AN INTRODUCTORY LOGIC
 
 AN 
 
 INTRODUCTORY LOGIC 
 
 BY 
 
 JAMES EDWIN CREIGHTON 
 
 NEW EDITION', REVISED AND CORRECTED 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 LONDON : MACMILLAN & CO., LTD. 
 I9O6 
 
 All rights reserved
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1898, 1900, 
 BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 
 
 Set up and electrotyped September, 1898. Reprinted July, 
 1899. New Edition, Revised and Corrected, March, 1900 ; 
 April, October, 1901 ; July, 1902 ! February, 1903 ; February, 
 August, 1904; January, October, 1905; September, 1906.
 
 Staek 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 THIS volume is intended primarily as a text-book for 
 college students, and grew out of my lectures on Logic 
 to undergraduate classes in Cornell University. It 
 aims at being both practical and theoretical. In spite of 
 the obvious deficiencies of formal Logic as a theory of 
 the nature of thought, I am convinced that it is one 
 of the most valuable instruments in modern education 
 for promoting clear thinking, and for developing criti- 
 cal habits of mind. J. S. Mill, speaking in the Auto- 
 biography of the discipline which he received from 
 working logical exercises, expresses the following 
 opinion : " I am persuaded that nothing, in modern 
 education, tends so much, when properly used, to form 
 exact thinkers, who attach a precise meaning to words 
 and propositions, and are not imposed on by vague, 
 loose, or ambiguous terms." Although in treating the 
 syllogistic Logic I have followed to a large extent the 
 ordinary mode of presentation, I have both here, and 
 when dealing with the Inductive Methods, endeavoured 
 to interpret the traditional doctrines in a philosophical 
 way, and to prepare for the theoretical discussions of 
 the third part of the book. 
 
 The advisability of attempting to include a theory of 
 thought, or philosophy of knowledge, even in outline,
 
 Vi PREFACE 
 
 in an elementary course in Logic, may at first sight 
 appear doubtful. It seems to me, however, that this 
 inclusion is not only justifiable, but even necessary at 
 the present time. Psychology is no longer a ' philoso- 
 phy of mind ' ; but, under the influence of experimental 
 methods, has differentiated itself almost entirely from 
 philosophy, and become a ' natural ' science. As a 
 natural science, it is interested in the structure of the 
 mental life, the characteristics of the elementary 
 processes, and the laws of their combination, and 
 not primarily in the function which ideas play in giving 
 us knowledge. It is clear that psychology does not 
 undertake to describe all that mind is and does. It 
 belongs to Logic to investigate intelligence as a know- 
 ing function, just as it is the task of Ethics to deal 
 -with the practical or active mental functions. 
 
 The practical question still remains as to whether 
 this side of Logic can be made profitable to students 
 who have had no previous philosophical training. I 
 am well aware of the difficulty of the subject, but my 
 own experience leads me to believe that the main con- 
 ceptions of modern logical theory can be rendered 
 intelligible even to elementary classes. Of the incom- 
 pleteness and shortcomings of my treatment I am quite 
 conscious ; but I have endeavoured to make the matter 
 as simple and concrete as possible, and to illustrate it 
 by means of familiar facts of experience, 
 
 For a number of the practical questions and exer- 
 cises, I am indebted to Professor Margaret Washburn 
 of Wells College ; others are original, or have been 
 collected in the course of my reading. I have also
 
 PREFACE vii 
 
 taken a number of arguments from the examination 
 papers of different universities, and from various works 
 on Logic, especially from Jevons's Studies in Deductive 
 Logic, from the little volume entitled Questions on Logic 
 by Holman and Irvine (2d ed., London, 1897), and from 
 Hibben's Inductive Logic. 
 
 In writing the book, I have been under obligation to 
 a large number of writers and books. My heaviest 
 debt is doubtless to Bosanquet, and perhaps next in 
 order I am under obligations to Mill, Jevons, Sigwart, 
 and Bradley. I have also derived help from Minto's 
 Logic, Deductive and Inductive, the chapter on ' Rea- 
 soning' in James's Principles of Psychology, J. H. Hys- 
 lop's Elements of Logic, and from other works to which 
 reference is made throughout the book. 
 
 My colleagues in the Sage School of Philosophy 
 have kindly aided me from time to time with advice 
 and encouragement, and I have also received valuable 
 suggestions from other teachers of Logic with whom I 
 have talked and corresponded. In particular, I wish 
 to express my obligations to my former colleague, Pro- 
 fessor James Seth, who read nearly all of the book in 
 manuscript, and to Dr. Albert Lefevre, who kindly 
 assisted me in reading the proofs. 
 
 J. E. C. 
 
 CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 
 August, 1898.
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 THE STANDPOINT AND PROBLEM OF LOGIC 
 
 PACK 
 
 I. Definition of the Subject I 
 
 2. Relation to Psychology 4 
 
 3. Logic as a Science and an Art 8 
 
 4. The Material of Logic 13 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 IMPORTANT STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
 
 5. The Logic of the Greeks : Aristotle 1 8 
 
 6. Logic during the Middle Ages 26 
 
 7. The Logic of Bacon 28 
 
 8. Logic since the Time of Bacon 29 
 
 PART I. THE SYLLOGISM 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS PARTS 
 
 9. The Nature of the Syllogism 
 
 10. The Parts of the Syllogism 
 
 n. The Proposed Division of Mental Operations . . . 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TERMS 
 
 12. Singular, General, and Collective Terms . . 
 
 13. Abstract and Concrete Terms . > . , . .. .
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 14. Positive and Negative Terms 52 
 
 15. Absolute and Relative Terms 54 
 
 1 6. Extension and Intension of Terms 55 
 
 ' CHAPTER V 
 DEFINITION AND DIVISION 
 
 17. Fixing the Meaning of Terms 61 
 
 18. Definition 63 
 
 19. Division . . .'.''. 71 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 PROPOSITIONS 
 
 20. The Nature of a Proposition 78 
 
 .21. The Quality and Quantity of Propositions . . . .80 
 
 22. Difficulties in Classification 83 
 
 23. Formal Relation of Subject and Predicate .... 85 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 24. The So-called Process of Immediate Inference ... 92 
 
 25. The Opposition of Propositions 94 
 
 26. The Obversion of Propositions 98 
 
 27. The Conversion of Propositions loo 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE SYLLOGISM 
 
 28. The Nature of Syllogistic Reasoning 105 
 
 29. The Rules of the Syllogism 108 
 
 30. The Figures of the Syllogism . ... . ."3 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 THE VALID MOODS AND THE REDUCTION OF FIGURES 
 
 31. The Moods of the Syllogism . . . . . . . 115 
 
 32. The Special Canons of the Four Figures . . . . 1 1 7 
 
 33. The Determination of the Valid Moods in Each of the Figures 120 
 
 34. The Mnemonic Lines 122
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xi 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 ABBREVIATED AND IRREGULAR FORMS OF ARGUMENT 
 
 PAGE 
 
 35. Enthymemes 126 
 
 36. Episyllogisms and Prosyllogisms . . . . . . 127 
 
 37. Sorites, or Chains of Reasoning . . . . . .129 
 
 38. Irregular Arguments . . . . . . . .132 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
 39. The Hypothetical Syllogism 136 
 
 40. Relation of Categorical and Hypothetical Arguments . .139 
 
 41. Disjunctive Arguments ' . . 145 
 
 42. The Dilemma . 148 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 43. Classification of Fallacies . . . . . . 
 
 44. Errors in Interpretation ....... 
 
 45. Formal Fallacies 
 
 46. Material Fallacies 
 
 PART II. INDUCTIVE METHODS 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION. OBSERVATION AND EXPLANATION 
 
 47. The Problem of Induction 172 
 
 48. Observation . . . . ~ 176 
 
 49. Explanation . . 182 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 METHODS OF OBSERVATION. ENUMERATION AND STATISTICS 
 
 50. Enumeration or Simple Counting . . . . . . 185 
 
 51. Statistics and Statistical Methods . . . . . . 189. 
 
 52. The Calculation of Chances . . . . . . .194
 
 xii TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 METHODS OF OBSERVATION. DETERMINATION OF CAUSAL 
 RELATIONS 
 
 fAGB 
 
 53. Mill's Experimental Methods 198 
 
 54. The Method of Agreement 200 
 
 55. The Method of Difference 205 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 METHODS OF OBSERVATION. DETERMINATION OF CAUSAL 
 RELATIONS (continued} 
 
 56. The Joint Method of Agreement and Difference . . . 209 
 57. The Method of Concomitant Variations . . . . .211 
 58. The. Method of Residues 213 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 METHODS OF EXPLANATION. ANALOGY 
 
 59. Explanation by Analogy 219 
 
 60. Analogy as Suggestive of Explanatory Hypotheses . . 223 
 6l. The Incompleteness of Analogical Reasoning . . . 226 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 METHODS OF EXPLANATION. THE USE OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 62. Reasoning from Hypotheses 230 
 
 63. The Formation of Hypotheses 234 
 
 64. The Proof of an Hypothesis 237 
 
 65. Requirements of a Good Hypothesis 240 
 
 . CHAPTER XIX 
 
 FALLACIES OF INDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 66. The Source of Fallacy 
 
 67. Fallacies due to the Careless Use of Language 
 
 68. Errors of Observation 
 
 69. Mistakes in Reasoning ....... 
 
 70. Fallacies due to Individual Prepossessions . '-. .;.-/.> ' ,
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii 
 
 PART III. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT 
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 JUDGMENT AS THE ELEMENTARY PROCESS OF THOUGHT 
 
 PAGE 
 
 71. Thinking the Process by which Knowledge grows or develops 260 
 
 72. The Law of Evolution and its Application to Logic . . 262 
 
 73' Judgment as the Starting-point ...... 266 
 
 74. Concepts and Judgment . . . . . . . 268 
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGMENT 
 
 75. The Universality of Judgments 274 
 
 76. The Necessity of Judgments 276 
 
 77. Judgment involves both Analysis and Synthesis . . . 279 
 
 78. Judgment as constructing a System of Knowledge . . 284 
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 
 
 79. The Law of Identity 288 
 
 80. The Law of Contradiction 295 
 
 81. The Law of Excluded Middle 297 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 TYPES OF JUDGMENT 
 
 82. Judgments of Quality 300 
 
 83. Judgments of Quantity 304 
 
 84. Judgments of Causal Connection 307 
 
 85. Judgments of Individuality 315 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV 
 THE NATURE OF INFERENCE. INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 
 
 86. Judgment and Inference 318 
 
 87. The Nature .of Inference 324 
 
 88. Induction and Deduction ....... 329
 
 xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XXV 
 RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL THEORIES 
 
 PAGE 
 
 89. The Point of View of Rationalism 335 
 
 90. The Doctrine of Empiricism 337 
 
 91. Reasoning from Particular ta Particular .... 340 
 
 92. Reasoning from Particulars to a Universal .... 344 
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 348 
 
 INDEX 389
 
 AN INTRODUCTORY LOGIC
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE STANDPOINT AND PROBLEM OF LOGIC 
 
 i. Definition of the Subject. Logic may be defined 
 as the science of thought, or as the science which in- 
 vestigates the process of thinking. Every one knows, 
 in a general way at least, what is meant by think- 
 ing, and has noticed more or less consciously some 
 of its peculiarities. Thinking is the intellectual act by 
 means of which knowledge is obtained. We do not 
 really know any fact until we think it ; that is, until the 
 mind sets it in its proper relation to the other parts of 
 its experience, and thus comes to understand its true 
 meaning. We make a distinction, for example, between 
 what has come to us through report or hearsay, and 
 conclusions which we have reached by our own think- 
 ing. ' I have heard,' we say, ' that A is dishonest, but 
 I do not know it.' That is, this fact has not been 
 reached as a result of our own thinking, and cannot 
 therefore claim the title of knowledge. On the other 
 hand, that the earth is round, is not a mere matter of 
 hearsay for an educated man. It is a piece of know- 
 ledge, because it is a conclusion which he has reached 
 by thinking, or by putting together various facts for 
 himself. 
 
 B I
 
 2 THE STANDPOINT AND PROBLEM OF LOGIC 
 
 Logic, then, in dealing with thinking, is concerned 
 with the process by which knowledge is obtained. In 
 defining it as a science, we mean that it seeks to sub- 
 stitute exact and systematic knowledge regarding the 
 nature of thought for the popular notions to be found 
 in everyday life. Like all the sciences, logic has to 
 correct and supplement ordinary knowledge. It is its 
 mission to help us to understand more exactly and 
 completely the way in which thinking goes on, and 
 to discover the laws which are followed in gaining 
 knowledge. 
 
 But it is also the business of a science to system- 
 atize facts. Logic, then, cannot content itself with a 
 mere description of this or that kind of thinking, in 
 isolation from other ways in which we think. It must 
 also deal with the way in which the various kinds of 
 thinking are related. For example, we apply such 
 terms as 'conception,' 'judgment,' 'induction,' and 'de- 
 duction ' to different intellectual operations, and give 
 the distinguishing characteristic in each case. But it is 
 necessary as well to understand how these processes 
 are related. Since all thinking has one end, the dis- 
 covery of truth, the various intellectual operations must 
 mutually cooperate and assist in this result. All of 
 the logical processes, then, stand in relation to one 
 another. They are all parts of the one intelligence, 
 though they may well represent different stages or 
 steps in its work of obtaining knowledge. It becomes 
 the business of logic, then, to show us the organic 
 structure of thought. In other words, it must furnish 
 a comprehensive view of the way in which intelligence
 
 i. DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT 3 
 
 acts, and the part which processes like ' conception,' 
 'judgment,' 'induction,' etc., play. 
 
 (1) The word 'logic 1 is derived from the adjective corresponding 
 to the Greek noun Aoyos, which signifies either a complete thought, 
 or a word as the expression of that thought. The singular form of 
 the adjective Aoyuo/, from which the English word is derived, was 
 supposed to qualify either eTrtoT??/^ as applying to the theoretical 
 science of logic, or re'xv?? as referring to the practical application 
 of its rules and as affording guidance in the art of correct reason- 
 ing. We shall have to raise the question in a subsequent section 
 how far it is possible to regard logic as an art, or a system of rules 
 which teach us how to reason correctly. 
 
 (2) We have defined logic as the science of the operations and 
 processes of thought, or as the science of thinking. It is evident, 
 however, that this definition does not carry us very far unless we 
 know what thinking means. And to gain a clearer idea of this com- 
 mon term may be said to be the problem of logic. This is, however, 
 by no means as easy a task as may at first appear. Familiar words 
 and phrases often conceal difficulties. They are constantly repeated 
 without reflection, and this very frequency of repetition is likely 
 to prevent us from trying to gain any clear ideas regarding the 
 nature of the objects which they denote. It is only when we 
 become discontented with our knowledge regarding any subject, 
 when doubts arise whether we really understand the meaning of 
 the words which we use, that we attempt to make our knowledge 
 scientific, i.e., to gain clear, definite, and systematic ideas. This 
 can perhaps be made clearer by considering the main differences 
 between an educated and an uneducated man. The educated man 
 has, of course, a great deal more information than the other, and 
 his knowledge is more definite and systematic. But a second and 
 more important distinction is found in the attitude of mind which 
 education begets. The educated man is desirous of knowing more, 
 because he is sensible of his own ignorance. The uneducated 
 man, on the other hand, supposes that he knows all about things 
 whose names are familiar to him. He can settle puzzling theo- 
 logical or political problems off-hand in a way which is per*
 
 4 THE STANDPOINT AND PROBLEM OF LOGIC 
 
 fectly satisfactory to himself, without study, and almost without 
 reflection. 
 
 It is clear that no intellectual salvation is possible for a man so 
 long as he remains in this state of mind. A sense of one's own 
 ignorance is the beginning of wisdom. Socrates, one of the great 
 pioneers of science among the Greeks, and especially of the sciences 
 of logic and ethics, was so firmly convinced of this that he made it 
 the business of his life to go about the streets of Athens and con- 
 vince those " who thought they were wise and were not wise," of 
 their ignorance. " And because I did this," he says naively, " many 
 of them were angry, and became my enemies." 
 
 2. Relation to Psychology. It may aid us in 
 obtaining a clearer view of what thinking is, if we 
 compare the general standpoint of logic with that of 
 psychology. Both of these sciences deal with what 
 goes on in mind or consciousness, and are thus opposed 
 to the so-called objective sciences, which are all con- 
 cerned with some group or field of external facts. But 
 in spite of this agreement, there is an important dis- 
 tinction between logic and psychology. In the first 
 place, psychology deals with all that there is in mind. 
 It describes pleasures and pains, acts of will, and the 
 association of ideas, as well as what is usually called 
 logical thinking. But logic does not differ from psy- 
 chology simply by being less inclusive than the latter. 
 It is true that, from the standpoint of psychology, the 
 thought-process is merely a part of the mental content, 
 which has to be analyzed and described like anything 
 else which goes .on in consciousness. Thinking has 
 doubtless for psychology peculiar marks or charac- 
 teristics which distinguish it from other related pro- 
 cesses like those of association; but when these have
 
 2. RELATION TO PSYCHOLOGY 5 
 
 been found, and the psychological description of think- 
 ing is complete, the question with which logic deals has 
 not yet been raised. For logic, as we shall see pres- 
 ently, adopts a different standpoint, and investigates 
 with a different end in view. 
 
 The important difference is this : In psychology we 
 are interested in the content of consciousness for its 
 own sake, and just as it stands. We try to find out 
 what actually goes on in our minds, and to describe it 
 just as we should any event which occurs in the exter- 
 nal world. But in logic the question is not : What are 
 mental processes ? but rather : What knowledge do 
 they give us, and is this knowledge true or false? 
 Logic, in other words, does not regard the way in 
 which ideas exist, and is not interested in them for 
 what they are, but rather in the purpose which they sub- 
 serve in affording us knowledge of something beyond 
 themselves. Psychology, in its description of conscious 
 states, inquires regarding their quality, intensity, dura- 
 tion, etc., and the ways in which they combine with 
 each other to form complex ideas. The problem with 
 which logic is concerned, on the other hand, has refer- 
 ence to the value of ideas when they are taken to 
 represent facts in the real world. In other words, the 
 question which logic raises is not regarding the actual 
 character of ideas as existing processes, but regarding 
 their value or significance as pieces of knowledge. 
 
 (i) The relation between logic and psychology may perhaps be 
 illustrated by referring to that which exists between morphology 
 and physiology. Morphology deals with the form and structure 
 of living organisms, and physiology with the various acts and func-
 
 tions which these organisms discharge. Thus we speak of the 
 former as the science of form or structure, and of the latter as the 
 science of function. In the same way, psychology may be said to 
 deal with the actual structure of mental processes, and logic with 
 the part which they play in giving us knowledge. 
 
 It must be noticed, however, that this is a distinction made for 
 purposes of investigation, and does not denote that structure and 
 function have nothing to do with each other. On the contrary, 
 some knowledge of the function is often necessary in order to under- 
 stand the structure of an organ ; and, on the other hand, it is usually 
 true that the nature of a function only becomes completely intelligi- 
 ble when the character of the mechanism with which it works is 
 known. And the same holds true, I think, of the relations between 
 psychology and logic. Although it has been found profitable when 
 dealing with consciousness, as in the biological realm, to investigate 
 the nature of structure and function separately, yet here, as there, 
 the two lines of inquiry cross each other ; for it is beyond question 
 that the knowledge we obtain by thinking is largely dependent upon 
 the character (quality, intensity, etc. ) of the actual processes in con- 
 sciousness. To understand the nature of a logical idea, then, it is 
 often necessary to refer to the psychological facts and their actual 
 mode of behaviour. And it is equally true that one cannot carry 
 on a psychological investigation into the nature of mental processes 
 without taking account, to some extent, of the part which they play 
 in giving us knowledge. No psychology is able to take ideas simply 
 as existing conscious processes to which no further meaning or 
 importance attaches ; it is only with reference to the function they 
 perform as knowing states that their own peculiar character can be 
 understood. In other words, the intellectual activities and purposes 
 of mind must be presupposed in psychology, though this science, for 
 the most part, goes its way as if the ideas were not cognitive at all. 
 At least this seems to be true of the 'new' or experimental psy- 
 chology as opposed to the philosophies of mind. 
 
 (2) It would of course be presumptuous, as well as utterly useless, 
 for any writer to draw a hard and fast line between logic and psy- 
 chology, and to forbid others to overstep it. In attempting to dis-
 
 2. RELATION TO PSYCHOLOGY 7 
 
 cover the dividing line between two closely related sciences one 
 must be guided by the procedure of those who are working in the 
 fields which it is proposed to divide. Now, it must be admitted that 
 by no means all of the recent writers in psychology limit the sphere 
 of their science in the way above described ; that is, there are 
 certain psychologists who do not confine their attention to the mere 
 mental processes as such, but include in their investigations the fur- 
 ther problem regarding the part which these processes play in giving 
 us knowledge. Thus in Professor James's Principles of Psychology 
 there is an excellent chapter on ' Reasoning' which certainly con- 
 tains as much logical as psychological matter. In the same way, 
 one finds problems of knowledge discussed in the psychological 
 writings of Professor Ladd, and also, to some extent, in the recent 
 work by Mr. Stout entitled Analytic Psychology. In spite of this, 
 it is evident that the tendency of the ' new, 1 or laboratory psy- 
 chology, is towards a sharper differentiation of its problems from 
 those of logic. The ' natural science of psychology ' is interested 
 in the conscious process as an event in time with certain defi- 
 nitely ascertainable characteristics. It is perhaps not a matter of 
 great moment whether the name 'psychology' be limited to this 
 kind of inquiry, or whether philosophical inquiries regarding the 
 nature of knowledge be also included under it. I have assumed, 
 however, in this section, that psychology is now being differentiated 
 from the more general inquiries regarding the nature of mind, and 
 that it has taken for its field of investigation the nature of mental 
 processes regarded merely as mental processes. 
 
 Consider a little further the nature of the ideas with 
 which logic deals. Every idea, as we have seen, not 
 only exists in some definite fashion in some particular 
 consciousness, connected with certain other ideas, and 
 with a definite quality, intensity, etc., but it has a mean- 
 ing or significance as a piece of knowledge. It not 
 only is something, but it also stands for or signifies 
 something. Now it is not with the existence, but with
 
 8 THE STANDPOINT AND PROBLEM OF LOGIC 
 
 the meaning side of ideas that logic has to do. A 
 logical idea, or piece of knowledge, is not merely a 
 modification of consciousness which exists in the mind 
 of some individual at a particular time. For example, 
 the proposition : ' The three angles of a triangle are 
 equal to two right angles,' will give rise to a number 
 of definite psychological processes (probably auditory 
 or visual in character) in the mind of any individual. 
 These processes would also probably differ in character 
 in the case of two persons. The meaning of the propo- 
 sition, however, is distinct from the definite processes 
 which arise in particular minds. The proposition has 
 a significance as an objective fact, or piece of know- 
 ledge, outside my mind ; the psychological images or 
 processes may differ for different persons, but the fact 
 expressed is the same for all minds and at all times. 
 
 $ 3. Logic as a Science and an Art. We have de- 
 fined logic as the science of thought, but it has often 
 been pointed out that there are equally strong reasons 
 for considering it to be an art. Jevons makes the 
 distinction between a science and an art very clear by 
 saying that " a science teaches us to know, and an art 
 to do." A science is interested in the discovery of facts 
 and laws without any thought of what use may be made 
 of this knowledge; an art, on the contrary, gives practi- 
 cal guidance and direction for some course of action. 
 The question before us, then, is this : Does logic merely 
 give us knowledge about the ways in which we think, 
 or does it also help us to think rightly ? 
 
 Before we attempt to answer this question, we must
 
 3. LOGIC AS A SCIENCE AND AN ART 9 
 
 note that practical rules of action are based upon sci- 
 entific knowledge. An art, in other words, depends 
 upon science, and grows in perfection with the advance 
 of scientific knowledge. Thus medicine, as the art of 
 healing, is founded upon the sciences of chemistry, 
 physiology, and anatomy, and it is because of the great 
 discoveries which have been made in these fields within 
 recent years, that it has been able to advance with such 
 gigantic strides. Again, the art of singing, in so far as 
 it is an art which can be taught and learned, depends 
 upon a knowledge of the physical and physiological 
 laws of the vocal organs. An art, then, always pre- 
 supposes a certain amount of science, or knowledge, 
 and is simply the application of this knowledge to some 
 practical purpose. In some cases the application is 
 very obvious and direct; in others, it is much more 
 difficult to determine ; but, in general, there is always 
 this relation between theory and practice, between 
 knowing and doing. 
 
 From what has been already said, it will be evident 
 that logic must first be a science before it can become 
 an art. Its first business must be to investigate the 
 nature of thought, and to attempt to discover the differ- 
 ent forms which the latter assumes in the course of its 
 development. So that we were right in defining it as 
 primarily a science. But the further question remains: 
 How far is it possible to apply the laws of logic after 
 they have been discovered in such a way as to obtain 
 directions how to reason correctly in every case ? Can 
 we not apply our knowledge of the laws of thought in 
 such a way as to get a complete art of reasoning, just as
 
 10 THE STANDPOINT AND PROBLEM OF LOGIC 
 
 the laws of chemistry and biology are applied in medi- 
 cine ? 
 
 It is no doubt true in logic, as everywhere, that scien- 
 tific knowledge is capable of practical application. But 
 I do not think that logic can be regarded as an art, in 
 the sense that it furnishes a definite set of rules for 
 thinking correctly. There is an important distinction 
 in this case which must not be left out of account. The 
 physical, and even the biological sciences, deal with 
 things whose way of acting is perfectly definite and 
 uniform. The character of any of the physiological 
 functions, as, e.g., digestion, may be comparatively com- 
 plex and difficult to determine, but it always attains its 
 end through the use of the same means. When once its 
 laws are understood, it is not difficult to prescribe just 
 how the proper means may always be secured for the 
 attainment of the desired end. But thinking has much 
 more flexibility in its way of acting. We cannot say 
 with the same definiteness as in the cases we have been 
 considering, that in order to reach a certain end we must 
 use a definite set of means. It is not possible, that is, 
 to say : If you would learn what is true about this sub- 
 ject, you must follow this rule and that in your thinking. 
 Logic, it seems to me, cannot be regarded as an art like 
 photography, or even like medicine ; for it is not possible 
 to lay down definite rules for the guidance of thinking 
 in every case. What we can do, is to show the method 
 by which new truths have been discovered, and the 
 general conditions which must always be fulfilled in 
 reasoning correctly. And it is also possible to point 
 out the more common errors which arise when these
 
 3. LOGIC AS A SCIENCE AND AN ART 1 1 
 
 conditions are violated. But it is beyond the power of 
 logic to formulate any definite set of rules for the 
 guidance of thinking in every case. 
 
 We have found that we must give up all extravagant hopes 
 of the practical advantages to be gained from a study of logic. 
 There is no set of rules which will make us infallible reasoners. 
 That being admitted, the question may be raised as to the utility of 
 the study. What will it profit us to devote ourselves to this subject? 
 It might be a sufficient answer to point out that this question pre- 
 supposes that knowledge has always some ulterior motive. The 
 assumption upon which it is based is, in other words, that the prac- 
 tical advantages arising from any study furnish the only justification 
 for undertaking it. But it is scarcely necessary to say that this is not 
 an attitude which any student should adopt. A student is one who 
 prosecutes a study for its own sake, with no other motive than the 
 desire to know. And to such a person logic should not be without 
 interest. For as we have seen, it is an inquiry into the nature of 
 intelligence. Its results, therefore, are not in themselves less in- 
 teresting or less important than a knowledge of the various forms 
 of geological formation, or of plant or animal life. " If it is re- 
 garded as a valuable achievement," says Hegel, " to have discovered 
 sixty odd species of parrot, a hundred and thirty-seven species of 
 veronica, and so forth, it should surely be held a far more valuable 
 achievement to discover the forms of reason." 1 
 
 The necessity of devoting oneself to a science quite 
 unselfishly cannot be too strongly enjoined, nor the evils 
 which arise when one begins a study greedy ' for quick 
 returns of profit,' too often emphasized. Nevertheless, 
 since the question has been raised, it would not be just 
 to refuse altogether to speak of the particular results 
 
 1 Hegel, Werke, Bd. V., p. 139. Quoted by Bosanquet at the beginning 
 of his work on Logic.
 
 12 THE STANDPOINT AND PROBLEM OF LOGIC 
 
 arising from a study of logic. As we have seen, we 
 cannot hope to become infallible reasoners by its aid. 
 It is just as true here as in any other field, however, 
 that knowledge is power, and ignorance synonymous 
 with weakness. For even if one resolves never to look 
 inside a logic book, one must nevertheless have some 
 theory, or act upon some principle it may be quite 
 unconsciously in deciding what is true and what is 
 false. For instance, a man may act upon the principles 
 that those things are likely to be true which are favour- 
 able to his own interests, or which agree with his own 
 prejudices, or with the articles of his church or political 
 party. Or again, he may regard his senses as the 
 standards of truth. Mr. Bradley says that if dogs 
 reason, they proceed upon the principle, ' what smells, 
 exists, and what does not smell does not exist.' It is not 
 uncommon to hear it announced : What can be perceived 
 through the senses is true ; what cannot be sensed, or is 
 contrary to the testimony of the senses, is an absurdity. 
 This was the standard of truth adopted, for example, by 
 those who attempted to overthrow the Copernican theory 
 by declaring it to be in plain contradiction to the tes- 
 timony of the senses. 
 
 It seems evident, therefore, that intellectual beings 
 cannot escape some kind of logical theory, whether they 
 hold" it consciously or unconsciously. It is clear, too, 
 that the character of this theory will determine to a 
 great extent their thoughts and opinions. The only 
 question which remains is whether it is better to 
 leave this matter entirely to chance, or to attempt to 
 gain some clear ideas regarding the nature of thinking,
 
 4- THE MATERIAL OF LOGIC 13 
 
 and the conditions under which knowledge arises. It 
 can scarcely be doubted that, even from a practical point 
 of view, a true theory is better than a false one. A 
 man who has reflected upon the nature of proof, and the 
 principles of reasoning, is much less likely to be deceived 
 than one who is guided unconsciously by assumptions 
 which he has never examined. It is always an advan- 
 tage to know exactly the nature of the result at which 
 we are aiming, and to be perfectly clear as to our own 
 purposes. And this is just what a study of logic aids 
 us in attaining. It helps us to understand the structure 
 of knowledge and conditions of proof. Moreover, it 
 engenders the habit of criticising propositions, and ex- 
 amining the evidence upon which they rest. Further, 
 the importance of this study for a theory of education 
 may well be emphasized. For education, at least so 
 far as it undertakes to train the knowing powers of 
 the individual, must be based upon a knowledge of the 
 necessary laws of intelligence, and of the steps or stages 
 which it passes through in its process of development. 
 
 4. The Material of Logic. The business of logic, 
 as we have seen, is to discover the laws of thought and 
 to show the differences which exist between real and 
 imaginary knowledge. Where now shall we find the 
 materials for this study ? Where are the facts which 
 are to be taken as a starting point ? It is, of course, 
 impossible to learn directly from one's own conscious- 
 ness all that thinking is, or everything of which it is 
 capable. For, quite apart from the difficulty of observ- 
 ing the process of thought while it is actually going on,
 
 14 THE STANDPOINT AND PROBLEM OF LOGIC 
 
 no one can suppose that his own mind furnishes an 
 example of all that thinking has done, or can do. It is 
 necessary to take a broader view, arid learn how other 
 men think. Of course, we cannot look into the con- 
 sciousness of other men, but we can study the products 
 and results of their thoughts. The history of the way 
 in which truth has been discovered is of the greatest 
 importance for logic. It must not be forgotten that 
 thought is not a thing which can be described once for 
 all. It is rather a living activity, which is constantly 
 showing what it is in what it does. The history of the 
 various sciences furnishes a record of the steps by means 
 of which thought has built up knowledge. And, in this 
 record, we have also a revelation of the nature of the 
 thinking process itself, and of the stages through which 
 it has passed in the course of its development. 
 
 It is by a reflection, then, upon the nature of proposi- 
 tions which are universally regarded as true that the 
 laws of logic are obtained. There is always a permanent 
 body of knowledge which no one thinks of calling in 
 question. Both in everyday knowledge, and in the 
 sciences, there is always found a great number of propo- 
 sitions which appear true to everybody. And it is here 
 that logic finds its material. Taking the facts and propo- 
 sitions which are recognized as certain by everybody, 
 logic examines their structure in order to learn about 
 the nature of the intellectual processes by which they 
 have been discovered. What principles, it asks, are 
 involved in those pieces of knowledge, and what partic- 
 ular acts of thought were necessary to discover them ? 
 It is only by examining various pieces of knowledge
 
 4- THE MATERIAL OF LOGIC 15 
 
 in this way, and attempting to trace out the conditions 
 of their discovery, that one can learn anything new 
 regarding the laws and character of thought. In other 
 words, there is no way of learning about thinking ex- 
 cept by studying what it has done. The best way of 
 getting information about what thought can do, is to 
 study what it has already accomplished. 
 
 Every piece of knowledge, as the product of thinking, is to some 
 extent a revelation of the nature of intelligence. But scientific 
 knowledge by this I mean the results of the philosophical and 
 historical sciences as well as of the so-called natural sciences^ 
 exhibits perhaps most clearly the nature of thought. For the 
 history of these sciences enables us to see the process of know- 
 ledge, as it were, in the making. In tracing the history of philo- 
 sophical and scientific ideas, we are at the same time following 
 the laws of the development of thought. It is this fact which 
 makes the history of philosophy and of the various sciences so 
 instructive. It was with this object in view, to take but a single 
 example, that Whewell wrote his famous History of the Inductive 
 Sciences. He was interested, that is, not so much in the mere facts 
 and names with which he dealt, as in showing the nature of thinking 
 and the methods which had been employed in gaining a knowledge 
 of the world. This is made very clear in the introduction to another 
 work of Whewell from which I quote : " We may best hope to 
 understand the nature and conditions of real knowledge by studying 
 the nature and conditions of the most certain knowledge which we 
 possess ; and we are most likely to learn the best methods of discov- 
 ering truth by examining how truths, now universally recognized, 
 have really been discovered. Now there do exist among us doc- 
 trines of solid and acknowledged merit certainly, and truths of which 
 the discovery has been received with universal applause. These 
 constitute what we commonly term sciences ; and of these bodies of 
 exact and enduring knowledge we have within our reach so large a 
 collection that we may hope to examine them and the history of
 
 1 6 THE STANDPOINT AND PROBLEM OF LOGIC 
 
 their formation with a good prospect of deriving from the study such 
 instruction as we need seek." 1 
 
 We have been insisting that the materials for the 
 study of logic are to be found mainly in the records 
 which we possess of what thinking has actually accom- 
 plished. Our own consciousness, it was said, can supply 
 but a very small quantity of material. To learn what 
 thinking is, one must have as broad a survey as possible 
 of its achievements. 
 
 But there is another side to the matter. It must never 
 be forgotten that it is the actual operations of thought 
 with which logic is concerned. The words and proposi- 
 tions which express the results of thinking must never be 
 allowed to take the place of the thoughts themselves. 
 Now, we cannot directly study the thoughts of any other 
 individual. It is only in so far as we interpret, through 
 our own consciousness, the records of what thinking has 
 done, that these records are able to throw any light 
 upon the problem of logic. So in this study, as else- 
 where, we must find the key to the material in our own 
 consciousness. If we are to gain any real ideas of the 
 character of the thinking processes by means of which 
 the sciences have been built up, we must reproduce 
 these in our own minds. One's own consciousness 
 must after all furnish the key which makes intel- 
 ligible the account of the various steps which the 
 thought of mankind has taken in building up science 
 or knowledge. 
 
 1 Whewell, History of Scientific Ideas, 3d ed., Vol. I., p. 4.
 
 4- THE MATERIAL OF LOGIC I/ 
 
 References 
 
 The following references may be given in connection with 
 I and 2 : 
 
 C. Sigwart, Logic, Vol. I., General Introduction. 
 F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, pp. i-io. 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I., Introduction. 
 
 H. L. Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, Chap. I. 
 R. Adamson, The first part of the article ' Logic ' in the Encyclo- 
 pedia Britannica. 
 
 D. G. Ritchie, The Relation of Logic to Psychology, Philos. 
 Review, Vol. V., pp. 585-600, Vol. VI., pp. 1-17.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 IMPORTANT STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
 
 5. The Logic of the Greeks : Aristotle. In the 
 fourth and fifth centuries before Christ, a great interest 
 in debate and public controversy sprang up in Athens. 
 There were several reasons for this. In the first place, 
 the Athenians of this period were a very acute and intel- 
 lectual people ; they therefore required some outlet for 
 their mental activities. The various sciences of nature 
 which occupy so much of the thought of the modern 
 world did not exist at that time, nor did the interest exist 
 which was necessary to create them. For although the 
 Greeks of this period had the greatest love and rever- 
 ence for nature, their interest in natural objects was 
 rather like that of the poet and the artist, than that of 
 the modern man of science ; in other words, they were 
 content to enjoy the beauty of natural objects, and to 
 take delight in the harmonies of sound and color which 
 their senses presented to them. They had no desire to 
 pull things to pieces to see how they are made, or to 
 discover the laws according to which they act, and so 
 their mental energy and mental acuteness found its 
 chief outlet in argumentative controversy, and public 
 debating became one of their favourite diversions. The 
 Athenians of those days used to argue, from the pure 
 love of argument, wherever they met, in the market- 
 
 18
 
 5. THE LOGIC OF THE GREEKS 19 
 
 place, in the groves and gardens, and at their meals and 
 banquets. 
 
 There was in addition, however, a very practical 
 reason why it was necessary and desirable for one to 
 be able to argue well. A man of property in Athens 
 was constantly exposed to lawsuits, and was obliged to 
 be his own lawyer and defend his cause by pleading 
 before the judges. It was of the utmost practical 
 importance, then, that he should be able to state his 
 cause well, and should be master of all the arts by 
 which the judges would be likely to be influenced. 
 Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to under- 
 stand why the art of public speaking came to be 
 regarded in Athens as a necessary part of education. 
 And, in response to this demand, there arose a class of 
 teachers called Sophists, who made it their business to 
 instruct young men in all the practical affairs of life, 
 and especially in the art of public speaking, or rhetoric, 
 as it was called. The Sophists do not seem to have 
 made it their object to teach truth to their pupils, or 
 to inculcate in them a love and reverence for truth; 
 they rather sought to make those whom they taught 
 clever men of the world. In teaching the art of argu- 
 mentation or public speaking they did not seek to point 
 out the methods by which true conclusions could be 
 reached, but rather taught the arts by which the judges 
 could be persuaded, and tricks for the discomfiture of 
 one's adversary. The rhetoric of the Sophists, in other 
 words, was not a science of reasoning, but an art of 
 persuasion and of controversy. It was not necessary 
 to have any real knowledge of the subject under dis-
 
 2O DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
 
 cussion in order to argue well, but only to be well 
 versed in all the arts of persuasion, and quick to take 
 advantage of the omissions of an opponent. 
 
 The theory on which the teaching of the Sophists 
 was based is usually known as scepticism. The 
 Sophists, that is, had come to the conclusion that it 
 is impossible to find any fixed standard of truth. 
 Looking at the diversity of individual opinions and 
 of individual feelings, they declared that knowledge 
 or truth as something objective, or the same for all, 
 is an illusion. Only individual opinions exist; there is 
 no standard by reference to which these opinions may 
 be measured. It is impossible, then, to distinguish 
 false opinions from true. Indeed, the words ' truth ' 
 and ' falsehood ' can have no real meaning ; each indi- 
 vidual must be the measure of truth for himself. 
 
 Moreover, in the opinion of the Sophists, the same 
 state of things exists with regard to our moral ideas. 
 There is no standard of right and wrong, just as there 
 is no standard of truth and falsehood. Each man 
 has the right to choose what he regards as most 
 advantageous f or s_ himself. The traditional rules of 
 morality have no authority over the individual, nor is 
 it possible to discover any rules of morality which are 
 binding on all men. It is the part of wisdom to con- 
 sult one's own interest in acting, and to seek to secure 
 one's own advantage. Moral distinctions, like logical 
 distinctions, are purely relative and individual. 
 
 Socrates was the great opponent of the ethical scepti- 
 cism of the Sophists. They had concluded, from the 
 diversity of individual opinion on moral questions, that
 
 5- THE LOGIC OF THE GREEKS 21 
 
 there is no real or absolute distinction between right and 
 wrong. Socrates, however, was convinced that, if one ex- 
 amined more carefully the nature of the judgments which 
 men pass on matters of right and wrong, one would find 
 common elements or ideas. It is possible, he believed, 
 to find a fixed standard, both in matters of theory and in' 
 matters of practice. This common element, however, 
 is not to be discovered in sensation, nor in feelings of 
 pleasure and pain; these are purely individual, and 
 can never serve as a universal standard. But beneath 
 the diversity of sensation and feelings there is the 
 thought, or concept, which is common to all men. 
 When rational beings come to understand each other, 
 they must agree as to the nature of the fundamental 
 virtues, justice, temperance, courage, etc. It is true 
 that few men have thought about these matters, and 
 are able to express their meaning clearly ; but every 
 man, as a rational being, carries these fundamental 
 notions in his mind. Now, in order to refute the 
 moral scepticism of the Sophists (and it was this side 
 of their teaching which Socrates especially opposed), 
 it is necessary that the ethical notions, or concepts, 
 which are implicit in the minds of men shall be drawn 
 out and carefully defined. How is this to be accom- 
 plished? Socrates did not undertake to teach men 
 what ideas they should hold regarding the nature of 
 any of the virtues ; he rather made them partners 
 in an investigation, and by means of skilful questions 
 tried to assist them' in discovering the real nature of 
 goodness for themselves. Another point to be noticed 
 is that the definition of the various virtues was reached
 
 22 DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
 
 as a result of comparing the views of a number of 
 individuals. In this way, by comparing the opinions 
 of many men, of different professions, and of different 
 grades of society, he was able to separate what was 
 merely individual and relative in these opinions, from 
 what was unchanging and absolute. 
 
 Plato, the disciple of Socrates, continued the work 
 of his master. He did not confine his attention wholly 
 to the moral conceptions, but showed that the Socratic 
 method could also be used to refute the intellectual scep- 
 ticism of the Sophists. In other words, he proved that 
 in the concept, or thought, as opposed to sensation, a 
 standard of truth is to be found, as well as a standard 
 of morality. Knowledge arises from thinking, and it 
 is possible to compare our thoughts, however impossi- 
 ble it may be to find any basis of comparison in our 
 sensations. 
 
 Plato's disciple, Aristotle, is of great importance in 
 the history of logic. He undertook a thorough investi- 
 gation of the process of reasoning, and sought to show 
 what conditions and principles are necessarily involved 
 in reaching certainty. Aristotle was thus the founder of 
 logic, as well as of psychology, zoology, and a number 
 of other sciences. His most important logical works 
 are the Categories, De Interpretation, Prior Analytics, 
 Posterior Analytics, Topics, and the Sophistical Elenchns, 
 a treatise on Fallacies. These writings came after- 
 wards to be known as the Organon (or scientific instru- 
 ment) of Aristotle. They contained, in the first place, 
 what we call theory of knowledge (a discussion of the 
 structure of knowledge, and of the scientific principles
 
 s- THE LOGIC OF THE GREEKS 23 
 
 upon which it rests), which formed an essential part of 
 Aristotle's philosophical system. But they also fur- 
 nished the practical application of these principles. In 
 his doctrine of the syllogism, which is found mainly in 
 the Prior Analytics, he showed what are the only valid 
 forms of reasoning, and thus furnished the pattern or 
 type to which all proofs must conform. He also classi- 
 fied, in his work on Fallacies, the various species of 
 false reasoning ; and showed how false arguments could 
 be refuted and exposed by the principles which he had 
 discovered. The form to which Aristotle maintained that 
 all true reasoning can be reduced was as follows : 
 
 All men are mortal, 
 Socrates is a man, 
 Therefore Socrates is mortal. 
 
 This is called a Syllogism, and it is made up of three 
 propositions. The first two propositions are called 
 Premises, and the last the Conclusion. Every piece of 
 reasoning, all proof, can be reduced to this form. Of 
 course, the propositions which make up the syllogism 
 do not always stand in this order, and sometimes one of 
 them may be omitted. Thus in the argument : ' he 
 ought to be supported by the state, for he is an old 
 soldier,' the conclusion stands first, and one premise is 
 wanting entirely. It is easy to see, however, that the 
 real argument when properly arranged is equivalent to 
 this : 
 
 All old soldiers ought to be supported by the state, 
 
 He is an old soldier, 
 
 Therefore he ought to be supported by the state. 
 
 Now the part of Aristotle's logic which was best
 
 24 DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
 
 worked out, was a theory of proof or demonstration by 
 means of the syllogism. Here he showed clearly the 
 various ways in which different kinds of propositions 
 could be combined as premises to yield valid conclu- 
 sions, and proved that no conclusion could be drawn 
 from other combinations. This part of the Aristotelian 
 logic has c-ome down to us almost unchanged, and is 
 the subject of Part I. of the present volume. 
 
 It will be noticed that, in the doctrine of the syllogism, 
 Aristotle was dealing with that kind of reasoning which 
 undertakes to demonstrate the truth of some fact, 
 by showing its relation to a general principle which 
 every one admits. In other words, this part of his 
 work may be called the logic of proof or demonstra- 
 tion. Aristotle was at one time of his life a teacher of 
 rhetoric, and he seemed always to have aimed at putting 
 this art of reasoning on a scientific basis. That is, for 
 the rules of thumb and questionable artifices of the 
 Sophists, he wished to substitute general laws and 
 methods of procedure which were based upon a study 
 of the principles and operations of reason. By com- 
 plying with the rules which he laid down, an argument 
 will necessarily gain the assent of every rational being. 
 
 But we do not employ our reason merely in order to 
 demonstrate to ourselves or to others what we already 
 know. We seek to discover new facts and truths by 
 its aid. In other words, we not only wish to prove what 
 is already known, but also to discover new facts, and we 
 need a logic of Discovery, as well as a logic of Proof. 
 This distinction between proof and discovery corre- 
 sponds in general to that between Deduction and In-
 
 5. THE LOGIC OF THE GREEKS 2$ 
 
 duction. Deduction is the process of showing how 
 particular facts follow from some general principle which 
 everybody admits, while Induction shows the methods 
 by which general laws are obtained from an observation 
 of particular facts. Now Aristotle, as we have seen, 
 furnished a very complete theory of Deduction, or 
 method of proof. But he did not treat of Induction, 
 or the method of passing from particular facts to gen- 
 eral laws, with anything like the same completeness. 
 Moreover, what he did write on this subject received no 
 attention for many centuries. Aristotle was himself a 
 great scientific observer, and may well be regarded as 
 the father of the natural history sciences. But, in his 
 logical writings, his main object seems to have been to 
 present a true theory of argumentation, as opposed to 
 the false theories of the Sophists. Science, too, was 
 only in its beginning when Aristotle wrote, and it was 
 impossible for him to foretell the methods of discovery 
 which it has actually employed. 
 
 After Aristotle's death (322 B.C.), and after the loss 
 of Athenian independence, there was a great decline of 
 interest in matters of mere theory which had no direct 
 application to the practical affairs of life. The Stoic 
 school did make some slight additions to logical theory, 
 but like their opponents, the Epicureans, they regarded 
 practice, the art of living well, as. the supreme wisdom 
 of life. The Romans, who derived their knowledge of 
 Greek philosophy largely from the Stoics, were also in- 
 terested in the practical advantages of logic, rather than 
 in its theoretical side. It was the possibility of apply- 
 ing the laws of logic to rhetoric and public speaking
 
 26 DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
 
 which especially interested Cicero, who was the first to 
 make Latin paraphrases and adaptations of Greek logic 
 in his rhetorical works. 
 
 6. Logic during the Middle Ages. For more than 
 seven hundred years, during the Middle Ages, the Greek 
 language and literature was almost unknown in Western 
 Europe. During this time, almost the only sources of 
 information regarding logic were Latin translations of 
 Aristotle's Categories, and of an Introduction to the same 
 work by Porphyry, who lived 232-303 A.D. Both of these 
 translations were made by Boethius (470-525), who is best 
 known as the author of The Consolations of Philosophy. 
 Even when scholars again became acquainted with the 
 original works of Aristotle, in the latter part of the 
 Middle Ages, they did not really understand their true 
 significance. They took the husk, one may say, and 
 neglected the kernel. They adopted the Aristotelian 
 logic as an external and arbitrary set of rules for the 
 guidance of thinking, and neglected entirely 'the sci- 
 entific theory upon which these rules were based. A 
 great deal of ingenuity was also shown in subdividing 
 and analyzing all possible kinds of argument, and giv- 
 ing the particular rule for each case. This process of 
 making distinctions was carried so far that scholastic 
 logic became extremely cumbersome and artificial. Its 
 pretensions, however, rapidly increased ; it claimed to 
 furnish a complete instrument of knowledge, and a sure 
 standard for discriminating between truth and false- 
 hood. 
 
 It is not very difficult to understand why this set of logical rules
 
 6. LOGIC DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 27 
 
 seemed so satisfactory to the age of Scholasticism. The men of this 
 period had no desire to increase their knowledge ; they supposed 
 that they were already in possession of everything which was worth 
 knowing. Their only object was to weave this knowledge into a 
 system, to show the connection and interdependence of all its parts, 
 and thus to put it beyond the possibility of attack. And for this 
 purpose, the school logic was admirably adapted ; it was always 
 possible to bring every case which could arise under one or other of 
 its rules. 
 
 There is no doubt that the Aristotelian logic had 
 a real value of its own, and that it exercised a very 
 important influence upon Western civilization, even in 
 the form in which it was taught by the Schoolmen; 
 but there is, of course, nothing complete or final about 
 it. Its main purpose, as we have already seen, was to 
 furnish a method by means of which the knowledge we 
 already possess may be so arranged as to be absolutely 
 convincing. But the centre of intellectual interest has 
 changed since mediaeval times. We are not content 
 merely to exhibit the certainty and demonstrative char- 
 acter of the knowledge which we already have, but we 
 feel that there is a great deal of importance still to be 
 discovered. So that, in modern times, one may say the 
 desire to make discoveries, and so add to the general 
 stock of knowledge, has taken the place of the medi- 
 aeval ideal of showing that the traditional doctrines 
 taught by the church are absolutely certain and con- 
 vincing. And when men became conscious of the 
 importance of gaining new knowledge, and especially 
 knowledge about nature, they at once saw the neces- 
 sity for a new logic, or doctrine of method, to aid them 
 in the undertaking.
 
 28 DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
 
 7. The Logic of Bacon. All the great thinkers 
 of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw clearly 
 that the school logic is simply a method of showing the 
 certainty of the knowledge we already possess, and 
 does not aid us at all in making new discoveries. A 
 new method, they all declared, was an absolute neces- 
 sity. The new point of view was put most clearly and 
 eloquently by the famous Francis Bacon (1561-1626), 
 at one time Lord Chancellor of England. Bacon called 
 his work on logic the Novum Organum, thus contrast- 
 ing it with the Organon, or logical treatises of Aristotle. 
 An alternative title of the work is, True Suggestions for 
 the Interpretation of Nature. Bacon begins this work 
 by showing the advantages to be gained from a know- 
 ledge of nature. It is man's true business, he tells us, 
 to be the minister and interpreter of nature, for it is only 
 by becoming acquainted with the laws of nature that we 
 are ever able to take advantage of them for our own 
 ends. " Knowledge and human power are synonymous, 
 since ignorance of the cause prevents us from taking 
 advantage of the effect." The discovery of the laws of 
 nature, which is therefore of so great practical impor- 
 tance, cannot be left to chance, but must be guided by 
 a scientific method. And it is such a method which 
 Bacon endeavours to supply in the Novum Organum. 
 
 The method which Bacon proposed seems to us very 
 simple. If we would gain new knowledge regarding 
 nature, he says, and regarding natural laws, we must 
 go to nature herself and observe her ways of acting. 
 Facts about nature cannot be discovered from logical 
 propositions, or from syllogisms ; if we would know the
 
 8. LOGIC SINCE THE TIME OF BACON 29 
 
 law of any class of phenomena, we must observe the par- 
 ticular facts carefully and systematically. It will often 
 be necessary, also, to put pointed questions to nature 
 by such experiments as will force her to give us the 
 information we want. Knowledge, then, must begin 
 with observation of particular facts ; and only after we 
 have made a great number of particular observations, 
 and have carefully classified and arranged them, taking 
 account of all the negative cases, are we able to discover 
 in them the general law. No hypotheses or guesses are 
 to be made ; but we must wait until the tabulations of 
 the particular phenomena reveal the general ' form ' or 
 principle which belong to them all. 
 
 It will be frequently necessary to refer to Bacon's 
 work in what follows. At present, it is sufficient to 
 note that Bacon showed that a knowledge of nature 
 cannot be attained through general propositions and 
 logical arguments, but that it is necessary to begin 
 with the observation of particular facts. He empha- 
 sized, also, the importance of systematic observation 
 and carefully planned experiments, and showed that 
 knowledge must begin with facts of perception. This 
 is the method of induction, and Bacon is usually said 
 to have been the founder of the inductive sciences of 
 nature. 
 
 8. Logic since the Time of Bacon. Another and 
 quite different method of extending knowledge was pro- 
 posed by the great Frenchman, Descartes (1596-1650), 
 who took mathematics as the type to which all know- 
 ledge should conform. That is, he supposed that the
 
 30 DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
 
 true method of extending knowledge was to begin with 
 general principles, whose truth could not be doubted, 
 and to reason from them to the necessary character 
 of particular facts. Descartes and his followers thought 
 that it was possible to discover certain axiomatic propo- 
 sitions from which all truth could be derived through 
 reason. They thus emphasized Deduction rather than 
 Induction, and reasoning rather than observation and 
 experiment. The spirit of Bacon's teaching was, how- 
 ever, continued in England by John Locke, in the 
 Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Dur- 
 ing the next centuries, philosophical thinkers were 
 divided into two great schools, Rationalists, or those 
 who agreed in the main with Descartes, and Empiricists, 
 or Sensationalists, who followed the teachings of Bacon 
 and Locke. 
 
 Although the natural sciences made great advances 
 during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there 
 seems to have been no effort made to analyze and 
 describe the methods which were actually being em- 
 ployed. In England, at least, it seems to have been 
 assumed that all discoveries were made by the use of 
 the rules and methods of Bacon. One of the first 
 writers to attempt to explain the method used by the 
 natural sciences was Sir John Herschel (1792-1871). 
 His work, Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, 
 was published in 1832. A little later, and with the 
 same object in view, William Whewell (1794-1866), 
 afterwards Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, un- 
 dertook his History of the Inductive Sciences, which 
 was followed some time after by the Philosophy of the
 
 8. LOGIC SINCE THE TIME OF BACON 3 1 
 
 Inductive Sciences, The man, however, who did most 
 towards putting the study of logic on a new basis was 
 John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the first edition of whose 
 Logic appeared in 1843. We shall have frequent occa- 
 sion to refer to this work in future discussions. It is 
 sufficient to say here that Mill continues the empirical 
 tradition of the earlier English writers in his general 
 philosophical position. Mill's book gave a great im- 
 pulse to the study of logic. Before it was published, 
 writers on the subject had confined their attention 
 almost exclusively to the syllogistic or deductive rea- 
 soning. Mill, however, emphasized strongly the impor- 
 tance of induction ; indeed, he regarded induction as 
 the only means of arriving at new truth, deduction 
 being merely a means of systematizing and arranging 
 what we already know. Though few logicians of the 
 present day adopt this extreme view, the importance of 
 inductive methods of reasoning, and the necessity of 
 studying them, have now become generally recognized. 
 Most modern writers on logic devote a considerable 
 amount of attention to induction. The reader will find 
 that Part II. of the present volume deals with this 
 subject. 
 
 There is still another side of logic which has been 
 developed in the English-speaking world since the time 
 of Mill, though it is a direct continuation of the move- 
 ment started in Germany by Kant more than a hun- 
 dred years ago. The so-called ' modern ' logic has laid 
 aside the formalism and paradoxical mode of expression 
 adopted by Hegel, but the fundamental conceptions 
 with which it works are essentially the same as those
 
 32 DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
 
 employed by the latter in his Wissenschaft der Logik 
 (1816-1818). It has been within the last twenty years 
 that the results of German idealism the doctrines of 
 Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel have become 
 naturalized in England and America. And largely as 
 a consequence of these teachings, a new conception of 
 the nature of thought has grown up, and given rise to 
 investigations which may be said to have created a 
 'modern' logic that is fairly entitled to rank beside 
 its sister science, the ' new ' psychology. 
 
 The Aristotelian doctrine of the syllogism is a purely 
 formal science. In the form in which it is represented 
 in ordinary text-books, it might perhaps be more prop- 
 erly described as the art of arranging our knowledge 
 in such a way as to compel assent. The ' matter ' with 
 which thought is supposed to work is supplied to it in 
 form of concepts and judgments. The problem which 
 formal logic has to solve is to define and classify the 
 various kinds of concepts with which thought operates, 
 and to determine the various relations in which these 
 stand when combined into judgments. Similarly, it 
 has to show what combinations of judgments can be 
 employed as premises leading to valid conclusions in 
 the syllogism. The criterion of truth employed in these 
 investigations is the principle of non-contradiction or 
 consistency. Inconsistent combinations of concepts, 
 that is, are ruled out ; but so far as the doctrine of 
 the syllogism goes, anything is true which is not self- 
 contradictory. 
 
 Now, without questioning the practical value of its 
 canons, it is obvious that formal or syllogistic logic does
 
 8. LOGIC SINCE THE TIME OF BACON 33 
 
 not take any account of many of the processes of every- 
 day thought, and that its rules go but a little way in 
 helping us to distinguish the true from the false. For, 
 in the first place, to think is not merely to combine and 
 arrange ideas already in our possession. This might 
 enable us to render clearer and more definite what we 
 already know, but would never enable us to gain new 
 knowledge. The real movement of thought as op- 
 posed to its merely formal procedure consists in the 
 formation of new ideas and new knowledge through 
 actual contact with the world of experience. A com- 
 plete account of the intellectual process, then, must 
 deal with the relation of the mind to objects; it must 
 investigate the various activities by means of which 
 thought interprets the world and builds up the various 
 sciences of nature and of man. 
 
 The recognition of the importance of induction, and 
 of the necessity of studying the methods of the induc- 
 tive sciences which was brought about by Whewell, 
 Mill, and others, was a step in the right direction, for 
 it called attention to a kind of thinking which occupies 
 a large place in our intellectual life, and also gave rise 
 to a truer conception of the nature of thought itself. 
 But even Mill did not reach the idea which guides 
 modern logicians, that thought or intelligence is one 
 from beginning to end, and that the various logical 
 processes are all parts of one whole, or rather ways in 
 which intelligence operates in different circumstances, 
 or at different stages of its development. He still 
 treats of logical processes, like conception, judgment, 
 and reasoning, as if they were quite separate from 
 D
 
 34 DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
 
 each other ; and, as has already been noticed, in his 
 zeal for induction, he fails completely to do justice to 
 syllogistic reasoning. 
 
 As opposed to the division of mind into separate 
 faculties, the thought by which modern logic is domi- 
 nated is that of the unity and continuity of all intel- 
 lectual life. Thought is regarded as an organic, living 
 function or activity, which remains identical with itself 
 throughout all its developing forms and phases. The 
 problem, accordingly, which logic must set before itself 
 is to show the unity and interrelation of all of the 
 intellectual processes. No one of the steps or stages 
 in this process can be completely understood when 
 viewed by itself : each is what it is only in and through 
 its connection with the whole of which it forms a part. 
 No hard and fast boundary lines are to be drawn be- 
 tween the different stages of the reasoning process, but 
 it must be shown that the whole nature of intelligence 
 is involved more or less explicitly at each step. So 
 far only the broad outlines of this theory have been 
 filled in ; but the conception of an organism whose 
 parts are developing in mutual relation and inter- 
 dependence, promises to be as fruitful when applied 
 to logic as it has already shown itself to be in the 
 other sciences. 
 
 Besides the ordinary histories of philosophy the reader may con- 
 sult for the history of logic : Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abend- 
 lande, 4 vols., Leipsic, 1855-1870; which extends, however, only to 
 the dose of the mediaeval period. Harms, Geschichte der Logik, 
 Berlin, 1881. Ueberweg, System der Logik, 4th ed., 1874; Eng. 
 trans, of 3d ed., London, 1874. Adamson, article 'Logic,' in tha
 
 8. LOGIC SINCE THE TIME OF BACON 35 
 
 Encyl. Brit., gth ed. Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, 
 also contain much historical information. 
 
 Among modern works on logic, the following may be mentioned : 
 J. S. Mill, A System of Logic, London, ist ed., 1843; Qth ed., 1875. 
 W. S. Jevons, The Principles of Science, London, 1874; 2d ed., 
 1877. Also, by the same author, Studies in Deductive Logic, 1880 ; 
 and Pure Logic, 1890. H. Lotze, Logik, 1874; Eng. trans., Lon- 
 don, 1 88 1 and 1888. W. Wundt, Logik, 2d ed., 1896. C. Sigwart, 
 Logik, 2d ed., 1889-1893 ; Eng. trans., London and New York, 1895. 
 
 The newer development of logic is well represented by F. H. Brad- 
 ley, The Principles of Logic, London, 1886. B. Bosanquet, Logic, 
 or the Morphology of Knowledge, London, 1888 ; and The Essentials 
 of Logic, London and New York, 1895. L. T. Hobhouse, The Theory 
 of Knowledge, London, 1 896, may also be mentioned in the same 
 group of writers, although he has been, perhaps, more influenced by 
 Mill than by any other writer. 
 
 The following works, among others, have proved useful as text- 
 books : W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, London and 
 New York, 1870. A. Bain, Logic, Deductive and Inductive, New 
 York, 1883. J. H. Hyslop, The Elements of Logic, New York, 1892. 
 W. Minto, Logic Inductive and Deductive, New York, 1894. J. G. 
 Hibben, Inductive Logic, New York, 1 896.
 
 PART I. THE SYLLOGISM 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS PARTS 
 
 9. The Nature of the Syllogism. The theory ol 
 the syllogism, as has been already stated ( 5), was 
 first worked out by Aristotle. And it stands to-day 
 in almost the same form in which he left it. A few 
 additions have been made at different points, but these 
 do not affect materially the main doctrine. In deal- 
 ing with the nature of the syllogism, we shall first 
 try to understand its general aim and purpose, or the 
 results which it seeks to bring about. We shall then 
 have to analyze it into the parts of which it is com- 
 posed, and to examine and classify the nature of these 
 elements. Finally, it will be necessary to discover 
 what rules must be observed in order to obtain valid 
 conclusions, and to point out the conditions which 
 most commonly give rise to error or fallacy. 
 
 In the first place, it is to be noticed that syllogistic 
 logic deals with the results of thinking, rather than 
 with the nature of the thought-process. Its object is 
 not to give an account of the way in which thinking 
 goes on, but to show how the ideas and thoughts which 
 we already possess may be combined so as to compel 
 
 36
 
 9. THE NATURE OF THE SYLLOGISM 37 
 
 assent. The ideas which it uses as material are fixed 
 by having been expressed in language. Indeed, it is 
 largely with words, as the expression of thoughts, that 
 syllogistic logic deals. Many of the discussions with 
 which it is occupied have reference to the meanings 
 of words and propositions ; and the rules which it fur- 
 nishes may be taken as directions for putting together 
 propositions in such a way as to lead to a valid conclu- 
 sion. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that 
 these rules are not arbitrary and external, but find their 
 justification in the nature of thought. Indeed, the 
 theory of the syllogism, when rightly understood, may 
 be said to reveal the fundamental characteristics of the 
 process of intelligence. For it brings together facts 
 in such a way as to make evident their relation and 
 dependence. It connects a judgment with the grounds 
 or reasons which support it, and is thus a process of 
 systematization. In order to understand the signifi- 
 cance of the rules of syllogistic logic, then, it will 
 frequently be necessary to look beyond words and 
 propositions to the act of thought whose result they 
 express. 
 
 A great deal has been written regarding the princi- 
 ples, or laws of thought, which are employed in syllo- 
 gistic reasoning. , It seems better, however, to postpone 
 the definite consideration of this subject until the student 
 has learned more about the various kinds of syllogisms, 
 and has had some practice in working examples. In 
 dealing with the nature and principles of thought in the 
 third part of this book, it will be necessary to discuss 
 this question at length. Even at the present stage of
 
 38 THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS PARTS 
 
 our inquiry, however, it is important to notice that syl- 
 logistic reasoning presupposes certain simple and fun- 
 damental principles of thought whose nature we shall 
 have to examine hereafter. In particular, the regular 
 syllogism is founded on a principle which we may call 
 the law of Identity, or the law of Contradiction, according 
 as it is stated affirmatively or negatively. Stated affirm- 
 atively, this so-called ' law ' simply expresses the fact 
 that every term and idea which we use in our reason- 
 ings must remain what it is. A is A, or has the same 
 value and meaning wherever employed. The law of 
 Contradiction expresses the same thing in negative 
 language. A cannot be both B and not B. If any 
 term is taken to be the same as another in one connec- 
 tion, it must always be taken to be so ; if it is different, 
 this relation must everywhere be maintained. .The 
 data or materials which are employed in the syllogism 
 are ideas whose meaning is supposed to be perma- 
 nently fixed, and expressed in words which have been 
 carefully defined. It would be impossible to reason, or 
 to determine the relation of our ideas, if their mean- 
 ing were to change without notice, or if the words by 
 means of which they are expressed were used now in 
 one sense, and now in another. It is of course true 
 that our ideas regarding the nature of things change 
 from time to time. And, as is evident from one's own 
 experience, as well as from the history of language, a 
 corresponding change takes place in the meaning of 
 words. But the assumption upon which syllogistic 
 reasoning proceeds, is that the ideas which are to be 
 compared are fixed for the mean time, and that the
 
 io. THE PARTS OF A SYLLOGISM 39 
 
 words by which they are expressed are used in the 
 same sense throughout the course of the argument. 
 In this kind of reasoning, then, just as in geometry, it 
 is essential that the terms which enter into the argu- 
 ment be clearly and precisely defined, and that when 
 thus determined they shall be taken as fixed and un- 
 changeable until further notice is given. 
 
 It is quite possible that all the requirements of the 
 syllogism may be met without its conclusions being 
 true of reality. In other words, an argument may be 
 formally true, but really false. It is not difficult to 
 understand why this may happen. The syllogism ac- 
 cepts the ideas and judgments which it compares with- 
 out criticism. These data are of course the product of 
 previous acts of thinking. But in proceeding to ar- 
 range them in syllogistic form, we do not inquire 
 whether or not they are true ; i.e. adequate to express 
 the nature of the things for which they stand. For 
 the purposes of the syllogism it is only essential that 
 their meanings be clearly understood, and that these 
 meanings be regarded as fixed and permanent. 
 
 io. The Parts of a Syllogism. The syllogism may 
 be said to express a single comprehensive act of thought. 
 We may define inference as a judgment which has been 
 expanded so as to exhibit the reasons by which it is 
 supported. In the syllogism 
 
 The geranium has five pointed sepals, 
 This plant has not five sepals, 
 Therefore it is not a geranium. 
 
 we may say that we have the judgment, 'this plant is
 
 40 THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS PARTS 
 
 not a geranium,' supported by the propositions which 
 precede it, and that the whole syllogism taken together 
 expresses a single thought, which is complete and self- 
 sufficient. It is possible, however, even when one is 
 dealing directly with the process of thinking, to dis- 
 tinguish in it different subordinate steps, various stages 
 which serve as resting places, in the course of its passage 
 to the complete and comprehensive form represented 
 by "the syllogism. But it is usual, in dealing with the 
 syllogism, to take a more external view of its nature, 
 and to regard it primarily as made up of words and 
 propositions. 
 
 In this sense, a syllogism can, of course, be divided 
 into parts. In the first place, it is composed of three 
 propositions. In the example given above the two 
 propositions which stand first are called the premises, 
 since they furnish the grounds or reasons for the propo- 
 sition which stands last, and which is known as the 
 conclusion. However, it is not true that we always 
 find the two premises and the conclusion arranged in 
 this regular order in syllogistic arguments. Oftentimes 
 the conclusion is given first. Frequently, too, one of 
 the premises is not expressed, and has to be supplied in 
 order to complete the argument. Thus the statement, 
 'he must be more than sixteen years of age, for he 
 attends the university,' is an incomplete syllogism. 
 The conclusion, as will be readily seen, stands first. 
 There is also only one premise expressed. To put this 
 statement in the regular syllogistic form we have to 
 supply the missing premise and arrange it as fol- 
 lows :
 
 io. THE PARTS OF A SYLLOGISM 4! 
 
 All students of the university are more than sixteen years of age, 
 
 He is a student of the university, 
 
 Therefore he is more than sixteen years of age. 
 
 When one premise of an argument is lacking, the name 
 of enthymeme is applied to it. When an argument is 
 defective in this way, it must be remembered that the 
 missing proposition is to be regarded as in consciousness, 
 though not expressed. It is of great importance to form 
 the habit of making clear to oneself the premises by 
 which any conclusion claims to be supported. In this 
 way groundless assumptions are often brought to light, 
 and the weakness of an argument exposed. Whenever 
 words like 'therefore,' 'for,' 'because,' 'it follows,' etc., 
 are used in their proper signification, it is possible to 
 find an argument composed of two premises and a con- 
 clusion. But one must not allow oneself to be imposed 
 upon by the mere words, but must insist on understand- 
 ing exactly what are the premises in the case, and how 
 the conclusion follows from them. 
 
 It is possible to carry the division of a syllogism still 
 further. Every logical proposition may be divided into 
 two terms, and a copula or connecting link. The terms, 
 which are the extremes of the proposition, are named 
 the subject and the predicate. Thus in the proposition, 
 ' the fields are covered with snow,' ' the fields ' is the 
 subject, 'are,' the copula, and, 'covered with snow,' 
 the predicate. To reduce a proposition to the logical 
 form in which it is most conveniently treated, it is neces- 
 sary to express it in such a way that the two terms are 
 united by some part of the verb 'to be,' preferably 'is' 
 or ' are.' Thus the sentence, ' No plant can grow with-
 
 42 THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS PARTS 
 
 out light and heat,' would be expressed as a logical 
 proposition in the following, or some similar, form : ' No 
 plant is an organism which can grow without light and 
 heat.' ' Men have strong passions,' may be written, 
 ' Men are beings having strong passions.' It is always 
 well to reduce a sentence to some such form, by substi- 
 tuting for the verb of predication some part of the verb 
 ' to be.' 
 
 The analysis of the syllogism gives us the divisions 
 under which it is convenient to treat this part of logic. 
 We shall accordingly deal (i) with Terms, (2) with 
 Propositions, and (3) with the Syllogism as a whole. 
 
 These divisions, however, are only made for the sake 
 of convenience in treatment. It must not be forgotten 
 that a term is a. part of a proposition. To understand 
 the nature of a term, it is necessary to consider the 
 part which it plays in the judgment which the propo- 
 sition expresses. In other words, the function of the 
 term, rather than the form of the word or words em- 
 ployed, must be considered. It is, of course, true that 
 we naturally and commonly use certain word forms to 
 express certain kinds of ideas, just as in the grammati- 
 cal sentence the different 'parts of speech' nouns, 
 verbs, etc., have each a definite and comparatively 
 permanent function. But even in the sentence, it is the 
 part which the word in its grammatical function plays, 
 rather than its form, which determines whether it is to 
 be classified as a noun or an adjective, a preposition or 
 a conjunction. In dealing separately with terms, as we 
 propose to do in the next chapter, we shall be occupied 
 to a large extent with the form of words in which cer-
 
 II. PROPOSED DIVISION OF MENTAL OPERATIONS 43 
 
 tain kinds of ideas are usually expressed. But, as the 
 same word or group of words may be used for different 
 purposes, it will be necessary, in order to understand 
 the meaning of terms, to refer frequently to the various 
 ways in which they are used in a proposition. 
 
 The same difficulty exists when propositions are con- 
 sidered by themselves, the relation to the complete 
 argument of which they form a part being thus ig- 
 nored. In this case, however, the results of the isola- 
 tion are not so apparent, for a proposition forms, in 
 a certain sense, a whole by itself. It is the expression 
 of a judgment which, as we shall see later, is the unitary 
 process of thought. It has thus a significance of its 
 own, as expressing a more or less complete and inde- 
 pendent act of thought. Nevertheless, it must not be 
 forgotten that its independence and completeness are 
 only partial and relative. A single proposition cannot 
 stand alone. Taken strictly by itself, a proposition is 
 only a fragment. In order to make it intelligible, it 
 must be brought into relation with the other proposi- 
 tions which state the grounds or reasons upon which 
 it rests, or the conclusion which it helps to support. 
 The logical nature of a proposition will, therefore, de- 
 pend upon its function in an argument, and in treating 
 of propositions this fact must not be forgotten. 
 
 ii. The Proposed Division of Mental Operations. 
 
 It is frequently stated in text-books on logic that corre- 
 sponding to the division into Terms, Propositions, and 
 Syllogisms, there must be a division of the different kinds 
 of thought, or of operations of the mind. These differ-
 
 44 THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS PARTS 
 
 ent operations are usually called Simple Apprehension, 
 Judgment, and Reasoning. " The first of these, Simple 
 Apprehension, is the act of mind by which we merely 
 become aware of something, or have a notion, idea, or 
 impression of it brought into the mind. The adjective 
 simple means apart from other things, and apprehension, 
 the taking hold by the mind. Thus the name or term 
 ' iron ' instantaneously makes the mind think of a very 
 strong and very useful metal, but does not tell us any- 
 thing about it, or compare it with anything else." 1 
 Judgment, the account continues, is an entirely dif- 
 ferent action of mind, and comes later than Simple 
 Apprehension. It consists in comparing two notions 
 or ideas derived from simple apprehension in order to 
 ascertain whether they agree or differ. In order to 
 judge, we must have two notions or ideas ready in the 
 mind. The judgment results from comparing these, 
 and affirming, that they agree or do not agree. In 
 the sarne way, having already made judgments, we 
 can combine them into arguments or processes of 
 reasoning by a new and still different activity of mind. 
 Apprehension, judgment, and reasoning are thus sup- 
 posed to be separate and distinct mental operations. 
 It is true that the later forms employ as their mate- 
 rial the finished products of the earlier. But from this 
 point of view, apprehension, judgment, and reasoning 
 simply succeed one another. The real unity which 
 belongs to these operations as forms of intelligence is 
 not set forth. 
 
 1 Jevons, Lessons on Logic, pp. n, 12.
 
 II. PROPOSED DIVISION OF MENTAL OPERATIONS 45 
 
 The whole of Part III. of the present book may be 
 regarded as an argument against this point of view. 
 We shall there endeavour to show that thinking is not 
 a process of externally joining on part to part, but 
 consists in a development or expansion of knowledge 
 from within. And, in particular, we shall try to ex- 
 hibit the essential unity of intellectual processes by 
 whatever name they may be called, and at whatever 
 stage of development they may be found. Without 
 anticipating too far our future discussions, we may point 
 out that the primary process of thought is not ' Simple 
 Apprehension,' but Judgment. In other words, it is 
 impossible to apprehend or passively receive ideas. 
 'To get an idea/ or to understand the meaning of a 
 term, is only possible when the mind judges or inter- 
 prets things for itself. To have an idea or concept 
 of anything, then, is to be able to judge more or less 
 clearly and confidently regarding it. I have an idea 
 of 'iron' when I judge that it is 'black' and 'heavy' 
 and 'malleable.' And the more complete and exact we 
 can make our judgments, the better is the idea or appre- 
 hension which we obtain of the thing in question. In- 
 telligence or thought must not be regarded as at first 
 merely receptive. It does not begin by laying hold of 
 separate ideas or terms, and afterwards call in judg- 
 ment as a new kind of process to bring the former into 
 relation. But it is from the first a systematizing and 
 relating activity which proceeds from the less perfect 
 to the more perfect form of judgment (cf. 73, 74).
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TERMS 
 
 12. Singular, General, and Collective Terms. A 
 logical term, as we have already seen, is an element of 
 a proposition. In dealing with terms apart from prop- 
 ositions, we shall be concerned mainly with different 
 classes of words and the meanings which they usually 
 express. It will be impossible, however, to fix ths 
 meanings of terms absolutely without reference to the 
 way in which they are used in propositions. The first 
 division which we have to notice is that into Singular or 
 Individual, General, and Collective terms. 
 
 (i) A Singular or Individual term is one which can 
 be applied in the same sense to but a single thing. 
 The main purpose of Singular terms is to refer to, 
 or identify, some individual object. Proper names are 
 all singular. It is true that proper names are some- 
 times used to denote a class of objects, as, e.g., 'a 
 Daniel,' ' a Mephistopheles.' But when thus employed 
 they lose their real character as proper names. That 
 is, their function is no longer merely to identify certain 
 individuals by naming them, but to describe them by 
 mentioning certain qualities or characteristics which 
 they are supposed to possess. But the ordinary pur- 
 pose in using a proper name is to indicate some indi- 
 vidual to whom the name belongs. In this sense, then, 
 proper names are Singular. 
 
 46
 
 12. SINGULAR, GENERAL, AND COLLECTIVE TERMS 47 
 
 In addition, any word or group of words which is 
 applied to a single thing may be regarded as singular. 
 And by 'single thing,' we mean anything which is 
 thought of as one, as well as objects which are per- 
 ceived through the senses. Thus, 'the waterfall just 
 below the bridge,' ' the centre of the earth,' are singu- 
 lar terms, and so also are words like 'justice,' 'good- 
 ness,' 'the chief end of man.' It is perhaps more 
 doubtful whether we should call terms such as ' white- 
 ness,' ' sweetness,' singular, since we speak of differ- 
 ent degrees and kinds of whiteness and sweetness. 
 The question would have to be decided in every case 
 by reference to the way in which the terms are em- 
 ployed in propositions. 
 
 (2) A General term is a name which applies to a 
 whole group of objects. It is not limited, like the sin- 
 gular name, to a single thing, but applies to a number 
 of different things. All class names like ' metal,' 
 ' man,' ' works on logic,' are of this character. The 
 general name belongs to each and every individual 
 of a whole class. Thus iron, gold, silver, etc., are 
 ' metals ' ; and A, B, and C, ' men.' 
 
 (3) A Collective term, on the other hand, is a name 
 applied to a number of individuals when taken together 
 and treated as a whole, as 'an army,' 'an audience.' 
 It is important to distinguish carefully between general 
 and collective terms. A general term is a name which 
 applies equally to each individual of the group ; or, in 
 other words, it is used of the individuals distributively. 
 A collective name belongs to the whole, but not to the 
 separate parts of the whole. Thus we say that 'sol-
 
 48 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TERMS 
 
 dier ' is a general name, and is used distributively of 
 each man in a regiment. ' Regiment,' however, is a 
 collective name, for it applies only to the whole group, 
 and not to the individual soldiers. 
 
 Ambiguity sometimes arises from the fact that the 
 English word 'all' is used in both of these senses. 
 That is, it may rnean ' all taken together/ or ' each and 
 every.' Thus we can say : ' All the angles of a tri- 
 angle are less than two right angles ' ; and ' all the 
 angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.' In 
 the former sentence, the word ' all ' is used distribu- 
 tively ; in the latter, collectively. In Latin two different 
 words are used : cuncti expresses the collective sense 
 of ' all,' and omnes its distributive signification. 
 
 It is worth noticing in this connection that it is the use which 
 is made of terms, rather than the form of the words composing 
 them, which determines their logical character. Thus terms which 
 are collective in one connection may be general in another. ' Regi- 
 ment,' for example, is a collective term with reference to the soldiers 
 which compose it, but general when used as a common term for a 
 number of similar divisions of an army. The same is also true of 
 terms like ' grove,' 'mob/ 'class/ etc. Again, collective terms 
 may be very properly regarded as singular when the proposition 
 in which they are used emphasizes the unity and solidarity of the 
 group. A proper name is sometimes applied to a collection of in- 
 dividuals that are permanently united or that have acted together 
 on some historic occasion, as, for example, ' The Fifth Cavalry regi- 
 ment/ < The Charge of the Six Hundred.' 
 
 13. Abstract and Concrete Terms. Terms are fur- 
 ther divided into abstract and concrete terms. The 
 word ' abstract ' is often used popularly to describe 
 anything which is difficult to understand. Etymologi-
 
 13. ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS 49 
 
 cally, it signifies drawn off, separated (abstraho, to 
 draw off, take away). We may distinguish two senses 
 in which the word is used, both, however, being derived 
 from its etymological signification. 
 
 (i) A term is called abstract when it refers to some 
 object which cannot be directly perceived through the 
 senses, and concrete when such perception is possible. 
 Thus 'a beech tree,' ' a tall man,' 'a sweet taste,' being 
 names of things which can be perceived, are concrete. 
 Words like 'sweetness,' 'hardness,' etc., have no objects 
 of sense directly corresponding to them, and are for 
 this reason called abstract. The same is true of terms 
 like 'individuality,' 'equality,' 'justice,' etc. These 
 words represent objects of thought, rather than ob- 
 jects of sense. There may be cases or instances of 
 'equality,' 'justice,' etc., which fall under our percep- 
 tion, but the real object to which these words corre- 
 spond is not a thing which can be perceived through 
 the senses at all. Their reality is conceptual, or for 
 thought, not something directly revealed through the 
 senses. 
 
 It is important to notice that there are degrees of abstractness in 
 terms, according as the objects for which they stand are nearer to, or 
 further removed from ordinary sense-perception. All general or 
 class names are abstract. One cannot point to a single object, to 
 which the term 'metal,' for example, or the term ' man 1 corresponds. 
 But although such terms have no direct sensuous object, yet we feel 
 that they stand nearer to sense-perception, and are therefore tess 
 abstract, than words like 'animal,' 'inorganic substance.' These 
 terms, again, are perhaps less abstract than 'energy,' or 'spirit,' or 
 even than singular terms like 'justice,' 'the ground of the universe,' 
 etc.
 
 50 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TERMS 
 
 (2) Again, the word ' abstract ' is applied to any ob- 
 ject which is treated apart from the whole to which it 
 belongs. Thus it would be an abstraction to attempt 
 to represent the nature of a leaf in complete isolation 
 from the plant to which it belongs, or to consider the 
 nature of a man without regard to the social institu- 
 tions family, church, state, etc. of which he is a 
 member. Of course, it is essential when dealing with a 
 complex whole to analyze it into its parts, and to under- 
 stand just what is the nature of each part when taken 
 by itself. But in order to comprehend fully the nature 
 of the parts, it is necessary to restore them to their 
 proper setting, and to see their relation to the concrete 
 whole. In this sense of the word, then, ' abstract ' 
 applies to what is taken out of its proper setting, broken 
 off, and considered apart from the things to which it is 
 organically related. Concrete, on the other hand, means 
 what is whole and complete, a system of things which 
 mutually support and explain one another. 
 
 Since science has to analyze things into their elements, 
 and to investigate and describe these elements in detail, 
 it is impossible entirely to avoid abstraction. But it is 
 necessary, in order to completely understand the nature 
 of a complex object, that the abstractions of analysis 
 shall be corrected. In other words, the concrete rela- 
 tions in which things stand must not be ignored in 
 investigating them. The conception of evolution in 
 recent times has done much to render the biological 
 sciences more concrete in the sense in which we are 
 now using the term. For it has substituted, for the old 
 method of treating each species of plant and animal as
 
 13- ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS 51 
 
 distinct and separate, ' cut off from each other as if by 
 a hatchet,' the view that all organic beings are members 
 of one family, and can be properly understood only in 
 their relations to one another. 
 
 It is interesting to notice that, from this point of view, sense- 
 perception is more abstract than thought. For the senses represent 
 things in isolation from each other. Each thing is known in sense- 
 perception as a separate individual, occupying its own space and 
 time, and in this way, cut off from its fellows. It is the business of 
 thought, on the other hand, to discover the relations between things, 
 and the principles according to which they are united. Thinking 
 thus overcomes the abstract point of view of sense-perception by 
 showing that what appear to the latter as separate objects are 
 really closely and necessarily connected as members of a com- 
 mon unity or system. Each science takes as its province certain 
 facts which resemble one another, but which nevertheless appear 
 to sense-perception to be quite independent. It attempts by 
 thinking to bring these facts into relation, to show that they are 
 all cases of some law, that there is a common principle which unites 
 them as parts of a whole or system. The law of gravitation, for 
 example, expresses the unity which thought has discovered in 
 things which appear to sense-perception as different as the falling 
 of an apple, the movements of the heavenly bodies, and the ebb 
 and flow of the tides. Scientific knowledge, then, is more con- 
 crete than the facts which we learn from ordinary sense-percep- 
 tion, because it brings to light real unity and connection in facts 
 which appear to be entirely isolated and independent from the 
 latter point of view. 
 
 In employing the terms 'Abstract' and 'Concrete' it 
 is of the utmost importance to distinguish the two sig- 
 nifications of the words. From one point of view, as we 
 have seen, all thought terms are abstract, as opposed to 
 words which refer directly to objects of sense-perception.
 
 52 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TERMS 
 
 In another sense, ' abstract ' denotes what is partial and 
 incomplete, what is taken by itself and out of relation 
 to the system of things to which it belongs. And since 
 the real connection and relations of things are not given 
 by perception, but have to be discovered by thought, 
 the knowledge which the latter yields is more concrete, 
 in this latter sense of the term, than that afforded by 
 the former. 
 
 14. Positive and Negative Terms. The distinction 
 between Positive and Negative terms is very obvious. 
 Positive terms express the existence of some quality, or 
 group of qualities, in the objects which they denote; as, 
 e.g., ' happy,' ' good/ ' equality,' ' organism,' etc. A Neg- 
 ative term, on the other hand, indicates the absence 
 of qualities or properties in some object; 'bad,' 'un- 
 happy,' 'inorganic,' 'injustice,' for example, are negative 
 terms. Negative terms are often formed from positive 
 by means of the affix, less, as in ' hopeless/ or by means 
 of certain prefixes, of which the more common are un, in, 
 dis, a, anti. Words which are positive in form are, how- 
 ever, often negative in meaning, and are used as the 
 contradictories of other terms. Thus 'ignorant' is 
 generally regarded as the negative of ' learned/ ' dark- 
 ness ' is the negative of ' light/ etc. It is not always 
 possible, however, to find a separate word to express the 
 exact opposite of every positive term. Words are used 
 primarily to express the presence of qualities, and the 
 negative idea may not be referred to so frequently as 
 to require a separate word to express it. Thus there 
 is no independent term to express the opposite of ' trans-
 
 H. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE TERMS 53 
 
 ferable,' but by employing ' not ' as a negative prefix we 
 obtain ' not-transferable.' 
 
 It is always advisable when we wish to limit a term strictly to its 
 negative application to employ not or non as a prefix. Words 
 which are negative in form frequently have a more or less definite 
 positive signification. Jevons points out that words like 'unloosed' 
 and ' invaluable, 1 though negative in form, have a positive meaning. 
 But, in addition, terms like 'unhappy,' 'immoral,' do not merely 
 indicate the absence of positive qualities, but also express some 
 positive properties of the objects to which they are applied. We 
 speak of a person ' being positively unhappy ' ; and we employ 
 'non-moral' to express the simple negative relation rather than 
 ' immoral.' 
 
 On the other hand, there are certain terms which are positive in 
 form that express the absence of qualities or attributes. Words like 
 'blind,' 'dumb,' 'maimed,' 'orphaned,' may be given as examples. 
 These are often called Privative terms, rather than Negative, the 
 distinction being that they refer to qualities or attributes which the 
 objects to which they are applied naturally and usually have, but of 
 which they have been deprived, or which they have never possessed. 
 Thus ' blind,' as applied to a man, implies that he has lost or is desti- 
 tute of the ability to see which naturally belongs to a human being. 
 
 Again, other terms seem to be positive and negative solely in 
 relation to each other. ' Element ' and ' compound ' are related as 
 negatives or contradictories. It is difficult, however, to say which 
 term is in itself negative or positive. 
 
 It is important to notice the distinction between the 
 relation in which positive and negative terms stand to 
 each other, and that expressed by words which have 
 to do with opposite extremes of something which pos- 
 sesses quality or degree. Positive and negative terms 
 are mutually contradictory. An element is what is not 
 a compound, ' dishonest ' is the contradictory of ' honest,'
 
 54 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TERMS 
 
 and as contradictories there is no middle ground be- 
 tween them. What is not an element, is a non-element 
 or a compound. Opposite or contrary terms, on the 
 other hand, express a great difference of degree in the 
 objects to which they refer. Thus 'foolish' is the op- 
 posite of ' wise,' ' cold ' the opposite of ' hot,' and ' bitter ' 
 of 'sweet.' But there is always the possibility of a 
 middle ground between opposites. We cannot say that 
 a man must be either wise or foolish, a taste either 
 sweet or bitter. The logical contradictory of ' wise ' is 
 'not-wise,' of 'bitter,' is 'not-bitter,' etc. Opposite or 
 contrary terms, then, must be carefully distinguished 
 from contradictories. 
 
 15. Absolute and Relative Terms. Another classi- 
 fication of terms, which is usually given by logicians, 
 is that into absolute and relative terms. An absolute 
 term is one which refers to an object which exists by 
 itself, and has an intelligible meaning when taken alone. 
 Thus, 'tree,' 'house,' 'the State of New York,' are ex 
 amples of absolute terms. A relative term, on the con- 
 trary, is a name which only derives a meaning from its 
 relation to something else. The term ' parent,' for ex- 
 ample, cannot be thought of except in relation to 'child.' 
 Similarly, 'teacher' is relative to 'pupil,' and 'cause' to 
 'effect.' Relative terms usually go in pairs and are 
 known as Correlatives. Adjectives, as well as nouns, 
 may be related in this way. The presence of one 
 quality or characteristic in a thing frequently implies 
 the presence of others. Thus, ignorance and super- 
 stition, sympathy and tolerance, are necessary correla-
 
 16. EXTENSION AND INTENSION OF TERMS 55 
 
 tives, because the one involves the other, or is invariably 
 connected with it. 
 
 It is of course true that no finite thing is completely absolute or 
 independent of other things. The nature of everything is largely 
 determined by the nature of the other things with which it stands 
 in relation. A tree, for example, is relative to the seed from which 
 it sprang, the soil in which it grew, the sunshine, rain, etc., which 
 accompanied its growth. All finite things have a beginning and an 
 end, and are also influenced throughout the whole period of their 
 lives by the action of other things. They are therefore not com- 
 pletely absolute or independent. It is, however, possible to make a 
 distinction between words which are the names of things that are 
 comparatively independent, and may for ordinary purposes be con- 
 sidered by themselves, and those which have only a meaning when 
 regarded as correlatives. 
 
 1 6. Extension and Intension of Terms. In the 
 
 foregoing sections of this chapter we have explained 
 the nature of the various kinds of terms with which 
 logic deals. It is now necessary to notice two different 
 purposes for which terms are employed. In the first 
 place, terms are used to refer to things, to name and 
 identify them. Thus ' man ' refers to the different 
 individual men, John Smith, Thomas Brown, etc., as 
 well as to the various classes of men, Caucasians, 
 Indians, Mongolians, etc. As denoting or naming ob- 
 jects, whether these be individual things or classes of 
 things, terms are said to be employed in Extension. 
 But words are also used to describe as well as to name. 
 That is, they represent the qualities or attributes be- 
 longing to things for which they stand. They are not 
 bare names without signification, but as the expression
 
 56 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TERMS 
 
 of ideas they stand for certain qualities or character- 
 istics which things are judged to possess. ' Man,' for 
 example, is not merely a name which may be applied 
 to individual human beings or races of men, but it 
 implies that the objects so named have certain qualities, 
 such as animal life, reason, and the power of com- 
 municating with their fellows. When words are used 
 in this way to define or describe things, rather than 
 merely to name them, they are said to be employed in 
 Intension. 
 
 The terms ' Denotation ' and ' Connotation ' were used by Mill 
 instead of Extension and Intension, respectively, and have been 
 adopted pretty generally since his time. To 'denote,' is to point 
 out or specify the objects for which a term stands ; and to 'connote' 
 is to take account of the attributes or qualities which a name implies. 
 The words 'breadth,' and 'comprehension,' are also sometimes used 
 as synonymous with Extension, and ' depth,' or ' content,' instead of 
 Intension. The terms to be remembered, however, are Extension 
 or Denotation, and Intension or Connotation. 
 
 It is useful to accustom ourselves to distinguish these 
 two functions or uses of a term, to notice, that is, the 
 things or classes of things to which the name applies, 
 and also to reflect upon the signification, or ways of judg- 
 ing about these things, for which the name stands. The 
 Extension of a term, as has been said, indicates the 
 objects to which a name applies, and the Intension the 
 qualities or attributes which it signifies. From the point 
 of view of extension, therefore, ' planet ' may be defined 
 by mentioning the names of the various planets, Mer- 
 cury, Venus, the Earth, Mars, etc. Similarly, a term 
 like 'carnivora' might be given in extension by nam-
 
 1 6. EXTENSION AND INTENSION OF TERMS 57 
 
 ing seals, bears, weasels, dogs, wolves, cats, lions, etc. 
 Usually, however, we define from the point of view of 
 intension, that is, by stating the qualities or character- 
 istics for which the term stands. Thus we give the 
 intensive meaning of ' planet,' as a heavenly body which 
 revolves in an elliptical orbit round the sun. ' Car- 
 nivora,' defined from the same point of view, are mam- 
 malian vertebrates which feed upon flesh. It is not 
 unusual, however, to supplement an intensive definition 
 by turning to extension and enumerating examples. 
 Thus we might add to the definition of 'carnivora' just 
 given, the words, ' as lions, tigers, dogs, etc.' 
 
 It is sometimes said that the intension and extension 
 of terms vary inversely. This is simply an attempt to 
 give a mathematical form of statement to the fact that 
 the more a term is defined, or limited, by the addition of 
 attributes, the fewer are the objects to which it applies. 
 ' As the intension of a term is increased its extension is 
 diminished, and vice -versa,' is the form in which the 
 relation is often stated. For example, let us begin 
 with some class-name like 'animal,' which has a great 
 extension, and add a new attribute, 'rational.' We get 
 ' rational animal ' = man. This term now applies to a 
 much smaller number of individuals than 'animal.' The 
 extension of the former term has been diminished, that 
 is, by increasing the intenJ\i.. If we add to 'man' still 
 another attribute like 'vinte,' we .again lessen the num- 
 ber of individuals to which the term applies. In gen- 
 eral, then, it can be seen that the extension of a term 
 is lessened as it is made more definite by the addition 
 of new attributes. And, conversely, by stripping off
 
 58 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TERMS 
 
 attributes, by ' decreasing the intension,' the number 
 of individuals to which a term applies is increased. 
 There is, however, no exact ratio between the increase 
 or decrease of intension and the corresponding change 
 in extension. Indeed, the extension of a class may 
 increase greatly without any loss of intension on the 
 part of the term by which the idea is expressed. Thus 
 the meaning or intension of the term ' man ' has not 
 lost, but rather gained, during the last hundred years by 
 the increase of population throughout the world. 
 
 Extension and intension, according to the view just 
 given, represent two different uses or functions of terms. 
 Every term denotes some object or group of objects 
 more or less directly, and at the same time connotes or 
 signifies certain qualities or attributes. Sometimes the 
 one purpose, sometimes the other, is the predominant 
 one. Proper names, for example, are used primarily 
 to denote or mark out things, and do not directly 
 qualify or describe them. In the proposition, 'these 
 animals are all vertebrates,' the predicate term ' verte- 
 brates ' is employed less as a name of a number of 
 animals, than as a description of their qualities. Never- 
 theless, in both these cases the terms employed have the 
 double function of naming or denoting objects, and of 
 connoting qualities. 
 
 Mill, however, and certaVpother logicians who follow 
 him, make a distinction betftsim connotative and non- 
 connotative terms. " A non-connotative term is one 
 which signifies a subject only, or an attribute only. A 
 connotative term is one which denotes a subject, and 
 implies an attribute. By a subject is here meant any-
 
 16. EXTENSION AND INTENSION OF TERMS 59 
 
 thing which possesses attributes. Thus ' John,' or ' Lon- 
 don,' or ' England ' are names which signify a subject 
 only. 'Whiteness,' 'length,' 'virtue,' signify an attribute 
 only. None of these names, therefore, are connotative. 
 But 'white,' 'long,' 'virtuous,' are -connotative. The 
 word ' white ' connotes all white things, as snow, paper, 
 the foam of the sea, etc., and implies or, as it was termed 
 by the schoolmen, connotes the attribute whiteness. . . . 
 All concrete general names are connotative. The word 
 'man,' for example, denotes Peter, James, John, and an 
 indefinite number of other individuals, of whom, taken 
 as a class, it is the name. But it is applied to them 
 because they possess, and to signify that they possess, 
 certain attributes." 1 
 
 There is no real ground, I think, for such an abso- 
 lute distinction between connotative and non-connota- 
 tive terms. When we consider the use or function of 
 terms, we find that they are never used merely to name 
 things, or merely to connote attributes, though in cer- 
 tain cases the former purpose is the primary one, and 
 in other cases the latter object is more prominent. 
 Even when proper names are employed, the qualities or 
 characteristics of the objects named are indirectly im- 
 plied. The very fact that a proper name is given to 
 an object implies that it possesses a certain definitely 
 marked individuality. And a proper name when used 
 intelligently carries with it some still more definite im- 
 formation regarding the qualities of the thing to which 
 it is applied, as, for example, whether it is a name of a 
 person, an animal, or a place. 
 
 1 Mill, System of Logic, Bk. I. Ch. II. 5.
 
 6O THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TERMS 
 
 The reader may consult, in connection with this 
 chapter : 
 
 J. S. Mill, Logic, Bk. I. Ch. II. 
 
 F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, pp. 155-173. 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I., pp. 46-71. 
 
 " " The Essentials of Logic, Lecture V.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 DEFINITION AND DIVISION 
 
 17. Fixing the Meaning of Terms. --We have al- 
 ready referred to the necessity of definitely fixing the 
 meaning of the terms which we employ in reasoning. 
 In ordinary life, words are frequently used in a loose 
 and shifting way, without any clear conception of the 
 qualities or properties which they connote, or of the 
 objects to which they apply. Logic demands, in 
 the first place, that we shall have clear and definite 
 ideas corresponding to our words, and that the signifi- 
 cation and scope of the latter shall be carefully deter- 
 mined. But this is a demand to which little attention 
 is paid in the ordinary affairs of life. To define our 
 terms in explicit language, or even to make clear to 
 ourselves the ideas and things for which they stand, is 
 by no means a natural or a universal mode of proced- 
 ure, but something which requires a distinct, conscious 
 effort. 
 
 Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and nearly all of the 
 older philosophical writers have warned us against the 
 abuse of words. The whole matter has been expressed 
 very clearly by Locke, from whom I quote the follow- 
 ing passage : 
 
 " For he that should well consider the errors and 
 obscurity, the mistakes and confusion, that are spread 
 
 61
 
 62 DEFINITION AND DIVISION 
 
 in the world by an ill use of words will find some 
 reason to doubt whether language, as it has been 
 employed, has contributed more to the improvement 
 or hindrance of knowledge amongst mankind. How 
 many are there, that when they would think on things 
 fix their thoughts only on words, especially when they 
 would apply their minds to moral matters ; and who 
 then can wonder if the result of such contemplations 
 and reasonings, whilst the ideas they annex to them 
 are very confused and very unsteady, or perhaps none 
 at all ; who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and 
 reasonings end in nothing but obscurity and mistake, 
 without any clear judgment or knowledge ? 
 
 " This inconvenience in an ill use of words men suffer 
 in their own private meditations ; but much more 
 manifest are the discords which follow from it in con- 
 versation, discourse, and arguments with others. For 
 language being the great conduit whereby men convey 
 their discoveries, reasonings, and knowledge from one 
 to another; he that makes an ill use of it, though he 
 does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge which are 
 in things themselves ; yet he does, as much as in him 
 lies, break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to 
 the public use and advantage of mankind." l 
 
 The remedy for the obscurities and confusions of 
 words is to be found in clear and distinct ideas. We 
 must endeavour to go behind the words and realize 
 clearly and distinctly in consciousness the ideas for 
 which they stand. Now the means which logic re- 
 
 1 Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. III. Ch. XI.
 
 i8. DEFINITION 63 
 
 commends for the attainment of this end is definition. 
 The first requirement of logical reasoning is that terms 
 shall be accurately defined. There are, however, two 
 ways in which the meaning of a term may be defined 
 or explained. Every term, as we have already seen 
 ( 1 6), may be regarded either from the point of view 
 of intension, or from that of extension. To define in 
 the narrower sense is to explain from the standpoint 
 of intension, to state the attributes or qualities which 
 are connoted by the term. The process of explaining 
 terms with reference to the objects, or classes of objects, 
 for which they stand is known as Division. We may 
 include, then, under the general term definition, (i) In- 
 tensive definition, or definition in the narrower sense, 
 and (2) Extensive definition or division. 
 
 1 8. Definition. To define a term is to state its 
 connotation, or to enumerate the attributes which it 
 implies. Thus we define a parallelogram as a quadri- 
 lateral figure whose opposite sides are parallel. A 
 distinction is often made between verbal and real defi- 
 nition. When we merely wish to explain the mean- 
 ing in which we intend to employ some term, we have 
 verbal definition. But when it is the purpose of our 
 assertion to state the real nature or essential character- 
 istics of some object, the proposition employed is said 
 to constitute a real definition. This distinction, though 
 not without importance, cannot, I think, be regarded as 
 ultimate. For we never define a word or term for its 
 own sake merely, but in order to understand the nature 
 of the objects to which it refers. Indeed, a mere word,
 
 64 DEFINITION AND DIVISION 
 
 apart from the things for which it stands, has no inter- 
 est for us. In denning a term, then, we are always 
 attempting to explicate or explain, more or less directly, 
 the nature of a thing, or our idea about a thing. 
 
 Nevertheless, there is an advantage in distinguishing 
 propositions whose immediate purpose is to expound 
 the meaning of a word, from those which assert some- 
 thing directly of an object. ' Monarchy consists in the 
 authority of one man over others,' may be regarded as 
 a verbal definition, because the purpose of the propo- 
 sition is simply to explain the meaning of the subject 
 term. On the other hand, ' iron is malleable ' is a real 
 definition (though not a complete one), because it does 
 not primarily refer to the signification of the word 
 ' iron,' but to the real object to which the name is ap- 
 plied. 
 
 In this connection, it is interesting to notice that a proposition 
 which amounts to nothing more then a verbal definition, is some- 
 times put forward as if it were an assertion which contained some 
 real knowledge. The solemn commonplaces in which ignorant per- 
 sons delight are often of this character. ' A republic is a govern- 
 ment by the people, 1 ' a just man will do what is right, 1 ' if it rains, 
 the ground will be wet, 1 may serve as examples. The mistake in 
 such cases consists in supposing that these assertions are anything 
 more than verbal. 
 
 There are two points of view from which the subject 
 of definition may be considered. We might either 
 discuss the best method of obtaining real definitions of 
 the nature of things^ or might confine our attention to 
 the requirements which a good definition has to fulfil. 
 A person's ability to define either a term, or the thing
 
 1 8. DEFINITION 65 
 
 for which the term stands, depends, however, upon the 
 possession of clear and distinct ideas on the subject. 
 The problem, then, as to the best method of finding 
 definitions, resolves itself into an inquiry concerning 
 the means to be used in obtaining and classifying our 
 ideas in general ; and the answer to this question, so 
 far as an answer can be given, must be found in the 
 theory of logic as a whole. In our treatment of the 
 subject we shall, therefore, confine our attention mainly 
 to a consideration of the requirements of a logical 
 definition, and the rules which must be observed in 
 stating it in language. 
 
 Before entering upon the subject, however, it is in- 
 teresting to refer briefly to the method proposed by 
 Socrates for obtaining definitions. Socrates, as we 
 have already seen ( 5), was the first to emphasize 
 the necessity of defining and fixing the meaning of 
 familiar terms. He found that, though the people of 
 Athens were constantly using terms like 'good,' 'beau- 
 tiful,' 'justice,' and 'temperance,' none of them, not 
 even those with the greatest reputation for wisdom, were 
 able to give any clear and consistent statement of what 
 these terms implied. Socrates himself did not profess 
 to be wiser than the rest, but he had a genuine spirit 
 of inquiry, and made it the business of his life to try to 
 arrive at clear conceptions, especially with regard to 
 certain fundamental ethical virtues, like justice, and 
 temperance, and wisdom, which he regarded as of the 
 utmost practical importance. It was by means of con- 
 versation with others that he sought to gain clear 
 ideas regarding the nature of these virtues. By a 
 r
 
 66 DEFINITION AND DIVISION 
 
 series of questions and answers, by comparison of 
 any definition proposed with particular facts which are 
 admitted, he led his interlocutors to expose and refute 
 the inadequacies of their earlier statements. In the 
 Republic, for example, the question is regarding the 
 nature of justice. The first definition suggested is, 
 that it is just 'to speak the truth, and to restore to 
 each man his own.' But supposing that a man were 
 out of his mind and demanded his weapons which had 
 been placed in the hands of a friend, would the friend 
 be an unjust man if he refused to return the weapons, 
 or abstained from telling the whole truth ? Evidently 
 not. The definition is then modified to read, ' It is just 
 to give to each man what is his due.' Socrates then 
 questions further, What is due to each man ? What is 
 due to a friend, and what to an enemy ? This leads to 
 the further modification that 'justice means doing good 
 to our friends and harm to our enemies.' By referring 
 again to particular instances and familiar analogies, 
 Socrates leads the person maintaining this definition 
 to admit that to injure a person is to make him less 
 virtuous, and therefore less just. But how can justice 
 render the character of another less just than it was 
 before ? The idea is absurd ; therefore the definition 
 has to be abandoned, and a fresh start made. 
 
 This method of proceeding by means of question and 
 answer, and thus compelling a speaker to admit par- 
 ticular facts which refute the general thesis which he 
 is maintaining, is called Dialectic. This was the means 
 by which Socrates constantly strove to advance to consis- 
 tent and adequate definitions. Apart from the dialectical
 
 1 8. DEFINITION 6/ 
 
 and dramatic form which the Socratic argument took, 
 the method employed is essentially that of induction. 
 For the definition, or conception, is derived from a com- 
 parison of particular instances, both positive and nega- 
 tive. By a consideration of individual cases, Socrates 
 sought to obtain a definition which would be a complete 
 and adequate expression of the nature of all the individ- 
 uals which share in the class name. Aristotle says that 
 it is to Socrates we owe the method of induction and 
 logical definitions. Clear and distinct conceptions, for- 
 mulated in exact definitions, constituted the scientific 
 goal for Socrates, and the inductive procedure of ob- 
 serving and classifying particular instances was the 
 means which he employed for reaching this goal. 
 
 The second question has reference to the formulation 
 of a definition in language. Suppose that we already 
 possess a clear conception of the meaning of the terms 
 to be defined, what are the conditions which a logical 
 definition must fulfil ? The answer to this question is 
 usually given in logical text-books by means of a set 
 of rules for definition. Before stating these rules, how- 
 ever, it is necessary to explain the meaning of the terms 
 'genus,' 'species,' and 'differentia,' which will be fre- 
 quently employed throughout the remainder of this 
 chapter. These terms, together with ' property ' and 
 'accident,' constitute what the older logicians call the 
 predicables, and to which a great deal of importance 
 was supposed to belong. It will only be necessary, 
 however, for us to consider briefly the signification of 
 the first three terms.
 
 68 DEFINITION AND DIVISION 
 
 In logic, any term may be regarded as a genus which 
 contains two or more subordinate classes or species. 
 A species, on the other hand, is simply a subdivision or 
 subordinate class of some larger whole. Thus ' metal ' 
 is a genus with reference to iron, gold, silver, etc., 
 which are its species. ' Rectilinear figure ' is the genus 
 to which belong the various species, triangle, quadri- 
 lateral, pentagon, etc. The differentia of any term is 
 made up of the qualities or characteristics which dis- 
 tinguish it from other terms, from the genus to which 
 it belongs, as well as from the species which are co- 
 ordinate with it. Thus the logical differentia of a 
 triangle, is the property of having three sides, the dif- 
 ferentia of man, is that which distinguishes him from 
 other animals, whether this be the power of speech and 
 reason, or some other characteristic either physical or 
 mental. 
 
 The use of the terms 'genus' and 'species' in logic is 
 entirely relative. That is, any term may be considered 
 either as a species or a genus, according as it is regarded 
 as forming a part of some more comprehensive class, or 
 as itself including other classes. Thus man, for example, 
 is a species of the genus ' animal ' ; but the same term 
 also may be regarded as a genus including various species 
 of men, Caucasians, Negroes, Mongolians, etc. In the 
 same way, ' animal ' may be considered a species of the 
 still more comprehensive class 'organized being,' and 
 this latter term again as a species of the genus ' material 
 being.' A still higher or more comprehensive term 
 which includes as its species material and spiritual 
 beings alike is 'being.' Since this term includes every-
 
 i8. DEFINITION 69 
 
 thing which exists, and can therefore never be included 
 in any more ' general class, it is sometimes called the 
 highest genus ' (summum genus}. On the other hand, 
 we might proceed downwards until we come to a class 
 which did not admit of division into any subordinate 
 classes. Such -a term is called in logic the lowest 
 species (infima species}. 
 
 It is important to notice that the terms ' genus ' and ' species ' have 
 not the same signification in logic as in the natural sciences. In 
 classifying objects in natural history, we use the terms 'variety,' 
 ' species, ' genus, 1 ' family,' and ' order,' to denote varying degrees of 
 relationship between certain groups or classes of objects. These 
 terms, as thus employed, also indicate certain relatively fixed divi- 
 sions, or permanent ways of grouping the various forms of plant and 
 animal life. But in logic the terms ' genus' and 'species' are em- 
 ployed to indicate the relationship between any higher and lower 
 class whatsoever. Moreover, as we have seen, any term (excepting 
 only the highest genus and the lowest species) may be regarded 
 from different standpoints, as either a genus or a species. 
 
 We shall now proceed to state the requirements of a 
 logical definition : 
 
 (l) A definition should state the essential attributes 
 of the thing to be defined. This is done by stating the 
 genus to which the object belongs, and also the pecul- 
 iar marks or qualities by means of which it is distin- 
 guished from other members of the same class. Or 
 as the rule is usually stated : A logical definition 
 should give the next or proximate genus, and the dif- 
 ferentia of the species to be defined. Thus we define 
 a triangle as a rectilinear figure (genus), having three 
 sides (differentia) ; and man as an animal (genus), which 
 has the power of speech and reason (differentia).
 
 70 DEFINITION AND DIVISION 
 
 (2) A definition should not contain the name to be 
 defined, nor any word which is directly synonymous with 
 it. If, for example, we were to define justice as the 
 way of acting justly, or life as the sum of vital pro- 
 cesses, we should be guilty of a violation of this rule. 
 
 (3) The definition should be exactly equivalent to the 
 class of objects defined, that is, it must be neither too 
 broad nor too narrow. In other words, the definition 
 must take account of the whole class and nothing but 
 the class. ' A sensation is an elementary state of con- 
 sciousness,' for example, is too broad a definition, since 
 it applies equally to affective and conative elementary 
 processes. On the other hand, the definition of gov- 
 ernment as 'an institution created by the people for 
 the protection of their lives and liberties,' is too nar- 
 row. For it takes no account of absolute forms of 
 government which do not depend upon the will of the 
 people. Both of these cases may be regarded as a 
 failure to give the true differentia of the class to be 
 defined, and hence as violations of the first rule. 
 
 (4) A definition should not be expressed in obscure, 
 figurative, or ambiguous language. The reasons for 
 this rule are at once evident. Any lack of clearness 
 or definiteness in a definition renders it useless as an 
 explanation. Sometimes the words used in defining 
 may be less familiar than the term to be explained 
 (ignotum per ignotius\ The definition which was once 
 given of the word 'net' as 'a reticulated texture with 
 large interstices or meshes,' may serve as an example. 
 
 (5) A definition should, whenever possible, be affirma- 
 tive rather than negative. A definition, that is, should
 
 19. DIVISION 71 
 
 state what a term implies rather than what it does not 
 imply. Sometimes, however, the purpose of a defini- 
 tion may be best attained by a negative statement of 
 what is excluded by the meaning of the term. Thus, 
 for example, we may define a spiritual being as a being 
 which is not material, that is, unlike a material body 
 made up of parts extended in space. 
 
 A logical definition, as has been said, requires us to mention the 
 proximate genus or next higher class to which the species to be defined 
 belongs, and also the specific or characteristic differences which dis- 
 tinguish it from other species. Now it is clear that there are certain 
 cases in which these conditions cannot be fulfilled. In the first 
 place, no logical definition can be given of the highest genus, be- 
 cause there is no more general class to which it can be referred. 
 And again, although it is possible to give the differentia of any 
 species such as ' man ' or ' metal,' it is not possible to state indi- 
 vidual characteristics by means of a logical definition. An indi- 
 vidual thing may be perceived, and its various properties pointed 
 out. But it is never possible to state in a logical definition wherein 
 the individuality of a particular thing consists. The uniqueness of 
 a particular object cannot be summed up in a -general definition, but 
 must be learned through perception. We may perhaps say that the 
 highest genus is above, and the individual thing below, the sphere of 
 logical definition. 
 
 There are, moreover, other terms such as 'space,' 'time, 1 'life,' 
 'thought,' which are not readily referred to any higher class, and 
 for which therefore logical definitions cannot be given. These 
 terms are sometimes said to denote objects which are sui generis, 
 or of their own class. 
 
 19. Division. We have already spoken of divi- 
 sion as a process of defining a term from the point of 
 view of extension. This is to enumerate the objects 
 or classes of objects which the term denotes. This
 
 72 DEFINITION AND DIVISION 
 
 enumeration must, however, be guided by certain prin 
 ciples which we have now to consider. 
 
 It is usual to begin this subject by speaking of Di- 
 chotomy, or the division of a term into two parts (S/%a 
 re/jiveiv, to cut in two). This is a purely formal process, 
 and is based on the so-called law of Excluded Middle, 
 which is regarded as one of the fundamental laws of 
 thought. This law may be stated as follows: There 
 is no middle ground between contradictories. Any term, 
 a, is either b or not-. A triangle is either equilateral or 
 not-equilateral. Of two contradictory predicates, one or 
 the other must belong to every possible subject. 
 
 Now it is clear that this is a purely formal principle 
 of division. Some positive knowledge of the particular 
 facts involved is always necessary, in order to enable 
 one to determine what things do stand in this relation 
 of logical opposition. The logical law, in other words, 
 does not help us at all in deciding what may be re- 
 garded as not-a in any particular case. It is not, there- 
 fore, a means of increasing our knowledge, but merely 
 a principle of order and arrangement. This fact, obvi- 
 ous as it seems, was not understood by the Schoolmen 
 who busied themselves with logic in the latter part of 
 the Middle Ages. They clung firmly to the belief that 
 it was possible to discover the nature of particular facts 
 by purely formal operations of this kind. Accordingly, 
 they spent a great deal of time in classifying and arrang- 
 ing terms as contradictions, contraries, etc. This work 
 was doubtless of much service in fixing the meaning of 
 terms, and in preventing confusion in their employment. 
 But it was a purely verbal investigation, and of course
 
 ig. DIVISION 73 
 
 could not lead to any discoveries regarding the nature 
 of things. 
 
 Moreover, it must be noticed that we do not always 
 get propositions to which any meaning can be attached 
 by uniting subjects and predicates in this way. If the 
 law of Dichotomy is not guided by knowledge of the 
 particular facts, it will give absurd propositions like, 
 'virtue is either square or not-square/ 'iron is either 
 pious or not-pious.' Unmeaning propositions of this 
 kind being left out of account, however, we may proceed 
 to divide everything according to this principle. All 
 geometrical figures are either rectilinear or not-rec- 
 tilinear ; all rectilinear figures either triangular or not- 
 triangular ; all triangles, equilateral or not-equilateral, etc. 
 This method of division may be represented thus : 
 
 Substance 
 
 Material non-material 
 
 I 
 
 r^ j 
 
 Organic not-organic 
 
 I I 
 
 mineral not-mineral 
 
 gold not-gold 
 
 If it were desirable, the terms 'non-material,' 'organic,' 
 and 'not-mineral' might also be further subdivided in 
 the same way. 
 
 Now it is not difficult to see that the practical use of 
 this principle will depend upon our ability to find some 
 positive value for the negative not-a. That is, to make 
 the law of more than formal value, we must know what
 
 74 DEFINITION AND DIVISION 
 
 concrete term excludes a, or is its logical contradictory. 
 And knowledge of this kind comes, as already said, only 
 from experience of the particular facts. The strictly 
 logical contradictory of a is always not-a ; of wise, not- 
 wise, of cold, not-cold, etc. Mistakes frequently arise in 
 stating contradictories in a positive form. The difficulty 
 is that terms are chosen which are not true logical con- 
 tradictories. Thus, if we say that every man is either 
 wise or foolish, our terms are not contradictory, for a 
 middle ground between them is possible. The same 
 would be true of divisions like, 'large or small,' 'rich or 
 poor,' 'saint or sinner,' 'idle or diligent.' In general, 
 it is safe to scrutinize all dichotomic divisions very 
 sharply to see that the alternatives are really contra- 
 dictories. 
 
 The method of dichotomy depends, as we have seen, 
 upon the law of Excluded Middle. But there is also 
 another process called Division in logic, which is per- 
 haps better known by its less technical name of Classi- 
 fication. In classification, there is no necessary limit 
 to the number of classes or divisions which may be ob- 
 tained. In this respect, it of course differs fundamentally 
 from the twofold division which we have been exam- 
 ining. Furthermore, a classification is always made 
 according to some principle which is retained through- 
 out the whole process. Any common characteristic of 
 the group of individuals to be divided may be taken as a 
 principle of classification. If, however, the characteristic 
 chosen is merely an external and accidental one, the 
 classification based upon it will be regarded as artificial, 
 and made for some special or temporary purposes,
 
 19- DIVISION 75 
 
 Thus we might divide all flowering plants according to 
 the color of the flowers, or the persons in any company 
 according to the pattern of their shoes. A classification 
 which proceeds upon such surface distinctions has, of 
 course, no real or scientific value. It does not attempt 
 to discover fundamental or deep-lying resemblances be- 
 tween the individuals with which it deals. 
 
 A scientific or natural classification, on the other hand, 
 has for its purpose the discovery of real likeness or resem- 
 blance. It seeks to find and group together, the things 
 which are related in some essential point. Consequently, 
 it selects as its principle of division some property which 
 appears to be a real mark of individuality, and to be 
 connected with changes in other properties. Such a 
 real principle of natural classification is rarely found 
 by comparison of merely one property or set of prop- 
 erties in the things to be compared. To classify accord- 
 ing to a single property may be a convenient method 
 of giving names to any group of individuals, and of 
 arranging them in such a way as to be useful to the 
 student. It does not, however, give any adequate idea 
 of the properties and true relations of the individuals 
 compared. A really scientific, or natural, classification 
 must be based upon a study and comparison of all 
 the discoverable properties of the different individuals 
 to be classified. It is only in this way that their real 
 resemblance and affinities can be brought to light. 
 
 (i) The classification of plants proposed by the famous Swedish 
 botanist, Karl Linnaeus (1707-1778), was based upon the comparison 
 of a single feature : the structure of the sexual organs of plants. This 
 method proved of the greatest convenience in indexing plants in a
 
 76 DEFINITION AND DIVISION 
 
 convenient way into genera and species so that they could be named 
 and described. Yet since the classification adopted was based upon 
 a single property or feature of the plant, it was considered (even by 
 Linnaeus himself) as merely artificial. Of course it is not so obvi- 
 ously artificial as the examples of what we may perhaps call merely 
 accidental or trivial classification given above. But Linnnsus's 
 system did not aim at setting forth the true relations of plants, and it 
 was not based upon any systematic study of all their properties. It 
 is useful merely as a stepping-stone to the real study of plants which 
 is presupposed in natural classification. 
 
 Certain rules for division are usually given in con- 
 nection with the treatment of this subject. It is not, 
 of course, supposed that by their help one can properly 
 divide any subject without special knowledge. The 
 purpose of these rules is rather to warn against the 
 logical errors to which one is most liable in the process 
 of division. 
 
 (1) Every division is made on the ground of differ- 
 ences in some attribute (or attributes) common to all 
 the members of the whole to be divided. 
 
 (2) Every division must be based on a single prin- 
 ciple or ground (fundamentum divisionis). 
 
 (3) The constituent species (or groups into which the 
 whole is divided) must not overlap, but must be mutually 
 exclusive. 
 
 (4) The division must be exhaustive, i.e., the con- 
 stituent species must be equal, when added together, 
 to the genus. 
 
 The first rule requires no remark. It simply states 
 that it is only possible to divide any whole on the basis 
 of differences in something which is common to all its 
 parts. The second rule warns against changing the
 
 i 9 . DIVISION 77 
 
 principle of division while the process is being carried 
 out. This law would be violated, if, for example, one 
 were to divide mankind into Caucasians, Negroes, Mon- 
 golians, Europeans, Australians, and Americans. The 
 principle of division which was first adopted in this 
 example was obviously that of the color of the skin. 
 But this principle was not carried through, and another 
 principle, that of geographical distribution, was substi- 
 tuted for it. In dividing one must be clearly conscious 
 of the principle which one is using, and keep a firm 
 hold of it until the division is completed. The example 
 which we have just given also violates the third rule. 
 For not all of the groups, European, Caucasian, etc., 
 exclude one another. Similarly, it would not be good 
 logic to divide animals into vertebrates, mammals, in- 
 sects, birds, molluscs, and fishes. The fourth rule 
 simply insists that the division must be complete. The 
 whole must be completely included in its divisions. It 
 would not be a complete division to say that books may 
 be divided into folios, quartos, and duodecimos ; or 
 vertebrates into mammals and birds. For in neither 
 of these examples are the divisions enumerated equal 
 to the whole class. 
 
 References 
 
 J. S. Mill, Logic, Bk. I. Chs. VII. and VIII. 
 
 W. Minto, Logic Inductive and Deductive, Pt. II. pp. 82-130. 
 
 C. Sigwart, Logic, Vol. I. 42-44. 
 
 J. H. Hyslop, The Elements of Logic, Ch. VI.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 PROPOSITIONS 
 
 20. The Nature of a Proposition. A proposition is 
 the expression in words of an act of judgment. It is 
 composed, as we have already seen, of two terms, a 
 subject and a predicate, connected by a copula. From 
 the point of view of formal logic the predicate is affirmed 
 (or denied) of the subject. When we come to consider 
 the nature of judgment (cf. especially 74, 77), we 
 shall find reasons for questioning whether this analy- 
 sis of the proposition can be taken as furnishing a cor- 
 rect account of what actually takes place in judgment. 
 When we judge, we do not begin with words or terms 
 which are not yet judgments, and then pass on to judg- 
 ment by joining together the former in an external way. 
 The conclusions which we shall have to adopt are, that 
 terms represent ways of judging, that the simplest 
 act of thought is already a judgment, and that thinking 
 develops by advancing from incomplete to more com- 
 plete and comprehensive judgments. The theory of 
 the syllogism is, however, worked out on the view of 
 the proposition already indicated. This is sufficiently 
 accurate for practical purposes, and is not likely to 
 lead to any serious mistakes so long as we remember 
 that it is the proposition, rather than the actual nature 
 of judgment, with which we are dealing. 
 
 78
 
 20. THE NATURE OF A PROPOSITION 79 
 
 The logical proposition, as the expression of an act of 
 thought, corresponds to the grammatical sentence. Not 
 every sentence, however, is a logical proposition. Sen- 
 tences which express a wish or an interrogation do not 
 directly enter into the process of argument at all, and 
 may therefore be neglected for the present The same is 
 true of exclamatory sentences. Again, even indicative 
 sentences frequently require to be rewritten in order to 
 reduce them to the form of a logical proposition, which 
 demands two terms and a copula. The sentence, ' the 
 sun shines,' must, therefore, for purposes of logical 
 treatment, be reduced to, 'the sun is a body which 
 shines.' ' On the hillside deep lies the snow ' is ex- 
 pressed as a logical proposition in some such form as 
 this : ' The snow is a covering lying deep on the hill- 
 side.' It is very important to change the grammatical 
 sentence to the regular form of a proposition before 
 attempting to treat it logically. 
 
 The most general division of propositions is that 
 which classifies them as Categorical and Conditional. A 
 categorical proposition asserts directly, and without any 
 condition. The predicate is either affirmed or de- 
 nied unconditionally of the subject. 'A is B,' 'this 
 room is not cold,' ' New York is the largest city in 
 America,' are examples of categorical propositions. 
 Conditional propositions, on the other hand, make a 
 statement which is not immediately and directly true> 
 but only claims to be true under a condition ; as, e.g., 
 'we shall go to-morrow, if it does not rain.' 'It will 
 either rain or snow to-morrow,' is also a conditional prop- 
 osition ; for neither rain nor snow are asserted directly
 
 80 PROPOSITIONS 
 
 and absolutely, but in each case the appearance of the 
 one is dependent upon the non-appearance of the other. 
 The first of these conditional propositions is known as 
 a Hypothetical, and the latter as a Disjunctive proposi- 
 tion ; but for the present we shall deal only with cate- 
 gorical propositions, and with the form of syllogistic 
 argument to which they give rise. After we have com- 
 pleted the account of the categorical syllogism, however, 
 it will be necessary to return to a consideration of 
 conditional propositions, and to the class of arguments 
 in which they are employed. 
 
 21. The Quality and Quantity of Propositions. We 
 shall now consider the various kinds of categorical prop- 
 ositions. Such propositions are classified with regard to 
 quality and quantity. From the standpoint of quality, 
 propositions are either affirmative or negative. An 
 affirmative proposition is one in which an agreement is 
 affirmed between the subject and predicate, or in which 
 the predicate is asserted of the subject. The proposi- 
 tion, ' snow is white,' for example, indicates such an 
 agreement between the subject and predicate, and is 
 therefore affirmative in quality. A negative proposition 
 indicates a lack of agreement or harmony between the 
 subject and predicate. The predicate does not belong 
 to the subject, but all relation or connection between the 
 two is denied. 'The room is not cold,' 'the trees are not 
 yet in full leaf,' are examples of negative propositions. 
 
 The quantity of a proposition is determined by the 
 extension of the subject. When the proposition refers 
 to all of the individuals denoted by the subject, it is said
 
 21. THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF PROPOSITIONS 8 1 
 
 to be universal in quantity. When, on the other hand, 
 the proposition affirms that the predicate belongs only 
 to a part of the subject, it is said to be particular. For 
 example, ' all metals are elements ' is a universal propo- 
 sition, because the assertion is made of the subject in 
 its widest or fullest extent ; ' some metals are white ' is 
 a particular proposition, because reference is made to 
 only a part of the subject 'metal.' 
 
 We divide propositions, then, with regard to quantity, 
 into Universal and Particular propositions. Universal 
 propositions are often indicated by adjectives like 'all,' 
 ' the whole,' ' every,' etc. It frequently happens, how- 
 ever, that no such mark of universality is present. A 
 scientific law is usually stated without any explicit 
 statement of its quantity, though from its very nature it 
 is meant to be universal. Thus we say, 'the planets 
 revolve around the sun,'' 'comets are subject to the law 
 of gravitation.' Propositions which have a singular or 
 an individual name as subject are often called Individual 
 propositions, as, e.g., 'the earth is a planet,' 'knowledge 
 is power.' But since it is impossible to limit a singular 
 subject, individual propositions are to be regarded as 
 universal. They belong, that is, to the class of propo- 
 sitions which employ the subject term in its complete 
 extent. 
 
 Another class, called Indefinite or Indesignate propo- 
 sitions, has sometimes been proposed. This class is 
 usually said to include propositions in which the form 
 of the words does not give any indication whether the 
 predicate is used of the whole, or only of a part of the 
 Subject.- ' Men are to be trusted,' ' animals are capable
 
 o2 PROPOSITIONS 
 
 of self-movement,' may serve as examples. This classi- 
 fication may be useful in illustrating the evil of making 
 indefinite or ambiguous statements. Otherwise there 
 is nothing to be learned from it. A really indefinite 
 proposition has no place in an argument, and logic 
 rightfully refuses to deal with it. The first demand of 
 logic is that our statements shall be clear and precise. 
 A proposition is not necessarily indefinite, however, 
 because it has no qualifying words like 'all' or 'some.' 
 It is the meaning of a proposition as a whole, rather 
 than the form of its subject, which renders it definite 
 or indefinite. Where, on the other hand, it is really im- 
 possible to decide whether the proposition is universal 
 or particular, logic forbids us to proceed with the 
 argument until this point has been made clear. 
 
 Particular propositions are usually preceded by some 
 word or phrase which shows that the subject is limited 
 in the extent of its application. The logical sign of 
 particular propositions is 'some,' but other qualifying 
 words and phrases, such as 'the greatest part,' 'nearly 
 all/ ' several,' ' a small number,' etc., also indicate par- 
 ticularity. Here again, however, it is the meaning of 
 the proposition, rather than its form, which is to be 
 considered. ' All metals are not white,' for example, is 
 a particular proposition, although introduced by 'all,' 
 since it is clearly equivalent to 'some metals are not 
 white.' 'Every mark of weakness is not a disgrace,' 
 again, is a particular proposition, and signifies that ' not 
 all, or some marks of weakness are not disgraceful.' 
 
 The words ' few ' and ' a few ' require special atten- 
 tion. The latter, as in the proposition, ' a few persons
 
 22. DIFFICULTIES IN CLASSIFICATION 83 
 
 have spoken to me about it,' is equivalent to 'some,' 
 and introduces a particular affirmative proposition. 
 ' Few,' on the other hand, is negative in character. 
 Thus, ' few were saved from the shipwreck ' implies that 
 only a few were saved, or that the greater number did 
 not escape, and the proposition is therefore to be con- 
 sidered as a particular negative. Propositions, then, 
 are classified as affirmative and negative in Quality, 
 universal and particular in Quantity. When these classi- 
 fications are combined, we get four kinds of propositions, 
 to symbolize which the vowels A, E, I, O are employed. 
 A and I, the vowels contained in affirmo, stand for 
 affirmative propositions ; E and O, the vowels in nego, 
 for negative propositions. This may be represented as 
 follows : 
 
 Affirmative: All S is P A 
 
 Negative: No S is P. E 
 
 Affirmative : Some S is P. I 
 
 Negative : Some S is not P. O 
 
 We shall henceforth use A, E, I, and O to represent 
 respectively a universal affirmative, a universal negative, 
 a particular affirmative, and a particular negative propo- 
 sition. In dealing with propositions logically, the first 
 step is to reduce them to one or other of these four 
 types. This can be accomplished readily by noticing 
 the distinctions previously laid down. There are, how- 
 ever, certain grammatical forms and sentences which 
 present some difficulty, and it may therefore be useful 
 to consider them separately. 
 
 22. Difficulties in Classification. In the first place, 
 we may notice that in ordinary language the terms 
 
 Universal < 
 Particular <
 
 84 PROPOSITIONS 
 
 of a proposition are frequently inverted, or its parts 
 separated in such a way that it requires attention to 
 determine its true logical order. In the proposition, 
 'now came still evening on,' for example, the subject 
 ' still evening ' stands between two portions of the 
 predicate. As a logical proposition, the sentence would 
 have to be expressed in some such form as the follow- 
 ing : ' Still evening is the time which now came on.' 
 Similarly, we should have to write an inverted sentence 
 like, ' deep lies the snow on the mountain/ as ' the snow 
 is something which lies deep on the mountain.' 
 
 If a subject is qualified by a relative clause, the verb 
 of the latter must not be confused with the main asser- 
 tion of the proposition. Take the sentence, ' he is brave 
 who conquers his passions.' Here it is evident that the 
 relative clause describes or qualifies ' he.' Logically, 
 then, the proposition is of the form A, and is to be 
 written, ' he who conquers his passions is brave.' The 
 reader will notice that all propositions which begin with 
 pronouns like 'he who,' 'whoever,' etc., are universal 
 in quantity, since they mean all who belong to the 
 class in question. 
 
 (i) We have reduced grammatical sentences to logical propo- 
 sitions by changing the form in such a way as to have two terms 
 united by ' is ' or ' are ' as the copula. Such a proposition, however, 
 does not express time, but simply the relation existing between 
 subject and predicate. When the grammatical sentence does 
 involve a reference to time, and especially to past or future time, 
 the reduction to logical form is somewhat awkward. Perhaps the 
 best method is to throw the verb expressing time into the predi- 
 cate. Thus 'the steamer will sail to-morrow' = 'the steamer is 
 a vessel which will sail to-morrow ' ; ' we waited for you two hours
 
 23. RELATION OF SUBJECT AND PREDICATE 85 
 
 yesterday ' = ' we are persons who waited for you two hours yes- 
 terday.' 
 
 (2) Exclusive propositions exclude all individuals or classes 
 except those mentioned by the use of some such word as ' except,' 
 ' none but,' ' only.' ' None but the guilty fear the judge ' ; ' only 
 citizens can hold property'; 'no admittance except on business.' 
 These propositions may all be reduced to the form E by writing 
 'no' before the negative si the subject term. Thus 'none but the 
 guilty fear the judge ' = <<? one who is not guilty fears the judge ' ; 
 ' only citizens can hold property ' = ' no one who is not a citizen, 
 etc ' ; ' no admittance except on business ' = '#<? person who has not 
 business is to be admitted. 1 
 
 23. Formal Relation of Subject and Predicate. We 
 have now to consider how the relation existing between 
 the terms of a proposition is to be understood. In 16 
 it was shown that every term may be interpreted in two 
 ways : either from the point of view of extension, or 
 from that of intension. Extensively, terms are taken 
 to represent objects or classes of objects ; while their 
 meaning in intension has reference to the attributes 
 or qualities of things. Now the interpretation of the 
 categorical proposition given by formal logic is based 
 entirely on extension. That is, the subject and predi- 
 cate are regarded as standing for individual objects 
 or classes of objects. The question to be considered, 
 then, concerns the extensive relation of these groups of 
 objects in the propositions A, E, I, and O. 
 
 This mode of interpreting propositions must not be 
 taken as furnishing an adequate theory of the nature of 
 the act of judgment which is expressed in the proposi- 
 tion. It leaves entirely out of account, as we have 
 seen, the connection of attributes asserted by the propo-
 
 86 PROPOSITIONS 
 
 sition, which in many cases is the most prominent 
 part of its signification. Thus the proposition, 'all 
 metals are elements,' implies that the quality of being 
 an element is united with the other qualities connoted 
 by the term ' metal.' Indeed, this interpretation is 
 perhaps more natural than the one given by formal 
 logic, namely, that the class of metals is included in 
 the class of elements. It must be admitted that the 
 extensive way of reading propositions, as affirming or 
 denying the inclusion of one class of objects in another 
 class, frequently seems artificial. Nevertheless, it is 
 the view upon which the historical account of the 
 syllogism is founded. And the fact that this mode of 
 representing the meaning of propositions leads in 
 practice to correct conclusions, proves that it is not 
 wholly false. It represents, as we have seen, one side 
 or aspect of the meaning of propositions. 
 
 From the point of view of formal logic, then, a logical 
 proposition signifies that a certain relation exists be- 
 tween the class of things denoted by the subject, and 
 that denoted by the predicate. This relation may be 
 one of inclusion or of exclusion. For example, the prop- 
 osition ' all good men are charitable ' is interpreted to 
 mean that ' good men ' are included in the class of 
 'charitable men.' On the other hand, 'no birds are 
 mammals,' signifies that the two classes, 'birds' and 
 'mammals,' are mutually exclusive. The meanings of 
 the four logical propositions A, E, I, and O may be 
 represented by means of a series of diagrams, which 
 were first used by the celebrated German mathematician 
 Euler, who lived in the eighteenth century.
 
 23. RELATION OF SUBJECT AND PREDICATE 87 
 
 To represent the meaning of a proposition in A, like 
 'all good men are charitable,' we draw a circle to sym- 
 bolize the class of charitable beings, and then place 
 inside it a smaller circle to stand for men. The propo- 
 sition, that is, signifies that ' good men ' are included in 
 the class of 'charitable beings.' The subject belongs 
 to, or falls within, the larger class of objects represented 
 by the predicate. 
 
 FIG. i. 
 / 
 
 It must be carefully noted that proposition A does 
 not usually assert anything of the whole of its predicate. 
 In the example just given, no assertion is made regard- 
 ing the whole class of ' charitable beings,' but only in so 
 far as they are identical with ' good men.' There may 
 possibly be other charitable beings who are not good 
 men, or not men at all. The meaning of the proposition, 
 then, is that ' all good men are some charitable beings.' 
 In other words, the predicate of the ordinary universal 
 affirmative^ proposition is taken only in a partial, or 
 limited extent : nothing is affirmed of the whole of the 
 circle of charitable beings. We denote this fact by 
 saying that the predicate of proposition A is undis*
 
 88 PROPOSITIONS 
 
 tributed. The subject, on the other hand, as a universal 
 term, is employed in its fullest extent, or is distributed. 
 
 In some cases, however, the predicate is not a broader 
 term which includes the subject, but the two are equal 
 in extent. In the proposition, ' all equilateral triangles 
 are equiangular,' for example, this is the case. If we 
 were to represent this proposition graphically, the circle 
 of equilateral triangles would not fall inside that of 
 equilateral triangles, but would coincide with it. The 
 same relation between subject and predicate holds in 
 the case of logical definitions. For example, in the 
 definition, ' monarchy is a form of political government 
 where one man is sovereign,' the subject is coextensive 
 with the whole of the predicate. In examples of this 
 kind, it is of course obvious that the predicate, as well 
 as the subject, is distributed. 
 
 As an example of proposition E, we may take the 
 example, 'no birds are mammals.' The meaning of 
 this proposition is represented graphically by means 
 of two circles falling outside each other as in Fig. 2. 
 
 FIG. 2. 
 
 The proposition asserts that the class of birds falls 
 completely without the class of mammals, that the two 
 classes are entirely distinct, and mutually exclusive.
 
 23. RELATION OF SUBJECT AND PREDICATE 89 
 
 With regard to quantity, the subject is of course uni- 
 versal or distributed. And, in this case, the predicate is 
 also distributed. For the proposition asserts that the 
 subject ' birds ' does not agree with any part of ' mam- 
 mals.' Or, in terms of the diagram, we deny that the 
 circle representing 'birds' corresponds with any portion 
 of the circle 'mammals.' But to exclude the former circle 
 completely from the circle which represents ' mammals,' 
 it is necessary that we know the whole extent of the 
 latter. Otherwise we could not be sure that the sub- 
 ject had not some point in common with it. Proposition 
 E, therefore, distributes, or uses in their widest extent, 
 both subject and predicate. 
 
 FIG. 3. 
 
 The meaning of a proposition in I, as, e.g., 'some 
 birds are web-footed,' is shown by means of two circles 
 intersecting or overlapping as in Fig. 3. A part of the 
 class of birds corresponds with a part of web-footed 
 animals. The proposition has reference to the common 
 segment of the two circles, which may be large or small. 
 The two circles correspond in part at least. In proposi- 
 tion I, both subject and predicate are undistributed. The
 
 90 PROPOSITIONS 
 
 subject is, of course, a particular or limited term. And, 
 as will be clear from what has already been said in the 
 case of proposition A, reference is made to only a 
 limited portion of the predicate. In the example used, 
 the assertion refers only to those web-footed animals 
 which are also birds. Or we may say that the proposi- 
 tion has reference only to the common segment of the 
 circles representing subject and predicate. Nothing is 
 asserted of the other portions of the two circles. In 
 other words, both subject and predicate are employed 
 in a limited extent, or are undistributed. 
 
 ' Some metals are not white,' may serve as an example 
 of proposition O. 
 
 FIG. 4. 
 
 This proposition may be represented graphically as 
 in Fig. 4. Though this is the same form of diagram 
 as that employed in the last figure, the proposition 
 refers now to the outlying part of the circle 'metals.' 
 Some metals, it asserts, do not fall within the sphere of 
 white substances. A larger or smaller section of the 
 circle representing the former term, falls completely 
 without the circle of white substances.
 
 23. RELATION OF SUBJECT AND PREDICATE 91 
 
 It is necessary to notice carefully that although the 
 subject of O is undistributed, its predicate is distributed. 
 For, as we have seen, a part of the subject is completely 
 excluded from the class of 'white substances.' But in 
 order to exclude from every part of the predicate, the 
 full extent of the predicate must be known. Or, in 
 terms of the diagram, the proposition excludes a portion 
 of the circle of metals (some metals) from each and 
 every part of the circle of white things. The latter 
 term must therefore be used in its full extent, or be 
 distributed. 
 
 It is absolutely necessary, in order to comprehend 
 what follows, to understand the distribution of terms 
 in the various propositions. It may help the reader to 
 remember this if we summarize our results in the follow- 
 ing way : 
 
 Proposition A, subject distributed, predicate undistributed. 
 Proposition E, subject distributed, predicate distributed. 
 Proposition I, subject undistributed, predicate undistributed. 
 Proposition O, subject undistributed, predicate distributed. 
 
 References to 23 
 
 W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, pp. 71-75. 
 
 J. S. Mill, Logic, Bk. I. Ch. V. 
 
 C Sigwart, Logic, 5. 
 
 B. Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic, Lectures V. and VI,
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 24. The So-called Process of Immediate Inference. - 
 Many logicians speak of two kinds, or processes of reason- 
 ing, to which they give the names of mediate, and imme- 
 diate inference. Mediate inference, it is said, asserts 
 the agreement or disagreement of a subject and predi- 
 cate after having compared each with some common 
 element or middle term. The conclusion is thus reached 
 mediately or indirectly. The syllogism is the best 
 example of mediate inference. In the syllogism, 
 
 All M is P, 
 All S is M, 
 Therefore S is P, 
 
 the conclusion is reached through the medium of M, 
 with which both S and P have been compared. It will 
 be noticed that to obtaii? a conclusion in this way two 
 propositions or premises are necessary. 
 
 We sometimes are able, however, to pass directly 
 or immediately from one proposition to another. For 
 example, the proposition that 'no men are infallible,' 
 warrants the statement that ' no infallible beings are 
 men.' Or, if we know that it is true that ' some birds are 
 web-footed,' we perceive at once that the proposition, 
 ' no birds are web-footed,' is false. It is this process of 
 passing directly from one proposition to another which 
 has been named by many logicians immediate inference. 
 
 92
 
 24. PROCESS OF IMMEDIATE INFERENCE 93 
 
 Can we be properly said to infer at all when we pass 
 from one proposition to another, as in the above ex- 
 amples ? As we have already shown, inference is a pro- 
 cess of exhibiting the relation of facts to one another by 
 discovering some common element, or connecting prin- 
 ciple by means of which they are united (cf. also 87). 
 Wherever we can discover a connecting thread, or com- 
 mon element between two facts or groups of facts, we 
 are able to infer with greater or less certainty from the 
 nature of the one what the nature of the other must be. 
 But it is essential to inference that there shall be a real 
 transition from one fact to another that the conclu- 
 sion reached shall be different from the starting-point. 
 
 The point at issue, therefore, is whether a new fact 
 or truth is reached in the so-called processes of imme- 
 diate inferences, or whether we have the same fact 
 repeated in the form of a new proposition. When we 
 pass from ' no men are infallible,' to ' no infallible beings 
 are men,' can we be said to infer a new truth ? In this 
 case it is evident, I think, that there has been no real 
 development or extension of the original proposition 
 so as to include a new fact. The new proposition is the 
 result of a verbal interpretation of the original one, and 
 restates the same fact in a different way. Inference 
 always completes or enlarges the truth from which it 
 sets out by showing the reasons which support it, or the 
 consequences which follow from it. But when we pass 
 directly from one proposition to another, as in the exam- 
 ples given above, it will be found, I believe, that nothing 
 has really been added to the original statement no new 
 facts have been brought into connection in the process.
 
 94 THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 It is of course true that the claims of each of the 
 different types of so-called immediate inference should 
 be examined separately. But it will be found, I think, 
 that the conclusion which we have reached is equally 
 true of all of the forms to which this name is applied. 
 It seems better to regard these processes as acts of 
 verbal interpretation, or explication of the meaning of 
 propositions, rather than as inferences in the true sense 
 of the word. They render important service in helping 
 us to understand what is implied or involved in the 
 propositions we use, but they do not lead the mind on 
 to any new truth. We may consider three ways in 
 which propositions may be transformed as a result of 
 the interpretative process Opposition, Obversion, and 
 Conversion. 
 
 25. The Opposition of Propositions. We have seen 
 that all categorical propositions have to be reduced to 
 one of the four forms, A, E, I, O, in order to be dealt 
 with by logic. Now, when these propositions have the 
 same subject and predicate, certain relations exist be- 
 tween them, to which the general name of Opposition 
 has been given. It is clear that the truth of some of 
 these propositions interferes with the truth of others. 
 Thus if it be true that 'no professional gamblers are 
 honest,' it is impossible that ' all professional gamblers 
 are honest,' or even that some are honest. The propo- 
 sition E is thus inconsistent with both A and I. Again, 
 if it be false that ' all politicians are dishonest,' it must be 
 true that ' some politicians are not dishonest,' though it 
 by no means follows that ' no politicians are dishonest'
 
 25. THE OPPOSITION OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 95 
 
 That is, when A is false, O is necessarily true, while E 
 may or may not be true. Propositions A and E are 
 called contrary propositions. 'All A is B,' and 'no A 
 is B,' express the greatest possible degree of contrariety 
 or opposition. If one proposition be true, the other is 
 necessarily false. It is to be noticed, however, that we 
 cannot conclude that if one is false, the other is true. 
 For both A and E may be false. Thus, for example, 
 the propositions, 'all men are wise,' and 'no men are 
 wise,' are both false. But, on the other hand, proposi- 
 tions A and O, E and I, are pairs of contradictory prop- 
 ositions : if one is false, its contradictory is necessarily 
 true ; and if one is true, the other is manifestly false. 
 The relation of the four logical propositions is clearly 
 
 shown by arranging them in the following way : 
 &s^ ./-v^^A* > i-^'cttu^ J r\3\ / V*^%M -6-< 
 
 A Contraries 
 
 
 Sub-Contraries 
 
 FIG. 5. 

 
 96 THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 A and E are known as contraries ; I and O as sub* 
 contraries ; A and O, I and E, as contradictories ; A 
 and I, E and O, are subalterns. 
 
 The relations of these propositions may now be 
 summed up in the following statements : 
 
 (1) Of contrary propositions, one is false if the other 
 is true, but both may be false. 
 
 (2) Of contradictory propositions, one is true and the 
 other necessarily false. 
 
 (3) If a universal proposition is true, the particular 
 which stands under it is also true ; but if the universal 
 is false, the particular may or may not be true. 
 
 (4) If a particular proposition is true, the correspond- 
 ing universal may or may not be true ; but if the par- 
 ticular is false, the universal must be false. 
 
 (5) Subcontrary propositions may both be true; but 
 if one is false, the other is necessarily true. 
 
 The knowledge that any one of these propositions is 
 either true or false enables us to determine the truth or 
 falsity of at least some of the others. 
 
 For example, if A is true, E is false, O is false, and 
 I is true. If A is false, E is doubtful, O is true, and 
 I doubtful. 
 
 If I is true, E is false, A is doubtful, and O doubtful. 
 If I is false, E is true, A is false, and O true. 
 
 Similarly we are also able to determine what follows 
 when we suppose that E and O are either false or true. 
 
 It ought to be carefully noted that when we affirm the truth of 
 the particular proposition I, we do not deny the truth of the universal 
 proposition A. The proposition, 'some students are fond of recre- 
 ation,' for example, does not exclude the truth of ' all students are
 
 25. THE OPPOSITION OF PROPOSITIONS 97 
 
 fond of recreation. 1 Similarly, the truth of O does not exclude the 
 corresponding proposition in E : the statement, 'some men are not 
 generous,' for example, does not interfere with the truth of the uni- 
 versal proposition, ' no men are generous.' A particular proposition, 
 in other words, asserts something of a limited part of a subject ; 
 it neither affirms nor denies anything of the same term taken 
 universally. 
 
 The reader will remember that propositions which 
 have the name of some singular or individual thing as 
 subject, have been classified as universal. ' New York 
 is the largest city in America,' ' charity is not the only 
 virtue,' are examples of such propositions. Now it is at 
 once evident that in cases of this kind there are no cor- 
 responding particular propositions. What has just been 
 said regarding the relation of universal and particular 
 propositions, applies therefore only to propositions which 
 have a general term or name as subject. Moreover, 
 we must notice that when A and E propositions have 
 a singular or individual name as subject, the relations 
 between them are somewhat different from those just 
 stated. A and E, we said, are contrary, but not contra- 
 dictory propositions. By that it was implied that al- 
 though we can proceed from the truth of the one to the 
 falsity of the other, it is not possible to go in a converse 
 direction, from falsity to truth. We cannot conclude, 
 for example, from the falsity of the proposition that 
 ' all men are selfish ' the truth of the corresponding 
 negative proposition, 'no men are selfish.' 'With contra- 
 dictory propositions, however, we can go from a denial 
 to an affirmation. Now the point to be observed, with 
 regard to propositions with a singular term as subject,
 
 98 THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 is that although only contraries in form, they have yet 
 the force of contradictories. ' Socrates is wise ' (A), 
 and ' Socrates is not wise ' (E), are contradictory as well 
 as contrary, propositions. 
 
 26. The Obversion of Propositions. The terms ' Ob- 
 version ' and '^Equipollence ' were formerly used to 
 denote any process by which the form of a proposition 
 is changed without an alteration in meaning being 
 involved. The name ' Obversion ' is, however, now gen- 
 erally employed to describe the change which a propo- 
 sition undergoes in passing from the affirmative to the 
 negative, or from the negative to the affirmative form 
 while still retaining its original meaning. 
 
 Every fact is capable of expression either in the form 
 of an affirmative or of a negative proposition. Whether 
 the affirmative or negative form is chosen in any par- 
 ticular case, is partly a matter of convenience. It is 
 also determined largely by the psychological interest of 
 the moment, i.e., by the purpose which we have in view 
 in making the assertion. When, for example, we wish 
 to repel some suggestion which may have occurred to 
 us, or to deny something which our companions appear 
 to believe, we naturally choose the negative form of 
 statement. But the meaning of the proposition is the 
 same whether we say, ' all men are fallible,' or, ' no men 
 are infallible.' Similarly, we can say, 'not one of the 
 crew escaped,' or, 'all of the crew perished.' 
 
 Obversion, then, is the process of substituting for 
 any affirmative proposition its equivalent in negative 
 form, or of expressing the meaning of a negative prop-
 
 26. THE OBVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS 99 
 
 osition as an affirmative. To obtain the obverse of 
 proposition A, we proceed on the principle that two 
 negatives are equal to an affirmative. Instead of 'all 
 animals digest food,' we may write, ' no animals are 
 beings that do not digest food'; for, 'every man has 
 his own troubles,' ' there are no men who have not 
 their own troubles.' Instead of affirming the predicate 
 of the subject, the obverse of A takes the negative of 
 the original predicate and denies it universally. 
 
 Proposition I may be obverted in the same way, 
 though it yields a particular, instead of a universal 
 negative proposition. Thus the obverse of, 'some of 
 the houses are comfortable,' is ' some of the houses are 
 not not-comfortable,' i.e., uncomfortable. We deny the 
 negative predicate in the obverse proposition, instead of 
 affirming the positive. 
 
 We obtain the obverse of the propositions E and O 
 by changing the negation contained in them to its 
 equivalent affirmation. This is done by attaching the 
 negative to the predicate, and then affirming it of the 
 subject. For example, to obtain the obverse of, ' no one 
 who was present can forget the scene,' we first write the 
 proposition in logical form, ' no one who was present is a 
 person who can forget the scene.' Now the negative of 
 the predicate term, ' a person who can forget the scene,' 
 is, ' a person who can not forget the scene.' Affirming 
 this universally we get, ' all persons who were present 
 are persons who cannot forget the scene.' As an exam- 
 ple of how the obverse of O is obtained, we may take the 
 proposition, 'some metals are not white.' Now if we 
 change the quality of the proposition by attaching the
 
 100 THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 negative to the predicate, we obtain ' some metals are not- 
 white.' That is, instead of denying, we affirm the neg- 
 ative of the original predicate. When the predicate is 
 made up of several words, it is important that the logical 
 contradictory of the whole term be taken. For example, 
 in the proposition, 'some men are not fond of work/ the 
 predicate fully expressed is, ' persons who are fond of 
 work.' Now the negative or contradictory term corre- 
 sponding to this is, ' persons who are not fond of work.' 
 The obverse of the original proposition therefore is, 
 'some men are persons who are not fond of work.' 
 
 27. The Conversion of Propositions. To convert a 
 proposition is to transpose its subject and predicate so 
 that each shall occupy the place previously held by the 
 other. Thus the proposition, 'no men are infallible,' is 
 converted by writing it, 'no infallible beings are men.' 
 The original proposition is called the convertend, and the 
 proposition obtained by conversion the converse. By 
 conversion, then, a new proposition is derived directly 
 from an old one. It is for this reason that conversion is 
 usually ranked as a process of immediate inference. 
 But, as we have already seen, the process of interpreta- 
 tion which results in conversion seems to fall wholly 
 within the proposition. In other words, it makes clear 
 what is involved in the original proposition, but does not 
 lead to any new fact with which the latter is connected. 
 We therefore reached the conclusion that it might more 
 .properly be regarded as a process of formal interpreta- 
 tion, than as one which involves real inference. 
 
 It is evident that in proceeding to convert propositions
 
 2^. THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS IOI 
 
 it will be necessary to notice whether the predicate of 
 the convertend, or proposition to be converted, is dis- 
 tributed or undistributed, otherwise we should not know 
 what extension to apply to this term when used as 
 the subject of the converse proposition. The rules 
 usually given to limit the process of conversion are as 
 follows : 
 
 (1) No term must be distributed in the converse prop- 
 osition which was not distributed in the convertend. 
 
 (2) The quality of the converse proposition must 
 remain the same as the quality of the convertend. 
 
 The reason for the first rule is at once evident from 
 what has been already said. The second rule is not one 
 which is always observed. Of course, the meaning of 
 a proposition must not be altered by changing the qual- 
 ity simply or directly. But, in converting by Contrapo- 
 sition, as we shall see later, it is first necessary to obtain 
 the equivalent of the convertend by obversion, and this 
 necessarily involves a change of quality. 
 
 There are three kinds of conversion usually recog- 
 nized : {a) Simple Conversion ; () Conversion by Limi- 
 tation or per accidens ; (c) Conversion by Contraposition. 
 
 (a) By Simple Conversion is meant the direct trans- 
 position of the subject and predicate without any other 
 change in the form of the proposition. Both propositions 
 E and I can be converted in this way. Thus the 
 converse of, ' none of the books on this shelf are novels,' 
 is another proposition in E, ' no novels are books on this 
 shelf.' From ' some dicotyledons are exogens ' we obtain 
 by conversion another particular affirmative proposition, 
 ' some exogens are dicotyledons.'
 
 IO2 THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 (b) Conversion by Limitation or per accidens is applied 
 to proposition A. In this process A loses its univer- 
 sality, and yields as a result only proposition I. To 
 illustrate this mode of conversion we may take the propo- 
 sition, 'brown hematite is an iron ore.' As we already 
 know, the term 'an iron ore,' being the predicate of 
 proposition A, is undistributed. When used as the sub- 
 ject of a new proposition, therefore, it must be limited 
 by the adjective 'some.' We thus obtain the converse 
 proposition, ' some iron ore is brown hematite.' Simi- 
 larly, the converse of the proposition, ' all sensations are 
 mental .processes,' is ' some mental processes are sensa- 
 tions.' When proposition A is converted by limitation, 
 then, it yields proposition I as a result. And it is evident 
 that the proposition has really lost something in the 
 process. For it is impossible by converting again to 
 obtain anything more than a particular proposition. 
 It is, however, sometimes possible to convert proposition 
 A without limiting the predicate. In formal definitions, 
 for example, the subject and the predicate are of equal 
 extent, and may be transposed simply without any 
 limitation of the latter. Thus the converse of, 'an 
 equilateral triangle is a plane figure having three equal 
 sides,' is 'a plane figure having three equal sides is an 
 equilateral triangle.' 
 
 (c) In Conversion by Contraposition the negative or 
 contradictory of the original predicate is taken as the 
 subject of the converse proposition. This method of 
 conversion is usually applied only to propositions A 
 and O. 
 
 When applied to A, it means that from a proposition
 
 27. THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS 103 
 
 in the form, All B is C, we are able to assert something 
 of what is not C. If we know, for example, that ' all 
 the planets are bodies revolving around the sun,' we 
 can obtain by contraposition the proposition, ' no bodies 
 which do not revolve around the sun are planets.' The 
 rule for contraposition is, first obvert, and then convert 
 simply. Thus, the obverse of, 'aluminium is a white 
 metal,' is the proposition in E, 'aluminium is not a 
 metal which is not white ; ' and converting this simply, 
 we get as the contrapositive of the proposition from 
 which we started, 'no metal which is not white is alu- 
 minium.' 
 
 Proposition O can be converted only by contraposi- 
 tion. If we were to convert simply, as, e.g., ' some 
 metals are not white,' 'some white things are not 
 metals,' we should fall into error ; for the term ' metal ' 
 is distributed in the converse proposition without having 
 been distributed in the convertend. 
 
 To obtain the converse of O by contraposition, the 
 rule given above, first obvert and then convert simply, 
 applies once more. The obverse of the proposition in 
 O, ' some men who make loud professions are not to be 
 trusted,' is the equivalent in I, 'some men who make 
 loud professions are persons not to be trusted.' Con- 
 verting this simply, we obtain the contrapositive, ' some 
 persons not to be trusted are men who make loud pro- 
 fessions.' 
 
 For the sake of convenience we may sum up the 
 treatment of Conversion as follows :
 
 IO4 THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 Proposition A is converted (i) by Limitation, and (2) by Contra 
 
 position. 
 
 All S is P. (A) 
 
 (1) Converting by Limitation, Some P is S. (I) 
 
 i.) Obversion yields, No S is 
 
 (2) Converting by Contraposition 
 
 not-P. (E) 
 
 ii.) The Simple Converse of this 
 is, No not-P is S. (E) 
 
 Proposition I is converted Simply. 
 
 Some S is P. (I) 
 Converting Simply, Some P is S. (I) 
 
 Proposition E is converted Simply. 
 
 No S is P. (E) 
 Converting Simply, No P is S. (E) 
 
 Proposition E may also be converted by Contraposition, but the 
 result is the same as the Contrapositive of O. Thus for example : 
 
 No S is P. (E) 
 
 f i.) Obversion yields, All S is not- 
 
 1P. (A) 
 
 v ' 
 11.) Converting this by Limitation, 
 Some not-P is S. (I) 
 
 Proposition O is converted by Contraposition. 
 Some S is not P. (O) 
 
 f i.) Obversion yields, Some S is 
 
 Converting by Contraposition \ .. 
 
 11.) The Simple Converse of this 
 
 1 is, Some not-P is S. (I) 
 
 References 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I. pp. 310-319. 
 
 W. Minto, Logic Inductive and Deductive, Pt. III. pp. 130-166. 
 
 J. H. Hyslop, The Elements of Logic, Ch. X.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE SYLLOGISM 
 
 28. The Nature of Syllogistic Reasoning. The syl- 
 logism, as we have already seen ( 10), presents a con- 
 clusion together with the reasons by means of which 
 it is supported. A single proposition taken by itself 
 is dogmatic : it merely asserts without stating the grounds 
 upon which it rests. The syllogism, on the other hand, 
 justifies its conclusion by showing the premises from 
 which it has been derived. It thus appeals to the 
 reason of all men, and compels their assent. To do 
 this, it is of course necessary that the truth of the 
 premises to which appeal is made should be granted. 
 If the premises are disputed or doubtful, the argument 
 is pushed a step further back, and it is first necessary 
 to show the grounds upon which these premises rest. 
 The assumption of syllogistic reasoning and, indeed, 
 of all reasoning whatsoever is that it is possible to 
 reach propositions which every one will accept. There 
 are certain facts, we say, well known and established, 
 and these can always be appealed to in support of our 
 conclusions. In syllogistic reasoning, then, we exhibit 
 the interdependence of propositions ; i.e., we show how 
 the truth of some new proposition, or some proposition 
 not regarded as beyond question, follows necessarily 
 
 105
 
 106 THE SYLLOGISM 
 
 from other propositions whose truth every one will 
 admit. 
 
 The question which arises in connection with the 
 syllogism, therefore, is this : Under what conditions 
 do propositions which are accepted as true contain or 
 imply a new proposition as a conclusion? Or we may 
 put the question in this form : In what ways may the 
 four logical propositions, A, E, I, O, be combined so as 
 to yield valid conclusions ? 
 
 We pointed out in a previous chapter that a syllogism 
 has always two premises. It is, however, impossible to 
 obtain a conclusion by combining any two propositions 
 at random, as e.g., 
 
 All A is B. 
 No X is Y. 
 
 It is evident that any two propositions will not yield a 
 conclusion by being taken together. In order to serve 
 as premises for a syllogism, propositions must fulfil 
 certain conditions, and stand in certain definite relations 
 to each other. To determine some of the most apparent 
 of these conditions, let us examine the argument : 
 
 All mammals are vertebrates, 
 The whale is a mammal, 
 Therefore the whale is a vertebrate. 
 
 "Vv^r-<rx MJsfV^ . \ 
 
 It will be noticed that the term ' mammal ' is common 
 to both premises, and that it does not occur at all in the 
 conclusion. Moreover, it is because the other terms 
 are compared in turn with this common or Middle Term 
 and found to agree with it, that they can be united in 
 the conclusion. It is only propositions which have a 
 middle term, therefore, which can be employed as the
 
 28. THE NATURE OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING 10? 
 
 premises of a syllogism. The syllogism is thus essen 
 tially a process of comparison. Each of the terms 
 entering into the conclusion is compared in turn with 
 the same middle term, and in this way their relation 
 to each other is determined. We reach the conclusion 
 not directly or immediately, but by means of the middle 
 term. The conclusion is therefore said to be mediated, 
 and the process itself is sometimes called mediate 
 reasoning. 
 
 It will be interesting to compare what has just been said regard- 
 ing the function of the middle term, with what has been previously 
 stated regarding the nature of inference. When we infer one fact 
 from another, it was said, we do so by discovering some identical link 
 or connecting thread which unites both. We may say that to infer 
 is to see that, in virtue of some identical link which our thought has 
 brought to light, the two facts, or groups of facts, are in a certain 
 sense identical. Now the middle term in a syllogism is just the 
 explicit statement of the nature of this identical link. It is true that 
 in the syllogism we seem to be operating with words or terms rather 
 than with the thought-process itself. When we go behind the 
 external connection of the terms, however, we can see that the middle 
 term represents the universal principle, by means of which the con- 
 clusion is reached. In the example given above, for instance, we 
 reason that the whale, being a mammal, is a vertebrate. 
 
 The terms which enter into the conclusion of a 
 syllogism are sometimes called the Extremes, as opposed 
 to the middle term. Of the Extremes, the predicate of 
 the conclusion is known as the Major Term, and the sub- 
 ject of the conclusion as the Minor Term. The premise 
 which contains the major term is called the Major Premise, 
 and stands first when the syllogism is arranged in logical 
 form. The Minor Premise, on the other hand, is the
 
 108 THE SYLLOGISM 
 
 premise which contains the minor term, and stands 
 second in the arrangement of the syllogism. The prop- 
 ositions of which the syllogism is composed may occur, 
 however, in any order in actual reasoning ; either 
 premise, or even the conclusion, may stand first. To 
 arrange an argument, therefore, it is necessary to 
 determine which is the major, and which the minor 
 premise. This can be done only by turning to the 
 conclusion, and distinguishing the major and minor 
 terms. For example, take the syllogism : 
 
 The whale suckles its young, 
 No fish suckles its young, 
 Therefore the whale is not a fish. 
 
 By turning to the conclusion we see that ' fish ' (being 
 the predicate) is the major term. The proposition 
 which contains this term, ' no fish suckles its young/ 
 is, therefore, the major premise, and should stand first. 
 Before proceeding to examine the syllogism further 
 it would be necessary to arrange it as follows : 
 
 No fish is an animal which suckles its young, 
 The whale is an animal which suckles its young, 
 Therefore the whale is not a fish. 
 
 29. The Rules of the Syllogism. It is customary 
 to give a number of rules or canons to which the syl- 
 logism must conform in order to yield valid conclusions. 
 We shall first enumerate the rules, and afterwards 
 remark on their meaning and importance. 
 
 (i) In every syllogism there should be three, and 
 only three, terms, and these terms must be used 
 throughout in the same sense.
 
 29. THE RULES OF THE SYLLOGISM 109 
 
 The terms, as we have already remarked, are known 
 as the major term, the middle term, and the minor term. 
 
 (2) Every syllogism contains three, and only three, 
 propositions. 
 
 These are called the major premise, minor premise, 
 and conclusion. 
 
 (3) The middle term must be distributed in at least 
 one of the premises. 
 
 (4) No term must be distributed in the conclusion 
 which was not distributed in one of the premises. 
 
 (5) From negative premises nothing can be inferred. 
 
 (6) If one premise be negative, the conclusion must 
 be negative ; and, conversely, to prove a negative con- 
 clusion one of the premises must be negative. 
 
 As a consequence of the above rules there result two 
 additional canons which may be set down here. 
 
 (7) No conclusion can be drawn from two particular 
 premises. 
 
 (8) If one of the premises be particular, the conclu- 
 sion must be particular. 
 
 The reason for the first and second rules will be 
 evident from what has been already said about the struct- 
 ure of the syllogism. We saw that a logical argument 
 is a process of comparison ; that two terms are united 
 through comparing them with a common or middle 
 term. If the meaning of the terms does not remain 
 fixed, there are more than three terms, and no com- 
 parison is possible. The second rule follows as a corol- 
 lary from the first. 
 
 The third rule, that the middle term must be dis- 
 tributed once, at least, is extremely important, and its
 
 110 THE SYLLOGISM 
 
 necessity will be readily perceived. For, since the 
 middle terra is the standard of comparison, it must be 
 used in at least one premise in its universal extent. 
 Otherwise we might compare the major term with one 
 part of it, and the minor term with another part. Such 
 a comparison would of course not warrant us in either 
 affirming or denying the connection of these terms in 
 the conclusion. For example, the two propositions, 
 
 Sedimentary rocks are stratified substances, 
 Some metamorphic rocks are stratified substances, 
 
 do not distribute the middle term, ' stratified sub- 
 stances,' at all, being both affirmative propositions. It 
 
 FIG. 6. 
 
 is clear that the term, 'sedimentary rocks,' agrees with 
 one part of the stratified substances, and ' metamorphic 
 rocks' with another part. We are, therefore, not able 
 to infer that ' some metamorphic rocks are sedimentary 
 rocks.' This may be clearly shown by representing the 
 propositions by Euler's method of circles as in Fig. 6. 
 We know from the second proposition that the circle 
 representing ' metamorphic rocks ' falls partly within the
 
 29. THE RULES OF THE SYLLOGISM III 
 
 circle of ' stratified substances.' But it is impossible to 
 determine from the statement whether it corresponds at 
 all with the circle of sedimentary rocks, or falls, as in 
 the figure, entirely without it. 
 
 The fourth rule states that no term must be dis- 
 tributed in the conclusion which was not distributed in 
 one of the premises. That is, the conclusion must be 
 proved by means of the premises, and no term which 
 was not employed in its universal signification in the 
 premises can, therefore, be used universally or dis- 
 tributively in the conclusion. This rule may be violated 
 by using either the major or the minor term in a wider 
 sense in the conclusion than in the premise in which it 
 occurs. The resulting fallacies are then known as the 
 Illicit Process of the major and minor terms respec- 
 tively. As an illustration of the illicit process of the 
 major term, we may consider the following argument : 
 
 All rational beings are responsible for their actions, 
 Brutes are not rational beings, 
 
 Therefore brutes are not responsible for their actions. 
 
 It will be at once seen that the major term, 'beings 
 responsible for their actions,' is distributed in the con- 
 clusion, but was not distributed when it appeared as the 
 predicate of an affirmative proposition in the major 
 premise. The fallacious nature of this argument may 
 also be shown by representing the proposition by 
 circles. 
 
 The illicit process of the minor term is usually more 
 easily detected. We may take as an example of this 
 fallacy :
 
 112 THE SYLLOGISM 
 
 All good citizens are ready to defend their country, 
 
 All good citizens are persons who vote regularly at elections, 
 
 Therefore all who vote regularly at elections are ready to defend 
 their country. 
 
 It is clear that the minor term, ' persons who vote 
 regularly at elections,' is undistributed when used as 
 the predicate of the minor premise. In the conclusion, 
 however, it is wrongly taken universally, and it is this 
 unwarranted extension to which the name of illicit 
 minor is given. Students are advised to draw circles 
 to illustrate the nature of this fallacy. 
 
 The fifth and sixth rules have reference to negative 
 premises. It is not difficult to understand why two 
 negative premises cannot yield any conclusion. For, 
 from the fact that S and P are both excluded from M, we 
 can conclude nothing regarding their relation to each 
 other. Two negative premises afford us no standard by 
 means of which we can determine anything concerning 
 the relation of major and minor terms. Again, where 
 one premise is negative and the other affirmative, it is 
 asserted that, of the major and minor terms, one agrees, 
 and the other does not agree, with the middle term. 
 The necessary inference from these premises, then, is 
 that major and minor terms do not agree with each 
 other. That is, the conclusion must be negative. 
 
 It is worth noticing that it is sometimes possible to obtain a con- 
 clusion from premises which are both negative in form. For ex- 
 ample : 
 
 No one who is not thoroughly upright is to be trusted, 
 This man is not thoroughly upright, 
 
 Therefore this man is not to be trusted.
 
 30. THE FIGURES OF THE SYLLOGISM 113 
 
 In this example, although the form of both premises is negative, 
 the minor premise supplies a positive basis for argument, and is 
 really affirmative in character. Or we may say that the ' not ' in the 
 predicate of the minor premise belongs to the predicate, and not to 
 the copula. The proposition may therefore be said to affirm, rather 
 than to deny. 
 
 The seventh and eighth rules, which refer to particular premises, 
 can be proved by considering separately all the possible cases. If 
 this is done, it will be found that these rules are direct corollaries 
 from the third and fourth, which are concerned with the proper dis- 
 tribution of terms. It is impossible to secure the necessary distri- 
 bution with two particular premises ; for either the distribution of 
 the middle term will not be provided for, or if this has been secured 
 by means of a negative premise, the conclusion will show a case of 
 the illicit major term. By means of the same rules, it may be 
 shown that a particular premise always requires a particular con- 
 clusion. The truth of these two subordinate canons may be also 
 readily shown by the use of circles. 
 
 30. The Figures of the Syllogism. We have seen 
 what an important part the middle term plays in the 
 syllogism. It constitutes the mediating link between 
 the major and minor terms, and makes possible their 
 union. Now upon the position of the middle term in the 
 premises depends the Figure of the syllogism. There 
 are four possible arrangements of the middle term in 
 the two premises, and therefore four figures of the 
 syllogism. If we let P represent the major term, S the 
 minor, and M the middle term, the form of the different 
 figures may be represented as follows : 
 
 SECOND FIGURE 
 P M 
 
 .-. S P
 
 114 THE SYLLOGISM 
 
 THIRD FIGURE FOURTH FIGURE 
 
 M P P M 
 
 M S M S 
 
 .-. S P .-. S P 
 
 In the first figure, the middle term is the subject of 
 the major premise, and the predicate of the minor 
 premise. 
 
 In the second figure, the middle term is predicate of 
 both major and minor premises. 
 
 The third figure has the middle term as the subject 
 of both premises. 
 
 In the fourth figure, the middle term occupies just the 
 opposite position in the two premises from that which 
 it held in the first figure ; i.e., it is the predicate of the 
 major premise, and the subject of the minor premise.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE VALID MOODS AND THE REDUCTION OF FIGURES 
 
 31. The Moods of the Syllogism. By the Mood of 
 a syllogism we mean the combination of propositions 
 A, E, I, and O, which goes to make it up. Thus, when 
 a syllogism is made up of three universal affirm ative 
 propositions, we speak of it as the mood AAA ; if it 
 is composed of a universal negative, a particular affirma- 
 tive, and a particular negative proposition, we name it 
 the mood EIO. 
 
 Every syllogism, as has been already stated, is made 
 up of some arrangement of the four propositions 
 A, E, I, O, taken three at a time. Now, there are in 
 all sixty-four possible permutations of these four propo- 
 sitions taken three at a time. We might then write 
 out these sixty-four moods, and proceed to determine 
 which of them are valid. But this would be a long and 
 somewhat tedious undertaking. Moreover, if we can 
 determine what are the valid premises, we can draw the 
 proper conclusions for ourselves. Since, then, there 
 are but two premises in each syllogism, we shall have to 
 deal only with the possible permutations of A, E, I, and O, 
 taken two at a time, or with sixteen combinations in all. 
 
 The following, then, are the only possible ways in 
 which the propositions A, E, I, and O can be arranged 
 as premises : 
 
 "5
 
 Il6 VALID MOODS AND THE REDUCTION OF FIGURES 
 
 AA 
 
 EA 
 
 IA 
 
 OA 
 
 AE 
 
 EE 
 
 IE 
 
 OE 
 
 AI 
 
 El 
 
 II 
 
 01 
 
 AO 
 
 EO 
 
 IO 
 
 OO 
 
 Some of these premises, however, cannot yield conclu- 
 sions, since they plainly violate certain rules of the syllo- 
 gism. The combinations of negative premises EE, 
 EO, OE, and OO can be at once struck out. Again, 
 since no conclusion follows from two particular prem- 
 ises, we can eliminate II, IO, and OI. There remain, 
 then, for further consideration the combinations: 
 
 AA EA IA OA 
 
 AE IE 
 
 AI El 
 
 AO 
 
 At this point we must recall the fact that every 
 argument must belong to one of the four figures. We 
 must now therefore ask this question : Which of the 
 above combinations of premises will yield valid con- 
 clusions in the first, second, third, and fourth figures, 
 respectively ? By examining the form of the syllogism 
 in each of these figures, we shall be able to discover 
 what conditions must be fulfilled in each case, and 
 to lay down special canons for each figure. We shall 
 first proceed to state and prove the special canons of 
 the different figures. It will not, however, be necessary 
 for the student to commit these rules to memory, as he 
 can always derive them for himself by a consideration 
 of the form of the argument in the different figures.
 
 32. THE SPECIAL CANONS OF THE FOUR FIGURES 1 1 7 
 
 32. The Special Canons of the Four Figures. In tht 
 first figure ', the minor premise must be affirmative, and 
 the major premise universal. 
 
 The first figure is of the form : 
 
 M P 
 S M 
 
 .-. S P 
 
 To show that the minor premise is affirmative, we 
 employ the indirect method of proof. Let us suppose 
 that the minor premise is not affirmative, but negative. 
 Then since one premise is negative, the conclusion must 
 be negative. But if the conclusion is a negative propo- 
 sition, its predicate, P, must be distributed. Any term 
 which is distributed in the conclusion must, however, 
 have been distributed when it was used in the premise. 
 P must be distributed, therefore, as the predicate of the 
 major premise. But since negative propositions alone 
 distribute their predicates, the major premise, M P, 
 must be negative. But by hypothesis the minor prem- 
 ise, S M, is negative. We have, therefore, two 
 negative premises, which is impossible. Our suppo- 
 sition, that the minor premise is negative, is therefore 
 false; or, in other words, the minor premise must be 
 affirmative. 
 
 This having been established, we can very easily 
 prove that the major premise must be universal. For 
 the middle term, M, must be distributed in at least one 
 of the premises. But it is not distributed in the minor 
 premise, for it is there the predicate of an affirmative 
 proposition. It must, therefore, be distributed as the
 
 Il8 VALID MOODS AND THE REDUCTION OF FIGURES 
 
 subject of the major premise, that is, the major premise 
 must be universal. 
 
 If we turn now to the second figure, we shall find 
 that the following rules may be deduced from a con- 
 sideration of its form : 
 
 (1) One premise must be negative, and the conclusion 
 therefore negative. 
 
 (2) The major premise must be universal. 
 The second figure is in the form : 
 
 P M 
 S M 
 
 /. S P 
 
 The reason for the first rule is at once evident. If one 
 premise is not negative, the middle term, M, is not 
 distributed, and no conclusion is therefore possible. 
 The only means of securing distribution of the middle 
 term in the second figure is by means of a negative 
 premise. And if one premise is negative, it of course 
 follows that the conclusion must be negative. 
 
 This having been established, the proof of rule 2 
 follows almost immediately. For, since the conclusion 
 is negative, its predicate, P, must be distributed. And 
 since P is distributed in the conclusion, it must have 
 been used distributively when it occurred as the subject 
 of the major premise, or, in other words, the major 
 premise must be universal. 
 
 The third figure is of the form : 
 M P 
 M S 
 
 .-. S P
 
 32. THE SPECIAL CANONS OF THE FOUR FIGURES 119 
 
 From an analysis of this, the two following rules may 
 be obtained : 
 
 P(i) The minor premise must be affirmative. 
 (2) The conclusion must be particular. 
 
 The minor premise is here shown to be affirmative 
 by the method employed in proving the same rule in 
 the first figure. That is, we suppose the minor premise 
 negative, and show that, as a result of this hypothesis, 
 the conclusion is negative, and the major term dis- 
 tributed. It follows, then, that this term must be dis- 
 tributed as the predicate of the major premise. But 
 this could happen only if this premise were negative. 
 The hypothesis that the minor premise is negative thus 
 leads to the absurdity of two negative premises. The 
 conclusion that the opposite is true, that the minor 
 premise is affirmative, is therefore proved indirectly. 
 
 Since the minor premise is affirmative, its predicate 
 S is undistributed. This term must therefore be used 
 in an undistributed, i.e., particular sense in the conclu- 
 sion. And, as this term forms its subject, the conclu- 
 sion is particular. 
 
 In the fourth figure the terms are arranged in the 
 
 following way : 
 
 P M 
 M S 
 
 From a consideration of the form of this figure we can 
 obtain the following special canons : 
 
 (i) If either premise be negative, the major premise 
 must be tiniversal.
 
 120 VALID MOODS AND THE REDUCTION OF FIGURES 
 
 (2) If the major premise be affirmative, the minor must 
 be universal. 
 
 (3) If the minor premise be affirmative, the conclusion 
 must be particular. 
 
 The student will be able to prove these canons for 
 himself by applying the rules of the syllogism in the 
 same way as has been done in the proofs already given. 
 
 33. The Determination of the Valid Moods in Each of 
 the Figures. We have now to apply these special 
 canons in order to determine what moods are valid in 
 each of the four figures. It has already been shown 
 (p. 1 1 6) that the premises which are not excluded by 
 the general rules of the syllogism are : 
 
 AA EA IA OA 
 
 AE IE 
 
 AI El 
 
 AO 
 
 Now we have proved that in the first figure the major 
 premise must be universal, and the minor affirmative. 
 The only combinations of premises which will stand 
 these tests are, AA, EA, AI, and El. Drawing the 
 proper conclusion in each case, we have as the four 
 valid moods of the first figure : 
 
 AAA, EAE, All, EIO_ 
 
 It will be noticed that the first figure enables us to 
 obtain as conclusion any one of the four logical propo- 
 sitions, A, E, I, and O. 
 
 The special canons of the second figure state that
 
 33- THE DETERMINATION OF THE VALID MOODS 121 
 
 the major premise must be universal, and one premise 
 negative. Selecting the combinations of premises 
 which fulfil these conditions, we obtain EA, AE, El, 
 and AO. These give, when the conclusions have been 
 drawn, the following four moods of the second figure : 
 
 EAE, AEE, EIO, AGO. 
 
 By means of the second figure, therefore, we are able 
 to establish the truth only of the negative propositions, 
 E and O. 
 
 In the third figure the minor premise must be affirma- 
 tive, and the conclusion particular. Taking all the 
 combinations in which the minor is affirmative, there 
 result, AA, IA, AI, EA, OA, El. It must be remem- 
 bered that the third figure yields only particular con- 
 clusions, even where both premises are universal. The 
 valid moods in this figure are therefore as follows : 
 
 AAI, IAI, All, EAO, OAO, EIO. 
 
 The canons of the fourth figure, which have to do 
 with the premises, state that where either premise is 
 negative, a universal major is necessary, and that an 
 affirmative major premise must be accompanied by a 
 universal minor. The combinations of propositions 
 which fulfil these conditions are A A, AE, I A, EA, 
 and EL In drawing conclusions from these premises, 
 however, it is necessary to pay attention to the third 
 canon of this figure, which states that where the minor 
 premise is affirmative, the conclusion must be particular. 
 Accordingly, the valid moods of this figure may now 
 be written :
 
 122 VALID MOODS AND THE REDUCTION OF FIGURES 
 
 AAI, AEE, IAI, EAO,_EIO___ 
 
 Here we are able to obtain a universal negative as a 
 conclusion, but not a universal affirmative. It is inter- 
 esting to notice that the first figure alone enables us 
 to prove a proposition of the form A. 
 
 It may also be pointed out that the combination IE, 
 although not excluded by the general rules of the syl- 
 logism, cannot be used at all as premises, since it vio- 
 lates the canons of all four figures. There remain in 
 all, then, nineteen valid moods of the syllogism, four 
 in the first figure, four in the second, six in the third, 
 and five in the fourth figure. 
 
 34. The Mnemonic Lines. It is not necessary to 
 commit to memory the valid moods in each figure. By 
 applying the general rules of the syllogism to the figure 
 in question, the student will be able to determine for 
 himself in every case whether or not an argument is 
 valid. The Latin Schoolmen in the thirteenth century, 
 however, invented a system of curious mnemonic verses 
 for the purpose of rendering it easy to remember the 
 valid moods in each figure. Although it is not neces- 
 sary for the student to burden his memory with these 
 barbarous names, it is interesting to understand the use 
 of the lines : 
 
 Barbara, Celarent, Dariz, Fertoque prioris ; 
 Cesare, Camestres, Fcstino, Baroko, secundae; 
 Tertia, Darapti, Disainis, Datist, Felapton, 
 Bokardo, Ferison, habet ; Quarta insuper addit 
 Bramantip, Came ties, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison. 
 
 The words printed in ordinary type are real Latin
 
 34- THE MNEMONIC LINES 123 
 
 words, indicating that the four moods represented by 
 Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio are the valid moods 
 of the first figure, that the next four are valid in the 
 second figure, that the third figure has six valid moods 
 represented by as many artificial names, and that the 
 fourth figure adds five more. Each word represents a 
 mood, the vowels A, E, I, and O indicating the quality 
 and quantity of the propositions which go to compose 
 them. Thus, Barbara signifies the mood of the first 
 figure which is made up of three universal affirmative 
 propositions A A A ; Cesare, a mood of the second 
 figure, composed of the three propositions E A E. 
 These lines, then, sum up the results reached on 
 pages 1 20-22 regarding the valid moods in each figure. 
 But certain consonants in these mnemonic words also 
 indicate how arguments in the second, third, or fourth 
 figures may be changed to the form of the first figure. 
 The first figure was called by Aristotle the perfect 
 figure, and the second and third the imperfect figures, 
 since he did not regard an argument in these forms as 
 so direct and convincing as one of the first-mentioned 
 type. The fourth figure was not recognized by Aris- 
 totle, but is said to have been introduced into logic by 
 Galen, the celebrated teacher of medicine, who lived in 
 the latter half of the second century. The process of 
 changing an argument from one of the so-called imper- 
 fect figures to that of the first figure is known as Reduc- 
 tion. And, as we have said, these curious but ingenious 
 mnemonic words give rules for carrying out this process. 
 For example, s indicates that the proposition represented 
 by the preceding vowel is to be converted simply. Thus
 
 124 VALID MOODS AND THE REDUCTION OF FIGURES 
 
 an argument in the second figure of the mood Cesare 
 is changed to Celarent in the first figure, by converting 
 the major premise simply. Again, / denotes that the 
 preceding vowel is to be converted by limitation, or per 
 accidens ; m is supposed to stand for mutare, and indir 
 cates that the premises are to be transposed ; k, which 
 is used in the moods Baroko and Bokardo, shows that 
 an indirect method of proof or reduction is necessary 
 to reduce the arguments to the first figure. 
 
 Further, the initial consonants of the moods of the im- 
 perfect figures correspond with those of the moods in the 
 first figures, to which they can be reduced. Cesare and 
 Camestres of the second figure, for example, and Ca- 
 menes of the fourth are reducible to Celarent ; and, 
 similarly, Festino, Felapton, Fesapo, and Fresison may 
 all be reduced to Ferio. 
 
 The student who understands the structure of the syllogism will 
 be able to arrange an argument in one figure or another, as may be 
 most convenient, without the aid of any mechanical rules. It may 
 be interesting, however, to give a single example for the sake of 
 illustrating the workings of this most ingenious device. Let us take 
 the following argument in the second figure of the mood AEE, or 
 Camestres : 
 
 All members of the class are prepared for the examination. 
 No idle persons are prepared for the examination, 
 
 Therefore no idle persons are members of the class. 
 
 Now the m in Camestres shows that the major and minor premises 
 are to be transposed ; the first s indicates that the minor premise is 
 to be converted, and the second that the same process must be per- 
 formed on the conclusion. 
 
 Converting the minor premise and transposing, we obtain :
 
 34- THE MNEMONIC LINES 12$ 
 
 No persons prepared for the examination are idle, 
 All members of the class are prepared for the examination, 
 Converting the conclusion, 
 
 Therefore no members of the class are idle persons. 
 This result, as will at once be seen, is an argument in the first 
 figure of the mood EAE, or Celarent. 
 
 References 
 
 Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic. Lectures XX., XXI. 
 A. Bain, Logic, Part First, Deduction, Bk. II. Ch. I. 
 
 NOTE. It would be interesting to work out, in connection with 
 the various forms of Inductive reasoning treated in Part II., the 
 organic relation of the syllogistic Figures, and their natural applica- 
 bility to various purposes of argument. This task, however, seemed 
 to lie beyond the proper limits of this book. All of the investiga- 
 tions on this point start from Hegel's treatment in the second part 
 of the Wissenschaft der Logik (Werke, Bd. 5, pp. 115 ff.). Those 
 interested in this subject may consult W.-T. Harris, The Psychologic 
 Foundations of Education, Ch. IX. -XL, and the same author's 
 Logic of Hegel. See also B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. II., pp. 44 ff., 
 88 ff., and The Essentials of Logic, Lecture X.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 ABBREVIATED AND IRREGULAR FORMS OF ARGUMENT 
 
 35. Enthymemes. The term ' enthymeme ' seems to 
 have been used by Aristotle for an argument from 
 signs or from likelihood, without complete proof. 
 From this sense of logical incompleteness, the name 
 has come to be applied in modern times to an argument 
 in which some part is omitted. We have already 
 noticed, in dealing with the syllogism ( 10), that one 
 premise is often omitted. Indeed, it is but seldom in 
 ordinary reasoning that we arrange our arguments in 
 the strict syllogistic form. We hurry on from one fact 
 to another in our thinking without stopping to make all 
 the steps definite and explicit. We feel it to be a waste 
 of time, and a trial to the patience, to express what is 
 clearly obvious, and so we press on to the conclusion 
 which is, for the time being, the central point of in- 
 terest. 
 
 But the more rapid and abbreviated the reasoning, 
 the more necessary is it to keep a clear head, and to 
 understand what conclusion is aimed at, and what 
 premises are assumed in the argument. To bring to 
 light the hidden assumption upon which an argument is 
 based, is often the best means of refuting it. 
 
 126
 
 36. EPISYLLOGISMS AND PROSYLLOGISMS 127 
 
 Enthymemes are sometimes said to be of the first, 
 second, or third order, according as the major premise, 
 the minor premise, or the conclusion is wanting. As a 
 matter of fact, an enthymeme of the third order is a 
 rhetorical device used to call special attention to a con- 
 clusion which is perfectly obvious, although suppressed. 
 Thus, for example, ' all boasters are cowards, and we 
 have had proofs that A is a boaster.' Here the con- 
 clusion is at once obvious, and is even more prominent 
 than if it were actually expressed. 
 
 It is usually easy to complete an enthymeme. If the 
 conclusion and one premise are given, the three terms 
 of the syllogism are already expressed. For the con- 
 clusion contains the major term and the minor term; 
 and one of these again, in combination with the middle 
 term, is found in the given premise. From these data, 
 then, it will not be difficult to construct the suppressed 
 premise. When the premises are given without the 
 conclusion, there is no way of determining, except from 
 the order, which is major and which is minor. It is 
 therefore necessary to assume that they are already 
 arranged in proper logical order, and that the subject 
 of the conclusion, or minor term, is to be found in the 
 second premise, and the predicate of the conclusion, or 
 major term, in the first premise. 
 
 36. Prosyllogisms and Episyllpgisms. In deductive 
 reasoning it is often necessary to carry on the argument 
 through several syllogisms, using the conclusion first 
 reached as a premise in the following syllogism. For 
 example, we may argue :
 
 128 FORMS OF ARGUMENT 
 
 All B is A 
 All C is B 
 
 .-. All C is A. 
 But all D is C 
 
 .-. All D is A. 
 
 It is clear that we have here two arguments in the first 
 figure. The first is called the Prosyllogism, and the 
 latter the Episyllogism. If the argument were carried 
 on further, so as to include three or more syllogisms, the 
 second would form the Prosyllogism with respect to 
 the third, while the third would be the Episyllogism of 
 the second. A concrete example of this kind of reason- 
 ing may now be given : 
 
 All timid men are suspicious, 
 All superstitious men are timid, 
 
 Therefore all superstitious men are suspicious. 
 But some educated men are superstitious, 
 
 Therefore some educated men are suspicious. 
 
 It will be noticed that in these examples the argument advances 
 from the premises of the Prosyllogism, to the conclusion of the 
 Episyllogism. It proceeds, that is to say, in a forward direction, 
 developing the consequences of the premises which form its starting- 
 point. This mode of investigation is therefore called the Progres- 
 sive or Synthetic, since it goes steadily forward building up its results 
 as it advances. To state the same thing in different words, we may 
 say that the Progressive or Synthetic method advances from the 
 conditions to what is conditioned, from causes to effects. 
 
 But it is often necessary to proceed in the opposite way. We 
 have often to go back and show the grounds upon which our prem- 
 ises rest, instead of going forward to show what consequences 
 follow from them. And when we do this we proceed Regressively 
 or Analytically. To take an example which will illustrate both 
 ways of proceeding :
 
 37- SORITES, OR CHAINS OF REASONING 1 29 
 
 No man is infallible, for no man is omniscient, 
 Aristotle was a man, 
 
 Therefore Aristotle was not infallible. 
 
 .n advancing from the premises to the conclusion in this argument 
 our procedure is progressive or synthetic. Instead of reasoning out 
 the consequences of the premises, however, we may go back and 
 show the grounds upon which the major premise rests. It is evident 
 that this premise is itself the conclusion of a syllogism which may 
 be expressed as follows : 
 
 All infallible beings are omniscient, 
 
 No man is omniscient, 
 
 Therefore no man is infallible. 
 
 The regressive method goes backward from conclusions to premises, 
 or from the conditioned to its necessary conditions. In scientific 
 investigation it reasons from effects to causes, while the synthetic 
 method advances from causes to effects. 
 
 37. Sorites, or Chains of Reasoning. A Sorites is 
 an abbreviated form of syllogistic reasoning in which 
 a subject and predicate are united by means of several 
 intermediate terms. Such a train of reasoning repre- 
 sents several acts of comparison, and therefore several 
 syllogistic steps. But instead of stopping to draw the 
 conclusion at each stage, the sorites continues the 
 processes of comparison, and only sums up its results 
 at the close. We may define the sorites, therefore, as 
 a series of prosyllogisms and episyllogisms in which all 
 of the conclusions, except the last, are suppressed. It 
 is usually stated in the following form : 
 
 All A is B 
 
 All B is C 
 
 All C is D 
 
 All D is E 
 .. All A is E. 
 
 K
 
 I3O FORMS OF ARGUMENT 
 
 It is evident that this train of reasoning fully expressed 
 is equivalent to the following three syllogisms : 
 
 FIRST SYLLOGISM SECOND SYLLOGISM THIRD SYLLOGISM 
 
 All B is C All C is D All D is E 
 
 All A is B All A is C (i) All A is D (2) 
 
 .-. All A is C (i). .-. All A is D (2). .-. All A is E (3). 
 
 There are two rules to be observed in using this form 
 of the sorites : (i) The first premise may be particular, all 
 the others must be universal ; (2) the last premise may 
 be negative, all the others must be affirmative. It is 
 evident from an examination of the syllogisms given 
 above that if any premise except the first were partic- 
 ular, the fallacy of undistributed middle would be com- 
 mitted. For, in that case, the middle term in one of the 
 syllogisms would be the subject of a particular propo- 
 sition, and the predicate of an affirmative proposition. 
 And if any premise but the last were negative, the 
 major term in the syllogism following that in which this 
 occurred would be disturbed in the conclusion without 
 having been distributed in the major premise. We 
 may now give some concrete examples of this kind of 
 reasoning : 
 
 Misfortunes sometimes are circumstances tending to improve 
 the character, 
 
 Circumstances tending to improve the character are promoters 
 of happiness, 
 
 What promotes happiness is good, 
 
 Therefore misfortunes are sometimes good. 
 
 In some cases the different terms of an argument of 
 this kind are expressed in the form of hypothetical
 
 37- SORITES, OR CHAINS OF REASONING 131 
 
 propositions. Thus, for example, we might argue : If 
 a man is avaricious, he desires more than he possesses ; 
 if he desires more than he possesses, he is discontented ; 
 if he is discontented, he is unhappy ; therefore if a man 
 is avaricious, he is unhappy. This argument is hypo- 
 thetical in form only, and may be easily reduced to 
 categorical type as follows : 
 
 An avaricious man is one who desires more than he possesses, 
 A man who desires more than he possesses is discontented, 
 A discontented man is unhappy, 
 
 Therefore an avaricious man is unhappy. 
 
 It will be noticed that the subject of the first premise 
 in this form of argument is taken as the subject of the 
 conclusion, and that the predicate of the conclusion is 
 the predicate of the last premise. This is usually called 
 the Aristotelian sorites. But there is another form 
 which unites in the conclusion the subject of the last 
 premise, and the predicate of the first, and which is 
 known as the Goclenian sorites. 1 This may be thus 
 represented : 
 
 All A is B 
 
 All C is A 
 
 All D is C 
 
 All E is D 
 
 .-. All E is B. 
 
 Since B is the predicate of the conclusion, the prem- 
 ise in which it appears is always to be regarded as the 
 major. As a result of this, it is to be noticed that the 
 
 1 Rudolf Goclenius (1547-1628), Professor at Marburg, first explained 
 this form in his hagoge in Organum Aristotlis, 1598.
 
 132 FORMS OF ARGUMENT 
 
 suppressed conclusions in this argument form the major 
 premise of the following syllogism, instead of the minor 
 premise as in the Aristotelian sorites. We may, there- 
 fore, expand the reasoning into the three following 
 syllogisms : 
 
 FIRST SYLLOGISM 
 All A is B 
 All C is A 
 
 SECOND SYLLOGISM 
 All C is B 
 All D is C 
 
 THIRD SYLLOGISM 
 All D is B 
 All E is D 
 
 .'. All C is B. .'. All D is B. /. All E is B. 
 
 A little consideration of the form of these syllogisms 
 will lead the student to see that the rules given for the 
 Aristotelian sorites must be here reversed. In both 
 forms of the sorites there cannot be more than one 
 negative premise, nor more than one particular premise. 
 In the Aristotelian form, no premise except the last can 
 be negative, and no premise except the first particular. 
 In the Goclenian sorites, on the other hand, the single 
 premise which can be negative is the first, and it is the 
 last alone which may be particular. 
 
 38. Irregular Arguments. There are a large num- 
 ber of arguments employed in everyday life which are 
 valid and convincing, and yet which cannot be reduced 
 to the syllogistic form. The difficulty with these argu- 
 ments is that they appear to have four terms, at least in 
 the form in which they are most naturally stated. We 
 may discuss such irregular forms of reasoning under 
 two headings: (i) Arguments which deal with the 
 relations of things in time and space, or with their 
 quantitative determinations; (2) arguments which are
 
 38. IRREGULAR ARGUMENTS 133 
 
 largely verbal in character, and may be said to depend 
 upon the principle of substitution. 
 
 . (i) As an example of the first class of argument we 
 may take the following : 
 
 A is greater than B, 
 B is greater than C, 
 
 Therefore A is still greater than C. 
 
 It is obvious that, although we have here four terms, 
 the conclusion is valid, and the form of argument per- 
 fectly convincing. The truth seems to be that in rea- 
 soning about quantities we do not proceed upon the 
 syllogistic principle of the inclusion and exclusion of 
 terms. But knowing the continuous nature of quantity, 
 we take as our principle that, ' what is greater than that 
 which is greater than another is a fortiori greater than 
 that other.' It would not, however, make the matter 
 any clearer to write this as our major premise, and 
 bring the real argument under it in this way : 
 
 What is greater than that which is greater than another is 
 still greater than that other, 
 
 A is that which is greater than that which is .greater than C, 
 
 Therefore A is still greater than C. 
 
 What we have here given as the major premise is 
 simply a statement of the nature of quantity, not a 
 premise from which the conclusion is derived. We find 
 the same irregularity in arguments referring to the rela- 
 tions of things in space and time : 
 
 A is situated to the east of B, 
 B is situated to the east of C, 
 
 Therefore A is to the east of C.
 
 134 FORMS OF ARGUMENT 
 
 In spite of the formal deficiency of four terms the 
 argument is valid. It will be observed, too, that it is 
 in virtue of the comparison of the position of A and 
 of C with that of B, that these relative positions have 
 been determined. The principle upon which we pro- 
 ceed may be said to be that, ' what is to the east of B 
 is to the east of that which B is to the east of.' Or 
 perhaps it would be truer to fact to say that we proceed 
 in such cases upon what we know regarding the nature 
 of space, and the relations of objects in space. 
 
 (2) The second class of irregular arguments are 
 largely verbal in character, and may be dealt with very 
 briefly. As an example we may consider : 
 
 Men are willing to risk their lives for gold, 
 Gold cannot buy happiness, 
 
 Therefore men are willing to risk their lives for what cannot buy 
 happiness. 
 
 It is doubtful, I think, whether these propositions rep- 
 resent any real inference. The whole process may 
 be regarded as a verbal substitution in the major prem- 
 ise of 'what cannot buy happiness' for the word 'gold.' 
 By a slight change in the form of the proposition, how- 
 ever, the argument may be expressed as a regular 
 syllogism of the third figure : 
 
 Gold is something for which men are willing to risk their lives, 
 Gold cannot buy happiness, 
 
 Therefore something which cannot buy happiness is something 
 for which men are willing to risk their lives. 
 
 Another example which also appears to be irregular 
 at first sight is added :
 
 38. IRREGULAR ARGUMENTS 135 
 
 The men of the Middle Ages were ready to undertake any expe- 
 dition where glory could be won, 
 
 The crusades were expeditions in which glory could be won, 
 
 The crusades, therefore, were readily undertaken by the men of 
 the Middle Ages. 
 
 This argument seems to be irregular in form only, and 
 by a slight change in form may be expressed in the first 
 figure : 
 
 All expeditions in which glory could be won were readily under- 
 taken by the men of the Middle Ages, 
 
 The crusades were expeditions in which glory could be won, 
 
 Therefore the crusades were readily undertaken by the men of 
 the Middle Ages. 
 
 References, especially for 38 
 
 W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, p. 152. 
 " " " The Principles of Science. Introduction. 
 F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, pp. 348-360.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
 39. The Hypothetical Syllogism. We have hitherto 
 been dealing with syllogisms composed entirely of cate- 
 gorical propositions, and have not referred to the use 
 which is made of conditional propositions in reasoning. 
 A conditional proposition is sometimes defined as the 
 union of two categorical propositions by means of a 
 conjunction. It is the expression of an act of judg- 
 ment which does not directly or unambiguously assert 
 something of reality. We have already pointed out 
 ( 20) that there are two classes of conditional propo- 
 sitions: the hypothetical and the disjunctive, and corre- 
 sponding to these we have the hypothetical and the 
 disjunctive syllogism. The hypothetical syllogism has 
 a hypothetical proposition as a major premise, and a 
 categorical proposition as a minor premise. The dis- 
 junctive syllogism in the same way is composed of a 
 disjunctive proposition as major, and a categorical 
 proposition as minor, premise. In addition to these, 
 we shall have to treat of another form of argument 
 called the ' dilemma,' which is made up of hypothetical 
 and disjunctive propositions. 
 
 A hypothetical proposition asserts something not di- 
 rectly, but subject to some limitation or condition. It 
 is usually introduced by some word or conjunctive 
 
 136
 
 39- THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM 137 
 
 phrase, like 'if,' 'supposing,' or 'granted that'; as, e.g. t 
 'if he were to be trusted, we might give him the mes- 
 sage'; 'suppose that A is B, then C is D.' The part of 
 a hypothetical proposition which expresses the suppo- 
 sition or condition is known as the Antecedent ; the 
 clause stating the result is called the Consequent. Thus, 
 in the proposition, ' he would write if he were well,' the 
 consequent, ' he would write,' is stated first, and the 
 antecedent, ' if he were well,' follows. 
 
 The hypothetical syllogism, as has been already re- 
 marked, has a hypothetical proposition as its major, and 
 a categorical proposition as its minor, premise : 
 
 If justice is to prevail, his innocence will be proved, 
 And justice will prevail, 
 
 Therefore his innocence will be proved. 
 
 It will be noticed that in this argument the minor 
 premise affirms the antecedent, and that, as a result, 
 the conclusion affirms the consequent. This form is 
 known as the constructive hypothetical syllogism, or the 
 modus ponens. 
 
 In the following example it will be observed that the 
 consequent is denied, and the conclusion obtained is 
 therefore negative. 
 
 If he were well, he would write, 
 He has not written, 
 
 Therefore he is not well. 
 
 This is called the destructive hypothetical syllogism^ or 
 modus tollens. 
 
 The rule of the hypothetical syllogism may therefore 
 be stated as follows : Either affirm the antecedent or
 
 138 HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
 deny the consequent. If we affirm the antecedent, i.e., 
 declare that the condition exists, the consequent neces- 
 sarily follows. And, on the other hand, if the conse- 
 quent is declared to be non-existent, we are justified 
 in denying that the condition is operative. 
 
 The violation of these rules gives rise to the fallacies 
 of denying- the antecedent, and of affirming tJie consequent. 
 Thus, for example, we might argue : 
 
 If he were well, he would write, 
 But he is not well, 
 
 Therefore he will not write. 
 
 Here the antecedent is denied, and the argument plainly 
 false. For we cannot infer that his being well is the 
 only condition under which he would write. We do 
 not know, in other words, that the antecedent stated 
 here is the only, or essential condition of the conse- 
 quent. We know that if there is fire, there must be 
 heat; but we cannot infer that there is no heat when 
 no fire is present. Of course, if we can be certain 
 that our antecedent expresses the essential condition, or 
 real sine qua non of the consequent, we can go from 
 the denial of the former to that of the latter. For 
 example : 
 
 If a triangle is equilateral, it is also equiangular, 
 This triangle is not equilateral, 
 
 Therefore it is not equiangular. 
 
 Usually, however, when the hypothetical form of ex- 
 pression is employed, we cannot be certain that the 
 antecedent expresses the sole, or essential condition, of 
 the consequent. At the ordinary stages of knowledge
 
 40. CATEGORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENTS 139 
 
 we have to content ourselves with reasoning from ante- 
 cedent conditions, without being able to show that no 
 other condition is possible. 
 
 To illustrate the fallacy of affirming the consequent, 
 we may take the following example : 
 
 If perfect justice prevailed, the rich would not be permitted to rob 
 the poor, 
 
 But the rich are not permitted to rob the poor, 
 
 Therefore perfect justice prevails. 
 
 Here it will be noticed that the consequent states only 
 one result of the prevalence of 'perfect justice.' Be-- 
 cause the consequent is declared to exist, it by no 
 means follows that it exists as a consequence of the 
 operation of this condition. It is also worth noting 
 in this example that the consequent of the major prem- 
 ise is negative. The minor premise which affirms the 
 consequent also takes a negative form. To. deny the 
 consequent we should have to say, 'the rich are 
 permitted to rob the poor.' Or, to put the matter gen- 
 erally, it is necessary to remember that the affirmation 
 of a negative proposition is expressed by a negative 
 proposition, and that the denial ' of a negative the 
 negation of a negation is, of course, positive in form. 
 
 40. Eolation of Categorical and Hypothetical Argu- 
 ments. It is evident that the form of the hypothetical 
 syllogism is very different from that of the categorical. 
 But, although this is the case, it must not be supposed 
 that with the former we have passed to a new and 
 wholly distinct type of reasoning. In hypothetical
 
 I4O HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
 reasoning, as in categorical, it is the presence of a 
 universal principle which enables us to bring two facts 
 into relation which formerly stood apart. Indeed, in 
 many cases, it is a matter of indifference in which form 
 the argument is stated. Thus, we may argue in hypo- 
 thetical form : 
 
 If a man is industrious, he will be successful, 
 A is an industrious man, 
 
 Therefore A will be successful. 
 
 The same argument may, however, be expressed equally 
 well in categorical form : 
 
 All industrious men will be successful, 
 A is an industrious man, 
 
 Therefore A will be successful. 
 
 It is clear that, in spite of the different forms in which 
 the argument is expressed, the reasoning is essentially 
 the same in both cases. The middle term, or general 
 principle which makes it possible to unite the subject 
 and predicate of the conclusion, in the hypothetical as 
 well as in the categorical syllogism, is 'industrious.' A 
 will be successful, we argue, because he is industrious, 
 and it is a rule that industrious men are successful. 
 
 Moreover, if an argument is fallacious in one form, it 
 will also be fallacious when expressed in the other. 
 The defects of an argument cannot be cured simply 
 by a change in its form. When a hypothetical argu- 
 ment, in which the antecedent is denied, is expressed 
 categorically, we have the fallacy of the illicit major 
 term. Thus, to state the example of denying the ante- 
 cedent given on page 138, we get:
 
 40. CATEGORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENTS 14! 
 
 The case of his being well is a case of his writing, 
 The present is not a case of his being well, 
 
 Therefore the present is not a case of his writing. 
 
 Similarly, when an argument in which the consequent 
 is affirmed is changed to the categorical form, the 
 defect in the reasoning appears as the fallacy of un- 
 distributed middle : 
 
 If this tree were an oak, it would have rough bark and acorns, 
 This tree has rough bark and acorns, 
 
 Therefore it is an oak. 
 
 When this argument is expressed in categorical form, 
 it is at once clear that the middle term is not distributed 
 in either the major or minor premise : 
 
 All oak trees are trees having rough bark and acorns, 
 This tree is a tree having rough bark and acorns, 
 
 Therefore this tree is an oak. 
 
 The change from the categorical to the hypothetical 
 form of argument, then, does not imply any essential 
 change in the nature of the reasoning process itself. 
 Nevertheless, it is important to note that hypothetical 
 propositions and hypothetical arguments emphasize one 
 aspect of thinking, which is entirely neglected by the 
 theory of the categorical syllogism. When dealing with 
 the extension of terms ( 16), we pointed out that every 
 term, as actually used in a proposition, has both an ex- 
 tensive and an intensive function. That is, the terms of 
 a proposition are employed both to name certain objects 
 or groups of objects, and to connote or imply certain 
 attributes or qualities. In the proposition, 'these are 
 oak trees,' the main purpose is to identify the trees.
 
 142 HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
 given in perception with the class of oak trees. When, 
 on the other hand, we say, ' ignorant people are super- 
 stitious,' the proposition does not refer directly to any 
 particular individuals, but states the necessary con- 
 nection between ignorance and superstition. Although 
 the existence of ignorant persons who are also super- 
 stitious is presupposed in the proposition, its most 
 prominent function is to assert a connection of at- 
 tributes which is wholly impersonal. We may perhaps 
 say that, in spite of the categorical form, the proposition 
 is essentially hypothetical in character. Its meaning 
 might very well be expressed by the statement, 'if a man 
 is ignorant, he is also superstitious/ What is here 
 emphasized is not the fact that ignorant persons exist, 
 and are included in the class of superstitious persons, 
 but rather the general law of the necessary connection 
 of ignorance and superstition. The existence of indi- 
 viduals to whom the law applies is, of course, presup- 
 posed by the proposition. It is not, however, its main 
 purpose to directly affirm their existence. 
 
 We have reached, then, the following position : 
 Every judgment has two sides, or operates in two ways. 
 On the one hand, it asserts the existence of individual 
 things, and sets forth their qualities and relations to 
 other things. But, at the same time, every judgment 
 seeks to go beyond the particular case, and to read off a 
 general law of the connection of attributes or qualities 
 which shall be true universally. In singular and par- 
 ticular propositions, the categorical element the direct 
 assertion of the existence of particular objects is most 
 prominent, although even here the hint or suggestion
 
 40. CATEGORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENTS 143 
 
 of a general law is not altogether absent. When we 
 reach the universal proposition, however, the reference 
 to real things is much less direct, and the meaning 
 seems capable of expression in hypothetical form. 
 
 Now in the chapters on the categorical syllogism 
 this latter aspect of judgments has been left out of 
 account. Propositions were there interpreted as refer- 
 ring directly to objects, or classes of objects (cf. 23). 
 The proposition, S is P, for example, was taken to 
 affirm that some definite object, or class of objects, 
 S, falls within the class P. And the fact that it 
 is possible to apply this theory shows that it repre- 
 sents one side of the truth. But the student must 
 sometimes have felt that, in this procedure, the most 
 important signification of the proposition is lost sight 
 of. It seems absurd to say, for example, that in the 
 proposition, ' all material bodies gravitate,' the class of 
 'material bodies' is included in the wider class of 
 'things that gravitate.' The main purpose of the judg- 
 ment is evidently to affirm the necessary connection 
 of the attributes of materiality and gravitation. The 
 judgment does not refer directly to things, or classes of 
 things at all, but asserts without immediate reference to 
 any particular object, if material, then gravitating. The 
 propositions of geometry are still more obviously hypo- 
 thetical in character. 'The three angles of a triangle 
 are equal to two right angles,' for example, cannot, 
 without violence, be made to mean that the subject is 
 included in the class of things which are equal to two 
 right angles. The main purpose of the proposition 
 is obviously to assert the necessary connection of
 
 144 HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
 the ' triangularity ' and the equality of angles with 
 two right angles, and not to make any direct asser- 
 tion regarding any actually existing object or group 
 of objects. 
 
 We reach, then, the following conclusion : Our 
 thought is at once both categorical and hypothetical. 
 As categorical, it refers directly to objects and their 
 relations. The terms of the proposition are then taken 
 in extension to represent objects or groups of objects, 
 and the copula to assert the inclusion of the subject in 
 the predicate, or, in cases of negative propositions, to 
 deny this relation. As hypothetical, the reference to 
 things is much more indirect. The terms of the propo- 
 sition are no longer regarded as representing objects or 
 classes, but are interpreted from the point of view of 
 intension. The judgment affirms or denies the con- 
 nection of the qualities or attributes connoted by the 
 terms, and not that of the objects which they denote. 
 Sometimes the one aspect of thought, sometimes the 
 other, is most prominent. 
 
 In sense-perception and in simple historical narra- 
 tion, assertions are made directly and categorically 
 regarding things and events. The main interest is in 
 particular objects, persons, or events, and our judgments 
 refer directly and unambiguously to them. But, as we 
 have already seen, our thought from its very beginning 
 attempts to get beyond the existence of particular things 
 and events, and to discover what qualities of objects are 
 necessarily connected. We pass from perception and 
 observation to explanation, from the narration of events, 
 to the discovery of the law of their connection. And,
 
 4 i. DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 145 
 
 as a result of this advance, our judgments deal no longer 
 exclusively with particular objects and events, and the 
 fact of their relation, but with the general laws of the 
 connection between attributes and qualities. There is, 
 of course, no fixed point at which we pass from the 
 categorical to the hypothetical aspect of thinking. But, 
 in general, as we pass from judgments of sense-percep- 
 tion and memory, to a statement of theories and laws, 
 the hypothetical element comes more and more clearly 
 into the foreground. We have seen that it is almost 
 impossible to interpret propositions regarding geometri- 
 cal relations as referring directly to classes of objects. 
 In the same way, it is evident that propositions which 
 state general laws are more truly hypothetical than cate- 
 gorical. When we assert that ' all men are mortal,' the 
 proposition does not intend to state a fact in regard to 
 each and every man, or to refer directly to individuals 
 at all, but to express the essential and necessary relation 
 between humanity and mortality. A proposition which 
 is essentially hypothetical in character, may then be 
 expressed in categorical form. It must be remembered 
 that it is not the form, but the purpose or function of a 
 proposition, which determines its character. The hy- 
 pothetical form, however, does justice to an aspect of 
 thought which is especially prominent in the universal 
 laws and formulas of scientific knowledge, and which 
 is not adequately represented by the theory of subsump- 
 tion, or the inclusion of the subject in the predicate. 
 
 41. Disjunctive Arguments. A disjunctive propo- 
 sition, as we have already seen, is of the form, *A is 
 
 x.
 
 146 HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
 either B, or C, or D ' ; or, when expressed negatively, 
 'A is neither B, nor C, nor D.' It is sometimes said to 
 be the union of a categorical and a hypothetical propo- 
 sition. On the one hand, it asserts categorically regard- 
 ing A, and without reference to any external condition. 
 But the disjunctive proposition is not simple like the 
 categorical proposition : it states its results as a series 
 of related conditions and consequences. If A is not B, 
 it tells us, it must be either C or D ; and if it is C, it 
 follows that it cannot be B or D. 
 
 A disjunctive proposition may at first sight appear to 
 be a mere statement of ignorance, and, as such, to be 
 less useful than the simple categorical judgment of per- 
 ception. And it is true that the disjunctive form may 
 be employed to express lack of knowledge. ' I do not 
 know whether this tree is an oak or an ash ' ; ' he will 
 come on Monday or some other day.' A true disjunc- 
 tive proposition, however, is not a mere statement of 
 ignorance regarding the presence or absence of some 
 fact of perception. It is an attempt, on the part of 
 intelligence, to determine the whole series of circum- 
 stances or conditions within which any fact of percep- 
 tion may fall, and to state the conditions in such a 
 way that their relations are at once evident. And to 
 do this implies positive knowledge. In the first place, 
 the enumeration of possibilities must be exhaustive, 
 no cases must be overlooked, and no circumstances 
 left out of account. Secondly, the members of the 
 proposition must be taken so as to be really disjunc- 
 tive. That is, they must be exclusive of one another. 
 We cannot combine disjunctively any terms we please
 
 41. DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 147 
 
 with each other. But it is only when we understand 
 the systematic connections of things in the field in ques- 
 tion, that we are able to express them in the form either 
 B or C, and thus assert that the presence of one ex~ 
 eludes the other. 
 
 A disjunctive proposition, then, presupposes syste- 
 matic knowledge, and is consequently the expression of 
 a comparatively late stage in the evolution of thought. 
 It is true that disjunction may involve doubt or igno- 
 rance regarding any particular individual. We may 
 not be able to say whether A is B or C or D. But, 
 before we can formulate the disjunctive proposition, 
 we must be already acquainted with the whole set of 
 possible conditions, and also with the relation in which 
 those conditions stand to each other. Our knowledge, 
 when formulated in the disjunctive major premise of 
 an argument, is so exhaustive and systematic, that 
 the application to a particular case effected by the 
 minor premise appears almost as a tautology. This 
 will be evident in the disjunctive arguments given 
 below. 
 
 There are two forms of the disjunctive syllogism. 
 The first is sometimes called the modus tollendo ponens, 
 or the mood which affirms by denying. The minor 
 premise, that is, is negative, and the conclusion affirma- 
 tive. The form is, 
 
 A is either B or C, 
 
 A is not C, 
 
 Therefore A is B. 
 
 The negative disjunctive argument has an affirmative 
 minor premise. It is known as the modus ponendo
 
 148 HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
 tollens, or the form which, by affirming one member of 
 the disjunctive series, denies the others, 
 
 A is B or C or D, 
 
 But A is B, 
 
 Therefore A is neither C nor D. 
 
 It is, of course, a very simple matter to draw the con- 
 clusion from the premises in these cases. As we have 
 already indicated, the real intellectual work consists in 
 obtaining the premises, especially in discovering the 
 relations enumerated in the major premise. It is in 
 formulating the major premise, too, that errors are most 
 likely to arise. As already pointed out, it is essential 
 that the disjunctive members shall be exhaustively 
 enumerated, and also that they shall exclude each other. 
 But it is not always easy to discover all the possibilities 
 of a case, or to formulate them in such a way that they 
 are really exclusive. If we say, ' he is either a knave 
 or a fool,' we omit the possibility of his being both the 
 one and the other to some extent. A great many state- 
 ments which are expressed in the form of disjunctive 
 propositions are not true logical disjunctives. Thus we 
 might say, 'every student works either from love of 
 learning, or from love of praise, or for the sake of some 
 material reward.' But the disjunction does not answer 
 the logical requirements, for it is possible that two or 
 more of these motives may influence his conduct at 
 the same time. The disjunctive members are neither 
 exclusive nor completely enumerated. 
 
 42. The Dilemma. A dilemma is an argument 
 composed of hypothetical and disjunctive propositions.
 
 42. THE DILEMMA 149 
 
 As the word is used in ordinary life, we are said to be in 
 a dilemma whenever there are but two courses of action 
 open to us, and when both of these have unpleasant 
 consequences. In the same way, the logical dilemma 
 shuts us in to a choice between alternatives, either of 
 which leads to a conclusion we would gladly avoid. 
 
 The first form, which is sometimes called the Simple 
 Constructive Dilemma, yields a simple or categorical con- 
 clusion, 
 
 If A is B, C is D ; and if E is F, C is D, 
 But either A is B, or E is F, 
 
 Therefore C is D. 
 
 It will be noticed that the minor premise affirms dis- 
 junctively the antecedents of the two hypothetical prop- 
 ositions which form the major premise, and that the 
 conclusion follows whichever alternative holds. We 
 may take as a concrete example of this type of argu- 
 ment : 
 
 If a man acts in accordance with his own judgment, he will be 
 criticised ; and if he is guided by the opinions and rules of others, 
 he will be criticised. 
 
 But he must either act in accordance with his own judgment, or 
 be guided by the opinions of others. 
 
 Therefore, in any case, he will be criticised. 
 
 The hypothetical propositions which make up the 
 major premise of a dilemma do not usually have the 
 same consequent, as is the case in the examples just 
 given. When the consequents involved are different, 
 the dilemma is said to be complex, and the conclusion 
 has the form of a disjunctive proposition. In the Complex
 
 150 HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
 Constructive Dilemma, the minor premise affirms disjunc- 
 tively the antecedents of the major, and the conclusion 
 is consequently affirmative. We may take, as an ex- 
 ample, the argument by which the Caliph Omar is 
 said to have justified the burning of the Alexandrian 
 library : - 
 
 If these books contain the same doctrines as the Koran, they are 
 unnecessary ; and if they are at variance with the Koran, they are 
 wicked and pernicious. 
 
 But they must either contain the same doctrines as the Koran or 
 be at variance with it. 
 
 Therefore these books are either unnecessary or wicked and per- 
 nicious. 
 
 A third form, the Complex Destructive Dilemma, obtains 
 a negative disjunctive proposition as a conclusion, by 
 denying the consequents of the hypothetical proposi- 
 tions which form the major premise of the argument. 
 We may take the following example : 
 
 If a man is prudent, he will avoid needless dangers ; if he is bold 
 and courageous, he will face dangers bravely. 
 
 But this man neither avoids needless dangers nor does he face 
 dangers bravely. 
 
 Therefore he is neither prudent nor bold and courageous. 
 
 By taking more than two hypothetical propositions 
 as major premise, we may obtain a Trilemma, a Tetra- 
 lemma, or a Polylemma. These forms, however, are 
 used much less frequently than the Dilemma. 
 
 The dilemma is essentially a polemical or contro- 
 versial form of argument. Its object, as we have seen, 
 is to force an unwelcome conclusion upon an adversary, 
 by showing that his argument, or his conduct, admits of
 
 42. THE DILEMMA I 5 I 
 
 one or other of two unpleasant interpretations. We 
 sometimes speak of the horns of the dilemma, and of 
 our adversary as 'gored,' whichever horn he may choose. 
 Dilemmas, however, like all controversial arguments, 
 are more often fallacious than valid. The minor pre- 
 mise of a dilemmatic argument, as we have already 
 seen, is a disjunctive proposition with two members. 
 But it is very rarely that two alternatives exhaust all 
 the possible cases. The cases enumerated, too, may 
 not exclude each other, or be real alternatives at all. 
 The dilemma is thus subject to all the dangers which 
 we have already noticed in the case of the disjunctive 
 argument. In addition, it is necessary to see that the 
 canon of the hypothetical syllogism, 'affirm the ante- 
 cedent or deny the consequent,' is observed. If this 
 rule is not observed, the logical form of the argument 
 will not be correct. 
 
 References, especially for 40 
 
 J. S. MiU, Logic, Bk. I. Ch. V. 
 C. Sigwart, Logic, Pt. I. Ch. VII. 
 
 W. Minto, Logic Inductive and Deductive, pp. 129-138, and 
 pp. 214-225. 
 
 F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Bk. I. Ch. 2. 
 B. Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic, Lecture VI.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 43. Classification of Fallacies. We shall hereafter 
 treat of the fallacies or errors to which inductive reason- 
 ing is most subject (Ch. xix.). At present, however, 
 it is necessary to consider the fallacies which are likely 
 to attend the employment of the syllogistic form of 
 reasoning. In considering the subject, we shall find 
 that many fallacies belong equally to both kinds of 
 reasoning. This is especially true of errors which arise 
 from the careless use of words. 
 
 The first systematic account of fallacies is given in 
 Aristotle's treatise, On Sophistical Difficulties (irepl a-ofaa-- 
 TIKWV e\eyx<ov). In this work, Aristotle divides falla- 
 cies into two classes : those which are due to language 
 (Trapa rrjv \%iv, or, as they are usually called, fallacies 
 in dictione\ and those which are not connected with lan- 
 guage (ea> TT}<? Xefeta?, extra dictioneni). Under the first 
 head, he enumerates six kinds of fallacies, and under 
 the second, seven. Aristotle's principle of classification 
 is, however, not entirely satisfactory. We must try to 
 find some positive principle or principles of classification 
 which will render us more assistance in understanding 
 the relations between the various fallacies than is 
 afforded by Aristotle's division into those which belong 
 to language, and those which do not.
 
 43- CLASSIFICATION OF FALLACIES 153 
 
 In the strict sense of the word, a fallacy is to be 
 defined as an error in reasoning. In the syllogism, 
 however, propositions or premises form the data or 
 starting-point. If, now, these propositions are not 
 properly understood, the conclusions to which they 
 lead are likely to be false. We may then first divide 
 fallacies into Errors of Interpretation, and Fallacies in 
 Reasoning. Errors in interpreting propositions might, 
 perhaps, be more properly treated in a work on rhetoric 
 than in a chapter on logical fallacies. But it has been 
 the custom ever since the time of Aristotle to include 
 in the enumeration of logical fallacies a number of 
 errors which are likely to arise in interpreting propo- 
 sitions. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter VII., there 
 are certain processes of interpretation, like Obversion 
 and Conversion, which are sometimes called immediate 
 inference, and which require a knowledge of the logical 
 structure of propositions. 
 
 The Fallacies which arise in the process of reasoning, 
 we may again divide into Formal Fallacies, or violations 
 of the syllogistic rules, and Material Fallacies. The 
 latter class may be further divided into Fallacies of 
 Equivocation (including Ambiguous Middle, Composi- 
 tion, Division, and Accident) and Fallacies of Presump- 
 tion (including Petitio Principii, Irrelevant Conclusion, 
 Non Sequitur, and Complex Questions). The following 
 table will summarize this classification :
 
 154 
 
 FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 FALLACIES 
 
 Errors in Interpretation 
 
 (1) Illogical Obversion or 
 
 Conversion 
 
 (2) Amphiboly 
 
 (3) Accent 
 
 Mistakes in Reasoning 
 
 Material 
 
 In Categorical 
 Arguments 
 
 In 
 
 Hypothetical 
 
 rco 
 
 (2) 
 
 (3) 
 
 (4) 
 
 1(5) 
 
 f(6) 
 
 Formal 
 Four Terms 
 Undistributed 
 
 Middle 
 Illicit Major 
 Illicit Minor 
 
 Equivocation 
 
 (1) Ambiguous 
 
 Middle 
 
 (2) Composition 
 
 (3) Division 
 
 (4) Accident 
 
 Negative Premises 
 
 Arguments [ 
 
 ic Antecedent 
 Affirming the Consequent 
 
 Presumption 
 
 (1) Petitio Prin- 
 
 cipii 
 
 (2) Complex 
 
 Question 
 
 (3) Irrelevant 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 (4) Non Sequitur 
 
 In Disjunctive 
 Arguments 
 
 (8) Imperfect Disjunction 
 
 44. Errors in Interpretation. This class of fallacies 
 results from imperfect understanding of the meaning 
 of propositions. They are not, then, strictly speaking, 
 errors of reasoning at all. If, however, the propositions 
 employed as premises in an argument are not correctly 
 understood, the conclusions founded upon them are 
 likely to be erroneous. And even if the proposition, 
 which is wrongly interpreted, is not made the basis of 
 further reasoning, it is in itself the result of an intel- 
 lectual error against which it is possible to guard. We 
 do not, of course, profess to point out all the possible 
 sources of error in interpreting propositions. The only
 
 44- ERRORS IN INTERPRETATION 155 
 
 rule applicable to all cases which can be given is this : 
 Accept no proposition until you understand its exact 
 meaning, and know precisely what it implies. Delib- 
 eration and attention, both with regard to our own 
 statements and those of others, are the only means 
 of escaping errors of this kind. 
 
 (i) Illogical Obversion or Conversion. In a previous 
 chapter (Ch. vii.), we have treated of Obversion and 
 Conversion, and shown the rules to be followed in stating 
 the obverse or the converse of a proposition. In Obver- 
 sion, we interpret or show what is involved in a proposi- 
 tion, by stating its implications in a proposition of the 
 opposite quality. And unless we have clearly grasped 
 the meaning of the original proposition, mistakes are 
 likely to arise in changing from the affirmative to the 
 negative form of statement, or from the negative to the 
 affirmative. Thus, we should fall into an error of this 
 kind if we should take the proposition, 'honesty is 
 always good policy,' to be the equivalent of, or to imply, 
 the statement, 'dishonesty is always bad policy.' Nor 
 can we obtain by obversion the proposition, ' all citizens 
 are allowed to vote,' from, ' no aliens are allowed to 
 vote.' 
 
 In Conversion, we take some proposition, A is B, and 
 ask what assertion it implies regarding the predicate. 
 Does ' all brave men are generous ' imply also that ' all 
 generous men are brave ' ? This is, perhaps, the most 
 frequent source of error in the conversion of proposi- 
 tions. I do not mean that in working logical examples 
 we are likely to convert proposition A simply, instead of 
 by limitation. But in the heat of debate, or when using
 
 156 FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 propositions without proper attention, there is a natural 
 tendency to assume that a proposition which makes a 
 universal statement regarding the subject, does the same 
 with regard to the predicate. And, although such errors 
 are very obvious when pointed out, as, indeed, is the 
 case with nearly all logical fallacies, they may very 
 easily impose upon us when our minds are not fully 
 awake, that is, when attention is not active and con- 
 sciously on guard. Of the other methods of conversion 
 perhaps contraposition is most likely to be a source of 
 error. We have already ( 27) given the rules for ob- 
 taining the contrapositive of any proposition. Some 
 practice in working examples will assist students in 
 perceiving what is the logical contrapositive to any 
 proposition, and in detecting fallacies. 
 
 (2) Amphiboly, or amphibology (afi<f>i/3o\a\ consists 
 in misconception arising from the ambiguous gram- 
 matical construction of a proposition. A sentence may 
 have two opposite meanings, but one may be more 
 natural and prominent than the other. A deception 
 may be practised by leading a person to accept the 
 meaning more strongly suggested, while the significance 
 intended is the very opposite, as, e.g., ' I hope that you 
 the enemy will slay.' In Shakespeare's Henry VI., we 
 have an instance of amphiboly in the prophecy of the 
 spirit, that "the Duke yet lives that Henry shall 
 depose." 
 
 (3) The Fallacy of Accent is a misconception due to 
 the accent or emphasis being placed upon the wrong 
 words in a sentence. It may, therefore, be regarded 
 as a rhetorical, rather than as a logical fallacy. Jevons's
 
 45- FORMAL FALLACIES 157 
 
 examples of this fallacy may be quoted in part. " A 
 ludicrous instance is liable to occur in reading Chapter 
 XIII. of the First Book of Kings, verse 27, where it is 
 said of the prophet, ' And he spake to his sons, saying, 
 Saddle me the ass. And they saddled him' The italics 
 indicate that the word him was supplied by the trans- 
 lators of the authorized version, but it may suggest a 
 very different meaning. The commandment, 'Thou, 
 shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour,' may 
 be made by a slight emphasis of the voice on the last 
 word to imply that we are at liberty to bear false 
 witness against other persons. Mr. De Morgan who 
 remarks this also points out that the erroneous quoting 
 of an author, by unfairly separating a word from its 
 context, or italicizing words which were not intended to 
 be italicized, gives rise to cases of this fallacy." 1 Jevons 
 is also authority for the statement that Jeremy Bentham 
 was so much afraid of being led astray by this fallacy 
 that he employed a person to read to him whose voice 
 and manner of reading were particularly monotonous. 
 
 45. Formal Fallacies. We shall follow our table, 
 and deal with mistakes of Reasoning under the two 
 headings of Formal Fallacies, and Material Fallacies. 
 Formal fallacies arise from violations of the rules of the 
 syllogism. The breaches of these rules have been 
 already pointed out, and illustrated in our discussion of 
 the various forms of syllogistic argument. The analysis 
 of arguments, with a view to the detection of such 
 fallacies, where any exist, is a very important exercise, 
 
 1 Jevons, Lessons in Logic, p. 1 74,
 
 158 FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 and affords valuable mental discipline. It seems only 
 necessary here to add a remark regarding the first 
 fallacy on our list, that of Four Terms, or Quaternio 
 Terminorum, as it is usually called by logicians. 
 
 The first canon of the categorical syllogism states 
 that 'a syllogism must contain three and only three 
 terms.' This rule would of course be violated by such 
 an argument as, 
 
 Frenchmen are Europeans, 
 Englishmen are Anglo-Saxons, 
 
 Therefore Englishmen are Europeans. 
 
 It is so obvious that this example does not contain 
 a real inference that no one would be likely to be mis- 
 led by the pretence of argument which it contains. In 
 some cases, however, a term may be used in two senses, 
 although the words by which it is expressed are the 
 same. The following example may be given : 
 
 Every good law should be obeyed, 
 The law of gravitation is a good law, 
 
 Therefore the law of gravitation should be obeyed. 
 
 Here we have really four terms. The word 'law,' in 
 the first proposition, means a command given or enact- 
 ment made by some persons in authority. A 'good 
 law' in this sense then means a just law, or one which 
 has beneficial results. But in the second proposition 
 it signifies a statement of the uniform way in which 
 phenomena behave under certain conditions. A ' good 
 law' from this point of view would imply a correct 
 statement of these uniformities. It is interesting to 
 note that this example may also be regarded as an
 
 46. MATERIAL FALLACIES 159 
 
 instance of Equivocation, and classified as a case of an 
 ambiguous middle term. It is often possible to classify 
 a fallacy under more than a single head. 
 
 There are, however, cases where an argument may 
 seem at first sight to have four terms, but where the 
 defect is only verbal. The matter must, of course, be 
 determined by reference to the meaning of terms and 
 not merely to the verbal form of expression. It is ideas 
 or concepts, and not a form of words, which are really 
 operative in reasoning. 
 
 46. Material Fallacies. What are called material 
 fallacies do not result from the violation of any specific 
 logical rules. They are usually said to exist, not in the 
 form, but in the matter of the argument. Consequently, 
 it is sometimes argued, the detection and description of 
 them do not properly belong to logic at all. We have 
 found, however, that all these fallacies have their 
 source in Equivocation and Presumption. They thus 
 violate two of the fundamental principles of logical 
 argument. For all logical reasoning presupposes that 
 the terms employed shall be clearly defined, and used 
 throughout the argument with a fixed and definite 
 signification. And, secondly, logic requires that the 
 conclusion shall not be assumed, but derived strictly 
 from the premises. The violation of these principles 
 is, therefore, a proper matter of concern to the logician. 
 We shall treat first of the fallacies of Equivocation. 
 
 (A) The fallacies of Equivocation have been enumer- 
 ated as Ambiguous Middle Term, Composition, Division, 
 and Accident. These all result from a lack of clearness
 
 160 FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 and definiteness in the terms employed. We shall deal 
 with them briefly in order. 
 
 (1) The phrase, Ambiguous Middle Term, describes 
 the first fallacy of this group. It is obvious that the 
 middle term cannot form a proper standard of com- 
 parison if its meaning is uncertain or shifting. A 
 standard of measure must be fixed and definite. One 
 illustration of this fallacy will be sufficient : 
 
 Partisans are not to be trusted, 
 Democrats are partisans, 
 
 Therefore Democrats are not to be trusted. 
 The middle term, 'partisan,' is evidently used in two 
 senses in this argument. In the first premise it signifies 
 persons who are deeply or personally interested in some 
 measure ; and in the latter it simply denotes the 
 members of a political party. When an argument is 
 long, and is not arranged in syllogistic form, this fallacy 
 is much more difficult of detection than in the simple 
 example which has been given. It is of the utmost 
 importance, then, to insist on realizing clearly in con- 
 sciousness the ideas for which each term stands, and not 
 to content ourselves with following the words. 
 
 (2) The fallacy of Composition arises when we affirm 
 something to be true of a whole, which holds true only 
 of one or more of its parts when taken separately or 
 distributively. Sometimes the error is due to confusion 
 between the distributive and collective signification of 
 ' all,' as in the following example : 
 
 All the angles of a triangle are less than two right angles, 
 A, B, and C are all the angles of this triangle, 
 
 Therefore A, B, and C are less than two right angles.
 
 46. MATERIAL FALLACIES l6l 
 
 It is, of course, obvious that ' all the angles of a 
 triangle' in the major premise signifies each and every 
 angle when taken by itself, and that the same words in 
 the minor premise signify all the angles collectively. 
 What is true of all the parts taken separately, is not 
 necessarily true of the whole. We cannot say that 
 because no one member of a jury is very wise or very 
 fair-minded, that the jury as a whole are not likely to 
 bring in a just verdict. The members may mutually 
 correct and supplement each other, so that the finding 
 of the jury as a whole will be much fairer and wiser 
 than the judgment of any single individual composing 
 it. Another instance of this fallacy which is often 
 quoted is that by which protective duties are sometimes 
 supported : 
 
 The manufacturers of woollens are benefited by the duty on 
 woollen goods ; the manufacturers of cotton by the duty on cotton ; 
 the farmer by the duties on wool and grain ; and so on for all the 
 other producing classes ; therefore, if all the products of the country 
 were protected by an import duty, all the producing classes would 
 be benefited thereby. 
 
 But, because each class would be benefited by an import 
 tax upon some particular product, it does not necessarily 
 follow that the community as a whole would be benefited 
 if all products were thus protected. For, obviously, the 
 advantages which any class would obtain might be more 
 than offset by the increased price of the things which 
 they would have to buy. On the other hand, it would 
 be necessary to take into consideration the fact that an 
 increase in the prosperity of one class indirectly brings 
 profit to all the other members of the same society.
 
 1 62 FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 We cannot regard a whole as simply a sum of parts, 
 but must consider also the way in which the parts act 
 and react upon each other. 
 
 (3) The fallacy of Division is the converse of Com- 
 position. It consists in assuming that what is true of 
 the whole is also true of the parts taken separately. 
 Some term, which is used in the major premise collec- 
 tively, is employed in a distributive sense in the minor 
 premise and conclusion. The following example will 
 illustrate this : 
 
 All the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, 
 A is an angle of a triangle, 
 
 Therefore A is equal to two right angles. 
 
 To argue that, because some measure benefits the 
 country as a whole, it must therefore benefit every 
 section of the country, would be another instance of 
 this fallacy. Again, we may often find examples of 
 both Division and Composition in the practice so com- 
 mon in debate of ' taking to pieces ' the arguments by 
 which any theory or proposed course of action is justi- 
 fied. A person would be guilty of Division if he should 
 argue that, because a complex theory is not completely 
 proved, none of the arguments by which it is supported 
 have any value. It is, however, perhaps more common 
 to fall into the fallacy of Composition in combating the 
 arguments of an opponent. Some measure, for example, 
 is proposed to which a person finds himself in opposi- 
 tion. It is usually easy to analyze the different argu- 
 ments which have been advanced in support of the 
 measure, and to show that no single one of these taken
 
 46. MATERIAL FALLACIES 163 
 
 by itself is sufficient to justify the change. The con- 
 clusion may then be drawn with a fine show of logic 
 that all the reasons advanced have been insufficient. 
 This, of course, is to neglect the cumulative effect of 
 the arguments ; it is to assume that what is true of 
 'all,' taken distributively, is also true of 'all' when 
 taken in conjunction. 
 
 (4) It is often difficult to distinguish the various forms 
 of the fallacy of Accident from Composition and Divi- 
 sion. We have seen that the latter rest upon a confu- 
 sion between whole and part ; or, as we have already 
 expressed it, on an equivocation between the distributive 
 and collective use of terms. The fallacies of Accident 
 are also due to Equivocation. But in this case the con- 
 fusion is between essential properties and accidents, 
 between what is true of a thing in its real nature, as 
 expressed by its logical definition, and what is true of it 
 only under some peculiar or accidental circumstance. 
 
 There are two forms of this argument which are 
 usually recognized : (a) The Direct or Simple Fallacy 
 of Accident, which consists in arguing that what is true 
 of a thing generally is also true of it under some acci- 
 dental or peculiar circumstance. The old logicians 
 expressed this in the formula, a dicto simpliciter ad 
 dictum secundum quid. The second form is (b) the 
 Converse Fallacy of Accident, which consists in arguing 
 that what is true of a thing under some condition or 
 accident, can be asserted of it simply, or in its essential 
 nature. The formula for this is, a dicto secundum quid 
 ad dictum simpliciter. 
 
 It would be an illustration of the direct fallacy to
 
 164 FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 reason, that because man is a rational being, there- 
 fore a drunken man or an angry man will be guided by 
 reason. Similarly, we should commit this fallacy if 
 we were to argue that because beefsteak is wholesome 
 food, it would be good for a person suffering with fever 
 or dyspepsia; or to conclude from the principle that 
 it is right to relieve the suffering of others, that we 
 ought to give money to beggars. 
 
 It would be a case of the converse fallacy to argue, 
 that because spirituous liquors are of value in certain 
 cases of disease, they must therefore be beneficial to a 
 person who is well. We should also be guilty of the 
 same fallacy if we should conclude that it is right to 
 deceive others, from the fact that it is sometimes neces- 
 sary to keep the truth from a person who is sick, or to 
 deceive an enemy in time of war. 
 
 The fallacies of Accident, like all the fallacies of 
 Equivocation, are largely the result of a loose and care- 
 less use of language. By qualifying our terms so as 
 to state the exact circumstances involved, they may 
 easily be detected and avoided. 
 
 ,(^) Fallacies of Presumption. The fallacies of this 
 group are the result of presumption or assumption on 
 the part of the person making the argument. It is pos- 
 sible (i) to assume the point to be proved, either in 
 the premises of an argument, or in a question (Petitio 
 Principii, and Complex Question); or (2) to assume 
 without warrant that a certain conclusion follows from 
 premises which have been stated (Non Sequitur)\ or 
 (3) that the conclusion obtained proves the point at 
 issue (Irrelevant Conclusion).
 
 46. MATERIAL FALLACIES 165 
 
 (i) Petitio Principii, or 'Begging the Question,' is a 
 form of argument which assumes the conclusion to be 
 proved. This may be done in either of two ways, 
 (i) We may postulate the fact which we wish to prove, 
 or its equivalent under another name. Thus, for ex- 
 ample, we might argue that an act is morally wrong 
 because it is opposed to sound ethical principles. 'The 
 soul is immortal because it is a simple and indecom- 
 posable substance/ may be regarded as another ex- 
 ample of this assumption. But (2) the question may 
 be begged by making a general assumption covering 
 the particular point in dispute. Thus, if the advisa- 
 bility of legislation regulating the hours of labor in a 
 mine or factory were under discussion, the question- 
 begging proposition, 'all legislation which interferes 
 with the right of free contract is bad,' might be pro- 
 pounded as a settlement of the whole question. 
 
 A special form of this fallacy results when each of 
 two propositions is used in turn to prove the truth of 
 the other. This is known as 'reasoning in a circle,' 
 or circulus in probando. This method of reasoning is 
 often adopted when the premise, which has been em- 
 ployed to prove the first conclusion, is challenged. ' I 
 should not do this act, because it is wrong.' ' But how 
 do you know that the act is wrong ? ' ' Why, because 
 I know that I should not do it.' 
 
 It is always necessary, then, to see that the conclu- 
 sion has not been assumed in the premises. But, since 
 the conclusion always follows from the premises, we 
 may say in one sense that the conclusion is always thus 
 assumed. It is, therefore, easy to charge an opponent
 
 1 66 FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 unjustly with begging the question. De Morgan in his 
 work on Fallacies, says : " There is an opponent fallacy 
 to the Petitio Principii which, I suspect, is of more 
 frequent occurrence : it is the habit of many, to treat 
 an advanced proposition as a begging of the question 
 the moment they see that, if established, it would es- 
 tablish the question." All argument must, of course, 
 start from premises to which both parties assent. But 
 candour and fairness forbid us to charge an opponent 
 with Petitio because the results of his premises are 
 unwelcome. It was Charles Lamb who humorously 
 remarked that he would not grant that two and two 
 are four until he knew what use was to be made of 
 the admission. 
 
 (2) The Complex Question is an interrogative form of 
 Petitio, It is not really a simple interrogation, but is 
 founded upon an assumption. Examples may be found 
 in popular pleasantries, such as, ' Have you given up 
 your drinking habits ? ' ' Do the people in your part of 
 the country still carry revolvers ? ' Disjunctive questions, 
 too, always contain an assumption of this kind : 'Is this 
 an oak or an ash ? ' ' Does he live in Boston or 
 New York ? ' The ' leading questions ' which lawyers 
 frequently use in examining witnesses, but which are 
 always objected to by the opposing counsel, are usually 
 of this character. Further instances may perhaps be 
 found in the demand for explanation of facts which are 
 either false, or not fully substantiated ; as, e.g. ' Why 
 does a fish when dead weigh more than when alive ?-' 
 ' What is the explanation of mind-reading ? ' 
 
 (3) The Irrelevant Conclusion, or Ignoratio Elenchi, 
 
 ^ Ot/YlX
 
 46. MATERIAL FALLACIES l6/ 
 
 consists in substituting for the conclusion to be proved 
 some other proposition more or less nearly related to it 
 This fallacy may be the result of an involuntary con- 
 fusion on the part of the person employing it, or it may 
 be consciously adopted as a controversial stratagem to 
 deceive an opponent or an audience. When used in 
 this latter way, it is usually intended to conceal the 
 weakness of a position by diverting attention from the 
 real point at issue. This is, indeed, a favourite device 
 of those who have to support a weak case. A counsel 
 for the defence in a law-suit is said to have handed 
 to the barrister presenting the case the brief marked, 
 ' No case ; abuse the plaintiff's attorney.' To answer 
 a charge or accusation by declaring that the person 
 bringing the charge is guilty of as bad, or even worse, 
 things, what is sometimes called the tu quoque form 
 of argument is also an example of this fallacy. 
 
 Apart from such wilful perversions or confusions, 
 many unintentional instances of this fallacy occur. In 
 controversial writing, it is very natural to assume that 
 a proposition which has some points of connection with 
 the conclusion to be established, is 'essentially the 
 same thing,' or ' practically the same, as the thesis 
 maintained.' Thus one might take the fact that a great 
 many people are not regular church-goers, as a proof 
 of the proposition that religion and morality are dying 
 out in the country. Many of the arguments brought 
 against scientific and philosophical theories belong to 
 this class. Mill cites the arguments which have been 
 urged against the Malthusian doctrine of population, 
 and Berkeley's theory of matter. We may quote the
 
 1 68 FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 passage referring to the former: " Malthus has been 
 supposed to be refuted if it could be shown that in 
 some countries or ages population has been nearly 
 stationary, as if he had asserted that population always 
 increases in a given ratio, or had not expressly declared 
 that it increases only, in so far as it is not restrained by 
 prudence, or kept down by disease. Or, perhaps, a 
 collection of facts is produced to prove that in some one 
 country with a dense population the people are better 
 off than they are in another country with a thin one, or 
 that the people have become better off and more 
 numerous at the same time ; as if the assertion were 
 that a dense population could not possibly be well off." l 
 
 There are several cases or forms of Irrelevant Con- 
 clusion to which special names have been given, and 
 which it is important to consider separately. When 
 an argument bears upon the real point at issue, it is 
 called argumentum ad rem. But, on the other hand, 
 there are the following special ways of obscuring the 
 issue : argumentum ad hominem, argumentum ad popti- 
 lum, argumentum ad ignorantiam, and argumentum ad 
 verecundiam. 
 
 The argumentum ad hominem is an appeal to the 
 character, principles, or former profession of the person 
 against whom it is directed. It has reference to a 
 person or persons, not to the real matter under discus- 
 sion. In order to confuse an opponent, and discredit 
 him with the audience, one may show that his character 
 is bad, or that the views which he is now maintaining 
 
 1 Logic, Bk. V. Ch. VII. 3.
 
 46. MATERIAL FALLACIES 169 
 
 are inconsistent with his former professions and practice. 
 Or the argument may be used with the hope of persuad- 
 ing the opponent himself. We then try to convince 
 him that the position which he maintains is inconsistent 
 with some other view which he has previously pro- 
 fessed, or with the principles of some sect or party 
 which he has approved. Or we may appeal to his in- 
 terests by showing him that the action proposed will 
 affect injuriously some cause in which he is concerned, 
 or will benefit some rival sect or party. In all of these 
 cases the real point at issue is, of course, evaded. 
 
 The argumentum ad populum is an argument ad- 
 dressed to the feelings, passions, and prejudices of 
 people rather than an unbiassed discussion addressed to 
 the intellect. 
 
 The argumentum ad ignorantiam is an attempt to 
 gain support for some position by dwelling upon the 
 impossibility of proving the opposite. Thus we cannot 
 prove affirmatively that spirits do not revisit the earth, 
 or send messages to former friends through 'mediums/ 
 Now it is not unusual to find ignorance on this subject 
 advanced as a positive ground of conviction. The 
 argument seems to be : 
 
 It is not impossible that this is so, 
 What is not impossible is possible, 
 Therefore it is possible that this is so. 
 
 The fallacy arises when we confuse what is only ab- 
 stractly possible i.e., what we cannot prove to be 
 impossible with what is really possible, i.e., with what 
 we have some positive grounds for believing in, though 
 those grounds are not sufficient to produce conviction.
 
 I/O FALLACIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 The argumentum ad verecundiam is an appeal to the 
 reverence which most people feel for a great name. 
 This method of reasoning attempts to settle a question 
 by referring to the opinion of some acknowledged 
 authority, without any consideration of the arguments 
 which are advanced for or against the position. It is, of 
 course, right to attach much importance to the views of 
 great men, but we must not suppose that their opinion 
 amounts to proof, or forbids us to consider the matter 
 for ourselves. 
 
 There is, however, a more common, though still less 
 justifiable, form of the argument from authority. A 
 man who is distinguished for his knowledge and attain- 
 ments in some particular field, is often quoted as an 
 authority upon questions with which he has no special 
 acquaintance. The prestige of a great name is thus 
 irrelevantly invoked when no significance properly 
 attaches to it Thus, for example, a successful general 
 is supposed to speak with authority upon problems of 
 statescraft, and the opinions of prominent clergymen 
 are quoted regarding the latest scientific theories. 
 
 (4) The fallacy of non sequitur, or the fallacy of the 
 consequent, occurs when the conclusion does not really 
 follow from the premises by which it is supposed to be 
 supported. The following example may serve as an 
 illustration : 
 
 Pennsylvania contains rich coal and iron mines, 
 Pennsylvania has no sea-coast, 
 
 Therefore the battle of Gettysburg was fought in that state. 
 This argument, of course, is thoroughly inconsequent,
 
 46. MATERIAL FALLACIES I /I 
 
 and would deceive no one. But when the conclusion 
 repeats some words or phrases from the premises, we 
 are likely, when not paying close attention, to be im- 
 posed upon by the mere form of the argument. We 
 notice the premises, and remark that the person using 
 the argument advances boldly through ' therefore ' to his 
 conclusion. And if this conclusion appears to be related 
 to the premises, and sounds reasonable, the argument is 
 likely to be accepted. The following example will illus- 
 trate this : 
 
 Every one desires happiness, and virtuous people are happy, 
 Therefore every one desires to be virtuous. 
 
 What is known as the False Cause (non causa pro 
 causa ; post hoc ergo propter hoc) is the inductive fallacy 
 corresponding to the non sequitur. In this we assume 
 that one thing is the cause of another merely because we 
 have known them to happen together a number of times. 
 The causal relation is assumed without any analysis or 
 examination, on the ground of some chance coincidence. 
 Thus a change in the weather may be attributed to the 
 moon, or the prosperity of the country to its laws re- 
 quiring Sunday observance (cf. pp. 255 f.). 
 
 References 
 
 J. H. Hyslop, The Elements of Logic, Chs. XVII. and XVIII. 
 
 J. S. Mill, Logic, Bk. V. 
 
 A. Sidgwick, Fallacies [Int. Scient. Series].
 
 PART II. INDUCTIVE METHODS 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION. OBSERVATION AND 
 EXPLANATION 
 
 47. The Problem of Induction. In Part I. we have 
 outlined the general nature of the syllogism, and have 
 shown what conditions must be fulfilled in order to 
 derive valid conclusions from given premises. But the 
 syllogism does not represent completely all of our ways of 
 thinking. We do not always find premises which every 
 one accepts ready to our hand. The propositions which 
 serve as the premises of syllogisms are themselves the 
 result of the activity of thought. It requires thinking 
 to arrive at such simple propositions as, 'all men are 
 mortal,' 'water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen.' 
 Facts of this kind are of course learned through expe- 
 rience, but they none the less require thought for their 
 discovery. Sense-perception without thought could give 
 us only a chaos of unordered impressions which would 
 have no meaning and no significance. It is important, 
 then, to understand how our intelligence proceeds to 
 discover the real nature of things, and the laws accord- 
 ing to which they operate. Thinking is the means by 
 which we interpret nature, and to show how this is to 
 
 172
 
 47- THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 1/3 
 
 be accomplished was the purpose of Bacon's Novum Or- 
 ganum. The problem is the discovery of the real nature 
 of things, and their relations with one another. The 
 assumption of all knowledge, as we have already seen 
 ( 9, cf. also 79, 80), is that there is a permanent con- 
 stitution of things which secures uniform ways of acting. 
 The procedure by means of which intelligence discovers 
 the permanent laws of things is usually known as In- 
 duction. We shall have to study this kind of thinking 
 in this and the following chapters. The general prob- 
 lem may perhaps be stated in this way : What are the 
 methods which inductive thinking employs, in order to 
 pass from the chaotic and unordered form in which the 
 senses present our experience, to a perception of the 
 order and law in things that is required by real know- 
 ledge or science ? 
 
 Before we attempt to answer this question, however, 
 there are several remarks to be made which will, I 
 hope, throw further light upon the nature of our under- 
 taking. In the first place, it is to be noticed that we 
 have spoken in the preceding paragraph of the methods 
 of inductive thinking. Now, as we shall show more 
 fully in 88, there is no essential difference between 
 the results of an inductive and a deductive inference. 
 The purpose of an inference is always_jthe same : 
 namely, to exhibitTTHelrelation and connection of par- 
 ticular facts or_events_in virtue of some universal law 
 or principle. In deductive thinking, sucE a law is 
 known, or provisionally assumed as known, and the 
 problem is to show its application to the facts with 
 which we are dealing. In induction, on the other hand,
 
 1/4 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 
 
 the starting-point must be the particular facts, and the 
 task which thought has to perform is to discover the 
 general law of their connection. Both deduction and 
 induction play an important part in the work of building 
 up knowledge. But the various sciences must start 
 with particular facts learned through experience. The 
 mind has not before experience any store of general 
 principles or innate truths which might serve as the 
 starting-point of knowledge (cf. 76). It must fall 
 back, therefore, upon the particular facts and events 
 learned through perception. This 'elementary know- 
 ledge,' as has been already pointed out, does not pass 
 over in a ready-made form into the mind, but is itself 
 the result of thinking or judging. However, before 
 any one deliberately and consciously undertakes to dis- 
 cover new truth, to understand the world, he is already 
 in possession of a store of such perceptive judgments. 
 These constitute the beginnings of knowledge, and 
 serve as the starting-point for scientific explanation. 
 The knowledge of laws and general principles comes 
 later, and is derived from a study of the particular facts. 
 It is clear, then, that the procedure of all the sciences 
 must be inductive, at least in the beginning. The various 
 sciences are occupied, each in its particular field, with 
 an attempt to reduce to order and unity facts, which at 
 first sight appear to be lawless and disconnected. And 
 it is true to say that in this undertaking the general 
 procedure is inductive. But it will also appear that in 
 performing this task thought does not always proceed 
 in strictly inductive fashion. Our thought uses every 
 means which will help it to its desired end. It is often
 
 47- THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 175 
 
 able, after pushing its inquiries a little way, to discover 
 some general principle, or to guess what the law of 
 connection must be. When this is possible, it is found 
 profitable to proceed deductively, and to show what re- 
 sults necessarily follow from the truth of such a general 
 law. Of course, it is always essential to verify results 
 obtained in this deductive way, by comparing them with 
 the actual facts. But in general, the. best results are 
 obtained when induction and deduction go hand in 
 hand. We shall expect to find, then, that the so-called 
 inductive methods sometimes include steps which are 
 really deductive in nature. 
 
 It is to be noticed, further, that in dealing with the nature of the 
 inductive methods, we are not laying down rules which thought must 
 follow. We are not attempting, that is, to prescribe to thinking its 
 mode of procedure. To do so would be quite futile. It is impos- 
 sible, as we have already seen ( 3), for logic to lay down any 
 a priori rules. Its task is rather to point out the methods by which 
 success has been already won in the various fields of knowledge. 
 Logic does not attempt to invent any methods of scientific proced- 
 ure, but it undertakes to describe the road by which truth has 
 already been gained. The scientific inquirer is interested pri- 
 marily in the results of his thinking : he is usually not interested in 
 tracing the various steps through which his thought has passed, and 
 the methods employed in reaching the goal. Oftentimes he would 
 be unable to give any such description even if he tried to do so. 
 Logic, however, takes the procedure of the thinking process for its 
 subject-matter. It undertakes to make thought conscious of its 
 own nature, of the goal at which it aims, and the methods which 
 are employed in the attainment of this goal. The comparative 
 value of these methods, too, must be decided by the actual charac- 
 ter of the results which they have yielded. One method is to be 
 regarded as better than another when it gives us knowledge which 
 Js universally acknowledged to be more complete and satisfactory
 
 1/6 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 
 
 than that afforded by the other. For logical methods, like every, 
 thing else, must be known and judged by their fruits. 
 
 Again, it must be remembered that complete scien- 
 tific explanation, which we found to be the type of per- 
 fect knowledge, is not attained at a single stroke. 
 Scientific inquiry may have various purposes. It is 
 often limited to an attempt to gain a knowledge of the 
 quantitative relations of things, or of the way in which 
 they are connected as antecedents and consequents. 
 In some cases, too, the conclusions reached are only 
 more or less probable, and require further confirmation 
 through the use of other methods. It follows, then, 
 that the various scientific methods which we shall have 
 to describe are not to be regarded as self-sufficient and 
 independent ways of reaching truth, but rather as 
 mutually helpful and complementary. For example, the 
 work done by thought in dealing with the quantitative 
 aspect of things, and the conclusions which it reaches 
 through analogical inference, are necessary steps in the 
 progress toward complete and satisfactory explanations 
 of the nature of things. We shall find it necessary, there- 
 fore, to keep in mind in our investigation this relation 
 of the various methods to one another. For our purpose, 
 we may perhaps classify the various scientific methods 
 as those of Observation and Explanation, the latter in- 
 cluding Analogy and Complete Scientific Explanation. 
 
 48. Observation. We may include under this 
 heading, Simple Enumeration, Statistical Methods, and 
 Methods of determining Causal Connection. Before 
 describing these processes in detail, however, it is neces-
 
 48. OBSERVATION 1 77 
 
 sary to make clear what is implied in the nature of scien- 
 tific observation, and what are the results aimed at by the 
 methods which it employs. It is customary to say that 
 Observation has to determine the nature and order of the 
 particular facts presented by our experience, and that 
 after this has been done, there still remains the task of 
 furnishing the theory, or Explanation of the facts. This 
 distinction, though not absolute, affords a convenient 
 principle of division in treating of the inductive methods. 
 We may say that it is observation which enables us to 
 discover the nature of particular facts, and to determine 
 the order of their connection. Accurate observation is 
 thus a first and necessary step in the work of reducing 
 our experience to systematic form. We have already 
 seen how emphatically and eloquently this doctrine was 
 proclaimed by Bacon in the Novum Organnm. 
 
 It is important, however, to remember that scientific 
 observation itself involves intellectual activity. To 
 observe at least in the sense in which the word is 
 used in scientific procedure requires something more 
 than the passive reception of impressions of sense in 
 the order in which they come to us. Without some 
 activity on the part of mind, it would be impossible to 
 obtain even the imperfect and fragmentary knowledge 
 of everyday life. But accurate observation is one of 
 the means which science employs to render this know- 
 ledge more complete and satisfactory ; and when obser- 
 vation thus becomes an exact and conscious instrument, 
 it involves, to even a greater extent than in ordinary 
 life, intellectual activities like judgment and inference. 
 It is because this is true, because scientific observation 
 N
 
 1/8 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 
 
 demands the constant exercise of thought, in selecting 
 and comparing the various elements in the material 
 with which it deals, that it affords such excellent intel- 
 lectual discipline. The observational sciences do not 
 merely train the sense-organs ; the discipline which 
 they afford is mental as well as physiological, and it 
 is, of course, true that mental training can only be 
 gained through the exercise of mental activity. 
 
 It is quite true that it is of the utmost importance to distinguish 
 between a fact, and further inferences from the fact. As will be 
 pointed out in the chapter on Inductive Fallacies, errors very fre- 
 quently arise from confusing facts and inferences. The point which 
 is emphasized in the previous paragraph, however, is that it requires 
 a certain amount of thinking in order to get a fact at all. Facts do 
 not pass over ready-made into the mind. Simply to stare at things 
 does not give us knowledge ; unless our mind reacts, judges, thinks, 
 we are not a bit the wiser for staring. To observe well, it is neces- 
 sary to be more or less definitely conscious of what one is looking 
 for, to direct one's attention towards some particular field or object ; 
 and to do this implies selection among the multitude of impressions 
 and objects of which we are conscious. Moreover, scientific obser- 
 vation requires analysis and discrimination. It is not unusual, in 
 text-books on logic, to symbolize the various facts learned through 
 observation by means of letters, <z, b, c, etc., and to take it for granted 
 that they are given in our experience as distinct and separate phe- 
 nomena; but, as we have just seen, judgments of analysis and 
 discrimination are necessary to separate out the so-called ' phenom- 
 ena' from the mass or tangle of experience in which they were 
 originally given. Again, to determine the nature of a fact through 
 observation, it is essential to note carefully how it differs from 
 other facts with which it is likely to be confused, and also, to some 
 extent, what relations and resemblances it has. But such knowledge 
 presupposes that thought has already been at work in forming judg- 
 ments of comparison.
 
 48. OBSERVATION 179 
 
 It may seem strange at first sight that the determina- 
 tion of the causal order and connection of phenomena 
 should be regarded as belonging to Observation rather 
 than to Explanation. To discover the causes of things 
 is, indeed, a very essential step in the process of expla- 
 nation ; but, as will appear more fully hereafter, the 
 distinction between observation and explanation is not 
 an absolute one. The process of knowledge is essen- 
 tially the same from beginning to end. The determina- 
 tion of the nature and order of phenomena is a long 
 step towards rendering them comprehensible. If the 
 distinction between observation and explanation as 
 methods of scientific procedure is to be made, it seems 
 right to assign to observation the task of determining 
 what phenomena are invariably conjoined as antecedents 
 and consequents. Experience presents to us a variety 
 of objects simultaneously or in rapid succession, but 
 in many cases such conjunction is merely temporary 
 and accidental. The problem which scientific obser- 
 vation has here to determine is the discovery of what 
 particular phenomena are necessarily connected, what are 
 the real antecedents and consequents in the case. ' The 
 sun was very hot this morning, and a picnic party went 
 on the lake, and this afternoon there is a severe thunder- 
 storm.' These events (and many others) are conjoined 
 temporally. Is there also a real connection between 
 any of them, or is their concurrence merely accidental ? 
 This is the question which must be answered by the 
 methods of determining causal connection. Of course 
 merely passive observation will not suffice to obtain an 
 answer. The relation of antecedent and consequent is
 
 180 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 
 
 not given, but has to be made out by the help of analysis 
 and inference. But, since the point to be determined 
 has reference to the nature and order of a set of facts 
 which can be observed, the methods employed may well 
 be included under Observation. 
 
 A distinction is sometimes made between observa- 
 tion and experiment. In observation, it is said, the 
 mind simply finds its results presented to it in nature, 
 while in experiment the answer to a question is obtained 
 by actively controlling and arranging the circumstances 
 at will. There are, no doubt, some grounds for this dis- 
 tinction, though it is not true that the mind is passive 
 in the one case, and active in the other. Even in ob- 
 servation, as we have seen, knowledge always arises 
 through active analysis and comparison of the impres- 
 sions received through sense. The difference is rather 
 this : In observing, where experiment is impossible, one 
 must wait for events to occur, and must take them in 
 the order in which .they are presented in the natural 
 series. But, where experiment is employed, we have 
 control of the ' conditions, and can produce the phe- 
 nomena to be investigated in any order, and as often 
 as we choose. In experiment, as Bacon says, we can 
 put definite questions to nature, and compel her to 
 answer. This is, of course, an immense advantage. 
 In some of the sciences, however geology and as- 
 tronomy for example it is not possible thus to con- 
 trol the conditions : one must wait and observe the 
 results of nature's experiments. Physics and chemis- 
 try are the experimental sciences par excellence ; and, 
 in general, we may say that a science always makes
 
 48. OBSERVATION l8l 
 
 more rapid progress when it is found possible to call 
 experiment to the aid of observation. It is not possible 
 to conceive how physics and chemistry could have 
 reached their present state of perfection without the 
 assistance of experiment. Indeed, the almost total 
 neglect of experiment by the Greek and mediaeval 
 scholars must be regarded as one of the chief reasons 
 why the physical sciences made so little progress dur- 
 ing those centuries. Dr. Fowler states in the following 
 passage some of the main advantages to be derived 
 from experiment: 
 
 "To be able to vary the circumstances as we choose, to produce 
 the phenomenon under investigation in the precise degree which is 
 most convenient to us, and as frequently as we wish, to combine it 
 with other phenomena or to isolate it altogether, are such obvious 
 advantages that it is not necessary to insist upon them. Without 
 the aid of artificial experiment it would have been impossible, for 
 instance, to ascertain the laws of falling bodies. To disprove the 
 old theory that bodies fall in times inversely proportioned to their 
 weight, it was necessary to try the experiment ; to be able to affirm 
 with certainty that all bodies, if moving in a non-resisting medium, 
 would fall to the earth through equal vertical spaces in equal times, 
 it was essential to possess the means of removing altogether the 
 resisting medium by some such contrivance as that of the air-pump. 
 . . . Even when observation alone reveals to us a fact of nature, 
 experiment is often necessary in order to give precision to our 
 knowledge. That the metals are fusible, and that some are fusible 
 at a lower temperature than others, is a fact which we can conceive 
 to have been obtruded upon man's observation, but the precise 
 temperature at which each metal begins to change the solid for the 
 liquid condition could be learned only by artificial experiment." l 
 
 It is important, then, to recognize the services which 
 
 1 Fowler, Inductive Logic, p. 41 f.
 
 1 82 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 
 
 experiment renders in helping us to understand the 
 facts with which the various sciences deal. But it is not 
 necessary to distinguish experiment from observation as 
 if it were a separate and independent mode of investiga- 
 tion. We should rather say that observation, in the 
 sense in which we have used the word, employs experi- 
 ment wherever practicable as an indispensable auxiliary. 
 The methods of observation, then, which have still to be 
 described, will in many cases call for the employment of 
 experiments. Indeed, it will be seen that some of these 
 are essentially methods of experimentation. 
 
 49. Explanation. We have already seen that the 
 distinction between observation and explanation is not 
 an absolute one. The task which thought has to per- 
 form the task which is undertaken by science is to 
 reduce the isolated and chaotic experiences of ordinary 
 life to order and system. And it is important to remem- 
 ber that all the various methods employed contribute 
 directly towards that result. It has, however, seemed 
 possible to divide this undertaking into two main divis- 
 ions. Observation, it was said, seeks to discover the 
 exact nature of the facts to be dealt with, and also to 
 determine the ways in which they are necessarily and 
 invariably connected. But, when this has been accom- 
 plished, we have not by any means reached an end of 
 the matter. The desire for knowledge is not satisfied 
 with a mere statement of facts, or with the information 
 that certain phenomena always occur in a fixed order 
 as antecedents and consequents. Complete knowledge 
 demands an explanation of the facts as thus determined
 
 49- EXPLANATION 183 
 
 by the methods of observation. ' Why,' we ask, ' should a 
 always precede b ? ' ' Why should dew be deposited under 
 such and such conditions, or water rise thirty-two feet in 
 a pump ? ' Science, we feel, should do more than de- 
 scribe the facts ; it should offer an explanation of 
 them as well. To explain events, however, is to furnish 
 reasons for them. The scientist is not content to know 
 merely that such and such phenomena exist, and occur 
 in conjunction with each other, but he attempts to dis- 
 cover why this is so. His knowledge is not confined to 
 the 'what,' but includes the 'why.' It is, of course, true 
 that a large part of scientific work is occupied with an 
 attempt to determine precisely and accurately the nature 
 of facts. Until the facts are thus scientifically deter- 
 mined attempts at explanation are usually quite futile. 
 But after this has been accomplished, it is still necessary 
 to show reasons why the phenomena with which we are 
 dealing have the precise character which they are found 
 to possess, and why they should occur in the invariable 
 order in which they are observed. Explanation, in other 
 words, completes the knowledge obtained through ob- 
 servation. It does further intellectual work on the 
 results given by the latter process. Explanation, itself, 
 has various degrees of completeness ; it may be more or 
 less satisfactory. When we come to treat Analogy, for 
 example, we shall find that it affords a kind of expla- 
 nation, though not one of an entirely satisfactory 
 type. In general, however, we may say that explana- 
 tion goes beyond the particular facts, and seizes upon 
 general principles or laws to which the facts are re- 
 ferred. And it is only when one knows the general law
 
 1 84 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 
 
 or principle involved in the case, that one can be said 
 really to understand the particular facts. 
 
 It is usually said that where we know merely the nature of phe- 
 nomena, and their connection, without being able to explain these 
 facts, our knowledge is empirical. Thus, I may know that an ex- 
 plosion follows the contact of a lighted match with gunpowder, or 
 that a storm follows when there is a circle around the moon, without 
 being able to explain in any way why these facts are connected. 
 On the other hand, if we can connect events by showing the gen- 
 eral principle involved, we say that our knowledge is really scientific. 
 It is important to notice, however, that empirical knowledge is simply 
 in a less advanced stage than the scientific knowledge which has suc- 
 ceeded in gaining an insight into the general law. Empirical know- 
 ledge leaves a problem which intelligence has still to solve. It is, of 
 course, true that a large part of every one's knowledge is empirical in 
 character. We all know many things which we cannot explain. In 
 all the sciences, too, phenomena are met with which seem to defy all 
 attempts at explanation. Indeed, some of the sciences can scarcely 
 be said to have passed the empirical stage. The science of medi- 
 cine, for example, has hardly yet reached any knowledge of general 
 principles. The physician knows, that is, as a result of actual ex- 
 periment, that such and such drugs produce such and such effects. 
 But he knows almost nothing of the means by which this result is 
 achieved, and is therefore unable to go beyond the fact itself. In 
 this respect, he is very little better off than the ordinary man, who 
 knows that if he eats certain kinds of food he will be ill, or if he 
 drinks strong liquors in excess he will become intoxicated.
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 METHODS OF OBSERVATION. ENUMERATION AND STA- 
 TISTICS 
 
 50. Enumeration or Simple Counting. We shall 
 begin the account of the scientific methods with Enu- 
 meration. To count the objects which we observe, 
 and to distinguish and number their parts, is one of 
 the first and most essential operations of thought. It is 
 of course true that qualitative distinctions precede quan- 
 titative. The child learns to distinguish things by some 
 qualitative mark, such as 'black' or 'hot,' before he is 
 able to count them (cf. 82). But we may say, never- 
 theless, that the qualities of things are known, in a 
 general way at least, before scientific procedure begins. 
 The determination of quantity, on the other hand, seems 
 to demand a more conscious effort on the part of the 
 mind. We learn, that is, to distinguish the general 
 qualities of things without effort, but, in order to obtain 
 quantitative knowledge, it is necessary to set ourselves 
 deliberately to work. We may, therefore, take Enumer- 
 ation, or Simple Counting, which is perhaps the easiest 
 kind of quantitative determination, as our starting-point 
 in dealing with the Inductive Methods. 
 
 A considerable step in advance, in the task of re- 
 ducing the world of our experience to order and unity, 
 is taken when we begin to count, i.e., to group together 
 
 185
 
 1 86 ENUMERATION AND STATISTICS 
 
 things of the same kind, and to register their number. 
 Thus Enumeration is, to some extent, also a process of 
 classification. What is counted is always a collective 
 whole, the units of which are either all of the same kind, 
 or else belong to a limited number of different classes. 
 Thus one might determine by Enumeration the number 
 of sheep in a flock, taking each individual as belonging 
 to the same general class, ' sheep ' ; or the analysis might 
 be pushed further so as to give as a result the number 
 of white and of black sheep separately. The purpose 
 for which the enumeration is undertaken always deter- 
 mines the length to which the process of analysis and 
 distinction is carried. For example, if the object of a 
 census enumeration were simply to determine the num- 
 ber of inhabitants in a country, it would not be neces- 
 sary to make any distinctions, but each person would 
 count as one. But where, as is often the case, the 
 aim is not simply to count the sum-total, but also to de- 
 termine the relative numbers belonging to various 
 classes, analysis has to be pushed further. In such 
 cases, we might count the number belonging to each 
 sex, the native-born, and those of foreign birth, those 
 below, and those above any given age, etc. 
 
 It will be noticed that the process of enumeration 
 takes account of each individual instance. And the 
 judgment which sums up the process puts the result in 
 a numerical form. ' There are twenty-five thousand 
 inhabitants in this town, five thousand of whom are of 
 foreign birth.' In cases where the examination of par- 
 ticular instances has been exhaustive, the result may be 
 stated in the form of a universal proposition. Thus,
 
 50. ENUMERATION OR SIMPLE COUNTING 1 87 
 
 after examining the calendar of each of the months 
 separately, we might say : ' All of the months contain 
 less than thirty-two days.' Or, after measuring each 
 individual in a company, the assertion might be made : 
 'No one in this company is more than six feet tall.' 
 Cases of this kind, where a general assertion is made 
 after an examination of all the individuals concerned, 
 are termed by Jevons, instances of Perfect Induction. 
 11 An Induction, that is an act of Inductive reasoning, is 
 called Perfect, when all the possible cases or instances 
 to which the conclusion can refer, have been examined 
 and enumerated in the premises." l On the other hand, 
 where, as usually happens, it is impossible to examine 
 all the cases, the inductive process is regarded as Im- 
 perfect by the same writer, and the conclusion expressed 
 in the general law as only probable. The assertion 
 that all the months of the year contain less than thirty- 
 two days, is derived from Perfect Induction, and is ab- 
 solutely certain, but the proposition that 'all men are 
 mortal,' is derived from Imperfect Induction, and there 
 is no certainty, but only a probability that all future 
 cases will agree with those which we have already 
 experienced. 
 
 This distinction, however, seems to be founded on a 
 mistaken view of the nature of inductive reasoning. It 
 assumes that it is the business of induction to count 
 instances. When the examination and enumeration is 
 exhaustive, the results can, of course, be summed up in 
 a general proposition which is absolutely certain. But 
 
 1 Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, pp. 212-213.
 
 )8S ENUMERATION AND STATISTICS 
 
 where the counting is incomplete, where all the possible 
 cases cannot be examined, the conclusion is regarded 
 as uncertain. Now, this could be accepted as an ac- 
 count of induction, only if it were maintained that this 
 process aims merely at a summation of particular in- 
 stances. We have already seen, however, that the real 
 object of inductive inference is to discover the general 
 law or principle which runs through and connects a 
 number of particular instances. It is, of course, true 
 that we shall be more likely to obtain a correct insight 
 into the nature of the law from an examination of a 
 large number of cases than from that of a small number. 
 But the discovery of the principle, and not the number 
 of instances, is the main point. If the purpose of the 
 induction, the discovery of the universal principle, can 
 be adequately attained, one case is as good as a hun- 
 dred (cf. 88). 
 
 The truth seems rather to be that enumeration is merely the 
 beginning, rather than the end of the inductive process. It gives 
 us important information regarding particular instances and indi- 
 viduals. But in itself it is not sufficient to bring to light the gen- 
 eral law that explains why the particular objects enumerated are 
 connected together, or act as they do. Enumeration plays a part 
 as a method of observation, but it affords no real explanation of 
 the particular facts with which it deals. Even where all the pos- 
 sible cases are examined, it cannot rightly be called Perfect In- 
 duction, for the goal of Induction is explanation by means of a 
 general principle. The requirements of inductive science are not 
 completely fulfilled, for example, when an examination of Mercury, 
 Venus, Mars, and all the other known planets yields the proposi- 
 tion : ' All the planets revolve around the sun in elliptical orbits.' 
 The 'all' in this proposition denotes simply an aggregate of indi- 
 viduals. It is merely an expression of fact. The reasons necessary
 
 51. STATISTICS AND STATISTICAL METHODS 189 
 
 to explain the fact are not reached by enumeration ; in order to ob- 
 tain them it is necessary that further work shall be done by think- 
 ing, and that the process of induction shall be carried further. 
 
 The conclusion which we reach, then, is that no 
 process of enumeration has any claim to the title of 
 Perfect Induction. Enumeration is the beginning, 
 rather than the end of the inductive procedure. 
 Nevertheless, it is exceedingly useful as a preliminary 
 step and preparation for scientific explanation. The 
 number of stamens and pistils which a plant contains, 
 or the number of tympanic bones possessed by an ani- 
 mal, is often of the greatest service in classification. 
 And classification, although it is by no means the end 
 of scientific investigation, is in many of the sciences a 
 most essential and important step towards it. The task 
 of explaining the infinite variety of natural objects 
 would be a hopeless one, if it were not possible to 
 discover similarities of structure, in virtue of which 
 things can be grouped together in classes. To this, 
 enumeration in a very great degree contributes. 
 
 51. Statistics and Statistical Methods. Statistical 
 methods depend upon enumeration. They aim at mak- 
 ing the process of counting as exact and precise as pos- 
 sible. Modern science has come to understand that its 
 first task must be to become acquainted, as completely 
 as possible, with the nature of the facts presented to it 
 by experience. And, for this purpose, the careful classi- 
 fication and precise enumeration of particulars afforded 
 by statistics, is often of the greatest importance. " The 
 extent to which the statistical method prevails, and
 
 ENUMERATION AND STATISTICS 
 
 everything is counted," says Professor Sigwart, "is 
 another instance of the fundamental difference between 
 ancient and modern science." l It would, of course, be 
 impossible to enter here into a full description of the 
 methods employed by statistical science. The method- 
 ology of every science must be learned by actual prac- 
 tice within the particular field. What we are interested 
 in from a logical point of view is the purpose which sta- 
 tistical investigation seeks to fulfil, and the part which 
 it plays in rendering our knowledge exact and syste- 
 matic. 
 
 We notice, in the first place, that the class of facts 
 to which statistics are applied has two main character- 
 istics : the subject dealt with is always complex, and 
 capable of division into a number of individual parts or 
 units ; and, secondly, it is also of such a nature that 
 the underlying law or principle of the phenomena to be 
 investigated cannot be directly discovered. Thus, we 
 employ statistics to determine the death-rate of any 
 country or community, or the ratio between the num- 
 ber of male and of female births. It is clear that it is 
 impossible to make use of experiment when we are deal- 
 ing with facts of this kind, because the conditions are not 
 under our control. If it were possible, for example, to 
 determine exhaustively the general laws according to 
 which the various meteorological changes are coordinated 
 with their conditions, we should not trouble ourselves to 
 count and register the separate instances of changes in 
 the weather. Nor, if we knew exactly the general condi- 
 
 1 Logic (Eng. trans.), Vol. I., p. 286.
 
 5L STATISTICS AND STATISTICAL METHODS 19 1 
 
 tions under which any given human organism in contact 
 with its environment would cease to exist, should we 
 count the individual cases of death. " In proportion as 
 we are unable to reduce the particular event to rules and 
 laws, the numeration of particular objects becomes the 
 only means of obtaining comprehensive propositions 
 about that which is, for our knowledge, fortuitous ; as 
 soon as the laws are found, statistical numeration ceases 
 to be of interest. There was some interest in counting 
 how many eclipses of the moon and sun took place year 
 by year, so long as they occurred unexpectedly and in- 
 explicably ; since the rule has been found according to 
 which they occur, and can be calculated for centuries 
 past and to come, that interest has vanished. But we 
 still count how many thunder-storms and hail-storms 
 occur at a given place, or within a given district, how 
 many persons die, and how many bushels of fruit a 
 given area produces, because we are not in a position to 
 calculate these events from their conditions." 1 
 
 In cases like those mentioned above, where we are 
 as yet unable to determine the general laws which are 
 at work, we call to our aid statistical enumeration. 
 There are two main advantages to be derived from the 
 employment of this method. In the first place, it con- 
 tributes directly towards a clear and comprehensive 
 grasp of the facts. Instead of the vague impression de- 
 rived from ordinary observation, statistics enable us to 
 state definitely the proportion of fine and rainy days 
 during the year. Statistical enumeration is thus one 
 
 1 Sigwart, Logic (Eng. trans.), Vol. II., p. 483.
 
 1 92 ENUMERATION AND STATISTICS 
 
 of the most important means of rendering observation ex- 
 act and trustworthy, and of summing up its results in a 
 convenient and readily intelligible form. It is of the 
 utmost importance when dealing with complex groups of 
 phenomena, to have a clear and comprehensive view of 
 the facts of the case. Thus, when trying to understand 
 the nature of society, it is necessary to determine accu- 
 rately by means of statistics, such facts as the number 
 of male and of female births, the death-rate, the pro- 
 portion of marriages, the age of marriage, etc. But, 
 in the second place, statistics often serve to reveal 
 quantitative correspondences or uniformities between 
 two groups of phenomena, and thus suggest that some 
 causal connection exists between them. It is found, 
 for example, that the number of births in any given 
 country varies inversely as the price of food during the 
 previous year. Now this fact at once suggests the ex- 
 istence of certain physiological and psychological laws 
 which may serve to bring these facts into causal rela- 
 tion. In many cases, such correspondences serve only 
 to confirm our expectation of the presence of a causal 
 law, which is based on other grounds. Thus we should 
 naturally expect that there would be a relatively greater 
 number of cases of fever in a town which had an insuf- 
 ficient water supply, or an antiquated system of sewer- 
 age, than in a town where these matters were properly 
 provided for; and statistics might bear out our conclu- 
 sions. In general, however, it may be said that causal 
 laws are suggested, not by corresponding uniformities, 
 but by corresponding variations, as shown by the sta- 
 tistics of different sets of facts. So long as the death-
 
 5L STATISTICS AND STATISTICAL METHODS 193 
 
 rate, for example, shows a constant ratio to the pop- 
 ulation, no causal inference is suggested ; but if the 
 annual number of deaths increases or decreases consid- 
 erably, we are led to look for some variation from the 
 normal in some coincident group of phenomena. And 
 if it is found that the variation in the death-rate has 
 been accompanied by unusually favourable or unfavoura- 
 ble conditions of weather, the presence or absence of 
 epidemics, or any similar circumstances, there will be at 
 least a presumption that a causal relation exists between 
 these two sets of events. From a certain likeness 
 or quantitative resemblance between the variations of 
 two distinct classes of phenomena, we are led to the 
 hypothesis of their causal connection. 
 
 Statistical enumeration is frequently employed to determine the 
 average of a large number of instances of a particular kind. This is 
 obtained by dividing the sum of the given numbers by the number 
 of individuals of which account is taken. In this way a general 
 average is reached which does not necessarily correspond exactly 
 with the character of any individual of the group. It represents a 
 purely imaginary conception, which omits individual differences and 
 presents in an abbreviated form the general character of a whole 
 class or group. In this way, by the determination of the average, it 
 becomes easier to compare complex groups with one another. Thus, 
 when the average height of Frenchmen and Englishmen has been 
 determined, comparison is at once made possible. For the mean 
 or average of a number of individuals, or set of instances, however, 
 we can infer nothing regarding the character of any particular indi- 
 vidual, or of any particular instance. What is determined by the 
 method of averages is the general nature of the group, as represented 
 by the average or typical individual. But this method does not en- 
 able us to infer anything regarding the character of any member of 
 the group, A, or B. When exact statistics are obtainable, however, 
 o
 
 194 ENUMERATION AND STATISTICS 
 
 it is possible to show what the probabilities are in reference to any 
 particular case, so long as the peculiar circumstances which belong 
 to each instance are not considered, and each case is reckoned simply 
 as one unit of the group. This is, of course, the principle employed 
 by the method of mathematical probabilities. It will be sufficient 
 here to indicate the general method of procedure in such cases. 
 
 52. The Calculation of Chances. There is, of course, 
 no such thing as 'chance/ regarded as a power which 
 controls and governs events. When we speak of some- 
 thing happening ' by chance,' or of some occurrence as 
 'probable,' we are expressing merely a deficiency in our 
 own knowledge. " There is no doubt in lightning as 
 to the point it shall strike ; in the greatest storm there 
 is nothing capricious ; not a grain of sand lies upon the 
 beach but infinite knowledge would account for its lying 
 there ; and the course of every falling leaf is guided by 
 the same principles of mechanics as rule the motions of 
 the heavenly bodies." 1 To assert that anything hap- 
 pens by chance, then, is simply to confess our ignorance 
 of the causes which are operative. 
 
 It is clear that we are in this position regarding many 
 of the ordinary events which belong to the future. Be- 
 cause of my ignorance of the causes at work, I can only 
 say, ' It may rain to-morrow.' It is impossible to tell 
 upon which side a penny will fall at any particular 
 throw, or what card may be drawn from a pack. But in 
 cases like these, we have to accept, for lack of anything 
 better, a numerical statement of the chances for any 
 particular event. Thus we know that, since there 
 
 1 Jevons, The Principles o/Scitnce, Vol. I., p. **},
 
 52. THE CALCULATION OF CHANCES 195 
 
 are only two sides upon which a penny can fall, the 
 chances of throwing heads in any trial is |. Similarly, 
 there are four chances out of fifty-two of drawing an 
 ace from a pack of cards. The chance of obtaining 
 an ace by any draw is therefore ^V = iV These figures 
 express the mathematical chances. Experience of a 
 limited number of instances may, however, sometimes 
 appear to show a lack of harmony between the mathe- 
 matical and the actual chances. But in proportion as 
 the number of trials is increased, the result is found to 
 approximate more and more nearly to the mathematical 
 expectation. In twenty throws of a penny or a die, we 
 should not be surprised to find that the result differed 
 from the fraction expressing the mathematical chances. 
 But this discrepancy would tend to disappear as the 
 number of cases was increased. Jevons illustrated this 
 by actual trial, using a number of coins at a time. Out 
 of a total of 20,480 throws, he obtained a result of 10,353 
 heads. On the result of the experiment he remarks : 
 " The coincidence with theory is pretty close, but con- 
 sidering the large number of throws there is some 
 reason to suspect a tendency in favor of heads." 1 
 
 Apart from the simple and somewhat artificial cases 
 where we are concerned with coins and dice, etc., it is 
 impossible to determine with mathematical precision the 
 chances for or against any event. In cases where the 
 whole series of possibilities does not lie before us, we 
 have to base our calculations for the future on what 
 is known regarding the frequency with which the events 
 
 1 Jevons, loc. cit. Vol. I., p. 230.
 
 196 ENUMERATION AND STATISTICS 
 
 under consideration have occurred in the past. Now 
 the results of the last paragraph make it clear that it is 
 of the utmost importance that the statistics, which are 
 taken as the basis, shall be as full and comprehensive 
 as possible. It is evident, for example, that serious 
 errors would be likely to arise, if the death-rate for a 
 single year, or for a single county or town, were taken 
 as typical of the country as a whole. To render sta- 
 tistics trustworthy, they must be extended over a consid- 
 erable period of time, and over a large extent of country, 
 so as to eliminate the accidents due to a particular time 
 or to a particular locality. 
 
 When this has been done, however, and statistics have been ob- 
 tained that have a right to be regarded as really typical, the chances 
 in any individual instance can be readily shown. Thus we find that 
 out of one thousand children born, about two hundred and fifty die 
 before the age of six years. The chances, then, at birth, that any 
 child will reach this age, are T 7 <,%% or f . Again, it is found that 
 only about two persons in one thousand live to be ninety years old. 
 So that the probability of any child living to this age would be ex- 
 pressed by the fraction -^^ or -5^. This is essentially the princi- 
 ple upon which life insurance companies proceed. Their business is 
 conducted on the assumption that there will be an approximately 
 constant death-rate, though they cannot foretell what particular indi- 
 viduals are to die in any year. It thus becomes possible to calculate 
 what losses from death may be expected each year. Suppose that 
 it is found that the annual death-rate among men of a certain age 
 throughout the country is twenty out of every thousand. If each 
 man's life were insured for $1000, the loss to the company from 
 this source would be $20,000. To compensate for this loss, the 
 company would be obliged to demand an annual payment of $20 
 from each of the one thousand individuals in the class. Of course, 
 the actual computations upon which insurance is based in concrete
 
 52. THE CALCULATION OF CHANCES 197 
 
 cases are vastly more complex than this, and many other consider- 
 ations arise of which account has to be taken. But the general 
 principle involved is, that by taking a sufficiently large number of 
 cases, chance can be almost eliminated. We can have no means 
 of determining whether any healthy individual will or will not die 
 before the end of the year. There would be a very serious risk, 
 amounting practically to gambling, in insuring his life alone. But 
 the transaction, as we have seen, is no longer a mere speculation 
 when a large number of individuals are concerned ; for the actual 
 loss can be accurately foretold and provided for. 
 
 References 
 
 C Sigwart, Logic, 101, 102. 
 
 J. G. Hibben, Inductive Logic, Ch. XV. 
 
 L. T. Hobhouse, The Theory of Knowledge, Pt. II. Ch. XI. 
 
 J. S. Mill, Logic, Bk. III. Ch. XVIII. 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I., pp. I28ff.
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 METHODS OF OBSERVATION 
 
 Determination of Causal Relation, 
 
 53. Mill's Experimental Methods. So far, we have 
 been dealing with the methods employed in discovering 
 the nature of particular things. We have been con- 
 sidering how our knowledge of the qualities and quanti- 
 ties of objects may be made as exact and complete as 
 possible, but almost nothing has yet been said regard- 
 ing the connection of things. Our experience, however, 
 is not made up of isolated facts and events. We can 
 scarcely be said to know at all, until we become aware 
 that certain parts of our experience are united, like the 
 links of a chain, one part involving another. And, as 
 has been already frequently pointed out, the growth of 
 knowledge is constantly bringing to light new connec- 
 tions between facts that were previously taken to be 
 independent of each other. Of these principles of 
 connection, the most universal and important is that 
 of cause and effect. Thus we say that everything 
 which happens has its cause, and is in turn followed 
 by its effect. What rule, or rules, can now be given 
 which will enable one to discover what is the cause or 
 the effect of an event in any particular case ? 
 
 Before we proceed to the answer of this question, however, it is 
 necessary to explain briefly what is meant in science by the relation 
 
 198
 
 53- MILL'S EXPERIMENTAL METHODS 199 
 
 of cause and effect. As the terms are used in modern scientific 
 investigation, a cause of any phenomenon is that which necessarily 
 and invariably precedes it ; and an effect is what follows, in the 
 same uniform way, some event which has gone before (cf. 84). 
 To determine the causal relation between phenomena, then, is to 
 discover what events or circumstances always accompany each 
 other as antecedent and consequent. Now, as will appear when 
 we come to describe the methods actually employed, it is very often 
 impossible to do this by means of direct observation. Reasoning 
 and experiment have oftentimes to be summoned to the aid of 
 observation in distinguishing between events which are merely 
 accidentally conjoined, and those which are necessarily connected 
 as cause and effects. But, as has been already shown ( 48, 49), 
 there is no hard and fast distinction to be made between methods 
 of observation and methods of explanation. To discover the in- 
 variable antecedent of a phenomenon is at least the beginning of 
 explanation. Thus B is explained to some extent when I am able 
 to point to A as its invariable antecedent. Nevertheless, since this 
 connection of A and B is itself a fact which may be observed, its 
 discovery may, I think, be fairly said to belong to observation rather 
 than to explanation. Explanation, in its complete form, carries one 
 beyond the mere fact of connection to its reas.oris. At the stage 
 we have now reached, however, the problem is to show what other 
 phenomenon, or group of phenomena, is necessarily and uniformly 
 connected with a given event or circumstance. 
 
 The methods by which such a law of connection may 
 be established were first formulated by Mill in his Logic. 
 He stated, in general terms, the principles which were 
 already in use in scientific procedure. Mill gives five 
 separate canons, but, as he himself recognizes, there 
 are but two main principles involved. "The simplest 
 aftd most obvious modes of singling out from among 
 the circumstances which precede or follow a phenome- 
 non, those with which it is really connected by an
 
 200 CAUSAL DETERMINATION 
 
 invariable law are two in number : One is by com- 
 paring together different instances in which the phe- 
 nomenon occurs. The other is by comparing together 
 instances in which the phenomenon does occur with 
 instances in other respects similar in which it does not. 
 These two methods may be respectively denominated 
 the Method of Agreement, and the Method of Differ- 
 ence." 1 Of the other three methods mentioned by 
 Mill, one the Joint Method of Agreement and Dif- 
 ference is, as the name implies, a direct combination 
 of the first two, while the Method of Residues and the 
 Method of Concomitant Variations are corollaries from 
 the same principles. We shall now proceed to state 
 and illustrate these canons. 
 
 54. The Method of Agreement. The principle upon 
 which this method proceeds is stated in the following 
 way by Mill : "If two or more instances of the phenome- 
 non under investigation have only one circumstance in 
 common, the circumstances in which alone all the in- 
 stances agree is the cause (or effect} of the given phenome- 
 non." The purpose of this rule, it will be remembered, 
 is to help us to determine what particular facts in our 
 experience are connected as causes and effects. If the 
 problem is to find the cause of some phenomenon, the 
 canon may be illustrated in the following way. Let 
 P 1 , P 2 , P 3 represent different instances of a phenome- 
 non, P, whose cause is to be ascertained. And suppose 
 that we are able to analyze, 
 
 1 Mill, Logic, Bk. III. Ch. VIII. $ 1
 
 54- THE METHOD OF AGREEMENT 2OI 
 
 the antecedents of P 1 into abed ; 
 the antecedents of P 2 into gfcm ; 
 the antecedents of P 3 into klnc. 
 
 Now it is clear that c is the sole circumstance in which 
 the antecedents of all these instances of P agree. We 
 should be justified in concluding, therefore, according to 
 this method, that c is probably the cause of the phe- 
 nomenon under investigation, P. We may, then, adopt 
 Jevons's formula for discovering the cause of any given 
 phenomenon by this method : "The sole invariable ante- 
 cedent of a phenomenon is probably its cause" 
 
 If, now, we wished to discover the effect of some- 
 thing which happens, it would be necessary to deter- 
 mine, by observing a number of instances, what common 
 circumstance can be found among the events which 
 follow it. 
 
 If Q 1 were followed \>y fghk, 
 
 and Q 2 were followed by Irngc, 
 
 and Q 3 were followed by grst, 
 
 we should be able to say that Q and g were connected 
 as cause and effect. The rule might then be expressed : 
 The sole invariable consequent of a phenomenon is prob' 
 ably its effect. 
 
 When antecedents and consequents are thus repre- 
 sented schematically by means of letters, it is easy to 
 perceive at once the common circumstance in a number 
 of instances. But the facts and events of the real world 
 are not separated off from each other in this way. The 
 common circumstance in which a number of instances 
 agree has to be separated out by analysis from the varia-
 
 202 CAUSAL DETERMINATION 
 
 ble elements which form part of the different antecedents 
 and consequents. In order to discover the common 
 characteristic, it is necessary that we should be able 
 to analyze a complex phenomenon into its constituent 
 parts, and should also be able to recognize the common 
 element as common, though it may appear in wholly 
 different circumstances. This will become evident by 
 considering a number df concrete cases in which this 
 method may be employed. 
 
 If a number of cases of typhoid fever were to appear 
 at about the same time in a community, one would nat- 
 urally wish to explain this phenomenon by tracing it to 
 its cause ; and to do this one would try to discover 
 some circumstance which was the common antecedent 
 of all the cases. The water supply might first be ex- 
 amined. But if it were found that this were derived 
 from entirely different sources in the different cases, we 
 should probably conclude that the explanation must be 
 sought elsewhere. Suppose that as a result of careful 
 analysis it was discovered that all the individuals pros- 
 trated with the fever had eaten oysters bought at the 
 same market. If this were the only common circum- 
 stance discoverable after careful investigation, we should 
 conclude that probably the oysters were the cause of 
 the fever. The process of analysis could be pushed 
 still further, if one wished, in order to determine more 
 exactly the precise source of the infection ; e.g., it might 
 be found, as a result of further inquiry, that the water 
 in which the oysters were kept was vitiated by a sewer. 
 
 Another example of the method of agreement which 
 is often quoted by logicians may be given. One would
 
 54- THE METHOD OF AGREEMENT 203 
 
 naturally suppose that the colours and lines of mother-of- 
 pearl were due to the chemical or physical character of 
 the substance itself. Sir David Brewster, however, 
 happened to take an impression of a piece of mother- 
 of-pearl in beeswax and resin, and was surprised to see 
 the colours reproduced upon its surface. He then took 
 a number of other impressions in balsam, gum-arabic, 
 lead, etc., and found the iridescent colours repeated in 
 every case. In this way he proved that the colours were 
 caused by the form of the substance, and not by its 
 chemical qualities or physical composition. The dif- 
 ferent substances, wax, balsam, lead, etc., in which the 
 phenomenon of colour appeared, had nothing in common 
 except the form. This, therefore, according to the 
 method of agreement, was properly regarded as the 
 cause of the phenomenon to be explained. 
 
 An example of the application of this method to the 
 discovery of the effect of a phenomenon may now be 
 given. Let us suppose that the problem is to determine 
 the effect of some proposed legislation. It is necessary, 
 of course, to refer to other instances where this legisla- 
 tion has been put in force. Let us suppose that in one 
 case what followed the enactment of the law under con- 
 sideration was falling off of revenue, increase of immi- 
 gration, good crops, etc., and in a second, revival of 
 ship-building, rainy weather, and increase of immigra- 
 tion ; and that in other instances where still other 
 conditions prevailed, the number of immigrants still 
 continued to increase. Since this latter circumstance is 
 the only one which follows invariably upon the enact- 
 ment of the law, we are justified in concluding, after a
 
 204 CAUSAL DETERMINATION 
 
 certain number of observations, that it is necessarily 
 connected with the law as its result. It is important 
 to note that the conclusions reached by this method 
 are greatly strengthened by increasing the number of 
 observations, and by taking instances as dissimilar in 
 character as possible. 
 
 The method of Agreement by itself, however, is not able to 
 afford us certainty in every case. We have spoken of the cause as 
 'the invariable antecedent,' and of the effect as 'the invariable con- 
 sequent.' So long, then, as we are dealing with events which fol- 
 low each other, there is no difficulty in perceiving which is cause, 
 and which effect. But we are often called upon to investigate the 
 relation between phenomena that are more permanent in character. 
 And it is then not at all easy to determine by means of the method 
 of Agreement which is cause and which is effect. Poverty and in- 
 temperance, for example, are found conjoined so frequently as to 
 make it evident, apart from other considerations, that some causal 
 relation exists between them. It might be maintained with appar- 
 ently equal show of reason, that the former is the cause, or the effect, 
 of the latter. Again, is one to say that ignorance is the cause or the 
 effect of moral degradation? There seems to be no method of de- 
 termining which is antecedent and which consequent. As a matter 
 of fact, it is probably true in such cases that the phenomena act 
 and react upon each other: that each term, in other words, is at 
 once both cause and effect. 
 
 There is still another circumstance which renders uncertain the 
 results of the method of Agreement. We have proceeded on the 
 assumption that the given phenomenon is always produced by 
 the same cause ; and, on the other hand, that the effects of different 
 causes are always different. But this is not so ; heat, for example, 
 may be caused by combustion, or by friction, or electricity. The 
 fact that an effect may be produced by any one of several causes, is 
 what is meant by the phrase 'Plurality of Causes.' Again, neither 
 the cause nor the effect need be composed of a simple phenomenon,
 
 55- THE METHOD OF DIFFERENCE 
 
 or single circumstance, as has been supposed. Indeed, so far as 
 observation can show, antecedents and consequents usually seem to 
 consist of complex sets of circumstances. The difficulty with the 
 method of Agreement is that it does not push the process of analysis 
 far enough to enable us to establish completely a law of causal rela- 
 tion. The fact of Agreement between phenomena often serves, how- 
 ever, to suggest a law of connection. This law has afterwards to be 
 tested by the other methods, especially by the method of Difference. 
 
 55. Th Method of Difference. According to the 
 method of Agreement, we cotnpare a number of diverse 
 instances, in all of which a given phenomenon occurs, 
 and endeavour to discover some circumstance which is 
 invariably present. The method of Difference, on the 
 other hand, compares an instance in which a phenome- 
 non occurs with another as nearly similar to it as possi- 
 ble, in which it does not occur. Its canon is expressed 
 by Mill as follows : " If an instance in which the phe- 
 nomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in 
 which it does not occur, have every circumstance in 
 common save one, that one occurring only in the former ; 
 the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ 
 is the effect or the cause or an indispensable part of 
 the cause, of the phenomenon" It will perhaps make 
 the matter clearer to say : ' whatever alone is present 
 in a case when the phenomenon to be investigated 
 occurs, and absent in another when that phenomenon 
 does not occur, other circumstances remaining the 
 same, is causally connected with that phenomenon.' 
 That is, by means of this method we compare two 
 instances which differ only in the fact that the phe- 
 nomenon in which we are interested, is present in the
 
 2O6 CAUSAL DETERMINATION 
 
 one, and absent in the other. If now the two cases are 
 represented in this way, 
 
 PHK conjoined with alg, 
 and HK conjoined with Ig, 
 
 we conclude at once that P is causally connected with a. 
 
 Almost any instance in which experiment is em- 
 ployed will serve to illustrate this method. If a bell is 
 rung in a jar containing air, the sound will of course be 
 heard at any ordinary distance. But after having re- 
 moved the air by means of an air-pump, let the bell be 
 again struck. It will now be found that the sound is no 
 longer heard. When the two cases are compared, it is 
 at once evident that the only difference in the antece- 
 dents is the presence of the air in the one case, and its 
 absence in the other. When the air was present, the 
 sound was heard ; when it was absent, the sound was 
 not heard. We conclude, therefore, that the perception 
 of sound is causally connected with the presence of 
 atmospheric air. Again, we can prove that the so-called 
 'taste ' of different objects depends upon smell, by tast- 
 ing, say, an orange, and after a little time has elapsed, 
 tasting it a second time while holding the nose. It 
 will be found in this latter case that instead of the 
 familiar 'orange taste,' one senses merely 'acid,' or 
 'sweet.' The only difference in the two trials being 
 that in the former the organ of smell, which was ex- 
 cluded in the latter, was operative, the so-called 'orange 
 taste ' is proved to be due to smell rather than to taste 
 proper. 
 
 An essential requirement of the method of Difference
 
 55- THE METHOD OF DIFFERENCE 207 
 
 is that only one circumstance shall be varied at a time. 
 The object of the method is to isolate the various con- 
 ditions which go to make up a complex phenomenon, 
 in order that we may mark the effect of the presence 
 or absence of each one individually. Now, in observing 
 what goes on in nature, we rarely find changes in 
 which but a single element has varied. If we find that 
 to-day is cooler than yesterday, we may be inclined to 
 refer the change to the thunder-storm of last night. 
 But rain also accompanied the thunder-storm, and the 
 direction of the wind has changed. So that it is im- 
 possible in such cases to apply the method of difference. 
 To employ this method successfully, observation usually 
 must be supplemented by experiment. In performing 
 experiments, we determine what conditions are to be 
 operative, and arrange the apparatus so as to carry out 
 our purpose. Having thus control of the conditions, we 
 are able to vary them at pleasure. In this way, experi- 
 ment becomes an instrument by means of which analysis 
 can be carried further than is possible for unaided ob- 
 servation. It enables us to separate things which are 
 usually conjoined, and to observe the result of each when 
 taken by itself. In employing experiment, however, the 
 greatest care must always be taken to introduce only 
 one new condition at a time, or at least only one new 
 circumstance which can in any way influence the result. 
 It often happens, too, as Jevons points out, that the 
 experimenter is not aware of all the conditions which 
 are operative when his investigations are made. " Some 
 substance may be present, or some power may be in 
 action which escapes the most vigilant examination
 
 2O8 CAUSAL DETERMINATION 
 
 Not being aware of its existence, we are of course 
 unable to take proper measures to exclude it, and thus 
 determine the share which it may have in the results of 
 our experiments." 1 For this reason, it is always neces- 
 sary that experiments should be repeated by different 
 persons, and so far as possible under varying conditions. 
 I quote two examples from the work of Jevons to which 
 reference has just been made. 
 
 " One of the most extraordinary instances of an erroneous opinion 
 due to overlooking interfering agents is that concerning the increase 
 of rainfall near the earth's surface. More than a century ago it was 
 observed that rain gauges placed upon church steeples, house-tops, 
 and other elevated places, gave considerably less rain than if they 
 were on the ground, and it has very recently been shown that the 
 variation is most rapid in the close neighborhood of the ground. 
 All kinds of theories have been started to explain this phenomenon ; 
 but I have attempted to show that it is simply due to the interfer- 
 ence of wind which deflects more or less rain from all the gauges 
 which are at all exposed to it. 
 
 " The great magnetic power of iron renders it a constant source of 
 disturbance in all magnetic experiments. In building a magnetic 
 observatory great care must be taken that no iron is employed in 
 the construction, and that no masses of iron are near at hand. In 
 some cases, magnetic observations have been seriously disturbed by 
 the existence of masses of iron in the neighborhood. In Faraday's 
 experiments upon feebly magnetic or diamagnetic substances, he 
 took the greatest precautions against the presence of any disturbing 
 substance in the copper wire, wax, paper, and other articles used in 
 suspending the test objects. It was his invariable custom to try the 
 effect of the magnet upon the apparatus in the absence of the object 
 of experiment, and without this preliminary trial no confidence 
 could be placed in the results." 2 
 
 1 Jevons, Principles of Science, Vol. II. p. 37. 
 
 2 Jevons, op. cit. pp. 40, 41.
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 METHODS OF OBSERVATION 
 
 Determination of Causal Relation (continued') 
 
 56. The Joint Method of Agreement and Difference. 
 When it is not possible to obtain experimental proof 
 directly, recourse is often had to what Mill has called 
 the joint method of Agreement and Difference. This 
 writer has given the following expression of the canon : 
 "If two or more instances in which the phenomenon 
 sccurs have only one circumstance in common, while 
 two or more instances in which it does not occur have 
 nothing in common save the absence of that circum- 
 stance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets 
 of instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an 
 indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon" 
 This method, as the name implies, is a combination 
 of the two already described. We may perhaps sim- 
 plify Mill's canon somewhat by putting the matter in 
 the following way : A number of diverse instances hav- 
 ing been examined, if it is found that there is a single 
 circumstance invariably present when the phenomenon 
 under investigation is present, and invariably absent 
 when the latter is absent, this circumstance is causally 
 connected ivith that phenomenon. By the help of this 
 method, the weakness which has already been noticed 
 in the method of Agreement is overcome. We first 
 p 309
 
 2IO CAUSAL DETERMINATION 
 
 compare different instances in which the phenomenon 
 occurs. If these are found to agree in only a single 
 circumstance, we conclude, according to the canon 
 of Agreement, that this circumstance is probably con- 
 nected causally with the phenomenon in which we are 
 interested. But the proof is not yet complete. To 
 really prove the connection, we must show that where- 
 ever this circumstance is absent, there the phenome- 
 non is also absent. 
 
 As an illustration of this method, we may take the 
 case where one is trying to decide whether some stimu- 
 lant like coffee or tobacco is injurious to him or not. If a 
 person invariably found himself troubled with insomnia 
 or nervousness after smoking, and if this seemed to him 
 the only circumstance in his mode of life common to all 
 these occasions, he might suspect that this was the cause. 
 That is, the coincidence or agreement between the habit 
 and ill-health would suggest a causal relation. But as yet, 
 the relation would be only suggested, not proved. The 
 method of Agreement, as we have already seen, only 
 gives us probable conclusions. Here, however, we have 
 the conditions under our control, and can resort to ex- 
 periment and the method of Difference, in order to verify 
 or disprove the suggestion. If after having given up 
 smoking for a reasonable length of time, a man found 
 that the disagreeable symptoms still continued, he would 
 conclude that his suspicion was unfounded. But if it 
 were found that his insomnia and nervousness had dis- 
 appeared during his period of abstinence, and if the 
 sole circumstance common to all these days and nights 
 of exemption was the absence of smoking, he would be
 
 57- THE METHOD OF CONCOMITANT VARIATIONS 211 
 
 forced to admit, however reluctant he might be to do so, 
 that the troublesome physiological derangements were 
 probably connected with the smoking habit. 
 
 57. The Method of Concomitant Variations. The 
 methods of Agreement and Difference are employed, 
 as we have seen, to determine what events are necessa- 
 rily connected as causes and effects. By examining a 
 considerable number of instances, and by comparing 
 the cases in which the phenomenon of interest to us 
 occurs, with cases in which it does not occur, we seek 
 to rule out all accidental and unessential conjunctions. 
 But as yet nothing has been said of quantitative rela- 
 tions. The discovery of a quantitative agreement or cor- 
 respondence between two phenomena, or two groups of 
 phenomena, often enables us to detect a causal relation 
 between them (cf. pp. 192-193). Moreover, science does 
 not rest satisfied with the mere discovery and description 
 of changes, and the order in which they occur. We may 
 almost say that science does not exist until the quanti- 
 tative aspects of phenomena are taken into account 
 until things are weighed and measured. The physicist 
 does not think his work finished when he has proved 
 that sound is produced by atmospheric vibrations. He 
 carries on his analysis until he can discover the qttanti- 
 tative relations between the amplitude and velocity of 
 the vibrations, and the loudness and pitch of the result- 
 ing tone. And the psychologist is not satisfied with the 
 general statement that certain sensations are causally 
 connected with certain kinds of stimulus ; but he seeks 
 to discover, whenever possible, the exact quantitative 
 relation between sensation and stimulus. In short, the
 
 212 CAUSAL DETERMINATION 
 
 most important feature, the very essence, one may say, 
 of modern scientific investigation, is the establishment 
 of quantitative relations. 
 
 Looking at two things from the standpoint of quan- 
 tity, then, we say that when their variations keep pace 
 with each other, they are in some way causally con- 
 nected. The following is Mill's statement of the canon : 
 " Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever 
 another phenomenon varies in a particular manner, is 
 either a caiise or an effect of that phenomenon, or is con- 
 nected with it through some fact of causation." The 
 illustrations of this law given by Jevons are so excellent 
 that we cannot do better than adopt them : 
 
 "The illustrations of this law are infinitely numerous. Thus 
 Mr. Joule, of Manchester, conclusively proved that friction is a cause 
 of heat by expending exact quantities of force by rubbing one sub- 
 stance against another, and showed that the heat produced was 
 exactly greater or less in proportion as the force was greater or less. 
 We can apply the method to many cases which had previously been 
 treated by the simple method of difference ; thus instead of striking 
 a bell in a complete vacuum, we can strike it with a very little air in 
 the receiver of the air-pump, and we then hear a very faint sound 
 which increases or decreases every time we increase or diminish the 
 density of the air. This experiment conclusively satisfies any per- 
 son that air is the cause of the transmission of sound. 
 
 " It is this method which often .enables us to detect the material 
 connection which exists between two bodies. For a long time it 
 had been doubtful whether the red flames seen in total eclipses of 
 the sun belonged to the sun or moon ; but during the last eclipse of 
 the sun. it was noticed that the flames moved with the sun, and were 
 gradually covered and uncovered by the moon at successive instants 
 of the eclipse. No one could doubt thenceforth that they belonged 
 to the sun.
 
 58. THE METHOD OF RESIDUES 2 1 3 
 
 " Whenever, again, phenomena go through Periodic Changes, alter- 
 nately increasing and decreasing, we should seek for other phe- 
 nomena which go through changes in exactly the same periods, and 
 these will probably be a connection of cause and effect. It is thus 
 that the tides are proved to be due to the attraction of the moon and 
 sun, because the periods of high and low, spring and neap tides, 
 succeed each other in intervals corresponding to the apparent revo- 
 lutions of those bodies round the earth. The fact that the moon 
 revolves upon its own axis in exactly the same period that it revolves 
 round the earth, so that for unknown ages past the same side of the 
 moon has always been turned toward the earth, is a most perfect 
 case of concomitant variations, conclusively proving that the earth's 
 attraction governs the motions of the moon on its own axis. 
 
 " The most extraordinary case of variations, however, consists in 
 the connection which has of late years been shown to exist between 
 the Aurora Borealis, magnetic storms, and the spots on the sun. 
 It has only in the last thirty or forty years become known that the 
 magnetic compass is subject at intervals to very slight, but curious 
 movements ; and that, at the same time, there are usually natural 
 currents of electricity produced in telegraph wires, so as to interfere 
 with the transmission of messages. These disturbances are known 
 as magnetic storms, and are often observed to occur when a fine dis- 
 play of the Northern or Southern Lights is taking place in some 
 part of the earth. Observations during many years have shown 
 that these storms come to their worst at the end of every eleven 
 years. . . . Close observations of the sun during thirty or forty years 
 have shown that the size and number of the dark spots, which 
 are gigantic storms going on upon the sun's surface, increase and 
 decrease exactly at the same periods of time as the magnetic storms 
 upon the earth's surface. No one can doubt, then, that these strange 
 phenomena are connected together, though the mode of the con- 
 nection is quite unknown. . . . This is a most remarkable and 
 extensive case of concomitant variations." 1 
 
 58. The Method of Residues. We have said that 
 
 1 Jevons, Lessons in Logic, pp. 249-251.
 
 214 CAUSAL DETERMINATION 
 
 modern science employs measurement whenever possi- 
 ble, in order to determine exactly the quantitative rela- 
 tions of phenomena. Groups of facts whose connections 
 are at first not perceived, or at best but vaguely appre- 
 hended, are brought into close relations with each other 
 by the establishment of definite quantitative relations. 
 The knowledge that electricity possesses energy, for 
 example, is very vague and incomplete when compared 
 with the definite equations which the physicist can fur- 
 nish between the electrical current generated under cer- 
 tain definite conditions, and the amount of work which 
 it is capable of performing. But the discovery of quan- 
 titative relations not only renders our knowledge more 
 perfect and complete, it also enables us in some cases to 
 detect laws of connection which would not otherwise be 
 observed. We have already seen how the perception of 
 corresponding changes in the quantities of phenomena 
 has led to the discovery of causal laws by means of the 
 method of Concomitant Variations. The method of 
 Residues, which we now have to discuss, is also a method 
 of quantitative determination. 
 
 In general, this method calls attention to any remain- 
 der or residue which is left over after other portions of 
 a complex phenomenon have been explained. There are 
 two results of this method which may be discussed sep- 
 arately. 
 
 (a) The application of this method to a complex 
 phenomenon which is the result of several causes, 
 often enables us to determine what part each of these 
 causes plays in the determination of the whole fact 
 under consideration. Mill's fifth canon seems to apply
 
 58. THE METHOD OF RESIDUES 
 
 to this case. It is as follows : Subduct from any phe- 
 nomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to 
 be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the 
 phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents. 
 Thus, if it is known that the complex phenomenon 
 BAG is the result of bac, and if it is further known 
 that a is the cause of A, and b of B, it follows, of course, 
 by subtraction that the residue still unexplained, C, is 
 caused by c, the remaining antecedent. 
 
 Of course the application of this method in concrete cases does 
 not usually resolve itself into such a simple process of subtraction. 
 It requires work ' previous inductions,' as Mill says to deter- 
 mine what are the whole number of antecedents in any case, as well 
 as to isolate the various antecedents so as to determine exactly what 
 part of the effect is to be ascribed to each one. This may be illus- 
 trated by an example : after my student's lamp has been lighted two 
 hours, I find the thermometer has risen from 65 to 70 Fahr. The 
 phenomenon to be explained then is the additional 5 of heat. 
 There is no fire, and it seems that the increase in temperature must 
 be due to the lamp, and the heat given off from my body during 
 this period. Suppose that the lamp is burned for the same length 
 of time while the room is unoccupied, all other conditions remaining 
 the same, and that the thermometer shows an increase of 4 in the 
 temperature. By subtraction we could conclude that the heat given 
 off by the body on the former occasion was the cause of the additional 
 degree of temperature. 
 
 To carry the process of analysis a step further. Let us suppose 
 that a half pint of oil, which is composed of hydrogen and carbon, 
 has been consumed. We could determine, by measuring the heat 
 produced by the oxidation of the exact amount of carbon contained in 
 one half a pint of oil, what quantity of heat is due to the combustion 
 of the carbon contained in the oil, and, by subtraction, what must be 
 ascribed to the burning of the hydrogen. 1 
 
 1 This is, of course, not strictly correct. For it leaves out of account the 
 heat generated by the chemical combination of the carbon and hydrogen. 
 It may therefore serve to illustrate a case where the method of Residues 
 breaks down.
 
 2l6 CAUSAL DETERMINATION 
 
 (&} The second case in which this method may be 
 applied is where there is an unexplained remainder or 
 residue left over after the result of all the known causes 
 has been calculated. Mill does not distinguish between 
 such instances and the method of simple subtraction 
 discussed above. Since, however, the cause must ex- 
 plain the whole of the effect, the method of residues 
 enjoins us to continue the search for explanation. 
 When any part of a complex phenomenon is still un- 
 explained by the causes which have been assigned, a 
 further cause for this remainder must be sought. If, for 
 example, it were found by actual measurement that the 
 heat produced by the lamp, and by the body of the 
 occupant, were not sufficient to account for the change 
 in temperature of the room, it would be necessary to 
 seek for some further cause to account for this unex- 
 plained remainder. 
 
 This method can scarcely be said to be more than 
 a demand for complete and precise explanation. The 
 attempt, however, to account for unexplained resi- 
 dues has led to many extremely important discoveries 
 in science. Residual phenomena are often so obscure, 
 and appear so uninteresting and unimportant to the 
 ordinary mind, that they are passed over without ex- 
 planation. It usually requires the eye of a scientific 
 genius to see the importance of things which appear 
 trivial and unessential. With Darwin, facts which might 
 appear to an ordinary observer mere unimportant ex- 
 ceptions, were made the object of special attention, and 
 often served as starting-points for his investigations. 
 Francis Darwin, speaking of his father, says : " There 
 was one quality of mind which seemed to be of special
 
 58. THE METHOD OF RESIDUES 2 1/ 
 
 and extreme advantage in leading him to make discover. 
 ies. It was the power of never letting exceptions pass 
 unnoticed. ... A point apparently slight and uncon- 
 nected with his present work is passed over by many 
 a man almost unconsciously, with some half-considered 
 explanation, which is really no explanation. It was just 
 these things that he seized upon to make a start from." l 
 
 Among the many important discoveries which have resulted from 
 the investigation of some obscure and seemingly unimportant fact, 
 we may mention that of ozone. It had been observed for a long 
 time that the passage of electric sparks through the air is accom- 
 panied by a peculiar odour. This odour was also found near 
 electrical machines, and was known as the ' electrical smell.' No 
 one seemed to have attached any importance to it or to have attempted 
 to explain it in any way, until Friedrich Schb'nbein, a professor of 
 chemistry at Basel, turned his attention to the subject. The result 
 of his investigations was the discovery of ozone, the peculiar modifi- 
 cation of oxygen, which was the cause of the odour. 
 
 Another very striking example of the application of this method 
 is afforded by the history of the discovery of the planet Neptune. 
 In 1781 a new planet was discovered moving outside all the other 
 planets by Sir William Herschel. This was the planet Uranus, 
 When its orbit came to be calculated, it was found that it did not 
 move as it might be expected to do according to the theory of gravi- 
 tation. That is, the attraction of the sun and the known planets did 
 not account for the path it took : it moved outwards into space 
 further than it ought to have done. It was evident that either some 
 mistake must have been made in the observation of the astronomers, 
 or some unknown body must be dragging it out of its course. No 
 traces of any such planet could be perceived, and the problem 
 remained unsolved. In 1843, a student of St. John's College, 
 Cambridge, named Adams, undertook to work out the movements 
 of Uranus, to discover, if possible, the position of the body which 
 
 1 Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Vol. I. p. 125.
 
 2l8 CAUSAL DETERMINATION 
 
 was pulling it out of what would otherwise be its proper path, the 
 attractions exercised by the sun and the planets in their different 
 positions, and to show what effect they would have in determining 
 the orbit of Uranus. Whenever the planet was deflected outwards, 
 it was necessary to show where the body was situated which was 
 thus influencing it. In 1845 ne was a l e to send a paper to the 
 astronomer royal at Greenwich, informing him in what quarter of the 
 heavens the new planet should be observed. When the discovery 
 was afterwards made, it was proved that his calculations were almost 
 exactly correct. A failure on the part of the astronomer royal to 
 cooperate by looking through his telescope for the planet gave the 
 prior right of discovery to a Frenchman named Leverrier. The 
 latter worked out his calculations in the same way as Adams, and 
 obtained almost exactly the same results. He sent these results to 
 Professor Galle of the Berlin University on the 23d September, 
 1846, asking him to look in the part of the heavens which he 
 indicated. That same evening, by following out the directions, the 
 planet was discovered in almost the exact spot predicted. 1 
 
 The history of this discovery illustrates as well several methods 
 and processes which we have not yet discussed, such as the forma- 
 tion and verification of hypotheses. It is also interesting as showing 
 how reason is able in certain conditions to anticipate perception. 
 The relations and forces of the heavenly bodies had been so per- 
 fectly formulated in the law of gravitation that these two investi- 
 gators, working in their studies, were able to predict not only the 
 presence but the exact position of a planet which up to that time had 
 never been observed. 
 
 In connection with Chapters XV. and XVI., the student is ad- 
 vised to read Mill, Logic, Bk. III. Chs. VIII. and IX. 
 
 1 Cf. Clerke, A Popular History of Astronomy during the Nineteenth 
 Century, pp. 96 ff. ; Buckley, A Short History of Natural Science, pp. 
 302 ff.
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 METHODS OF EXPLANATION 
 
 Incomplete Explanation. Analogy 
 
 59. Explanation by Analogy. We have now passed 
 from the field of observation to that of explanation. 
 Scientific observation, aided by experiment, as we have 
 seen, has to determine the exact nature of the facts of 
 experience, and the order in which those facts are con- 
 nected. Explanation, on the other hand, undertakes to 
 furnish reasons why the facts are as we- find them to be. 
 But, as has already been pointed out ( 48, 49), no hard 
 and fast line can be drawn between the determination 
 of the nature and connection of facts, and their explana- 
 tion. The task which our thought is called upon to 
 perform is to transform obscurely known and isolated 
 facts into an orderly and consistent system of know- 
 ledge. And, to accomplish this, it is necessary, in the 
 first place, that the facts shall be thoroughly analyzed 
 and carefully examined ; and, secondly, that they shall 
 be grouped together according to some general principle 
 or principles which shall make clear and intelligible the 
 relations in which they stand to each other. 
 
 To explain, then, is just to show that some fact or 
 group of facts is related to some other fact or group with , 
 which we are acquainted. So far as the methods we have 
 
 219
 
 22O ANALOGY 
 
 discussed enable us to establish connections between 
 events, they may fairly claim to be methods of explana- 
 tion. Nevertheless, although the difference between 
 these methods and those of explanation proper is one of 
 degree rather than of essential nature, it is important to 
 keep it in mind. The canons which were stated in the 
 last two chapters what Mill named the experimental 
 methods are rules for determining the order and 
 succession of particular facts. The problem before us 
 in those chapters was to determine what particular 
 phenomena of our experience are essentially and neces- 
 sarily connected as antecedents and consequents. And 
 for this purpose active observation, aided by experi- 
 ment, suffices. It is, of course, true that these observa- 
 tions and experiments furnish the starting-point for 
 explanation. But they constitute a more or less distinct 
 step in the work of systematization which is carried on by 
 thought. The method of Difference, for instance, enables 
 us to say that hot water will break thick glasses when 
 poured into them, but will not injure thin ones. ' So 
 much for the fact,' we say, ' but the explanation is still 
 wanting.' We must try to make the fact intelligible by 
 going outside of it, and showing that this behaviour on 
 the part of the glasses is simply a case or illustration of 
 what we already know of the properties of bodies when 
 heated. Again, the method of Concomitant variations, 
 as we have seen from Jevons's example, has led us to 
 believe in some causal connection between electrical 
 storms, sun-spots, and the Aurora Borealis. In this 
 instance, knowledge has not been able to advance 
 beyond the fact to its explanation. No satisfactory
 
 59- EXPLANATION BY ANALOGY 221 
 
 theory has yet been established to account for the 
 undoubted fact that these phenomena are in some way 
 causally connected. 
 
 In discussing methods of Explanation, we deal first 
 with Analogy. The principle of Analogy is resem- 
 blance. The phenomenon to be explained is connected 
 with some more familiar occurrence through some 
 perceived or imagined likeness between the two cases. 
 In the early stages of the history of the race, everything 
 was explained on the analogy of human actions (cf. 84). 
 All natural events, that is, were supposed to be produced 
 by superhuman agents, who were, however, endowed 
 with essentially the same qualities as man. In the 
 thunder, the men of a primitive age heard the voice of a 
 god. An eclipse of the sun or moon was interpreted as 
 a divine sign or warning. When the sea became tem- 
 pestuous and lashed its shores, they believed that the 
 sea-god was angry. In every case, they interpreted 
 these mysterious happenings of nature by referring 
 them to causes similar in character to those which they 
 best understood the motives and volitions of them- 
 selves and their fellows. 
 
 The principle of analogy is employed in the same 
 way in modern times. It is true that we no longer 
 think that natural events are directly caused by the 
 action of some spiritual agent more or less like our 
 selves. But, when we endeavour to show that the phe- 
 nomena which we are interested to explain are similar 
 in important respects to some group of facts with whose 
 mode of operation we are familiar, we proceed by anal- 
 ogy. On the basis of this similarity, we argue that the
 
 222 ANALOGY 
 
 phenomena with which we are dealing probably have 
 the same properties, or operate in the same way, or are 
 governed by the same laws, as the better-known facts 
 which they resemble. The formula of analogy may 
 be stated in this way : Two things resemble each 
 other in one or more respects, they are therefore of 
 the same general type or character; therefore a cer- 
 tain proposition which is true of the one is probably 
 true of the other. The following example of analogy 
 has been frequently used as an illustration : 
 
 " We may observe a very great similitude between this earth 
 which we inhabit, and the other planets, Saturn. Jupiter, Mars, 
 Venus, and Mercury. They all revolve round the sun, as the earth 
 does, although at different distances and in different periods. They 
 borrow all their light from the sun, as the earth does. Several of 
 them are known to revolve around their axes like the earth, and by 
 that means must have a like succession of day and night. Some of 
 them have moons that serve to give them lignt in the absence of the 
 sun, as our moon does to us. They are all in their motions subject 
 to the same law of gravitation as the earth is. From all this simili- 
 tude, it is not unreasonable to think that those planets may, like our 
 earth, be the habitation of various orders of living creatures." l 
 
 The word 'analogy ' at the present time is somewhat loosely used 
 for any mark of similarity or resemblance which enables us to rea- 
 son from one thing to another. " The original word avaXoyia, 
 as employed by Aristotle, corresponds to the word Proportion in 
 Arithmetic ; it signifies an equality of ratios, ICTOT^S Aoywv : two 
 compared with four is analogous to four compared with eight. 
 There is something of the same meaning in the technical use of the 
 word in physiology, where it is used to signify similarity of function as 
 distinguished from similarity of structure, which is called homology ; 
 thus the tail of a whale is analogous to the tail of a fish, inasmuch 
 
 1 Reid, Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay I. Chap. III.
 
 6o. ANALOGY AS SUGGESTIVE OF HYPOTHESES 223 
 
 as it is similarly used for motion, but is homologous with the hind- 
 legs of a quadruped. A man's arms are homologous with a horse's 
 fore legs, but they are not analogous, inasmuch as they are not used 
 for progression." 1 
 
 Apart from these technical uses, what is known as 
 analogical reasoning may, perhaps, be best defined as 
 an argument from similar instances. In analogy, we do 
 not stop to work out a law of connection between 
 phenomena by comparing a number of cases, or by 
 using any of the ordinary inductive canons. But 
 finding a striking resemblance between some circum- 
 stance quality, arrangement, function, etc. in the 
 phenomena to be explained, and some phenomena with 
 which we are already acquainted, we used the latter as 
 a basis for conclusions about the former. Analogy is 
 thus an argument from examples or instances, its value 
 depending upon the real identity in some important 
 aspect of the cases compared. When, however, our 
 thought is able to extend to a new case, or set of 
 cases, some general law or principle with whose opera- 
 tion it is already acquainted in other instances, we have 
 passed beyond analogy to complete explanation. In 
 the former case, we argue from the resemblance of 
 instances ; in the latter, the thread which binds the 
 new instance with the old is the identity of a general 
 principle. 
 
 60. Analogy as Suggestive of Explanatory Hypothe- 
 ses. We have shown above that analogical reasoning 
 
 1 Minto, Logic Inductive and Deductive, p. 367.
 
 224 ANALOGY 
 
 depends on the resemblance which exists between indi 
 vidual cases or instances, and that it is not guided by 
 any general law or principle. In the next section, how- 
 ever, we propose to show in more detail wherein it falls 
 short, and why, taken by itself, it can only be regarded 
 as incomplete explanation. Here we have to notice the 
 important part which it plays in suggesting laws and 
 principles. Although analogy ' sticks in the particular 
 instances,' it leads the mind on to general laws and 
 explanatory theories. It is thus of the greatest impor- 
 tance as a necessary stage on the way to complete 
 explanation. 
 
 When we are able to discover some general resem- 
 blance between a group of phenomena which we are in- 
 terested to explain, and another group whose principle of 
 operation we already understand, our thought strives to 
 extend the known principle and to bring the new facts 
 under it. The unknown or unexplained facts are thus 
 brought under a known law. It is of course true that 
 the application of the law to a new set of facts broadens 
 our conception of its scope, and often requires us to state 
 it in a more adequate way. Thus the analogy which 
 Newton perceived between the heavenly bodies falling 
 through space and the falling of the apple towards the 
 ground, led to the formulation in exact mathematical 
 terms of the universal law of gravitation. Our know- 
 ledge of the various functions of plants digestion, re- 
 production, etc. has been obtained by ascribing to the 
 various organs of the plant, purposes analogous to those 
 which are fulfilled by the parts of animal bodies. And, 
 in turn, the study of plant physiology has thrown light
 
 60. ANALOGY AS SUGGESTIVE OF HYPOTHESES 225 
 
 upon animal physiology, and enlarged and modified many 
 of its theories. 
 
 An extremely interesting instance of the part which analogy 
 plays in suggesting possible explanations, is found in the account 
 of the discovery of the principle of Natural Selection given by Dar- 
 win in his Autobiography. In 1837 Darwin opened a note-book 
 for the purpose of recording all facts in any way connected with the 
 variation of species in nature and under domestication. He first 
 investigated the variations of plants and animals which are produced 
 under domestication, by printed enquiries, by conversation with 
 skilful breeders, and by extensive reading. " I soon found," he says, 
 " that selection was the keystone of man's success in making useful 
 races of plants and animals." When useful or pleasing varieties 
 of plants or animals occur, the gardener or breeder preserves them, 
 and their peculiar qualities are transmitted to their offspring. And, 
 in a number of generations, these qualities become more pronounced 
 through accumulation. The differences between varieties of the 
 same species of domesticated animals varieties which areas differ- 
 ent, for example, as the mastiff and Skye terrier are due to the 
 selective agency of man. But is there anything analogous takes 
 place on an indefinitely larger scale in nature ? If so, what is it 
 which plays the part of the gardener or breeder, and preserves cer- 
 tain varieties? 
 
 When Darwin had reached this point in his investigations, and 
 had come to appreciate what selection could do, he happened to 
 read Malthus's book, On Population. The purpose of this book 
 was to dispel the optimistic ideas of some of the writers of the 
 eighteenth century who looked for the speedy realization of social 
 well-being and happiness. Such an ideal is impossible of fulfilment, 
 said Malthus, because of the inevitable tendency of population to 
 increase faster than the supply of food. Human beings increase in 
 a geometrical ratio ; the means of subsistence, at best, only by an 
 arithmetical ratio. The population will thus constantly tend to 
 exceed the limit of the food supply, and will be kept in check only 
 by starvation. A constant struggle for food is the lot, then, to 
 Q
 
 226 ANALOGY 
 
 which each individual is doomed in virtue of this law. Darwin's 
 observations of the rate at which plants and animals tend to repro- 
 duce their kind, led him at once to extend Malthus's principle to 
 the whole of nature. The fecundity of natural beings leads to a 
 struggle for existence, not merely among men, but throughout the 
 whole organic world. And if there is a struggle, we have natural 
 selection or the survival of the fittest. Darwin saw "that natural 
 selection was the inevitable result of the rapid increase of all organic 
 beings." It is not difficult to see that this discovery was the result 
 of Darwin's wonderful power of perceiving analogies between differ- 
 ent classes of facts. His genius led him to recognize first the re- 
 semblance of the variations of species in nature, to the more familiar 
 variations which go on among domesticated plants and animals. 
 And, secondly, he perceived that the competition for the means of 
 subsistence, which the pressure of population imposes upon the mem- 
 bers of the human race, is simply one phase of ' the struggle for 
 existence,' which is going on everywhere throughout the organic 
 world. 
 
 6 1. The Incompleteness of Analogical Reasoning. 
 
 The most striking feature of analogical arguments is 
 found in the fact that they yield only probable conclu- 
 sions. And the reason for this is not far to seek. For, 
 as has been already shown, analogy is a method of 
 reasoning from one particular case to another on the 
 basis of some imagined or perceived similarity between 
 the two cases. Complete logical demonstration, or cer- 
 tainty, however, is attained only when the new fact or 
 group of facts is really and essentially united by means 
 of some general principle with what is already known. 
 
 But it must not be forgotten that ' probability ' is not 
 a fixed quantity. An argument from analogy may have 
 any degree of value, from zero almost up to the limit 
 of complete logical certainty. To fully explain or
 
 6i. INCOMPLETENESS OF ANALOGICAL REASONING 22/ 
 
 demonstrate any fact, we are obliged, I think, to go 
 beyond analogy, and to verify its conclusions by a 
 method which has still to be described. It is evident, 
 nevertheless, that the value of an analogical argument 
 will depend upon the nature of the resemblance which 
 is taken as the basis of inference. In general, it is 
 true that the greater the resemblance between the two 
 cases, the more certainly can we reason from one to the 
 other. This is not to say, however, that the value of 
 the conclusion is in direct proportion to the number 
 of points of resemblance which can be discovered. For 
 example, we might reason : These two men are of the 
 same height, of the same age, live in the same house, 
 come from the same town ; the one man stands well 
 in his classes, therefore the other probably does so also. 
 If the number of points of resemblance were the essen- 
 tial thing, the argument ought to possess some weight, 
 but it is clear that it has none. The difficulty is that 
 none of the resemblances mentioned are fundamental, 
 or in any way essential to the real nature of the things 
 compared. If we knew that the two men were similar 
 in character, this one characteristic would be worth 
 more, as a basis for the conclusion, than all the circum- 
 stances which we have mentioned combined. 
 
 It is true, then, as Mr. Bosanquet remarks, that in 
 analogical reasoning we must weigh the points of re- 
 semblance rather than count them. 1 Other things 
 being equal, the more points of resemblance we can 
 make out the better; but if these are to contribute at 
 
 1 Logic, Vol. II., p. 99.
 
 228 ANALOGY 
 
 all to the certainty of the conclusion, they must rep- 
 resent some deep-lying characteristic of the things 
 compared. In general, it must be said that it is only 
 experience which can inform us what resemblances are 
 fundamental, and what merely external. Systematic 
 knowledge in any field enables us to separate the essen- 
 tial from the accidental. And, what is perhaps a corol- 
 lary from this, it must not be forgotten that the value 
 of an inference from analogy depends largely upon the 
 amount of intellectual insight possessed by the mind 
 which makes it. The ordinary mind, at least in its 
 undisciplined and untutored condition, regards all things 
 as of equal importance. It is therefore led away by 
 the strongest stimulus by striking external and acci- 
 dental resemblances. On the other hand, a scientific 
 genius whose mind is well stored with facts, and who 
 is gifted in addition with imagination, is able to pene- 
 trate beneath the surface and to apprehend the real or 
 fundamental resemblance. His imagination enables 
 him to see beyond the chaos of the particular facts, 
 and to detect the underlying principle by means of 
 which these facts can be connected and systema- 
 tized. 
 
 Analogy thus becomes deepened until it passes from 
 the stage of a mere argument from particular to par- 
 ticular, to the perception of a general law which includes 
 the individual instance. But no such direct insight can 
 claim the title of knowledge, until it is tried and tested 
 by the facts. The guesses of scientific men unfortu- 
 nately often prove mistaken. It is always necessary 
 that fancy shall be confronted with facts. Even Dar-
 
 6i. INCOMPLETENESS OF ANALOGICAL REASONING 22Q 
 
 win's magnificent analogical inference was nothing 
 more than a hypothesis, as he himself well under- 
 stood, until its power of explaining the facts of organic 
 life was demonstrated. We have now to explain in 
 the next chapter the methods by which such guesses 
 are tested. 
 
 References 
 
 J. S. Mill, Logic, Bk. III. Ch. XX. 
 
 A. Bain, Logic, Part Second, Induction, pp. 140-148. 
 J. G. Hibben, Inductive Logic, Ch. XIV. 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. II. Ch. III. 
 
 " " The Essentials of Logic, pp. 155-158. 
 
 W. Minto, Logic Inductive and Deductive, pp. 367-373.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 METHODS OF EXPLANATION. THE USE OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 62. Reasoning from an Hypothesis. An hypothesis 
 is a guess or supposition made to explain some fact or 
 group of facts. We have seen in the last chapter how 
 the mind is led on by the perception of analogies to 
 formulate a general law or principle of explanation for 
 phenomena which were not previously understood. But 
 even when guided by analogy, a guess or hypothesis is 
 only the beginning of explanation. A mere hypothesis 
 or supposition must be tried by its capacity to explain 
 facts, and in this way either verified or disproved. 
 4 Theory ' is another word that is often used as equiva- 
 lent to hypothesis. Strictly speaking, however, it is 
 more correct to use the term ' hypothesis ' for the un- 
 verified, or only partially verified guess, and to reserve 
 ' theory ' for the hypothesis that has been more com- 
 pletely demonstrated. This distinction, however, is not 
 usually maintained, and even in scientific writings the 
 terms ' theory ' and ' hypothesis ' are used interchangea- 
 bly. Nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish in some 
 way the 'mere hypothesis,' or supposition, which is 
 quite as likely to be false as true, from the hypothesis 
 which has been established by proof. 
 
 It is well to remember that it is not only in solving 
 scientific problems that we employ hypotheses. In our 
 
 230
 
 62. REASONING FROM AN HYPOTHESIS 231 
 
 ordinary experience, we are constantly trying to imagine 
 the most likely explanation of facts which we perceive 
 through the senses. If, for example, one should find on 
 returning to one's room that a pane of glass had been 
 broken, one would straightway set about finding some 
 explanation of this occurrence. One might perhaps 
 first imagine that a stone or something of the kind had 
 been thrown against it. Acting on this supposition, one 
 would look for the stone in the room. If it were found 
 there, the hypothesis would be confirmed ; if no traces of 
 it could be discovered, and if, moreover, on examination 
 the glass proved to be shattered in a way that would 
 probably not result from the projection of a stone 
 against it, our first hypothesis would have to be aban- 
 doned. We should then make another guess perhaps 
 that the outside blind had been violently closed by the 
 wind and again examine the facts to see if they gave 
 any support to this supposition. We are constantly 
 making hypotheses of this character to explain phe- 
 nomena which we meet with in everyday experience. 
 If we find a stream swollen, we conclude that it must 
 have rained in some part of the country drained by 
 the stream. If a man has typhoid fever, we are pretty 
 sure to guess that he has been drinking impure water. 
 We no sooner perceive something unusual or striking 
 than we begin .to guess out, as it were, its explanation. 
 The formation of hypotheses, then, is simply the mind's 
 response to the demand for explanation. 
 
 It is worth noticing that it is only unusual or striking events, or 
 those in which they have some practical concern, which attract the 
 attention.of the majority of mankind, and lead them to form explana-
 
 232 THE USE OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 .ory hypotheses. What is familiar, or of no practical importance, 
 does not usually awaken curiosity. Indeed, in a great many cases, 
 such phenomena are not observed at all. But the great scientist is 
 distinguished, one may say, by his intellectual curiosity. He tries 
 to understand phenomena which the ordinary mind neglects, and 
 simply takes for granted. He has questions in his mind with regard 
 to familiar things which he wishes to have answered, guesses which 
 he is desirous of having proved or disproved. We have found it 
 convenient, in the preceding chapters, to separate the description of 
 the processes of determining the nature of facts, from the account 
 of the methods of explanation. But it must by no means be sup- 
 posed that the nature of facts is discovered quite independently of 
 the influence of hypotheses or theories. Unless the mind has 
 some question to answer, or theory to test, it is impossible to see 
 any significance in an experiment. In other words, every ex- 
 periment must have a purpose, and the purpose is to get some 
 information that will help us to answer a question which we bring 
 with us to the investigation. 
 
 In the actual process of acquiring knowledge, then, 
 observation and theorizing go hand in hand. Unless we 
 go to nature with something in our mind, we are not 
 likely to learn much. As a rule, we see only what we 
 look for. Francis Darwin says of his father : " He 
 often said that no one could be a good observer unless 
 he were an active theorizer. This brings me back to 
 what I said about his instinct for arresting exceptions: 
 It were as though he were charged with theorizing 
 power ready to flow into any channel on the slightest 
 disturbance, so that no fact, however small, could avoid 
 releasing a stream of theory, and thus the fact became 
 magnified into importance. In this way it naturally 
 happened that many untenable theories occurred to him, 
 but fortunately his richness of imagination was equalled
 
 62. REASONING FROM AN HYPOTHESIS 233 
 
 by his power of judging and condemning the thoughts 
 which occurred to him. He was just to his theories and 
 did not condemn them unheard ; and so it happened 
 that he was willing to test what would seem to most 
 people not at all worth testing. These rather wild trials 
 he called 'fool's experiments,' and enjoyed exceedingly. 
 As an example, I may mention, that finding the cotyle- 
 dons of Biophytum to be highly sensitive to vibrations 
 of the table, he fancied that they might perceive the 
 vibrations of sound, and therefore made me play my 
 bassoon close to a plant." l 
 
 A good example of how essential theories are for an 
 observer, and how blind he may be to what he is not 
 looking for, is found in the work from which we have 
 just quoted. In the brief autobiography contained in 
 the first volume, Darwin tells of a geological trip through 
 Wales which he took while a student at Cambridge, in 
 company with Sedgwick, the professor of geology. It 
 must be remembered that this was before Agassiz had 
 come forward with his theory of a glacial period in the 
 world's history. Darwin writes : " We spent many 
 hours in Cwm Idwal, examining all the rocks with su- 
 preme care, as Sedgwick was anxious to find fossils in 
 them ; but neither of us saw a trace of the wonderful 
 glacial phenomena all around us ; we did not notice the 
 plainly scored rocks, the perched boulders, the lateral 
 and terminal moraines. Yet these phenomena are so 
 conspicuous that, as I declared in a paper published 
 many years afterward in the Philosophical Magazine, a 
 
 l Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Vol. I., p. 126.
 
 234 THE USE OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 house burnt down by fire did not tell its story more 
 plainly than did this valley. If it had been filled by a 
 glacier, the phenomena would have been less distinct 
 than they now are." l 
 
 63. Formation of Hypotheses. We are now ready to 
 consider a little more closely the formation of hypothe- 
 ses or theories. In the first place, it is to be noticed 
 that hypotheses are not received from without through 
 sense-perception, but are made by the mind. They are 
 the creations of the imagination. A good theorizer, like 
 a poet, is in a certain sense born, not made. The man 
 to whom ' nothing ever occurs,' whose intellectual pro- 
 cesses are never lit up with a spark of imagination, is 
 unlikely to make any important discoveries. It has 
 been by a flash of scientific genius, by imaginative in- 
 sight which we may almost call inspiration, that great 
 scientific theories have been discovered. Not even a 
 scientific genius, however, can afford to neglect the 
 facts. But, guided by accurate observation, the scien- 
 tific imagination tries to invent some law or principle 
 which will serve to connect and explain facts. Tyndall 
 has an essay on " The Scientific Use of the Imagina- 
 tion," from which we may quote a short passage. 
 " With accurate experiment and observation to work 
 upon, imagination becomes the architect of physical 
 theory. Newton's passage from a falling apple to a 
 falling moon was an act of the prepared imagination. 
 . . . Out of the facts of chemistry the constructive 
 
 1 Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Vol. I., p. 49.
 
 63. FORMATION OF HYPOTHESES 235 
 
 imagination of Dalton formed the atomic theory. Davy 
 was richly endowed with the imaginative faculty, while 
 with Faraday its exercise was incessant, preceding, 
 accompanying, and guiding all his experiments. His 
 strength and fertility as a discoverer are to be referred 
 in great part to the stimulus of the imagination. Scien- 
 tific men fight shy of the word because of its ultra- 
 scientific connotations ; but the fact is, that without the 
 exercise of this power, our knowledge of nature would 
 be a mere tabulation of coexistences and sequences." 1 
 
 In speaking of hypotheses as ' guesses,' or 'creations of the im- 
 agination, 1 their dependence upon facts must not be forgotten. It is 
 only when the phenomena to be explained have been carefully ob- 
 served that our guesses at their explanation are likely to be of value. 
 It is well known that a considerable amount of knowledge is usually 
 required to ask an intelligent question. And in the same way, the 
 mind must be well stored with facts, in order to render our hypo- 
 thetical explanations worthy of consideration. Indeed, observation 
 of facts, and the formation of theories go hand in hand, and naturally 
 assist each other. We have already spoken of the lack of theory 
 which makes us blind to facts which seem to lie directly before us. 
 But we have perhaps not yet emphasized sufficiently the dependence 
 of theories upon the facts of observation. The process of explanation 
 may be described as a fitting together of the facts given by observa- 
 tion, with the explanatory theories which the mind originates. The 
 theory with which we start enables us to ask questions, and leads us 
 to scrutinize the phenomena which are to be explained ; while the 
 latter react upon the theory, and cause it to undergo constant modifi- 
 cation. The account of Darwin's discovery of the principle of ; the 
 survival of the fittest ' is a good illustration of an hypothesis con- 
 structed by a constant dependence upon the facts during every step 
 of its progress. 
 
 1 Fragments of Science, p. 104.
 
 236 THE USE OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 We have already referred to the way in which analogy 
 leads the mind on to general principles of explanation 
 ( 60). Analogy is a method of inferring that what is 
 true of one object is probably true of others which 
 resemble it. But the ordinary mind sees resemblances 
 only when they are very obvious and striking. The man 
 of scientific insight, on the other hand, like the poet, pene- 
 trates more deeply into the nature of things, and is able 
 to discover analogies and resemblances to which the 
 ordinary man is blind. Who but a genius like Newton 
 would have thought of connecting the fall of an apple 
 with the fall of the heavenly bodies through space ? The 
 history of science shows that great discoveries are 
 made by means of imaginative insight, but it also 
 teaches that mere imagination without dependence 
 upon known facts is frequently a source of much mis- 
 chief. Mere theories without facts are not only empty, 
 but often stand in the way of true knowledge. The 
 fruitful exercise of the imagination, if we may judge 
 from the way in which great discoveries have been made, 
 always takes place in closest connection with what ob- 
 servation and experiment reveal regarding the nature 
 of phenomena. If the imagination is to have power to 
 discover any truth, it must constantly ' touch earth,' 
 and be guided in its course by the nature of facts which 
 are already known. 
 
 In framing hypotheses, then, the imagination is 
 constantly prompted by analogies with processes which 
 are more or less familiar. The hypothesis, then, is not 
 created by the imagination 'out of nothing.' It is rather 
 an extension or development of a known law, than an 
 absolute creation.
 
 64. THE PROOF OF AN HYPOTHESIS 237 
 
 64. The Proof of an Hypothesis. We have discussed 
 the way in which hypotheses are formed, but as yet have 
 said nothing regarding the means of determining their 
 truth and falsity. But to form hypotheses is usually 
 easy, to verify them is often exceedingly difficult. The 
 scientific worker constantly finds that theories which he 
 has formed are without foundation, and must therefore 
 be discarded. It is not only essential that a scientific 
 investigator shall possess a mind fertile in ideas ; he 
 must also love truth more than any theory, no matter 
 how interesting or attractive it may appear. In behalf 
 of truth, every theory must be subjected to the most 
 thorough and searching tests possible ; if it is not borne 
 out by the facts, it must be at once discarded. What 
 now is the general method of procedure in testing an 
 hypothesis ? Two steps or stages may be distinguished 
 in this process : (i) We assume that the hypothesis is 
 true, and proceed to show what are the necessary results 
 which follow from it. In doing so we proceed deduc- 
 tively ; that is, assuming the truth of the hypothesis, 
 we reason out what consequences it must have. (2) The 
 conclusions thus reached are compared with the actual 
 facts, as given to us directly in perception, or as deter- 
 mined by experiment. If these are found to agree, the 
 hypothesis is regarded as true ; if they do not agree, it 
 must be discarded or modified. 
 
 This procedure may become clearer by considering 
 some concrete examples. If we were to come on the 
 campus some morning and find that several branches 
 had been broken from one of the trees, we should 
 naturally try to explain this circumstance by making
 
 238 THE USE OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 some hypothesis. Perhaps the first thing which would 
 occur to us would be that there had been a violent wind- 
 storm. The hypothesis having been made, the next step 
 would be to look around to see if it could be verified. 
 ' If there has been a cyclone,' we might argue, ' there 
 should be other signs of its presence ; we should find 
 broken twigs and blown leaves lying about, and all the 
 trees should present a storm-tossed appearance.' If 
 observation showed that these things were actually 
 present, we would consider our hypothesis so far con- 
 firmed. But if not, our first guess would be disproved, 
 and it would be necessary to look about for another 
 explanation. 
 
 An excellent illustration of the way in which an hypothesis 
 becomes more and more completely demonstrated, is found in the 
 history of the experiments by which it was proved that the atmos- 
 phere has weight. Galileo noticed that water will rise in a pump only 
 about 33 feet. He could not find out, however, why it was that the 
 water should stop at this point. After his death, his friend and pupil 
 Torricelli took up the problem, and asked himself : Why does the 
 water rise at all ? It then occurred to him that air must weigh some- 
 thing, and that it might be this weight on the surface of the water 
 which forced the water up the pump when there was no air pressing 
 it down. Now, if this were so, he reasoned, the weight of the air 
 ought to lift mercury, which is fourteen times heavier than water, to 
 one-fourteenth of the height. So he took some mercury, and filling 
 a tube about 34 inches long, turned it upside down into a basin of 
 mercury which was open, and therefore under the pressure of the 
 atmosphere. The mercury began to settle in the tube, and finally 
 rested at a height of 30 inches. Torricelli had thus invented the 
 barometer, an instrument which would measure the weight of the 
 atmosphere. It was afterwards suggested by the famous French 
 writer, Pascal, that at the top of a high mountain, where there is less
 
 64. THE PROOF OF AN HYPOTHESIS 239 
 
 air pressing downwards, the column of mercury should fall consid- 
 erably if the atmosphere were really what caused the water and the 
 mercury to rise. When this experiment was made by carrying the 
 barometer to the top of a mountain called the Puy de Dome, the mer- 
 cury fell nearly three inches. Still further confirmation of Torri- 
 celli's theory was afforded by the discoveries of Otto Guericke of 
 Magdeburg. In 1650 Guericke invented the air-pump. The first use 
 which he made of his new invention was to show that the atmos- 
 phere is pressing down upon us heavily and equally in all directions. 
 He fitted closely together two metal hemispheres and exhausted the 
 air between them by means of his pump. It was found that the 
 pressure of the atmosphere was so great that it took a great force to 
 separate the hemispheres. 1 
 
 To establish a scientific theory, then, there are neces- 
 sary not only a ready imagination, but also patience and 
 perseverance in the careful deduction of the conse- 
 quences of the theory, and in the comparison of the 
 results thus obtained with the actual facts. Scientific 
 work also demands the utmost candor and openness of 
 mind on the part of those who engage in it. One must 
 be willing to abandon any theory as soon as it is found 
 to disagree with the facts. And this is by no means an 
 easy thing to do. When one has a theory which suffices 
 for nearly all the facts, there is always a temptation to 
 cling to it, and to neglect or explain away any trouble- 
 some or contradictory facts. There is no doubt that 
 the scientific explanations which have become accepted 
 and established were not the ideas which first happened 
 to occur to the men with whose names they are associ- 
 ated. When Newton first attempted to work out the 
 verification of the gravitation hypothesis, he used the 
 
 1 Cf. Buckley, Short History of Natural Science, pp. 114-121.
 
 \ 
 
 240 THE USE OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 most accurate measurements he could obtain regarding 
 the size of the earth. But in calculating on this basis 
 the pull of the earth on the moon, and the consequent 
 deflection of the moon from the straight line, his results 
 came out wrong. That is, the moon moved more slowly 
 than it ought to do according to his theory. The differ- 
 ence was not great, but Newton could not overlook this 
 lack of agreement with the observed facts. He put the 
 whole matter aside ; and it was only when he heard 
 sixteen years later that Picart had discovered, from new 
 and more accurate measurements, that the earth was 
 larger than had been supposed, that he repeated his 
 calculations, and found his hypothesis verified. 
 
 Although it very frequently turns out, both in every- 
 day matters and in scientific work, that our hypotheses 
 are disproved, the negative answers thus obtained are 
 not without value. For we are often able at once to 
 limit the number of possible hypotheses. In a field 
 where we already possess some systematic knowledge, it 
 is often possible to say : The explanation of this group 
 of phenomena must be either a or b or c. If, then, one 
 is able to show that neither a nor b will afford the 
 required explanation, these negative conclusions will 
 lead directly to the establishment of c. 
 
 65. Requirements of a Good Hypothesis. Various 
 conditions or requisites of a good hypothesis are laid 
 down by writers on logic. The three laws which are 
 most frequently stated are as follows: (i) That the 
 hypothesis shall be conceivable and not absurd. (2) 
 That it shall be of such a character that deductions
 
 65. REQUIREMENTS OF A GOOD HYPOTHESIS 241 
 
 can be made from it (3) That it shall not contradict 
 any of the known laws of nature. 
 
 It does not seem to me that the first law is of much 
 value. It is largely individual taste or education which 
 leads us to pronounce certain theories ' absurd ' or ' in- 
 conceivable.' Thus, for a long time, it seemed incon- 
 ceivable that the earth should be round, and should 
 revolve on its own axis ; and less than a generation 
 ago the theory of evolution, as propounded by Darwin, 
 seemed to many persons utterly ' absurd.' Nor can the 
 third law always be applied as a test of an hypothesis, 
 for many great discoveries seemed, at the time when 
 they were announced, to contradict known laws of nat- 
 ure. The difficulty is that no one is able to affirm, 
 unconditionally, that a law of nature forbids us to 
 make this or that hypothesis. Of course, we feel that 
 a theory is very probably false which is at variance with 
 the law of gravity, or with that of the conservation 
 of energy, or any of the laws which we regard as es- 
 tablished beyond a reasonable doubt. But, although 
 the chances are always very greatly against any theory 
 which runs counter to what are regarded as well-estab- 
 lished laws, there is yet always a possibility that it may 
 be true. There is no law of nature so certain as to be 
 infallible. Even those laws which appear to be beyond 
 the possibility of doubt, may require to be modified or 
 supplemented. We may find that, practically, it is not 
 wise to trouble ourselves with theories which undertake 
 to overthrow the law of gravitation, or to disprove other 
 fundamental laws of the physical world. But theo- 
 retically, at least, there is always a chance in cases
 
 242 THE USE OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 such as we have been supposing the chance is almost 
 infinitely small that the new theory may be right, and 
 the old one wrong. The practical objection to admit- 
 ting the claims of this canon is the difficulty in apply- 
 ing it fairly. The phrase, ' contrary to the laws of 
 nature,' like 'inconceivable,' and 'absurd,' is likely to be 
 used to condemn any theory with which one disagrees. 
 In this way, it is evident that the very point is begged 
 which is really at issue. 
 
 Of these three canons, therefore, the second appears to 
 state the only condition which is essential to an hypothe- 
 sis. An hypothesis, if it is to be of any value, must be 
 capable of being proved or refuted. But, unless its 
 consequences can be shown by way of deduction, it 
 is impossible to know whether it agrees, or does not 
 agree, with the facts which it is supposed to explain. 
 An hypothesis from which nothing can be deduced, 
 then, is of no value whatever. It always remains at 
 the stage of mere possibility, and without any real 
 connection with fact. It is a mere guess which has 
 no significance whatever, for it is entirely incapable 
 either of proof or of disproof. 
 
 In general, it is possible to deduce the consequences of a theory 
 only when the principle employed is analogous, in mode of opera- 
 tion, to something with which we are familiar. Thus, for example, 
 it is because the ether is conceived as resembling other material 
 bodies in important respects that it can be used as a principle of 
 explanation. It is assumed to be elastic and capable of receiving 
 and transmitting vibrations, and as spread out like other material 
 bodies in space. In virtue of these similarities to other material 
 substances, it is possible to deduce the consequences which such 
 a substance as ether would imply, and to compare them with the
 
 65. REQUIREMENTS OF A GOOD HYPOTHESIS 243 
 
 actual facts. But if one should make the assumption that certain 
 phenomena are due to some agency totally unlike anything of which 
 we have any experience, a disembodied spirit, or ghost, for example, 
 it would be impossible either to prove or to disprove the assertion. 
 For knowing nothing whatever of the way in which spirits act, one 
 could not say whether the phenomena to be explained, table-rap- 
 ping, planchette-writing, etc., were or were not consistent with a 
 spirit's nature and habits. 
 
 Another example of a barren hypothesis from which no conclu- 
 sions can be drawn, is afforded by the ' catastrophe ' or ' convulsion ' 
 theory in geology, which was first combatted by Lyell, in his Prin- 
 ciples of Geology, published in 1830. " People had so long held the 
 belief that our earth had only existed a few thousand years, that 
 when geologists began to find a great number of strange plants and 
 animals buried in the earth's crust, immense thicknesses of rock 
 laid down by water, and whole mountain masses which must have 
 been poured out by volcanoes, they could not believe that this had 
 been done gradually, and only in parts "of the world at a time, as the 
 Nile and the Ganges are now carrying down earth to the sea, and 
 Vesuvius, Etna, and Hecla are pouring out lava a few feet thick 
 every year. They still imagined that in past ages there must have 
 been mighty convulsions from time to time, vast floods swallowing 
 up plants and animals several times since the world was made, vio- 
 lent earthquakes and outbursts from volcanoes shaking the whole 
 of Europe, forcing up mountains, and breaking open valleys. It 
 seemed to them that in those times when the face of the earth was 
 carved out into mountains and valleys, table-lands and deserts, and 
 when the rocks were broken, tilted up, and bent, things must have 
 been very different from what they are now. And so they made 
 imaginary pictures of how nature had worked, instead of reasoning 
 from what they could see happening around them." 1 
 
 The convulsions, or catastrophes, which were thus assumed to take 
 place were regarded as the result of strange incalculable forces 
 whose mode of operation could never be exactly determined. 
 
 1 Buckley, Short History of Natural Science, pp. 441-442.
 
 244 THE USE OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 *nstead of these mysterious agencies, Lyell assumed that causes 
 similar to those with which we are now acquainted had been 
 acting uniformly for long ages. The nature of the causes at work 
 being known, it became possible to calculate the nature of the effects, 
 and thus to reduce the facts of geology to order and system. As 
 we have already shown, hypotheses which are to prove really service- 
 able are formed by extending some known principle through analogy 
 to a new class of facts. The assumption of mysterious agencies 
 and principles whose mode of operation is unlike anything which is 
 known to us, does not aid in the extension of knowledge. 
 
 References 
 
 W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons on Logic, Ch. XXX. 
 " " The Principles of Science, Ch. XXIII. 
 C. Sigwart, Logic, 83. 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. II., pp. 155-167.
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 FALLACIES OF INDUCTION 
 
 66. The Source of Fallacy. It is necessary at the 
 close of our discussion of the inductive methods, to say 
 something regarding the errors to which we are most 
 subject in this kind of thinking. We have seen that 
 knowledge is the result of the mind's own activity, and 
 that it grows in completeness through a persistent effort 
 to keep distinct things which are different, and to con- 
 nect phenomena which belong together. Truth, in other 
 words, is gained by intellectual activity. And, on the 
 other hand, we fall into error, and are led away by false 
 arguments as a result of mental indolence. Thinking is 
 hard work, and there is always a tendency to avoid it. As 
 a matter of fact, we all think much less frequently than 
 we suppose. Usually, we are content to follow familiar 
 associations, and to repeat current phrases, without doing 
 any real intellectual work. The difficulty is that we can 
 get along comfortably without thinking for the most 
 part more comfortably, perhaps, than when we do 
 think. Then, again, the mind is less directly under con- 
 trol of the will than the body. One may force himself 
 to sit down at his desk and open a book ; but it is more 
 difficult to compel oneself to think. 
 
 The only way in which we can be saved from becom- 
 ing ' intellectual dead-beats,' is by the formation of good 
 
 245
 
 246 FALLACIES OF INDUCTION 
 
 mental habits. It requires eternal vigilance and unceas- 
 ing strenuousness to prevent our degeneration into mere 
 associative machines. What the logical doctrine of fal- 
 lacies can do is to put us on our guard against this ten- 
 dency. It enumerates and calls attention to some of 
 the commonest and most dangerous results of slovenly 
 thinking, in the hope that the student may learn to 
 avoid these errors. Some of the fallacies of which we 
 shall treat in this chapter, apply equally to deductive 
 or syllogistic reasoning, and have been already treated 
 in Chapter XL We shall, however, enumerate them 
 here again for the sake of completeness. It is conve- 
 nient to discuss the various fallacies under the following 
 heads : 
 
 (1) Fallacies due to the careless use of Language. 
 
 (2) Errors of Observation. 
 
 (3) Mistakes in Reasoning. 
 
 (4) Fallacies due to Individual Prepossessions. 
 
 67. Fallacies due to the Careless Use of Language. 
 The careless and unreflective use of words is a very fre- 
 quent source of error. Words are the signs or symbols 
 of ideas; but the natural sluggishness of the mind leads 
 often to a substitution of the word for the idea. " Men 
 imagine that their reason governs words, whilst, in fact, 
 words react upon the understanding ; and this has ren- 
 dered philosophy and the sciences sophistical and inac- 
 tive." 1 It is much easier to deal with counters than 
 
 1 Bacon, Novum Organum, Aph. LIX.
 
 67. THE CARELESS USE OF LANGUAGE 247 
 
 with realities. Since we must use words to express our 
 thoughts, it is almost impossible to prevent them from 
 becoming our masters. The dangers from the use of 
 words has been well represented by Locke, from whom 
 I quote the following passage : 
 
 " Men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words 
 which are easily got and retained, before they knew or had framed 
 the complex ideas to which they were annexed, or which were to be 
 found in the things they were thought to stand for, they usually con- 
 tinue to do so all their lives ; and, without taking the pains neces- 
 sary to settle in their minds determined ideas, they use their words 
 for such unsteady and confused notions as they have, contenting 
 themselves with the same words other people use, as if their very 
 sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning. . . . 
 This inconsistency in men's words when they come to reason con- 
 cerning either their tenets or their interest, manifestly fills their 
 discourse with abundance of empty, unintelligible noise and jargon, 
 especially in moral matters, where the words, for the most part, 
 standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas not regu- 
 larly and permanently united in nature, their bare sounds are often 
 only thought on, or at least very obscure and uncertain notions 
 annexed to them. Men take the words they find in use among their 
 neighbours ; and, that they may not seem ignorant what they stand 
 for, use them confidently, without much troubling their heads about 
 a certain fixed meaning ; whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain 
 this advantage : That, as in such discourses they seldom are in the 
 right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the 
 wrong ; it being all one to go about to draw men out of their mis- 
 takes who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his 
 habitation who has no settled abode." 1 
 
 (i) In treating of the misuse of words, we mention, 
 in the first place, errors arising from the use of a word 
 
 1 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. III. Ch. X.
 
 248 FALLACIES OF INDUCTION 
 
 or phrase in more than one sense. This is usually 
 called the fallacy of Equivocation. In some cases, the 
 equivocation may be mere wilful quibbling on the part 
 of the person propounding the argument, as in the 
 following example of Jevons : 
 
 All criminal actions ought to be punished by law, 
 
 Prosecutions for theft are criminal actions, 
 
 Therefore prosecutions for theft ought to be punished by law. 
 
 Examples of this kind do not mislead any one ; but in 
 some instances the change of meaning in words may 
 not be perceived, even by the person who employs the 
 argument. For example, one might reason : 
 
 It is right to do good to others, 
 
 To assist A in obtaining office is to do him good, 
 
 Therefore it is right to assist him in this way. 
 
 Here the phrase which is used equivocally is, 'to do 
 good,' as will at once be perceived. 
 
 (2) Another frequent source of error in the use of 
 words is found in what has been excellently named 
 the Question-begging Epithet. As is well known, there 
 is much in a name. Epithets like 'class-legislation,' 
 ' compromise measure/ ' a dangerous and immoral doc- 
 trine,' are terms freely used to describe the measures 
 or views of opponents. And, as it is always easier to 
 adopt a current phrase, than to examine the facts and 
 draw our own conclusions, it is not surprising that the 
 name settles the whole matter in the minds of so many 
 people. Of course, the epithet employed may beg the 
 question in favour of the subject it is used to describe, 
 as well as against it. Politicians well understand the
 
 67. THE CARELESS USE OF LANGUAGE 249 
 
 importance of adopting an impressive and sonorous 
 election cry to represent the plank of their party. Thus, 
 party cries like ' honest money,' ' prohibition and prosper- 
 ity,' ' the people's cause,' etc., are essentially question- 
 begging epithets. Even words like 'liberty,' 'justice,' 
 and 'patriotism,' are frequently used in such a way as 
 to bring them under the class of fallacies which we 
 have here described. Under this heading, also, may be 
 grouped ' cant ' words and phrases. When we accuse 
 a person of using cant, we always imply that he is 
 more or less consciously insincere, that he is profess- 
 ing opinions and sentiments which he does not really 
 possess. Any insincere expression which is made pri- 
 marily for the sake of effect may be rightly termed 
 cant It is not even necessary that the speaker should 
 be fully conscious of his insincerity. A man may easily 
 deceive himself, and, as he repeats familiar words and 
 phrases, imagine himself to be overflowing with patriot- 
 ism, or with sympathy for others, or with religious 
 feelings. 
 
 (3) Figurative language is another frequent source of 
 error. Of the various figures of speech, perhaps meta- 
 phors are the most misleading. The imagery aroused 
 by metaphorical language is usually so strong as to make 
 us forget the difference between the real subject under 
 consideration, and the matter which has been used to 
 illustrate it. Thus in discussing problems of mind, it 
 is very common to employ metaphors drawn from the 
 physical sciences. For example, we read in works on 
 psychology and ethics of ' the struggle of ideas/ of ' the 
 balancing and equilibration of motives,' of ' action in
 
 250 FALLACIES OF INDUCTION 
 
 the direction of the strongest motive/ etc. Another 
 illustration, which has been often quoted, is Carlyle's 
 argument against representative government founded 
 on the analogy between the ruler of a state and the 
 captain of a ship. The captain, he says, could never 
 bring the ship to port if it were necessary for him 
 to call the crew together, and get a vote every time 
 he wished to change the course. The real differences 
 between the relation of a captain to his crew, and the 
 executive officers in a state to the citizens, is lost sight 
 of by the metaphor. Metaphorical reasoning is simply 
 a case of analogy, the imperfections and dangers of 
 which have been already pointed out. It is, however, 
 one of the errors which it is most difficult to avoid. A 
 hidden metaphor lurks unsuspected in many of the 
 words in common use. We may thus appreciate the 
 force of Heine's humorous petition : " May Heaven 
 deliver us from the Evil One, and from metaphors." l 
 
 68. Errors of Observation. Sometimes insufficient 
 observation is the result of a previously conceived the- 
 ory ; sometimes it may be due to inattention, to the 
 difficulties of the case, or to lack of the proper instru- 
 ments and aids to observation. We have already had 
 occasion to refer to the influence of a theory on obser- 
 vation (cf. 62). As a rule, we see only those instances 
 which are favourable to the theory or belief which we 
 already possess. It requires a special effort of attention 
 to take account of negative instances, and to discover the 
 
 1 Quoted by Minto, Logic, p. 373.
 
 68. ERRORS OF OBSERVATION 251 
 
 falsity involved in some long-standing belief. Indeed, it 
 perhaps requires quite as much mental alertness to over- 
 throw an old theory, as to establish a new one. This 
 tendency of the mind to seize upon affirmative instances, 
 and to neglect the evidence afforded by negative cases, 
 is well set forth by Bacon in the following passage : 
 
 " The human understanding, when any proposition has been once 
 laid down (either from general admission and belief, or from the 
 pleasure it affords), forces everything else to add fresh support and 
 confirmation ; and although most cogent and abundant instances 
 may exist to the contrary, yet either does not observe or despises 
 them, or gets rid of and rejects them by some distinction, with 
 violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of 
 its first conclusions. It was well answered by him who was shown 
 in a temple the votive tablets suspended by such as had escaped the 
 peril of shipwreck, and was pressed as to whether he would then 
 recognize the power of the gods ; ' But where are the portraits of 
 those who have perished in spite of their vows? ' All superstition is 
 much the same, whether it be that of astrology, dreams, omens, 
 retributive judgment, or the like, in all of which the deluded ob- 
 servers observe events which are fulfilled, but neglect and pass over 
 their failure, though it be much more common. But this evil insin- 
 uates itself still more craftily in philosophy and the sciences, in 
 which a settled maxim vitiates and governs every other circumstance, 
 though the latter be much more worthy of confidence. Besides, 
 even in the absence of that eagerness and want of thought (which 
 we have mentioned), it is the peculiar and perpetual error of the 
 human understanding to be more moved and excited by affirmatives 
 than negatives, whereas it ought duly and regularly to be impartial ; 
 nay, in establishing any true axiom the negative instance is the most 
 powerful." * 
 
 The nature of this fallacy has been so well illustrated 
 
 *Novum Organum, Bk. I. Aph. XLVI.
 
 2$2 FALLACIES OF INDUCTION 
 
 by the quotation which has just been given, that we may 
 pass on at once to speak of other cases of insufficient 
 observation. Our discussion of the processes of reason- 
 ing have made it clear how necessary it is to observe 
 carefully and attentively. The majority of the false 
 theories which have appeared in science and in philoso- 
 phy, as well as those of common life, have arisen from 
 lack of observation. The doctrine of innate ideas, and 
 the theory that combustion was a process of giving off 
 phlogiston a substance supposed to be contained in 
 certain bodies may be given as examples. In some 
 seaside communities, there is a belief that living beings, 
 botH. human and animal, never die at flood tide. 'They 
 always go out with the ebb,' it is said. Again, there is 
 a general belief, which was shared by such an eminent 
 scientist as Herschel, that the full moon in rising pos- 
 sesses some power of dispersing the clouds. Careful 
 observations made at the Greenwich observatory have, 
 however, shown conclusively that the moon has no such 
 power as that supposed. 1 
 
 Another circumstance to be considered in this con- 
 nection is the inaccuracy and fallibility of ordinary 
 memory. Every one must have noticed how rarely two 
 persons agree completely in the report which they give 
 of a conversation which they have heard, or of events 
 which they have experienced. This is due in part to 
 diversity of interest : each person remembers those cir- 
 cumstances in which for any reason he is most strongly 
 interested. But, in addition, it is largely the result of 
 
 1 Cf. Jevons, Principles of Science, Ch. XVIII.
 
 68. ERRORS OF OBSERVATION 253 
 
 the inevitable tendency of the mind to confuse what is 
 actually observed, with inferences made from its obser- 
 vations. The inability to distinguish between what is 
 really perceived, and what is inferred, is most strongly 
 marked in uneducated persons, who are not on their 
 guard against this fallacy. An uneducated person is cer- 
 tain to relate, not what he actually saw or heard, but the 
 impression which the events experienced made upon 
 him. He therefore mixes up the facts perceived, with 
 his own conclusions drawn from them, and with state- 
 ments of his own feelings in the circumstances. A 
 lawyer who has to cross-examine a witness is usually 
 well aware of this tendency, and takes advantage of it 
 to discredit the testimony. The experienced physician 
 knows how worthless is the description of symptoms 
 given by the ordinary patient, or by sympathetic friends, 
 or by an inexperienced nurse. The more one's sympa- 
 thies and interests are aroused in such a case, the more 
 difficult it is to limit oneself to an exact statement of 
 actual occurrences. 
 
 But this tendency is not confined to persons deficient 
 in knowledge and ordinary culture. It usually requires 
 special training to make one a good observer in any 
 particular field. It is by no means so easy as it may 
 appear to describe exactly what one has seen in an 
 experiment. If we know, or think that we know, 
 the explanation of the fact, there is an almost inevita- 
 ble tendency to substitute this interpretation for the 
 account of what has been actually observed. Recent 
 psychological investigation, aided by exact experimental 
 methods, has done much to disentangle the data of
 
 254 FALLACIES OF INDUCTION 
 
 perception from inferences regarding these data. As 
 every one knows who has practised psychological intro- 
 spection, it is only with the utmost difficulty, and after 
 long training, that one can distinguish the actual psy- 
 chological process present to consciousness, from the 
 associative and logical elements which are bound up 
 with them in our ordinary experience. The following 
 passage from Mill deals with this question : 
 
 " The universality of the confusion between perceptions and the 
 inferences drawn from them, and the rarity of the power to discrimi- 
 nate the one from the other, ceases to surprise us when we consider 
 that in the far greater number of instances the actual perceptions of 
 our senses are of no importance or interest to us except as marks 
 from which we infer something beyond them. It is not the colour 
 and superficial extension perceived by the eye that are important to 
 us, but the object of which these visible appearances testify the 
 presence ; and where the sensation itself is indifferent, as it gener- 
 ally is, -we have no motive to attend particularly to it, but acquire a 
 habit of passing it over without distinct consciousness, and going on 
 at once to the inference. So that to know what the sensation ac- 
 tually was is a study in itself, to which painters, for example, have 
 to train themselves by long-continued study and application. In 
 things further removed from the dominion of the outward senses, 
 no one who has not had great experience in psychological analysis 
 is competent to break this intense association ; and when such ana- 
 lytic habits do not exist in the requisite degree, it is hardly possible 
 to mention any of the habitual judgments of mankind, from the 
 being of God and the immortality of the soul down to the multi- 
 plication table, which are not, or have not been, considered as mat- 
 ter of direct intuition." a 
 
 69. Mistakes in Reasoning. The problem of the 
 inductive processes of reasoning is to ascertain what 
 
 * Logic, Bk. V. Ch. IV. 5.
 
 69. MISTAKES IN REASONING 255 
 
 facts are necessarily and essentially connected, and to 
 explain this connection. Now, in order to distinguish 
 between chance conjunctions of phenomena, and real 
 causal connections, careful and extensive observation, 
 aided whenever possible by experiment, must be em- 
 ployed. In short, to establish a real law of connection 
 between phenomena, it is necessary to use one or more 
 of the inductive methods described in Chapters XIV. 
 and XV. But to do this implies, in many cases, long 
 processes of analysis ; the performance of intellectual 
 work, which ordinary minds, at least, have the tendency 
 to shirk whenever possible. It is much easier to allow 
 associations to control our thoughts, and to assume that 
 events which happen together in our experience a num- 
 ber of times are causally connected. We are led to 
 such a conclusion by a natural psychological tendency, 
 without taking any thought about the matter, while 
 logical analysis and discrimination require a distinct 
 conscious effort. 
 
 The general name used to describe fallacies which 
 are due to this particular form of mental sluggishness 
 is post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Two events occur in close 
 conjunction with each other, and it is then assumed 
 without further investigation that they are related to 
 each other as cause and effect. Many popular supersti- 
 tions, are examples of this fallacy. Some project begun 
 on Friday turns out disastrously, and it is inferred that 
 some causal relation existed between the fate of the 
 enterprise, and the day on which it was begun. Or 
 thirteen persons sit down to dinner together, and some 
 one dies before the year is out. It is to be noticed that
 
 256 FALLACIES OF INDUCTION 
 
 such beliefs are supported by the tendency, to which 
 we referred in the last section, to observe only the 
 instances in which the supposed effect follows, and to 
 neglect the negative cases, or cases of failure. ' Fortune 
 favours fools," we exclaim when we hear of any piece 
 of good luck happening to any one not noted for his 
 wisdom. But we fail to take account of the more 
 usual fate of the weak-minded. The belief that the 
 full moon in rising disperses the clouds, which was also 
 quoted earlier, is a good example of post hoc, propter hoc. 
 In fact, all the fallacies treated in this chapter, except 
 those due to language, might quite properly be included 
 under this heading. 
 
 A special case of this fallacy, to which attention may 
 be called separately, arises from hasty generalization, or 
 generalization on an insufficient basis of fact. There 
 is a constant tendency on the part of the mind to seek 
 general conclusions, to express all its knowledge in the 
 form of general statements. But, although it is the 
 aim of science to express the truth regarding the nature 
 of the world in the form of general laws, it is not allow- 
 able to hurry on to such principles without first making 
 our observation of the facts as complete as possible. 
 Thus it is not unusual to hear a traveller declare, on 
 the basis of a very limited experience, that ' the hotels 
 of some city or country are thoroughly bad.' The 
 generalizations which are so frequently made regarding 
 the peculiar characteristics of Americans, or English- 
 men, or Frenchmen are usually of the same sort. Con- 
 clusions regarding the effect of moral and political 
 conditions, too, are often drawn from observations in
 
 70. FALLACIES DUE TO INDIVIDUAL PREPOSSESSIONS 257 
 
 a limited field. Even scientific books are not always 
 free from this error. In a recently published psycho- 
 logical study of the first year of the life of a child, 
 by the mother, it was explained why a baby always 
 sucks its thumb rather than its fingers. The explana- 
 tion was that the thumb, being on the outside and pro- 
 jecting outwards, got oftenest into the baby's mouth, 
 and so the habit was formed. The point is, that the 
 mother assumed what she had observed in her own 
 child to be true universally. Other parents, however, 
 declare that their babies never put the thumb into the 
 mouth, but always the fingers or the whole hand. 
 
 70. Fallacies due to Individual Prepossessions. 
 Bacon named this class of fallacy " The Idols of the 
 Cave." Each individual, as he represents the matter, 
 is shut up in his own cave or den ; that is, he judges 
 of things from his own individual point of view. In 
 the first place, one's inclinations and passions, likes 
 and dislikes, pervert one's judgment. It is exceed- 
 ingly difficult, as we all know, to be fair to a person 
 we dislike, or to refrain from judging too leniently 
 the shortcomings of those to whom we are warmly 
 attached. Again, it is not easy to put oneself in 
 the position of an impartial spectator when one's 
 interests are at stake. " The understanding of men," 
 says Bacon, "resembles not a dry light, but admits 
 some tincture of the passions and will." Further- 
 more, each individual has a certain personal bias as a 
 result of his natural disposition and previous training. 
 Thus it is almost impossible for an individual to free 
 s
 
 258 FALLACIES OF INDUCTION 
 
 himself from national prejudices, or from the standpoint 
 of the political party, or the church in which he was 
 brought up. Or, if a person does give up his old views, 
 he not infrequently is carried to the opposite extreme, 
 and can see no good in what he formerly believed. 
 Even education and the pursuit of special lines of 
 investigation may beget prejudices in favour of particular 
 subjects. When a man has been engaged exclusively for 
 a long time in a particular field, employing a particular 
 set of conceptions, it is almost inevitable that he should 
 look at everything with which he has to do in the same 
 light. The mathematician's view of the world is almost 
 sure to be different from that of the historian, or that 
 of the student of aesthetics. It is very difficult for the 
 physicist to conceive of any natural process except in 
 terms of molecules and vibrations. It is inevitable that 
 each man should be blinded to some extent by his own 
 presuppositions. But to recognize one's limitations in 
 this respect, is to pass, to some extent at least, beyond 
 them. 
 
 Moreover, each age, as well as each individual, may be regarded 
 as governed largely by current presuppositions and prejudices. 
 Throughout the Middle Ages, theological doctrines and opinions 
 controlled almost absolutely the opinions and beliefs of mankind. 
 This influence, doubtless, still .makes itself felt, but people are now 
 pretty generally awake to the dangers from this source. On the 
 other hand, it is more difficult to realize at the present time that 
 it is not impossible for prejudices and prepossessions to grow out 
 of scientific work. The success of modern scientific methods 
 has sometimes led investigators to despise and belittle the work of 
 those who do not carry on their investigations in laboratories, or do 
 not weigh and measure everything. But conceptions and method!
 
 70. FALLACIES DUE TO INDIVIDUAL PREPOSSESSIONS 259 
 
 which prove useful in one science cannot always be employed profit- 
 ably in another. A conception, or mode of regarding things, which 
 has proved serviceable in one field is almost certain to dominate a 
 whole age, and to be used as an almost universal principle of ex- 
 planation. The eighteenth century, for example, was greatly under 
 the influence of mechanical ideas. Newton's discovery made it pos- 
 sible to regard the world as a great machine, the parts of which 
 were all fitted together according to the laws of mechanics. This 
 view led to such a vast extension of knowledge in the realm of 
 physics and astronomy, that the conceptions upon which it is based 
 were applied in every possible field to psychology, to ethics, to 
 political science. The world itself, as well as religious creeds and 
 political and social institutions, were supposed to have been de- 
 liberately made and fashioned by some agent. Again,, in these later 
 years of the nineteenth century we are dominated by the idea of 
 evolution. The biological notion of an organism which grows or 
 develops has been applied in every possible field. We speak, for 
 example, of the world as an organism rather than as a machine, of the 
 state and of society as organic. And the same conception has been 
 found useful in explaining the nature of human intelligence. It is 
 easy for us to realize the limitations and insufficiency of the notion 
 of mechanism as employed by the thinkers of the eighteenth century. 
 But it is not improbable that the twentieth century may be able to 
 see more clearly than we are able to do, the weaknesses and limita- 
 tions of the conception which has proved so fruitful in this genera- 
 tion. 
 
 References 
 
 Bacon, No-vum Organum, Aph. XXXVIII-LXVIII. 
 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. III. Chs. 
 X. and XI. 
 
 J. S. Mill, Logic, Book V. 
 
 A. Bain, Logic, Pt. II. Induction, Bk. VI. 
 
 J. Fowler, Inductive Logic, Ch. VI. 
 
 J. G. Hibben, Inductive Logic, Ch. XVII. 
 
 A. Sidgwick, Fallacies [Int. Scient. Series].
 
 PART III. THE NATURE OF 
 THOUGHT 
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 JUDGMENT AS THE ELEMENTARY PROCESS OF THOUGH! 
 
 71. Thinking the Process by which Knowledge grows 
 or develops. Logic was defined ( i) as the science of 
 thinking, and we have seen that the business of thought 
 is to furnish the mind with truth or knowledge. Under 
 what general conception, now, shall we bring thinking, 
 and what method shall we adopt to aid us in its investi- 
 gation ? It is at once clear that thinking, the conscious 
 process by which knowledge is built up, does not re- 
 semble mechanical processes like pressure, or attraction 
 and repulsion. It is more nearly related to something 
 which has life, like a plant or an animal, and which 
 grows or develops from within, in accordance with the 
 laws of its own nature. Thinking must be regarded 
 rather as a living, than as a dead thing, though it is 
 necessary also to remember that it is conscious as well 
 as living. 
 
 When the thinking process is regarded in this way, 
 moreover, a method of procedure at once suggests itself. 
 In these days we have become familiar with the notion 
 of evolution or development, and the application of this 
 
 260
 
 ;i. THE PROCESS OF THINKING 26 1 
 
 notion has proved of the greatest service to science, and 
 particularly to those sciences which deal with the phe- 
 nomena of life. What is characteristic of this manner of 
 regarding things is the fact that it does not consider the 
 various phenomena with which it deals as fixed, un- 
 changeable things, each with a ready-made nature of its 
 own. But each thing is simply a stage of a process, a 
 step on the way to something else. And the relations 
 of the various phenomena to each other, their connec- 
 tion and unity as parts of the one process, come out 
 more clearly when viewed in this way. In other words, 
 by taking a survey of the genesis and growth of things, 
 we gain a truer idea of their nature and relations than 
 would be possible in any other way. The past history 
 of any phenomenon, the story of how it came to be 
 what it is, is of the greatest possible service in throwing 
 light upon its real nature. Now, one cannot doubt 
 that this conception will also prove serviceable in the 
 study of logic. That is to say, it will assist us in gain- 
 ing a clearer idea of the nature of thinking, to conceive 
 it as a conscious function, or mode of acting, which un- 
 folds or develops in accordance with the general laws of 
 organic evolution. And this process may be supposed 
 to go on both in the individual, as his thought develops 
 and his knowledge expands, and in the race, as shown 
 by its history. By adopting this notion, we may hope 
 to show also that there is no fundamental difference 
 in kind between the various intellectual operations. 
 Judgment and Inference, for example, will appear as 
 stages in the one intellectual process, and the relation 
 between Induction and Deduction will become evident
 
 262 JUDGMENT AS THE ELEMENTARY PROCESS 
 
 72. The Law of Evolution and its Application to Logic. 
 The most striking characteristic of any organism at a 
 low stage of development is its almost complete lack of 
 structure. An amoeba, for example, can scarcely be 
 said to have any structure ; it is composed of protoplasm 
 which is almost homogeneous, or of the same character 
 throughout. When we compare an amoeba, however, 
 with an animal much higher in the scale of life, e.g., 
 a vertebrate, a great difference is at once evident. 
 Instead of the simple, homogeneous protoplasm, the 
 organism is composed of parts which are unlike or hete- 
 rogeneous, such as bones, muscles, tendons, nerves, 
 blood-vessels, etc. In Mr. Spencer's language, there 
 has been a change from a state of homogeneity, to 
 one of heterogeneity. The process of evolution from 
 the lower organism to the higher has brought with 
 it a differentiation of structure. That is, in the amoeba 
 there are no special organs of sight, or hearing, or 
 digestion, but all of these acts seem to be performed 
 by any part of the organism indifferently. In the 
 vertebrate, on the other hand, there is division of 
 labour, and a separate organ for each of these func- 
 tions. One may also notice that the same change is 
 observable when the acts or functions, performed by a 
 lower organism are compared with those of a higher. 
 The life of the amoeba seems to be limited almost en- 
 tirely to assimilation and reproduction ; while, when we 
 advance from the lower animals to the higher, and from 
 the higher animals to man, there is an ever-increas- 
 ing complexity and diversity in the character of 
 the actions performed. We thus see how the process
 
 72. THE LAW OF EVOLUTION 263 
 
 of evolution involves differentiation both of structure 
 and of function, in passing from the homogeneous 
 to the heterogeneous. 
 
 But differentiation, or increase in diversity, is only 
 one side of the process of evolution. As we pass from 
 a lower to a higher stage, the various parts of an or- 
 ganism are seen to become more essential to each other. 
 If certain plants or low animal organisms are divided 
 into several parts, each part will go on living. Its con- 
 nection with the other parts does not seem to have been 
 at all necessary to it. But when we are dealing with 
 higher forms of life, each part is seen to have its own 
 particular function, and to be essential to the other 
 parts, and to the organism as a whole. In other words, 
 the parts now become members, and the whole is not 
 simply an aggregation of parts or pieces, but is consti- 
 tuted by the necessary relation of the members to each 
 other. The more highly evolved the whole with which 
 we are dealing, the more closely connected and essential 
 to each other are the various parts seen to be. It be- 
 comes increasingly true that if one member suffers, all 
 the other members suffer along with it. 
 
 Evolution, then, not only exhibits a constant process 
 of differentiation, and a constant increase in the diver- 
 sity of parts and organs, but there goes along with this 
 what might be called a process of unification, whereby 
 the parts are brought into ever closer and more essen- 
 tial relation to one another. In this way, a real or or- 
 ganic whole, as opposed to a mere aggregate, is formed. 
 This is what Mr. Spencer calls the process of integra- 
 tion ; and it accompanies, as we have seen, what the 
 same writer calls differentiation.
 
 ' 264 JUDGMENT AS THE ELEMENTARY PROCESS 
 
 The application of this general law of evolution to 
 the development of the thinking process is not diffi- 
 cult. We shall expect to find that thinking, in its 
 first beginnings, both in the individual and in the race, 
 will be much less complex than at a higher stage. 
 That is, the earliest or simplest thinking tends to take 
 things in a lump, without making any distinctions. 
 The infant, for example, does not distinguish one 
 person from another, or perhaps does not distinguish 
 even the parts of its own body from surrounding ob- 
 jects. Now, it is clear that intellectual development, 
 growth in knowledge, must in the first place involve 
 differentiation. What is complex must be analyzed or 
 separated into its various parts. Things which are 
 different must be distinguished, and clearly marked 
 off from each other. The development of thought 
 implies then, as one of its moments, discrimina- 
 tion or analysis what we previously called differen- 
 tiation. 
 
 The other moment of the law of evolution, integration, 
 also finds a place in the development of thought, and 
 goes hand in hand with the former. The child and the 
 uneducated man not only often fail to make distinctions 
 where these really exist, but the parts of their know- 
 ledge are fragmentary, and have little or no relation to 
 one another. The various pieces of their knowledge 
 are like the parts of the amoeba they may be in- 
 creased or diminished without themselves undergoing 
 any change. But in order to pass from a lower to a 
 higher intellectual point of view, to become better 
 educated, in a word, it is necessary to see the way in
 
 72. THE LAW OF EVOLUTION 265 
 
 which the various pieces of our knowledge are con- 
 nected and depend upon one another. It is not enough 
 to analyze and keep separate things which are distinct, 
 but it is also necessary to understand how the various 
 parts of our knowledge are so related as to be essential 
 to one another. In other words, we may say that it is 
 characteristic of our intelligence to endeavour to put 
 things together so as to form a whole, or system of 
 interconnected parts. And the more completely it is 
 able to do this (provided that the process of differentia- 
 tion has also made a corresponding advance), the higher 
 is the stage of development which has been attained. 
 The ideal of knowledge, or of complete intellectual 
 development, would be to understand the oneness and 
 relation of everything which exists, even of all those 
 things which seem now to be entirely different in kind. 
 A knowledge of any one fact would then carry with it a 
 knowledge of every other fact. Or, rather, our know- 
 ledge would be so completely unified, that each part 
 would show the nature of the whole or system to 
 which it belongs ; just as a leaf of a plant, or the tooth 
 of an animal, is sufficient to tell the naturalist of the 
 wholes to which they belong. 
 
 This, of course, will always remain an ideal ; but it is 
 in this direction that thinking actually develops. It is 
 a step in advance to discover the reasons for any fact 
 which one previously knew as a mere fact. But, to 
 discover the reasons for a fact, is to bring it into con- 
 nection with other facts, to see them no longer as 
 isolated and independent, but as belonging together 
 to one group or system of facts. And the further
 
 266 JUDGMENT AS THE ELEMENTARY PROCESS 
 
 the process of explanation goes on, the more completely 
 is our knowledge unified and related. 
 
 There is, however, another fact implied in the very 
 nature of evolution, of which logic, as well as the other 
 sciences, may take advantage. We have assumed that 
 the more complete and difficult kinds of thinking have 
 grown or developed from simpler types of the same 
 process, and not from something different in kind. It 
 will therefore follow, that the essential characteristics of 
 the thinking process may be discovered in its simplest 
 and most elementary form. It is found that all the 
 essential functions of the fully developed organism are 
 discharged by the primitive cell. And because it is 
 easier to study what is simple than what is complex, 
 the cell is taken as the starting-point in biology. Simi- 
 larly, there will be an advantage in beginning with the 
 simplest and most elementary forms of thinking. What 
 is found true of these simple types of thought, may be 
 assumed to be essential to the thinking process as such. 
 
 73. Judgment as the Starting-point. What, then, 
 is the simplest form of thinking ? What shall we take 
 as a starting-point, which will correspond to the cell in 
 biology, or the elementary process in psychology ? To 
 answer this question, it is not necessary first to decide 
 where in the scale of animal life that which we are en- 
 titled to call thinking actually begins. We shall not be 
 obliged to discuss the much-debated question, whether 
 or not dogs think. Wherever thinking may be found, 
 it is essentially an activity of the mind. When it is 
 present, that is, there is always work done, something
 
 73- JUDGMENT AS THE STARTING-POINT 267 
 
 interpreted or put together, and a conclusion reached. 
 One may perhaps say that thinking is simply the way 
 in which the mind puts two and two together and sees 
 what the result is. It implies that the mind has waked 
 up to the significance of things, and has interpreted 
 them for itself. Suppose that one were sitting in one's 
 room very much engaged with some study, or wrapt up 
 in an interesting book, and suppose that at the same 
 time the sound of a drum fell upon one's ears. Now, 
 the sound sensations might be present to consciousness 
 without calling forth any reaction on the part of the 
 mind. That is, we might be so intent on our book that 
 we should not wake up, as we have been saying, to the 
 meaning or significance of the drum-taps ; or perhaps 
 not even to the fact that they were drum-taps at all. 
 But if the mind did react upon the sound sensations, 
 it would try to interpret them, or put them together so 
 as to give them a meaning. As a result, some conclu- 
 sion would be reached, as, for example, 'the drum is 
 beating ' ; or sufficient intellectual work may have been 
 done to give as a conclusion, ' that is the Salvation Army 
 marching up the street.' In any case, it is of the great- 
 est importance to notice that the conclusion does not 
 come into our minds from without, but that it is the 
 product of the mind's own activity, as has been de- 
 scribed. It is not true, in other words, that knowledge 
 passes into our minds through the senses ; it is only 
 when the mind wakes up to the meaning of sensations, 
 and is able to put them together and interpret them, 
 that it gains any knowledge. 
 
 Now, the simplest form of such an act of thought is
 
 268 JUDGMENT AS THE ELEMENTARY PROCESS 
 
 called a judgment. Judgment, we may say, is a single 
 intellectual act of the kind we have described ; and its 
 conclusion is expressed by means of a Proposition ; as, 
 for example, 'the grass is green,' 'the band is playing.' 
 In accordance with general usage, however, we may use 
 the term 'Judgment' for both the act itself and its 
 result. And the word ' Proposition ' will then denote 
 the external expression in speech or writing of the 
 product of an act of judgment. 
 
 In our investigation of the nature of thought, then, 
 we must begin with Judgment. There are three things 
 which we shall have to do : (i) to endeavour to discover 
 the fundamental characteristics of this simple type of 
 thinking ; (2) to show the various forms which it as- 
 sumes, or to describe the different kinds of Judgment ; 
 and (3) to trace the process by which Judgment ex- 
 pands into the more complete logical form of Inference. 
 Before any of these questions are considered, however, 
 it is necessary to meet a very serious objection to our 
 whole procedure of beginning with Judgment as the 
 elementary process of thinking. 
 
 74. Concepts and Judgments. In the last section, 
 we endeavoured to show that Judgment is the elemen- 
 tary process of thought, and that with it all knowledge 
 begins. This view, however, may seem to be contra- 
 dicted by the treatment of Judgment usually found in 
 logical text-books. Judgment, it is said, is expressed 
 by a proposition ; and a proposition is made up of three 
 parts, subject, predicate, and copula. Thus in the prop- 
 osition, 'iron is a metal,' 'iron ' is the subject, 'a metal'
 
 74- CONCEPTS AND JUDGMENTS 269 
 
 the predicate, and the two terms are joined or united by 
 means of the copula 'is.' A Judgment is therefore 
 defined as an act of joining together, or, in negative 
 judgments, of separating, two concepts or ideas. If 
 this account be accepted, it follows that the ideas of 
 which the judgment is composed (iron and metal, in 
 the example given above) are pieces of knowledge 
 which precede the judgment itself. And the act by 
 which these logical ideas (or, as they are usually called, 
 concepts) are formed must also be earlier and more 
 fundamental than the act of judging. It is therefore 
 held that logic should begin with concepts, which are 
 the elements out of which judgments are compounded, 
 and that the first logical act consists in the conception 
 or simple apprehension of the ideas or concepts (cf. n). 
 
 It is necessary to examine this position very care- 
 fully. What is maintained is that a process of forming 
 concepts, or logical ideas, presumably quite distinct 
 from the activity of judgment, necessarily precedes the 
 latter. Before it is possible to judge that 'iron is a 
 metal,' for instance, one must have gained, by means of 
 Conception or Apprehension, the ideas denoted by the 
 subject and predicate of this proposition. Judgments, 
 that is, are made or compounded out of something 
 different from themselves. 
 
 It may be well to begin the defence of our own 
 position by noting what_ is undoubtedly true in what 
 has just been stated. In making a judgment like 'iron 
 is a metal,' it is, of course, necessary to have the con- 
 cept 'iron,' and the concept 'metal.' But what is 
 implied in having a concept of anything ? Let us
 
 2/0 JUDGMENT AS THE ELEMENTARY PROCESS 
 
 suppose that a person is making the above-mentioned 
 judgment for the first time that is, really drawing a 
 conclusion for himself, and not merely repeating words. 
 He would begin, we may say, with the concept 'iron.' 
 But if this concept is more than a mere word, if it 
 really means anything, it must have been formed by a 
 number of judgments. The concept 'iron,' if it has 
 any significance for the person using it, means a defi- 
 nite way of judging about some substance that it is 
 hard, malleable, tough, etc. The greater the number 
 of judgments which the concept represents, the more 
 meaning or significance it has; apart from the judg- 
 ment, it is a mere word, and not a thought at all. 
 
 To admit, then, that in judging we always start from 
 some concept, does not imply that there is a different 
 form of intellectual activity prior to judgment, which 
 furnishes the latter with ready-made material for its 
 use. But, as we have seen, in ordinary judgments like 
 the example with which we have been dealing, the new 
 judgment is a further expansion or development of a 
 previous set of judgments which are represented by the 
 concept. The concept, then, stands for the series of 
 judgments which have already been made. Language 
 comes to the aid of thought, and makes it possible to 
 gather up such a set of judgments and represent them 
 by a single expression often by a single word. Every 
 word that is the name of some logical concept repre- 
 sents intellectual work the activity of judgment in 
 its formation. In learning our own language, we 
 inherit the word without doing the work. But it must 
 never be forgotten that the word in itself is not the
 
 74- CONCEPTS AND JUDGMENTS 2/1 
 
 concept. To make the thought our own, to gain the 
 real concept, it is necessary to draw out or realize to 
 ourselves the actual set of judgments for which the 
 word is but the shorthand expression. 
 
 The view which regards the judgment as a compound 
 of two parts subject and predicate rests upon the 
 substitution of words for thoughts. It analyzes the 
 proposition (the verbal or written expression of 
 the judgment), instead of the judgment itself. In 
 the proposition, the parts do exist independently of 
 each other. The subject usually stands first, and is 
 followed by the predicate. But there is no such order 
 of parts in a judgment. When one judges, 'it is rain- 
 ing,' or, 'that is a drum,' the piece of knowledge is one 
 and indivisible. And the act by which this knowledge 
 is gained, is not an external process of joining one part 
 to another, but is an intellectual reaction by which we 
 recognize that something, not previously understood, 
 has a certain meaning or significance. 
 
 Again, it is only when concepts are identified with 
 the words which make up the parts of the proposition, 
 that they can be regarded as ready-made existences, 
 which are quite independent of their connection in a 
 judgment. The terms, 'iron,' and 'metal,' are separable 
 parts of the proposition and exist independently of their 
 connection with it. The conclusion has been therefore 
 drawn that concepts had a like independence of judg- 
 ments, but might enter into the latter and form a part 
 of them without affecting their own nature in any way. 
 But, as we have already seen, the concept has no 
 meaning apart from the series of judgments which it
 
 2/2 JUDGMENT AS THE ELEMENTARY PROCESS 
 
 represents. And, as thinking goes on, as new judg- 
 ments are made, its nature is constantly changing. In 
 short, concepts are not dead things, but living thoughts 
 which are in constant process of development. 
 
 The objection, then, which urges that conception is a 
 logical process, which is prior to judgment, turns out 
 when rightly understood to be no objection at all. For, 
 in the light of what has been already said, it only 
 amounts to this : In making new judgments regarding 
 anything, we must set out from what we already know 
 of it, as represented by the judgments already made. 
 That is, the starting-point for a new judgment is the con- 
 cept or series of judgments which represents the present 
 state of our knowledge. The progress of knowledge 
 is not from the unknown to the known, but from a state 
 of partial and incomplete knowledge to one of greater 
 perfection. Thus the judgment 'gold is malleable' 
 (supposing it to be a real judgment made for the first 
 time), adds to, or develops further, our existing know- 
 ledge of gold, as represented by a series of judgments 
 previously made regarding it. 
 
 It may be urged, however, that not every judgment can grow out 
 of previous judgments in this way. For, if we go back far enough, 
 we must reach some judgment which is absolutely first, and which 
 presupposes no antecedent judgment. This is like the paradox 
 regarding the origin of life. If all judgments are derived from an- 
 tecedent judgments, how was it possible for the first one to arise? 
 It will, perhaps, be sufficient answer to deny the existence of the 
 paradox. Consciousness must be regarded as having from the first 
 the form of a judgment. No matter how far one goes back in the 
 history of consciousness, one will always find, so long as conscious- 
 ness is present at all, some reaction, however feeble, upon the
 
 74- CONCEPTS AND JUDGMENTS 2/3 
 
 content, and something like knowledge resulting. Even the 
 consciousness of the newly born infant, reacts, or vaguely judges, 
 in this way. These primitive judgments are, of course, very weak 
 and confused, but they serve as starting-points in the process of 
 intellectual development. Growth in knowledge is simply the 
 process by means of which these vague and inarticulate judgments 
 are developed and transformed into a completer and more coherent 
 experience. 
 
 References 
 
 W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, pp. 9-16. 
 F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Bk. I. Ch. I. 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I. Ch. I. 1-6. 
 
 H. Lotze, Logic (Eng. trans.), Vol. I., pp. 13-61. 
 
 C. Sigwart, Logic, 40-42. 
 
 L. T. Hobhouse, The Theory of Knowledge, Pt. I. Chs. I. and II.
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGMENT 
 
 75. The Universality of Judgments. We have now 
 to examine the nature of Judgment a little more closely 
 than we have done hitherto. And, in the first place, 
 we note that all judgments claim universality. There 
 are, however, several kinds of universality, and more 
 than one sense in which a judgment may be said to be 
 universal. We speak of a universal judgment (more 
 properly of a universal proposition), when the subject is 
 a general term, or is qualified by some such word as 
 'all,' or 'the whole.' And we distinguish from it the 
 particular judgment, where the subject is only the part 
 of some whole, and is usually preceded by ' some,' or by 
 other partitive words. But here we have no such dis- 
 tinction in mind ; we are speaking of the universality 
 which belongs to the very nature of Judgment as such, 
 and which is shared in by judgments of every kind. 
 
 When we say that judgments are universal, in the 
 sense in which the word is now used, we mean that the 
 conclusions which they reach claim to be true for every 
 one. No matter what the subject and the predicate 
 may be, a judgment, e.g., ' man is mortal,' comes forward 
 as a fact for all minds. We have shown in the last 
 chapter that it is by judging, or putting things together 
 for itself, that the human mind gains knowledge. Now, 
 
 274
 
 75- THE UNIVERSALITY OF JUDGMENTS 2/5 
 
 the assumption upon which this process is based is 
 that the result thus reached knowledge is not some- 
 thing merely individual and momentary in character. 
 When I judge that 'two and two are four,' or that 'iron 
 has magnetic properties,' the judgment is not merely a 
 statement of what is going on in my individual con- 
 sciousness ; but it claims to express something which is 
 true for other persons as well as for me. It professes 
 to deal with facts which are true, and in a sense inde- 
 pendent of any individual mind. The judgments by 
 which such conclusions are reached are universal, then, 
 in the sense of being true for every one and at all times. 
 The word 'objective' has essentially the same meaning. 
 Although each man reaches truth only by actually judg- 
 ing for himself, yet truth is objective, out there beyond 
 his individual or ' subjective ' thought, shared in by all 
 rational beings. The assumption upon which all argu- 
 ment proceeds is that there is such a standard, and that 
 if people can be made to think they will arrive at it. 
 Thought is objective, or, in other words, has in itself 
 its own standard of truth. 
 
 The only alternative to this position is scepticism, or pure in- 
 dividualism. If Judgment is not universal in the sense that it 
 reaches propositions which are true for everybody, it is of course im- 
 possible to find any standard of truth at all. The judgments of any 
 individual in that case would simply have reference to what seems 
 true to him at the moment, but could not be taken to represent any 
 fixed, or permanent truth. Indeed, if one regards Judgment as deal- 
 ing merely with particular processes in an individual mind, the 
 ordinary meanings of truth and falsehood are completely lost, and it 
 becomes necessary to give a new definition of the words. This was 
 the position of the Sophists at the time of Socrates (cf. 5). Each
 
 2/6 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGMENT 
 
 individual man was declared to be the measure of what is true and 
 false, as well as of what is good and bad. There is thus no other 
 standard of truth or value than the momentary judgment (or ca- 
 price) of the individual. This is, in a way, the reductio ad 
 absurdum of scepticism. 
 
 The common nature of truth, as something in which all can 
 share, presupposes, then, a common mode of thinking or judging on 
 the part of all rational beings. And it is this universal type or form 
 of knowing with which logic deals. The question as to whose 
 thought is investigated, or in what individual mind the thought takes 
 place, is in itself of no importance. The consciousness of a savage 
 differs very greatly from that of an educated man ; it is much less 
 complex and less highly developed. But yet, in spite of the enor- 
 mous differences, there exists in both an intelligence, or way of 
 thinking, which shows the same essential character, and operates 
 according to the same fundamental laws. 
 
 76. The Necessity of Judgment. The second char- 
 acteristic which we note as belonging to Judgment is 
 necessity. By this we mean that when a person judges, 
 he is not free to reach this or that conclusion at will. 
 As an intellectual being, he feels bound to judge in a 
 certain way. This is sometimes expressed by saying 
 that we cannot believe what we choose, we must believe 
 what we can. 
 
 In many of the ordinary judgments of everyday life, 
 which are made without any clear consciousness of their 
 grounds, logical necessity is implicitly present as an im- 
 mediate feeling of certainty. In cases of this kind, we 
 simply identify ourselves with the judgment, and feel 
 that it is impossible that it can be false. But, of course, 
 no judgment can claim to be necessary in its own right. 
 Its necessity comes from its connection with other facts
 
 76. THE NECESSITY OF JUDGMENT 
 
 which are known to be true. Or, in logical terms, 
 we may say that it comes from reasons or premises 
 which support it. And one should always be ready 
 to show the grounds or reasons upon which one's 
 feeling of necessity rests. But in ordinary life, as we 
 have seen, it is not unusual to regard a conclusion as 
 necessary, without clearly realizing the nature of the 
 reasons by which it is supported. An uneducated man 
 is rarely able to go back and discover the reasons for 
 his belief in any statement of which he is convinced. 
 If you question his assertion, he feels that you are 
 reflecting upon his veracity, and consequently grows 
 angry. In the feeling of immediate necessity or con- 
 viction, he identifies himself with the judgment, and 
 does not see that the criticism is not directed against 
 the latter, but against the grounds by which it is sup- 
 ported. 
 
 In this distinction between necessity that is merely 
 felt, and the necessity that is conscious of its own 
 grounds, we see the direction in which judgment must 
 develop. In the evolution of thought, we must become 
 conscious of the grounds upon which our judgments 
 are made. That is, the simple judgment, which seems 
 to stand in isolation, must expand so as to unite with 
 itself its reasons. By itself, it is only a fragment of a 
 more complete and widely embracing thought. The 
 feeling of necessity is an evidence of its dependence and 
 connection, though this dependence and connection upon 
 other facts may not be clearly understood. But what 
 is implicit must be made explicit ; the necessity which 
 is merely felt to belong to the simple judgment must
 
 2/8 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGMENT 
 
 be justified, by showing the grounds or reasons upon 
 which it rests. And, for this purpose, the simple judg- 
 ment must expand so as to include the reasons which 
 are necessary to support it. In other words, it must 
 develop into an inference. As a matter of fact, the 
 same form of words as used by different persons, or by 
 the same person at different times, may express either 
 a judgment or an inference. Thus, 'the price of wheat 
 rose after the war began,' might express either a simple 
 historical fact, which is accepted from experience or from 
 hearsay, or it might, in the mouth of a person acquainted 
 with the laws of supply and demand, be the necessary 
 conclusion of a number of premises. Again, a child 
 might read that, ' the travellers found great difficulty in 
 breathing when they reached the top of the mountain,' 
 accepting this as a simple statement of fact. If he were 
 to read this same statement some years later, however, 
 he would probably connect it at once with other facts re- 
 garding the nature of the atmosphere, and the action of 
 gravity, and so perceive at once its inferential necessity. 
 
 According to the view which has just been stated, necessity is not 
 a property which belongs to any judgment in itself, but something 
 which arises through its dependence upon other judgments. In 
 other words, necessity is always mediate, not immediate. This 
 view, however, differs from a theory that was once generally received, 
 and has some adherents, even at the present time, especially among 
 thinkers who belong to the Scottish or 'common-sense 1 school. In 
 dealing with the facts of experience, we always explain one fact by 
 referring it to a second, and that second by showing its dependence 
 upon some third fact, and so on. Thus the movement of the piston- 
 rod in an engine is explained by the pressure of steam, and this is 
 due to the expansive power of heat, and heat is caused by combus-
 
 77- JUDGMENT BOTH ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC 279 
 
 tion of fuel, etc. We are thus pushed back in our explanations from 
 one fact or principle to another, without ever reaching anything 
 that does not require in its turn to be explained. 
 
 Now, it is said that this process cannot go on forever ; for if it 
 did there could be no final or complete knowledge ; the whole 
 system would be left hanging in the air. There must, therefore, 
 it is argued, be some ultimate facts which furnish the support for 
 the world of our experience, some principle or principles which are 
 themselves necessary and do not require any proof. That is, there 
 must be certain propositions which are immediately necessary, and 
 which serve as final explanation for everything else. Now, it is 
 clear that such propositibns must be entirely different in character 
 from the ordinary facts of experience, since their necessity belongs 
 to their own nature, and is not derived from any other source. It 
 had to be supposed, therefore, that they stood upon a different 
 plane, and were not derived from experience. To explain the su- 
 perior kind of certainty which they were assumed to possess, it was 
 supposed that they were present in the mind at birth, or were innate. 
 They have also been called necessary truths, a priori truths, and 
 fundamental first principles, in order to emphasize their supposed 
 distinction from facts which are derived from experience. 
 
 77. Judgment involves both Analysis and Synthesis. 
 The business of our thought is to understand the ways 
 in which the various parts of the real world are related. 
 And a judgment, as we have already seen, is just a 
 single act of thought, one step in the process of 
 understanding the world. Now we ask : How does 
 Judgment accomplish its task? Does it proceed by 
 analysis, showing the parts of which things are com- 
 posed, or does it employ synthesis in order to show 
 how various parts combine in such a way as to form 
 a whole ? Or is it possible for both these processes to 
 be united in one and the same act of judgment?
 
 280 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGMENT 
 
 Suppose that one actually makes the judgment for 
 oneself (and does not merely repeat the words), ' the 
 rose has pinnate leaves.' What has taken place ? We 
 notice, firstly, that a new property of the rose has been 
 brought to light; a distinction, or mark, has been dis- 
 covered in the content 'rose,' which was not seen to 
 belong to it before the judgment was made. So far, 
 then, the process is one of analysis, of discovering the 
 parts or distinctions of something which is at first taken, 
 as it were, in a lump. And this is a most essential ele- 
 ment in all thinking. In order to know, it is absolutely 
 necessary that the differences between the parts of 
 things should be clearly apprehended, that we should 
 not confuse things which are unlike, or fail to make 
 proper distinctions. If we examine a number of in- 
 stances where a real judgment is made, we shall find 
 that this moment of analysis, or discrimination, is always 
 present. Sometimes, indeed, analysis may not seem to 
 be the main purpose of the judgment ; but if one looks 
 closely, one will always find in a judgment that elements 
 which are unlike are held apart or discriminated. 
 
 Let us look again at the same judgment, 'the rose 
 has pinnate leaves.' It is not difficult to see that the 
 discovery of something new in itself is only one part of 
 what the judgment has accomplished. The judgment 
 also affirms the union of this new discovery with the 
 properties of what we call the rose. It is, therefore, 
 from this point of view, an act of synthesis. It asserts 
 that the prickly branches, fragrant flowers, feather-like 
 leaves, and other distinctions, are united in the one 
 content which we call the rose. It does not stop with
 
 77- JUDGMENT BOTH ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC 281 
 
 the mere assertion, 'there is a mark or distinction,' but 
 it affirms that it is a mark of something, i.e., that it is 
 united with other marks or properties to form a con- 
 crete whole. In other words, we may say that every 
 judgment affirms the imity of the different parts, or 
 aspects, of a thing ; and this is, of course, synthesis. 
 From this point of view, then, Judgment can be defined 
 as a process of synthesis, just as we denned it above as 
 one of analysis. 
 
 But how, it may be asked, is it possible for a judg- 
 ment to be both analytic and synthetic ? Are not these 
 processes directly opposed to each other? There can 
 be no doubt that this is the case when we are dealing 
 with material things : pulling things to pieces is the 
 opposite of putting them together. When we are 
 doing the one we cannot also be doing the other. But 
 there is no such opposition between these processes 
 when they go on in our minds. An illustration may 
 make this clear. Suppose that one is trying to under- 
 stand some piece of mechanism, say a watch ; in order 
 to be able to see how it goes, or judge correctly regard- 
 ing it, two things are necessary. First, one must notice 
 all the parts of which it is composed the wheels of 
 various sizes, springs, pins, etc. But, in the second 
 place, one would not understand the watch until one 
 saw how all the parts were united, how one part fits 
 into another, and all combine together into one whole. 
 We do not mean that these are two steps which take 
 place in succession ; as a matter of fact, the detection 
 of the various parts, and the perception of their connec- 
 tion, go hand in hand. In the process of understanding
 
 282 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGMENT 
 
 the watch, we have both taken it to pieces and put it 
 together again at one and the same time. Not really, 
 of course, but in our thought. In the world of material 
 things, as we have said, only one of these processes 
 could go on at a time ; but in every act of thinking, 
 in every judgment, analysis and synthesis go hand in 
 hand, and one has no meaning except with reference to 
 the other. 
 
 Although every judgment contains, as we have 
 seen, the two moments of analysis and synthesis, these 
 are not always equally prominent. The main purpose 
 of the judgment usually falls on one side or the other. 
 In a judgment like, 'water can be divided into hydro- 
 gen and oxygen,' the main emphasis seems to be on 
 the parts, and the assertion that these elements are 
 parts of a whole, though present, is only implied. But 
 when one asserts, ' these springs and wheels together 
 make up a watch,' it is the nature of the whole upon 
 which the emphasis is laid, and the separation or dis- 
 crimination of the parts, is, as it were, secondary. It is 
 not difficult to see, however, that the two moments of 
 Judgment are present in both of these cases. The dif- 
 ference consists in the fact that at one time analysis, 
 and at the other synthesis, is made the main purpose. 
 
 It was at one time supposed that analytic and 
 synthetic judgments were entirely different in kind 
 from each other. An analytic judgment, it was said, 
 is one in which the predicate is obtained by analyzing, 
 or bringing to light, what is contained in the subject. 
 Thus the judgment, 'all material bodies fill space,' is 
 analytic ; for the predicate (space-filling) is contained in
 
 77- JUDGMENT BOTH ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC 283 
 
 the very notion, or idea, of a material body. All that 
 is necessary in order to obtain the judgment is to com- 
 prehend the meaning of the subject. An analytic judg- 
 ment, then, adds nothing to our knowledge. It merely 
 enables us to bring to light and express what is con- 
 tained in the ideas we already possess. A synthetic 
 proposition, on the contrary, was defined as one in which 
 the predicate was not already contained in the subject, 
 but which added a new element or idea to it. ' This body 
 weighs ten pounds,' for example, is a synthetic propo- 
 sition, for one cannot obtain the predicate by analyzing 
 the subject. The predicate adds a new fact which 
 must have been derived from experience. 
 
 This view is of course fundamentally different from the account 
 of Judgment which we have just given. The absolute distinction 
 between analytic and synthetic judgments, like the theory that 
 thought begins with concepts, arises, I think, from a substitu- 
 tion of the spoken or written proposition for the judgment itself. 
 In the proposition the subject seems to be the starting-point. We 
 have a word or term which appears to be independent and capa- 
 ble of standing alone. The question is, then, where shall we find 
 the predicate ? For example, in the proposition, 'iron is an ele- 
 ment,' the subject stands first, and the predicate comes later. It 
 seems possible then to say that we have first the subject ' iron,' and 
 then join on to it the predicate ' element,' which has been obtained 
 either by analyzing the subject, or from some previous experience. 
 But the proposition, as a collection of words, must not be substituted 
 for the act of judgment. Judgment, as we have already seen, is a 
 single act of intelligence, which at once discriminates and brings 
 into relation different aspects of the whole with which it is dealing. 
 A mere subject by itself has not any intelligible meaning. If one 
 hears the word ' iron,' for example, the word may call up certain 
 mental images ; but by itself it is not a complete thought or fact in
 
 284 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGMENT 
 
 which we can rest. ' Well, what of it? ' we say. The mind at once 
 goes on to form some judgment like, 'this is iron, 1 or ' iron is heavy.' 
 We cannot think a term without thinking something of it. In short, 
 although the words which form the subject of a proposition are 
 relatively independent, and can be used without the words which 
 make up the predicate, in a judgment, on the other hand, a subject 
 is only a subject through its relation to a predicate. The propo- 
 sition may be divided into parts, but the judgment is a single 
 thought-activity, and cannot be divided (cf. 74). 
 
 78. Judgment as Constructing a System of Knowledge. 
 In this section we have not to take account of any new 
 characteristic of Judgment, but rather to emphasize 
 the part it plays in building up knowledge. As we 
 have seen, Judgment works both analytically and syn- 
 thetically : it discovers new parts and distinctions, and 
 at the same time brings the parts into relation and thus 
 builds up a whole. That is the law according to which 
 thinking develops, and is just what we called differen- 
 tiation and integration in a previous section ( 72). 
 
 It is necessary here, however, to dwell upon the fact 
 that each judgment may be regarded as a step in the 
 process of building up a system of knowledge. The 
 emphatic word here is ' system,' and we must be per- 
 fectly clear about its meaning. A system is a whole 
 which is composed of various parts. But it is not the 
 same thing as an aggregate or heap. In an aggregate 
 or heap, no essential relation exists between the units 
 of which it is composed. In a heap of grain, or pile of 
 stones, one may take away any part without the other 
 parts being at all affected thereby. But in a system, 
 each part has a fixed and necessary relation to the whole
 
 78. CONSTRUCTING A SYSTEM OF KNOWLEDGE 285 
 
 and to all the other parts. For this reason we may say 
 that a building, or a piece of mechanism, is a system. 
 Each stone in the building, each wheel in the watch, 
 plays a part, and is essential to the whole. In things 
 which are the result of growth, the essential relations in 
 which the parts stand is even more clearly evident. 
 The various parts of a plant or an animal have each their 
 own function, but at the same time they are so neces- 
 sary to each other that an injury to one is an injury to 
 all. We express this relation in the case of living things 
 by saying that the parts are organic to each other. And, 
 in the same way, it is not unusual to speak of society as 
 an organism, in order to express the fact that the vari- 
 ous individuals of which it is composed are not inde- 
 pendent units, but stand in necessary relations to one 
 another, and are all mutually helpful or hurtful. 
 
 We have said that Judgment constructs a system of 
 knowledge. This implies, then, that it is not merely 
 a process of adding one fact to another, as we might 
 add one stone to another to form a heap. No ! Judg- 
 ment combines the new facts with which it deals, with 
 what is already known, in such a way as to give to 
 each its own proper place. Different facts are not 
 only brought together, but they are arranged, related, 
 systematized. No fact is allowed to stand by itself, but 
 has to take its place as a member of a larger system 
 of facts, and receive its value from this connection. Of 
 course, a single judgment is not sufficient to bring a 
 large number of facts into relation in this way. But each 
 judgment contributes something to this end, and brings 
 some new fact into relation to what is already known.
 
 286 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGMENT 
 
 In a simple judgment like, 'that was the twelve o'clock 
 whistle,' the constructive or systematizing work accom- 
 plished is evident. The auditory sensation, which in 
 itself, as a mere wandering sound, was not a piece of 
 knowledge at all, is interpreted in such a way as to find 
 a place in the system of experience. One may appreciate 
 what part the judgment really plays by remembering how 
 the sound appeared before one was able to judge. There 
 may have been at first a moment of bewilderment 
 ' What does this mean ? ' one asks. In the next moment 
 the judgment is made: 'It is the twelve o'clock whistle.' 
 That is, our thinking has constructed a meaning for it, 
 and brought it into relation with the rest of our know- 
 ledge. 
 
 (i) Every new experience is thus brought into relation with the 
 facts which we already know, and is tested by them. It has to find its 
 place in the system of knowledge to join itself to what is already 
 known. If this is impossible, if what claims to be a fact is entirely 
 opposed to what we already know on the same subject, it is usually 
 declared to be false. Thus, we would refuse to believe that some 
 person whom we know well and respect was guilty of theft ; for it 
 would be impossible to connect such conduct with what we already 
 know of his character. And, similarly, we find it impossible to 
 believe, even although we have the evidence of our senses, that the 
 conjurer has actually performed what he professes ; for to do so 
 would often be to reverse entirely our conception of natural laws. It 
 must not be forgotten, however, that the existing system of know- 
 ledge, which seems to serve as the standard and test of new facts, is 
 itself undergoing constant modification through the influence of 
 these facts. As new experiences are brought into connection with 
 the existing body of our knowledge, there is a constant rearrange- 
 ment and readjustment of the latter going on. Usually this adjust- 
 ment is slight, and takes place almost imperceptibly. But, in some
 
 78. CONSTRUCTING A SYSTEM OF KNOWLEDGE 287 
 
 cases, a single fact may be so significant as completely to transform 
 what seemed to be the accumulated knowledge of years. The 
 experiment which Galileo made by dropping balls of different 
 weight from the tower of Pisa, made it impossible to hold any longer 
 the old theory which seemed as certain as anything well could be 
 that the velocity with which bodies fall is proportional to their 
 weight. Again, if theft were actually proved against the man we 
 respect, that single fact might be sufficient to force us to give up 
 everything which we supposed that we knew about his character. 
 
 (2) We have said that judgment is the process by which know- 
 ledge grows into a system. It is by judging or thinking that we 
 attempt to bring the various parts of our experience into relation 
 with one another. The degree to which this has been done is the 
 measure of our intellectual development. The knowledge of the 
 uneducated and unthinking man, like that of the child, is largely 
 composed of unrelated fragments. It is an aggregation, not a 
 system of facts. The facts which go to make it up may quite well 
 be contradictory, but this contradiction is not seen because no 
 attempt is made to unite them. There is, of course, no human 
 experience which is entirely systematic, or which has been com- 
 pletely unified. Even those who have thought most deeply find it 
 impossible to fit together exactly knowledge gained from different 
 fields, and from different sciences. The facts of one science, for 
 example, may seem to stand by themselves, and not to have any 
 relation to the facts derived from another science. Or there may 
 appear to be a conflict between the results of physical sciences, 
 and the truths of moral philosophy and religion. But the ideal 
 always remains that truth is one and indivisible, and that it must 
 be possible ultimately to harmonize all facts in one all-embracing 
 system of judgment. 
 
 References 
 
 B. Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic, Lecture II. 
 " " Logic, Vol. I., pp. 97-103. 
 
 C. Sigwart, Logic, 18.
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 
 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 
 
 79. The Law of Identity. We found ( 73) that 
 Judgment is the simplest form of thinking. And, in 
 the last chapter, we were engaged in studying its main 
 characteristics, and becoming acquainted with its mode 
 of operation. The essential nature of the thinking 
 process, therefore, has already been stated, though we 
 have not traced the mode of its development, nor shown 
 its application to the various problems of experience. In 
 nearly all books dealing with logic, however, one finds a 
 statement of three fundamental laws of thought which 
 differ greatly, in form at least, from what we have so 
 far learned regarding the nature of Judgment. These 
 laws are so well known by name, and yet so ambiguous 
 in their mode of statement, that it seems well to try to 
 decide what meaning to apply to them. It will also be 
 interesting to note their relation to the discussion of 
 Judgment already given. They are usually regarded as 
 axioms, or propositions which require no proof, rather 
 than as descriptive of the nature of thought. In this 
 sense, they are supposed to be the foundation of all 
 logic, since they are presupposed in all thinking. 
 
 The first of these laws, or axiomatic principles, is that 
 of Identity. Whatever is, is ; everything remains iden- 
 tical with itself ; A is A. These are some of the forms 
 in which the law is usually stated. In all argument, we 
 
 288
 
 79- THE LAW OF IDENTITY 289 
 
 assume at least that each thing possesses a permanent 
 character, and does not pass now into this, now into 
 that. If any knowledge is to be possible at all, the 
 character of things must remain fixed. Socrates is 
 always to be Socrates, and iron, iron. Every one as- 
 sumes as much as this, though he may not himself be 
 conscious of it (cf. 9). 
 
 Another interpretation of this principle was, how- 
 ever, offered by Boole and Jevons, who developed what 
 is known as the Equational, or Symbolic logic. Accord- 
 ing .to these writers, the law of Identity expresses 
 the fundamental nature of Judgment. That is to say, 
 every judgment is the expression of an identity between 
 the subject and the predicate. The judgment, 'New 
 York is the largest city in America,' is simply a case of 
 a is a. It expresses the fact, that is, that New York 
 and the largest city in America are identical. ' Iron is 
 a metal,' is another example of the same principle. It 
 may be written : iron = metal. And, since the copula 
 may often be ambiguous, it will be better to discard it 
 in working out arguments, and adopt, in its place, the 
 sign of equality. 
 
 Judgment, then, is simply an equation, and may be 
 written as such. Further, the conclusion of a series of 
 logical premises may be obtained by a process similar 
 to that employed in working algebraical equations. 
 That is, we can substitute for any term in a judgment, 
 its equivalent, or the value which it has in another 
 judgment. This method Jevons calls ' the substitution 
 of similars,' which he maintains is the fundamental 
 principle of all reasoning.
 
 2QO THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 
 
 If, now, we employ letters to symbolize the terms of 
 the propositions, it is claimed that we can work out 
 any argument by the equational method. Take the 
 argument, 
 
 All metals are elements, 
 
 Iron is a metal, 
 
 Therefore iron is an element. 
 
 Now represent metal by M ; iron by I ; and element by 
 E. Then the argument in equational form will be, 
 
 M = E (i) 
 
 I = M (2) 
 
 and by the substitution in (i) of the value of M in (2) 
 we get I = E, the required conclusion. 
 
 Or, we may illustrate this method by a somewhat 
 more complex example which is also taken from Jevons : 
 ' Common salt is sodium chloride, which is a substance 
 that crystallizes in cubical form ; but what crystallizes 
 in cubical form does not possess the power of double 
 refraction.' The conclusion of this argument may be 
 found by letting A = Common Salt, B = Sodium Chlo- 
 ride, C = something which crystallizes in cubical form, 
 and D = something which possesses the power of double 
 refraction. The negative of any of these terms will be 
 expressed by the corresponding small letters. The argu- 
 ment may now be expressed : 
 
 A = B (i) 
 
 B = C (2) 
 
 C = d ....... (3) 
 
 By substitution of the value of C in (2) we get, 
 
 B = d (4) 
 
 And substituting here the value of B in (i), 
 
 A = d
 
 79- THE LAW OF IDENTITY 29 1 
 
 Giving to these symbols their meanings, we get the 
 result ' common salt does not possess the power of 
 double refraction,' which is the conclusion of the argu- 
 ment. 
 
 Of course, in simple arguments like those we have 
 been examining, there is nothing gained by the use 
 of symbols, and the representation of arguments in 
 this form. But when the various terms employed are 
 much longer and more complex, simplification may be 
 attained in this way. Various other symbols have also 
 been used to express the relation of the various terms 
 to each other, and a symbolic logic has been developed 
 which follows very closely the procedure of algebra. 
 The examples given may, however, serve as illustrations 
 of this method. 1 
 
 It is, however, as a theory of the meaning of Judg- 
 ment that we are interested in this mode of interpreting 
 the law of Identity. We have seen that it works fairly 
 well in practice, and therefore cannot be wholly false. 
 But there are certain forms of reasoning in which it will 
 not work. We cannot get the conclusion by the equa 
 tional method in an example like the following : ' B is 
 greater than A, C is greater than B, therefore C is still 
 greater than A.' 
 
 This practical objection being left out of account, we 
 have to ask whether an equation represents fairly the 
 nature of Judgment. Does a judgment express merely 
 
 1 The clearest statement of the aims and methods of the Equational 
 Logic may perhaps be obtained from Jevons, The Principles of Science, 
 Introduction. Cf. also G. Boole, An Investigation of the Laws of 7 hought. 
 London, 1854.
 
 292 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 
 
 the identity of subject and predicate ? And if so, what 
 kind of identity is referred to ? In mathematical rea- 
 soning, the sign of equality expresses the identity of 
 quantitative units. When one says, 2 + 3 = 5, the 
 meaning is that the number of units on each side of 
 the equation is identical. And, similarly, the assertion 
 that a parallelogram = 2 triangles with the same base 
 and of the same altitude as itself, expresses the fact that, 
 in the two cases, the number of units of area, square 
 feet, square yards, etc. is the same. In mathematics, the 
 equation declares that the quantitative relations of its 
 two sides are identical. It does not assert that the two 
 things compared the triangle and one half the par- 
 allelogram, for example have the same qualities, or 
 are exactly the same in all respects. Now, if we ex- 
 tend the use of the sign of equality, it must take on 
 a new meaning. It is clear that in a judgment like 
 'iron = metal,' there is no reference at all to quantita- 
 tive relations. We are not asserting that the number 
 of units in the two terms is identical. What, then, does 
 the sign of equality express in such a case? 
 
 The answer is not difficult, say those who hold this 
 theory. The sign of equality in such cases expresses 
 absolute identity ; the entire and complete sameness of 
 subject and predicate. The proposition, ' mammals = 
 vertebrates/ asserts that mammals and vertebrates are 
 one and the same thing. But that statement in its 
 present form is not true : the class mammal does not 
 completely correspond with the class vertebrate. To 
 make it exact, say those who uphold the equational 
 form, one must qualify or limit the predicate and write
 
 79- THE LAW OF IDENTITY 293 
 
 the proposition, ' mammals = some vertebrates.' But, 
 even so, we may urge, the form of the judgment is still 
 defective. In the first place, it does not correspond to 
 the model a = a. For one side, ' mammal,' is clearly 
 marked off, while the other is indefinite and vague. 
 And, secondly, just because of its vagueness, it is not 
 a satisfactory piece of knowledge. To obviate these 
 objections, one must go further and write, mammals = 
 mammalian vertebrates. At last the judgment seems 
 to correspond to the type, a = a. But a new difficulty 
 arises. Has not the judgment lost all its original mean- 
 ing and become a mere tautology ? There seems to be 
 no escape from the following dilemma : either there is 
 some difference between subject and predicate, and the 
 judgment is therefore not in the form a = a, or the judg- 
 ment is tautologous and expresses nothing. The view 
 of the equational logic that Judgment affirms the entire 
 identity of subject and predicate refutes itself. The 
 form a = a cannot be regarded as the type to which all 
 judgments conform. 
 
 But there must be some kind of identity between the 
 parts of a judgment. In one sense, we do seem to 
 declare that the subject and predicate are identical 
 when we say, 'iron is a metal.' As we have seen, how- 
 ever, if these terms are merely identical and nothing 
 more, the judgment loses all meaning. We are forced 
 to the conclusion that every judgment affirms both 
 identity and difference, or that there is identity running 
 through and underlying the diversity. But is not this 
 a paradoxical statement ? When we affirm identity, 
 does not this imply the absence of all difference? If
 
 294 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 
 
 a is a, how can it at the same time be something differ- 
 ent from itself ? 
 
 And yet this is just what every judgment which has 
 any meaning affirms. 'Iron is fusible.' 'This table is 
 made of oak.' 'The sword is rusty with age.' In all 
 these judgments there is an assertion of the unity of 
 different properties or parts in one whole. A is B, and 
 yet does not cease to be A, is rather the type of judg- 
 ment than a is merely or abstractly a. It is worth 
 noticing that this view of the matter corresponds with 
 the account of Judgment already given. We saw 
 that Judgment constructs a system of knowledge by 
 showing that various things, which seem at first unre- 
 lated, are yet connected by an underlying unity. Know- 
 ledge is always the synthesis or union of different parts 
 or different properties in a common identity. And 
 each judgment, as an element of knowledge, displays 
 the same essential structure which belongs to knowledge 
 as a whole. It involves, as was shown in ( 77), both 
 analysis and synthesis, and declares the oneness or 
 identity of a number of properties or parts, without at 
 the same time losing sight of their distinctness. 
 
 Let us now sum up our discussion of the law of Iden- 
 tity. When rightly understood, as we have seen, it does 
 not affirm that a can only be bare a, that the subject 
 and predicate are absolutely identical. It is a law of 
 thought, and expresses the fact that Judgment brings 
 together differences ; i.e., different things and qualities, 
 and shows that they are parts of one whole or unity. 
 It reveals the underlying unity or identity which is 
 present in the midst of variety. This law also states
 
 8o. THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION 295 
 
 another characteristic of Judgment which we have 
 already emphasized. This is what we have called the 
 universality of Judgment ( 75). It is to judgments, and 
 not to concepts or terms, as has sometimes been sup- 
 posed, that the law of Identity properly applies. What 
 it affirms in this connection is simply that Judgment 
 claims to be true, and hence is identical at all times 
 and for all persons. It cannot be true for you and 
 false for me that, 'iron is a metal.' Truth is not a 
 matter of individual taste, but every judgment which 
 is true has a permanent character or identity belonging 
 to it. 
 
 80. The Law of Contradiction. The law of Contra- 
 diction is the second of the so-called laws of thought. 
 It is usually stated as follows : It is impossible for the 
 same thing both to be a, and not to be a ; or, a is not 
 not-a. It is evident that this law states in a negative 
 form the same characteristics of thought as the law of 
 identity. Indeed, it was in this form that the principle 
 was first laid down by Aristotle. " It is impossible," 
 he says, "that the same predicate can both belong and 
 not belong to the same subject at the same time, and 
 in the same sense." l We cannot assert in the same 
 sense that Socrates is both wise, and not wise. Truth 
 is not, as the Sophists supposed, a matter of taste or 
 convenience, but must be consistent with itself. If a 
 judgment affirms that 'iron is a metal,' it at the same 
 
 1 Metaphysics, Bk. III. Ch. IV. See also the remaining chapters of 
 the same book for Aristotle's demonstration that all thought presupposes 
 such a principle.
 
 296 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 
 
 time excludes the assertion that it is not a metal. 
 There is a fixity and permanence about judgments 
 which prevents them from changing into anything else. 
 And it is just this permanence which we have already 
 called the universality of Judgment, which the law of 
 Contradiction expresses in a negative form. 
 
 The law of Contradiction has, however, sometimes 
 been interpreted in such a way as to make it equivalent 
 to the assertion of abstract or bare identity which we 
 found in the Equational logic. That is, the statement 
 that it is impossible for any judgment to unite a and 
 not-a may be taken to mean that it is impossible to 
 assert the unity of a and anything different from a. 
 But, as we have seen, this is exactly what we do in 
 every judgment which is more than a tautology. The 
 law, then, does not forbid the union of differences in 
 one judgment, but of contradictories, or of what would 
 destroy the integrity of the judgment and render it 
 unmeaning. If the law is to hold true of Judgment, 
 not-a must not be taken as equivalent to anything which 
 is different from a, but as signifying what is opposed, or 
 contradictory to a. 
 
 It is not by any means easy to decide what things are merely 
 different, and therefore compatible with each other, and what con- 
 tradictory or opposed. Logic can give no rule which may be applied 
 in every case. If experience shows that two things, or two proper- 
 ties, are at any time united, we say that they are merely different 
 from each other ; if they have never been found in conjunction and 
 we are not able to conceive how their union could take place, we 
 call them opposites or contradictories. It io worth noticing, too, 
 that no terms are in themselves contradictory, except those which 
 are in the form a and not-a, wise and not-wise. But they become
 
 8i. THE LAW OF EXCLUDED MIDDLE 297 
 
 contradictory and exclude each other when they claim to occupy 
 the same place in some particular system of facts. Thus ' maple ' 
 and ' oak ' denote trees of a different variety, which are, however, so 
 little opposed that they may exist side by side. If both these terms 
 were applied to the same tree, however, they would become con- 
 tradictory. By claiming to stand in the same relations, these 
 terms become rivals, as it were, and exclude each other. But a 
 knowledge of the particular facts involved is always necessary 
 in order to determine whether or not two assertions are really 
 incompatible. 
 
 8 1. The Law of Excluded Middle. The third law is 
 a corollary from what has just been said in the last sec- 
 tion. There is no middle ground, it declares, between 
 contradictories. A is either b or not-b. To affirm the 
 one is to deny the other. When we have real contra- 
 dictories, i.e., when not-b is not merely something 
 different from b, but something which excludes it, 
 every judgment is double-edged, and both affirms and 
 denies at the same time. To deny that the throw of a 
 penny has given heads, is to assert that it has fallen 
 tails. As we have seen, however, logic affords no rules 
 of deciding when things do thus stand in the relation 
 of mutual opposition. The law of Excluded Middle 
 states only that where this relation does exist, every 
 proposition has a double value, and both affirms and 
 denies at the same time. It requires special know- 
 ledge of the particular facts in each case to enable 
 us to decide what things are thus opposed to one 
 another. There is no logical law by means of which 
 things may be divided into two opposing groups or 
 classes.
 
 298 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 
 
 It is important to notice that all of the judgments 
 which we use in everyday life are to some extent double- 
 edged. That is, they contain, besides what is directly 
 affirmed, some implication or counter statement. For 
 example, to say, 'that object is red,' is implicitly to deny 
 that it is blue, or any other colour. The statement, 'A 
 never looks at a book,' carries with it the implication 
 that A is not very intelligent. In almost any field 
 where we have any systematic knowledge, we can limit 
 pretty definitely the number of possibilities a must 
 be either b, or c, or d. In such cases, to affirm that a is 
 b, is of course to deny implicitly c and d ; and con- 
 versely, the denial of any one possibility, as c, enables 
 one to assert that a is b or d. In ordinary conversa- 
 tion, misunderstandings and misconceptions frequently 
 arise because neither party is fully aware of all the pos- 
 sible cases and the relation between them. It is very 
 difficult, however, to make a statement which will have 
 no counter implications. If one says, 'this railway sys- 
 tem does not employ steam power,' the proposition 
 seems to justify the question: 'Does it then use elec- 
 tricity or compressed air ? ' We should feel that it was 
 a mere quibble if the person who made the statement 
 should reply: 'I did not say that it employed any kind 
 of power.' 'There are some small errors in this paper,' 
 would ordinarily be taken to imply the counter propo- 
 sition, 'the paper contains no serious errors.' It is 
 clear that it is only when one's knowledge becomes 
 systematic, i.e., when one knows the relations in 
 which all the facts in the field under consideration 
 stand to each other, that one can be fully aware
 
 8i. THE LAW OF EXCLUDED MIDDLE 299 
 
 ^f what is really implied in each assertion or denial 
 irf. 41, 78). ' 
 
 References 
 
 F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, pp. 131-154, 343-360. 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol, II., pp. 207-212. 
 
 W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, Ch. XIV. 
 " " " The Principles of Science, Introduction. 
 
 G. T. Ladd, The Philosophy of Knowledge, Ch. IX. 
 
 C. Sigwart, Logic, 23-25. 
 
 J. Watson, " The Metaphysic of Aristotle," Philos, Review, Vol 
 VII., pp. 113-134-
 
 CHAPTER XXIII . 
 
 TYPES OF JUDGMENT 
 
 82. Judgments of Quality. We have hitherto been 
 considering the nature of Judgment in general, and 
 have learned something regarding its main character- 
 istics. It is now necessary to examine briefly some of 
 the more important forms or types of Judgment. We 
 shall begin with very simple and elementary ways of 
 judging, and afterwards consider some of the more 
 complex types. In this way, we shall see the nature 
 and structure of Judgment illustrated at different levels 
 of thought. And we also hope to show that there are 
 no arbitrary divisions in the process of thinking, that 
 the lower forms of Judgment gradually develop into the 
 higher in accordance with the general law of evolution. 
 It is, of course, impossible to carry out at present this 
 plan in detail, for that would be to give a complete his- 
 tory of the development of thought. It will be neces- 
 sary for us to take long steps, and content ourselves 
 with a general view of the relation of the various stages 
 in the development of Judgment. 
 
 The first efforts of intelligence to understand the 
 world take the form of judgments of Quality. At a low 
 stage of mental development, it is the simple qualities 
 of things which force themselves on attention. The 
 young child, for example, takes notice of only the 
 
 300
 
 82. JUDGMENTS OF QUALITY 301 
 
 most striking qualities of things. His judgments are 
 very vague and indefinite, and take account only of 
 some prominent quality of things. That is, there is no 
 discrimination of the various parts and relations of the 
 objects, but the judgments express merely a general 
 impression based upon some striking quality. Thus it 
 has often been noticed that the child calls every man 
 'papa,' and any light, of whatever size, the moon. A 
 little boy, known to the author, used to call Sisters 
 of Charity, crows, on account of the colour of their 
 dresses. The objects as he apprehended them were 
 simply black, and nothing more. His intelligence 
 rested in the qualitative total impression ; the vari- 
 ous parts, with their quantitative relations, which he 
 afterwards learned to know and distinguish, did not 
 at that time exist for him. 
 
 It is perhaps impossible to find in the experience of 
 an adult any judgments which deal entirely with simple 
 qualities, and which take no account of the numbers, and 
 even to some extent of the relations, of the parts. But 
 we can find examples of judgment where the qualitative 
 aspect is much the most prominent where indeed the 
 quantitative and more complex relations are scarcely 
 noticed at all. ' This is green,' ' that is a strange odour,' 
 'there is something a long way off.' all these seem to 
 be judgments of quality or general impression, and to 
 involve scarcely any other element. It is, too, the 
 easiest kind of judgment to make, the judgment which 
 involves least mental effort, and which notices only 
 the most evident, and, as it may be seen, the most 
 superficial, aspect of things. It is evident that such
 
 302 TYPES OF JUDGMENT 
 
 judgments belong to a lower stage of thinking, than 
 those which imply analysis and perception of quantita- 
 tive relations. Compare, for example, 'this is very 
 large/ with, 'this object is made up of roots, trunk, 
 branches, and leaves ' ; or 'this is green,' with, 'this leaf 
 is divided into two parts by a rib running through the 
 centre.' The first judgment in each pair obviously 
 involves much less intellectual work than the latter. 
 The judgment of simple quality is, as we have seen, the 
 starting-point of thought. It is with this kind of 
 thinking that the knowledge of the child begins. And, 
 before the savage learns to count, i.e., to distinguish 
 and enumerate the parts of the objects with which he 
 deals, his judgments must necessarily belong to this 
 same type. 
 
 It must never be forgotten, however, that simple 
 judgments of quality are really judgments; i.e., are not 
 given to the mind from any external source, but are the 
 products of its own activity. A judgment, as we have 
 already pointed out ( 73), implies a reaction on the 
 part of the mind on what is presented to consciousness 
 through the senses. It distinguishes and puts together 
 the material which sense presents in such a way as to 
 perceive its significance what it really amounts to 
 as a piece of knowledge. This act of interpretative 
 intelligence has gone, however, but a little way in the 
 type of judgment with which we are dealing. But even 
 in a vague qualitative judgment like, 'there is something 
 black,' the essential characteristics of Judgment can be 
 already distinguished. For it presupposes at least some 
 analysis or discrimination of the black object from the
 
 8a. JUDGMENTS OF QUALITY 303 
 
 rest of the environment, and of the black colour from 
 other colours. And the judgment, 'something is black,' 
 has made at the same time a beginning in constructing 
 this vague something into a system of qualities, or into a 
 thing that is known. The other qualities and relations 
 are as yet wrapped up in the indefiniteness of the 'some- 
 thing.' In spite of its indefiniteness, however, the latter 
 plays the part of a permanent centre or identity. It is 
 the whole from which the quality of blackness has been 
 separated out, and to which it is again attached. 
 
 Our thought, however, is not satisfied with a know- 
 ledge of the general qualities of things, but pushes 
 farther its work of analysis and construction. In this 
 way, it begins to distinguish the various parts of objects, 
 and to compare one with another. We not only judge 
 that ' the grass is green,' but go further and say ' this 
 piece is dark green, and that light green.' The indefinite 
 judgment, 'this cane is heavy,' is no longer satisfactory, 
 and is replaced by, 'this end of the cane is much 
 heavier than that.' And when this stage is reached, 
 judgments of Quality are already passing into the next 
 higher type, judgments of Quantity. For the moment 
 of comparison, which is already contained in these 
 judgments, is the basis of counting, measuring, and all 
 quantitative determination. In advancing from the 
 simple apprehension of quality, to take note of, and 
 compare, the degree or intensity which the same quality 
 manifests in different instances, intelligence has entered 
 upon a path which leads directly to judgments of 
 quantity. To distinguish parts, to regard things as 
 degrees or instances of a common quality, is at once
 
 304 TYPES OF JUDGMENT 
 
 to suggest the quantitative process of counting and 
 measurement. 
 
 83. Judgments of Quantity. It is very difficult, as 
 we have seen, to draw a hard and fast line between 
 quality and quantity. Indefinite judgments of general 
 impression which do not imply any comparison, seem 
 always to be qualitative rather than quantitative in 
 character. This is true, I think, of judgments like, 
 'this object is very large,' 'there was a great flock of 
 sheep in the field.' In such cases, the interest does not 
 seem to be quantitative at all ; i.e., there is no effort 
 made to determine how many units or parts there are in 
 the whole about which the judgment is made. But the 
 general impression of size or number is apprehended 
 and judged of at the same level of intelligence, and in 
 the same vague way, as the simple qualities with which 
 we dealt in the last section. It is by means of such 
 a general qualitative impression that the savage who 
 cannot count beyond five, is able to distinguish between 
 six and some larger number. And we must suppose 
 that the shepherd's dog does not learn that some of the 
 sheep are missing by any process of counting. We 
 must suppose that the general qualitative impression 
 made by the smaller flock is different from that made by 
 the larger, and that there has been no real counting or 
 estimation of number in the case. 
 
 But quantitative judgments proper belong to a higher 
 stage of intelligence than do those which have just 
 been described. Indefinite judgments, like 'this is very 
 large,' or, ' there are a great many stars in that group/
 
 83. JUDGMENTS OF QUANTITY 305 
 
 are not satisfactory pieces of knowledge. We accord- 
 ingly set ourselves to get more exact information about 
 the parts which compose the wholes. The first step 
 in this process leads to Judgments of Enumeration. If 
 the whole which is analyzed is composed of homogene- 
 ous parts, the judgments of enumeration take the form 
 of simple counting. 'There are one, two, three, . . . 
 twenty men in this company.' Where the parts are 
 not of the same kind, however, a separate name may 
 have to be given to each. ' This plant is composed of 
 root, stalk, leaves, and flower.' 
 
 But exact quantitative knowledge requires us to do 
 more than enumerate the parts of which a whole is 
 composed. We must go on and weigh or measure 
 them. There is of course no essential difference be- 
 tween weighing and measuring, so that we may call 
 all judgments which express the result of this process 
 Judgments of Measure. It is worth noting that judg- 
 ments of this class are not so simple and direct as may 
 appear at first sight. When we measure, we express 
 the relation of the parts with which we are dealing to 
 some common unit or standard. The judgment, 'this 
 tower is 200 feet high,' means that if the tower is com- 
 pared with a foot-rule, it will be found to contain it 
 200 times. It really, then, involves a proportion, and 
 might be expressed :- tower : foot-rule = 200 : i. 
 
 The point which it is important to notice is that all 
 measurement is the result of comparison. In the first 
 place, some unit is more or less arbitrarily selected. 
 Then the judgment states simply the relation between 
 this unit and the object measured : one is contained in 
 x
 
 306 TYPES OF JUDGMENT 
 
 the other once, or twice, or ten times. The quantita- 
 tive determination thus obtained, then, is merely rela- 
 tive. That is, it does not belong absolutely, and in its 
 own right to the object measured, but indicates the 
 relation of that object to something else. 
 
 For this reason, it may seem that quantitative rela- 
 tions tell us nothing regarding the real nature of 
 objects, and that to discover what the latter are in 
 themselves, we shall have to return to the point of view 
 of quality. But we have seen that simple judgments of 
 quality yield a very unsatisfactory kind of knowledge. 
 Moreover, we should find on examination that even 
 qualities always imply a reference to each other, and 
 are no more absolute than quantities. 
 
 In order to obtain more satisfactory knowledge re- 
 garding things, we shall have to go forward to a higher 
 type of judgment, rather than backward to quality. 
 But the importance of quantitative determination for 
 exact knowledge must not be overlooked. By means 
 of measurement, things are reduced to common terms, 
 as it were, and thus a basis of comparison is afforded 
 where it would otherwise be impossible. To reduce 
 everything to such a common measure is the business 
 of the physico-mathematical sciences. Everything has 
 a quantitative value, and can be expressed mathemati- 
 cally in terms of some unit or standard, as, for exam- 
 ple, the unit of heat, or of pressure, or the electrical 
 unit. It was this tendency to count and measure and 
 weigh things which established the body of exact know- 
 ledge which we call science. And in almost every field, 
 .knowledge increases greatly, both in extent and exact-
 
 84. JUDGMENTS OF CAUSAL CONNECTION 307 
 
 ness, as soon as it is found possible to reduce all phe- 
 nomena to a common measure, and to express their 
 relations by means of mathematical formulas. 
 
 It is a great step in advance to be able to compare things as 
 quantities, and to express their relations in terms of number. But 
 judgments of quantity are not entirely satisfactory ; they are, as has 
 already been noticed, merely relative in character. Moreover, from 
 a quantitative point of view, each thing is equivalent to the sum of 
 its parts. When the parts have been enumerated and measured, 
 the value of the whole is obtained by addition. But it is scarcely 
 ever possible to represent adequately the nature of a whole in this 
 way. So long as we are dealing with a piece of inorganic matter, 
 the method of regarding the sum of the parts as equivalent to the 
 thing, generally gives good results and leads to no difficulty. But it 
 is quite different when the whole in question belongs to something 
 which has life and consciousness. In such cases, we have what has 
 already been called an organic whole ( 78). Now, it is clear that 
 the principle of quantity, which can only add and subtract, is in- 
 sufficient to represent completely the nature of an object of this kind. 
 It has no means of representing the individuality or real whole, 
 which rather constitutes the parts, than is constituted by them. 
 That is, to understand such objects, we shall have to take a new 
 point of view, and begin with the whole rather than with the parts. 
 From the point of view of quantity, the nature of the whole is dis- 
 covered by adding together the parts ; while in order to understand 
 objects which possess an individuality of their own, there seems to 
 be a central principle to which the parts are subordinated, and in 
 relation to which alone they can be understood. The type of judg- 
 ments which deal with such objects we shall have to discuss in 
 85. 
 
 84. Judgments of Causal Connection. Another class 
 of judgments used in building up knowledge, may be 
 called judgments of Causal Connection. They under- 
 take to show how the various changes which go on in
 
 308 TYPES OF JUDGMENT 
 
 things are connected causally with other things or 
 events. This type of judgment leading as it does 
 beyond the particular object, to a knowledge of the ways 
 in which objects are connected seems to belong to-a 
 higher stage of mental development than those which 
 merely take note of quality and quantity. This does 
 not mean that we never look for causes, until the quali- 
 ties and quantities of things have been discovered. Nor 
 is it true that any causal judgment, however vague and 
 unsatisfactory, is higher than any judgment of quality 
 or quantity whatsoever. But, in the beginnings of know- 
 ledge, one may say, thought does not travel outside the 
 particular object to show the connections of the latter 
 with anything else. And beginning in this way, it 
 seizes first upon quality and quantity which seem to be- 
 long to things in themselves. We have seen, however, 
 that as a matter of fact judgments of quantity involve 
 comparison, and so a reference of one thing to another, 
 though that reference is not usually made consciously 
 or explicitly. But, when we judge that one thing is 
 causally connected with another, the external reference 
 has become explicit, and is the very essence of the judg- 
 ment. 
 
 The word ' cause ' has been used in a great many 
 senses, and its various meanings have given rise to a 
 great deal of discussion. That every event must have 
 a cause, was formerly regarded as an innate truth, or a 
 priori proposition. We have seen, however, that we do 
 not come into the world with any ready-made stock of 
 knowledge. All knowledge, we have often repeated, is 
 the result of the mind's own judging activity. The so-
 
 84. JUDGMENTS OF CAUSAL CONNECTION 309 
 
 called law of causation (every event must have a cause) 
 must therefore express the fact that thought does con- 
 nect things as causes and effects. Intelligence is not 
 satisfied to take things in isolation ; it tries to gain an 
 insight into the ways in which they are connected, to 
 discover what one has to do with another. And this is 
 just the characteristic of thought which was emphasized 
 in 78. Judgment, it was there said, is a process of 
 constructing a system, of showing how the various parts 
 of knowledge fit into one another, and are mutually de- 
 pendent upon one another. The tendency of thought 
 to connect things causally, then, is the same as its ten- 
 dency towards a system, which has now become more 
 explicit and conscious of itself in this type of judgment 
 than it was in quality and quantity. 
 
 It will be interesting to note some of the most impor- 
 tant changes which take place in the principle of causal 
 explanation at different stages in the development of 
 knowledge. The child and the savage regard all 
 changes and events which take place in the natural 
 world, as due to the agency of living beings. These 
 beings are represented as more or less similar to men, 
 and as endowed with human passions and emotions. 
 Thus we say that the earliest kind of explanation is es- 
 sentially anthropomorphic. This word is derived from 
 avdptoTTos, a man, and pop^ij, shape or form, and hence 
 is used to describe the way of representing either a 
 spiritual being, as for example, the Deity, or natural 
 forces like fire, wind, etc., in human form. It is proba- 
 bly true that at a very early stage in the development 
 of both the individual and the race, every object is
 
 3IO TYPES OF JUDGMENT 
 
 supposed to have life. Or, perhaps, it would be truer to 
 say that the young child (and the same would be true 
 for the savage on a low plane of intelligence) has not 
 yet made the distinction between animate and inani- 
 mate objects, but vaguely regards everything as like 
 himself. This stage is usually known as animism, 
 because each object is supposed to be endowed with 
 a spirit, or anima. 
 
 Gradually, however, the distinction between animate 
 and inanimate objects becomes clear. Accordingly, 
 we find that at a somewhat more advanced stage the 
 mode of explanation takes a different form, though 
 it is still anthropomorphic. Physical objects are no 
 longer regarded as living, but the changes in them 
 are supposed to be due to the action of spirits, who 
 are outside of the objects, but who use them to ac- 
 complish their purposes. These invisible spiritual 
 agents, to whom all natural events are referred, have 
 been variously named. It is clear, however, that the 
 gods of mythology belong here, as well as the fairies, 
 elfs, ghosts, and witches of the popular folk stories. 
 It was a great advance when a Greek thinker, named 
 Thales, came to the conclusion that it does not in 
 any way explain natural events to refer them to the 
 action of the gods. For, in the first place, to say that 
 the gods cause this or that event, is to state some- 
 thing which we have no means of proving. And even 
 if the assertion were true, it would not really explain 
 anything. For it would not enable us to understand 
 how the changes in question came about. It would 
 tell nothing whatever regarding the actual steps in the
 
 84. JUDGMENTS OF CAUSAL CONNECTION 3 1 1 
 
 process itself. Thales saw this, and tried to give a 
 natural explanation of the world, and all that goes on 
 in it. He tried to build up a real system of know- 
 ledge by attempting to show how everything which has 
 happened in the world has been connected with some 
 natural cause. We know very little about the actual 
 explanation of the world which Thales gave, except that 
 he tried to derive everything from water. It is on ac- 
 count of the method which he adopted, rather than of 
 what he actually performed, that he is regarded as the 
 founder of science. Thales first showed, one may say, 
 that knowledge means an insight into the ways in which 
 the actual phenomena of the world are connected. We 
 cannot unite into a system things so different in kind 
 as spirits and natural phenomena. Or we may say that 
 real explanation demands that there shall be some like- 
 ness, or ground of similarity, between the cause and the 
 effect. An event which happens in the world of objects, 
 must be explained by showing its connection with some 
 other event, of a similar character, which precedes it. 
 
 The development of this conception of scientific ex- 
 planation also influenced still further the notion of 
 causality. We have seen that in the beginnings of 
 knowledge every event was supposed to be due to the 
 action of some living agent, or spiritual being. Even 
 after this mythological mode of explanation is dis- 
 carded, and natural causes put in the place of spirits, 
 it is still difficult to rid oneself entirely of the old an- 
 thropomorphism. The popular mind still tends to 
 regard the cause as an agent which produces the effect, 
 through some power or efficiency which it possesses. It
 
 312 TYPES OF JUDGMENT 
 
 is not necessary to raise the question at present whetbef 
 there are any grounds for this belief. To discuss this 
 problem would carry us beyond logic into metaphysics. 
 What we wish to notice is that science has gradually 
 abandoned the notion that the cause does something to 
 the effect. That, as we have seen, is a remnant of the 
 old prescientific idea, and a notion which does not aid 
 at all in explaining our knowledge. It is the business 
 of science to show how the things and events which 
 make up our experience are necessarily connected with 
 one another. Science has to discover what things in- 
 variably go along with one another, and necessarily pre- 
 suppose one another. And, when it is found that some 
 particular thing or event, A, invariably precedes another 
 particular occurrence, B, the former is regarded as the 
 cause, and the latter as the effect. In order to elimi- 
 nate as far as possible the notion of agency or effi- 
 ciency which attaches to the word cause, the terms 
 'antecedent' and 'consequent' are often used to in- 
 dicate this relation. For science, the cause is not an 
 active agent, but the invariable antecedent of something 
 else which simply follows it. The cause does not explain 
 the effect by assigning an agent which brings the latter 
 about through its personal efforts ; but it explains, 
 because it reveals another necessary step in the process, 
 and gives us a new fact which joins on or can be con- 
 nected with the one from which we start. 
 
 We conclude then that the cause of any event is its 
 invariable and necessary antecedent. In another part of 
 this book (Chs. XV., XVI.), it is shown what tests it is 
 necessary to apply in order to determine whether two
 
 84. JUDGMENTS OF CAUSAL CONNECTION 313 
 
 phenomena are merely accidentally conjoined, or whether 
 the connection is essential and real. It is necessary now 
 to take one more step in tracing the various ways in 
 which the idea of causality has been used. As a re- 
 sult of a famous scientific discovery, which was made 
 about the middle of the present century, a new element 
 has been added to the notion of cause in its application 
 to physical phenomena. The law of the Conservation 
 of Energy states that the amount of energy, or power of 
 doing work, possessed by any set of bodies, remains con- 
 stant. Any change in a material body is the result of 
 a transformation of energy from one form to another. 
 The same is true of the world as a whole : the total 
 amount of energy which it contains remains constant. 
 All changes which take place in the physical universe 
 motion into heat, or electricity into motion are sim- 
 ply different forms, or manifestations, of the one world- 
 energy. 
 
 As a result of this law, the effect always represents 
 the same amount of energy, or power of doing work, 
 as the cause. Since no energy is ever lost, the one 
 must be equal to the other. And, as a matter of fact, 
 the quantitative equivalence of many of the various forms 
 of energy has been proved by actual measurement. In 
 working out this law, for example, Joule showed that 
 "the energy stored up in the I Ib. weight which had been 
 pulled up 772 feet was gradually transformed, as soon as 
 the weight was released, into an amount of heat capable 
 of raising the temperature of a pound of water i 
 Fahr. ; while Him showed, on the other hand, that ex- 
 actly this amount of heat would, if it could be turned
 
 314 TYPES OF JUDGMENT 
 
 back again into energy, raise the I Ib. weight to the 
 height of 772 feet at which it stood before." 1 
 
 The new element which this law adds to the idea of 
 cause as a necessary and invariable antecedent, is that of 
 the quantitative identity of cause and effect. Taking the 
 phenomena which are connected in this way to repre- 
 sent simply certain quantities of energy, we say that the 
 one is equivalent to the other. The energy which the 
 cause represents has been transformed without loss, and 
 reappears in the effect. If what seems to be the total 
 effect is not equal to the cause, part of the energy of 
 the latter must have been transformed into something 
 else. No energy can have been lost. 
 
 It becomes, therefore, the task of the physical sci- 
 ences to show that this relation of quantitative identity 
 exists between phenomena which are causally connected. 
 The ideal of physical science, is to prove that two phe 
 nomena are connected as cause and effect, by showing 
 that both represent the same quantity of energy. For 
 this purpose, measurement and calculation are neces- 
 sary. The physical sciences, as was pointed out in the 
 last section, deal largely with judgments of quantity, 
 and devote themselves to showing by measurement that 
 the same amount of energy persists through the various 
 changes which phenomena undergo. In establishing 
 causal connections, the physical sciences find it necessary 
 to use the principles of measurement and calculation. 
 
 It will be evident, from what has been already stated, that this 
 relation of cause and effect should apply to all phenomena whose 
 
 1 Buckley, Short History of Natural Science, p. 339.
 
 85. JUDGMENTS OF INDIVIDUALITY 3 1 5 
 
 energy Is capable of being measured and represented in quantitative 
 terms. As a matter of fact, however, the law has been proved only 
 in physics and chemistry. From the very nature of the case, it is 
 extremely difficult to measure exactly the relations of cause and effect 
 in the sciences which deal with organic life. But even in those 
 sciences, the law of the Conservation of Energy is assumed to hold 
 true. For example, the amount of energy which a plant contains, is 
 assumed to be exactly the same as that represented by the various 
 elements or forces water, sunlight, mineral substances, etc. 
 which were instrumental in composing it. In the same way, we 
 suppose that the same relation holds of the changes which go on 
 in the brain, though we are, of course, unable to prove this by 
 actual measurement. 
 
 It is difficult, however, to see how this law can have any applica- 
 tion to mental phenomena. We can indeed measure the intensity 
 and duration of sensations. But neither feelings nor complex pro- 
 cesses of mind seem to be capable of measurement. Moreover, it is 
 never possible to measure the energy, or power of doing work, which 
 states of consciousness possess, and to equate one with another in 
 this respect. And this being so, the law of the Conservation of 
 Energy cannot, of course, apply to psychical causes and effects. In 
 the mental sciences, then, we cannot claim that the notion of Cau- 
 sality contains the element of quantitative identity between cause 
 and effect which has been found to exist in the physical sciences. 1 
 
 85. Judgments of Individuality. By Judgments of 
 Individuality, we mean judgments which regard some 
 complex object as a real whole with a definite nature of 
 its own. We have already had occasion ( 78) to dis- 
 tinguish a mere aggregate or sum of parts, like a heap 
 of stones, from a true whole which possesses a certain 
 character and individuality of its own. It is the former 
 point of view from which judgments of quantity and 
 
 1 Cf. Wundt, Ethik (ist ed.) pp. 398 f.; Sigwart, Logic, 97*, 7.
 
 316 TYPES OF JUDGMENT 
 
 of causal connection regard objects. For these types of 
 judgments are concerned wholly with the parts the 
 former to measure, and the latter to show their causal 
 connection. It requires a new form of judgment to 
 represent adequately the nature of a complex object 
 which possesses individuality. This form gives expres- 
 sion to the organic unity and wholeness of things, and 
 emphasizes the way in which the parts cooperate for a 
 common purpose or end. Thus we regard the parts of 
 a plant as a unity cooperating in a common purpose, 
 and a man as a conscious system of ends. 
 
 (i) We have seen that judgments of causal connection relate phe- 
 nomena as causes and effects. A change in an object is explained 
 by showing that some other change or event invariably precedes it. 
 But this change, in its turn, demands explanation, and has to be 
 accounted for by the discovery of a new cause. This type of judg- 
 ment shows that one phenomenon is connected with a second, and 
 a second with a third, and so on indefinitely. The view of the 
 world which it presents is that of a never-ending series of causes 
 and effects. It is never possible to find a cause which is not itself 
 the effect of something else. No phenomenon possesses any inde- 
 pendence of its own, but is simply a link in a series, or a piece of 
 a whole that is never completed. 
 
 In the last section, it was stated that causal judgments connect 
 one part of our knowledge with another, and, in this way, aid in 
 uniting the parts of our experience in a systematic way. Now it 
 is undoubtedly true that it would be impossible to have any real 
 knowledge of anything as a whole, or an individual, without know- 
 ing the way in which the parts are related, and mutually depend 
 upon each other. In that sense, judgments of causal relation are 
 indispensable to a knowledge of a true whole. But this form of 
 judgment itself resolutely goes on connecting part with part one 
 phenomenon with another and refuses to regard any group of 
 parts as possessed of an independent character or individuality
 
 85. JUDGMENTS OF INDIVIDUALITY 317 
 
 From this point of view, everything is externally determined ; its 
 cause, or principle of explanation, lies outside of it in something 
 else. The mark of individuality, on the other hand, is the power 
 of origination, or self-determination. 
 
 (2) Psychology, one may say, adopts the standpoint of Causal 
 Connection ; Ethics, that of Individuality. The former science re- 
 gards mind as a sum of mental processes, and undertakes to show 
 how its various parts are connected. Every state of consciousness 
 is supposed to be determined by something external to itself some 
 antecedent mental state, or some bodily process. The interest, as 
 was previously said, is centred in the parts, and it is very rarely that 
 the psychologist stops to look at the mind as a whole. Ethics, on 
 the other hand, has to begin with the individual. It does not regard 
 mind as a thing or substance (that is the naive point of view against 
 which psychology rightly warns us), but as a self-conscious system 
 of ideas, purposes, and feelings, which possesses the power of initia- 
 ting action, and of determining itself. Ethics can adopt all that psy- 
 chology has to tell regarding the mechanism of the mental processes. 
 Indeed, without a systematic and detailed account of the nature and 
 laws of mental life it could have no adequate conception of mind 
 as a whole : the judgment of Individuality must use the results of 
 judgments of Causal Connection. What it really does, is to trans- 
 form the sum of mental processes into a system which has a real 
 unity of its own. For it is only when a person is regarded as a 
 self-conscious and self-acting individual, that he can be supposed 
 capable of conduct to which the terms ' moral ' and ' immoral ' can 
 properly be applied. 
 
 References 
 
 Hegel, Logic, Pt. II., The Doctrine of Essence (Wallace's trans., 
 2d ed.), pp. 206-286. 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I. Chs. II.-V. 
 J. S. Mill, Logic, Bk. III. Ch. V. 
 
 C. Sigwart, Logic, 73.
 
 CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 THE NATURE OF INFERENCE. INDUCTION AND 
 
 DEDUCTION 
 
 86. Judgment and Inference. It must not be for- 
 gotten that our object in these chapters is to obtain as 
 definite a conception as possible regarding the nature of 
 thought. To attain this end, we agreed ( 73) that 
 it would be advantageous to begin with the simplest or 
 most elementary form of thinking. That form we found 
 to be Judgment. We have now endeavoured to show 
 what Judgment is, and what part it plays in building up 
 knowledge. And, in the last chapter, we have attempted 
 to see some of the steps in the evolution of Judgment, 
 as it passes from simple judgments of Quality to judg- 
 ments of Individuality. This account being completed, 
 it remains now to discuss the nature of reasoning or 
 Inference. 
 
 We shall probably get the clearest idea of the nature 
 of Inference by regarding it as a completely developed 
 judgment. As thinking develops from the form of sim- 
 ple judgment to that of Inference, it displays progressive 
 differentiation and integration. In accordance with this 
 law, we can say (i)that Inference is more complex than 
 Judgment. The latter process, in its simplest form, can 
 scarcely be said to have any parts : it represents a single 
 act or pulsation of intelligence. Inference, on the other 
 
 318
 
 86. JUDGMENT AND INFERENCE 319 
 
 hand, seems to imply steps or stages in thinking a 
 passage of the mind from one fact to another. More- 
 over, (2) Inference differs from Judgment in exhibiting 
 the grounds upon which its statement rests. The sim- 
 ple judgment makes a declaration on the basis of sense- 
 perception, as, for example, 'the mail-train has just gone 
 down ' ; ' it rained yesterday.' Each of these statements 
 stands alone, as it were ; it does not attempt to gain 
 support by pointing out the connection with other facts. 
 To infer, however, is just to show the necessary con- 
 nection of facts that from the presence or absence 
 of certain things, the presence or absence of certain 
 other things necessarily follows. It is not necessary 
 for Inference that the conclusion reached should be a 
 fact which was not hitherto known. We often do reach 
 new truths by reasoning from necessary connections. 
 Thus we might infer that the mail-train has just gone 
 down, from the fact that this train is always on time, 
 and that it is now five minutes past the hour. Or, we 
 might prove, to a person who doubted the correctness of 
 our memory, that it rained yesterday, by pointing to 
 other facts with which rain is necessarily connected. 
 We might point to the muddy condition of the roads, 
 the swollen streams, or, perhaps, might remind the per- 
 son who questions the statement, that it was yesterday 
 that A was out driving, and came home soaking. In 
 this way, one tries to exhibit the necessity of the fact 
 under consideration ; and to do this is to infer. 
 
 In the actual process of knowledge, we more fre- 
 quently go from a fact to its reasons, than in the oppo- 
 site direction. The intelligence begins by accepting all
 
 320 THE NATURE OF INFERENCE 
 
 the connections as true and universal which it meets 
 with in ordinary experience, or which are suggested to 
 it in any way. It does not trouble itself at all about 
 the grounds of its judgments, and thus the insufficient 
 basis on which many of these stand is at first not evi- 
 dent. The child, for example, believes everything which 
 it is told by its mother or nurse, or it may be, all the 
 pleasant things which it imagines. Very often, too, the 
 judgments of older persons are determined by their own 
 wishes. The French peasant, girl was sure that it was 
 impossible for the Germans to take Paris. Another 
 principle upon which both children and adults quite 
 unconsciously proceed, is that the future must always 
 resemble the past. The child assumes that the order 
 of events each day will be the same, that there will 
 always be games after dinner, and visitors in the after- 
 noon, because that has happened a number of times in 
 the past. And one may have no better reason for 
 believing that the sun will rise to-morrow, than the fact 
 that it rose yesterday and to-day. 
 
 In these early, unreflective judgments, the ground or 
 principle upon which they are based is, of course, not 
 conscious at all. Each judgment is accepted by itself, 
 and no questions are raised as to how it is known. But 
 the development of intelligence may be regarded as a 
 process of becoming conscious of the reasons which 
 show the falsity of certain of our beliefs, and the neces- 
 sity of others. The original judgment is not in reality 
 so isolated and unrelated as it appeared ; it contains 
 implicitly its own reasons. But the validity of its pro- 
 cedure cannot be made manifest, until the reasons
 
 86. JUDGMENT AND INFERENCE 321 
 
 for the statement made by the judgment are brought 
 to light. In the development of knowledge, the judg- 
 ment must expand so as to show the reasons which it 
 necessarily presupposes. In itself, it is only a fragment 
 of the complete statement, and it tries to complete itself 
 by making clear the nature of the whole which it in- 
 volves. It is not until the implicit reasons which every 
 judgment contains are thus brought to consciousness, 
 that it can be either proved or disproved. Taking the 
 mere judgment by itself, it is only possible to place 
 one man's assertion against another's denial. But proof 
 or disproof of a proposition implies that reasons are 
 given for or against it. If its connection with some 
 fact, or set of facts, known to be true, becomes evident 
 on reflection, the felt necessity which the judgment 
 possesses ( 76), is transformed into logical necessity. 
 But, if no such connection can be found, or, if the 
 judgment in question is seen to presuppose propositions 
 which are themselves false, we must, of course, cease to 
 regard it as valid. 
 
 When a judgment develops so as to become conscious of its 
 reasons, it has already taken on the form of Inference. And, as 
 we have already seen, this is the usual procedure of knowledge. 
 We begin by believing without reason, or we assume that certain 
 things are true, and try to find reasons for our belief. The conclu- 
 sion, which is, of course, logically last, is usually first for us, and we 
 set out from it to find the grounds, or the premises. 
 
 This way, however, of proceeding from conclusion to 
 premises, or from a judgment to its reasons, implies 
 that the mind is already aware of the distinction be- 
 tween false knowledge and true, and therefore that the 
 
 Y
 
 322 THE NATURE OF INFERENCE 
 
 work of criticising and testing knowledge has already 
 begun. The criticism of knowledge is probably forced 
 upon the mind at first by the practical consequences of 
 false judgments. So long as false judgments lead to 
 no unpleasant results, they are likely to pass unnoticed, 
 without any question being raised regarding the grounds 
 by means of which they are supported. The child usu- 
 ally believes all that he is told, until he discovers that 
 his credulity is making him a laughing-stock, or has led 
 to the loss of some pleasure which he values. Sooner 
 or later he learns that the ground upon which he has 
 been unconsciously proceeding somebody told me 
 is insufficient. In the same way, the natural tendency 
 to regard all connections which we happen to find ex- 
 isting between events as universal and necessary, be- 
 comes more critical and discriminating. The child soon 
 learns that the events of one day do not necessarily 
 follow in the order of the day before, and that it is not 
 always rainy on Fridays, and fine on Sundays. But, in 
 order to discriminate between what is true and what is 
 false, he is obliged to go beyond the facts themselves, 
 and to become more or less clearly aware of the grounds 
 assumed in each type of judgment. He is forced to 
 include in the judgment the reasons by which it is sup- 
 ported. And, in this way, the distinction between valid 
 and invalid principles of connection is gradually learned. 
 Through experience, which is more or less dearly 
 bought, we learn that we cannot depend upon hear- 
 say, and also that many of the most obvious connec- 
 tions between events are not essential, and have no 
 claim to be regarded as universal laws. It becomes
 
 86. JUDGMENT AND INFERENCE 323 
 
 evident that it is necessary, in order to reach true 
 principles of connection, to take a wider survey of the 
 facts, and to push the process of analysis further than 
 is done by our ordinary judgments of sense-perception. 
 For example, we may at one time have supposed it to 
 be a universal law that hot water will break glasses 
 when poured into them. But as soon as we have ex- 
 perience of any instance or instances to the contrary, 
 we see that there is no essential connection between 
 hot water and broken glasses. It is necessary then to 
 go behind the obvious facts of the case, in order to dis- 
 cover what is the real antecedent in the two cases. 
 The two instances where the glasses break, and where 
 they do not seem to be the same ; and yet, since 
 the result is different, there must be a difference which 
 further analysis will bring to light. It is by penetrat- 
 ing behind the point of view of ordinary knowledge, 
 that science endeavours to show how phenomena are 
 really and essentially connected. 
 
 The judgments of ordinary adult life usually involve some con- 
 sciousness of their grounds, and are therefore so far inferences. 
 But in many cases of this kind it would be difficult for the individual 
 to state explicitly the reasons for his judgment. The connection 
 which he asserts may be guaranteed to his mind by some complex 
 set of circumstances very difficult to formulate. Or it may rest 
 upon some general similarity or analogy, which is so obviously in- 
 sufficient that he hesitates to acknowledge that it is the only ground 
 he has for judging. Thus one may be vaguely conscious that 
 one's only reason for liking A is his resemblance to B. It may be 
 impossible to say exactly in what points A resembles B ; one may 
 proceed on a vague general similarity. Or one may hesitate to 
 make clear, even to oneself, that the only reason for disliking A- is
 
 324 THE NATURE OF INFERENCE 
 
 because of some external resemblance in name, or dress, or figure 
 to C, whom one dislikes. 
 
 87. The Nature of Inference. We have seen that 
 it is difficult to draw any hard and fast line between 
 Judgment and Inference. In general, however, we may 
 be said to reason when we do not simply accept a fact 
 on the basis of sense-perception or memory, but show 
 that it necessarily follows from some other known fact 
 or facts. Inference, then, requires (i) that certain data 
 or premises should be accepted as already known ; and 
 (2) it implies an insight into the necessary connection 
 of some new fact or set of facts with what we already 
 know. Thus one is said to infer B, when one sees that 
 it necessarily follows from some fact which is already 
 known. It is not necessary for an inference that B 
 should never have been in consciousness before. As 
 we have seen in the last section, what we very often do 
 in inference is to show the reasons or necessity of some 
 fact which we have previously accepted without know- 
 ing why. No matter whether we go from premises to 
 conclusion (from the reasons to the fact), or in the 
 opposite direction, from the conclusion to the premises, 
 we are said to infer whenever we find the ground for 
 the existence of one fact in the nature of another fact. 
 In the former case, we use words like ' therefore ' and 
 ' consequently,' to indicate the connection ; and when 
 the reasons are stated last, ' for ' and ' because.' When- 
 ever these conjunctions are used correctly, an infer- 
 ence has been made, and it is always useful in following 
 a course of reasoning to make clear to ourselves pre- 
 cisely on what grounds it has been made.
 
 87. THE NATURE OF INFERENCE 325 
 
 Although Inference seems very simple and very 
 natural, its procedure is much more puzzling, when 
 looked at closely, than one would at first imagine. As 
 we have seen, there is no Inference unless the result 
 reached is different from the starting-point. But how 
 are we ever justified in passing from a knowledge of 
 one fact to another different from it ? How can we 
 ever pass from the known to the unknown ? The 
 Greeks, who loved to bring to light the paradoxes 
 which so often underlie familiar facts, used to discuss 
 this question. How is it possible for that "which is 
 unknown external to the mind to pass into the 
 mind and get itself known ? It was to solve this puz- 
 zle that Plato propounded the doctrine that all knowing 
 is remembering. 1 Knowledge, he declares, is not in- 
 creased by learning that of which we were altogether 
 ignorant, but by a process of calling to mind or recol- 
 lecting the knowledge which the soul possessed in a 
 previous state of existence, but which was forgotten 
 when it entered upon the conditions of the present life. 
 It was therefore no longer necessary to suppose, accord- 
 ing to Plato, that the mind performed the impossible 
 feat of knowing what is external to itself, or that things 
 previously unknown pass bodily into our minds, and 
 thus become known. 
 
 Plato was undoubtedly right in protesting against the 
 popular view that knowledge is received into the mind, 
 as food is received into the stomach. Knowledge, 
 as we have frequently seen, comes from within, not 
 
 1 This is the theory upon which Wordsworth bases his " Ode on the 
 Intimations of Immortality."
 
 326 THE NATURE OF INFERENCE 
 
 from without. But the apparent paradox of knowledge 
 may be explained without adopting Plato's poetical 
 notion of a previous state of existence. We may admit 
 that the process of inference would be quite inex- 
 plicable, if it proceeded from one fact, A, to a know- 
 ledge of a second fact, B, which is totally different from 
 the former. When we examine cases of inference, how- 
 ever, we find that there is always a certain amount of 
 identity between the two ends of the process. The con- 
 clusion is always different, and yet not entirely different 
 from the premises. Thus, from the propositions, 'all 
 metals are elementary substances,' and ' gold is a metal,' 
 one can infer that gold is an elementary substance. 
 It is possible to connect ' gold ' and ' elementary.' Here 
 the identical link what is called in formal logic the 
 middle term is 'metal.' It is possible to connect gold 
 and elementary substance, because the former is at the 
 same time a metal, which in its turn is an element. Of 
 course, these conceptions gold, metal, element are 
 not absolutely indentical ; it was pointed out in ( 79) 
 that propositions cannot be regarded as expressing 
 mere identity without difference. But we can say that 
 there is a common thread or element running through 
 these notions, which furnishes the principle of con- 
 nection. Where we cannot discover such a common 
 nature, no inference can be made. Thus, for example, 
 it would be impossible to draw any conclusion from 
 the statements that ' it rained yesterday ' and ' gold has 
 been discovered in Alaska,' because there is no com- 
 mon element or connecting thread present which would 
 lead us beyond the premises.
 
 87. THE NATURE OF INFERENCE 327 
 
 In formal arguments the middle term, or connecting link, is usu- 
 ally explicitly stated ; but in the actual process of reasoning things 
 out, it is frequently necessary to go in search of it. We may notice, 
 for example, that the fire in a stove burns more slowly when the 
 damper is shut. In order to understand the fact, we have to find out 
 some fact which is common to ' closed-damper ' and ' slow-burning,' 
 some link of identity, as it were, which enables us to pass from the 
 one to the other. Such a connecting link is afforded, of course, in 
 this case by the supply of oxygen. Darwin was noted for his keen- 
 ness in detecting connections which escaped the ordinary eye, as 
 well as for his skill in giving explanations of them. On one occa- 
 sion, he observed that in the part of the country where he lived, 
 clover was abundant in those fields which were situated near villages, 
 while the outlying fields were almost destitute of it. What now, he 
 asked himself, is the connecting link between these facts? Some 
 investigation of the matter convinced him that the two agencies 
 which produced this result were mice and cats. The field mice 
 destroy the clover by feeding upon its roots, but the cats go out from 
 the villages into the fields near by and kill the mice. 
 
 We have seen that the passage from one fact to an- 
 other in inference does not involve a transition to some- 
 thing wholly different from the starting-point. There is 
 always some aspect or feature in which the premises are 
 identical with the conclusion. And it is on the strength 
 of this identity that a passage can be made from one to 
 the other. The same fact may be expressed differently 
 by saying that all inference takes place within a system, 
 'where the parts are so held together by a common 
 nature that you can judge from some of them what the 
 nature of the others must be.' Suppose you were given 
 the leaf of a plant. If you had some systematic botani- 
 cal knowledge, it would be possible to infer the species 
 of plant to which the leaf belonged. That is, from
 
 328 THE NATURE OF INFERENCE 
 
 the nature of a part, the nature of the whole to which it 
 belongs could be determined. The part represents the 
 whole in some sense contains it implicity. It is said 
 that the great naturalist Cuvier could determine by ex- 
 amining a single tooth the nature of the animal to which 
 it belonged. Let us suppose that the tooth were that of 
 a ruminant animal. Now a zoologist, who knows the 
 characteristics of such an animal, could draw various in- 
 ferences regarding the possessor of the tooth. He could 
 conclude, for example, that the animal to which it once 
 belonged must also have had cloven hoofs. A single 
 piece or part, that is, would enable one who knows the 
 system or common nature to which all the parts be- 
 long, to judge what the other parts are like. 
 
 The examples just given have referred to the possi- 
 bility of an inference from one part of an organism to 
 another. But, as we have already seen, the systematic 
 connection which here exists between the parts, is more 
 or less completely present whenever it is possible to 
 infer at all. Inference pushes further the work of con- 
 structing a system begun by Judgment ( 78). If each 
 thing was known by itself, if the parts of our knowledge 
 did not fall together into systems where each part to 
 some extent determines the nature of the other parts, no 
 inference would be possible. It is because the various 
 pieces of our knowledge are never independent of each 
 other, but form an organic whole, like the members of a 
 living organism, that certain facts follow, as we say, 
 from certain other facts. And it is of course true, that 
 as our knowledge in any field becomes more completely 
 organized, it is more possible to use it as a basis for in-
 
 88. INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 329 
 
 ference. The better we are able to put together in a 
 systematic way the various facts which we have learned 
 about geology, or astronomy, or the weather, the more 
 significant each fact becomes. The geologist may be 
 able to tell from the appearance of the cliffs what has 
 taken place in a locality thousands of years ago. And, 
 similarly, for the fisherman, the temperature, direction 
 of the wind, its rising or falling, etc., are all signs from 
 which he is able to infer, more or less correctly, the 
 kind of weather which may be expected. A person 
 who had no systematic knowledge in either of these 
 fields, would, however, see nothing in the scarred rocks, 
 or in the sudden change of the wind ; he might notice 
 the facts, but would not be able to use them as a basis of 
 inference. 
 
 It is important to notice that what has just been said goes to 
 confirm our previous statements regarding the increasing degree of 
 integration which knowledge shows in the course of its development. 
 The knowledge of the scientist differs from that of the ordinary man, 
 not only in the greater number of facts which the former contains, but 
 also, as we have seen, in the degree of integration or coherence 
 which these facts possess. Inference, then, is simply a deep insight, 
 based on definite knowledge, into the necessary connection of things. 
 It is an act of thought which discovers the essential relations be- 
 tween things which at first sight appear to have no connection with 
 each other. As has already been said, it is a reasoned judgment ; 
 i.e., a judgment which has become conscious of the reasons for the 
 connections which it affirms. 
 
 88. Induction and Deduction. It has been already 
 pointed out that there are two directions in which infer- 
 ence or reasoning may proceed. We may begin with 
 certain facts or principles which are already known,
 
 330 THE NATURE OF INFERENCE 
 
 or are assumed to be true, and proceed to show that 
 some result necessarily follows from them. Thus we 
 might infer that if the draughts of a stove are closed so 
 that the supply of oxygen is lessened, the fire will burn 
 slowly ; or from the relative positions and revolutions of 
 the planets, that an eclipse of the sun will take place on 
 a specified day and hour. This method of reasoning is 
 known as Deduction. It proceeds, as we have seen, 
 from premises to conclusion. In the first part of this 
 book, this form of reasoning has been treated at some 
 length and its rules of procedure stated. At present, 
 we need only notice that in deductive reasoning the par- 
 ticular case is always brought under some general law 
 or principle, which is already known or assumed as true. 
 Socrates is known to be mortal, because as a man he 
 falls under the general law that all men are mortal ; the 
 closing of the draughts is a case of lessened supply of 
 oxygen, and, therefore, in accordance with the general 
 law, a case of slow burning. A deductive inference 
 shows what are the results of the application of a gen- 
 eral law to particular facts or instances. It proceeds 
 downwards, as it were, from the general law to its con- 
 sequences. 
 
 In Induction, on the contrary, the procedure is just 
 the opposite of this. We begin with particular 
 phenomena, and try to discover from them the law 
 or principle which unites them. Certain facts are 
 observed to happen together, and the problem is to 
 find the ground or explanation of this connection. 
 Inductive inference is thus a process of reading the 
 general law out of the particular facts. It is an insight
 
 88. INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 331 
 
 into the nature of the whole or system, based upon a 
 careful examination of the parts. ' Yesterday the smoke 
 tended to fall to the ground, and it rained in the after- 
 noon.' These two facts may simply be observed a 
 number of times without any thought of their con- 
 nection. But intelligence asks : Why should they 
 happen in conjunction ? And to answer this question, 
 we must begin by analyzing the facts in our possession. 
 When the smoke falls to the ground, the atmosphere 
 must be lighter than usual ; this is the case when it 
 contains a great deal of moisture ; but when the 
 atmosphere is in this condition, it usually tends to 
 discharge its moisture in the form of rain ; therefore 
 we have the general law which enables us to show that 
 the behaviour of the smoke and the rain yesterday were 
 not only accidentally conjoined, but essentially connected. 
 Deduction and Induction, then, are both forms of 
 inference, but the starting-point and mode of procedure 
 of the one is different from that of the other. Conse- 
 quently, it is not unusual to speak of them as two kinds 
 of reasoning which are quite distinct and independent 
 of each other. It is, however, important to avoid this 
 popular error, and to remember that the real process of 
 inference is in each case the same. The essence of 
 inference, as has been shown, consists in the fact that 
 it exhibits the manner in which particular facts are 
 connected together into a system or whole. And this 
 end is achieved both by Deduction and Induction. In 
 the former case, the general law of connection what 
 we may call the nature of the system within which the 
 particulars fall is known, and we argue from this as
 
 332 THE NATURE OF INFERENCE 
 
 to the nature and relations of the various parts which 
 fall within it. We have the common thread which 
 unites the various facts in our hand, and following it out 
 are able to show its application in determining the 
 nature of events which have not yet come within the 
 range of our experience. Knowing the law of gravity, 
 for example, one could infer deductively what momentum 
 a ball weighing one pound must necessarily have after 
 falling one hundred feet. It would not be necessary 
 actually to measure the momentum of the falling body 
 in this particular case, but it could be shown to be the 
 necessary result of the general law. What the deductive 
 inference shows to us, is ,the way in which a general 
 principle or law of connection runs through a group of 
 facts, and constitutes them a real or organic whole. 
 The same insight is reached by inductive inference, 
 although the starting-point is entirely different. As 
 we have already seen, induction begins by observing 
 that certain phenomena are frequently conjoined, and 
 attempts to discover some law or principle which will 
 make the fact of their connection intelligible. 
 
 It is usual to say that in induction we go from the 
 particular facts to the general law. The following, how- 
 ever, would be a more correct form of statement : 
 Before the inference, we observe that a number of phe- 
 nomena occur together, but do not know whether this 
 conjunction is necessary or not ; or, if we assume that 
 it is necessary, we do not understand why it should be 
 so. As a result of the inductive inference, we gain an 
 insight into the necessary connection of the observed 
 phenomena, and also understand the principle according
 
 88. INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 333 
 
 to which the latter are united. What we really obtain 
 through an inductive inference is not only a general law, 
 but also a perception of its concrete application to 
 particular phenomena. This being so, it is clear that 
 Induction and Deduction are not two different kinds of 
 inference. Inference always implies an effort on the 
 part of the mind to see how phenomena are neces- 
 sarily connected according to some general principle. 
 And, in carrying out this purpose, the mind must begin 
 with the knowledge which it already possesses. When 
 the general law of connection is known, and the object 
 is to discover the nature of some particular fact, the 
 method of procedure is deductive. But, when the 
 problem by which we are confronted is to read out of 
 the facts of sense-perception the general law of their 
 connection, the method of inference which must be 
 employed is that of induction. But from whatever 
 point we set out, and whatever may be the immediate 
 object of the inference, the result is always the same 
 an insight into the necessary connection of facts accord- 
 ing to some general principle. 
 
 It is not unusual to hear the remark made that 
 modern science has been built up by the employment 
 of the inductive method. This must not, however, be 
 interpreted to mean that deductive inferences are not 
 also used in the discovery of scientific truth. Science 
 (which is simply another name for systematic know- 
 ledge) is the product of thinking, and thought, as we 
 have seen, is not limited to any one mode of procedure. 
 Thought aims at extending knowledge, and so long as 
 it can find any link of connection, or guiding thread, it
 
 334 THE NATURE OF INFERENCE 
 
 is not limited to any one direction, or to any fixed mode 
 of working. It is, of course, to be admitted and 
 this is what is true in the statement which we have 
 quoted that general laws cannot be discovered with- 
 out an examination of particular facts, and that their 
 validity must always be tested by comparison with the 
 facts. But as soon as a general law is discovered in 
 any field, it is always used as a principle from which to 
 deduce new results. When it is possible to employ 
 mathematics in the calculation of these results, it is 
 usually possible to extend our knowledge of the subject 
 much more rapidly than before. Thus physics and 
 astronomy owe their rapid development to the applica- 
 tion of mathematics. It must be remembered, however, 
 that this presupposes a certain stage of advancement 
 a certain inductive stage, as it were on the part of 
 the science. But even in this earlier stage, we are 
 constantly employing deduction, reasoning out the 
 results of certain guesses or suggestions to see if they 
 hold true (cf. 47). Both in ordinary life, and in 
 scientific procedure, we may see, Induction and Deduc- 
 tion are constantly employed together. 
 
 References 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. II. Ch. I. 
 
 F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, pp. 430-468. 
 
 W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II. Ch. XXII. 
 
 J. G. Hibben, Inductive Logic, Chs. I. and II.
 
 CHAPTER XXV 
 
 RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL THEORIES 
 
 89. The Point of View of Rationalism. In the his- 
 torical sketch of logic given in Chapter II., it was stated 
 that there are two rival accounts of the nature of know- 
 ledge, and the methods by which it is attained (cf. 8). 
 The first of these theories is known as Rationalism, and 
 has its best known historical representative in Descartes; 
 while Empiricism, the opposing theory, is associated with 
 the names of the great thinkers, Bacon and Locke. 
 The doctrines of both these schools have been fre- 
 quently modified, and the contrast between them is 
 now no longer so pronounced as it was formerly. In 
 spite of this fact, however, the division has always 
 represented two schools of thought whose general re- 
 lations to each other have remained comparatively con- 
 stant. In general, too, it has been true that English 
 thinkers have upheld Empiricism, while Rationalism 
 has had its home on the Continent at first in France, 
 and later in Holland and Germany. 
 
 Rationalism regards mathematics as the type of all 
 knowledge. Its essential characteristic consists in the 
 fact that it undertakes to derive all knowledge from 
 general principles. These principles have sometimes 
 been regarded as innate (truths which are stamped 
 upon the mind at birth), or it has been supposed that 
 
 335
 
 336 RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL THEORIES 
 
 they are in some way known before experience, and 
 have a right to the title of a priori propositions ( 76). 
 Notwithstanding the various forms in which their theo- 
 ries have been expressed, all rationalistic thinkers agree 
 in regarding the first principles upon which our know- 
 ledge is based, as upon a different plane from the facts 
 of ordinary life. While the latter are known only by 
 experience, and may be wholly or partially false, the 
 former are described as principles which are in them- 
 selves necessary, truths the opposite of which is incon- 
 ceivable, or sometimes as the axioms presupposed in all 
 experience. These principles being accepted, the prob- 
 lem which lay before Rationalism was to show how all 
 the facts of our experience necessarily follow from 
 them, just as the various propositions of geometry 
 follow from the definitions and axioms which are as- 
 sumed as the starting-point. As a matter of fact, how- 
 ever, the famous Jewish thinker, Spinoza (1632-1677), 
 was the only man who ever attempted to carry out 
 Rationalism in this systematic form. In general, one 
 may say that rationalistic thinkers have been mainly 
 interested to show that the facts of the moral and reli- 
 gious experience are logically derivable from certain 
 necessary first principles. It was questions like those 
 regarding the existence of God, the immortality of the 
 soul, and the freedom of the will, which the rationalists 
 were anxious to put beyond dispute. And, as a con- 
 sequence, not nearly the same amount of effort was 
 devoted to showing how the other facts of experience 
 could be similarly derived from general principles. 
 It will be at once clear, from what has been already
 
 90. THE DOCTRINE OF EMPIRICISM 337 
 
 said, that the great instrument of knowledge from this 
 standpoint must be reason. Very little attention is paid 
 to perception, and the experience which it furnishes is 
 not regarded as entitled to the name of knowledge. 
 In order to know, in the true sense of the word, it is 
 necessary to show the systematic connection of every 
 fact with some fundamental first principle; and this, 
 of course, can be done only by the employment of 
 reasoning. Perception gives us only the bare facts ; it 
 is reason which enables us to trace the mutual connec- 
 tions, and derivation of these facts from some general 
 law. The weakness of the rationalistic position does not 
 consist in its insistence on the necessity of connecting 
 the particular facts of experience with general laws or 
 principles, but in the assumption upon which it pro- 
 ceeded that these principles could themselves be derived 
 from some other source than experience. The result 
 was that the rationalists employed themselves too ex- 
 clusively in deducing facts from general propositions 
 which were assumed to be true without sufficient criti- 
 cism and examination. They saw clearly enough that 
 mere perception without general principles can never 
 give us knowledge, but they did not understand that it 
 is impossible to separate the latter from the former, 
 and to regard principles as existing in the mind prior 
 to experience. 
 
 90. The Doctrine of Empiricism. Empiricism main- 
 tains that all knowledge is derived from experience ; and 
 by experience is understood the separate unconnected 
 facts with which the mind is furnished in perception. 
 z
 
 338 RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL THEORIES 
 
 Empiricism refuses to admit that we possess any 
 store of first principles or general truths which are 
 native to the mind, or are obtained from any other 
 source than experience. It is impossible for the mind 
 to know anything of which it has had no perception. 
 Moreover, the very fact that perception is made the 
 standard, of knowledge, led to the belief that the mind 
 is something essentially passive, upon which ideas are 
 impressed by external forces. Empiricism regards 
 knowledge as the sum of the particular facts furnished 
 to the mind through sense, not as a system which is 
 the product of the mind's own activity. As a conse- 
 quence, there results an entirely different theory of 
 knowledge from that which we have given in this book. 
 Ideas are supposed to be furnished to the mind by 
 the channel of the senses, or are compounded from 
 simpler elements which are supplied in this way. And 
 when ideas become united by standing in juxtaposition, 
 or being associated in some other way, the result is a 
 judgment. In this account, the judging, or interpreting 
 activity of the mind, which we have made the source 
 of all knowledge, is wholly omitted. Indeed, one may 
 say that empirical theories undertake to explain know- 
 ledge without reference to the mind and its mode of 
 activity. Although all empirical thinkers do not deny 
 the existence of the mind, yet none of them wish to go 
 beyond the particular facts, and to call in its aid as a 
 principle of explanation. 
 
 The same insistence upon particular facts, and 
 avoidance of general principles, is characteristic of 
 empirical theories of reasoning. All inference, it is
 
 90. THE DOCTRINE OF EMPIRICISM 339 
 
 maintained, is based upon a perception of resem- 
 blance between individual cases. The general law, 
 or principle, is nothing in itself but an abbreviated 
 statement of the manner in which all the instances 
 act which we have hitherto observed. The clearest 
 statement of this theory is given by John Stuart 
 Mill, from whose work on Logic the following pas- 
 sages are taken : " Now, all which man can observe 
 are individual cases. From these all general truths 
 must be drawn, and into these they may again be 
 resolved; for a general truth is but an aggregate of 
 particular truths, a comprehensive expression by means 
 of which an indefinite number of individual facts are 
 affirmed or denied at once. . . . From instances which 
 we have observed, we feel warranted in concluding that 
 what we found true in those instances holds in all simi- 
 lar ones, past, present, and future, however numerous 
 they may be. ... When, therefore, we conclude from 
 the death of John and Thomas, and every other person 
 we ever heard of in whose case the experiment had 
 been fairly tried, that the Duke of Wellington is mortal 
 like the rest, we may indeed pass through the generali- 
 zation, All men are mortal, as an intermediate stage ; 
 but it is not in the latter half of the process, the descent 
 from all men to the Duke of Wellington, that the infer- 
 ence resides. The inference is finished when we have 
 asserted that all men are mortal. What remains to be 
 performed afterwards is merely deciphering our own 
 notes." 1 In other words, Mill maintains that all in- 
 ference is based upon the perception of particular 
 i Mill, Logic, Bk. II. Ch. III. 3.
 
 340 RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL THEORIES 
 
 cases. There is no such a thing as reasoning from 
 general truths or principles. We may, indeed, arrive 
 at such general truths by repeated experiences, and 
 store them up as maxims in our memory ; but they are 
 not at all necessary for the process of inference, which 
 may be said to be always inductive in character, since 
 it sets out from a perception of individual cases. " In- 
 duction, properly so called, . . . may be denned as a 
 generalization from experience. It consists in inferring 
 from some individual instances in which a phenome- 
 non is observed to occur, that it occurs in all instances 
 of a certain class ; namely, in all which resemble the 
 former in what are regarded as the material circum- 
 stances." 1 
 
 This account of the way in which inference proceeds 
 undoubtedly contains much that is true. Nevertheless, 
 it is not, I think, an adequate statement of the nature of 
 inference. What one misses chiefly is some insistence 
 upon the fact that it is only in virtue of some identical 
 link, or common element, which is present in all the 
 individual cases, that one is able to pass from one to 
 another. On this point we must refer to what was said 
 in the last chapter ( 87). It will perhaps be possible 
 to gain a clearer idea of what is true and what is false 
 in this theory, by considering further Mill's doctrine, 
 that it is possible to reason from one particular fact to 
 another, without any reference to general truths. 
 
 91. Reasoning from Particulars to Particulars. " Not 
 only may we reason from particulars to particulars, with- 
 
 * Mill, Logic, Bk III. Ch. III. I.
 
 9i. FROM PARTICULARS TO PARTICULARS 341 
 
 out passing through generals, but we perpetually do so 
 reason. All our earliest inferences are of this nature. 
 From the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences, 
 but years elapse before we learn the use of general 
 language. The child, who, having burned his fingers, 
 avoids to thrust them again into the fire, has reasoned 
 or inferred, though he never thought of the general 
 maxim, Fire burns. He knows from memory that he 
 has been burned, and on this evidence believes, when 
 he sees a candle, that if he puts his finger into the flame 
 of it, he will be burned again. He believes this in any 
 case which happens to arise, but without looking in 
 each instance beyond the present case. He is not gen- 
 eralizing ; he is inferring a particular from particulars. 
 ... It is not only the village matron, who, when called 
 to a consultation on the case of a neighbour's child, pro- 
 nounces on the evil and its remedy on the recollection 
 and authority of what she accounts the similar case of 
 her Lucy. We all, when we have no definite maxims 
 to steer by, guide ourselves in the same way." l 
 
 The doctrine as thus stated by Mill is the extreme 
 opposite of Rationalism. Not only are all general 
 propositions derived from observation of particular in- 
 stances, but they play no part in the process of infer- 
 ence proper. All reasoning, according to this account, 
 is based on the perception of resemblance between 
 individual cases. No common nature or general prin- 
 ciple seems necessary to unite the latter into a system. 
 
 Nevertheless, it must be confessed that Mill's state- 
 
 1 Mill, Logic, Bk. II. Ch. III. 3.
 
 342 RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL THEORIES 
 
 ment affords an excellent account of many of our 
 ordinary inferences. We may accept it, however, as a 
 description of fact without committing ourselves to the 
 theory which it contains. That is, it will still be neces- 
 sary to ask if inference is not, after all, based on the 
 perception of some general law or principle, although 
 it is not always possible to formulate the nature of 
 the latter. It does not seem to me that the nature of 
 the inference in the cases cited is completely described 
 when it is said to be a passage from one particular 
 case to another which resembles it. For it is necessary 
 to look further, and to see what is implied in the fact 
 that one case is perceived to resemble another. When 
 the child perceives that the bright object before him 
 resembles something which previously gave him pain, 
 he has got beyond the merely individual aspect of 
 things, and is beginning to regard them as types or 
 instances of a general law. Of course, the child is 
 not fully conscious of any general principle. He does 
 not separate the latter from its embodiment in the par- 
 ticular case, or put it into language even to himself. 
 But, in order to infer, one must take the individual 
 case as something more than a mere particular, as this 
 which is only here and now. In the child's perception 
 of resemblance between the present object and the one 
 previously experienced, there is an implicit reference to 
 a permanent type, or identity which persists through 
 the two cases. In other words, when one asks what a 
 perception of resemblance means, one sees that it im- 
 plies an apprehension on the part of intelligence of 
 something which is more than merely momentary.
 
 9i. FROM PARTICULARS TO PARTICULARS 343 
 
 The same quality or other element which is found in 
 that object is also found in this. And the inference 
 proceeds, that ' object was hot, therefore this object 
 (having the same general nature, or being of the same 
 type) is also hot. It is, of course, frequently impossible 
 to formulate clearly the nature of the principle upon 
 which we proceed, and, in cases like those cited, one may 
 not be aware that it is present. But, I hope, it will now 
 be clear that even in such instances the inference is 
 based upon a permanent nature present in the two cases. 
 We have already seen that where such an identical link 
 is not present, it is impossible to pass, by means of in- 
 ference, from a knowledge of one thing to another. As 
 mere particulars, two phenomena occurring at different 
 times are entirely isolated, and have nothing to do 
 with each other. But as pieces of knowledge, facts 
 which have been constituted by the interpreting func- 
 tion of Judgment, they are bound together by a com- 
 mon principle, the nature of a whole or system. This 
 principle is, indeed, not anything apart from the facts 
 connected, or in any way prior to them ; but neverthe- 
 less something without which it would be impossible to 
 understand their connection. 
 
 The conclusion of the matter, then, is that we never 
 reason from one bare particular to another particular. 
 More than that, we may say a fact which is merely 
 particular something which is only here and now 
 has no existence in knowledge. For knowledge lays 
 hold of the universal aspect of things, their permanent 
 significance. Intelligence sees the universal or typical 
 nature in what is for sense a fleeting phenomenon. It
 
 344 RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL THEORIES 
 
 is only when the facts of sense are interpreted in this 
 way, when their real nature is apprehended by thought,- 
 that they can be said to be known at all. Knowledge 
 sees the universal in the particular, or reads the partic- 
 ular as a case of the universal. And when thus inter- 
 preted, the particular ceases to be a bare particular, and 
 becomes an individual with a permanent nature of its 
 own. When one reasons from an individual case, then, 
 it is the universal or typical nature, not the particular 
 or momentary existence, upon which the inference pro- 
 ceeds. If there were any merely particular facts in 
 knowledge, we could never reason from them. But, as 
 has been shown, the so-called particular facts, as ele- 
 ments of knowledge, possess a universal or typical as- 
 pect in virtue of which alone inference is possible. 
 
 92. Reasoning from Individual Cases to a Universal. 
 - There remains another question which is very closely 
 related to the points already discussed in this chapter. 
 We must admit that in inductive inference at least the 
 starting-point is individual instances, though, as the last 
 section showed, the latter, as used in reasoning, are 
 something more than mere particulars. The problem 
 which meets us, however, is this : How is it ever pos- 
 sible to get a universal conclusion from individual 
 instances ? It, of course, frequently happens that we 
 cannot examine- all the cases. What right then have 
 we in these circumstances to state our conclusion 
 generally to assert, for example, that 'all men are 
 mortal/ or ' all mosses cryptogams ' ? 
 
 It is often said that in such cases the general con-
 
 92. FROM PARTICULARS TO A UNIVERSAL 345 
 
 elusion is never more than probable, and that its proba- 
 bility increases directly in proportion to the number of 
 instances examined. Thus if A and B are conjoined only 
 once in my experience, it is very improbable that the 
 connection is a universal and essential one. But if they 
 are found together ten times, the proposition, 'A is B' 
 begins to have probability, which is, of course, greatly 
 increased (without ever becoming more than probable 
 however), if the conjunction is observed a hundred, or a 
 thousand times. Now, there can be no doubt that the 
 frequency of conjunction is, to a certain extent, a prac- 
 tical test of real or universal connection. Belief, as a 
 psychological fact, is engendered by frequency of repeti- 
 tion. But the causes of our belief are here, as in many 
 cases, quite different from the real or logical grounds. 
 The fact that two phenomena have occurred together a 
 hundred times, in itself affords no logical ground for 
 affirming a universal connection between them, or that 
 they will be connected the hundred and first time. Of 
 course, as we have said, psychological belief or expecta- 
 tion would be engendered by the frequent conjunction ; 
 but the latter would supply no real or logical grounds. 
 Practically, we are more certain to be right, if we gen- 
 eralize on the basis of a large number of observations, 
 than if we proceed on the authority of a smaller num- 
 ber. But, as affording logical justification for our pro- 
 cedure, a hundred instances (if they are merely counted) 
 are no better than one. 
 
 The truth is that a general conclusion does not de- 
 pend for its logical justification upon the number of 
 instances observed. Inference is not a matter of count-
 
 346 RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL THEORIES 
 
 ing instances at all, but is an intellectual insight into 
 the nature of a general law or principle of connection. 
 The problem of inductive inference is to discover this 
 principle in the individual case, to penetrate beneath 
 the surface, and read out of the individual phenome- 
 non its real meaning or significance. To accomplish 
 this usually requires an examination of many particu- 
 lar cases. We have more chances of learning the 
 secret fully if we take as wide a survey as possible 
 of the facts. A generalization based upon a small 
 number of observations is pretty sure to be incorrect 
 or inaccurate. But though of such great practical im- 
 portance, the number of instances is logically indiffer- 
 ent. The essential point is to detect the general law or 
 principle, and for this purpose one case may conceiva- 
 bly be as good as a hundred. Inductive inference, 
 then, is not a process of passing from a certain number 
 of cases to a general conclusion which always remains 
 probable because it has no proper justification. But its 
 real nature consists in the discovery, through the aid of 
 examples, of a universal law of connection. We have 
 already shown the part which the constructive imagina- 
 tion, guided by Analogy, plays in reaching this result 
 (cf. 60, 63). 
 
 It must be admitted that there are many cases where it is impossi- 
 ble to get beyond the fact that two phenomena are constantly con- 
 joined in our experience. The grounds which should make this fact 
 intelligible lie beyond our ken. Under circumstances of this kind, 
 we are, of course, compelled to act on the presumption that the same 
 order of events will continue to obtain. We may find that a certain 
 medicine is followed by certain physiological consequences, without
 
 92. FROM PARTICULARS TO A UNIVERSAL 347 
 
 being able to discover anything regarding the way in which the lat- 
 ter have been produced. And we may confidently predict that the 
 same results will follow in a new case where the same medicine has 
 been given. But it must be noticed that this is not the ideal of rea- 
 soning. Knowledge of the kind we have described is merely em- 
 pirical, follows a rule of thumb without being able to give any account 
 of itself. Moreover, even in such cases, it is always assumed that 
 there is some general principle or law which may yet be discovered, 
 and which is capable of explaining the facts known empirically. 
 
 References 
 
 J. S. Mill, Logic, Bk. II. 
 
 H. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, 208. 
 
 W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II. Ch. XXVIII. 
 
 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. II., pp. 176-179.
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 CHAPTER I. The Standpoint and Problem of Logic 
 
 1 . What are some of the main characteristics of thought or 
 thinking ? 
 
 2. Explain the use of the verb to think in each of the fol- 
 lowing sentences : * I do not know, but I think so ; ' 'If you 
 think the matter over, you will come to the same conclusion.' 
 
 3. ' Words and phrases are often repeated without reflection, 
 and their very familiarity is likely to prevent us from attempting 
 to understand exactly what ideas they represent.' Give illus- 
 trations of this fact. 
 
 4. What do you mean by a science ? How does ' scientific ' 
 knowledge differ from the knowledge of ordinary life? 
 
 5. What is the meaning of the word 'law' in the phrase 
 ' a law of thought ' ? Compare the use of the word in such ex- 
 pressions as ' laws of nature,' ' the laws of the land." 
 
 6. Is it true that Logic and Psychology have the same 
 subject-matter? 
 
 7. Explain carefully how the problem of Logic differs from 
 that of Psychology. 
 
 8. If we parallel Psychology with Morphology, and Logic 
 with Physiology, what mental science will correspond to 
 Embryology? 
 
 9 Illustrate by means of examples not used in the text the 
 relation in which science and art, or theory and practice, stand 
 to each other. 
 
 348
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 349 
 
 10. Criticise the following statement : ' Logic is not only a 
 science ; it is also an art, for it teaches us to reason correctly.' 
 
 11. What part does Introspection play in investigating logi- 
 cal questions? 
 
 12. In what sense may we say that the records of everything 
 which the human race has accomplished form the material of 
 Logic? 
 
 CHAPTER II. Historical Sketch 
 
 1. 'The sciences have arisen in response to the practical 
 needs of mankind.' Is this statement confirmed by the history 
 of the origin and development of Logic ? 
 
 2. ' Since each individual sees things from his own point of 
 view, there is therefore nothing really true in itself, or good in 
 itself.' Give some illustrations of the former part of this state- 
 ment. What term would you use to describe the theory which 
 the sentence expresses? 
 
 3. Explain what is meant by the statement that Socrates 
 and Plato found a standard of truth t and of conduct in the 
 Concept. 
 
 4. Why was it not possible for Aristotle to lay down a com- 
 plete theory of Inductive Reasoning? 
 
 5. What is Mill's theory regarding the relation of Induction 
 and Deduction? 
 
 6. Describe the standpoint of Modern Logic. 
 
 PART I. THE SYLLOGISMS 
 CHAPTER III. The Syllogism and its Parts 
 
 1. Describe the general purpose and nature of the syllogism. 
 
 2. What is the principle upon which syllogistic reasoning 
 depends? Why is it impossible to reason if this principle is 
 violated ?
 
 35O QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 3. Explain the distinction between the formal and real truth 
 of an argument. 
 
 4. Arrange the following sentences as logical propositions, 
 pointing out the logical Subject and the Predicate in each 
 case : 
 
 (a) Learning taketh away the wildness of men's minds. 
 () Dissipation wastes health. 
 
 (c ) The exposition of a principle indirectly contributes to 
 
 its proof. 
 
 (d) To me the meanest flower that lives can give thoughts 
 
 that do often lie too deep for tears. 
 (<?) The Alps consist of several parallel ranges. 
 (/) The travellers had found the city in ruins. 
 
 5. Point out the Premises and Conclusion in the following 
 arguments, and supply any premise which may be wanting : 
 
 (a) He is not indifferent to money ; for he is a sensible 
 man, and no sensible man despises money. 
 
 () All human productions are liable to error, and there- 
 fore all books, being human productions, are liable 
 to error. 
 
 (c) All that glitters is not gold ; for brass glitters. 
 
 (</) All bodies which move round the sun are planets; 
 therefore the earth is a planet. 
 
 (<?) Platinum is a metal, and therefore combines with 
 oxygen. 
 
 6. How does Jevons describe Simple Apprehension? Is it 
 possible to maintain that Apprehension, Judgment, and Rea- 
 soning are three distinct operations of mind ? 
 
 CHAPTER IV. Terms 
 
 i. Distinguish in the following list the terms which are 
 usually (i) Singular, (2) General, and (3) Collective. If any
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 351 
 
 term may belong to more than one class, explain and illustrate 
 its various uses : 
 
 Niagara Falls, an oak tree, the United States Navy, 
 
 gold, a dancing party, Brooklyn Bridge, 
 
 chair, the United States, humanity, 
 
 a pack of cards, city, the centre of the earth. 
 
 2. Explain and illustrate the ambiguity in the use of the 
 word ' all.' 
 
 3. In what two ways are the words Abstract and Concrete 
 used ? In what sense, if at all, can we say that Psychology and 
 Logic are ' abstract ' sciences ? 
 
 4. Distinguish carefully between Contradictory and Oppo- 
 site terms. 
 
 5. What are Correlative terms? Give at least three ex- 
 amples. 
 
 6. Mention the synonyms for Intension and Extension. 
 
 7. Explain the Extensional and Intensional use of the fol- 
 lowing terms : 
 
 metal, chair, man, Caesar, superstition, 
 
 justice, student, John Jones, island, emperor. 
 
 8. Criticise the statement that ' Extension and Intension 
 stand in inverse ratio to each other.' What truth does it con- 
 tain? 
 
 9. Invent a series of at least six terms which may be ar- 
 ranged so as gradually to increase in Extension. 
 
 10. What may be said in reply to Mill's contention that 
 proper names are non-connotative ? 
 
 CHAPTER V. Definition and Division 
 
 \?. .!< * 
 
 1. Why is Definition necessary? 
 
 2. What is the distinction between extensive and intensive 
 definition? What is a verbal definition?
 
 352 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 3. In what two ways may we conceive the problem of 
 Definition? 
 
 4. What do you understand by the Socratic Dialectic ? Ex- 
 plain its purpose and mode of procedure. 
 
 5. Explain the terms : 
 
 genus, differentia, infima species, 
 
 species, summum genus, sui generis. 
 
 6. Criticise the following definitions, pointing out what rules, 
 if any, are violated by them : 
 
 (1) Logic is the science of thought. 
 
 (2) A power is a force which tends to produce motion. 
 
 (3) Tin is a metal lighter than gold. 
 
 (4) A gentleman is a man who has no definite means of 
 
 support. 
 
 (5) The body is the emblem or visible garment of the 
 
 soul. 
 
 (6) Man is a vertebrate animal. 
 
 (7) Thunder-bolts are the winged messengers of the 
 
 gods. 
 
 (8) A moral man is one who does not lie or steal or live 
 
 intemperately. 
 
 (9) Cheese is a caseous preparation of milk. 
 
 (10) Evolution is to be defined as a continuous change 
 from indefinite incoherent homogeneity to definite 
 coherent heterogeneity of structure and function, 
 through successive differentiations and integra- 
 tions (Spencer). 
 
 (n) Oats is a grain which in England is generally given 
 to horses, but in Scotland supports the people. 
 
 7. Give examples of terms which are indefinable, and ex- 
 plain why this is the case. What is the distinction between 
 Description and logical Definition?
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 353 
 
 8. Define the following terms by giving the genus and dif- 
 ferentia : 
 
 science, republic, psychology, island, 
 
 triangle, monarchy, gold standard, import duty. 
 
 9. Examine the following Divisions and point out which are 
 logical and which are not : 
 
 (1) Living beings into moral and immoral. 
 
 (2) Men into saints and sinners. 
 
 (3) Religions into true and false. 
 
 (4) Man into civilized and black. 
 
 (5) Geometrical figures into rectilinear and non-recti- 
 
 linear. 
 
 (6) Substances into material and spiritual. 
 
 (7) Metals into white, heavy, and precious. 
 
 (8) Elementary mental processes into sensations and 
 
 affections. 
 
 (9) Students into those who are idle, those who are 
 
 athletic, and those who are diligent. 
 (10) Books into scientific and non-scientific. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. Propositions 
 
 1. What is a proposition? In what sense may a proposition 
 be said to have parts ? 
 
 2. Distinguish between Categorical and Conditional propo- 
 sitions. 
 
 3. What is meant by (a) the Quality, and (b) the Quantity, 
 of propositions? 
 
 4. Arrange the following sentences in the form of logical 
 propositions, and indicate the Quality and Quantity of each 
 categorical proposition by the use of the letters A, E, I, 
 and O: 
 
 2A
 
 354 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 (1) Brevity has to be sought without sacrificing per- 
 
 spicuity. 
 
 (2) He that doeth these things is like to a man that 
 
 buildeth his house upon a rock. 
 
 (3) Socrates declared knowledge to be virtue. 
 
 (4) Phosphorus does not dissolve in water. 
 
 (5) Nearly all the troops have left the town. 
 
 (6) Only ignorant persons hold such opinions. 
 
 (7) Few persons are proof against temptation. 
 
 (8) Over the mountains poured the barbarian horde. 
 
 (9) Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish. 
 
 (10) Neither gold nor silver is the proper standard of 
 value. 
 
 5. How does formal logic interpret the relation between the 
 subject and predicate of a categorical proposition? Does this 
 view do full justice to the signification of propositions? 
 
 6. How would you represent by means of circles the propo- 
 sition, ' gold is the most precious metal ' ? 
 
 7. What do you mean by the distribution of terms ? Explain 
 why negative propositions distribute the predicate, while affir- 
 mative propositions do not. 
 
 8. State precisely what is asserted by Proposition I. What 
 forms may the diagrams which represent this proposition 
 assume ? 
 
 CHAPTER VII. The Interpretation of Propositions 
 
 1. Why is it better to speak of the Interpretation of propo- 
 sitions than to use the term ' Immediate Inference ' ? 
 
 2. What is meant by the Opposition of propositions ? 
 
 3. Explain the distinction between Contrary and Contradic- 
 tory propositions. 
 
 4. If proposition O is false, what is known regarding the 
 truth or falsity of A, E, and I ?
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 355 
 
 5. What is the simplest proposition which must be estab- 
 lished in order to disprove the following statements : (a) All 
 men desire wealth, (b) No man is perfectly happy, (c) Some 
 knowledge is not of any value, (d) Pain alone is evil. (<?) All 
 is not lost. 
 
 6. Give the contrary (or sub-contrary) , and the contradictory 
 of: (a) All metals are elements, (b) No coward need apply. 
 (f) Socrates was the wisest man in Athens, (d) Not all men 
 are brave. (<?) No man but a traitor would have done this. 
 
 (7. Give the Obverse of the following propositions : 
 (i) All horses are quadrupeds. 
 
 (2) Good men are charitable. 
 
 (3) None of the captives escaped. 
 
 (4) Some of the planets are not larger than the earth. 
 
 (5) Some students do not fail in anything. 
 
 (6) All English dukes are members of the House of Lords. 
 
 (7) No illogical author is truly scientific. 
 
 8. Convert in at least one way : 
 (T) All men are rational. 
 
 (2) Some metals are readily fusible. 
 
 (3) Perfect happiness is impossible. 
 
 (4) None of the captives escaped. 
 
 (5) Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown. 
 
 (6) Not every man could stand such hardships. 
 
 (7) None but the brave deserves the fair. 
 
 (8) Phosphorus will not dissolve in alcohol. 
 
 (9) Hydrogen is the lightest body known. 
 , (10) The world is my idea. 
 
 9. Convert by contraposition : 
 
 (1) All honest men are of this opinion. 
 
 (2) Oxygen can be prepared by heating potassium chlo- 
 
 rate in a thin glass dusk.
 
 356 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 (3) Some of the enemy were not prepared to surrender. 
 \ (4) Not all who came to scoff remained to pray. 
 
 (5) A triangle is a plane figure bounded by three straight 
 
 lines. 
 
 (6) The return of peace had given fresh confidence to 
 
 the government party. 
 
 10. Describe the logical relation between each of the four 
 following propositions : 
 
 (1) All substances which are material possess gravity. 
 
 (2) No substances which possess gravity are immaterial. 
 
 (3) Some substances which are immaterial do not possess 
 
 gravity. 
 
 (4) Some substances which do not possess gravity are 
 
 immaterial. (Jevons.) 
 
 11. What is the Obverse of the Converse of, 'None of the 
 planets shine by their own light ' ? 
 
 12. Can we logically conclude that because heat expands 
 bodies, therefore cold contracts them? (Jevons.) 
 
 13. What is the logical relation, if any, between the two 
 assertions in Proverbs xi. i, 'A false balance is an abomination 
 to the Lord ; but a just weight is his delight ' ? (Jevons.) 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. The Syllogism and its Rules 
 
 1. What is the relation of the Proposition and the Syllo- 
 gism? 
 
 2. What is the function of the Middle Term in a Syllogism? 
 
 3. How are the major and minor terms, and the major and 
 minor premises of a Syllogism distinguished? 
 
 4. Prove the seventh and eighth canon of the Syllogism, 
 (a) by means of the previous rules, and () by the use of 
 circles.
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 357 
 
 5. Construct an argument to illustrate the fallacy of ambigu- 
 ous middle term. 
 
 6. Arrange the following arguments in the regular logical 
 order of major premise, minor premise, and conclusion, and 
 examine them to see whether they conform to the canons of 
 the Syllogism : 
 
 (1) Gold is not a compound substance; for it is a metal, 
 
 and none of the metals are compounds. 
 
 (2) All national holidays are bank holidays, the bank will 
 
 therefore be closed on the fourth of July. 
 
 (3) All cruel men are cowards, no college men are 
 
 cruel, therefore no college men are cowards. 
 
 (4) Some useful metals are becoming rarer. Iron is a 
 
 useful metal, and is therefore becoming rarer. 
 
 (5) This man shares his money with the poor, but no 
 
 thief ever does this, therefore this man is not a 
 thief. 
 
 (6) He who is content with what he has is truly rich. 
 
 An envious man is not content with what he has ; 
 no envious man therefore is truly rich. 
 
 7. What does the Figure of an Argument depend upon? 
 How do you distinguish the four figures? 
 
 CHAPTER IX. The Valid Moods and the Reduction of Figures 
 
 1. Arrange the following arguments in logical order, and 
 give the mood and figure in each case : 
 
 (i) No P is M, (2) All M is S, 
 
 Some S is M, Some M is P, 
 
 Therefore some S is not P. Therefore some S is P. 
 
 2. Name the premises from which valid conclusions may 
 be drawn, no account being taken of figures :
 
 358 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 AA, EO, IA, IO, II, EE, El, AE, EA, OO. 
 
 3. Prove the special canons of the fourth figure. 
 
 4. 'The middle term must be distributed once at least.' 
 In what figures may it be distributed twice? What is the 
 character of the conclusion when this occurs? 
 
 5. Prove generally that when the major term is predicate in 
 its premise, the minor premise must be affirmative. 
 
 6. If the major term be distributed in its premise, but used 
 undistributively in the conclusion, determine the mood and 
 figure. 
 
 7. Explain why we can obtain only negative conclusions by 
 means of the second figure and particular conclusions by means 
 of the third figure. 
 
 8. What conclusions do AA, AE, and EA yield in the fourth 
 figure ? Explain. 
 
 9. Is it possible for both major and minor terms to be par- 
 ticular at the same time in the premises? If so, construct an 
 argument where this is the case. 
 
 10. What do you understand by Reduction? Reduce the 
 following argument to the first figure : 
 
 No fixed stars are planets, 
 
 All planets are bright and shining, 
 
 Therefore some bright and shining bodies are not fixed stars. 
 
 CHAPTER X. Abbreviated and Irregular Arguments 
 
 i. Complete the following arguments, determine their mood 
 and figure, and examine them to see if they violate any of the 
 rules of the syllogism : 
 
 (1) Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the 
 
 earth. 
 
 (2) He must be a strong man, for he was on the crew.
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 359 
 
 (3) Zoophytes have no flowers ; therefore they are not 
 
 plants. 
 
 (4) None but material bodies gravitate, therefore air is 
 
 a material body. 
 
 (5) He has been a politician for years, and is therefore 
 
 not to be trusted. 
 
 2. Illustrate the difference between the Progressive or 
 Synthetic, and the Regressive or Analytic methods as em- 
 ployed in Mathematics and Psychology. May a science 
 employ both methods at the same time ? 
 
 3. Break up the concrete examples of Sorites given on 
 pages 130, 131, into syllogisms. 
 
 4. Show generally why all the premises except the first in 
 the Aristotelian Sorites must be universal. 
 
 5. Prove that in the Goclenian Sorites the first premise 
 alone can be negative, and the last alone particular. 
 
 6. In the examples of arguments given on page 133, is there 
 any middle term? If not, what serves as the standard of 
 comparison ? 
 
 CHAPTER XL Hypothetical and Disjunctive Arguments 
 
 1. What reasons are there for classifying the disjunctive 
 proposition as conditional ? 
 
 2. What are the rules of the hypothetical syllogism ? 
 
 3. Is it ever possible to obtain a valid conclusion by deny- 
 ing the antecedent or affirming the consequent ? 
 
 4. Determine which of the following hypothetical arguments 
 are valid and which invalid ; then express the latter in the 
 categorical form, pointing out what are the categorical fallacies 
 which result : 
 
 (i) If a man is avaricious, he will be unhappy ; but A is
 
 360 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 unhappy, and we may therefore conclude that he is 
 avaricious. 
 
 (2) If A is B, C is D, but A is B, therefore we may 
 
 conclude that C is D. 
 
 (3) If the door were locked, the horse would not be 
 
 stolen ; but the horse is not stolen, therefore the 
 door must have been locked. 
 
 (4) If man were not capable of progress, he would not 
 
 differ from the brutes ; but man does differ from 
 the brutes, therefore he is capable of progress. 
 
 (5) If he had studied his lesson, he would have been 
 
 able to recite ; but he was able to recite, and there- 
 fore must have studied his lesson. 
 
 (6) If it becomes colder to-night, the pond will be frozen 
 
 over; but it will not become colder to-night, 
 therefore the pond will not be frozen over. 
 
 5. What aspects of thinking are emphasized by the cate- 
 gorical and hypothetical forms of reasoning respectively ? 
 
 6. How far may the disjunctive proposition be regarded as 
 an expression of ignorance, and what is the justification for 
 the statement that it involves systematic knowledge ? 
 
 7. To what fallacy is the disjunctive argument specially 
 liable? 
 
 8. How would you criticise the dilemmatic arguments given 
 on page 150? 
 
 CHAPTER XII. Fallacies of Deductive Reasoning 
 
 i." What is the distinction between errors of interpretation 
 and fallacies in reasoning? 
 
 2. Why is the detection of material fallacies a proper subject 
 of logic? 
 
 3. If it is true that all the righteous people are happy, can
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 361 
 
 we conclude that all unhappy people are unrighteous ? If so, 
 how do we pass from the first statement to the second? 
 
 4. Can we proceed logically from the proposition, ' all good 
 citizens vote at elections,' to ' all who vote in elections are 
 good citizens ' ? 
 
 5. Does the statement that ' some sciences are useful,' justify 
 the proposition that ' some useful things are not sciences ' ? 
 
 6. Mention the fallacies of Equivocation, and explain what is 
 common to them all. 
 
 7. Explain the terms : Petitio Principii, Circulus inprobando, 
 Argumentum ad hominem, Argumentum ad populum. 
 
 8. Examine the following reasoning: 'The argument from 
 design must be regarded as without value ; for it has been re- 
 jected by Spinoza, Kant, Spencer, and Darwin.' 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES 
 
 Arrange the following arguments whenever possible in regular 
 logical order ; determine whether or not they are valid ; give 
 the mood and figure of the valid categorical arguments ; if any 
 argument is invalid, point out and name the fallacy involved : 
 
 \ i. All virtue is praiseworthy, and charity is a virtue, there- 
 fore charity is praiseworthy. 
 
 2. All colours are physical phenomena ; but no sound is a 
 a colour, therefore no sound is a physical phenomenon. 
 
 3. Some minerals are precious stones, all topazes are pre- 
 cious stones, therefore some minerals are topazes. 
 
 4. Some acts of homicide are laudable, therefore some 
 cruel things are laudable. 
 
 5. If he has found the treasure, he is rich ; but he has not 
 found it, therefore he is not rich. 
 
 6. He must be a Democrat ; for all the Democrats believe 
 in Free Trade.
 
 362 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 7. If only the ignorant despise knowledge, this man cannot 
 be ignorant, for he praises it. (Edinburgh, 1892.) 
 
 8. Whatever is given on the evidence of sense may be taken 
 as a fact ; the existence of God, therefore, is not a fact, for it is 
 not evident to sense. (St. Andrews, 1896.) 
 
 9. This explosion must have been occasioned by gunpowder ; 
 for nothing else would have possessed sufficient force. 
 
 10. This burglary is the work of a professional ; for an 
 amateur would not have been half so clever. 
 
 n. No stupid person can become President of the United 
 States ; therefore Mr. Cleveland and Mr. McKinley must both 
 be men of ability ^ 
 
 12. Since almost all the organs of the body have some use, 
 the vermiform appendix must be useful. 
 
 13. Every candid man acknowledges merit in a rival, every 
 learned man does not do so ; therefore learned men are not 
 candid. 
 
 14. Every book is liable to error, every book is a human 
 production, therefore all human productions are liable to error. 
 
 15. Learned men sometimes become mad; but as he is not 
 learned, there is no danger of his sanity. 
 
 1 6. If this candidate used money to secure his election, he 
 deserved defeat ; but he did not use money in this way, and 
 therefore did not deserve defeat. 
 
 17. All valid syllogisms have three terms ; this syllogism is 
 therefore valid, for it has three terms. 
 
 18. No persons destitute of imagination are true poets; 
 some persons destitute of imagination are good reasoners ; 
 therefore some good reasoners are not true poets. 
 
 19. Only material bodies gravitate ; ether does not gravitate. 
 
 20. In reply to the gentleman's arguments, I need only say 
 that two years ago he advocated the very measure which he 
 now opposes.
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 363 
 
 21. If he claims that he did not steal the goods, why, I ask, 
 did he hide them as no thief ever fails to do ? 
 
 22. If this therefore be absurd in fact and theory, it must 
 also be absurd in idea, since nothing of which we can form a 
 clear and distinct idea is impossible. (Hume, Treatise of 
 Human Nature?) 
 
 23. Whatever is produced without a cause is produced by 
 nothing, or in other words has nothing for its cause. But 
 nothing can never be a cause. Hence every object has a real 
 cause of its existence. (Hume, Treatise.} 
 
 24. Everything must have a cause ; for if anything wanted 
 a cause it would produce itself, that is, exist before it existed, 
 which is impossible. (Hume, Treatise?) 
 
 25. If it be true, as Mr. Spencer thinks, that the past 
 experience of the race has produced innate ideas and feel- 
 ings, Weismann's denial of Use-inheritance would be refuted. 
 Certainly, but it is just possible that Mr. Spencer's theory is 
 not true. 
 
 26. Democracy is not a perfect form of government, for 
 under it there are able men who do not get power; and so 
 it allows men to get power who are not able. 
 
 27. Of university professors, some are zealous investigators, 
 and some good teachers. A is an excellent teacher, and we 
 may therefore conclude that he is not a zealous investigator. 
 
 28. Seeing that abundance of work is a sure sign of indus- 
 trial prosperity, it follows that fire and hurricane benefit in- 
 dustry, because they undoubtedly create work. (St. Andrews, 
 
 1895-) 
 
 29. I will have no more doctors ; I see that all of those who 
 have died this winter have had doctors. (St. Andrews, 1896.^ 
 
 30. If a man is educated, he does not want to work with his 
 hands; consequently, if education is universal, industry will 
 cease. (London, 1897.)
 
 364 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 31. None but the wise are good, and none but the good are 
 happy, therefore none but the wise are happy. (Edinburgh, 
 1897.) 
 
 32. Giving advice is useless. For either you advise a man 
 what he means to do, in which case the advice is superfluous ; 
 or you advise him what he does not mean to do, and the advice 
 is ineffectual. (London, 1897.) 
 
 33. No pauper has a vote, A B is not a pauper, therefore 
 he has a vote. (St. Andrews, 1897.) 
 
 34. The love of nature is never found either in the stupid 
 or the immoral man, therefore stupidity and virtue are incom- 
 patible. (Edinburgh, 1897.) 
 
 35. Not all educated persons spell correctly; for one often 
 finds mistakes in the papers of University students. 
 
 36. Free Trade is a great boon to the workingman ; for it 
 increases trade, and this cheapens articles of ordinary con- 
 sumption; this gives a greater purchasing power to money, 
 which is equivalent to a rise in real wages, and any rise in 
 real wages is a boon to the workingman. 
 
 37. If the train is late, I shall miss my appointment ; if it is 
 not late, I shall not reach the depot in time to go by it, there- 
 fore, in any case, I shall miss my appointment. 
 
 38. He who spareth the rod hateth his child; the parent 
 who loves his child therefore spareth not the rod. 
 
 39. Whatever tends to withdraw the mind from pursuits of 
 a low nature deserves to be promoted ; classical learning does 
 this, since it gives us a taste for intellectual enjoyments ; there- 
 fore it deserves to be promoted. 
 
 40. As against the proposition that the formation of public 
 libraries prevents private individuals from purchasing, and so 
 decreases the sale of books, a writer urges that whatever 
 encourages the reading of books encourages the buying of 
 books. It is a library's purpose to encourage reading, and
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 365 
 
 hence the net result is rather to increase than to lessen pur- 
 chases. 
 
 41. No reason however can be given why the general hap- 
 piness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he 
 believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, 
 however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which 
 the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that 
 happiness is a good, that each person's happiness is a good to 
 that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to 
 the aggregate of all persons. (Mill's Utilitarianism.} 
 
 42. This man is a Protestant; for he exercises the right of 
 private judgment. 
 
 43. If the orbit of a comet is diminished, either the comet 
 passes through a resisting medium, or the law of gravitation is 
 partially suspended. But the second alternative is inadmis- 
 sible. Hence if the orbit of a comet is diminished, there is 
 present a resisting medium. 
 
 44. How do we know that our intuitive beliefs concerning 
 the world are invariably true ? Either it must be from experi- 
 ence establishing the harmony, or an intuitive belief must certify 
 the correctness. Now experience cannot warrant such har- 
 mony except in so far as it has been perceived. Still more 
 futile is it to make one instinctive belief the cause of another. 
 Thus we cannot know that any intuitive belief is universally 
 valid. (Bain.) 
 
 45. Which of the following are real inferences : (i) 'This 
 weighs that down, therefore it is heavier'; (2) 'This piece of 
 marble is larger than that, and therefore is heavier.' 
 
 46. The parts of pure space are immovable, which follows 
 from their inseparability, motion being nothing but change of 
 distance between any two things ; but this cannot be between 
 parts that are inseparable, which therefore must be at per- 
 petual rest one amongst another.
 
 366 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 47. If a body moves, it must move either in the place where 
 it is, or in the place where it is not. But a body cannot move 
 in the place where it is, nor yet in the place where it is not. 
 Hence a body cannot move at all. 
 
 48. We have no perfect idea of anything but a perception. 
 A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have 
 therefore no idea of substance. (Hume.) 
 
 49. Every good government promotes the intelligence of the 
 people, and no despotism does that. (Bain.) 
 
 50. He was too impulsive a man not to have committed 
 many errors. (Bain.) 
 
 51. A true philosopher is independent of the caprices of 
 fortune, for he places his chief happiness in moral and intel- 
 lectual excellence. 
 
 52. Educated among savages, he could not be expected to 
 know the customs of polite society. (Bain.) 
 
 53. No war is long popular ; for every war increases taxa- 
 tion, and the popularity of anything that touches our pockets 
 is very short lived. 
 
 54. The general object which all laws have, or ought to 
 have, in common, is to augment the total happiness of the 
 community ; and therefore, in the first place, to exclude as far 
 as may be everything that tends to subtract from that happi- 
 ness : in other words, to exclude mischief. But all punishment 
 is mischief; all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the princi- 
 ple of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to 
 be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater 
 evil. (Bentham.) 
 
 55. Experiments for the purpose of ascertaining the func- 
 tions of the various organs in animals cause pain, and as we are 
 not warranted in causing pain to any sentient creature, such 
 experiments are wrong. 
 
 56. Thou shalt not b^ar false witness against thy neighbour.
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 367 
 
 57. What is the use of all this teaching? Every day you 
 hear of a fraud or forgery, by some one who might have led 
 an innocent life, if he had never learned to read and write. 
 (Edinburgh.) 
 
 58. Pious men only are fit to be ministers of religion ; some 
 men who have not received a college education are pious men, 
 therefore such men are fitted to be ministers of religion. 
 
 59. What fallacy did Columbus commit when he proved 
 that an egg could stand on end? (Jevons.) 
 
 60. No traitor is to be trusted, John is no traitor, and 
 therefore is to be trusted. 
 
 6 1. Against what fallacy does the proverb, 'all that glitters 
 is not gold,' warn us? 
 
 62. Livy describes prodigies in his history, therefore he is 
 never to be believed. 
 
 63. The theory of evolution is true, for it is accepted by 
 every scientific biologist. 
 
 64. The theory of evolution is not true, for it was not ac- 
 cepted by Agassiz, nor by Gladstone ; moreover, you cannot 
 accept this doctrine, for it is disclaimed by the authorities of 
 your church. 
 
 65. The advantages which would accrue to the working- 
 classes are not sufficient to justify Protection, neither are the 
 advantages which it would bring to the farmers or the manu- 
 facturers, or to any other class in the community ; Protection 
 therefore has not enough advantages to justify it. 
 
 66. No man should be punished if he is innocent ; this man 
 should not be punished ; therefore he is innocent. 
 
 67. He could not face bullets on the field of battle, and is 
 therefore a coward. 
 
 68. We know that God exists because the Bible tells us so ; 
 and we know that whatever the Bible affirms must be true 
 because it is of divine origin.
 
 368 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 69. Nations are justified in revolting when badly governed, 
 for every people has a right to good government. (Edinburgh.) 
 
 70. When Croesus was about to make war upon Cyrus, King 
 of Persia, he consulted the oracle at Delphi, and received for 
 an answer that, if he should wage war against the Persians, he 
 would overthrow a mighty empire. 
 
 71. England has a gold coinage, and is a very wealthy coun- 
 try, therefore it may be inferred that other countries having a 
 gold coinage will be wealthy. 
 
 72. Your arguments against the philosophy of Hegel are 
 of no value ; for you uphold that of Schopenhauer, which is 
 equally repugnant to common sense. 
 
 73. For those who are bent on cultivating their minds by 
 diligent study, the incitement of academical honours is unnec- 
 essary ; and it is ineffectual for the idle, and such as are in- 
 different to mental improvement ; therefore the incitement of 
 academical honours is either unnecessary or ineffectual. 
 
 74. Without order there is no living in public society, be- 
 cause the want thereof is the mother of confusion, whereupon 
 division of necessity followeth ; and out of division, destruction. 
 
 75. If it is always impossible not to sin, it is always unjust to 
 punish. Now it is always impossible not to sin, for all that is 
 predetermined is necessary, and all that is foreseen is pre- 
 determined, and every event is foreseen. Hence it is always 
 unjust to punish. (Leibniz, Theodicy?) 
 
 76. If a gas is heated, its temperature rises ; if its tempera- 
 ture rises, its elastic force increases ; if its elastic force increases, 
 the pressure on the walls of the containing vessel increases ; 
 therefore if a gas is heated, the pressure on the walls of the 
 containing vessel increases. (Ray.) 
 
 77. The end of human life is either perfection or happi- 
 ness ; death is the end of human life, therefore death is either 
 perfection or happiness.
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 369 
 
 78. If light consisted of material particles, it would possess 
 momentum ; it cannot consist of material particles, for it does 
 not possess momentum. 
 
 79. This person is very learned, and very sociable, hence it 
 follows that learning increases sociability. 
 
 80. Why advocate socialism? Until men become morally 
 perfect, it is impossible ; when they have become so, it will be 
 unnecessary. (Edinburgh.) 
 
 8 1. The diameter of the earth is, in round numbers, forty 
 millions of feet. Consequently the attraction of a sphere of the 
 same mean density as the earth, but one foot in diameter, will 
 be TTnnAnnnr P art the attraction of the earth ; that is, TRr ^ T5irTr 
 of the weight of the body attracted. Consequently, if we should 
 measure the attraction of such a sphere of lead, and find that 
 it was just ^TnnrWoT tnat f tne we ight of the body attracted, 
 we would conclude that the mean density of the earth was 
 equal to that of lead. But the attraction is actually found to 
 be nearly twice as great as this ; consequently a leaden sphere 
 is nearly twice as dense as the average of the matter composing 
 the earth. (Newcomb, Popular Astronomy?) 
 
 82. Mr. C. said that he was certain that the donors gave the 
 [noperty to the institution with a distinct and unanimous 
 understanding as to its future use. The directors who acted 
 for the institution in this transfer must necessarily have had an 
 understanding, either the same as that of the donors, or differ- 
 ent. If the understanding of the directors was the same as 
 that of the donors, then they, the former, were unquestionably 
 bound to live up to that understanding. If it was different, 
 then the property was conveyed on a misunderstanding, and 
 every dictate of honour and fair play would demand the return 
 of the property. 
 
 II
 
 370 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 PART II. INDUCTIVE METHODS 
 CHAPTER XIII. The Problem of Induction 
 
 1. Explain why syllogistic logic is not a complete account 
 of the nature of thinking. 
 
 2. In what sense is it possible to lay down the laws of scien- 
 tific procedure? 
 
 3. In solving a complex scientific problem do we usually 
 employ but a single method ? 
 
 4. What can you say regarding the division of inductive 
 methods into methods of Observation, and methods of Expla- 
 nation ? 
 
 5. Would it be permissible to add Experimental methods as 
 a third and independent class? 
 
 6. What is the distinction between ' empirical ' and ' scien- 
 tific ' knowledge ? 
 
 7. What are the advantages to be derived from experiments 
 in scientific work ? 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. Enumeration and Statistics 
 
 1. What is the justification for beginning our account of the 
 inductive methods with Enumeration? 
 
 2. Explain what Jevons regards as 'Perfect' induction. 
 Has this process any right to the name? 
 
 3. For what purpose are statistics employed? To what 
 classes of phenomena are they applied ? 
 
 4. What is meant by a phenomenon? 
 
 5. Explain how statistics may suggest causal laws, or confirm 
 our expectation of them. May statistics also be used to dis- 
 prove a proposed law of causal connection? Illustrate your 
 answer.
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 3/L 
 
 6. Explain what is meant by the ' average/ and show how it 
 is obtained. 
 
 7. How does the procedure of insurance companies differ 
 from gambling? 
 
 CHAPTER XV. Causal Determination 
 
 1. What are the two main principles upon which the canons 
 proposed by Mill are founded ? 
 
 2. Give the Canon of the Method of Agreement, and illus- 
 trate its use. 
 
 3. 'I have noticed that A always precedes B, it is there- 
 fore the cause of B.' Is this good reasoning? 
 
 4. What is meant by the ' Plurality of Causes ' ? 
 
 5. Under what disadvantages does the Method of Agreement 
 labour? How is it supplemented? 
 
 6. State and illustrate the canon of the Method of Differ- 
 ence. 
 
 7. Why is this method applicable only to the spheres where 
 experiment can be employed? Would it be safe to depend 
 upon this method in determining the causes of social or politi- 
 cal conditions? 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. Causal Determination {continued) 
 
 1. Where do we employ the Joint Method? 
 
 2. What would it be necessary to establish in order to 
 prove inductively that some change in the tariff laws was 
 beneficial to the country? 
 
 3. ' One of the main characteristics of modern science is its 
 quantitative nature.' Explain. 
 
 4. How does the law of Concomitant Variations assist us in 
 determining causal relations ?
 
 3/2 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 5. In what two ways may the Method of Residues be 
 applied ? 
 
 6. Mention some discoveries to which the investigation of 
 unexplained residues has led. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. Analogy 
 
 1. Why do we include Analogy among the methods of Ex- 
 planation ? 
 
 2. What do you mean by Analogy? What is the principle 
 upon which it proceeds? 
 
 3. How is the word used in mathematical reasoning, and in 
 physiology ? 
 
 4. Into what Figure of the Syllogism does an argument 
 from Analogy naturally fall? Is the argument formally valid, 
 and if not, to what syllogistic fallacy does it correspond ? 
 
 5. Explain how Analogy may suggest a true law or explana- 
 tory principle. 
 
 6. Why do we speak of Analogy as Incomplete Explanation? 
 
 7. If all analogical reasoning yields only probability, is not 
 one analogy as good as another for purposes of inference ? If 
 not, upon what does the value of an inference from Analogy 
 depend ? 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. The Use of Hypotheses 
 
 1. How do you distinguish the terms 'theory' and 'hy- 
 pothesis ' ? 
 
 2. What is an hypothesis, and how is it used? 
 
 3. Do hypotheses play any part in assisting Observation? 
 Explain and illustrate. 
 
 4. Give some instances in which hypotheses have proved 
 injurious, and have misled people regarding the nature ol 
 facts.
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 373 
 
 5. 'Hypotheses are formed by the imagination working in 
 dependence upon facts and guided by analogy.' Explain. 
 
 6. What are the steps in the proof of an hypothesis? 
 
 7. Explain what part is played by Induction and Deduction 
 respectively in using hypotheses. 
 
 8. What canons have been laid down to which a good hy- 
 pothesis must conform? Why are the first and third of these 
 rules of little value ? 
 
 9. Explain why an unverifiable hypothesis is not worth dis- 
 cussing. 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. Fallacies of Induction 
 
 1. What is the source of fallacy? How far is it true that the 
 study of Logic can protect us from fallacies ? 
 
 2. How do you classify Inductive Fallacies? 
 
 3. Explain and illustrate the following fallacies : Question- 
 begging Epithet, Equivocation, Fallacies due to Figurative Lan- 
 guage. 
 
 4. Explain and illustrate the tendency of the mind to neg- 
 lect negative cases. 
 
 5. Is it an easy matter to ' tell just what we saw and heard' 
 at a particular time ? 
 
 6. What do you mean by post hoc ergo propter hoc ? Why 
 may we take this as the general type of inductive fallacies ? 
 
 7. What did Bacon mean by the Idols of the Cave? 
 
 8. ' Every age, as well as every individual, has its idols.' 
 Explain this statement. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES 
 
 Analyze the examples of inductive reasoning given below, 
 and point out what methods are employed, indicating also 
 whether or not the conclusion is completely established :
 
 374 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 1. In my experience A has been invariably preceded by B, 
 and we may therefore conclude that it is the cause of it. 
 
 2. Scarlet poppies, scarlet verbenas, the scarlet hawthorn, 
 
 fd, 
 
 and honeysuckle are all odourless, therefore we may conclude 
 that all scarlet flowers are destitute of odour. 
 
 3. What inference, if any, can be drawn from the follow- 
 ing statement : ' In nine counties, in which the population 
 is from 100 to 150 per square mile, the births are 296 
 to 100 marriages ; in sixteen counties, with a population 
 of 150 to 200 per square mile; the births are 308 to 100 
 marriages ' ? 
 
 4. The great famine in Ireland began in 1845 and reached 
 its climax in 1848. During this time agrarian crime increased 
 very rapidly, until, in 1848, it was more than three times as 
 great as in 1845. After this time it decreased with the return 
 of better crops, until, in 185 1, it was only 50 per cent more than 
 it was in 1845. ^ * s evident from this that a close relation 
 of cause and effect exists between famine and agrarian crime. 
 (Hyslop.) 
 
 5. Sachs maintained, in 1862, that starch is formed by the 
 decomposition in chlorophyl of carbon-dioxide gas under the 
 influence of light. He found that when all other conditions 
 were constant, and light was excluded from a plant, no starch 
 was formed ; the single circumstance of readmitting light was 
 accompanied by renewed formation of starch. Further, he 
 found that if certain portions of the leaves of an illuminated 
 plant were covered with black paper, no starch was found in 
 these portions. 
 
 6. Jupiter gives out more light than it receives from the sun. 
 What is the obvious conclusion, and by what method is it 
 reached ? 
 
 7. What methods would you employ in order to test the 
 truth of the proposition, omne vivum ex vivo ?
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 375 
 
 8. War is a blessing, not an evil. Show me a nation that 
 has ever become great without blood-letting. 
 
 9. If wages depend upon the ratio between the amount of 
 labor-seeking employment, and the amount of capital devoted 
 to its employment, the relative scarcity or abundance of one 
 factor must mean the relative abundance or scarcity of the 
 other. Thus capital must be relatively abundant where wages 
 are high, and relatively scarce where wages are low. Now, as 
 the capital used in paying wages must largely consist of the 
 capital-seeking investment, the current rate of interest must be 
 the measure of its relative abundance or scarcity. So if it be 
 true that wages depend upon the ratio between the amount of 
 labor-seeking employment, and the capital devoted to its em- 
 ployment, then high wages must be accompanied by low inter- 
 est, and, reversely, low wages must be accompanied by high 
 interest. This is not the fact but the contrary. (George.) 
 
 10. Construct an inductive argument to prove that some 
 article of food, or some habit, is beneficial or injurious to you, 
 and analyze your reasoning, showing the methods which you 
 have employed. 
 
 11. Some comets have been observed to have the same 
 orbits as certain meteoric showers. The hypothesis is suggested 
 that all meteoric showers may represent the debris of disinte- 
 grated comets. Biela's comet having been missing for some 
 time, it was accordingly predicted that when next due it would 
 be replaced by a meteoric shower. This prediction was verified 
 by observation. 
 
 12. Tyndall found that of twenty-seven sterilized flasks con- 
 taining infusion of organic matter, and opened in pure Alpine 
 air, not one showed putrefaction ; while of twenty-three similar 
 flasks, opened in a hay-loft, only two remained free from putre- 
 faction after three days. He concluded that putrefaction is 
 due to floating particles in the air.
 
 376 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 13. 'Whether or not a bad theory is better than none, 
 depends upon circumstances.' Examine this statement, and 
 point out what are some of the circumstances of which mention 
 is made. 
 
 14. It is said that a general resemblance of the hills near 
 Ballarat in Australia to the Californian hills where gold had 
 been found suggested the idea of digging for gold at Ballarat. 
 (Minto.) 
 
 ' 15. There are no great nations of antiquity but have fallen 
 to the hand of time ; and England must join them to complete 
 the analogy of the ages. Like them she has grown from a 
 birth-time of weakness and tutelage to a day of manhood and 
 supremacy ; but she has to face her setting. Everything that 
 grows must also decay. (Edinburgh, 1893.) 
 
 1 6. Goldscheider proved that muscular sensations play no 
 considerable part in our consciousness of the movements of our 
 
 1 limbs, by having his arm suspended in a frame and moved by 
 an attendant. Under these circumstances, where no work 
 devolved on his muscles, he found that he could distinguish as 
 small an angular movement of the arm as when he moved and 
 supported it himself. 
 
 17. Goldscheider also proved that the chief source of move- 
 ment-consciousness is pressure sensations from the inner sur- 
 face of the joints, by having his arm held so that the joint 
 surfaces were pressed more closely together, and finding that 
 a smaller movement was now perceptible. 
 
 1 8. Wages in the United States are higher than in England, 
 because the former country is a republic and has a protective 
 tariff. 
 
 19. It does not follow that an institution is good because a 
 country has prospered under it, nor bad because a country in 
 which it exists is not prosperous. It does not even follow that 
 institutions to be found in all prosperous countries, and not
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 377 
 
 to be found in backward countries, are therefore beneficial 
 For this at various times might confidently have been asserted 
 of slavery, of polygamy, of aristocracy, of established churches ; 
 and it may still be asserted of public debts, of private property 
 in land, of pauperism, and of the existence of distinctly vicious 
 or criminal classes. (George.) 
 
 20. Explain the procedure of the reductio ad absurdum form 
 of argument. 
 
 21. It may be a coincidence merely; but, if so, it is re- 
 markably strange that while the chloroform has not changed, 
 while the constitutions of the patients have not changed, where 
 the use of the inhaler is the rule there are frequent deaths from 
 chloroform ; whilst in Scotland and Ireland, where the use of 
 the inhaler is the exception, deaths are proportionally rare. 
 
 22. We should think it a sin and shame if a great steamer, 
 dashing across the ocean, were not brought to a stop at a signal 
 of distress from the mere smack. . . . And yet a miner is 
 entombed alive, a painter falls from a scaffold, a brakeman is 
 crushed in coupling cars, a merchant fails, falls ill and dies, and 
 organized society leaves widow and child to bitter want or 
 degrading alms. (George, Protection and Free Traded) 
 
 23. Manufacturing countries are always rich countries ; 
 countries that produce raw material are always poor. There- 
 fore, if we would be rich, we must have manufactures, and in 
 order to get them, we must encourage them. : . . But I could 
 make as good an argument to the little town of Jamaica . . . 
 in support of a subsidy to a theatre, I could say to them : all 
 cities have theatres, and the more theatres it has the larger the 
 city. Look at New York ! . . . Philadelphia ranks next to 
 New York in the number and size of its theatres, and therefore 
 comes next to New York in wealth and population. ... I 
 might then drop into statistics . . . and point to the fact that 
 when theatrical representations began in this country, its popu-
 
 3/8 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 lation did not amount to a million, that it was totally destitute 
 of railroads, and without a single mile of telegraph wire. Such 
 has been our progress since theatres were introduced that the 
 census of 1880 showed we had 50,155,783 people, 90,907 miles 
 of railroad, and 291,212^ miles of telegraph wires. (George, 
 Protection and Free Trade.} 
 
 24. What methods would you employ to investigate the con- 
 nection between changes in the barometer and in the weather ? 
 
 25. In Sir Humphry Davy's experiments upon the decom- 
 position of water by galvanism, it was found that, besides 
 the two components of water, oxygen and hydrogen, an acid 
 and an alkali were developed at the two opposite poles of the 
 machine. The insight of Davy conjectured that there might 
 be some hidden cause of this portion of the effect : the glass 
 containing the water might suffer partial decomposition, or 
 some foreign matter might be mingled with the water, and the 
 acid and alkali be disengaged from it, so that the water would 
 have no share in their production. ... By the substitution of 
 gold vessels for glass, without any change in the effect, he at 
 once determined that the glass was not the cause. Employing 
 distilled water, he found a marked diminution of the quantity 
 of acid and alkali evolved ; yet there was enough to show that 
 the cause, whatever it was, was still in operation. . . . He 
 now conceived that the perspiration from the hands touching 
 the instruments might affect the case, as it would contain 
 common salt, and an acid and an alkali would result from its 
 decomposition under the agency of electricity. By carefully 
 avoiding such contact, he reduced the quantity of the products 
 still further until no more than slight traces of them were per- 
 ceptible. An experiment determined this : the machine was 
 put under an exhausted receiver, and when thus secured from 
 atmospheric influence, it no longer evolved the acid and the 
 alkali. (Gore, The Art of Scientific Discovery.)
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 379 
 
 26. Properties known to exist in potassium have been pre- 
 dicted of and found to exist in rubidium ; for instance, the 
 carbonates of sodium and potassium are not decomposed by 
 a red heat, neither are those of rubidium, or caesium. Some 
 of the statements which are true of chlorine have been found to 
 be true, in varying degrees, of bromine and iodine. . . . After 
 I had found the molecular change in antimony electro-deposited 
 from its chloride, I sought for and discovered it in that de- 
 posited from its bromide and iodide ; and after having found 
 magnetic changes in iron by heat, I also found similar ones in 
 nickel. (Gore, The Art of Scientific Discovery.} 
 
 27. What inductive fallacy may David be said to have 
 committed when he said in his haste that all men are liars? 
 
 28. It has been found that linnets when shut up and edu- 
 cated with singing larks the skylark, woodlark, or titlark 
 will adhere entirely to the songs of these larks, instead of the 
 natural song of the linnets. We may infer, therefore, that 
 birds learn to sing by imitation, and that their songs are no 
 more innate than language is in man. (Hyslop.) 
 
 29. We observe very frequently that very poor handwriting 
 characterizes the manuscripts of able men, while the best hand- 
 writing is as frequent with those who do little mental work 
 when compared with those whose penmanship is poor. We 
 may, therefore, infer that poor penmanship is caused by the 
 influence of severe mental labor. (Hyslop.) 
 
 30. Galileo describes his invention of the telescope as fol- 
 lows : This then was my reasoning ; this instrument [of 
 which he had heard a rumor] must either consist of one glass, 
 or of more than one ; it cannot be of one alone, because its 
 figure must be either concave or convex, or comprised within 
 two parallel superficies, but neither of these shapes alter in the 
 least the objects seen, although increasing or diminishing them ; 
 for it is true that the concave glass diminishes, and that the
 
 380 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 convex glass increases them ; but both show them very indis- 
 tinctly, and hence one glass is not sufficient to produce the 
 effect. Passing on to two glasses, and knowing that the glass 
 of parallel superficies has no effect at all, I concluded that the 
 desired result could not possibly follow by adding this one to 
 the other two. I therefore restricted my experiments to com- 
 binations of the other two glasses ; and I saw how this brought 
 me to the result I desired. (Quoted by Gore, The Art of Scien- 
 tific Discovery?) 
 
 31. Darwin was struck by the number of insects caught by 
 the leaves of the common sun-dew. It soon became evident 
 to him that " Drosera was excellently adapted for the special 
 purpose of catching insects." ... As soon as he began to 
 work on Drosera, and was led to believe that the leaves ab- 
 sorbed nutritious matter from the insects, he began to reason 
 by analogy from the well-understood digestive capacity of ani- 
 mals. . . . Having by analogy established the power of di- 
 gestion in plants, analogy led him to seek in plants the elements 
 that do the work of digestion in animals. Bringing together 
 what was known of plants, he pointed out that the juices of 
 many plants contain an acid, and so on,e element of a digestive 
 fluid was at hand ; and that all plants possess the power of 
 dissolving albuminous or proteid substances, protoplasm, chlo- 
 rophyl, etc., and that " this must be effected by a solvent, proba- 
 bly consisting of ferment together with an acid." After writing 
 the last-quoted sentence, he learned that a ferment which con- 
 verted albuminous substances into true peptones had been 
 extracted from the seeds of the vetch. (Cramer, The Method 
 of Darwin.*) 
 
 32. Strongly impressed with the belief that some ' harmonic ' 
 relation must exist among the distances of the several planets 
 from the sun, and also among the times of their revolution, 
 Kepler passed a large part of his early life in working out a
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 381 
 
 series of guesses at this relation, some of which now strike us 
 as not merely most improbable, but positively ridiculous. His 
 single-minded devotion to truth, however, led him to abandon 
 each of these hypotheses in turn so soon as he perceived its 
 fallacy by submitting it to the test of its conformity to observed 
 facts. . . . But he was at last rewarded by the discovery of 
 that relation between the times and the distances of the planet- 
 ary revolutions, which with the discovery of the ellipticity of the 
 orbits, and of the passage of the radius vector over equal areas 
 in equal times has given him immortality as an astronomical 
 discoverer. But ... he was so far from divining the true 
 rationale of the planetary revolutions that he was led to the 
 discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars by a series of happy 
 accidents . . . whilst his discovery of the true relations of 
 times and distances was the fortunate guess which closed a 
 long series of unfortunate ones, many of which were no less 
 ingenious. 
 
 Now it was by a grand effort of Newton's constructive imagi- 
 nation, based on his wonderful mastery of geometrical reason- 
 ing, that, starting with the conception of two forces, one of 
 them tending to produce continuous uniform motion in a 
 straight line, the other tending to produce a uniformly acceler- 
 ated motion towards a fixed point, he was able to show that if 
 these dynamical assumptions were granted, Kepler's laws, being 
 consequences of them, must be universally true. And it was 
 his still greater glory to divine the profound truth that the fall 
 of the moon towards the earth that is the deflection of her 
 path from a tangential line to an ellipse is a phenomenon of 
 the same order as the fall of a stone to the ground. (Gore, The 
 Art of Scientific Discovery.} 
 
 33. After Franklin had investigated the nature of electricity 
 for some time, he began to consider how many of the effects 
 of thunder and lightning were the same as those produced by
 
 382 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 electricity. Lightning travels in a zig-zag line, and so does an 
 electric spark ; electricity sets things on fire, so does lightning ; 
 electricity melts metals, so does lightning. Animals can be 
 killed by both, and both cause blindness. Pointed bodies 
 attract the electric spark, and in the same way lightning strikes 
 spires, and trees, and mountain tops. Is it not likely then that 
 lightning is nothing more than electricity passing from one 
 cloud to another, just as an electric spark passes from one sub- 
 stance to another ? (Buckley, A Short History of Natural 
 Science?) 
 
 34. How did Franklin proceed to verify the hypothesis 
 stated in the last example ? 
 
 35. Galileo discovered by means of his telescope that Jupi- 
 ter has four moons, instead of one like the earth, and he 
 regarded this discovery as a confirmation of the Copernican 
 theory. Explain the nature of the reasoning involved in 
 reaching this conclusion. 
 
 36. That the period of tide should be accidentally the same 
 as that of the culmination of the moon, that the period of the 
 highest tide should be accidentally the same as the syzygies, is 
 possible in abstracto ; but it is in the highest degree improb- 
 able : the far more probable assumption is, either that the sun 
 and moon produce the tide, or that their motion is due to the 
 same grounds as the motion of the tide. (Hibben.) 
 
 37. During the retreat of the Ten Thousand a cutting north 
 wind blew in the faces of the soldiers, sacrifices were offered 
 to Boreas, and the severity of the wind immediately ceased, 
 which seemed a proof of the god's causation. (Hibben.) 
 
 38. A nectary implies nectar, but Sprengel had come to the 
 conclusion that orchis morio and orchis maculata, though fur- 
 nished with nectaries, did not secrete nectar. Darwin examined 
 the flowers of orchis morio for twenty-three consecutive days, 
 looking at them after hot sunshine, after rain, and at all hours ;
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 383 
 
 he kept the spikes in water and examined them at midnight 
 and early the next morning. He irritated the nectaries with 
 bristles, and exposed them to irritating vapors. He examined 
 flowers whose pollinia had been removed, and others which 
 would probably have them soon removed. But the nectary 
 was invariably dry. 
 
 He was thoroughly convinced, however, that these orchids 
 require the visits of insects for fertilization, and that insects 
 visit flowers for the attractions offered in the way of nectar, and 
 yet that in these orchids the ordinary attraction was absent. 
 In examining the orchids he was surprised at the degree to 
 which the inner and outer membranes forming the tube or 
 spur were separated from each other, also at the delicate nature 
 of the inner membrane, and the quantity of fluid contained 
 between the two membranes. He then examined other forms 
 that do secrete nectar in the ordinary way, and found the mem- 
 branes closely united, instead of separated by a space. " I was 
 therefore led to conclude," he says, " that insects penetrate the 
 lax membrane of the nectaries of the above-named orchids and 
 suck the copious fluid between the two membranes." He 
 afterwards learned that at the Cape of Good Hope moths and 
 butterflies penetrate peaches and plums, and in Queensland a 
 moth penetrates the rind of the orange. These facts merely 
 proved his anticipation less anomalous than it had seemed. 
 (Cramer, The Method of Darwin?) 
 
 39. Construct an hypothesis to explain some fact of your 
 experience, and explain how it may be either verified or over- 
 thrown. 
 
 40. When Darwin began to work on Droscra he was led 
 to believe that the leaves absorbed nutritious matter from 
 insects. He then reasoned by analogy from the well-under- 
 stood digestive capacity of animals. He made preliminary 
 'crucial' experiments by immersing some leaves of Drosera
 
 384 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 in nitrogeneous and others in non-nitrogeneous fluids of the 
 same density to determine whether the former affected the 
 leaves differently from the latter. This he found to be the case. 
 He then experimented with solid animal matter and found 
 that the leaves are capable of true digestion. Analogy then 
 led him to seek in plants the elements that do the work of 
 digestion in animals. He pointed out that the juices of many 
 plants contain an acid, and so one element of a digestive fluid 
 was at hand ; and that all plants possess the power of dissolving 
 albuminous or proteid substance-protoplasm, chlorophyl, and 
 that this must be effected by a solvent consisting probably 
 of a ferment together with an acid. Afterwards he learned 
 that a ferment which converted albuminous substances into 
 true peptones had been extracted from the seeds of the vetch. 
 (Cramer, The Method of Darwin, pp. 95-99.) 
 
 41. In opposition to the facts stated above, Tischutkin 
 maintains that the ' digestion ' of insectivorous plants is not 
 accomplished in the same way as in animals, but is due to 
 bacteria : that the pepsin is not a secretion of the plant, but 
 a by-product of the activity of the bacteria. Suppose that this 
 theory is true, and Darwin's false, what would you say regard- 
 ing the character of the latter's reasoning ? 
 
 PART III. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT 
 CHAPTER XX. Judgment the Elementary Process 
 
 1. What objections are there to speaking of thought as 'a 
 thing like other things ' ? 
 
 2. What is the general law of Evolution? Explain what is 
 meant by a change from the homogeneous to the heterogene- 
 ous. 
 
 3. What general conclusions are reached by the application 
 of the law of Evolution to the thought-process ?
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 385 
 
 4. What do you understand by Judgment? How does a 
 simple judgment differ from sensation? 
 
 5. In what sense may our judgments be said to be the union 
 of two concepts ? 
 
 6. Would the doctrine that in knowing we first have Simple 
 Apprehension, then as separate intellectual processes, Judgment 
 and finally Inference, agree with the general evolutionary view 
 of consciousness ? Explain fully. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. The Characteristics of Judgment 
 
 1. What do you understand by the universality of judg- 
 ments? What is the distinction between the universality of a 
 judgment and that of a proposition? 
 
 2. How would you prove that all judgments are universal? 
 
 3. Is any judgment necessary in itself? If not, whence do 
 judgments derive their necessity? 
 
 4. What is the argument by which it has been maintained 
 that there must be judgments or principles which are in them- 
 selves necessary? 
 
 5. Explain how it is possible for a judgment to be at once 
 both analytic and synthetic. 
 
 6. Explain what is meant by a ' system ' of knowledge. 
 
 7. When judgment brings new facts into relation to what 
 we already know, does the old body of knowledge undergo any 
 modification ? 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. The Laws of. Thought 
 
 1. In what sense can we speak of a law of Thought? 
 
 2. Explain what is meant by the law of Identity. 
 
 3. How has this law been interpreted by Boole and Jevons? 
 
 4. What does Jevons mean by the ' substitution of similars,' 
 and how does he propose to employ this principle? 
 
 c
 
 386 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 5. What objections are there to employing the sign of 
 equality to represent the relation between the subject and 
 predicate of a judgment? 
 
 6. Explain how the law of Identity is related to the charac- 
 teristics of judgment treated in the last chapter. 
 
 7. What is the meaning of the law of Contradiction? 
 
 8. Explain the use of the law of Excluded Middle. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. Types of Judgment 
 
 1. Why do we begin with judgments of Quality? 
 
 2. Explain how we pass in the development of intelligence 
 from Quality to Quantity. 
 
 3. In what sense is it true that judgments of Quantity never 
 give us the real nature of things, but only their relation to 
 something else? 
 
 4. What is meant by anthropomorphic causes? How are 
 they distinguished from scientific causes? 
 
 5. What new element did the discovery of the law of the 
 Conservation of Energy introduce in the causal conception as 
 employed in certain sciences? 
 
 6. Why cannot this new extension have any application in 
 the field of the mental sciences? 
 
 7. How does the standpoint of judgments of Individuality 
 differ from that of judgments of Causality ? 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. Inference 
 
 1. How does Inference differ from Judgment? In what 
 sense may it be said that it is an extension of the latter pro- 
 cess? 
 
 2. Does the passage from Judgment to Inference illustrate 
 the general law of Logical Evolution? Explain, 
 
 a
 
 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 387 
 
 3. In the development of our knowledge, which usually 
 comes first, premises or conclusion? 
 
 4. How is it possible to pass from the known to the un- 
 known ? 
 
 5. Explain under what circumstances only an Inference is 
 possible. 
 
 6. What is the common element in both Induction and 
 Deduction? How do they differ? 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. Rational and Empirical Theories 
 
 1. Who are the great historical representatives respectively 
 of Rationalism and Empiricism ? 
 
 2. Explain the method and procedure of Rationalism. 
 
 3. What is the great instrument of knowledge according to 
 Rationalism ? What according to Empiricism ? 
 
 4. State as clearly as you can the various points at issue 
 between the two schools. 
 
 5. Explain Mill's theory that we always reason from one 
 particular fact to another. How far do you agree with his 
 conclusions ? 
 
 6. Is it true that we obtain a general law by summing up 
 particulars ? 
 
 7. Is there any direct and necessary connection between the 
 number of instances and the induction of the general law? 
 
 8. Criticise Jevon's theory of 'Perfect Induction' as stated 
 on page 187.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Abstract, two Meanings of the Word, 
 
 Si- 
 
 Accent, the Fallacies of, 156. 
 
 Accident, the Fallacy of, 163. 
 
 Agreement, the Method of, 200; De- 
 ficiencies in the Method of, 204. 
 
 Amphiboly, the Fallacy of, 156. 
 
 Analogy, Explanation by Means of, 
 219; the Principle of, 221; State- 
 ment of Law, 222; its Function in 
 suggesting Hypothesis, 223 ; its Use 
 by Darwin, 225 ; its Incompleteness 
 as a Method of Explanation, 226. 
 
 Analysis, its Relation to Synthesis, 279. 
 
 Anthropomorphism, 309. 
 
 Apprehension, Simple, 44. 
 
 A priori Truths, 278. 
 
 Argumentum, ad rcm, 168 ; ad homi- 
 nem, 168 ; adpopulum, 169 ; ad igno- 
 rantiam, 169; ad verecundiam, 170. 
 
 Aristotle, Logic of, 22 ; List of Logical 
 Works, 22 ; his Theory of the Syllo- 
 gism, 23 ; Importance of Induction 
 and Deduction in his Logic, 25 ; his 
 Classification of Fallacies, 152; his 
 Statement of the Law of Contradic- 
 tion, 295. 
 
 Art, an, its Relation to a Science, 8. 
 
 B 
 
 Bacon, Logic of, 28 ; his Method, 28 ; 
 on the Tendency to neglect Negative 
 Instances, 257 ; his Idols of the Cave, 
 
 257- 
 Bosanquet, his Views of Logic, n, note ; 
 
 his Writings on Modern Logic, 17 ; 
 
 his Remarks on Analogy, 227. 
 Bradley, 12. 
 
 Cant Words and Phrases, 249. 
 Causal Connection, Judgments of, 307. 
 
 Cause, the Fallacy of the False, 171 ; 
 the Development of the Principle of, 
 
 309. 
 
 Causes, the Plurality of, 204. 
 
 Chances, the Calculation of, 194. 
 
 Circle, Argument in a, 165. 
 
 Classification, Principles of, 74 ; Rules 
 of, 76; of Fallacies, 152, 246; Aris- 
 totle's, of Fallacies, 152. 
 
 Composition, the Fallacy of, 160. 
 
 Concepts and Judgments, 268. 
 
 Conclusion, the Irrelevant, 168. 
 
 Concrete, two Senses of the Word, 
 
 Si- 
 Consequent, Fallacy of the, 170. 
 Conservation of Energy, the Law of, 
 
 and its Influence on the Conception 
 
 of Cause, 313. 
 
 Contradiction, the Law of, 38, 295. 
 Conversion, the, of Propositions, 100; 
 
 Simple, 101 ; by Limitation, 101 ; 
 
 by Contraposition, 102; Errors in, 
 
 Darwin, his Power of arresting Ex- 
 ceptions, 217 ; his Use of Analogy, 
 225 ; his Employment of Hypotheses, 
 232. 
 
 Deduction, its Relation to Induction, 
 
 329. 
 Definition, the Necessity of, 63 ; Verbal 
 
 and Real, 63; Ways of Regarding, 
 
 64 ; Socrates' Search for, 65 ; Rules 
 
 of, 69. 
 
 Descartes, 29, 335. 
 Dialectic, Socrates' Use of, 65. 
 Dichotomy, 72. 
 Difference, Method of, 205. 
 Differentia, 68. 
 Dilemma, the simple Constructive, 149 ; 
 
 the Complex Constructive, 150; the 
 
 Complex Destructive, 150. 
 
 389
 
 390 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Division, Rules for, 76 ; the Fallacy of, 
 162. 
 
 Empiricism, the Doctrine of, 337. 
 
 Enthymemes, 41, 126. 
 
 Enumeration, as the Starting-point of 
 Induction, 185; Judgments of, 305. 
 
 Episyllogisms and Prosyllogisms, 127. 
 
 Equivocation, the Fallacies of, 159. 
 
 Ethics, its Standpoint compared with 
 that of Psychology, 316. 
 
 Euler, no. 
 
 Evolution, the Law of, 262 ; the Appli- 
 cation of the Law of, to Thought, 264. 
 
 Excluded Middle, the Law of, 72, 297. 
 
 Experiment and Observation, 180; 
 Advantages of employing, 180. 
 
 Explanation and Observation, 177 ; the 
 Problem of, 182. 
 
 Extension and Intension of Terms, 55. 
 
 Fallacies, Classification of, 152, 246; 
 Syllogistic, 149 ; Inductive, 245 ; the 
 Source of, 245; of Interpretation, 
 154 ; occasioned by Language, 246 ; 
 of Reasoning, 157, 254 ; of Observa- 
 tion, 250; Individual, 257. 
 
 Figures of the Syllogism, 113; the 
 Special Canons of the four, 1 17 ; De- 
 termination of the Valid Moods in, 
 120; the Perfect, 123 ; the Imperfect, 
 123 ; Reduction of, 123 ; the Organic 
 Relation of, 125, note. 
 
 Galen, 123. 
 
 Generalization, Danger of hasty, 256. 
 Genus, its Definition, 68. 
 Guericke, 239. 
 
 H 
 
 Hegel, Quotation from his Logic, n; 
 his Influence on the Development of 
 Logic, 31. 
 
 Herschel, J., 30. 
 
 Hypothesis, Reasoning from an, 230; 
 the Employment of, to explain Com- 
 mon Events, 231 ; Darwin's Use of, 
 
 232; the Necessity for an, 233; 
 Formation of, 234 ; the Function of 
 Analogy in suggesting, 223, 236 ; the 
 Proof of, 237; Requirements of a 
 Good, 240. 
 
 I 
 
 Identity, the Law of, 38, 288; Je- 
 vons's Interpretation of the Law of, 
 289. 
 
 Ignoratio Rlenchi, 166. 
 
 Imagination, its Part in the Formation 
 of Theories, 234. 
 
 Individuality, Judgments of, 315. 
 
 Induction and Deduction, 2, 24, 329; 
 the Baconian Method of, 28 ; Mill's 
 Emphasis on, 31; the Problem of, 
 172; Perfect and Imperfect, 187. 
 
 Inference, Mediate and Immediate, 92 ; 
 the Nature of, 324 ; as distinguished 
 from Judgment, 318 ; the Paradox 
 of, 325 ; as a Development of Judg- 
 ment, 328 ; and Number of Instances, 
 344. (See also Reasoning.) 
 
 Instances, the Value of Numerous, 345. 
 
 Intension and Extension of Terms, 55. 
 
 Interpretation, of Propositions, 92; 
 Errors of, 154 ; Judgment a Process 
 of, 266. 
 
 J 
 
 James, 7. 
 
 Jevons, his Account of Perfect Induc- 
 tion 187 ; his Calculation of Chances, 
 195; his Interpretation of the Law 
 of Identity, 289; his Principle of the 
 Substitution of Similars, 289. 
 
 Judgment, the Starting-point of Know- 
 ledge, 266; as a Process of Inter- 
 pretation, 267 ; and Concept, 268 ; 
 the Universality of, 274 ; the Neces- 
 sity of, 276; a priori, 279; as involv- 
 ing both Analysis and Synthesis, 
 279; as constructing a System of 
 Knowledge, 284; its Relation to In- 
 ference, 318. 
 
 Judgments, of Quality, 300; of Quan- 
 tity, 304 ; of Enumeration, 305 ; ol 
 Measure, 305 ; of Causal Connec- 
 tion, 307 ; of Individuality, 315.
 
 INDEX 
 
 391 
 
 Ladd, 7. 
 
 Language, Dangers from the Careless 
 Use of, 6 1 ; Fallacies of, 246 ; Figura- 
 tive, 249. 
 
 Law, of Identity, 38, 288 ; of Contra- 
 diction, 38, 295 ; of Excluded Mid- 
 dle, 72, 297; of Conservation of 
 Energy, 313. 
 
 Laws of Thought, 38, 72, 288. 
 
 Locke, as the Representative of Em- 
 piricism, 30, 335 ; on the Careless 
 Use of Words, 61, 247. 
 
 Logic, Definition of, i ; Derivation of 
 the Word, 3 ; Relation to Psychol- 
 ogy, 4 ; Comparison with Physiology, 
 6 ; as a Science and an Art, 8 ; Util- 
 ity of, 10; Necessity of, 12; the 
 Materials of, 13 ; of the Sophists, 18 ; 
 of Socrates, 19; of Aristotle, 22, 32; 
 of the Schoolmen, 26; of Bacon, 28 ; 
 Development of Modern, 31 ; the 
 Equational, 289. 
 
 Lyell, his Overthrow of the ' Catas- 
 trophic ' Theory in Geology, 243. 
 
 M 
 
 Malthus, his Theories of Population, 
 168, 225. 
 
 Measure, Judgments of, 305. 
 
 Mental Operations, proposed Division 
 of, 43- 
 
 Metaphors, Dangers from the Use of, 
 250. 
 
 Method, the Progressive or Synthetic, 
 128 ; the Regressive or Analytic, 128 ; 
 the, of Agreement, 200; the, of Dif- 
 ference, 205 ; the Joint, of Agreement 
 and Difference, 209 ; the, of Con- 
 comitant Variations, 211 ; the, of 
 Residues, 213. 
 
 Middle Term, the Function of the, 106 ; 
 Ambiguous, 160. 
 
 Mill, his Importance in the History of 
 Logic, 30 ; his Experimental Meth- 
 ods, 198 ; his View of the Nature of 
 General Principles, 339; his Doc- 
 trine that all Reasoning is from one 
 Particular Case to another, 340. 
 
 Morphology, compared with Psychol- 
 ogy, 8. 
 
 N 
 
 Negative Instances, Tendency to neg- 
 lect, 251. 
 
 Neptune, the Discovery of, 217. 
 Newton, his Care in testing Theories, 
 
 239- 
 Non sequitur, 170. 
 
 O 
 
 Observation, and Explanation, 177; 
 
 and Experiment, 180; Errors of, 
 
 250. 
 Obversion, the, of Propositions, 98 ; 
 
 Errors in, 155. 
 Opposition, the, of Propositions, 94. 
 
 Perception, as involving Judgment, 
 266 ; Difficulty in distinguishing be- 
 tween Inference and, 253. 
 
 Petitio Principii, 165. 
 
 Physiology compared with Logic, 6. 
 
 Plato, in the History of Logic, 22 ; and 
 the Doctrine of Reminiscence, 325. 
 
 Post hoc propter hoc, 171, 255. 
 
 Predicables, the, 67. 
 
 Prejudices, Individual, 257 ; of an Age, 
 258. 
 
 Premises, Definition of, 40. 
 
 Presumption, Fallacies of, 164. 
 
 Propositions, Categorical, 79; Condi- 
 tional, 79 ; the Nature of, 78 ; Qual- 
 ity and Quantity of, 80; Difficul- 
 ties in classifying, 83; Relation of 
 Subject and Predicate in, 85; the 
 Opposition of, 94 ; the Obversion of, 
 98 ; the Conversion of, 100. 
 
 Psychology, its Relation to Logic, 4; 
 Comparison with Morphology, 6; 
 Comparison with Ethics, 316. 
 
 Quality, of Propositions, 80; Judg- 
 ments of, 300. 
 
 Quantity, of Propositions, 80; Judg- 
 ments of, 304. 
 
 Quaternio Terminorum, 158.
 
 392 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Question, the Fallacy of the Complex, 
 
 166. 
 Question-Begging Epithet, 248. 
 
 R 
 
 Rationalism, its Point of View, 335; 
 the Nature of its Problems, 336 ; its 
 Neglect of Perception, 337. 
 
 Reasoning, the Nature of Syllogistic, 
 105; Mediate, 92, 107; Immediate, 
 93 ; Mistakes in, 254 ; Inductive and 
 Deductive, 329 ; from Particulars to 
 Particulars, 340 ; from Particulars to 
 a Universal, 344. (See also Infer- 
 ence.) 
 
 Reduction of the Imperfect Figures, 
 123. 
 
 Residues, the Method of, 213. 
 
 Schonbein, his Discovery of Ozone, 
 217. 
 
 Science, as related to Art, 8. 
 
 Sigwart, on the Difference between 
 Ancient and Modern Science, 190; 
 on the Application of Statistics, 191. 
 
 Similars, the Principle of the Substitu- 
 tion of, 289. 
 
 Socrates, his Sense of Ignorance, 4; his 
 Place in the History of Logic, 20; 
 his Search for Definitions, 65 ; his 
 Employment of Dialectic, 66. 
 
 Sophists, the Logic of, 19; Socrates' 
 Refutation of, 20; Plato's Criticism 
 
 of their Theory of Knowledge, 22; 
 their Scepticism, 275. 
 Sorites, Aristotelian, 131 ; Goclenian, 
 
 Species, Definition, 68. 
 
 Spinoza, as a Rationalist, 336. 
 
 Statistics, 189. 
 
 Stout, 7. 
 
 Subject, Relation of Predicate and, 85. 
 
 Syllogism, the Aristotelian, 23, 32; the 
 Nature of the, 36; the Principle of 
 the, 38 ; the Parts of the, 39 ; the 
 Rules of the, 103 ; the Figures of the, 
 113 ; the Hypothetical, 136 ; Rules for 
 the Hypothetical, 137 ; Relation of 
 Categorical and Hypothetical, 139; 
 the Disjunctive, 145 ; Fallacies of the 
 Disjunctive, 148. 
 
 Synthesis, its Relation to Analysis, 279. 
 
 System, Difference between a, and an 
 Aggregate, 285. 
 
 Thales, 310. 
 
 Thought, the Laws of, 38 ; the Nature 
 
 of, 260. 
 Torricelli, 238. 
 
 V 
 
 Variations, of Statistics, 193; the 
 Method of Concomitant, 211. 
 
 W 
 
 Whewell, 15, 30. 
 
 Words, the Abuse of, 61, 246.
 
 Recent Books on Philosophy, Etc* 
 
 The flaking of Character 
 
 Some Educational Aspects of Ethics. By JOHN MAcCuNN, of 
 University College, Liverpool. Cambridge Series. 
 
 Cloth. I2mo. $1.25. 
 
 The subject is divided into four general parts : Congenital Endowment, 
 Educative Influences, Sound Judgment, and Self-development and Self- 
 control. Each of these parts contains several chapters dealing with the 
 various phases of character-building and its influence upon education. 
 Teachers will find much that is new and stimulating in these pages. 
 
 The World and the Individual 
 
 Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen. 
 First Series. The Four Historical Conceptions of Being. By 
 JOSIAH ROYCE, Ph.D., of Harvard University. 
 
 Cloth. 8vo. $3.00. 
 
 A Brief Introduction to Hodern Philosophy 
 
 By ARTHUR KENYON ROGERS, Ph.D. Cloth. i2mo. $1.25. 
 
 flethods of Knowledge 
 
 An Essay in Epistemology. By WALTER SMITH, of Lake 
 Forest University. Cloth. 121110. $1.25. 
 
 A definition of knowledge and theory of the method by which knowl- 
 edge may be attained. 
 
 An Outline of Philosophy 
 
 With Notes Historical and Critical. By JOHN WATSON, of 
 Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Second Edition. 
 
 Cloth. 8vo. |2.a. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 66 FIFTH. AVENUE, NEW YORK
 
 RECENT BOOKS ON EDUCATION 
 
 The Meaning of Education 
 
 AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES. By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUT- 
 LER, Columbia University. Cloth, zarno. $1.00 
 
 Social Phases of Education in the School and the Home 
 
 By SAMUEL T. BUTTON, Superintendent of Schools, Brookline, Mass. 
 
 Cloth. 12010. 31.25. 
 
 Education of the Central Nervous System 
 
 A STUDY OF FOUNDATIONS, ESPECIALLY OF SENSORY AND MOTOR 
 TRAINING. By REUBEN POST HALLECK, Author of " Psychology and 
 Psychic Culture." I2mo. Cloth. $1.00. 
 
 " He has succeeded admirably in presenting the subject in a simple, clear, logical 
 
 way. It is just the book, it seems to me, for the reading of all persons interested in 
 
 4 Child Study.'" FRANCIS W. PARKER, Chicago Normal School. 
 
 Educational Aims and Educational Values 
 
 By PAUL H. HANUS, of Harvard University. Cloth. I2mo. $1.25. 
 " A very readable book. . . . His insight into educational problems is good, his ex- 
 perience wide, and his power of expression admirable." 
 
 MYRON T. S. SCUDDER in The Educational Review 
 
 The Development of the Child 
 
 By NATHAN OPPENHEIM, M.D., Attending Physician to the Children's 
 Department, Mt. Sinai Hospital Dispensary. Cloth. #1.25. 
 
 " Interesting and suggestive." The Tribune, New York. 
 
 The Physical Nature of the Child and How to Study It 
 
 By STUART H. ROWE, Ph.D., New Haven, formerly Professor of 
 Pedagogy and Director of Practice in the State Normal School, Man- 
 kato, Minn. Cloth. I2mo. $1.00. 
 
 " The average school-teacher could read no better work on school hygiene." 
 
 C. H. THURBER in The School Review 
 
 By DAVID EUGENE SMITH, Ph.D., Principal of the State Normal 
 School at Brockport, New York. Cloth. I2mo. $1.00. 
 
 The first issue in a series to be known as The Teacher's Professional Library, 
 
 edited by Nicholas Murray Butler, Professor of Philosophy and Education in Columbia 
 
 University. 
 
 The Study of Children and Their School Training 
 
 By DR. FRANCIS WARNER, Author of "The Growth and Means for 
 Training of the Mental Faculty." Cloth. i6mo. |z.oo. 
 
 The Nervous System of the Child 
 
 ITS GROWTH AND HEALTH IN EDUCATION. A handbook for 
 teachers. By the same author. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK
 
 A 000178263 o