-"*J" S \ --.. *T- ft . ~ i . y ; =? } ' -Yi f X \ 5? c ^m-MNMttV' 0S"\| "^/m\lN!l ]\\V S > I * W N B _^ A ' n u ^ " ^ rr uj- t r^ ^ Jfil J^'li s ^u x '> I ? C\ ~ ^OJ!1V.)-JO N = 2 \~:?\ => 9 -S* I R S Jl . 5 O' &AHV ^ X, o/ ^. -N ^l-tiBRARY/9/ ^,1-UBRARY^c ^^^ '5 v*- t ^ THE g DICTIONARY, COMPRISING THE OPINIONS OF ALL THE BEST WRITERS ON MORAL, POLITICAL AND THEOLOGICAL SUBJECTS, SUCH AS aocfcc, $umc. &cU)*tttt, Strain &mttft, $oUatr?, ROUSSEAU, DAVID WILLIAMS, BAYLE, D'ALEMBERT, DIDEROT, MONTESQUIEU, CONDORCET, FILANGERI, BECCARIA, PRIESTLEY, GODWIN, AND OTHERS, Who have written in favour of the Liberties and Happiness of Mankind. Honiron : W. BENBOW, PRINTER AND PUBLISHER, 9, CASTLE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE. 1822. e. TO THE FIRST EDITION. THE following Work is compiled from the writ- ings of the most eminent philosophers in Europe. It was undertaken originally with no other view but to serve as a Common-place Book for pri- vate use. If the publication of it can add to the amusement of travellers who carry few books with them, or satisfy the curiosity of those who cannot purchase many books, or have little time to read them, it will answer every purpose the Editor could expect. There are some articles in it which have been the subject of controversy amongst ancient as well as modern philosophers : on these subjects, the ar- guments on both sides of the question are, in ge- VI. PREFACE. neral, extracted for the satisfaction of the reader. If the Work meets the approbation of the Public, the defects of it may be amended in a Supplement or future Edition. A love of truth, and warm wishes for its diffu- sion, under respectable authorities, were the sole objects of the Editor in this Publication. F. S , M. D. London, January, 1786. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EQIT10N. The Compiler of this Work, within two years after its original publication, wishing to make a present of some copies to his friends, applied to his publisher, and to his astonishment was informed that it was out of print. The Bookseller stated that from the manner m which the Work had disappeared, he suspected it had been bought up with a view of suppressing it. Many years having passed since that period, and the Philosophical Dictionary having become extremely scarce, the Editor has given Mr. Benbow permission to re- print it, and has added many new articles, some of which are selected from eminent authors who have written since the publication of the former PREFACE. edition, and others are original. It is but justice to add, that a few very dry and abstruse articles have been omitted, as being neither intelligible nor interesting to the generality of readers. Further improvements are in contemplation, should the present undertaking meet the approba- tion of the Public. F. S , M. D. March, CONTENTS Philosophical Dictionary, alphabetically arranged. A. Abraham Abuses Actions Adam Adultery Ambition America Ancestors Animals Animals, reason of Apostacy Art and Nature Arts and Sciences Assassination Ditto of Princes Assent Athanasius's Creed Atheism Ditto and Superstition Atheist B. Babel Bankruptcy, national Beasts Being Belief Ditto or Disbelief Bigotry, religious Bible Societies C. Calvinistic Divinity Capet, Hugh Catechism Cause, existence of Celibacy Ceres Eleusina Certainty Chain of Events Chance and Causes Character Ditto, National Charles I. Chastity, the merit-of Christian Religion Christianity Civil Commotions Climates, influence of Ditto, difference of Commerce Conciliation Confucius Conscience Ditto, liberty of Controversy Controversies, religious Corn, exportation of Corruptions, religious and political Country Courtezans Creation Credulity and Authority Crimes Crown, influence of Customs, origin of D. Darkness Death in Battle Ditto, punishment of Debt, National Deity Ditto, to discover a Ditto, belief of the Ditto, worship of the Delicacy Deliriums Deluge Destiny Discretion Divisibility of Matter Divorce and Repudiation Dotage Dreams Dress, female Duration E. Ecclesiastical Power Ditto, Civil Power, &c. Economy Education Ditto of Children Ditto of Common People Empire English Constitution Ennui Enthusiasm Equality Ditto, what it means Ditto, benefits of Establishments, religious Evidence Ditto, historical Evil, the origin of CONTENTS. Evil, observation on, natural and moral Experience External Objects F. Fabulous stories Facts, matter of Ditto, nature of Faith Ditto and Reason Fame Ditto, the love of Fanaticism Ditto, punishment of Filial Affection Final Causes Flattery Friendship Ditto, real Future Punishment Ditto Rewards and Punishment Ditto State G. Gallantry Genius God Ditto, knowledge of Good Government, resistance to Ditto, civil Ditto, just Ditto, principles of H. Habit Ditto, influence of Ditto, moral Happiness Ditto of different stations Hell Hereditary Succession Ditto in Government History Hospitals, foundling Humanity Hypocrisy I. Idea of Body Ideas, what derived from Ditto of Sensation Ditto, association of Ditto, origin of Idolatry 111 Humour Imagination Indians Infants, exposition of Ingratitude Injury, do none Intentions ,T. .1 11 stic* Ditto, virtue of Justice, the origin of K. Knowledge, historical Ditto, of Existence Ditto, necessary L. Labour Ditto, national Law of Nature Laws, Ditto, civil Ditto interpretation of Ditto, continuance of Legal Restraints Legislature, its omnipotence Ditto, power of Ditto, omnipotence of every Liberty Ditto, general idea of Ditto, civil, and political Ditto, different sorts of Ditto, political Love, cause of Luxury Ditto and refinement Ditto, effects of Luxurious ages most happy Luxury favourable to government* M. Madmen and Idiots Madness Mahometanism Manufacturers Marriage Ditto, object of Marriage, degrees of Ditto, between relations Ditto, with Brother's widow Matter Matters of fact Melancholy Men, different races of Ditto, Inferiority of Ditto, no distinction in Mind, strength of Miracles Ditto, Birth of Ditto, Violation of laws of nature Ditto of Religion Ditto, proof of, Ditto, Mysterious and imposing Ditto over death Morality and Religion not the same Miracles, human testimony of no proof of divine original Ditto, surprise and wonder favour- able to Ditto never proved by human testi- mony Monks, principles of Morality CONTENTS. Moral rules Ditto rules, duty of Ditto sense Ditto systems Morality, different systems of Moral virtue N. National characters Nations, the character of, and cause of difference National faith Nature, pupil of Necessity and liberty Ditto origin of Ditto, Philosophical Ditto and liberty, a dispute of words Ditto, Philosophical Ditto, liberty of the will is Ditto and liberty Ditto in man Ditto, Philosophical, and liberty of indif- ference ' Ditto, Philosophical, essential to business Ditto essential to morality and religion Novelty, origin of O. Oaths Obstinacy Occult qualities Opinion depend on interest Opinions, speculative Oracles Orthodoxy P. Pain and Pleasure Ditto and Terror Parable against Persecution Pardon of Criminals Parental Affection Parliament of Britain Passions, different Ditto source of error Patriotism Peasants and Savages Philosophers, Christianity rejected by the ancient Philosophy Ditto, of Ancient Greeks Ditto Modern Physiognomy Pleasure, the love of Polytheism Ditto, the cause of Ditto primary religion of mankind Ditto not primary religion of mankind Poor, Relief of the Populace, the. Popular Opinion Population Populousness of Ancient Europe Power, origin of Practice of Christianity, contrasted with precept Prayer Prejudice Ditto, Virtue and Vices, of Ditto, religious Provisions, price of Priests Primogeniture, contrary to the interests of families Probability, grounds of Prodigality, effects of Professors in Universities Promises and their obligations Property Ditto, the Origin of Prophesies Protestantism Providence and a future state Public spirit Ditto works Punishments, Power of Ditto Capital Ditto the intent of Ditto, immediate Ditto, infamous Ditto, mild R. Reason, meaning of Ditto and faith Ditto and faith not opposite Ditto and nature sufficient to teach Morality Reformation, the Ditto, and its effects Ditto national Religion Ditto, the inconvenience of Ditto, motives of attachment to different Ditto, the truth or falsity of Ditto, true, not to be discovered without examination Ditto, Christian founded on faith Ditto natural Ditto, of the first man Ditto, and Toleration of the Romans Ditto, the influence of, on mankind Religious principles, the influence of on Man Religion, (state of) in Pennsylvania Ditto, Universal Religious Opinions Religions, the bad influence of Ditto, barbarity Religious Terror Revelation Revelation not admissible against reason Revenues, state of the Ditto of the church Right, whatever is, is Ditto and wrong, standard of CONTENTS. Roman republic Ditto Church Ditto Church, Power and decline of S Science and virtue Security, Political Sensation Sense, Common Slave, (the labour of) dearer than that of free men Slaves and Slavery, Considerations on Sleep Society, the first principles of human Ditto and government, the origin of Sovereign, the Duties of a Soul, the origin of the Ditto, popular opinious concerning the Ditto, the Ditto, immortality of the Ditto, the immateriality of the Ditto, the doctrine of the, among the anci- ent philosophers, Barbarians and Jews Ditto, immortality of the Ditto, the, thinks not always Spirits knowable, the existence of Substance, the word Suicide Superstition Sumptuary laws superfluous Sympathy, the principle of, and antipathy, not a proper standard of right and wrong T. Taxes, their source and properties Testimony, hearsay Testimony, human Theocracy Thinking is the action, not the essence of the soul Times, reflections on the good old Tithes in England, the origin of Toleration the spirit of, in ancient Rome Ditto, reasons for and against Ditto, not a primary virtue Ditto, the chief cause and origin of Tradition Tyranny V. Vicious, no action, unless injurious to so- ciety Virtue Virtuous man Virtues, Falsity of human y. Union of body politic Unity of the deity, the W. War, Calamities of Wars, religious, are a less fatal scourge than that of the Inquisition; with a succinct history of this tribunal Wicked and wickedness Witnesses, credibility of Women Worship Worship, corruptions of the Christian Worship, idolatrous Z. Zeal, fanatical DIRECTIONS FOR THE BINDER. Through a mistake of the Printer, it will be necessary to place signature 2 Q. after 3 F. and 3 P. after 2 Q. and then 3 U. regular to 4 A. after which, 1. ?. 3. 4. 5. &c. PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY. ABR ABRAHAM. We must not suppose that Abraham was known only to the Jews ; he is revered all over Asia, even in India. This name, which signifies father of a nation, in more than one Ori- ental language, was given to an inhabitant of Chaldea, from whom several nations boast of being de- scended. The care which the Arabians and the Jews took to derive their descent from this Patriarch, proves that such a per-| son had existed. The Jewish books make himj son of Thane, and the Arabians! say that this Thane was his grand i father, and that Azar was his! father, in which they have been j followed by several Christians. Among the commentators, there are forty-two different opinions as to the year in which he was born, and I shall not venture a forty-third. It appears, even from the dates, that he lived sixty years longer than the text allows him. Philon the Jew, and Suidas, re- late, that Thane, father or grand- father of Abraham, who lived at Ur in Chaldea, was a poor man, who gained his livelihood by making little idols, and that he was an idolater. If so, the an- ABR cient religion of the Sabeans, who iiad no idols, and who wor- shipped the heavens, was per- haps not then established in Chal- dea, or if established in a part of that country, idolatry might at the same time prevail in another part of it. It appears, that in those days every petty nation had its own religion. All kinds were allowed, and all were quietly tolerated, in the same way as were the particular cus- toms of each family among them- selves. Laban, Jacob's father-in- law, had his idols. Every clan thought it right that its neigh- bouring clans should have its own gods ; and each was satis- fied with thinking its own the most powerful. The Scripture says, that the God of the Jews who destined for them the land of Canaan, or- dered Abraham to leave the fer- tile country of Chaldea to go towards Palestine, and promised to him, that in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed. It belongs to theolo- gicians to explain, by means of allegories and mystical mean- ings, hoiv all nations could bo blessed, in a seed from whic they did not spring. Some tim ABR ABR after these promises, Abraham's family was afflicted with famine, and went into Egypt to get corn. Abraham, who was very old, performed this journey withSarah his wife, who was sixty-five years of age. She was very beautiful, and Abraham, fearing- that the Egyptians, struck with her charms, would kill him, in order that they might enjoy this rare beauty, proposed to her to pass herself off as his sister. Human nature must, in those days, have been possessed of a vigour which is no longer to be found in these degenerate times. What Abra- ham had foreseen took place : the young- men of Egypt thought his wife charming, notwithstand- ing her sixty-five years: the King himself became enamoured of her, and placed her in his seraglio, although lie had pro- bably younger women in it ; but the Lord afflicted the king and all his court with great plagues. The text does not say how the king learned that this dangerous beauty was Abraham's wife, but in short he did learn it, and sent her back to her husband. Sarah's beauty must have been unchangeable ; for twenty-five years afterwards, being big with child at upwards of ninety years of age. and travelling with her husband in the territory of a king of Phenicia, called Abimelech, Abraham, who had not corrected himself, again made her pass for his sister. The Phenician king was as amorous as the king of Egypt : God appeared in a dream to Abirnelech, and threatened him with death if he touched his new mistress. We must, con- fess that the conduct of Sarah was equally as strange as the duration of her charms. From both of these kings the complaisant Abraham received large presents of sheep, oxen, asses, camels, and men and wo- men servants, which proves, that there were populous and power- ful kingdoms at the time that theJewish nation consisted of only a single family. It proves, also, that they had laws, for without them, no kingdom could exist, and, consequently, that the laws of Moses, declared long after, could not be the first. Indeed, with respect to it, it would have appeared much more conforma- ble to the feeble lights of our reason, that God, having himself a law to give, should have given it at once to the whole human race, instead of to a petty horde of barbarians, wandering in a desert. The rest of the history of Abraham is subject to great dif- ficulties, to be removed only by faith and resignation. God, who appears to him often, and who makes several covenants with him, sends to him one day three angels in the valley of Mamre. The Patriarch sets before them bread, a calf, butter, and milk. The three Spirits dine, and, afterwards, Sarah is sent for, and one of the angels, whom the text calls " the Lord," promises to her that she shall have a SOD. Sarah, who wasthen ninety-four, and whose husband, according to one version, was a hundred and forty-three, fell a laughing at the idea, seeing " it had ceased to be with her after the manner of women." And she said to herself, " After I am ABR ABU waxed old, shall I have pleasure, ray lord being- old also ?" Which proves from Scripture itself, that human nature was then not very different from what it is at pre- sent. However, this old woman, when with child, the following- year, charms the king- Abirnelech, as we have already seen. All this appears to us very strange, and we are at a loss how to reconcile such thing's to our feeble reason, as well as the promise which the Lord makes to Abraham in the 13th chapter of Genesis, to give to him and his seed for ever, in sempiter- num, all the land which he sees to the northward and southward, and eastward and westward ! On another occasion (chap. 15), he promises to him all the land, from the Nile to the Euphrates, and that his seed shall be as the dust of the earth, " so that if the dust of the earth can be num- bered, then shall his seed be numbered." Now, critics have asked, how God could promise to the Jews that immense coun- try, which they have never pos- sessed ; and how he bestowed on them, for ever, that small part of Palestine, from which they have been expelled so long ago! As to their numbers, the same critics insist, that there are not at present four hundred thousand Jews in the whole world I They are also astonished that a stranger, who came to pasture his flocks near Sodom, should, with three hundred and eighteen servants, have defeated four kings, and pursued them as far as Damascus, which is more than a hundred miles from Sodom. However, such a victory is by no means impossible, for there are several instances equally won- derful, witness Gideon, who, with three hundred men armed, witli 300 pitchers and 300 lamps, defeats a whole army. Witness Sampson, who, with his own hand, kills a thousand Philistines with the jaw-bone of an ass. It is farther worthy of remark, in the history of this Patriarch, who is looked upon as the father of the Jews and of the Arabians, that his principal children are Isaac, miraculously born of his aged wife Sarah, and Ishmael. born of his servant maid, Hagar, That it is in Isaac that the race of the Patriarch is blessed, not- withstanding of which, Isaac was the father of a wretched and despicable nation, long time slaves, and latterly dispersed all over the face of the earth. That Ishmael, on the contrary, is the father of the Arabians, who founded the empire of the Ca- liphs, one of the most powerful and extensive in the world. Abridged from Voltaire. ABUSES. When abuses become so frequent or common as to be op- pressive and intolerable, and to threaten the destruction of Go- vernment itself, then it is that the last remedy must be applied; that the free spirit of the people must put into action their natural powers to redress those grievan- ces, for which they have no peaceable means of redress, and assert their indefeasible right to a just and equitable govern- ment. No man can deny that cases may occur in which the people can have no choice but slavery or resistance: no man can hesitate to say what their B2 ACT ADA choice ought to be ; and it is the best wisdom of every Go- vernment not to create a neces- sity for resistance, by depriving the people of legal means of redress. C. Fox. ACTIONS. My sentiment is, that the State has no right to enquire into the opinions of people, either political or religious : in my mind they have a right to take cogni- sance of their actions. C. Fox. ADAM. So much has been said and written about Adam, his wife, pre-Adamities, &c., that I shall not lose time in repeating all the reveries of the Rabbins and others, but I shall venture an idea as to Adam, which, so far as I know, is new. It is no less than the profound secresy which was observed with respect to him, all over the habilable world, except in Palestine, till the period when the Jewish books began to be known in Alexandria, when they were translated into Greek under one of the Ptolomys. Even then they were very little known : books were scarce and dear, and, moreover, the Jews of Je- rusalem were so enraged at those of Alexandria for having trans- lated their Bible, or book, into a prophane language, that these latter concealed their translation as much as possible. It was in fact kept so secret, that no Greek or Roman author mentions it till the time of the Emperor Aurelian. It is certain,- that the Jews had written and read very little : that they were profoundly igno- rant of astronomy, geometry, geography, and physical science ; that they knew nothing of the history of other nations; and that the language was a bar- barous mixture of the ancient Phenician and corrupted Chal- dean, and extremely poor withal. Farther, that as they did not communicate to any stranger their books or titles, nobody in the world except themselves had ever heard of Adam or Eve, or Abel or Cain, or Noah. Abraham alone was known to the Oriental nations ; but none of them al- lowed that this Abraham or Ibra- him was the stock from which the Jews were descended. Such are the secrets of provi- dence, that the father and the mother of the human race were wholly unknown to the human race, to such a degree, that the names of Adam and Eve are not to be found in any ancient au- thor, either of Greece or Rome, of Persia or of Syria, or even among the Arabians, till about the time of Mahomet. God was pleased to allow that the title deeds of the great family of the world should be preserved only among the smallest and most wretched part of the family. How did it happen that Adam and Eve were wholly unknown to their children: that neither in Egypt nor in Babylon was the smallest trace of our first parents to be found ? Why do neither Orpheus nor Sinus nor Tharninis mention them ? For if they had done so, the notice would have been taken up by Hesiod, and above all, by Homer, who speaks of every thing except of the authors of the human race. Clement, of Alexandria, who relates so many ancient testimo- nies, would not have failed to cite any passage in which men- ADA ADA lion had been made of Adam and Eve. Eusebius, in his Uni- versal History, has collected even the most doubtful testimo- nies; and he certainly would not have passed over the slightest hint, the smallest probability in favour of our first parents. I as- sert, then, that they were wholly unknown among- the Gentiles. The Phenician Sanconiathon, who certainly lived before Moses, and who is cited by Eusebius as an authentic author, gives ten generations of the human race, the same as Moses does down to the time of Noah; but among them he does not mention either Adam or Eve, or any of their descendants, not even Noah. We do not find the name ol Adnm or of Noah in any of the ancient dynasties of Egypt, nor among the Chaldeans. In a word, the whole world is silent respecting them. It must be acknowledged, that such a concealment is with- out example. Every nation has attributed to itself an imaginary origin ; not one has hit upon the true one. It is difficult to under- stand how the father of all man- kind remained so long unknown : one would have thought that his name would naturally have flown from mouth to mouth, from one end of the world to the other. Let us humble ourselves be- fore the decrees of Providence which has permitted this asto- nishing piece of forgetfulness All has been mysterious and se- cret in the nation conducted by God himself, and which pre- pared the way for Christianity which has been the wild olive on which the fruit bearing olive has been grafted. That the names of the parents of the hu- man race should have been unknown to their descendants, certainly ranks among the great- est mysteries. I dare affirm, that nothing short of a miracle could thus have stopped the eyes and ears ofall nations, so as to make them lose all remembrance of their first parent. What would Caesar, Anthony, Cressus, Pompey, Ci- cero, Marcellus, Metellus, have thought, if a poor Jew pedlar, while selling them some balm, had said, " We are all descend- ants from the same father, named Adam ?" All the Roman Senate would have exclaimed, " Show us your genealogical tree." Then the Jew would have v unrolled his ten generations down to Noah, with the secret of the general deluge. The Se- nate would have asked, how many persons there were in the Ark, to feed all the animals du- ring ten whole months, and during the following- year, which could not produce any food. The sweater of coin would have answered, " We were eight, Noah and his wife, their three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japhei, and their wives, all descended from Adam, in a straight line." The Senate would have laughed, and would have caused the poor Jew to be flogged ; so much are people blinded by their preju- dices. It is difficult to know at what time the book called Genesis, in which Adam is mentioned, was written, as it is to know the date of the Viedam, the Shan- crit, and other ancient Asiatic ADI; ADU books. The Jews were not per- mitted to read the flrst chapter of it till they were 25 years of age. This ignorant and barba- rous nation, secluded in *a small corner of the globe, which they believed to be long-, narrow, and flat, had no difficulty in believing that all mankind, of whom they knew nothing-, were descended from Adam, and they could not know that the Negroes, whose conformation is so different from ours, inhabited immense coun- tries in Africa: still less did they dream of America. Upon the whole, as our reason is apt only to mislead us in these mat- ters, our best way is to lay it aside, to have abundance of faith, to be humble, and to adore. Abridged from Voltaire. ADULTERY is a crime which, po- litically considered, owes its existence to two causes, viz. Pernicious laws, and the power- ful attraction between the sexes. This attraction is similar in many circumstances to gravity, the spring- of motion in the universe. Like this, it is diminished by distance ; one regulates the motion of the body, the other that of the soul. But they differ in one respect: the force of gravity decreases in proportion to the obstacles that oppose it ; the other gathers strength and vigour as the obstacles increase. Adultery proceeds from an abuse of that necessity which is constant and universal in human nature ; a necessity anterior to the formation of society : where- as, all other crimes tend to the destruction of society, and arise from momentary passions, and not from a natural necessity. It is the opinion of those who have studied history and man- kind, that this necessity is con- stantly in the same degree in the same climate. If this be true, useless or rather pernicious must all laws and customs be, which tend to diminish the sum total of the effect, of this passion ; such laws would only burden one part of the society with the additional necessities of the other: but on the contrary, wise are the laws which, following the natural course of the river, divide the stream into a number of equal branches, preventing thus both sterility and inun- dation. Conjugal fidelity is al- ways greater in proportion as marriages are more numerous and less difficult. But when the interest or pride of families, or paternal authority, not the incli- nation of the parties, unite the sexes, gallantry soon breaks the slender ties, in spite of common moralists, who exclaim against the effect, whilst they pardon the cause. The act of adultery is a crime so instantaneous, so mysterious, and so concealed by the veil which the laws them- selves have woven, a veil neces- sary indeed, but so transparent as to heighten rather than con- ceal the charms of the object ; the opportunities so frequent, and the danger of discovery so easily avoided; that it were much easier for the laws to pre- vent this crime, than to punish it when committed. To every crime which from its nature must frequently remain un- punished, the punishment is an incentive. Such is the nature of the human mind, that difficulties, ADU A MB if not insurmountable, nor too great for our natural indolence, embellish the object and spur us on to the pursuit; they are so many barriers that confine the imagination to the object, and oblige us to consider it in every point of view. In this agitation the mind naturally inclines and fixes itself to the most agreeable part, studiously avoiding every idea that might create disgust. Beccaria. ADULTERY. (2d Article.) Adul- tery signified in Latin alteration, adulteration, one thing substi- tuted for another, forgery, false keys, false contracts, false seals, (adulleratio.) Hence a man who stepped into another man's bed was called adiilter. The greatest evil resulting from this crime is the burdening a man with children which are not his. By these means we have seen families of heroes wholly debased. Their wives, through a depraved taste, or in the weakness of the moment, have submitted to the embraces of an ill-made dwarf, or of a mean, spiritless valet. Both mind and body have suf- fered from it. Little, monkey- like, creatures have been heirs to some of the first names in Eu- rope. They have in their halls the portraits of their pretended ancestors, six feet high, hand- some, well-made, covered with a coat of mail, which the present race could hardly lift. Often an important station is held by a little man who has no right to it, and of whom neither the head, the heart, nor the arms are cal- culated for the burden. Voltaire. ADULTERY. (3d Article.) Eng- land, so far as we know, is the only country in Europe in which a compensation in money, award- ed by a Jury, is supposed to heal the wounds of a cornuted hus- band. Vonspiegle. AMBITION. Those great objects of self-interest, of which the loss or acquisition quite changes the rank of the person, are the objects of the passion properly called Ambition ; a passion which, when it keeps within the bonds of prudence and jus- tice, is always admired in the world, and has even sometimes a certain irregular greatness, which dazzles the imagination when it passes the limits of both these virtues, and is not only unjust but extravagant. Hence the general admiration for heroes and conquerors, and even for statesmen, wh o e projects have been very daring and extensive, though altogether devoid of jus- tice ; such as those of the Car- dinals of Richelieu and of Retz. The objects of avarice and am- bition differ only in their great- ness. A miser is as furious about a halfpenny, as the man of am- bition about the conquest of a kingdom. A, Smith. AMERICA, (how peopled). As there is no end to systems respect- ing the manner in which America has been peopled, we shall con- tinue to insist, that he who pro- duced flies in that country, also produced in it men. However much we may be inclined to dis pute, we must admit that the Supreme Being, who exists through all nations, has placed in the latitude of Paris, two- legged animals, without feathers, whose skin is a mixture of white and red, with long brownish A ME ANC beards; in AJYica, negroes, or black men, with beards, and wool on their heads, and others with coarse hair on their heads, and no beards, while in the same country he has placed Albinos, that is to say, animals which are quite white, with reddish eyes, and having neither wool nor hair on their heads, but something resembling white silk. We can see no good reason why God should not have placed on another continent, a kind of Animals of the same species, copper coloured, and without beards, or hair on their bodies. How far does the fury of sys- tems, joined to the tyranny of prejudices, carry us? We see these animals, we admit that God could have placed them where they are, and yet we deny he has placed them there. The same people who admit that the beavers are original inhabitants of Canada, pretend that men could not get the erbut by means of a boat, and that Mexico could have been peopled only by some descendants of Magog . As well might they say, that if there are men in the moon, they must have been carried thither by Astolpho on his flying horse, when he went to fetch the bot- tle in which Orlando's senses were contained. As soon as a new island is dis- ; covered, the first question among j the learned is, " How was it peopled?" while, at the same lime, they never doubt for an j instant that the trees, the turtle, and the parrot, are original pro- ductions of the island. Do these wise men imagine that God's power was exhausted by making- one couple of human beings ; or that it was more difficult for him to make twenty couple or twenty thousand, to enjoy this beautiful world which he had created ? Voltaire. ANCESTORS. (Wisdom of our.) This is a phra&e, of which, from prescriptive use, nobody seems to doubt the propriety; but if we examine it a little, we shall perhaps be inclined to alter our opinion. What were our ancestors ? They were extremely ignorant, extremely superstitious, and con- sequently extremely barbarous:- few of them, except the priests, could either read or write ; and when, at a later period, the higher classes did begin to study a little, their learning was con- fined to the worse than use- less metaphysical jargon of the schools. On the most important of all sciences, that of Govern- ment, they were miserably ig- norant ; and it is not too much to say, that the meanest mecha- nic now-a-days knows more of it than the greatest statesmen did, two centuries ago. In the mechanical arts, they were deplorably deficient ; for, had you talked to them 1 of the wonders of the steam engine, of iron rail-ways, of canals, of steam boats, of safety lamps, and a thousand other modern inven- tions, they would have stared at you in ignorant astonishment. It appears to me, that this absurd phrase has taken its rise from confounding the wisdom of old people with the wisdom of our ancestors. It is a valuable aux- iliary to those who wish to sup_ ANI ANI port and perpetuate ancient abuses, not because they are ancient, but because they are profitable to them. It would be strange indeed, if, with the ad- vantage of knowing- all that they knew, and all that has been learned since, we were not wiser than our ancestors ; in^he same way that our descendants will undoubtedly be wiser than us. Let us, therefore, hope, now the absurdity of the phrase has been pointed out, that it will quietly find its way to the tomb of all the Capulets ; and that, as we have made our houses more comfortable, and our dress more convenient, we may also be allowed to ameliorate our insti- tutions, instead of perversely clinging to those which no longer suit us, although we derive them from the wi'sdom of our ances- tors. S. ANIMALS, ORIGIN OF INFERIORITY TO MAN. All the feet of animals terminate either in horn, as those of the ox and the deer ; or in nails, as those of the dog and the wolf; or in claws, as those of the lion and the cat. Now this different organisation of the feet of ani- mals from that of our hands, de- prives them, as Mr. Buffon asserts not only of all claim to the sense of the touch, but also of the dex- terity requisite in handling- an instrument, in order to make any of the discoveries which suppose the use of hands. 2. The life ot animals, in general, being of a shorter duration than that ol man, neither permits them to make so many observations, nor consequently to acquire so many ideas. 3. Animals being better armed and better clothed by na- ture than the human species, have fewer wants, and consequently ought to have less invention. If the voracious animals are more cunning than others, it is because hunger, ever inventive, inspires them with the art of formating stratagems to surprise their prey. 4. The animals com- pose only a society that flies from man ; who, by the assistance of weapons, made by himself, is become formidable to the strong- est among them. Besides, man. is the most fruitful animal upon earth : He is born and lives in every climate ; while many of the other animals, as the lion, the elephant, and the rhinoceros, are found only in a certain lati- tude : And the more a species of animals capable of making ob- servations is multiplied, the more ideas and genius it pos- sesses. But some may ask, why monkeys, whose paws are nearly as dexterous as our hands, do not make a progress equal to that of man ? Because they are inferior to him in several re- spects ; because men are more multiplied on the earth ! be- cause, among the different spe- cies of monkeys, there are but few whose strength can be com- pared to that of man; because the monkeys being frugivorous, have fewer wants, and there- fore less invention than man ; because their life is shorter, and they form only a fugitive society with regard to man, and such animals as the tyger, the lion, &c. ; and, finally, because the organical disposition of their body, keeps them, like children, in perpetual motion, even after D ANI ANI their desires are satisfied. Mon- keys are not susceptible of lassi- tude ; which ought to be con- sidered as one of the principles of the perfection of the human mind. By combining 1 all these differences between the nature of man and beast, we may understand why sensibility and memory, though faculties com- mon to man and other animals, are in the latter only sterile faculties. If nature, instead of hands and flexible fingers, had terminated our wrist with the foot of a horse, mankind would have been totally destitute of art, habitation, and defence against other animals. Wholly employed in the care of pro- curing food, and avoiding the beasts of prey, they would have still continued wandering in the forests like fugitive flocks. It is therefore evident, that accord- ing to this hypothesis the police would never have been carried in any society to that degree of perfection to which it is now arrived. There is not a nation now existing, but, with regard to the action of the mind, must have continued very inferior to certain savage nations, who have not two hundred dif- ferent ideas, nor two hundred words to express those ideas ; and whose language must conse- quently be reduced, like that of animals, to fire or six different sounds or cries, if we take from it the words bow, arrow, nets, &c., which suppose the use of hands. From whence I conclude, that without a certain exterior organisation, sensibility and memory in us would prove two sterile faculties. II dvclius. j ANIMALS, THE REASON OF. It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many things from experience, and infer that the same events will follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquaint- ed with the more obvious pro- perties of external object*, and gradually, from their birth, trea- sure up a knowledge of the na- ture of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, &c. and of the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what hurts them, and to pursue what gives ease and pleasure. A horse ac- customed to the field will not attempt what exceeds his force or ability. An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the young- er, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles ; this sagacity is founded on obser- vation and experience. This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals; which by the proper application of rewards and pu- nishments, may be taught any course of action most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experi- ence which renders a dog appre- hensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him ? Is it not experi- ence which makes him answer to his name ? It is custom alone which engages animals, from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attend- APO ART ant, and carries their imagination from the appearance of one to expect the other. Bnt though, animals learn much of their knowledge from observation, they derive also much from the original hand of nature ; which greatly exceeds their share of capacity on ordinary occasions, and in which they improve little or nothing by the longest prac- tice and experience. These we call instincts. Hume. APOSTACY. Apostate, a term of reproach. In religion, the chang- ing from one form of religion to another. A man who has hitherto professed himselfa Christian be- comes a Mahometan the Chris- tian says he is an apostate the Mahometans a convert. If he has changed from conviction that the Mahometan form of religion is better than the Christian form, he is a convert. Has he changed for a sum of money, for power, for privilege, in short, from in- terested motives, he is an apos- tate. Philosophers pretend that if he acts the part of an honest man, and never does to others that which he would not wish they should do unto him, it is of little consequence in which of the forms he continues. Apostate in politics a man , who having professed one set of po- litical opinions, and supported one party, changes, or pretends to change his opinions, and gives his support to the opposite party: a Whig who becomes a Tory; a case of frequen^ occurrence, es- pecially among the lawyers ; and vice versa, a Tory who becomes a Whig, a case of very rare oc- currence. Has he changed place from interested motives from the gift or expectation of a place, a pension or a title? Verily, he is an apostate. Has he changed from conviction that his former opinions were wrong? he is not an apostate he is a man who has made use ot his reason, and who, thinking his former opini- ons erroneous, rejects them, and avows his change of sentiments. When the author of Wat Tyler condescends to write in the Quarterly, to abuse like a true renegade, all those who re- tain the opinions he formerly professed, and to tell us that the only thing wanting to make us completely happy, is to double our taxes, we naturally are in- duced to inquire into the cause of such a change ; and when we find that Robert Southey has been appointed Poet Laureate, with his butt of malmsey to in- spire him, and sundry pensions besides, we set down the said Robert Southey as an apostate, a vile apostate, compared to whom Jack Ketch is a respecta- ble gentlemen. We have heard of a Mr. Goldsmith, who may safely be placed in the same line. The bar also furnishes nu- merous examples. Bowbridge. ART and NATURE. (The sufferings produced by.) The sufferings produced by art, that is to say, by bad government, ignorance, superstition, and folly, are much greater than those produced by Nature. Nature is all beautiful ; but, to judge from the effects, one would be inclined to sup- pose, that the object of all go- vernments had hitherto been to counteract, as much as possible, her benevolent intentions, the interest and happiness of the ART ASS immense majority having been generally sacrificed to the plea- sure and aggrandizement of a few. Let us hope that the morning of a new era has at length dawned ; and that with truly representative governments, the interest and happiness of all will be truly attended to. S. S. ARTS AND SCIENCES, FREE GO- VERNMENTS ALONE FAVOURABLE TO THE RISE OF THE. Though a republic should be barbarous, it necessarily, by an infallible ope- ration, gives rise to law, even before mankind have made any considerable advances in the other sciences. From law arises security ; from security curi- osity ; and from curiosity knowledge. The latter steps of this progress may be more acci- dental: but the former are alto- gether necessary. A republic without laws can never have any duration. On the contrary, in a monarchical government, law arises not necessarily from the forms of government. Monar- chy, when absolute, contains even something repugnant to law. Great wisdom and re- flection can alone reconcile them. But such a degree of wis- dom can never be expected, before the great refinements of human reason. These refine- ments require curiosity, security, and law. The first growth, therefore, of the arts and sci- ences can never be expected in despotic governments. There are other causes which discou- rage the rise of the refined arts in despotic governments ; though the want of laws, and the dele- gation of full powers to every petty magistrate, seem to be the principal. Eloquence certainly springs up more naturally in popular governments: emu- lation, too, in every accomplish- ment, must there be more ani- mated and enlivened ; and ge- nius and capacity have a fuller scope and career. All these causes render free governments the only proper nursery for the arts and sciences. Hume. ASSASSINATION OF PRINCES. The maxim, which forbids assassination in every case what- ever, is the result of prudent reflection, and hfs a tendency to allay the jealousy, and to mitigate the cruelty, of persons who, by violent usurpations which laws cannot restrain, have incurred the resentment of mankind. Even tyrants, it is supposed, are cruel from fear, and become merciful in propor- tion as they believe themselves secure : it were unwise, there- fore, to entertain maxims which keep the powerful in a continual state of distrust and alarm. This prudential morality, however, wa entirely unknown in the ancient republics, or could not be observed without surrender- ing the freedom for which the citizens contended. Amongst them the people were obliged to consider, not what was safe, but what was necessary ; and could not always defend them- selves against usurpations, nei- ther by legal forms, nor by open war. Jt was thought allowable, therefore, to employ artiiice, surprise, and secret conspiracy, against an usurper. And this was so much the case at Rome, that no names were ASS ASS held in greater veneration than those. of citizens who had assas- sinated persons suspected of views dangerous to the common- wealth ; or who, by any means whatever rendered abortive the projects of adventurers who at- tempted to arm any party against the legal constitution of their conntry. The sacrifice of Csesar to the just indignation of his country, was a striking example of what the arrogant have to fear in trifling with the feelings of a free people ; and at the same time a lesson of jealousy and of cruelty to tyrants, or an admonition not to spare in the exercise of their power those whom they have insulted by usurping it. Ferguson. ASSASSINATION OF PRINCES. (2d Article.) In those countries where the laws afford protection to all, and where justice is fairly and impartially administered, the assassination of princes, or of their ministers, hardly ever occurs. In despotic countries, or in those where the laws have been strained from their purpose so as to afford protection only to the few, while the many are oppressed, assassinations are not unlikely to occur ; because, when people find that they are at the mercy of a tyrant, or of his agents, or that the laws do not afford them redress when they have been wronged ; they are apt to become desperate, and to seek revenge, if not re- lief, by depriving of life those who they think are the authors of their calamities. In former times, religious fanaticism often led to assassination: it was it which caused the death of Henry the fourth, the only good king- that France has ever had. Religious fanaticism having spent its fury, political fanati- cism seems now likely to oc- cupy its place. It was to it that the insolent and unworthy de- scendant of Henry the Fourth owed his -death in 1820. His fate should be a lesson to princes: but will they take it? In the Bible we find several instances of assassination, some of them very atrocious, but which do not seem to have beeu viewed in that light by God's chosen people: among others, that committed by Jael, who, having decoyed the poor discom- fited Sisera into her tent, pins him to the ground while asleep, by driving a nail (it must have been a very long one) through his temples ; and for this action the angel of the Lord says, " she shall be blessed above wo- men!" The angel of the Lord must, of course, be right; but were it to occur now, we should probably view it in another light. S. ASSENT DERIVED FROM TESTI- MONY AND EXPERIENCE. In things that happen indifferent- ly, as that a bird should fly this or that way, that it should thun- der on a man's right or left hand, &c. when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concur- rent testimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent is un- avoidable. Thus, that there is such a city in Italy as Rome ; that about one thousand seven hundred years ago, there lived in it a man called Julius Csesar ; that he was a general, and that he won a battle against another ASS ASS called Pompey ; this, though in the nature of the thing, there be nothing- for, nor against it ; yet being related by historians of credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing it ; and can as little doubt of it, as he does of the being and actions of his own ac- quaintance, whereof he himself is a witness. Thus, far, the matter goes on easy enough. Probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence with it, that it natu- rally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe, or disbelieve, as a de- monstration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of history arid witnesses clash with the ordi- nary course of nature, or with one another ; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exact- ness are required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing ; which rises and falls according as those two foundations of cre- dibility, viz. common observa- tion in like cases, and particular testimonies in that particular in- stance, favour, or contradict it. These are liable to so great a variety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, different qualifications, tempers, designs, oversights, &c. of the reporters, that it is impossible to reduce into precise rules the various de- grees wherein men give their assent. This only may be said in general, that as the arguments and proofs for and against, upon due examination, nicely weigh- ing every particular circum- stance, shall to any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or less degree, to pre- ponderate on either side ; so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainments, as we call belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, disde- lief, &c. LOCKE. ASSENT TO BE REGULATED BY THE GROUND OF PROBABILITY. I cannot but own, that men's sticking to their past judgment, and adhering firmly to conclu- sions formerly made, is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is, not that they rely on their me- mories for what they have be- fore well judged ; but because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they have formed right judg- ment of several matters ; and that for no other reason, but be- cause they never thought other- wise ? who imagine themselves to have judged right, only be- cause they never questioned, never examined their own opi- nion? which is, indeed, to think they judged right, because they neverjudged at all : and yet these of all men, hold their opinion with the greatest stiffness ; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets who haveleastexamined them. What we once know, we are certain is EO : and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs undis- covered, which may overturn our knowledge or bring it in doubt. But in matters of proba- ATH ATH bility, it is not in every case we can be sure that we have all the , particulars before us that any way concern the question ; and that there is no evidence be- hind, and yet unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at present seem to preponderate with us. LOCKE. ATHANA.SJUS (Creed of St.) There are many curious thing's pub- lished by Priests, and this Creed is not one of the least curi- ous among- them. In it we are told, that unless a person believes doctrines which, at the same time are acknowledged to be incom- prehensible, he cannot be saved. Now it appears to me, that before a person can believe anything, he must first compre- hend it; for, to say that he be- lieves a thing which he does not understand, is either to tell a lie, or to say that he is a fool. For what purpose was our rea- son given to us ? Surely that we might exercise it on every pro- position that is made to us, and not swallow blindly every doc- trine, however contrary to rea- son, that designing priests, igno- rant of every thing except their own interest, wish to cram down our throats. When I make use of my reason, it is impossible for me to understand how three dif- ferent persons can be one and the same person. I, therefore, do not believe it, because belief is not voluntary, but depends upon conviction. Well,it don't signify ; but because I cannot believe that one incom- prehensible being and three in- comprehensible beings are one and the same, this worthy Saint tells me, that " without doubt I shall perish everlastingly ! " He also tells me, that " it is neces- sary to everlasting salvation that I believe rightly the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ." Here, again, the more 1 make use of my .reason to investigate this propo- sition, the less can I believe so strange a story : first, I cannot believe that the all-merciful Cre- ator condemned all mankind to perpetual punishment, because their first parents ate an apple: for granting it to be a crime, it is utterly repugnant to reason that we should suffer for a crime, in which, as it was committed be fore we were born, we could not possibly have any hand. Secondly, I cannot comprehend how, if I have committed a crime, the putting to death an innocent person should atone for my crime. Thirdly, I cannot comprehend how a virgin should conceive and bring forth a child, she still re- maining a virgin. In short, the more I make use of my reason to investigate these matters, the less can I comprehend them, and, of course, I cannot believe them. Believe, or you will be damned, says St. Athanasius. Good father, answer I, I am very willing to believe, but I cannot. Then, re- plies he .expect no mercy. What, no mercy from the great God of mercy! From you, good father, I see I need expect none : you would think roasting before a slow fire too good for me: but maugre your authority, I shall continue to make use of the rea- son which God has given me, and expect mercy, notwithstand- ing. ATH ATH ATHEISM. Why is a society of Atheists thought impossible ? Because it is thought that men, under no restraint, could never live together ; that laws avail nothing against secret crimes; and that there must be an avenging God, punishing in this world or the other, those delin- quents who have escaped human justice. Though Moses's law did not reach a life to come, did not threaten any punishment after death, and did not leave the pri- mitive Jews the least insight into the immortality ot the soul ; still the Jews, so far from being Athe- ists, so far from denying a divine vengeance against wickedness, were the most religious men on the face of the earth. They not only believed the existence of an eternal God, but they believed him to be ever present among them : they dreaded being pu- nished in themselves, in their wives, in their children, in their posterity to the fourth genera- tion ; and this was a very power- ful restraint. But among the Gentiles, seve- ral sects had no curb : the Scep- tics doubted of every thing ; the Epicureans held that the Deity could not concern himself about human affairs, and, in reality, they did not allow of any Deity ; they were persuaded that the soul is not a substance, but a fa- culty born and perishing with the body ; consequently, their only check was morality and ho- nour. The Roman senators and knights were downright Athe- ists; as neither to fear or ex- pect any thing from the gods, amounts to a denial of their ex- istence : so that the Roman se- nate, in Caesar's and Cicero's time, was, in fact, an assembly of Atheists. VOLTAIRE. ATHEISM. (2d Article.) Plutarch thinks unworthy opinions of the Deity more criminal than Athe- ism. But, with submission to Plu- tarch, 'nothing can be more evi- dent, than that it was infinitely better for the Greeks to stand in awe of Ceres, Neptune, and Ju- piter, than to be under no man- ner of awe. The sacredness of oaths is manifest and necessary ; and they who hold that perjury will be punished, are certainly more to be trusted than those who think that a false oath will be attended with no ill conse- quence. It is beyond all ques- tion, that in a policed city, even a bad religion is better than none. But fanaticism is certainly a thousand times more danger- ous than Atheism : there is in Atheism no temptation to those sanguinary proceedures, for which fanaticism is notorious ; if Atheism do not suppress crimes, fanaticism incites to the commis- sion of them. The fanatics com- mitted the massacre of St. Bar- tholomew. Hobbes was account- ed an Atheist ; yet he led a quiet harmless life, whilst the fanatics were deluging England, Scot- land, and Ireland with blood. Spinosa was not only an Atheist, but taught Atheism ; yet, who can say he had any hand in the juridical murder of Barneveldt? It was not he who tore the two De Witts to pieces, and broiled and eat their flesh. Atheists for the most part, are men of study, but bold and erroneous in their reasonings ; and, not compre- hending the creation, the origi- ATH nal of evil, and other difficulties, have recourse to the hypothesis of the eternity of thing's and of necessity. The sensualist and ambitious have little time for spe- culation, or to embrace a bad system ; to compare Lucretius with Socrates, is quite out of their way. It was otherwise with the senate of Rome, which almost totally consisted of Athe- ists both in theory and practice, believing- neither in aProvidence nor a future state. It was a meeting 1 of philosophers, of vo- taries of pleasure and ambition ; all very dangerous sets of men, and who, accordingly, overturn- ed the republic. I would not, willingly, lie at the mercy of an Atheistical prince, who might think it his interest to have me pounded in a mortar: lam very certain that would be my fate. And, were la sovereign, I would not have about me any Atheisti- cal courtiers, whose interest it might be to poison me. So ne- cessary is it both for princes and people, that their minds be tho- roughly imbibed with an idea of a supreme Being, the Creator, Avenger, and Rewarder. What are the inferences from all this ? That Atheism is a most perni- cious monster in sovereign prin- ces, and likewise in statesmen, however harmless their life be, because from their cabinet they can make their way to the for- mer. That if it be not so mis- chievous as fanaticism, it is al- most ever destructive of virtue. I congratulate the present age on there being fewer Atheists now than ever ; philosophers having discovered, that there is no vegetable without a germ, no germ without design, and that corn is not produced by putre- faction. Some unphilosophical geometricians have rejected flnal causes : but they are admitted by all teal philosophers; and, to use the expression of a known author, a catechism makes God known to children, and Newton demonstrates him to the learn- ed. VOLTAIRE. ATHEISM AND SIPERSTITION. If superstition, in every degree of it, be founded in error, and if it counteract the effects of know- ledge and goodness, it is a posi- tive and active evil : Whereas, Atheism being the effect merely of ignorance, is rather a misfor- tune ; and its effects are the harm- less ones which usually follow upon mere ignorance. The wise and able moralist, Plutarch, said, it was much better men should even disbelieve and deny the ex- istence of a God, than believe him to be ill-disposed and of an immoral character. All quibbles which have been brought to ob- viate the consequences of this proposition ; the appeals to pru- dence, expedience, and interest, may do very well in modern po- litics, and in the schemes of legislators and priests, whose only aim is to keep the people like cattle in those tracks where they may be most serviceable to them ; but will be despised by every one who apprehends, and judges, and feels like a man. To see the difference between ignorance and error in all possi- ble cases, take a child totally unacquainted with truth, and take a good old lady who is, as she supposes, just going to hea- ven, loaded with points of faith D ATH ATH and principles of religion ; and you will have proofs as many as you can wish, as clear and con- vincing 1 as any mathematical con- clusions, of the great and im- portant difference between igno- rance and error. Take a savage uncorrupted by European com- merce ; take a simple savage who, in the compass and variety of his knowledge, is little above a brute ; take a religious savage, millions of which we may have in Europe ; and in attempting to instruct both, we shall have more convincing proofs of the very important difference be- tween ignorance and error. The former we may easily benefit ; the latter we seldom or never can. Williams. ATHEIST. There were formerly aniong Christians many more atheists than there are now. This may, at first sight, appear paradoxical; but, on examina- tion, will be found to be true. "When the first fathers of the church disputed among them- selves as to the nature and sub- stance of God, as to whether his son was alike to him or not ; in what manner the Holy Ghost proceeded from the two ; whe- ther the son, while on earth, united in his person the nature of God and of man ; in short, when those who should have known best were at variance upon almost every point relating to the nature and attributes of God, it became allowable for reasoning people to doubt of the existence of any such person. But, when knowledge became more general ; and when phi- losophy, founding its reasoning on experience, pointed the im- possibility of the universe, with all its glorious combinations, ex- isting without a creative and su- perintending guide; when the simple and sublime laws of the motion of the celestial bodies were explained ; when the hand of the Creator was recognized in all his works, the doubts of Atheism were forced to disap- pear before the lights of phi- losophy, and the atheist was obliged to acknowledge that THERE is A Goo. Abridged from Voltaire. BABEL. Commentators have been much puzzled as to the height of the famous tower of Babel. St. Jerome makes it 20,000 feet: the ancient Jewish book, en- titled Jacult, makes it 81,000. It is not its dimensions alone that have exercised the ingenuity of the learned, for they have been at a loss to understand how the children of Noah, " having di- vided the isles of the Gentiles in their lands ; every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations;" and having es- tablished themselves in different countries (Genesis, chap. 10), came afterwards all to meet in a plain in the land of Shinar, and all of the same mind to build a mighty tower, " saying, let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth." Chap. 1 1 . Genesis speaks of the different kingdoms which the sons of Noah had founded, and it appears odd that the inhabitants of a part of Europe, Africa, and Asia, should all meet at Shinar to build a tower ! The Vulgate places the deluge in the year of the world, 1656, and the building of the BAN BAN tower of Babel in the year 1771, only 115 years after the destruc- tion of the human race, except- ing 1 the family of Noah. Men must then have multiplied with astonishing celerity, and all the arts must have revived in a won- derfully short time, when we consider the great number of crafts requisite for carrying- on so stupendous a work. Babel is no other than Baby- lon, which was founded, accord- ing- to the Persian historians, by a prince called Tamnrath. It is distressing to think, that among all the profane historians, there does not exist the most distant hint of this tower of Babel, nor of the confusion of tongues caused by the building of it. This occurrence, so very remark- able, was equally unknown to the whole world, as the names of Noah, Methusalem, Cain, Abel, Adam, and Eve. Herodotus, who travelled so much, does not say a word of either Noah, Shem, Cush, Phut, or Nimrod. Amidst all this darkness of antiquity, our only guide must be our faith in the Bible ; a book so long un- known to all the world, but hap- pily displayed to us as an infalli- ble and unerring guide. Abridged from Voltaire. BANKRUPTCY NATIONAL. It will scarcely be asserted, that no bounds ought ever to be set to national debts; and that the public would be no weaker, were twelve or fifteen shillings in the pound, land-tax, mortga- ged with the present customs and excises. There is, how- ever, a strange supineness from long custom creeped into all ranks of men with regard to public debts, not unlike what divines so vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines. We all own, that the most sanguine imagination cannot hope either that this or any future ministry will be pos- sessed of such rigid and steady frugality, as to make a consider- able progress in the payment of our debts ; or that the situation of foreign affairs will, for any long time allow them leisure and tranquillity for such an un- dertaking. What then is to be- come of us ? Were we ever so good Christians, and ever so re- signed to Providence, this, me- thinks, were a curious question, even considered as a speculative one, and what it might not be altogether impossible to form some conjectural solution of. The events here will depend little upon the contingencies of battles, negociations, intrigues, and factions. There seems to be a natural progress in things which may guide our reasoning. As it would have required but a moderate share of prudence when we first began this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from the nature of men and of ministers, that things would ne- cessarily be carried to the length we see ; so now, that they have happily reached it, it may not be difficult to guess at the con- sequences. It must indeed be one of these two events ; either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will des- troy the nation. It is impossible they can both subsist after the manner they have been hitherto managed in this as well as in some other countries. BAN BAN It has been computed, that all the creditors of the public, na- tives and foreigners, amount on- ly to 17, 000* "These make a fi- gure at present on their income ; but in case of a public bankrupt- cy, would in an instant become the lowest, as well as the most wretched, of the people. The dignity and authority of the landed gentry and nobility is much better rooted, and would render the contention very un- equal if ever we come to that extremity. One would incline to assign to this event a very near period, such as half a cen- tury, had not our fathers' pro- phecies of this kind been found fallacious by the duration of our public credit so much beyond all reasonable expectation. When the astrologers in France were every year foretelling the death of Henry IV. " These fellows," says he, " must be right at last." But, however, it is not alto- gether improbable, that, when the nation become heartily sick of their debts, and are cruelly oppressed by them, some daring projector may arise with vision- ary schemes for their discharge. And as public credit will begin by that time to be a little frail, the least touch will destroy it, as happened in France during the regency ; and in this man- ner it will die of the doctor. But it is more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the necessary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities ; or even perhaps, of victories and conquests. Let the time come, and surely it will * At present about 200,000. 1820. * come, when the new funds, cre- ated for the exigencies of the year, are not subscribed to, and raise not the money projected. Suppose, either that the cash of the nation is exhausted, or that our faith, which has been hither- to so ample, begins to fail us. Suppose that in this distress (he nation is threatened with an invasion ; a rebellion is suspected or broken out at" home ; a squad- ron cannot be equipped for want of pay, victuals, or repairs ; or even a foreign subsidy cannot be advanced. What must a prince or minister do in such an emer- gence? The right of self-pre- servation is unalienable in every individual, much more in every community. And the folly of our statesmen must be greater than the folly of those who con- tracted the debt, or, what is more, than the folly of those who trusted or continue to trust this security, if these statesmen have the means of safety in their hands, and do not employ them. The funds created and mortga- ged will, by that time, bring in a large yearly revenue, sufficient for the defence and security of the nation. Money is, perhaps, lying in the Exchequer, ready for the discharge of the quar- terly interest ; Necessity calls, fear urges, reason exhorts, com- passion alone exclaims. The money will immediately be seized for the current service, under the most solemn protestations, perhaps, of being immediately replaced. But no more is re- quisite. The whole fabric, al ready tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thousands in its ruins. And this is called BAN BAN the natural death of public cre- dit : for to this period it tends as naturally as an animal body to its dissolution and destruc- tion. The public is a debtor whom no man can oblige to pay. The only check which the cre- ditors have on her, is the inte- rest of preserving- credit ; an in- terest which may easily be over- balanced by a great debt, and by a difficult and extraordinary emergence, even supposing- that credit irrecoverable. Not to mention that a present necessity often forces states into measures which are, strictly speaking-, against their interest. Those two events supposed above are calamitous, but not the most calamitous. Thousands are hereby sacriiiced to the safe- ty of millions. But we are not without danger, that the con- trary event may take place, and that millions may be sacrificed for. ever to the temporary safety of thousands. Our popular go- vernment, perhaps, will render it difficult and dangerous for a minister to venture on so des- perate an expedient as that of a voluntary bankruptcy. And though the House of Lords be altogether composed of the pro- prietors of lands, and the House of Commons chiefly, and con- sequently neither of them can be supposed to have great pro- perty in the funds ; yet the con- nexions of the members may be so great with the proprietors, a* to render them more tenaci- ous of public faith than pru- dence, policy, or even justice, strictly speaking, requires. And perhaps our foreign enemies may be so politic as to discover that our safety lies in despair, and may not, therefore, show the danger, open and barefaced, till it be inevitable. The ba- lance of power in Europe, our grandfathers, our fathers, and we, have all esteemed too un- equal to be preserved without our attention and assistance. But our children, weary with the struggle, arid fettered with incumbrances, may sit down se- cure, and see their neighbours oppressed and conquered ; till at last they themselves and their creditors lie both at the mercy of the conqueror. And this may be demonstrated the violent death of our public credit. -- These seem to be events which are not very remote, and which reason foresees as clearly almost as she can do any thing that lies in the womb of time. -Hume. BANKRUPTCY, NATIONAL, (2d Ar- ticle.) That a national bank- ruptcy, either total or partial, must take place sooner or later, is as certain as that the sun will con'inue to shine and to give light. The precise time when it will take place, no man can fore- tell, no more than ho can foretell the hour of his natural death ; but the one event is just as cer- tain as the other. The national debt, or rather the borough- mong-er debt (for the nation had nothing to do with the con- tracting of it) owes its origin to William, the Dutchman, who had married Mary, the oldest daugh- ter of the legitimate bigot, James the second ; in whose person we have a fine practical instance of the cashiering of kings, when they think proper to attempt to play the,, tyrant. William, fan- BAN BAN eying himself a hero, had a great mind to humble the pride of the French king-, Louis XIV, and this he could not do without get- ting- more money than the an- nual revenue of the kingdom af- forded him : he, therefore, fell upon the notable expedient of borrowing- money, of which it was optional in the borrower to repay the principal, but of which the lender could demand only the interest. This invention, which is called funding, has caused more wars, bloodshed, and misery, than any thing 1 with which the human race has ever been afflicted, excepting- only re- ligious persecution. Before this infernal invention, it was impossible that wars could last long, because, as soon as the money of one of the belligerents was exhausted, he was under the necessity of making- peace, as he best could. But, when gulls were got in plenty, who were foolish enough to lend their money to government, on condi- tion of being paid the interest only, then kings and their minis- ters, being no longer under the necessity of repaying what they had borrowed, gave a loose to their ambition and extravagance. We accordingly find that from the year 1688, when Dutch Wil- liam did us the favour to come over to govern us, till the death of George III. in 1820, being a period of 132 years, seventy-one years were spent in war, and only 61 in peace ! Is it not a most melancholy considera- tion, that more than one half of that long period has been spent in murderous wars, begun through the pride or folly of our rulers, continued through their obstinacy, or love of power, and productive of nothing but blood- shed, misery, and desolation ? All this we owe to the fund- ing system, and the consequent facility of borrowing money ; for, as wars, however oppressive to the people, are really the har- vest of the government, by the pretences which they afford for drawing immense sums from the nation ; the principle business of ministers has been to look out for pretences for plunging us into just and necessary wars : and, with the good will with which they have always set about the work, pretences have never been wanting. In 1688, we had no debt : in 1819, the annual charge on account of the debt, was forty-eight millions three hundred and ninety-five thousand two hundred and seventy-two pounds / This enor- mous sum, drawn from the in- dustrious classes, is paid to peo- ple who do nothing. It is this which has paralyzed the indus- try of the most active and intel- ligent nation in the world. It is this which has reduced the free-born Englishman to a state compared to which, the lot of a West-India slave was happiness. It is this, in short, which has pro- duced more real misery and suf- fering than any other nation was ever yet afflicted with. The question will finally come to be, shall the nation continue to submit to such an affliction, or shall they at once relieve them- selves from the whole, or a part of the intolerable load which oppressed them ? Shall 39 peo- ple out of every 40 continue BAN BEA steeped in misery, in order that the fortieth may not be deprived of any of his wonted luxuries ? Shall the immense majority of a nation, the active, the industrious, continue to suffer, in order that the very small minority of drones may continue to enjoy ? It is in vain that interested hypo- crites or designing knaves will tear their lungs, crying out, " A breach of faith ! A breach of faith !" Jn the case of an indi- vidual who has become bank- rupt, and who, being unable to pay twenty shillings in the pound, pays ten, whoever thinks of accusing him^of a breach of faith ! Where, may be asked, is the difference in the case of the nation ? The public creditor has been foolish enough to lend his money, on the faith of being paid only the interest of it out of the produce of the taxes; for it would puzzle him exceedingly to shew any other fund from which he has a right to draw his interest. Well ; the taxes do not produce enough to enable the Government to pay him his interest in full ; for the amount of his interest is greater than the whole produce of the taxes. What, then, is to be done ? Go- vernment, alarmed at the empty clamour about a broach of faith, has continued to pay the interest in full, as long as it could by any means do so ; nay, much longer than it ought to have done it ; for a great part of the taxes have of late years been paid, not from income, but from capital. At last, finding that it is im- possible for this state of things to continue longer, ministers will be obliged to say to the public creditor, " We cannot any longer pay you your interest in full, because we have not the means of doing it, but we are still wil- ling to pay you as much as we can afford, consistently with the relief of the people and the safely of the State." This would be no breach of faith, for there can be no such thing as an involuntary breach of faith. A debtor who has the means and who refuses to pay, is guilty of breach of faith : but he whose means ena- ble him to pay only a half, and who pays that half, is not guilty of a breach of faith. With him it is not a matter of choice, but of necessity. Therefore, the pub- lic creditor may lay his account, and that at no very distant pe- riod, with seeing his interest re- reduced one-fourth, one-third, one- half; in short, to such an extent as shall be consistent with the relief of the people and the safety of the State ; for, un- doubtedly, without the former, the latter would not be of long duration. S. BEASTS. Is it possible any one should say, or affirm in writing, that beasts are machines void of knowledge and sense, have a sameness in all their operations, neither learning nor perfecting any thing, &c. ? How ! this bird who makes a semicircular nest when he fixes it against a wall ; who, when in an angle, shapes it like a quadrant, and circular when he builds it in a tree ; is this having a sameness in its operations ? Does this hound, after three months teach- ing, know no more than when you first took him in hand? BEA BEA Your canary bird, does he re- peat a tune at first hearing- ? or rather, is it not some time be- fore you can bring- him to it ? Is he not often out, and does he not improve by practice ? Is it from my speaking- that you al- low me sense, memory, and ideas ? Well ; I am silent ; but you see me come home very melancholy, and with eager anxiety look for a paper, open the bureau where I remember to have put it, take it up arid read it with apparent joy. You hence infer, that I have felt pain and pleasure, and that I have memory and knowledge. Make, then, the like inference concerning- this dog-, which, hav- ing lost his master, runs about every where with melancholy yellings, comes home all in fer- ment, runs up and down, roves from room to room, till at length he finds his beloved master in his closet, and then expresses his joy in softer cries, g-esticulations, and fawning-s. This dog-, so very superior to man in affection, is seized by some barbarian vir- tuosos, who nail him down on a table, and dissect him while living-, the better to show you the meseraic veins. All the same org-ans of sensation which are in yourself, you perceive in him. Now, machinist, what say you? Has he nerves to be impassible ? For shame ! charg-e not nature with such weakness and incon- sistency. But the scholastic doctors ask what the soul of beasts is? This is a question I do not understand. A tree has the faculty of receiving sap into its fibres, of circulating it, of un- folding the buds of its leaves and fruits. Do you now ask me what the soul of a tree is ? It has received these properties, as the animal above has received those of sensation, memory, and a certain number of ideas. Who formed all those properties, who has imparted all theso faculties ? He who causes the grass of the field to grow, and the earth to gravitate towards the sun. The souls of beasts are substantial forms, says Aristotle, the Ara- bian school, the Angelic school, and the Sorbonne. The souls of beasts are material, cry other philosophers; but as little to the purpose as the former. When called upon to define a material soul, they only perplex the cause : they must necessarily allow it to be sensitive matter. But from whence does it derive this sensation, from a material soul; which must mean, that it is matter giving sensation to matter : beyond this circle they have nothing to say. According to others equally wise, the soul of beasts is a spiritual essence dying with the body: but where are your proofs ? What idea have you of this spiritual being-, which, with its sensation, me- mory, and its share of ideas and combinations, will never be able to know so much as a child of six years? What grounds have you to think that this incorporeal being dies with the body ? But still more stupid are they who affirm this soul to be neither body nor spirit. By spirit, we can mean only some thing unknown, which is not body ; the soul of beasts, there- fore, according to this system, is neither body, nor something- BEI BEl which is not body. Whence can so many cjntradictory errors arise ? From a custom, which lias always prevailed among 1 men, of investigating the nature of a thing- before they knew whether any such thing- existed. The sucker, or clapper of a bellows, is likewise called the soul of the bellows. Well, what is the soul ? It is only a name I have given to that sucker or clapper, which falls down, lets in air, and, rising- again, propels it through a pipe on my working the bel- lows. Here is no soul distinct from the machyie itself; but who puts the bellows of animals in motion ? I have already told you ; he who puts the heavenly bodies in motion. The philoso- pher, who said, esi Deus anima brulorum, should have added, Quod Deus est anima mundi. Voltaire. BEING a Cogitative, has existed from Eternity. There is no truth more evident, than that something' must be from eternity. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could sup- pose so manifest a contradiction as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing: this being o 1 all absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence o all beings, should ever produce any real existence. If then there must be sornethin eternal, let us see what sort o being it must be. And to that it is very obvious to reason, tha it must necessarily be a cogitativ being. For it is as impossible tc conceive, that ever bars incogi tative matter should produce < thinking 1 intelligent being, a that nothing should of itself , produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall 3 ad it, in itself, able to produce nothing. For example, let us suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet with to be eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest together ; if there were no other being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it pos- sible to conceive, it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce any thing? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot produce in it- self so much as motion: the motion it has must also be from eteruity or else be produced and added to matter by some other being more powerful than mat- ter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But let us suppose mo- tion eternal too ; yet matter, in- cogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it might pro- duce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought: know- ledge will still be as far beyond the pow r er of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing or nonen- tity to produce. And I appeal 4o every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily per- ceive matter produced by no- thing, as thought to be pro- duced by pure matter, when before there was no such thing as thoug-ht,oran intelligent being existing ? Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine asort of spi- ritualizing or making a think- ing thing of it), vary the figure E BEL T>EL nation ; and have no principle, but what may be common to them with all the evil spirits in the universe. Williams. BELIEF. (Article 2.) According to some philosophers, is inde- pendent of our interest. These philosophers are right or wrong, according to the idea they at- tached to the word belief. If they mean by it a clear idea of the matter believed ; and that they can, like the geometricians, demonstrate the truth of it ; it is certain that no error is be- lieved, that none will stand the exatnen, that we form no clear idea of it, and that in this sense there are few believers. But if we take the word in the com- mon acceptation, and mean by a believer an adorer of the bull Apis ; if the man who, without having a clear idea of what he believes, believes by imitation, who, so to say, believes he be- lieves, and maintains the truth of his belief at the hazard of his life ; in this sense there are many believers. The Catholic church boasts continually of its martyrs ; but 1 know not wherefore. Every religion has its own. " He that pretends to a revelation ougrht to die in the maintenance of whal he asserts; that is the only proo he can give of its truth." It is not so with the philosopher : hi propositions must be supportec by facts and reasonings : whether he die or not in the maintenance of his doctrine, is of little import- ance : his death would prove only that he was obstinately at tached to his opinion ; not tha it was true. As for the rest, the belief of fanatics, always found- ed on imaginary, but powerfu interest in heavenly rewards, constantly imposes on the vul- gar; and it is to those funatics that we must attribute the esta- blishment of almost all general opinions. Helvctius. BELIEF. (Article 3.) Nothing is more free than the imagination of man ; and though it cannot ex- ceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, to all the varieties of fic- tion and vision. It can feign a train of events with all the ap- pearance of reality, ascribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint them out. to itself with every circumstance that belongs to any historical fact which it be- lieves with the greatest cer- tainty. Wherein, therefore, con- sists the difference between such a fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to such a con- ception as commands our assent, and which is refused to every known fiction. For, as the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this par- ticular idea to any fiction, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases ; contrary to what we find by daily experi- ence. We can, in our concep- tion, join the head of a man to the body of a hor?e ; but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed. It follows, therefore, that the difference between iic- tion and belief, lies in some sen- timent, or feeling, Aviiich is an- nexed to the latter, not to the BEL BEL former, and which depends not on the will, nor 'can be com- manded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation in which the mind is placed at any parti- cular juncture. Whenever any object is presented to the me- mory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imag-ination to conceive the object which is usually conjoin- ed to it ; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sen- timent different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of be- lief. For as there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly, that we cannot conceive the contrary, there would be no difference between the concep- tion assented to, and that which is rejected, were it not for some sentiment which distinguishes the one from the other. If I see a billiard-ball moving- towards another on a smooth table, I can easily conceive it to stop upon contact. This conception im- plies no contradiction ; but still it feels very differently from that conception by which I represent to myself the impulse and the communication of motion from one ball to another. Were we to attempt a definition of this sentiment, we siiould, perhaps, find it a very diflicult, if not an impossible, task ; in the same manner as if we should endea- vour to define the feeling- of cold, or passion of anger, to a crea- ture who never had an experi- ence of these sentiments. Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling ; and no one is ever at a loss to know the meaning- of that term ; because every man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it. It may not, however, be improper to attempt a description of this sentiment ; in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at some ana- logies which may aflbrd a per- fect explication of it. 1 .say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, steady con- ception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, whrch may seem so un- philosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind which renders realities, or whtit is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influ- ence to the passions and imagina - tion. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dis- pute about the terms. The ima- gination has the command over all the ideas, and can join and mix and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive fictitious objects with all the cir- cumstances of place and time ; it may set them in a manner be- fore our eyes in their true co- lon ;s, just as they might have existed : but as it is impossible that this faculty of imagination can ever of itself reach belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in con-- moii life ; and in philosophy, we can go no farther than asser., that belief is something felt bv the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of judgment from tre fictions of the imagination : it irivt-s them more weiirht and in- BEL BEL fluence ; makes them appear of greater importance ; enforces them in the mind ; and renders them the governing principle of our actions. I hear at present, for instance, a person's voice with whom 1 am acquainted ; and the sound comes as from the next room. This impression of my senses immediately conveys my thought to the person, together with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as ex- isting at present with the same qualities and relations of which I formerly knew them possessed. These ideas take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an en- chanted castle. They are very different to the feeling, and have a much greater influence of every kind, either to give pleasure or pain, joy, or sorrow. The senti- ment, therefore, of belief, is no- thing but a conception more in- tense and steady than what at- tends the mere fictions of the imagination ; and this manner of conception arises from a custo- mary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses. Hume. BELIEF OR DISBELIEF of any Reli- gion can neither be a virtue nor a crime in any one using the best means in his power for informa- tion. If we take a survey of that variety of sects which are scat- tered over the face of the earth, and who mutually accuse each other of falsehood and error, and ask which is the right ; every one of them in their turns will answer theirs ; we know our sect is in the right, because God hath declared so. " All of them," says Charron, " pretend that they derive their doctrine, not from men, nor from any created being, but from God. But to say truth, without flattery or disguise, there is nothing in such pretensions : however they may talk, they owe their religion to human means ; witness the manner in which they first adopt it. The nation, country, and place where they are born and bred, determine it. Are we not circumcised or baptized, made Jews, Turks, or Christians, be- fore we are men?" Our religion is not the effect of choice, but of accident ; and to impute it to us, is unjust: it is to reward or punish us for being born in this or that country. If the method taken by him who is in the right, and by him who is in the wrong, be the same, what merit or de- merit hath the one more than the other ? Now, either all re- ligions are good, and agreeeble to God ; or if there be one which he hath dictated to man, and will punish him for rejecting, he hath certainly distinguished it by ma- nifest signs and tokens as the only true one. These are com- mon to all times and places, and are equally obvious to all man- kind. If natural religion be in- sufficient, it is owing to the ob- scurity in which it necessarily leaves those sublime truths it professes to teach. It is the bu- siness of revelation to exhibit them to the mind in a more clear and sensible manner, to adapt them to the understandings of men, in order that they may be capable of believing them. True faith is assured and confirmed by the understanding ; and the best of all religions is undoubtedly BIB BIB the clearest. If there be only one religion in the world which can prevent our suffering eternal damnation, and ensure our title to future happiness ; and there be on any part of the earth a single mortal who is sincere, and is not convinced of its evi- dence ; the God of that religion must be a cruel tyrant. Would we seek the truth, therefore, in sincerity, we must lay no stress on the place and circumstances of our birth, nor on the authority of fathers or teachers; but ap- peal to the dictates of reason and conscience concerning every thing taught us in our youth. It is to no purpose to bid me subject my reason to the truth of things of which it is incapaci- tated to judge ; the man who would impose on me a falsehood may bid me do the same. It ii necessary, therefore, I shoulc employ my reason even to know when 1 ought to submit- Rousseau. BIBLE SOCIETIES. In order to counteract the torrent of wha is called blasphemy, innumerable Bible Societies have of late years been established ; bibles, prayei books, and religious tracts of al descriptions have been thrus into the hands or crammed int< the pockets of every one wh< would receive them ; and tha the rich might not take t themselves the sole merit of thi goodly work, penny-a-wee! societies have been every where got up, to enable the poo half-starved labourers to ta? themselves for the same purpose If the bible were reall the excellent book it is callec if it were an useful treatise t teach mankind morality, there would ,be no harm in all this; but when we reflect upon the number of strange stories which are told in it, and which it is impossible to reconcile to reason ; when we recollect, that the history of God's chosen people is a tissue of the most horrid cruelties, infamous vices, and atrocious villanies that ever a nation was disgraced with, we should pause before we give our money for the purpose of cir- culating such a book. It is not. my intention here to enter into an investigation of the contents of this far-famed and widely-circulated book, be- cause, notwithstanding of its di- vine origin, and its invulnera- bility to human attacks, Mr. Attorney-General might possibly think fit to refute my arguments by an ex-officio information. Strange infatuation ! To think that the word of God himself should require the assistance of a lawyer's wig and gown tof the north are stronger, and CLI COM less capable of irritation and sen- sibility, than those of the inha- bitants of warm countries ; con- sequently, they are less sensible of pain. You must flay a Mus- covite alive to make him feel. From this delicacy of organs pe- culiar to warm climates, it fol lows that the mind is most sen- sibly moved by whatever relates to the union of the two sexes : here every thing- leads to this object. In northern climates, scarce has the animal part of love a power of making- itself felt. In temperate climates, love, attended by a thousand ap- pendages, endeavours to please by things that have at first the appearances, though not the re- ality, of this passion. In warmer climates, it is liked for its own sake ; it is the only cause of hap- piness ; it is life itself. In south- ern countries, a machine of a delicate frame, but strong- sensi- bility, resigns itself either to a love which rises, and is inces- santly laid, in a seraglio ; or, to a passion which leaves women in greater independence, and is consequently exposed to a thou- sand inquietudes. In northern regions, a machine, robust and vigorous, finds a pleasure in whatever is apt to throw 'the spirits into motion ; such as hunt- ing, travelling, war, wine. I we travel towards the north, we meet with people who have few vices, many virtues, and a greai share of frankness and sincerity If we draw near the south, we fancy ourselves entirely removec from the verge of morality : here the strongest passions are pro ductive of all manner of crimes each man endeavouring-, let the means be what they will, to in- dulge his inordinate desires. In temperate climates, we find the inhabitants inconstant in their manners, as well as in their vices and virtues ; the climate has not a quality determinate enough to fix them. The heat of the climate may be so excessive as to deprive the body of all vigour and strength. Then the faintness is communi- cated to the mind ; there is no curiosity, no enterprise, no ge- nerosity of sentiment ; the incli- nations are all positive ; indo- lence constitutes the utmost hap- piness : scarcely any punishment is so severe as mental employ- ment, and slavery is more sup- portable than force and vigour of mind necessary for human conduct. Montesquieu. COMMERCE, FAVOURABLE TO CI- VILIZATION AND PEACE. There are many thing-s which, in them- selves, are morally neither good nor bad ; but they are produc- tive of consequences which are strongly marked with one or other of these characters. Thus commerce, though in itself a mo- ral nullity, has had a considerable influence in tempering the human mind. It was the want of objects in the ancient world which oc- casioned such a rude and per- petual turn for war. Their time hung on their hands without the means of employment. The indo- lence they lived in afforded lei- sure for mischief; and being all idle at once, and equal in their circumstances, they were easily provoked or induced to action. But the introduction of com- merce furnished the world with objects,whichintheirextentreach CON CON every man, and give him some- thing to think about, and some- thing to do: by these his attention is mechanically drawn from the pursuits which a state of indolence and an unemployed mind occa- sioned; and he trades with the same countries which former ages tempted by their productions, and too indolent to purchase them, would have gone to war with. The condition of the world is materially changed by the influ- ence of science and commerce; it is put into a fitness not only to admit of but to desire an exten- sion of, civilization. The world has undergone its divisions of em- pire, the several boundaries of which are known and settled. The idea of conquering countries like the Greeks and Romans, does not now exist ; and experience has exploded now the notion of going to war for the sake of profit. In short, the objects of war are exceedingly diminished, and there is now left scarcely any thing to quarrel about, but what arises from the demon of society, prejudice, and the con- sequent sullenness and untracta- bleness of the temper. Paine. CONCILIATION, THE ONLY WAY TO GOVERN MANKIND. Here seems to be no way for governing man- kind but by conciliation; and, according to the forcible way which the Irish have of expres- sing their meaning, I know of no mode of governing the peo- ple, but by letting them have their own way. Charles Fox. CONFUCIUS. The writings of Con- fucius, his philosophy and patri- otism, have justly entitled his name to immortality, and his memory to gratitude. Born in an age when both religion and morality were neglected, he en- deavoured to reform the conduct of the sovereign, and of the peo- ple ; not by pretended revela- tions, but by a simple exposition of the principles most conclusive to the well-being of society. The mode in which he connected his doctrine with the kings, or sa- cred books, is a proof of his knowledge of our nature, ever yielding to authority, and more especially to antiquity, that w hich would be refused to reason. Confucius, in the application of his maxims to the conduct of life, and in his method of teaching, resembled Socrates. It appears that the maxims of government and the principles of moral con- duct, in order to influence prac- tice, must receive the sanction either of divine revelation, or of human laws. The former are, however, after a certain, lapse of time, little- attended to (as far as history instructs us), and the only useful works on such sub- jects, are those that apply gene- ral principles to the particular circumstances of different socie- ties. Ellis, Lord Amherst's Embassy to China. CONSCIENCE. All the morality ofouractionsliesin the judgment we ourselves form of them. All the rules of morality are written in indelible characters on the heart of man. 1 have only to consult my- self to know what I ought to do; all that I feel to be right is right, whatever I feel to be wrong is wrong. Conscience is the ablest of all casuists, and it is only when we are trafficking with her that we have recourse to the subtilties of reason. It is pretended, that CON CON every one contributes to the pub- lic good for his own interest ; but whence comes it that the virtuous man contributes to it to his prejudice? Can a man lay down his life for his own inte- rest? The chief of our concerns, indeed, is that of ourselves ; yef, how often have we been told by the monitor within, that to pur- sue our own interest at the ex- pence of others would be to do wrong! Which is most agree- able for us to do, and leaves the most pleasing- reflection behind it, an act of benevolence or of mischief? For whom are we most interested at our theatres ? Do we take pleasure in acts of villany ? or do we shed tears at seeing the authors of them brought to punishment? It has been said, that every thing is in- different to us in which we are not interested : the contrary, however, is certain, as the sooth- ing endearments of friendship and humanity console us un- der afflictions ; and even in our pleasures we should be too so- litary, too miserable, if we had nobody to partake them with us. If there be nothing moral in the heart of man, whence arise those transports of admira- tion and esteem we entertain for heroic actions, and great minds ? What hath this virtuous enthu- siasm to do with our private in- terest? Wherefore do I rather wish to be an expiring Cato, than a triumphant Caesar? Of what hurt is the wickedness of a Cataline to me? Am I afraid of falling a victim to his villany ? Wherefore do 1 then look upon him with the same horror as if he was my cotemporary? We do not hate the wicked only be- cause their vices are hurtful, but also because they are wicked. Amidst all the inhuman absurd forms of worship, amidst all the prodigious diversity of manners and characters, you will every where find the same ideas of jus- tice and honesty, the same no- tions of good and evil. Antient Paganism adopted the most abo- minable deities, which it would have punished on earth as infa- mous criminals; deities that pre- sented no other picture of su- preme happiness than the com- mission of crimes, and the gra- tification of their passions. But vice, armed even with sacred au- thority, descended in vain on earth ; moral instinct influenced the human heart to revolt against it. Even in celebrating the de- baucheries of Jupiter, the world admired and respected the con- tinence of Zenocrates ; the chaste Lucretia adored the impudent Venus. There exists, therefore, evidently in the heart of man, an innate principle of justice and goodness ; by which, in spite of our own maxims, we approve or condemn the actions of ourselves and others. To this principle I give the appellation of consci- ence. But we are told by some philosophers, that there is no- thing in the human mind but what is instilled by experience ; nor can we judge of any thing but from the ideas we have ac- quired. To confute this opinion, we need only to distinguish be- tween our acquired ideas and our natural sentiments; for we are sensible before we are intelli- gent ; and as we do not learn to desire our own good, and to CON avoid what is evil, but possess this desire immediately from na- ture ; so the love of virtue and hatred of vice, are as natural as the love of ourselves. The ope- rations of conscience are not in- tellectual, but sentimental : for though all our ideas are acquired from without, the sentiments which estimate them arise from within ; and it is by these alone that we know the agreement or disagreement which exists be- tween us, and those thing's which we ought to seek or shun. To exist, is, with us, to be sen- sible ; our sensibility is iricon testably prior to our intelli- gence : and we were possessed of sentiment before we formed ideas. Whatever was the cause of our being-, it hath provided us with sentiments agreeable to our constitution ; nor can it possibly be denied that these, at least, are innate. These sentiments are, in the individual, the love of himself, aversion to pain, dread of death, and the desire of hap- piness. But if. as it cannot be doubted, man is, by nature, a so- cial being 1 , or at least formed to become such, his sociability ab- solutely requires that he should be furnished with other innate sentiments relative to his spe- cies ; for, to consider only the physical wants of men, it would certainly be better for them lo be dispersed than assembled. Now it is from this moral sys- tem, formed by its duplicate re- lation to himself and his fellow- creatures, that the impulse of conscience arises. To know what is virtuous, is not to love virtue. Man has no innate know- ledge of virtue ; but no sooner is it made known to him by rea- son, than conscience induces him to love and admire it. This is the innate sentiment I mean. Rouaseau. CONSCIENCE. (2nd Article.) The conscience is not an ori- ginal infallible guide appointed by God in our breasts ; it is formed as reason, imagination, and the other powers of the mind, by education, habits, ex- amples, principles, and laws: and it differs greatly, according as we have been differently af- fected by those circumstances. A person who has been taught to consider happiness as the end of life, and to acquire real know- ledge and virtue as the means of that happiness, has a virtuous sensibility formed, which will ever direct him right, and will make him always happy. By a process something similar, an infinite variety of false consciences are formed. A man who has been taught to consider interest as the end of life, and industry, attention, servility, as means, makes his experiments and trials with that object in view; and his understanding and conscience will be totally different from the former. Religion, that first and best of blessings, has been mis- interpreted and misunderstood, so as to furnish an infinite variety of false principles of conduct. The intent and purpose of it is to lead men by virtue to happiness. But there is no species of vice which men have not committed on one or more of those false systems, which they have deno- minated true religion. The rea- son of this is obvious. A man is brought up to his religion as he CON CON is brought up to his trade. He is told of what articles and doc- trines it is to consist: and that if he does not induce his mind to believe and practise it, he will loose the good opinion of his friends; he will make them his implacable enemies ; his fortune will be injured ; his person pu- nished ; and after he has been tormented in this world, he will be consigned to the devil in the next. Thus are most religions taught ; thus are the consciences of men formed to every species of villainy and cruelty : for the genuine principle of a bigot is hatred of all his fellow-creatures beyond the inclosures of his own party. And yet he not only imagines he has a good consci- ence, but triumphs in its execra- ble testimony. If we descend into the com- mon walks of life, and consider the difference of men's appre- hensions on the subject of right and wrong, we shall see that the satisfaction arising from the testimony of their consciences must be extremely different. A scale might be formed on the customs and principles of trade and commerce, graduated from dishonesty and fraud to the extreme points of honour and justice. Men's consciences, in their various employments, are adjusted on this kind of scale ; and we may generally judge oi the nature of a man s understand- ing, the elevation of his mind, and the delicacy and genuine- ness of his moral sensibility, from the nature of his employment False consciences, when they are formed with care on some political, moral, or religious pre- possessions, are incurable sources of ill. They are like many dis- orders in the animal economy, where the patient is sensible of his danger; where temporary and fallacious gratifications ren- der him secure and satisfied ; and where no remedies can be ap- plied, because his own concur- rence and his own endeavours are requisite, and he cannot see the necessity of them. It is to be hoped no person will be so puerile as to say, that if men think themselves right, they must be so ; and the utmost that can be expected of them, is to act on their opinions. It may be a de- sirable matter, that men should proceed thus far in the path of morality, and act sincerely and honestly on those principles which they profess, whether good or evil. Hypocrisy, added to ig- norance and vicious principles, increases the mischief of them ; and yet we find it generally at- tending them. Men have not only false ideas and false con- sciences given them ; but they are also taught to wear masks, whenever they think proper to act contrary even to their wretched principles. If we re- move this hypocrisy, it is true we remove an evil. We should only then have errors to encoun- ter with, which might either be prevented by a rational and just education, or by a diligent and careful attention to the nature and happiness of man. Persons, ill-educated, ill-formed, and with false and delusive consciences, are, however, in a much worse state than common and flagrant sinners, whose actions are in op- position to their minds, and who i LIB CON are often restored to virtue by experiencing- the miseries of vice. It is not uncommon to see those who have been led into excesses by their passions recover them- selves, and become regular and happy. It is very uncommon to see a man in any profession acting 1 above the prepossessions of it. It is very uncommon to see a charitable sectary, or a per- son who has had his mind formed on narrow gloomy cruelty, re- cover any degree of liberality, good-nature, and humanity. Men in this situation are like lunatics, the main-spring of whose minds is a false and insufficient one. And we might as well say luna- tics are as they ought to be, be- cause they think so ; as that men who act ill on religious or po- litical principles are right, be- cause they are of that opinion. The proper and real happines of man, as an individual, as a member of society, and a part ol the universal empire of God, is to be procured only by real knowledge and virtue. It is therefore, as much our duty, in every case, to consider and exa- mine our principles, as it is honestly to act on them when we are satisfied they are right Williams. CONSCIENCE, LIBERTY OF. We can comprehend things no other wise than as they present them selves to our perceptions ; nor i it possible for any one to restrain his mind from receiving a variet) of propositions either as true o as false, when clearly understood It is not in our power to think o judge according to the opinion of another ; nor are we at liberty in any case, to believe or dis believe, or suspend our assent, just as humour or fancy may di- rect, or others command. In these particulars, we must be guided by that light which arises from the nature of things, so far as it is perceived ; and by those evidences and arguments which may appear to the mind, and convince the judgment. No one can give a rational assent to any thing but in the use of his reason. How, then, is it possible he should receive as reasonable what ap- pears to him to be unreasonable ? or that he should receive as a cer- tain truth what does not come to his own mind with clear and con- vincing evidences? Nor can those arguments which may be urged, although valid in themselves, ever produce an alteration in opinion, if they do not appear to his own judgment obvious in their connexion, and sufficient for that purpose. Fell. CONTROVERSY. Where i the opinion, so rational, and so plausible, that the spirit of con- troversy cannot shake it ? Can any position be so absurd, as to render specious arguments in- capable of supporting it ? when a person is once convinced, either of the truth or of the falsity of any thing, he immediately, from a passion or disputation, be- comes attached to his own idea, and soon seeks solely, to acquire a superiority over his adversary, by dint of the powers of imagi- nation and by subtilty; especi- ally when some obscure question, involved by its nature in dark- ness, is the point in debate. Arnobius. CONTROVERSIES, RELIGIOUS. Two men, travelling- on the high- CON (JON way, the one east, the other west, can easily pass each other, if the way be broad enough. But two men, reasoning- upon opposite principles of religion, cannot so easily pass without shocking; though one should think that the way were also, in that case, sufficiently broad, and that each might proceed with- out interruption in his own course. But such is the nature of the human mind, that it al- ways takes hold of every mind that approaches it; and as it is wonderfully fortified and corroborated by an unanimity of sentiments, so it is shocked and disturbed by any contrariety. Hence the eagerness which most people discover in a dis- pute; and hence their impati- ence of opposition, even in the most speculative and indifferent opinions. This principle, however frivo- lous it may appear, seems to have been the origin of all re- ligious wars and divisions. But as this principle is universal in human nature, its effects would not have been confined to one age, and to one sect of religion, did it not there concur with other more accidental causes, which raise it to such a height as to produce the greatest mise- ry and devastation. Most religi- ons of the ancient world arose in the unknown ages of govern- ment, when men were as yet barbarous and uninstructed, and the prince as well as peasant was disposed to receive with implicit faith, every pious tale or fiction, which was offered him. The magistrate embraced the religion of the people, and entering cor- dially into the care of sacred matters, naturally acquired an authority in them, and united the ecclesiastical with the civil power. But the Christian re- ligion arising, while principles directly opposite to it were firm- ly established in the polite part of the world, who despised the nation who broached this novel- ty ; no wonder that, in such cir- cumstances, it was but little countenanced by the civil magis- trate, and that the priesthood were allowed to engross all the authority in the new sect. So bad a use did they make of this power, even in those early times, that the persecutions of Christianity may, perhaps, in part, be ascribed to the vio- lence instilled by them into their followers ; though it must not be dissembled that there were laws against external superstition amongst the Romans, as anci- ent as the time of the twelve tables ; and the Jews, as well as Christians, were sometimes punished by them ; though, in general, these laws were not rigorously executed. Immedi- ately after the conquest of Gaul, they forbad all but the natives to be initiated into the religion of the Druids ; and this was a kind of persecution. In about a cen- tury after this conquest, the Emperor Claudius, quite abolish- ed that superstition by penal laws; which would have been a very grievous persecution, if the imitation of the Roman manners had not, before hand, weaned the Gauls from their ancient prejudices. (Suetonius in vita Claudii.) Pliny ascribes the abolition of Druid superstitions CON CON to Tiberius, probably because that emperor had taken some steps towards restraining- them This is an instance of the usua caution and moderation of the Romans in such cases ; and very different from their violent anc sanguinary method of treating the Christians. Hence we may entertain a suspicion, those furi- ous persecutions of Christianity were in some measure owing to the imprudent zeal and bigotry of the first propagators of that sect ; and ecclesiastical history affords us many reasons to con- firm this suspicion. After Chris- tianity became the established religion, the principles of priest- ly government continued ; and engendered a spirit of perse- cution, which has ever since been the poison of human socie- ty, and the source of the most inveterate factions in every government. There is another cause (besides the authority of the priests, and the separation of the ecclesiastical and civil powers) which has contributed to render Christendom the scene of religious wars and divisions. Religions, that arise in ages to- tally ignorant and barbarous, consist mostly of traditional tales and fictions, which may be very different in every sect, without being contrary to each other ; and even when they are con- trary, every one adheres to the tradition of his own sect, with- out much reasoning and dispu- tation. But as philosophy was widely spread over the world at the time when Christianity arose, the teachers of the new sect were obliged to form a sys- tem of speculative opinions ! to divide with some accuracy their articles of faith; and to explain, comment, confute, and defend with all the subtilty of argument and science. Hence naturally arose keenness in dis- pute, when the Christian religi- on came to be split into new divisions and heresies. And this keenness assisted the priests in their policy, of begetting- a mutual hatred and antipathy among their deluded followers. Sects of philosophy, in the ancient world, were more zea- lous than parties of religion ; but in modern times, parties of religion are more furious and enraged than, the most cruel fac- tions that ever arose from in- terest and ambition. The civil wars which arose some years ago in Morocco, between the blacks and whites, merely on account of their complexion, are founded on a pleasant difference. We laugh at them: but were things rightly examined, we afford much more occasion of ridicule to the Moors. For what are all the wars of religion which have prevailed in this polite and knowing part of the world ? They are certainly more absurd than the Moorish civil wars. The difference of complexion is a sensible and real difference: But the difference about an article of faith, which is utterly absurd and unin- telligible, is not a difference in sentiment, but a difference in a few phrases and expressions, which one party accepts of without understanding them, and the other refuses in the same manner. Hume. COR COR CORN, THE EXPORTATION o*>. In inland high countries, remote from the sea, and whose rivers are small, running- from the country, and not to it,as is the case of Switzerland, great distress may arise from a course of bad harvests, if public granaries are not provided and kept well stored. Anciently, too, before navigation was so general, ships so plenty, and commercial con- nections so well established, even maritime countries might be occasionally distressed by bad crops : But such is now the faci- lity of communication between those countries, that an unre- strained commerce can scarce ever fail of procuring a suffici- ency for any of them. If indeed any government is so imprudent as to lay its hands on imported corn, forbid its exportation, or compel its sale at limited prices, there the people may suffer some famine, from merchants avoiding their ports. But where- ever commerce is known to be always free, and the merchant absolute master of his commo- dity, as in Holland, there will always be a reasonable supply. When an exportation of corn takes place, occasioned by a higher price in some foreign countries, it is common to raise a clamour, on the supposition that we shall thereby produce a domestic famine. Then follows a prohibition, founded on the imaginary distress of the poor. The poor to be sure, if in dis- tress, should be relieved ; but if the farmer could have a high price for his corn from the foreign demand, must he, by a prohibi- tion of exportation, be compelled to take a low price, not of the poor only, but of every one that eats bread, even the richest? The duty of relieving the poor is incumbent on the rich; but by this operation the whole bur- den of it is laid on the farmer, who is to relieve the rich at the same time. Of the poor, too, those who are maintained by the parishes, have no right to claim this sacrifice of the farmer; as, while they have their allowance, it makes no difference to them whether bread be cheap or dear. Those working poor, who now mind business only five or four days in the week, if bread should be so dear as to oblige them to work the whole six required by the commandment, do not seem to be aggrieved, so as to have a right to public redress. There will then remain, comparatively, only a few families in every dis- trict, who, from sickness, or a great number of children, will be so distressed by a high price of corn, as to need relief; and they should be taken care of by particular benefactions, without restraining the farmer's profit. Those who fear that exportation may so far drain the country of corn as to starve ourselves, fear what never did, nor ever can happen. They may as well, when they view the tide ebbing towards the sea, fear that all the water will leave the river. The price of corn, like water, will find its level. The more we ex- port, the dearer it becomes at home; the more is received abroad, the cheaper it becomes there : and as soon as these pri- ces are equal, the exportation stops of course. As the seasons COR ABU vary in different countries, the calamity of bad harvest is never universal. If, then, all ports were always open, and all commerce free, every maritime country would generally eat bread at the medium price or average ol all the harvests; which would probably be more equal than we can make it by our artificial re- gulations, and therefore a more steady encouragement to agri- culture. The nation would all have bread at the middle price ; and that nation which at any time inhumanly refuses to relieve the distresses of another nation, deserves no compassion when in distress itself. Franklin. CORRUPTION, RELIGIOUS AND PO- LITICAL. The name of religious corruption is given to all kinds of libertinism, and principally to that of men with women. This species of corruption is not in- compatible with the happiness of a nation. The people of dif- ferent countries have believed, and believe still, that this cor- ruption is not criminal. It could not be criminal in any state, if women were in common, and their offspring declared the chil- dren of the state: this crime would then, in a political view, be attended with no danger. In fact, if we take a survey of the earth, we shall see different na- tions of people, among whom what we call libertinism is not only considered as no corruption of manners, but is found author- ised by the laws, and even con- secrated by religion. What in- numerable evils, will it be said, ure Annexed to this kind of cor- ruption ? May it not be answer- ed : That dissoluteness is then only politically dangerous in a state, when it contravenes the law of the country, or is blend- ed with some other defect of go- vernment. It is in vain to add, that the nations where such dis- soluteness prevails, are the con- tempt of the world. What na- tion ever excelled the Greeks f a people which to this day is the admiration and honour of human nature. Before the Peleponesian war, an aera fatal to their virtue, what nation, what country, pro- duced so many virtuous and great men ? Yet the taste of the Greeks for the most indecent and unnatural lust is well known ; and the most virtuous of the Greeks, according 1 to our ideas of morality, would have been looked upon in Europe as most wicked and contemptible de- bauchees. This kind of corrup- tion of manners was in Greece carried to the utmost excess, at the very time that country pro- duced such great men of every kind as made Persia to tremble. We may therefore observe, that religious corruption does not seem incompatible with the greatness and felicity of a state ; but political corruption is pre- parative to the fall of an empire, and presages its ruin. With this a people is infected when the bulk of the individuals separate their interest from that of the public. This kind of corruption, which sometimes is blended with the preceding, has led many mo- ralists to confound them : if the question be only of the politi- cal interest of a state, the latter would perhaps be the most dan- gerous. A people, however pure its maaners migfat have bead at cou cou first, when this corruption be- comes common, mu*t necessarily be unhappy at home, and little feared abroad : the duration of such an empire is precarious ; it is chance which either delays or hastens the fall of it. The pub- lic happiness or misery depends solely on the agreement or op- position of the interest of indi- viduals with the general interest ; and the religious corruption of manners may, as history abun- dantly proves, be often joined with magnanimity, elevation of soul, wisdom, abilities ; in fine, with all the qualities which form great men. There are two dif- ferent species of bad actions ; some vicious in every form of government ; others, which in a state are pernicious, and con- sequently criminal only, as those actions are contradictory to the laws of those countries. Hel- vetius. .COUNTRY. A country is composed of several families: and as self- love generally leads us to stand np for and support our particular families when a contrary interest does not intervene ; so, from the like self-love, a man stands up for his town or village ; which he calls his native home. The more extended this native home is, the less we love it : it is im- possible in nature to have a ten- der love for a family so numerous as scarce to be known. The candidate, amidst his ambitious intrigues to be chosen yEbi Tribune, Praetor, Consul, Dicta- tor, makes a noise about his love for his country: whereas it is only himself that he loves Every one is for securing to him- self the freedom of lying 1 at his own home, and that it shall be in no man's power to turn him out; every one is for being sure of his life and fortune. Thus the whole society coincid- ing in the like wishes, private interest becomes that of the pub- lic ; and an individual in praying only for himself, prays in effect for the whole community. Every state on the whole earth indisputably has originally been a republic; it is the natural pro- gress of human nature : a num- ber of families at first entered into an alliance to secure one another against bears and wolves; and that which had plenty of grain, bartered with another which had nothing but wood. On our discovery of America, all the several tribes throughout that vast part of the world were found divided into republics; but there were only two king- doms. Of a thousand nations, only two were subdued. Vol- taire. COURTESANS. Courtesans were more honoured by the Romans than by us ; and more than either by the Greeks. All the world have heard of the two Aspasias, one of whom instructed even Socrates in politics and elo- quence ; of Phyrne, who, at her own expence, built the walls of Thebes, destroyed by Alexander, and whose lewd- ness repaired, in some measure, the evil done by that conqueror , of Lais, who captivated so many philosophers, even Diogenes, whom she made happy, and of whom Aristippus said, " I pos- sess Lais, but Lais does not pos- sess me:" a good maxim for every man of sense. But the cou cou most celebrated of all was Le- ontium, who wrote books of philosophy, and was beloved by Epicurus and his disciples. The famous Ninon 1'Enclos may be looked upon as the modern Leon- tium: but how few others have resembled her ! Nothing- is more uncommon than philosophical ladies of pleasure: perhaps it is a profanation to join the former to the latter term. We will not enlarge on this article ; but it may be proper to observe, that independent of our reli- gion, viewing- it only in a moral light, a passion for common women equally enervates the soul and the body, and is attend- ed with the worst of conse- quences, with regard to fortune, health, repose, and happiness. On this occasion, we may recall the saying- of Demosthenes, " I will not buy repentance at so dear a price ;" and also that of the Emperor Adrian, who, on being asked why Venus was painted naked, replied, Quia nullos dimiltit. But are not false and coquetish women more contemptible in one sense, and more dangerous to the heart and understanding, than courtesans ? This question we shall leave others to de- termine. A celebrated philosopher, (Buffon) now living, examines in his natural history, Why love makes the happiness of all other beings, and the misery of man? He answers, " That the only thing valuable in that passion is the instinctive attraction (le phy- sique), and that the moral sen- timent (le moral) which accom- panies it, is g-ood for nothing*." This philosopher does not main- tain that the moral adds nothing to the physical pleasure ; for here experience would be against him: nor that the moral is only an allusion (which is the case), but destroys not the veracity of the pleasure. His meaning is, undoubtedly, that from the moral sentiment proceed all the evils of love : and here one can- not be of his opinion. From this, let us only infer, that if a light superior to our reason did not promise us a hap- pier state, we might well com- plain of Nature, who, with one hand presenting us the most alluring of pleasures, would seem with the other to push us from it, in surrounding it with so many rocks and shelves, and placing it in a manner on the brink of a precipice between grief and privation. Qualibus in tenebris, vitae quan- tique periclis Degitur hoc tevi quodcunque est ! D'Alembert. CREATION. We have no ideas of matter being created and endued with the qualities whch it pos- sesses. Things having certainly very much the appearance which they might have had, if we could suppose a certain portion of space occupied by a confused mass of such materials as form this world ; and if we could suppose Almighty God im- mediately employed in keeping- this mass from universal dissipa- tion till the laws of motion, at- traction, and gravitation took place : then, from the motion of this substance, we can account for the present form of the earth ; the constituent parts of it ; the CRl beds or strata and lamina; of which it is composed ; the sub- siding of those heavier matters ; the raising- water to the surface ; of the air above it ; and of that ether, that pure electric fire, which seems to be the last and simplest of our elements. In the disposition of these things, we find most eminently those quali- ties which we admire ; Wisdom, Power, Goodness. These quali- ties uniformly co-operate with each other ; we therefore refer them to one great principle, which we call God. Whether this great Almighty Being pro- duced matter, and gave it prin- ciples and laws, it would be im- pious assurance in us either to assert or deny ; because it is a subject on which we can have no conceptions, no ideas: But that the materials of this world have been brought into such order, and have such effects either with or without the in- dustry of man, as to show wis- dom, power, and goodness in the great principle which uni- formly and constantly actuates it ; this we understand. Williams. CREDULITY AND AUTHORITY. Nations in general are made more for feeling than thinking. The greatest part of them never had an idea of analysing the nature of the power by which they are governed. They obey without reflection, because they have the habit of obeying. The lover of j power has no other fulcrum than opinion. The origin and the object of the first national asso- ciations being unknown to them, all resistance to government ap- pears to them a crime. It is chiefly in those states where the principles of legislation are con- founded with those of religion, that this blindness is to be met with. The habit of believing favours the habit of suffering. Man renounces not any object with impunity. It seems as if nature would revenge herself upon him who dares thus to de- grade her. The servile disposi- tion which she stamps upon his soul, in consequence, extends it- self throughout. It makes a duty of resignation as of meanness ; and, kissing chains of all kinds with respect, trembles to exa- mine either its doctrines or its laws. In the same manner that a single extravagance in religi- ous opinions is sufficient to make many more to be adopted by minds once deceived, a first usur- pation of government opens the door to all the rest. He who believes the greater, believes the less ; he who can do the greater, can do the less. It is by this doable abuse of credulity and authority, that all the absurdities in matters of religion aud policy, have been introduced into the world, for the harassing and the crushing of the human race. Rayncd. CRIMES, THE DEGREE OF. Crimes are only to be measured by the injury done to society. They err, therefore, who imagine that a crime is greater or less accord- ing to the intention of the person by whom it is committed: for this will depend on the actual impressions of objects on the senses, and on the previous disposition of the mind; both which will vary in different persons, and even in the same K CRO cus person at different times, accord- ing- to the succession of ideas, passions, and circumstances. Up- on that system it would be ne- cessary to form, not only a par- ticular code for every individual, but a new penal law for every crime. Men, often with the best intention, do the greatest injury to society ; and with the worst, do it the most essential services. Others have estimated crimes rather by the dignity of the person offended, than by their consequences to society. If this were the true standard, the smallest irreverence to the Di- vine Being ought to be punished with infinitely more severity than the assassination of a mo- narch. Others have imagined, that the greatness of the sin should aggravate the crime. But the fallacy of this opinion will appear, on the slightest consider- ation of the relations between man and man, and between God and man. The relations between man and man are relations of equality. Necessity alone hath .produced, from the opposition of private passions and interests, ;the idea of public utility ; which is the foundation of human jus- tice. The degree of sin depends on the malignity of the heart, which is impenetrable to finite beings. How, then, can the de- gree of sin serve as a standard to determine the degree of crimes ? If that were admitted, men may punish when God pardons, and pardon when God condemns ; and thus act in opposition to the Supreme Being- Beccaria. CROWN, THE INFLUENCE OP THE, IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. The influence of the crown has perhaps not been industri- ously augmented in a view to un- dermine the fabric of civil liber- ty: it appears rather to have insensibly arisen to its present pitch, from the increase of em- pire and commerce, from the augmentation of our armies, na- vies, debts, and revenues. But refer its origin to what cause you please, its existence is cer- tain, and its tendency obvious. In the hands of a wise and good prince, this influence may not be prejudicial ; but the freedom of a people should not depend on the accidental good disposition of the prince. It is our duty by social compact to be loyal ; it is our right by nature to be free. When the servility of the Roman Senate had given up to Augus- tus the liberties of the state, the people enjoyed under him a mild and moderate government ; but did they do the same under Ti- berius, Caligula, Nero, Domi- tian, and many other weak and wicked princes who succeeded him? Rome was once free. France heretofore had the three estates which were the guar- dians of its liberty. Spain had many rights and privileges, of which nothing now but the sha- dow remains. Denmark and Sweden had once constitutions something like that of England ; but all these countries have been enslaved by their own corrup- tion. * * CUSTOMS, THE ORIGIN OF BARBA- ROUS AND RIDICULOUS, IN VARI- OUS AGES AND NATIONS. Some maintain, that we have an idea of virtue absolutely independent of different ages and government ; and that virtue is always one cus cus and the same. Others maintain, on the contrary, that every na- tion forms a different idea of virtue, and consequently that the idea of virtue is merely arbitrary. These two philosophical sects are deceived ; but they would both have escaped error, had they, with an attentive eye, con- sidered the history of the world. They would then have perceived, that time must necessarily pro- duce, in the physical and moral world, revolutions that change the face of empires ; that in the great catastrophes of kingdoms, the people always experience great changes ; that the same actions may successively become useful and prejudicial, and, con- sequently, by turns, assume the name of virtuous and vicious: for by the word virtue can only be understood, a desire of the general happiness, and the ob- ject of virtue is the public wel- fare, and the actions it enjoins are the means it makes use of to accomplish that end : and, there- fore, the idea of virtue is not arbitrary, but, in different ages and countries, all men, at least those who live in society, ought to form the same idea of it : and, in short, if the people represent it under different forms, it is be- cause they take for virtue the various means they employ to accomplish the end. However stupid we suppose mankind, it is certain, that, enlightened by their own interest, they have not, without motives, adopted the ridiculous customs we find among some of them : the fan- tasticalness of these customs pro- ceeds, then, from the diversity of the interests of different na tions ; and, in fact, if they have always, though confusedly, un- derstood by the word virtue the desire of the public happiness ; if they have consequently given the name of virtuous only to actions of public utility; and if the idea of utility has always been secretly connected with the idea of virtue, we may as- sert, that the most ridiculous, and even the most barbarous customs, have always had for their foundation either a real or apparent utility. Theft was per- mitted at Sparta : they only pu- nished the awkwardness of the thief. By the laws of Lycurgus, and the contempt for gold and silver in that country, few things could be stolen ; and these thetts inured the Lacedemonians to a habit of courage and vigilance, who could only oppose these virtues to the ambition of the Persians and the treachery of the llotes. It is, therefore, certain, that theft, which is always pre- judicial to rich people, was of use to Sparta. At the end of winter, when hunger calls the savage to the chase, there are some savage na- tions who massacre all the old and infirm men, who are unable to sustain the fatigues of hunt- ing: were they left in their ca- bins or in the forests, they would fall a prey to hunger or the wild beasts; they, therefore, choose rather to preserve them from those dreadful misfortunes, by a speedy and a necessary parri- cide. And this execrable custom originates from the same princi- ple of humanity, that makes us look upon it with horror. But,, without having recourse to sa- cus DAR vage nations, let us direct our views to China : if it be asked why an absolute authority is there given to fathers over the lives of their children ? we find that the lands of that empire, how extensive soever they are, cannot sometimes furnish sub- sistence for the numerous inha- bitants. Now, as the too great disproportion between the mul- tiplicity of men and the fertility of the lands, would necessarily occasion wars fatal to that em- pire, we see, that in time of fa- mine, and to prevent an infinite number of murders and unneces- sary misfortunes, the Chinese nation, humane in its intentions, but barbarous in the choice of the means, has, through a senti- ment of humanity, though a mistaken one, considered the permission to murder their in- fants as necessary to the repose of the empire. We sacrifice, say they, for this purpose, some unfortunate victims, from whom infancy and ignorance conceal the horrors of death, in which, perhaps, consist its most formida- ble terrors. It was equally a motive of public utility, and the desire of protecting modest beau- ty, that formerly engaged the Swiss to publish an edict, by which it was not only permitted, but even ordained, that each priest should provide himself a concubine. These examples might be mul- tiplied without end; and all would concur to prove, that cus- toms, even the most foolish and barbarous, have always their source in the real or apparent utility of the public. But, it i said, that these customs are not. on this account, the less odious or ridiculous. It is true, bat it is only, because we are ignorant of the motives of their establish- ment ; and because these cus- toms, consecrated by antiquity and superstition, subsist, by the negligence or weakness of go- vernments, long after the causes of their establishment are re- moved. All the customs that procure only transient advan- tages, are like scaffolds that should be pulled down when the palaces are raised. The interest of states, like all human things, is subject to a thousand revolu- tions. The same laws and the same customs become succes- sively useful and prejudicial to the same people ; from whence we may conclude, that those laws ought, by turns, to be adopted and rejected, and that the same actions ought succes- sively to be named virtuous and vicious : a proposition that can- not be denied, without confessing that there are actions which, at one and the same time, are virtu- ous and prejudicial to the state, and, consequently, without sap- ping the foundations of all go- vernment and all society. Helvetius. DARKNESS, LOCKE'S OPINION CON- CERNING, CONSIDERED. It is Mr. Locke's opinion, that dark- ness is not naturally an idea of terror ; and that though an ex- cessive light is painful to the sense, that the greatest excess of darkness is no-ways trouble- some. He observes, indeed, in another place, that a nurse or an old woman, having once asso- ciated the idea of ghosts and goblins with that of darkness, DAR night ever after becomes painful and horrible to the imagination. The authority of this great man is doubtless as great as that of any man can be. But it seems that an association of a more general nature, an association which takes in all mankind, may make darkness terrible: for in utter darkness it is impossible -to know in what degree of safety we stand ; we are ignorant of the objects which surround us ; we may every moment strike against some dangerous obstruc- tion ; we may fall down a preci- pice the first step we take ; and if an enemy approach, we know not in what quarter to defend ourselves. In such a case strength is no sure protection ; wisdom can only act by guess ; the boldest are staggered ; and he who would pray for nothing else towards his defence, is forced to pray for light. Ztv wetltg, etto.stavfvo'ati air xspo? victt; Amount 0fi), cb? &' E As to the association of ghosts and goblins, surely it is more natural to think, that darkness, being originally an idea of ter- ror, was chosen as a fit scene for such terrible representations, than that such representations have made darkness terrible. The mind of man very easily slides into an error of the former sort; but it is very hard to imagine that the effect of an idea, so universally terrible in all times and in all countries, as darkness, could possibly have been owing to a set of idle sto- ries, or to any cause of a nature so trivial, and of an operation so precarious. Perhaps it may appear, on in- quiry, that blackness and dark- ness are, in some degree, painful, by their natural operation, in- dependent of any associations whatsoever. It must be ob- served, that the ideas of dark- ness and blackness are much the same; and they differ only in this, that blackness is a more confined idea. Dr. Cheselden has given us a very curious story of a boy who had been born blind, and continued so until he was thirteen or fourteen years old. He was then couched for a cataract ; by which operation he received his sight. Among many remarkable particulars that attended his first perceptions and judgments on visual objects, Che- selden tells us, that the first time the boy saw a black object it gave him great uneasiness ; and that some time after, upon acci- dentally seeing a negro woman, he was struck with great hoitbr at the sight. The horror, in this case, can scarcely be supposed to arise from any association. The boy appears, by the account, to have been particularly observ- ing and sensible for one of his age ; and, therefore, it is proba- ble, if the great uneasiness he felt at the first sight of black had arisen from its connection with any other disagreeable ideas, he would have observed and men- tioned it : for an idea, disagreea- ble only by association, has the cause of its ill effect on the pas- sions, evident enough at the first impression. In ordinary cases it is, indeed, frequently lost ; but this is because the ori- ginal association was made very early, and the consequent itn- DAR DBA pression repeated often. ID this instance, there was no time for such an habit; and there is no reason to think that the ill effects of black on his imagination were more owing to its connection with any disagreeable ideas, than that the good effects of more cheerful colours were derived from their connection with pleas- ing ones. They had both pro- bably their effects from their na- tural operation. It may be worth while to examine, how darkness can ope- rate in such a manner as to cause pain. It is observable, that still as we recede from the light, nature has so contrived it, that the pupil is enlarged by the retiring of the iris, in proportion to our recess. Now, instead of declining from it but a little, sup- pose that we withdraw entirely from the light: it is reasonable to think, that the contraction of the radial fibres of the iris is pro- portionably greater ; and that this part, by great darkness, may come to be so contracted, as to strain the nerves that compose it, beyond their natural tone, and, by this means, to produce a pain- ful sensation. Such a tension, it seems, there certainly is, whilst we are involved in darkness ; for in such a state, while the eye remains open, there is a con- tinual nisus to receive light : this is manifest, from the flashes and luminous appearances which of- ten seem in these circumstances to play before it, and which can be nottringbut the effect of spasms produced by its own efforts in pursuit of its object. Several other strong impulses will pro- duce the idea of light in the eye, besides the substance of light it- self, as we experience on many occasions. Though the circular ring of the iris be in some sense a sphincter, which may possibly be dilated by a simple relaxation ; yet, in one respect, it differs from most of the sphincters of the body, that it is furnished with antagonist muscles, which are the radial fibres of the iris. No sooner does the circular muscle begin to relax, than these fibres, wanting their counterpoise, are forcibly drawn back, and open the pupil to a considerable wide- ness. But though we were not apprised of this, every one, it is to be presumed, will find, if he opens his eyes, and makes an effort to see in a dark place, that a very perceivable pain ensues. It hath also been a complaint of some ladies, that after having worked a long time upon a ground of black, their eyes were so pained and weakened, they could hardly see. It may, per- haps, be objected to this theory of the mechanical effect of dark- ness, that the ill effects of dark- ness or blackness seem rather mental than corporeal : and it is true that they do so ; and so do all those that depend on the affections of the finer parts of our system. The ill effects of bad weather appear no otherwise than in a melancholy and dejection of spi- rits ; though, without doubt, in this case, the bodily organs suffer first, and the mind through these organs. Burke. DEATH, IN THE FIELD OF BATTLE. Death, in the field, is not al- ways glorious. Socrates says, it can be so only when one dies for DEA DEA one's relations, one's children, or one's country. The death of a soldier, fighting- in a bad cause, never can be glorious. He may have performed the most heroic actions, have shown proofs of the most undaunted courage ; yet, if he has fallen in any cause except that of the defence of his coun- try, or of the weak oppressed by the strong, his death cannot have been glorious. The cause in which he fought must have been just : without that, glory is out of the question. S. DEATH (PUNISHMENT OF). Many philosophers have doubted the propriety of punishing any crimes with death, while others who agree with them as to abo- lishing it for all other crimes, would still retain it for that of murder. These last, when ques- tioned as to the reasons on which their opinion is founded, can give none, but satisfy themselves by referring to the law of Moses, in which it is said, " He who smiteth a man so that he die, shall surely be put to death." But, with all submission to them, if they are to adopt one law of a savage barbarian, like Moses, why not adopt the whole of his bloody code ? "Why not put a man to death for com- pounding an oil like that which was poured upon Aaron (Exo- dus, chap. 30), or for eating blood puddings (Leviticus, chap. 17), and for twenty other things equally absurd ! 1 confess 1 do not see upon what rational ground the punishing a man with death can be defended. If it is intend- ed as an example and a warning to deter others, the inefficacy o it in this respect, in those coun- tries where it is most practised, shows how fruitless it Is : Why, then, persist in destroying men, who, if allowed to live and pro- perly taken care of, might in time become useful members of society ? I suspect the following is the cause of it : the hanging or beheading of a criminal costs very little trouble ; but the keep- ing of him in safe custody, and in such a way as would tend to render him a useful member of society, is a tedious and trouble- some process. Therefore, go- vernors, who in general wish to have as little trouble as possible, prefer the former way ; and I confess they have in their favour that, which with many people would warrant any absurdity under the sun ; viz. the sanction of antiquity. " But," exclaim the advo- cates for hanging, " how then would you punish criminals?" Answer, " By disgrace, by pri- vations, by hard labour, by im- prisonment, for a longer or shorter period, in proportion to the atrocity of the crime com- mitted." " Well, granting that all this might do for ordinary crimes, what, then, would you do with a murderer ?" A nswer, " I would imprison him for life ; I would burn him on the fore- head with the letter M : 1 would make him work hard, and I would feed him sparingly. I would exhibit him in the market place once a year, on the anni- versary of the day on which he committed the murder, along with the implements with which he accomplished it, and with a label mentioning all the circum- stances of his crime/' DEI The pain of dying is nothing 1 ; a few minutes and it is over, and in a few days the man and his crime are alike forgotten by the people. But, to be made to live, in the way above stated, would be worse than death to the indi- vidual, while at the. same time it would operate much more power- fully in the way of example to deter others ; the great object of all punishment in civilized so- cieties. To all criminals except the murderer, 1 would hold out the prospect of the period of their confinement being- shorten- ed, in proportion to their good behaviour ; and even to the mur- derer I would hold out the pros- pect of his situation being ame- liorated on the same conditions, within the prison ; but none that he should ever be again allowed to join that society whose laws he had so grossly violated. S. DEBT, NATIONAL. The National Debt in England originated in the knavery of those who bor- rowed, and in the folly of those who lent; perpetuating taxes that take money from industri- ous people, in order to give it to those who are idle. The li- berty enjoyed by England has enabled it to flourish beyond any other society (hitherto known) in the world ; not as some wri- ters have foolishly asserted, be- cause it has a National Debt, but in spite of so great an evil. /I. Young's Tour tn France. DEITY. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most careless thinker; and no men can be so hardened in ab- surd systems as at all times to reject it. That nature does no- thing in vain, is a maxim estab- lished in all the schools, merely from the contemplation of the books of nature, without any re- ligious purpose : and from a firm conviction of its truth, an ana- tomist, who had observed a new organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had discovered its use and intention. One great foundation of the Coperniean system is the maxim, that, nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any end : and astrono- mers, without thinking of it, often lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is observable in other parts of philosophy : and thus all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess that intention. It is with pleasure I hear Galen reason concerning the structure of the human body. The anatomy of a man, says he, discovers above 600 different muscles ; and whoever duly con- siders these will find, that in each of them nature must have ad- justed, at least, ten different cir- cumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed ; proper figure, just magnitude, right dis- position- of the several ends, the upper and lower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves, veins, and ar- teries ; so that in the muscles alone, above 6000 several views and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he calculates to be 284.- The dis- tinct purposes aimed at in the structure of each above forty. What a prodigious display of ar- DEI DEI tifice even in these simple and homogeneous parts. But if we consider the skin, ligaments, ves- sels, glandules, humours, the se- veral limbs and members of the body, how must our astonish- ment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted ? The further we advance in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom ; but descry at a distance further scenes beyond our reach, in the fine in- ternal structure of the parts, in the oaconomy of the brain, in the fabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every different species of animal, with wonderful variety and with exact propriety, suited to the dif- ferent intentions of nature in framing each species. And if the infidelity of Galen, even when these natural sciences were still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances ; to what pitch of pertinacious obsti- nacy must a philosopher in this age have attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence ? Could I meet with a man of this kind, I would ask him, Suppo- sing there were a God who did not discover himself immediately to the senses; were it possible for him to give stronger proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature ? What, indeed, could such a divine being do, except copy the present economy of things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could mistake them afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which demonstrate thi prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions ; and con ceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures ? Now, acccording to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for undisputed, when it is su p- ported by all the arguments which its nature admits of; even though these arguments be not very forcible or numerous : how much more in the present case, where no human imagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their co- gency? The comparison of the universe to a machine is so ob- vious and natural, and is justified by so many instances of order and design in nature, that it must immediately strike all unpreju- diced apprehensions, and pro- cure universal approbation. That the works of nature bear a great analogy to the produc- tions of art, is evident ; and, according to all the rules of good reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concern- ing them, that their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional differ- ence in the causes ; and in par- ticular ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the Supreme Cause than any we have ever observed in mankind. Here, then, the existence of a Deity is plainly as- certained by reason : and if we make it a question, Whether, on account of these analogies, we can properly call him a Mind or Intelligence, notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed between him and human minds ; what is this but a mere verbal contro- L DEI DEI versy ? No man can deny the analogies between the effects : to restrain ourselves from inqui- ring concerning- the causes is scarcely possible. From this in- quiry the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an analogy : and if we are not con- tented with calling the first and supreme cause a God or Deity but desire to vary the expression what can we call him but Mine or Thought, to which he is just- ly supposed to bear a consider- able resemblance ? So that this controversy is a dispute of words. Hume. DEITY, TO DISCOVER A. To dis- cover a Deity, mankind must open the sacred volume of God's works ; consider the obvious fit- ness of every cause to produce its effect ; the proof which this affords of intention and design ; the harmony and order which prevails wherever we have clear and perfect views ; and the in- variable certainty with which virtue and happiness arise to in- dividuals, and nations, from the laws of this order. Let them go one step, and one step only, into the region of analogy and imagination ; let them suppose these great qualities these in- tentions, this design, this good- ness, not to be scattered through the universe, but to belong to one being who actuates it; and they will know all that can possibly be known of God. Beware of trust- ingyour imagination one moment longer. She has soared her ut- most height: and every effort she makes will be towards the earth, and will generate error and absurdity. You are to glance only by the utmost exertion of your abilities at that Being who is incomprehensible ; and you are to be satisfied with few and ge- neral ideas on so great a subject. When a man has obtained gene- ral proofs, that the universe is replete with the effects of wis- dom, directed to the happiness of its inhabitants, he has all the knowledge he can ever have of God. AH his further enquiries, when judiciously made, will only furnish additional evidence to the same general truth. But whe- ther he be Nature itself, or a principle distinct from and ani- mating it ; whether he consist of matter or spirit; whether he be infinite space or a mathemati- cal point ; whether he be unde- finable and have no form, or have any determinate figure ; and re- side in a particular place. These are ridiculous and mischievous questions; because, we have no possibility of being inform- ed on the subjects of them ; be- cause they mislead us from truth, the principle of virtue, to visions and errors, the principles of vice ; they create differences, generate divisions, and destroy the general harmony and bene- volence, which were designed to reign through the whole uni- verse. All nature is an altar to the unknown God. Williams. DEITY, BELIEF OF A. The belief of an invisible, intelligent Pow- er, has been very generally dif- fused over the human race, in all places and in all ages ; but it has neither,, perhaps, been so universal as to admit of no ex- ceptions, nor has it been in any degree uniform in the ideas which it has suggested. Some nations have been discovered, DEL DEL who entertain no sentiments of religion, if travellers and histo- rians may be credited ; and no two nations, and scarce any two men, have ever agreed precisely in the same sentiments. It would appear, then, that this pre-con- ception springs not from an ori- nal instinct, or primary impres- sion of Nature ; since every in- stinct of that kind must be abso- lutely universal in all nations and ages, and must have always a precise determinate object which it inflexibly pursues. The first religious principles, therefore, are secondary ; such as may easily be perverted by various accidents and causes, and whose opera- tion, too, in some cases, may, by an extraordinary concurrence of circumstances, be altogether pre- vented. Hume. DEITY, THE WORSHIP OF THE. To know God, says Seneca, is to worship him. All other worship is, indeed, absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of man- kind, who are delighted with in- treaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the condi- tion of mankind ; and represents him as a capricious daemon, who exercises his power without rea- son and without humanity ! And were the Divine Being dispo- sed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly mortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the vota- ries of most popular supersti- tions. Nor would any of the human race merit his favour, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain suitable notions of his divine perfections : as the only persons entitled to his compassion and indulgence would be the philosophical Scep- tics, a sect almost equally rare ; who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or endeavour to suspend, all judg- ment with regard to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects. Hume. DELICACY, OF TASTE AND OF PAS- SION. Some people are subject to a certain delicacy of passion, and others enjoy a delicacy of taste. The first quality makes them extremely sensible to all the accidents of life, and gives them a lively joy upon every prosperous event, as well as a piercing grief when they meet with misfortunes and adversity. Favours and good offices easily engage their friendship ; while the smallest injury provokes their resentment. Any honour or mark of distinction elevates them above measure; but they are sensibly touched with contempt. Delicacy of taste much resem- bles this delicacy of passion, and produces the same sensibility to beauty and deformity of every kind, as that does to prosperity and adversity, obligations and injuries. When you present a poem or a picture to a man pos- sessed of this talent, the delicacy of his feeling makes him be touch- ed very sensibly with every part of it ; nor are the masterly strokes perceived with more exquisite relish and satisfaction, than the negligences or absurdities with disgust and uneasiness. A po- lite and judicious conversation affords him the highest enter- DEL DEL tainment; rudeness or imperti- nence is a great punishment to him. Deli cacy of passion gives us more lively enjoyments, as well as more pungent sorrows, than are felt by men of cool and se- date tempers ; but when every thing is balanced, there is no one who would not, perhaps, ra- ther be of the latter character, were he entirely master of his own disposition. Good or ill for- tune is very little at our disposal ; and when a person, that has this sensibility of temper, meets with any misfortune, his sorrow or resentment takes entire posses- sion of him, and deprives him of all relish in the common occur- rences of life ; the right enjoy- ment of which forms the chief part of our happiness. Not to mention, that men of such lively passions are apt to be transport- ed beyond all bounds of prudence and discretion, and to take false steps in the conduct of life, which are often irretrievable. Delicacy of taste has also the same effect as delicacy of passion: it enlarges the sphere, both of our happi- ness and misery, and makes us sensible to pains as well as plea- sures, which escape the rest of mankind. A delicacy of taste is favourable to love and friendship, by confining our choice to few people, and making us indifferent to the company and conversa- tion of the greatest part of man- kind. Mere men of the world, whatever strong sense they may be endowed with, are seldom very nice in distinguishing cha- racters; or marking those insen- sible differences and gradations which make one man preferable to another. Any one that has competent sense is sufficient for their entertainment. But one that has well digested his knowledge, both of books and men, has little enjoyment but in the company of a few select companions. He feels too sensibly, how much all the rest of mankind fall short of the notions which he has en- tertained. How far delicacy of taste and that of passion are connected to- gether, in the original frame of the mind, it is hard to determine. However, there appears *a very considerable connection between them ; but, notwithstanding this connection, delicacy of taste is as much to be desired and culti- vated, as delicacy of passion is to be lamented, and to be reme- died, if possible. The good or ill accidents of life are very little at our disposal ; but we are pretty much masters what books we shall read, what diversions we shall partake of, and what com- pany we shall keep. Hume. DELIRIUMS. Deliriums sometimes attend diseases, especially acute ones. In these, a disagreeable state is introduced into the ner- vous system by the bodily disor- der, which checks the rise of pleasant associations, and gives force and quickness to disgustful ones; and which, consequently, would, of itself alone, if sufficient in degree, vitiate and distort all the reasonings of the sick person. But, besides this, it seems that in deliriums attending distempers, a vivid train of visible images forces itself upon the patient's eye ; and that either from a dis- order of the nerves, and blood vessels of the eye itself, or from one in the brain, or one in the DEL DEL alimentary duct; or, which is most probable, from a concur- rence of all these. It seems also, that the wild discourse of deli- rious persons is accommodated to this train in some imperfect man- ner ; and that it becomes so wild, partly from the incoherence of the parts of this train, partly from its not expressing- even this incohe- rent train adequately, but de- viating 1 into such phrases as the vibrations excited by the distem- per in parts of the brain, corres- ponding- to the auditory nerves, or in parts still more internal, and consequently the seats of ideas purely intellectual, produce by their associated influence over the organs of speech. That delirious persons have such trains forced upon the eye from internal causes, appears pro- bable from hence ; that when they first beg-in to be delirious and talk wildly, it is g-enerally at those times only when they are in the dark, so as to have all visible objects excluded : for, upon bring-ing- a candle to them, and presenting- common objects, they recover themselves, and talk ra- tionally till the candle be re- moved ag-ain. From hence we may conclude, that the real ob- jects overpower the visible train, from internal causes, while the delirium is in its infancy ; and that the patient relapses as soon as he is shut up in the dark, because the visible train from internal causes overpowers that which would rise up, were the person's nervous system in a natural state according- to the usual course o association and the recurrent re- collection of the place and cir- cumstances in which he is situa- ted. By degrees the visible train, from internal causes, grows so vivid, by the increase of the dis- temper, as even to overpower the impressions from real objects ; at least frequently and in a great degree, and so as to intermix it- self with them, and to make an inconsistency in the words and actions : and thus the patient be- comes quite delirious. Persons inclining to be deliri- ous in distempers, are most apt to be so going to sleep, and in waking from sleep ; in which circumstances the visible trains are more vivid than when we are quite awake. It casts also some light on this subject, that tea and coffee will sometimes occasion such trains ; and that they arise in our first attempts to sleep after those li- quors. As death approaches, the de- liriums attending diseases abound with far more incoherencies and inconsistencies than any other species of alienations of the mind, the natural result of the entire disorder of the nervous system. However, there are some cases of death, where the nervous sys- tem continues free from disorder to the last, as far as by-standers can judge. Hartley. DELUGE. When people under- take to defend any system of the- ology, there is nothing, however absurd or improbable, that they will not attempt to vindicate. Nay, let the thing be absolutely impossible, according to the laws of nature, " A miracle 1" they exclaim, and the thing is resolved at once; as if the all-wise au- thor of nature had no way of carrying on his work but by DEL every now and then thwarting and interrupting the laws which he himself, in the plenitude of bis wisdom, had established. When a man has made a piece of machinery which he finds does not answer his intention, he alters and tries to make it more perfect : but, to suppose that the omniscient Creator should not have foreseen and provided for all possible contingencies that might happen to his work, is to judge of the Almighty from our- selves, and to ascribe to him the weaknesses of the frail beings whom he has deigned to create. The deluge is one of those circumstances mentioned in the Jewish books, which it is impos- sible could have happened with- out a total subversion of the laws of nature. The writer or compiler of these books, which were so long concealed from all the world by the miserable horde of barbarians, among whom they were compiled, shows, in al- most every instance, his utter ignorance of the laws by which the universe is governed. In his account of the Creation of the " Heaven and the earth," as he calls it (Genesis vi. 1.) he makes day and night to exist during the three first days, although the sun is not created till the fourth day. The sun, which is 10,000 times larger than this globe, is made solely for the use of it, without any reference to the eight or ten additional planets of which it is the common centre. He makes what he calls a fir- mament, and divides the waters which were under it from those which were above it. He then makes the waters under the fir- mament be gathered into one place; as if, from the natural laws of fluids, the waters would not have sought their own level ! After this, he makes the sun and moon " to rule the day and night," and then the stars " to give light upon the earth ! He then says that the Creator made man after his own image, and gave him dominion over all the earth ; but sometime afterwards, " when men began to multiply on the face of the earth, and bad daughters born unto them, the sons of God (who were they ?) saw that the daughters of men were fair ; and they took them wives of all which they chose ; and there were giants in the earth in those days, and after that, when the sons of God came in unto the daughters of men, they bare children to them, and the same became mighty men, men of renown ;" (Genesis, c. vi. v. 1, 2, and 4.) Well, after this story about the sons of God marrying the daugh- ters of men ; the giants, and the men of renown ; the wicked- ness of man becomes so great, that the writer tells us, " the Lord repented that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart : and he said, 1 will destroy man whom I have created, from the face of the earth ; both man and beast, and the creeping thing, and the fowls of the air ; for it repenteth me that I have made them." (v. 6 and?.) He therefore resolves to destroy them all by drowning them ; though it must appear difficult to reconcile to our ideas of justice, the drowning of the poor beasts and birds, which had DEL DEL certainly not sinned, while the fishes, which were in the same predicament, were not only not destroyed, but were allowed to gambol all over the world ! Fortunately, he relents, and consents to spare a breed of these same wicked men, and of all the inferior animals, by means of a large floating 1 hulk which one Noah is desired to build, and into which they all creep in the greatest order, and with all the quietness imaginable. Well, then, after they are all in, and the door shut, " the fountains of the great deep are broken up, and the windows of the heaven (or firmament) are opened" and down again comes all the water that had been placed above the firmament ; so that the waters at length " prevail" 15 cubits, or about 26 feet above the tops of the highest hill, and, consequently, drown every animal that lived upon the earth, excepting only those that were snug in the ark with Noah. To the barbarous and igno- rant horde of the Jews, this wild story might appear possible enough ; for they knew nothing of the real shape of the earth, but fancied it was long, nar- row, and flat like a table : they thought the firmament was made of brass, and that on the top o it rested an immense quantity o water ; so that when the " win- dows" of it were opened, the water of course came gushing down, till the windows were " stopped " again. Had the wri- ter of this romance known that the earth revolved on its own axis once in 24 hours ; that there are hills upon it upwards of 25,000 feet high : he would have paused before he had written such nonsense. Where was all the water to come from to cover the whole of the earth at one and the same time, to the depth of upwards of five and twenty thousand feet? How was it disposed of, where did it return to, after it had served 1 to drown all the inhabitants of the earth? Where was the lower level found to drain it off to ? Then, as to the Ark, which was 300 cubits long, 50 broad, and 30 high ; or, in our measure, about 525 feet long, 87 broad, and 52| high, or about 3004 tons register, could it possibly con- tain seven pair of all the clean beasts, and one pair of all the unclean ones, with seven pair of each kind of birds, besides all the reptiles and insects, together with their provisions for twelve months ? On what were the car- nivorous animals fed all this time, and for a long time after they were put ashore seeing that there was nothing upon the earth to feed them with ? How did Noah get the Ark built? Did he and his three sons build it ; and if so, how long would they be about it? Did none of their neighbours ask them what they were going to do with such a sheer-hulk, and if they learned their intention, would not others have built ships for themselves also ? These questions must be left to be answered by the first learned bishop who thinks it worth his while. One thing more, and we have done. Had God really been the capricious being here represent- ed, as " having repented him of DEL DBS having 1 made man, &c." could he not have destroyed his crea- tion without the clumsy expe- dient of a deluge ? Would not a single word from him have suf- ficed for that purpose ? But we may rest assured that God is not a fickle and capricious being ; that he did not " repent" him of what he had done ; and that he never did alter or suspend his wisely ordained and immutable laws, in order to drown men be- cause they were exactly what he himself had made them. Bow- bridge. DELUGE. That ever the whole globe was at one time totally overflowed with water, is physi- cally impossible. The sea may have covered all parts succes- sively one after the other ; and this could be only in a gradation so very slow, as to take up a prodigious number of ages. The sea, in the space of five hundred years, has withdrawn from Aiguesmortes, from Frejus, and from Ravenna, once large ports, leaving about two leagues of land quiteldry. This progression shows, that to make the circuit of the globe, it would require two millions two hundred thou- sands years. A very remarkable circumstance is, that this period comes very near to that which the earth's axis would take up in raising itself again, and coin- ciding with the equator. A mo- tion so far from improbable, that for these fifty years past some apprehension has been entertain- ed of it; but it cannot be accom- plished under two millions three hundred thousand years. The strata or beds of shells every where found, sixty, eighty, and even a hundred leagues from the sea, prove, beyond all dispute, that it has insensibly deposited those maritime products on ground which was once its shores: but that the water at one and the same time covered the whole earth, is a physical absurdity, which the laws of gravitation, as well as those of fluids, and the deficiency of the quantity of water, demonstrates to be impossible. The universal deluge was a miracle. Voltaire. DESTINY. The world subsists ei- ther by its own nature, by its physical laws, or a Supreme Being has formed it by his pri- mitive laws. In either case these laws are immutable ; in either case every thing is necessary. Heavy bodies gravitate towards the centre of the earth, and can- not tend to remain in the air ; pear-trees can never bear pine- apples ; the instinct of a spaniel can never be the instinct of an ostrich ; every thing is arranged, set in motion, and limited. Man can have but a certain number of teeth, hair, and ideas ; and a time comes when he necessarily loses them. It is a contradiction that what was yesterday has not been, and what is to-day should not be : No less a contradiction is it, that a thing which is to be should not come to pass. If thou couldst give a turn to the destiny of a fly, I see no reason why thou mightest not as well deter- mine the destiny of all other flies, of all other animals, of all men, and of all nature ; so that at last thou wouldst be more powerful than God himself. It is common for weak people to say, Such a physician has cured DES DIS a person of a dangerous illness ; he has added to his life ten years. Others as weak, but in their own opinion very wise, say, The pru- dent man owes his fortune to him- self. But the prudent man often- times is crushed by his destiny, in- stead of making- it : it is their des- tiny that renders men prudent. The physician has saved a person ; allowed : But herein he certainly did not reverse the order of na- ture ; he conformed to it. It is evident that the person could not hinder his being- born in such a town, and having- a cer- tain illness at such a time : that the physician could be no where but in the town where he was ; that the person was to send for him ; and that he was to pre- scribe those medicines which ef- fected the cure> A peasant imagines that the hail which is fallen in his ground is purely matter of chance ; but the phi- losopher knows that there is no such thing as chance ; and that by the constitution of the world, it must necessarily have hailed that day in that very place. Some, alarmed at this truth, say, there are necessary events, and others which are not so : but it would be odd indeed that one part of this world were fixed and not the other ; that some things which happen were to happen, and that others which happen were not necessarily to happen. On a close examina- tion, the doctrine which op- poses that of destiny must ap- pear loaded with absurdities and contrary to the idea of an eternal Providence. But many are destined to reason wrongly others not to reason at all ; anc others to persecute those who do reason. Voltaire. DISCRETION. The quality the most necessary for the execution of any useful enterprize is dis- cretion ; by which we carry on a a safe intercourse with others ; give due attention to their own and to their character ; weigh each circumstance of the busi- ness which we undertake ; and employ the surest and safest means for the attainment of any end or purpose. To a Crom- well, perhaps, or a De Retz, discretion may appear an alder- man-like virtue, as Dr. Swift calls it ; and being incompati- ble with those vast designs to which their courage and ambition prompted them, it might really in them be a taultor imperfection. But in the cond uct of ordinary life, no virtue is more requisite, not only to obtain success, but to avoid the most fatal miscar- riages and disappointments. The greatest parts without it, as observed by an elegant writer, may be fatal to their owner : as Polyphemus, deprived of his eye, was only the more exposed, on account of his enormous strength and stature. The best character, indeed, were it not rather too perfect for human nature, is that which is notswayedby temper of any kind, but alternately employs enter- prise and caution, as each is useful to the particular purpose intend- ed. Such is the excellence wh ih St. Evremond ascribes to Ma- reschal Turenne, who displayed, in every campaign as he grew older, more temerity in his mili- tary enterprises ; and being now, from long experience, perfectly DIV DLV acquainted with every incident in war, he advanced with great- er firmness and security in a road so well known to him. Fabius, says Machiavel, was cautious ; Scipio enterprising 1 : and both succeeded ; because the situation of Roman affairs, during- the command of each, was peculiar- ly adapted to his g-enius ; but both would have failed had these situations been reversed. He is happy whose circumstances suit his temper ; but he is more ex- cellent who can suit his temper to any circumstances. Hume. DIVISIBILITY OF MATTER. In mat- ter we have no clear ideas of the smallness of parts, much beyond the smallest that occurs to any of our senses: and, therefore, when we talk of the divisibility of matter in infinitum, though we have clear ideas of division and divisibility, and have also clear ideas of parts made out of a w hole by division ; yet we have but very obscure and confused ideas of corpuscles, or minute bodies so to be divided, when by former divisions they are reduced to a smallness, much exceeding the perception of any of our sen- ses: and so all that we have clear and distinct ideas of, is, of what division in general or ab- stractedly is, and the relation of totum and pars : But of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain progressions, I think we have no clear nor dis- tinct idea at all. For I ask any one, whether taking the small- est atom of dust he ever saw, he has any distinct idea (bating still the number which concerns ex- tension) betwixt the 100,000th, and the 1,000,000th part of it? Or, if he thinks he can refine his ideas to that degree, without los- ing sight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of these num- bers. Such a degree of smallness is not unreasonable to be suppo- sed ; since a division carried on so far brings it no nearer the end of infinite division, than the first di- vision in two halves does. I must confess, that I have no clear dis- tinct ideas of the different bulk or extension of those bodies ; having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that I think, when we talk of division of bo- dies in infinitum, our ideas of their distinct bulks, which is the subject and foundation of divi- sion, comes, after a little pro- gression, to be confounded and almost lost in obscurity. For that idea which is to represent only bigness, must be very ob- scure and confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big but only by number: so that we have clear distinct ideas, we may say, of ten and one, but no distinct ideas of two such extensions. It is plain, from hence, that when we talk of in- finite divisibility of body or ex- tension, our distinct and clear ideas are only of numbers. Locke. DIVORCE AND REPUDIATION. There is this difference between a divorce and a repudiation, that the former is made by mutual consent arising from a mutual an- tipathy ; while the latter is formed by the will and for the advantage of one of the two parties, inde- pendently of the will and advan- tage of the other. The necessity there is some- times for women to repudiate, D1V DOT and the difficulty there always is in doing 1 it, render that law very tyrannical which gives this right to men, without granting- it to women. A husband is the mas- ter of the house ; he has a thou- sand ways of confining- his wife to her duty, or of bringing 1 her back to it: so that, in his hands, it seems as if repudiation could be only a fresh abuse of power. But a wife who repudiates, only makes use of a dreadful kind of remedy. It is always a great misfortune for her to go in search of a second husband, when she has lost the most part of her attractions with another. One of the advantages attending the charms of youth in the female sex is, that in advanced age the husband is led to complacency and love, by the remembrance of past pleasures. It is, then, a general rule, that in all countries where the laws have given to men the power of repudiating, they ought also to grant it to women. Nay, in cli- mates where women live in do- mestic slavery, one would think that the law ought to favour wo- men with the right of repudia- tion, and husbands only with that of divorce. When wives are confined in a seraglio, the husband ought not to repudiate on account of oppo- sition of manners ; it is the hus- band's fault if their manners are incompatible. Repudiation, on account of the barrenness of the women, ought never to take place but where there are many : this is of no im- portance to the husband. The law of the Maldivians per- mitted them to take a wife whom they had repudiated. A law of Mexico forbad their being re- united, under pain of death. The law of Mexico was more rational than that of the Maldivians : at the time even of the dissolution, it tended to the perpetuity of marriage. Instead of this, the law of the Maldivians seemed equally to sport with marriage and repudiation. The law of Mexico admitted only of divorce. This was a particular reason for their not permitting 1 those who were voluntarily sepa- rated be ever re-united. Repudi- ation seems chiefly to proceed from a hastiness of temper, and from the dictates of passion; while divorce appears to be an affair of deliberation, Divorces are frequently of great political use: but as to the civil utility, they are established only for the advantage of the husband and wife ; and are not always favourable to their children. Montesquieu. DOTAGE. The dotage of old per- sons is oftentimes something more than a mere decay of memory : for they mistake things present for others ; and their discourse is often foreign to the objects that are presented to them. How- ever, the imperfection of their memories, in respect of impres- sions just made, or at short inter- vals of past time, is one principal source of their mistakes. One may suppose here, that the part of the brain which receives ideas is decayed in a peculiar manner, perhaps from too great use ; while the parts appropriated to the natural, vital, and animal motions, remainded tolerably per- fect. The sinuses of the braia DRE DRE are probably considerably dis- tended in these cases, and the brain itself in a languishing- state ; for there seems to be a consider- able resemblance between the inconsistencies of some kinds of dotage and those of dreams. Be- sides which, it may be observed, that in dotage the person is often sluggish and letharg-ic ; and that, as a defect of the nutritive facul- ty in the brain, will permit the sinuses to be more easily dis- tended, so a distension of the si nuses from this or any other cause may impede the due nutri- tion of the brain. We see that in old persons all the parts, even the bones themselves, waste and grow less. Why may not this happen to the brain, the origin of all, and arise from an obstruction of the infinitely small vessels of the nervous system; this obstruction causing such a degree of capacity, as greatly to abate, or even destroy, the pow- ers of association and memory ? When old persons relate the in- cidents of their youth with great precision, it is rather owing to the memory of many preceding memories, recollections, and re- lations, than to the memory of the thing itself. Hartley. DREAMS. We have many striking instances of dreaming in men and animals. The poet versifies, the mathematician views figures, the metaphysician reasons, and the dog hunts in his dreams. Is this the action of the body's organs, or is it merely the soul, which, now freed from the power of the senses, acts in the full enjovment of its properties ? If the organs alone produce our dreams by /light, why not our ideas by day ? If it be merely the soul acting of itself, and quiet by the suspension of the senses, which is the only cause and subject of all our sleeping ideas ; whence is it that they are almost ever irrational, irregular, and inco- herent? Can it be that, in the time of the soul's most abstract quietude, its imagination would be the most confused ? Is it fan- tastical when free ? Were it born with metaphysical ideas, as some writers, who were troubled with waking dreams, have affirmed, its pure and luminous ideas of being, of infinitude, and of all the primary principles, naturally should awake in her with the greatest energy when the body is sleeping, and men should phi- losophise Tbest in their dreams. Whatever system you espouse, however you may labour to prove that memory stirs the brain, and your brain your soul; you must allow that, in all your ideas in sleep, you are entirely passive ; your will has no share in those images. Thus it is clear, that you can think seven or eight hours on a stretch, without hav- ing the least inclination to think, and even without being certain that you do think. Consider this, and tell me what is man's com- pound ? Superstition has always dealt much in dreams ; nothing, indeed, was more natural. A man deeply concerned about his mis- tress who lies ill, dreams that he sees her dying; and the next day she actually dies: then, to be sure, God had given him pre- vious knowledge of his beloved's death. A commander of an army dreams much of gaining a battle ; g-ains it : then the Gods had inti- DRE DUR mated to him, that he should be conqueror. It is only such dreams as meet with some ac- complishment that are taken no- tice of; the others we think not worth remembrance. Dreams make full as great a part of an- cient history as oracles. Somnia qu(e ludunt animos volitantibus limb r is, Non delubra dcum, nee ab eethere numina mittunt, Sed sua quisque facit. Voltaire. DRESS, FEMALE. It is well known, that a loose and easy dress con- tributes much to give both sexes those fine proportions of body, that are observable in the Gre- cian statues, and which serve as models to our present artists ; nature being- too much disfigured among- us to afford them any such. The Greeks knew nothing- of those Gothic shackles, that mul- tiplicity of ligatures and ban- dages, with which our bodies are compressed. Their women were ignorant of the use of whalebone stays, by which ours distort their shape, instead of dis- playing it. This practice, carried to so great an excess as it is in England, must, in time, dege- nerate the species, and is an in- stance of bad taste. Can it be a pleasing sight to behold a wo- man cut in two in the middle, as it were, like a wasp ? On the contrary, it is as shocking to the eye as it is painful to the imagi- nation. A fine shape, like the limbs, hath its due size and pro- portion ; a diminution of which is certainly a defect. Such a de- formity, also, would be shocking in a naked figure ; wherefore, then, should it be esteemed a beauty in one that is dressed ? Every thing that confine and lays nature under a restraint is an instance of bad taste : this is as true in regard to the orna- ments of the body as to the em- bellishments of the mind. Life, health, reason, and convenience, ought to be taken first into con- sideration. Gracefulness cannot subsist without ease ; delicacy is not debility ; nor must a woman be sick in order to please. In- firmity and sickness may excite our pity : but desire and pleasure require the bloom and vigour of health. Rousseau. DURATION. It is evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another, in his understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas, one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession : and the dis- tance between any part? of that succession, or between the ap pearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call duration. For whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our mind, we know that we do exist, and so we call the existence, or the con- tinuation of the existence of our- selves, or any thing else, com- mensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds, the du- ration of ourselves, or any other thing co-existing with our think- ing. That we have our notion of succession and duration from this original, viz. from reflection on the train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another DUR ECC in our own minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no percep- tion of duration, but by consi- dering 1 the train of ideas that take their turns in our under- standing 1 . When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception ol duration ceases with it, which every one clearly experiences in himself whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an hour, or a day, or a month, or a year; of which duration of thing-s, whilst he sleeps, or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him ; and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, until fhe moment he begins to think ag-ain, seems to him to have no distance. And so I doubt not but it will be to a waking man, if it were possible for him to keep only one idea in his mind, with- out variation, and the succession of others. And we see, that one who fixes his thoughts very in- tently on one thing-, so as to take but little notice of the succession of ideas that pass in his mind, whilst he is taken up with that earnest contemplation, lets slip out of his account a good part of that duration, and thinks that time shorter than it is. But if sleep commonly unites the dis- tant parts of duration, it is be- cause during that time we have no succession of ideas in our minds. For if a man, during his sleep, dreams, and a variety of ideas make themselves percepti- ble in his mind one after another, he hath, then, during such a dreaming, a sense of duration, and of the length of it, by which it is to me very clear, that men derhe their ideas of duration from their reflection on the train of the ideas they observe to suc- ceed one another, in their own understandings ; without which observation they can have no notion of duration, whatever may happen in the world. Locke. ECCLESIASTICAL POWER AND ITS INFLUENCE. In all Christian churches the benefices of the clergy are a sort of freeholds, which they enjoy, not during pleasure, but during life or good behaviour. If they held them by a more precarious tenure, and were liable to be turned out upon every slight disobliga- tion, either of the sovereign or of his ministers, it would, per- haps, be impossible for them to maintain their authority with the people ; who would then consider them as mercenary de- pendents upon the court, in the sincerity of whose instructions they could no longer have any confidence. But should the so- vereign attempt, irregularly, and by violence, to deprive any num- ber of clergymen of their free- holds, on account perhaps of their having propagated, with more than ordinary zeal, some factious or seditious doctrine ; he would only render, by such persecution, both them and their doctrine ten times more popular, and there- fore ten times more troublesome and dangerous than they had been before. Fear is, in almost all cases, a wretched instrument of government, and ought in particular never to be employed against any order of men, who have the smallest pretensions to independency. To attempt to terrify them, serves only to irri- tate their bad humour, and to ECC confirm them in an opposition, which more gentle usage per- haps might easily induce them either to soften or to lay aside altogether. The violence which the French government usually employed, in order to oblige all their parliaments, or sovereign courts of justice, to enregister any unpopular edict, very seldom succeeded. The means com- monly employed, however, the imprisonment of all the refrac- tory members, one would think, were forcible enough. The prin- ces of the. house of Stuart, some- timesemployed the like means, in order to influence some of the members of the Parliament of England; and they generally found them equally intractable. The Parliament of England is now managed in another man- ner; and a very small experiment, which the Duke of Choiseul made about twelve years ago upon the Parliament of Paris, demonstrated sufficiently, that all the Parliaments of France might have been managed still more easily in the same manner. That experiment was not pursued. For though management and persuasion are always the easiest and the safest instruments of go- vernment, as force and violence are the worst and the most dan- gerous ; yet such, it seems, is the natural insolence of man, that he almost always disdains to use the good instrument, ex- cept when he cannot or dare not use the bad one. The French government could and durst use force, and therefore disdained to use management and persuasion But there is no order of men, it appears, I believe, from the ex- ECC perience of alleges, upon whom it is so dangerous, or rather so perfectly ruinous, to employ force and violence, as upon the re- spected clergy of any establish - ed church. The rights, the pri- vileges, the personal liberty of every individual ecclesiastic, who is upon good terms with his own order, are, even in the most des- potic governments, more respect - ed than those of any other pei - son of nearly equal rank and foi - tune. It is so in every gradation of despotism, from that of the gentle and mild government of Paris, to that of the violent and furious government of Constan- tinople. But though this order of men can scarce be ever forced, they may be managed as easily as any other: and the security of the Sovereign, as well as the public tranquillity, seems to de- pend very much upon the means which he has of managing them ; and those means seem to consist altogether in the preferment which he has lo bestow upon them. In the ancient constitution of the Christian church, the bishop of each diocese was elected by the joint votes of the clergy, and of the people of the Episcopal city. The people did not Ion* retain their right of election : and while they did retain it, they almost always acted under tl'e influence of the clergy, who in such spiritual matters appeared to be their natural guides. The clergy, however, soon grew weary of the trouble of manag- ing them, and found it easier to elect their own bishops them- selves. The abbot, in the same manner, was elected by the ECC ECC monks of the monastery, at least in the greater part of abbacies. All the inferior ecclesiastical be- nefices comprehended within the diocese were collated by the bi- shop, who bestowed them upon such ecclesiastics as he thought proper. All church preferments were in this manner in the dis- posal of the church. The sove- reign, though he might have some indirect influence in those elections, and though it was sometimes usual to ask both his consent to elect, and his appro- bation of the election, yet had no direct or sufficient means of managing the clergy. The am- bition of every clergyman natu- rally led him to pay court, not so much to his sovereign, as to his own order, from which only he could expect preferment. Through the greater part of Europe the Pope gradually drew to himself, first, the collation of almost all bishoprics and abba- cies, or of what were called Con- sistorial benefices ; and after- wards, by various machinations and pretences, of the greater part of inferior beneflces, com- prehended within each diocese ; little more being left to the bi- shop than what was barely ne- cessary to give him a decent au- thority with his own clergy. By this arrangement, the condition of the sovereign was still worse than it had been before. The clergy of all the different coun- tries of Europe were thus formed into a sort of spiritual army; dispersed in different quarters, indeed, but of which all the movements and operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon one uniform plan. The clergy of each par- ticular country might be consi- dered as a particular detachment of that army, of which the ope- rations could easily be supported and seconded by all the other detachments, quartered in the different countries round about. Each detachment was not only independent of the sovereign of the country in which it was quartered, and by which it was maintained, but dependent upon a foreign sovereign, who could at any time turn its arms against the sovereign of that particular country, and support them by the arms of all the other detach- ments. Those arms were the most for- midable that can well be ima- gined. In the ancient state of Europe, before the establish- ment of arts and manufactures, the wealth of the clergy gave them the same sort of influence over the common people, which that of the great barons gave them over their respective vas- sals, tenants, and retainers. In the great landed estates, which the mistaken piety, both of prin- ces and private persons, had be- stowed upon the church, juris- dictions were established of the same kind with those of the great barons ; and for the same reason. In those great landed estates, the clergy, or their bai- liffs, could easily keep the peace, without the supporter assistance either of the king or of any other person ; and neither the king nor any other person could keep the peace there, without the support and assistance of the clergy. The jurisdictions of the clergy, therefore, in their parti- ECC cular baronies or manors, were equally independent, and equally exclusive of the authority of the King's courts, as those of the great temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like those of the great barons, almost all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon their immediate lords ; and there- fore, liable to be called out at pleasure, in order to fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might think proper to engage them. Over and above the rents of those estates, the clergy pos- sessed, in the tythes, a very large portion of the rents of all the other estates in every kingdom of Europe. The revenues aris- ing from both those species of rents were, the greater part of them, paid in kind, in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, &c. The quan- tity exceeded greatly what the clergy could themselves con- sume; and there were neither arts nor manufactures, for the produce of which they could ex- change the surplus. The clergy could derive advantage from this immense surplus in no other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the like surplus of their revenues, in the most profuse hospitality, and in the most extensive charity. Both the hospitality and the charity of the ancient clergy, accord- ingly, are said to have been very great. They not only maintain- ed almost all the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen had frequently no other means of subsistence than by travelling about from monastery to monastery, under pretence of devotion, but in re- ality to enjoy the hospitality of the clergy. The retainers of some particular prelates were often as numerous as those of the greatest lay lords ; and the retainers of all the clergy taken together were, perhaps, more numerous than those of all the lay lords. There was always much more union among the lay lords. The former were un- der a regular discipline and sub- ordination to the papal authori- ty: The latter were under no regular discipline or subordina- tion, but almost always equally jealous of one another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy, therefore, had both together been less numerous than those of the great lay lords, and their tenants were probably much less numerous ; yet their union would have rendered them more formi- dable. The hospitality and cha- rity of the clergy, too, not only gave them the command of a great temporal force, but in- creased very much the weight of their spiritual weapons. Those virtues procured them the high- est respect and veneration among all the inferior ranks of people ; of whom many were constantly, and almost all occasionally, fed by them. Every thing belong- ing or relating to so popular an order, its possessions, its privi- leges, its doctrines, necessarily appeared sacred in the eyes of the common people ; and every violation of them, whether real or pretended, the highest act of sacrilegious wickedness and pro- faneness. In this state of things, if the Sovereign frequently found' it difficult to resist the confede- racy of a few of the great nobili- N ECC ty, we cannot wonder that he should find it still more so to re- sist the united force of the clergy of his own dominions, supported by that of the clergy of all the neighbouring dominions. In such circumstances, the wonder is, not that he was sometimes obliged to yield, but that he ever was able to resist. The privileges of the clergy in those ancient times (which to us who live in the present times appear the most absurd), their total exemption from the secular jurisdiction, for example, or what in England was called the bene- fit of clergy, were the natural or rather the necessary consequences of this state of things. How dangerous must it have been for the Sovereign to attempt to punish a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his own order were disposed to protect him, and to represent either the proof as in- sufficient for convicting so holy a man, or the punishment as too severe to be inflicted upon one whose person had been rendered sacred by religion ? The Sove- reign could, in such circum- stances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the ecclesi- astical courts, who, for the honour of their own order, were interested to restrain, as much as possible, every member of it from committing- enormous crimes or even from giving occasion to such gross scandal, as might dis- gust the minds of the people. In the state in which things were, through the greater part of Europe, during the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for some time both before and after that period, ECC the constitution of the church of Rome may be considered as the most formidable combination that ever was formed, against the au- thority and security of civil go- vernment, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind, which can flourish only where civil government is able to protect them. In that constitution, the grossest de- lusions of superstition were sup- ported in such a manner, by the private interests of so great a number of people, as put them out of all danger from any as- sault of human reason : because, though human reason might per- haps have been able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, some of the delusions of superstition ; it could never have dissolved the ties of private in- terest. Had this constitution been attacked by no other ene- mies but the feeble efforts of hu- man reason, it must have en- dured for ever. But that im- mense and well-built fabric, which all the wisdom and virtue of man could never have shaken, much less have overturned, was, by the natural course of things, first weakened, and afterwards in part destroyed ; and is now likely, in the course of a few centuries more, perhaps, to crumble into ruins altogether. The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and com- merce, the same causes which destroyed the power of the great barons, destroyed, in the same manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole tem- poral power of the clergy. In the produce of arts, manufac- tures, and commerce, the clergy, ECC like the great barons, found something* for which they could exchange their rude produce : and thereby discovered the means of spending their whole reve- nues upon their own persons, without giving any considerable share of them to other people. Their charity became gradually less extensive, their hospitality less liberal or less profuse. Their retainers became consequently less numerous, and by degrees dwindled away altogether. The clergy, too, like the great ba- rons, wished to get a better rent from their landlord estates, in order to spend it, in the same manner, upon the gratification of their own private vanity and folly. But this increase of rent could be got only by granting leases to their tenants ; who, thereby, became in a great mea- sure independent of them. The ties of interest, which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this man- ner gradually broken and dis- solved. They were even bro- ken and dissolved sooner than those which bound the same ranks of people to the great barons : because the benefices of the church being, the greater part of them, much smaller than the estates of the great barons, the possessor of each benefice was much sooner able to spend the whole of its revenue upon his own person. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the tempora' power of the clergy, the abso- lute command which they hac once had over the great body of the people, was very much de- cayed. The power of the church was by that time very nearly reduced through the greater part of Europe to what arose from her spiritual authority; and even thatspiritual authority was much weakened, when it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy. The inferior ranks of people no long- er looked upon that order, as they had done before, as the comforters of their distress, and the relievers of their indigence. On the contrary, they were pro- voked and disgusted by the vani- ty, luxury, and expence of the richer clergy, who appeared to spend upon their own pleasures what had always before been regarded as the patrimony of the poor. In this situation of things, the sovereigns in the different states of Europe endeavoured to re- cover the influence which they had once had, in the disposal of the great bodies of the church by procuring to the deans and chapters of each diocese, the restoration of their ancient right of electing the bishop, and to the monks of each abbacy that of electing the abbot. The re- establishing of this ancient order was the object of several statutes enacted in England, during the course of the fourteenth cen- tury, particularly of what is cal- led the Statute of Provisory ; and of the Pragmatic Sanction established in France in the fif- teenth century. In order to ren- der the election valid, it was necessary that the Sovereign should both consent to it before- ECC ECC hand, and afterwards approve of the person elected ; and though the election was still supposed to be free, he had, however, all the indirect means which his % situation necessarily afforded him, of influencing- the clergy in his own dominions. Other regu- lations of a similar tendency were established in other parts of Europe. But the power of the Pope in the collation of the great benefices of the church seems, before the Reformation, to have been no where so effec- tually and so universally restrain- ed as in France and England. The Concordat afterwards, in the sixteenth century, gave to the kings of France the absolute right of presenting to all the great, or what are called the Consistorial, benefices of the Gallican church. Since the establishment of the Pragmatic sanction, and of the Concordat, the clergy of France have in general shown less re- spect to the decrees of the Pa- pal court than the clergy of any other Catholic country. In all the disputes which their Sovereign has had with the Pope, they have almost constantly taken party with the former. This in- dependency of the clergy of France upon the court of Rome, seems to be principally founded upon the Pragmatic sanction, and the Concordat. In the earlier periods of the monarchy, the clergy of France appear to have been as much devoted to the Pope as those of any other country. When Robert, the second Prince of the Capetian race, was most unjustly excommunicated by the court of Rome, his own servants, it is said, threw the victuals which came from his table, to (he dogs, and refused to taste any thing themselves which had been polluted by the contact of a per- son in his situation. They were taught to do so, it may very safely be presumed, by the clergy of his own dominions. The claim of collating to the great benefices of the church, a claim, in defence of which, the court of Rome had frequently shaken, and sometimes overturn- ed, the thrones of some of the greatest sovereigns in Christen- dom, was in this manner either restrained or modified, or given up altogether, in many different parts of Europe, even before the time of the Reformation. As the clergy had now less influence over the people, so the state had more influence over the clergy. The clergy, therefore, had both less power, and less inclination, to disturb the state. The authority of the church of Rome was in this state of de- clension at the time of the Re- formation. A. Smith. ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL POW- ERS, THE ADVANTAGE OF UNITING THEM IN EVERY GOVERNMENT. The union of the civil and ec- clesiastical powers serves ex- tremely in every civilized go- vernment to the maintenance of peace and order, and prevents those mutual encroachments which, as there can be no ulti- mate judge between them, are often attended with the most dangerous consequences. Whe- ther the supreme magistrate who unites these powers, re- ceives the appellation of Prince, or Prelate, it is not material. EDU The superior weight which tem- poral interests commonly bear, in the apprehensions of men, above spiritual, renders the civil part of his character most prevalent ; and, in time, prevents those gross impostures, and bigotted persecutions, which, in all false religions, are the chief founda- tion of clerical authority. Hume. ECONOMY. The pursuit of the ob- jects of private interest in all common, little, and ordinary cases, ought to flow rather from a regard to the general rules which prescribe such conduct, than from any passion for the objects themselves. To be anx- ious, or to be laying a plot either to gain or save a single shilling, would degrade the most vulgar tradesmen in the opinion of all his neighbours. Let his circum- stances be ever so mean, no at- tention to any such small mat- ters, for the sake of the things themselves, must appear in his conduct. His situation may re- quire the most severe economy, and the most exact assiduity ; but each particular exertion of that economy and assiduity must pro- ceed, not so much from a re- gard to that particular saving or gain, as from the general rule which to him preseribes, with the utmost rigour, such a tenor of conduct. His parsimony to- day must not arise from a desire of the particular three-pence which he will save by it ; nor his attendance in his shop from a passion for the particular ten- pence which he will acquire by it: both the one and the other ought to proceed solely from a regard to the general rule, which prescribes, with the most un- relenting severity, this plan of conduct to all persons in his way of life. In this consists the differ- ence between the character of a miser and that of a person of ex- act economy and assiduity. The one is anxious about small mat* ters for their own sake ; the other attends to them only in consequence of the scheme of life which he has laid down to him- self. A. Smith. EDUCATION. The time which we usually bestow on the instruction of our children in principles, the reasons of which they do not un- derstand, is worse than lost : it is teaching them to resign their faculties to authority ; it is im- proving their memories instead of their understandings ; it is giving them credulity instead of know- ledge ; and it is preparing them for any kind of slavery which can be imposed on them. Whereas, if we assisted them in making experiments on themselves; in- duced them to attend to the con- sequence of every action, to adjust their little deviations, arid fairly and freely to exercise their pow- ers ; they would collect facts which nothing could controvert. These facts they would deposit in their memories as in secure and eternal treasures ; they would be ma- terials for reflection, and, in time, be formed into principles of con- duct, which no circumstances or temptations could remove. This would be a method of forming a man who would answer the end of his being, and make himself and others happy. Williams. EDUCATION. If men were edu- cated to use the powers of their minds freely ; to investigate, by their own industry, all the prin- EDU EDU ciples they want ; to consider nothing- as an intellectual acqui- sition but in consequence of such investigation : this knowledge would be a sure foundation of virtue, and human life would have few crimes or miseries to infest it. Instead of this, they are educated to take almost every thing- from others, and to suffer their own powers to lie inactive. Most of the vices of the world have arisen from the habit men have so long been in of believing-, instead of inquiring. A mind that is trained to in- quiry, is trained in a kind of ac- tivity which will lead to virtue. A mind in which this activity is suppressed, has a greater dif- ficulty in becoming virtuous, and is a much easier prey to vice. It seems to acquire knowledge, and has none ; and false knowledge is worse than none. All the wis- dom we obtain, by believing as we are commanded, and com- mitting to memory principles, doctrines, and opinions, which we have never considered or do not understand, is so much poi- son in the mind, which acts the more surely and fatally as we have no apprehension of danger from it. We see men over- whelmed with what they call doctrines and principles, both of religion and morality, without being of any use to the world, and without ever performing a religious or moral action. It was not so when men were educated to inquire, to think, to form to themselves a few principles which they comprehended and felt, and to act on them. This was the case in the best ages of Greece. Edu- cation had a few simple and im- portant objects ; and they always related to private and public vir- tue. It underwent some modifi- cations, according to the circum- stances of the different pupils. It would astonish a modern tutor to know the time and pains which were taken on these few things, and to see what wonder- ful men were formed in this manner. Education was, then, the art of developing the mind to principles and employments which were suited to it, and giving it habits which would lead to any degree of real know- ledge. Education, at present, is a different thing: it is the art of loading the memory with the imperfect and useless knowledge of all languages and all sciences ; and our youth are often sent into the world without one prin- ciple of real wisdom, and almost incapable of any act of public or private virtue. Williams, EDUCATION. The most important and most useful rule of education is, not to gain time, but to lose it. If children took a leap from their mother's breast, and at once arrived at the age of rea- son, the methods of education now usually taken with them would be very proper: but ac- cording to the progress of na- ture, they require those which are very different. We should not tamper with the mind till it has acquired all its faculties : for it is impossible it should perceive the light we hold out to it while it is blind ; or that it should pur- sue, over an immense plain of ideas, that route which reason hath so slightly traced, as to be perceptible only to the sharpest sight. EDU EDU The first part of education, therefore, ought to be purely negative. It consists neither in teaching- virtue nor truth; but in guarding the heart from vice, and the mind from error. Take the road directly opposite to that which is in use, and you will almost always do right. Never argue with a child, particularly in striving to reconcile him to what he dislikes : for to use him to reason only upon disagreea- ble subjects, is the way to dis- gust him, and bring argument early into discredit, with a mind incapable of understanding it. Exercise his corporeal organs, senses, and faculties as much as you please ; but keep his intellectual ones inactive as long as possible. Be cautious of all the sentiments he acquires pre- vious to the judgment, which should enable him to scrutinize them : prevent or restrain all foreign impressions ; and in or- der to hinder the rise of evil, be not in too great hurry to instil good ; for it is only such when the mind is enlightened by rea- son. Look upon every delay as an advantage; it is gaining a great deal, to advance without losing any thing : let the infancy of children, therefore, have time to ripen. In short, whatever in- struction is necessary for them, take care not to give it them to- day, if it may be deferred with- out danger till to-morrow. Another consideration which con- firms the utility of this method, is the particular genius of the child, which ought U, be known, before it can be judged what moral regimen is adapted to it. Every mind has its peculiar turn, according to which it ought to be educated ; and it is of very material consequence to our en- deavours, that it be educated ac- cording to that turn, and not to any other. The prudent governor will watch a long time the work- ings of nature, and will lay the natural character under no un- necessary restraints. If we set about any thing before we know in what manner to act, we pro- ceed at random ; liable to mis- take, we are frequently obliged to undo what is done, and find ourselves further from the end designed, than if we had been less precipitate to begin the work. Rousseau. EDUCATION OF CHILDREN. In the education of children, excessive severity, as well as excessive indulgence, should be equally avoided. If you leave children to suffer, you expose their health, endanger their lives, and make them actually miserable. On the other hand, if you are too anxi- ous to prevent their being sensi- ble of any kind of pain and in- convenience, you only pave their way to feel much greater : you enervate their constitutions, make them tender and effeminate ; in a word, you remove them out of their situation as men, into which they must hereafter return, in spite of all your solicitude. In order not to expose them to the few evils nature would inflict on them, you provide for them many which they would otherwise ne- ver have suffered. Can you conceive any being can be truly happy in circum- stances inconsistent with its con- stitution? And is it not incon- sistent with the constitution of EDU EDU man, to endeavour to exempt him from all the evils incident to his species? Man is capacitated to experience great pleasure only by being 1 inured to slight pain : Such is the nature of man. If his physical constitution be too vigorous, his moral constitution tends to depravity. The man who should be ignorant of pain would be a stranger also to the sensations of humanity, and the tender feelings of compassion for his species : his heart would be unsusceptible of sympathy ; he would be unsocial ; he would be a monster among his fellow- creatures. Would you know the most in- fallible way to make your child miserable ? It is to accustom him to obtain every thing he desires: for those desires still in- creasing from the facility of gra- tification, your incapacity to sa- tisfy them must sooner or later reduce you to the necessity of a refusal ; and that refusal, so new and uncommon, will give him more trouble than even the want of that which he desires. From wanting your cane he will pro- ceed to your watch ; he will next want the bird that flies in the air, the star that glitters in the firmament ; in short, every thing he sees : nothing less than omnipotence would enable you to satisfy it. Nature has constituted chil- dren to claim our love and as- sistance ; but has she made them to be obeyed and feared ? A child should obtain nothing merely because he asks for It, but because he stands in need of it : A child should be made to do nothing out of obedience, but only out of necessity. Thus the words command and" obey should have no place in his dic- tionary, much less those of duly and obligation : but those of power, necessity, impotence, and restraint, ought to stand forth in capitals. It ought to be ob- served, that as pain is often a necessity, so pleasure is some- times a natural want. Children have therefore but one desire only which should not be grati- fied; and this is the desire of exacting obedience. Hence it follows, that in every thing t^ey demand, it is the motive wfffch excites them to make such de- mand which ought to engage our attention. Indulge them as much as possible in every thing which may give them real plea- sure ; but constantly refuse them what they require from motives of caprice, or merely to exercise their authority. Rousseau. EDUCATION, A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF ANCIENT AND MODERN. Dif- ferent plans and different insti- ,tutions for education seem to have taken place in different ages and nations. In the republics of ancient Greece, every free citi- zen was instructed, under the di- rection of the public magistrate, in gymnastic exercises and in music. By gymnastic exercises it was intended to harden his body, to sharpen his courage, and to prepare him for the fatigues and dangers of war; and as the Greek militia was, by all ac- counts, one of the best that ever was in the world, this part of their public education must have answered completely the pur- pose for which it was intended. *By the other part, music, it was EDU EDU proposed, at least by the philo- sophers and historians who have given us an account of those in- stitutions, to humanize the mind, to soften the temper, and to dis- pose it for performing- all the so- cial and moral duties both of public and private life. In ancient Rome, the exercises of the Campus Martius answer- ed the same purpose as those of theGymnasiuminancientGreece, and they seem to have answered it equally well. But among- the Romans there was nothing- which corresponded to the musical edu- cation of the Greeks. The mo- rals of the Romans, however, both in private and public life, seem to have been not only equal, but upon the whole a g-ood deal superior, to those of the Greeks. That they were su- perior in private life, we have the express testimony of Poly- bius and of Dionysius of Halicar- nassus, two authors well ac- quainted with both nations ; and the whole tenor of the Greek and Roman history bears witness to the superiority of the public morals of the Romans. The g-ood temper and moderation of con- tending- factions seems to be the most essential circumstance in the public morals of a free people. But the factions o the Greeks were almost al- ways violent and sang-uinary whereas, till the time of the Gracchi, no blood had ever been shed in any Roman faction ; anc from the time of the Gracch the Roman republic may be con- sidered as in reality dissolved Notwithstanding-, therefore, the very respectable authority o Plato Aristotle, and Polybius and notwithstanding- the very ingenious reasons by which Mr. Montesquieu endeavours to sup- port that authority, it seems pro- bable, that the musical education of the Greeks had no great effect in mending- their morals ; since, without any such education, those of the Romans were, upon the whole, superior. The res- pect of those ancient sages for the institutions of their ancestors, had probably disposed them to find much political wisdom in what was, perhaps, merely an ancient custom, continued with- out interruption from the earliest period of those societies, to the times in which they had arrived, at a considerable degree of re- finement. Music and dancing are the great amusements of al- most all barbarous nations, and the great accomplishments which are supposed to fit any man for entertaining his society. It is so at this day among the negroes on the coast of Africa. It was so among the ancient Celtes, among the ancient Scandina- vians, and, as we learn from Ho- mer, among the ancient Greeks, in the times preceding the Trojan war. When the Greek tribes had formed themselves into little republics, it was natural that the study of those accomplishments should, for a long time, make a part of the public and common education of the people. The masters, who instructed the young people either in music or in military exercises, do not seem to have been paid, or even appointed by the state, either in Rome, or even in Athens ; the Greek republic, of whose laws and customs we are the best EDU EDU informed. The state required that every free citizen should fit himself for defending it in war, and should, upon that account, learn his military exercises. But it left him to learn them of such masters as he could find ; and it seems to have advanced nothing for this purpose, but a public field or place of exercise, in which lie should practise and perform them. In the early ages both of the Greek and Roman republics, the other parts of education seem to have consisted in learning- to read, write, and account, accord- ing to the arithmetic of the times. Those accomplishments the richer citizens seem frequently to have acquired at home by the assistance of some domestic pe- dagogue, who was generally either a slave or a freed-man ; and the poorer citizens, in the schools of such masters as made a trade of teaching for hire. Such parts of education, how- ever, were abandoned altogether to the care of the parents or guardians of each individual. It does not appear that the state ever assumed any inspection or direction of them. By a law of Solon, indeed, the children were acquitted from maintaining those parents in their old age who had neglected to instruct them in some profitable trade or business. At Rome, the study of the civil law made a partof the education, not of the greater part of the citizens, but of some particular families. The young people, however, who wished to acquire knowledge in the law, had no public school to go to, andjiad no other method of sludvinqr it, than by frequenting the company of such of their relations and friends as were supposed to un- derstand it. It is, perhaps, worth while to remark, that though the laws of the twelve tables were, many of them, copied from those of some ancient Greek republics, yet law never seems to have grown up to be a science in any republic of ancient Greece. In Rome it became a science very early, and gave a considerable degree of illustration to those citizens who had the reputation of understanding it. In the re- publics of ancient Greece, parti- cularly in Athens, the ordinary courts of justice consisted of nu- merous, and, therefore, disor- derly, bodies of people, who frequently decided almost at ran- dom, or as clamour, faction, and party-spirit happened to deter- mine. The ignominy of an un- just decision, when it was to be divided among five hundred, a thousand, or fifteen hundred people (for some of their courts were so very numerous), could not fall very heavy upon any individual. At Rome, on the contrary, the principal courts of justice consisted either of a single judge, or of a small num- ber of judges, whose charac- ters, especially as they delibe- rated always in public, could not fail to be very much affected by any rash or unjust decision. In doubtful cases, such courts, from their anxiety to avoid blame, would naturally endea- vour to shelter themselves un- der the example, or precedent, of the judges who had sat before them, either in the same or in some other court. This attention KDU EDU to practice and precedent neces- sarily formed the Roman law into that regular and orderly system in which it has been delivered down to us ; and the like at- tention has had the like effects upon the laws of every other country where such attention has taken place. The superiority of character in the Romans over that of the Greeks, so much re- marked by Polybius and Diony- sius of Halicarnassus, was pro- bably more owing 1 to the better constitution of their courts of jus- tice, than to any of the circum- stances to which those authors ascribe it. The Romans are said to have been particularly distin- guished for their superior respect to an oath. But the people who were accustomed to make oath before some diligent and well- informed court of justice, would naturally be much more attentive to what they swore, than they who were accustomed to do the same thing before mobbish and disorderly assemblies. The abilities, both civil and military, of the Greeks and Ro- mans, will readily be allowed to have been at least equal to those of any modern nation. Our pre- judice is, perhaps, rather to over- rate them. But except in what related to military exercises, the state seems to have been at no pains to form those great abili- ties : for I cannot be induced to believe that the musical educa- tion of the Greeks could be of much consequence in forming them. Masters, however, had been found, itseems, for instruct- ing the better sort of people among those nations in every art and science in which the cir- cumstances of their society ren- dered it necessary or convenient for them to be instructed. "The demand for such instruction pro^- duced, what it always produces, the talent for giving it ; and the emulation which an unrestrained competition never fails to excite, appears to have brought that ta- lent to a very high degree of per- fection. In the attention which the ancient philosophers excited in the empire, which they ac- quired over the opinions and principles of their auditors, in the faculty which they possessed of giving a certain tone and cha- racter to the conduct and con- versation of those auditors ; they appear to have been much supe- rior to any modern teachers. In modern times, the diligence of public teachers is more or less corrupted by the circumstances, which render them more or less independent of their success and reputation in their particular professions. Their salaries, too, put the private teacher, who would pretend to come into com- petion with them, in the same state with a merchant who at- tempts to trade without a bounty, in competition with those who trade with a considerable one. If he sells his goods at nearly the same price, he cannot have the same profit ; and poverty and beggary at least, if not bank- ruptcy and ruin, will infallibly be his lot. If he attempts to sell them much dearer, he is likely to have so few customers that his circumstances will not be much mended. The privileges of graduation, besides, are, in many countries, necessary ; or at least extremely convenient, to EDU EDU most men of learned professions ; that is, to the far greater part of those who have occasion for a learned education. But those privileges can be obtained only by attending- the lectures of the public teachers. The most care- ful attendance upon the ablest instructions of any private teacher cannot always give any title to demand them. It is from these different causes that the private teacher of any of the sciences which are commonly taught in universities, is in modern times generally considered as in the very lowest order of men of let- ters. A man of real abilities can scarce find out a more humiliat- ing 1 or a more unprofitable em- ployment to turn them to. The endowments of schools and col- leges have, in this manner, not only corrupted the diligence of public teachers, but have ren- dered it almost impossible to have any good private ones. Were there no public institutions for education, no system, no sci- ence would be taught for which there was notademand; or which the circumstances of the times did not render it, either neces- sary, or convenient, or at least fashionable to learn. A private teacher could never find his ac- count in teaching, either an ex- ploded and antiquated system ol a science, acknowledged to be useful, or a science universally believed to be a mere useless and pedantic heap of sophistry and nonsense. Such systems, such sciences, can subsist no where, but in those incorporated socie- ties for education, whose pros- perity and revenue are in a great measure independent of their reputation, and altogether inde- pendent of their industry. Were there no public institutions for education, a gentleman, after going through, with application and abilities, the most complete course of education which the circumstances of the times were supposed to afford, could not come into the world, completely ignorant of every thing which is the common subject of conversa- tion, among gentlemen and men of the world. There are no public institu- tions for the education of women ; and there is, accordingly, nothing- useless, absurd, or fantastical in the common course of their edu- cation. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it necessary or useful for them to learn; and they are taught nothing else. Every part of their education tends evidently to some useful purpose ; either to improve the natural attractions of their person, or to form their mind to reserve, to modesty, to chastity, and to economy: to render them both likely to be- come the mistresses of a family, and to behave properly when they have become such. In every part of her life, a woman feels some conveniency or advantage from every part of her education. It seldom happens that a man, in any part of his life, derives any conveniency or advantage from some of the most laborious and troublesome parts of his educa- tion. A. Smith. EDUCATION OF THE COMMON PEO- PLE, ATTENTION TO WHICH IS INCUMBENT UPON THE PUBLIC. Ought the public to give no at- tention, it may be asked, to the EDU EDU education of the people ? Or, if it ought to give any, what are the different parts of education which it ought to attend to in the different orders of the peo- ple? and in what manner ought it to attend to them ? In some cases, the state of the society necessarily places the greater part of individuals in such situations as naturally form in them, without any attention of government, almost all the abili- ties and virtues which that state requires, or perhaps can admit of. In other cases, the state of the society does not place the greater part of individuals in such situations ; and some atten- tion of government is necessary, in order to prevent the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the great body of the people. In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour; that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations ; frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are ne- cessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man, whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, al- ways the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to ex- ert his understanding, or to ex- ercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficul- ties which never occur. He na- turally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human crea- ture to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversa- tion, but of conceiving any ge- nerous, noble, or tender senti- ment; and consequently of form- ing any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests of his country, he is altogether incapable of judging; and unless very par- ticular pains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war. The uni- formity of his stationary life na- turally corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes him regard with abhorrence the irregular, uncer- tain, and adventurous life of a soldier. It corrupts even the ac- tivity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigour and perse- verance, in any other employment than that to which be .has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expence of his intellectual, so- cial, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilized so- ciety this is the state in which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless govern- ment takes some pains to pre- vent it. It is otherwise in the barba- rous societies, as they are com- monly called, of hunters, [of shepherds, and even of husband- men in that rude state of hus- bandry which precedes the im- provement of manufactures, and the extension of foreign com- merce. In such societies, the EDU EDU varied occupations of every man oblige every man to exert his capacity, and to invent expe- dients for removing- difficulties which are continually occurring-. Invention is kept alive, and the mind is not suffered to fall into that drowsy stupidity, which, in a civilized society, seems to benumb the understanding- of almost all the inferior ranks of people. In those barbarous so- cieties, as they are called, every man, it has already been ob- served, is a warrior. Every man, too, is in the same measure a statesman, and can form a tole- rable judgment concerning- the interest of the society, and the conduct of those who govern it. How far their chiefs are good judges in peace, or good leaders in war, is obvious to the ob- servation of almost every single man among them. In such a society, indeed, no man can well acquire that improved and refined understanding, which a few men sometimes possess in a more civilized state. Though in a rude society, there is a good deal of variety in the occupa- tions of every individual, there is not a great deal in those of the whole society. Every man does, or is capable of doing, almost every thing which any other man does, or is capable of doing. Every man has a considerable degree of knowledge, ingenuity, and invention; but scarce any man has a great degree. The de- gree, however, which is common- ly possessed, is generally suffi- cient for conducting the whole simple business of the society. In a civilized state, on the con- trary, though there is little va- riety in the occupations of the greater part of individuals, there is an almost infinite variety of objects to the contemplation of those few, who, being attached to no particular occupation them- selves, have leisure and inclina- tion to examine the occupations of other people. The contem- plation of so great a variety of objects necessarily exercises their minds in endless comparisons and combinations, and renders their understandings, in an. extra- ordinary degree, both acute and comprehensive. Unless those few, however, happen to be placed in some very particular situations, their great abilities, though honourable to themselves, may contribute very little to the good government or happiness of their society. Notwithstand- ing the great abilities of those few, all the nobler parts of the human character may be, in a great measure, obliterated and extinguished in the great body of the people. The education of the common people requires, perhaps, in a civilized and commercial society, the attention of the public more than that of people of some rank and fortune. People of some rank and fortune are ge- nerally eighteen or nineteen years of age before they enter upon that particular business, profession, or trade, by which they propose to distinguish them- selves in the world. They have, before that, full time to acquire, or, at least, to fit themselves for afterwards acquiring, every accomplishment which can re- commen/i them to the public es- teem, or render them worthy of EDU EDU it. Their parents or guardians are generally sufficiently anxious that they should be so accom- plished ; and are, in most cases, willing 1 enough to lay out the expense which is necessary for that purpose. If they are not always properly educated, it is seldom from the want of expense laid out upon their education ; but from the improper applica- tion of that expense. It is sel- dom from the want of masters ; but from the negligence and in- capacity of the masters who are to be had, and from the difficulty, or rather from the impossibility which there is, in the present state of things, of finding any better. The employments, too, in which people of some rank or fortune spend the greater part of their lives, are not, like those of the common people, simple and uniform. They are almost all of them extremely compli- cated ; and such as exercise the head more than the hands. The understandings of those who are engaged in such em- ployments can seldom grow tor- pid for want of exercise. The employments of people of some rank and fortune, besides, are seldom such as harass them from morning to night. They gene- rally have a good deal of lei- sure; during which, they may perfect themselves in every branch, either of useful or orna- mental knowledge, of which they may have laid the founda- tion, or for which they may have acquired some taste in the earlier part of life. It is otherwise with the com mon people. They have little time to spare for education. Their parents can scarce afford to maintain them even in in- fancy. As soon as they are able to work, they must apply to some trade by which they can earn their subsistence. That trade, too, is generally so simple and uniform, as to give little exercise to the understanding ; while, at the same time, their labour is both so constant and so severe, that it leaves them little leisure, and less inclination, to apply to, or even to think of any thing else. But though the common peo- ple cannot, in any civilized so- ciety, be so well instructed as people of some rank and for- tune, the most essential parts of education, however, to read, write, and account, can be ac- quired at so early a period of life, that the greater part even of those who are to be bred to the lowest occupations, have time to acquire them before they can be employed in those occu- pations. For a very small ex- pense, the public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the neces- sity of acquiring those most es- sential parts of education. The public can facilitate this acquisition by establishing in every parish or district, a little school, where children may be taught fora reward so moderate, that even a common labourer may afford it ; the master being partly, but not wholly, paid by the public ; because if he was wholly, or even principally paid by it, he would soon learn to neg- lect his business. In Scotland, the establishment of such parish- EDU EDU schools has taught almost the whole common people to read, and a very great proportion of them to write and account. In England, the establishment of charity schools has had an effect of the same kind ; though not so universally, because the esta- blishment is not so universal. If in those little schools the books, by which the children are taught to read, were a little more in- structive than they commonly are ; and if, instead of a little smattering of Latin, which the children of the common people are sometimes taught there, and which can scarce ever be of any use to them, they were instructed in the elementary parts of geo- metry and mechanics, the literary education of this rank of people would perhaps be as complete as it can be. There is scarce a com- mon trade which does not afford some opportunities of applying to it the principles of geometry and mechanics, and which would not, therefore, gradually exercise and improve the common people in those principles, the necessary introduction to the most sublime as well as to the most useful sciences. The public can encourage the acquisition of those most essen- tial parts of education, by giving- small premiums and little badges of distinction to the children of the common people who excel in them. The public can impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education, by obliging every man to undergo an examination or probation in them, before he can obtain the freedom in any cor- poration, or be allowed to setup any trade either in a village or town corporate. It was in this manner, by fa- cilitating the acquisition of their military and gymnastic exercises, by encouraging it, and even by imposing upon the whole body of the people the necessity of learning those exercises, that the Greek and Roman republics main- tained the martial spirit of their respective citizens. They facili- tated the acquisition of those exercises, by appointing a cer- tain place for learning and prac- tising them, arid by granting to certain masters the privilege of teaching in that place. Those masters do not appear to have had either salaries or exclusive privileges of any kind. Their reward consisted altogether in what they got from their scho- lars ; and a citizen who had learnt his exercises in the public Gymnasia, had no sort of legal advantage over one who had learnt them privately, provided the latter had learnt them equally well. Those republics encouraged the acquisition of those exercises, by bestowing- little premiums and badges of distinction upon those who ex- celled in them. To have gained a prize in the Olympic, Isthmian, orNemsean games, gave illustra- tion, not only to the person who gained it, but to his whole family and kindred. The obligation which every citizen was under to serve a certain number of years, if called upon, in the armies of the republic, suffici- ently imposed the necessity of learning those exercises, without EDU EDU which he could not be fit for that service. That in the progress of im- provement, the practice of mili- tary exercises, unless govern- ment takes proper pains to sup- port it, goes gradually to decay, and, together with it, the mar- tial spirit of the great body of the people, the example of mo- dern Europe sufficiently demon- strates. But the security of every society must always depend, more or less, upon the martial spirit of the great body of the people. In the present times, indeed, that martial spirit alone, and unsup- ported by a well-disciplined standing army, would not, per- haps, be sufficient for the defence and security of any society. But where every citizen had the spi- rit of a soldier, a smaller stand- ing army would surely be re- quisite. That spirit, besides, would necessarily diminish very much the dangers to liberty, whether real or imaginary, which are commonly apprehended from a standing army. As it would very much facilitate the opera- tions of that army against a fo- reign invader, so it would ob- struct them as much, if unfortu- nately they should ever be di- rected against the constitution of the state. The ancient institutions of Greece and Rome seem to have been much more effectual, for maintaining the martial spirit of the great body of the people, than the establishment of what are called the militias of modern times. They were much more simple. When they were once established, they executed them- selves, and it required little or no attention from government to maintain them in the most per- fect vigour. Whereas, to main- tain, even in tolerable execution, the complex regulations of any modern militia, requires the con- tinual and painful attention of government, without which, they are constantly falling- into total neglect and disuse. The influence, besides, of the ancient institutions, \n as much more uni- versal. By means of them, the whole body of the people was completely instructed in the use of arms : whereas, it is but a very small part of them who can ever be so instructed by the re- gulations of any modern militia ; except, perhaps, that of Switzer- land. But a coward, a man in- capable either of defending or of revenging himself, evidently wants one of the most essential parts of the character of a man. He is as much mutilated and deformed in his mind as another is in his body, who is either de- prived of some of its most essen- tial members, or has lost the use of them. He is evidently the more wretched and miserable of the two ; because happiness and misery, which reside alto- gether in the mind, must neces- sarily depend more upon the healthful or unhealthful, the mu- tilated or entire state of the mind, than upon that of the body. Even though the martial spirit of the people were of no use, towards the defence of the society, yet, to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity, and wretchedness, which cow- ardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading themselves through the great body of the EDU EMP people, would still deserve the most serious attention of govern- ment ; in the same manner as it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and offen- sive disease, though neither mor- tal nor dangerous, from spread- ing 1 itself among them ; though, perhaps, no other public good might result from such attention besides the prevention of so great a public evil. The same thing may be said of the gross ignorance and stu- pidity Which, in a civilized so- ciety, seem so frequently to be- numb the understandings of all the inferior ranks of people- A man, without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man, is, if possible, more con- temptible than even a coward ; and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential part of the character of human nature. Though the state was to derive no advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of people, it would still deserve its attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more they are instructed, the less lia- ble they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition; which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders. An instruct- ed and intelligent people, be- sides, are always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel them- selves, each, individually, more respectable, and more likely to obtain the respect of their law- ful superiors ; and they are therefore more disposed to re- spect those superiors. They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of seeing, through the interested complaints of fac- tion and sedition : and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or un- necessary opposition to the mea- sures of government. In free countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the favourable judgment which the people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance, that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concern- ing it.- A. Smith. EMPIRE, THE CAUSES OF THE DE- CADENCY OP AN. The intro- duction and improvement of the arts and sciences in an empire do not occasion its decadency ; but the same causes that accele- rate the progress of the sciences, sometimes produce the most fa- tal effects. There are nations where, by a peculiar series of circumstances, the seeds of the arts and sciences do not spring up till the moment the manners begin to corrupt. A certain number of men assemble to form a society. These men found a city: Their neighbours see it rise up with a jealous eye. The inhabitants of that city, forced to be at once labourers and sol- diers, make use by turns of the spade and the sword. What in such a country is the necessary science and virtue ? The mili- tary, arts and valour, they alone are there respected. Every other science and vittue are there un- known 1 . Such was the state of EMP EMP rising- Rome, when, weak and surrounded by warlike nations, it with difficulty sustained their attacks: Its glory and power ex- tended over the whole earth : it acquired, however, the one .and the other very slowly : ages of triumphs were necessary to sub- ject their neighbours. Now, when the surrounding nations were subdued, there arose from the form of their government civil wars, which were succeed- ed by those with foreigners ; so that it cannot be imagined, while the citizens were engaged in the different employments of magis- trates and soldiers, and inces- santly agitated with strong hopes and fears, they could enjoy the leisure and tranquillity necessary to the study of the sciences, In every country where these events succeed each other in a regular series, the only period favourable to letters is, unfortu- nately, that when the civil wars, the troubles and factions being extinguished, liberty .is expiring, as in the time of Augustus, under the strokes of despotism. Now this period precedes but a short time the decadency of an empire. The arts and sciences, however, then flourish; and that for two reasons. The first is, the force of men's passions. In the first moments of slavery, their minds, still agi- tated by the remembrance of their lost liberty, are like the sea after a tempest. The citizen still burns with a desire to render himself illustrious, but his situa- tion is altered. He cannot have his bust placed by that of Timo- leon, Pelopidas, or Brutus: .He cannot deliver his name down to posterity as the destroyer of ty- rants, and the avenger of liberty. His statue may, however, he placed by those of Homer, Epi- curus, or Archimedes. This. he knows ; and therefore, if there be but one sort of glory to which he can aspire, if it be wjth the laurels pf the muses alone- that he can be crowned, ijt is in the career of .the arts >and sciences he prepares to seek them ; and it is then that illustrious men of every literary ,profession arise. The second of these pauses is, the interest sovereigns.then have to encourage the progress. pf -the sciences. A.t the moment that despotism is established, what does the monarch desire? To inspire his subjects with the love qf the arts and sciences. W.hat does he.fear ? That they should reflect on their fetters, blush on their servitude, and again turn their looks towards liberty. He would, therefore, by employing 1 their. minds, (make them forget their base condition. He conse- quently presents them with new objects of glory. AS an hypo- critical fautor of the arts and sci- ences, he shows the more regard to the man of genius, the more he feels the want of his,eulogies. The manners of a nation do not change the moment despotism is established. The spiritof apeople is free some timeafter their hands are tied. Duringthese first mo- ments illustrious ; men stijljire- secve some, consideration. The tyrant, therefore, loads, them s with favours, tjiat they may load him with praises ; and men of, great talents are too often seduced to become the panegyrists of usur- pation and tyranny. What mo- lives can induce them to it? Sometimes meanness, and fre- quently gratitude. It must be confessed, that every revolution in an empire supposes great talents in him by whom it is pro- duced, or at least some brilliant vice that astonishment and grati- tude metamorphose into virtue. Such is, at the time of the esta- blishment of despotism, the pro- ductive cause of great accom- plishments in the arts and scien- ces. The first moments past, if the same country become barren in men of talent, it is because the tyrant, being then well esta- blished on his throne, is no long- er in want of their assistance. So that the reign of the arts and in a*" state seldom ex- above a century or two. If m each" empire the sciences just shobability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plau- sible account of the strange mixture of good or ill which ap- pears in life. But if we con- sider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agree- ment of the parts of the uni- verse, we shall not discover in it any marks of the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is, indeed, an opposition of pains and plea- sures in the feelings of sensible creatures; but are not all the operations of nature carried on by an opposition of principles; of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true conclusion is, that the original source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these princi- ples ; and has no more regard to good above ill, than Yo heat above cold, or to drought above moisture ; or, to light above heavy. There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe: That they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have per- fect malice ; that they are op- posite, and have both goodness and malice ; that they have nei- ther goodness nor malice. Mixt phenomena can never prove the two former unmixt principles. And the uniformity and steadi- ness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable. Allowing, what never will be believed, at least what never possibly can be proved, that animal, or at least human hap- piness, in this life exceeds its misery, is to do nothing: for this is not by any means what we expect from Infinite Power, Infinite Wisdom, and Infinite Goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world ? Not by chance, surely. From some cause, then. Is it from the in- tention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention ? But he is Almighty. Nothing can possibly shake this reasoning; so short, so clear, so decisive; ex- cept we assert, that these sub- jects exceed all human capacity and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them. What is here said of natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Su- preme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevo- lence resembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater cause to exclude from him moral senti- ments, such as we feel them; since moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predomi- nant above moral good, than natural evil above natural good. But even though this should not be allowed, and though the vir- tue which is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will be very difficult to account for it. We must assign a cause for it, without having recourse EXF to the first cause. But every ef- fect must have a cause, and that cause another: you must either carry on the progression in in- finitum, or rest on that original principle who is the ultimate cause of all things. Hume. EXPERIENCE, CAUSES AND EF- FECTS DISCOVERABLE, NOT BY REASON, BUT BY. The know- ledge of causes and effects is not, in any instance, attained by rea- sonings a priori, but arises en- tirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of wa- ter, that it would suffocate him, or, from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. No object ever disco- vers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it ; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any in- ferences concerning real exist- ence and matter of fact. Present two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy : he will ne- ver discover, that they will ad- here together in such a manner as to require great force to sepa- rate them in a direct line, while they make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure. No man imagines, that the explosion of gunpowder, or the attraction of the loadstone, could ever be dis- covered by arguments a priori. Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reasons why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a tyger ? Were any object pre- sented to us, and were we re- quired to pronounce concerning the effect which will result from it, without consul ting past obser- vation, after what manner must the mind proceed in this opera- tion ? It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to the object as its effect ; and it is plain that this invention must be arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause by the most ac- curate scrutiny and examination: For the effect is totally different from the cause ; and consequently can never be discovered in it. A stone raised into the air, and left without any support, immedi- ately falls ; but to consider the matter a priori, is there any thing we discover in this situa- tion which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than up- ward, or any other motion in the stone ? In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause ; and the first invention or conception of it a priori must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the con- junction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary ; since there are always many other effects which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, without the as- sistance of observation and expe- rience. The utmost effect of human reason is, to reduce the EXP FA'P principles productive of natural phenomena to a greater simpli- city, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few ge - neral causes, by means of rea- soning from analogy, experience, and observation. But the causes of these general causes, the ulti- mate springs and principles ol nature, are totally shut up from human curiosity and inquiry. Hume. EXPERIENCE, THE FOUNDATION OF ALL CONCLUSIONS FROM. Nature has kept us a great dis- tance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the know- ledge of a few superficial quali- ties of objects ; while she con- ceals from us those powers and principles on which the influ- ence of these objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and con- sistence of bread ; but neither sense nor reason ever can in- form us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body. Sight, or feeling, conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies: but as to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant conception. But, not- withstanding this ignorance of natural powers and principles, we always presume, where we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experi- enced, will follow from them. If a body of like colour and consistence with that of bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experi- ment ; and foresee, with cer- tainty, like nourishment and support. But it is allowed on all hands, that there is no known connection between the sensible qualities arid the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a con- clusion concerning their con- stant and regular conjunction, by any thing which it knows of their nature. As to past experi- ence, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information only of those precise objects, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me ; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was at that time endued with such secret powers : But does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time ; and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers ? The con- sequence seems no wise neces- sary. These two propositions are far from being the same, / have found such an object has always been attended with such an effect ; and / foresee, that other objects, which are in ap- pearance similar, will be attend- ed with similar effects. The one proposition is, in fact, al- ways inferred from the other : But this inference is not made by a chain of reasoning. If this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as per- fect at first ; and upon one in- stance, as after ever so long 1 a EXP EXP course of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing is so like as eggs ; yet no one, on account of this apparent similarity, expects the same taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and security, with regard to a particular event. This inference is not intuitive ; neither is it de- monstrative. That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case, seems evident; since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those we have experienced, may be attended with different and contrary effects. Is it not clearly and distinctly to be con- ceived, that a body falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt, or feel- ing of fire ? Is there any more intelligible proposition, than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and Janu- ary, and decay in May and Junel Now, whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative arguments, or ab- stract reasoning a priori. If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment, these arguments must be proba- ble only, or such as regard mat- ter of fact and real existence : but all arguments concerning exist- ence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; and our knowledge of that relation is de- rived entirely from experience ; and all our experimental conclu- sions proceed upon the suppo- sition, that the future will be con- formable to the past. To endea- vour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable ar- guments, or arguments regarding existence is begging the question. All arguments or inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past ; and that simi- lar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future ; since all these ar- guments are founded on a suppo- sition of this resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argu- ment or inference, proves not, that for the future it will continue so. In vain do we pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from our past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with re- gard to some objects : why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects ? There ia no logic, or process of argument, which can secure us against this supposition. In all reasoning, therefore, from experience, there is a step EXP EXP taken by the mind, which is not established by any argument or process of the understanding. But if the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority ; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same. Suppose a person, though en- dowed with the strongest facul- ties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world: he would, indeed, imme- diately observe a conlinual suc- cession of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover any thing further. He would not be able by any reasoning to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by which all natural operations are per- formed, never appear to the sen- ses ; nor is it reasonable to con- clude, merely because one event, in one instance precedes another, that, therefore, the one is the cause, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of the one from the appearance of the other. . And, in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of any thing beyond what was immediately present to his memory or senses Suppose, again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived so long in the world as to have observed similar objects or events to be constantly con- joined together; what is the consequence of this experience ? He immediately infers the exis- tence of the one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other ; nor is it by any process of rea- soning he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to it: and though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. To this he is determined by custom or habit. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, with- out being impelled by any rea- soning or process of the under- standing, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of custom. Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which ren- ders our experience useful to us ; and makes us expect for the fu- ture a similar train of events with those which have appeared in past. Having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold, have always been con- joined together ; if flame or snow be presented anew to our senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold; and to be- lieve that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself up- on a nearer approach. This be- lief is the necessary consequence of placing the mind in such cir- cumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situ- ated as unavoidably to feel the EXT FAB passion of love, when we receive benefits ; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and un- derstanding, is able either to pro- duce or to prevent ! Hume, EXTERNAL OBJECTS ONLY PRO- BABLE, THE EXISTENCE OF. Whoever will be satisfied with evidence only, can hardly be sure of any thing except his own ex- istence. How could he, for ex- ample, be convinced of that of other bodies ? For cannot God, by his omnipotence, make the same impressions on our senses as the presence of the objects would excite ? And if we grant, that the Deity can do this, how can it be affirmed, that he does not employ his power in this manner ; and that the whole universe is nothing more than a mere phenomenon! Besides, as we are affected in our dreams by the same sensation we should feel were the object present, how can it be proved, that our life is not one continued dream? I would not be understood, from hence, to deny the existence of bodies, but only to show, that we have less assurance of it than of our own existence. And, as truth is an indivisible point, we cannot say of a certain fact, that it is more or less true : It is therefore evident, that if we are more cer- tain of our own existence than that of other bodies, the existence of the latter is no more than a probability. It is, indeed, a very great probability, ; and with re- gard to the conduct of life, equi- valent to evidence ; notwith- standing Which, it is only a pro- bability. Helvetius. FABULOUS STORIES, THE DIFFI- CULTY OF DETECTING. The difficulty of detecting falsehood in any private, or even public history, at the time and place where it is said to happen, is very great; but much more so where the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy , and judg- ment which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood, in the most recent actions. But the matter never comes to any issue, if trusted to the common method of alterca- tion, and debate, and flying ru- mours ; especially when men's passions have taken party on either side. In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsi- derable to deserve their attention and regard: And when, after- wards, they would willingly de- tect the cheat, in order to unde- ceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the re- cords and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery. No means of detection remain but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters: and these, though always suffici- ent with the judicious and know- ing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar. * * FACT, MATTERS OF, NOT DEMON- STRATIVELY CERTAIN. ALL the objects of human reason and inquiry may be naturally di- vided into two kinds, viz. FAI Relations of ideas, and matters of fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic ; and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere oper- ation of thought, without de- pendence on what is any where existent in the universe. Matters of fact, which are the second ob- jects of human reason, are not as- certained in the same manner ; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The con- trary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can ne- ver imply a contradiction ; and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to- morrow, is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirma- tion that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction ; and could never be distinctly con- ceived by the mind. Hume. FACT, THE NATURE OF OUR REA- SONINGS CONCERNING MATTERS OF. All reasonings concerning matters of fact, seem to be found- ed in the relation of cause and effect. By means of that rela- tion alone, we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any mat- ter of fact which is absent ; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France? he would give you a reason ; and this rea- son would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former re- solutions and promises. A man finding a watch, or any other machine, in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men in that island. AH our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly supposed, that there is a relation between the present fact, and that inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. The hear- ing of an articulate voice, and rational discourse, in the dark, assures us of the presence of some person. Why? Because these are the effects of the hu- man shape and fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anato- mize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find, that they are founded on cause and effect ; and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire ; and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other. Hume. FAITH. There being many things wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all ; and other things, of whose past, present, or future existence, by the na- tural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all ; these, as being beyond the dis- covery of our natural faculties, and above reason, are, when re- vealed, the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the an- gels rebelled against God, and thereby lost their first happy state ; and that the dead shall rise, and live again : these, and FAI the like, being beyond the dis- covery of our reason, are purely matters of faith; with which, reason has directly nothing- to do. But since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation in any of those matters, wherein our natural fa- culties are able to give a proba- ble determination ; revelation, where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it against the probable conjectures of reason : Because the mind, not being cer- tain of the truth of what it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony ; which, it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words where- in it is delivered. Indeed, if any thing shall be thought revela- tion which is contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there reason must be hearkened to, as to a matter within its province: since a man can never have so certain a knowledge, that a proposition which contradicts the clear prin- ciples and evidence of his own knowledge, was divinely re- vealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it i delivered, as he has that the con- trary is true : and so is bound to" consider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swal- low it, without examination, as a matter of faith. First, whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth, our mind, by its natural faculties and notions, cannot judge ; that is purely matter of faith, and above reason. Secondly, all propositions, whereof the mind, by the use of its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge from na- turally acquired ideas, are mat- ter of reason ; with this differ- ence still, that in those concern- ing which it has but an uncer- tain evidence, and so is per- suaded of their truth only upon probable grounds, which still ad- mit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing vio- lence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and over- turning the principles of all rea- son ; in such probable proposi- tions, I say, an evident revela- tion ought to determine our as- sent even against probability. For where the principles of rea- son have not evidenced a propo- sition to be certainly true or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth, and ground of assent, may deter- mine : and so it may be matter of faith, and be also above rea- son. Because reason, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination where reason came short; and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay. Thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence or hindrance to reason ; which is not injured or disturb- ed, but assisted and improved, FAI FAI by new discoveries of truth com- ing from the eternal fountain of all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed, is certainly true ; no doubt can be made of it This is the proper object of faith, but whether it be a divine reve- lation or no, reason must judge ; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain proba- bility in opposition to knowledge and certainty. There can be no evidence, that any traditional revelation is of divine original, in the words we receive it, and in the sense we understand it, so clear, and so certain, as that of the principles of reason : and, therefore, nothing that is con- trary to, and inconsistent with the clear and self-evident dic- tates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith, wherein reason has no- thing to do. Whatsoever is di- vine revelation, ought to over- rule all our opinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received with full assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takes not away the land-marks of knowledge ; this shakes not the foundation of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were given us. Locke. FAITH. Belief, or disbelief, can neither be a virtue, nor a crime, in any one who used the best means in his power of being informed. If a proposition is evident, we cannot avoid be- lieving it; and where is the merit or piety of a necessary assent? If it is not evident, we cannot help rejecting it, or doubting of it : and where is the crime of not performing impossibilities, or not believing what does not appear to us to be true ? Whilby. FAITH AND REASON. If the pro- vinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these bounda- ries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reason at all ; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the several reli- gions of the world, will not de- serve to be blamed. For to this crying up of faith, in opposition to reason, we may, I think, in good measure, ascribe those ab- surdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and di- vide mankind. For men having been principled with an opinion, that they must not consult rea- son in the things of religion, however apparently contradicto- ry to common sense, and the very principles of all their know- ledge, have let loose their fan- cies and natural superstition ; and have been by them led into so strange opinions and extravagant practices in religion, that a con- siderate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies, andjudge them, so far from being accept- able to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational and more senseless than beasts themselves. Credo, quia impos- sible est, " I believe, because it is impossible," might, in a good FARI FAN man, pass for a sally of zeal ; but would prove a very bad rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by. f * FAME. A man, whose talents and genius give him the conscious- ness of deserving reputation, may let the public voice alone. He need not trouble himself in dic- tating what it shall determine; but wait, if I may say so, for future fame to come and take his or- ders. He will soon put to silence every inferior voice, as the force of the fundamental sound in a concord destroys every dissonance which tends to alter the harmony. We must act in fame as cautiously as in sickness ; impatience is fatal in either of them. How many men are there distinguished for their rare endowments, to whom we may apply the rebuke formerly made to a Carthaginian general : " The gods do not give all talents to one: you have that of obtaining a victory, but not that of using it." Renown is a kind of game at commerce, where chance sometimes gets a fortune but where merit acquires, in ge- neral, more certain gains; pro- vided, that while it uses the tricks of gamesters, it does no expose itself to be betrayed bj them. But it is too frequentl^ considered as a mere lottery where persons imagine they mak their fortunes by inventing fals tickets. D'Alembert. FAME, ORIGIN OF TI*E LOVE OF. Our opinions, of all kinds, ar strongly affected by society an< sympathy ; and it is almost irn possible for us to support an principle or sentiment, agains the universal consent of ever one with whom we have an friendship or correspondence. But of all our opinions, those which we form in our own fa- vour, however lofty or pre- suming, are at bottom the frail- est, and the most easily shaken by the contradiction and oppo- sition of others. Our great con- cern, in this case, makes us soon alarmed, and keeps our passions upon the watch ; our consciousness of partiality still makes us dread a mistake. - And the very difficulty of judg- ing concerning an object, which is never set a due distance from us, nor is seen in a proper point of view, makes us hearken anxi- ously to the opinions of others, who are better qualified to form just opinions concerning us. Hence that strong love of fame with which all mankind are pos- sessed. It is in order to fix and confirm their favourable opinion of themselves, not from any ori- ginal passion, that they seek the applauses of others. And when a man desires to be praised, it is for the same reason that a beauty is pleased with surveying herself in a favourable looking-glass, and seeing the reflection of .her own charms. Hume. FANATICISM. Fanaticism is to su- perstition what a delirium is to a fever, and fury to anger: He who has ecstasies and visions, who takes dreams for realities, and his imagination for prophecies, is an enthusiast; and he who sticks not at supporting his folly by murder, is a fanatic. The only remedy for this in- fectious disease is a philosophical temper, which spreading through society, at length softens man- ners, and obviates the excesses FAN FIL of the distemper ; for whenever it gets ground, the best way i to fly from it, and stay till the air is purified. The laws and re ligion are no preservative agains this mental pestilence. Religion so far from being- a salutary ali- ment in these cases, in infectec brains becomes poison. The laws likewise haveprovec very ineffectual against this spi- ritual rage ; it is, indeed, like reading an order of council to lunatic. The creatures are firmly persuaded that the spirit by which they are actuated is above all laws, and that their enthu- siasm is the only law they are to regard. What can be answered to a person who tells you, that he had rather obey God than men ; and who, in consequence of that choice, is certain of gaining hea- ven by cutting your throat? The leaders of fanatics, and who put the dagger into their hands, are usually designing knaves; they are like the old man of the mountain, who, ac- cording to history, gave weak persons a foretaste of the joys of paradise, promising them an eter- nity of such enjoyments, pro- vided they would go and murder all those whom he should name to them. In the whole world, there has been but one religion clear of fa- naticism, which is that of the Chinese literati. As to the sects of philosophers, instead of being infected with this pestilence, they were a ready and sure pre- servative against it : for the effect of philosophy is to compose the soul, and fanaticism is incom- patible with tranquillity. Voltai. FANATICISM, THE PUNISHMENT OF. Painful and corporal pu- nishments should never be ap- plied to fanaticism ; for, being founded on pride, it glories in persecution. Infamy and ridicule only should be employed against fanatids: if the first, their pride will be overbalanced by the pride of the people ; and we may judge of the power of the se- cond, if we consider, that even truth is obliged to summon all her force when attacked by error, armed by ridicule. Thus, by op- posing one passion to another, and opinion to opinion, a wise legislator puts an end to the ad- miration of the populace, oc- casioned by a false principle, the original absurdity of which is veiled by some well-deduced con- sequences. This is the method to avoid confounding the immutable re- lations of things, or opposing nature ; whose actions, not being limited by time, but operating incessantly, overturn and destroy all those vain regulations which contradict her laws. It is not only in the fine arts that the imi- tation of nature is the funda- mental principle; it is the same in sound policy, which is no other than the art of uniting and directing to the same end the natural and immutable sentiments of mankind. Beccaria. 'ILIAL AFFECTION. The bond that ties children to their parents is less strong than commonly imagined. Nothing is more com- mon in Europe than to see chil- dren desert their parents, when they become old, infirm, inca- pable of labour, and forced to FIN FIN subsist by beggary. We see, in the country, one father nou- rish seven or eight children ; but seven or eight children are not sufficient to nourish one father. If all children be not so unna- tural, if some of them have af- fection and humanity, it is to education and example they owe that humanity. Nature, no doubt, designed, that gratitude and habit should form in man a sort of gravitation, by which they should be impelled to a love of their parents ; but it has also designed that man should have, in the natural desire of inde- pendence, a repulsive power, which should diminish the too freat force of that gravitation, rom hence, perhaps, comes the proverb, founded on common and constant observation, That the love of parents descends, and does not remount. Helvetius. FINAL CAUSES. A man must be (it seems) stark mad to deny, that the stomach is made for digestion, the eye to see, and the ear to hear. On the other hand, he must be strangely attached to final causes to affirm, that stone was made to build houses, and that China breeds silk worms to furnish Europe with satin. But it is said, if God has manifestly made one thing with design, he had a design in every thing. To allow a Providence in one case, and deny it in another, is ridi- culous. Whatever is made, was foreseen and arranged ; now every arrangement has its ob- ject, every effect its cause : there- fore, every thing is equally the result or the product of a final cause : therefore, it is equally true to say, that noses were made to wear spectacles, and fingers to be decorated with diamonds, as it is true to say, that the ears have been made to hear sounds, and the eyes to re- ceive light. This difficulty, I apprehend, may be easily cleared up, when the effects are invariably the same in all times and places ; when such uniform effects are independent of the beings they appertain to, there then is evi- dently a final cause. All animals have eyes, and they see ; all have ears, and they hear ; all a mouth, with which they eat ; a stomach, or something similar, by which they digest ; all an orifice, which voids the excre- ments ; all an instrument of ge- neration ; and these natural gifts operate in them without the in- tervention of any art. Here are clear demonstrations of final causes ; and to contradict so uni- versal a truth, would be to per- vert our faculty of thinking. But it is not in all places, nor at all times, that stones form edi- fices ; all noses do not wear spec- tacles; all fingers have not a ring ; nor are all legs covered with silk stockings : therefore, a silk worm is not made to cover my legs, as your mouth is made to eat, &c. Thus there are effects produced by final causes ; but withal, many which cannot come within that appellation. But both one and the other are equally agreeable to the plan of a general providence ; for cer- tainly nothing comes to pass in opposition to it, or so much as without it. Every particular within the compass of nature is uniform, immutable, and the im- T FLA FRI mediate work of their Author. Men were not essentially created to butcher one another ; but the composition we are made of, is frequently productive of massa- cres, as it produces calumnies, vanities, persecutions, and imper- tinences : not that the formation of man is precisely the final cause of our follies and brutalities ; a final cause being universal and invariable, in all places, and at all times. The crimes and ab- surdities of the human mind are, nevertheless, in the eternal order of things. In thrashing corn, the flail is the final cause of the grain's separation ; but if the flail, thrashing the corn, destroys a thousand insects, this is not from any determinate will of mine, neither is it mere chance : these insects were at that time under my flail ; and it was de- termined they were to be there, that is, it was consequential to the nature of things. The instruments given to us by nature cannot be final causes, ever in motion, and infallible in their effect. The eyes, given us for sight, are not always open ; every sense has its intervals of rest, and its exertion is frequently prevented by extraneous causes ; nevertheless, the final cause sub- sists, and as soon as it is free, will act. Voltaire. FLATTERY. Every body hates praise when he believes it to be false; people, then, love flatterers only in the quality of sincere ad- mirers. Under this, it is impos- sible not to love them, because every one believes that his ac- tions are laudable and worthy of praise. Whoever disdains elo- giums, suffers, at least, people to praise him on this account. When they detest a flatterer, it is be- cause they know him to be such. In flattery, it is not the praise, but the falsehood, which shocks us. If the man of sense appears little sensible of elogiums, it is because he more frequently per- ceives the falsehood : but let an artful flatterer praise, persist in praising him, and sometimes seem to censure with the elo- giums he bestows ; and even the man of the greatest sense and penetration will, sooner or later, be his dupe. This taste derives its source from a vanity common to all men. Every man, there- fore, would be praised and flat- tered ; but all would not have it done in the same manner; and it is only in this particular that the difference between them consists. Of all praises, the most flattering and delicate is, with- out dispute, that which most evi- dently proves our own excel- lence. What gratitude do we owe to those who discover to us defects that, without being pre- judicial to us, assure us of our superiority ? Of all flattery, this is the most artful. Helvetius. FRIENDSHIP. Friendship is a tacit contract between two sensible and virtuous souls : I say sensi- ble ; for a monk, a hermit, may not be wicked, yet live a stranger to friendship. I add virtuous; for the wicked have only accom- plices, the voluptuous have com- panions, the designing have asso- ciates, the men of business have partners, the politicians form a factious band, the bulk of idle men have connections, princes have courtiers ; but virtuous men alone have friends. Cethegus FRI FRI was Catiline's accomplice, and Maecenas wasOctavius's courtier ; but Cicero was Atticus's friend. What is implied in this con- tract between two tender and ingenuous souls ? Its obligations are stronger and weaker, accord- ing to their degree of sensibility, and the number of good offices performed. Voltaire. FRIENDSHIP, REAL. Love implies want, and there is no friendship without; for this would be an effect without a cause. All men have not the same wants ; and, therefore, the friendship that subsists between them is founded on different motives : some want pleasure or money, others credit ; those conversation, and these a confidant to whom they may dis- burthen their hearts. There are, consequently, friends of money, of intrigue, of the mind, and of misfortune. In friendship, as in love, people form the most ro- mantic ideas; they always search for the hero, and every instant think they have found him. We are never so violently affected with the virtues of a man as when we first see him ; for as custom renders us insensible to personal beauties, a good under- standing, and even the qualities of the soul, we are never so strongly agitated as by the plea- sure of surprise. We generally love a man while we know little of him, and are desirous of know- ing him better ; but no sooner is this curiosity satisfied, than we are disgusted. In considering friendship as a reciprocal want, it cannot but be acknowledged, that it is very difficult for the same wants, and, consequently, for the same friendship, to, sub- sist between two men for a long- course of time, and, therefore, nothing is more uncommon than friendship of a long standing. The circumstances in which two friends ought to be found being once given, and their characters known ; if they are ever to quar- rel, there is no doubt but that a man of penetration, by fore- seeing the time when these two men would cease to be recipro- cally of use to each other, might calculate the moment when their rupture would happen, as an astronomer calculates the time of an eclipse. We ought not, however, to confound with friend- ship the chains of habit, the re- spectful esteem felt for an ac- knowledged friend, or that happy point of honour, so useful to so- ciety, that makes us keep an acquaintance with those whom we call our friends. We perform the same services for them as we did when they filled us with the warmest sensations, though in reality we do not want their company.Friendship supposes a want; and the more this want is felt, the more lively will be the friendship ; the want is, then, the measure of the sensation. A man and woman escaping shipwreck, save themselves on a desert island, where, having no hope of ever seeing their na- tive country, they are forced to bend their mutual assistance, to defend themselves from the wild beasts, to enjoy life, and to escape despair : no friendship can be more warm than that between this man and woman, who per- haps would have hated each other had they remained at Paris. If one of them happens to perish , FBI FR1 the other has really lost the half of himself: no grief can equal his ; a person must dwell alone on a desert island, who can be sensible of all its violence. The unfortunate are in g-eneral the most tender friends; united by their reciprocal distresses, they enjoy, while condoling- the mis- fortune of a friend, the pleasure of being affected with their own. What is true of circumstances, is also true of characters ; there are some who cannot live with- out a friend. The first are, those of a weak and timid disposition, who, in their whole conduct, never conclude on any thing without the advice and assist- ance of others. The second are, the persons of a gloomy, severe, and tyrannical disposition, who are warm friends of those over whom they vent their spleen : these are like one of the wives of Socrates, who, at the news of the death of that great man, became more inconsolable than the se- cond, who being of a mild and amiable temper, lost in Socrates only an husband, while the other lost in him the martyr of her ca- pricious temper, and the only man who could bear with it. If we loved a friend only for him- self, we should never consider any thing but his happiness ; we should not reproach him for being so long without seeing or writing to us ; we should say, that he had probably spent his time more agreeably, and should rejoice in his happiness. Men have taken great pains to repeat after each other, that those ought not to be reckoned in the list of friends whose in- terested views make them love us only for our ability to serve them. This kind of friendship is certainly not the most flatter- ing- ; but it is, nevertheless, a refi friendship. Men, for instanco, ' love in a minister of state tfee power he has of obliging them ; and in most of them the love of the person is incorporated with the love of the preferment. Why is the name of friendship refused to this sensation ? Men do not love us for ourselves, but always on some other account ; and the above-mentioned is as good as any other. A man is in love with a woman ; can it be said he does not love her, because he only admires the beauties of her eyes or complexion ? But, it is said, the rich man, reduced to poverty, is no longer beloved. This is not denied : but when the small- pox robs a woman of her beauty, all addresses to her commonly cease; though this is no proof she was not beloved while she was beautiful. Suppose a friend, in whom we had the greatest confidence, and for whose mind, disposition, and character, we had the greatest esteem, were suddenly become blind, deaf, and dumb, we should regret in him the loss of a friend ; we should still respect his memory ; but, in fact, we should no longer love him, because he would have no resemblance to the man who was the object of our friendship. If a minister of state fall into dis- grace, we no longer love him ; for this reason, because he is the friend who is suddenly become blind, deaf, and dumb. It is, nevertheless, true, that the man, anxiouafor preferment, has great tenderness for him who can pro- PUT FUT cure it for him. Whoever has this want of promotion is born the friend of the minister of < tate. It is, then, our vanity that makes us refuse giving- the *name to so selfish and necessary a passion. It may, however, be observed, that the most solid and durable friendships are commonly those of virtuous men, however villains themselves are suscepti- ble of it. If, as we are forced to confess, friendship is only the sensation by which two men are . united, we cannot deny but that friendships subsist between the wicked, without contradicting the most authentic facts. Can we, for instance, doubt, that two conspirators may be united by the warmest friendship ? That Jaffler did not love James Piero ? ThatOctavius, who was certainly not a virtuous man, did not love Mecaenas, who was, at best, but a weak man ? The power of friendship is not in proportion to the virtue of two friends, but to the force of the interest by which they are united. Hel- vetius. FUTURE PUNISHMENTS. If Su- preme Justice avenges itself on the wicked, it aveng-es itself here below. It is you and your errors ye nations ! that are its ministers of vengeance. It employs the evils you bring- on each other, to punish the crimes for which you deserve them. It is in the insa- tiable hearts of mankind, cor- roding- with envy, avarice, and ambition, that their avenging passions punish them for their vices, amidst all the false appear- ances of prosperity. Where is the necessity of seeking a hell in another life, when ft is to be found even in this, in the hearts of the wicked ? Where our momentary neces- sities or senseless desires have an end, there ought our passions and our vices to end also. Of what perversity can pure spirits be susceptible? As they stand in need of nothing, to what end should they be vicious I If des- titute of our grosser senses, all their happiness consists in the contemplation of things, they can- not be desirous of any thing but good ; and whoever ceases to be wicked, is it possible he should be eternally miserable ? Rous- seau. FUTURE REWARDS AND PUNISH- MENTS. Man is considered as a moral, because he is regarded as an accountable being: But an accountable being, as the word expresses, is a being that must give an account of its ac- tions to some other ; and that, consequently, must regulate them according to the good liking of this other. Man is accountable to God and his fellow-creatures. But though he is, no doubt, principally accountable to God, in the order of time he must ne- cessarily conceive himself as ac- countable to his fellow-creatures, before he can form any idea of the Deity, or of the rules by which that Divine Being will judge of his conduct. A child surely con- ceives itself as accountable to its parents, and is elevated or cast down by the thought of their merited approbation or disappro- bation, long before it forms any idea of its accountableness to the Deity, or of the rules by which that Divine Being will judge of its conduct. The great Judge PUT of the world has, for the wisest reasons, thought proper to inter- pose between the weak eye of human reason and the throne of his eternal justice, a degree of ob- scurity and darkness, which, though it does not entirely cover that great tribunal from the view of mankind, yet renders the im- pression of it faint and feeble, in comparison of what might be ex- pected from the grandeur and importance of so mighty an object. If those infinite rewards and pun- ishments, which the Almighty has prepared for those who obey or resist his will, were perceived as distinctly as we foresee the fri- volous and temporary retaliations which we may expect from one another, the weakness of human nature, astonished at the immen- sity of objects so little fitted to its comprehension, could no long- er attend to the little affairs of this world: and it is absolutely impossible, that the business oi society could have been carried on, if, in this respect, there had been a fuller revelation of the in- tentions of Providence than that which has already been made. A. Smith. FUTURE STATE. Cicero, in his speech for Cluentius, says to a full senate, What hurt does death to him ? All the idle tales about hell none of us give the least credit to ; then what has death deprived him of? Nothing but the feeling of pain. Does not Ceesar, Catiline's friend, in order to save that wretch from an in- dictment brought against him by the same Cicero, object, that to put a criminal to death is not punishing him ; that death is no- thing ; that it is only the end GAL of our sufferings ; and that it is rather a happy than a fatal mo- ment ? And did not Cicero and the whole senate yield to these arguments ? Voltaire. GALLANTRY. Nature has implant- ed in all living creatures an af- fection between the sexes, which even in the fiercest and most rapacious animals is not merely confined to the satisfaction of the bodily appetite, but begets a friendship and mutual sympathy, which runs through the whole tenor of their lives ; nay, even in those species where nature limits the indulgence of this ap- petite to one season, and to one object, and forms a kind of mar- riage or association between a single male and female, there is yet a visible complacency and be- nevolence, which extends far- ther, and mutually softens the af- fections of the sexes towards each other. How much more must this have place in man, where the confinement of the ap- petite is not natural : but either is derived accidentally from some strong charm of love, or arises from reflections on duty and con- venience ? Nothing, therefore, can proceed less from affectation than the passion of gallantry. It is natural in the highest degree. Art and education, in the most elegant courts, make no more alteration on it, than all the other laudable passions. They only turn the mind more towards it ; they refine it ; they polish it ; and give it a proper grace and expression. But gallantry is as generous as it is natural. Nature has given man the superiority above woman, by endowing him with greater strength both of GAL GEN mind and body : it is his part to alleviate that superiority as much as possible by the generosity of his behaviour, and by a studied deference and complaisance for all her inclinations and opinions. Barbarous nations display this superiority, by reducing their females to the most abject slavery; by confining them, by beating them, by selling them, by killing them : But the male sex among a polite people, discover their superiority in a more generous, though not less evident manner ; by civility, by respect, by com- plaisance, and in a word by gal- lantry. Gallantry is not less consistent with wisdom and pru- dence, than with nature and ge- nerosity ; and, when under pro- per regulations, contributes more than any other invention to the entertainment and improvement of the youth of both sexes. A- mong every species of animals, Nature has founded on the love between the sexes their sweet- est and best enjoyment. But the satisfaction of the bodily ap- petite is not alone sufficient to gratify the mind; and, even, among brute creatures, we find that their play and dalliance, and other expressions of fondness, form the greatest part of the en- tertainment. In rational beings, we must certainly admit the mind for a considerable share. Were we to rob the feast of all its garniture of reason, discourse, sympathy, friendship, and gaiety, what remains would scarcely be worth acceptance in the judg- ment of the truly elegant and luxurious. What better school for manners than the company of virtuous women ; where the mutual endeavour to please must insensibly polish the mind ; where the example of female softness and modesty must communicate itself to their admirers ; and where the delicacy of that sex puts every one on his guard, lest he give offence by any breach of decency ? Hume. GENIUS. Genius is properly the faculty of invention, by means of which a man is qualified for mak- ing new discoveries in science, or for producing original works of art. We may ascribe taste, judgment or knowledge, to a man who is incapable of inven- tion ; but we cannot reckon him a man of genius. Jn order to de- termine how far he merits that character, we must inquire, whether he has discovered any new principle in science, or in- vented any new art, or carried those arts, which are already practised, to a higher degree of perfection than former masters ? Or, whether, at least, in matters of science, he has improved on the discoveries of his predecessors, and reduced principles formerly known to a greater degree of simplicity and consistence, or traced them through a train of consequences hitherto unknown ? or, in the arts, designed some new work, different from those of his predecessors, though per- haps not excelling them ? What- ever falls short of this is servile imitation, or a dull effort of plod- ding industry, which, as not im- plying invention, can be deemed no proof of genius, whatever capacity, skill, or diligence it may evidence. But if a man shows invention, no intellectual defects which his performance GOD GOD may betray can forfeit his claim to genius. His invention may be irregular, wild, undisciplined; but still it is regarded as an in- fallible mark of real natural genius : and the degree of this faculty that we ascribe to him, is always in proportion to our esti- mate of the novelty, the difficulty, or the dignity of his invention. Gerard. GOD. Newton was fully persuaded of the existence of a God ; and by that term understood, not only an infinite, almighty, eter- nal, creative Being, but a mas- ter, who had established a rela- tion between himself and his creatures ; as, without this rela- tion, the knowledge of a God is only a barren idea, which would seem to invite every reasoner of a perverse nature to the practice of vice, by the hopes of impunity. Accordingly, that great Philo- sopher, at the end of his Prin- cipia, makes a singular remark, namely, That we do not say, My eternal, my infinite, because these attributes do not at all relate to our nature, but we say, My God, and are thereby to understand the master and preserver of our life, the object of our thoughts. Newton's philosophy leads to the knowledge of a Supreme Being, who freely created and arranged all things. For if the world be finite, if there be a vacuum, the existence of matter is not neces- sary, and, therefore, has received existence from a free cause. If matter gravitates, it does not appear to gravitate from its na- ture, as it is extended by its . nature ; it has, therefore, re- ceived its gravitation from God. . If the planets, in a space void of resistance, revolve one way ra- ther than another, the hand of their Creator must have directed their course that way, with an absolute freedom. It may, perhaps, appear strange to many, that among all the proofs of the existence of a God, the strongest, in Newton's opinion, is that of final causes. The de- sign, or rather the designs, vari- ous ad infinitum, displayed in the most enormous and most mi- nute parts of the universe, form a demonstration, which, from its being so manifestly sensible, is little regarded by some philoso- phers ; but Newton thought that these infinite relations could only be the work of an artist infinitely wise. He made little account of the proof from the succession of beings. It is commonly said, that if men, animals, vegetables, and whatever compose this world, were eternal, a series of genera- tions without cause must, of con- sequence, be admitted. The ex- istence of these beings, it is said, would have no origin ; no eter- nal can be supposed to rise again from generation to generation without a beginning' ; no eter- nal, because no one can exist of itself. Thus every thing would be effect, and nothing cause. This argument appeared to him founded only on the ambiguity of generations, and of beings formed one by the other. For Atheists, who admit a plenum, answer, that there are, properly speaking, no generations : there are not several substances : the universe is a whole, necessarily existing, incessantly displaying itself. It is one and the same being, whose nature is immuta- GOD GOD ble in its substance, and eternally varied in its modifications. Thus the argument drawn from the succession of beings would, per- haps, prove very little against an Atheist who should deny the plurality of beings. He would have recourse to those ancient axioms, that nothing is produced by nothing ; that one substance cannot produce another ; that every thing is eternal and ne- cessary. Matter, says the Atheist, is necessary, because it exists ; mo- tion is necessary, because nothing is at rest ; and motion is so ne- cessary, that in nature never any motive forces are lost. What is to-day was yesterday ; therefore, it was before yester- day, and thus recurring without end. No person will dare to say, that things shall return to nothing ; how, then, dare to say, that they came from no- thing ? In a word, I know not if there be a metaphysical proof m ore striking, and which speaks more strongly to man than the admirable order in the world ; and whether there has ever been a finer argument than the fol- lowing : The heavens declare the glory of God. Accordingly, you see that Newton, at the end of his Optics and Principia, uses no other. No reasoning appeared to him more grand and convinc- ing in favour of a Deity than that of Plato, who makes one of his interlocutors say, You think I have an intelligent soul, because you perceive order in my words and actions ; surely, then, from the order you see in this world, there must be in it a spirit su- premely intelligent. But if the existence of an eter- nally almighty Being be proved, is it not equally proved that this Being is infinitely good in the general sense of the word? This is the grand refuge of the Atheist. If I admit a God, says he, this God must be good- ness itself. He who has given me a being, should also give me happiness: but I see only dis- order and calamity among man- kind. The necessity of an eter- nal matter offends me less than a Creator dealing so harshly with his creatures. My doubts are not to be removed by being told, that a first man, composed of a body and soul, offended his Creator, and that mankind suffers for his offence. For if our bodies are derived from the first man, our souls are not ; and even if they are, it seems the most hor- rid injustice for the punishment to descend from the father to the children. It is evident, that the Ameri- cans, and the people of the old world, the Negroes and the Lap- landers, are not at all descended from that first man. The interior constitution of the organs of the Negroes is a palpable demonstra- tion of this. I had, therefore, rather admit the necessity of matter, generations, and eternal vicissitudes than a God, the free author of miserable creatures. To this, it is answered, The words, good, comfort, and hap- piness, are equivocal: what is evil with regard to you, is good in the general plan. Will you deny a God, because you have been afflicted with a fever ? You say he owed you happiness : but what reason have you to think u GOD GOD w ? Why did he owe you this happiness? Was you in any treaty with him ? Therefore, to be only happy in this life, you need only acknowledge a God. You who cannot pretend to be perfect in any one thing", how can you ex- pect to be perfectly happy ? But suppose, that in a continual hap- piness for one hundred years, you may have a Gtof the head-ach, shall this short interval induce you to deny a Creator? Surely no. If, therefore, you do not startle at a quarter of an hour's suffering 1 , why at two hours ? Why at a day ? Why should a year of torment prevail on you to reject the belief of a supreme universal Artisan ? It is proved, that there is in this world more good than evil ; for, after all, few men are to be found who really wish for death. Men are fond of murmuring; there is a pleasure in complain- ing-, but more in living. We delight in viewing only evil, and exaggerating it. Read history, it is replied; what is it more than a continual series of crimes and misfortunes? Agreed; but his- tories are only the repositories of great events: tempests only are recorded ; calms are overlooked. After examining the relations between the springs and organs of an animal, and the designs which display themselves in every part, the manner by which this animal receives life, by which he sustains it, and by which he gives it, you readily acknowledge the supreme Artist. Will you, then, change your opinion, be- cause wolves eat the sheep, and spiders catch flies ? Do not you, on the contrary, perceive, that these continual generations, ever devoured, and ever re-produced, are a part of the plan of the uni- verse ? Wisdom and power, you say, are perceivable in them, but goodness is still wanting. In fine, if you may be happy to all eternity, can any pains and afflictions in this life be worth mentioning? You cannot think the Creator good, because there is some evil in this world. But if necessity supply the place of a Supreme Being, will affairs be mended? In the system which admits a God, some difficulties only are to be removed ; in all the other systems, we must encounter ab- surdities. Philosophy, indeed, plainly shows us that there is a God, but it cannot teach us what he is, what he is doing, how and wherefore he does it; whether he exists in time or in space ; whether he has commanded once, or whether he is always acting ; whether he be in matter, or whe- ther he be not there, &c. To himself only, these things are known. Voltaire. GOD, KNOWLEDGE OF. Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself ; though he has stampt no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being ; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness , since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point, since he has so plentifully pro- GOD vided us with the means to dis- cover and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our being-, and the great concernment of our happiness. But though this be the most obvious truth that rea- son discovers, and though its evi- dence be (if 1 mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty, yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive know- ledge, or else we shall be as un- certain and ignorant of this as of other propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear de- monstration. To show, there- fore, that we are capable of know- ing, i. e. being certain that there is a God ; and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no further than ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence. Man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that nonentity, or the ab- sence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should know any demonstration in Euclid. If therefore, we know there is some real being, and that nonentit cannot produce any real being it is an evident demonstration that from eternity there has been something ; since what was no from eternity had a beginning and what had a beginning mus be produced by something else. Next, it is evident, that wha had its being and beginnin; from another, must also hav all that which is in, and belong GOD to its being, from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to, and received from the same source. This eternal source, then, of all being, must also be the source and original of all power : and so this eternal Being must be also the most powerful. Again, a man finds in himself perception and knowledge : we have then got one step further ; and we are certain now, that there is not only some being, but some knowing intelligent being in the world. There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to be ; or else there has been also a knowing being from eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no being had any know- ledge, when that eternal being was void of all understanding : I reply, that then it was impos- sible there should ever have been any knowledge; it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and ope- rating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it it impossi- ble that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as re- pugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put in- to itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater an- gles than two right ones. Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we in- fallihly*find in our own consti- tution, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth that there is an GOO eternal, most powerful, and most knowing- Being; which, whe- ther any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident; and from this idea, duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other attri- butes which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. If, never- theless, any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance, and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind hap- hazard ; 1 shall leave with him that very rational and emphati- cal rebuke of Tully, 1. ii. De Leg., to be considered at his leisure: " What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside, there is no such thing ? Or that those things, which, with the utmost stretch of his reason, he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?" Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tarn stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem putet inesse, in ceelo mundoque non putet ? From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain knowledge of the exist- ence of a God, than of any thing our senses have not imme- diately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any thing else without us. When I ay we know, I mean there is such a knowledge within our reach which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that as we do to several other inquiries. Locke. GOOD, ITS PREVALENCE OVER EVIL. That the good overbal- ances the evil in the physical and moral world, is clear, from their subsisting with regularity and order. If evil preponderated in the former, nature would soon destroy herself; if in the latter, rational beings would put an end to their own existence. The preference of life to death in one, and the prevalence of order over disorder in the other, lead us to the same desirable conclusion. From the opposition of the differ- ent elements in the physical world arises all physical evil ; such as storms and earthquakes : but, from this same opposition, arises all the physical good ; such as the regularity of the whole, the vicissitude of season., gene- ration, vegetation, and an end- less variety of other beneficial effects. From the contrariety of interests in the moral world, arise wars, devastations, and murders ; but, from the same contrariety, proceed peace, order, harmony, commerce, art, and science, with every advantage of cultivated science. To complain that there is pain in the moral world, is as unreasonable, and as absurd, as to complain that there is dark- ness in the physical ; as all can- not be light in the one, so nei- ther can all be pleasure in the other. It is enough if pleasure preponderate ; and that point has been already established. * * GOVERNMENT, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A FREE AND A DES- POTIC ONE. The difference be- GOV GOV tween a free and a despotic state, consists in the manner in which that whole mass of power, which, taken together, is su- preme, is, in a free state, distri- buted among the several ranks of persons that are sharers in it : in the source from whence their titles to it are successively de- rived: in the frequent and easy changes of condition between the governors and governed ; whereby the interests of one class are more or less indistin- guishably blended with those of the other: in the responsibility of the governors ; or the right which a subject has of having the reasons publicly assigned and canvassed of every act of power that is exerted over him: in the liberty of the press ; or the security with which every man, be he of the one class or the other, may make known his complaints and remonstrances to the whole community ; in the liberty of public associations ; or the security with which malcon- tents may communicate their sen- timents, concert their plans, and practise every mode of opposi- tion short of actual revolt, before the executive power can be jus- tified in disturbing them. Jer. Bentham. GOVERNMENT, RESISTANCE TO. It is then, and not till then, al- lowable to, if not incumbent on every man, as well on the score of duty as of interest, to enter into measures of resistance, when, according to the best calculation he can make, the probable mis- chiefs of resistance (speaking with respect to the community ia general), appear less to him than the probable mischiefs of submission. This, then, is to him, that is, to each man in particular, the juncture of resistance. A natural question here is : By what sign shall this juncture be known? By what common signal alike conspicuous to all ? A com- mon sign there is none. Every man must be determined by his own internal persuasion of a ba- lance of utility on the side of re- sistance; for utility is the test and measure of loyalty. It may be said, that the letter of the law is the measure of government in free states ; and not that other loose and general rule, To govern in subservience to the happiness of the people. True it is, that the governing in opposition to the law is one way of governing in opposition to the happiness of the people : the natural effect of such a contempt of the law being, if not actually to destroy, at least, to threaten with destruc- tion, all those rights and privi- leges that are founded on it; rights and privileges, on the en- joyment of which that happiness depends. But still this is not sufficient; and that for several reasons. First, Because the most mischievous, and under some constitutions the most feasible, method of governing in opposi- tion to the happiness of the peo- ple, is, by setting the law itself in opposition to their happiness. Secondly, Because it is a case very conceivable, that a king may, to a great degree, impair the happiness of his people, without violating the letter of any single law. Thirdly, Because extraordinary occasions may now and then occur, m which the happiness of the people may be GOV GOV better promoted by acting 1 , for the moment, in opposition to the law, than in subservience to it. Fourthly, Because it is not any single violation of the law, as such, that can release the people from allegiance : for it is scarce ever any single violation of the law that, by being submitted to, can produce so much mischief as shall surpass the probable mis- -chief of resisting it. If every sin- gle instance whatever of such violation were to be deemed an entire release from allegiance, a man, who reflects at all, would scarce find any where under the sun, that government which he could allow to subsist for twenty years together. Utility, then, is the test and measure of all go- vernment: and the obligation of governors of every denomination to minister to general happiness, is an obligation superior to, and inclusive of every other. This is the reason why kings, on the one hand, should, in general, keep within established laws; and, to speak universally, abstain from all such measures as tend to the unhappiness of their sub- jects: and, on the other hand, why subjects should obey kings as long as they so conduct them- selves, and no longer; why they should obey, in short, so long as the probable mischiefs of obedience are less than the probable mischiefs of resist- ance: why, in a word, taking the whole body together, it is their duty to obey just so long as it is their interest, and no longer where a state is limited by express convention, as the German Empire, Dutch Pro- vinces, Swiss Cantons, and the ancient Acliaean league. There we may be furnished with a com- mon signal of resistance. A cer- tain act is in the instrument of convention specified, with res- pect to which, the government is therein precluded from issuing a law to a certain effect. A law is issued to that effect notwith- standing. The issuing, then, of such a law (the sense of it, and likewise the sense of that part of the convention which provides against it, being supposed clear) is a fact notorious and visible to all : in the issuing, then, of such a law, we have a fact which is capable of being taken for that common signal of resistance. These bounds the supreme body has marked out to its authority : of such a demarcation, then, what is the effect? Either none at all, or this, that the disposition to obedience confines itself within these bounds. Beyond them, the disposition is stopped from ex- tending : beyond them the sub- ject is no more prepared to obey the governing body of his own state, than that of any other. No convention, however, should prevent what the parties affected shall deem a reformation ; no disease in a state should be with- out its remedy. Such might, by some, be thought the case, where that supreme body, which, in such a convention, was one of the contracting parties, having incorporated itself with that which was the other, no longer subsists to give any new modi- fication to the engagement. Al- though that body itself, which contracted the engagement, be no more, a larger body, from whence the first is understood to GOV GOV have derived its title, may still subsist. Let this larger body be consulted. Various are the ways that might be conceived of doing this; and that without any dis- paragement to the dignity of the subsisting legislature ; of doing it to such effect, as that, should the sense of such larger body be favourable to the alteration, it may be made by a law; which, in this case, neither ought to be, nor probably would be, regarded by the people as a breach of the convention. Jer. Bentham. GOVERNMENT. Rank, privileges, and prerogatives in a state, are constituted for the good of the state ; and those who enjoy them, whether they be called kings, senators, or nobles, or by whatever names or titles they be distinguished, are, to all in- tents and purposes, the servants of the public, and accountable to the people for the discharge of their respective offices. If such magistrates abuse their trust, in the people lies the right of deposing, and conse- quently of punishing them. And the only reason why abuses which have crept into offices have been connived at, is, that the correcting them, by havin recourse to first principles, is far from being easy, except in small states; so that the re- medy would often be worse than the disease. But, in the largest states, if the abuses o government should at any time be great and manifest ; if th servants of the people, forget ting their masters, and thei masters' interest, should pursu a separate one of their own if, instead of considering tha they are made for the people, they should consider the people as made for them ; if the oppres- sions and violations of right should be great, flagrant, and universally resented ; if, in con- sequence of these circumstances, it should become manifest, that the risk which would be run in attempting a revolution would be trifling, and the evils which might be apprehended from it, were far less than those which were actually suffered, and which were daily increasing ; what principles are those which ought to restrain an injured and insulted people from asserting their natural rights, and from changing, or even punishing their governors ; that is, their servants, who had abused their trust ; or from altering the whole form of their government, if it appeared to be of a structure so liable to abuse? It will be said, that it is opening a door to re- bellion, to assert that magistrates abusing their power may be set aside by the people, who are of course their own judges when their power is abused. May not the people, it is said, abuse their power as well as their gover- nors ? I answer, It is very possi- ble they may abuse their power: it is possible they may imagine themselves oppressed when they are not: it is possible their animosity may be artfully and unreasonably inflamed by ambi- tious and enterprising men, whose views are often best an- swered by popular tumults and insurrections : and the people may suffer in consequence of their folly and precipitancy : But what man is there, or what GOV body of men (whose right to direct their own conduct was never called in question) bu are liable to be imposed upon and to suffer in consequence o their mistaken apprehensions and precipitate conduct ? With respect to large socie- ties, it is very improbable that the people should be too soon alarmed, so as to be driven to these extremities. In such cases, the power of the government, that is, of the governors, must be very extensive and arbitrary ; and the power of the people scattered and difficult to be united ; so that if a man have common sense, he will see it to be madness to propose, or to lay any measures against the go- vernment, except in case of very general and great oppression. Even patriots, in such circum- stances, will consider that pre- sent evils always appear greater in consequence of their being present ; but that future evils of a revolt, and a temporary anar- chy, may be much greater than are apprehended at a distance. They will also consider, that unless their measures be per- fectly well laid, and their success decisive, ending in a change, not of men, but of things ; not of governors, but of the rules and administration of government, they will only rivet their chains the faster, and bring upon them- selve and their country tenfold rain. So obvious are these difficul- ties that lie in the way of pro- curing redress of grievances by force of arms, that 1 think we may say, without exception, that in all cases of hostile opposition to government, the people must have been in the right ; and that nothing but very great oppression could drive them to such despe- rate measures. The bulk of a people seldom so much complain without reason, because they never think of complaining till they feel ; so that in all cases of dissatisfaction with government, it is most probable that the peo- ple are injured. The case, I own, may be otherwise in states of small extent, where the power of the governors is compara- tively small, and the power of the people great and soon united. If it be asked, how far a people may lawfully go in punishing their chief magistrates ? I an- swer, that if the enormity of the offence (which is of the same extent as the injury done to the public) be considered, any pu- nishment is justifiable that a man can incur in human society. It may be said, there are no laws to punish those governors, and we must not condemn persons by laws made ex post facto ; for this conduct will vindicate the most obnoxious measures of the most tyrannical administra- tion. But I answer, that this is a case, in its own nature, prior to the establishment of any laws whatever ; as it affects the very being of society, and defeats the principal ends for which recourse was originally had to it. There may be no fixed law against an open invader who should at- tempt to seize upon a country, with a view to enslave all its in- habitants ; but must not the in- vader be apprehended, and even put to death, though he had bro- ken no express law then in oov GOV being, or none of which he was properly apprised? And why should a man, who takes the advantage of being king, or governor, to subvert the laws and liberties of his country, be considered in any other light than that of a foreign invader ? Nay, his crime is much more atrocious ; as he was appointed the guardian of the laws and liberties which he subverts, and which he was therefore under the strongest obligation to main- tain. In a case, therefore, of this highly criminal nature, Sa- lus populi suprema est lex ; "That must be done which the " good of the whole requires:" and generally kings deposed, banished, or imprisoned,, are highly dangerous to a nation ; because, let them have governed ever so ill, it will be the interest of some to be their partisans, and to attach themselves to their cause. So plain are these first principles of all government, that they must overcome the meanest prejudices, and carry conviction to every one. What- ever be the form of any govern- ment, whoever be the supreme magistrates, or whatever be their number; that is, to whomsoever the power of the society is dele- gated, their authority is in its own nature reversible. No man can be supposed to resign his natural liberty, but on conditions. These conditions, whether they be expressed or not, must be violated, whenever the plain and obvious ends of government are not answered ; and a dele- gated power, perverted from the intention for which it was be- stowed, expires of course. Ma- gistrates, therefore, who consult not the good of the public, and who employ their power to op- press the people, are a public nuisance ; and their power is abrogated ip&o facto. fhis, however, can only be the case in extreme oppression, when the blessings of society and civil .go- vernment, great and important as they are, are bought too dear; when it is better not to be go- verned at all, than to be governed in such a manner ; or, at least, when the hazard of a change of government would be apparent- ly the less evil of the two ; and, therefore, these occasions rarely occur in the course of human af- fairs : but where they do occur, resistance is a duty ; and a re- gard to the good of society will certainly justify this conducA of the people. Priestley. GOVERNMENT, CIVIL. Whether government be the appointment of a pretended religion ; whether originating with the Patriarchs ; or owing to a social compact ; are not matters worthy of in- quiry. If it produce happipess at home, and be just and bene- ficent to all the world, it is good, it is valuable, and should be sup- ported. If it be otherwise ; if it render people corrupt, depraved, and miserable; if it be unjust and oppressive to its dependants and neighbours, its origin is not worth investigating: for, be its descent what it may, it is an in- jury, and an evil, and a curse, and mankind may and ought to treat it as such. Williams. GOVERNMENT. Had every man sufficient sagacity to perceive, at all times, the strong interest which binds him to the observ- GOV fence of justice and equity, and strength of mind sufficient to persevere " in a steady ad- herence to a general and a dis- tinct interest, in opposition to the allurements of present plea- sure and advantage ; there had never, in that case, been any such thing as government or po- litical society; but each man, following his natural liberty, had lived in entire peace with all others. What need of positive laws, where natural justice is of itself a sufficient restraint? Why create magistrates, where there never arises any disorder or ini- quity ? Why abridge our native freedom, when, in every instance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial ? It is evident, that if government were totally useless, it never could have place ; and that the sole foundation of the duty of alle- giance is the advantage which it procures to society, by preserv- ing peace and order among man- kind. As the obligation to jus- tice is founded entirely on the 'interests of society, which re- quire mutual abstinence from pro- perty, in order to preserve peace among mankind, it is evident, that when the execution of jus- tice would be attended with very pernicious consequences, that virtue must be suspended, and give place to public utility, in such extraordinary and press- ing emergencies. The maxim, Fiatjustitia el mat ctelam, ' Let justice be performed though the universe be destroyed/ is appa- rently false, and by sacrificing the end to the means, shows a preposterous idea of the subor- dination of duties. What go- vernor of a town makes any scru- ple of burning the suburbs, when they facilitate the advances of the enemy f Or what general abstains from plundering- a neu- tral country, when the necessi- ties of war require it, and he cannot otherwise maintain his army ? The case is the same with the duty of allegiance ; and com- mon sense teaches us, that as government binds us to obedi- ence only on account of its ten- dency to public utility, that duty must always, in extraordinary cases, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original obli- gation. Solus populi suprema lex ; ' The safety of the people is the supreme law.' This maxim is agreeable to the sentiments of mankind in all ages. Accord- ingly, we may observe, that no nation, that could find any re- medy, ever yet suffered the cruel ravages of a tyrant, or were blamed for their resistance. Those who took up arms against Dionysius or Nero, or Philip II. have the favour of every reader in the perusal of their history ; and nothing but the most violent perversion of common sense can ever lead us to condemn them. Government is a mere human in- vention for the interest of so- ciety ; and where the tyranny of the governor removes this in- terest, it also removes the obli- gation to obedience. Resistance, therefore, being admitted in ex- traordinary cases, the question can only be with regard to the degree of necessity which can justify resistance, and render it lawful and commendable, which can only be in desperate cases GOV GOV when the public is in the highest danger from violence and ty- ranny. For besides the mischiefs of a civil war, which commonly attend insurrections, it is certain that, where a disposition to re- bellion appears among any peo- ple, it is one chief cause of ty- ranny in the rulers. Thus the tyrannicide, or assassination ap- proved of by ancient maxims, instead of keeping tyrants and usurpers in awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelent- ing, and is now justly, on that account, abolished by the laws of nations. Hume. GOVERNMENT, JUST. The general good is the end of all just go- vernment ; and all the rules of conduct agreed upon, all the statutes, laws, and precepts en- acted and promulgated, are made with a view to promote and se- cure the public good, and, there- fore, the very nature and design of government requires new laws to be made, whenever it is found that the old ones are not suffi- cient, and old ones to be re- pealed, whenever they are found to be mischievous in their opera- tion. If the essential parts of any system of civil government are found to be inconsistent with the general good, the end of govern- ment requires that such bad sys- tem should be demolished, and a new one formed, by which the public weal shall be more effec- tually secured. And, further, if, under any constitution of go- vernment, the administration should vary from the fundamen- tal design of promoting and se- curing the common good, in such case the subjects are in duty bound to join all their strengtl to reduce matters to their ori- ginal good order. Laythrop't Sermon at Boston. GOVERNMENT, PRINCIPLES OF. To begin with first principles, we must, for the sake of gaining clear ideas on the subject, do what almost all political writers have done before us ; that is, we must suppose a number of people existing, who experience the in- convenience of living independ- ent and unconnected ; who are exposed, without redress/* to in- sults and wrongs of various kinds, and are too weak to procure themselves many of the advan- tages which they are sensible might easily be compassed by united strength. These people, if they would engage the protec- tion of the whole body, and join their force in enterprises and un- dertakings, calculated for the common good, must voluntarily resign some part of their natural liberty, and submit their conduct to the direction of the commu- nity : for without these concep- tions, such an alliance, attended with such advantages, could not be formed. Were these people few in number, and living within small distances of one another, it might be easy for them to as- semble upon every occasion, in which the whole body was con- cerned, and every thing might be determined by the votes of the majority, provided they had previously agreed the votes of the majority to be decisive. But were the society numerous, their habitations remote, and the oc- casions on which the whole body must interpose frequent, it would be absolutely impossible that all the members of the state should GOV HAB assemble, or give their attention to public business. In this case, though, with Rousseau, it be giving- up their liberty, there must be deputies or public officers appointed to act in name of the whole body ; and, in a state of very great extent, where all the people could never be assembled, the whole power of the commu- nity must necessarily, and almost irreversibly, be lodged in the hands of these deputies. It may be said, no society on earth was ever formed in the manner re- presented above. I answer, it is true ; because all governments whatever have been, in some measure, compulsory, tyrannical, and oppressive, in their origin ; but the method I have described must be allowed to be the only equitable and fair method of forming a society. And since every man retains, and can never be deprived of his natural right, (founded on a regard to the general good) of relieving him- self from all oppression, that is, from every thing that has been imposed upon him without his own consent ; this must be the only true and proper foundation of all the governments subsisting in the world, and that to which the people who compose them have an unalienable right to bring them back. It must ne- cessarily be understood, then, whether it be expressed or not, that all people live in society for their mutual advantage, so that the good and happiness of the members, that is, the majority of the members, of any state, is the great standard by which every tiling relating to that state must Itoally be determined. And though it may be supposed, that a body of people may be bound by a voluntary resignation of all their interests to a single person, or to a few, it can never be sup- posed that the resignation is ob- ligatory on their posterity, be- cause it is manifestly contrary to the good of the whole that it should be so. In treating of par- ticular regulations in states, this principle must necessarily ob- trude itself; all arguments in favour of any law being always drawn from a consideration of its tendency to promote the pub- lic good. Virtue and right con- duct consist in those affection* and actions which terminate in general utility; justice and vera- city, for instance, have nothing intrinsically excellent in them, separate from their relation to the happiness of mankind; and the whole system of right to power, property, and every thing else in society, must be regulated by the same consideration : the decisive question, when any of these subjects are examined, be- ing, What is it that the good of the community requires?- Priestly. HABIT. We are what we are made by the objects that surround us ; To expect that a man who sees other objects, and who leads a life different from mine, should have the same ideas that 1 have, would be to require contradicti- ons. Why does a Frenchman resemble another Frenchman, more than a German, and a Ger- man much more than a Chinese ? Because these two nations, by their education, and the resem- blance of the object* presented to them, have an infinitely greater HAB HAS connection with each other than with the Chinese. Ifelvetvtts. HABIT, INFLUENCE OF. The in- fluence of habit arises from the natural indolence of man ; and this indolence increases in pro- portion as he indulges himself in it: it is easier to do as we have done before, than to strike out any thing new. The influence of habit is great over old men and indolent persons ; it seldom affects youth. Habit is conveni- ent only to weak minds, which it enfeebles daily more and more. Habit in every thing destroys the powers of the imagination ; these are excited only by the no- velty of the object. The imagi- nation is never employed on those objects which are familiar to us; these affect only the memory ; and hence we see the season ol the axiom, Ab assuetis non sit pastsio ; for the passions are lighted only at the fire of the imagination. Rousseau. HABIT, WHAT IT is. General states of mind, turns of thought and fixed habits which are the consequences of them, arise from education and the circumstances men are placed in. It is a ne- cessary effect of the principles o association, that the mind grows callous to new impressions con- tinually ; it being already occu- pied with ideas and sensation: which render it indisposed to re ceive others, especially of an he terogeneous nature. In conse quence, we seldom see any con siderable change in a person' temper and habits, after he i grown to man's estate ; nothing short of an entire revolution in his circumstances and mode o life can effect it Priestley]; HABITS, MORAL AND AND THEIR INFLUENCE! ITf POLI- TICAL SOCIETY. The" end of every individual is his own gobd. The rules he observes in the pursuit of this good are a system of propositions, almost every one founded in authority : that is, derive their weight from the credit given to one or more per- sons, and not from demonstrati- on. And this in the most impor- tant, as well as the other affairs of life, is the case even of the wisest and philosophical part of the human species ; and that it should be so is the less strange, when we consider that it is per- haps impossible to prove that being, or life itself, has any other value than what is set on it by authority. A confirmation of this may be derived from the ob- servation, that in every country in the universe happiness is sought upon a different plan ; and, even in the same country, we see it placed, by different ages, professions, and ranks of men, in the attainment of enjoy- ments utterly unlike.- These propositions, as well as others framed upon them, become ha- bitual by degrees ; and, as they govern the determinations of the will, I call them moral habits. There are another set of habits that have the direction of the body, that I call therefore me- chanical habits. These compose what we commonly call the arts ; which are more or less liberal or mechanical, as they more or less partake of assistance from the operations of the mind. The cu- mulus of the moral habits of each individual is the manners of that individual ; the cumulus of the HAP HAP manners of individuals makes up the manners of a nation. The happiness of individuals is evi- dently the ultimate end of poli- tical society ; and political wel- fare, or the strength, splendour, and opulence of the state, have been always admitted, both by political writers, and the valua- ble part of mankind in general, to conduce to this end ; and are therefore desirable. The causes that advance or obstruct any one of these three objects are exter- nal or internal. The latter may be divided into physical, civil, and personal ; under which last head I comprehend the moral and mechanical habits of man- kind. The physical causes are principally climate, soil, and number of subjects ; the civil are government and laws; and political welfare is always in a ratio composed of the force of these particular causes ; a multi- tude of external causes, and all these internal ones : and not on- ly control and qualify, but are constantly acting on, and there- by insensibly, as well as sensibly, altering one another both for the better and the worse ; and this not excepting the climate itself. Franklin. HAPPINESS. A considerable part of our happiness consists in the desire itself. It is with happiness as with the golden bird cent by the fairies to a young princess : The bird settles at thirty paces from her ; she goes to catch it, advances softly, is ready to seize it ; the bird flies thirty paces fur- ther ; she passes several months in the pursuit, and is happy. If the bird had suffered itself to be taken at first, the princess would have put it in a cage, and in one week would have been tired of it. This is the bird of happiness which we incessantly pursue ; we catch it not, and are happy in the pursuit, because we are secure from disgust. If our de- sires were to be every instant gratified, the mind would lan- guish in inaction, and sink under disquietude. Man must have de- sires. Few men, however, ac- knowledge they have this want ; it is nevertheless to a succession of their desires they owe their happiness Helvetius. HAPPINESS OF DIFFERENT STATI- ONS FROM THE DIFFERENT EM- PLOYMENT OF TIME. Men hun- ger and thurst ; they require to lie with their wives, to sleep, &c. Of the twenty-four hour* of the day they employ ten or twelve in providing for these se- veral wants. As soon as they are gratified, from the dealer in rabbit-skins to the monarch, all are equally happy. It is in vain to say that the table of wealth is more delicate than that of medi- ocrity. When the labourer is well fed, he is content. The dif- ferent cookery of different people proves only that good cheer is that to which we have been ac- customed. If labour be general- ly regarded as an evil, it is be- cause, in most governments the necessaries of life are not to be had without excessive labour ; from whence the very idea of labour constantly excites that of pain. Labour, however, is not pain in itself: habit renders it easy ; and when it is pursued without remarkable fatigue, is in itself an advantage. How many artisans are there who, when rich, HAP HEL still continue their occupations, and quit them not without regret when age obliges them to it ? There is nothing that habit does not render agreeable. The busy man is the happy man. To prove this, I distinguish two sorts of pleasures. The first are the plea- sures of the senses. These are founded on corporeal wants, are enjoyed by all conditions of men ; and at the time of enjoy- ment all are equally happy. But these pleasures are of short du- ration. The others are the plea- sures of expectation. Among these I reckon all the means of procuring corporeal pleasures; these means are by ' expectation always converted into real plea- sures. When a joiner takes up his plane, what does he experi- ence 1 All the pleasures of ex- pectation annexed to the pay- ment for his work. Now these pleasures are not experienced by the opulent man. He is there- fore always uneasy, always in motion, continually rolling about in his carriage, like the squirrel in his cage, to get rid of his dis- gust. The wealthy idler expe- riences a thousand instances of anxiety, while the labouring man enjoys the continual pleasure of fresh expectations. In general, every useful occupation fills up in the most agreeable manner the interval that separates a gratified from a rising want ; that is, the ten or twelve hours of the day, when we most envy the in- dolence of the rich, and think they enjoy superior happiness. Employment gives pleasure to every moment ; but is unknown to the great and idle opulent The measure of our wealth whatever prejudice may think, is not, therefore, the measure of our happiness. Great treasures are the appearance of happi- ness, not the reality ; so that the workman in his shop, or the tradesman behind his counter, is often more happy than his so- vereign. The condition of the workman who can by a mode- rate labour provide for his wants and those of his family, when the habit of labour has been ear- ly contracted, is nearly as happy as it can be, nay, is perhaps of all conditions the most happy. The want that compels his mind to application, and his body to exercise, is a preservative against discontent and disease : now these are evils ; joy and health, advantages. Therefore, without being equal in wealth and digni- ty, individuals may be equal in felicity. It was hot on the tomb of Croesus, but on that of Bau- cis, this epitaph was engraved, His death was the evening of a beautiful day. Helvetius. HELL. When men come to live m society, they could not but per- ceive that many evil-doers esca- ped the severity of the laws ; these could affect only open crimes ; so that a curb was want- ing against clandestine guilt, and religion alone could be such a curb. The Persians, the Chal- deans, the Egyptians, and the Greeks, introduced a belief of punishments after this life ; and, of all ancient nations we are ac- quainted with, the Jews alone admitted only temporal pu- nishments. At length the Pha- risees and Essenes, among the Jews, admitted the belief of a hell in their way. This dogma HE* HER the Greeks had already dissemi- nated among the Romans, and the Christians made it a capital article of faith. Several fathers of the Church did not hold the eternity of hell' torments ; they thought it very hard that a poor man should be burning for ever and ever only for stealing a g-oat. Not long since, an honest well-meaning- Hugenot minister advanced in his sermons, and even in print, that tbere would be a day of grace to the damned ; that there must be a proportion between the trespass and the penalty ; ane that a momentary fault could not deserve an ever- lasting punishment. Voltaire. HEREDITARY SUCCESSION IN GO- VERNORS. The highest offices of all in a state ought to be here- ditary in some measure, espe- cially the office equivalent to that of King. Experience teaches us this maxim, elective mo- narchies having generally been the theatres of cabal, confusion, and misery. It must be acknow- ledged, however, to be exceed- ingly hazardous to the liberties of a people to have any office of importance filled by the same persons, or their descendants, frequently. The boundaries of very great power can never be so exactly defined, but that, when it becomes the interest of meet to extend them, and when so flattering an object is kept so long time in view, op- portunities will be found for the purpose. What nation would not have been enslaved by the uncontroverted succession only of three such princes as Henry IV. of France, and Henry VII. of England, or the present king of Prussia ? The more ac- complished and glorious they were as warriors or statesmen, the more dangerous would they be as princes in free states. It is nothing but the continual fear of a revolt in favour of some rival, that could keep such prin- ces within any bounds ; i. e. that could make it their interest to court the favour of the people. Hereditary nobles stand in the same predicament as hereditary princes. The long continuance of the same parliaments have all the same tendency. But though it be evident that no office of great power or trust should be suffered to continue a long time in the same hands, the suc- cession might be so rapid, that the remedy would be worse than the disease. But though the exact medium of political liberty, with respect to the continuance of men in power, be not easily fixed, it is not of much conse- quence to do it ; since a consi- derable degree of perfection in government will [admit of great varieties in this respect. Priestly. HEREDITARY SUCCESSION IN GO- VERNMENT. Of all the various forms of government which have prevailed in the world, an here- ditary monarchy seems to pre- sent the fairest scope for ridi- cule, io it possible to relate, without an indignant smile, that, on the father's decease, the pro- perty of a nation, like that of a drove of oxen, descend^ to the infant son, as yet unknown to mankind and to himself; and the fairest warriors and the wisest statesmen, relinquishing their natural right to empire, HER HOS approach the royal cradle with bended knees, and protestations of inviolable fidelity? Satire and declamation may paint these obvious topics in the most daz- zling- colours ; but our most serious thoughts will respect an useful prejudice that establishes a rule of succession independant of the passions of mankind ; and we shall cheerfully acquiesce in any expedient which deprives the multitude of the dangerous, and indeed the ideal power of giving- themselves a master. In the cool shade of retirement, we may easily devise imaginary forms of government, in which the sceptre shall be constantly bestowed on the most worthy, by the free and incorrupt suf- frage of the whole community. Experience overturns these airy fabrics ; and teaches us, that, in a large society, the election of a monarch can never devolve to the wisest or to the most nu- merous part of the people. The army is the only order of men sufficiently united to concur in the same sentiments, and power- ful enough to impose them on their fellow-citizens ; but the temper of soldiers, habituated at once to violence and slavery, renders them very unfit guar- dians of a legal, and even civil constitution. Justice, humanity, or political wisdom, are qualities they are too little acquainted with in themselves to appreciate them in others. Valour will acquire their esteem, and libe- rality will purchase their suf- frage; but the first of these merits is often lodged in the most savag-e breasts: the latter can only exert itself at the ex- pence of the public; and both may be turned against the pos- sessor of the throne by the am- bition of a daring rival: The superior prerogatives of birth, when it has obtained the sanc- tion of time and popular opinion, is the plainest and least invidious of [all distinctions among- man- kind. The acknowledged right extinguishes the hopes of fac- tion, and the conscious security disarms the cruelty of the mo- narch. To the firm establish- ment of this idea we owe the peaceful succession and mild ad- ministration of European mo- narchies ; to the defect of it we must attribute the frequent civil wars, through which an Asiatic despot is obliged to cut his way to the throne of his fathers. Gibbon. HISTORY, THE MIRACULOUS AND MARVELLOUS IN. It is the busi- ness of history to distinguish be- tween the miraculous and mar- vellous ; to reject the first in all narrations merely profane and human ; to scruple the second ; and when obliged by undoubted testimony, to admit of something- extraordinary, to receive as little of it as is consistent with the known facts and circumstances. Hume. HOSPITALS, FOUNDLING. Hospi- tals for foundlings seem favoura- ble to the increase of numbers, and perhaps may be so, when kept under proper restrictions. But when they open the door to every one, without distinction, they have, probably, a contrary effect, and are prejudicial to the state. It is computed, that every ninth child born at Paris is sent to the hospital, though it seems Y HUM certain, according to the common course of human affairs, that it is not a hundredth child whose pa- rents are altogether incapacitated to rear and educate him. The great difference for health, in- dustry, and morals, between the education in an hospital and that in a private family, should induce us not to make the entrance into an hospital too easy and engag- ing. To kill one's own child is shocking to nature, and must, therefore, be somewhat unusual ; but to turn over the care of him upon others is very agreeable to the natural indolence of man- kind. Hume. HUMANITY. Born without ideas, without vice, and without virtue, every thing in man, even his hu- manity, is an acquisition : it is to his education he owes his senti- ment. Among all the various ways of inspiring him with it, the most efficacious is to accustom him from childhood, in a manner from the cradle, to ask himself, when he beholds a miserable ob- ject, by what chance he is not exposed in like manner to the inclemency of the seasons, to hunger, cold, poverty, &c. When the child has been used to put himself in the place of the wretched, that habit gained, he becomes the more touched with their misery, as, in deploring their misfortunes, it is for human nature in general, and for him- self in particular, that he is con- cerned. An infinity of differen sentiments, then, mix with the first sentiment; and their assem- blage composes the total of the sentiment of pleasure felt by a noble soul in succouring the dis- tressed, a sentiment that he is HUM not always in a situation to ana- lyse. We relieve the unfortu- nate to avoid the pain of seeing them suffer. To enjoy an ex- ample of gratitude, which pro- duces in us, at least, a confused hope of distant utility ; to exhibit an act of power, whose exercise is always agreeable to us, be- cause it always recalls to the mind the images of pleasure at- tached to that power; and, lastly, because the idea of happiness is constantly connected, in a good education, with the idea of be- neficence, and this beneficence in us, conciliating the esteem and affection of men, may, like riches, be regarded as a power or means of avoiding pains and procuring pleasures : In this manner, as from an affinity of different sen- timents, is made up the total sentiment of the pleasure we feel in the exercise of benefi- cence. Helvetius. HUMANITY, PRACTICE OF. In or- der to love mankind, little must be expected from them. In or- der to view their faults without asperity, we must accustom our- selves to forgiveness, to a sense that indulgence is a justice which frail humanity has a right to re- quire from wisdom. Now, no- thing has a greater tendency to dispose us to indulgence, to close our hearts against hatred, and to open them to the principles of an humane and mild morality, than a profound knowledge of the human heart. Accordingly, the wisest men have always been the most indulgent. What beau- tiful maxims of morality are scat- tered through their works ! It was the saying of Plato, ' Live ' with your inferiors and domes HYP IDE ' tics as with unfortunate friends/ ' Must I always/ said an Indian philosopher, ' hear the rich cry- ' ing- out, Lord, destroy all who ' take from us the least parcel of ' our possessions ; while the poor ' man, with a plaintive voice, and ' eyes lifted up to heaven, cries, ' Lord, g-ive me a part of the ' g-oods thou dealest out in such ' profusion to the rich ; and if ' others less happy deprive me of ' a part, instead of imprecating- ' thy vengeance, I shall consider ' these thefts in the same manner ' as in seed-time we see the doves ' ranging- over the fields in quest ' of their food.' Helvetius. HUMANITY. The folly and wick- edness of human nature does not fill a man of sense and humanity with indignation : he, like De- mocritus, sees in them none but fools : or children, against whom it would be ridiculous to be of- fended, and who are more worthy of pity than of anger. There are some men who are not humane because they have been imposed upon, and whose humanity de- creases in proportion as they ob- tain more knowledge ; but the man of genuine sense and hu- manity is constantly the friend of mankind, because he alone is ac- quainted with the nature of man. He considers men with the eye of a mechanic ; and, without in- sulting- humanity, complains that nature has united the preserva- tion of one being to the destruc- tion of another ; that, to afford nourishment, he orders the hawk to seize in his talons the dove ; made it necessary for the insect to be devoured, and rendered every being an assassin. Hel- tctius. HYPOCRISY. To act the part of a hypocrite is a task at once so painful and so difficult, that no- thing but the most violent effort of patience and artifice can sup- port a long and successful per- formance of it. Let us always be fearful of giving- too much to the mind, by taking too much away from the heart. If we en- joy some talents wherewith we deceive others, how many more talents do we not possess which seduce us to impose upon our- selves? The willingness with which we are apt to credit the supposed exertions of hypocrisy, may, perhaps, arise from the not having sufficiently reflected on the nature of the human heart. All who have observed the em- pire which our interest maintains over our opinions, must have met with ample reason to be con- vinced that its own successes soon prove the means of its de- struction. We lead off, by dis- honestly affecting- certain prac- tices and sentiments ; and when this imposture hath broug-ht us within the reach of applying- some great part, of commanding- mankind, and of receiving from them riches and consequence, we begin to repose in it more trust ; and it at length happens, that by little and little our in- terest attains to the power of consolidating in our mind the basis of our authority. It is an old remark, that gamesters begin by being dupes, and end by being- knaves: in matters of opinion the case is reversed, and we be- gin by being knaves, and end by being dupes. Chatelleitr. IDEA OF BODY EQUALLY OBSCURE AS THAT OF SPIRIT. If anv one IDE IDE say, he knows not what it is that thinks in him, he means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking- thing 1 . If he says he knows not how he thinks, I an- swer, neither knows he how he is extended, how the solid parts of body are united, or cohere tog-ether to make extension. For though the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter, that are grosser than the particles of air, and have pores less than the corpuscles of air ; yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain, nor can be a cause of, the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And if the pressure of the ether, or any subtiler matter than the air, may unite and hold fast together the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies; yet it can- not make bonds for itself, and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that materia subtilis. So that that hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by showing that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bo- dies, reaches not the parts of the ether itself: and by how much the more evidently it proves that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the ether, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and unity ; by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the ether itself, which we can nei- ther conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible ; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies. But, in truth, the pressure of any ambient fluid, how great so- ever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter. For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies one from another in a line perpen- dicular to them, as in the experi- ment of two polished marbles ; yet it can never in the least hin- der the separation by a motion in a line parallel to those sur- faces ; because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space deserted by a lateral motion, resists such a motion of bodies so joined, no more than it would resist the motion of that body were it on all sides environed by that fluid, and touched no other body: And therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion. For if the pressure of the ether be the adequate cause of co- hesion, whe rever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate against such a lateral separation, therefore in every imaginary plane, intersecting any mass of matter, there could be no more cohesion than of two polished surfaces, which will al- ways, notwithstanding any ima- ginary pressure of a fluid, easily slide one from another. So that, perhaps, how clear an idea so- ever we think we have of the extension of body, which is no- thing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider IDE IDE it in his mind, may have reason to conclude, that it is as easy for him to have a clear idea how the soul thinks, as how the body is extended. For since body is no further nor otherwise extend- ed than by the union and co- hesion of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the ex- tension of body, without under- standing- wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts ; which seems to me as incompre- hensible as the manner of think- ing-, and how it is performed. I allow it is usual for most peo- ple to wonder how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day ob- serve. Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the parts of bodies stick firmly tog-ether ? Is there any thing more com- mon? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like I say concerning thinking and vo- luntary motion : Do we not ex- periment it in ourselves? and, therefore, can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confess : but when we would a little nearer look into it, and con- sider how it is done, there, I think, we are at a loss both in the one and the other ; and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourselves perceive or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of g-old or brass (that but now, in fusion, were as loose from one another as the particles of water, or the sands of an hour-glass,) come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of men's arms cannot se parate them. Any considering- man will, I suppose, be here at a loss to satisfy his own or another man's understanding-. The little bodies that compose that fluid we call water, are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one who, by a microscope, pretended to per- ceive their distinct bulk, figure, or motion ; and the particles of water are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force sensibly separates them : nay, if we consider their perpe- tual motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another: and yet let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate; these little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable. He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the cement that makes them stick so fast to one another, would discover a great and yet unknown secret; and yet, when that was done, would be far enough from making- the extension of body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts) in- telligible, till he could show wherein consisted the union or consolidation of the parts of those bonds, or of that cement, or of the least particle of matter that exists. Whereby it appears, that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible as any thing- belonging to our minds; and a solid extended substance as hard to be conceived as a thinking- im- material one, whatever difficul- ties some would raise against it. IDE IDE In the communication of mo- tion by impulse, wherein as much motion is lost to one body as is got to the other, which is the ordinariest case, we can have no other conception but the pass- ing 1 of motion out of one body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and inconceivable as how our minds move or stop our bodies by thought, which we every moment find they do. The increase of motion by im- pulse, which is observed or be- lieved sometimes to happen, is yet harder to be understood. We have, by daily experience, clear evidence of motion pro- duced both by impulse and by thought: but the manner how, hardly comes within our com- prehension ; we are equally at a loss in both. So that, however we consider motion and its com- munication either from body or spirit, the idea which belongs to spirit is at least as clear as that which belongs to body. And if we consider the active power of moving, it is much clearer in spirit than body; since two bo- dies, placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the ideas of power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed mo- tion: whereas the mind affords ideas of an active power every day of moving bodies ; and there- fore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirits, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only passive : those beings that are both active and passive, we may judge to par- take of both. But be that as it will, I think we have as many and as clear ideas belonging to spirit as we have belonging to body, the substance of each be- ing equally unknown to us; and the idea of thinking in spirit as clear as extension in body ; and the communication of motion by thought, which we attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse, which we ascribe to body. Constantexperience makes us sensible of these, though our narrow understandings can com- prehend neither. Sensation convinces us, that there are solid extended sub- stances ; and reflection, that there are thinking ones. Experience assures us of the existence of such beings, and that the one hath a power to move the body by impulse, the other by thought : this we cannot doubt of. Expe- rience, I say, every moment fur- nishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other; but beyond these ideas, as re- ceived from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire further into their nature, causes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do that of thinking. If we would explain them any fur- ther, one is as easy as the other; and there is no more dif- ficulty to conceive how a sub- stance we know not should by thought set body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist, than those belonging to spi- IDE IDE rit. Locke. IDEAS, DERIVED FROM QUALITIES IN BODIES. Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding-, that I call idea ; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snow-ball having a power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce those ideas in us as they are in the snow-ball, I call qualities ; and as they are sen- sations or perceptions in our un- derstandings, I call them ideas. Qualities thus considered in bodies, are, first, Such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in whatsoever state it be ; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force that can be used upon it, it con- stantly keeps ; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself be per- ceived by our senses : v. g. Take a grain of wheat; divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on till the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all these qualities. For division (which is all that a mill or pestle, or any other body, does upon another in reducing it to insensible parts] and never take away either so- lidity, extension, figure, or mo- bility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct or separate masses of matter of that which was before but one ; all which distinct masses, reck- oned as so many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number. These I call original or primary qualities of body ; which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure motion, or rest, and number. Secondly, Such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the ob- jects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i. e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts ; as colours, sounds, tastes, Sec. These I call secondary qualities. The next thing to be consi- dered is, how bodies produce ideas in us ; and that is mani- festly by impulse ; the only way which we conceive bodies ope- rate in. If, then, external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas in it, and yet we perceive these original qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses ; it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brain, or to the seat of sensation, there to produce on our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the extension figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and IDE IDE thereby convey to the brain some motion, which produces those ideas which we have of them in us. After the same manner that the ideas of these original quali- ties are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of se- condary qualities are also pro- duced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our senses, for it being- manifest that there are bodies, each whereof are so small that we cannot by any of our senses, discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, as is evident in the particles of air and water, and others extremely smaller than these, perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air or water are smaller than pease or hailstones ; the different motions and figures, bulk and number of such particles affecting 1 the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colours and smell of bodies, v. g. that a violet, by the im- pulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their mo- tions, causes the ideas of the blue colour and sweet scent of that flower, to be produced in our minds. From whence I think it is easy to draw this observation, That the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualites have no resem- blances of them at all. There is nothing- like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They are in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us ; and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call so. Flame is denominated hut and light , snow, white zndcold ; and manna, white and sweet, from the ideas they produce in us which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those ideas are in us ; the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror. But whoever considers that the same fire, that in one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does, at a nearer ap- proach, produce in us the far dif- ferent sensation of pain, will have no reason to say, that bhidea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire and his idea of pain, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is not in the fire The particular bulk, number figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow, are really in them whether one's senses perceive them or not; and therefore maybe called real qualities ; because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them, than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them ; let not the eyes see light or co- lours, nor the ears hear sounds ; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell ; and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their IDE IDE causes, /. e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts. Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet taste into an oily one. What real al- teration can the beating 1 of the pestle make in any body, but an alteration of the texture of it ? Ideas being 1 thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an account how the same water, at the same time, may produce the idea of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other ; whereas it is impossible that the same water, if those ideas were really in it, should at the same time be both hot and cold. For if we imagine warmth as it is in our hands to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits, we may understand how it is possible that the same water may at the time produce thesamesensation of heat in one hand, and cold in the other ; which yet figure never does, that never producing the idea of a square by one hand which has produced the idea of a globe by another. But if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the mo- tion of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any other body ; it is easy to be understood, that if that motion be greater in one hand that in the other ; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its mi- nute particles a greater motion that in those of one of the hands, and a less than in those of the other, it will increase the motion of the one hand, and lessen it in the other ; and so cause the dif- ferent sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon. -Locke IDEAS OF SENSATION CHANGED BY THE JUDGMENT. The ideas we receive by sensation are often altered by the judgment, with- out our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a roun 1 globe, of any uniform coloui, v. g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain, that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eye?, but we, having by use been ac customed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies aro wont to make on us, what alter ations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the sensible figure of bodies, the judgment presently, by an ha- bitual custom, alters the appear-- ances into the causes, so that, from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure, and an uniform colour, when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane variously coloured, as is evident in paint- ing. Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught, by his touch, to distinguish a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one, and when the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose, then, the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: Query, Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which IDE IDE is the globe, which the cube ? It may be answered, No : for though he has obtained the ex- perience how a globe, how a cube, affects his touch, yet he has not yet attained the experi- ence, that what affects his touch so or so, must affect the sight in the same manner ; or that a pro- tuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube. But this I think is not usually in any of our ideas but those re- ceived by sight; because sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and co- lours, which are peculiar only to that sense ; and also the far dif- ferent ideas of space, figure, or motion, the several varieties whereof change the appearance of its proper object, viz. light anc colours, we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many cases, by a settled habit in things whereo we have frequent experience, is performed so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by the judg- ment, so that one, viz. that ol sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself; as a man who reads or hears with attention or understanding, takes little notice of the characters or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them. Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how very quick the actions of the mind are per- formed, for as itself is thought to take up no space, to have no extension, so its actions seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be crowed into an instant. I speak this in com- parison to the actions of the body. Any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were, in an instant, do our minds, with one glance, see all the parts of a demonstra- tion, which may very well be called a long one, if we consider the time it will require to put it into words, and, step by step, show it another? We shall not be so much surprised that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider how the facility which we get of doing things by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without our no- tice. Habits, especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce actions in us, which often escape our observa- tion. How frequently do we in a day cover our eyes with our eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark ? Men, that by custom, have got the use of a by-word, do, almost in every sentence, pronounce sounds, which, though taken notice of by others, they themselves nei- ther hear nor observe, and, there- fore, it is not so strange that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it. Locke. IDEAS, ASSOCIATION OF. It is evi- dent, that there is a principle of connection between the different thoughts and ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to IDE i IDE the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a cer- tain degree of regularity and method. In our more serious thinking and discourse, this is so observable, that any particular thought which breaks in upon this regular track or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering re- veries, nay, in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not alto- gether at adventures, but that there was still a connection up- held among the different ideas which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest con- versation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions ; or, where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of the discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him away from the subject of conversation. Among the languages of different na- tions, even where we cannot suspect the least connection and communication, it is found, that the words expressive of ideas the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other, a certain proof, that the simple ideas, comprehended in the com- pound ones, were bound together by some universal principle, which had aa equal influence on all mankind. The principles o connection among ideas appear to be only three in number, viz resemblance, contiguity in time and place, and cause and effect Contrast or contrariety is a con nection among ideas, which may- perhaps, be considered as a mix, ture of causation and resem- blance. Where two objects are contrary, the one destroys the other, i. e. is the cause of its an- nihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an object implies the idea of its former existence. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original : this depends on the principle of re- semblance. The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an inquiry or discourse concerning the others: this ori- ginates from the contiguity of the apartments. If we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which fol- lows it: this arises from the con- nection between cause and effect. This subject is copious; and many operations of the human mind depend on the connection, or association of ideas, which is here described, particularly the sympathy between the passions and imagination will, perhaps, appear remarkable, while we observe that the affections, ex- cited by one object, pass easily to another connected with it, but transfuse themselves with difficulty, or not at all, along different objects, which have no manner of connection together. By introducing into any compo- sition personages and actions fo- reign to each other, an injudi- cious authorloses thatcommunica- tion of emotions, by which alone he can interest the heart, and raise the passions to their proper height and period. That this enumeration of the principles of the association of ideas is com- plete, and that there are no other IDE IDE except these, may be difficult to prove to the reader's satisfaction, and even to a man's own satis- faction. Hume. IDEAS, THE ORIGIN OF. ALL the perceptions of the mind may be divided into two species, distin- guished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are denomi- nated ideas ; the other species we shall call impressions. By the term impression, may be un- derstood all our more lively per- ceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. There is a considerable difference between the percep- tions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensa- tion, or anticipates it by his ima- gination. These faculties may copy the perceptions of the senses ; but the utmost we say of them, even when they operate with the greatest vigour, is, that they represent the object in so lively a manner, that we could almost say we feel or see it: but except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they ne- ver can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these per- ceptions altogether undistin- guishable. A man in a fit of anger is actuated in a very dif- ferent manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me of a person in love, I easily understand your mean- ing, and form a just conception of his situation ; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of that passion. All our ideas are copies of our impressions. When we analyse our thoughts or ideas, we always find, that they resolve them- selves, however compounded, into such simple ideas, as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. If it happen from a defect of the organ that a man is not sensible of any species of sensation, we always -find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of co- lours ; a deaf man of sounds. The case is the same, if the ob- ject, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ. A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the relish of wine. A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge. There is a phenome- non, which may prove it not to be impossible for ideas to arise independent of impressions. The several ideas of colours and of sounds are really different from each other, though resembling. If this be true of different co- lours, it must be so of the dif- ferent shades of the same colour; each shade produces a distinct idea. Suppose a person to have enjoyed his sight thirty years, and to have become acquainted perfectly with colours of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank where that shade is want- ing ; and it seems possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and IDO ILL raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses. Simple ideas, therefore, are not always, in every instance, derived from cor- respondent impressions. Hume. IDOLATRY, HEATHEN. THE Hea- then idolatry is a common topic of declamation and abuse on oc- casions of this nature. It stands, with modern absurdity and folly, in the same circumstances with a woman who has been beauti- ful, but whose charms are faded, and who is ever the object of the most malignant satire to another who is distinguished with a na- tive and original ugliness. The superstitions of the ancients, like their beautiful edifices, are de- faced only by time and violence. The communities of antiquity, ia ' their decline, seem to have been like some great minds in the de- cline of life, who are said to re- tain their former conclusions, while they have totally forgotten the premises and calculations which had led them to them. The Heathen mythology is natu- ral philosophy allegorised and abused by poets and priests : Jupiter and Juno, and Minerva and Neptune, were personifica- tions of real principles in nature : whereas the phantoms of modern superstition are representations of no true objects in heaven or earth. The former were in the state of all similies, metaphors, and poetical ornaments, liable to be misunderstood and abused ; but they were also useful, and furnished the most elegant enter- tainment and pleasure, the latter being the produce only of per- verted and gloomy imaginations, are never useful, never pleasing 1 , but merely the instruments of imposture, to intimidate and in- jure mankind. Idolatry, there- fore, was to be restrained, as all excesses of natural passions are to be restrained. For, by fixing the attention wholly on poetical persons, men were led away from nature, the only source of truth ; they easily wandered into follies and vices ; and their whole sys- tem fell a sacrifice to more ex- travagant and mysterious institu- tions. The emperor Julian seems to have had these ideas, and he lived at the very period of this remarkable revolution. He pro- bably thought, that men were not at so great distance from the real principles of nature and truth, and would not require so much trouble to lead them back to those principles, while they adhered to the Heathen idolatry, as when the ambitious Christian priests had plunged them into the fathomless abyss of mysteries : awed them with heavenly and infernal phantoms : bound them down to unintelligible and use- less dogmas, and reduced them to the worst species of slavery. Succeeding events proved that he judged rightly. Men, by re- signing their faculties to pre- tended heavenly commissioners, and becoming the tools of their ambition, exhibited a scene of ignorance, barbarism, cruelty, and villany, beyond any thing- which had ever dishonoured the annals of the world. This wretched state remained until some fragments of ancient learn- ing were recovered, and some persons were tempted, by manly thoughts and fine writing, into ILL ILL reason, into heresies, and rebel- lions. Williams. fcL-HuMouR.. - Nothing 1 concerns me more than to see people in ill-humour; to see men torment one another; particularly when, in the flower of their age, in the very season of pleasure, they waste their few short days of sunshine in quarrels and dis- putes, and only feel their error when it is too late to repair it. We are apt to complain, that we have but few happy days ; and it appears to me that we have very little right to com- plain. If our hearts were always in a proper disposition to receive the good things which Heaven sends us, we should acquire strength to support the evil when they come upon us. But you will, perhaps, say, we cannot always command our tempers, so much depends on the consti- tution ; when the body is ill at ease, the mind is so likewise. Well, let us look upon this dis- position as a disease, and see if there is no remedy for it. I think, indeed, a great deal might be done in this respect. Ill-humour may be compared to sloth. J t is natural to man to be indolent : but if once we get the better of our indolence, we then go on with alacrity, and find a real pleasure in being active. If you object, that we are not masters of ourselves, and still less of our feelings, I must answer, that we do not know how far our strengh will go till we have tried it ; that the sick consult physicians, and submit to the most scrupulous regimen and the most nauseous medicines to recover their health. Is it not enough that we are without the power to make one another happy, but must we de- prive each other of that satisfac- tion, which, left to ourselves, we might often be capable of enjoy- ing? Show me the man who has ill-humour, and who hides it; who bears the whole burden of it himself, without interrupt- ing the pleasures of those about him. No ; ill-humour arises from a consciousness of our own want of merit; from a discontent which always accompanies that envy which foolish vanity en- genders. We dislike to see peo- ple happy, unless their happiness is the work of our own hands. Woe unto those who make use of their power over a human heart to deprive it of the simple plea- sure it would naturally enjoy ! All the favours, all the attention in the world, cannot, for a m'o- ment, make amends for the loss of that happiuess which a cruel tyranny destroys. We should say to ourselves every day, What good can I do to my friends ? I can only endea- vour not to interrupt them in their pleasures, and try to aug- ment the happiness which I my- self partake of. When their souls are tormented by a violent passion, when their hearts are rent with grief, 1 cannot give them relief for a moment. And when at length a fatal malady seizes the unhappy be- ing, whose untimely grave was prepared by thy hand when, stretched out and exhausted, he raises his dim eyes to heaven, and the damps of death are on his brow then thou standest before him like a condemned criminal ; thou seest thy fault, IND INF but it is too late; thoti feelest thy want of power ; thou feelest, with bitterness, that all thou canst give, all thou canst do, will not restore the strength of thy unfortunate victim, nor pro- cure for him a moment of conso- lation. Goethe. IMAGINATION, WORKS OF, GENE- RALLY PLEASING. Works of imagination are more generally admired, because there are few who have not experienced some passion. Most persons are better pleased with the beauty of a de- scription, than with the depth of an idea ; because they have felt more than they have seen, and seen more than they have re- flected. From hence we may conclude, that the paintings of the passions must be more ge- nerally agreeable than those of natural objects ; and a poetical description of the same objects must find more admirers than philosophical works. Helve- tius. INDIANS, JUSTLY INCREDULOUS WITH REGARD TO ICE. The In- dian prince, who refused to be- lieve the first relations concern- ing the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assdent to facts that arose from a state of nature with which he was unacquainted, and bore so little analogy to those events of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not con- formable to it. No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him ; and it is impossible for him, a priori, to tell what will result from it. It is making a new ex- periment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. Ohe may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow ; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy; and is such as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold ; but when it comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment from the utmost liquidity to per- fect hardness. Such an event may be denominated extraor- dinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony to render it credible to people in a warm cli- mate ; but still it is not miracu- lous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of na- ture, in cases where all the cir- cumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra have al- ways seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing 1 of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy; but they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter ; and therefore they can- not reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence. Hume. INFANTS, THE EXPOSITION OF. The practice of exposing chil- dren in their early infancy -vras very common among the an- cients ; and is not mentioned by any author of those times with the horror it deserves, or scarcely even with disapprobation. Plu- tarch, the humane, good natured INF INF Plutarch, recommends it as a virtue in Attalus, king- of Per- gamus, that he murdered, or, if you will, exposed all his own children, in order to leave his crown to the son of his brother Eumenes ; signalizing-, in this manner, his gratitude and af- fection to Eumenes, who had left him his heir preferably to that son. It was Solon, the most ce- lebrated of the sag-es of Greece, that gave parents permission, by law, to kill their children. And, perhaps, by an odd connexion of causes, this barbarous practice of the ancients increased the popu- lation of those times. By re- moving the terrors of too nume- rous a family, it would engage people in marriage; and such is the force of natural affection, that very few, in comparison, would have resolution enough, when it came to the push, to carry into execution their former intentions, though Plutarch, it must be owned, speaks of it as a general practice of the poor. China, the only country where this practice of exposing children prevails at present, is the most populous country we know ; and every man is married before he is twen- ty. Such early marriages could scarcely be general, had not men the prospect of getting rid of their children. Hume. INFANTS, THE EXPOSITION OF. The exposition, that is, the mur- der of new-born infants, was a practice allowed of in almost all the states of Greece, even among the polite and civilized Atheni- ans; and whenever the circum- stances of the parent rendered it inconvenient to bring up the child, to abandon it to hunger, or to wild beasts, was regarded without blame or censure. This practice had probably begun in the times of the most savage barbarity. The imaginations of men had been first made familiar with it in that earliest period of society, and the uniform conti- nuance of the custom had hinder- ed them afterwards from per- ceiving its enormity. We find at this day, that this practice prevails among all savage nations ; and in that rudest and lowest state of society it is undoubtedly more pardonable than in any other. The extreme indigence of a sa- vage is often such, that he him- self is frequently exposed to the greatest extremity of . hunger ; he often dies of pure want ; and it is frequently impossible for him to support both himself and his child. We cannot wonder, there- fore, that, in this case, he should abandon it. One who, in flying from an enemy whom it was im- possible to resist, should throw down his infant because it re- tarded his flight, would surely be excuseable: since by attempt- ing to save it, he could only hope for the consolation of dying with it. That in this state of society, therefore, a parent should be allowed to judge whether he can bring up his child, ought not to surprise us so greatly. In the latter ages of Greece, however, the same thing was permitted from views of remote interest or convenience, which could by no means excuse it. Uninterrupted custom had by this time so thoroughly autho- rised the practice, that not only the loose maxims of the world tolerated this barbarous custom, ING INJ but even the doctrine of phi- losophers, which ought to have been more just and accurate, was led away by the established practice; and upon this, as upon many other occasions, instead of censuring:, supported the hor- rible abuse, by far-fetched con- siderations of public utility. Aristotle talks of it as of what the magistrate ought upon many occasions to encourage. The humane Plato is of the same opinion; and, with all that love wth these states, in proportion as the power of governors has been openly aiul directly checked, the civil liberty of the subject has been checked with it. The governors, as such, could not indeed infringe the liberty of the subject; but then neither could they protect the ac- cused against the abuse of power on the part of the magistrate, nor the feeble against the oppression of the more powerful individual. Acid too, that when this impotence of the governors has produced, as it naturally must produce, a state of atiarch\ and confusion, they have been compelled to have recourse to the most violent methods to pro- tect the state against either the attacks of foreign foes, or the cabals of factious and overpowerful citi- zens. Such was, at Home, the ap- pointment of a Dictator, or of a Consul armed with the dictatorial power, conveyed by that aibilrary and unlimited commission of Vi- dfdt Consul ne quid Respublica de- trinif/iticfipiat Mich is, in Poland, the more dreadful tyranny of aeon- federation. No bounds can be set to the supreme p^wer; the very term of supreme power precludes the idea. In a state where the supreme power is distributed among different ranks and bodies of men, 1 against each of these ranks, taken ' separately, there may be liberty ; bounds may be prescribed to them ; they as well as individuals may be restrained by law: against the whole there can be no liberty ; united, they are omnipotent. The coronation- j oath is frequently urged as a proof j that the supreme power not only may be, but actually is, circum- scribed within certain bounds. The fact is, liiat this oath is not a con- vention between the supreme power and the people, but a promise only from one of the constituent parts of the supreme power; a very dif- ferent thing: each part may have certain limits ; and yet the whole, united, be illitnited. Notwithstand- ing this omnipotency of the su- preme power in every state, there is a wide difference between a free and despotic slate. In a free state, besides civil or political liberty, the subject enjoys what is often confounded with it, though very different from it, civil or political security. This security arises not from any limitation of the supreme power, but from such a distribution of the several parts of it as shall best insure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. If ti.i-> distinction could so be made as lo render, the interests of the governors and governed per- fectly undistii:euishable, this end wouid be completely obtained, and the subject would enjoy perfect political security : this security is more or less perfect as these in- terests are less or more distinguish- able. But it is at first sis>ht apparent, that political security cannot be produced in the same manner as civil liberty. This latter is pro- duced by a positive operation of the law; that is, by a positive act of those persons in whose hands is lodged the power of making and executing laws : But political secu- rity cannot be so product d; for this plain reason, because whatever produces it, is to operate against those very persons in whose hands the power is lodged. I.IK Political security, or the assiuance the people may have that the powers of government will be ap- plied to the production of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, must be created by the manner of distributing the several portions of power, which, when united, form the supreme power ; of arranging the functions of the several classes of governors who, taken together, compose what is meant by government. The happy effects arising from a proper ar- rangement of the functions and power of the several classes of governors are exemplified in the English constitution. Lind. THE DIFFERENT SORTS OF LIBER- TY. Natural liberty is that which the laws of nature allow, or the absence of restraints imposed by the laws of nature. Physical, mo- ral, religious, and civil liberty, are the absence of physical restraints, of moral, of religious, of civil re- straints. There is a liberty which is the result of uatural and civil li- berty, as it were, mixed together. Natural restraints bind a man in one action, civil restraints bind him in another: the liberty left him upon the whole, is less than either his na- tural or civil liberty taken singly, Many actions are forbidden by the laws of nature, as hurtful merely to the individual who commits them, such as drunkenness and acts of im- prudence. About these we gene- rally riiui civil laws to be silent. On the other hand, natural laws are silent about many particulars in which the laws of civil society prescribe to us, as about the modes of transferring property. Some- times a civil law merely enforces a prohibition of nature. Again, it yery frequently happens, that a civil law, though it has the >anie action for its object as some law of nature, does yet narrow ear liberty, by be- ing more minu'o and circumstantial in its prohibition; and it seems that the name of civil liberly is some- times given to this compounded or resulting liberly, which we enjoy upon the whole by the joint per- mission of natural and civil laws. Hey. POLITICAL AND CITIL LIBERTY IN BARBAROUSAGES. The great bo- dy of the people, in barbarous and licentious ages, enjoy much less true liberty, than where the execution of the laws is the most severe, and where subjects are reduced to the strictest subordination and depen- danceon the civil magistrate. The reason is derived from the excess itself of that liberty. Men mu*t guard themselves at any price a- gainst insults and injuries ; and where they receive no protection from the laws and magistrate, they will seek it by submission to supe- riors, and by herding in some infe- rior confederacy, which acls under the direction of a powerful chief- tain ; and thus all anarchy is the immediate cause of tyranny, if not over the state, at least over many of the individuals. A barbarous peo- ple may be pronounced incapable of any true or regular liberty, which requires such a refinement of ia\v and institutions, such a comprehen- sion of views, such a sentiment of honour, such a spirit of obedience, and such a sacrifice of private inter- est and connections to public order, as can only be the result of great reflection and experience, and must grow to perfection during several ages of a settled and established government. Hunt. LOV LOV L.OVE ONLY A DESIRE OF ENJOY- MENT. When a person imagines that lie loves only the soul of a woman, it is certainly her person "that he desires; and here, lo satisfy his wants, and especially his cario- sity, he is rendered capable of every thing. This truth nitfy* be proved from the little sensibility most spec- tators shew at the theatre, for the affection of a man and his wife; when the same spectators are so warmly moved by the love of a young man for a young woman. What can produce these different sensations, if it be not the different sensations which they themselves have experienced in these two re- lations? Most of them have felt, that as they will do every thing for the favours desired, they will do little for the favours obtained ; that in the case of love, curiosity being once gratified, they easily comfort themselves for the loss of one who proves unfaithful, and that then the misfortune of a lover is very sup- portable. Love, therefore, can ne- ver be any thing but a disguised de- sire of enjoyment. Helvetius. THE PHYSICAL CAUSE OF LOVE. When we have before us such ob- jects as excite love and complacen- cy, the body is affected in the fol- lowing manner : the head reclines something on one side; the eye-lids are more closed than usual, and the eyes roll gently with an inclination to the object ; the mouth is a lit- tle opened, and the breath drawn slowly, with now and then a low sigh; the whole body is composed, and the hands fall idly to the sides. All this is accompanied with an in- ward sense of melting and langour. These appearances are always in proportion to the degree of beauty in the object and of sensibility in the observer. And this gradation, from the highest pitch of beauty and sensibility even to tiie lowest of mediocrity and indifference, aad their correspondent effects, ought to be kept in view, else this descrip- tion will seem exaggerated, which it certainly is not. But from this de- scription it is almobt impossible not to conclude, that beauty acts by relaxing the solids of the whole system. There are all the appear- ances of such a relaxation ; and a relaxation somewhat below the na- tural tone seems to me to be the cause of all positive pleasnre. Who is a stranger to that manner of ex- pression so common in all times and in all countries, of being softened, relaxed, enervated, dissolved, melt- ed away by pleasure ? The univer- sal voice of mankind, faithful to tlieir feelings, concurs in affirming lliis uniform and general effect ; and although some odd and particular instance may, perhaps, be found, \vherein there appears a considera- ble degree of positive pleasure, without all the characters of relax- ation, we must not therefore reject the conclusion we had drawn from a concurrence of many experiments, but we must still retain it, subjoin- ing the exceptions which may oc- cur, according to the judicious rule laid down by Sir Isaac Newton in the third book of his Optics. This position is confirmed by the genu- ine constituents of beauty having each of them, separately taken, a natural tendency to relax the fibres, and by the appearance of the hu- man body, when all these constitu- ents are united together before the sensory ; so that we may venture to conclude, that the passion called love is produced by this relaxation. We may also conclude, that as a LUX LUX beautiful object presented to the sense, by causing a relaxation in the body, produces the passion of love in the mind ; so if by any means the passion should first have its origin in the mind, a relaxation of the outward organs will as certainly en- sue in a degree proportioned to the cause. Burke. LUXURY. Every refinement of con- veniency, of elegance, and of splen- dour, v.hich soodie the pride or gratify the sensuality of mankind, have been severely arraigned by the moralists of every age ; and it might perhaps be more conducive to the virtue, as well as happiness of mankind, if all possessed the ne- cessaries, and none the superikiities of life. But in the present imper- fect condition of society, luxury, though it may proceed from vice or folly, seems to be the only means that can correct the unequal dis- tribution of property. The dili- gent mechanic, and the skilful art- ist, who have obtained no share in the division of the earth, receive a voluntary tax from the possessors of the land ; and the latter are prompt- ed, by a sense of interest, to im- prove those estates, with whose pro- duce they may purchase additional pleasures. These operations im- press the political machine with new degrees of activity, and are produc- tive of the happiest effects in every society. Gilbon. LUXURY. Luxury is a word of an uncertain signification, and may be taken in a good as well as in a bad sense. In general, it means great refinement in the gratification of the senses! and any degree of it may be innocent or blameable, accord- ing to the age, or country, or con- dition of the person. The bounds between the virtue and the vice cannot here be fixed exactly, more than in other moral subjects. To imagine that the gratifying any of the senses, or indulging any delicacy in meats, drinks, or apparel, is of itself a vice, can never enter into any head that is not disordered by the phrenzies of enthusiasm. These indulgencies are only vices when they are pursued at the expense of some virtue, as liberaliry or charily ; in like manner, they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himself to want and beggary. Where fchey entrench up- on no virtue, but leave ample sub- ject whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generosity or compassion, they are entirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowledged as such by almost all moralists. To be entirely occupied with the luxury of the table, for instance, without any re- lish for the pleasure of ambition, study, or conversation, is a mark of stupidity, and is incompatible with any vigour of temper or genius. To confine one's expence entirely to such a gratification, without regard to friends or family, is an indication of a heart devoid of humanity or benevolence But if a man reserve time sufficient for all laudable pur- suits, and money sufficient for all generous purposes, he is free from every shadow of blame or reproach. Hume. LUXURY. It is in vain to attempt a precise definition of luxury. The word luxury, like that of greatness, is one of those comparative expres- sions that do not offer to the mind any determinate idea; that only ex- press the relation two or more ob- jects have to each other. It has no fixed sense till the moment it is put, if I may use the expression, into an LUX Ll'X equation; and we compare the lux- ury of one nation, class of men, or private person, with that of others of the same rank. An English pea- sant, well cloathed and fed, is in a state of luxury compared with a French peasant. The man dressed in a coarse cloth, is in a state of luxury, compared to a savage co- vered with a bear's skin. All things, even to the feathers that adorn the cap of a wild Indian, may be re- garded as luxury. Hdvctiu-s. LUXURY, AND REFINEMENT OF MANNERS, FAVOURABLE TO LI- BERTY. In rude unpolished ages, when the arts are neglected, all labour is bestowed on the culti- vation of the ground ; and the whole society is divided into two classes, proprietors of land and their vassals or tenants. The latter are necessarily dependant, and fit- ted for slavery and subjection ; es- pecially where they possesss no riches, and are not valued for their knowledge in agriculture ; as must always be the case where the arts are neglected. The former natu- rally erect themselves into petty tyrants; and must either submit lo an absolute master, for the sake of peace and order; or if they will preserve their independency, like the ancient barons, they must fall into feuds and contests among themselves, and throw the whole society into such confusion, as is perhaps worse than the most des- potic government. But where lux- ury nourishes commerce and indus- try, the peasants, by proper cul- tivation of the land, become rich and independent ; while the trades- men and merchants acquire a share of the property ; and draw au- thority and consideration to that middling rank of men, who are 1 lie best and firmest basis of pub- lic liberty. These submit not to slavery like the peasants, from po- verty and meanness of spirit ; and having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they arc not tempted, for the sake of thvit gratification, to countenance the tyranny of their sovereign. They covet equal laws, which may se- cure their property, and preserve them from monarchical as well JH aristocratical tyranny. Hit me. LUXURY, EFFECTS Ofc', DISCOVER- ABLE BY A COMPARISON OF DIF- FERENT COTEMPOHARY NATIONS. To declaim against present times, and magnify the virtue of remote ancestors, is a propensity almost inherent in human nature : and as the sentiments and opinions of civilized ages alone are transmitted to posterity, hence it is that we meet with so many severe judg- ments pronounced against luxury, and even science; and hence it i> that at present we give so ready an assent to them. But the fal- lacy is easily perceived by com- paring different nations that are cetemporaries ; where we both judge more impartially, and can better set in opposition those man- ners with which we are sufficiently acquainted. Treachery and cruelty, v the most pernicious and most odious of all vices, seem peculiar to uncivilized ages; and by the refined Greeks and Romans were ascribed to all the barbarous na- tions which surrounded them. They might justly, therefore, have presumed, that their own ances- tors, so highly celebrated, pos- sessed no greater virtue, and were as much inferior to their posterity, in honour and humanity, as in taste and scitnce. An ancient 2 3 LUX LUX Frank or Saxon may be highly extolled ; but I believe every man would think his life or fortune much U?HIS secure in tiic hands of a Moor or Tartar, than in those of a French or English gentleman the rank of men the most civilized in the most civilized nations. Hume. LUXURIOUS AGES MOST HAPPY. Human happiness, according to the most received notions, seems to consist in three ingredients action, pleasure, and indolence ; and though these ingredients ought to be mixed in different propor- tions, according to the disposi- tions of the person, yet no ingre- dient can be entirely wanting, with- oul destroying, in some measure, the relish of the whole composi- tion. Indolence or repose, in- deed, seems not of itself to con- tribute much to our enjoyment; but, like sleep, is requiste as an indulgence to the weakness of hu- man nature, which cannot support an uninterrupted course of bu- siness or pleasure. That quick march of the spirits, which takes a man from himself, and chiefly gives satisfaction, does in the end (exhaust the mind, and requires some intervals of repose, which, though agreeable for a moment, yet, if prolonged, beget a languor and lethargy that deitroys all en- joyment. Education, custom, and example, have a mighty influence in turning the mind to any of these pursuits; and it must be owned, that where they promote a relish for action and pleasure, they are so far favourable to un- man happiness. In times when industry and tlir ails flourish, men are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward, Uie occupation ilsclf, as well as those pleasures which are the fruit of their labour. The mind acquires new vigour, enlarges it powers and faculties, and by an assiduity in honest industry, both satisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly spring up when nourished by ease and idleness. Banish those arts from society, you deprive men both of action and pleasure ; and leaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even destroy (he rtlish of indolence, which never is agreeable but when it succeeds to labour, and recruits the spirits, exhausted by too much application and fatigue. The spirit of the age affects all the arts ; and the minds of men, being once roused from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn them- selves on all sides, and carry im- provements into every art and sci- ence. Profound ignorance is to- tally banished, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures to think as well as to act, to culti- vate the pleasures of the mind as well as those of the body. The more these refined nrts advance, the more sociable men become ; nor is it possible that, when en- riched with science, and possessed of a fund of conversation, they should be contented to remain in solitude, or live with their fellow - citizens in that distant manner which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock into cities love to receive and communicate knowledge, to show their wit or their breeding, their taste in conversation or living, in clothes and furniture. Curiosity allures the wise, vanity the foolish, and pleasure both. Particular clubs LIX LUX and societies are every where form- ed, both sexes meet in au easy and sociable manner, and the tempers of men, as well as their behaviour, refine apace. So that, besides the improvements which they re- ceive from knowledge and the li- beral arts, it is impossible but they must feel an increase of hu- manity, from the very habit of conversing together ami contri- buting to each other's pleasure and entertainment. Thus, industry, knowledge, and humanity, are linked together by an indissoluble chain ; and are found, from ex- perience, as well as reason, to be peculiar to the more polished, and what are commonly denominated the more luxurious ages. Nor are these advantages attended with disadvantages that bear any pro- portion to them. The more men refine upon pleasure, the less will they indulge in excesses of any kind ; because nothing is more de- structive to true pleasure than such excesses. One may safely affirm, that the Tartars are oftener guilty of beastly gluttony, when they feast on their dead horses, than European courtiers with all their refinements of cookery. And if libertine love, or even iufidelity to the marriage-bed be more fre- quent in polite ages, when it is often regarded only as a piece of gallantry; drunkenness, on the other hand, is much less common, a vice more odious, and more per- nicious both to body and mind. Hume. LUXURY AND REFINEMENT OF MANNERS FAVOURABLE TO GO- VERNMENT. The increase and consumption of all commodities which serve to the ornament and pleasure of life, are advantageous to society ; because at the same time that they multiply those inno- cent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of store-house of labour, which, in the exigencies of a state, may be turned to the public service. In a nation where there is no demand for such superfluities, men sink into indolence, and lose all enjoyment of life ; and are use- less to the public, which cannot maintain nor support its fleets and armies from the industry of such slothful members. The bounds of all the European kingdoms are at present nearly the same they were two hundred years ago ; but what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of those kingdoms? which can be ascribed to nothing but the increase of art and industry. This industry is much promoted by the knowledge inseparable from ages of art and refinement; as on the other hand this knowledge enables I he public to make the best advantage of the industry of its subjects. Laws, order, police, dis- cipline ; these can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reason has refined itself by exercise, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at least of commerce and manufactures. Not to mention, that all ignorant ages are infested with supersiition/wbich throws the government off its bias, and disturbs men in the pursuit of thfcirinterestand happiness. Know- ledge in the arts of government naturally begets mildness and mode- ration, by instructing men in the advantages of humane maxims above rigour and severity, which drive subjects into rebellion, and render the return to submission impracti- cable by cutting off all hopes of pardon. When the tempers of men MAD 31 AD are softened, as well as their know- ledge improved, this humanity ap- pears still more conspicuous, and is the chief characteristic which distinguishes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance. Factions are then less inveterate, revolutions less tragical, authority less severe, and seditions less fre- quent. Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty ; and after the field of battle, where honour and interest steel men against compassion as well as fear, the combatants divest themselves of the brute, and resume the man. Luxury and refinement of manners in destroying ferocity do not annihilate the martial spirit. If anger, which is said to be the whetstone of courage, loses some- what of its asperity by politeness and refinement, a sense of honour, which is a stronger, more constant, and more governable principle, acquires fresh vigour by that eleva- tion of genius which arises from knowledge and a good education. Refinement on the pleasures and conveniences of life has no natural tendency to beget venality and cor- ruption. The disorders in the Roman slate, which have been as- cribed to luxury and refinement, really proceeded from an ill-mo- delled government, and the un- limited extent of conquests. The value which all men put upon any particular pleasure depends on com- parison and experience ; nor is a porter less greedy of money which lie spends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier who purchasescham- pagne and ortolans. Riches arc valuable at all times to all men, be- cause they always purchase plea- sures, such as men are accustomed to and desire ; nor can any thing festiain or regulate the love of money, but a sense of honour and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound most in ages of knowledge and refinement. Hume. MADMEN AND IDIOTS. Those who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have but little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand and make use of language, or judge or reason, to any tolerable degree, but only a lilile, and imperfectly- about things present, and very familiar to their senses. And indeed any of the forementipned faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects in mem understandings and knowledge. The defect of natnrals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion in the intel- lectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of rcasgn ; whereas mad- men, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme. For they do not appear to me to have lost -the faculty of reasoning ; but having joined together 'some ideas- very wrongly, they mistake them for truths ; and they err as mdn do that argue right from wrong principles ; for by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions front them. Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference, require suitable attend- ance, respect, and obedience ; others, who have thought them- selves made of glass, have med the caution necessary to preserve such ' brittle bodies. Hence it comes 10 WAD MAD pass, that a man who is very sober, and of a right understanding in ail other tilings, may in one particular be as frantic as any in Bedlam ; if either by any very sudden strong impression, or long fixing his fancy upon oue sort of thoughts, inco- herent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully as to remain united. But there are degress of madness as of folly ; the disorderly jumbling ideas together is in some more and some less. In short, herein seems to be tiie difference between idiots and madmen, that madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right from them ; but idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all. Locke. MADNESS. The causes of madness are of two kinds, bodily and mental. That which arises from bodily causes is nearly related to drunkenness, and to the deliriums attending diseases. That from mental causes is of the same kind with temporary alienations of the mind during vio- lent 'passions, and with the pre- judices and opinionativeness which much application to one set of ideas only occasions. We may thus distinguish the causes for the more easy conception and analysis of the subject; but in fact they are both united for the most part. The bodily cause lays hold of that passion or affection which is most disproportionate ; and the mental cause, when that is primary, generally waits till some bodily distemper gives it full scope to exert itself. Agreeably to this, the prevention and cure of all kinds of madness require an attention both to the body and mind. It is observed, that mad persons often speak rationally and consist- ently upon the subjects that occur, provided that single out: which most affects them be kept out of view. And the reason of this may be, that whether they first become mad because a particular original mental uneasiness falls in with an accidental bodily disorder, or be- cause an original bodily disorder falls in with an accidental mental one; it must follow, that a par- ticular set of ideas shall be ex- tremely magnified, and consequent- ly an unnatural association of same- ness or repugnancy between them generated ; all other ideas and as- sociations remaining nearly the same. When one false position of this kind is admitted, it begets more of course, the same bodily and mental causes also continuing; but then this process stops after a cer- tain number of false positions are adopt <- of such absolute ne- cessity where a plurality of wives was t orbit), and of so much con- venience where this 'plurality TT;!* allowed, that it continutU on thr. same foot among the Romans tiil Christianity was established fully in the empire ; and that it con- tinues still among the Jews in the east, if nof practised, lor pru- dential reasons, in the same iiMn- ner, and as openly in the west. Bo!ingloke. MARRIAGE. Marriage has two ob- jects : the one the preservation of the species ; the of her the pleasure and happiness / t/it luo sexes. To what shall we refer the uni- formity of its institution? I an- swer to the conformity between this mode of matrimony and the primitive state of the inhabitants. of Europe, that is, the state- of peasants. In that rank, the man and woman have one common ob- ject of desire, which is the im- provement of the land they occu- py ; this improvement results from their mutual labours. The man and wife constantly occupied in their farm, and always useful to each other, support, without disgust, and without inconvenience, their indissoluble union. The lavr of in- dissolubility in marriage is a cruel MAR MAR and barbarous laj*: (says Foute- nIIe.) The tew happy marriage!) prove the necessity of a reforma- tion in this matter. There are countries where the lover and his mistress do not marry till after they have lived together three years. During that time, they try the sympathy of their characters. If they do not agree, they part, and the girl goes to another. These African marriages are the most proper to secure the happi- ness of the parties. But how then must the children be provided for ? By the same laws that secure their maintenance in countries where divorces are permitted. Let the sons remain with the father, and the daughters go with the mother; and let a certain sum be stipulated in the marriage articles for the education of such children. The inconvenience of divorces will then be insignificant, and the happiness of the married parties secured. But it may be said, that divorces will enormously increase under a law so favourable to human incon- stancy. Experience proves the con- trary. To conclude if the va- riable and ambulatory desires of men and -women urge them some- times to change the object of their tenderness, why should they be de- prived of the pleasure of variety, if their inconstancy, by the regula- tion of wise laws, be not detrimen- tal to society ? In France, the wo- men are too much mistresses; in the east, too much slaves; they are there a sacrifice to the pleasure of men. But why should they be a sacrifice r If the two parties cease to love, and begin to hate each other, why should they be obliged to live together? Marriage fre- quently represents nothing more thaa the picture of two unfortunate people who are chained together, to be a reciprocal torment to each other. Helvetius. MARRIAGE, THE DEGREES OF. The natural reason why marriage in certain degrees is prohibited by the civil laws, and condemned by the moral sentiments of all nations, is de- rived from mens' care to preserve purity of manners; while they re- flect, that if a commerce of love were authorised between the near- est relations, the frequent oppor- tunities of intimate conversation, especially during early youth, would introduce an universal dis- soluteness and corruption. But as the custouis of countries vary con- siderably, and open an intercourse, more or less restrained, between different families, or betweea the several members of the same fa- mily, so we find, that the moral precept varying with its cause, is susceptible, without any inconve- nience, of very different latitude in the several ages and nations of the world. The extreme delicacy of the Greeks permitted no converse between per- sons of two sexes, except uhere they lived under the name roof ; and even the apartments of a sttp- mother and her daughters were al- most as much shut up against vi- sits from the husband's sons, as against those from any strangers, or more remote relations. Hence, in that nation, it was lawful for a man to marry, not only his niece, but his half-sister by the lather ; a liberty unknown to the Romans, and other nations, where a more oj>en intercourse was authorised between the sexes. Hume. MARRIAGE BETWEEN RELATIONS. With regard to marriages be- tween relations, it is a thing ex- tremely delicate to fix exactly the MAR point at which the laws of nature stop, and where (he civil laws be- gin. For this purpose we must establish some principles. The marriage of the sou with the mo- ther confounds the state of things: the son ought to have an unlimited respect to his mother, the wife an unlimited respect to her husband, therefore the marriage of the mo- ther to the son would subvert the natural slate of both. Besides, Nature has fonvarded in women the time in which they are able to have children, but has retarded it in men ; and for the same reason, women sooner loose the ability, and men later. If the marriage between the mother and the son were permitted, it would almost always be the case, that when the husband was capable of entering into the views of nature, the wife would be incapable. The marriage between the father and the daugh- ter is contrary to nature as well as the other ; but it is less contrary because it has not those two ob- stacles. Thus the Tartars, who may marry their daughters, never marry their mothers, as we see in accounts of that nation. This law is very ancient among them. Attila, (says Priscus) in his em- bassy, stopt in a certain place to marry Esca his daughter a thing permitted, he adds, by the laws of the Scythians. It has ever been the natural duty f fathers to watch over the chastity of their children. In- trusted with the care of their edu- cation, they are obliged to preserve the body in the greatest perfection, and the mind from the least cor- ruption ; to encourage whatever has o, tendency to inspire them with vir- tuous desires, and to nourish a be- eomitig tenderness. MAR As children dwell, or are sup- posed to dwell, in their lather's house, marriages between fathers and children, between brothers aud sisters, are prohibited, in order to preserve natural modesty in fa- milies. On the same principle, mar- riages between the son-in-law with the mother-in-law, the father-in- law with the daughter-in-law, are prohibited by the law of nature. In this case, the resemblance has the same eliect as the reality, be- cause it springs from the same cause. There are nations among whom cousin-germans are consi- dered as bi others, because they commonly dwell in the same house ; there are others where this custom is not known. Among the first, the marriage of cousin-germans ought to be regarded as contrary to nature ; not so among the others. Rut the laws of nature cannot be local ; therefore, when these mar- riages are forbidden, or permitted, it must be done according to the circumstances, by a civil law. It is not a necessary custom for the brother-in-law and the sister- in-law to dwell together in the same house. The marriage between them is not then prohibited to preserve chastity in the family; and the law which forbids or per- mits it, is not a law of nature, but a civil law, regulated by cir- cumstances, and dependant on the custom of each country. 1 The prohibitions of the law of nature are invariable; the father, the mother, and the children, ne- cessarily dwell in the same house. The prohibitions of the civil laws are accidental, because they de- pend on accidental circumstances; cousin-germans and others dwelling in the house by accident. This MAR MAR explains why the law of Moses, those of the Egyptians, and of many oilier nations, permitted the marriageof the brother-in-law with the sister-iu-law, whilst these very marriages were disallowed by other nations. In India, they have a very na- tural reason for admitting this sort of marriages. The uncle is there considered as the father, and is obliged to maintain and educate his nep/iew, as if he were his own child. This proceeds from the dis- position of these people, which is good-natured and full of humanity. This law, or the custom, has pro- duced another : If a husband has lost his wife, he does not fail to marry her sister, tchi'ch is extremely natural, for his new consort be- comes the mother of her sister's children, and not a cruel step- mother. Montesquieu. MARRIAGE WITH A BROTHER'S WIDOW. Marriage, in this de- gree of affinity, is indeed prohi- bited in Leviticus; but it is natural to interpret that prohibition as a part of the Jewish ceremonial or municipal law; and though it is there said in the conclusion, that the Gentile nations, by violating these degrees of consanguinity, had incurred the Divine displea- sure, the extension of this maxim to e very precise case before speci- fied, is supposing the Scriptures to be composed with a minute ac- curacy and precision, to which, we know with certainty, the sacred penmeu did not think proper to confine themselves. The de- scent of mankind from one com- mon father, obliged them, in the first generation, to marry in the nearest degrees of coDsan guiuily: instances of a like na- ture occur among the patriarchs ; and the marriage of a brother's widow was, in certain cases, riot only permitted, but even en- joined as a positive precept by the Mosaical law. It is in vain to say, that this precept was an exception to the rule, and an exception confined merely to the Jewish nation. The inference is still just, that it can contain no natural or moral turpitude, otherwise God, who is the au- thor of all purity, would never in any case have enjoined it. U ii me. MATTER. Wise men, on being- asked, \Vhat the soul is? an- swer, They are entirely ignorant of it: and if asked what matter is, give the like answer. This almost unknown being 1 , is it eternal? So all antiquity be- lieved. Has it, of itself, an ac- tive force? This is the opinion of several philosophers. Have they who deny it any superior reason for their opinion ? You do not conceive that matter can, intrinsically, have any property ; but how can you affirm that it has not, intrinsically, such pro- perties as are necessery to it. You know nothing- of its na- ture, and yet deny it to have modes which reside in its nature ; for, after all, as matter exists, it must have a form and figure ; and being necessarily figured, is it impossible that there are other modes annexed to its configu- ration ? Matter exists, this you know ; but you know it no fur- ther than by your sensations. We weigh, we measure, we analyse, we decompound mat- ter ; but on offering- to go -a step beyond these operations, we find ourselves bewildered, and an MAT MAT abyss opens before us. How can we conceive that what is with- out succession has not always ben? Were the existence of matter not necessary, why ex- ists it? And if it was to exist, why should it not always have existed ? Never was an axiom more universally received than this nothing- produces nothing. Tlie contrary, indeed, is incom- prehensible ; all nations have held their chaos anterior to the divine disposition of the world. Matter, therefore, was looked on in the hands of God as clay under the potter's wheel, if such faint images may be used to ex- press the divine power. Matter being 1 eternal, should have eter- nal properties ; as configuration, the inert power, motion, and divisibility. But this divisibility is no more than the consequence of motion ; as without motion there can be no division, sepa- ration, and arrangement : there- fore motion was looked on as essential to matter. The chaos had been a confused motion ; and the arrangement of the uni- verse was a regular motion impressed on all bodies by the Deity. But how should matter, of itself, have motion, as, ac- cording to all the ancients, it has extension and impenetrabil- ity ? It cannot, however, be conceived without extension, and it may without motion. To this the answer was It is impossibe but matter must be permeable ; and if permeable, something must be continually passing into its pores : where is the use of passages, if nothing passes through them ? The sys- tem of the eternity of matter has, like all other system*, very great difficulties. That of mat- ter formed out of nothing is not less incomprehensible. Happily, which ever system is espoused, morality is hurt by neither; for what signifies it whether matter be made, or only arranged? Cod is equally our absolute mas- ter. Whether the chaos was only put in order, or whether it was created of nothing, still it behoves us to be virtuous. Scarce any of these metaphysical questions have a relation to the conduct of life. Disputes are like table-talk ; every one for- gets after dinner what he has said, and goes away where his interest or inclination leads him. -Voltaire. MATTER. It has at all times been alternately asserted, that matter felt, or did not feel. If a pre- cise idea had been fixed to the word matter, it would have been perceived, if I may use the expression, that men were the creators of matter that mat- ter was not a being that in na* ture there were only individuals to which the name of body had been given ; and that this word matter could import no more than the collection of properties common to all bodies. The meaning of this word being de- termined, all that remained was to know, whether extent, so- lidity, and impenetrability were the only properties common to all bodies; and whether the dis- covery of a power, such, for in- stance, as attraction, might not give rise to a conjecture that bo- dies had some properties hither- to unknown, such as that of sensation, which, though evi- MAT MEL dent only in the organized mem- bers of animals, might yet be common to all individuals ? The question being 1 reduced to this, it would have appeared, that if, strictly speaking, it is impossible to demonstrate that all bodies are absolutely insensible, no man, unless instructed by a particular revelation, can decide the ques- tion otherwise than by calcu- ting and comparing- the proba- bility of this opinion with that of the contrary. Hclveliu*. MATTERS OF FACT, DEMONSTRA- TIONS OF There is an evident absurdity in pretending to demon- strate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori ; be- cause nothing is demonstrable, un- less the contrary implies a contra- diction. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-exist- ent. There is therefore no being whose non-existence implies a con- tradiction ; consequently there is no being whose existence is de- monstrable. Hume. MATTERS OF FACT, DEMONSTRA- TIONS OF. \\hen \veonce assume the existence of any thing as a fart, the non-existence of the cause implies the non-existence of the effect, or of the thing assumed as a fact. Nothing, it is said by Mr. Hume, that is distinctly conceiv- able implies a contradiction. Is it distinctly conceivable, that there should be a first cause of all things? If if, be not, the necessary existence of the Deity is established. What- ever we conceive as existent, we can according to that philosopher, conceive also as non-existent. Not so ; we conceive space as existent : can we conceive it as non-existent ? The utmost stretch of the imagination cannot annihilate space; therefore its existence is necessary, and its non-existence implies a contradiction. So it is with the first cause, or the Deity.- Allow the existence of one thing, and of but a single atom, and the non-existence of its primary cause, or the Deity, involves an absurdity. * * MELANCHOLY. Vapours, hypo- choudtiacal and hysterical disor- ders, are comprehended under this class. The causes of it are self- indulgence in eating and drinking, and particularly in fermented li- quors, want of due bodily exercise, injuries done to the brain by fevers, concussions, &c. too much appli- cation of the mind, especially to the same objects and ideas, violent and long continued passions, pro- fuse evacuations, and an hereditary disposition ; which last we may suppose to consist chiefly in an undue make of the brain. In women, the uneasy states of the uterus are propag-ated to the brain, both immediately and me- diately ; i. e. by first affecting the stomach, and thence the brain. In men, the orig-inal dis- order oftens begins, and continues a long 1 time, chiefly in the organs of digestion. The causa proximo of melan- choly, is an irritability of the medullary substance of the brain, disposing it upon slight occasions to such vibrations as enter the limits of pain: and particularly to such kinds and degrees as be- long to the passions of fear, sor- row, anger, jealousy, &c. And as these vibrations, when the passions are not in great excess, do not much transgress the limits of pleasure, it will often happen that hypochondriac and hysteric MEN MEN persons shall be transported with joy from trifling- cau&es, and be at times disposed to mirth and laughter. They are also very tickle and changeable, as having their desires, hopes, and fears, increased far beyond their natural state, when they fall in with such a state of the brain as favours them. It often happens to these per- sons to have very absurd desires, hopes, and fears, and yet at the same time to know them to be absurd ; and in consequence thereof to resist them. While they do this, we may reckon the disease within the bounds of melancholy; but when they en- deavour to gratify very absurd desires, or are permanently per- suaded of the reality of very groundless hopes and fears, and especially if they lose the con- necting consciousness in any great degree, we may reckon the dis- ease to have passed into madness strictly so called. Hartley. MEN, THE DIFFERENT RACES OF. None but the blind can doubt that the Whites, the Negroes, the Albinoes, the Hottentots, the Laplanders, the Chinese, the Americans, are races entirely dif- ferent. No curious traveller ever passed through Leyden, without seeing part of the reticulem mucosum of a Negro dissected by the cele- brated Ruych. This membrane is black ; and communicates to Negroes that inherent blackness, which they do not lose but in such disorders as may destroy this texture, and allow the grease to issue from its cells and form white spots under the skin. Their round eyes, squat noses, and invariable thick lips, the dif- ferentconfigti rations of theirears, their woolly heads, and the mea- sure of their intellects, make a prodigious difference between them and other species of men; und what demonstrates that they are not indebted for this differ- ence to their climates is, that Negro men and women being transported into the coldest coun- tries, constantly produce animals of their own species ; and that Mulatloes are only a bastard race of black men and white women. The Albinoes are, in- deed, a very small and scarce nation; they inhabit the centre of Africa. Their weakness doe* not allow them to make excur- sions far from the caverns which they inhabit; the Negroes, never- theless, catch some of them at times, and these we purchase of ti:em as curiosities. To say that they are dwarf Negroes, whose skin has been blanched by a kind of leprosy, is like saying- that the Blacks themselves are Whites blackened by the leprosy. An Albino no more resembles a Guinea Negro than he does an Englishman or a Spaniard. Their whiteness is not like ours ; it does not appear like flesh, it has no mixture of white and brown ; it is the colour of linen, or rather of bleached wax ; their hair and. eye-brows are like the finest and softest silk ; their eyes have no sort of similitude with those of other men, but they come very near partridges eyes. Their shape resembles that of the Lap- landers, but their head that of no other nation whatever- as their hair, their eyes, their ears, are all different : and thev have LAW LAW nothing- that seems to belong to man but the stature of their bodies, with the faculty of speak- ing and thinking, but in a degree very different from ours. The apron, which nature has given to the Caffres, and whose flabby and lank skin falls from their naval halfway down their thighs ; the black breasts of the Samoides women, the beard of the males of onr continent, and the beardless chins of the Ameri- cans, nre such striking distinc- tions, that it is scarce possible to imagine that they are not each of them of different races. But riow if it should be asked, From whence came the Ameri- cans ? it should be asked, From whence came the inhabitants of the Terra Australis ? And it has been already answered, That the tame Providence which placed men in Norway, planted some also in America and under the antarctic circle, in the same man- ner as it planted trees and made grass to grow there. Several of the learned have surmised, that some races of men, or animals approximating to men, have perished. The Albinoes are so few in number, so weak, and so ill-used by the Negroes, that there is reason to apprehend this species will not long exist. With respect to the duration of the life of man (if you abstract that line of Adam's descendants consecrated by the Jewish books), it is probable that all the r?ces of man have enjoyed a life nearly as short as our own ; as animals, trees, and all productions of nature, have ever had the same duration. 3ut it should be observed, that commerce, not having always introduced among mankind the productions and disorders of other climates, and men being more robust and laborious in the simplicity of a country life, for which they are born, they must have enjoyed a more equal health, and a life somewhat longer, than in effeminacy, or in the unhealthy works of great cities ; that is to say, that if in Paris or London one man in 20,000 attains the age of a hundred years, it is pro- bable that 20 men in 20 years arrived formerly at that age. This is seen in several parts of America, where mankind have preserved a pure state of nature. The plague and the small-pox, which Arabian caravans commu- nicated in a course of years to the people of Asia and Europe, were for a long time unknown. Thus mankind in Asia and the fine climates of Europe multi- plied more easily than elsewhere. Accidental disorders, and some wounds, (vere not indeed cured as they are at present ; but the ad vantage of never being afflicted with the plague or small-pox, compensated all the dangers at- tendant on our nature ; so that, every thing considered, it is to be believed, that human kind formerly enjoyed, in the favour- able climates a more healthy and happy life than since the founda- tion of great empires. Voltaire. MEN, AN ORIGINAL INFERIORITY IN THE INTELLECTUAL ABILITIES OF, BEYOND THE POLAR CIRCLES AND BETWEEN THE TROPICS. There is some reason to think, that all the nations which live beyond the polar circles, or be- tween the tropics, are inferior MEN MEN to the rest of the species, and are incapable of all the higher attainments of the human mind. The poverty and misery of the northern inhabitants of the globe, and the indolence of the southern from their few necessities, may perhaps account for this remark- able difference, without having recourse to physical causes. Though it may be suspected, that the Negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or live different kinds), are naturally inferior to the Whites, there scarcely ever was a civilized nation of any other complexion than White, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures a- mong them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and ..barbarous of the Whites, such as the ancient Germans and present Tartars, have still some- thing eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish them- selves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a man of parts and learning ; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplish- ments, like a parrot who speaks a few words plainly. Hume. MEN, NO ORIGINAL DlSTINCTION" IN THEIR INTELLECTUAL ABILI- TIES. David Hum;?, in a note to his Essay on National Charac- ters, says, " I am apt to suspect that the Negroes, and, in ge- neral, all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds,) are inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, norevea any individual, eminent either in action or speculatian: no inge- nious manufactures amongthem, no arts, no sciences ; not to men- tion our colonies, there are Ne- gro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of which none have ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity." This suspicion (for it seems scarcely to have matured into an opinion) concerning an original distinction in the breeds of men, has unaccountably given occa- sion to some writers to quote Hume as an advocate for the slavery of the Negroes; which, if his facts were odmitted, is fo- reign to his argument. But his assertions are doubtless too ge- neral. Were the Carthaginians, a civilized African nation, white. No instances, it is true, can be produced among the Negroes ; but examples taken under the disadvantages of that oppression in which they are usually seen by Europeans, will be reason- ably objected to. The bad quali- ties of slaves may with more jus- tice be attributed, not to their complexion or climate, but to the abject servility of their con- dition, which represses emula- tion, and extinguishes whatever is great and noble in the min MIX MiR Many instances, however, prove that when opportunities have oc- curred of relief from the severity of their bondage, the Negroes are capable of instruction both in arts and sciences. With res- pect to their disposition in their own country, Adanson, in his history of Senegal, says, that they are good-natured, civil, and obliging 1 ; and that he was con- vinced a considerable abatement ought to be made in the accounts he had heard and read of the savage character of the Africans. Bosman, a Dutch governor, who resided some years in Africa, relates, that they are friendly to strangers ; that they dicover in conversation a great quickness of parts and understanding ; and that they have a variety of me- chanical arts, and some curious manufactures, among them ; par- ticularly that of gold and silver hat-bands, in which he doubts if they can be rivalled by the most polished nations. Barbel, Brue, and Holben, who also resided in the country, unite in the favourable representation which they give of their capa- city for civil government and the administration of justice. These testimonials, extracted from writers who had resided on the spot, evidently overthrow the fallacious foundation on which Hume had hazarded his speculation. * * MIND, THE STRENGTH OF. All men are equally desirous of hap- piness; but few are successful in the pursuit. One chief cause is the want of strength of mind, which might enable them, to re- sist the temptation of present ease or pleasure, and carry them forward in the search of more distant profit and enjoyment. Our affections, on a general prospect of their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain measures of preference of one above another. And these decisions, though really the resujt of our calm passions and propensities, (for what else can pronounce any object eli- gible or the contrary ?) are yet said, by a natural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure reason and reflection. But when some of these objects approach nearer us, or acquire the ad- vantages of favourable lights and positions, which catch the heart or imagination, our gene- ral resolutions are frequently confounded, a small enjoyment preferred, and lasting shame and sorrow entailed upon us. And however poets may employ their wit and eloquence in cele- brating present pleasure, arid rejecting all distant views to fame, health, or fortu-ne, it is obvious, that this practice is the source of all dissoluteness and disorder, repentance and misery. A man of a strong determined temper adheres tenaciously to his general resolutions ; and is neither seduced by the allure- ments of pleasure, nor terrified by the menaces of pain ; but keeps still in view those distant pursuits, by which he at once ensures his happiness and his honour. Hume. MIRACLES. A Miracle, inlhe ener- getic sense of the word, means something wonderful ; and thus every thing is a miracle. The order of nature, the activity of light, the life of animals, are per- MIR MIR petual miracles. According' to the received notion, however, a miracle is a violation of the di- vine and eternal laws. A dead man walking- two leagues with his head in his hands, is what we call a miracle. Several na- turalists affirm, that, in this sense, there are no miracles ; and their arguments are these : a miracle is a breach of the mathematical, divine, immutable, eternal laws ; now this definition alone makes a miracle a contradiction in terms. A law cannot be both immutable and broken. But it is answered, Cannot a law of God's making- be suspended by its Author ? They boldly answer, No; and it cannot be that the infinitely wise Being should have made laws, and afterwards break them. If, say they, he made any alteration in his machine, it would be to make it go the better. Now it is clear that God has framed this immense machine as good as it possibly could be : if he saw that any imperfection hereafter would be occasioned by the nature of the materials, he at first provided against any such future defect ; so that there would be no cause for any after-change. Besides, God can do nothing without reason : now, what reason could induce him to disfigure his own work for any time ? It is for man's sake, say their opponents. It is to be hoped then, answer they, that it is for the sake of all men, it being impossible to con- ceive that the Divine Nature should work for some particular men, and not for all mankind. But supposing that God had been pleased to distinguish a small number of men by particular favours, must he therefore alter what he has settled for all times and all places ? Must he sus- pend or r.ker the eternal play of those immense springs OQ which depends the motion of the uni- verse ? He certainly can favour his creatures without any such inconstancy and change : his fa- vours are comprised in his very laws : every thing has been wisely contrived and arranged for their good ; and they all ir- revocably obey the force whick lie has originally implanted in nature. Wherefore is God to work a miracle ? to accomplish a design he has for some living beings ? That is making God to say, I have not been able, by the fabric of the universe, by my divine decrees, by my eternal laws, to compass such a design : I see I must make an alteration in my eternal ideas, my immuta- ble laws, as what I intended can- not be executed by those means. This would be an acknowledg- ment of weakness, not a declara- tion of power : it would be the most inconceivable contradiction. So that to suppose God works any miracles, is, if men can in- sult God, a downright insult to him : it is no less than saying to him, You are a weak and incon- sistent Beinp A further reply to these philosophers is, Your crying up the immutability of the Supreme Being, the eternity of his laws, with the regularity of his infinite y;orlds, signifies no- thing: our small heap of dirt has been covered with miracles ; in history, prodigies are as frequent as natural events. Name me one nation where incredible prodi- gies have not been ^performed, MIR MIR especially in times when reading and writing- were little known. A philosopher was one day asked, What he would say if the sun stood still ; that is, if the motion of the earth round that body ceased ? if all the dead arose ? and if all the mountains went and threw themselves into the sea ? and all this to prove some important truth. What I should say ! answered the phi- losopher ; I would turn Mani- chean ; and say, that there is a principle which undoes what the other has done. Voltaire. MIRACLES. I have seen the birth of many miracles of my time, which, although they were still- born, yet have we not failed to foresee what they would have come to had they lived. It is bat finding- the end of the clue, and a man may wind off as much as he will ; and there is a greater distance betwixt nothing and the minutest thing in the world, than there is betwixt that and the greatest. Now, the first that are tinctured with the beginning of novelty, when they set out their history, find, by the oppo- sition they meet with, where the difficulty of persuasion lies, and caulk that place with some false piece. Besides that, Insita homi) ibus libidinc alendi de indus- tna rumorcs, " men having a na- tural lust to propagate reports," we naturally make a conscience of restoring what has been lent us, without some usury and ad- dition of our own invention. Pri- vate error first creates public error ; and afterwards, in turn, public error causes a particular one. Thus all this fabric rises by patch-work from hand to hand ; so that the remotest wit- ness knows more than the near- est, and the last informed is more certain than the first. It w a natural progress ; for whoever believes any thing, thinks it a work of charity to persuade ano- therinto the same opinion: which the better to do, ho will make no difficulty of adding as much of his o\vn invention as he conceives necessary to obviate the resist- ance or want of conception he supposes in. others. There is nothing to which men commonly are more inclined than to give way to their own opinions. Where the ordinary means fail us, we add command and force, fire and s\vord. It is a misfor- tune to be at that pass, that the best touchstone of the truth must be the multitude of be- lievers, in a crowd where the number of fools so much exceed the wise. Quasi vero quidquam sit tarn Talde, quam nihil. saptre, vulgare. Sanitatis patrocinium cst insanientium tvrba. " As if any thing were so common as igno- rance." "The mob of fools is a protection to the wise. It is Lard for a man to form his judg- ment against the common opi- nions. The first persuasion taken of the very subject itself pos- sesses the simple, and from that it spreads to the wise, by the authority of the number and an- tiquity of the witnesses. For my part, what I would not be- lieve from one, I would not be- lieve from a hundred ; and I do not judge of opinions by the years. It is not long since ono of our princes, in whom the gout has spoiled an excellent na- tural gniu *nd sprightly dii-^ MLR Mia position, suffered himself to be 10 far persuaded with the report of the wonderful operations of a certain priest, who by words and gestures cured all sorts of diseases, as to go a long journey to seek him out ; and, by the force of his apprehension, for some time so persuaded and laid his leg's asleep for several hours, as to obtain that service from which they had a long time left off. Had fortune packed tog-e- ther five or six such accidents, it had been enough to have brought this miracle into nature. There was after this discovered so much simplicity, and so little art, in the architect of such ope- rations, that he was thought too contemptible to be punished, as would be the case of most such things, were they examined to the bottom. Miramur ex interval- lofallentia, " we admire at things that deceive by their distance J> So does oar sight often repre- sent to us strange things at a distance, that vanish at approach- ing- them near. Nunquam ad li- quidumfama perducitur, " Fame never reports things in their true light," It is to be wondered at from how many idle begin- nings and frivolous causes such famous impressions commonly proceed. This it is that obstructs the information ; for whilst we seek out the causes, and the great and weighty ends worthy of so great a name, we lose the true ones. They escape our sight by their littleness ; and, in truth, a prudent, diligent, and subtle enquirer is necessary in such researches ; one who is in- different, and not prepossessed. Montaigne. MIRACLES. A miracle is a viola" tion of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable expe- perience has established these laws, the proof against a mira- cle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argu- ment from experience can pos- sibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable that all men must die; that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air ; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water ; unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or a miracle, to prevent them? No- thing is a miracle if it happen in the common course of nature. Sometimes an event may not in itself seem to be contrary to the lav.s of nature; and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be de- nominated a miracle, because in fact it is contrary to these laws. Thus, if a person claim- ing a divine authority should command a sick person to be well, the clouds to pour rain ; in short, should order many natural events, which immediately fol- low upon his command, these might justly be esteemed mira- cles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature: for if any suspicion remain, that the event and com- mand concurred by accident, there is no miracle, and no transgression of the laws of na- ture. If this {suspicion be re- moved, there (s evidently a mi- racle, and a transgression of these laws ; because nothing can be more contrary to nature, than Ml ft that the voice or command of a man should have such an in- fluence. A miracle may be ac- curately defined: A transgression . of a law of nature by a particular volition order to enable us to judge of it, that we should be fully acquainted with those laws; and in order to judge of it with certainty, that we should be ac- quainted with them all. For if there should be but one we are ignorant of, it may, in some cir- cumstances unknown to the spectators, alter the effect of those which may be known. Hence every one who takes upon him to say, that such or such an act is a miracle, declares himself to be perfectly acquaint- ed with all the laws of nature, and that he knows this act to be an exception. But where is the man who knows all the laws of nature ? Newton himself never pretended to such knowledge. A sensible man, being witness to an unheard of act, may affirm that he saw such a fact, and we may believe him. But neither that sensible man nor any other sensible man upon earth, will take upon him to affirm, that such fact, how new and astonishing soever, is a miracle; for how can he know it? The most that can be said in favour of a person who boasts his working miracles is, that he does things very extraordi- nary. But who will deny the possibility or reality of things very extraordinary ? New discoveries are daily made in the operations of nature, while human industry is hourly proceeding- towards perfection-. The curious art of chemistry alone hath its transmutations,, precipitations, detonations, ex- plosions, its phosphorus, its earthquakes, and a thousand other wonders, to operate on the beholders. With such in- struments as cannon, the load- stone, the barometer, and optical instruments, what prodigies might not be worked among ignorant people ? The Eu- ropeans have, in consequence of their arts, always passed for gods among the barbarians. And yet if, in the midst even of these arts-, of sciences, colleges and academies; if r in the rnidst of Europe, in France, or in England, a person had started up, in the last century, armed with all those miracles of electricity which are now common to the meanest of our experimentalists, it is pro- bable he would have been burnt for a sorceror, or followed as a prophet. The spectators of mar- vellous things are naturally led to cry them up with exaggeration. In deceiving others on this head, therefore, men may frequently, without ill intention, deceive themselves. When things arc ever so little above our know- ledge or comprehension, we are apt to think them above that of human reason in general ; and the mind is at length induced to see a prodigy, where the heart is so strongly inclined to find one. From what is here advanced, I conclude that mere facts, though ever so well attested and admis- sible in all their circumstances,, serve to prove nothing ; and that we may suspect an exaggeration MIR MIR of their circumstances without suspecting 1 the sincerity of those who have related them. The discoveries which are daily mak- ing in the laws of nature, those which probably will be made hereafter, and those which may ever remain to be made ; the past and present progress of human industry; the different bounds which people set to the impossible, according- as they have more or less knowledge ; all these thing's serve to prove that we are unacquainted with those bounds. And yet, in order to a miracle's being- really such, it must surpass them. Whether there be truly any miracles or not, therefore, it is impossible for a wise man to be assured that any fact whatever is truly such. Rousseau. MIRACLE, MYSTERY, AND PRO- PHECY, MEANS FOR IMPOSING ON MANKIND. Miracle, mystery, and prophecy are the three means which have been employ- ed in all ages, and perhaps in all countries, to impose upon mankind. The two lirst are in- compatible with true religion, and the third ought always to be suspected. With respect to mystery, eve- ry thing we behold is, in one sense, a mystery. We cannot account how it is that an acorn when put into the ground, is made to develop itself, and be- come an oak. We know> not how it is that the seed we sow unfolds and multiplies itself, and returns to us such an abundant interest for so small a capital. The fact, however, as distinct from the operating cause, is not a mystery, because we see it; and w r know also the means we are to use, which are no other than the putting the seed inta the ground. W 7 e know there- fore as much as is necessary for us to know; and that part of the operation that we do not know, and which if we did, we could not perform, the Creator takes upon himself and performs it for us. But though every created thing is, in this sense,'a mystery, the word mystery cannot be ap- plied to moral truth, any more than obscurity can be applied to light. The God in 'whom we believe is a God of moral truth, and not a God of mystery or obscurity. Mystery is the enemy of truth. It is a fog of human invention that obscures and dis- torts truth. Truth never enve- lopes itself in mystery ; and the mystery in which it is at any time enveloped, is the work of its antagonist, and never of itself. Religion therefore, being the be- lief of a God, and the practice of moral truth, cannot have con- nexion with mystery. The be- lief of a God, so far from having any thing of mystery in it, is of all beliefs the most easy, because it arises to us, as before observ- ed, out of necessity; and the practice of moral truth, or in other words, a practical imitati- on of the moral goodness of God, is no other than- our acting to- wards each other benignly, as he acts towards all. We can- not serve God in the manner we serve those who cannot do with- out such service ; and therefore, the only idea we can have of serving God is, that of contri- buting to the happioess of the MIR MIR living- creation that God has made. This cannot be done by retiring- ourselves from the world, and spending a recluse life in selfish devotion. The very nature and design of religion, if I may so express myself, prove, even to demon- stration, that it must be free from j mystery, and imincumbered with every thing that is mysterious. Religion considered as a duty, must be on a level to the under- standing and comprehension of all. 'When men, whether from policy, or pious fraud, set up sys- tems of religion, incompatible with the word or works of God in the creation, and not only above human comprehension, but repugnant to it, they were under the necessity of inventing or adopting a word that should serve as a bar to all questions, enquiries, and speculations. The word mystery answered this pur- pose ; and thus it has happened, that religion, which in itself, is without mystery, has been cor- rupted into a fog of mysteries. As mystery answered all gene- ral purposes, miracle followed as an occasional auxiliary. The former served to bewilder the mind; the latter to puzzle the senses. The one was the lingo, the other the legerdemain. But before going farther into this subject, it will be proper to en- quire what is to bs under- stood by a miracle. In the same sense that every thing may be said to be a mystery, so also it may be said that every thing is a miracle, and that no one thing is a greater miracle than another. The elephant, though larger, is not a greater miracle -than the mite ; nor a mountain a greater miracle than an atom. To an almighty power, it is no more difficult to make the one than the other, and no more dif- ficult to make a million of worlds than to make one. Eve- ry thing therefore is, in one sense, a miracle ; whilst in the other sense, there is no such thing as o miracle. When com- pared to our power and compre- hension it is a miracle. When compared to the power that per- forms it, it is not a miracle. Of all the modes of evidence that ever were invented to obtain belief for any system or opinion, to which the name of religion has been given, that of miracle, however successful the imposi- tion may have been, is the most inconsistent. For, in the first place, whenever recourse is had to shew, for the purpose of pro- curing that belief, (for a miracle, 'under any idea of the word, is a show) it implies a lameness or weakness in the doctrine that is preached ; which, not being able to stand the test of reason, calls in the assistance of miracles to its support. And in the second place, it is degrading the Al- mighty into a show-man, playing tricks to amuse, and make the people stare and wonder, instead of convincing them. In every point of view, in which those things called miracles, can be placed and considered, the reality of them is improbable, and their existence unnecessary. They would not answer any useful purpose, even if they were true ; for it is more difficult to obtain belief to a miracle, than to a principle evidently moral, with- MIR MIR out ant/ miracle. Moral princi- ple speaks universally for itself. Miracle can be but a thing- of the moment, and seen but by a few. instead therefore, of admitting the recitals of miracles as evi- dence of any system of religion being- true, they ought to bo considered as symptoms of its being fallacious. It is necessary to the character of truth, that it reject all adventitious aid, while it is the character of fable 1o seek the aid of whicl, truth has no need. Thus much for mys- tery and miracle. As mystery and miracle took charge of the past and the pre- sent, prophecy took charge of the future, and thus rounded the tenses of faith. It was not suffi- cient to know what had been dont;, but also what would be done. The supposed prophet was the supposed historian of times to come ; and if he hap- pened, in shooting with a long bow of a thousand years, to come within a thousand miles of the mark, the ingenuity of pos- terity would make it. point- blank ; and if he happened to be directly wrong, it was only to suppose, as in .the cases of Jonas and of Ninevah, that God had repented himself, and changed his mind, What fools do fabu- lous systems of relig-ion make of us ! If by a prophet we are to suppose a man to whom the Almighty communicated some event that would take place at a future period, either there were such men, or there were not. If there were, it is consistent to believe that the event so com- municated, would be told in terms that could be understood ; and not related in such an obscure manner, as to be out of the com- prehension of those that heard it, and withal, so equivocal, as to fit almost any circumstance that might happen afterwards. It is conceiving very irreverently of the Almighty, to suppose he would deal in this jest- ing manner with mankind: yet all the things called prophe- cies, come under this descrip- tion. But it is with pro- phecy as it is with miracle. It could not answer the purpose even if it were read. Those to whom a prophecy was told, could not tell whether the man prophecied or lied or, whether it had been revealed to him, or was a conceit of his own. A prophet, therefore, is a charac- ter usjeless and unnecessary; and the s'afe side of the case is, to guard against being imposed upon, by not giving credit to such stories. Upon the whole, mystery, mi racle, and prophecy, are appen- dages that belong to fabulous, and hot to true religion, which being founded on reason, has no need of their assistance. They are the means by which religion has been made into a trade. The success of one impostor gave encouragement to another, and the quieting salvo of doing some good by keeping up a pious fraud, protected them from re- morse. Besides, the trade was a profitable one ; and every one knows that so long as there are gulls, there will be no want of persons to take advantage f their gullabilitv. P * *. MIR MIR MIRACLES. At a period, when faith could boast of numerous miraculous victories over death, it seems difficult to account for the scepticism of those philoso- phers who still rejected and de- rided the doctrine of the resur- rection. A noble Grecian had rested upon this important ground, the whole controversy ; and promised Theophilus, bishop of Antioch, that if he could be gratified with the sight of a sin- gle person who had been actu- ally raised from tne dead, he would immediately embrace the Christian religion. It is some- what remarkable that the pre- late of the first eastern church, however anxious for the conver- sion of his friend, thought proper to decline this fair and reason- able challenge. Gibbon. MORALITY AND RELIGION NOT THE SAME. Morality and Reli- gion are so generally confounded, that most people look upon them as synonimous terms, although, as we shall endeavour to shew, no two things can be more dif- ferent. Religion consists in faith in certain doctrines, and in the observance of certain ceremo- nies. Thus we say, " the Chris- tian religion, the Mahometan re- ligion, the Hindoo religion :" meaning thereby, 'the different articles of faith, and the different rites and ceremonies of these respective forms of religion, of which the professors of each, think their own the only true one, and piously condemn all who differ from them to eternal damnation, for the glory of God. We do not say the Christian mo- rality, the Mahometan morality, the Hindoo morality, for there is only one kind of morality, and it consists in the practice of the social virtues, and. may be all summed up in the precept of " Never doing to others that which we would not they should do unto us." This is a simple, effectual, and safe rule of con- duct; for no man willingly does any thing to injure himself; and as long as he follows this precept, he will never do any thing to injure others. A man may be perfectly mo- ral, and at the same time totally devoid of religion ; while ano- ther may be excessively religi- ous, without possessing one par- ticle of morality ! This sounds strange, but it is not the less true. For instance Downright is a dutiful son, a good husband, and an affectionate father ; he is kind to all who are dependent upon him, upright in all his deal- ings, punctual to his creditors, lenient to his debtors, bountiful to the needy, affable to all ; in short, he is what Pope calls the noblest word of God an honest man. But Downright never en- ters a church, nor is he hypocrite enough to say he believes things, which his reason tells him are not to be believed, because they are impossible. Glosswell again, was disres- pectful to his parents, and cer- tainly hastened their deaths by his bad behaviour. He is surly to his wife, and often brutal to- wards his children. But Gloss- well has prayers morning and evening in his family, says grace before and after meat; goes to church regularly twice every Sunday, repeats the responses aloud, and when he comes home, MIR MIR can recapitulate all the heads-of the sermon ; believes that the man-god Jesus was born of a virgin ; that three make one, and one three or, in other words, that three and one are sometimes the same ; that about four thousand years after the creation of the world, God the father sent God the son into it, in the shape of a man, to under- go all sorts of abusive treatment, and latterly, a painful and igno- minious death, by which, man- kind never were, some how or other, to be freed from the ef- fects of a sin committed soon al'ter the creation; which sin consisted in the eating- of an ap- ple, and for the eating- of which apple, the all-bountiful creator had mildly condemned all man- kind, thong-h then unborn, to eternal punishment. All this, Glosswell devoutly believes, as well as all God's violations of his own laws, called miracles, together with all the dark and incomprehensible mysteries of the Christian faith. without which, he thinks no man can be saved. With all this ample stock of religion, Glosswell has not one spark of morality: in his deal- ing's, he never fails to lake an advantag-e where he can do it with safety; he is a hard creditor, and sometimes pays his own cre- ditors with a law-suit; he is fawning- to his superiors, and in- solent to his inferiors; in short, | his only rule of action is to keep j on the windy side of the law,i and not to do any thing- that will endanger his neck. Well, Downright has a great deal of morality, and no religion; Glosswell has a great deal of religion, and no morality. Cer- tainly, then, religion and mo- rality are not the same thing ; and it would therefore be right, in future, to distinguish them from one another. S. MIRACLES, ESTABLISHED ONLY BY HUMAN TESTIMONY, NO PROOF OF THE DIVINE ORIGINAL OF ANY RELIGION. If we extend our theology beyond the pros- pect of the universe, and the proper use of our faculties, we must have recourse to extraor- dinary means. These means can- not depend on the authority of men: for all men being of the same species, they have all the same natural means of know- ledge, and one man is as likely to be deceived as another. Faith therefore must depend not on hearsay, but on proofs. The tes- timony, therefore, of mankind is, at the bottom, that of reason, and adds nothing to the natural means God hath given us for the discovery of truth. What can even the apostle of truth have to tell us, of which we are not still to judg-e ? But God himself hath spoken: listen to the voice of revelation. But, to whom hath he spoken! and how comes it that he hath appointed others to teach his word ? There would have been much less risk of de- ception, if every individual had heard him speak, and this would have been no difficult matter to Omnipotence. It may be said, we are Secure from deception by his manifesting- the mission of his messengers by miracles. Where are these miracles to be seen ? Are they only related in books? Who wrote these books? Men. Who were witnesses of MIR MIR these miracles? Men. Always human testimony! It is always men that tell us what other men have told them. What a num- ber of these are constantly be- tween us and the Deity! We are always reduced to the ne- cessity of examining 1 , comparing 1 , and verifying- such evidence. This occasions a very intricate discussion, for which we stand in need of immense erudition. We must recur back to the earliest antiquity ; we must examine, weigh, confront prophecies, re- velations, facts, with all the monuments of faitji that have made their appearance in all the countries of the world, to ascer- tain their time, place, authors, and occasions. There is g - reat sagacity requisite to enable us to distinguish between pieces that are suppositions and those which are authentic; to compare ob- jections with their replies, trans- lations with their originals ; to judge of the impartiality of wit- nesses, of their good sense, of their capacity; to know if no- thing be suppressed or added to their testimony, if nothing be changed, transposed or falsified ; to obviate the contradictions that remain ; to judge what weight we ought to ascribe to the silence of our opponents, in re- gard to facts alleged against them ; whether they did not dis- dain them too much to make any reply ; whether books were common enough for ours to reach them ; or if we were honest enough to let theirs have a free circulation among us, and to leave their strongest ob- jections in full force. Again, supposing- all these mo- numents acknowledged to be in- contestable, we must proceed to examine the proofs of the mis- sion of their authors. It would be necessary for us to be per- fectly acquainted with the laws of chance, and the doctrine ot" probabilities, to judge what pre- diction could not be accomplish- ed without a miracle; to know the genius of the original lan- guage, in order to distinguish what is predictive in these lan- guages, and what is only figura- tive. It would be requisite for us to know what facts are agree- able to the established order of nature, and what are not so ; to be able to say how far an art- ful man may not fascinate the eyes of the simple, and even astonish the most enlig'htened spectators ; to know ot what kind a miracle should be; and the authenticity it ought to bear, not only to claim our belief, but to make it criminal to doubt it; to compare the proofs of false and true miracles, and discover the certain means of distinguish- ing them ; and, after all, to tell why the Deity should choose, in order to confirm the truth of his word, to make use of means which themselves require so much confirmation, as if he took de- light in playing upon the cre- dulity of mankind, and had pur- posely avoided the direct means to persuade them. Suppose that the Divine Ma- jesty hath really condescended to make man the organ of pro- mulgating its sacred will ; is it reasonable, is it just, to require all mankind to obey the voice of such a minister, without his mak- ing himself known to be such? MIR MIR Where is the equity or propriety I of furnishing 1 him, for universal' credentials, with only a few par- ticular tokens displayed before a handful of obscure persons, and of which all the rest of mankind know nothing- but hearsay? In every country in the world, if we should believe all the prodi- gies to be true which the com- mon people, and the ignorant, affirm to have seen, every sect would be in the right : there would be more miraculous events than natural ones ; and the great- est miracle of all would be to find that no miracles had hap- per.ed where fanaticism had been persecuted. The Supreme Being is best displayed by the fixed and unalterable order of nature. Who is there will venture to de- termine how manyeye-witnesses are necessary to reader a miracle worthy of credit ? If the miracles intended to prove the truth, of a doctrine, stand themselves in need of proof, of what use are they ? There might as well be none performed at all. The most important examina- tion, after all, remains to be made into the truth of the doc- trines delivered ; for as those who say that God is pleased to work these miracles, pretend that the devil sometimes imitates them, we are not a jot nearer than before, though such miracles should be ever so well attested. As the magicians of Pharoah worked the same miracles, even in the presence of Moses, as he himself performed by the express command of God, why might not they, in his absence, from the same proofs, pretend to the same authority? Thus, after proving the truth of the doctrine by the miracle, we are reduced to prove the truth of the miricle by that of the doctrine, lest the works of the devil should be mistaken for those of the Lord. The doctrines coming from God ought to bear the sacred characters of the Divinity; and should not only clear up those confused ideas which unenlightened reason ex- cites in the mind, but should also furnish us with a system of reli- gion and morals agreeable to those attributes by which only we form a conception of his essence. Rousseau. MIRACLES, THE PASSION OF SUR- PRISE AND WONDER FAVOURABLE TO. The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from mira- cles, being an agreeable emo- tion, gives a .sensible tendency towards the belief of those events from which it is derived. With what greediness are the miracu- lous accounts of travellers re- ceived ; their descriptions of sea arid land monsters, &c. ? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; human testi mony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an en- thusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality. What greater temptation than to ap- pear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven ? If, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man has first made a convert of himself, and entered seriously into the delusion ; who- ever scruples to make use of pious frauds in support of so holy and meritorious a cause ? The smallest spark may here kindle 2 H MIR MIR into the greatest flame. The ! gazingmultitudereceive greedily without examination, whatever soothes superstition, and pro- motes wonder. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evi- dence: what judgment they have, they renounce by princi- ple ; or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination dis- turb the regularity of its ope- rations. Their credulity increases his impudence ; and his impu- dence overpowers their credulity. The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been de- tected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove the strong pro- pensity of mankind to the ex- traordinary and the marvellous; and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations ol this kind. We judge, therefore, in conformity to experience and observation, when we account for them by the known and' na- tural principles of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of all the laws of na- ture ? Hume. MIRACLES ABOUND IN IGNORANT AND BARBAROUS AGES.~It form a very strong presumption a- gainst all miraculous relations that they are observed to aboum chiefly among ignorant ant barbarous nations; or if a ci- vilized people has ever given admission to any of them that people will be found to have received them from igno- rant and barbarous ancestors/who transmitted them with that in- violable sanction and authority which always attend received opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into a new world, Pestilences, famines, death, &c. are never the effects of those natural causes which we expe- rience. Prophecies, omens, ora- cles, judgments, quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we ad- vance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn that there is nothing mysterious or superna- tural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual pro- pensity of mankind towards the marvellous; and that though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be tho- roughly extirpated from human nature. The advantages are so great of starting an imposture among an ignorant people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the ge- nerality of them, (which, though seldom, is sometimes the case) it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most ig- norant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report a- broad. None of their country- men have large enough corres- pondence, or sufficient credit and authority, to contradict and beat MIR MON down the delusion. Mens' in- clination to the marvellous has full opportunity to display it- self. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance. Hume. MIRACLES CAN NEVER BE PROVED BY HUMAN TESTIMONY, SO AS TO BE THE FOUNDATION OF A SYSTEM OF RELIGION. If a miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men, in all ages, have been so much im- posed on by ridiculous stories of this kind, that this very circum- stance would be a full proof of a cheat; and sufficient with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without further exami- nation. Thoug-h the being to whom the miracle is ascribed be almighty, it does not, cpon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a being, other- wise than from the experience which we have of his produc- tions in the usual course of na- ture. This still reduces us to past observation; and obliges us to compare the instances of the violations of truth in the testi- mony of men, with those of the violations of the laws of nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely or probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any other matter of fact, this must diminish very much the authority of the former testi- mony, and make us form a reso- lution, never to lend any atten- tion to it, with whatever spe- cious pretext it may be covered. Hume. MONKS, PRINCIPLES or THE, NOT A PROPER STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. Among the different principles adopted as a standard of right and wrong, is the principle of the monks; or, as it is more frequently called, the ascetic principle, or asceti- cism ; a term from a Greek word which signifies exercise. The practices by which the monks sought to distinguish themselves from other men, were called their exercises. These exercises consisted in so many contrivan- ces they had for tormenting themselves. By this they thought to ingratiate themselves with the Deity. For the Deity, said they, is a Being of infinite bene- volence: now a Being of the most ordinary benevolence is pleased to see others make n themselves as happy as they can ; therefore to make ourselves, ajs unhappy as we can is the way to please the Deity. If any body asked them, What motive they could find for doing all this I Oh! said they, you are not to imagine that we are punishing ourselves for nothing: we know very well what we are about. You are to know, that for every grain of pain it costs us now, we are to have a hundred grains of pleasure by and by. The case is, that God loves to see us tor- ment ourselves at present; in- deed he has as good as told us so. But this is done only to try us r in order just to see how we should behave ; which it is plain he could not know, without MON making- the experiment. Now, then, from the satisfaction it give him to see us make ourselves as unhappy as we can make our- selves in this present life, we have a sure proof of the satisfac- tion it will give him to see us as happy as he can make us in a life lo come. By the principle of asceticism therefore is meant, that princi- ple, which, like the principle of utility, approves or disapproves of any action, according- to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose in- terest is in question ; but in an inverse manner approving of actions in as far as they tend to diminish his happiness ; dis- approving of them in as far as they tend to augment it. It ij evident that any one who repro- bates any the least particle of pleasure, as such, from whatever source derived, is pro tanto a partizan of the principle of a- ceticism. It is only upon that principle, and not from the prin- ciple of utility, that the most abominable pleasure which the vilest of malefactors ever reaped from his crime would be to be reprobated, if it stood alone. The case is, that it never does stand alone; but is necessarily followed by such a quantity of pain, (or, what comes to the tame thing, such a chance for a certain quantity of pain) that the pleasure, in comparison of it, is as nothing: and this is the true and sole, but perfectly suffi- cient reason for making it a ground for punishment. There are two classes of men of very different complexions, by whom the principle of asceti- cism appears to have been em- braced: the one a set of moral- ists ; the other a set of religion- ists. Different accordingly have been the motives which appear to have recommended it to the notice of these different parties. Hope, % that is, the prospect of pleasure, seems to have animated the former: hope, the aliment of philosophic pride; the hope o!' honour and reputation at the hands of men. Fear, that is, the prospect of pain, the latter: fear, the offspring of supersti- tious fancy ; the fear of future punishment at the hunds of a splenetic and revengeful Deity. I say, in this case, fear ; for of the invisible future, fear is more powerful than hope. T^ese circumstances characterize the two different parties among the partizans of the principle of as- ceticism; the parties and their motives different the principle the same. The religious party, however, appear to have carried it further than the philosophical they have acted more consistently, and less wisely. The philosophical party have scarcely gone ft.rther than to reprobate pleasure ; the religious party have frequently gone so fur as to make it a matter of merit and of duty to court pain. The philosophical party have hardly gone further than the making- pain a matter of in- difference. It is no evil, they have said: they have not said, it is a good. They have not so much as reprobated all plea- sure in the lump. They have discarded only what they have called the gross- that is, such as MON MON are organical, or of which the origin is easily traced up to such as are organical, they have even cherished and magnified the re- fined. Yet this, however, not under the name of pleasure : to cleanse itself from the sordes of its impure original, it was neces- sary it should change its name ; the honourable, the glorious, the reputable, the becoming, the ho- nestum, the decorum, it was to be called ; 'in short, any thing but pleasure. From these two sources have flowed the doctrines from which the sentiments of the bulk of mankind have all along received a tincture of this principle; some from the philosophical, some from the religious, some from both. Men of education more frequently from the philo- sophical, as more suited to the elevation of their sentiments; the vulgar more frequently from the superstitious, as more suited to the narrowness of their in- j tellect, undiiated by knowledge ; and to the abjectness of their condition, continually open to the attacks of fear. The tinc- tures, however, derived from the two sources would naturally in- termingle, insomuch, that a man would not always know by which of them he was most in- fluenced; and they would often serve to corroborate and enliven one another. It was this con- formity that made a kind of alliance between parties of a complexion otherwise so dis- j similar ; and disposed them to j unite, upon various occasions, against the common enemy, the partizan of the principle of utility, whom they joined in branding with the odious name of Epicurean. The principle of asceticism, however, with whatever warmth it may have been embraced by its partizans as a rule of pri- vate conduct, seems not to have been carried to any considerable length when applied to the bu- siness of government. In a few instances it has been carried a little way by the philosophical party; witness the Spartan re- gimen. Though then, perhaps, it may be considered as having- been a measure of security ; and an application, though a pre- cipitate and perverse application of the principle of utility. Scarcely in any instances, to any- considerable length, by the re- ligious : for the various monastic orders, and the societies of the Quakers, Dumplers, Moravians, and other religionists, have been free societies, whose regimen no man has been astricted to with- out the intervention of his own consent. Whatever merit a man may have thought there would be in making himself miserable, no such notion seems ever to have occurred to any of them, that it may be a merit, much less a duty, to make others miserable; although it should seem, that if a certain quantity of misery were a thing- so desirable, it would not matter much whether it were brought by each man upon him- self, or by one man upon another. It is true, that from the same source from whence, among the religionists, the attachment to the principle of asceticism took its rise, flowed other doctrines and practices, from which misery in abundance was produced in MON MON one man by the instrumentality of another ; witness the holy wars, arid the persecutions for religion. But the passion for producing: misery in these cases proceeded upon some special ground ; the exercise of it was confined to persons of particular descriptions ; they were tor- mented, not as men, but as here- tics and infidels. To have in- flicted the same miseries on their fellow-believers and fellow-sect- aries, would have been as blame- able in the eyes even of these re- ligionists, as in those of a par- tizan of the principle of utility. For a man to give himself a certain number of stripes was indeed meritorious; but to give the same number of stripes to another man, not consenting, would have been a sin. We read of saints who for the good of their souls, and the mortification of their bodies, have voluntarily yielded themselves a prey to vermin ; but though many persons of this class have wielded the reins of empire, we read of none who have set themselves to work, and made laws on purpose, with a view of stocking the body poli- tic with the breed of highway- men, housebreakers, or incendi- aries. If at any time they have suffered the nation to be preyed upon by swarms of idle pension- ers, or useless placemen, it has rather been from negligence and irnbecillity, than from any settled plan for oppressing- and plunder- ing of the people. If at any time they have sapped the sources of national wealth, by cramping commerce, and driving the inhabitants into emigration, it has been with other views, and in pursuit of other ends. If they have declaimed against the pur- suit,, of pleasure, and the use of wealth, they have commonly stopped at declamation ; they have not, like Lycurgus, made express ordinances for the pur- pose of banishing the precious meials. If they have established idleness by law, it has been, not because idleness, the mother of vice and misery, is itself a virtue, but because idleness (say they) is the road to holiness. If under the notion of fasting, they have joined in the plan of confining- their subjects to a diet, thought by some to be of the most nourishing and prolific nature, it has been not for the sake of making them tributaries to the nations by whom that diet was to be supplied, but for the sake of ma- nifesting their own power, and exercising the obedience of the people. If they have established, or suffered to be established, punishments for the breach of celibacy, they have done no more than comply with the pe- titions of those deluded rigorists, who, dupes to the ambitious and deep-laid policy of their rulers, first laid themselves under that idle obligation by a vow. The principle of asceticism seems originally to have been the reverie of certain hasty specula- tors, who having perceived, or fancied, that certain pleasures, when reaped in certain circum- stances, have, at the long run, been attended with pains more than equivalent to them, took occasion to quarrel with every thing that offered itself under the name of pleasure. Having then got thus far, and having- MOR MOR forgot 'he point which they set out from, they pushed on, and went so much further as to think it meritorious to fall in love with pain. Even this, we see, is at bottom but the principle of utility misapplied. The principle of utility is ca- pable of being- consistently pur- sued ; and it is but tautology to say, that the more consistently it is pursued, the better it must ever be for human-kind. The principle of asceticism never was, nor ever can be, consistently pursued by any living 1 creature. Let but one tenth part of the inhabitants of this earth pursue it consistently, and in a day's time they will have turned it into a hell. See the article RIGHT and WRONG. /. Benlham. MORALITY. The truths of morali- ty, like all other truths, are dis- covered only by trials and experi- ments. The principles of moral conduct would be totally insig- niflcant if they did not lead to some ends ; and if a certain man- ner of exercising 1 our faculties, a certain manner of acting 1 , had not been found, by repeated experi- ments, to have made 'us happy, and a different manner to have made us unhappy, we should never have had any principles of morals. This science, therefore, which, under its own name, but more especially under that o! relig-ion, has been considered as a matter of mere speculation, and abounding- with doubts and uncertainties and difficulties, is as plain and as clear as v geometry ; it depends on facts, which canno! easily be mistaken, because the whole world is collecting- and observing- them ; and it has this advantag-e over other sciences, that all men have an equal in- terest in the success of their inquiries. Williams. MORAL RULES, THE ORIGIN OF. The rules of morality are ulti- mately founded on experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve or disapprove of. We do not orig-inally approve or condemn particular actions, because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent with a certain general rule. The gene- ral rule, on the contrary, is formed, by finding- from expe- rience, that all actions of a cer- tain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of. To the man who first saw an inhuman murder, committed from avarice, envy, or unjust resent- ment, and upon one too who loved and trusted the murderer ; who beheld the last agonies of the dying person ; who heard him with his expiring breath com- plain more of the perfidy and ingratitude of his false friend, than of the violence which had been done to him ; there could be no occasion, in order to con- ceive how horrible such an ac- tion was, that he should reflect that one of the most sacred rules of conduct was what prohibited the taking away the life of an innocent person ; that this was a plain violation of that rule, and consequently a very blameable action. His detestation of this crime, it is evident, would arise instantaneously, and antecedent to his having formed to himself any such general rule. The gene- MOR MOR ral rule, .on the contrary, which' he might afterwards form, would i be founded upon the detestation j which he felt necessarily arise in his own breast at the thought of this and every other particular action of the same kind. When we read in history, or" romance, the account of actions, either of i generosity or of baseness, the admiration which we conceive fov the one, and the contempt which we feel for the other, neither of them arise from re- flecting- that there are certain general rules which declare all actions of the one kind admi- rable, and all actions of the other contemptible. Those general rules, on the contrary, are all formed from the experience we have had of the effects which actions of ail different kinds naturally produce upon us. An amiable action, a respectable ac- tion, an horrid action, are all of them actions which naturally ex- cite the love, the respect, or the horror of the spectator, for the person who performs them. The general rules which determine what actions are, and what are not the objects of each of those sentiments, can be formed no other way than by observing- what actions actually and in fact excite them. When these general rules indeed have been formed, and when they are universally acknowledged and established by the concurring sentiments of mankind, we fre- quently appeal to them, as to the standards of judgment, in debating- concerning the degree of praise or blame that is due to certain actions of a complicated and dubious nature. They are upon these occasions commonJy cited as the ultimate foundations of what is just or unjust in hu- man conduct; and this circum- stance seems to have misled se- veral eminent authors to draw up their systems in such a man- lier, ay if they had supposed that the original judgments of man- kind, with regard to right or wrong, were formed, like the decisions of a court of judicatory, by considering, first, the general rule; and then, secondly, whe- ther the particular action under consideration fell properly with- in its comprehension. &ee the article RIGHT and WRONG. A. Smith. MORALS, IN DIFFERENT CLIMATES, GENERAL STATE OF. In point of morality in general, it is agreed, that the manners of cold climates far exceed those of warm ; in the latter, the passions are nat;:- rally very strong, and likewise- kept in a perpetual state of irri- tation from the high degree of sensibility that prevails, which causes a great multiplication of crimes, by multiplying the ob- jects of temptation. Many desires and passions arise there, from causes that would either never occur in a cold climate, or be easily resisted; but in a warm one the passion or inclination is stronger, and the power of re- straint less. In cold climates, the desires are but few in com- parison, and not often of a very immoral kind; and those re- pressed with less difficulty, as they are seldom very violent. In temperate climates, the passions are in a middle state, and gene- rally inconstant in their nature ; sufficiently strong, however, to MOR MCR furnish motives for action, though not so powerful as to admit of no restraints from considerations of prudence, justice, or religion. Falconer. MORAL OBLIGATION, THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEAS OF. Every per- son feels a gleam of pleasure the moment that lig-ht is introduced into a dark room; and disagree- able sensations, tending to me- lancholy, and sometimes verging towards the borders of terror, upon passing suddenly from a light into a perfectly dark place. These feelings are instantaneous and constant, and to appearance simple, yet they are unquestion- ably the offspring of association. but formed by a thousand sensa- tions and ideas, which it is im- possible to analyse or separate: and they vary exceedingly in different persons, especially ac- cording to the circumstances of their early lives. The ideas annexed to the words moral right and wrong are likewise far from being sim- ple in reality; though the asso- ciation of their parts has become so intimate and perfect in a long course of time, that, upon first naming them, they present that appearance. So the motion of the head, and of any particular limb, may seem to be a very simple thing, though a great number of muscles are employed to perform it. The first rudiments of the ideas of right, wrong, and obligation, seem to be acquired by a child when he finds himself checked and controuled by a superior power. At first, he feels nothing but mere force; and consequently he has no idea of any kind of restraint but that of mere neces- sity. He finds he cannot have his will, and therefore he submits. Afterwards, he attends to many circumstances, which distinguish the authority of a father or of a master from that of other per- sons. Ideas of reverence, love, esteem, dependence, accom- pany those commands; and, by degrees, he experiences the pe- culiar advantages of filial sub- jection. He sees also, that all his companions, who are noticed and admired by others, obey their parents and that those who are of a refractory disposi- tion are universally disliked. These, and other circumstan- ces now begin to alter and modify the idea of mere necessity, till by degrees he considers the com- mands of a parent as something- thai must not be resisted or dis- puted," even though he has a power of doing it ; and ail these ideas coalescing-, form the ideas of moral right and moral obliga- tion, which are easily transferred from the commands of a parent to those of a magistrate, of God, and of conscience. It is plainly apparent to every person who has attended to the ideas of chil- dren, that their ideas of moral right and moral obligation are formed very gradually and slowly, from a long train of circumstan- ces, and that it is a considerable time before they become at all distinct and perfect. This opinion of the gradual formation of the ideas of moral right and wrong from a great variety of elements, easily ac- counts for that prodigious diversi- ty in the sentiments of mankin respecting the objects of moral 2 i MOR MOR obligation ; and they seem un- accountable on any other hy- pothesis. If the idea of moral obligation was a simple idea, arising from the view of certain actions or sentiments, why should it not be as invariable as the perception of coloursand sounds? But though the shape and colour of a flower appear the same to every human eye, one man prac- tises as a moral duty what another looks upon with abhor- rence, and reflects upon with re- morse. Now a thing that varies with education and instruction, as moral sentiments are known to do, certainly has the appear- ance of being generated by a series of different impressions, in the manner here described. The most shocking crimes that men can commit are those of injustice and murder ; and yet it is hardly possible to define any circumstances in which some part of mankind have not, with- out the least scruple or remorse, seized the property, or taken away the lives of others: so that the definition of these crimes must vary in almost every coun- try. Now, an idea, or feeling, that depends upon arbitrary de- finition, cannot be, properly speaking, natural, but must be fictitious. , 4 A crime the least liable to va- riation in its definition, is that of a lie ; and yet a child will, upon the slightest temptation, tell an untruth as readily as the truth ; that is, as soon as he can suspect that it will be to his advantage , and the dread that he afterwards has of telling a lie is acquired principally by his being threat- ened, punished, and terrified by those who detect him in it ; till at length a number of painful impressions are annexed to the telling of an untruth, and he comes even to shudder at the thought of it. But where this care has not been taken, such a facility in telling lies, and such an indifference to truth, are ac- quired, as is hardly credible to persons who have been diffe- rently educated. But whether the feelings which accompany the ideas of virtue and vice be instinctive or acquired, their operation is the very same ; so that the interests of virtue may be equally secured on this scheme as on any other. There is a sufficient provision in the course of our lives to gene- rate moral principles, sentiments, and feelings, in the degree iu which they are wanted in life ; and with those variations, with respect to modes and other cir- cumstances, which we see in dif- ferent ages and countries, and which the different circumstances of mankind, in different ages and countries, seem to require. Priestley. MORAL RULES, AND SENSE OF DU- TY. The regard to the general rules of morality is what is pro- perly called a sense of duty; a principle of the greatest conse- quence in human life, and the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are capable of directing their actions. There is scarce any man who, by dis- cipline, education, and example, may not be so impressed with a regard to these general rules of conduct, as to act upon almost every occasion with tolerable decency, and through the whole MOR MOR of his life avoid any tolerable degree of blarne. Without this sacred regard to the general rules of morality, there is no man whose conduct can be much depended upon. It is this which constitutes the most essential dif- ference between a man of princi- ple and honour, and a worthless fellow. The one adheres, on all occasions, steadily arid resolutely to his maxims, and preserves through the whole of his life one even tenor of conduct. The other acts variously and ac- cidentally, as humour, inclina- tion, or interest, chance to be uppermost. Nay. such are the inequalities of humour to which all men are subject, that without this principle, the man who, in all his cool hours, had the most delicate sensibility to the pro- priety of conduct, might often be led to act absurdly upon the most frivolous occasions, and when it was scarcely possible to assign any serious motive for his behaving in this manner. Upon the tolerable observance of these rules depends the very existence of human society, which would crumble into nothing if mankind were not generally impressed with a reverence for those im- portant rules of conduct. False notions of religion are almost the only causes which can occa- sion any very gross perversion of the general rules of morality; and that principle, which ought to give the greatest authority to the rules of duty, is alone capa- ble of distorting our ideas ol them in any considerable degree. In all other cases, common sense \ sufficient to direct us, if not to the most exquisite propriety ol conduct, yet to something which is not very far from it ; and pro- vided we are in earnest desirous t6 do well, our behaviour will always, upon the whole, be praise-worthy. Bat wherever the natural principles of reli- gion are not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of some worthless cabal wherever the first duty which it requires is to fulfil all the obligations of mo- rality wherever men are not taught to regard frivolous ob- servances as more immediate duties of religion than acts of justice and beneficence; and to imagine, that by sacrifices and ceremonies, and vain supplica- tions, they can bargain with the Deity for fraud, and perfidy, and violence ; it establishes and con- firms the general rules of mo- rality. A. Smith. MORAL SENSE. The.moral sense is formed by time and experience, and not born with us. So are all the natural senses, not one of which is born with us ; they are all created some instantane- ously some in a little time some in a long time but all by experience. The moral sense differs from a natural one, as much as the effect of reflection differs from simple feeling. But the conformation given by na- ture and education may be so exquisitely just in some men, that they may be said to judge of actions and principles by a kind of instantaneous sensation, which may be very properly called a moral sense. The eye, as a sense, is formed by the ex- perience of many years : but when it is formed, it judges of dis- tances and magnitude, of beauty MOR MOR and deformity, apparently by an immediate sensation ; but in fact by a process which is the effect of experience. The mind is in the same state as to morals: it has judged of causes by effects, on all material occasions: it has so associated virtue with pleasure, and vice with pain, that when the actions and principles under those de- nominations present themselves, they seem to act on the mere sense, not as virtues or vices, but as pleasures or pains. The pre- sent fashionable affectation of sentiment arises from the same cause. Persons whose organiza- tion is just, perfect, and deli- cate, are susceptible of very lively impressions, from those principles and actions which ex- perience has taught them to be good or bad. When they pre- sent themselves again, the as- sociated ideas of pleasure or pain immediately present them- selves; and before any judgment can be made, that is, before those circumstances, which have been often and sufficiently ex- amined, can undergo a second examination. In time, they for- get that experience and reason had any share in classing the vir- tues and vices and finding this moral intelligent sensibility sel- dom err, they refer every thing to it; so that we very commonly hear people say, " We act from our feelings or, we judge of men and things according as they excite our sensibility. Williams. MORAL SYSTEMS. If there is an universal system of morality, it cannot be the effect of a particular cause. It has been the same in past ages, and it will continue the same in future times; it can- not then be grounded on reli- gious opinions, which, ever since the beginning of the world, and from one pole to the other, have continually varied. Greece had vicious deities the Romans had them likewise : the senseless worshipper of the Fetiche adores rather a Devil than a God. Every people made gods for themselves, and gave them such attributes as they pleased : to some they ascribed a goodness, to others cruelty; to some im- morality ; to others the greatest sanctity and severity of manners. One would imagine that every nation intended to deify its own passions and opinions. Notwith- standing that diversity in reli- gious systems and modes of wor- ship, all nations have perceived that men ought to be just; they have all honoured as virtues, goodness, pity, friendship, fide- lity, paternal tenderness, filial respect, sincerity, gratitude, pa- triotism ; in short, all those sen- timents that can be considered as so many ties adapted to unite men more closely to one another. The origin of that uniformity of judgment, so constant, so gene- ral, ought not then to be looked for in the midst of contradictory and fluctuating opinions. If the ministers of religion have ap- peared to think otherwise, it is because by their system they were enabled to regulate all the actions of mankind-; to dispose of their fortunes, and command their wills ; and to secure to themselves, in the name of hea- ven, the arbitrary government of the world. The veil is now re- MOR MOR moved. At the tribunal of phi- losophy and reason, morality is a science whose object is the preservation and common happi- ness of the human species. To this double end all its rules ought to tend. Their natural, constant, eternal principle is in j man himself.and inaresemblance there is in the general organiza- tion of man ; which includes a similarity of wants, of pleasures and pains, of force and weak- ness ; a resemblance, from whence arises the necessity of society, or of a common opposi- tion against such dangers as are equally incident to each indivi- dual, which proceed from nature herself, and threaten man on all sides. Snch is the origin of par- ticular duties and of domestic virtues; such is the origin of general duties and public vir- tues ; such is the source of the notion of personal and public utility; the source of all com- pacts between individuals, and of all laws of government. Several writers have endeavour- ed to trace the first principles of morality in the sentiments of friendship, tenderness, compas- sion, honour, and benevolence ; because they found them en- graved on the human heart: But did they not also find there hatred, jealousy, revenge, pride, and the love of dominion? For what reason, therefore, have they founded morality on the former principles, rather than on the latter; It is because they found that the former were of general advantage to society and the others fatal to it. The very sentiments which these phi- losophers adopted as the ground- work of morality, because they appear to be serviceable to the common good, if left to them- selves would be very predudicial to it. How can we determine to punish the guilty, if we listen only to the pleas of compassion? How shall we guard against partiality, if we consult only the dictates of friendship? How shall we avoid being favourable to idleness, if we attend only to t the sentiments of benevolence? All these virtues have their li- mits, beyond which they dege- nerate into vices: and those li- mits are settled by the invariable rules of essential justice; or, which is the same thing, by the common interests of men united together in society, and the con- stant object of that union. These limits, it is true, have not yet been ascertained ; nor indeed could they, since it has not been possible to fix what the common interest itself was. And this is the reason why among all people, and at all times, men have formed such different ideas of virtue and vice; why hitherto morality has ap- peared to be but a matter of mere convention among men. That so many ages should have passed away in an entire ignorance of the first principles of a science so important to our happiness, is a certain fact ; but so extraor- dinary, that it should appear in- credible. We cannot imagine how it has not been sooner dis- covered, that the uniting of men in society has not, and in- deed could not have, any other design but the general happi- ness of individuals; and there- fore, that there is not, and can- MOR MOR not be, any other social tie be- tween them than that of their common interest : and that no- thing 1 can be consistent with the order of societies, unless it be consistent with the common utility of the members that com- pose them : that it is this princi- ple which necessarily determines virtue and vice; and that our ad 'ons are consequently more or less virtuous, according- as they tend more or less to the com- mon advantage of society ; that they are more or less vicious, ac- cording 1 as the prejudice, society receives from them, is greater or less. Is it on its own account that valour is ranked among 1 the num- ber of virtues? Nor it is on ac- count of the service it is of to society. This is evident from hence, that it is punished as a crime in a man whom it causes to disturb the public peace. Why then is drunkenness a vice ? Because every man is bound to contribute to the common good; and to fuliil that obligation, he has occasion for the free exer- cise of his faculties. Why are certain vices moreblameable in a magistrate than in a private man ? Because greater inconveniences result from them to society. As society ought to be bene- ficial to every one of its mem- bers, it is but just that each of its members should contribute to the advantage of society. To be virtuous, therefore, is to be use- ful ; to be vicious, is to be use- less or hurtful. This is morality. This, indeed, is universal mo- rality. That morality which, being connected with the nature of man, is connected with the nature of society ; that morality which can vary only in its appli- cation, but never in its essence: that morality, in short, to which all law should refer, and to which they should be subordinate. Raynal. MORALITY, THE DIFFERENT SYS- TEMS OF, AND THEIR INFLU- ENCE. In every civilized so- ciety in every society where the distinction of ranks has once been completely established, there have been always two dif- ferent schemes or systems of morality current at the same time : of which the one may be called the strict or austere ; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the loose system. The former is generally admired and revered by the common people: the lat- ter is commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are called people of fashion. The degree of disapprobation with which we ought to mark the vices of levity, the vices which are apt to arise from great prosperity, and from the excess of gaiety and good humour, seems to consti- tute the principal distinction between those two opposite schemes or systems. In the li- beral or loose system, luxury, wanton and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to some degree of intemperance, the breach of chastity, at least in one of the two sexes, &c. pro- vided they are not accompanied with gross indecency, and do not lead to falsehood or injustice, are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence, and are easily either excused or pardoned al- together. In the austere sys- tem, on the contrary, those ex- MOR MOR cesses are regarded with the ut- most abhorrence and detesta- tion. The. vices of levity are always ruinous to the common people ; and a single week's thoughtlessness and dissipation is often sufficient to undo a poor workman for ever, and to drive him, through despair, upon com- mitting the most enormous crimes. The wiser and better sort of the common people, therefore, have always the utmost abhorrence and detestation of such excesses, which their experience tells them are so immediately fatal to people of their condition. The disorder and extravagance of several years, on the contrary, will not always ruin a man of fashion ; and people of that rank are very apt to consider the power of indulging in some de- gree of excess as one of the ad- vantages of their fortune ; and the liberty of doing so without censure or reproach, as one of the privileges which belong to their station. In people of their own station, therefore, they re- gard such excesses with but a small degree of disapprobation, and censure them very slightly, or not at all. Almost all religious sects have begun among the common peo- ple, from whom they have ge- nerally drawn their earliest, as well as their most numerous pro- selytes. The austere system of morality has, accordingly, been adopted by those sects almost constantly, or with very few ex- ceptions ; for there have been some. It was the system by which they could best recom- mend themselves to that order of people to whom they first pro- posed their plan of reformation upon what had been established. Many of them, perhaps the greater part of them, have even endeavoured to gain credit by refining upon this austere system, and by carrying it to some de- gree of folly and extravagance.; and this excessive rigour has fre- quently recommended them more than any thing else to the re- spect and veneration of the com- mon people. A man of rank and fortune is by his station a distinguished member of a great society, who attend to every part of his con- duct, and who thereby oblige him to attend to every part of it himself. His authority and consideration depend very much upon the respect which this so- ciety bears to him. He dare not do any thing which would dis- grace or discredit him in it; and he is obliged to a very strict ob- servation of that species of mo- rals, whether liberal or austere, which the general consent of this society prescribes to persons of his rank and fortune. A man of low condition, on the contrary, is far from being a distinguished member of any great society. While he remains in a country village, his conduct may be at- tended to, and he may be oblig- ed to attend to it himself. In this situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is called a character to lose. But as soon as he comes into a great city, he is sunk in obscurity and dark- ness. His conduct is observed and attended to by nobody ; and he is therefore very likely to neglect it himself, and to aban- don himself -to every sort of low MOR MOR profligacy and vice. He never emerges so effectually from this obscurity, his conduct never ex- cites so much the attention of any respectable society, as by his be- coming the member of a small religious sect. He from that mo- ment acquires a degree of consi- deration which he never had before. All his brother secta- ries are, for the credit of the sect, interested to observe his conduct ; and if he gives occasion for any scandal, if he deviates very much from those austere morals which they almost al- ways require of one another, they punish him by what is always a very severe punishment, even where no civil effects attend it, expulsion or excommunication from the sect. In little religious sects, accordingly, the morals of the common people have been almost always remarkably regu- lar and orderly ; generally much more so than in the established church. The morals of those little sects, indeed, have fre- quently been rather disagreeably rigorous and unsocial. There are two very easy and effectual remedies, however, by whose joint operation the state might, without violence, correct whatever was unsocial or dis- agreeably rigorous in the morals of all the -little sects into which the country was divided. The first of those remedies is the study of science and phi- losophy, which the state might render almost universal among all people of middling or more than middling rank and fortune ; not by giving salaries to teach- ers in order to make them neg- ligent and idle, but by instituting some sort of probation, even in the higher and more difficult sciences, to be undergone by every person before he was per- mitted to exercise any liberal profession, or before he could be received as a candidate for any honourable office of trust or profit. If the state imposed upon this order of men the necessity of learning, it would have no occasion to give itself any trou- ble about providing them with proper teachers. They would soon find better teachers for themselves than any whom the state could provide for them. Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition; and where all the superior ranks of people were secured from it, the inferior ranks could not be much exposed to it. The second of those remedies is the frequency and gaiety of public diversions. The state, by encouraging, that is, by giving entire liberty to all those who for their own interest would at- tempt, without scandal or inde- cency, to amuse and divert the people by painting, poetry, mu- sic, dancing, by all sorts of dramatic representations and ex- hibitions, vould easily dissipate, in the greater part of them, that melancholy and gloomy humour which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and en- thusiasm. Public diversions have always been the objects of dread and hatred, to all the fanatical promoters of those popular fren- zies. The gaiety and gopd-hu- mour which those diversions in- spire were altogether inconsist- ent with that temper of mind, which was 'fittest for their pur- MOR MOR pose, or which they could best work upon. Dramatic represen- tations besides, frequently ex- posing- their artifices to public ridicule, and sometimes even to public execration, were upon that account, more than all other diversions, the objects of their peculiar abhorrence. In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one religion more than those of another, it would not be neces- sary that any of them should have any particular or immediate dependency upon the sovereign or executive power; or that he should have any thing to do, either in appointing, or in dis- missing them from their offices. In such a situation he would have no occasion to give himself any concern about them, further than to keep the peace among them, in the same manner as among the rest of his subjects; that is, to hinder them from per- secuting, abusing, or oppressing one another. Btit it is quite otherwise in countries where there is an established or go- verning- religion. The sove- reign can in this case never be secure, unless he has the means of influencing- in a considerable degree the greater part of the teachers of that religion. The clergy of every establish- ed church constitute a great in- corporation. They can act in concert, and pursue their inte- terest upon one plan, and with one spirit, as much as if they were under the direction of one man ; and they are frequently too under such direction. Their interest as an incorporated body is never the same with thut of the sovereign, and is sometimes directly opposite to it. Their great interest is to maintain their authority with the people ; and this authority depends upon the supposed certainty and im- portance of the whole doctrine which they inculcate, and upon the supposed necessity of adopt- ing every part of it with the most implicit faith, in order to avoid eternal misery. Should the sovereign have the imprudence to appear either to deride or doubt himself of the most trifling- part of their doctrine, or from humanity attempt to protect those who did either the one or the other, the punctilious honour of a clergy, who have no sort of dependency upon him, is imme- diately provoked to proscribe him as a profane person, and to employ all the terrors of religion in order to oblige the peo- ple to transfer their allegiance to some more orthodox and obe- dient prince. Should he oppose any of their pretensions or usurpations, the danger is equally great. The princes who have dared in this manner to rebel .against the church, over and above this crime of rebellion, have generally been charged too wi|li the additional crime of heresy, notwithstanding- their so- lemn protestations of their faith and humble submission to every tenet which she thought proper to prescribe to them. But the authority of religion is superior to every other authority. The fears which it suggests conquer all other fears. When the au- thorised teachers of religion pro- pagate through the great body of the people doctrines subver- 2 K MOR I\IOR sive of the authority of the so- vereign, it is by violence only, or by the force of a standing army, that, he can maintain his authority. Even a standing army cannot in this case give him any lasting 1 security ; because if the soldiers are not foreigners, which, can seldom be the case, but drawn from the great body of the people, which must almost always be the case, they are likely to be soon corrupted by those very doctrines. The re- Tolutions which the turbulence of the Greek clergy was con- tinually occasioning at Constan- tinople, as long as the eastern empire subsisted; the convul- sions which,, during the course of several centuries, the turbu- lence of the Roman- clergy was continually occasioning in- every part of Europe ; sufficiently de- monstrate how precarious and insecure must always be the si- tuation of the sovereign who has no proper means of influ- encing the clergy of the esta- blished and governing 1 religion of his country. Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evi- dent enough, are not within the proper department of a tempo- ral sovereign, who, though he may be very well qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed to be so (or instructing the peo- ple. With regard tasuch mat- ters, therefore, his authority can seldom be sufficient to counter- balance the united authority o! the clergy of the established church. The public tranquillity, however, and his own security may frequently depend upon the doctrines which they may think proper to propagate concerning' such matters. As he can seldom directly oppose their decision, - therefore, with proper weight and authority, rt is necessary that he should be able to in- fluence it;- and he can influence it only by the fears and expecta- tions which he may excite in the greater part of the individuals of the order. Those fears and expectations may consist in the fear of deprivation or other pu- nishment, and in the expectation of further preferment. A. Smith. MORAL VIRTUE, THE PRINCIPLE OF. Men are no more to be told, what they must believe, and how they must act, than an instru- ment is to be told what harmony it is to afford. The thoughts" and actions of a man result from his construction, as harmony does from that of an instrument.- That construction is good or evil, and will lead to virtue or vice, according as he has been originally formed by nature; ac- cording, as he has been attem- pered in his childhood ; accord- ing as he has been educated in. his youth: and according to the company and friends he lias been connected with. This or- ganization of the mind, or this moral constitution, is the true- principle of human actions. When this is right, truly or nobly, or delicately harmonized ; virtues of a noble or of an a- miable aspect, and every species of genuine happiness, will be the effects. When this is wrong, when it is defective or disar- ranged, the etrect is vice; and no precepts, no instructions, no doctrines from heaven or hell, will make dissonance harmony,, darkness light, or vice to be vir- tue. If a god had descended, and told the world, in a language to be understood from pole to pole, This you are -to believe, and thus you are to act: What would have been the conse- quence? Exactly what we see to be the consequence in the Christian world, where every true believer is thoroughly per- suaded that God Almighty came from heaven; laid down in his g-ospel every thing- necessary to be believed and practised, in or- der to bear thing's patientl}' here., &nd to be everlastingly happy hereafter. And are men the wiser, or the better? We nifist be thoroughly blinded by pre- judice, and extremely ignorant ef history, to say they are. Williams, TC ATIONAL CHARACTERS.Different reasons are assigned for national characters : some account for them from moral, and others from physical causes. By moral causes we may understand all circumstances which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us. Of this kind are the na- ture of governments, the revolu- tions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in 'which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like circumstances. By physical causes we may under- stand those qualities of the air and climate which are supposed to work insensibly on the tem- per, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving a particulap complexion, whieb, ibough reflection and reasoft may sometimes overcome it, yet it will prevail among the gerie-^ rality of mankind, and have an influence on their manners. That the character of a nation will depend much on moral causes, is evident to every ob- server; since a nation is nothing- but a collection of individuals, and the manners of individuals are frequently determined by these causes. As poverty and hard labour debase the minds of the common people, and render them unfit for any science or in- genious profession; so where any government becomes very oppressive to all its subjects, it has a proportional effect on their temper and genius, and ba- nishes all the liberal arts from among them. As to physical causes, their operation is doubtful; 'in this particular, men seem to owe nothing of their temper or genius to the air, food, or cli- mate. The contrary opinion seems, at first sight, probable; since we find those circumstances have an influence over ^3very other animal. The hu-man mind is of a very imitative nature ; nor is it possible for ay set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, ami communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. Where a number of men are united into one poli- tical body, the occasions of theif intercourse must be so frequent, for d-e fence, commerce, and government, that, together with the sawe speech or language, they must acquire resemblance in their manners, and have a cornmou and. national cba,- NAT NAT racter, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual. Now, though nature produces all kinds of temper and under- standing- in great abundance, it follows not that she always pro- duces them in like proportions, and that in every society the in- gredients of industry and indo- lence, valour and cowardice, hu- manity and brutality, wisdom and folly, will be mixed after the same manner. In the infancy of society, if any of these disposi- tions be found in greater a- bundance than the rest, it will naturally prevail in the compo- sition, and give a tincture to the national character. If, on the first establishment of a republic, a Brutus should be placed in au- thority, and be transported with such an enthusiasm for liberty, as to overlook all the ties of nature as well as private interest, such an example will naturally have an effect on the whole society, and kindle the same passion in every bosom. Whatever it be that forms the manners of one gene- ration, the next must imbibe a deeper tincture of the same die : men being more susceptible of all impressions during infancy, and retaining these impressions as long as they remain in the world. All national characters, where they depend not on fixed moral causes, proceed from such accidents as these ; and physical causes appear not to have any discernible operation on the hu- man mind. It is a maxim in all philosophy, That causes which do not appear are to he con- sidered as not existing. The diinese have the greatest uni- formityof character imaginable ; though the air and climate, in diffeMit parts of those vast do- minions, admit of very consider- able variations. Athens and Thebes were but a short day's journey from each other ; though the Athenians were as remark- able for ingenuity, politeness, and gaiety, as the Thebans for dulriess, rusticity, and a phleg- matic temper. Strabo (lib. ii.) rejects, in a great measure, tliQ influence of climate upon men. " AH is custom and education/' says he: " It is not from nature " that the Athenians are learned, " the Lacedaemonians ignorant, " and the Thebans too, who are, " still nearer neighbours to the* " former. Even the difference " of animals," he adds, " depends " not on climate." The same national character commonly follows the authority of government to a precise boundary; and upon crossing a river, or passing a mountain, one finds a new set of manners, with a new government. Is it conceivable, that the qualities of the air should change exactly with the limits of an empire? Any set of men, scattered over distant nations, who have a close communication together, acquire a similitude of manners, and have but little in common with the nations amongst whom they live. Thus the Jews in Europe, and the Armenians in the East, have a peculiar character. Where a 'difference of language or religion keeps two nations, inhabiting the same country, from mixing with each other, their manners will be very dis^ NAT tinct, and even opposite, 'flic Turks and modern Greeks have very different characters. The same set of manners will follow a nation, and adhere to them, over the whole globe, as well as the same language and laws. The manners of a people change very considerably fro in one age to another. The inge- nuity, industry, and activity of the ancient Greeks, have nothing in common with the stupidity and indolence of the present in- habitants of those regions. Can- dour, bravery, and love of liberty, formed the character of the an- cient Romans : as subtlety, cow- ardice, and a slavish disposition, do that of the modern. Where the government of a nation is altogether republican, it is apt to beget a particular set of manners. Where it is altoge- ther monarchical, it is more apt to*have the same effect ; the imita- tion of superiors spreading the national manners faster among the people. If the governing part of a state consist altogether of merchants, as in Holland, their uniform way of life will fix their character. If it consist chie'fly of nobles and landed gentry, like German}', France, and Spain, the same effect fol- lows. The genius of a particu- lar sect of religion is also apt to mould the manners of a people. If the characters- of men de- pended on the air, the degrees of heat and cold would naturally be expected to have a mighty influence, since nothing has a greater effect on all plants and animals. And indeed there is some reason to think, that all the nations that live beyond the polar circles, or between the tropics, are inferior to the rest of the species. The poverty of the northern inhabitants, and the indolence of the southern from their few necessities, may per- haps account for this difference without physical causes. This, however, is certain, that the cha- racter of nations is' very promis- cuous in the temperate climates ; and that almost all the general observations which have been formed of the more southern or more northern nations in these climates, are found to be uncer- tain and fallacious. Hume. NATIONS, THE CHARACTER OF, AND THE CAUSES OE THEIR ALTERA- TIONS. Each nation has its par- ticular manner of seeing and feeling, which forms its charac- ter: and in every nation its cha- racter either changes on a sud- den, or alters by degrees, accord- ing to the sudden or insensible alterations in the form, of its go- vernment, and consequently of its public education ; for the form of government under which we live always makes a part of our education. That of the French, which has been for a long time gay, was not always so. The Emperor Julian says of the Pa- risians, " I like them, because their character, like mine, is aus- tere and serious." The characters of nations, therefore, change: but at what period is the alteration most per- ceptible ? At the moment of revolution, when a people pass on a sudden from liberty to sla- very. Then from bold and haughty they become weak and pusillanimous: they dare not look on the man in office ; thev NAT NAT are enthralled. This dejected' people say, like the ass in the table, Whoever be my master, 1 cannot carry a heavier load. As much as a free citizen is zealous for the honour of his nation, so much is a slave indifferent to the public welfare. His heart is de- prived of activity and energy ; is \vithout virtue, without spirit, and without talents; he becomes indifferent to the arts, commerce, agriculture, &e. It is not for servile hands, say the English, to till and fertilize the lands. Si- jnonides entered the empire of a despotic sovereign, and found there no traces of men. A free people are courageous, open, humane, and loyal. A nation of slaves are base, perfidious, mali- cious, and barbarous ; they push their cruelty to the greatest ex- cess. If the severe officer has all to fear from the resentment of the injured soldier on the day of battle, that of sedition is in like manner, for the slave oppressed, the long-expected day of ven- geance ; and he is the more en- raged in proportion as fear has held his fury the longer re- strained. "What a striking picture of a sudden change in the character ef a nation does the Roman his- tory present us with? What people, before the elevation of the Caesars, showed more force, more virtue, more love of liberty, and horror for slavery ? And what people, when the throne of the Ceesars was established, showed more weakness or de- pravity? Their baseness dis- gusted Tiberius. Indifferent to liberty, when Trajan oifered it, they refused it : they disdained that liberty their ancestors had purchased with so much blood. All things were then changed in Rome ; and that determined and grave character, which distinguished its first inhabitants, was succeeded^ by that light and frivolous dis- position with which Juvenal re- proaches them in his tenth Satire. Let us exemplify this matter 'by a more recent change. Compare the English of the pre- sent day with those under Henry Vlll. Edward VI. Mary and Elizabeth. This people, now so humane, indulgent, learned, free, and industrious, -such lovers of the arts and philosophy, were then nothing more than a nation of slaves; inhuman and superstiti- ous; without arts, and without industry. When a prince usurps over his people a boundless au- thority, he is sure to change their character; to enervate their souls ; to render them timid and base. From that moment, indif- ferent to glory, his subjects lose that character of boldness and constancy proper to support all labours, and brave all dangers. The weight of arbitrary power destroys the spring of their emu- lation. Does a prince, impatient of contradiction, give the name offactious toihe man of veracity?' he substitutes in his nation the character of falsity for that of frankness. If, in those critical moments, the prince, giving him- self up to flatterers, finds that he is surrounded by men void of all merit, whom should he. blame ? Himself; for it is he that has made them such. Who could believe, when he considers the evils of servitude, that there were stilt NAT NAT prirvces mean enough to wi-sh to Feign over slaves : and stupid enough to be ignorant of the fatal changes that despotism produces in the character of their subjects? What is arbitrary power \ The seed of calamities, that, sown in the bosom of a state, springs up to bear the fruit f misery and devastation. Let us hear the King of Prussia : Notking. is heller, said he, in a discourse pronounced to the Academy of Ber\\n,than an arbi- trary government, under prin- ces just, humane, and virtu- ous ; nothing worse under the common race of kings. Now, how many kings are there of the latter sort ? and how many such as Titus, Trajan, and Anto- ninus ? These are the thoughts of a great man. What elevation of mind, what knowledge does not such a declaration suppose in a monarch? What, in fact, does a despotic power announce ? Often ruin to the despot, and al- ways to his posterity.. The founder of such power sets his kingdom on a sandy foundation. It is only a transient ill-judged notion of royalty, that is, of pride, idleness, or some similar passion, which prefers the exercise of an unjust and cruel despotism over tvretched slaves, to that of a le- gitimate and friendly power over a free and happy people. Arbi- trary power is a thoughtless child, who_ continually sacrifices the future to the present. The most formidable enemy of the public welfare is not riot and se- dition, but despotism ; it changes the character of a nation, and al- ways for the worse ; it produces nothing- but vices. Whatever might be the power of an Indian* Sultan, he could never form-, magnanimous subjects : he would never lind among his slaves tlw? virtues of free men. Chemistry can extract no more gold from, a mixed body than it includes ;-: and the most arbitrary power can draw nothing from a slave but the baseness he contains. Experience, then, proves, that the character and spirit of a people change with the form oC government ; and that a differ- ent government gives by turns,, to the same nation, a character noble or base, firm or fickle r courageous or cowardly. If the Persian have no idea of liberty, and the savage no idea of servi*- tude, it is the effect of their dif- ferent instruction. Heivetius. NATIONAL FAITH. When a num-" ber of political societies are 1 erected, and maintain a great in- tercourse together, a new set of rules are immediately discovered to be useful in that particular si- tuation ; and accordingly take place under the title of the laivs of nations. The rules of justice^ such as prevail among individuals,, are not entirely suspended among- political societies. All princes- pretend a regard to the rights of other princes ; and some, no doubt, without hypocrisy. Alli- ances and treaties are every day made between independent stafes, which would be only so much waste of parchment, if they were not found by experi- ence to have some influence and authority. But here is the differ- ence between kingdoms and in- dividuals. Human nature cannot by any means subsist without the association of individuals: and NAT NAT that association never could have place, were no regard paid to the laws of equity and justice. Disorder, confusion, the war of all against all, are the necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct. But nations can sub- sist without intercourse. They may even subsist, in some de- gree, under a general war. The observance of justice, though useful among- them, is not guarded by so strong- a necessity as among individuals ; and the moral obligation holds proportion with the usefulness. All politi- cians will allow, and most philo- sophers, that reasons of state may, in particular emergencies, dispense with the rules ot'justice, and invalidate any treaty or alli- ance, \vbere the strict observ- ance of it would.be prejudicial in a considerable degree to either of the contracting- parties. But nothing less than the extremes! necessity, it is confessed, can justify individuals in a breach of promise, or an invasion of the properties of others. In a con- federated commonwealth, such as the Achsean republic of old, or the Swiss Cantons, and the tlnited Provinces in modern time ; as the league has here a peculiar utility, the conditions of union have a peculiar sacredne^s and authority ; and a violation of them would be regarded as equally criminal, or even as more criminal than any private injury or injustice. Hume. NATIONAL FAITH. .When two nations conclude a treaty be- tween them, they have, like pri- vate persons, no other object than their reciprocal advantage and happiness; when this re- ciprocal advantage no longer subsists, the treaty becomes void : one of the two nations may break it. Ought they to do it? No, if there result but a small damage to them from ob- serving it ; for then it would be better to suffer that damage, than be regarded as too easy violators of their engagements. Now, in the motives themselves that make those two people ob- serve their treaty, we see the right that every people have to disannul a treaty when it is evi- dently destructive to their hap- piness Ilclvi-tias. NATIONAL FAITH. If treaties be- tween nations were as sacred as promises between individuals, nations would be perpetually sa- crificed to the folly and inatten- tion of their rulers; who ought always to consult the interest of the, community, and not their own reputation for integrity, when it must be injurious to the people. Helvetius. NATURE, THE PUPIL OF. Was it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place without any communication with his own species, he could uo more think of his own character, of the pro- priety or demerit of his own sentiments arid conduct, of the beauty and deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or de- formity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with re- gard to which he is provided with no mirror which can pre- sent them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is imme- diately provided with the mirror NEC NEC which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they dis- approve of his sentiments ; and it is here he first views the pro- priety and impropriety of his own passions the beauty and deformity of his own mind. To a man, who from his birth was a stranger to society, the objects of his passions, the eternal bo- dies which either pleased or hurt him, would occupy his whole attention. The passions them- selves, the desires or aversions, the joys or sorrows, which those objects excited, though of all things the most immediately pre- sent to him, would scarce ever be the objects of his thoughts. The idea of them could never interest him so much as to call upon his attentive consideration. The consideration of his joy could in him excite no new joy, nor that of his sorrow any new sorrow ; though the considera- tion of the causes of those pas- sions might often excite both. Bring him into society, and all his own passions will immediately be- come the causes of new passions. He will observe that mankind approve of some of them, .and are disgusted by others. He will be elevated in the ope case, and cast down in the other ; his de- sires and a versions, his joys and sorrows, \vjll now become the causes ef n ew desires and new aversions, new joys and new sorrows ; they will now there- fore interest him deeply, and often call upon his most attentive consideration. A. Smith. NECESSITY AND LIBERTY. Is not the will necessarily determined by what appears to be the best reason ? It no doubt is so : nor is it possible to conceive any creature willing what he does not think best. But this is im- properly called necessity; for necessity is always from without, and cannot be without two things an agent who applies force and violence, and a patient who suffers it. Nothing, there- fore, can force itself: so that when we say the intellect is necessarily determined by the strongest reason, we can mean nothing, but that necessity, which is in the nature of every thing, and is the same by which a tri- angle, or any other geometrical figure, has all the properties belonging to its nature. L. Monboddo. NECESSITY AND LIBERTY. If mo ral motives are certain in their operation, is not man as much a machine as if he were impelled by a mechanical force? If the Deity proposes a motive which I cannot resist, am I in thaLcase a free agent ? Are not my elec- tive powers absolutely over- ruled and determined to one par- ticular choice ? On the contrary, if moral motives are not certain in their effects, there will be a difficulty in reconciling divine fore-knowledge, and man's free will. In reply to this, it may be answered, That even admitting the certain operation of moral motives, man is not so much a machine as if he were impelled by mere mechanical force. The very asking, If he be not as much a machine as some others? necessarily implies a compara- tive gradation in machiDery : so L NEC KEG that a man may even be admit- ted to be a machine, and yet possess a capacity of being- ac- tuated by moral motives, which none but rational machines are. For distinction sake, he may be cai.ed a moral machine ; possess- ed of a principle of self-deter- mination or volition, in which he is infinitely superior to inanimate machines. In the operation, however, of the moral motives by which he is actuated, and the actions subsequent thereto, he is as very a mechanical machine as a piece of clock-work. How should it be otherwise, when the operations of the Deity himself in the government of the world are mechanical ? The universe itself is one great machine, moved by the power of its great Creator. It is pride, therefore, alone, which makes a man asha- med to be thought a microcosm, subject to similar laws of motion ; he is ambitious of being thought a god, capable of willing and moving solely of himself. Ken- rick. NECESSITY, THE ORIGIN OF OB- JECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF PHILOSOPHICAL. If we examine the operations of bodies, and the production of effects from their causes, we shall find, that all our faculties can never carry us further in our knowledge ol this relation, than barely to ob- serve, that particular objects are constantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a customary transition, from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the Strictest scrutiny of this subject, men still entertain a strong pro- pensity to believe, that they pe- netrate further into the powers of nature, and perceive some- thing- like a necessary connection between the cause and effect. When, again, they turn their reflections towards the operation of their own minds, and feel no such connection of the motive and the action, they are apt from thence to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects resulting from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced , that we know nothing further of causation of any kind, than merely the constant con- junction of objects, and the con- sequent inference of the mind from one to another ; and find- ing that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions, we may thence be more easily led to own the same necessity com- mon to all causes. The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for from another cause, viz. a false sensation or seeming experience which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference in many of our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking intelligent being, who may consider the action; and it consists chiefly in the determina- tion of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects ; as li- berty, when opposed to neces- sity, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a cer- tain looseness or indifference, NEC NEC which we feel in passing-, or not 'passing 1 , from the idea of one ob- ject to that of any succeeding- one. Now we may observe, that though, in reflecting on hu- man actions, we seldom feel such a looseness and indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of the agent ; yet it frequently happens, that in performing the actions them- selves, we are sensible of some- thing 1 like it : and as all resem- bling 1 objects are readily taken for each other, this has been em- ployed as a demonstrative, and even intuitive proof of human li- berty. We feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions ; and imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing 1 , because, when by a de- nial of it we are provoked to try, we feel that it moves easily every- way, and produces an image of itself (or a velleity, as it is called in schools), even on that side on which it did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we per- suade ourselves, could at that time have been completed into the thing 1 itself ; because, should that be denied, we find upon a second trial, that at present it can, We consider not, that the fantastical desire of showing li- berty is here the motive of our actions. And it seems certain, that, however we imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character ; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circum- of our situation and tem- per, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposi- tion. <-Now this is the very essence of necessity, according- to the foregoing- doctrine. Hume. NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL. It is universally allowed, that mat- ter in all its operations, is act- uated by a necessary force ; and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such particular circum- stance, could possibly have re- sulted from the operation of that cause. Would we, therefore, form a just and precise idea of necessity, we must consider whence that idea arises, when we apply it to the operation of bodies. It seems evident, that if all the scenes of nature were shifted continually in such a manner, that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any similitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have attained the least idea of necessity, or of a connection among- those objects, or of cause and effect. Inference and rea- soning concerning the operations of nature, would, from that mo- ment, be at an end. Our idea, therefore, of necessity and caus- ation arises entirely from the uniformity in the operations of nature; where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is, by custom, de- termined to infer the one from the other. These two circum- stances form the whole of that necessity we ascribe to matter. NEC NEC And these two circumstances take place iu the voluntary actions of men, and in the ope- rations of the mind. The con- stant conjunction of similar events in voluntary actions, ap- pears from their uniformity in all nations and ages. The same motives produce always the same actions. The same events follow from the same causes. Ambi- tion, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed fn various degrees, and distributed through society, have been from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprizes which have ever been observed among mankind. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. The records of wars, intrigues, and factions, are collections of experiments, by which the poli- tician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science ; in the same manner as the physi- cian "or natural philosopher is acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, Sec. by experi- ments. Nor are the earth, water, or other elements, examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates, more like to those which at present lie under our observation, than the men described by Poly bins and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be suspected, when he describes the supernatural courage of Alexander, by which he was hurried on singly to attack mul- titudes, as when he describes his supernatural force and activity by which he was able to resist them. So readily and univer* sally do we acknowledge an uni- formity in human motives and actions as well as in the opera- tions of body. Hence likewise the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a va- riety of business and company, in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as speculation. By means of this guide we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclina- tions and motives, from their actions, expressions, and even gestures; and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their mo- tives and inclinations. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experi- ment we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning man- kind. We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of actions should be carried to such a length, as that all men, in the same circumstances, will always act precisely in the same man- ner, without making any allow- ance for the diversity of charac- ters, prejudices, and opinions. Such an uniformity in every par- ticular is found in no part of na- ture. An artificer who handles, only dead matter* may be disap- pointed of his aim as well as the politician who directs the con- duct of sensible and intelligent beings* It is from the variety of conduct in different men we form a greater variety of maxims, which still support a degree of regularity. Are the manners of- NEC men different -in different ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and education. Even the characters which are peculiar to each indi- vidual, have an uniformity in their influence; otherwise our Acquaintance with the persons, and our observation of their con- duct, could never teach us their dispositions, nor serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them. The irregular and unex- pected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particu- lar circumstance of their charac- ter and situation. Even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the person himself, or by others ; we know, in ge- neral, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree, incon- stant and irregular. This is in a manner the constant character of human nature ; though it be ap- plicable, in a more particular manner, to some persons, who have no fixed rule for their con- duct, but proceed in a continued course of caprice and incon- stancy. The internal principles and motives, however, may ope- rate uniformly, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities. Hume. NECESSITY AND LIBERTY, A DIS- PUTE OF WORDS. Men begin at the wrong end of the question, concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by ex- amining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understand- ing, and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple question, viz. the operations of body, and of brute NEC unintelligent matter ; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity, except that of a constant cen- junction of objects, and wtbse- quent inference of the mind from, one to another. If these circum- stances form, in reality, the whole of that necessity which we conceive in matter, and if these circumstances be also ui- versally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the dispute is merely verbal. Hume. NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL.- --. Whoever desires to injure him- self, say the Stoics, and without motives,should throw himself in- to the fire, the sea, or out of the window, would be justly thought a madman: for, in his natural state, man pursues pleasure and: flies pain; and, in all his .actions, is necessarily determined by a desire of happiness, real or ap- parent. Man, therefore, is not free. His will is as necessarily the effect of his ideas, and con- sequently of his sensations, as pain is the effect of a blow. Beside, add the Stoics, is there a single instant when the liberty of man can be referred to the different operations of the same mind ? If, for example, the same thing cannot, at the same in^> slant, be and not be, it is not therefore possible, that at the moment the mind acts, it could act otherwise ; that at the mo- ment it chooses, k could choose otherwise ; that at the moment it deliberates, it could deliberate otherwise ; that at the moment it wills, it could will otherwise. Now if it be my will, such as it is, that makes me deliberate ; NEC NEC if my deliberation, such as it is makes me choose ; if my choice such as it is, makes me act ; and if, when I deliberated, it was not possible for me (considering- the love I have for myself) not to deliberate; it is evident that that liberty does not consist in the actual volition, nor in the actual deliberation, nor in the actual choice, m>r in the actual action ; and, in short, that 'liberty does not relate to any of the opera- tions of the mind. If that were the case, the same thing- must Jbe and not be at the same in- .slant. Now, add the Stoics, this is the question we ask the phi- losophers, Can the mind be free, if, when it wills, when it delibe- rates, and when it chooses, it is not free ? Helvetius. NECESSITY, THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL, is. When the word liberty is applied to the will, no- thing- more can be understood by it than the free power of wil- ling- or not willing a thing 1 . But this power would suppose that there could be wills without a motive, and consequently effects Tvith6ut acause. And it would fol- low, that we could equally wish ourselves g-ood and evil : a sup- position absolutely impossible. In fact, if the desire of happi- ness be the true principle of all our thoug-hts and of all our ac- tions; if all men really tend towards their true or apparent happiness; it will follow, that all our wills are no more than the effect of this tendency. In this sense, therefore, no ade- quate idea can be annexed to the word liberty. But it will be said, if we are under a necessity of pursuing happiness wherever we discern it, we are at least at liberty in making- choice of the means for procuring- our hap- piness. Yes, it may be an- swered ; but then liberty is only a synonimous term for knowledg-e. The more or less a person understands of the law, or the more or less able the counsellor is by whom he is di- rected in his affairs, the more or less eligible will be his measures. But whatever his conduct be, the desire of happiness will al- ways induce him to take those measures which appear to him the best calculated to promote his interest, his disposition, his passions, and, in fine, whatever he accounts his happiness. There are some who consider the sus- pension of the mind as a proof of liberty. They are not aware, that in volition, suspension is no less necessary than precipitancy. When, for want of considera- tion, we have drawn on our- selves some misfortune, self-love renders suspension absolutely necessary. The word delibera- tion is equally mistaken. We conceive, for instance, 'that while we are choosing- between two pleasures nearly equal, that we are deliberating-. But what we consider as deliberation, is only the slowness with which the heavier of two weights, nearly equal, makes one of the scales of a balance subside. How can the problem of liberty be phi- losophically solved, if, as Mr. Locke has proved, we are disci- ples of friends, parents, books, and, in fine, all the objects that surround us? All our thoughts and wills must then be cither the immediate effects, or necessary NEC NEC consequences, of the impressions we have received. Helvetius. NECESSITY AND LIBERTY. When any past perception is brought into view again, whether by any conatus or exertion of the per- cipient, or ab extra only, or without any design of his, such being in view is what we call memory. The perceptions of living beings ma^y be related to each other two ways extremely different ; the one, when a being- exerts an internal power to make a past perception again present; the other, when the perception, or the resemblance of it, is of- fered by some external cause, without any exertion on the part of the percipient. He^ce it appears that there are two kinds of memory specifically different, an active and a passive memory. Reason implies or sup- poses memory in general ; for without memory, whatever is in the mind would be a train of un- connected and unrelated per- ceptions, which is inconsistent with a power producing a chain of depending consequences: and without active memory, what- ever is in the mind, would be re- lated by accident only with re- spect to us ; which is inconsist- ent with a power, by which we bring together any two percep- tions or ideas, that we may see their agreement and diversity. In a word, reasoning supposes our comparing, and comparing supposes our bringing together perceptions, that are in nature successive, and consequently dis- tant; that is, it supposes active memory. Since reason implies and supposes active memory, it follows that it implies or sup- poses liberty ; this kind of me- mory being only the power of reflecting back, and applying vo- luntarily our attention to any past perception, and consequent- ly to any part of our past consci- ousness within certain limits at least. The power of reflecting 1 and applying, is here opposed to the necessity of doing it on the one hand, and the ne- cessity of nofcj^oing it on the other. Bu4 we are not free in seeing the identities, diversi- ties, agreements, or disagree- ments of our ideas: we are noi free in seeing the natures and habitudes, and relations of those perceptions, upon which we have thus freely and voluntarily re- flected back our attention. For every percipient, if it shall bring together and compare any two perceptions, must of necessity, according to its faculty of dis- cernment, see whether they agree or disagree, or how far they are the same or different. It must by its original constitution, be thus far purely passive in, its perception, being- active and free only in reflecting and ap- plying its attention to it. So that it is wonderful that there should ever have been any dispute in the world, whether a rational creature could be a free creature ; since the pronouncing a creature rational is the same thing as the pronouncing it free in other words. It happens to human liberty, as to motion, that it is easier to feel it, and be cer- tain of the reality of it, than accu- rately to explain its nature. The friends of common sense and sound philosophy should there- fore deduce their instances of NEC NEC it from the first and highes kind of liberty, than over theper- ceptions of the mind, which is the cause ; rather than from the motions of the body, which are but the consequence and effect of the other. Baxter. NECESSITY AND LIBERTY, PHILO- SOPHICAL, IN MAN. According tfr Newton and others, the infi- nitely free Being- has communi- cated to man a limited portion of that liberty; and by liberty iere, is not understood the sim- ple power of applying our thoughts to such or such an ob- ject, and of beginning the mo- tron: not only the faculty of willing is meant, but that of willing in the most free and effi- cacious manner; and even of willing without any other ra- son than the will itself. There is not a man on the earth who does not believe that he some- times feels himself possessed of this Hberty. Many philosophers, however, think the contrary; and that all the Hberty we enjoy J6 that of wearing sometimes freely the fetters of fatality. Collins is of this opinion : he calls man a necessary agent. Clarke says, if this be true, man is no longer an agent. But who does not see that this is true chi- chanery? Whatever produces necessary effects, Collins calls a necessary agent. Is it of any con- sequence whether he be called agent or patient? The point is to know'Nvhether he be neces- sarily determined. If only one single case can be found where man is really free with a liberty of indifference, that alone seems sufficient to de- cide the question. Now what case shall we find more proper than that where our liberty is put to a trial I For instance, it is proposed to me to turn to the right or the left, or to do some other action, to which nei- ther pleasure attracts-, nor dis- gust diverts. I then choose, and do not follow the dictates of my understanding which represents to me the best ; for, in this case, there is neither better nor worse. How do I act? I exercise a right God has given me of willing and acting in certain cases without any other reason than my own will. 1 enjoy a right and power to begin the motion, and begin it on which side I please. If, in this case, my will directs me, why should any other cause be sought than my own will? It seems probable, therefore, that in indifferent things we have the liberty of indifference. For who can say that God has, or has not been able to confer on us this gift? And if he is able, and we feel this power in ourselves, how can it be affirmed that we do not enjoy it ? This liberty of indiffe- rence is, however, treated as a chimera: it is said, that to de- termine without a reason, be- longs only to madmen. But it should be remembered, that mad- men are distempered persons, without any liberty. They are necessarily determined by the disorder of their organs. They are not their own masters; they choose nothing. He is free who determines for himself. Now, why shall we not in things in- different determine ourselves merely by our own will ? We enjoy, in all other cases, the liberty called spontaniety ; NEC NEC that is, our will is determined by motives when there are any ; and these motives are always the last result of the understanding or instinct. Thus, when my un- derstanding- represents to itself, that it is better for me to obey than break the law, I conform to the law with a spontaneous li- berty; I perform voluntarily what the last dictamen of my understanding- leads me to per- form. This species of liberty is never better perceived, than when our will opposes our de- sires. I have a violent passion for something but my under- standing tells me, I must resist this passion ; it represents to me a greater good in victory, than in a compliance with my appetite. This last motive preponderates, and I oppose my desires by my will. This command of my rea- son I necessarily and willingly obey. I do not what I desire, but what I will ; and, in this case/1 am free, and enjoy all the liberty of which such a circum- stance can make me susceptible. In fine, I am free in no respect, when my passion is too strong, and my understanding- loo weak ; or, when my organs are disor- dered ; and this, unfortunately, is very often the case of men. So that spontaneous liberty is to the soul what health is to the body : some persons enjoy it en- tirely and constantly ; many are often deprived of it ; and others are sick during their whole lives : all the other faculties of man are subject to the same varia- tion. Sight, hearing, taste, strength, cogitation, are some- times stronger, and sometimes weaker: our liberty, like every thing- else, is limited, variable: in a word, very trifling; be- cause man is himself inconsider- able. The difficulty of reconciling- human actions with God's eter- nal prescience, was no obstacle to Newton ; he avoided that la- byrinth. Liberty being- once proved, it is not for us to deter- mine how God foresees what we shall freely do. We know not how God sees whai passes at present. We have no idea of his mode of seeing-, why then should we have any of his mode of foreseeing-? We should consider all his attributes as equally in- comprehensible. It must be owned, that against this idea of liberty there are ob- jections which startle. It is im- mediately seen that this liberty of indifference would be but a trivial present, if it extended no further than spitting to the right or left, or choosing either odd or even. The business is, whe- ther Cartouche and Shah Nadier have a liberty of not shedding- human blood ? Of what conse- quence is the liberty of putting- Oie left or right foot first? This liberty of indifference is then found to be impossible ; for how can we be said to determine without reason ? You will, but why will you ? You are asked even or odd; you choose even, without being aware of the mo- tive; which is, that even pre- sents itself to your mind at the instant you make the choice. Every thing- has its cause : consequently your will is not ex- cepted. There is then no wil- ling, but in consequence of the last idea received. No person NEC NEC- can know what idea he will have the next moment ; there- fore, no person is master of his own ideas ; therefore no person is master of willing- or not will- ing 1 . Were he master of these, he might perform the contrary of what God has disposed in the concatenation of the thing's of this world. Thus every person might, and actually would, change the. eternal order* All the liberty the wise Locke knew, was the power of doing what one wills. Free-will seem- ed to him only a chimera. A patient during- the paroxysm of the gout has not the liberty ol walking; nor the prisoner that of going abroad: the one be- comes free when Qured ; the other on opening to him the gate. To place these difficulties in a stronger light, I will suppose that Cicero is attempting to prove to Catiline that he ought not to conspire against his coun- try. Catiline tells him, it is ou ofhispower; thai his conferences with Cethegus have imprintec in his mind the idea of the con spiracy ; that this idea please; him beyond any other ; and tha we only will in consequence o our last decision. But you might answers Cicero, adopt othe ideas as well as. I, by listening attentively to me, and reflecting on the duty of consulting th good of your country. It is o no consequence, returns Cati line, your ideas offend me ; anc the desire of assassinating yoi prevails. I am sorry for you madness, says Cicero ; endea vour to take some of my medi cines. If I am mad, replies Ca tiline, t cannot command my er> deavours to be cured. But, urged the consul, men are endued with reason, which they may consult, and may cure the disorder of the organs which renders you thus perverse, thus hardened in so horrid a crime ; especially if this disorder be not too strong. Show me, says Catiline, the point where this disorder is. curable. For my part, I own, that from the first moment I began the conspiracy, all my reflections have tended to make me perse- vere in the undertaking. Wheji did you first take this fatal reso- lution ? asks the consul. When I had lost my money at play. And could not you have abstain- ed from play ! No for the idea of play predominated at that time in my mind above all other ideas ;, and had I not played, I should have discomposed the order of the. universe, by which Quartilla was to win 400,000 sesterces of me ; with this mo- ney she was to purchase a house and a gallant; by this gallant she was to have a son ; Cethegus and Lentulus were to come to my house, and we were to conspire against the republic. Destiny has made ine a wolf, and you a shepherd's dog: destiny will de- cide which is to cut the. throat of the other. To this., Cicero could have answered only by an oration. It must indeed be al- lowed, that the objections a- gainst liberty can hardly be an- swered but by a vague elo- quence : a subject on which the wiser a person is, the more he fears to consider it. But, which- ever system we embrace by whatever fatality we suppose all NEC NEC our actions are governed, \ve shall always act as if we were free. Voltaire. NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND THE LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE. 1. Plants are organized beings, in which every thing- is done ne- cessarily. Some plants belong- to the animal kingdom, and are, in effect, animals attached to the earth. 2. Can these animal plants, with roots, leaves, and sensations, be supposed to have liberty ? No, surely. 3. Have not animals a percep- tion, an instinct, a reason begun, a measure of ideas and of me- mory? What, in reality, is in- stinct ? Is it not one of those secret springs we can never know? Nothing can be known but by analysis, or a consequence of what are called the first prin- ciples. Now, what analysis, or what synthesis, can explain the nature of instinct ? We only perceive that this instinct is al- ways necessarily accompanied with ideas. A silk worm has a perception of the leaf which nourishes it: the partridge of the worm which it seeks and swal- lows ; the fox of the partridge which it eats ; the wolf of the fox whrch it devours. Now it is not very likely that these beings possess what we call liberty : may we not, therefore, have ideas without being free ? 4. Men receive and combine ideas in their sleep ; but they cannot be said to be then free. Is not this a fresh proof, that we may have ideas without being free? 5. Man has, above other ani- mals, the gift of a more compre- hensive memory: this memory is the sole source of all his thoughts. Can this source, common to ani- mals and men, produce liberty ? The ideas of reflection in one brain, can they be any other than ideas of reflection in another? 6. Are not all men determined by their instinct ? And is not this the reason why they never change their character ? Is not this instinct' what we call the disposition ? 7. Were We free, where is the man who would not change his disposition I But was ever a man seen on earth, who gave himself one single propensity ? Was there ever a man born with an aversion to dancing, that gave himself a taste for dancing? A sluggish and sedentary man, that gave himself an inclination to seek motron? Do not age and regimen diminish the passions, which reason fancies it has sub- dued? 8. Is not the will the last con- sequence of the last ideas receiv- ed ? If these ideas are necessary, is not the will also necessary ? 9. Is liberty any thing more than the power of acting or not acting ? And was not Locke in the rig'ht to call liberty, Power ? 10. A wolf has the perception of sheep feeding in a meadow ; his instinct prompts him to de- vour them, but is prevented by the dogs. A conqueror has the perception of a province, which his instinct leads him to invade : he finds fortresses and armies to obstruct his passage. Where is the great difference between the wolf and the conqueror? 1 1. Does not this universe ap- NEC NEC pear in all its parts subjected to immutable laws ? If a man might at his pleasure direct his will, is it not plain, that he might discompose these immutable laws ? 12. By what privilege should man be exempted from the same necessity, to which the stars, animals, plants, and every thing 1 else in nature are subjected ? 13. Is it justly said, that in the system of this universal fatality, punishments and rewards would be useless and absurd? Is it not rather evident, that the in- utility and absurdity of punish- ments and rewards appears in the system of liberty ? In short, if a highwayman is possessed of a free will, determining itself solely by itself, the fear of pu- nishment may very well fail of determining him to re- nounce robbery: but if the physical causes act alone : if the sight of the gibbet and wheel make a necessary and violent im- pression : they then necessarily correct the villain, while he is gazing at the execution of an- other. 14. To know if the soul be free, should we not first know what this soul is ? Can any one boast that his reason alone de- monstrates to him the spiritual nature, the immortality of the soul? It is the general opinion of physicians, that the principle of sensation resides in the place where the nerves unite in the brain. But this place is not a mathematical point. The origin of every nerve is extended. There is in that place a bell on which the fine organs of our senses strike ; but who can con- ceive that this bell occupies no point of space? Are we not automata : born to will always, to do sometimes what we will, and sometimes the contrary? Stars at the centre of the earth, without us and within us, every essence, every substance is to us, unknown. We see only appear- ances. We are in a dream. 15. Whether in this dream we believe the will free or sub- ject ; the organised earth of which we are formed endued with an immortal or perishable faculty ; whether we think like Epicurus or like Socrates, the wheels that move the machine of the universe will be always the same. Vollaire. NECESSITY AND LIBERTY. Every one finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in him- self. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of li- berty and necessity. All the actions that, we have any idea of, reducing themselves to these two, viz. thinking and motion : so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power: wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it : there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be vo- luntary. So that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in NEC NEC any agent to do or forbear ^iny particular action, according- to the determination or thought ol the mind, whereby either ol them is preferred to the other : where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty ; that agent is under necessity. So that liberty can- not be where there is no thought, no volition, no will ; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be voli- tion, where there is no liberty. A liltle consideration of an obvi- ous instance or two may make this clear. A tennis-ball, whether in mo- tion by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free agent. If we inquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any volition or preference of motion to rest, or vice versa; and there- fore has not liberty, is not a free agent ; but both its motion and rest come under our idea of ne- cessity, and are so called. Like- wise a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition; and there- fore therein he is not free. So a man srriking' himself, or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm which it is not in his power, by volition or the direc- tion of his mind, to stop or for- bear ; nobody thinks he has in this liberty ; every one pities him, as acting by necessity and con- straint. Again, suppose a man to be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a room, where is a person he longs to see and speak with ; and to be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out ; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly in, i.e. prefers his stay to going away ; -I ask, is not this stay voluntary ? I think no- body will doubt it: and yet being locked fast in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay ; he has not freedom to be gone. So that liberty is not an idea be- longing to volition or preferring ; but to the person having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no further. For wherever restraint comes to check that power, or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting ; there liberty and our notion of it presently ceases. We have instances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A man's heart beats, and the blood circulates, which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop; and, therefore, in respect of these motions, where rest depends not on his choice, nor would follow the determination of his mind, if it should prefer it, he is not a free agent. Convulsive motions agitate his legs, so that though he will it ever so much, he can- NBC NEC not by any power of his mind stop their motion (as in that odd disease called chorea sancti Viti) but he is perpetually dancing- ; he is not at liberty in this action, but under as much necessity of moving- as a stone that falls, or a tennis-ball struck with a racket. On the other side, a palsy or the stocks hinder his leg's from obey- ing- the determination of his mind, if it would thereby trans- fer his body to another place. In all these the/re is want of free- dom ; thoug-h the sitting stHl even of a paralytic, whilst he pre- fers it to a removal is truly vo- luntary. Voluntary, then, is not opposed to necessary, but to in* voluntary. For a man may pre- fer what he can do to what he cannot do; the state he is in to its absence or chang-e, thoug-h necessity has made it in itself unalterable. As it is in the motions of the body, so it is in the thoughts of our minds : where any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, accord- ing to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in his mind, is not at liberty to think or not to think ; no more than he is at liberty, whether his body shall touch any other or no : but whether he will remove his contempla- tion from one idea to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is in respect of his ideas as much at liberty as he is in res- pect of bodies he rests on : he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another. But yet some ideas to the mind, like some motions to the body, are such & in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplati- ons : and sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane does our bodies, with- out leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather choose. But as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue, begin or forbear, any of these motions of the body without, or thoughts within, according as it thinks lit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the man as a free agent again. Wherever thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the direc- tion of thought ; there necessity takes place. This,, in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to that pre- ference of his mind, is called Compulsion ; when the hinder- ing or stopping any action is contrary to his volition, it is called Restraint. Agents that have no thoug-ht, no volition at all, are in every thing necessary agents. If this be so, (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and I think unreasonable, be- cause unintelligible, question, viz. Whether man's will be free or no ? For if I mistake not, it follows from \vhat I have said, that the question itself is alto- gether improper: and it is as in* NEC NEC significant as to ask whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square: liberty being 1 as little applicable to the will, as swift- ness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue. Every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a question as either of these : because it is obvious, that the modifications of motion belong not to sleep, nor the difference of figure to virtue : and when any one well consi- ders it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attri- bute or modification of the will, which is also but a power. I think the question is not proper, Whether the will be free ? but, Whether a man be free ? Thus I think- That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action, and vice versa, make it to exist or not exist : so far he is free. For if 1 can, by a thought directing 1 the motion of nay finger, make it move when it was at rest, or vice versa ; it is evident, that in respect of that 1, am free : and if. I can, by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words or silence, 1 am at liberty to speak or hold my peace. And as far as this power reaches, ol acting or not acting, by the de- termination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free. For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will ? And so far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or rest to any action, pro- duce that action or rest ; so far can he do what he will. For such a preferring of action to its absence, is the willing of it : and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he will. So that in respect of actions with- in the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free as it is possible for freedom to make him. But the inquisitive mind of man, willing to shift off from himself, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal necessity, is not content with this; free- dom, unless it reaches further than this, will not serve the turn: and it passes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet there- fore is raised this further ques- tion, Whether a man be free to will? Which I think is what is meant, when it is disputed whether the will be free. And as to that I imagine That willing or volition, being an action and freedom consist- ing in a power of acting or not acting, a man, in respect of will~ ing, or the act of volition, when- any action' in his power is once- proposed to his thoughts as pre- sently to be done, cannot be free. "The reason whereof is very ma- nifest : for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist; and its existence or not existence following perfectly the determi- nation and preference of his NEC NEC will ; he cannot avoid willing the existence or not existence of that action : it is absolutely necessary that he will the one or the other ; i. e. prefer the one to the other : since one of them must necessarily follow ; and that which does follow, fol- lows by the choice and determi- nation of his mind, that is, by his willing 1 it ; for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of willing-, a man in such a case is not free : liberty consisting- in a power to act or not to act ; which in reg-ard to volition, a man, upon such a proposal, has not. For it is un- avoidably necessary to prefer the doing- or forbearance of an action in a man's power which is once so proposed to his thoug-hts: a man must neces- sarily will the one or the other of them ; upon which preference or volition, the action, or its for- bearance, certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring- one of the two, being- that which he cannot avoid, a man, in respect of that act of willing-, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free ; unless necessity and freedom can consist tog-ether, and a man can be free and bound at once. This then is evident, that in all proposals of present actions, a man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing-; liberty consist- ing- in a power to act or forbear acting-, and in that only. For a man that sits still is said yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it ; but if a man sitting- stHl has not a power to remove himself, he is riot at li- berty. So likewise a man fall- ing- down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being- so, it is plain that a man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to g-ive off M alking, is not at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk or give off walking or no : he must necessarily prefer one to the other of them ; walking or not walking. And so it is in regard of all other actions in our power so proposed ; which are the far greater number. For considering the vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives, there are but few of them that are though ton or pro- posed to the will, till the time they are to be done ; and in all such actions, as I have shown, the mind in respect of willing, has not a power to act or not to act, wherein consists liberty. The mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid some determina- tion concerning them, let the consideration be as short, the thought as quick, as it will ; it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking, or changes it ; continues the action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one, in preference to or with neglect to the other; and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary. Since, then, it is plain, that, in most cases, a man is not at liber- ty whether he will or no, the next thing demanded is, Whether NEC NEC a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, motion or rest? This question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself that one might thereby suf- ficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will. For to ask, Whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest ; speaking- or silence, which he pleases? is to ask, Whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with? A question which, 1 think, needs no answer : and they who can make a question of it, must suppose one will to de- termine the acts of another, and another to determine that, and so on in infinitum. To avoid these and the like absurdities, nothing 1 can be of greater use than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the thing's under consideration. If the ideas of liberty and volition were well fixed in the under- standings, and carried along with us in our minds, as they oug-ht, through all the questions that are raised about them, I suppose a great part of the difficulties that perplex men's thoughts, and entangle their understandings, would be much easier resolved ; and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms, or where the nature of the thing, caused the obscurity. It is carefully to be remem- bered, that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence or not existence of any action upon our volition of it ; and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference. A man standing on a cliff is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the sea ; not because he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do ; but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap or not to leap. But if a greater force than his either holds him fast, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that case : because the doing or forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his power. He that is a close prisoner in a room twenty feet square, being at the north side of liis chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty feet southward, because he can walk or not walk it ; but is not at the same time at liberty to do the contrary, i. e. to walk twenty feet northward. In this, then, consists freedom viz. in our being- able to act'or not to act, according as we shall choose or will. We must remember, that vo- lition, or willing, is an act of the mind, directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multi- plying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word action ; to comprehend the for- bearance too of any action pro- posed : sitting still, or holding one's peace, when walking or speaking are proposed, though mere forbearances, requiring' as much the determination of the will, and being as often weighty in their consequences, as the con trary actions, may, on that con- sideration, well enough pass Tor actions too. The will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the 2 N NEC NEC operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they de- pend on such direction : to the question, What is it that deter- mines the will ? the true and proper answer is, The mind : for that which determines the gene- ral power of directing" to this or that particular direction, is no- thing but the agent itself exercis- ing- the power it has that parti- cular way. If this answer satis- fies not, ft is plain the meaning of the question, What determines the will ? is this, What moves the mind, in every particular in- stance, to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular motion or rest ? And to this I answer, The motive for continuing in the same state or action is only the present satis- faction in it: the motive to change is always some uneasi- ness; nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This, is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action; which, for shortness sake, we will call determining of the will. That which determines the will in regard to our actions, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine, is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view ; bat some (and for the most part the most pressing) un- easiness a man is at present un- der. This is that which succes- sively determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, desire ; which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. All pain ef the body, of what sort so- ever, and disquiet of the mind, i* uneasiness ; and with this is al- ways joined desire equal to the- pain or uneasiness felt, and is scarce distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an. uneasiness in the want of an ab- sent good, in reference to any pain felt, ease is that absent good : and till that ease be at- tained, we may call it desire \. nobody feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased of, with a desire equal to that pain, and in- separable from it. Besides thisv desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good : and here also the desire and un- easiness are equal. As much as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that great- ness, as all pain causes desire equal to itself: because the ab- sence of good is not always a pain, as the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked on and considered without desire. But so much as there is any where of desire, so. much there is of uneasiness. That desire is a state of un- easiness, every one who reflects- on himself will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope, (which is not much different from it) " that it being deferred makes the heart sick:" and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire ; which sometimes raises the un- easiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, Give me children, give me the thing NEC NEC esfred, or I die ? Life Kself, , and all its enjoyments, rs a bur-' >den cannot be borne under the ' 4asting and uaremoved pressure of such an uneasiness. Good and evfi, present and j absent, it is -true, work upon the mind: but that which immedi- ately determines the will, from time to time, to every volun- tary action, is the uneasiness of desire fixed on some ab- sent good ; either negative, as indolence -to one in pain; or |>osi live, as enjoyment of pleasure That it is this uneasiness that determines the will to the suc- cessive voluntary actions where- of the greatest part of our lives are made up, and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends, I shall endeavour to show, both from experience and the reason of the thing. When a man is perfectly con- tent with the state he is in, which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness, what in- dustry, what action, what will is there left but to continue in it? Of this every man's obser- vation will satisfy him. And thus we see our all-wise Maker, suitable to our constitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their seasons, to move and de- termine their wills, for the pre- servation of themselves and the continuation of thir species. For I think we may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of these good ends, to which we -are carried by these several un- easinesses, had been sufficient to determine the will, and set u on work, we should have had none of these natural pains, arid perhaps, in this world, little or no pain at all. " It is better to marry than to burn," says St. Paul ; where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal lile. A little burning felt, pushes os more powerfully, than greater pleasures in prospect draw or allure. We being in this world beset with sundry uneasinesses, dis- tracted with different desires, the next inquiry naturally will be, Which of them has the pre- cedency in determining the will to the next action ? And to that the answer is, That, ordinarily, which is the most pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed. For the will being the power of direct- ing our operative faculties to some action for some end, can- not at any time be moved to- wards what is judged at that time unattainable: that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to loose its labour, for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable : and therefore very great uneasinesses move not tfce will when they are judged not capable of a <;ure ; they in that case put us not upon endeavours. But, these set apart, the most important and urgent uneasiness we at that time feel, is that which or- - rity arises from any popular reli- gion. It is the solemnity and importance of the occasion, the- regard to reputation, and the reflecting on the general interests of society, together with the punishments annexed to perjury ia all well-regulated govern- ments, that are the chief re- straints upon mankind. Custom- house oaths, and political" oaths,, are but little regarded, even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and religion ; and a Quaker's affirmation is with us justly put upon the same footing: with the oath of any other per- son. Polybius ascribes, indeed,, the infamy of Greek faith to the prevalence of the Epicurean phi- losophy : but the Punic faith, it is well known, had as bad a re- putation in ancient times, as Irish evidence has in modern ; though we cannot account for these vul- gar observations by the same reason. Not to mention, that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean philo- sophy ; and Euripides ha* glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against his nation with, re- gard to this circumstance. Hume. OBSTINACY. It is often from the want of passions that arises the obstinacy of persons of mean, parts. Their slender knowledge- supposes that they never had any desire of instruction, or at least, that this desire has been: always very faint; very much below their fondness for sloth r now he who is not desirous of instruction, has never sufficient motives for altering his mind. To save himself the fatigue of ima.- occ occ gination, he must always turn a deaf ear to the remonstrances of reason ; and obstinacy, in this case, is the necessary effect of sloth. Helvetius. OCCULT QUALITIES. The doctrine of occult qualities is the wisest and truest which antiquity has produced. The formation of the elements, the emission of light, animals, vegetables, minerals, our birth, our death, waking-, sleeping-, sensation, thoug-ht every thing is occult quality. See, feel, separate, measure, weigh, collect, and be assured that you will never do any more. Newton calculated the force of gravitation, but he has not dis- covered its cause. Why is that cause occult ? It is a first prin- ciple. We are acquainted with the laws of motion; but the cause of motion being a first principle, will for ever remain a secret. You are alive, but how? You will never know any thing of the matter. You have sen- sations, ideas : but can you guess by what they are pro- duced ? Is not that the most oc- cult thing in the world? Names have been given to a certain number of faculties which dis- play themselves in. us, according as our organs acquire some de- gree of strength, when they are freed from the teguments in which we were enclosed during nine months, without so much as knowing in what that strength consists. If we call any thing to mind, we say it is memory : if we range a few ideas in order, it is judgment; if we form a con- nected picture of some other scattered id^eas, it is called ima- gination : and the result or principle of those qualities is named soul, a thing still a thou- sand times more occult. It is a certain truth, that there does not exist in us one separate being called sensibility, another memory, a third judgment, a fourth imagination; how then can we easily conceive that we have a fifth composed of the four others which are really non- entities ? What was understood by the ancients, when they pro- nounced the Greek word Psyche? Did they mean a property of man, or a particular being concealed in man ? Was it not an occult expression of a very occult thing ? Are not all the systems of ontology and psychology mere dreams ? In our mother's womb we are entirely unacquainted with ourselves ; yet there our ideas ought to be the purest, be- cause there our attention is the least distracted. We are unac- quainted with ourselves at our birth, in our growth, during our life, and at the hour of death. The first reasoner who departed from the ancient doctrine of oc- cult qualities, corrupted the un- derstanding of mankind. He involved us in a labyrinth, from which it is now impossible to extricate ourselves. How much wiser had the first man been, who, sensible of his ignorance, had said to that Being who is the author of the uni- verse : " Thou hast made me "without my knowing it; and " thou preserves! me without my " being able to find out the mode " of my existence. When I " suckled my nurse's breast, I " fulfilled one of the most ab- " struse laws of natural philoso- OPI OPi " phy ; and I fulfil one still more "' unknown, when I eat and di- " -est the aliments with which " thou feedest me. I know still " less, how some ideas enter my " head to quit it the next ino- " ment without ever re-appear- " ing ; and how others remain ' there during- rny whole life, " notwithstanding- my strong-est " efforts to drive them out. I am " an effect of thy occult and su- " preme power, which the stars " obey as well as myself. A par- " tide of dust agitated by the " wind, saith not, I command " the winds. In te vivimus, " movemur, et sumus. Thou art " the sole Being, and the rest is " only mode." Voltaire. OPINIONS, OUR, DEPEND UPON OUR INTEREST. All men agree in the truth of g-eometric proposi- tions. Is it because they are demonstrated? No: but be- cause men have no interest in taking 1 the false for the true. If they had such interest, the pro- positions most evidently demon- strated would appear to them problematic; they would prove on occasion, that the contained is greater than the container: this is a fact of which some religious afford examples. If a Catholic divine propose to prove that there are sticks that have not two ends, nothing- is more easy: he will first distinguish sticks into two sorts, the one material, the other spiritual. He will then deliver an obscure dissertation on the nature of spiritual sticks: and conclude that the existence of these sticks is a mystery above, yet not contrary to, reason: and then this self-evident proposi- tion, that there is no stick with- out two ends, becomes pro- blematic. It is the same with the most obvious truths of mo- rality ; the most evident is " That, with regard to crimes, " the punishment should be per- " sonal, and that I ought not to " be punished for a crime com- " mitted by my neighbour.'' Yet how many theologians are there who still maintain, that God punishes in the present race of mankind the sins of their first parents. Helvetius. OPINIONS, SPECULATIVE, NOT IN- JURIOUS TO SOCIETY. The most absurd opinions in morality, and from whence the most detesta- ble consequences may be drawn, can have no influence on the manners of a people, if there be no alteration in their laws. It is not a false maxim in mo- rality that will render us wicked, but the interest we have to be so. In morality, says Machiavel, whatever absurd opinion we ad- vance, \ve do not thereby injure society, provided we do not maintain that opinion by force. In every sort of science, it is by exhausting the errors that we come at last to the spring of truth. In morality, the thing- really useful, is the inquiry after truth; and the non-inquiry that is really detrimental. He that extols ignorance, is a knave that would make dupes. Should we destroy error, compel it to si- lence / No: How then? Let it talk on. Error, obscure in itself, is rejected by every sound under- standing. If time has not given ~it credit, and it be not favoured by government, it cannot be a the aspect of examination. Reason will ultimately direct ORA wherever it be freely exercised. Helvetians. ORACLES. It is evident we cannot be acquainted with futurity, be- cause we cannot be acquainted with what does not exist ; but it is also clear, that conjectures may be formed of an event. All predictions are reduced to the calculations of probabili- ties: there is, therefore, .no na- tion in which some predictions have not been made that have come to pass. The most cele- brated and best attested, is that which Flavius Josephus made to Vespasian and Titus his son, the conquerors of the Jews. He saw Vespasian and Titus adored by the Roman armies in the East, and Nero detested by the whole empire. He had the audacity, in order to obtain the good graces of Vespasian, to predict to him, in the name of the God of the Jews, (Joseph, Book iii. ch. 28.) that he and his son would become emperors. They, in effect, were so-, but it is evident that Josephus ran no risk. If the day of Vespasian's overthrow had come, he would not have been in a situation to punish Josephus ; if he obtained the imperial throne, he must recompense nis prophet; and till such time as he reigned he was in hopes of doing- it. Vespasian informed this Jose- phus, that if he were a prophet he should have foretold him the loss of Jotapat, which he had ineffectually defended against the Roman army. Josephus re- plied, that he had in fact fore- told it; which was not very surprising-. What commander, >vho sustains a siege in a small ORA place against a numerous army, does not foretell that the place will be taken. The most brilliant function of the oracles was to insure victory in war. Each army, each na- tion, had its own peculiar oracles, who promised triumphs. The oraculous intelligence of one of the parties was infallibly true. The vanquished, who had been deceived, attributed their defeat to some fault committed towards the gods after the oracle had been consulted : and they hoped the oracle's prediction would, another time, be accomplished. Thus is almost the whole earth fed with illusion. It was not difficult to discover that respect and money might be drawn from the multitude by playing the prophet ; and the credulity of the people must be a revenue for any who knew how to cheat them. There were in all places soothsayers; but it was not sufficient to foretell in their own name, it was necessary o speak in the name of- the di- vinity ; and from the time of the prophets of Egypt, who called themselves seers, till the time of Ulpius, who prophesied to the favourite of the empire, Adrian, who became a god, there was a prodigious number of sacred quacks, who made the gods speak to make a jest of man. It is well known how they might succeed ; by an ambigu- ous reply, which they after- wards explained as they pleased. These prophets were reckoned to know the past, the present, and the future. This is the eulo- gium which Homer makes upon Calchas. OUT FAl Divinations and auguries were a kind of oracles, and, perhaps, of higher antiquity ; for many ceremonies were necessary much time was required to draw custom to a divine oracle, that could not do without temple and priests ; and nothing was easier than to tell fortunes in the cross ways. This art was sub- divided into a thousand shapes ; predictions were extracted from the flight of birds, sbeeps' livers, the lines of the palms of the hand, circles drawn upon the ground, water, fire, small flints, wands, and, in a word, from every thing that could be de- vised, and frequently from en- thusiasm alone, which supplied the place of all rules. But who invented this art? The first rogue that met with a fool. Vollaire. ORTHODOXY. Orthodoxy is a Greek word, which signifies a right opinion ; and hath been used by churchmen as a term to denote a soundness of doctrine or belief, with regard to all points and articles of faith. But as there have been amongst these church- men several systems of doctrine or belief, they all assert for them- selves, that they only are ortho- dox, and in the right; nd that all others are heterodox, or in the wrong. So that what at one time, and in one place, hath been declared orthodoxy, or sound belief, has at another time, and in another, or even the same place, been declared to be heterodoxy, or wrong belief. Of this there are numberless instances in ec- clesiastical history ; and we need only just take a transient view of the present Christian world, to perceive many more of it subsisting at this day. What is orthodoxy at Constantinople, is heterodoxy or heresy at Rome. What is orthodoxy at Rome, is heterodoxy at Geneva, London, and many other places. What was orthodoxy here in the reign of Ed ward VI. became heresy in the reign of his sister Mary ; and in Queen Elizabeth's time, things changed their names again. Va- rious was the fate of these poor words in the reigns of our suc- ceeding kings : as the currents of Calvinism, Arminianism, and Po- pery, ebbed and flowed. So un- certain and fluctuating a thing is orthodoxy. To-day it consists in one set of principles, to-mor- row in another. Were the words orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and he- resy, employed as they ought, in distinguishing virtue from vice, and good from evil, they would admit of no variation, and be for ever taken in the same sense. But as they are used to denote opinions concerning the most in- comprehensible subjects, no won- der that their meaning should be- so often mistaken, and occasion so many endless and bitter dis- putes. Robertson. PAIN AND PLEASURE, MANKIND GOVERNED BY. Nature has placed mankind under the go- vernance of two sovereign mas- ters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think : every * PAI effort we can make to throw off onr subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to ab- jure their empire ; but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is, to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds in- stead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light. The happiness of the indivi- duals, of whom a community is composed, that is, their pleasures and their security, is the end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view: the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be made to fashion his behaviour. But whether it be this or any thing else that is to be done, there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be made to do it, but either pain or pleasure. /. Bentham. PAIN AND PLEASURE, SANCTIONS, OR SOURCES OF, AND THEIR IN- FLUENCE IN LEGISLATION. There are four distinguishable sources from which pleasure and pain are in use to flow : Consi- dered separately, they may be termed the physical, the politi- cal', the moral, and the religious; and inasmuch as the pleasures and pains belonging to each of them are capable of giving a bidding force to any law or rule of conduct, ihey may all of them be termed sanctions. If it be ia PAI the present life, and from the or- dinary course of nature, not pur- posely modified by the interpo- sition of the will of any human being, nor by any extraordi- nary interposition of any superior invisible being, that the plea- sure or the pain takes place or is expected, it may be said to issue from or belong to the phy- sical sanction. If at the hands of a particular person or set of persons in the community, who under names correspondent to that of judge, are chosen for the purpose of dispensing it, accord- ing to the will of the sovereign or supreme ruling power in the state, it may be said to issue from the political sanction. If at the hands of such chance persons in the community, as the party in question may happen in the course of his life to have cou- cerns with, according to each man's spontaneous disposition, and not according to any settled or concerted rule, it may be said to issue from the moral sanction. If from the immediate hand of a superior invisible Being, either in the present life, or in a future, it may be said to issue from rel-i- ous sanction. Pleasures or pains which may be expected to issue from the physical, political, or moral sanctions, must all of them be expected to be experienced, if ever, in the present life : those which may be expected to issue from the religious sanction, may be expected to be experienced either in the present life or in a future. Those which can be experi- enced in the present life, can of course be no other than such att human nature in the course of PA I PAl the present life is susceptible of; and from each of these sources may flow all the pleasures or pains of which, in the course of the present life; human nature is susceptible. With regard to these then, (with which alone we have in this place any concern) those of them which belong- to any one of those sanctions, differ not ultimately in kind from those which belong- to any one of the other three: the only difference there is among- them lies in the circumstances that accompany their production. A suffering; which befalls a man in the na- tural and spontaneous course of thing-s, shall be styled, for in- stance, a calamity ; in which case, if it be supposed to befall him throug-h any imprudence of his, it may be styled a punish- ment issuing- from the physical sanction. Now this same suffer- ing 1 , if inflicted by the law, will be what is commonly called a punishment ; if incurred for want of any friendly assistance, which the misconduct, or supposed misconduct of the sufferer has occasioned to be withholden, a punishment issuing' from the moral sanction ; if throug-h the' immediate interposition of a par- ticular providence, a punishment issuing- from & religious sanction. A man's g-oods, or his person, are consumed by fire. If this happened to him by what is called an accident, it was a cala- mity ; if by reason of his own imprudence, (for instance, from his neglecting- to put his candle out) it may be styled a punish- ment of the physical sanction ; if it happened to him by the sentence of the political magis- trate, a punishment belonging to the political sanction ; that is, what is commonly called a pun- ishment : if for want of any assist- ance which his neighbour with- held from him out of some dis- like to his moral character, a punishment of the moral sancti- on : if by an immediate act of God's displeasure, manifested on account of some sin committed by him, or through any distrac- tion of mind, occasioned by the dread of such displeasure, a pun- ishment of the religious sanction. As to such of the pleasures and pains belonging to the religious sanction as regard a future life, of what kind these may be we cannot know. These lie not open to our observation. During the present life they are matter only of expectation: and, whe- ther that expectation be derived from natural or revealed religion, the particular kind of pleasure or pain, if it be different from all those which lie open to our ob- servation, is what we can have no idea of. Of these four sanc- tions, the physical is altogether, we may observe, the ground- work of the political and the mo- ral ; so is it also of the religious, in as far as the latter bears rela- tion to the present life. It is in- cluded in each of those other three. This may operate in any case, (that is, any of the pains or pleasures belonging to it may operate) independently of them : none of them can operate but by means of this. In a word, the powers of nature may operate of themselves ; but neither the ma- gistrate, nor men at large, can operate, nor is God, in the case in question, supposed to operate, 2 P PAI PAl but through the powers of na- ture. For these four objects, which in their nature have so much in common, it seemed of use to find a common name. It seemed of use, in the first place, for the convenience of giving- a name to certain pleasures and pains, for which a name equally cha- racteristic could hardly other- wise have been found : in the second place, for the sake of holding up the efficacy of cer- tain moral forces, the influence of which is apt not to be suf- ficiently attended to. Does the political sanction exert an in- fluence over the conduct of man- kind? The moral, the religious sanctions do so too. In every inch of his career are the opera- tions of the political magistrate liable to be aided or impeded by these two foreign powers : who, one or other of them, or both, are sure to be either his rivals or his allies. Does it happen to him to leave them out in his calcula- tions : he will be sure almost to find himself mistaken in the result. It behoves him, there- fore, to have them continually before his eyes; and that under such a name as exhibits the re- lation they bear to his own pur- poses and designs. /. Bentham. PAIN AND TERROR, THE NATURE OF. A man who suffers under violent bodily pain has his teeth set, his eye-brows violently con- tracted, his forehead wrinkled, his eyes dragged inwards, and rolled with great vehemence, his hair stands on end, the voice is forced out in short shrieks and groans, and the whole fabric tot- ers. Fear or terror, which if an apprehension of pain or death, exhibits exactly the same effects, approaching in violence to those just mentioned, in proportion to the nearness of the cause, and the weakness of the subject. This is not only so in the hu- man species, but it is observable even in dogs ; they, under the apprehension of punishment, writhe their bodies, and yelp, and howl, as if they actually felt blows. From whence we may conclude, that pain and fear act upon the same parts of the body, and in the same man- ner, though somewhat different in degree: that pain and fear consist in an unnatural tension of the nerves ; that this is some- times accompanied with an un- natural strength, which some- times suddenly changes into an extraordinary weakness ; that the effects often come on alter- nately, and are sometimes mixed with each other. This is the nature of all convulsive agita- tions, especially in weaker sub- jects, which are the most liable to the severest impressions of pain and fear. The only difference between pain and terror is, that things which cause pain operate on the mind by the intervention of the body; whereas, things that cause terror, generally affect the bodily organs by the opera- ration of the mind suggesting the danger; but both agreeing, either primarily, or secondarily, in producing- a tension, contrac- tion, or violent emotion of the nerves, they agree likewise in every thing else. For it appears clearly from this example, as well as from many others, that when the body is disposed, by any PA1 PAR means whatsoever, to such emo- tions as it would acquire by the means of a certain passion, it will of itself excite something- very like that passion in the mind. To this purpose, Mr. Spon, in his Recherches d'Antiquite, gives us a curious story of the cele- brated Campanella,a physiogno- mist. This man, it seems, had not only made very accurate ob- servations on human faces, but was very expert in mimicking such as were any way remark- able. When he had a mind to penetrate into the inclinations of those he had to deal with, he composed his face, his gesture, and his whole body, as nearly as he could, into the exact simili- tude of the person he intended to examine ; and then carefully examined what turn of mind he seemed to acquire by this change. So that, says our au- thor, he was able to enter into the dispositions and thoughts of people as effectually as if he had been chang-ed into the very men. We may observe, that on mi- micking- the looks arid gestures of angry, or placid, or frighted, or daring men, our minds are in- voluntarily turned to that pas- sion whose appearance we t-n- deavour to imitate ; nay, it seems hard to avoid it, though one strove to separate the passion from its correspondent gestures. Our minds and bodies are so closely and intimately connected, that one is incapable of pain and pleasure without the other. Cam- panella, of whom we have been speaking, could so abstract his attention from any sufferings of his body, that,he was able to en- dure the rack itself without much pain : and in lesser pains, every body must have observed that when we can employ our attention on any thing else, the pain has been for some time suspended : on the other hand, if by any means the body is in- disposed to perform such ges- tures, or to be stimulated into such emotions as any passion usually produces in it, that pas- sion itself never can arise, though its cause should be ever so strong- ly in action ; though it should be merely mental, and imme- diately affecting none of the senses : As an opiate, or spiritu- ous liquors, shall suspend the operation of grief, or fear, or an- ger, in spite of all our efforts to the contrary : and this, by in- ducing in the body a disposition contrary to that which it receives from these passions. Burke. PARABLE AGAINST PERSECUTION. AND it came to pass after these things, that Abraham sat in the door of his tent, about the going- down of the sun. And behold a man bent with age, coming from the way of the wilderness leaning on his staff. And Abra- ham arose, and met him, and said unto him, Turn in, 1 pray thee, and wash thy feet, and tarry all night ; and them shalt arise early in the morning, and go on thy way. And the man said, Nay ; for I will abide under this tree. But Abraham pressed him greatly : so he turned, and they went into the tent : and Abra- ham baked unleavened bread, and they did eat. And when Abraham saw that the man blessed not God, he said unto him, Wherefore dostthon not worship PAR PAR the most high God, Creator of heaven and earth? And the man answered and said, 1 do not worship thy God, neither do 1 call upon his name ; for 1 have made to myself a god, which abideth always in my house, and provideth me with all things. And Abraham's zeal was kindled against the man ; and he arose, and fell upon him, and drove him forth with blows into the wilderness. And God called un- to Abraham, saying, Abraham, where is the stranger? And Abra- ham answered and said, Lord, he would not worship thee, neither would he call upon thy name ; therefore have I driven him out from before my face into the wil- derness. And God said, Have I borne with him these hundred and ninety and eight years, and nourished him, and clothed him, notwithstanding his rebellion a- gainst me ; and couldst not thou, who art thyself a sinner, bear with him one night? Franklin. PARDON OF CRIMINALS. Clemency is a virtue which belongs to the legislator, and not to the execu- tor of the laws ; a virtue which ought to shine in the code, and not in the private judgment. To show mankind, that crimes are sometimes pardoned, and that punishment is not the necessary consequence, is to nourish the flattering hope of impunity, and is the cause of their considering every punishment inflicted as an act of injustice and oppression. The prince in pardoning, gives up the public security in favour of an individual, and, by his ill- judged benevolence, proclaims a public act of impunity. Let then the executors of the laws be in- exorable ; but let the legislators be tender, indulgent, and hc- mane. He is a wise architect, who erects his edifice on the foundation of self-love, and con- trives that the interest of the public shall be the interest of each individual ; who is not obliged, by particular laws and irregular proceedings, to sepa- rate the public good from that of individuals, and erect the image of public felicity on the basis of fear and distrust ; but, like a wise philosopher, he will per- mit his brethren to enjoy, in quiet, that small portion of hap- piness which the immense system established by the first cause, permits them to taste on this earth. A small crime is sometimes pardoned, if the person offended, choose to forgive the offender. This may be an act of good-na- ture and humanity, but it is contrary to the -good of the public. For, although a private citizen may dispense with satis- faction for the injury he ha& re- ceived, he cannot remove the ne- cessity of example Beccaria. PARENTAL AFFECTION. It is the constant hourly attention that a mother gives to her child, an at- tention that commences on her part before it is born, and not any thing properly instinctive, that is the cause of the idea of it becoming associated with all- most every idea and affection of her soul, which is the source of maternal tenderness ; a kind [of tenderness that the father seldom feels any thing of till some months afterwards, when it is acquired by the same attention: hence it is that a sickly child ge- nerally gets the largest share of PAR PAR its parents' love. For the same reason also, nurses that are not mothers feel more of this tender- ness than the mothers who send their children out to nurse. The same familiar intercourse, that endears a child to a parent, does likewise endear the parent to the child ; and to expect these affections without such inter- course and attention, is the same thing- as expecting- the harvest without a previous se"Sd-time. This intercourse, and those en- dearments, which gradually sup- ply the associations that consti- tute parental affection, are me- chanical thing's, and cannot be acquired without the association of the proper ideas and sensations which only time and intercourse can supply. Priestly. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. A ffiO ther idolizes her son ; I love him, says she, for his own sake However, oae mig-ht reply, yo take no care of his education though you are in no doubt tha a good one would contribute in finitely to his happiness : why therefore, do not you consu some men of sense about him and read some of the book written on that subject? Wh\ because, says she, I think I kno as much of that matter as tho* authors and their works. B how did you g-et this confidenc in your own understanding-? it not the effect of your indiffe ence ? An ardent desire alwa inspires us with a salutary di trust of ourselves. If we have suit at law of considerable co sequence, we visit counsello and attorneys, we consult great number, and examine the advice. Are we attacked any of those lingering- diseases, which incessantly place around us the shades and horrors death we go to physicians, com- pare their opinions, read, me- dical books, and in some de- gree become physicians, our- selves, Such is the conduct of a man very much interested. With respect to the education of chil- dren, if you are not influenced in the same manner, it is because you do not love your son so well as yourself. But, adds the mother, What then should be the motive of my tenderness? Among- fathers and mothers, I reply, some are influenced by the desire of per- petuating- their name in their children ; they properly love only their names: others are fond of command, and see in their child- ren their slaves. The animal leaves its young- when their weakness no longer keeps them in de- pendence ; and paternal love becomes extinguished in almost all hearts, when children have by their age and station attained to independence. Then, said the poet Saadi, the father sees no- thing- in them but greedy heirs ; and this is the cause, adds some poet, of the extraordinary love of the grandfather for his grand- children ; he considers them as the enemies of his enemies. There are fathers and mothers- who make their children their plaything's and their pastime. The loss of this play-thing-would be insupportable to them ; but would their affliction prove that they loved the child for itself? Every body knows the story of M. de Lauzun ; when he was in the Bastille, without books, with- out employment, a prey to lassi- PAR PAR tude and the horrors of a prison ' he took it into his head to tame a spider. This was the only consolation he had left in his misfortune. The governor of the Bastille, from an inhumanity com- mon to men accustomed to see the unhappy, crushed the spider The prisoner felt the most cut- ting- grief ; and no mother coulc be affected by the death of ar, only son with a more violent sorrow. Now, whence is de- rived this conformity of senti- ments for such different objects ? It is because, in the loss of child, or in the loss of the spider, people frequently weep for no- thing- but for the lassitude and want of employment into which they fall. If mothers appear, in general, more afflicted at the death of a child, than fathers employed in business, or g-iven up to the pursuit of ambition, it is not because the mother loves her child more tenderly, but be- cause she suffers a loss more dif- ficult to be supplied. Errors in this respect, are very frequent ; people rarely cherish a child for its own sake. That parental affection, of which so many peo- ple make a parade, and by which they believe themselves so warmly affected, is most fre- quently nothing- more than an effect, either of a desire of perpetuating 1 their names, of the pride of command, or the fear of the wearisomeness of in- action. Helvelius. PARLIAMENT OF BRITAIN, THE INDEPENDENCY OF THE. Men are g-eneraily more honest in their private -than in their public capacity: and will go greater lengths' to serve a party, than when their own private in- terest is alone concerned. Ho- nour is a great check upon man- kind : But where a considerable body of men act together, this check is in a great measure re- moved : since a man is sure to be approved by his own party for what promotes the common in- terest ; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of ad- versaries. When there offers, therefore, to our censure and ex- amination, any plan of govern- ment, real or imaginary, where the power is distributed among several courts, and several or- ders of men, we should always consider the private interest of each court and each order ; and if we find that, by the skilful division of power, private in- terest must necessarily in its operation concur with public, we may pronounce that govern- ment to be wise and happy. If, on the contrary, the private in- terest of each order is not check- ed, and be not directed to public interest, we ought to look for nothing but faction, disorder, and tyranny, from such a govern- ment. The share of power al- lotted by the British constitution to the House of Commons is so great, that it absolutely com- mands all the other parts of the government. The king's legis- lative power is plainly no proper check to it. For though the King has a negative in framing laws ; yet this, in fact, is esteem- ed of so little moment, that whatever is voted by the two Houses, is always sure to be passed into a law, and the Royal assent is little better than a form. The principal weight of PAR PAR the Crown lies in the executive power. But besides that, the executive power in every go- vernment is altogether subordi- nate to the legislature; besides this, I say, the exercise of this power requires an immense ex- pence; and the Commons have assumed to themselves the sole power of granting- money. How easy, therefore, would it be for that House to wrest from the Crown all these powers, one after another, by making- every grant conditional, and choosing- their time so well, that their re- fusal of subsidies should only dis- tress the government, without giving- foreign powers any ad- vantage over us ? By what means is this member of the British constitution confined within the proper limits, since, from the very constitution, it must necessarily have as much power as it demands, and can only be confined by itself? How 7 is this consistent with our expe- rience of human nature? I answer, that the interest of the body is here restrained by the interest of individuals; and that the House of Commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members. The Crown has so many offices at its disposal, that, when assisted by the honest and disinterested part of the House, it will always command the reso- lution of the whole : so far, at least, as to preserve the ancient constitution from danger. We may, therefore, give to this in- fluence what name we please ; we may call it. by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but some degree and some kind of it are insepa- rable from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed go- vernment. All questions concerning the proper medium between ex- tremes are difficult to be decided ; both because it is not easy to find words to fix this medium, and because the good and ill, in such cases, run so gradually into each other, as even to render our senti- ments doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the present case, which would embarrass the most knowing and impartial examiner. The power of the Crown is always lodged in a single person, either king or minister; and as this person may have either a greater or less de- gree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity, or fortune, the power which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. By that influence of the Crown, which I would justify, 1 mean only that arising from the offices and honors which are at the disposal of the Crown. As to private bribery, it may be con- sidered in the same light as em- ploying spies ; which is scarcely justifiable in a good minister, and is infamous in a bad one : but to be a spy, or to be corrupted, is always infamous under all minis- ters, and is to be regarded as a shameless prostitution. Polybius justly esteems the pecuniary in- fluence of the senate and censors, to be one of the regular and con- stitutional weights which pre- served the balance of the Roman government. Hume. N THE SAME SUBJECT. It may PAS be questioned whether the pro- gress to absolute slavery and in- security would be more rapid, if the King- were nominally arbi- trary, or only virtually so, by uniformly influencing- the House of Commons. In some respects, so large a body of men would venture upon thing's which no single person would choose to do of his own authority ; and so long as they had little intercourse but with one another, they would not be much affected with the sense of fear or shame. One may safely say, that no single member of the House would have had the assurance to decide as the ma- jority have often done in cases of controverted elections. When- ever the House of Commons shall be so abandonedly corrupt, as to join with the Court in abolishing any of the essential forms of the constitution, or effectually defeat- ing the great purposes of it, let every Eng-lishman, before it is too late, re-peruse the history of hiscounlry, and do what English- men are renowned for having done formerly in the same cir- cumstances. W here civil liberty is entirely divested of its natural . guard, political liberty, 1 should not hesitate to prefer the govern- ment of one to that of a number ; because a sense of shame would have less influence upon them, and they would keep one an- other in countenance, in cases in which any single person would yield to the sense of the majority. Priestly. PASSIONS, THE ORIGIN OF We must distinguish the passions in- to two kinds ; those immediately given us by nature, and those we owe to the establishment of so- PAS ciely. And to know which of these passions has produced the other, let us transport ourselves hi idea to the first ages of the world ; and we shall there see that nature, by hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, informed man of his wants, and added a variety of pleasing and painful sensations; the former to the gratifications of these wants, the latter to the incapacity of gratifying them. There we shall behold man ca- pable of receiving the impres- sions of pleasure arid pain, and born as it were with a love for the one and hatred for the other. Such was man when he came from the hand of nature. In this state he had neither envy, pride, avarice, or ambition ; sensible only of the pleasure and pain derived from nature, he was ig- norant of all those artificial pains and pleasures we procure from the above passions. Such pas- sions then are not immediately given by nature ; but their exist- ence, which supposes that of society, also supposes fhat we have in us the latent seeds of those passions. If, therefore, we receive at our birth only wants, in those wants, and in our first desires, we must seek the origin of these artificial passions. Hel- vetius. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. They certainly do not attach clear ideas to the word passions, who regard them as detrimental. Our desires are our motives: and it is the force of our desires which determines that of our virtues and vices. A man without desire and without want, is without in- vention and without reason. No motive can engage him to com- PAS PAS bine or compare his ideas each other.- Tne more a man approaches to that state ' of apathy, the more stupid he be- comes. To attempt to destroy the passions of men, is to attempt to destroy their action. Does the theologian rail at the pas- sions ? He is the pendulum that mocks its spring-, and the effect that mistakes its cause. By annihilating the desires, you an- nihilate the mind; every man without passions, has within him no principle of action, nor mo- tive to act.- -Plelvetius. PASSIONS, DIFFERENT, RECIPRO- CALLY INSULT EACH OTHER. Let a woman, young 1 , beautiful, and full of g-allantry, such as his- tory has painted the celebrated Cleopatra, who by the multipli- city of her charms, the attracti- ons of her wit, the variety of her caresses, makes her lover daily taste all the delights that could be found in inconstancy, and in short, whose first enjoy- ment was, as Echard says, only the first favour ; let such a wo- man appear in an assembly of prudes, whose age and deformity secure their chastity ; they will there despise her charms and her talents : sheltered from seduc- tion by the Medusean shield of deformity, these prudes form no conception of the pleasure aris- ing- from the infatuation of a lover; and do not perceive the difficulty a beautiful woman finds fn resisting- the desire of making him the confidant of all her secret charms : they therefore fall with fury upon this lovely woman, and place her weakness among- crimes of the blackest die : but let one . of these prudes in her turn ap- pear in a circle of coquets, she will there be treate'd with as lit- tle respect as youth and beauty shew to old age and deformity. To be revenged on her prudery, they will tell her, that the fair who yields to love, and the dis- agreeable who resists that pas- sion, are both prompted by va- nity ; that in case of a lover, one seeks an admirer of her charms, and the other flies from him who proclaims her disgrace: and that both being animated by the same motive, there is no other differ- ence but that of beauty between the prude and the woman of gal- lantry. Helvelius. PASSIONS, THE, SOURCES OF ERROR. The passions lead us into er- ror, because they fix our atten- tion to that particular part of the object they present to us, not allowing us to view it on every side. A king passionately affects the title of conqueror; and ine- briated with the hopes of victo- ry, he forgets that fortune, is inconstant, and that the victor shares the load of misery almost equally with the vanquished, He does not perceive, that the welfare of his subjects is only a pretence for his martial frenzy, and that pride alone forges his arms, and displays his ensigns ; his whole attention is fixed on the pomp of the triumph. Fear, equally powerful with pride, will produce the same effect ; It will raise ghosts and phantoms, and disperse them among the tombs; and in the darkness of the woods, present them to the eyes of 'the atfrig'hted traveller ; seize on ail the faculties of the soul, without leaving any one at liberty to re- flect on the absurdity of the mo- VAT lives for such a ridiculous terror. The passions not only fix the attention on particular sides of the objects they present 'to us; but they also deceive us, by ex- hibiting the same objects when they do not really exist. It is common for us to see in things what we are desirous of finding- there. Illusion is the necessary effect of the passions; thestrength or force of which is generally measured by the degree of ob- scurity into which they lead us. There is no century which has not by some ridiculous affirmati- on or negation afforded matter of laughter to the following age. A past folly is seldom sufficient to shew mankind their present folly. The same passions, how- ever, which are the germ of an infinity of errors, are also the sources of our knowledge. If they mislead us, they at the same time impart to us the strength necessary for walking. It is they alone that can rouse us from that sluggishness and torpor al- ways ready to seize on the facul- ties of the soul. Helvetius. PATRIOTISM. Every particular so- ciety, when it is confined, and its members united, alienates itself from the general one of mankind. A true patriot is inhospitable to foreigners : they are mere men, and appear to have no re- lation to him. This inconveni- ence is inevitable, but it is not great. The most essential point is a man's being benificent and useful to those among whom he lives. The inhabitants of Spar- ta, when abroad, were ambitious, covetous, and unjust: but disin- terestedness, equity, and concord reigned within their walls. Be ever mistrustful of those cosmo- polites, who deduce from books the far-fetched and extensive ob- ligations of universal benevo- lence, while they neglect to dis- charge their actual duties to- wards those who are about them. A philosopher of this stamp af- fects to have a regard for tho Tartars, by way of excuse for his having none for his neigh- bours. Natural man is every thing with him ; he is a nume- rical unit, an absolute integer, that bears no relation but to himself or his species. Civilized man is only a relative unit, the numerator of a fraction, that de- pends on its denominator, and whose value consists in its rela- tion to the integral body of soci- ety. The best political institu- tions are those which are best calculated to divest mankind of their natural inclinations ; to deprive them of an absolute, by giving them a relative, exist- ence, end incorporating distinct individuals in one common whole. A citizen of Rome was neither Cains not Lucius; he was a Roman,- nay, he even loved his country, exclusive of its relation to himself. Regulus pretended himself a Carthaginian, as being become the property of his mas- ters. In that character he re- fused to take his seat in the Roman senate, till a Carthagi- nian commanded him. He was filled with indignation at the re- monstrances made to save his life ; and returned triumphant to perish in the midst of tortures. This appears to me, indeed, to have little relation to men with whom we are at present ac- quainted. The Lacedemonian, PEA PHI Pedaretes, who presented him- self for admission into the coun- cil of three hundred, was reject- ed, returned home rejoicing- that there were to be found in Sparta three hundred men better than himself. Supposing- the demon- strations of his joy sincere, as there is room to believe they were, this man was a true citi- zen. A. woman of Sparta, hav- ing- five sons in the army, and being 1 hourly in expectation of hearing- of a battle, a messeng-er at length arrived ; of whom she, trembling-, asked the news. Your five sons, says he, are killed. Vile slave, who asked you of my sons? But we have gained the victory continued he. This was enoug-h ; the heroic mother ran to the temple, and gave thanks to the gods. This woman was a true citi- zen. Those who would have uian, in the bosom of a society, retain the primitive sentiments of nature, know not what they want. Ever contradicting- him- self, and wavering between his duty and inclination, he would neither be the man nor the citi- zen ; he would be good for nothing either to himself or to others. Rousseau. PEASANTS AND SAVAGES. There are two kinds of 'men, who live in a continual exercise of body, and never think of the cultiva- tion of the mind : These are Pea- sants and Savages. The former nevertheless are clownish, bru- tal, and dull ; while the tatter are as remarkable for their strong sense as for their subtlety. Ge- nerally speaking, nothing is so stupid as a clown, nor so cun- ning as a savage. Whence comes this difference ? Doubtless it arises hence : the former being- accustomed to do what he is bid, or what his father used to do- before him, plods on in the same beaten track ; and being little better than a mere machine, constantly employed in the same manner, habit and obedience stand with him in the place of reason. As to the savage, the case is widely different ; being attached to no one place, having- no settled task, obedient to none, and restrained by no other law than his own will, he is obliged to reason on every ac- tion of his life : he makes not a motion nor takes a step without having previously considered the consequences. Thus, the more his body is exercised, the more is his mind enlightened ; his mental and corporeal faculties advance together, and recipro- cally improve each other. Rousseau. PHILOSOPHERS, CHRISTIANITY RE- JECTED BY THE ANCIENT. It is incumbent on us diligently to remember, that the kingdom of heaven was promised to the poor in spirit, and that minds afflicted by calamity and the con- tempt of mankind, cheerfully listen to the divine promise of future happiness ; while, on the contrary, the fortunate are satis- fied with the possession of this world : and the wise abuse, in doubt and dispute, their vain su- periority of reason and know- ledge. We stand in need of such, re- flections to comfort us for the loss of some illustrious characters, which, in our eyes, might have seemed the most worthy of the PHI PHI heavenly present. The names of Seneca, of the elder and younger Pliny, of Tacitus, of Plutarch, of Galen, of the stoic Epictetus, and of the emperor Marcus Antoninus, adorn the age in which they flourished, and exalt the dignity of human nature. They filled with glory their respective stations, either in active or contemplative life ; their excellent understandings were improved by study: philo- sophy had purified their minds from the prejudices of the popu- lar superstition ; and their days -were spent in the pursuit of truth, and in the practice of vir- tue. Yet all these sages over- looked or rejected the perfection of the Christian system. Their language or their silence equal- ly discover their contempt for the growing sect, which, in their time, had diffused itself over the Roman empire. Those of them who condescend to men- tion the Christians, consider them only as obstinate and per- verse enthusiasts,who exacted an implicit submission to their mys- terious doctrines, without being able to produce a single argu- ment that could engage the at- tention of men of sense and learning. It is at least doubtful whether any of these philosophers pe- rused the apologies which the primitive Christians repeatedly published in behalf of themselves and their religion : but it is much to be lamented that such a cause was not defended by abler advocates. They expose, .with superfluous wit and elo- quence, the extravagance of po- ly theism. They interest our com- passion' by displaying the inno- cence and sufferings of their in- jured brethren: but when they would demonstrate the divine origin of Christianity, they in- sist much more strongly on the predictions which announced, than on the miracles which ac- companied the appearance of the Messiah. Their favourite argu- ment might serve to edify a Christian, or to convert a Jew, since both the one and the other acknowledge the authority of those prophecies, and both are obliged, with devout reverence, to search for their sense and their accomplishment. But this mode of persuasion loses much of its weight and influence, when it is addressed to those who nei- ther understand nor respect the Mosaic dispensation, and the prophetic style. In the unskilful hands of Justin, and the succeed- ing apologists, the sublime meaning of the Hebrew oracles evaporates in distant types, af- fected conceits, and cold allego- ries ; and even their authenticity was rendered suspicious to an un- enlightened Gentile, by the mix- ture of pious forgeries, which, under the names of Orpheus, Hermes, and the Sibyls, were obtruded on him as of equal value with what were looked upon as the genuine inspirations of heaven. But how shall we excuse the supine inattention of the Pagan and philosophic world to those evidences which were presented by the hand of omnipotence, not to their reason, but to their senses ? During the age of Christ, of his apostles, and of their first disciples, the doc- PHI PHI trine winch they preached was confirmed by innumerable pro- digies. The lame walked, the blind saw, the sick were healed, the dead were raised, dsemons were expelled, and the laws of nature were, or appeared to be frequently suspended, for the benefit of the church. But the sages of Greece and Rome turned aside from the awful spectacle, and pursuing- the ordinary occu- pations of life and study, appear- ed unconscious of any alterations in the moral or physical govern- ment of the world. In the reign of Tiberius, we are told that the whole earth, or, at least, a cele- brated province of the Roman empire, was involved in a preter- natural darkness of three hours. Even this miraculous event which ought to have excited the won- der, the curiosity, and the devo- tion of mankind, passed without notice in an age of science arid history. It happened during the life-time of Seneca, and the elder Pliny, who must have experienc- ed the immediate effects, or re- ceived the earliest intelligence of the prodigy. Each of these phi- losophers, in a laborious work, has recorded all the great phe- ncemena of nature, earthquakes, meteors, comets, arid eclipses, which his indefatigable curiosity could collect. Both the one and the other have omitted to men- tion the greatest phenomen9n to which the mortal eye has been witness since the creation of the globe. A distinct chapter of Pliny is designed for eclipses of an extraordinary nature and un- usual duration ; but he contents himself with describing 1 the sin- gular defect of light which fol- lowed the murder of Caesar, when during the greatest part of the year, the orb of the sun ap- peared pale and without splen- dour. This season of obscurity, which cannot surely be com- pared with the preternatural darkness of the passion, had been already celebrated by most of ti,e poets and historians of that me- morable age ; who, however wonderful it may seem, make no mention of Christ, or of his mira- cles, although they appeared in a province of the Roman empire. Gibbon. PHILOSOPHY. The surest sign whereby to judge of any philo- sophy, is by its fruits or useful- ness in supplying the necessities of mankind, and improving- the practical arts whereon the ac- commodations of life principally depend. We are not, therefore, to form a judgment of any phi- losophy from its show and ap- pearance, the greatness of its authors, the antiquity of its ori- gin, the multitude of its ad- mirers, the reputation it has gained among- learned men, nor even from general consent itself; but principally from its use, or the tendency it has to improve the mind, enlarge the human powers, and give us a command over nature. The cultivation of natural philosophy is the founda- tion of all philosophical know- ledge, or the true matter where- of science should be formed. Bacon. PHILOSOPHY, ANCIENT GREEK. The ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three 'great branches; Physics, or natural philosophy ; Ethics, or moral philosophy; and Logic. This PHI PHI general division seems perfectly agreeable to the nature of things. The great phenomena of na- ture, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, eclipses, com- ets, thunder, lightning-, and other extraordinary meteors ; the generation, the life, growth, and dissolution of plants and animals ; are objects which, as they necessarily excite the won- der, so they naturally call forth the curiosity of mankind to inquire into their causes. Superstition first attempted to satisfy this curiosity, by referring all those wonderful appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. Philosophy afterwards endea- voured to account for them from more familiar causes, or from such as mankind were better ac- quainted with, than the agency of the gods. As those great phe- nomena are the first objects of human curiosity ; so the science which pretends to explain them must naturally have been the first branch of philosophy that was cultivated. The lirtt philosophers, accordingly, ot whom history has preserved any account, appear to have been natural philosophers. In every age and country of the world men must have at- tended to the characters, designs and actions of one another ; and many reputable rules and max- imsj for the conduct of human life, must have been laid down and approved of by common consent. As soon as writing came into fashion, wise men, or those who fancied themselves such, would naturally endeavour to increase the number of those established and respected max- ims, and to express their own sense of what was either proper or improper conduct ; sometimes in the more artificial form of apo- logues, like what are called the fables of /Esop ; and sometimes in the more simple one of apoph- thegms, or wise sayings, like the Proverbs of Solomon, the verses of Theognis and Phocyllides, and some part of the works of Hesiod. They might continue in this manner for a long time, merely to multiply the number of those maxims of prudence and morality, without even attempt- ing to arrange them in any very distinct or methodical order, much less to connect them toge- ther by one or more general principles, from which they were all deducible, like effects from their natural causes. The beau- ty of a systematical arrangement of different observations con- nected by a few common prin- ciples, was first seen in the rude essays of those ancient times to- wards a system of natural philo- sophy. Something of the same kind was afterwards attempted in morals. The maxims of com- mon life were arranged in some methodical order, and con- nected together by a few com- mon principles in the same manner as they had attempted to arrange and connect the phe- nomena of nature. The science which pretends to investigate and explain those connecting principles, is what is properly called Moral Philosophy. Different authors gave differ- ent systems both of natural and moral philosophy. But the arguments by which they sup- ported those different systems PHI PHI far from being always demon- strations, we re frequently at best but very slender probabilities, and sometimes mere sophisms, which had no other foundation but the inaccuracy and ambiguity of common language. Specula- tive systems have in all ages of the world been adopted, for rea- sons too frivolous to have deter- mined the judgment of any man of common sense in a matter of the smallest pecuniary interest. Gross sophistry has scarce ever had any influence upon the opin- ions of mankind, except in mat- ters of philosophy and specula- tion ; and in these it has fre- quently had the greatest. The patrons of each system of na- tural and moral philosophy naturally endeavour to expose the weakness of the argu- ments adduced to support the systems which were opposite to their own. In examining those arguments, they were ne- cessarily led to consider the dif- ference between a probable and a demonstrative argument, be- tween a fallacious and a con- clusive one ; and logic, or the sci- ence of the general principles ol good and bad reasoning, neces- sarily arose out of the observations which a scrutiny of this kind gave occasion to. Though in its origin posterior both to physics and to ethics, it was commonly taught, not indeed in all, but in the greater part of the ancien schools of philosophy, previously to either of those sciences. The student, it seems to have been thought, ought to understanc well the difference between gooc and bad reasoning, before he was led to reason upon subject of so great importance. A. Smith. PHILOSOPHY, MODERN. In the ancient philosophy, whatever was taught concerning the na- ture either of the human mind or of the Deity, made a part of the system of physics. Those beings, in whatever their essence might be supposed to consist, were parts of the great system of the universe, and parts, too, pro- ductive of the most important effects. Whatever human reason could either conclude or conjec- ture concerning them, made, as it were, two chapters, though no doubt two very important ones, of the science which pretended to give an account of the origin and revolutions of the great sys- tem of the universe. But in the universities of Europe, where philosophy was taught only as subservient to theology, it was natural to dwell longer upon these two chapters than upon any other of the science. They were gradually more and more extended, and were divided into many inferior chapters ; till at last the doctrine of spirits, of which so little can be known, came to take up as much room in the system of philosophy, as the doctrine of bodies, of which so much can be known. The doctrines concerning those two subjects were considered as mak- ing two distinct sciences. What are called metaphysics or pneu- matics were set in opposition to physics, and were cultivated not only as the more sublime, but for the purposes of a particular pro- fession, as the more useful science of the two. The proper subject of experiment and observation, a PHI PHI subject in which a careful atten- tion is capable of making- so many useful discoveries, was almost entirely neglected. The subject in which, after a few very simple and almost obvious truths, the most careful attention can discover nothing- but obscu- rity and uncertainty, and can consequently produce nothing- but subtleties and sophisms, was greatly cultivated. When those two sciences had thus been set in opposition to one another, the comparison between them naturally g-ave birth to a third, to what was called Onto- logy, or the science which treat- ed of the qualities and attributes which were common to both the subjects of the other two sciences. But if subtleties and sophisms composed the greater part of the metaphysics or pneu- matics of the schools, they com- posed the whole of this cobweb science of ontology ; which was likewise sometimes called meta- physics. Wherein consisted the happi- ness and perfection of a man, considered not only as an indivi- dual, but as the member of a family, of a state, and of the great society of mankind, was the object which the ancient moral philosophy proposed to investi- gate. In that philosophy the duties of human life were treated of as subservient to the happiness and perfection of hu- man life. But when moral, as well as natural philosophy, came to be taught only as subservient to theology, the duties of human life were treated of as chiefly subservient to the happiness of a life to come. In the ancient philosophy, the perfection of Vir- tue was represented as necessa- rily productive, to the person who possessed it, of the most perfect happiness in this life.'' In the modern philosophy, it was frequently represented as gene- rally, or rather as almost always, inconsistent with any degree of happiness in this life; and hea- ven was to be earned only by penance and mortification, by the austerities and abasement of a monk ; not by the liberal, ge- nerous, and spirited conduct of a man. Casuistry and an ascetic morality made up, in most cases, the greater part of the moral philosophy of the schools. By far the most important of all the different branches of philosophy, became in this manner by far the most corrupted. Such, therefore, was the com- mon course of philosophical edu- cation in the greater part of the universities in Europe. Log-ic was taught first: Ontology came in the second place: Pneu- matology, comprehending- the doctrine concerning- the nature of the human soul and of the Deity, in the third : In the fourth followed a debased system of moral philosophy, which was considered as immediately con- nected with the doctrines of pneumatology, with the immor- tality of the human soul, and with the rewards and punish- ments v.-hich, from the justice of the Deity, were to be expected in a life to come : A short and superficial system of physics usually concluded the course. The alterations which the uni- versities of Europe thus intro- duced into the ancient course of PHI PHI philosophy, were all meant for the education of ecclesiastics, and to render it a more proper intro- duction to the study of theology. But the additional quantity of subtlety and sophistry, the ca- suistry and the ascetic morality which those alterations intro- duced into it, certainly did not render it more proper for the education of gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely ei- ther to improve the understand- ing-, or to mend the heart. This course of philosophy is what still continues to be taught in the greater part of the uni- versities of Europe ; with more or less diligence, according as the constitution of each particu- lar university happens to render . diligence more or less necessary to the teachers. In some of the richest and best endowed uni- versities, the tutors content themselves with teaching a few unconnected shreds and parcels of this corrupted course ; and even these they commonly teach very negligently and superfici- ally. The improvements which, in modern times, have been made in several different branches of philosophy, have not, the greater part of them, been made in uni- versities; though some no doubt have. The greater part of uni- versities have not even been very forward to adopt those improve- ments after they were made ; and several of those learned so- cieties have chosen, to remain for a long time the sanctuaries in which exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection, after they had been hunted out of every other corner in the world. In general, the richest and best endowed universities have been the slow- est in adopting those improve- ments, and the most averse to permit any considerable change in the established plan of edu- cation. Those improvements were more easily introduced into some of the poorer universities, in which the teachers, depending upon their reputation for the greater part of their subsistence, were obliged to pay more at- tention to the current opinions of the world. But though the public schools and universities of Europe were originally intended only for the education of a particular profes- sion, that of churchmen, and though they were not always very diligent in instructing their pupils even in the sciences which were supposed necessary for that profession ; yet they gradually drew to themselves the education of almost all other people, particularly of almost all gentlemen and men of fortune. No better method, it seems, could be fallen upon of spend- ing, with any advantage, the long interval between infancy and that period of life at which men begin to apply in good earnest to the real business of the world, the business which is to employ them during the re- mainder of their days. The greater part of what is taught hi schools and universities, how- ever, does not seem to be the most proper preparation for that business. In England, it becomes every day more and more the custom to send young people to travel in PHI PHY foreign countries- immediately upon their leaving school, and without sending them to any university. Our young people, it is said, generally return home much improved by their travels. A young man who goes abroad at seventeen or eighteen, and returns home at one and twenty, returns three or four years older than he was when he went abroad ; and at that age it is very difficult not to improve a good deal in three or four years. In the course of his travels, he ge- nerally acquires some knowledge of one or two foreign languages ; a knowledge, however, which is seldom sufficient to enable him either to speak or write them with propriety. In other res- pects he commonly returns home more conceited, more unprin- cipled, more dissipated, and more incapable of any serious appli- cation either to study or to bu- siness, than he could well have become in so short a time had he lived at home. By travelling so very young, by spending in the most frivolous dissipation the most precious years of his life, at a distance from the inspection and controul of his parents and relations, every useful habit, which the earlier parts of bis education might have had some tendency to form in him, instead of being rivetted and confirmed, is almost necessarily either weak- ened or defaced. Nothing but the discredit into which the uni- versities are allowing themselves to fall, could ever have brought into repute so very absurd a practice as that of travelling at this early period of life. By sending his son abroad, a father delivers himself, at least for some time, from so disagreeable an object as that of a son unem- ployed, neglected, and going to ruin before his eyes. Such have been the effects of some of the modern institutions for education. A. Smith. PHYSIOGNOMY. The physiogno- my, or countenance, is formed by a simple display of the traces already sketched out by nature : but besides this natural display of the features, they are insensi- bly fashioned into physiognomy by the frequent impression of certain affections of the mind. That these affections are im- pressed on the visage, is beyond doubt ; and that such impres- sions, by frequent repetition, must necessarily become durable. Hence it is that a man's charac- ter may frequently be discovered in his face, without having re- course to mysterious explica- tions, which suppose a know- ledge we are not endowed with. In the countenance of a child there are only two affec- tions which are strongly impress- ed, t. e,-joy and grief: he laughs or he cries : the intermediate affec- tions are nothing. He passes incessantly from one emotion to another; and this continual change prevents any permanent impression which might form a physiognomy: but at an age when, becoming more sensible, he is more powerfully and fre- quently affected, the impressions are too deep to be easily effaced ; and from the habitual state of the mind results a certain ar- rangement of features, which in time becomes unalterable. Ne- vertheless, the physiognomy does PLE POL sometimes change at different ag'es: but whenever this hap- pens, it may be remarked, that there is a change also of the habitual passions. Rousseau. PLEASURE, THE LOVE OF, AND THE LOVE OF ACTION, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN NATURE. There are two natural propensities, which we may distinguish in the most virtuous and liberal dispositions, the love of pleasure and the love of action. Jf the former is refi- ned by art and learning, impro- ved by the charms of social inter- course, and corrected by a just regard to ceconomy, to health, and to reputation, it is produc- tive of the greatest part of the happiness of private life. The love of action is a principle of a much stronger and more doubt- ful nature. It often leads to anger, to ambition, and to re- venge ; but when it is guided by .the sense of propriety and bene- volence, it becomes the parent of every virtue ; and if those vir- tues are accompanied with equal abilities, a family, a state , or an empire, may be indebted for their safety and prosperity to the undaunted courage of a sin- gle man. To the love of plea- sure we may therefore ascribe most of the agreeable, to the love of action, we may attribute most of tho useful and respect- able qualifications. The charac- ter in which both the one and the other should be united and harmo- nized, would seem to constitute the most perfect idea of human nature. The insensible and in- active disposition, which should be supposed alike destitute o! both, would be rejected by the common consent of mankind, a* utterly incapable of procuring any happiness to the individual, or any public benefit to the world. Gibbon. POLYTHEISM. The belief of a plurality of gods is one of the great errors with which the moderns reproach the Greeks and Romans. There seems to be no reason to infer that they had more than one Supreme God. We may read in a thousand dif- ferent parts of their writing's, that Zeus Jupiter is the master of gods and men. Joiis omnia plena. And the Apostle Paul himself gives the same testimony with regard to the ancients: " In God we live, move, and have our being, as one of your poets expresses it." After this testimony, shall we presume to accuse our masters of not ac- knowledging a Supreme God ? We are not here to examine, whether there was in former limes a Jupiter, king of Crete; whether he was made a god ; or whether the Egyptians had twelve great gods, or eight ; or whether the Jupiter of the Latins was one of this number? The present object of inquiry is only to know, whether the Greeks or Romans acknowledged a Divine Being, supreme over the rest of heavenly beings ? This they are for ever repeating, and therefore we cannot but believe them. Let us only look into the admirable epistle of the philosopher Maxi- mus of Medavra to St. Augus- tin. " There is one God" (says he) " without beginning, the " common parent of all things, " who has never begotten any " one like himself. Who is the " man so brutish or stupid, as to POL POL " entertain a doubt thereof?" Thus does this Heathen, who wrote in the fourth century, de- clare the sentiments of all an- tiquity. If I was to draw the veil ol the Egyptian mysteries, I should there find the Knefby whom all things were produced, and \vho presides over all the other deities ; I should find Methra among- the Persians; Brama, among the Indians; and it is more than probable, that I should be able to demonstrate, that every well governed nation ac- knowledged a Supreme Being, who had other inferior gods subordinate to him. The Chinese have never acknowledged any more than one sole God for up- wards of 4000 years. The Greeks and Romans admitted numberless superstitions. There is no doubt of it. Every one knows they adopted the most ridiculous fa- bles ; and to this I add, that they themselves laughed at them. The basis of their my tho logy, however, was founded in reason. 1 In the first place, allowing that the Greeks gave their heroes a place in heaven as a reward for their virtues ; this was a most prudent and useful act of reli- gion. What nobler incentive could have been proposed ? The number of saints to whom the Catholics have raised temples and altars, infinitely exceed those of the Greek and Roman demigods and heroes. But their deified heroes, though they were admitted into the court, or par- took of the favours of Zeus, the Demiurgos, the Eternal Lord, they did not share his throne or power. The second subject of reproach we have against them, is for ad- mitting such a number of Gods into the government of the world. Neptune presides over the sea; Juno over the air ; Eo- lus over the winds ; Pluto, or Vecta, over the earth ; Mars over the field of battle. " Let us re- ject these genealogies, and con- demn all their adventures, which never made any part of the basis of the Greek or Roman religion. But there seems no degree of folly in adopting beings of the second order, to whom some de- gree of power is given over us mortals. Do not we assign par- ticular functions to several an- gels ? There was a destroying angel who fought for the Jews: there was the angel of travel- lers, who served as a guide to Tobias. Michael was the tute- lary angel of the Hebrew peo- ple. We are told in Daniel, that he fought with the angel of the Persians, and disputed with the angel of the Greeks. In the prophet Zachariah, we read of an angel of an inferior order, who gives an account to Michael of the state in which he found thing! upon earth. Every nation has its particular angel. The Septuagint version tells us in Deuteronomy, that the Lord divided the nations according to the number of the angels. The Apostle Paul in the Acts ad- dresses himself to the angel of Macedonia. These celestial spi- rits are often called by the name of gods, Eloim, in scripture ; and the word that answers to Deus, POL POL God, of all nations, does not con- stantly signify the Supreme Mas- ter of heaven and earth, but fre- quently a heavenly being, a being superior to man, though dependent on the Sovereign Lord of nature. We may from hence conclude, that the ridicule or error does not lie in polytheism itself, but in the abuse made of that belief in the vulgar fables, and in the multitude of ridiculous deities which every one set up after his own fancy, which served as the amusements of the old women and children of Rome, and proves that the word Deus had very different acceptations. It is cer- tain, Deus Crepitus, did not cause the same idea, as Deus Divan, and Hominum Pater the father of gods and men. The Roman pontiffs never gave a place in their temples to those little puppets, with which the good women used to fill their chambers and closets. The re- ligion of the Romans was in the main extremely grave and rigid. Oaths were held inviolable. They could not begin a war till the college of the Feciales had declared it just. A vestal, that was convicted of having broke her vow of virginity, was con- 'demned to die. All which be- speaks a people rather rigid than ridiculous in their morals. It may be asked, how a senate who imposed chains and laws upon whole nations, could suffer so many extravagances, and countenance such a heap of ab- surd fables among their pontiffs ? It may be answered, wise men in all nations have made use of fools. They willingly left the people in possession of their fa- vourite feasts, the Lupercalia and Saturnalia, as long as they con- tinued obedient to authority. The holy chickens which fore- told victory to their armies, were exempted from the spit and the pot. Never let us be surprised, that the wisest governments have permitted the most ridicu- lous customs, or improbable fa- bles. These customs, these fa- bles, existed before those go- vernments were formed ; and we do not pull down an extensive and irregular city, merely for the sake of building it again by rule and compass. But how happens it, some may say, that on the one hand we perceive so much philosophy and science, and on the other so much fanaticism ? It is because sci- ence and philosophy came to the world a little before Cicero, and fanaticism had already been in being for many ages. Policy then. said to Folly and Fanaticism, let us all live together as comfort- ably as we can. The ancients taught and were instructed to look upon utility, and not truth, as the end of the national religion. Their max- ims with regard to the public worship, were, Quce omnia sapi- ens scrvabit tanquam legibvs jussa, non tanquam diis gratia. Voltaire. POLYTHEISM, THE CAUSE OF THE LONG DURATION OF. The Pa- gan religion, despised by its own ministers, inveighed against by the philosophers, and neglected, the most frequently, by the peo- ple, was equally incapable of POL POL striking a deep root, and of form- ing 1 a code of doctrines difficult to be overthrown. The credit which it maintained during- a length of time is, not- withstanding, unquestionable. To account, therefore, for all this, we must have recourse to some more distant cause ; for it is not sufficient to demonstrate with Mr. Hume, that polytheism is the first religion which must have offered itself to an untutor- ed set of men ; it is not even sufficient to have discovered that this religion was mild, and that its modes of worship were agree- able and ingenious : on the one hand, it may be answered, that it existed during the most po- lished ages ; and, on the other hand, that the pain and cruelty attending its practices, have been already proved. We mustthere> fore lead our observations still further ; and we shall then dis- cover in the system of politics, the true reason of the long du- ration of polytheism. Would we, in general, comprehend some circumstance from antiquity, we must not lose sight of two important facts ; namely, that Asia hath been the cradle, as it were, of the sciences; and Greece, the cradle of poetry. From this single consequence a thousand considerations will na- turally flow. The poets, the first amongst the Greeks who enjoyed the knowledge of any thing, have arranged, as well as they possibly could, all the ma- terials which they were able to collect, from the sentiments of the Phenicians and Egyptians, relative to the origin of the world, and the generation of gods: but these poets forged many new fables, which they mixed with the ancient fables, and particularly laboured at at- tempts to circulate delusive ac- counts concerning the origin of the Greeks ; an origin for which they blushed to have been in- debted to merchants, or a people of slaves. Amidst these poets, Homer quickly obtained the first rank. He composed so many tales, and spoke of such a multi- tude of things, that his books, in this respect, like the Koran, were of themselves sufficient to found a religion. And yet the oracle of Delphos, another poet, Ly- curgus, who made metrical laws, pretending indeed that they were dictated by Apollo, but which he had stolen from the Cretans, Hesiod, and many others, began to form, from a very small number of acquired intelligences, and from a very great number of ingenious con- jectures, a monstrous and gigan- tic scaffolding of materials. From all these poems, and all these oracles, arose a particular language, styled Muthos in op- position to Logos, which was the language of reason, and which did not prevail until some time afterwards. But the Muthos main- tained its ground during whole ages ; and as the poets had con- tinually treated of the most in- teresting subjects, such as the origin of republics, the principles of legislation, the rights of ma- gistracy, the limits of states, &c. poetry, or fable, or, if it be a more proper expression, religion, became, as it were, the general repository of archives, and the titles of the nobility of republics. POL POL from thence sprang the obliga- tion which united polity with re- ligion, and the necessity which preserved tenets and cere- monies.-^ Chatellur. POLYTHEISM, THE PRIMARY RELI- GION OF MANKIND. --It is a matter of fact incontestable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind were idolators. The doubtful and sceptical principles of a few phi- losophers, or the theism, and that, too, not entirely pure, of one or two nations, form no ob- jection worth regarding. Be- hold, then, the clear testimony of history. The further we mount up into antiquity, the more do we find mankind plung- ed into idolatry. The most an- cient records of the human race still present us with polytheism as the popular and established system. Shall we assert, that, in more ancient times, before the knowledge of letters, or the dis- covery of any art or science, men entertained the principles of pure theism? That is, while they were ignorant and barbarous, they discovered truth ; but fell into error as soon as they acquir- ed learning and politeness. This assertion contradicts probability and experience. The savage tribes of America, Africa, and Asia, are all idolators. Not a single exception to this rule. It seems certain, that ac- cording to the natural progress of human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some groveling and familiar no- tion of superior powers, before they stretch their conception to that perfect Being, who best6"w- ed order on the whole frame o nature. We may as reasonabl imagine, that men inhabited pa- laces before huts and cottages, or studied geometry before agri- culture, as assert, that the Deity appeared to them a pure spirit, omniscient, omnipresent, omni- potent, before he was appre- hended to be a powerful, though limited, being, with human pas- sions and appetites, limbs and organs. The mind rises gradu- ally from inferior to superior: By abstracting from what is im- perfect, it forms an idea of per- fection : And slowly distinguish- ing the nobler parts of its frame from the grosser, it learns to transfer only the former, much elevated and refined, to its divi- nity. Nothing could disturb this natural progress of thought, but some obvious and invincible ar- gument, which might immedi- ately lead the mind into the pure principles of theism, and make it overleap at one bound the vast interval which is interposed be- tween the human and the divine nature. But though the order and frame of the universe, when accurately examined, affords such an argument ; yet this con- sideration could never have any influence on mankind when they formed their first rude notions of religion. The causes of such objects as are quite familiar to us, never strike our attention or curiosity ; and however extraor- dinary or surprising these objects in themselves, they are passed over by the raw and ignorant multitude without much exami- nation or inquiry. Adam rising at once in paradise, and in the full perfection of his faculties, would naturally, as represented by Milton, be astonished at the POL POL glorious appearances of nature, the heavens, the air, the earth, his own organs and members ; and would be led to ask, "Whence this wonderful scene arose ? But a barbarous, neces- sitous animal (such as man is on the first origin of society) pressed by such numerous wants and passions, has no leisure to admire the regular face of nature, or make inquiries concerning the cause of objects, to which, from his infancy, he has been gradu- ally accustomed. On the con- trary, the more regular and uni- form, that is, the more perfect nature appears, the more he is familiarized to it, and the less in- clined to scrutinize and examine it. A monstrous birth excites his curiosity .and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty ; and immediately sets him a trem- bling, and sacrificing, and pYay- ing. But an animal, complete in all its limbs and organs, is to him an ordinary spectacle, and produces no religious affection or opinion. Ask him from whence that animal arose ? he will tell you, From the copulation of its,parents. And these, whence ? from the copulation of theirs. A few removes satisfy his curiosity, and set the objects at such a dis- tance that he entirely loses sight of them. If men were at first led into the belief of one Supreme Being, by reasoning from the frame of nature, they could never possi- bly leave that belief in order to embrace idolatry ; but the same principles of reason, which at first produced and diffused over mankind so magnificent an opin- ion, must be able, with great facility, to preserve it. The first invention, or proof of any doctrine, is much more difficult * than the supporting and retain- ing it. There is a great difference between historical facts and spe- culative opinions ; nor is the knowledge of the one propagated in the same manner with that of the other. An historical fact, while it passes by oral tradition from eye-witnesses and contem- poraries, is ~ disguised in every successive narration, and may at last retain but very small, if any, resemblance of the original truth on which it was founded. The frail memories of men, their love of exaggeration, their su- pine carelessness ; these princi- ples, if not corrected by books and writing, soon pervert the account of historical events, where argument or reasoning have little or no place, nor can ever recal the truth which has once escaped those narrations. It is thus the fables of Hercules, Theseus, Bacchus, are supposed to have been originally founded in true history, corrupted by tra- dition. But with regard to spe- culative opinions, the case is far otherwise. If -these opinions be founded in arguments so clear and obvious as to carry convic- tion with the generality of man- kind, the same arguments which at first diffused the opinions will still preserve them in their ori- ginal purity. If the arguments be more abstruse, and more re- mote from vulgar apprehension, the opinions will always be confined to a few persons ; and as soon as men leave the con- templation of the arguments, the POL opinions will immediately be lost, and be buried in oblivion. Which ever side of the dilemma we take, it must appear impossi- ble, that Theism could, from rea- soning*, have been the primary religion of the human race, and have afterwards by its corrup- tions, given birth to idolatry, and to all the various superstitions of the heathen world. Reason, when obvious, prevents these corruptions. When abstruse, it keeps the principles entirely from the knowledge of the vul- gar, who are alone liable to corrupt any principles or opi- nions. Hume. POLYTHEISM , NOT THE PRIMARY RELIGION OF MANKIND. David Hume, in his natural history of religion, produces strong reasons to prove that the first religion was Polytheism; and that be- fore improved reason came to see there could only be one Su- preme Being, men began with believing several gods. It may, however, on the con- trary, be presumed, that they began with worshipping only one god, and that afterwards human weakness adopted se- veral others. It is not to be doubted but villages and country towns were prior to large cities ; and that men were divided into small republics before they were united into large empires. It is very natural that a town, terri- fied at the thunder, distressed by the rain of its harvest, in- sulted by a neighbouring town, daily feeling its weakness, and every where perceiving an in visi- ble power, soon came to say, there is some being above us which does us good and hurt. It seems POL impossible that they should have said, there are two powers; For wherefore several? In every thing we begin with the simple, and then proceed to the com- pound ; and often an improve- ment of knowledge brings us back again to the simple : this is the process of the humai> mind. Which being was first wor- shipped ? Was it the sun '{ Was it the moon? It is hardly credible. Only let us take a view of children, they are pretty nearly on a footing with igno- rant men. The beauty and benefit of that luminous body, which animates nature, make no impression on them ; as in- sensible are they of the conve- niences we derive from the moon, or of the regular varia- tions of its course; they do not so much as think of these things ; they are accustomed to them. What men do not fear, they never worship. Children look up to the sky with as much in- difference as on the ground ; but at a tempest the poor crea- tures tremble, and run and hide themselves. I am inclined to think it was so with the primi- tive men. They who first ob- served the course of the hea- venly bodies, and brought them to be objects of admiration and worship, must necessarily have had a tincture of philosophy : the error was too exalted for rude illiterate husbandmen. Thus the cry of^a village would have been no more than this : There is a power which thunders, which sends down hail on us, which, causes our children to die; let us by all POL POL means appease it: But which way? Why, we see that little presents will soothe angry peo- ple y let us try what little pre- sents wiJl do with this power. He must also, to be sure, have a name or title ; and that which naturally presents itself first is, chief, master, lord : Thus is this power called My Lord. Hence it probably was that the first Egyptian* called their god, Knef ; the Syrians, Adoni ; the neighbouring- nations, Baal or Bel, or Mo lock or Meloc ; the Scythians, i^ipe ; all words signi- fying Lord, Master. In like manner almost all Ame- rica was found to be divided into multitudes of little colonies, all with their patron deity. The Mex- icans and Peruvians, Who were large nations, had but one only god ; the latter worshipping Man- go Kapack, and the other the god of war, whom they called Vilipus- ti, as the Hebrews had styled their lord Sabaoth. It is not from any superiority or exercise of reason that all nations began with wor- shipping only one deity ; for had they been philosophers, they would have worshipped the uni- versal God of nature, and not the god of a village ; they would have examined the infi- nite testimonies acknowledged of a creating and preserving Being ; they examined nothing, they ooly perceived: and such is the progress of our weak un- derstanding. Every town per- ceived its weakness and want of a powerful protector. This tutelary and terrible being, they fancied to reside in a neighbour- ing forest, or mountain, or in a cloud. They fancied only one such power, because in war the town, had but one chief. This being they imagined to be cor- poreal, it being impossible they could have any other idea. They could not but believe that the neighbouring town had also its god. Accordingly Jephtha says to the inhabitants of Moab, Wilt thou not possess that which Chemosh thy god giveth Ihee to possess ? So whomsoever the Lord our God shall drive out from before us, them will we possess." This speech from one foreigner to another is very, extraordi- nary. It is very natural that from the heat of fancy and a vague in- crease of knowledge, men soon multiplied their gods, and assign- ed guardians to the elements, seas, forests, springs, and fields. The more they surveyed the heavenly bodies,, the greater must their astonishment have been. Well might they who worshipped the deity of a brook pay their adorations to the sun ; and the first step being taken the earth was soon covered with deities ; so that at length cats and onions came to he wor- shipped. However, time must neces- sarily improve reason: accord- ingly it produced some philo- sophers, who saw that neither onions nor cats, nor even the heavenly bodies, had any share in the disposition of nature. All those philosophers, Babylonians, Persians, Egyptians, Scythians, Greeks, and Romans, acknow- ledged only, one supreme God, rewarding and punishing. This they did not immediately POO POP mafceltnown to the peopte r fo a word against onions and cats spoken before old women anc priests, would have cost a man his life : Those good people would have -stoned him. WeU, what was to be done ? Orpheus ad others institutec mysteries, which the initiatec swear by execrable oaths never to reveal ; and of these mysteries the principal is the worship oi one only God. This great truth spreads over half the earth : the number of the initiated swells immensely : the ancient religion indeed still subsists ; bat not being contrary to the tenet ol God's unity it is connived at. The Romans had their Deus Optimus Maximus ; the Greeks their Zeus, their supreme God. All the other deities are only intermediate beings ; Heroes and emperors were classed among the gods, which meant no more than the blessed ; for it is not supposed that Claudius, Gctavius, Tiberius, and Caligula, were accounted creators of hea- ven and earth. In a word, it seems certain, that in Augustus's time, all who had any religion acknowledged one supreme eternal God, with several classes of secondary deities ; the worshipping of whom has since been called ido- latry. Vollaire. POOR, RELIEF OF THE. -The best way of doing good to the poor, is not making them easy in po- verty, but by driving them out of it. The more public provi- sions are made for the poor, the less they provide for themselves, and become poorer : And on the contrary, the less is done for them, the more they do for them- selves, and become richer. There is no country in the world where so many provisions are establish- ed for them as in England : so many hospitals to receive them when they are sick or larfie, founded and maintained by vo- luntary charities; besides a ge- neral law made by the rich for the support of the poor. Under all these obligaiions, are the poor modest, humble, thankful, industrious ? On the contrary, it may be affirmed, that there is no country in the world in which the poor are more idle, dissolute, drunken, and insolent. The day the parliament passed that law, it took away from before their eyes the greatest of all induce- ments to industry, frugality, and sobriety, by giving them a de- pendence on some-whatelse than a careful accumulation during youth and health, for support in age and sickness. In short, a law to provide for the poor is a pre- mium for the encouragement of idleness ; and it has its effect in the increase of poverty. More will be done for the happiness of the poor by inuring them to pro- vide for themselves, than could be done by dividing all the estates in the kingdom among them . Franklin. POPULACE, THE. It is the popu- lace which compose the bulk of mankind. Those which are not in this class are so few in num- ber that they are hardly worth notice. Man is the same crea- ture in every state ; therefore that which is the most numer- ous, ought to be most respected. To a man capable of reflection, all civil distinctions are nothing -, POP POP He observes the same passions, the same feeling's, in the clown and the man of quality. The principal difference between them consists in the language they speak ; in a little refine- ment of expression ; but if there be any real distinction, it is cer- tainly to the disadvantage of the least sincere. The common peo- ple appear as they really are; and they are not amiable: If those in high life were equally undisguised, their appearance would make us shudder with horror. There is, say our philo- sophers, an equal allotment of happiness and misery to every rank of men ; a maxim as dan- gerous as it is absurd. If all mankind are equally happy, it would be ridiculous to give our- selves any trouble to promote their felicity. Let each remain in his situation : let the slave en- dure the lash, the lame his in- firmity, and let the beggar perish, since they would gain nothing by a change of situation. The same philosophers enume- rate the pangs of the rich, and expatiate on the vanity of their pleasures. Was there ever so palpable a sophism ? The pangs of a rich man are not essential to riches, but to the abuse of them. If he were even more wretched than the poor, he would deserve no compassion ; because he is the creator of his own misery, and happiness was in his power. But the sufferings of the indigent are the natural consequences of his " state ; he feels the weight of his hard lot ; no length of time nor habit can ever render him insensible of fatigue and hunger: neither wis- dom nor good-humouf can anni- hilate the evils which are inse- parable from his situation. What avails it an Epictetus to foresee that his master is going to*break his leg ? Doth that prevent the evil ? On the contrary, his fore- knowledge adds greatly to his misfortune. If the populace were really as wise as we sup- pose them stupid, how could they act otherwise than as they do ? Rousseau. POPULAR OPINION. The popular opinion, in many instances, is as contemptible as it is ill-founded. It is oftentimes below the con- cern of a good man, and unwor- thy the notice of a wise one. A sovereign scorn of it has been es- teemed the peculiar result of an elevation of soul, and an unequi- vocal indication of the truest wisdom. This superiority to current calumnies hath formed the poet's rhapsody, hath proved the philosopher's impenetrable armour, and supported the real patriot under the storms of oblo- quy, the pressure of exile, and the agonies of an ignominious death. On occasions of this sort, it is necessary, it is useful, it is laudable. It leads to generous plans of conduct, and it inspires resolution to attempt their accom- plishment. It fortifies us against the probable event of ill success ; and consoles us under the morti- fication of disappointment, the envious strife of tongues, and the envenomed shafts of low, illibe- ral reproach. When it is directed to these ends, and effects these purposes, it is the strength and blessing of those who possess it. But, then, its excellency entirely depends on this direction, and POP POP these effects. We are, unhappily, on many accounts, disposed to extend its influence, and to over- stretch its tone. Self-deception obscures our moral discernment, and renders us unjust and incom- petent judges of our own mo- tives to action. We sometimes, perhaps, mistake them involun- tarily. But oftentimes through weakness which we might have prevented, or through wicked- ness which we are studious to conceal from our own view, we call that a contempt of popu- lar rumour, which is no other than the lordly pride of intoxi- cated reason, or the sordid va- nity of blind self-love. Populus me sibilat ; at mihi plaudo Ipse domi. For great occasions there are, when the public verdict is re- spectable, and the public censure awful ! Interdum vulgus rectum -videt : When enormous abuses extort a general and j ust disapprobation, then the " Vox populi" is, with- out a perversion of terms, " Vox Dei ;" then God and man alike insulted, alike condemn. In this case, no station can justify inat- tention. An audience is due from the highest; and sove- reigns themselves refuse to listen at the peril of their salvation. __* * POPULATION. People increase in proportion to the number of mar- riages ; and that greater in pro- portion to the ease and conve- nience of supporting a family. When a family can, be easily sup- ported, more persons marry, and earlier in life. As the increase of people depends on the encou- ragement of marriages, the fol- lowing things must diminish a nation, viz. 1. The being con- quered. 2. Loss of territory. 3. Loss of trade. 4. Loss of food. 5. Bad government and insecure property. 6. Heavy taxes. 7. The introduction of slaves. The negroes brought into the English sugar islands, have greatly diminished the whites there ; the poor are by these means deprived of employ- ment, while a few families ac- quire vast estates, which they spend on foreign luxuries : and educating their children in the habit of those luxuries, the same income is needed for the support of one that might have maintain- ed one hundred. The whites who have slaves, not labouring, are enfeebled, and therefore not so generally prolific; the slaves being worked too hard, and ill fed, their constitutions are bro- ken, and the deaths among them are more than the births ; so that a continual supply is needed from Africa. The northern co- lonies having few slaves, in- crease in whites. Slaves also pejorate the families that use them ; the white children be- come proud, disgusted with la- bour ; and being educated in idleness, are rendered unfit to get a living by industry. Hence the prince that acquires new ter- ritory, if he finds it vacant, or if he removes the natives to give his own people room ; the legis- lator that makes effectual laws for promoting of trade, increasing employment, improving land by more and better tillage, provid- ing more food by fisheries, secur- ing property, &c. and the man POP POP that invents new trades, arts, manufactures, or new improve- ments in husbandry ; may be properly called the fathers of their nation ; as they are the cause of the generation of multi- tudes, by the encouragement they afford to marriage. As to privileges granted to the married, (such as tbejtt* trium liber or urn among the Romans) they may hasten the filling of a country that has been thinned by war or pestilence, or that has otherwise vacant territory ; but cannot in- crease a people beyond the means provided for their sub- sistence. Foreign luxuries and needless manufactures, imported and used in a nation, do, by the same reasoning-, icrease the people of the nation that famishes them, and diminish the people of the nation.- that uses them. Laws, therefore, that prevent such importa- tions, and, on the contrary, pro- mote the exportation of manu- factures to be consumed in foreign countries, may be called (with respect to the people that make them) generative laws ; as by increasing subsistence they encourage marriage. Such laws likewise strengthen a country doubly, by increasing its own population, and diminishing its neighbours. Some European nations prudently refuse to con- sume the manufactures of East India. They should likewise forbid them to their colonies ; for the gain to the merchant is not to be compared to the loss, by these means, of people to the nation. Home luxury in the great, increases the nation's manufacturers employed by it, who are many ; and only tends to diminish the families that in- dulge in it, who are few. The greater the fashionable expence of any rank of people, the more cautious they are of marriage. Therefore luxury should never be suifered to become common. The great increase of offspring in particular families, is not always owing to greater fecundity of nature, but sometimes to exam- ples of industry in the heads, and industrious education; by which the children are enabled to provide better for themselves, and their marrying early is en- couraged from the prospect of good subsistence. To manners of this kind are owing the popu- lousness of Holland, Switzer- land, China, Japan, and most parts of Hindostan,&c. in every one of which the force of extent of territory and fertility of soii is multiplied, or their want com- pensated by industry and -fruga- lity. Natural fecundity is hardly to be considered ; because the vis generandi, as far as we know, is unlimited, and because experi- ence shows, that the numbers of nations are altogether governed by collateral causes ; and among these, none is of so much force as quantity of subsistence ; whe- ther arising from climate, soil, improvement of tillage, trade, fisheries, secure property, con- quest of new countries, and other favourable circumstances. Franklin. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. There is in all men, both male and fe- male, a desire and power of ge- neration, more active than is ever universally exerted. The restraints which they lie under, POP PGVV most proceed from some diffi- culties in their situation, which it belongs to a wise legislature to observe and remove. Almost every man who thinks he can maintain a family will have one, and the human species, at this rate of propagation, would more than double every generation. How fast do mankind multiply in every colony, or new settle- ment, where it is an easy matter to provide for a family ; and where men are no ways strait- ened or confined as in long es- tablished governments ? Histo- ry tells us frequently of plagues, which have swept away the third or fourth part of a peo- ple : yet in a generation or two the destruction was not perceiv- ed, and the society had again acquired, their former number. The lands which were culti- vated, the houses built, the com- modities raised, the riches ac- quired, enabled the people, who escaped, immediately to marry, and to rear families, which sup- plied the place of those who had perished. Where there is room for more people, they will al- ways arise, even without the assistance of naturalization bills. It is remarked, that the provin- ces of Spain which send most people to the Indies, are most populous ; which proceeds from their superior riches. Every wise, just and mild government, by rendering the condition of its subjects easy and secure, will always abound most in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country / indeed, whose climate and soil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one which pro- duces only corn ; and that morer populous than one which is only fitted for pasturage. In general,, warm climates, as the necessi- ties of the inhabitants, are there fewer, and vegetation more powerful, are likely to be most populous ; But if every thing else be equal, it seems natural to ex- pect, that wherever there are most happiness and virtue, and the wisest institutions, there will also be most people. Hume. POPULOUSNESS, THE, OF ANCIENT EUROPE. It has been contended by many, that Europe, when ig- norant and barbarous, was more populous than at present. The answer to their numerous cita- tions, is, that ten acres of wheat will nourish more men than a hundred acres of heath, pastu- rage, &c.; that Europe was for- merly covered with vast forests ;. and that the Germans lived oa the produce of their cattle. Thi* Caesar and Tacitus affirms ; and their testimony decides the ques- tion. A nation of herdsmen can- not be numerous. Civilized Eu- rope is, therefore necessarily more populous than it was when> barbarous and savage. It is a folly to have recourse to histori- ans concerning this matter, who- are often untrue or ill informed,, when we have before us evident proofs of their falsehood. A country cannot support a great number of people without agri- culture, unless it be by a mira- cle, and miracles are much more rare than falsehoods. Helve- tius. POWER, THE ORIGIN OF OPINION CONCERNING INVISIBLE INTEL- LIGENT.- It must be allowed, that in order to carry men's at- POW POW tention beyond the present course of things, or lead them into any inference concerning in- visible intelligent power, they must be actuated by some pas- sion, which prompts their thought and reflection ; some motive, which urges their first inquiry. But what passion shall we here have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty consequence ? Not spe- culative curiosity surely, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for men in igno- rant ages and barbarous nations, and would lead men into inqui- ries concerning the frame of na- ture ; a subject too large and com- prehensive for their gross appre- hensions. No passions, therefore, can be supposed to work upon such barbarians, but the ordi- nary affections of human life ; the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of re- venge, the appetite for food and other necessaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, es- pecially the latter, men scruti- nize, with a trembling curiosity, the course of future causes, and examine the various and con- trary events of human life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, they see the first ob- scure traces of divinity. We are placed in'this world, as in a great theatre, where the true springs and causes of every event are entirely unknown to us ; nor have we either sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to prevent, those ills with which we are continually threatened. We hang in perpetual suspence be- tween life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want ; which are distributed amongst the hu- man species by secret and un- known causes, whose operation is often unexpected and always un- accountable. These unknown causes, then, become the con- stant object of our [hope and fear; and while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers on which we have so entire a dependence. In proportion as any man's course of life is governed by ac- cident, we always find that he increases in superstition : as may particularly be observed of gamesters and sailors, who though, of all mankind, the least capable of serious consideration, abound most in frivolous and su- perstitious apprehensions. The gods, says Coriolanus, in Diony- r sius, have an influence in every affair ; but above all in war, where the event is so uncertain. All human life, especially before the institution of order and good government, being subject to fortuitous accidents, it is natural that superstition should prevail every where in barbarous ages, and put men on the most earnest inquiry concerning those invisi- ble powers who dispose of their happiness and misery. Any of the human affections may lead us into the notion of invisible, intelligent power ; hope as well as fear, gratitude as well as affliction: but if we examine our own hearts, or observe what passes around us, we shall find that men are much oftener POW thrown on their knees by the me- lancholy than by the agreeable passions. Prosperity is easily re- ceived as our due ; and few questions are asked concerning its cause or author. It begets cheerfulness, and activity, and alacrity, and a lively enjoyment of every social and sensual plea- sure: and during this, state of mind, men have little leisure or inclination to think of the un- known invisible regions. On the other hand, every disastrous ac- cident alarms us, and sets us on in- quiries concerning the principles whence it arose: apprehensions spring up with regard to futu- rity : and the mind, sunk in diffi- dence, terror, and melancholy, has recourse to every method of appeasing those sacred intelli- gent powers, on whom our for- tune is supposed entirely to de- pend. Even at this day, and in Europe, ask any of the vulgar, Why he believes in an Omnipo- tent Creator of the world? he will never mention the beauty of final causes, of which he is ignorant : He will not hold out his hand, and bid you contem- plate the suppleness and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all one way, the counter- poise which they receive from the thumb, the softness and fleshy parts of the inside of hi hand, with all the other circum stances which render that mem ber fit for the use for which i was destined. To these he ha been long accustomed : and h beholds them with listlessnes and unconcern. He will tell yo of the sudden and unexpecte death of such a one : the fall an bruise of such another ; the ex cesiive drought of this seasoa ; the cold and rains of another. These he ascribes to the imme- diate operation of Providence : and such events, as with good reasoners are the chief difficulties in admitting a Supreme Intelli- gence, are with him the sole ar- guments for it. Convulsions in nature, disorders, prodigies, mi- racles, though the most opposite to the plan of a wise superin- tendant, impress mankind with the strongest sentiments of reli- gion : the causes of events seem- ing then the most unknown and unaccountable. We may con- clude, therefore, upon the whole, that since the vulgar, in nations which have embraced the doc- trine of Theism, still build it upon irrational and superstitious opinions, they are never led into that opinion by any process of argument, but by a certain train of thinking more suitable to their genius and capacity. Hume. 'OWER, THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF. When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in any single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection, any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one bil- liard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sen- timent or inward impression from the succession of objects ; consequently there is not, in any single particular instance of Z T POW PRA eaiue and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection. From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect even without experience ; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by the mere dint of thought and rea- soning. The scenes in the universe are continually shifting, and one ob- ject follows another in an unin- terrupted course : but the power or force which actuates the whole machine, is entirely con- cealed from us, and never dis- covers itself in any of the sensible qualities of the body. We know that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame ; but what is the connection between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is im- possible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies in single instances of their operation: be- cause no bodies discover any power which can be the original of this idea. Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, says, That finding, from experience, that there are several new productions in matter, and concluding that there must some- where be a power capable of producing them, we arrive by this reasoning at the idea of power. But no reasoning can ever give us a new original sim- ple idea: as this philosopher himself confesses. This, there- fore, can never be the origin of that idea. Nor can external objects, as they appear to the senses, give us any idea of power or necessary connection by their operation in particular instances. This idea is derived from reflec- tion on the operations of our own minds, and is copied from internal impressions. We ar every moment conscious of in ternal power, while we feel tha by the simple command of ou will, we can move the organs our body, or direct the faculti of our minds, in their operatic An act of volition produces mo tion in our limbs, or raises a ne idea in our imagination. Th influence of the will we kno by consciousness. Hence w acquire the idea of power o energy : and are certain, that v ourselves, and all other intell gent beings, are possessed power. This idea, then, is a idea of reflection, since it arist from reflecting on the operation of our minds, and on the com- mand which is exercised by th will, both over the organs of th body, and the faculties of th mind. Hume. PRACTICE OF CHRISTIANITY CON TRASTED WITH ITS PRECEPT The inconsistencies into whic men are led by the profession Christianity, arise chiefly fron the excessive purity of its prin ciples, contrasted with the \ io lence of our passions, which it unequal wholly to subdue, fror the neglect of its spirit, occasi oned by a mistaken attachmen to external forms ; and from desire in many zealous Chris tians to consider their religio as something superior to th control and direction of reatoi PRA PRA To these three causes we must attribute the inconsistencies of those, who having- no design to deceive othcrs,are deceived them- selves ; arid never compare their conduct with that standard by which they constantly profess to be directed. To what else is it that we see so many political fanatics who pray to God for suc- cess in war without examining the justice of their cause, and thank him for victories in which thousands of innocent men have been murdered ! The conduct of the world will ever be found in- consistent with those precepts which command us to " love our ' enemies, to do good to them " that hate us, and when stricken "on one cheek to offer the " other," for they are wholly in- compatible with our nature. They may be followed by a few individuals, but they never can be generally observed. Socrates judged more wisely on this sub- ject than Jesus Christ. (See Plato's Georgics.) That Bacon, Newton, and Locke, have written in defence of Christianity, is no proof that Christianity is true ; it proves only that even the strongest minds cannot always overcome the force of early impressions. Burdon's Elements for Think- ing. PRAYER. The Hebrew books, in which there are so many strange stories, "passing all human un- " derstanding," tell us, that God created man after his own image. The unknown writer does not tell us from whom he derived this singular piece of in- formation, but it does appear a little extraordinary, that the Almighty Creator of that glori- ous luminary, the sun, with all its dependent planets, including this our earth, and all its won- derful productions, should, after all, be, to appearance, no more than one of ourselves. To many, this assertion in what is called the Mosaic account of the crea- tion, does appear to savour more of blasphemy than any thing that ever emanated from the pen of Voltaire or Paine. It is utterly impossible that we should ever know who the igno- rant compiler or compilers of the Hebrew books were ; as, till comparatively a late period, the knowledge of their existence was wholly confined to the in- significant, barbarous, and blood- thirsty horde who had the auda- city to call themselves the cho- sen people of God. Beyond the small territory occupied by the Jews, not exceeding in extent and fertility the principality from which the eldest son of our king takes his title, these books were totally unknown, till about 270 years before Christ, when a translation of them was procured for the library at Alexandria, founded by the second Ptolemy, about 277 years before Christ. Where, or in what shape they existed before that time can never be known ; and those who are inclined to place implicit faith in the modern Jews, may place what faith they please in the accounts given by their savage and illiterate ancestors, of the writing of their sacred books, and the sources from which the authors of them drew their information. It appears that the presump- PRA. tion of the compiler of the books was at least equal to his igno- rance ; for being 1 desirous to give an account (and such an ac- count !) of what he could not possibly know any thing about, the creation and the Creator and seeing that man was the most dignified being with which he was acquainted, he impiously makes God the same in appear- ance as man: for if man be like God, as he tells us he is, God must be like man. Nay, he not only makes him resemble man in his appearance, but he also ascribes to him many of the pas- sions and imperfections of man- kind. He makes him a Being requiring rest ; he makes him capricious, repenting him of what he had done : he makes him cruel, ordering the extirpation of whole nations, and harshly punishing even unintentional faults: jea- lous to excess of the worship paid to him : unjust, for he punishes the sins of the fathers upon the children: in short, he makes the God of the Jews a compound of every thing that is bad in human nature in one word, a very ' T Jew. In the same way that a proud, vain-glorious tyrant insists upon having homage paid to him by his dependants, so this writer makes his God delight in the worship paid to him by those he has created ; fond of bloody sacrifices, and pleased with the savoury odour of their burnt offerings. Nay, he makes him give the most minute direc- tions about every thing relating to his superstitious and unmean- ing worship ; even to the mak- ing of the perfumes, lighting of the lamps, blowing of trumpets, &c. ! No busy-body, preparing for a feast, could be more occu- pied with it, or enter more into the detail of all the minutiae of it, than this ignorant Jew makes the Almighty Creator of the world to be ! Instead of finding him engaged in contemplating the beautiful spectacle of the universe he has created, we find him exclusively occupied with a villainous horde of barbarians in a desart ! Instead of finding him engaged in regulating the mo- tions of the millions of worlds he has made, we find him directing the building of altars and taber- nacles, the cutting up of victims, the preparing of burnt offerings, &c. even down to the most minute and disgusting details of domestic cleanliness ! It is upon such books that a certain religion is founded ! a religion which is become " part "and parcel" of the law of some countries,and for publishing their doubts concerning which, the in- habitants are subjected to fine and imprisonment under the most grievous restrictions. These books, written nobody knows when, nor by whom ; but most of them evidently the production of some ignorant barbarian ! These books, in which almost every page teems with gross absurdi- ties ; with impossibilities under the name of miracles ; and with instances of indecency, cruelty, and breach of faith, not to be paralleled in any other hooks in the world ! These books are to be extolled as the works of in- spired writers, and to be taken PRA PRE as our infallible guides. We are from them to look upon God as a Being- pleased with the eternal adulation and fawning- of his creatures, and to be gained by the ceremonies of adoration, humiliation, and prayer ! When we have a favour to ask of our fellow men, we beg it of them ; we pray them to grant it ; a vanquished enemy kneels to his conqueror to entreat him to spare his life. And because we use these means towards our weak fellow-mortals, are we to suppose that the Almig-hty Crea- tor of the universe is to be won by the same degrading- means ? Is it not blasphemous to imag-ine that our benevolent Maker is to be moved to hear us by the same means we would use to move a Dey of Algiers, or an Emperor of Morocco ? When will man, shaking- off the prejudices with which, in all ages, priests have endeavoured to enslave his understanding 1 , make use of his reason, and judge for himself? When will he discover that the true worship of the Deity consists not in empty forms and unmeaning ceremonies, in genuflexions and prayers, but in the grateful enjoyment of all that the goodness of God haslet before him ; and in endeavouring humbly to imitate his example by contributing as much as he can to the happiness of others ? To pray to God to grant us this or that ; is it not to ask him to substitute our will for his ? To be guided by our fallible judg- ment, instead of his own, which is infallible ? He has made this world and all it contains : he has given it certain rules essential to its en- durance: he has provided in the most admirable manner for the continuation of every thing in it, animate and inanimate : his all- seeing eye overlooks the whole ; but is it to be believed, that, dis- trustful of his own work, he is incessantly watching all the petty and trivial occurrences that take place in this millionth part of the creation ; and that he is to be constantly listening to all the prayers and importu- nities which foolish mortals are perpetually addressing to him I Away with the vain thought ! Enjoy with contentment what God has set before thee. Seek him not in edifices raised by the hand of man, but look round thee, and contemplate him in all his glorious works. Waste not that time in useless prayer, which might be more beneficial- ly employed in assisting thy fellow-creatures. If thou hast not the ability to do works of active benevolence, make it the rule of thy conduct " never to " do to others that which thou " wouldest not they should do " to thee." Do this ; and leave prayers and the theory of reli- gion to priests and monks, and their deluded votaries; confid- ing, that if " there is another " and a better world." thou-wilt be rewarded not according to thy belief, but according to thy deeds. Bowbridge. PREJUDICE. There is a high de- gree of difficulty in questioning opinions established by time, by habits, and by education: every religious and political innovation is opposed by the timidity of some, the obstinacy and pride of PRE PLIE others, and the ignorance of the i bulk of mankind, who are inca- pable of attention to reasoning and argument: and must, if they have any opinions, have opinions of prejudice. All improvements therefore in religion and politics must be gradual. There was a time when the most part of the inhabitants of Britain would have been as much startled at ques- tioning the truth of the doctrine of transubstantiation, as they would, in this age, at the most sceptical doubts on the being of a God * * ON THE SAME SUBJECT. The Chinese the&logian, who proves the nine incarnations of Whislh- nou ; and the Musselman, who, after the Koran, maintains, that the earth is carried on the horns of a bull ; certainly found their opinions on ridiculous principles and prejudices: yet each of them, in his own country, is esteemed a person of sense. What can be the reason of this ? It is because they maintain opi- nions generally received. In relation to religious truths, rea- son loses all her force against two grand missionaries, Example _ and Fear. Besides, in all coun- tries, the prejudices of the great are the laws of the little. This Chinese and Musselman pass then for wise, only because they are fools of the common folly. Certain countrymen, it is said, erected a bridge, and upon it carved this inscription. : The present bridge is built here : If folly and stupidity of this kind must always excite laughter, why do not different absurdities in our own country make the same impression upon us ? It is because people freely ridicule the folly from which they think themselves exempt, because no- body repeats after the country- men, Tke present bridge is built here. Helvetius. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. Men are vain, full of contempt, and con- sequently unjust, whenever they can be so with impunity. .For which reason all r>en imagine, that on this globe there is no part of it, in this part of the earth no nation, in the nation no province, in the province no city, in the city no society, com- parable to their own. We, step by step, surprise ourselves into a secret persuasion that we are superior to all our acquaintance. If an oyster confined within its shell, is acquainted with no more of the universe than the rock on which it is fixed, and therefore cannot judge of its extent ; how can a man, in the midst of a small society, always surrounded by the same objects, and ac- quainted with only one train of thoughts, be able to form a pro- per estimate of merit without his own circle. Truth is never en- gendered or perceived but in the fermentation of contrary opi- nions. The universe is only known to us in proportion as we become acquainted with it. Who- ever confines himself to convers- ing with one set of companions, cannot avoid adopting their pre- judices, especially if they flatter his pride. Who can separate himself from an error, when vanity, the companion of igno- rance, has tied him to it, and rendered it dear to him ? It is the philosopher alone who contemplates the manners, PllE laws, customs, religions, and the different passions that actuate mankind, that can become al- most insensible both to the praise and satire of his cotemporaries ; can break all the chains of pre- judice, examine with modesty and indifference the various opi- nions which divide the human species; pass, without astonish- ment, from a seraglio to a char- treuse, reflect with pleasure on the extent of human folly, and see, with the same eye, Alcibi- ades cut off the tail of his dog, and Mahomet shut himself up in his cavern ; the- one to ridicule the folly of the Athenians, and the other to enjoy the adoration of the world. He knows, that our ideas necessarily proceed from the company we keep, the books we read, and the objects presented to our sight : and that a superior intelligence might di- vine our thoughts from the ob- jects presented before us, and from our thoughts divine the number and nature of the ob- jects offered to the mind. The Arab persuaded of the infallibi- lity of his Khalif, laughs at the credulity of the Tartar, who be- lieves the Great Lama immortal. In Africa, the negro who pays his adorations to a root, the claw of a lobster, or the horn of an animal, sees nothing on the earth but an immense mass of deities, and laughs at the scarcity of gods among us ; while the ill-informed Musselman accuses us with acknowledging three. If a sage, descended from hea- ven, and in his conduct consulted only the light of reason, he would universally pass for a fool. All are so scrupulously attached to the interest of their own vanity, that the title of wise is only given to the fools of the common folly. The more foolish an opinion is, the more danger- ous it is to prove its folly. Fon- tenelle was accustomed to say, that if he held every truth in his hand, he would take great care not to open it to shew them to men. In destroying of prejudices, we ought to treat them with re- spect : like the doves from the ark, we ought to send some truths on the discovery, to see if the deluge of prejudices does not yet cover the face of the earth ; if error begins to subside; and if there can be perceived here and there some isles, where virtue and truth may find rest for their feet, and communicate them- selves to mankind. Hclvetius. PREJUDICE, THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF. All those virtues originate from prejudice, the exact observance of which does not in the least contribute to the public happiness ; such as the aus- terities of those senseless Fakirs \vithwhich the Indies are peo- pled: virtues that, beingotten in- different, an<] even prejudicial to the state, are the punishment of those who make vows for the per- formance of them. These talse virtues in most nations (for many of them are to be found in every nation under heaven) are more honoured than the true virtues ; and those that practise them held in greater veneration than good citizens. Happy the peo- ple among whom the virtues which originate from prejudice and folly are only ridiculous, they are frequently extremely PRE barbarous. In the capital of Cochin they bring- up crocodiles ; and whoever exposes himself to the fury of one of these ani- mals, and is devoured, is reck- oned among- the elect. What is more barbarous than the insti- tution of convents among 1 the Papists ? In Martemban, it is an act of virtue, on the day when the idol is brought out, for the people to throw themselves under the wheels of his chariot ; and whoever offers himself to this death, is reputed a saint. As there are virtues of prejudice, there are also vices of prejudice. It is one for a Bramin to marry a virgin. If, during the three months in which the people of Formosa are ordered to go naked, a man fastens upon him the smallest piece of linen, he wears, say -they, a clothing unworthy of a man. The neglect, in Catholic countries, of fasts, confessions, penances, and pater nosters, is a crime of the first magnitude. And there is, perhaps, no country where the people have not a greater abhorrence of some of these crimes of prejudice, than for villainies the most attrocious, and the most injurious to society. Helvetius. PREJUDICES, RELIGIOUS AND PHI- LOSOPHICAL. It is a very true observation, and a very common one, that our affections and pas- sions put frequently a bias so se- cret, and yet so strong, on our judgments, as to make them swerve from the direction ol right reason : and on this prin- ciple we must account, in a great measure, for the different sys- tems of philosophy arid religion, about which men dispute so much, PRE and fight and persecute so often. But it is not so commonly ob- served, though it be equally true, that as extensive as this principle is in itself, since it extends to al- most all mankind, the action of it in one single man is sometimes sufficient to extend the effects of it to millions. Many a system, and many an institution, has ap- peared and thrived in the world as a production of human wis- dom raised to the highest pitch, and even illuminated by inspira- tion, which was -owing, in its origin, to the predominant pas- sion, or to the madness of one single man. Authority comes soon to stand in the place of rea- son. Men come to defend what they never examined, and to explain what they never under- stood. Their system, or their institution, to which they were determined by chance, not by choice, is to them that rock of truth on which alone they can be saved from error : they cling to it accordingly ; and doubt it- self was this rock to the Acade- micians. De rebus incognitis judicant, et ad quamcunque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate de- lati, ad earn tanquam ad saxum adhoerescunt. (Acad. qusest. lib. 2.) All errors, even those of ig- norance and superstition, are hard to remove when they have taken long hold of the minds of men, and especially when they are woven into systems of reli- gion. But there are some from which - men are unwilling- to depart, and of which they grow fond by degrees. As men ad- vance in knowledge, their self- conceit and curiosity are apt to PRE PRE increase; and these are sure to be flattered by every opinion that gives man high notions of his own importance. What con- tradictions and inconsistencies are not huddled tog-ether in the human mind ? Superstition is produced by a sense of our weakness ; philosophical pre- sumption by an opinion of our strength ; and superstition and presumption contribute alike to continue, to confirm, to propa- g-ate error. Errors in rules of policy and law are easy to be corrected by experience, like errors in natural philosophy. Nay, the first are so the most ; because how little regard soever philosophers may have to ex- perience, in either case, the truth will force itself upon them, or others; in one, by the course of affairs ; whereas it must be sought, to be had in the other. But when it is sought, it is ob- tained. Errors in theology and metaphysics cannot be thus cor- rected. Systems of laws and poli- tics may be various ; nay, contrary to one another ; and yet be such as right reason dictates, provided they do not stand in opposition to any of the laws of our nature. But in theological reasonings, and those which are called meta- physical, the various opinions may be all false : or if they are not all so, one alone can be true. This consideration should have two effects. It should render philosophers and divines more cautious in framing 1 opin- ions on such subjects, and less positive in maintaining* them from the beginning. The v contrary has happened, to such a degree of extravagance, as must seem delirious to every one who is not in the same delirium. Can he be less than mad, who pretends to contemplate an in- tellectual world, which he as- sumes in the dull mirror of his own mind ; of which he knows little more than this, that it is both dull and narrow ! Can he be less than mad, who perse- veres dogmatically in this pre- tension, whilst he is obliged to own, that he arrives with many helps, much pains, and by slow degrees, to a little imperfect knowledge of the visible world which he inhabits ; and con- cerning which he is, therefore, sober, and modest enough to reason hypothetically! In a word, can he be less than mad, who boasts a revelation super- added to reason, to supply the defects of it; and who super- adds reason to revelation, to supply the defects of this too, at the same time? This is mad- ness, or there is no such thing- incident to our nature. All men are apt to have a high conceit of their own understandings, and to be tenacious of the opinions they profess : and yet almost all men are guided by the under- standings of others, not by their own ; and may be said more truly to adopt, than to beget, their opinions. Nurses, parents, pedagogues, and after them all, and above them all, that univer- sal pedagogue Custom, fill the mind with notions which it has no share in framing; which it receives as passively as it re- ceives the impressions of out- ward objects ; and which left to itself, it would never have framed, perhaps, or would have 2 u PRE PRI examined afterwards. Thus prejudices are established by education, and habits by custom. We are taught to think what others think, not how to think for ourselves ; and whilst the memory is loaded, the under- standing remains unexercised, or exercised in such trammels as constrain its motions, and diced its pace, till that which was ar- tificial becomes in some sort na- tural, and the mind can go no other. It may sound oddly, but it is true in many cases, to say, that if men had learned less, their way to knowledge would be shorter and easier. It is in- deed shorter and easier to pro- ceed from ignorance to know- ledge, than from error. They who are in the last, must un- learn, before they can learn to any good purpose : and the first part of this double task is not, in many respects, the least difficult ; for which reason it is seldom un- dertaken. The vulgar, under which denomination we must rank, on this occasion, almost all the sons of Adam, content them- selves to be guided by vulgar opinions. They know little, and believe much. They examine and judge for themselves in the common affairs of life sometimes : and not always even in these. But the greatest and noblest ob- % jectsof the human mind are very transciently at best, the object of theirs. On all these they resign themselves to the authority that prevails among the men with whom they live. Some of them want the means, all of them want the will to do more : and as absurd as this may appear in speculation, it is best perhaps upon the whole, the human na- ture, and the nature of govern- ment considered^ that it should be as it is. Bolirtgbroke. PROVISIONS, THE PRICE OF, THF. INEFFICACY OF LAWS TO. REGU- LATE. It is impracticable to fix the rates and prices of provisions and commodities by civil laws ; and if it were possible to reduce the price of food by any other expedient than introducing" plen- ty, nothing could be more per- nicious and destructive to the public. Where the produce of a year, for instance, falls so far short, as to afford full subsistence only for nine months, the only expedient for making it last all the twelve, is to raise the prices, to put the people by that means on short allowance, and oblige them to spare their food till a more plentiful year. But in reality, the increase of prices is a necessary consequence of scar- city; and laws, instead of pre- venting it, only increase the evil, by cramping and restraining commerce. Hunie. PRIESTS. The first priests were probably botanists, chemists, phy- sicians, natural philosophers, and astronomers. These performed cures, showed wonders, and were in the rank of those impostors who, under thename of conjurers, continue to deceive the world. The poets took up the princi- ples and actions of these men ; personified some of them ; and referred those they could not understand to the operations of invisible powers", with whom the impostors pretended to converse, and whose messengers and dele- gates they were supposed to be. These invisible beings, once in- PRI PRI t reduced into the system of na- ture, and being- supposed to cure diseases, to perform miracles, and to foretel events, men were soon prevailed upon, not only to consign their health and for- tunes to their direction, but even their understandings and senses ; and to receive rules from them for the conduct of life, which could only be derived from those senses and understand- ing's: rules which gradually de- viated from the effects of experi- ence, until all attention was transferred from experience to the priest, and religion was set in opposition to morality. Wil- liams. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. Though all mankind have a strong pro- pensity to religion at certain times and in certain dispositions, yet are there few or none who have it to that degree, and with that constancy, which is requi- site to support the character of this profession. It must there- fore happen, that clergymen being drawn from the common mass of mankind, as people are to other employments, by the views of proflt, the greatest part, though no Atheists or Free- thinkers, will find it necessary, on particular occasions, to feign more devotion than they are at that time possessed of; and to maintain the appearance of fer- vor and seriousness, even when jaded with the exercises of their religion, or when they have their minds engaged in the com- mon occupations of life. They must not, like the rest of the world, give scope to their na- tural movements and sentiments : they must set a guard o*ver their looks, and words, and actions : and in order to support the ve- neration paid them by the igno- rant vulgar, they must not only keep a remarkable reserve, but must promote the spirit of su- perstition, by a continued gri- mace and hypocrisy. This dis- simulation often destroys the candour and ingenuity of their temper, and makes an irrepara- ble breach in their character. If by chance any of them be pos- sessed of a temper more suscep- tible of devotion than usual, so that he has but little occasion for hypocrisy to support the character of his profession, it is so natural for him to overrate thi& advantage, and to think that it atones for every violation of morality, that frequently he is not more virtuous than the hy- pocrite. And though few dare openly avow those exploded opinions, That every thing is lawful to the saints, and that they alone have property in their goods : yet may we observe, that these principles lurk in every bosom, and represent a zeal for religious observances as so great a merit, that it may compensate for many vices and enormities. This observation is so common, that all prudent men are on their guard when they meet with any extraordi- nary appearance of religion ; tho:igh, at the same time, they confess, that there are many ex- ceptions to this general rule ; and that probity and surpersti- tion, or even probity and fanati- cism,, are not altogether, and in every instance, incompatible. Most men are ambitious ; but the ambition of other men PRI commonly be satisfied, by ex- celling- in their particular pro- fession, and thereby promoting the interests of society. The ambition of the clergy can often be satisfied only by promot- ing 1 ignorance, and superstition and implicit faith, and pious frauds. And having got what Archimedes only wanted, (viz another world on which he could fix his engines) no won- der they move this world at their pleasure. Most men have an overweening conceit of themselves ; but these have a peculiar temptation to that vice, who are regarded with such veneration, and are even deemed sacred, by the ignorant multitude. Most men are apt to bear a particular regard for members of their own profession: but as a lawyer, or physician, or mer- chant, does each of them follow out his business apart, the inter- ests of these professions are not so closely united, as the interests of clergymen of the same reli- gion ; where the whole body gains by the veneration paid to their common tenets, and by the suppression of antagonists. Few men bear contradiction with patience : but the clergy proceed even to a degree of fury on this article : because all their credit and livelihood depend upon the belief which their opinions meet with ; and they alone pretend to a divine and supernatural authority, or have any colour for representing their antagonists as impious and pro- phane. The odium thcologicum, or theological hatred, is noted even to a proverb ; and means that decree of rancour which is the most furious and implacable. Revenge is a natural passion to mankind ; but seems to reign with the greatest force in priests and women. Because, being deprived of the immediate exer- tion of anger, inviolence and combat, they are apt to fancy themselves despised on that ac- count ; and their pride sup- ports their vindictive K disposi- tion. Thus many of the vices in human nature are, by fixed moral causes, inflamed in that profession ; and though several individuals escape the conta- gion, yet all wise governments will be on their guard against the attempts of a society who will for ever combine into one fac- tion ; and while it acts as a socie- ty, will for ever be actuated by ambition, pride, revenge, and a persecuting spirit. The temper of religion is grave and serious ; and this is the cha- racter required of priests, which confines them to strict rules of decency, an d commonly prevents irregularity and intemperance among them. The gaiety, much less the excesses of pleasure, is not permitted in that body ; and this virtue is, perhaps, the only one they owe to their profession. In religions, indeed, founded on speculative principles, and where public discourses make a part of religious services, it may also be supposed, that the clergy will have a considerable share in the learning of the times, though it is certain that their taste in elo- quence will always be better than their skill in reasoning and philosophy. But whoever pos- sesses the other noble virtues of humanity, meekness, and mo- PRI PHI deration, as very many of them, no doubt, do, is beholden for them to nature or reflection, not to the genius of his calling 1 . It was no bad expedient in the old Romans, for preventing- the strong- effect of the priestly cha- racter, to make it a law, that none should be received into the sacredotal office till he was past fifty years of ag-e, (Dion. Hal. lib. 1.) The living- a layman till that ag-e, it is presumed, would be able to fix the character. It is a trite, but not altogether a false maxim, that priests of all religions are the same; and though the character of the pro- fession will not in every instance prevail over the personal charac- ter, yet it is sure always to predo- minate with the greater number. For, as chemists observe, that spirits when raised to a certain height are all the same, from whatever materials they are ex- tracted ; so these men, being- ele- vated above humanity, acquire a uniform character, which is entire- ly their own, and which, in my opinion, is, generally speaking, not the most amiable that is to be met with in human society. Hume. PRIMOGENITURE CONTRARY TO THE REAL INTEREST OF FAMI- LIES. When land, like move- ables, is considered as the means only of subsistence and enjoy- ment, the natural law of succes- sion divides it, like them, among all the children of the family; of all of whom the subsistence and enjoyment may be supposed equally dear to the father. This natural law of succession accord- ingly took place among the Ro- mans, who made no more dis- tinction between elder and younger, between male and fe- male, in the inheritance of lands, than we do in the distribution of moveables. But when land was considered as the means, riot of subsistence merely, but of power arid protection, it was thought better that it should descend un- divided to one. In those dis- orderly times, every great land- lord was a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his subjects. He was their judge, and in some respects their legislator in peace, and their leader in war. He made war according to his own discretion, frequently against his neighbours, and sometimes against his sovereign. The se- curity of a landed estate, there- fore, the protection which its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part of it to be oppressed and swal- lowed up by the incursions of its neighbours. The law of primo- geniture, therefore, came to take place, not immediately indeed, but in process of time, in the succession of landed estates, for the same reason that it has generally taken place in that of monarchies, though not always at their first institution. That the power, and consequently the security, of the monarchy may not be weakened by division, it must descend entire to one of the children. To which of them so important a preference shall be given, must be determined by some general rule, founded not upon the doubtful distinctions of personal merit, but upon some plain and evident difference which can admit of no dispute. Among the same family, there PRI PR I can be no indisputable difference but that of sex, and that of age. The male sex is universal!}' pre- ferred to the female ; and when all other things are equal, the elder every where takes place of the younger. Hence the ori- gin of the right of primogeni- ture, and of what is called li- neal succession. Laws frequently continue in force long after the circum- stances which first gave occasion to them, and which could alone render them reasonable, are no more. In the present state o"f Europe, the proprietor of a sin- gle acre of land is as perfectly secure of bis possession as the proprietor of a hundred thou sand. The right of primogeni- ture, however, still continues to be respected ; and as of all in- stitutions it is the fittest to sup- port the pride of family distinc- tions, it is still likely to endure for many centuries. In every other respect, nothing can be more contrary to the real inte- rests of a numerous family, than a right which, in order to en- rich one, beggars all the rest of the children. Entails are the natural conse- quences of the law of primoge- niture. They were introduced to preserve a certain lineal suc- cession, of which the law of primogeniture first gave the idea, and to hinder any part of the original estate from being car- ried out of the proposed line, either by gift or devise, or aliena- tion: either by the folly, or by the misfortune of any of its suc- cessive owners. They were al- together unknown to the Ro- mans. Neither their substitu- tions nor fideicommisses bear any resemblance to entails, though some French lawyers have thought proper to dress the mo- dern institution in the language and garb of those ancient ones. When great landed estates were a sort of principalities, en- tails might not be unreasonable. Like what are called the funda- mental laws of some monarchies, they might frequently hinder the security of thousands from being endangered by the caprice or extravagance of one man. But in the present state of Europe, when small as well as great es- tates derive their security from the laws of their country, no- thing can be more completely absurd. They are founded upon the most absurd of all supposi- tions, the supposition that every successive generation of men have not an equal right to the earth, and to all that it pos- sesses ; but that the property of the present generation should be restrained and regulated ac- cording to the fancy of those who died perhaps five hundred years ago. Entails, however, are still respected through the greater part of Europe ; in those countries, particularly, in which noble birth is a necessary quali- fication for the enjoyment either of civil or military honours. Entails are thought necessary for maintaining this exclusive privilege of the nobility to the great offices and honours of their country ; and that order having usurped one unjust advantage over the rest of their fellow- citizens, lest their poverty should render it ridiculous, it is thought reasonable that they should have P1U PllO another. The common law of England, indeed, is said to ab- hor perpetuities, and they are accordingly more restricted there than in any other European mo- narchy ; though even England is not altogether witlwut them. In Scotland, more than one-fifth, perhaps, more than one-third part of the whole lands of the country, are at present supposed to be under strict entail. Great tracts of uncultivated land were in this manner not only engrossed by particular fa- milies, but the possibility of their being divided again was as much as possible precluded for ever. It seldom happens, however, that a great proprietor is a great improver. In the disorderly times which gave birth to those barbarous institutions, the great proprietor was sufficiently em- ployed in defending his own ter- ritories, or in extending his ju- risdiction and authority over those of his neighbours. He had no leisure to attend to the cultivation and improvement of land. When the establishment of law and order afforded him this leisure, he often wanted -the inclination, and almost always the requisite abilities. If the expense of his house and person eitherequalled or exceed- ed his revenue, as it did very frequently, he had no stock to employ in this manner. Jf he was an ceconomist, he gene- rally found it more profitable to employ his annual savings in new purchases, than in the improve- ment of his old estate. To im- prove land with profit, like all other commercial projects, re- quires an exact attention to small savings and small gains, of which a man born to a great fortune, even though naturally frugal, is very seldom capable. The situa- tion of such a person naturally disposes him to attend rather to ornament which pleases his fan- cy, than to profit for which he has so little occasion. The ele- gance of ,his dress, of his equip- age, of his house and househoW- furniture, are objects which from his infancy he has been ac- customed to have some anxiety about. The turn of mind which this habit naturally forms, fol- lows him when he comes to think of the improvement of land. He embellishes perhaps four or five hundred acres in the neighbourhood of his house, at ten times the expence which the land is worth after all his im- provements ; and finds, that if he was to improve his whole estate in the same manner, and he has little taste for any other, he would be a bankrupt, before he had finished a tenth part of it. There still remain in both parts of the united kingdoms some great estates, which have continued without interruption in the hands of the same family since the times of feudal anarch}'. Compare the 'present condition of those estates with the posses- sions of the small proprietors in their neighbourhood, and you will require no other argument to convince you how unfavoura- ble such extensive property is to improvement. A. Smith. PROBABILITY, GROUNDS OF. Pro- bability being to supply the de- fect of our knowledge, and to guide us where that tails, is al- ways conversant about proposi- PRO PRO tions whereof we have no cer- tainty, but only some induce- ments to receive them for true. The grounds of it are these two following: First, the conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, observation and experience. Secondly, the testimony of of others, vouching their obser- vation and experience. In the tes- timony of others is to be consi- dered, 1. The number, 2. The integrity, 3. The skill oT the witnesses. 4. The design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5, The consistency of the parts, and cir- cumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary testimonies. Probability wanting that in- tuitive evidence which infallibly determines the understanding, and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more or less, for or against, any proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it ; and, '.ipon a due balanc- ing the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to the prepon- derancy of the greater grounds of,probability on the one side or the other. If I see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability, it is knowledge: but if another tells me he saw a man in England in the midst of a sharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold ; this has^so great a conformity with what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed by the nature of the thing itself to assent to it, unless some majii- fest suspicion attend the rela- tion of that matter of fact. But if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never saw nor heard of any such thing before, there the whole probability relies on testimony ; and as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak Con- trary to the truth, so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief. Though, to a man whose experience has always been quite contrary, and has never heard of any thing like it, the most untainted credit of a wit- ness will scarce be able to find belief. As it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who entertain- ing the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him, that the water in his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so .hard, that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if he were there. To which the king replied, " Hi- ' therto I have believed the ' strange things you have told ' me, because I look upon you ' as a sober fair man ; but now ' 1 am sure you lie." Upon these grounds de- pends the probability of any proposition; arid as the confor- mity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of ex- perience, and the number and credibility of testimonies, do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I confess, which though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of for one, by PRO PRO which men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than any thing else, and that is the opinion of others ; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one, since there is much more falsehood and error among men than truth and knowledge. And if the opi- nions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden. Locke. PRODIGALITY, TENDENCY AND EFFECTS OF. Capitals are increased by par- simony, and diminished by prodi- gality and misconduct. Whatever a person saves from his revenue he adds to his capital, and either employs it himself in maintaining an additional number of productive hands, or enables some other person to do so, by lending it to him for an interest, that is, for a share of the profits. As the capital of an individual can be increased only by what he saves from his annual revenue or his annual gains, so the capital of a society, which is the same with . that of all the individuals, who compose it, can be increased only in the same manner. Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cau^e of the increase of capital. Industry indeed pro- vides the Subject which parsimony accumulates. But whatever indus- try might acquire, if parsimony did not save and store up, the capital would never be the greater. Parsimony, by increasing the fund which is destined for the main- tenance of productive hands, tends to increase the number of thote hands whose labour adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed. It tends, therefore, to increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country. It puts into motion an additional quantity of industry, which gives an addi- tional value to the annual produce. What is annually saved is as regularly consumed as what is : \uaii) cpcnt, and nearly in the same time too ; but is consumed by a different set of people. That portion of his revenue which a rich man annually spends, is, in most cases, consumed by idle guests and menial servants, who leave nothing behind them in return for their con- sumption. That portion which he annually saves, as, for the sake of the profit, it is immediately em- ployed as a capital, is consumed in the same manner, and nearly in the same time too, but by a different set of people ; by labourers, manu- facturers, and artificers, who re- produce with a profit the value of their annual consumption. His revenue, we shall suppose, is paid him in money. Had he spent the whole, the food, clothing, and lodging, which the whole could have purchased, would have been distri- buted among the former set of people. By saving a part of it, as that part is for the sake of the profit immediately employed as a capital either by himself or by some other person, the food, cloth- ing, and lodging, which may be purchased with it, are necessarily reserved for the latter. The con- sumption is the same; but the con- sumers are different. By what a frugal man annually saves, he not only affords mainte- tl PRO PRO nance to an additional number of productive hands for that or the ensuing year; but, like the founder of a public workhouse, he esta- blishes as it were a perpetual fund for the maintenance of an equal number in all times to come. The perpetual allotment and destination of this fund, indeed, is not always guarded by any positive law, by any trust-right, or deed of mortmain. It is always guarded, however, by a very powerful principle, the plain and evident interest of every indivi- dual to whom any share of it shall ever belong. No part of it can ever afterwards be employed t.o maintain any but productive hands, without an evident loss to the person who thus perverts it from its proper destination. The prodigal perverts it in this manner. By not confining his ex- pence within his income, he en- croaches upon his capital. Like him who perverts the revenues of some pious foundation to profane pur- purposes, he pays the wages of idle- ness with those funds which the frugality of his forefathers had as it were consecrated to the mainte- nance of industry. By diminishing the funds destined for the employ- ment of productive labour, he necessarily diminishes, so far as it depends upon him, the quantity of that labour which adds a value to the subject upon which it is be- stowed, and consequently the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the whole country, the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. If the prodigality of ome was not compensated by the frugality of others, the conduct of every prodigal, by feeding the idle with the bread of the industrious, tends not only to beggar himself, but to impoverish his country. Though the expence of the pro- digal should be altogether in home- made, and no part of it in foreign commodities, its effect upon the productive funds of the society would still be the same. Every year there would be still a certain quantity of food and clothing, which ought to have maintained produc- tive, employed in maintaining un- productive hands. Every year, therefore, there would still be some diminution in what would otherwise have been the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country. This expence, it may be said, indeed, not being in foreign goods, and not occasioning any, exporta- tion of gold and silver, the same quantity of money would remain in the country as before. But if the quantity of food and clothing, which were thus consumed by unproduc- tive, had been distributed among productive hands, they would have reproduced, together with a profit, the full value of their consumption. The same quantity of money would in this case equally have remained in the country, and there would besides have been a reproduction of an equal value of consumable goods. There would have been two values instead of one. The same quantity of money, be- sides, cannot long remain in any country in which the value of the annual produce diminishes. The sole use of money is to circulate consumable goods. By means of it, provisions, materials, and finished work, are bought and sold, and dis- tributed to their proper consumers. The quantity of money, therefore, PRO PRO which can be annually employed in any country, must be determined by the value of the consumable goods annually circulated within it. These must consist either in the immediate produce of the land and labour of the country itself, or in something which had been pur- chased with some part of that pro- duce. Their value, therefore, must diminish, as the value of that pro- duce diminishes, and along with it the quantity of money which can be employed in circulating them. But the money which, by this annual diminution of produce, is annually thrown out of domestic circulation, will not be allowed to lie idle. The interest of whoever possesses it requires that it heuld be employed ; but having no employment at home, it will, in spite of all laws and pro- hibitions, be sent abroad, and em- ployed in purchasing consumable goods which may be of some use at home. Its annual exportation will, in this manner, continue for some time to add something to the annual consumption of the country, beyond the value of its own annual produce. What, in the days of its prosperity, had been saved from that annual produce, and employed in purchasing gold and silver, will .nrQpn tribute, for some little time, to ( a support its consumption in adver- sity. The exportation of gold and o o&ilver is, in this case, not the m |*ause, but the effect of its declen- -jsjon; and may even, for some little time, alleviate the misery of that declension. The quantity of money, on the contrary, must in every country naturally increase, as the value of rthe annual produce increases. The Yalue of the consumable goods annually circulated within the so- ciety being greater, will require a greater quantity of money to circu- late them. A part of the increased produce, therefore, will naturally be employed in purchasing, wher- ever it is to be had, the additional quantity of gold and silver neces- sary for circulating the rest. The increase of those metals will in this case be the effect, not the cause, of the public prosperity. Gold and silver are purchased every where in the same manner. The food, cloth- ing, and lodging, the revenue and maintenance, of all those whose labour or stock is employed in bringing them fiom the mine to the market, is the price paid for them in Peru as well as in England. The country which has this price to pay, will never be long without the quan- tity of those metals which it has occasion for; and no country will ever long retain a quantity which it has no occasion for. Whatever, therefore, we may imagine the real wealth and revenue of a country to consist in, whether in the value of the annual produce of its land and labour, as plain reason seems to dictate ; or in the quantity of the precious metals which circulate within it, as vulgar prejudices suppose ; in either view of the matter, every prodigal ap- pears to be a public enemy, and , every frugal man a public bene- factor. The effects of misconduct are often the same as those of prodiga- lity. Every injudicious and unsuc- cessful project hi agriculture, mines, fisheries, trade, or manufactures, tends in the same manner to dimi- nish the funds destined for the main- tenance of productive labour. In every such project, though th e capital is consumed by productiv PRO PRO hands only, yet as, by the Injudi- cious manner in which they are employed, they do not reproduce the full value of their consumption, there must always he some dimi- nution in what would otherwise have heen the productive funds of the society. It can seldom happen, indeed, that the circumstances of a great nation can he much affected either by the prodigality or misconduct of individuals, the profusion or impru- dence of some being always more than compensated for by the fru- gality and good conduct of others. With regard to profusion, the principle which prompts to expense is the passion for present enjoy- ment, which, though sometimes violent and very difficult to be re- strained, is in general only momen- tary and occasional. But the prin- ciple which prompts to save is the desire of bettering our condition : a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In the whole interval which separates those two moments, there is scarce perhaps a single instant in which any man is so perfectly and com- pletely satisfied with his situation as to be without any wish of alter- ation" or improvement of any kind. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and wish to better their condition. It is the means the most vulgar and the most ob- vious ; and the most likely way of augmenting their fortune is to save and accumulate some part of what they acquire, either regularly and annually, or upon some extraordi- nary occasions. Though the prin- ciple of expense, therefore, prevails in almost all men upon some occa- sions, and in some men upon almost all occasions ; yet in the greater part of men, taking the whole course of their life at an average, the prin- ciple of frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly. With regard to misconduct, the number of prudent and successful undertakings is everywhere much greater than injudicious and unsuc- cessful ones. After all our com- plaints of the frequency of bank- ruptcies, the unhappy men who fall into this misfortune make hut. a very small part of the whole number en- gaged in trade and all other sorts of business ; not much more perhaps than one in a thousand. Bank- ruptcy is perhaps the greatest and most humiliating calamity that can befal an innocent man. The greater part of men, therefore, are suffi- ciently careful to avoid it. Some, indeed, do not avoid it ; as some do not avoid the gallows. Great nations are* never impove- rished by private, though they sometimes are by public prodigality and misconduct. The whole, or almost the whole, public revenue is in most countries employed in main- taining unproductive hands. Such are the people who compose a^nu- merous and splendid court ; a great ecclesiastical establishment ; great fleets and armies ; who in tiffle of peace produce nothing, and in -time of war acquire nothing whicfrcan compensate the expense of main- taining them, even while the war lasts. Such people, as they them- selves produce nothing, are > all maintained by the produce of other mens' labour. When multiplied, therefore, to an unnecessary mini- ber, they may in a particular year PRO PRO consume so great a share of this produce as not to leave a sufficiency for maintaining the productive la- bourers, who should re-produce it next year. The next year's pro- duce, therefore, will be less than that of the foregoing ; and if the same disorder should continue, that of the third year will be still less than that of the second. Those unproductive hands, who should he maintained by a part only of the spare revenue of the people, may consume so great a share of their whole revenue, and thereby oblige so great a number to encroach upon their capitals, and upon the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour, that all the fru- gality and good conduct of indivi- duals may not be able to compen- sate the waste and degradation of produce occasioned by this violent and forced encroachment. This frugality and good conduct, however, is, upon most occasions, it appears from experience, suffi- cient to compensate, not only for private prodigality and misconduct of individuals, but the public extra- vagance of government. The uni- form, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as pri- vate opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government and of the greatest errors of administration. Like the unknown principle of animal life, it .frequently restores health and vigour to the constitution, in spite not only of the disease, but of the absurd prescription of the doctor. A- Smith. PHOFESSOHS IN UNIVERSITIES, cm- CUM6TANCE9 WHICH DETERMINE THE MERIT OF. In countries where church-benefices are the greater part of them very moderate, a chair in a university is generally a better establishment than a church- benefice. The universities have, in this case, the picking and choo- sing of their members from all the churchmen of the country, who, in every country, constitute by far the most numerous class of men of letters. Where church benefices, on the contrary, are many of them very considerable, the chuxch na- turally draws from the universities the greater part of their eminent men of letters r- who generally find some patron who does himself ho- nour by procuring them church- preferment. In the former situa- tion, we are likely to find the uni- versities filled with the most emi- nent men 'of letters that are to be found in the country. In the latter we are likely to find few emi- nent among them ; and those few among the youngest members of the society, who are likely to be drained away from it, before they can have acquired experience and . knowledge enough to be of much use to it. It is observed by M. de Voltaire, that Father Porree, a Jesuit of no great eminence in the republic of letters, was the only professor they had ever had in France whose works were worth the reading. In a country which has produced so many eminent men of letters, it must appear somewhat singular, that scarce one of them should have been a pro- fessor in a university. The famous Gassendi was, in the beginning of his life, a professor of the univer- sity of Aix. Upon the first dawn- PRO PRO in'g of his genius, it was roprc sented to him that by going into the church, he could easily find a much more quiet and comfortable subsistence, as well as a better si- tuation for pursuing his studies and he immediately followed the advice. The observation of M. de Voltaire may be applied, I believe, not only to France, but to all other Roman Catholic countries. We very rarely find, in any of them, an eminent man of letters who is a professor in a university, except, perhaps, in the professions of law and physic ; professions from which the church is not likely to draw them. After the church of Rome, that of England is by far the richest and best endowed church in Christendom. In Eng- land, accordingly, the church is continually draining the universities of all their best and ablest mem- bers ; and an old college tutor, who is known and distinguished in Europe as an eminent man of let- ters, is as rarely to be found there as in any Roman Catholic country. In Geneva, on the contrary, in the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, in the Protestant countries of Ger- many, in Holland, in Scotland, in Sweden, and Denmark, the most eminent men of letters whom those countries have produced, have, not all indeed , but the. far greater part of them, been professors in univer- sities. In those countries the uni- versities are continually draining the church of all its most eminent men of letters. A. Smith. PROMISES, AND THEIR OBLIGATION. The only intelligible reason why men ought to keep their promises is this; that it is for the advantage of so- ciety they should keep them ; and if they do not, that, *s far as punishment will go, they should be made to keep them. It is for the advantage of the whole number that the promises of each individual should be kept; and, rather than tliey should not be kept, that such individuals as fail to keep them should be punished. If it be asked how this appears ? the answer is at hand : Such is the benefit to gain, and mischief to avoid, by keeping them, as much more than compen- sates the mischief of so much pu- nishment as is requisite to oblige men to it. Suppose the constant and universal effect of an observance of promises were to produce mischief, would it then be mens' duty to ob- serve them? Would it then be right to make laws, and apply punishment to oblige to observe them?" No (it may perhaps be replied); but for this reason : Among promises, there are some that, as every one allows, arc void: a promise that is in itself void, cannot, it is true, create any obli- gation ; but allow the promise to be valid, and it is the promise itself that creates the obligation, and nothing else." The fallacy of this argument it is" easy to perceive. For what is 1t then the promise depends on for its validity? What is it that being present makes it valid ? What is it that being want- ing makes it void? To acknowledge that any one promise may be void, is to acknowledge, that if any other is binding, it is not merely because it is a promise. That circumstance, then, whatever it be, on which the validity of a promise depends, that circumstance, I say, and not the promise itself, must, it is plain, be the cause of the obligation which a promise is apt in general to carry with it, and not the intrinsic obli- gation of promises upon those who PRO PRO make them. Now this other princi- ple that still recurs upon us, what other can it be than the principle of utility? the principle which fur- nishes us with that reason, which alone depends not on any higher reason, but which is itself the sole and all-sufficient reason for every point of practice whatsoever. J. Bent ham. PROPERTY. Laws and conventions arc necessary in order to unite duties with piivileges, and confine justice to its proper ohjects. In a state of nature, where every thing is com- mon, I owe nothing to those I have promised nothing; I acknowledge nothing to be the property of ano- ther, but what is useless to myself. In a state of society, the case is dif- ferent, where the rights of each are fixed by law. Each member of the community, in becoming such, devotes himself to the public from that moment, in such a state as he then is, with all his powers and abilities ; of which abilities - his possessions make a part. Not that in consequence of this act the possession changes its nature by changing hands, and becomes actual property in those of the sovereignty; but as the power of the community is incomparably greater than that of an individual, the public posses- sion is in fact more fixed and irre- vocable, without being more lawful, at least with regard to foreigners. For every state is, with regard to its members, master of all their possessions by virtue of the social compact ; which in a state, serves as the basis of all other rights ; but with regard to other powers or states, it is master of them only by the right of prior occupancy, which it derives from individuals. The right of prior occupancy, although more real than that of the strongest, becomes not an equitable right till after the establishment of property. Every man had naturally a right to every thing which is necessary for his subsistence; but the positive act by which he is made the pro- prietor of a certain possession ex- cludes him from the property of any other. His portion being assigned him, he ought to confine himself to that, and hath no longer any right to a community of possession. Hence it is, that the right of prior occupancy, thought but of little force in a state of nature, is so re- spectable in that of society. The point to which we are chiefly direct- ed in the consideration of this right rather what belongs to another, than what does not belong to us. It is easy to conceive, how the united and contiguous estates of individuals become the territory of the public, and in what manner the right of sovereignty, extending itself from the subjects to the lands they occupy, becomes at once both real and personal ; a circumstance which lays the possessors under a state of the greatest dependence, and makes even their own abilities a security for their fidelity. This is an advan- tage which does not appear to have been duly attended to by sovereigns among the ancients ; who, by styling themselves only Kings of the Per- sians, the Scythians, the Macedo- nians, seemed to look on themselves only as chief of men, rather than as masters of a country. Modern princes more artfully style them- selves the Kings of England, France, Spain, &c., and thus, by claiming the territory itself, are secure of the inhabitants. What is very sin- gular in this alienation is, that the community, in accepting the posses- PRO PKO sions of individuals, is fio far from despoiling them thereof, that, on the contrary, it only confirms them in such possession, by converting an usurpation into an actual right, and a bare possession into a real pro- perty. The possessors also being considered as the depositories of the public wealth, while their rights are respected by all the members of the state, and maintained by all its force against a foreign power, they acquire, if I may so say, by a cession advantageous to the public, and still more so to themselves, every thing they ceded by it : a paradox which is easily explained by a distinction between the rights which the sore- reign and the proprietor have in the same fund. It may also happen, that men may form themselvei into a society before thoy have any possessions ; and that, acquiring a sufficient territory for all, they may possess it in common, or divide it among them either equally, or in such different proportions as may be determined by the sovereign. Now, in whatsoever manner such acqui- sition may be made, the right which each individual has to his own estate must be always subordinate to the right which the community hath over the possessions of all ; for, without this, -there would be nothing binding in the social tie, nor any real force in the exercise of the supreme power. Rousseau. PROPERTY, THE ORIGIN OF. Accord- ing to Mr. Locke, " A law is a rule prescribed to the people, with the sanction of some punishment 01 re- ward, proper to determine their \\ills. All laws (according to him) suppose rewards or punishments attached to the observation or in- fraction of them." The definition laid down, The man who violates, among a polished people, a convention not attended with this sanction, is not punish- able: he is however unjust. But could he be unjust before the estab- lishment of all convention, and the formation of a language proper to express injustice ? No : for in that state man can have no idea of pro- perty, nor consequently of justice. Injustice, therefore, cannot precede the establishment of a convention, a law, and a common interest. Now what does the establisment of laws suppose ? The union of men ih society, greater or less, and the formation of a language proper to communicate a certain number of ideas. Now, if there be savages whose language does not contain above five or six sounds or cries, the formation of a language must be the work of several centuries. Until that work be completed, men without convention and laws must live in a state of war. That con- dition is a state, it may be said, of misery; and misery being the creator of laws, must force men to accept them. Before the public in- terest has declared the law of first possession to be held sacred, what can be the plea of a savage inhabi- tant of a woody district, from which a stronger savage had driven him out? What right have you, he would say, to .drive me from my pos- session ? What right hare you, says the other, to that possession ? Chance, replies the first, led my steps thither: it belongs to me be- cause I inhabit it, and land belongs to the first occupier. What is that right of the first occupier? replica the other ; if chance first led you to this spot, the same chance has given me the force necessary to drive you from it. Which of these PRO PftO t\ro rights deeerret the preference I Would you know all the superiority of mine ? Look up to heaven, and see the eagle that darts upon the dove : turn thine eyes to the earth, and see the lion that preys upon the stag : look toward the sea, and be- hold the goldfish devoured by the shark. All things in nature show that the weak is a prey to the powerful. Force is the gift of the gods ; by that I have a right to possess all that I can seize. Hea- ven, by giving me these nervous arms, has declared its will. Begone from hence ; yield to superior force, or dare ihe combat. What answer can be given to the discourse f this savage, or with what injustice can he be accused, if the law of first oc- cupation be not yet established ? Justice then supposes the establish- ment of laws. The observance of justice supposes an equilibrium in the power of the inhabitants. It ia by a mutual and salutary fear that men are made to be just to each other. Justice is unknown to the solitary savage. It is at a period that men, by increasing, are forced to manure the earth, that they per- ceive the necessity of securing to the labourer his harvest, and the property of the land he cultivates. Before cultivation, it is no wonder that the strongest should think he has as much right over a piece of barren ground as the first occupier. ~Helvetius. PROPHECIES. The truth of prophecies can never be proved without the concurrence of three things, which cannot possibly happen . These are, that I should in the first place be a witness to the delivery of the pro- phecy ; next, that I should also be a witness to the event ; lastly, that it should be clearly demonstrated to CIA that euoh event conid not followed by accident : for though a prophecy were as precise, clear, and determinate as an axiom of geome- try, yet as the perspicuity of the prediction, made at random, does not render the accomplishment of it impossible, that accomplishment, when it happens, proves nothing in fact concerning the foreknowledge of him who predicted it. Rousseau. ON THE SAMB SUBJECT. All prophe- cies are real miracles ; and as such only can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not ex- ceed the capacity of human nature to foretel future events, it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a Divine mission or authority from heaven. Hume. PROTESTANTISM, THE PRINCIPLES OP. When the Reformers separated themselves from the church of Rome, they accused it of error ; and in order to correct this error at the fountain-head, they interpreted the Scriptures in a different sense from what the church had been accus- tomed to. When they were asked, on what authority they venture thus to depart from received doc- trines? they answered, on their own authority; on that of their reason. They said, the meaning of the Scriptures was plain and in- telligible to all mankind, as far as they related to salvation: that every man was a competent judge of doctrines, and might interpret the Bible, which is the rule of faith, ac- cording to his own mind : that by this means all would agree as to essential points; and as to those on which they would not agree, they must be unessential. Here then was private judgment established as the only interpreter oftha Scriptujeg: thus was the au- 2 v PRO PRO thority of the chuiQh at o.noe ro- jcted, and the religious tenets of individuals left to their own parti- cular jurisdiction. Such are the two fundamental points of the Re- formation; to acknowledge the Bible as the rule of belief, and to admit of no other interpreter of its meaning than one's self. These two points combined, form the principle on which the Protestants separated from the church of Rome: nor could they do less, without being in- consistent with themselves ; forwhat authority of interpretation could they pretend to, after 'having re- jected that of the church? But it inay be 'asked, how on such princi- ples tha Reformed could ever be united among themselves? How, every one having his own particular way of thinking, they could form themselves into a body, and make head against the Catholic Church ? This it was necessity for thorn to do; and therefore they united with regard to this one point, they ac- knowledged every one to be a com- petent judge as far as related to himself. They tolerated, as in such circumstances they ought, every in- terpretation but one, viz., that which prohibited other interpretations. Now this interpretation, the only one they rejected, was that of the Catholics. It was necessary for them unanimously to proscribe the Romish church, which in its turn equally proscribed them all. Even the diversity of their manner of thinking from all others was the common bond of union. They were so many little stages in league against a great power, each losing nothing of its own independence by their general confederacy. Thus was the Reformation esta- blished ,and thus it ought to he main- It is true, that the opinion of the majority may be proposed to the whole, as the most probable manner, or as the most authentic. The sovereign may even reduce it into form, and recommend it to those who are appointed to teach it ; be- cause some rule and order ought to be observed in public instructions: and in fact, no person's liberty is in- fringed by it, as none are compelled to be taught against their will. But it does not hence follow, that Indi- viduals are obliged directly to adopt the interpretations thus proposed to them, or that doctrine which is thus publicly taught. Every one remains, after all, a Judge for him- self, and in that acknowledges no other authority than his own. Good instructions ought less to fix the choice we ought to make, than to qualify us for making such choice. Such is the true spirit of the Reformation; such its real foundation ; according to which pri- vate judgment is left to determine in matters of faith, which are to be deduced from the common stan- dard, i. e., the gospel. Freedom is so essential also to reason, that it cannot, if it would, subject itself to authority. If we infringe ever so little on this principle of private judgment, Protestantism instantly falls to the ground. Now the liberty of interpreting the Scripture, not only includes the right of explaining its several pas- sages, but that of remaining in doubt witli regard to such as ap- pear dubious, and also that of not pretending to comprehend those which are incomprehensible. The Protestant religion is tolerant from principle; it is essentially so, as innch as it is possible for a religion to be ; since the only tenet it does PRO PRO not (t>lerftte ' (hat ol pereca tion.Rousteau. PROVIDBNCB, AND A FUTURE STATE.- Whcn we infer any particular caus from an effect, we must proportio the one to the other ; and can neve be allowed to ascribe to the caus any qualities but what are exactl sufficient to produce the effect. J the cause, assigned for any effect be not sufficient to produce it, must either reject the cause, or ad( to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect. Bu if we ascribe to it other qualities or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we indulge the licence of conjecture, and suppose qualities and energies without reason. The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be brute unconscrou matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to assign to it any qualities beyond what are precisely requisite to pro- duce the effect : nor can we, by any rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects from it beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from the sight of one of Zcuxis's pictures, could know that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in- stone and marble than in colours. Allowing, therefore, the gods, to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe; it follows, that they possess that precise de- gree of power, intelligence, and be- nevolence, which appears in their workmanship ; but nothing further can ever be proved. So far as any attribute at present appears, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposition of further attributes is mere hypothesis ; much more the supposition, that in distant periods of time and place) there has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attri- butes, and a scheme of administra- tion more euitable to such imagi- nary virtues. The Divinity may possibly possess attributes "which we have never seen exerted; may be governed by principles of action whch we cannot discover to be satisfied. All this may be allowed. But still this is mere possibilitr and hypothesis. If there be an* marks of distributive justice in the world, we may conclude from thence, that since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If there be no marks of a .distributive justice in the world, we have no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If it be said, that the justice of the gods at present exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent, I an- swer, that we have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so fur aswesee it atpresentexert itself. In works of human art and con- trivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause, and, returning back from the cause, to- form new inferences concerning the effect, and examine the alterations which it has probably undergone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of this manner of reasoning ? Plainly this : that man is a being, whom we know by experience, whose motives and de- signs we are acquainted with, and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connection and co- herence according to the laws which nature has established for the government of such a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work had proceeded from the skill and industry of man ; as we are PRO PfiO bfherwke acquainted with the na- ture of the animal, we can draw ai hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him; and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it were impossible for us to argue in this manner ; because our knowledge of all the qualities which we ascribe to him., being in that case derived from the produc- tion, it is impossible they could point to any thing further, or be the foundation of any new Inferences. If we saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human foot, we should conclude from our other experience, that there was probably auother foot, which also left its impression, though effaced by time or other ac- cident. Here we mount from the effect to the cause ; and descending again from the cause, infer altera- tions in the effect: but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning. We compre- hend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations con- cerning the usual figure and mem- bers of that species of animal; without which this method of ar- gument would be fallacious and sophistical. The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his produc- tions, and is a single being in the universe, nor comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can, by analogy, infer any attri- bute or quality in him. As the uni- verse shows wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shows a particular degree of theae perfections re i/ifer a parti- degree of them* precfeefy ddapted to the effect which we exa-r mine. The great source of our mis- take in all our reasonings on the works of nature is, that we tacitly consider ourselves as in the place of the Supreme Being ; and con- clude, that he will, on every occa- sion, observe the same conduct which we ourselves, in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible. But besides that the ordinary course of nature may con- vince us, that almost every thing is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours ; besides this, it must evidently appear con- trary to all rule of analogy to rea- son from the intentions and pro- jects of men, to those of a Being so different and so much superior, who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the eun to a waxen taper; and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection. It may, indeed, be matter of doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect (as we have all along supposed), or to be of so singular or particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object that has ever fallen under our observation. It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined that we can infer the one from the other ; and were an effect presented which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species, we could form no conjec- ture or inference at all concerning its cause. The universe is such an effect : it is quite singular and un- paralleled, antf puppoBe$ to be the fUB PUB proof of a lX4f y ; a cwiee no less singular and unparalleled. If expe- rience, and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides in infe- rences of this nature, both the effect and cause must bear a simi- larity and resemblance to other effects and causes which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other. Hume. PUBLIC SPIRIT AND PRIVATE VIRTOES, NO NECESSARY CONNECTION BE- TWEEN. Good laws may beget order and moderation in the government, where the manners and customs have instilled little humanity and justice into the tempers of men. The most illustrious period of the Roman history, considered in a poli- tical view, is that between the be- ginning of the first and end of the last Punic war; the due balance between the nobility and people being then fixed by the contest of the tribunes, and not being yet lost by the extent of conquests. Yet, at this very time, the horrid practice of poisoning was so common, that, during part of a season, a praetor punished capitally for this crime above three thousand persons in a part of Italy; and found informa- tions of this kind still multiplying upon him. There is a similar, rather a worse instance, in the more early times of the common-wealth; so depraved in private life were that people, whom in their histories we so much admire. It seems they were really more virtuous during the time of the two triumvirates, when they were tearing their com- mon country to pieces, and spread- ing slaughter and desolation over the face of the earth merely for the choice of tyrants. Hume. PUBLIC WORKS, A>T> PUBMC INS ftotfa, ftott TO HB One of the duties of the sovereign or common wealth is that of erect- ing and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual, or small number of individuals; and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual, or small number of individuals, should erect or maintain. The perfor- mance of this duty requires, too, very different degrees of expence in the different periods of society. After the public institutions and public works necessary for the de- fence of the society, and for the administration of justice, the other works and institutions of this kind are chiefly those for facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for promoting the instruction of the people. The institutions for in- struction are of two kinds; those for the education of the youth, and those for the instmction of people of all ages. A. Smith. PUNISHMENTS, THE POWER OF. Ess perience shows, that in countries remarkable for the lenity of their laws, the spirit of the inhabitants is as much affected by slight penal- ties as in other countries by severer punishments. If an inconveniency or abuse arises in the state, a violent Go- vernment endeavours suddenly to redress it ; and, instead of putting the old laws in execution, it esta- blishes some cruel punishment,which instantly puts a stop to the evil. But the spring of Government hereby loses its elasticity: the ima- gjnjition grows Accustomed to the PUN PUN severe afi well as to the milde punishment : and as the fear of th latter diminishes, they are soo ohliged in every case to have re course to the former. Robherie on the highway were grown commo in some countries; in order to re medy this evil, they invented th punishment of breaking upon th wheel, the terror of which put i stop for a while to this mischievou practice; but soon after robberie n the highways became as common as ever. Mankind must not be governec with too much severity ; we ough to make a prudent use of the means which nature has given us to con- duct them. If we inquire into th cause of all human corruption, we shall find that they proceed from the impunity of criminals, and not from the moderation of punish- ments. Let us follow nature, who ha given shame to man for his scourge; and let the heaviest part of the punishment be the infamy attend- ing it. But if there be eome countries where shame is not a consequence of punishment, this must be owing to tyranny, which has inflicted the same penalties on honest men and villains. And if there are others where men are deterred only by cruel punishments, we may be sure that this must, in a great measure, arise from the violence of the Go- vernment which has used such pe- nalties for slight transgressions. It often happens that a legislator, desirous of remedying an abuse, thinks of nothing else ; his eyes are open only to this object, and shut to its inconveniences. When the abuse is redressed, you see only the severity of the legislator: yet there remains an evil in the stair that has sprung from this icverity ; the minds of the people are cor- rupted, and become habituated to despotism. There are two sorts of corrup- tion one when the people do not observe the laws ; the other when they are corrupted by the laws : an incurable evil, because it is in the - very remedy itself.- Montesquieu. PUNISHMENTS. Among a people hardly yet emerged from barbarity, punishments should be most severe as strong impressions are required ; but in proportion as the minds of men become softened by their inter- course in society, the severity of punishments should be diminished, if it be intended that the necessary relation between the object and the sensation should be maintained.- That a punishment may not be an act of violence of one, or of many, against a private member of so- ciety, it should be public, imme- diate, and necessary; the least pos- sible in the case given ; propor- tioned to the crime, and determined by the laws. Beccaria. 'UNISHMENTS, CAPITAL. The fre- quency of executions is always a sign of the weakness or indolence of Government. There is no male- factor who might not be made good for something ; nor ought any per- son to be put to death, even by way of example, unless such as could "not be preserved without endangering the community. In a well-governed state there are but few executions; not because there are many pardoned, but because there are few criminals: whereas, when a state i.? on the decline, the multiplicity of crimes occasions their impunity. Under the Roman republic, neither the Senate nor the PUX PUN Consuls etcr attempted to grant pardons: even the people never did this, although they sometimes re- called their own sentence. The fre- quency of pardons indicates, that in a short time crimes will not stand in need of them ; and every one may see the consequence of such con- duct. Rousseau. PUNISHMENTS, THE INTENT OF. The intent of punishments is not to tor- ment a sensible being, nor to undo a crime already committed. Is it possible that torments and useless cruelty, the instrument of furious fanaticism, or of the impotency of tyrants, can be authorised by a poli- tical body; which, so far from being influenced by passion, should be the cool moderator of the passions of individuals? Can the groans of a tortured wretch recal the time past, or reverse the crime he has committed? -The end of punish- ment, therefore, is no other than to pi event the criminal from doing further injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like offence. Such punishments, therefore, and such a mode of in- flicting them, ought to be chosen, as will make the strongest and most lasting impressions on the minds of Others, with the least torment to the body of the criminal. Bcc- curia. PUNISHMENTS, IMMEDIATE. The more immediately after the commission of a crime a punishment is inflicted, the more just and useful it will be. It will be more just, because it spares the criminal the cruel and superfluous torment of uncertainty, which increases in proportion to the strength of his imagination and the sense of his weakness ; and because the privation of liberty, being a punishment, ought to be inflicted be/ore condemnation but for & short a time as possible. The time should be determined by the neces- sary preparation for the trial, and the right of priority in the oldest prisoners. Theimprisonment should be attended with as little severity as possible. The confinement ought not to be closer than is requisite to prevent his flight, or his concealing the proofs of his crime, and the trial should be conducted with all possible expedition. Can there be a more cruel contrast than that between the indolence of a judge and the painful anxiety of the ac- cused; the comforts and pleasures of an insensible magistrate, and the filth and misery of the prisoner? The degree of the punishment and the consequences of a crime, ought to be so contrived, as to have the greatest possible effect on others, with the least possible pain to the delinquent. An immediate punish- ment is more useful; because the smaller the interval of time between the punishment and the crime, the stronger and more lasting will ba the association of the two ideas, crime and punishment ; so that they may be considered, one as the-^ cause, and the other as the una- voidable and necessary effect. It is then of the greatest importance, that the punishment should succeed the crime as immediately as pos- sible, if we intend that, in the rude minds of the multitude, the se- ducing picture of the advantage arising from the crime should in- stantly awake the attendant idea of punishment. Delaying the pu- nishment serves only to separate- these two ideas : and thus affect* the minds of the spectators rather as being a terrible sight, than fhe necesary consequence of a crime, PUN PUN the horror which hould contribute to heighten the idea of punishment There is another excellent me- thod of strengthening this impor- tant connexion between the ideas 01 crime and punishment ; that is, to make the punishment as analogous as possible to the nature of the crime; in order that the punishment may lead the mind to consider the crime in a different point of view from that in which it was placed by the flattering idea of promised advan- t age s. Beccar ia . PUNISHMEJJTS.INFAMOUS.-- The punish raent of iufamy is a mark of the public disapprobation. This is not always in the power of the laws. It is necessary that the infamy in- flicted by the laws should be the same as that which results from the relations of things, from universal morality, or from that particular system adopted by the nation and the laws which governs the opinion of the vulgar. If, on the contrary, one be different from the other, either the laws will no longer be respected, or the received notions of morality and probity will vanish ; which are always too weak to resist the force of example. If we declare those actions infamons which are in themselves indifferent, we lessen the infamy of those which are really infamous. The punishment of in- famy is properly adapted to those injuries which affect the honour of the citizens in any government : but it should not be too frequently in- flicted, for the power of opinion grows weaker by repetition ; nor should it be inflicted on a number of persons at the same time, for the infamy of many resolves itself into the infamy of none. Bcccaria. PrNisuMKNTs, MILD. Crimes arc more effectually prevented by th cer- tainty than the seretity of punish- ment. The certainty of a small punishment will make a stronger impression than the fear of one more severe, if attended with the hopes "of escaping; for it is the nature of mankind to be terrified at the approach of the smallest in- evitable evil, whilst hope, the best gift of heaven, hath the power of dispelling the apprehension of a greater ; especially if supported by examples of impunity, which weak- ness or avarice too frequently afford. If punishments be very severe, men are naturally led to the perpetra- tion of other crimes, to avoid the punishment due to the first.* In proportion as punishments be- come more cruel, the minds of men, as a fluid rises to the same height with that which surrounds it, grow hardened and insensible ; and the force of the passions still continuing, in the space of an hundred years the wheel terrifies no more than for- merly the prison. That a punish- ment may produce the effect re- quired, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed the good expected from the crime ; including in the calculation the certainty of the punishment and the privation of the expected advantage. All se- verity beyond this is superfluous, and therefore'tyrannical. -Men regulate their conduct by the re- peated impression of evils they know, uot by those with which they are unacquainted. Let us, for example, suppose two nations, in one of which the greatest punishment is perpe- tual slavery, and in the other tha wheel. Both will inspire the same degree of terror ; and there can be norensons for increasing the punish- ments of the first, which are not equally valid for augmenting those REA REA of the second to more lasting aiu ingenious modes of tormenting.~ The most artful contrivance o punishments can never establish an exact proportion between the crime and the punishment ; the human frame can only suffer to a certain degree, beyond which it is impos- sible to proceed, be the enormity o the crime ever so great. Severe punishments also occasion impu- nity. Human nature is limited no less in evil than in good. Excessive barbarity can never be more than temporary; it being impossible that it should be supported by a perma- nent system of legislation ; for if the laws be too cruel, they must be altered, or anarchy and impunity will succeed. Beccaria. REASON. Of all the words in our lan- guage, the meaning of the word rea- son is the most ambiguous. Some- times it is taken for that fitness in subjects to one another which is natural and independent on will and pleasure ; as when we say, that such or such a thing is agreeable or con- trary to the reason of things. Some- times it is taken for human capa- city and comprehension ; as in that trite observation, That many things are above our reason which are not contrary to our reason : for the meaning of that sentence must be, if it has any meaning at all, that there are many things which we have no capacity to comprehend. And this, indeed, every man who reflects ever so little upon human nature, must be fully convinced of; for we can no more argue upon such subjects, than we can describe objects which are confessedly out of sight. Sometimes the word reason is taken for the cause or induce- ment which prevailed upon us to act in this or that manner rather than any other ; as when we say, 2 z this waa my reason for acting thui or thus. Sometimes it signifies the argument by which we prove any truth or detect any falsehood ; as we say a thing must be true or false for this or that reason. Sometimes it signifies the human intellect or understanding; which is that fa- culty of the mind by which it per- ceives objects suitable to it, and which may be communicated to it by various means. Sometimes by reason we mean the moral sense, moral virtue in general, or more particularly the virtue of justice; as when we say, it is contrary to rea- son to make one law for ourselves, and another for other people : and thus we call a man good, who is governed more by [reason than ap- petite and passion. And same- times it is taken for the power of judging or drawing a conclusion from premises ; which is the great- est mean by which we arrive at knowledge. The difference between, the knowledge of God and his intel- ligent creatures is, that he knows and sees all things, with all their possible combinations and circum- stances, by intuition at one view : whereas we come to our knowledge by slow degrees, and after many de- ductions of one thing from another. But as all good things come from God, we could not possibly have any knowledge at all, unless he had been pleased to communicate to us some portioa of his own divine knowledge, and made us to see and perceive by intuition, and at the first view, some certain truths that we call Axioms, Data, or Self-evi- dent Principles ; which, by the use of our reason or faculty of com- paring and judging, should lead us on to other truths, and raise us step by step to larger views, and more extensive knowledge. This is the REA REA most proper us of the word Rea- son ; and this includes the intellec- tual, the moral and the discussive powers of the mind : the two former as certain principles ; the latter as the power of comparing objects, which are thus presented to us, with each other, and therebx find- ing out wherein they agree or dis- agree. This is what we commonly c^l! reasoning or exercising our rea- son. This is the characteristic of human nature; this distinguishes :man from all the other animals of the earth, and makes him wiser than the beasts that perish. jRo- bertson.N THE SAME SUBJECT. By natural religion, I mean the principles of morality common to mankind. New- ton believed that God having given the same senses to all men, the same wants, the same sentiments; consequently the same rude notions, every where the foundation of so- ciety, prevail among all mankind. It is certain, that God has given to bees and ants something to induce them to live in common, which he has not given to wolves nor falcons. It is certain, from all mens living in society, there is in their essence a secret tie, by which God intended to connect them together. Now, if at a certain age, the ideas flowing from the senses to men, all organ- ized in the same manner, did not gradually give the same principles necessary to society, it is certain that such society could not subsist. This is the reason why truth, grati- tude, friendship, &c. are esteemed from Siam to Mexico. It has always seemed strange to ma, that so wise a man as Locke should have advanced, that there is REL REL no notion of good and evil common to all men. This is a mistake. It is founded on the narratives oi travellers ; who say, that in some countries it is customary for parents to eat their children, and to eat women when past childbearing ; that in others, certain enthusiasts, who make use of she-asses instead of women, are honoured, with the name of saints. But there is no- thing more common than for them to see through a false medium, give a false account of what they have seen ; to mistake the intention, es- pecially in a nation to whose lan- guage they are strangers; and, in fine, to judge of the manners of a whole people by a particular fact, whose circumstances are to them unknown. Were a Persian at Lisbon, at Madrid, at Goa, on the day of an Auto-da-Fe, he would think, and not without an appearance of rea- son that the Christians sacrificed men to God. Let him look into the almanacks, sold all over Europe among the lower class, and he will conclude, that we all believe in the effects of the moon ; though this is so far from being true, that we laugh at them. Thus, should a traveller tell me, for instance, that the sa- vages eat their parents from fillial affection ; I should answer, that, first, the fact is dubious ; secondly, if it be true, it will be so far from destroying the idea of respect due to parents, that it is probably a bar- barous manner of showing tender- ness ; a horrible mistake of the law of nature. For possibly they kill their parents from mere duty, to free them from the troubles of old age, or the fury of an enemy : and if they thus give their parents a tomb within their own bodies, in- stead of being devoured by savage conquerors, this custom, however shocking it may appear to human nature, necessarily flows from a goodness of heart. Natural reli- gion is nothing more than this law known through the world, Do as you would be done by. Now the savage who kills his father to save him from the enemy, and who buries him in his breast, that he may not find a grave in the bowels of his enemy, wishes that his son might treat him in the same manner as if reduced to the same exigency. This law of treating our neighbour as ourselves, flows naturally from the rudest notions, and sooner or later is heard in the hearts of all men ; for having all the same reason, the fruits of that tree must have a re- semblance : and they do, in reality, resemble each other ; for, in every society, the name of virtue is given to whatever is thought useful to the society. Name me a country upon earth, or a society of ten persons, where what tends to promote the common good is not esteemed ; and when you have done this, I will allow there is no natural law. The law is doubtless infinitely varied ; but, can we infer from hence any thing more than that it exists? Matter every where receives different forms ; yet every where it retains its nature. It is in vain to say, that theft was enjoined at Lacedemon ; but, in a city where every thing was common, a permission to take dexterously what private persons appropriated to themselves contrary to law, was a method of punishing the epirit of appropriation prohibited among that people. Meum and luum was a crime, for which what we call theft was the punishment ; and among them, REL REL as among us, there was some ordc made by God for us all, as he madi for the ants to live in society. Th< disposition we all have for living in society, is the foundation of the law of nature. Voltaire. RELIGION OF THE FIRST MAN. Af- ter the formation of societies, it is credible that there was some reli- gion, a kind of rustic worship. Man entirely occupied with his wants could not soar to the Author of life He could not be acquainted with those causes and effects, which to the wise proclaim an eternal Archi- tect. The knowledge of a God, cre- ator, requiter, and avenger, is the fruit of cultivated reason, or ol revelation. All people were for ages what the inhabitants of the several coasts of Africa, and of several islands, and half the Americans, are at pre- sent. Those people have no idea of a sole God, creator of all things, omnipresent, and existing of him- self from all eternity. They should not, however, be called Atheists in the usual sense; for they do not deny a Supreme Being ; they are not acquainted with him ; they have no idea of him. The Caffres take an insect for their protector, the Negroes a serpent. Among the Americans, some adore the moon, others a tree. Several have no worship whatever. The Peruvians, when they be- came polished, adored the sun. Ei- ther Mango Capac had made them believe that he was the sun of that planet, or a dawn of reason made them believe tht they owed some acknowledgement to the planet which animated nature* In order j to know how these different doc-j trines and superstitions gained! 3 c ground, it seems to me necessary to follow the career of human un- derstanding left alone without a guide. The inhabitants of a vil- lage, who are little better than sa- vages, perceive the fruits which should nourish them perish : an in- undation carries away some cabins; others are destroyed by thunder. Who has done them this mischief? It could be none of their fellow- citizens, for they have equally suf- fered. It is therefore some secret power that has afflicted them, and must therefore be appeased. How is it to be effected ? By using it as they do those whom they are desi- rous of pleasing ; in making it some small presents. There is a serpent in the neighbourhood ; it is very likely the serpent : they offer him milk near the cavern whither he re- tires ; and from that time he be- comes sacred : he is invoked when they are at war with the neighbour- ing village, who, on their side, have , chosen another protector. Other little colonies find them- selves in the same situation. But there being no object near them to excite their terror and adoration, they call in general the being whom they suspect has dene them mis- chief, the master, the lord, the chief, the ruler. The idea of this being more conformable than the others to the dawn of reason, which increases and strengthens with time, posesses every one's head when the nation is become more numerous. Thus, we find tha,t many nations have had no other God than their master, their lord. Such was Adonai among the Phenicians ; Baal, Milkom, and Adad, with the people of Syria. All these names signified nothing more than, " The lord," " The powerful," REL REL This was doubtless the origin o: that opinion, which so generally and so long prevailed, that every people was protected by the divinity they had chosen. This idea was so deeply looted in men, that in after- times it was adopted by the Jew themselves. Nothing was more common than to adopt strange gods. The Greek acknowledged those of the Egyp- tians ; not Apis's bull and Anubis' dog, but Ammon, and the twelve great gods. The Romans adored all the gods of the Greeks. Except in the time of war and bloody fana- ticism, all nations were well satis- fied that their neighbours had their own particular gods, and imitated frequently the worship and ceremo- nies of strangers. The Jews them- selves imitated the circumcision of the Arabs and Egyptians ; they of- ten adpred the Baal and Belphegor of their neighbours. The most polished people of Asia, on this side the Euphrates, adored the planets. The Chaldeans, before the time of Zoroaster, paid homage to the sun ; as did afterwards the Peruvians in another hemisphere. This error must be very natural to man, as it had so many followers in Asia and America. A small and half savage tribe has but one pro- tector. Does it become more nu- merous ? The number of its gods is increased. The Egyptians began by adoring Isbeth or Isis, and they at last adored cats. The first ho- mage the rustic Romans paid was to Mars; that of the Romans, mas- ters of Europe, was to the goddess of marriage and to the god of thieves. Yet Cicero, all the philo- sophers, and those initiated, ac- knowledged a supreme and omnipo- tent God. They were all brought back to that point of reason from whence savage men had departed by instinct. The Apotheosis could not have been devised till long after the first kinds of worship. It is not natural immediately to make a god of a man whom we 'saw born like our- selves ; suffer like us, maladies, chagrin, the miseries of humanity ; subject to the same humiliating wants ; die, and become food for worms. But this is what happened to all nations, after the revolution of several ages. A man who had done great things, who had been serviceable to human nature, could not in truth be looked upon as a god by those who had seen him tremble with the ague, and seek for clothing ; but enthusiasts persuaded themselves, that, being possessed of eminent qualities, he had them from a god, and that he was the son of a god. In the same manner gods produced children all over the world ; Bacchus, Perseus, Hercules, Castor and Pollux, were sons of gods. Romulus was a son of a god ; Alexander was proclaimed a son of a god in Egypt ; Odin with us northern nations, was a son of a god ; Mango Capac was son of the sun in Peru. The historian of the Moguls, Abulgazi, relates, that one of the grandmothers of Gingiskan, named Alanku, when a girl, was impregnated by a celestial ray. Gingiskan himself passed for the son of God. And when Pope Inno- cent sent brother Asuliu to Batou- ken, grandson to Gengis, this monk, who could not be presented but to one of the viziers, said he came from the vicar of God ; the minister re- plied, " Js this vicar ignorant that he should pay homage and tribute REL REL - to the son of God, the great Ba- toiikan his master?" With men fond of the marvellous, there is no great distance between a son of god, and god. After two or three generations, the son partakes of the father's dominion. Thus temples were raised to all those who were supposed to be born from the supernatural correspondence of the Divinity with our wives and daughters. From hence we may conclude, that the majority of mankind were for a long time in a state of insen- sibility and imbecility; and that, perhaps, the most insensible of all were those who wanted to discover a signification in those absurd fa- bles, and to ingraft reason upon folly. Volta ire. RELIGION AND TOLERATION OF THE ROMANS. The Romans adopted or allowed the doctrines of every other people, after the example of the Greeks ; and, in reality, the Senate and the Emperors always acknow- ledged one supreme God, as well as the greatest part of the philoso- phers and poets of Greece. The toleration of all religion was a na- tural law, engraven on the hearts of all men. For what right can one created being have to compel ano- ther to think as he does ? But when a people are united, when religion is become a law of the state, we should submit to that law. Now the Romans, by their law, adopted all the gods of the Greeks, who themselves had altars for the gods unknown. The twelve tables or- dained, Separatim nemo haberet deos neve advenas nisi publice adscitos ; " That no one should have foreign new gods without the public sanc- tion." This sanction was given to many doctrines ; and all the others were tolerated. This association of all the divinities in the world, this kind of divine hospitality was the law of nations from all antiquity, except one or two small nations. As there were no dogmas, there was no religious war. It is also very remarkable, that, amongst the Romans, no one was ever perse- cuted for his way of thinking. There is not a single example, from the time of Romulus down to Domitian ; and amongst the Greeks Socrates is the only exception. It is incontest- able that the Romans, as well as the Greeks, adored one supreme God, Deus optimus maximus. With this knowledge of one God, with this universal indulgence, which are every where the fruits of cultivated reason, were blended innumerable superstitions ; which were the an- cient fruits of reason, erroneous and in its dawn. The sacred fowls, the goddess Pertunda, and the goddess Cloacina, were ridiculous. Why did not the conquerors and legisla- tors of so many nations abolish such nonsense ? Because, being ancient, it was dear to the people, and was no way prejudicial to the govern- ment. Scipios, the Paulus Emilius's, the Ciceros, the Catos, the Caesars, had other employment than that of combating popular superstition. When an ancient error is establish- ed, policy avails itself of it, as a bit which the vulgar have put into their own mouth, till such time as another supersition arises to destroy it ; and policy profits of this second error, as it did of the first. Vol- taire. RELIGIONS, THE INFLUENCE OF, ON THE MORAL CONDUCT OF MANKIND. Men of more piety than knowledge, have imagined, that the virtues of a na- tion, its humanity, and the refine- BEL BEL menta of its manners, depend on the purity of its worship. The hypo- erites, interested in propagating this opinion, have published with- out believing it ; and the com- mon people believed it without examination. This error, once asserted, has been almost every where received as a certain truth. Experience and history teach us, however, that the prosperity of a people does not depend on the pu- rity of their worship, but on the excellence of their legislation. Of what importance, in fact, is their belief? That of the Jews was pure ; and the Jews were the dregs of nations: they have never been compared either to the Egyptians or the ancient Persians. It was un- der Constantino that Christianity became the ruling religion. It did not, however, restore the Romans to their primitive virtues. There was not seen a Decius who devoted him- self for the good of his country; or a Fabricius, who preferred seven acres of land to all the riches ol the empire. At what period did Constantinople become the sink oJ all the vices ? At the very time the Christian religion was established Its worship did not change the man- ners of its sovereigns ; their piety did not make them better. The most Christian kings have not been the greatest of monarchs. Few o them have displayed on the throne the virtues of Titus, Trajan, or An- touius. There are in every countr; a great many sound believers, anc but few virtuous men. Why ? Be cause religion is not virtue. Al belief, and all speculative opinions have not commonly any influence on the conduct and probity of man The dogma of fatality is alrnos the general opinion of the East : i was that of the Stoics. This dog- ma, it is said, is destructive of all virtue. The Stoics, however, were not less virtuous tnan the philoso- phers of other sects; nor are the Mahometan princes less faithful to their treaties than the Catholic ; nor the fatalist Persian less honest in his commerce than the French or Portuguese Christian. Purity of manners is therefore independent of purity of doctrines. The Pagan re- ligion, with regard to its morality, was founded, like every other, on what they call the law of nature. With regard to its theologic or my- thologic part, it was not very edify- ing. We cannot read the history of Jupiter and his loves, and especially the treatment of his father Saturn, without allowing that the gods did not preach virtue by) example. ' Yet Greece and ancient Rome abounded in heroes and virtuous ci- tizens; while modern Greece and Rome produce, like Brazil and Mex- ico, none but vile slothful wretches, without talents, virtue, or industry. Now, if, since the establishment of Christianity in the monarchies of Europe, the sovereigns have not been more vigilant or intelligent ; if the people have not had moro knowledge and humanity ; if the number of patriots has not been iu any degree augmented ; of what use, then, are religions? Why place, then, so much importance in the belief of certain revelations, that are frequently contestable, and al- ways contested ? What does the his- tory of religions teach us? That they have every where lighted up the torch of intolerance, strewed the plains with carcases, embrued the fields with blood, burned cities, and laid waste empires; but that they have never made men better. flEL R-fif, Their goodness is the work of the laws. Punishment and contempt restrain vice. Religion regulates our belief, and the laws our manners and our virtues. What is it that distinguishes the Christian from the Jew, the Guehar, and the Mussul- man? Is it an equity, a courage, an humanity, a beneficence, parti- cular to one and not known to the others ? No ; they are known by their several professions of faith. Let not, therefore, honesty ever be confounded with orthodoxy. In every country the oithodox is he that believes such particular doc- trines ; and throughout the whole earth, the virtuous man is he that does such actions as are humane, and conformable to the general interest. The evils that arise from false religions are real ; the good imaginary. Of what use, in fact, can they be? Their precepts are either contrary, or conformable, to the law of nature ; that is, to what mature reason dictates to societies for their greatest happiness. In the first case, the precepts of such religion must be rejected as con- trary to the public welfare. In the second, they must be admitted. But then, of what use is a religion which teaches nothing that sound sense does not teach without it ? The precepts of reason, it may be said, when consecrated by a reve- lation, will at least appear more respectable. Yes, in the first moments of fervor ; for then max- ims believed to be true, because they are supposed to be revealed, act more forcibly on the imagina- tion : but that enthusiastic spirit is soon dissipated. A revelation, merely from its being uncertain and contestable, far from fortifying the demonstration of a moral principle, must, in ttme f obscure its evidence. Truth and falsehood arc two hete- rogeneous beings: they never go together. Besides, all men are not actuated by religion : all have not faith. An honest man will always obey his reason in preference to revelation ; for it is, he will say, more certain that God is the author of human reason, that is, of the faculty in man of distinguishing the true from the false, than that he is the author of any particular book. It is more criminal in the eyes of a wise man to deny our own reason, than to deny any revelation what- ever. The conduct of men and nations is rarely consistent with their belief, or even their specula- tive principles. Duelling was for a long time fashionable in Europe, especially in France. Religion for- bade it, yet they fought every day. Luxury has since softened the man- ners of the French : duelling is punished with deaih. The delin- quents are almost all obliged to fly their country. There is no longer any duelling. From whence arises the security of Paris ? From the devotion of its inhabitants? No; but from the regularity and vigilance of the poMce. The Pa- risians of the last age were more devout and greater thieves. Virtue, therefore, is the work of the laws, and not of religion . Suppose we would increase the number of thieves, what must be done ? Augment the taxes and the wants of the people ; oblige every tradesman to travel with a purse of gold ; place fewer patroles on the highways ; and, lastly, abolish the punishment for robbery. We should then soon see impunity multiply transgressions. It is not, there- fore, on the truth of a revelation UEL RfiL or tl>e parity of a worship, but solely on the sagacity or absurdity of the laws, that the virtues or vices of the citizens depend. In short, it is reason improved by expeiience, that alone can demon- strate to nations the interests they have to bo just, humane, am faithful to their promises. Super- stition does not in this case produce the effects of reason. The religious system destroys all proportion be- tween the rewards decreed for the actions of men, and the utility o those actions to the public. Hel- vetius. RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES, THE INFLUENCE OP, ON THE CONDUCT OF MANKIND It is certain, from experience that the smallest grain of natura! honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems.- A man's natural inclination works incessantly upon him ; it is for ever present to the mind ; and mingles itself with every view and conside- ration : whereas, religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether habitual to the mind. Another advantage of inclination, it engages on its side all the wit and ingenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them ; in which it is almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account for those strange salvos and excuses with which people satisfy themselves when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their religious duty ? This is well understood in the world ; and none but fools ever repose less trust in a man, becausa they hear, that, from study and philosophy, he has enter- tained some speculative doubts with regard to theological subjects. And when we have to do with a man who makes a great profession of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and deceived by him? We must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and reflection, stand in less need of such motives to keep them under the restraint of morals : and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtuo in human behaviour. The recommendations to the Divinity are generally sup- posed to be either frivolous obser- vances, or rapturous ecstacies, or a bigotted credulity. We need not run back into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that atrociousness un- known to the Grecian and Egyptian superstitions, of declaiming, in ex- press terms, against morality ; and representing it as a sure forfeiture of the divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be laid upon it. But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in direct opposi- tion to morality, the very diverting of the attention, "the raising up a new and frivolous spocios of merit, the preposterous distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most pernicious conse- quences, and weaken extremely men's attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity. Such a principle of action likewise, REL REL not being any of the familiar mo- tives of human conduct, only acts by intervals on the temper, and must be roused by continual efforts in or- der to render the pious zealot satis- fied with his own conduct, and make him fulfill his devotional task. Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the heart at the time feels cold and languid. A habit of dissimulation is by degrees contracted ; and fraud and falsehood become the predomi- nant principle. Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, That the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being inconsistent, are often, or commonly united in the same individual cha- racter. The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation, is apt to extin- guish the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfish- ness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and be- nevolence. Thus the motives of vulgar super- stition have no great influence on general conduct ; nor is their opera- tion very favourable to morality, in the instances where they predomi- nate. Hume. RELICION (THE STATE OF) IN PEN- SYLVANIA. In Pensylvania there is no religion established by go- vernment: each one adopts that he likes best. The priest is no charge to the state. The individuals pro- vide them as they find it convenient, and tax themselves accordingly. The priest is there like a merchant, maintained at the expence of the consumer. He who has no priest, and consumes no part of the com- modity he deals in, pays uo part of of his expence. Pensylvania is a proper model for other nations. Helvetim. RELIGIONS OF THE ANCIENTS. When we consider the compound nature of man, neither a merely sensitive being, nor yet > merely intellectual or moral agent ; it will afford no smill entertainment to let our thoughts wander over the various ways that the different religions of the Greeks, Romans, and other na- tions of antiquity, were calculated to act upon and occupy all the senses and the imagination, as well as the understanding, of the people. Even the ancient Jewish religion was not ill-constructed for this pur- pose, by its pompous and magni- ficent feasts, its music, its sacri- fices, its numerous ceremonies, and their frequency. The ancients seem to have grounded themselves upon a persuasion, that all this external of things, this feasting, and occupa- tion of the senses, was indispensa- bly necessary for the bulk of man- kind ; whose situations in life ut- terly disqualified them for philoso- phy, subtile calculations and deduc- tions ; and who could be but little affected, and that but for a very short time, by any set of abstract speculative opinions ; which, by de- spising the toys and puppet-show work of superstition and weakness, would leave nothing to amuse the weak and ignorant, who are very numerous, and not always confined to the lower class. Their ( religions were 'accordingly constructed in such a manner, as to afford a general pursuit and occupation, which grew up with every man, at the same time that he was pursuing his par- ticular avocation of life ; and those who were disappointed in these particular pursuits, found an asy- lum and resource in the matter REL with which religion was amply! stored, and with which they could fill up the vacancy of their minds, thus sickened and forsaken by its other prospects. ** RELIGION, UNIVERSAL. An universal religion cannot be founded but on principles eternal and invariable, that arc drawn from the nature of man and things ; and that, like the propositions of geometry, are ca- pable of the most rigorous demon- stration. Are there such principles, and can they be equally adapted to all nations ? Yes, doubtless : or if they vary, it will be only in some of their applications to those different countries where chance has placed the different nations. Heaven re- quires that man by his reason should co-operate to his own happiness, and that of the numerous societies of the earth. God has said to man, I have cre- ated thee, I have given thee sensa- tions, memory, and consequently reason. It is my will that thy rea- son, sharpened at first by want, and afterward enlightened by experi- ence, shall provide thee food, teach thee to cultivate the land, to im- prove the instruments of labour, of agriculture ; in a word, of all the sciences of the first necessity. It is also my will," that by cultivating this same reason, thou mayest come to the knowledge of my moral will ; that is, of thy duties towards so- ciety, of the means of maintaining order, and lastly, of the best legis- lation possible. x This is the only natural religion to which mankind should elevate their minds, that only which can be- come universal, that which is alone worthy of God, which is marked with his seal, and that of the truth. All others must bear the impression of man, of fraud and falsehood. Tho will of God, just and good, is, that the children of the earth should be happy, and enjoy every pleasure compatible with the public welfare. Helvetius. RELIGIOUS OPINIONS, IN, EVERY MAN THINKS HIMSELF RIGHT. We meet every day with people so sceptical with regard to history, that they assert it impossible for any nation ever to believe such absurd princi- ples as those of Greek and Egyp- tian Paganism; and at the same time so dogmatical with regard to religion, that they think the same ab- surdities are to be found in no other communion. Cambyses entertained like prejudices, and very impiously ridiculed, and even wounded, Apis, the great god of the Eyyptians, who appeared to his profane senses no- thing but a large spotted bull. But Herodotus judiciously ascribes this sally of passion to a real madness or disorder of the brain. Other- wise, says the historian, he never would openly affront any establish- ed worship. For on that head, continues he, every nation are best satisfied with their own, and think they have the advantage over every other nation. It must be allowed that 'the Roman Catholics are a very learned sect; and that no one communion, but that of the church of England, can dispute their being the most learned of all the Chris- tiian churches: yet Averroes, the famous Arabian, who, no doubt, heard of the Egyptian superstitions declares, that of all religions, the most absurd and nonsensical is that, whose votaries eat, after having created, their deity. There is, in- deed, no tenet in all Paganism, which can give so fair a scope to ridicule as this of the real prc- REL REL sence. It is so absurd, that i eludes the force of all arguments But to these doctrines we are so accustomed, that we never vvondei at them ; though in a future age, it will probably become difficult to persuade some nations that any hu- man two-legged creature could evet embrace such principles. And it i a thousand to one but these nation themselves shall have something full as absurd in their own creed, to which they will give a most implicit and most religious assent. I lodged once at Paris, in the same hotel with an ambassador from Tunis, who, having passed some years at London, was returning home that way. One day I observed his Moorish excellency diverting him- self under the porch with survey- ing the splendid equipages that drove along; when there chanced to, pass that way some Capuchin friars, who had never seen a Turk; as he, on his part, though accus- tomed to the European dresses, had never seen the grotesque figure of a Capuchin : and there is no express- ing the mutual admiration with which they inspired each other. Had the chaplain of the embassy entered into a dispute with these Franciscans, their reciprocal sur- prise had been of the same nature. Thus all mankind stand staring at one another ; and there is no beat- ing it out of their heads, that the turban of the African is not just as good or as bad a fashion as the cowl of the European. He is a very ho- nest man said the prince of Sallee, speaking of De Ruyter ; it is a pity he were a Christian. How can you worship leeks and onions ? we shall suppose a Sarbonnist to say to a priest of Sais. If we worship them, replies the latter, at least we do not 30 cat them at the same time. But what strange objects of adoration are cats and monkies ? says the^ learned doctor. They are at least as good as the relics and rotten bones of martyrs, answers his no less learned antagonist. Are you mad, insists the Catholic, to cut one another's throats about the pre- ference of a cabbage or cucumber ? Yes, says the Pagan,! allow it, if you will confess that those are still mad- der, who fight about the preference amoii volumes of sophistry, ten thousand of which are not equal in value to one cabbage or cucumber. Every by-stander will easily judge (but unfortunately the by-standers are few) that if nothing more were requisite to establish any popular system, but exposing the absurdi- ties of other systems, erery votary of every superstition could give a sufficient reason for his blind and bigoted attachment to the princi- ples in which he has been educated. It is with our religion, as with our watches ; those of others go either too fast or too slow, ours only gives the true hour of the day. Hume. RELIGIONS, ABSURDITY ESSENTIAL TO POPULAR. Popular theology, espe- cially the scholastic, has a kind of appetite for absurdity and contra- diction. If that theology went not beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines would appear too easy and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised ; mystery affect- ed ; darkness and obscurity sought after ; and a foundation of merit afforded the devout votaries who desire an opportunity of subduing their rebellious reason. Ecclesias- tical history sufficiently confirms these reflections. When a contro- versy is started, some people pre- tend always with certainty to fore- REL REL tel the issue. Whichever opinion, say they, is most contrary to plain sense, is sure to prevail; even where the general interest of the system requires not that decision. Though the reproach of heresy for some time he bandied about among the disputants, it always rests at last on the side of reason. Any one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to know the de- finition of Arian, Pelagian, Erastian, Socinian, Sabellian, Eutychian, Nes- torian, Monothelite, &c. not to men- tion Protestants, whose fate is yet uncertain, will he convinced of the truth of this observation. To op- pose the torrent of scholastic reli- gion by such feeble maxims as these, That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not . to be, that the whole is greater than a part, that two and three make jive, is pretending to stop the ocean with a bullrush. Will you set up prophane reason against sacred mystery ? No pu- nishmentis great enough for your impiety. And the same fires which were kindled for heretics, will serve also for the destruction of philoso- phers. Hume. RELIGIONS, THE BAD INFLUENCE OF MOST POPULAR, ON MORALITY. It is certain, that, in every religion, however sublime the verbal defini tion which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries, perhaps the .greater number, will still seek the Divine favour, not by virtue and .good morals, which alone can be ac- ceptable to a perfect Being, but either by frivolous observances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous ec- stacies, or by the belief of mysteri- ous and absurd opinions.' The least part of the Sadder, as well as the Pentateuch, consists in precepts ol morality; and ws may be assured always, that that part was also the least obierved and regarded. When the old Romans were attacked with a pestilence, they never ascribed their sufferings to their vices, or dreamed of repentance and amend- ment. They never thought that they were the general robbers of the world, whose ambition and ava- rice made desolate the earth, and reduced opulent nations to want and beggary. They only created a dic- tator clavis jigendae causa, in order to drive a nail into a door ; and by that means, they thought that they had sufficiently appeased their in- censed deity. If we should suppose, what seldom happens, that a popu- lar religion were found, in which it was expressly declared, that nothing but morality could gain the Divine favour ; if an order of priests were instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily sermons, and with all the arts of persuasion ; yet so inveterate are the peoples' prejudices, that, for want of some other superstition, they would make the very attendance on those sermons the essentials of re- ligion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The sub- lime prologue of Zaleucus's laws inspired not the Locrians, so far as we can learn, with any sounder no- tions of the measures of acceptance with the Deity than were familiar to the other Greeks. This observation, then, holds uni- versally : but still one may be at some loss to account for it. It is not suf- ficient to observe, that the people every where degrade their Deities into a similitude with themselves. This will not remove the difficulty. For there is no man so stupid, as that, judging by his natural reason, he would not esteem virtue and ho- nesty the most valuable qualities IlEL ilEL which any person could posses Why not ascribe the same sentimen to his Deity ? Why not make a religion, or the chief part of it, t consist in these attainments ? No is it satisfactory to say, that th practice of morality is more difficul than that of superstition; and therefore rejected. For, not to men tion the excessive penances of th Braohmins and Talapoins, it is cer tain, that the Bhamadan of th Turks, the four Lents of the Mus covites, and the austerities of some Roman Catholics, must he mor severe than [the practice of an) moral duty, even to the most viciou. and depraved of mankind. In short all virtues, when men are reconcilec to it by ever so little practice, is agreeable. All superstition is for ever odious and burdensome. Perhaps the following account may be received as a true solution of the difficulty. The duties which a man performs as a friend or parent, seem merely owing to his benefactor or children ; nor can he be wanting to these duties, without breaking through all the ties of nature and morality. A strong inclination may prompt "him to the performance : a sentiment of order and moral beauty joins its force to these natural ties : and the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty without any effort or endeavour. Even with re- gard to the virtues which are more austere, and more founded on re- flection, such as public spirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity ; the moral obligation, in our apprehen- sion, removes all pretence to reli- gious merit ; and the virtuous con- duct is deemed no more than what we owe to society and ourselves. In all this a superstitious man finds nothing which he has properly per- formed for the sake of his Deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the Divine favour and protection. He considers not, that the most genuine method of serving the Divi- nity is by promoting the happiness of his creatures. He still looks out for some more immediate service of the Supreme Being, in order to allay those terrors with which he is haunt- ed. And any practice, recommended to him, which either serves to no purpose in life, or offers the strongest violence to his natural inclinations ; that practice he will more readily embrace, on account of those very circumstances which should make him absolutely reject it. It -seems the more .purely religious, because it proceeds from no mixture of any other motive or consideration ; and if, for its sake, he sacrifices much of his ease and quiet, his claim of merit appears still to rise upon him in pro- portion to the zeal and devotion which he discovers. In restoring a loan, or paying a deht, his Divinity is no- wise beholden to him ; because these acts of justice are what he was bound to perform, and what many would have performed, were there no God in the universe. But if he fast a day, or give himself a sound whipping; this has a direct reference, in his opinion, to the service of God. No other motives could engage him to> such austerities. Hence the great- est crimes have been found, in many instances, compatible with a super- stitious piety and devotion. Hence it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw any certain inference in favour of a man's morals from the fervour or strictness of his religious exercises, even though he himself believes them sincere. The greatest and truest zeal gives us no security against hypocrisy. Hume. REL REL RELIGIONS, BARBARITY AND CAPRICE ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY IN PO- PULAR. Barbarity and caprice ; these qualities, however nominally disguised, we may universally ob- serve, form the ruling character of the Deity in popular religions. How is the Deity disfigured in our repre- sentations of him ! What absurdity and immorality are attributed to him ! How much is he disregarded even below the character, which we should naturally, in common life, ascribe to a man of sense and virtue. Even priests, instead of correcting these depraved ideas of mankind, have often been found ready to foster and encourage them. The more tre- mendous the Divinity is represented, the more tame and submissive do men become to his ministers. And the more unaccountable the measures of acceptance required by him, the more necessary does it become to abandon our natural reason, and to yield to their ghostly guidance and direction. Thus it may be allowed, that the- artifices of men aggravate our natural infirmities and follies of this kind, but never originally beget them. Their root strikes deeper into the mind, and springs from the essential and universal properties of human nature. After the commis- sion of crimes, there arise remorses and secret horrors, which give no rest to the- mind, but make it have recourse to religious rites and cere- monies as expiations of its offences. Whatever weakens or disorders the internal frame, promotes the interests of superstition. While we abandon ourselves to the natural undisciplined suggestions of our timid and anxious hearts, every kind of barbarity is ascribed to the Supreme Being from the terrors with which we are agi- tated ; and every kind of caprice from the methods which we embrace in order to appease him. Hume. RELIGION, THE TERRORS OF, PREVAIL ABOVE ITS COMFORTS. It is allowed that men never have recourse to de- votion so readily as when dejected with grief, or depressed with sick- ness. Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is riot so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow ? Men may sometimes find consola- tion in religion when they are afflict- ed ; but it is natural to imagine, that they will form a notion of those unknown beings suitable to the pre- sent gloom and melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the contemplation of them. Ac- cordingly, we find the tremendous images to predominate in all religions, and we ourselves, after having cm- ployed the most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the flattest contradiction, in affirming, that the damned are infi- nitely superior in number to the elect. There never was a popular reli- gion which represented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. These fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies between the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking to nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the re- gions that lie behind it ; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of Cerberus and furies, devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone. It is true, both fear and hope en- ter into religion ; because bo^h these passions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them forms a species of divinity suitable to Uself. But when a man is in a REV REV cheerful disposition, he is fit for bu- siness, or company, or entertain- ment of any kind : and he naturally applies himself to these, and thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge him- self deeper in affliction. It may in- deed happen, that after he has in this manner engraved the religious opinions deep into his thoughts and imagination, there may arrive a change of health and circumstances which may restore his good-humour , and raising cheerful prospects of fu- turity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that as terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the passion which al- ways predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure. Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by ex- hausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of superstiti- ous terror and dejection ; nor is there any state of mind so happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and uncer- tainty, between an eternity of hap- piness and an eternity of misery. No wonder that such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind, and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions ; yet it is apt to make considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people. Hume. REVELATIOX. There is one sort of propositions that challenge the high- est degree of our assent upon bare testimony, whether the thing pro- posed agree or disagree with com- mon experience and the ordinary course of things, or no. The rea- son whereof is, because the testi- mony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived ; and that is, of God himself. This carries with it an assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name, revelation ; and our assent to it, faith; which as ab- solutely determines our minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our knowledge itself; and we may as well doubt that of our being, a we can whether any revelation from God ba true. So that faith is a set- tled and sure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation. Only we must be sure that it be a di- vine revelation, and that we under- stood it right ; else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error of wrong principles, if we have faith and assurance in what is not divine revelation. And therefore, in those cases, our assent can be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is the meaning of the expressions it is delivered in. If the evidence of its being a revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher thsn an assurance or diffi- dence, arising from the more or less apparent probability of the proofs. Locke. ON THE SAME SLTJECT. If revelation be as liable to be misunderstood as arguments drawn from reason, it is no surer guide to mankind. If it need reason's assistance to explain it, it is weaker. If it do not open our understandings, so as to make ilEV us argue more clearly and on better 4 grounds, it is not a greater light. If it confound reason, it can never produce rational conviction. If it have not plainly the advantage of reason, when compared with that alone, it is not superior to reason ; Or if reason have the advantage of revelation, when compared, revela- tion is inferior to reason. If we can know nothing truly by revelation without reason, revelation is no true light at all. Revelation must be en- tirely true, perfectly plain and easy to be understood ; intrinsically pure, just, consistent, and harmonious : its precepts and doctrines must all tend to make men wiser, better, and hap- pier : without these qualifications, it wants the proofs of a divine origi- nal; it seems to be given in vain, and cannot be the revelation of per- fect wisdom : and men of sense, de- void of the prejudices of education, will conclude it to be no extraordi- nary light ; and that nothing more is necessary to direct the faith am practice of mankind, than adhering in judgment to reason only, free( from all enthusiasm and imposture and, in practice, to virtue alone freed from all superstition. ** REVELATION NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST REASON. In propositions whose certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or dis- agreement of our ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations, we need not the assistance of revelation, as neces- sary to gain our assent, and intro- duce them into our minds; because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already, which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of any thing, unless where God imme- diately reveals it to us ; and there, too, our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, shake or over-rule plain knowledge, or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding. For since no evidence of our own faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive know- ledge, we can never receive for a truth any thing that is directly con- trary to our clear and distinct knowledge: u. g. the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that we can never assent to a pro- position that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation; since the evidence, first, that we deceive not ourselves in ascribing it to God secondly, that we under- stand it right, can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once : and there- fore no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be con- tradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge ; because this would be to subvert the principles and foun- dations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever ; and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and REV REV what we certainly know, give way to what we may possibly be mis- taken in. In propositions, there- fore, contrary to the clear percep- tion of the agreement or disagree- ment of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our as- sent, under that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of any thing that con- tradicts our knowledge , because, though faith be founded on the tes- timony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us ; yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine reve- lation, greater than our knowledge ; since the whole strength of the cer- tainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which, in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz. that we cannot tell how to con- ceive that to come from God, the bountiful Author of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of the knowledge he has giren us, render all our faculties useless, wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship, our un- derstandings, and put a man in a condition wherein he will have les light, less conduct, than the beast that perisheth : for if the mind oi man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) evidence oi any thing to be a divine revelation as it has of the principles of its own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason, to give a place to a proposition whose revelation ha not a greater evidence than those principles have. Thus far a man has use of rea- aon, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original reve- lation, where it is supposed to be made to himself: but to all those who pretend not to immediate reve- lation, but are required to.pay obe- dience and to receive the truths revealed to others, which, by the tradition of \vritings or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them ; reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine revelation, and nothing else, faith, as We use the word, (called commonly divine faith) has to do with no proposi- tions but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those who made revelation alone the sole object of faith, can say, that it is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to be- lieve that such or such a propo- sition, to be found in such or such a book, is of divine inspiration ; unless it be revealed, that that pro- position, or all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such a revelation, the be- lieving or not believing that propo- sition or book to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason; and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason ; which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to itself; it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable. In all things therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those principles of know- ledge I have above mentioned, rea- son is the proper judge ; and reve- REV REV lation, though it may in consenting with it confirm i(s dictates, yet can- not in such cases invalidate its decrees : nor can we he obliged, whore we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pre- tence that it is matter of faith ; which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason. Locke. REVENUES OF THE STATE. The re- venues of the state are sacred ; it is not only the most infamous theft, hut actual treason, to misapply them or pervert them from their own original destination. It reflects a great dishonour on Rome, that the integrity of Cato the censor was something so very remarkable; and that an emperor, on rewarding the talents of a singer \vith a few crowns, thought it necessary to observe, that the money came from his own private purse, and not from the public treasury. But if we find few Galbas, where shall we look for a Cato ? For when vice is no longer dishonourable, what chiefs will be so scrupulous as to abstain from touching the public revenues left to their discretian, and even not to af- fect in time to confound their own expensive and scandalous dissipa- tions with the glory of the state, and the means of extending their own influence with that of augment- ing its power ? It is particularly with regard to this delicate part of the administration that virtue alone is the only efficacious instrument, and that the' integrity of the minister is the only rein capable of restraining his avarice. Books of accounts, instead of serving to expose frauds, tend only to conceal them ; for pru- dence is never so ready to conceive new precautions as knavery is to elude them. Never mind account- books and papers, therefore; but place the management of the fi- nances in honest hands : this is the only way to have them well em- ployed, however they are accounted for. Rousseau. REVENUES OF THE CHURCH. The re- venue of every established church, such parts of it excepted as may ariso from particular lands or manors, is a branch, it ought to be observed, of the general revenue of the state, which is thus diverted to a purpose very different from the defence of the state. The tithe, for example, is a real land tax, which puts it out of the power of the proprietors, of land to contribute so largely towards the defence of the state as they other- wise might be able to do. The rent of land, however, is, according to some, the sole fund, and, according to others, the principal fund, from which, in all great monarchies, the exigencies of the state must be ulti- mately supplied. The more of this fund that is given to the church, the less, it is evident, can be spared to the state. It may be laid down as a certain maxim, that, all other things being supposed equal, the richer the church, the poorer must necessarily be, either the sovereign on the one hand, or the people on the other ; and in all cases, the less able must the state be to defend itself. In several Protestant coun- tries, particularly in all the Protes- tant cantons of Switzerland, the revenue which anciently belonged to the Roman Catholic church, the tithes and church-lands, has been found a fund sufficient not only to afford competent salaries to the established clergy, but to defray, with little or no addition, all the other cxpcnces of the state. The REV REV magistrates of the powerful canton of Berne, in particular, have ac cumulated out of the savings fron this fund a very large sum, sup- posed to amount to several millions part of which is deposited in a public treasure, and part is placec at interest in what are called the puhlic funds of the different in- debted nations of Europe; chiefly in those of France and Greal Britain. What may be the amount of the whole expense which the church either of Berne or of any other Protestant canton, costs the state, I do not pretend to know. By a very exact account it appears, that, in 1755, the whole revenue of the clergy of the church of Scotland, iiicluding their glebe or church lands, and the rent of their manses or dwelling-houses, estimated according to a rea- sonable valuation, amounted only to 68,5141. Is. 5d. This very moderate revenue affords a decent subsistence to nine hundred and forty-four ministers. The whole cxpence of the church, including what is occasionally laid out for the building and reparation of churches, and of the manses of .ministers, cannot well be supposed to exceed eighty or eighty-five thousand pounds a-year. The most 'Opulent church iii Christendom docs not maintain better the uniformity of faith, the fervour of devotion, the spirit of order, regularity, and austere morals in the great body of the people, than this very poorly- endowed church of Scotland. All the good effects, both civil and religious, which an established church can be supposed to produce, are produced by it as completely as by any other. The greater part of the Protestant churches of 3 E Switzerland, which in general aro nof better endowed than the church of Scotland, produce those effects in a still higher degree. In the greater part of the Protestant cantons, there is not a single person to be found who does not profess himself to be of the established church. If he professes himself to be of any other, indeed, the law obliges him to leave the can- ton. But so severe, or rather indeed so oppressive a law, could never have been executed in such free countries, had not the dili- gence of the clergy before-hand converted to the established church the whole body of the people, with the exception of perhaps a few individuals only. In some parts of Switzerland, accordingly, where, from the accidental union of a Protestant and Roman Catholic country, the conversion has not been so complete: both religions are not only tolerated, but esta- blished by law. The proper performance of every service seems to require that its pay or recompence should be, as exactly as possible, proportioned to the nature of the service. If any service is very much under- paid, it is very apt to suffer by the meanness and incapacity of the greater part of those who are employed in it. If it is very much overpaid, it is apt to suffer perhaps still more by their negligence and idleness. A man of a large revenue, whatever may be his profession, thinks he ought to live like other men of large revenues ; and to spend a great part of his time in festivity, in vanity, and in dissi- pation. But, in a clergyman, this train of life not only consumes the time which ought to be employed ,v* RIG RIG in the duties of his function ; but in the eyes of the common people destroys almost entirely that sanc- tity of character which can alone enable him to perform those duties with proper weight and authority. A. Smith. RIGHT, WHATEVER is, is. To deny that there is any evil in the world, may be said as a banter by a Lu- cullus, full of health, and feasting in his saloon with his mistress; but only let him look out of the window, and he will see some unhappy people, and a fever will make the great man himself so. Lactantius, in his 13th chapter on the Divine anger, puts the fol- lowing words in the mouth of Epicurus : " Either God would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or he can, and will not; or he has neither the power nor will ; or, lastly, he has both the .power and will. If he has the will and not the power, this shows weakness, which is contrary to the nature of God: if he has the power and tot the will, it is malignity ; and this is no less con- trary to his nature. If he is nei- ther able nor willing, it is both weakness and malignity: if he be both willing and able (which alone is consonant to the nature of God) how came it that there is evil in the world?" To this argument Lactantius replies, " That God wills evil, but that he has given us wisdom for acquiring good." This answer must be allowed to fall very short of the objection; as sup- posing that God, without pro- ducing evil, could not have given us wisdom : if so, our wisdom is a dear bargain. The origin of evil has ever been an abyss; the bottom of which lies beyond the reach of human eyes: and many philosophers, in their perplexity, had recourse to two principles; one good, the other evil. Typhon was the evil principle among the Egyptians, and Arima- nus among the Persians. This divinity is well known to have been espoused by the Manicheans. Amidst the absurdities which swarm in the world, and may be classed among its evils, it is no slight error to have supposed two almighty beings struggling for the mastery, and making an agreement together, like Moliere's two phy- sicians. Allow me the puke, and I will allow you the bleeding. Basilides, from the Platonics, affirmed, so early as the first cen- tury of the church, that God gave our world to be made by the lowest angels ; and that by their ignorance things are as they are. This theo- logical fable falls to pieces before the terrible objection, that it is not in the nature of an infinitely wise and powerful God to cause a world to be constructed by ignorant architects, who know not how to conduct such a task. Simon, aware of this objection, obviates it by saying, that the angel who acted as surveyor is damned for his bungling : but this bungling of the angel does not mend our case. Neither does the Grecian story of Pandora solve the objection any better. The box with all evils in it, and Hope remaining in the bottom, is indeed a charming alle- gory ; but this Pandora was made by Vulcan purely to be revenged of Prometheus, who had formed a man of mud. The Indians are not in any re- spect nearer the mark : God, they say, in crealrag man, gave him a REL REL drug, by which he was to enjoy perpetual health : the man put this drug on his ass; the ass, being thirsty, the serpent showed it the way to a spring ; and whilst the ass was drinking, the serpent made off with the drug. The Syrians had a conceit, that the man and the woman having been created in the fourth heaven, they took a fancy to eat a bit of cake, instead of ambrosia, their natural regale. Ambrosia per- spired through the pores ; but, af- ter eating the cake, they had a motion to go to stool ; and they asked an angel the way to the privy. Do you see, said the angel, yon little planet, scarce visible ? That is the privy of the universe ; make the best of your way thither. They marched ; and there they were left to continue ; and, ever since this, our world has been what it is. But the Syrians know what to answer, when they are asked, Why God permitted man to eat of the cake, and why it should be produc- tive of such dreadful evil to us ? The hypothesis, That whatever is, is right, is favoured and sup- ported by Bolingbroke, Pope, and Shaftsbury. In the treatise of Shaftsbury, entitled The Moralist, are these words, " Much is alleged in answer, to show why nature errs, and why she became thus im- potent, and erring from an unerring hand. But I deny she errs it is, on the contrary, from this order of inferior and superior things, that we admire the world's beauty, founded thus on contrarieties; whilst from such various and disagreeing principles an universal concord is established. " Thus, in the several orders of terrestrial forms a resignation is required, a sacrifice and yielding of natures one to another. The vege- tables by their death sustain the animals ; and animal bodies dis- solved enrich the earth, and raise again the vegetable world. Nu- merous insects are reduced again by the superior kinds of birds and beasts ; and these again are checked by man ; who, in his turn, submits to other natures, and resigns his form a sacrifice in common to the rest of things. And if, in natures so little exalted and pre-eminent above each other, the sacrifice of interest can appear so just ; how much more reasonably may all in- ferior natures be subjected to the superior nature of the world ! The central powers, who hold the last- ing orbs in their just poise and movement, must not be controlled to save a fleeting form, and rescue from the precipice a puny animal, whose brittle frame, however pro- tected, must of itself soon dissolve. The ambient air, the inward va- pours, the impending meteors, or whatever else is nutrimental or preservative of the earth, must ope- rate in a natural course ; and other constitutions must submit to the good habit and constitution of the all-sustaining globe." This hypo- thesis is not more satisfactory than the others. Their whatever is, is right, imports no more than that all is directed by immutable laws ; and who knows not that ? Flies are produced to be devoured by spiders, by swallows, &c. &c. We see a clear and stated order throughout every species of crea- tures ; in short, there is order in all things. Had we no feeling, no objection would lie against such a system : RIG But that is not the point ; what we ask is, Whether there are no sensible evils, and whence they have originated ? Pope, in his 4th epis- tle, on Whatever is, is right, says, " There is no evil, or partial evil is universal good." An odd general good, indeed, composed of the gout, stone, pains, afflictions, crimes, sufferings, death and dam- nation ! The system of, whatever is, is right, represents the Author of na- ture merely as powerful ; as a cruel king, who, if he does but compass his designs, is very easy about the death, distresses, and afflictions of his subjects. Were our first parents to be driven out of Paradise, where they were to have lived for ever, had they not eaten an apple ? Were they in wretchedness to beget chil- dren loaded with a variety of wetchednesses, and making others as wretched as themselves ? Were they to undergo such dis- eases? to feel such vexations? to expire in pain? and, by way of refreshment, to be burned through all the ages of eternity? Will these sufferings prove, that whatever is, is right ? So very far is the opinion of the best world pos- sible from being consolatory, that -it puzzles those very philosophers who embrace it ; and the question of good and evil remains an inex- plicable chaos to candid inquirers. Voltaire. RIGHT AND WRONG, STANDARD OF, The different principles sought for in different times, by different men, as standards of right and wrong, may be reduced to the following. 1. The principle of the Monks ; or, as it is called, Asceticism, or the Ascetic Principle. See the ar- ticle MONKS. 2. The principle of sympathy and antipathy. See the article SYMPATHY. 3. The principle of utility. See the article UTILITY. The theological principle ; means that principle which professes to- recur for the standard of right and wrong to the revealed will of God, more closely examined, seems to be never any thing more or less than one or other of the three be- fore-mentioned principles, present- ing itself under another shape. The happiness of the indivi- duals, of whom a community is composed, that is, their pleasures and their security, being the end, and the sole end which the legisla- tor ought to have in view; and the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be made to fashion his beha- viour, none but the principle of utility, and the only one which is capable of being constantly pur- sued, can be the proper standard of right and wrong, and the true foundation of a wisa code of laws J. Bentkam. ROMAN REPUBLIC, CAUSE OF THE DE- STRUCTION OP. AVhcn the interest of a state is changed, and the laws, which', at the first foundation, were useful, are become prejudicial ; those very laws, by the respect con- stantly preserved for them, must necessarily draw the state to its ruin. Who doubts that the de- struction of the Roman republic was the effect of a ridiculous venera- tion for the ancient laws, and that this blind respect forged the fetters with which Caesar loaded his coun- try. After the destruction of ROM ROM Carthage, when Rome attained the summit of her glory, the Romans, from the opposition they then found between their interests, iheir man- ners, and their laws ought to have foreseen the revolution with which the empire was threatened ; and to have been sensible, that, to save the etate, the republic in a body ought to have pressed the making those reformations which the times and circumstances required ; and above all to hasten the prevention of those changes which personal ambition, the most dangerous to the legislattffe, might introduce, 'rhc same laws which raised the Romairs to the highest elevation, could not support them in that state ; an empire, like a vessel which has been driven by the winds to a certain latitude, where, being opposed by other winds, it is in danger of being lost, if, to avoid shipwreck, the pilot does not spee- dily change his coarse. This po- litical truth was well known to Mr. Locke, who, on the establish- ment of the legislature of Georgia, proposed that his laws should be in force only one century ; and at that time being expired, they should become void, if they were not afresh examined and confirmed. He was sensible that a military or commercial government supposed very different laws ; and thai a le- gislation proper to favour com- merce and industry, might one day become fatal to that colony if its neighbours entered into a war among themselves, and circum- stances made it necessary for that people to become more warlike than commercial. Helvetius. ROMAN CHURCH, THE POLICY OF THE. The policy of the court of Rome has been commonlv much admired : and men, judging by success, have bestowed the highest eulogies on that prudence by which a power, from such slender beginnings, could advance, without force of arms, to establish an univet sal and almost ab- solute monarchy in Europe. But the wisdom of such a long succession of men who filled the Papal throne, and who were of such different ages, tempers, and interests, is not intelligible, and could never have place in nature. The instrument, indeed, with which they wrought, the ignorance and superstition of the people, is so gross an engine, of such universal prevalence, and so little liable to accident or disorder, that it may be successful even in the most unskilful hand ; and scarce any indiscretion can frustrate its operations. While the court of Rome was openly abandoned to the most flagrant disorders, evrn while it was torn with schisms and fac- tions, the power of the church made daily a sensible progress in Europe. The clergy, feeling the necessity of protection against the violence of princes or the vigour of the laws, were well pleased to ad- here to a foreign head, who, being removed from the fear of the civil authority, could freely employ the power of the whole church in de- fending their ancient or usurped pro- perties and privileges, when in- vaded in any particular country. The monks, desirous of an inde- pendence on their diocesans, pro- fessed still a more devout attach- ment to the triple crown ; and the stupid people possessed no science or reason which they could oppose to the most exorbitant pretentious. Nonsense passed for demonstra- tion : the most criminal means were sanctified by the piety of the cud. ROM ROM Treaties were supposed not to be binding where the interests of God were concerned: the ancient laws and customs of state had no au- thority against a divine right : im- pudent forgeries were received as ancient monuments of antiquity: and the champions of the holy church, if successful, were cele- brated as heroes ; if unfortunate, were worshipped as martyrs : and all events thus turned out equally to the advantage of clerical usur- pations. Hume. ROMAN CHURCH, THE. Few ecclesi- astical establishments have been fixed upon a worse foundation than that of the church of Rome, or have been attended with circum- stances more hurtful to the peace and happiness of mankind. The large revenues, privileges, immuni- ties, and" power of the clergy, ren- dered them formidable to the civil magistrates, and armed with too extensive authority an order of men who always adhere closely to- gether, and who never want a plausible pretence for their en- croachments and usurpations. The higher dignities of the church served indeed to the support of gentry and nobility; but, by the establishment of monasteries, many of the lowest vulgar were taken from the useful arts, and main- tained in those receptacles of sloth ,and ignorance. The supreme head of the church was a foreign poten- tate, who was guided by interests always different, sometimes con- trary, to those of the community. And as the hierarchy was necessa- rily solicitous to preserve an unity of "faith, rites, and ceremonies, all liberty of thought lan a mani- fest risk of being extinguished ; and violent persecutions, or, what was worse, a stupid aud abject credulity, took place every where. To increase these evils, the church, though she possessed large re- venues, was not contented with the her acquisitions, but retained a power of practising further on the ignorance of mankind. She eveu bestowed on each individual priest a power of enriching himself by the voluntary oblations of the faithful, and left him still a power- ful motive for diligence and indus- try in his calling. And thus the church, though an extensive and burthensome establishment, was liable to many inconveniences which belong to an order of priests, who trusted entirely to their own art and invention for attaining a subsist- ence. The advantages attending the Romish hierarchy were hot a small compensation for its incon- veniences. The ecclesiastical pri- vileges during the barbarous times, had served as a check to the despotism of kings : The union of all the western churches under the supreme Pontiff facilitated the intercourse of nations, and tended to bind all the parts of Europe into a close connection with each other: And the pomp and splen- dour of worship which belonged to so opulent an establishment, contri- buted in some respects to the , encouragement of the fine arts, and began to diffuse a general ele- gance of taste, by uniting it with religion. Hume. ROMAN CHURCH, THE POWER or, AXI> ITS DECLINE. In the ancient con- stitution of the Christian church, the bishop of each diocese was elected by the joint votes of the clergy and of the people of the episcopal city. The people did not long retain Iheir right of election ; ROM ROM and while they did retain it, they almost always acted under the in- fluence of the clergy, who in such spiritual matters appeared to he their natural guides. The clergy, however, soon grew weary of the trouble of managing them, and found it easier to elect their own 'bishops themselves. The abbot, in the same manner, was elected by the monks of the monastery, at least in the greater part of abba- cies. All the inferior ecclesiastical benefices comprehended within the diocese were collated by the bi- shop, who bestowed them upon such ecclesiastics as he thought proper. All church-preferments were in this manner in the disposal of the church. The sovereign of the country did not possess any di- rect or sufficient means of managing the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman naturally led him to pay court, not so much to his sove- reign, as to his own order, from which only could he expect prefer- ment. Through the greater part of Europe the Pope gradually drew to himself, first, the collation of almost all bishoprics and abbacies, or of what were called consistorial benefices, afterwards, by various machinations and pretences, of the greater part of inferior benefices comprehending within each dio- cese ; little more being left to the bishop than what was barely ne- cessary to give him a decent au- thority over his own clergy. By this arrangement the conduct of the sovereign was still worse than it had been before. The clergy of al the different countries of Europe were thus formed into a sort 01 spiritual army; dispersed in dif- ferent quarters indeed, but o: which all the movements and ope. rations could now be directed by one head, and head, and con- ducted upon one uniform plan. The clergy of each particular country might be considered a par- ticular detachment of that army, of which the operations could easily be supported and seconded by all the other detachments quar- tered in the different countries round about. Each detachment was not only independent of the sovereign of the country in which it was maintained, but dependant upon a foreign sovereign, who could at any time turn its arms against the sovereign of that par- ticular country, and support them by the arms of all the other de- tachments. Those arms were the mos! formid- able that can well be imagined. In the ancient state of Europe, before the establishment of arts and ma- nufactures, the wealth of the clergy gave them the same sort of influ- ence over the common people, which that of the great barons gave them over their respective vassals, te- nants, and retainers. In the great landed estates, which the mistaken piety both of princes and private persons had bestowed upon the church, jurisdictions were estab- lished of the same kind with those of the great barons ; and for the same reason. In those great landed estates, the clergy, or their bailiffs, could easily keep the peace without the support or assistance either of the Icing or of any other person ; and neither the king nor any other person could keep the peace there without the support and assistance of the clergy. The jurisdictions of the clergy, therefore, in their particular baronies or manors, were ROM equally independent, and equally exclusive of the authority of the king's courts, as those of the great temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like those of the great barons, almost all tenants at will entirely dependent upon their im- mediate lords, and therefore liable to be called out at pleasure, in order to give fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might think proper to engage them. Over and above the rents of those estates, the clergy possessed, in the tythes, a very large portion of the rents of all the other estates in every king- dom of Europe. The revenues aris- ing from both these species of rents were, the greater part of them, paid in kind ; in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, &c. The quantity exceeded greatly what the clergy could them- selves consume ; and there were neither arts nor manufactures for the produce of which they could exchange the surplus. The clergy -could derive advantage from this immense surplus in no other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the like surplus of their revenues, in the most profuse hospitality, and in the most exten- sive charity. Both the hospitality, and the charity of the ancient clergy, accordingly, are said to have been very great. They not only main- tained almost the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen had frequently no other means of subsistence than by travelling about from monastery lo monastery, under pretence of de- votion, but 5n reality to enjoy the hospitality of the clergy. The re- tainers of some particular prelates were often as numerous as those 'of the greatest lay-lords ; and the re- tainers of the clergy taken together were, perhaps, more numerous than those of all the lay-lords. The former were under a regular dis- cipline and subordination to the papal authority. The latter were under no regular discipline or sub- ordination, but almost always equally jealous of one another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy, there- fore, had both together been less numerous, yet their union would have rendered them more for- midable. The hospitality and charity of the clergy too, not only gave them the command of a great temporal force, but increased very much the weight of their spi- ritual weapons. Those virtues procured them the highest re- spect and veneration among all the inferior ranks of people, of whom many were constantly, and almost all occasionally, fed by them. Every thing belonging or related to so popular an order, its posses- sions, its privileges, its doctrines, necessarily appeared sacred in the eyes of common people ; and every violation of them, whether real or pretended, the highest ' act of sa- crilegious wickedness and profane- ness. In this state of things, if the sovereign frequently found it difficult to resist the confederacy of a few of the -great nobility, we cannot wonder that he should find it still more so to resist the united force of the clergy of his own do- minions, supported by that of the clergy of all the neighbouring do- minions. In such circumstances the wonder is, not that he was sometimes obliged to yield, but that he was ever able to resist. The privileges of the clergy in those ancient times (which to us who live in the present times ap- ROM ROM pear the most absurd) their tota exemption from the secular juris diction, or what in England wa called the benefit of the clergy were the*'natural or rather the ne cessary consequences of this state of things. How dangerous mus it have been for the sovereign to attempt to punish a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his own order were disposed to protect him and to represent either the proo as insufficient for the convicting so holy a man, or the punishment as too severe to b inflicted upon one whose person had been rendered sacred by religion. The sovereign could, in such circumstances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts ; who, for the honour of their own order, were interested to restrain, as much as possible, every member of it from committing enormous crimes, or even from giving occa- sion to such gross scandal as might disgust the minds of the people. In the state in which things were through the greater part of Europe during the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for some time both before and after that period, the constitution of the church of Rome may be con- sidered as the most formidable combination that ever was formed against the authority and security of civil government, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind ; which can flourish only where civil govern- ment is able to protect them. In thas constitution the grossest de- lusions of superstition were sup- ported in such a manner by the private interests of so great a num- ber of people, as put them out of all danger from any assault of hu- 3 F man reason : because, though hu- man reason might perhaps have beenable to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, some of the delusions of superstition ; it could never have dissolved the ties of private interest. Had this con- stitution been attacked by no other enemies but the feeble efforts of human reason, it must have en- dured for ever. But that immense and well-built fabric, which all the wisdom and virtue of man could never have shaken, much less have overturned, was by the natural course of things, first weakened, and afterwards in part destroyed ; and is now likely, in the course of a few centuries more, perhaps, to crumble into rums al- together. The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the same causes which destroyed the power of the great barons, de- stroyed in the same manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the clergy. In the produce of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found something for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby discovered the means of spending the whole revenues upon their own persons, without giving any considerable share of them to other people. Their charity became gradu- ally less extensive, their hospitality less liberal or less profuse. Their re- tainer* became consequently less numerous, and by degrees dwid- dled away altogether. The clergy too, like the great barons, wished to get a better rent from their landed estates, in order to spend it in the same manner, upon the gra- tification of their own private va- SEC nlty and folly. But this increase j of rent could be got only by grant- ing leases to their tenants, who thereby became in a great mea- sure independent of them. The ties of interest, which bound the infe- rior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this manner gradually broken and dissolved. They were even broken and disolved sooner than those which bound the same ranks of people to the great ba- rons ; because the benefices of the church being the greater part of them, much smaller than the estates of the great barons, the possessor of each benefice was much sooner able to spend the whole of its re- venue upon his own person. Dur- the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the absolute command which.they once had over the great body of the people, was very much decayed. The power of the church was by that time very nearly re- duced, through the greater part of Europe, to what arose from her flfirital authority; and even that spiritual authority was much weak- ened when it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy. The inferior ranks of peo- ple no longer looked upon that or- der, as they had done before, as the comforters of their dis- tress, and the relievers of their indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and disgusted by the vanity, luxury, and expencc oi the richer clergy, who appeared to spend upon -their own pleasures what had always before been re- graded as the patrimony of the poor. A. Smith. SCIENCE AND VIRTUB, THE CONNEC- TION OF. Good morals and know- ledge are almost inseparable in every age, though not in every in- dividual. Whatever we may ima- gine concerning the usual truth and ^ sincerity of men who live in a rude and barbarous state, there is much more falsehood, and even perjury, among them than among civilized nations ; and virtue, which is no- thing but a more enlarged and more cultivated reason, never flourishes to any degree, nor is founded on steady principles of honour, ex- cept where a good education be- comes general ; and men are taught the pernicious consequences of vice, treachery, and immorality. Even superstition, though more preva- lent among ignorant nations, is but a poor supply for the defects of knowledge and education ; and our European ancestors, who employed every moment the expedient of swearing on extraordinary crosses and relics, were loss honourable in all engagements than their poste- rity, who from experience have omitted those ineffectual securi- ties. Hume. SECURITY, POLITICAL. A govern- ment which excludes all persons except one, or a very few, from having access to the chief magis- tracy, or from having votes in the choice of magistrates, and which keeps all the power of the state in the same hands, or the same fami- lies, is easily marked out, and is the extreme of political slavery. For such is the state of mankind, thatpersons possessed of unbounded power will generally act as if they forgot the proper nature and design of their station, and pursue their own interest, though it be opposite to that of the community at large. SEN SEN Provided those who make laws suhmit to them themselves, and, with respect to taxes in particular, so long as those who impose them hear an equal share with the rest of the community, there will be no complaint. But in all cases, when those who lay the tax upon others exempt themselves, there is tyranny ; and the man who sub- mits to a tax of a penny, levied in this manner, is liable to have the last penny extorted from him. Men of equal rank and fortune with those who tiompose the British House of Commons, have nothing to fear from the imposition of taxes, so long as there is any thing like rotation in that office; because those who impose them are liable to pay them themselves, and are no better able to bear the burden. But persons of lower rank, and especially those who have no votes in the election of members, may have reason to fear, because an unequal part of the burden may be laid upon them: they are neces- sarily a distinct order in the com- munity, and have no direct method of controuling the measures of the legislature. Our increasing game- laws have all the appearance of the haughty decrees of a tyrant, who sacrifices every thing to his own pleasure and caprice. Upon these principles, it is evident, that there must have been a gross inat- tention to the very first principles of liberty, to say no worse, in the first scheme of taxing the inhabi- tants of "America in the British Parliament. Priestly. EXSATION. Thoughts seem to us something strange ; but sensation is no less wonderful ; a divine power equally shows itself in the sensation of the meanest insect as in Newton's brain. We receive our first knowledge from our sen- sations, and our memory is no more than a continued sensation: a man born without any of his five senses would, . could he live, be totally void of any ideas. It is owing to our senses that we have even our metaphysical notions : for how should a circle or a triangle be measured, without having seen or felt a triangle? How can we form an idea, imperfect as it is, of infi^ nitude, but by enlarging bounda-r ries? And how can we throw down boundaries, without having seen or felt them? An eminent philosopher, in his Traite des Sen- sations, tom.n.p. 128, says, Sen- sation includes all our faculties. Voltaire. , SENSE, COMMON. There is some- times to be found in idiomatical and vulgar expressions, an image of what passes in the hearts of all mankind. Sensus communis sig- nified among the ancient Romans, not only common sense, but also humanity and sensibility. As we are much inferior to the Romans, it signifies with us only the half of its import with them. It means enly common understanding, a sim- ple capacity of reason, the mere comprehension of ordinary things, a kind of mean between stupidity and genius. To say that a man wants common sense, is a gross affront. To say that he does not want common sense, is an affront also; as it is as much as to say, that although he is not altogether stupid, he has neither genius nor wit. But whence comes this ex- pression Common Sense, if not from the senses ? In the invention and use of this term, mankind plainly confess, that nothing enters SEN SLA into the mind but through the senses; would they, else, have used the word sense, to signify common understanding? We some- times say, that common sense is very rare. What is the meaning of that phrase ? Certainly no more than that the progress or exercise of reason is interrupted in some men hy their prejudices and pre- possessions. Hence we see a man capable of reasoning very justly on one subject, err most grossly in arguing upon another. An Arabian, who may be an exact calculator, an ingenious chemist, and a good astronomer, believes nevertheless that Mahomet could put one-half of the moon in his sleeve. ' Where- fore is it that he is superior to mere common sense in judging of these three sciences, and inferior to it in his conception of the half- moon in Mahomet's sleeve? In the first place, he sees with his own eyes, and judges with his own understanding; in the second, he sees with the eyes of others, shut- ting his own, and perverting that understanding which nature gave him. In what manner can this strange perversion of reason be effected ? How can these ideas which suc- ceed each other so regularly anc constantly in our contemplations on numerous other objects, be so mi- serably confused in our reflecting upon another a thousand times more obvious and palpable ? The capacity of the man, that is, his principles of intelligence, being still the same, some of his organs therefore, must be depraved : a? we sometimes see in the niccsi epicure, a vitiated taste with regarc to some species of viands. But how came the organ of the Arab who sees an half-moon in Maho- met's sleeve, to be thus depraved ? By fear. He hath been told that, if he does not believe in this story of the half-moon end sleeve, his soul in passing over the narrow bridge, immediately after his death, will be tumbled into the gulph beneath, there to perish eternally. Again, he is further told, that if he should doubt the truth of the sleeve, one dervise will accuse him of impiety ; a second will prove him to be destitute of common sense, in that having all possible motives of credibility laid before him, yet he refuses to submit his proud reason to the force of evi- dence ; a third will have him brought before the petty divan of a petty province, and get him legally impaled. All this strikes a panic into the good Arabian. He does not want for sense in judging of other matters ; but his conceptions are hurt in regard to this particu- lar. But does the Arab really believe this story of Mahomet's sleeve ? No. He endeavours to believe it ; he says to himself, it is impossible, but it is true ; I believe what I do not believe. Thus a con- fused heap of ideas are formed in his brain, which he is afraid to unravel ; and this causes him to want common, sense in reasoning upon this subject. Voltaire. SLAVES (THE LABOUR OF) DEARER TO THEIR MASTERS THAN THAT OF FREE MEN. The wear and tear of a slave, it has been said, is at tha expense of his master ;. but that of a free servant is at his own expence. The wear and tear of the latter, however, is in reality, as much at the expence of his master as that of the former. The wages paid to the journeymen, and ser- SLA SLA vauts of every kind, must be such as will enable them one with ano- ther to continue the race of jour- neymen and servants, according as the increasing, diminishing, or sta- tionary demand of the society may happen to require. But though the wear and tear of a free servant be equally at the expense of his mas- ter, it generally costs him much less than that of a slave. The fund destined for replacing or repair- ing, if I may say so, the wear and tear of a slave, is commonly ma- naged by a negligent master or careless overseer. That destined to perform the same office with regard to the free man, is ma- naged by the free man himself. The disorders which generally prevail in the oeconomy of the rich, naturally introduce themselves into the management of the former. The strict frugality and parsimo- nious attention of the poor, as naturally establish themselves in that of the latter. Under such different management, the same purpose must require different de- grees of expence to execute it. It appears, accordingly, from the ex- perience of all ages and nations, ] believe, that the work done by free- men comes cheaper in the .end than that performed by slaves. It is found to do so even at Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, where the wages of common labour are so very high. A. Smith. SLAVES AND SLAVERY, CONSIDERA- TIONS ON. In the ancient state o Europe, the occupiers of land wen all tenants at will. They were al slaves ; but their slavery was of a milder kind than that known amoa the ancient Greeks and Romans, o even in our West Indian colonies They were supposed to belong mor directly to the land than to their master. They could, therefoie, be sold with it, but not separately. They could marry, provided it was with the consent of their master ; and he could not afterwards dis- solve the marriage by selling the man and wife to different persons. If he maimed or murdered any of them, he was liable to a penalty, though generally but to a small one. They were not, however, ca- pable of acquiring property. What- ever they acquired was acquired to their master, and he could take it from them at pleasure. Whatever cultivation and improvement conld be carried on by means of such slaves, was properly carried on by their master. It was at his ex- pence. The seed, the cattle, and the instruments of husbandry were all his. It was for his benefit. Such slaves could acquire nothing but their daily maintenance. It was properly the proprietor himself, therefore, that in this case occu- pied his own lands, and cultivated them by his own bondmen. This species of slavery still subsists in Russia, Poland, Hungary, and other parts of Germany. It subsisted in Bohemia and Moravia, till lately that it was abolished by the pre- sent Emperor Joseph II. It is only in the western and southern pro- vinces of Europe that it has gra- dually been abolished altogether. But if great improvements are seldom to be expected from great proprietors, they are least of all to be expected when they employ . slaves for their workmen. The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it ap- pears to cost ^>nly their mainte- nance, is in the end the dearest of SLA SLA any. A person who can acquire r>o property, can have no other inte- rest but to eat as much, and to la- bour as little as possible. What- ever work he does beyond what is sufficient to purchase his own main- tenance, can be squeezed out of bin by violence only, and not by any interest of his own. In ancient Italy, how much the cultivation o: corn degenerated, how unprofitable it became to the master, when ii fell under the management of slaves is remarked both by Pliny and Co- lumella. In the time of Aristotle it had not been much better in an- cient Greece. Speaking of the idea; republic described in the laws oi Plato, to maintain five thousand idle men (the number of warriors sup- posed necessaryfor its defence) to- gether with their women and ser- vants, would require, he says, a territory of boundless extent and fertility, like the plains of Baby- lon. The pride of man makes him love to domineer ; and nothing mortifies him so much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors. Wherever the law allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it, therefore, he will generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen. The planting of sugar and tobacco can afford the expence of slave-cultiva- tion. The raising of corn, it seems, in the present times, cannot. In the English colonies, of which the principal produce is corn, the far greater part of the work is doae by freemen. The late resolution of the Quakers in Pensylvania to set at liberty all their negro slaves, may satisfy us that their number cannot be very great. Had they made arty considerable part of their property, such a resolution could never have been agreed to. In our sugar colonies, on the contrary, the whole work is done by slaves, and in our tobacco colonies a very great part of it. The profits of a sugar-plantation in any of our West Indian colonies are generally much greater than those of any other cultivation that is known either in Europe or America: and the profits of tobacco plantation, though inferior to those of sugar, are su- p-'rior to those of corn, as has already been observed. Both can afford the expence of slave culti- vation, but sugar can afford it still better than tobacco. The number of negroes accordingly are greater, in proportion to that of the whites, in our sugar than in our tobacco colonies. To the slave cultivators of an- cient times, gradually succeeded a species of farmers known at present in France by the name of Metayers. They are called in Latin, Coloni Partiarii. They have been so long in disuse in England, that at pre- sent I know no English name for them. The proprietor furnished them with the seed, cattle, and in- struments of husbandry; the whole stock, in short, necessary for culti- vating the farm. The produce was divided equally between the pro- prietor and the farmer, after set- ting aside what was judged neces- sary for keeping up the stock, which was restored to the proprie- tor when the farmer either quitted, or was turned out of the farm. Land occupied by such tenants is properly cultivated at the ex- ponce of the proprietor, as much as that occupied by slaves. There is, however, one very essential dif- ference between them. Such te- SEC SEC nants, being freemen, are capable of acquiring property, and having a certain proportion of the produce of the land, they have a plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as possible, in order that their owu proportion may be so. A slave, on the con- trary, who can acquire nothing but his maintenance, consults his own ease by making the land produce as little as possible over and above that maintenance. It is probable that it was partly upon account of this advantage, and partly u; on account of the encroachments which the sovereign, always jealous of the great lords, gradually encouraged their villains to make upon their authority, and which seem at last to have been such as rendered this species of servitude altogether in- convenient, that tenure in villeaage gradually wore out through the greater part of Europe. The time and manner, however, in which so important a revolution was brought about, is one of the most obscure points in modern history. The church of Rome claims great merit in it ; and it is certain that so early as the twelfth century, Alex- ander III. published a bull for the general emancipation of slaves. I seems, however, to have been rather a pious exhortation, than a law to which exact obedience was icquired from the faithful. Slavery continued to take place almos universally for several centuries afterwards, till it was graduallj abolished by the joint operation o the two interests above mentioned that of the proprietor on the on< hand, and that of the sovereign 01 the other. A villain enfranchised and at the same time allowed t( continue in possession of the land having no stock of his own, could cultivate it only by means of what the landlord advanced to him, and must therefore have been what the French call a Metayer. In all European colonies the cul- ture of the sugar-cane is carried on by negro slaves. The constitu- tion of those who have been born in the temperate climate of Europe, could not, it is supposed, support the labour of digging the ground under the burning sun of the West Indies; and the culture of the sugar-cane, as it is managed at present, is all hand labour, though, in the opinion of many, the drill plough might be introduced into it with great advantage. But, as the profit and success of the cultivation which is carried on by means of cattle, depend very much upon the good management of those cattle; so the profit and success of that which is car- ried on by slaves, must depend equally upon the good management of those slaves ; and in the good management of their slaves, the French planters, I think it is ge- nerally allowed, are superior to the English. The law, so far as it gives some weak protection to the slave against the violence of his master, is likely to be better exe- cuted in a colony where the go- vernment is in a great measure arbitrary, than in one where it is altogether free. In every country, where the unfortunate law of slavery is established, the magistrate, when he protects the slave, intermeddles, in some measure, in the management of the private property of. the master ; and, in a free country, where the master is, perhaps either a member of the colony assembly, or an elec- SLA SLE tor of such member, he dares not do this but with the greatest cau- tion and circumspection. The re- spect which he is obliged to pay to the master, renders it more difficult for him to protect the slave. But in a country where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, where it is usual for the magistrate to intermeddle even in the manage- ment of the private property of in- dividuals, and to send them, per- haps, a lettre de cachet, if they do not manage it according to his liking, it is much easier for him to give some protection to the slave ; and common humanity naturally disposes him to do so. The pro- tection of the magistrate renders the slave less contemptible in the eyes of his master, who is thereby induced to consider him with more regard, and to treat him with mom geutleness. Gentle usage renders the slave not only more faithful, but more intelligent, and therefore, upon a double account, more use- ful. He approaches more to the condition of a free servant, and may possess some degree of integrity and attachment to his master's inte- rest ; virtues which frequently be- long to free servants, but which can never belong to a slave, who is treated as slaves commonly are in countries where the master is per- fectly free and secure. That the condition of a slave is better under an arbitrary than un- der a free government, is, I believe, supported by the history of all ages and nations. In the Roman his- fory, the first time we read of the magistrate interposing to protect the slave from the violence of his master, is under the emperors. When Vedius Pollio, in the pre- sence of Augustus, ordered one of his slaves, who had committed slight fault, to be cut into piece and ^thrown into his fish-pond in order to feed his fishes, the emperor commanded him, with indignation, to emancipate immediately, not only that slave, but all the others that belonged to him. Under the repub- lic no magistrate could have had authority to protect the slave, much less to punish the master. A. Smith. SLEEP. Every thing relating to sleep is a very puzzling phenomenon, on the supposition of the distinction between the soul and the body ; especially on the little evidence that can be pretended of the soul being employed at all in a state of really sound sleep, exclusive of dreaming. And surely, if there be a soul dis- tinct from the body, and it be sen- sible of all the changes that take place in the corporeal system to which it is attached, why does it not' perceive that state of the body which is termed sleep ; and why does it not contemplate the state of the body and brain during sleep, which might afford matter enough for reasoning and reflection ? If no new ideas could be transmitted to it at that time, it might employ itself upon the stock which it had acquired before, if they had really adhered in it and belonged to it. All this we should naturally expect if (he k soul was a substance really distinct from the body, and if the ideas properly belonged to this sub- stance, so that it was capable of carrying them all away with it, when the body was reduced to dust. The soul, during the sleep of the body might be expected to approach to the state in which it would be when the body was dead, death being often compared to a soc soc more sound sleep. For if it be capable of thinking and feeling when the powers of the body shall entirely cease, it might be capable of the same kind of sen- sation and action when those powers are only suspended. Priettley. SOCIETY, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN. Whether the pro- pensity to truck, barter, and ex- change one thing for another, be one of those original princi- ples in human nature, of which no further account can be giv- en ; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to in- quire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. Two grey- hounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, how- ever, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidenta concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particu- lar time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for ano ther with another dog. Nobo dy ever saw one animal by it gestures and natural cries sig nify to another, this is mine that yours ; I am willing to giv this for that. When an anima wants to obtain something eitlie of a manor of another animal it has no other means of persua- sion but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam; and a spaniel endeavours, by a thousand attractions, to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his bre- thren ; and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclina- tions, endeavours, by every ser- vile and fawning attention, to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civi- lized society he stands at all times in need of the co-opera- tion and assistance of great mul- titudes, while his whole life i* scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of ani~ mals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entire- ly independent, and in its natu- ral state has occasion for the as- sistance of no other living crea- ture. But man has almost con- stant occasion for the help of his brethren ; and it is in vain for him to expect it from their be- nevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in their favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to ano- ther a bargain of any kind pro- poses to do this. Give jre that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we 2 Q soc soc obtain from one another the far greater part of those good of- fices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity, but to their self-love; and never talk to them of our own neces- sities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the bene- volence of his fellow citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence : but though this principle ultimately provides him with all the neces- saries of life which he has occa- sion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money which one man gives him he purchases food; the old clothes which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other old clothes which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, as he has occasion. As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we ob- tain from one another the great- er part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds, a particular person makes bows and arrows, tor ex- ample, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houses. He is accus- tomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours; who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest to de- dicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser of hides or skins, the principal part of the clothing of savages. And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own la- bour which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a parti- cular occupation, and to culti- vate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of business. The difference of natural ta- soc soc lents in different men, is in reality much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause as the effect of the di- vision of labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philoso- pher and a common street-por- ter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were very much alike; and nei- ther their parents nor play-fel- lows could perceive any re- markable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of; and widens by de- grees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to ac- knowledge scarce any resem- blance. But without the dis- position to truck, barter, and ex- change, every man must have procured to himself every neces- sary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to per- form, and the same work to do; and there could have been no such difference of employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents. As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents so remarkable among men of different professions, so it is this same disposition which renders that difference useful. Many tribes of animals acknowledged to be all of the same species, de- rive from nature a much more remarkable distinction of genius than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place among men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so different from a street-porter as a mastiff is from a greyhound, or a grey- hound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's dog. Those different tribes of animals, how- ever, though all of the same species, are of scarce any use to one another. The strength of the mastiff is not in the least supported either by the swift- ness of the greyhound, or by the sagacity of the spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd's dog. The effects of those different geniuses arid talents, for want of the power or disposition to bar- ter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the least contri- bute to the better accommoda- tion and conveniency of the spe- cies. Each animal is still obliged to support and defend itself separately and independently, and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar ge- niuses are of use to one another : the different produces of their respective talents, by the gene- ral disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of other men's talents he has oc- casion for. A. Smith. soc soc SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, THE OaiGJN OF, Man, thrown a* it Were by chance, upon this globe ; gurrounded by all the evils of nature ; obliged continually to defend and protect his life against the storms and tempests of the air, against the inunda- tions of water, agains.1 the fire of volcanos, against the intempera- ture of frigid and torrid zones, against the sterility of the earth which refuses him aliment, or its baneful fecundity which makes poisons spring up beneath his feet : in short, against the claws and teeth of savage beasts, who dispute with him his habitation and his prey ; and attacking his person, resolved to render themselves rulers of this globe, of which he thinks him- self to be the master : Man, in this state, alone and abandoned to himself, could do nothing for his preservation. It was neces- sary therefore that he should unite himself and associate with his like, in order to bring toge- ther their strength and intelli- gence in common stock. It is by this union that he lias tri- umphed over so many evils, that he has fashioned this globe to his use, restrained the rivers, subju- gated the seas, insured his sub- sistence, conquered a part of the animals, in obliging them to serve him; and driven others, far from his empire, to the depths of deserts or of woods, where their number diminishes from age to age. What a man alone would not have been able to effect, men have executed in concert, and all together they preserve their work. Such is the origin, such the advantage, and the end of all society. Go- vernment owes its birth to the necessity of preventing and re- pressing the injuries which the associated individuals had to fear from one another. It is the sen- tinel who watches in order that the common labours be not dis- turbed. Thus society originates in the wants of men ; govern- ment in their vices. Society tends always to good, govern- ment ought always to tend to the repressing of evil. Society is the first, it is in its origin inde- pendent and free : government was instituted for it, and is but its instrument. It is for one to command, it is for the other to obey. Society created the pub- lic power ; government, which has received it from society, ought to consecrate it entirely to its use. In short, society is es- sentially good; government, as is well known, may be, and is but too often, evil. It has been said, that we were all born equal; that is not so: that we had all the same rights ; that is unintelligible nonsense. "What are rights where there is an in- equality of talents or of strength, and no security nor sanction ? It has been said, that nature offer- ed to us all the same dwelling and the same resources; that is not so : that we were all en- dued with the same means of defence ; that is not so:, nor can it be true, in any sense, that we all enjoy the same qualities of mind and body. There is amongst men an original in- equality which nothing can remedy. It must last for ever ; and all that can be obtained by the best legislation, is, not to soc soe destroy it, but to prevent the abuse of it. But in making dis- tinctions between her children like a stepmother, in creating some children strong and others weak, has not nature herself formed the germ or principle of! tyranny ? I do not think it can ' be denied; especially if we look back to a time anterior to all le- gislation ; a time in which man will be seen as passionate and as void of reason as a brute. What then have founders of nations, what have legislatures proposed to themselves, to obvi- ate all the disasters arising from this germ, when it is expanded by a sort of artificial equality, which might reduce all the members of a society, without exception, under an impartial, sole authority ? It is a sword which moves gently, equably, and indifferently over every head: but this sword was ideal ; it was necessary that there should be a hand, a corporeal being, who should hold it. What has resulted thence ? Why, that the history of civilized man is but the history of his misery. All the pages of it are stained with blood ; some with the blood of the oppressors, others with the blood of the op- pressed. In this point of view, man appears more wicked and more miserable than a beast. Different species of beasts subsist on different species ; but socie- ties of men have never ceased to attack each other. Even in the same society, there is no condition but devours and is de- voured, whatever may have been or are the forms of the government or artificial equality which have been opposed to tbcr primitive and natural inequality. - But are these forms of govern- ment, supposing them made by the choice, and the free choice, of the first settlers in a country, and whatever sanction they may have received, whether that of oaths, or of unanimous accord, or of their duration ; are they obli- gatory upon their descendants ? There is no snch thing: if the people are happy under their form of government, they will keep it; if they are unhappy, the impossibility of suffering more and longer will determine them to change it: that is the just exercise of a natural and un- alienable right of the man who is oppressed, and even of the man who is not oppressed. A man wills and chooses for him- self; he cannot will nor choose for another ; and it would be a madness to will and to choose for him who is yet unborn, for him who will not exist for ages. There is no individual but who, discontented with the form of the government of his country, may go elsewhere to seek a bet- ter. There is no society but whip/i has the same right to change as their ancestors had to adopt their form of government. Upon this point it is with socie- ties as if they were at the first moment of their civilization. Without which there would be a great evil ; nay, the greatest of evils would be without a re- medy. Millions of men would be condemned to misery with- out end. The conclusions naturally fol- lowing from these principles are, That there is no form of govern- sov sou ment which has the prerogative to be immutable: No political authority, which, created .yester- day or a thousand years ago, may not be abrogated in ten years time or to-morrow : No power, however respectable, however sacred, that is autho- rized to regard the state as its property. All authority in this world has begun either by the consent of the subjects or by the power of the master. In both one and the other case it may justly end. There is no pre- scription in favour of tyranny against liberty. The truth of these principles is so much the more essential, because all power by its very nature tends to despotism. The public happiness is the first law of nations as the first duty. The first obligation of these great bodies is with themselves; they owe, before all other things, liberty and jus- tice to the members which com- pose them. Every child which is born to the state, every new citizen who comes to breathe the air of the country he has chosen or nature given him, is entitled to the greatest happi- ness he can enjoy. Every obli- gation which cannot be recon- ciled with that is broken ; every contrary claim is a wicked at- tempt upon his rights: Such a claim is opposite to all the ideas of policy and order, and violates every principle of morality. Raynal. SOVEREIGN, THE DUTIES OF A The sovereign is completely dis- charged from a duty, in the at- tempting to perform which he must alvyays be exposed to in- numefable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient ; the du- ty of superintending the indus- try of private people, and of di- recting it towards the employ- ments most suitable to the in- terest of the society. Accord- ing to the system of natural li- berty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to ; three duties of great importance, in- deed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the so- ciety from the violence and in- vasion of other independent so- cieties; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an ex- act administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public in- stitutions, which it can never be for the interest of any indi- vidual, or small number of indi- viduals, to erect and main- tain ; because the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may fre- quently do much more than re- pay it to a great society. A. Smith. SOUJ,, THE ORIGIN OF THE POPULAR OPINIONS CONCERN- ING THE. The notion of the soul of man being a sub- stance distinct from the bo- dy hath not been known to the writers of the Scriptures, ami especially those of the Old Testament. According to the SOB SOU uniform system of revelation, all our hopes of a future life are built upon another, and a seem- ing- opposite foundation, viz. that of the resurrection of some- thing- belonging- to us that dies and is buried ; that is, the body, which is always considered as the man. This doctrine is ma- nifestly superfluous, on the idea of the soul being a substance so distinct from the body as to be unaffected by its death, and able to subsist, and even to be more free and happy, without the body. This opinion, therefore, not having been known to the Jews, and being repugnant to the scheme of revelation, must have had its source in heathen- ism; but with respect to the date of its appearance, and the manner of its introduction, there is room for conjecture and specu- lation. This opinion is evident- ly not the growth of Greece and Rome ; but was received by the philosophers of those countries either from Egypt, or the coun- tries more to the East. The Greeks in general refer it to the Egyptians, but Pausauius gives it to the Chaldeans or the Indi- ans. Though every thing- re- lating to so very obscure a sub- ject, must be in a great measure conjectural ; yet it seems reason- able to think with Mr. Toland, that this doctrine was derived from the Egyptians, and that it might possibly have been sug- gested to them by some of their known customs respecting the dead, whom they preserved with great care, and disposed of with a solemnity unknown to other nations; though it might have arisen among them from other causes, without the help of those peculiar customs. The authority of Herodotus, the old Greek historian, who had him- self travelled in Egypt, is very express to this purpose. He says, that " the Egyptians were the first who maintained that the soul of man is immortal ; that when the body dies, it en- ters into that of some other animal ; and when it has trans- migrated through all terrestrial, marine, and flying- animals, it returns to the body of a man again. This revolution is com- pleted in three thousand years." He adds, that " several Greeks, whose names he could not men- tion, had published that doctrine as their own." It is, however, probable, that the notion of there being some- thing in man distinct from his body, and the cause of his feel- ing, thinking, and willing, and his other mental operations and affections, might very well occur in these rude ages without such a step as this ; though, no doubt, the custom above-mentioned would much contribute to it. Nothing is more common than to observe how very ready all illiterate persons are to ascribe the cause of any difficult appear- ance to an invisible agent, dis- tinct from the subject on which the operation is exerted : But the notion of a proper immate- rial being, without all extension or relation to place, did not ap- pear till of late years in compa- rison; what the ancients meant by an immaterial substance being nothing more than an attenuated matter, like air, ether, fire, or light, considered as fluids, be- sou yond which thetr idea of jncor- poriety did not ero. Psellus says, that the ancient heathens, both Greeks and others, called orilyj the grosser bodies (Ta pachu- tena ton somalon} corporeal. Indeed the vulgar notion of a soul or spirit, wherever it has been found to exist, has been the same in all ages ; and in this respect even the learned of ancient times are only to be considered as the vulgar.^- We gather from Homer, that the belief of his time was, that the ghost bore the shape of, and exactly resembled, the deceased person to whom it belonged ; that it wandered upon the earth, near the place where the body Jay, till it was buried ; at which time it was admitted to the shades below, In both these states it was possessed of the entire consciousness, arid retain- ed the friendships and enmities of the man. We learn from Ossian, that it was the opinion of the times in which he lived, that the souls of heroes went immediately after death to the hills of their country, and the scenes which they had frequent- ed in the most happy times of their lives. It was thought, too, that dogs and^ horses saw the ghosts of the deceased. They also imagined, that the ghosts shrieked near the place where a death was to happen soon after ; from which circumstances, as; well as several others, it is evi- dent, that, in their idea, the soul was material, something like the Eidolon of the Greeks. All the Pagans ef the East, says Loubiere, do truly believe that " there remains something of a man after his death, which sub- sists independently and sepa- rately from his body. But they give extension and figure to that which remains ; and attribute to it all the same members, all the same substances, both solid and liquid, which your bodies are composed of. They only sup- pose, that souls are of a matter subtle enough to escape being seen or handled." We find it also to be one of the oldest opi- nions in heathen antiquity, that the heavenly bodies were ani- mated as well as men. This opinion was held by Origen and other philosophising Christians. Upon the whole, we may con- jecture with some probability, that this doctrine was derived from the Egyptians ; but how far the Egyptians really carried their notions concerning the state of human souls before or after death,doth not distinctly ap- pear, because we have no Egyp- tian writings. But it is proba- ble, that their ideas never ripen- ed into such a system as was af- terwards found in the East, on account of their empire and civil polity having been so soon over- turned, and the country having undergone such a number of re- volutions. Accordingly we find, that those who introduced as much of this system as was re- ceived in Greece, did in general travel into the East for it. <- Priestley. SOUL, THE. The powers of sen- sation or perception and thought, as belonging to man, have never been found but in conjunction with a certain organized system of matter. Had we formed a judgment, therefore, concerning the necessary seat of thought, by the circumstances that uni- sou sou versally accompany it, which is our rule in all other cases, we could not but have concluded, that in man it is a property of the nervous system, or rather of the brain ; because, as far as we can judge, the faculty of think- ing, and a certain state of the brain, always accompany and correspond to one another which is the very reason why we believe that any property is inherent in any substance what- p* r. There is no instance of any man retaining the faculty of thinking when his brain was de- stroyed ; and whenever that fa- culty is impeded or injured, there is sufficient reason to believe that the brain is disordered in pro- portion ; and therefore we are necessarily led to consider the latter as the seat of the former. Moreover, as the faculty of thinking, in general, ripens and comes lo maturity with the body, it is also observed to decay with it; and if, in some cases, the mental faculties continue vigo- rous when the body in general is enfeebled, it is evidently be- cause, in those particular cases, the brain is not much affected by the general cause of weakness : but, on the other hand, if the brain alone be affected, as by a blow on the head, by actual pressure within the skull, by sleep, or by inflammation, the mental faculties are universally affected in proportion. Like- wise, as the mind is affected in consequence of the affections of the bod} 7 and brain, so the body is liable to be reciprocally af- fected by the affections of the mind, as is evident in the visible effects of all strong passions hope or fear, love or anger, joy or sorrow, exultation or despair. These are certainly irrefragable arguments, that it is properly no other than one and the same thing that is subject to these af- fections, and that they are ne- cessarily dependent upon one another. In fact, there is just the same reason to conclude, that the powers of sensation and thought are the necessary result of a particular organization, as .that sound is the necessary re- sult of a particular concussion of the air ; for in both cases equally the one constantly accompanies the other, and there is not in na- ture a stronger argument for a necessary connection of any cause and any effect. Dr. Haller has observed, in his discourses, " That the powers of thought, speech, and motion, appear equally to depend upon the bo- dy, and run the same fate in case of men's declining in old age. When a man dies through old age, I perceive his powers of speech, motion, and thought, decay and die together, arid by the same degrees. The moment he ceases to move and breathe, he appears to cease to think too. When I am left to mere reason, it seems to me that my power of thought as much de- pends upon my body as my pow- er of sight or hearing. I could not think in infancy. My pow- ers of thought, of sight, and of feeling, are equally liable to be obstructed by the body. A blow on the head has deprived a man of thought, who could yet see, and feel, and move: so that na- turally the power of thinking 2 R sou sou seems as much to belong to the body as any power of man what- soever. Naturally there appears no more reason to suppose that a man can think out of the body than he can hear sounds or feel cold out of the body." It is true, that we have a very imperfect idea of what the pow- er of perception is-; and it may be as naturally impossible that we should have a clear idea of it as that the eye should see itself: but this very ignorance ought to make us cautious in asserting- with what other properties it may or may not exist. Nothing but a precise and definite know- ledge of the nature of percep- tion and thought can authorize any person to affirm, whether they may not belong" to an ex- tended substance, which has also the properties of attraction and repulsion. It is very unaccount- able ia Mr. Locke to suppose as he did, and as he largely con- tends, that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the faculty of thinking may be a property of the body, and yet to think it more probable that this faculty inhered in an immaterial soul. A philosopher ought to have been apprised, that we are to suppose no more causes than are necessary to produce the effects : and therefore that we ought to conclude that the whole man is material, unless it should ap- pear that he has some powers or properties absolutely incom- patible with matter. That the faculty of thinking necessarily depends, for its exercise, at least, upon a stock of ideas, about which it is always conversant, will hardly be questioned by any person ; but there is not a sin- gle idea of which the mind is possessed but \fhat may be proved to have come to it from the bodily senses, or to have been consequent upon the per- ceptions of sense. Could we, for instance, have any idea of colour, as red, blue, &c. without the eyes and optic nerves ; of sound, without the ears; of smell, without the nostrils-, &c. &c. It is even impossible to conceive h6\v the mind r - uld have become possessed of any of its present ideas without just such a body as we have ; and consequently, judging from pre- sent appearances (and we have no other means of forming any judgment at all) without a body of some kind or other, we could have had no ideas at all,. any more than a man without eyes could have any particular ideas belonging to colours. The no- tion, therefore, of the possi- bility of thinking in man with- out an organized body, is not only destitute of all evidence from actual appearances, but is directly contrary to them : and yet these appearances ought alone to guide the judgment of philosophers. It is a great ad- vantage to the system of ma- terialism, that we thereby get rid of a great number of diffi- culties ; such, for instance, as these : What becomes of the soul during sleep ; in &swoon ; when the body is seemingly dead, (as by drowning or other accidents) and especially after death? also, What was the condition of it before it became united to the body ; and at what time did that union take place ? &c. &c. sou sou If the soul be immaterial, and *the body material, neither the generation nor the destruction r of the body can have any effect with respect to it. This foreign principle must have been united to it either at the time of con- ception or at birth : and must either have been created at the :time of such union, or have ex- isted in a separate state prior to that union. Must the divine .power be necessarily employed to produce a soul whenever the human species copulate? Or must some of the pre-existent spirits be oblig-ed, immediately upon that event, to descend from the superior regions to in- habit the new-formed embryo? These are suppositions hardly to .be considered at all, without being- immediately rejected as extremely improbable, if not ab- surd. If a man be actuated by a principle distinct from his body, every brute animal must have an immaterial soul also ; for they differ from us in degree only, and not at all in kind, having- all the same mental as well as corpo- real powers and faculties that we have, though not in the same extent ; and they are pos- sessed of them in a greater de- gree than those of our race that are idiots, or that die infants. Are these souls of brutes origi- nally and naturally the same beings with the souls of men ? Have they pre-existed, and are they to continue for ever? II so, how and -where are they to be disposed of after death ? and are they also to be re*-united to their present bodies as well as the souls of men ? These are only a few of the difficulties which must occur to any person who adopts the opinion of the immateriality of the soul. It is contended, that spirit and body can have no common pro- perties ; and when it is asked, How then can they act upon one another; and how can they be so intimately connected as to be continually and necessarily subject to each other's influence? it is acknowledged to be a diffi- culty and a mystery that we can- not comprehend. But had this question been considered with due attention, what has been called a difficulty, would have been deemed an impossibility. It is impossible to conceive even the possibility of mutual action, ' without some common property, by means of which the things that act and re-act upon each other may have some connection. A substance that is hard may act upon, and be acted upon, by another hard substance, or even one that is soft ; but it is certainly impossible that it should affect, or be affected by a substance that can make no resistance at all. But, admit- ting that substances which have no common property can never- theless affect and be affected by each other, to be no more than a difficulty, it is, however, a diffi- culty of such magnitude, as far to exceed that of conceiving that the principle of sensation may possibly consist with mat- ter ; and therefore, if, of two difficulties, it be most philoso- phical to take the least, we must of course abandon the hypo- thesis of two heterogeneous and incompatible principles in man sou sou which is clogged with the greater difficulty of conception, and admit that of the unifor- mity of his nature, which is only attended with a less diffi- culty. If the operations ascribed to mind may result from the pow- ers of matter, why should we suppose a being which is use- less, and which solves no diffi- culty ? It is easy to see, that the properties of matter do not exclude those of intelligence ; but it cannot be imagined how a being, which hns.no property besides intelligence, can make use of matter. In reality, how can this substance, which bears no relation to matter, be sensi- ble of it, or perceive it? In or- der to See things, it is necessary that they make an impression upon us, that there be some re- lation between us and them; but what can be this relation ? It is affirmed, that we have as clear an idea of spirit as we have of matter, each being equaljy the unknown support of known properties ; matter of extension and solidity, and spi- rit of sensation and thought. But still, since the substance is confessedly unknown to us, it must also be unknown to us what properties it is capable of supporting; and therefore, un- less '.' ^re be a real inconsist- ency JJ the properties them- selves, those which have hither- to been ascribed to both sub- . stances may belong to either of \ them. For this reason, Mr. Locke, who maintains the im- materiality of the soul, and yet maintains that, for any thing we know to the contrary, mat- ter may have the property of thought added to it, ought to have concluded that this is really the case ; since, accord- ing to the rules of philosophis- ing, we ought not to multiply causes without necessity. Priestley. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. It IS maintained in the schools, That as thought does not belong to extension and matter, it is evi- dent that the soul is spiritual. "What in fact is the meaning of the word thought? Either it is void of meaning, or, like the word motion, it merely ex- presses a mode of a man's ex- istence. Now, to say that a mode or manner of being is not a body, or has no extension, nothing can be more clear: but to make of this mode a being, and even a spiritual being, no- thing is more absurd. Hel- vetius. SOUL, IMMORTALITY OF THE. The horror mankind have for death and annihilation, would have been sufficient, without the aid of revelation, to have made them invent the doctrine of the immortality of the. soul. Man would be immortal in his pre- sent state ; and would believe himself so, if all the bodies that surround him did not every in- stant prove the contrary. Forced to yield to this truth, he has still the same desire of im- mortality. Esau's cauldron of rejuvenescence proves the anti- quity of this desire. To make it perpetual, it was necessary to found it on some probability at least : to effect this, they made the soul of a matter extremely subtle ; they supposed it an in- sou sou destructible atom that survived the dissolution of all the other parts; in a word, a principle of life. The being, under the name of soul, was to preserve after death all the affections of which it was susceptible during its union with the body. This system supposed, men doubted the less of the immortality of the soul, as neither experience nor observation could contradict such belief; for neither of them can form any judgment of an imperceptible atom. Its exist- ence, indeed, was not demon- strated ; but what proof do we want of what we wish to be- lieve, and what demonstration is strong 1 enough to prove the falsity of a favourite opinion ? It is true we never meet with any souls in our walks ; and it is to show the reason of this that men, after having created souls, thought themselves ob- liged to create a country for their habitation. Each nation, and even each individual, ac- cording to his inclinations and the particular nature of his wants, has formed a particular plan. Sometimes the savage nations placed this habitation in a vast forest, full of wild-fowl, and watered with rivers stocked with fish : sometimes they placed it in an open level country, abounding in pasture, in the middle of which rose a bed of strawberries as large as a moun- tain ; different parts of which they portioned off for the nou- rishment of themselves and fa- milies. People less exposed to hunger, and, besides, more nu- merous and better instructed, placed on this spot all that is delightful in nature, and gave it the name of Elysium. Covetous mortals formed it after the plan of the garden of Hesperides ; and stocked it with trees, whose golden branches were loaded with fruits of diamonds. The more voluptuous nations placed in it trees of sugar and rivers of milk, and furnished it with de- licious animals. Imagination, directed by different wants and inclinations, operated every where in the same manner. Each people furnished the coun- try of souls with what was on earth the object of their de- sires. Helvetius. SOUL, THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE. If it be asked, Whether the soul be a spiritual or a mate- rial substance ? it must be grant- ed, that neither opinion is capa- ble of demonstration ; and con- sequently, that, by weighing the reasons on both sides, balancing the difficulties, and determining in favour of the greater number of probabilities, we should form only conditional judgments. It is the fate of this problem, as it hath been of many others, to be resolvable only by the assistance of the calculation of probabilities. Whatever may have been affirmed by the Stoics, Seneca was not fully convinced of the spirituality of the soul : " Your letter (says he to -one of his friends) came at an improper time, being delivered to me when I was taking a walk in the temple of Hope. There I freed myself from all doubts with regard to my soul's immortality. My imagination, gently warmed by the reasoning of some great men, firmly believed in That im- sou mortality which they pr-omise more than they prove. 1 began (to be displeased with my ex- istence, and to despise the re- mains of an unhappy life, when I had opened to myself with de- light the gates of eternity ; but your letter awakened me, and of so pleasing- a dream left me only the regret of knowing* it was a dream !" A proof, says Mr. Deslandes in his Critical History of Philosophy, that formerly nei- ther the immortality nor imma- teriality of the soul were be- lieved, is, that in the tirrjQ of Nero, the people of Rome com- plained that the introduction of the new-fangled doctrine of the other world enervated the cou- rage of the soldiers, and rendered them timorous ; that it deprived the unhappy of their principal consolation, and added double terror to death, by threatening them with new sufferings after this life. Without examining if it be the interest of the public to admit the doctrine of the immor- tality of the soul, it may be ob- served, that at least this dogma has not always been regarded as politically useful. It took its rise in the schools of Plato : but Pto- lemy Philadelphus king of Egypt, thought it so dangerous, that he forbid it to be preached in his dominions on pain of death. Helvetius. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. Newton, like almost all true philosophers, was persuaded that the soul is an incomprehensible substance; that we have not a sufficient know- ledge of nature for us to dart) to affirm, that it is impossible for God to add the gift of thought to any extended substance what- soever. But the great difficulty is, rather to know how matter can become cogitative. Thought, indeed, seems to have nothing in com-mon with the known attri- butes in that extended being whflch we call body. But are we acquainted with all the pro- perties of bodies ? Does it not seem very bold to say to God, You have been able to give a being motion, gravitation, vege- tation, and life, but cannot give it thought ? They who say, that, if matter could recei-ve the gift of cogitati- OQ, the soul would not be immor- tal, seem to have drawn an un- fair consequence. Is it more dif- ficult to preserve than to make ? Besides, if an undi visible atom be eternal, why shall not the faculty of cogitation it enjoys last as long ? Jf I am not mistaken, they who deny God to have the power of annexing ideas to mat- ter, are forced to say, that what we call spirit is a being whose essence is to think exclusive of any extended being whatsoever. Now, if it be the nature of spirit to think essentially, then it thinks necessarily and thinks incessant- ly, as every triangle has necessa- rily and always three angles^ in- dependently of God. How ! on God's creating something that is not matter, must that something absolutely think ? Weak and bold as we are, do we know whe- ther God has not formed millions of beings, with neither the pro- perties of spirits nor matter as known to us ? We are like a herdsmafi, who, having seen no other beasts than oxen, should say, If God pleases to make any other, they must have horns and sou sou cheio the cud. Which wiU be thought more reverential to the Deity, to affirm that there are be- ings without the divine attribute of cogitation abstractedly from him, or to apprehend that God can grant that attribute to any being he shall please to choose ? It must be observed, that New- ton was very far from venturing to define the soul, as so many others have presumed to do ; he thought it was possible there might be millions of other think- ing beings, whose nature might be entirely different from that ol our soul; so that the division of all nature into matter and spirits seems the definition of a deaf and blind man defining the senses, without any idea or conception of sight or hearing. How in- deed can any one say, that God has not filled the immense space with an infinity of substances, having nothing in common with mankind ? Most ancient nations conceived nothing beyond matter, and looked on ideas in our under- standing as the impression of the seal on wax. This perplexed opinion was rather a rude instinct than ratiocination. Succeeding philosophers, who were for prov- ing that matter thinks of itself, have erred still more. The vul- gar were mistaken without any previous reasoning: these erred from principles ; not one of them being, ever a'ble to discover any thing in matter that tended to prove it was intelligent. Locke alone appears ta have re- moved the contradiction between matter and" thought ; recurring at once to the Creator of all thought and of all matter, and modestly saying, " Cannot Fie who can do every thing., give cogitation to a material being, lo- an atom, to an element of mat- ter?" He stopped at this possi- bility, as became a man of his wisdom. To affirm that matter does actually think because God can impart such a faculty to it, would be the highest presump- tion ; but is it less to assert the contrary ? The most generally received opinion, is that which considers the soul and body as two distinct and quite different substances, created by God to act on each other. The only proof of this reciprocal action us the experi- ence which every one believes to have of it. We feel our bodies sometimes obeying our will, and sometimes tyrannizing over it: we conceive that they in reality act on each other because we feel it, and we cannot carry our investigations further. An ob- jection, however, lies to this system not easily removed. An external object, for instance, communicates a vibration to the nerves ; which motion either ex- tends to the soul or not : if it reaches the souJ, it imparts mo- tio to it, which would suppose- the soul corporeal ; if it does not, there is no longer any actioa. All the answer that can be given is, this action is one of those things the mechanism of which will for ever remain unknown : a sad conclusion, but almost the only one becoming man in more than one point of metaphysics. Voltaire. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. KnOlV Thyself, is an excellent precept, which God alone can practise. sou sou Who but he can know his es- sence ? We call soul that which ani- mates ; and so contracted is our understanding, that we know little more of it. Three-fourths of our species do not go that length, and little concern them- selves about the thinking being ; the other fourth is seeking what nobody has found, or ever will find. Thou, poor pedant, seest a vegetating plant ; and thou sayest vegetation, or even vege- tative soul. Thou observest bo- dies have and give motion, and this with thee is strength. Thy hound's aptness in learning to hunt under thy instruction thou callest instinct, sensitive soul : and thou hast combined ideas, that thou termest spirit. What is to be understood by these words, This flower vege- tates ? Is there a real being named vegetation? One body impels another; but is there in it a distinct being called strength? This hound brings thee a par- tridge ; but is there abeing call- ed instinct ? Should we not laugh at a philosopher who should tell us all animals live ; therefore there is in them a being, a substantial form, which is life The first philosophers, both Chaldeans and Egyptians, said there must be something in us that produces our thoughts. This something must be very subtile ; it is a breath, it is a fire, it is tether, it is a light, it is an ente- lechia,itis a number, it is har- mony. According to the divine ^Plato, it is a compound of the same and of the other ; and -Epi- curus, from Democritus, has said, that it is thinking atoms in us. But how does an atom think ? It is said, that the soul is an imma- terial being ; and that its nature is to think, because it does think. But on this subject we seem to be as ignorant as Epicurus. The nature of a stone is to fall, be- cause it falls ; but what makes it fall still remains a question. We know a stone has no soul ; we know that a negative and affirmative are not divisible, are not parts of matter : but matter, otherwise unknown to us, has qualities that are no.t divisible, as gravitation towards a centre, given it by God. This gravita- tion has no parts, is not divisible. The motory force of bodies is not a being composed of parts ; nei- ther can it be said, that the ve- getation of all organized bodies, their life, their instinct, are dis- tinct or -divisible beings. You can no more cut in two the ve- getation of a rose, the life of a horse, the instinct of a dog, than you can cut in two a sensation, a negation, or an affirmation. Thus the argument taken from the indivisibility of thought proves nothing. Our idea of the soul is no other than of a power unknown to us of feeling and thinking. But is this power of feeling and thinking the same as that by which we digest and walk ? It certainly is not. The Greeks were well aware that thought often had no concern with the play of our organs. Instead of those organs they substituted a sensitive soul ; and for the thoughts a more fine and more subtile soul. But it is certain sou sou this sensitive soul has no exist- ence ; it is nothing 1 but the mo- tion of our organs ; nor does our reason afford us any more proof of the existence of the other soul. Let us take a view of the fine systems which philosophy has struck out concerning 1 souls. One says, that the soul of a man is part of the substance of God himself; another, that it is part of the great All ; a third, that it has been created from all eternity; a fourth, that it is made, and not created. Others affirm, that God makes them as they are wanted ; and that they come- at the instant of copula- tion. One cries, They are lodg- ed in the seminal animalcules : Not at all, says another, they take up their residence in the Fallopian tubes. Some affirm, that the soul stays six weeks till the foetus be formed, and then possesses itself of the pinea] gland ; but if the germ prove addle, it goes away to whence it came till a better opportunity. The last opinion makes its abode to be in the callous body of the brain. If any man has discover- ed a ray of light in this region of darkness, perhaps it is Malle- branche, notwithstanding the ge neral prejudices against his sys- tem. It does not differ greatl} from that of the Stoics ; and who knows but these two opin ions, properly rectified, conn nearest the truth ? There is something very sublime in that ancient notion:' We exist in God ; our thoughts, our senti- ments, are derived from the Su- preme Being. It must, however, be con- fessed, that we know little con- cerning the soul but only by faith. We live upon this earth in the same manner as the man in the iron mask spent his days in the prison, without knowing his original, or the reason of his being confined. We are born, we live, we act, we think, we sleep, we wake-, without knowing how. God has given us the faculty of thinking as he has given us all our other appartenances ; and had he not come, at the time appointed by his providence, to inform us that we had an imma- terial and immortal soul, we should have been without any proof of it. Voltaire. SOUL, IMMATERIALITY OF THE. In meditating on the nature of man, we may discover two dis- tinct principles ; the one raising him to the study of eternal truths, and bearing him aloft to the regions of the intellectual world ; the other debasing him even below himself, and subject- ing him to the slavery of sense and the tyranny of the passions. From hence we may conclude that man is not one simple and individual substance. By the word substance is here meant, a being possessed of some primitive quality, ab- stracted from all particular and secondary modifications. Now, if all known primitive qualities may be united in one and the same being, we have no need to admit of more than one sub- stance: but if some of these qualities are incompatible with and necessarily exclusive of each other, we must admit of the existence of as many different substances as there are such in- 2 s sou sou compatible qualities. Notwith- standing what Mr. Locke hath said on this subject, we need only to know that matter is ex- tended and divisible to be as- sured that it cannot think. At- traction is one of the laws of nature, the mystery of which may possibly be impenetrable: but we are at least capable of conceiving-, that gravity, acting in the ratio of the quantity of matter, s neither incompatible with extension or divisibility. Can we conceive the same of thoug-ht and sentiment? The sensible parts are extended, but the sensitive being is single and indivisible ; it is either entirely itself or nothing- : The sensitive being therefore is not a body. A mere machine is evidently incapable of thinking; it has neither motion nor figure pro^ ductive of reflection : whereas, in man there exists something perpetually prone to expand, and to burst the fetters by which it is confined. Space itself affords not bounds to the human mind : the whole uni- verse is not extensive enough for him : his sentiments, his de- sires, his anxieties, and even his pride, take rise from a principle different from that body within which he perceives himself con- fined. No material being can be self-active, but man perceives himself self-active: and this sentiment carries with it a stronger conviction than any reason which can ever be brought against it. He hath a body on which other bodies act, and which act reciprocally on them. This reciprocal action is indubitable ; but the will is in- dependent of the senses. It can neither constent to or resist their impressions ; and we per- ceive clearly within ourselves when we act according to our wills, and when we submit to be governed by our passions. If the soul be immaterial, it may survive the body. Were there no other proof of the im- materiality of the soul than the oppression of the just and the triumph of the wicked in this world, that alone would be a sufficient proof of it. So shock- ing a discord amidst the gene- ral harmony of things would make us look out for the cause, and we should infer from thence, that we do not cease to exist with this life, but that every thing resumes its order after death. When the union of the body and soul is broken, it is conceivable that the one may be dissolved and the other pre- served entire. Why should the dissolution of the one necessarily bring onthatof the other ? On the contrary, being so different in their natures, their state of union is a state of violence ; and when it is broken, they both re- turn to their natural situation: the active and living substance regains all the force it had em- ployed in giving motion to the passive and dead substance to which it had been united. The failings and infirmities of man make us sensible that man is but half alive, and that the life of the soul commences at the death of the body. But what is that life ? Is the soul immortal in its own nature ? A limited comprehension is in- sou capable of conceiving 1 any thing that is unlimited. Whatever we call infinite is beyond human conception. We can neither deny nor affirm : we can employ no arguments on subjects we cannot conceive. Nothing- is more probable than that the soul survives the body so long- as is necessary to justify Providence in the good order of things : every rational man will adopt that as an article of faith, but who knows that the soul will survive the body for ever ? We may readily conceive how ma- terial bodies wear away and are destroyed by the separation of their parts but we cannot con- ceive a like dissolution of a thinking being: and hence, as we cannot imagine how it can die, we may presume it cannot die at all. Rousseau. SOUL, IMMATERIALITY OF THE. Soul is an invented word, faintly and obscurely denoting- the spring of human life. All ani- mals have a motion, and this ability to move is called active force ; but this force is no dis- tinct being- whatever. We have passions, memory and reason: but these passions, this memory, and reason, are surely not sepa- rate thing-s; they are not beings existent in us : they are not diminutive persons of a particu- lar existence ; they are generical words invented to fix our ideas. Thus the soul itself, which sig-ni- fies our memory, our reason, our passions, is only a bare word. Whence then motion in nature? from God, Whence vegetation in the plant? from God. Whence motion in animals? from God. Whence cogitation in man ? from God. Were the human soul a diminutive person, inclosed within our body, to di- rect its motions and ideas, would not that betray* in the eternal Maker of the world an impotence and an artifice quite unworthy of him? He then must have been incapable of making automata, which shall have the gift of motion and thought in themselves. When I learned Greek, I read Homer, where Vulcan appears to me an excellent smith, when Jie makes g-olden tripods going of them- selves to the counsel of the g-ods ; but had this same Vulcan concealed within these tripods one of his boys, to make them move without being 1 perceived, I should think him but a bung-- ling- cheat. Wherefore should God put two springs to a work when one will do? That God can animate that so little known being which we call matter, must not be denied. Why then should he make use of another ag-ent to animate it? Further, What may that soul be which you are pleased to give to our body ? From whence did it come? When did it come? Must the Creator of the universe be continually watching the copu- lation of men and women ? Closely observe the moment when a germ issues from a man's body, and passes into that 'of a woman, and then quickly inject a soul into this g-erm ? And if this g-erm dies, what becomes of its so{ ? Either it must have been created ineffectually, or must wait another opportunity. This is really a strange em- ployment for the Sovereign of sou the universe. And it is not only .ria the copulation of the human species that he must be continu- ally intent, but must observe the like Vigilance and celerity with all animals whatever: for, like us, they have memory, ideas, and passions ; and if a soul be necessary for the formation of these sentiments, these ideas, these . passions, and this me- mory, God must be perpetually at work about souls for elephants ; and fleas, for fish and for bonzes. What idea doth such a notion give of the Architect of so many millions of worlds, thus obliged , to be continually making 1 invi- sible props for perpetuating 1 his c\ work? Voltaire. SOUL, THE DOCTRINE OF THE IM- MORTALITY OF THE, AMONG THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS, BAR- BARIANS, AND JEWS. The writ- ings of Cicero represent in the . most lively colours the ignorance, the errors, and the uncertainty of the ancient philosophers with regard to the immortality of the soul. When they are desirous . of arming their disciples against the fear of death, they inculcate, j as an obvious, though melan- choly position, that the fatal stroke of our dissolution releases us from the calamities of life ; and those can no longer suffer who no longer exist. Yet there were a few sages of Rome who had conceived a more exalted, and in some respects, a juster idea of human nature ; though it must be confessed, that, in the sublime inquiry, their reason had . been often guided by their ima- . gination, and that their imagina- - tiftn had been prompted by their vanitv. When thev viewed with SOU complacency the extent of their own mental powers ; when they exercised ihe various faculties of memory, of fancy, and of judg- ment, in the most profound spe- culations, or the most important labours ; and when they reflect- ed on the desire of fame, which transported them into future ages, far beyond the bounds of death and the grave ; they were unwilling to confound them- selves with the beasts of the field, or to suppose that a being, for whose dignity they entertained the most sincere admiration, could be limited to a spot of earth and to a few years of duration. With this favourable prepos- session, they summoned to their aid the science, or rather the language, of metaphysics. They soon discovered, that as none of the properties of body will apply to the operations of the mind, the human soul must consequent- ly be a substance distinct from the body, pure, simple, and spiritual, incapable of dissolution, and susceptible of a much higher degree of virtue and happiness after the release from its corpo- real prison. From these specious and noble principles, the philoso- phers who trod in the footsteps of Plato deduced a very unjustifiable conclusion ; since they asserted not only the future immortality but the past eternity of the soul ; which they were too apt to con- sider as a portion of the infinite and self-existing spirit which pervades and sustains the uni- verse. A doctrine thus removed beyond the senses and experi- ence of mankind, might serve to amuse the leisure of a philoso- phic mind ; or, in the silence of sou sou solitude, it might sometimes im- part a ray of comfort to despond- ing 1 virtue ; but the faint impres- sion which had been received in .the schools, was soon obliterated by the commerce and business oi active life. We are sufficiently acquainted with the eminent persons who flourished in the age of Cicero and of the first Caesars, with their actions, their characters, anc their motives, to be assured that their conduct in this life was never regulated by any serious conviction of the rewards or punishments of a future state. At the bar and in the seriate ol Rome, the ablest orators were not apprehensive of giving offence to their hearers, by exposing that doctrine as an idle and extravagant opinion, which was rejected with contempt by every man of a liberal education and understanding. Since, there- fore, the most sublime efforts of philosophy can extend no fur- ther than feebly to point out the desire, the hope, or at most the probability of a future state, there is nothing except a divine revelation that can ascertain the existence and describe the con- dition of the invisible country which is destined to receive the souls of men after their separa- tion from the body. But we may perceive several defects inherent to the popular religions of Greece and Rome, which rendered them very un- equal to so arduous a task. 1. The general system of their my- thology was unsupported by any solid proofs ; and the wisest among the Pagans had already disclaimed its usurped authority. 2. The description of the infernal regions had been abandoned to the fancy of painters and pcets ; who peopled them with so nany phantoms and monsters, who dispensed their rewards anc pu- nishments with so little ecuity, that a solemn truth, the most congenial to the human leart, was oppressed and disgracd by the absurd mixture of the wildest fictions. 3. The doctrine of a future state was scarcely consi- dered among the devout poly- theists of Greece and Rome as a fundamental article of faith. The providence of the gods, as it re- lated to public communities rather than to private individual*, was principally displayed on tie visible theatre of the present world. The petitions whch were offered on the altars of Jupiter and Apollo, expressed the anxiety of their worshippers for temporal happiness, and tieir ignorance and indifference ton- cerning a future life. Th im- portant truth of the immorality of the soul was inculcated with more diligence as well as siccess in India, in Assyria, in Egypt, and in Gaul ; and since \vd can- not attribute such a difference to the superior knowledge of the Barbarians, we must asc'ibe it to the influence of an established priesthood, which employed the motives of virtue as the instru- ments of ambition. We might natimlly expect, that a principle so essential to religion would havs been reveal- ed in the cleares' terms to the chosen people of Palestine, and that it might sjfely have been entrusted to the hereditary priesthood of Aaron. It is in- sou cimbent on us to adore the mys- terious dispensations of Provi- dence, when we discover, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is omitted in the law of Moses ; it is darkly insinuated by the prophets ; and, during tht long- period which elapsed be.ween the Egyptian and the Babylonian servitudes, the hopes as veil as the fears of the Jews appear to have been confined within the narrow compass of the present life. After Cyrus had permitted the exiled nation to return to the promised land, and after Ezra had restored the ancient records of their religion, two celebrated sects, the Sad- duces and Pharisees, insensibly irose at Jerusalem. The former, selected from the more opulent aid distinguished ranks of so- o'ety, were strictly attached to the literal sense of the Mosaic liw ; and they piously rejected tie immortality of the soul as an opinion that received no counte- nance from the divine book wlich they revered as the only ruh of their faith. To the au- thority of Scripture, the Phari- sees added that of tradition ; and they accepted, under the name of traditions, several speculative tenets from the philosophy or religio* of the eastern nations. The doctrines of fate and pre- destinatbn, of angels and spirits, and of a future state of rewards and puni:hments, were in the number of these new articles of belief; and as the Pharisees, by the austerity of their manners, had drawn iito their party the body of the Jewish people, the immortality of the soul became the prevailing sentiment of the SOU synagogue under the reign of the Asmonaen princes and pon- tiffs. The temper of the Jews was incapable of contenting it- self with such a cold and languid assent as might satisfy the mind of a polytheist ; and as soon as they admitted the idea of a future state, they embraced it with the zeal which has always formed the characteristic of the nation. Their zeai, however, added no- thing to its evidence, or even probability : and it was still ne- cessary that the doctrine of life and immortality, which had been dictated by nature, approved by reason, and received by supersti- tion, should obtain the sanction of divine truth from the authority and example of Christ. Gibbon, SOUL, IMMORTALITY OF THE. By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the immorta- lity of the soul ; the arguments for it are commonly derived either from metaphysical topics, or moral, or physical. But in reality it is the gospel, and the gospel alone, that has brought life and immortality to light. I. Metaphysical topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, and that it is impossible for thought to belong to a material sub- stance. But just metaphysics teach us, that the notion of sub- stance is wholly confused and imperfect ; and that we have no other idea of any substance, than as an aggregate of particular qualities inhering in an unknown something. Matter, therefore, and spirit, are at bottom equally unknown ; and we cannot de- termine what qualities inhere in the one or in the other. They likewise teach us, that nothing sou SOU can be decided a priori concern- ing 1 any cause or effect ; and that experience, being- the only source of our judgments of this nature, we cannot know from any other principle, whether matter, by its structure or ar- rangement, may not be the cause of thought. Abstract rea- sonings cannot decide any ques- tion of fact or existence. But admitting- a spiritual substance to be dispersed throughout the .universe, like the ethereal fire of the Stoics, and to be the only in- herent subject of thought, we have reason to conclude from analogy, that nature uses it after the manner she does the other substance, matter. She employs it as a kind of paste or clay ; modifies it into a variety of forms and existences : dissolves after a time each modification, and from its substance erects a new form As the same material substance may successively compose the bodies of all animals, the same spiritual substance may compose their minds : their consciousness or that system of thought whicV they formed during life, may be continually dissolved by death and nothing interest* them ir the new modification. The most positive assertors o the mortality of the soul neve denied the immortality of it substance; and that an imma terial substance, as well as material, may lose its memory or consciousness, appears in par from experience, if the soul b immaterial. Reasoning from th common course of nature, an without supposing any new in terposition of the Suprem Cause, which ought always t t)e excluded from philosophy, what is incorruptible must also be ingenerable. The soul there- fore, if immortal, existed before our birth ; and if the former ex- istence no ways concerned us, neither will the latter. Ani- mals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even rea- son, though in a more imperfect manner than men: Are their souls also immaterial and im- m ortal ? II. Let us now consider the moral arguments, chiefly those derived from the justice of God, which is supposed to be further interested in the future punish- ment of the vicious, and reward of the virtuous. But these ar- guments are grounded on the supposition that God has attri- butes beyond what he has ex- erted in this universe, with which alone we are acquainted. Whence do we infer the exist- ence of these attributes? It is very safe for us to affirm, that whatever we know the Deity to have actually done is best ; but it is very dangerous to af- firm, that he must always do what to us seems best. In how many instances would this rea- soning fail us with regard to the present world? But if any pur- pose of nature be clear, we may affirm, that the whole scope and intention of man's creation, so far as we can judge by natural reason, is limited to the present life. With how weak a concern from the original inherent struc- ture of the mind and passions, does he ever look further? What comparison either for steadiness or efficacy, betwixt so floating an idea and the sou sou most doubtful persuasion of any matter of fact that occurs in common life ? There arise, in- deed, in some minds, some un- accountable terrors with regard ta futurity ; but these would quickly vanish were they not artificially fostered by precept and education. And those who foster them, what is their mo- tive? Only to gain a liveli- hood, and to acquire power and riches in this world. Their very Zealand industry, therefore, are an argument against them. What cruelty, what iniquity, what injustice in nature, to con- fine all our concern, as well as all our knowledge, to the pre- sent life, if there be another scene still waiting us of infinite- ly greater consequence ? Ought this barbarous deceit to be as- cribed to a beneficent and wise being ? Observe with what ex- act proportion the task to be performed and the performing powers are adjusted throughout all nature. If the reason of man gives him great superiority above other animals, his necessities are proportionably multiplied upon him : his whole time, his whole capacity, activity, courage, and passion, find sufficient employ- ment in fencing against the mi- series of his present condition ; and frequently, nay, almost al- ways, are too slender for the business assigned them. A pair of shoes, perhaps, was never yet wrought to the high- est degree of perfection which that commodity is capable of at- taining; yet it is necessary, at least very useful, that there should be some politicians and moralists; even some geometers, poets, and philosophers among mankind. The powers of men are no more superior to their wants, considered merely in this life, than those of foxes and hares are, compared to their wants, and to their period of ex- istence. The inference from parity of reason is therefore ob- vious. On the theory of the soul's mortality, the inferiority of wo- men's capacity is easily account- ed for. Their domestic life re- quires no higher faculties either of mind or body. This circum- stance vanishes and becomes absolutely insignificant on the religious theory: the one sex has an equal task to perform as the other; their powers of rea- son and resolution ought also to have been equal, and both of them infinitely greater than at present. As every effect im- plies a cause, and that another, till we reach the first cause of all, which is the Deity ; every thing that happens is ordained by him, and nothing can be the object of his punishment or ven- geance. By what rule are pu- nishments and rewards distri- buted ? What is the divine standard of merit and demerit? Shall we suppose that human sentiments have place in the Deity ? How bold that hypo- thesis ! We have no conception of any other sentiments. Ac- cording to human sentiments, "^ense, courage, good manners, industry, prudence, genius, &c, are essential parts of personal merits. Shall we therefore e- rect an elysium for poets and heroes like that of the ancient mythology? Why confine all sou sou rewards to one species of virtue^ Punishment, without any proper end or purpose, is inconsistent with our ideas of goodness and justice ; and no end can be served by it after the whole scene is closed. Punishment, according to our 'con- ception, should bear some propor- tion to the offence. Why then eternal punishment for the tempo- rary offences of so frail a creature as man ? Can any one approve of Alexander's rage, who intended to exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his favourite horse Bucephalus? Heaven and hell suppose fwo distinct species of men, the good and the bad ; ,but the greatest part of mankind float betwixt vice and virtue. Were one to go round the world with an intention of giving a good supper to the righteous and a sound drubbing to the wicked, he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would find that the merits and the demerits of most men and women scarcely amount to the value of either. To suppose measures of approbation and blame different from the human confounds every thing. Whence do we learn that there is such a thing as moral distinctions, but from our own sentiments? What man who has not met with personal provo- cation or what good-natured man who has) could inflict on crimes, from the sense of blame alone, even the common, legal, frivolous pu- nishments? And does any thing steel the breasts of judges and juries against the sentiments of humanity but reflection on necessity and pub- lic interest? By the Roman law, those who had been guilty of par- ricide, and confessed their crime, were put into a sack along with an 3 p ape, a dog, and a serpent, and thrown into the river. Death alone was the punishment of those who denied their guilt, however fully proved. A criminal was tried be- fore Augustus, and condemned after a full conviction ; but the humane emperor, when he put the last interrogatory, gave it such a turn as to lead the wretch into a denial of his guilt. "You surely (said the prince) did not kill your father?" This lenity suits our na- tural ideas of right even towards the greatest of all criminals, and even though it prevents so incon- siderable a sufferance. Nay, even the inost bigotted priest would na- turally without reflection approve of it, provided the crime was not heresy or infidelity; for as these crimes hurt himself in his temporal interest and advantages, perhaps he may not be altogether so indul- gent to them. The chief source of moral ideas is the reflection on the interests of human society. Ought these interests, so short, so frivo- lous, to be guarded by punishment eternal and infinite ? The damna- tion of one man is an infinitely greater evil in the universe than the subversion of a thousand mil- lions of kingdoms. Nature has rendered human infancy peculiarly frail and mortal, as it were on purpose to refute the notion of a probationary state ; the half of mankind die before they are ra- tional creatures. III. The physical arguments from the analogy of nature are strong for the mortality of the soul; and are really the only philosophical argu- ments which ought to be admitted with ragard to this question, or indeed any question of fact. Where any two objects are so sou s@u closely connected that all altera- tions which we have ever seen in the one are attended with propor- tionable alterations in the other, we ought to conclude, by all rules of analogy, that, when there are still greater alterations produced in the former, and it is totally dis- solved, there follows a total dis- aolution of the latter. Sleep, a very small effect on the body, is attended with a temporary extinc- tion-, at least a great confusion in the soul. The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned ; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems una- voidlable; their common dissolution in death. The last symptoms which the mind discovers, are disorder, weakness, insensibility, and stupi- dity; the forerunners of its anni- hilation. The further progress of the same causes encreasing, the same effects totally extinguish it. Judging by the usual analogy of nature, no form can continue when transferred to a condition of life very different from the original one in which it was placed. Trees perish in the water, fishes in the air, animals in the earth. Even so small a difference as that of climate is often fatal. What reason then to imagine, that an immense alte- ration, such as is made on the soul by the dissolution of its body, and all its organs of thought and sen- sation, can be effected without the dissolution of the whole? Every thing is in common betwixt soul and body. The organs of the one are all of them the organs of the other; the existence, therefore, of the one must be dependent on that of the other. The souls of animals are allowed to ba mortal; and these bear so near a resemblance to the souls of men, that the analogy from one to the other forms a very strong argument. Their bodies are not more resembling, yet no one rejects the argument drawn from comparative anatomy. The Me- tempsychosis is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy can hearken to. Nothing in this world is perpe- tual; every thing, however seem- ingly firm, is in continual flux and change : the world itself gives symptoms of frailty and dissolution. How contrary to analogy, therefore, to imagine that one single form, seemingly the frailest of any, and subject to the greatest disorders, is immortal and indissoluble? What daring theory is that ! how lightly, not to say how rashly, entertained ! How to dispose of the infinite number of posthumous ex- istences ought also to embarrass the religious theory. Every planet in every solar system we are at liberty to imagine peopled with intelligent mortal beings, at least we can fix on no other supposition. For these, then, a new universe must every generation be created beyond the bounds of the present universe, or one must have been created at first so prodigiously wide as to admit of this continual influx of beings. Ought such bold sup- ppsitions to be received by any philosophy, an4 that merely on the pretext of a bare possibility? When it is asked, Whether Agamemnon, Thersites, Hannibal, Varro, and every stupid clown that ever existed in Italy, Scythia, Bactria, of Guinea, are now jflive, can any man think, that a scrutiny of sou sou nature will furnish arguments strong enough to anstfer so strange a question in the affirmative? The want of argument without revela- tion sufficiently establishes the ne- gative. Quanta fadlius, says Pliny, certiusque sibi quemque cre- dere, ac specimen securitatis anti- gene tali sumere experimento. Our insensibility before the composition of the body seems to natural reason a proof of a like state after disso- lution. Were our horrors of anni- hilation an original passion, not the effect of our general love of hap- piness, it would rather prove the mortality of the soul : for, as na- ture does nothing in vain, she would never give us a horror against an impossible event. She may give us a horror against an unavoidable event, provided our endeavours, as in the present case, may often remove it to some distance. Death is in the end unavoidable; yet the human species could not be pre- served had not nature inspired us with an aversion towards it All doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured by our passions ; and the hopes and fears which gave rise to this doctrine are very ob- vious. It is an infinite advantage in every controversy to defend the negative. If the question be out of the common experienced course of nature, this circumstance is almost if not altogether decisive. By what arguments or analogies can we prove any state of existence which no one ever saw, and which no way resembles any that ever was seen? Who will repose such trust in any pretended philosophy as to admit upon its testimony the reality of so marvellous a scene ? Some new species of logic is requi- site for that purpose, and some new faculties of the mind, that may enable us to comprehend that logic. Notking could set in a fuller light the infiaite obligations which mankind have to divine revelation, since we find that no other medium could ascertain this great and im- portant truth Hume. SOUL, THE, THINKS NOT ALWAYS.- We know certainly by experience that we sometimes think; and thence private revenue of in- dividuals arises ultimately from thr.'e different sources rent, profit, and wages. Every tax must finally be paid from one or other of those three different sorts of revenue, or all of them indifferently. The four following maxims, with regard to taxes, seem to be essential. 1 . The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly a possible, in proportion to their respective abilities ; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The ex- pense of government to the in- dividuals of a great nation, is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate. In the oh- servation of neglect of this maxim consists, what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. Every tax, it must, be observed once for all, which falls finally upon only one of the three sorts of revenue above-mentioned, is necessarily un- equal, insofar as it does not affect the other two. 2. The tax which each indivi- dual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the mannef of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of tax-gatherers ; who can either ag- gravate the tax upon any obnoxi- ous contributor, or extort, by the terror of euch aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself. The uncertainty of taxation eti- TAX courages the insolence and favours the corruption of an order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very consi- derable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the expe- rience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty. 3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for the contribu- tor to pay it. A tax upon the rent of land or of houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are usually paid, is levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay ; or when he is most likely to have wherewithal to pay. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all finally paid by the consumer, and general- ly in a manner that is very conve- nient for him. He pays them by little and little, as' he has occasion to buy the goods. As he is at li- berty, too, either to buy or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any con- siderable inconveniency from such taxes. 4. Every tax ought to be so con- trived as both to take out and keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury, in the four following ways. First, the levying of it may require a gveat number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose ano- ther additional tax upon the peo- ple. Secondly, it may obstruct the industry of the people, and dis- courage them from applying to cer- tain branches of business which might give employment to great multitudes. Thirdly, by the for- feitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unsuccessfully to e- vade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the em- ployment of their capitals. An in- judicious tax offers a great tempta- tion to smuggling : but the penal- ties of smuggling must arise in pro- portion to the temptation. The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates the temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it ; and it com- monly enhances the punishment too in proportion to the very cir- cumstance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the crime. Fourthly, by subjecting the people to the fre- quent visits and the odious exami- nation of the tax-gatherers, it may- expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression ; and though vexation is not, strictly speaking, expence, it is certainly equivalent to the expence at which every man would be willing to re- deem himself from it. It is in some one or other of these four different ways that taxes are fre- quently so much more burdensome to the people than they are bene- ficial to the sovereign. The evident justice and utility of the foregoing maxims have re- commended them more or less to TES TES the attention of all nations. Al nations have endeavored, to the best of their judgement, to render their taxes as equal as they coulc contrive; as certain as convenient to the contributor, both in the time and the mode of payment ; and, in proportion to the revenue which they brought to the people. 4. Smith. TESTIMONY, HEARSAY. Hearsay is a testimony weakened by its re- moval from the first source ; it is liable from its very nature to im- portant objections, which generally diminish its authority. Very few persons impose upon themselve such strict laws of veracity, that every word which drops from them in conversation can be regarded as a judicial testimony. Vanity, self- interest, love of talkativeness, a variety of motives, even the most frivolous, make people indulge themselves in fictions and they think themselves the more secure, both as a detection is not attended with any important consequences, and as their companions never dream of sifting their story, or ex- amining circumstances so as to ren- der their detection possible. Lord Mansfield. TESTIMONY, HUMAN.- There is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to hunun life, than that derived from the testimony of men, and the re- ports of eye-witnesses and specta- tors. Our assurance, in any ar- gument of this kind, is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of hu- man testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Were not the me- mory tenacious to a certain degree ; were not men, in general, inclined to truth and probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood ; were not these qualities discovered by experience to be inherent in human nature, we should never repose confidence in human testimony, and as the evi- dence derived from it is founded on past experience ; so it varies with the experience, and is regarded as a proof or a probability, according as the conjunction between any par- ticular kind of report and any kind of objects has been found to be constant or variable. Where this experience is not entirely uni- form on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, with the same op- position and mutual destruction of arguments as in every other kind of evidence. We hesitate ; we balance opposite circumstances; and in- cline to that side on which we dis- cover a superiority, but with a di- minution of assurance in proportion to the source of its antagonist. This contrariety of evidence may originate from various causes ; from the opposition of contrary testimony ; from the character or number of the witnesses ; from the manner of their delivering their tes- timony; or from the union of all these circumstances. We suspect a matter of fact when the witnesses contradict each other ; when they are but few, or of a suspicious cha- racter ; when they have an inter- est in what they affirm : when they deliver their testimony with doubt and hesitation ; or, on the contrary, with too violent asseverations, &c. If the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish, partake of the extraordinary and marvellous, the evidence is more or less credi- ble in proportion as the fact is TES THE more or less unusual. The reason why we place any credit in wit- nesses and historians, is not de- rived from any connection which we perceive a priori between testi- mony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite expe- riences. Experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another de- gree of assurance against (he fact to be established ; from which con- tradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, a mutual destruc- tion of authority. If the fact af- firmed be really miraculous, and the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amount to an entire proof, in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the most forcible must prevail ; but still with a dimi- nution of its force in proportion to that of its antagonist. When any one tells me he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more propable that this person should either deceive or be deceived ; or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the su- periority which I discover, I pro- nounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates, then, and not till then, can he pretend to com- mand my belief or opinion. But there is not to be found, in all his- tory, any miracle to be attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, educa- tion, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves ; of such undoubted integrity; as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others ; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of being detected in any falsehood ; and at the same time attesting facts, per- formed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable : all which circum- stances are requisite to give us full assurance in the testimony of men. Hume. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. The judg- ment must be employed to discern the truth or falsehood of assertions, by attending to the credibility and consistency of the different parts of the story; and the veracity and character of witnesses in other respects ; by comparing the asser- tions with accounts received from other witnesses, who could not be ignorant of the same facts ; and, lastly ; by bringing the whole to the test of a comparison with known and admitted facts. Mansfield. THEOCRACY. It seems the greater part of the ancient nations were governed by a kind of theocracy. To begin by India, you there find the Brsmins have long been so- vereigns : in Persia, the Magi have the greatest authority. The story of Smerdis's ears may very proba- bly be a fable ; but it will always follow that he' was a Magus upon the throne of Cyrus. Several Egyptian priests had so great a dominion over their kings, that they went so far as to prescribe to them how much they should eat and drink, brought up their children. THE Till tried them after their deaths, and often made themselves kings. If we come down to the Greeks, however fabulous their history may he, do we not learn therefrom, that the prophet Chalcas had suffi- cient power in the army to sacri- fice the daughter of the king of kings ? Come still lower to the savage nations since the Greeks, the Druids governed the Gauls. It does not seem to have heen possible, that in the first colonies there could have been any other than a theocratic government; for as soon as a nation has chosen a tutelar god, this god has priests, these priests reign over the minds of the people ; they cannot govern but in the name of the god ; they, therefore, always make him speak ; they retail his oracles ; and it is by an express order from god that every thing is done. China is the only one of all the ancient states which has not been tinder sacerdotal subjection. As to the Japanese, they submitted to the laws imposed upon them by a priest six hundred years before we were in being. Almost every where theocracy is so much estab- lished ; so deeply rooted, that the first histories are those of gods, who became incarnated to come and govern men. The gods, said the people of Thebes and Memphis, have reigned twelve thousand years in Egypt. Brama incarnated himself to reign in India, Samonocodom at Siam, the god Adad governed Syria, the goddess Cybele had been sove- reign of Phrygia, Jupiter of Crete, Saturn of Greece and Italy. The same spirit runs through all these fables ; it consists in a confused idea which men had, that the gods formerly descended on earth. Voltaire, ON THE SA.MK SUBJECT. Some have doubted whether the science of God, theology, be in fact a science. AH science, they say, supposes a observations. Now, what observa- tions can be made on a Being that is invisible and incomprehensible? Theology therefore is no science. In fact, what do we understand by the word God ? The unknown cause of order and motion. Now, what can we say of an unknown cause? If we attach our ideas to the word God, we shall fall, as Mr. Bobinet has shown, into a thousand contradictions. No one doubts, say the Chinese Letters, that there is in nature a ruling power, though he is ignorant, what it is: but when we conjecture the nature of this unknown power, the creation of a God is then nothing more than the deification of human ignorance. I do not entirely agree with these Letters, though I am forced to own witlt them, that theology, the science of God, or the Incomprehensible, is not a se- parate science. What is theology ? I do not know. Helvetius. THINKING is THE ACTION, not THE ESSENCE, OF THE SOUL. That there are ideas, some or other, always present in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience con- vinces him ; though the mind em- ploys itself v about them with seve- ral degrees of attention. Some- times the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contem- plation of some objects, that it turns their ideas on all sides, re- marks their relations and circum- stances, and views every part so nicely, and with such intention, that it shuts out all other THI TIT thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary improssion made then on the senses, which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions ; at other times It barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them ; and at other times, it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows that make no im- pression. This difference of intention and remission of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees be- tween earnest study and very near mind'ng nothing at all, every one, I think, has experienced in himself. Trace it a little further, and you find the mind asleep, retired aa it were from the senses, and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense, which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas. I need not seek for this instance in those whr* sleep out whole stormy n : ghts without hear- ing the thunder, or seeing the light- ning, or feeling the shaking of the house, which are sensible enough to those who are waking. But in this retirement of the mind from the senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dream- ing : and last of all, sound sleep closes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almost every one has ex- perience in himself; and his own observation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would further conclude from hence, is, that since the mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of thinking ; and be, some- times even in a waking man, so re- miss as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree that they are very little removed from none at all ; and at last in the dark retire- ments of sound sleep loses the sight perfectly of all ideas what- soever: since, I say, this is evi- dently so in matter of fact and constant experience, I ask, whe- ther it be not probable, that think- ing is the action, and not the es- sence of the soul? Since the ope- rations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission ; but the essences of things are not con- ceived capable of any such varia- tion. Locke. TIME, REFLECTIONS ox THE GOOD OLD. From whence can proceed the frenzy of exalting the past ages at the expence of blackening the . age in which we live ?-^-Undoubt- edly from self-love, which finds a double satisfaction in this conduct : first, from the comparison which we form between ourselves and the men whom we condemn ; and, se- condly, from that still more strik- ingly marked superiority, which assigns to us a knowledge of pre- ceding times, whilst we appear in some measure to assimilate with them, by pronouncing their eulogy. We apply to antiquity those ideas which we have entertained of con- sanguinity. The eldest imagine themselves more nearly related to it by a degree ; they lay claim to a share of its honours, and cry it up before the rising generation. We are but seldom jealous of the virtues of our ancestors: by knowing them, we suppose ourselves to be more enlightened ; by praising them, we conceive that we are more wise. On the contrary, we are dazzled by the virtues of our own age, and seem afraid effacing them. Chattellur. ^ IN ENGLAND, THE ORIGIN TlT TOL OF The Ecclesiatics, in the reign of Ethelwolf, the father of Alfred the Great/ made very rapid ad- vances in the acquisition of power and grandeur: and in those days of ignorance, inculcating the most ab- surd and most interesting doc- trines, though they met sometimes, from ttye contrary interest of the the laity, with an opposition which it required time and address to overcome, they found no obstacle in their reason and understanding. Not content with the donations of land made them by the Saxon princes and nobles, and with the temporary 'oblations from the devo- tion of the people, they had cast a wishful eye on a vast revenue, which they claimed as belonging to them by a divine, indefeasible, and inhe- herent title. However little versed in the Scriptures, they had been able to discover, that the priests under the Jewish law possessed a tenth of all the produce of land ; and, forgetting what they them- selves taught, that the moral part only of that law was obligatory on Christians, they insisted, that this donation was a perpetual property conferred by heaven on those who officiated at the altar. During some centuries, the whole scope of sermons and homilies was directed to this purpose; and one would have imagined, from the geneial tenor of these discourses, that all the practical parts of Christianity were comprehended in the exact and faithful payment of tithes to the Clergy. Encouraged by their success in inculcating these doc- trines, they ventured farther than they were warranted by the Leviti- cal law, and pretended to draw the tenth of all industry, merchandize, wages of labourers, and pay of soldiers ; nay, some canonists went so far as to affirm, that the clergy were entitled to the tithe of the profits made by the courtezans in the exercise of their profession. Though parishes had been insti- tuted in England by Honorius Archbishop of Canterbury nearly two centuries before, the ecclesias- tics had never been able to get pos- session of the tithes ; and they therefore seized the favourable op- portunity of making that acquisi- tion, when a weak, superstitious prince was on the throne, and when the people, discouraged by their losses from the Danes, and terri- fied with the fear of future inva- sions, were susceptible of any im- pression which bore the appear- ance of religion. Hume. TOLERATION, THE UNIVERSAL SPIRIT OF, IN .ANCIENT ROME. The policy of the emperors and the senate of Rome, as far as it concerned reli- gion, was happily seconded by the reflections of the enlightened, and by the habits of the superstitious part of their subjects. The vari- ous modes of worship which pre- vailed in the Roman world, were all considered by the people as equally true ; by the philosopher as equally false ; and by the magis- trate as equally useful: and thus toleration produced not only mutual indulgence, but even religious con- cord. The superstition of the people was not embittered by any mixture of theological rancour, nor was it confined by the chains of any speculative system. The devout Polytheist, though fondly attached to his national rites, ad- mitted wiih implicit faith the differ- ent religions .of the earth. Fear, gratitude, and curiosity, a dream or an omen, a singular disorder, or TOL TOL a distant journey, perpetually dis posed him to multiply the article of his belief, and to enlarge the list of his protectors. The thii texture of the Pagan mytholog; waa interwoven with various bu not discordant materials. As soon as it was allowed that sages am heroes, who had lived or who hac died for the benefit of their coun- try, were exalted to a state o power and immortality, it was uni- versally confessed that they de- served, if not the adoration, at least the reverence of mankind The deities of a thousand groves and a thousand streams, possessed in peace, their local and respec- tive influence; nor could the Ro- man who deprecated the wrath oi the Tiber, deride the Egyptian who presented his offering to the benefi- cent genius of the Nile. The vi- sible powers of nature, the planets and the elements, were the same throughout the universe. The in- visible governors of the moral world were inevitably cast in a si- milar mould of fiction and allegory. Every virtue, and even vice, ac- quired its divine representative; every art and profession its patron, whose attributes, in the most distant ages and countries, were uniformly derived from the character of their peculiar vota- ries. A republic of gods of such opposite tempers and interests re- quired in every system, the mo- derating hand of a supreme magis- trate; who, by the progress of knowledge and flattery, was gra- dually invested with the sublime perfections of an eternal parent and an omnipotent monarch. Such was the mild spirit of antiquity, that- the nations were less atten- tive to the difference, than to the resemblance, of their religious wor- ship. The Greek, ihe Roman, and the Barbarian, as they met before their respective altars, easily per- suaded themselves, that uuder various names, and with various ceremonies, they adored the same deities, The elegant mythology of Homer gave a beautiful, and al- most a regular form, fo the poly- theism of the ancient world. The philosophers of Greece de- duced their morals from the nature of man, rather than from that of God. They meditated, however, on the divine nature as a very curious and important speculation ; and in the profound inquiry, they displayed the strength and weak- ness of the human understanding. Of the four most celebrated school*, the Stoics and the Platonists endea- voured to reconcile the jarring inte- rests of reason and piety. They have left us the most sublime proofs of the existence and perfections of the first Cause; but, as it was impossible for them to conceive the creation of matter, the workman in the Stoic philosophy was not sufficiently distinguished from the work; whilst, on the contrary, the spiritual God of Plato and his dis- ciples resembled an idea rather than a substance. The opinions of the Academics and Epicureans were of a less religious cast; but whilst the modest science of the former induced them to doubt, the positive ignorance of the latier urged them to deny, the Providence of a Supreme Ruler. The spirit of in- quiry, prompted by emulation, and supported by freedom, had divided the public teachers of philosophy into a variety of contending sects; but the ingenuous youth, who, from every part, resorted to Athens TOL TOL and the other seats of learning in the Roman eiuake, were alike in- structed in every school to reject and despise the religion of the mul- titude. How, indeed, was it .pos- sible, that a philosopher should accept, as divine truths, the idle tales of the poets, and the inco- herent traditions of antiquity; or that he should adore as gods those imperfect beings whom he must have despised as men! Against such unworthy adversaries Cicero condescended to employ the arms of reason and eloquence ; but the satire of Lucian was a much more adequate, as well as efficacious weapon. We may be well assured, that a writer conversant with the world, would never hare ventured to expose the gods of his country to public ridicule, had they not already been the objects of secret contempt among the polished and enlightened orders of society. Notwithstanding the fashionable irreligion which prevailed in the age of the Antouines, both the interest of the priests, and the credulity of the people, were sufficiently re- spected. In their writings and con- versation, the philosophers of anti- quity asserted the independent dignity of reason ; but they resigned their actions to the commands of law and of custom. Viewing with a smile of pity and indulgence the various errors of the vulgar, they diligently practised the ceremonies of their fathers ; devoutly frequented the temples of the gods ; and some- times, condescending to get a part on the theatre of superstition, they concealed the sentiments of an Atheist under the sacerdotal robes. Reasoners of such a temper were scarcely inclined to wrangle about their respective modes of faith and 3 z worship. It was indifferent to them what shape the folly of the multi- tude .might choose to assume ; and they approached, with (he same inward contempt, and the same external reverence, the altars of the Libyan, the Olympian, or the Capitoline Jupiter. It is not easy to conceive from what motives a spirit of persecution could introduce itself into the Roman counsels. The magistrate could not be actuated by a blind, though honest bigotry, since the magistrates were philoso- phers, and the schools of Athens had given laws to the senate. They could not be impelled by ambition or avarice, as the temporal and ecclesiastical powers were united in the same hands. The pontiffs were chosen among the most illustrious of the senators; and the office of supreme pontiff was constantly ex- ercised by the emperors themselves. They knew and valued the advan- tages of religion as it is connected with civil government. They en- couraged the public festivals, which humanize the manners of the people. They managed the arts of divina- tion as a convenient instrument of policy ; and they respected, as the firmest bond of society, the useful persuasion, that either in this or in a future life, the crime of per- jury is most assuredly punished by the avengiag gods. But whilst they acknowledged the general advan- tages of religion, they were con- vinced, that the various modes of worship contributed alike to the same salutary purposes ; and that in every country, the form of superstition which had received the sanction of time and experience, was the best adapted to the climate and to its inhabitants. Avarice and taste very frequently despoiled the TOL TOL vanquished nations of the elegant statues of their gods, and the rich ornaments of their temples : but in the exercise of the religion 'which they derived from their ancestors, they uniformly experienced the in- dulgence, and even protection, of the Roman conquerors, The pro- vince of Gaul seems, and indeed only seems, an exception to this universal toleration. Under the specious pretext of abolishing human sacrifices, the emperors Tiberius and Claudius suppressed the dan- gerous power of the Druids: but the priests themselves, their gods, and their altars, subsisted in peace- ful obscurity till the final destruction of Paganism. Rome, the capital of a great monarchy, was incessantly filled with strangers and subjects from every part of the world, who all introduced and enjoyed the favourite superstitions of their native country. Every city in the empire was justified in maintaining the purity of its ancient ceremonies ; and the Roman senate, using the common privilege, sometimes inter- posed to check this inundation ol foreign rites. The Egyptian super- stition, of all the most contemptible and abject, was frequently prohi- bited; the temples of Serapis and Isis demolished, and their worship- pers banished from Rome and Italy But the zeal of fanaticism prevailec over the cold and feebie efforts o; policy. The exiles returned, the proselytes multiplied, the temples were restored with increasing splen- dour, and Isis and Serapis assumet their place among the Roman deities Nor was tlus indulgence a depar- ture from the usual maxims o government. In the purest ages o the commonwealth, Cybele ant .5Ssculapiiis had been invited by solemn embassies ; and it was cns- tomary to tempt the protectors of besieged cities, by promise of more distinguished honours than they possessed in their native country. Rome gradually became the com- mon temple of her subjects; and the freedom of the city was be- stowed on all the gods of mankind. - Gibbon. TOLERATION, REASONS FOR AND AGAINST. The practice of persecu- tion is the scandal of all religion ; and the theological animosity, so fierce and violent, far from being an argument of men's conviction in their opposite tenets, is a certain proof of the contrary; and they have never reached any serious persuasion with regard to these remote and sublime subjects. Even those who are the most impatient of contradiction in other contro- versies, are mild and moderate in comparison of polemical divines ; and wherever a man's knowledge and experience give him a perfect assurance of his own opinion, he regards with contempt, rather than anger, the opposition and mistakes of others. But while men zealously maintain what they neither clearly comprehend, nor entirely believe, they are shaken in their imagined faith by the opposite persuasion or even doubts of ether men; and vent on their antagonists that impatience which is the natural result of so disagreeable a state of the understanding. They thcu embrace easily aay pretence for representing opponents as impious and profane ; and it they can also find a colour for connecting this violence with the interests of civil government, they can no longer be restrained from giving uncontrouled scope to vengeance and resentment. TOL TOL But surely never enterprise was more unfortunate than that of founding persecution on policy, or endeavouring, for the sake of peace, to settle an entire uniformity of opinion, in questions which, of all others, are least subjected to the criterion of human reason. The universal and uncontradicted pre- valence of one opinion in religious subjects, can only he owing at first to the stupid ignorance and barba- rism of the people, who never indulge themselves in any specula- tion and inquiry; and there is no other expedient for maintaining that uniformity, so fondly sought after, but by banishing for ever all curiosity and all improvement in science and cultivation. It may not appear, indeed, difficult to check, by a steady severity, the first be- ginnings of controversy; but be- sides that this policy exposes for ever the people to all the abject terrors of superstition, and the magistrate to the endless encroach- ments of ecclesiastics, it also ren- ders men so delicate, that they can never endure to hear of opposition ; and they will sometimes pay dearly for that false tranquillity in which they have been so long indulged. As healthful bodies are ruined by too nice a regimen, and are thereby rendered incapable of bearing the unavoidable incidents of human life, a people who never were al- lowed to imagine that their princi- ples could be contested, fly out into the most outrageous violence, when any event (and such events are common) produces a faction among their clergy, and gives rise to any difference in tenet or opinion. But whatever may be said in favour of suppressing, by persecution, the first beginnings of heresy, no solid argument can be alleged for ex- tending severity towards multitudes, or endeavouring, by capital punish- ments, to extirpate an opinion which has diffused itself through men of every rank and station. Besides the extreme barbarity of such an attempt, it proves commonly inef- fectual to the purpose intended; and serves only to make men more obstinate in their persuasion, and to increase the number of their proselytes. The melancholy with which the fear of death, torture, and persecution inspires the secta- ries, is the proper disposition for fostering religious zeal ; the pros- pect of eternal rewards, when brought near, overpowers the dread of eternal punishments: the glory of martyrdom stimulates all the more furious zealots, especially the leaders and preachers ; where a violent animosity is excited by op- pression, men pass naturally from hating the persons of their tyrants, to a more violent abhorrence of their doctrines ; and the spectators, moved with pity towards these supposed martyrs, are naturally seduced to embrace those principles which can inspire men with a con- stancy that appears almost super- natural. Ope.n the door to tolera- tion, the mutual hatred relaxes among the sectaries ; their attach- ment to their particular religion de- cays; the common occupations and pleasures of life succeed to the acrimony of disputation ; and the same man, who in other circum- stances would have braved flames and tortures, is engaged to change hi& religion from the smallest pros- pect of favour and advancement, or even the frivolous hopes of be- coming more fashionable in his principles. If any exception can TOL TOL be admitted to this maxim of tole- ration, it will only be where a theo- logy altogether new, nowise con- nected with the ancient religion of the state, is imported from foreign countries, and may easily, at one blow, be eradicated without leav- ing the seeds of future innovations. But as this instance would involve some apology for the ancient Pagan persecutions, or for the extirpation of Christianity in China and Japan; it ought surely, on account of this detested consequence, to be rather buried m eternal silence and obli- vion, especially as no human depra- vity can equal revenge and cruelty covered with the mantle of religion. Though these arguments appear entirely satisfactory, yet such is the subtilty, of human wit, that the enemies to toleration are not re- duced ta silence; and they still find topics on which to maintain the controversy. The doctrine, say they, of liberty of conscience, is founded on the most flagrant im- piety, and supposes such an indif- ference among all religions, such an obscurity in theological doc- trines, as to render the church and magistrate incapable of distinguish- ing, with certainty, the dictates of Heaven from the mere fictions of human imagination. If the Divi- nity reveals principles to mankind, he will surely give a criterion by which they may be ascertained; and a prince, who knowingly allows these principlbs to be perverted or adulterated, is infinitely more cri- minal than if he gave permission for the vending of poison, under the shape of food, to all his subjects. Persecution may, indeed, seem bet- ter calculated to make hypocrites than converts ; but experience teaches us, that the habits of} hypocrisy often turn into reality; and the children, at least, ignorant of the dissimulation of their parents, may happily be educated in more orthodox tenets. It is absurd, in opposition to conside- rations of such unspeakable impor- tance, to plead the temporal and frivolous interests of civil society ; and if matters be thoroughly exa- mined, even that topic will not appear so universally certain in favour of toleration as by some it is represented. Where sects arise, whose fundamental principle on all sides is to execrate, and abhor, and damn, and extirpate each other, what choice has the magistrate left but to take part, and by rendering one sect entirely prevalent, restore, at least for a time, the public tran- quillity ? The political body, being here sickly, must not be treated as if it were in a state of sound health ; and an affected neutrality in the prince, or even a cool preference, may serve only to encourage the hopes of all the sects, and keep alive their animosity. The Protes- tants, far from tolerating the re- ligion of their ancestors, regard it as an impious and detestable idolatry; and during the late minority, when they were entirely masters, they enacted very severe, though not capital, punishments against all exercise of the Catho- lic worship, and even against such as barely abstained from their pro- fane rites and sacraments. Nor are instances wanting of their endea- vours to secure an imagined ortho- doxy by the most rigorous execu- tions: Calvin has burned Servctus at Geneva; Cranmer brought Arians and Anabaptists to the stake: anil if persecution of any kind be ad- . initted, (he most bloody and violent TOL TOL will surely be allowed the most jus- tifiable, as the most effectual. Imprisonments, fines, confiscations, whippings, serve only to irritate the sects, without disabling them from resistance : but the stake, the wheel, and the gibbet, must soon terminate in the extirpation or ba- nishment of all the heretics in- clined to give disturbance, and in the entire silence and submission of the rest. Hume. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. A hierarchy, moderate in its acquisitions of power and riches, may safely grant a tole- ration to sectaries; and the more it abates the fervour of innovators by lenity and liberty, the more securely will it possess those ad- vantages which the legal establish- ments bestow upon it. But where superstition has raised a church to such an exorbitant height as that of Rome, persecution is less the result of bigotry in the priests than of a necessary policy ; and the rigour of law is the only method of repelling the attacks of men, who, besides religious zeal, have so many other motives, derived both from public and private inte- rest, to engage them on the side of innovation. But though such overgrown hierarchies may long support themselves by these violent expedients, the time comes, when severities tend only to enrage the new sectaries, and make them break through all bounds of reason and moderation. This is the neces- sary progress of human affairs, and the operation of those principles which are inherent in human nature. Hume. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. If we look back into history for the character of the present sects of Christianity, we shall find few that have not in their turns been persecutors and complainers of persecution. The primitive Christians thought perse- cution extremely wrong in the Pa- gans, but practised it on one ano- ther. The first Protestants of the church of England blamed perse- cution in the Romish church, but practised it against the Puritans : these found it wrong in the bishops, but fell into the same practice both at home and in New England. To account for this, we should remem- ber that the doctrine of toleration was not then known, or had not prevailed in the world. Persecu- tion was not therefore so much the fault of the sect as of the times. It was not in those days deemed wrong in itself. The general opi- nion was only, that those who are in an error ought not to persecute the truth : but the possessors of truth were in the right to perse- cute error, in order to destroy it. Thus every sect, believing itself possessed of all truth, and that every tenet differing from their's was error, conceived, that when the power was in their hands, per- secution was a duty required of them by that God whom they sup- posed to be offended by heresy. By degrees, more moderate and more modest sentiments have taken place in the Christian world ; and among Protestants, particularly, all dis- claim persecution, none vindicate it, and few practise it. Tolera- tion in religion, though obvious to common understanding, was not, however, the production of reason, but of commerce. The advantage of toleration for promoting com- merce was discovered long before by the Portuguese. They were too zealous Catholics to venture so bold a measure in Portugal, but it TOL TOL was permitted in God. ; and the in quisition in that town was confinet to Roman Catholics. Franklin. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. Wher shall we find the rule to measure the merit of any particular reli- gion? Unless we could give al men the same constitutions of bod] and mind ; the same educations tempers, and talents, we shall in vain expect any general agreement on this subject. Since, then, thi diversity of judgment is a circum- stance in the nature of things un- avoidable, it seems to be alike re- pugnant to Christianity and com- mon sense, to load any man with obloquy and invective, who hap- pens to differ from us in opinion upon that subject. God, who alone knows the hearts of men, and the extent of their abilities, can esti- mate the strength of the intellec- tual faculties, and the force of the natural propensities of each indi- vidual ; and he alone is the only judge how far any person is in a wilful error. But it is unquestion- ably the duty and interest of man- kind, instead of polluting their principles, and provoking their op- ponents, by calumnies and re- proaches ; instead of fancying their tenets alone are accompanied with moral rectitude and wisdom, to distrust their own opinions, to be ready to hear those of others with good temper, and a liberal disposi- tion ; to abate in non-essentials a little of their firmness ; to make mutual concessions, and thereby to preserve inviolate the peace of civil society, and the bond of Christian charily unbroken. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. It is univer- sally true, that where the magistrate has the greatest pretence for inter- fering in religious and moral princi- ples, his interference (supposing there \Tas no impropriety in it) is the least necessary. If the opinions and principles in question be evidently subversive of all religion and so- ciety, they must be evidently false and easy to refute ; so that there can be no danger of their spread- ing, and the patrons of them may safely be suffered to maintain them in the most open manner they choose. The religious and moral principles, perhaps the most de- structive to society, are, that there is no God ; and, that there is no faith to be kept with heretics. But surely these principles are too absurd to be formidable and alarm- ing ; they can have no terrors, but what an ill-judged opposition may give them. Persecution may pro- cure friends to any cause, and per- haps to this ; but hardly any thing else can do it. It is a fact, that there are more Atheists and Infidels of all kinds in Jloman Catholic states, where religion is so well guarded, than in England. If ever arbitrary power should gain ground in England, it will be by means of the seeming necessity of having recourse to illegal methods in order to come at opinions, or persons, ge- nerally obnoxious : but when these illegal practices have once been au- thorised, and have passed into precedents, all persons, and all opinion?, will lie at the mercy of the minister, who will animadvert upon whatever gives him umbrage. This is the method in which des- potism has generally been intro- duced, and is well known to have been the method used by the thirty tyrants at Athens. They first cut off persons the most generally ob- noxious, and such as the laws could not reach; and that intelligent TOL TOL people were not aware, that the very same methods might be em- ployed to take off the worthiest men in the city. Such is the con- nection and gradation of opinions, that if once we admit there are some which ought to be guarded by civil penalties, it will ever be impossible to distinguish, to gene- ral satisfaction, between those which may be tolerated, and those which may not : but a happy cir- cumstance it is for human society, that in religion and morals, there is no necessity to distinguish them at all ; the more important will guard themselves by their own evi- dence, and the less important do not deserve to be guarded. In aD modes of religion which subsist among mankind, however subver- sive of virtue they may be in theory, there is some salvo for good morals ; so that, in fact, they enforce the more essential parts, at at least, of that conduct which the good order of society requires When, under pretence'of conscience men disturb the peace of society, and are guilty of a breach of the laws, they ought to be restrainec by the civil magistrate. If a man commit murder, let him be punish- ed as a murderer, and let no regan be paid to the plea of conscience for committing the act ; but le not the opinion which led to the act be meddled with. Priestley. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. Govern ments are the judges of actions and net of opinions. If faith be a gift of Heaven, they who have i not, deserve to be pitied-; no punished. It is the excess of in humanity to persecute an unfortu nate person. If I advance a gros error, I am punished by ridicul and contempt; but if in conse- quence of an erroneous opinion I at- tempt to violate the liberty of other people, it is then I become criminal. If, being a devout adorer of Venus, I burn the temple of Serapis, the magistrate ought to punish me ; not as a heretic, but as a disturber of the public peace ; as a man un- just, who being in the free exercise of my own worship, would deprive my fellow-citizens of the liberty I enjoy myself. Wherever several religions and several sects are tole- rated, they become insensibly ha- bituated to each other ; their eeal loses every day something of its acrimony, Where a full toleration is established there arc few fanatics Helvetius. TOLERATION NOT A PRIHSTLY VIRTUE. The long schism which had di- vided the Latin church for nearly forty years, was finally terminated by the council of Constance ; which deposed the pope, John XXIII. for his crimes, and elected Martin V. in his place, who was acknowledged by almost all the kingdoms of Eu- rope. This great and unusual act of authority in the council, gave the Koman pontiffs ever after a mortal antipathy to those assem- blies. The same jealousy which had long prevailed in most Euro- pean countries, between the civil aristocracy and monarchy, now also took place between these pow- ers in the ecclesiastical body. But the great separation of the bishops in the several states, and the diffi- culty of assembling them, gave the pope a mighty advantage ; and made it more easy for him to centre all the powers of the hierarchy in his own person. The cruelty and treachery which attended the pu- nishment of John Huss and Jerome of Prague, the unhappy disciples of TOL TOL WicKliffe, who, in violation of a safe-conduct, were burned alive for their errors by the council of Con- stance, prove this melancholy truth, that toleration is none of the vir- tues of priests in any form of eccle- siastical government. Hume. TOLERATION, THE CHIEF CAUSES AXD ORIGIN OF. In all former ages, not wholly excepting even those of Greece and Rome, religious sects, and heresies and schisms had been esteemed dangerous, if not perni- cious, to civil government, and was regarded as the source of faction, and private combination, and oppo- sition to the laws. The magistrate therefore applied himself directly .to the cure of this evil, as of every other ; and very naturally attempt- ed, by penal statutes, to suppress those separate communities, and punish the obstinate innovators. But it was found by fatal expe- rience, and after spilling an ocean of blood in those theological quarrels, that the evil was of a peculiar na- ture, and was both inflamed by violent remedies, and diffused itself more rapidly throughout the whole society. Hence, though late, arose the paradoxical principle and salu- tary practice of toleration. The liberty of the press was incompatible with such maxims and such principles of govern- ment as then prevailed : and was therefore quite unknown in that age. Besides employing the two terrible courts of star-chamber and high commission, whose powers were unlimited, Queen Elizabeth exerted her authority by restraints upon the press. She passed a de- cree in her court of star-chamber, that 'is, by her own will and plea- sure, forbidding any book to be printed in any place but in London, Oxford andCambridge : and another, in which she prohibited, under se- vere penalties, the publishing of aiiy book or pamphlet " against the form or meaning of any restraint or ordi- nance, contained, or to be con- tained, in any statute or laws of this realm, or any injunction made or set forth by her Majesty or her privy council, or against the true sense or meaning of any letters patent, commissions', or prohibi- tions under the great seal of Eng- land." James extended the same penalties to the importing of such books from abroad. And to render these edicts more effectual, he af- terwards inhibited the printing of any book without a licence from the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York, the Bishop of London, or the Vice-chancellor of one of the universities, or of some person appointed by them. In tracing the coherence among the systems of modern theology, we may observe, that the doctrine of absolute degrees has ever been intimately connected with the en- thusiastic spirit ; as that doctrine affords the highest subject of joy, triumph, and security, to the sup- posed elect, and exalts them, by infinite degrees, above the rest of mankind. All the first reformers adopted those principles ; and the Jansenists too, a fanatical sect in France, not to mention the Maho- metans in Asia, have ever embraced them. As the Lutherian establish- ments were subjected to episcopal jurisdiction, their enthusiastic ge- nius gradually decayed, and men had leisure to perceive the absur- dity of supposing God to punish, by infinite torments what he him- self from all eternity had unchange- ably decreed. The king, though at this time his Calvinistic education TOL TOL had rivettcd him in the doctrine of absolute decrees ; yet, being a zealous partisan of episcopacy, was insensibly engaged, towards the end of his reign, to favour the milder theology of Arminius. Even in so great a doctor, the genius of the religion prevailed over its speculative tenets ; and with the whole clergy gradu- ally dropped the more rigid principles of absolute reproba- tion and unconditional decrees. Some noise was at first made about these innovations; but being drowned in the fury of factions and civil wars which ensued, the scholastic arguments made an insignificant figure amidst those violent disputes about civil and ecclesiastical power, with which the nation was agitated. And at the res- toration, the church, though she still retained her old sub- scriptions and articles of faith, was found to have to tally, changed her speculative doctrines, and to have embraced tenets more suit- able to the genius of her disci- pline and worship, without its being possible to assign the pre- cise period in which the alteration was produced. Hume. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. Mar- tyrs are productive of proselytes. The execution of a person of that character made more Pro- testants than Calvin's Institutes. The sixth part of France were Calvinists under Francis II.; as one third of Germany, at least, were Lutherans under Charles V. There remained only one right way to act ; which was, to imi- tate the example of Charles V. who, after a series of wars, con- cluded at length with granting liberty of conscience ; and that of Queen Elizabeth, who main- tained the established religion, but allowed every body to wor- ship God their own way, pro- vided they behaved as peaceable subjects. This is the maxim now observed in all those countries heretofore ravaged by religious wars, after having been con- vinced by repeated, though too fatal experiments, of the recti- tude of this measure. But, before this measure can be pursued, the laws must be in force, and the fury of ^parties must begin to subside. France was nothing but one continual scene of sanguinary factions from the reign of Francis I. to the happy days of Henry the Great., In those licentious times the laws were trampled upon : and , even when the civil wars were at an end, fanaticism survived, and assassinated this monarch, in the bosom of peace, by the hand of a madman, a visionary let loose from a cloister. Vol- taire. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. What is toleration ? It is a privilege to which human nature is enti- tled: we are all made up of weakness and errors ; it there- fore behoves us mutually to for- give one another's follies. This is the very first law of Nature. Though the Guebre, the Banian, the Jew, the Mahome- tan, the lettered Chinese, the Greek, the Roman Catholic, the Quaker, traffic together on the Exchange of Amsterdam, Lon- don, Surat, or Bassora, the will never offer to lift up a poinard against each other to gain pro- 4 A TOL TOL selytes; wherefore, then, since the first council of Nice, have we been almost continually cut- ting- each other's throats ? Constantino began with issu- ing an edict allowing" the exer- cise of all religions, and some time after turned persecutor. Before him, all the severe treat- ment of the Christians proceeded purely from their beginning 1 to make a party in the state. The Romans permitted every kind of worship, even the Jews and Egyptians, both which they so very much despised. How then came Rome to tolerate these forms ? It was because neither the Egyptians nor the Jews themselves went about to exter- minate tjie ancient religion of the empire; they did not cross seas and lands to make proselytes; the getting of money was all they minded : whereas, it is in- disputable, that the Christians could not be easy unless their religion bore the sway. The Jews were disgusted at the statue of Jupiter being set up at Jerusalem; but the Christians would not so much as allow it to be in the capitol of Rome. St. Thomas candidly owns, that it was only for want of power that the Christians did not de- throne the emperors : they held that all the world ought to em- brace their religion ; this of course made them enetjries to all the world till its happy con- version. Their controversial points likewise set them at enmity one against another concerning the divinity of Christ: they who de- nied it, were anathematised as Ebionites ; and these ana- thematised the worshippers of Jesus. If some would have all goods to be in common, as they al- leged was the custom in the Apostles' -time, their adversaries call them fticolaitans, and ac- cuse them of the most horrid crimes. If others set up for a mystical devotion, they are branded with the appellation of Gnostics, and opposed -with ex- treme vehemence and severity. Marcion, for disputing on the Trinity, got the name of an ido- lator. Tertullian, Praxeas, Origen, Novatus, Novatianus, Sabellns, and Donatus, were all persecu- ted by their brethren before Con- stantine's time ; and no sooner had Constantine established the Christian religion, than the Athanasians and Eusebians fell foul of one another ; and ever since, down to our own times, the Christian church has been de- luged with blood. The Jewish people were I own, extremely barbarous and merciless, massacreing all the in- habitants of a little wretched country, to which they had no more right than their vile des- cendants have to Paris or Lon- don. However, when Naaman is cured of his leprosy by dipping seven times in the river Jordan, and by way of expressing his gratitude to Elisha, from whom he had the secret of that easy cure, he tells him that he will worship the God of the Jews, he yet reserves to himself the liberty to worship his sovereign's god likewise ; and asks Elisha's leave, which the prophet rea- dily grants. The Jews worship- TOL TllA ped their God ; but never were offended at, or so much as thought it strange, that every nation had its own deity. They acquiesced in Chamoth's giving a track of land to the Moabites, provided they would let them -quietly enjoy what they held from their God. Jacob made no difficulty of marrying an idola- ter's daughter ; for Laban had another kind of god than he whom Jacob worshipped, These are instances of toleration among the most haughty, most obstinate, and most cruel peo- ple of all antiquity ; and ,we, overlooking what little indul- gence was among them, have imitated only tiheir sanguinary rancour. Every individual persecuting another for not being of his opinion is a monster ; this is evi- dent beyond all dispute : but the government ! men in power, princes ! how are they to deal with those of a different worship from theirs ? If foreigners and powerful, it is certain princes will not disdain entering into an alliance with them. Francis I. though his Most Christian ma- jesty, unites with the Mussulmen against Charles V. likewise a Most Christian monarch. Fran- cis supplies the German Luthe- rans with money to support their revolt against the Emperor ; but according to custom, burns them in his own country. Thus from policy he pays them in Saxony ; and from policy makes bonfires of them at Paris. But what was the consequence ; Persecution ever makes proselytes. France came to swarm with new, Pro- testants ; who at first quietly sub- milled to be hanged, and after- wards hung others': civil wars came on ; and St. Bartholomew's day, or the Massacre of Paris, crowned all. Thus this corner of the world became worse than all that ever the anci- ents or moderns have said of hell. Ye fools ! never to pay a pro- per worship to the God who made you ! wretches, on whom the example of the Noachidce, the lettered Chinese, the Persees, and all wise men, have had no influence ! monsters ! to whom superstitions are as necessary as carrion to crows ! You have been already told it, and I have no- thing else to tell you ; whilst you have but two religions among you, they will be ever at dagger's drawing ; if you have thirty, they will live quiet- ly. Turn your eyes to the Grand Seignior; be has among his subjects Guebres, Banians, Greeks, Latins, Christians, and Nestorians. Whoever goes about to raise any disturbance is surely impaled ; and thus all live in pea*ce and quietness. Voltaire. TRADITION. It is a rule observ- ed in the law of England, that though the attested copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy ever so well attested, and by ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in judicature. This is so generally approved as reason- able, and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our inquiry after material truths, that 1 never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This prac* tice, if it be allowable in the TRA TRA decisions of right and wrong-, carries this observation along with it, viz. that any testimony, the further off it is from the ori- ginal truth, the less force and proof it has. The being and ex- istence of the thing itself is what I call the original truth. A cre- dible man vouching his know- ledge of it, is a good proof: but if another equally credible do witness it from his report, the testimony is weaker; and a third that attests the hearsay of an hearsay, is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, each remove weakens the force oftheproof: and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of, because I find amongst some men the quite contrary com- monly practised, who look on opinions to gain force by grow- ing older ; and what a thousand years since would not, to a ra- tional man, contemporary with the first voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have since, from him, said it one after an- other. Upon this ground, pro- positions, evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning, come by an inverted rule of probability to pass for authentic truths ; and those which found or deserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors, are thought to grow venerable by age, and are urged as undeniable. 1 would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of history : it is all the light we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity : I wish we had more of them, and more un- corrupted. But this truth itself forces me to say, that no pro- bability can arise higher than its first original. What has no no other evidence than the single testimony of one only witness, must stand or fall by his only testimony, whe- ther good, bad, or indifferent; and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, in- terest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons or caprices that men's minds are acted by (im- possible to be discovered), may make one man quote another man's words or meaning wrong. He that has but ever so little examined the citations of wri- ters, cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve where the originals are wanting ; and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age Was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often re- peated. But the further still it is from the original, the less va- lid it is ; and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it, than in his from whom he received it. Locke. TRA TYRANNY. By a tyrant, is meant a sovereign who makes his humour the law ; who seizes on his subject's substance, and afterwards inlists them to go and give his neighbours the like treat- ment. These tyrants are not known in Europe. Tyranny is distinguished into that of one person and of many ; a body invading the rights of other bodies, and corrupting the laws that it may exercise a des- potism apparently legal, is the latter tyranny ; but Europe likewise has none of these ty- rants. Under which tyranny would you choose to live ? Under none: but had I the option, the ty- ranny of one person appears to me less odious and dreadful than that of many. A despot has always some intervals of good humour ; which is never known in an assembly of despots. If a tyrant has done me an injury, there is his mistress, his confes- sor, or his page, by means of whom I may appease him, and obtain redress ; but a set of su- percilious tyrants is inaccessable to all applications. If they are not unjust, still they are austere and harsh ; and no favours are ever known to come from them. Under one despot, I need only stand up against a wall when 1 see him coming by ; or prostrate myself, or knock my forehead against the ground, according to the custom of the country: but under a body of perhaps a hundred despots, I may be obliged to repeat this ceremony a hundred times a-day ; which is not a little troublesome to TRA those who are not very nimble. Another disagreeable circum- stance is, if my farm happens to be in the neighbourhood of one of our great Lords, it is un- known what damages I am obliged to put up with : and if I have a law-suit with a relation of one of their High-mighti- nesses, it will infallibly go against me. 1 am very much afraid, that in this world things will come to such a pass, as to have no other option than being either hammer or anvil. Happy he who gets clear of this alter- native. Vollairc. VICIOUS, NO ACTION, UNLESS INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY. An action not mischievous to any body, neither actually nor pro- bably, directly nor consequen- tially is no sin. To talk of an action mischievous to God, is impiety and nonsense. An ac- tion mischievous to a man's self alone is no sin, but a piece of folly ; and all that is to be said of it is, he must bear the con- sequences. An action mischiev- ous to others is indeed a sin, and as such it must continue : all pretences of making it as if it had never been, are as vain as they are pernicious ; it must go to the bad side of a man's cha- racter, and there remain : there is but one way of making up for it, which is, to do another as profitable to society as that is mischievous. The whole affair of atone- ments is, as Bishop Warburton, after Plutarch, calls it, a foolish business, the dependence of the superstitious. The Almighty, according to Lord Kames, who deems it " the most important VIR VJR of ail truths," admits of no com- position for sin. A notion, says he, prevailed in the darker ages of the world, of a substitute in punishment, who undertakes the debt, and suffers the punish- ment that another merits. Traces of this opinion are found in the religious ceremonies of the ancient Egyptians, and other heathen nations. Among them the conceptions of a Deity were gross, and those of morality not less so. VIRTUE. What is virtue? Do- ing good to others. How can I give the name of virtue to any one but to him who does me good ? I am in w r ant, you relieve me ; I am in danger, you come to my assistance ; I have been deceived, you tell me the truth ; I am ill used, you com- fort me ; I am ignorant, you in- struct me : I must say, then, you are virtuous. But what will be- come of the cardinal and theolo- gical virtues? Let them ever re- main in the schools. What is your temperance to me? It is no more than an ob- servance of a rule of health : you will be the better for it ; and much good may it do you. If you have faith and hope, better still: they will procure you eternal life. Your theolo- gical virtues are heavenly gifts ; and those you call cardinal, are excellent qualities for your guid- ance in life ; but relatively to your neighbour, they are no virtues. The prudent man does good to himself; the virtuous to men in general. Very well was it said by St. Paul, that cha- rity is better than faith and hope. But how ! are no virtues to be admitted but those by which others are benefited ? No in- deed. We live in a society ; consequently there is nothing truly good to us, but what is for the good of such society. If a hermit is sober and devout, and, among other mortifications, wears a sackcloth shirt; such a one I set down as a saint: But before 1 shall style him virtuous, let him do some act of virtue which will promote the well- being of his fellow creatures. Whilst he lives by himself, to us he is neither good nor bad; he is nothing. If St. Bruno recon- ciled families, and relieved the indigent, he was virtuous ; if he prayed and fasted in the desert, he was a saint. Among men vir- tue is a mutual exchange of kindnesses ; and whoever de- cline such exchanges ought not to be reckoned a member of so- ciety. ,W T ere that saint to live in the world, probably he would do good in it ; but whilst he keeps out of it, the world will only do his saintship justice in not allowing him to be virtuous. He may be good to himself but not to us. But, say you, if a hermit be given to drunkenness, sensuality, and private debauchery, he is a vicious man ; consequently, with the opposite qualities, he is virtuous. That is what I cannot come into. If he has those faults he is a very filthy man ; but with regard to society, as it is not hurt by his infamies, he is not vicious, wicked, or deserving of punishment. It is to be presu- med, that were he to return into society, he would do much harm, VIR VIR and prove a very bad man. Of this there is a greater propabi- lity, than that the temperate and chaste hermit will be a good man ; for in public life faults in- crease, and good qualities dimi- nish. A much stronger objection is, that Nero, Pope Alexander VL and other such monsters, did some good things. I take upon me to answer, that when they did so they were vir- tuous. Some divines, so far from al- lowing that excellent emperor Antoninus to have been a good man, represent him as a con- ceited Stoic, who, besides ruling over men, coveted their esteem, that in all the good he did to mankind, his own reputation was the end; that his justice, application, and benevolence, proceeded purely from vanity: and that his virtues were a downright imposition on the world. At this I cannot forbear crying out, Oh ! my God, be pleased, in thy goodness, often to give us such hypocrites. Voltaire. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. Vir- tue consists in the knowledge of what men owe to each other ; and consequently supposes the formation of societies. Before this formation, what good or evil could be done to a society not yet existing? A man of the woods, a man naked and with- out language, might easily ac- quire a clear idea of strength and weakness, but not of justice and equity. A man born in a de- sert island, and abandoned to himself, would live there with- out vice or virtue. He could not exercise either of them. What* then, are we to understand by the words virtuous and vicious ? Actions useful or detrimental to society. Virtue is nothing more than the desire of public happiness. The general welfare is the ob- ject of virtue ; and the actions it enjoins, are the means it employs to accomplish that object The idea of virtue must, therefore, be every where the same. If in various ages and countries men appear to have formed different ideas of virtue ; if philosophers have, in consequence, treated the idea of virtue as arbitrary, it is because they have taken for virtue itself the several means it makes use of to accomplish its object : that is to say, the several actions it enjoins. These ac- tions have certainly been some- times very different, because the interest of nations change ; and, lastly, because the public good may, to a certain degree, be pro- moted by different means. The word virtue frequently excites in the mind very different ideas, according to our state and situa- tion, the society in which we live, and the age and country in which we were born. If a younger brother, according to the custom of Normandy, should avail himself, like Jacob, of the hunger or thirst of the elder, to divest him of his pri- mogeniture, he would be de- clared a'cheat by all the tribunals. If a man, the example of David, should cause the husband of his mistress to be sacrificed, he would be reckoned, not among the number of the virtuous, but of villains. It would VIR VIR be to liule purpose to say he made a good end ; assassins sometimes do the same, but are never proposed as models of vir- tue. The entrance of foreign merchandise, permitted to-day in Germany, as advantageous to its commerce, and conformable to the good of the state, may be to-morrow forbid. To-morrow the purchaser may be declared criminal, if by some circumstances that purchase become prejudi- cial to the national interest. The same actions may, there- fore, become successively useful and prejudicial to a nation, and merit by turns the name of virtuous and vicious, without the idea of virtue suffering any change, or ceasing to be the same. Helvetius. VIRTUOUS MAN. The virtuous man is not he who sacrifices his pleasures, habits, and strongest passions, to the public welfare ; since it is impossible that such a man should exist. He, who to be virtuous must always conquer his inclinations, must necessarily be a wicked man. The merito- rious virtues are never certain and infallible virtues. In the Haram, it is not to the merito- rious virtues, but to impotency, that the Grand Seignior instructs his women. It is impossible, in practice, for a man to deliver himself up, in a manner, daily to a war with the passions, wrthout losing many battles. The vir- tuous man is he whose strongest passions is so conformable to the general interest, that he is al- most constantly necessitated to. be virtuous. For this reason, he approaches nearer to perfection, and has a greater claim to the name of being a virtuous man, who requires stronger motives of pleasure, and a more power- ful interest, in order to deter- mine him to do a bad action, than are necessary to his perform- ing a good one ; and conse- quently supposes that he has a greater passion for virtue than for vice. Caesar was, without doubt, not the most virtuous among the Romans ; yet if he would not renounce the title of a good citizen, without taking that of the master of the world, we have not a right to banish him from the class of virtuous men. In fact, among the virtuous, who really deserve that title, how few are there who, if placed in the same circumstances as Csesar was, would refuse the sceptre of the world ; especially if, like Caesar, they thought they had those superior talents that secure the success of great enter- prises ? Less abilities would, perhaps, render them better citi- zens; and a moderate degree of virtue, supported by a greater anxiety for the success, would be sufficient to deter them from en- gaging in so bold a project. In- deed, sometimes a want of ta- lents preserves us from vice ; and frequently to the same de- fect we owe all our virtues. We are, on the contrary, less virtuous as less powerful mo- tives lead us to the commission of a crime. Such, for instance, is that of some of the Emperors of Morocco, who, solely from the motive of making a parade of their dexterity, would with one blow of a sabre, in mounting a horse, cut off the head of the groom who held the stirrup. Helvetia*. VIR UNI VIRTUES, FALSITY OP HUMAN WHEN the Duke de Rochefou- cault had published his Thoughts on Self-Love , one M. Esprit, of the Oratory, wrote a captious book, entitled the Falsity of Human Virtues. This genius says there is no such thing- as virtue ; but at the close of every chapter, kindly refers his read- ers to Christian charity: So that, according- to HI. Esprit, neither Cato, nor Aristides, nor Marcus Aurelius, nor Epictetus, were good men; and a good reason why, these are only found among Christians. Again, a- mong Christians, the catholics are the only virtuous ; and among the catholics the Jesuits, enemies to the Oratorians, should have been excepted : therefore there is scarce any virtue on earth but among the enemies of the Jesuits. This Sieur Esprit sets out with saying, That prudence is not a virtue ; and his reason is, because it is often mistaken : which is as much as to say, Csesar was nothing of a soldier, because he had the worst of it at Dyrachium. Had this reverend gentleman been a philosopher, he would not have treated of prudence as a virtue, but as a talent, a happy and useful quality ; for a villain may be very prudent, and I have known such. The madness of pretending that virtue is the portion only of us and our parti- sans ! What is virtue, my friend ? It is doing good. Do me some, and that is enough : as for your motive, that you may keep to yourself. How ! According to you, there is no difference be- tween the president de Thou and Ravaillac; between Cicero and that wretch Popilius, whose life he had saved, and who yet hired himself to cut off his head. You will pronounce Epictetus and Porphyry to be rascals, because they did not hold with our doctrines. Such insolence is quite shocking ; but I have done, lest I grow warm. Vol- taire. UNION OF BODY POLITIC. Union, in a body-politic, is a very equi- vocal term : true union is such a harmony, as makes all the parti- cular parts, as opposite as they may seem to us, concur to the general welfare of the society, in the same manner as discords in music contribute to the gene- ral melody of sound. Ujiion may prevail in a state full of seeming commotions ; or, in other words, there may be an harmony from whence results prosperity, which alone is true peace, and may be considered in the same view as the various parts of this universe," which are eternally connected by the action of some and the re- action of others. In a despotic state, indeed, which is every government where the supreme power is immode- rately exerted, a real division is perpetually kindled. The pea- sant, the soldier, the merchant, the magistrate, and the grandee, have no other conjunction than what arises from the ability of the one to oppress the other without resistance ; and if at any time an union happens to be in- troduced, citizens are not then UNI WAR united, but like dead bodies laic in the grave contiguous to eacl other. Montesquieu. UNITY OF THE DEITY, THE I men were led into the appre- hension of invisible intelligen power by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly entertain any concep- tion but of one single Being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjustec all its parts, according to one re- g-ular plan and connected system For though, to persons of a cer- tain turn of mind, it may not appear altogether absurd, that several independent beings, en- dowed with superior wisdom might conspire in the contrivance and execution of one regular plan ; yet is this a merely arbi- trary supposition, which, even ii allovv'ed possible, must be con- fessed neither to be supported by probability nor necessity. All things in the universe are evi- dently of a piece. Every thing is adjusted to every thing. One design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author ; because the concep- tion of different authors, with- out any distinction of attributes or operations, serves only to give perplexity to the imagination, without bestowing any satisfac- tion on the understanding. The statue of Laocoon, as we learn from Pliny, was the work of three artists : but it is certain, that were we not told so, we should never have concluded, that a groupe of figures, cut from one stone, and united in one plan, was not the work and contrivance of one statuary. To ascribe any single effect to the combination of several cau- ses, is not surely a natural and obvious supposition. Hume. WAR. Famine, the plague, and war, are the three most famous ingredients in this lower world. Under famine may be classed all the noxious foods which want obliges us to have recourse to ; thus shortening our life, whilst we hope to support it. In the plague are included all contagious distempers : and these are not few in number. These two gifts we hold from Providence : But war, in which all those gifts are concentrated, we owe to the fancy of three or four hundred persons scattered over the surface of this globe, under the name of princes and ministers ; and on this account it may be that, in several dedica- tions, they are called the living images of the Deity. The most hardened flatterer will allow, that war is ever at- tended with plague and famine, especially if he has seen the military hospitals in Germany, or passed through some villages where some notable feat of arms has been performed. It is unquestionably a very not- able art to ravage countries, de- stroy dwellings, and, communi- bus annis, out of a hundred thousand men to cut off forty thousand. This invention was originally cultivated by nations assembled for their common good: for instance, the diet of the Greeks sent word to the diet of Phrygia aad its neigh- bours, that they were putting to WAR WAR sea in a thousand fishing-boats, in order to do their best to cut them off root and branch. The Roman people, in a ge- neral assembly, resolved, that it was their interest to go and fight the Veientes, or the Vol- scians, before harvest ; and some years after, all the Romans being- angry witli all the Carthaginians, fought a long time both by sea and land. It is otherwise in our time. A genealogist sets forth to a prince, that he is descended in a direct line from a count, whose kindred, three or four hundred years ago, had made a family compact with a house, the very memory of which is extinguished. That house had some distant claim to a province, the last pro- prietor of which died of an apoplexy. The prince and his council instantly resolve, that this province belongs to him by divine right. The province, which is some hundred leagues from him, protests that it does not so much as know him ; that it is not disposed to be governed by him ; that before prescribing laws to them, their consent, at least, was necessary. These alle- gations do not so much as reach the prince's ears ; it is insisted on, that his right is incontesta- ble. He instantly picks up a multitude of men, who have nothing to do, nor nothing to lose ; clothes them with coarse blue, white, green, or scarlet cloth, a few sous to the ell ; put on them hats bound with coarse white worsted; makes them turn to the right and left ; and thus marches away with them to glory. Other princes, on this arma- ment, take part in it to the best of their ability, and soon cover a small extent of country with more hireling murderers than Gengis-Kan, Tamerlane, and Bajazet had their heels. People, at no small distance, on hearing that fighting is going forward, and that if they would make one, there are five or six sous a-day for them, immediately divide into two bands, like reap- ers, and go and sell their ser- vices to the first bidder. These multitudes furiously butcher one another, not only without having any concern in the quarrel, but without so much as knowing what it is about. Sometimes five or six powers are engaged, three against three, two against four, sometimes even one against five, all equally detesting one another; and friends and foes by turns, agree- ing only in one thing, to do all the mischief possible. An odd circumstance in this infernal enterprise is, that every chief of these ruffians has his co- lours consecrated, and solemnly prays to God before he goes to destroy his neighbour. If the slain in a battle do not exceed two or three thousand, the for- tunate commander does not think it worth thanking God for; but if, besides killing ten or twelve thousand men, he has been so far favoured by heaven as totally to destroy some re- markable place, then a verbose hymn is sung in four parts, com- posed in a language unknown to all the combatants, and besides stuffed with barbarisms. The same songr does for marriage* W All WAR and births as for massacres; which is scarce pardonable, es- pecially in a nation of all others the most noted for new songs. All countries pay a certain num- ber of orators to celebrate these sanguinary actions ; some in a long- black coat, and over it a short-docked cloak ; others in a gown, with a kind of shirt over it; some, again, over their shirts have two pieces of motley-co- loured stuff hanging down. They are all very long-winded in their harangues ; and to illus- trate a battle fought in Wetter^ avia, bring up what passed thou- sands of years ago in Palestine. At other times, these gentry de- claim against vice; they prove by syllogisms and antitheses, that ladies, for slightly height- ening the hue of their cheeks with a little carmine, will as- suredly be the eternal object of eternal vengeance ; that Po- lyeucte and Athalia are the de- vil's works ; that he whose table on a day of abstinence is loaded with fish to the amount of two hundred crowns, is infallibly saved : and that a poor man, for eating two penny-worth of mut- ton, goes to the devil for ever and ever. Among five or six thousand such declamations there may be, and that is the most, three or four written by a Gaul named Mas- sillon, which a gentleman may bear to read : but in not one of all these discourses has the ora- tor the spirit to animadvert on war, that scourge and crime which includes all others. These groveling speakers are continu- ally prating against love, man- kind's only solace, and the only way of repairing it : not a word do they say of the detestable en- deavours of the mighty for its destruction. Bourdaloue ! a very bad ser- mon hast thou made against im- purity ; but not one, either bad or good, on those various kinds of murders ; on those robberies, on thoste violences, that universal rage by which the world is laid waste ! Put together, all the vi- ces of all ages and places, and . never will they come up to the mischiefs and enormities of only one campaign. Ye bungling soul-physicians ? to bellow for an hour and more against a few flea-bites, and not say a word about that horrid dis- temper which tears us to pieces. Burn your books, ye moralising philosophers ! Whilst the hu- mour of a few shall make it an act of loyalty to butcher thou- sands of our fellow-creatures, the part of mankind dedicated to he- roism will be the most execrable and destructive monsters in all nature. Of what avail is hu- manity, benevolence, modesty, temperance, mildness, discretion and piety ! when half a pound of lead, discharged at the dis- tance of six hundred paces, shat- ters my body ! when I expire at the age of twenty under pains unspeakable, and amidst thou- sands in the same miserable con- dition ? when my eyes, at their last opening, see my native town all in a blaze ; and the last sounds I hear, are the shrieks and groans of women and children expiring among the ruins ; and all for the pretended interest of a man who is a stranger to us. The worst is, that war appears WAR WAR to be an unavoidable scourge : for, if we observe it, the god Mars was worshipped in all na- tions ; and among" the Jews, Sabbaoth signifies the god of ar- mies ; but in Homer, Minerva calls Mars a furious hair-brained infernal deity. Voltaire. WAR, CALAMITIES OF. War im- pedes the course of every salu- tary plan, exhausts the sources of prosperity, and diverts the at- tention of g-overnors from the happiness of nations. It even suspends sometimes every idea of justice and humanity. In a word, instead of gentle and be- nevolent feelings, it substitutes hostility and hatred, the neces- sity of oppression, and the rage of desolation. The first idea that occurs to me, when I reflect on the ' origin of most wars, is, that those great combinations of politics which have so often kindled the torch of discord, and occasioned so many ravages, have very sel- dom merited all the admiration that has been so lavishly bestow- ed upon them. At least I might venture to say, that when a state is arrived at an illustrious height of power, it is owing to the wani of a comprehension sufficiently extensive, and to an incompeten knowledge of its resources, tha continual anxieties are enter- tained, and the duration of the public tranquillity made to de pend on such a variety of uncer tain speculations. I might even venture to "observe, moreover that in such nations it is a rea misfortune for the people, when by a kind of imitative spirit, thei government has been accus tomed to contemplate tin strength of states in those exterior connections only, the texture and combination of which form what is cMed-political science.. Then the most subtle ideas concerning the balance of power become the predominant principles, and in- cessantly engross the attention. Hence arise those frequent wars of competition, of which the first renders a second more probable : for in proportion as a state has been weakened by a war, it is so much the more apt to become jealous again ; because the sen- sations of jealousy are excited only by comparison ; and in a course of years, it is sometimes one power, and sometimes ano- ther, that attracts political ob- servation. Thus, the history of all ages exhibits nations inces- santly endeavouring to reduce each other to the same state of humiliation to which they had themselves been reduced by their own political mistakes. On the contrary, were every state to be sparing of its strength, to culti- vate a proper knowledge of its resources, and to render them respectable by a wise adminis- tration, it would arrive, without effort, to that height of superio- rity it is so anxious to attain. I must likewise observe, that this kind of superiority is the only one of which the rela- tive consequences, if I may so express myself, are universal. The triumphs of war exalt you no doubt above the nation you may conquer ; but as these tri- umphs commonly require long efforts and great sacrifices, the exhausted slate resulting thence necessarily alters the proportion which existed between your WAR WAR strength and that of the great powers who were not engaged in your quarrel, and whose pros- perity increased under the protec- tion of that peace which they en- joyed. In a word, it cannot be de- nied, that the height of great- ness to which a nation may ar- rive by the wisdom of its ad- ministration is the most com- manding, and the most conducive to secure the respect of other nations. These are much more jealous of the most insignificant acquisitions which are proposed to be gained by war or negocia- tion, that of the augmentation of greatness of which order is the foundation. And this sentiment is natural : for that prosperity, which originates in the wise conduct of a sovereign, renders his virtues also more conspicu- ous ; exhibiting them at the same time as a security against any abuse which he might make of his augmented power. Of late years it has been, for the sake of commerce in particu- lar, that such scenes of blood- shed have been recorded. Com- merce, that loose and indetermi- nate idea adds new lustre to political speculations ; and the public opinion, excited by a word that indicates an universal interest, is often misled itself in its decisions. 1 would fain ask those who, from such motives, are ever ready to be the advo- cates for war ; Do you know the balance of the commerce of your country? Have you studied its elements ? Have you suffici- ently examined, whether the trade in which you desire to par- ticipate, will increase the na- tional opulence ? Do you well discern the causes and conse- quences of that opulence ? Have you balanced the advantages you expect from war, against the in- jury which commerce will sus- tain from the augmented rate of interest, occasioned by the multi- plication of the government loans, and the dearness .of la- bour, which is a necessary con- sequence of the increase of taxes ? Are you certain, that while you endeavour to obtain a new branch of commerce by the sword, you may not lose another, either through that difference which you will be obliged to pay to your ancient allies, or those con- cessions that your new ones may require? In a word, are you sufficiently acquainted with the whole extent of your present prosperity; and have you form- ed an estimate of all the sacri- fices which the very end of your ambition may deserve ? Nothing is more simple than the word commerce in its vulgar accepta- tion ; nothing more complicated; when it is applied to the univer- sality of exchanges, to the impor- tance of some, the inutility of others, the disadvantage of many ; to political views ; in short, to labour, taxes, and all the unexpected combinations which war and great events pro- duce. Deliberate and deep reflection is necessary then, be- fore we determine to kindle the flames of war for a commercial advantage. And it ought never to be forgotten, that in time of peace, a diminution of certain duties, a bounty on some expor- tations, a privilege obtained WAR WAfc from some foreign nations, and many other advantages resulting from a wise administration, are often of far greater value than the object which is proposed to be gained by fleets and armies. Nations, in their savage state, were actuated by blind and unruly passions ; and these pas- sions havebeen softened in some measure by the effect of civiliza- tion. But the multiplicity and confusion of different interests, which the ideas of money, commerce, national riches, and the balance of power have introduced, have become other causes of hostility and jealousy; and as the science of govern- ment has not improved in pro- portion to the contradictions it had to reconcile, and the diffi- culties it had to overcome, man- kind still enjoy but imperfectly the change in their conditions. I would here submit to reflec- tion, a consideration with which 1 have ever been forcibly struck. Most governments appear satis- fied, if, at the conclusion of a bloody and expensive war, they have made an honourable peace. Undoubtedly such a termination may satisfy a state, which having been unjustly attacked, was re- duced to the necessity of repell- ing force by force. But that nation which might heve avoided the enmity of other powers by more circumspect proceedings, and that also which has underta- ken a war from mere political speculations, cannot be ignorant, that an estimation of the advan- tages which they derive from the treaty of peace is not the only calculation worthy of their atten- tion. Each is also to consider what would have been its situa- tion at the period when the treaty was concluded, if war had not interrupted the course of its prosperity. Such comparisons might have been often useful to all the po- tentates in Europe ; and Great Britain, in particular, might have received the most important in- structions from them : but as it is not in my power to enter into such an extensive detail, I shall confine myself to such reflections as are applicable to France. Let us suppose a war in which this kingdom should be obliged to alienate from fifty to sixty millions of its annual revenue (from 1,187, 5QOL to 2,625,OOOL sterling) in order to pay the in- terest of the loans, which the preparations for war, the expen- ces of each campaign, and the liquidation of debts had render- ed necessary ; and let us next take a cursory view of the differ- ent uses to which government might have applied such a reve- nue, not only for the advance- ment of the national happiness, but for the augmentation of the military force. The distribution which I am going to make of this revenue, does not indicate my absolute opinion on the subject. But, i a calculation of this kind, I would anticipate objections, by showing how the different wishes that are formed in a monarchy, with respect either to happiness or power, might have been perfectly accomplished. In the first place J find, that with eighteen millions (787,500/. sterling), of that annual revenue, WAR the regimental companies might Lave been completed to their full compliment, and the army augmented by 50,000 infantry, and ten or twelve thousand horse. ' I find, in the next place, that two millions of that revenue (87,500Z. sterling 1 ) which in time of peace would pay the interest of a loan of forty millions (1,750,OOOL sterling) would have added to our navy thirty men of war, and a proportionable number of frigates ; and this augmentation might have been maintained by four millions yearly (175,OOOZ. sterling). Thus we see twenty-four millions (1,050,OOOZ. sterling) of that re- venue devoted solely to the mi- litary service. Let us now apply the surplus to the various parts of admi- nistration, and let us consider the result. With eighteen millions (787, 500Z. sterling) yearly, the price of salt might have been rendered uniform throughout the kingdom, by reducing it one-third in the provinces of little gabels (an excise on salt) and two-thirds in those of the great ; and not increasing the charges of the pri- vileged provinces. With from four to five milli- ons (from 175,OOOL to 21S,750L sterling) annually, the interior parts of the kingdom might have been freed from all custom-house duties, without raising those levied on the exports and im- ports of the kingdom, or carry- ing to account the improvements I suggested when treating on this subject. With 2,500,000 livres (IOD, 375Z. sterling) serving to pay tWe interest of successive loans, to the amount of fifty millions (2,187,500Z. sterling) all the necessary canals might have been executed that are still wanting in the kingdom. With <3ne million more per annum (43,750L sterling) go- vernment might be enabled to bestow sufficient encouragement on all the establishments of in- dustry that can advance the prosperity of France. With 1,500,000 livres (65, 625J. sterling) the sums annual- ly destined to give employment to the poor might be doubled ; and, while great advantages would thus accrue to the inhabi- tants of the country, the neigh- bouring communications might be multiplied. With the same sum the pri- sons throughout the kingdom might, in a few years, be im- proved, and all the charitable institutions brought to perfec- tion. And with two millions an- nually (87,500J. sterling) the clearing of the waste lands might proceed with incredible vigour. These distributions amount to thirty-one millions (1,356,250Z. sterling) which joined to twenty-four millions (1,050,000^. sterling) for military expences, make together the annual re- venue of fifty-five millions em- ployed as above (2,406,250J. ster- ling ;) a sum equal to that which I have supposed to be alienated for the disbursements of the war. The distributions which I have.thus suggested, it is evident, WAR WAR may be modified in many differ- ent ways : but it is sufficient to perceive the immense advantages which this simple statement ex- hibits ; whether with respect to the strength and prosperity of the kingdom, or for the assist- ance and solace of the indigent class of people. This is not all ; for if we es- timate the diminution of com- merce which results from a war of five or six years duration, it will be found, that the kingdom is depriv ed of a considerable in- crease of riches. In fine, war, and the loans which it occasions, create a very sensible rise in the rate of inter- est. On the contrary, peace, under a wise administration, would lower it annually, were it only in consequence of the in- crease of specie, and of the in- fluence of the stated reimburse- ments. This successive reduc- tion of interest is likewise a source of inestimable advantages to commerce, agriculture, and the finances. Let these effects be now com- pared with the advantages which a fortunate war, (and all wars are not so) would give to a king- dom arrived at that height of prosperity by which France is now distinguished; and let this comparison be made, not in a desultory manner, but by the aid of reflection and science ; and it will be found, for the most part, that ten seeds have been sown, in order to gather the fruit of one. Undoubtedly, with so many powerful means, a government may expect, with great proba- bility, to humble its rivals and extend its dominions. But to employ its resources for the hap- piness of its subjects ; to com- mand respect without the assist- ance and dangers of an ever restless policy ; this is a conduct, which alone can correspond to the greatness of its situation ; and which displays at once a know- ledge of its ascendancy, and of the advantages to be derived from it. By such a conduct, a govern- ment imitates those beneficent rivers whose rapid current can- not be impeded, but which, in their majestic course, encourage navigation, facilitate commerce, and fertilise the country without injury or devastation. It is not war, but a wise and pacific administration, that can procure all the advantages of which France may be yet in want. The quantity of specie in the kingdom is immense; but the want of public confidence very often occasions the greatest part of it to be hoarded up. The population of the king- dom is immense ; but the excess and nature of the taxes impover- ish and dishearten the inhabi- tants of the country. In a state of misery the human species is weakened; and the number of children, who die before their strength can be matured, is -no longer in a natural proportion. The revenue of the sovereign is immense: but the public debt consumes two-fifths of it ; and nothing can diminish this burden but the fruits of a prudent oeco- nomy, and the lowering of the rate of interest. The contributions of the na- tion, in particular, are immense; WAR WAR but it is only by the strengthen- ing 1 of public credit that govern- ment can succeed in finding suffi- cient resources in extraordinary emergencies. Finally, the balance of com- merce in favour of the kingdom is an immense source of riches; but war interrupts the current. Hence results an important re- flection ; namely, that the nation which derives the most consider- able advantages from peace, makes also the greatest sacrifices whenever it renounces that state of quiet and prosperity. Neckcr. WARS, RELIGIOUS, ARE A LESS FATAL SCOURGE THAN THAT OF THE INQUISITION; WITH A SUCCINCT HISTORY OF THIS TRIBUNAL. A militia of 500,000 monks and friars, fighting with spiritual arms under the standard of Rome could not hinder one half of Europe from shaking off the yoke of that court: And the In- quisition has had no other effect than to deprive the pope of some more provinces, witness the united Netherlands ; or to commit unhappy wretches, without an- swering any purpose, to the flames. You may remember, that in the wars against the Albigenses, and about the year 1200, Pope Innocent III. established this tribunal, which takes cognisance of human thoughts ; and that in contempt of the bishops, the na- tural judges in matters of doc- trine, it w'as entrusted to the care of the Dominicans and Cor- deliers. Those first inquisitors had the power of summoning and ex- communicating heretics ; of granting indulgences to every prince that would exterminate them when condemned ; of re- conciling penitents to the church ; of taxing their sins, and receiving sums of money by way of surety for their repentance. It was a very droll instance of the absurd contradictions to which human policy is often- times reduced, that the most in- veterate enemy of the see of Rome happened to be the most strenuous defender of this tribunal. Frederick II. accused by the pope, one time, of being a Ma- hometan, another time of Athe- ism, imagined he should wipe off this reproach by taking the in- quisitors under his protection. He even went so far as to pub- lish four edicts at Pavia in 1241, whereby he laid an injunction on the magistrates, to commit those to the flames whom the in- quisitors should condemn as ob- stinate heretics, and to imprison those for life whom this tribunal should declare repentant. Notwithstanding this political step, Frederick II. was persecu- ted as much as before ; and the popes afterwards turned the arms he had put into their hands against the rights and privileges of the empire. Pope Alexander III. esta- blished the Inquisition in France in 1255, under St. Lewis. The guardian of the Cordeliers at Paris, and the provincial of the Dominicans, were grand inqui- sitors. By the bull of Pope Alexander, they were to consult, but not to be dependent on the bishops. The giving of this strange jurisdiction to men, who bv vows had renounced the WAR WAR world, set both clergy and laity against them. An inquisitor of the order of Cordeliers assisted at the trial of the knights Templar ; bt the public were soon so dissatisfied, that those friars had nothing more left than an empty title. In Italy the popes had more credit ; because, though dis- obeyed at Rome, from whence they had been long- absent, they were still at the head of the fac- tion of the Guelphs against the Gibellines. They made use of this inquisition against the parti- sans of the empire: For in 1801, Pope John XXII. made the monkish inquisitors proceed against Matthew Visconti, a Milanese nobleman, whose sole crime was his attachment to the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria. The vassal's fidelity to his paramount was declared heresy ; the house of Este, as also that of Malatesta, were treated in the same manner, and for the same reason ; and if the sentence was not put in execution, it was because at that time it was easier for the pope to find inquisitors than armies. The more this tribunal gained ground, the more strenuously it was claimed by the bishops, who saw themselves stripped of a pri- vilege which seemed to belong to their order. The popes a length joined them in commission with the monkish inquisitors who exercised a full authority almost in every state of Italy the bishops being properly no more than their assessors. Venice had received the Inqui sition towards the end of thi thirteenth century in 1289 every where else it was depend ent on the pope ; but in the Ve- netian dominions it became sub- ject to the senate. The wisest precaution they took, was, that the fines and confiscations should not belong to the inquisitors. They thought to moderate the zeal of those men by removing the temptation of enriching themselves : But as the passion of pride and ambition is more preponderating with mankind than avarice, the restless spirit of the Inquisition obliged the senate, a long time after, that is, in the sixteenth century, to enact a law, that the Inquisition should never proceed without the assist- ance of three senators. In con- sequence of this regulation, and several others of the like good policy, the authority of this tri- bunal was in a manner abo- lished at Venice by being eluded. One would have imagined that the Inquisition should have been introduced with the greatest ease, and settled in the firmest man- ner, in the kingdom of Naples ; yet it never reached this part of Italy. The sovereigns of Naples and Sicily thinking themselves intitled, in consequence of papal concessions, to the enjoyment of ecclesiastic jurisdiction, the Ro- man pontitl' and the king were constantly disputing who should nominate the inquisitors; which was the reason of iheir not being appointed: and the people, for the first time, benefited by the quarrel of their masters. Yet there were fewer heretics in Naples arid Sicily than in other countries. The religious tran- quillity of those kingdoms, shows very plainly, that the Inquisition WAR WAR was not so much the bulwark of religion, as a scourge designed , for the disturbance of the human species. At length, it was established in Sicily, after it kad been re- ceived in Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1478: but in Sicily, rather more than in Cas- tile, it was a prerogative of the crown, and not a Roman tribu- nal ; for in Sicily the king is pope. The Inquisition had long be- fore gained admittance into Arragon ; it was there in a lan- guid state as well as in France, without jurisdiction or order, and almost entirely forgot. But it was not till after the, conquest of Granada, that it ex- erted throughout the kingdom of Spain such vigour and se- verity as had been never observ- ed in the ordinary courts of jus- tice. The Spaniards must at that time have had something in their nature more severe and unrelent- ing than other nations. This appears by the barbarities which they so wantonly exercised in the new world; and especially by the cruelties which they in- troduced into a jurisdiction, wherein the Italians, its invent- ors, behave with some lenity. The court of Rome had erected those tribunals out of policy ; but they became more odious by the barbarity of the Spanish inquisitors. After Mahomet II. had sub- dued Constantinople, both he and his successors permitted the conquered Greeks to enjoy their religion in peace : and when the Arabians were masters in Spain, they never compelled the Chris- tian natives of that country to embrace the Koran. But after the taking of Granada, Cardinal Ximenes, whether induced by religious zeal, or by the ambition of extending his primacy, would have all the Moors turn chris- tians. This was an enterprise diametrically contrary to the treaty by which the Moors had submitted ; and it required some time to bring it to bear. But Ximenes would fain convert the Moors as quick as be had taken Granada. They were compell- ed to hear sermons ; they were persecuted : they rose up in arms ; were quelled, and forced to submit to baptism. Ximenes obliged 50,000 Moors to receive this sign of a religion which they did not believe to be true. The Jews were included in the treaty with the kings of Granada, but did not meet with more indulgence than the Moors. They were very numerous in Spain, where they followed the business of brokerage, as in all other countries. This profession, far from giving any umbrage, is founded on peace. There are above 28,000 Jews tolerated by the pope in Italy ; and there are above two hundred and four- score synagogues in Poland. The city of Amsterdam alone contains 15,000 Jews ; though surely it can trade without them. The Jews did not seem to be more dangerous in Spain ; and the taxes that might be laid on them, would have been sure re- sources to the government. It was therefore difficult to account by the maxims of sound policy for the persecution they under- went. WAR WAR The inquisition proceeded against the Jews and the Mus- sulmen. We have already ob- served, what a number of Maho- metan and Jewish families chose rather to re tire from Spain, than to be subject to the cruelty of this tribunal; which deprived Ferdinand and Isabella of a mul- titude of subjects. Surely there was least danger from those peo- ple, since they preferred to be fugitives rather than rebels. Those who staid behind pretend- ed to be Christians. But the grand inquisitor, Torquemada, made Queen Isabella look upon all those sham Christians, as peo- ple that deserved to lose there lives and estates. This Torquemada was a domi- nican, and afterwards cardinal ; he settled the form of proceed- ing in the Spanish court of In- quisition ; a form contrary to ail human laws, and which subsists notwithstanding, to this very day. In fourteen years he brought near fourscore thou- sand men to their trial, and caused six thousand to be burnt with all the pomp and ceremony usual on. the greatest solemni- ties. The accounts given us of people who sacrificed human victims to the Deity, fall greatly short of the executions of the Inquisition. Against those bloody rites the Spaniards did oot conceive sufficient horror, because they were sacrificing their inveterate enemies, and the Jews. But they soon became victims themselves : For when Lutheranism began to spread, the few Spaniards suspected ol embracing that doctrine were made a sacrifice. The form ol proceeding was an infallible way to destroy whomsoever the in- quisitors pleased. The prison- ers are not confronted with their accusers ; and there is no in- former ever so base but they lis- ten to : A public criminal, an infamous person, a child, a pros- titute, are good evidence; even a son may inform against his father, a wife against her husband. In short, the prisoner is obliged to accuse himself; to guess, and to confess the crime he is supposed to be guilty of, and of which he is frequently ignorant. This strange manner of proceed- ing struck a terror into the whole kingdom of Spain: a general jealousy and suspicion took possession of all ranks of people : friendship and sociability were at an end : brothers were afraid of brothers ; fathers, of their children. Hence silence is become the characteristic of a nation, endowed with all the vivacity natural to a warm and fruitful climate. The most art- ful endeavoured to be bailiffs to the Inquisition, under the name of familiars ; choosing rather this servile office, than to be exposed to such cruelties. To this tribunal we must likewise attribute that ignorance of sound philosophy, in which Spain lies buried; while Ger- many, England, France, and even Italy, have discovered such a multitude of truths, and en- larged the sphere of knowledge. Never is human nature so de- based, as when ignorance is armed with power. But these melancholy effects of the Inquisition are a trifle, in comparison to those public sacri- WAR WAR (ices called Auto da Fe, or acts of faith, and to the shocking- barbarities that precede them. A priest in a white surplice, or a monk who has vowed meekness and humility, causes his fellow-creatures to be put to the torture in a dismal dungeon. A stage is erected in the public market-place, where the con- demned prisoners are conducted to the stake, attended with a train of monks and religious con- fraternities. They sing- psalms, say mass, and butcher mankind. Were a native of Asia to come to Madrid upon the* day of an execution of this sort, it would be impossible for him to tell whether it was a rejoicing, a religious feast, a sacrifice, or a massacre ; and yet it is all this together. The kings, whose presence alone in other cases is the harbinger of mercy, assist at this spectacle uncovered, lower seated than the inquisitors, and behold their subjects expiring in the flames. The Spaniards re- proached Montezuma with im- molating his captives to his gods; what would he have said, had he beheld an Auto da Fe. These executions are more rare at present. But reason, whose rays with difficulty per- vade the darkness of fanatacism, has not as yet been able to abolish them. The Inquisition was not intro- duced into Portugal till towards the year 1557, before this coun- try fell under the Spanish yoke. At first it met with all the oppo- sition its very name ought na- turally to inspire: But at length it forced its way ; and now it is under the same form of govern- ment at Lisbon as at Madrid. 1 he grand inquisitor is nominated by the king, and confirmed by the pope. The particular courts of this office, to which they give the name of holy, are subordinate both in Spain and Portugal, to the tribunal of the capital. In both these kingdoms the Inquisi- tion is distinguished by the same severity and by the same zeal in extending its power. In Spain, after the decease of Charles V. they presumed to seize on that emperor's father- confessor Constantine Pontius : The poor man died in a dungeon ; and his effigy was burnt after his death at an Auto da Fe. In Portugal, John of Bragan- za, having rescued his country from the Spanish yoke, would have been glad to deliver it from the Inquisition ; but he could do no more than deprive the inquisitors of the confiscated estates. After his decease they declared him excommunicated ; and the queen his widow was obliged to desire they would ab- solve the dead corpse. By this absolution, equally ridiculous and disgraceful, he was ac- knowledged to have been guilty. When the Spaniards made settlements in America, they carried the Inquisition along with them. And the Portu- guese introduced it into the East Indies, after it had been authorised at Lisbon. Every body has heard of the Inquisition of Goa. This jurisdiction in other countries is contrary to the law of nature, but at Goa it is repugnant to good policy. The Portuguese WAR sail to the East Indies merely for the sake of trade. Now trade and the Inquisition are incom- patible. Were it to be establish- ed at London or at Amsterdam, those cities would neither be so populous nor so opulent. We find, that when Philip II. would fain introduce it into the Nether- lands, the interruption of com- merce was one of the principle causes of the revolution of that country. France and Germany have been happily preserved from this scourge. They have indeed experienced religious wars : but wars must sometimes have an end; while the Inquisi- tion, when once established, be- comes eternal. It is not at all surprising-, that so detestable a tribunal should have been charged with exces- ses of cruelty and insolence which it never committed. We find in several writers, that the above mentioned Constantine Pontius, confessor to Charles V. had been accused before the Holy Office with having- dictated the em- peror's will, wherein there was not a sufficient number of pious legacies; that both the confes- sor and the will were condemn- ed to be burnt; and at length that Philip II. could obtain no more, but that the sentence should not be executed in re- gard to the will. This whole story is evidently false. Con- stantine Pontius had not been suc- cessor for sometime to Charles V. when he was imprisoned ; and that prince's will was respected by Philip II. who had too great abilities and power to suffer the commencement of his reign, and his father's glory, to be thus dishonoured. We read likewise in several books written against the Inqui- sition, that the King of Spain, Philip III. assisting at an /Auto da Fe, and seeing several of his sub- jects, Jews, Mahometans, and heretics, or suspected heretics in the flames, he cried out ; " Poor wretches, indeed, to suffer death because they could not change their opinion!" It is very pro- bable that a king mig'ht have entertained such sentiments, and that those words might have dropped from him. Only it is cruel he did not spare those whom he pitied. But they add, that these words having been carried to the grand inquisitor, he charged the king with them, and had the impudence to demand a reparation of the honour of the holy office : that the king was so mean as to submit ; and that this reparation consisted in his being let blood, which the grand in- quisitor ordered to be burnt by the common hangman. Philip III. was a shallow prince, but not so excessively weak. A story of this nature is not credi- ble of any prince; it is related only in anonymous pieces in the Lives of the Popes,- and in those false memoirs printed in Holland under so many spurious titles, Besides, it must be very weak policy to calumniate the Inqui- sition, and to try to wound her with the arms of falsehood and imposture. This tribunal, designed for the extirpation of heresy, is the very- thing that keeps the Protestants at the greatest distance from tlie WIC WIC Church of Rome. They view it as an object of horror ; they would rather die than submit to it ; so that the sulphurous shirts of the holy office are the standard against which they will ever unite. Voltaire. WICKED AND WICKEDNESS. We are perpetually told that human nature is essentially perverse ; that man is born a child of the devil. Now nothing 1 can be more imprudent : for, my friend, in preaching to me that all the world is born in wickedness, thou informest me that thou art born so, and that it behoves me to beware of thee as I would of a fox or crocodile, O ! not at all, sayest .thou, I am regenerated: I am no unbeliever or heretic ; I may be trusted : so then, the remainder of mankind bein either heretics, or what thou callest infidels, will be a mere herd of monsters ; and whenever thou art speaking to a Lutheran or a Turk, thou shouldest con- clude that they are for robbing and murdering thee, for they are the devil's spawn : one is not regenerated, and the other is degenerated. Much more rational and much more handsome would it be to say to men, " You are all born good ; consider how dreadful it would be to defile the purity of your being." Mankind should be dealt with as individuals. If a prebendary leads a scandalous life, a friend says to him, is it possible that you can thus dis- grace the dignity of a preben- dary ? A counsellor or judge is reminded that he has the honour of being counsellor to the king, and that it is his duty to be an example of virtue. The encou- ragement to a soldier is, Re- member you belong to the regi- ment of Champagne. And every individual should be told, Remember your dignity as- a man. Say or do what you will, this must at length be the case; for what can mean this saying, so common among all nations, re- flect within thyself? Now, were you born a child of the devil ; were your origin criminal ; were your blood formed of an infernal liquor ; to bid you reflect within yourself would import, Consult your diabolical nature, and follow its suggestions ; cheat, rob, mur- der ; it is your father's law. Man is not born wicked ; he becomes so, as he falls sick. Should some physicians come and tell him, you are born sick ; it is certain that these physicians, whatever they might say or d, will not cure him if his disease be inherent in his nature ; and these reasoners are themselves very sick. Bring together all the children Of the universe, you will see nothing in them but innocence, gentleness, and fear. Were they born wicked, spiteful, and cruel, some signs of it would come from them, as little snakes strive to bite, and little tygers to tear. But Nature having been as spar- ing of offensive weapons to man as to pigeons and rabbits, it cannot have given them an instinct to mischief and destruc- tion. So man is not born wicked ! How comes it then that so many are infected with the pestilence of wickedness? It is because they who bear rule over them having caught the distemper, communicate it to others ; as a woman; having the distemper which Christopher Columbus is said to have brought from Ame- rica, has spread the venom all over Europe. By the first am- bitious man was the world cor- rupted. You will say, that this first monster only fecundated that germ of pride, rapine, fraud, and cruelty, which is in all men. I own that, in general, the greater part of our brethren easily con- tract these qualities : but has every body the putrid fever, the stone, and gravel, because every body is liable to those dis- tempers ? There are whole nations which are not wicked ; the Philadel phians, the Banyans, have never shed human blood. The Chinese, the people of Tonquin, Lao, Siam, and even of Japan, have lived in the most profound tran- quillity for these hundred years past. In the space of ten years scarce any of those enormities at which human nature stands as- tonished, is heard of in the cities of Rome, Venice, Paris, London, and Amsterdam : cities where yet cupidity, the mother of all crimes, is flagrant. If men were essentially wicked, and all born under the sway of a being- as malignant as wretched, who, in revenge for his punish- ment, inspired them with all his rage, we should every morning hear of husbands being mur- dered by their wives, and fathers by their children, just as fowls are found killed by a pole-cat, WIC who came in the night and sucked their blood. If we suppose there are ten hundred millions of men upon the earth, it is a great many : and this makes about five hun- dred millions of women, who sew and spin, feed their little ones, keep the house or hut clean, and backbite their neigh- bours a little. I do riot see any great harm these poor simple- tons do on earth. Of this num- ber of inhabitants on the globe, there are at least two hundred millions of children, who cer- tainly neither kill nor plunder, and about as many who, through age and sickness, are not capable of those crimes. Thus there re- mains, at most, but a hundred millions whom youth and vigour qualify for the commission of crimes. Of these hundred mil- lions, we mav say, that ninety are continually taken up with prodigious labour, in forcing the earth to furnish them with food and raiment: now these have scarce time to perpetrate out- rages. In the remaining ten millions will be included idlers and jo- cund companions, who love peace and festivity ; the men of talents, who are taken up with their several professions ; magis- trates and priests, who it mani- festly behoves to lead an irre- proachable life, at least in ap- pearance : so that the real wicked men are reduced to some few politicians, either secular or regular, who will always be for disturbing the world ; and some thousands of vagrants who hire their services to those poli- 3 WIT ticians. Now never is a million of these wild beasts employed at once, and among these I reckon highwaymen : so that at most, and in the most tempestuous times, there is but one man of a thousand who may be called wicked ; and he is not so al- ways. Thus is wickedness on earth infinitely less than is talked of and believed. To be sure, there is still too much misfortune, distress, and horrible crimes ; but the pleasure of complaining and magnifying- is such, that at the least scratch you cry -out, the earth is deluged with blood. If you have been cheated, then the world is full of perjury. An atra- bilarious mind, on having been wronged, sees the universe covered with damned souls: as a young rake,_seated at supper with his doxy" after the opera, does not dream that there are any distressed objects. Vol- taire. WITNESSES, CREDIBILITY OF. Every man of common sense, that is, every one whose ideas have some connection with each other, and whose sensations are conform- able to those of other men, may be a witness : but the credibility of his evidence will be in propor- tion as he is interested in declar- ing or concealing the truth. Hence it appears, how frivo- lous is the reasoning- of those who reject the testimony of women on account of their weakness : how puerile it is, not to admit the evidence of those who are under sentence of death, because they are dead in law ; and how irrational to ex- clude persons branded witli in- WIT famy ; for in all these cases they ought to be credited, when they have no interest in giving false testimony. The credibility of a witness, then, should only diminish in proportion to. the hatred, friendship, or connec- tions, subsisting between him and the delinquent. One wit- ness is not sufficient ; for whilst the accused denies what the other affirms, truth remains sus- pended, and the right that every- one has to be believed innocent, turns the balance in his favour. The credibility of a witness is the less as the alrociousness of the crime is greater, from the impro- bability of its having been com- mitted. In cases of wanton cruelty, the presumption is al- ways ag-ainst the accuser ; for no man is cruel without some interest, without some motive of fear or hatred. There are no spontaneous or superfluous sen- timents in the heart of man ; they are all the result of impres- sions on the senses. The credibi- lity of a witness may also be dimi- nished, by his being a member of a private society, whose customs and principles of conduct are either not known, or are differ- ent from those of the public. Such a man has not only his own passion, but those of the society of which he is a member. The credibility of a witness is null when the question relates to the words of a criminal ; for the tone of voice, the gesture, all that precedes, accompanies, and follows, the different ideas which men annex to the same words, may so alter and modify a man's discourse, that it is almost im- possible to repeat them precisely WOM WOR in the manner in which -they were spoken. Violent and un- common actions, such as real crimes, leave a trace in the multitude of circumstances that attend them, and in their effects ; but words remain only in the memory of the hearers, who are commonly negligent and prejudiced. It is infinitely easier, then, to found an accusation on the words, than on the actions of a man ; for in these, the num- ber of circumstances urged against the accused, afford him variety of means of justification. Beccaria. WOMEN. In a republic, the con- dition of citizens is limited, equal, mild, and agreeable: every thing partakes of the benefit of pub- lic liberty. An empire over the woman cannot amongst them be so well exerted ; and, where the climate demands this empire, it is most agreeable to the government of a single person. This is one of the reasons why it has always been difficult to establish a popular government in the east On the contrary, the slavery of women is perfectly conform- able to the genius of a despotic government, which delights in treating all with severity. Thus at all times have we seen in Asia domestic slavery and des- potic government walk hand in hand with an equal pace. Mon- tesquieu WORSHIP. In the reign of Ar- cadius, Logomacos, a theologue of Constantinople, went into Scythia, and stopped at the foot of mount Caucasus, in the fetrile plains of Zephiriw, bordering on Colchis. The aood old mail Dondindac was, after a light re- past, kneeling in his large hall, between his vast sheepfold and his ample barn, with his wife, his five sons and five daughters, some of his kindred and his domes- tics, all chaunting the praises of the Bounteous Giver of all good things. Ho ! What art thou about idolater ? said Logomacos to him. I am no idolater, said Dondindac. An idolater thou must be, said Logomacos to him, as being a /Scythian, or at least no Greek. Well, and what wast thou gabbling in thy Scythian jargon ? All languages are alike in God's ear, answered the Scythian ' we were singing his praises. Very extraordinary indeed, replied the theologue, a Scythian family worshipping God without any previous in- struction from us ? I^e soon en- tered into a conversation with Dondindac ; for the theologue had a smattering of the Scythian, and the other understood a little Greek. This conversation is lately come to light in a manu- script kept in the imperial library at Constantinople. Log. I will see whether thou knowest thy catechism : why prayest thou to God ? Don. Because it is just and proper to worship the Supreme Being ; as of him we hold all we have. Log. Pretty well, for a bar- barian: and what askest thou of him ? Don. I thank God for the good things he gives me, and even for the crosses with which* he tries me: but as for asking of him any thing, that is what I never pre- sume to do ; l;c knows what we WOR WOR stand in need of better than our- selves: besides, I should be afraid to ask for sunshine, when rain would better suit my neigh- bour. Log. Ah ! I apprehended we should soon have some nonsense or other from him. Let me take a retrospect of things; who told thee there is a God ? Don. All Nature? Log. That is - nothing 1 ; what idea hast thou of God ? Don. That he is my Creator, my master ; who will reward me if I do well, and punish me if I do amiss. Log, That is but trivial and low ; let us come to the essential. Is god infinite secundum quid, or in his es%erice ? Don. I do not understand yon. Log. Stupid dolt ! is God in a place, or out of all place, or is he everywhere ? Don. I know nothing ol that ; it may be just as you please. Log. Ignorant wretch ! Well ; can he make what has been nol to have been, or that a stick shall not have two ends ? Is futurity to him as future, or as present ? How does he do to bring nothing into existence, and to annihilate existence? Don. I never bestow a though on those things. .Log. What an oaf is this Well, I must let myself down, I must suit myself to the meanness of his intellects. Tell me, friend believest thou that matter can be eternal ? Don. What is it to me whethe it exists from eternity or not ? did not exist from eternity. Goc is always my master and in structor. He has given me the the knowledge of justice, and it is my duty to act accordingly. I do not desire to be a philoso- pher, let me be a man. Log. What a plague it is to have to do with such thick- headed creatures ! I must pro- ceed gradually with him. What is God ? Don. My sovereign, my judge, my father. Log. That is not what I ask you ; what is his nature ? Don. To be powerful and good. Log. But whether is he corpo- real or spiritual ? Don. How should I know. Log. What ! not know what a spirit is ! Don. Not I in the least ; and what should I be the better for such knowledge ? will it mend my morals, make me a better husband, a better father, a better master, a better member of so- ciety ? Log. A man must be abso- lutely taught what a spirit is, since it is, it is, it is Well, we will let that alone till ano- ther time. Don. \ fancy, instead of being able to tell me what it is, you will rather tell me what it is not. But after so much questioning, may 1 take the freedom to ask you a question ? I was formerly in one of your temples, and why do you paint God with a long beard. Log. That is a very abstruse qusetion ; the solution of which would be above your comprehen- sion, without some preliminary instructions. won WOR Don. Before you enter on your instructions, I must tell you a circumstance which I hope never to forget. I had just built a summer-house at the end of my garden ; and one day sit- ting- in it, I heard a mole and a chafer descanting on it: a su- perb edifice it certainly is, said the mole, and of very great parts must that mole have been who built it. A mole, forsooth ! quoth the chafer ; the architect of that pretty building could be no other other than some chafer of an extraordinary genius. This colloquy put me on a re- solution never to dispute. Vol- taire. WORSHIP, CORRUPTIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN. In the long pe- riod of twelve hundred years, which elapsed between the reign of Constantine and the reformation of Luther, the wor- ship of saints and relics cor- rupted the pure and perfect sim- plicity of the Christian model: and some symptoms of degene- racy may be observed even in the first generations which a- dopted and cherished this per- nicious innovation. I. The satisfactory experience, that the relics of saints were more valuable than gold or pre- cious stones, stimulated the clergy to multiply the treasures of the church. Without much regard tor truth or probability, they invented names for skele- tons, and actions for names. The fame of the Apostles, and of the holy men who had imi- tated their virtues, was dark- ened by religious fiction. To the invincible band of genuine and primitive martyrs, they ad- ded myriads of imaginary he- roes who had never existed, ex- cept in the fancy of crafty, or credulous legendaries; and there is reason to suspect, that Tours might not be the only diocese in which the bones of a malefac- tor were adored instead of those of a saint. A superstitious prac- tice, which tended to increase the temptations of fraud and credulity, insensibly extinguished the light of history, and of rea- son, in the Christian world. II. But the progress of su- perstition would have been much less rapid and victorious, if the faith of the people had not been assisted by the seasonable aid of visions and miracles, to ascertain the authenticity and virtue of the most supicious re- lics. In the reign of the younger Theodosius, Lucian, a presby- ter of Jerusalem, and the eccle- siastical minister of the village of Caphargamala, about twenty miles from the city, related a very singular dream, which, to remove his doubts, had been re- peated on three successive Sa- turdays. A venerable figure stood before him, in the silence of the night, with a long beard, a white robe, and a gold rod; announced himself by the name of Gamaliel, and revealed to the astonished presbyter, that his own corpse, with the bodies of his son Abibas, his friend Nico- demus, and the illustrious Ste- phen, the first martyr of the Christian faith, were secretly buried in the adjacent field. He added, with impatience, that it was time to release himself, and his companions, from their ob- scure prison ; that their appear- WC-R won ance would be salutary to a dis- tressed world : and that they had made choice of Lucian to inform the bishop of Jerusalem of their situation, and their wishes. Tke doubts and diffi- culties which still retarded this important discovery, were suc- cessively removed by new vi- sions; and the ground wasopen- ed by the bishop, in the presence of an innumerable multitude. The coffins of Gamaliel, of his son, and of his friend, were found in regular order; but when the fourth coffin, which contained the remains of Ste- phen, was shown to the light, the earth trembled, and an odour, such as that of Paradise, was smelt, which instantly cured the various diseases of seventy- three of the assistants. The companions of Stephen were left in their peaceful residence of Caphargamala ; but the relics of the first martyr were trans- ported, in solemn procession, to a church constructed in their honour, on Mount Sion ; and the minute particles of those relics, a drop of blood, or the scrapings of a bone, were acknowledged, in almost every province of the Roman world, to possess a di- vine and miraculous virtue. The grave and learned Augustin, whose understanding scarcely admits the excuse of credulity, has attessed the innumerable prodigies which were perform- ed in Africa by the relics of St. Stephen; and this marvellous narrative is inserted in the ela- borate work of the city of God, which the bishop of Hippo de- signed as a solid and immortal proof of the truth of Christianity. Augustin solemnly declares, that he has selected those miracles only which were publicly cer- tified by the persons who were either the objects, or the spec- tators, of the power of the mar- tyr. Many prodigies were omit- ted, or forgotten ; and Hippo had been less favourably treat- ed than the other cities of the province. And yet the bishop enumerates above seventy mira- cles, of which three were resur- rections from the dead, in the space of two years, and within the limits of his own diocese. If we enlarge our view to all the dioceses, and all the saints, of the Christian world, it will not be easy to calculate the fables and the errors which issued from this inexhaustible source. But We may surely be allowed to observe, that a miracle, in that age of superstition and credulity, lost its name and its merit, since it could scarcely be considered as a deviation from the ordinary and established laws of nature. III. The innumerable mira- cles, of which the tombs of the martyrs were the perpetual the- atre, revealed to the pious be- liever the actual state and con- stitution of the invisible world; and his religious speculations appeared to be founded on the firm basis of fact and experience. Whatever might be the condi- tion of vulgar souls, in the long interval between the dissolution and the resurrection of their bo- dies, it was evident, that the su- perior spirits of the saints and martyrs did not consume that portion of their existence in si- lent and inglorious sleep. It was evident (without presuming WOR \VOR to determine the place of their habitation, or the nature, of their felicity) that they enjoyed the lively and active consciousness of their happiness, their virtue, and their powers ; and that they had already secured the posses- sion of their eternal reward. The enlargement of their intel- lectual faculties surpassed the measure of the human imagina- tion ; since it was proved by ex- perience, that they were capable of hearing 1 and understanding* the various petitions of their nu- merous votaries; who, in the same moment of time, but in the most distant parts of the world, invoked the name and assistance of Stephen or of Martin. The confidence of their petitioners was founded on the persuasion, that the saints, who reigned with Christ, cast an eye of pity upon earth ; that they were warmly interested in the pros- perity of the Catholic church ; and that the individuals, who imitated the example of their faith and piety, were the pecu- liar and favourite objects of their most tender regard. Some- times, indeed, their friendship might be influenced by consi- derations of a less exalted kind : they viewed, with partial af- fection, the places which had been consecrated by their birth, their residence, their death, their burial, or the possession of their relics. The meaner pas- sions of pride, avarice, and re- venge, may be deemed unwor- thy of a celestial breast ; yet the saints themselves condescended to testify their grateful approba- tion of the liberality of their vo- taries : and the sharpest bolts of punishment were hurled against those impious wretches who vio- lated their magnificent shrines, or disbelieved their supernatural power. Atrocious, indeed, must have been the guilt, and strange would have been the scepticism, of those men, if they had obstinate- ly resisted the proofs of a divine agency, which the elements, the whole range of the animal crea- tion and even the subtle and in- visible operations of the human mind, were compelled to obey* The immediate, and almost in- stantaneous, effects, that were supposed to follow the prayer, or the offence, satisfied the Chris- tians, of the ample measure of favour and authority which the saints enjoyed in the presence of the Supreme God ; and it seem-< ed almost superfluous to inquire, whether they were continually obliged to intercede before the throne of grace ; or whe- ther they might not be per- mitted to exercise, according to the dictates of their be- nevolence and justice, the dele- gated powers of their subordinate ministry. The imagination, which had been raised by a painful effort to the contempla- tion and worship of the Uni- versal Cause, eagerly embraced such inferior objects of adoration, as were more proportioned to its gross conceptions and imper- fect faculties, The sublime and simple theology of the primitive Christians was gradually corrupt- ed ; and the monarchy of heaven, already clouded by metaphysi- cal subtleties, was degraded by the introduction of a popular my- thology, which tended to restore the reign of polytheism. WOR won IV. As the objects of religion were gradually reduced to the standard of the imagination, the rites and ceremonies were intro- duced that seemed most power- fully to affect the senses of the vulgar. If, in the beginning- of the fifth century, Tertullian, or Lactantius, had been sud- denly raised from the dead, to assist at the festival of some popular [saint or martyr ; they would have gazed with as- tonishment and indignation on the profane spectacle, which had succeeded to the pure and spi- ritual worship of a Christian congregation. As soon as the doors of the church were thrown open, they must have been offend- ed by the smoke of incense, the perfume of flowers, and the glare of lamps and tapers, which dif- fused, at noon-day, a gawdy, superfluous, and, in their opinion, a sacrilegious light. If they approached the balustrade of the altar, they must have made their way though the prostrate crowd, consisting, for the most part, of strangers and pilgrims, who resorted to the city on the vigil of the feast : and who al- ready felt the strong intoxication of fanaticism, and, perhaps, of wine. Their devout kisses were imprinted on the walls and pavement of the sacred edifice ; and their fervent prayers were directed, whatever might be the language of their church, to the bones, the blood, or the ashes of the saint, which were usually concealed, by a linen or silken veil, from the eyes of the vul- gar. The Christians frequented the tombs of the martyrs, in the hope of obtaining, from their powerful intercession, every sort of spiritual, but more especially of temporal, blessings. They implored the preservation of their health, or the cure of their in- firmities ; the fruitfulness of their barren wives, or the safety and happiness of their children. Whenever they undertook any distance or dangerous journey, they requested, that the holy martyrs would be their guides and protectors on the road ; and if they returned without having experienced any misfortune, they again hastened to the tombs of the martyrs, to celebrate with grateful thanksgivings, their ob- ligations to the memory and relics of those heavenly patrons. The walls were hung round with symbols of the favours which they had received ; eyes, and hands, and feet, of gold and silver: and edifying pictures, which could not long escape the abuse of indiscreet or idolatrous devotion, represented the image, the attributes, and the miracles of the tutelar saint. The same uni- form original spirit of superstition might suggest, in the most distant ages and countries, the same methods of deceiving the credu- lity, and of affecting the senses, of mankind : but it must inge- nuously be confessed,, that the ministers of the Catholic church imitated the profane model which they were impatient to destroy. The most respectable bishops had persuaded them- selves, that the ignorant rustics would more cheerfully renounce the superstitions of paganism, if they found some resemblance, some compensation, in the bosom of Christianity. The religion of WOR Constantino achieved, in less than a century, the final con- quest of the Roman empire : but the victors themselves were in- sensibly subdued by the arts of their vanquished rivals. Gibbon. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. At the time when the worship of one Supreme God universally pre- vailed in Asia, in Europe, and Africa, among all who made a due use of their reason, it was that the Christian religion re ceived its birth. Platonism greatly promoted the understanding of its dogmas. The Logos, which in Plato signifies the Wisdom, the Reason of the Supreme Being, with us made the Word, and the second person of the Deity. Thus reli- gion was wrapped up in meta- physics, to human reason unfa- thomable ! How Mary was afterwards declared mother of God ; how the consubstantiality of the Father and the Word was established, together with the procession of the Pneuma, the divine organ of the divine Logos ; two natures and two wills result- ing from the Hypostasis ; and lastly, the Superior Mandu cation, in which both soul and body are fed with the members of the In- carnate God, worshipped and eaten in the form of bread, pre- sent to the sight, felt by the taste, and yet annihilated ; these things we shall not repeat here. All mysteries have ever been sublime. So early as the second century, the expulsion of devils was per- formed by pronouncing the name of Jesus ; whereas before, the name of Jehovah, or Yhaha, was made use of in such miracles: for St. Matthew relates, that Jesus's enemies *having spread abroad that it was by the name of the prince of the devils that he cast out the devils, he made them this answer: " If I cast out devils by Beelzebub, by whom do your children cast them out? ; ' At what time the Jews ac- knowledged Beelzebub, a fo- reign deity, to be prince of the devils, is not known: but we know, and learn it from Joseph us that at Jerusalem there were exorcists, whose immediate pro- vince it was to dislodge the devils from the bodies of the possessed ; that is, men labouring under uncommon distempers ; which, in those times, a great part of the world attributed to malignant genii. Thus the the demoniacs were relieved by the true pronuncia- tion of the word Jehovah, now lost, together with other cere- monies at present buried in ob- livion. Exorcisms by Jehovah, or other of God's names, continued to be practised even in the early ages of the church. Origen against Celsus, No. 262. says, " If, when invoking God, or swearing by him, he is termed the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, certain things will be done by those names, such being their nature and force, that devils are subject to those who utter them ; whereas, -if called by any another appellation, as God of the tumultuous sea, or the destroyer, no effect follows. The word Israel translated into Greek will do nothing ; but on pronouncing it in Hebrew, along- 4 WOR \VOR with the other requisite words, the magical operation will take place." The same Origen. No. 19, has these remarkable words : " there are names of a natural virtue, as those used by the Wise Men in Egypt, the Magi in Persia, and the Brachmans in India, Magic, as it is called, is no vain and chimerical art, as the Stoics and Epicureans pretend ; neither were the names of Sabbaoth or Adonai made for created beings, but appertain to a mysterious theology concerning the Creator; hence comes the virtue of these names, when placed in order, and pronounced according to the rules," &c. Origen, in speaking thus, only relates what was universally be - lieved, and does not deliver his own private opinion. All the religions then known admitted a kind of magic, and with two dis- tinctions, the celestial and in- fernal magic, necromancy, and theurgy ; every nation had its prodigies, divinations, and ora- cles. The Persians did not deny the Egyptian miracles, nor the the Egyptians offer to discredit the Persians. God was pleased to wink at the first Christians espousing the Sybilline oracles, and some other inconsequential errors, as not corrupting the es- sentials of religion. Another very remarkable cir- cumstance is, that the Christians of the two first centuries ab- horred temples, altars, and i images.^ This Origen owns, No. 374 ; but on the church's being modelled into a settled form, its discipline and every thing be- came altered. When once a religion comes to be established by law, the magistrates are very vigilant in suppressing most of the things which used to be done by the professors of that religion before it was publicly received. The founders held their private meet- ings, though forbidden under penalties ; now none but pub- lic assemblies held under the eye of the law are permitted, and all clandestine associations made punishable. The old maxim was, it is better to obey God than man; now the opposite maxim comes into vogue. To obey God, is to conform to the laws of the land. AH places rung with obsessions and pos- sessions, the devil was let loose upon earth : now the devil does not stir out of his den. Prodi- gies and predictions were neces- sary then ; now a stop is put to them, and they are exploded ; he who should openly take upon him to foretel any public cala- mity, would soon be shown the way to Bedlam. The founders took money underhand from the believers ; whereas a man col- lecting money to dispose of it as he pleases, without any legal warrant, would be taken to task. Thus the whole of the scaffolding used in the construction of the building is taken away. Next to our holy religion, (to be sure the only good reli- gion) which would be the least bad? Would it not be the most sim- ple ? would it not be that which taught a great deal of morality and few doctrines ; that which tended to make mn virtuous without making them fools : that WOR WOR Which did not impose the belief of things impossible, contra- dictory, injurious to the Deity, and pernicious to mankind ; and vrhich did not take on itself to threaten with eternal punish- ments all who had common sense ? would it not be that which did not support its articles by executioners, and deluge the earth with blood for unintelligi- ble sophisms ? that in which a quibble, a pun, and two or three suppositions maps, would not suffice to make a priest a sove- reign and a god, though noted for the most profligate morals and execrable practices ? that which did not make kings sub- ject to this priest f would it not be that which taught only the adoration of one God, justice, forbearance, and humanity ! The religion of the Gentiles is said to be absurd in several points, contradictory, and per- nicious. But have not its evils and follies been greatly exaggerat- ed I Jupiter's carrying on his amours in the shape of a swan, a bull, with other such doings of the Pagan deities, is certainly the height of ridicule; but let any one, throughout all antiquity, show me a temple dedicated to Leda lying with a swan or a bull. Did Athens or Rome ever hear a sermon to encourage girls to copulate with the swans in their court-yards! Did the collection of fables, so beautifully embel- lished by Ovid, constitute their religion ? are they not like our Golden Legend, or Flower of the Saints ! Should some Bramin or Dervise object to us the story of St. Mary, the Egyptian, who, not having wherewith to pay the sailors who had brought her into Egypt, voluntarily granted to each of them, in lieu of money, what is called favours, we should immediately say to the Bramin, You are mistaken, father, the Golden Legend is not our reli- gion. We taunt the ancients with their prodigies and oracles ; but could they return on earth, and were the miracles of our lady of Loretto, and those of our lady of Ephesus, to be numbered, in whose favour would the balance of the account be ? Human sacrifices have been in- troduced almost among all na- tions, but very rarely were they practised. Jeptha's daughter, and king Agag, are the only two we meet with among the Jews ; for Isaac and Jonathan were not sa- crificed. The Grecian story of Iphigenia is not thoroughly veri- fied: human sacrifices are very rarely heard of among the anci- ent Romans; in a word, very little blood has the Pagan reli- gion shed, and ours has made the earth an aceldama. Ours, to be sure, is the only good, the only true religion; but by our abuse of it, we have done so much mischief, that when we speak of other religions it should be with temper and modesty. If a man would recommend his religion to strangers or his countrymen, should he not go about it with the most winning composure, the most insinuating mildness ? If he sets out with saying, that what he declares is demonstrably true, he will meet with strong opposition : and if he takes upon him to tell them that they reject his doctrine, only WOK \V01l because it condemns their pas- sions ; that their heart has cor- rupted their mind; that they have only a false and presumptu- ous reason : he excites their con- tempt and resentment, and over- throws what he was for building- op. If the religion which he preaches be true, will passion and insolence add to its truth ? Do you storm and rage when you say that men should be mild, patient, benevolent, just, exact in the discharge of all the duties of society? No; here every body is of your mind. Why then such virulent language to your brother, when you are preaching to him metaphysical mysteries? It is because his good sense irritates your self-love. You proudly require that your bro- ther should submit his under- standing to yours ; and pride disappointed blazes into rage: hence, and hence only, arises your passion. A man who receives ever so many musket- shots in a battle, is never seen to express any anger : but a doctor, at the denial of assent, kindles into implacable fury. Voltaire- WORSHIP, lDOLA.TRous.-ldo! comes from the Greek EIDOS, a figure, EIDOLOS, the representation of a figure, LATREUEIN, to serve, to revere, to adore. The word adore is originally Latin, and has various meanings ; as to put the hand to the mouth in token of respect, to bend the body, to kneel, to salute, and more com- monly to pay a supreme wor- ship. It is proper to observe here, that the Trevoux Dictionary be- gins this article with saying, that all ' the Pagans v;ere idolaters, and that the Indians are still so. First, nobody was called Pagan before the time of Theodosius the younger, when that appel- lation was given to the inhabi- tants of the country towns of llsAy , Pagorum Incolte Pagani, who retained their ancient reli- gion. Secondly, Indostan is en- tirely Mahometan, and the Ma- hometans are implacable ene- mies to images and idolatry. Thirdly, many people of India, who are of the ancient religion of the Parsees, a certain tribe which admit of no idols, cannot with with any propriety be term- ed idolaters. It appears that there never was any people on the earth who took to themselves the name of Idolaters. It is rather an abusive word, a term of detesta- tion ; as the Spaniards formerly used to call the French Gava- chos, which the French returned by calling the Spaniards Mara- nas. Had the senate of Rome, the ereopagus of Athens, the court of the kings of Persia, been asked, " Are you idolaters?" they would hardly have known what the question meant ; at least not one of them would have answered, " We worship idols or images/' The word idolater or idolatry, does not occur either in Homer, Hesiod, Herodotus, or any Gentile author. Never was there any edict or law ordering idols to be worshipped, to be accounted as deities, or to be considered as such. The Roman and Carthagenian generals at the making a treaty, called all their gods to witness ; it is in their presence, say they, WOR that \ve swear to this peace. Now the statues of all these gods, their number being* none of the smallest, were not in the gene- ral's tent: but they held the gods to be, as it were, present at the actions of men, as witnesses and as judges ; and certainly it was not the image which made the deity. In what light did they then look on the statues of their false deities which stood in the tem- ples ? In the same light, if I may be allowed the expression, as we view the images of the objects of our veneration. Their error was not the worshipping a piece of wood or marble, but the worshipping a false deity repre- sented by the wood and marble. The difference between them and us is not that they had images and we had none; but that their images represented imaginary beings, and in a false religion ; whereas ours repre- sent real beings, and in a true religion. The Greeks had the statue of Hercules, and we that of St. Christopher ; they had Esculapius and his goat, and we St. Roch and his dog ; they had Jupiter with his thunder-bolts, and we St. Anthony of Padua, and St. James of Compostella. When the Consul Pliny, in the exordium of his panegyric on Trajan, addresses his petitions to the immortal gods, he cannot be thought to mean the images, which were far from being im- mortal. Neither in the latter nor the most remote times of Paganism one single fact occurs to conclude that they worshipped idols. Homer mentions only gods dwelling in lofty Olympus. The Palladium, though it fell from heaven, was no more than a sacred pledge of Pallas's protec- tion ; it was the goddess herself who was reverenced in the Pal- ladium, But the Romans and Greeks kneeled down before statues, put crowns on them, decked them with flowers, burnt incense to them, and carried them in solemn state through public, places. These usages we have consecrated in our religion, and yet we are not idolaters. In times of drought, the women, after keeping a fast, carried forth the statues of the gods in public, walking bare- footed, with their hair loose ; and immediately, according to Petronius, the rain would pur down by pailsful ; Statim urcea- tim pluebat. Have we not a- dopted this rite, which, though an abomination among the Gen- tiles is doubtless genuine devotion with Catholics? How common is it among us to carry bare-foot- ed the shrines of saints, in order to obtain a blessing from Heaven by their intercession ? A Turk, a lettered Chinese, at seeing those ceremonies, might from his igno- rance, accuse us of placing our confidence in the images which we thus carry about in proces- sion ; but a word or two would undeceive him. We are surprised at the prodi- gious number of declamations thundered out in all ages against the idolatry of the Romans and Greeks ; and afterwards, our surprise is still greater at finding that they were not idolaters Some temples were nioreprivi- WOR leged than others. The" great Diana of Ephesus stood in higher fame than a village Diana ; more miracles were performed in the temple of Esculapius at Epidaurus than in any other of his temples. More offerings were made to the statue of Jupiter the Olympian, than to that of the Paphlagonian Jupiter. But since it is proper always to contrast the usages of a true religion to those of a false worship, have not some of our altars, for ages past, been more frequented than others? What are the offerings to our Lady des Neiges, in comparison of those made to our Lady ofLoretto? It is our business to examine, whether this affords a just pretence for charging us with idolatry. The original invention was only one Diana, one Apollo, and one Esculapius ; not as many Dianas, Apollos, and Escula- piuses, as they had temples and statues. Thus it is evidenced, as far as a point of history can be, that the ancients did not hold a statue to be a deity ; that the worship could not relate to the statue or idol ; and consequently that the ancients were not idola- ters. A rude superstitious populace, incapable of reflection, either to doubt, or deny, or believe, who flocked to the temples, as having nothing else to do, and because the little are there on a level with the great, who carried their offerings merely out of custom, who were continually talking of miracles, without having ever examined any one, and who were very little above the vic- tims they brought ; such a popu- lace, I say, might, at the sight WOR of the great Diana, and the thundering Jupiter, be struck with a religious horror; and, without knowing it, worship the statue itself. This is no more than what has been the case of our ignorant peasants ; and care is accordingly taken to give them to understand, that it is the blessed in heaven they are to invoke for their intercession, and not figures of wood and stone, and that their worship is due to God. The Greeks and the Romans increased the number of their deities by apotheoses; the Greeks deified illustrious con- querors, as Bacchus, Hercules, and Perseus ; Rome raised altars to its emperors. Of a very dif- ferent kind are out apotheoses ; if we have saints answerable to their demi-gods and secondary gods, it is without any regard to rank or conquests. We have erected temples to men, merely for their exemplary virtues, and most of whom would not have been known on earth, had they not been placed in heaven. The apotheoses of the ancients were acts of adulation: ours of respect to virtue. But these ancient apotheoses are another convinc- ing proof that the Greeks and Romans cannot properly be called idolaters. It is manifest that they no more held a divine virtue residing in the statues of Augustus and Claudius than in their medals. Cicero, in his philosophical works, does not leave us so much as the least suspicion that any mistake could be committed with regard to the statues of the gods, so as to confound them \VOR \VOR with the deities themselves. His speakers inveigh with great acrimony against the established religion, but not one of them dreams of charging the Romans with mistaking marble and brass for deities. Lucretius, who never gives any quarter to the superstitious, reproaches no body with this folly: I must therefore again say it, this opinion never existed, never was thought of ; and never was there any such thing as ido- laters. Horace introduces a statue of Priapus, saying : Olim, truncus eram ficulnus, inutile lignum, , Cumfaber incertus scamnum, faceretne Priapum, Maluit esse Deum. What is to be inferred from this passage ! Priapus was one of those petty deities which were given up to the sarcasms of the jocular ; and this very joke is as strong a proof as can be, that the figure of Priapus was not greatly revered, being made a scarecrow. Dacier, commentator-like, has taken care to observe, that Baruch had foretold this business, saying, They shall be whatever the artist pleases. But he might withall have remarked, that the like might be said of all the sta- tues that ever existed. A tub may be made out of block of marble, as well as the statue of Alexander or Jupiter or something still more respect able. The matter of which were formed the cherubims of the Holy of Holies, might have equally served for the meanes purposes. A- throne or an altar lose nothing of the reverence due to them, because the artist might have formed them into a kitchen table. Dacier, instead of inferring that the Romans worshipped Priapus's image, and that Baruch had pre- dicted it, ought rather to have concluded that the Romans made a jest of it. Look into all the authors who speak of the statues of their gods, not one shall you find mentioning idolatry, but quite the contrary. You'read iu. Martial, Qui sinxit sacros auro vel marmore vultus, Nonfacit ille Deos. In Ovid, Colitur pro Jove forma Jovis. In Statius, Nulla autcm effigies nulli com- missa metallo, Forma Dei mentes habitare ac numina gaudet. In Lucan, Estne Dei sedes, nisi terra et pontus et aer. To enumerate all the passages in confirmation that images were accounted images would take up a volume. The only case which could fa- vour an opinion that images had any thing divine in them, was the oracular images : but cer- tainly the current opinion was, that the gods had chosen some particular altars and particular statues, where they sometimes condescended to reside, giving audience to men, and answering them. In Homer, and the cho- ruses of Greek tragedies, we only meet with prayers addressed to Apollo himself, as delivering his oracles on such a mount, in such a temple, or such a city. All antiquity throughout has left no vestige of supplications made to a statue. They who professed magic, who believed it to be a science, or who feigned to believe it, pretended to be possessed of the secret of bringing down the gods into statues; but not the great gods, only the secondary, the genii. This Mercurious Tris megistus used to term making deities, and it is refuted by St. Augustinin his City of God. But this very thing evidently shows the images to have had nothing divine in them, as not animated without the art of a magician. And I fancy few magicians were found so dexterous as to ani- mate a statue so as to make it . speak. In a word, the images of the gods were not gods ; it was Jupiter, and not his image, which hurled the thunderbolt ; it was not the Statue of Neptune which agitated the sea, nor that of Apollo which diffused light. The Greeks and Romans were Gen- tiles, Polytheists, but by no means idolaters. Voltaire. ON THE SAME SUBJECT. To Call those nations who worshipped the sun and stars idolaters, is wronging them. For a long time neither images nor temples were known among them t if they were mistaken, it was in paying to the heavenly bodies the hom- age due only to their Creator. Besides, the doctrine of Zoroaster or Zerdust, as preserved in the Sadder, teaches the existence of a Supreme Being, who punisheth and rewardeth. Now this is very tar from idolatry. The Chinese government never admitted idols, constantly adhering to the sim- ple worship of King-tien, the master of heaven. Gengiskan, among the Tartars, cannot be charged with idolatry, never having had any such thing as images. The Mussulmen of Greece, Asia Minor, Syria Persia, India, and Africa, call the Chris- tians idolaters, giaours; imagin- ing that the Christians worship images. Several images which they found at Constantinople in St. Sophia, and in the church of the Holy Apostles, and others, they broke to pieces, converting the churches into mosques. Ap- pearances, as usual, deceived them, and led them to believe that the dedicating of temples to saints who had formerly been n'en, the worshipping of their images with genuflexion, and the performing of miracles in those temples, were undeniable proofs of the most arrant idolatry yet the furthest from it in the world. The Christains in reality worship only one God, and in the blessed themselves revere only the virtue of God acting in his saints. The Iconoclasts and the Protestants have brought the same charge of idolatry against the the church of Rome, and the same answer has been given them. Men having very seldom pre- cise ideas, and still more seldom expressing their ideas in precise words, clear of all ambiguity, the name of idolaters was given to the Gentiles, and especial- ly the Polytheists. Immense volumes have been written, ac- cording to the multitude of vary- ing sentiments, on the origin of worshipping God, or several WOR WOR gods, and under sensible repre- sentations. Now this multitude of books and opinions only proves the ignorance of the au- thors. We know not who invented any part of our qlothing, and yet we would fain know who was the first inventor of idols. What signifies a passage of Sanchohi- athon, who lived before the Tro- jan war? What information does he give us, in saying that the chaos, the mind, that is the breath, being enamoured with its principles, extracted the mud from them : that he made the air luminous : that the wind Colp and his wife Bau begot Eon, and he begot Genos : that Cro- nos their descendent had two eyes behind as before ; that he came to be god, and gave Egypt to his son Jaut? This is one of the most respectable monuments of antiquity. Orpheus, who was prior to Sanchoniathon, gives us just as much light in his Theogonia, which Damascius has preserved. He represents the mundane principle in the form of a dragon with two heads, one of a bull, and the other of a lion, with a face in the middle, which he terms god face, and gilded wings to the shoulders. Yet these ideas, fantastical as they are, give us an insight into two important truths ; one that sensible images and hierogly- phics are derived from the most remote antiquity; the other, that all, ancient philosophers acknowledged a primordial prin- ciple. As to polytheism, common sense will tell you, that at the com- mencement of mankind, that is, of weak creatures, susceptible of reason and folly, subject to every accident, to sickness and death, they soon came to a sense of their weakness and depen- dence ; they easily conceived that there was something su- perior to themselves ; they felt a power in the earth which pro- duced their food, another in the air which often destroyed them, arid another in the consuming flre and the submerging water. What could be more natural in men absolutely ignorant, than to fancy that there were beings which presided over those ele- ments ? What could be more natural than to revere the invii- ble power which made the sun and stars to shine ? And on proceeding to form an idea of these superior powers, what ^yas again more natural than to re- present them in a sensitive way '( Or I may even say, how could they go about it otherwise ? Judaism, anterior to our religion, and prescribed by God himself, was full of those images under which the Deity is represented. He condescends to speak the language of men in a bush ; he makes his appearance on a mountain ; the heavenly spirits sent by him all come in a hu- man shape : in a word, the sanc- tuary itself is filled withcheru- bims, human bodies, and the wings and heads of beasts. This led Plutarch, Tacitus, and Ap- pian, and so many others, into the ridiculous mistake of upbraid- ing the Jews with worshipping an ass's head. Thus God, who had forbidden the painting and carving of any figure, has been 5 won \VOR pleased nevertheless to accom- modate himself to human weak- ness, which requires the senses to be spoken to by images. Isaiah, chap, vi sees the Lord seated on a throne, and his train fill the temple : In chap. i. of Jeremiah, the Lord stretches out his hand and touches the prophet's mouth: Esekiel, chap, iii. sees a throne of sapphire, and God appears to him like a man seated on that throne. This imagery does not in the least defile the purity of the Jewish religion, which never made use of pictures, statues, and idols, as public representations of the Deity. The lettered Chinese, the Parsees, the ancient Egyptians, Lad no idols : but Isis and Osiris were soon represented in figures ; Bell at Babylon was as soon ex- hibited in a huge Colussus; Drama was in the Indian penin- sula a hideous kind of monster. The Greeks above all multiplied the names of the deities, and of course the statues and temples ; but ever attributing the supreme power to their Zeus, by the Latins named Jupiter, the sove- reign of gods and men. The Romans imitated the Greeks: both always place their gods in heaven, without knowing what they meant by heaven and their Olympus; these superior beings could not be supposed to reside in the clouds, which are only water. At first seven of them were placed in the seven planets, among which was reckoned the sun ; but afterwards the resi- dence of all the gods was ex- tended to the whole heavenly ex~ panse. The Romans had twelve great deities, six male, and six female, whom they distinguished by the appellation of Dii majorum gentium, Jupiter, Neptune, Apollo, Vulcan, Mars, Mercury : Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Venus, Diana. Pluto, was then omitted, and Vesta took his place. Next were the gods minorum gentium, the indigetes or heroes, as Bacchus, Hercules, Escula- pius; and the infernal deities, Pluto, Proserpine; the sea gods, as Thetis, Amphitrite ; the Ne- reides, and Glaucus ; afterwards the Dryades, the Naiades : the gods of gardens; the pastoral deities : every profession, every action of life, children, maidens, wives, women in childbed, all had their deity : there was even the god Fart. Lastly, empe- rors, were deified ; not that these emperors, nor the god Fart, nor the goddess Pertunda, nor Pri- apus, nor llumila the goddess of Bubbies, nor Stercutius the god of genital parts, were accounted the lords of heaven and earth. Some of the emperors indeed had temples ; the petty house- hold-gods went without them : but all had their images or their idols. These were little grotesque figures, set up in a closet by way of ornament; old women and children were highly delighted with them: bat never were these figures authorised by any public worship; every one was left to follow his own private superstition. These little idols are still found in the ruins of ancient cities. Though we cannot^fix -the won precise time when men began to make idols, they are, however, known to belong- to the most re- mote antiquity. Terah, Abra- ham's father, used to make them at Ur, in Chaldea. Rachel pur- loined and carried off Laban's idols. There is no going- higher. But what did the ancient na- tions think of all those images ? what virtue, what power did they attribute to them ? " Was it thought that the gods quitted heaven to come down and hide themselves in their stetues? or that they imparted to them a portion of the divine spirit, or did not impart any thing at all to them ? A great deal of use- less erudition has been thrown away on this point, it being evi- dent that every one's notions of them were proportioned to his reason, his credulity, or fanati- cism. The priests, we may be sure, wonld not be wanting to annex to their statues all the divinity they possibly could, in order to draw the more offerings. The philosophers, it is well known, censured these superstitions ; the military people made a jest of them ; and the commonality, ever ignorant and silly, knew not what they were doing. This is, in a few words, the history of all the nations to whom God has not made himself known. The premises are applicable to the worship universally paid in Egypt to an ox, and in seve- ral cities to a dog, a monkey, a cat, and onions. In all appear- ance they were at flrst only em- blems. Afterwards a certain ox called Apis, a certain dog named WOR Anubis, were worshipped ; stfll the people went on eating beef and onions ; but what the Egyp- tian old women thought of sa- cred onions and oxen is not clear- ed up. It was not uncommon for idols to speak. On the anniversary of Cybele's festival, the city of Rome commemorated the beau- tiful distich uttered by the statue on its removal from King Atta- lus's palace. Ipsa pata volui, ne sit mora, mitte volentem ; Dignus Roma locus, quo Devs omnis eat. " I allowed myself to be car- ried off: Away with me quickly. Rome is worthy to be the resi- dence of every deity." The statue of Fortune had spoke ; the Scipios, the Ciceros, and Caesars, indeed, believed nothing of the matter ; but the old women, to whom Encolpus gave a crown to buy geese and gods, might very well believe it. The idols like wise pronounced oracles, the priests concealed within these statues, speaking in the name of the Deity. Amidst so many gods, so many different theogonies and sepa- rate worships, whence is it that no such thing as a religious war was ever known among the peo- ple called idolaters ? This tran- quillity was a good springing from an evil, from error itself: for every nation owning several inferior gods, peaceably allowed its neighbours to have theirs like- wise. Except Cambyses's kill- ing the ox Apis, not one in- stance is to be found in all pro- fane history of a conqueror offer- ing- any insult to the gods of a vanquished nation. The Gen- . tiles had no exclusive religion ; and all the priests minded, was to multiply offering's and sacrifices. The first offerings were the fruits of the earth : but the priest soon came to want animal food for their table: with their own hands they slew the vic- tims ; and as they made them- selves butchers, they became sanguinary. At length they introduced the horrible practice of offering human victims, and especially comely boys and girls, abominations never known among the Chinese, the Parsis, or Indians. But at Hieropolus in Egypt, Porphyry tells us it was nothing extraordinary to sacrifice men. In Tauris strangers were sacri- ficed; but this savage custom being known, the priests of Tau- ris, it is to be supposed, did not much business. This execrable superstition prevailed among the most ancient Greeks, the Cy- priots, the Phenicians, the Tyri- ans, and the Carthaginians. The Romans themselves gave into this religious guilt: and, accord- ing to Plutarch, sacrificed two Greeks and two Gauls, to ex- piate the incontinency of three vestals. Procopius, who was contemporary with Theodobert King of the Franks, says that the Franks sacrificed men on their entrance into Italy under that prince. These horrid sacrifices were common among the Gauls and G-errnans. There is no read- ing history without being very much displeased with one's own species. What i(, among the Jews, Jeptha sacrificed his daughter, and Saul was going to slay his son? What if they who were devoted to the Lord by ana- thema could not be redeemed, as beasts were redeemed, but were indispensably put to death ? What though Samuel, a Jew- ish priest, cut to pieces with a consecrated cleaver King Agag prisoner of war whom Saul had spared, and sharply reproved Saul for having treated that king according to the laws of nations? What of all this! God is the Sovereign of mankind, and may take away their lives when he will, as he will, and by whom he will: but men are not to put themselves on a footing with the Lord of life and death, and usurp the prerogatives of the Supreme Being. Amidst such detestable proceed- ings, it is some relief to the feel- ing heart to know, that in al- most all those nations called idolatrous, there was the sacred theology and popular error, pri- vate worship and public ceremo- nies ; the religion of the wise, and that of the vulgar. To those who were initiated in the mysteries, the existence of one only God was preached. Of this a sufficient testimony is the hymn attributed to the elder Or- pheus, which was sung in the celebrated mysteries of Ceres Eleusina ! " Contemplate the Divine nature, illume thy mind, govern thy heart, walk in the path of justice, take care that the God of heaven be before thine eyes ; there is none but him ; he alone is self existent ; all beings derive their existence front him WOR \VOR he upholds them all ; never has he been seen by mortals ; and he sees all things." The following passage of the philosopher Maximus of Ma- daura, in his letter to St. Augus- tine, is likewise worth attention ? " What man is so dull, so stupid, as to question the existence of an eternal, a supreme, infinite Deity, who has created nothing like himself, and is the common Father of all things I" A thousand monuments might be produced, that wise men in all times abhorred both idolatry and Polytheism. Epictetus, that pattern of re- signation and patience, so great in so mean a condition, never speaks but of one only God. One of his maxims is this, " God has created me, God is within me ; I carry him about every where. Shall I defile him with obscene thoughts, unjust actions, or infamous desires ? My duty is to thank God for every thing, to praise him for every thing : and to thank, praise, and serve him continually, whilst I have life." All Epictetus's ideas turn on this principle. Marcus Aarelius, who perhaps was on the throne of the Ro- man empire not less great than Epictetus in servitude, does in- deed often mention gods, in con- formity to the current phraseo- logy, or to express intermediate beings between the Supreme Essence and men ; but in how many passages does he show, that in reality he acknowledges only one eternal infinite God? " Our souls," says he, " are an emanation of the Deity ; my body my spirits, proceed from God." The Stoics, the Platonists, held one Divine and Universal Nature ; the Epicureans denied it. The priests, in their mys- teries, spoke only of one God. Where, then, were the ido- laters ? Besides, it is one of the great- est mistakes in Moreri's Diction- ary, to say, that in the time of Theodosius the younger, no idol- aters remained but in the remote parts of Asia and Africa. There were still, and even down to the seventh century, many Gentile nations in Italy. All Germany north of the Weser were strangers to Christianity in Char- lemagne's time ; and long after him Poland, and the wole North, continued in what is called idolatry. Half Africa, all the realms beyond the Granges, Japan, the innumerable com- monality of China, a hundred Tartarian hords, retain their an- cient worship ; whereas, in Eu- rope, this religion is to be found only among some Laplanders, Samoides, and Tartars. To conclude, in the time which we distinguish by the appellation of the middle og^e, the Mahome- tan's were called Pagans : a peo- ple who execrate images were branded as idolaters and image- worshippers ; and it must be frankly owned, that the Turks^ seeing our churches crowded with images and statues, are more excusable in calling us i do laters. Voltaire. WORSHIP, SUPERSTITIOUS. What- ever goes beyond the adoration ' of one Supreme Being, and a submission of the heart to his eternal order, is generally su- perstition ; and a most danger- WOR ZEA ous superstition is the annexion of the pardon of crimes to cer- tain ceremonies. . Et nigras mactant pecudes, et manibus divis Inferias mittunt, Ofaciles nimiwn qui tritria crimina ceedis Fluminea tolli posse putatis aqua t " You imagine that God will forget your having killed a man, only for your washing yourself in a river, sacrificing a black sheep, and some words having been said over you/' Of course, then, a second murder will be forgiven you at the same easy rate, and so a third ; and a hun- dred murders will only cost you a hundred black sheep, and a hundred ablutions! Poor mor- tals! away with such conceits; the best way is, commit no mur- der, and so save your black sheep. How scandalous is it to ima- gine that a priest of Isis and Cybele can reconcile you to the Deity, by playing on cymbals and castinels! And what is this priest of Cybele, this vagrant gelding, who lives by your weakness, that he shall set up to be as a mediator between heaven and you ? Has he any commission from God ? He takes money from you only for mutter- ing some strange words ; and can you think that the Being of beings ratifies what this hypo crite says ? Some superstitions are inno- cent; you dance on Diana or Pomona's festivals, or those of any of the secondary gods in your calendar: be it so ; danc- ing is pleasant, healthy, and ex- hilirating ; it hurts nobody but do not take it into your head that Pomona and Vertum- nus are mightily pleased .at your having frolicked in honour of them ; and that, should you fail to do so, they would make you smart for it. The garden- er's spade and hoe are the only Pomona and Vertumnus. Do not be so weak as to think that your garden will be destroyed by a tempest ifyou omit dancing the Pyrrhic or the Cordax. There is another superstition which is perhaps excusable, and even an incentive to virtue ; I mean, deifying great men who have been signal benefactors to their own species. To be sure it would be better only to look on them as venerable person- ages, and especially to endea- vour to imitate them ; there- fore revere, without worship- ping, a Solon, a Thales, a Py- thagoras ; but by no means pay thy adorations to Hercules for having cleansed Augea's sta- bles, and lying with fifty girls in one night. Especially forbear setting up a worship for wretches without any other merit than ignorance, enthusiasm, and nastiness ; who made a vow of idleness and beg- gary, and gloried in such infamy ; fit subjects indeed for deification after their death, who were never known to do the least good when living ! Observe that the most super- stitious times have ever been noted for the greatest enormi- ties. Voltaire, ZEAL, FANATICAL. Fanatic zeal is ZEA ZEA to superstition what a delirium is to a fever, and fury to anger ! he who has ecstasies and visions, who takes dreams for realities, and his imaginations for pro- phecies, is an enthusiast ; and he who sticks not at supporting his folly by murder, is a fanatic. Bartholomew Diaz, a fugitive at Nuremberg, who was firmly convinced that the pope is the Antichrist in the Revelations, and that he has the mark of the beast, was only an enthusiast? whereas his brother, who set out for Rome with the godly in- tention of murdering him, and who actually did murder him for God's sake, was one ot the most execrable fanatics that supersti- tion could form. Polieuctes, who, on a Pagan festival, went into the temple, pulling down and breaking the images and other ornaments, showed himself a fanatic, less horrible, indeed, than Diaz, but equally rash and imprudent. The murderers of Francis duke of Guise, of William prince of Orange, of the kings Henry III. and Henry IV. and of so many others, were demoniacs, ag-i*ted by the same evil spirit as Diaz. The most detestable instance of fanatic zeal is that of the citizens of Paris, who on the feast of St. Barthomew could massacre their fellow-citizens for not going to mass. Some are fanatics in cool blood, these are the judges who can sentence people to death with- out any other guilt than for not being of their way of thinking ! these judges are the more guilty, and the more deserving of uni- versal execration, as not being under a fit of rage like the Cle- ments, the Chatels, the Ra- vaillacs, the Gerads, the Dami- ens, One would think they might listen to reason. When once this kind of zeal has touched the brain, the dis- temper is desparate. I have seen Con vulsionists,who in speaking of the miracles of St. Paris, grew hot involuntarily ! their eyes glared, they trembled in all their limbs, their countenance was quite dis- figured with rancour, and they unquestionably would have kil- led any one who had contradict- ed them. As to our holy religion having been so often corrupted by these infernal impulses, it is the folly of men that is to be blamed. Voltaire. FINIS. Benbow, Printer, Castle-street, London. . -dJi7/ I . lofi 1 ' -- -V7.1: ^9t!t Las .-snoa.!/;! fllivv i X <: } ' n y =5 < SJ *TgM-1?, ^,- : \.__N-B^- m . ^J. ]>-o S ^ t J ^ c< i a _ 55 , U -4w^-v p-, fen -p * 'tfOJI!V3-JO" i-A Yl " ZP_Vi ' ^X = i) Ti :? _.;,/ ':> s * ^f;iTHW ^\UlBRARY0/r ^tf-i UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FAPII ITV ;: * illliii A A 000008560 5 RAfJY-0^ ^; 1 I f^ ? I s /W 5 I "/"M =>3 _,/ < Co %OJi]\OJ^ s? ^ | ^> %; r^ c^ ~' O <~i u_ > r^ -/: v< ) c V*" * "" m ^~*j /^ JT'^^T-** -^ r> t f r E5 l =53 T' ii; $ ^ ,^- >*. ^. &