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 Officers of the Army, Militia and Volunteers, 
 
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 • • • . •. • . 
 
PREFACE TO FIFTH EDITION. 
 
 The favourable reception which this work has met with 
 from Officers generally, and especially from Officers of the 
 Volunteers, has exhausted four editions within five years 
 of its publication. The author has adopted in the present 
 edition many of the numerous suggestions which he has 
 received from various quarters and for which he returns 
 thanks. 
 
 These Lectures are an attempt to put in a compact, 
 portable, and, above all economical form, the various items 
 which constitute the present course of tactical instruction 
 necessary to qualify officers of the army for promotion. 
 They are also addressed to officers of the Militia and 
 Volunteers. 
 
 The subject matter, and order of arrangement are 
 based entirely upon the Tactical Syllabus contaiued in the 
 Queen's Regulations ; it is hoped therefore that they may 
 be found useful, especially to officers who are unable to 
 attend a garrison course, and to Volunteer officers who 
 wish to pass the examination in tactics. 
 
 The additions required by G.O. 29 of 1887, namely, 
 Detached Duties of Cavalry ; and the Employment of 
 Horse Artillery with Cavalry acting independently, have 
 been made. 
 
 The Author has added some extracts from the " Letters 
 on Artillery" by Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen. 
 who held high commands in the Prussian Artillery during 
 the campaigns of 1866 and 1870. 
 
Lecture I. 
 
 As these Lectures are addressed to Officers of Militia and 
 Volunteers, as well as to those of the Regular Forces, perhaps it 
 may be as well to commence with a brief sketch of "Organisation." 
 
 The art of organising an army consists in dividing and sub- 
 dividing it into fractions capable of being handled by one man. 
 
 If these fractions are too large, they become unwieldy and 
 lose mobility ; if they are too small we shall have confusion from 
 multiplicity of parts. Thus then we require a starting point or 
 standard, on which to base our arrangements, and it is found 
 in the fact that one superior can control from four to eight 
 subordinates. 
 
 For instance, a company is divided into four squads, under 
 non-commissioned officers and subalterns, who are commanded 
 by a captain. Four companies form a half-battalion, under a 
 major; or should this arrangement be impracticable, eight 
 companies are under the lieutenant-colonel. 
 
 1 . The following table gives the detail of the various units as 
 fixed by G-. 0., July, 1888 :— 
 
 
 
 J2, 
 
 
 
 
 00 
 
 E 
 
 ED 
 
 to 
 
 
 <v 
 
 <8 
 
 0} 
 CD 
 
 [o 
 
 
 « 
 
 ja 
 
 o 
 
 1H 
 
 
 o 
 
 a 
 
 OS 
 
 H 
 
 CD 
 
 > 
 
 Battalion of Infantry 
 
 30 
 
 1036 
 
 70 
 
 16 
 
 Regiment of Cavalry 
 
 32 
 
 634 
 
 614 
 
 20 
 
 Battery of Horse Artillery 
 
 7 
 
 179 
 
 193 
 
 7 
 
 „ Field Artillery 
 
 7 
 
 170 
 
 141 
 
 7 
 
 Mounted Infantry Battalion 
 
 48 
 
 1052 
 
 1098 
 
 28 
 
 Infantry Detachment with 2 Ma- 
 
 
 
 
 
 chine Guns 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 8 
 
 Nil 
 
 Cavalry Detachment with 2 Ma- 
 
 
 
 
 
 chine Guns 
 
 1 
 
 17 
 
 14 
 
 Nil 
 
 Mounted Engineer Troop 
 
 4 
 
 113 
 
 119 
 
 9 
 
 Pontoon Troop 
 
 5 
 
 211 
 
 190 
 
 28 
 
 Field Engineer Company 
 
 7 
 
 210 
 
 70 
 
 13 
 
 Telegraph Troop 
 
 6 
 
 241 
 
 171 
 
 22 
 
 Field Park 
 
 1 
 
 44 
 
 50 
 
 12 
 
 Commissariat & Transport Company 
 
 4 
 
 263 
 
 316 
 
 65 
 
 Bearer Company 
 
 3 
 
 61 
 
 4 
 
 15 
 
 Field Hospital 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 6 
 
 Nil 
 
 Reserve Ammunition Column ... 
 
 7 
 
 184 
 
 217 
 
 31 
 
 A Brigade of infantry consists of — 
 Brigade Staff, 
 
 Four Battalions of Infantry, 
 Two Machine Guns, 
 One Company C. and T., 
 One Sick Bearer Company, 
 One Field Hospital Company. 
 Total : combatants— 119 officers, 4047 rank and file ; Non-combatants 
 14 officers, 373 rank and file ; 536 horses, 120 vehicles. 
 
 Although the Division includes arms other than infantry, it is 
 officially styled " a Division of Infantry." 
 
 U 
 
2 ' ORGANISATION. 
 
 A Division of Infantry consists of — 
 Divisional Staff, 
 1st Brigade of Infantry. 
 2nd Brigade of Infantry, 
 One Squadron of Divisional Cavalry, 
 Three Batteries F.A., 
 
 One Divisional Reserve Ammunition Column, 
 One Field Company R.E., 
 One Company C. and T., 
 One Field Hospital. 
 
 Total : combatants— 287 officers, 8840 rank and file ; non-combatants 
 — 40 officers, 1020 rank and file; 18 guns, 4 machine guns, 2164 
 horses, 406 vehicles. Thus it will be seen that a division of infantry 
 is a complete tactical and administrative unit, able if necessary to 
 march and fight independently. 
 
 AN AEMY COEPS. 
 
 First Division. 
 Divisional Staff 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Brigade Staff 
 „ Regiment 
 
 
 
 2 Machine Guns 
 1 Company C & T 
 1 Sick Bearer Co. 
 1 Field Hospital „ 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Brigade Staff 
 „ Regiment 
 
 
 
 2 Machine Guns 
 1 Company C & T 
 1 Sick Bearer Co. 
 1 Field Hospital „ 
 
 1 Squadron of Di- 
 visional Cavalry 
 
 3 Batteries F. A. 
 
 1 Divisional Re- 
 serve Amu. Col. 
 
 1 Field Comp.R.E. 
 
 1 Company C & T 
 
 1 Field Hospital 
 
 Second Division. 
 Divisional Staff 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Brigade Staff 
 
 ,, Regiment 
 
 )) !) 
 
 )> )) 
 
 " . " 
 
 2 Machiue Guns 
 1 Company C & T 
 1 Sick Bearer Co. 
 1 Field Hospital ,, 
 
 Third Division. 
 Divisional Staff 
 )> >> 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Brigade Staff 
 
 Regiment 
 
 I! 
 )> 
 )) 
 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Brigade Staff 
 ,, Regiment 
 
 •J .Machine Guns 
 1 Company C & T 
 1 Sick Bearer Co. 
 1 Field Hospital „ 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Brigade Staff 
 ,, Regiment 
 
 !> 
 )) 
 
 !) 
 )) 
 
 " . " 
 
 2 Machine Guns 
 1 Company C & T 
 1 Sick Bearer Co. 
 1 Field Hospital ,, 
 
 
 
 " . " 
 2 Machine Guns 
 
 1 Company C & T 
 
 1 Sick Bearer Co. 
 
 1 Field Hospital ,, 
 
 1 Squadron of Di- 
 visional Cavalry 
 
 3 Batteries F. A. 
 
 1 Divisional Re- 
 serve Amn. Col. 
 
 1 Field Co. R. E. 
 
 1 CompanyC&T 
 
 1 Squadron of Di- 
 visional Cavalry 
 
 3 Batteries F. A*. 
 
 1 Divisional Re- 
 serve Amn. Col. 
 
 1 Field Co. R. E. 
 
 1 Company C & T 
 
 1 Field Hospital 
 
 1 Field Hospital 
 
 Total : combatants — 1013 officers, 29,835 rank and 
 batants — 145 officers, 3971 rank and file ; 84 guns, 14 
 10,058 horses, 1755 vehicles. 
 
 Corps Troops. 
 
 Corps Cavalry. 
 
 II Q & 1 Squadron 
 
 Corps Artillkry. 
 
 3 Batteries H. A. 
 2 Batteries F. A. 
 Arm y Corps Resrv. 
 Ammunition Col. 
 
 Corps Engineers. 
 
 1 Field Company 
 1 Pontoon Troop 
 H.Q.&i Telegraph 
 Battalion 
 Field Park 
 
 Corps Infantry. 
 
 1 Battln. Infantry 
 
 2 Machine Guns 
 2Comp. [Signallers 
 
 C & T Corps. 
 
 1 Company Details 
 
 2 Bakery Comps. 
 
 Medical. 
 
 1 Field Hospital 
 Chaplain's Dept. 
 Ord. Store Dept.1 
 Army Pay Dept. 
 Veterinary Dept. I 
 Military Police 
 Army P. O. Corp| 
 
 file; non-com- 
 machine guns, 
 
ORGANISATION. 2A 
 
 A Brigade of Cavalry consists of — 
 Brigade Staff, 
 
 Three Regiments of Cavalry, 
 Two Machine Guns, 
 lij Companies C. and T. Corps, 
 One Bearer Company, 
 One Field Hospital. 
 
 Total : combatants — 96 officers, 1651 rank and file ; non-combatants 
 — 18 officers, 262 rank and file ; 2 machine guns, 2219 horses, 136 
 vehicles. 
 
 A Division of Cavalry consists of — 
 Divisional Staff, 
 Two Brigades of Cavalry. 
 
 DIVISIONAL TROOPS. 
 
 Two Batteries Horse Artillery, 
 
 Two Machine Guns, 
 
 Mounted Detachment R.E., 
 
 One Battalion Mounted Infantry, 
 
 Divisional Reserve Ammunition Column, 
 
 One Company C. and T. Corps, 
 
 One Field Hospital. 
 
 Total : combatants — 307 officers, 5135 rank and file ; non-combatants 
 — 18 officers, 208 rank and file ; 12 guns, 6 machine guns, 6518 
 horses, 431 vehicles. 
 
 A single army corps would be accompanied by a cavalry brigade. 
 Should two army corps take the field, they would have a cavalry 
 division attached, and the grand total would be : combatants — 2333 
 officers, 64,805 rank and file ; Non-combatants — 308 officers, 8150 
 rank and file ; 180 guns, 34 machine guns, 26,654 horses, and 3941 
 vehicles. 
 
 The amount of ammunition carried into the theatre of war 
 for artillery, including that carried in gun carriages and limbers, 
 is five hundred, rounds per gun. 
 
 The amount of ammunition provided for infantry, including 
 that carried by the men is 480 rounds per man. 
 
 To continue — In 1870, the Germans brought into the field 
 no less than 1 6 Army Corps, and in accordance with the above 
 principle, divided them into three armies, one of three corps, one 
 of seven corps, and one of six corps. By this means the head- 
 quarter staff had only three units to control, but these three 
 units included 500,000 men. 
 
 The first object of organisation is tactical efficiency; the 
 second is facility of " administration." 
 
 A body of troops may be said to be tactically efficient when 
 they can march, drill, and shoot well. 
 
 Administration is the art of supplying troops, whether in 
 quarters or in the field, with food, clothing, ammunition, medical 
 requisites, pay, etc., and a body of troops may be considered 
 tactically and administratively efficient when it is provided with 
 all things necessary for marching, fighting, and subsistence. 
 
3 ORGANISATION. 
 
 UNITS. 
 
 A TACTICAL UNIT is any body of troops trained and ready 
 to march, manoeuvre and fight under one superior. For instance, 
 an Army Corps is a tactical unit under a general officer, and a 
 mere section of 40 men detached under a subaltern for the defence 
 of a house is also a tactical unit. 
 
 A COMPLETE TACTICAL UNIT is one which combines 
 the three arms of the service, as in the case of a Division. 
 
 A movable column of the three arms, as frequently used in 
 our little wars, is also a complete Tactical unit. 
 
 AN ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT is any body of men who 
 are provided with food, clothing, pay, ammunition and all things 
 necessary for their subsistence and maintenance by one superior 
 or one department. Great advantage is gained where the Tactical 
 and Administrative conditions can be combined, as in the regiment 
 of infantry or cavalry or battery of artillery ; and this then 
 becomes a Tactical and Administrative unit. 
 
 No attempt will here be made to go further into these 
 subjects. The details which make the soldier tactically efficient 
 are, or should be, familiar to every regimental officer ; the details 
 of administration form no part of the course for which these 
 lectures were written. 
 
 STRATEGY. 
 
 Strategy is the art of moving an army on the theatre of war, 
 with a view to placing it in a favourable situation for battle. 
 
 TACTICS. 
 
 The term Tactics is officially defined as follows : the 
 manoeuvres of the three arms combined become " Tactics," and 
 inasmuch as one arm by itself is inconrpleti, such a term is 
 inapplicable to the movements of but one arm. 
 
 MINOR TACTICS. 
 
 But modern war has introduced, or perhaps to speak more 
 correctly, has imperatively demanded the study of what are now 
 known as "Minor Tactics." The province of Minor Tactics is 
 not merely on the battle-field but off it ; in fact, their application 
 never ceases during the campaign. An example will illustrate 
 their use better than description. An officer is placed in com- 
 mand of a battabon of infantry, a troop of cavalry, and two guns, 
 and is ordered to march to a given locality and take up outposts. 
 "Where is he to place his men? Into what fractions is he to 
 divide them ? How is he to post each fraction ? What are the 
 duties of each ? "With what orders is he to furnish each ? How 
 is he to employ his cavalry '? Where should he post his guns ? 
 
ORGANISATION. 3A 
 
 Again, on the right of the position he takes up, is a wood, in the 
 centre is a village, on the left is a defile leading towards the 
 enemy. How is he to treat each ? In the event of an attack by 
 the enemy how is he to act ? The answers to these and a hundred 
 similar questions should be in his head, for if he had a whole 
 library of military books at hand, time would fail him to refer 
 to them. Every moment of delay means so much extra fatigue 
 to his men, already wearied by a long march, so much injury 
 to their morale, and so much advantage to the enemy. One of 
 the principal features of modern war is the responsibility which 
 devolves upon subordinates both on and off tlie actual battle- 
 field, and every officer should prepare himself to accept such 
 responsibility whenever and wherever it may come. Minor Tactics 
 then may be defined as the art of handling small bodies of men on 
 service ; so as to economise their physical powers and to secure a 
 proper division of work among all, so as to dispose them to the 
 best advantage in action, and to obtain their highest fighting 
 value whether the action be a pitched battle or a mere skirmish. 
 In a word "Minor Tactics" means that knowledge of his duty 
 on the part of an officer which never fails to command the 
 confidence of his men. 
 
Lecture II 
 
 I N FA NTRY. 
 
 Home's 
 Tactics. 
 
 German 
 
 Official 
 
 Account. 
 
 Prince 
 Ilohenlohe. 
 
 .7*6 of their total 
 
 6-3 
 
 >> 
 
 ii 
 
 6-5 
 
 it 
 
 ii 
 
 2-8 
 
 ii 
 
 ii 
 
 0-3 
 
 ii 
 
 ii 
 
 Infantry has been described as "the main stay and the back- 
 bone of all armies, whether it be viewed in the light of numbers 
 or its action on the field of battle. Its fire is more deadly than 
 artillery, its action is sure while that of cavalry is fitful. On the 
 infantry the brunt of the fighting falls, it suffers more in action 
 and more on the line of march." 
 
 Note. — The total losses of the German army during 1870-1 
 were thus divided : — 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Artillery 
 
 Engineers 
 
 Train 
 
 Thus we see that the proportionate loss of Infantry was greater 
 than that of all the other arms combined. 
 
 Throughout the whole war of 1870-1, the proportion of 
 Germans killed to the entire force was -~V- 
 
 The proportion of officers killed and wounded was \, and the 
 proportion of men killed and wounded was -^-. 
 
 The action of the other two arms is auxiliary to that of the 
 infantry. 
 
 Under the present system of conducting war there is only one arm that can 
 he called independent, and that is the infantry. The infantry is strictly the 
 army, the nation in arms. It needs the assistance of the other arms and these 
 are, and will continue to bo, auxiliary arms to the infantry, and can fulfil their 
 object well and rise to their highest efficiency only when they are conscious of 
 their character as auxiliary arms, and have no other aim than to help the army, 
 that is the infantry. 
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF INFANTRY. 
 
 In Peace : Easy to raise, train, and equip ; comparatively 
 inexpensive. 
 
 In War : Combines Fire and Shock, also Fire and Motion, 
 easily manoeuvred and brought into action ; can fight on broken 
 ground, men can use their weapons independently, is self- 
 protecting, can furnish men for trench duties, working parties, 
 &c, which the other arms cannot spare. Slow in movement. 
 
 WEAPON. 
 
 The Martini-Henri rifle ; sighted up to 1,400 yards, but 
 perfectly effective at large objects such as columns, batteries, &c, 
 up to 3,000 yards. 
 
1NFANTKY. 
 
 AMMUNITION. 
 
 G.O. 161 of 1887 provides as follows : — 
 
 Rounds per rifle on first taking the field. 
 
 70 carried by the soldier. 
 
 30 in four S. A,A. carts and on two mules accompanying 
 
 each regiment. 
 10 in the regimental baggage waggons. 
 40 in the Divisional ammunition column. 
 30 in Army Corps ammunition column. 
 
 180 
 
 Before going into action each battalion will detail a mounted 
 officer to have charge of the regimental reserve ammunition. 
 
 Each company to detail one N.C.O. and two or three privates 
 as carriers. 
 
 When a battalion is about to attack, every man is to have a 
 hundred rounds on his person. One S.A.A. cart and one mule 
 will follow close in rear of each half battalion ; remaining carts 
 in rear of the centre. The carriers to distribute the ammimition 
 to the men. 
 
 Officers and buglers to carry 40 rounds each to distribute if 
 
 necessary. 
 
 Note. The above calculations are for the Martini-Henry rifle. Should a 
 •298 bore be introduced, the amounts will be increased. 
 
 EXPENDITURE 
 
 Varies immensely, and records of past battles and actions 
 fail to give any standard by which actual requirements can be 
 estimated. 
 
 Examples : At the Battle of Koniggratz, in 1866, two battalions 
 of Prussian Guards averaged 13 and 14 rounds per man. At the 
 action of Trautenau the 1st Battalion 43rd Regiment averaged 
 23 rounds per man. In no case did any Prussian soldier expend 
 the ammunition on his person (60 rounds). The total expenditure 
 of ammunition by the four Prussian armies which took part in 
 the war of 1866, namely, the First and Second Armies, the Army 
 of the Elbe and the Army of the Maine, was 1,850,000 rounds, 
 which, with a total aggregate of 270,000 combatants, gives an 
 average of 7 rounds per man. In 1870, one division of the French 
 Imperial Guard, at Rezonville, averaged 20 rounds a man. 
 During the period from 2nd August to 23rd September, the French 
 army blockaded in Metz averaged 25 rounds a man. Same 
 campaign : The Germans, at St. Privat, 6 rounds a man ; at 
 Beaumont, 9 ; at Sedan, 25 battalions averaged 10 per man. 
 Highest recorded in German army during one day: 108th 
 Regiment at Viviers, 16 per man. During the defence of Rorke's 
 Drift, which lasted 13 hours, 9,000 rounds were fired, giving an 
 average of 80 rounds per man, and 15 rounds fired for every 
 Zulu killed. At the second action at Charasia, in Afghanistan, 
 
 lb 
 
6 INFANTRY. 
 
 1880, 70,000 rounds of Martini and Snider ammunition were 
 fired by our troops, with a result of 200 Afghans killed and 300 
 wounded ; which figures include the execution done by our 
 Artillery as well. This gives about 150 rounds for every casualty. 
 At the battle of Kandahar, Sir F. Eobert's army averaged 5 
 rounds per man. 
 
 TACTICAL UNITS. 
 
 A battalion in our service consists of 8 companies, and a 
 company at war strength is 125 men. Nearly all foreign armies 
 have 4 companies of about 250 men, but this is solely due to 
 motives of economy in the matter of officers. In war it is found 
 that the battalions are under-officered. 
 
 Note. — iu ]«7o the Germans lost 1 officer to 8 men at 
 Weissembui-g; 1 officer to 20 men at Worth; 1 to 19 at Gravelotte, 
 at which latter battle 2 battalions lost the whole of their officers. 
 During the Zulu war our casualties were 1 officer to 18 men, and 
 during the Afghan war, 1 officer to 13 men. At Tel-el-Kebir the 
 proportion of officers to men killed was 1 to 5. 
 
 Heavy Mere the losses with which we (Germans) paid for our frontal 
 attacks . . • those who had fallen were the bravest men who exposed 
 
 themselves most in the lighting line; and above all there were very few 
 officers remaining. 
 
 TIME AND SPACE OCCUPIED. 
 
 Each man is allowed thirty inches laterally, thus 1,000 men 
 drawn up in line, that is with half of them in the rear rank, 
 will occupy 15,000 inches, or 416 yards. 
 
 As this book deals only with tactics, the front of 24 inches 
 per man, which is allowed for mere drill and parade, will be 
 disregarded. 
 
 In fours or files the length of road required is the same as 
 front in hue. [All calculations should be made in yards.] 
 
 The depth of quarter column is expressed in yards by 5 times 
 the number of companies less one. 
 
 The depth of infantry in line is three yards. 
 
 Pace for marching may be taken at three miles an hour. 
 
 Ex. 1. How long will it take a body of infantry 1,000 strong 
 to pass a given spot at three miles an hour ? 1,000 
 men=416 yards, or including colours say 420 yards. 
 3 miles an hour is 5,280 yards in 60 minutes, and 
 we have 5,280 : 420 :: 60. 
 
 Am. : Nearly 5 minutes. 
 
INFANTKY. 7 
 
 Ex. 2. A scout reports that a body of infantry took 7 minutes 
 passing him. They were marching 4 miles an hour, 
 but he noticed several intervals. Required their 
 strength. 4 miles an hour is 7,040 yards in 60 
 minutes, and we have thus the length of the 
 column— 60: 7 :: 7,040. 
 
 Am. : 820 yards, which multiplied by 2? that is, 
 reduced to intervals of 15 inches, gives 1,968 men. 
 
 Deducting 20 per cent, for intervals and loose 
 marching, we have 1,575 men. 
 
 Ex. 3. Given a brigade as follows : 1st battalion, 8 companies, 
 each 100 strong; 2nd battalion, 6 companies, each 
 90 strong ; and 3rd battalion, 4 companies, each 75 
 strong ; in mass of columns. Required the depth 
 of the mass, the length of front when deployed 
 into line, and the time required to deploy. 
 
 The depth of a quarter colunm=nuiuber of companies less 
 one x 5 and we have 
 
 1st battalion 7 X 5=35 yards. 
 
 2nd ,, 5 x 5=25 „ 
 
 3rd ,, 3x5 = 15 „ 
 
 2 intervals of 12 paces as per field exercise 20 ,, 
 
 Am. : 95 yards. 
 
 The front in hue will be, 
 
 1st battalion 333 yards. 
 
 2nd „ 225 „ 
 
 3rd „ 125 „ 
 
 2 intervals of 25 yards 50 ,, 
 
 Total 733 yards. 
 
 The time for deployment will be that required by the left 
 hand man of the rear company of the mass, who will traverse 
 the length of the Hue less front of leading company, that is 690 
 yards, which at three miles an hour gives 8 minutes, or, allowing 
 for the depth of the mass, say 9 minutes. 
 
8 
 
 Lecture III. 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 GENERAL FUNCTIONS. 
 
 When the rifled musket first appeared, numerous infantry 
 enthusiasts announced that the days of cavalry were past. When 
 the breech-loading rifle appeared, the same cry was repeated, 
 yet cavalry still maintains its place in all European armies, 
 But although the arm remains, its duties have changed. The 
 sword and lance being still as they were a hundred years ago 
 — the principal weapons of the cavalry soldier — it follows that 
 he is now placed at a serious disadvantage in actual combat with 
 the other two arms, both of which have made enormous strides of 
 late years with their respective weapons. Neither the Franco- 
 German war nor the Russo-Turkish War produced a single 
 decisive blow struck by the arm during a battle, nor a single 
 effectual pursuit of a beaten army after a victory. 
 
 But it would be a great error to suppose that because cavalry 
 has lost much of its power when actually opposed to the other 
 two arms, there is little further use for it. On the contrary, it 
 has, when its functions are properly understood, become more 
 important than ever. Its duties now are to be the very eyes 
 and ears of an army. Spread out far in front and on the flanks, 
 it should watch the enemy, report his every movement, harass 
 and annoy him by its perpetual presence and watchfulness, 
 secure and send back supplies from the country, and finally, 
 conceal the movements of its own army by drawing a screen over 
 it, whether marching or halted. 
 
 Speaking of the French disasters in 1870, the Emperor 
 Napoleon wrote — " The enemy concealed his movements so well 
 behind the impenetrable screen of cavalry which he threw 
 forward, that in spite of the most persevering researches it was 
 never known where the main body of his forces really was." 
 Surely no higher compliment was ever paid to the utility of any 
 arm of the service. Nor does it follow that the r6le of cavalry 
 on the battle-field is over. Von Moltke observes — " Because 
 in modern warfare the long range and destructive fire of artillery 
 necessitates a scattered formation, there will be more frequent 
 opportunities for those brilliant dashes of small bodies of cavalry." 
 
 Another German writer, Captain May, says — " So long as 
 rapidity, boldness, and dash are active agents in war, cavalry 
 will retain its importance." 
 
CAVALRY. 9 
 
 CHARACTERISTICS. 
 
 Characteristics in Peace : Very expensive to equip and 
 maintain, and takes longer to train than infantry. 
 
 War : Formerly fought by shock alone, but Fire has now 
 become indispensable. 
 
 In these forays, and the encounters which resultedfrom them, our (German) Tactical deduc- 
 cavalry was often met hy dismounted French horsemen armed with Chassepots, tions from the 
 
 whose fire absolutely stopped the advance of our men war of 1870-1. 
 
 Fighting took place on foot for the possession of certain localities, even against Boguslawski. 
 French infantry, and often ended with victory for our light horsemen .... 
 The lancers, in consequence, did their best tj arm themselves with rifles. . . . 
 The question is simply that of enabling cavalry at need to overcome the 
 resistance of riflemen. 
 
 The force of cavalry depends on the combined action of 
 man and horse, a combination which may or may not be forth- 
 coming at the desired moment. Has power of rapid movement, 
 and can seize momentary opportunities as they occur. Its presence 
 generally produces some moral effect on infantry at first, which, 
 however, wears off during a campaign. Has little defensive 
 power when mounted, especially on the flanks. Is useless on 
 steep or broken ground, is easily thrown into disorder, and 
 difficult to rally. 
 
 WEAPONS. 
 
 Dragoons and Hussars carry sword and Martini carbine, the 
 latter sighted to 1,000 yards. Lancer regiments carry sword, 
 lance and carbine. In India several of our native lancer regiments 
 have the front rank equipped with lance and sword, the rear 
 rank with sword and carbine. 
 
 AMMUNITION. 
 
 Twenty rounds are at present carried in the field by men 
 armed with carbines. 
 
 Note. — The Russians appear to avail themselves largely of 
 cavalry fire action According to the official account of the 
 operations in Central Asia in 1880-1, the preparatory orders for 
 a reconnaissance of Denghil Teppe include 120 rounds per man 
 for cavalry and infantry ; and after the operation we are told 
 that the expenditure was " 75 rounds per cavalry carbine, and 
 12 rounds per infantry rifle." Again, after the storming of 
 Denghil Teppe, we are told that the cavalry were led through 
 the town to pursue the flying enemy, and expended, during the 
 pursuit, 12,500 rounds. 
 
 CAVALRY UNITS. 
 
 With us the cavalry regiment consists of 8 troops, in which 
 respect we stand alone, all foreign armies having four squadrons. 
 We tried the squadron system a few years ago, and. shortly 
 
 2 
 
10 CAVALRY. 
 
 afterwards abandoned it, principally because it was unsuited to 
 tbe numerous small detachments which the arm has to furnish, 
 especially in Ireland The squadron is however adhered to for 
 purposes of manoeuvre, and thus the administrative and tactical 
 units in our cavalry are different. 
 
 PACES. 
 
 Pace : Walk, 4 miles an hour ; trot, 8 ; gallop, 12. 
 
 The term "canter" is never used out of the Riding School. 
 
 Each horse occupies one yard laterally; thus a squadron 
 80 strong in line, two deep, would require 40 yards of front. 
 Erom nose to croup 8 feet. Depth of a squadron in line, in- 
 cluding squadron leader in front, and serre-files in rear, is 20 
 yards. 
 
 In marching in "fours" that is 8 abreast, the length of 
 road occupied equals front in line. In "sections, that is, four 
 abreast, it is double the front in line. In half-sections, that is 
 two abreast, it is four times the front in line. Between squadrons 
 in line, 12 yards interval is allowed. 
 
 Example : What length of front will a cavalry regiment of 
 four squadrons, each 80 strong, require ? 
 4 X 40 = 160 yards, 
 Intervals 3x12= 36 yards. Ans. 196 yards. 
 
 Ex. 2 : How long will said regiment take to pass a given 
 spot at a walk, in half-section ? 
 
 Half -sections = 4 x 160 = 640 yards. 
 Four miles an hour is 1,760 yards in 15 minutes, and 
 we have 1,760 : 640:: 15. 
 
 Ans. 5J minutes nearly. 
 
 Ex. 3 : A body of cavalry was observed to take four minutes 
 in passing a given spot at a trot. They were four abreast, 
 and several intervals were noticed. How many were 
 there ? 
 
 Eight miles an hour is 1,760 yards in 7^ minutes, and 
 we have first to find the length of the column in 
 yards, thus 7J:4::1,760. 
 
 Ans. 940 yards nearly. 
 
 Had they been in " fours," or 8 abreast, their numbers 
 would have been the same as in line, two deep, or 1,840 ; 
 but as they were in " sections," four abreast, we have 
 940 men. Deducting 10 per cent, for intervals, we 
 have, in round numbers, 840. 
 
 Note — There appears to be a growing predilection for 
 mounted infantry in some shape. Not ihat this would be any 
 novelty, for it would only be a return to the days of "dragoons," 
 who were once simply mounted infantry. 
 
11 
 
 As long ago as 1836 Jomini -wrote — " Opinions will always be divided as 
 to those amphibious animals called dragoons, It is certainly an advantage to 
 have several battalions of mounted infantry, 'who can anticipate an enemy as 
 a defile, defend it in retreat, or scour a wood ; but to make cavalry out of 
 foot soldiers, or a soldier who is equally good on horse or foot is very 
 
 difficult It cannot be denied, however, that great advantage might 
 
 result to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men on horseback 
 to a decisive point and then bring them into action as infantry. 
 
 The subject has been much discussed and divers proposals of 
 a more or less sweeping nature have been made. One was to the 
 effect that as the expense of both cavalry and mounted infantry was 
 out of the question ; the whole of our existing cavalry should be 
 converted into mountediuf antry , on the ground that swordand lance 
 are both obsolete and there is no duty demanded of cavalry which 
 could not be performed, and performed better, by mountedinfantry. 
 Another by a German officer advocated the entire abolition of 
 cavalry, the money thus saved to be expended in maintaining 
 additional infantry proper. 
 
 No nation has yet taken any step in the matter nor does 
 there seem much probability of any immediate change. 
 
12 
 
 Lecture IV. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 FUNCTIONS. 
 
 Clausewitz. 
 
 Modern artillery has been described by a German writer on 
 tactics in the following terse sentence — " Worse than useless off 
 the battle-field, but invaluable on it." As, however, the functions 
 of the arm are limited entirely to the battle-field, we will examine 
 them fir-t. 
 
 If there is one result which breech-loading riflesbave established 
 more clearly than another, it is that troops can no longer stand 
 up in the open under hostile fire, but must avail themselves of 
 cover, and this holds good, especially with the defensive. The 
 art of obtaining cover from behind which, however, fire can 
 be delivered, has attained to a pitch unknown in former days. 
 Tillages, houses, woods, gardens, enclosures, walls, hedges, etc., 
 are now occupied and prepared for defence ; should none of 
 these be forthcoming, entrenchments of a strength varying from 
 the ordinary shelter trench to the full field parapet are constructed, 
 and behind the shelter thus obtained, the weaker side awaits 
 the attack. 
 
 Here, then, we have one of the functions of artillery — 
 to do that which it alone of the three arms has power to do, 
 namely to batter down solid masonry, smash obstacles, make 
 breaches in walls and entrenchments, and to spread confusion 
 and disorder among the ranks of the defenders. 
 
 The effect of artillery fire is more moral than actual ; it kills but very few, 
 but its appalling noise, ihe way it tears down trees, knocks houses into small 
 pieces, and mutilates the human frame when it d< es bit, strike- terror into all 
 but the stoutest hearts. 
 
 It is, in fact, not too much to say that for infantry alone to 
 attack a properly prepared position, would be simply suicidal. 
 It must first te ;> shaken " by the fire of the attacking guns. 
 
 "From Meanwhile Bazeilles had been attacked by a brigade of Bavarians, who, 
 
 Saarbruck to being unsupported by artillery, were repulsed. Then the village was vigorously 
 
 Sedan," shelled bv the German batteries on the opposite side of the Meuse ; and after it 
 
 Col. Knollys, had been" judged that its defenders were sufficiently shaken, the Bavarians once 
 
 B.A. ' more advanced to the assault supported by guns so posted as to be able to pour 
 
 in a destructive cross fire. The French, conscious of the vital importance of this 
 
 point, clung to it with desperate tenacity, repulsed their assailants with severe 
 
 loss again and again, and for seven hours the fight surged backwards and 
 
 forwards. At last, when the village had been reduced to a wreck and had been 
 
 set on fire in numerous places by the shells of the Prussians, . . . the 
 
 gallant defenders fearfully thinned, relinquished their hold on Bazeilles, and fell 
 
 back on Sedan. 
 
 Lord 
 "Wolselev. 
 
ARTILLERY. 13 
 
 There is perhaps too great a tendency to regard artillery as 
 an arm to be employed solely against materiel, to the exclusion 
 of its undoubted powers against troops. The experience gained 
 by the Germans in 1870, proves conclusively that a well handled 
 and served artillery is capable of rendering good service at every 
 stage of a battle. 
 
 At Spieheren it began by making tbe enemy's artillery abandon its post Prince 
 on tbe Rotberberg ; it next repuL-ed tbe frequent counter attacks of the enemy Hobenlohe. 
 on its position on tbe Foist, and finally secured possession of tbe Rotberberg. 
 At Vionville our artillery commenced by harassing all tbe enemy's camps ; it 
 then maintained the fight in tbe centre until tbe infantry of tbe 3rd corps had 
 arrived in sufficient numbers, on which occasion, unassisted by the other arms, 
 it had to defend itself against the enemy's infantry ; later on it contributed in 
 conjunction with the infantry, to repulse the repeated counter attacks of the 
 enemy. Finally it pushed forward with the infantry when it was already dark and 
 assisted the latter to make certain of the victory which had been so hard to win. 
 
 The functions of artillery on the defensive are to counteract 
 the effect of the attacking guns by engaging them first, and then 
 to fire on the attacking infantry. But as, at this stage, the 
 Synopsis only requires the general functions of the arm to be 
 dealt with, all other details will be reserved for the lecture on 
 artillery in action. Next in order we have to consider the 
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF ARTILLERY. 
 
 In peace. Very expensive to equip and maintain, and takes 
 longer to train than infantry. 
 
 In War. Eights by fire only, has long range (for particulars 
 see further on). Can destroy both men and material. Moral 
 effect of shell fire very great. 
 
 In the field it is bidky, complicated, cumbersome, and liable 
 to casualties ; occupies great space on the march and in action ; 
 cannot easily change position, powerless when moving ; offers a 
 large target ; has no defensive power on flanks when in action, 
 and frequently requires an escort from the other arms. Its action 
 is also affected by wind, fog, etc. 
 
 Note — Liable to casualties. 
 On the following day an aide-de-camp passed by this point and found on a Prince 
 narrow crest which ran between two very steep ravines, an entire French battery Hohenlohe. 
 which had been abandoned here. The team of the leading gun had been blown 
 to pieces by our shells and tbe other guns could not pass it ; thus the whole 
 battery fell into our bands. 
 
 ARTILLERY WEAPONS. 
 
 The following abbreviations are used: HA., Horse-artillery; 
 F.A., Field-artillery; M.L.R. Muzzle-loading rifled; B.L.R. 
 Breech loading rifled. 
 
 At present there are four classes of batteries which may 
 accompany a British army into the field, namely : — 
 
 H.A. Batteries 
 
 F.A. Batteries (two classes light and heavy). 
 
 Mountain Batteries. 
 
 Position Batteries. 
 
 2a 
 
14 ARTILLERY. 
 
 H.A. BATTERIES are equipped with 6 B.L.E., 12 pr. steel 
 guns, 7 ft. 7£ inches long, 3 inches calibre, 12 grooves "04 inch 
 deep and '6 inch wide. Weight of gun 7 cwt. Charge of powder 
 4 lbs. Weight of shells filled and fuzed about 12^ lbs. 
 Draught six horses. Total weight behind teams; gun and 
 limber 33 \ cwt. Waggon 36cwt. Gun carriage steel, fitted with 
 a hydraulic buffer to absorb recoil. 
 
 LIGHT E.A. BATTERIES are equipped with 6 guns, 
 similar, in all respects, to the H.A. 
 
 HEAVY F.A. BATTERIES are equipped with 6 M.L.R. 
 16 pr. guns, 6ft. 6in. long, 3iin. calibre. 3 grooves. Weight of 
 gun, 12cwt. Powder charge, 3lb. Draught, 6 horses. This gun 
 will in time be superseded by a B.L.R. from 18 to 22lbs. 
 
 MOUNTAIN BATTERIES are equipped with 4 M.L.R. 
 jointed steel guns, weight 400lbs., of which the breech and 
 muzzle portion each weigh 200lbs. Length 70-45 inches. 
 Calibre 2-5 inches, rifled with 8 grooves. 'Sin. wide and -05in. 
 deep. Powder charge, l£lbs. 
 
 POSITION BATTERIES are equipped with 4 M.L.R., 
 40 pr. guns, 8ft. long, 4J inches calibre. 3 grooves. Weight of 
 gun 34cwt. Powder charge, 71b. Draught, 12 horses, or in 
 India, two elephants. Also two 6'3 inch R.M.L. Howitzers. 
 Length 56 inches, weight 17|cwt. Charge of powder, varies 
 as required. 
 
 H.A. Batteries on peace establishment have three ammunition 
 waggons, which, however, never manoeuvre with them. On War 
 establishment, they have six. 
 
 F.A. Batteries have six waggons, which accompany the 
 battery on all occasions. 
 
 Position batteries have usually two waggons. 
 
 Mountain batteries have neither limbers nor waggons. 
 
 AMMUNITION. 
 
 A 12 pr. B.L.R. gun and waggon carries 30 rounds common 
 shell, 70 shrapnel, and 8 case shot; total 108 rounds. 
 
 A 16 pr. gun and waggon carries 24 common shell, 72 
 shrapnel, and 4 case; total, 100 rounds. 
 
 EXPENDITURE. 
 
 As in the case of infantry, it varies immensely, and no estimate 
 can be formed as to probable requirements. 
 
ARTILLERY. 15 
 
 At the battle of Friedland, 1807, the French artillery engaged 
 in the celebrated manoeuvre of General Senarmont (6 batteries) 
 fired an average of 72 round shot and shell and 12 case shot, in 
 all 84 rounds per gun. At the Alma our field artillery fired 18 
 rounds per gun, and at Inkerman 53 rounds per gun. In the 
 campaign of 1866, the artillery of the Prussian Guard Corps 
 averaged 18 rounds per gun at the battle of Koniggratz. At 
 this battle one battery of the 6th corps averaged 60 rounds per 
 gun. During the Franco-German war, the artillery of one 
 German corps averaged 1 4 rounds for each of 1 1 engagements, 
 but at Sedan, one Prussian battery fired 126 rounds per gun. 
 At the battle of Vionville however, the Prussian artillery engaged 
 fired an average of 89 rounds per gun, while one horse artillery 
 battery fired 194 rounds per gun. At the battle of Kandahar, 
 the 18 guns of Sir F. Robert's army averaged 5 rounds per gun. 
 
 PROJECTILES. 
 The projectiles at present in use by our artillery in the field are, 
 
 Common shell. 
 Shrapnel shell. 
 Case shot. 
 
 COMMON SHELL is a hollow cast iron projectile filled with 
 a bursting charge of gunpowder. In form it is much like an 
 exaggerated snider bullet. The bursting charge is ignited by 
 either a "time" or "percussion" fuze, which will be described 
 further on. On explosion it is scattered into fragments with great 
 force. It should be used against masonry, obstacles, earthworks, 
 and troops in close formation at long range. 
 
 SHEAPNEL SHELL is similar in exterior appearance to 
 common shell, except that the head is painted red to distinguish 
 it. The metal however is much thinner, and the interior is filled 
 with round bullets packed in rosin (200 bullets in the 12 pr.) At 
 the base is a small bursting charge of powder which connects 
 with the fuze at the head by means of a channel down the centre ; 
 a new pattern has the bursting charge in the head instead of in 
 the base. The action of the shell is as follows : The fuze burns 
 the exact number of seconds for which it has been " bored," and 
 then ignites the bursting charge. The shell, which is now in full 
 flight as a single projectile, is burst open and the bullets are set 
 free, travelling onward with full velocity, but scattering as they 
 go. The shell should be burst above and a little short of the 
 object, or it loses its effect, and thus eveiything depends on the 
 exactitude with which the fuze is bored. Shrapnel should be 
 used against scattered troops in the open. It is in fact case shot 
 at long ranges. 
 
16 ARTILLERY. 
 
 CASE SHOT are simply cylinders of tin filled with bullets 
 of lead hardened with antimony. The 12 pr. contains 340 (34 to 
 the lb.) The bullets are packed in with clay and sand. On firing, 
 the cylinder breaks up at once and the bullets proceed onwards, 
 scattering from the muzzle. Case shot is only effective up to 
 350 yards at most, and is never used except on the defensive; that is 
 when guns are threatened by a rush of infantry or cavaliy. As 
 before stated, each gun is provided with eight rounds only, and 
 should more be required, as recently happened in Afghanistan, 
 shrapnel is rammed into the gun, point foremost, and fired, when 
 it breaks up at once. 
 
 Prince During the whole of the war 1870-71, the artillery of the Guard fired 
 
 Hohenlohe. 25,000 rounds of shell and one round of case. 
 
 The above are the only projectiles now in use. 
 
 FUZES. 
 
 To understand modern projectiles properly, a brief description 
 of fuzes is necessary. — There are two kinds, namely, "Time" 
 and "Percussion." 
 
 TIME FUZES are constructed so as to ignite the bursting 
 charge at any required second during the flight of the projectile, 
 and thus to burst it in the air. 
 
 PERCUSSION FUZES are constructed as their name 
 implies, to burst the shell on impact with any solid obstacle. 
 
 RANGES. 
 
 The possible range of modern field artillery may be said to 
 be practically unlimited. For instance, Colonel Ivnollys, R.A., 
 quotes a case in the Carlist war in which the Carlists effectually 
 shelled the works of San Sebastian with some 1 6 pr. Whitworth 
 guns from a distance of five miles, or nearly 9,00U yards. But as 
 it is impossible at the time to see the effect of fire at such ranges, 
 it is wasted, and the best authorities agree that artillery fire 
 should not be used at ranges beyond which its effect can be seen. 
 
 Again, light guns may, from their superior mobility venture 
 nearer to the enemy than those which are heavier, and the 
 following ranges have been laid down as the useful limits at 
 ordinary objects. 
 
 Position guns from 1500 to 3000 yards. 
 16 pr. ,, ,, 1000 to 2500 yards. 
 12 pr. ,, ,, 800 to 20U0 yards. 
 
 TACTICAL UNIT. 
 
 A battery of field artillery consists of six guns and six 
 waggons. 
 
ARTILLERY. 17 
 
 A half battery of three guns and waggons. 
 
 A division of two guns and waggons. 
 
 A sub-division of one gun and waggon. 
 
 Column of route is guns followed by their waggons in 
 single file. 
 
 Guns in action or in line require 1 9 yards interval to enable 
 the team of six horses to take ground at once to a flank if 
 necessary ; thus a battery in line or in action requires five 
 intervals x 19 = 95 yards of front. Should more than six horses 
 be used add 4 yards to each interval for each additional pair. 
 
 In column of route each vehicle and its team may be assumed 
 at 15 yards in length. Between the rear of each and the noses 
 of the succeeding team there should be an interval of four yards; 
 thus we have — 
 
 12 vehicles = 180 yards. 
 11 intervals = -14 ,, 
 
 Total, 224 yards. 
 
 Ex. How long will a field battery take to pass a given spot 
 at a walk. 
 
 Four miles an hour is 7040 yards in GO minutes, and we have 
 
 70-10 : 224 :: 60 
 
 Ans. 2 minutes nearly. 
 
 Remarks: It is generally admitted that the actual effect of 
 artillery in action is far below what it should be, and is in no way 
 commensurate with the improvements which have been expended 
 on the arm or the tremendous power and range of the modern 
 gun. This is attributable to several causes, among which may 
 be mentioned : 
 
 (1) The effective range of any weapon is limited by the power 
 of human vision and this limit has been nearly reached by the 
 infantry rifle, consequently the gun is either compelled to fight at 
 long ranges which neutralise its effect, or to come within infantry 
 fire, thereby exposing the gunners and possibly the guns to loss. 
 
 (2) The close and massive formations of infantry which once 
 offered such a target to artillery, have disappeared from warfare, 
 and in their place we have dispersion. 
 
 (3) The art of gaining cover and concealment is now culti- 
 vated by infantry, to an extent which still further impairs the 
 efficacy of artillery. 
 
 (4) The full development of the real power of rifled artillery 
 depends on a combination of conditions seldom to be obtained on 
 service ; such as level ground on which to work the guns, absence 
 of wind, fog, rain, etc , and quick and accurate determination of 
 constantly varying ranges. 
 
 2 is 
 
18 
 
 Lecture V. 
 
 SPACE AND TIME OCCUPIED BY THE THREE 
 
 ARMS. 
 
 In all calculations of time and space occupied by the three 
 arms in combination, the following- facts should be remembered : — 
 
 Infantry, as already stated, occupy when in line, 30 inches 
 per man, and in fours or files, 15 inches per man. Thus as 
 troops in line are always two deep, 15 inches per man will give 
 the front in line., or the length of road occupied in fours or files. 
 If the length of road occupied by infantry is given and their 
 numbers are required, multiply the length in yards by 2:, which 
 will give the numbers. If the number of infantry is given and 
 the length of road that they will occupy is required, divide by 
 2g to get the answer in yards. 
 
 Cavalry, in " fours," eight abreast, occupy a length of road 
 equal to their front in line, and their numbers are the same as 
 those in line two deep. If, therefore, we have 200 yards of road 
 occupied by cavalry in ;i fours," we know that their strength is 
 400. Similarly, if 200 yards of road are occupied by cavalry in 
 "sections" (four abreast), we know that their strength is 200, 
 and in half-sections it would be 100. Conversely, 150 cavalry 
 in half-sections would occupy 300 yards of road, in sections, 150 
 yards, and in fours, 75 yards. 
 
 Field Batteries occupy 224 yards of road. 
 
 To prevent confusion on the march, and to absorb accidental 
 checks, 25 yards interval is allowed between cavalry and in- 
 fantry units. Between artillery units, and between artillery and 
 either of the other arms, 28A- yards are allowed. 
 
 In calculating for transport, allow 20 yards for every vehicle 
 drawn by six horses; 15 yards for every vehicle drawn by four 
 horses; and 10 yards for every vehicle drawn by one or two 
 (abreast) horses. These spaces include the intervals of four 
 yards, which should be kept between separate vehicles. 
 
 A few examples are added: — 
 
 Ex. 1. How long will it take the following to pass, at 3 
 miles an hour? 
 
 400 Cavalry in sections 
 
 2 Batteries F.A. 
 
 3 Battalions, each 900 strong, in fours. 
 First, we mnst find the leagth of road occupied. 
 
 400 Cavalry in sections. . . . . . = 400 yards. 
 
 2 Batteries Field Artillery . . . . = 448 * ,, 
 
 3 Battalions, 900 each .. .. = 1125 
 
 3 intervals of 28 yards . . . . = 84 ,, 
 
 2 intervals of 25 yards . . . . = 50 ,, 
 
 Total 2107 yards. 
 
SPACE AXD TIME OCCUPIED BY THE THREE ARMS. 19 
 
 Next to find the time. 3 miles an hour is 1760 yards in 20 
 minutes, and we have, 
 
 1760 : 2107 :: 20. Am. ; 24 minutes. 
 
 Ex. 2. A spy reports that the following passed through a 
 village at a trot : — 
 
 Cavalry, 2 abreast, taking 5 minutes. 
 
 Artillery, in column of route, taking 3 minutes. 
 Required the strength. 
 
 Here we must first find the length of the column. 
 
 Eight miles an hour is 1760 yards iu 7^ minutes, and for the 
 cavalry we have, 
 
 7^-: 5:: 1760. Ann.: 1175 yards of cavalry, which in 
 half -sections, gives 587. 
 
 For the artillery, a similar calculation gives 704 yards, which, 
 divided by 224, gives a little over three batteries. 
 
 No allowance has yet been made for intervals in the march, 
 and as no units are given, yre must deduct 20 per cent., leaving 
 in round numbers, 470 cavalry and two batteries. 
 
 Ex. 3. Required the front for troops drawn up on parade, 
 as follows : — 
 
 1 Regiment of cavalry, 400 strong, in columns of squadrons. 
 1 Battalion of 8 companies, each 60 strong, in quarter column. 
 1 » s >» 80 ,, ,, 
 
 1 Battery, F.A. 
 
 As the cavalry and infantry are in column, we have ouly to 
 find the front of one squadron or company, 
 1 Bquadron . . . . = 
 
 1 Company, 60 strong = 
 1 „ 80 „ = 
 
 1 „ 70 „ 
 
 1 Battery, P. A . . = 
 
 3 intervals of 25 yards = 
 1 ,, of 28A yards = 
 
 Total 335i yards. 
 
 Ex. 4. How long will it take the said force to deploy into 
 
 line in quick time, and what will be the length of the line ? 
 First, to find the length of the line. 
 
 The cavalry will require . . .. 200 yards. 
 
 3 squadron intervals of 12 yards 36 
 
 1 Battalion, 480 strong . . . . 200 
 
 1 „ 4R0 „ .. 200 
 
 1 ., 230 ,, .. .. 117 
 
 1 Battery, F.A 95 
 
 3 intervals of 25 yards . . . . 75 
 
 I „ of 28.1 yards . . . . 28^ 
 
 59 vards 
 
 25 
 
 7 
 
 33 
 
 ? 
 
 29 
 
 > 
 
 95 
 
 » 
 
 75 
 
 28i 
 
 > 
 
 Total 951 h yards 
 
20 SPACE AND TIME OCCUPIED BY THE THKEE ABMS. 
 
 The time required to complete the deployment will be regulated 
 by the distance that the left gun has to traverse, less the front 
 originally occupied, that is to say, 616 yards, which, at 3 miles 
 an hour, is 7 minutes. 
 
 Ex. 5 What length of road will the following convoy and 
 escort require, and how long will it take to pass a given spot at 
 2h miles an hour ? 
 
 1 squadron, 60 strong, in sections ; 1 Battalion of infantry, 
 700 ; 40 four-horse waggons ; 50 carts drawn by two horses 
 (abreast). 
 
 60 cavalry in sections . . 60 yards. 
 
 40 four-horse waggons 600 ,, 
 
 50 carts . . . . . . 500 ,, 
 
 1 Battalion, 700 . . 292 ,, 
 
 Total 1452 yards. 
 
 As regularity of march is not likely to be observed by a 
 convoy, add 20 per cent, to the above, making a total of 1742 
 yards, which at 2 A miles an hour will require about 23 minutes. 
 
 The following rule was given by the late Sir George Colley, 
 for rough and hasty calculations : Allow two infantry or one 
 cavalry soldier for every yard of road, and 20 yards for every 
 vehicle. 
 
 Again, in estimating the numbers of passing troops, allow 
 rougldy (at quick time for infantry or walk for mounted branches) 
 — 200 infantry or 50 cavalry (in half sections), or one half 
 battery of field artillery per minute. 
 
 PROPORTION OF THE THREE ARMS. 
 
 The normal proportion of the three arms is fixed in most 
 European armies as follows. One cavalry soldier to every eight 
 infantry, and three guns per thousand of the other two aims. 
 Circumstances may however alter these figures. Should the 
 country in the intended theatre of war be very mountainous or 
 much wooded, the proportion of cavalry and artillery might be 
 diminished, while that of infantry would be increased. In open 
 or uncultivated country, the reverse would follow. 
 
21 
 
 Lecture VI. 
 
 ADVANCED GUARDS. 
 
 Tt is of paramount necessity that the commander of every 
 body of troops moving within possible touching distance of the 
 enemy, or in a hostile or unknown country, should : — 
 
 (1) Discover the whereabouts, strength, and intentions of 
 the enemy. 
 
 (2) Veil the strength and movements and secure the safety of 
 his own force, or protect it from surprise. 
 
 (3) Gain complete knowledge of the area of operations. 
 
 To achieve these objects most effectually, and that he may, 
 without keeping his whole force in a constant state of tension 
 and readiness, be able to choose when, where, and how he will 
 form for battle, or whether he will decline to fight at all, certain 
 dispositions must be made. 
 
 These dispositions consist in forming a portion of his force 
 into covering bodies — Advanced Guard, Kear Guard, and Flank 
 Guards. Each of these bodies assumes special importance 
 (according to the movement which is being executed. In a 
 movement to the front the advanced guard and in a movement 
 to the rear the rear guard, is of the first consideration, while in 
 both cases the flank guards require careful attention. 
 
 In a flank march the covering body on the exposed flank 
 becomes of the greatest consequence, but even then the advanced 
 and rear guards' duties must not be neglected. 
 
 ADVANCED GUAED IN AN ADVANCE. 
 
 1. Strength. — Within certain limits the strength of the ad- 
 vanced guard will be regulated by circumstances. 
 
 It is not formed as an altogether independent body, for it 
 does not act for itself, but only as an accessory of the force to 
 which it belongs. Its strength, therefore, should only be such 
 is will enable it to assist effectively in carrying out the objects 
 if the general commanding in the field without committing him 
 o any unintended action. 
 3 
 
22 ADVANCED GUARDS. 
 
 When near the force it covers, within easy reach of support 
 and assistance, it need not be strong. If it be a day's march or 
 more from that force, it must be able to maintain unaided a 
 more or less serious engagement, and should, therefore, be 
 strengthened accordingly. The character of the enemy, and the 
 probable nature of the intended operations, will also materially 
 affect this point. 
 
 If the enemy is strong, fresh, active, and energetic, and has 
 had no reverses, the advanced guard must be more powerful 
 than is essential with a weak and unenterprising foe, or one 
 which is in retreat, or has suffered serious loss ; but, in all 
 circumstances, it is more prudent to have an advanced guard too 
 strong than too weak. 
 
 Its average strength should be about one-sixth of the whole 
 force, but may frequently be increased to one-fourth or even 
 more, and ought very rarely to be less than one-eighth. 
 
 2. Composition. — The composition of an advanced guard will 
 depend upon the nature of its probable duties, and the character 
 of the country through which it has to pass. In almost all 
 fairly level countries the proportion of mounted troops with the 
 advanced guard should be large ; whenever possible, it sbould 
 be composed of all arms. 
 
 When practicable, it is advisable that the advanced guard 
 should be furnished from the body of troops which immediately 
 follows it. For example, the advanced guard of a division 
 should, if possible, be found by the leading brigade of the 
 division. If the advanced guard comes into action with the 
 enemy, its immediate support will then be the remainder of its 
 own brigade. 
 
 The probable necessities arising out of the various duties to 
 be performed, and the nature of the country, must dotermine 
 the proportionate employment of the different arms. 
 
 If an advanced guard has to move over a generally open and 
 level country, or to follow and keep touch with a retreating 
 enemy, it must have greater mobility, and the mounted services 
 should preponderate. In a close, intersected, or mountainous 
 country, or when an unbeaten enemy is to be met who may offer 
 stubborn resistance, a larger number of Infantry will be essential. 
 But no country is so close and intersected that a proportion of 
 mounted troops and machine guns are not indispensable with an 
 advanced guard. However few in number, mounted-infantry 
 are able to move well in advance, find out the enemy quickly, 
 
ADVANCED GUAEDS. 23 
 
 and as quickly transmit the news. Even if driven in, the small 
 numbers which can carry out the duty will not throw the troops 
 in rear into disorder. 
 
 With an advanced guard, mounted-infantry find a most 
 congenial and important sphere of action. In the absence of 
 Cavalry the} 7 will be employed in scouting, reconnoitring, and 
 in far-reaching patrols. 
 
 Mounted-infantry, machine guns, and Artillery will be of 
 great use in supporting the Cavalry movements, and in forcing 
 the deployment of the enemy. 
 
 In rapid movements for a special operation, such as the seizure 
 of an important position, bridge, or defile, mounted-infantry 
 with machine guns will be invaluable to supplement the action 
 of the slower moving Infantry. 
 
 Infantry will be required to seize and hold positions, out-flank 
 denies, and for like duties ; while Engineers will be necessary 
 for the repair of bridges and roads, for the removal of local 
 obstructions, and to prepare means of passage over rivers and 
 other obstacles. 
 
 "When a force of either Cavalry or Infantry is moving alone, 
 the advanced guard duties should be conducted on the same 
 principles as if the force were a mixed one ; and determination, 
 intelligence, and resource must supplement the deficiency of 
 varied power. 
 
 In detailing an advanced guard, complete units should, as far 
 as possible, be employed, i.e., troops, companies, battalions, 
 regiments, and batteries. It is essential that, in carrying out a 
 duty which requires the exercise of so many high qualities, 
 officers and men should have been previously accustomed to 
 work together, and should have mutual acquaintance and 
 confidence. 
 
 Tbe fewest possible number of non-combatants should be with 
 all advanced and flank guards. Advanced guards should be 
 lightly equipped with a view to rapidity of movement. 
 
 The strength and composition are given below of the advanced 
 guards which would probably be furnished under ordinary 
 conditions by — 
 
 (1) A division. 
 
 (2) A mixed brigade of all arms. / * ,. , 
 
 faS A hrirtilfl of Tnfmitrv I Aotm S al °™- 
 
 (3) A brigade of Infantry. 
 
 (4) A battalion of Infantry. 
 
 / ^> > OF THE 
 
 FHI7BR3IT7] 
 
24 ADVANCED GUAEDS. 
 
 ADVANCED GUAED OF A DIVISION ACTING 
 INDEPENDENTLY. 
 
 Advanced Party. 
 Left Group. Centre Group. Eight Group. 
 
 2 Cyclists. 
 
 Flank Z Flank 
 
 Patrol. *i Patrol. 
 
 3 
 
 o 
 
 < 
 
 Detached Group. 2 to 4 miles. Detached Group 
 
 3 
 o 
 
 3 Squadrons. 
 
 2 or 3 Cyclists. 
 
 2 Machine Guns. 
 
 £ Battalion Infantry. 
 
 i Company B.E. 
 
 t» 
 
 o 
 
 .—. 
 
 s 
 
 -+N 
 
 1—1 
 
 -4-> 
 
 s 
 o 
 
 O.C. Advanced Guard. 
 
 ^ Troop. 4 Cyclists. 
 
 1 Battery R.H.A. 1 Machine Gun. 
 
 H Battalions Infantry. 
 
 S.A.A. Carts. 
 
 i Bearer Company, 
 
 as 
 
 • i-t 
 u 
 
 a3 
 > 
 a 
 o 
 
 a 
 
 03 
 
 in 
 
 P 
 
 £ Troop. 
 Main Body. 
 
ADVANCED GUARDS. 
 
 25 
 
 For the advanced guard of a brigade or regiment of Cavalry, 
 see " Cavalry Movements," Part v., s. 1. 
 
 A Division. 
 Consisting of — 
 1 Regiment Cavalry, and 1 ma- 
 chine gun. 
 Detachment of Mounted Infantry 
 (100 men), and 1 machine 
 gun. 
 
 1 Co. R.E. 
 
 *3 Batteries Field Artillery. 
 
 2 Brigades Infantry (8 Battalions), 
 
 and 4 machine guns. 
 Bearer Company. 
 1 Infantry and Artillery Reserve 
 
 Ammunition Column. 
 Departments and Staff. 
 1 Troop Military Police. 
 
 A Mixed Brigade. 
 Consisting of — 
 
 1 Regiment Cavalry, and 1 ma- 
 chine gun. 
 
 4 Battalions Infantry, and 2 ma- 
 chine guns. 
 
 Detachment of Mounted Infantry, 
 and 1 machine gun. 
 
 1 Battery R.H.A. 
 
 1 Battery R.A. 
 
 1 Co. R.E. 
 
 Ammunition Column. 
 
 Bearer Company, Departments, 
 and Staff. 
 
 Advanced Guard. 
 
 3j Squadrons Cavalry, and 1 ma- 
 chine gun. 
 
 The Detachment of Mounted In- 
 fantry, and its machine gun. 
 
 | Co. R.E. 
 1 Battery Artillery. 
 1 Battalion Infantry, and 1 ma- 
 chine gun. 
 I Bearer Co. 
 Infantry Reserve Ammunition. 
 
 Advanced Guard. 
 
 3| Squadrons Cavalry, and 1 ma- 
 chine gnu. 
 
 3 Battalion Infantry, and 1 ma- 
 chine gun. 
 
 Detachment of Mounted Infantry, 
 and 1 machine gun. 
 
 i Battery R.H.A. 
 
 | Co. R.E. 
 
 Section of Bearer Co. 
 
 A Brigade of Infantry. 
 
 Advanced Guard. 
 
 4 Battalions, and 2 machine guns. 4 Companies, and the 2 machine 
 Bearer Company, Ammunition guns. 
 
 Column and Departments. 
 
 A Battalion of Infantry. Advanced Guard. 
 
 8 Companies with Regimental 1 or 2 Companies. 
 Transport. 
 
 It may be laid down as a general rule, that with these ad- 
 vanced guards there will be all the available cyclists, mounted 
 infantry, and mounted sappers, together with a large proportion 
 of the machine guns, and, if the country is fairly open, all the 
 Cavalry that can be spared. 
 
 * The Division when acting independently would most probably have Batteries 
 of Artillery. 
 
26 ADVANCED GUARDS. 
 
 3. Disposition on the march. — The advanced guard -will generally 
 be divided into two portions : — 
 
 (1) The Van Guard, including all the scouting troops and 
 
 those which on an emergency will be first engaged 
 with the enemy. 
 
 (2) The Reserve, which is intended to support the scouting 
 
 troops when they are checked b}>- the enemy. 
 
 With the exception of the men required to keep up communi- 
 cations with the force that is covered, the mounted men belonging 
 to the advanced guard should, as a rule, be with the van guard. 
 It will be their duty to explore as wide a front as is consistent 
 with occupying and watching it so effectually, that no scouting 
 body of the enemy may pass unseen or unopposed through the 
 screen which they form. 
 
 In the case of the advanced guard of a division or any larger 
 force, the van guard may also include a small proportion of 
 Artillery, Infantiy, and Engineers, who on the march, should 
 be in the order here named. 
 
 It may be assumed that on the march one squadron of 100 
 mounted men will be able to thoroughly scout over a front of 
 about two miles in an ordinary country ; in a very open country 
 over a front of double that extent ; the extreme front that can 
 be effectively covered and searched by an advanced guard may 
 be thus fairly calculated according to the number of mounted 
 men employed. 
 
 This screen of scouts will be from one-and-a-half to two miles 
 in front of the rest of the van guard. 
 
 The van guard will keep up communication with its screen of 
 scouts by means of signals, mounted men, or cyclists. 
 
 The reserve of the advanced guard will move at a distance of 
 from about 1,000 to 3,300 yards from the van guard, headed by 
 a small detachment of Cavalry to keep up communication with 
 the van. Its column of route will be as a rule in this order : 
 mounted troops, the artillery, machine guns, infantry, engineers, 
 ammunition reserves, and ambulance. The order in which the 
 different arms in the reserve should follow on the Hue of march 
 is determined by the probable necessity for their employment. 
 
 Mounted Infantry, will, in future, probably form a part of 
 every force in the field ; it should move with the van guard, and 
 may be usefully employed in detached scouting and patrol 
 duties, thereby allowing the Cavalry to be reserved for combined 
 action with the other arms. It is very desirable to have a formed 
 body of Cavalry with the advanced guard always ready to charge. 
 
 Machine guns will find their most important use with advanced 
 guards or detached forces, and will aid materially in holding all 
 positions, bridges, defiles, &c, seized by them, when the move- 
 ments of ordinary Infantry would be too slow for the emergency. 
 Machine guns should therefore, be so placed in the advanced 
 guard as to be always ready for action with the smallest delay. 
 
ADVANCED GUARDS. 27 
 
 The flanks of the advanced guard must in all circumstances 
 be covered and protected by special flank guards and patrols, 
 composed as a rule of mounted men. 
 
 The distances between the various portions of the advanced 
 guard (advanced scouts, van guard, and reserve), and between 
 the advanced guard and the force which it covers, depend upon 
 greatly varying circumstances. In a comparatively open country 
 the scouts can extend over a much wider front, and the distances 
 generally may be much greater than can be the case in a close 
 and intersected district, where observation is difficult and com- 
 muniaation is cramped and impeded. 
 
 It may be accepted as a general rule for guidance that the 
 advanced scouts (although they are not necessarily to confine 
 themselves to such limits) should be so far ahead of the reserve 
 of the advanced guard that effective artillery fire cannot be 
 opened upon it by the enemy without its having time to form 
 for action. 
 
 The whole advanced guard should be at such a distance from 
 the force which it covers, that, if the enemy is met in strength, 
 the action of the advanced guard will secure ample time to the 
 general commanding to decide whether he will accept battle or 
 not, and to form his force accordingly. 
 
 At the same time the advanced guard must not be so far from 
 the main body as to incur the risk of being cut off by an enter- 
 prising enemy, before it can be supported or enabled to with- 
 draw. 
 
 The actual route formation of the troops of an advanced 
 guard should be such that the force is able to change to a 
 fighting formation without delay or interruption. 
 
 If roads are close and parallel, it may be divided into two or 
 more small columns, but, unless in the case of advanced guards 
 with large armies, it is, in most circumst ances, better that it 
 should remain on one road, the other roads being watched by 
 patrols. Advantage should, however, be always taken of 
 iavourable ground on either side of the main route, which will 
 enable any of the troops, without extra fatigue, to move on a 
 wider front. 
 
 4. Duties of the Advanced Guard. — It has been said that the 
 commander of a force on the move depends upon his advanced 
 guard to discover the position and doings of the enemy, to 
 screen his own movements, and to gain every knowledge of the 
 theatre of operations. In order to perform these duties 
 satisfactorily, not only must the whole area through which the 
 main body has to pass be thoroughly reconnoitred, but also as 
 much of the country a* possible to the left and right of it. All 
 obstructions must be removed which might impede the main 
 body. 
 
 In a mixed force the scouts and all advanced parties will be 
 furnished by the mounted troops. The rules for their action are 
 laid down in the "Cavalry Movements." 
 
28 ADVANCED GUARDS. 
 
 If Infantry are ever obliged, by the nature of the country or 
 the deficiency of mounted men, to perform these duties, they 
 will be guided by instructions laid down for Skirmishing. 
 
 The real work of the advanced guard will be done in a great 
 measure by its scouts and patrols, and any inefficiency or 
 faulty arrangements in the performance of their duty may 
 render the whole advanced guard of practically little use. 
 
 If possible, every patrol that has to examine a village, or any 
 important position which might give concealment to an enemy, 
 or which has to make a special reconnaissance of an enemy after 
 contact has been established, should be accompanied by an 
 officer. Every man of every patrol or scouting group, and the 
 leading files of advanced guards, should thoroughly understand 
 the use of signals for communicating the presence of an enemy 
 and other important information, and should also know the 
 chain of connection by which information can be most rapidly 
 passed. 
 
 It cannot be too often or too emphatically impressed upon all 
 patrols and scouting groups, that negative information, i.e., 
 information of the non-existence of any enenvy or obstacle in the 
 district or on any road, may be, and very often is, as valuable 
 as the positive information of the presence of an enemy or the 
 existence of an obstacle; and this negative information should 
 be constantly rendered accordingly. 
 
 One important means of collecting information and of keeping 
 it back from the enemy, is to rapidly seize all post and telegraph 
 offices, and secure the correspondence, and also, if the enemy 
 has recently left the neighbourhood, the postmaster and the 
 telegraph clerk. The correspondence will be examined, and the 
 postmaster and the telegraph clerk will be questioned, if possible, 
 by an officer of the intelligence department, or some per- >n 
 detailed for the duty ; if there is no such person present, the 
 offices should be placed under a guard, and the postmaster and 
 the telegraph clerk should be detained till the arrival of the 
 main body. If circumstances do not permit of this, the most 
 important part of the correspondence should be carried off, viz., 
 originals of telegrams sent, letters in the letter-box, and letters 
 recently received. It may be necessary sometimes to leave the 
 careful examination of this correspondence to persons detailed 
 for the particular duty, but it is certain that no letter or tele- 
 graphic despatch should ever be forwarded to the enemy from, 
 any office after the time of the first arrival of the weakest 
 scouting party which is unopposed by armed force. 
 
 The removal of obstacles will be the special duty of the 
 Engineers attached to the advanced guard, aided by the Cavalry 
 pioneers. The latter may, indeed, in many cases, have to un- 
 dertake work of this nature without Engineer assistance. 
 
 If large bodies of the enemy are seen, they must be cautiously 
 engaged, both with a view to make them show their force and 
 intentions, and to give the general commanding time to form for 
 
ADVANCED GUARDS. 29 
 
 battle, if he means to fight ; or if he does not, to withdraw 
 without actively compromising himself. 
 
 If small detachments of hostile troops are encountered, they 
 must on no account be allowed to advance so far that they can 
 procure information, but, in driving them back, it is advisable 
 that they should be only seriously attacked in advantageous 
 ch'cumstances or by a superior force. With an army on the 
 march supports are always advancing, and an advanced party, 
 as a rule, loses Little or nothing by waiting till the work can be 
 done easily with every advantage, instead of engaging in even 
 an equal combat. 
 
 When the enemy is found in position, he should be made to 
 show his strength, and if it be apparent that he can be forced 
 from it without the direct help of the main body, the advanced 
 guard should attack him with all vigour, and drive him off. 
 But the commander of an advanced guard must be careful that 
 he is not drawn into a task beyond his strength, which may 
 commit the general commanding to a serious action in order to 
 extricate him. In such a case, it is the duty of the advanced 
 guard, pending the arrival of instructions, to fight a temporising 
 action, only engaging to such an extent that the enemy cannot 
 withdraw and must show his strength. The employment of 
 Artillery, and perhaps machine gun*, will probably be the best 
 means of securing this result and of gaining the necessary time. 
 
 An advanced guard in pursuit of an enemy, or when it expects 
 to meet him, should make every exertion to secure important 
 positions, such as bridges, defiles, or magazines along the line 
 of march. The retreating enemy must not be allowed to establish 
 himself in defence, and an advancing enemy should be fore- 
 stalled in possession of such positions. 
 
 Due precautions should be taken against surprise before an 
 advanced guard commits itself to the passage of any position 
 capable of affording concealment to the enemy, or which might 
 impede its own free movement for fighting purposes. Defiles, 
 passes, woods, towns, villages, shoidd, if possible, have their 
 flanks turned and examined before they are directly entered. 
 In passing a defile this is effected by crowning the heights 
 enclosing it. The outskirts of towns and villages should be 
 examined by scouting groups, and in woods of great extent all 
 cross roads and bye-paths for a considerable distance on both 
 flanks must be specially and carefully examined and watched. 
 
 In order to carry out these precautions, it may frequently be 
 necessary to strengthen the numbers employed in scouting 
 groups and patrols, and sometimes to halt the main body of the 
 advanced guard till preventive measures are complete. In the 
 latter case, the halt should be made in a place which is not 
 exposed to fire from any position that may be occupied by the 
 enemy. 
 
 If a halt be made on the line of march, the advanced guard 
 must at once be disposed so as to shield the force which it covers 
 ie 
 
30 ADVANCED GUARDS. 
 
 by a system of outposts, advantage being taken of every com- 
 manding point which gives an exceptionally good look-out. The 
 reserve of the advanced guard must occupy the nearest good 
 military position, and for this purpose its commander should not 
 hesitate to increase or diminish in a moderate degree his distance 
 from the main body, nor fail to report at once what are his 
 dispositions. No important position which has been once seized 
 should be evacuated until the subsequent occupation of it by 
 the main body is secure. 
 
 Delays enforced upon an advanced guard should, when prac- 
 ticable, be compensated by a temporary increase of pace. All 
 halts involve corresponding checks in reai*, and may, therefore, 
 derange, perhaps materially, the plans of the general in com- 
 mand. 
 
 Advanced and flanking guards should press forward to occupy 
 the enemy's end of defiles and like positions as rapidly as 
 possible, so as quickly to clear the route and allow for tho 
 secure passage of heavy and encumbered columns. 
 
 5. 2 he Commander of the Advanced Guard.— Tho duties of tho 
 commander of the advanced guard have necessarily been in a 
 great measure detailed above. He should bo in the confidence 
 of the general commanding the main body, whose views and 
 plans he can then forward in the most effective manner. Left 
 with the power of complete initiative, he must only exercise it 
 in the strictest subordination to the general plan and intention 
 of the commander-in-chief. 
 
 He must take care that all duties are conducted according to 
 the regulated chain of responsibility. Although he cannot 
 himself superintend the execution of every detail, his influence 
 should be felt to such an extent that he can rest satisfied his 
 instructions are fully understood by his subordinates, and that 
 all fully and clearly realise what is expected of them. 
 
 His position should, as a rule, be at the head of the reserve, 
 but he may frequently find it necessary to be with the van guard, 
 so that, if anything of importance is communicated by the scouts, 
 he may personally attend to the emergency and decide on the 
 best course to pursue. 
 
 The movements of scouts and patrols, and to a great extent 
 those of the van guard, though carried out on the initiative of 
 subordinates, must be in general accord with his instructions. 
 The reserve should not, however, act except on orders given by 
 him to suit the varying necessities of the moment. 
 
 Finally, he should ensure that all information is well sifted 
 and collated before he sends it to the general commanding, and 
 that his reports are as clear and specific as circumstances will 
 admit, facts being clearly distinguished from suppositions, even 
 should they have apparently the best foundation. In wars in 
 civilized countries these reports can often be telegraphed to the 
 rear, a line being either laid or repaired as the reserve of the 
 advanced guardjidvances. 
 
ADVANCED GUARDS. 31 
 
 6. Maintenance of Connection. —It is even more necessary to an 
 advanced guard than to any other body of troops that complete 
 connection should be maintained throughout every one of its 
 portions. Men should be told off as connecting links between 
 the various bodies to repeat signals, to pass orders, and to take 
 care that every movement or stoppage in front or rear is at once 
 notified in the opposite direction. 
 
 In foggy weather, and in a very close and intricate country, 
 it will often be necessary to leave men at cross roads and on 
 doubtful tracks, to make certain that the proper route is followed 
 by the rearmost portions of the force. Above all, when any 
 scouting groups are pushed forward to an unusual distance for a 
 special purpose, they should establish one or more connecting 
 posts at places which are distinctly marked on the map and are 
 easy to find, so that reports may be transmitted as rapidly as 
 possible. 
 
 Intermediate communication from flank to flank should also 
 be carefully kept up. It may easily happen that one extremity 
 of the screen of scouts may encounter the enemy without 
 attracting the attention of the remainder : to prevent this, in- 
 termediate patrols, signallers, and connecting files should be 
 employed. 
 
 Good signallers should accompany the advanced guard ; much 
 time and expenditure of orderlies will be saved, if the}- can 
 establish stations for the transmission of intelligence. During 
 the march it may be difficult of accomplishment, but as soon as 
 a halt is made, and especially if an encounter with the enemy is 
 commenced, every exertion should be made by the signallers of 
 the advanced guard to open communication with those in rear. 
 
 The advanced guards of a large force, which is pushed for- 
 ward to a considerable distance from the army to be covered, 
 will usually be accompanied bv telegraph equipment to keep up 
 momentary communication with the commander-in-chief. 
 
 For the rapid transmission of orders and information between 
 the component parts of the advanced guard, and between it and 
 the main body, cyclists will be of great value. 
 
 The smallest possible number of carriages should be taken for 
 the conveyance of indispensable stores, medical supplies, and 
 ambulance. Tents will never be taken. 
 
 It is only with large advanced guards, pushed a day's march 
 or more ahead of the army, that the Artillery ammunition 
 wagons should accompany the batteries. Eeserve ammunition 
 and the tools of the Engineers should be, as far as possible, 
 carried on pack mides or horses. To save the advanced guard 
 from unnecessary discomfort, all its heavier equipment and 
 baggage should move together at the head of the baggage of 
 the main body. 
 
 As it will frequently be impossible to say where their halting 
 place for the night may be, and what may be the dispositions, 
 the men of all advanced and flank guards should always carry 
 
32 ADVANCED GUARDS. 
 
 in their haversacks one day's rations, and the horses should 
 carry one day's corn. Unless the country has heen ravaged hy 
 the enemy, the advanced guard should have no difficulty in 
 living upon the supplies it affords. The commissary with it 
 should he furnished with money of the country for this purpose. 
 
 ADVANCED GUAED IN A EETEEAT. 
 
 During a retreat the importance of the advanced guard 
 diminishes considerably, though many of its duties still remain 
 unaltered and must be carried out with care and attention. 
 
 The movements of the enemy will be watched and counteracted 
 by the rear guard, but the reconnaissance of the country with a 
 view to facilitate the passage of the army, or the selection of a 
 position in which to accept battle, still remains the function of 
 the advanced guard. 
 
 So wide a front need not be covered by the advanced guard 
 in a retreat as during an advance. As a general ride, only the 
 ground which will subsequently be traversed by the main body 
 need be occupied and examined. 
 
 As great mobility is not so much required, the services of 
 many mounted troops will not be necessary ; during a retreat 
 their presence with the rear guard is essential, but if a few 
 mounted men can be spared for the advanced guard, they will 
 save the Infantry fatigue. 
 
 All the Engineers not required with the rear guard to break 
 down bridges, destroy roads, and create obstacles to delay the 
 enemy's pursuit will be most useful with the advanced guard 
 to prepare the roads, repair bridges, &c. In any case a liberal 
 supply of engineer tools should be always at hand. 
 
 "When a force is moving in several columns by a number of 
 parallel roads, the necessities of advanced guard duty will be 
 met in the most effective way by allowing each column to 
 fiu-nish its own small advanced guard ; but if this is done all 
 these small advanced guards shoidd be in constant communica- 
 tion with each other. 
 
 Generally speaking, every order and regulation which applies 
 to an advanced guard in an advance, applies equally to the 
 conduct of the smaller body which will form the advanced guard 
 in a retreat. 
 
 FLANK GUAEDS. 
 
 With small bodies of troops on the march, the flank guards 
 will only be patrols or groups of scouts detached froni the 
 advanced and rear guards, to complete the circle of watchfulness. 
 
 For a large body of troops special arrangements must be 
 made The detachments acting on each flank will be separate 
 bodies, following the same general rules as advanced and rear 
 
ADVANCED GUARDS. 33 
 
 guards, varying in strength according to the distance which 
 they have to cover, and the probability of the flank attacks they 
 may have to resist. 
 
 As in all other detached duties, mounted men will usually be 
 employed, but when there is any probability of attack they may 
 have to be supported by the other arms. 
 
 The interval between the flank guards and the main body 
 must depend upon the amount of notice required by the main 
 body to prepare for an attack The nature of the country enters 
 largely into this consideration 
 
 If a flank movement has to be executed, the advanced or rear 
 guard, as the case may be, whichever is next the enemy, will 
 become a flank guard until the movement is completed, and in 
 such a case, another advanced or rear guard, sufficient for the 
 duties which will devolve upon it, must be at once detailed and 
 take its place. 
 
33a 
 
 Lecture VII 
 
 REAR GUARDS. 
 
 If it is necessary for an advancing army to keep the enemy 
 at a distance from the main column in order to give it time to 
 prepare ; how much more is such precaution required for a 
 beaten and disorganised arm)- ? But the difference between 
 the two duties is immense. An Advanced Guard on touching 
 the enemy can either halt or advance to attack. Should it be 
 repulsed or outflanked, every moment brings up fresh troops to 
 support it, while any attempt to outflank it can be seen and 
 forestalled by troops in rear. An Advanced Guard can generally 
 observe the normal formation, and in short, it has a comparatively 
 easy task. 
 
 On the other hand, a Rear Guard labours under almost every 
 conceivable disadvantage. It may be attacked at any moment, 
 and no matter under what disadvantages of time and place, it 
 must make at least a show of resistance. The commander can 
 seldom if ever make a counter attack or even a prolonged 
 defence, because every moment separates him further from his 
 retreating army, nor can he ask for reinforcements, for in all 
 probability none will be available. 
 
 A beaten army is no longer in the hands of its general. It no longer 
 responds to his appeal. The troops that have been driven from the held will 
 be slow to form front for battle ; confusion too will be added to despondency, 
 for regiments will be broken and mixed, artillery will be separated from its 
 ammunition, supply trains will be thrown into disorder, and the whole machine 
 will be for the time disjointed. 
 
 COMPOSITION. 
 
 flamley. It is partly to provide for this that generals usually keep part of their 
 
 reserves out of action. 
 
 Rear Guards told off to cover the retreat of a beaten army should be 
 formed from the reserves or at least from the freshest troops ; their strength 
 should be one fourth or one fifth of the M-hole force. 
 
 One fourth or one fiftb may appear a very small proportion 
 to allot for this duty, but it must not be supposed that the 
 victorious army will at once pursue with its whole force. On 
 the contrary experience shows that it also is generally disorganised 
 and more or less exhausted after the battle. The victorious 
 general may detach only a portion of his army in pursuit, having 
 other designs for the remainder. Troops must be detailed and 
 formed up for pursuit, darkness has probably set in, and the 
 
REAR GUARDS. 
 
 335 
 
 track of the beaten army may be lost. Military history abounds 
 •with instances of victories more or less thrown away owino- to 
 feeble pursuit, arising from one or more of the above causes ; in 
 fact, vigorous immediate pursuit is rather the exception than 
 otherwise. 
 
 _ On the evening of the 4th of August all contact with the foe defeated at 
 Weissenburg, was lost. 
 
 Again, after the battle of Worth — 
 
 The pursuit instituted by the cavalry was discontinued at the entrances to 
 the difficult mountain passes, and thus all contact with the enemy had ceased to 
 exist. 
 
 Again, after the battle of Spicheren — 
 
 The darkness of the night and the generally unfavourable nature of the 
 ground on the Spicheren plateau, did not render it advisable to send large bodies 
 of cavalry in pursuit of the enemy who was retreating in good order. 
 
 Xote. — Perhaps the two most effective pursuits recorded in history are the 
 French pursuit of the Prussians after Jena, and the Prussian pursuit of the 
 French after Waterloo. 
 
 Like an Advanced Guard a Rear Guard should be a miniature 
 arnxy. The pursuers 'will send forward their swiftest moving 
 arms, cavalry, and horse artillery, which must be met by cor- 
 responding arms on the retreating side. The pursuer's infantry 
 will certainly follow, and therefore as cavalry and artillery have 
 little defensive power, a Rear Guard must consist of the three 
 arms. A party of sappers should also be attached to it for 
 purposes of demolition. 
 
 As the advanced guard in an advance, so the rear guard 
 during a retreat is the most important of the forces which covers 
 an army or any body of troops in the field. Rear guards are of 
 two kinds, according as the main body is advancing or retreating. 
 
 REAR GUARD IX A RETREAT. 
 
 1. The difference between the duties of an advanced guard 
 and those of a rear guard is that the former has to reconnoitre, 
 and fights to hold its ground till supports come up, whereas the 
 latter "has no reconnaissance duties, and fights in order that it 
 may fall back. 
 
 The rules for the guidance and disposition of a rear guard are, 
 in principle, the same as those for an advanced guard in a 
 reversed order ; the body that would correspond with the van is 
 not, however, required. Its principal object is to retard the 
 enemy, prevent him from attacking or harassing the march of 
 the main body, and stealing round and gaining the flanks. 
 
 2. Strength. — Its strength, like that of an advanced guard, 
 must depend upon circumstances. When the ground offers 
 many facilities for defence, and when the enemy is weak, 
 
 specially in Cavaby, and lacks energy and enterprise, a less 
 
 German 
 Official 
 Account. 
 
 Ibid. 
 
 Ibid. 
 
33c REAR GUARDS. 
 
 strong rear guard will suffice than would be required in an open 
 country, unfavourable for defence, and when the enemy presses 
 on boldly and with determination. 
 
 As a rule it should be the same strength as an advanced guard 
 of an advancing force ; but in particular circumstances, as when 
 it is covering a retreating and beaten force against energetic 
 pursuit, the strength may be increased to one-third of the force 
 from which it is detached. 
 
 3. Composition. — A rear guard should be composed of the best 
 and freshest troops, and, above all, of those whose soldier-like 
 spirit is least disturbed. All arms will be required, but 
 particularly Cavalry and mounted Infantry, as mounted troops 
 will probably be the chief arm employed by the enemy in pursuit. 
 Horse Artillery and machine guns will be of the highest utility 
 for checking and delaying advancing columns, by forcing them 
 to deploy. Mounted troops have the great advantage of being 
 able to retire quickly from a position held to the last, without 
 serious danger of being cut off. At the same timo, although 
 mounted troops are invaluable in an ordinary country, good 
 Infantry finds its place, where natural positions (such as rivers, 
 defiles, &c.) enable an effective stand to be made. Machine 
 guns in many situations will well supplement a deficiency of 
 Infantry. 
 
 4. Disposition. — If a sufficient screen of mounted patrols and 
 scouts, with properly disposed supports, covers a wide extent of 
 countiy, the whole of the remainder of the rear guard may move 
 together, either in one column or in more than one when near 
 and parallel routes exist which can be utilized without losing the 
 cohesion of the force. 
 
 The order of march for the troops of the rear guard will be : 
 the whole of the mounted men with their machine guns cover the 
 extreme rear, the Artillery move next, and then the Infantry still 
 nearer to the main body, as it requires most time to establish 
 itself in defensive positions. 
 
 A pursuing enemy will do his utmost to out-flank the rear 
 guard. It is not likely he will be able to pass the extreme flank 
 of the rear scouts unnoticed, but their weak line may easily be 
 driven in by pursuing cavalry, and the reserve of the rear guard 
 and possibly the main body may be thus exposed to danger. 
 The flanks must therefore generally be strengthened, and when 
 there are roads parallel to the principal route along which an 
 enemy coidd advance, it may be advisable to have on them 
 separate but completely constituted, if smaller, rear guards. 
 Sufficient resistance to an outflanking movement until help can 
 be rendered may thus be provided for. 
 
 As a protection against flank attacks, the most careful com- 
 munication should be maintained throughout every portion of 
 the rear guard, and especially from the flanks to the centre. 
 
BEAR GUAEDS. Sod 
 
 5. Duties of Hear Guard. — The duty of a rear guard is to 
 manoeuvre, tut not to begin an actual contest, unless with some 
 definite object, such as the defence of a position for the purpose 
 of gaining time. 
 
 Except for some undoubted benefit, no position is to be held 
 so long that the force in occupation of it runs the risk of being 
 cut off. The first object of the rear guard is to prevent the 
 enemy from closing with the main body, and to protect it from 
 being harassed. This can be often accomplished by forcing the 
 enemy into frequent deployments and then retiring the rear 
 guard to another position. To deploy and then reform column 
 of route, takes time, and it is time of which the retreating force 
 stand most in need. 
 
 The enemy's march should be impeded by every possible 
 expedient ; by breaking up roads, demolishing bridges, forming 
 obstacles, and ruining supphes. In a close country, to leave a 
 burning village behind often serves to check a pursuing enemy, 
 but this measure and the destruction of railwaj^s should not be 
 resorted to except under urgent necessity or in obedience to 
 superior orders. To burn hay ricks, fire the grass in countries 
 where that is possible, and destroy all corn, cannot fail to retard 
 a Cavalry pursuit. 
 
 In retiring from a position the troops should not all move at 
 once, but by echelons, the slower-moving arms first; such a 
 movement should be concealed as long as possible by the brisker 
 fire and the greater activity of those which remain the latest. 
 
 Frequently it may happen that opportunity is offered of 
 making a counter attack, and partially assuming the offensive. 
 This may sometimes be necessary to disengage the tail of the 
 column, or to check a too close pursuit. "When this has to be 
 done it must be executed with promptitude and vigour-, but the 
 commander of the rear guard must be careful that his force 
 is not led too far from the main body, and that pursuit is on no 
 account attempted. Every hour the rear guard is halted the 
 enemy's force increases in strength, whilst the rear guard 
 becomes further removed from the main body, and consequently 
 from all support. The commander must, therefore, take care 
 not to compromise the safety of the rear guard in carrying out 
 his primary mission of retarding the enemy. 
 
 The position of the commander of the rear guard should be 
 with the main body of his force, and he should be in constant 
 and close communication with the screen of mounted men cover- 
 ing the extreme rear. 
 
 Above all, the duty of the commander and each officer of a 
 rear guard is to do his utmost to maintain the courage, daring, 
 and martial spirit of the men, and for this the highest qualities 
 of a soldier will be required. 
 
 6. Equipment. — The equipment of a rear guard should be even 
 lighter than that of an advanced guard. Nothing should 
 
 5/ 
 
33e REAR GUARDS. 
 
 accompany it which may have to be left behind in a rapid move- 
 ment. No reserve supplies of ammunition or food need be 
 carried. In most cases arrangements can be made that the 
 main body on its march daily drops everything required by the 
 rear guard. Men and horses should carry with them one day's 
 supply of food and corn. 
 
 The ambulance must accompany a rear guard, but if all other 
 transport is dispensed with or reduced to a minimum, the sick 
 and wounded should be little encumbrance to the free movement 
 of the rear guard. 
 
 EEAE GUAED IN AN ADVANCE. 
 
 This is one of the most distasteful and toilsome duties that 
 devolves upon troops in the field; it therefore demands the 
 exercise of some of the best qualities of a soldier. 
 
 The rear guard in an advance will be a small force left behind 
 mainly for police purposes ; to hinder men from straggling from 
 the main body, bring up those who have fallen behind for any 
 reason, and prevent plunder and misconduct. In an enemy's 
 country it will have also to guard against any attacks on the 
 baggage and train by armed inhabitants or small irregular forces. 
 
 It will generally be composed of Infantry, \vitk just enough 
 mounted men to scout well to the flanks and to communicate 
 with the main body in front. The bulk of the mounted police 
 should be with it. Unlike a rear guard covering a retreat, it is 
 not necessary to employ whole battalions on this service. 
 Companies from different battalions of the main body should be 
 detailed, so that when the halt for the night is made, these 
 companies, upon reaching the halting-place and rejoining their 
 head-quarters, will find everything prepared for their comfort 
 by the other companies of their battalions. Complete battalions 
 that reach their halting-place very late — night has often far 
 advanced before they can get to the front — have difficulty in 
 cooking and in preparing for a night's rest. 
 
 Eear guards can as a rule be conveniently formed from the 
 piquets or outposts that were on duty when the march began. 
 Having been up all the previous night they will thus have some 
 hours for rest and cooking before it comes to their turn to march, 
 all the force with its baggage trains, &c, having first to move off. 
 
 The general disposition of the force on the march will be the 
 same as that of the rear guard covering a retreat, the flanks 
 being guarded so that no unexpected minor attack can be made 
 on the baggage. 
 
 It should move as near the rear of the baggage train as will 
 ensure that everyone and every cart, &c, is in front of it, and 
 that no irregularity can take place. 
 
34 
 
 Lecture VI 11. 
 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Objects of Outposts. — Every body of troops in the field is 
 dependent for security upon its outposts. 
 
 These outposts consist of detachments, sent out to cover the 
 front and flanks and sometimes the rear in order to — 
 
 (i) Obtain accurate intelligence of the position, strength, 
 
 movements and intentions of the enemy, 
 (ii) Prevent his obtaining information on these points, 
 (iii) Protect the main body from surprise, by checking any 
 advance of the enemy until preparations are made to 
 receive him. 
 
 Tactical Divisiox. — These objects are attained by dividing the 
 force detailed for outpost duty into fractions, which radiate from 
 the main body in the direction of the enemy, in gradually 
 decreasing numbers ; and, while prying into the affairs of their 
 adversary, form an impenetrable veil to the troops they cover. 
 
 The principle upon which the actual outpost duty is conducted, 
 is, that a fraction of the outposts should be constantly in a state 
 of observation and watchfulness, while the remainder are in 
 readiness to afford the advanced fraction immediate support, or 
 offer any resistance necessary. On this basis the outposts are 
 divided into — 
 
 Reserves. 
 Support. 
 Piquets 
 
 " Strong Patrols " are usually supplied from the Reserve, and 
 piquets furnish — 
 
 i. Sentries, 
 ii. Reliefs, 
 ii. Rounds. 
 iv. Detached posts. 
 v. Examining posts. 
 iv. Visiting and reconnoitring patrols 
 
 Units to be intact. — In outposts and the parts into which 
 they are subdivided units should as far as possible be kept intact. 
 The reserve should be a brigade, battalion, or half -battalion, 
 and the supports and piquets should be composed of companies 
 or half-companies. 
 
OUTPOSTS. 35 
 
 Distances between the outpost lines. — As a principle, out- 
 posts should be pushed as far forward as is compatible with 
 safety. The distances separating the various lines being so fixed, 
 that each affords such support to the other as will enable the 
 troops to defend the outpost position so effectually, that the force 
 they cover stands in no danger of being surprised. 
 
 Mutual support — It will depend upon circumstances whether, 
 when the outposts are attacked, reinforcements are to be pushed 
 forward ; or whether each line in succession is gradually to fall 
 back upon the troops supporting it, and there make a stand ; or 
 retire still further towards the main body. Orders on this subject 
 will be issued by the General or other senior officer charged with 
 the command of the outposts. 
 
 When to retire. — Outposts should hold their ground as long 
 as possible, and must bear in mind, that if they remain firm, their 
 numbers will be greatly exaggerated, especially at night or in 
 the early morning before things at a distance can be clearly 
 seen, and the progress of the adversary consequently retarded. 
 Generally speaking, troops on outpost duty need not retire until 
 their flanks are turned, and it is an axiom on this service that 
 the smallest fractions must, when necessary, sacrifice themselves 
 to protect the larger. 
 
 The portions of troops retiring will, when practicable, draw 
 off to a flank, so as to give a clear front for the fire of the next 
 supporting body. 
 
 Intelligence to be circulated. —Detachments of the outposts 
 are, by means of patrols, mounted orderlies or sentries, sup- 
 plemented when feasible by a system of telegraphic and visual 
 signalling, to keep each other mutually informed on all matters 
 respecting the enemy, as well as of their own movements. 
 
 Positions artificially strengthened. — "When an army en- 
 camps for any length of time in one place, the position taken by 
 the outposts or at least certain portions of it, should be strengthened 
 by abattis, entanglements, redoubts ; by fortifying farm-houses, 
 barricading villages, bridges and defiles, loopholing walls ; and 
 by rendering every approach to the camp as difficult as possible. 
 These measures are only to be adopted under the orders of 
 officers in superior command. 
 
 If the force halts for more than a few hours, free lateral 
 communication between the component parts of outposts is 
 invariably to be secured ; so as to enable all, in case of attack, to 
 act in the most complete concert one with the other. For this 
 purpose passages should be made through enclosures, hedges and 
 brushwood cut down, ditches filled in ; and the nearest line of 
 retreat from one post to another marked out by felled trees, straw 
 placed on poles, or by other means. 
 
 As nothing checks the ardour of an attack more than an 
 unexpected obstacle within a moderate distance of the objective, 
 every impediment is to be thrown in the way of an enemy's 
 advance, in front of the ground where it has been decided to 
 make the first stand. 
 5a 
 
36 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 In order to enable the outposts to resist the enemy's onset 
 successfully, the front of attack is to be narrowed, by blocking 
 up roads, defiles, bridges, and all avenues of approach not 
 required by the army itself. 
 
 Night dispositions. — Unless for some special reason, outposts 
 at night are not to be brought nearer the main body ; but in 
 order to secure additional protection, patrols will be pushed well 
 ahead, on the routes by which the enemy must advance to occupy 
 roads, bridges, high ground and villages. When it is requisite 
 to make certain modifications in the dispositions of the outposts 
 for night, or in foggy weather, the alterations will be arranged 
 during the daylight ; but in order to conceal them from the enemy, 
 the changes will not be carried out till dusk. 
 
 Under arms at dawn. — Outposts will be under arms an hour 
 before daylight, when, if everything is quiet in front, the 
 positions taken up by day will be resumed. 
 
 Hour for relief. — When the force remains stationary, 
 outposts are relieved at daybreak, so as to have the stronger 
 force at hand at an hour when attacks are generally made. 
 
 On being relieved, officers commanding any portions of the 
 outposts will accompany the officers who relieve them round the 
 limits of their command, explaining the situation, and affording 
 every information in their power. 
 
 No compliments. — No compliments arc paid by troops on 
 outpost duty. If a superior officer visits the various detachments 
 the men take no notice of him unless he addresses them. When 
 the officer commanding the outposts approaches, the outposts will 
 only stand to their arms if ordered to do so. 
 
 THE RESERVE. 
 
 The reserve is the main body and head-quarters of the troops 
 detailed for outpost duty, and may be considered a general 
 support to the two front lines of supports and piquets. 
 
 It should be placed in the most advantageous position for 
 defence, if a stand is to be made there ; but, if the ground 
 occupied by the supports is to be held, then the reserves will be 
 so placed as to be readily moved to any quarter threatened. It 
 must be sufficiently advanced to prevent the camp or bivouac 
 being shelled by the enemy. 
 
 The distance of the reserve from the main body is approxi- 
 mately from one to two miles. 
 
 Occasionally it may be advisable to divide the reserve into two 
 parts, when, for instance there are two bridges, or two defiles or 
 roads by which piquets and supports would have to fall back if 
 driven in. 
 
 _ Its strength depends so much upon circumstances such as the 
 distance of the outposts from the main bod}-, and the nature of 
 the ground, that it is impossible to fix it by any general rule. It 
 will vary from I to £ of the force detailed for outpost duty. 
 
 When the main body of the army bivouacs in a defensive 
 
OUTPOSTS. 37 
 
 position, and could within a very short time be formed up to 
 resist attack , reserves may at times be dispensed with. 
 
 The reserve should always bivouac out of sight of the enemy. 
 
 SUPPOETS. 
 
 The support consist of one or more companies of the same 
 battalion that furnishes the piquets. It is not necessary to have 
 a separate support to each piquet ; on the contrary, there should 
 only be one to each group of two or three piquets, but it will be 
 about equal in strength to the aggregate of the piquets to which 
 it is linked. 
 
 Supports are placed wherever the ground affords the best 
 general line for mutual defence. A protracted resistance by a 
 portion of the supports, while another portion was forced to retire 
 would probably result in the capture of the force which held its 
 ground. Positions which present moderately good opportunities 
 of defence throughout, are much to be preferred to the line which 
 possesses some strong features, but is untenable elsewhere. 
 
 The distance of the supports from the reserve is approximately 
 from 400 to 800 yards. 
 
 If properly posted, the supports should be able to check the 
 advance of a considerable body of mounted troops, and thus 
 prevent any reconnaissance being made by even a strong force 
 of the enemy. 
 
 They should keep up communication with their piquets, with 
 the supports right and left, and with the reserve. 
 
 The circumstances of the moment alone can enable a decision 
 to be arrived at in the event of attack ; whether the supports 
 reinforce the piquet or wait, and with them hold the position 
 originally occupied by the supports, or together with them and 
 the other supports retire upon the reserve. This must be decided 
 by the officer in command of the outposts, in accordance with 
 the intention of the General Officer Commanding the Army, 
 which would be communicated to him from day to day. 
 
 PIQUETS. 
 
 The piquet furnishes the sentries required, and supports them 
 if attacked. It also supplies the visiting and reconnoitring 
 patrols, and, when necessary, the detached posts and the 
 examining party. 
 
 Its best position is in rear of the centre of the sentries it 
 furnishes, not so far from them that they would run the risk of 
 being overpowered before the piquet could help tbem, or so close 
 on them that an attack would fall almost simultaneously on 
 sentries and piquets. It should be on a road or path if possible 
 with clear ground for action in front, and on the flanks ; its 
 position should be easy for the troops in the rear to find, but 
 concealed from the view of the enemy. 
 
 The distance of the piquet from the support is approximately 
 from 400 to 800 yards. 
 
38 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 A piquet should never occupy a house ; when unavoidably 
 posted in a cramped locality, obstacles should be constructed a 
 little distance in front. Bridges, defiles, and causeways should 
 as a rule be left outside the line of piquets. 
 
 The piquet must not take up a position with the intention of 
 defending it to the last, unless orderod to do so ; or unless, 
 while awaiting the arrival of supports, such a measure is un- 
 avoidable for the preservation of the party. 
 
 In case of alarm, the piquet at once falls in ; if the enemy is 
 close at hand, and active ; or should there be reasou to 
 apprehend an attack, a portion of the piquet is kept constantly 
 under arms during the night. This party, ready for immediate 
 action, is kept distinct from the remainder, to guard against tho 
 confusion that might otherwise arise from a sudden attack. 
 
 A single sentry is placed over the piquet, in such a position 
 that, while protecting the arms, he can see the sentries in front, 
 or the files connectiug them with the piquet. He stands still, 
 and is continually on the watch for any signal from the line of 
 sentries. 
 
 As attacks are often made at or about daybreak, a desirable 
 reinforcement will always lie obtained by relieving the piquets 
 and supports at that hour. "When the new piquet has arrived, 
 the officer commanding the old piquets will accompany the officer 
 commanding the former along the chain of posts, and will point 
 out the situation and strength of the enen y's posts, and afford 
 every information in his power. 
 
 When the posts have been relieved, if everything appears 
 quiet and the weather is sufficiently clear, the old piquet will 
 fall back iqion the support and march into camp. 
 
 Should firing be heard in front before it reaches tho camp 
 the commander will instantly return to the front. 
 
 Sentbies. — Sentries are, according to the features of ground, 
 placed in pairs or groups. 
 
 In the former case, the reliefs of each double sentry are with 
 the piquet; where they have more shelter and rest. In the 
 latter case, the remainder of the group lie down as close as they 
 can to the sentry without being visible to the enemy. 
 
 Groups may consist of three, four, six or more men, a non- 
 commissioned officer is placed in charge of from one to three groups. 
 
 Besides saving the fatigue which is incurred when double 
 sentries are relieved from the piquet, the group system is more 
 economical ; it leaves comrades together, and gives the sentries 
 confidence from having succour so close to them. 
 
 Where groups are used, a single sentry generally suffices by 
 day; but at night when the strain on a man's nerves renders it 
 desirable that he should have a companion, the sentries ai*e double. 
 
 Beliefs. — The reliefs are calculated on the principle that the 
 sentries remain on their posts for two hours, unless in very 
 severe weather or under exceptional circumstances, when they 
 may be relieved hourly. The reliefs are kept separated by a few 
 yards from the remainder of the piquet, to avoid disturbing them. 
 
OUTPOSTS. 39 
 
 Roonds. — An officer, or non-conmiissioned officer, and a 
 private go round once between reliefs, to ascertain, if the sentries 
 are on the alert, and whether they have anything to report or 
 suggest, also to keep up communication with the neighbouring 
 piquets. Hollows, or places capable of affording concealment 
 to small parties of the enemy who may have crept in between 
 the sentry posts, are examined closely. 
 
 Bounds do not go in front of the sentries, nor pass in view of 
 the enemy. They should sometimes go from right to left, and 
 sometimes from left to right. 
 
 Detached posts. — Detached posts consist of from three to 
 twelve men, under an officer or non-commissioned officer, and 
 form a piquet on a small scale. "When in front or rear of the 
 extreme flank of the line, such posts are usually placed in echelon 
 to watch some particular place or road by which the flank, from 
 its not resting on a natural obstacle, could be turned ; or to watch 
 a village lying in front of the line of sentries, where an enemy 
 might collect preparatory to an attack ; or to guard any elevated 
 spot from which the enemy could overlook the outposts, and the 
 position of the main body. These posts are sometimes placed to 
 maintain communication between piquets lying unusually far 
 apart. 
 
 Examining post. — When ordered to establish an examining 
 post, the officer commanding the piquet will detail an officer, or 
 selected non-commissioned officer, to command it, who shoidd, if 
 possible, speak the language of the country. The party will 
 consist of not less than six men, and their orders are to allow no 
 person other than those on duty with the outposts, to pass any- 
 where except at this post. 
 
 The examining party are under the orders of the officer 
 comnmnding the piquet from which they are detached, and, 
 according to his instructions, the officer, or non-commissioned 
 officer in charge, examines every individual wishing to pass 
 inwards or outwards, and gives or with-holds the necessary 
 permission. 
 
 In the absence of an examining post, the officer commanding 
 the piquet will issue orders to prevent any unauthorised person 
 passing to or from the front. 
 
 Patrols. — Without patrolling, however active and alert the 
 sentries may be, the service of the outposts can never be properly 
 performed. 
 
 Vigilance, silence, and circumspection must be strictly enjoined 
 on all patrols. No noise on any account must be made. Patrols 
 shoidd be especially careful to prevent their arms and accoutre- 
 ments rattling, or anything about them glittering. 
 
 Instances may occur, when the front of an outpost can be 
 watched by patrols better than by sentries. In cases of this 
 kind, patrols must be incessantly on the move in front of the 
 line, and must communicate with each other. 
 
40 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 When the officer commanding a piquet accompanies a patrol, 
 he is to inform the next in command of his intended absence,, 
 and the probable time of his return. 
 
 A patrol not accompanied by an officer commanding a piquet, 
 will receive instructions from him, and will report to him on its 
 return. 
 
 The mode of conducting patrols, their number, strength, and 
 the distance to which they may be sent, necessarily depend on 
 the ever- varying local and other circumstances in which the 
 piquets may find themselves. 
 
 Patrols may be classed under three headings : — 
 (a) Visiting patrols. 
 (5) Eeconnoitring patrols. 
 (c) Strong patrols. 
 
 Visiting Patrols. — Visiting patrols usually consist of an 
 officer or non-commissioned officer and one or two men ; they 
 are sent at intervals, as a rule between rebefs, along the front, 
 in order to ascertain that the sentries are alert, whether they 
 have anything unusual to report, or whether they require 
 assistance to examine doubtful objects. This party, on leaving 
 the piquet, communicate when feasible with the sentries of the 
 piquets on their right and left, and then move along the front 
 of the line of sentries, beginning at one flank, and returning by 
 the other. 
 
 All woods, ravines, or broken ground in the immediate 
 neighbourhood of the sentries, where bodies of the enemy could 
 collect without being detected, are occasionally visited by these 
 patrols ; also the posts of groups and their sentries, and of all 
 sentries in foggy weather. 
 
 Eeconxoitring patrols. — Eeconnoitring patrols of from three 
 to seven men move in the direction of the enemy to such a 
 distance as may be deemed expedient. Mounted troops are 
 usually detailed for this duty, and patrol once or twice a-day, 
 about four or five miles to the front ; if the enemy be not sooner 
 discovered, they may range as far as ten miles from the army. 
 When mounted troops are not available, infantry are employed; 
 either cavalry or infantry will answer the purpose when the 
 enemy is close at hand. 
 
 These patrols are preceded by scouts selected for their 
 intelligence, whom no sound or sign will escape, and whose 
 experienced eyes and ears will detect the approach of danger. 
 If in serious danger of being cut off, these feelers fall back on 
 their patrols, and if the advance of a large body of the enemy 
 seems imminent, one or two men are sent back with the utmost 
 despatch to acquaint the officer of the nearest piquet. If a post 
 of the enemy is discovered, the patrol remains in observation of 
 it ; if only a small patrol is met, it is driven in, to disclose what 
 is behind ; but at night it is unwise to advance, as exchanging 
 shots only tends to disturb your own troops in rear. 
 
 No strong force of the enemy will cross an enclosed country 
 in the dark, except by roads. The main approaches must, 
 consequently be carefully patrolled at night, but at the same 
 
OUTPOSTS. 41 
 
 time the men engaged on this duty must listen attentively for 
 any movement through adjacent woods, or over the fields. 
 
 When returning from the front, by night or during verv foggy 
 weather, reconnoitring patrols are to frequently stop and listen, 
 so as to guard against being followed up and overtaken suddenly 
 by hostile patrols, who might also elude their observation, and 
 creep through, the sentries to attack the piquets. 
 
 In all reconnoitring, everything may be said to depend upon 
 the judgment, resource, and enterprise of those engaged in it. 
 The commander of a patrol of this description must start on his 
 duty determined to find out something worth knowing, and keep 
 pushing on till he succeeds ; or until stopped by his adversary. 
 Some risk must be accepted to gaiQ the end in view, and loss 
 may sometimes occur in its execution ; but the extreme im- 
 portance of ascertaining what the enemy is about, is paramount. 
 Still, no precaution for the safety of the patrol should be omitted, 
 and no futile engagement entered upon Observation without 
 fighting being its business, men are selected for this service who 
 possess keen sight and quickness of perception. 
 
 Strong patrols. — Strong patrols are often sent forward to 
 protect the camp or bivouac from the prying curiosity of the 
 enemy's patrols or reconnoitring parties. They are also used to 
 dislodge the enemy from posts he has occupied, and in doing so 
 to ascertain what lies behind his advanced posts. They may. 
 therefore, when stratagem fails, have sometimes to act on the 
 offensive. Usually furnished by the reserve, or supports, they 
 are rarely sent more than a mile from the front line of outposts. 
 
 A mounted orderly, when available, accompanies the patrol, 
 to convey the information acquired quickly to the rear. 
 
 Good signallers should invariably go out with both recon- 
 noitring, and strong patrols. 
 
 Refore daybreak, strong patrols are sent forward, and proceed 
 with the greatest caution lest they unexpectedly fall in with the 
 enemy's columns waiting for daylight to make an attack. 
 
 SELECTION OF OUTPOST LINE. 
 
 A healthy camping ground, well supplied with water, on a 
 good road, will usually determine the site for the camp or 
 bivouac of the main body; for the line of outposts, a good 
 I defensible position, with an extended field of view, Is desirable. 
 The outpost line will be selected : first, with reference to the 
 Sposition of the main body of the Army ; and next, with regard 
 feto the approaches to it from the enemy's side. 
 There are, ordinarily speaking, two lines : — 
 (i) The line of observation, to which falls the two primary 
 lobjects of the outpost, viz., gaining information, and preventing 
 flthe enemy from doing so. 
 
 (ii) The line of defence, which resists any hostile advance 
 |until the main body is prepared. 
 
42 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 In order to combine defensive strength with scope for 
 observation, it is desirable to choose a line marked by well- 
 defined features, such as a ridge, the far edge of a wood, &c. 
 The flanks should rest on some natural object ; for example, a 
 lake, river, or morass, a hill or a precipice. When such elements 
 of safety do not exist, the flanks are, in the case of a small force, 
 doubled back ; and with larger bodies, detachments are detailed 
 to strengthen the line at these points. 
 
 In operating with troops armed with weapons of precision, 
 the line chosen ought to preclude the possibility of the adversary's 
 artillery occupying any position from which it could shell the 
 main body, without first driving in the outposts. 
 
 FOKCE TO BE EMPLOYED. 
 
 As the duty of outposts is severe, the numbers employed are 
 limited to the actual requirements. It is of vital importance, 
 that men who have to march and perform the various duties 
 incidental to a campaign, sbould have as much rest as possible. 
 Every effort therefore is made, to avoid f aligning the troops 
 more than can be helped. At the same time, the reasons for 
 using outposts require that there shall be sufficient men to find 
 out what the enemy is about, and for general observation ; and 
 also to furnish sufficient supports and reserves, to resist all 
 attacks long enough to enable the Army to get under arms and 
 come into action. 
 
 Another point affecting the strength of outposts is : whether, 
 if attacked, the main body would advance to fight in the position 
 occupied by the outpost Jine ; or whether, it would accept battle 
 in a position in rear. . Sometimes the ground may admit of no 
 choice in this respect. If it be necessary to offer a determined 
 resistance on the ground in occupation b} T the outposts, then they 
 should be made strong enough to hold the position until the 
 maiu body could reach it. If, on the other hand, the battle-field 
 chosen for the main body be in rear of the outposts, then the 
 opposition offered should only be of a nature to delay the advance 
 of the enemy, until the main body had ample time to get into a 
 fighting formation. This coidd be effected by a smaller outpost 
 force. 
 
 The configuration and nature of the country, the character 
 and proximity of the enemy, the strength of the army to 
 be covered, the number of mounted troops available as an 
 independent body to scour the front ; all influence to a great 
 degree, the numbers of the force to be apportioned to the 
 outposts. As a general rule, it will seldom be necessary to 
 detail more than l/5th or l/6th of the total effective strength of 
 the main body to be covered. 
 
 COMPOSITION. 
 
 Outposts are composed of Cavalry, Mounted Infantry, or 
 Infantry. As an exceptional arrangement, two or more guns 
 
OUTPOSTS. 43 
 
 are sometimes added to some particular post. For the defence 
 of bridges or defiles -which it is important to hold, machine guns 
 may be used with advantage. 
 
 The relative proportions of the Mounted troops, and Infantry, 
 and the method of employing them, depend on whether the 
 action of the outposts is to be more, or less aggressive ; and 
 whether the country is open or enclosed. 
 
 Patrolling or reconnoitring by day, and when the country is 
 favourable by night also, are most efficiently performed by 
 Mounted troops (the instruction for this service being laid down 
 in the "Movements of Cavalry," Part V.), but it is only when 
 the enemy's main body is still far distant, that they can carry 
 out those duties without assistance ; if the adversary is close at 
 hand, Infantry must be in a position to give timely support, to 
 cover the retreat of the Cavalry patrols if driven in, and to check 
 the enemy's progress. 
 
 "When a reconnoitring force is of sufficient strength to operate 
 against the enemy until reinforced, Artillery would naturally 
 form a portion of it. Its position is usually with the reserve, 
 but in special localities, where an inportant approach, defile or 
 bridge had to be defended, it might be advantageous to place 
 guns in the front line. In such a case, especial care will be taken 
 that they do not incur the risk of being cut off, and that they 
 can when necessary, effect a rapid retreat. 
 
 DUTIES OF OFFICEES. 
 
 All officers detailed for outpost duty, shoidd realise clearly 
 the great difference between it and parade exercise. At drill, 
 precision of movement, concentration of authority, and the literal 
 execution of orders are prescribed. On outpost duty, on the 
 other hand, officers must never hesitate to act on their own 
 responsibility, when by so doing they will carry out the in- 
 tentions of the Commander of the outposts. He acts as the 
 centre of the system, but decentralises his command. He gives 
 as few orders as possible, but explains clearly the general aim 
 and objects of his proposed arrangements. He should accord 
 great latitude to those under him, and they must strive to merit 
 the confidence reposed in them. They can succeed only, if they 
 thoroughly comprehend and master the governing idea in all its 
 various practical issues ; and thus give effect to the Commanding 
 officer's wishes, without bHndly following rules, or even orders. 
 
 The fundamental principles should be taught to, and impressed 
 upon, all officers ; but the execution of them on service must be 
 entrusted to their individual sagacity. The condition of the troops, 
 the nature of the country, the weather, the efficiency, tactics, 
 and armament of the enemy, constitute such ever-varying con- 
 ditions as to render it impossible to attempt to lay clown in- 
 structions applicable to all emergencies. To do so, would but 
 hamper the intelligent and energetic officer ; and might mislead 
 5b 
 
44 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 one less astute or of inferior spirit. In fact, circumstances are 
 so changeable, that the same officer will feel himself justified in 
 placing outposts, over the same line of country, differently on 
 different days. 
 
 Everyone entrusted with these important duties must carefully 
 consider how the objects to be attained by the outposts may be 
 arrived at. When proceeding to their posts, they must examine 
 the country over which they pass, noting on their way the 
 positions which would favour resistance, observing all landmarks 
 and prominent objects. By this means they will, even at night, 
 find their way should they have to fall back. Blazed trees, 
 broken branches, small heaps of stone, &c, help to mark a road 
 or path that has to be moved over in a return march. 
 
 Officers on outpost duty are to provide themselves with : — 
 
 Field glasses. 
 
 A good watch. 
 
 Magnetic compass. 
 
 Memorandum book. 
 
 Appliances for making a rough sketch. 
 
 Orders received are written down at once, tho time of receipt 
 recorded and all intelligence obtained is sent at once to the 
 Head-Quarters of the outposts. 
 
 Commander of the outposts. — The General Officer Com- 
 manding the Army having selected an officer of rank and 
 experience to command the outposts, will, either personally or 
 through a staff officer, inform him on the following points : — 
 
 1 . All that is known of the enemy, his movements, intentions, 
 
 the positions he occupies, &c. 
 
 2. Precise situation of the intended camp or bivouac. 
 
 3. Boughly, the line to be taken up by the outposts. 
 
 4. The force to be employed, and the troops of which it 
 
 will consist. 
 
 5. To what extent reserves and supports are necessary, or 
 
 may be dispensed with. 
 
 6. Information regarding roads leading to the front. 
 
 7. The general idea. Whether an advance, a halt, or a 
 
 retreat is contemplated. 
 
 8. The attitude to be adopted by the outposts. To what 
 
 extent the enemy is to be opposed, and in which 
 direction, if necessary, the outposts are to fall back. 
 
 All troops detailed for outpost duty are placed under this 
 officer who is called the " Commander of +he Outposts." He is 
 responsible that the best information is obtained regarding the 
 enemy, and that every precaution is taken to ensure the security 
 and repose of the remainder of the force. 
 
 It is often convenient to make the officer commanding the 
 advanced guard, the Commander of the Outposts ; and to allow 
 him to continue to act in that capacity. 
 
OUTPOSTS. 45 
 
 After he has received his instructions from the General 
 Commanding, and with map in hand has studied the nature of 
 the country in front and on the flanks, he issues orders to the 
 officers whom he selects to command sections of the outposts 
 on these points : — 
 
 1. Information regarding the enemy. 
 
 2. The approximate lines to be occupied by day, and by 
 
 night. 
 
 3. Division of the outpost line into sections, and the allot- 
 
 ment to battalions, &c. 
 
 4. The flank from which the piquets are to be numbered. 
 
 y.B. — It is generally advisable to number from the 
 flank which is first taken tip, or which rests on some 
 natural qbstacle. 
 
 5. Measures for securing the flanks. 
 
 6. Defence of positions, mining bridges, lateral com- 
 
 munications. 
 
 7. Directions regarding patrols. 
 
 8. Disposal of signallers, and mounted orderlies. 
 
 9. The countersign. 
 
 10. Disposition in case of attack, and the extent to which 
 
 the enemy is to be opposed. 
 
 1 1 . Submission of reports. 
 
 12. Where he himself is to be found. 
 
 13. The time the outposts will be relieved. 
 
 N.B. — It is desirable that the foregoing, or as much as 
 possible of it, should be communicated to the outposts 
 before they march off. 
 
 In sub-dividing the outpost line into sections, about three 
 miles may be considered a suitable command for Cavalry on 
 open ground, and from one to one-and-a-half for Infantry. 
 
 As soon as the line has been taken up, according to his in- 
 structions ; the Commander of the Outposts will inspect it, and 
 make any modifications requisite 
 
 His place is, according to the number of the troops under his 
 command, with the reserve, or support ; or in some central 
 position near the line of outposts. 
 
 Field Officer commanding a section of the outpost line. — 
 The officer deputed to command a section of the outpost line, 
 will ordinarily be the officer commanding a battalion, or a half- 
 battalion. Under the orders he has received from the Com- 
 mander of the Outpost, he will select the companies for piquet 
 duty. In doing so, he will observe the principle of keeping 
 units intact, though in some instances, especially when the 
 group system is not adopted, he may find it necessary to break 
 up large companies, and so avoid delay, and the excessive 
 fatigue of relieving sentries distributed over a wide front. 
 
 After imparting to the officers who are to command piquets 
 the information he has received from the Commander of the 
 
46 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 Outposts, and told thern all he can to assist them in carrying 
 out their duties efficiently, he will give particular instructions 
 on the following points : — 
 
 1. Eoughly, the ground to be taken up by the sentries. 
 
 2. Approximate position of the piquet. 
 
 3. Situation for examining posts and detached posts. 
 
 4. Patrols. 
 
 5. Defensive works, open communications. Preparations 
 
 to destroy bridges or render defiles impassable. 
 
 6. The extent of resistance to be offered in case of attack. 
 
 7. Line of retreat if necessary. 
 
 8 Whether valises may be taken off. 
 9. Where he himself is to be found. 
 
 This officer should be personally acquainted with the officers 
 commanding piquets, and if they do not belong to his own 
 regiment, he must ascertain their characters and the reliance to 
 be placed on each. 
 
 Commander of the itqcet. — Having received his instructions 
 from the officer commanding that section of the outpost line of 
 which he is to form apart, and being satisfied that he thoroughly 
 comprehends what is required, the officer commanding a piquet 
 will march his party, preceded by advanced and flanking scouts 
 to the ground approximately indicated for his piquet. Here he 
 will halt them, and send a few skirmishers, or a reconnoitring 
 patrol, in the direction of the enemy, to cover him while he 
 disposes of his sentries. He will also detail a tile to communicate 
 with the neighbouring piquets on either flank. 
 
 After a careful examination of the ground allotted to him, his 
 knowledge of the situation will enable him to decide where the 
 sentry posts are to be, and whether the service will be better 
 performed by groups or double sentries. To form a decision on 
 this point, he must take into consideration not only the ground 
 actually to be occupied by his sentries, but all roads and paths 
 in the vicinity, and heights within rifle range, and all undulations 
 which might afford cover to the approach of an enemy. 
 
 The distance of the sentries from the piquet is approximately 
 from 100 to 400 yards. 
 
 He will now proceed to post the sentries, or groups, to the 
 best advantage ; while doing so, the piquet may pile arms, but 
 must not break off. 
 
 On his return from the front, he will definitely fix the position 
 of the piquet, and its sentry ; and will then detail parties for 
 the following duties ; — 
 Relief for the sentries, 
 Patrols, 
 Pounds, 
 
 and, if necessary — 
 Detached posts, 
 Examining post. 
 
OUTPOSTS. 47 
 
 The hours at which each patrol is to go out, must be de- 
 termined, and the different parties kept separated by a few 
 yards. 
 
 The dispositions for night will then be considered. 
 
 In his arrangements to strengthen his post, the officer com- 
 manding a piquet should take care not to begin works of an 
 extensive kind, which would fatigue his men, and be useless if 
 unfinished when attacked. Simple obstructions should be placed 
 on the bnes of approach, and in front of the piquet-position, to 
 delay the enemy's advance, and throw him into confusion; and 
 a small parapet may often with advantage be made to cover 
 the piquet. 
 
 The confidence of the troops is greatly increased by a thorough 
 acquaintance with the ground. This constitutes the chief 
 advantage the defence has over the attack. At night, ambuscades 
 on the side of a road, in a field, or behind a fence should be 
 arranged. A few men judiciously placed, and well-handled, 
 suddenly opening fire by volleys, upon an advancing force, even 
 of considerable numbers, will so disconcert an enemy that he 
 may often be driven back in disorder, with but little or no loss 
 to those in ambush. 
 
 Officers commanding piquets must pay strict attention to the 
 following . — 
 
 1. In posting sentries, employ no more men than are 
 
 sufficient to watch thoroughly the country in their 
 front. 
 
 2. The position of each sentry should fulfil the following 
 
 requirements : — 
 
 A good view to the front and flanks. 
 Concealment from the enemy. 
 Non-liability to sudden attack. 
 
 At night, the power of seeing against the sky-line, 
 anyone approaching, without themselves being seen. 
 
 3. Ascertain that the sentries thoroughly understand their 
 
 orders. 
 
 4. Select intelligent men with good sight for important posts. 
 
 5. On dark nights, or in thick weather, the sentries to fix 
 
 bayonets, but not by day, or on clear moonlight nights. 
 
 6. That the sentries are visited every hour between reliefs. 
 
 7. Relieve the sentries every two hours ; but in severe 
 
 weather, or at night if necessary, every hour. 
 
 8. The patrols to go out and return by different ways. 
 
 9. No men to stray from their piquets. 
 
 10. Allow no noise, and unless specially sanctioned, no fires. 
 
 1 1 . Strengthen the piquet post in front as far as time and 
 
 materials admit. 
 
 12. Be ready with a plan of action in the event of attack 
 
 from any quarter, and at any hour, especially at dawn ; 
 remember, that if prepared, the enemy may be en- 
 countered with confidence. 
 
48 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 13. Write down all verbal orders, and any information likely 
 
 to be of use, to the relieving officer. 
 
 14. Make a rough sketch of the ground in the vicinity, and 
 
 ascertain the correct distances of prominent objects 
 within range. 
 
 15. In making a report, written or verbal, give all details 
 
 which may assist the officer receiving it to make ac- 
 curate deductions, and take judicious precautions. 
 
 DUTIES OF SENTRIES. 
 
 A sentry should be made to understand clearly : — 
 
 1. The direction of the enemy, and the probable lino of 
 
 his advance. 
 
 2. The extent of front he is to watch. 
 
 3. The position of the sentries on his right and left. 
 
 4. The number and position of his piquet, and the besl 
 
 way to it. 
 
 5. The situation of the nearest examining post. 
 
 6. The names of villages, rivers. &c, in view: and the 
 
 places to which roads and railways had. 
 
 7. The parole and countersign. 
 
 8. That his duty is to see and listen without being seen or 
 
 heard; and that he is to report the result of his 
 observations. 
 
 9. On his vigilance depends the lives of his comrades, as 
 
 well as his own. 
 
 10. He is to pay no compliments, nor allow anyone to distract 
 
 his attention. 
 
 11. He must not permit any unauthorised person to pass 
 
 through the line, nor more than one at a time to 
 approach his post. 
 
 12. By day. strangers are to be directed to the nearest 
 
 examining post; by night, all persons approaching 
 are to be challenged, and ordered to halt ; should 
 they persist in advancing, they are to be shot. 
 
 13. He is to warn the outposts, when satisfied the enemy is 
 
 advancing in some force, but not otherwise. 
 
 14. H attacked he should defend himself by firing or using 
 
 his bayonet, as circumstances may require. 
 
 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 CoaiiiUNiCATiox. — When an Army is halted, telegraphic com- 
 niunication is generally established between the base of 
 operations and the head-quarters of the force on service. Even 
 when advancing, the field telegraph can be so quickly laid, that 
 it may often be possible for the General Commanding, to direct 
 the movements of all his troops by wire. 
 

 OUTPOSTS. 49 
 
 Army signalling is well adapted to keep touch, by day and 
 night, between the main body and the various detachments 
 which protect it, whether on the march or halted. Eeconnoitring 
 patrols especially should have good signallers with them, so 
 that no delay may take place in the transmission of intelligence. 
 If the configuration of the country is favourable, the extent to 
 which a well-arranged scheme of visual signalling can be worked, 
 is only limited by the consideration of the safety of those 
 engaged in it. 
 
 In the absence of signallers, a preconcerted system of signs 
 for the interchange of news must be adopted, only such signals 
 as are not already provided for in Part II, § 21, will be 
 necessary. These additional signals should be so simple that 
 they may be readily learnt by all ranks, and not be liable to 
 misinterpretation. 
 
 
 Intelligence. — Information concerning an enemy may be 
 obtained by — 
 
 (a) Actual observation of his troops and their position. 
 
 (b) The traces he leaves. 
 
 (c) Questioning inhabitants. 
 
 There is no real security for an Arm}' in the field without 
 positive intelligence regarding the enemy, and this can best be 
 obtained by piercing the mask behind which he endeavours to 
 conceal himself, and learning, by direct observation, not only 
 where he is, and what he is about, but possibly what he purposes 
 doing. This will be most effectually attained by skilfully- 
 conducted reconnoitring patrols ; every point of vantage, such 
 as a tower, or any lofty spot, shoidd be occupied by an officer 
 with a powerful telescope ; by this means all the enemy's move- 
 ments that are beyond the outposts range of view can be detected. 
 
 When a balloon is available, it can, in fine weather, do in- 
 estimable service in the way of spying out the enemy's move- 
 ments and dispositions, as well as the geography of the country 
 he occupies. 
 
 The following may serve as guides, in estimating numbers 
 and distances : — 
 
 A battalion in fours, 800 strong, stretches 250 yards. 
 
 A squadron in sections, 100 ,, 
 
 » 
 
 100 , 
 
 A field battery, without waggons. . 
 
 )» 
 
 110 , 
 
 ,, ,, with waggons 
 
 )> 
 
 224 , 
 
 Horse Artillery battery 
 
 >i 
 
 168 , 
 
 Two-horse cart 
 
 >i 
 
 10 , 
 
 Four-horse waggon 
 
 >> 
 
 15 
 
 N.B. — Allow l0°/ o for straggling, with a force of about a battalion, 
 15% for a division. 
 20% for «>* army corps. 
 
50 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 The ordinary pace of infantry on the inarch is 3 miles an 
 hour, or 88 yards per minute. 
 
 In double time the pace of infantry on the march is 5 miles 
 an hour, or 146 yards per minute. 
 
 The pace of cavalry and artillery at a walk is 4 miles an hour, 
 or 117 yards per minute. 
 
 The pace of cavalry and artillery at a trot is 8£ miles an hour, 
 or 250 yards per minute. 
 
 On the march — 
 
 Infantry in fours 
 
 occupy 
 
 1 foot per man. 
 
 Cavalry in sections 
 
 }} 
 
 1 yard „ 
 
 Cavalry in half-sections 
 
 » 
 
 2 yards ,, 
 
 Cavalry in fours 
 
 >> 
 
 £ yard ,, 
 
 Artillery, without waggons . . 
 
 !) 
 
 1 10 yards per battery 
 
 Artillery, with waggons 
 
 )> 
 
 224 „ 
 
 Troops will pass a given point in one minute, as follows : 
 
 In quick time at a walk — 
 
 264 infantry in fours. 
 
 58 cavalry in half-sections. 
 117 ,, sections. 
 234 ,, fours. 
 
 £ battery artillery, with waggons. 
 1 ,, ,, without waggons. 
 
 In double time or at a trot. 
 
 438 infantry in fours. 
 1 1 5 cavalry in half -sections. 
 250 ,, sections. 
 
 500 ,, fours. 
 
 1 battery artillery with waggons. 
 
 2 batteries artillery, without waggons. 
 
 With a combined force, at the pace of the slowest arm. 
 
 264 infantry in fours. 
 44 cavalry in half-sections. 
 88 ,, sections. 
 
 176 ,, fours. 
 
 2 guns, artillery, with waggons. 
 4 ,, ,, without waggons. 
 
 The following intervals between the three arms in combination 
 must be allowed for in calculations : — 
 
 Between artillery and cavalry or infantry (one interval and a 
 half), 28J yards. 
 
 Between infantry and cavalry, 24 yards. 
 
OUTPOSTS. 51 
 
 On a calm night on hard ground — 
 
 A company marching can be heard 600 paces 
 A squadron at a walk ,, 800 ,, 
 
 A ,, trot „ 1200 ,, 
 
 A single horseman ,, 500 ,, 
 
 (b) The position and strength of an enemy may be estimated 
 from the number and extent of his bivouac fires. If the flames 
 appear and disappear, it is a sign that the ground is occupied, 
 and that people are moving between the observer and the 
 fires. 
 
 If there are an unusual number of fires, it is probable that 
 the enemy means to retreat, and has merely lighted extra fires 
 as a ruse. If there is much smoke at an unusual hour, the 
 enemy may be cooking, prior to a march. 
 
 If the dust raised by troops in motion be thick and low, it 
 most likely indicates infantry; if higher and less dense, cavalry, 
 when broken, artillery or train. The length of such clouds of 
 dust enable the strength to be roughly estimated ; and also the 
 direction of march. In such calculations, the effect of wind 
 should be taken into consideration. 
 
 Dogs barking, horses neighing, an uncommon amount of 
 smoke from chimneys, are all signs of an abnormal condition of 
 things in inhabited localities, probably caused by the presence 
 of troops. 
 
 Much may be gleaned from tracks on roads. If the ground 
 is evenly beaten down with footprints, the column consists of 
 infantry alone ; hoof and waggon-tracks argue the probability 
 of cavalry and artillery. If the tracks cover only a portion of 
 the road, possibly the column was not a large one ; if the road 
 is trodden on both sides, the force was probably of considerable 
 strength. 
 
 In coming to a deserted camping ground, the number of fire- 
 places, and the length and breadth of the ground recently 
 occupied, are guides to the strength ; while articles of equipment 
 lying about, buttons, papers, dead horses, ammunition, &c, 
 show the service to which the troops belonged. During a retreat 
 of the enemy, such traces will lead to valuable inferences being 
 drawn as to the character of his retreat, and the state of 
 discipline of his army. 
 
 (c) To collect information from the inhabitants of the country 
 require judgment and tact ; but by questioning villagers, and 
 paying those who give information, and by the promise of 
 protection for themselves and their property, important intelli- 
 gence may be acquired by patrols and reconnoitring parties. 
 
 5C 
 
52 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 Deserters and spies should be captured ; it may be advisable 
 sometimes to carry oS the head men of villages, who decline to 
 be interrogated, or who give misleading answers. 
 
 Reports. — Officers employed on outpost and all patrol duties 
 will state in reporting the information they have acquired : — 
 
 The source from which it emanated. 
 
 The manner in which obtained. 
 
 How far it is reliable. 
 
 The place, hour, and date of despatching the report. 
 
 The points of the compass will, if possible, be mentioned in 
 describing natural objects, or towns, roads, &c, When this is 
 not practicable, the writer will particularise, by interpolating 
 before the words "right," "left," "front," or "rear;" "our," 
 or "the enemy's." Above all. it must be legibly writfo n. tin- names 
 of places, and of all foreign people being in printed characters. 
 
 It is essential that reports should be clear and pi Vague 
 
 and indefinite terms, such as "a narrow road," "large village," 
 "wide stream," "a high wall," "a bad bridge," are to be 
 avoided. 
 
 Artillery. — Artillery will sometimes form a portion of the 
 reserve, and under very special circumstances may even be 
 detached with the supports, or with the piquets ; but it must be 
 remembered that outposts are not intended to fight battles, but 
 to delay an attacking enemy. The employment of artillery 
 with outpo.-ts, except under special circumstances, is to be 
 deprecated as liable to entail a general action in advance of the 
 selected position, and to expose the guns to undue risk. 
 
 If the outpost line commands within range defiles or bridges 
 over which the enemy mu>t pass, it inay be desirable, however, 
 to place guns to harass the enemy while debouching from the 
 defile or passing over the bridge ; skirmishers in this case should 
 be thrown forward to protect the guns from the enemy's sharp- 
 shooters, who might have crossed by fords or other means. 
 
 Artillery may often be placed with advantage to cover the 
 retreat of the advanced line of the outposts. 
 
 When artillery is attached to a post stationed in a defile, the 
 guns are generally unlimbered and ready for action ; but in all 
 other cases in an enclosed country, they should remain limbered 
 up as near to the main road as possible, but never in an enclosed 
 space, where they might be liable to be cut off and unable to 
 effect a rapid retreat. 
 
 Feres. — Outposts may be allowed to light fires, when they can 
 be made out of view of the enemy. When fires are permitted, 
 
OUTPOSTS. 52a 
 
 alarm posts in the event of attack, are in rear of the fires, so as 
 to prevent the troops, when drawn up, being seen by the enemy; 
 and to compel him to expose himself should he advance. 
 
 Flags of Truce. — When it is necessary to communicate with 
 the enemy under a flag of truce, a smart officer, conversant with 
 the enemy's language, and of a cheerful disposition should be 
 selected. He will be accompanied by a trumpeter, and both 
 should be good horsemen and well mounted. They should ride 
 towards the enemy's position with flag flying and trumpet 
 sounding, so as to attract his attention. An officer will usually 
 be sent out to meet them ; if not, they should not retire until 
 satisfied, after being persistently fired at, that they have been 
 seen by the enemy, and that he will not receive them. 
 
 On the approach of an enemy's flag of truce, it will be halted 
 by the line of sentries before it can overlook their position. 
 The officer, or non-commissioned officer of the nearest examining 
 post, will then be summoned ; and will detain the flag of truce 
 until instructions are received fi'om the commander of the 
 outposts ; who will be immediately communicated with. 
 
 If the flag of truce is merely the bearer of a letter or parcel, 
 the officer commanding the piquet (or examining post if there 
 is one near), will receive it and instantly forward it to the head- 
 quarters of the outposts. The flag of truce having taken a receipt 
 will be required forthwith to depart, and none of the outposts 
 must be suffered to hold any communication with this party. 
 
 If permission be given for the flag of truce to pass, the 
 individuals with it must be carefully blindfolded and then led 
 under escort to the commander of the outposts. No conversation 
 is to be allowed en route, and every precaution must be taken to 
 prevent the party gaining any information, which might sub- 
 sequently prove useful. 
 
 Outposts whex furnished by advanced guards. — When a 
 force is on the march from day to day, the advanced guard will 
 furnish the outposts. It arrives early on the ground and while 
 awaiting the arrival of the main body, a position can be selected 
 for the outposts, and the different detachments moved into their 
 places before the main body encamps. This obviates the 
 disadvantage of a fresh body of troops arriving later on the 
 ground having to take up a forward position, possibly in the 
 dark ; and also what is equally undesirable, the marching of 
 troops backwards and forwards, which would occur in replacing 
 the advanced guard. 
 
 The outposts to cover the flanks, as well as the troops required 
 for detached posts, are supplied by the main body on its arrival. 
 
52b outposts. 
 
 Outposts, when to be withdrawn. — If the army is about to 
 advance, the outposts are not to he withdrawn until the advanced 
 guard have passed through them, and even then some will he 
 required to protect the flanks until the main body, train, &c, 
 have moved off. The outposts of the previous night will then 
 follow in rear under the command of the senior officer, and will 
 form the rear guard. 
 
 Placed under cover of advance guard. — After a march 
 unless the outposts are formed from the advanced guard itself, 
 they will take up their position under cover of the advanced and 
 flank guards and their scouts. 
 
 After victory, under cover of pursuing troops. — If a halt 
 is intended after a succesful action, outposts are placed under 
 cover of the pursuing troops, and should not lose touch of the 
 enemy. 
 
 Outposts during retreat. — During a retreat, outposts as a 
 rule forming the rear guard, hold their ground with tenacity in 
 order to deceive the foe, and give time for their own main body 
 to move off. This resistance, however, must not be so protracted 
 as to compromise the safety of the army by obliging it to fight 
 so as to extricate the outposts. 
 
 Not to become seriously engaged. — Whenever outposts 
 coyer, at some distance, a position on which an army wishes to 
 fight, they must take care not to become seriously engaged, but 
 to fall back as slowly as possible. This retrograde movement 
 will be made deliberately, and in perfect order, to avoid creating 
 confusion, and to gain time for the main body to get under arms. 
 It may sometimes happen, that outposts occupy the selected battle- 
 field, in which case the ground must be held at all hazards. 
 
 Standing orders. — During a campaign, or any particular 
 operation, it is desirable that standing orders be published for 
 the guidance of troops employed on the outpost service. Sup- 
 plementary orders, which local contingencies may render neces- 
 sary, being issued to those concerned before they proceed on duty. 
 
 GENEEAL EEMAEKS. 
 
 It is difficult to lay down any rule as to the number of 
 infantry that should be allotted to any given length of front, 
 or the exact division of a battalion, but the following is quoted : 
 — "A battalion of infantry should be distributed as follows: 
 In reserve, four companies, and on outlying piquet four com- 
 panies ; each of these latter four companies to be divided into 
 two equal portions, one to act as a support, the other divided 
 into two or more piquets of about equal strength of about thirty 
 or forty men each ; these again being divided into three equal 
 parts, one furnishing the N.C.O. for the reliefs, patrols, &c, and 
 
 
outposts. 52c 
 
 the privates for patrolling ; the other two furnishing three 
 reliefs for the double sentries in advance, and the single 
 sentry over the arms. A battalion would therefore cover from 
 2,000 to 3,000 yards, according as the country was close or 
 open. " 
 
 Eoughly speaking, from 500 to 700 men per mile may be 
 taken as a fair estimate. 
 
 DISTANCES OF OUTPOSTS FROM THE ARMY THEY 
 COYER. — The distance of the sentry Line from the army should 
 be about 2 miles, for the following reasons. It is considered 
 that a properly handled outpost line would if attacked and 
 forced to retire, delay the enemy and limit his advance to one 
 mile an hour. This gives the army two hours to prepare for 
 action, which ought to be sufficient. 
 
 Again : — 2 miles from the sentry line to the army=3,520 
 yards, and we may assume that the rifle fire from the 
 sentry line would be effective against batteries at 1,000 
 yards. This would keep the enemy's guns from ap- 
 proaching nearer than 4,500 yards, a distance sufficient 
 to prevent them from molesting the camp. 
 
 There is no reason why this distance of two miles should not 
 be exceeded if the nature of the ground permits. Lord Wolseley 
 says:— 
 
 " All outposts should be as far in advance of the army as they 
 can be with safety; that is, without exposing them to being cut off or 
 overpowered before assistance can reach them." 
 
 DEFILES. 
 
 Outposts should alv\ ays keep defiles, bridges, causeways, etc., 
 between them and the enemy. The passage of such by the 
 enemy would be rendered almost impossible if a couple of guns 
 are attached to the piquet stationed there, feiniiiiaiiy with 
 ravines or defiles leading towards the enemy. In such cases it 
 is recommended that the guns should be uulimbered and ready 
 for action. 
 
 WOODS. 
 
 If a wood occurs in the outpost line, try to occupy the edge 
 nearest the enemy with the line of sentries, and fell and entangle 
 the edge. 
 
 If a wood occurs in front of the fine of outposts which cannot 
 be extended to include it, the line of sentries should be sufficiently 
 withdrawn to be out of accurate rifle fire — say 700 or 800 yards — 
 cover should be made, and the woods frequently visited by patrols. 
 
 If a wood is so large that the outpost line must pass through 
 it, place the line of sentries on the near edge of any openings, or 
 should there be none, try to make clearings, or look for high 
 ground. 
 6 
 
52d outposts. 
 
 Never use more men than are absolutely necessary. Remember 
 that in civilised warfare, ground that is difficult to watch is also 
 difficult of access. The problem which the British officer on service 
 has to solve, is not so much how to conform to established theory 
 and orthodox rules, as to make the most of the limited numbers 
 at his disposal. 
 
 OUTPOSTS AT NIGHT 
 
 Make as few changes as possible at night. There appears to be 
 an altogether exaggerated apprehension of probable attack by 
 the enemy during darkness, whereas there is hardly an instance 
 of one to be found in military history. 
 
 Ilamley. No occurrence can be rarer than a oighl attack by a considerable force in the 
 open field. When the difficulties are for a moment considered of moving in 
 
 order of march, or in battle order, or in any order, on ground little known by 
 day and absolutely bewildering at night, these enterprises must be seen to 
 belong to the domain of fancy or fable. Even the familiar march just before 
 dawn, in order to attack with the daylight, rests on no better foundation. 
 
 Some writers on outposts recommend an amount of change at 
 night which amounts to little short of an entire redistribution of 
 the whole outposts. The greater desideratum is for all ranks to be 
 well acquainted with the ground, so that sentries can watch with 
 certainty, reliefs take place with regularity, patrols proceed with 
 confidence, and unnecessary fatigue be spared to all. If any 
 changes are made, the roads and approaches from the enemy by 
 which alone he could advance in force, should be more carefully 
 guarded, and such changes must be notified to all concorned. 
 
 CONDUCT ON ATTACK. 
 
 If the outposts cover an army drawn up in position for battle 
 the whole outpost line should fall back slowly on attack. In 
 this case special orders as to the amount of resistance to be 
 offered, will probably have been issued beforehand. In other 
 cases, the usual rule is for the sentries to fall back slowly on the 
 piquets, which will extend to reinforce them. If hard pressed, 
 the two combined will fall back on the supports, and the reserve 
 will move up as required, unless the line of resistance has been 
 fixed as the station of the reserve, in which case the remainder 
 will fall back on it. The flanks must be carefully watched 
 throughout. 
 
 On no account must the enemy, if repulsed, be pursued beyond 
 the original sentry line, without special orders. The original 
 ground should be merely reoccupied. 
 
 If at any time a man deserts in the direction of the enemy, an 
 immediate report should be sent to the commander of the out- 
 posts, and the parole and countersign changed at once. 
 
 OUTPOSTS SCHEMES. 
 
 Outposts schemes now form such a prominent feature in tactical 
 examinations that the following memoranda may prove useful. 
 
OUTPOSTS. 52e 
 
 The whole system of outposts is divided into three distinct lines : 
 
 1st. The line of Piquets and Sentries. 
 2nd. The Supports. 
 3rd. The Eeserve. 
 the latter may or may not be required. 
 
 As a general rule the Eeserve should be equal to all in front of 
 it and the supports equal to those in front of them ; though cir- 
 cumstances may of course modify this rule. These data being 
 given, it becomes easy to calculate the number of double sentry 
 posts that can be furnished by a given force or vice versa, a line 
 of front being given, to calculate the number of men required for 
 duty. 
 
 First let it be assumed that 100 men in the Piquet line can 
 furnish ten double sentry posts ; for instance. 
 
 Strength of company - 100 
 Deduct N.C.O. visiting 
 Patrols, Eeconnoitring Patrols, 
 Orderlies, Officers' Servants, 
 Cooks, Signallers, etc. - 40 
 
 60 
 
 which divided by six, the number required for each post, gives 
 ten double sentry posts. 
 
 In other words the number of sentry posts may be taken at 
 10 p. c. of the men available for piquet duty. 
 
 Example 1 : A force of 20,000 Infantry is ordered to cover its 
 front with outposts — Eeserves required. Find the number of 
 double sentry posts that can be furnished. Allowing \ of the 
 whole for outpost duty, we have : 
 
 •2)4000 
 
 2000 Eeserve 
 2)2000 Eemaining 
 
 1000 Supports 
 1000 Piquets 
 which gives 100 double sentry posts. 
 
 Ex. 2 : A force of 1800 Infantry is detailed for outpost duty. 
 Eeserve to be \ of the whole. Bequired the number of sentry 
 
 posts 
 
 3)1800 
 
 600 Eeserve 
 2)1200 Eemaining 
 
 600 Supports 
 600 Piquet Line 
 which gives 60 double sentry posts. 
 
52f outposts. 
 
 Ex. 3 : A given line of front is to be covered with outposts 
 and on examination it appears that 36 double sentry posts will 
 be required to watch it. Eequired the strength of the outposts. 
 Eeserve required, but only to be 1/4 of whole. 
 
 36 double sentry posts give 360 men. 
 
 360 Picquet Line 
 360 Supports 
 
 3)720 
 
 240 Eeserve 1/4 of whole. 
 960 or 1 complete Battalion. 
 
 CAVALEY. 
 
 As a general ride, allow half the proportion of Cavalry that 
 Infantry would require to watch a given front ; or allow double 
 the front for an equal number of men. 
 
 
53 
 
 Lecture IX. 
 
 The following chapters forming Part V. of Instruction and 
 Movements of Cavalry, are added in accordance with CO., 29, 
 1887. 
 
 FOE SUBALTERNS AND CAPTAINS. 
 
 PAET V.— DETACHED DUTIES OF CAYALEY. 
 
 The detached duties of cavalry by their very nature do not 
 admit of exact regulations being laid down which would meet all 
 possible contingencies, nor is it desirable to attempt to do so, 
 especially in the case of cavalry which is called on to carry 
 out these duties under extremely varied conditions of country, 
 climate, and enemy. In order, however, to ensure mutual co- 
 operation and understanding in the field, it is necessary that the 
 troops should bcinstrueted on a uniform system. 
 
 Whilst, therefore, certain fixed rides and forms are laid down, 
 such as experience has proved to be most generally suitable to 
 the contingencies of war in all countries, it is not intended that 
 there should be a rigid adherence to the letter of these rules, so 
 long as the modifications introduced in each case are in accordance 
 with their spirit. 
 
 In each individual case it must be considered how, and with 
 what expenditure of force, the object in view, whether it be 
 security or information, can best be obtained. As the service 
 of exploration and reconnaissance is particularly and almost 
 entirely in the hands of the cavalry, there is no arm in which 
 there are so many opportunities of distinction, not only for the 
 subordinate leaders, but also for individual men. Non-commis- 
 sioned officers may, and probably often will, have to replace 
 officers ; they must, therefore, receive as high a training as possible, 
 so that, in case of necessity, there may be no lack of material. 
 
 The following are detached duties : — 
 
 1 . Measures for security on the march, in camp, bivouac, or 
 billets. 
 
 2. Eeconnaissance ; both with regard to the country and the 
 enemy. 
 
 3. Escorts and foraging. 
 
 4. Protection of the lines of communication ; raids against the 
 enemv's communications. 
 
54 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 General Principles of Detached Duties of Cavalry. 
 
 Certain clear aud well-marked distinctions exist between 
 the different branches of Cavalry Detached Duties; and for their 
 proper performance it is important that the distinctions should be 
 thoroughly understood by all. 
 
 The most important of these duties are the following. 
 
 1st. Advanced and Eear Guards, and Flank Detachment-, 
 having principally for their object the protection of a moving 
 main body against surprise. 
 
 2nd. Outposts, having for their object the protection of the 
 immediate front and flanks of a stationary main body in rear. 
 
 3rd. Reconnoitring Parties, having for their object the gather- 
 ing of information as to the position, movements and numbers of 
 the enemy. 
 
 Advanced and Rear Guards. — These are moving parties, 
 constantly moving on and scouring the country in the immediate 
 front, rear, and flank, in order to secure the safety of the advance 
 or retreat of the main body, or at least to give it timely notice 
 of any intended opposition to its movements. 
 
 For this purpose it may be necessary for the advanced guard 
 to go a considerable distance in front; still its object is not 
 general reconnaissance, but the safety of the immediate front and 
 flank of the main body. 
 
 The movements of an advanced or rear guard are dependent on 
 the movements and progress of the main body. And herein 
 mainly and especially its duties differ from those of reconnoitring 
 parties (reconnaissance proper). 
 
 Outposts. — These provide for the safety of the main body in 
 rear. They consist of detachments pushed to the front on watch, 
 fco ( nable those behind them to rest in security. There can be 
 no real rest without the feeling of security. 
 
 They are pushed forward only so far as may enable their 
 vedettes and patrols to give such timely notice of the approach 
 of an enemy, as may be needed to enable the main body to turn 
 out and resist an attack. 
 
 Reconnoitring Parties. — These are moving parties sent out 
 from the main body, whether stationary or advancing, in order 
 to gain any possible information in regard to the enemy, whether 
 in the immediate front or at a distance. 
 
 Reconnoitring parties often precede advance guards, whilst 
 at other times they are employed, independently. 
 
 They are distinguished from advanced guards in the following 
 particulars : — 
 
 a. The object of an Advanced Guard is intelligence as regards 
 the enemy in the immediate front and flank. It is also intended 
 to protect the front and flank, if necessary, either by making 
 or resisting an attack. 
 
 The object of Reconnoitring Parties is not (primarily at least) 
 intelligence as to the immediate front and flank, but as to the 
 
DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 55 
 
 general movements, position, and strength of the enemy. More- 
 over, reconnoitring parties are not intended to fight. They 
 never fight, except it be absolutely necessary in order to gain 
 information which cannot be otherwise obtained. 
 
 b. An Advanced Guard in its movements conforms to the 
 movements and progress of the main body. 
 
 Reconnoitring Parties, on the other hand, do not conform to 
 the movements of the main bod}\ They supply, or ought to 
 supply, the information on which the movements of the main 
 body will depend. 
 
 The duties of Reconnoitring Parties cannot be exactly defined. 
 In each case they receive special orders as to the direction in 
 which they are to go, the distance to which they are to go, and 
 the objects which they are sent out to discover. They are 
 parties of "Discovery," sent out with special orders and for a 
 special object. 
 
 It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of these duties. 
 The whole fate of a campaign may depend on the accuracy or 
 otherwise of the intelligence transmitted, or on the early arrival 
 of that intelligence. Intelligence received to-night may be in- 
 valuable ; the same intelligence received to-morrow may be 
 useless. On the other hand, inaccurate intelligence carelessly 
 or hastily gathered may lead to disaster to the army. 
 
 S. 1. — Advanced and Hear Guards. 
 General Observations. 
 
 As troops on the march must, as a rule, move by roads, the 
 length of a column is very great in proportion to its breadth. 
 For example, four squadrons of cavalry in sections will occupy 
 about 400 yards, whilst a British infantry division on the war 
 strength, in one column without baggage, will cover about 
 3£ miles. 
 
 To deploy for action, therefore, requires a considerable time, 
 probably 1£ hours, and, during this time, the troops are either 
 not at all, or only partially, in a position to fight. 
 
 So long as the enemy is distant, the chief consideration is the 
 ease and comfort of the troops, but as soon as the theatre of war 
 is reached, other considerations outweigh these. 
 
 In all marches, independent detachments composed, as a rule, 
 of all arms, precede, flank, and follow the main body, and in the 
 first, two cases are called "Advanced Guards" and "Flank 
 Detachments," and in the last " Rear Guards." 
 
 The strength and composition of these detachments depend 
 on the strength of the main body, the character of the country 
 and enemy, the vicinity of the latter, and the nature of the 
 march, according as it is — 
 
 1 . An advance before a battle. 
 
 2. A pursuit after a victory. 
 
 3. A retreat after a defeat. 
 
56 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 In all cases, however, both by day and night, and under all 
 circumstances of country, climate, weather, and enemy, cavalry, 
 owing to its mobility, plays an important rule, and is, as a rule, 
 the arm nearest the enemy both in advance and retreat. 
 
 The duties of the advanced guard and flank detachments are — 
 
 1. To clear the way for the main body aud protect it from 
 surprise. 
 
 2. To reconnoitre the front and flanks from a military point of 
 view and to report the presence and dispositions of the 
 enemy to the officer commanding the main body, so that be 
 ma} r mak<- his arrangements in plenty of time. 
 
 The duties of the ■• Bear Guard," during an advance, are prin- 
 cipally of a police nature: in a retreat, it protects the main !»ody 
 from surprise and endeavours to hold the enemy iu check. 
 
DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 57 
 
 ADVANCED GUARD. 
 
 The security of troops on the march is provided for in front, 
 and to a certain extent on the flanks, by an advanced guard. 
 
 At some considerable distance from the enemy, or when the 
 ground is very open, it may consist of cavalry alone or cavalry 
 and horse artillery. In the case of an independent cavalry 
 Division or brigade this must naturally always be the case. 
 
 The strength of an advanced guard, as a general rule, varies 
 from 1/6 to 1/4 of the whole force, but it always includes a body of 
 cavalry sufficiently strong to perform the duties of reconnaissance 
 and security from surprise. 
 
 The distance between the advanced guard and the main body 
 depends on circumstances ; if too great, the advanced guard runs 
 a risk of being overwhelmed, if too small, the main body may be 
 surprised. 
 
 The only guide, therefore, that can be given is, that the leader 
 must have regard to the following points : — 
 
 [a.) As the advanced guard has to give timely warning of an 
 enemy's approach, it must he pushed further to the front in 
 proportion to the length of time the main body requires to 
 deploy, and the ease and rapidity with which the enemy 
 can advance. 
 
 (£.) The time intelligence is likely to take in coming in and 
 being transmitted, and the amount of resistance that can be 
 offered by the advanced guard. 
 
 (e.) The character of the enemy, his tactics and armament. 
 
 It is clear that on a night march, or in snowy, foggy, or very 
 hazy, rainy weather, the distance between the various parts of 
 the advanced guard and its distance from the main body must 
 be considerably reduced, and in a very open country pro- 
 portionately increased. 
 
 Formation of the Advanced Guard. 
 
 The strength and composition of an advanced guard will of 
 
 course depend upon the force and nature of the marching body 
 
 which it has to protect, as well as upon the force and proximity 
 
 of the enemy and the nature of the country to be traversed. The 
 
 bllowing instructions refer to an advanced guard composed of 
 
 avalry only, and of a strength considered to be suitable for the 
 
 protection of a force consisting of one or two regiments. If a 
 
 tronger advanced guard is considered requisite, the reserve can 
 
 e reinforced by an additional squadron. 
 
 The principle of the formation of an advanced guard is that it 
 Should consist of a number of bodies gradually increasing in 
 strength from front to rear, so as to oppose a constantly increas- 
 ing resistance to an enemy, and to provide each party in front 
 pvith immediate support if any slight opposition impedes its 
 tdvance. 
 
 6a 
 
58 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 Supposing a squadron to be employed for the duty, it will be 
 divided into the following parts: — 
 
 1 . Advanced party, divided as a rule into three groups. 
 
 2. Support, with flanking patrols. 
 
 3. Reserve. 
 A squadron 48 files in line, to march off to the right as an 
 
 advanced guard, might be told off for drill purposes as follows, 
 the number of files for the advanced party depending on the 
 number of non-commissioned officers (here supposed to bo two) 
 in the ranks ; it being understood that the advanced party 
 should have with it three non-commissioned officers. On service, 
 however, the men for the more advanced duties must not be 
 told off haphazard, but must be carefully selected. 
 
 Officers with the Advanced Guard. 
 
 Every officer should be provided with the following articles, as 
 they are absolutely necessary for the proper performance of 
 detached duties. Non-commissioned officers in charge of parties 
 should, as Ear as possible, be similarly provided: — 
 
 The best map procurable ; main roads traced in red, rivers in 
 blue. 
 
 Pencils — plain Mack, red and blue; India rubber. 
 
 Forms of report, ready prepared ; drawing paper, or cardboard 
 ruled in lin., 3in., and 4in. squares. Tracing cloth. 
 
 A compass, pail of dividers, and protractor. 
 
 Memorandum book, with metallic pencil. 
 
 A knife and box of Lucifer match) 
 
 A transparent cover for map, in case of wet weather. 
 
 A pair of field g] 
 
 A watch, to be set by that of the officer commanding the 
 advanced guard. 
 
 Commander of the Advanced Guard. 
 
 The commander's attention must be principally directed to the 
 following points : — 
 
 1. Measures for the security of the march. 
 
 2. Rapidly obtaining and transmitting reliable information 
 regarding the enemy. 
 
 3. The ground, and how best to take advantage of it. 
 
 4. What he proposes to do if the enemy is encountered. 
 
 As regards Xo. 1, it is attained, in the case of a mixed force, 
 by the cavalry : the distance to which it extends, and the number 
 of parties sent out must be sufficient to secure the front and 
 flanks as far as the main body. All measures must be so taken 
 that neither distance, communication, nor tioie are lost, and that 
 the march of the whole is not delayed 
 
 As regards No. 2, which is also provided for by the cavalry, 
 the duty of the commander is not limited to getting information 
 and transmitting it ; he must be able to collate the various 
 reports he receives regarding the strength, arm, and direction of 
 
DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALEY. 59 
 
 march of the enemy, and from these, and from his personal 
 observation, see through the enemy's intentions, estimate time, 
 distance, and the possible danger that may arise during the 
 interval, and thus transmit a reliable dispatch. 
 
 With respect to No. 3, a correct reconnaissance of the road 
 and country is as important as Nos. 1 and 2. 
 
 With respect to No. 4 the cavalry is again the chief 
 factor. 
 
 If the advanced guard meets the enemy, the first thing to be 
 done is to find out what it has in front of it, whether an advanced 
 guard, flank detachments of a column on the march, the outposts 
 of a stationary force, on what road their main body is moving, 
 and how far it is off. The shortest and best method of ascertain- 
 ing the above points is to take a few prisoners. 
 
 In addition to the main points already mentioned the follow- 
 ing is a summary of the various other duties which the com- 
 mander of an advanced guard must see carried out : — 
 
 On halting at any place, all approaches are to be reconnoitred 
 and guarded. An officer should be sent to the highest spot to 
 get an extensive view. The town hall, railway station, post and 
 telegraph offices are to be occupied. In an enemy's country the 
 principal authorities will be ordered to cause all weapons of 
 every description to be brought, at a fixed time, to some enclosed 
 place, where they will be rendered useless. They are further to 
 point out any store or manufactory of powder, dynamite, or other 
 explosive, with a view to their being rendered harmless. The 
 authorities are to be warned that the least negligence in the 
 above two matters will entail the severest penalty not only on 
 the individual, but also on the whole locality. 
 
 The mayor, or corresponding personage, must wait on the com- 
 manding officer, and afford all information that may be required 
 regarding the neighbourhood, roads, bridges, fords, resources in 
 provisions, bakeries, mills, drinking places, smithies, wheel- 
 wright's and carpenter's shops, also resources in the way of 
 cloth, leather, &c. ; he will also procure guides. Schools, offices, 
 &c, are to be searched for maps. On arriving at a river the 
 passages are reconnoitred, and if the bridges are broken, or in- 
 sufficient, approximate measurements are taken, and carpenters 
 and material are to be requisitioned, if practicable, to proceed at 
 once with the repairs, and other crossings must be sought for. The 
 important point is to secure as many points of passage as possible 
 for the troops that are in rear. 
 
 If artillery fire is heard, an officer's patrol must be sent to 
 ascertain the cause. 
 
 The ahove principles hold good for all detachments, whether 
 large or small, which are pushed forward as an advanced guard. 
 
 The commander of the advanced guard (squadron leader) will 
 usually march with the reserve, but being responsible for the 
 conduct of the whole advanced guard, is not restricted to any one 
 ^position. 
 
60 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 Before starting he must see that he not only gets bis instruc- 
 tions, but understands them, writing down in his pocket book 
 
 the main points, such as places he is to pass, and marking them 
 on his map. 
 
 He then inspects his command, and pays particular attention 
 to the arms and ammunition ; to the saddling, state of the shoe- 
 ing, whether all have spare shoes, &c. 
 
 As a general rule no grey, unsteady or neighing horses should 
 be allowed in the advanced party or flanking patrols ; if there 
 are any, or any of the horses are badly shod, or the men's arms 
 are out of order, he will detail others in their place. 
 
 All orders and instructions for the advanced guard are sent to 
 him, as also the reports from the various fractions of the advanced 
 guard ; such of the latter as are of importance will be forwarded 
 by him to tbe commander of the main body, but he will invari- 
 ably state his own opinion as to their reliability. He will keep 
 the commander of the main body regularly informed as to the 
 presence or absence of the enemy, and anything that could effect 
 the movements of the main body. 
 
 Should he at any time leave the reserve, he will make arrange- 
 ments to ensure his receiving orders and reports without delay, 
 and will instruct the commander of the reserve (troop leader) how 
 to act in his absence. 
 
 Commander of the Supfout. 
 
 The officer commanding the support (troop leader is in charge 
 of the whole advance, including the Hanking patrols; and 
 although the advanced party is under the immediate direction 
 of his subordinate, it is he who is responsible to the commander 
 of the advanced guard that the duty is properly performed. 
 
 Tbe duties of the advanced party and support are — 
 
 1. To explore the ground and cover the march of the advanced 
 guard in such a manner as to avoid unnecessary delays. 
 
 2. Reconnoitre the road and country on both sides of the main 
 line of advance with regard to the nature of the road, its 
 capabilities from a military point of view, and available 
 resources. 
 
 3. Rapidly gather as complete and reliable information re- 
 garding the enemy as possible. 
 
 4. Drive back hostile parties opposing the advance, and take 
 prisoners from them. 
 
 To explore the main line of advance is exclusively the task 
 of the advanced party and support ; as regards the flanks they 
 are only responsible as far as their flanking patrols extend. 
 
 Beyond this limited zone the safety of the flanks of the main 
 body must be provided for by special flank detachments, varying 
 in strength from half a troop to a combined force of all arms. 
 
 All flanking parties keep up a constant communication with the 
 main body from which they are detached. 
 
 To carry out the above duties, the commander of the support 
 
DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 61 
 
 must regulate his advauced party, and flanking patrols, in such 
 a manner that they scout sufficiently far, and at the same time keep 
 up communication with him, and are able to rely on his support. 
 
 He must utilise every possible means for obtaining information 
 regarding the enemy, his numbers, position, &c. To do this it is 
 not only necessary to send out patrols and observe for himself, 
 but all persons who are likely to know should be questioned, 
 and, whenever possible, prisoners taken. 
 
 All information should be reduced to writing, whenever 
 possible, clearly and concisely. 
 
 If there is a guide, he will march with the support. 
 
 In case the enemy is met, the support commander will act in 
 accordance with the spirit of his instructions, and if he is unable 
 to drive the hostile army back, either owing to the latter's posi- 
 tion or superior force, he will always report how near the troops 
 in rear can approach without risk of discovery, and indicate the 
 best way, under cover, of reaching the place from which the 
 enemy can be reconnoitred. 
 
 Advanced Party. 
 
 This will consist, as a rule, of at least ten men and three non- 
 commissioned officers. If the country is open and practicable 
 for cavaby, or there are several parallel roads within a quarter 
 of a mile or so on either side of the main line of advance, the 
 advanced party will be broken up into three groups, termed 
 Centre Group and Right and Left Flank Groups of the advanced 
 party, the senior non-commissioned officer having the general 
 charge of the whole. If the march is along a confined road and 
 the advauced party cannot be broken up, two advanced scouts 
 should be pushed forward, and any men considered unnecessary 
 can be sent back to the support. The centre group, commanded 
 by the senior non-commissioned officer, follows the route to be 
 taken by the main body, and, if it consists of only four men, is 
 formed as follows : — Two men ride in front, one on each side of 
 the road ; their duties are to observe the road in front and on the 
 immediate flanks. They must keep an extra sharp look out at 
 all bends and turnings, and on reaching any high ground over 
 which the road passes look carefully round before exposing 
 themselves. The non-commissioned officer with one man rides 
 in rear of the two men in front, in order to direct them. The 
 fourth man can be employed when necessary as a connecting 
 link with the support, and thus keep up the communication, 
 which, at turnings of the road, in woods, towns, broken ground, 
 at night, or in foggy, snowy, or hazy weather, is very apt to be 
 lost. The distance from the support varies according to circum- 
 stances ; for instance, at night, or in very broken ground, it 
 must be shorter than in open ground, &c. As a general rule, it 
 varies between 300 and 600 yards. 
 
 The flank groups, each consisting of at least three men and a 
 ion-commissioned officer, ride parallel to the main line of 
 
62 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 advance, roughly level with the two men of the centre ^ r ' "'P' 
 and should he, as a rule, in view of them. Two men will ride 
 in front and one in rear of the non-commissioned officer. Their 
 duties are to search the ground in their immediate neighbour- 
 hood, and to assist the centre group hy turning the thinks of 
 woods, villages, &c, and examining the high ground on each 
 side when the road passes through a defile. They examine bye 
 paths and cross roads at a trot to avoid delay. 
 
 Flanking Patrols. 
 
 Six to eight men, under a non-commissioned officer, or, oven 
 under certain circumstances, half a troop on one or both flanks. 
 They ride parallel to the main line of advance, and roughly level 
 with the reserve. Their duties are to search the ground and 
 main communications which lie beyond the view of the advanced 
 party, thus securing the Hanks of the troops ill rear. The interval 
 between theni and the main line of advance is so variable that it 
 is almost useless to lay down any normal distance. It may, 
 however, be said that they should never be nearer than half a 
 mile from the main line of advance ; the front scouted will then 
 be about a mile. In an enclosed country they will generally march 
 on the nearest suit a tile road running parallel to t lie main advance. 
 
 On service a flanking patrol Bhould neverconsist of less than G 
 men under a non-commissioned officer, otherwise they will be 
 unable to carry out their duties, especially in an enclosed country 
 where they cannot be immediately supported. For instance, 
 if they come to a village or hamlet, the flanks have to be turned 
 before they can venture to ride through it; this will absorb 4 
 men. The leader must then ask- <piestions : and may possibly 
 have to send information ; this will reduce his command tempo- 
 rarily, and, if he comes to cross roads, a high hill from which a 
 view is to be obtained, a wood, or another hamlet, before the 
 men he has sent with the message return, he has not sufficient 
 force to carry out his duties 
 
 Again, 6 to 10 men is a sufficiently powerful force to drive in, 
 or hold in check, hostile patrols; they will also be more enter- 
 prising than a smaller party, especially in a country where the 
 inhabitants are unfriendly, as, in this case, the latter are very 
 likely to attempt to overpower a party of 3 or 4 men, whilst they 
 would hesitate in making a demonstration against a force twice 
 as numerous. 
 
 If the commander of the support has not been told the roads, &c, 
 to be followed by the flanking patrols and their strength, he must 
 judge for himself if they are necessary on one or both flanks, and 
 what route they are to follow. 
 
 He must tell them where to rejoin, and should give them a 
 rough tracing of the route on tracing cloth. 
 
 In an enclosed country, in the immediate presence of an enemy, 
 and at night, unless special orders are given to the contrary, all 
 men employed in the advanced party and a proportion of those 
 in the flanking patrols, march with their arms drawn and loaded, 
 
DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 63 
 
 the leaders with swords drawn. In an open country, however, 
 or by day, swords need not be drawn, and only the leading men 
 in the advanced party or patrols march with arms drawn. 
 
 The Support. 
 
 This consists of the remainder of the troop, and follows the 
 main line of advance at about 500 or 600 yards distance from 
 the advanced party, on as broad a front as the road will allow. 
 
 Its duties are twofold : — 
 
 (a) It forms the body from which men in the parties in front 
 are replaced, and supplies any other detachments that may be 
 required. 
 
 (b) It is the first formed body to meet the enemy. 
 
 The commander is not bound to remain with this party ; indeed 
 the most suitable place for him will often be with the advanced 
 party, where he can see everything, and take his measures 
 accordingly. In this case the senior non-commissioned officer 
 takes temporary charge. 
 
 All information gathered by the commander of the support 
 will be forwarded to the officer commanding the advanced guard. 
 
 The party halts, as far as possible under cover, whenever the 
 advanced party halts, until the cause of the delay is ascertained. 
 Similarly, it halts whilst a village or wood is being turned, until 
 it is seen that they are unoccupied, or the reverse. 
 
 It keeps up the connection with the reserve by means of a file 
 as connecting link, and also with the advanced party when the 
 latter is not strong enough to furnish a link. 
 
 Swords need only be drawn in an enclosed country, in the 
 immediate presence of the enemy, and at night. 
 
 The Reserve. 
 
 The troop forming the reserve will march at " Attention," and 
 be ready to move quickly to the front or flank if its assistance 
 shoidd be required, or to form a rallying point for the parties 
 in front. It should, as far as possible, remain intact, and the 
 only detachment supplied by it is a file as connecting link 
 between it and the main body. It follows the Support at a 
 distance, varying with the closeness of the country and clearness 
 of the atmosphere, of 600 to 800 yards. 
 
 Communication between the parts of the Guard. 
 
 The advanced party and flanking patrols must have a code 
 of signals by which they can communicate, as talking may betray 
 the presence of the party to the enemy, and riding backwards 
 and forwards uses up the horses. These signals should consist 
 principally in signs, such as holding the hand over the head for 
 halt, and pointing in the direction they wish the others to look. 
 Signalling with flags is not suitable so far in advance, as the 
 waving of the flags would attract the attention of the enemy ; 
 but signallers should always accompany the advanced guard, so 
 
64 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 as to be able to transmit intelligence -whenever circumstances 
 render it possible to do so with safety. 
 
 When one of the men of the advanced party or support is 
 sent back -with a message, his place should be taken by a man 
 from the reserve moving to the front. The messenger, after 
 delivering his report, falls in with the reserve. By this arrange- 
 ment each party in front is kept at its complete strength, while 
 messages are forwarded direct from the front to the rear by a 
 single man, without the risk of mistake which might occur in 
 transferring them from hand to hand. 
 
 Men sent with messages should return carbines, taking care 
 to unload. 
 
 As the rate of march of the main body necessarily regulates 
 that of the advanced guard, each party of the latter must be 
 careful to maintain connection with the bod}' next in rear of it. 
 To this end links should be dropped at points where, owing to 
 bends in the road or to the hilly or enclosed nature of the country, 
 the usual connecting files are unable to keep in sight the parties 
 between which they are marching Connecting files should always 
 be double, when men can be spared, as many horses are trouble- 
 some and neigh when alone, and one of the two men can pass on 
 any communications from front to rear, or vice versa, and draw 
 attention to any change of direction or pace in rear. 
 
 As the habit of constant communication is essential, it is a 
 good precaution to arrange that a report shall be sent from the 
 advanced guard to the main body every hour, half-hour, or other 
 named period. 
 
 Method of Examining Localities. 
 
 Villages. — The precautionary measures necessary before passing 
 an inhabited locality depend chiefly on the proximity of the enemy. 
 
 If there is reason to suppose that a place is unoccupied, it is 
 generally sufficient if the groups of the advanced party ride 
 rapidly round and through it, signalling to the support that all is 
 clear. To halt and report the place unoccupied is a waste of 
 time and horseflesh. 
 
 In localities where there are post or telegraph offices, all letters, 
 registers, &c., should be seized as soon as possible. When the 
 commander of the support arrives he opens them and returns any 
 of no military interest, transmitting the remainder ; if the clerks 
 wish it, he gives them a certificate to say he has taken the letters. 
 
 Houses should be searched by men in groups of at least two, 
 one to remain at the entrance, and, if possible, they ought to be 
 able to communicate \>y speaking. 
 
 If there is reason to think that the locality is occupied, the 
 first thing is to approach as close as possible without delay. 
 
 The commander, therefore, halts the support under cover, and 
 the advanced party endeavour to work up to and round the place 
 in order to penetrate the enemy's strength and dispositions. If the 
 place is occupied there will usually be a reserve close to the exit 
 
DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 65 
 
 on the far side, and often the ground will admit of one or two 
 
 men creeping right round unobserved and finding out if this is the 
 case ; this reserve is more easily detected than an enemy in the 
 village. 
 
 If they succeed, the result of their observations is much more 
 valuable than anything that can be got by drawing fire, which 
 would only show, as a rule, that the place is occupied. 
 
 Whilst the commander is questioning the inhabitants, the sup- 
 port halts on the near side, the advanced party watching the 
 approaches on the far side. When he has finished, it trots 
 through the village, and the parties in advance regain their 
 distance also at a trot. 
 
 In searching localities on the line of march, care must be taken 
 that the advance of the rest of the advanced guard and the main 
 body is not thereby delayed. The advanced groups must there- 
 fore trot on in time to examine places which cannot be passed 
 without being searched. 
 
 Woods. — In woods the centre group of the advanced party 
 follows the main road, and the flank groups ride round the out- 
 skirts, if the wood is not too large. If the size of the wood 
 renders it necessary, the commander of the support sends a 
 couple of men to ride between the groups of the advanced party. 
 
 When the far edge is reached the parties must look carefully 
 round before debouching. 
 
 Very large woods shovdd be explored for a distance of 200 or 
 300 yards on each side of the road. 
 
 Defile. — The course to be pursued is much the same as with 
 villages. If there is reason to suppose the defile unoccupied, the 
 different parties pass it at a trot, the advanced party proceeding 
 as quickly as possible on reaching the far side to any spot from 
 which a view can be obtained. The crest of the defile, if it is 
 formed by high ground, should always be searched by scouts 
 rather in advance of the advanced party. 
 
 Information Regarding the Enemy. 
 
 There are three means by which this is obtained — 
 
 (a) Traces left by the enemy. 
 
 (b) Intelligence afforded by questioning, &c. 
 
 (c) Personal observation on meeting the enemy. 
 Clouds of dust. — If the dust cloud is thick and low it indicates 
 
 Infantry. Cavalry raise a cloud just the contrary, viz., high and 
 thin. If the cloud is broken it indicates Artillery or Train. The 
 ength of the cloud enables the probable strength to be estimated, 
 xnd also the direction of march ; the influent o of the wind, if 
 here is any, must bo taken into consideration. 
 
 Bivouac Fires. — The position and strength of an enemy can be 
 estimated from the number and extent of the fires. If the flames 
 vppear and disappear ir is a sign that the ground in occupied, as 
 his is probably caused by men moving between fch? observer and 
 he fires. 
 
66 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 If there is an unusual number of tires it is probable thai the 
 enemy means to retreat, and has merely lit the extra fires as a 
 ruse. Similarly, if there is much -moke at an unusual time, the 
 enemy is probably cooking prior to moving off. 
 
 Tracks, Noises, 8fc. — Dogs barking, horses neighing, an unusual 
 amount of smoke from chimneys, arc all signs of the presence of 
 troops in inhabited localities. Much may be gathered from 
 tracks on the road; for example, it' the ground is evenly beaten 
 down, the column consisted of Infantry alone ; hoof and w., 
 tracts argue the probability of Cavalry and Artillery. 
 
 If the tracks occupy only half the road, the column was on the 
 march, and possibly not a strong force ; if, on the other hand, 
 the ground is trodden down on both sides of the road, the force 
 was more or less in fighting formation, and probably of consider- 
 able strength. 
 
 Deserted camping grounds. — The number of fire-places, and the 
 length and breadth of the ground occupied, enable the strength of 
 the force to be estimated. Articles of equipment found lying 
 about, buttons, papers, (had horses, ammunition, &c., will show 
 the arm to which, the troops belonged. During a pursuit such 
 trace- will often enable valuable inferences to be drawn as to the 
 nature of the retreat and the state of the enemy's discipline and 
 morale. 
 
 Intelligence Afforded by Questioning, & 
 
 Information regarding an enemy is rarely wanting in war ; the 
 difficulty generally is to distinguish between what is true and what 
 is the reverse. The! support will rarely have time 
 
 to thoroughly (pie-t ion and >ift the answers received from the 
 prison r ountry people, &c, but those appar< 
 
 having something to tell worth listening to about the en 
 should be sent to the commander of the advanci d guard, with a 
 report as to how far th m to be telling the truth. 
 
 In order to arrive al the truth, in spil gnorance, real or 
 
 pretended, the method of putting questions musl suitably 
 
 adapted to the individual >ned. All statements, from 
 
 whatever source, mu- illy compared one with another 
 
 The statements of the inhabitant ; irding the passibility 
 or othewise of denies, rivers should not be received, 
 
 rule, without testing their correctnes in many cases, through 
 
 ignorance, real or pretended, they lead one astray. The i 
 sources of information are newspapet graph and railway 
 
 registers, private letters, r< quisition forms, papers left behind 
 by accident; these latter, however, are often left with thoJ 
 intention that they should be found and mislead. Municipal 
 authorities, post, telegraph, and railway officials, clergymen] 
 gamekeepers, &c, should be questioned as to the presence of 
 the enemy, direction of march, strength and arm, what numbers 
 were on the buttons or shoulder die uniform, whether 
 
 they bivouacked, or were billeted, what hour they marched at, 
 whether outposts were placed and where, whether patrol- Mere 
 
DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 67 
 
 sent out, and if so, how often and where to, the roads they took 
 going and returning, what questions they asked, and whether 
 they always went out or arrived at the same hour, the state and 
 general character of the road leading to the enemy, and if there 
 are any obstructions on it. 
 
 All individuals should be questioned separately and out of 
 hearing of each other, as from discrepancies in the answers the 
 truth may be got at. Deserters and prisoners should be 
 Questioned separately, immediately they give themselves up, as 
 they are more likely to tell the truth when they have not had 
 time to concoct a story. They should be asked regarding the 
 number or name of their regiment and company, strength of 
 the same, name of officer commanding the corps, brigade, 
 division, and army corps to which they belong, whether they 
 have been bivouacking or billeted, position of the outposts, the 
 number of sick and wounded, and whether their rations were 
 regularly served out. 
 
 The above are all matters of the greatest importance for the 
 head-quarters, and it is from prisoners that the surest and most 
 reliable information can be obtained. 
 
 Meeting the Exemy. 
 
 On any group of the advanced party discovering the enemy 
 it conceals itself, reports immediately, and does not let the 
 enemy out of sight. The other groups are warned by signs so 
 that they may take part in the observation, all endeavouring to 
 reach any cover in the vicinity and prosecute their observations 
 from it ; if necessary, they take off their head-dress. 
 
 Under no circumstances is the advanced party to attack an 
 enemy unless it has received special orders to do so, and least of 
 all should they fire. To fire is the greatest fault that can be 
 committed ! it is only permissible when there is no other means 
 of warning the advanced guard of imminent danger in time. 
 Firing renders all further observation impossible, and prevents 
 the leader acting according to his instructions, or having time to 
 make his arrangements. 
 
 In peace, during manceuvers, &c, it is impossible to insist too 
 strongly on the axioms that the advanced party never attacks 
 and never fires first, and that it always endeavours to conceal 
 itself and observe. 
 
 Immediately the leader of the support learns the presence of 
 the enemy he goes to the front, after first handing over the 
 command to the next senior, and directing him to take up a 
 position, which as far as possible, is hidden from view and 
 covers the road, and will enable the offensive to be taken in case 
 of necessity. 
 
 On arrival at the front, if he can get a view of the situation, 
 he must make up his mind quickly how he will act, according to 
 the circumstances and the spirit of his instructions. If the 
 principal object is observation, he will endeavour to reach, 
 undiscovered, some spot from which he can get the best view ■ 
 
68 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 This, naturally, can only be done supposing the enemy is distant 
 and not advancing. 
 
 If he considers that his instructions warrant his attacking and 
 making prisoners, he should make a rapid flank attack, combined 
 if possible, with a surprise ; a dip in the ground, or other cover 
 properly utilized, will often facilitate this. If the fore-ground 
 is not favorable, and the enemy is advancing, a success may be 
 obtained by a pretended retreat, or lying in ambush. The 
 leader must, however, in all cases, take care to inform the 
 commander of the reserve, in plenty of time, of the situation, 
 the strength of the eneiny, and his own plan of action, in order 
 that the latter may be able to cooperate If, on the other hand, 
 the enemy surprises the support, and this can only happen 
 through the negligence or bad management of the advanced 
 party and flankers, the leader, without any regard to the 
 strength of the enemy, attacks at once. 
 
 An immediate and energetic charge is absolutely necessary so 
 as to enable the troops in rear to form for action. 
 
 Reconnaissance of the Main Eoad, Surrounding 
 Country, &c. 
 
 The power of forming a quick and correct estimate of the 
 country passed through is a very necessary qualification for an 
 officer with the support. He cannot halt to make his obser- 
 vations, as he would be able to do on a regular reconnais- 
 sance, owing to the delay that would thus be entailed on the 
 troops in rear. 
 
 The three main points to which he directs his attention are — 
 
 1. The road; its state, bridges, fords, embankments, woods, &c. 
 If any obstacles to the march exist, he must not only report 
 their nature, but any way of turning them, also any 
 provisional steps he may be able to take to overcome 
 the difficulty. It is obvious that the leader of the support 
 has not the means at his disposal of clearing away any 
 serious obstruction, and it is for this reason that a party of 
 Engineers always forms a portion of the advanced guard of 
 a mixed force. On arriving at an obstruction, for instance a 
 broken bridge, the flankers go up and down the stream to 
 see if they can find a crossing, one or two men try the depth 
 to see if it is fordable, the remainder maintaining a look-out, 
 while, if there is a village or farm in the vicinity, labour and 
 material are requisitioned, so as to have them ready for the 
 Engineers on their arrival. The leader of the advanced 
 guard now despatches his report, and, if a means of crossing 
 has been discovered, the support and advanced party march 
 on, leaving a non-commissioned officer and a couple of men 
 behind to see that the requisition is complied with. 
 
 2. Supplies. No special steps need be taken in this matter, 
 unless instructions are given to do so. For instance, if a 
 
 
DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 69 
 
 halt is to be made on reaching a certain place, the leader of 
 the advanced guard will, on arrival, take steps through the 
 mayor, or other personage, to secure provisions, forage, &c. 
 He will report how far he is successful, and never omit to 
 mention the facilities with regard to water and where it 
 is to be - found. He will then march on, leaving a non- 
 commissioned officer and a couple of men to see the orders 
 complied with, and place temporary outposts in a suitable 
 position beyond the locality (see Halts). 
 
 The Surrounding Country, Positions, Sfc. This is rather 
 the business of the staff officer with the advanced guard 
 than of its leader ; still the latter will often have to direct 
 his attention to it. For example, if the enemy is met, and 
 he is able to reconnoitre his position, he should be able to 
 point out the best line of attack, &c. Further, at the end 
 of a march he may have to look out for a suitable bivouac 
 ground, &c. 
 
70 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 REAR GUARD. 
 
 When a force retires before the enemy, the rear guard covers 
 and protects its retreat and consequently must be of a strength 
 sufficient to carry out its role independently. 
 
 It is composed of all arms in proportion suitable to the cir- 
 cumstances, and is disposed according to the proximity of the 
 enemy and his attitude; if the latter does not press very closely 
 in pursuit, and the rear guard is consequently not obliged to 
 march, either as a whole or in part, ready for action, the disposi- 
 tion, distances, and measures for security will be similar to those 
 laid down for the advanced guard, only in reverse order. 
 
 As regards the distance from the main body, the commander 
 of the rear guard musl be guided by two main considerations; 
 he must not allow himself to he either thrown hack on the main 
 body, or ( -lit off from it. 
 
 No task is. so diilicult as that of the commander of a rearguard. 
 He must possess the faculty of knowing when, where, and how 
 long to make a stand, and so arrange his retreat thai when he 
 falls hack he not only retires, but, as it were, disappears. 
 
 If he falls into the error of trying to dispute every inch of 
 ground, he will lose time, and, whilst he is allowing the enemy 
 to hold him in front, the latter will turn and cu1 him off. 
 
 Formation or Tin: Rear Guakd. 
 
 The rear guard is formed info separate parties, exactly like 
 the advanced guard, and the order of march is that of the latter 
 reversed. 
 
 A squadron detailed for the rear guard is told off in exactly 
 the same manner as for the advanced guard; on the order to 
 march, however, being received, the support and rear party, &c., 
 gain their distance by allowing the rest of 1 lie force to march 
 off; the flanking patrols move off at once. 
 
 All details regarding the method of watching the enemy and 
 conducting their other duties as laid down for the advanced 
 party are equally applicable to the rear party. 
 
 Special care must be taken in the choiceof the thinking patrols 
 and the direction they are to follow, as on them falls the task 
 of detecting i] H , turning movements the enemy is sure to 
 undertake. 
 
 The Commander oe tue Rear Guard. 
 His duties are — 
 
 1 . To watch the enemy, and especially any turning movements. 
 
 2. To delay the advance of the enemy by every means in his 
 power, and prevent his forcing the rear guard to fight 
 against its will, or overlooking the hitter's movements. 
 
 3. To protect parties employed in carrying out the destruction 
 of roads, bridges, &c, by keeping watch on the enenry, and, 
 if necessary, acting offensively ; for instance, by laying an 
 
DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALTIY. 71 
 
 ambush for him. or making short bold attacks. The end to 
 be attained is not only to protect the working parties, but 
 also to make the enemy cautious, dehry his advance, and 
 procure time for the main body to continue its march. The 
 offensive movements must be short and sharp, and, as soon 
 as completed, the retreat must be rapidly continued, other- 
 wise there will be a danger of being cut off. 
 
 4. Whenever possible, and time permits, to create obstacles by 
 destroying bridges, removing ferries, erecting barricades, &c, 
 with the help of requisitioned labour. Obviously, time will 
 rarely permit of such operations being commenced and 
 carried out by the support and rear party ; it is the duty of 
 the main body and reserve to make these arrangements, 
 and detail the parties to carry them out, but the support 
 and rear party will often have to put the finishing stroke to 
 the work. 
 
 5. Never to leave stragglers, sick, or wounded behind; for the 
 latter, cuts or waggons should be requisitioned; if this is 
 not possible, the names and regiment of those left behind 
 should be taken, and the men handed over to the care of 
 the municipal authorities. Every effort must be made to 
 bring on abandoned 3tores, equipments, &c, by requisition- 
 ing horses and waggons for this purpose ; if this cannot be 
 done, they should be destroyed rather than allowed to fall 
 into the enemy's hand-. 
 
 G. If the main body halts, to take up a position under cover, 
 lacing the enemy, so as to watch his movements, and charge 
 if necessary. 
 
 Defiles. 
 
 If a defile, such as a bridge, causeway, or wood has to be passed, 
 the reserve take up a position on the near side : the remainder 
 withdraw under cover of this improvised bridge head, and them- 
 selves form up on reaching the far side in order to cover the 
 retreat of the reserve. If the rear guard is composed of all three 
 arms, the Infantry and a proportion of Artillery form the bridge 
 head, and allow the Cavalry and Artillery to retire, the latter 
 taking up a position on the far side to i over the withdrawal of 
 the Infantry. Tillages should be passed by Cavalry and Artillery 
 in a similar manner, if they cannot be turned. If the retiring 
 force consists of Cavalry alone, the retreat must be covered by 
 dismounted men on the far side of the pas-age. 
 
 The chief duty of the Cavalry on a retreat is never to lose the 
 touch. The greater portion of it should move well on the flanks, 
 with a view of parrying the turning movements that the enemy 
 are sure to attempt ; only the amount absolutely recpuired march- 
 ing on the main line of retreat. 
 
 Maintenance of the Tow n. 
 
 The duty of maintaining the touch is by no means an easy one, 
 especially if the enemy's pursuit i- slack, as the distance between 
 
 JIVER3IT 
 
72 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 the Cavalry and the rest of the rear guard becomes dangerously 
 great. The whole of the available Cavalry must, under these 
 circumstances, be concentrated to make an offensive return, in 
 order to ascertain, either by taking prisoners or driving the 
 enemy in, the reason the pursuit is nut vigorously prosecuted. 
 
 Officers' patrols must be freely employed to ascertain whether 
 the enemy is pursuing with strong columns of all arms, or weak 
 ones composed of Cavalry alone, as, in the latter case, by taking 
 advantage of the screen thus formed, his main body may be either 
 halted, or have marched off in a totally different direction. 
 
 To carry out such reconnaissances, the patrols must make very 
 long detours, and it is the most difficult duty they can be 
 employed on. 
 
 If the pursuit is vigorous, the task of the Cavalry is much 
 simpler. 
 
 Obstructions to the March of the Enemy. 
 
 These must be both active and passive ; in the former case, a 
 skilful utilizitation of the ground is the chief element ; in the 
 latter, time, materials, and labour. 
 
 For active obstruction, defiles that cannot be turned unobserved 
 form the most suitable ground. All defiles can be turned if the 
 turning movement is sufficiently extensive, but even in that case 
 the object of the rear guard is attained by the delay caused. 
 
 The entry to a defile should not be obstinately disputed, as, in 
 case of a reverse, the result must be a complete rout. As much 
 show should be made as possible with a few troops, so as to 
 oblige the enemy to deploy and waste time in reconnoitering ; if 
 he then advances to the attack, the troops should retire as quickly 
 as possible and not wait for the attack. 
 
 The skill, firmness, and coolness necessary to carry out tin's 
 operation are very great ; everything depends on showing a bold 
 front up to a certain moment, and not a minute longer. All 
 arrangements regarding the retirement must be most carefully 
 made, as regards length of columns, rate of march, &c. The 
 object to be attained is not only to retire, but to disappear just 
 as the enemy havirjg reconnoitred the position and made all his 
 arrangements is about to attack. 
 
 The enemy can Lie best delayed when attempting to debouch 
 from a defile by attacking him in front and flank before he has 
 time to deploy more than the head of his column ; he should not 
 however, be attacked until a force has issued sufficient to be 
 worth beating ; but, at the same time not strong enough to have 
 a chance of success. 
 
 During a retreat dismounted Cavalry will often be able to 
 render invaluable service. 
 
 Passive obstruction i> attained by destroying bridges, or render- 
 ing them impassable ; for example, if the roadway consists of 
 planks they should be loosened, and removed altogether alter 
 
DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 73 
 
 the passage of the rear party, or the bridge may be burnt, or if 
 of stone or iron, blown up. 
 
 Gateways, narrow roads, &c, should be blocked up by locking- 
 together waggons (if possible filled with rubbish, manure, &c.) 
 and removing one or more of the wheels. 
 
 Fords are rendered impassable by throwing in ploughs, 
 harrows, &c. 
 
 Boats should be removed to the far side of the river from the 
 enemy, and sunk. 
 
 Villages, woods, houses, if the circumstances demand it, should 
 be set on fire by the support and rear party after they have 
 passed them. 
 
74 DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY. 
 
 3.— HALTS. 
 
 In principle, it is the advanced (rear) guard which furnishes 
 the outposts, at any rate until they can be relieved, if necessary, 
 by fresher troops ; during a temporary halt, therefore, the various 
 fractions of the advanced (rear) party at once form themselves 
 into detached posts, placing vedettes and sending mit patrols to 
 the front and flanks. If the halt is for the night they act in a 
 similar manner until the regular outposts are placed. 
 
 The distance between the halting place of the advanced (rear) 
 guard and the force coverod is based on the following considera- 
 tions : — 
 
 1. Time required for reports to reach the main body. 
 
 2. Time required for the necessary orders to be issued and 
 reach the troops. 
 
 3. Time required for the troops to turn out, and for the most 
 distant to reach the alarm post. 
 
 To avoid mistakes, no allowance should bo made for the 
 amount of resistance that can be offered for the advanced (rear) 
 guard, but it should be so far off that tho time taken by it to fall 
 back should correspond with that calculated above as necessary 
 to put the main body into position. 
 
 During a retreat the time required for tho various columns to 
 file off, after reaching the alarm post, calculated on the length of 
 the longest column, must be allowed in addition to the above. 
 
 Consequently the distance between a rear guard, and the body 
 it covers, when halted, will be greater than between an advanced 
 guard andthe main body. 
 
 
75 
 
 Lecture X. 
 CAVALRY OUTPOSTS. 
 
 General Observations. 
 
 Outposts are the detachments hy means of which the main 
 hody, when halted, is enabled to obtain that absolute repose and 
 security from surprise which are necessary for the maintenance 
 of its efficiency. 
 
 This end is attained by checking any attack of the enemy long 
 enough to enable the main body to prepare for action, prevent- 
 ing reconnaissances on the part of the enemy, ensuring a feeling 
 of security from surprise, and obtaining such information about the 
 enemy as may be necessary for carrying out the foregoing duties. 
 
 The duties to be performed are exceedingly harassing, con- 
 secpiently the fewer troops that can be employed, consistently 
 with the object in view, the better. 
 
 This economy in numbers can only be obtained, (a) By a 
 judicious combination and mutual co-operation of the different 
 arms, (b) By selecting the best line possible under the circum- 
 stances, and assigning to each arm that portion of the line and 
 those duties for which it is best suited. 
 
 Outposts consist essentially of — 
 
 1st. A stationary and defensive hne, or lines, capable of afford- 
 ing a certain amount of resistance, and occupying advanced 
 positions barring the enemy's lines of approach. 
 
 2nd. A line of observation and information, which watches 
 the various lines of approach, and reports on the move- 
 ments of th^ enemy and his position. 
 
 The strength of the outposts varies with the nature of the 
 country, the character and nearness of the enemy, and the 
 strength of the main body, a very small force requiring rela- 
 tively stronger outposts than a large one, but they woidd not 
 ordinarily exceed 1/6 or 1/5 of the main body. 
 
 Outposts are generally composed of cavahy and infantry, and 
 exceptionally of artillery. This latter arm is only emplojed 
 when some important piece of ground, such as a defile, has to be 
 defended ; its place is almost invariably with the reserve, under 
 the immediate orders of the officer commanding the outposts. 
 
 It is only rarely, and then at a considerable distance from the 
 enemy's main force, that the Cavalry will be able to thoroughly 
 perform these duties without the co-operation of the infantry, 
 and the occasions upon which infantry alone can properly perform 
 them are even more exceptional. 
 
 "When, therefore, in peace time, a mixed garrison affords the 
 opportunity of practising outpost duty with the two arms coin- 
 pined, advantage should be taken of it. 
 
 The relative proportion of cavalry and infantry, and the method 
 of employing them, depend on whether the stationary ox the 
 
76 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 mobile element is called upon to play the more important role. 
 In a very enclosed country with numerous lines of approach, in 
 close contact with the enemy, by night, or in foggy, snowy 
 weather, the former will predominate and the chief work will fall 
 on the infantiy ; whilst in an open country, by day, most of the 
 work will be done by the cavalry ; but under all circumstances, 
 both by day and night except during seige operations, the 
 patrolling and reconnoitring must be done by the cavahy. 
 
 Infantry outposts should always have 2 to 4 cavahy orderlies 
 with each piquet and support to carry reports and, if specially 
 ordered, to patrol. 
 
 In many cases it may be advisable to push cavalry as far 
 forward as possible, giving it perfect freedom of action. Its 
 orders will be to march when the enemy marches, halt when he 
 halts, and never lose touch of him ; under these circumstances 
 the cavahy must itself provide that element of resistance which 
 is usually furnished by the infantry, and fall back on the latter 
 if driven in. The cavalry must keep the regular outposts 
 acquainted with its movements. 
 
 During active operations, when the army is advancing, the 
 outposts are not withdrawn until, at any rate, the leading portion 
 of the advanced guard has passed well beyond the outpost line. 
 After withdrawal they form flank detachments, or else join the 
 main column, as may be directed. 
 
 During a retreat they hold their ground, as a rule, as long as 
 possible, in order to deceive the enemy and give the remainder 
 of the force time to get well on the road.. In such case the out- 
 posts will, as a rule, form the rear guard. 
 
 The outposts, when falling back, preparatory to joining the 
 column, must always cover their withdrawal with patrols. 
 
 AYhen the force remains stationary the outposts are relieved 
 at daybreak, so as to have a double force at hand at this hour, it 
 being the time at which attacks are generally made. 
 
 After a march the outposts are put out under cover of the 
 screen formed by the advanced (rear) party, flankers, &c. , of the 
 advanced (rear) guard, and by patrols sent out by each piquet ; 
 after an action, under that formed by the troops immediately 
 observing the enemy. 
 
 Outposts should always be furnished by complete units, and 
 on a retreat, if possible, by troops that have not been engaged. 
 
 The general distribution of troops for outpost duty is — 
 
 1. Piquets, from which are furnished the vedettes, eossack 
 posts, patrols, and detached posts. 
 
 2. Supports to the piquets. 
 
 3. Reserve. 
 
 Choice or Line foe the Outposts and Method of 
 Occupying it. 
 The line for the outposts is taken up according to 
 bst. The position of the troops to be covered. 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 77 
 
 2nd. The existing circumstances as regards enemy, ground, 
 time of day, weather. 
 
 In order to combine a certain defensive strength with a good 
 view, it is desirable, when choosing a line for the outposts, that 
 it should run along well defined features, such as a ridge of high 
 land, banks of a river, far edge of a wood, &c. , and that the flanks 
 should rest either on other troops or on a natural obstacle that 
 cannot be easily passed without its being noticed, for instance, 
 morass or river, but never on a wood ; where this is not the case 
 they should be doubled back. 
 
 Special measures must always be taken to ensure the safety of 
 the flanks, if they do not rest on other troops. With a small 
 force this will be ensured by doubling the flank back, and placing 
 a detached post there, with particular orders about patrolling ; 
 in the case of a considerable body of troops, however, a combined 
 detachment should be specially told off to the exposed flank. 
 
 In practice it will not always be possible to secure the above 
 advantages, and the best must be made of the ground such as it 
 is; the chief object must always be to select, in the shortest 
 time, a line that will do, at any rate, as a temporary measure ; 
 later on, if time permits, it can be improved upon. The most 
 important point, under all circumstances, is to occupy or observe 
 all the approaches by which an enemy could advance. 
 
 Whenever the outposts are furnished by a combined force, the 
 infantry should, as far as possible, furnish all stationary posts of 
 observation, carry out any temporary fortification, and relieve 
 the cavalry of all duties except reconnoitring and patrolling. If 
 the cavalry alone furnishes the outposts it must, by means of 
 dismounted men, barricades, &c, end* avour to provide the 
 element of resistance usually provided by the infantry. 
 
 The outpost line, if more than three miles long, or if the 
 ground is much broken, should be divided into sections. 
 Generally the ground observed by two piquets will form a 
 section,- and in allotting the ground, a road, ravine, wood, or 
 village should never form the line of demarcation between one 
 section and another, as mistakes easily arise, and they would 
 probably not be watched by either section. As a rule, several 
 weak piquets are preferable to a few strong ones, as the vedi 
 are better under control and the work of visiting and relieving 
 them is less harassing ; but power of resistance is lost if the 
 piquets are too weak. There shoidd be a support to ac least 
 every two or three piquets, or each section, and an examining 
 post to each piquet. 
 
 The piquets are numbered consecutively from the right of the 
 line. The cossack post, and double vedettes, furnished by each 
 piquet are numbered from the right of the piquet. 
 
 A stationary line of observation is not in itself sufficient to 
 secure the safety of the force ; a concentrated advance of the 
 enemy, especially if favoured by the ground, would break 
 through the chain with the greatest ease, and surprise the sup- 
 
78 
 
 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 ports and reserve. The only means of successfully resisting such 
 attacks and properly carrying out the duties of outposts, is by 
 means of patrols who approach as close to the enemy's position 
 as possible and report the moment a force leaves his outpost line. 
 The commander of the outposts will then receive notice of the 
 attack sufficiently early to enable him to make the dispositions 
 necessary to repel it. 
 
 Against civilized troops the extent of front occupied should be 
 sufficiently great to prevent an enemy, even if he turns a flank, 
 placing himself, undiscovered, within effective artillery range, 
 i.e., 3,500 yards, of the main body. Similarly, the distance from 
 the supports to the position occupied by the main body should 
 not be less than 3,500 yards, in other words it should be such 
 that the enemy will not be able to open fire on the main body 
 before it is in position. 
 
 If the force is in the near presence of an enemy, and is to 
 remain stationary for more than the night, the outpost line must 
 be occupied in as complete a manner as possible, and no link in 
 the chain omitted, whilst, on the other hand, at a considerable 
 distance from the enem}- this will not bo so necessary. 
 
 March Outposts. 
 
 General Instructions are given at page 74. 
 
 During the period of daily marches and combats, the outposts 
 will often have to be put out late in the day, possibly in the 
 dark; it is impossible on such occasions to take up a line that 
 commands a view, is not itself commanded, &c., nor is it necessary 
 to attempt it, as the enemy will have no opportunity of making 
 himself acquainted with the dispositions, and the only way he 
 can attack in the dark is along the reads. 
 
 mi_ ■ • i 
 
 Hie mam points when taking up a line late in the day, or in 
 the dark, are — 
 
 1st. To occupy all roads and send constant patrols down them. 
 2nd. To send patrols to all villages in the neighbourhood ; if 
 
 an enemy is near he will either be found or heard of in the 
 
 villages. 
 3rd. If there is a stream running along the front or flank, to 
 
 occupy the bridges and turds, and patrol the banks; since 
 
 the patrols cannot lose their way as long as they know 
 
 where the stream is. 
 
 Outposis by Night. 
 
 Generally in foggy, snowy weather, the different portions of 
 the outposts are drawn closer together, and by night their 
 positions shifted ; and whereas by day vedettes are placed on 
 high ground, so as to get as extended a view as possible, by night 
 they should be placed on low ground, so that they may have the 
 advantage of the sky line to help them to distinguish anybody 
 approaching their post. But it is the sense of hearing rather 
 than the eyesight, which must be depended on at night, and 
 vedettes should generally be placed on, or close to, approaches. 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 79 
 
 At night it is advisable to send forward standing patrols 
 beyond the line occupied by day : these patrols conceal them- 
 selves close to the probable line of approach. Nothing disconcerts 
 a night attack, carried out in accordance with observations made 
 during the day, more than to stumble on an enemy's post sooner 
 than expected. When acting against an uncivilised enemy, 
 accustomed to a life in the open, and whose senses of hearing 
 and sight are consequently very acute, detached parties must be 
 especially on their guard to avoid surprise. 
 
 An isolated detachment, such as a contact squadron or officer's 
 patrol, will find its only safety consists in shifting its position 
 after darkness sets in. 
 
 Commander of the Outposts. 
 
 All troops detailed for the outposts are under his orders, and 
 he is responsible that every precaution is taken to ensure the 
 security of the remainder of the force. He receives instructions 
 regarding the general line to be taken up, what is known of the 
 enemy, and the time required by the main body to form up, from 
 the commander of the advanced guard. 
 
 As soon as, by help of his map, and, if necessaiy, riding for- 
 ward to reconnoitre, he has decided on the general line, he issues 
 orders to the troops detailed on the following points : — 
 
 1. Information regarding the enemy and country. 
 
 2. The approximate line to be taken up, the number of piquets, 
 the positions, strength, and composition of the supports and 
 reserve. The division of the line into sectio 
 
 3. Dispositions in case of attack, and in view of a possible 
 retreat. 
 
 4. How often reports are to be furnished and where they are 
 to be sent. 
 
 5. Directions regarding number of patrols, the distance they 
 are to proceed to on the front and Hanks, the roads, woods, 
 ravines, &c, that are to be specially searched and watched. 
 In the immediate vicinity of the enemy the distance to 
 which the patrols are to go is not to be laid down ; they 
 must approach as close to the enemy's position as possible. 
 If the troops are very tired, or the weather bad, the orders 
 regarding the patrols must be very stringent, and it may be 
 desirable to relieve the vedettes every hour. 
 
 6. Measures for securing the flanks. 
 
 7. Roads and localities that are to be barricaded or otherwise 
 prepared for defence, lateral communications, &c, to be 
 made, whether additional tools will be forthcoming, and if 
 so, when and where they can be got. 
 
 8. Whether the piquets and supports may light fires. This 
 should always be allowed unless their doing so would betray 
 their presence to the enemy. 
 
 9. Arrangements regarding cooking, food, wood, straw, and 
 forage. Whenever possible, the reserves should draw all 
 supplies and cook for the piquets and supports. 
 
80 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 10. The parole and countersign. 
 
 11. Special officers' patrols from the reserve. Strong recon- 
 naissances to be sent to the front and flanks shortly before 
 daybreak. The time the outposts will be relieved. An orderly 
 to meet the relieving troops and show the way, 
 
 In addition, if the outposts consist of a mixed force, 
 
 12. Piquets that are to be composed of cavalry and infantry. 
 
 13. Hour at which the cavalry piquets are to be relieved by 
 the infantry. Two to four cavalry soldiers to be left with 
 each infantry piquet. 
 
 It is desirable that the whole of the above orders should be 
 communicated to the outposts before they march off, but as this 
 will not alwa3 r s be possible without a certain dela} ? , the com- 
 mander should communicate the more important points, reserving 
 the remainder until he inspects the line. 
 
 As soon as the line has been taken up he will inspect it, 
 making any modification that may seem desirable ; ho will at the 
 same time inspect the positions the troops will occupy at night. 
 
 These positions should be selected as early as possible so that 
 the piquets may make themselves acquainted with, the ground 
 whilst there is still daylight, but they should not move into them 
 till after darkness sets in. 
 
 The place of the commander of the outposts will be with the 
 reserve, when not engaged in visiting the outposts. The name, 
 rank, and appearance of the officer commanding the outposts 
 should be known to all. 
 
 Piquets. 
 
 The strength of a piquet varies usually between 25 and 30, 
 i.e., half a troop, and at least one-third should be told off for 
 patrolling, the remainder to furnish vedettes, look-out sentry, 
 and extra patrols, according to circumstances. 
 
 As soon as an officer is detailed for piquet, he will form his 
 party up, and after inspecting it in the manner laid down for the 
 advanced guard, he will fall out into the serrefile rank the non- 
 commissioned officers he may require to warn and march the 
 reliefs, and to take charge of the reconnoitring and visiting 
 patrols and the examining post. Men and horses which, for 
 any reason, are not suited for detached duties at a distance from 
 the piquet, should be told off for sentry on the piquet, but care 
 should be taken to equalise, as far as possible, the duties to be 
 performed. A young soldier should always be posted with an 
 old soldier on vedette and patrol duty. 
 
 It must be remembered that each double vedette absorbs six 
 men, each cossack post three or four ; consequently a piquet of the 
 ordinary strength cannot afford to put out more than two double 
 vedettes or three or four cossack posts. If the piquet is on a 
 flank it should as a rule be, if possible, 15 files strong, so as to 
 be able to furnish a detached post under a non-commissioned 
 officer. 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 81 
 
 The officer in charge of the piquet having received his in- 
 structions from the commander of the outposts, and after making 
 sure that he understands them, will march his party, preceded 
 hy advanced and flanking patrols, to about the place where he 
 considers the piquet should stand. 
 
 On the way he must endeavour to impress the features of the 
 ground over which he marches on his mind, so as to be prepared 
 for any contingencies that may arise, and should warn all under 
 his command to do the same. 
 
 On reaching the approximate position for the piquet, he halts, 
 and sends a reconnoitring patrol in the direction of the enemy, 
 and a visiting patrol to establish communication with the neigh- 
 bouring posts ; he then decides, according to the ground, whether 
 he will observe the ground allotted to him by means of vedettes 
 or cossack posts. 
 
 The advanced and flanking patrols continue to watch the front 
 and flanks until the vedettes are posted. 
 
 In order to save men and horses, and have a sufficient 
 number to spare for the important duties of reconnaissance, 
 every effort should be made to watch the ground with as 
 few posts as possible, consistently with the attainment of the 
 object in view; at the same time economy in the number of the 
 vedettes must not be carried to excess, as patrols are liable to 
 lose their way and to be cut off. 
 
 As the vedettes should be able to see those on their right and 
 left, and the ground lying between, so that no person can pass 
 unobserved, 1,500 to 2,000 yards maybe taken as the front a 
 piquet with two or three vedette posts can observe in an ordinary 
 country in fair weather, and from 300 to 600 yards may be taken 
 as the nominal distance between the vedettes and the piquet. 
 "With a view to saving fatigue to men and horses, the piquet 
 should be placed as near to its vedettes as can be done with 
 safety. 
 
 The men who will probably be required for the vedette and 
 possack posts are then told off, together with a non-commissioned 
 officer and two or three orderlies, and move out from the ranks ; 
 the remainder, who are to continue mounted, are placed under 
 the charge of the second in command. 
 
 The usual method of posting vedettes is as follows : — The 
 officer rides to the nearest elevated position in his front whence 
 he can see the general line which his vedettes are to occupy, 
 halting his party somewhat in rear of the line. The centre 
 vedette will then be placed and the officer will take the men who 
 are to watch the ground to the right and post them, while the 
 non-commissioned officer posts the men on the left. Care must 
 be taken that the flank vedettes are in sight of those of the 
 neighbouring piquets. The flank vedettes of the line will 
 usually be thrown back, and if not protected by an impassable 
 natural obstacle, will generally be supported by a detached post 
 in rear. 
 
82 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 When the country is open, and suitable eminences can he 
 seen from the piquet, the vedettes or cossack posts may he 
 allowed to move independently to points indicated and place 
 themselves so that they can get a good view to the front (particu- 
 larly as regards the approaches leading from the enemy), can see 
 the vedettes on either side, and also the piquet if possible, whilst 
 at the same time keeping themselves as much concealed a* possible. 
 At night they should be directed to post themselves on low 
 ground rather than on high, so as to get the advantage of the sky 
 line, or, if in the neighbourhood of a -«vood or village, some little 
 distance beyond its edge. 
 
 The officer, accompanied by the non-commissioned officer, next 
 proceeds to inspect the hue the vedettes have taken up, altering 
 it where necessary. 
 
 In addition to the general orders to vedettes (p. 84), he points 
 out to each vedette — 
 
 1 . The direction of the enemy, and what is known of his posi- 
 tion and movements. 
 
 2. The extent of front each vedette is specially to watch. 
 
 3. The number of his post and the number and position of the 
 posts on either side. 
 
 4. The number and position of the piquet and the way to it. 
 
 5. The position of the nearest examining post. 
 
 6. The name of the commander of the outposts. 
 
 7. The names of any villages, hills, rivers, or defiles that can 
 be seen, and where the railways and roads lead to. 
 
 8. By night the parole and countersign. 
 
 The officer must make cert^lu, by questioning, that the vedettes 
 understand their instruction*, and the non-commissioned officer 
 who accompanies him must listen attentively, making notes in 
 his pocket-book, if necessary, so that he may be able to give the 
 information himself to the vedettes when marching reliefs. 
 
 During his inspection he will select the place for the examin- 
 ing post and place it, if this has not already been done. 
 
 As soon as the vedettes have been posted he withdraws the 
 look-out men, returns to the piquet, and examines the ground 
 in the immediate vicinity in order to see if the position of the 
 piquet can be improved. It is desirable that the piquet should 
 be in rear of the centre of the chain of vedettes, close to a main 
 approach, with clear ground for action to the front and flanks, and, 
 though easy to find for the troops in rear, still concealed from the 
 view of the enemy. If a defile lies between the piquet and the 
 vedettes, the former should be placed so as to be able to charge 
 an enemy as he debouches. In addition, the spot should be level 
 and fimi so as to give the horses as much rest as possible. 
 
 Having finally settled the position of the piquet, which may 
 generally now dismount, he posts a look-out sentry near the 
 piquet and in such a position that he can see as many of the 
 vedettes as possible, and prepares a sketch of his position and 
 disposition for the commander of the outposts. 
 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 83 
 
 One of the most important points is, to so regulate the service 
 for the reconnoitring patrols, that they are able to rest. This 
 will hardly be possible unless there are men enough for three 
 patrols, as there should always be a patrol ready to start in case 
 of emergency, and, in principle, the ground in front should never 
 be without a patrol. 
 
 It is generally advisable that the patrols should not go out and 
 come back by the same road, and that the fresh patrol should be 
 sent out about the time the old one is expected back. If halted 
 for 2-1 hours or more, the time of despatch and road to be followed 
 must be constantly changed. 
 
 If a report is received that an enemy is advancing, or signal 
 shots are fired, the piquet mounts, and the commander proceeds 
 at once to the line of vedettes to see if a real attack seems 
 probable — if the enemy is still distant the waiting patrol is sent 
 to reconnoitre. As soon as the enemy's intentions are evident he 
 sends word to the commander of the outposts, the support, and 
 the neighbouring piquets. If he can do so with any chance of 
 success, he attacks the enemy; if, however, the latter is too 
 strong, he falls back taking care not to mask the front of the 
 support. 
 
 It is an axiom on outpost duty that, if necessary, the smaller 
 fractions must sacrifice themselves to protect the larger. 
 
 During the day-time, the officer in command of a piquet must 
 never absent himself from it ; that is to say, he must either be 
 visiting the vedettes, or with the piquet. By day he selects the 
 position for the night (which, however, is not to be taken up 
 till after dark), makes himself acquainted with the ground in 
 the vicinity, and constantly visits the vedettes and ascertains 
 that they are alert and acquainted with their orders ; whenever 
 he absents himself for the above purposes, he must warn tho 
 officer or non-commissioned officer who is to command whilst 
 he is away. During the night he will never leave the piquet. 
 
 The horses are never to be unsaddled or unbridled at night ; 
 but, during the day, when matters seem quiet, the girths should 
 be loosened and the saddles shifted of one-third at a time. The 
 horses' ears must be pulled, and their legs, bellies, and chests 
 handrubbed or wisped, especially in wet weather. 
 
 All feeding and watering is to bo carried out by fractions of 
 one-third at a time, under the superintendence of a non-commis- 
 sioned officer, who is responsible that no irregularities occur. 
 The horses that are to be fed must be taken a short distance 
 away from the others for this purpose. No horses are to be fed 
 at daylight till the patrols return. 
 
 No man is to leave the piquet, and those not actually employed 
 must be made to get as much rest and sleep during the day as 
 possible, so that they may be the more alert at night. 
 
 If a fire is allowed it must be made in a concealed place. 
 
 No noise of any kind, or trumpet sounds, are allowed on 
 piquet. 
 
84 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 Piquets pay no compliments, but the officer in command 
 reports himself to any superior officer who may visit his post. 
 
 Piquets are, as a rule, relieved at daybreak. The new piquel 
 takes its position alongside the old, and both officers proceed to 
 relieve the vedettes together ; the position now taken up is the 
 day line, and during the relief the officer going off duty com- 
 municates everything regarding the post, in the most minute 
 detail, to the officer who relieves him. Any special orders are 
 to be handed over in writing. Whilst the relief is going on the 
 reconnoitring patrols of both piquets go out together, so that the 
 new patrols may be shown the ground, &c, by those who are 
 acquainted with it. When the patrols return, tho old piquet 
 falls back. 
 
 During the period of daily marches, the outposts are not 
 relieved, but stand fast until the advanced guard has passed the 
 line, or, on a retreat, until they are ordered to fall back. 
 
 Vedkttes and Cossack Posts. 
 
 Vedettes are posted either double or single, according as they 
 are relieved from the piquet or by " eossack posts." 
 
 This latter system consist ^ in posting the reliefs for each single 
 vedette close to him, the party being in charge of anon-com- 
 missioned officer or of the senior soldier, and has the great 
 advantages of economy in numbers, saving of men and horses, 
 and concealment as regards the position of the piquet. Cossack 
 posts are particularly suitable for situations where it would be 
 difficult to relieve or frequently visit a vedette, or where the 
 redette cannot be seen from the neighbouring posts or the piquet. 
 
 Vedettes, as a general rule, are posted and remain mounted, 
 but as they can often carry out their duties just as efficiently 
 dismounted, the officer commanding the piquet must give orders 
 on this point to each post. 
 
 The vedettes should be posted so as to get as good a view as 
 practicable, and not be seen ; consequently, by day, they should 
 be posted behind a tree, wall, &c. ; by night, well below a crest, 
 so as to get the advantage of the sky line, but never close to 
 trees, running water, or mills, as it is the sense of hearing that 
 must be depended on at night, and the rustle caused by the wind, 
 and the ripple of the water, would distract their attention. In 
 bad weather, or at night, to prevent the proper direction being 
 ost by the horses turning round, a mark, pointing towards the 
 direction to be watched, should be made on the ground or on 
 ome adjacent object. 
 
 The general orders fur vedettes, with which all men should be 
 acquainted before going on outpost duty, ai-e — 
 
 1 . To keep their carbines loaded and at the advance, lances at 
 the trail with flags furled. 
 
 2. To make no unnecessary noise or movement, and allow no 
 persons, except the commander of the outposts, the commander 
 of the piquet, those accompanying them, and the patrols, to pass 
 the chain or loiter abcut 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 85 
 
 3. Any other persons approaching their post from any direction, 
 by clay, to be ordered to " halt," when still 30 or 40 yards distant, 
 and directed to the examining post ; if the order is not implicity 
 complied with they are to be fired on. 
 
 4. All parties approaching the post from any direction, by 
 night to be ordered to " halt," " advance one man," " give the 
 parole " and " countersign." The parole and countersign are to 
 be given up in as low a tone as practicable. Persons who do not 
 implicitely comply with the above orders are to be fired on. 
 
 5. If any of the ground between two contiguous vedettes 
 cannot be distinctly seen from either post, it is to be frequently 
 patrolled by one of them, or, in the case of a cossack post, by 
 one of the relief. 
 
 6. If a vedette wishes to draw attention to anything, he 
 holds out his head-dress as a signal or makes some similar sign 
 to attract the attention of the look-out sentry, when a patrol 
 will at once be sent out from the piquet. If by any chance 
 this is not noticed, he circles right for cavalry, left for infantry, 
 and figure of eight for a combined force, increasing the pace 
 according to the strength and rapidity of approach of the enemy. 
 In the case of cossack posts the above can be more easily and 
 effectively done by a man riding in to the piquet to report. 
 Circling should not be employed without urgent necessity, as it 
 disturbs the whole outpost force. 
 
 7. If any neighbouring vedettes circle, he passes it on. 
 
 8. If suddenly attacked or suprised, he tires before retiring, to 
 attract the attention of the piquet and other vedettes; and only 
 those vedettes fall back who are obliged to. 
 
 9. Single vedettes do not quit their post under any pretence ; 
 double vedettes only one at a time, to report, or patrol unseen 
 ground in the chain. 
 
 10. No compliments are paid 
 
 The special orders for each post are mentioned on page 82. 
 
 Look-otjt Sentry o> t Piquet. 
 
 One man is posted dismounted by day, mounted by night, on 
 both occasions with his carbine drawn and loaded. He reports 
 all signals. &c, from the vedettes. He pays no compliments, 
 and only challenges at night. 
 
 Examining Post. 
 
 This is posted on the main approach, and consists, as a rule, 
 of the relief for the nearest vedette. It is under the charge of 
 a selected non-commissioned officer, speaking, if possible, the 
 language of the country ; he receives special orders from the 
 officer commanding the piquet. No persons except the com- 
 mander of the outposts, the officer commanding the piquet, 
 those accompanying them, and the patrols are to pass the chain 
 anywhere save at the examining post. The non-commissioned 
 officer in charge examines every individual wishing to pass 
 
86 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 either outwards or inwards, and gives the necessary permission, 
 or refuses it, according to his instructions. 
 
 If a flag of truce presents itself, it must be detained at the 
 examining post until instructions are received from superior 
 authority, and if permission is given for it to enter the line, the 
 individual hearing it must be first carefully blindfolded, and then 
 led, under escort, by a circuitous route, to the commander of the 
 outposts. No conversation, except by properly authorized 
 persons, is to be allowed, on any subject under any pretence, with 
 the individual bearing the flag of truce. 
 
 Prisoners and deserters are to be forwarded from the examin- 
 ing post to the Officer commanding the piquet, who, after 
 questioning them, forwards them under an escort with a report 
 to the commander of the outposts. They must be ordered to 
 lay down their arms before they are allowed to approach the 
 chain. 
 
 Detached Post. 
 
 Is usually 3 to 10 men strong under a non-commissioned officer 
 and forms a picpiet on a small scale ; the regulations regarding 
 piquets apply to it. Such a post is usually placed in echelon, 
 in front or rear of the extreme flank of the outpost line, so as 
 to watch some particular place or road by which the flank, sup- 
 posing the latter does not rest on a natural obstacle, could be 
 turned ; or else to maintain communication between two piquets 
 lying unusually far apart. Special instructions are given on 
 these points to the non-commissioned officer by tho commander 
 of the picpiet from which he is detached. 
 
 Visiting Patrols and Reliefs. 
 
 The former consist usually of two men ; they go from time to 
 time, generally between the reliefs, along the line of vedettes 
 and to the neighbouring piquets, to see if all is correct. Both 
 patrol and relief march within the chain and keep as far as 
 possible under cover. They are not to be challenged by day. 
 Vedettes, except in very severe weather, or when the men are 
 much fatigued, are relieved every two hours. The relief is 
 carried out exactly in the same way as for an ordinary post, 
 except that whilst the relief is going on one man maintains the 
 look-out and the remainder keep concealed as far as possible. 
 
 With cossack posts the reliefs can always be carried out every 
 hour if desirable. 
 
 Reconnoitring Patrols. 
 
 Consist of 2 or 3 men under a non-commissioned officer ; they 
 are employed beyond the chain of vedettes to reconnoitre the 
 ground and the enemy. No grey horses, except in rainy, foggy, 
 or snowy weather, or those that neigh, are to be sent, and both 
 men and horses should be specially chosen for this duty. They 
 must take steps to prevent their arms and accoutrements rattling 
 or glittering in the sunlight. 
 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 87 
 
 The officer commanding the piquet gives each patrol its 
 orders on the following points : — 
 
 1 . How far it is to go ; if in the immediate presence of an 
 enemy this is not necessary, as the patrols always appi-oaeh 
 as close to the enemy's line as possible. 
 
 2. The road or general direction they are to follow going and 
 returning. 
 
 3. The ground they are particularly anxious to examine. 
 
 4. About what time he will expect them back. 
 
 By day the}' will avoid main roads and inhabited localities, 
 moving under cover as far as possible. They must often halt, 
 behind cover, to observe the ground, so that they may act as 
 guides if required ; also to see if they can discover the enemy. 
 
 If an enemy's patrol is seen, they hide themselves and watch 
 its movements. If a friendly patrol is met, they do not challenge, 
 but inform each other of what each has seen ; before doing so, 
 however, they should get under cover. If they observe a con- 
 siderable body of troops leave the enemy's line, one man rides 
 in at once to report, the remainder keeping under cover and 
 continuing to observe their movements. 
 
 In a broken country they may be much assisted by watching 
 if their horses prick their ears or start, as they generally become 
 aware of the vicinity of other horses or men, especially if they 
 are partially concealed, before their presence is noticed by their 
 riders. At night one man should often dismount and place his 
 ear to the ground, as the sound of horses or men on the move 
 travels along the ground much further than through the air; 
 the barking of dogs is often also a sign of strangers being about. 
 
 They must remember that their duty is to observe, and not to 
 fight, and fighting must always be avoided unless they are 
 ordered to make prisoners or are surprised.. 
 
 "When returning they should often halt, under cover, at the 
 turnings of roads, &c, to make sure they are not being followed. 
 It may often be practicable to get right up to the enemy's line 
 by judiciously following a patrol that is returning. If a patrol 
 succeeds in approaching the enemy's line, it conceals itself, and 
 endeavours to ascertain — 
 
 1. How many vedettes the enemy has put out, and where they 
 are placed. The most favourable opportunity for ascertaining 
 this is when the relief is going round. 
 
 2. The nature of the ground in front of, and between the 
 vedettes, as to whether it affords a fair chance of cutting 
 one of them off or surprising the piquet. 
 
 3. The time the enemy sends out patrols, their strength, and 
 the general direction they follow. 
 
 By night they should endeavour to overhear the parole and 
 countersigns, and find out the main position by observing the 
 watch fires. To do this it may often be advisable to let a man 
 dismount and creep up as close as possible so as to avoid the 
 noise of the horses' hoofs betraying their presence. 
 
88 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 With weak piquets the reconnoitring- patrols may combine the 
 duties of visiting patrols with their own. 
 
 Supports. 
 
 In a combined force they are usually furnished l»y the infantry. 
 It depends on circumstances whether they are furnished both by 
 day and night, or only at night. In the case of cavalry alone, 
 they are formed of the remainder of the squadrons which have 
 
 furnished the piquet or piquets. A look-out sentry is placed, 
 the roads barricaded, and other temporary fortification resorted 
 to when practicable, to replace as far as possible the defensive 
 element furnished by infantry. The relative position of the 
 support with regard to the piquets of that section is analogous 
 to that of the piquets of the vedettes, and the same points are 
 desirable in selecting a place for it. The regulations regarding 
 cooking, feeding, watering, &c, laid down for the piquets apply 
 equally to the supports. 
 
 Visiting patrols should be frequently sent from the support to 
 the piquets, and a patrol should always be ready to march and 
 ascertain the cause of any shot being tired, or any stir that may 
 be noticed in tho piquets. 
 
 The Reserve op the Outposts 
 
 Is under the immediate orders of the commander of the out- 
 posts, and forms the force by means of which an enemy's attack 
 is to be principally repelled, and from which, in case of necessity, 
 the more advanced posts are strengthened. With a Combined 
 force the remainder of the squadron furnishing the piquets will 
 be with the reserve, and provide two or three orderlies Eor each 
 infantry post to carry reports ; the employment of these men for 
 any other purpose is absolutely Forbidden. Any special patrol 
 will also be furnished by the squadron If there is artillery to 
 defend a particular defile, the guns are to be in position ready to 
 fire; in all other cases they are to be unlimbered to the main 
 approach; under no circumstances are they to be placed in an 
 enclosed spot. 
 
 Sentries are put out and patrols sent in such numbers as may 
 be necessary. The regulations regarding trumpet calls, feeding, 
 watering, &c, laid down for the piquets are equally applicable 
 to the reserve; the men, however, are to cook, not only their 
 own food, and draw wood, straw, &c, for their own use, but are 
 always to perform these duties for the piquets, and if possible, 
 also for the supports. 
 
89 
 
 Lecture XI. 
 
 SCREENING AND EECONNOITEING OF CAVALEY 
 IN ADVANCE OF AN AEMY. 
 
 The real value of screening can be best appreciated by re- 
 calling one or two instances of what has occurred, even in 
 modern war, when from ignorance of the true use of cavalry or 
 from other causes, cavalry screens were either not employed 
 or were temporarily thrown out by unexpected events. For 
 instance — 
 
 In the campaign of 1859, a French army of 124,500 infantry. 10,700 cavalry Hamley. 
 and 300 guns, and an Austrian army of 146,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and 
 nearly 700 guns, actually encountered each other in full march at Solferino, 
 neither having had the slightest knowledge of the vicinity of the other. 
 
 Again, in the campaign of 1866, we read that on the night 
 before the battle of Koniggratz, in which more than 400,000 
 men were engaged, Geman 
 
 The outposts of the two armies faced each other within a distance of four- official 
 and-a-half-miles, without either army suspecting the near and concentrated ^ ccoun t. 
 presence of the other. 
 
 Again, in the campaign of 1870, we read: — 
 
 A survey of the positions of the opposed forces on the evening of the 25th 
 of August", shows on the right flank of the German army moving -westward, 
 and only two days' march to the north of it, a French army of 150,000 men 
 advancing eastward, the movements and intentions of which were as yet still 
 unknown to its adversary. 
 
 In this latter case the Germans had a cavalry screen, " but 
 the retreat of the French from Alsace, accelerated by the as- 
 sistance of the railways, had broken the contact with the enemy 
 after the battle of Worth." 
 
 THE CAVALEY DIVISION OE BRIGADE COVEEING 
 
 THE AEMY. 
 
 The role of an independent cavalry Division or brigade consists 
 in conceabng the movements of its own army whilst endeavouring 
 to discover those of the enemy, thus forming the strategical 
 advanced (or rear) guard of the force it covers ; but it must not 
 be supposed, because a Division or brigade of cavalry is acting 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
90 
 
 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 in front or (rear), that the army can therefore dispense with ad- 
 vanced (or rear) guards. The importance of this service remains 
 the same and must be strictly carried out. 
 
 Each brigade or regiment moving by a separate road must 
 have its own advanced guard, and these must keep up commu- 
 nication with each other. 
 
 As a rule the Division or brigade will be ordered to attach 
 itself to a particular body of the enemy, or to watch a particular 
 piece of country. 
 
 In both cases it is necessary — 
 
 1. To discover the enemy. 
 
 2. Not to lose the touch when obtained. 
 
 3. To avoid being beaten in detail or the line being forced. 
 
 4. To retain the power of assuming the offensive. 
 
 To attain the above ends the easy and rapid concentration of 
 the main body is a matter of vital importance, and consequently, 
 detachments of a greater strength than a squadron must be 
 avoided. The force will be divided into two main parts, the 
 normal order of march being — 
 
 1. Contact squadrons, and officers' patrols, pushed as far 
 
 forward as possible to maintain or seek to establish tou<h 
 with the enemy. 
 
 2. The main body with the usual advanced and rear guards 
 
 on one or two roads, concentrated, and ready for action ; 
 only the number of connecting posts absolutely necessary 
 to be allowed. 
 
 The cavalry Division or brigade regulates its movements by 
 those of the enemy, consequently its distance! from the main body 
 cannot be laid down in any way. 
 
 The front that can be covered by a Division varies according 
 to the ground, the strength, character and proximity of the 
 enemy. 
 
 Against civilised troops, and in a cultivated country, the 
 normal front that can be covered without undue extension is 
 from 10 to 12 miles. To cover a wider front, and to echelon the 
 force more in depth than the usual advanced and rear guards, 
 is to render it liable to be beaten in detail. 
 
 The exact formation to be adopted must be left to the com- 
 mander of the independent cavalry. While at a distance from 
 the enemy, contact squadrons can be pushed further forward, 
 extended over a wider front, and allowed more complete in- 
 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 91 
 
 dependence of the Divisien or brigade than when the enemy is 
 within striking distance. In the latter case the main body, 
 must be brought closer to the advanced squadrons in order to 
 give them the support they may require to enable them to 
 attain their object. 
 
 Information regarding the enemy may be obtained most easily, 
 and with the least expenditure of force, by the employment of 
 well mounted officers, accompanied by a few selected men. 
 
 Officers detached for the above purpose may be left to watch 
 the enemy, or particular localities, for a considerable time, only 
 rejoining when forced to by the enemy, or by their mission being 
 accomplished. 
 
 When, however, the enemy by his alertness or numbers 
 prevents a reconnaissance being carried out by small parties, it 
 may become necessary to break through his line. 
 
 The contact once established should never be lost. The 
 Division or brigade follows the enemy with its contact squadrons, 
 following his movements step by step, whilst officers' reconnoitring 
 parties endeavour to hang on his flanks and rear. 
 
 An independent cavalry Division or brigade should never fight 
 if it can avoid it, that is, unless the enemy's screen cannot other- 
 wise be pierced, or with a view to establish a moral superiority. 
 
 A cavalry Division or brigade in its isolated position requires a 
 rear guard. The rear regiment of each column will invariably 
 tell off a rear guard of the strengh of a troop for a regiment, a 
 squadron for a brigade, Its duties are not only to check 
 straggling, excesses, &c, but also to see that nothing of a 
 suspicious nature takes place in the rear. If an enemy should 
 appear, it will attack him at once, regardless of his superiority, 
 in order to give the nearest body of troops time to show a 
 front. Nothing that goes on in rear should escape its notice. 
 If clouds of dust approach, the cause must be at once ascertained. 
 Villages. &c, must be watched for some time after the column 
 has passed to see that no flags are hoisted on towers, wind mill s 
 which were still, suddenly set going, or men mounted or in carts 
 : allowed to leave the locality by by-roads. 
 
 As to whether it is advisable to place the troops in billets or 
 1 bivouacs, depends on the proximity of the enemy ; but it must 
 be remembered, that in Europe the worst billet is preferable to 
 , the best bivouac both for men and horses. In bad weather it is 
 better to fall back a few miles, leaving sufficient force to main- 
 :' tain the touch, even if you have to retrace your steps the follow- 
 ing morning, rather than bivouac, if by this means a good night's 
 ' test can be secured. At night, especially, there is less danger if 
 I surprised in billets than in a camp or bivouac. The advanced 
 detachments will generally bivouac, the main body need rarely 
 do so. 
 
 The following is the approximate time necessary for a march 
 of fourteen miles when all the precautions necessary in the 
 
92 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 presence ot an enemy are observed, and lie is known to bo in 
 the neighbourhood :— 
 
 Under the most unfavour- 
 On a good On a bad able conditions— snow, 
 road. road. frost, &c. 
 
 1 Regiment or Battery 
 
 H.A 4 hours 6 hours 9 hours 
 
 Division of Cavalry . . 4 hours 7 hours 12 hours 
 
 The above is the time the head of the column will take. 
 
 Contact Squadrons. 
 
 These precede the Division or brigade with the object generally 
 of establishing and maintaining touch of the enemy. 
 
 As the duty is most harassing, they must be frequently 
 relieved. 
 
 Their movements are independent of the Division and depend 
 exclusively on those of the enemy. 
 
 Their special mission consists in seizing registers and papers 
 of every description and transmitting them; intercepting tele- 
 graphic and railway communications ; destroying bridges, manu- 
 factories of arms, and convoys; occupying important defiles, bo 
 as to secure them for the passage of the force from which they 
 are detached. 
 
 They will not be accompanied by any cart or waggon, but will 
 carry the necessary rations and forage either on their horses or 
 on requisitioned animals, or procure them by requisition. 
 
 Before starting they should ascertain the probable movements, 
 for some days to come, of the bodj'from which they arc detached 
 so as to know where to send reports; also, with a view to com- 
 bined action, whether any other contact squadrons are being 
 sent in the same direction. 
 
 They report daily as to their progress, and add what it is 
 proposed to effect the following day and where they mean to 
 pass the night; if the orderly carrying the report is intelligent, 
 it is very desirable not to commit these last two points to writing. 
 
 The squadron pushes forward as many officers' and non-com- 
 missioned officers' patrols as may be necessary, and covers its 
 own march with an advanced party and Hankers, hut otherwise 
 mov< sas i onoentrated as possible. The rules for officers' patrols 
 are equally applicable to the contact squadron, particularly as 
 regards the precautions to be taken at night. 
 
 Officers' Patrols. 
 
 Officers' patrols have much the same duty to perform as the 
 contact squadron, and their mode of carrying it out is analogous; 
 the difference being that in the one case a whole squadron is 
 employed, and in the other, only a well mounted officer accom-j 
 panied by 6 to 10 selected men, and even in some cases by only 
 
 2 or 3, or, perhaps, a couple of officers by themselves, are 
 employed. The contact squadron is employed, or the officers' 
 patrol according to circumstances. 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 93 
 
 The main principle is, that when long distances have to be 
 ridden, such as would ruin a considerable body of troops if they 
 attempted to ride them in one day, and, when the object in view 
 can be attained by observation, and a larger force could not hope 
 to remain undiscovered, officers' patrols are sent. 
 
 The horses composing these parties, as well as the men, must 
 be especially chosen, as, in order to appear unexpectedly and 
 disappear in a similar manner, and thus gain all the advantages 
 of a surprise, they may be called on to ride 60 or 70 miles in the 
 24 hours. They should take biscuit and tinned meat for 
 themselves for three days and biscuit for the horses. 
 
 The usual missions for an officers' patrol are : — 
 
 1. To ascertain the enemy's strength, position, or direction of 
 march. 
 
 2. To convey a despatch or establish connection with some 
 portion of the force with which there is no direct com- 
 munication. 
 
 3. To reconnoitre a road, river or pass. 
 
 4. To ascertain whether the enemy is present in certain 
 localities. 
 
 Officers' patrols may be sent out from the contact squadron, 
 or from, the Division ; in the former case their mission forms a 
 portion of the general mission of the sopiadron, and the duration 
 of their absence and the distance to be ridden will probably be 
 much less than in the latter, in which they receive a special 
 mission. 
 
 As a ride these patrols will find their only chance of safety at 
 night is to shift their position after dark and pass the night in a 
 wood, taking care to see that they are not watched when entering 
 it; if, however, a solitary house can be found to pass the night 
 in, they should not enter it till night-fall, first surrounding it to 
 prevent any of the inhabitants leaving and giving information ; 
 they should then make the chief person responsible that they 
 are not attacked, and take some members of the family as 
 hostages. 
 
 These latter must be well treated, but given to understand 
 that they will suffer in case of an attack. 
 
 Steps must be taken to facilitate escape by the back, through 
 gardens, &c, in case of necessity, and the party must pass the 
 night in the stables with their horses. 
 
 As officers and men run a great risk of falling into the 
 enemy's hands, they should have no papers about them containing 
 information regarding the force to which they belong; especially 
 is this the case with any diary that they may keep for their 
 private amusement. 
 
 it is desirable that they should, after carefully reading and 
 committing to memory the instructions they receive, destroy 
 them. 
 
94 detached duties. 
 
 Advanced Scouts. 
 
 In order to carry out their duties with secrecy and the least 
 expenditure of force, it will frequently be necessary for patrols, 
 especially if they are strong and the chief object is to maintain 
 contact with the enemy, to detach advanced scouts, who will 
 work usually in pairs. The commander of a patrol should not 
 let his advanced scouts separate themselves very far from the 
 patrol or for a very long time, but they must be allowed great 
 freedom and independence of action . The general rules regarding 
 the conduct of the groups of the advanced party of an advanced 
 guard, ihe method of examining localities, gaining intelligence 
 and maintaining the touch of the enemy, laid down in S. 1, 
 apply equally to advanced scouts and patrols. 
 
 Uf.coxnoitring Formation of a Single Regiment. 
 
 When a single regimenl is employed to cover the strategical 
 march of a considerable force and to reconnoitre an enemy, it is 
 evident that, owing to the wide front over which it must 
 necessarily be extended, it will possess but little power of 
 resistance, and this disadvantage must be compensated for, as 
 far as possible, by so disposing of the squadrons as to ensure the 
 early acquisition and rapid transmission to the main body of 
 information regarding the enemy. 
 
 A regiment thus employed may be at a distance of 10 or 15 
 miles from the force which it covers. From it one squadron 
 moves several miles further to the front, two others are extended 
 ]£ to 3 miles to the right or left of it, while the fourth remains 
 in support, following the centre squadron at a few miles distance. 
 Each of the three advanced contact squadrons, providing for its 
 immediate security by a small advanced guard and flankers, is 
 now arranged for the systematic reconnaissance of that part of 
 the country which it is ordered to explore. Officers' or non- 
 commissioned officers' patrols of six or more men are sent out to 
 the front and flanks, while the rest of the squadron, from a third 
 to a half, moves along a central route. The distance of the 
 advanced squadrons from the support, and their intervals from 
 each other, will depend upon the nature of the country, the 
 direction of the roads, and the proximity and force of the enemy. 
 The squadrons will generally be extended as far as possible, in 
 order that too many men may not be employed on the service, 
 and the distance and intervals should be such that the different 
 bodies may be able to receive support in case of encounter with 
 hostile forces. In open country and on good roads the patrols 
 may be pushed 5 or 6 miles in advance of their squadrons, but 
 when they come in contact with the enemy, they can either fall 
 bach, if necessary, to receive support, still preserving the touch 
 of the enemy, or the contact squadrons can be brought closer to 
 them, as may seem most advisable. From the patrols sent out 
 by the squadrons, small scouting parties (advanced scouts) of 
 two or three men may be again detached, in order to thoroughly 
 search the country. 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 95 
 
 Although constant connection by sight or hearing is not 
 necessarily to be maintained between all the parties and men 
 employed, there should be constant means of communication, so 
 that information and orders may be readily transmitted. It 
 will frequently be necessary for scouts and patrols to move at 
 considerable distances from their squadron, or for one of the 
 contact squadrons to separate itself far from the supporting 
 squadron, in order to carry out the duties entrusted to them ; 
 but each patrol should know the general position of the patrols 
 on its right and left, and where its own squadron is to be found ; 
 and each contact squadron should also know where the neigh- 
 bouring squadrons and the support are. Scouts ride in to their 
 patrols with information, and these similarly send in information 
 to their squadrons. The squadrons communicate with each 
 other laterally, either by communicating posts or communi- 
 cating patrols, and connecting posts will be established between 
 the supporting squadron and the main body, and, if necessary, 
 between the advanced squadrons and the support. 
 
 Connecting Posts. 
 
 Connecting posts are employed to facilitate the keeping up of 
 communication between detached bodies of cavalry and the 
 force in rear which they are covering or acting in concert with. 
 
 The number of posts depends, principally, on the number of 
 suitable houses, or other well marked and easy recognisable spots 
 on the road. As a rule they should be about five miles apart. 
 
 "With a large number of despatches two men may be away at 
 the same time in each direction, or possibly, owing to circum- 
 stances, it is not advisable to let the men go singly ; therefore as 
 the post itself must never be left quite deserted, the best number 
 for a post, as a rule, is one non-commissioned officer and six men. 
 If the posts are more than five miles apart they must be stronger. 
 One officer should superintend four posts, whenever an officer 
 can be spared for this duty. 
 
 With very few men at one's disposal, and when the country is 
 very hostile, the posts may have to be made up to half a troop, 
 and placed far apart, and, if they are left entirely to their own 
 resources for protection, they must, shortly before dusk, leave 
 the post, and pass the night elsewhere, stationing men on the road 
 to look out for despatches. 
 
 The house or other place chosen should be on the high road, 
 close to a bridge or some other place that must be passed, and it 
 should be marked by a bundle of hay or straw on a pole by day, 
 and by a lantern at night. 
 
 The villagers, &c, must be held responsible for the safety of 
 the post, and warned, that if anything happens to it, severe 
 measures of reprisal will be taken ; the post, however, must also 
 take measures to protect itself. A sentry must always be posted 
 on the stable and a lantern kept burning all night. 
 
 Two horses are always to be kept ready to start imme- 
 diately. 
 
96 
 
 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 The commander of the post gives each orderly clear directions 
 regarding his road and the pace he is to travel at. On reaching 
 the next post he receives a receipt for the despatch carried. If 
 there is any delay in forwarding a despatch, or if it is lost, the 
 authority sending it mnst be at once informed. 
 
 The orderlies are always to carry the despatch on their persons, 
 so that in case anything happens to the horse the despatch may 
 be safe. In order to avoid the writing becoming illegible through 
 wet, &c, important despatches sent in this manner should he 
 enclosed in two envelopes. 
 
 Communicating Posts. 
 
 These may be either fixed or temporary, and generally consist 
 of three men. They are employed to keep up lateral communi- 
 cation between squadrons when detached for reconnaissance, or 
 between parallel columns on the march, and are placed at points 
 well marked on the map and easily found, on or between the 
 routes to be taken by squadrons Their position should, when- 
 ever possible, be decided on by the leaders before starting. One 
 man of the post should always be ready to mount to carry on a 
 message. 
 
 If these posts are not established, communication between 
 squadrons can only be kept up by communicating patrols riding 
 across from one squadron to another, and they will often have 
 difficulty in finding the squadron they are despatched to. 
 
 The men should bo acquainted, as far as possible, with the 
 routes taken by their own and neighbouring squadrons. 
 
 S. 4. Rej)orts. 
 
 Eeports are of two kinds, verbal and written ; whenever time 
 and circumstances allow, they should be in writing. 
 
 Whenever a verbal report or message is sent, the hearer must, 
 before he rides away, be made to repeat it and understand its 
 nature, otherwise endless mistakes will take place, even in the 
 simplest matters. 
 
 Connecting Post No. 3 at A. 
 Corporal B. Private C, D, E, F, G, A. 
 
 Date 
 
 Detail. 
 
 Arrived. 
 
 Forwarded. 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 
 2 letters 
 
 —1 to 
 
 H.Q.,lto 
 
 A..Q.M.G 
 
 When. 
 
 Bearer. 
 
 From. 
 
 When. 
 
 who y m To 
 
 
 8th June 
 1883. 
 
 1120 
 p.m. 
 
 Pte.X, 
 7th Hus 
 
 Con- 
 necting 
 postNo. 
 2atW. 
 
 11.22 ' 
 p.m. 
 
 Pte. E, 
 7th Hus 
 
 Con- 
 necting 
 post No. 
 4atM. 
 
 Private E, 
 returned at 
 1.15 a.m. 
 with re- 
 ceipt. 
 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 97 
 
 As great delays invariably occur, the time of arrival and 
 despatch are to be noted on the back of each envelope, in order 
 that a better supervision may be exercised, and, in case of 
 t necessity, blame may be laid on the proper person. 
 
 Even when there are no letters to be carried, communication 
 must take place frequently between the posts to ascertain that 
 all is correct. 
 
 A man who has to make a verbal report, should settle before- 
 ; hand what he intends to say, and should not speak in a hurry. 
 ! If he sees that the person to whom he reports misunderstands 
 him he should not hesitate to tell him so. On the other hand, 
 I a man making a report should not be questioned so as to flurry 
 [ him, but should be allowed as far as possible, to tell his tale in 
 i his own way. 
 
 With regard to the form of report, the following regulations 
 I are always to be adhered to, and every officer should, if possible, 
 I be provided with a sufficient supply of forms similar to those 
 [issued in Army Book 153, and corresponding envelopes (Army 
 ( Form C, 398.) 
 
 The report is to be written sufficiently legible to enable it to be 
 I read, even by the dim light of a tire. 
 
 The style is to be similar to that in which telegrams are made 
 I out, viz., concise and clear, omitting nothing of importance whilst 
 avoiding superfluous matter. 
 
 Great care should be taken in spelling the names of places 
 I and people, which should be written in printed characters. 
 
 The individual who signs a report is responsible for the con- 
 tents of his despatch ; consequently the distinction between what 
 is absolutely certain and he has himself seen, what others have 
 seen and reported and what is supposed or inferred must be clearly 
 drawn. He must look at facts as they really are, and not allow 
 his imagination to run away with him, taking care neither to 
 neglect what is important, or cause alarm needlessly. 
 
 He should, whenever practicable, convince himself by personal 
 observation of the correctness of what he reports, and when this 
 cannot be done, if the matter is important, he should, if possible, 
 send the message by the individual who obtained the information 
 or saw the occurence reported. 
 
 Eeports must always be numbered consecutively ; place, date, 
 hour, minute, and signature should be invariably filled in. 
 
 Vague phrases, such as enemy, party, &c, are not permissible, 
 but the estimated strength, formation, composition, and direction 
 of march of columns are to be stated ; right and left are only to 
 be used with regard to the banks of rivers, looking down stream ; 
 on all other occasions the points of the compass are to be em- 
 ployed to indicate the position of the enemy or a locality. 
 
 Similarly, the expression "it is reported " is not to be used, 
 but the authority for the report must be quoted : for example, 
 " the flanking patrol on such a road reports "— " the inhabitants 
 
 at say , &c, &c." 
 
 Whenever necessary to make the report clearer, a sketch 
 should be added to it. 
 11 
 
98 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 Place, date, time of despatch, and pace, are to be filled in on 
 the envelope, and the receiver having first signed his name and 
 filled in the date, time, and place he is at, will return it to the 
 bearer as a receipt. 
 
 As regards pace, X means trot and walk, or 6 miles an hour ; 
 XX trot the whole distance, or 8 to 10 miles in the hour ; XXX 
 as fast as possible. 
 
 In sending reports, regard must always be paid to the import- 
 ance of their contents, and the security or otherwise of the road 
 to be traversed. 
 
 If necessary they should be sent in duplicate, and even trip- 
 licate, by different roads and under suitable escort; but in many 
 cases where the road to be traversed is unsafe, it may be advisable 
 to send the report verbally in preference to putting it on paper. 
 Further, as despatches may be lost, or have to be destroyed to 
 avoid their falbng into the enemy's hands, it may often be 
 advisable to make the bearer acquainted with their contents. 
 
 When forwarding a despatch in duplicate, or triplicate, no 
 mention should be made in the document that this is the case, 
 as in the event of one copy falling into the hands of the enemy 
 it would give him very valuable information, and the person to 
 whom the reports are addressed will soon know from the number 
 to be filled in at the right hand top corner if any have gone wrong. 
 
 As a rule, officers, especially at night, or when the distance is 
 great, should have an escort ; this is particularly the case when 
 they are detached for the purpose of receiving orders, &c, as 
 these latter cannot often be issued till late in the evening, and 
 under any circumstances it cannot be foreseen at what hour they 
 will be issued. 
 
 In Europe, an officer carrying despatches may often drive with 
 advantage instead of riding; his escort would then be composed 
 of two or three men who would be carried in the same or another 
 vehicle. 
 
 S. 5. Reconnaissance. 
 General Observations. 
 
 Reconnaissance is generally divided into — 
 
 1. Reconnaissance of an enemy. 
 
 2. Eeconnaissanee of a country. 
 
 On service, however, the two generally go together. 
 
 Details regarding the reconnaissance of a country, are fully 
 laid down in Section XI. of the " Text Book of Military Topo- 
 graphy," consequently it is chiefly the reconnaissance of an enemy 
 that will be dealt with in this section, attention only being called 
 to some of the more important points in the former. 
 
 Cavalry officers will not, as a rule, be called on to carry out the 
 reconnaissance of positions for their own troops, as that is rather 
 the province of the Staff and Engineers ; still as they will often 
 be so situated that it would be a great advantage to employ 
 them, they should possess the necessary knowledge. 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 99 
 
 The reconnaissance of an enemy, of existing communications, 
 and the task of discovering fresh ones by means of which an 
 obstacle may be turned, will generally be carried out by cavalry. 
 
 In all reconnaissances the inhabitants should be questioned, 
 but their statements must be compared, and, if possible, verified 
 by personal inspection ; if the latter cannot be done, it must 
 always be so stated in the report. It does not follow, by any 
 means, even with a friendly population, that their statements 
 regarding the enemy, the existence and state of communications, 
 depths of streams, &c, are correct. 
 
 Eecoxxaissance of an Army 
 
 Is made either in force or by employing officers' patrols alone. 
 
 The precautions customary in all armies will, as a rule, render 
 a satisfactory reconnaissance of an enemy's position very difficult 
 to perform; still, with good luck, it will often be possible to 
 reach a spot, under cover, from which, by the help of a field 
 glass, the necessary observations may be made. 
 
 In making a reconnaissance in force, the strength employed 
 must be sufficient front the very first to attain the object in 
 view. 
 
 The force endeavours to get as close as possible to the enemy 
 unobserved, and as soon as its presence is detected it must act 
 quickly and with determination, retiring as soon as it has gained 
 its object. 
 
 The officer commanding the troops should confine himself 
 principally to directing their movements, and entrust the actual 
 work of seeing into the enemy's dispositions and strength to 
 specially selected officers. The latter will endeavour to gain a 
 point of observation, under cover, on the flank of the enemy, and, 
 as a rule, will find that the best opportunity of carrying out 
 their mission will be when their own troops are falling back and 
 the enemy leaves his position to pursue. 
 
 A reconnaissance in force, however, is only of value when one 
 is in a position to at once profit by the information obtained, as 
 in a short time the enemy's dispositions will, in all probability, 
 be completely altered. 
 
 Positions. — The following are the chief points to be solved : — 
 
 1 . In which direction does the enemy's front face, and where, 
 judging by the arm and distribution of the troops, so far as 
 can be distinguished, is the most serious resistance likely to 
 be met. 
 
 2. With what number of troops, and of what arm is the 
 front occupied. 
 
 3. Whether the position is fortified; if so, how and where. 
 
 4. The best lines of approach for the direct attack, and positions 
 for the batteries accompanying it. 
 
 5. Where the flanks rest, and whether they rest on impassable 
 ground or entrenchments. 
 
100 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 6. The best lines of approach and positions for batteries for a 
 flank attack. 
 
 7. If any reserves are visible behind the front or flanks, the 
 arm and strength ; whether stationary or in movement ; if 
 the latter, in which direction. 
 
 8. In the case of a defile ; are the neighbouring passes occupied ; 
 if so, how. Is there any way of turning the position, and if 
 so, whether practicable for all arms. 
 
 Columns on the March. — The important points to notice are — 
 
 (a) What front is the column marching on. 
 
 (b) Which arm is in front, as it gives the rate of march. 
 (e) Is there apparently much opening out. 
 
 A given point is passed in one minute — 
 
 By about 250 Infantry in fours. 
 
 ,, 150 Cavalry in sections at a walk, or if in rear of 
 
 Infantry, about 120. 
 , , 4 guns, if in rear of inf antry 
 ,, 260 Cavalry in sections at a trot. 
 
 If, however, the whole column can be seen, a very quick 
 estimate can be made with the help of a map, and the following 
 practical rule, viz. : — 
 
 1 yard for every two Infantry soldiers. 
 1 yard for each Cavalry soldier. 
 20 yards for each gun or waggon. 
 Care must be taken to distinguish between troops and waggons, 
 and between the latter and guns. 
 
 An allowance, varying according to national characteristics, 
 discipline, the state of the roads and weather, of between £ and 
 £ of the total length of the column must, as a rule, be made for 
 opening out. 
 
 During an Engagement. — Officers' patrols must be invariably 
 sent well to the flanks, and, if possible, in rear of the enemy ; 
 they will report frequently, even if it is only to say that there is 
 no sign of hostile columns in that direction. These patrols 
 must be particularly active as evening approaches, so as to 
 ascertain in time whether the enemy intends retreating. 
 
 Reconnaissance of a Country. 
 
 Communications. — The principal points are — 
 
 Present state of the road, with details of width, bridges, and 
 fords. Whether any path indicated on the map has been 
 improved into a road — or any road being allowed to fall into 
 decay from disuse— or been blocked up altogether and a fresh 
 communication opened up— or a perfectly new road made where 
 none existed before. 
 
 Unlridged Rivers in view of an Offensive Crossing. — All roads 
 in the vicinity of rivers lead to the localities where the usual 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 101 
 
 communications from one bank to another take place ! as these 
 roads must be used by the Engineers to bring up the necessary 
 materials— unless it can be collected in some tributary — also by 
 the troops to effect the necessary concentration, the points chosen 
 to throw bridges must be close to these localities, otherwise 
 opening up and constructing the necessary approaches would 
 take too long, and betray the design. Where the roads pass 
 over low ground, it must be ascertained whether they are likely 
 to become impassable in the event of rain. 
 
 Having regard to the above a report must be furnished as to 
 the point or points for crossing recommended, giving reasons for 
 the selection, with the following in detail : — 
 
 (a) Lines of approach, places under cover close by suitable 
 for the concentration of troops, and as depots for materials. 
 
 (b) Full details regarding the banks, particularly with regard 
 to the ramps necessary for guns and horses, width and depth of 
 river, rate of current, and bed of river close to the bank at the 
 actual spot, landing place on far side. 
 
 (c) Details as far as can be ascertained regarding the enemy. 
 
 (d) Facilities for deployment after successful crossing particu- 
 larly for Cavalry and Artillery, roads on the far side. 
 
 (e) Points from which the passage can be supported by 
 Artillery. 
 
 (/) Number and size of boats, supply of wood, oars, rope, &c, 
 in the vicinity. 
 
 Bridged Rivers in view of an Offensive Crossing. — Unless the 
 enemy has withdrawn entirely to the far bank, it will only be 
 by a combination of great daring and luck that a reconnaissance 
 can be made except from a distance. 
 
 The chief points to be noticed are— 
 
 1. The existing bridges, whether apparently untouched, 
 partially or completely destroyed, or prepared for demolition ; 
 the lines of approach, under cover, to these bridges ; and 
 positions for the batteries, as far forward as possible to cover 
 the crossing. 
 
 2. Whether any ford or ferry exists which is apparently not 
 guarded, or insufficiently so ; the way to approach it under cover, 
 and for what arms it is suitable. 
 
 3. Where the flanks of the enemy's position rest, with a view 
 to determining whether it can be turned higher up or lower down. 
 In this case all fords and bridges that might be utilised by the 
 enemy for an offensive movement against the flank march must 
 be mentioned with full details, also the points from which the 
 roads leading to them from the enemy can be seen, and up to 
 what point the view extends. 
 
 Undefended Rivers as an Obstacle across the Line of March. — The 
 chief points to observe are — 
 
 1 . Whether the bridges and fords shown on the map really 
 exist and can be used for all arms, including ammunition columns. 
 
.102 DETACnED DUTIES. 
 
 • ■ 
 
 In reporting a ford practicable for Infantry it must always be 
 stated if the reserve ammunition carts can also cross. 
 
 2. Whether, in addition to those shewn on the map, there are 
 any others ; if so, their position, and for what arms they are 
 suitable. 
 
 3. The bridges and fords found more or less impassable, and 
 whether this applies to all arms; as regards bridges, the nature 
 of repair required, the quantity of material and labour that can 
 be obtained in the vicinity, and where ; estimate of time and 
 labour to execute the work, must be added. 
 
 4. Any spot that seems suitable for the construction of a 
 bridge, with full details; the material at hand and number of 
 boats with oars that can be procured 
 
 5. Whether there is any place that the Cavalry might 
 swim. 
 
 6. In frosty weather, if the ice will bear, search must be made 
 for sand, ashes, dung, &c. ; if, on the other hand, the frost has 
 only just commenced, supplies of straw and brushwood will be 
 found useful. When the ice begins to bear the weight of a man, 
 the straw or brushwood is laid i foot thick with the stalks at 
 right angles to the current, a fresh supply is then laid at right 
 angles to the first layer, water being poured over the whole at 
 intervals ; a bridge thus constructed will bear ammunition 
 waggons even after a thaw and when the ice itself is no longer 
 safe. 
 
 Advanced Guard Positions. — On most occasions the action of 
 an advanced guard is confined either to attacking a position, 
 barring the advance, or, if forced to assume the defensive, to 
 maintaining its ground. 
 
 It will, therefore, be rarely necessary to reconnoitre any special 
 position unless with the object of covering the deployment of the 
 main body after the passage of the latter through a defile. 
 
 The chief points in this latter case are — 
 
 A line with a clear field of fire, and without obstacles to a 
 forward movement, covering the exit of the defile, and so far 
 in advance that the movements of the main body, as it 
 debouches, cannot be seen, or that it is at any rate not exposed 
 to fire. 
 
 Hear Guard Positions. — The chief points in choosing a rear 
 guard position are — 
 
 That it shall cover the fine of retreat, and, if possible, hide the 
 direction taken by the main body; obstacles along the front 
 which, while allowing a clear field of fire, will compel the enemy 
 to undertake long turning movements, are of especial value. In 
 addition, if the retreat is conducted in succession. 
 
 («) The second position must not be so close to the first that, 
 in case of a disaster, the retiring troops and the enemy arrive 
 together, and the field of fire must be sufficiently extensive and 
 clear. 
 
 (b) It must, however, be close enough to permit the retiring 
 
DETA.CHED DUTIES. 103 
 
 troops to get under cover before the retreat becomes a rout. It 
 is, of course, impossible to lay down exactly what this distance 
 should be, but the effective range of Artillery on that particular 
 piece of ground will, as a general rule, be sufficient. 
 
 (c) It must be sufficiently far in front of a dehle to enable the 
 retiring troops to withdraw uumolested, and take position on 
 the far side. 
 
 S. 6. Requisitions. 
 
 Whenever troops leave the vicinity of railways, or precede 
 the main body by several marches, as is often the case with 
 cavalry, the regular issues from magazines must cease, and they 
 must depend on the very limited suppbes that can accompany 
 them, and on what can be obtained from the inhabitants. 
 
 As the system of requisitioning easily leads to plunder, creates 
 a hostile feebng amongst the inhabitants, and exhausts the 
 country it is necessary that it shoidd be carried out systematically, 
 and the slightest excess checked at once. 
 
 Requisitions, whenever possible, should be made through the 
 local authorities, only what is absolutely required being taken ; 
 and payment should be made, either on the spot, or by orders on 
 the commissariat. 
 
 With an unfriendly population, it is absolutely essential that 
 the party to carry out the requisition should arrive unexpectedly, 
 and occupy all the outlets as quickly as possible, not only to 
 prevent supplies being removed, but also to prevent notice of the 
 presence of the party being given to the enemy. 
 
 A party detailed to carry out a requisition tells off about one- 
 quarter of its strength, under an officer, to guard the outlets and 
 carry out the object in view ; as soon as all the approaches are 
 guarded, the head local authority is sent for and the place and 
 time for the supplies to be delivered clearly explained ; one or 
 two of the inhabitants are taken, if necessary as hostages, sentries 
 posted over any place in which suppbes are seen to exist, whilst 
 the remainder of the party take up a suitable position in the 
 direction of the enemy, posting look-out men, and sending out 
 patrols ; all individuals who come within the Hnes are to be 
 detained till the work is hushed. 
 
 After posting the main body, the commander accompanied by 
 a trumpeter, returns to the locality and superintends the loading 
 of the supplies, which should have been collected in an open 
 space. If there are no horses, but carts, &c, in the place, some 
 of the horses of the detachment must be harnessed to them. If 
 there are neither carts nor horses, the inhabitants must be made 
 to carry what is required in sacks or baskets; hay, straw, &c, 
 being tied on horses which are to be led. A horse can carry a 
 couple of cwt., in addition to his kit. 
 
 If the locality is deserted or the authorities decHne to assist a 
 portion of the party must be told off to search for the supplies 
 and bring them where they are to be laden. 
 
104 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 The return of the party should be made by a different road to 
 that they went by. Where there is a choice of a good road and 
 a bad, the former should be choseu for the return journey, aud 
 if necessary, some of the inhabitants should accompany the party 
 as hostages for a certain distance. 
 
 If the requisition has included horses and waggons, or cattle, 
 their drivers must be made to accompany the party. 
 
 If the object of the expedition is to cut green crops, the 
 detachment is similarly told off into a guard and a party to carry 
 out the immediate object in view. On arriving at the place, the 
 horses of the latter are linked; to each mower are allotted 
 two binders, and to each man with a sickle one binder ; before 
 starting, care must be taken to provide the party with the 
 necessary sickles and scythes, if the latter can be got. 
 
 The mowers are placed at one end of the ground, the men 
 with the sickles at the other. If no carts accompany the party, 
 care must be taken that the bundles are securely tied together 
 and on to the horses, and that they are put on as soon as made up. 
 
 If the enemy is in the neighbourhood, the mowers, &c, keep 
 their weapons by them. 
 
 In both cases, if the enemy attacks in such force as to oblige 
 the work to be broken off, the working party retires with as 
 much as they have secured whilst the guard covers their with- 
 drawal. 
 
 S. 7. A'scorts /or Prisoners. 
 
 These are generally composed of cavalry and infantry ; the 
 latter furnishes the defensive element in case of attack, whilst 
 a few of the former skirt the column to maintain order, the 
 remainder providing the advanced and rear guards aud Hankers. 
 A portion of the infantry precede, flank, and follow the column, 
 the remainder march concentrated as a reserve about the centre. 
 100 to 120 infantry and '25 to 30 cavalry should generally suffice 
 for 1000 prisoners. 
 
 The officer in command of the escort receives the route by 
 which he is to march, also a list, if possible a nominal roll, of the 
 prisoners under his charge ; and when handing them over he 
 should get a receipt. 
 
 Before starting, the prisoners should be warned that any 
 attempt to escape, or other insubordination, will result in their 
 being shot or cut down ; the weaker the escort the more severe 
 must be the measures to be taken. They are at the same time 
 to be told that if they behave well, they will be well treated. 
 
 The escort always loads in the presence of the prisoners. 
 
 The prisoners are to march in regular formation, on as broad 
 a front as possible, in the centre of the road, the officers separate 
 from the men. Any prisoners who show signs of insubordination 
 are to be separated from the remainder, and marched with their 
 hands tied together, under the control of specially selected men 
 from the escort. 
 
 Non-commissioned officers amongst the prisoners are to be 
 held responsible that discipline is maintained. Temporary halts 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 105 
 
 should be made on open ground, with, if possible, a stream, marsh, 
 or other impassable ground on one or more sides, but never in 
 woods or inhabited localities ; and the passage of these latter must 
 be avoided as far as practicable. 
 
 Arrangements must be made regarding food for the prisoners, 
 and cooking utensils provided in order to enable them to cook. 
 
 At night, if large barns or houses can be found in which to 
 place them, all the doors should be locked, except one, at which 
 a double sentry is placed, and a lantern must be kept burning. 
 If it is necessary to bivouac, the precautions are the same as for 
 temporary halts. 
 
 If the column is attacked, the whole of the prisoners are to lie 
 down, a portion of the escort remains to watch them, threatening 
 to shoot any that move, and the remainder resist the attack. 
 
 Escokt of Convoys. 
 
 The convoy may consist of waggons with supplies, or wounded, 
 remount horses, cattle, &c. 
 
 Before starting, the commander draws the convoy up on as 
 broad a front as possible, and it marches always in the same 
 consecutive order, each driver having a number. In a combined 
 convoy of waggons and animals, the former are to be in front. 
 
 As regards the tactical arrangements they must be such that 
 in case of attack, the engagement shall take place at some 
 distance from the convoy. "With this object, the escort is divided 
 into two parts ; the one, as weak as circumstances will permit, 
 maintains discipline amongst the drivers, and sees that the 
 column keeps properly closed up ; the other, consisting of the 
 main body, marches concentrated, covering the convoy with 
 advanced and rear guards and flankers. 
 
 If the enemy is in the vicinity, and the ground is broken, it is 
 advisable that the main bod}' should go from one defile or hill to 
 the next ; and the convoy should only follow when the ground, 
 particularly on the flanks, has been searched. 
 
 In case of attack, if the convoy cannot get away in time, a 
 lager is to be made, the cavalry escort attacking the enemy, 
 whilst the infantry defends the convoy. 
 
 Halts for the night must be made, as far as possible, in a spot 
 with a clear field of fire, and the waggons formed into a lager. 
 
 S. 8. Raids, Surprises, Sfc. 
 General Observations. 
 
 Although campaigns are principally decided by general actions, 
 these latter are merely the result of wide and complicated 
 combinations. 
 
 In order that an army may meet the enemy at a given point 
 with a good chance of success, it is necessary that all its arrange- 
 ments regarding the concentration of troops and their supply 
 with food, ammunition, &c, should be carried out undisturbed. 
 
 12 
 
106 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 All these arrangements depend, not only on military, but also 
 on political, technical, topographical, and financial considerations, 
 and in order to be successful must work harmoniously. 
 
 The interruption of a railway or telegraph line, the destruction 
 of an ammunition or supply column, the capture of a despatch, 
 may produce difficulties the results of which cannot be estimated. 
 
 Cavalry is the arm which must carry out the above enterprises, 
 and, as a rule, one or two squadrons at most are employed 
 together. The instructions for contact squadrons and officers' 
 patrols apply generally to squadrons detached to effect surprises 
 or lay an ambush. All their operations, however, on account 
 of their weak strength and isolated position, must be based on 
 effecting a surprise. 
 
 Surprises. 
 
 Surprises undertaken by cavalry alone (and it is only such that 
 are here intended) will be directed, as a rule, against the enemy's 
 outposts, bivouacs, small detachments on the march, convoys, 
 isolated magazines, railways, telegraphs. 
 
 To be successful, a surprise must generally be carefully 
 planned. The first consideration is to ascertain as far as 
 possible the enemy's position, numbers, precautious he takes, 
 &c. As soon as sufficient information regarding the above has 
 been obtained, the following points are those upon which the 
 success of the enterprise will chiefly depend, viz. : — 
 
 Time for carrying out the Operation. — As a rule the most con- 
 venient method is to arrive in the neighbourhood of the enemy 
 towards evening, take up a position under cover, and utilize the 
 night for making a thorough reconnaissance, and to carry out 
 the surprise about daybreak, if the enemy does not seem very 
 alert, or else after his morning patrols have returned. 
 
 Direction of March.— A. first necessity for success is that the 
 party should be able to approach undetected ; consequently, as a 
 rule, a long detour must be made to avoid discovery, and with a 
 view to taking the enemy in the flank or rear. 
 
 Order of March.— This must be as concentrated as possible to 
 avoid discovery ; there should be no noise, and measures must 
 be taken to avoid accoutrements rattling against each other. 
 
 The Attack.— The plan on which this is executed depends so 
 entirely on the ground and existing circumstances, that only 
 certain rules, which are applicable in nearly all cases, will be 
 here referred to. The essential is always to approach as close as 
 possible undiscovered, and then attack vigorously and quickly, 
 so as to be upon the enemy before he can form up or has realised 
 what is about to take place. 
 
 The whole of the dispositions must be made clear to all, and 
 certain definite signals, which cannot easily be misunderstood, 
 agreed upon. 
 
 The leader forms a portion of the force into a reserve, and 
 directs the remainder to attack from one or more sides ; attacks 
 from two or more sides produce much greater confusion amongst 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 107 
 
 the enemy than an attack from one side only ; on the other hand, 
 there is a greater risk of premature discovery, and care must be 
 taken that the attack shall be simultaneous. 
 
 The leader, accompanied by a trumpeter, posts himself with 
 the reserve in such a position that he can watch what goes on 
 and, if necessary, throw the reserve into the fight or order a 
 retreat; under no circumstances should he join personally in the 
 fight. 
 
 The line of eventual retreat must be arranged, also a spot 
 agreed upon which all are to make for in case the enterprise fails, 
 or too strong a force of the enemy suddenly appears. 
 
 On the march to the enemy the leader should have made up 
 his mind as regards this latter point, and every man of the party 
 must know where the place is and the way to it ; it is desirable 
 that it should lie on the general line of retreat, not too close to 
 the scene of action, and behind some natural obstacle. 
 
 Three signals will be sufficient for most cases : — 
 
 " Charge," — or better, a shrill whistle, as the signal for attack. 
 
 "Eally," — the attacking parties to join the reserve. 
 
 " Mount,"— every man to make the best of his way to the place 
 agreed on in case of failure. This signal is given instead of 
 "Eetire," or any similar call, so as to leave no loophole for 
 mistakes. 
 
 If the attack is made in the dark, each man should have a 
 distinguishing mark, such as a white band on the arm. 
 
 If the surprise is directed against a line of outposts, the whole 
 party, without paying attention to the vedettes, must make for 
 the piquet ; there is to be no firing. 
 
 Against troops in billets or bivouac, the first point is to cut 
 down the sentries, trumpeters, buglers or drummers, overpower 
 the guard, occupy the alarm post, and try and seize the com- 
 mander and other officers. 
 
 In the case of a cavalry bivouac, a party should be told off 
 specially to cut the horses loose from the piquet ropes. 
 
 Retreat. — If the surprise has been successful, the party must 
 return as quickly as possible to its own outposts by the shortest 
 road. On the return journey the march should not be too con- 
 centrated, and every precaution should be taken against surprise. 
 To appear unexpectedly and disappear rapidly are two axioms in 
 all surprises. 
 
 Ambushes. 
 
 These are surprises directed against troops, bearers of des- 
 patches, or convoys on the march, and in most points the 
 conditions of success are analogous. Beliable information 
 regarding the road the enemy marches by, his numbers, order of 
 march, and the precautions he takes are here the chief points. 
 Choice of Places for the Ambush.— They must be on the enemy's 
 | flank, as a rule, and, if possible, close to a defile, as he cannot be 
 \ in fighting formation whilst passing through it ; they should be 
 under cover, and with ground on which cavalry can act. 
 
108 DETACHED DUTIES. 
 
 The distance from his line of march depends chiefly on the 
 precautions the enemy is supposed to be in the habit of taking ; 
 if too close, there is a risk of being discovered by his patrols ; if 
 too distant, the advantages of a surprise are lost. 
 
 The party or parties remain hidden in the spot selected with- 
 out sending out look-out men and patrols, or at any rate not more 
 than one or two sentries, who are to be posted close by, in the 
 immediate flanks and rear. The leader must himself watch the 
 enemy's march so as to give the signal for attack at the right 
 moment ; neither a non-commissioned officer nor a private should 
 be entrusted with this duty. 
 
 The Attack. — The dispositions regarding the division of the 
 force, signals, &c, laid down for surprises, hold good for 
 ambushes. 
 
 The attack takes place as soon as so many of the enemy have 
 passed as it is considered the party can overpower. 
 
 The attack of a convoy never presents much difficulty, unless 
 the ambush is prematurely discovered by the patrols ; if this 
 has not taken place, the fore part of the convoy should be allowed 
 to pass, and the attack directed* against the centre. If the 
 ambush is discovered, or the enemy halts or hesitates, he must 
 be attacked at once, and as much damage done as possible ; it is 
 rarely advisable to retire without attempting an attack. 
 
 Retreat. — The measures laid down for surprises apply equally 
 to ambushes. 
 
 8. 9. Destruction of Railway and Telegraph Lines. 
 
 As a rule, the time and means at the disposal of parties of 
 cavalry employed for the above objects will only permit of the 
 partial interruption or destruction of railway and telegraph 
 lines. If the damage to be carried out is intended to be com- 
 plete, the work should be entrusted to troops specially trained, 
 as the more thorough their technical training has been, the 
 quicker and more systematically will the work proceed, and, 
 consequently, the longer its execution can be delayed — a point, 
 under certain circumstances, of the greatest importance. 
 
 The following are general rules : — 
 
 1 . Neither railway nor telegraph lines are to be damaged 
 without special orders, and these should always specify the 
 nature of the damage, whether to be partial, or as complete 
 as circumstances will permit. 
 
 2. Whenever possible, the work executed should be of such a 
 nature that it will not be easily detected ; for example, in 
 the case of a line of railway — 
 
 (a) Remove the fish plates, and shift the position of the 
 rails slightly ; or cut the sleepers under the rails and 
 simply replace the latter over the hollow thus made. 
 
 (b) In hot countries, insert wedges between the junctions 
 of rails, points, &c, thus opposing an obstacle to the 
 
DETACHED DUTIES. 109 
 
 extension produced by the sun's rays during the day. 
 This will cause deviations in the line in all directions, 
 (c) Cut the water supply for engines, especially in the 
 vicinity of steep gradients. 
 In the case of telegraph liues — 
 
 (a) Cut a wire and replace it by a stout piece of whipcord. 
 
 (b) Establish a "leak" by connection of the conductor 
 to earth. The connection may best be made along the 
 pole. 
 
 (c) Establish a "contact" between two wires. 
 
 Cutting down the poles takes time, and they can be 
 replaced almost as quickly as they can be cut down. 
 
 3. In extreme cases use gun cotton or dynamite. It is not 
 advisable to employ explosives, if the work can be carried 
 out without their help, as the noise produced must give the 
 enemy notice of the undertaking. 
 
 4. If a station is to be taken, the first thing is to interrupt 
 the railway and telegraphic communication on both sides; 
 next, approach as close as possible under cover, but rapidly, 
 and endeavour to surround the place; seize the officials and 
 registers, and place outposts. Cartridges of gun cotton or 
 dynamite can be placed so as to destroy the line in case the 
 enemy attacks before the operation is completed. 
 
 Subterranean Telegraphs. 
 
 Abroad, telegraph lines are very generally subterranean. 
 
 The existence of such a line being known or suspected, search 
 should be made for marks, generally blocks of wood or stone, 
 indicating the position of test boxes. These, however, may have 
 been removed, and in this case, a trench should be dug simul- 
 taneously on each side of the road, at right-angles to its axis, and 
 not close to a bridge or other construction, as there is generally 
 a deviation in the position of the cable in the neighbourhood of 
 bridges, &c. If the line exists, it will be found about three feet 
 below the surface, and a line of bricks or metal piping will 
 indicate its existence. 
 
 As the cable is usually enveloped in a casing of wire and 
 gutta percha, it is somewhat difficult to break it without 
 melting this outer covering, and this latter operation would 
 present, as a rule, great difficulty. The best course, probably, is 
 either to attempt to destroy the insulation by means of smart 
 blows with a farrier's axe or hammer, or else to cut the cable by 
 means of gun cotton. 
 
 Subterranean cables will be rarely interrupted by blowing up 
 a bridge, as they are seldom led over bridges, but are laid some 
 little distance above or below them. In this case, they must be 
 grappled for with a grapnel. 
 
110 
 
 Lecture XII. 
 
 The following is added to the course in accordance with CO., 
 29, 1887. 
 
 FOE CAPTAINS ONLY. 
 
 THE EMPLOYMENT OF HOESE AETILLEEY WITH 
 A DIVISION OF CAVALEY ACTING INDEPEN- 
 DENTLY. 
 
 It may be assumed that a division of Horse Artillery, consisting 
 of two or three batteries, will be attached to a Division of 
 Cavalry, when acting independently. 
 
 S. 1. Duties of the Officer Commanding the Artillery 
 with a Division of Cavalry. 
 
 1. There should be a special commanding officer for the 
 artillery ; one of the officers commanding batteries should not be 
 detailed for this post, as their interest should bo centred in 
 their own batteries. 
 
 2. He should be thoroughly acquainted not only with his own 
 arm, but with the formations, movements, and drill of cavalry. 
 
 3. When acting with cavalry he must have more independence 
 than when with infantry. This is not so necessary when the 
 cavalry forms merely a covering in front or rear of an army; but 
 in a fight, it is absolutely essential that he should be allowed a 
 certain freedom of action. 
 
 4. His place is with the commanding officer of the cavalry, 
 to learn his views and receive his general instructions, till his 
 batteries are in action, when his place is with them. 
 
 5. The most suitable position, then, for him is on the flank of 
 his batteries nearest the cavalry, where he will best be able to 
 observe the course of the fight. He should see that the ground, 
 both in front and rear, is carefully reconnoitred with reference 
 to advancing or retiring. 
 
 6. When the artillery has taken up its position for the fight, 
 it is, to a great extent, left to its own resources, and the officer 
 commanding must, after receiving general instructions from the 
 commander of the cavalry, use his own discretion as to the best 
 way of conforming to the cavalry movements, at the same time 
 giving them as much assistance as possible. 
 
 8. 2. Escorts. 
 
 1 . A special escort will be given to batteries of artillery only 
 when their isolated position renders it necessary. A squadron, 
 as a rule, will be sufficient for the purpose. 
 
EMPLOYMENT OP HORSE ARTILLERY. Ill 
 
 2. The duty of the escort is to protect the guns "when limbered 
 up and on the move, and when in action, against surprise ; and 
 to do this effectually it should throw out scouts in any direction 
 from which the enemy's troops should creep up unobserved. 
 
 3. In the cavalry fight, the different phases follow one another 
 with great rapidity, and the dust and conformation of the ground 
 will probably quite conceal any threatening movements against 
 the guns ; so that without special protection the action of the 
 guns might be paralysed, and heavy losses inflicted by small 
 bodies of an enterprising enemy. 
 
 4. A cavalry escort should be on the most exposed flank of 
 the eruns, well screened from view, in echelon to the rear. In 
 an open plain it may be at a distance of 100 or 200 yards, but 
 should there be cover in the vicinity it will, of course, be taken 
 advantage of. It should never be placed directly in rear of the 
 battery when in action, as in such a position it is exposed to the 
 fire which may be directed against the guns. 
 
 5. As a general rule when the guns advance at a gallop to 
 take up a position, the escort should move forward at a rather 
 slower pace, so that the horses may arrive at their post fresh and 
 ready for a charge, should such be necessary to repel an attack 
 on the guns. 
 
 6. When a battery is retiring in action, the escort should 
 allow the guns to pass it, and will then move steadily to the 
 rear on the exposed flank of the battery, halting when the guns 
 come into action as close to them as circumstances and cover will 
 allow. 
 
 7. When the escort is sufficiently numerous and the ground 
 suitable, it may occasionally be advisable to dismount some of 
 the escort with carbines, while the battery is in action, in order to 
 check the advance of an enemy on the exposed flank of tho guns. 
 
 8. 3. Formations. 
 
 1 . The most compact and handiest "rendezvous formation " is 
 a line of quarter columns of divisions, without battery intervals. 
 
 2. When expecting to be engaged, or about to cross difficult 
 ground, the quarter column should be opened to deploying in- 
 tervals ; they are then ready at any moment to form line. 
 
 3. In changing direction on the move, it is best to work on 
 the two centre guns, one flank increasing and the other dimi- 
 nishing the pace. 
 
 4. In action, echelon of batteries is generally the best formation 
 as admitting of ready conformity to the changes of the action. 
 
 IS. 4. On the March. 
 
 1 . The artillery should march as near the head of the column 
 as is consistent with its safety, in order that it may be brought 
 into action without delay, and remain in action as long as 
 
112 EMPLOYMENT OP HORSE ARTILLERY. 
 
 possible. Should the cavalry Division be marching on one road, 
 it is probable that one of the Brigades vail be detailed as ad- 
 vanced guard, and be furnished with a battery ; in this ease the 
 battery would march immediately in rear of the main body of 
 the advanced guard. 
 
 The batteries with the main bodies of the Division should 
 march together in rear of the leading regiment. 
 
 2. Should the brigades be operating separately, each would 
 furnish its own advanced guard ; and the battery, if attached to 
 the advanced guard, would march immediately in rear of the 
 main body of the advanced guard ; if left with the maiu body of 
 the brigade, its place will be in rear of the leading squadron. 
 
 3 The Division being formed for attack in three lines, the 
 batteries should be formed in line, or quarter columns of 
 divisions, at full intervals ; in the latter case the columns should 
 be at deploying intervals. The batteries should be, if possible, 
 on the protected flank of the cavalry, in line with, or in rear of 
 the first line. 
 
 S. 5. With the advanced Guard. 
 
 1. The artillery with the advanced guard should never be 
 pushed forward with the troops actually engaged in recon- 
 naissance, whose whole attention should be devoted to their own 
 peculiar duties, which are to observe, and not to fight ; the 
 presence of the guns would only hinder them, and impede their 
 movements and retreat if driven in. 
 
 2. As soon as the advance is checked, and the advanced 
 parties either driven in, or brought to a standstill by the enemy, 
 who may be occupying a position, the commander of the ad- 
 vanced guard, accompanied by the commander of the battery, 
 will proceed to the front, personally to reconnoitre and decide as 
 rapidly as possible whether to push on or fall back ; should he 
 determine to attack with the advanced guard, he will direct the 
 latter to bring his battery up to a position whence he can 
 cannonade the enemy, whilst the cavalry advances and threatens 
 the flanks of the enemy's position. 
 
 3. In taking up this and all other positions for a similar pur- 
 pose, the greatest care must be taken to select one whence fire 
 can be maintained as long as possible ; that is where the cavalry, 
 by their advance, will not mask the guns and oblige them to 
 cease firing. 
 
 The cavalry commander in his advance, and the artillery com- 
 mander by the position he takes up, must co-operate to obtain 
 this most important result. 
 
 The artillery should as a rule advance straight to its front and 
 gallop at once to a decisive range of say 1,5UU yards and open 
 fire, as it is better to be prompt on meeting with a check than 
 to waste time in finding the best possible position. 
 
EMPLOYMENT OF HOESE ARTILLERY. 113 
 
 4. Should the enemy's position be very strongly held, and 
 should he be provided with artillery and infantry, it will at once 
 be clear that he cannot, unless greatly demoralised, be forced out 
 of it by the advanced guard alone. The battery should on no 
 account be allowed to maintain an artillery duel, and fire away 
 its ammunition with a doubtful result. 
 
 5. The supply of ammunition to horse artillery acting with 
 cavalry at some distance from the army is a matter attended 
 with great difficulty, and it is most important that it should 
 always have a supply at hand. 
 
 6. Should the advance guard succeed in driving back the 
 enemy, the order of march should be resumed. 
 
 S. G. With the Bear Guard. 
 
 1 . With a rear guard covering the retreat of an army, and 
 expecting constantly to be in contact with the enemy, probably 
 more than one battery will be employed. Here the object is to 
 delay the enemy, which can best be done by the fire of the guns, 
 which will cause him to deploy at a great distance. 
 
 2. Every position from which this can be done should be 
 occupied, and with two or more batteries the retreat should be 
 made alternately — one battery retiring, covered by the fire of 
 others which have already been withdrawn to positions in rear. 
 
 3. Guns so employed should be protected by a strong escort. 
 
 4. To act defensively with effect, the cavalry must dismount, 
 and the battery should come into action behind the line of the 
 dismounted men. When it is decided to fall back, the battery 
 should limber up and retire, followed by the cavalry, who would 
 meanwhile have taken to their horses. 
 
 S. 7. The Fiyht of the Division. 
 
 1. The object of the artillery is first to silence the enemy's 
 guns ; but as soon as his cavalry appears, the fire should be 
 turned on his first line, and continued on it till the latest moment 
 compatible with the safety of our cavalry. Then the fire should 
 be directed against the second and third lines, the latter of 
 which, if the position for the guns has been well chosen, it 
 should be possible to fire at during the charge. 
 
 2. As the time for preparing the attack by the artillery will 
 be comparatively short, immediately the cavalry has resolved 
 to attack, the artillery, without preparatory cannonade, should 
 advance as rapidly as possible with its escort to a distance not 
 exceeding a third of the whole space separating the cavalry and 
 the object of its attack. Here it should come into action, and 
 fire steadily at the enemy till its fire is masked by its own 
 cavalry in their advance. 
 
 3. If well placed it need fear no front attack. Cavalry seldom 
 venture to attack well-placed and efficiently-served guns. 
 
114 EMPLOYMENT OF HORSE ARTILLERY. 
 
 4. The batteries should be massed and their fire concentrated 
 as much as possible, so that the movements of the cavalry may 
 not be seriously impeded by the dispersion of the artillery over 
 a large front. 
 
 5. The advance of the guns should be, if practicable, on the 
 protected flarik of the cavalry, directly in the direction of the 
 enemy, while the cavalry will probably advance obliquely to the 
 enemy's line to endeavour to take it in flank : the enemy seeing 
 his flank thus threatened will wheel up his first and second lines, 
 which may thus be taken in flank by the fire of the guns. 
 
 6. By attacking in this manner, pivoting on and supported by 
 the batteries, who are firing directly on the enemy, two important 
 advantages are gained ; first the, enemy is driven to expose 
 himself to a flank fire ; second, if his guns, as presumably they 
 will be, are opposite to our guns, our cavalry will be wholly or 
 partly sheltered from their fire by the oblique movement of the 
 enemy's cavalry. 
 
 7. It must be recollected that the time available for the guns 
 to fire is very short ; the advance must therefore be made with, 
 the utmost rapidity, and as far to the front as possible, in order 
 that the fire may be sustained till the opposing cavalry are about 
 to meet, and that then the enemy's reserves may be brought 
 under fire. 
 
 8. The position of the guns once taken up should not bo changed 
 unless absolutely necessary ; but when the whole of the third 
 line is engaged in the melee, and there remains nothing further 
 to fire at, the limbers should be brought up, and the batteries 
 held in readiness to move. As, however, it is from the third 
 line, or bodies detached therefrom, that the greatest risk to the 
 guns comes, it would be highly imprudent to limber up till the 
 whole of the enemy's cavalry is engaged, and till there is no 
 chance of the guns being again brought into action with effect 
 without a change of position. 
 
 With three batteries, however, it is considered well, as soon as 
 the charge takes place, to limber up the one on the outer flank, 
 and hold it in readiness to advance if the charge is successful 
 and the enemy retires, in order at once to co-operate in the 
 pursuit. 
 
 9. Should the cavalry by their charge, or by dismounted men 
 take a position the possession of which is important, then as 
 many guns as may be necessary should be advanced without a 
 moment's delay to aid in the defence, so as to prevent the enemy 
 from re-forming and attempting to re-take it, and to operate on 
 his line of retreat. 
 
 10. After a successful Charge. — Should the combat have been 
 successful, the enemy's cavalry, on their retirement, will be 
 exposed to the oblique fire of the guns from their first position, 
 which need not be changed. 
 
 If, however, his retreat be not in such a direction that the 
 guns can act upon him, they should all be advanced in such a. 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT OF HORSE ARTILLERY. 115 
 
 manner as to act upon his flank, to break his resistance and 
 complete his defeat. To do this the batteries should be advanced 
 in echelon ; and coming alternately into action, a ceaseless fire 
 should be maintained, and no rest or chance of re-forming left 
 to the enemy. 
 
 11. When the Charge has been unsuccessful. — In this case the 
 artillery, remaining in their first position, offer a solid rallying 
 point for the cavalry to retire on, either for covering their retreat, 
 or for enabling them to re-form and resume the offensive. 
 
 This is perhaps the most important rdle of the artillery ; if 
 efficiently carried out, it may prevent a disaster, and perhaps 
 lead to a victory. If, however, directly the cavalry appears to 
 be defeated, the guns are withdrawn to a backward position, 
 this becomes impossible : the guns must therefore hold on with 
 tenacity to their position. 
 
 12. When the cavalry is defeated and pursued by the enemy 
 in the direction of the batteries, the task of the latter becomes 
 a very difficult one ; the pursuing enemy must be stopped at all 
 risks, and it will be a matter of the greatest difficulty not to 
 injure our own cavalry by the fire of the guns. 
 
 13. When there is no hope of restoring the equilibrium of the 
 fight, and the only alternative is a retreat, which must be covered 
 by the guns, the batteries should be withdrawn by echelon. This 
 movement on the part of the artillery should not be undertaken 
 without orders from the cavalry commander, whose duty it is 
 to inform the artillery commander of his intention. 
 
 14. The retreat is thus carried out by a division of two or 
 three batteries. The inner batteries, that is those nearest to the 
 melee, retire first, and take up a position in rear, as a point for 
 the cavalry to retire on, under cover of their fire ; the outer 
 battery remains to cover the retreat of the cavalry, and to repel, 
 by means of its fire, with the aid of any small bodies of the 
 third line which are still unbroken, the enemy's attacks. The 
 pursuit of the latter being checked, the rear battery should be 
 withdrawn to the position occupied by the other guns. 
 
 15. As in the pursuit, the most effective action of the artillery 
 will be on the enemy's flanks ; it should therefore be the object 
 of the cavalry to endeavour to draw their pursuers in a direction 
 oblique to the line occupied by the guns. 
 
 16. When the retreating cavalry has to pass a defile, the guns 
 should be hurried through it, and take up a position in rear of it, 
 whence they can take the pursuing troops in flank, and check 
 their advance, by which the cavalry will nearly always be able to 
 pass it in safety. 
 
 Horse artillery should never retire faster than a trot. 
 
 8. 8. The Passage of Defiles. 
 
 Defiles will always be passed in a methodical manner in the 
 presence of an enemy. 
 
116 EMPLOYMENT OF HORSE ARTILLERY. 
 
 1 . Officers' patrols will reconnoitre the nature of the passage, 
 and look for means of turning it whilst the advanced guard 
 and main body halt under cover. 
 
 2. The artillery will take up two positions so as to bring a 
 cross fire to bear on the entrance. 
 
 3. If the defile is apparently unoccupied, patrols will pass 
 through and scout sufficiently far on the opposite side to 
 make certain that there will be sufficient time for the 
 main body not only to pass, but to deploy ; a brigade 
 of twelve squadrons in sections, with a battery, fomis 
 a column of about three-quarters of a mile, and will 
 consequently take about six minutes to pass a bridge at a 
 trot. 
 
 4. If the defile is occupied, and cannot be turned, it will be 
 attacked by the artillery, and a suitable force of dismounted 
 men. If the attack is successful, the column will pass with 
 the following precautions : — Half the artillery and a 
 proportion of cavalry pass first and take up a position on the 
 far side, with dismounted men on each side of the defile to 
 act as a support. The remainder of the column follows at 
 a suitable distance. 
 
 5. The front on which the defile is passed will never exceed 
 half a breadth of the road. 
 
 6. If the defile can be turned, the enemy must be held in 
 front by demonstrations whilst the turning movement is 
 carried out. 
 
 
117 
 
 Lecture Xlll. 
 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 TACTICS AS INFLUENCED BY FIEE. 
 
 General Observations. 
 
 Necessity of Peace training for War. — The more carefully troops 
 are trained to do during peace what -will be required of them 
 in time of war, the more efficient they will prove when they take 
 the field. It is a recognised fact that men who are in ordinary 
 times taught and frequently practised to act in a particular 
 manner, will, from acquired habit, under somewhat similar 
 conditions, do the same in moments of great mental strain, and 
 will, even under heavy fire, act, as it were instinctively, ac- 
 cording to well-established custom. 
 
 Eilicacy of fire can only be obtained when men keep their 
 presence of mind ; and to obtain the best results, there must be 
 good organization, strict discipline, and constant practice. 
 
 II. 
 
 Considerations influencing the fight. — A clear uninterrupted field 
 for the use of the rifle is necessary in order that the greatest 
 efficacy of fire may be obtained. Victory depends not so much 
 on the losses inflicted upon the enemy as on the moral effect 
 produced by a determination to hold Avhat has been won, or to 
 advance, as may be ordered. 
 
 Modern fire-arms have greatly increased the power of defence; 
 superior numbers should therefore be employed in the attack, 
 and deficiency in this respect can only be compensated for by 
 skilful leading. 
 
 Commanders must bear in mind the considerable distances to 
 be traversed and the fatigue to be undergone by troops ad- 
 vancing to the attack under the conditions of modern war, and, 
 in view of the final effort of the fight, must husband the strength 
 of their men by every means in their power. 
 
 The fire to which attacking troops are exposed may be 
 appropriately divided into three zones. The first zone begins at 
 about 3,000 yards from the enemy's guns, and is about 1,300 
 
 13a 
 
118 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 yards in depth, its further limit being at about 1,700 yards from 
 the infantry of the enemy's position, at which distance unaimed 
 rifle fire begins to tell. This first zone may be regarded as a 
 purely artillery zone. The second zone begins at the furthest 
 limit of the first zone, and extends to within about 800 yards of 
 the enemy's infantry, at which distance aimed rifle fire becomes 
 very effective, and the fire of artillery very deadly. The third 
 zone extends from the further limit of the second zone up to the 
 enemy's infantry. 
 
 III. 
 
 Conditions regulating Formations. — Although the history of war 
 shows that rules have often to be set aside, yet normal tactical 
 formations have a real absolute value, and when adapted to the 
 configuration of the ground, and to the nature and condition of 
 the troops, seldom fail to influence favourably the issue of 
 a contest. 
 
 The manner in which troops must fight will be governed very 
 much by the numbers employed. In a battle, most of those 
 engaged are restricted as to their front by the presence of others 
 on either side of them ; whereas in a small combat, the front of 
 an independent detachment is limited only by consideration of 
 ground, the maintenance of cohesion, and the position of the 
 enemy. 
 
 The following conditions should be kept in view in adopting 
 formations of attack against disciplined and well-armed troops. 
 
 Formations should — 
 
 (1) Admit of the most efficacious fire at all times, and of its 
 
 greatest development at the decisive moment. 
 
 (2) Present a difficult target to the enemy's fire. 
 
 (3) Allow of the best use of any cover that can be advan- 
 
 tageously made use of. 
 
 (4) Afford the greatest mobility at all times. 
 
 (5) Admit readily of reinforcement. 
 
 (6) Lend themselves to the maintenance of command. 
 Troops opposed to modern rifles should pass over fire-swept 
 
 zones in extended order by successive Hnes ; those in rear 
 feeding the firing line, in such strength as will enable it to 
 maintain its fire power, and give fresh vitality to the attack. 
 The formation should allow of a sufficient body in rear being 
 always available as reinforcements whenever the firing line 
 requires a fresh impulse; and thus enable troops to approach 
 the enemy with as much rapidity as is consistent with steadiness 
 and an effective fire, while the destructive effect of the enemy's 
 fire is lessened, and decisive ranges are reached with compara- 
 tively slight loss 
 
 In disposing troops on the field of battle such formations as 
 will ensure the most efficient fire should be adopted; but the 
 weapons of the adversary, and the probable effects of his fire, 
 

 INFANTKY TACTICS. 119 
 
 must also be considered. Close formations may be used against 
 savages who adopt sbock tactics, or an enemy unarmed with 
 modern weapons; they give a greater moral support to and 
 control over the men, and admit of the ready transmission of 
 orders, but diminish the front of fire. 
 
 AETILLEEY FIEE. 
 1. Artillery Zone. 
 
 The extreme range of usefid field artillery fire may be said to 
 be 3,000 yards. Artillery officers claim effective action for their 
 guns at much greater ranges, but it is not necessary for infantry 
 to practise formations intended to lessen the effect of artillery 
 fire at longer ranges than those at which objects can be clearly 
 seen. As the range increases, infantry fire, compared with that 
 of artillery, decreases very rapidly in accuracy, and becomes so 
 uncertain as not to be worth the expenditure of ammunition. 
 
 Thus, whilst the distance at which the effect of fire can be 
 observed practically fixes the extreme range of useful artillery 
 fire, good infantry should make artillery pay heavily for coming 
 into action within the effective range of rifle fire. 
 
 2. Infantry versus Artillery. 
 
 A good effect can be obtained by infantry fire on batteries of 
 artillery up to 1,500, and in some cases even up to 1,700 yards. 
 Infantry, exposed to artillery fire, at a range a little beyond that 
 of rifle fire, should be advanced to within effective rifle range ; 
 when both arms are equally well trained — even when the in- 
 tervening ground is open — it should be difficult for artillery, by 
 its fire alone, to prevent infantry in extended order from pushing 
 across the first zone, and closing to this range, but against in- 
 fantry in masses it can cope single-handed. Within effective 
 rifle range of skirmishers, guns, unsupported by infantry fire, 
 will suffer severely. 
 
 When engaged with infantry, artillery will, if it has the 
 choice, at first take-up a range exceeding 1,700 yards; but, in 
 the course of the action, it may, for some special reason, push 
 on here and there to within that range. Unless supported by 
 infantry, artillery can, however, rarely, and never without 
 extreme risk, advance nearer than this to unbroken infantry; 
 but against disorganized troops, and with the support of the 
 other arms, artillery may fight at the very shortest ranges, 
 especially on the defensive. 
 
 When it is necessary to employ infantry alone against artillery, 
 a distinction must be made, if the artillery is occupied elsewhere 
 or not. When a battery is in action against artillery, the fire 
 of a smaller number of infantry may be opposed to it than when 
 it is not occupied elsewhere. 
 
120 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 Should artillery attempt to advance into position within range 
 of infantry while the latter are still intact and are not engaged 
 with infantry, they should endeavour to throw the artillery into 
 disorder before it can unlimber. Artillery, on the move, is 
 much more vulnerable than when in action, as it then offers a 
 large target. When artillery is in motion, is unlimbering or 
 limbering up, the teams form the best target; at other times 
 the gunners. 
 
 If it is necessary to employ a small force of infantry (say 50 
 men) against artillery otherwise engaged, the infantry fire 
 should be concentrated on one gun at a time. "When concen- 
 trating fire on individual guns, that to windward should be 
 attacked first, as it is the most free from smoke, and from that 
 flank the observation of fire is conducted. When individual 
 gunners can be noticed, those bringing up ammunition should 
 be fired at first, as on their movements the rapidity of the fire 
 depends. 
 
 3. Artillery ln the Attack. 
 
 After some little preliminary skirmishing between the ad- 
 vanced cavalry of both sides, all actions, great and small, begin 
 with an artillery contest, when the attacking side, bringing all 
 its guns into action, strains every nerve to subdue the artillery 
 fire of the defence so as to allow its own infantry to cross the 
 first zone, and engage the opposing infantry at effective rifle 
 range. The attack at the opening of an action, concentrates 
 therefore its artillery fire first on the artillery, and when the 
 enemy's artillery fire is fairly silenced, then on his infantry, and 
 especially upon the strong tactical points of the defence. Whilst 
 this artillery contest is proceeding, the infantry deploy for the 
 attack, and should drive in all the enemy's detachments in front 
 of this position. When this has been accomplished, the gem ral 
 in command will decide when it is fitting to push forward his 
 artillery to within the more effective range of about 2,000 yards 
 of the enemy's guns. When the attacking infantry has crossed 
 the first zone, and reached within effective range of the enemy, 
 its fire supplements that of the artillery. Upon reaching the 
 limits of the third zone, its fire becomes deadly, and as soon as 
 the preparation is complete, the actual attack is delivered. It 
 is infantry fire which really decides the issue. 
 
 When the guns are pushed forward, infantry in advance may 
 be required to keep the infantry of the enemy from approaching 
 within effective rifle fire of the guns. These supporting bodies 
 may be called for from the nearest available troops. 
 
 In the preparatory advance to the attack, every feature of the 
 ground is taken advantage of to bring up infantry, under cover, 
 to an effective range, without undue exposure to the enemy's 
 fire ; but ground will not always favour an advance, and it is 
 then to be remembered that it is the density of the formation 
 
INFANTKY TACTICS. 120A 
 
 which is the greatest cause of loss. The ground covered by the 
 bursting of a shell is far greater in depth than in width. The 
 range and accuracy of modern arms preclude the manoeuvring 
 of infantry in dense formations within effective range of the 
 enemy's artillery. 
 
 The rules which govern the use of artillery in large battles 
 are very different from those for smaller combats. In the 
 former the artillery of an Army Corps requires a front of about 
 2,000 yards, and will be compelled to occupy some portion of 
 the ground over which the infantry must advance ; but when 
 acting with a small force, artillery can generally choose its own 
 positions, and fight on the flanks of the infantry, or in any 
 intervals in the line ; it will also probably be able to do so in 
 the later phases of more serious engagements. 
 
 Batteries will never hesitate to fire over their own infantry if 
 circumstances require it. 
 
 
 4. Deeexce against Artillery. 
 
 In the defence, some of the infantry may occupy a forward 
 position for a first line of resistance ; they will be able to delay 
 the advance of the hostile artillery, or to make it suffer losses 
 while still distant from the main position. These troops should 
 be specially detailed, and should be distiact from those entrusted 
 with the main line of defence. 
 
 At the commencement of an attack the fire of the advancing 
 infantry is not very serious, as artillery alone then fire with 
 efficacy. The defence, too cannot expect much effect from their 
 fire against the infantry of the attack whilst at a distance and 
 in a scattered formation. But infantry well posted, and with 
 the knowledge of the distances, which can be more easily 
 1 obtained by the defence, can always, even at long ranges, inflict 
 serious loss upon the artillery of the attack. 
 
 5. Notes regarding Artillery Fire. 
 
 1 . Artillery, when once posted in a good position, will try to 
 remain in it as long as its fire is effective. Guns can only be of 
 I use as long as they are stationary. 
 
 Artillery will usually adopt a formation that will enable the 
 fire to be directed by the will of one man. 
 
 3. A cessation of fire at any time will probabby mean that the 
 battery is about to move. Tire shoidd be directed on the teams 
 as they come up. 
 
 4. The trajectory of modern high velocity guns is low; all 
 1 cover, therefore, becomes more valuable to infantry as it gets 
 
 closer to them, for their accuracy is practically as great at 1,500 
 as at 500 yards. 
 
121 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 5. When taking up a position with the object of firing on 
 artillery, infantry should bear in mind that artillery, as a rule, 
 prefer high ground, and will not, if possible, come into action 
 within range of visible infantry, who are not engaged with 
 other troops. 
 
 6. Infantry should avoid the neighbourhood of conspicuous 
 objects (trees, houses, stone walls, &c), as these assist artillery 
 in finding its range. A small hollow, or soft ground, im- 
 mediately in front of infantry is very baffling to the enemy's 
 artillery, as is also a position some distance in rear of the crest 
 of a plateau. 
 
 7. The fire from a battery generally begins from a flank with 
 common shell to ascertain the range ; when the range is ascer- 
 tained by the bursting of the shell on impact and the fire 
 becomes accurate, the fire may then be regular. 
 
 8. The fire of common shell by the enemy will generally 
 precede that of shrapnel ; the short pause between the two will 
 give an excellent opportunity for a skirmishing line to push in ; 
 in which case the enemy's battery will have to find its range 
 again. 
 
 N.B. — Common shell burst on impact : shrapnel are meant to 
 burst in the air in front of the object fired at, but if fitted with 
 time and percussion fuze, will also burst on impact. 
 
 9. Infantry, suffering from artillery fire, will often incur | 
 greater loss by retiring than by advancing. 
 
 10. If the enemy fires a salvo, it often indicates that the 
 infantry is so well placed that it is difficult for him to observe J 
 the effect of his fire. 
 
 11. One or two shrapnel which burst well in front of 
 advancing infantry often mark the spot on which the enemy 
 intends to open a rapid fire of shrapnel when he considers that 
 the infantry are within reach of the bullets. The intervening 
 space should be crossed as quickly as possible. 
 
 12. The appearance of individual officers on a probable 
 artillery position is a sign that guns are coming ; the neighbour- 
 ing infantry should then remain concealed, if possible, and in 
 readiness to overwhelm the guns with a destructive rifle fire. 
 
 13. To disable guns. 
 
 (i) Breech-loaders. 
 
 Open the breech, and if possible remove some portion of the 
 breech mechanism, or bend or burr it with the handspike. 
 N.B —Many modern guns have removable vents ; it is of 
 no use to spike these. 
 
 (ii) Muzzle-loader3. 
 Spike the guns. 
 
 (hi) All guns. 
 
 Carry away linch-pins and tangent-scales; break elevating 
 wheels and trunnion-sights. 
 
INFANTRY TACTICS. 121a 
 
 INFANTRY FIRE. 
 
 1. Cone of Fire. 
 
 In the first zone the infantry fire of both sides counts for very 
 little ; the best positions in that zone should therefore be 
 allotted to the artillery, on the effectiveness of whose fire every- 
 thing then depends. 
 
 When a volley is fired, each rifle being directed on the same 
 object, the paths of the bullets in the air form a curved cone of 
 fire more or less dispersed in relation to distance and to the 
 steadiness of the firers, making instantaneously a group of hits 
 similar in deviation to a group made by the same number of 
 shots fired consecutively by one man. The volley is therefore 
 in itself more immediately effective than a succession of shots 
 fired by an individual ; it is the only method of firing which 
 allows of complete control, direction, and concentration, on which 
 essentials the full efficiency of fire in action depends ; it also 
 admits of correction of elevation and direction by observing 
 where the bullets strike, enables the expenditure of ammunition 
 to be regulated, and is the best fire to be used in pursuit or 
 whenever it is necessary to get men in hand and keep them 
 steady. 
 
 Volley firing should therefore be continued by attacking 
 troops as long as possible. Independent firing should only be 
 resorted to by the firing line immediately before the final charge 
 or when in close proximity to the enemy. The smoke it creates 
 will be in many instances a good screen for the line coming up 
 in rear of the firing line to deliver this final charge. Dropping 
 individual fire carried on here and there produces little result, 
 and has the drawback of slackening the advance ; it is more 
 adapted for skirmishers and scouts. 
 
 To understand the form of the cone of fire in relation to the 
 distance from which it is delivered, and how to apply it, or 
 receive it, on varied configurations of ground, must be the 
 careful study of officers, as it governs the disposition and for- 
 mation of troops whether in attack or defence. 
 
 The curve or angle of descent increases in proportion to the 
 distance ; at the same time the section of the cone increases, and 
 the density of the fire is consequently decreased. 
 
 The beaten zone is that portion of ground struck by bullets 
 fired with the same elevation, and directed on the same object; 
 it decreases as the range increases, owing to the greater curve 
 of the trajectory; the width of ground beaten increases with 
 the range. 
 
 As an example of the application of these principles ; when 
 firing against rising ground, or against troops in movement or 
 presenting considerable depth, a dispersed cone (caused either 
 by distant fire, or by using varied elevations, or by aiming with 
 the same elevation at different spots) would be most effective; 
 when firing against falling ground, or compact bodies, or 
 
122 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 attacking cavalry, a close cone would give the best results ; in 
 both cases the required form of the cone being determined by 
 the degree of rise or fall of the ground from the line of sight. 
 
 When troops are holding a plateau, and the upward fire of 
 the advancing enemy directed on its crest is from comparatively 
 short distances, the defenders should be drawn towards the crest, 
 where they would be safer, and also best posted to repulse the 
 enemy ; but when the fire is distant they would be safer 
 withdrawn from the crest ; the position in either case depend- 
 ing upon the height of the plateau and the distance of the 
 enemy's fire. 
 
 2. Description of Fire. 
 
 Volley firing should be used in the attack as long as possible, 
 and as a rule it should be by sections. At long ranges the fire 
 unit should generally be the half company, in order to give the 
 full effect which a concentration of lire produces ; but a good 
 volley can rarely be delivered by a larger unit than the section. 
 
 Independent fire is difficult to control in the attack, and 
 should be postponed as long as possible ; when troops once 
 begin independent firing, it is most difficult to induce them to 
 rise with one impulse and dash at a firm enemy. 
 
 The more thoroughly the habit of firing volleys at the closest 
 ranges is acquired by troops in peace practices, the longer -will 
 it be possible to fire by volleys in actual fig lit. For this reason 
 independent firing is not to be used except, as already explained, 
 in connection with the final charge upon the position, or at close 
 ranges. 
 
 In offensive operations the preparation of the attack belongs 
 to the artillery, and the firing line should not, as a rule, open 
 fire until the second stage of the attack commences ; and only 
 then if the ground be open, and does not admit of a closer 
 advance without firing. No battle has ever been won at long 
 ranges, owing to the uncertainty of the fire, and the feeling of 
 security which distance engenders. 
 
 On the defensive, however, especially against large bodies of 
 troops, and efficacious fire may often be directed at the extreme 
 ranges to which the rifle is sighted. Apart from other results, 
 this long-range fire will compel the assailants to open out sooner 
 than they intended, thus greatly increasing the difficulties of the 
 advance, possibly inducing them to return the fire, and to 
 prematurely expend their ammunition, which it may not be 
 possible to replace. 
 
 Experience teaches that the expenditure of ammunition is 
 greatest when long-range fire has been employed. Consequently, 
 a commander should carefully consider his supply of ammunition 
 and the means of replenishing it before he decides to use such 
 fire. It should not be undertaken by those troops which are 
 destined for the assault, unless an ample supply of ammunition 
 is at hand. 
 
 
INFANTE Y TACTICS. 122A 
 
 3. Limits of the Employment of Fire with the Martini- Henry Rifle. 
 
 The limits of the employment of rifle fire depend on know- 
 ledge of the range, and the features of the ground In the field, 
 the moral condition of the troops, and the quantity of ammuni- 
 tion at their disposal, must also be taken into consideration. 
 These limits, therefore, cannot be absolutely fixed, but the result 
 of numerous experiments enables certain general rules to be 
 established. 
 
 On troops in close order, volley firing by sections will be 
 found effective, if it be well regulated and directed — 
 
 At 800 yards, on a small section. 
 
 At 1,000 yards, on a large section. 
 
 At 1,200 yards, on a half company, and on a division of 
 artillery, i.e.; two guns. 
 
 From 1,400 to 1,700 yards, on battalion or company columns, 
 and on compact bodies of artillery or cavalry. 
 
 4. Classification of Distances. 
 
 For the sake of convenience, firing distances with the rifle 
 may be classified as follows : — 
 
 Up to 400 yards, " Short Distances ; " 
 
 From 400 to 800 yards, " Medium Distances ; " 
 
 From 800 to 1,700 yards, "Long Distances;' 1 
 
 From 1,700 yards and upwards, "Extreme Distances.' 1 '' 
 
 5. On the relative vulnerability of various formations on open ground. 
 
 At "short" distances, to a fairly good shot, a man kneeling 
 is but little less vulnerable than a man standing up ; at 
 "medium" distances the vulnerability of a line of skirmishers 
 is clearly proportional to its density, •".*., to the intervals between 
 the men. The vulnerability of a section in close order will 
 generally necessitate its extension at distances between 700 and 
 900 yards ; at shorter distances deep formations are very vul- 
 nerable, even when they present a narrow front ; troops with an 
 extended front allow of the fire upon them being easily regulated 
 as regards direction, but at " long" distances their vulnerability 
 is not great, owing to their shallowness when passing through 
 the dangerous zone. 
 
 Formations in column on a fairly broad front ; such as a strong 
 company in column of sections, are very vulnerable objects. A 
 company in column of sections would suffer, at long distances, 
 twice the losses of a company in line. The vulnerability of 
 deep formations in column does not diminish with increased 
 distances as rapidly as that of a line ; it depends on the number 
 of their subdivisions and their consequent increased depth when 
 crossing the dangerous zone ; at long distances it remains 
 practically about the same whatever the position of the men, 
 whether standing, kneeling, or lying down. 
 
 w 13b 
 
123 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 6. Determination of Range. 
 
 The efficacy of fire depends directly upon the range being 
 accurately known. 
 
 At short distances the flatness of the trajectory almost com- 
 pensates for errors in determining elevation ; but at medium 
 and long distances it is of the first consequence to know the 
 range accurately. 
 
 The eye being an uncertain means of judging distance, all 
 captains can with advantage carry a simple range-finder to 
 ascertain the distance when the exact range cannot be ascer- 
 tained from the artillery. Range-finders are more useful in 
 defence than in attack. Although it may be difficult to use 
 them with an attacking firing line when steadily advancing, still 
 there may be moments even then when they may be very useful. 
 
 In the absence of artillery or range-finders, the distance 
 estimated should be tested by volleys, the observer going out to 
 a flank to watch the result, which, in ordinary cases, will be 
 easily perceptible. But if the bullets fall on turf, wet ground, 
 or into furze, heath, &c, or behind a rise in ground, the effect 
 cannot be seen at long distances, even with a telescope. 
 
 The method of estimating distance by flash and sound will 
 sometimes be found useful. 
 
 7. Fire Discipline. 
 
 Troops may be styled thoroughly well disciplined when their 
 rifle fire is under perfect control, when the men aim carefully, 
 are steady in the heat of action, and at all personal risk secure 
 a good field of fire. 
 
 Generally speaking, the control of fire is the duty of the 
 captains of companies and the leaders of units employed under 
 them. The captains determine the nature of the fire, and its 
 direction, and, helped by the subalterns and non-commissioned 
 officers, control it to the last moment possible. 
 
 Perfect supervision will lead to no result unless it is supple- 
 mented by the most stringent fire discipline. It is only when 
 every soldier has been well practised in this fire discipline that 
 the full effect of modern rifles can be obtained. 
 
 The certainty that ammunition is not wasted, that the sights 
 are properly adjusted, and the fire directed where required, are 
 the results of fire when well under control. The nearer the 
 enemy is approached the more efficacious becomes this fire, but 
 the more difficult it is to maintain the necessary control over the 
 troops engaged. The use of the whistle in the firing line is of 
 the greatest value ; it calls attention to the whereabouts of the 
 officer, causes men to pause, and so to hear the orders given. 
 
 Sudden losses intimidate an enemy more than if the losses are 
 gradual ; fire, therefore, shoidd be sudden, unexpected, and 
 powerful, and sometimes divided by pauses to allow the smoke 
 to clear away, to judge the effect produced, to give the necessary 
 
INFANTRY TACTICS. 123A 
 
 orders, and to steady the men. This should be constantly prac- 
 tised. In ordinary circumstances, not more than two or three 
 rounds a minute should be fired, though greater rapidity is 
 advisable just before the assault. 
 
 Collective fire is the regulated action of a number of rifles 
 directed on the same spot ; and the more it is concentrated, both 
 as to time and place, the greater will be its moral effect. In 
 the first stage of the attack it may sometimes be advantageous 
 tc concentrate the fire of several sections or half-companies of a 
 battalion on the same object. The defenders of a position 
 should pour a heavy fire upon the firing line as it rises from 
 cover to rush forward. 
 
 8. Position of Men Firing . 
 
 The attitude of men firing affects the accuracy of their fire. 
 On the defensive, when unprotected by entrenchments, or during 
 the preparation for or the first stage of the attack, the lying 
 down position should be used, and also ordinarily during the 
 advance. In the final stages of the attack, if the ground is flat 
 and open, the firing line may lie down to fire after each rapid 
 advance, but as a general rule fire should be delivered kneeling 
 (or standing if a view of the enemy cannot otherwise be 
 obtained). Men must not then be allowed to lie down or creep 
 from place to place, as, by so doing, their fire becomes less 
 effective, they lose offensive spirit, and in the attack are not 
 readily induced to continue the advance, or in defence to charge 
 the assaulting line, or to deliver a counter attack at any time 
 during the action ; no scheme of defence is worthy of the name 
 that does not provide for a counter attack. 
 
 THE ATTACK. 
 1. Division into Phases. 
 
 The attack on a position is somewhat analogous to that on a 
 fortress. Artillery fire is concentrated on certain points ; under 
 cover of the guns the infantry advance and assist with their rifles 
 to subdue the fire of the defenders ; and finally a breach is made 
 in the position through which a formed body of men is pushed 
 to effect a lodgment. 
 
 It may be divided into three distinct phases : — 
 1st, Preparation. 
 
 2nd, Delivery (including the bayonet assault). 
 3rd, Ee-formation after any success, and making good the 
 position won ; or, Eetirement. 
 
 2. The Preparation. 
 
 Choosing objectives, and concentrating fire upon them, are 
 difficult duties, and should therefore be carefully practised at 
 
124 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 manoeuvres. Fire should be directed on the same objective 
 until it is destroyed, or its action paralysed from the losses in- 
 flicted. Hence it becomes necessary to choose, as the first 
 objectives, those portions which are at the moment the most 
 efficient in defence, provided they are within effective range. In 
 the early phases of the attack, small detachments of the enemy, 
 pushed forward in advance of the position to be defended from 
 about 300 to 800 yards, will be encountered, and must be the 
 first objectives of the attacking infantry and artillery. 
 
 When the attack begins by an artillery duel, and the guns are 
 within rifle range, they should be selected as objectives. Fire 
 should always be directed at mounted officers and others seen in 
 advance of their troops. 
 
 Since a dispersed fire has but small results, objectives should 
 be changed as seldom as possible during the progress of the 
 attack. 
 
 Victory depends upon the final assault ; but experience teaches 
 that before the bayonet charge can be successfully delivered 
 against good troops, the defenders of a position must have been 
 shaken and demoralized by a preparatory artillery or infantry 
 fire directed on the main points of attack ; otherwise it will bo 
 impossible for the firing line to advance over the fire swept zone. 
 
 In the absence of artillery, infantry will have to prepare its 
 own attack, and consequently in that case a larger expenditure 
 of ammunition than ordinary will be necessary. Special troops 
 should be made use of for this long-range firing. 
 
 3. The Delivery. 
 
 There must be no indecision at this stage, but the attack must 
 not be prematurely hurried on ; the general commanding must 
 himself decide when the enemy's fire has been sufficiently 
 subdued to deliver it with success. The infantry must act with 
 vigour and promptitude when the attack is made, and being 
 well under control, and with a good supply of ammunition, must 
 be led to within effective range, opposite the selected point or 
 parts of the hostile line which are believed to have suffered 
 most, aud where the foreground is most favourable to their 
 approach. 
 
 The science of leading infantry consists in adopting the for- 
 mation most suitable to the object in view, in utilizing all 
 advantages of ground, and in concentrating fire according to 
 time and place. 
 
 The company leaders should decide when the opportune 
 moment arrives to open fire ; and the}' must determine, by 
 estimating results, whether the consumption of ammunition will 
 be remunerative. Sapidity of movement is antagonistic to 
 steadiness of aim; by the former, losses may be avoided, but 
 without the latter, few will be inflicted. Until the final charge 
 troops must not be hurried during the attack, or the firing will 
 not be effective. 
 
INFANTRY TACTICS. 124a 
 
 Flank fire being very effective from the demoralization it 
 causes, an attack begun on a flank often becomes the real attack, 
 while what was originally a front attack serves only as an 
 auxiliary or as a demonstration. This latter, however, must be 
 sufficiently aggresive to hold the enemy in his position, and 
 should be made in such formation as will admit of its being" 
 readily converted at will into the main effort. Isolated flank 
 attacks without the aid of frontal attacks or demonstrations are 
 very liable to be themselves outflanked. 
 
 On the other hand, when a demonstration only is intended, 
 the fighting line shold avoid compromising itself by being 
 drawn into a serious attack. 
 
 As far as possible, company and battalion units under their 
 own leaders should be kept intact in the firing line with an 
 interval on each flank. Troops when struck by a heavy fire are 
 apt to diverge from the bine of direction ; it then becomes 
 necessary to push forward sections, half companies or companies, 
 to keep the firing line at its proper density and give fresh 
 energy to the attack. No smaller reinforcement than a section 
 should ever be sent forward, and the men composing it should 
 keep together. These reinforcements should be brought up into 
 the intervals in the firing line. Thus, during the advance, 
 although reinforcements by different companies may have taken 
 place, the line will still be composed, as far as possible, of 
 organized units under their responsible commanders. 
 
 Although troops taking part in the attack are, as a rule, ex- 
 tended so as to oppose the whole line of defence, yet the actual 
 assault will generally be confined to localities previously selected 
 when possible, and the portions of the firing line, whose duty it 
 is to carry the position at these points, should therefore be 
 concentrated towards them in strength superior to that of the 
 enemy. In other words, attacks must be general, assaults local. 
 
 Every movement in extended order does not necessarily end 
 in an assault : leaders should therefore hesitate to commit their 
 troops to this final stage of the attack unless certain that such 
 an operation is intended by the general. 
 
 The moral effect of fixing bayonets is great ; it intimidates 
 the enemy and encourages those about to engage in the assault. 
 The Second Line marching up in rear with drums beating and 
 bugles sounding should have bayonets fixed. Upon reaching 
 the firing line this Second Line charges through it, and the 
 firing line at once (rises) fixes bayonets, and joins with it in the 
 charge. 
 
 4. Re-formation after any success, and making good the position won. 
 
 When the assailants have succeeded in carrying a position, 
 volleys will be poured into the retreating enemy, and all formed 
 bodies of infantry within reach shoidd be brought to the front 
 and disposed to resist the probable counter attack ; under their 
 cover the troops which carried out the assault should speedily 
 
125 INFANTEY TACTICS. 
 
 re-form, and the artillery, having, when the attack was delivered, 
 moved forward to within about 1,000 yards of the enemy, will 
 come into action as soon as possible after the position has been 
 seized by the assaulting infantry. 
 
 5. Retirement. 
 
 A retirement under fire is always attended with the heaviest 
 loss. The fire-swept zone has to be crossed a second time by 
 men more or less demoralised by a sense of defeat, while the 
 moral force of the successful side is corresponding^ raised. 
 The danger of retirement when once engaged must be impressed 
 upon all ranks, in order that the attack shall be driven home 
 with the greatest energy possible. 
 
 6. Ammunition Supply. 
 
 Ammunition transport will be indicated by a distinctive red 
 flag, with a black ball upon it ; and every mounted officer should, 
 prior to the attack, acquaint himself with the position, not only 
 of that belonging to the battalion, but also of the nearest am- 
 munition column. 
 
 Extra ammunition must be issued immediately previous to the 
 attack, and every pause in the fight should be utilised to replenish 
 the supply of the troops engaged. 
 
 Troops engaged are to be supplied from the wagons of any 
 ammunition column, regardless of the brigade or division to 
 which it may belong. 
 
 The supply being alwa}-s from the rear to the front, it should 
 very seldom be necessary to send a man back from the firing 
 line for ammunition. 
 
 INFANTEY versus CAVALRY. 
 
 Unless cavalry is in preponderating force, and has moreover 
 some important object to attain at any sacrifice, it will not incur 
 the loss which must inevitably be sustained in attacking un- 
 shaken infantry ; formations in battalion squares will therefore 
 seldom be necessary. 
 
 Squares should never be formed by infantry when in force if 
 threatened by a few squadrons only; their object, in all pro- 
 bability, will be merely to induce the infantry to close and thus 
 both delay its advance and cause it to offer a better target for 
 the enemy's fire. 
 
 When cavalry is seen advancing without supports, it should 
 be awaited in line, since even if it charges it can do but little 
 harm ; the flank or flanks should be slightly thrown back, for, 
 if a choice is afforded, cavalry will select the flank for attack in 
 order to meet the minimum of fire. 
 
 Should cavalry attack an extended line, those sections only, 
 as a rule, which are immediately threatened, should close. 
 
 Fire against attacking cavalry must always be aimed low, and 
 even in front of it, when galloping or coming up hill. 
 
INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 ATTACK AND DEFENCE. 
 
 125a 
 
 The Attack. 
 
 General Principles. 
 
 I. 
 
 Zones of Fire.— For about 3,000 yards from the enemy's 
 position, the ground over which the troops destined to attack 
 have to move is subjected in different places to different kinds 
 of fire, which affect materially the conduct of the advance. It 
 is convenient to divide this space into zones, but the limits here 
 given must only be considered as approximate. 
 
 Zones. Description of Fire. 
 
 1st 
 
 2nd 
 3rd 
 
 ;1 Field Artillery | 
 Limit of rifle . . . . ) 
 Unaimed rifle 
 
 Aimed rifle 
 
 } 
 
 Limits. 
 
 Terms applied to 
 Ranges. 
 
 3,000 to 1,700 yards 
 
 1,700 to 800 ,, 
 800 to 400 ,, 
 
 400 to position 
 
 Extreme. 
 
 Long. 
 
 Medium. 
 
 Short. 
 
 Within the 1 st zone, infantry fire does not count for much ; 
 on the other hand, the actual loss inflicted at such long ranges 
 by artillery fire on infantry in open formations is comparatively 
 small. 
 
 Artillery employed in defending a position does not then fire 
 so much on advancing infantry as on the attacking artillery. 
 
 Unaimed infantry fire produces losses ; but the effects of such 
 fire may be mitigated by observing where it falls and avoiding 
 those places. 
 
 The fire which causes the heaviest losses and checks the ad- 
 vance is the aimed or directed infantry fire. 
 
 II. 
 
 Distribution. — Troops allotted for the attack will, when of 
 sufficient strength, be divided into first, second, and third lines : — 
 
 The First Line, subdivided into Firing Line, Supports, and 
 Eeserves, engages the enemy, and is intended eventually to 
 establish itself within charging distance of his position. 
 
 The duties of the firing line are to keep up a well-directed fire 
 on the enemy from the moment such fire becomes effective ; to 
 push forward as near his position as possible ; and thence to 
 deliver such a heavy fire as will enable the Second Line to 
 approach the point selected for attack, for the purpose of driving 
 him from it. 
 
 The supports and reserves keep the firing line at its most 
 efficient strength by filling the gaps caused by casualties ; pro- 
 tect its flanks by the fire they can bring to bear upon any troops 
 
 
126 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 which threaten them ; and encourage those engaged in front, by 
 the feeling that there is a body of comrades following to assist 
 them. As the final stage is reached, the supports and reserves 
 become absorbed in the firing line. 
 
 During the advance all serious flank attacks must be met by 
 the reserves, which will also find any troops required for long- 
 range fire. 
 
 The Second Lixe assaults the position when its way is pre- 
 pared through the losses inflicted upon the enemy by the First 
 Line. 
 
 The Third Line either confirms the success and pursues the 
 defeated enemy, or covers the retreat of the First and Second 
 Lines, and so prevents a repulse or even a defeat from becoming 
 a disaster. 
 
 III. 
 
 Formations. — Before an enemy's position can be assailed, the 
 troops allotted for the attack will be compelled by the fire of his 
 artillery to open out, and quit the close formations in which 
 they have been marching. The rifle fire of the defenders will 
 also begin to tell at a considerable distance, and will increase in 
 intensity the nearer the position is approached. The formations 
 adopted by the attacking force must be suited to the character 
 of the enemy, to his mode of fighting, to the weapons with which 
 he is armed, and to the ground to be traversed. Close forma- 
 tions which could be used with impunity against an enemy 
 having no artillery and with inferior small arms, would be im- 
 possible against troops provided with field or "quick firing" 
 guns and modern rifles. 
 
 To cross the space swept by fire, an ordinary skirmishing line, 
 although sufficient to feel the way, and drive in an enemy's 
 scouts and advanced parties, would be unsuited for any more 
 serious effort. For the attack of a position the front or firing 
 line must be thicker ; in the first place because it will have to 
 bear the brunt of the battle, especially of all counter-attacks ; 
 secondly, because it must contain such inherent force as will 
 enable it to reduce the destructive effects of the enemy's fire 
 during the advance for attack. 
 
 When an advance in line or any close formation is no longer 
 practicable, the space must be passed over in greater or less 
 extension according to circumstances ; but advancing troops, 
 particularly those intended for the final attack, should never be 
 further extended than is necessary, having regard to the fire 
 power of the enemy, and the nature of the ground. If the 
 undulations of ground afford good cover, it may be possible to 
 bring up the Second Line intact over the whole or a portion of 
 it, and in one part of the line if not in another ; or in the case 
 of mists, fogs, or night attacks, the line may be able to approach 
 to within striking distance, without departing much front its 
 original order. 
 
INFANTRY TACTICS. 126a 
 
 The firing line moves, as a rule, in extended order, though, 
 from the nature of the ground this may be unnecessary until the 
 2nd zone is reached. The intervals between its files when effective 
 ranges are approached should be about 3 paces. It will be closer 
 at some places, more open at others, according as the ground 
 affords suitable cover. When the firing line opens fire, rank 
 entire will be formed ; each man would then have a space of 
 2 paces. 
 
 It is a principle that each portion of the extended line should 
 be supported by men of the same tactical unit. 
 
 Supports will usually move in line, with one pace interval 
 between files, and, when the firing line commences to fire, with 
 such an interval between each support as will place it as nearly as 
 possible in rear of the outer flank of the unit it is supporting. 
 
 The reserves will move in line or small columns, with one pace 
 interval between files if necessary. 
 
 Since neither the supports nor reserves can usually fire without 
 danger to the firing line, they will adopt that formation which is 
 most suitable to the ground, and which will enable their leaders 
 to hold the men most thoroughly in hand, while allowing them 
 to advance without confusion, and to reinforce quickly when 
 required. 
 
 Great latitude must be allowed to leaders of supports and 
 reserves in choosing the best formations ; while one portion may 
 move in column, or fours, it may be more advantageous for 
 another to advance in line. It must, however, be remembered 
 that deep formations are very vulnerable, especially at the shorter 
 ranges, and even at long distances a column would probably suffer, 
 under the same fire, twice the loss a line would incur. 
 
 The Second Line at the "extreme" ranges should be so formed 
 as not to offer a mark sufficiently large to induce the enemy to 
 turn his guns on them. The best formation will probably be 
 quarter columns or half battalion quarter columns. So formed, 
 and kept during the early stages of the attack at about 500 yards 
 in rear of the reserves of the firing line, the Second Line may 
 advance slowly and experience but little loss. On arriving at 
 " long " ranges, however, unaimed infantry fire will begin to tell, 
 and the quarter columns must deploy. This deployment may be 
 into small columns of two companies with one company interval, 
 or into line, according to the relative strength of the First and 
 Second Lines, and to the situation of the latter with regard to 
 the points in the enemy's position which have been selected 
 for assault. 
 
 Though the connection of the First and Second Lines should 
 always be of the closest kind, it is unadvisable to allow any 
 portion of the Second Line to become extended in the firing line. 
 Except for purposes of fire- action, troops are weakened by being 
 scattered or dispersed. The efforts of the commander of the 
 Second (or assaulting) Line must be strenuous to keep his force 
 together, and it is most important that it should be brought up 
 
 x 13c 
 
127 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 steadily and deliberately to the front as fresh as possible, all 
 hurry being avoided. 
 
 The formations adopted by the Third Line will depend upon 
 local circumstances. They will be changed to suit the nature of 
 the fire during the advance through the three zones, in so far as 
 such changes will not interfere with the primary duties of con- 
 firming success or covering retreat. 
 
 It is essential that the units of an attacking force be kept 
 intact, and that no command be greatly disseminated. In the 
 First Line each commander should have at his disposal his own 
 supports and reserves. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Strength. — In deciding the strength to be employed it must be 
 borne in mind that whatever attack is determined upon should 
 be made with a force amply sufficient to give a reasonable hope 
 of success. When an attack is undertaken by too small a force, 
 the result is generally failure, and to the men engaged in it, who 
 have to cross the fire-swept zone twice, once in advancing and 
 again when retreating, the result must be destruction. Un the 
 other hand, there is a limit to the number of men that can be 
 efficiently employed against a prescribed front. The number will 
 depend very much upon the nature of the operation, tind the 
 strength and extent of the enemy's position. 
 
 A commander would seldom be justified in using all the troops 
 at his disposal as an attacking force, and as a rule it may be laid 
 down that the infantr} 7 of the attacking force should in the first 
 instance contain about 4 men per yard of the front to be covered. 
 
 The functions of the firing line are to crush and overwhelm 
 the enemy with bullets ; but if too many men were placed in it 
 they would not only interfere with each others freedom of 
 movement and independence of action when firing, but increase 
 uselessly the chances of loss. It follows, then, that as many 
 men should be placed in the firing line as the ground will permit, 
 consistently with the efficient use of their rifles at the distance 
 they may happen to be from the enemy's position. The gaps 
 caused by casualities in the firing line must be filled up by the 
 supports, and when they are expended by the reserves. The 
 strength of the supports and the tiring fine should, at the outset, 
 be the same, and the reserve should be equal to the firing line 
 and supports together. 
 
 Opposite those points in the enemy's position which it is in- 
 tended to assail, the Second Line should be of the same strength 
 as the First Line, and superior in number to that of the defenders, 
 otherwise it may be only one-third the strength, and where no 
 assault is intended it may be dispensed with. 
 
 Usually the Second and Third Lines will be of the same 
 strength, and will together numerically equal the First Line ; 
 but if the force is large the Third Line should in many cases be 
 about as strong as the First Line. 
 
INFANTRY TACTICS. 12?A 
 
 V. 
 
 Distances.— The distances between the three bodies composing 
 the First Line depend, as in their formations, upon the weapons 
 of the enemy, and the configuration of the ground to be traversed 
 in reaching him. These distances will vary as the attackers 
 become exposed to the different kinds of fire employed against 
 them. 
 
 The nearer the supports and reserves are to the firing line the 
 more they will generally suffer, but if too far they cease to be 
 effective as supports, or immediately available when required as 
 reinforcements. At extreme distances they may move com- 
 paratively close to the front line, but on nearing the zone of 
 aimed fire they must keep as long as possible outside the 
 immediate area of the fire directed at it. At the same time, their 
 approach must be so arranged that when required in the firing 
 line they will not have inordinately long distances to traverse, 
 and so arrive breathless at a moment when a marked effort might 
 be required from them. The distance which separates these 
 bodies must be decided by the officer in command, but it should 
 rarely during any stage of the advance exceed 300 yards. After 
 the firing line has been subjected to aimed infantry fire, the 
 distance must be diminished and reinforcements pushed forward. 
 Before the final assault, when the firing lino commences its rapid 
 fire, any of its supports and reserves which have not already been 
 used up as reinforcements should join it, and open fire. 
 
 It has been found from experience that when troops armed 
 with modern rifles come within close ranges, a crisis soon arrives, 
 and the rapid fire which ensues cannot be prolonged more than 
 a few minutes. Bearing in mind that on the fresh troops com- 
 posing the Second Lino devolves the duty of the actual assault, 
 it is evident that this body must be sufficiently near the firing 
 lino to push boldly to the front at the critical moment. It must 
 not, therefore, be at a greater distance in roar than can be 
 traversed in a few minutes. During the earlier stages of the 
 attack the distance on open ground may be about 800 yards. 
 When, however, the supports and reserves of the First Line 
 become absorbed, the distance should be reduced to about 200 
 yards ; as the firing line nears the enemy's position, and the fire 
 becomes more rapid and more intense the Second Line moves up 
 to the firing line. 
 
 Thus the distance between the First and Second Lines when 
 forming for attack should be about 600 or 800 yards; the 
 distance between the Second and Third Lines will be about 
 1,000 yards. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Intervals. — To keep each unit in the firing line separate and 
 distinct there will be 6 paces interval between companies, 12 
 paces between battalions, 30 paces between brigades, and 60 
 paces between divisions. 
 
128 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 vn. 
 
 The Front. — The front allotted to an attacking force should not 
 exceed that which the troops composing its First Line would 
 cover were they deployed with the intervals allowed between 
 units in the firing line, just described. 
 
 A Battalion extends as follows : — In First Line, two half 
 companies as Firing Line, two half companies as Supports, 
 and two companies as Reserve. In Second Line two companies, 
 and in Third Line two companies. Total front covered by 800 
 men, 212 paces. 
 
 A Brigade of four battalions extends as follows : —In First 
 Line two battalions extend, each furnishing four half companies 
 as Firing Line, four half companies as Supports, and four 
 companies as Reserve. One battalion forms the Second Line, 
 and one battalion the Third Line. Total front covered, 848 
 paces. 
 
 A Division extends four battalions as Firing Line, Supports 
 and Reserves, two battalions as Second Line, and two as Third 
 Line. Total front covered, 1726 paces. 
 
 An Army Corps usually extends twelve battalions as First Line 
 four battalions in Second Line, and eight battabons in Third 
 Line. Total front covered, 4802 paces. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Conduct of the Attack. — The attack almost invariably begins 
 with an artillery contest, and only when the artillery fire of the 
 defence is somewhat subdued will the attacking infantry advance 
 through the 1st zone. There must be no undue haste in this 
 phase of the action, which is essentially a period for artillery, 
 machine-guns, and long-range rifle volleys. 
 
 When the defender's artillery has been sufficiently reduced 
 if not silenced, and the attacking infantry has passed into the 
 2nd zone, the artillery of the attack can often, with advantage, 
 be pushed well forward to prepare the further advance. 
 
 During all the early stages of the attack, it may be expected 
 that the enemy will have strong detachments well in front of his 
 main position to a distance of from a quarter to half a mile. 
 Thesfi must be driven back before the guns can be advanced 
 through the 2nd zone, otherwise they would be within effective 
 musketry range of the enemy. Should the advanced detachments 
 of the enemy offer a sufficient target, the guns may select them 
 as their first objective before directing their fire upon the 
 defenders of the position. 
 
 If the ground affords favourable opportunities for long-range 
 fire, companies may be detached from the reserves of the firing 
 line to fire half-company volleys. Machine-guns used singly 
 may also be most usefully employed against advanced detach- 
 ments of the enemy, or directed upon the troops occupying the 
 main position or against his supports and reserves if they can 
 be seen. 
 
Infantry tactics. i28A 
 
 In the absence of artillery the preparation of the attack must 
 be effected entirely by long-range rifle fire. 
 
 It may be advisable to push forward a few picked shots, 
 usually under an officer, to drive in the enemy's scouts. Taking 
 advantage of the ground, they will search the country in front, 
 and act according to the requirements of the moment. As a 
 rule, however, the firing line can clear away the enemy's scouts 
 by its own marksmen. 
 
 At the extreme ranges, while the artillery duel is taking 
 place, the first line will be able to advance with but slight loss ; 
 even when they first come under the unaimed or random fire of 
 the infantry, they will probably suffer so little that the firiDg 
 line may continue to advance without replying to the enemy's 
 fire. Unless the ground is open and does not admit of a closer 
 advance without firing, the opening of fire should be delayed as 
 long as possible. When, however, the 3rd zone is approached, 
 and the firing line becomes a mark for aimed fire, it will be 
 forced to move more slowly, and its cwn fiie will begin to tell 
 with greater effect upon the enemy. 
 
 At several points during the advance, the progress of the 
 firing line will be checked for the moment by the fire it is 
 exposed to, and by the opposition it encounters ; to give it a 
 fresh impetus when its energy is temporarily expended, it will 
 require reinforcement. The fight in front being supported and 
 fed from the rear, the firing line will gradually work forward, 
 making its fire tell the more heavily the nearer it approaches 
 the enemy, who at last should be hemmed in so closely, that 
 any attempt at a change of position on his part, which means at 
 least a temporary diminution of his fire, will enable a forward 
 movement to be made, or will facilitate the bringing up of a 
 greater number of troops in a closer formation with a view to 
 the delivery of the final assault. 
 
 Two distinct phases of the attack occur within the 3rd zone. 
 The first may be said to begin when effective ranges are 
 reached, and to end when the firing line by itself can no longer 
 continue to advance ; the second lasts from the time the check 
 occurs till the position is assaulted and carried by the second 
 line. In the 3rd zone, the firing line should alwaj's contain 
 enough men to keep up the most effective fire upon the enemy, 
 but its strength should not be increased needlessly. 
 
 The advance will be as long as possible in a general line, a 
 continuous artillery and rifle fire bring kept up, with a view to 
 inflict the greatest possible loss upon the enemy, to strike 
 dismay in his ranks, and so reduce the destructive effect of his 
 fire. As a rule, it is very unadvisable to hasten the advance 
 lest the men's strength should be exhausted. When the 
 defenders' fire begins to tell seriously, it will become necessary 
 to advance by the forward rush of alternate portions. The 
 directing portions in advance, from under cover where it is 
 available, deliver their fire, those in rear will then run up to 
 
 0? THH ^ 
 
 JIVIR3IT7] 
 
129 INFANTRY TACTICS. 
 
 the front line and prepare to fire ; their fire will bo the signal 
 for the others to establish themselves in a fresh position by 
 another rush ahead. Since, however, this mode of advancing is 
 of a harassing nature, it should not be undertaken until the 
 defenders' fire renders it unavoidable, and a slower pace would 
 unduly expose the attackers. 
 
 During the advance through the 3rd zone the supports and 
 reserves will send forward such reinforcements as may be 
 requisite. Whenever the firing line seems to hang back and to 
 be disinclined to push forward, the arrival of a well timed 
 reinforcement gives it renewed impulsion. The constant tendency 
 of men to close towards the points of direction, will always 
 create gaps on the flanks of each extended portion in the firing 
 line for these reinforcements to occupy. 
 
 It is evident that in a position of some extent there will be 
 but few points, perhaps only one, which it will be deemed 
 advisable to select for serious attack, and where at all hazards it 
 is intended to drive that attack home ; although the firing line 
 must keep the enemy engaged along bis entire front, it must be 
 clearly understood that the preponderance of fire is to be directed 
 at the selected objective points. 
 
 The duty of the firing line, reinforced by its supports and 
 reserves, is to get as near the position as posible ; but when it 
 cannot advance further without unnecessary exposure, advan- 
 tageous ground will be chosen, whence a telling converging fire 
 may be brought to bear upon the parts of the position to be 
 assaulted. 
 
 By the time the First Line reaches this critical distance it will 
 have sustained such heavy losses that decisive action becomes 
 imperative, and a fresh impulse is necessary to carry the attack 
 forward and pierce the enemy's line. 
 
 This will be given by the Second Line which will, under cover 
 of the First Line, have been able to advance in good order and 
 under perfect control. Its commander having watched the 
 opportune moment, when the defenders are sufficiently shaken, 
 will boldly advance with the Second Line towards the point or 
 points he has determined to assault. 
 
 On reaching the firing line, the Second Line will double through 
 it, and, with loud cheers, carry the position at the point of the 
 bayonet, drums beating, and bugles plajing ; the firing line will 
 join the Second Line, and assist it in delivering the assault. 
 
 The Third Line, formed in the most convenient manner 
 according to local circumstances, will work forward ready to 
 support the attack, to meet the enemy's reserves if a serious 
 counter-attack is made when the assault is delivered, and 
 subsequently to confirm the success of the attack by oj^ening a 
 heavy fire upon the enemy as he retreats, or by the mere 
 occupation of the captured position. 
 
 When successful, the guns will also be brought up to the 
 position to engage the enemy's artillery ; while the Cavalry and 
 
INFANTRY TACTICS. 129A 
 
 Mounted Infautry move forwai'd in pursuit, harassing the retreating 
 troops and preventing any attempt at reformation. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Fire Discipline. — Commanders should concentrate their fire on 
 one point at a time, in preference to directing it indiscriminately 
 over a wider area. They should cause their men not only to aim 
 at such of the enemy's troops as may be facing them, but also 
 at times on those to the right or left, as oblique fire is very deadly. 
 An enemy placed behind cover -which only conceals his immediate 
 front may often be thus made to suffer severely. 
 
 To ensure that fire is always under control during the advance 
 of the firing line, independent firing will be deferred as long as 
 possible, and the men will only fire by command of their leaders. 
 
 To demoralize the enemy by the fire of the firing line, and of 
 artillery, may be regarded as a necessary preliminary to a 
 successful assault upon the most important points of his position. 
 This has to be effected under conditions unfavourable to the 
 attacking infantry, whose nerves will be tried daring a prolonged 
 advance under fire, the tension becoming greater as close ranges 
 are reached and the final conflict is neared. The march before 
 beginning the fight, the subsequent rapid advances, and the 
 fatigues of frequent firing, will tax to tho utmost the physical 
 strength, endurance, and courage of all concerned. It is therefore 
 evident that prompt obedience to orders, and strict fire discipline 
 are of paramount importance. Those ends can only be attained 
 by constant practice daring peace. 
 
 Especial care should be taken that ammunition is not wasted 
 in the preparatory stages, so that when a heavy firo is required 
 before the assault there may be no deficiency. 
 
 THE DEFENCE. 
 
 Genebal Principles. 
 
 The formations laid down for the attack, and tho general rules 
 given for troops composing an attacking force, are in a cortain 
 measure applicable to the defence of a position. 
 
 Taken inversely, many of the principles upon which the attack 
 is based will also be found to assist in considering the question 
 of defence. 
 
 Although what follows will hold good in most cases, it is 
 impossible to lay down precise instructions for defending a 
 position, as so much depends upon its nature, extent, and 
 surroundings, and the strength and composition of the force 
 available for its occupation. 
 
 -La 
 
 Ground to be Reconnoitred. — Before taking up a defensive 
 position the officer commanding the force will order all the 
 ground in the vicinity to be reconnoitred. The officer deputed 
 for this duty will advance with the usual precautions, preceded 
 by scouts and flanking parties. 
 
129b infantry tactics. 
 
 As a rule, a general line as straight as possible, and without 
 any very pronounced salients, is best for the defence. When, 
 however, such salients do exist, accompanied by valleys running 
 inwards, artillery may often be placed with advantage at the 
 re-entering angles at the head of the valleys, whence they will 
 flank the salients. 
 
 If a position is purely defensive, a river, stream, or marsh 
 running along its front, will be of great value as impeding the 
 assaulting troops, and yet being swept by the fire of the defence. 
 
 II. 
 
 Requirements of a Defensive Position. — The chief points to be 
 considered in the selection of a position may be taken in the 
 following order : — 
 
 1 . The extent of the position should be suited to the strength 
 
 of the defending force. 
 
 The best position, if too large for the force which occupies it, is 
 useless. 
 
 2. It should have a clear field for fire and command of view, 
 
 over the country in front, and on both flanks. 
 
 There should be no ground in front which will screen the enemy's 
 movements, and massing ot troops from observation ; it should 
 be such as will retard his advance and throw him into confusion I 
 without affording cover from fire. 
 
 3. Security for the flanks, which should rest on heights 
 
 with a command of view and fire ; or upon points ti 
 
 strong for defence. 
 An active enemy will always try to support his frontal attack by a | 
 flank attack. Even when a flank rests upon strong natural obstacles I 
 it is almost always liable to an enveloping attack. Practically I 
 the best way to meet this is to have a strong reserve placed I 
 either behind the exposed flank, or in echelon outside it. An I 
 advanced post occupied in force on the road or line of approach, on ] 
 which an enemy must inarch to turn a flank, will have a retarding 
 influence which may be of much value, and a strong retired position j 
 in echelon on the exposed flank furnished with artillery will be useful j 
 in raking with its fire the flank of an enemy attempting a turning j 
 movempnt. 
 
 4. Good cover, especially for the supports and reserves and 
 
 the Second Line. 
 
 Cover for the firing line can generally be obtained in a short time 
 by throwing up shelter trenches, but good cover for the remainder 
 or the defending force will almost invariably depend upon the ground 
 falling more or less rapidly to the back of the position. 
 
 5. Good artillery positions. 
 
 Either opposite those of the enemy or taking them in flank. 
 
 6. Good lateral communications. 
 
 The means of rapidly moving troops in reserve from one part of 
 the line to the other, so as to be able to mass them to meet the enemy 
 
INFANTRY TACTICS. 129C 
 
 at the points which he elects to carry by storm, are of great impor- 
 tance. For this purpose defensive positions should be deep, so as to 
 give ample room for carrying out such movements. 
 
 7. Good means of retreat. 
 It is essential to have several parallel roads running to the rear 
 from the centre and both flanks of the position. Provided this is 
 secured, a certain amount of broken ground is an advantage, _ as 
 preventing or checking the pursuit at different points. Any position 
 favouring defence in rear of the first should be noted. 
 
 III. 
 
 Advanced Posts. — When the line of defence has been decided 
 on, the ground for about half-a-mile in front will be examined 
 for suitable positions for advanced posts, which should command 
 all the ground which cannot be seen from the main position. 
 The}- will, according to the general intention, usually consist of 
 from a group to a company ; in extreme cases it may be 
 advisable to employ a half-battalion. Where there is no natural 
 cover, shelter trenches should be thrown up. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Communication. — Signallers will generally be attached to the 
 advanced posts to communicate the movements of the enemy 
 from time to time, and to enable the commander of the defending 
 force to issue his instructions to the advanced posts and recon- 
 noitring parties. 
 
 V. 
 
 Ranges to be noted. — When time permits, the distances of all 
 prominent objects in the probable lines of attack should be 
 carefully ascertained, and noted by all concerned. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Distribution. — Troops acting on the defensive will be divided, 
 like those formed for attack, into three lines. 
 
 The First Like. — The firing line must be as thick as com- 
 patible with a free use of the rifle at any point that is threatened 
 as soon as the attacking force ccmes within effective musketry 
 fire. 
 
 The supports and reserves will be placed concealed from the 
 enemy's view as much as possible, well under cover, and near at 
 hand to feed the firing line as casualties occur, or to move to 
 important places requiring additional strength. 
 
 The distribution of the First Line will depend very much 
 upon local circumstances, and the conditions under which the 
 defence is to be established, whether the resistance is to be 
 temporary or obstinate. In a close country with a commanding 
 position favouring defence, such as the crest of a hill, or a high 
 ridge with broken or precipitous ground in front or on the 
 
 y 13d 
 
129d infantey tactics. 
 
 flanks, and a clear line of retreat, the supports and reserves 
 may be brought comparatively close to the front and the First 
 Line need not be so strong as if the country were open, with 
 merely shelter trenches for the line of defence. 
 
 The Second and Third Lines. — The Second and Third Lines 
 hidden from the enemy, if practicable, will be placed in a 
 central position at first, but when the enemy's attack is developed, 
 they should be moved, either in whole or part, to a spot whence 
 they can make a prompt counter attack. 
 
 Artillery and infantry fire shoidd be opened at the earliest 
 stages of the attackers' advance ; cavalry, horse artillery, and 
 mounted infantry being pushed to the front to force them to 
 extend prematurely. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Strength. — Including all arms and troops in reserve, it may be 
 assumed, as a ride, that the force for the defence of a position 
 should be equal to about 5 men for each yard in extent. The 
 infantry, taken separately, should be about 3 men per yard. 
 
 If forced to occupy a position too extended for the numbers 
 avadable for its defence, it is better to occupy it thinly and keep 
 a strong reserve wherewith to make an energetic counter attack 
 upon the assailants, than to distribute the force available for its 
 defence generally throughout the position, and so be strong 
 nowhere. 
 
 YIIL 
 
 Defending force to assume the offensive. — In defending a position, 
 any favourable opportunity that may offer of assuming the 
 offensive should be taken advantage of, if the force at the 
 disposal of the general commanding allows of it ; for a counter 
 attack delivered at the right moment will disconcert the arrange- 
 ments of the attack, and may often change the fortune of a day. 
 
 No position is suitable for defence that precludes the free 
 action of the defenders in making a counter attack. 
 
 CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE. 
 1st Zone. 
 
 When the enemy advances, the artillery, from their forward 
 position, will force bim to deploy, to disclose his strength, and 
 possibly to declare his intentions. Parties of mounted infantry, 
 which will have previously reconnoitred well in advance, should 
 now, under cover of the guns, deliver long range volleys. 
 
 When the guns are obliged to retire, the batteries in the 
 position will cover their retreat, which will be by the flanks. On 
 the mounted infantry being driven back, the advance posts will 
 engage the enemy and prevent his scouts, or the picked shots in 
 his firing line from annoying the artillery. 
 
INFANTE Y TACTICS. 129E 
 
 2nd Zone. 
 
 Up to this point the firing line of the defence should be kept 
 back well under cover, but as the advance posts are compelled to 
 withdraw it should be directed to open fire by half-company or 
 section volleys. .Reinforcements will be moved up as gaps occur, 
 opportunities being taken to keep the units intact by directing 
 the companies in the firing line to close on their centres as 
 casualties take place. 
 
 3kd Zone. 
 
 As medium ranges are reached fire will be directed upon the 
 enemy's supports and reserves as well as at his firing line. Any 
 pre-arranged counter attack, usually by mounted troops, should 
 at this period be boldly delivered. 
 
 The enemy's intentions will now be apparent, and the points 
 he has selected as his objectives must be strengthened by such 
 reinforcements as will bring a superior fire to bear upon the 
 attackers. The Second Line will also be disposed in rear so as 
 to best meet the enemy should he succeed in assaulting those 
 points. 
 
 Throughout the progress of the attack fire will be delivered by 
 carefully controlled volleys ; the opportunities given when the 
 firing line advances by alternate portions should be taken the 
 fullest advantage of. especially when after each rush no cover is 
 available. If the assailants are not repulsed, and reach the final 
 stage of the attack, independent firing will be employed. 
 
 As the enemy prepares to charge, the Second Line will be 
 ordered to fix bayonets, and, moving up to the firing line, will 
 meet the assailants as they attempt the assault. 
 
 Should the defenders be driven from the position, the retreat 
 will be conducted under cover of the artillery and mounted troops. 
 
 The Third Line will previousely have taken up some advan- 
 tageous position, if necessary, and the retirement of the First and 
 Second Lines will be as described in S. 31. 
 
 COUNTER ATTACKS. 
 
 The question of counter attacks is one of great consequence 
 and much difficulty in connection with the defence of a position. 
 They may be considered under two heads : — 
 
 1 . Those made by the Third line, or the local reserves of 
 
 the troops actively engaged in the defence. 
 
 2. Those made by general reserves, composed of separate 
 
 brigades or divisions kept distinct under their own 
 commanders for this purpose. 
 
 The first will take place usually just as the enemy is advancing 
 to storm the position, immediately after he has forced his way 
 in, or just after the assault has failed. 
 
129f infantry tactics. 
 
 No large position is ever attacked along its whole front at 
 once. Certain decisive points or keys are usually selected, and 
 upon these only the attack is really pushed home. The con- 
 sequence is that the flanks of the assaulting bodies are usually 
 exposed to an attack in flank which should be vigorously made 
 by the Third Line, especially when the attackers come within 
 the 3rd Zone, and are exposed to the full power of the defenders' 
 fire. Divisional Cavalry can be well employed in this way ; a 
 single squadron sweeping down unexpectedly on the flank of 
 troops engaged in a severe conflict to their front, is very likely 
 to succeed. 
 
 Again, just when the assault has been successful and the 
 troops making it are penetrating the defensive line, their flank 
 is similarly exposed to counter attacks by local reserves of 
 cavalry and infantry ; or should the assault fail these troops 
 will have an excellent opportunity of turning the repulse into 
 a disaster. 
 
 These attacks are rather in the nature of sallies from a fortress, 
 and have rarely more than a local effect. 
 
 The second species of counter attacks made by a considerable 
 body of troops, specially detailed from the general reserves, will 
 exercise a powerful effect on the fate of the contending forces. 
 The most opportune moment for action will be towards the close 
 of the battle, when the assailants are worn out and dispirited by 
 repeated repulses. A large body of fresh troops brought up 
 rapidly at this period, and launched with energy in a concen- 
 trated attack upon important points, will usually produce decisive 
 residts. 
 
 Such an attack may either be made on a flank or on the 
 centre of the assaulting force. In the first case it will be best 
 made by previously moving the troops entrusted with the counter 
 attack to a position beyond the flank of the line of defence, so 
 that they may operate obliquely on the enemy's flank and 
 envelop him. In the second case, it should be made direct on 
 the centre of the hostile line, with the utmost determination and 
 dash. If successful, a blow of this description will be decisive, 
 inasmuch as the assaulting force will be divided, and the beaten 
 fractions will be thrown back on divergent lines of retreat. 
 
 These great attacks must be covered by the convergent fire of 
 all the batteries that can be brought to bear upon the point 
 assailed. 
 

 16 
 
130 
 
 Lecture XIV. 
 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 PREPARATION FOE THE ATTACK.— The formation of a 
 body of cavalry for an attack depends upon the description 
 and disposition of the enemy which it has to encounter, and 
 also upon the nature of the ground to be traversed, which, if 
 not known bv previous observation, should invariably be 
 reconnoitred immediately previous to and during the attack. 
 This is best done by squadron scouts thrown out to the front 
 and flanks, who should be instructed to fall back immediately 
 before the actual collision with the enemy takes place. 
 
 "When any body of cavalry is acting in two or more lines, cadi 
 line should have its scouts thrown out to it- own immediate 
 front, in order that it may be made aware of the nature of the 
 ground over which it will itself have to pass. 
 
 At the same time while scouts are employed to reconnoitre 
 the ground to be traversed, other special precautions should be 
 taken to guard against Hank attacks from the enemy. For this 
 reason, during the advance of any body of cavalry to the attack, 
 one or two small patrol- consisting of about two men and a 
 non-commissioned officer each, and always und< r the general 
 supervision of an officer, should invariably be detached to 
 some distance on each flank as "flanking patrols," to watch 
 the enemy's movtments, and prevent the line being taken by 
 surprise by any sudden think attack. These thinking patrols 
 should go out with carbines, so as to be prepared to fire in order 
 to give an alarm in case of their meeting with the enemy. They 
 should carefully search all ground that might afford concealment 
 to the enemy, and should give intelligence of his movements to 
 the main body by reports or signals. The tlanking patrols 
 should remain out in observation during the execution of the 
 attack, and carefully watch for any attempt on the enemy's part 
 to take the main body in flank while it is engaged in the attack 
 to its front. 
 
 In the same way when any body of cavalry is formed under 
 cover of ground in order to obtain shelter from fire, scouts and 
 flanking patrols should be kept out to the front and flanks, 
 and (if necessary also to the rear, both as a security against 
 sudden surprise, and to give timely information of any 
 favourable opportunity which may occur for assuming the 
 offensive, and unexpectedly attacking the enemy's troops. 
 
 The officer commanding a body of cavalry must, either 
 personally or by means of subordinate officers, reconnoitre the 
 enemy's troops, and make himself acquainted with their position 
 and formation, so that, in preparing for the attack, his own 
 dispositions may be such as will best enable him to out- 
 
CAVALRY TACTiCS. 131 
 
 manoeuvre the enemy. His object should be to manoeuvre so 
 as to place the enemy in disadvantageous positions, or to betray 
 him into movements which cause confusion, and which will 
 thus afford a favourable opportun : ty for attacking him with 
 success. 
 
 SUPPORTS AND RESERVE. 
 
 As a rule no attack should be made without a properly 
 constituted support, and, in most instances (and always when 
 attacking cavalry), a reserve to the attacking body, of nearly 
 equal strength with it. 
 
 Each of these bodies should be in line, or in such formation 
 that the line can be formed with the greatest rapidity. The 
 necessity for adapting their formation to the circumstances of 
 the ground and means of protection from fire must also always 
 be recognised. 
 
 The distance between them should be such that, while 
 those in rear may be sufficiently near to afford timely support 
 to the line in front, the disorder of one should not affect the 
 others. In most cases a distance of about 300 yards will be 
 sufficient. 
 
 The support should never, under any circumstances, and the 
 reserve should not as a general rule be directly behind the 
 attacking body, but should be echeloned upon it. They should 
 steadily follow its advance, maintaining their respective distances, 
 and act according to its success or failure. 
 
 The best cavalry becomes to a certain extent disorganised, 
 even after a successful attack, and it is imperatively necessary 
 that there should be an unbroken force at hand for shelter and 
 assistance. 
 
 The formation of even a single regiment for attack should be 
 based on the same principle; the exposed flank should be 
 protected and watched, and a reserve, if possible, should be kept 
 in hand. 
 
 It cannot be supposed that, after the point of the attack is 
 indicated, a body of cavalry can at once assume the formation in 
 line which is required for the actual attack. 
 
 It is necessary to have a formation for advancing over rough 
 or broken ground, or through intervals between other troops, 
 and for utilising casual shelter from fire. While Hue is the 
 formation for the actual attack, a column formation of some kind 
 is that in which cavalry can most conveniently manoeuvre with 
 the object of passing obstacles, utilising accidents of ground, 
 taking advantage of cover, and easily changing the direction of 
 the advance on the move. 
 
 CAVALRY v. CAVALRY. 
 
 It is a principle of the highest importance that there can be 
 no occasion on which it is permissible for cavalry to remain 
 halted to receive an attack. A body of cavalry which remains 
 stationary, and allows itself to be attacked by the enemy's 
 
132 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 cavalry, must inevitably be defeated ; while superiority in 
 rapidity of movement, and in skilful manoeuvring, will in most 
 
 cases compensate even for great inferiority of numbers. 
 
 As the most vulnerable part of any cavalry formation is its 
 flank, the importance of flank attacks, and combined front and 
 flank attacks, cannot be too strongly insisted on ; and, this being 
 the case, the necessity for guarding against such attacks becomes 
 also evident. Hence also arises the necessity for invariably 
 sending out flanking patrols on the flanks of an advancing body 
 ticavalry, in order to guard against surprise from flank attacks 
 on the enemy's part. 
 
 When a whole regiment is to be used in an attack (the support 
 being otherwise provided for) no formation meets all necessary 
 conditions better than that in " double echelon of squadrons from 
 the centre." By this formation the front and both Hanks of the 
 enemy are threatened, as the flank squadrons can with ease be 
 directed in flank attack, while the centre squadrons are making 
 the direct attack. It is apparent also that by no other formation 
 can flank attacks by the enemy be more easily mel and checked, 
 as the flank squadrons, being held back from the first shock of 
 the encounter, will be available to meet any such attempted 
 movement. 
 
 In naming the above formation as that which is most advisable 
 for a cavalry regiment in the attack on cavalry, it is clearly to 
 be understood that it applies only to operations on open and 
 favourable ground. When a force is operating necessarily on a 
 narrow front and in cramped ground, other dispositions must be 
 made use of; but in every situation the duty of protecting the 
 flanks and threatening those of the enemy's formation remains 
 unchanged. 
 
 In some instances, it will be found that an attack may be 
 successfully undertaken by a regiment with one or both flank 
 squadrons detached to the front of their respective Hank or 
 flanks, and acting to a certain extent independently. The 
 principle of making and guarding against flank attacks would 
 be thus maintained, and great elasticity would be given to a 
 force operating on broken ground. 
 
 In attacking cavalry, the attacking force gains an advantage 
 if it can meet the enemy down hill, as the slope of the ground, 
 if not too steep, adds to the impetus. 
 
 CAVALEY v. AETILLEEY. 
 
 The attack on artillery when limbered up must always be an 
 affair of opportunity, and it is therefore not necessary to specify 
 any particular manner in which it may best be undertaken. 
 
 It must often be the duty of cavalry, however, to attack 
 artillery in position, and a plan of attack should be adopted 
 which will offer the smallest advantage to the fire of modern 
 field guns. 
 
CAVALRY TACTICS. 133 
 
 It is obvious that if in any way possible, artillery should under 
 all circumstances be attacked by cavalry on the flanks or in the 
 rear. 
 
 If this cannot be done, however, it is most unadvisable that an 
 attack should be made by cavalry in a close formation, and 
 therefore extended order should generally be employed. 
 
 In attacking artillery escorted by other troops, there are two 
 distinct objects — the one to attack the guns, the other to attack 
 the escort protecting the gnus. The attack on the guns should 
 he made in extended order : that on the escort, when the latter 
 consists of cavalry, should be made in close order. 
 
 The attack on artillery in position will be made : — 
 
 (a.) Either for the purpose of causing so much annoyance that 
 the guns must limber up and move to other ground. 
 
 i £.) Or with the intention that the guns shall be either captured 
 or disabled from further service. 
 
 In attacking a battery for the purpose of making it quit its 
 position, unless it is protected by more than an ordinarily 
 powerful escort, two squadrons should suffice. 
 
 Of these squadrons one should be formed in extended order, 
 and should m ike a converging advance. The other squadron 
 should be in support, formed in line at close intervals. 
 
 If the battery shows no disposition to retire, the squadron in 
 extended order must rapidly attack, closing in towards the guns 
 on one or both flanks of the latter. The supporting squadron 
 must also advance at a gallop, taking such advantage of ground 
 as it can to obtain shelter from fire, and musl manoeuvre against 
 the escort, with the object of endeavouring to take it in flank or 
 rear, and of preventing its acting againsl the squadron in 
 extended order which is engaged in the attack upon the guns. 
 When circumstances are favourable, the mounted attack upon 
 artillery in position may also sometimes be supported by the 
 lire of dismounted men. 
 
 If it is resolved to secure the battery, or prevent it from again 
 (oming into action, the force should make a converging attack 
 on its position, squadrons being formed in extended order, and 
 acting independently of each other, in the way most suitable to 
 the ground to be traversed. The effect of the fire of the guns 
 will thus be very greatly reduced, and the attack if pushed home, 
 must succeed. But in any case, when attacking artillery which 
 is escorted by cavalry, it is most important that a compact 
 support should be kept in hand to act against the escort, in the 
 event of its threatening the troops in extended order. 
 
 Note. — If at any time it is necessary to arrest the progress of 
 a battery, no measure is so effectual as shooting one of the 
 wheel horses. 
 
134 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 CAVALRY v. INFANTRY. 
 
 As a rule, the attack of infantry by cavalry will only be 
 undertaken under the following circumstances : — 
 
 (rt.) "When infantry is either demoralised or of inferior quality, 
 in winch case it is at all times at the mercy of good cavalry. 
 (b.) "When cavalry, from the nature of the ground, or from 
 misty atmosphere, &c, &c, arc able to approach to within 
 a short distance of infantry unperceived, and can thus take 
 them by surprise. 
 (c.) When infantry has been already broken and partially 
 defeated by the fire action of opposing- infantry or artillery. 
 or when it has expended its ammunition. 
 (d.) Cavalry may usefully threaten to attack skirmishers, so 
 as to delay their advance, and by inducing them to close, 
 cause them to offer a better target for the fire of artillery 
 and musketry. 
 As in the attack on cavalry, the besl formation for the attack 
 on infantry will be found to he the "double echelon of squadrons 
 from the centre." In every case, however, the facilities afforded 
 by the nature of the ground must determine, in a great measure, 
 the particular formation to be employed. 
 
 A succession of attacks in column over the same ground 
 should never under any circumstances be made use of. All 
 attacks should be either convergent or in echelon. 
 
 In threatening to attack skirmishers, with the view of arresting 
 their progress and forcing them to close, the mode of attack 
 in " extended order " may generally be employed with advantage. 
 The effect of the fire of a body of infantry is always much 
 greater towards its left flank than towards its right. It follows, 
 therefore, that it a choice is afforded, the right flank of an 
 infantry formation should be selected for attack. 
 
 It has been noticed that in attacking cavalry, an advantage is 
 gained if the enemy can he attacked down hill. 
 
 In attacking infantry, however, the reverse is the case; 
 infantry are always apt to lire high, and therefore advancing up 
 a slight incline against them is rather an advantage. 
 
 THE EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK. 
 
 Cavalry can only be used on the offensive, and therefore all 
 the different movements which it practises, should have the 
 intention of placing it in the most advantageous situation for 
 attack. 
 
 The charge is that attack made with the greatest velocity and 
 regularity possible in order to break the formation of the enemy. 
 
 Whatever distance a force has to go over, it is most important 
 that the space to be traversed under the enemy's fire should 
 be passed over at a rapid pace. From the moment, therefore, 
 that the force becomes exposed to fire, if the nature of the 
 ground will permit, the leader shoidd move at a brisk trot till 
 within about 500 or 600 yards of the enemy. He should then 
 

 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 135 
 
 give the command " Gallop'' 1 and gradually increase the pace 
 till the force arrives within about 50 yards of the point of 
 attack, when the word " Charge" will be given, and the pace 
 increased to the utmost rapidity which the body can bear in 
 good order. 
 
 The distances, as noted above, are to be understood as 
 referring to the attack by cavalry on a force in position. If the 
 enemy is advancing to meet it, the pace must be increased at the 
 discretion of the commanding officer, so that it is greatest at the 
 moment of encounter. 
 
 When the shock of the charge has broken the enemy's 
 order, one or both flank troops in the case of a single regiment. 
 or flank squadrons in the case of a brigade, may be ordered to 
 pursue and follow up the advantage, opening out and covering 
 the front and intervals, whilst the remainder of the force keeps 
 together and supports ; but their great object should be instantly 
 to rally and be able to renew their efforts in a body. It is most 
 important that cavalry engaged in a pursuit should not be 
 allowed to get out of hand of their r fficers. 
 
 If the force fails in the attack, officers must prevent their men 
 from falling back directly on the support. They must lead them 
 clear of its' flank or flanks and rally them under its protection. 
 Nothing can be more fatal than a disordered body throwing 
 itself back upon a force advancing to its assistance. 
 
 A direct attack on the enemy's front should invariably be 
 supported by an attack on one or both of bis flanks, made either 
 obliquely or at right angles, to the line of the frontal attack. 
 Such flank attacks should be executed by wheeling up a portion 
 or the whole [according to circumstances of the troops echeloned 
 in rear of the flanks of the lirst line. 
 
 DUTIES OF SUP1 OBT. 
 With a body of cavalry formed in three line, while the first 
 line advances to the principal attack, the support, following in 
 echelon in rear of the exposed flank, should co-operate with, 
 and assist, the direct attack by manoeuvring against the flank 
 of the enemy. The duties of the support are: — 
 
 (a.) To be' prepared to meet any flank attack on the enemy's 
 part. SO a- to relieve the lirst line from all anxiety for the 
 security of it- flanks and rear. 
 (b.) To support the direct attack of the first line by threatening 
 and attacking the enemy's flank, and thus, in the event of a 
 successful charge, to protect the first line from a counter- 
 attack by the "enemy, or to follow up and reinforce the 
 attack, in order to improve and complete the first advantage, 
 (t.) In the event of the failure of the principal attack, to 
 cover the retreat of the first line, and endeavour to effect a 
 diversion by acting against the flank of the enemy. 
 The support must, in short, be constantly in readiness to take 
 part in the actio:, cither offensively or defensively, according to 
 circumstances. 
 
136 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 Occasions may also occur when it may be of advantage to 
 employ the first line in manoeuvring to gain the enemy's flank, 
 and thus to betray him into some movement which would afford 
 a favourable opportunity for attacking- him with the support, 
 on which would then devolve the duty of making the principal 
 attack. It must be left to the judgment of the commander 
 of the whole force t>> decide, according to the circumstances 
 of the moment, in which it may be most advantageous to employ 
 the two lines respectively. 
 
 DVT IKS OF EESEEVE. 
 
 The reserve should, as a rule, be kept in hand as long as 
 possible, and not be employed until a critical moment has 
 arrived, when it may be effectively used to reinforce the first 
 line and support, and either decide the victory or ward off tho 
 result of an unsuccessful attack, and arrest pursuit. 
 
 During a pursuit by one's own troops after a successful 
 charge, it is especially impor ant that an intact reserve should 
 be kept in hand, in case of the enemy renewing the attack with 
 fresh troops. There are few occasions when cavalry is less 
 able to defend itself than immediately after a successful charge. 
 The natural tendency to pursue after success increases the 
 disorder necessarily caused by collision with the enemy. It 
 is a general maxim that in cavalry engagements the advantage 
 in the end rests with that side which can last bring fresh and 
 unbroken troops into action. 
 
 For the same reason the support should never, as a general 
 rule in attacks against cavalry, he wholly expended unless a 
 third line is at hand. When this is not the case a portion only 
 of the support should he employed in co-operating with the 
 first line, so that, under all circumstances, the principle may 
 be maintained of keeping an intact reserve available to the last 
 possible moment, in order to meet critical contingencies. 
 
 GENEEAL OBSEEVATIONS. 
 
 The main essentials to the success of a cavalry attack are that 
 it should be well-timed, rapid in execution, and, if possible, 
 sudden and unexpected. The opportunities for making an 
 attack with cavalry under the most favourable circumstances 
 quickly pass away. Whenever they occur they must be instantly 
 seized, and it is therefore absolutely essential that a constant 
 and careful watch should be kept for such opportunities 
 by a well organised system of reconnoitring, conducted by 
 scouts and flanking patrols. 
 
 Although cavalry should never be unnecessarily exposed in 
 masses to the tire of artillery or infantry, occasions will occur 
 when it must run the risk of such exposure, and even be 
 prepared to sacrifice itself, in order to effect an important object, 
 such as to check the enemy's advance at a critical moment, or to 
 afford support to the other arms. The importance of the object 
 to be gained will often be sufficient to compensate for the losses 
 
CAVALRY TACTICS. 137 
 
 incurred by exposure to fire ; and, when this is the case, the 
 commander of a body of cavalry must never for a moment 
 hesitate in bringing his force into action at any risk. 
 
 With the increased range and rapid fire of artillery and small 
 arms at the present day, it is most essential that cavalry should 
 
 (1) remain if possible, under cover until required to act, and 
 
 (2) move at a rapid pace when advancing to the attack over 
 open ground, in order to reduce to the utmost the period during 
 which it remains exposed to the enemy's fire. In carrying out 
 sudden attacks, which may be made unexpectedly under cover 
 of favourable accidents of ground, the success of the attack 
 depends mainly on its being executed with rapidity. In short 
 under all circumstances, cover when not in action, and celerity 
 in manceuvering is essential to the success of cavalry movements ; 
 as without it greater risk is incurred from exposure to the 
 enemy's fire, and favourable opportunities for attack are lost. 
 
 DISMOUNTED SERVICE. 
 
 Now that cavalry are armed with breech-loading rifled 
 carbines, capablo of sustaining a rapid and accurate fire at 
 long ranges, dismounted service is of great importance, and 
 should be constantly practised. 
 
 The cavalry soldier should, when mounted in the ranks, 
 depend on his sword, or lance, and horse alone. 
 
 The carbine must only bo used when he is acting on foot, or, 
 when mounted, for the purpose of giving an alarm. 
 
 There are many positions in which cavalry may find themselves 
 placed, particularly in an enclosed country where they cannot 
 attack an enemy mounted, in which, if able to act quickly 
 dismounted, under cover for themselves and their led horses, 
 their services may be most valuable. 
 
 The following general rules should always be borne in mind: — 
 
 (1.) Cavalry should never be dismounted in any position when 
 mounted opposing cavalry have a chance of attacking them 
 before they can remount and be ready to meet the attack. 
 
 (2.) They should never dismount in a position where their led 
 horses would be under any direct fire. 
 
 (3.) The nearer they are to their led horses when dismounted 
 the better, as they can more rapidly rally and mount ; their 
 fire will also be more effective, as they can allow the 
 enemy to approach within easy range. 
 
 (4.) Rapidity of movement is essential in preparing for 
 dismounted service, in order, if possible, to surprise the 
 enemy in close formation, before they can bring a fire to 
 bear in return, or retire under cover or out of range. 
 
 It is impossible to lay down exact rules for dismounted 
 service, as the proportion of dismounted men required, the cover 
 available for their support and led horses, and the nature of the 
 ground or roads, must vary in every case. 
 
 16 
 
138 CAVALRY TACTICS. 
 
 The positions in -which cavalry would generally be required to 
 act dismounted are : — 
 
 (1.) In open undulating ground where rapid movements can 
 
 be effected, shelter obtained, and cavalry (or artillery 
 
 limbered up) can be harassed. 
 (2.) On ground where advanced or rear guards can harass or 
 
 keep in check cavalry or artillery, owing to some obstacle, 
 
 such as a bridge, ford, &c, intervening, which the enemy 
 
 cannot cross without delay and exposure. 
 (3.) In roads and enclosed country, where cavalry is exposed 
 
 to direct fire in column at long range, prior to attack 
 
 mounted; or, where, from banks or fences intervening, a 
 
 flank fire can be brought to bear on an enemy moving on 
 
 a parallel line. 
 (4.) In outbuildings or farm-yards, where an inferior force 
 
 might keep cavalry in cheek without danger of being 
 
 outflanked or surrounded. 
 (5.) Where patrols or scouts fall in with opposing detached 
 
 bodies sent out to reconnoitre. 
 
<( 
 
 139 
 
 Lecture XV. 
 
 ARTILLERY TACTICS. 
 
 The general principles regarding the employment of Woolwich 
 artillery have been in no wise affected by the introduction of c^elPralt, 
 modern rifled guns. Its action consists in fire alone, and mainly r.a. 
 
 in fire at ranges beyond the effective limit of the infantry weapon. 
 It has firstly to commence and carry on the action at long 
 range, dealing destruction to the hostile men and material at 
 the period before the action of the other arms is possible : 
 secondly, to maintain the fight, to reduce to a minimum effect 
 the artillery and infantry fire of the enemy, and thus enable 
 the infantry of its own side to advance, or throw confusion into 
 the ranks of an attacking enemy; and thirdly, to co-operate 
 with the other arms in dealing a final blow at the hostile line, 
 following up its retreat if victorious, or covering the retirement 
 of its own side in case of defeat." 
 
 THE ATTACK. 
 
 The artillery of an army advancing to the attack, will hasten 
 to the front and take up a position, usually about a mile or 
 thereabouts from the enemy t<» open the action. In doing this 
 it will become a mark for the defender's guns which will open 
 upon it immediately it appears, and endeavour to silence it 
 before the attacking infantry comes on the scene. 
 
 Tho attacking guns return* the lire from the defender's artillery 
 and thus the battle commences with an artillery duel. 
 
 Meanwhile, the attacking infantry are arriving at the scene 
 of action and getting into attack formation. When they are 
 ready to advance, the attacking guns turn their fire npon the 
 defender's position, trenches, and general infantry line ; to 
 break up obstacles, make breaches, and shake the morale of the 
 defenders by shell fire. 
 
 As the attacking infantry draws close up to the position, 
 the fire of the attacking guns will be more or less "masked," 
 and they should then limber up and move forward at speed to 
 support their infantry at the critical moment, by engaging the 
 enemy at close ranges of about 600 or 700 yards. 
 
 This forms one of the exceptions to the rule that guns 
 should never come under infantry fire. The advantage of the 
 immense moral support thus afforded to the attacking infantry 
 should outweigh all other considerations, and, moreover, the 
 risk to the guns is diminished by the fact that the defending 
 infantry are too much occupied to bestow much attention on 
 them. Any of the attacking guns which from casualties, local 
 impediments, etc., are unable to advance, should continue their 
 fire on the defending guns or any available part of the position. 
 
140 
 
 AKTILLEKY TACTICS. 
 
 Prince 
 Hohenlohe. 
 
 Woolwich 
 Lectures 
 Colonel Pratt, 
 R.A. 
 
 "How can you expect a gunner to watch his comrades of the infant! y 
 
 charging- at the last and hottest crisis, without longing to he with them ? 
 
 Artillery which leaves its infantry in the lurch in its efforts to avoid the /.one 
 of infantry fire, shews plenty of head for its own interests, hut no courage at 
 all and would he useless." 
 
 Should the attack succeed, every available gun must hasten 
 forward accompanied by cavalry, to confirm the success and fire 
 on the retreating enemy. 
 
 Should the attack fail, the attacking guns, aided by the 
 cavalry, must cover the retreat of the now broken and repulsed 
 infantry ; even if it comes to firing case. The usual method of 
 covering the retreat is by taking up successive positions ; or by 
 retiring in echelon of batteries. 
 
 THE DEFENCE. 
 
 The defenders will have received warning from their cavalry 
 screen of the approach of the enemy, and if time lias permitted, 
 the ranges of all spots on which the attacking guns are likely to 
 take post, have been carefully ascertained. Immediately the 
 attacking artillery shows, the defending guns, as already stated, 
 open fire on it. 
 
 "In the great artillery duel which ensues, there 1 is a 
 difference of opinion as to whether any of the guns of the 
 defence shoidd be kept in reserve. The matter seems to depend 
 on the relative power of the two forces. A number of guns 
 somewhat inferior to those of the assailant should be able to 
 prevent him obtaining the mastery. If the defender has more 
 than these available they might with advantage be retained as 
 local reserves, and reserve their fire till the infantry attack- 
 begins to be delivered. If the defence, however, is palpably 
 inferior, it should by the deployment of every gun, delay as far 
 as possible the final assault. In the event of great inferiority 
 when the batteries are overwhelmed with concentric fire, it will 
 be generally advisable to withdraw a considerable proportion 
 of the guns under cover, and keep them ready to come into 
 action against the infantry when it advances." 
 
 This theory is denied b}- the Germans who argue that as you 
 cannot tire a gun by firing it, every gun kept out of action is a 
 gun wasted. Moreover, Prince Hohenlohe sa}-s — "If in the 
 artillery duel, the attack is allowed to gain any predominance, 
 the guns in reserve will never be able to re-adjust the balance. 
 Therefore employ all your guns from the outset." 
 
 The artillery duel is followed by the advance of the attacking 
 infantry. Now is the time for the artillery of the defence to 
 neglect all other objects and considerations, and to pour the fire 
 of every available gun on them, for the infantry must be 
 repulsed at all hazards. 
 
 Supposing the attack to succeed, the defending guns aided 
 by their cavalry must cover the retreat as already described. 
 Should the attack be repulsed, the defending guns hasten forward 
 in conjunction with the cavalry to turn the repulse into a rout. 
 
AKTiLLEKY TACTICS. 
 
 141 
 
 GKENEBAL EEMABKS. 
 
 It has been already stated that although artillery should 
 not as a rule come within infantry fire, there are occasions when 
 it may and should do so. 
 
 Military history abounds with instances of gates and barriers 
 blown open, of attacks succeeding, of defences prolonged, of 
 exhausted infantry supported and encouraged, and of doubtful 
 battles decided by the opportune arrival of guns in the thick 
 of the fight, and by the actual and moral effect they produced. 
 
 In the war of 1870 we read :—" Conspicuous in the first place in 
 contrast to former times is a great change in the employment of the German 
 artillery. Placed at the head of the marching columns, it appeared with the 
 foremost on the held of battle, mostly preparing the great offensive blows. 
 Fearlessly holding to the position which it once took up, it may be said to have 
 formed a solid framework to the order of battle." 
 
 "In the German leading, the effort was conspicuous to employ the 
 artillery at the outset in masses and afterwards in the most intimate connection 
 with the task of the infantry. Proceeding in this wise, the one great battery 
 at Noiseville on the 14th of August was sufficient to protect the momentarily 
 threatened right wing of the First Corps. On the 18th, the formidable array of 
 guns near Gravelotte, also secured the right wing of the Germans against any 
 breaking forward on the part of the enemy until the decisive blow in the north 
 could be prepared by other bodies of artillery ; and not until these had been in 
 action sometime, was the blow struck by the infantry. And again, on the other 
 hand, German batteries accompanied their infantry to close quarters— on the 
 14th past La Planchette and Lauvallier; on the 16th past Mars la Tour and 
 towards Kezonville ; and on the 18th past Gravelotte, Yenni ville, and St. Ail." 
 
 In fact the whole theory that field artillery should never come 
 under infantry fire, is now scouted by the Germans as a con- 
 sequence of their experience of 1870. 
 
 " There were hundreds and thousands of cases in the war of 1870-71, where 
 artillery which refused to retire, could not be driven back by infantry fire. 
 Thus we may consider the decisions of the umpires at Kriegspiel and manueuvres, 
 that artillery should be compelled to allow itself to be driven hack by infantry 
 fire, as the most unnal oral of all decisions. Such decisions are also ruinous in their 
 eonsequences, since when they are constantly repeated during a long interval of 
 peace, all artillery officers who have not seen war, end hy believing that 
 artillery cannot stand its ground against infantry, and the natural consequences 
 of this will be that they also, as so many others have already done, will in war 
 
 at once give way before the fire of infantry, I repeat once more and I 
 
 cannot too often repeat, that artillery cannot generally speaking, ever be driven 
 back by infantry, if it refuses to leave its ground. On the contrary, when the 
 infantry fire is really hot, it cannot fall back, since too many of its horses will 
 
 then be shot If artillery wishes to save itself, it must kill its enemy by 
 
 its fire. This is its only safety as far as I tan see.. If acting thus, it does not 
 save itself, it will at least save its honour." 
 
 As the correctness of the following account is admitted by the 
 other side, it may be worth cjuoting. 
 
 " We had not long to wait for the first movement which the enemy's infantry 
 was to make in our direction. It advanced in quarter column from Ainanvilliers 
 and attacked us energetically. When the head of the column became visible 
 o\er the hill, our trial shots reached it at a raDge of 1900 paces, and my thirty 
 guns opened a rapid fire. The enemy's infantry was enveloped in the thick 
 smoke which the shells made as they burst. But after a very short time we 
 saw the red trousers of the masses which were approaching us, appear through 
 the cloud. I stopped the fire. A trial shot was fired at 1700 paces range ; this 
 was to show us the point up to which we should let them advance before 
 
 German 
 
 Official 
 
 Account. 
 
 Prince 
 Hohenlohe. 
 
142 ARTILLER* TACTICS. 
 
 re-opening the rapid fire. We did the same for the ranges of 1500, 1300, 1100 
 and 900 paces. In spite of the horrible devastation which the shells caused in 
 their ranks, these brave troops continued to advance. But at 900 paces the 
 effect of our fire was too deadly for them, they turned short round and fled. 
 We hurled shells after them as long as we could see them. Here was an 
 infantry attack which was repulsed purely and simply by the fire <>f artillery. 
 A few years later I had an oppoitunity of talking with an aide-de-camp of 
 General de Ladmirault and the very man who had canied the order to make 
 this counter attack, and who had been present dining its execution. Two 
 regiments of infantry had been des| atched on this duty. The French officer 
 said to me "It was impossible to succeed. You have no idea what it is to have 
 to advance under the fire of your artillery." 
 
 POSITIONS FOR ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 
 
 Woolwich A good artillery position should have a dear open range 
 
 Lectures to the front, the hue of guns being as even as possible and 
 Colonel Pratt, perpendicular to the line of fire. A ridge sufficiently high to see 
 11. A. over all the ground in front, with a slope behind it to give cover 
 
 to limbers, and marshy ground or a slope in front, sufficient to 
 catch the enemy's shells, provided it does not interfere with 
 forward movement, is advantageous. The tops of high liills not 
 so good as those of medium height, as they are difficult to get up 
 and advance from, and the effect of common shell is diminished. 
 There should be as little cover in front as possible for the 
 enemy to utilise, and the vicinity of woods, houses, trees, or 
 any conspicuous object in rear should he avoided. Stony ground 
 or stonewalls in immediate front to be avoided, and the space in 
 rear should be sufficiently open for guns to come into action 
 simultaneously. The presence of natural cover such as houses, 
 trees, hedges some distance in front, which can be just seen 
 over, seems often an advantage, as it renders it difficult for an 
 enemy to estimate the correct range An immediate back- 
 ground such as a wood or village, makes guns very visible, 
 but a distant similar back-ground is generally an advantage. 
 The flanks of artillery in action are weak points and care mttst 
 be taken to protect them as far as possible. If secured by neither 
 troops nor the nature of ground it is advisable to retire the flank 
 batteries in echelon. 
 
 CONCENTRATION OF FIRE. 
 
 There are two ways in which artillery fire can be concentrated 
 on any given spot. (1) by massing batteries together; and 
 (2) by dispersing batteries but concentrating their fire ; which 
 with the great range of modern guns, can always be done. 
 
 The former method is generally preferred, for the following 
 reasons. The guns are under a single control ; words of 
 command, orders, and correct ranges, are easily circulated, 
 casualties are little noticed, and the effect produced is greater. 
 On the other hand, an immense target is offered to the enemy, 
 and should a retreat become necessary there is some risk of 
 confusion and loss. 
 
ARTILLKRY TACTICS. 
 
 143 
 
 GENERAL PEINCIPLES. 
 
 • ' To sum up I ask your consideration of the following 
 principles for handling field artillery 
 
 1. The battery of six guns is the fire unit, and want of room 
 is the sole admissible excuse for dividing it, 
 
 2. The normal unit of manoeuvre is the •' group," or in 
 official language the "Division," composed of two or three 
 batteries. 
 
 3. The sole aim of artillery is to support the other arms; 
 saving them from loss by weakening the enemy and by attracting 
 his fire, and encouraging them by its company in all phases of 
 the battle. 
 
 4. An Officer commanding a mixed force must give 
 sufficient instructions to his artillery. He is responsible for its 
 position relative to the other troops and for the general character 
 of its tactics. The arm that has to prepare the way for the 
 others cannot be left to conform to their movements. Without 
 an active brain the limbs cannot co-operatf. 
 
 5. All guns are to be used as soon as available. A gun out 
 of action is a gun wasted and only an encumbrance. 
 
 6. No gun can be retired without the sanction of the Officer 
 commanding the troops. He alone can judge of the expediency. 
 
 7. The ranges should be as short as circumstances permit. 
 The nearer the gun is to its target the surer it is to hit, and to 
 hit is everything. But in the earlier stages of the combat too 
 much risk of damage to mobility should not be incurred, and 
 the advantages of the long-range fire of modern guns should 
 not be forgotten. 
 
 8. The supply of ammunition must be ample, and it must be 
 near at hand." 
 
 Lecture at 
 U.S. 
 
 Institution 
 Captain R. F. 
 Johnson, R A. 
 
144 
 
 Lecture XVI. 
 THE THREE ARMS IX COMBINATION. 
 
 All officers should study and understand the characteristics 
 and functions of the three arms, in order to qualify themselves 
 for the command of a mixed force. Such knowledge tends to 
 smoothness in working, ensures a proper distribution of work 
 and minimises the friction inevitable on active service. 
 Moreover, it prevents such absurdities as infantry in marching 
 order being expected to "double" for prolonged distances, 
 horse artillery being ordered to "charge" a body of infantry, 
 guns being ordered to fire " grape " at a range of 800 yards, or 
 an officer in command of a tore,, of the three arms in an enemy's 
 country, preparing for action by issuing an order that his 
 command was to "form line of battle." under the impression 
 that the three arms would " drop into their proper places" of 
 their own accord. 
 
 N.B. — None of the above are imaginary. 
 
 But although an officer commanding a mixed force should 
 know the duties and functions of the various arms, he should 
 not attempt to undertake or interfere with the technical details 
 belonging to each. These should be left to the respective 
 commanding officers. 
 
 THE ATTACK. 
 
 Modern warfare points clearly to the conclusion that a properly 
 prepared and conducted defence is invincible by a frontal attack. 
 
 For example :— At Worth, the Germans made a frontal attack, 
 and notwithstanding the gallantry of their infantry and the 
 overwhelming fire of a superior artillery, made no impression 
 until superiority of numbers enabled them to surround and crush 
 in both flanks of the French army. 
 
 Thus between one and two p.m., the bow of the German front of attack 
 .Niemann. ^ad been drawn closer and tinner round the French position and encompassed it 
 from north to south. 
 
 Again, at Gravelotte the Germans attacked the French at 
 noon and no impression was made along a front of nearly eight 
 miles, until the right flank of the French was turned and driven 
 in at 6 p.m. 
 
 In conformity with the dispositions of the chief command, the German right 
 Ibid. w i n g thus held "the enemy fast, even to the centre, without pressing him too 
 strongly, until the left wing was able to surround the French right. 
 
 But it does not follow that a frontal attack is useless, on the 
 contrary, the enemy must be engaged along the front, to give a 
 turning movement a chance of success. 
 
 At the Peiwar Kotal a frontal attack against a naturally almost 
 impregnable position, was made for the avowed purpose of 
 holding the Afghans and engaging their attention, pending the 
 
THE THREE ARMS IN COMBINATION. 145 
 
 execution of a flank attack. And at Laing's Nek a purely 
 frontal attack failed completely. 
 
 Again, when the French army was imprisoned in Metz after the 
 battle of Gravelotte, the onus of attack devolved upon them if 
 they wished to break out, and this they failed to do principally 
 because the Germans having drawn their line of investment 
 completely round them, there was no flank to attack. 
 
 The moral of this is clear, that an attack must be made with 
 superior numbers or its equivalent in morale and quality of 
 troops. The old idea of penetrating and storming a de3isive point 
 in a given line of defence appears to have passed away altogether. 
 
 In the wars of the Revolution ami Napoleon I., there were many cases in Boguslnwski 
 which inferior numbers gained decisive advantages. Now, since the introduction 
 of breech-loaders, the chance of attacking with inferior numbers successfully, 
 even supposing superior generalship on the side of the assailant, has been 
 reduced to a minimum, if the troops are of equal quality, because the direct 
 attack being beset with immense difficulties can hardly ever succeed at once and 
 generally resolves itself into a long, stationary or slowly progressive musketry 
 engagement. Hence ensues the necessity for a turning movement, which 
 however is only practicable for a superior force. 
 
 Great tactical attacks will therefore take the form of turning movements as 
 was the case at Gravelotte and Sedan, which movements we may confidently 
 consider to be as much characu listicof the battles of these times, as the practice 
 of breaking through the centre was characteristic of the battles of Napoleon I. 
 
 The arrangement and conduct of these great turning move- 
 ments fall within the province of Higher Tactics rather than of 
 Minor Tactics. The following rules are however, taken from a 
 variety of sources and are here given. 
 
 1 . Reconnoitre the position to be attacked, as far as possible 
 by means of the advanced cavalry and by staff officers. 
 
 2. Attack at the earliest possible moment, because every hour 
 of delay means so much additional fortification and strength 
 for the position. As a rule the assailant lias nothing to gain 
 by delay, while the defender can improve every minute. 
 
 3. Keep small reserves in hand along the line of attack, 
 independent of the turning force, to confirm a success or 
 check a counter attack. 
 
 THE DEFENCE. 
 
 Defence is of two kinds, " active " and " passive." The former 
 implies a defensive attitude and defensive tactics only until an 
 opportunity arrives for assuming the offensive in the shape of 
 attacks or counter strokes ; the latter implies simply repulsing 
 attack without following up such repulse. 
 
 It has often been observed that pure or passive defence can 
 never win a battle, and as far as regards the actual battle-field 
 this is doubtless true. But moral or political circumstances may 
 so influence the situation that a passive defence, if protracted, 
 may eventually be equivalent to victory. Perhaps the best 
 instance of passive defence is Plevna, and it is not saying too 
 much that had not famine put an end to it : the whole course 
 and possibly the result of the war would have been changed. 
 
 17 
 
14-6 THE THREE ARMS IN COMBINATION. 
 
 Again, the passive defence of Laing's Nek achieved all the 
 results sought by the defenders. 
 
 But as purely passive defence is a matter of necessity, from 
 inability to assume the offensive, we may include it in the active 
 defence for purposes of study, as the same rules, up to a certain 
 point, apply to both. 
 
 In taking up a position for defence, the first thing to consider 
 is the strength of the force which is to hold it. As a general 
 rule five men per yard of all arms, or three men per yard of 
 infantry is the proper proportion, unless the ground is unusually 
 favourable for defence, when fewer will suffice. 
 
 The following conditions should as far as possible be adhered 
 to: — 
 
 1. A clear field of fire and a command of view over tho country 
 in front and on the flanks. 
 
 2. Good artillery positions in rear of the infantry Hue. 
 
 3. Good cover for supports and reserves. 
 
 4. Extent suited to the numbers of defenders. 
 6. Security for flanks. 
 
 6. Free and sheltered communications throughout the position. 
 
 7. Facilities for counter attack, it' such be contemplated. 
 
 8. Facilities for creating strong points and for protecting the 
 whole or parts of the line by obstacles, according to 
 circumstances. 
 
 " That all these advantages are to be found in any position 
 is not to be expected ; but a clear field of view and for fire is now so 
 essential. that if it does not exist or cannot be made within the time 
 and uuans at one's disposal, a position can rarely be tenable.'' 1 
 
 Never commit the error of throwing out skirmishers in front 
 of a previously prepared defensive position. Skirmishers were 
 once used to cover the front of small columns behind which they 
 rapidly retired before the real fighting commenced. But when 
 your line of defence extends for two or three or more miles, the 
 skirmishers cannot clear the front, and must retire into it, com- 
 pletely masking the fire from the position at the critical moment. 
 
 COUNTER ATTACK 
 
 should never be undertaken without order, and when made 
 should not be carried out by troops in the first line of defence, 
 but by local reserve. 
 
 General Schaw '^ ile examples from late years are so numerous in which the attempt of the 
 RE, first line to attack directly to its front proved futile and wasteful of life that this 
 
 mode of action may be deemed inadmissible. ... In 1870 and 1S74, 
 French and Spaniards have alike boldly left their trenches ar.d rushed at their 
 enemies, and alike they have suffered for their temerity without deriving any 
 advantage from it. As examples, the French advance out of their position on 
 their left at Gravelotte and the Carlist bayonet attacks on Republican troops 
 
 endeavouring to storm their trenches may be cited If an attack 
 
 is properly supported by artillery and leserves of infantry, such counter attacks 
 evidently must fail because the numbeis are too small, and the truops so leaving 
 their shelter and ceasing their effective fire, both incur heavier losses themselves 
 and also fail to inflict so much loss on their enemies as they would do if they 
 continued to fire steadily from their trenches. 
 
The three arms in combination. 147 
 
 Most authorities agree that counter attacks may be made by 
 local reserves when an attack against any portion of a line has 
 failed, but such counter attack must be purely local, and must 
 never be allowed to become pursuit. Also when the assailant 
 having been repulsed, or unable to make any impression along 
 the whole front has evidently exhausted his strength. In this 
 case the counter attack should be general and should seek to 
 turn repulse into defeat. 
 
 EESEEYES. 
 
 "The Reserve represents a formed body of fresh troops at the 
 disposal of the general commanding. No body of troops should 
 ever engage without a reserve, its strength must depend on the 
 nature of the position to be attacked, and the probable strength 
 of the defending force. In the case of a Division, the seventh 
 Battalion will form the Eeserve. With an Army Corps one 
 Division will form the Eeserve." 
 
 Thus it would appear that about one-third to one-sixth of any 
 force should form the Eeserve, but the proportion must be decided 
 by the general on the spot. 
 
 The functions of a Eeserve are, by judicious and timely 
 employment to avert impending defeat, or turn a doubtful battle 
 into victory. Circumstances alone can decide the precise time 
 and manner in which it should be used. 
 
 AVith regard to the position of the reserve, the modern 
 tendency is to have numerous small reserves instead of one large 
 one. The present system of always turning one or both flanks 
 necessitates a reserve in rear of each wing, and there should 
 always be small local reserves wherever they may be considered 
 necessary. 
 
 At the battle of Gravelotte, Marshal Bazaine held one corps 
 in reserve, the Imperial Guard, and stationed it in rear of his 
 extreme left. As it happened, its presence there was wholly 
 unnecessary, whereas it was urgently required on the extreme 
 right, which owing to the distance — seven miles — it was unable 
 to reach in time to prevent the turning of the flank, and the 
 defeat of the French. Had half of the corps been in reserve in 
 rear of each wing, the battle might have had a different result. 
 
 THE THEEE AEMS IN ACTION. 
 
 Let us now suppose one army A, advancing to attack another 
 army B, drawn up in position, and follow the course taken by 
 the various arms. 
 
 A's cavalry screen in front first comes upon the cavalry parties 
 of B which would probably be thrown out, and drives them in. 
 They then proceed to reconnoitre the position as far as possible, 
 after which they form up under cover, usually on the flanks, to 
 await events. Next, the advanced guards of A's various 
 columns appear, halt, and commence forming up for attack. 
 Meanwhile A's artillery hurries up, takes up position about a 
 mile from the enemy, and engages the artillery of B, thus 
 
148 THE THREE ARMS IN COMBINATION. 
 
 opening the battle with an artillery duel. During this duel 
 the infantry of A are coming up, and on reaching the general 
 line of their own guns are formed for attack. When all is 
 ready, A's guns turn their attention to the trenches, &c, of B's 
 position to prepare the way for the infantry, and the advance 
 commences. Now is the time for B to turn the fire of every gun 
 on the attacking infantry, which must be repulsed if possible. 
 As A's infantry approaches the position, a portion of A's guns 
 should advance to support it by engaging the enemy at closer 
 ranges. The infantry attack having been pushed home, will 
 either >ueceed (a) or fail (b). 
 
 (a.) The position being taken, A hurries up his cavalry and 
 guns, supporting them if possible by reserves of infantry to 
 folic iw the retiring foe or to meet the counter attack, which 
 may now be looked for. 
 (b.) The infantry of A being repulsed, B follows them up 
 vigorously with his cavalry and guns, supported by his 
 reserve infantry, while A's cavalry and guns cover the 
 retreat, supported if possible by their reserves. 
 
 TUE ATTACK AND DEFENCE COMPARED. 
 
 General. 
 
 The attacking side can choose the point of attack and time of 
 attack. 
 
 The defence must conform to the attack. 
 
 The attack can be made concentric, the defence is more or less 
 divergent. 
 
 Cavaluy. 
 
 The Cavalry of the attack have probably had hard work in 
 scouting and reconnoitring, and are not acquainted with the 
 ground in front of the position. 
 
 The Cavalry of the defence have probably pushed forward a 
 few miles in front of the position and remained there in observa- 
 tion, consequently they should be fresher than the Cavalry of 
 the attack. They ought to be thoroughly acquainted with the 
 ground in front of the position, and should know where they 
 can act, and where they cannot. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 The Artillery of the attack have to drive up and find positions 
 from which they can open fire. They have to find the range of 
 the position, and this under the fire of the defending guns. They 
 are not acquainted with the ground over which they may 
 subsequently have to advance. 
 
 The artillery of the defence have had time to place their guns 
 under cover. 
 
 They can also ascertain the exact range of every spot in front 
 of the position where the attacking guns can take post. 
 
 They should be well acquainted .vith the ground in front of 
 the position, should have arranged their lines of advance, in the 
 
THE THBEE ARMS IN COMBINATION. 149 
 
 event of a counter attack being ordered, and should have noted 
 all points in front, to pass which -will necessitate even a 
 momentary concentration of the attacking Infantry. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 The very fact of attacking carries with it a certain moral 
 power which excites the men. 
 
 Although the men cannot fire very steadily and are often 
 exposed, yet they only offer a running target to the enemy. 
 
 They leave their killed and woimded behind them as they 
 advance. 
 
 The defending side can choose their ground and entrench 
 themselves. 
 
 Their fire is delivered by men in position, who are more or 
 less covered, and who ought to be cool and aim well. 
 
 They can study the conformation of the ground, utilise its 
 advantages, and move men from place to place as required. 
 
 On the other hand the defence is more trying to the nerves 
 than the attack. The defenders must await the attack in 
 suspense. They are exposed to a preliminary shell fire, and 
 sometimes to cross fire from the attacking guns, which is very 
 trying. 
 
 Their dead and wounded lie where they fall, by the side of 
 their comrades, which is not encouraging. 
 
 PURSUIT. 
 
 The word "pursuit" is conspicuous by its absence from our 
 cavalry regulations, and, judging from the experience of recent 
 European wars, it will soon become a lost art. 
 
 Pursuit must always be an affair of opportunity and inspiration, 
 and the only rules that can be laid down are that the flying 
 enemy should be pressed not merely in rear, but on the flanks, 
 and that the cavalry, on whom this duty mainly devolves, should 
 keep parties in support of those actually pursuing. 
 
 RETREAT. 
 
 " The parks of stores and provisions in rear should commence Lord 
 moving about sun-down, followed by the baggage. If possible Wolaeley. 
 it is better the troops should move a couple of hours before 
 daybreak. They will then have got sufficiently far to the rear 
 before it is light, so that the dust occasioned by their march may 
 not be visible to the enemy. Only cavalry outposts should be left 
 in front of the enemy. These outposts should not retire until 
 forced to do so. Then, aided by a few guns, they can do so 
 slowly." 
 
150 
 
 Lecture XVII. 
 MARCHES. 
 
 The space occupied by troops on the march has already been 
 fully considered. 
 
 In arranging a march, two great and generally conflicting 
 questions have to be considered, namely the "tactical " and the 
 " administrative." 
 
 In peace time or when not near the enemy, administrative 
 considerations may be allowed to preponderate and the comfort 
 of the troops studied as far as possible. 
 
 For instance, if a march of the three arms is to be made, and 
 a choice of roads exists, give infantry the shortest, cavalry the 
 softest, guns the hardest and smoothest. Or should only one 
 road be available, the mounted branches might be allowed to 
 precede the infantry by an hour or so, partly because it is most 
 fatiguing to horses to have to conform to the slow pace of the 
 infantry, and partly on account of the extra labour devolving on 
 mounted men at the end of the march. 
 
 ORDER OF MARCH. 
 
 On service everything must give way to tactical considerations, 
 in other words, order of march must be regulated by order 
 of battle. 
 
 The following order of march for a complete Division on a 
 single road, is that recommended by the Quarter-Master General 
 and will serve as a type for general study. 
 
 Assuming that the advanced guard consists of two squadrons, 
 one battalion, and two guns, the remainder would march in the 
 following order : — 
 
 Two squadrons of cavalry. 
 
 General and his staff. 
 
 1st battalion of leading brigade. 
 
 Divisional artillery (3 batteries). 
 
 Three remaining battalions of leading brigade. 
 
 Small arm ammunition carts of leading brigade, 
 
 Intrenching tool carts of leading brigade. 
 
 Forge waggons of cavalry regiment. 
 
 Second brigade (4 battabons). 
 
 Small arm ammunition carts. 
 
 Tool carts. 
 
 Infantry and artillery reserve ammunition train. 
 
 Ambulance and field hospital. 
 
 Led horses. 
 
 Interval of 100 to 1.000 yards, according to proximity of enemy. 
 
 Non-combatant staff. 
 
MARCHES. 151 
 
 Military police. 
 
 Baggage of Divisional Head Quarter Staff. 
 
 Baggage of troops according to their order. 
 
 Commissariat train. 
 
 Military police. 
 
 Allowing for opening out, half-a-mile between the rear of the 
 
 advanced guard and the head of the column, and a similar 
 
 distance between the rear of the column and head of the baggage 
 
 column ; the whole would occupy from seven to eight miles 
 
 of road. 
 
 PACE. 
 
 The pace decreases as numbers increase. In small bodies, 
 infantry may do two-and-three-quarter miles an hour, field 
 artillery three-and-a-half, horse artillery and cavalry five. 
 
 In large bodies the rate is much slower, and infantry can only 
 do two-and-a-half and two miles an hour, even with good roads 
 and good arrangements. The other arms on service, must of 
 course conform to the infantry. 
 
 Bad roads make the pace very slow. For instance, in 1815, 
 Marshal Vandamme marching from Ligny to "VVavre, took seven 
 hours to do ten miles. In the same campaign, Blucher's army 
 marching from Wavre to Waterloo, could only accomplish one- 
 and-a-half miles an hour, owing to the state of the roads. 
 
 In 1859, Marshal Canrobert's corps which was sent for in all 
 haste to support the Guard at Magenta, took five hours to march 
 nine miles. The road in this case was good but blocked and 
 encumbered with baggage. In 1866, the 8th Austrian corps 
 marching to Sadowa, took fourteen hours to do twelve miles. 
 
 In 1870, when the Crown Prince was following McMahon 
 northwards, his troops were sometimes on their feet from 4 am. 
 to 8 p.m., yet it is doubtful whether they covered twenty-four 
 miles in one day. 
 
 DISTANCES. 
 
 As a ride distances should be from twelve to fifteen miles a 
 day of actual march, and a halt every four or five days. For 
 prolonged operations nothing over ten miles a day, including 
 halts, can be depended on. 
 
 Fifteen to twenty miles a day may be done under exceptional 
 circumstances. Anything over twenty is forced marching. 
 
 The following three examples of great marches may be of 
 interest : — 
 
 NAPOLEON'S MARCH from BOULOGNE to the RHINE, 
 
 September, 1805. 
 This is the grandest march on record, both as regards pace Alison's 
 and numbers. Although apparently undertaken on the spur of History of 
 the moment, everything had been most carefully planned before- Europe. 
 hand, and the instant it became evident from Villeneuve's defeat 
 by Sir Robert Calder, tl at all hope of invading England was 
 gone, orders were issued to march. Strength, 150,000 infantry. 
 
152 
 
 MARCHES. 
 
 (The cavalry and guns appear to have joined en route.) Distance, 
 400 miles. Time, 25 days. Rate, 20 miles a day of actual march, 
 and sixteen miles a day including halts. Object, to surprise the 
 Austrian army. Opposition during march, none. Although 
 this march is unequalled by any other, it must be remembered 
 that it took place under circumstances and facilities which could 
 never be obtained in these days of telegraphs and publicity. 
 
 " The instructions given by Napoleon to all the chiefs of the 
 Grand Army for the tracing of their routes, and the regulation 
 of their movements, were as perfect a model of the combinations 
 of the general as the fidelity and accuracy with which they were 
 followed, were of the discipline and efficiency of his soldiers. 
 The stages and places of rest, the daily marches of every regi- 
 ment, were pointed out with undeviating accuracy, over the 
 immense distance from Cherbourg to Homburg. . . . The 
 troops simultaneously commenced their march from the coast of 
 tin- Channel in the beginuing of September, and performing 
 with the celerity of the fioman Legions, the journej'S allotted to 
 them, arrived on the Rhine from the 17th to the 25th of the 
 
 same month A rigorous embargo was laid on all 
 
 parts of the empire, the post was stopped, the troops were kept 
 ignorant of their destination, and such was the effect of these 
 measures, that they were far advanced on their way to the Rhine 
 before it was known either to the < 'abinets of London or Vienna, 
 that the} r had left the heights of Boulogne." 
 
 SHERMAN'S MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA. 
 
 November, 1863. 
 
 General In this march no attempt was made at rapidity or secrecy, the 
 
 Sherman's object in view being the moral and political effect produced by 
 Report. the passage of the army and the devastation of the country on a 
 breadth of forty miles. ''All the troops were provided with 
 good waggon trains loaded with ammunition and supplies 
 approximating twenty days' bread and forty days' sugar and 
 coffee, a double allowance of salt for forty da}*s, and beef cattle 
 equal to forty days' supply. The waggons were also supplied 
 with about three days' forage and grain ; all were instructed, by 
 a judicious system of foraging, to maintain this order of things 
 as long as possible, living chiefly, if not solely upon the country." 
 Distance, as traversed, from Atlanta to Savannah, about 250 miles. 
 Time 27 days. Constant opposition and obstruction of roads by 
 the enemy took place. Force 60,000 infantry, 5,500 cavalry, 
 and 60 guns. 
 
 ROBERTS' MARCH FROM KABUL TO KANDAHAR. 
 
 August, 1880. 
 
 Official In this case the principal object was time, and the second to 
 
 Account, inflict a decisive defeat upon Ayub Khan, without which the 
 
 march would have been useless. Force, 7,500 infantry, 1,600 
 
MAKCHES. i53 
 
 cavalry, and 18 mountain guns (7 prs.). About one-third of the 
 troops were European. No wheeled guns or transport accom- 
 panied the force, everything being carried on pack animals. 
 Above 8,000 camp followers were employed, raising the total to 
 18,000 men, and nearly 9,000 animals. 
 
 Total distance traversed, 321 miles. Time, 23 days. Rate of 
 actual marching 15£ miles a day. Rate including halts, 14 miles 
 a day. Opposition, none. 
 
 "Thus was brought to a successful issue one of the most 
 memorable marches of modern times, an operation that had been 
 practically unopposed throughout, owing possibly to the good 
 offices of the new Ameer, and bad fortunately been greatly 
 assisted by the favourable condition of the standing crops of 
 autumn corn, which served as the principal means of feeding the 
 numerous animals. On the other hand, it had been carried out 
 through a hostile country by a force which had no base and no 
 assured line of retreat, in the event of a reverse ; and which was 
 entirely dependent on the country for its daily supply of meat, 
 flour, and corn." 
 
 These three marches possess one common feature, namely, the 
 complete accomplishment of the object in view. 
 
 HOUR OF MARCH. 
 
 The hour of march must vary with the climate and the season 
 of year, usually 5 or 6 a.m is preferred, but circumstances must j^d. 
 
 decide; for instance during the march from Kabul to 
 Kandahar : —"For the first few stages the troops turned out at 
 2.45 a.m., and marched at 4.30; but later on when the ther- 
 mometer stood at 100° in the shade at 4 p.m., an earlier start 
 was effected at 2.30 a.m. 
 
 An earlier start is advisable for infantry, but not for the 
 mounted branches, for horses will not drink in the early morning, 
 and harness, saddles, etc., cannot be so well arranged in the 
 dark." 
 
 " The season of the year, the distance to be got over, and the Lord Wolseley 
 climate, must determine the hour of setting out ; it should be an 
 understood thing, however, that the men should have their 
 breakfast before starting." 
 
 HALTS. 
 
 Most authorities agree that there should be a halt of about 
 ten minutes, half-an-hour, or even sooner, after starting, and five 
 minutes halt after every hour. Should the march exceed ten 
 miles there might be a longer halt about half way. 
 
 It should be an absolute rule that when the "halt" sounds, 
 every individual should instantly halt wherever he may be. 
 Some officers, especially mounted officers are rather apt_ to 
 commence closing up, dressing, or fidgetting their men, forgetting 
 that the whole object of the halt is to give perfect rest, and this 
 cannot be obtained unless the men are left alone. 
 18 
 
154 
 
 MARCHES. 
 
 In a long column of route, measures should be taken to en- 
 sure a simultaneous halt. 
 
 It should be remembered that during any accidental or un- 
 authorised halts the troops get no rest. Infantry cannot take 
 off their equipments, cavalry cannot dismount, and if anything 
 they are more fatiguing then marching. 
 
 Avoid halting in villages, and never halt in a defile when the 
 enemy is near. 
 
 INTEEYALS. 
 
 Intervals are left between tactical units on the march on pur- 
 pose to absorb accidental checks, and all stepping out, closing 
 up, &c, should be prohibited, for if they are allowed, those in 
 the rear of a long column will be either running or standing still 
 during the whole march. 
 
 OPENING OUT. 
 
 There is a strong tendency in all troops, especially in hot 
 weather, to open out or "tail off" and thus increase the length 
 of the column, and this must be guarded against. The amount 
 of lengthening or opening out is a test of discipline. With good 
 officers and troops it should never exceed one sixth the length of 
 the column itself. With bad officers and troops it will reach 
 one-half, and in extreme cases the length of the column itself will 
 bo doubled. 
 
 This may seem a small matter when we read it, but let us 
 consider it for a moment in practice. A Division is marching on 
 a single road, and ought to occupy, as before shewn, from three 
 to four miles. The general has arranged all his precautionary 
 measures, such as the composition and distance of his advanced 
 guard, on the supposition that the extreme rear of his column 
 can be brought into action in about one hour. Instead of this 
 the rear is between two and three hours off, the inevitable result 
 being that if the advanced guard is attacked in earnest, the 
 whole force will be beaten in detail. 
 
 GENEBAL EEMAEKS. 
 
 Never parade your men for a march a moment earlier than 
 necessary. 
 
 Make your first march short, if possible. 
 
 If it is found necessary for a column en route to retrace its 
 steps, never "counter march," but " turn about." 
 
 Avoid night marches if possible. 
 
 Never allow columns to cross on the march. 
 
 Blucher would have appeared on the scene of Waterloo long 
 before he did, had not two Prussian columns crossed each other 
 when starting froni Wavre. 
 
 Again, on the occasion of Marshal MeMahon's march to Sedan. 
 "At the very commencement even of the march, on the first day, 
 defective arrangements led to the columns crossing, and other 
 irregularities." 
 
MARCHES. 155 
 
 FLANK MAECHES. 
 
 If one army A, is marching, say due East, and another army 
 B, is marching against it from the south ; A is making a flank 
 march. 
 
 The dangers of a flank march are rather strategical than 
 tactical, for if proper precautions are taken by A, such as throwing 
 out his cavalry well on the threatened flank, and further pro- 
 tecting it by flanking parties moving parallel to the line of 
 march ; the army should have ample warning and time to pre- 
 pare. Moreover it must be an extreme case in which A was not 
 aware from the outset of his situation, and could not regulate 
 his order of march accordingly. 
 
 The topographical means by which the dangers of a flank 
 march may be minimised belong to strategy rather than to tactics. 
 It is sufficient to observe that A should, if possible, interpose 
 some natural obstacle, such as a river or a mountain range, 
 between his own army and B. 
 
 1'8A 
 
155a 
 
 Lecture XVII. a 
 
 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 
 BY NIGHT. 
 
 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 1. The moral effects. — Night attacks affect the efficiency of the 
 troops attacked (1) by breaking their rest, 2; by alarming them, 
 which alarm is more prejudicial in proportion to the boldnes and 
 resolution of the assailants. Daring night adventures when 
 skilfully and still more when successfully executed, raise the 
 fighting value of the assailants by the confidence gained, and 
 depress in proportion those who are worsted in the fight. 
 
 2. Material effects. — The assailant, when successful, obtains 
 two great advantages — 
 
 (a) The saving of time ; for at night all the preliminary 
 stages of a battle are eliminated, and the final rush 
 decides the issue. 
 
 (£) The diminution of loss ; since the movements of the 
 assailants being unseen, the defenders are unable to 
 use their full numerical strength, so as to secure the 
 best results from their fire. 
 
 Operations by night may be classed under three heads — 
 Marches. 
 
 Attack (both of a position, and merely to harass the foe). 
 The Defence. 
 
 MARCHES. 
 
 It is essential that troops should be practised in marching by 
 night; for, apart from their use when an immediate collision is 
 contemplated, these marches are frequently necessary in order to 
 seize a position before the enemy can reach it, and to gain time 
 either in advance or in retreat. The suffering and fatigue in- 
 cidental to such marches with troops inexperienced in war will 
 be minimised when careful training has been earned out in peace 
 time. 
 
 All attacks, except when the opposing forces are in contact, 
 are necessarily preceded by a march, on the conclusion of which 
 the assaidt is delivered ; but as the position is already half won 
 when the troops are sufficiently close to assault without their 
 presence having been discovered, the greatest attention with 
 forethought for all contingencies, is to be given to arrangements 
 for the march, which will be considered further in the following 
 Section. The longer the troops can be allowed to sleep the 
 greater will be their fighting value when day dawns ; but at the 
 
OPERATIONS BY NIGHT. 155B 
 
 same time, the object in view may be frustrated unless sufficient 
 time is given to reach the desired spot while the night lasts. 
 
 It is not safe to allow for a force of 1,000 men making good 
 more than 1 mile per hour at night, over an undulating and 
 roadless country. 
 
 ATTACKS. 
 
 1. Condition? favourable to attack. — The conditions favourable 
 to attack are — 
 
 (a) Discipline of the assailants. 
 
 (b) Want of discipline or war experience on the part of the 
 
 enemy's troops, as may be assumed if it is found that 
 their outpost duties are badly performed. 
 
 (c) The friendly attitude of the inhabitants. 
 
 (d) The weakness of any portion of the enemy's position. 
 
 (<?) The proximity of the enemy, as lessening the risks and 
 
 confusion incidental to night marches. 
 (/) The existence of woods, or other features favourable to 
 
 the concealment of preliminary movements. 
 
 2. Conditions unfavourable to attack. — The unfavourable con- 
 ditions are — 
 
 (g) The discipline and efficiency of the enemy's troops. 
 (h) The want of discipline in the assailant's troops ; for 
 officers, however efficient, cannot supervise their men 
 closely at night. 
 (*) Ignorance of the ground and position held by the enemy. 
 (£) Any conditions adverse to the chances of effecting a 
 surprise. 
 It is the duty of the commander to balance carefully the 
 opposing factors, but when he has decided that the apparent 
 advantages are coniniensurate with the risk, the operations 
 once undertaken should be executed with the utmost energy, 
 decision, and vigour. 
 
 3. Reconnaissance. —It is only the absolute necessity of acting 
 without any delay, that can justify a night attack without a 
 previous reconnaissance being made by the one or more officers 
 who are to be entrusted with the difficult, dangerous, but 
 honourable duty of guiding the column or columns. 
 
 No reconnaissance from a distance is sufficient. Those who 
 are to guide the attacking columns should, even if well 
 acquainted with the ground prior to its occupation by the enemy, 
 traverse the route to be followed as far as, and, when possible, 
 even beyond the enemy's advanced sentries. 
 
 No guides are cjuite reliable unless they have been accustomed 
 to pass over the ground in the dark. Night changes everything ; 
 it becomes difficirlt to recognize a well-defined, beaten, and even 
 familiar road. Obstacles on it so slight as by day to escape 
 observation, may at night delay the advance, and even produce 
 disorder. 
 
155C OPERATIONS BY NIGHT. 
 
 Reconnaissances must, therefore, be made systematically ; 
 every essential point should be noted, and the distances timed 
 between natural and other easily remembered objects on the road. 
 
 The principal points that require attention may generally be 
 classed under three heads : — 
 
 1st. The approaches to the enemy's line of outposts; the 
 positions of his sentry line, piquets, and supports, and their 
 strength. 
 
 2nd. The roads leading from the enemy's outposts to his 
 position ; the obstacles, natural and artificial, which lie in front 
 of it, and the nature of the position itself. 
 
 3rd. The mistakes that can be made in the selection of the 
 route, and how the way may be lost during the advance ; the 
 choice of the best route to avoid or circumvent, as far as 
 practicable, the enemy's outposts, and, if possible, to avoid 
 moving down wind. 
 
 N.B. — Dark, windy, rainy, or foggy nights are most suitable 
 for small affairs; clear star-light nights, with a strong head- 
 wind, for the movement of large bodies. 
 
 4. Plan of attack. — The commander, having acquired all the 
 information obtainable from spies, friendly inhabitants, and the 
 reconnoitrers, will determine on his plan. He should, in any 
 case, obtain such a knowledge of the enemy's position as will 
 enable him to select the most favourable point for attack — if 
 possible it should be one of the most important points in that 
 position — to select the best route leading to that point, and to 
 decide upon the most suitable composition for his attacking 
 columns. In order to ensure simplicity, the columns of attack 
 should be as few, and as little subdivided as practicable. When 
 the mounted arms of the service are employed, they will always 
 be well separated from the Infantry, and well in rear of it. It 
 can seldom be right to dispense with a support and a strong 
 reserve, but they should be kept at a sufficient distance from the 
 attacking troops so as not to be carried away by the confusion 
 which any unfortunate panic might inflict upon those in front. 
 
 It is desirable that the different columns should be kept in 
 communication as long as is possible : the simpler the plan of 
 attack the better ; ruses are apt to lead to confusion, though 
 false attacks are often very useful. 
 
 The number of the troops employed in the actual attack should 
 be as few as is thought likely to be commensurate with success. 
 
 The point selected will naturally be that most favourable for 
 effecting the object, but it by no means follows that it should be 
 the weakest, either naturally or for want of artificial defence. 
 The operation will be greatly facilitated where the approach is 
 sheltered from sight and sound, and is easy up to the immediate 
 vicinity of the enemy's position. 
 
 5. Guides. — In a friendly country a capable officer will seldom 
 have much difficulty in obtaining reliable guides. When the 
 inhabitants are hostile, it may be necessary to sieze some men 
 
OPERATIONS BY NIGHT. 155D 
 
 to act as guides ; this should not be done until immediately 
 before the enterprise, and of those siezed none shoidd be released 
 until the operation is concluded. Those selected to guide the 
 columns should be placed in charge of non-commissioned officers, 
 and actually tied to them to prevent any chance of escape. They 
 should, however, be treated kindly and promised a handsome 
 reward, conditional on their conduct. The outposts shoidd be 
 specially warned before the men are siezed, to prevent any 
 inhabitants crossing over to the enemy's position. 
 
 6. Orders to be issued. —The following are generally applicable 
 to marches whether a collision is contemplated or not : — 
 
 a. Object of the movement. 
 
 b. General idea. 
 
 c. The compass direction of the route to be followed, with 
 exact description of the limits within which the attacking 
 columns may advance previous to the final advance to assault. 
 
 d. Dress, equipment, amount of ammunition, and rations. 
 
 e. Distinctive marks and watchword. 
 
 /. Kxplanation of the necessity of preventing lights being 
 struck, or of any one smoking, or speaking loudly, and pro- 
 hibition of any bugle sounds. 
 
 g. II our for assembly at and departure from point or points 
 of concentration. 
 
 h. Order of march, distances between units, and how com- 
 munication is to be maintained. In marching by night pre- 
 paratory for an assault, the instructions laid down for route 
 marching are reversed, and it becomes the duty of the head of 
 the column to ensure that its communication with those behind 
 it is maintained. 
 
 i. Halts, when to be made, and for how long. The men must 
 always lie down during these halts. 
 
 j. Attitude to l>e assumed in case of sudden attack by the 
 enemy, either in front or on the flanks. 
 
 k. Time and place for the final halt, preparatory to the attack. 
 The final halt should be as short as possible. 
 
 I. Instructions for the assaidt, especially for the rank and 
 file ; and the signal for its being delivered. 
 
 m. Subsequent measures. 
 
 n. The position of the commander of the column, both during 
 the march and at the final halt prior to the assaidt. 
 
 These orders shoidd be concise, but so worded as to admit of 
 no doubt. They will be communicated beforehand to those 
 officers only from whom action is necessary, in order that the 
 necessary arrangements may be made. Until the troops arrive 
 at the point of assembly, prior to the march-off, no more will be 
 made known than is absolutely necessary, in order to maintain 
 secrecy. Before they move off, however, all should be so clearly 
 explained that everyone may know the object in view, the 
 compass direction of the attack, and what part he has to play in 
 the operation. 
 
155e operations by night. 
 
 7. Instructions for rank and file {to be read before they march off 
 from the place of assembly). — When a collision is contemplated, it 
 must be impressed on the rank and file that no man is to fire, or 
 even to load, without a distinct order from his own officer; and 
 that, until it is daylight, the bayonet alone is to be used. The 
 officers must enforce perfect silence, prevent anyone speaking 
 above a whisper, and prevent their men firing until objects can 
 be clearly seen in the morning. There is to be no cheering 
 except by men charging, or until the enemy has left the position ; 
 and every man once engaged must understand that, with this 
 exception, whilst it is dark he is to continue to advance in 
 profound silence until the enemy is defeated 
 
 "When the order for the assault is given there must be no 
 straggling or breaking off ; shoidd it be still dark the closer the 
 men hang together the better, and no one under any circumstances 
 is to stop to help a wounded officer or man. "Wounded officers 
 must set an example in this respect. 
 
 If an entrance cannot be effected on account of obstacles, all 
 except those at the head of the column will be ordered to he 
 down while the obstacles are removed by those at the head of the 
 column, or by the detailed working party when necessary. As it 
 will not be possible to keep units intact, each company, half 
 company, or section shoidd look to its leader, who cannot do 
 wrong in striving to be first into the battery, keep, or other 
 strongest part of a work. Officers should carry forward with 
 them all the effectives around them, and the soldiers should 
 follow the officer who leads them into the enemy's works. Should 
 the enemy attempt to rally they must be vigorously attacked with 
 the bayonet, and no halt permitted until the enemy is driven out 
 of the works. The support will follow with all speed those who 
 have taken the works. 
 
 These particular instructions for the rank and file should be 
 read two or three times to the men. 
 
 8. Equipment . — The materials necessary for surmounting 
 obstacles, and for entrenching the position when captured, must 
 be prepared. They may be scaling ladders, fight bridging, hay 
 bags, fascines, gabions, &c, according to the nature of the 
 obstacles to be encountered. They will be carried by parties 
 specially detaded, and who should have a fighter personal load 
 than the other troops ; but it will not generally be advisable to 
 deprive them of their arms and of all their ammunition. 
 
 9. Distinctive Marks and Watchword. — These will depend upon 
 the climate and the clothing in wear. It matters not what they 
 are so long as they are readily distinguishable . A white shirt 
 over the uniform answers well. A watchword must be fixed on, 
 and should be one difficult for the enemy to pronounce. 
 
 10. Communication.— Every effort must be made to ensure the 
 maintenance of unbroken lateral communication between the 
 columns of attack, and also between the several units of which 
 
OPERATIONS BY NIGHT. 155F 
 
 each column is composed. A thin rope or strong cord passed 
 froni front to rear, and held up in the distances between those 
 units, is a good plan for securing this communication, and for 
 preventing the units in rear losing the road taken by those in 
 front. The officer responsible for guiding the troops must arrange 
 for the advanced party being provided with a few haversacks full 
 of torn up paper, so that it may be laid as if for a paperchase. 
 One man at a time would scatter a few scraps here and there as 
 the advance is proceeded with, and the paper should be thrown 
 a little to one side, so that it may not be trodden under foot. 
 Under ordinary conditions the paper will be distinctly seen at 
 night, but should it be temporarily lost sight of on light coloured 
 sand or soil, or rendered invisible from the darkness which 
 prevails on roads passing through woods, the trail may be 
 quickly picked up by striking a match or using a lantern. 
 Lateral communication between the columns, and between them 
 and the reserve in rear, can only be secured by the care and 
 vigilance of mounted officers. 
 
 11. Signalling. — Rockets with fireballs of different colours are 
 best for signalling during night attacks. These signals must be 
 arranged beforehand, and all staff officers made acquainted with 
 them. No rockets shoidd be discharged until the assaidt is 
 delivered. 
 
 12. Points of Assembly. — The places of assembly, unless well 
 known, must be distinctly marked ; and from them the routes 
 for the columns towards the enemy's position will be denned as 
 clearly as possible without attracting the attention of the enemy. 
 From the extreme points thus marked, accurate bearings should 
 be taken and recorded of the direction to be followed after 
 passing such points. When roads or plainly marked tracks 
 exist, it will be sufficient to mark clearly any turns or branch 
 tracks. This may be done by blocking those which are not to 
 be used with stakes, stones, or heaps of earth, or sand or brush- 
 wood ; for choice, such materials [e.g. stones) should be used 
 as thoughtless men are unlikely to remove. When it is not 
 possible to mark such turnings, men must be dropped from each 
 unit as it advances, to remain until joined by the next unit, with 
 which they will move forward, but not until they have seen their 
 relief posted. 
 
 When no tracks exist, the route must be fixed by compass 
 bearings, the points where any change of direction is necessary 
 to be carefully noted, and the distances between clearly denned, 
 and easily recognisable points measured and timed. Tliis should 
 be done by staff officers or commanding officers with their ad- 
 jutants or orderly officers. All these officers should compare 
 their compasses during the day to correct error. 
 
 Whenever the spot or spots selected for concentration prior to 
 the advance are at a distance from the camp, staff officers and 
 commanders of units must make themselves thoroughly acquainted 
 with the road to them beforehand, so as to guide the troops 
 
155g operations BY night. 
 
 thither in the darkest night without difficulty. Unless there is 
 a "well-defined track, accurate compass bearings on a fixed star 
 or stars must be taken. Commanders of units and of columns 
 paraded before marching to the point of assembly, must on no 
 account quit their men. On arriving at the point of assembly 
 they will send an officer to report their arrival to the staff officer, 
 who should himself remain at a central point. "When the final 
 instructions are clearly understood, and all watches compared, 
 the troops will move off unloaded, each column being guided by 
 a specially selected officer. 
 
 13 The Advance. — The two important considerations to be kept 
 in view during the advance are (a) to keep the enemy in com- 
 plete ignorance of the intended attack ; and (b) to maintain the 
 right direction. The maintenance of absolute silence in the 
 columns, the exclusion of horses known to neigh, the careful 
 avoidance of any light or smoking, are necessary to conceal tho 
 intended attack ; and the proper direction should be verified as 
 far as possible by the natural features of the ground, and when 
 the night is not too dark, by previously marked points, by the 
 stars when they are visible, and failing these by* compass bearing, 
 which should be used in every case from time to time. 
 
 It is desirable when marching by a star to select a fixed one 
 on the decline, but not too near the horizon, in the required 
 direction. As it sinks, another should be chosen, as near as 
 possible on a similar bearing. In the northern hemisphere the 
 relative bearing of the pole star, in the southern hemisphere the 
 southern cross will be found of great assistance in maintaining 
 the direction ; a fairly accurate bearing can thus be fixed when 
 no compass is available. Care should be taken to observe 
 which stars coincide with the back bearing on the point of 
 assembly. 
 
 14. Formation of a column, Sfc. — The following instructions for 
 the formation of a column and for the conduct of the advance 
 are given as a general guide : — 
 
 a. Each attacking column will be preceded by a "point." 
 This "point" should consist of two or three men and a serjeant 
 under an officer, all carefully selected for coolness, intelligence, 
 good sight, and good hearing. The officer will be responsible 
 for not loosing touch of the column. The "point" will move 
 slowly, and will precede the advanced guard at a distance of 
 from 100 to 200 yards. 
 
 b. The advanced guard will be provided with pioneers and 
 materials for clearing obstacles. 
 
 * In enclosed country a rough tracing from the map or reconnaissance sketch 
 can be drawn on tracing paper, and placed over a piece of cardboard prepared 
 with luminous paint. A scale and meridian should be plainly marked, by the 
 help of the compass baving its needle similarly painted, the route can be 
 followed, whether on foot or mounted, on the darkest night. 
 
OPERATIONS BY NIGHT. 15-DH 
 
 c. The attacking column at from 50 to 100 yards distance 
 from the advanced guard will be in column of companies, half 
 companies, or sections (or in fours,) with the ranks at 3 paces 
 distance, and the files at 1 side pace interval, according to the 
 nature of the route followed. 
 
 d. The support at from 200 to 400 yards in rear of attacking 
 column. 
 
 e. Gun detachments should accompany the support ready to 
 serve the enemy's guns when captured or to spike them if 
 necessary. A detachment of Engineers shxmld as a rule also 
 accompany the support. 
 
 The reserve will be about half-a-mile in rear, and behind it 
 will be the Artillery, the reserve ammunition, a supply of 
 entrenching tools, and the Cavalry. When the enemy'- position 
 is approached, the distances between the "point" and the 
 advanced guard and between it and the attacking column should 
 be diminished by one-half. 
 
 It will be specified in the orders what the men are to carry. 
 One day's rations should always be carried, and it will often be 
 advisable to carry two. Water-bottles filled and greatcoats 
 should also be taken. The more ammunition that can be carried 
 without impeding the men's movements, the better. 
 
 Officers must be careful to ensure that the men do not fall 
 asleep, that they keep in their ranks and maintain correct 
 distance. Frequent short halts will be made. 
 
 Cavalry and Mounted Infantry will be kept entirely separate 
 from the attacking columns ; they can do little in the dark, and 
 should not be allowed into contact with the enemy until day- 
 break. Then if the attack has succeeded they will push forward 
 with the Horse Artillery with all speed, endeavouring to get 
 round the flank of the retreating enemy. If the attack has 
 failed, they will do their utmost to protect the retreating 
 Infantry by falling on the flank of the pursuing enemy. 
 Signallers should accompany the support and the reserve, 
 marching in rear of the columns, to be utilized when secrecy is 
 no longer essential. If the enemy's outposts are improperly 
 placed or withdrawn, the general advance will, when it is 
 possible to do so without giving an alarm, be continued to 
 within a mile, or perhaps half-a-mile of his position. The 
 troops should then be halted for the shortest possible time that 
 will enable formations to be corrected prior to the order or 
 signal for the assault being given. 
 
 When outposts are met, every endeavour should be made to 
 capture and destroy them without noise. They must be rushed 
 in silence with the bayonet without cheering or a moment's 
 hesitation the instant they are encountered. 
 
 15. The assault. — Just before the order is given for the assault, 
 the company officers will repeat to their men, in a low tone, the 
 gist of the previous instructions for rank and file, " No firing, 
 bayonet only. Keep close to one another and to your officers.— 
 Follow me." 
 18b 
 
155l OPERATIONS BY NIGHT. 
 
 16. The support. — "While the final dispositions are being made 
 for the assaidt, the support will take up a position within 300 or 
 400 yards of the assaulting column, ready to move forward in 
 case of success, or to stand fast and cover the retreat of the 
 attacking column if it he driven back. Troops repulsed in the 
 attack should endeavour to fall back towards the flanks of the 
 support so as to leave its front clear. 
 
 17. The reserve. — The reserve, followed by such Artillery as 
 may have been ordered to accompany it, will follow the support 
 at a distance of about half-a-mile, and await orders by signal or 
 otherwise. 
 
 18. Occupation of the captured position. — The evacuation of the 
 position by the enemy being notified to the reserve by signal or 
 messenger, it will advance and assist in making the position 
 secure from any offensive return of the enemy. The attacking 
 column and support will take up the pursuit, and the Cavalry 
 and Mounted Infantry will push forward as rapidly as jtossible 
 in a line parallel to the enemy's line of retreat, keeping clear of 
 all encounters with him until daylight Troops will be told off 
 to defend the different portions of the position, and the 
 ammunition will, if necessary, be completed, and the reserve 
 ammunition brought up. 
 
 19. Pursuit. — The enemy will be pushed with every possible 
 vigour in rear by the pursuing Infantry, whilst mounted troops 
 will harass his flanks ; reports to be sent back when any definite 
 information is obtained. Mounted troops should not hesitate to 
 ride down a defeated enemy and break his formation, even at a 
 loss to themselves. 
 
 20. failure of the assault. — The most carefully thought-out 
 arrangements must be made beforehand to provide for failure, 
 though no orders should be given on this subject to the troops. 
 The commanders of the support and the reserve will arrange for 
 moving quickly into the positions selected for them, and will take 
 care the tracks leading to them are clearly marked out. Lanterns 
 may then be advantageously used for this purpose. As the 
 retreating or repulsed troops arrive they will be placed in position 
 by the commander of the support or reserve, as may have been 
 ordered by the officer in command. These officers will be solely 
 responsible for placing the troops, irrespective of their rank and 
 that of the officer who had command of the assaxdting column. 
 Every endeavour will be made to get battabons, and even 
 companies together. If the whole force is obliged to retire, the 
 rear-guard will be formed from the reserve, and from those troops 
 which have not been engaged. 
 
 21. Minor Attacks. — The foregoing suggestions refer to serious 
 attacks made on a large scale for the capture of the enemy's 
 position, or with the intention of destroying his army. Very 
 great damage may, however, be done to an enemy, his rest 
 disturbed, and his troops demoralized by the bold handling of 
 even one company. 
 
OPERATIONS BY NIGHT. 155 J 
 
 The officers and non-commissioned officers having reconnoitred 
 the selected ground as carefully as possible during the day should 
 move forward at night (the darker, dirtier, and more inclement 
 the better) on an extended front, their groups at no greater 
 interval than 1 or 15 yards in order that the general idea may 
 be maintained, and loss from their own fire avoided, and, if 
 possible, these should be connected with a light cord. When 
 the time arrives for opening fire, the connecting files between 
 the groups should fire independently, and the groups by 
 volleys ; the object being merely to cause annoyance and 
 create panic, during which it is very likely some of the enemy 
 will fire on their own people. The officer in command should, 
 when his object is effected, cease filing and withdraw in silence. 
 Such isolated attempts are often very desirable when a night 
 attack by the enemy is anticipated, Active, enterprising officers 
 can, by cutting in on the rear of the enemy's outpost fine, do 
 much to demoralize and shake the confidence of their opponents. 
 
 THE DEFENCE. 
 
 1 . The Defence. — The arrangements for defence may be con- 
 sidered under three headings : — 
 
 The Outpost Line. 
 
 Preparation of the Position for Defence. 
 
 Defence of the Position. 
 
 2. The Outpost Line. — The duties of outposts have been de- 
 scribed, but here it may be stated that when a night attack is 
 expected, greater risks may properly be incurred by the outpost 
 line than is desirable upon ordinary occasions, in order to obtain 
 the earliest possible information of an impending attack. 
 
 The senses of sight and hearing vary so much in individuals, 
 that company officers should bear this in mind when detailing 
 their men for duty. Men expecting to be attacked have often 
 their ears and nerves so strained that they imagine they hear 
 noises, troops marching, &c. 
 
 3. Preparation of the Position for Defence. — This includes the 
 clearing away of cover in front, marking distances, creating 
 obstacles, and the preparation of mechanical arrangements for 
 laying guns and rifles on spots over which the enemy's advance 
 may be expected to move. 
 
 The greater distance to which, up to 1,000 yards, the front 
 can be cleared the better ; but it will seldom be feasible to effect 
 much clearance for more than 300 or 400 yards. Trees and 
 brushwood should be cut down, walls and banks levelled, and 
 buildings mined. Arrangements, when possible, should be 
 made for setting fire to hay or corn stacks or wooden buildings, 
 to fight up the ground over which the enemy's troops must 
 advance. The ranges of this lighted zone should be measured 
 and carefully noted. 
 
 The nature of these will depend on the time and material 
 available for their construction. Abatis strongly picketed down, 
 
155k operations bv night. 
 
 and with a wire entanglement in front, and if possble provided 
 with self-acting fougasses or land mines, form the most effective 
 obstacles ; they should he made especially strong at the weakest 
 points of the position, and there defended by quick-firing or 
 machine guns. The distance at which these obstacles are to be 
 placed must depend on circumstances, but they must necessarily 
 be sufficiently close to enable the defenders to recognize, either 
 by sight or by sound, the presence of the enemy attempting to 
 destroy them. 
 
 The position should be divided into sections, under separate 
 commands, and the troops told off for each should be furnished 
 with a sectional reserve. A general reserve will be stationed in 
 a central spot, with easy access for traffic and with telegraphic 
 or telephonic communication. The officers will make themselves 
 thoroughly acquainted with the ground in front of their respective 
 sections, the commander of each forming bis plan for the defence. 
 A rallying point, fixed in rear, must be well marked, and officers 
 will make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the shortest 
 way to it. When the front is not covered by outposts, each 
 sectional commander must provide for the safety of his portion 
 of the line by listening posts established in advance, and frequent 
 patrols outside the line of obstacles. "Whether there are out- 
 po>ts in front or not, all officers and non-commissioned officers 
 should by means of patrols become thoroughly familiar with the 
 ground in front of the position, both for the purpose of inflicting 
 loss by fire on the enemy and of undertaking offensive returns. 
 All ranks should be made to understand that their honour 
 depends upon maintaining the position confided to their charge. 
 
 4. Defence of the Position. — The general system on which this 
 should be based is that the firing line should be placed in 
 accordance with the scheme of defence, the sectional reserves 
 being well posted under cover within supporting distance. 
 "When the enemy approaches the line of obstacles, fire or light 
 balls should be thrown behind him to make him a clear mark 
 for rifle and artillery fire. The Artillery will open with canister, 
 the machine guns will fire, and the Infantry will deliver carefully 
 controlled volleys, the men bein<r cautioned, when they cannot 
 see the enemy, to bring the rifle to the horizon and then let it 
 sink a little. Independent firing is in no case to be permitted. 
 
 If the enemy surmounts the obstacle, the defenders will cease 
 firing and by a vigorous charge endeavour to drive him beyond 
 it, taking care to halt when they have done so ; the Artillery 
 will be careful to cease firing when the Infantry do so, prepara- 
 tory to attack. When the firing line charges, it will be replaced 
 by the sectional reserve, which will not, however, quit the 
 position. The general reserve will remain steady and ready to 
 move in any direction. The artillery and machine guns will be 
 limbered up and withdrawn the moment the enemy effects an 
 entry. If he should do so, the sectional reserve will charge and 
 remain at all hazards on the danger side of the artillery while it 
 
OPEKATIONS BY NIGHT. 155L 
 
 is being removed. It is of the utmost importance at such a time 
 to keep the troops in formed bodies, and not to allow their 
 energy to be expended in desultory fights. They shoidd be led 
 forward in rapid vigorous attacks, and reformed as quickly as 
 possible, whether successful or unsuccessful, in the most sheltered 
 spot. As offensive tactics are at such moments most suitable, 
 no firing 1 shoidd be allowed and strict silence should be main- 
 tained. 
 
 If the enemy cannot be driven out by the local defenders and 
 the sectional reserve, the general reserve will be brought up and 
 a determined attempt made to drive them out. Even should 
 final success not be possible to the troops on the ground, they 
 should at all hazards remain in the position until daybreak, so 
 that the enemy may not have the cover of night to prepare it 
 for defence. 
 
 5. Retirement from the Position. — When it appears to the officer 
 in command doubtful whether he will be able to hold his position, 
 all guns, reserve anmiunition, and such like impedimeuta, will 
 be sent to the rear, and in campaigns with uncivilized nations, 
 all wounded men also. Such escort as may be necessary should 
 be taken from the troops which originally formed the outposts, 
 or from others who may have suffered losses, care being taken 
 to provide reliable guides to the position selected in rear. This 
 new position should be occupied, and arrangements made for 
 lights to guide the main body to it from the old position, shoidd 
 the main body be eventually forced back before the day dawns. 
 
 lbc 
 
156 
 
 Lecture XVIII. 
 DEFENCE OF A HOUSE. 
 
 The following Lectures though not included among the 
 subjects comprised in the Tactical Syllabus are added at the 
 request of numerous officers of Volunteers, fur whose information 
 the following preliminary definitions are given. 
 
 ABATIS are small trees or limbs of large trees laid close 
 together, their butt ends being staked or secured to the ground. 
 Twigs and small branches are removed and the remainder are 
 pointed, facing the enemy. 
 
 N.B. — Pine trees are useless as their branches point backwards. 
 
 WIEE ENTANGLEM ENTS are also used as obstacles. They 
 are formed by driving stakes into the ground in parallel rows 
 arranged chequerwise. Three rows at least should be used. 
 The stakes should all be 6 feet apart and their heads should 
 be connected at 2 feet from the ground by stout wire crossing in 
 all directions. 
 
 A SALIENT ANGLE is any angle in a work or building 
 which points outwards. Thus in a house fronting North the 
 angles formed by the East and West sides are salient angles. 
 
 A EE-ENTEBING ANGLE is one which points inwards, 
 thus in the case above imagined, if from the North side of a 
 house a porch projects, the angles formed by the porch and tho 
 house are re-entering angles. 
 
 A SALIENT is any portion not necessarily angular, of a work 
 or a wood which projects towards the enemy ; and 
 
 A EE-ENTEANT is any portion, the form of which recedes 
 from the enemy. 
 
 A KEEP OE EEDUIT is a work or building in the interior 
 of a larger one. Thus if a village be fortified, any large building 
 in the iuterior may be also fortified separately, with the intention 
 of prolonging the defence after the outer line has been captured. 
 
 FLANK E1EE is that which from one part of a work sweeps 
 along the front of another and thus aids in its defence. Suppose 
 a long line of loop-holed wall, A B, to be attacked. The assail- 
 lants might make a rush and get under the loop-holes, the fire 
 from which could not be depressed sufficiently to hit them. 
 Having reached this point, the assailants might with impunity 
 proceed to blow in the walls with explosives But if from one 
 end of the wall, B, another portion of wall, B C, projected at 
 right angles, or nearly so from A B, the fire from B C would 
 sweep along the front of A B and take effect on the assailants, 
 no matter how close they might be to it. Eeciprocally, that 
 portion of A B which is nearest to B would afford it what is 
 termed "flank defence." 
 
DEFENCE OF A HOUSE. 157 
 
 Flank defence is one of the most important elements in for- 
 tification. 
 
 TAMBOUES. To afford flank fire as already described, 
 where no existing facilities are forthcoming, tambours may be 
 constructed. They are simply works projecting from any given 
 line of wall or other defence, so as to afford room for about half-a- 
 dozen rifles to flank it. They may be triangular or rectangular 
 in shape, and may be constructed of " dry " that is loose masonry, 
 wood, or railway plant ; the whole if possible roofed over and 
 covered with earth. They may be elevated so as to give two 
 tiers of fire, half sunken or sunken, in which latter case they are 
 excavations, and the muzzles of the rifles are just about the level 
 of the ground. 
 
 MACHICOULIS GALLEEIES are existing balconies utilised 
 for defence by building a parapet on the exterior with hearth- 
 stones, sandbags, boards, &c, and piercing the floor with loop- 
 holes, giving downward fire. Should no balconies exist, 
 Machicoulis may be improvised by thrusting strong beams out 
 from the house and planking them over. 
 
 Loop-holes are of two kinds, horizontal and vertical, the former 
 give lateral range, the latter admit of elevation and depression 
 of fire. From the outside they should appear as narrow slits 
 about 3 inches wide by about 1 2 inches long or high. Internally 
 they are made with a " splay " or widening out. The minimum 
 distance apart of loop-holes depends on the thickness and strength 
 of the masonry in which they are cut. From 4 to 6 feet apart 
 is the usual limit. In strong walls 9 inches thick they might be 
 made at intervals of thirty inches. Loop-holes can be made with 
 crowbars, chisels, and hammers, or pickaxes. When near the 
 ground they should always be horizontal. Very thick walls, 
 such as those of churches, cannot be loop-holed and fire must be 
 delivered from windows and doors. 
 
 Doors, lower windows, &c, may be barricaded, and weak 
 portions strengthened by placing against them boxes, barrels, 
 cupboards, pianos, &c, and then filling them with earth. Walls 
 of dry bricks or stones may also be built up inside. 
 
 A "banquette" is a platform of earth or wood on which men 
 stand to fire. It is assumed that men fire (standing) at a height 
 of 4ft. 6in. Thus a wall of 6 feet high might be made available 
 for fire by having a banquette raised to a height of 1 ft. 6in. 
 
 Buildings may be used for defence under different circum- 
 stances, either singly or in combination with others, as follows : — 
 
 1 . As tactical points in the battlefield, either as advanced 
 posts, as supporting points in the line or on a flank, or as rallying 
 points to cover retreat. 
 
 2. As reduits to a more extensive locality, rendered defensible, 
 such as a village or wood. 
 
 3. As isolated posts on a line of communication. 
 
 A substantial house can quickly be converted into a redoubt, 
 giving absolute security against cavalry and very great advantage 
 
 18d 
 
158 DEFENCE OF A HOUSE. 
 
 in a contest with infantry ; but unless the walls are very massive 
 they can be readily breached by field artillery, and the bursting 
 of shells inside the building 1 , combined with the fires probably 
 kindled by them, will make the prolonged defence of an ordinary 
 building subjected to a combined attack of infantry and artillery 
 almost hopeless. No banking up of earth against the lower 
 parts of the walls will have an}- effect in preventing shells from 
 setting fire to the building. 
 
 To fortify a building the following are the successive steps to 
 be taken : — 
 
 FOE A VEEY HASTY DEFENCE : TIME 1 TO 3 HOUKS. 
 
 [a.) Eemove the inhabitants and all combustible matter and 
 provide water. 
 
 (b.) Barricade doors and accessible windows so as to resist 
 ingress and musketry fire. Inaccessible windows should be at 
 least masked so as to hide the defenders and the glass broken 
 outwards. One door with a moveable- barricade, or a window 
 with a ladder may be reserved for escape. 
 
 (c.) Make loop-holes, using an axe in wood, picks or crowbars 
 in masonry, or by removing the tiles at the eaves. 
 
 (d.) Clear away all cover in the \ trinity as far as time allows. 
 
 CAEEFUL PEEPAEATION : TIME 24 TO 48 HOUES. 
 
 (a.) Make a rough survey of the building and its vicinity aud 
 arrange your plan of defence, determine what outbuildings or 
 parts of the main building are to be destroyed, what buildings 
 or trees in the vicinity shoidd be left standing as screens from 
 distant artillery fire. 
 
 (b.) Clear an open field of fire round the house, removing or 
 burning all inflammable materials, and saving everything that 
 may be useful for obstacles or barricades. Improvo any existing 
 fences, &c, that will serve as obstacles ; fill up hollow ways, 
 depressions, &c, that might afford cover to an enemy, with 
 abatis, brushwood, rubbish, &c, and level or burn any buildings 
 from which the enemy might fire. 
 
 (c.) Prepare the defence of the house by barricading windows 
 and doors, (leaving one door for use which must be specially 
 dealt with), make loop-holes and provide flank defence, obstacles, 
 and Machicoulis galleries. Inside the building improve the 
 communications by enlarging doorways, breaking through par- 
 tition walls, &c, make banquettes where necessary, place in 
 each room a large vessel full of water and smaller ones to draw 
 it ; also a heap of earth to throw over any part set on fire. 
 Arrange store places for provisions and ammunition, the latter 
 below ground if possible, set apart a place for hospital, and 
 prepare latrines If the house is likely to have artillery fire 
 brought against it, it may be of use to shore up the floors and 
 cover them 3 inches thick with earth or sand. 
 
 (d.) In the case where distant artillery fire is to be feared, 
 provide shelter trenches for the garrison outside the building 
 
DEFENCE OF A HOUSE. 159 
 
 usually on its flanks. Existing fences or folds of the ground 
 may answer the purpose. 
 
 GARKISON. — Allow two men for every door, window, loop- 
 hole, or opening to be defended, and also a reserve of one fourth 
 the above. Always allot, if possible, a tactical unit. 
 
 ATTACKING A FORTIFIED HOUSE.— A house may be 
 attacked by infantry by day or by night, or a combined attack 
 by infantry and artillery may be made. 
 
 AN INFANTE Y ATTACK BY DAYLIGHT would probably 
 be made by throwing forward skirmishers and gradually 
 strengthening them until they formed a long enveloping line of 
 marksmen, lying down under cover if possible and concentrating 
 their fire on the loop-holes of the front to be attacked. Protected 
 by their fire, the storming party advances accompanied by 
 engineers, or a working party with axes, sledge hammers, gun 
 cotton, or whatever means are available for removing obstacles 
 and forcing an entrance. 
 
 The advance would probably be made over ground on which 
 the defenders fire was weakest, probably at a sabent, and having 
 penetrated the line of obstacles at that point, the assailants would 
 endeavour to extend close to the walls under the line of fire of 
 the defenders and so grapple with and bend their rifles. If flank 
 defence existed it would be neutralized as far as possible by a 
 concentrated fire on the loop-holes. The entrance would not be 
 attempted at a salient which would be difficult ; but at a door or 
 window, or by breaching the wall with gun cotton. 
 
 A Tambour if low or weakly constructed might offer an easy 
 access to the interior of the building. 
 
 Once inside the building, if the defenders resist, it should be 
 set on fire. 
 
 Two or more attacks should generally be made at the same 
 time to distract the attention of the defenders and multiply the 
 
 fllH,IlC6S OI SU.CCGSS 
 
 AN INFANTRY ATTACK BY NIGHT is more likely to 
 succeed than by day, because the approach can be made with 
 little or no loss. It is only while removing the obstacles and 
 endeavouring to force an entrance that the defenders fire will be 
 effective. 
 
 The attack should be made by surprise as far as possible, and 
 a previous reconnaissance is of great importance to avoid 
 mistakes and confusion in the dark, and to ascertain what 
 provision is to be made for destroying and overcoming obstacles. 
 The troops should be assembled secretly as close to the building 
 as possible, and the different columns of assault would move 
 directly and silently to then- prescribed points of attack. 
 
 If breaches are to be made by gun cotton or gun powder, every 
 effort should be made to lodge the explosive and ignite the fuse 
 before the attack is discovered, and to assault immediately the 
 explosion takes place. The assailants should not stop to fire but 
 should endeavour to come to close quarters at once. 
 
160 DEFENCE OF A HOUSE. 
 
 A COMBINED ATTACK BY INFANTRY AND ARTIL- 
 LERY ON A HOUSE EXPOSED TO DISTANT ARTILLERY 
 FIRE. — The artillery commences the attack, concentrating the 
 fire of available guns on the building. This fire would probably 
 drive the defenders out of the building. If it also ruins it and 
 sets it on fire, the infantry on their approach will only have to 
 deal with the defenders of the outer line of defence, if there be 
 one. If, however, the building should still be defensible when 
 the attacking artillery is obliged to cease fire, owing to the 
 nearness of their own infantry to the house, and the attacking 
 infantry cannot force their way in, it may be necessary to bring 
 up some guns to within musketry range to breach the walls. 
 
 A COMBINED ATTACK BY INFANTRY AND ARTIL- 
 LERY ON A HOUSE SCREENED FROM DISTANT 
 ARTILLERY FIRE.— This should commence in the same 
 manner as an attack of infantry alone by day ; but as soon as the 
 firing party of infantry has established a decided ascendancy 
 over the fire from the building, two or more guns should be 
 brought up into line with them, screened as much as possible 
 by slopes of the ground, trees, >.yc., and by their fire break down 
 obstacles, breach the building and set it on fire. "When the 
 artillery fire has prepared the way, the infantry assault should be 
 made. 
 
 DEFENDING A HOUSE AGAINST ASSAULT.— In the 
 case of an infantry attack by day, accurate fire from the building 
 should hinder the approach of the enemy and inflict loss upon 
 him. Should he succeed in establishing an overpowering lino of 
 fire, it would be good policy to withdraw the men from the loop- 
 holes until the storming parties advance, and then concentrate 
 fire on them ; particularly while checked by the obstacles. This 
 fire must be as rapid and deadly as possible, and will probably 
 beat off the attack, 
 
 In the case of a night attack b}- infantry, surprise should be 
 avoided by all possible means, particularly by careful patrolling ; 
 and any attempt to lodge explosives against the walls secretly, must 
 be carefully guarded against. When the attack takes place, a 
 grazing and flanking fire on the obstacles round the house, 
 delivered as rapidly as possible, must inevitably take effect and 
 will probably frustrate the efforts of the assailants. 
 
 In defending a house against a combined infantry and 
 artillery attack, it will be generally best to reserve the fire of at 
 any rate a portion of the garrison, until the guns are brought up 
 — in the oase where they must come close to the building, and 
 then to concentrate fire on the gun detachments, and finally on 
 the assaidting columns. 
 
 In the case where artillery fire can open from a distance, the 
 garrison should generally be removed from the building during 
 the cannonade, and be placed in trenches near it, or under cover 
 
DEFENCE OF A HOUSE. 161 
 
 in rear, until the near approach of the attacking infantry compels 
 their artillery to cease firing, when, if the buildings are still 
 tenable, they should be rapidly reoccupied and the entrances — of 
 which there should be sufficient — barricaded. Should the 
 buildings take fire during the cannonade, a few volunteers should 
 endeavour to extinguish the flames. 
 
 i9 
 
162 
 
 Lecture XIX. 
 
 DEFENCE OF A VILLAGE. 
 
 The defence of a village is usually wasteful of men and it 
 should always be decided whether a village would require more 
 men to hold it than its tactical position may he worth. The 
 number of men required to hold a similar front of ground affords 
 a fair test of this point. 
 
 The principal advantages of villages are : — 
 
 1. They can be made defensible quickly and generally admit 
 of protracted and obstinate defence. 
 
 2. They conceal the numbers and dispositions of their garrisons 
 and of the troops in rear of them. 
 
 3. They afford shelter to their garrisi >ns 1 >efore they are fortified. 
 Their disadvantages are: — 
 
 1 . The dispersion of their garrison and consequent difficulty 
 of supervision. 
 
 2. Liability of defenders to loss by splinters, &c, under 
 artillery fire. 
 
 3. Liability to be set on fire by shells. 
 The object of holding a village may be 
 
 (a.) As part of, or on the flanks of an army i?i position. In this 
 case they should be strongly fortified on the front, or on the 
 front and flanks according to circumstances. 
 
 (J.) As an advanced post or outpost of an army in position. In 
 this case their distance from the said position and its supporting 
 fire, must determine the amount of fortification. 
 
 (c.) As a detached or isolated posts. In this case an obstinate 
 defence will be required all round. 
 
 The suitability of villages for defence depends upon :— 
 
 1 . The form and nature of the surrounding ground, which should 
 be such as not to include commanding positions within close 
 range ; to afford a clear field of fire with a small amount of 
 labour ; and if necessary to permit of the unimpeded advance of 
 troops making a counter attack in any required direction. The 
 nature of the materials of which a village is built, must also be 
 considered with reference to its inflammabibty. 
 
 2. The shape of the village and nature of the houses, Src. The 
 suitability of form to the tactical position affects considerably 
 the time required for preparation, as well as the obstinacy of the 
 defence when prepared. Straggling hamlets lying end on to the 
 enemy can be made very strong against flank attacks, but can 
 easily be raked by fire and require much artificial addition in 
 the form of shelter trenches, &c, thrown out on their flanks, to 
 increase their direct fire ; their length may also be so great as to 
 weaken the support they might derive from positions in rear of 
 them, in which case it rnay be necessary to abandon and destroy 
 as far as possible the more advanced portion of the place, and to 
 withdraw the main line of defence towards the centre. 
 
DEFENCE OF A VILLAGE. 163 
 
 Similarly villages broadside on to the enemy are strong in 
 front and safer from fire, but require more attention on the 
 flanks. Those of a circular form are suitable for all positions. 
 
 DETAILS OF DEFENCE. 
 
 The officer in command must first ascertain the object in view 
 and adapt his defence accordingly. 
 
 If occupied only as an outpost for a night, place temporary 
 barricades on roads and approaches, and loophole the walls in 
 the required direction. 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 The following general principles must be borne in mind. 
 
 The fire of modern artillery will quietly knock a village to 
 pieces and to conduct the defence from the village alone is now 
 impossible when guns are brought against it. 
 
 Therefore we must have two lines, the first line well in advance 
 of the village covered by trenches, hedges, walls, &c, and a 
 second line in the village itself. 
 
 The first line must be traced far enough in advance of the 
 village to be out of range of splinters from masonry, and near 
 enough to admit of the second line firing into it, if captured. 
 About 50 yards would be a minimum distance, the maximum 
 must depend in great measure on the strength of the garrison, 
 about 100 yards would be a lair average. 
 
 With regard to the second line; never post men immediately 
 outside buildings which are shell proof ; loophole and prepare 
 t hem, and then let the men retire behind them and use them 
 as cover until required for action. 
 
 Never allow men who have just retired or been driven out of 
 one position to join or mix with troops defending a second; 
 they should be collected in rear and re-formed. 
 
 IN ever allow a fighting line of one corps to be supported by 
 men of another. Keep tactical units intact. 
 
 REGULAR FORTIFICATION. 
 
 The first thing necessary is to survey the village and obtain a 
 good plan of it. 
 
 Then arrange your first line, giving each regiment its own 
 portion of fighting line and supports. (Main body not required.) 
 Let each unit be responsible for its own portion of shelter trench, 
 hedge, wall, abatis, clearance in front, &c. 
 
 Then arrange your second line, the men of which should be 
 allotted similarly by tactical units and be employed in loopholing 
 houses, preparing them for defence and joining them to each 
 other by means of stockade work, shelter trenches, &c, so as to 
 make a continuous line. Any houses, &c, which are in front 
 and cannot be taken into the line, should be levelled. 
 
 When the attack commences, the front line lie down in their 
 trenches under the preliminary artillery fire, and the second line 
 shelters behind the houses. When the enemy's infantry advances, 
 
164 DEFENCE OF A VILLAGE. 
 
 the front line comes into action, fed by their supports. If 
 repulsed they retire round the flanks, and reform in rear of the 
 second line, the men of which take post and continue the defence, 
 because the fire of attacking artillery is now masked by their 
 own infantry and must cease. 
 
 The artillery of the defence should be posted on the flanks of 
 the village, if possible on high ground, crossing their fire in front. 
 
 If mitrailleurs are available they should be posted behind 
 barricades, where the}" can sweep roads, streets, &c. ; they must 
 not be exposed to artillery fire at the commencement of the 
 action, but reserved for the attacking infantry. 
 
 A bomb proof building in a sheltered situation should be set 
 apart, or bomb proof cover should be constructed for the 
 accommodation of sick and wounded. 
 
 GARRISON. — Allow two men per pace (one as a minimum) 
 of the circumference to be defended, whether in first or second 
 line. As a general rule about § the entire force would be in first 
 line, the remainder in the second. 
 
 With an adequate garrison from 12 to 18 hours should suffice 
 to fortify a village strongly. 
 
 KEEP OR REDUIT. 
 
 When a village is intended to be held to the last, a substantial 
 building or group of buildings and enclosures may be prepared 
 for defence as a keep. Here a resolute few must hold out till 
 assistance arrives. It is useless to prepare a keep unless there 
 is some prospect of assistance, for it will sooner or later be 
 reduced to ruins by artillery fire. The real object of a keep is 
 to facilitate recapture, by having as it were one foot in the 
 place, and as its garrison cannot be large and must be kept 
 separate from the rest, it could not attain this result unaided. 
 
 ATTACK OF A VILLAGE. 
 
 The attack of a village is usually attended with much difficulty 
 and heavy casualties. 
 
 Artillery fire should first be brought to bear on the village 
 and front line : then attack with infantry. Should the second 
 line prolong the defence after the first has been repulsed, some 
 guns might be brought up to close range to effect a breach, as 
 in attacking a house. A village may be simply shelled until it 
 is set on fire, but if the defenders cannot remain in it, neither can 
 the rssailants. 
 
165 
 
 Lecture XX. 
 DEFENCE OF WOODS. 
 
 Woods present one or two peculiar features in war. They 
 screen the defenders so completely that it is impossible to obtain 
 any estimate of the force holding any given wood. Once within 
 a wood, both sides are on equal terms, all tactical formations 
 become dissolved and the experience of past wars shews that 
 when once an attack has pushed in, it nearly always succeeds in 
 driving out the defenders ; therefore the enemy should be kept 
 beyond the edge. 
 
 The military value of a wood depends on its (1) position, (2) 
 its extent, and (3) its nature. 
 
 (1). With regard to its position, the front or outer edge of a 
 wood may coincide with the front or flank of a position, in 
 Avhich case it would be highly advantageous. Or it may be 
 situated in front of a position so that it cannot be included in it, 
 in this case the edge in front of a position should if possible be 
 felled inwards, the trees interlaced, and roads strongly barricaded 
 to prevent the enemy emerging from it. 
 
 (2). With regard to its extent, a wood may be of a size adapted 
 to the requirements of the case, or may be so large that to hold 
 it all is impossible. In this latter case, the portion to be held 
 should be isolated from the rest by existing roads, streams, 
 clearings, etc, or should none exist, by felling broad "belts." 
 A "belt" is 4 or 5 rows of trees felled towards the enemy and 
 entangled. Behind this clearing or belt at about 20 yards or so 
 a shelter trench should be made. Choose low ground if possible 
 for clearing or belt, and higher ground for the trench. 
 
 (3). Its nature : The important feature in a wood is the 
 presence or absence of undergrowth. Some woods are open and 
 passable to all arms, some are passable to cavalry and infantry, 
 some to infantry only and some are totally impassable. Other 
 features to be noticed are, any rivers or streams flowing through 
 it ; any roads or paths ; any clearings or openings. 
 The vital part of a icood is the edge nearest the enemy. 
 A wood with a badly denned edge— that is to say where the 
 trees instead of ceasing abruptly at a given line, become gradually 
 thinner and merge by degrees into the open plain — such a wood 
 is most difficult to treat, since at any given spot, assailant and 
 defender are on almost equal terms. In this case the general 
 line of defence must be drawn as well as circumstances will 
 admit, and everything in front felled or cleared as far as possible. 
 At any rate a broad belt should be cleared, behind which a 
 shelter trench should be made. Logs might be laid on the top 
 of the excavated earth as cover for the men's heads, loop holes 
 being driven through the earth, and the logs supported at 
 intervals with cross stakes. 
 
166 defence of woods. 
 
 A wood with a well defined edge and open ground in front, is 
 a great element of strength even as it stands, but if the edge he 
 fortified with the outer trees felled as abatis and trench as just 
 described it ought to be impregnable. If time admits, it would 
 be better to throw up a small parapet with a command of five or 
 six feet, this will enable the defenders to see over the abatis in 
 front. Logs or head cover should be provided. Should any very 
 large trees be found near the edge they should be left standing. 
 The labour of felling is immense, and they give good cover. 
 
 If the edge instead of being straight, is broken into salients 
 and reentrants, fortify the salients first, drawing the trenches 
 round the heads and carrying them slightly to the rear but not 
 too far or the men on the flanks of two adjacent salients will fire 
 into each other. At the bottom of the intermediate reentrant, a 
 short length of trench may be traced so as to fire directly to the 
 front. 
 
 If the defence is to be purely passive, carry a line of abatis 
 right across the mouth of the reentrants, nearly level with the 
 heads of the salients, so that the fire from the flank of each 
 salient may cross in front of it. 
 
 If it is intended to make counter attacks the reentrants should 
 not be obstructed. 
 
 SUPPORTS should be provided as usual. If the wood is 
 thin, a trench or cover of some sort will be required, but if tho 
 wood is fairly thick, bodies of troops in rear of the fighting line 
 are safe if they are placed just so deep in the wood that tho open 
 cannot be seen between the trees. 
 
 M AIN BODIES or small local reserves should also be provided 
 for the purpose of instantly attacking tho enemy at any spot 
 where he may effect an entrance and driving him out. 
 
 As already stated in the defence of villages, tactical units 
 should be kept intact. A given length of defensive line should 
 be handed over to each regiment or corps in proportion to its 
 strength and tho officer commanding it should be held responsible 
 for the proper preparation and distribution of his own fighting 
 line, supports and main bod}'. 
 
 The lines by which supports, main bodies, ammunition, sick 
 bearers, &c, should advance, should be marked if possible by 
 clearing away small trees, or " blazing " the trunks of large ones. 
 
 GARRISON. — Two men per pace of fighting line as a 
 maximum, one man as a minimum. The former will include 
 supports and main bodies, the latter will merely furnish a fight- 
 ing line. 
 
 ARTILLERY should be placed if possible on the flanks of a 
 wood, crossing their fire in front. Should the wood be so large 
 that the guns must be posted in the wood they should be placed 
 near roads where they can retire if required. They should be 
 spaced at wide intervals, posted in gun pits if possible and 
 concealed from the enemy's view. 
 
DEFENCE OF WOODS. 
 
 167 
 
 CAVALRY should be placed wherever they -will be able to 
 make a dash at the enemy's infantry after a repulse. They must 
 remain near the edge well under co^er, until required to act. 
 
 FIRST LINE. — The above, that is to say fighting line 
 supports, main bodies or local reserves and whatever cavalry and 
 artillery may be acting with them, form the first line. 
 
 SECOND LINE. — A second line similar in all respects to the 
 first may be prepared at any suitable position, probably about a 
 mile in rear of the first, or the troops forming the second line 
 may be simply kept in colnmn ready to move in any required 
 direction. In rear of them again would be held the reserve. 
 
 ATTACK OF A WOOD.— Reconnoitre as far as possible, 
 ascertaining what length of front is fortified. Select the point 
 of attack and commence with artillery fire, then let the infantry 
 advance. The enemy should be held all along the line if possible 
 by demonstrations or false attacks, to prevent him from rein- 
 forcing the point really threatened. When the attack has 
 succeeded ia penetrating at any point, fresh troops should be 
 pushed in at once to confirm the success and to drive the enemy 
 back through the wood. 
 
 
 ^*-A^ 
 
 > OF TH^ 
 
 'dittos 
 
 "■ 
 
 Wiles & Son, "Trinity Printing Works," Colchester. 
 
IN D T3X. 
 
 Administration, 2A. 
 
 Advanced Guards, 21 et seq. ; cavalry, 57. 
 
 Ambushes, cavalry, 1 07. 
 
 Ammunition, artillery, 1 4 ; cavalry, 9 ; infantry, 5. 
 
 Army Corps, composition, 2. 
 
 Artillery, characteristics, etc., 12; notes on artillery lire, I20A; 
 arillery tactics, 1 39. 
 
 Attack, artillery of, 139; cavalry, 130 ; infantry, 123A et seq. ; 
 of house, 159; of village, 164; of wood, I67 ; the three arms in, 
 1 44 ; attack and defence compared, 148. 
 
 Batteries, various kinds, I 3 ; positions for, 142. 
 
 Bridges, reconnaissance of, IOI. 
 
 Brigade, composition of, cavalry, 2A ; infantry, I. 
 
 Cavalry, ambushes, 107 ; characteristics, etc., 9 ; advanced guard, 
 57, et seq. ; dismounted service, 1 37 ; outposts, 75 ; rear guards, 70 ; 
 reconnoitring and screening, 89 ; reconnoitring country, 1 00 ; of an 
 enemy, 99; surprises, 1 06; cavalry tactics, 130. 
 
 Characteristics, artillery, 1 3 ; cavalry, 9 ; infantry, 4. 
 
 Charge, cavalry, I 34. 
 
 Connecting Posts, 95. 
 
 Contact Squadrons, 92. 
 
 Cossack Posts, 84. 
 
 Counter Attacks, 129E. 
 
 Defence, artillery of the, I4O; infantry, 129A; three arms, 1 45. 
 
 Defiles, cavalry and horse artillery passing, 1 1 5. 
 
 Dismounted service, 1 3 7 . 
 
 Division, of infantry, 2 ; of cavalry, 2A. 
 
 Examining Post, 85. 
 
 Escorts, for prisoners, 104; for convoys, 105; for artillery, no. 
 
 Expenditure of Ammunition, artillery, 14; cavalry, 9; infantiy, 5. 
 
 Fire Tactics, infantry, HI, et seq. 
 
 Fire discipline, 1 23 ; 129A. 
 
 Flags of Truce, 5 2 a. 
 
 Fords reconnoitred, IOI. 
 
Functions, of artillery, 1 2 ; cavalry 8 ; infantry, 4. 
 
 Fuzes, 1 6. 
 
 Groups, 38. 
 
 House, attack of, 159; defence of, 1 56. 
 
 Infantry, characteristics, etc., 4 ; attack, 125A, et seq. 
 
 Marches, 1 50 ; flank marches, 155; night marches, 1 5 5A, f/ seq. 
 
 Night marches and operations, I 55A, et seq. ; outposts at, 36. 
 
 Organization, I . 
 
 Outposts, cavalry, 75 et seq. ; infantry, 40 et seq. 
 
 Pace for marching, artillery, 17 ; cavalry, IO ; infantry, 6. 
 
 Patrols, from outposts, cavalry, 86 ; infantry, 39. 
 
 Piquets, cavalry, 80 ; infantry, 37. 
 
 Position, attack of, 1 44 ; defence of, 1 45 ; for battery in action, 1 42 
 
 Projectiles, artillery, I 5. 
 
 Pursuit, 1 49. 
 
 Railways, destruction of, 1 08. 
 
 Ranges, artillery, 1 6 ; infantry, 1 2 5A. 
 
 Rear Guards, 33A et seq. ; cavalry, 70. 
 
 Reconnaissance, of country, 100 ; of enemy, 99. 
 
 Requisitions, 1 03. 
 
 Reserve, of cavalry attack, 1 3 1, 136; of cavalry outposts, 88; 
 of infantry attack, 125A ; of infantry outposts, 36. 
 
 Retreat, 1 49. 
 
 Rivers, reconnaissance of, 100. 
 
 Second line, of infantry attack, 126, 129. 
 
 Sentries, outpost, 38, 48. 
 
 Shell, common, 15 ; shrapnel, I 5. 
 
 Supports, cavalry attack, I 3 1, I 35 ; cavalry out] osts, 88 ; infantry 
 attack, J25A; infantry outposts, 37. 
 
 Surprises, cavalry, 1 06. 
 
 Tactics, 3. 
 
 Telegraphs, destruction of, 108. 
 
 Three Arms, tactics of, 1 44. 
 
 Time and Space, artillery, 17; cavalry, iC; infantry, 7 com- 
 bined, 18. 
 
 Units, artillery, 16 ; cavalry, 9 ; infantry, 6. 
 
 Vedettes, 84. 
 
 Weapons, artillery, 1 3 ; cavalry, 9 ; infantry, 4. 
 
 IVoods, 165 ; in outposts, 52c. 
 
Hints to Candidates at Examination. 
 
 1. On receiving your paper read it slowly and deliberately all 
 through. 
 
 2. Then select any question you know you can do, answer it 
 and lay it aside : then choose another and so on. 
 
 Never attempt to answer a paper in the order in which the 
 questions are set. 
 
 3. Before answering any question, read it carefully through 
 two, three, or four times, until you have thoroughly grasped, not 
 merely its words, but its purport and object. 
 
 4. If a question puzzles you after a fair trial, leave it and pass 
 on at once to another. The required answer will probably occur 
 to you befoie long, but in any case remember you are working 
 against time and cannot afford to delay. 
 
 5. Write the number of each question on the heading or margin 
 of each page or half-sheet, you can then easily refer to any given 
 question. 
 
 Of the above, No. o is by far the most important, and a long 
 experience both as Candidate and Examiner, has convinced the 
 author that numbers of candidates fail to do themselves justice 
 simply from neglect of it. 
 
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