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 Need of Social Statistics 
 As an Aid to the Courts 
 
 Vk-alter p, V^illcox 
 
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 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES 
 
 GIFT OF 
 
 JAIiES H. TUFTS 

 
 l*A.,tN 
 
 The Need of Social Statistics 
 as an Aid to the Courts 
 
 BY 
 
 WALTER F. WILLCOX 
 
 Reprinted from 
 
 AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 
 
 March-April, 1913 
 
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 THE NEED OF SOCIAL STATISTICS 
 <l AS AN AID TO THE COURTS 
 
 2515^5
 
 THE NEED OF SOCIAL STATISTICS AS AN AID TO 
 
 THE COURTS. 
 
 Of recent years and especially of recent months public 
 opinion and political parties have been aroused, as they 
 have not since the Dred Scot case, over certain judicial 
 decisions and their relation to the public welfare. One 
 outside both of politics and of law might think it prudent 
 to be silent on this subject. But on a matter of such mo- 
 ment every phase of opinion is entitled to a hearing and 
 we may have faith that "in the multitude of counsellors 
 there is safety. ' ' Among that multitude I have heard none 
 claiming to speak for the statistician. Believing as I do 
 that this small but growing group has a point of view which 
 deserves attention, I shall venture this afternoon to present 
 and defend their position, as I conceive it. 
 
 What I have to say may be introduced with a quotation 
 from a distinguished jurist who, in part, it may be, be- 
 cause of his work as a student in natural science and later 
 his teaching of law at three great universities, has a 
 broader outlook and more familiaritv with related fields of 
 thought than is likely to be the lot of the lawyer or judge 
 immersed in the routine duties of an exacting profession. 
 Professor Pound in closing a recent series of suggestive 
 articles in the Uarvard Law Review says: "Not a little 
 of the world-wide discontent with our present legal order 
 is due to modes of juristic thought and juridical method 
 which result from want of 'team-work' between jurispru- 
 dence and tlic other social scioncos." 
 
 The "juridical method" is primarily deductive, deriv- 
 ing conclusions from the principles of the law applicable to 
 the case at bar. Philosophical jurisprudence subjects 
 those principles to a critical analysis, discovers the large 
 empirical element they contain, and by showing how they
 
 200 47 AMERICAN LAW REVIEW. 
 
 alter with i^rowing experience and with changes in the im- 
 plicit political or social presuppositions upon which they 
 are bnilt undermines that almost religious faith in their 
 permanent social value common among lawyers and judges. 
 But even philosophical jurisprudence, like a great part of 
 economies and of sociology, devotes much time to the 
 definition, elucidation and criticism of terms and con- 
 ceptions and to deduction from principles — intellectual 
 processes in which the lawyer and the judge are already 
 trained. 
 
 If the lawver should turn to economic historv and sta- 
 tistics, which are perhaps the most inductive branches of 
 social science, he would find a change in method sharply 
 marked. The contrast between the mental characteristics 
 exercised, on the one hand, in stating legal principles neatly 
 and clearly and applying them convincingly to a given or 
 assumed state of facts, and those exercised, on the other 
 hand, in the patient investigation of the facts as they have 
 been and are is of the widest. For this reason an intelli- 
 gent and sympathetic comprehension of the methods of as- 
 certaining social fact would be of the first value to a judge 
 as supplementing the somewhat excessively deductive train- 
 ing he usually obtains from his profession. 
 
 It may be said in reply that the facts are given to the 
 Appellate Court, that in previous trials they have been ad- 
 mitted or established, and that all the judge has to do is to 
 apply his principles. But this statement I am compelled 
 to challenge. The very contrary is often the truth. In 
 the great majority of decisions belonging to the class in 
 dispute the court has by implication, if not by direct state- 
 ment, passed upon questions of fact so important that if 
 they had been differently viewed the verdict would have 
 been other than it was. In other words, my main conten- 
 tion is that many, perhaps most, of the court decisions 
 which have aroused dissatisfaction and criticism have 
 turned on questions of social fact, and fact often im- 
 perfectly apprehended or established.
 
 SOCIAL STATISTICS AS AN AID TO THE COUETS. 261 
 
 In order to avoid controverted matter at the start, I 
 will draw my first illustration from a decision neither made 
 by a court nor arousing £fny considerable dissatisfaction, 
 that rendered by the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission 
 of 1902-03. 
 
 One claim made before that Commission by the union 
 mine workers, the only one with which I am now concerned, 
 was for an increase of 20 per cent, in their wages. For 
 this claim the following reason, among others, was as- 
 signed: ''The rate of wages in the anthracite coal fields is 
 insufficient to compensate the mine workers in view of the 
 dangerous character of the occupation in relation to acci- 
 dents, the liability to serious and permanent disease, the 
 high death rate and the short trade life incident to this em- 
 ployment." The Commission found and reported that 
 anthracite coal mining "should be classed as one of the 
 dangerous industries of the country, ranking with several 
 of the most dangerous." 
 
 No evidence was introduced and I believe no important 
 evidence could then or can now be found regarding the 
 comparative liability of American anthracite coal miners 
 *'to serious and permanent disease, a high death rate and a 
 short trade life," and yet these points seem to go to the 
 essence of the miners' claim. In determining the total 
 death rate and the length of trade life accidents are usually 
 a minor factor. In the eyes of the public and probably in 
 those of the miners they bulk much larger than the facts, if 
 known, would warrant. 
 
 To show this, let me turn to some foreign statistics, not 
 assuming that they would hold true for Pennsylvania, but 
 believing they point to a line of evidence which we sorely 
 need for this country. Let us suppose a demand for a 20 
 per cent, increase of coal miners' wages had been made in 
 Elnglaiid, sup[)ort('(l ])y similar clainis, and examine the evi- 
 dence there available to aid in its solution. During the 
 years 1900-1902 figures were carefully gathered showing 
 the deatli rate from accidents and other causes among
 
 262 47 AMERICAN LAW REVIEW. 
 
 nearly half a million coal miners. The figures show that 
 fatal accidents were more than twice as common among 
 coal miners as among all occupied and retired males of 
 like age. Thus, if an inference from England to Pennsyl- 
 vania were allowable, the finding of the Commission that 
 anthracite coal mining is ''one of the dangerous indus- 
 tries" — already well supported by Pennsylvania figures — 
 seems confirmed. But looking to the death rate from all 
 causes, a much more significant evidence of the length of 
 trade life, the death rate of English coal miners at ages 
 25-64 was between eleven and twelve per cent, below the 
 average of all working males. Why does coal mining, at 
 least in England, notwithstanding the frequency of fatal 
 accidents, seem to be a healthy occupation? Because the 
 very high mortality from accidents is more than neutral- 
 ized by the low mortality from certain forms of disease, 
 notably consumption. How far these results would apply 
 to anthracite coal miners in Pennsylvania, no one can tell. 
 
 The second case of which I wish to speak is the well- 
 known bake-shop case.^ The New York law under discus- 
 sion was one of the earliest American statutes restricting 
 the hours of men's labor. The work of bakers was lim- 
 ited to ten hours a day or 60 a week, and the statute, al- 
 though a part of the labor law, was defended and justified 
 as protecting the health of the consumers of bread, or of 
 the bakers themselves. Nineteen judges passed upon the 
 statute, ten thinking it constitutional and nine unconstitu- 
 tional ; but, as five of the nine were members of the United 
 States Supreme Court, the last and binding decision was 
 adverse. 
 
 From the numerous opinions in the case it is possible to 
 derive this general conclusioii : If the occupation of a 
 baker as tlien followed in the bake-shops of cities in New 
 York was so harmful to those engaged in it or through its 
 products was so injurious or menacing to the general health 
 as to invite special legislation, then the statute was an 
 
 > People V. Lochner, 177 N. Y. 145 and 198 U. S. 45.
 
 SOCIAL, STATISTICS AS AN" AID TO THE COUETS. 263 
 
 admissible exercise of the police power. But if neither of 
 these conditions was met, the statute was unconstitutional. 
 Thus Judge Parker of the Court of Appeals wrote : ' ' The 
 published medical opinions and vital statistics . . . fully 
 justify the section under review as one to protect the health 
 of the employees ; ' ' and Justice Vann, defending the same 
 conclusion, wrote : "I do not think the regulation in ques- 
 tion can be sustained unless we are able to say from com- 
 mon knowledge that working in a bakery . . . is an 
 unhealthy emploj^nent. " On the other hand. Justice Bart- 
 lett of the same court admitted that the State might regu- 
 late the hours of labor in any vocation pursued at the risk 
 of health, but expressed his belief "that the occupation of 
 a baker did not fall within that class" and so voted against 
 the validity of the statute; and Justice Peckham of the 
 United States Supreme Court in writing the prevailing 
 opinion said: ''There can be no fair doubt that the trade 
 of a baker in and of itself is not an unhealthy one to that 
 degree wliich would authorize the legislature to pass such a 
 statute." Other justices, like Harlan and Holmes, upheld 
 the statute on the ground that whether the occupation was 
 healthy or unhealthy was a question of fact upon which the 
 court should accept the opinion of the Legislature implied 
 in the passage of the law. On the whole, a study of the 
 opinions warrants a belief that the law would have been 
 hold constitutional by every one of the judges if either of 
 the following conditions had been met: If the judge had 
 accepted the opinion of the Legislature affirming the un- 
 healthy character of the baker's occupation as conclusive; 
 or it', on iinlfix-ndciit ly reviewing the evidence offered in 
 support of tiiat conclusion, he had found it convincing. 
 
 This decision tlms tnnicd on ;i <|Uostion of fact. Upon 
 that question the evidence cited by tiic Judges consisted in 
 a series of opinions froni medical wi'itci's jind vague refer- 
 ences to vital statistics. Mulhall's Dictionary of Statistics, 
 that })f'te noire of careful statisticians, was cited four times. 
 I doubt whether any member of t his Association would hold
 
 264 47 AMERICAN LAW REVIEW. 
 
 that the evidence mentioiied in the numerous opinions of the 
 judges warranted a confident answer either affirmative or 
 negative to the question, Was the occupation of a baker in 
 the cities of New York State a very unhealthy one? 
 
 If a similar question had arisen in England the answer 
 to it would have been clear and probably convincing. The 
 death rate of bakers 25-64 years of age in 1891 and in 1901 
 was to the death rate of all males at the same ages as 92 is 
 to 100; in other words, the occupation was somewhat 
 healthier than the average. During the decade 1890-1900 
 the death rate of bakers fell, the improvement being great- 
 est in the case of consumption and diseases of the respira- 
 tory system. AVhether similarly a low death rate and 
 rapid improvement in the health of bakers in this country 
 or in New York State would appear, if the facts were 
 known, no one can safely assert. The even division of the 
 judges arose largely from the circumstance that most of 
 them felt bound to reach a conclusion of fact when the evi- 
 dence was inconclusive and about equally balanced. 
 
 The third and last case of which I wish to speak is the 
 one in which the New York Court of Appeals in 1911 
 unanimously held the Workman's Compensation Act of 
 1910 unconstitutional.^ 
 
 The statute was based upon a classification of occupa- 
 tions under which eight especially dangerous kinds of em- 
 ployment were selected for protection by a new system of 
 compensation in case of accident. To this classification no 
 serious objection was raised by the court. The central 
 question decided in this case, as in the bake-shop case, was 
 that the statute was not a legitimate exercise of the police 
 power, that is, "the power of promoting the public welfare 
 by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and prop- 
 erty.^ On this point the court said that the statute "does 
 nothing to conserve the health, safety or morals of the 
 employees," and, elsewhere, that it "contains not a single 
 
 ' Ives V. South Buffalo Ry. Co., ' Freund, Police Power, p. ill. 
 
 201 N. Y. 271.
 
 SOCIAL STATISTICS AS AN AID TO THE COURTS. 265 
 
 provision which can be said to make for the safety, health 
 or morals of the employees." From the context of these 
 passages we may infer that if the court had taken a differ- 
 ent view, if it had believed that the statute did make for 
 the safety or health of the employees, it would have decided 
 that the statute was a valid exercise of the police power 
 and constitutional. 
 
 Now the striking thing about these positions of the court, 
 like those in the other two cases, is that they are not con- 
 clusions of law, but statements of fact. As such it requires 
 no special training in the law to examine them. 
 
 The United States is believed to have an extremely high 
 accident rate, but our statistics to confirm or correct the 
 opinion are meager, if not inconclusive. One of the main 
 purposes of the law declared unconstitutional was to lower 
 that accident rate in those industries as well as to assure 
 compensation. The court seems to assume without giving 
 its reasons that this purpose would not be realized. The 
 general testimony of students of accident statistics in for- 
 eign countries where legislation aiming at the same end 
 has for years been in force is to the effect that the propor- 
 tion of accidents to one thousand employees has increased, 
 that the proportion of serious accidents to one thousand 
 employees has been stationary or has decreased, but that 
 this decrease, if it existed, has been offset or more than 
 offset by the apparent increase of minor accidents. Thus 
 an examination l)y Dr. H. J. Harris of the accident sta- 
 tistics of Germany, Austria and Great Britain, published 
 in the proceedings of our Association for last March, con- 
 cludes that *'tho progress in the movement for reducing the 
 risk of indnstry has resulted in distinctly reducing the risk 
 of death or permanent disablement, but has not yet dimin- 
 ished the risk of temporary disablement."^ I (inotc also 
 the statements of M. A. Fontaine, the French Director of 
 Labor, presented a few weeks ago before the Interna- 
 tional Congress on Hygiene .-ind Demography at Washing- 
 
 \ *Am. Stat. Absu. I'uIj.. vol. xiii., I*. 27 (March 1912).
 
 266 47 AMERICAN LAW REVIEW. 
 
 ton : ' ' If, ill order to eliminate the influence of the increase 
 of the number of workmen, one refers the numbers of ac- 
 cidents to one thousand workmen, it is apparent that there 
 has been [sc. in France] no increase in severe accidents, 
 that the actual danger of the industries has not augmented, 
 but that there is a characteristic and important increase 
 of minor accidents. This change is attributed to the in- 
 creasing care with which accidents are reported and still 
 more to the legal modifications which influence the work- 
 men to prolong short, temporary disabilities in order to 
 get their remuneration."^ The usual and probably the 
 correct explanation of this fact in other countries also is 
 that many minor accidents formerly were not reported at 
 all, but now are registered. If this explanation be ac- 
 cepted, then the tendency in foreign countries has been to- 
 wards a real decrease of serious accidents and perhaps 
 towards a real decrease of all, though not of reported, 
 minor accidents. On the same point the opinion of the 
 commission recommending the law appears in the follow- 
 ing sentence of its report signed by 13 of the 14 members : 
 ''It is the opinion of a great many of the employers tes- 
 tifying before us on the subject that the compensation sys- 
 tem will have the effect of making the employers more 
 careful and with that we agree, nor does it seem in any 
 way probable that the compensation system would have 
 any effect on making workmen careless."^ This opinion 
 of the Commission was in line with evidence showing that 
 under the present system in three-eighths of the cases of 
 fatal accident investigated nothing was paid to the surviv- 
 ing representatives of the deceased, in one-eighth only the 
 funeral expenses Avere paid and in nearly three-eighths 
 more the payment was less than $500. In cases of partial 
 disability, temporary or permanent, the proportion receiv- 
 ing no compensation was even higher. This evidence, care- 
 fully considered by the Commission and presented in its 
 
 * Abstracts of Papers at Interna- " Wainwright Commission, First 
 
 tional Congress on Hygiene and Report, p. 56. 
 Demography, pp. 284, 285.
 
 SOCIAL STATISTICS AS AN AID TO THE COURTS. 267 
 
 report, seems fully to justify its opinion. If the amount to 
 be paid out by employers for accidents were to be increased 
 several times, as the proposed system would do, the motives 
 leading the employer to try to diminish the number of such 
 accidents would be correspondingly strengthened. 
 
 The conclusion of the New York Commission has been 
 recently supported by that of the Massachusetts Commis- 
 sion on Compensation for Industrial Accidents. It recom- 
 mended an elective compensation law and with the New 
 York decision in hand it unanimously rejected the con- 
 clusion of that court regarding the effect of such legislation 
 upon the safety and health of employees and reported the 
 following finding: "No one can study the history of this 
 subject in other countries without being impressed by the 
 fact that the operation of compensation laws in several of 
 them has materially reduced the number of injuries in fac- 
 tories and workshops, especially those resulting from ma- 
 chine operation."" On the basis of this experience as well 
 as other evidence, the Massachusetts Commission added : 
 "Under the terms of the new law . . . the employers 
 will realize that it is of the utmost consequence in a finan- 
 cial as well as a humanitarian way to prevent the injury. 
 It is believed that it will l)e possible to decrease very largely 
 the number of accidents and this aspect of the law is re- 
 garded as its most inii)ortant part."" 
 
 The New York court seems to believe that an indirect 
 method of decreasing the nnmbcr of accidents, namely, by 
 increasing the employer's pecuniary interest in pi-cvcnting 
 them, is unjustified. It lianlly realizes that in securing 
 social change indirect methods are often the most effective. 
 The opinion of the Tjegislature, also, that the new law wonld 
 diminish accidents seems to ])e clearly iiidieatec! l.y its ])ass- 
 age of the bill. \V<' hav then npon one side <>f I his issue 
 of fact the conclusion of statisticians regarding \\\r prol)- 
 able effef^t of similar laws in foreign eonntries, tin; ctnieln- 
 sio?i of the New York Commission and tlw Massnchns(«lls 
 
 ' Jtrport. ]). 40. ' Ihid.
 
 268 47 AMERICAN LAW REVIEW. 
 
 Commission and tlie statistical evidence npon whicli they 
 based that conchision and the opinion of the Legislature 
 which passed the law; and upon the other, the unanimous 
 verdict of the Court of Appeals. 
 
 Another line of evidence also leads to the belief that the 
 decision in question is entitled to scant consideration except 
 from such courts as are bound to accept it as authority. 
 The evidence is rather psychological than statistical, but 
 still it may be mentioned as supporting the argument that 
 courts are ill adapted to deal with these questions of social 
 fact and that a speedy development of sound statistical 
 work in this field is of capital importance for courts, judges 
 and Legislatures. 
 
 If a statute passed in the exercise of the police power is 
 attacked as unconstitutional, the court usually admits the 
 existence of a presumption in favor of its constitutionality. 
 As Justice Harlan put it in his dissenting opinion on the 
 bake-shop case: '*If there be doubt as to the validity of 
 the statute . . . the courts must keep their hands off, 
 leaving the Legislature to meet the responsibility for un- 
 wise legislation." A court approaching such a question 
 and feeling bound to review the judgment of the Legisla- 
 ture might be expected to describe briefly the existing con- 
 ditions, the evils which the statute was designed to remove, 
 and the changes that had resulted or would result from it, 
 before approaching the discussion of the constitutional ob- 
 jections to the new system. In that discussion an obvious 
 desire to find the law constitutional would be expected. 
 
 In the present case the opinion begins with a paragraph 
 reciting the facts and praising ''the industry and intelli- 
 gence of this Commission." The second paragraph begins 
 the argumentative part with a most significant sentence: 
 "The statute, judged by our common-law standards, is 
 plainly revolutionary." On the lips of a lawyer and judge 
 57 years of age the word "revolutionary," like the word 
 "socialistic," is a term of reproach or opprobrium and not 
 of argument. With his opening sentence as a clue to the
 
 SOCIAL, STATISTICS AS AX AID TO THE COURTS. 269 
 
 writer's frame of mind, the following phrases scattered 
 through the opinion gain new meaning: "The radical 
 character of this legislation," "this departure from our 
 long-established law and usage," "this indictment of the old 
 system," "the new statute is totally at variance with the 
 common law theory, " " the theory is not merely new in our 
 system of jurisprudence but plainly antagonistic to its 
 basic idea." From these passages one not familiar with 
 the law would be almost sure to infer that there is a strong 
 legal presumption against a "revolutionary" statute "to- 
 tally at variance with the common law theory." A careful 
 reading of the decision shows that the court at another 
 point of its discussion grudgingly admits what I take to be 
 unquestioned, that the Legislature has the right to revolu- 
 tionize the common law. If so, the common law no more 
 furnishes any standard by which a statute changing it 
 should be judged, than the decision of a lower court fur- 
 nishes a standard by which the reversal of its decision by a 
 higher court should be judged. Then what is the use of 
 this lengthy discussion of the common-hiw tlieory? Ap- 
 parently it reveals a frame of mind somewhat like this: 
 The statute is so totally at variance with the common law 
 that it probably violates also some underlying constitu- 
 tional provision. And to that conclusion the court comes 
 when it says : "With all due respect to the niciiihcrs of the 
 commission, we beg to observe that the statute enacted in 
 conformity with their recommendations does not stop at 
 reversing the common law; it attempts to icverse the very 
 provisions of the Constitution." \n<l the court finds it 
 unconstitutional because it is not a health law, or in its own 
 words: "This statute . . . contains not a single ])r()- 
 vision which can l)e sai<l to make for the safety, health or 
 morals of the employees." The evidence already pre- 
 sented seems to indieat<' that it was a hen 1th hiw in the 
 sense that its intended effect was, .ind probably its actual 
 effect would have been, to dirninish oi' clirck the iiicre;ise in 
 the number or [>ro|)ortion of" aeeifh'iits ifi IIm' industries af- 
 fected.
 
 270 47 AMERICAN LAW REVIEW. 
 
 These three cases agree among themselves and represent 
 many others in that each tribunal passed upon an important 
 question of fact involved with the questions of law and in 
 so doing decided the case. Each was a question of social 
 fact, or fact about a group average, the average duration 
 of trade life, the average healthfulness of an occupation, 
 the average effect of a given method of compensation upon 
 the frequency of industrial accidents. 
 
 Even if the view taken by many judges should finally 
 be accepted by all courts and the decision of these questions 
 of fact made by the legislature in enacting a statute should 
 be left in all but extreme cases witliout judicial review 
 still the difiiculty of drawing a line between the extreme 
 cases and other cases would be no less serious, though it 
 might arise less often. If the court should refrain, the de- 
 cision of the Legislature would be final. 
 
 If an appeal on such questions of fact from the decision 
 of the State court of last resort to the voters were per- 
 mitted, as has been proposed, the voters would face the 
 same problem. 
 
 With whichsoever of these three. Legislature, court, or 
 people, the final decision rests, there is great and growing 
 need of perfecting our agencies for ascertaining social fact, 
 and of these in my judgment the main one is social statis- 
 tics. It is the lack of convincing social statistics upon such 
 problems which has made it impossible to answer with con- 
 fidence many of the questions judges and Legislatures have 
 assumed or felt bound to answer. 
 
 It might be said that the need for statistics is not clear, 
 that the brilliant work of Mr. Brandeis in defending the 
 Oregon fen-hour law for women, which illustrates just what 
 is needed, is far from statistical. Such work was probably 
 the best that could be done under the conditions, but in 
 many fields it could not be duplicated and like any collec- 
 tion of opinions it is open to challenge as mere opinion. 
 Even expert opinion is a poor substitute for an inductive 
 and exhaustive study of the fact.
 
 SOCIAL, STATISTICS AS AN AID TO THE COURTS. 271 
 
 Our political meclianism for the inductive determination 
 of social fact is immeasurably inferior to our mechanism 
 for the deductive application of legal principles to assumed 
 states of social fact. Many courts, wisely or unwisely, 
 have felt bound to review and decide upon such issues of 
 fact and in doing so have often traversed the judgment of 
 the Legislature and sometimes of the public, and at the 
 same time have revealed a lack of desire or ability to in- 
 vestigate for themselves or do more than weigh the evi- 
 dence submitted by the parties in the light of their own 
 convictions or impressions. Such cases are sure to multi- 
 ply and the criticism of the courts aroused by their decision 
 seems likely to increase. 
 
 In such cases a developed system of social statistics 
 should ascertain the facts and present them in a convincing 
 way. It should render upon these multiplying questions of 
 social fact somewhat the service that the jury system does 
 upon questions of individual fact. Our methods of ascer- 
 taining social fact are on the whole less developed than in 
 any other great industrial country; more and more our 
 courts are finding it necessary to decide such questions of 
 fact; our national attitude towards the courts is apparently 
 changing from one of perhaps extravagant hiudatioii to one 
 of perhaps excessive criticism. These facts seem to me lo 
 be interdependent. Tlio asccrtainmeiil .iinl jnoof of the 
 social facts should not he left to the iii(livi(hial parties to 
 whatever suit may arise, '^riic lacts in the case nt bar iiwiy 
 be anytliing l)nt typical and it is by typical, n'presentative 
 or average facts that the court should l)e guided to a de- 
 cision. Into this field of exploration our American statis- 
 tics seem destined to advance and by so doing to supple- 
 ment a defect in our judicial system. 
 
 Waltkk I'\ W'ii.i.cox 
 
 COU.NEM, U.MVEHSITV. 
 
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