' < 
 

VINDICATION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 IAEQTJIS OF DALHOUSIE'S 
 
 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 BY 
 
 SIR CHARLES JACKSON, 
 
 . LONDON: 
 
 SMITH, ELDEK AND CO., 65, CORNHILL. 
 1865. 
 
1): 
 
 i \P 
 
 T3 
 
 HENWY MORSE STEP-HENS 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION 1 
 
 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE 5 
 
 KEBOWLEE 44 
 
 NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS 51 
 
 ACT XL OF 1852 65 
 
 SPOLIATION OF THE NAGPOKE PALACETHE BHONSLA 
 
 FUND 72 
 
 THE NAWAB OF THE CABNATIC 82 
 
 THE EAJ OF TANJOBE ... 106 
 
 ANNEXATION OF OUDE 117 
 
 MILITARY PBOPOSALS 158 
 
 CONCLUSION 171 
 
 5 1 
 

ItfTKODUCTION, 
 
 SEVERAL works have lately appeared containing 
 reflections on the Indian Administration of the 
 late Marquis of Dalhousie. According to Mr. 
 Kaye, that statesman was a ' great minute writer/ 
 ( with unrivalled powers of special pleading/ l 
 who committed many unwise and unjust acts, 
 which caused general discontent, and contributed 
 to produce the Sepoy war. Mr. Arnold represents 
 Lord Dalhousie as an able administrator and 
 statesman, driven by ( one dominant passion ' f to 
 ' the very verge of conventional justice, generosity, 
 ' and good faith, and even sometimes not a little 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, pp. 73-78. 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ' beyond those boundaries/ 1 and the narrative of his 
 annexations seems ' doubtless more like counting 
 * out the spoil of brigands in a wood than detailing 
 ' the acts of English statesmanship ; '* and Major Bell 
 affirms that Lord Dalhousie ' lowered the reputation 
 ' of our Government by repeated breaches of our 
 ' pledged faith/ and adds, in words for which he 
 claims additional weight as being ' carefully chosen/ 
 that ' he was the very worst and basest of rulers/ 3 
 
 I shall not comment on the language in 
 which some of these opinions are conveyed, 
 although I think a life devoted to his country, 
 and prematurely worn out in its service, might 
 have secured for Lord Dalhousie at least the 
 semblance of respect. But without pausing to 
 enter into any verbal controversy, I propose, in a 
 short explanation and defence of his policy, to 
 examine whether there is any just foundation for 
 such an estimate of his character and administra- 
 tion. I think that such an inquiry, impartially 
 
 1 ABNOLD'S Dalhousw Administration, p. 200. 
 
 2 ARNOLD, p. 199. 
 
 3 The Empire in India, by Major BELL, p. 26. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 conducted, will show that Lord Dalhousie was a 
 great administrator and statesman, with large views 
 as to the requirements of India and his own duties 
 as its Govern or- General ; that his policy was the 
 policy of progress and civilization; and that his 
 measures added materially to the happiness and 
 prosperity of the people of India. 
 
 I do not propose to write a history of Lord 
 Dalhousie's administration. I shall pass over in 
 silence his annexation of the Punjaub, and shall 
 not repeat the praises, which have been well be- 
 stowed, on his admirable arrangements, and selection 
 of officers, for the government of that province. I 
 shall not speak of the conquest of Pegu, nor dwell 
 on his judicious arrangements on that occasion, 
 which I had particular opportunities of observing. 
 Neither is it my intention to chronicle those peaceful 
 glories, which throw a brighter light on his admi- 
 nistration than all his conquests and annexations, 
 his canals, railroads, electric telegraph, and other 
 public works, as well as his anna postage. I shall 
 
 12 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 not describe his vigilant superintendence of every 
 department of the State, how he swept away useless 
 Boards, substituting in their stead individual respon- 
 sibility, how he selected meritorious officers for his 
 work, as it were by instinct, how firmly he punished, 
 how gracefully he praised. It would be agreeable 
 indeed to speak of all these things ; but my prin- 
 cipal object, at present, is the more limited purpose 
 of vindicating his policy and reputation from the 
 attacks of his assailants. 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE, 
 
 I WILL first consider the annexations of the States 
 of Sattarah, Nagpore, Jhansi, and Sumbulpore. 
 
 When a Hindoo has no male issue, he generally 
 adopts the child of some relation as his own son. 
 The son thus adopted is as capable as a real son 
 of performing the religious ceremonies which are 
 supposed to be of special benefit to the soul of a 
 deceased Hindoo, and is therefore entitled to all the 
 rights of a real son in the property of his adopting 
 father. This general rule is, however, subject to 
 one exception or qualification. When the Hindoo 
 is a prince, holding his principality subordinate to, 
 or as a gift from a paramount state, it is a condition 
 of succession to the principality that the adoption 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 be made with the consent of such paramount state, 
 His private property will pass to the adopted son, 
 whether the paramount state has or has not con- 
 sented to the adoption ; but, in the absence of such 
 consent, the principality reverts to the paramount 
 state. 
 
 Sattarah and Jhansi were incorporated into our 
 dominions under the operation of the last rule. 
 The Rajahs of those dependent principalities 1 died 
 without male issue of their bodies, but each of them 
 
 1 We took the first Rajah of Sattarah from the prison of the 
 Peishwa, and elevated him to the throne, as the Sattarah treaty 
 recites, ' in consideration of the antiquity of ' his family. The 
 treaty provided that the Rajah should hold his dominions ' in 
 1 subordinate co-operation with ' the British Government, and be 
 guided in all matters by the advice of the Resident ; that he 
 should not increase or diminish his military establishment without 
 our consent ; and that all his intercourse with other courts, even 
 the negotiations for the marriages of his family, should be con- 
 ducted through the Resident. 
 
 Jhansi was a Soubahdaree under the Peishwa, whose rights 
 were transferred to the British by conquest. By treaty the Indian 
 Government ' consented on certain conditions to constitute Rao 
 ' Ramchund the hereditary chief,' not on the ground of hereditary 
 right, but ' in consideration of the character of ' his grandfather, 
 and in deference to the wish of that relative. We afterwards con- 
 ferred the title of Rajah on the Soubahdar. Colonel Low, who 
 opposed the other annexations, assented to this, on the ground 
 that the Rajah was a subject rather than a prince. 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 7 
 
 adopted a son a short time before his death, without 
 receiving permission to do so from the paramount 
 power, the British Government. Nagpore and 
 Sumbulpore were annexed because their last Eajahs, 
 also dependent princes, 1 died without heirs. No 
 adoption was made by either of these Eajahs, and 
 their states reverted to the British Government, 
 the paramount power which created them. In all 
 these cases Lord Dalhousie declined to waive the 
 right which had accrued to the Government. He 
 refused to reconstitute these lapsed dynasties, or to 
 give away the lapsed territories a second time to an 
 aged lady and boys, who were proposed to him as 
 candidates for the vacant thrones. His decision, 
 on each of these cases of lapse, received the 
 support of the Court of Directors and the Board 
 of Control. 
 
 It is erroneous to suppose that this doctrine of 
 
 1 The British Government acquired Nagpore by conquest in 
 1818, and conferred it on its first and last Rajah, who paid a 
 tribute of 80,000?. a year. Sumbulpore was ceded to the British 
 Government by the Nagpore state in 1817 and 1826, and conferred 
 by the British Government on its first Rajah, as Mr. Kaye informs 
 us, ' under terms which would have warranted the resumption of 
 ' the state on the death of the first incumbent ; but twice the 
 * sovereign rights had been bestowed anew upon members of the 
 ' family.' 
 
8 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 lapse violated the religious feelings of the people 
 with respect to adoption. Mr. Kaye observes: 
 ' Ere long there was a word which came to be more 
 ' dreaded than that of conquest. The native mind 
 
 * is readily convinced by the inexorable logic of the 
 ' sword. There are, however, manifest compensa- 
 6 tions ; his religion is not invaded, his institutions 
 ' are not violated, but LAPSE is a dreadful and 
 
 * appalling word, for it pursues the victim beyond 
 ' the grave. Its significance in his eyes is nothing 
 6 short of eternal condemnation/ 1 I confess to a 
 want of faith in the existence of this feeling of dread ; 
 but if it was felt, there was no foundation for it. 
 Lord Dalhousie never disputed the validity of these 
 adoptions as such. He never denied their alleged 
 spiritual effect, and nothing he said or did could 
 affect their validity as acts done in the performance 
 of a religious duty. He recognized them as facts, 
 and was careful to give effect to them so far as the 
 private property of these princes was concerned. 
 In the Jhansi case, when the Eesident proposed 
 that all the property of the late Rajah should be 
 given to his Kanee, Lord Dalhousie objected that it 
 
 1 KAYE, p. 69. 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 9 
 
 was * beyond the power of the Government so to 
 ' dispose of the property of the Rajah, which by law 
 ' will belong to the son whom he adopted. The 
 i adoption was good for the conveyance of private 
 * rights, though not for the transfer of the prin- 
 ' cipality.' 
 
 One would suppose, from the way in which Lord 
 Dalhousie has been assailed, that this ' dreadful 
 ' and appalling ' doctrine of lapse was first suggested 
 and enforced by him ; but it was the settled public 
 law of India, repeatedly acted on by the Indian 
 Government, and sanctioned by the Court of Direc- 
 tors, long before he landed in that country. 
 
 The law which requires the sanction of Govern- 
 ment for the adoption of a son is applicable to all 
 persons holding tenures under Government, such as 
 Jaghiredars, 1 Wuttundars, and Enamdars, 2 as well 
 as dependent princes. The state revenues are 
 alienated in all these cases, and the permission of 
 the paramount state is necessary to continue to an 
 adopted son such alienations of revenue. Under 
 these circumstances, and considering the extent to 
 which revenue free grants had prevailed, this law 
 
 1 The Empire in India, by Major BELL, p. 147. 
 
 2 STEELE'S Laws and Customs, p. 185. 
 
10 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 could not have been a novelty, but must, on the 
 contrary, have been well known throughout India. 
 
 To avoid wearying our readers with a legal 
 dissertation on this question, we will cite a Minute of 
 Sir George Clerk's on the Sattarah annexation. Sir 
 George deservedly holds a high rank among Indian 
 statesmen, and his authority is considered, by the 
 opponents of Lord Dalhousie's policy, to be of great 
 weight. He opposed the annexation of Sattarah, 
 yet felt compelled to admit that ' the sanction of 
 ( the paramount state is by custom required to 
 ' render an adoption to a principality valid. In the 
 ' time of our predecessors this was a source of profit 
 ' to the treasury/ That the principle of this law 
 was well known and established throughout India, 
 appears from the answers of the Kesidents at the 
 different native Courts to an inquiry made by the 
 Government of Bombay. These answers establish 
 that in all parts of India, with the exception of 
 one petty state, the previous recognition of the 
 ruler was necessary to give the adopted son a 
 title to grants of revenue, or privileges emanating 
 from the state. 1 
 
 1 See Report of Mr. W. Hart, Bombay Civil Service, dated 
 March 27, 1847. Mr. Kaye in his work admits the law to be as 
 we have stated it (see p. 70). 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 11 
 
 That this law was acted upon by the British 
 Government before Lord Dalhousie's time is also 
 clear. In 1831, the Bombay Government resolved to 
 f continue to grant or to withhold its permission to 
 ' adopt according to circumstances/ In 1834, the 
 Court of Directors ordered, ' wherever it is optional 
 ' with you to give or to withhold your consent to 
 6 adoptions, the indulgence should be the excep- 
 * tion, not the rule, and should never be granted 
 6 but as a special mark of favour and approbation.' 1 
 In 1835, Rao Ram Chund, the dependent Rajah 
 of Jhansi, died, leaving two uncles, and a boy 
 adopted the day before his death, without the 
 permission of the British Government. The 
 Government of India, without inquiry into the 
 fact of adoption, and treating it as an immaterial 
 circumstance, appointed the elder of the two 
 uncles Rajah ; and on his death without issue, in 
 1838, they placed the younger uncle on the 
 throne, although the adopted son was still living, 
 and asserted his claim. 2 In 1841, permission to 
 
 1 Mr. WILLOUGHBY'S Minute in the Sattarah papers. 
 
 2 See Memorandum of Mr. Secretary (now Sir J. P.) Grant, 
 and the Minute of Lord Dalhousie in the Jhansi papers. 
 
12 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 adopt was refused to the state of Angria Colaba, 
 which consequently lapsed. On that occasion 
 the Indian Government, composed of Lord 
 Auckland, Mr. Bird, and Mr. Prinsep, declared 
 their intention ( to persevere in the one clear and 
 ' direct course of abandoning no just and honour- 
 ' able accession of territory or revenue, while all 
 1 existing claims of right are at the same time 
 * scrupulously respected.' Again, in 1843, in 
 consequence of a refusal to permit adoption, the 
 small state of Mandvee also lapsed, and became 
 incorporated into the British dominions. 1 
 
 It has been suggested that permission to adopt 
 should always be given on payment of a nuzzur 
 (present). But this suggestion is not applicable 
 to these lapses, for it is a fact that the permission 
 of Government was not asked by any of the Kajahs 
 whose territories lapsed, except the Rajah of 
 Sattarah; and his application, if it ever left his 
 palace before his death, of which there is no 
 evidence in the papers, was made too late to reach 
 
 1 See Mr. WILLOUGHBY'S Minute on the Sattarah question, 
 14th of May, 1848. Lord Dalhousie called this Minute ( a text- 
 book on adoption,' and he was in the habit of referring to it 
 when similar questions subsequently arose. 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 13 
 
 the Government in his lifetime. 1 It is said that 
 Lord Dalhousie would have refused permission 
 if it had been asked; but that is mere conjecture, 
 and I am considering the facts that happened, 
 and not what might have occurred. But if Lord 
 Dalhousie had been afforded an opportunity of 
 granting or refusing permission to adopt, I do not 
 think he would have been bound to consent on 
 payment of a nuzzur. No authority can be pro- 
 duced in support of such a doctrine. Major Bell 
 in his work admits that such permission was some- 
 times refused by the native governments in the 
 case of Jaghires, 2 and the Jaghires of Nopanee, 
 Chinchoree, Sonee, and others in the Deccan and 
 South Mahratta country, were all incorporated into 
 our dominions in consequence of similar refusals 
 by the British Government. 3 I have also shown 
 that applications for leave to adopt were refused by 
 governments that preceded Lord Dalhousie's. The 
 law has always been stated in an unqualified way, 
 and the fact that permission must be obtained 
 
 1 It was sealed on the evening of the 3rd of April, 1848, 
 and the Eajah died at half-past one, P.M., of the 5th of April. 
 
 The Empire in India, by Major BELL, p. 147. 
 * Mr. WILLOUGHBY'S Minute, Sattarah case, 14th of May, 1848. 
 
14 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 implies that it may be refused ; otherwise the per- 
 mission is unnecessary and a farce. The exaction 
 of a nuzzur, however, invests the application with 
 all the appearance of a stern reality; for it is 
 difficult to perceive the difference in principle 
 between a right to demand a present, undefined 
 in its amount, and which might (as was proposed 
 in the Nagpore case) amount to 120,000/. a year 
 increased tribute to the paramount power, and a 
 right to refuse permission to adopt. If the nuzzur 
 required was not paid, the paramount power would 
 not consent to the adoption. 
 
 Sir George Clerk, in his Minute on the Sattarah 
 annexation, raised an objection, which, if valid, 
 would also apply to the lapse of Jhansi and 
 Nagpore. His objection is founded on the 
 language of the treaty, conferring Sattarah on the 
 first Kajah ( and his heirs and successors.' Sir 
 George Clerk, although he admits ' that the 
 
 * sanction of the paramount state is by custom 
 
 * required to render the adoption to a principality 
 6 valid,' nevertheless contends that such sanction 
 could not be refused without injustice, as the grant 
 was in perpetual sovereignty to the Kajah, ' his 
 ' heirs and successors,' and that the adopted son 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 15 
 
 was such heir and successor, as he stood in the 
 same relation as a real son. But this argument is 
 inconsistent with the previous admission, and 
 assumes the whole question in dispute ; for if the 
 consent of the paramount state is necessary to 
 render an adopted son capable of inheriting a 
 principality, and the Kajah of Sattarah did not 
 obtain such consent, then the son adopted by 
 him was not his heir or successor within the 
 meaning of the treaty. It can scarcely be 
 contended, that the words ' heirs and successors ' 
 in the treaty, meant those who were not heirs or 
 successors according to the law applicable to the 
 subject. 
 
 The dynasties of all these dependent princes 
 became extinct on their deaths. The adopted 
 sons of the Rajahs of Sattarah and Jhansi could 
 not inherit, because the permission of the para- 
 mount power was not obtained for their adoption, 
 and there was no other heir to those sovereignties. 
 The Rajah of Nagpore left no heir in the male 
 line (and no other heir could inherit 1 ), and neither 
 
 1 See Sir R. JENKINS' Report on Nagpore, in which he states 
 the principles regulating the succession to the throne. He says, 
 
16 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 he nor his widow complicated the question by 
 adopting a son. The Rajah of Sumbulpore 
 obtained his sovereignty from the British Govern- 
 ment under a treaty which did not constitute him 
 an hereditary prince. 1 Under these different 
 circumstances, all these dependent thrones were 
 vacant, and, as the sovereignty must be in some 
 one, they reverted to the British Government, the 
 paramount power which had created the expired 
 dynasties. This is the ' appalling ' doctrine of 
 lapse, and it is worth while to observe how little 
 Lord Dalhousie had to do with it. He did not 
 invent it. He did not refuse these princes per- 
 mission to adopt. He merely happened to be the 
 governor of a country in which these lapses 
 occurred by operation of law. 
 
 But then it is said, although the Rajah of 
 Sattarah and Jhansi did not obtain permission to 
 adopt, the Government should have recognized their 
 adopted sons ; and although the Rajah of Nagpore 
 never adopted a son, and his Ranees neither adopted 
 
 ' It is hereditary in the entire male line from the common ancestor 
 
 * or first founder of the dynasty, to the exclusion of females or 
 
 * their issue.' 
 
 1 See KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 97. 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 17 
 
 nor expressed any intention of doing so, the Govern- 
 ment should have required the Ranees to adopt, or 
 called upon the principal men of the province to 
 select some person as their prince. 1 These sug- 
 gestions raise the real question. If Lord Dalhousie 
 is open to censure, it cannot be for lapses of territory 
 which were effected by operation of law, but it must 
 be because he did not waive the rights which the 
 law gave him, and reconstitute, and in fact recreate, 
 these lapsed and extinct dynasties. This is the real 
 issue on which Lord Dalhousie has himself put these 
 annexations. In his Sattarah Minute he said : ' I 
 
 * do not presume to dispute the wisdom of creating 
 
 * the Eaj of Sattarah. I conceive that the same 
 ' reasons do not prevail for its reconstitution now, 
 ' when it is again placed by events at our disposal/ 2 
 In his Nagpore Minute, he says : ' The simple 
 ' question for determination is, whether the sove- 
 ' reignty of Nagpore, which was bestowed as a gift 
 ' upon a G-oojur by the British Government in 1818, 
 ' should now be conferred upon somebody else as a 
 
 * gift a second time.' 
 
 1 See Colonel Low's Minute on the Nagpore Annexation. 
 In another part of the same Minute he says, " While I find 
 ' no sufficient reason for the reconstitution of Sattarah," &c. 
 
 2 
 
18 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie decided that it would not be for 
 the benefit of the British Government, or the good 
 of the native population, to reconstitute these de- 
 pendent states. I think no statesman, with any 
 sense of his responsibility, could arrive at any other 
 conclusion. 
 
 The continuance of these dependent states could 
 not have been beneficial to the British Government. 
 They were the creations of their policy in former 
 times, and the objects for which they were created 
 had long ceased to exist. Some of them were 
 established that they might act as " counterpoises " 
 to other states, but these latter states had since 
 dwindled into comparative insignificance, and no 
 longer required a counterpoise. Others were set up 
 because it was thought their creation would be 
 popular, and they would act as safety valves, affording 
 employment to the turbulent soldiery then roving 
 over the Deccan ; but the power of the Mahrattas 
 had since been broken, and their predatory troops 
 were no longer feared. The dislike of the Court of 
 Directors, in those days, to the extension of their 
 territory, and the difficulty experienced in adminis- 
 tering such rapidly increasing dominions, were also 
 reasons for the creation of these states, but when 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 19 
 
 Lord Dalhousie governed India, they were situated 
 in the midst of our territory; their annexation 
 consolidated our dominions without increasing our 
 frontier; and their administration was scarcely a 
 perceptible tax on our increased resources. 
 
 These dependent sovereignties might have been 
 convenient at the time of their creation, but they 
 were the fruitful source of subsequent trouble. Their 
 sovereigns either rebelled against us, or so mis- 
 managed their territory and oppressed their subjects, 
 that we were obliged to interfere. We were com- 
 pelled to dethrone and exile the first Kajah of Sat- 
 tarah. Jhansi was so misgoverned by its first two 
 Eajahs, that its revenues fell from 180,OOOL a year 
 to 30,000/. a year ; and at last we were obliged to 
 assume the management of the province. The state 
 of Jaloun, in 1840, was thus described by Lord 
 Auckland : ' In the course of nine or ten years, 
 ' the land had been most profusely alienated ; debts 
 ' to the amount of 30 lacs had been contracted ; 
 ' extensive districts had been mortgaged as a security 
 ' for them ; there was neither order nor security in 
 * the territory; every village was exposed to the 
 ' attacks of plunderers ; cultivation was deserted ; 
 ' and a country which had been fruitful and pros- 
 
20 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 ' perous, was from day to day becoming deso- 
 ' late.' In Mysore, the incapacity and oppres- 
 sive conduct of its Kajah compelled us to deprive 
 him of the administration of his country, and for 
 many years we have governed it for him. Sumbul- 
 pore was grievously misgoverned. In Nagpore, the 
 Kajah being an infant, and the Regent, Banka Baee, 
 a female, we were obliged to administer the govern- 
 ment during the minority. What became of that 
 country after it was handed over to the Rajah on 
 his coming of age, I will show hereafter. 
 
 One of these states, Sattarah, interfered with 
 our military communications, being situated between 
 the stations of Poona and Belgaum, and all these 
 states, when annexed, were either entirely, or in 
 a great degree, surrounded by British territory. 
 The existence of native states so situated, must have 
 been a source of weakness rather than strength. 
 India is not so exceptional a country that common 
 sense cannot be applied to its political questions, 
 and if a foreign state and jurisdiction would be 
 deemed an intolerable annoyance in the midst of 
 a European kingdom, it cannot be considered a 
 benefit in the centre of our Asiatic dominions. 
 
 But the benefit of these dependent states to 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 21 
 
 the British Government was not the sole question 
 for Lord Dalhousie's consideration. His mind 
 would have found little satisfaction in such a 
 narrow and selfish view of the subject. His Mi- 
 nutes show that he anxiously weighed the conse- 
 quences to the inhabitants of these territories if 
 he reconstituted their extinct dynasties, and that 
 he formed a deliberate opinion that the British 
 rule was better than that of any native ruler, 
 and certainly much better than could be expected 
 from the rule of the aged lady and boys he was 
 asked to place on the vacant thrones. In his Nag- 
 pore Minute, Lord Dalhousie observed, ' I place the 
 
 * interests of the people of Nagpore foremost among 
 ' the considerations which induce me to advise that 
 ' that state should now pass under British govern- 
 1 ment ; for I conscientiously declare that unless 
 ' I believed that the prosperity and happiness of 
 6 its inhabitants would be promoted by their being 
 ' placed permanently under British rule, no other 
 ' advantages which could arise out of the measure 
 
 * would move me to propose it.' In his Sattarah 
 Minute, when speaking of the benefits to be derived 
 from incorporating that territory into the British 
 dominions, he says, ' In my conscience I believe 
 
22 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 we should ensure to the population of the state 
 'a petpeUiity of that just and mild government 
 'which they have lately enjoyed, hut which they 
 c wffl hold by a poor and uncertain tennre, indeed, 
 * if we resolve now to continue the raj, and deliver 
 c it over to a boy brought up in obscurity, selected 
 almost by chance, and of whose 
 and qualities nothing whatever was 
 known by the Rajah who adopted him, nothing 
 c whatever is known to us.' 
 
 The AgMiw and fitness of the candidates for 
 the vacant thrones was another grave question 
 involved in the reconstitution of these extinct dy- 
 nasties. The Rajahfl of ffillnpfch and Jhansi each 
 adopted distant relatives, who were mere boys. 
 The Ranee Banka Baee, who had been Regent 
 fhnrncr the minority of the late Rajah, and was 
 seventy-five years old, was proposed by the Resident 
 as the future Sovereign of Nagpore ; and in case the 
 Government should object to her, he suggested that 
 a youth named Jeswunt Rao, a relative of the late 
 Rajah cm the female side, who was described as 
 tractable hot not brflKant, should be selected as 
 Rajah; and if he should be objected to, the Resident 
 proposed that another relative on the female side, 
 
of whom he did not speak 00 feronnbiy, a boy 
 
 The Bailees of the fete Rajah made no 
 with the intentions of the 
 
 an aged ladj tottering on the 
 
24 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 all the evils of an Asiatic regency. Now the only 
 chance an Indian prince has of becoming fit for 
 his position is that he should be brought up in 
 adversity, like the Rajah of Sattarah, or that he 
 should fight his way up to the throne, in which 
 case, however, though fit to rule in one sense, 
 he is generally a tyrant. But what hope could 
 be entertained of any Indian prince brought up 
 in the purple of his becoming anything but an 
 indolent, sensual, and tyrannical sovereign ? To 
 show what a ruler one of these Indian princes 
 was, who was brought up under the eye of Sir 
 Richard Jenkins, and who, Mr. Kaye assures us, 
 was not the worst specimen of his class, we will 
 here extract from a Report of Mr. Mansell, the 
 Resident at Nagpore, a description of the last ruler 
 of that country. 1 
 
 * A distaste for business and low habits seem 
 ' the distinguishing features of his temperament. 
 ' Any strict attention to affairs of state paid by 
 ' him has been enforced by the remonstrance of 
 * the Resident, while his natural inclination has 
 ' again led him, when unchecked, to absorb him- 
 
 1 Report of Mr. Mansell, dated 14th December, 1853. Par- 
 liamentary Papers relating to the Rajah of Berar, p. 13. 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 25 
 
 ' self in the society of low followers, in the sports 
 ' of wrestling, kite-flying, and cards, in singing and 
 
 * dancing, and in the intercourse of his dancing- 
 1 girls. A saying of his to an officer who, about 
 ' a year ago, was appointed to the office of Durbar 
 4 Vakeel, on the removal of the old incumbent, 
 ' will not incorrectly illustrate his character. The 
 
 * audience of investiture was over, and the new 
 ' Vakeel was then dismissed with these words : 
 ' " Now, go away, and study the provisions of 
 ' " the treaty, so as to see that they are enforced, 
 ' " to protect me in the enjoyment of those plea- 
 
 * " sures of dancing and singing that I have loved 
 
 * " from my boyhood." 
 
 * A concubine, by name Janee, is spoken of as 
 
 * having led the Kajah into confirmed habits of 
 < drinking about eight years since, so that now, when 
 6 not ill, his drinking exceeds a bottle of brandy a 
 ' day. Not a few disgraceful scenes have occurred 
 ' at the palace while the Kajah has been overcome 
 ' with spirits, and generally it may be said that 
 ' indisposition has thus grown into incapacity to 
 
 * discharge business, in the thoughtful and earnest 
 1 form becoming a sovereign, for any continuance 
 ' of time/ 
 
26 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 ' The addiction to the low pleasures of the 
 ' harem was always a marked characteristic of the 
 ' Eajah, and has become more baneful since the 
 
 * habit of drinking has so grown upon him. His 
 
 * time is now absorbed in the paltry conversation 
 ' and the mean pursuits of the concubines, and he 
 ' now with reluctance leaves the inner apartments. 
 ' The Vakeel has frequently had to coerce the Eajah 
 ' by very decided language into coming into court, 
 1 and disposing of such business as required to be 
 ' done in a public form.' .... 
 
 * When thus the Kajah has been divesting him- 
 1 self of much of the best part of his character, he 
 ' has been acquiring habits of avarice that have led 
 ' him into a systematic indifference to the claims of 
 1 the administration of justice, and to the selection 
 ' of merit in making official appointments. Of late 
 ' years all the anxiety of the Kajah and of his 
 
 * favourite ministers has been to feed the privy 
 1 purse by an annual income of two or more lacs of 
 ' rupees from nuzzurs, fines, bribes, confiscation of 
 ' property of deceased estates, the composition of 
 1 public defaulters, or the sale of their effects, and 
 '. such like sources. The Kajah has thus been led 
 
 * on by his avarice to discard all feeling, and to 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 27 
 
 * throw himself into the hands of the most unprin- 
 1 cipled of his servants, who plundered the country, 
 4 and put justice up to sale for profits but a slender 
 ' part of which reached the Rajah. He has done 
 1 many cruel acts, and even carried war into the 
 ' country of his feudal dependants, on the misre- 
 1 presentation of those parties, gilded by the offer 
 1 of a nuzzur. Orders of the most contradictory 
 6 character have been issued at the bid of rival 
 ' parties from time to time in cases before the 
 < law courts, the number of which is notorious. As 
 { soon as indifference and a blind submission to 
 ' the advice of certain evil advisers became profit- 
 ' able, the Rajah just contented himself with sign- 
 ' ing and sealing the proceedings that awarded a 
 ' decision to the best paymaster. All this has 
 ' aggravated the low tone of mind originally belong- 
 ' ing to the Rajah. He acts and thinks like a 
 ' village chandler. Profits and pickings are to be 
 ( made anyhow. The choicest amusement of the 
 ' Rajah is an auction sale, when some unfortunate 
 * widow is ruled not to be entitled to her husband's 
 ' estate, or when some public defaulter is found 
 6 to have made away with revenue collections, just 
 < equal to the sum he paid five or six years before 
 
28 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 ' for his situation of revenue collector to the 
 ' Rajah.' .... 
 
 ' The favourable features in the condition of the 
 ' country are mainly those that existed when the 
 ' state was entrusted to the Rajah in 1830, and 
 
 * the unfavourable ones are mainly those that the 
 ' country has assumed under the Rajah's rule. That 
 ' the partial pleasing aspect of things is not over- 
 ' shadowed or destroyed, is mainly owing to the 
 1 occasional interference of the Resident, who, when 
 4 affairs had become particularly gloomy, caused a 
 1 better tone to be infused into every department, 
 1 and secured a new lease of decency to be succeeded 
 
 * by the old degradation under a new incumbent of 
 6 the Residency. The machinery that has mainly 
 ' kept society together under the latter part of the 
 ' Rajah's reign, has been the almost British discipline 
 6 of the troops bequeathed by the transfer of 1830 
 ' to the Rajah. This has made him all-powerful, 
 
 6 capable equally of setting an enemy and justice at 
 ' defiance. The revenue system of fixed leases left 
 ' behind by Mr. Jenkins has, on the other hand, 
 
 * preserved the finances of the state, and the agri- 
 1 cultural interest, from being sacrificed wholly to 
 ' reckless folly or temporary expedients to raise funds/ 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 29 
 
 Mr. Kaye's work furnishes us with another 
 graphic description of native rulers. Speaking of 
 the successive kings of Oude, he writes : 
 
 * It would take long to trace the history of the 
 ' progressive misrule of the Oude dominions under a 
 ' succession of sovereigns all of the same class 
 ' passive permitters of evil rather than active 
 ' perpetrators of iniquity, careless of, but not rejoic- 
 
 * ing in, the sufferings of their people. The rulers 
 ' of Oude, whether Wuzeers or kings, had not the 
 ' energy to be tyrants. They simply allowed things 
 f to take their course. Sunk in voluptuousness 
 ' and pollution, often too horribly revolting to be 
 < described, they gave themselves up to the guidance 
 ' of panders and parasites, and cared not so long 
 ' as these wretched creatures administered to their 
 ' sensual appetites. Affairs of state were pushed 
 t aside as painful intrusions. Corruption stalked 
 'openly abroad, every one had his price; place, 
 ' honour, justice everything was to be bought ; 
 
 * fiddlers and barbers, pimps and mountebanks, 
 ' became great functionaries. There were high 
 
 * revels at the capital, whilst, in the interior of 
 ' the country, every kind of enormity was being 
 ' exercised to wring from the helpless people the 
 
30 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 ' money which supplied the indulgences of the 
 ' court. Much of the land was farmed out to large 
 'contractors, who exacted every possible farthing 
 ' from the cultivators, and were not seldom, upon 
 ' complaint of extortion, made, unless inquiry 
 1 were silenced by corruption, to disgorge into the 
 ' royal treasury a portion of their gains. Murders 
 ( of the most revolting type, gang robberies of the 
 1 most outrageous character, were committed in open 
 ' day. There were no courts of justice except at 
 
 * Lucknow ; no police but at the capital and on the 
 ' frontier. The British troops were continually 
 1 called out to coerce refractory landowners, and to 
 ' stimulate revenue collection at the point of the 
 ' bayonet. The sovereign Wuzeer or king knew 
 ' that they would do iiieir duty ; knew that, under 
 
 * the obligations of the treaty, his authority would 
 ' be supported ; and so he lay secure in his Zenana, 
 ' and fiddled whilst his country was in flames/ 
 
 The arguments in favour of perpetuating these 
 lapsed states, are to be found in the Minutes of Sir 
 George Clerk and Colonel Low, the chief opponents 
 of Lord Dalhousie's policy, who contended that 
 dependent states were useful, inasmuch as they 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 31 
 
 afforded employment to a native nobility and 
 turbulent spirits who would not be employed by us, 
 and who would sink into ' the dead level ' of the 
 population under our rule ; that other native states 
 would be alarmed by these annexations, fearing the 
 application of the same doctrines to their own 
 successions ; that our territory was already large 
 enough ; and that natives prefer their own rulers to 
 the British Government. 
 
 The first of these arguments may be true in 
 fact, and yet entitled to very little consideration. 
 I think it probable that few of the nobility of these 
 courts would be employed by a well-ordered govern- 
 ment, and certainly the turbulent spirits, who lived 
 by intrigue and violence, would find their occupation 
 gone. But the eye of the statesman, who con- 
 sidered this question, did not dwell upon the par- 
 ticular interests of a noble class or a turbulent 
 soldiery, but on the wider claims of the great mass 
 of the population. The nobles and soldiers attached 
 to these courts were pensioned, 1 and, with the 
 
 1 On the lapse of all these territories, Lord Dalhousie pro- 
 vided ample means for the Ranees and ladies of the deceased 
 Rajahs, and also pensions for the officers and adherents of the 
 family, as well as six months' pay for the troops. 
 
32 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 natural advantages of their birth and position, 
 might well be left to fight their own battle. If 
 the native noble is worth preserving, he can pre- 
 serve himself and his own position under our rule, 
 as the Maharajah of Burdwan and others have done. 
 At all events, Lord Dalhousie was not the man to 
 give away a kingdom to support a nobility and 
 soldiery, whether they were or were not ' turbulent 
 spirits/ All his Minutes on these annexations 
 show, that his mind dwelt much on the misgovern- 
 ment of native states, and the greater happiness the 
 mass of the people would experience under our 
 rule. 1 And surely this was a far nobler object to 
 keep in view than the conciliation and employment 
 of native nobles, a class very well able to take care 
 of themselves, and not generally eulogized by those 
 who are brought into contact with them. 
 
 Then it is suggested that all the Princes of India 
 were alarmed by these annexations, and feared the 
 application of the doctrine of lapse to their own 
 successions ; but the truth is, that the doctrine was 
 
 1 See extracts already given, and his observations on the 
 government of Jaloun and Jhansi, in his Minute on the Jhansi 
 Annexation. 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 33 
 
 capable of a very limited application among Princes. 
 Lord Dalhousie repeatedly declared that it was 
 applicable to dependent states only. Speaking of 
 his own Minute on the Sattarah annexation, he 
 observed, ' The opinion which I gave was restricted 
 ' wholly to subordinate states, to those dependent 
 
 * principalities which either as the virtual creation 
 ( of the British Government, or from their former 
 
 * position, stood in such relation to that Government 
 
 * as gave to it the recognized right of a paramount 
 
 * power in all questions of the adoption of an heir 
 ' to the sovereignty of that state. The opinion I 
 
 * gave referred exclusively to " subordinate states," 
 'to a " dependent principality," like that of Sat- 
 < tarah and others that have been named/ 1 I do 
 not believe that one independent sovereign was 
 alarmed by these lapses of territory, but if there 
 
 1 Minute of Lord Dalhousie on the Nagpore Annexation, 
 dated 28th January, 1854 p. 35 of the Nagpore papers. Un- 
 fortunately in all printed copies of Lord Dalhousie's Minute on the 
 Sattarah, annexation, in one of the most important passages, the 
 word ' independent ' appears instead of ' dependent.' I know 
 not how it is written in the original, but the whole argument of the 
 Minute requires that it should be * dependent.' See this passage 
 set out in Mr. Kaye's work, p. 74. 
 
 3 
 
34 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 was such a sovereign, his fear was most unreason- 
 able, and might have been removed by ten minutes' 
 conversation with the Resident at his Court, or a 
 reference to Calcutta. But the range of this sup- 
 posed dread was still more limited, for the doctrine, 
 requiring the consent of the British Government to 
 adoptions by dependent sovereigns, is inapplicable to 
 those of the Mahomedan faith, and it was Lord 
 Dalhousie's fate to gather in nearly the whole crop 
 of dependent Hindoo territories. I believe that 
 Mysore was the only one remaining at the close of 
 his administration. 
 
 Then it is said that these annexations enlarged 
 our territory, which was already quite large enough. 
 That they enlarged our territory is a geographical 
 fact, which cannot be disputed, but the question 
 is, whether these annexations unduly taxed our 
 resources, or diminished our strength. With respect 
 to Sattarah, Lord Dalhousie observed, ' There may 
 ' be conflict of opinion as to the advantage or pro- 
 ' priety of extending our already vast possessions 
 ' beyond their present limits. No man can more 
 ' sincerely deprecate than I do any extension of 
 the frontiers of our territory which can be avoided, 
 ' or which may not become indispensably necessary 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 35 
 
 ' from considerations of our own safety, and of the 
 ' maintenance of the tranquillity of our provinces. 
 ' But I cannot conceive it possible for any one to 
 ( dispute the policy of taking advantage of every 
 ' just opportunity which presents itself for consoli- 
 
 * dating the territories that already belong to us, by 
 ' taking possession of states which may lapse in the 
 
 * midst of them ; for thus getting rid of these paltry 
 
 * intervening principalities, which may be made a 
 ' means of annoyance, but which can never, I 
 
 * venture to think, be a source of strength.' .... 
 
 * It would be difficult to imagine a case to which the 
 ' rule founded on this general principle would be 
 
 * more closely applicable than the Kaj of Sattarah. 
 
 * The territories lie in the very heart of our pos- 
 ' sessions. They are interposed between the two 
 < principal military stations in the Presidency of 
 ' Bombay, and are at least calculated, in the hands 
 ' of an independent sovereign, to form an obstacle 
 ' to safe communication and combined military 
 
 * movements. The district is fertile, and the revenue 
 ' productive. By incorporating Sattarah with our 
 6 possessions we should acquire continuity of mili- 
 ' tary communication, and increase the revenues of 
 ' the state.' On the lapse of Jhansi, Lord Dal- 
 
 8-2 
 
36 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 housie wrote, The British Government will not 
 ' derive any material advantage from the possession 
 ' of this territory, for it is of no great extent, and the 
 ' revenue is inconsiderable, but it lies in the midst 
 ' of other British districts, and the possession of it 
 ' as our own will tend to the improvement of the 
 
 * general internal administration of our possessions 
 ' in Bundelkund.' Sumbulpore, when it lapsed in 
 1855, was situated between our provinces of Nagpore 
 and Cuttack, and was in fact surrounded by British 
 territory. The position of Nagpore is thus described 
 by Lord Dalhousie : f Its incorporation, however, 
 6 with the British empire, would extinguish a 
 
 * government having separate feelings and interests, 
 ' and would absorb a separate military power out of 
 
 * which there must always be a possibility that 
 ' embarrassment, if not anxiety, might some day 
 
 * arise. The incorporation ef Nagpore would give 
 ' to us a territory which comprises 80,000 square 
 ' miles, producing an annual revenue of 40 lacs of 
 1 rupees, and containing more than 4,000,000 of 
 1 people who have long desired to return to our rule. 
 ' It would completely surround with British terri- 
 
 * tory the dominions of his Highness the Nizam, in 
 ' a manner highly beneficial for the purposes of 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 37 
 
 * internal administration. It would render con- 
 
 * tinuous several British provinces, between which 
 
 * foreign territory is now interposed. Orissa in the 
 4 east, would be joined with Candeish in the west, 
 
 * and Berar, recently assigned to the south, would 
 
 * be made fully continuous with the Saugor and 
 
 * Nerbudda territories to the north. It would place 
 < the only direct line of communication which exists 
 
 * between Calcutta and Bombay almost within 
 ' British territory, whereas the road now passes for 
 
 * a considerable distance through foreign states/ 
 . . . . ' To sum up all in one sentence, the 
 
 * possession of Nagpore would combine our military 
 strength, would enlarge our commercial resources, 
 
 * and would materially tend to consolidate our 
 ' power.' 
 
 The observation, that the natives of India prefer 
 the rule of their own princes to that of our Govern- 
 ment, did not apply to the inhabitants of Nagpore. 
 They had experienced the benefits of our rule 
 when Sir B. Jenkins governed the country, during 
 the minority of the late Bajah, and they afterwards 
 suffered under that Kajah from a system of 
 government which has been already described, 
 and the consequence was, that they were anxious to 
 
38 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 revert to our rule. 1 Whether this preference for 
 
 rulers of their own colour and race, animated the 
 
 inhabitants of the other lapsed states at the time of 
 
 their annexation, it is difficult to say, but if it did, 
 
 they only entertained a feeling common to a large 
 
 mass of our Indian population, and all subjugated 
 
 races, and 'if it be the duty of a Governor- General to 
 
 defer to such a feeling, we must be prepared to 
 
 go further, and leave India to its native princes. 
 
 If Lord Dalhousie was not right in assuming 
 
 that our Government was the very best the natives 
 
 could get, and in treating any alleged preference 
 
 of theirs for native rulers as immaterial ; if he 
 
 ought, in deference to the supposed wishes of the 
 
 people, to have declined the government of these 
 
 lapsed states, and recreated these extinct dynasties, 
 
 how could he justify his retention of any other 
 
 province of our Indian dominions ? Why should 
 
 he, in deference to such a preference, relinquish 
 
 provinces acquired by law, and in defiance of such 
 
 a preference, retain other provinces ? Our present 
 
 1 See the Eeport of Mr. Mansell, the Resident at the time 
 of the lapse, and the Minutes of Colonel Low and Sir F. Halliday 
 in the Parliamentary papers relating to the Bajah of Berar, pp. 21, 
 47 note, and 52. 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 39 
 
 right to remain in India is not based on any love 
 of the natives for our rule, or any preference for 
 our government, and we shall only involve our- 
 selves in difficulties, if we either act or argue on 
 such an assumption. 
 
 Lastly, it is said that these annexations caused 
 general discontent, and were a principal cause of 
 the rebellion of 1857. But if this were so, how 
 was it that Nagpore and Sattarah remained 
 faithful to our rule ? Surely the inhabitants of 
 Sattarah had as much cause of complaint as those 
 of Jhansi, and Nagpore as Sumbulpore, and yet 
 during the rebellion neither Nagpore nor Sattarah 
 joined the insurgents. It was no fear of British 
 troops that caused the difference, for the European 
 regiment had long been withdrawn from Nagpore, 
 and Sattarah never had such a garrison. When 
 states, supposed to be suffering under a common 
 wrong, act so differently, it is probable that the 
 alleged wrong had nothing to do with their 
 conduct, which must be explained in some other 
 way. It is true that Jhansi and Sumbulpore were 
 carried away by the storm wave of rebellion, which 
 rose so high in 1857, but is there any evidence 
 to show that their rebellion was caused by annexa- 
 
40 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 tion ? As they did rebel, it is assumed that their 
 annexation was the cause, but let us suppose that 
 Lord Dalhousie had reconstituted Sumbulpore and 
 Jhansi. Will any one who knows India venture 
 to assert, that, under such circumstances, the new 
 Princes would have remained faithful to us in 1857 ? 
 Would a native Prince have secured Sumbulpore, 
 with its almost barbarous people, from the conta- 
 gion and wild excitement of rebellion ? Is it to 
 be believed that when Central India rose against us, 
 Jhansi would have remained faithful, if we had 
 acknowledged the adoption by the last Rajah ? If 
 Holkar and Scindiah experienced such difficulty in 
 steering through that storm, is it to be supposed 
 that a mere boy at Jhansi would have been able to 
 do so ? 
 
 What would have been said of Lord Dalhousie, 
 if Nagpore, with its vast cotton-fields, were now 
 under a native sovereign, indifferent to our com- 
 mercial interests and incapable of furthering them ? 
 Would not Lord Dalhousie have been assailed as 
 a short-sighted politician, who lost a golden oppor- 
 tunity of acquiring a country capable of yielding 
 large supplies of the great staple of our manufac- 
 
ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 41 
 
 tures ? But no one who has read his Minute 
 on the annexation of Nagpore, can dispute his 
 qualifications for such a charge as India. In the 
 fifty-second paragraph, he says, * The possession 
 
 * of Nagpore will materially aid in supplying a 
 
 * want, upon the secure supply of which much of 
 ' the manufacturing prosperity of England depends. 
 6 Many items go to make up the sum of that pro- 
 
 * sperity; but there is perhaps no one item in it 
 1 all upon which more depends than upon a steady 
 ' and full supply of the staple article of cotton 
 
 * wool. The importance of this question is ever 
 1 pressing itself upon all who are connected with 
 
 * the administration of either England or India.' 
 .... ' I need hardly say then that my attention 
 
 * has never ceased to be directed to the means 
 6 of obtaining those cheap and abundant fields of 
 
 * supply, and that ready access to them, which 
 
 * alone can release England from almost total 
 
 * dependence upon a foreign power, for the supply 
 1 of an absolutely indispensable material of her 
 
 * trade.' 
 
 From what has been said of these annexations, 
 I think it sufficiently appears that Lord Dalhousie 
 
42 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 
 
 did not originate the doctrine of lapse ; that he 
 did not extend it, by applying it in a manner in 
 which it was never before applied ; and that his 
 application of it to these states, was not forced 
 upon a reluctant government at home, but was 
 fully sanctioned in each case. I have endeavoured 
 to show, that these states lapsed by operation of law; 
 that Lord Dalhousie carefully considered the ques- 
 tion of their reconstitution ; that weighty reasons 
 support the conclusions to which he came ; and that 
 these annexations were injurious neither to the in- 
 habitants of the territories annexed, nor to the 
 interests of the British empire. And if I have 
 succeeded in showing this, it is not easy to see upon 
 what ground, the imputations, which have been so 
 freely cast upon the memory of a great statesman, 
 are to be justified. 
 
 The question as to these annexations is one 
 of great moment, for if Lord Dalhousie acted un- 
 justly, we have as yet acquired no title by effluxion 
 of time, and, even^ now, it is our duty to make 
 restitution, and reconstitute these states. It would 
 be strange morality, indeed, to abuse Lord Dal- 
 housie for his annexations, and yet hold fast the 
 territories he acquired. Is the India Office now 
 
I 
 
 ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE. 43 
 
 prepared to reconstitute these dynasties, and re- 
 linquish the revenue arising from these states ? 
 If not, if Lord Dalhousie's policy is to be upheld 
 in fact, surely it would be as well to abstain from 
 casting reflections and doubt upon it, and thus 
 exciting hopes in India, which must end in dis- 
 appointment. 
 
KEROWLEE 
 
 THE little Rajpoot State of Kerowlee escaped 
 annexation, but still Lord Dalhousie is blamed 
 by Mr. Kaye because he ventured to think it 
 might be annexed, and, entertaining doubts about 
 it, referred the question to the Court of Di- 
 rectors, thus causing a delay which alarmed the 
 Rajpoot States. 
 
 The Rajah of Kerowlee died in July, 1852, 
 after adopting a boy, named Bhurt Pal, without 
 the sanction of the British Government. Two 
 questions arose for decision : first, whether Kerow- 
 lee was a dependent state; second, whether it was 
 politic to annex it. 
 
 No one reading Mr. Kaye's narrative would 
 suppose that there had been any question as to 
 
KEROWLEE. 45 
 
 the independence of this state, but Lord Dalhousie 
 asserted that by the third article of the treaty our 
 supremacy was ' specifically admitted/ and that for 
 many years the government had been administered 
 by our officers. The Court of Directors differed from 
 Lord Dalhousie, and thought that Kerowlee was only 
 a protected ally, but they did not produce the treaty 
 when the papers were called for by the House of 
 Commons. 
 
 Although Lord Dalhousie thought the doctrine 
 of lapse might be applied to Kerowlee, yet it is 
 clear, from his language and conduct, that he 
 entertained great doubts as to the policy of an- 
 nexing this Kajpoot State. All the merit of enter- 
 taining these doubts is ascribed by Mr. Kaye to 
 Sir F. Currie, and Lord Dalhousie's vision is de- 
 scribed as clouded ' by the film of a foregone con- 
 clusion.' 1 ' To a man/ Mr. Kaye observes, ' who 
 ' had graduated from boyhood upwards in Indian 
 ' statesmanship' (Sir F. Currie), 'there was some- 
 1 thing almost sacrilegious in the idea of laying 
 ' a destroying hand even upon the least of the 
 1 ancient houses of Kajpootana of destroying titles 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, p.. 93. 
 
46 KEROWLEE. 
 
 ' that had been honoured long years before the face 
 ' of the white man had been seen in the country. 
 ' But impressions of this kind are the growth of 
 ' long intercourse with the people themselves, and 
 
 * we cannot be surprised that after a year or two 
 ' of Indian government Lord Dalhousie, with all 
 
 * his unrivalled quickness of perception, should not 
 ' have thoroughly understood the vital differences 
 1 between the various races inhabiting the great 
 ' continent of India.' 1 This seems to be written 
 in support of ' a foregone conclusion,' that nothing 
 Lord Dalhousie said or did could be right, for it 
 is clear from the papers, that Lord Dalhousie was 
 the first to suggest these vital differences.' In his 
 Minute, written before Sir F. Currie's, he states 
 the very objection Mr. Kaye supposes he could 
 not appreciate. < On the other hand,' he says, 
 
 * the state is isolated, and would not consolidate 
 ' our territories as in the case of Sattarah. Though 
 
 * not a very old state, still it is a Kajpoot princi- 
 ' pality, and, unlike the existing Mahratta and 
 
 * Mahomedan dynasties, has the claim of antiquity 
 ' in its favour. The refusal of sanction to adoption 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 93. 
 
KEROWLEE. 47 
 
 ' in the case of Kerowlee might create alarm and 
 
 * dissatisfaction in the older and more powerful 
 1 states in Kajpootana, as being apparently signi- 
 
 * ficant of the intention of the British Government 
 ' towards themselves. Such an alarm would be 
 1 unfounded. For I presume that the Government 
 6 of India would not at any time be disposed to 
 4 interfere with the customary modes of suc- 
 ' cession among these old Eajpoot states, whose 
 ( antiquity, whose position, and feelings would all 
 
 * make it our policy to leave them in the possession 
 ' of such independence as they now enjoy. But 
 ' although the alarm would be unfounded, it may 
 ' possibly be considered undesirable to run any risk 
 ' of exciting it, by refusing to allow the adoption in 
 ' Kerowlee.' . , . . * The arguments appear to me 
 ' to preponderate in favour of causing Kerowlee to 
 6 lapse, but as the Honourable Court may desire to 
 ' continue the succession on the ground of its being 
 ' a Eajpoot state, I do not propose to refuse at once 
 ' the sanction of the Government to the adoption, 
 ' but to refer it to the Court of Directors, soliciting 
 4 an immediate reply.' 
 
 The papers left India in September, 1852, but 
 the answer of the Court of Directors did not reach 
 
48 KEROWLEE. 
 
 Calcutta till March, 1853. For this delay Lord 
 Dalhousie was not responsible, but nothing could 
 have been more fortunate than its occurrence, for it 
 turned out that Bhurt Pal, the alleged adopted son, 
 had no title to the succession, and that the claims of 
 one Mudden Pal were supported by all the influen- 
 tial persons in the state. If Lord Dalhousie had 
 blindly followed the Resident's suggestion, and 
 recognized the adoption of Bhurt Pal, he would 
 have done wrong, and caused discontent. 
 
 When the letter of the Court of Directors, recog- 
 nizing the adoption of Bhurt Pal, arrived in India, 
 Lord Dalhousie proceeded calmly to inquire into 
 the rival claims. He observed: ' I do not antici- 
 ' pate any sort of disturbance in Kerowlee from delay 
 * in deciding the case. If there were, I should still 
 ' pursue these investigations, for it would be better 
 ' to risk tumult than to give a wrongful decision on 
 ' the succession to a throne.' But when, with the 
 concurrence of Sir H. Lawrence, he had made up 
 his mind in favour of Mudden Pal, he took the 
 responsibility of immediate recognition on himself, 
 and without further reference to the Court of 
 Directors, (who had decided in favour of Bhurt Pal,) 
 issued his orders recognizing Mudden Pal as Rajah. 
 
KEROWLEE. 49 
 
 This act saved much time, but brought on him a 
 severe rebuke from the Court of Directors. 
 
 I know not on what authority Mr. Kaye suggests 
 that, during the period of two years occupied by 
 these investigations, the houses of Eajpootana were 
 kept in suspense, and that it was well known the 
 British Government was discussing the policy of 
 annexing Kerowlee, 1 for there could have been no 
 secret or suspense as to the annexation, after the 
 receipt of the despatch of the Court of Directors. 
 If the effect of that letter was not well known in 
 Kerowlee, as I believe it was, soon after it reached 
 India, the fact that the Government was taking 
 pains to investigate the rights of the rival claimants, 
 and to ascertain the feelings of the people respecting 
 them, must have satisfied every one, that the question 
 before the British Government was not annexation, 
 but succession, not the destruction of the dynasty, 
 but its continuance. 
 
 Then Mr. Kaye observes : * It was not strange 
 ' indeed that a year or two afterwards there should 
 ' have been in circulation all over the country ominous 
 ' reports to the effect that the policy of Lord Dal- 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, p 96. 
 
50 KEROWLEE. 
 
 * housie had eventually triumphed, and that the 
 c gradual absorption of all the Kajpoot states had 
 ' heen sanctioned by the Home Government.' 1 
 A little more particularity as to the date and 
 venue of this rumour, would have shown to what 
 extent it was connected with the proposed annexa- 
 tion of Kerowlee. It is very improbable that a 
 native rumour would be couched in the exact lan- 
 guage used by Mr. Kaye, and a little alteration in 
 its terms would merely convey the prevalent notion 
 in India, that we intend to absorb the whole country. 
 But whatever the rumour may have been, it was, 
 like most Indian rumours, totally destitute of truth. 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 97. 
 
NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS, 
 
 I HAVE had some difficulty in making out the precise 
 charge brought against Lord Dalhousie, with respect 
 to the claims of the notorious Nana Sahib to suc- 
 ceed to the pension and jaghire of his adoptive 
 father, the ex-Peishwa. Mr. Kaye speaks of ' the 
 ' harshness of the sentence/ 1 and cites, with manifest 
 approbation, a memorial of the Nana Sahib to the 
 Court of Directors, in which his most impudent 
 claim is certainly argued with some ingenuity ; but 
 Mr. Kaye does not show in what respect Lord 
 Dalhousie erred, or what injustice was done to the 
 Nana. His narrative omits every fact which would 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, 103. 
 
 42 
 
52 NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 
 
 show the audacity of the claim, and states every 
 unsupported argument as if worthy of belief, and 
 he may intend to point the moral of the tale when 
 he relates the sad events at Cawnpore. Mr. 
 Arnold says, 1 that ' firm to the course of losing no 
 ' chance of economy or sequestration, Lord Dal- 
 6 housie rejected his claim,' and he adds : * It is 
 ' enough to say he was an adopted Hindoo son ; he 
 ' claimed the city and pension by right of adoption ; 
 ' the first was prolonged to him for a time, the last 
 ' was refused to him altogether, and Cawnpore told 
 * in 1857 how a Hindoo prince's heart regarded 
 ( Lord Dalhousie's doctrine of expedient escheats.' 
 These are insinuations rather than charges, but 
 whether they are one or the other, what becomes of 
 them when it is shown, that the decision of Nana 
 Sahib's claim raised no question whatever either 
 of adoption or escheat ? Lord Dalhousie's decision 
 would have been the same if the Nana had been 
 a real, instead of an adopted, son ; and his opinion 
 that the pension of Bajee Eao was, what it professed 
 to be, a pension for his life, and not a grant in 
 perpetuity of 80,0002. a year to him and his heirs, 
 
 1 ARNOLD'S Dalhousie Administration,])}). 127 and 128. 
 
NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 58 
 
 excluded all occasion for raising any question of 
 
 * expedient escheat,' even if there had been a dis- 
 position to do so, which I believe to be a perfectly 
 unfounded suggestion. 
 
 In 1818, the Peishwa Bajee Kao, having been 
 defeated by the^ British forces, entered into negotia- 
 tions with Sir John Malcolm, then the Governor- 
 General's agent in the Deccan. The terms eventu- 
 ally agreed on, were, that Bajee Kao should resign 
 all sovereign power, and leave the Deccan, and 
 that he should ' receive a liberal pension from the 
 ' Company's Government for the support of himself 
 
 * and family;' Sir John Malcolm engaging that 
 it should not be less than eight lacs of rupees 
 (80,000/.) per annum. This arrangement with the 
 Peishwa was confirmed by the Government, although 
 they disapproved of the terms, and considered the 
 pension much too large. Subsequently, the Govern- 
 ment, probably adverting to the terms of the 
 arrangement, which contemplated the pension of 
 80,OOOL a year as the least sum which Bajee Eao 
 should receive, granted him a tract of land near 
 Bithoor as a jaghire, during pleasure ; with a 
 limited civil and criminal jurisdiction over its 
 
54 NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 
 
 inhabitants. 1 I shall afterwards show that there is 
 no pretence for saying that it was contemplated by 
 any of the parties that this should be a pension 
 and jaghire in perpetuity, more than any other 
 ordinary pension granted by the Government should 
 be in perpetuity. 
 
 Bajee Kao subsequently adopted two sons, one 
 of whom was the noted Dhoondoo Punt Nana Sahib, 
 and often pressed upon the Government the pro- 
 priety of making a future provision for his family. 2 
 The very fact of such an application, to say nothing 
 of its terms, implies that the ex-Peishwa himself 
 understood that his pension was granted for his 
 life only. If it were certain that the pension was 
 hereditary, he would have been silent; if there 
 had been any well-founded grounds for contending 
 that it was hereditary, he would have asserted those 
 grounds. I do not find that he ever went so far as 
 to ask for a continuance of the pension and jaghire 
 to his heirs. No assurance of the continuance 
 
 1 See Regulation I. of 1832, and particularly the Preamble. 
 
 2 Minute of Court of Directors, 6th November, 1844 ; Letter 
 of Colonel Manson, 6th November, 1847 ; Eeport of Colonel 
 Manson of 10th February, 1851, paragraph 3, 
 
NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 55 
 
 of it was ever given him, and he accumulated 
 large property, probably with the purpose of making 
 that provision for his descendants, which he had 
 no reason to believe the Government would make. 
 He died in January, 1851, leaving a will in favour 
 of Nana Sahib, who accordingly took possession of 
 all the personal property which Bajee Rao had 
 thus accumulated. What this amounted to no one 
 knows. Nana Sahib admitted it to be 280,OOOZ. ; 
 but both the Lieutenant- Governor and Lord Dal- 
 housie believed that this admission fell far short of 
 the truth, and it is not likely that the truth would 
 be told by him pending the claim then made on 
 the Government. 
 
 The first petition presented on behalf of the 
 Nana, after the ex-Peishwa's death, contains a 
 vague request that Nana Sahib, his widowed mother, 
 his younger brother, his sisters and cousins, as 
 well as his old servants, might 'be supported as 
 ' hitherto/ This comparatively modest application 
 was subsequently, on the 29th of July, 1851, im- 
 proved upon, and the Nana, having in the interval 
 probably been advised that the pension might be mis- 
 taken for an inheritance, made the bolder demand 
 for a continuance of the pension and jaghire in 
 
56 NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 
 
 favour of himself, and that a provision suited to 
 the rank of the late ex-Peishwa might be granted 
 to him. The claim first came before Mr. Thomason, 
 the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Pro- 
 vinces, who treated it as an application for some 
 portion of the pension,* which he decidedly refused. 
 The Lieutenant-Governor, however, proposed, that 
 the land contained in the Bithoor jaghire should 
 be allowed to continue free of land-tax during the 
 life of the Nana, provided he continued to reside 
 there. 
 
 The papers then came before Lord Dalhousie, 
 who observed : 2 ' For thirty-three years the Peishwa 
 ' received an annual clear stipend of 80,OOOL, 
 
 * besides the proceeds of the jaghire. In that 
 
 * time he received the enormous sum of more than 
 
 1 See commencement of the letter of Secretary to Government 
 of the North- West Provinces to Sir H. Elliot, 13th September, 
 1851. There is probahly a mistranslation, and the claim for a 
 provision in the Nana's petition was probably put in the alter- 
 native, ' or that a provision,' &c. 
 
 2 The extract is from a letter of Sir H. Elliot, Secretary to 
 the Government of India, to the Governor of the North- West 
 Provinces, dated 24th September, 1851. It contains internal 
 evidence that it is a Minute of Lord Dalhousie's, cast into the 
 form of a letter, according to the practice at that time. 
 
NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 57 
 
 * two millions and a half sterling. He had no 
 6 charges to maintain, he has left no sons of his 
 ' own, and has bequeathed property to the amount 
 6 of twenty-eight lacs to his family. Those who 
 ' remain have no claim whatever on the considera- 
 6 tion of the Government. Neither have they any 
 
 * claim on its charity, because the income left to 
 ' them is amply sufficient. Even if it were not 
 
 * ample, the Peishwa, out of his vast resources, ought, 
 
 * his lordship observed, to have made it so, and 
 ' the probability is, that the property left is in 
 
 * reality much larger than it is avowed to be/ 
 
 Lord Dalhousie did not, however, interfere with 
 the Lieutenant-Governor's arrangement as to the 
 Bithoor jaghire, which remained in the Nana's 
 possession rent-free, that is to say, free from pay- 
 ment of land-tax. This was an act of favour for 
 which Nana Sahib should have been grateful, as 
 the Preamble of Kegulation I. of 1832 proves, that 
 the jaghire was resumable by the Government at 
 pleasure. 1 
 
 1 I have been unable to ascertain the value of the jaghire. 
 It appears from the correspondence, that Bajee Rao expended 
 large sums in buildings on the estate, and I hear that many of his 
 old followers resided on the land. 
 
58 NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's expression that the Peishwa 
 * left no sons of his own/ may have been unfor- 
 tunate, inasmuch as it may afford a ground, how- 
 ever slight, for the argument of Mr. Arnold, that 
 the non-continuance of the ex-Peishwa's pension 
 was a fresh application of the doctrine of escheat, 
 founded on a refusal to recognize the adoption of 
 Nana Sahib. But the whole correspondence shows 
 that this is not the fact ; that the real issue was 
 whether the pension was hereditary or for life 
 only; and that Lord Dalhousie, in adverting to 
 the failure of Bajee Bao's natural heirs, was using 
 an argument a fortiori, which was in truth unneces- 
 sary to his conclusion. 
 
 It was not till after this decision that the claim 
 of the Nana assumed the distinct form of a claim of 
 right to succeed to the pension. His memorial to 
 the Court of Directors relied on the terms of the 
 arrangement, entered into between Sir John Malcolm 
 and Bajee Bao, granting a pension to the latter * for 
 ' the support of himself and family/ and insisted that 
 such provision indicated the hereditary character of 
 the grant, as it was unnecessary and unmeaning in 
 its application to a mere life grant, ' for a provision 
 ' for the support of a prince necessarily included 
 
NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 59 
 
 'the maintenance of his family/ 1 The Court of 
 Directors regarded the pension as they would any 
 other pension granted to their dependants for the 
 maintenance of themselves and their families, and 
 held that the pension was not hereditary, and 
 that Nana Sahib had no claim whatever to its 
 continuance. 
 
 The fourth article of the agreement entered into 
 between Sir John Malcolm and Bajee Eao, provided, 
 ' that Bajee Eao shall, on his voluntarily agreeing 
 
 * to this arrangement, receive a liberal pension from 
 
 * the Company's Government for the support of 
 ' himself and family,' and the amount was thus 
 defined ; ' Brigadier General Malcolm takes upon 
 
 * himself to engage that it shall not be less than 
 
 * eight lacs of rupees per annum/ The memorial 
 contended that this fourth article amounted to a 
 perpetual charge on the revenues in favour of Bajee 
 Kao and his heirs. But the word ' pension ' does 
 not necessarily import an hereditary pension, and, 
 on the contrary, its ordinary and popular meaning 
 is an annuity payable for the life of the recipient. 
 Here the grantee of the pension is Bajee Kao alone, 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 105. 
 
60 NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 
 
 and not Bajee Eao and his heirs. The construction 
 contended for must therefore rest on the words 
 * for the support of himself and his family.' But 
 these are not the words ordinarily used in treaties, 
 or other formal documents, to indicate the hereditary 
 character of a grant ; and if it was intended to 
 confer an hereditary grant, there was no difficulty 
 in expressing that intention in language that would 
 obviate all doubt. It is obvious that the words are 
 capable of receiving the interpretation that the 
 pension was intended to provide for the support not 
 only of the ex-Peishwa, but of his family also. It is 
 objected that on this hypothesis the words would 
 be superfluous and unmeaning ; but I demur to the 
 statement that a provision for a prince necessarily 
 includes the maintenance of his family. Those 
 words are expressive in two senses, first, as in- 
 timating the intention of the Government that the 
 pension should be large enough to provide for the 
 family of the Peishwa as well as for himself, and 
 secondly, as expressing that it was designed to throw 
 the burden of the family on the ex-Peishwa himself, 
 and prevent applications for pensions from his rela- 
 tions, such as the Government afterwards received 
 from numerous retainers of Bajee Eao, (not included 
 
NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 61 
 
 in the term 'family,') and felt compelled to 
 grant. 
 
 Assuming, however, that these words are 
 ambiguous, let us consider, for that is the best 
 criterion of their meaning, what was the under- 
 standing concerning them of both parties to the 
 original arrangement, as evidenced by their declara- 
 tions and acts. 
 
 It is clear that Sir John Malcolm only intended 
 to grant a pension for life. His letter of the 19th 
 of June, 1818, points out that if Bajee Eao had 
 protracted the contest, many men 'would have 
 ' rejoined his army, and if that should have occurred, 
 ' there would have been the necessity of our bringing 
 ' into the field armies which would have cost more 
 ' than the value of the life pension granted to Bajee 
 Eao.' L And it is remarkable that Mr. Kaye himself, 
 in another work, takes this accurate view of the case. 
 In his Life of Sir John Maleolm he calls Bajee Eao 
 ' an annuitant/ and argues on the assumption that 
 the pension ceased with his life. 2 
 
 Again, what evidence is there that Bajee Eao 
 
 1 KAYE'S Life of Sir J. Malcolm, vol. ii., p. 259. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 265. 
 
62 NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 
 
 understood that the pension was granted for anything 
 more than his life ? I have already adverted to his 
 applications for a provision for his family after his 
 death. All were appeals to the generosity of the 
 Government for future favour, not claims of right 
 founded on an interpretation, however erroneous, of 
 the agreement with Sir J. Malcolm. Is it to be 
 supposed that if the ex-Peishwa had not himself 
 understood that his pension was for life, his appli- 
 cation would have assumed that form? Surely 
 he would either have remained silent concerning a 
 pension which he thought assured to' his successors 
 without question; or he would have asked for the 
 recognition of his adopted son as the future successor 
 to his pension ; or, if he supposed that the hereditary 
 character of the pension was unfairly in controversy, 
 he would have put forward his own construction of 
 the treaty, and claimed the performance of what he 
 understood to be its obligations. 
 
 Again, if the continuance of this pension was 
 matter of contract, or understood so to be, there 
 seems to have been nothing to prevent the Nana 
 Sahib from suing the Government for the payment 
 of it. No question of personal dignity interfered 
 with his adoption of that course, if he had been 
 
NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 63 
 
 so advised, for he and his father allowed a lady 
 of their family, the widow of Chinna Appa, a 
 younger brother of Bajee Eao, to institute a suit 
 against the Government, and they furnished the 
 funds for its prosecution. No question of juris- 
 diction prevented his application to the courts of 
 justice. There does not seem to be any substan- 
 tial difference between his claim, and that which 
 has been notoriously carried through all the Courts 
 in a suit between the late Mr. Dyce Sombre or his 
 representatives, and the East India Company. 
 
 I trust I have shown that Lord Dalhousie was 
 right in protecting the public purse from this 
 preposterous demand. If a moderate degree of 
 liberality towards native grandees be reasonable 
 and politic, the continuance of the jaghire was 
 a sufficient compliance with such a policy. If the 
 proper refusal of a larger claim engendered hatred, 
 no blame can attach to Lord Dalhousie. 
 
 I have dwelt upon this question longer than I 
 think is warranted by its importance ; for, of all 
 the imputations cast upon Lord Dalhousie's memory 
 by his assailants, this, of a supposed grievance of 
 the Nana Sahib, has ever seemed to me to be 
 the least substantial. Those who will take the 
 
64 NANA SAHIB'S CLAIMS. 
 
 trouble fairly to investigate the question, can hardly 
 fail to come to the conclusion, that it is only by 
 the exercise of a perverse ingenuity that British 
 writers can find, in the dealings of Lord Dalhousie's 
 government with this monster of treachery and 
 cruelty, any explanation I suppose they would 
 hardly account it, extenuation of the foulest crime 
 of the Indian Mutiny. 
 
ACT XL OF 1852, 
 
 I AGREE with Mr. Kaye in considering the re- 
 sumption measures of the Indian Government most 
 oppressive. But they were not the work of Lord 
 Dalhousie, or the result of his policy. These 
 resumptions were recommended by the first revenue 
 authorities in India, sanctioned by the Court of 
 Directors, and carried out with ruthless energy in 
 Bengal, Behar, the North-West Provinces, and 
 Bombay, long before Lord Dalhousie landed. All 
 that can be laid to Lord Dalhousie's charge, is, 
 that he assented to a resumption Act for certain 
 districts in Bombay, 1 which was a mere supplement 
 
 1 Act XI. of 1852. 
 
66 ACT XI. OF 1852. 
 
 to previous legislation, and was less oppressive than 
 former enactments on the same subject. 
 
 Under the old native governments, it was the 
 practice to grant lands free from revenue (or land- 
 tax), in favour of religious persons or communities, 
 and as rewards for public and other services 1 ren- 
 dered to the state or its sovereign. As the tax 
 on land was the principal source of revenue, the 
 existence of large tracts of land exempted from 
 its payment, of necessity, either caused a great 
 loss to the Government, or the increased taxation 
 of the un exempted lands. An inquiry into the 
 validity of these revenue-free tenures, on first taking 
 possession of a province, was a wise measure ; but 
 the old resumption Eegulations applied to pro- 
 vinces long under our rule, and subjected to inves- 
 tigation the titles of persons who had held land 
 for long periods, without paying revenue. They 
 were framed on the principle that there was a 
 general liability on all landowners to pay the tax, 
 and cast the onus of proving exemption on the 
 
 1 Some of these services were not of a reputable, or even a 
 decent nature. 
 
ACT XI. OF 1852. 67 
 
 landowners, many of whom had lost the evidences 
 of it. These Eegulations disregarded the presump- 
 tions arising from lapse of time, and the conduct of 
 the Government in never compelling payment of the 
 tax, and made the landowner prove his own case 
 
 affirmatively, irrespective of those presumptions. 1 
 
 f 
 
 Act IX. of 1852 was prepared by the Govern- 
 ment of Bombay, and forwarded to Calcutta. I 
 was then acting as fourth, or law, member of the 
 Council, and entertained strong objections to the 
 Act ; but feeling the hopelessness of attempting to 
 subvert a policy already established, I objected to 
 the severity of some of its clauses, rather than its 
 principle. These objections were overruled by the 
 civilian members, one of whom, I remember, con- 
 sidered my views ' occidental rather than Oriental.' 
 When the Act came before the Council, Lord Dal- 
 housie expressed a verbal opinion in its favour, 
 but the ground of that opinion I do not remember. 2 
 
 1 See Bengal Regulations XIV. of 1825. The previous Bombay 
 Regulations were XVII. of 1827, chapters 9 and 10, and Regula- 
 tion VI. of 1833. 
 
 2 I do not recollect seeing any Minute of Lord Dalhousie's 
 on the subject. 
 
 52 
 
68 ACT XI. OF 1852. 
 
 Being overruled, and disapproving of the Act, I took 
 no further interest in it, and it passed the Council, 
 without any material alteration in its very untech- 
 nical language. 
 
 Although I agree with Mr. Kaye in much that 
 he has said of resumption measures, I think that, 
 misled hy Mr. Set on Karr's memorial, he has given 
 an exaggerated account of the working of this Act. 
 Mr. Seton Karr is quoted as saying : ' Each day 
 ' produced its list of victims, and the good fortune 
 
 * of those who escaped hut added to the pangs of 
 ' the crowd who came forth from the shearing-house 
 ' shorn to the skin, unable to work, ashamed to 
 ' beg, condemned to penury.' And Mr. Kaye 
 adds, * the titles of no less than 35,000 estates, 
 ' great and small, were called for by the Commission, 
 
 * and during the first five years of its operations, 
 ' three -fifths of them were confiscated.' 1 Now, 
 most readers would suppose from these statements, 
 that these enamdars were immediately turned out of 
 their houses and lands, and reduced to penury. 
 But, in fact, there was no ousting from possession, 
 the object of these investigations being a resump- 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 177. 
 
ACT XI. OF 1852. 69 
 
 tion of the right to the land revenue, and not a 
 resumption of the land itself. The title which 
 was set aside was not the title to land, but the 
 title to hold it free from the payment of revenue. 
 It is true, that in the case of a pretended village 
 enamdar, that is, the holder of a whole estate let 
 out to subholders, resumption became the same as 
 dispossession, because its consequence was, that 
 the actual holder of each field came to pay the 
 assessment of his land direct to Government, 
 nothing being then paid to the quasi enamdar. 
 But then, in all these cases, the Act of 1852 per- 
 mitted, 1 and the Commissioners always allowed, 
 unless it was a case of gross fraud, 2 the person 
 claiming as enamdar, whose title was disproved, to 
 retain the privileges of enamdar during his life. In 
 this respect, this much-abused Act of 1852, was 
 more lenient in its provisions than the kindred 
 enactments of the Bengal Presidency. 
 
 The Enam Commissioners were, in another 
 respect, much more lenient than other resumption 
 
 1 Act XI. of 1852, schedule B., rule vi., aud its provisions, 
 and rule vii., provision 7. 
 
 2 Ex relatione W. Hart, Esq., formerly Chief Enam Com- 
 missioner. 
 
70 ACT XI. OF 1852. 
 
 authorities. 1 Previous to the institution of that 
 Commission, it was the universal custom, in all 
 investigations of the titles of alleged enams, to 
 throw the burden of proving his title upon the 
 landowner. But in 1845, it was settled by the 
 Enam Commission, that the onus probandi was on 
 the Government, and this principle was not departed 
 from by Act XI. of 1852, which recognizes titles 
 with no other foundation than long exemption from 
 payment of revenue. 2 
 
 I shall not dwell further on this resumption 
 measure, for it must be clear to every unprejudiced 
 mind, that it formed no part of Lord Dalhousie's 
 policy, and that the oppressive nature of the Act 
 has been greatly exaggerated. It had nothing to 
 
 1 For a full account of these resumption operations in Bombay, 
 see a printed letter, dated 25th July, 1859, addressed by 
 W. Hart, Esq., formerly Chief Enam Commissioner, to W. 
 Ewart, Esq., Chairman of the Committee appointed to inquire 
 into the prospects of European colonization and settlement in 
 India. This letter shows, that the Act was less oppressive in its 
 provisions than the former rules under which the Commission 
 acted. 
 
 2 See sections xi. and xii. of Mr. Hart's letter to Mr. Ewart, 
 before referred to, pp. 6, 7, and 8 ; and Act XI. of 1852, 
 schedule B., rules iii. and iv., and provision 5 of rule vii., and 
 provision 4 of rule viii. 
 
ACT XI. OF 1852. 71 
 
 do with the subsequent outbreak in a part of 
 the Southern Mahratta country, and there was 
 no rebellion in the other districts in which Act XI. 
 of 1852 was put in force, notwithstanding the 
 excitement occasioned by a mutiny at Kholapore, 
 and intrigues at Sattarah. 
 
 
SPOLIATION OF THE NAGPORE PALACE- 
 THE BHONSLA FUND, 
 
 MR. KAYE complains of ' the spoliation of the 
 
 * palace, which followed closely upon the extinction 
 
 * of the Eaj ' of Nagpore. 1 He speaks of the sale 
 of the live and dead stock, of the furniture removed, 
 and of the jewels sent to the Calcutta market, as 
 creating a worse impression than the seizure of 
 the kingdom itself. He also observes, ' I know 
 
 * that the question of public and private property 
 1 is a difficult one, and I shall not attempt to 
 6 decide it here. I only speak of the intense 
 ' mortification that these sales create in the family 
 ' itself, and the bad impression which they produce 
 1 throughout the country. Eightly or wrongly, 
 
 i KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 83. 
 
SPOLIATION OF THE NAGPORE PALACE. 73 
 
 ' they cast great discredit on our name ; and the 
 6 gain of money is not worth the loss of character.' 1 
 Mr. Arnold also speaks of this transaction, as if 
 Lord Dalhousie had confiscated the property of 
 the late Kajah. 2 
 
 But Lord Dalhousie did not sell this property 
 as public property of the Nagpore State, to which 
 the British Government became entitled on their 
 accession to the sovereignty. The difficult ques- 
 tions referred to by Mr. Kaye, whether the pro- 
 perty of an absolute monarch is not all public 
 property, and whether it is possible to distinguish 
 between the public and private property of such a 
 sovereign though referred to, were not actually 
 relied on, until Lord Canning's government seized 
 the property appertaining to the Kaj of Tanjore. 
 Lord Dalhousie did not claim this property for 
 the British Government, or confiscate it, but he 
 directed its realization by sale, with the view of 
 protecting the proceeds from misappropriation. 
 In his Minute of the 10th of June, 1854, he 
 observed : 3 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 84, note. 
 
 2 ARNOLD'S Dalhousie Administration, vol. ii. p. 166. 
 
 3 Parl. Papers relating to Annexation of Berur, 1856, p. 10. 
 
74 SPOLIATION OF THE NAG PORE PALACE 
 
 ' It is not, I thin1c 9 desirable that the property 
 1 which the Honourable Court has considered to 
 ' be " fairly at the disposal of the Government," 
 ' should be alienated from the family, but neither 
 ' should it be given up, to be appropriated and 
 1 squandered by the Eanees. 
 
 ( I would, therefore, propose that jewels, and 
 1 furniture, and other personal property suitable to their 
 1 rank, having been allotted to the Eanees, the value 
 f of the rest of the jewels, &c. ; should be realized, 
 ' and that the proceeds should be constituted a 
 ' fund for the benefit of the Bhonsla family. As the 
 ' Commissioner seems to think that the value likely 
 ' to be realized has been over-estimated, the Govern- 
 ' ment should be prepared to make up any sums 
 ' that may be wanting to afford adequate stipends 
 ' to the family.' 
 
 Every obstacle was thrown in the way of the 
 realization of the property. The treasure was con- 
 cealed under ground in the palace. A large amount 
 in gold mohurs was kept in the private apartments 
 of the Ranees, where it could not be taken. 
 Then the Eanees refused to point out what por- 
 tion of the furniture and jewels they wished to 
 retain, and at other times they offered to give up 
 
THE BHONSLA FUND. 75 
 
 the whole, without retaining any part for them- 
 selves; and, on one occasion, the opposition culmi- 
 nated in a riot in the palace, in which several 
 persons were injured. 1 
 
 The Commissioner, Captain Elliot, appears to 
 have acted with the greatest forbearance under 
 these trying circumstances, and Lord Dalhousie 
 directed, 2 that ' he should be exhorted to continue 
 1 to act on the same principles, disregarding the 
 6 petulance and vexatious opposition the Kanees 
 6 may offer; and under every provocation showing 
 ' them the courtesy due to their rank, their sex, 
 ' and their changed condition ; especially he should 
 ' be instructed to have recourse to no " stringent or 
 ' " coercive measures," without previous communi- 
 * cation with the Government, except under cir- 
 1 cumstances which will not admit of delay/ 
 And, again, when the retention of the gold mohurs 
 was reported to him, he wrote to the Commis- 
 sioner 3 : ' It will be satisfactory to the Govern - 
 ' ment if the treasure withheld improperly in the 
 
 1 Parl. Papers, Annexation of Berar, pp. 25, 32, 42. 
 
 2 Lord Dalhousie's Minute, 30th September, 1854. Parl. 
 Papers, Annexation of Berar, 1856, p. 29. 
 
 3 Parl. Papers, Annexation of Berar, 1856, p. 45. 
 
76 SPOLIATION OF THE NAGPORE PALACE 
 
 ' palace, should be obtained by persuasion, or volun- 
 * tarily given up. Under any circumstances, you 
 6 should closely adhere to the resolution expressed 
 ' in your 12th paragraph, that you would on no 
 ' account use force for the recovery of the gold 
 ' mohurs. It would, indeed, be desirable rather 
 1 to fail in obtaining them, than to enter the palace 
 1 apartment for that purpose.' 
 
 Eventually the Ranees gave up some of the 
 gold mohurs, and some of the treasure was dug 
 up : but it was the opinion of the Commissioner 
 that large sums were still concealed, or had been 
 made away with. The difficulty as to the furniture 
 and jewels to be assigned to the Ranees, was solved 
 by the Commissioner making that selection for 
 them, which they refused to make for themselves. 1 
 
 The property, after setting aside suitable por- 
 tions of it for the Ranees, and after payment 
 of the debts of the household, 2 realized the sum 
 
 1 Parliamentary Papers, Annexation of Berar, pp. 42, 43, 27. 
 
 2 These debts should have been paid by the Ilajah in his life- 
 time, and his money was ' now applied to the purpose on which it 
 1 ought originally to have been expended.' See Lord Dalhousie's 
 Minute of the 26th of September, 1854. Parliamentary Papers, 
 Annexation of Berar, p. 30. 
 
THE BHONSLA FUND. 77 
 
 of 200,OOOL 1 On the 26th of September, 1854, 
 long before this sum was realized, Lord Dalhousie 
 observed : ' The officiating Commissioner asks for 
 ' the promised instructions regarding the formation 
 
 * of the fund for the use of the Kanees, to be 
 ' formed out of the value of property to be sold 
 ' for their behoof. The Government will not be 
 s in a condition to give those instructions until it 
 1 shall know the sum which may have been realized, 
 i and shall have determined how it may be invested. 
 
 * In the meantime, the officiating Commissioner 
 ' should pay the full amount of the several stipends 
 ' allowed to the persons for whom they were 
 
 * designed, out of the Government Treasury.' Mr. 
 Temple, the Commissioner of Nagpore, in his recent 
 Report on that province, speaks of the above- 
 mentioned sum of 200,OOOL as constituting ' the 
 ' Bhonsla Fund,' and as a deposit in the hands of 
 the British Government for the benefit and sup- 
 port of the Bhonsla family. Notwithstanding 
 this official declaration, to which Major Bell 
 refers in his work, notwithstanding the re- 
 
 1 See Mr. TEMPLE'S Report on Nagpore, and Parl. Papers, 
 Annexation of Berar, p. 30. 
 
78 SPOLIATION OF THE NAGPORE PALACE 
 
 peated declarations of Lord Dalhousie on this 
 subject, Major Bell has thought fit to write as 
 follows : 1 ' In his very natural desire to overlay 
 ' this ugly deed with a little moral gilding, Lord 
 ' Dalhousie betrayed himself into some inconsistency 
 ' of language, but his practical object is not at all 
 6 ambiguous. He intended absolutely to appro- 
 ' priate the private property of the family, and 
 ' with the proceeds to supply, or reduce as much as 
 ( possible, the annual expense of their maintenance. 
 4 He does indeed repeatedly declare that the pro- 
 ' ceeds shall not be " alienated from the Bhonsla 
 ' " family." But as he simultaneously employs in 
 
 * these very minutes, and in the orders issued at 
 ' the same time to the Commissioner, other terms 
 ' implying a totally opposite meaning, these pretty 
 ( expressions become mere prevarications, and fail 
 
 * entirely to give an air of decency to what was, 
 
 * in fact, a daring act of spoliation.' I can find 
 
 i 
 nothing in Lord Dalhousie's Minutes to justify 
 
 these remarks. He may not have been sufficiently 
 explicit as to the destination of this fund eventually, 
 but he states expressly, that the fund was to be an 
 inalienable deposit for the benefit of the Bhonsla 
 
 1 BELL'S Empire in India, p. 240. 
 
THE BHONSLA FUND. 79 
 
 family a statement which would seem to exclude 
 the Government from any participation in that 
 fund. So long as it was so kept in deposit, all 
 the annuities and pensions to the late Rajah's 
 family, relations, and dependants amounting to a 
 sum far exceeding any interest the fund could pro- 
 duce, were paid by the British Government. And 
 although Lord Dalhousie did not explain how 
 the fund was to be dealt with when the pensions 
 were paid off, yet it is clear he set it apart, and 
 appropriated it, as an inalienable fund for the 
 benefit of the Bhonsla family, and that he left 
 the fund untouched when he resigned office in 
 1856. Without pledging the Government of India 
 as to details, Lord Dalhousie laid down a principle 
 for the administration of the fund, and left it open 
 to some future Governor-General to deal with it 
 in accordance with such principle, that is, for the 
 benefit of the Bhonsla family, in such manner as he 
 might think just. 1 
 
 1 While this sheet has been in the press, the Calcutta Cor- 
 respondent of the Times announces, that Sir C. Trevelyan has 
 * absorbed ' this fund, and ' capitalized ' it. I suppose this means 
 that the money has been taken by the Government, and Govern- 
 ment Paper substituted for it. But whatever is now done with 
 
80 SPOLIATION OF THE NAGPORE PALACE 
 
 At the time of the annexation, Lord Dalhousie 
 granted the following annuities to the ladies of the 
 family of the late Eajah : 
 
 The Banka Baee, adoptive mother 
 
 of the late Rajah 12,000 a year. 
 
 The widows of the late Rajah : 
 
 Unpoornah 5,000 ,, 
 
 Durga 2,500 ,, 
 
 Annunda 2,500 ,, 
 
 Kamulgee 2,500 ,, 
 
 Sacotra , 1,000 
 
 25,500 a year. 
 
 In addition to these stipends, the family held 
 estates, free from payment of revenue, producing 
 I,00(M. a year. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie likewise directed, that liberal 
 )vision should be made for other members of the 
 family, as well as the connections, dependants, and 
 retainers of the late Kajah. The total sum granted 
 to these persons amounted to 78, TOOL a year. 
 Mr. Temple, in his recent Eeport, states, that not- 
 withstanding the death of some of these annuitants, 
 the sum of 98,200/., one-fourth of the revenue of 
 
 the fund, I would only call attention to the fact, that the fund, 
 which Lord Dalhousie is supposed to have appropriated, is actually 
 in existence, and the suhject of a financial operation, in 1865. 
 
THE BHONSLA FUND. 81 
 
 the late kingdom of Nagpore, was still devoted to 
 the support of the Bhonsla family, and its retainers 
 and dependants. 
 
 I trust this short statement will relieve Lord 
 Dalhousie from the charge of spoliation. The 
 creation of the Bhonsla Fund with the proceeds of 
 the sale, and its present existence as an actual 
 fund in the hands of the British Government, 
 show that Lord Dalhousie's object was not con- 
 fiscation, but preservation. If the property was 
 sold at a great sacrifice, as Mr. Kaye suggests, 
 that was a misfortune for which Lord Dalhousie 
 is not shown to be answerable. It could not 
 have been his wish to diminish a fund which, to 
 some extent so long as the Government held it 
 in deposit without paying interest diminished the 
 amount payable by Government for annuities and 
 pensions. 
 
THE NAWAB OP THE CARNATIC, 
 
 ON the 17th of October, 1855, his Highness Ma- 
 homed Ghouse, the last Nawab of the Carnatic, 
 died, without leaving issue. The Prince Azeem 
 Jah, his uncle and nearest relation, sought the 
 recognition of the Government as Nawab, in 
 succession to his nephew. The Government of 
 Madras, Lord Dalhousie, and the Court of Di- 
 rectors, all concurred in refusing to recognize his 
 claim. 
 
 The Nawabs of the Carnatic, once important 
 powers, with whom the kings of England cor- 
 responded, and the East India Company negotiated, 
 had long since dwindled into mere puppets of 
 royalty. In 1801, in consequence of their mis- 
 conduct during the war with Tippoo Sultan in 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CAR1STATIC. 83 
 
 1799, and the subsequent discovery of a secret 
 correspondence between them and that prince, they 
 were deprived of the government of their country, 
 and reduced to the position of sovereigns in name 
 and rank only, with a handsome pecuniary pension 
 secured on the revenues. Their position was some- 
 what similar to that of the late titular sovereign of 
 Delhi ; but to compare the condition to which they 
 afterwards sank with that of fallen royalty elsewhere, 
 would give a very inadequate notion of their de- 
 gradation. The kings of Delhi, though shorn of 
 real power, continued to reside in the imperial 
 city, with the empty honours of a throne ; they 
 rarely came in contact with any functionary higher 
 than a Commissioner, and on the rare occasions 
 when they encountered a Governor-General, they 
 were treated with extraordinary honours ; and they 
 retained, as the representatives of the house of 
 Timour, their hold on the affections of the Mahom- 
 medans throughout India; and even Europeans 
 could not refuse to feel for them something of that 
 respect and sympathy which fallen greatness inspires. 
 Very different was the position of the Nawabs of 
 the Carnatic. Living in a presidency town, over- 
 shadowed by .the Governor of Madras, squandering 
 
 62 
 
84 THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 
 
 their large revenue in debauchery and mere frivoli- 
 ties; cheating, whenever they could cheat, their 
 creditors by means of their immunity from legal 
 process; and, on the other hand, plundered by 
 usurers, whose rapacity was in proportion to the 
 insecurity of their debts ; they rapidly sank to the 
 lowest limit to which puppet-royalty can descend. 
 Such a mockery of an ancient dynasty could answer 
 no useful purpose, though it might form a rallying 
 point for the disaffected, and it can hardly be con- 
 tended that the Government of India was bound to 
 perpetuate so mischievous a " sham," at the expense 
 of one-fifth of the revenues of the province, if it 
 could be got rid of without injustice. 
 
 Two questions arose for consideration. First, 
 whether Prince Azeem Jah had any hereditary right 
 to succeed his nephew. Second, if he had not, 
 whether it was under the circumstances expedient to 
 confer the title of Nawab upon him. 
 
 No better statement of the argument on the 
 hereditary right can be put, than that by Lord 
 Dalhousie, in his Minute of the 19th of December, 
 1855 i 1 
 
 1 Carnatic Papers, printed by order of the House of Commons, 
 17th April, i860, p. 47, paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 85 
 
 < In the determination of the future disposal of 
 the musnud of the Carnatic, it is quite unnecessary 
 ' to make any reference to the treaties of 1785, 
 6 1787, and 1792. 
 
 ' Subsequently to the date of those treaties, it 
 ' was declared by the British Government, that 
 * the detected treachery and secret but active hos- 
 ' tility of the Nawabs Mahomed Ali and Omdut-ul- 
 ' Omrah had placed them in the position of public 
 1 enemies, had rendered their territories justly liable 
 1 to forfeiture, and had therefore abrogated the 
 4 treaties which had previously been in force. 
 ' " By acting on these principles of condu 
 ' says Lord Wellesley, " the Nabobs have 
 ' " only violated the rights of the Company, but by 
 ' " uniting their interests with those of the most 
 ' " implacable enemy of the British empire, actually 
 ' " placed themselves in the relation of public 
 ' " enemies to the Company's government,'! 
 ' again, " at the death of Omdut ul Omrah, the 
 ' " British Government remained at liberty to 
 
 1 See paragraph 14 of the Marquis Wellesley's Despatch, of 28th 
 May, 1801, in 2nd vol. of Lord WELLESLEY'S Indian Despatches, 
 p. 520. The whole of this important despatch is not inserted in the 
 Parliamentary papers, only so much as appears in the Petitioner's 
 Case. See also paragraphs 16 and 19 of this despatch. 
 
86 THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 
 
 ' " exercise its rights, founded on the faithless 
 ' " policy of its ally, in whatever manner might be 
 ' " deemed most conducive to the immediate safety 
 ' " and to the general interests of the Company in 
 < " the Carnatic." 
 
 ' Thus in 1801, the territories of the Nawab of 
 1 the Carnatic were at the absolute disposal of the 
 1 British Government. 1 
 
 ' It is distinctly stated in Lord Wellesley's 
 1 despatches, and in the papers connected with the 
 
 * treaty of 1801, that the British Government was 
 ' then at liberty to assume the government of the 
 
 * Carnatic. Lord Wellesley was only deterred from 
 6 assuming it by various considerations of expe- 
 
 iency and policy, in which the revolt of the 
 )ligars, the view which might be taken of the 
 measure by other native powers, or the long- 
 
 * established connection between the Company and 
 ( the house of Mahomed Ali, all held a place. 
 
 . Accordingly, the title of the Nawab of the 
 
 * Carnatic was conferred upon Azeem-ul-Dowlah by 
 4 the treaty of 1801, on certain conditions which 
 ' are specified. 
 
 |See Lord Wellesley's despatch of 18th August, 1801. 
 Carnatic Parliamentary papers of the 27th May, 1861, p. 109. 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 87 
 
 < It is from this treaty, if at all, that a right of 
 ' hereditary succession to the musnud of the Car- 
 1 natic must be derived/ 
 
 Prince Azeem Jah and his advisers deny that 
 there was treachery or hostility on the part of the old 
 Nawabs, and they cite Mr. Mill's criticism on the 
 evidence of it. 1 Whether that criticism is satis- 
 factory I need not stop to inquire, though I do not 
 think it would be difficult to show, that Lord Wel- 
 lesley was justified in his conviction of the Nawab's 
 treachery. It is sufficient for my purpose to say, 
 that this question was considered in 1801, and had 
 long been res judicata. No statesman, in the posi- 
 
 1 MILL'S History of British India, vol. vi. p. 309. This criti- 
 cism omits all mention of the fact that during the war against 
 Tippoo, in 1799, the Nawab ' acted more like an enemy than a 
 ' friend,' and was suspected of treachery at the time by Lord Clive, 
 then Governor of Madras. The Nawab was prohibited by treaty from 
 correspondence with foreign powers, and ought to have avoid tid ai^y 
 correspondence with such an enemy to our rule as Tippoo. Sh John 
 Malcolm, who was much better acquainted with Oriental modes of 
 expression than Mr. Mill, considered the letters found at Serugjv 
 patam, contained ' conclusive evidence of a secret intercourse 
 ' between the Nawab and Tippoo Sultan, directed to purposes 
 ' hostile to the interests of the Company.' See Narrative of pro- 
 ceedings relative to the settlement of the Carnatic by Mijor 
 (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm. Papers ordered by the House of 
 Commons to be printed, 17th April, 1860, pp. 23, 24, and 25, 
 
88 THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 
 
 tion of Lords Dalhousie or Harris, could dream of 
 re-opening in 1855, questions which had been 
 settled in 1801. The question which they had to 
 decide was, not whether Lord Wellesley was right 
 in imposing the treaty of 1801 on the Nawab he 
 then placed on the throne, but whether under the 
 terms of that treaty, which had subsisted for 
 upwards of half a century, they were justified in 
 doing that which sound policy demanded, and in 
 abating an admitted nuisance. The simple issue 
 for their decision was, whether Lord Wellesley had 
 undertaken, in the treaty of 1801, that the titular 
 ity and emoluments continued to the new 
 Nawab should be hereditary. 
 
 The first Treaty signed by the new Nawab, 
 Azeem-ul-Dowlah, was not ratified by Lord Wel- 
 lesley, as required by its concluding article. He 
 objected to it, because the preamble and first section 
 attributed the right of the new Nawab, Azeem-ul- 
 i > Hah, to succeed * to a supposed claim of inhe- 
 ' ritance, and not to the liberality and moderation 
 ' of the British Government.' ' This/ he observed, 
 was the fundamental principle on which the late 
 ' arrangements have been framed ; and consequently 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNAT1U. 89 
 
 ' the acknowledgment of an inherent right in any 
 ' member of the family of the late ' Nawabs ' to 
 ' succeed to the Soubahdarree of the Carnatic is 
 ' incompatible with the maintenance of that prin- 
 ' ciple.' 1 In consequence of this objection, the 
 preamble and first article were altered. The Treaty, 
 thus altered, received the cheerful assent 2 and sig- 
 nature of the Nawab Azeem-ul-Dowlah. The im- 
 portant part of the preamble, and the whole of the 
 first article, thus altered, are as follows : 3 
 
 6 And whereas, the Soubahdarry of Arcot having 
 ' become vacant, the Prince Azeem-ul-Dowlah Ba- 
 
 * hadur has now been established by the English 
 
 * East India Company in the rank, property, and 
 6 possessions of Ms ancestors, heretofore Nabobs of 
 ' the Carnatic : And whereas the said Company 
 6 and his Highness Prince Azeem-ul-Dowlah Ba- 
 < hadur have judged it expedient that additional 
 
 * provisions should be made for supplying the 
 
 1 Despatch of the 18th of August, 1801. Carnatic Parlia- 
 mentary papers of May, 1861, p. 109. 
 
 2 Despatch of the Governor of Madras to Vice-President in 
 Council, 22nd September, 1801, paragraphs 5 and 6. Carnatic 
 papers of May, 1861, pp. Ill and 112. 
 
 3 Vol. ii. Lord WELLESLEY'S Indian Despatches, Appendix, 
 p. 720. 
 
90 THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 
 
 ' defects of all former engagements, and of esta- 
 1 blishing the connection between the said con- 
 ' tracting parties on a permanent basis of security 
 ' in all times to come : Wherefore, the following 
 
 * treaty is now established/ &c. .... for settling 
 the succession to the Soubahdarry of the territories 
 of Arcot, and for vesting the administration of the 
 civil and military government of the Carnatic in 
 the United Company, &c. 
 
 ' Article 1. The Nabob Azeem-ul-Dowlah Ba- 
 ' hadur is hereby formally established in the state 
 ' and rank, with the dignities dependent thereon of 
 ( his ancestors, heretofore Nabobs of the Carnatic, 
 ' and the possession thereof is hereby guaranteed 
 ' by the Honourable East India Company to his 
 'said Highness Azeem-ul-Dowlah Bahadur, who 
 
 * has accordingly succeeded to the Soubahdarry of 
 
 * the territories of Arcot.' 
 
 By the fourth article, the whole civil, military, 
 fiscal, and judicial government of the Carnatic was 
 vested for ever in the East India Company. 
 
 Speaking of this Treaty, Lord Dalhousie ob- 
 serves : ' I entirely agree with Lord Harris, and 
 < with the members of the Government of Fort 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 91 
 
 * St. George, in holding that the treaty of 1801 
 
 * confers no right of hereditary succession. It is 
 ' a purely .personal treaty concluded between the 
 4 Honourable Company on the one part, and the 
 6 Nawab Azeem-ul-Dowlah on his own behalf on 
 ' the other part. There is no mention of heirs and 
 
 * successors in any part of the treaty, and no grant 
 ' of anything is made by it to any one except to the 
 ' Nawab Azeem-ul-Dowlah himself. Lord Wellesley 
 ' was not a man who did things without a reason. 
 ' When, therefore, Lord Wellesley, while nego- 
 ' tiating treaties with the Nawab of Oude and 
 6 others, and forming the treaties with these 
 
 * princes, their heirs and successors, is found 
 ' negotiating a treaty with the Nawab Azeem-ul- 
 6 Dowlah alone, and omitting all mention in it 
 ' of heirs and successors, it is very certain that 
 
 * Lord Wellesley did not intend to extend the 
 ' provisions of that treaty beyond the life of 
 ' Azeem-ul-Dowlah himself/ 
 
 The words, ' of his ancestors/ occurring in the 
 preamble and first, article, are relied on as showing, 
 that Azeem-ul-Dowlah succeeded by descent from 
 his ancestors. But those words only state, what 
 was the fact, that the former Nawabs were the 
 
92 THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 
 
 ancestors of Azeem-ul-Dowlah, without in any way 
 affirming that he inherited from them. The Treaty 
 does not say that he succeeded, but that he was 
 6 established ' in the rank of his ancestors. Lord 
 Wellesley was careful to erase from the first 
 Treaty the words, 'the right of Prince Azeem- 
 * ul-Dowlah, founded upon the hereditary right of 
 ' his. father, to succeed to the rank/ and to sub- 
 stitute instead the words, 'established in the rank,' 
 and to declare, as we have seen, that Azeem-ul- 
 Dowlah did not succeed by hereditary right, but 
 in consequence of the liberality and moderation 
 of the British Government. As a matter of fact, 
 Azeem-ul-Dowlah was not the heir of the late 
 Nawab in 1801, for AH Hossein, the son of the 
 late Nawab, was at that time such heir. 1 Azeem- 
 ul-Dowlah moreover relinquished all claim to the 
 acknowledgment of his hereditary pretensions, 2 
 
 1 In some of the despatches All Hossein is spoken of as the 
 reputed son of the late Nawab. He was the acknowledged son 
 of the late Nawab, who made a will in his favour; and the 
 acknowledgment of a son by his father is almost conclusive 
 as to parentage, according to Mahomedan law. MACNAGHTEN'S 
 Principles of Mahomedan Law, p. 61. 
 
 2 See paragraph 6 of the letter of the Governor of Madras to 
 the President in Council, dated 22nd September, 1801, in Carnatic 
 Parliamentary papers of May, 1861, p. 112. 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 93 
 
 and took possession of the throne under a new 
 title, which was not derived from the old Nawabs, 
 but from the treaty of 1801. 
 
 Mr. Arnold contends that the Treaty was not a 
 personal one, because he says, * the fourth article 
 1 declares that four-fifths of the revenue were for 
 6 ever vested in the Company, and the remaining 
 1 one-fifth for ever appropriated for the support of 
 
 * the dignity of the Nawabship.' 1 But this does 
 not accurately represent the fact, for the fourth 
 article contains no such words. It provides that 
 the administration of the civil and military govern- 
 ment of the Carnatic, ' together with the full and 
 
 * exclusive right to the revenues thereof, (with the 
 ' exception of such portion of such revenues as shall 
 1 be appropriated for the maintenance of the said 
 ' Nabob, and for the support of his dignity,) shall be 
 
 * for ever vested in the said English Company.' 2 
 This article not only does not secure one-fifth of the 
 revenues to the Nabob for ever, but limits the 
 
 1 ARNOLD'S Dalhousie Administration, vol. ii. pp. 176, 177. 
 
 2 See Lord WELLESLEY'S Indian Despatches, vol. ii. Appendix, 
 p. 721. The 6th article also speaks of the fifth of the revenues 
 being ' allotted for the maintenance of the said Nawab and the 
 ' support of his dignity.' 
 
94 THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 
 
 payment of revenue to the ' said Nabob,' that is, 
 to Azeem-ul-Dowlah. All the revenue is vested in 
 the Company, except what is excepted, and the 
 exception does not confer more than a life-interest 
 on Azeem-ul-Dowlah. 
 
 Great stress is also laid on the words, ' in all 
 times to come/ found in the preamble of the 
 Treaty, and in the second Separate Article. 1 It 
 is said, these words show that the treaty was not 
 a personal one, that it contemplated the existence 
 of Nawabs in all times to come, and therefore an 
 hereditary succession. If the intention had been to 
 create an hereditary title, nothing would have been 
 easier than to say so in express words, and it might 
 have been inconvenient and impolitic, even having 
 regard to the interests of the Nawab, to limit the 
 tenure in express terms to his life. The framers of 
 the Treaty might well content themselves with the 
 words used in the first article, which established 
 Azeem-ul-Dowlah alone on the throne, and gua- 
 ranteed it to him alone, and omitted the usual 
 limitation in favour of heirs and successors, found in 
 
 1 Vol. ii. of Lord WELLESLEY'S Indian Despatches, Appendix, 
 pp. 720, 723. 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 95 
 
 other treaties establishing sovereignties. 1 Are these 
 considerations outweighed by the fact that the 
 words 'in all times to come' are found in the 
 preamble? Surely, if it had been the intention 
 of the parties to create an hereditary title by 
 these words, we should not have found them in 
 the preamble alone, but also in the first article, 
 which defines the rights of the Nawab. The 
 explanation of these words which I would suggest, 
 is that the framers of this Treaty intended it to 
 operate in perpetuity so far as it was expressed, 
 that is, so far as the rights of the Company were 
 concerned, leaving it to be determined, by future 
 considerations and events, whether this shadowy 
 royalty should be prolonged beyond the life of 
 Azeem-ul-Dowlah. The Treaty, therefore, carefully 
 confines the tenure of the Nawabship to the life of 
 Azeem-ul-Dowlah, and yet speaks in a vague way 
 so as not to exclude the possibility of the existence 
 of future Nawabs. This possibility might well be 
 contemplated, and yet confer no hereditary right of 
 succession, and it is clear that a mere reference to 
 
 1 See the treaties of Sattarah, Jhansi, and Nagpore already 
 referred to. 
 
96 THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 
 
 future Nawabs, does not make them parties to a 
 Treaty which conferred no benefit on them, and was 
 entered into by Azeem-ul-Dowlah ' on his own 
 ' behalf alone. 1 
 
 Mr. Arnold also cites the second Separate Article, 
 to show that the Treaty was not a personal one. 2 
 That article states, that it is ' the intention of the 
 6 contracting parties that the said sum of 213,421 
 ' pagodas, and the said sum of 621,105 pagodas, 
 i shall be considered to be permanent deductions in 
 6 all times to come from the revenues of the Car- 
 ' natic.' 3 Now this sum of 213,421 pagodas was a 
 sum payable, under the ninth article of the treaty 
 of 1787, to the family and principal officers of two 
 former Nabobs, and the sum of 621,105 pagodas 
 was payable on account of the private debts of one 
 of those Nabobs, and the sixth article of the Treaty 
 of 1801 provided, that both these sums should be 
 deducted from the gross revenue, in order to ascer- 
 tain the net revenue, of which the Nawab was to 
 have one-fifth. It is obvious, that as these debts 
 
 1 See Preamble of Treaty of 1801. 
 - ARNOLD'S DaMwusie Administration, vol. ii., p 177. 
 3 Lord WELLESLBY'S Indian Despatches, vol. ii. Appendix, 
 p. 7JJ3. 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 97 
 
 were paid off, and as the relatives and officers of 
 these old Nawabs died, these large sums would 
 decrease in amount, and the net revenue would 
 increase. To prevent this, and to secure to the 
 Government these large deductions from the revenue, 
 even after the debts and pensions were paid, this 
 clause was imposed on the Nabob. The word ' per- 
 manent' is not used in the sense of 'perpetual,' 
 but with the view of showing that the charges were 
 to continue, though the objects for which they were 
 incurred should fail. The words ' in all times to 
 come* have already been commented on. They 
 cannot be regarded as words of hereditary limita- 
 tion. It would be more consonant with established 
 rules of construction to reject those words altogether, 
 than give them a scope and operation inconsistent 
 with their position in the Treaty, and the other 
 language of that document. 
 
 Another argument on the Treaty is founded on 
 the words found in the preamble, ' for settling the 
 6 succession to the Soubahdarry.' The suggestion 
 seems to be, that these words contemplate an 
 hereditary succession. But Lord Harris has well 
 observed in his Minute, that these words refer to the 
 vacant throne mentioned in the former part of the 
 
 7 
 
98 THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 
 
 preamble, 1 and were fully satisfied by the appoint- 
 ment of Azeem-ul-Dowlah to that throne. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's Minute thus continues, It 
 1 is true that two Nawabs have sat upon the 
 
 * musnud since the death of Azeem-ul-Dowlah, but 
 
 * they successfully occupied that position solely by 
 'the grace and favour of the British Government, 
 ' and not as of right. There is nothing whatever 
 1 connected with the accession of those princes to 
 
 * the musnud, which would countenance the asser- 
 tion of any right to that dignity, either in them- 
 ' selves or in their children or heirs.' 
 
 ' The uncle of the late Nawab supports his 
 < present claim to the succession by reference to 
 ' certain allusions which have been made to him 
 
 * in former official papers, as the heir of his nephew 
 4 Mahomet Ghouse. Undoubtedly, those allusions 
 ' were made ; no attempt need be made to evade 
 6 them or weaken the full force of their meaning, 
 1 such as it is. They may readily be admitted to 
 ' indicate an expectation on the part of the British 
 ' Government, that if Mahomet Ghouse should 
 
 1 Minute of Lord Harris, dated 25th October, 1855, para. 13. 
 Camatic papers of April 17, 1860, p. 10. 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 99 
 
 ' have no children, his uncle Azeem Jah would 
 ' be allowed to succeed him as Nawab. But to 
 ' indicate an expectation, or even an intention, 
 ' is not to recognize or confer a right. The words, 
 ' therefore, which have been quoted, conferred no 
 4 right on Azeem Jah, and conveyed no pledge or 
 ' promise of the succession to him ; and, although 
 ' they indicated a favourable intention on the part 
 ' of the Government towards him, the Government 
 ' has since had but too much reason to forego all 
 
 * such intentions in favour of himself and the 
 
 * members of his family.' 
 
 I should exceed the limits to which this work is 
 confined, if I supported these statements of Lord 
 Dalhousie with a narrative of the correspondence 
 which took place on the subsequent accessions of 
 the son and grandson of Azeem-ul-Dowlah. 1 I 
 would only remark, that on the death of Azeem- 
 ul-Dowlah in 1819, the Madras Government, 
 finding no hereditary limitation in the Treaty, 
 felt precluded from acknowledging his eldest son 
 
 1 For a statement of the correspondence, see Carnatic Par- 
 liamentary papers of 17th April, 1860, pp. 34, 35, and para- 
 graph 6 of the Despatch of the Court of Directors, 15th March, 
 1856, at p. 45 of those papers. 
 
 7 2 
 i 
 
100 THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 
 
 as his successor, and applied to the Governor- 
 G-eneral for instructions, and when the rank and 
 title of Nawah was conceded to the son, his grati- 
 tude was expressed in language implying the recep- 
 tion of a great favour, rather than the recognition 
 of his rights. 1 
 
 The alleged admissions of the Government, and 
 the circumstances attending them, were not thought 
 worthy of explanation by Lord Dalhousie, but the 
 facts are as follows : 
 
 In 1829, on the occasion of the appointment of 
 Mr. Scott as physician to the Nawab, the Court 
 of Directors wrote : ' We disapprove of the prin- 
 
 * ciple of this arrangement, but under the peculiar 
 
 * circumstances of the case, the Nawab being an 
 ' infant and in delicate health, and the Naib-i- 
 4 Moktar>(Azeem Jah) being the next heir, in case 
 ' of his demise, the appointment of Mr. Scott 
 
 * admits of justification.' 2 
 
 And in 1843, when the list of natives claiming 
 exemption from the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
 Court was revised, the Marquis of Tweedale in 
 
 1 See his letter of the 17th September, 1819. Carnatic 
 Parliamentary papers, printed 17th April, 1860, pp. 16, 35. 
 Carnatic papers, printed 17th April, 1860, p. 15. 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 101 
 
 Council observed, ' That his Highness the Prince 
 
 * Azeem Jah Bahadur (the late Naib-i-Moktar) does 
 
 * not hold that place in list No. 1, to which he is 
 4 entitled, in consideration of the position he has 
 ' lately occupied in communication with the British 
 
 * Government, and of that which he still holds in 
 
 * relation to his Highness the Nawab, and to his 
 
 * succession to the musnud. It is, therefore, re- 
 
 * solved, that the name of Prince Azeern Jah be 
 
 * placed first on the list of such relations of his 
 ' Highness/ 1 &c. 
 
 Now we have the best authority for saying 
 that, as a matter of fact, the first of these alleged 
 admissions did not refer to the inheritance of 
 the Nawabs. The Court of Directors, in their 
 despatch of the 15th of March, 1856, observe : 2 
 
 * The subject then before us was not the suc- 
 
 * cession to the musnud, but the appointment of 
 
 * a physician to the young Nawab, and we had no 
 ' intention whatever of entering into the question, 
 ' what might be Azeem Jah's right of inheritance. 
 
 * As the nearest of kin, we spoke of him as the 
 ' heir to whatever could legally be derived from 
 
 1 Carnatic Parliamentary papers, printed 17th April, 1860, p. 9. 
 
 2 Ibid., para. 8, p. 46. 
 
102 THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 
 
 ' the Nawab by inheritance, but the Nawabship 
 6 had never been considered by us to be heritable 
 ' by heirs as of right/ 
 
 Admissions to be of value must be made with 
 reference to the subject, and should not be inci- 
 dental observations, made in the discussion of such 
 unimportant questions as whether a doctor should 
 be appointed, or a name stood in its proper place 
 in a list. The succession to the throne was not in 
 question on either of these occasions, but if it had 
 been, these observations would not have had the 
 effect of importing new terms into the Treaty. The 
 Treaty either conferred an hereditary title on Azeem 
 Jah, or it did not. If it did, the alleged admissions 
 are not wanted, if it did not, the alleged admis- 
 sions did not by their own force create an hereditary 
 title, and could not be imported into the Treaty so 
 as to alter its language into an hereditary grant. 
 
 On the question of policy, I shall rest entirely 
 on the very clear view of it held by Lord Harris. 
 Mr. Arnold erroneously ascribes the following 
 passage to Lord Dalhousie, 1 but the Governor- 
 
 1 AKNOLD'S Dalhousie Administration, vol. ii., p. 175. 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 103 
 
 General felt that he could add nothing to the force 
 of Lord Harris's observations on this head, and 
 contented himself with a reference to his lordship's 
 Minute. 1 Lord Harris observes, 2 
 
 ' I will here state my very decided opinion that 
 
 * these rights and privileges should not be continued, 
 ( if they can be abrogated without a violation of 
 < faith. 
 
 ' First, on the general principle that the 
 ' semblance of royalty, without any of the power, is 
 ' a mockery of authority which must be pernicious. 
 
 ' Second, because though there is virtually no 
 ' divided rule or co-ordinate authority in the govern- 
 ' ment of the country for these points were finally 
 ' settled by the Treaty of 1801 yet some appear- 
 ' ance of so baneful a system is still kept up by the 
 
 * continuance of a quasi royal family and court. 
 
 < Third, because the legislation of the country 
 ' being solely in the hands of the Honourable Court, 
 ' it is not only anomalous, but prejudicial to the 
 ' community, that a separate authority, not amenable 
 ' to the law, should be permitted to exist. 
 
 1 See LOBD DALHOUSIE'S Minute of 19th December, 1855. 
 Parliamentary Carnatic papers of April, 1860, p. 48. 
 
 2 Carnatic papers of April, 1860, paragraph 6, p. 9. 
 
104 THE NAWAB OF THE CAENATIC. 
 
 ' Fourth, because it is impolitic and unwise to 
 
 * allow a pageant to continue, which though it has 
 ' been politically harmless, may at any time become 
 1 a nucleus for sedition and agitation. 
 
 ' Fifth, because the habits of life and course of 
 
 * proceeding of the Nabobs have been morally most 
 
 * pernicious, tending to bring high station into 
 ' disrepute, and favouring the accumulation of an 
 
 * idle and dissipated population in the chief city of 
 ' the Presidency 
 
 ' 50. 1 I think there are strong reasons for alter- 
 ' ing the relations of this government with the Arcot 
 6 family, and of changing its position. 
 
 ' The causes which may have given force to the 
 ' policy of 1801 no longer exist ; the rank, con- 
 ' sequence, and reputation of the Arcot family have 
 4 sunk by the conduct of its representatives. The 
 ' manner of life and the character of the late Nabob 
 ' were disreputable, and the conduct of the Prince 
 
 * Azeem Jah, who would succeed him, has already 
 ' come under the severe animadversion of the 
 ' Honourable Court. 
 
 * It is with no wish unnecessarily to bring these 
 
 1 Carnatic papers, printed 17th April, 1860, p. 13. 
 
THE NAWAB OF THE CARNATIC. 105 
 
 ' faults into public view that I make mention of 
 
 * them, but because I am convinced that serious 
 
 * moral evil is caused by the continuance of the 
 ' pageant of an effete royalty, and that political 
 ' inconvenience might at any time arise from the 
 
 * existence of a Court at the Presidency, which, 
 ' though destitute of authority and power, must be 
 
 * inimical, or at all events discontented, and capable 
 6 of being made a nucleus for intrigue.' 
 
 These words require no comment from me. 
 The conduct of the titular Sovereign of Delhi in 
 1857, and the gathering of the disaffected around 
 that shadow of the Great Mogul, have sufficiently 
 illustrated the wisdom of these remarks. 
 
 The members of the late Nawab's family were 
 liberally provided for, 1 as well as his officers and 
 attendants. The Government also undertook to 
 pay all his debts, and these, as well as others 
 contracted by Prince Azeem Jah, when acting as 
 Naib during his nephew's minority, amounting in 
 the whole to the large sum of 420,0002., 2 have been 
 paid by the Government. 
 
 1 Prince Azeem Jah was allowed 15,000/. a year. 
 
 2 See speech of Sir C. Wood in the last Carnatic Debate, 
 Times, 15th March, 1865. 
 
( 106 ) 
 
 THE RAJ OF TANJORE, 
 
 THE Rajahs of Tanjore were formerly inde- 
 pendent princes, but in the year 1799, a Treaty 
 was concluded with the Rajah Serfojee, whereby 
 the whole country of Tanjore, except its fort, was 
 transferred to the British Government. The Rajah 
 remained the titular sovereign of Tanjore, and the 
 actual sovereign of the fort, in which he resided. 
 
 On the 29th of October, 1855, Sewajee, the 
 last Rajah of Tanjore, died, leaving two daughters, 
 and no less than twenty widows. 
 
 Mr. Forbes, then Resident at Tanjore, with the 
 consent of the family, proposed that the youngest 
 daughter should be elevated to the throne, as the 
 eldest daughter was in a dying state. He cited 
 well-known authorities, showing that in the case of 
 private individuals, females inherit in default of 
 
THE RAJ OF TANJORE. 107 
 
 male issue, and he mentioned the fact, that in the 
 year 1735, the widow of a deceased Kajah of Tanjore 
 had succeeded to the throne. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie was on his way from the Nil- 
 gherries to Calcutta, and was present at the Council 
 in Madras when the subject came before it. It was 
 then unanimously resolved, that the Raj was extinct. 1 
 The case came before Lord Dalhousie again when 
 presiding at the Supreme Council in Calcutta, and 
 he came to the same conclusion, which was sup- 
 ported by all the members of his Council. 2 
 
 The case presented three questions for considera- 
 tion. First, whether there was any male heir of 
 the last Kajah. Second, whether, in the absence 
 of a male heir, the daughter could inherit. And 
 third, whether, if there were no inheritance, it was 
 expedient to reconstitute the Kaj, and give it to the 
 daughter. 
 
 First, there was no male heir of the late Rajah. 
 He left neither a real nor an adopted son, and he 
 
 1 The members of the Madras Government were : Lord 
 Harris, Governor; General Anson, Commander-in-chief; and 
 Sir H. Montgomery. 
 
 2 The members of the Supreme Council were Mr. Dorin, Sir 
 J. P. Grant, and Sir B. Peacock. 
 
108 THE RAJ OF TANJORE. 
 
 was himself the only son of his father, the Rajah 
 Serfojee, who was the adopted son of his predecessor, 
 Tooljajee, consequently any claimant through males 
 must have been distantly related. No such claimant 
 appeared. 
 
 On the second question, Mr. Arnold observes, 
 ' This was a house in which, contrary to Hindoo 
 ' custom, no salic law ruled the widow or daughter 
 ' might succeed the husband or father.' 1 There is 
 no other foundation for this statement, than the 
 fact that a widow succeeded to the Raj in 1735, but 
 the circumstances attending that succession are not 
 stated. If this succession proved anything, it would 
 establish the right of the senior widow to the Raj, 
 but it would be too much to infer from this single 
 circumstance, the existence of a right in the widow 
 in this particular family, unknown to the general 
 custom of descent. Still less could it be inferred 
 from this succession that a right also accrued to the 
 daughter, who alone claimed it from Lord Dalhousie. 
 No law or authority has been cited, showing that 
 females can inherit a Raj, and all the members of 
 Council at Calcutta and Madras, men conversant 
 
 1 ARNOLD'S Dalhousie Adminittrcttion, vol. ii., p. 182. 
 
THE RAJ OP TANJORE. 109 
 
 with such questions, agreed with Lords Dalhousie 
 and Harris in their opinion, that the daughter could 
 not inherit. The Court of Directors held, that * by 
 ' no law or usage has the daughter of a Hindoo 
 ' Rajah any right of succession to a Raj ;'* and Sir 
 C. Trevelyan, when he, as Governor of Madras, 
 reviewed all the circumstances of the case, observed, 2 
 < My first twelve years of public service were passed 
 
 * in the Indian diplomatic departments, and I have 
 ' as extensive a knowledge of the customs and 
 f practice of native chiefs as most people. I men- 
 ' tion this as my justification for offering a con- 
 ' fident opinion, that the succession of females forms 
 6 no part of the constitution of native states or 
 ' chiefships. It may occasionally have taken place, 
 ' as in the instance of Holkar's widow, Aralaya 
 
 * Bhai, and the Begum Sumroo, but the special 
 1 nature of the circumstances in these cases, shows 
 ' that it was a deviation from an established rule. 
 6 No well-informed and impartial native would main- 
 ' tain the right of succession of a female to a 
 1 Hindoo Raj.' 
 
 1 See the despatch of Court of Directors dated 16th April, 1856. 
 
 2 See MOORE'S Indian Appeal Cases, vol. vii., p. 542. 
 
110 THE RAJ OF TANJORE. 
 
 As females could not inherit, it was thought 
 that the Raj lapsed for want of heirs, and the only 
 question which remained for consideration was, 
 whether it was expedient to reconstitute the Raj, 
 and give it to the daughter. This question was 
 thus disposed of by Lord Dalhousie. 'When we 
 6 know that more than fifty years ago the adminis- 
 ' tration of Tanjore was formally withdrawn from 
 ' the hands of its ruler, by reason of past misgovern- 
 ' ment when we learn from the Resident that 
 ' even the late Rajah, shorn as he was of all power, 
 'yet betrayed a disposition on all occasions, " to 
 ' " do whatever he knew the Resident would not 
 ' " allow, and to use the whole weight of his authority 
 ' " to frustrate whatever management might be 
 ' " proposed for the advantage of the durbar ; " and 
 ' when we are informed, " that the Rajah so far 
 ' " succeeded, that it will certainly take time, and 
 ' " thought, and care, to set straight all that the 
 ' " late Rajah has put in disorder," I certainly think 
 6 the British Government would be deeply to blame 
 ' if it revived this dead sovereign in the person of 
 ' a young girl, who, helpless now, would be nothing 
 ' less than a tool in the mischievious hands of 
 ' others in future years.' And the Court of Directors, 
 
THE RAJ OF TANJORE. Ill 
 
 after observing that the daughter had no right to 
 succeed to the Eaj, remarked 1 * that it was entirely 
 6 out of the question that we should create such 
 ' a right, for the sole purpose of perpetuating a 
 ' titular principality, at a great cost to the public 
 ' revenues/ 
 
 Even those who consider the existence of native 
 states so desirable, that they would go out of their 
 way to recreate them when extinct, would find it 
 difficult to assign reasons for reconstituting the Kaj 
 of Tanjore. It was not a native State. The Eajah 
 was a titular Prince, with neither subjects nor 
 territory beyond the walls of his fort. He had no 
 power to do good either to Tanjore, or the British 
 Government. His Kaj was a sham royalty, involv- 
 ing a great charge on our revenues, and like other 
 sham royalties, it had been an annoyance to us, and 
 might probably become still more so in troubled 
 times. 
 
 As my own opinion in this case differs from the 
 view taken of it by so many eminent men, I must 
 be understood as expressing it with some diffidence. 
 I am inclined to think that this was not a case of 
 
 , l Despatch of Court of Directors, 16th of April, 1856. 
 
112 THE RAJ OF TANJORE. 
 
 lapse or escheat; that the titular dignity ex- 
 pired ; and that the soyereignty of the fort became 
 vacant. Neither the daughter nor widow could 
 inherit. On the other hand, as the Kajah was not 
 a dependent sovereign created by the British, but 
 held his fort as a reserved portion of his old 
 dominions, it was not a fief, which could lapse or 
 escheat to the British Government. If I am 
 correct in this view, then it was the case of 
 the sovereign of the surrounding country taking 
 possession of the vacant sovereignty of the fort, no 
 other person having an equal claim to it. 1 The 
 British Government could neither allow the sove- 
 reignty to remain vacant, nor permit any one else, 
 without title, to assume such sovereignty. 
 
 Mr. Arnold observes on this subject, 2 ' True to 
 ' the steady policy of seizing every chance of 
 ' aggrandisement, Lord Dalhousie refused to recog- 
 * nize any one of them ' (the widow and daughters) 
 < as successor, equally as it must appear against 
 ' treaty and precedent. A rich set of Jaghires, the 
 ' estate of the mother of Sewajee, yielding three lacs 
 
 1 I am speaking, of course, of the sovereign rights only, and 
 not of property. 
 
 2 ARNOLD'S Dalhousie Administration, vol. ii., p. 182. 
 
THE RAJ OF TANJORE. 113 
 
 'of rupees annually, was confiscated at the same time. 
 ' The Ranee of Tanjore appealed from Calcutta to 
 * Leadenhall Street, thence to the Supreme Court at 
 ' Madras, and claimed 700,000/. as the property of 
 1 her husband. Madras decided in her favour, but 
 ' the Company appealed to the Privy Council. The 
 ' Privy Council reversed the Indian decision, and 
 < only upon the ground that, as the Governor- 
 ' General had acted for the Company in his interpre- 
 tation of a treaty, a law court could take no 
 6 cognizance of the Kanee's plaints. To the property 
 s and the titular dignity of Tanjore Lord Kingsdown 
 ' declared that the Company had no legal claim,' 
 &c. In another passage, 1 Mr. Arnold states that 
 Lord Dalhousie, l by a technicality of law courts, 
 6 refused to the Ranee of Tanjore the crown and the 
 ' treasure that belonged to her/ 
 
 In these passages there are some important 
 
 inaccuracies. No part of the Jaghires or lands 
 * 
 
 belonging to the Eajah or his family was taken 
 possession of, much less confiscated, during Lord 
 Dalhousie 's administration. He left India in the 
 beginning of March, 1856, having done no more 
 
 1 ARNOLD'S Dalhoime Administration, vol. ii. p. 200. 
 
 8 
 
114 THE RAJ OF TANJORE. 
 
 than recommended that the Raj should be declared 
 extinct. 1 The decision of the Court of Directors is 
 dated the 16th of April, 1856, and after its arrival 
 in India, Mr. Forbes, the former Resident, was 
 appointed Commissioner at Tanjore, and, on the 
 18th of October, 1856, he assumed charge of all the 
 lands belonging to the late Rajah and his family, 
 with the view of investigating their titles, and 
 ascertaining whether they were private or state 
 property. 2 He also took possession of considerable 
 personal property. Without awaiting the result of 
 the investigation, the Ranee Kamachee, the senior 
 widow, on the 16th of November, 1856, filed her bill 
 in the Supreme Court at Madras, stating that the 
 private and personal estate of the late Rajah had 
 been taken possesion of by Mr. Forbes, and claiming 
 such estate, but setting up no title to the Raj. 3 The 
 Government in their answer insisted, that their 
 
 1 By an order of the Government, even the pensions and 
 allowances to the relations and dependants of the late Rajah were 
 continued, pending the decision of the Court of Directors. 
 See letter of Madras Government to Government of India, dated 
 10th July, 1856. 
 
 2 See judgment of Lord Kingsdown. MOORE'S East Indian 
 Appeals, vol. vii. p. 538. 
 
 3 MOORE'S East Indian Appeals, vol. vii. p. 476. 
 
THE RAJ OF TANJORE. 115 
 
 right to take possession of the Rajah's estate, 
 was a question of state, arising from the political 
 relations between the East India Company and 
 the state of Tanjore, and were matters which 
 could not be inquired into by the Supreme 
 Court. The answer, however, without waiving 
 this objection, admitted that some of the real 
 and personal property, specified in four different 
 schedules, was private property of the late Rajah, 
 which they were willing to deliver up to his legal 
 representative. 1 The answer also stated, that the 
 Government had resolved to appropriate the 
 property mentioned in schedules M and N, for 
 payment of the late Rajah's debts, and towards 
 making a provision for his family. 2 The Supreme 
 Court at Madras decided in the Ranee's favour, but 
 the Privy Council were of opinion, that the property 
 claimed by the respondent was seized by the British 
 Government, acting as a sovereign power, and that 
 the act so done, was an act of state, over which 
 the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction. After this 
 
 1 I suspect the answer admitted the same with respect to the 
 property mentioned in another schedule, R, but the Report is not 
 clear on this point. See MOORE'S Indian Appeals, vol. vii. p. 491. 
 MOORE'S Enst Indian A)>pcnh\ vol. vii. p. 491. 
 
 82 
 
116 THE RAJ OF TANJORE. 
 
 decision, that portion of the property which was 
 admitted to be private, and also, the whole of the 
 landed estates, 1 were given up by the Government to 
 the family of the late Kajah. 
 
 It thus appears that Lord Dalhousie had nothing 
 to do with the seizure of this property ; that the 
 lands were never confiscated ; that the personalty 
 was not confiscated, but only such part of it was 
 taken as appeared to appertain to the Kaj ; and that 
 the assertion that Lord Dalhousie resorted to 'a 
 ' technicality of the law courts ' to deprive the Ranee 
 of her crown and treasure, is perfectly unfounded, 
 inasmuch as he had left India long before the 
 suit was instituted, in which that defence was relied 
 on. 
 
 1 Chiefly through the exertions of my valued friend, the late 
 Mr. Morehead, member of Council, and, for a short time, Governor 
 of Madras. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDB. 
 
 As Lord Dalhousie's advice with respect to Oude 
 was not followed, and as he is not, in fact, 
 responsible for the annexation of that province, it 
 may seem a work of supererogation to examine his 
 opinions on that subject. But as the annexation 
 took place during his administration, as the general 
 public still suppose that this was the final measure 
 of his annexation policy, and as those better 
 informed do not appreciate the advice he gave, I 
 shall attempt to explain his views. To do this 
 effectually, I must first consider, as briefly as pos- 
 sible, the nature of our relations with Oude. 
 
 By the 3rd article of the Treaty of 1801, the 
 British Government bound itself ' to defend the 
 
118 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 ' territories of the Nawab Vizier of Oude against 
 ' all foreign and domestic enemies/ and by the 
 6th article, the Nawab Vizier engaged that he 
 would ' establish in his reserved dominions, such 
 ' a system of administration to be carried into 
 ' effect by his own officers as shall be conducive 
 ' to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated 
 ' to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants, 
 6 and his Excellency 1 will always advise with, and 
 4 act in conformity to, the counsel of the officers of 
 * the East India Company/ 
 
 No system of government better calculated to 
 ensure failure was ever devised. The monarch was 
 rendered independent of his people. However 
 nefarious his conduct might be, he was protected 
 from their resentment. Nevertheless the govern- 
 ment had all the elements of weakness, for it had no 
 strength of its own for advice the King was bound 
 to listen to the minister of a foreign country for 
 all purposes of coercion he was dependent on 
 British troops. All the evils of a divided govern- 
 ment were secured for the country. The people 
 
 1 That is, the Nawab Vizier. These Nawab Viziers subse- 
 quently, with the consent of our Government, assumed the title 
 of Kings of Oude. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 119 
 
 soon discovered that there was another power 
 beside the throne, stronger than the king himself. 
 The favour of the Eesident was a matter of the 
 greatest moment, and a large class soon arose, 
 protected from their own King, by the pledged 
 faith of the British Government. 1 Such a system 
 led to its natural result, in the indifference of the 
 Sovereign to good government, the destruction of 
 his authority, and the contempt of his subjects. 
 Lord Wellesley himself contemplated failure: 'I 
 ' am satisfied,' 5 he said, ' that no effectual security 
 ' can be provided against the ruin of the province 
 ' of Oude until the exclusive management of the 
 6 civil and military government of that country 
 ' shall be transferred to the Company, under 
 ' suitable provisions for the maintenance of his 
 * Excellency and family.' 
 
 That which was anticipated came to pass. The 
 Kings of Oude, secured by British troops from the 
 rebellion of their subjects, became indifferent or 
 averse to the cares of government, gave themselves 
 
 1 See Colonel Low's Minute of 18th August, 1855. Oude 
 papers, p. 221. 
 
 2 Lord WELLESLEY'S Despatches, 22nd January, 1801, 
 vol. ii. p. 426. 
 
120 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 up to sensual indulgences, and confided the reins 
 of power to the lowest creatures of their Court. 
 The great landowners either bribed the Court 
 functionaries and got their estates assessed at 
 a trifling sum, or defied the collectors and 
 refused payment of revenue, which was then 
 collected by British bayonets. The lower orders 
 were oppressed by the talookdars and farmers 
 of the revenue. The police were few and untrust- 
 worthy. The judges considered their cases, as 
 barristers do their briefs, ' as things out of which 
 ' money might be made .'* Corruption prevailed 
 everywhere. Life and property were insecure, and 
 violence and outrage were unchecked by police or 
 courts of justice. 
 
 It was the duty of those who had inflicted this 
 bad system on the people of Oude, to take some 
 measures for their protection. But years passed 
 away, and we did nothing but remonstrate occa- 
 sionally with the King. In 1831, Lord William 
 Bentinck went so far as to tell him, that ' unless 
 * his territories were governed upon other princi- 
 
 1 Colonel SLEEMAN'S Report, September 24, 1849, paragraph 
 16. Oude papers, p. 159. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 121 
 
 ' pies than those hitherto followed, and the 
 ' prosperity of the people made the principal object 
 ' of his administration, the precedents afforded by 
 4 the principalities of the Carnatic and Tanjore 
 ' would be applied to the kingdom of Oude, and 
 ' to the entire management of the country, and the 
 ' king would be transmuted into a state prisoner ' ! 
 This threat also failed to have any effect, and the 
 state of the country remained the same during the 
 life of the King Nussurooddeen. He was a con- 
 temptible creature, given up to the lowest 
 debauchery, but, if he had possessed the highest 
 intellectual powers, he would have found it difficult 
 to govern an Asiatic kingdom, under such a system 
 as that inaugurated by the Treaty of 1801. 
 
 His death took place in 1837, and Lord 
 Auckland thought this a favourable opportunity 
 for making a new treaty with his successor. 
 Lord Auckland considered this desirable, because 
 the Treaty of 1801 merely stipulated for a 
 power of control, without defining the means 
 of enforcing it, and this he proposed to remedy 
 by inserting in the new treaty a specific penalty, 
 to be incurred by the King, in case the mis- 
 government of the country should continue. 
 
122 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 Few treaties do assign any penalty for the non- 
 performance of their stipulations. If they are not 
 observed, the party injured has a right to annul 
 the treaty, or enforce its stipulations by a resort 
 to arms. But Lord Auckland considered, as Lord 
 Dalhousie likewise thought at a subsequent period, 
 that it was impossible to enforce the stipulation of 
 a treaty, which required reforms to be carried out 
 by the king's own officers, that the treaty imposed 
 by the British Government on the Kings of Oude, 
 having designated the King's own officers as the 
 proper instruments for carrying out the proposed 
 reforms, it would be unjust in the British Govern- 
 ment to resort to force, because its own instruments 
 did not succeed in carrying them out. 
 
 The Treaty of the 18th of September, 1837,* 
 was accordingly signed by the King of Oude. 
 After stipulating for the payment of an auxiliary 
 force by the King, its 7th Article provided * that 
 ' the King of Oude will take into his immediate 
 ' and earnest consideration, in concert with the 
 ' British Eesident, the best means of remedying 
 
 1 See Oude papers, ordered to be printed 15th March, 1858, 
 p. 33. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDB. 123 
 
 t 
 
 6 the existing defects in the police, and in the 
 ' judicial and revenue administration of his do- 
 
 * minions ; and that if his Majesty should neglect 
 ' to attend to the advice and counsel of the British 
 ' Government or its local representative, and if 
 1 (which God forbid) gross and systematic oppres- 
 1 sion, anarchy, and misrule should hereafter at 
 
 * any time prevail within the Oude dominions, 
 ' such as seriously to endanger the public tran- 
 
 * quillity, the British Government reserves to 
 ( itself the right of appointing its own officers to 
 ' the management of whatsoever portions of the 
 ' Oude territory, either to a small or to a great 
 1 extent, in which such misrule may have occurred, 
 6 for so long a period as it may deem necessary, the 
 ' surplus receipts, in such a case, after defraying all 
 ( charges, to be paid into the King's Treasury, and a 
 6 true and faithful account rendered to his Majesty 
 1 of the receipt and expenditure of the territories so 
 6 assumed.' The 8th Article provided, that * if the 
 ' Governor-General should exercise the power vested 
 ' in him by the last Article, he would endeavour 
 ' as far as possible to maintain (with such im- 
 1 provements as they may admit of) the native 
 
 * institutions and forms of administration within 
 
124 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 1 the assumed territories, so as to facilitate the restora- 
 6 tion of these territories to the Sovereign of Oude, 
 ' when the proper period for such restoration shall 
 6 arrive.' 
 
 The Court of Directors refused to ratify this 
 Treaty. By their despatch of the 15th of April, 1839, 1 
 they directed that no delay should take place in 
 announcing to the King their disallowance of the 
 Treaty of 1837, and the restoration of their rela- 
 tions with the State of Oude to the footing on 
 which they previously stood. Instead of doing 
 this, however, the Govern or- General adopted the 
 singular course of informing the King, that he was 
 released from the onerous condition, imposed on 
 him by the Treaty, of paying for the auxiliary force. 
 He did not mention the fact that the whole Treaty 
 was disallowed, 2 and, on the contrary, the intima- 
 tion of the disallowance of one part of it, was calcu- 
 lated to lead the King to believe, that in all other 
 respects it was in full force. Lord Auckland made 
 
 1 Oude papers, ordered to be printed 15th March, 1858, 
 p. 57. 
 
 2 See the letter of the Governor- General to the King of Oude, 
 dated 8th July, 1839. Oude papers, ordered to be printed 
 15th March, 1858, p. 60. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 125 
 
 no secret of what he had thus done. In a letter to the 
 Court of Directors, dated the 15th of July, 1839, 
 he acknowledged the receipt of their orders of the 
 15th of April, and forwarded a copy of the letter 
 he had addressed to the King of Oude. 1 The Court 
 of Directors do not appear to have taken any notice 
 of this strange mode of carrying out their orders. 
 
 It was not surprising that no progress was 
 made in the improvement of the Government, for 
 the Kings of Oude now felt perfectly safe. They 
 thought the Treaty of 1837 was in existence, and that 
 the worst that could befal them was a temporary relief 
 from the trouble of governing, while all the royal 
 honours and revenues would be preserved to them 
 and their posterity. No language can describe 
 the licentiousness of the Court, the corruption of 
 the courtiers, the tyranny of the Talookdars, or 
 the cruel wrongs of the people. 
 
 In December, 1847, Lord Hardinge had an 
 interview with the King of Oude, and at the same 
 time he addressed a memorandum 2 to him, in which 
 
 1 See Oude papers, ordered to be printed 15th March, 1858, 
 p. 60. 
 
 2 Oude papers, ordered to be printed 15th March, 1858, p. 61. 
 
126 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 he cited the Treaty of 1837 as if it were still in force, 1 
 and warned the King, that if he procrastinated in 
 making the necessary reforms, he would incur the 
 risk of forcing the British authorities to interfere 
 
 1 The following are extracts from this memorandum : * 7. 
 
 * In the more recent treaty of 1837 it is stipulated that the solemn 
 ' and paramount obligation provided by treaty for the prosperity 
 
 * of your Majesty's subjects, and the security of the lives and 
 ' property of the inhabitants, has been notoriously neglected by 
 ' several successive rulers in Oude, thereby exposing " the British 
 ' " Government to the reproach of imperfectly fulfilling its obliga- 
 
 f " tions towards the Oude people ; " and accordingly his Majesty 
 ' the King of Oude was bound to " take into his immediate and 
 ' " earnest consideration, in concert with the Resident, the best 
 ' " means of remedying the existing defects in the police, and in 
 
 * " the judicial and revenue administration ; and that if his Majesty 
 ' " shall neglect to attend to the advice and counsel of the British 
 ' " Government or its local representative, and if (which God 
 ' " forbid) gross and systematic oppression, anarchy, and misrule 
 
 * " should hereafter at any time prevail within the Oude dominions, 
 ' " such as seriously to endanger the public tranquillity, the British 
 ' " Government reserves to itself the right of appointing its own 
 ' " officers to manage whatsoever portions of territory, either great 
 ' " or small, in which such misrule may have occurred, for so long a 
 
 * " period as it may deem necessary, the surplus receipts to be paid 
 ' " into the King's Treasury." 
 
 ' 8. I allude to the Treaty of 1837 as confirmatory of the 
 
 * original Treaty of 1801, which not only gave the British 
 
 * Government the right to interfere, but declared it to be the 
 ' intention of the Government to interfere if necessary, for the 
 ' purpose of securing good government in Oude 
 
 * 12. These extracts will enable your Majesty to form a clear 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 127 
 
 by assuming the government of Oude. A period of 
 two years was then fixed, as affording sufficient 
 time for the correction of abuses, and the introduc- 
 tion of an amended system of administration. 
 
 The report of Colonel Sleeman, the British 
 Resident at Lucknow, dated the 10th of December, 
 1851, contains a fearful account of the misgovern - 
 ment of Oude, and the oppression of its people. 
 The friendly disposition of this officer towards native 
 States is well known, and yet he was compelled to 
 write as follows : l 
 
 < Fifty years of sad experience has shown, that 
 ' the hopes in which the Treaty of 1801 was founded, 
 6 that sovereigns of the reigning family of Oude 
 ' would be disposed and able, to form and carry out, 
 ' by means of their own officers, a system of 
 ' administration calculated to secure life and pro- 
 
 * perty, to promote the welfare and happiness of 
 ' the people of Oude, and to render the alliance 
 
 * judgment of the position in which the Kings of Oude are placed 
 ' by treaty. The Governor- General is required, when gross and 
 ' systematic abuses prevail, to apply such a remedy as the exigency 
 
 * of the case may require ; he has no option in the performance 
 ' of this duty.' 
 
 1 Report of Colonel SLEEMAN, 10th December, 1851. Oude 
 papers, p. 166. 
 
128 ANNEX ATION OF OUDE. 
 
 ' with the British Government, who were to protect 
 ' those sovereigns from all foreign and domestic 
 ' enemies, if not honourable to that Government, 
 ' at least irreproachable, were altogether fallacious 
 ' and can never be realized ; and with a due regard 
 ' to its own character, as the paramount power 
 ' in India, and to the particular obligations by 
 ' which it is bound by solemn treaties to the suffering 
 ' people of this distracted country, I do not think 
 ' that our Government can any longer forbear to 
 4 exercise to the fullest extent, the powers ivhich the 
 6 Treaty of 1837 confers upon it, of taking upon itself 
 ' the administration, and conducting it by means of 
 1 their own officers. ... 
 
 6 Numerous instances of all these evils and 
 * sufferings, and of the apathy with which they are 
 ' viewed by the Oude government, are contained in 
 ' the diaries which it is my duty to submit every 
 f month to Government, but they are not the 
 6 tenth part of what every month takes place. The 
 < Eesident has every month to report flagrant 
 ' instances of the same sort, after careful investiga- 
 ' tion, for the consideration and orders of the 
 ' Governor-General, all tending to show an utter 
 ' disregard of the solemn duties imposed upon the 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 129 
 
 ' sovereigns of Oude and their ministers by the 
 4 treaties of 1801 and 1837. ' It is clear from these 
 extracts, that the abrogation of the Treaty of 1837 
 was unknown to Colonel Sleeman a fact also 
 apparent from his correspondence. 1 
 
 In 1854, Lord Dalhousie's attention was called 
 to an authorized collection of the Treaties with native 
 states, printed at Calcutta in 1845, which contained 
 the disallowed Treaty of 1837. Lord Dalhousie 
 took immediate notice of this, and brought it before 
 his Council. Mr. Dorin then mentioned the fact, 
 that the abrogation of the treaty had never been 
 notified to the King, and this was confirmed by 
 Colonel Low (formerly Resident at Lucknow), who 
 assured the Council, that the disallowance of the 
 treaty had never been communicated to any one 
 at Lucknow, European or native. 2 Mr. Grant, the 
 third member of Council, recommended that the 
 King should, even at that late period, be informed 
 of the fact. The letter of the Governor-General in 
 Council, forwarding these Minutes, informed the 
 
 1 See KAYE'S Sepoy War, in note at p. 129. 
 
 2 See all the Minutes on this subject ; Oude papers, ordered 
 to be printed 15th March, 1858, pp. 66, 67, 68. 
 
 9 
 
130 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 Court, that the total abrogation of the Treaty had 
 not been announced to the King of Oude, and that 
 Lord Auckland had informed the Court of what 
 he had done. 1 The Court of Directors, in their 
 answer, did not refer to these facts, or attempt any 
 explanation of them, but contented themselves with 
 observing, ' that the best course was to take no step 
 ' whatever, and to leave matters as they stood until 
 * some particular question arises, which must be 
 1 dealt with according to circumstances.' 2 
 
 The continued misgovernment of Oude, and the 
 fearful state of that kingdom, at last forced them- 
 selves upon the attention of Lord Dalhousie. 3 In 
 1854, he felt obliged to take the very ominous 
 course of directing Colonel Outram, then Kesident 
 at Lucknow, to report upon the state of the 
 country, with a view of ascertaining whether its 
 affairs continued to be in the same condition which 
 
 1 Oude papers, ordered to be printed 15th March, 1858, p. 65. 
 
 2 Letter of Court of Directors to Government of India, 
 10th January, 1855 ; Oude papers, ordered to be printed, 
 15th March, 1858, p. 68. 
 
 3 He always entertained a great distaste for the subject. I 
 remember a conversation with him in 1852, in which he stated 
 that he had been pressed to take the country (by whom he did not 
 say), and that he felt averse to such a measure. I cannot trust 
 my memory to state the precise nature of his objections at that time. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 131 
 
 former Residents described them to be, and whether 
 the reform (for the accomplishment of which Lord 
 Hardinge had given a period of two years,) had in 
 any degree been effected. The report of Colonel 
 Outram contained disclosures so frightful, that 
 Lord Dalhousie was compelled to take up the 
 consideration of the subject, with a view to its 
 final decision. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's Minute of the 18th of June, 
 1855, contains an elaborate history of our relations 
 with Oude, and a full statement of the misgovern- 
 ment of the country, and the wrongs of the people. 
 Its argument is based on the Treaty of 1801, 
 that of 1837 being null and void. 1 It acknow- 
 ledges, as fully as could be expected from a 
 Governor- General, the grave responsibility the 
 British Government had incurred by allowing, for 
 so long a period, such misrule in Oude. Thus 
 he observes : 2 ' For tolerating so long this total 
 
 * disregard of the obligations of solemn Treaty, and 
 
 * for all the ills and human suffering which have 
 ' sprung therefrom, the British Government is 
 ' heavily responsible. It cannot, indeed, be 
 
 1 Minute of 18th June, 1855 ; Oude papers, p. 149. 
 *.Ibid. p. 180. 
 
 92 
 
132 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 ' charged with indifference to the evils whose 
 6 existence it perceived, or with neglect of all 
 
 * exertions to palliate or remove them. For, 
 ' from the date of the treaty to the present day, 
 ' the records of Government exhibit one unhroken 
 
 * series of acts of counsel, of complaint, and of 
 ' condemnation, on the part of the Government of 
 ' India, and its representatives at Lucknow. By 
 ' official notes, in friendly letters, through the 
 
 * mouth of the Kesident, and at formal personal 
 ' interviews, the Govern or- General has urged, 
 1 from time to time, upon the notice of the Euler 
 ' of Oude, the wretched internal condition of his 
 
 * kingdom ; and, throughout all that period, at 
 ' frequent intervals, words of indignant censure 
 
 * have alternated with earnest remonstrances, with 
 ' warning, and with threats. But the Govern - 
 ' ment of India has never taken the one measure 
 ' which alone could be effectual, by withdrawing 
 ' its countenance from the Sovereign of Oude, 
 ' and its troops from his dominions. It is by 
 ' these aids alone that the Sovereigns of Oude 
 
 * have been enabled for more than half-a-century 
 ' to persist with impunity in their course of 
 1 oppression and misrule. Their eyes have never 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 133 
 
 ' seen the misery of their subjects ; their ears have 
 
 * never been open to their cry. Secure of the 
 i safety of his person secure of the stability of 
 ' his throne each successive ruler has passed his 
 ' lifetime within the walls of his palace, or in the 
 
 * gardens round his capital, careful for nothing 
 
 * but the gratification of his individual passion 
 1 avarice, as in one ; intemperance, as in another ; 
 ' or, as in the present King, effeminate sensuality, 
 ' indulged among singers, musicians, and eunuchs, 
 ' the sole companions of his confidence, and the 
 ' sole agents of his power. Were it not for the 
 ' support which the Government of India is known 
 
 * to be bound to afford the King against all 
 ' domestic as well as against foreign enemies ; 
 ' were it not for the constant presence of British 
 6 troops at Lucknow, the people of Oude would 
 
 * speedily work their own deliverance, and would 
 
 * impose upon their ruler the effectual check of 
 1 general revolt by which Eastern rulers are best 
 
 * controlled. Colonel Sleeman thus bears his 
 4 testimony to this important truth : " I am per- 
 ' " suaded," he says, " that, if our troops were 
 6 " withdrawn from Oude, the landholders would 
 ' " in one month march over them all, and pillage 
 
134 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 * " the capital of Lucknow." I respectfully sub- 
 1 mit to the Honourable Court that the time has 
 1 come when inaction on the part of the British 
 ' Government, in relation to the affairs of the 
 1 kingdom of Oude, can now be no longer justified, 
 ' and is already converting our responsibility into 
 
 * guilt/ 
 
 Lord Dalhousie then observes that there were 
 four modes of proceeding : * 
 
 1 First, The King may be required to abdicate 
 
 * the sovereign powers he has abused, and to 
 4 consent to the incorporation of Oude with the 
 ' territories of the British Crown. 
 
 ' Second, The King may be permitted to retain 
 6 his royal title and position, but may be required 
 ' to vest the whole civil and military administra- 
 
 * tion of his kingdom in the government of the 
 ' East India Company for ever. 
 
 6 Third, His Majesty may be urged to make 
 6 over his dominions to the management of British 
 
 * officers for a time. 
 
 6 Fourth, The King may be invited to place 
 6 the management of the country in the hands of 
 
 1 Paragraph 50, Minute of 18th June, 1855; Oude papers, 
 p. 184. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 135 
 
 * the Resident ; under whose directions it shall be 
 ' carried on by the officers of the King acting with 
 ' such British officers as may be appointed to aid 
 
 * them. 
 
 ' First, The King may be required to abdicate 
 6 the sovereign powers he has abused, and to 
 ' consent to the incorporation of Oude with the 
 
 * territories of the British Crown. 
 
 ' Although the dynasty of Oude is a thing but 
 
 * of yesterday, sprung from treachery at the first, 
 ' and only reared to kingly rank by ourselves, and 
 < although I firmly believe that the incorporation 
 1 of that territory with the British dominions, and 
 ' the bold extinction of its sovereignty, would be 
 ' the happiest issue that could be desired for the 
 
 * interests of all connected with it, yet I do not 
 6 counsel the adoption of that measure by the 
 ' Government of India. 
 
 ' The rulers of Oude, however unfaithful they 
 ' may have been to the trust committed to them, 
 
 * however gross may have been their neglect, 
 ' however grievous their misgovernment of the 
 
 * people committed to their charge, have yet ever 
 ' been faithful and true in their adherence to the 
 ' British power. No wavering friendship has ever 
 
136 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 ' been laid to their charge. They have long 
 ' acknowledged our power, have submitted with- 
 ' out a murmur to our supremacy, and have aided 
 ' us as best they could in the hour of our utmost 
 
 * need. Wherefore, although we are bound to 
 ' dissolve our connexion with a government whose 
 ' oppression is sustained only by the countenance 
 ' we lend it, and although we are entitled to 
 ' seek by all means in our power to amend the 
 t lot of a people whom we have so long indirectly 
 
 * injured, justice and gratitude, nevertheless, 
 ' require, that in so doing, we should lower the 
 
 * dignity and authority of the sovereigns of Oude, 
 6 no further than is absolutely necessary for the 
 
 * accomplishment of our righteous ends. 
 
 < The reform of the administration of the pro- 
 ' vince may be wrought, and the prosperity of the 
 
 * people may be secured, without resorting to so 
 1 extreme a measure as the annexation of the 
 
 * territory, and the abolition of the throne. 
 
 ' I, for my part, therefore, do not advise that 
 4 the province of Oude should be declared to be 
 
 * British territory/ 
 
 The Minute then refers to the history of our 
 past relations with Oude, the Nizam, the Punjaub, 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 137 
 
 and Nagpore, as showing the inefficacy of a divided 
 government or a temporary assumption of power 
 (the second and third modes suggested), and thus 
 proceeds : l 
 
 ' It is my earnest counsel that no less effectual 
 1 measure than that which is contained in the 
 ' second project should be resolved upon, namely, 
 6 that while the King should be permitted to retain 
 ' his royal title and rank, he should be required 
 
 * to vest the whole civil and military adminis- 
 ' tration of Oude in the hands of the Company, 
 ' and that its power should be " perpetual in 
 ' " duration, as well as ample in extent." 
 
 1 It still remains to be considered in what 
 ' manner the policy I have advocated may best 
 ' be carried into effect. 
 
 * The King's consent is indispensable to the 
 ' transfer of the whole or of any part of his 
 4 sovereign authority to the government of the 
 
 * East India Company. It would not be expedient, 
 ' or right, to endeavour to extract this consent by 
 ' means of menace or compulsion. It must be 
 1 sought by leading the King to perceive, that a 
 
 * simple regard for his own interests, and for the 
 
 1 Oude papers, p. 187. 
 
138 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 ' maintenance of his family and throne, should 
 ' of itself be sufficient to induce him to give 
 1 his consent to those measures, which alone can 
 
 * save his kingdom and house from the misfortunes, 
 1 which will surely follow his refusal to alter the 
 
 * course in which he has long unhappily persisted. 
 
 ' In pursuance of this policy, I would propose 
 ' that, as soon as the sanction of the Honourable 
 1 Court shall be obtained to the necessary change 
 ' in our relations with the Court of Lucknow, a 
 ' letter should be addressed by the Governor- 
 ' General to the King.' . . . 
 
 ' The letter should proceed to state that the 
 ' Resident had accordingly been directed to declare 
 ' the treaty of 1801 at an end, to quit the territory 
 1 of Oude, and to withdraw the entire subsidiary 
 ' force within the British frontier. 
 
 * It should then be added that, as the King is 
 
 * well aware that his authority, and the very ex- 
 
 * istence of his throne, have long been maintained 
 1 solely by the presence of a British force in Oude, 
 ' his Majesty will readily foresee the consequences 
 ' which would undoubtedly follow its withdrawal. 
 ' If his Majesty is ready to meet those conse- 
 6 quences, and to endure them, the Government 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 139 
 
 ' of India will interpose no further in his Majesty's 
 ' affairs, unless the security of its territories, and 
 ' the interests of their inhabitants, shall be put in 
 ( danger by the state of the neighbouring province 
 ' of Oude. If, on the other hand, his Majesty 
 ' should shrink from encountering those conse- 
 ' quences, and should desire to avert them, his 
 ' Majesty will have it in his power to do so by 
 ( renewing relations of amity with the Govern- 
 ' ment of India on conditions, which shall be calcu- 
 1 lated to prevent a recurrence of misgovernment 
 
 * in Oude, while they will effectually secure the 
 ' interests of his Majesty's family, and maintain 
 ' his kingly rank in affluence and dignity. 
 
 ' A draft treaty to the effect now stated should 
 
 * then be offered by the Resident to the King.' 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's Minute discloses a strong dis- 
 inclination to resort to extreme measures. What 
 his real opinions were will not be fully known 
 until his papers are published, for he was not one 
 to embarrass the action of Government by writing 
 hard things against his country, or making a case 
 for such creatures as the Kings of Oude. But a 
 careful examination of his Minutes has satisfied me, 
 that the conduct of the British Government towards 
 
140 ANNEXATION OP OUDE. 
 
 Oude, paralysed an arm never slow to adopt strong 
 measures when right was on its side. 
 
 No doubt the Kings of Oude had failed to fulfil 
 the obligations imposed on them by the Treaty of 
 1801. But for half a century, although we had 
 remonstrated and threatened, we had done nothing 
 to enforce their observance of the treaty, and our 
 long acquiescence had verged on a participation of 
 their guilt. 1 We had placed them in a position in 
 which good government was impossible, and Lord 
 Dalhousie laid particular stress, as we shall pre- 
 sently see, on one of the provisions of the Treaty 
 of 1801, which had in itself frustrated all the good 
 intentions of its framers. 2 And, lastly, the sove- 
 reigns of Oude, with all their faults, had been our 
 faithful and useful allies.* 
 
 No doubt the Treaty of 1837 was null and void, 
 but we had concealed from the King the disallow- 
 ance of that Treaty, and had allowed him to suppose 
 that the worst that could befall him was the tempo- 
 rary administration of Oude by our officers, leav- 
 
 1 See extracts from Lord Dalhousie's Minute, ante, pp. 181, 134. 
 
 2 Minute of 13th February, 1856, para. 15 ; Oude papers, 
 299. See post, p. 152. 
 
 3 See extract from Lord Dalhousie's Minute, ante, pp. 1 35, 136. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 141 
 
 ing him in possession of the throne and surplus 
 revenues. Although this concealment could not 
 operate so as to give effect to a Treaty which was 
 in fact null and void, yet it might. deter a Governor- 
 General from inflicting a more severe penalty than 
 the disallowed Treaty imposed ; and if the infliction 
 of that penalty was for any reason unadvisahle, 
 surely fair dealing required, that we should abstain 
 from force, wash our hands as clean as we could 
 of all our transactions with Oude, and begin a 
 new career unfettered by the past. That considera- 
 tions of this nature did affect Lord Dalhousie to 
 some extent, will presently appear. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie 's proposal for a return to the 
 statu quo ante was not without its difficulties, for 
 the Treaty bound us to secure good government 
 for the people of Oude, and our proposed departure 
 would be followed by a continuance of misrule. 
 But Lo'rd Dalhousie thought, that the King's fear 
 of the vengeance which his own subjects would exact 
 if he were left alone, would induce him to sign the 
 Treaty ; and if not, the withdrawal of the British 
 troops would be the signal for such an insurrection, 
 as would induce the King, within a month, to agree 
 to whatever stipulations might be offered to him 
 
142 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 by the British Government. 1 It was also the 
 opinion of Colonel Low, that our departure would 
 be followed by insurrections which would compel 
 our return. 2 If such events had occurred we should 
 then have been unfettered by Treaties, and able to 
 do what we thought best for the people of Oude. 
 
 There was yet another difficulty in Lord Dal- 
 housie's proposed return to the statu quo ante, inas- 
 much as he did not intend to restore to the Kings 
 of Oude the territory made over to us by the Treaty 
 of 1801, as a compensation for a subsidy which was 
 then determined, and as the consideration for the 
 future assistance we had agreed to give the King 
 against foreign and domestic enemies. No doubt 
 Lord Dalhousie felt, that we had been in possession 
 of this territory more than fifty years, that third 
 parties, the inhabitants of these territories, had now 
 acquired rights under that treaty, and that the 
 British Government had also incurred obligations 
 as the ruler of those territories, and that these 
 rights and obligations could not be lightly resigned 
 to such a Government as that of Oude. But these 
 
 1 See Minute of 13th February, 1856 ; Oude papers, 299, 300. 
 
 2 Minute of Col. (now Major Sir John) Low ; Oude papers, 
 pp. 221, 222. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDB. 143 
 
 considerations do not remove the difficulty; they 
 only show more clearly, how impossible it was to 
 return to the statu quo ante, and that the utmost 
 Lord Dalhousie could do, would only produce such 
 an approximation to the former relations between 
 the parties, as existing circumstances permitted. 
 
 The recommendations of Lord Dalhousie were 
 not approved of by the Members of his Council. 
 Mr. Dorin advised annexation and the deposi- 
 tion of the King, and Mr. Grant * was of 
 the same opinion, except that he would have 
 allowed the King to retain his title during his 
 life. Mr. Grant contended, in his very able 
 Minute, that ever since the Treaty of 1801, if 
 not before, the British Government had been in 
 fact the rulers of Oude, governing it by means 
 of a dependent King, who had bound himself by 
 treaty to govern well, and that the King, having 
 failed to fulfil his engagement, it was the duty of 
 the British Government to remove him. Mr. 
 Peacock, 2 considering the King a protected, rather 
 
 1 Now Sir John P. Grant, K.C.B. 
 
 2 Now Sir Barnes Peacock, the Chief Justice of the High 
 Court at Calcutta. 
 
144 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 than a dependent, sovereign, insisted that his 
 violation of the Treaty by the oppression of the 
 people, justified the British Government in resort- 
 ing to such force as was necessary to secure good 
 government, and that the permanent assumption of 
 the government of the country, without depriving 
 the King and his posterity of their rank as sovereigns, 
 was all that was necessary. Colonel Low, also, 
 supported this view, and it was urged by all the 
 Council, with more or less force, that if the British 
 Government felt the wrongs of the people of Oude 
 so strongly, as to interfere on their behalf under the 
 Treaty of 1801, they would be acting inconsistently, 
 and at the same time unjustly, if they annulled the 
 Treaty, quitted the country, and left its people with- 
 out redress. 
 
 On the arrival of these Minutes in England, the 
 Cabinet were consulted, and in accordance with 
 their advice, the Court of Directors issued their 
 final orders for the assumption of the government 
 of Oude. Their despatch of the 21st of November, 
 1855, is a specimen of the art of writing important 
 instructions so as to avoid responsibility, but it 
 expresses their disapproval of Lord Dalhousie's plan 
 of obtaining the free consent of the King to a new 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 145 
 
 Treaty, and in case of his refusal, of cancelling the 
 Treaty of 1801, and withdrawing from Oude ; and 
 it directs that unless it was ' the conviction of the 
 ' Governor- General ' that the King's alarm at such 
 a threat would render his acceptance ofthe Treaty 
 ' a matter of virtual certainty,' that alternative 
 should not be offered to him ; and it authorizes 
 ' the only other course by which our duties to the 
 ' people of Oude can be fulfilled that of assuming 
 ' authoritatively the powers necessary for the per- 
 ' manent establishment of good government through - 
 ' out the country, leaving all questions of detail to 
 ' the wisdom of the Govern or- General, in con- 
 junction with the other members of your govern- 
 ' ment.' The Court of Directors, in fact, supported 
 the opinions of the members of Council against that 
 of the Governor-General. 
 
 Some men, under such circumstances, would have 
 gladly shifted the burden of annexation on that 
 Council, and on that new Governor- General, now 
 slowly approaching the shores of India, who, as a 
 member of the English Cabinet, had advised it. But 
 Lord Dalhousie had some time before written to the 
 Court of Directors, expressing his belief, that it would 
 be more advantageous for the public service, that he 
 
 10 
 
146 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 should deal with this question than a new Governor- 
 General, first entering on his government ; and 
 the Court now availed themselves of this offer, and 
 observed : ' It is in every account to be desired that 
 6 the great measure which we have authorized 
 
 * should be carried into effect under the auspices of 
 ' the nobleman, who has so long, and with such 
 ' eminent ability and success, administered the affairs 
 ' of the British Empire in India, who has bestowed 
 ( such attention and earnest consideration on this 
 
 * particular subject, and whose acts may carry a 
 ' weight of authority which might, perhaps, not in 
 1 the same degree attach to the first proceedings of 
 1 a new administration/ * 
 
 Lord Dalhousie, although he was now ill, and 
 scarcely able to walk, was the last man to shrink 
 from the fulfilment of any offer he had made, and 
 he now resolved, with a spirit of self-sacrifice, to 
 take upon himself the odium of this annexation, 
 a measure which he foretold would bring him no 
 credit, and would be violently assailed by the 
 opponents of the Indian Government. 2 And thus 
 
 1 Oude papers, p. 236. 
 
 2 Lord Dalhousie's letter to Court of Directors, 3rd July, 1855. 
 Oude papers, p. 1. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 147 
 
 Oude came to be annexed by the statesman, who 
 had alone opposed the adoption of that course. 
 
 The private instructions prepared by Lord 
 Dalhousie for Colonel Outram's guidance, during 
 the discussions expected to take place when he 
 should announce the orders of government to the 
 King, show us more of Lord Dalhousie's inmost 
 thoughts with respect to our relations with Oude, 
 than he thought fit to disclose in his Minute. 
 These instructions contain the following remarkable 
 passage r 1 
 
 ' It is very probable that the King, in the course 
 ' of the discussions which will take place with the 
 ' Kesident, may refer to the treaty negotiated with 
 6 his predecessor in 1837. 2 The Eesident is aware 
 ' that that treaty was not continued in force, having 
 ' been annulled by the Court of Directors so soon 
 ' as it was received in England. The Resident is 
 < further aware, that although the King of Oude was 
 
 1 Oude papers, p. 239. 
 
 2 The King was overwhelmed by the announcement of his fate, 
 and wholly incapable of argument, but it appears from the letter 
 he sent to the Resident on the 1st of February, 1856, that he 
 insisted that our conduct was at variance with the ' Treaties,' 
 there being only two Treaties in existence, those of 1801 and 1837. 
 Oude papers, p. 283. 
 
 102 
 
148 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 * informed at that time that certain provisions of 
 ' the Treaty of 1837, respecting an increased mili- 
 ' tary force, would not be carried into effect, the 
 ' entire abrogation of the Treaty by the Court of 
 ' Directors was never communicated to his Majesty. 
 
 6 The effect of this reserve and want of full com- 
 ' munication is felt to be embarrassing to this day. 
 6 It is the more embarrassing that the cancelled 
 ' instrument was still included in a volume of 
 ' treaties which was published in 1845, by the 
 
 * authority of Government. There is no better way 
 ' of encountering this difficulty than by meeting it 
 ' full in the face. 
 
 ' If the King should allude to the Treaty of 
 
 * 1837, and should ask why, if further measures 
 ' are necessary in relation to the administration 
 ' of Oude, the large powers which are given to 
 ' the British Government by the said Treaty should 
 
 * not now be put in force, his Majesty must be 
 ' informed that the Treaty has had no existence 
 ' since it was communicated to the Court of Di- 
 ' rectors, by whom it was wholly annulled. His 
 
 * Majesty will be reminded that the Court of 
 ' Lucknow was informed at the time that certain 
 ' articles of the Treaty of 1837, by which the 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 149 
 
 ' payment of an additional military force was 
 i imposed on the King, were to be set aside. It 
 ' must be presumed, that it was not thought neces- 
 1 sary at that time to make any communication 
 < to his Majesty regarding those articles of the 
 ' Treaty which were not of immediate operation, 
 ' and that a subsequent communication was un- 
 e doubtedly neglected. The Resident will be at 
 ' liberty to state that the Governor-General in Council 
 ; regrets that any such neglect should have taken place, 
 ' even inadvertentlij. The Resident may at the same 
 1 time observe that the absence of a final communi- 
 ' cation to the Court of Lucknow, regarding the 
 ' annulment of the Treaty of 1837 by the Govern- 
 1 ment of that day, has not been productive of any 
 4 detriment whatever to his Majesty's interests, 
 
 * either then or at any later period. 
 
 6 Should his Majesty observe, that although the 
 4 Treaty of 1837 was annulled, and is no longer in 
 ' existence, a similar measure less stringent than 
 ' that which is now proposed, might be adopted 
 ' on the present occasion, his Majesty should be 
 
 * requested to observe, that the measure to which 
 ' he refers was at once rejected by the Supreme 
 1 Authorities in England ; and that all subsequent 
 
150 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 ' experience has shown, that the remedy which 
 the Treaty of 1837 supplied, would be wholly 
 ' inadequate to remove the evils and abuses, which 
 ' have long marked the condition of Oude.' 
 
 These instructions have led me to conclude, that 
 Lord Dalhousie's proposal for a return to the statu 
 quo ante, was partly the result of the embarrassment 
 and difficulty raised in his mind by our concealment 
 of the abrogation of the Treaty from the King. 
 The Treaty of 1837 was void, its provisions 
 incapable of being conceded as a matter of grace, 
 and therefore he proposed a return to the statu 
 quo ante. 
 
 On the 13th of February, 1856, after the 
 annexation had taken place, and just before Lord 
 Dalhousie's departure, he recorded another Minute 
 on this subject. It manifests an undiminished 
 preference for that course, which he had suggested 
 in his former Minute and had been obliged to 
 abandon. He observes, 1 * I considered it to be my 
 * duty to suggest, not the mode of proceeding 
 ' which might seem to be the shortest and the 
 1 easiest for the Government of India, but that 
 
 1 Oude Papers, p. 299. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 151 
 
 * mode of proceeding, which, while it should be 
 1 effectual for the purpose designed, should at the 
 ' same time be in most accordance with established 
 ' usage and most in conformity to international 
 ' law, and therefore least liable to criticism or cavil, 
 ' and least open to the attack of those who might 
 ' be expected to condemn and oppose the measure. 
 1 ... It was not for me to suggest for the 
 ' adoption of the Honourable Court in the first 
 ' instance, and without necessity, any line of 
 1 political action which was likely to create a 
 6 keener opposition and to call forth severer 
 ' comment, than would be elicited by adherence 
 ' to the usual course of action which public law 
 ' and settled custom had prescribed. 
 
 ' Acting upon this view of my duty, I con- 
 ' sidered that it was open to me to advise that the 
 fulfilment of the Treaty of 1801 should be com- 
 ' pelled by force of arms, or that the treaty should 
 1 be declared null and void, by reason of the con- 
 1 tinuous violation of it by the rulers of Oude. 
 
 * The former alternative, which has been 
 ' advocated by Mr. Peacock, was rejected by me, 
 
 * and has been in like manner rejected by the 
 
 * Honourable Court, as neutralized in this par- 
 
152 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 ' ticular case, and rendered insufficient to secure 
 ' the object at which we are aiming, by the pecu- 
 ' liar provisions of the Treaty of 1801. 
 
 * " By those treaties," the Honourable Court 
 
 * observed, " the king of Oude is bound, in general 
 ' " terms, to govern according to the advice of the 
 4 " Residents, and specifically to introduce into his 
 ' " territory a reformed system of administration. 
 ' " But it also provided that this reformed system 
 
 * " shall be carried into effect by his own officers ; 
 
 * " and throughout the period of more than half- 
 ' " a-century, during which the treaties have 
 1 " existed, this one provision has frustrated all the 
 6 " efforts that have been made to induce the sovereigns 
 ( " of Oude to fulfil their obligations to the British 
 1 " Government and their own subjects." x 
 
 6 The alternative of compelling the fulfilment 
 
 * of the Treaty by force of arms being thus closed 
 ' against us by the peculiar provisions of the treaty 
 1 itself, I feel myself bound to advise that the 
 ' Treaty of 1801 should be declared null and 
 ' void, that our troops should be withdrawn, 
 
 1 The italics here are those of Lord Dalhousie himself. I have 
 referred to the argument founded on this provision of the Treaty 
 of 1801, ante, pp. 121, 122. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 153 
 
 1 that our protection of the government should 
 ' cease, and that all our relations with it should 
 * be broken off. 
 
 1 I have never affected to conceal my convic- 
 ' tion that this measure would lead to precisely 
 6 the same result as the more peremptory course 
 1 advised by others, but with some intervening 
 ' delay. . . . 
 
 ' Holding firmly to these views of the expe- 
 
 * diency of guiding our political action in relation 
 ' to Oude by established law and custom, and 
 6 finding no weight in the objections to the course 
 
 * which had already been advised, I should have 
 ' preferred to act on the suggestions which were 
 1 originally submitted to the Honourable Court in 
 ' my Minute of the 18th of June. 
 
 * But the sentiments of my colleagues were 
 adverse,' &c. 
 
 Lord Dalhousie's own scheme for the with- 
 drawal of the British forces from Oude, in the 
 event of the King's refusing his assent to a new 
 treaty, having been disallowed, only one of three 
 courses remained open to him, first, he might 
 annex Oude, deposing the King ; secondly, he 
 
154 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 might assume the government of the country per- 
 manently, recognizing the King as its nominal 
 sovereign with a fixed pension ; and, thirdly, he 
 might assume the government of the country 
 permanently, recognizing the King as its actual 
 sovereign, and making the British Government 
 accountable to him for the surplus revenues. 
 
 Mr. Kaye thinks the last alternative should 
 have been adopted. But it is not easy to see 
 wherein such an arrangement differed in principle 
 from that proposed by Lord Auckland in the Treaty 
 of 1837, which was peremptorily disallowed by the 
 Home Government ; and there is certainly no 
 ground for saying that the Home Government of 
 1856, was likely to be more favourable to such an 
 arrangement than that of 1837. The objections, 
 however, to this course are patent, and have been 
 well stated by Lord Dalhousie, as follows : 1 
 
 ' The Government of India would not be 
 ' justified in making over such a surplus to the 
 * reigning sovereign of Oude, only that it might 
 6 be unprofitably wasted by him, and squandered 
 1 upon the follies, and excesses, and vices, which 
 
 i See his Minute of 18th June, 1855 ; Oude papers, pp. 189, 190. 
 
ANNEXATION OP OUDE. 155 
 
 * are the usual characteristics of a native prince. 
 ' ... If the Government of India shall not only 
 4 renew its former obligations to defend the King 
 ' from all foreign and domestic enemies, but shall 
 1 undertake new and onerous duties, in addition to 
 
 * them ; if it shall consent to bear henceforth all 
 ' the labour, all the risk, of reconstructing and 
 
 * permanently administering the Government of 
 ' Oude, and of supplying the numerous European 
 ' agency which will be required for the purpose, 
 
 * surely it may justly covenant that after fully 
 6 providing for the pensioned dynasty of Oude, 
 ' for the administration of the province, and for 
 1 its progressive improvement, the Supreme Govern- 
 ' ment shall be at liberty to devote to the general 
 ' advantage of the Indian Empire some portion of 
 
 * that surplus of the revenue of Oude, of which 
 1 our own exertions and resources shall have been 
 
 * the sole origin and creative cause.' 
 
 If it be said, that the difficulty arising from the 
 non-communication of the disallowance of the 
 Treaty of 1837 was a reason, more or less impe- 
 rative, for the adoption of this course, it may well 
 be said, that of all concerned, Lord Dalhousie's 
 Government was the least responsible for that 
 
156 ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 
 
 difficulty. . I have shown that they pressed upon 
 the Home Government, in 1854, the propriety of 
 removing it, by a formal communication to the 
 King ; but were not permitted to do so. Lord 
 Dalhousie felt that the Treaty of 1837 was null 
 and void ; that any scheme involving a similar 
 policy would not receive the sanction of the 
 authorities which had rejected that Treaty, 1 and 
 that the scheme was objectionable in itself. 
 
 The first course I have suggested as being open 
 to Lord Dalhousie that of annexing Oude and 
 deposing its King he would not adopt, for the 
 reasons set forth in his Minute of the 18th of June, 
 1855. 2 
 
 The only course, therefore, that remained was 
 that which was actually adopted. A new treaty 
 was offered for the King's signature, transferring 
 the government of his country permanently to the 
 East India Company, but recognizing the King as a 
 nominal sovereign, with a large pension for himself 
 and his heirs. On his refusal to sign this Treaty, 
 the government of Oude was permanently assumed 
 by the British authorities, leaving the status of 
 
 1 See instructions to Colonel Outram, ante, p. 149. 
 3 See ante, pp. 135, 136. 
 
ANNEXATION OF OUDE. 157 
 
 the King and his family for subsequent arrange- 
 ment. 1 
 
 My object in investigating these transactions is 
 fully answered, if I have shown that Lord Dalhousie 
 was not possessed of the dominant passion for 
 annexation which has been so unjustly imputed to 
 him ; that he was in fact opposed to the annexation 
 of Oude ; that the responsibility of that measure 
 rests, not with him, but with the English Cabinet 
 and the Court of Directors ; and that his part in the 
 transaction was the last sacrifice which he made on 
 the altar of duty. 
 
 1 Lord Dalhousie granted the King a pension of 120,000/. a 
 year. 
 
( 158 ) 
 
 MILITARY PROPOSALS. 
 
 WHEN the Mutiny broke upon us in 1857, with 
 a small European force wholly unequal to the task 
 of repressing it, it was natural that the public 
 should seek for some one to blame, and matters 
 were so ingeniously managed, that the blame even- 
 tually settled on Lord Dalhousie, who had left 
 India fifteen months before the Mutiny began, who 
 had protested against the reduction of the European 
 force which took place in his time, and had recom- 
 mended a very considerable increase to that force, 
 as well as a large reduction of the native army. 
 
 Mr. Kaye observes, 1 ' If anything should teach 
 * us the wisdom of never suffering our European 
 ' force, even in the most tranquil times, to decline 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 341. 
 
MILITARY PROPOSALS. 159 
 
 * below what we may call " the athletic standard," 
 ' it is the fact, that when the times cease to be 
 ' tranquil, we cannot suddenly raise it to the 
 1 standard without exciting alarm and creating dan- 
 1 ger. But this lesson was not learnt. Or, if Indian 
 ' statesmen ever took it to their hearts, it was remorse- 
 ' lessly repudiated in the council of the English 
 6 nation/ An examination of what took place, will 
 enable us to assign to this remark its proper place and 
 value, in a history of Lord Dalhousie's administration. 
 
 In 1854, during the Crimean war, the Home 
 authorities proposed to withdraw two of her Majesty's 
 infantry regiments (the 25th and 98th) from India. 
 Lord Dalhousie objected to this, 1 in a forcible 
 Minute, dated the ^ 13th of September, 1854, from 
 which I shall cite two passages. The first passage 
 is prophetic of some of the events which followed : 2 
 
 * We are perfectly secure so long as we are 
 
 * strong, and are believed to be so ; but if European 
 ' troops shall now be withdrawn from India to 
 ' Europe, if countenance shall thus be given to the 
 ' belief, already prevalent, that we have grappled 
 
 1 He had already sent two Cavalry regiments to the Crimea. 
 
 2 Parliamentary papers ordered to be printed by House of 
 Commons in 1858. 
 
160 MILITARY PROPOSALS. 
 
 ' with an antagonist whose strength will prove equal 
 ' to overpower us, if by consenting to withdrawal, 
 
 * we shall weaken that essential element of our 
 6 military strength, which has already been declared 
 ' to be no more than adequate for ordinary times, 
 6 and if, further, we should be called on to despatch 
 ' an army to the Persian Gulf, an event which, 
 ' unlocked for now, may any day be brought about 
 ' by the thraldom in which Persia is held, and by 
 
 * the feeble and fickle character of the Shah ; then, 
 ' indeed, I shall no longer feel, and can no longer 
 ' express, the same confidence as before, that the 
 
 * security and stability of our position in the East 
 ' will remain unassailed.' 
 
 The second passage shows, that Lord Dalhousie 
 did not overlook the consequences of that increase 
 in our dominions, which the narrative of Mr. Kaye 
 implies to have been the discovery of ' intelligent 
 ' natives.' l Speaking of the distances at which 
 the European regiments were stationed from each 
 other, Lord Dalhousie observes : 2 ' I confidently 
 4 submit to the candour of her Majesty's Ministers, 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War. pp. 343, 344. 
 
 2 Minute, 13th September, 1854. Parliamentary Papers 
 ordered to be printed on motion of Mr. Vansittart in 1858. 
 
MILITARY PROPOSALS. 161 
 
 ' that placed as it is amidst distances so vast, amidst 
 ' multitudes so innumerable, amidst people and 
 ' sects various in many things, but all alike in this, 
 1 that they are lately conquered subjects of our race, 
 ' alien to them in religion, language, in colour, in 
 
 * habits, in all feelings and interests, the Govern- 
 1 ment of India has had solid grounds for the 
 1 declaration, more than once made' of late years, that 
 ' the European force at its command is not more 
 
 * than adequate for preserving the empire in security 
 ( and tranquillity, even in ordinary times, much 
 
 * more then,' &c. 
 
 Notwithstanding this remonstrance, her Majesty's 
 25th and 98th regiments were withdrawn from India, 
 without relief, reducing the number of Koyal regi- 
 ments of Infantry to twenty- two, and not twenty-four, 
 as stated by Mr. Kaye. 1 Although this was said to 
 be a mere temporary arrangement, occasioned by the 
 drain on our resources at that time, and although 
 the nominal establishment of Infantry for India 
 remained at thirty-three battalions/ the two bat- 
 talions thus withdrawn were not replaced at the 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 841. 
 
 2 See Lord Dalhousie's Minute (No. 2) on European Infantry, 
 5th February, 1856. Parliamentary Papers ordered to be printed 
 in 1858. 
 
 11 
 
162 MILITARY PROPOSALS. 
 
 end of the Crimean war, and when the Mutiny 
 broke out, there were only thirty-one battalions of 
 European Infantry actually on the Indian establish- 
 ment, 1 and five or six of these were absent in that 
 Persian war, which Lord Dalhousie had foreseen. 
 
 On the 28th of February, 1856, the last day 
 Lord Dalhousie presided at the Council of India, 
 he laid on its table nine Minutes, containing his 
 views and proposals on military subjects. He 
 requested that they might be forthwith transmitted 
 to the Home authorities, a request which was com- 
 plied with the next day. I cannot find that any 
 further attention was paid to these Minutes, either 
 at home or in India. Nothing more was heard 
 of them, until the year 1858, when, in consequence 
 of a motion of Mr. Vansittart's in the House of 
 Commons, one of them (No. 2), and also the 
 Minute of the 13th of September, 1854, already 
 referred to, were produced and printed. I know 
 
 1 There were nine regiments of European (Company's) Infantry, 
 and the following Royal Infantry regiments, twenty-two in 
 number, viz., the 8th, 10th, 24th, 27th, 29th, 32nd, 35th, 43rd, 
 52nd, 53rd, 60th 1st battalion, 61st, 64th, 70th, 74th, 75th, 
 78th, 81st, 83rd, 84th, 86th, 87th. In all, thirty-one battalions. 
 
MILITARY PROPOSALS. 163 
 
 not on what grounds the other eight Minutes 
 were withheld, but their suppression, coupled with 
 articles, which appeared at the time in the public 
 prints, misstating their effect, grievously affected 
 Lord Dalhousie's reputation. Even now, it is im- 
 possible to state the full effect of these Minutes ; 
 for although the authorities at the India House, 
 including Mr. Kaye himself, rendered me every 
 assistance, two of them are not to bo found, and 
 I have been obliged to collect as much as possible 
 of their effect, (but whether or not the whole, I am 
 unable to say,) from references to them in the other 
 Minutes. 
 
 Minute No. 1 (missing) proposed the raising of 
 two European Cavalry regiments for the Company's 
 service in Bengal, the officers for these regiments 
 being taken from four regular regiments of native 
 Cavalry, which were to be disbanded. As Lord 
 Dalhousie suggested the withdrawal of the two Royal 
 regiments of Cavalry in Bengal, this proposal would 
 not have increased the European force, although 
 it would have greatly reduced the regular native 
 Cavalry, which afterwards proved to be un- 
 faithful. 
 
 Minutes Nos. 2 and 3 refer to the European 
 
 112 
 
164 MILITARY PROPOSALS. 
 
 Infantry, and propose to raise the establishment 
 from thirty-three, its nominal, and thirty-one, its 
 actual number of battalions, to thirty-five battalions, 
 and if possible to thirty-seven battalions. The 
 force of thirty-five battalions, Lord Dalhousie pro- 
 posed to get by replacing in Bengal the two Koyal 
 regiments withdrawn during the Crimean war, and 
 by raising two more regiments of Company's Euro- 
 pean Infantry, one for each of the presidencies of 
 Bengal and Madras, disbanding two native regi- 
 ments in each of those presidencies to obtain officers 
 for such new European corps. In paragraph 19 he 
 says, ' I mention nineteen battalions as the mini- 
 ' mum force of European infantry which ought to 
 6 be maintained on the Bengal establishment 
 
 * twenty battalions would be better, and even more 
 
 * would not be superfluous ;' and if Lord Dalhousie 
 had adverted to the approaching annexation of Oude, 
 when he signed this Minute, 1 he would have altered 
 
 1 The Minute is dated on the 5th of February, 1856, only 
 two days before the annexation, in the hurry of business preceding 
 Lord Dalhousie's departure, but it bears internal evidence that it 
 was written some time before its date, inasmuch as it assigns 
 troops to specified places, and assigns none to Oude, though 
 European troops were actually there on the 5th of February, 
 to support the Resident if necessary. 
 
MILITARY PROPOSALS. 165 
 
 this suggestion into a positive demand for a still 
 greater increase. The Minute proposes, that if 
 the European force is increased to thirty-seven 
 battalions of Infantry according to his suggestion, 
 the two additional battalions should also be Com- 
 pany's regiments, one for Bengal and one for Madras, 
 the officers for them being obtained by disbanding 
 two more native regiments in each presidency. 
 
 No. 4 Minute recommends the removal of the 
 European Invalid Companies stationed at Chunar, 
 where they were useless, to some other place where 
 they might add to the apparent military strength. 
 
 No. 5 is missing, but I found the following 
 passage in Minute 8 or 9 referring to it : ' The 
 * augmentation of European companies of Artillery 
 ' which was solicited by the Commandant, has 
 1 already been proposed by me in one of the series of 
 ' Minutes on military establishments, which is now 
 ' before my colleagues. The augmentation, however, 
 1 was proposed in the form of companies, not of 
 ' a battalion, and I prefer to adhere to that pro- 
 ' posal.' It is clear, therefore, that he proposed 
 an increase in the European companies of 
 Artillery, though the amount of the increase 
 cannot now be ascertained. 
 
166 MILITARY PROPOSALS. 
 
 Minute 6 contains Lord Dalhousie's proposals 
 for the Bengal native Infantry. There were 
 seventy-four regular regiments, and two of these 
 being disbanded to obtain the officers for the 
 new European regiment, he proposed to reduce the 
 remaining seventy-two regiments from 1,000 to 
 800 Sepoys, with a corresponding deduction of 
 non-commissioned officers (say ten) in each corps. 
 He proposed that the three irregular Ghoorka 
 regiments should be raised from 640 to 800 men 
 each, and that those corps and the 66th native regi- 
 ment (also G-hoorkas) should be armed with rifles, 
 and that four irregular regiments of native Infantry, 
 of 800 men each, should be raised for particular 
 service in the Punjaub. In other words, he pro- 
 posed to strengthen the Ghoorka force ; * to reduce 
 the regular native infantry by 14,910 men f and 
 to increase the irregular native infantry by 3,200 
 men; thus effecting a total reduction of about 
 11,710 Sepoys. 
 
 1 Increase in the three Irregular Ghoorka Eegiments, 480 
 men ; reduction in 66th Ghoorkas, 200 men : increase, 280 men. 
 
 2 As the 66th were not Sepoys, but Ghoorkas, they should be 
 excluded from the reduction. This leaves 71 regiments to be 
 reduced by 210 men, that is, 14,910 men. 
 
MILITARY PROPOSALS. 167 
 
 Minute No. 7 treats of the Bengal native Cavalry. 
 The regular Cavalry of that presidency consisted of 
 ten regiments, but four of these being disbanded, and 
 their officers transferred to the new European 
 Cavalry regiments, under Minute No. 1, Lord 
 Dalhousie proposed to reduce the six remaining 
 regiments from 420 to 300 troopers. This effected 
 a reduction of 2,400 native troopers. 1 He also 
 proposed, that all the Irregular Cavalry regiments 
 (24 in number) should be reduced from 500 to 400 
 troopers. This reduction, however, was almost 
 neutralized by another proposal to raise four 
 additional regiments of irregular Cavalry for par- 
 ticular service in the Punjaub. 2 
 
 Another Minute proposed the addition of two 
 additional lieutenants to each regiment, with the 
 view of meeting the great demand for officers for 
 the Staff and Irregular regiments. This recom- 
 mendation, as it involved some patronage, appears 
 to have been attended to, and improved upon, for, 
 
 1 Four regular regiments of native Cavalry disbanded, 1,680 ; 
 six regiments of native cavalry reduced by 120 men each, 
 720; number reduced, 2,400. 
 
 2 The reduction in the irregular Cavalry would be 2,400 ; 
 increase of four new regiments, 1,600. Total reduction, 800 
 men. 
 
168 MILITARY PROPOSALS. 
 
 shortly afterwards, a captain and lieutenant were 
 added to each corps. 
 
 Lastly, Lord Dalhousie proposed that the 
 Commissariat department should be separated from 
 the regimental strength, and should be constituted a 
 separate Staff department by itself. This suggestion, 
 neglected at the time, was probably the origin of that 
 Staff Corps, which has now been established in India. 
 
 I will only say a few words as to these recom- 
 mendations of Lord Dalhousie. It requires no 
 military science to estimate the value of four more 
 battalions of European infantry at the commence- 
 ment of the Mutiny. With one of them at Cawnpore, 
 another at Lucknow, and the two newly-raised corps 
 doing duty in such garrisons as Forts William and 
 St. George, thus freeing other regiments for active 
 service, it is probable that the rebellion might have 
 been at once repressed, or its progress might have 
 been delayed, and its extent limited, so as to save 
 many valuable lives and avert much subsequent 
 difficulty. And those who know what the weak 
 European companies of Artillery (only 90 men) had 
 to go through at Cawnpore, Lucknow, Indore, and 
 elsewhere, during the Mutiny, will fully appreciate 
 
MILITARY PROPOSALS. 169 
 
 the proposed increase in their strength. But to 
 form a just opinion of Lord Dalhousie's proposal for 
 the increase of the European force, it must be 
 considered in connection with that large decrease of 
 the native army which he also proposed a reduction 
 which greatly increased the relative proportion of 
 the two forces. 
 
 With whom the blame rests of neglecting these 
 recommendations I know not, nor do I care to 
 know. My object is not to throw blame on any 
 one, but to rescue Lord Dalhousie from the 
 charge of leaving India, without having considered 
 our military position in that country, and without 
 having taken due precautions for its improvement. 
 
 I know not on what authority Mr. Kaye speaks 
 of Lord Dalhousie's * rooted conviction of the fidelity 
 * of the sepoy. 1 T The extract referred to by Mr. 
 Kaye on that point in the Farewell Minute, is part 
 of a section which treats of the material condition of 
 the army. Speaking of the European part of it, he 
 mentions the improvement in their barracks, food, 
 and health, and adverting to the Sepoy he says, 2 
 
 i KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 324, and see 203. 
 
 9 'Ibid. p. 203, and Lord Dalhousie's Farewell Minute. 
 
170 MILITARY PROPOSALS. 
 
 6 Hardly any circumstance of his condition is in need of 
 ' improvement' an observation exclusively directed 
 to his physical condition, and not to his loyalty. In 
 the absence of any unfavourable reports from the 
 military authorities, or of any facts calculated to 
 excite alarm, Lord Dalhousie must have been 
 omniscient, if he could have foreseen a mutiny, which 
 originated in greased cartridges unknown to the 
 Sepoy in his time. What he thought of the Sepoy 
 must be, to some extent, a matter of conjecture, but 
 his recorded Minutes insist on the European force 
 as ' the essential element of our strength,' i and his 
 military proposals suggest an increase in our 
 European, and a decrease in our native army. 
 
 1 Minute of 13th September, 1854, ante, p. 160. 
 
( 171 ) 
 
 CONCLUSION, 
 
 IT may be rash to speculate on future opinion, 
 but I am confident, that when the history of Lord 
 Dalhousie's administration is impartially written, 
 the propriety of his annexations will be gratefully 
 acknowledged. It will then appear, that he duly 
 appreciated the responsibility cast upon him by the 
 public law of India, and properly refused to recreate 
 the extinct dynasties of Sattarah, Jhansi, Nagpore, 
 and Sumbulpore, thereby consolidating our empire, 
 and securing a good government for the popula- 
 tion of those States. It will then be admitted 
 that other causes than annexation excited that 
 rebellion in Jhansi and Sumbulpore, which annexa- 
 tion did not produce in Nagpore and Sattarah. 
 
172 CONCLUSION. 
 
 That history will record, how, on the restoration 
 of peace in the Punjaub, Lord Dalhousie swept 
 away one of those dependent double Governments, 
 in which the old Anglo -Indian school of politicians 
 delighted to trust, and having annexed that province, 
 administered its Government so wisely and so 
 well, that when our hour of trial came, the sub- 
 jugated race not only remained faithful, but proved 
 our* best allies in the suppression of rebellion else- 
 where. The page that relates the conquest and 
 annexation of Pegu, will also mention, that under 
 the administration of that province, organized by 
 Lord Dalhousie, the population was so satisfied 
 with our rule, that when the mutiny burst out, 
 the European garrison, with the exception of a 
 few companies, was safely withdrawn, and sent on 
 service elsewhere. When the clamour of paid 
 advocacy has ceased, the wisdom and foresight of 
 Lord Dalhousie, in refusing to recognize any longer, 
 such rallying points for the disaffected as the 
 titular sovereignties of the Carnatic and Tanjore, 
 will be gratefully acknowledged ; and although 
 history will narrate, that his hand signed the pro- 
 clamation annexing the kingdom of Oude, it will 
 also record the fact, that of all the statesmen of 
 
CONCLUSION. 173 
 
 his time, Lord Dalhousie was the least responsible 
 for that measure. 
 
 The administration of Lord Dalhousie was the 
 commencement of a new era in India, and her 
 great advance in civilization will date from the 
 time of his government. Under his rule large 
 sums were for the first time set aside for Public 
 Works. The Grand Trunk Eoad was continued 
 from Delhi throughout the Punjaub, and other 
 great lines of road were constructed. The Baree 
 Dooab, and Ganges Canals, and other public works 
 in Madras, provided for the irrigation of large 
 districts. The Anna Postage and Electric Tele- 
 graph established throughout the country, and 
 the system of Eailroads, devised and commenced 
 by Lord Dalhousie, secured for India that cheap 
 and frequent interchange of thought, and rapidity 
 of communication, which will add to her happi- 
 ness, and promote her civilization. Measures 
 taken for the suppression of female infanticide, 
 and the Meriah sacrifices, large grants for educa- 
 tional purposes, and Lord Dalhousie 's personal 
 support of the late Mr. Bethune's school for the 
 education of native girls, attest his anxiety for 
 the moral improvement of the native population. 
 
174 CONCLUSION. 
 
 And not content with the present, but looking 
 carefully into the future, he imported, from England 
 and elsewhere, men of skill and science, and em- 
 ployed them in exploring the mineral and other 
 resources of the vast empire he governed. 
 
 Momentous events occurred, and great ques- 
 tions were decided during the eight years of Lord 
 Dalhousie's administration. He spared no labour 
 in coming to a right conclusion on all of them, 
 and, whether right or wrong, he adduced weighty 
 reasons for every act of his administration. Those 
 reasons convinced most men at the time, and 
 public opinion approved, and applauded, his whole 
 policy. But the tide has now turned, and because, 
 more than a year after he left India, the mutiny 
 and rebellion broke out, it has occurred to in- 
 genious minds to suggest, that they were the con- 
 sequences of Lord Dalhousie's policy. Every act 
 of his administration has been canvassed with the 
 view of extracting from it some cause, proximate 
 or remote, of rebellion ; and even the railroad and 
 electric wire have been introduced into a picture, 1 
 worked up with all a painter's skill, to show the 
 discontent produced by his Government. 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, p. 190. 
 
CONCLUSION. 175 
 
 No impartial historian can attribute the mutiny, 
 or the subsequent rebellion, to Lord Dalhousie's 
 administration. In his time the greased car- 
 tridges, which are now admitted to have been the 
 proximate cause of the mutiny, were unknown to 
 the Sepoy, and there would have beeji no rebellion 
 if there had not been a mutiny. The mutiny and 
 the circumstances attending its outbreak convinced 
 every native in India, that our Sepoys were dis- 
 affected, and that we were weak in the essential 
 element of our military power European soldiers. 
 This knowledge, confirmed by the unchecked 
 success of the mutineers for a time, was quite 
 sufficient to excite rebellion in subjugated races, 
 differing from us in colour, habits, and religion, 
 and loving us not. The mutiny stirred native 
 society to its lowest depths. The Hindoo sympa- 
 thized with the fancied wrongs of the Sepoy. The 
 Mohammedan thought the time was come to assert 
 once more the supremacy of his religion and race. 
 The disaffected throughout India felt that our 
 power was shaken, and that the time to strike for 
 freedom was come. It may be, that, when rebellion 
 took courage from the mutiny, and burst forth into 
 action, it betrayed the existence of discontent, and 
 
176 CONCLUSION. 
 
 the old antagonism between darkness and light, but 
 the discontent was that of subjugated races the 
 antagonism was that of ignorance and falsehood 
 opposed to civilization and truth. 
 
 I shall not follow the example set me by recent 
 publications, and attempt a description of Lord 
 Dalhousie's character. I feel unequal to such a 
 task, although I would say a few words, in con- 
 clusion, on the character which others have given 
 him. 
 
 It seems almost superfluous to object to those 
 descriptions of Lord Dalhousie, which characterize 
 him as possessed of ' one dominant passion ' which 
 drove him ( beyond the boundaries of conventional 
 ( justice, generosity, and good faith,' 1 as taking 
 ' a sheriff's officer's advantage of the Nizam/ ' as 
 ' resorting to a technicality of the law courts/ * to 
 ' deprive the Ranee of Tanjore of her crown and 
 * treasure/ 2 and as being ' the worst and basest of 
 ' rulers.' 3 These remarks might have been ex- 
 
 1 ARNOLD'S Dalhousie Administration, vol. ii. p. 200. 
 
 2 For these and other similar passages, see vol. ii. of ARNOLD'S 
 Dalhousie Administration, pp. 199, 200. 
 
 3 The Empire in India, by Major BELL, Madras Staff Corps, 
 p. 26. 
 
CONCLUSION. 177 
 
 eiisable, if Lord Dalhousie had done his great deeds 
 to aggrandize his own fortune ; but when it is 
 remembered that all his acts were done in the 
 service of his country, that weighty reasons were 
 assigned for all of them, and that, whether right 
 or wrong, they were all done with the view of 
 benefiting this country as well as India, and as 
 such, received the sanction of his Sovereign, her 
 Ministers, and Parliament, the unprejudiced mind 
 revolts from such language, as extravagant and 
 unjustifiable. 
 
 Mr. Kaye says Lord * Dalhousie had no imagina- 
 6 tion,' and that for want of that faculty he was 
 unable to sympathize with those under his rule. 1 It 
 may be that he was unable to form ' a dramatic 
 ( conception of the feelings ' of ' the representative 
 ' of a long line of kings,' or 'of the greybeard 
 * chief,' mentioned by Mr. Kaye, but I doubt 
 whether a man with his almost intuitive power of 
 appreciating the men around him, could be totally 
 destitute of imagination. Whether he did, or 
 did not, possess that faculty, he possessed other 
 qualities essential to a Governor, unrivalled 
 
 1 KAYE'S Sepoy War, pp. 356, 357. 
 
 12 
 
178 CONCLUSION. 
 
 powers of perception, and an anxious desire to 
 be right on every occasion a desire which led 
 him to investigate with such labour, and discuss 
 with such logical precision, all the great questions 
 that came before him. Some may prefer a Go- 
 vernor with a lively imagination, but I must confess 
 to a preference for qualities, rarely found in com- 
 bination with great imaginative powers, care, 
 accuracy, common sense, and a sound judgment. 
 
 As to Lord Dalhousie's supposed want of 
 sympathy for those under his rule, I do not think 
 an adverse opinion as to his annexations justifies 
 so severe a reflection on his memory. Probably, 
 if Mr. Kaye had known him personally, he would 
 not have formed so harsh a judgment on such 
 little evidence. I can recall instances, within my 
 own knowledge when Advocate -General, of Lord 
 Dalhousie's indignation when acts of oppression and 
 torture had attracted his notice in the public prints, 
 and of his readiness to protect the native popula- 
 tion from the recurrence of such acts. And I am 
 sure that no one who was present on the Maidaun 
 of Calcutta on the evening when Lord Dalhousie 
 embarked, who saw the whole population moved, 
 as one man, with a deep sense of regret and ad- 
 
CONCLUSION. 179 
 
 miration, and observed the emotion of the departing 
 statesman under the manifestation of that feeling, 
 would consider him as one incapable of either ex- 
 citing, or feeling sympathy. Many who witnessed 
 that triumphant departure, had a melancholy fore- 
 boding that the curtain was falling on the last 
 act of a great public career ; that neither plaudits 
 in India, nor well-merited honours at home, could 
 avail to prolong a life almost exhausted in the 
 public service. Others, more sanguine, hoped that 
 he would recover his wasted strength, and enter on 
 a new course of honour and success, as bright and 
 glorious as his Indian career. But no one in that 
 vast assemblage dreamed, that in a few years, the 
 great reputation of their departing Governor would 
 be doubted, sneered at, and assailed, or that it 
 would ever be necessary to defend an administration 
 that had been one brilliant and uninterrupted 
 success. 
 
LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY SMITH, ELDER AMD CO., 
 OLD BAILEY, E.C. 
 
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