^fer 
 
 NNEX ( 
 
 'ar s Day^ 1912. 
 
 HE PERSIAN CRISIS 
 
 OF 
 
 DECEMBER, I 9! I; 
 
 HOW IT AROSE AND WHITHER IT 
 MAY LEAD US 
 
 COMPILED FOR THE USE OF THE PERSIA COMMITTEE 
 
 BY 
 
 EDWARD G. BROWNE, M.A., F.B.A., F.R.C.P. 
 
 nia 
 
 Privately Printed 
 
 at the 
 University Press, Cambridge
 
 THE present crisis in Persia, by far the most serious which 
 has yet occurred, is directly due to a series of aggressive and 
 provocative acts on the part of the Russian Government, or 
 at any rate of its agents in Persia, which, continued since the 
 early days of the establishment of Constitutional Government 
 five years ago, have become very much more open and violent 
 during the last six months. 
 
 Until the deposition of Muhammad Ali, the ex-Shah, in 
 July, 1909, there was a constant struggle between him and 
 his people. Although on his accession in January, 1907, and 
 on several subsequent occasions, he swore fidelity to the 
 Constitution granted by his father, Muzaffar-ud-Din, in the 
 previous autumn, he persistently strove to recover the auto- 
 cratic powers enjoyed by his ancestors. Within a year of his 
 accession, in December, 1907, he attempted by a coup d'etat 
 to destroy the Majlis or Parliament, while in the following 
 June (1908) he succeeded, aided by his Cossacks and their 
 Russian officers (of whom Colonel Liakhoff attained the chief 
 notoriety), in bombarding and destroying the Parliament, 
 killing or imprisoning a number of the leading reformers, and 
 re-establishing autocratic government. The city of Tabriz, 
 however, withstood this attempt to restore the old regime, 
 and sustained a siege of nine months. By April, 1909, the 
 city was reduced to the verge of starvation, and finally, with 
 the approval of the British Foreign Office, a Russian force, 
 commanded by General Znarsky, marched to Tabriz, raised 
 the siege, and re-opened the roads. Although, as has been 
 often pointed out, the effect of this step was unquestionably 
 to avert what threatened to be a terrible catastrophe and to 
 put an end to much suffering, it cannot be forgotten that 
 consideration for the safety of the inhabitants was avow- 
 edly not the motive which prompted the sending of the
 
 expedition. " It seems to me," wrote Sir Arthur Nicholson 
 (at that time British Ambassador at St Petersburg, now 
 Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office), " that it 
 would be the Nationalists who would profit by the arrival 
 of the Russian force, but I submit that the chief object to 
 be kept in view is the safety of the Consuls, even at tlie risk 
 of the measures wJiicJi circumstances have rendered necessary 
 proving of benefit to the popular movement at Tabriz " (White 
 Book [Cd. 4733], No. 208). In spite of numerous and solemn 
 promises that these troops would be withdrawn as soon as 
 normal conditions were restored, they have remained at 
 Tabriz in greater or lesser number from that day till this, 
 and their presence has in many ways and on many occasions 
 put great difficulties in the way of the Persian Government 
 officials. 
 
 Meanwhile, encouraged by the protracted resistance offered 
 by Tabriz to Muhammad AH, two separate movements for the 
 restoration of Constitutional Government arose and gathered 
 force. Of one of these the centre was Resht, near the Caspian 
 Sea, while the other involved the Bakhtiyari tribesmen who 
 dwell to the south-west of Isfahan. Two armies, bent on 
 marching on Teheran and compelling Muhammad Ali to 
 restore the Constitution, were thus formed, and early in May, 
 1909, began a simultaneous advance on the capital, in spite 
 of warnings from the Russian and British Legations, and 
 threats that, in case of their persisting in their advance, 
 a large number of Russian troops might be brought into the 
 country " to guard the Teheran-Caspian road." Both Colonel 
 Liakhoff, commander of the Shah's Persian Cossacks, and 
 the Times correspondent were very confident at this time 
 " that the (Cossack) Brigade alone was sufficient to deal 
 with any attack by Revolutionaries or Bakhtiyaris, singly or 
 combined," and the Times correspondent added that though 
 the Russian officers in command of the Brigade were no 
 longer on the active list of the Russian army, they were 
 nevertheless " completely under the control of the Russian 
 Government, owing to the fact that their pensions and their 
 prospect of future re-instatement depend on their acting in
 
 accordance with the wishes of St Petersburg" It must there- 
 fore be assumed that the active part taken by those Russian 
 officers (Blazenoff, Zapolski and Peribonozoff) in the fight 
 at Badamak on July 11 and 12, and in Teheran on July 13 
 17 by Colonel Liakhoff was "in accordance with the wishes 
 of St Petersburg," and though Liakhoff was removed from 
 Persia three weeks later (on August 4) it was not because he 
 had fought but because he had failed to make good his boasts 
 as to his ability to defeat the Nationalists. The astonishing 
 thing is that, owing to some extraordinary lapse of memory, 
 Sir Edward Grey should have publicly stated on three separate 
 occasions (July 27, November 27 and December 14, 191 1) that 
 " if those Russian officers (of the Cossack Brigade) had inter- 
 fered or lifted a finger, and used their influence in Teheran, 
 the Shah would never have been expelled." Any reference to 
 the contemporary accounts published in the Press, especially 
 in the Times, would have shown him that they exerted 
 themselves to the utmost to defeat the Nationalists, and 
 failed. 
 
 The victorious Nationalists used their success with a 
 moderation which excited the admiration even of the then 
 Times correspondent. " Their behaviour," he telegraphed on 
 July 14, 1909, "has been irreproachable. Order has been 
 maintained in those parts of the town which they occupy, 
 they have shewn mercy to their prisoners, and altogether 
 they evince a laudable desire to carry out their plans in 
 a civilized manner." Similarly the Daily Telegraph corre- 
 spondent declared that " the behaviour of the Revolutionaries 
 was absolutely correct," that " they were perfectly capable 
 of maintaining order," and that "all were full of praise for 
 their wisdom in preventing complications." The casualties 
 on both sides amounted to about 500, according to the most 
 authentic accounts, and it is worth noting that only one 
 European was injured by a stray bullet during the five days 
 street fighting. 
 
 The deposition of Muhammad AH (who, seeing his cause 
 to be hopeless, had taken refuge at the Russian Legation) 
 next followed, but the negotiations as to his disposal and
 
 pension were protracted until Sept. 7, 1909, when the Protocol 
 concerning his abdication was finally signed. The yearly 
 allowance which the Persian Government was to pay him 
 was fixed at 100,000 tumans (16,666} a year; and the 
 representatives of Russia and Great Britain on their part gave 
 the following guarantee (Article 1 1 of the Protocol, Blue Book 
 [Cd. 5120], pp. 130 131, Inclosure in No. 232): 
 
 "Art. ii. The two representatives undertake to give his 
 Majesty Mohammed Ali Mirza strict injunctions to abstain 
 in future from all political agitation against Persia, and the 
 Imperial Russian Government promise on their side to take 
 all effective steps in order to prevent any such agitation on 
 his part. If His Majesty Mohammed Ali Mirza leaves Russia, 
 and if it is proved to the satisfaction of the two Legations 
 that in any country other than Russia he has carried on 
 political agitation against Persia, the Persian Government 
 shall have the right to cease payment of his pension." 
 
 During the Nationalist advance on Teheran, Russia had 
 conveyed some 3000 more troops (on July 8) to Resht and 
 Kazvin, and on July 13, 1909, Sir E. Grey admitted, in reply 
 to a question by Mr Flynn, that there were some 4000 troops 
 at Tabriz, 1700 between Resht and Kazvin, and 600 more in 
 other places, adding that they would be withdrawn as soon as 
 they were no longer required " for the protection of foreign 
 lives and property from the possibility of danger." 
 
 During the two years which intervened between the 
 deposition of Muhammad Ali and the first stages of the 
 present crisis it might be supposed that the Persians, rid of 
 their incubus, were free to devote themselves to the task of 
 reforming the government of their country, and especially the 
 finances. They were, however, hampered from the first by a 
 series of troubles for most of which agents and partisans of 
 the ex-Shah, aided and abetted in many cases by Russian 
 officials, were responsible. 
 
 Thus in August, 1909, Rahim Khan, the notorious brigand 
 who had played so conspicuous a part in the siege of Tabriz, 
 revolted against the new regime. On August 29 he was 
 captured by the Russians, but was released by them on
 
 5 
 
 September 18 on payment of ^"20,000 Turkish and 180 camels. 
 A month later he attacked Ardabil, thus affording a pretext 
 to Russia for sending fresh troops into the country and for 
 postponing the withdrawal of the troops already at Kazvin, 
 and on November 9 he was threatening to march on Teheran, 
 overturn the Constitutional Government, and restore the ex- 
 Shah. By this time the Persian Government had already 
 been compelled to spend ^25,000 in the equipment of an 
 army to take the field against him. On December 31, 1909, 
 this army, led by Yeprem Khan, obtained a signal success 
 against him, and on January 24, 1910, they had so far 
 surrounded him that his only way of escape lay across the 
 Russian frontier. The Persian Government called the atten- 
 tion of the Russian Government to this fact, and to Article XIV 
 of the Treaty of Turkmanchay, in which it is provided that 
 " His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias also promises 
 on his part not to permit Persian refugees to establish them- 
 selves or take up their abode in the Khanates of Karabagh, 
 Nakhchawan, or that part of the Khanate of Erivan situated 
 on the right bank of the River Araxes," and begged them not 
 to allow Rahim Khan to escape across their frontier, but 
 nevertheless he was permitted to do so, and remained in 
 Russian territory until January 1911, when he returned to 
 Tabriz. 
 
 The case of Darab Mirza, a Persian prince naturalized as 
 a Russian subject and holding a commission in the Labinsky 
 Cossack regiment, which formed part of the Russian army of 
 occupation at Kazvin, was even more flagrant. At the end 
 of May, 1910, he obtained leave of absence, went to Zanjan, 
 and endeavoured to overthrow the Constitutional Government 
 there. In spite of the protests of the Persian Government, 
 which wished to deal with the matter themselves, Russian 
 Cossacks were sent to arrest him. While returning with him 
 to Kazvin they fell in with the Persian force sent to subdue 
 him, fired upon them, and killed Ali Khan, the Persian officer 
 in command. The Russian authorities denied all complicity 
 in Darab Mirza's attempt to provoke civil war, but unfortu- 
 nately for these denials a dossier of original documents has
 
 reached this country containing incontestable evidence of the 
 complicity of the Russian Colonel Rakuza, who supplied 
 numerous disaffected Persians associated with Darab Mirza 
 in his enterprize with safe conducts, written in Persian, but 
 signed and sealed by himself in Russian, declaring the bearers 
 to be under the protection of the Emperor of Russia, and 
 threatening the direst penalties to any Persian official who 
 should interfere with them or their families and followers. 
 Some of the most active of Darab Mirza's supporters were 
 supplied with such safe conducts signed by Colonel Rakuza. 
 
 Mention should also be made of the massacre of villagers 
 at Varmuni near Astara by Russian troops in February, 1911, 
 in which some 60 persons, including women and children, 
 were slain; and of the case of Rashid-ul-Mulk, ex-Governor 
 of Ardabil, who was imprisoned at Tabriz on a charge of 
 treachery, but was forcibly released by the Russian Consul- 
 General on July 28, 1911. 
 
 These were some of the endless series of troubles which 
 continued, from the restoration of the Constitution in July, 
 1909, until the present time to embarrass, harrass, weaken 
 and impoverish the Persian Government, which was never 
 for a moment left free to devote its energies to the restoration 
 of order in the more distant parts of Persia, especially the 
 South. A fresh series of embarrassments was created by the 
 obstacles placed by Russia and England in the way of Persia's 
 attempt to obtain a loan, save a joint Anglo-Russian loan 
 involving on Persia's part the acceptance of terms of tutelage 
 incompatible with the national independence which she desired 
 above all things to maintain. On December 13, 1909, Persia 
 enquired of the two Governments on what terms such a loan 
 (of .500,000) would be granted to her; but on April 10, 1910, 
 two days after the expiry of Russia's Railway Concession, 
 she rejected the proposed conditions as inconsistent with her 
 national safety. Two months later she entered into nego- 
 tiations with a private firm in London (Seligmann's) for a 
 loan, and this was on the point of being concluded on terms 
 satisfactory to both parties when, in October, 1910, the nego- 
 tiations were frustrated by the action of the British acting in
 
 7 
 
 harmony with the Russian Government, which latter at the 
 same time prevented Persia from realizing money on the 
 Crown jewels, said to have been valued by a French expert 
 at ,750,000. On August 25, 1910, Russia had also en- 
 deavoured to extort fresh concessions as the price of with- 
 drawing her troops; a tacit admission on her part that their 
 presence was no longer necessary for the protection of 
 European residents which drew forth a remonstrance even 
 from the Times. 
 
 About this time also occurred certain important changes 
 in the diplomatic and consular services of Russia and England 
 which corresponded with a harsher and more vigorous attitude 
 of the two Powers towards Persia, and with a marked unfriend- 
 liness on the part of France (followed by England) towards 
 Turkey which led immediately to a rapprocliement between 
 that country and Germany. 
 
 These changes began with the departure of Lord Hardinge 
 of Penshurst (formerly Sir Charles Hardinge) from the British 
 Foreign Office to take up the position of Viceroy of India, 
 and the advent in his place of Sir Arthur Nicholson, hitherto 
 British Ambassador at St Petersburg; an appointment warmly 
 applauded by the organs of the Russian Government. About 
 the same time (end of September, 1910) M. Izvolsky, the chief 
 upholder in Russia of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, was 
 removed from the position of Foreign Minister which he had 
 hitherto held and sent as Ambassador to Paris, his place being 
 taken at the Russian Foreign Office by M. Sazonofif, a reputed 
 Germanophil. Last, but not least, M. Pokhitanoff, whose 
 violent and high-handed behaviour when Consul-General at 
 Tabriz was notorious, and who, with his colleague M. Petroff, 
 was directly responsible for the two Ultimatums of November 
 last which have produced the present crisis, was sent as Russian 
 Consul to Teheran in October, 1910. Almost simultaneously 
 (October 16) was despatched the British note to Persia on the 
 state of the Southern Roads which was at first described as 
 an " Ultimatum," though later attempts were made to invest 
 it with a milder character. Represented in Vienna as "the 
 debut of Sir Arthur Nicholson, an energetic and unscrupulous
 
 8 
 
 politician," it caused the greatest excitement and alarm not 
 only in Persia but in Turkey, where, at a great protest meeting 
 held at Constantinople on October 23, 1910, violent speeches 
 were made denouncing the action of England and Russia 
 towards Persia, and an appeal was telegraphed to the German 
 Emperor as the only European monarch animated by friendly 
 feelings towards Islam. This appeal, which apparently evoked 
 no reply, did not benefit Islam, but it probably greatly 
 strengthened the German Emperor's position in dealing with 
 the Tsar at Potsdam on November 5, 1910, and in formulating 
 the terms of the celebrated Potsdam Agreement which came 
 as such a disagreeable surprise to England and France when 
 its terms became known. From this point onwards Russia, 
 assured of Germany's recognition (on certain terms) of her 
 " sphere of influence " in Persia, appears to have had the 
 whip-hand over England, and to have been able (probably 
 by threats, expressed or implied, of a closer rapprochement 
 with Germany) to compel her partner to acquiesce with ever 
 diminishing resistance in the abandonment of that respect 
 for the " independence and integrity " of Persia which both 
 Powers had repeatedly and solemnly declared to be the 
 underlying principle on which the Anglo-Russian Agreement 
 of August 31, 1907, was based. 
 
 To return to events in Persia. On October 29, 1910, 
 Husayn-Kuli Khan, the Persian Foreign Minister, a man of 
 unusual capacity and integrity, informed the two Legations 
 that the Persian Government, having intercepted treasonable 
 correspondence between the ex-Shah and some of the Turk- 
 man tribes on the Persian frontier east of the Caspian, 
 proposed in accordance with the terms of the Protocol of 
 August 25, 1909, to stop the payment of the next instalment 
 of his allowance pending further investigations. In response 
 to this communication not only did the two Legations refuse 
 to consider the allegation against the ex-Shah, and insist on 
 the immediate payment of the allowance, but they subjected 
 Husayn-Kuli Khan to the insult of sending two Legation 
 servants (ghulams) to follow him about everywhere, even into 
 his house, until the money was paid. Strong protests were
 
 made by the Persian Government at the humiliation thus in- 
 flicted upon them, which, though represented by Sir E.- Grey 
 in Parliament as " the custom of the country," was in fact an 
 unprecedented and unparalleled outrage. The Russian Lega- 
 tion was, however, bent on getting rid of Husayn-Kuli Khan, 
 whom they disliked both on account of his fearlessness and 
 uprightness and his English education and alleged Anglophil 
 tendencies ; and on November 16, 1910, the Russian Minister 
 demanded an apology from him for an alleged insult to the 
 Russian Consular Agent at Kashan, a Persian of bad repute 
 named Agha Hasan, to whose appointment the Persian Govern- 
 ment had consistently objected. Finally Husayn-Kuli Khan 
 was driven to resign on December 27, 1910. 
 
 Hardly had the ex-Shah's pension been paid as a result 
 of the pressure described above, when it transpired that he 
 had left Odessa (unknown, as was pretended, to the Russian 
 Government) and started on a journey of intrigue through 
 Europe, in the course of which he visited Vienna, Brussels, 
 Berlin, Rome, Meran, Nice, Paris and other places where his 
 old adherents were living in exile, and made his plans for the 
 attempt to regain his throne which occurred last summer. 
 
 Early in the year 1911 occurred two assassinations which 
 produced a very bad effect in Persia, because in both cases 
 the assassins were claimed by Russia as her subjects, and were 
 removed from Persian jurisdiction. The first case occurred 
 on February I at Isfahan, when a certain Abbas, an ex-chief 
 of police, shot at and wounded the Governor, Mutamad-i- 
 Khakan, and killed his cousin, and then took refuge in the 
 Russian Consulate. The second case occurred at Teheran 
 five days later, when the Minister of Finance, Sani-ud-Dawla, 
 a reputed Germanophil who appears to have been engaged 
 in trying to negotiate a loan for Persia, was shot by two 
 Georgians, who succeeded in wounding four of the .police 
 before they were arrested. Two days later the new Regent, 
 Nasir-ul-Mulk, who had been elected to this responsible 
 position on the death of Azud-ul-Mulk in the previous 
 autumn, finally returned to Teheran. His advent aroused 
 fresh hopes, especially as (in compliment, it was said, to him,
 
 10 
 
 and to add prestige to his assumption to the Regency) the bulk 
 of the Russian garrison (except 80 Cossacks) were withdrawn 
 from Kazvin on March 13, a month after his arrival. 
 
 The next four months were probably, in spite of continued 
 intrigues directed against the Government, the most hopeful 
 which Persia experienced during these stormy years. May 
 witnessed the arrival of Mr Morgan Shuster and the other 
 American financial experts whom Persia had engaged to 
 organize her revenue and expenditure. To enforce the pay- 
 ment of legal taxes by means of a carefully selected Treasury 
 Gendarmerie was soon recognized as the first necessity. This 
 organization was beginning to take shape in July, and the com- 
 mand of the new force was offered by Mr Shuster to Captain 
 C. B. Stokes of the Indian Army, whose period of service as 
 Military Attache to the British Legation had just come to an 
 end. At first the British Government raised no objection, and 
 Captain Stokes was given to understand that his resignation 
 would be accepted ; but within ten days Russia had protested 
 against this appointment, on the ground that it involved the 
 employment of a British officer in the so-called " Russian 
 Sphere," and was therefore " contrary to the spirit of the 
 Anglo-Russian Agreement." Prolonged negotiations ensued, 
 and for a time there seemed some hope that Russia would 
 waive her objection on learning that the appointment had no 
 political significance, but had been determined on simply 
 because no other available officer possessed Captain Stokes's 
 exceptional qualifications for the post. The Novoe Vremya, 
 however, and other reactionary organs of the Russian Press 
 violently denounced the appointment, and the situation was 
 suddenly further complicated by the reappearance of the 
 ex-Shah on Persian territory with a considerable following of 
 Turkmans, accompanied by his brother Shua-us-Saltana. He 
 had returned through Russia, crossed the Caspian in a Russian 
 steamer, the Christopher os> and was said to be accompanied 
 by six Russian Naval Officers, while the Russian cargo-boat 
 Djabbar lay at hand on the Caspian to enable him to retrace 
 his steps if his adventure should fail. His second brother, 
 Salar-ud-Dawla, meanwhile entered Persian territory on the
 
 II 
 
 Western side, across the Turkish frontier, and, collecting an 
 army of Lurs, attacked Kirmanshah. 
 
 Confronted by this double invasion and further harrassed 
 by the Russian objections to Captain Stokes's appointment 
 and the vigorous campaign they had now instituted against 
 the able and honest American Treasurer-General, Mr Morgan 
 Shuster, the Persian Government in vain protested to Russia 
 and Great Britain against the violation of Article 1 1 of the 
 Protocol of August 25, 1909, involved in the ex-Shah's return. 
 The two Powers, while admitting that the ex-Shah had 
 certainly forfeited his pension, declined to take any further 
 steps in the matter, which, they said, now concerned only the 
 Persian Government. Every effort was therefore made by the 
 Persians to put an end to this fresh and most serious menace, 
 and, after some indecisive engagements and many wild reports, 
 the ex-Shah's most capable general Arshad-ud-Dawla was 
 defeated and shot on September 5. The victory of the 
 Government troops was complete, and a few days later the 
 ex-Shah re-embarked on the Russian boat and fled back to 
 Russia. Three weeks later his brother Salar-ud-Dawla suf- 
 fered an equally decisive defeat in the West at Sawa and 
 Nawbaran, and fled to Europe on October 4, while Ramadan, 
 which he had occupied, was retaken by the Government 
 troops two days later. 
 
 Now at last it seemed that, freed from these dangers, which 
 it had overcome by its own energy, and from the burden of 
 the ex-Shah's large allowance, the Persian Government might 
 hope for a little breathing-space. But no sooner was it evident 
 that the ex-Shah had hopelessly failed in his attempt than 
 fresh difficulties were raised by both Russia and England. 
 England, making no allowance for the serious preoccupations 
 which had rendered it impossible for the Persian Government 
 to send troops to restore order in the South, announced her 
 intention of sending a number of Indian troops to Pars ; while 
 though, according to the Times, the Persian Government 
 behaved in the most conciliatory manner towards Russia, 
 a Russo-Persian conflict was provoked on October 9, by the 
 overbearing conduct of Messrs Pokhitanoff and Petroff. The
 
 12 
 
 property of the ex-Shah's brother Shua-us-Saltana, who had 
 taken part in the recent rebellion, was declared confiscated 
 by the Persian Government, and Treasury Gendarmes were 
 placed in charge of his estates of Mansuriyya, Dawlatabad 
 and Mansurabad. The notorious M. Pokhitanoff, the Russian 
 Consul-General, regardless of the fact that Shua-us-Saltana 
 had placed himself under Turkish, not Russian, protection 
 and that, according to his own will, he not only owed nothing 
 to the Russian Bank, but had a credit there of 18,000 tumans 
 (,3600), took upon himself to interfere. Two members of 
 the Russian Consulate in uniform, accompanied by ten 
 Russian Cossacks, entered the house and threatened to fire on 
 the five Treasury Gendarmes unless they at once retired,, 
 which they did. Next day a strong body of Treasury 
 Gendarmes returned, and, finding only a small guard of 
 Persian Cossacks, evicted them. " All these proceedings," 
 said the Times correspondent in his telegram of October 10, 
 " appear to have been due to the initiative of M. Pokhitanoff, 
 the Russian Consul-General. The Russian Minister appears 
 to have rectified the matter, and the incident now seems to 
 be closed, except that the Persian Government is now ad- 
 dressing a protest against the action of the Consul-General." 
 
 Unfortunately, so far from the incident being closed, it led 
 directly to the present most serious crisis. After the confis- 
 cation had been effected by the Treasury Gendarmes, two 
 officials of the Russian Consulate, Petroff and another, re- 
 turned to the house and began to revile and abuse the Persian 
 gendarmes on duty there. Being unable to provoke an 
 incident of any kind (for the men had been strictly enjoined 
 not to allow themselves to be drawn into any altercation), 
 they departed to the Russian Consulate and declared that 
 they had been insulted and threatened. 
 
 A few days after this (on October 17) Russia definitely 
 refused to withdraw her objection to the appointment of 
 Captain Stokes to command the Treasury Gendarmerie, and 
 though the Times had stated on August 4 that l< neither the 
 British nor the Indian Government had any power to prevent 
 Captain Stokes from accepting the appointment," means were
 
 13 
 
 found to meet Russia's wishes and to prohibit him from 
 taking up the post to his acceptance of which no objection 
 had originally been made. 
 
 Next day the Times published a leader criticizing Mr 
 Shuster's actions, and especially his protest against Anglo- 
 Russian policy in Persia, which he described as essentially 
 " hostile to the regeneration of Persia," and Mr Shuster at 
 once announced his intention of justifying his criticisms by 
 a statement of facts which had come under his observation. 
 His indictment duly appeared in the Times of November 9 
 and 10, and was feebly criticized in a leading article of con- 
 spicuous weakness on November u. 
 
 Meanwhile Russia, encouraged by her success in prevent- 
 ing the employment of Captain Stokes, and finding the 
 indulgence of the British Foreign Office practically unlimited, 
 raised, on October 22, a fresh objection to the appointment 
 of twenty additional Swedish officers who had been asked 
 for by the Persian Government, and apparently obliged the 
 Swedish Government to yield on this point on November 7. 
 On October 27 the first detachment of Indian troops landed 
 at Bushire, and on the same day it was announced that 200 
 more Russian troops had landed at Enzeli, that they would 
 be followed by 1700 more, and that 1900 more would advance 
 from Julfa to Tabriz. That the sending of these Indian troops 
 to the south would at once be followed by the sending of a 
 much larger number of Russian troops to the north was 
 exactly what had been feared by those who deprecated any 
 partition of Persia, and the result in this case fully justified 
 their apprehensions. 
 
 On November 2 there was a sudden recrudescence of the 
 Shua-us-Saltana incident. The Russian Minister, M. Poklevski 
 Koziell, who was supposed to have dissociated himself entirely 
 from the conduct of the Consul-General, M. Pokhitanoff, 
 presented a verbal Ultimatum to the Persian Government 
 demanding: (i) that the Treasury Gendarmes should be 
 at once removed from the Shua-us-Saltana's properties ; and 
 (2) that the Persian Foreign Minister should apologize for 
 the alleged insult offered to the Russian Consular officers.
 
 1 4 
 
 He also returned the Persian note of protest, although he had 
 previously acknowledged and answered it, and demanded an 
 immediate reply to his Ultimatum. The Persian Government 
 at first refused to apologize for an offence never committed, 
 but expressed their complete readiness to submit the whole 
 question to impartial investigation, and to apologize if it 
 could be shown that they or their officials had been guilty of 
 any discourtesy, but finally, having received on November 1 1 
 a written Ultimatum in the same sense, and being advised by 
 the British Legation, whose advice they sought, to yield to 
 force majeure, they gave way, and the required apology was 
 tendered on November 26 by the Persian Foreign Minister. 
 
 Any hope that this undeserved humiliation would appease 
 the Russian Government was dispelled by the presentation of 
 a second yet more unendurable Ultimatum on November 29, 
 in which Russia put forward three fresh demands, viz. 
 (i) that the Persian Government should dismiss Mr Shuster 
 and Mr Lecoffre ; (2) that they should undertake to appoint 
 in future no foreigners in the Government Service without 
 first consulting the Russian and British Ministers ; (3) that 
 they should pay an indemnity for the expenses involved in 
 the despatch of the Russian expedition, which the compliance 
 of the Persians with the first Ultimatum had not stopped. 
 Compliance with the terms of the second Ultimatum was also 
 demanded within 48 hours. 
 
 The acceptance of this Ultimatum evidently involved on 
 the one hand a complete renunciation of Persia's position as 
 an independent State and the final abandonment of the hope- 
 ful reforms so energetically pushed forward by Mr Shuster, 
 and on the other hand offered no sure hope of a final settle- 
 ment. It was a case of the Wolf and the Lamb, and the 
 Lamb at last turned at bay. On November 30 the Majlis 
 " unanimously refused compliance with the Russian Ulti- 
 matum," and on December I Mr Morgan Shuster published 
 a still stronger defence of his action, ending with the following 
 words : 
 
 " I was early offered the plain choice between serving the 
 Persian people and only appearing to do so, while actually
 
 15 
 
 serving foreign interests bent on Persia's national destruction. 
 I have no apologies to offer for my course." 
 
 The events of December, 1911, are within the memory 
 of all. There were delays and pauses which aroused transient 
 hopes that the Russian advance might be stayed, and that 
 Sir Edward Grey, while publicly defending every step taken 
 by Russia, might in secret be endeavouring to restrain her 
 cupidity, which evidently deemed the moment come for the 
 satisfaction of her old ambitions in Persia. But the advance 
 of the Russian troops continued, and on Christmas Day arrived 
 sinister rumours of frightful bloodshed both at Tabriz and 
 Resht, with open threats on the part of the Russian Govern- 
 ment of field courts martial and wholesale executions on the 
 model of those employed with such terrible ferocity in the 
 Baltic provinces some years ago. The details of these events 
 will not be fully known for some time, if ever, and telegraphic 
 communication with Tabriz, Resht and even Teheran was 
 interrupted, wholly or partly, down to the end of 1911, but 
 there is every reason to fear that, as the Times correspondent 
 said, "when the veil is lifted, it will reveal desolation." 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's incomprehensible complaisance to 
 Russia, and complete reversal of the principles firmly held 
 by all previous British statesmen as to the absolute necessity 
 of maintaining buffer States between the British and the 
 Russian Empires, has now brought us within measurable 
 distance of^a partition of Persia, having as its result not 
 merely the destruction of an ancient and talented people whom 
 in the very hour of their awakening we have abandoned to the 
 mercy of the most ruthlessly retrograde Power in the world, 
 but also the creation of a long, indefensible Anglo-Russian 
 frontier, necessarily involving an enormous increase of military 
 expenditure, and enabling Russia henceforth to exert direct 
 pressure upon us in a way hitherto impossible. It is perhaps 
 still not too late to save Persian independence and maintain 
 the buffer State if, even at this eleventh hour, England will 
 act with firmness, and tell Russia plainly that unless she is 
 prepared to abide by the terms of the Anglo- Russian Agree- 
 ment, " based as it is " (to quote the words of the British
 
 i6 
 
 Minister's Memorandum of September 4, 1907, to the Persian 
 Foreign Office) " on a guarantee of Persia's independence and 
 integrity," that Agreement and the Entente of which it is the 
 expression must go, because no understanding or agreement 
 is possible unless it is loyally observed by both sides. 
 
 But if this is not done; if England continues to show the 
 same weak complaisance as heretofore with Russia's every 
 fresh act of aggression, what will probably happen? Russia, 
 having occupied her own "Sphere of Influence" (which includes 
 the largest and richest half of Persia) will inevitably be tempted 
 to push forward into the " Neutral Zone " until she reaches 
 her old objective the Persian Gulf. Shall we then attempt to 
 stop her, at much greater disadvantage than now, by force, or 
 shall we allow her to establish herself on that sea hitherto so 
 jealously guarded? In considering this question let us recall 
 the following sayings of Lord Lansdowne (May 5, 1903) and 
 Lord Curzon. 
 
 " I say it without hesitation, we should regard the establish- 
 ment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf 
 by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, 
 and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our 
 disposal." (Lord Lansdowne.} 
 
 " I should regard the concession of a port upon the Persian 
 Gulf to Russia by any Power as a deliberate insult to Great 
 Britain, as a wanton rupture of the status quo, and as an 
 intentional provocation to war; and I should -impeach the 
 British Minister who was guilty of acquiescing in such a 
 surrender as a traitor to his country." (Lord Curzon} 
 
 Let us also recall the following words which appeared in 
 the St Petersburg Bourse Gazette (supposed to be the organ 
 of M. de Witte) in October 1901: 
 
 "Russian diplomacy... has put an end once and for all to 
 the idle talk about dividing Persia into a northern sphere of 
 influence belonging to Russia and a southern sphere belonging 
 to England. There can be no division of spheres of influence 
 in Persia, which, together with the waters which bathe its 
 shores, must remain the object of Russian material and moral 
 protection"
 
 17 
 
 As regards the moral aspect of the question it is hardly 
 possible to speak with moderation. An earlier and nobler 
 generation of Englishmen, who held the partition of Poland 
 to be a crime of the first magnitude, would have refused to 
 believe that their own country could, under a Government 
 calling itself " Liberal," actually aid and abet the arch-enemy 
 of Freedom in so cruel an act as the destruction of an ancient 
 nation, which, after suffering centuries of oppression, seemed, 
 after six years' desperate struggle, to be at last on the high- 
 road to regeneration. In a letter written on December 6, 1911, 
 to one of his friends in this country, Mr Morgan Shuster, the 
 upright, able and honest American to whom Persia entrusted 
 the reorganization of her finances, and who, because it became 
 clear that he would, if unimpeded, succeed in that reorgani- 
 zation, was driven from his post by Russia, with the 
 acquiescence if not the support of England, speaks as 
 follows : 
 
 " It would take volumes and weeks to describe all the 
 details of the complications of the situation here, and I shall 
 not attempt to do so until I have more leisure than at present; 
 but I can assure you as a man that the spectacle now presented 
 to us here of the strangling of the national spirit of a people 
 who have lived for centuries under the most frightful des- 
 potism and tyranny, and only recently have begun to en- 
 joy even the sentiment of liberty, though without many of 
 its practical benefits, is a most sickening and melancholy one. 
 You, I believe, are rated by that esteemed London Times as 
 a ' dreamer ' and ' sentimentalist.' From their smug editorials 
 I take it that they consider any man who dares to look 
 further than his own pantry or larder as stamped with this seal, 
 and that they publicly uphold a far different code of ethics 
 and morality in dealing with a whole nation of people from 
 that which they would be willing to countenance in transactions 
 between private individuals or business corporations. While 
 I am no student of England's political problems, I cannot but 
 believe that if the British people permit themselves to be 
 carried along these lines to the inevitable conclusion, their 
 prestige, and even the integrity of the British Empire itself
 
 18 
 
 will before many years have suffered a series of surprising 
 shocks." 
 
 On September 4, 1907, the British representative at 
 Teheran communicated to the Persian Foreign Office a 
 Memorandum, in Persian, designed to reassure the Persians 
 as to the nature and effects of the Anglo-Russian Agreement 
 signed on August 31 of the same year, and though Mr Acland 
 (on December 5, 1911) and Sir E. Grey (on December 14, 
 1911) professed ignorance as to this document, its genuineness 
 is indisputable and beyond all question. This is how it con- 
 cludes: 
 
 " From the above statements you will see how baseless 
 and unfounded are these rumours which have lately prevailed 
 in Persia concerning the political ambitions of England and 
 Russia in this country. The object of the two Powers in 
 making this Agreement is not in any way to attack, but 
 rather to assure for ever the independence of Persia. Not 
 only do they not wish to have at hand any excuse for inter- 
 vention, but their object in these friendly negotiations was not 
 to allow one another to intervene on the pretext of safe- 
 guarding their interests. The two Powers hope that in the 
 future Persia will be for ever delivered from the fear of foreign 
 intervention, and will thus be perfectly free to manage her 
 affairs in her own way, whereby advantage will accrue both 
 to herself and to the whole world." 
 
 Was ever so explicit a promise so flagrantly violated 
 within so short a period as four years? By our association 
 with the Russian Government in this matter we have not 
 restrained them in any effective way from the pursuit of ends 
 which they have scarcely troubled to disguise: we have only 
 made ourselves jointly responsible for actions which have 
 brought dishonour on both partners, but material advantage 
 only to one. To England this ill-starred and unequal 
 partnership has given "neither this world nor the next": 
 we have lost "the Here and the Hereafter, and this is the 
 Conspicuous Loss." 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
 
 MAP SHEWING THE THREE "SPHERES" (RUS 
 IN THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREE 
 
 (It will be noticed that all the principal towns of Persia except Dizfiil, S 
 part of the country, are included in the " Russian Sphere." The " B 
 of importance, viz. Rinnan.)
 
 AFGHANISTAN 
 
 iN, BRITISH AND NEUTRAL) DEFINED 
 NT OF AUGUST 31, 1907. 
 
 itar, Shiraz and Kirman, as well as the most fertile and populous 
 h Sphere" consists mostly of desert, and contains only one town
 
 
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