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 1917
 
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 PREFACE 
 
 The fact that my booklet on Homesteads has, I under- 
 stand, achieved a success that surpasses what were in my 
 view expectations of too roseate a hue, emboldens me to 
 offer to my fellow practitioners this companion volume on 
 Chattel Exemptions. The book pretends to no higher rank 
 than that of the former booklet, viz., a faithful compilation 
 of all Canadian authority on the subject, together with such 
 U.S.A. authority as has seemed to me of utility. The sub- 
 ject matter, however, is of an interest which is less local. 
 
 Should the work be lucky enough to meet with an ap- 
 proval throughout Canada similar to that which fell to the 
 lot of its companion in Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatche- 
 wan, I shall consider myself indeed fortunate. 
 
 As before, I would ask for correction or suggestion, in 
 order that future editions of the work, should they ever be 
 called for, may be as complete as possible. 
 
 I have to thank my friend Mr. H. S. Coulter, Barrister, 
 of Edmonton, my former pupil in the law, for much valuable 
 work in the preparation of the booklet for the press. 
 
 WALTER S. SCOTT. 
 31 Gariepy Block, Edmonton, 
 September, 1917.
 
 Chattel Exemptions from 
 Execution 
 
 Property exempt from execution is of two sorts: (a) 
 Property which is exempt without the necessity of any 
 choice on the part of the debtor, e.g., the bedding in) 
 ordinary use by the debtor and his family in Ontario or 
 family portraits in Quebec; (b) property which is not 
 exempt until choice has been made by the debtor or 
 some other person, e.g., twelve volumes of books in 
 Manitoba. 
 
 Where, for the ascertainment of exemptions, a choice 
 is necessary it is sometimes held that the right to 
 exemption is a privilege which must be exercised by the 
 debtor, no duty or right to make selection being in the 
 Sheriff, while in other jurisdictions the view is that the 
 Sheriff should make a vicarious selection. 
 
 Where the right of exemption is regarded as a per- 
 sonal privilege, all property -will be prima facie subject 
 to execution, and the Sheriff need have no fear of an 
 action for damages until claim has been made by the 
 execution debtor. 
 
 It has been decided to be a personal privilege in 
 British Columbia (Roy v. Fortin, 9 W.W.R. 407; see also
 
 6 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 Johnson v. Harris, 1 B.C.R., Pt. 1, 93; Sehl v. Humphreys, 
 1 B.C.R., Pt. 2, 257; Pilling v. Stewart, 4 B.C.R. 94; Hud- 
 son's Bay Co. v. Hazlitt, 4 B.C.R. 450; in re Ley, 7 B.C.R. 
 94; Yorkshire v. Cooper, 10 B.C.R. 65, and Dickenson 
 v. Robertson, 11 B.C.R. 155), where the debtor must 
 make his claim within two days after the seizure or 
 after notice thereof, whichever is the longer time. In 
 Quebec where the Code allows the debtor to "select and 
 withdraw" certain property, the bailiff, where no choice 
 has been made by the debtor, should seize all the effects, 
 leaving it to the debtor to exercise his rights before the 
 sale. (Filion v. Chabot, 9 Quebec (Sup. Ct.) 327.) 
 
 In Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba it has been 
 decided that where a debtor refuses or neglects to make 
 a selection the Sheriff may do so for him and seize the 
 balance. (In re Demaurez, 5 Terr. L.R. 84; Cloutier v. 
 Georgeson, 13 Man. L.R. 1, and Robin Hood v. Maple 
 Leaf, 9 W.W.R. 1453.) The Executions Act (Man.), 
 s. 40 provides that no Sheriff charged with the execu- 
 tion of any writ of execution .... shall seize or' 
 take in execution any goods, chattels or effects declared 
 by the Act to be free from seizure under writs of 
 execution. 
 
 In Field v. Hart, 22 O.A.R. 449, a chattel mortgagee 
 was held entitled to claim exempt furniture without 
 special claim by the execution debtor and it was referred 
 to the Clerk of the County Court to ascertain and report 
 which of the goods in question in the interpleader issue 
 were in fact goods exempt from seizure, thus taking the 
 question out of the hands of the Sheriff. 
 
 It would appear that, generally speaking, the debtor 
 may, where no choice has been made by the Sheriff, make 
 a choice within a reasonable time, probably at any time
 
 NECESSITY OF CLAIM. 7 
 
 prior to the conversion of the property by sale by the Sheriff. 
 Otherwise, he would be held to have irrevocably waived his 
 right of selection. 
 
 It would appear from the cases mentioned supra and a 
 collation of the U.S.A. cases that, speaking generally, 
 it is not necessary for the debtor to make a choice of exempt 
 articles in Canada, yet in the United States the making of a 
 claim and a choice is usually necessary, though in a few of 
 the States the right of exemption must be respected. 
 
 A defendant made an assignment to the plaintiff pur- 
 suant to the Creditors' Trust Deeds Act of all her property 
 and effects, which may be seized and sold or attached under 
 executions or the Execution Act or attachment. 
 
 She delivered possession of her property without making 
 any claim to exemptions under the provisions of the Home- 
 stead Act. The plaintiff subsequently lent certain of the 
 goods assigned to the defendant and defendant refused to 
 return them, claiming them as an exemption which, but for 
 her ignorance of the law, she would have made at the time 
 of the assignment. It was held that, if she had wished to 
 resort to her right of exemption, she should have done so at 
 the time of delivery of possession to the assignee, or at all 
 events at a reasonable time therafter. (Roy v. Fortin, 
 9 W.W.R. 407.) 
 
 The dissenting judgment of McPhillips, J. A., in the last 
 mentioned case is, in part, as follows : 
 
 "It now becomes necessary to consider some of the deci- 
 sions in this Province dealing with the question of exemp- 
 tions, and it would not appear to me that to hold that the 
 appellant is still entitled to insist upon her right, is, in any 
 way, concluded by authority in any case there is no auth- 
 ority which is binding upon this Court. Pilling v. Stewart 
 (1895), 4 B.C.R. 94, was a decision of Drake, J. (an able 
 and painstaking judge whose judgments will always have
 
 8 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 the most careful attention) and it was a case where an 
 assignment for the benefit of creditors and exemption there- 
 under was considered and it was there held (and the statute 
 law was the same then as now) that the $500 exemption 
 under the Act is not an absolute right, but a privilege or 
 option to be effectuated only by claiming it within a reason- 
 able time in regard to the specific goods seizable or which 
 may have been seized under execution, and does not apply to 
 the proceeds of the goods after sale and conversion into 
 money. At p. 99, the learned judge said: 'In my opinion if 
 the debtor neglects to notify the assignee who has lawfully 
 taken possession of the goods assigned he cannot after con- 
 version make any claim under the statute unless the acts of 
 the assignee have been of such a nature as to prevent a 
 claim being put in before conversion.' 
 
 "In the present case there has been no' conversion and 
 the acts of the assignee are not capable of being approved, 
 and to still admit of the exemption to the appellant will 
 not be running counter to this decision. Yorkshire Guaran- 
 tee & Securities Corporation v. Cooper (1903), 10 B.C.R. 
 65, is a decision of the full court, but it was not a case of 
 an assignment for the benefit of creditors, but Pilling v. 
 Stewart, supra, was referred to and Drake, J., at p. 72, said : 
 
 " 'The question is, was a claim made before the property 
 was converted by sheriff's sale: Pilling v. Stewart (1895), 
 4 B.C.R. 94. Here a claim was made for exemption not 
 only to the sheriff verbally before the seizure but also after 
 the seizure. The sheriff knew perfectly well that a claim 
 for exemption meant a claim for whatever the law allows.' 
 
 "No injury has occurred in the present case; there has 
 been no sale of the goods in question, and the assignee knew 
 at the outset from the assignment itself that the exemption 
 was claimed. Drake, J., also at the same page (72) said:
 
 NECESSITY OF CLAIM. 9 
 
 * 'The object is to give the debtor something to go on 
 with after the judgment against such debtor has been re- 
 alized out of his estate in excess of $500. In a country like 
 this it is a very necessary thing that a person should not be 
 thrown upon his friends for the purpose of his support, and 
 this provides a means of obviating it.' 
 
 "That the appellant should have signed the writing to 
 return the goods adds a strange feature to the situation. I 
 have adverted to this, and in my opinion, it should be given 
 no weight whatever and, in this connection, I will quote what 
 my brother Irving had to say in Yorkshire v. Cooper, supra, 
 where it was urged that the claim could not be set up as the 
 claimant to the exemption had contended that the vessel 
 was not his, but that of a company. At p. 73 he said : 
 
 " 'In my opinion, a man who is of an excitable character, 
 insisting upon an absurd proposition of law, should not lose 
 his rights. And that is the way I regard the statement that 
 he insists upon making, viz.: that the ship is the property 
 of the Glenora Steamship Co.* 
 
 "The appellant in the present case, upon the facts, 
 should not lose her rights. My brother Martin, in the same 
 case, at p. 73, said : 
 
 " 'I concur with what my learned brothers have said in 
 disposing of this matter, that it should be decided upon the 
 construction of our own statute ; and I concur with them also 
 that our judgment should be based upon the application of 
 the statute to the peculiar requirements of this country, to 
 which it is well suited.' 
 
 "In Dickenson v. Robertson (1905), 11 B.C.R. 155, 
 Hunter, C. J., said at p. 156: 
 
 " 'It is idle to say that there was a seizure before the 
 15th ; you might just as well talk of a seizure by telephone. 
 
 " 'As to the question of the debtor's right of exemption 
 in spite of the cases cited I strongly incline to think that it
 
 10 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 is absolute, and not a mere privilege to be asserted within 
 the two days on peril of the loss of everything. The effect 
 of the statute is that the debtor may select the $500 worth 
 within the two days, but if he does not the sheriff is to leave 
 $500 worth behind. Suppose the debtor too ill to think of 
 exemptions, was it intended that he should be left destitute, 
 or does the law regard life more than the debt. Or suppose 
 he is absent and his notice goes astray, must he go home 
 and find not even a stove to cook his food on? I need not, 
 however, come to any final conclusion as to this as I have no 
 doubt that the claim was put in within the time allowed. 
 But as the sheriff contends that the goods claimed as exempt 
 have been undervalued, the matter will stand over to allow 
 the proper proceedings to be taken to settle that question, 
 and to enable the debtor to answer the sheriff's affidavit on 
 the point of waiver. As to whether the right can or cannot 
 be waived I express no opinion.' 
 
 "Upon the whole, therefore, I am of the opinion that the 
 right to exemption upon the facts of the present case is abso- 
 lute and that the right still exists, and even were I wrong in 
 this, and it were a privilege only, that privilege could be 
 exercised in a reasonable time, or at any time before con- 
 version, and that reasonable time would be when affected 
 with knowledge of the right to the exemption and the need 
 to make a selection, and, as in this case, the appellant at the 
 time of the taking possession of the goods in question was 
 unaware of the right to the exemption the giving of the 
 writing to return the goods cannot avail to establish estoppel 
 or waiver; and that upon the facts the claim made by the 
 appellant was within a reasonable time." 
 
 A right of exemption from execution is a privilege exer- 
 cisable at the option of the debtor and to take effect must be 
 claimed. (Johnson v. Harris, 1 B.C.R., Pt. 1, 93.)
 
 NECESSITY OF CLAIM. 11 
 
 The execution debtor was entitled, as an exemption un- 
 der the Homestead Act, to $500 out of $1,000 realized by 
 the sheriff on the sale of a steamship, the only exigible per- 
 sonalty of the debtor. Semble, notice of claim of exemp- 
 tion is necessary. (Yorkshire Guarantee & Securities Cor- 
 poration v. Cooper, 10 B.C.R. 65.) 
 
 P. & Y., partners, on the 26th of July, 1894, executed a 
 deed of assignment to S., for the benefit of their creditors, 
 of "all their and each of their personal estate which might 
 be seized and sold under execution (save and except the 
 household furniture of Agnes York), and all their and each 
 of their real estate," and S. immediately entered into pos- 
 session thereof, and afterwards converted the same \r\io 
 money. Subsequently, on December 28th, 1894, P. claimed 
 from S. $500 of the proceeds as an exemption from execu- 
 tion to which he was entitled under the Homestead Act 
 (R.S.B.C. 1888, c. 57), Amendment Act, 1890, sec. 2, and 
 implied reservation in the deed. Held that the $500 exemp- 
 tion from execution under the Act is not an absolute right, 
 but a privilege or option to be effectuated only by claiming 
 it within a reasonable time in regard to the specific goods 
 seizable, or which have been seized under execution, and 
 does not apply to the proceeds of the goods after sale and 
 conversion into money. (Pilling v. Stewart, 4 B.C.R. 94.) 
 
 The option is one which the debtor must exercise in a 
 reasonable time after assignment or execution, and it applies 
 only to goods and chattels capable of seizure or which have 
 been seized; it does not apply to the proceeds of a subse- 
 quent conversion. The intention of the Act was that a 
 debtor should not be stripped of all he possessed in the 
 world, but should be left a sufficiency to enable him to start 
 again. (S.C.) 
 
 In execution of a judgment against a carter the bailiff 
 left with him a horse and a carriage and seized all his other
 
 12 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 effects, which were sold. After the sale the bailiff seized 
 another carriage which had been left with another person 
 for repairs, and of which he knew nothing at the time of 
 the first seizure. The debtor then made a declaration that 
 he would choose and keep the carriage last seized, and 
 offered to return the one formerly left with him to be sold 
 in its place. The bailiff having refused this offer, the debtor 
 signified to his creditor an opposition afin d'annuler. It 
 was held that the debtor, although he had stated to the 
 bailiff in regard to the carriage left at the first seizure that 
 he had nothing but that to enable him to gain a living, had 
 not exercised the choice accorded to him by statute, and 
 was entitled to make such choice when the second carriage 
 was seized. The signature of the debtor to the proces verbal 
 does not establish a choice by him, and if there is no choice 
 the bailiff should seize all the effects, leaving it to the vendor 
 debtor to exercise his rights before the sale, but at his own 
 expense. (Filion v. Chabot, Que., 9 (Sup. Ct.) 327.) 
 
 The sheriff is bound to leave the debtor what is exempt, 
 the debtor having the right, if he chooses to exercise it, to 
 a choice from a greater quantity of the same kind of articles 
 as are exempt. If he does not see fit to make a choice, it 
 is probable he would not be heard to complain that the 
 sheriff had not made the choice most favorable to the debtor. 
 (Per McGuire, J., In re Demaurez, 5 Terr. L.R. 84.) 
 
 When a debtor merchant makes an assignment in the 
 form prescribed by The Assignments Act, R.S.M., c. 7, of all 
 his stock-in-trade and personal property, etc., liable to 
 seizure under execution to a trustee for creditors, the 
 assignee has a right to select such articles as would be 
 exempt under The Executions Act, R.S.M., c. 53, sec. 43, in 
 the absence of a selection by the debtor; and, if he appro- 
 priates and sells only a portion of the property coming un- 
 der the head of any class of the statutory exemptions and
 
 NECESSITY OF CLAIM. 13 
 
 leaves to the debtor a sufficient quantity of the same kind 
 of property to reach the prescribed value, he will not be 
 liable to an action for the value or the proceeds of the 
 portion sold. (Cloutier v. Georgeson, 13 Man. L.R. 1.) 
 
 Where property is necessarily exempt, the sheriff should 
 assume that the right to exemption will be claimed, and a 
 sheriff who makes a levy or sale of such property should be 
 regarded as a wrong-doer, and held answerable as such, 
 unless the debtor has, by his express waiver or by acts of 
 acquiescence equivalent thereto, estopped himself from in- 
 sisting on his right of exemption. (Cole v. Breen, 21 111. 
 104.) 
 
 The sheriff is by law and the inaction of the debtor 
 made his agent for the purpose of selecting the property to 
 be held as exempt, and after such selection the remainder 
 may be sold. (Slaughter v. De Tiney, 10 Ind. 103.) 
 
 Where the defendant removes or conceals some of the 
 chattels so as to avoid a levy on them, this is an irrevocable 
 election to claim as exemptions the property so removed 
 or concealed. (Ross v. Hannah, 18 Ala. 125.) 
 
 Where there are several articles out of which the debtor 
 has a right to select a certain number he must on being 
 informed of the levy or within a reasonable time thereafter 
 point out to the officer not only those which he selects as 
 exempt, but also those which may remain and tender the 
 latter to the officer, or at least give him an opportunity to 
 levy thereon. (Keybers v. McComber, 67 Cal. 395.) 
 
 Where an assignment was made of property, "except 
 such as is exempt from levy or sale under execution," but 
 no demand was made for exemption until several weeks 
 after the assignment, a waiver of the right to select exempt 
 property was inferred. (Lemont v. Wooton, 59 N.W. 456.)
 
 14 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 II. DUTY OF SHERIFF TO NOTIFY DEBTOR OF RIGHT 
 TO EXEMPTION AND TO DEMAND SELECTION. 
 
 Quaere as to whether the Sheriff should notify the debtor 
 of his rights and ask him to make a selection, where a 
 selection is necessary. 
 
 A sheriff has no right to seize any of the tools or neces- 
 saries used by the debtor in the practice of his trade, how- 
 ever great their value, until he first calls on the debtor to 
 make choice of articles to the value of $500, which he de- 
 sires to claim as exempt. (Robin Hood v. Maple Leaf, 9 
 W.W.R. 1453, per Mathers, C.J. K.B.) 
 
 In the case of the sheriff or other officer acting under 
 process of execution the duty is cast upon the officer by 
 statute to allow the debtor to make the selection, and, in 
 my opinion, he can only discharge that duty by apprising the 
 debtor of this statutory right, and then, if the debtor does 
 not exercise it, that would constitute a sufficient estoppel 
 and not to apprise the debtor would be a breach of duty 
 upon his part. (Per McPhillips, J. A., in Roy v. Fortin, 
 supra.) 
 
 It has been held that the duty of the sheriff is to notify 
 the debtor of his rights of exemption, and also to require 
 a person to make his selection at the time of the levy. (See 
 Cook v. Scott, 6 111. 333.) 
 
 The proper course to be pursued by an officer on levying 
 a writ is to insist that the defendant, if then present, exer- 
 cise his right of selection. Where the defendant has not 
 thus or in some other manner been called upon to act, he 
 retains his right of selection in ordinary circumstances up 
 to the time of the sale, on tendering to the officer the prop- 
 erty remaining in the defendant's hands subject to execu- 
 tion. (Harrington v. Smith, 20 Am. St. Rep.. 272.)
 
 PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED COMPANIES, ETC. 15 
 
 III. PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED COMPANIES, 
 CORPORATIONS. 
 
 In Manitoba a partnership firm cannot claim several 
 exemptions for each partner, but only one exemption 
 for the firm out of the partnership property (R.S.M. 
 1913, c. 66, s. 32). In Alberta is it settled by McKinnon v. 
 Beals (1917), 1 W.W.R. 1328, that the statutory exemp- 
 tions have no application to a partnership. The ques- 
 tion has been raised, but not determined in Pilling v. 
 Stewart, 4 B.C.R. 94. "The ratio decidendi of McKinnon 
 v. Beals would seem to extend the inability to claim an 
 exemption to limited companies and other corporations. 
 In some jurisdictions, however, definition clauses would 
 exclude such extension. The better rule, where an execu- 
 tion is levied against partnership assets under an execu- 
 tion against the individual, seems to be that laid down 
 by the United States cases cited infra. 
 
 If the partnership is dissolved before the lien of the 
 judgment against which the exemption is claimed attaches 
 and the dissolution has been bona fide, each partner may 
 claim an exemption in the partnership property which has 
 been set off to him. (Worman v. Giddey, 30 Mich. 151.) 
 
 To hold that one against whom an officer has an execu- 
 tion is entitled to have a certain amount of property, of 
 which he has the entire title, exempted therefrom, and at 
 the same time to hold that he could have no exemptions out 
 of such property, if he was not the sole owner, is to do 
 violence to the evident intention of the statute. The differ- 
 ent text writers upon the subject, though most of them have 
 fallen into the error of grouping cases of judgments against 
 a partnership with those against the individual members 
 thereof, have come to the conclusion that upon principle,
 
 16 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 exemption should be allowed to the individual partner when 
 the levy is under a judgment against him. (Dennis v. Cass, 
 48 Am. St. Rep. 880.) 
 
 The courts which have held that exemptions could not 
 be had out of partnership property, when levied upon under 
 an execution against the individual partner, have done so in 
 the face of the statutes for the reason that the rule an- 
 nounced by them is more convenient of execution than 
 would be one which allowed such exemption. (Thompson: 
 Homesteads and Exemptions, 216.) 
 
 (As to Aliens, see Scott on Homesteads, 52.) 
 
 IV. RIGHT OF TRANSFEREE, MORTGAGEE, OR 
 PLEDGEE TO CLAIM EXEMPTION. 
 
 In jurisdictions where the privilege is regarded as purely 
 personal, it seems to follow that the claim to exemption 
 cannot be made by an assignee, mortgagee or pledgee. 
 In Manitoba this principle was adopted in Young v. 
 Short, 3 Man. L.R. 302, but has been since rejected in 
 Robin Hood v. Maple Leaf, 9 W.W.R. 1453. (See also 
 Bates v. Cannon, 18 Man. L.R. 7.) It has not been fol- 
 lowed in Baker v. Gil him, 9 W.L.R. 436 (Saskatchewan), 
 nor in Ashcroft v. Hopkins, 2 Alta. L.R. 253 (Alberta); 
 nor in Ontario (see Field v. Hart, 22 O.A.R. 449, and 
 Temperance Insurance Co. v. Coombe, 28 C.L.J. 88.) 
 
 To hold, as it is contended, that the mortgagee cannot 
 raise the claim that the property was exempted from seizure 
 under execution at the time he took the mortgage, and that 
 therefore his mortgage is invalid as against execution 
 creditors, would have the effect of preventing the home-
 
 RIGHT OF TRANSFEREE, ETC., TO CLAIM EXEMPTION. 17 
 
 steader from raising money on his homestead as a security ; 
 as the proposed lender would hesitate under such circum- 
 stances to lend. I am of opinion, therefore, that the mort- 
 gagee has a right to raise the question that the property is 
 not liable to seizure under the execution in so far as his 
 mortgage is concerned. (Per Wetmore, C.J., in Baker v. 
 Gillum, 9 W.L.R. 436.) 
 
 In Cox v. Schack, 14 Man L.R. 174, the assignor of the 
 plaintiff, an assignee for the benefit of creditors had in effect 
 mortgaged goods to the defendant by a mortgage which was 
 held bad as against creditors. It was doubtful upon the 
 wording of the assignment whether the debtor had reserved 
 any exemptions to which he would be entitled under s.s. (f ) 
 of s. 43 of The Executions Act, R.S.M., c. 53, viz. : "The tools 
 .... and necessaries used by the judgment debtor in the 
 practice of his trade, profession or occupation, to the value 
 of five hundred dollars," within which description the 
 articles came, and it was not shown that the debtor had 
 ever claimed any of them from the assignee or asked to have 
 any of them set aside as exempt, or that he had not got 
 out of other articles of his estate all his exemptions under 
 that s.s. ; and the articles were not shown to have depre- 
 ciated in value. It was held that the defendant could not 
 claim the benefit of any such exemption, even if it was re- 
 served by the debtor in the assignment. 
 
 Young v. Short supra was decided on the authority of 
 Mickes v. Towsley, 1 Cow. 114; Smith v. Hill, 22 Barb. 656, 
 and Earl v. Camp, 16 Wend. 562, which laid down the rule 
 that the privilege should be claimed by the debtor or by 
 someone acting for him by authority express or implied, a 
 view that is taken in many of the American cases, thus, it 
 has been held that a pledgee or mortgagee or other person 
 to whom property has been transferred cannot make a valid 
 claim for exemption, especially if the debtor has had an op-
 
 18 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 portunity to make the claim and has not done so. (Terry 
 v. Wilson, 63 Mo. 493 ; Sherrible v. Sheff ee, 33 Am. St. Rep. 
 63.) 
 
 If the debtor can transfer at will his exempt property it 
 logically follows that the title of the transferee in the prop- 
 erty cannot be assailed or impaired by the creditor of the 
 transferee. This is the rule followed in many jurisdictions. 
 In other jurisdictions the rule that the purchaser of exempt 
 property stands in the place of the debtor and can assert the 
 latter's right to exemption has been held to apply only to 
 property specifically exempt, and not to property, which de- 
 fendant has a right to select in lieu of the SDeeified property 
 exempt under the statute ; and there are a number of juris- 
 dictions which hold that as the right of the debtor to his 
 exemption is personal to him, exempt property loses the 
 quality, which the law attached to it in the hands of the 
 debtor, as soon as it is transferred and the vendee is not 
 allowed to assert the exemption claim, but holds the prop- 
 erty subject to the debts of his transferrer. (18 Cyc. 1448.) 
 
 See further Scott on Homesteads, p. 28, for similar rules 
 with regard to homesteads. 
 
 V. MORTGAGE OF EXEMPT AND NON-EXEMPT 
 PROPERTY. 
 
 A judgment debtor has a prima facie right, it would 
 seem, that his non-exempt property should be exhausted 
 before recourse is had to his exempt property by a person 
 who has a charge on both properties. 
 
 Where exempt property and non-exempt property were 
 covered by the same mortgage it was held that the creditor 
 had no right to sell the exempt property, provided that the 
 non-exempt property was sufficient to satisfy his lien. (San- 
 ders v. Phillips, 62 Vt. 331.)
 
 EXECUTION UNDER JUDGMENT FOR PRICE. 19 
 
 It has been held that where a mortgage covers both 
 exempt and non-exempt property, the mortgagor is entitled 
 both as against the mortgagee and an execution creditor to 
 demand that the mortgagee first exhaust the non-exempt 
 property, before resorting to the exempt, but this is a right 
 which the mortgagor must assert in proper time for him- 
 self and, further, is a right which would not be enforced 
 where either from the act or omission of the mortgagor, it 
 would be inequitable to enforce it. (Miller v. McCarty, 
 28 Am. St. Rep., 375 and 50 N.W. 235.) 
 
 VI. EXECUTION UNDER JUDGMENT FOR PRICE 
 
 In Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia, Alberta, Sask- 
 atchewan, the Yukon Territory, Nova Scotia and Quebec 
 there is no exemption, except in the case of things which 
 may be classified as prime necessities, and which vary 
 slightly in the different jurisdictions. See statutory pro- 
 visions infra, when the article is proposed to be taken 
 under an execution founded upon a judgment for its 
 price. 
 
 In such cases the burden is on the party claiming the 
 exemption to show that the goods in respect of which 
 exemption is claimed were not seized "in satisfaction of 
 a debt contracted for or in respect of such identical 
 goods." (In re Sharp, 5 B.C.R. 117.) 
 
 It seems consistent with principle that the assignee of 
 a vendor should be allowed to exercise the privilege of 
 his assignor. 
 
 Goods generally exempted from seizure under execu- 
 tion by virtue of s. 29 of the Execution Act, R.S.M., 1902, 
 c. 58, but withdrawn from such exemption by s. 36 of the 
 Act, when the purchase price of them is the subject of the 
 judgment proceeded upon, are subject to seizure although
 
 20 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 the judgment has been recovered only upon a bill of ex- 
 change for the price accepted by the judgment debtor. 
 (Canada Law Book Co. v. A.B., 7 W.L.R. 363, 17 Man. L.R. 
 345.) 
 
 A judgment was obtained by a law publishing company 
 for the balance of a long current account, some of the pay- 
 ments having been made for particular books and others 
 generally on account. It was held by Beck, J., that the 
 subject matter of the judgment was the residue of the 
 account after the elimination of the specific payments for 
 the specific items, as a current account with some general 
 credits against it, and that account as an entirety or rather 
 the articles specified in it and not the mere balance of the 
 account of such articles as might be found by the applica- 
 tion of the rules as to appropriation of payments not to have 
 been paid for, or in other words, that all books in the 
 account except those specifically paid for were liable to 
 seizure under the plaintiff's execution. (Canada Law Book 
 Co. v. Fieldhouse, 12 W.L.R. 396.) 
 
 Lien notes were given at an auction sale for exempt pro- 
 perty and after the sale the sheriff seized these notes in the 
 hands of the auctioneer. It was held that such notes did 
 not come within the Exemption Ordinance. (Jones v. Jesse, 
 10 W.L.R. 627.) 
 
 In Shenkman v. Steinbook, 7 W.W.R. 1051, goods were 
 not wholly paid for and the balance of the price was secured 
 by a chattel mortgage, which was subsequently released and 
 a cheque taken for the balance. It was held in an action 
 on the cheque that the simple contract debt had become 
 merged in a higher security effected by the chattel mort- 
 gage and that upon the release of the chattel mortgage the 
 right to sue for the price of the goods as such had not 
 revived and that therefore the unpaid for goods could not 
 be taken in execution.
 
 EXECUTION UNDER JUDGMENT FOR PRICE. 21 
 
 Goods sold at an auction were bought in lots, one lot by 
 one purchaser and another by another and the purchasers 
 joined in giving promissory notes in payment. The vendor 
 of the goods sued on both notes in one action and recovered 
 judgment. Under the execution the sheriff seized the goods 
 purchased by one of the purchasers, and it was held that s. 4 
 of the Exemption Ordinance could not be held to operate so 
 as to render the goods in question liable to be sold under 
 execution under the circumstances of the case. 
 
 "In so deciding," says Johnstone, J., "I do not wish to be 
 understood as holding that in no circumstances can goods 
 the price of which form part of the subject matter of the 
 judgment, be seized under execution, but I do go as far as 
 to say that where, as here, there is a joint liability on the 
 part of the defendants of an uncertain extent as to the 
 amount to which each is indebted, as principal debtor or as 
 surety, the provision of the Ordinance here sought to be 
 enforced cannot be extended in such a case." (McBride v. 
 Brooks, 16 W.L.R. 271.) 
 
 The acceptance by the vendor of a note has been held 
 not to affect his right to enforce his claim to the purchase 
 money. The debt is nevertheless for purchase money within 
 the meaning of the statute. (18 Cyc. 1391.) 
 
 There have, however, been decisions the other way. 
 (See Vye v. McNeill, 3 B.C.R. 24, where the debtor was 
 allowed to claim his exemptions out of the proceeds of the 
 sale of a horse, although the horse was sold to satisfy a 
 promissory note given in payment therefor, and see Shenk- 
 man v. Steinbook, 7 W.W.R. 1051, where a vendor was held 
 bound by the exemption in an action on a cheque given for 
 the purchase price.) 
 
 If a plaintiff reduces his claim to a judgment and then 
 sues on the judgment, it is held in some American juris- 
 dictions that he is no longer within the exception to the
 
 22 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 exemption law. Nevertheless, within other jurisdictions a 
 more rational and just view is taken of this exception to 
 the exemption laws. 
 
 Whenever justice requires it judgments will be generally 
 construed not as a new debt, but as an old debt in a new 
 form. (Garside v. Coleby, 72 N.H. 544.) 
 
 It has been held that where goods bought from different 
 vendors have been so intermixed that they cannot be separ- 
 ated, the defendant is entitled to his exemption against both 
 vendors, since neither could prove that the goods seized by 
 him were sold by him to the defendant. 
 
 The plaintiff may be able to recover the purchase price 
 where the debt has changed its form as where a note has 
 been taken or security taken for a debt. (Rogers v. Brackett, 
 34 Minn 279 ; Roberts v. McGur, 82 Michigan 221.) 
 
 It seems probable that the assignee of a vendor is also 
 entitled to this right. (State v. Orahood, 27 Mo. App. 396 ; 
 Houlehan v. Rassler, 73 Wis. 557.) In that case one 
 lent $80.00 to another to be used by him for the purchase of 
 a team of horses, and the money was so used, and it was 
 held that the lender of the money was entitled to recover 
 the same by execution notwithstanding the exemption. 
 
 The words of the statute in that case were : "No property 
 exempt by the provisions of this statute shall be exempt from 
 execution issued upon a judgment in an action brought by 
 any person for the recovery of the whole or any part of the 
 purchase money of the same property." 
 
 A judgment is not for the purchase money unless it is 
 against the purchaser and is based upon the contract made 
 between the vendor and the vendee. Hence a surety for a 
 purchase price who has been compelled to pay cannot seize 
 property exempt from execution upon recovering judgment 
 against the purchaser. (Smith v. Slade, 57 Barb. 637.)
 
 PERSONAL PROPERTY, GOODS AND CHATTELS. 23 
 
 It has been held in Hickox v. Fay, 36 Barb. 9, that where 
 other items of indebtedness are included the right to take 
 exempt property is waived. 
 
 VII. PERSONAL PROPERTY, GOODS AND CHATTELS 
 
 In British Columbia the exemption is of "goods and 
 chattels" to the value of $500. Choses-in-action do not 
 fall within the exemption, (Hudson's Bay Co. v Hazlett, 
 4 B.C.R. 450.) Chattels ordinarily used in the debtor's 
 occupation to the value of $100 are exempt in Ontario 
 inclusively with tools and implements, so also in Nova 
 Scotia to the value of $30.00. 
 
 In Hudson's Bay Co. v. Hazlett supra, Davie, C.J., says: 
 "The process of attachment by a garnishing or receiving or- 
 der is not a process under which the debt would be seized or 
 sold, and, therefore, the exemption does not apply," and 
 McCreight, J., adds: "In my opinion the meaning to be 
 applied to the words 'goods and chattels' is that to be taken 
 from common parlance. The test is whether the thing is 
 capable of larceny, i.e., of being physically seized and taken 
 away." 
 
 Book debts are not within the exemption of the follow- 
 ing provision of the Homestead Act, R.S.B.C. 1888, c. 57, 
 sec. 10: "The following personal property shall be exempt 
 from forced seizure and sale by any process at law or in 
 equity; that is to say, the goods and chattels of any debtor 
 . . . to the value of $500," as not being within the de- 
 scription of personal property capable of seizure, or capable 
 of being dealt with conformably to the provisions of the Act 
 relating to the mode of claiming the exemption. (Hudson's 
 Bay Co. v. Hazlett, 4 B.C.R. 450.) 
 
 An execution debtor placed certain buildings on land, 
 the buildings being of wood resting on loose stone founda-
 
 24 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 tions, to which they were not affixed, nor were the founda- 
 tions let into the earth, but the earth had been levelled to 
 make the foundations level and a cellar had been dug under 
 the building. A judgment creditor seized the buildings, 
 and the owner of the fee simple claimed them as part of the 
 freehold. It was held that the buildings in question not 
 being affixed to the freehold and there being no evidence 
 that it was intended that they should be a part of it, the 
 buildings were the property of the debtor and liable to 
 seizure. (Hamilton v. Chisholm, 2 Sask. L.R. 227.) 
 
 In Bink Kee v. Yick Chong (10 W.L.R. 110) the building 
 rested on rock placed on the soil and the chimneys were 
 supported by poles resting on rock. The front stoop was 
 supported on wooden posts and was formerly attached to a 
 wooden block sidewalk. It was held that the house was a 
 part of the freehold and not a chattel, and that the fact that 
 it could be removed without materially injuring the freehold 
 was immaterial. 
 
 As to exemptions of a house as a part of the homestead, 
 apart from any question as to whether it is a chattel or not, 
 see Scott on Homesteads. 
 
 The term "personal property" is generally held to in- 
 clude choses in action, whether in statutes making an abso- 
 lute exemption of a certain amount of property or in statutes 
 allowing the debtor to select a certain amount of property, 
 either generally or in lieu of certain articles specifically 
 exempt. Under other statutes the courts have found it im- 
 possible to have the term connote a "chose in action." 
 (18 Cyc. 1445.) 
 
 The debtor when he is by statute allowed as exempt 
 personal property not exceeding a designated value may 
 hold free from levy under execution, fees due him as a 
 justice of the peace, or choses in action, or moneys deposited
 
 TOOLS. IMPLEMENTS, ETC. . 25 
 
 in a bank or stock in corporations, or any other species of 
 property. (Freeman on Executions, 1280.) 
 
 VIII. TOOLS, IMPLEMENTS, NECESSARIES 
 IX. TRADE, PROFESSION, OCCUPATION, CALLING 
 
 The tools and necessary implements to the extent of two 
 hundred dollars used by the execution debtor in the 
 practice of his trade or profession (Alberta, Saskatche- 
 wan and Yukon Territory $500) ; the tools, agricultural 
 implements and necessaries used by the debtor in the 
 practice of his trade, profession or occupation, to the 
 value of $500 (Manitoba); tools and implements of, or 
 chattels ordinarily used in the debtor's occupation to the 
 value of $100 (Ontario) \ tools of the trade or calling of 
 the debtor to the value of $100, inclusively with apparel, 
 bedding and kitchen utensils (New Brunswick); tools 
 and implements of, or chattels ordinarily used in the 
 debtor's occupation to the value of $30 (Nova Scotia); 
 the tools and implements of the trade of the debtor 
 (Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland), and the 
 tools and implements used in trade to the value of $200 
 (Quebec), are exempt from execution. 
 
 The word "tools" in the ordinary acceptation and use of 
 the word, in most cases, will readily indicate what the par- 
 ties meant, such as the tools of a carpenter or of a smith. 
 Where not so, whether certain articles are or are not tools 
 is a question for the jury. (Filschie v. Hogg, 35 U.C.Q.B. 94.) 
 
 Tools and implements of his trade to the value of 5, s. 
 47, County Court Act, 1888, include the sewing machine of 
 a sempstress (Churchward v. Johnson, 54 J.P. 326) and the 
 hired cab of a cab-driver (Lavell v. Ritchings, 75 L.J.K.B. 
 287; [1906] 1 K.B. 480) ; and if such a chattel be the only
 
 26 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 one on the premises belonging to the execution debtor, the 
 exemption extends to it though its value be much in excess 
 of 5, "to the value of 5" means, that excepted articles 
 to "at least" that value must be left on the premises (per 
 Alverstone, C.J., in Lavell v. Ritchings supra, Stroud, p. 
 576. See, however, in Ontario Executions Act, s. 2 (f), and 
 see Vye v. McNeill, 3 B.C.R. 24.) 
 
 We take the word "tool" to mean an instrument of 
 manual operation particularly those used by farmers or 
 mechanics. We think the word implement has a more ex- 
 tensive meaning, including with tools, utensils of domestic 
 use, instruments of trade and husbandry; but both words, 
 we think, exclude the idea of animals. The word "chattel" 
 has a legal, well-defined meaning and is more comprehen- 
 sive than the other two, and includes animals as well as 
 goods movable and immovable, except such as have the 
 nature of freehold. (Davidson v. Reynolds, 16 U.C.C.P. 
 140.) 
 
 The test to ascertain what a tool is has been suggested 
 to be the capacity of the debtor to use it by his own personal 
 strength or skill without aid or assistance of other machinery 
 or motive power. It seems to be a better test than that 
 afforded by the mere simplicity of construction. (Freeman 
 on Executions, 1213.) 
 
 In some jurisdictions the term "tool" as used in exemp- 
 tion statutes includes only those implements of the artisan 
 which are worked by hand or muscular power. It is usually 
 held that the term does not include machinery used in 
 manufacture, particularly when the business is conducted on 
 a large scale. Some of the cases go further and will not 
 include minor machinery even though it is worked by hand 
 or foot power, but other authorities take the other view. 
 (18 Cyc. 1416.) A large threshing machine has been held
 
 TOOLS. IMPLEMENTS, ETC. 27 
 
 not to be a working tool of the farmer. (See Ford v. John- 
 son, 34 Barb. 364; see also in re Klimp, 63 Am. St. Rep. 69, 
 39 L.R.A. 340.) 
 
 "The first question is whether or not a four-wheeled cab 
 which had been let on hire to a licensed cab-driver, and was 
 being used by him for the purposes of his trade, was an 
 'implement of his trade' within the meaning of the sec- 
 tion. It has been argued that it was not an implement of his 
 trade, because he might have gone elsewhere and hired 
 another cab with which to ply his trade. It may be that he 
 could have done so, but it does not follow that the cab was 
 not within the exemption. There is no ground for saying 
 that the section is limited to specific articles which in the 
 circumstances of the particular case are in themselves essen- 
 tial to the trade of the person using them. It is sufficient 
 that the article is used by that person for the purposes of his 
 trade. The case of Fenton v. Logan, 1833, 2 L.J.C.P. 102, 
 is worthy of attention in this connection, in which it was held 
 that a threshing machine in actual use may be an implement 
 of trade for an analogous purpose." (Lavell v. Richings, 
 75 L.J.K.B. 287.) 
 
 Implements are "things of necessary use in any trade or 
 mystery which are implyed in the practice of the said 
 trade, or without which the work cannot be accomplished. 
 And so also for furniture of household with which the house 
 is filled." (Termes de la Ley 347.) 
 
 The word "implements" seems to be of a wider meaning 
 than tools and has been held to include a printing press 
 (Bliss v. Vedder, 55 Am. Rep. 237) and the piano of a 
 music teacher (Amend v. Murphy, 69 111. 337) : "In our 
 opinion the legislature meant by the words "the farming 
 utensils or implements of husbandry of the judgment deb- 
 tor," such utensils or implements as are needed and used 
 by the farmer in conducting his own farming operations and
 
 28 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 it was not intended that all farming machinery which a 
 farmer may own should be exempt, because while he uses it 
 chiefly by renting it out or doing work on other farms for 
 hire, he still uses it to a small extent on his own land. (In 
 re Baldwin 71 Cal. 78; see also Davidson v. Reynolds, 
 16 U.C.C.P. 140.) 
 
 Formerly "trade" was used in the sense of an "art or 
 mystery," e.g., that of a Brewer or a Tailor (Norris v. Staps, 
 Hob. 211), but now "Trade" has the technical meaning of 
 buying and selling (per Willes, J., Harris v. Amery, 35 
 L.J.C.P. 92 ; L.R. 1 C.P. 148, see also San Paulo Ry. v. Carter 
 [1896] A.C. 38; Grainger v. Gough [1896] A.C. 325, 
 Pinkerton v. Ross , 33 U.C.Q.B. 508 ; R. v. Pearson, 1 C.C.C. 
 337 ; but for "Trade" as including "manufacture," see Com- 
 missioners of Taxation v. Kirk [1900] A.C. 588, and Blan- 
 chette v. Levesque, Q.R. 41 S.C. 477.) It is not essential to 
 a trade that the persons carrying it on should make or 
 desire to make a profit. (Re Law Reporting Council, 58 
 L.J.Q.B. 95, Stroud 2078.) 
 
 Under the statutes exempting the tools of a debtor's 
 trade the term trade is frequently, although by no means 
 universally, construed to mean the kind of employment in 
 which mechanics, artisans and handicraftsmen are engaged. 
 (18 Cyc. 1415.) 
 
 Where a boiler and some wood were seized by the 
 sheriff under a writ of fi fa goods and were claimed by the 
 execution debtor as exempt from seizure under the Yukon 
 Exemptions Ordinance, it was held that both the wood and 
 the boiler were liable to seizure. The latter not being a 
 chattel or necessary implement used by the debtor in the 
 practice of his trade or profession. At the time of the 
 seizure the debtor was working as an ordinary laborer, and 
 the fact that he had used the boiler when he was a miner
 
 TOOLS, IMPLEMENTS, ETC. 29 
 
 in doing work upon his claim and might use it again if he 
 returned to mining or became a prospector, did not make 
 the boiler exempt. (McRae v. Frooks, 17 W.L.R. 287.) 
 
 Where a sleigh and a pair of horses had been seized, the 
 value of one of the horses being $75 and the value of the 
 other horse, harness and sleigh being $50, the debtor was 
 permitted to retain the worse horse and the sleigh under the 
 section which exempted tools and implements of or chattels 
 ordinarily used in the debtor's occupation to the value of 
 $60. (Davidson v. Reynolds, 19 U.C.C.P. 140.) 
 
 In this case the bailiff had allowed the owner of the 
 horses to drive away with them on the pretence of finding 
 security, but he sold the sleigh and horses. It was held 
 that the driving away with the horses amounted to a selec- 
 tion of them. 
 
 The word "metier" (trade), used in cl. 10 of art. 598, 
 C.P., must not be taken in too literal a sense ; it applies to 
 all manual work done with the object of making a living. 
 Therefore, the effects which garnish the table and dining- 
 room of a boarding-house keeper are instruments used in 
 the exercise of her metier, and as such are exempt from 
 seizure under execution. (Boily v. Guillot, 9 Que. P.R. 336.) 
 
 A horse used by a butcher to deliver meat to his custom- 
 ers does not fall under the designation of "tools, instru- 
 ments, or other effects," in cl. 10 of Art. 598, C.P. An 
 opposition to have the animal withdrawn from a seizure of 
 goods under execution, on the ground that the execution 
 debtor used it in the exercise of his trade, should be dis- 
 missed upon motion, under Art. 651, C.P. (Lecavalier v. 
 Brunelle, 33 Que. S.C. 145, 9 Que. P.R. 209.) 
 
 A gin and grist mill is not exempt as a tool of the 
 debtor's trade. In some instances printing presses and type 
 used by a practical printer have been held to be tools of his 
 trade; in others a different conclusion has been sustained.
 
 30 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 In New York it has been held that a watch may, in some 
 instances, be exempt as a working tool or as necessary 
 household furniture. The chair and foot-rest used by a 
 barber have been decided to be exempt as tools of his 
 trade, but it is held otherwise in regard to the horse of a 
 farmer and the library of a lawyer. (Freeman on Execu- 
 tions, 1213.) 
 
 The exemption is not limited merely to the tools used by 
 the tradesman with his own hands, but comprises such in 
 character and amount as are necessary to enable him to 
 prosecute his appropriate business in a convenient and usual 
 manner, and the only rule by which it can be restricted is 
 that of good sense and discretion, with reference to the cir- 
 cumstance of each particular case. It would be too narrow 
 a construction of a humane and beneficial statute to deny 
 to tradesmen whose occupation can hardly be prosecuted at 
 all much less to any profitable end without the aid of assist- 
 ants, as journeymen and apprentices, the necessary means 
 of their employment. (Howard v. Williams, 2 Pick. 83.) 
 
 The vehicle of a physician or the bus of an hotelkeeper 
 used in connection with his business are necessary tools and 
 instruments kept for the purpose of carrying on a trade or 
 business. (Van Buren v. Loper, 29 Barb. N.Y. 388 ; White 
 v. Jemeny, 27 Am. St. Rep. 320.) 
 
 Books, or even desks, would be implements of trade of 
 a teacher of languages (per Macdonald, L,J.C., Macpherson 
 v. Drummond, 43 Sc. L.R. 102.) 
 
 A threshing machine is an implement of trade, within 
 the conditional exemptions from distress. (Fenton v. Logan, 
 2 L.J.C.P. 102.) 
 
 A pedlar of fruits and vegetables, although he may 
 occasionally buy and sell horses, is not a dealer "trading" 
 in horses within the meaning of Art. 1489 C.C. (Vezina v. 
 Brosseau, Q.R. 30 S.C. 493.)
 
 DEBTOR HAVING MORE THAN ONE TRADE. 31 
 
 A person who works on goods belonging to others only 
 is not a trader. (Vermette v. Vermette, Q.R. 30 S.C. 533.) 
 
 A baker is not a trader merely because he buys and sells 
 candies as incidental to his business as a baker. (Robinson 
 v. Graham, 16 Man. L.R. 69, 3 W.L.R. 135.) 
 
 An executor is not a trader when disposing of his testa- 
 tor's business in the course of winding up the estate. 
 (Paisley v. Nelmes, 9 C.C.C. 413.) 
 
 A photographer carries on a trade. (Davidson v. Han- 
 non, 52 Am. St. Rep.) 
 
 A newsdealer is a tradesman. (R. v. Anderson, 10 
 C.C.C. 144.) 
 
 Carrying on a school is a calling. (Doe v. Keeling, 
 1 M. & S. 95; Kempt v. Sober, 1 Sim. N.S. 517; Galway v. 
 Barden, 1899, 1 I.E. 514.) 
 
 Tavern-keeping is a calling, an occupation. (Re 
 McCracken and Township of Sherborne, 23 O.L.R. 91.) 
 
 X. DEBTOR HAVING MORE THAN ONE TRADE, ETC. 
 
 It does not appear to be definitely settled with regard to 
 a man having more than one trade, etc., whether he may 
 claim exemptions cumulatively, or is confined to exemp- 
 tions in his principal trade, etc., or may elect between 
 his various trades, etc. 
 
 A debtor who follows several callings cannot claim 
 exemption from seizure of tools used in his business, unless 
 they are used in his principal calling. (McManamy v. 
 Pelletier, 24 Que. S.C. 127.) 
 
 Where a person was by trade a repairer of watches 
 and jeweller it was held that he could not maintain a claim 
 for such tools and implements as were used in connection 
 with a steam laundry run for him by an expert, "though he 
 sometimes tinkered about the laundry," he himself not being 
 by trade a laundry man. (Re Demaurez, 5 Terr. L.R. 84.)
 
 32 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 It is said that a debtor by possessing more than one trade 
 cannot cumulatively claim several exemptions created by 
 statute for several distinct employments. Thus, one person 
 cannot claim the exemption of his library and office furni- 
 ture as a professional man and at the same time have 
 exempted to him tools and implements for the purpose of 
 carrying on his trade or business as a mechanic or miner. 
 The mere fact, however, that a debtor carries on two or more 
 trades or professions at the same time does not deprive him 
 of all exemptions. If he has two separate pursuits, the ex- 
 empted articles must belong to him in his main or principal 
 business, in other words, to the business in which he is prin- 
 cipally engaged. (Jenkins v. McNall, 41 Am. St. Rep. 422.) 
 
 In Lockwood v. Younglove, 27 Barb. 505, it was said that 
 the debtor has the right to elect under which trade he will 
 claim. 
 
 XL ABANDONMENT OF TRADE, OCCUPATION, ETC. 
 
 Tools, etc., which are exempt, cease to be so when the 
 debtor withdraws from his trade or occupation, without 
 any intention of resuming the same. 
 
 Tools and implements ordinarily used in the execution 
 debtor's occupation are no longer exempt from seizure when 
 he changes that occupation to one in which the tools and 
 implements in question are not ordinarily used. An execu- 
 tion creditor was held entitled, therefore, to garnish the 
 price of a baker's wagon sold by the execution debtor a few 
 days after he had abandoned the occupation of baker and 
 entered upon the occupation of a laundryman. (Wright v. 
 Hollingshead, 230 O.A.R. 1.) 
 
 The exemptions in clause 6 of s. 2 are of a qualified char- 
 acter. They are tools or implements ordinarily used in the
 
 ABANDONMENT OF TRADE, ETC. 33 
 
 debtor's occupation. When they cease to answer that de- 
 scription, they cease to be exempt. Though it may seem 
 probable from the wide language of s. 4 that if the debtor 
 dies while following his occupation, his widow becomes 
 entitled to all the exemptions which he might claim. But, 
 if he abandons the occupation for the purpose of enabling 
 him to carry on which, the tools and implements employed in 
 it were exempted, the reasons for protecting them against 
 the claims of his creditors no longer exist, whether he has 
 so abandoned it is a question of fact. Having regard to the 
 object of the statute, passed as it was in ease and favor of 
 the debtor, an abandonment would not necessarily be pre- 
 sumed from a mere temporary cessation of the particular 
 occupation in which the exempt implements had been used, 
 even where it was followed by the actual change of employ- 
 ment. All the surrounding circumstances must be taken 
 into consideration, just as when the question of change of 
 residence is examined in relation to the qualification of a 
 voter. (Per Osier, J. A., in Wright v. Hollingshead, 
 23 O.A.R. 1.) 
 
 The privilege granted the debtor by Art. 598, C.C.P., 
 par. 10, of selecting and withdrawing from seizure "tools 
 and implements and other chattels ordinarily used in his 
 profession, art, or trade, to the value of $200," only exists 
 while the debtor is carrying on his profession, art, or trade. 
 When he has ceased to do so, his right to make a selection 
 is at an end, and, therefore, his creditor can have no right, 
 under Art. 1031, C.C., to make such selection. In any case 
 the right of the creditor, under the last mentioned article, 
 is merely to bring back certain effects to the patrimony of 
 the debtor, for the benefit of his creditors generally, and 
 cannot be exercised for the exclusive benefit of the creditor 
 seeking to avail himself of the provisions of the article. 
 (Stephens v. Toback, 26 Que S.C. 41.)
 
 34 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 There can be no necessity for tools, within the meaning 
 of the law, for a debtor who does not intend to use them in 
 his trade. Hence he is not entitled to an exemption after 
 having abandoned his trade nor where he has never exer- 
 cised the trade for which the tools claimed were designed. 
 (Freeman on Executions, 507.) 
 
 The distinction between withdrawing from the pursuit 
 of a particular trade or occupation with the determination 
 never to resume it and a temporary diversion from its prose- 
 cution, while engaged in conducting some other business or 
 exercise not intended to be of permanent or durable con- 
 tinuance is clear and definite. To secure himself the privi- 
 leges and benefits intended to be conferred by the provisions 
 of the statute an artisan is not required to live by his trade 
 without a possible intermission, or the occurrence of any 
 interruption in its pursuit. If, for instance, owing to 
 the unusual stagnation of business, he cannot for a season 
 find remunerative employment in carrying it on, or if from 
 personal infirmity or other intervening impediment it be- 
 comes necessary or expedient that he should resort tem- 
 porarily to some other department of industry to obtain 
 means of supporting himself and his family, he cannot, as 
 long as he entertains an intention to return as soon as cir- 
 cumstances will permit to occupation and employment in 
 his trade, be said to have given up or abandoned it. The 
 tools and implements requisite to carry it on in the usual 
 and ordinary manner in which such business is conducted 
 are in the meantime still things of necessity to him within 
 the meaning of the law. (Caswell v. Keith, 12 Gray 351.) 
 
 XII. HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE. 
 
 The furniture and household furnishings (Alberta and 
 Saskatchewan), the bed and bedding in common use for 
 the debtor and his family, and also his household furni-
 
 HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE 35 
 
 ture and effects (Manitoba), and the furniture, house- 
 hold furnishings, dairy utensils, swine and poultry 
 (Yukon) to the value of $500 are exempt. In the other 
 jurisdictions the articles of furniture exempt are set 
 forth nominatim. 
 
 "Household furniture" will include all personal chattels 
 that may contribute to the use or convenience of the house- 
 holder or the ornament of the house, such as Plate (Nicholls 
 v. Osborne, 2 P. Wms. 419 ; Jesson v. Essington, Pre. Ch. 
 207), Linen, China (both useful and ornamental) and Pic- 
 tures, also Prize Medals, Coins or Trinkets, if framed and 
 hung or otherwise disposed for household ornament (Wil- 
 liams' Executors 1048, 1049, 1 Jarman 757 n, Shepheard's 
 Touchstone 447, Cremorne v. Antrobus, 5 Russ. 312; Field 
 v. Peckett, 30 L.J. Ch. 813; Re Londesborough, 50 L.J. 
 Ch. 9) ; or the clock of the house, if not a fixture (Slanning 
 v. Style, 3 P. Wms. 336; but quaere as to a Bust (Willis v. 
 Courtois, 1 Beav. 195, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, p. 897). 
 
 A bequest of household stuff will not comprise "apparel, 
 books, weapons, tools for artificers, cattle, victuals, corn, 
 Plow-geere and the like." (Shepheard's Touchstone, p. 
 447.) 
 
 Tenant's fixtures in a leasehold house are not "House- 
 hold Furniture" (Finney v. Grice, 48 L.J. Ch. 247, 10 C.D. 
 13, and Re Seton-Smith, 71 L.J. Ch. 386) ; but see Peto v. 
 Grissell, 5 L.J. Ch. 286 and Paton v. Sheppard, 10 Sim. 186. 
 
 As to meaning of furniture see Newsome v. County of 
 Oxford, 28 O.R. 442, and in re Holden, 5 O.L.R. 156. 
 
 As to "Furniture" not including text books or books of 
 practice, see Re Local Offices of the High Court, 12 O.L.R. 
 16, nor a safe, see Goldie v. Taylor, 2 Terr. L.R. 298. As to 
 "household furniture" including books, see in re Holden 
 supra.
 
 36 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 The word "furniture" is one of a very broad signification, 
 and, according to lexicographers, embraces all suitable, 
 necessary, convenient or ornamental articles with which a 
 residence is equipped. (Alsup v. Jordan, 5 Am. St. Rep. 
 53.) 
 
 In the case last cited, it was held that a piano might be 
 exempt if used in the family as an article of furniture and 
 for the purpose of teaching music to the children thereof. 
 It has, however, been held that a piano is not an article of 
 household furniture. (Kehl v. Dunn, 47 Am. St. Rep. 561.) 
 
 Under the Law of Distress Amendment Act, 1888 (Imp.) 
 "bedding" has been held to include a bedstead. (Davis v. 
 Harris (1900), 1 Q.B. 729.) 
 
 "The expression 'household furniture' must be under- 
 stood to mean those vessels, utensils or goods which, not 
 becoming fixtures, are designed in their manufacture origin- 
 ally and chiefly for use in the family as instruments of the 
 household and for .conducting and managing household 
 affairs." (Towns v. Pratt, 66 Am. Dec. 726.) 
 
 Where the household furniture to which a debtor is 
 entitled as exempt by statute is limited by value only, the 
 furniture exempt "may be pictures "hung upon the walls or 
 other furniture, or mere ornaments, or bedroom furniture 
 for visitors only, or bedroom furniture, tableware, etc., for 
 paying guests, boarders, etc." "The word 'furniture' is a 
 comprehensive term embracing about everything with 
 which a house or anything else can be furnished. It evi- 
 dently means everything with which the residence of the 
 debtor, is furnished." (Rasure v. Hart, 18 Kan. 344, cited 
 in Freeman on Executions, at p. 231.) 
 
 XIII. HORSES, COWS, WAGONS 
 
 In many of the statutes there are specific exemptions 
 of horses (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Quebec),
 
 HORSES, COWS, WAGONS 37 
 
 cow (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Quebec, Nova 
 Scotia, Prince Edward Island), and wagons (Saskatche- 
 wan and Alberta), quite apart from their possible ex- 
 emption as tools or implements or chattels ordinarly used 
 in a trade, profession or occupation. 
 
 In Ontario a horse ordinarily used in the debtor's occu- 
 pation, not exceeding in value $60, is a "chattel" within the 
 Act, and is therefore not liable to seizure. (Davidson v. 
 Reynolds, 16 C.P. 140.) 
 
 In Quebec the exemption from seizure under execution 
 of a horse and harness, etc., can be invoked only by a carter 
 or one who uses the horse to gain a living, and not by a 
 butcher who keeps the horses and uses them in his trade. 
 (Lecavalier v. Brunelle, 8 Que. P.R. 245.) 
 
 A horse, the only exigible personalty of defendant, was 
 taken in execution. It was appraised at $1,000. Defend- 
 ant, under sec. 2, H. A. Act. 1890, c. 20, providing "2. It 
 shall be the duty of every sheriff or other officer seizing the 
 personal property of any debtor under a writ of fieri fiacias, 
 or any process of execution, to allow the debtor to select 
 goods and chattels to the value of $500 from the personal 
 property so seized," claimed that he was entitled to select 
 the horse to the extent of $500, and to be paid that amount 
 by the sheriff out of the proceeds of its sale. Held that the 
 debtor was so entitled. (Vye v. McNeill, 3 B.C.R. 24.) 
 
 In states where a very liberal construction is given to 
 the exemption law, it is held that a thing which is essential 
 to the use of exempt property is itself exempt; thus in Texas 
 a horse has been held to include his saddle and bridle and 
 also the rope by which he was led, on the grounds that the 
 grant in the statute must include not only the subject itself, 
 but everything absolutely essential to its beneficial enjoy- 
 ment. (Cobbs v. Coleman, 14 Tex. 599.)
 
 38 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 The value of a horse is to be determined upon the whole 
 evidence and not by an exclusive reference to the price it 
 brought at a bailiff's sale. This is one, but merely one, test 
 of its value. All experience proves that it is by no means 
 a highly satisfactory test. It is but seldom that articles put 
 up at a bailiff's sale realize their fair price. (McMartin v. 
 Hurlburt, 2 O.A.R. 146.) 
 
 In Quebec a contractor who uses a horse in his business 
 is not a carter, and cannot as such oppose the seizure of the 
 horse in execution. The law does not allow the privilege 
 of protection from seizure of two horses or two oxen except 
 to a farmer, the cultivation of whose farm is his principal 
 occupation. (McManamy v. Pelletier, 24 Que. S.C. 127.) 
 
 In Quebec when a horse, carriage and harness are the 
 only ones of their several kinds which the defendant, who 
 is a carter, has for earning his livelihood, they will be 
 exempt from attachment. (Butler v. Prevost, 7 Que. P.R. 
 465.) 
 
 In Quebec the exemption from seizure of a horse and 
 vehicle can be invoked only by a carter or one who uses the 
 horse and vehicle to gain his living, and not by a carpenter, 
 who is sometimes a contractor and sometimes a foreman, at 
 the same time hiring out his horse and vehicle. (St. Lambert 
 Lumber Co. v.. Lambert, 10 Que. P.R'. 259.) 
 
 In Quebec an opposition to the seizure of a horse by the 
 defendant on the ground "that he is the agent of a company 
 dealing in gas fixtures, that he installs the same and that the 
 said horse is necessary to him to carry on his business," will 
 be dismissed, the opposant being neither a carter nor a 
 coachman. (Rousseau v. Nadeau (1909), 10 Que. P.R. 351.) 
 
 Statutes which exempt horses have been held to include 
 mules and jack-asses within their meaning; and a statute 
 which exempts a mule to the debtor includes within its
 
 HORSES, COWS, WAGONS 39 
 
 meaning an ass, which the debtor uses for farm work. 
 (18 Cyc. 1412.) 
 
 A heifer is a young cow and as such exempt from attach- 
 ment, if the debtor has no other (Johnson v. Babcock, 8 
 Allen 583), but a yearling heifer was held not to be exempt 
 under a statute exempting two cows and a calf. (Mitchel 
 v. Joyce, 69 Iowa 122.) 
 
 In Seminary, Etc., v. Cabana (1910), 11 Que. P.R. 315, 
 it was held that, although the debtor was not a farmer, he 
 had the right to claim that his cow, which had been seized, 
 was exempt. 
 
 Where it appears that a debtor is not possessed of any 
 ordinary farm wagon but has two buggies, one of these 
 buggies is exempt as a "wagon" under the Exemptions 
 Ordinance, and the debtor has the choice of buggies. (Per 
 Stuart, J., Ashcroft v. Hopkins, 2 Alta. L.R. 253.) 
 
 The usual interpretation confines the term "wagon" as 
 used in the provision for exemption to a vehicle which is 
 suitable for the transportation of goods. Hence a buggy 
 is held not exempt from execution. (18 Cyc. 1414.) 
 
 A hearse has been held to be a wagon. (Spikes v. Bur- 
 gess, 65 Wis. 428.) 
 
 The term "wagon" is intended to mean a common vehicle 
 for the transportation of goods, wares or merchandise of all 
 descriptions. A hackney coach used for the conveyance of 
 passengers is a different article and does not come within 
 the equity or literal meaning of the act. (Quigley v. Gor- 
 ham, 63 Am. Dec. 139.) 
 
 A bicycle is not a wagon, (Shadewald v. Phillips, 72 
 Min. 520.) 
 
 Necessary provisions means provisions of such a quantity 
 as a provident man would ordinarily keep on hand. (Ward 
 v. Gibbs, 30 S.W. 1125.)
 
 40 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM. EXECUTION. 
 
 It does not seem clear whether fodder for animals not 
 possessed at date of execution, is exempt or not. 
 
 Where a statute exempts specific animals in numero, 
 their number is not doubled when ownership in them is of 
 an undivided half of each. (White v. Capron, 52 Vt. 634.) 
 
 XIV. CLOTHING. 
 
 The necessary and ordinary wearing apparel (Ontario) ; 
 the necessary and ordinary clothing (Alberta, Saskatch- 
 ewan, The North- West Territories and Manitoba), 
 the necessary wearing apparel (Nova Scotia and Prince 
 Edward Island), the ordinary wearing apparel 
 (Quebec), and the wearing apparel inclusively with 
 other exemptions up to $100 (New Brunswick), the 
 necessary wearing apparel (Newfoundland) of the 
 debtor and his family are exempt from execution. 
 
 It is supposed that the common law exemption of wear- 
 ing apparel, when actually being worn, is not interfered 
 with by these enactments. 
 
 The word "necessary" has been given a liberal construc- 
 tion, and it would appear that in the result it does not matter 
 much whether the exemption be of necessary clothing, or 
 of clothing simpliciter. There does, however, seem to be 
 some slight distinction between the word "clothing" and 
 "apparel" as in the case of Brown v. Edmonds quoted infra, 
 both words were used in the exemption statute and the 
 court came to the conclusion that "apparel" must mean, 
 under the circumstances, something more than "clothing." 
 
 For another case of "wearing apparel" being construed 
 as meaning more than "clothing," see Crichton v. Symes, 
 3 Atk. 61 ; and as to variation in meaning of "wearing ap- 
 parel" arising from circumstances and climate, see Wensky 
 v. Canadian Development Co., 8 B.C.R. 190; 21 C.L.T. 601.)
 
 CLOTHING 41 
 
 "We think the word 'necessary' was not intended to de- 
 note those articles of furniture only which are indispensable 
 to the bare subsistence of the persons for whose benefit the 
 law was designed, the debtor and his family. According to 
 such a limited construction it would exclude many things 
 which universal usage and the common understanding of 
 that word in reference to this subject have pronounced to 
 be necessary articles of household furniture, and would 
 indeed protect merely those rude contrivances which are 
 used only in a savage state. The word was obviously used in 
 a larger sense; it was intended to embrace those things 
 which are requisite in order to enable the debtor not merely 
 to live, but to live in a convenient and comfortable manner." 
 (Montague v. Richardson, 63 Am. Dec. 173.) 
 
 A fur overcoat for a man of certain age and of a cer- 
 tain social position is an ordinary garment necessary and in- 
 dispensable during the winter season and therefore is 
 exempt from seizure under Art. 589 C.P.C. (Robertson v. 
 Honan, 24 Que. S.C. 510.) A right of retention claimed by 
 one who has repaired such a coat does not authorize a 
 creditor to seize it under execution. 
 
 "Necessary wearing apparel" includes cloth put into the 
 hands of a tailor to be made into clothes for the debtor ; and 
 it has been held that "necessary wearing apparel" will in- 
 clude the trimmings as well as the cloth left in the hands of 
 a tailor for such a purpose. (18 Cyc. 1426.) 
 
 Whether an article attached is a necessary or a luxury 
 may under some circumstances be a question for the jury, 
 depending upon the situation of the debtor and the char- 
 acter and uses and perhaps the cost of the article. (Towns 
 v. Pratt, 66 Am. Dec. 726.) 
 
 "The wearing apparel" necessary for immediate use 
 "must be such an amount of clothing as is necessary to meet 
 the varying climate and customary habits and ordinary
 
 42 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 necessities of the mass of the people. The clothing worn by 
 the individual while about his daily toil might be all that 
 was necessary for the time, but be wholly insufficient when 
 the labor ceased, and the clothing suitable and proper for 
 days of labor might not be such as the common sentiment of 
 the community would deem necessary for use on days set 
 apart for religious assembling and worship." (Peverly v. 
 Sayles, 10 N.H. 356.) 
 
 "Watches are as essential to the comfort and conveni- 
 ence of men in nearly all vocations as are hats or coats. In 
 many they are absolute necessities. We are inclined to hold 
 the defendant's watch and chain absolutely exempt as wear- 
 ing apparel." (Brown v. Edmonds, 50 Am. St. Rep. 762.) 
 
 A watch is an article for which exemption has been 
 claimed under various provisions of the statutes of exemp- 
 tion. Thus it has been held to be exempt as necessary 
 household furniture, as a working-tool and as wearing ap- 
 parel. We think the better rule is that it is not exempt in 
 either capacity. (Freeman on Execution, 1239.) 
 
 XV. VALUE OF CHATTELS EXCEEDING LIMIT OF 
 EXEMPTION. 
 
 The right of exemption of chattels up to a certain value 
 has led to considerable diversity of opinion. Thus, in 
 British Columbia, a debtor has been held entitled to the 
 proceeds of sale of a valuable chattel up to the statutory 
 value, but in England, under a similar statute, to the 
 whole of a chattel of a greater value than the statutory 
 limit; while in U.S.A. the debtor has been held in such a 
 case not to be entitled to any exemption. 
 
 In Ontario, if any tool or implement of or chattel 
 ordinarily used in the debtor's occupation is of a value 
 greater than $100 and there are not other goods suffi-
 
 VALUE OF CHATTELS EXCEEDING LIMIT OF EXEMPTION 43 
 
 cient to satisfy the writ, such article may be sold by the 
 sheriff, who shall pay $100 to the debtor out of the 
 proceeds. 
 
 The other question is whether the section, which exceptd 
 from seizure implements of trade "to the value of five 
 pounds," gave protection to this cab, which was admittedly 
 worth more than 5, but which was the only chattel upon 
 the premises. In my opinion the section means that imple- 
 ments of trade must be left on the premises to at least the 
 value of 5. There is nothing to shew that that limit of 
 value can in any case be disregarded. In order to give effect 
 to the argument of the defendant, it would be necessary to 
 hold that in such a case as this no tools or implement of 
 trade whatever were protected from seizure a conclusion 
 which would be obviously inconsistent with the language of 
 the section. In Churchward v. Johnson, 54 J.P. 326, where 
 this was incidentally referred to, it was held that a sewing 
 machine, as being an implement of trade, was within the 
 protection of the section, though its value was stated to be 
 8 10s. I have come to the conclusion that, though the im- 
 plement of trade here in question exceeds 5 in value, yet, 
 as it is the only chattel on the premises, it is within the 
 protection afforded by the Act." (Per Alverstone, L.J., in 
 Lavell v. Richings, 75 L.J.K.B. 287.) 
 
 I further agree that the limit of value fixed by the section 
 applies not only where the implements of trade upon the 
 premises do not exceed that limit, but also where the only 
 chattel upon the premises is an implement of trade which 
 does exceed that limit and there is not means of severing 
 it so as to take only the part of it which is in excess of the 
 limit. In such a case the only course is to leave the chattel 
 alone, for if it were seized the Act would clearly be in- 
 fringed. (Per Darling, J., in S.C.)
 
 44 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 A horse, the only exigible personalty of defendant, was 
 taken in execution. It was appraised at $1,000. Defend- 
 ant, under sec. 2, Homestead Amendment Act, 1890, c. 20, 
 providing that "it shall be the duty of every sheriff or other 
 officer seizing the personal property of any debtor under a 
 writ of fieri faicas, or other process of execution, to allow 
 the debtor to select goods and chattels to the value of $500 
 from the personal property so seized," claimed that he was 
 entitled to select the horse to the extent of $500, and to be 
 paid that amount by the sheriff out of the proceeds of its 
 sale. It was held that the debtor was so entitled. (Vye 
 v. McNeill, 3 B.C.R. 24.) 
 
 It has been held that where the statute permits the 
 debtor to hold as exempt an article of a designated value 
 and the article of the class named owned by him is of greater 
 value and not capable of division into parts, that the debtor 
 is neither entitled to retain the article on tendering to the 
 officer its value above the amount exempt, nor to have such 
 amount paid to him from the proceeds of the sale. (Waldo 
 v. Gray, 12 111. 184.) 
 
 XVI. PROCEEDS OF EXEMPT PROPERTY. 
 
 The proceeds of an involuntary disposition of property 
 are themselves exempt, but the proceeds of a voluntary 
 disposition are not exempt until they have been rein- 
 vested in other exempt property before a creditor has ac- 
 quired a charge upon them. (Massey Harris Co. v. 
 Schram, 5 Terr. L.R. 338; Slater v. Rodgers, 2 Terr. L.R. 
 210; Pilling v. Stewart, 4 B.C.R. 94. ) It is not quite clear 
 as to whether a debtor who has sold exempt property 
 with the express purpose of re-investing in other exempt 
 property can claim exemption for the proceeds of sale 
 (See Cullen v. Harris, 66 Am. St. R. 380, where it was; 
 held that the exemption could be maintained.)
 
 INSURANCE MONEY 45 
 
 The same principle is applicable to a sum of money re- 
 ceived on account of the loss of or damage to exempt prop- 
 erty where such loss or damage has occurred without any 
 acquiescence on the part of the owner. Thus it has been 
 held that money recovered as damages for the conversion of 
 exempt property is itself exempt (Harrell v. Harrell, 77 Ga. 
 130), and it also has been held that the claim for damages 
 for the loss of or injury to an animal due to the negligence 
 of another person cannot be taken in execution. 
 
 If the house on a homestead is burnt down and the owner 
 has it insured the insurance money is exempt from seizure, 
 and he is entitled to receive the same to restore his home. 
 (Osier v. Muter, 19 O.A.R. 94.) 
 
 The natural increase of exempt animals has been held 
 not to be exempt (Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Green, 78 N.C. 
 247) ; but their produce has been held to be exempt (Leavitt 
 v. Metcalf, 2 Vt. 342, 19 Am. Dec. 718). 
 
 XVII. INSURANCE MONEY. 
 
 By statute it is settled in Manitoba that any moneys that 
 may become payable by reason of loss by fire under any 
 policy of fire insurance in respect of any property, that is 
 at the time of such loss exempt from seizure, are exempt 
 from seizure under execution or attachment or any other 
 legal process. The principle underlying this statutory 
 provision is probably applicable to the other juris- 
 dictions. (Jones v. Jesse, 10 W.L.R. 627.) 
 
 It is considered right that this description of property 
 should be left to a debtor for the support of himself and his 
 family and to be free from the claims of creditors. 
 
 If he die, they remain exempt with his widow or family 
 and they are free also if he become an absconding debtor. 
 He remains, however, liable to have exempted articles 
 seized for a debt contracted for their purchase.
 
 46 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS PROM EXECUTION. 
 
 When he insures such goods, he obtains an indemnity if 
 destroyed by fire, and it appears to be but reasonable that 
 such indemnity when recovered shall stand in the place of 
 exempted goods to enable him to replace the articles prop- 
 erly protected by the statute. 
 
 Here if the company had exercised their right to replace 
 these goods the exemption would at once apply. If the in- 
 demnity money secured by the thrift of the debtor can be 
 intercepted by execution, the whole object of indemnity to 
 the debtor under the statute and his care in securing such 
 indemnity are lost. (Per Hagarty, see J.O., in Osier v. 
 Muter, 19 O.A.R. 94.) 
 
 XVIII. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES. 
 
 A transfer of exempt property cannot, except under 
 peculiar circumstances, be held to be fraudulent as 
 against creditors, inasmuch as the transfer, no matter 
 -what the intention of the transferor was, could not 
 operate to defraud the creditors, since it would not place 
 beyond their reach anything which they would be en- 
 titled to take under execution, ( Field v. Hart, 22 O.A.R. 
 449; Bates v. Cannon, 18 Man. L.R. 7; Temperance In- 
 surance Co. v. Coombe, 28 C.L. J., 88. ) 
 
 It is not a fraud on creditors for a debtor to use personal 
 property which is subject to legal process to acquire or im- 
 prove a homestead which is exempt. (Washburn on Real 
 Property, s. 603.) 
 
 For a case where a transfer of exempt property might 
 be regarded as fraudulent, see Scheuerman v. Scheuerman, 
 10 W.W.R. 379, and see generally Scott on Homesteads, 39. 
 
 Even if a conveyance were set aside as fraudulent the 
 title to the property would not re-vest in the debtor, so as 
 to give him any right to exemption.
 
 FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 47 
 
 It is not fraudulent to reserve out of an assignment for 
 the benefit of creditors such property as is exempt from 
 execution. (See Robinson v. Huston, 4 Man. L.R. 71.) 
 
 A chattel mortgage, although given under circumstances 
 entitling a creditor to have it set aside as a fraudulent 
 preference under s. 41 of The Assignments Act, R.S.M. 1902, 
 c. 8, will nevertheless be held valid as to any goods covered 
 by it which would under s. 29 of The Executions Act, R.S.M. 
 1902, c. 58, be exempt from seizure under execution. (Bates 
 v. Cannon, 18 Man. L.R. 7.) 
 
 An execution debtor can do as he pleases with the statu- 
 tory exemptions, and his execution creditor cannot take ad- 
 vantage of the fact that they are insufficiently described in 
 a bill of sale thereof by the execution debtor. (Field vi 
 Hart, 22 O.A.R. 449.) 
 
 The debtor has an absolute jus disponendi over the 
 exemptions. He is not compelled to keep them in his pos- 
 session in order that they should retain the character of 
 exemptions. If sold, he is entitled to the proceeds in money, 
 which he can deal with as he likes, and after his death his 
 widow has the same right as he himself had. At common 
 law a debtor has a right to prefer his creditor. A prefer- 
 ence is fraudulent only by virtue of the statute, and the 
 plaintiff cannot be placed in any better position than if the 
 chattels had remained in the debtor's hands. There can be 
 no fraudulent transfer of chattels which in no case could be 
 reached by execution. (Temperance Ins. Co. v. Coombe, 
 28 C.L.J. 88.) 
 
 A chattel mortgage given by a debtor on a wagon which 
 is exempt will not be set aside at the instance of a creditor, 
 even if it is proved that the chattel mortgage was given 
 under circumstances which would, except for the exemption, 
 constitute a fraudulent preference under the Assignments 
 Act. (Ashcroft v. Hopkins, 2 Alta. L.R. 253.)
 
 48 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 An assignment for the benefit of creditors contained the 
 following clauses: Provided always that the said trustee 
 shall have power and authority, if he shall deem it expedient 
 and for the general benefit of the creditors, from time to 
 time and as often as he shall deem it proper out of the pro- 
 ceeds of the sales of the said stock to purchase goods and 
 stock for the purpose of enabling him to assort and sell off 
 the present stock to the best advantage for the benefit of the 
 creditors, but such purchase shall be made with such view 
 only and not with a view of continuing the business beyond 
 a reasonable time . . . Provided also that the said party 
 of the first part, notwithstanding anything herein contained, 
 shall have the right and privilege if he so elects within a 
 reasonable time to reserve to himself out of the goods and 
 chattels and property hereinbefore conveyed and assigned 
 such property as would be exempt from seizure under 
 execution according to the laws of the Province of Mani- 
 toba." Under these circumstances it was held that the 
 assignment was not, by reason of these clauses, void as 
 against creditors. (Robinson v. Huston, 4 Man. L.R. 71.) 
 
 "In 'Burrell on Assignments' it is said at the end of sec- 
 tion 202: "The reservation of such property as is exempt 
 by law from levy and sale under execution is consistent with 
 the rights of creditors" ; and at section 96 it is said : "There 
 are, however, portions of a debtor's property which the law 
 expressly exempts from the process of creditors, and these, 
 of course, he is allowed to except and retain out of the gen- 
 eral conveyance." 
 
 "In Mulford v. Shirk, 26 Penn. St. 473, such a reserva- 
 tion was objected to as rendering an assignment void. Tha 
 statute in that state exempted from levy and sale property 
 to the amount of $300. The court, holding that the reserva- 
 tion was not fatal to the assignment, said : "We think not, 
 and that because such a reservation is not within the reason
 
 LOSS OF EXEMPTION BY ABSCONDING DEBTOR 49 
 
 of the rule. Though expressed in the assignment it is not 
 created by it, but by the Act of Assembly, and it does not 
 tend to defeat or delay or hinder creditors, because by law 
 they never could appropriate this part of their debtor's estate. 
 In all the adjudged cases the reserved interest which has 
 been held to avoid the assignment springs from the instru- 
 ment itself, but in this case it is created by Act of Parliament 
 and vested in the debtor, and the whole effect of the reser- 
 vation is that he does not part with it. His creditors are not 
 hindered by his keeping that which they had no right to 
 touch." 
 
 This decision was followed in Heckman v. Mesinger, 49 
 Penn. St. 465, and approved of in Blackburne's Appeal, 39 
 Penn. St. 160, in which the court held that the debtor not 
 having made the exception of exempt property, he could not 
 afterwards reclaim it. (Robinson v. Huston, 4 Man. 
 L.R. 71.) 
 
 In Manitoba the statutory exemption cannot be claimed 
 by or on behalf of a debtor who is in the act of removing 
 with his family from the province, or is about to do so, 
 or who has absconded taking his family with him. 
 (R.S.M. 1913, s. 33, c. 66.) 
 
 In Alberta and Saskatchewan the statutory exemp- 
 tions cannot be claimed where the debtor has absconded 
 or is about to abscond from the Territories leaving no 
 wife or family behind (The Exemptions Ordinance, 
 s. 66.) 
 
 The wording of the Manitoba provision does not make it 
 quite clear whether or not absconding from the province, or 
 absconding generally, is the disabling fact.
 
 50 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 An absconding debtor, under 33 and 34 Viet., c. 76, 
 seems to be an insolvent debtor who "departs for distant 
 countries before the necessary proceedings can be taken to 
 make him a bankrupt." 
 
 In R. v. Angelo, 5 W.W.R. 1303, Irving, J.A., says the 
 word means to remove oneself for the sake of not being dis- 
 covered by those with whom we are acquainted ; and Martin, 
 J.A., says that the word abscond has different legal mean- 
 ings, and according to the context may imply that the ab- 
 sconder has fled the country to foreign parts or (e.g., in 
 the case of certain sections of the English Bankruptcy Acts) 
 that he has "departed from, his dwelling house for the pur- 
 pose of delaying his creditors and escaping payment of his 
 debts, without leaving England in which country he was in 
 fact in R. v. Judge of the North Allerton County Court 
 rightly held to have been arrested as an absconder. (1898) 
 2 Q.B. 680, 68 L.J.Q.-B. 24. 
 
 XX. RIGHTS UPON DEATH OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR. 
 
 In Ontario exempt chattels after the death of the debtor 
 are exempt from the claims of his creditors, and his 
 widow is entitled to retain for the benefit of herself and 
 his family or, if there is no widow, the family of the 
 debtor is entitled to them (The Execution Act, s. 6.) 
 
 In Manitoba the exemption has been held not to con- 
 tinue after death so as to prevent an order for the sale 
 of the homestead being made in favor of a creditor who 
 recovers a judgment against the executor and that al- 
 though the widow and children are resident upon the 
 land. ( London & Canadian Loan Agency Co. v. Connell, 
 11 Man. L.R. 115). 
 
 In Alberta and Saskatchewan the exempt property is 
 exempt from seizure under execution against the per- 
 sonal representative, if it is in the use and enjoyment
 
 BIGHTS UPON DEATH OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR 51 
 
 of the widow and children or widow or children of the 
 deceased and if necessary for the maintenance and sup- 
 port of the said widow and children or any of them (The 
 Exemptions Ordinance, s. 5.) 
 
 In Re Conlin Estate, 7 W.W.R. 187, it was held that the 
 proceeds of sale of a homestead must be held to be exempt 
 from liability for the debts of the deceased and applicable 
 to the exclusive use of the widow and children, who were in 
 the occupation of the homestead. 
 
 ' In Re Tatham, 2 O.L.R. 343, Meredith, C.J., held that 
 goods of a deceased husband, exempt from seizure under 
 The Execution Act, Ontario, were not, except as to funeral 
 and testamentary expenses, assets in the hands of his execu- 
 tors for the payment of debts, the effect of s. 4 of that Act 
 being to give his wife a parliamentary title thereto. 
 
 (See further as to meaning of "family," "child," "main- 
 tenance," and the rights of creditors upon the death of the 
 judgment debtor, Scott on Homesteads, p. 45.) 
 
 The plaintiffs recoverd a judgment against the defend- 
 ant as surviving executor of the estate of one William Kines, 
 and under rule 804 of The Queen's Bench Act, 1895, applied 
 for an order for the sale of a parcel of land vested in the 
 defendant as such executor. The widow and minor chil- 
 dren of Kines were living on the land. 
 
 Held that sec. 12 of The Judgments Act, R.S.M., c. 80, 
 which provides that no proceedings shall be taken under any 
 registered judgment against the land upon which the judg- 
 ment debtor or his family actually resides or which he cul- 
 tivates, would not apply so as to prevent the sale of the 
 land in question, as neither the defendant nor his family 
 resided upon or cultivated it. (London & Canadian Loan 
 Agency Co. v. Connell, 11 Man. L.R. 115.)
 
 52 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS PROM EXECUTION. 
 
 XXI. ESTOPPEL. 
 
 A judgment debtor may be estopped from asserting his 
 claim to exemptions, where he has made representations 
 to the contrary or acted in such a way as to lead others 
 to believe that he had waived his right. 
 
 The plaintiffs sued to recover a balance due for a thresh- 
 ing outfit sold and delivered by the plaintiff company to de- 
 fendants, Charles Hornby and his wife, Ellen Hornby, 
 under a written agreement signed by defendants which 
 provided that promissory notes were to be given on ap- 
 proved security for the amounts payable at the dates men- 
 tioned. When the machinery had been delivered at the 
 defendants' farm, the plaintiffs' agent called there to take 
 settlement for it. Defendants then signed the notes asked 
 for and the agent demanded a lien on the farm as security 
 for the notes, and, relying on the representations of both 
 defendants then made that the wife owned the land, ac- 
 cepted a lien on the land for the amount, signed by Mrs. 
 Hornby in the presence of her husband, and did not insist, 
 as he might have done, that the husband should also sign 
 it. It appeared that the title to the land was then actually 
 in the husband, and had remained so ever since. 
 
 Renewal notes had been given by the defendants and 
 the original periods of credit considerably extended, and 
 during this time the husband wrote several letters in which 
 the wife was spoken of as the actual owner. 
 
 The chief contention at the trial was as to whether the 
 plaintiffs were entitled to a lien on the land for the debt as 
 against the defendant, Charles Hornby. 
 
 Held, there was ample consideration for the giving of 
 the lien, as the plaintiffs might have removed the machinery 
 and refused to carry out the transaction if it had been re- 
 fused.
 
 ESTOPPEL 53 
 
 It was held that the defendant, Charles Hornby, was 
 estopped by the representations he had made, and subse- 
 quently repeated, from denying that the land in question 
 was his wife's property and from claiming it as his own as 
 against the plaintiffs. (John Abell Co. v. Hornby, 15 Man. 
 L.R. 450.) 
 
 The ordinary principles of such estoppel are here in- 
 serted for convenience of reference. 
 
 One recognized proposition as to estoppel in pais is that, 
 if a person by words or conduct wilfully endeavors to cause 
 another to believe in a certain state of things which such 
 person knows to be false, and if the other believes in such 
 state of things, and acts upon his belief, he who knowingly 
 made the false statement is estopped from averring after- 
 wards that such a state of things did not, in fact, exist. 
 
 Another recognized proposition as to estoppel in pais is 
 that if a person, either in express terms or by conduct, makes 
 a representation to another of the existence of a certain 
 state of facts which he intends to be acted upon in a certain 
 way, and it be acted upon in that way in the belief of the 
 existence of such a state of facts to the damage of him who 
 so believes and acts, such person is estopped from denying 
 the existence of such a state of facts. 
 
 A third recognized proposition as to estoppel in pais is 
 that if a person, whatever his real meaning may be, so con- 
 ducts himself that a reasonable man would take his conduct 
 to mean a certain representation, and that he was intended 
 to act upon it in a particular way, and if he with such belief 
 does act in that way to his damage, such person is estopped 
 from denying that the facts were as represented. 
 
 A fourth recognized proposition as to estoppel in pais 
 is that, if the transaction itself which is in dispute, A. has led 
 B. into the belief of a certain state of facts by conduct of 
 culpable negligence calculated to have that result, and such
 
 54 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 culpable negligence has been the proximate cause of lead- 
 ing and has led B. to act by mistake upon such belief to his 
 prejudice, A. cannot be heard afterwards as against B. to 
 shew that the state of facts referred to did not exist. (Carr 
 v. London and North-Western Railway, 44 L.J.C.P. 109.) 
 
 If at the time of the levy a debtor denies ownership of 
 the property, he is held to be estopped from subsequently 
 claiming the right to exemption. (Gilleland v. Rhoades, 34 
 Pa. St. 187.) 
 
 So also, it was held that if a debtor voluntarily surren- 
 dered property without making a claim, he was subsequently 
 estopped from making it. (Richards v. Haines, 30 Iowa 
 574.) 
 
 It has been held that where false representations to ob- 
 tain credit had been made, the person making the repre- 
 sentation is estopped from subsequently claiming the exemp- 
 tion. (Blount v. Medbury, 94 N.W. 428.) 
 
 In order that a plea of estoppel may be effective to pre- 
 vent a debtor from claiming his exemption it must appear 
 that because of fraud, perjury, or false representation, the 
 party urging the estoppel has been induced to act and to 
 place himself in a position wherein he would not otherwise 
 have placed himself, and where it would be inequitable for 
 the defendant to deny his former representations or to dis- 
 prove his former assertions whether under oath or not. 
 
 If a debtor conveys his property to delay or defraud 
 creditors he cannot sustain an action for it as exempt be- 
 cause he has parted with the title and cannot urge his own 
 fraudulent design for the purpose of defeating his deed. If, 
 however, the conveyance should be vacated for fraud the 
 exemption rights would revive. (Freeman, p. 1130.) 
 
 As to property exempt under the Homestead Laws, it is 
 perfectly clear that an execution sale against the objections 
 and in defiance of the right of the claimant conveys no title
 
 WAIVER ;>0 
 
 whatever and it seems to be pretty well settled that this rule 
 is applicable to other exempt property. (Freeman, p. 1133.) 
 
 (See Scott on Homestead, 44, for unreported case of 
 Brock v. Morton, where it was held that the doctrine of 
 estoppel did not apply to exemptions.) 
 
 In Angell v. Johnson, 33 Am. Rep. 152, it was said: "We 
 are of opinion the debtor cannot stand by and know the levy 
 is about to be made and afterward claim the exemption. He 
 must at the time in some manner indicate to the officer his 
 purpose to claim the property as exempt." 
 
 XXII. WAIVER. 
 
 The right of exemption may be waived but (semble) not 
 in advance (nor at all in Manitoba, see R.S.M. 1913, c. 
 66, s. 29), that being against public policy. 
 
 In Roy v. Fortin supra the borrowing of goods by the 
 debtor from an assignee for the benefit of creditors was held 
 to be a waiver of the right to claim such goods as exempt 
 through recognition of the title of the assignee, while an- 
 other judge in the same case held that the very making of 
 the assignment operated as a waiver of the right. 
 
 Exemption is not an absolute right, but a privilege which 
 may be waived, and where debtors assigned all their prop- 
 erty that might be seized and sold under execution, it 
 was held that by the form of the assignment the privilege 
 had been waived. (In re Ley and others, 7 B.C.R. 94.) 
 
 If the debtor's delay to claim his exemption arises from 
 the fact that he is absent from the jurisdiction, no waiver 
 of the right of exemption can be inferred from such delay. 
 (See Harrington v. Smith, 20 Am. St. Rep. 272, in which case 
 the debtor had written to his creditor asking for delay until 
 he could "come down and fix up everything satisfactory.")
 
 56 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS PROM EXECUTION. 
 
 "The statutes which allow a debtor being a householder 
 and having a family for which he provides to retain as 
 against the legal remedies of his creditors, certain articles 
 of prime necessity to a limited amount, are based upon views 
 of policy and humanity, which would be frustrated if an 
 agreement like that contained in these notes, entered into 
 in connection with the principal contract, could be sus- 
 tained. A few words contained in any note or obligation, 
 would operate to change the law between those parties, and 
 so far disappoint the intentions of the legislature. If effect 
 shall be given to such provisions it is likely that they will 
 generally be inserted in obligations for small demands, and 
 in that way the policy of the law will be completely over- 
 thrown. Every honest man, who contracts a debt, expects 
 to pay it, and believes he will be able to do so without hav- 
 ing his property sold under execution. No one worthy to 
 be trusted would, therefore, be apt to object to a clause 
 subjecting all his property to levy on execution, in case of 
 non-payment. It was against the consequences of this over- 
 confidence, and the readiness of men to make contracts, 
 which may deprive them and their families of articles indis- 
 pensable to their comfort, that the legislature has under- 
 taken to interpose. When a man's last cow is taken on an 
 execution, on a judgment rendered upon one of these notes, 
 it is no answer to say that it was done pursuant to his con- 
 sent, freely given, when he contracted the debt. The law 
 was designed to protect him against his own improvidence 
 in giving such consent. The statutes contain many examples 
 of legislation based on the same motives. The laws against 
 usury, and those which forbid imprisonment for debt, and 
 those which allow a redemption after the sale of land on 
 execution, are of this class. So, of the principle originally 
 introduced by courts of equity, and which has been long 
 established in all courts, to the effect that if one convey land
 
 WAIVER 57 
 
 as security for a debt, and agree that his deed shall be- 
 come absolute, if payment is not made by the day, he shall 
 be entitled to redeem, on paying the debt and interest ; and 
 so, also of executory contracts without consideration to 
 make gifts and the like. In these cases the law seeks to 
 mitigate the consequences of men's thoughtlessness and im- 
 providence; and it does not, I think, allow its policy to be 
 evaded by any language which may be inserted in the con- 
 tract. It is not always equally careful to shield persons 
 from those acts which, instead of being promissory in their 
 character and prospective in their operation, take effect 
 immediately. One may turn out his last cow on execution, 
 or may release an equity of redemption, and he will be 
 bound by the act. In thus discriminating the law takes 
 notice of the readiness with which sanguine and incautious 
 men will make improvident contracts, which look to the 
 future for their consummation, when if the results were to 
 be presently realized, they would not enter into them at all. 
 If with the consequences immediately before them, they 
 will do the act, they will not generally be allowed to retract, 
 it being supposed in such case, that valid reasons for the 
 transaction may have existed and that at all events the 
 party was not under the illusion which distance of time 
 creates. Ordinarily, men are kept to their executory, as 
 well as their executed contracts; but in a few exceptional 
 cases, where the temptation is great, or the consequences 
 peculiarly inconvenient, parties are not allowed to make 
 valid prospective agreements. The present is, in my 
 opinion, one of those cases." (Kneettle v. Necomb, 22 N.Y. 
 249.) 
 
 Such contracts contravene the policy of the law and 
 hence are inoperative and void. The owner may, if he 
 chooses, sell or otherwise dispose of any property he may 
 have, however much his family may need, but the law will
 
 58 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 not aid him in that regard, nor permit him to contract in 
 advance, that his creditor may use the process of the courts 
 to deprive his family of its benefit and use when an exemp- 
 tion has been created in their favor. Laws enacted from 
 considerations of public concern and to conserve the general 
 welfare, cannot be abrogated by mere private agreement. 
 (Recht v. Kelly, 25 Am. Rep. 301.) 
 
 It may be doubted how far the head of a family is en- 
 titled to waive his rights to exemption, at any rate in those 
 jurisdictions where the right to exemption may be presumed 
 to be conferred upon a man and his family. 
 
 The rule to be gathered from the majority of the re- 
 ported cases on the subject is: That the mere surrender of 
 property to an officer, or the execution of a bond for its 
 surrender to him does not estop the debtor from subse- 
 quently claiming such of the property as may be exempt. 
 (Freeman, p. 1123.) 
 
 XXIII. IMMOVABLES DECLARED EXEMPT. 
 GIFTS ON CONDITION OF EXEMPTION. 
 
 XXIV. ALIMENTARY ALLOWANCES. 
 ALIMENTARY DEBTS. 
 
 In Quebec the following are exempt from seizure: Im- 
 movables declared by a donor or testator, or by law, to 
 be exempt from seizure; and sums of money or objects 
 given or bequeathed upon the condition of their being 
 exempt from seizure, and also alimentary allowances 
 granted by a court, and sums of money or pensions given 
 as alimony, even though the donor or testator has not 
 expressly declared them to be exempt from seizure. 
 They may, however, be seized for alimentary debts. 
 
 Property which is the subject of a gift upon condition 
 that the donee shall not alienate it, is not exigible under
 
 ALIMENTARY ALLOWANCES AND DEBTS 59 
 
 \ 
 
 execution or other process against the donee. (Roberts v. 
 Bergevin, 16 Que. K.B. 104.) 
 
 Although a clause prohibiting seizure in a deed of gift 
 of an immovable property cannot prevent the sale of the 
 property, yet it is an obstacle to such property being 
 charged with a judicial hypothec resulting from registra- 
 tion (with required notice) of a judgment rendered against 
 the donee. Hence by an action directed against the creditor 
 who registered such judgment, the donee may have such 
 hypothec erased. (Latour v. Latour (1909), 38 Que. S.C. 
 193.) 
 
 A condition of inexigibility under which a thing is given 
 cannot be extended to another thing, hence, a piano ac- 
 quired with the proceeds of the insurance of a similar in- 
 strument destroyed in a fire and which had been given on 
 condition of exemption from seizure is exigible. (Alexander 
 Milling Co. v. Cloutier (1909), 36 Que. S.C. 196.) 
 
 Immovables, sums of money or objects given upon the 
 condition of their being exempt from seizure, as provided 
 in par. 3 of Art. 599 C.P., may, nevertheless, be seized in 
 satisfaction of an alimentary debt. The costs and expenses 
 attending a suit instituted by a universal usufructuary lega- 
 tee but without calling into question either the possession, 
 the enjoyment, the creation or the preservation of such 
 usufruct, which is alleged to be exempt from seizure, do 
 not create an alimentary debt, because they were not useful 
 either for the material existence of the object given or be- 
 queathed, or of that of the person who received the gift or 
 legacy. A legatee, upon whom a seizure is effected for 
 costs of the nature of those stated, has a right to obtain a 
 discharge from the attachment by garnishment under the 
 provision of pars. 3 and 4 of Art. 599 C.P. Quaere, do ob- 
 jects declared exempt from seizure by the donor become, at 
 the donee's death, liable thereto, with retroactive effect in
 
 60 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 such a way that all of the donee's creditors acquire the right 
 to seize them? (Drainville v. Savoie and Rouleau (1910), 
 16 R.L.N.S. 505.) 
 
 A judgment allowing damages to the father for the kill- 
 ing of his son is not in the nature of an alimentary allow- 
 ance, and the amount of these damages can be seized, if they 
 have not been declared exempt from seizure. (Leroux v. 
 James dit Carriere, 11 Que. P.R. 13. Sub nom. James v. 
 Leroux and Vulcan Portland Cement Co., 16 R.L.N.S. 20.) 
 
 An indemnity granted to a father for the death of his 
 son who, he alleges had been his only support, and allowed 
 by a Court in a suit for damages taken by the father against 
 the party responsible for his son's death, partakes of the 
 nature of "alimentary allowances granted by a Court," un- 
 der the provisions of Art. 599 C.P., and is, therefore, exempt 
 from seizure. (Carriere v. Leroux (1909), 19 Que. K.B. 
 249, 11 Que. P.R. 158.) 
 
 Property the subject of a gift with a provision for in- 
 saisissabilite is exigible for an alimentary debt. (Patenaude 
 v. Boissoneault, 10 Que. P.R. 258.) 
 
 An alimentary allowance, created by an onerous deed of 
 gift, is seizable. (Biron v. Biron (1910), 16 R.L.N.S. 386, 
 16 R. de J. 418.) 
 
 An order for alimony is not subject to the provisions of 
 the Lacombe Law, and defendant's salary may be attached 
 therefor. (Desormeau v. Legault and Peck Rolling Mills 
 Co. (1910), 11 Que. P.R. 328.) 
 
 The amount which the party responsible for the death of 
 another is condemned to pay to the latter's surviving father 
 and mother, by virtue of article 1056 C.C., is an alimentary 
 allowance granted by a Court, within the meaning of art. 
 599 (4) C.P., and is exempt from seizure. (Leganiere v. 
 Desjardins and Great Northern Railway Co. (1909), 37 
 Que. S.C. 513.)
 
 CONSTRUCTION OF EXEMPTING STATUTES 61 
 
 XXV. CONSTRUCTION OF EXEMPTING STATUTES. 
 
 It has been held that statutory exemption from seizure 
 being in derogation of the rights of creditors under the 
 general law is to be strictly construed. (Harris v. Rankin, 
 4 Man. L.R. 135; London & Canadian Loan and Agency 
 Co. v. Connell, 11 Man. L.R. 151; Kraemer v. Gless, 10 
 U.C.C.P. 475, and re Hetherington, 14 W.L.R. 529.) 
 
 It must be remembered that in many of the jurisdictions 
 (e.g., British Columbia and Alberta) there is a provision 
 that every enactment should be deemed remedial and that 
 consequently there is not the same necessity for a strict 
 construction. 
 
 In Washburn on Real Property, at s. 544, it is said that 
 exemption laws, whatever may be said of their policy, are 
 not in derogation of common law, but are simply restrictive. 
 of statutes passed in derogation of the common law. 
 
 (See further, as to view taken in U.S.A., Scott on Home- 
 steads, 11.) 
 
 Statutes conferring exemptions or privileges in deroga- 
 tion of the general law must be construed strictly, so that 
 the protection of sec. 12 does not continue after the death of 
 the judgment debtor, although his widow and children may 
 be living upon the property; and a fortiori no exemption 
 can be claimed when the judgment in question is recovered 
 against the executor of the deceased debtor. (London and 
 Canadian Loan and Agency Co. v. Connell, 11 Man. L.R. 
 
 When a class of property is exempt, such as suitable ap- 
 parel, bedding, tools, arms and articles of household fur- 
 niture, such as may be necessary for upholding life, the 
 courts take care that the beneficial purposes of the legisla- 
 ture are carried into execution, but when a specific article is
 
 62 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 exempt, the court cannot extend the statute by construction 
 to another and different article. (Carty v. Drew, 46 Vt. 346.) 
 
 XXVI. POINTS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE. 
 
 A deed of assignment of the estate and effects of in- 
 solvents for the benefit of their creditors, executed on 
 March 26th, 1896, pursuant to the Creditors' Trust Deeds 
 Act, 1890, excepted "such personal property as may be 
 selected by the said debtors under the Homestead Act and 
 Homestead Amendment Act, 1890.". It was held that the 
 onus was on the claimants to show that the claim was not 
 within the exception to the right of exemption provided by 
 sec. 10 of the Homestead Act, 1890, as amended by the Act 
 of 1893, sec. 2, in regard to goods seized in "satisfaction 
 of a debt contracted for or in respect of such identical 
 goods," and in the absence of evidence upon the point the 
 claim was disallowed. (Sehl v. Humphreys, 1 B.C.R. Pt. 2, 
 257.) 
 
 In an action or proceeding to enforce or establish an 
 exemption right, the burden is upon him who seeks to en- 
 force or establish it. The claimant of exemption has the 
 burden to show that he has fulfilled the statutory require- 
 ment as to steps taken to obtain his exemption, such as de- 
 mand and furnishing a schedule. (18 Cyc. 1494.) 
 
 Where in an interpleader issue the claimant alleges that 
 the goods seized include the statutory exemptions that is a 
 question for trial in the issue and is not to be left to the 
 sheriff to deal with. (Field v. Hart, 22 O.A.R. 449.) 
 
 A sheriff sued in the county court by an execution debtor 
 for $100 damages, the value of implements seized and sold 
 by the sheriff without any special direction from the execu- 
 tion creditor and elleged to be exempt, cannot obtain in that 
 court an interpleader order directing the trial of an issue
 
 POINTS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE 63 
 
 between the execution debtor and the execution creditor, to 
 settle whether the implements were exempt or not. The 
 sheriff acts at his own peril in granting or refusing the 
 exemption. (In re Gould v. Hope, 20 O.A.R. 347.) 
 
 In British Columbia the sheriff's costs of seizure and 
 possession money are payable by the execution debtor claim- 
 ing the exemption, which is a privilege arising only when 
 claimed. (Sehl and Humphreys, 1 B.C.R. Pt. 2, 257.) 
 
 A workman who demands the withdrawal from a 
 seizure of his necessary tools, cannot claim costs against the 
 execution creditor, because the bailiff making the seizure 
 cannot make the distinction between tools which the debtor 
 may claim as exempt and his other tools. (Cunningham v. 
 Guilbault, 6 Que. P.R. 75.) 
 
 When an execution debtor declares he has no goods and 
 the execution creditor does not contest this statement, the 
 execution debtor has an absolute right to a replevin by the 
 execution creditor; this replevin is equivalent to a pre- 
 emption against execution; the execution creditor must pay 
 the costs of the motion to protect it from the execution 
 debtor. (Henri v. Beaucage (1909), 10 Que. P.R. 409.) 
 
 A magistrate sitting as judge of the Small Debts Court 
 has no jurisdiction to decide the validity of a claim of 
 exemption, under the Homestead Act, of goods seized under 
 process of execution issued from that Court. (Auberg v. 
 Anderson; Stewart v. Anderson, 5 B.C.R. 622.) 
 
 23 Vic., c. 25, exempting certain articles from seizure, 
 does not bind the Crown. Semble, that the statute does not 
 apply where the debtor has absconded, leaving the goods 
 with his family. (Regina v. Davidson, 21 U.C.Q.B.R. 41.) 
 
 Where goods of the plaintiff were seized under execu- 
 tion, and she filed an opposition alleging that the notices of 
 sale and the advertisements of the seizure were irregular, 
 and that certain of the goods seized were exempt, the execu-
 
 64 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 tion debtors were granted an order declaring the opposition 
 maintained, and allowing them to proceed to sell the goods 
 seized other than those claimed as exempt, upon giving new 
 and regular notices of sale. (Jean v. De Marchi, 2 Que. 
 P.R. 442.) 
 
 The allegation that the effects seized are all relating to 
 and used by opposant in his profession, and as such are 
 exempt from seizure, is sufficient, and this opposition will 
 not be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious on a motion to 
 that effect. (Thompson v. Buchan, 8 Que. P.R. 246.)
 
 EXEMPTIONS ORDINANCE, ALBERTA AND- SASKATCHEWAN 65 
 
 ALBERTA AND SASKATCHEWAN 
 
 An Ordinance Exempting Certain Property From Seizure 
 and Sale Under Execution 
 
 The Lieutenant-Governor, by and with the advice and 
 consent of the Legislative Assembly of the Territories, 
 enacts as follows : 
 
 SHORT TITLE 
 
 1. This Ordinance may be cited as "The Exemptions 
 Ordinance," C.O., c. 27, s. 1. 
 
 EXEMPTIONS 
 
 2. The following real and personal property of an execu- 
 tion debtor and his family is hereby declared free from 
 seizure by virtue of all writs of execution, namely : 
 
 1. The necessary and ordinary clothing of himself and 
 his family ; 
 
 2. Furniture, household furnishings, dairy utensils, swine 
 and poultry to the extent of five hundred dollars ; 
 
 3. The necessary food for the family of the execution 
 debtor during six months which may include grain and 
 flour or vegetables and meat either prepared for use or on 
 foot; 
 
 4. Three oxen, horses or mules or any three of them, six 
 cows, six sheep, three pigs and fifty domestic fowls be- 
 sides the animals the execution debtor may have chosen to 
 keep for food purposes and food for the same for the 
 months of November, December, January, February, March 
 and April or for such of these months or portions thereof as 
 may follow the date of seizure, provided such seizure be 
 made between the first day of August and the thirtieth day 
 of April next ensuing;
 
 66 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION, 
 
 5. The harness necessary for three animals, one wagon or 
 two carts, one mower or cradle and scythe, one breaking 
 plough, one cross plough, one set of harrows, one horse 
 rake, one sewing machine, one reaper or binder, one set of 
 sleighs and one seed drill; 
 
 6. The books of a professional man; 
 
 7. The tools and necessary implements to the extent of 
 two hundred dollars used by the execution debtor in the 
 practice of his trade or profession; 
 
 8. Seed grain sufficient to seed all his land under cultiva- 
 tion not exceeding eighty acres, at the rate of two bushels 
 per acre, defendant to have choice of seed, and fourteen 
 bushels of potatoes; 
 
 9. The homestead, provided the same be not more than 
 one hundred and sixty acres ; in case it be more, the surplus 
 may be sold subject to any lien or encumbrance thereon; 
 
 10. The house and buildings occupied by the execution 
 debtor and also the lot or lots on which the same are situate 
 according to the registered plan of the same to the extent 
 of fifteen hundred dollars C.O., c. 27, s. 2. 
 
 GENERAL,. 
 
 3. The execution debtor shall be entitled to a choice from 
 the greater quantity of the same kind of articles which are 
 hereby exempted from seizure. C.O., c. 27, s. 3. 
 
 4. Nothing in this Ordinance shall exempt from seizure 
 any article except for the food, clothing and bedding of the 
 execution debtor and his family, the price of which forms 
 the subject matter of the judgment upon which the execu- 
 tion is issued. C.O., c. 27, s. 4. 
 
 5. In case of the death of the execution debtor, his pro- 
 perty exempt from seizure shall be exempt from seizure 
 under execution against his personal representative, if the 
 said property is in the use and enjoyment of the widow and
 
 HOMESTEAD ACT (R.S.B.C. 1911, C. 100) 67 
 
 children or widow or children of the deceased and is neces- 
 sary for the maintenance and support of the said widow and 
 children or any of them. C.O., c. 27, s. 5. 
 
 6. The provisions of section 2 hereof shall not apply to 
 any case where the debtor has absconded or is about to 
 abscond from the Territories leaving no wife or family 
 behind nor to an execution issued upon a judgment or order 
 for the payment of alimony. C.O., c. 27, s. 6; 1901, c. 16, 
 s. 1. 
 
 BRITISH COLUMBIA. 
 Homestead Act, 1911, R.S.B.C. 100. 
 
 2. In the construction of this Act 
 
 "Homestead" means and shall include the pieces or par- 
 cels of land, together with any erections or buildings there- 
 on, whether leasehold or freehold, or both leasehold and 
 freehold, with their rights, members and appurtenances, 
 which shall be duly registered as a homestead in manner 
 hereinafter mentioned, and any erection or building, on any 
 such homestead as aforesaid, whether or not the same be 
 affixed to the soil, shall be taken to be real estate and part 
 of such homestead ; 
 
 "Debtor" shall include the personal representative of the 
 debtor, if the debtor be dead, and shall also, in case of the 
 absence of the debtor, include any member of his household. 
 
 3. Nothing in this Act contained shall be construed as 
 exempting any real or personal property from sale for taxes 
 or from distress for rent. 
 
 17. The following personal property shall be exempt 
 from forced sale or sale by any process at law or in equity ; 
 that is to say, the goods and chattels of any debtor at the
 
 68 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 option of such debtor, or, if dead, of his personal represen- 
 tative, to the value of five hundred dollars: Provided that 
 nothing herein contained shall be construed to exempt any 
 goods or chattels from seizure in satisfaction of a debt con- 
 tracted for or in respect of such identical goods or chattels : 
 Provided further, that this section shall not be construed 
 so as to permit a trader to claim as an exemption any of the 
 goods and merchandise which form a part of the stock in 
 trade of his business. 
 
 18. It shall be the duty of every sheriff or other officer 
 seizing the personal property of any debtor under a writ of 
 fieri facias, or any process of execution, to allow the debtor 
 to select goods and chattels to the value of five hundred 
 dollars from the personal property so seized; and every 
 debtor whose personal property has been seized as afore- 
 said may, within two days after such seizure or notice there- 
 of, whichever shall be the longest time, select goods and 
 chattels to the value of five hundred dollars from the per- 
 sonal property so seized, and thereupon, if a list of the 
 selected articles shall not have been deliverd to the sheriff 
 or other officer by the debtor, the sheriff or other officer 
 shall make a written list thereof, a copy of which he shall 
 give to the debtor; and the sheriff or other officer shall 
 forthwith, if in his opinion the goods and chattels so selected 
 do not exceed in value the sum of five hundred dollars, 
 withdraw from possession of the same, and the same shall 
 be, and such sheriff or other officer shall certify in writing 
 thereof that they are, the goods and chattels exempt under 
 the last preceding section of this Act. 
 
 19. Should such sheriff or other officer be of the opinion 
 that the goods and chattels selected by such debtor exceed 
 in value the sum of five hundred dollars, he shall within one 
 day after the receipt or making of the list referred to in the 
 last preceding section, notify such debtor to that effect in
 
 HOMESTEAD ACT (R.S.B.C. 1911, C. 100) 69 
 
 writing, and shall (unless within one day more such sheriff 
 or other officer and such debtor agree upon the goods and 
 chattels to be exempt, not to exceed in value the sum of five 
 hundred dollars) without delay call upon a Justice of the 
 Peace resident in the locality, who shall at once name an 
 appraiser, whose duty it shall be to appraise, and who shall, 
 when sworn, without delay appraise the selected goods and 
 chattels in the presence of the debtor, or after one day's 
 notice to him, to be served either personally or tacked up 
 in some conspicuous place where the seized goods are 
 situate; and when a claim to exemption has been made, 
 and has been admitted or agreed upon as aforesaid, or when 
 the goods claimed have been selected and appraised under 
 or at the sum of five hundred dollars, such sheriff or other 
 officer shall withdraw from possession of the same, and the 
 same shall be, and such sheriff or other officer shall certify 
 in writing that they are, the goods and chattels exempt 
 under section 17 of this Act. R.S. 1897, c. 93, s. 19. 
 
 20. If the goods claimed by the debtor are appraised at 
 more than five hundred dollars, then the appraiser shall 
 ('the deMor still being allowed his option if he claims it) 
 appraise so much of the claimed goods as shall not exceed 
 five hundred dollars, and the goods so appraised at five 
 hundred dollars shall constitute and be certified as the 
 exempt goods. R.S. 1897, c. 93, s. 20. 
 
 21. If the goods claimed shall be appraised at a sum ex- 
 ceeding five hundred dollars, then the fees of the appraiser, 
 not 10 exceed five dollars, and his expenses of travel for tht 
 distance actually and necessarily travelled by him, not to 
 exceed fifty cents a mile one way, shall be levied out of the 
 exempted goods ; and if the goods shall be appraised at five 
 hundred dollars only, or at a sum less than five hundred, 
 then the sheriff or other officer shall pay the fees and mile-
 
 70 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 age of the appraiser as aforesaid, but in the latter case, 
 the sheriff or other officer may deduct the sum so paid the 
 appraiser from the proceed of execution (if any) against 
 goods not exempt. 
 
 22. Every appraiser under this Act shall, before acting 
 as such, take and subscribe the following oath before any 
 person duly authorized to administer an oath, or in the 
 absence of any such person, then before any sheriff or 
 sheriff's officer, who is hereby authorized to administer the 
 same: 
 
 I. A.B., having been appointed the appraiser of goods 
 and chattels seized under an execution (or as the case may 
 be), in the suit of 
 
 against (or as the case may 
 
 be), do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully 
 perform the duties of the said office without partiality, 
 fear, favor or affection, and that I will appraise the value of 
 the goods and chattels submitted to my appraisement, to the 
 best of my ability. So help me God. 
 A. B., 
 
 Appraiser under Homestead Act. 
 Sworn before me at 
 this day of 19 
 
 J.P. 
 (or as the case may be) 
 
 23. The debtor may appeal Irom the decision of the ap- 
 -praiser, or from any act of the sheriff or other officer, to 
 the nearest County Court Judge, upon giving such security 
 for the appeal as the County Court Judge may order, and 
 th-c appeal shall be decided summarily by the County Court 
 Judge without delay.
 
 REVISED STATUTES OF MANITOBA, 1913, C. 66 71 
 
 MANITOBA. 
 Revised Statutes of Manitoba, 1913, c. 66. 
 
 29. Except as otherwise by any Act provided, the follow- 
 ing personal and real estate are hereby declared free from 
 seizure by virtue of all writs of execution issued by any 
 Court in this Province, namely: 
 
 (a) The bed and bedding in the common use of the judg- 
 ment debtor and his family, and also his household furni- 
 ture and effects, not exceeding in valut the sum of five 
 hundred dollars. 
 
 (b) The necessary and ordinary clothing of the judg- 
 ment debtor and his family, and the necessary fuel for the 
 judgment debtor and his family for six months. 
 
 (c) Twelve volumes of books, the books of a professional 
 man, one axe, one saw, one gun, six traps. 
 
 (d) The necessary food for the judgment debtor and his 
 family during eleven months, but this exemption shall only 
 apply to such food and provisions as may be in his posses- 
 sion at the time of seizure. 
 
 (e) Three horses, mules or oxen, six cows, ten sheep, 
 ten pigs, fifty fowls, and food for the same during eleven 
 months. 
 
 Provided, that the word "horses" shall include colts and 
 fillies, the words "oxen" and "cows" shall include steers 
 and calves and heifers respectively; and 
 
 Provided also, that the exemption as to horses over the 
 age of four years shall apply only in case they are used by 
 the judgment debtor in earning his living. 
 
 (f) The tools, agricultural implements and necessaries 
 used by the judgment debtor in the practice of his trade, 
 profession or occupation to the value of $500.
 
 72 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION. 
 
 (g) The articles and furniture necessary to the perform- 
 ance of religious services. 
 
 (j) All the necessary seeds of various varieties or roots 
 for the proper seeding and cultivation of eighty acres. 
 
 (1) The chattel property of any municipality or school 
 district in this Province, where the writ of execution issued 
 after the 1st of January, 1911. 
 
 30. Any moneys that may become payable by reason of 
 loss by fire under any policy of fire insurance in respect of 
 any property that is at the time of such loss exempt under 
 this Act from seizure, shall be exempt from seizure under 
 execution or attachment or any other legal process. 
 
 31. The property and interest of an annuitant or of any 
 person interested or entitled in or to any contract for an 
 annuity, or any annuity itself, under the Act of the Parlia- 
 ment of Canada known as "The Government Annuities 
 Act, 1908," and under any Act or Acts amending the same, 
 or that may be substituted therefor, or in or to any moneys 
 payable or paid under or by reason of any such contract or 
 annuity, shall be exempt from seizure, levy or attachment 
 by or under the process of any court, and shall not be 
 affected by any trust, charge or lien: Provided, however, 
 that nothing in this Act contained is intended to conflict or 
 be inconsistent with any enactment or provision of the said 
 "The Government Annuities Act, 1908," or the amendment 
 made thereto in 1909. 10 Ed. 7, s. 24, s. I. 
 
 32. A partnership firm cannot claim several exemptions 
 for each partner, but only one exemption for the firm out of 
 the partnership property. 
 
 33. The exemptions in this Act mentioned cannot be 
 claimed by or on behalf of a debtor who is in the act of 
 removing with his family from the Province, or is about to 
 do so, or who has absconded, taking his family with him.
 
 REVISED STATUTES OF MANITOBA, 1913, C. 66 73 
 
 34. The judgment debtor shall be entitled to a choice 
 from the greater quantity of the same kind of property or 
 articles which are hereby exempted from seizure. 
 
 35. It is hereby declared that, with the exception of the 
 land, to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres, upon 
 which the defendant or his family actually resides, or which 
 he cultivates either wholly or in part, or which he actually 
 uses for grazing or other purposes, none of the above men- 
 tioned exemptions of property or articles from seizure or 
 sale under executions affected, applied to, affect or apply to 
 executions issued to enforce judgments recovered upon 
 debts due or accruing due under or by virtue of any act, 
 contract or obligations done, entered into or undertaken 
 before the second day of May, in the year 1885, or to 
 enforce judgments recovered before said last mentioned 
 date, save only in so far as any of the same may have been 
 exempt under any law in force in this Province previous to 
 the said last mentioned date. R.S.M., c. 54, s. 47. 
 
 36. When the execution is issued upon a judgment, re- 
 covered wholly or partly for a debt, obligation or liability 
 due or accruing due before the second day of March, in 
 the year 1894, only such property shall be exempt from 
 seizure thereunder for the amount recovered in respect of 
 such debt, obligation or liability, and the interest thereon 
 recovered or leviable as was exempt from seizure under 
 execution immediately before said last above mentioned 
 date. 3-4 Ed. 7, c. 15, s. 1. 
 
 37. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to 
 exempt from seizure any real or personal estate mentioned 
 in paragraphs (a), (c), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j) and 
 (k) of Section 29 of this Act, the purchase price of which 
 is the subject of the judgment proceeded upon either by 
 way of execution or certificate of judgment or attachment,
 
 74 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS IN WESTERN CANADA. 
 
 38. No sale of any farm or garden crops, whether grain 
 or roots, shall take place until after the same have been 
 harvested or taken or removed from the ground. 
 
 40. No sheriff, sheriff's bailiff, County Court bailiff, or 
 other officer, charged with the execution of any writ of 
 execution issued out of any court in Manitoba shall seize or 
 take in execution any goods, chattels or effects declared by 
 this Act to be free from seizure under writs of execution. 
 R.S.M., c. 58, s. 39. 
 
 41. Every agreement to waive or abandon an exemption 
 from seizure or a benefit right or privilege or exemption 
 from seizure under this Act and every arrangement, con- 
 tract or bargain, verbal or written, under seal or otherwise, 
 made or entered into with or without valuable considera- 
 tion, whereby an attempt is made to prevent any person 
 from claiming the benefit, right or privelege of exemption 
 under this Act, shall be absolutely null and void : Provided, 
 however, that this section shall not give rise to any infer- 
 ence or implication that such agreement, arrangement, con- 
 tract or bargain was not heretofore void. 
 
 NEW BRUNSWICK. 
 
 The Memorial and Execution Act (Consolidated Stats. 
 N.B. 1903, c. 128.) 
 
 34. The wearing apparel, bedding, kitchen utensils, and 
 tools of his trade or calling to the value of $100.00 of any 
 debtor shall be exempt from levy or sale under execution.
 
 ONTARIO EXECUTION ACT 75 
 
 ONTARIO. 
 The Execution Act. 
 
 1. This Act may be cited as "The Execution Act." 
 
 2. In this Act 
 
 (a) "Execution" shall include a writ of fieri facias and 
 every subsequent writ for giving effect thereto. 
 
 (b) "Sheriff" shall include any officer to whom an execu- 
 tion is directed. 
 
 3. The following chattels shall be exempt from seizure 
 under any writ issued out of any court, namely : 
 
 (a) The bed, bedding and bedsteads, including cradles 
 in ordinary use by the debtor and his family. 
 
 (b) The necessary and ordinary wearing apparel of the 
 debtor and his family. 
 
 (c) One cooking stove with pipes and furnishings, one 
 other heating stove with pipes, one crane and its append- 
 ages, one pair of handirons, one set of cooking utensils, one 
 pair of tongs and a shovel, one coal scuttle, one lamp, one 
 table, six chairs, one washstand with furnishing, six towels, 
 one looking-glass, one hair brush, one comb, one bureau, one 
 clothes press, one clock, one carpet, one cupboard, one 
 broom, twelve knives, twelve forks, twelve plates, twelve 
 teacups, twelve saucers, one sugar basin, one milk jug, one 
 teapot, twelve spoons, two pails, one washtub, one scrub- 
 bing brush, one blacking brush, one washboard, three 
 smoothing irons, all spinning wheels, one weaving loom in 
 domestic use, one sewing machine in domestic use and at- 
 tachments, thirty volumes of books, one axe, one saw, one 
 gun. six traps, and such fishing nets and seines as are in 
 common use, the articles in this subdivision not exceeding 
 in value $150. 
 
 (d) All necessary fuel, meat, fish, flour and vegetables 
 actually provided for family use, not more than sufficient
 
 76 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION 
 
 for the ordinary consumption of the debtor and his family 
 for thirty days and not exceeding in value $40. 
 
 (e) One cow, six sheep, four hogs and twelve hens, in 
 all not exceeding the value of $100, and food therefor for 
 thirty days, and one dog. 
 
 (f) Tools and implements of, or chattels ordinarily used 
 in the debtor's occupation to the value of $100, but if a 
 specific article claimed as exempt be of a value greater than 
 $100 and there are not other goods sufficient to satisfy the 
 writ, such article may be sold by the sheriff, who shall pay 
 $100 to the debtor out of the net proceeds, but no saJe of 
 such article shall take place unless the amount bid therefor 
 shall exceed $100 and the cost of sale in addition thereto. 
 
 (g) Fifteen hives of bees. 
 
 4. The debtor may, in- lieu of tools and implements of or 
 chattels ordinarily used in his occupation referred to in 
 clause (f ) of Section 3, elect to receive the proceeds of the 
 sale thereof up to $100, in which case the officer executing 
 the writ shall pay the net proceeds of the sale, if the same 
 do not exceed $100, or, if the same exceed $100 shall pay 
 that sum to the debtor in satisfaction of the debtor's right 
 to exemption under clause (f). 
 
 5. The sum to which a debtor is entitled under clause (f ) 
 of Section 3 or under Section 4 shall be exempt from at- 
 tachment or seizure at the instance of a creditor. 
 
 6. Chattels exempt from seizure shall, after the death of 
 the debtor, be exempt from the claim of his creditors, and 
 his widow shall be entitled to retain them for the benefit of 
 herself and his family, or, if there is no widow, the family 
 of the debtor shall be entitled to them. 
 
 7. The debtor, his widow or family, or in the case of in- 
 fants, their guardian, may select out of any larger number 
 the chattels exempt from seizure.
 
 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, QUEBEC 77 
 
 8. Nothing herein shall exempt any article enumerated 
 in clauses (e) to (g) of Section 3 from seizure to satisfy a 
 debt contracted for such article 
 
 QUEBEC. 
 The Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
 598. The debtor may select and withdraw from 
 seizure ; 
 
 1. The bed, bedding and bedsteads in use by him and 
 his family; 
 
 2. The ordinary and necessary wearing apparel of 
 himself and his family ; 
 
 3. Two stoves and their pipes, one pot-hook and its 
 accessories, one pair of andirons, one pair of tongs and one 
 shovel ; 
 
 4. All the cooking utensils, knives, forks, spoons and 
 crockery in use by the family, two tables, two cupboards or 
 dressers, one lamp, one mirror, one washing-stand with its 
 toilet accessories, two trunks or valises, the carpels or mat- 
 ting covering the floors, one clock, one sofa and twelve 
 chairs, provided that the total value of such effects does not 
 exceed the sum of fifty dollars; 
 
 .5. All spinning wheels and weaving looms intended 
 for domestic use, one axe, one saw, one gun, six traps, such 
 fishing nets, lines and seines as are in common use, one tub, 
 one washing-machine, one wringer, one sewing machine, 
 two pails, three flat-irons, one blacking brush, one scrub- 
 bing brush, one broom; 
 
 6. Fifty volumes of books, and all drawing and paint- 
 ing executed by the debtor or the members of his family, 
 for their use ;
 
 78 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION 
 
 7. Fuel and food sufficient for the debtor and his 
 family for three months ; 
 
 8. One span of plough-horses or a yoke of oxen, one 
 horse, one summer vehicle and one winter vehicle, and the 
 harness used by a carter or driver for earning his livelihood, 
 one cow, two pigs, four sheep, the wool from such sheep, 
 the cloth manufactured from such wool, and the hay and 
 other fodder intended for feeding the said animals; and. 
 moreover, the following agricultural tools and implements; 
 one plough, one harrow, one working sleigh, one timbril, 
 one hay-cart with its wheels, and all harness necessary and 
 intended for farming purposes; 
 
 9. Books relating to the profession, art or trade of the 
 debtor, to the value of two hundred dollars; 
 
 10. Tools and implements or other chattels ordinarily 
 used in his profession, art or trade to the value of two 
 hundred dollars; 
 
 11. Bees to the extent of fifteen hives; 
 
 12. The things mentioned in Articles 1743 to 1748 of 
 the Revised Statutes and their amendments. 
 
 Nevertheless, the things and effects mentioned in Para- 
 graphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are not exempt from seizure 
 and sale when the suit is to recover the price of their pur- 
 hase, or when they have been given in pawn. C. C. P. 556, 
 amended; R. S. 5917; 52 Vic. c. 50, s. 3; 53 Vic., c. 58, c. 1. 
 (C. P. 645, 861, 870 C. C. 1980.) 
 
 599. (As amended by 62 V. c. 53, s. 1.) The follow- 
 ing are exempt from seizure: 
 
 1. Consecrated vessels and things used for religious 
 worship ; 
 
 2. Family portraits; 
 
 3. Immovables declared by a donor or testator, or by
 
 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, QUEBEC 79 
 
 law, to be exempt from seizure ; and sums of money or 
 objects given or bequeathed upon the condition of their 
 being exempt from seizure; 
 
 4. Alimentary allowances granted by a court, and 
 sums of money or pensions given as alimony, even though 
 the donor or testator has not expressly declared them to be 
 exempt from seizure. They may, however, be seized for 
 alimentary debts; 
 
 5. All vessels, boats and other fishing craft, tackle, 
 nets, seines, lines, or other fishing apparatus, and provisions 
 belonging to any fisherman, and necessary for his subsist- 
 ence and that of his family or for his fishing operations. 
 Such effects may, however, be seized and sold for their 
 purchase price, but not between the first day of May and 
 the first day of November; 
 
 6. Pay and pensions of persons belonging to the Army 
 or to the Navy; 
 
 7. Contingent emoluments and fees due of ecclesiasti- 
 cal and ministers of worship by reason of their current 
 services and the income of their clerical endowment; 
 
 8. The salary of professors, tutors and school 
 teachers ; 
 
 9. Salaries of public officers; with the exception of 
 public officers and employees of the Province, whether 
 permanent or not, which are seizable for; 
 
 (a) One-fifth of every monthly salary not exceeding 
 one thousand dollars per annum; 
 
 10. Salaries of city or town clerks in incorporated 
 cities or towns, except as to the proportions mentioned in 
 Paragraph 9; 
 
 11. All other salaries and wages, at whatever time and 
 in whatever time and in whatever manner payable, for,
 
 80 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION 
 
 (a) Four-fifths, when they do not exceed three dollars 
 per day; and, 
 
 (b) Three-quarters, when they exceed three dollars 
 but do not exceed six dollars per day ; and, 
 
 (c) Two-thirds, when they exceed six dollars per day. 
 
 12. Books of account, titles of debt and other papers 
 in the possession of the debtor, except as mentioned in 
 Article 641. 
 
 641. Debentures, promissory notes, whether nego- 
 tiable or not, shares in corporations and other instruments 
 payable to order or to bearer, bank notes included, may be 
 seized like all other moveable effects belonging to the 
 debtor. C. C. P. 565, in part amended. (C. P. 599, 912, 
 666, 677, 595 C. C. 1573.) 
 
 13. All pensions given by institutions, financial or 
 other, to their employes as retiring allowances, or pension 
 funds established among the employes and the contribu- 
 tions paid or to be paid to form such funds and to give a 
 right to the advantages flowing from them. (New, in part, 
 C. C. P. 558, amended; 556 ex. 5 part. R. S. 5918, 52 V. C. 
 50 s. 4; 54 V. C. 12, s. 2, C. P. C., 628, first amended R. S. 
 593.) 54 V. C. 12, s. 3; C. C. P. 632 part; 557 (C. P. 645, 
 697, 722, 861, 870 C. C. 1190, s. 3, 1911, 1980.) 
 
 (See also R. S. 3611 and 3705.) 
 
 (It is thought best to retain here the statutory provisions 
 as to attachment of salaries, etc., though not within the 
 scope of this book.)
 
 NOVA SCOTIA (REV. STAT. 1900, c. 155, 340) 81 
 
 NOVA SCOTIA 
 
 (Rev. St. 1900, c. 155, 340) 
 
 40. The following goods and chattels shall be exempt 
 from seizure under any writ of execution, namely: 
 
 (a) The necessary wearing apparel, beds, bedding * 
 and bedsteads of the debtor and his family. 
 
 (b) One stove and pipes therefor, one crane and its 
 appendages, one pair of andirons, one set of cooking uten- 
 sils, one pair of tongs, six knives, six forks, six plates, six 
 teacups, six saucers, one shovel, one table, six chairs, one 
 milk jug, one teapot, six spoons, one spinning wheel, one 
 weaving loom, one sewing machine, if in ordinary domestic 
 use, ten volumes of religious books, one water bucket, one 
 axe, one saw, and such fishing nets as are in common use, 
 the value of such nets not to exceed twenty dollars ; 
 
 (c) All necessary fuel, meat, fish, flour and vegetables 
 actually provided for family use, not more than sufficient 
 for the ordinary consumption of the debtor and his family 
 for thirty days, and not exceeding in value the sum of forty 
 dollars; 
 
 (d) One cow, two sheep and one hog, and food there- 
 for for thirty days; 
 
 (e) Tools and implements of, or chattels ordinarily 
 used in the debtor's occupation to the value of thirty 
 dollars ; 
 
 But nothing in this rule contained shall exempt any 
 article enumerated in (b), (c), (d) and (e) from seizure in 
 satisfaction of a debt contracted for such identical article.
 
 82 CHATTEL EXEMPTIONS FROM EXECUTION 
 
 NEWFOUNDLAND 
 
 By statute the following property of an execution debtor 
 is free from seizure: The working tools and implements of 
 trade of any person, his fishing skiff or punt, the necessary 
 cooking apparatus, bedding and wearing apparel of himself 
 and his family. The share or wages of a sealer are not 
 liable to attachment under mesne or final process except 
 for supplies advanced to him to be paid for out of his share 
 of the proceeds of the voyage. 
 
 (This resume is taken from that prepared by John 
 Fenelon St. John's of the Middle Temple and Newfoundland 
 Bar for "The Canada Legal Directory.") 
 
 PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 
 
 Under execution from the Supreme Court: 
 
 "All necessary wearing apparel and bedding of the 
 debtor and his family and the tools and implements of his 
 trade or occupation to the value of $50, sixteen dollars in 
 money and one cow" {14 v., c. 2, s. 15). 
 
 Under execution from the County Court : 
 
 "Wearing apparel and bedding of the debtor and his 
 family. Tools and implements of his trade, 1 cow and 1 
 cooking stove, in all amounting to the value of $50" (14 v., 
 c. 12, s. 67). 
 
 This information was kindly supplied by W. A. V. 
 Morson, Esq., Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Prince 
 Edward Island.
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED 
 
 Abell Co., John, v. Hornby, 15 Man. L.R 53 
 
 Alexander Milling Co. v. Cloutier, 38 Que. S.C. 196 59 
 
 Alsup v. Jordan, 5 Am. St. Rep. 53 36 
 
 Amend v. Murphy, 69 111. 337 . . . : 27 
 
 Angell v. Johnson, 33 Am. Rep. 152 55 
 
 Ashcroft v. Hopkins, 2 Alta. L.R. 253 16,19,48 
 
 Auberg v. Anderson, 5 B.C.R. 622 64 
 
 Baker v. Gillum, 9 W.L.R. 436 16,17 
 
 Baldwin, re, 71 Cal. 78 28 
 
 Bates v. Cannon, 18 Man. L.R. 7 16, 46, 47 
 
 Blackburne's Appeal, 39 Penn. St. 160 49 
 
 Blanchette v. Levesque, Que. Rep. 41 S.C. 447 28 
 
 Bliss v. Vedder, 55 Am. St. Rep. 237 27 
 
 Blount v. Medbury, 94 N.W. 428 54 
 
 Bink Kee v. Yick Chong, 10 W.L.R. 110 24 
 
 Biron v. Biron, 16 Revue Legale 386, 16 R. de J. 418 60 
 
 Boily v. Guillot, 9 Que. P.R. 336 29 
 
 Brown v. Edmonds, 50 Am. St. Rep. 762 42 
 
 Butler v. Prevost, 7 Que. P.R. 465 38 
 
 Canada Law Book Co. v. A.B., 7 W.L.R. 363, 17 Man. L.R. 345 20 
 
 Canada Law Book Co. v. Fieldhouse, 12 W.L.R. 396 20 
 
 Caswell v. Keith, 12 Gray 351 .._ 34 
 
 Carr v. London and North Western Ry., 44 L.J.C.P. 109 54 
 
 Carriere v. Leroux, 19 Que. K.B. 249, 11 Que. P.R. 158 60 
 
 Carty v. Drew, 46 Vt. 346 62 
 
 Churchward v. Johnson, 54 J.P. 326 25 
 
 Cloutier v. Georgeson, 13 Man. L.R. 1 6,13 
 
 Citizens Nat. Bank v. Green, 78 U.C. 247 45 
 
 Cobb v. Coleman, 14 Tex. 599 38 
 
 Cole v. Breen, 21 111. 104 13 
 
 Commissioners of Taxation v. Kirk (1900), A.C. 508 28 
 
 Conlin Estate, re, 7 W.W.R. 187 51 
 
 Cook v. Scott, 6 111. 333 14 
 
 Cox v. Schack, 14 Man. L.R. 174 17 
 
 Cremorne v. Antrobus, 5 Russ. 312 35 
 
 . Crichton v. Symes, 3 Atk. 61 40,41 
 
 Cullen v. Harris, 66 Am. St. Rep. 380 45 
 
 Cunningham v. Guilbault, 6 Que. P.R. 75 63 
 
 Davidson v. Hannon, 52 Am. St. Rep 31 
 
 Davidson v. Reynolds, 16 U.C.C.P. 140 26, 28, 29, 37 
 
 Davis v. Harris (1900), 1 Q.B. 729 36 
 
 Demaurez, re, 5 Terr. L.R. 84 6, 12, 32 
 
 Dennis v. Cass, 48 Am. St. Rep. 880 16 
 
 Desormeau v. Legault et al.ll Que. P.R. 328 61 
 
 Dickenson v. Robertson, frtB.C.R. 155 6, 9 
 
 Doe v. Keeling, 1 M. & S. 95 31
 
 84 TABLE OF CASES CITED 
 
 Drainville v. Savoie & Rouleau, 16 Revue Legale N.S. 505 60 
 
 Earl v. Camp, 16 Wend. 562 17 
 
 Fenton v. Logan, 2 L.J.C.P. 102 27,30 
 
 Field v. Hart, 22 O.A.R. 449 6, 16, 46, 47, 63 
 
 Field v. Peckett, 30 L.J. Ch. 813 '. . 35 
 
 Filion v. Chabot, 9 Que. (S.C.) 327 6, 12 
 
 Filschie v. Hogg, 35 U.C.Q.B. 94 25 
 
 Finney v. Grice, 48 L.J. Ch. 247, 10 C.D. 13 35 
 
 Ford v. Johnson, 34 Barb. (N.Y.) 364 27 
 
 Galway v. Barder, 1899, 1 I.R. 514 31 
 
 Garside v. Coleby, 72 N.H. 544 22 
 
 Gilleland v. Rhoades, 34 Pa. St. 187 54 
 
 Gold v. Hope, 20 O.A.R. 347 63 
 
 Goldie v. Taylor, 2 Terr. L.R. 298 36 
 
 Granger v. Gough (1896), A.C. 325 28 
 
 Hamilton v. Chisholm, 2 Sask. L.R. 227 24 
 
 Harrell v. Harrell, 77 Ga. 130 45 
 
 Harrington v. Smith, 20 Am. St. Rep. 272 14, 56 
 
 Harris v. Amery, 35 L.J.C.P. 92, L.R. 1 C.P. 148 28 
 
 Harris v. Rankin, 4 Man. L.R. 135 61 
 
 Henri v. Beaucage, 10 Que. P.R. 409 63 
 
 Hetherington, re, 14 W.L.R. 529 61 
 
 Heckman v, Mesinger, 49 Penn. St. 465 _ 49 
 
 Hickox v. Fay, 36 Barb. N.Y. 9 23 
 
 Holden, re, 5 O.L.R. 156 35 
 
 Houlehan v. Rassler, 73 Wis. 557 22 
 
 Howard v. Williams, 2 Pick. 83 30 
 
 Hudson Bay Co. v. Hazlitt, 4 B.C.R. 450 6, 23 
 
 James v. Leroux, 11 Que. P.R. 13 60 
 
 Jean v. De Marchi, 2 Que. P.R. 442 64 
 
 Jenkins v. McNall, 41 Am. St. Rep. 422 32 
 
 Jesson v. Essington, Pre. Ch. 207 35 
 
 Johnson v. Babcock, 8 Allen 353 ' 39 
 
 Johnson v. Harris, 1 B.C.R. Pt. 1, 93 6, 10 
 
 Jones v. Jesse, 10 W.L.R. 627 20, 45 
 
 Kehl v. Dunn, 47 Am. St. Rep. 561 36 
 
 Kempt v. Sober, 1 Sim. N.S. 517 31 
 
 Keybers v. McComber, 67 Cal. 395 13 
 
 Klimp, re, 63 Am. St. Rep. 69, 39 L.R.A. 340 27 
 
 Kneettle v. Necomb, 22 N.Y. 249 58 
 
 Kraemer v. Gless, 10 U.C.C.P. 475 61 
 
 Latour v. Latour, 38 Que. S.C. 193 59 
 
 Lavell v. Ritching, 75 L.J.K.B. 287, L.R. (1906) 1 K.B. 480. . .25, 26, 27, 43 
 
 Law Reporting Council, re, 58 L.J.Q.B. 95 28 
 
 Leavitt v. Metcalf , 2 Vt. 342, 19 Am. Dec. 718 45 
 
 Lecavalier v. Brunelle, 33 Que. S.C. 145, 9 Que. P.R. 209 29,37 
 
 Leganiere v. Desjardins, 37 Que. S.C. 513 63 
 
 Lemont v. Wooton, 59 N.W. 456 13 
 
 Leroux v. James dit Carriere, 11 Que. P.R. 13 _ 60 
 
 Ley, re, 7 B.C.R. 94 6, 55 
 
 Local Offices of the High Court, re, 12 O.L.R. 16 36 
 
 Lockwood v. Younglove, 27 Barb. N.Y. 505 32
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED 85 
 
 Londesborough, re, 50 L.J. Ch. 9 35 
 
 London & Can. Loan Agency Co. v. Connell, 11 Man. L.R. 115. .51, 52, 61, 62 
 
 Massey Harris v. Schram, 5 Terr, L.R. 338 44 
 
 Mickes v. Towsley, 1 Cow. 114 17 
 
 Miller v. McCarty, 28 Am. St. Rep. 375 and 50 N.W. 235 19 
 
 Mitchell v. Joyce, 69 Iowa 122 39 
 
 Montague v. Richardson, 63 Am. Dec. 173 41 
 
 Mulford v. Shirk, 26 Penn. St. 473 49 
 
 McBride v. Brooks, 16 W.L.R. 271 21 
 
 McCracken and Township of Sherborne, re, 23 O.L.R. 91 31 
 
 McKinnon v. Beals (1917), 1 W.W.R. 1328 15 
 
 McManamy v. Pelletier, 24 Que. S.C. 127 31, 38 
 
 McMartin v. Hurlburt, 2 O.A.R. 146 38 
 
 McPherson v. Drummond, 43 Sc. L. R. 102 30 
 
 McRae v. Frooks, 17 W.L.R. 287 29 
 
 Newsome v. County of Oxford, 28 O.R. 442 35 
 
 Nichols v. Osborne, 2 P. Wms. 419 35 
 
 Norris v. Staps, Hob. 211 28 
 
 Osier v. Muter, 19 O.A.R. 94 45, 46 
 
 Paisley v. Nelmes, 9 C.C.C. 413 31 
 
 Patenaude v. Boissoneault, 10 Que. P.R. 258 60 
 
 Paton v. Sheppard, 10 Sim. 186 35 
 
 Peto v. Grissell, 5 L.J. Ch. 286 35 
 
 Peverley v. Sayles, 10 N.H. 356 42 
 
 Pilling v. Stewart, 4 B.C.R. 94 7, 8, 11, 15, 44 
 
 Pinkerton v. Ross, 33 U.C.Q.B. 508 28 
 
 Quigley v. Gorham, 63 Am. Dec. 139 39 
 
 Rasure v. Hart, 18 Kan. 344 36 
 
 Recht v. Kelly, 20 Am. Rep. 301 _ 58 
 
 Regina v. Davidson, 21 U.C.Q.B. 41 64 
 
 Rex. v. Anderson, 10 C.C.C. 144 31 
 
 Rex v. Angelo, 5 W.W.R. 1303 60 
 
 Rex v. Judge of North Allerton County Court (1898), 2 Q.B. 680, 
 
 68 L.J.Q.B. 24 50 
 
 Rex v. Pearson, 1 C.C.C. 337 28 
 
 Richards v. Haines, 30 Iowa 574 54 
 
 Roberts v. Bergevin, 16 Que. K.B. 104 59 
 
 Roberts v. McGur, 82 Mich. 221 22 
 
 Robertson v. Honan, 24 Que. S.C. 510 41 
 
 Robin Hood v. Maple Leaf, 9 W.W.R. 1453 6, 14, 16 
 
 Robinson v. Graham, 16 Man. L.R. 69, 3 W.L.R. 135 31 
 
 Robinson v. Huston, 4 Man. L.R. 71 47, 48, 49 
 
 Rogers v. Brackett, 34 Minn. 279 22 
 
 Ross v. Hannah, 18 Ala. 125 13 
 
 Rosseau v. Nadeau, 10 Que. P.R. 351 38 
 
 Roy v. Fortin, 9 W.W.R. 407 5, 7, 14, 53 
 
 Sanders v. Phillips, 62 Vt. 331 18 
 
 San Paulo Ry. v. Carter (1896) A.C. 38 28 
 
 Scheurman v. Scheurman, 10 W.W.R. 379 47 
 
 Sehl v. Humphreys, 1 B.C.R. Pt. 2, 257. 6, 62, 63 
 
 Seminary, etc., v. Cabana, 11 Que. P.R. 315 39 
 
 Seton-Smith, re, 71 L.J. Ch. 386 35
 
 86 TABLE OP CASES CITED 
 
 Shadewald v. Phillips, 72 Minn, 520 39 
 
 Sharp, re, 5 B.C.R. 117 19 
 
 Shenkman v. Steinbok, 6 W.W.R. 1051 20, 21 
 
 Sherrible v. Sheffee, 33 Am. St. Rep. 63 18 
 
 Slater v. Rodgers, 2 Terr. L.R. 210 44 
 
 Slaughter v. De Tiney, 10 Ind. 103 13 
 
 Smith v. Hill, 22 Barb. 656 17 
 
 Smith v. Slade, 57 Barb. N.Y. 637 22 
 
 Spikes v. Burgess, 65 Wis. 428 39 
 
 State v. Orahood, 27 Mo. App. 396 22 
 
 St. Lambert Lumber Co. v. Lambert, 10 Que. P.R. 259 38 
 
 Stanning v. Style, 3 P. Wms. 336 35 
 
 Stephens v. Toback, 26 Que. S.C. 41 34 
 
 Stewart v. Anderson, 5 B.C.R. 622 64 
 
 Thompson v. Buchan, 8 Que. P.R. 246 64 
 
 Tatham, re, 2 O.L.R. 343 51 
 
 Temperance Insurance Co. v. Coombe, 28 C.L.J. 88 16, 46, 47 
 
 Terry v. Wilson, 63 Mo. 562 18 
 
 Towns v. Pratt, 66 Am. Dec. 726 36, 41 
 
 Van Buren v. Loper, 29 Barb. N.Y. 388 30 
 
 Vermette v. Vermette, Que. Rep. 30 S.C. 533 31 
 
 Vezina v. Brosseau, Que. Rep. 30 S.C. 493 30 
 
 Vye v. McNeill, 3 B.C.R. 24 _ 21, 26, 37, 44 
 
 Waldo v. Gray, 12 111. 184 44 
 
 Ward v. Gibbs, 30 S.W. 1125 40 
 
 Wensky v. Canadian Development Co., 8 B.C.R. 190, 21 C.L.T. 601 . . 41 
 
 White v. Capron, 52 Vt. 634 .'. 40 
 
 White v. Jemeny, 27 Am. St. Rep. 320 30 
 
 Willis v. Courtois, 1 Beav. 195 35 
 
 Worman v. Giddey, 30 Mich 151 15 
 
 Wright v. Hollingshead, 23 O.A.R. 1 33 
 
 Yorkshire Guarantee & Securities Corporation v. Cooper, 10 
 
 B.C.R. 65 6, 8, 9, 11 
 
 Young v. Short, 3 Man. L.R. 302 16,17
 
 INDEX 
 
 Abandonment of trade, occupation, etc 32 
 
 Absconding debtor, loss of exemption by 49 
 
 Alimentary allowances 58 
 
 Alimentary debts 58 
 
 Assignee for creditors, choice of exemptions by 12 
 
 Baker, not a trader 31 
 
 Barber's chair, exemption of 30 
 
 Bicycle not a wagon 39 
 
 Boarding-house effects, exemption of 29 
 
 Boiler and wood, exemption of 28 
 
 Book debts, exemption of 23 
 
 Books, exemption of 30 
 
 Books, judgment for price of 20 
 
 Books, not furniture 35 
 
 Buggy as a wagon _ 39 
 
 Buildings, exemption of 23 
 
 Bus of hotelkeeper, exemption of 30 
 
 Cab, exemption of 25 
 
 Calling, meaning of 25 
 
 Carter, horse of, exemption 38 
 
 Chattels, exemption of 23 
 
 Cheque for price, action on 21 
 
 Choice, duty of sheriff to notify debtor of his right to a 14 
 
 Choice of articles exempt _ 6 
 
 Choses-in-action, whether personal property 23 
 
 Claim of exemption, whether necessary 5 
 
 Concealment of chattels, as a choice 13 
 
 Cloth in hands of tailor, as exemption 41 
 
 Clothing, exemption of _ 40 
 
 Construction of exempting statutes 61 
 
 Cows, exemption of . . . ; 37 
 
 Damages for conversion of exempt property 45 
 
 Death of judgment debtor, rights upon 50 
 
 Deposit in bank, exemption of 24 
 
 Estoppel, as to exemptions 52 
 
 Estoppel, principles of 53 
 
 Executor not a trader 31 
 
 Fees, exemption of 24 
 
 Fixtures, tenants, not household furniture 35 
 
 Fraudulent Conveyances 46 
 
 Fur coat, exemption of 41 
 
 Furniture, exemption of 35 
 
 Gifts on condition of exemption 58 
 
 Goods and chattels, exemption of 
 
 Hackney coach as a wagon ,. 39 
 
 Hearse as a wagon 39
 
 00 INDEX 
 
 Heifer, exemption of 39 
 
 Horse as a tool 29 
 
 Horse of contractor, exemption _ 33 
 
 Horse, of greater value than limit 44 
 
 Horses, exemption of 37 
 
 Household furniture, exemption of 35 
 
 Immovables declared exempt 54 
 
 Implements, exemption of : 25 
 
 Insurance money, exemption of 45 
 
 Intermixed goods, exemption in case of 22 
 
 Jackass as horse 39 
 
 Judgment for price, action on 21 
 
 Judgment for price, execution under 19 
 
 Library of lawyer, exemption of 30 
 
 Lien note, whether exempt 20 
 
 Machinery, exemption of 26 
 
 Metier, meaning of 29 
 
 Merger of simple contract debt 20 
 
 Mortgage of exempt and non-exempt property 18 
 
 Mortgagee, right of, to claim exemption 16 
 
 Mule as horse 39 
 
 Natural increase of exempt animals 45 
 
 Necessaries, exemption of 25 
 
 Necessary clothing, exemption of 40 
 
 Necessary provisions, meaning of 40 
 
 Newsdealer, a tradesman 31 
 
 Note, acceptance of, by vendor, effect 21 
 
 Occupation, meaning of _ 25 
 
 Onus of showing exemption 19, 62 
 
 Ornaments, as furniture 36 
 
 Partner, claim of exemption by 11 
 
 Partner, right of individual, to exemption 15 
 
 Partnership, exemptions of 15 
 
 Pedlar of fruits not a trader 30 
 
 Personal property, exemption of 23 
 
 Photographer a trade 31 
 
 Piano as furniture i, 36 
 
 Piano, exemption of / 27 
 
 Pictures, as furniture 36 
 
 Pleading, points of 62 
 
 Pledgee, right of, to claim exemption 16 
 
 Price, execution under judgment for 19 
 
 Printing press, exemption of _ 27, 29 
 
 Privilege, exemption a personal 5 
 
 Proceeds of exempt property 44 
 
 Produce of exempt animals 45 
 
 Profession, meaning of 25 
 
 Saddle and bridle, exemption of 37 
 
 School keeping, a calling 31 
 
 Sewing machine, exemption of 25 
 
 Sheriff, choice of exemptions by 12 
 
 Sheriff, duty of, to notify debtor of his rights 14
 
 INDEX 89 
 
 Sleigh and horses, exemption of 29 
 
 Tableware for boarders, as furniture 36 
 
 Tavernkeeping, a calling 31 
 
 Threshing machine, exemption of 26, 30 
 
 Time for choice of exempt articles 6 
 
 Tools, exemption of 25 
 
 Trade, exemption, where debtor has more than one 31 
 
 Trade, meaning of 25 
 
 Transferee, right of, to claim exemption 16 
 
 Value of one article exceeding statutory limit 42 
 
 Vendor, right of assignee of, to sue for price of exempt articles ... 22 
 
 Wagon, exemption of 37 
 
 Waiver of exemption 55 
 
 Waiver of right to select 13 
 
 Watch as wearing apparel 42 
 
 Watch, exemption of 30 
 
 Wearing apparel, exemption of 40 
 
 Widow, rights of 50
 
 90 LEGAL CARDS 
 
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 LEGAL CARDS 91 
 
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 SHORT, CROSS, MACLEAN, AP'JOHN & MACDONALD 
 
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 Solicitors for Merchants Bank of Canada, Union Bank of Canada 
 
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 92 ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
 INDEXING AND FILING 
 
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 iniiii ii" i 1111 lim '!!; -7 J .i o p p 
 
 Law Booklet 
 No. 1. 
 
 SCOTT 
 
 ON 
 
 ant tfoetr Exemptions 
 
 3n WJfsrmi Canaba 
 
 General Meaning of Homestead. 
 
 Extent of Exemption. 
 
 Right to Insurance Moneys. 
 
 Exemption Where Land Mortgaged. 
 
 Effect of a Registered Judgment. 
 
 Waiver of Exemption. 
 
 Is the Existence of a Family 
 
 Necessary? 
 
 Special Meaning of Homestead. 
 Aim of Exempting Statutes. 
 
 Right of Owner to Incumber Home- 
 stead. 
 
 Whether Right of Exemption Per- 
 sonal or Not. 
 
 Conveyances in Fraud of Creditors. 
 
 The Rights of Widow and Children 
 of a Deceased Owner of a Home- 
 stead. 
 
 Who May Claim Exemption. 
 
 The above are only a few of the phases of Homestead Exemptions dealt 
 with in the booklet. It is weary work searching through Reports, Digests, 
 etc. This little book will put you on the track of what you are looking for 
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