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 AMERICA'S 
 FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Volume I.
 
 JOHN JAY
 
 AMERICA'S 
 FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 BY 
 WILLIS FLETCHER JOHNSON, A.M., L.H.D., 
 
 Honorary Professor of the History of American Foreign Relations 
 
 in New York University; Author of "A Century of Expansion," 
 
 "Parsifal and the Holy Grail," "Four Centuries of the Panama 
 
 Canal," "Colonel Henry Ludington: A Memoir," etc. 
 
 WITH PORTRAITS 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES 
 
 VOLUME ONE 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 THE CENTURY CO. 
 
 19il 
 
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 Copyright, 1916, by 
 The Century Co. 
 
 Published, April, 1916 
 
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 PRINTED IN U. S. A.
 
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 TO 
 
 MY ALMA MATER 
 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
 
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 PREFACE 
 
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 It is my purpose to write a History of the Foreign Relations 
 of the United States of America. I shall begin it with some 
 consideration of what I may term the pre-natal influences of 
 ^ the nation, to wit, the relations which existed among the Euro- 
 pean powers which preceded this Republic in possession of the 
 land, and which in an important measure were left as a legacy 
 ^ of good or evil to the United States; and I shall hope to com- 
 
 •* "^ plete it as a continuous and coherent narrative down to our 
 own day. It will be a history for the reading and informa- 
 tion of the average lay citizen. Therefore it will not be a tech- 
 ^ nical treatise on diplomacy or international law, such as would 
 appeal chiefly to the student, jurist or statesman. Neither will 
 
 ^f there be any effort — which it might be vain for me to make — 
 vi* to invest the narrative with such romantic charm or rhetorical 
 art as would commend it to the dilettante or to the seeker after 
 entertainment but would at the same time probably impair its 
 value as a work of serious information. Nor yet shall I seek 
 as a special pleader to depict our country as always wise and 
 just in its dealings with others, or others as necessarily in 
 the wrong in their controversies with America; but I shall sin- 
 cerely strive to treat all with impartiality. In brief, I shall 
 aim to make this a popular history in a worthy sense of that 
 too often abused term, intended for popular perusal and ac- 
 curate information upon topics which are among at once the most 
 important and the most neglected or most misunderstood in all 
 our national annals. 
 
 The observations of a lifetime largely given to the study of 
 these things have persuaded me that the foreign relations of 
 this country are the least generally known part of its history. 
 Our wars, our territorial growth, our material progress, our 
 development as a people, our social and economic problems, 
 have been the themes of innumerable writers and are reason-
 
 PREFACE 
 
 ably assumed to be familiar to all who are entitled to be re- 
 garded as well informed. But of the origin and development 
 of our international relationships, and of the great principles 
 of our external policies of state, and indeed even of many of 
 the conspicuous incidents and processes which have marked and 
 directed that development, there is a lamentable lack of infor- 
 mation. There seems to have prevailed too widely the spirit 
 of a Senator of the United States who, a generation ago, while 
 discussing a grave matter in which the international good repute 
 of the United States was involved, scornfully demanded "What 
 do we care for 'Abroad'?" 
 
 The result is that we are of all important nations probably 
 the most self-centered and circumscribed. Our citizens have 
 been gathered from all the world, but very few of them be- 
 long to all the world. We are the most cosmopolitan in ma- 
 terial substance, but the least cosmopolitan in sympathy and in 
 genius. The British nation, from which we are chiefly sprung, 
 is often spoken of as "insular"; but its insularity is vastly 
 and generously comprehensive in contrast to the bigoted pa- 
 rochial egotism of its gigantic offspring. From this excess of 
 adulatory introspection, this sometimes smug and sometimes 
 hifalutin self-complacency, and this lack of appreciative per- 
 spective and proportion in viewing other nations and their af- 
 fairs, have arisen many of our domestic and most of our ex- 
 ternal ills. 
 
 It would be a grateful and beneficent achievement to inspire 
 the American people with a more adequate and accurate con- 
 ception of their real place in the world and of their true rela- 
 tionship with other nations. The result should be to ameliorate 
 international sentiments; to moderate both excessive attach- 
 ments and excessive animosities into a spirit of benevolent im- 
 partiality; to unify the sympathies, the policies and the action 
 of all domestic parties toward the external world ; and to invest 
 our popular attitude toward other peoples and their governments 
 with a dignity and a benignity worthy of a nation that is well 
 proportioned and judicious in all its greatness. If I shall suc- 
 ceed in doing this to a perceptible extent, the purpose of my 
 labors in this book will be fulfilled.
 
 CONTENTS OF VOLUME I 
 
 Chapter I. Colonial Influences 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Types of International Relationship — Prenatal Influences — America the 
 Offspring of England — The Colonies Founded in European Rivalries — 
 British, Spanish, Swedish, Dutch, and French — American Interests Sacri- 
 ficed by the Stuarts as Pawns in the European Game — Colonial Policy of 
 the Commonwealth — Betrayal by Charles II — France Striking at England 
 in America — The British Genius for Colonization — Queen Anne's War 
 Anticipated in America — Tlie Peace of Utrecht — American Aid to Eng- 
 land — Fatuous Policy of Halifax — The Rise and Significance of Town 
 Meetings — The Revolt against Class Privilege — The Tragedy of Acadia — 
 The Beginning of American Expansion in the Ohio Valley — The French and 
 Indian War — Purblind British Policy — Frederick the Great — The Treaty 
 of Paris — ^Americaa Devotion to the Mother Country III Repaid ... 3 
 
 Chapter II. Insisting Upon Autonomy 
 
 Rise of the American Spirit — Not Independence but Equal Rights with 
 Englishmen in England Sought — The Royal Prerogative's Last Stand — 
 British Democracy in America — Some Extravagant Vagaries — Taxation 
 Without Representation — Formation of a League of the Colonies — Regarded 
 in England as Treason — The Stamp Act — Imperial Federation Proposed by 
 Otis and Franklin — Samuel Adams the Pioneer of Separation — Repeal of 
 the Stamp Act — Its Vicious Principle Reaffirmed — Townshend's Legacy 
 of Mischief to North — Oppression of Colonial Commerce — The Massachu- 
 setts "Circular Letter" — The Royal Prerogative Denied — Drifting Toward 
 Separation — TTie Committee of Correspondence — Independence Proposed — 
 French Incitements and Encouragement — American Expectations of For- 
 eign Aid 25 
 
 Chapter III. Independence Declared 
 
 The First Continental Congress — "Independence" Still a Forbidden Word 
 — Massachusetts and Virginia the Leaders — Jay's Address to the People 
 of Great Britain — The Attitude of Parliament — Hearings and Petitions of 
 English Cities Refused — Looking for Civil War but not Separation — The 
 Second Continental Congress — Appeals to England — Address to Ireland — 
 Fatal Policy of the British Government — Mercenary Troops Sought in Rus- 
 sia — Catherine the Great and George III — Russian Sympathy Given but no 
 Troops — Holland's Refusal to Give Aid Against America — An Army Se- 
 cured at last in Germany — Alien Forces Needed because of British Un- 
 willingness to Serve Against America — National Origin of the Americans 
 and Their Leaders — First Proposals for Ambassadors and Alliances — Mov- 
 
 vii
 
 viii CONTENTS OF VOLUME I 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ing for Independence — The Declaration — A Significant Amendment — The 
 Attitude and Conduct of Prance — No Love for America, but More Enmity 
 for England — Vergennes as an International lago — The Other European 
 Powers — Not One Friend for the New Republic 45 
 
 Chapter IV. The Revolution 
 
 Effect of the Declaration — British Sympathizers with America — Howe's 
 Mission of Conciliation — Deane and Lee in Prance — Caron de Beaumar- 
 chais and His Aid to America — "Hortalez & Co." — Franklin's Mission — 
 Unsympathetic Attitude of Louis XVI — Duplicity of Vergennes — The 
 French Compact with Spain — French Designs Upon Canada — The Treaty 
 with France — Hostility of Spain — The Treaty of Aranjurez — Gerard, the 
 First French Minister — His Pernicious Counsel — Dilatory Policy of France 
 — Lafayette's True Friendship — The Triumph at Yorktown — Indifference 
 of Frederick the Great Toward America — Russia's Sympathy with Eng- 
 land and Refusal to Recognize the United States or Its Envoys — Dana's 
 Fruitless Mission — Russian Insults to Franklin in Paris — The Armed 
 Neutrality Hostile Rather Than Friendly to America — Holland Alone Sin- 
 ^ cerely Sympathetic 71 
 
 Chapter V. Friends and Foes in Peace-Making 
 
 First Plans for Peace — French Assent Needed — Discord and Corruption in 
 Congress — Disputes over the Fisheries and the Mississippi — French In- 
 trigues — The "Pro-Gallican" Party — A French Protectorate Proposed by 
 Gerard — Jay's Mission to Spain — Self-Stultification of Congress — Adams's 
 Mission to Paris — Received by Vergennes with Insults and Hostile In- 
 trigues — Departure for The Hague — The Treaty with the Netherlands — 
 Fall of the North Ministry — Anglo- American Negotiations Begun — Ver- 
 gennes as a Mischief-Maker — Prance Bound to Spain More than to America 
 — The United States to be Sacrificed to Franco-Spanish Interests — Oswald's 
 Commission — Jay's Masterly Diplomacy — Congressional Instructions De- 
 fied — Anger and Fear of Vergennes at the Treaty of Peace — The Final 
 Treaty — Stipulation as to the Yazoo Lands — The Fisheries and the Missis- 
 sippi — All Other Powers Excluded from the Treaty Making — Austrian and 
 Russian Attitudes — Franklin's Treaty with Prussia — "Free Ships, Free 
 Goods' ' — Advent of America Among the Nations 105 
 
 Chapter VI. Confederation and Constitution 
 
 Washington's Counsel for National Union and a Strong Federal Govern- 
 ment — Ignored Under the Confederation — Embarrassment in Foreign Af- 
 fairs — Separation of State and Church Foreshadowed — Overtures from 
 Hamburg — Negotiations with Spain — Jay and Gardoqui — Sedition in the 
 West — Adams's IllPated Mission to England — Disastrous Weakness of the 
 Confederation the Source of Many Woes — Jay's Forecast of True Constitu- 
 tional Principles — "The Federalist" on Foreign Relations — The Treaty- 
 Making Power under the Constitution — Authority of the Federal Judiciary 
 ■' — Organization of the Department of State — Foreign Affairs at the Adop- 
 tion of the Constitution — Washington's Saving Common Sense — Jefferson 
 as Secretary of State — OflScial and Popular Attitude of European Coun- 
 tries in 1789 — Influence of Jay and Hamilton — The President Made the 
 Sole Source of Diplomatic Authority — Sending Ministers Abroad and Re- 
 ceiving Foreign Envoys — Establishment of the Fundamental Principles of 
 Diplomatic Intercourse 134
 
 CONTENTS OF VOLUME I ix 
 
 Chapter VII. Establishing Neutrality 
 
 PAGE 
 
 America's First Diplomatic Conflict with France — Washington's Rebuke 
 to Moustier — First Senatorial Ratification of a Treaty — Effect of Hamil- 
 ton's Financial and Industrial Work upon Foreign Relations — Gouverneur 
 Morris in France — Recognition of New Governments — Washington on Amer- 
 ica's Self-Sufficiency — An Epochal Proclamation of Neutrality — The Rise 
 of Faction — Genet's Scandalous Conduct — Jay on the Rights and Duties 
 of Independent America — Jefferson's Relations with Genet — The Recall 
 of Genet; and of Morris — Resignation of Jefferson — British Disregard of 
 American Neutrality — Paralysis of American Commerce — Need of a Navy 
 Sorely Pelt — An Embargo Proposed — Jay's Treaty with Great Britain — 
 Faction and Foreign Intrigue — Randolph's Resignation — Relation of the 
 House of Representatives to Treaty-Making — Troubles with Spain — Pinck- 
 ney and Godoy — Forecasting the Monroe Doctrine 165 
 
 Chapter VIII. The Crisis of Nationality 
 
 Results of the First Administration — Independence, Neutrality, "Amer- 
 icanism," and the Freedom of the Seas — Foreign Policy Expounded in 
 Washington's Farewell Address — Adams's Effort to Continue Washing- 
 ton's Policy — The Menace of War with France — Dissensions in the Fed- 
 eralist Party — Preparations for War — Dealing with Talleyrand — "Millions 
 for Defense; not One Cent for Tribute I " — Talleyrand's Attempt to Cor- 
 rupt Gerry — The "X. Y. Z." Correspondence — Building a Navy — Waging 
 an Undeclared War — Dr. Logan's Mission of Meddling — Adams's Resolute 
 Course — A Diplomatic Triumph over France — Dealing with Bonaparte — 
 The War Averted — The Alien Laws — Naturalization — An Enlightened 
 Treaty with Prussia — Overtures from Russia — America Still a Novice 
 Among the Powers 200 
 
 Chapter IX. Complete Nationality 
 
 Jefferson's Reversals of Policy — The War with Tripoli — The Dispute with 
 Spain over Navigation of the Mississippi — Conflicting Claims in West Flor- 
 ida — Two Theories Concerning River Navigation — Hamilton's Continental 
 Policy — Impatience and Sedition in the West — French Aspirations in Amer- 
 ica — The Treaty of San Ildefonso — Jefferson's Letter to Livingston — 
 From Pro-Gallican to Pro-Anglican — Revocation of American Rights at 
 New Orleans — Jefferson's Masterly Course — Preparations for War — Mis- 
 sion of Monroe and Livingston — Negotiations with Talleyrand and Marbois 
 — The Louisiana Purchase — Bonaparte's Exultation — Spanish Protests 
 Ignored — Effects of the Transaction — Disputes over West Florida and 
 Texas — Proposals of Purchase or Seizure — Duplicity of Talleyrand — Dip- 
 lomatic Relations with Spain Suspended 225 
 
 Chapter X. The Second War with Great Britain 
 
 Neutrality Disregarded by France and Great Britain — Attacks Upon 
 American Commerce — The Non-Importation Act — Impressment of Seamen 
 — The Leopard-Cheaapeake Affair — Blockade and Embargo — Relations with 
 Russia — Social Amenities at Washington — Madison's Accession to the 
 Presidency — Maladroit and Misleading Diplomacy — The Orders in Council 
 and the Berlin and Milan Decrees — Madison Tricked by Bonaparte — John 
 Quincy Adams in Russia — American Influences Set Russia against France —
 
 CONTENTS OF VOLUME I 
 
 PAQB 
 
 British Hopes of Regaining New England — British Meddling in West 
 Florida, and with the Indians — The Rise of Clay and Calhoun in Congress — 
 Madison's War Message — A War for the Conquest of Canada — The Hart- 
 ford Convention — Russian Offers of Mediation — Direct Negotiations with 
 Great Britain — Russian Duplicity — The Conferences at Ghent — A Treaty 
 Which Made Peace but Left All Else Unsettled — Further Negotiations — 
 A Clash with Russia — An American Victory — A Warning of Russian De- 
 signs 257 
 
 Chapter XI. Opening a New Era 
 
 John Quincy Adams at the State Department — Insisting Upon Fishery 
 Rights — The Northern Boundary — A Modus Vivendi in Oregon — Russian 
 Arbitration of Slave Claims — Seizure of West Florida — Strenuous Policy 
 Toward East Florida — Jackson's Invasion of Florida — Arbuthnot and Am- 
 brister — Adams's Vigorous Diplomacy — "The Immutable Principle of Self- 
 Defense" — De Onis's Treaty-Making — General Vivas — Acquisition of Flor- 
 ida — Rise of the Cuban Question — Adams's Enunciation of American Policy 
 — Russia's Territorial Pretensions on the Pacific Coast — Attempt to Monop' 
 olize the Pacific Ocean — Adams's Warning to Tuyll — America's Great 
 Triumph in the Alaska Treaty — Interest in the South American Revolu- 
 tions — Requests for Recognition of the South American States — Proposals 
 for Concerted Recognition — Clay's Radical Exhortations — Final Recogni- 
 tion of the South American Republics and Establishment of Diplomatic 
 Relations 300 
 
 Chapter XII. The Monroe Doctrine 
 
 Origin and Development of the Doctrine — Contributions by Hamilton, 
 Jefferson, Washington, and John Quincy Adams — The Holy Alliance and 
 Its Designs Upon America — A Russo-Spanish Expedition of Conquest 
 Threatened — Great Britain's Dissent from the Schemes of the Alliance — 
 Canning's Suggestions to Rush — Rush's Reply and Report to Adams — 
 Great Britain's Warning to France — Opinions and Advice of Jefferson and 
 Madison Secured by Monroe — Calhoun's Fear of the Alliance — Adams's 
 Intrepid Attitude — Monroe's Message Enunciating the Doctrine — Webster's 
 Account of Its Reception — Effect in South America and in Europe — British 
 Misapprehension of a Part of It — Canning's Boast of Authorship — The Two 
 Parts of the Doctrine and Their Purport — An Expression of American Pol- 
 icy for the Safeguarding of American Welfare — Its Applications and Its 
 Limitations — American Hegemony — Cleavage Between North and South 
 America over the Slavery Question 329 
 
 Chapter XIII. Expansion of Interests 
 
 World Power Status Established and Recognized — Recognition of New 
 States — Offers of Mediation between Spain and South America — The Pan- 
 ama Congress — Unfortunate Pro-Slavery Attitude of the Senate — Estrange- 
 ment of Southern Neighbors — Rival Designs in Cuba — Commercial Nego- 
 tiations with Great Britain — The Maine-New Brunswick Boundary — An 
 Arbitral Award Rejected — The Aroostook War — The Webster-Ashburton 
 Treaty — British Refusal to Surrender Fugitive Slaves — Discreditable Di-
 
 CONTENTS OF VOLUME I xi 
 
 PAQK 
 
 plomacy of Jackson and Van Buren — Carrying Domestic Faction into 
 Foreign Relations — Beneficent Treaty with Great Britain — Both Flattery 
 and Threatenings to France — Preparations for War — British Mediation 
 Successful — Governmental Respect for Treaties — French Arbitration be- 
 tween America and Portugal 354 
 
 Chapter XIV. Aggression and Expansion 
 
 The Louisiana Boundary Dispute — Adams's Insistence Upon Our Title 
 to Texas — Defeated by a Factional Conspiracy — Texas Conceded to Mex- 
 ico — Proposals for Purchase Declined — Colonization for Purposes of An- 
 nexation — Independence of Texas Proclaimed — Texan-Mexican War — Jack- 
 son's Evasive Policy — Texas Finally Recognized — Trouble at Niagara — 
 Premature Aggression in California — European Protection for Texas — 
 Schemes for Annexation of Texas — The Slavery Question Dominant 
 — Annexation Treaty Defeated — California Involved in the Dispute — 
 Annexation by Joint Resolution — Slidell's Mission to Mexico — The Mex- 
 ican War — Trist's Negotiations for Peace — The Treaty of Guadalupe- 
 Hidalgo — Enormous Territorial Acquisitions — The Gadsden Purchase . .377 
 
 Chapter XV. Oregon 
 
 Early Explorations of the Pacific Coast — Spanish and Russian Titles — 
 Discovery of the Columbia River — Other Bases of American Claims — Rival 
 Claims of Great Britain — Astoria — The Modus Vivendi — American Sug- 
 gestions to Great Britain and Russia — Adams and Stratford Canning — Did 
 England Claim the Moon? — Russia Forced Back to "Fifty-four Forty" — 
 The Continuous Coast Strip — Gallatin's Negotiations — The Rule of the 
 Hudson Bay Company — Indian Envoys Open American Eyes — The Advent 
 of the Missionaries — Overland Colonization from the United States — 
 "Fifty-four Forty, or Fight!" — Polk's Monumental Repudiation of Policy 
 — Buchanan-Pakenham Negotiations — Treaty-Making Processes Reversed — 
 The San Juan Controversy — Submission to Arbitration — The American Case 
 Triumphant — Final Settlement in Oregon 403 
 
 Chapter XVI. Isthmian Interests 
 
 Central American Canal Schemes — Rivalry Between Panama and Nicaragua 
 — Early American Surveys — The Isthmian Route to California and Oregon — 
 The Treaty of 1848 with New Granada — British-American Rivalries in 
 Nicaragua — The Mosquito Coast — Diplomacy of Hise and Squier — The 
 Fight for Tigre Island — Abbott Lawrence's Investigation of British Claims 
 — The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty — Foreign Interests Sacrificed to the Exigen- 
 cies of Domestic Partizanship — Provisions of the Treaty — Disagreement 
 as to Their Meaning — Clayton Tricked and the Senate Careless — Enforce- 
 ment of the British Interpretation — Nicaragua Betrayed — British Aggres- 
 sions in the Bay Islands — American Destruction of Greytown — British 
 Refusal to Recognize the Monroe Doctrine — Talk of Abrogating the Clayton- 
 Bulwer Treaty — Walker's Land Piracy in Nicaragua — Futile Negotiations 
 with Great Britain — Ousley's Mission — The United States and Nicaragua 
 Both Entrapped by British Diplomacy and All Canal Projects Indefinitely 
 Postponed 430
 
 xii CONTENTS OF VOLUME I 
 
 Chapter XVII. Early Eastern Relations 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The First American Visit to China — Jay's Recommendation of Consular 
 Relations — The Mission of Edmund Roberts — American Titles in Anam — 
 The Treaty with Siam; and with Muscat — America Drawn into Anglo- 
 Chinese Controversies — The Opium War — Commodore Kearny and the 
 Open Door in China — Caleb Gushing' s Negotiations — Chinese Evasions — A 
 Treaty Made — An American Triumph — The Principle of Extra-Territorial 
 Jurisdiction — Chinese Contempt for Foreigners — Demands for Treaty Re- 
 vision — American Interest in the TaiPing Rebellion — American Ships 
 Destroy Forts at Canton — The Advance Upon Peking — "Blood Is Thicker 
 than Water !"■ — An American Envoy at Peking — Refusal to Kneel Before 
 the Emperor — Making the Best of a Difficult Situation 456 
 
 Chapter XVIII. The Opening of Japan 
 
 The American Flag in the Dutch Service — First Effort to Establish Inter- 
 course with a Hermit Nation — Taking Home Japanese Castaways — Hu- 
 manity 111 Requited — A Futile Mission — American Sailors 111 Treated — 
 Fillmore and Webster Plan the "Opening" — Elaborate Preparations for 
 Perry's Expedition — Sensation Produced by the Arrival of the "Black 
 Ships" — Perry's Masterful Attitude — Reception of the President's Letter 
 by the Emperor's Representatives — Perry's Return for an Answer — His 
 Imposing Retinue — Making the Treaty — Japanese Appreciation of Perry's 
 Services — Townsend Harris, the Schoolmaster of Japan — Another Treaty 
 Made — The First Japanese Mission to Amercia — Insistence Upon American 
 Rights — The Cho-Shiu Rebellion — Religious Freedom Established in Japan 
 through the American Initiative 479 
 
 Chapter XIX. Early Dealings with Hawaii 
 
 A Tragic First Visit to the Islands — Beginnings of Commercial Inter- 
 course — Russian Designs Thwarted — Hawaiian Refugees in New England 
 • — The Advent of the Missionaries — Rapid Progress of Civilization — An 
 Unratified Treaty — A Naval Outrage — American and British Rivalry — 
 French Aggressions and Intrigues — Webster's Wise Policy — Tyler's 
 Recommendation of a Practical Protectorate — Appeal of the Islands for 
 Aid Against British Aggressions — British Disavowal and Redress — An 
 American Envoy Sent to the Islands — More French Aggressions — American- 
 Hawaiian Treaty — Seeking American Protection — Webster's Eflfective 
 Warning to France — Overtures for Annexation — Statehood the Obstacle — 
 Reciprocity Deferred 497 
 
 Chapter XX. Some Vigorous Self-Assertion 
 
 European Immigration to America — Its Causes, Sources, and Effects — The 
 "Know-Nothing" Party — American Interests in the Hungarian Repub- 
 lic — Webster's Letter to Huelsemann — Kossuth's Visit to the United 
 States — The Koszta Incident — Protection of Naturalized Citizens — The 
 British Minister Dismissed for Connivance at Enlistments for the British 
 Army — Marcy's Refusal to Enter the Declaration of Paris — "Diplomatic 
 Costume" Follies — Cuban Filibustering — Anti-Spanish Outrages in New 
 Orleans — Tripartite Guarantee over Cuba Refused — Pro-Slavery Efforts to 
 Acquire Cuba — Soule's Mission to Spain — The Black Warrior Episode — 
 The Ostend Manifesto — The North Atlantic Fisheries — Reciprocity with 
 Canada — Suppressing the Slave Trade — Great Britain Accepts American 
 Views of the Right of Visit and Search — Friction with Mexico — Numerous 
 Treaties with Various Lands 525
 
 PORTRAITS IN VOLUME I 
 
 John Jay Frontispiece 
 
 Prom an Engraving by J. C. Buttre, in J. S. Jenkins's "Lives of the 
 Governors of New York," 1851. 
 
 TACINa 
 PAGE 
 
 Alexander Hamilton 168 
 
 From the Painting by John Trumbull, in the Governor's Room, City Hall, 
 New York. 
 
 Thomas Jefferson 232 
 
 From the Painting by Charles Wesley Jarvis, in the Governor's Room, 
 City Hall, New York. 
 
 Albert Gallatin 296 
 
 From the Painting by Daniel Huntington, in the Council Room of New 
 York University. 
 
 James Monroe 328 
 
 From the Painting by John Vanderlyn, in the Governor's Room, City Hall, 
 New York. 
 
 John Quincy Adams 360 
 
 From a Painting by A. B. Durand, Engraved by H. Wright Smith for 
 Josiah Quincy 's "Memoir of the Life of John Quincy Adams," 1858. 
 
 Daniel Webster 472 
 
 From a Daguerreotype. 
 
 William L, Marcy 536 
 
 From an Engraving by J. C. Buttre, in J. S. Jenkins's "Lives of the 
 Governors of New York," 1851.
 
 X
 
 AMERICA'S 
 FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Volume I.
 
 AMERICA'S 
 FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 I 
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 
 
 THE foreign relations of a country are manifold. There are, 
 in the primitive state, the personal relations of the chief of 
 the tribe, or of the monarch, which for a time dominate the whole 
 attitude of one people toward another. In the theoretical fra- 
 ternity of thrones, all monarchs are to all others "dear cousins" 
 or "beloved brothers." In fact, they are sometimes friends and 
 sometimes mortal foes. In the days of absolutism these personal, 
 monarchical relations often determined the whole foreign policy 
 of a nation. Wars and peace, alliances and treaties, were made 
 not according to the will of the people or in conformity with 
 their interests, but at the will, the pleasure, or the caprice of the 
 sovereign. With such relations we have happily little to do in 
 these days. America felt them sharply and bitterly in early 
 colonial times, but has scarcely known even their indirect in- 
 fluence for the last hundred years. Even in Europe, in exclu- 
 sively European affairs, such influences are waning. They still 
 exist to a degree. There is some usefulness in the visits and 
 counter-visits of monarchs. But such usefulness is generally 
 supplementary to the initiative and will of the people expressed 
 through parliamentary ministers; and it is to be observed that 
 a royal interview between even the greatest sovereigns is re- 
 garded as of little political or diplomatic significance unless some 
 of their ministers are present at it. 
 
 A second type of international relationships is that created by 
 individuals who are not sovereigns, and perhaps not occupants 
 of any official places, but who possess, or are supposed to possess, 
 
 some representative character and who perform some noteworthy 
 
 3
 
 4 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 public service. Thus they succeed in impressing strongly the 
 public, and, perhaps also, the governmental mind, and in mate- 
 rially affecting the relationship between the two countries. 
 Sometimes their actions are generous and disinterested, and 
 sometimes they are actuated by self-seeking. Sometimes the re- 
 sults are beneficent, and sometimes they are productive of all ill 
 feelings between the nations. We cannot doubt that strong in- 
 ternational sentiments, affecting practical relationships, were cre- 
 ated by the services of Lafayette to America in the Revolution ; 
 by those of Byron to Greece; by the residence of Garibaldi in 
 the United States just before his great achievement ; by the hos- 
 pitality of the United States to the exiled Kossuth ; and by other 
 like incidents of an unofficial and personal character. 
 
 This form of international relationship naturally and directly 
 leads into that wider and more potent one based upon general 
 popular sentiment. We are told that the Creator made of one 
 blood all races of men that dwell upon the earth. Yet there is 
 no question that among different races, or different branches of 
 the one common race, widely varying relations exist, from warm- 
 est friendship and sympathy to implacable animosity, based upon 
 causes which, if not natural, are so ancient and remote as to 
 elude analysis. Thus it was in the earliest recorded times. 
 There was hatred between Egyptian and Israelite. The Jews 
 had no dealings with the Samaritans. The Greeks regarded all 
 who did not speak their language as barbarians. There was no 
 peace or friendship between Iran and Turan. So it is at the 
 present day, despite the ameliorating influences of religion and 
 civilization, and, perhaps above all, of commerce and close com- 
 munication. Such relationships, whether of amity or hatred, 
 are determined by conditions of race, of language, of religious 
 faith, of immemorial tradition, of pecuniary interest, of national 
 ambition, of indefinable prejudice, and what not else. They are 
 often, perhaps, unreasonable, and certainly in many cases are 
 entirely inexplicable. 
 
 There are, finally, what we may call official or constitutional 
 relationships, created by responsible governments representative 
 of the people and based upon the popular will and interest. 
 These are, or are supposed to be, logical and reasonable, affected 
 neither by sentiment nor by caprice. They are expressed in
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 5 
 
 treaties and other negotiations, whether friendly or hostile, and 
 are controlled and directed by the commonly accepted principles 
 of international law. Such relationships form the basis and sub- 
 stance of the major part of modem diplomacy. Sometimes they 
 are generous and self-sacrificing, but far more often they are in 
 a degree selfish, each nation pursuing toward its neighbors the 
 policy which will best promote and conserve its own welfare. 
 "There can be," said Washington in his Farewell Address, "no 
 greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from 
 nation to nation." 
 
 There are also in international relationships, and indeed in 
 nearly all the affairs of States, what are called prenatal in- 
 fluences, just as there are in the characters and careers of in- 
 dividual men. No American or European State now existing 
 came into existence as a new creation. It was formed by evo- 
 lution, or revolution, from some preexisting State or States, and 
 from its civil ancestors it inherited certain conditions, character- 
 istics, traditions, predilections, animosities, and what not, which 
 went far toward determining its early relationships with its 
 neighbors, and which in some cases have for many centuries per- 
 ceptibly colored and influenced international sentiments and at- 
 titudes. 
 
 This latter fact is notably apparent in the case of the subject 
 now under consideration. The United States of America was a 
 political, social, religious, intellectual, and racial offspring of 
 Great Britain, and especially of England. That is the funda- 
 mental fact in all its history, whether internal or external. That 
 was the circumstance which determined the original character 
 of these States, which established their earliest relations with 
 other countries, and which directed them into the course which 
 they have since pursued and are now pursuing as a united na- 
 tion. To-day this nation is perhaps the most composite under 
 the sun. Almost every tribe and people in the world has con- 
 tributed to its population ; some of them in recent years so largely 
 as to exert a perceptible influence upon the national character 
 and popular institutions. Nevertheless, the foundation was 
 English, and the framework remains English. Wliat the Thir- 
 teen Colonies were in 1776, they were because of their English 
 origin and their century and a half of English connection and
 
 6. AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 control. Vast as has been the material growth of the United 
 States, and comparably great its constitutional development, the 
 original English leaven has continued to this day to leaven the 
 whole lump, and the original English spirit to inspire the whole 
 mind and soul. 
 
 These English colonies, moreover, had their foundation and 
 development in European intrigues, rivalries, and wars. That 
 is a significant fact, which has largely colored the history of 
 foreign relations. At the time of the discovery of America 
 there was more friendship than enmity between England and 
 Spain. Both were Catholic powers, and in no quarter had they 
 come into serious conflict. Between the British Isles and the 
 Iberian Peninsula there were strong ties. Prince Henry of Por- 
 tugal, the great promoter of adventure and discovery in the 
 fifteenth century, was a grandson of John of Gaunt and thus a 
 member of the English royal house of Lancaster. It was, too, 
 by only the narrowest of chances that England failed to become, 
 instead of Spain, the first proprietor of the Western World. 
 When the Columbus brothers were at their wits' end to secure 
 patronage for their enterprise of seeking Japan, China, and the 
 Indies by the western route, Bartholomew turned to the English 
 court. There the far-seeing and statesmanlike Henry VII re- 
 ceived him cordially, became interested in his plans, and was 
 about to equip his expedition and send him forth under the 
 English flag. But at the last moment word came that his brother 
 Christopher had already pledged himself to the services of Spain. 
 But for that, Columbus would have found a world for England 
 and not for Leon and Castile. 
 
 That was in 1488. Many things happened between then and 
 the latter part of the next century. The religious revolution 
 in England aroused, instead of friendship, the bitterest of an- 
 tagonism between that country and Spain. Moreover, Spain's 
 fatuous expulsion of the Jews and Moors deprived the Iberian 
 Peninsula of its best elements and left a nation of soldiers and 
 priests, hopelessly declining. So in the strenuous days of Eliza- 
 beth it was the English policy to antagonize Spain, and to strike 
 at her, not only by burning her fleet in Cadiz Harbor and ravag- 
 ing the Spanish Main, but also by seizing upon parts of the 
 Continent which Spain claimed and which had been accorded to
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 7 
 
 her by a papal bull, and planting thereon sturdy English colo- 
 nies. It is true that some of the most important English col- 
 onies in this country were founded for conscience's sake, in 
 quest of ' ' freedom to worship God. ' ' But those were of a little 
 later date. The pioneer English colony on the North American 
 continent, Virginia, had no such purpose. Its aim wa.s to spoil 
 the Spanish king's dominion, and to carry the English war 
 against Spain into America. It was as a part of the English 
 warfare against Spain th^t the first English colony was planted 
 upon these shores. 
 
 This English challenge did not go unnoticed. Spain was 
 quick to perceive it, and to appreciate its menace. For not a 
 moment did she mean to tolerate it. Preparations were 
 promptly made for wiping the stain of English heretic feet 
 from the sacred shore of New Spain. But the Spaniards pro- 
 ceeded with as much^ caution as valor. Elizabeth of England 
 had been gathered to her fathers, and the incompetent and cor- 
 rupt James Stuart was on the throne. He might be dealt with 
 differently from his predecessor. A Spanish fleet of thirteen 
 sail was prepared, for a descent upon Virginia. That was in 
 the spring of 1612. News of it came to England, and was con- 
 firmed, again and again. But the English government, under 
 the malign control of James, made no effort to meet it or to de- 
 fend the colony. Then Spanish spies began to report to their 
 king upon the condition of England and of the colony. Eng- 
 land had no effective navy. The king's ships lay rotting at 
 their wharves. Only a few merchant ships, even, went out. 
 The whole maritime service of England was falling into decay. 
 Virginia was also in a parlous state. It was receiving no royal 
 subsidy or other favor, and was likely soon to fall through its 
 own weakness. So there was really no need of action. All 
 Spain had to do was to sit still, and she would win her point. 
 Moreover, there was in every Spanish mind a strong conviction 
 that it was best to let a sleeping dog lie, especially when it was 
 a British mastiff of the Devon breed. It was all very well to 
 say that the English navy had gone to ruin. But who could 
 tell what might happen? For years Spaniards had not ven- 
 tured to go boating on rivers and lakes in the heart of Spain, 
 for fear lest Francis Drake should suddenly appear!
 
 8 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 So diplomatic counsels prevailed above the militant. It was 
 decided at Madrid not to incur the danger of having the Spanish 
 king's beard singed again, but to try peaceful intrigues with 
 King James. Why not, since a Stuart was ever ready to be 
 bribed or in some way corrupted ? The Spanish fleet was there- 
 fore not sent to Virginia, but the Spanish minister, Gondamar, 
 had a free hand at London to play his tricks and manners upon 
 the credulous and corrupt tyrant. His task was easy. He soon 
 persuaded James that * ' a seditious company is but the seminary 
 to a seditious Parliament," wherefore if he did not presently 
 want a lot of rebels in Westminster Hall defying his divine 
 right, he would better suppress the Virginia Company. Sim- 
 ilarly, in after years, George III was convinced that if the 
 Thirteen Colonies won their independence in the Revolution of 
 1776, all the other colonies, including Ireland, would speedily 
 be lost to the British Crown. "Should America succeed," he 
 said, "the West Indies must follow, not in independence but in 
 dependence on America. Ireland would soon follow, and this 
 island reduce itself to a poor island indeed." 
 
 Never did gudgeon swallow a bait more eagerly than James, 
 and forthwith he began his meddling and attempted dictation 
 in the affairs of the company. He first tried to dictate the 
 election of one of his creatures as its treasurer, for which at- 
 tempt he was compelled to eat humble pie. But Gondamar 
 persisted. The lure of a Spanish princess as the bride of the 
 English heir-apparent was potent and effective. James main- 
 tained his hostility to the company, by other and finally more 
 effective means than that at first tried. A king whose kingly 
 grandson could put and keep a Jeffreys on the bench could 
 surely himself prostitute the law courts to any base purpose. 
 So in 1642, James, at Spanish instigation, had a court annul 
 the charter of the Virginia Company, on the ground that it gave 
 that company the privilege of transporting the king's subjects, 
 at their will, from England to Virginia, and so might actually 
 depopulate the realm by transferring the whole English peo- 
 ple to its oversea dominion ! Upon a more preposterous ground 
 never was so gross a moral and political crime committed. 
 
 There were for a time two other colonial settlements on the 
 North Atlantic coast besides the English. These were soon, how-
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 9 
 
 ever, incorporated into the English domain, and now form im- 
 portant parts of the United States. It is to be observed that 
 they were founded in much the same manner and for precisely 
 the same purpose as the English colony of Virginia. They 
 were inspired by European animosities, and were founded as 
 parts of European campaigns. The Dutch settlement of New 
 Netherlands, on the Hudson River, which was afterward devel- 
 oped into the State of New York, was made as a part of the heroic 
 struggle of the Dutch against their Spanish oppressors. It 
 was suggested by William Usselincx and his colleagues of the 
 Orange party, as an effective means of striking at Spain, and 
 of creating, on these distant shores, a diversion in aid of the 
 much-tried Netherlands. On account of its purpose it was for 
 a time not only tolerated but even sanctioned and encouraged 
 by England, although it was a trespasser on territory claimed 
 by the latter; because England and Holland were then making 
 common cause against Spain. It will be recalled that so intimate 
 were their relations at one time that the Dutchmen earnestly 
 besought Elizabeth of England to become their queen and thus 
 to unite the two countries under one crown. It was when Eng- 
 land and Holland parted and became enemies, and England, 
 under the Stuart rule, was sold to be an appanage and vassal 
 of France and Spain, that the Dutch colony was finally seized 
 by England. That seizure was performed in consequence of 
 conditions existing in Europe, and as a part of a European cam- 
 paign, and was effected, we may add, with the baseness and 
 turpitude characteristic of all the Stuarts and especially of 
 Charles II. 
 
 The Swedish colony on the Delaware River, from which 
 largely sprang the States of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, had 
 a history not unlike that of the New Netherlands. The estab- 
 lishment of it was suggested by the same man, William Usselincx, 
 who urged it upon Gustavus Adolphus as a part of his great 
 Protestant campaign against the Catholic powers in the Thirty 
 Years' War. The "Lion of the North" was favorably impressed 
 by the idea and authorized its execution, but was too busy to pay 
 much personal attention to it. After his death it was taken up 
 zealously by his great chancellor, Oxenstierna, and the colony 
 of New Sweden was planted at the head of Delaware Bay. Its
 
 10 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 relations with its neighboring Dutch colony at the northeast 
 were much like those of the latter with the English. New 
 Sweden was regarded as a trespasser on Dutch territory, £is the 
 New Netherlands were on English territory. But as long as 
 Holland was fighting for life against Spain, she had need of 
 Sweden's friendship and cooperation, and therefore respected 
 the Swedish colony. But in 1648 the Thirty Years' War came 
 to an end in the peace of Munster. Holland was freed from 
 the Spanish incubus. Then Charles X of Sweden became in- 
 volved in a great war with Poland. As Holland had no further 
 need of Swedish friendship, and as Sweden was fully occupied 
 elsewhere, the Dutchmen of New Amsterdam saw their oppor- 
 tunity, and improved it. Peter Stuyvesant hastened around 
 from the Hudson to the Delaware, and effected the conquest of 
 New Sweden and its incorporation into his own bailiwick in 
 the twinkling of an eye, very much as England a little later in 
 turn conquered and annexed the Dutch colony. 
 
 In these and other regions Dutchmen, Swedes, Germans, and 
 Frenchmen renounced their old nationality, to become first Brit- 
 ish subjects and later American citizens. In such manner were 
 all the colonies, from Maine to Georgia, founded and Anglicized, 
 because of European complications. Thus were their early in- 
 terests inseparably, as it seemed, interwoven with the tangled 
 threads of European politics. They were the property of a 
 European power, and they naturally were compelled to share 
 the experiences of that power, in peace and in war. At that 
 period, moreover, England was much more involved in Euro- 
 pean politics and wars than at the present time. In the last 
 half of the nineteenth century it was her policy to refrain from 
 continental embroilments, in "splendid isolation." But in the 
 Stuart and Hanoverian days she was almost incessantly involved 
 in political or military complications with continental powers, 
 and chiefly with France and Spain, the two powers which had 
 holdings upon this continent and with which therefore the Eng- 
 lish colonies here came into direct contact. For while Spain 
 remained settled in Florida, at the south and southwest of the 
 colonies, France was settled in Canada and the Ohio and Miss- 
 issippi valleys, at the north, northeast, and northwest, thus com- 
 pletely encircling the colonies on the landward side.
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 11 
 
 Before we leave the Stuart regime, it is to be observed that not 
 only did those four unworthy monarehs make the American 
 colonies pawns and sacrifices in their European games, but they 
 planted here by other and not less hateful means the first seeds 
 of American resentment toward and alienation from the mother 
 country. The first causes of the political — there never was any 
 other than political — animosity of the colonies against England, 
 were not due to any desire or intent of the English people, but 
 were, on the whole, contrary thereto. They were the personal 
 work of those Stuart kings who so often and so flagrantly de- 
 fied and violated the public will at home in England, who so dis- 
 graced and humiliated the English name abroad, and who were, 
 upon the whole, not only among the very worst that England 
 ever had but also among the very worst that any country ever 
 had. Every one of those four kings did something to oppress 
 the American colonies and to implant in them the germs of re- 
 volt, though at first it was revolt like that of the English at 
 home in England against Charles I and James II, and not 
 against England but against England's semi-alien oppressors. 
 James I, as we have seen, not only treated the Virginians with 
 monstrous tyranny and bad faith, but also issued a decree for- 
 bidding the Puritans to emigrate to America. Charles I issued 
 several decrees to the same effect, forbidding migration without 
 leave, and forbidding shipownei's to carry such emigrants. 
 There was never in history a nobler or more profitable bit of 
 fate's irony than in the fact that in this way Charles forcibly 
 detained in England, for his own subsequent destruction, Oliver 
 Cromwell, John Hampden and Arthur Haslerig! 
 
 Under the fine statesmanship of the Commonwealth the first 
 definite and consistent colonial policy was adopted by the English 
 government. Then for the first time the colonies began to be 
 regularly treated as something of value, to be cultivated and 
 developed for their own sake and for the sake of the empire. 
 At the same time there first arose in the colonies the political 
 party spirit and divisions which prevailed in England. Before 
 that time there were Cavaliers and Puritans, Tories and Whigs, 
 in the colonies. But they had not ventured to assert themselves 
 as such to any marked degree, save in purely local affairs. To 
 England and the English government they were English colo-
 
 12 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 nists and nothing else. It was not safe for so few and feeble a 
 folk, under the arbitrary tyranny of a Stuart, to identify them- 
 selves with factional feuds at home. But under the freedom of 
 Cromwell's administration, and with the accompanying growth 
 of the colonies, they felt emboldened to show the political colors 
 which they would have worn had they remained at home. There 
 arose in the colonies parties of Cavalier and Roundhead, Church- 
 man and Independent, corresponding with those in England, 
 and making themselves known and their influence and sympathy 
 felt to their brethren in the mother country. Such party di- 
 visions were by no means equal. In New England the Puritans, 
 Roundheads, or Independents were the vast majority, and they 
 governed their colonies in their own way. Much shallow and 
 senseless reproach has been cast upon the New England colo- 
 nists for coming to America to find ' ' freedom to worship God, ' ' 
 and then persecuting others for worshiping Him in a different 
 manner from their own. The fact is that those who came thither 
 for ' ' freedom to worship God ' ' were not the Puritans of Boston 
 and New England in general, but the mere handful of Pilgrims 
 at Plymouth, and these latter were not intolerant persecutors. 
 The persecution of Quakers, Baptists, Episcopalians, and others 
 was the work not of the Pilgrims but of the Puritans, and the 
 Puritans made no pretense of seeking any general "freedom to 
 worship God." So far as they sought such freedom, it was for 
 themselves and for themselves alone. They wanted to worship 
 God in their own way, according to the dictates of their own 
 consciences. Since they were not permitted to do so in England 
 without interference, they came to America, and they did not 
 propose to let their old persecutors or any one else follow them 
 hither to interfere with their freedom here. Harsh as their 
 conduct seemed at times, it was entirely logical and consistent, 
 as a measure of self-protection, and is to be regarded with a 
 certain stem admiration rather than with reproof. 
 
 Nor is it truthful or honest to single out Massachusetts and 
 Connecticut for adverse comment, for their alleged intolerance 
 and severity. The other colonies acted in precisely the same 
 way. Virginia, settled and developed by Episcopalians, was 
 every whit as intolerant as Massachusetts. It fined and banished 
 and otherwise oppressed Independents and all who would not
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 13 
 
 conform with Episcopalianism, just as the Massachusetts men 
 treated Episcopalians and Quakers, and it enacted "blue" laws 
 as extreme as any ever known in Connecticut. Maryland, the 
 Roman Catholic colony, too, is often cited as a noble example 
 of religious liberty. But the fact is that its tolerance extended 
 to only certain sects. Those holding Unitarian beliefs were 
 savagely outlawed. Any one uttering an oath, or any words 
 that seemed blasphemous to the ecclesiastical authorities, was 
 put to death; and all the people were compelled to eat fish and 
 abstain from meat on Fridays. If there was one entirely free 
 colony among them all, it was that of Rhode Island and Provi- 
 dence Plantations. 
 
 Before the middle of the seventeenth century, then, the Ameri- 
 can colonies had not only established well-defined civil and re- 
 ligious policies of their own, but they had also begun to exert 
 a marked and important reflex influence upon England and 
 upon Europe. In them were nurtured and developed to full 
 puissance much of the independence and love of liberty which 
 presently brought about the British revolution and freed that 
 kingdom from the Stuart incubus. Not a few of the most ca- 
 pable English statesmen of commonwealth and revolutionary 
 days had their training and grounding in practical government 
 in Massachusetts. Charles I, as we have seen, kept Cromwell 
 and Hampden and Haslerig at home. But Harry Vane, and 
 George Downing, and Hugh Peters came to Massachusetts, and 
 in the pure air of that colony developed the qualities which were 
 so strenuously displayed upon their return to England. It is 
 of interest to recall, by the way, a circumstance which, while 
 it has no direct bearing upon our subject, has an indirect signifi- 
 cance of the inexplicable manner in which popular sentiments 
 are swayed. Under the Stuarts the British flag, then called the 
 King's colors, was unhesitatingly adopted by the colonies. In 
 spite of the ill-treatment which they suffered at Stuart hands, 
 the colonists were loyal to the Stuart flag, which consisted simply 
 of the Union Jack, the red cross of St. George and the white 
 cross of St. Andrew superimposed, upon a blue field. But when 
 the Cromwellian Commonwealth, which did so much for the 
 colonies, changed the design, putting the Union Jack as a canton 
 in the corner of a red field, as in the British flag of to-day, the
 
 14 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 colonists would have none of it. They clung to the flag of their 
 oppressors; they rejected the flag of their friends. 
 
 With the temporary restoration of the Stuarts, for the com- 
 plete filling of their cup of wrath, the colonies were made tq 
 suffer bitterly at the hands of such creatures as Berkeley and 
 Andros. True, the wise policy of the Commonwealth was not 
 altogether reversed. The colonies were still regarded as some- 
 thing to be prized and developed. But they were to be deprived 
 of their autonomous charters, and developed as crown colonies. 
 They were, moreover, to be kept in that ignorance which is the 
 only foundation of such thrones as that of the Stuarts. Charles 
 II prohibited printing in the colonies, and James II ordered 
 Andros to ''allow of no printing press." Berkeley in 1671 offi- 
 cially reported : "I thank God we have no free schools, nor any 
 printing, and I hope we shall not have them this hundred years. 
 God keep us from both!" No wonder that Evelyn, who was 
 one of Charles II 's council, tells us in his diary that in 1670 the 
 council was much concerned over New England, "since we un- 
 derstood they were a people almost upon the very brink of re- 
 nouncing any dependence on the Crown." Yes, just as were 
 most of the people of England itself, and for the same ample 
 reason. It was not yet England that the colonies were turning 
 against, but the criminal tyrants who were misgoverning Eng- 
 land, against whom England itself presently rose in righteous 
 and glorious revolt. 
 
 Nor was such misgovemment the only grievance of the colo- 
 nies against the Stuarts. Again and again the supine or cor- 
 rupt foreign policy of that dynasty made the colonies its victims. 
 In 1632 a treaty was made between Charles I of England and 
 Louis XIII of France, by which Charles restored to Louis abso- 
 lutely and without demarcation of limits "all places possessed 
 by the English in New France, I'Acadie, and Canada, particu- 
 larly Port Royal, Quebec, and Cape Breton." To this treaty 
 we may justly ascribe nearly all the subsequent and terribly 
 costly troubles between England and France in America, in 
 which the colonies suffered so severely. Again, in 1654, Crom- 
 well seized Acadia from France; but again the servile Charles 
 II surrendered it in the treaty of Breda, in 1667. In the last- 
 named year, too, Charles became involved in hostilities with
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 15 
 
 Holland, in which of course the colonies became concerned, and 
 for the next seven years the Virginian coast was subject to pe- 
 riodical ravages at the hands of the Dutch, from which Charles 
 could or would afford no protection. The colonists had given no 
 cause for such treatment by the Dutch. They were the innocent 
 victims of an evil policy in England. The Dutch were striking 
 at England in Virginia, just as the English had formerly struck 
 at Spain in that quarter. The colonists understood all this. 
 But while their disaffection and resentment toward the Stuarts 
 waxed apace, their loyalty to England, as England, remained 
 unimpaired. Therefore they continued to fight freely and val- 
 iantly, whenever occasion called, not only for themselves but for 
 England and for the British Empire. 
 
 Charles II and James II made themselves vassals and tribu- 
 taries of Prance. For that reason their American colonies suf- 
 fered little molestation from the French. But immediately 
 upon the fall of the Stuarts, the French storm broke. The 
 Stuarts found refuge in France, and France took up their cause, 
 and, following the old precedent, struck at England in America. 
 Under Frontenac, one of the ablest and most ruthless of all 
 French colonial governors, raids upon the northern colonies were 
 begun, and a state of chronic warfare was established which 
 lasted with little respite for seventy years. Already in 1686 
 the Spanish had resumed hostilities on the Carolina frontier, 
 so that by 1689 there was war all along the landward line of the 
 colonies. In these hostilities the colonists were largely left to 
 their own defense. They suffered terribly, and they also took 
 the aggressive and inflicted heavy blows upon their enemies. 
 Frontenac signalized his first attack upon them with the hideous 
 massacres of Schenectady, Salmon Falls, Casco Bay, and Haver- 
 hill. Quickly the colonists responded, not with massacres but 
 with bold campaigns for the conquest of Canada and the ex- 
 pulsion of the French from the North American continent. In 
 1690 the New Englanders captured Port Royal once more, and 
 at the same time they sent an expedition against Quebec which 
 would doubtless have succeeded had it not been handicapped by 
 the incapacity of the royal governor. In that desperate cam- 
 paign a thousand colonial soldiers perished, and the colonies 
 incurred a debt of 140,000 pounds sterling, and were compelled
 
 16 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 to issue the first paper money in our history. In 1649 the 
 French planned a descent upon Boston, which failed. Then 
 there came a brief breathing space in the treaty of Ryswick, in 
 1697. 
 
 In that treaty the arrogance of Louis XIV was first decisively 
 checked. He suffered heavy losses in Europe, he was compelled 
 to recognize William of Orange as the lawful king of England, 
 with Anne as his heir, and the political map of Europe was 
 largely recast. Unhappily the English government thought it 
 politic to give France consolation for those losses at home by 
 restoring Port Royal, thus once more depriving the colonists of 
 the fruit of hard-won victory. Indeed, it was such conduct on 
 the part of the home government that so long extended the 
 struggle for national supremacy in America. Had England and 
 France both kept hands off and let the colonists settle matters 
 for themselves, the settlement would have been prompt, decisive, 
 and lasting. For the English genius of colonization was splen- 
 didly at work. The French had settled first upon this continent, 
 and claimed by far the larger area, and France at home was 
 twice as populous as England. Yet the census of 1688 showed 
 only 11,248 French colonists in the whole of North America, 
 while the English numbered more than 207,000. Massachusetts 
 alone had four times and Virginia nearly five times as many 
 citizens as the entire French Empire in America. By 1714 
 the English population increased to 375,000, and the French to 
 only 30,000. But the colonists were not left to fight it out for 
 themselves. They were still mere pawns in the European game. 
 Nevertheless they were beginning to prepare, perhaps as yet 
 unconsciously, for something better than pawnship. The first 
 Continental Congress was held in these colonies in 1690, and it 
 was held expressly to consider and to deal with the complica- 
 tions in which the colonies found themselves involved through 
 European wars. 
 
 The peace of Ryswick was soon broken. Lous XIV, mad- 
 dened at the check he had received, sought to recoup his ambi- 
 tious fortunes in another direction. Spain still possessed a vast 
 colonial empire, besides the best strategic position in all Europe, 
 and had within herself still the "promise and potency" of much 
 achievement. His plan was, then, to unite France and Spain
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 17 
 
 under one crown. So he put his grandson, Philip of Anjou, 
 upon the Spanish throne, as the first step toward the union of 
 the two kingdoms in a power that should dominate the Conti- 
 nent. Thus a Franco-Spanish alliance was formed, which pres- 
 ently again circled the English colonies with active foes on all 
 the landward borders. England's response was powerfully 
 made in Europe, and the victories of Marlborough shattered the 
 "great monarch's" power forever. The war was resumed in 
 America, too, largely by the colonists. "Queen Anne's War," 
 between England and Spain, was actually anticipated in Amer- 
 ica. Before that war was declared formally, the Spanish organ- 
 ized an Indian raid upon the Carolina plantations, which was re- 
 pulsed by the colonists. Then the colonists sent out a counter- 
 expedition of their own, from Charleston, captured the town of 
 St. Augustine in Florida, and laid siege to the fort, which they 
 would have captured, too, had not a strong Spanish fleet come 
 to its rescue. In 1703 they made another raid into Florida, 
 and in 1706 they beat off an attack of the allied French and 
 Spanish fleets upon Charleston, with heavy loss to the fleet. Nor 
 were they idle at the North. They played a leading part in the 
 recapture of Port Royal in 1710, and of the reconquest of 
 I'Acadie, or Nova Scotia. We must not forget, either, that in 
 1703 they sent troops to defend the island of Jamaica against 
 invasion, and gave money and goods freely to rehabilitate Nevis 
 and other West India islands which had been ravaged and de- 
 spoiled. Through these operations, and especially through the 
 abominable massacres instigated or perpetrated by Frontenac 
 and his successors, the New Englanders were imbued with a deep 
 distrust and hatred of the French, which continued to prevail 
 among them for several generations, and which may even to 
 this day be perceived. 
 
 The next respite from open war was found in the treaty of 
 Utrecht, in 1713. That making of peace inspired the writing of 
 a sublime "Te Deura," nor was it altogether unworthy of such 
 distinction. The ambitious plans of the French king were hope- 
 lessly ruined by the permanent separation of the French and 
 Spanish crowns and the confinnation of the Hanoverian suc- 
 cession in England. At the same time Newfoundland, Nova 
 Scotia, and the great Hudson Bay Territory were finally given 
 
 VOL. 1—2
 
 J 
 
 18 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 to England. Unhappily, also, to the latter was given a monopoly 
 of the slave trade between Africa and North America. But the 
 peace of Utrecht was illusive and of short duration. The 
 French in Canada and the Spanish in Florida never ceased to 
 incite the Indians to hostilities against the English settlers, and 
 within five years open war was resumed. In 1739 the Virginia 
 colonists were upon the point of despatching a strong expedition 
 to Florida, for the conquest and annexation of that country, and 
 Alexander Spottiswoode, the father of American expansion, was 
 to be recalled from retirement to lead it. The next year the colo- 
 nists sent three thousand men to aid the English in the siege of 
 Carthagena, and in 1741 they sent a still larger contingent at 
 their own expense to assist in the conquest of Cuba. In those 
 years, too, they furnished for England's wars a larger and 
 stronger fleet, in ships and guns and men, than the whole Eng- 
 lish navy had been at the time of the Great Armada. In 1745 
 the colonists took the leading part in the capture of Louisbourg. 
 Indeed, all through the wars that ended in 1748 the colonists 
 performed mighty deeds and won great glory. But then came 
 the bungling treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Under it Cape Breton 
 Island was restored to France, and the boundaries of Nova 
 Scotia were left undetermined, the French insisting that the 
 English were entitled to only the peninsula, while the English 
 claimed ownership clear back to the St. Lawrence River. The 
 question of the ownership of the Ohio and upper Mississippi val- 
 leys was also left unsettled, the French claiming that their Ca- 
 nadian and Louisianian possessions were coterminous, while the 
 English claimed that their Virginian colony extended across the 
 continent. Thus in this treaty once more were fruits of co- 
 lonial effort sacrificed, and vexatious problems were left for some 
 future time to solve. 
 
 That time of solution was, however, coming fast. It was true, 
 as Montesquieu declared in 1748, that "a free, prosperous, and 
 great people was forming in the forests of America." The 
 Americans themselves began to be conscious of that fact, perhaps 
 more so than their English kin at home. At that time the Eng- 
 lish government, in its colonial department, was not marked with 
 the greatest wisdom or highest efficiency. It was dominated by 
 two men, the Duke of Newcastle and the Duke of Bedford.
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 19 
 
 There could not easily be imagined two men more unlike. The 
 one was slovenly, fickle, perfidious, cowardly, and base ; the other, 
 precise, resolute, loyal, brave, and proud. Happily, Bedford 
 had the more direct control of American affairs. But he was by 
 no means an ideal administrator for the colonies, since he was 
 lacking in both knowledge of their needs and sympathy with 
 their aspirations. Nor was the case helped by making the young 
 Earl of Halifax the First Commissioner for the Plantations. 
 This nobleman was a shallow, pretentious, overbearing youth, 
 with ambitions far beyond his abilities, and an almost total lack 
 of judicial qualities. Ignorant of the state of affairs in the colo- 
 nies, he began his work by seeking information from the royal 
 governors and others. The reports which he received were prob- 
 ably grossly untrustworthy and distorted. To him, who accepted 
 them as true, they seemed monstrous. From South Carolina he 
 heard that "leveling principles prevail. The people have got 
 the whole administration into their hands." Virginia "had 
 nothing at heart but to lessen the influence of the Crown." In 
 Pennsylvania, he was informed, the "obstinate, wrongheaded 
 Assembly of Quakers pretended not to be accountable to his 
 Majesty or his government." In New Jersey there was "a 
 growing rebellion." New England was, of course, worst of all. 
 There had already been "a rebellious insurrection" in Boston, 
 and that, and similar evil manifestations, arose from the con- 
 stitution of the colony, "by which the management of it de- 
 volves on the populace, assembled in their town meetings." 
 
 It does not appear that a more crassly ill-conceived criticism 
 was ever passed upon Massachusetts, or upon any colony in the 
 history of America or of the world, than that directed against 
 the "town meetings." No doubt that feature of the colonial 
 government at that time, as afterward, dominated the colonies 
 and shaped their destinies. But it was in fact, as it was per- 
 ceived by wiser minds to be, the supreme virtue of the English 
 colonial system, and the secret or one great secret of the success 
 of the English colonies over those of France and Spain. That 
 shrewd and judicious French observer, De Tocqueville, after- 
 ward bore witness to that fact, in his "Democracy in America." 
 The French colonies in America failed, he confessed, because 
 they had no such institution as town meetings, and the English
 
 20 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 colonies prospered and grew into powerful States because they 
 had them. "Nations which are accustomed to township insti- 
 tutions and municipal government," he wrote, "are better able 
 than any other to found prosperous colonies. The habit of 
 thinking and governing for oneself is indispensable in a new 
 country." Never were words truer than those, and it was a 
 part of the condemnation of the British government of those 
 days that it did not recognize the fact. Instead of regarding 
 the town meetings of Massachusetts with suspicion and aver- 
 sion, it would have been well if Halifax and the others in Lon- 
 don had hailed them with approval and encouraged them. But 
 to do so would have been contrary to the spirit of their caste. 
 
 The gist of the whole situation was that the spirit of popular 
 government, as against royal autocracy or class privilege, was 
 growing in America, It was also growing in England, too. 
 But it seemed more conspicuous and more menacing in the colo- 
 nies than at home, and was, moreover, fatuously supposed to be 
 more easily suppressed. So the young Halifax set out to restore 
 the colonies to order by Act of Parliament, much after the man- 
 ner of the papal bull against the comet. The result was not as 
 mischievous as it might have been, owing to the paramount im- 
 portance of other issues which arose at the same time. Such mis- 
 chief as it did was subjective rather than objective. America 
 was not alienated from England by his maladroit efforts, but 
 among certain statesmen in England an unfounded and unfor- 
 tunate prejudice against America was engendered. 
 
 Much more important and more effective was Halifax's effort, 
 at the same time, to settle the questions which had been left open 
 by the Aix-la-Chapelle treaty, and to secure for England her 
 full claims in Nova Scotia and in the Ohio Valley. In Nova 
 Scotia, as we have seen, the English claimed territory extending 
 inland to the St. Lawrence River, while the French strove to con- 
 fine them to the peninsula. As soon as Halifax made known his 
 plans for enforcing the English claims, the smooth and subtle 
 La Galissoniere promptly moved to meet him. He sent Bien- 
 ville to proclaim French sovereignty in the Ohio Valley, and at 
 the same time, with characteristic ruthlessness, sought to use the 
 simple Acadian peasants as his tools in Canada. His plan was 
 to induce them to remove from their homes on the peninsula, and
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 21 
 
 plant themselves anew on the disputed frontier, there to be a 
 barrier against the English advance. The scheme was as foolish 
 as it was wicked, and would have been quite as ineffectual. The 
 Acadians did not do as La Galissoniere suggested. But by his 
 proposal there was begun a train of circumstances which led 
 str:iight to that most pitiful tragedy of a people, the wholesale 
 expatriation of the Acadians. For that act of the British gov- 
 ernment history has found few excuses and much condemnation. 
 But at least the condemnation must fall in part upon La Galis- 
 soniere and his colleagues, and upon those priests who, backed 
 with the authority of the Roman Church, incited the simple- 
 hearted and ignorant Acadian peasants to refuse all recognition 
 of British sovereignty, saying to them from the altar: "Better 
 surrender your meadows to the sea and your houses to the flames, 
 than, at the peril of your souls, take the oath of allegiance to 
 the British government." 
 
 The international rivalry in the Ohio Valley became keen in 
 1751. Louis XV of France personally disclaimed hostile intent, 
 protesting to the British minister at Paris that he was deter- 
 mined to keep the peace. De Puysieux, the French minister for 
 foreign affairs, who had made the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
 said the same. But the latter was in September of that year suc- 
 ceeded by the pugnacious St. Contest, who sniffed the battle afar 
 off and promptly planned a maritime league against England, in 
 which he was energetically aided by his congenial colleague, 
 Rouille, the minister of marine, who began preparing for war. 
 In all these things Spain took a keen interest, but refrained from 
 any direct participation, preferring wisely to play the oppor- 
 tunist's part in a waiting game. Said the Marquis of Ensenada, 
 the minister of Ferdinand VI: "By antipathy and also from 
 interest the French and English will be enemies, for they are 
 rivals for universal commerce." So he planned to let them fight 
 each other to exhaustion and then at the psychological moment 
 to step in and seize for Spain the spoils of their war. 
 
 But there were other forces at work than those at London, 
 Paris, and IMadrid. A generation before the illustrious Spot- 
 tiswoode, that far-seeing, pioneer knight-errant of imperial ex- 
 pansion and of Anglo-Saxon mastery of the North American 
 continent, had blazed in imaginative anticipation the triumphal
 
 22 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 progress of British arms and the impregnable establishment of 
 British colonists from the shores of the Chesapeake to the brim 
 of the Great Lakes. The dull ears of the lords of trade at Lon- 
 don had refused to listen to him. But now the crack of rifles 
 in the valley of the Beautiful River roused them from their 
 deaf lethargy. Dinwiddie and his Ohio Company were forcing 
 the hand of England in the Ohio Valley. George Washington 
 and his "self-willed and ungovernable" followers pushed for- 
 ward in defiance of France and began at Great Meadows in May, 
 1754, the war which set two continents aflame and transformed 
 the map of the civilized world. We need not here rehearse the 
 story of that tremendous conflict, the French and Indian War in 
 America and the Seven Years' War in Europe. It was won for 
 England largely by the colonists, who put 20,000 troops into the 
 field, and gave 400 vessels to make England mistress of the seas. 
 The result of it in America was a matter of life and death to 
 England. Had she been beaten, she would have lost her colo- 
 nial empire and been reduced to the rank of a second-class power. 
 Winning it, as she did, she was made the foremost colonial and 
 commercial power in the world, and France was wholly expelled 
 from the North American continent. That war was precipi- 
 tated, was forced upon England, by the American colonies, or by 
 the Virginia colony ; and was chiefly fought and won for her by 
 the colonists, in 1754 and 1763, who established and confirmed 
 the British Empire, for centuries to come, as the foremost colo- 
 nial empire and the chief maritime power of the world. They 
 placed the mother country at that time under an indebtedness 
 which the long process of succeeding ages could scarcely hope to 
 repay. Yet in the settling up of the terms of peace at the end 
 of that war, some of the purblind politicians of England actually 
 hesitated for a time over the question of retaining Canada, won- 
 dering whether it would not be better to restore Canada to 
 France, and to take instead only the island of Guadeloupe for 
 England. Their argument was that the colonies were already 
 large and numerous enough, and that the French should be left 
 in North America to be a check upon the English colonies and 
 to prevent the latter from growing so large as to overshadow 
 England itself! Such was some English statesmanship in the 
 year of grace 1763. *
 
 COLONIAL INFLUENCES 23 
 
 We must not forget, in passing, the interest of Prussia in that 
 war. It was the Seven Years' War that showed Frederick the 
 Great the foremost military genius and ablest ruler of his age, 
 and that raised Prussia from third-class to first-class rank among 
 the powers of Europe. It put Prussia in the way of succeeding 
 to the headship of the German world, so that, without greatly 
 straining our fancy, we may see in the little skirmish at Great 
 Meadows the beginning of the campaign which led through 
 Dueppel and Sadowa to Sedan and the Hall of Mirrors at Ver- 
 sailles, Again, it was Frederick the Great who, early in that 
 war, declared that "by the law of nations, the goods of an 
 enemy cannot be taken from on board the ships of a friend." 
 That was the first authoritative enunciation of what has come 
 to be one of the most important principles of international law 
 in time of war, namely, that "free ships make free goods." 
 Later, during our revolution, France and other powers took up 
 Frederick's declaration, and induced Catherine of Russia to 
 put it forward as the fundamental principle of the "Armed 
 Neutrality." But it is not to be forgotten that we owe that 
 principle to Frederick the Great, and that it was put forth by 
 him in a war begun by the American colonies, at a time when 
 he and Pitt, Prussia and England, stood alone against the world. 
 
 Note also that in the latter part of that war Pitt was com- 
 pelled to retire from office ; and that the wretched bunglers who 
 succeeded him promptly changed their relations with Frederick 
 so that he believed that they had broken faith and betrayed 
 him, thus incurring his wrath, and bringing upon England it- 
 self his distrust, contempt, and animosity. It was quite fitting 
 that such a deed should be done by those who proposed to throw 
 away the empire which the colonists had won for them in 
 America, and to retain a French jailer over the freedom of 
 growth of English States. Happily, other counsels prevailed, 
 and England retained for herself the fruits of conquest in 
 America, though with bad faith and fatuity her politicians re- 
 fused to apportion them equitabl,y among the colonies, and thus 
 sowed seeds of future trouble and disaster. Speaking at the 
 end of that war, in 1762, Granville exclaimed in rapture: "The 
 country never saw so glorious a war or so honorable a peace." 
 The king himself declared: "England never signed such a
 
 24 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 peace before, nor, I believe, any other power in Europe." A 
 few years later that wise and true English patriot, David Hart- 
 ley, said in the House of Commons: "In the war of 1756 the 
 Americans turned the success of the war at both ends of the line. 
 Nor did they stint their services to North America. They fol- 
 lowed the British arms out of their continent to Havana and 
 Martinique. And so they had done in the preceding war. 
 They were at the siege of Carthagena — yet what was Cartha- 
 gena to them, but as members of the common cause? In that 
 war, too, they took Louisbourg from the French, single handed, 
 without any European assistance. Whenever Great Britain has 
 declared war, they have taken their part, ever foremost to par- 
 take of honor and danger with the mother country." That 
 noble eulogium was true and was well deserved by the colonies. 
 Franklin had also truly boasted, in 1768: "Scotland has had 
 its rebellion ; Ireland has had its rebellion ; England has had its 
 plots against the reigning family ; but America is free from this 
 reproach." 
 
 Down to the treaty of Paris in 1763, then, the English colo- 
 nies in North America shared the political fortunes of the mother 
 country, in peace and in war. Especially did they incur the 
 enmity of England's chief enemies of those days, France and 
 Spain. In some of the circumstances of the French and Indian 
 War, however, and in some of the conditions of the treaty of 
 peace which was made at the end of it, were planted and de- 
 veloped seeds of revolution, the fruit of which was England's 
 loss of the major part of the empire which she had gained in 
 North America. We have quoted the enthusiastic encomiums 
 pronounced by the king and by Granville upon that war and 
 the treaty of peace. Yet at that very time the king was prepar- 
 ing to establish and maintain a standing army of twenty battal- 
 ions in the American colonies! Such an establishment was not 
 needed for the suppression of any real disloyalty at that time. 
 It was designed to meet the fictitious conditions which young 
 Halifax had discerned in his alarmist reports. But it mate- 
 rially aided in provoking a revolutionary spirit which neither it 
 nor any available English force was sufficient to quell.
 
 II 
 
 INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY 
 
 WE have said that a radical change in the political tempera- 
 ment of the colonies occurred in the days of Cromwell. 
 At that time they began to align themselves with the two great 
 parties of the mother country. Down to 1763 they remained 
 entirely loyal to the British connection. Puritans in Massa- 
 chusetts denounced the Stuarts, and Cavaliers in Virginia 
 washed down a bit of bread with wine and with the toast, ' ' God 
 send this Crum-well down ! ' ' Later they were "Whig and Tory 
 to their hearts' content. But they were all the time English- 
 men, ready to stand for England against all the world. In or 
 about the year 1763, however, another and more ominous change 
 occurred. The colonists then began to regard themselves as 
 Americans. They were still Englishmen, by nativity or ances- 
 try, and by affection. But they began to realize that in some 
 important respects American interests were different and sepa- 
 rate from those of England, and they insisted that that fact 
 should be recognized by the English government. For some 
 time American interests had been impaired and ignored, under 
 a series of acts which seemed to be deliberately calculated to put 
 and to keep the colonists in a state of inferiority and degrada- 
 tion. The felling of white pine and pitch pine trees outside of 
 fenced enclosures was prohibited. It was forbidden for a colony 
 to export, even to a neighboring colony, woolen goods or hats 
 of domestic manufacture. A hatter was not permitted to have 
 more than two apprentices at a time. The manufacture of steel, 
 and of various kinds of ironware, was prohibited. The bills of 
 credit which were issued by colonial governments were declared 
 to be not legal tender. With these and similar acts the Ameri- 
 cans were driven to seek a vindication of their right to autonomy. 
 There was as yet no thought of alienation from the British 
 crown. The word "independence" had no place in the political 
 
 25
 
 26 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 vocabulary of the colonists. But autonomy was demanded. 
 Rather let us say that the maintenance of autonomy was de- 
 manded. The colonists held that they already enjoyed auton- 
 omy under their charters and constitutions, and when a contro- 
 versy or a clash arose over it, that was not because they were 
 demanding something new, but because the British government 
 was trying to deprive them of something to which they were en- 
 titled and which they already possessed. We shall perceive this 
 the more clearly if we recall an interview between Lord Gran- 
 ville, the lord president of the council, and Benjamin Franklin, 
 the representative of the colony of Pennsylvania, in 1757. 
 "You Americans," said Granville, "have wrong ideas of the 
 nature of your constitutions; you contend that the king's instruc- 
 tions to his governors are not laws, and you think yourselves at 
 liberty to regard or disregard them at your own discretion. But 
 these instructions are, so far as they relate to you, the law of 
 the land, for the king is the legislator of the colonies!" This 
 was new doctrine to Franklin, who had always understood that 
 the colonial assemblies were colegislators with the king, just as 
 Parliament was in England. Parliament enacted laws, which 
 required the royal assent before they became valid. The king 
 could make no law without Parliament. So the colonists con- 
 tended it should be in the colonies. They were as good and true 
 Englishmen as those in England, and they were entitled to as 
 good treatment. Their colonial assemblies, therefore, were to 
 make the laws for the colonies, and the laws thus made were to 
 receive the royal assent before becoming valid. But the king 
 could no more make colonial laws without the cooperation and 
 indeed the initiative of the assemblies, than he could make Eng- 
 lish laws without the like action of Parliament. 
 
 There can be little question that had that contention of the 
 colonists been granted by the English government, the colonies 
 would have remained contented and loyal. The demand was 
 merely for equal treatment of all subjects of the crown, in what- 
 ever land. But the British government would not concede it. 
 In England itself the demand for constitutional government 
 through a representative assembly had long been too strong for 
 denial. It was irresistible. But in the remote and compara- 
 tively feeble colonies the king and some of his advisers thought
 
 INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY 27 
 
 autocracy still possible. So it was that Granville assumed the 
 attitude which we have just recalled. So it was that the lords 
 of trade in 1760 reported that they could discern in the colonies 
 a movement and intention "to establish a democracy in place 
 of his Majesty's government," and recommended the taking of 
 strenuous measures for the restoration of the authority of the 
 crown and for checking the growing influence of the popular 
 assemblies. 
 
 The colonists were, from their point of view, logical and right 
 in their demand for autonomy under the crown. From the 
 point of view of the crown, however, they were in error. The 
 fact was that the crown was at that time making its last desper- 
 ate stand for what was known as the king's prerogative, and 
 particularly for that prerogative which embraced autocratic per- 
 sonal authority over the colonies. We must remember that in 
 the fifteenth century the title of all unoccupied lands was vested 
 in the person of the sovereign of the country by which those 
 lands were discovered. That is to say, these American colonies 
 were the property not of the British nation, but of the king. 
 The king alone could sell or give away lands for the founding 
 of these colonies. The crown alone could make and repeal laws, 
 and could appoint and remove governors and judges. Parlia- 
 ment had nothing to do with it. The colonies were not sub- 
 ject to Parliament, but to the king. Their charters were granted 
 not by Parliament, but by the king ; and he could amend or abro- 
 gate them at will. The colonists were not citizens or subjects 
 of the British Empire; they were the personal subjects of the 
 king. 
 
 Now all this was the admitted constitutional law of England. 
 Franklin conceded it, though he declared that the colonies would 
 resist it. The greatest judges of England upheld it. Neverthe- 
 less, there was a strong and growing party in England itself 
 which disputed it, or which at least held that the king's pre- 
 rogative was obsolete and should be abolished. The prerogative 
 had been freely exercised, without question or challenge, by 
 Queen Elizabeth; doubtless because she exercised it wisely and 
 well. Under James I it was called into question, because of 
 his misuse of it. Under Charles I it was denied, and that mon- 
 arch lost his life because of his stubborn insistence upon it.
 
 28 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Charles II exercised it again, but James II lost his crown be- 
 cause, like Charles I, he insisted upon maintaining it. Finally, 
 under George III this final attempt was made to vindicate that 
 medieval principle, not in England herself, but in her richest 
 colonies. The last battle for the king's prerogative was fought 
 out, as more than one other European battle was fought, upon 
 American soil. 
 
 Of course the attitude of the British Parliament was egre- 
 giously illogical. It was held by the upholders of the preroga- 
 tive that the colonies were not under Parliament, but under the 
 crown. Yet Parliament enacted laws for them, precisely as 
 though they were counties of the United Kingdom. The colo- 
 nists argued that they either were or were not subject to Parlia- 
 ment. If they were, then they were entitled to representation 
 in it and to all other rights of British citizens. If they were 
 not, then Parliament had no right to make laws for them and 
 they owed no allegiance or obedience to it. 
 
 In view of this attitude of the colonies the impression arose in 
 England that democracy and secession were arising here. No 
 doubt democracy was developing in America. But it was only 
 the democracy that already existed in England, and that for a 
 century and a half since has prevailed there without overthrow- 
 ing the crown. The intention was not to establish a democracy 
 in place of, but rather under, his Majesty's government. But 
 the British statesmen stubbornly misconceived the purport of the 
 American demand. When the Americans demanded the main- 
 tenance of autonomy under the crown, the king and his court- 
 iers interpreted them as demanding independence and separa- 
 tion from the crown. 
 
 Yet there was no such thought in the American mind. In 
 1762 the British attorney-general, Pratt, said to Franklin that 
 he believed that with all their boasted affection for England, 
 the Americans would one day set up independence. "No such 
 idea," replied Franklin, "is entertained by Americans, or ever 
 will be, unless you grossly abuse them." To Lord Kames, 
 Franklin added: "The future grandeur and stability of the 
 British Empire lies in America." There is no doubt that Frank- 
 lin was entirely sincere in these statements, and there seems little 
 reason to doubt that he was correct in his judgment of his coun-
 
 INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY 29 
 
 trymen and their intentions and desires. We can find no con- 
 vincing indication that independence was then thought of by any 
 responsible person in the colonies, or that it was thought of for 
 a number of years thereafter save by a very few, and they by 
 no means leaders of public policy. 
 
 Public opinion was, however, in the dozen years before the 
 Revolution, in a decidedly inchoate state. America was an "un- 
 licked cub." Dependence upon England for guidance had dis- 
 couraged the development of strong statesmanship here, and 
 among those who should have been men of light and leading 
 some of the wildest notions prevailed. Jefferson, for example, 
 was preaching that an epidemic of yellow fever was not an un- 
 mixed evil, since it would discourage the growth of great cities, 
 and he regarded great cities as ''pestilential to the morals, the 
 health, and the liberties of mankind." Artisans and tradesmen 
 he held to be the ' ' panders of vice and the instruments by which 
 the liberties of a country are generally overturned." It was 
 in his view an error to attract hither mechanics or other artisans 
 from Europe, or to establish here manufactures of any kind. 
 It would be better to leave the workmen in Europe, carry food 
 and raw materials to them there, and bring back the fin- 
 ished products. Even the carrjdng trade should be done by oth- 
 ers. He wished the colonists, and the States after independence 
 had been achieved, to * ' practise neither commerce nor navigation, 
 but to stand precisely on the footing of China." Perhaps in 
 such sentiments were to be found the germs of his hatred of Eng- 
 land, the ''nation of shopkeepers." But with such statesman- 
 ship at the forefront, we may well wonder that America fared 
 as well as it did. 
 
 The effort to deny or to withdraw the colonial right of au- 
 tonomy was strongly made in the enactment of laws taxing the 
 colonies without giving them representation in the taxing body. 
 Dinwiddie, the Governor of Virginia who precipitated the 
 French and Indian War, was the first of the colonial governors 
 to suggest that iniquitous and disastrous scheme; though the 
 same unenviable distinction is also claimed for Shirley of Massa- 
 chusetts. But the principle had been still earlier enunciated in 
 Parliament. In 1732-33 Parliament enacted laws for the pro- 
 motion of sugar growing in the West Indies at the expense of
 
 30 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 New England, and Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
 protested against them in a petition to Parliament, on the ground 
 that they violated the charter of that colony. When this peti- 
 tion was announced in the House of Commons, Sir William 
 Yonge opposed the reception of it. "This," he said, "is some- 
 thing very extraordinary, and in my opinion looks very like aim- 
 ing at an independence and disclaiming the authority and juris- 
 diction of this House, as if this House had not a power to tax 
 them." Mr, Winnington spoke to the same purport. "I hope," 
 he said, ' ' the petitioners have no charter which debars this House 
 from taxing them as well as any other subjects of this nation. 
 I am sure they can have no such charter." In the end such 
 views prevailed, and the petition was not received. Nor was 
 that the end of that fatuous course of the British government, 
 but only its beginning. It was planned to enact a measure which 
 would specifically and unmistakably establish the principle of 
 taxation without representation, and would check the growing 
 insistence of the colonies upon a rational degree of self-govern- 
 ment. 
 
 On the fourth of July, 1754, the colonies completed the for- 
 mation of a general league. It was purposed that a petition 
 should be presented to Parliament asking for the establishment 
 of a general government here, of course under the British crown ; 
 under which each colony should retain its internal constitution 
 with only such changes as the formation of the general govern- 
 ment made necessary; the government to consist of a president 
 appointed by the crown, and a grand council elected by the 
 representatives of the people. The scheme was that the presi- 
 dent should be, in fact, a viceroy, exercising here the powers and 
 functions which the king himself exercised at home ; and that the 
 grand council should correspond with Parliament. Moreover, 
 the king should have the power of approval or veto over all acts 
 of this government, which must be transmitted to him for his 
 action. Such was the plan of government which the colonists 
 laid before the British government, with high hopes of its ac- 
 ceptance. At that time the war with France was impending 
 and the colonists expressed full confidence that, if such a system 
 were promptly adopted, they would be able to master the French 
 on this continent without any aid from the mother country.
 
 INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY 31 
 
 It is obvious that that plan was a prototype of the forms of 
 government which in later years were granted to Canada, Aus- 
 tralia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and under which those 
 countries have enjoyed and are enjoying, and seem likely in- 
 definitely to enjoy, an exceptionally high degree of prosperity 
 and of contentment; and under which, instead of being weaned 
 away from the mother country, they are greatly confirmed in 
 loyalty and devotion to her. There is convincing reason for be- 
 lieving that similar results would have followed the granting of 
 that request of the colonists in 1754. But at that time, to the 
 then ruling statesmen of Great Britain, it savored of secession 
 and of treason. Accordingly, the plan was not approved. Nor 
 was the rejection of it the worst thing that the Westminster gov- 
 ernment did. It was thought necessary to rebuke so presumptu- 
 ous an act, and to read a stern lesson to the ambitious Americans. 
 Accordingly the British ministry put forward in its stead a 
 proposal, "That the governors of all the colonies, assisted by 
 one or two members of the councils, should assemble to concert 
 measures for the organization of a general system of defense, 
 to construct fortresses, to levy troops, with authority to draw 
 upon the British treasury for all suras that might be requisite; 
 the treasury to be reimbursed by way of a tax, ivliicli should he 
 laid upon the colonies hy an act of Parliament." Thus while 
 nominally and plausibly the colonists were to be called upon 
 merely to repay to England the cost of their own defense, there 
 was subtly to be established the principle of parliamentary taxa- 
 tion of the colonists without their representation. This insidious 
 scheme was readily understood in America, Benjamin Frank- 
 lin dissected and exposed its purpose in a letter to Governor 
 Shirley of Massachusetts, and although Shirley and other gov- 
 ernors persisted in approving the plan and in urging upon the 
 ministry its adoption as just, practicable, and expedient, oppo- 
 sition to it became widespread. The General Court of Massachu- 
 setts instructed the agent of the colony in London to oppose it 
 and every measure which should have for its object the estab- 
 lishment of taxes in America by the British Parliament on any 
 pretext whatever. In the face of such opposition the measure 
 was dropped, only to have its offensive principle revived at the 
 close of the war which then came on, in a still worse form.
 
 32 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 The fatal Stamp Act was introduced by Grenville in 1765. It 
 had previously been suggested to but rejected by Walpole, and 
 had been vainly proposed by Pelham. It had been urged upon 
 Pitt, and planned by Bute. Townshend was eager to support it. 
 The agents of Georgia and Massachusetts in England favored it. 
 The time thus seemed auspicious to establish the authority of 
 England over the colonies and to put a quietus upon the colonial 
 assumption of autonomy. Grenville made, it is true, a pretense 
 of deferring to colonial wishes. He told the agents of the col- 
 onies that he was willing to substitute for the stamp tax any 
 other form of taxation which would produce the necessary reve- 
 nue, and which might be more agreeable to them. With much 
 shrewdness he suggested that they had thus an opportunity of 
 establishing the precedent that they were to be consulted before 
 taxes were imposed. But this specious pretense did not deceive 
 them. It was too obvious that he was endeavoring to trick them 
 into an approval of the principle of taxation of the colonies by 
 a parliament in which they had no representation. 
 
 That was on February 13, 1765. Franklin expostulated with 
 Grenville, personally, persistently, and vehemently. But it was 
 in vain. ' ' The tide was too strong against us, ' ' wrote Franklin. 
 ' ' The nation was provoked by American claims of independence, 
 and all parties joined in resolving by this act to settle the point. 
 We might as well have hindered the sun's setting." So the act 
 became a law on March 22. Whether Franklin was right in his 
 estimate that the whole English nation was provoked against 
 America, may be open to question. If it was so, beyond doubt 
 that state of affairs did not last long, as we shall presently see. 
 Moreover, if it was so, that provocation was caused by misap- 
 apprehension — the misapprehension of American intentions, to 
 which we have already referred. The "independence" which 
 Americans then had in mind was not the independence of 1776, 
 but mere autonomy under the Crown, such as Franklin had con- 
 tended for and Granville had sought to deny ten years before. 
 
 The ill-conceived act did not last long. But it did much mis- 
 chief in America. It not only strengthened the insistence upon 
 autonomy, but it also gave rise to the first audible suggestions of 
 secession and independence. Generally, we must remember, the 
 act was acquiesced in, with regret but with loyal submission.
 
 INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY 33 
 
 Franklin exhorted his countrymen to meet extortion with thrift. 
 The very night that the act was passed, he wrote to Charles 
 Thomson, who was afterward secretary to the Continental Con- 
 gress, ' ' The Sun of Liberty is set ; the Americans must light the 
 lamps of industry and economy. ' ' To this Thomson replied em- 
 phatically, "Be assured we shall light torches of quite another 
 sort ! ' ' Even so fervent a patriot as James Otis, however, coun- 
 seled submission to the law. It was an evil law, but no people 
 could expect to have all their laws wise and righteous. The best 
 way was to accept it, bear it as best they could, and work pa- 
 tiently for its repeal. Otis and Franklin, with many others in 
 America, and Grenville, Adam Smith, and others in Great Brit- 
 ain, favored a solution of the trouble in Imperial Federation, 
 proposing to give the colonies representation at Westminster; a 
 proposition which, in various forms, has figured conspicuously 
 in British imperial politics in our own time, and is still a vital 
 and important issue. 
 
 One man in America, however, almost alone at that time, reso- 
 lutely opposed all such schemes, opposed acquiescence in the law, 
 and began to advocate separation from the British crown. That 
 man was Samuel Adams. When the enactment of the Stamp 
 Act was announced in 1765, he counseled resistance to it. He 
 was equally outspoken against imperial federation. The dis- 
 tance of the colonies from England was so great, and communi- 
 cation between the two countries was so imperfect, he argued, 
 that the colonial representatives would quickly lose touch with 
 their constituents and be unable to serve their interests aright. 
 Such representation would not be effective. It would not be 
 equal to that of the British constituencies. Therefore it would 
 in principle be no better than none at all. It may be that Adams 
 carried his point a little too far in some directions, but there is 
 no doubt that in the main it was a valid one, and that for the 
 reasons which he set forth imperial federation would have been 
 unsatisfactory at that time. Indeed, we cannot conceive of its 
 being entirely satisfactory until the latter part of the nineteenth 
 century, when swift and frequent steamships and a constant 
 cable service brought America and England closer together than 
 Yorkshire and Middlesex were in Grenville 's time. 
 
 Samuel Adams went further, however, than that. He began 
 
 Vol. 1—3
 
 34 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 as early as 1765, because of that Stamp Act, to suggest and to 
 counsel independence. This we have on the testimony of Hutch- 
 inson, the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, and we see no reason 
 for doubting the truth of it. Indeed, no reason appears why 
 Adams's warmest friends should wish to deny it. In 1768 it is 
 a matter of record that Hutchinson forwarded to London the 
 sworn testimony of Richard Sylvester of Boston, that Samuel 
 Adams had urged a number of men to "take up arms immedi- 
 ately and be free." It might have been advisable for Adams 
 at that time to avoid credit for such utterances, seeing that they 
 would have endangered his neck. But why should we at this 
 date deny him the honor of having been so far in advance of his 
 fellows the seer and forerunner of independence ? 
 
 We have said that the Stamp Act was short lived. Just a 
 year after it was made it was destroyed. Conway, the minister 
 for the colonies, moved for its repeal on February 21, 1768, and 
 on March 18 the repeal was effected. Enactment had taken 
 thirty-seven days; repeal took only twenty-five. Moreover, the 
 king did not sign the bill on its passage, being incapacitated by 
 insanity; but he did sign the repealing act. It is mournful to 
 record, however, that the repeal was unpopular in England. The 
 nation generally seemed displeased with it, thus corroborating 
 Franklin's testimony of a year before as to the animosity of all 
 men of all parties. We have attributed this insane passion to 
 misapprehension of America's real intent. There must also be 
 taken into account England's ignorance of America in nearly all 
 respects. The natural circumstances cited by Samuel Adams to 
 show the inefficiency of American representation at Westminster 
 served equally to keep Englishmen in England ignorant of 
 America, not only of its desires and intentions, but also of its 
 powers and resources. So it came to pass that the repeal in turn 
 was scarcely longer lived than the act which it had abolished. 
 The unpopularity of the repeal encouraged the half -crazy king 
 and his worse than crazy courtiers to seek a renewal of the op- 
 pressive policy. Pitt, the world 's foremost champion of freedom 
 at that time, was sent into the House of Lords; the brilliant, 
 plausible, cynical, conscienceless Townshend gained the ear of 
 the king ; and then — the deluge ! 
 
 It is to be observed, too, that the act repealing the obnoxious
 
 INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY 35 
 
 Stamp Act was an altogether illusory measure. It was proposed 
 and supported by the friends of America and of British consti- 
 tutional liberty. But it was coupled with another measure 
 which made it not unacceptable to the purblind upholders of 
 autocracy. The real question at issue was not the amount of 
 tax levied upon America. The colonies would have been able to 
 pay ten times as much without suffering. It was the question 
 of abstract principle, whether the British government had a 
 moral and constitutional right to levy any tax whatever upon 
 the colonists without their consent. That was the real issue. 
 Samuel Adams emphasized it again when he led the Massachu- 
 setts Assembly to protest against the Stamp Act because it tended 
 "to destroy that equality which ought ever to subsist among all 
 his Majesty's subjects." Englishmen in England could not be 
 taxed without their consent. Was it right to tax Englishmen in 
 America without their consent? Pitt in the British House of 
 Commons and Camden in the House of Peers had unhesitatinglj^ 
 said, No! They had urged that the Stamp Act should be re- 
 pealed, and not only that, but that the reason for its repeal 
 should be plainly stated, namely, that it "was founded on an 
 erroneous principle." They wanted the British government to 
 admit that it had no right to discriminate between two classes of 
 British subjects, and no right to tax one class — colonists — with- 
 out their consent. But Pitt and Camden were voted down. The 
 repeal was indeed voted. But with it was adopted a Declaratory 
 Act, explicitly reasserting that Parliament had a right to make 
 laws binding upon the colonies "in all cases whatsoever." That 
 was really more mischievous than the original Stamp Act. For 
 while the Stamp Act was repealed, the vicious principle upon 
 which it was based was reaffirmed. 
 
 May 13, 1767, was the day selected for sounding the knell of 
 the British Empire in these States. On that day all Americans, 
 even the official representatives of the colonies, were excluded 
 from the precincts of the House of Commons. An evil deed was 
 to be done, and it was to be done in secret. Townshend per- 
 formed the congenial task with avidity. He laid before the 
 House a scheme for taxing the American colonies, which for 
 subtle and ingenious malice has probably never been surpassed, 
 if equaled, in the history of evil government. It was not a
 
 36 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 renewal of the Stamp Act, but an imposition of port dues and 
 duties. Now the Americans had objected to the Stamp Act, 
 which was internal taxation, on principle. But at the same time 
 they conceded, on principle, the right of the British government 
 to regulate commerce, with tariffs, port dues, and such forms of 
 external taxation. Townshend therefore, with exquisite malice, 
 planned to take them at their word, or at the letter of their Word. 
 He would not impose the kind of tax to which they objected. 
 He would tax them in the way in which they declared their 
 willingness to be taxed. But he would do so in so offensive, 
 despotic, and oppressive a manner as to make the system far 
 more objectionable than the one which had been repealed. He 
 therefore prepared and introduced a series of bills which stand 
 to this day an unsurpassed monument of folly and wickedness. 
 It was not, again, the amount of the tax that was objectionable. 
 That the colonists were easily able to bear. It was not the prin- 
 ciple of such a tax. That, the colonists conceded. It was the 
 way in which that tax was to be levied and collected. There is 
 no exaggeration in saying that the execution of those laws would 
 have destroyed the charter rights of the colonists, the local lib- 
 erties of the municipalities, and even the personal freedom of 
 the citizens. Nor is it easy to believe that such was not Town- 
 shend 's deliberate design. He meant to show the American col- 
 onists, once for all, that they had no rights which the Govern- 
 ment in London was bound to respect. 
 
 In such fashion were the destinies of the colonies to be dis- 
 posed of, without their consent or representation — in the circum- 
 stances of the moment, without even their knowledge! Despite 
 the earnest opposition of some, who were equally friends of 
 America and of England, the bills were enacted in the course of 
 a few weeks. In the following September, Townshend died, 
 leaving a legacy of incalculable mischief to his successor, the 
 amiable and benevolent but hopelessly pliable and subservient 
 Lord North. For a little time longer the friendly Shelburne re- 
 mained in the colonial office, to temper to America the harshness 
 of the royal will. But soon he was displaced in favor of that 
 most ignorant and pig-headed of Irishmen, Lord Hillsborough. 
 The latter began his brief but mischievous career by grossly in- 
 sulting Franklin, but happily was in a little time forced by
 
 INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY 37 
 
 Franklin to resign the office which he so egregiously dishonored. 
 After him came Lord Dartmouth, who did his best for peace 
 and justice. But it was in vain. A principle was at stake. 
 Had England a right to tax the colonies without their consent? 
 England had committed herself to the affirmative answer, and 
 from that position she would not recede. 
 
 The Stamp Act was not the only measure which provoked re- 
 sentment in the colonies. Away back in the reign of Charles II 
 acts were passed forbidding commerce to or from the colonies 
 in any save British or colonial ships. This was aimed princi- 
 pally at Holland, and was another illustration of the way in 
 which these colonies were dragged into European controversies. 
 Then it was forbidden the colonies to send their chief products 
 to the markets of any other country than England and her pos- 
 sessions. Again it was enacted that no products or manufac- 
 tures of Europe should be brought to these colonies save in 
 British-built ships sailing from British ports. Still more, it was 
 decreed that one of these colonies should not trade directly with 
 another in certain articles, but must do so by way of England. 
 That is to say, Virginia could not ship tobacco to New York 
 directly, but must send it to England and thence back to 
 New York; though it was provided that it might be shipped 
 directly from one colony to another on payment of a tax upon it 
 equal to the customs duties it would have to pay in England. 
 These laws were not, it is true, enacted for the oppression of the 
 colonies, but for the fostering, protection, and development of 
 British trade; and the colonies had certain compensations for 
 them, in acts forbidding Englishmen to get supplies of certain 
 commodities anywhere else than from the colonies. Thus, Vir- 
 ginia was compelled to send her tobacco to the English market. 
 But on the other hand the English market was forbidden to get 
 supplies from any other source than Virginia. It was made a 
 serious crime for an Englishman to grow tobacco in his own 
 garden for his own use. He must get it from Virginia. These 
 laws, enacted a hundred years before, were maintained and en- 
 forced down to the time of the Revolution. 
 
 The year following the enactment of Townshend's Act, 1768, 
 was one of the most momentous in colonial history. Hitherto 
 the colonists had denied the authority of Parliament, since they 
 
 V.'
 
 38 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 had no representation in it. Now they took the extreme step of 
 denying the royal prerogative. In February of that year the 
 Massachusetts general court adopted a so-called Circular Letter, 
 addressed to the assemblies of the other colonies. Of this docu- 
 ment Samuel Adams was the author, anj it was probably his 
 ablest and best production. The purport of it was that if the 
 injustice and oppression of the measures which Townshend had 
 imposed upon them were to be successfully resisted, the colonies 
 must stand and act together. A copy of it was sent to England, 
 and was laid before the ministers. There it caused much ex- 
 citement, and provoked the British government to the making 
 of perhaps the greatest mistake which it made in all that time of 
 blunders. Down to this time the ministers and Parliament had 
 maintained at least a pretense of constitutionality in all their 
 dealings with the colonies. But now the notorious Hillsborough 
 threw constitutionality to the winds. In the name of the king 
 he peremptorily ordered the Massachusetts legislature to re- 
 scind the Circular Letter, under penalty of immediate dissolu- 
 tion; and at the same time he ordered the other colonial assem- 
 blies to disregard the message from Massachusetts. The reply 
 was unequivocal. By a vote of 92 to 17 the Massachusetts as- 
 sembly refused to rescind the letter, disobeyed Hillsborough's 
 command, and defied the authority of the king. Thereupon the 
 British government ordered more troops to Boston. The colo- 
 nists called and held a provincial convention, in which ninety- 
 six towns and eight districts were represented, and though the 
 royal governor ordered it to disperse and threatened it with 
 heavy penalties, it did its work, recited the grievances of the 
 colonists, and protested against having a standing army saddled 
 upon them. That was the high-water mark of colonial spirit 
 before the battles of Lexington and Concord. 
 
 Parliament met in November, and with a weak, vacillating, di- 
 vided ministry persisted in its fatuous course. Riots and the 
 Boston Massacre followed, and years of disturbance and discon- 
 tent. England herself was thus fertilizing the soil in which 
 Samuel Adams was planting the seeds of revolution. Franklin 
 certainly had not been and was not yet a secessionist. But he 
 was a man of clear and discerning vision. In 1769 he reported 
 that matters were tending more and more toward ' ' a breach and
 
 INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY 39 
 
 final separation" between England and America. Two years 
 later, although he was constantly and energetically working for 
 peace and union, he saw that the tax laws contained the seeds 
 of "a total disunion of the countries, though as yet that event 
 may be at a considerable distance." That was in 1771. In 
 November, 1772, Samuel Adams moved, in a Boston town meet- 
 ing, that ''a Committee of Correspondence be appointed . . . 
 to state the rights of the colonists . . . and to communicate and 
 publish the same to the several towns and to the world." This 
 committee was imitated by other Massachusetts towns, and led 
 the Virginia House of Burgesses, in March, 1773, to adopt reso- 
 lutions recommending the creation of an intercolonial Committee 
 of Correspondence. It was this latter body which in 1774 called 
 together the first Continental Congress and recommended the 
 creation of a continental army. 
 
 Samuel Adams kept on with his propaganda of independence. 
 He was still a voice crying in the wilderness, but people were 
 more and more listening to him. In September, 1773, he pub- 
 licly proposed in a newspaper "that a Congress of American 
 States be assembled as soon as possible ; draw up a Bill of Rights ; 
 and choose an Ambassador to reside at the British Court." A 
 month later he urged in like manner that the colonies should 
 "form an Independent State, an American Commonwealth." 
 In a private letter he wrote: "If the British administration 
 and government do not return to the principles of moderation 
 and equity, the evil which they profess to aim at preventing will 
 the sooner be brought to pass, namely, the entire separation and 
 independence of the colonies." While thus American sentiment 
 was being prepared for war and independence, there seems to 
 have been a reaction in England, such as there certainly was a 
 little later. Franklin, who had reported the whole English na- 
 tion to be arrayed against America, in 1774 declared that while 
 angry writers in England were trying to make out that the im- 
 pending war with the colonies would be a national and popular 
 war, in fact it would be nothing but a ministerial war. In 
 February, 1775, he was still looking for a victory over the min- 
 istry and it was not until the following month, when he sailed for 
 home, that he abandoned that hope and regarded war as inevi- 
 table.
 
 40 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 An interesting and instructive exposition of some British views 
 at this time is afforded to us in the letters of Horace Walpole. 
 Writing in February, 1774, he said: "The ministers have a 
 much tougher business on their hands, in which even their facto- 
 tum, the Parliament, may not be able to insure success — I mean 
 the rupture with America." In November of the same year he 
 wrote: "Every day may bring us critical news from America. 
 I am in perfect ignorance of the situation of affairs there." 
 And a few days later: "There are advices from America that 
 are said to be extremely bad. I don 't know the particulars, but 
 I have never augured well of that dispute. I fear we neither 
 know how to proceed or retreat." Still more to the point, in 
 December, 1774, commenting upon the acts of the first Conti- 
 nental Congress, which had then met, he wrote to H. S. Conway : 
 "The Americans at least have acted like men, gone to the bot- 
 tom at once, and set the whole upon the whole. Our conduct 
 has been that of pert children; we have thrown a pebble at a 
 mastiff, and are surprised that it was not frightened. Now we 
 must be worried by it, or must kill the guardian of the house." 
 The acts to which he referred were the resolutions against re- 
 ceiving taxed goods, and for sending a petition of rights to the 
 king, to the House of Commons and to the people of England, 
 and the demand for the repeal of various acts of Parliament af- 
 fecting the colonies. 
 
 There were various other causes, besides this supreme question 
 of principle, which led to the final breach between England and 
 the colonies and caused the latter to establish independent rela- 
 tionship with the nations of the earth. One of these was the 
 arbitrary conduct of the British government at the end of the 
 French and Indian War, in annexing the Northwest territory to 
 Canada, instead of granting it to Virginia. That was not merely 
 a denial of Virginia's expectations and desires. It was a viola- 
 tion of explicit grants formerly made. The English government 
 had conceded that region to Virginia. That was why Dinwiddle 
 had sent the Ohio Company — a Virginia concern, with a Vir- 
 ginia charter — into the wilderness to take possession of the Ohio 
 and Miami valleys. That was why Virginia troops, under com- 
 mand of Washington, had confronted and fought the French 
 at Great Meadows and elsewhere. It was a grievous wrong to
 
 INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY 41 
 
 despoil the colony, or the colonies, of territory to which the 
 colonial title had been made clear, both in treaties and on bat- 
 tle fields. Again, there was the military spirit, and the spirit 
 of self-reliance which had been developed in all the colonies by 
 years of fighting. In England's wars the colonists had been 
 made soldiers, and had acquired military leaders. They now 
 realized their power, and began to feel able to cope even with 
 England herself. They had seen on more than one field the 
 proved superiority of colonial levies over British troops of the 
 line, especially in the irregular manner of warfare which would 
 naturally prevail to a considerable extent in any conflict upon 
 this continent. They realized that they were strong enough to 
 be warranted in insisting upon what they believed to be their 
 rights. 
 
 To these causes we may justly add the insidious and generally 
 malicious incitements of aliens, and especially of the French. 
 During the years between the treaty of 1763 and the outbreak 
 of the American Revolution, French emissaries were busy in the 
 colonies, adding fuel to the fire of discontent, uttering or sug- 
 gesting evil against England, hinting at substantial aid for the 
 colonies from other lands in case of rebellion, and in every pos- 
 sible manner promoting the movement for revolution. Their 
 object in this was not recognized by the colonists at that time, or 
 not clearly. It is now patent. They were once more attempting 
 to strike at England in her colonies and to wage a European war 
 in America. Under the genius of the elder Pitt, England had 
 inflicted staggering defeats upon France, and France wanted re- 
 venge. She had no hope of securing it by direct attack upon 
 England, and she had no stomach for the attempt. But if she 
 could stir up strife between England and the American colo- 
 nies, she might gain her end in the most complete and effective 
 way. In such a conflict one side or the other would triumph. If 
 the colonies triumphed, England would be robbed of her richest 
 possessions and perhaps be reduced to the rank of a third-rate 
 power ; and the colonies themselves, in their independence, would 
 be so weak that, deprived of the protection of the mother country, 
 they would fall prey to France and the latter would thus regain 
 the American Empire of which England had robbed her. On 
 the other hand, if England won, she and the colonies would both
 
 42 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 be much impoverished and weakened by the war, and might then 
 be overcome by France in a timely assault. But France did 
 not expect nor intend that England should win. Her plan was 
 to provoke the war, to let it run on for some years, until both 
 combatants were much exhausted, and then herself to intervene 
 with all her might in apparent behalf of the colonies. That 
 would ensure the defeat of England, and give France a hold 
 upon the colonies which she could easily improve in the acquisi- 
 tion of the major part of North America. 
 
 With such aims Frenchmen lost no opportunity to suggest to 
 Americans: "To what end have Americans lavished their 
 blood, encountered so many dangers, and expended so much 
 treasure, in the late war, if the English supremacy must con- 
 tinue to press upon them with so much harshness and arro- 
 gance? Is it not time that Americans, no longer in a state of 
 infancy, should at length consider themselves a nation, strong 
 and formidable in itself? Let the Americans, then, seize the 
 occasion, with a mind worthy of themselves, now that they have 
 proved their arms, now that an enormous public debt overwhelms 
 England, now that her name has become detestable to all! 
 America can place her confidence in foreign succors. ..." 
 
 Nor were these suggestions void of plausibility. England had 
 indeed incurred a large measure of that jealous detestation which 
 is the common penalty of prosperity. She had been too success- 
 ful. She had expelled France from America and secured for 
 herself a dominant territorial establishment in this continent. 
 She had beaten down Spain and treated her as a negligible factor 
 in the problem. She had wrested from France another great 
 empire in the Far East. To Holland, too, she had been the cause 
 of many losses, in more than one continent and ocean, and she 
 had imperiled the colonies and commerce of that nation. Un- 
 der the sway of Pitt's successors she had abandoned Prussia 
 and incurred the bitter resentment of the great Frederick. Nor 
 were Russia and Sweden kindly inclined toward her. In all 
 parts of the world England seemed to be aiming at the sov- 
 ereignty of the seas, and though the "influence of sea-power in 
 history" had not then been philosophically set forth, it was in- 
 stinctively perceived that sovereignty of the seas meant more 
 than half the control of the land as well. Against such ap-
 
 INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY 43 
 
 proach toward universal dominion there arose well-nigh uni- 
 versal opposition, active or passive. The memory of defeats in 
 war, of losses of territory, of seizures of ships on one pretext or 
 another, of the arrogance which the English too often exhibited 
 in dealing with others, the dread of further aggressions by these 
 formidable islanders — these and a multitude of other motives 
 combined to inspire the nations of Europe to desire the humilia- 
 tion of England and the breaking of her mighty power. Not 
 one of them, it is true, nor any practicable combination of them, 
 would venture to undertake the formidable task. But if the 
 chief English colonies could be incited to do so, and to be the 
 tool of Anglophobic Europe? It would be a fine variation of 
 the old fable, for the rats to get a bell tied upon the cat, and 
 the cat's claws clipped, by one of that cat's own kittens. 
 
 How much or how little influence such European desires and 
 suggestions had upon American action, we may not now deter- 
 mine. That those desires were strong, and those suggestions, in- 
 citements, urgings, promises, and what not were numerous, there 
 can be no question. That without any of them the American 
 colonists would in time have proceeded to declare and to estab- 
 lish their independence, is not to be doubted. Patrick Henry, 
 in his "Liberty or death!" speech in 1775, referred to the hopes 
 of aid from abroad which had been aroused, when he said: 
 "We shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God . . . 
 who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us." Neverthe- 
 less, he did not wholly rely upon such hopes, for in the same 
 speech he declared the ability of the colonies to win their liberty 
 single-handed. "Three millions of people, armed in the holy 
 cause of liberty, and in such a country as that which we possess, 
 are invincible by any force which our enemy can send against 
 us." 
 
 The promptings of France are to be recalled, then, as indicat- 
 ing not so much the cause of the revolution as the attitude and 
 temper of the European mind at that time toward the colonies 
 and toward England. The colonies had been hated and assailed 
 so long as they were loyal English colonies, because of that very 
 loyalty and that English connection, and the foes of England 
 had struck at England by striking at her colonies. Now that 
 the colonies were becoming disaffected toward England, the
 
 44 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 temper of England's foes toward them changed. The continen- 
 tal powers sought to strike at England again through her colo- 
 nies; not, however, by striking at the colonies, but rather by 
 helping or instigating them to strike at England. That was 
 not, moreover, because of any love for the colonies, but because 
 of hatred for England. Let that fact not be forgotten. It was 
 at the time scarcely concealed by any of the European powers. 
 It was cynically confessed and avowed by the foremost of them. 
 It was doubtless perfectly well understood by the clearest-headed 
 of the colonists, and went far, as we shall see, toward determin- 
 ing their subsequent policy toward the European powers. 
 
 More than a century and a half of colonial history, then, 
 brought us to the verge of the Revolution, with this record of 
 foreign relations. We had come into actual contact with only 
 five powers. With one of them, Sweden, our relations had been 
 so slight as to be negligible. With Holland, too, they had been 
 comparatively slight ; at first friendly, but later, through Stuart 
 iniquity, hostile. With two others, Spain and France, they had 
 been from the first close and important, and they had almost 
 invariably been, for England's gake, unsympathetic, and most 
 of the time actively hostile. With the fifth, England herself, 
 we had been identified. Her relations had been our relations. 
 Now a radical change was impending. We were about to de- 
 stroy our identity with England, to establish temporarily hos- 
 tile relations with her, and to create for ourselves for the first 
 time an independent set of relations with all the world.
 
 Ill 
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 
 
 AMERICAN independence is commonly dated from July 4, 
 1776. The rise of the irresistible spirit of independence, 
 and the practical commitment of the colonies to that policy, had 
 a somewhat earlier date. We have seen that in 1772, in a Boston 
 town meeting, Samuel Adams secured the appointment of a Com- 
 mittee of Correspondence, for communication and cooperation 
 with other towns. Four months later the Virginia House of 
 Burgesses adopted the same idea and extended it to intercolonial 
 scope. A year and a half later still that system bore its richest 
 fruition in the assembling of the first Continental Congress. 
 This body met at Philadelphia on the fourth of September, 1774. 
 It has been pronounced, and probably was, the ablest legislative 
 body of equal numbers ever assembled in the world. That it 
 opened the way for independence, and made it practically cer- 
 tain that the colonies would pursue that way, is not to be 
 doubted. At the same time it is equally beyond doubt that it 
 made no overt move toward independence, but on the contrary 
 scrupulously avoided any mention of such a thing. All the 
 members of the Congress were land-owners, and therefore con- 
 servatively inclined. Some of them were among the richest men 
 in the colonies. Some of them came under explicit instructions 
 from their constituents to use all their efforts for restoring 
 amicable relations with the mother countr}% though on a basis 
 of liberty ; that is, the same liberty in the colonies that was en- 
 joyed in England. Others were specially instructed to seek an 
 improvement of commercial conditions. Still others were unin- 
 stmcted, and were left free to act according to their own judg- 
 ment. It does not appear that a single one was instructed or 
 desired by his colleagues to vote either for submission to Eng- 
 land or for independence. 
 
 The sentiment in favor of independence, so far as it existed 
 
 45
 
 46 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 at all, was then chiefly confined to Massachusetts. When John 
 Adams and the other Massachusetts delegates to the Congress 
 reached Philadelphia, they were met and taken into confidential 
 council by Rush, Mifflin, Bayard, and other Philadelphians, who 
 earnestly urged them to keep their independence views under 
 cover. "You must not," they said, "utter the word 'independ- 
 ence,' nor give the least hint or insinuation of the idea, either 
 in Congress or in any private conversation; if you do, you are 
 undone, for independence is as unpopular in the Middle and 
 South as the Stamp Act itself. No man dares to speak of it." 
 It is not for a moment to be imagined either that these Philadel- 
 phians were insincere or that they were misinformed and igno- 
 rant of the state of affairs in the middle and southern colonies. 
 On the contrary, there is every reason for believing that they 
 spoke the precise truth. Of all the colonies, Massachusetts and 
 Virginia were most purely English in origin and composition, 
 and since the demand first for autonomy and later for inde- 
 pendence was an English demand for equality among English- 
 men, it was naturally strongest and most prompt in those colo- 
 nies. Moreover, it was a little more prompt in Massachusetts 
 than in Virginia, for the reason that the former was chiefly a 
 Puritan colony, formed by Dissenters from the State Church of 
 England and therefore more inclined toward independence, 
 while Virginia was preeminently a colony of Episcopalians, who 
 were more generally inclined to respect the "divine right of 
 kings" and to hesitate before setting the royal will at defiance. 
 Nevertheless, it is to be recorded that the Episcopalians of Vir- 
 ginia were second^ by only the narrowest of margins to the Dis- 
 senters of Massachusetts in demanding "Liberty or death!" 
 and in devoting to that cause their lives, their fortunes, and their 
 sacred honor. 
 
 With such warning and exhortation, then, Adams and his 
 colleagues from Massachusetts kept their designs of independ- 
 ence, so far as they had yet developed them, hidden in their own 
 hearts. From beginning to end that session of Congress made 
 no reference to indepenednce, but acted as though such a thing 
 had never entered into its dreams. One of its most important 
 acts was to form a so-called association, which solemnly declared 
 that after December 1, 1774, its members, in order to compel
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 47 
 
 redress of their grievances, would neither import nor consume 
 any goods of British origin, nor export goods to Great Britain, 
 Ireland, or the British West Indies. Another highly important 
 work was a continuation and further development of the work 
 of the Committee of Correspondence through which it had been 
 called into being. It appointed a committee, ' ' to state the rights 
 of the colonies in general. ' ' The foremost member of that com- 
 mittee was John Jay of New York. He declared that it was 
 necessary ''to recur to the law of nations and the British con- 
 stitution to ascertain our rights." This appeal to the British 
 constitution indicated that he had in mind merely the securing 
 of equal rights with other Englishmen, rather than independ- 
 ence of the British crown. His view, moreover, was accepted by 
 Lee and Livingston, his colleagues on the committee, and he wag 
 appointed by them to draft an address to the people of Great 
 Britain. In that address he said : ' ' We consider ourselves, and 
 do insist that we are and ought to be, as free as our fellow sub- 
 jects in Great Britain. We believe there is yet much virtue, 
 much justice, and much public spirit in the English nation. To 
 that justice we now appeal. You have been told that we are 
 seditious, impatient of government, and desirous of independ- 
 ence; but these are mere calumnies. Permit us to be as free 
 as yourselves, and we shall ever esteem a union with you to be 
 our greatest glory and our greatest happiness. Place us in the 
 same situation that we were in at the close of the last war, and 
 our former harmony will be restored." Now Jay was not only 
 one of the youngest and most intrepid men in the Congress. He 
 was one of the most fervent and aggressive patriots, as his sub- 
 sequent career showed. Yet here he was in September, 1774, 
 deliberately declaring, and committing the Congi'ess and the 
 nation to the principle, that a restoration of the state of af- 
 fairs that existed in 1763 would be entirely satisfactory to the 
 colonies. It is impossible to doubt either that he was sincere or 
 that he correctly expressed the temper of the Congress, which 
 adopted his address. The other addresses adopted by the Con- 
 gress, to the king, and to the colonies of Canada, Newfound- 
 land, Nova Scotia, and Florida, corresponded with this in tone. 
 There was no hint anywhere of independence. 
 
 When the British Parliament met in the late fall of that year.
 
 48 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 the ministry seemed at first to be impressed by the unanimity and 
 earnestness of the Americans and to be inclined toward an 
 amicable adjustment of affairs with them. Lord North inti- 
 mated to various American merchants in London that if they 
 presented petitions they would be received with courteous atten- 
 tion. Then came news that New York refused to stand with 
 the other colonies in the association, in refusing to receive British 
 merchandise. That circumstance was due partly to the presence 
 in New York city of a large faction of so-called Tories, and partly 
 to the commercial spirit of the place, which for the time pre- 
 ferred profit to patriotism. The news apparently persuaded the 
 British ministry that the colonies were not united, after all, and 
 that therefore their petitions and those of their friends in Eng- 
 land might prudently be ignored. Accordingly, after a debate, 
 the House of Commons refused to receive the petition of the 
 American Congress, which had been addressed to the king and 
 by him referred to the House. It even refused to give a hear- 
 ing upon the subject to Franklin and his fellow commissioners. 
 And it gave the same inhospitable treatment to petitions which 
 were presented in behalf of the colonies by the West India 
 Islands, and by the cities of London, Liverpool, Manchester, 
 Birmingham, Bristol, Norwich, and Glasgow. These cities im- 
 plored Parliament to restore the calm and friendly relations 
 which had formerly prevailed between Great Britain and the 
 colonies. But all was in vain. The House of Commons curtly 
 threw the petitions into the wastepaper basket. More than that, 
 on February 2, 1775, on the initiative of Lord North, Parlia- 
 ment proposed, in its address to the king, that the province of 
 Massachusetts should be declared to be in a state of rebellion, 
 supported and fomented by illegal combinations and criminal 
 compacts with the other colonies. Following this a bill was en- 
 acted forbidding the colonies, since they would not trade with 
 Great Britain, to conduct commerce with any other country. 
 New York and Georgia, which had refused to enter the associa- 
 tion, were excepted from the operations of this act. 
 
 That memorable First Continental Congress, then, spoke no 
 word for independence, but adjourned without indicating that 
 it had any such measure in mind. On adjournment, it provided 
 for another Congress in May, 1775, to which it invited Canada
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 49 
 
 and the other British colonies to send delegates — an invitation 
 which was not accepted. The meeting of this second Congress 
 commanded of course much attention not only in England but 
 also on the continent of Europe. In England, as we have seen, 
 the ministerial party regarded it with disapproval amounting to 
 detestation, and called all who were concerned in it rebels. At 
 the same time the unanimity with which the colonies united for 
 cooperation was a cause of surprise and concern. The large com- 
 mercial cities, for the sake of business interests, begged Parlia- 
 ment to be conciliatoiy. On the part of the people generally, 
 however, there was a large degree of apathy and weariness. For 
 ten years the controversy over American affairs had been going 
 on, and the people of England were tired of it. There was no 
 thought nor fear of a revolution for independence, and a sug- 
 gestion that such a movement could be successful against the 
 might of Great Britain would have been received with incred- 
 ulity and derision. The general expectation was that the matter 
 would be settled by mutual concessions and compromise. At the 
 beginning of 1775 that shrewd observer and caustic critic, 
 Horace Walpole, wrote of the attitude of the Government toward 
 the American Congress: "They are bold Ministers, who do not 
 hesitate on a civil war in which victory may bring ruin." Wal- 
 pole was no admirer of Lord Chatham, but in this same letter 
 he wrote of him, referring to his championship of the American 
 cause : ' ' He will certainly be popular again with the clamorous 
 side, who no doubt will become the popular side, too." On the 
 continent of Europe the general feeling was one of opposition ta 
 England more than sympathy with America. If the Congress 
 was a source of embarrassment and menace to England, so much 
 the better for England's rivals and foes. But this feeling was 
 more official than popular. The masses of the people in con- 
 tinental countries were not sufficiently acquainted with the state 
 of affairs in America to have any marked sentiments in the mat- 
 ter. In England there was a considerable popular knowledge 
 of the situation and popular sentiment. But there was also 
 much apathy. 
 
 The second Congress met in Philadelphia on May 10, 1775. 
 Much had occurred meanwhile to strain further the relations be- 
 tween the colonies and England. Lexington and Concord had 
 Vol. I — 4
 
 50 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 been fought, and Patrick Henry had uttered his immortal ap- 
 peal for ' ' Liberty or death ! " It is, by the way, not at all cer- 
 tain that Henry in that speech meant independence. He made 
 no direct reference to it, or to anything more than a gaining of 
 equal rights and liberties with the other subjects of the British 
 crown. For these he would fight, as Englishmen had fought 
 before, in England itself. So the second Continental Congress 
 met, like the first, without any independence in its program. 
 John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were members of it, but they 
 began their work without so much as speaking the word inde- 
 pendence. Jay also was there, pursuing his former policy. He 
 urged the sending of a loyal address to the king, and Congress 
 agreed to it. Down to that time, he afterward declared, he had 
 never heard any American express a wish for the independence 
 of the colonies. Jay was a New Yorker, and had not come into 
 contact with Samuel Adams. But Adams stood almost alone, 
 and there is no doubt that Jay's statement was quite true. It 
 is probable that outside of a limited number in Boston, scarcely 
 any one in the colonies had proposed independence or had heard 
 it proposed. 
 
 This session of Congress lasted until August 1, and then ad- 
 journed for five weeks. During that session, the battle of 
 Bunker Hill was fought, and the colonies formed a provisional 
 union and organized a continental army. Franklin proposed a 
 confederation of the Thirteen Colonies, Canada, the Floridas, 
 the British Indies, and Ireland — a proposition which was never 
 acted upon. But yet there was little thought of secession from 
 the British Empire, and no official mention of independence. 
 Congress, in an address drafted by Jefferson, set forth its reasons 
 for taking up arms. "Our cause," it said, "is just, our union 
 is perfect, our internal resources great, and, if necessary, foreign 
 assistance is undoubtedly attainable. Before God and the world 
 we declare that the arms we have been compelled by our enemies 
 to assume, we will employ for the preservation of our liberties; 
 being, with one mind, resolved to die free men rather than live 
 slaves. ' ' This, it will be perceived, was practically a paraphrase 
 and adaptation of Henry's great speech, which had so impressed 
 Jefferson. Thus far, like Henry 's speech, it made no declaration 
 for independence. But then it added: "We have not raised
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 51 
 
 armies with designs of separating from Great Britain and estab- 
 lishing independent States. Necessity has not yet driven us into 
 that desperate measure." There can be no question that this 
 statement was entirely honest and sincere. It was followed with 
 an address to the king, drafted by Dickinson, which said : ' ' We 
 beseech your Majesty to direct some mode by which the united 
 applications of your faithful colonists to the throne, in pursuance 
 of their common councils, may be improved into a happy and per- 
 manent reconciliation." On the same day, July 6, 1775, the 
 Congress wrote to the corporation of the City of London that 
 "North America wishes most ardently for a lasting connection 
 with Great Britain on terms of just and equal liberty." 
 
 Another letter was addressed to the people of Ireland. This 
 related the grievances of the colonists, and also referred to those 
 which Ireland was suffering. This must be regarded as an ex- 
 ceptional step, and as an attempt, in classic phrase, to "carry 
 the war into Africa," by fomenting trouble for England in the 
 adjacent island. It was notorious that the Irish were, for many 
 reasons, dissatisfied with British rule and felt themselves to be 
 suffering various grievances. The American colonists seem to 
 have endeavored to take advantage of this fact, and to incite the 
 Irish to increased hostility to England. "We know," they said, 
 "that you are not without your grievances. We sympathize 
 with you in your distress, and are pleased to find that the design 
 of subjugating us has persuaded the administration to dispense 
 to Ireland some vagrant rays of sunshine. Even the tender 
 mercies of government have long been cruel toward you. In 
 the rich pastures of Ireland many hungry parasites have fed and 
 grown strong, to labor in its destruction." Still there was no 
 mention of American secession, nor any incitement to such action 
 in Ireland. "God grant," it said, "that the iniquitous schemes 
 of extirpating liberty from the British Empire may soon be de- 
 feated. We have taken up arms to defend it." That is, the 
 colonies had taken up arms to defend and maintain liberty 
 within the British Empire, not to seek it outside. Similar in 
 tone was the letter addressed to the people of Canada, and in- 
 deed such was the whole spirit of the Continental Congress, from 
 May 10 to August 1, 1775. When, a little later, that body was 
 accused of having "aimed at independence," John Jay in-
 
 52 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 dignantly and effectively repudiated the "malice and falsity" of 
 that "ungenerous and groundless charge," and quoted the 
 "Journal" of Congress in support of his contention. "To 
 charge the Congress," he said, "with aiming at the separation 
 of these colonies from Great Britain, is to charge them falsely 
 and without a single spark of evidence to support the accusa- 
 tion." 
 
 Nothing could have been worse than the British government's 
 response to the American Congress. Horace Walpole, whom we 
 have already quoted, wrote of it, in September, 1775 : "I most 
 heartily wish success to the Americans. They have not made 
 one blunder; and the administration have made a thousand, be- 
 sides the two capital ones of first provoking and then uniting the 
 colonies." Instead of resorting to reason, to conciliation, or to 
 abatement of grievances, it persisted in brute force. As if to 
 make that evil policy as evil as possible, it sought to employ alien 
 and mercenary force. As early as August, 1775, application 
 was made to the Empress of Russia for twenty thousand soldiers 
 for service in America, for the suppression of the "rebellion." 
 It was natural that such aid should first be sought in Russia 
 for many reasons. Russia was just then more friendly to Eng- 
 land than any other important power on the Continent. She 
 was also the most despotic of all, and therefore most inclined to 
 sympathize with the suppression of a movement for freedom 
 and the rights of man. The sending of a Russian army to help 
 another country to suppress a freedom-seeking revolution is by 
 no means unknown to history. Moreover, Russia had from 1768 
 to 1774 been waging a successful war with Turkey, in which 
 Great Britain had given her not only sympathy but material 
 aid. It was the Englishman Elphinstone who led the Russian 
 fleet in the victory over the Turks at Scio and who destroyed the 
 Turkish fleet at Tchesme, in 1770, and thus essentially and 
 greatly contributed to the Russian success. After overrunning 
 "Wallachia, Moldavia, the Crimea, and other Turkish territories, 
 Russia in 1774 made the very profitable treaty of Kutchuk-Kai- 
 narji, by which she became mistress of the Crimea and other 
 Tartar lands. This result was largely owing to England's 
 friendship. Moreover, the conclusion of peace in 1774 left Rus- 
 sia with a large army of veteran troops on hand, with nothing to
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 53 
 
 do, and it seemed reasonable to suppose that the empress might 
 like to find work for it in America. Again, there was the mem- 
 ory of the fact that Russia, under the Empress Elizabeth, had 
 accepted a subsidy from England. 
 
 For these and other reasons, therefore, it was with a confident 
 expectation of success that the King of England applied to the 
 Empress Catherine for aid. At that time, however, Catherine 
 was in such matters entirely under the influence of her minister, 
 Panin, an excellent man — for an eighteenth-century Russian — 
 reasonable, free from rancor, and honest. He was, however, in- 
 ordinately vain and susceptible to flattery, and through those 
 weaknesses, and through the giving of some gimcrack presents, 
 had been quite won over by Frederick the Great of Prussia, so 
 that he took Frederick's view of England and America. Now 
 Frederick was at this time feeling particularly resentful toward 
 England for what he deemed her desertion of him near the end 
 of the Seven Years' War, and while he had no especial sympathy 
 with the Americans — no absolute monarch could well sympathize 
 with democracy — he was glad to see the colonies used as a stick 
 with which to beat Great Britain. This view of the case was 
 adopted by Panin, and by him impressed upon the empress. 
 
 The general tone of the Russian court, therefore, became cool 
 toward Great Britain, and the expectation was expressed that the 
 Americans would succeed. It is probable that this expectation 
 was simulated for the sake of annoying the British minister, 
 rather than really felt. That minister. Gunning, however, 
 seemed not to notice it. He was probably somewhat obtuse. At 
 any rate, he continued to act as though the Russian court were 
 most friendly, and early in August, 1775, asked Panin if he would 
 be justifiable in reporting to King George that, in case such aid 
 were needed, "he might reckon upon a body of her Imperial Maj- 
 esty's infantry." Gunning had been specifically directed to 
 make such advances to the empress, but he deemed it most politic 
 to make them as though entirely on his responsibility and without 
 the fore-knowledge of the British government. Panin, however, 
 appears to have seen through this ruse, and to have known what 
 Gunning's instructions were; and on August 8 he gave the em- 
 press's reply. It was to the effect that, because of gratitude for 
 favors received from England during the last war, she was en-
 
 54 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tirely ready, upon this and every other occasion, to give to the 
 King of England all possible assistance, in whatever manner he 
 might think proper. Her very words, as reported by Panin at 
 her command, were that "she found in herself an innate affec- 
 tion for the British nation which she would always cherish." 
 We have said that Gunning was probably obtuse. He was so 
 obtuse that he received this answer in good faith, and though it 
 did not contain a word specifically about the troops, he believed 
 that it meant that a Russian army would be placed under Brit- 
 ish orders for service in America. Doubtless Catherine would 
 have been pleased to mediate between the king and his rebellious 
 subjects, as she indeed afterward explicitly offered to do. That 
 she would not loan troops for the American war, and never had a 
 thought of doing so, must have been evident to everybody at that 
 time, excepting Gunning. 
 
 Or perhaps we should add George III himself as another ex- 
 ception. He, "with his own hand," wrote forthwith to Cather- 
 ine a most cordial if not actually fulsome letter of thanks for the 
 promise which Gunning had reported she had made. ' ' I accept 
 the succor that your Majesty offers me of a part of your troops," 
 he wrote, "whom the acts of rebellion of my subjects in some 
 of my colonies in America unhappily require. Nothing shall 
 efface from my memory the offer your Imperial Majesty has 
 made to me on this occasion." So Gunning was commissioned 
 to arrange for the immediate despatch of twenty thousand Rus- 
 sian troops, and the British government began preparing to for- 
 ward them to America. They were to be engaged for two years. 
 Seven pounds sterling would be paid for each man, half down 
 and half on embarkation. In addition England would, if re- 
 quired, pay a subsidy to Russia. Expense was no object. Eng- 
 land wanted the troops and would pay whatever was necessary 
 for them. But before the instructions to this effect reached 
 Gunning, the empress one day asked him if his government had 
 made any progress toward settling the American trouble. With- 
 out waiting for him to reply she continued : ' ' For God 's sake, 
 put an end to it as soon as possible, and do not confine your- 
 selves to one method of accomplishing it. There are other means 
 than force of arms, and they ought all to be tried." Poor Gun- 
 ning, much taken aback, replied that his master was doing all he
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 55 
 
 could consistently with his dignity and sovereignty. The em- 
 press again repeated her hope that England and America would 
 soon come to terms, and the interview ended, with Gunning feel- 
 ing particularly uncomfortable. 
 
 When Gunning's instructions and the letter from George III 
 to Catherine arrived, the empress had gone into a religious "re- 
 treat ' ' for a few days. Gunning consulted with Panin, who was 
 noncommittal but let the Englishman continue in his belief that 
 help would be given. When the empress was again accessible, 
 on September 30, Gunning presented the king's letter to Panin, 
 who laid it before her. Catherine expressed herself through 
 Panin in reply as much moved by George's friendly expressions. 
 She declared that her friendship for him was no less warm. But 
 she greatly disliked to have her troops employed in America, 
 She asked if he could not get Hanoverians instead. Gunning 
 argued at much length and with much earnestness, conjuring 
 Panin, by his regard for the honor of his sovereign, to reflect on 
 the light in which a refusal of aid would be looked upon not 
 only by Great Britain but also by all Europe, and the effect 
 which it might have upon some of them. He even abated his re- 
 quest, saying that he would be content with only fifteen thousand 
 men. Panin remained inscrutable, and reported the matter to 
 Catherine, who avoided seeing Gunning. In the imperial coun- 
 cil, however, the subject was much discussed. Catherine evi- 
 dently wanted to oblige the king if possible, but saw many ob- 
 jections to doing so in the way which Gunning had asked. The 
 divisions in Poland, the hostility of Sweden, and the weakened 
 condition of her army, made it seem inexpedient to send troops 
 to America. Besides, it might offend some other European pow- 
 ers, it would probably engender discontent among her own sub- 
 jects, and her minister to England asvsured her that it would 
 alienate the English people, who by no means approved the pol- 
 icy of their government toward America. 
 
 The end of the matter was that she presently dictated to her 
 secretary a letter to King George in reply to the one which he 
 had written to her with his own hand. She told him that her 
 empire needed peace, and her army rest; that it would be im- 
 proper to employ her troops at the other side of the world and 
 beyond her own reach ; that affairs in Poland and Sweden made
 
 56 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 it inexpedient to weaken her army; and that, finally, it would 
 be unworthy of her dignity and his, and of the dignities of the 
 two monarchies and nations, to unite their forces "simply to 
 calm a rebellion which is not supported by any foreign power." 
 When in December Gunning returned to England, the empress 
 took leave of him in a most cordial manner, and repeated her 
 assurances of affection for the king and her readiness to aid him 
 in any way possible and at any time; "but," she added, "one 
 cannot go beyond one's power." 
 
 "We have reviewed this episode at such length to show as cer- 
 tainly as possible the real attitude of Russia at that time. It 
 seems evident that she was inclined toward friendly relations 
 with England, and was willing to go to a considerable length in 
 cultivating them. It does not appear that she — Russia as a 
 whole, the Government, the empress, or any of her ministers — 
 cherished the slightest sympathy with America. On the con- 
 trary, Russian sympathy was doubtless on the side of the Brit- 
 ish government. The most autocratic Government in the world 
 could scarcely have helped sympathizing with autocracy in its 
 attempt to suppress democracy. There is not a word or a hint 
 in Catherine's final letter of refusal that is expressive of regard 
 for the American cause. To assume, therefore, that Russia was 
 a friend of America at that time would be utterly extravagant 
 and unwarranted. She was England's friend, and, as we shall 
 presently see, she made that fact unmistakably evident before 
 the end of the Revolution. 
 
 Baffled in the effort to get mercenaries from Russia, the Brit- 
 ish government turned next to Holland. "We are told that the 
 House of Orange was inclined to accede to the request. It would 
 have loaned the so-called Scottish Brigade, which originally con- 
 sisted of Scotsmen but was by this time made up chiefly of "Wal- 
 loons and deserters from various lands. But the House of 
 Orange was not the autocrat of Holland. The States General 
 was in power, and that body referred the matter to the provincial 
 assemblies. Those of Zeeland and Utrecht gave their consent 
 to the scheme, but the others refused. The dominant sentiment 
 of the nation was expressed by John Derk, of Chapelle, who 
 urged that it was beneath the dignity of the republic to inter- 
 meddle in the affairs of a foreign nation, for pay; that Holland
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 57 
 
 was too weak as a military power and too great as a commercial 
 power for it to be prudent for her thus to take part in the quar- 
 rels of others ; and that, if she helped England against America, 
 France might aid America against England and thus become 
 hostile to Holland, so that the latter country would be involved 
 in a serious war. He also dwelt upon the alleged tyranny of 
 England upon the sea and the wrongs inflicted by her upon 
 Dutch commerce. Finally he argued that the Americans were 
 contending for liberty very much as the Dutch had formerly con- 
 tended for it against Spain, and that they were entitled to the 
 sympathy of Holland. These views prevailed, and the States 
 General refused the English request. It may be added that this 
 honorable attitude was taken by Holland entirely without influ- 
 ence from outside. America had made no advances to her at 
 that time. The conduct of Holland a few years later makes it 
 seem probable that the refusal to lend troops was to a consider- 
 able degree connected with a certain incipient sympathy with 
 the Americans. Dutchmen asked themselves and each other 
 why they, whose fathers had been called rebels and had freed 
 themselves through a long and desperate struggle, should lend 
 their troops for the suppression of similar "rebels" engaged in a 
 similar struggle for freedom. To make the refusal the more 
 pointed, while at the same time avoiding the appearance of dis- 
 courtesy to an old friend, the States General offered to send 
 troops to England's aid in any European war, but positively re- 
 fused to let a man go across the sea ! That is to say, they were 
 friendly to England, but they would not be hostile to Amer- 
 ica. 
 
 Thus rebuffed a second time, King George made a third at- 
 tempt to hire troops, and this time was successful. The attempt 
 was made in Germany, where many of the smaller States had 
 never recovered from the demoralization of the Thirty Years* 
 War, and where mercenaiy military service was a common trade. 
 He found several petty princes who were eager to hire him 
 troops. They needed no persuasion. They regarded it as a 
 favor to them for him to accept the soldiers they offered. Some 
 of these princelings were actuated by nothing more than a de- 
 sire to get money. They sold troops as they would have sold 
 fat cattle. Others were fanatics in the cause of autocracy.
 
 58 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 (Your petty tyrant is usually the greatest stickler for the divine 
 right of kings!) Still others were eager to curry favor with 
 England with an eye to future advantage. As for the men, some 
 of them went gladly, as adventurers and soldiers of fortune, care- 
 less whom they fought. Many of them went reluctantly, having 
 heard of America's struggle for freedom and sympathizing with 
 it, inasmuch as they felt the need of more freedom at home. 
 Many of these deserted and joined the American army at their 
 first opportunity. It does not appear that any of the soldiers 
 were actuated by animosity toward America. On the contrary, 
 it is probable that among the people of Germany, so far as any 
 accurate knowledge of America extended, there was a sympa- 
 thetic feeling for this country. 
 
 What, meantime, was the popular feeling in England? It 
 had begun to make itself known in unmistakable fashion. There 
 was a strong reaction from the animosity against America which 
 Franklin had observed a year or two before. Englishmen began 
 to realize that their own struggle for popular rights was being 
 fought on American soil by their American brethren. Chatham, 
 Camden, Barre, and others of their best statesmen steadily up- 
 held the American cause in Parliament. In August, 1775, the 
 king issued a proclamation on the American rebellion containing 
 this amazing statement: "There is reason to apprehend that 
 such rebellion hath been much promoted and encouraged by the 
 traitorous correspondence, counsels, and comfort of divers 
 wicked and desperate persons within our realm" — to wit, Chat- 
 ham, Camden, Barre, and the rest! — and his purpose was de- 
 clared "to bring to condign punishment the authors, perpetrat- 
 ors, and abettors of such traitorous designs." Many British 
 ofiicers refused to serve against America, preferring to resign 
 their commissions. Among these were the eldest son of Lord 
 Chatham, who had begun a most promising military career; Ad- 
 miral Keppel, Lieutenant-General Sir Jeffrey Amherst, General 
 Conway, afterward a field-marshal ; Lord Frederick Cavendish ; 
 and the Earl of Effingham, who was commended for his act by 
 the city corporations of London and Dublin in public addresses. 
 Not one of these men was ostracized socially for such manifesta- 
 tions of sympathy with America; a fact which shows pretty 
 clearly that a considerable part of the English nation, including
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 59 
 
 much of the aristocracy, at heart took the American side of the 
 quarrel, and that the oppression of the colonies was the act not 
 of the English nation but of a small clique of its rulers. Nor 
 was the conduct of the City of London void of much significance. 
 Hitherto it had been a center of warlike spirit and of hearty 
 support of the Government. Now it became sullen and disaf- 
 fected. The corporation applauded Effingham for refusing to 
 fight America. Its members of Parliament voted from first to 
 last against the war. Its money market let the price of govern- 
 ment bonds fall, and showed by the fluctuations of stocks in gen- 
 eral its sympathy with America and its disapproval of the pol- 
 icy of the British government. As for the common people 
 throughout the kingdom, it is sufficient to remember that it was 
 their unwillingness to enlist in the army to fight America that 
 drove the king to seek mercenaries abroad. 
 
 It will be profitable at this point, and it will throw an instruc- 
 tive light upon what we may call the popular foreign relations 
 of the country, to consider who were, in the main, the American 
 revolutionists. Upon this point there has been much dispute, 
 and some amazing contentions have been made. We have been 
 told, for example, that the masses of Americans of direct Eng- 
 lish origin were not in sympathy with the Revolution, but re- 
 mained loyal to the king, and that the real leaders of the Revo- 
 lution in both civil and military life were non-English — accord- 
 ing to some authorities, chiefly Irish. It is, of course, impos- 
 sible to determine, in the absence of a census, just what pro- 
 portion of the American patriots were of English and what 
 of non-English origin. But some general facts are knowTi, which 
 controvert the pretensions which we have quoted. One is that 
 the chief colonies were founded and settled almost entirely by 
 Englishmen; with the exception of New York, which was of 
 Dutch origin, but into which long before the Revolution there 
 had come an English influx greater than the Dutch. As for 
 the Irish, there were few of them in America at that time, ex- 
 cepting those who had come under compulsion in Cromwell's 
 day. Ireland was not yet united to Great Britain, and the great 
 flood of emigration from that country had not begun. Apart 
 from Cromwell 's exiles, most of the Irish in America were from 
 the north of that island, and were really Scotch, who had been
 
 60 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 settled in Ireland for only a generation or two before coming 
 hither. 
 
 So much for what is known in a general way of the masses of 
 the American people. Still more explicit and certain is our 
 knowledge of the leaders in the Revolution, and at least equally 
 significant is it. Let us begin with the signers of the Declara- 
 tion of Independence. All but eight of them were natives of the 
 colonies. Of the eight foreign-born, two, Robert Morris of Penn- 
 sylvania and Button Gwinnett of Georgia, were born in Eng- 
 land ; one, Francis Lewis of New York, was born in Wales ; two, 
 James Wilson of Pennsylvania and John Witherspoon of New 
 Jersey, were born in Scotland; and three, James Smith and 
 George Taylor of Pennsylvania, and Matthew Thornton of New 
 Hampshire, were born in Ireland, though not one of them bore a 
 characteristically Irish name. If we turn to the army, we find 
 most of the prominent officers of American birth and English 
 ancestry. Such were Washington, whose family was conspicu- 
 ous among the English gentry ; Greene, of English Quaker stock ; 
 Wayne, of Yorkshire ancestry, grandson of an English com- 
 mander at the Boyne ; Harry Lee, whose forefathers came from 
 Shropshire; Artemas Ward, Mifflin, Warren, and others. Mor- 
 gan was of Welsh, Muhlenberg of German, Schuyler and Freling- 
 huysen of Dutch, and Sullivan of Irish ancestry. Of those who 
 were foreign-born, the gallant Montgomery was Irish, St. Clair 
 was Scotch, as was also Paul Jones, the founder of our navy; 
 the traitor Charles Lee and the semi-traitor Gates were English. 
 Lafayette was French, and Steuben and De Kalb were German. 
 
 In civil councils, the predominance of Englishmen, born in 
 America, was still more marked. The Adamses were from Dev- 
 onshire, true "dogs of Devon." Franklin's ancestors came from 
 Northamptonshire, and Otis's from Norfolk. Lewis Morris and 
 Gouverneur Morris were descended from one of Cromwell's 
 "Ironsides," and so was Rush. Rodney boasted an English 
 line unbroken from the days of Queen IMaud. Others of pure 
 English origin were Hancock, Sherman, Gerry, R. H. Lee, Ran- 
 dolph, Pendleton, Page, R. T. Paine, Harrison, Drayton, Ells- 
 worth, Clinton, Dayton, Stockton, Clymer, Shippen, Bedford, 
 Dickinson, and Madison. Jefferson was of English and Welsh 
 extraction. Livingston, Monroe, and John F. IMercer were de-
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 61 
 
 scended from Scotch forebears. Carroll was Irish, and so was 
 Rutledge, though the latter came from north of Ireland stock in 
 which Scotch blood predominated. Jay, Laurens, and Boudi- 
 not were of French Huguenot ancestry. As for the foreign- 
 born, Hamilton was a native of a West India island and was 
 of Scotch and French Huguenot parentage; Hugh Mercer came 
 from Scotland ; the Tuckers were Englishmen bom in Bermuda ; 
 and Thomas Paine and Robert Morris were natives of England. 
 Thus if we may judge ex pede — or rather ex capite — Herculeni, 
 there can be little hesitation in saying that the American Revo- 
 lution was chiefly the work of men of British blood, of whom the 
 majority were born in the colonies. The bearing of this fact 
 upon the popular feeling between America and England is ob- 
 vious ; nor is it much less marked upon American relations with 
 other lands. The dominant fact was that the Americans be- 
 longed to the English race, and whatever racial sympathy there 
 was, therefore, was between America and England rather than 
 between America and any other land. 
 
 Such was the Continental Congress which reassembled for 
 fateful work in the fall of 1775, a body of which Lord Chatham 
 declared that its members had never been surpassed by those of 
 any similar body "in solidity of reasoning, force of sagacity, 
 and wisdom of conclusion." Such, too, was the nation of which 
 that Congress was representative. The spirit of Congress to- 
 ward Great Britain was what might have been expected. We 
 have seen that down to the adjournment in August, despite the 
 actual state of war that existed, there was practically no thought 
 of secession, save on the part of a few members who kept their 
 thoughts secret. But in November, 1775, the progress of events 
 became irresistible. The struggle with Great Britain became so 
 severe as to compel America to look to other lands for aid. AVhy 
 not, since England was seeking mercenaries upon the Continent? 
 Accordingly, Samuel Chase of IMaryland, after careful and pro- 
 longed consultation with John Adams, moved in Congi*ess that 
 ambassadors be sent to France. The motion was seconded by 
 Adams, who wrote that it was evidently an unwelcome surprise 
 to the majority of Congress, and that "the grimaces, the agita- 
 tion, and convulsions" with wliich it was received "were very 
 great." A long debate followed, and in the end the motion
 
 62 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 failed to pass. Instead, Samuel Adams's old system of commit- 
 tees of correspondence was taken up and enlarged upon. It is 
 true that there were those in Congress who heartily favored 
 Chase's motion, and some who would have gone even further 
 than he suggested. Patrick Henry was for alliances with France 
 and other powers, even if they had to be purchased with conces- 
 sions and territory; a policy which would have been most mis- 
 chievous had it been adopted. John Adams's policy was the 
 wiser. He wanted no alliance, but only commercial treaties, con- 
 sistently urging that America should be kept separated as widely 
 as possible from European politics and wars. 
 
 The result of this debate, we have said, was the appointment 
 of a committee of correspondence. It was a committee whose 
 work should be conducted in secret, and it was instructed to en- 
 ter into communication with our friends in Great Britain, Ire- 
 land, a7id other parts of the "world." Practically, it was the 
 foundation of the American State Department, or Ministry for 
 Foreign Affairs. Its members were Jay, Franklin, Harrison, 
 Johnson, and Dickinson. Thus it included representatives of all 
 shades of thought in Congress, and one of the very youngest 
 members — Jay, only thirty years old — and one of the oldest — 
 Franklin, just entering his seventieth year. Jay seems to have 
 been the most active and dominant member of the committee. 
 He had various interviews with Bonvouloir, the first of the secret 
 emissaries of France to this country, but nothing practical re- 
 sulted from them. The ill-starred Silas Deane was, it is true, 
 presently selected as the first American envoy to France, to 
 which country he proceeded in June, 1776, and of whose un- 
 happy doings there we shall hear more. There were also some 
 tentative negotiations with Canada, which came to nothing. The 
 fact was that foreign negotiations in advance of independence 
 were an anomaly which could result in little if any good. 
 
 This fact soon dawned upon the minds of Congress, and the 
 design of independence began to take form. Once begun, the 
 process was rapid. The first definite step was taken by a com- 
 mittee composed of John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and Richard 
 Henry Lee, representing respectively Massachusetts, South 
 Carolina, and Virginia. They reported on May 15, 1776, a pre- 
 amble and resolutions which declared that the king had excluded
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 63 
 
 the inhabitants of these United Colonies from the protection of 
 his crown ; that the whole force of his kingdom, aided by foreign 
 mercenaries, was being exerted for the destruction of the good 
 people of these colonies ; that it was irreconcilable to reason and 
 conscience for the colonists now to take oaths and affirmations 
 for the support of any government under the crown of Great 
 Britain ; that it was necessary that every kind of authority under 
 the crown should be totally suppressed, and that all the powers 
 of government should be exerted under the authority of the peo- 
 pe of the colonies. That was the first actual Declaration of In- 
 dependence. The adoption of it inevitably involved the further 
 step of formally declaring independence to be a fact. This was 
 recognized by the moderate element in Congress, which was not 
 yet prepared for so radical a step, and the proposition was ear- 
 nestly opposed. But the tide was rising rapidly, and too strongly 
 to be restrained. Adams's trenchant proposal — for it was 
 framed by him — was adopted by Congress. More than that, it 
 was approved by the people of the colonies, and various colonial 
 assemblies adopted resolutions looking to the same effect. Vir- 
 ginia, notably, instructed her delegates to the Congress to move 
 for a formal declaration that the United Colonies were ' ' free and 
 independent States." It was in accordance with these instruc- 
 tions that Richard Henry Lee, who had been Adams's colleague 
 in the action of May 15, on June 7 moved for a Declaration of 
 Independence. His motion was seconded by John Adams. 
 After three days' debate it became evident that, as Jefferson 
 said, certain of the colonies were "not yet matured for falling 
 from the parent stem," though "they were fast advancing to 
 that state." Accordingly the matter was postponed until July 
 1, in order to give time for securing entire unanimity. Mean- 
 time, on June 11, Congress appointed Thomas Jefferson, John 
 Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Liv- 
 ingston a committee to draft the Declaration, ready for adoption 
 when the subject should again be taken up. 
 
 There is no more familiar fact in American history than that 
 Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence. It is quite 
 true. The original draft of that document shows it to be in his 
 handwriting, with only three trifling changes in the hands of 
 Adams and Franklin. Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that
 
 64 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Jefferson was appointed to the committee because of his readiness 
 and sententiousness of speech. Lee, as the mover of the resolu- 
 tion, should according to all parliamentary practice have been 
 made chairman of the committee, yet he was not made even a 
 member of it. That was because he and Jefferson were both 
 from Virginia, and it would not do to appoint two members from 
 one colony. Therefore if Jefferson was to be a member, for the 
 sake of his ability as a writer, Lee had to be left off. Besides, 
 it has been explained, Jefferson, who was still a young man, had 
 at that time not a single enemy in Congress, while there was a 
 strong faction opposed to Lee. All that, however, is by the way. 
 The point of present interest is that the Congress itself in one 
 respect materially amended the Declaration as drafted by Jeffer- 
 son and reported by the committee. Jefferson, despite his decla- 
 ration of a few months before of his love of union with Great 
 Britain, wrote in the Declaration that the policy of the British 
 government must "bid us renounce forever these unfeeling 
 brethren," and must make us "endeavor to forget our former 
 love for them." But this passage was stricken out by Con- 
 gress, in order not to reflect upon or stir up animosities against 
 the English people. There can be little doubt that in this Con- 
 gress was wiser than Jefferson. The American quarrel was 
 not with the English people, but with the Government. The 
 adoption of Jefferson 's words would have represented the matter 
 incorrectly, and would also have alienated from America the 
 sympathies of a large portion of the British nation, sympathies 
 which were of inestimable value and practical service to us dur- 
 ing the war and at its close. So the amended Declaration was 
 finally adopted on July 4, 1776, without any expression of en- 
 mity for the British people, but with the simple statement that 
 thereafter we should hold them as we held the rest of mankind, 
 "enemies in war, in peace friends." 
 
 Meantime, while America and Great Britain were thus com- 
 porting themselves toward each other, what of France, whose 
 emissaries had been so eager and diligent in provoking strife be- 
 tween these two and in suggesting French assistance for the 
 colonies? On May 10, 1774, the young and amiable Louis XVI 
 had succeeded his grandfather upon the throne. His minister 
 of state, a sort of self-appointed prime minister, was the Count
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 65 
 
 de Maurepas. His minister for foreign affairs, who presently 
 became all powerful, was the Count de Vergennes, a man of 
 ability, who was sincerely devoted to France according to his 
 conception of her welfare, and who was devoid of a single spark 
 of generous feeling for any other country. His minister of 
 finance, for a short time only, was Turgot, a reformer and phi- 
 losopher, and one of the most benevolent and generally estimable 
 French statesmen of his day. France was at that time at peace 
 with Great Britain, and maintained an ambassador at the Brit- 
 ish court. The latter, M. de Guines, was a close observer of the 
 progress of the quarrel between the king and his colonies. He 
 regarded the policy of the king and his ministers as fatuous. 
 ''These people," he wrote, "appear to me in a delirium." He 
 was convinced that they coud not subdue the rising rebellion in 
 the colonies, but believed that they would wage a war of mere 
 devastation. "You may be sure," he wrote, "the plan of these 
 people is to force back America fifty years, if they cannot sub- 
 due it." Vergennes could not believe that the British govern- 
 ment would be so mad as to refuse conciliation with the colonies, 
 and wrote to De Guines for further information, especially ask- 
 ing why he thought there would be no friendly settlement, De 
 Guines, who seems to have been a judicious observer, replied 
 that further negotiations were impossible. The ministry could 
 yield nothing to the Americans. The king was as feeble and as 
 obstinate as Charles I had been in his fatal quarrel with Parlia- 
 ment. This representation of the case convinced Vergennes, 
 and he acknowledged the fact. "America or the ministers them- 
 selves," he said, "must succumb." At the same time Vergennes 
 sent Bonvouloir, a trusted agent, to America, to get and report 
 all possible information. Bonvouloir had already spent much 
 time here, and was well acquainted with the American leaders. 
 His reports to Vergennes corroborated those of De Guines, and 
 fully convinced the French government that the breach between 
 Great Britain and the colonies was irremediable. 
 
 The French government, however, made no move toward aid- 
 ing the colonies in the struggle which it had encouraged them 
 to begin. Louis XVI had no inclination to do so. Neither 
 principle nor sentiment impelled him to help the Americans. 
 On the contrary, his natural feelings were altogether against any 
 
 VOL. 1—5
 
 66 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 such democratic movement as that which they were undertak- 
 ing. At the same time he was partly afraid of England, and 
 partly desirous of crippling her political and commercial power, 
 and in these passions he was by no means discouraged by his 
 ministers. On August 7, 1775, Vergennes told De Guines that 
 Louis approved the sending of Bonvouloir to America, partly to 
 obtain and report information, and partly, perhaps chiefly, "to 
 secure the Americans against that jealousy of us with which so 
 much pains will be taken to inspire them." The Americans 
 were to be persuaded that France had no notion or desire of 
 regaining Canada, and that France would welcome their inde- 
 pendence and do all within her power to promote their prosper- 
 ity. Botta, in his admirable "History of the American War," 
 says of the attitude of France in 1775 and the early part of 
 1776: "She would not throw off the mask in these beginnings, 
 either because she feared that by prematurely engaging in the 
 defense of the Americans the English government might be in- 
 duced to offer them such terms of accommodation as, in recon- 
 ciling the two parties, would turn their united forces against 
 her; or especially because she was not yet entirely prepared for 
 maritime war. She wished to temporize until her armaments 
 were completed, and until the continuation of reciprocal out- 
 rages should have rendered all arrangements impossible." 
 
 This view of the case is supported by the reports of Bonvou- 
 loir, who in March, 1776, wrote to Vergennes: "The position 
 of England toward its colonies in North America, and the pos- 
 sible and probable consequences of the contest, whatever its is- 
 sue may be, have beyond a doubt every claim to the most serious 
 attention of France and Spain. Whether they should desire the 
 subjection or the independence of the English colonies, is proble- 
 matical; on either hypothesis they are menaced with danger, 
 which human forecast can perhaps neither prevent nor turn 
 aside. If the continuation of the civil war may be regarded as 
 indefinitely advantageous to the two crowns, inasmuch as it will 
 exhaust the victors and the vanquished, there is on the other 
 hand room to fear, first, that the English ministry, feeling the 
 insufficiency of its means, may stretch out the hand of concilia- 
 tion; or, secondly, that the King of England, after conquering 
 English America, may use it as an instrument to subjugate Euro-
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 67 
 
 pean England ; or thirdly, that the English ministry, beaten on 
 the continent of America, may seek indemnity at the expense 
 •of France and Spain, to efface their shame and to conciliate the 
 insurgents by offering them the commerce and supply of the 
 isles; or, fourthly, that the colonists, on attaining independence, 
 may become conquerors from necessity, and by forcing their 
 excess product upon Spanish America, destroy the ties which 
 bind our colonies to their metropolis." He further suggested 
 that the British ministry might any day resign, that Chatham 
 and his friends might return to office and make peace with 
 America, and that England and America united might proceed 
 to the conquest of Mexico and the waging of a war with France. 
 "In the midst of so many perils," he continued, "the strong love 
 of peace, which is the preference of the king and the King of 
 Spain, seems to prescribe the most measured courses. . . . Care 
 must be taken to avoid being compromised, and not to provoke 
 
 the ills which it is wished to prevent The continuance 
 
 of the war for at least one year is desirable for the two crowns. 
 To that end the British ministry must be maintained in the 
 persuasion that France and Spain are pacific, so that it may not 
 fear to embark in an active and costly campaign ; whilst on the 
 other hand the courage of the Americans might be kept up by 
 secret favors and vague hopes, which would prevent an ac- 
 commodation and assist to develop ideas of independence. . . . 
 We ought to continue with dexterity to tranquilize the English 
 ministry as to the intentions of France and Spain. It will also 
 be proper to extend to the insurgents secret aid in military 
 stores and money, without seeking any return for it beyond the 
 political object of the moment; but it would not comport with 
 the dignity or interest of the king to treat with the insurgents, 
 till the liberty of English America shall have acquired con- 
 sistency. ' ' 
 
 Such were the counsels of this trusted agent of the French 
 government, which were offered for the mature deliberation of 
 the king and his ministers, and which Vergennes appears to have 
 approved. It would be difficult to conceive any policy more self- 
 ish, cold-blooded, and cynical. It proposed in effect that France 
 should play the part of lago. "We can perceive in it not one 
 trace of sympathy with the American struggle for liberty, and
 
 68 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 not a hint of a desire for the welfare of the colonists. On the 
 contrary, the latter were to be used as a mere pawn in the game 
 of France against Great Britain, and were to be sacrificed ruth- 
 lessly, without the slightest compunction, whenever it might be 
 to the interest of France thus to do. A far different view, and 
 a far more creditable one, was taken by Turgot, the French re- 
 forming statesman, whose counsel the king sought immediately 
 after receiving this memorial from Bonvouloir. Turgot was con- 
 vinced that the Americans would be successful in establishing 
 their independence, and he sincerely desired that they should 
 do so, not merely for the sake of injuring Great Britain, but for 
 the sake of promoting the general welfare of humanity. "The 
 present war," he wrote to the king, "will probably end in the 
 absolute independence of the colonies, and that event will cer- 
 tainly be the epoch of the greatest revolution in the commerce 
 and politics not only of England but of all Europe. From the 
 prudent conduct, the courage, and intelligence of the Americans, 
 we may augur that they will take care, above all things, to give 
 a solid form to their government, and as a consequence they 
 will love peace and seek to preserve it. The rising republic will 
 have no need of conquests to find a market for its products; it 
 will have only to open its harbors to all nations. Sooner or later, 
 with good will or from necessity, all European nations which 
 have colonies will be obliged to leave them an entire liberty of 
 trade. . . . "When the English themselves shall recognize the 
 independence of their colonies, every mother country will be 
 forced in like manner to exchange its dominion over its colonies 
 for bonds of friendship and fraternity. If this is an evil, there 
 is no way of preventing it, and no course to be taken but resig- 
 nation to the absolute necessity. . . . Wise and happy will be 
 that nation which shall first know how to bend to the new cir- 
 cumstances and consent to see in its colonies allies and not sub- 
 jects. When the total separation of America shall have healed 
 the European nations of the jealousy of commerce, there will 
 exist among men one great cause of war the less, and it is very 
 difficult not to desire an event which is to accomplish this good 
 for the human race. 
 
 "It is a very delicate question to know if we can, underhand, 
 help the Americans to ammunition or money. There is no dif-
 
 INDEPENDENCE DECLARED 69 
 
 ficulty in shutting our eyes on tlieir purchases in our ports ; our 
 merchants are free to sell to any one who will buy of them ; we 
 do not distinguish the colonists from the English themselves; 
 but to aid the Americans with money would excite in the Eng- 
 li^ just complaints. . . . Our preparations ought to tend only 
 to the maintenance of peace. . . . Every plan of aggression 
 ought to be rejected." 
 
 Here then were the representatives of the two schools of 
 French thought. The politic and crafty Vergennes had no love 
 for America, and probably no faith in the future of the United 
 States. But he favored aiding this country secretly, and per- 
 haps openly, for the sake of the injury that could thus be in- 
 flicted upon England. The good Turgot, on the other hand, 
 was a sincere admirer of America, and had unbounded faith in 
 its future greatness. But while, for the sake of humanity in 
 general, he earnestly wished for our success, he would not by any 
 means ally France with this country or give us any such open 
 aid as might be displeasing to England. Evidently, neither was 
 a particularly valuable friend to the struggling colonists, though 
 the unsympathetic Vergennes was doubtless more inclined to 
 give us practical aid than was the sympathetic Turgot. Between 
 the two. King Louis did not hesitate. He ignored Turgot 's ad- 
 vice, in this as in some other matters, and that great statesman 
 was soon retired to private life, to the incalculable loss of France. 
 The policy of Vergennes was adopted, and followed to the end 
 of the American war. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, 
 however, that in so doing, and in whatever aid was given to this 
 country, there was no real love for America or for the American 
 cause. Malouet, the French Minister of JMarine, opposed the 
 plan of aiding the Americans, because he said it was illogical 
 and dangerous for an absolute monarchy to aid a democratic 
 revolution. There is no question that Louis XVI thought the 
 same, and in that belief was supported by Maurepas and even 
 by Necker. Thomas Paine declared that "with respect to prin- 
 ciples, Vergennes was a despot." Vergennes hated free speech, 
 a free press, and parliamentary government, and detested the 
 Americans as rebels. But he still more hated and feared Eng- 
 land. "The inveterate enmity of that power to us," he said to 
 Louis in 1775, "makes it our duty to lose no opportunity for
 
 70 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 weakening it. The independence of the insurgent colonists must 
 therefore be encouraged." 
 
 It was in this spirit, not of hating the Americans less, but of 
 hating Great Britain more, that the French government contem- 
 plated the American movement toward independence in the early- 
 part of 1776, and finally, in May of that year, intimated, through 
 the picturesque adventurer Beaumarchais, a willingness to aid 
 the colonists with money to the extent of 200,000 louis d'or, or 
 nearly a million dollars. 
 
 We may add, to show as completely as possible the attitude of 
 the world toward America at this crisis in affairs, that in June, 
 1776, Keith, the British minister at Vienna, had an audience 
 with the emperor, Joseph II, and also with the empress, the illus- 
 trious Maria Theresa, at which the attitude of Austria and of 
 the empire toward the American insurgents was discussed. The 
 emperor told Keith that he had just issued a proclamation, 
 strictly forbidding his subjects in the Netherlands to have any 
 commerce or any dealings whatever with the Americans. "I 
 am," he added, "very sorry for the difficulties which have arisen 
 to distress the king's government. The cause in which he is 
 engaged is in fact the cause of all sovereigns, for they have a 
 joint interest in the maintenance of a just subordination and 
 obedience to law, in all the monarchies which surround them. I 
 saw with pleasure the vigorous exertions of the national strength, 
 which he is now employing to bring his rebellious subjects to a 
 speedy submission, and I most sincerely wish success to those 
 measures." Maria Theresa also expressed herself to the same 
 effect. We must remember that these sovereigns, especially the 
 great empress-queen, had no cause to love England, for England 
 had not long before been the ally of Frederick of Prussia in his 
 war against Austria. Their sympathy with England was, 
 therefore, the more significant. We may take it as typical of 
 the general feeling of the courts of Europe. The new-born re- 
 public had on July 4, 1776, not a single sincere and effective 
 official friend in all the world.
 
 IV 
 
 THE REVOLUTION 
 
 THE Declaration of Independence did not at first make any 
 material change in the foreign relations of America. It 
 intensified the estrangement which had already arisen between 
 this country and Great Britain, though it did not by any means 
 deprive America of the friendship and open advocacy of many 
 leading British statesmen, nor did it close the door against Brit- 
 ish attempts at reconciliation. Indeed, the roster of friends of 
 America in Great Britain seemed rather to lengthen, as the reso- 
 lution of this country to establish its independence was made 
 more manifest. It bore, and bore to the end, such names as 
 those of Chatham, Burke, Fox, Shelburne, Rockingham, Barre, 
 Hartley, Camden, Pitt, Grafton, Conway, Richmond, Cavendish, 
 and many others. How large a proportion of the British nation 
 stood behind these men and thought as they did, is matter for 
 speculation only. At this date investigation would be fruitless. 
 But reason is on our side in assuming the proportion to have 
 been a large one, comprising a majority of those elements which 
 formed the real heart and mind of the British people. This fact 
 seems to have been recognized by the purblind and fatuous gov- 
 ernment itself to some extent, for repeated efforts were made to 
 seek conciliation with the revolted and seceded colonies. A 
 week after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Lord 
 Howe arrived in America on an errand of conciliation. He had, 
 it is true, been despatched hither and had received his instruc- 
 tions before independence was declared ; but at a time when the 
 intention of Congress to make such a declaration was well known. 
 Moreover, his efforts at conciliation were continued here for sev- 
 eral months after the actual declaration had been published 
 and had been considered by the British government. We must 
 therefore regard his mission as in fact subsequent to the Declara- 
 tion of Independence. 
 
 71
 
 72 AIVIERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 He at first sought to negotiate directly with Washington. 
 But there was an obstacle in the way. He would not — under 
 British military etiquette he thought he could not — recognize 
 Washington's military rank. Washington's title of General had 
 been bestowed upon him by a government which Howe and his 
 government regarded as unlawful, wherefore the title itself was 
 spurious. To call him "General" Washington would be too 
 much like a recognition of the authority and legitimacy of the 
 American government. But Washington would not countenance 
 the putting of such a slight upon the American government as 
 would be implied in permitting himself to be addressed as a mere 
 civilian. Moreover, as he shrewdly pointed out, as a civilian 
 he had no standing and no authority to negotiate with Howe, or 
 to represent the American people or their government. The 
 only ground on which it was possible for him to negotiate ef- 
 fectively with Howe was that of his military rank and authority, 
 and since Howe would not recognize that, negotiations were out 
 of the question. Congress, however, generously made a way out 
 of the difficulty by appointing a committee of its own number to 
 treat with Howe. The committee consisted of Franklin, John 
 Adams, and Rutledge, who were mere civilians. Howe assured 
 them that the king was sincerely desirous of conciliation, and 
 was ready to grant the reforms and redress of grievances which 
 America demanded. Such grant could be made, however, to 
 America only as to a British colony. The Declaration of Inde- 
 pendence was an awkward obstacle. Great Britain could not 
 recognize or acquiesce in it. Was there no way, he asked, of 
 going back of it, and treating on the ground of the status quo 
 ante? To this Franklin, with the hearty support of his col- 
 leagues, replied with an emphatic negative. The Declaration of 
 Independence must stand, and must be made effective. "All 
 former attachments," he said, "are obliterated. America can- 
 not return to the dominion of Great Britain." So Howe's olive 
 branch was rejected and his mission was a failure. 
 
 Meantime, what of the attitude of France, who had professed 
 so much interest in the American cause and had so much en- 
 couraged the Americans to seek independence? Already diplo- 
 matic relations had been established with her, and some secret 
 aid had been secured. On March 3, 1776, Silas Deane was ap-
 
 THE REVOLUTION 73 
 
 pointed an American commissioner to France, and in June he 
 proceeded to that country, where he was presently joined by 
 Arthur Lee as a coUea^e, and between them they made a bad 
 mess of American affairs. Deane's mission was to get from 
 France an army of 25,000 troops and 200 pieces of artillery, to 
 be paid for at some indefinite future time. His own salary and 
 expenses were to be paid to him in cargoes of tobacco, rice, and 
 other American produce, which this Government would consign 
 to him and which he would sell in the French market. Thus he 
 was to pass as a merchant, under the name of Timothy Jones. 
 The scheme was at best a wretched one, though perhaps the best 
 the American government could plan at that time. It might 
 have worked with more success had Deane been more careful to 
 keep his own counsel. But he revealed his secrets to one Edward 
 Bancroft, an American who enjoyed the confidence of Congress 
 and was employed by it as a secret agent, but who was in fact a 
 spy in British employ and who promptly betrayed Deane to the 
 British government. 
 
 Even before Deane's arrival in France, that extraordinary 
 adventurer, Caron de Beaumarchais, had interested himself in 
 the American cause. He was a watchmaker, an inventor, of lit- 
 erary and dramatic genius, and of unbounded political ambition. 
 He wrote "The Barber of Seville," "The Marriage of Figaro," 
 and other dramatic masterpieces, and attracted the attention of 
 the young French king and became one of his favorite courtiers. 
 He argued the American cause to the king in theatrical style, 
 and fascinated him with it ; nor did he fail to impress the cooler 
 and more expert mind of Vergennes, the foreign minister, with 
 his schemes. Vergennes agreed with Beaumarchais that the 
 time was opportune for the humiliation of Great Britain and 
 her permanent reduction to the rank of a second-class power. 
 To this end, however, the American war must be prolonged for 
 at least a year, in order to confirm the alienation of the colonies 
 and to tax if not to exhaust the resources of both combatants. 
 Turgot, as we have seen, opposed the policy of Vergennes and 
 Beaumarchais, and at first Louis XVI was inclined to listen to 
 him. But Turgot 's influence waned. In I\Iay, 1776, he was 
 forced out of the ministry, and Vergennes became practically 
 supreme. Then a free hand was given to Beaumarchais to exe-
 
 74 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 cute his designs for his own profit and for the promotion of 
 the American Revolution. The firm of Roderique Hortalez & 
 Company was established in Paris — a mere pseudonym for Beau- 
 marchais himself. The French and Spanish governments se- 
 cretly furnished it with $600,000 capital. Ostensibly it was 
 nothing but a private commercial venture, its object being to 
 sell to the Americans military supplies which it had purchased 
 from the French government arsenals. In fact, it was a mere 
 screen to cover the sales or gifts of arms by the French gov- 
 ernment to America, which was not a lawful thing. For a time 
 all went well, and the secret of the trade was well kept. But 
 when Deane arrived in Paris he was taken into Beaumarchais 's 
 confidence in all things except the connection of the French 
 government with it. Deane promptly told Edward Bancroft, 
 and he told the British government. Had the latter known the 
 whole truth, it would have regarded it as cause for war against 
 France, as indeed it was. As it was, it protested to the French 
 government against its tolerance of contraband commerce, and 
 began seizing the ships of ''Hortalez & Co." or blockading them 
 in port. Thereupon Vergennes, in order to avoid a breach with 
 Great Britain, directed measures to be taken for the suppres- 
 sion of the contraband trade in which his own government was 
 so deeply implicated, and Beaumarchais had to send out his ves- 
 sels surreptitiously. The business was thus so much interfered 
 with that it was driven to the verge of bankruptcy. 
 
 In the latter part of 1776 Franklin arrived in France and 
 he, Deane, and Arthur Lee were commissioned as joint envoys 
 to that country. His arrival created a great sensation, in both 
 France and Great Britain. Lord Rockingham declared that it 
 was a serious blow to Great Britain, more than counterbalancing 
 the British victory on Long Island and capture of New York. 
 Lord Stormont, the British ambassador, threatened to leave 
 Paris at once if the "chief of the American rebels" were per- 
 mitted to come thither. Vergennes replied that he had sent word 
 to Franklin at Nantes, where he had landed, not to come on to 
 Paris; but if the message had miscarried, and Franklin did 
 come to Paris, it would be scandalous inhospitality and a viola- 
 tion of the usages of civilized nations to expel him. So Frank- 
 lin went to Paris, where he was received with favor by the
 
 THE REVOLUTION 75 
 
 Government and with vast enthusiasm by the people. In a few 
 days he and his two ill-assorted colleagues were received by 
 Vergennes, and they asked plumply that France should make a 
 treaty of commerce and alliance with America, and should lend 
 eight warships to release Beaumarchais 's ships from blockade. 
 Vergennes replied that this was asking entirely too much. 
 France could not take open ground against Great Britain in 
 that way. But by way of consolation and encouragement he 
 offered them a secret loan of $400,000, to be repaid after the 
 war and without interest. Of course this action by Vergennes 
 was of assistance to America. But it was of none to the "Hor- 
 talez & Co." enterprise, which quickly fell into hopeless straits. 
 Franklin was not informed of any of the details of that enter- 
 prise, but left them all to Deane. Neither does Lee seem to have 
 been fully informed, but he did know that Beaumarchais was 
 the whole concern, and he assumed that the supplies were free 
 gifts from France to America, and that whatever America paid 
 for them would be divided between Beaumarchais and Deane. 
 In this Lee was probably quite honest, but he was nevertheless 
 unjust to Deane. He reported his assumption to Congress as 
 facts, with the result that Congress at once stopped sending mer- 
 chandise to "Hortalez & Co." in payment for supplies, and that 
 firm's operations came to an end. Deane was unable to explain 
 matters without betraying confidence, and so was himself dis- 
 credited and ruined. The fact seems to be that Deane and Lee, 
 while both well meaning, were subject to infirmities of tem- 
 perament which quite unfitted them for diplomatic work, and 
 moreover the triple commission system was a clumsy and im- 
 practicable thing. Later, in 1778, John Adams discovered and 
 accurately described the true state of afi'airs when he reached 
 France and found, as he said, ''animosity between IMr. Deane 
 and Mr. Lee; between Dr. Franklin and Mr. Lee; between Mr. 
 Izard and Dr. Franklin; between Dr. Bancroft and Mr. Lee; 
 between Mr. Carmichael and all." 
 
 Apart from the "Ilortalez & Co." enterprise, Deane 's activi- 
 ties were chiefly directed to granting military commissions and 
 sending European recruits to the American army. Such serv- 
 ices were generally of doubtful value. The men he sent over 
 were chiefly adventurers, who had no heart in the American
 
 76 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 cause, but were seeking what profit they might make out of it. 
 Some of them were spies in the employ of the French govern- 
 ment, or of ambitious Frenchmen. Even De Kalb, the Alsatian, 
 who did us such good service in the Carolina campaign, came 
 over as a secret agent of the Count de Broglie, who aspired to 
 play in America the part of William of Orange. But De Kalb 
 soon renounced that service and became a true friend of the 
 American cause. Washington was much annoyed at the influx 
 of Deane 's mercenaries, and on one occasion declared to Gouver- 
 neur Morris: "I do most devoutly wish that we had not a 
 single foreigner among us, except M. de Lafayette." Deane 
 also received offers of mercenary troops from Germany and 
 Switzerland, and he seemed to favor the employment of them, 
 and suggested it to Congress, which happily disapproved it. 
 
 Amid all these doings, the attitude of the French king was 
 unsympathetic toward America. It is well known that he 
 strongly disapproved Lafayette's coming to this country and 
 tried to prevent it. We have said that he fell in with Beau- 
 marchais's proposals. But that was only because that wily ad- 
 venturer shrewdly suggested to him that it would be to the 
 interest of France to give America such aid as would put her 
 forces on equal terms with those of England, "but no more," 
 and so not to give America the victory, but to prolong the war 
 indefinitely. Even such aid to democratic rebels the king ac- 
 quiesced in with much reluctance and many misgivings, declar- 
 ing that he did not think it right. It was too inimical to the 
 principles of the divine right of kings. Such was the general 
 attitude of the ** ruling classes" in France, with the exception of 
 a few like Lafayette, who were sincere lovers of popular liberty 
 and friends of America. Botta doubtless set forth the situation 
 accurately when he wrote in his "History of the American 
 War": "Though France would rather see America inde- 
 pendent than reconciled with England, she relished the prospect 
 of a long war between them still better than independence." 
 Such a war would ravage the colonies and exhaust England. 
 So France encouraged the colonies to fight and aided them just 
 enough to keep them fighting, but was careful not to help them 
 to win too soon the final victory. "Thus France," wrote Botta 
 again, "pursuing invariably the course prescribed by reasons of
 
 THE REVOLUTION 77 
 
 state, on the one hand amused the British ministers with pro- 
 testations of friendship, and on the other encouraged the Amer- 
 icans with secret succors, confirming their resolution with con- 
 tinual promises of future cooperation. . . . Alternately ad- 
 vancing and receding, never allowing their intentions to be 
 fathomed, the French ministers kept the Americans in continual 
 uncertainty. ' ' 
 
 It is not to be wondered at that such treatment in time proved 
 trying to the Americans. A year of it was sufficient to exhaust 
 their patience. In August, 1777, the American commissioners 
 presented a memorial to the French government, in which they 
 pretty directly intimated that if France did not come to the 
 mark with more efficient aid at an early date, the colonies might 
 make peace with England. Nor was this by any means a ground- 
 less hint. There was still in America a large and influential 
 party which was in favor of such a settlement, and there was 
 of course such a party in England, including not a few of the 
 foremost statesmen of the kingdom. Nor was it an idle warning 
 that the Americans gave in that same memorial, that in case of 
 such reconciliation and reunion between the colonies and Eng- 
 land, the French "West India Islands would be endangered and 
 France would be in peril of utter exclusion from this hemisphere. 
 The French government, through its corps of ministers and se- 
 cret agents, was too well informed of the state of affairs in both 
 England and America to discredit the force of these suggestions, 
 and was therefore compelled to regard the memorial seriously. 
 It ventured, however, for a time to reply with further evasions, 
 procrastinations, and delay. In so doing it incurred a grave 
 risk, but was at least lucky in the outcome. 
 
 The Americans fulfilled their threat. They did make over- 
 tures to England for a reconciliation. But ''inter amm, leges 
 silent." The successes of Burgoyne in the beginning of his cam- 
 paign made the English government confident of victory over 
 the "rebels," and caused it to turn a deaf ear to the American 
 proposals. Never was there in the whole struggle, as the event 
 presently showed, a greater blunder made by the purblind min- 
 istry^ It sacrificed the last chance of reconciliation. For with 
 their overtures thus refused, the Americans set themselves the 
 more sternly to work to fight the battle out, and, thanks to the
 
 78 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 prowess of Arnold and Schuyler and Morgan, a startling change 
 in circumstances was soon effected. Burgoyne was beaten at 
 Saratoga, and with his whole army was compelled to surrender 
 to the Americans. It was a staggering blow to England, and it 
 gave a new aspect to the whole situation. It is true that renewed 
 overtures for peace were then made by Americans, notably by 
 Horatio Gates in his puffed-up vanity at wearing the laurels 
 which other and better men had won. But such overtures were 
 not as favorable to England as those of an earlier date, and even 
 such as they were, it is doubtful if they would have commanded 
 the sanction of the American people. The latter question did 
 not come up for answer, however, because the English govern- 
 ment delayed to enter into negotiations until it was too late. 
 
 The French government, however, was moved to act. It saw 
 that there was danger, either that peace would be made between 
 the colonies and England by concession and negotiation, which 
 was the last thing it wanted, or that the colonies would win their 
 independence in the field without French aid and more quickly 
 than was desirable for French interests. So it decided to inter- 
 vene, partly to secure American gratitude, which might be oi 
 material profit to France ; partly to be able to regulate the prog- 
 ress of the war and thus to prevent it from ending too soon; 
 and partly to secure for France a voice in the final making of 
 peace and in the demarcation of boundaries in America. The 
 news of Burgoyne 's surrender reached France at the beginning 
 of December, 1777. Vergennes was then employing as a spy 
 the landlord of the house in which Franklin and Deane lived. 
 That spy, by dint of diligent listening at keyholes and similar 
 tricks, was able to report that negotiations were in progress with 
 England for an ending of the war. This information convinced 
 Vergennes that further delay would be dangerous. So on De- 
 cember 6, two days after the arrival of the news of Burgoyne 's 
 surrender, he sent Gerard — afterward French envoy to America 
 — ^to Franklin, to tell him that the French court was at last con- 
 vinced that the colonies were in earnest and were able to main- 
 tain their independence, and were worthy of recognition, and 
 that it would therefore be glad to renew negotiations for a treaty 
 of alliance. By this means Vergennes counted on being able 
 to head off the negotiations with England and thus to keep the
 
 THE REVOLUTION 79 
 
 colonies and the mother country apart, and to prolong the war 
 for another year. 
 
 The trick was successful. The Americans paused in their ne- 
 gotiations with England, and a little later abandoned them 
 altogether. This was when, on December 16, the French gov- 
 ernment announced to them that "France would not only ac- 
 knowledge but would support with all her forces the independ^ 
 ence of the United States, and would conclude with them a treaty 
 of amity and commerce." With surprising and commendable 
 frankness it added that ''His Most Christian Majesty desired 
 no indemnification of the United States, nor pretended to act 
 solely with a view to their particular interest, since, besides the 
 benevolence he bore them, it was manifest that the power of 
 England would be diminished by the dismemberment of her 
 colonies." It was further stated by the French government 
 that this treaty would be made as soon as the assent of Spain 
 could be got, that being necessary under the Bourbon Family 
 Compact between France and Spain; and that all France would 
 ask of America would be that, in case of war between France 
 and England, which was likely to occur, America would not 
 make peace with England until her own independence was fully 
 secured, nor until France also made peace with England. This 
 definite promise satisfied the Americans and inclined them to 
 withdraw from all negotiations with England and to wait pa- 
 tiently again for France's action. 
 
 The gross insincerity of the French government is patent in 
 the fact that it did not attempt to secure Spain's assent to the 
 treaty, although Vergennes declared to the Americans that it 
 was necessary to do so and that the treaty could not be made 
 until it was done. On the contrary, it carefully concealed from 
 Spain the fact that it was making such a treaty, and, even after 
 the treaty was made and signed, denied that it had made it. The 
 only recognition of the "Bourbon Family Compact" in the 
 treaty was in a private clause, which provided that Spain's as- 
 sent should be secured before the treaty became valid. On 
 January 8, 1778, further negotiations took place, the French 
 stipulating that they were not to help America subdue Canada 
 or the British West Indies, and were to give only naval aid. 
 Ten days later Gerard brought to the American commissioners
 
 80 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tentative drafts of the treaties for consideration. More than a 
 fortnight of consideration and discussion followed, all conducted 
 with profound secrecy. Franklin secured the insertion into the 
 treaty of a recognition of the principle first set forth by Fred- 
 erick the Great of Prussia, and warmly advocated by Franklin, 
 that "free ships make free goods," a principle which afterward 
 formed the basis of the Armed Neutrality, and for which Russia 
 has received much unmerited credit. There was much discus- 
 sion, also, over the question of West India trade. Congress had 
 instructed the American commissioners to urge that no export 
 duty should be imposed by France upon molasses shipped from 
 her West India islands to the United States, that commodity 
 being particularly important to America as the raw material of 
 rum. When the Americans asked this stipulation, the French, 
 through Gerard, asked some corresponding concessions, and 
 much dispute ensued, in the course of which the cantankerous- 
 ness of Arthur Lee came near to wrecking the whole business. 
 Finally, however, an agreement was reached, and on February 
 6 the treaties were signed, under a strict pledge that they were 
 to be kept secret until France was ready for their publication. 
 The news of them, however, leaked out; just how has not ap- 
 peared. Deane and Lee each accused the other of betraying 
 them, and Lee even went so far as to accuse Franklin. Presently 
 Deane was recalled, and John Adams was appointed to fill his 
 place. Adams took Lee's side in his controversy with Deane, 
 and it seems probable that Lee was entirely honest in these par- 
 ticular matters, if not in all others, though he was doubtless 
 much mistaken on many points, and was by natural temperament 
 quite unfit for diplomatic work. Moreover, the plan of main- 
 taining three coequal representatives at the French court was 
 an impractical one that was sure to cause trouble, and it was 
 therefore a most auspicious thing for Congress, in October, 1778, 
 to make Franklin sole minister to France. 
 
 Thus France at last formally gave to America the long-prom- 
 ised countenance, if not as yet much material aid. It is in- 
 structive to note to what date it was postponed. Lexington, Con- 
 cord, Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Bunker Hill, Arnold's expedi- 
 tion to Quebec, and the Siege of Boston, all occurred before the 
 Declaration of Independence. The battles of Fort Moultrie,
 
 THE KEVOLUTION 81 
 
 Long Island, Harlem Heights, White Plains, Fort Washington, 
 Trenton, and Princeton were all fought before France gave us 
 even any secret aid beyond that of "Hortalez & Co." There- 
 after the battles of Ridgefield, Ticonderoga, Bennington, Oris- 
 kany, Brandywine, and Germantown, the flight from Philadel- 
 phia, the surrender of Burgoyne, and Lord North's notice of 
 proposals for conciliation, all came before France would make a 
 treaty with the country she had so much incited to war and had 
 so much promised to aid. 
 
 The French, we have seen, made it clear in the treaty that they 
 were not to help the United States conquer Canada. More than 
 that, they were strongly opposed to any attempt at such con- 
 quest, and earnestly strove to dissuade the Americans from mak- 
 ing it. When Gerard came hither as the first French minister 
 to the United States, some of his earliest and most strenuous 
 efforts were directed, though vainly, to restraining Gouverneur 
 Morris from so much as mentioning Canada in the congressional 
 instructions to Franklin. He also urged with equal earnestness 
 that the United States should not seek in the Northwest Terri- 
 tory a frontage on the Mississippi River, lest Spain should be 
 alarmed and antagonized. The French policy was to let Eng- 
 land retain Canada and the Northwest Territory, so as to keep 
 the United States small and comparatively weak, to prevent this 
 country from gaining territorial dominance on the continent, 
 and to leave the largest possible probability of further friction 
 and conflict between England and the United States, to the in- 
 jury of both. France's interest was not in our welfare, but in 
 the weakening and ultimate ruin of both America and England. 
 She was willing to help America in order to injure England, but 
 she did not mean to let America grow too strong, and she would 
 be quite ready in turn to help England in order to injure Amer- 
 ica, if that would sei*ve her own selfish purpose. Gerard ad- 
 mitted that if we antagonized Spain, France would stand with 
 Spain rather than with us ; and it was perfectly notorious that 
 Spain did not want the United States to become independent, but 
 wished us to remain always so weak as to "feel the need of sure- 
 ties, allies, and protectors." 
 
 There was in America from the beginning a strong ambition 
 to conquer and annex Canada, though Washington never shared 
 
 VOL. I 6
 
 82 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 it, but rather opposed it. Lafayette, it is interesting to note, 
 wanted to conquer Canada for France, with the help of the 
 United States. He thought that France should help the United 
 States to win independence, and that the United States in return 
 should help France to recover Canada. Many Americans, in the 
 first flush of enthusiasm over the French alliance, favored that 
 scheme, and when Lafayette proposed to Congress in October, 
 1778, that Canada should be conquered, for America if not for 
 France, there was at first a prospect that it would be approved. 
 Washington, however, threw all the weight of his advice against 
 it. He was unalterably opposed to letting France have Canada, 
 for then, with the Spanish at New Orleans and along the Mis- 
 sissippi, the United States would be within the grip of France 
 and Spain, just as the colonies were at the beginning of the 
 French and Indian War. Moreover, if France helped us to win 
 Canada for ourselves, there was danger that she would be 
 tempted to take it for herself. "Men are very apt," he wrote 
 to Congress, "to run into extremes. Hatred of England may 
 carry some into an excess of confidence in France, especially 
 when motives of gratitude are thrown into the scale. Men of 
 this description would be unwilling to suppose France capable 
 of acting so ungenerous a part. I am heartily disposed to enter- 
 tain the most favorable sentiments of our new ally and to cher- 
 ish them in others to a reasonable degree. But it is a maxim, 
 founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation 
 is to he trusted further than it is hound hy its own interest; 
 and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart 
 from it." The Father of his Country never spoke or penned 
 wiser words than those, which are worthy to be engraved in gold 
 upon the walls of every state department and chancellery in the 
 world; and it was of inestimable value to America that the au- 
 thor of those words was the first President and therefore the 
 founder of the foreign policy of the constitutional republic. It 
 it true that Congress did not altogether follow the counsel of 
 Washington in this matter. It is also true that Washington 
 was mistaken in supposing, as he did, that Lafayette had been 
 prompted by the French king and his ministers to make the pro- 
 posal of Canadian conquest. But the general principle of 
 Washington 's policy was sound, and in the end it prevailed.
 
 THE REVOLUTION 83 
 
 The fact is that the French government, far from wishing to 
 conquer Canada, was vigorously opposed to any such scheme. 
 Vergennes did not mean, if he could help it, to have the United 
 States become a great power, so as to dominate the continent. 
 Canada must, he insisted, be left to England, and Florida must 
 be Spain's. He also suggested to Spain the practicability of her 
 seizing the Northwest and Southwest territories, between the 
 Mississippi and the Alleghenies; and even urged the American 
 Congress to let Spain have those lands without demur, declaring 
 that France would not help the United States to get them for 
 itself. 
 
 To return, however, to the date of the French alliance. Eleven 
 days after the signing of the treaty, and before the news had 
 widely leaked out, Lord North, on February 17, introduced into 
 Parliament two bills looking to an arrangement with America. 
 One of these declared that Parliament had no intention of exer- 
 cising the right to tax America. The other provided for the 
 sending of commissioners to America, to make peace on the basis 
 of the status quo ante helium. The British government thus 
 proposed to acknowledge that it had been altogether in the wrong, 
 and to concede all America 's demands, save actual independence. 
 Such overtures to America would not have satisfied all. Prob- 
 ably they would not have been accepted by Congress. But they 
 would no doubt have been acceptable to many, and the making 
 of them would have caused grave dissensions in this country and 
 might have ruined the cause of independence. But of course it 
 was now too late, after the making of the French treaty, for 
 them to have any such effect. Indeed, they were destined in ad- 
 vance to be discredited in Parliament. For news of the sign- 
 ing of the treaty of friendship and commerce between France 
 and America had at last got out. It had reached the ears of 
 Horace Walpole, and he had imparted it to Charles James Fox. 
 So when Lord North sat down, after introducing the bills. Fox 
 arose and asked whether a treaty had not already been made 
 ten days before, between France and America, and if so, if the 
 British government was not too late with its proposals for con- 
 ciliation. Lord North hesitatingly admitted that he had heard 
 hints of such a thing. There is little doubt that he spoke truly, 
 and that he had heard nothing more than vague hints. But the
 
 84 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 mischief was done, and Parliament realized that the useful prom- 
 ise of the bills was destroyed. The bills were indeed passed, 
 and Townshend's fatal policy was nominally reversed and re- 
 pudiated. On March 11 they received royal assent, and a little 
 later three commissioners were sent to America to make peace. 
 But it was too late. Congress summarily rejected the overtures. 
 The disclosure of the treaties had its natural effect in causing 
 hostilities between France and England. On March 13, 1778, 
 the Marquis de Noailles, the French ambassador in London, an- 
 nounced to the British government that France had made a 
 treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States. He 
 did not mention the treaty of alliance, nor was it necessary that 
 he should do so. The other was sufficient to arouse England's 
 resentment. Ten days later Lord Stormont, the British am- 
 bassador, abruptly left Paris without taking leave of the French 
 government. A week later Gerard sailed for America, the first 
 French minister to the United States. Within a month more 
 French and British fleets sailed for American waters, and the 
 war between France and England had begun. It was in such 
 circumstances that the "forlorn hope" of the three English peace 
 commissioners came to America. Their attempts to negotiate, 
 at first with Washington and then with Congress, failed utterly. 
 But in a letter to Congress, in June, they made some comments 
 upon the French alliance which are worthy to be recalled. "We 
 cannot but remark," they wrote, "the insidious interposition 
 of a power which has from the first settlement of the colonies 
 been actuated with enmity to us both ; and, notwithstanding the 
 pretended date or present form of the French offers to North 
 America, it is notorious that they have only been made because 
 it was believed that Great Britain had conceived the design of 
 an amicable arrangement, and with a view to prevent reconcilia- 
 tion and to prolong this destructive war." In that, it must be 
 confessed, the English commissioners expressed practically the 
 truth concerning the French government and its motives, though 
 not, of course, concerning some individual Frenchmen such as 
 Lafayette. But it will be remembered that the French king 
 did not approve Lafayette's generous conduct toward America, 
 and strove to prevent it and to punish him for it, even to the ex- 
 tent of imprisoning him. Yet Lafayette seems, in his noble en-
 
 THE REVOLUTION 85 
 
 thusiasm, to have invested the attitude of the French government 
 with the same fine spirit that marked his own, and he resented 
 this letter of the commissioners so bitterly that he challenged the 
 Earl of Carlisle, one of the commissioners, to fight a duel over it, 
 a challenge which Carlisle declined. 
 
 Meantime, some interesting complications were in progress 
 with Spain. We have seen that Vergennes, at first protesting 
 that France could not make the American alliance without 
 Spain's assent, finally did make it without Spain's assent or 
 knowledge, and he had his representative in London deny to the 
 Spanish ambassador there that such a treaty had been made. 
 When at last the facts came out, the Spanish government was 
 indignant. Charles III of Spain earnestly desired the main- 
 tenance of peace in Europe. Moreover, he distrusted France, 
 and feared that Spain would be made her tool and would be 
 sacrificed to her selfish interests. His chief minister, Florida 
 Blanca, took even stronger ground. He aspired to be the dic- 
 tator of American affairs, and to restore Spanish dominance 
 upon this continent. His wrath at France's recognition of 
 American independence was therefore great. He promptly 
 turned to Spain's ancient enemy, England, and proposed some- 
 thing much like an alliance with her. His suggestion was that 
 Spain and England should cooperate for the settlement of Amer- 
 ican affairs. England was to keep Canada, Nova Scotia, and the 
 Northwest Territory, and Spain was to have all south of the Ohio 
 River and the whole coast of the Gulf of Mexico, which was to be 
 a "closed sea" belonging exclusively to Spain. However, Great 
 Britain was to have the right to navigate it, and also to navigate 
 the ]\Iississippi River through Spanish territory. The United 
 States, if permitted to be independent, was to be confined to the 
 narrow strip between the Allegheny IMountains and the Atlantic, 
 extending from Maine to Georgia ; but Great Britain was to hold 
 Rhode Island, to break the continuity of the coast line. The 
 reply of the English government was that it could enter into no 
 negotiations so long as France was assisting the American rebels. 
 
 Then Florida Blanca turned to France, and sought to negoti- 
 ate a treaty as advantageous as possible to Spain. He especially 
 wanted to shut the United States away from the i\Iississippi 
 River, and lie proposed to join forces with Vergennes, and even
 
 86 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 to approve the latter 's alliance with America, which he had a lit- 
 tle time before denounced as "worthy of Don Quixote." He 
 urged upon Vergennes various plans of campaign. One was to 
 invade England itself. Another was to settle American affairs 
 by making the United States independent, but giving Rhode 
 Island to Great Britain, in order to weaken the United States 
 and to make lasting irritation and trouble between it and Eng- 
 land. No wonder that Vergennes declared that Spain never had 
 anything in common with the United States ! This latter propo- 
 sition was too radical for France, though Vergennes, who through 
 Montmorin, his representative at Madrid, was almost desperately 
 endeavoring to secure Spanish support in the war with England 
 upon which he was entering, suggested that France had not com- 
 mitted herself to American sovereignty over the territory west of 
 the Alleghenies, and might conspire and cooperate with Spain 
 to rob her of it and keep the United States away from the Mis- 
 sissippi. This half-promise, which France afterward loyally 
 strove to fulfil, went far toward persuading Spain to ally her- 
 self with Frjance. There is little doubt that Charles III sin- 
 cerely wanted to keep the peace. He also feared that in an alli- 
 ance with France, for war upon England, Spain would be made 
 the tool of France. Still, he desired to win back Florida, Ja- 
 maica, and Gibraltar, which the British had taken from Spain. 
 The Spanish ultimatum to France, therefore, was that the United 
 States should be shut away from the Mississippi, and that peace 
 should not be concluded until England had been compelled to 
 surrender Florida, Jamaica, and Gibraltar. To these terms, 
 Vergennes, in his desperation, agreed. 
 
 The treaty of Aranjurez was accordingly signed between 
 France and Spain, on April 12, 1779. Under its terms, Spain 
 was to aid France in warring against England, and neither party 
 was to make peace with England without the assent of the other. 
 Such assent was not to be given by Spain until she had regained 
 Gibraltar, nor by France until the British hold upon Dunkirk 
 had been fully relinquished. Spain did not by this treaty ally 
 herself with America, nor did she contemplate such a step. In- 
 deed, it was stipulated that she should not do so, save with the 
 express permission of France. The latter did not want Spain 
 or any other power to aid the Americans, lest they should thus
 
 THE REVOLUTION 87 
 
 win their independence more quickly than France desired, and 
 should do so without being made to feel much dependence upon 
 and gratitude toward France. The French aim was to let Amer- 
 ica become independent just when it suited France, and to just 
 such an extent as suited France ; and to make America feel that 
 she owed her independence to France and must therefore con- 
 tinue to regard that country as her benefactor and protector. 
 In these circumstances it is not surprising that France kept the 
 terms of this precious treaty secret from America. If they had 
 not been kept thus secret the French minister, Gerard, would 
 have had a still more difficult task on hand than he had when he 
 came hither and tried to persuade the committee of Congress on 
 foreign affairs to modify American demands and ambitions so 
 as to meet the wishes of Spain ; his argument being that if that 
 was not done, Spain would not help France, and then France 
 could not help America. He further intimated that if the 
 United States would abandon its claims upon the territory be- 
 tween the Alleghenies and the IMississippi, and to a frontage 
 upon the latter river, Spain would recognize American inde- 
 pendence and make with the United States a treaty of commerce. 
 Probably Gerard himself believed this to be true. But no good 
 reason exists for supposing that it was true, or that any such 
 fatal sacrifice by this country would have gained the actual aid 
 of Spain. 
 
 That the chief aim of France in allying herself with America 
 was to cripple England is unquestionable. Equally certain is it 
 that both France and Spain at an early date feared lest they 
 should be led to play the part of Frankenstein, by aiding in the 
 creation of a new power that should in time overshadow both. 
 Accordingly France, almost as soon as the treaties with America 
 were made, began to look about for precautions against the too 
 great growth of the United States, while the same motive was 
 absolutely dominant in the Spanish mind. Thus was presented 
 the strange spectacle of one actual and one potential ally of 
 America devoting their thought largely to ways and means for 
 fettering and crippling America and making it from its birth a 
 dwarf and a weakling among the nations. Vergennes, in Octo- 
 ber and November, 1778, expressed to IMontmorin, his minister 
 at Madrid, fears lest in time the natural ties of race and blood
 
 88 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 should incline America toward commercial intimacy and polit- 
 ical friendship with England, and he promptly agreed with the 
 suggestion of Florida Blanca, that the possession of Canada and 
 Nova Scotia should be guaranteed to Great Britain, in order that 
 the United States might not become too great and in order, also, 
 to create a perennial source of irritation and possible warfare 
 between the United States and Great Britain. That is to say, 
 our ally guaranteed protection and security to our enemy, 
 against us! True, Vergennes would not go quite so far as to 
 accept Spain's proposal, that Rhode Island and perhaps New 
 York, too, should also be guaranteed to Great Britain, because, 
 he said, France had already recognized the independence of the 
 Thirteen Colonies, including Rhode Island and New York. 
 But, he added, "We are very far from desiring that the nascent 
 republic should remain the exclusive mistress of all that immense 
 continent." Expectation and hope were combined in his proph- 
 ecy to Montmorin that the United States would "never be any- 
 thing more than a feeble body, capable of little activity." 
 
 The Spanish attitude toward America was further and un- 
 mistakably revealed in the declaration of Florida Blanca, shortly 
 before the making of the treaty with France. "The king, my 
 master," he said, "will never acknowledge their independence 
 until the English themselves shall be forced to recognize it by 
 the peace. He fears the example which he should otherwise 
 give to his own possessions." It was with that understanding 
 that the treaty was made. France bound herself to invade 
 Great Britain or Ireland, to help Spain recover Gibraltar, Mi- 
 norca, Florida, the Bay of Honduras, and the coast of Cam- 
 peche, and, if she should gain Newfoundland for herself, to 
 share its fisheries with Spain alone to the exclusion of the 
 United States. France, moreover, expressly bound herself not 
 to make peace nor even to grant a suspension of hostilities with 
 England until Gibraltar should have been restored to Spain. 
 On the other hand, Spain was authorized to require, as the price 
 of her friendship, that the United States should renounce all 
 frontage on the Great Lakes and the basin of the St. Lawrence, 
 all navigation of or even approach to the Mississippi, and even 
 the possession of any land west of the Allegheny Mountains! 
 Thus within little more than a year after making her treaties
 
 THE REVOLUTION 89 
 
 with the United States, France assented to and even urged a 
 scheme for restricting this country forever to the petty coast 
 strip occupied by the colonies before the French and Indian 
 War. She also modified, if not supereeded, her pledge not to 
 make peace with England until our independence was granted, 
 with a pledge to another nation not to make such peace until its 
 ends were gained. That was a practical fulfilment of Gerard's 
 warnmg that as between Spain and America, France would side 
 with Spain. In that treaty France deliberately sacrificed Amer- 
 ican interests in behalf of Spain, and gave the amplest justifica- 
 tion for the disregard of French interests which Jay, Adams, 
 and Franklin afterward displayed in the making of the treaty 
 of Paris in 1783. There are few more satisfactory chapters in 
 our history than those which tell how George Rogers Clark baf- 
 fled the designs of Spain by winning our frontage on the Mis- 
 sissippi, and how the three peace commissioners at Paris baf- 
 fled France's malevolence by making the peace treaty without 
 the consent or even the knowledge of the French government. 
 
 The coming of Gerard to America as the first French minister 
 was hailed with much joy and exultation, and rightly so. It 
 v/as an incident of great value to America. Nevertheless, it was 
 also fraught with possibilities of mischief and ruin to this coun- 
 try, and we have cause to be grateful that there were in Con- 
 gress and in the army men wise enough to discern the meaning 
 of Gerard's suggestions and the mischievous character of his 
 advice. We have already cited some of his utterances. He 
 also told Congress that if America did not abandon all preten- 
 sions to navigation of the Mississippi, and concede to Spain a 
 monopoly of that river, Spain might join England against the 
 United States. He added that if France had to choose between 
 an alliance with Spain and one with America, she would choose 
 Spain and let America go. America, he said, must not expect 
 to have her independence recognized by England for a long 
 time to come. Thus Holland's independence had not even yet 
 been formally recognized by Spain, nor had that of Switzerland. 
 The latter country enjoyed its "sovereignty and independence 
 only under the guarantee of France." His intimation, and 
 doubtless Vergennes's intention, was that the United States 
 should be content with a similar status. Indeed Vergennes, in
 
 90 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 his instructions to Gerard, expressly declared that should the 
 United States become independent, it should be so hemmed in 
 by foreign powers as to be forever dependent upon France for 
 the maintenance of its nominal independence. England was to 
 keep Canada. Spain was to have a monopoly of the Mississippi 
 River. The United States was to be excluded from the North 
 Atlantic fisheries, which were to be divided between France and 
 England. 
 
 Well might America at that time have prayed to be saved 
 from her professed friends! France had intervened ostensibly 
 in her behalf, not so much to help her as to prevent her from 
 winning too great a victory and from becoming too powerful a 
 nation. It was not that France loved America, and wished to 
 help her, but rather that she feared her and wished to cripple 
 her and stunt her growing power. Happily, America did not 
 accept all of Gerard's pernicious counsel, though it did accept 
 enough to cause it some loss and future trouble. Thus it re- 
 nounced its claims upon Nova Scotia and Bermuda, and for the 
 time waived its rights to the North Atlantic fisheries. Had it 
 not been for this, Bermuda would have become a possession of 
 this Union, as the correspondence of the Tuckers — a Bermuda 
 family — shows, and the subsequent controversies over the fish- 
 eries would have been avoided. Congress did refuse to sacrifice 
 the Northwest Territory and the frontage on and navigation of 
 the upper part of the Mississippi River, and it was because of 
 that refusal that Spain declined to lend money to the United 
 States. This was made clear when John Jay went to Spain in 
 1781, to negotiate a treaty and secure a loan. Congress in- 
 structed him to offer to guarantee Spain's possession of Florida, 
 and also to concede to Spain the monopoly of the Mississippi 
 below the thirty-first parallel of latitude. There was even a 
 suggestion that he might, if necessary, agree to surrender to 
 Spain everything west of the Allegheny Mountains, including 
 Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. But John 
 Jay was too great a statesman and patriot to act upon such in- 
 sane instructions. He never revealed them to Spain, but sought 
 a treaty on honorable and prudent terms; wherefore Spain re- 
 fused to make any, or even to recognize him as an official envoy. 
 
 To return to the French treaty with America. That was
 
 THE REVOLUTION 91 
 
 made in the winter of Valley Forge. That was a time when 
 America needed immediate help, if ever she needed it or was to 
 get it. But such help, in the form of military or naval suc- 
 cors, was not forthcoming. We have already seen how, long 
 after the beginning of the Revolution, France waited before she 
 gave us recognition. A similar delay occurred after recognition 
 before actual assistance was given. The treaties were made at 
 the beginning of February. They were kept secret until the 
 middle of March. Then war was declared between France and 
 England. But it was not until July 8, nearly four months later, 
 that the first French ships reached Delaware Bay, bearing an 
 army of four thousand men and also Gerard, the French minis- 
 ter. Meantime, without any aid, the Americans had emerged 
 from Valley Forge, had compelled the British to leave Philadel- 
 phia, and had fought the important battle of Monmouth. When 
 the French fleet reached the Capes of the Delaware, the British 
 were in possession of only two important places in all the 
 United States, namely, New York and Newport. Nor even then 
 did the French act promptly for finishing up the war. The 
 capture of Newport was attempted by the Americans at the end 
 of July, but the French failed to cooperate and the attack failed. 
 A siege of Newport was maintained until the end of August, 
 but the French did nothing toward it and it had to be aban- 
 doned. Indeed, practically nothing was done by the French to 
 aid us, in all that first year of the alliance, save to lend us 
 money; though all the time Gerard was busy with his evil 
 counsels to Congress, trying to get the young republic to com- 
 mit suicide in its cradle. 
 
 The next year, 1779, was even less profitable to the American 
 cause, and was marked with even less helpfulness on the part 
 of our French allies. Wayne stormed Stony Point, but had no 
 French aid in doing so. Paul Jones startled the world with his 
 fight off Flamborough Head, but the French cooperation there 
 was more harmful than helpful to him. France busied herself 
 with helping Spain in futile assaults upon Gibraltar, to the 
 neglect of America, to whom her aid had first been pledged. It 
 is true that the loyal and gallant Lafayette showed himself as 
 devoted to the American cause, and as energetic in it, as Wash- 
 ington himself. But how was he regarded in France? He
 
 92 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 went thither iu February, 1779, to secure more aid for America, 
 but was received by the king with grave displeasure, and was 
 actually sent to prison for a week, to punish him for his interest 
 in American independence. The queen, it is true, treated him 
 with favor, and expressed sympathy with America; but more 
 on grounds of girlish sentiment than on those of conviction or 
 political reason and policy. So that year passed, and the war 
 lagged. In fact, the French alliance was doing far more harm 
 than good. The wearied Americans had been led to expect prac- 
 tical aid in battle, and had thus been tempted to relax their 
 own efforts and to secure for themselves a little of the rest which 
 they so sorely needed. "There is a just God," Patrick Henry 
 had said, "who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us." 
 The Americans, exhausted after the herculean exertions of Val- 
 ley Forge and Monmouth, trusted to those friends to fight their 
 battles for them, and the result was that the battles were not 
 fought, or were lost. It is by no means beyond bounds of rea- 
 sonable supposition that if the Americans had not been de- 
 luded by expectations of immediate French aid in battle, they 
 would themselves have fought the war to a victorious ending in 
 1779, or at latest in 1780. 
 
 That was not to be. While the Americans vainly waited 
 for the expected aid, British activities were renewed and dis- 
 aster came to the Americans in the South, and Arnold's treason 
 was being planned in the North. Lafayette did his best for us. 
 He remained in France for more than a year, daily urging that 
 an army of at least 12,000 men be sent to America, not under 
 a French general to cooperate with Washington, but to be in- 
 corporated directly with Washington's array and to serve di- 
 rectly under his command. In this he was energetically sec- 
 onded by the gallant but ill-fated Admiral d'Estaing. All he 
 could secure, however, was a promise from Vergennes, to be 
 repeated to the American government, that some help would be 
 sent, and with that he returned to this country, in April, 1780. 
 Three months later Ternay's fleet, with Rochambeau's army of 
 6,000 men, reached Newport, and lay there, bottled up and 
 idle, for a year. Vergennes meant to send 6,000 more, thus 
 fulfilling Lafayette's request, but the British fleet prevented him 
 from doing so. That year, while Ternay lay idle and helpless
 
 THE REVOLUTION 93 
 
 at Newport, was one of the most disastrous to the Americans in 
 the whole war. Lincoln surrendered to Clinton at Charleston, 
 the incompetent Gates was defeated at Camden, and Arnold 
 sought to betray West Point to the British. In such circum- 
 stances, Ternay wrote from Newport to Vergennes that the out- 
 come of the Revolution was still doubtful, and that the American 
 cause had not made nearly as much progress as Europeans sup- 
 posed. 
 
 Early in 1781, however, the Americans began to recover from 
 their deplorable dependence upon French aid, and to act upon 
 the principle that "who w^ould be free, themselves must strike 
 the blow!" Greene and Morgan set about recouping the losses 
 suffered under Gates, and by midsummer it was evident that 
 the Americans were at last surely working out their own salva- 
 tion. The chief aid given by France in the first half of the year 
 was indirect though not without material value. A great fleet 
 was sent out under De Grasse, to attack Jamaica and seize it 
 for Spain. In that design it was unsuccessful. But it per- 
 formed the valuable service of diverting British attention from 
 the United States to the West Indies, and of drawing toward 
 the latter the British armaments which might otherwise have 
 been directed against our shores. At the middle of August the 
 French fleet came from the West Indies toward the Chesapeake 
 Bay, reaching the latter at the end of the month. It is to be 
 noted, however, that this was done not primarily to aid America 
 but to promote the French and Spanish interests in the West In- 
 dies, the theory being that a French naval demonstration on the 
 coast of Virginia would attract British attention thither and 
 thus aid the anti-British campaign in the West Indies. Mean- 
 time, Lafayette, with a skill and heroism rarely equaled, kept 
 Comwallis cooped up at Yorktown until Washington, with 
 Rochambeau's array from Newport added to his own, made his 
 wonderful rush from the Hudson to the Chesapeake. Then the 
 end quickly came. While the French fleet kept guard off shore, 
 the French allies on land helped Washington to press his lines 
 nearer and nearer to Comwallis 's defenses, until at last, on 
 October 17, the white flag went up, and on October 19 Com- 
 wallis surrendered; and the Revolution was all over, save the 
 detennination of the exact bases of peace.
 
 94 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Before leaving this part of the story, however, we must briefly 
 consider the attitude of other powers toward America, and the 
 American relations with them, during the actual war of the 
 Revolution, as distinguished from the time of peace-making at 
 the end. Prussia during the Seven Years' War had risen to 
 a place among the great powers of Europe, and her favor and 
 assistance were much desired by the Americans. It was thought 
 that there would be a possibility of enlisting the active sympathy 
 of Frederick the Great in the American cause, partly because 
 of the liberal views which he held in strange connection with 
 his absolutism, and partly because he was much exasperated 
 against England for what he regarded as her desertion of him 
 in the latter part of the Seven Years' War, Arthur Lee was 
 accordingly sent to Berlin as the American envoy. He was of 
 all men one of the least fitted for diplomacy, and it may be that 
 his unfitness was the cause of the failure of his mission. He was 
 hospitably treated by Frederick's minister. Baron Schulenberg, 
 but was not received by Frederick himself and never secured 
 official recognition as an accredited envoy. In the fall of 1777 
 and spring of 1778, it is true, Frederick refused to let the mer- 
 cenaries of other German States pass through Prussia on their 
 way to America as hirelings of the British. But it was quite 
 clear that he did so not because of a wish to protect America 
 so much as because of his contempt for and detestation of the 
 mercenary system. He expressed great interest in Washing- 
 ton's victory over the British and Hessians at Trenton, but it 
 was admiration for Washington's military genius rather than 
 gratification at the result. So great a soldier as he could not 
 have helped appreciating and admiring that performance of 
 Washington's, which was one of the most brilliant and effective 
 in the whole history of warfare. There has long been extant a 
 story that Frederick sent to Washington at that time a sword, 
 inscribed "From the Oldest General to the Greatest." It is 
 possible that he did so, but the story does not seem ever to have 
 been satisfactorily authenticated. 
 
 Frederick, through Baron Schulenberg, did indeed promise 
 Lee, in January, 1778, that Prussia would recognize American 
 independence whenever France did so. But the promise was 
 not kept. France soon afterward made her treaties with
 
 THE REVOLUTION 95 
 
 America, but Frederick merely renewed his promise without 
 fulfilling it. He wrote to Franklin, in Paris, that he would 
 probably soon recognize American independence, but that recog- 
 nition did not come. He would not even open his port of Em- 
 den to American warships and their prizes, for the reason that 
 he did not feel strong enough to defend and maintain its neu- 
 trality against British resentment, seeing how open that port 
 was to British attacks. He did, however, open his ports to 
 American merchantmen, and he finally opened his Baltic port 
 of Dantzig, which was less exposed than Emden to attack from 
 Great Britain, to American warships; by which act he in a 
 measure, by implication, recognized the belligerent status of 
 America. It is possible that he would have gone further and 
 would have given the United States full recognition, but for the 
 fact that he presently became involved in a grave dispute con- 
 cerning the succession to the Bavarian crown, in which as the 
 champion of Germany he was constrained to join with Saxony 
 in resisting Austrian aggressions, and in which the cultivation 
 of friendly relations with England seemed necessary. "At this 
 moment," he wrote, "the affairs of England with her colonies 
 disappear from my eyes." Again, in response to Arthur Lee's 
 importunities for recognition as the minister of the United 
 States at the Prussian court, he said: "We are so occupied 
 with Germany that we cannot think of the Americans. We 
 should be heartily glad to recognize them, but at this present 
 moment it would do them no good, and to us might be very 
 detrimental." Thereafter Frederick so far modified his re- 
 sentment against England as to permit the passage of a few 
 mercenaries through his dominions on their way to America, 
 and he promised to protect Hanover from French attacks. But 
 he steadfastly refused to make any alliance with Great Britain. 
 His attitude until the end of the war was one of cold indiffer- 
 ence toward the American struggle. Germany was his world, 
 and beyond the borders of the Fatherland his sympathies and 
 interests did not extend. He wrote truly to his brother con- 
 cerning relations with America and England, "I propose to 
 procrastinate in these negotiations, and go over to the side on 
 which Fortune shall declare herself." 
 
 We have already considered the attitude of Russia in 1775-76,
 
 96 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 and have seen that it was in no respect sympathetic toward 
 America, but rather inclined to the British side. The fact that 
 Kosciuscko, Pulaski, and other Poles, who certainly had no love 
 for Russia, promptly allied themselves with the American cause, 
 was also an indication that Russia was more hostile than friendly 
 to America. There were, however, still stronger manifestations 
 of Russia's preference for England. Early in 1778 the British 
 ambassador to Russia, Sir James Harris, afterward Earl of 
 Malmesbury, began negotiations for a close alliance between Great 
 Britain and Russia, to offset the Franco-American alliance, 
 which lasted practically until the end of the Revolution. It is 
 true that the alliance was not made, though it came very near 
 consummation. Catherine the Great was an admirer of Vol- 
 taire and of Charles James Fox, and her minister, Count Panin, 
 was little more than a puppet in the hands of Frederick the 
 Great, whose feelings toward the British government were not 
 amiable. For these reasons Catherine hesitated to show favor 
 to the ministry of Lord North. Nevertheless, neither she nor 
 any of her court ever expressed any sympathy with America. 
 On the contrary, her favorite lover, Prince Potemkin, who had 
 more influence than most of her ministers, intimated to Sir 
 James Harris that the desired alliance of Russia with Great 
 Britain, against France and America, would be made if Great 
 Britain would give to Russia the Mediterranean island of Mi- 
 norca. The British government hesitated. It wanted Russia 
 as an ally, but it did not relish the idea of letting her have that 
 important island and thus establish herself as a power in the 
 Mediterranean Sea. So the negotiations were prolonged, Rus- 
 sia demanding Minorca as the price of her alliance and Great 
 Britain striving and hoping to persuade her to be content with 
 a less price. Finally, in 1781, Great Britain yielded and agreed 
 to give her Minorca. But it was then too late. Russia had en- 
 tered into other relations, and would not make the alliance even 
 on these terms. 
 
 Russia did, however, render to Great Britain a signal service. 
 We have seen that in 1775, while declining to provide a mer- 
 cenary army for his uses — saying that she would like to do so 
 but was physically unable — Catherine assured King George that 
 she would gladly aid him against America in any way she could.
 
 THE KEVOLUTION 97 
 
 That promise was fulfilled in 1778. Early in that year France 
 recognized American independence and formed an American 
 alliance. Thereupon Catherine, through Count Panin, assured 
 King George, through Sir James Harris, that so long as Great 
 Britain treated the Americans as rebels, Russia would refuse to 
 recognize their independence. That promise was faithfully ful- 
 filled. Russia did in fact refuse to recognize American inde- 
 pendence until long after it had been recognized elsewhere. 
 Great Britain herself recognized American independence and 
 entered into treaty relations with the United States long before 
 Russia did. Nor was that all. In December, 1780, Congress 
 sent the accomplished Francis Dana as American envoy to St. 
 Petersburg, and instructed him to engage, if possible, the Rus- 
 sian empress "to favor and support the sovereignty and inde- 
 pendence of the United States," to secure the admission of the 
 United States as a party to the conventions of the neutral mari- 
 time powers, and to establish friendly relations between the two 
 countries. He was also to seek a treaty of amity and commerce 
 with Russia similar in spirit to that which had been made with 
 France. He was not, however, at once to announce his public 
 character, but was first to find out privately from the French 
 minister at St. Petersburg the disposition of the Russian court 
 toward America. 
 
 Dana was at this time in Paris, serving as secretary to John 
 Adams. On receiving his instructions he applied to Adams 
 and Franklin for advice, and by Franklin was referred to Ver- 
 gennes. The latter discouraged him so far as he could from 
 undertaking the mission, saying that he did not approve of hia 
 going to Russia in his public character and advising him to con- 
 sult the Russian minister at The Hague concerning the pro- 
 priety of his going privately. Franklin also gave Dana little 
 encouragement. Adams, on the other hand, urged him to set 
 out at once for St. Petersburg according to his instructions, 
 and to have nothing to do with the Russian minister at The 
 Hague or with any one else connected with the Russian govern- 
 ment until he met the French ambassador at St. Petersburg. 
 Dana accepted this advice and acted upon it, reaching St. Peters- 
 burg in August, 1781. 
 
 There he placed himself in communication with the French 
 
 VOL. I 7
 
 98 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 minister, the Marquis de Verac. The latter had probably re- 
 ceived from Vergennes information of Dana's coming and in- 
 structions as to how to receive him. He wrote to Dana that he 
 must not make his mission known nor make any advances to 
 the Russian court, for Russia would not recognize the minister 
 of a power which had not yet, in Russian eyes, any political ex- 
 istence. This was not pleasing to Dana and he replied to Verac 
 that he intended to communicate confidentially with the Russian 
 foreign minister and to seek, through him, to present a memorial 
 to the empress. Verac in return told Dana bluntly that Russia 
 and the other neutral powers would have nothing to do with the 
 United States until its independence had been acknowledged by 
 Great Britain. At this Dana decided to wait until he could re- 
 ceive further advices. 
 
 It was Dana's not unreasonable conviction that the French 
 government was jealous of his attempt to secure from Russia 
 recognition of American independence. Vergennes, however, 
 declared that the French government simply wished to save 
 Dana and America from receiving a humiliating rebuff from the 
 Russian court. Russia, he said, would have little to gain from 
 the independence of the United States, since American products 
 would compete with those of Russia in the markets of the world. 
 Moreover, the empress, as an absolute monarch, detested revolu- 
 tions and could not be expected to aid or countenance one. 
 These plausible explanations were accepted by Congress and 
 its secretary for foreign affairs, Livingston, and Dana was ac- 
 cordingly instructed not to present his letter of credence to the 
 Russian court until he had obtained some assurance of its favor- 
 able acceptance. 
 
 When at last news came that the preliminary treaty of peace 
 had been signed by the British and American commissioners, 
 Dana was overjoyed and expected that at last he would be recog- 
 nized and received. In this, however, he was doomed to disap- 
 pointment. Verac insisted that he must wait until the final 
 treaty was signed and until the attitude of the other European 
 powers was ascertained. On March 5, 1783, a confidential mes- 
 senger from the empress informed Dana that he might communi- 
 cate his mission to one of her ministers at any time, though he 
 might not receive a prompt answer. Two days later, therefore,
 
 THE REVOLUTION 99 
 
 he communicated his mission to Count Ostermann, the minister 
 for foreign affairs, and requested an audience with the empress. 
 Ostermann seems to have revealed this to Sir James Harris, 
 the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, who at once, on his 
 own authority, protested against any Russian negotiations with 
 an American minister until the final treaty was made and rati- 
 fied; adding that for Russia to do so would certainly alienate 
 Great Britain forever. In reply, Harris received assurances 
 from the empress herself that no American agent would be re- 
 ceived until after the ratification of the final treaty, or until 
 Great Britain herself received one. 
 
 Thereafter Ostermann adopted a policy of delay toward Dana, 
 refusing to see him for more than a month. Finally he informed 
 Dana that the empress would not receive him until the making 
 of a definitive treaty by Great Britain, France, and Spain ; that 
 even then Dana must have a letter of credence dated since the 
 making of such a treaty, and since the date at which the em- 
 press should herself recognize American independence; and 
 finally that an American minister would not be received by her 
 until one had been received by the King of England. Dana re- 
 quested Ostermann to put these conditions in writing, but the 
 Russian refused to do so. A fortnight later Dana made a vig- 
 orous written reply to Ostermann, protesting against all these 
 conditions and arguing that they were contrary to international 
 law. He added that these were simply his private sentiments 
 and not an official expression of the views of Congress. To 
 this Ostermann made no reply, but in a personal interview some 
 time later he protested that Dana had misunderstood the atti- 
 tude of the empress. 
 
 The making of peace lessened the desire of Congress for the 
 establishment of relations with Russia and in April, 1783, Con- 
 gress adopted a resolution authorizing Dana to return home, 
 provided he was not at the time engaged in negotiations with 
 the Russian government. Dana wrote in reply to Livingston 
 that he was persuaded that no treaty with Russia could be ob- 
 tained without going to the pecuniary expense to which other 
 powers were put in such matters ; and that as Congress had not 
 authorized such procedure he would return to the United States 
 as soon as possible. He also wrote to Ostermann that on account
 
 100 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of ill health and private affairs he had secured the permission 
 of Congress to return home and therefore would not trouble the 
 empress further about an audience. Shortly afterward he left 
 St. Petersburg and returned home. He did not go to Russia 
 again and no one was sent thither to replace him. Congress 
 passed a resolution in April, 1784, to the effect that it would be 
 advantageous to make a treaty with Russia, and in 1785 John 
 Adams wrote from London that the Russian ambassador there 
 had several times asked why none was made. But nothing in 
 that direction was actually done. 
 
 Again in 1782, in the closing months of the War for Inde- 
 pendence, the Count du Nord, a son of Empress Catherine, 
 visited the Russian minister, Prince Bariatinski, in Paris. He 
 at once entered into social relations with all the foreign ministers 
 there excepting only Franklin, the American minister. When 
 one day the prince's servant sent the count's and the prince's 
 cards to Franklin, as to all foreign envoys, and Franklin in re- 
 turn called at the prince's house and signed his name in the 
 visiting book, there was a tremendous row. The servant was 
 in danger of losing his place for his blunder, and the prince took 
 extraordinary pains to hush the matter up, not wishing it to be 
 known that he and the count had, even to that extent, and that 
 unintentionally and through a blunder, recognized the Ameri- 
 can envoy ! And that was at a time when nearly all other for- 
 eign representatives were going out of their way to pay re- 
 spects to Franklin! The case was ended by Franklin's con- 
 temptuously burning up the Russian prince's card and sending 
 him word to erase his name from the book. At almost the same 
 moment when the Russian nobles were acting in such fashion, 
 the King of Denmark was inviting Franklin to dine with him, 
 and the Swedish minister was, at his sovereign's command, 
 seeking to make a treaty with America through him. 
 
 Even that is not all. At about the same time Franklin re- 
 ceived a letter from Mr. Dana, at St. Petersburg, reporting that 
 the news that Holland had recognized American independence 
 had given a shock at the Russian capital and had not been well 
 received. Again, John Adams, at The Hague, in a letter to 
 Franklin in June, 1782, expressed his suspicion that Russia was 
 making intrigues in England's favor. Many other historical
 
 THE REVOLUTION 101 
 
 evidences to the same purport might be cited, were it necessary. 
 But these indications of Russia's lack of sympathy for, if not of 
 actual hostility to, America will in the absence of a single mark 
 of sympathy be sufficient. 
 
 The so-called Armed Neutrality deserves attention at this 
 point, as an interesting factor in the Revolution, and as the 
 basis of some entirely unwarranted pretenses of Russian friend- 
 ship and aid for America, A too-common conception of the 
 Armed Neutrality is that Russia, for the sake of aiding America, 
 conceived and promulgated the doctrine "free ships make free 
 goods," and organized a continental alliance to maintain that 
 principle against Great Britain. It would be difficult to form 
 a greater misconception. The principle in question was first 
 enunciated by Frederick the Great of Prussia, in 1752, and he 
 alone is entitled to the credit therefor. In the summer of 1778, 
 when the war between France and Great Britain had begun and 
 the British fleet was taking great liberties with the commerce of 
 all nations on the high seas with the view of preventing com- 
 merce with the American States, the French government recalled 
 that declaration of Frederick's, and conceived the notion that 
 it would be a good stroke to have it adopted as a rule of inter- 
 national law by a combination of powers too great for England 
 to defy. The British navy was then overhauling Prussian, 
 Swedish, Danish, and Dutch ships, particularly, and those coun- 
 tries would doubtless gladly join such a combination. But not 
 one of those countries seemed quite suited for the leadership of 
 the movement. Russia would have made a good leader. But 
 Russia was on friendly terms with England and at the point 
 of making an alliance with her, and the British navy was, more- 
 over, under specific instructions not to molest or in any way in- 
 terfere with Russian ships. At the outset, then, it seemed im- 
 possible to get Russia to assume the lead in the desired move- 
 ment. 
 
 The astute French ministers, however, soon found a way to 
 attain their end, through the use of Spain as a cat's-paw. 
 Either at French instigation or on their own initiative, the 
 Spanish in the winter of 1779-80 seized two Russian ships and 
 confiscated their cargoes. That aroused Russia's wnrath, and 
 brought her close to the point of declaring war against Spain.
 
 102 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 But then, just iu time, Frederick the Great persuaded the Span- 
 ish minister, Florida Blanca, to offer the fullest possible amends 
 to Russia, He also suggested to Count Panin, who was com- 
 pletely under Frederick's influence, that it would be a fine stroke 
 of policy, and would prevent any more such incidents, for Rus- 
 sia to proclaim to the world the doctrine that Frederick him- 
 self had enunciated twenty-eight years before, namely, that in 
 time of war all neutral ships should be exempt from seizure, 
 and their cargoes likewise, save when the latter consisted of 
 contraband goods. Panin was dazzled with the idea, and flat- 
 tered by Frederick's condescension in suggesting it to him, and 
 he promptly urged it upon Catherine. The French govern- 
 ment at the same time added its persuasion. Catherine was 
 flattered by the practical offer of the headship of a great Euro- 
 pean league, and thus with little difficulty was prevailed upon 
 to issue her famous proclamation of February 28-March 10, 
 1780. 
 
 That proclamation was addressed, let us observe, to the courts 
 of London, Versailles, and Madrid, the three European belliger- 
 ents in the war. The fourth belligerent, America, was entirely 
 ignored. In that circumstance was an indication of Russia's 
 unsympathetic attitude toward this country. To that we may 
 add this significant fact, that with all her professions of neutral- 
 ity Russia throughout the whole Revolution refused to give 
 American warships access to her ports. The ships of England, 
 of France, and of Spain were permitted to enter her ports and 
 to enjoy there the privileges of belligerents in neutral ports. 
 But the vessels of the United States were rigidly excluded. Nor 
 was that all. Franklin, in making the American treaty with 
 France, had inserted therein the very principle which Russia 
 now proclaimed. He urged upon Congress that America should 
 promptly adhere to the Armed Neutrality. Congress complied, 
 and voted thus to do, and John Adams, at The Hague, was di- 
 rected to enter into negotiations with the European powers to 
 that end. But such application was frowned upon by Russia, 
 and was rejected by her. The Armed Neutrality was formed 
 by Russia, then, not at her own instance, but at the suggestion 
 of Prussia and France. It was emphatically not formed for 
 America's benefit, but on the contrary America was specifically
 
 THE KEVOLUTION 103 
 
 excluded from it. It was not directed by Russia against Great 
 Britain, but against Spain, with which country Great Britain 
 was at war. Nor was it maintained in good faith by Russia, as 
 we shall see. 
 
 Denmark and Sweden were the first to enter into the Armed 
 Neutrality alliance with Russia. They did so promptly upon 
 Russia's issuance of the proclamation. Their adherence was 
 welcome to Russia, because of their proximity to her shore and 
 their intimate relations with her commerce. France and Spain 
 also adopted the principle. The Netherlands, Prussia, and Aus- 
 tria did so in 1781, Portugal in 1782, and the Two Sicilies in 
 1783. Turkey also signified her acceptance of it. Great Brit- 
 ain alone refused to do so, and in fact never accepted the prin- 
 ciple until 1856. Meantime sympathy with America had been 
 growing in the Netherlands. At the end of 1779 Holland opened 
 her ports to American warships, particularly to Paul Jones. 
 The thrifty burghers declined, it is true, to lend America money 
 until France assured its repayment, because they were not yet 
 sufficiently confident of our success. Nevertheless they were 
 willing to go far in aiding us. In 1778 William Lee, the Ameri- 
 can commissioner, drew up with two prominent citizens of Am- 
 sterdam a draft of a treaty of friendship and commerce with 
 the United States, It had no validity, as the government of 
 Holland was not even cognizant of it, and it was kept secret for 
 a time. But in October, 1780, the British captured an Ameri- 
 can ship bound for Holland, among whose passengers was Henry 
 Laurens, and among his papers was a draft of this proposed 
 treaty which Congress had approved and which he was taking 
 back to Holland for final ratification. The British government 
 was enraged. It peremptorily demanded of the Dutch govern- 
 ment that it disavow the treaty and severely punish the chief 
 magistrate of Amsterdam, who had signed it. The Dutch gov- 
 ernment did repudiate the treaty, but it could not constitu- 
 tionally punish the magistrate. The incident was no adequate 
 cause for war or even for offense. But the British govern- 
 ment was angry with Holland for opening her ports to Ameri- 
 can ships, and so early in 1781 declared war upon her. ^Mean- 
 while Holland had joined the Armed Neutrality. The Russian 
 minister to Holland reported to his government that that was
 
 104 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 the cause of the British declaration of war, which was perhaps 
 partly the case. Holland therefore promptly made appeal to 
 Russia for aid against England, which Russia was morally 
 bound to give. But England now offered Minorca to Russia 
 as the bribe for a Russian alliance, and although Russia did 
 not accept the offer she was moved to remain friendly to Eng- 
 land. She consulted Frederick of Prussia, declaring that she 
 would fight England only if he would. He refused to do so, 
 whereupon Russia decided to remain friendly with England, and 
 abandoned her ally, Holland, to her fate. 
 
 During the Revolution attempts were made by Congress to 
 enter into relations with various other European powers, espe- 
 cially with Austria and Tuscany, to the courts of which countries 
 envoys were accredited. The result of such overtures was, how- 
 ever, entirely negative. In the era of peace-making at the close 
 of the war those and other powers manifested a strong interest in 
 America, fulfilling the saying of John Adams, that "It is ob- 
 vious that all the powei^ of Europe will be continuously ma- 
 noeuvering with us to work us into their real or imaginary bal- 
 ances of power." But our actual foreign relations during the 
 actual war were practically confined to those already mentioned, 
 to wit. Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, Prussia, and Hol- 
 land. Among them we had one ally and one half-friend — the 
 least of them all.
 
 V 
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 
 
 ACTUAL preparations for peace-making were begun long 
 before the end of the Revolution. It was not until Octo- 
 ber, 1781, that Comwallis surrendered and thus brought to a 
 conclusion the serious military operations of the war. But as 
 early as January, 1779, the American Congress began to con- 
 sider ways and means of peace-making, to formulate the condi- 
 tions that should be demanded, to select the commissioners who 
 were to negotiate the treaty, and to prescribe the rules by which 
 they were to be governed in their work. This was not merely 
 because of the confidence that was felt in the ultimate and in- 
 deed speedy triumph of the American cause, for these prepara- 
 tions for peace-making were conducted at a time when the out- 
 look was gloomy and when a French officer, as we have seen, was 
 reporting that the success of America was still dubious. It was 
 suggested and almost necessitated by the terms of our relation- 
 ship with France. Our treaty with her laid upon us the com- 
 pulsion of consulting her in peace-making, and indeed of not 
 making peace without her assent. So it appropriately came to 
 pass that on January 14, 1779, Congress unanimously adopted 
 a report from a committee of which Samuel Adams and John 
 Jay were leading members, to the effect that the United States, 
 in accordance with that treaty, would not conclude a peace with 
 Great Britain without the formal consent of France. 
 
 Such unanimity did not, however, mark all the deliberations 
 of Congress at that time in foreign affairs. On the contrary, 
 that rapidly degenerating body, which began as one of the best 
 and ended as one of the worst of parliaments, began to present 
 to the outer world a divided and faction-rent front, such as 
 might well have caused despair to all but the most hopeful and 
 resolute. Whatever the domestic differences which divide a peo- 
 ple, in foreign negotiations they should surely be united. That 
 
 io5
 
 106 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 is desirable at all times. At so crucial a time as that it was 
 particularly essential. But it was a lesson which Congress did 
 not seem to have learned, or to heed. Washington, above all 
 his fellows, with that clarity of vision and sanity of judgment 
 which were the chief elements of his genius, perceived the neces- 
 sity of union, and realized the menace of the divided counsels 
 that then prevailed. ' ' Our affairs, ' ' he declared, ' ' are now come 
 to a crisis. Unanimity, disinterestedness, and perseverance in 
 our national duty are the only means to avoid misfortunes. . . . 
 Nothing can save us but a total reformation in our own conduct, 
 or some decisive turn to affairs in Europe." He might even 
 have expressed himself more strongly without exaggeration. 
 There is only too much reason for believing that Congress suf- 
 fered from lack not only of unanimity but also of honest3^ 
 
 It is known that all through the period of our peace negotia- 
 tions the French government regularly subsidized various 
 American journalists and other writers, who were in return ex- 
 pected to conduct a pro-Gallican propaganda, seeking in the very 
 act of winning independence from Great Britain to make 
 America a practical dependency of France. Away back in 1775 
 Bonvouloir had boasted, "I can do what I please with them!" 
 meaning that by bribery, cajolery, or playing upon their preju- 
 dices and passions, he could make Americans subservient to self- 
 ish French interests. Nor did such exertion of alien influence 
 and even of corruption prevail in only private and journalistic 
 life. It entered public life, official life, and probably congres- 
 sional life. Thomas Paine, who had formerly regarded and de- 
 nounced Vergennes as a despot, according to Durand accepted 
 a subsidy of $1,000 a year from him, through Luzerne, at the 
 very time when he was secretary of the congressional committee 
 on foreign affairs, and in return therefor wrote and worked in 
 favor of France and the French alliance. Luzerne, the second 
 French minister to America, openly boasted in 1781 that he had 
 secured the election of Robert R. Livingston to the foreign secre- 
 taryship. We may not suppose Livingston to have been privy to 
 or aware of Luzerne's intrigues. But it was a perilous and a 
 disgraceful thing for our foreign relations to be thus subject to 
 alien influence and dictation. George Pellew has related, with 
 authority which we can scarcely challenge, that in after years
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 107 
 
 Gouverneur Morris and John Jay, both grown old, were sitting 
 after dinner in Jay's house at Bedford, New York, recalling 
 revolutionary times in which they had been leading participants 
 and of which they had unrivaled knowledge. "Jay," said 
 Morris, reflectively, "what a set of damned scoundrels we had 
 in that second Congress ! " " Yes, ' ' replied Jay, ' ' that we had ! ' ' 
 Such was the situation, and such were Washington's feelings, 
 at the beginning of 1779, and we know how dark the American 
 outlook grew thereafter because of the lack of the very qualities 
 which Washington so earnestly urged his countrymen to culti- 
 vate. The lack of unanimity was painfully obvious to Congress 
 in the consideration of terms of peace. At the middle of Feb- 
 ruary, 1779, a special committee of five was appointed to formu- 
 late the American demands. It consisted of Gouverneur Mor- 
 ris of New York, Thomas Burke of North Carolina, John With- 
 erspoon of New Jersey, Samuel Adams of Massachusetts, and 
 Merewether Smith of Virginia. In a few days the committee 
 reported in favor of demanding, as ultimata, that the United 
 States should have the Northwest and Southwest territories clear 
 to the Mississippi, and should have not only a frontage on but 
 free navigation of that river from its source down to the Florida 
 line, with further navigation through to the Gulf and the use of 
 a port on Spanish soil near its mouth ; but that the United States 
 should never seek to extend its sovereignty beyond the IMissis- 
 sippi, or indeed to expand its territories in any direction beyond 
 the limits which should be prescribed in the treaty of peace; 
 and that the fishing rights in the waters and on the banks and 
 shores of Newfoundland should belong equally to the United 
 States, France, and Great Britain. Congress debated the mat- 
 ter for a month, and then, under French influence, struck out 
 the clause relating to the navigation of the lower IMississippi. 
 Next a long controversy ensued over the fisheries. The New 
 York delegation, led by Gouverneur Morris and John Jay and 
 forming a part of the French or "pro-Gallican" faction, refused 
 to insist upon demanding a treaty right to the fisheries, while 
 the New Englanders, led by Elbridge Gerry, and forming the 
 mass of the "anti-Gallicans," were as resolutely in favor of such 
 a demand. In the end, largely through the intrigues and inter- 
 vention of the French minister, Gerard, the former won. Con-
 
 108 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 gress refused to demand the right to the fisheries. That de- 
 lighted Vergennes, who had all along opposed American rights 
 in the North Atlantic, declaring that ' ' the fisheries on the coasts 
 of Newfoundland, of Nova Scotia, and of Canada belong ex- 
 clusively to the English ; and the Americans have no pretension 
 whatever to share in them." Happily, Congress also set aside 
 the astounding proposition of the committee, to bind the United 
 States never to extend its domain beyond the Mississippi River, 
 or beyond the limits fixed in the treaty of peace. So by the 
 middle of June the terms were apparently settled, chiefly in ac- 
 cordance with the views of the ' ' pro-Galliean ' ' party, and Dick- 
 inson of Pennsylvania, Gouverneur Llorris of New York, and 
 Marchant of Rhode Island were appointed a committee to select 
 a minister to negotiate the treaty. 
 
 But the matter was not settled. Two days later Gerry threw 
 a bomb into Congress. He moved for a demand of the common 
 right with Great Britain to fish on the banks of Newfoundland 
 and the other banks and seas of North America, as a sine qua non 
 of treaty-making. There followed a long and bitter debate. 
 The " pro-Gallicans, " inspired and openly directed by Gerard, 
 the French minister, opposed Gerry's proposition with might 
 and main. New York, Maryland, Virginia, and North Caro- 
 lina threatened to secede from the confederation if it should be 
 adopted. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode 
 Island, and Pennsylvania supported Gerry. New Jersey, Dela- 
 ware, and South Carolina were divided. For a time the con- 
 tinued union of the States and the success of the American cause 
 trembled in the balance. Finally, a compromise was secured. 
 Gerry's proposal was not adopted, but in its place Congress 
 voted to declare an academic expression of opinion that America 
 had a right to the fisheries, and a request that France would 
 guarantee that right to us in the act of peace-making. Even 
 this, with its humiliating confession of dependence upon France, 
 greatly displeased Gerard, who went so far in expressing his 
 resentment as to threaten that France might withdraw from the 
 American alliance and unite herself unreservedly wath Spain. 
 This menace scared some of the weaker brethren, the "pro- 
 Gallicans" rallied their forces again, and on July 12, at Gerard's 
 dictation, the former action of Congress was reconsidered, and
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 109 
 
 the whole question of the fisheries was remitted to some subse- 
 quent treaty to be made with Great Britain after peace had been 
 established. 
 
 Encouraged by this success, the French government through 
 Gerard attempted a still more mischievous stroke. It sought to 
 persuade Congress to forego all demand for recognition of Amer- 
 ican independence by Great Britain, and to be content with a 
 French guarantee of independence. Thus the United States, 
 instead of realizing the ideal set forth in the Declaration of In- 
 dependence, to the attainment of which the signers of that in- 
 strument had pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their 
 sacred honor, would have been made a dependency of France 
 and would have enjoyed self-government only under an alien 
 guarantee. Astounding as it may seem, this monstrous pro- 
 posal was received with favor by some members of Congress. 
 The majority of that body insisted, however, that Great Britain 
 must recognize American independence, and there is reason to 
 suppose that this attempt of France to strangle the young repub- 
 lic opened the eyes of many Americans to the danger of foreign 
 influence. Thus disappointed, Gerard made one more attempt 
 at mischief. He asked Congress to renounce the right to navi- 
 gate the Mississippi, and to leave that matter entirely to the 
 magnanimity of Spain. This Congress would not do. But not 
 wishing to rebuff him too openly, it dodged a decision of the 
 case by sending a minister of its own to Spain to settle the matter 
 by direct negotiation with that country. 
 
 Upon such a basis, then, by the end of September, the terms 
 upon which peace was to be sought appeared to be settled, and 
 there remained only the selection of a minister to conduct the 
 negotiations. Gerard tried to dictate the choice of Jay, whom 
 he regarded as a trustworthy member of the "pro-Gallican" 
 party, though by that time Jay was already beginning to get his 
 eyes opened to the real sentiments and aims of France. But 
 the French minister was not able to control the action of Con- 
 gress in that matter. After several indecisive ballots, John 
 Adams was chosen as peace commissioner, and was instructed to 
 negotiate a treaty with Great Britain on these terms: Great 
 Britain was to treat with the United States as "sovereign, free, 
 and independent," and independence was to be formally con-
 
 110 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 firmed by the treaty ; Nova Scotia was to be acquired if possible, 
 but was not to be insisted upon; the fishery rights were to be 
 sought but were not to be insisted upon in the peace treaty 
 though they were to be insisted upon in the commercial treaty 
 which was to be subsequently negotiated. So Adams was com- 
 missioned for a task for which he was consciously ill-fitted in 
 most respects, and which he was unable to enter upon for a long 
 time. Then, as a sort of consolation for Gerard, the latter 's 
 candidate, Jay, was appointed minister to Spain, and was in- 
 structed to offer that country an American guarantee of the 
 Floridas in return for a Spanish guarantee of free navigation 
 of the Mississippi to and into the Gulf. He was also instructed 
 to seek a loan of $5,000,000. 
 
 Let us first follow Jay on his unpromising errand. Franklin 
 had been appointed minister to Spain before him, on January 1, 
 1777, but had never gone thither, his communications with the 
 Spanish government being confined to the sending of a note 
 conveying the resolutions of Congress promising help to Spain 
 in her recovery of Pensacola — which, by the way, Spain never 
 properly acknowledged. Then Arthur Lee succeeded Franklin, 
 and actually went to Spain. By dint of hard work he secured 
 loans of $170,000, and promises of millions more, which were 
 never fulfilled. Failing to get a considerable loan, and seeing 
 no prospect of a treaty, Lee then left Spain in disgust, to take 
 the place of his brother William at Berlin, while William went 
 to Holland. Jay was, therefore, the third American envoy to 
 the Spanish court. He was commissioned on October 16, 1779, 
 and sailed four days later on the same American frigate that 
 had been detailed to take the French minister, Gerard, back to 
 France, on the arrival here of his successor, Luzerne. On the 
 voyage, indeed, as soon as it was begun, Gerard tried to find out 
 what Jay's instructions were. He did not succeed, and a 
 marked coolness arose between the two men. John Adams 
 thought that this was what led Jay to separate himself from the 
 French party and to regard France and Frenchmen with dis- 
 trust. It may have contributed something to that end, but the 
 more probable fact is that Jay, who was one of the ablest states- 
 men of his time, was by far too great a man to be blindly led by 
 any foreign influence. He was himself of French ancestry, and
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 111 
 
 was naturally inclined to regard France with favor and affec- 
 tion ; but he was above all an American, and above most men of 
 his time imbued with the true spirit of national independence 
 and sovereignty. He arrived at Cadiz on January 22, 1780, 
 and quickly realized that he was in an unpleasant situation. 
 He sent his secretary, Mr. Carmichael, on to Madrid, to "see 
 how the land lay, ' ' and did not follow him until spring. 
 
 The favor which Gerard had shown him, and his own record 
 of inclination toward the "Galilean" side in Congress, should 
 have commended him to Spanish favor, but apparently did not. 
 At any rate, he was not favorably received. Indeed he was not 
 officially received at all, nor recognized. The Spanish govern- 
 ment took the ground that it could not or would not recognize 
 him as a minister, nor receive him as such, until a treaty was 
 negotiated between the two countries. But it would make no 
 treaty with America until the United States would renounce the 
 right to navigate the Mississippi, which of course the United 
 States would not do. That is to say, Spain would not recognize 
 Jay as a minister unless he would forsake and repudiate the most 
 vital and imperative part of his instinictions. The United States, 
 it may be observed, was probably the first country to claim the 
 right to navigate the territorial waters of another country; for 
 of course the lower Mississippi, with both its shores Spanish 
 territory, was a territorial water of Spain. It is not clear that 
 the right was or is a valid one. On the other hand, Spain was 
 doubtless going too far in trying to make the Gulf of Mexico a 
 ynare claiisum. Yet such was her aim, and that was the chief 
 reason for her bitter opposition to any United States frontage 
 on the Mississippi. Florida Blanca declared, in September, 
 1780, that Spain was more interested in the monopolization of 
 the Mississippi River than in the regaining of Gibraltar. If so, 
 seeing that she had stipulated with France that her regaining 
 of Gibraltar was a sine qua non of peace with Great Britain, 
 we may judge with what determination she resisted the Amer- 
 ican demands for equal use of the Mississippi and of the Gulf. 
 
 Such was the impossible position in which Jay found himself. 
 He was commissioned to make a treaty on certain terms, and 
 he was told that no treaty would be made except on exactly op- 
 posite terms. It is possible that at first he would have made a
 
 112 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 treaty on Spain's terms, for a limited term of years, for at that 
 time the winning of independence seemed far more important 
 than the free navigation of the Mississippi and the Gulf, and 
 Jay, as we have seen, inclined toward the "pro-Gallican" side. 
 But the conduct of the Spanish and French governments them- 
 selves soon opened his eyes to their real intentions to sacrifice 
 the interests of the United States to their own selfish ends, and 
 he became resolute in his adherence to the principle which had 
 been laid down by Congress. 
 
 He was in fact much more resolute than Congress itself. For 
 the latter body, under the influence of French intrigues, soon 
 reversed itself, in circumstances intolerably unjust to Jay. It 
 was in the spring of 1781. The French ambassador at Madrid 
 had assumed to take Jay under his patronage and direct the 
 diplomatic conduct of the young American, a course of action 
 which did not in the least strengthen Jay 's attachment to France. 
 He told Jay that he (Jay) was making a failure of his mission 
 through his insistence upon navigation of the Mississippi and 
 that it was a pity thus needlessly to blight his own diplomatic 
 career in the bud and at the same time to imperil the welfare of 
 the country he was trying to serve. Jay replied that, apart from 
 his own convictions upon the matter, whatever they might be, 
 there were the orders of Congress, which he must obey. At this 
 the French ambassador expressed some incredulity, and declared 
 his belief that Jay had been endowed by Congress with much 
 more discretion and liberty of action than he was willing to ad- 
 mit. This confident expression was based upon something more 
 than mere opinion or guesswork. The Frenchman had already 
 learned, what Jay himself did not learn until some weeks later, 
 that under French influence Congress had changed its attitude 
 and had decided to drop its demand for free navigation of the 
 Mississippi. 
 
 In time Jay received his new instructions, weeks after the 
 French ambassador and, probably, the Spanish government, had 
 learned their nature. He was directed no longer to insist upon 
 free navigation of the lower Mississippi, below the thirty-first 
 parallel of latitude. A little later that amazing Congress fur- 
 ther directed him to make a treaty with Spain, if possible, with- 
 out regard to the treaty already made with France, Apparently
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 113 
 
 Congress thought that it, too, would try its hand at double-deal- 
 ing and betrayal of allies, fondly imagining that its doings would 
 be kept by Spain secret from France. These instructions Jay, 
 now thoroughly aroused and exasperated, wisely and patriot- 
 ically declined to obey. Then came an order to make, if he 
 could, a treaty with Spain on the best terms he could, to secure 
 her as our ally in the war. This order he attempted to fulfil. 
 He made proposals to the Spanish government for a treaty of 
 alliance, in which the claim of the United States to free naviga- 
 gation of the lower Mississippi was waived. But he added the 
 stipulation that if the alliance were postponed until after gen- 
 eral peace was reestablished, that waiver would be withdrawn 
 and the demand reasserted. 
 
 To this surprisingly conciliatory proposal the Spanish court 
 and government made no reply whatever. Jay waited patiently 
 until the spring of 1782. Then he was about to make a pretty 
 peremptory demand for a reply of some kind, but the French 
 ambassador again intervened and dissuaded him from so doing. 
 The fact is, of course, that Spain was at heart thoroughly hostile 
 to the United States, partly because of old traditions, partly be- 
 cause this was a republic and therefore offensive to monarchical 
 absolutism, partly because the United States had already seized 
 territory which Spain regarded as her own, and partly because 
 Spain feared further aggressions and spoliation if the United 
 States were permitted to become great and powerful and to 
 abut directly upon Spanish territory. Before this, in 1781, there 
 came to Jay's knowledge a mediation proposal of the Russian 
 and Austrian courts. He strongly opposed having anything to 
 do with it, because both Austria and Russia were more friendly 
 to Great Britain than to America, and were not likely to act 
 impartially. He continued to work for his original ideal, of a 
 close defensive alliance of America, France, Spain, and Holland. 
 But Spain was hostile to America, and was intent on regaining 
 Gibraltar; and France, bound by the treaty of Aranjurez, began 
 to regard American independence as a matter entirely inferior 
 in importance to the attainment of Spain's ends. 
 
 All these phases of the situation, and all the cross threads of 
 intrigue and self-seeking, soon became quite obvious to Jay's 
 penetrating vision, and he realized that his mission to Spain was 
 
 VOL. 1—8
 
 114 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 hopeless, and that American reliance upon European aid was 
 vain. So when, early in 1782, the French ambassador, Mont- 
 morin, urged him not to demand from Spain a reply to his final 
 treaty proposals, Jay acceded to his urgings. But he did more. 
 He plainly told Montmorin that he believed that Great Britain 
 herself would be the first nation to recognize the full independ- 
 ence of America, for it was quite evident that France, with all 
 her professions of friendship and her actual treaty of alliance 
 with us, did not wish ' * to see us treated as independent by other 
 nations until after a peace, lest we should become less manage- 
 able in proportion as our dependence upon her shall diminish." 
 A more exact estimate of the actual situation, and a more ac- 
 curate forecast of the future, could not have been made. Mont- 
 morin and his masters at Versailles must have realized then that 
 at least one American statesman understood the whole devious 
 scheme of their diplomacy, and their dream of Jay as the cham- 
 pion or the tool of the "Galilean" cause must have had a rude 
 awakening. 
 
 The end of Jay's mission speedily followed. In May, 1782, 
 the Spanish minister, Florida Blanca, invited Jay to dinner, and 
 for one moment it looked as though recognition of the American 
 envoy by the Spanish government was after all to be given. 
 But the next day the invitation was withdrawn, and Florida 
 Blanca explained that it had been given by mistake. He would, 
 however, he added, be glad to renew it to Jay not as a diplomatic 
 envoy but as "a private gentleman." It seems not improbable 
 that this episode was a premeditated attempt to humiliate Jay. 
 At any rate Jay replied to it with spirit. He declined to receive 
 the proffered invitation and held no more intercourse with the 
 Spanish government. As soon as possible thereafter he left 
 Madrid and went to Paris, to cooperate with Franklin. It may 
 be added, to complete the record of Jay's mission, that, in addi- 
 tion to betraying him to France, Congress drew bills upon Jay 
 — and also upon Laurens, who had been commissioned to The 
 Hague but who had been captured by the British and was actu- 
 ally in the Tower of London — for large amounts, which he was 
 expected to raise through loans! The embarrassment which 
 this extraordinary financiering caused to Jay may easily be im- 
 agined. He was unable to secure any such loans in Spain, and
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 115 
 
 the drafts would have been altogether dishonored had not the 
 French government come to the rescue and paid them, with only 
 the slightest help from Spain. 
 
 John Adams, as we have seen, was commissioned to negotiate 
 the treaty of peace with Great Britain, at the same time that 
 Jay was sent to Spain. He forthwith proceeded to Paris, where 
 negotiations would be conducted when the opportune time ar- 
 rived. But on reaching that capital he was quickly made to feel, 
 as Jay was at Madrid, the sinister influence of the self-seeking 
 and not always sincere French government, insinuating itself 
 between him and his own government and striving to shape his 
 actions to its ends. He was not even treated with diplomatic 
 courtesy. Upon his arrival he disclosed to Vergennes the nature 
 of his mission, as fully as his instructions made it permissible 
 for him to do, and of course with entire truthfulness. Ver- 
 gennes in reply intimated a gross doubt of his truthfulness, and 
 a belief that he was concealing much that he might reveal if he 
 would. He told Adams that when Gerard arrived from Amer- 
 ica, as he would do soon, he expected to learn from him the whole 
 truth about his (Adams's) commission and instructions! It 
 would be difficult to imagine anything more offensive, and we 
 must reckon it one of the great moral triumphs of the Massa- 
 chusetts fire-eater's career that he kept his tamper and was 
 patient under such provocation. It was bad enough for Ver- 
 gennes to intimate that he or his agent would be able to pene- 
 trate the secret instructions of Congress to its confidential agent 
 and to learn from Congress things which that body had in- 
 structed Adams himself not to disclose. It was monstrous for 
 him practically to tell Adams that he would not believe his word 
 until it was confirmed by Gerard. Vergennes was undoubtedly 
 desperately desirous of learning the full extent of Adams's pow- 
 ers and plans, and especially of learning — in order that he might 
 defeat them — his plans for negotiating a commercial treaty with 
 Great Britain as a complement to the treaty of peace. His boast 
 of being able to get the information he wanted from Gerard 
 was, however, justified. When that envoy returned to France 
 he imparted to Vergennes a full account of the proceedings in 
 Congress and of the instructions to Adams, concerning both the 
 treaty of peace and the commercial treaty. Vergennes there-
 
 116 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 upon told Adams that he had found from Gerard that he 
 (Adams) had told the truth! 
 
 Finding that Adams was commissioned to make a commercial 
 treaty, Vergennes did not venture openly to dissuade him from 
 attempting to do that work. But he advised and even urged 
 him strongly to keep that part of his instructions a profound 
 secret, on the ground that it was best to do one thing at a time, 
 and to negotiate the peace treaty before anything whatever was 
 said about the commercial treaty. This advice seemed plausible, 
 but it was grossly insincere. It was Vergennes 's device for 
 keeping Adams quiet upon that subject until Congress could be 
 influenced in some way to alter his instructions. To the latter 
 end Vergennes promptly addressed himself. The new French 
 minister to America, Luzerne, diligently set to work upon Con- 
 gress, and in July, 1781, actually prevailed upon that infatuated 
 body to revoke Adams's powers to make a treaty of commerce! 
 In such fashion was an American foreign envoy on a mission 
 of supreme importance made the plaything of a designing alien 
 power through the folly or corruption of the American Con- 
 gress. 
 
 In existing circumstances there was little or nothing for 
 Adams to do under his commission. The time had not yet come 
 for negotiations with Great Britain. But he could not be idle, 
 and so he undertook to do some diplomatic work with the French 
 government. In this he no doubt acted indiscreetly, infringing 
 upon Franklin's prerogatives. He seems, however, to have been 
 encouraged in that course by Vergennes himself, who then at- 
 tempted to make trouble between Franklin and Adams. It was 
 probably a deliberate scheme of Vergennes 's to arouse dissen- 
 sion and jealousy between the two Americans, and especially to 
 discredit Adams and to defeat in advance the mission on which 
 he had come to Europe. Fortunately the good nature and good 
 sense of Franklin and the transparent honesty of Adams pre- 
 vented any serious trouble between the two, and the situation 
 was soon wholly relieved by Adams's departure from Paris to 
 The Hague. At that capital he received two new commissions 
 from Congress. One authorized him to give the adherence of 
 the United States to the Armed Neutrality, and to secure the 
 recognition of this country as a member of that league — a course
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 117 
 
 which Russia opposed and prevented. The other made him 
 American minister to the Netherlands and authorized him to ne- 
 gotiate a treaty with that country. In the latter work he was 
 ultimately successful. 
 
 Holland more than any other European country sympathized 
 with the American demand for independence. Her friendship 
 was shown in her refusal of mercenaries to Great Britain, and 
 in other ways. Upon the arrival of Adams at The Hague a 
 strong sentiment arose in favor of recognizing him and making 
 the desired treaty. This would probably have been done with- 
 out delay, had it not been for the malign influence of France, 
 The French minister at The Hague not only refrained from 
 giving Adams the slightest aid, but actually used his influence 
 against him, to prevent his recognition by the Government. 
 Vergennes also exerted himself to the same end. So strong was 
 French influence in Holland at that time that Adams was thus 
 held aloof for a considerable period. For eight months he 
 waited in vain for recognition, but he knew the secret of the de- 
 lay and was confident of overcoming it at last. On January 9, 
 1782, he renewed his efi'orts to secure recognition. On February 
 28, Friesland, the province most of all devoted to the principles 
 of liberty, declared in favor of receiving him as the envoy of a 
 sovereign power. The other provinces followed the example, 
 and on April 19, the seventh anniversary of the battle of Lex- 
 ington, the States General, in accordance with the unanimous 
 wish of the provinces, resolved thus to receive him. Thus the 
 Dutch republic was the second power in the world to recognize 
 the independence of the United States. We might say it was the 
 firet to do so for our own sake and for love of liberty and through 
 sympathy with us. On October 8, 1782, Adams concluded with 
 the Netherlands a treaty of friendship and commerce — before 
 the treaty of Paris was concluded. This was greatly displeas- 
 ing to Vergennes, who complained that Adams was "too pre- 
 cipitate," The French minister by this time had also discovered 
 that John Jay could not be used for French purposes to the 
 detriment or sacrifice of the American cause, as had been hoped 
 when Gerard urged his appointment as peace commissioner. 
 He denounced both Adams and Jay as ' ' persons not easily man- 
 aged" {caracteres peu maniahles) . But Adams exulted in his
 
 118 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 achievements at The Hague, as he was well entitled to do, declar- 
 ing: "I have planted the American standard at The Hague. 
 There let it wave and fly in triumph. I shall look down upon the 
 flagstaff with pleasure from the other world." 
 
 The news of Yorktown, and the surrender of Comwallis, in 
 October, 1781, convinced even the infatuated Lord North that 
 the end of British dominion in the United States had come. 
 Forthwith an attempt was made by the British government to 
 treat for peace directly and exclusively with America, ignoring 
 France ; or at least separately and apart from that country. To 
 this Franklin peremptorily objected. The American alliance 
 with France required this country to negotiate for peace only 
 in conjunction with her, and to that agreement he would hold 
 true. Then North tried to treat with France separately and 
 apart from America, but Vergennes also refused. These refus- 
 als of the allies completed North's discomfiture. Had he suc- 
 ceeded in either scheme for separate negotiations, he might 
 partly have rehabilitated himself. But it was not to be. On 
 February 22, 1782, Conway's address to the king, against fur- 
 ther continuance of the war, was carried. Less than a month 
 later, on March 20, Lord North's ministry resigned. In the 
 new Cabinet, which was then formed, the friends of America 
 were in the ascendant. Lord Rockingham was prime minister, 
 Charles James Fox was forei^ minister, and Lord Shelbume 
 was minister for the colonies. Each of these three had grave 
 faults, but each was an undoubted friend of America. Between 
 Fox and Shelbume there at once arose a rivalry, which much 
 delayed negotiations for peace, though both men were really de- 
 sirous of expediting them, Shelbume conceived that as the 
 American States had been and still were, from the British point 
 of view, British colonies, it was his province, as colonial minister, 
 to treat with them. Therefore he sent Richard Oswald, a rich 
 Scottish merchant, to Paris to confer with the representatives 
 of the States. Fox, as foreign minister, also sent a peace com- 
 missioner to Paris, Thomas Grenville, to negotiate with the 
 French government without reference to America. Oswald was 
 sent on April 12, and Grenville on May 7. The two worked at 
 cross purposes until July. On the first day of that month 
 Lord Rockingham died, and was succeeded as prime minister
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 119 
 
 by Shelburne. Fox at once retired from the foreign ministry, 
 and his agent, Grenville, was recalled from Paris, leaving Os- 
 wald to continue all the negotiations alone. 
 
 Meantime the French government was busy with devious 
 schemes. Vergennes was not at all pleased with the idea of 
 having John Adams alone negotiate the treaty of peace, and he 
 took steps to change both the personality of the commission and 
 its instructions. It was his boast that, through his agent, Lu- 
 zerne, the French minister to America, he secured the appoint- 
 ment of R. R. Livingston as the first American secretary for for- 
 eign affairs, and through him got Congress to appoint new peace 
 commissioners to serve as Adams's colleagues, and to order them 
 to subject themselves to the advice and direction of the French 
 government. Adams did not object to the appointment of col- 
 leagues. On the contrary, he welcomed it. Peace commission- 
 ers, he said, should have a talent for making peace, while his 
 own talent lay, according to his own confession, in the direction 
 of making war. So a commission of five members was consti- 
 tuted, Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and Laurens being added as 
 Adams's colleagues. Laurens, however, was a prisoner in the 
 Tower of London, and Jefferson was detained at home by the ill- 
 ness of his wife, so that the commission actually consisted of 
 Adams, Franklin, and Jay, Next Vergennes proposed that the 
 French government and the American commissioners should ne- 
 gotiate with England separately yet pari passu. To this the 
 Americans agreed. Vergennes scornfully rejected, however, a 
 suggestion that France should be satisfied with the granting of 
 independence to the United States, and on that basis should ap- 
 prove the making of peace between America and Great Britain. 
 France had not gone to war with Great Britain solely or chiefly 
 for the sake of the United States. She had another ally, whom 
 she held dearer than America. That was Spain, who never had 
 had anything in common with the United States and never had 
 recognized its independence. The demands of Spain must be 
 granted, and her desires must be gratified, before there could be 
 peace. Thus France might indefinitely prolong the war for ob- 
 jects entirely foreign and indifferent to America, yet America 
 must not make peace until those objects were attained. The 
 interests of the United States might be sacrificed to Spain 's am-
 
 120 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 bitions to secure Jamaica, Gibraltar, and what not. In such a 
 dilemma was America placed by the French alliance. She was 
 a mere pawn in the Franco-Spanish game. 
 
 Nor was this complication merely theoretical or nominal. It 
 was actual, and it embarrassed the negotiations at every turn. 
 Oswald's commission, as prepared by Shelburne, authorized him 
 to treat with the commissioners of "the said colonies or planta- 
 tions." To that phrase Jay instantly and strenuously objected. 
 It was beneath the dignity of the United States to be regarded 
 as "colonies," and for the American commissioners to acquiesce 
 in it would be "descending from the ground of independence." 
 He held that American independence should be recognized at 
 the beginning, and that the negotiations should be conducted on 
 that basis, as with the commissioners not of colonies but of inde- 
 pendent, sovereign States. Vergennes did not approve this bold 
 stand of Jay's, and strove to dissuade him from it. Independ- 
 ence would not come to America, he argued, until the treaty had 
 been made. Therefore Shelburne was right in thus regarding 
 the States as still mere colonies. But the arguments and per- 
 suasions of Vergennes only confirmed Jay in his resolution not 
 to acquiesce in that phrase in Oswald's commission. He believed 
 that Vergennes wished to postpone not merely peace-making but 
 even the recognition of American independence by Great Britain 
 until Spain's demands had been secured, fearing that if America 
 once got its independence recognized by Great Britain, it would 
 refuse to continue the war any longer for Spain's benefit. 
 Doubtless Jay was quite right in this interpretation of Ver- 
 gennes 's attitude. That Vergennes was right in thus planning 
 to make America subservient to Spanish interests, may be 
 doubted. The root of the trouble lay, of course, in the treaty of 
 Aranjurez, by which France was bound to Spain. 
 
 This was the situation. America and France had made a 
 treaty between themselves, without reference to Spain, binding 
 them to fight England together, and to make peace with her 
 only on terms satisfactory to both. Later France made the 
 treaty with Spain, without reference to America, to practically 
 the same effect. Doniol, in his voluminous work, "La Partici- 
 pation de la France dans I'Establissement de I'lndependance des 
 Etats Unis, " has elaborately argued that France could not help
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-IVIAKING 121 
 
 making the treaty of Aranjurez. Perhaps not. But that was 
 not our business. We had no lot nor part in it, and were not to 
 be bound by it nor to be made subject to its provisions. France 
 might make the treaty with Spain, but she could not make Amer- 
 ica a party to it. If it was necessary for her to make it she 
 should have revealed the fact to the American government, and 
 should have released America from her obligations under the 
 French alliance to whatever extent the conditions thereof were 
 affected by the new treaty. But France did not do so. She 
 made the treaty with Spain, and carefully concealed it from 
 America, which was disingenuous; and then she tried to sacri- 
 fice American interests to the alien interests of Spain, which was 
 worse. 
 
 There is no question that Vergennes's fear that British recog- 
 nition of American independence would impel America to with- 
 draw from her obligations to stand with France in peace-making 
 was inspired by Spain, or was in fact Spain's fear. So much 
 was practically admitted by Montmorin, the French ambassador 
 to Spain, speaking not only for himself but also for Florida 
 Blanca. Moreover, it is to be recalled that Vergennes had pre- 
 viously declared to Grenville that British recognition of Amer- 
 ican independence would be no favor to France, since such in- 
 dependence had in fact existed before French intervention in 
 the war. He had also objected to the Austro-Russian scheme of 
 general peace-making, on the ground that it provided for British 
 negotiations with the United States as colonies and not as an 
 independent power. So now he was practically repudiating the 
 ground which he himself had taken not long before. The situa- 
 tion was shrewdly summed up by Jay in September, 1782, when 
 he wrote to Livingston, as he had already said to Franklin, that 
 France was postponing British acknowledgment of American 
 independence until France and Spain had secured their own 
 selfish objects; that both France and Spain would dispute the 
 extension of the United States westward to the Mississippi River; 
 and that Spain would demand for herself a monopoly of the Gulf 
 of Mexico. Vergennes, as is well known, never failed to urge 
 upon England that the United States should be excluded from 
 the Newfoundland fisheries, "lest they should become a nursery 
 for seamen," and he was almost ready to join England in check-
 
 122 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ing the rising power of the United States. When Jay and 
 Aranda, the Spanish minister at Paris, discussed the boundaries 
 of the United States as they should be established by the treaty 
 of peace, Jay earnestly claimed for the United States the whole 
 territory westward to the Mississippi north of the Florida line. 
 Aranda opposed this claim, insisting that the Northwest Terri- 
 tory should be restored to England, or else given to Spain. Ver- 
 gennes said nothing at this time, but his secretary, Rayneval, 
 expressed the opinion that America was claiming too much, and 
 we can scarcely suppose he would have said that without Ver- 
 gennes's approval, and without knowing that it coincided with 
 Vergennes's own views. 
 
 To return, however, to the question of Oswald's commission. 
 That amiable envoy readily saw the point involved, and person- 
 ally sought amendment of his commission, so as to meet the just 
 demands of the Americans. The British government at first de- 
 murred. Franklin, the most conciliatory of men, would have 
 yielded and let the commission stand. But Jay, who was the 
 giant and the hero of all these negotiations, was inexorable, and 
 Adams cordially supported him. In September, 1782, the 
 French government sent Rayneval, Vergennes's confidential sec- 
 retary, to England, to urge the British government to hold out 
 firmly against the American demands in the Mississippi Valley 
 and to support the French and Spanish proposals. That is to 
 say, our ally joined forces, or attempted to join forces, with our 
 opponent against us! Jay, learning of this, sent Benjamin 
 Vaughan to England to counteract the influence of Rayneval. 
 In this Vaughan succeeded. He kept the British government 
 from committing itself to the French and Spanish scheme for 
 spoliating the United States. He did more. He raised again 
 the question of Oswald's commission. Shelburne asked him, 
 "Is a new commission necessary?" "It is," replied Vaughan. 
 Forthwith a new one was issued, framed and phrased as Jay de- 
 sired. That incident marked the turning point in the negotia- 
 tions. Thereafter Great Britain and the United States worked 
 together, ignoring France and Spain. 
 
 The military and naval incidents of 1782, indeed, were well 
 calculated to affect materially the attitude not only of England 
 but also of Spain and France toward the subject of peace-mak-
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 123 
 
 ing. Rodney's tremendous victory over the French at Mar- 
 tinique in April, Elliot's heroic defense of Gibraltar in Septem- 
 ber, and Howe's relief of that fortress in October, quite turned 
 the scale in British eyes. Before those occurrences the British 
 government might have been inclined for prudential reasons to 
 defer to French and Spanish demands in negotiating with 
 America. After them it felt able to regard those powers as neg- 
 ligible quantities and to deal with America without regard for 
 them. Spain, in the same occurrences, had lost all hope of re- 
 gaining Gibraltar and Jamaica, and even her Bourbon pride was 
 convinced of the futility of longer holding out for those objects 
 as the sine qua non of peace. Nor was she without some conso- 
 lation. West Florida and Minorca were to be restored to her, 
 and the latter was only a little less important in her eyes than 
 Gibraltar itself. As for France she had no such gains, and she 
 had met with heavy losses. But she was not without cause for 
 seeking peace. The disaster of Martinique had hopelessly crip- 
 pled her power at sea, and had shown her the folly of further 
 fighting. Moreover, she had really gained her prime object. In 
 the just words of Botta : "The Court of Versailles had attained 
 the object it had most at heart, that is, the separation of the 
 Colonies from the Mother Country." With that France might 
 well be content. The one other belligerent, Holland, was ready 
 to follow France in making peace with England on almost any 
 terms. 
 
 There were therefore ample reasons why all these powers 
 should unite harmoniously in the work of peace-making. But 
 they did not. France and Spain persisted in holding aloof and 
 in trying to make mischief, France especially striving to the last 
 to fetter and injure her nominal ally to the utmost of her ability. 
 Thus on November 10 Adams told Vergennes that the United 
 States and England were unable to agree upon two points, to wit, 
 the indemnity to the American Tories and the Penobscot bound- 
 ary. Vergennes 's reply was, again, to take the British side 
 against his American allies. In this we shall probably do him 
 no injustice if we accept Adams's belief, that his purpose was to 
 encourage the maintenance of "a French party and an English 
 party" in America, and thus weaken and distract the young re- 
 public through division of its counsels.
 
 124 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 "We may indeed regard as substantially accurate and not un- 
 grateful or unjust the summary of French policy toward 
 America in the Revolution and in the subsequent peace-making 
 which Adams gave to Jonathan Jackson in a letter written in the 
 fall of 1782. "In substance," he said, "it has been this: In 
 assistance afforded us in naval force and in money to keep us 
 from succumbing, and nothing more ; to prevent us from ridding 
 ourselves wholly from our enemies; to prevent us from growing 
 powerful or rich ; to prevent us from obtaining acknowledg- 
 ments of our independence by other foreign powers, and to pre- 
 vent us from obtaining consideration in Europe, or any advan- 
 tage in the peace but what is expressly stipulated in the treaty; 
 to deprive us of the grand fishery, the Mississippi River, the 
 western lands, and to saddle us with the Tories." If we add 
 to the "assistance ajfforded" the service rendered by the French 
 army at Yorktown, which was welcome though not essential, we 
 shall have in Adams's terse phrases a complete presentation of 
 the French attitude toward America. 
 
 Adams appreciated the situation. So did Jay. In fact, Jay 
 was probably the first of all to do so and to lay bare the devious 
 ways of French diplomacy. At any rate, he took the lead in cut- 
 ting the Gordian knot. Under the orders of Congress, the 
 American commissioners could make no treaty with England 
 save with French consent. But France would not consent to 
 any treaty the terms of which were satisfactory to America. 
 If then the orders were obeyed, either the welfare of America 
 must be sacrificed in the making of an unsatisfactory and inju- 
 rious treaty, or the work of the commissioners must fail. Con- 
 fronted with this dilemma, the impetuous and intrepid Jay de- 
 termined upon a heroic course. He would defy and violate the 
 commands of the Congress which had commissioned him, by mak- 
 ing a treaty wdth England without regard to the advice, consent, 
 or policy of France. He proposed this to Franklin, with whom 
 he was then in Paris, Adams being at The Hague. Franklin 
 disapproved it. He had lived long in France and had been the 
 recipient of the most flattering attentions, from both the court 
 and people, and he naturally cherished the most amiable senti- 
 ments toward France and also a great degree of confidence in 
 and gratitude toward her. His temperament was naturally con-
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 125 
 
 ciliatory and pacific, and he was something of a stickler for strict 
 obedience to orders. The action proposed by Jay would, he 
 thought, be offensive and painful to France, and it would be a 
 breach of instructions. "Would you break your instructions?" 
 he asked. "Yes!" replied Jay, "as I break this pipe!" And 
 taking from his lips the long clay "churchwarden" which he had 
 been smoking, he dashed it into fragments in the fireplace. 
 Franklin, however, still hesitated and demurred and Jay was 
 thus compelled to wait. But he did not wait long. Adams soon 
 came back from The Hague, and Jay at once laid the plan before 
 him. Adams was delighted with it, and instantly approved it, 
 with enthusiasm. "It is glory," he afterward declared, "to 
 have broken such infamous orders!" If not infamous, they 
 were certainly ill-advised and would, if slavishly followed, have 
 proved disastrous. Before the united persuasions of Jay and 
 Adams, Franklin presently yielded, and the policy of Jay was 
 carried out. Negotiations were conducted directly between 
 America and England, and they made rapid progress toward a 
 satisfactory conclusion. 
 
 Vergennes and his colleagues remained in ignorance of what 
 was going on. This was partly because of the secrecy of the 
 Anglo-American negotiations, but more because of Vergennes 's 
 incredulous contempt for the Americans. With his army of 
 spies and keyhole listeners he could have ascertained what was 
 going on if he had tried to do so. But he did not try because 
 he did not suppose that the Americans were capable of doing 
 anything of importance. He wrote to Luzerne in October : "It 
 behooves us to leave them to their illusions, to do everything we 
 can to make them fancy that we share them, and unostentatiously 
 to defeat any attempts to which these illusions may carry them, 
 if our cooperation is required. The Americans," he added, 
 "have all the presumption of ignorance, but there is reason to 
 expect that experience will ere long enlighten them." Such 
 were the base treachery and deceit of the statesman who professed 
 to be our friend, and who afterward expressed such astonishment 
 and grief at our lack of confidence in him and our ingratitude 
 and wickedness in making a treaty without consulting him ! 
 
 The Americans pursued their plan, with much success. It 
 was at the end of October that Jay's bold proposal was adopted.
 
 126 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 On November 30 a provisional treaty was concluded and signed 
 by the American and British commissioners. It was not to be 
 made permanent and effective, it is true, until a treaty should 
 be made between England and France, and until it should re- 
 ceive the approval of France. But it was admirably designed to 
 "force the hand" of the French government, and to compel it 
 to approve the Anglo-American treaty and to conclude for itself 
 a treaty with Great Britain. Such in fact were its results. 
 When Vergennes learned what had been done, the fact was ac- 
 complished and the provisional treaty was ready to be laid before 
 him for the approval which in the circumstances of the case he 
 could not withhold. He found himself completely outwitted by 
 the very men whom he had so despised and had sought to delude 
 and make mere puppets in his hands. More, he found himself 
 beaten and humiliated by the very scheme which he himself had 
 devised for his own sinister ends. He was not willing to have 
 Adams alone conduct the peace negotiations, but, through most 
 unwarrantable meddling in American affairs, compelled the ap- 
 pointment of Jay and Franklin to be his colleagues. And now 
 Jay had administered to him the most stinging rebuke and most 
 humiliating defeat in all his career. This defeat he took with 
 bad grace. He wrote a bitter protest to Franklin, in a tone of 
 injured innocence that contrasts damningly with his own pre- 
 vious utterances to Luzerne ; to which Franklin replied with a 
 masterpiece of tactful and conciliatory diplomacy. Vergennes 
 also wrote to Luzerne a letter, which he afterward counter- 
 manded, though too late, urging him to protest to Congress 
 against the irregular conduct of the American commissioners. 
 Robert R. Livingston, then the foreign secretary of Congress, 
 actually sent to the commissioners a letter of rebuke, and wished 
 them to seek to propitiate Vergennes by humbly apologizing to 
 him and by revealing to him a certain secret clause in the treaty 
 which they had pledged themselves to Great Britain not to di- 
 vulge! After that we may almost believe Vergennes 's boast, 
 that it was through his influence, or at his nomination, through 
 Luzerne, that Livingston had been elected to his place ; and that 
 Livingston was merely his subservient lackey. 
 
 Nevertheless, Vergennes was more frightened than angered at 
 the victory of the Americans over his double dealing. He was
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 127 
 
 chagrined. But he was more alarmed, lest America and Great 
 Britain should now join hands against France. For a time it 
 seemed to him as though, in separating the colonies from the 
 mother country, instead of hopelessly weakening his enemy he 
 had raised up two foes against France instead of only one. 
 With that menace before him he deemed it discreet to swallow 
 his wounded pride. He made haste to accept the explanation 
 made to him by Franklin, and further to bid for the continued 
 favor of America he offered this country another loan. 
 
 The treaty of November 30, 1782, was merely a provisional one, 
 for making peace but not dealing with the subject of commerce. 
 The death of Shelburne and the consequent change of ministry 
 in England deferred the completion of the work for nearly a 
 year. The same commissioners for America remained in place, 
 but Oswald, for Great Britain, was replaced by David Hartley, 
 "the good Hartley," Franklin's friend, who for many years had 
 been an earnest advocate of the American cause in the British 
 Parliament. The definitive treaty was finally made on September 
 3, 1783. Under that instrument the British government recog- 
 nized in the fullest manner the independence of the United 
 States, and conceded to this country the whole Northwest and 
 Southwest territories, extending westward to the Mississippi 
 River and southward to the Florida line. The provisional 
 treaty had contained a secret clause (the one which Livingston 
 had asked the commissioners to reveal to Vergennes) concern- 
 ing the southern boundary, to wit: That if Great Britain 
 should retain possession of Florida, the boundary between 
 Florida and the United States should be drawn eastward from 
 the mouth of the Yazoo River, in latitude 32 degrees 30 minutes, 
 but if Florida was surrendered to Spain, then it should be 
 drawn from the mouth of the Red River, in latitude 31 de- 
 grees. Between these two lines, therefore, was a strip of ter- 
 ritory nearly a hundred miles wide from north to south, and 
 nearly five hundred from east to west, comprising the south- 
 em parts of the States of Mississippi and Alabama, which 
 the United States and England agreed should be a part of Flor- 
 ida if Florida belong to England, but which should not belong 
 to Florida, but come to the United States, if Florida were as- 
 signed to Spain! That territory formed the "Yazoo lands,''
 
 128 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 concerning which we afterward had an acrimonious dispute with 
 Spain. It must be confessed that the equity and morals of that 
 secret compact are not evident. The territory in question either 
 did or did not belong with Florida. If it did, then it belonged 
 with Florida even if the latter were assigned to Spain. If it did 
 not, then it did not belong with Florida even if the latter were 
 retained by England. The double dealing of Spain, however, 
 and her ill-concealed enmity toward the United States, were 
 ample explanations of this trick of the negotiators. They were 
 also, from the point of view of ordinary human nature, ample 
 provocation to it. The Americans knew that France and Spain 
 were playing them false and were secretly trying to betray and 
 sacrifice America, and it was not unnatural that in return they 
 should thus retaliate against those whom they knew to be their 
 enemies. And bad as their device was, it was far less reprehen- 
 sible than the machinations of France and Spain against this 
 country. America was under no obligations whatever to Spain, 
 but was quite free to despoil her in any way she could. France, 
 on the other hand, was bound to America in the strongest and 
 most sacred fashion ; yet here she was deliberately seeking to de- 
 spoil this country, and conniving with its foes for its ruin. 
 Nevertheless, with all this provocation, we must regard that 
 secret provision in the treaty about the Yazoo lands as unjustifi- 
 able, and as a regrettable blemish upon our early diplomacy. 
 
 The treaty further confirmed the United States in the free en- 
 joyment of the fisheries on the Newfoundland Banks and in a 
 limited use of the shores of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and 
 other British territories. Congress was to recommend to the 
 separate States a generous treatment of the Tories, or British 
 Loyalists, a recommendation which had no mandatory force and 
 which was not in fact generally followed. The navigation of 
 the Mississippi River, from source to mouth, was to be "forever 
 free and open ' ' to Englishmen as well as Americans — a provision 
 which was from the beginning a dead letter, seeing that then and 
 for years afterward the lower part of that river was a territorial 
 water of Spain, and as such was subject to her control and open 
 to navigation by others only through her consent, which was by 
 no means freely granted. It was, indeed, foolish to put that pro- 
 vision into the treaty, for two major reasons. One was, as we
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 129 
 
 have said, that the lower part of the river belonged wholly to 
 Spain, and therefore Great Britain and the United States were 
 practically trying, in a treaty between themselves, to regulate 
 and control the property of a third power which was not at all a 
 party to the treaty. The other reason was, that Great Britain 
 had no claim whatever to the navigation of the Mississippi, any 
 more than to that of the Hudson or the Delaware, seeing that 
 at no point did it touch her territories. If its headwaters had 
 been in Canada, she might have sought the right to use it as an 
 outlet to the sea. But they were not. From source to mouth the 
 river touched no lands but those of the United States and of 
 Spain ; unless, of course. West Florida and the Yazoo lands were 
 definitely assigned to Great Britain. In that case Great Brit- 
 ain would have controlled one shore of the lower reaches of the 
 river, and a stipulation for American navigation of that part of 
 the river would have been legitimate and useful. 
 
 When the definite treaty of peace was signed at Paris on Sep- 
 tember 3, 1783, by David Hartley on behalf of Great Britain and 
 by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay on behalf of 
 the United States, it was suggested that the act be done in the 
 presence of the diplomatic representatives of Austria and Rus- 
 sia, as a complimentary recognition of the offers of those powers 
 to mediate and of their efforts to end the war. To this the Brit- 
 ish government objected, on the ground that the transactions con- 
 cerned only Great Britain and the United States, and that no 
 other power had any interest in them. This was probably not 
 so much because of opposition to the general principle of friendly 
 mediation as to a feeling that England and America, even in 
 their quarrel, were much more closely related to each other than 
 to any other nations, and that therefore they should settle their 
 family differences between themselves, without external aid. In 
 that view of the case the British refusal may be regarded as hav- 
 ing set an interesting precedent for the solidarity of the Anglo- 
 Saxon nations, which has been followed on some subsequent oc- 
 casions. 
 
 The efforts of Austria and Russia for mediation in 1781 re- 
 quire a word of explanation. In 1779 the great empress, Maria 
 Theresa, who was a sincere lover of peace, wrote with her own 
 hand to Charles III of Spain, to dissuade him, if possible, from 
 
 Vol. 1—9
 
 130 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 war with England. In that she was not successful, but a little 
 later in the same year she, or her ministers, made an offer of 
 mediation between England and France, which likewise failed. 
 At that time not a word was said concerning America, and Aus- 
 tria practically ignored the very existence of this country. Wil- 
 liam Lee had, it is true, been commissioned as American minis- 
 ter to Austria, but, because of Austria's unwillingness to offend 
 Great Britain by receiving him, he was never recognized in that 
 capacity and therefore accomplished nothing. In 1781, when 
 Joseph II, son of Maria Theresa, was on the Austrian throne, his 
 minister. Prince Kaunitz, prepared for an international peace 
 congress at Vienna, under the joint patronage of Austria and 
 Russia, and in doing so accepted the advice of the French foreign 
 minister, Vergennes, that the United States should be invited to 
 participate in it and to conduct at it negotiations for peace with 
 Great Britain at the same time that the European powers were 
 seeking peace among themselves. The United States, however, 
 would not accept the invitation, and Great Britain would have 
 nothing to do with such a scheme. The refusal of the United 
 States was voiced by John Adams, who would not enter the con- 
 gress unless the other powers represented there would first recog- 
 nize the independence of the United States, which neither Austria 
 nor Russia was willing to do. Great Britain, on the other hand, 
 refused to enter the congress unless France would first withdraw 
 from her alliance with the United States. Prince Kaunitz, for 
 the Austrian government, thereupon laid upon Great Britain 
 the blame for the failure of the congress, and held that the Brit- 
 ish government was in the wrong in its treatment of the Ameri- 
 can colonies, and that it ought to make concessions to them so as 
 to retain their loyalty instead of driving them to rebel. How 
 little he cared for America, however, or indeed for the cause of 
 peace, was clearly shown in his comments upon the war. *'As 
 for us, ' ' he said, ' ' there is more to gain than to lose by the con- 
 tinuation of the war, which becomes useful to us by the mutual 
 exhaustion of those who carry it on." Never was there a more 
 cynical exhibition of the spirit of lago in international affairs : 
 
 "... Now, whether he kill Cassio, 
 
 Or Cassio him, or each do kill the other. 
 
 Every way makes my gain."v-
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 131 
 
 The fact is that Austria was at that time one of the last States 
 from which real sympathy with America could reasonably have 
 been expected. Joseph II was a monarch of liberal theories but 
 despotic practices; autocratic, ambitious, and insincere. He 
 tried to pose as the friend of both England and France, but was 
 really the friend of neither. Vergennes described Austria under 
 his rule as in name an ally but in fact a rival of France. On 
 the whole, Austrian influence was detrimental to the American 
 cause. The unconcealed enmity of Russia has already been de- 
 scribed. Beyond doubt it was fitting and it was well that Great 
 Britain and America refused to enter a congress with those 
 powers in 1781, and that they ignored them in the making of 
 the peace treaty of 1783. It may be added that Vergennes told 
 Franklin that while the offer of mediation, in March, 1781, was 
 not unwelcome to the French government, yet it could not be 
 accepted by it, since the concurrence of Spain would be necessary 
 and it could probably not be secured. But he advised Franklin 
 to urge Congress to accept the offer. 
 
 In 1782, John Adams said: "It is obvious that all the powers 
 of Europe will be continuously manoeuvering with us to work us 
 into their real or imaginary balances of power!" But, for rea- 
 sons which we shall not find it difficult to discover and which 
 we shall have to regard as convincing, they did not generally 
 seek any relations with us. Immediately after the making of 
 the definitive treaty of peace with Great Britain in 1783, several 
 European nations and one African State did make overtures to 
 Franklin for treaties with the United States, and with three of 
 them such conventions were concluded. The negotiations with 
 Denmark, Austria, Portugal, and Hamburg were fruitless, but 
 those with Sweden, Prussia, and Morocco resulted in the mak- 
 ing of treaties. Those with Sweden and Prussia were treaties 
 of amity and commerce, and that with Morocco was one of peace 
 and friendship. The signing of the treaty with Prussia was 
 Franklin's last diplomatic act abroad, and it was one in which 
 he must have taken particular pleasure. For that treaty pro- 
 vided for the abolition of privateering, and for the holding of 
 private property inviolable at sea, the same as on land. Those 
 two principles were dear to Franklin's heart. They were a 
 practical extension of Frederick the Great's famous principle
 
 132 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of "free ships, free goods." They were at that time far in ad- 
 vance of the world ; and indeed even now they are not fully ac- 
 cepted and adopted in international law. But it is pleasant to 
 remember that at that early date, in one of the earliest treaties 
 made by the young republic, those just and beneficent principles 
 were promulgated to a reluctant and unsympathetic world. It 
 is to be remembered, by the way, in passing, as somewhat strange, 
 that despite the profusion of talk in France and Holland about 
 "free ships and free goods," no mention of that principle was 
 made in the first treaties made by those countries with the United 
 States. 
 
 During the Revolution, then, and during the post-revolution- 
 ary period of the Confederation, down to the adoption of the 
 Constitution of the United States in 1789, only a dozen formal 
 relationships were entered into, with only half that number of 
 foreign powers. To recapitulate: With France we made a 
 treaty of amity and commerce, and a treaty of alliance against 
 Great Britain, in February, 1778 ; two contracts concerning war 
 loans, in July, 1782, and February, 1783; and a consular con- 
 vention, in November, 1788. With Great Britain we made a 
 preliminary treaty of peace in November, 1782, and a final 
 treaty of peace and amity in September, 1783. With Morocco, 
 we made a treaty of peace and friendship in January, 1787. 
 With the Netherlands we made a treaty of peace and commerce 
 in September, 1785. And with Sweden we made a treaty of 
 amity and commerce in April, 1783. 
 
 Such were the international relationships of the United States 
 in the revolutionary era; though the international influence of 
 this nation was much more important than its technical diplo- 
 macy. For the Revolution did far more than merely to estab- 
 lish the independence of the United States. It brought about 
 the end of personal government in Great Britain. It effected 
 for a time the commercial emancipation of Ireland. France 
 and Spain purposely connived at prolonging the war, so as to 
 make it as costly, as exhausting and therefore as ruinous as pos- 
 sible to both Great Britain and the United States ; but before it 
 ended, even because of that prolongation of it. Great Britain 
 wrested from them the command of the sea and a large part of 
 their colonial empires, while the United States emerged from the
 
 FRIENDS AND FOES IN PEACE-MAKING 133 
 
 struggle in full possession of the spoils of war of which they had 
 endeavored to deprive her. The net result was that friendship 
 between America and Great Britain was restored in a larger de- 
 gree than it had known for many years, and American friend- 
 ship with Holland was confirmed, through the operations of nat- 
 ural affinity. The artificial alliance with France was not lasting. 
 Spain remained hostile. The rest of the world was expectant 
 but unsympathetic.
 
 VI 
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 
 
 WASHINGTON, at the close of the Revolution, and just 
 before his retirement from the command of the army, 
 bestowed upon the Thirteen States a gift of inestimable value, 
 which they then quite failed to appreciate and were slow to util- 
 ize. That was the advice which he gave in his circular letter to 
 the chief magistrates of the various States and which he desired 
 to have considered as his legacy to the people whose independence 
 he had won. Of the four cardinal points of that remarkable 
 document, only one, the first, is pertinent to the present subject. 
 That was, that there must be an indissoluble union of all the 
 States, under a single national government, and that this central 
 government must have plenary powers to make its authority ef- 
 fective. In this he spoke from fulness of observation and of 
 sometimes bitter experience. The constantly increasing evils of 
 the second Continental Congress, which at times threatened to 
 frustrate the great design of American union and liberty, were 
 due to the lack of such a system. Especially were the weak- 
 nesses of our foreign relations attributable to that cause, and 
 especially was a strong central government necessary to our as- 
 sumption and maintenance of a worthy, responsible, and authori- 
 tative place among the sovereign nations of the globe. 
 
 This was recognized clearly by Washington, and by others, 
 but unfortunately not by the American people generally, nor 
 even by all of their influential leaders. It was also recognized 
 abroad, where there was little confidence in the perpetuity of the 
 new order of things. Some, with George III of England, ex- 
 pected the Thirteen States to begin quarreling and fighting 
 among themselves. Others, with Frederick the Great of Prussia, 
 believed that the territory of the Thirteen States was too large to 
 form a single and enduring republic. They pointed out that 
 the Roman republic was transformed into an empire through too 
 
 134
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 135 
 
 great expansion of its area. The only successful republics were 
 small in area, like tlolland, Venice, and Switzerland. There- 
 fore they expected either that the Thirteen States would remain 
 separate or at least form several groups, or that the whole would 
 presently become a monarchy. 
 
 Practically no response was made to the sage advice of Wash- 
 ington, at least for several years. Meantime the States kept on 
 under their Articles of Confederation, which had been adopted 
 on November 15, 1777. These, of course, utterly failed to realize 
 the conception of an efficient central government, or of a nation 
 in the true sense of the word. There was no central or general 
 authority, save the Congress, So far as foreign relations were 
 concerned, they were to be conducted by the Congress, which 
 was to have the sole power of making war or peace, of sending 
 and receiving ambassadors, and of making treaties and alliances. 
 But the individual States were left free, in defiance of all treaties, 
 to establish all their own separate tariff systems. Thus, if the 
 Congress made a treaty of commerce with a foreign nation, pro- 
 viding for free trade between it and America, any State could 
 at will annul that treaty by prescribing a tariff or even by pro- 
 hibiting all commerce with the nation in question. Moreover, 
 each State had its own code of laws dealing with religious liberty, 
 personal and property rights, and many other matters directly 
 affecting the status of citizens or subjects of other lands, and in 
 this diversity there was danger of immeasurable embarrassment 
 and trouble. 
 
 It is not surprising, then, that one of the earliest diplomatic 
 controversies after the Revolution had to do with religious af- 
 fairs. This was, indeed, in the interval between the preliminary 
 and the ultimate treaty of peace. In July, 1783, the apostolic 
 nuncio in Paris requested Franklin to forward to Congress a 
 note explaining the necessity for a change in the office of apos- 
 tolic vicar for the United States and asking Congress to ratify 
 the new appointment. Franklin, of course, complied, and the 
 matter was laid before Congress, which discussed it at some 
 length, and, for a wonder, disposed of it in the wisest possible 
 manner. Obviously it was a matter of much importance, since 
 its decision would set a precedent for all time for the relations 
 of church and state in this country. In more than one of the
 
 136 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 States there was practically a state church, and some of the mem- 
 bers of Congress favored taking the desired action upon the ap- 
 pointment of the apostolic vicar. Had that been done, the young 
 republic would have been committed to the policy of a state 
 religion, or at least of an organic relationship between church 
 and state ; and would have entailed upon itself the endless vexa- 
 tion and grave troubles which such a connection invariably 
 causes. Happily, wiser counsels prevailed, and Franklin was di- 
 rected to reply to the nuncio that "the subject of his applica- 
 tion being purely spiritual, it is without the jurisdiction and 
 power of Congress, who have no authority to permit or refuse 
 it." The importance and value of this action, to all the sub- 
 sequent history of the nation, are scarcely to be overestimated. 
 It was the sure precursor of the constitutional prohibition of 
 any state church or of any governmental meddling with religious 
 affairs, and it was a priceless precaution against our being drawn 
 into complications with alien powers in which — as at that time 
 was all but universally the case — church and state were united 
 to the detriment of both. 
 
 Another diplomatic incident of this same period is worthy of 
 passing notice, more as a curiosity than for any importance to 
 our foreign relations. At the end of March, 1783, the burgo- 
 masters and Senate of the free city of Hamburg, Germany, ad- 
 dressed to Congress a letter which ran in part as follows: 
 
 "Right Noble, High, Mighty, Most Honorable Lords: Since 
 by the preliminary articles of peace lately between the high bel- 
 ligerent powers concluded, the illustrious United States of North 
 America have been acknowledged free, sovereign, and independ- 
 ent, and now, since European powers are courting in rivalry the 
 friendship of your High Mightinesses, 
 
 "We, impressed with the most lively sensations on the illus- 
 trious event, the wonder of this and the most remote future ages, 
 and desirous fully to testify the part which we take therein, do 
 hereby offer your High Mightinesses our service and attachment 
 to the cause. 
 
 "And in the most sincere disposition of the heart, we take 
 the honor to wish, so far as from Omnipotent Providence do we 
 pray, that the most illustrious Republic of the United States of 
 America may, during the remotest centuries, enjoy all imagin-
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 137 
 
 able advantages to be derived from that sovereignty which they 
 gained by prudence and courage. That by the wisdom and 
 active patriotism of your illustrious Congress it may forever 
 flourish and increase, and that the high mighty regents of these 
 free United States may with ease and in abundance enjoy all 
 manner of temporal happiness, and at the same time we most ob- 
 sequiously recommend our city to a perpetual friendly intelli- 
 gence, and her trade and navigation in matters reciprocally ad- 
 vantageous, to your favor and countenance. 
 
 "In order to show that such mutual commerce with the mer- 
 chant houses of this place may undoubtedly be of common bene- 
 fit, your High Mightinesses will be pleased to give us leave to 
 mark out some advantages of this trading city. ' ' 
 
 This extraordinary missive then set forth the advantages 
 which America might expect to derive from trade with Ham- 
 burg, and enclosed a long catalogue of goods which might be pur- 
 chased there, some of which were described as "imitating the 
 French, but one third cheaper," or "nearly like the English, but 
 twenty -nine per cent, cheaper." This letter was conveyed to 
 Congress by the hand of a prominent citizen of Hamburg, de- 
 puted for the purpose; but it had little or no effect upon the 
 course of American trade. 
 
 In the spring of 1784 Congress commissioned John Adams, 
 Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson to negotiate treaties 
 of commerce with any nations which should desire or be willing 
 to enter into such conventions. Obviously, it was preeminently 
 desirable for this country that it should establish such relations 
 as widely as possible. But not a single such treaty was made, 
 if we except one with the semi-piratical power of Morocco. 
 
 The most important purely diplomatic negotiations after the 
 making of peace but still under the Confederation were those 
 with Spain. That country had during the war refused to aid 
 this country or to recognize its independence, and in the time of 
 peace-making it exerted all its influence to our disadvantage. It 
 was painfully divided between a desire to see England beaten 
 and humiliated and a dread of seeing the Thirteen States suc- 
 ceed and become a strong new nation, since the latter achieve- 
 ment would certainly have an unfavorable influence upon 
 Spain's remaining interests in the "Western Hemisphere. "V\nien
 
 138 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 at last, in spite of Spanish intrigues and marplotry, the treaty 
 of peace was made and published, Spain found in it much cause 
 for apprehension and for offense. Two features were particu- 
 larly obnoxious. One was the disposition of the Yazoo lands, to 
 which reference has already been made. Spain claimed them 
 as her own, and was not inclined to acquiesce in the treaty's 
 disposition of them as belonging either to England or to the 
 United States. The other was the navigation of the Mississippi 
 River, of which in its lower reaches she claimed sole possession. 
 France, it is true, had accepted with only formal demur these 
 results of Jay 's astute and audacious diplomacy ; but Spain had 
 no mind to do so, at least without a struggle. 
 
 Accordingly in the summer of 1784, when not only the public 
 part of the peace treaty but also its secret part about the Yazoo 
 lands had become known, the Spanish government sent to Con- 
 gress a formal notification that Spain would not recognize the 
 validity of that instrument, and that if American vessels sought 
 to navigate that part of the Mississippi of which Spain still pos- 
 sessed both banks, they would be seized as trespassers and con- 
 fiscated. Nor was this an idle or a merely formal threat. It was 
 promptly put into effect, and an organized, vigorous, and versa- 
 tile campaign was begun by Spain against American interests 
 in the ]\Iississippi Valley. She entered into diplomatic negotia- 
 tions. She strengthened her military forces along the river. 
 She sent secret agents among the Indian tribes, to incite them to 
 hostility against settlers from the States. Above all, she also 
 sent subtle emissaries among the settlers on our western frontier, 
 to plant seeds of disaffection, discontent, and secession among 
 them, and to induce them, if possible, either to withdraw from 
 the United States and to set up an independent State of their 
 own, or to annex themselves to the Spanish domain. Nor was 
 this last propaganda difficult. Kentucky was rapidly filling up 
 with colonists, and free navigation of the Mississippi was abso- 
 lutey essential to their prosperity. In 1785 they numbered more 
 than 20,000 souls, and were increasing at a rapid rate. 
 
 Early in the summer of 1785 the first Spanish minister came 
 to this country. This was Don Diego de Gardoqui, and he bore 
 a commission authorizing him to negotiate with the United States 
 concerning all existing boundary disputes. Congress received
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 139 
 
 him, and turned him over to Jay, whom it had made its secre- 
 tary for foreign affairs. Jay was probably the best-fitted man 
 in America for that place, but the feebleness and indecision of 
 Congress was a heavy handicap to even a man of his genius. In 
 consequence, the advantage in the controversy more than once 
 rested with the Spanish envoy. Jay was directed by Congress 
 to insist upon the provisions of the peace treaty concerning the 
 Yazoo lands, and also upon the free navigation of the whole of 
 the Mississippi. Gardoqui was equally insistent in denying 
 both. For months the two disputed without result. Gardoqui 
 purposely protracted the discussions, hoping thus to encourage 
 the development of discontent and sedition in Kentucky. Early 
 in 1786 Jay reported to Congress that he was still negotiating 
 with Gardoqui, but was making little progress, and that our right 
 to navigate the Mississippi would have to be established "by 
 arms, or by treaty." Late in the summer of that year he de- 
 spaired of effecting a settlement, and asked Congress to appoint 
 a special committee to advise, instruct, and aid him. Spain, he 
 reported, was willing to make a favorable commercial treaty with 
 us, but was quite inflexible in refusing us the right to navigate 
 the Mississippi. What, he asked, could be done? We were in 
 no condition for war with Spain, and abandonment of our rights 
 as stipulated in the peace treaty with Great Britain was not to 
 be considered. The only practicable course, in his view, was to 
 make a treaty for a limited period, twenty-five or thirty years, 
 under which we should have important commercial advantages, 
 but under which, also, in return for those advantages, we should 
 for the time being hold in abeyance our right to navigate the 
 river. This arrangement he frankly regarded as a temporary 
 makeshift, forced upon us by our weak and demoralized condi- 
 tion, and especially by our lack of that efficient Federal Gov- 
 ernment which Washington had recommended. In time, he 
 hoped, we should "become more really and truly a nation," and 
 then we could assert and maintain our rights. 
 
 It was a lamentable thing to have a statesman of Jay 's genius 
 forced into so humiliating an attitude. It was worse still to 
 have Congress act as it did over his report and proposal. The 
 States were divided. New England cared much for a general 
 treaty of commerce, but little or nothing about the Mississippi,
 
 140 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 and therefore the members from those States favored Jay 's coun- 
 sel of despair. They voted solidly to instruct him to make a 
 commercial treaty and let the Mississippi go. The Southern 
 States, on the other hand, were equally unanimous and resolute 
 for insisting upon the immediate free use of the river, and thus 
 for holding Jay to his original instructions. The vote was by 
 States, each State being a unit, according to the Articles of Con- 
 federation. Twelve States were represented when the vote was 
 taken, and of these seven approved Jay's proposal. But that 
 was not enough. Under the Articles of Confederation nine 
 States were necessary for the making of a treaty. It would be 
 fruitless, then, for Jay to negotiate a treaty on the authority of 
 only seven States, when there was no prospect of getting nine to 
 ratify it. Passions ran high in Congress over the matter. Pat- 
 rick Henry declared that he would "rather part with the Con- 
 federation than relinquish the navigation of the Mississippi." 
 Madison, usually calm and philosophic, was roused to something 
 like anger. Washington counseled patience and moderation, but 
 his voice was lost in the tumult. 
 
 Nor was that all. Treason began to arise in the Southwest. 
 A prominent citizen of Kentucky was one James Wilkinson, who 
 had been an officer in the revolutionary army and who subse- 
 quently was for a time the commanding officer of the whole 
 American army, but who was certainly one of the most thor- 
 ough-paced scoundrels in American history. If he is not com- 
 monly bracketed with Arnold and Burr, of the latter of whom 
 he was indeed a confederate, it is not because such association 
 would do him injustice. Trickster and thief, he also became a 
 traitor. For the sake of Spanish gold he secretly took oath of 
 allegiance to the King of Spain, and plotted to separate Ken- 
 tucky from the Confederation and annex it to the Spanish Em- 
 pire. Happily the majority of Kentuckians were too sane and 
 honest to be corrupted by him. But unhappily they were so dis- 
 gusted with the action of Congress in even considering relin- 
 quishment of the Mississippi that they were on that account 
 prejudiced against the idea of increasing the authority of the 
 central government. That is to say, because of their undoubted 
 grievance they illogically opposed the only permanent cure for it 
 and for similar grievances. The southern idea of state rights as
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 141 
 
 opposed to federal sovereignty had in a large degree its origin in 
 this dispute over the Mississippi. 
 
 So the dispute dragged on, wearily and unprofitably. In the 
 spring of 1787 Jay reported to Congress that the negotiations 
 were "dilatory, unpleasant, and unpromising," and he was be- 
 coming convinced that nothing would come of them. The only 
 thing to do, in his opinion, was to hold in abeyance for a time 
 the right to navigate the lower part of the river, until conditions 
 changed in such a way as to enable us to assert and maintain 
 that right. Of course, with the rapid growth of the West in 
 population and commerce, approach was being made toward 
 such conditions. The outcome of the negotiations was, in fact, 
 nothing. They ended where they began. 
 
 Meantime in the Northwest Territory, between the Ohio River 
 and the Great Lakes, England was practically ignoring the treaty 
 of peace. Under that treaty she relinquished that territory to 
 the United States. But, in fact, she continued to hold the fron- 
 tier forts, all the way from Lake Champlain to Lake Superior, 
 and thus exercised over the Indians an influence enormously 
 profitable to British trade, while settlement of those regions by 
 pioneers from the States was greatly discouraged and impeded. 
 To seek redress of this grievance and fulfilment of the treaty 
 stipulations, as well as for ordinaiy diplomatic purposes, the 
 first American minister to England was appointed. This was 
 in 1785. The minister was John Adams, a singularly unfor- 
 tunate choice. Able and patriotic as he was, he had little ca- 
 pacity for diplomatic negotiations ; he was impetuous, irascible, 
 impatient, pugnacious; and he was strongly prejudiced against 
 England. However, he was a past-master in legal knowledge 
 and acumen, and he could be as resolute as the most stubborn op- 
 ponent. 
 
 His mission began, indeed, with promise. He was presented 
 to the king in June, 1785, and was received as courteously as 
 though he had been the ambassador of an ally instead of a power 
 which had lately rebelled against the king. His own words in 
 addressing the king were discreet and tactful. He expressed 
 hope that he might be instrumental in restoring complete esteem, 
 confidence, and affection between the two countries; or, he added, 
 "the old good nature and the old good humor between people
 
 142 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 who, though separated by an ocean, and under different govern- 
 ments, have the same language, a similar religion, and kindred 
 blood." The king was deeply affected. He protested that in 
 the unpleasant years of the past he had been animated by what 
 he sincerely regarded as his duty, and he assured Adams that he 
 would eagerly meet the friendly advances of America. "The 
 moment I see such sentiments and language as yours prevail," 
 he said, "and a disposition to give this country the preference, 
 that moment I shall say, let the circumstances of language, re- 
 ligion, and blood have their natural and full effect." 
 
 When, however, Adams began the practical negotiations for 
 which he had been commissioned, the scene changed radically 
 and not for the better. His aims were threefold. One was to 
 persuade the British government to withdraw its forces from 
 the frontier forts, in accordance with the treaty. The second 
 was, to secure indemnity for Great Britain's exportation of 
 Negro slaves from America after the making of the treaty and in 
 violation of its provisions. The third was, to make advantageous 
 commercial relations between the two countries. To all three, 
 the British ministry was irresponsive. Moreover, it was dilatory 
 and procrastinating. It was nearly five months after his arrival 
 in London before he was able to get any answer whatever to his 
 representations, and then it was most unsatisfactory. To the 
 first and second points the ministry gave an unequivocal re- 
 fusal. Great Britain would not relinquish the forts nor pay the 
 indemnity until the debts due to Englishmen from Americans 
 were paid. Adams protested that the treaty contained no such 
 stipulation. That was quite true. But the treaty did provide 
 that creditors of one country should not be legally impeded in 
 the recovery of their debts in the other country, and it was 
 claimed, with only too much truth, that in America legal ob- 
 stacles were put in the way of British creditors. As for com- 
 mercial relations, England ignored them because she did not be- 
 lieve that any treaty stipulations would be to her profit. The 
 enforcement of navigation laws would be profitable to her mer- 
 chants, and she was certain to secure the major part of America's 
 foreign trade even without a treaty. The result was that 
 Adams's mission utterly failed. His personal relations in Eng- 
 land became less and less pleasant, until at last they were no
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 143 
 
 longer tolerable. He resigned his place in 1788 and came home 
 in disgust, without making a treaty, and without getting a single 
 one of the objects for which he had gone. 
 
 The secret of the whole trouble lay, of course, in the weak- 
 ness of our government, under the Confederation ; in the lack of 
 that strong and efficient central authority which Washington 
 had recommended. Congress had stipulated that no impedi- 
 ments should be placed in the way of collecting lawful debts. 
 At once individual States created such impediments to a scandal- 
 ous degree, in flagrant violation of the treaty, and Congress was 
 quite unable to compel them to respect and to fulfil the treaty. 
 What wonder, then, that the English government insisted that it 
 was under no obligation to fulfil its obligations under the treaty 
 until America fulfilled hers ? Again, the States treated the Brit- 
 ish loyalists in a most outrageous manner, in open violation of 
 the treaty. In later years, even down to our own times, it was 
 often remarked that a considerable part of Canada, particularly 
 inhabitants of British rather than of French origin, cherished a 
 peculiar and implacable animosity against the United States. 
 The reason was and is obvious. Such feelings were merely nat- 
 ural and largely justifiable resentment against the injustice and 
 persecution which the United States inflicted upon British loyal- 
 ists. These loyalists sought refuge in Canada, and there nursed 
 for generations their wrath against their oppressors and despoil- 
 ers. In this matter, too. Congress was powerless against the in- 
 dividual States. As a result of Jay's statement concerning 
 American violations of the treaty, Madison, in a letter to 
 Jefferson, urged that "the treaty should be put in force as a 
 law, and the exposition of it left, like that of other laws, to the 
 ordinary tribunals." Resolutions to that effect were passed by 
 Congress, and were transmitted to all the States, accompanied by 
 a powerful letter from Jay, urging the repeal of all state laws 
 which conflicted with the treaty. But the States had capacious 
 waste-paper baskets, and these documents were promptly con- 
 signed to them. Congress had no powers which the States felt 
 themselves required to obey or to respect. 
 
 America, moreover, was for this same cause, the lack of a 
 strong central government, quite unable to raise a revenue ade- 
 quate to its needs. It had no army worthy of the name. It
 
 144 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 could not build a navy. It could not exclude from its ports the 
 shipping of any nation that cared to send commerce hither. In 
 brief, it could not perform the essential international functions 
 of a sovereign State. Why should other nations regard it seri- 
 ously? Why should any nation make a treaty with a govern- 
 ment which was confessedly and notoriously unable to fulfil 
 its own treaty obligations? That was the miserable plight of 
 America at that time, and that was the light in which Great 
 Britain and other European powers regarded it. British 
 statesmen with pardonable scorn asked whether treaties were to 
 be made by Congress or by the individual States, and declined 
 to accredit any minister to a country which had no really respon- 
 sible authority to receive him. They not unnaturally refused, 
 also, to take any steps toward fulfilling their obligations to a 
 country which would not or could not fulfil its own. Jay him- 
 self testified, with truth, that there was not a day on which the 
 treaty of peace was not violated by some of the States. * ' I sus- 
 pect, ' ' he added, ' ' that posterity will read the history of our last 
 four years with much regret. ' ' 
 
 Our relations during this humiliating period with certain 
 other powers must also be noticed. These were the Mohamme- 
 dan States bordering on the Mediterranean Sea, to wit, Turkey, 
 Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco. The latter four were 
 known as the Barbary States, and were notorious practicers of 
 piracy, ravaging the commerce and even the coasts of other na- 
 tions almost at will. Before the Revolution a large commerce in 
 flour, fish, and other products was enjoyed by America in Medi- 
 terranean ports. But as soon as America became independent the 
 Barbary pirates began preying at will upon its commerce, seiz- 
 ing its vessels and holding their crews captive for ransom. 
 Various agents were sent to remonstrate and to demand redress, 
 but in vain. The pirates who had long flouted all Europe 
 scorned this new power at the further side of the ocean. In Al- 
 giers twenty-one Americans were captured and enslaved, and 
 nearly $60,000 was demanded for their release. But America 
 had no money to use in redeeming them, so they had to be left to 
 their fate ; though Congress did finally give a small sum for pro- 
 viding them with food and other necessities of life. 
 
 While Adams was in London he had several interviews with
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 145 
 
 the minister from Tripoli, who addressed him with much con- 
 descension and patronage. The Tripolitan conceded that 
 America might be a great country, but he pointed out that its 
 ships could not navigate the Mediterranean Sea without the per; 
 mission of the Barbary States. He was willing to negotiate a 
 treaty between the United States and Tripoli for $150,000, or 
 with all four of the Barbary States for $600,000. Adams was 
 presently joined by Jefferson, who was the American minister to 
 France, and together they tried to get better terms from the 
 Tripolitan, but in vain. He even demanded an addition of ten 
 per cent, of the bonus mentioned, as a personal bribe for him- 
 self. The negotiations were fruitless. With Morocco, indeed, 
 a treaty of peace and friendship was made in 1787, being ne- 
 gotiated by Thomas Barclay and signed by Adams and Jeffer- 
 son ; but the other three powers continued to prey upon our com- 
 merce at will. The United States was too poor to pay tribute, 
 and too weak to fight ; and a settlement of scores with the pirates 
 of North Africa had to be postponed until we became a nation 
 with a national government. And there was a similar postpone- 
 ment of all further treaty-making with all other powers. 
 
 To recapitulate, it may be observed that in the few treaties 
 and the other relationships with foreign powers which antedated 
 the formation of the Federal Government under the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States, three major things were achieved, one 
 of which was and is good, while the other two were wholly and 
 indefensibly bad, and have left a legacy of evil which in some 
 measure troubles the nation to this day. The first of these was 
 the adoption, in Franklin's treaty with Prussia, of a high and 
 advanced principle of neutrality in naval warfare. It was far 
 in advance of the world at that time, and indeed the world at 
 large has not even yet come up to that standard, though it is 
 steadily making toward that end. But what is most to the pres- 
 ent purpose is that the adoption of that principle at that time, 
 futile as it seemed, established a precedent which has ever since 
 exerted a humane and beneficent influence upon our naval policy. 
 The second of these things was our scandalous spoliation, perse- 
 cution, and expulsion of all who were even suspected of having 
 been British sympathizers during the Revolution ; a crime com- 
 pared with which the British expulsion of the Acadians was a 
 
 VOL. I 10
 
 146 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 trifling and negligible episode. The result was the loss to this 
 country of thousands of its most valuable citizens, and the en- 
 gendering of resentment and estrangement in Canada instead of 
 cordial and helpful friendship. The third, also wholly and in- 
 excusably bad, was the setting up of state rights over and above 
 the obligations of national treaties. In that was set a precedent 
 which has plagued us more than once since then, and which is 
 the direct source of one of the most serious and perplexing of 
 our present international controversies. 
 
 These two grave evils arose from the inherent weakness of the 
 Confederation. And since the Confederation showed itself so 
 disastrously inefficient in the conduct and direction of foreign af- 
 fairs, it was natural that the alert and far-seeing foreign secre- 
 tary should take the lead in seeking a new order of things which 
 should give us a government worthy of the name. There was no 
 more earnest and efficient advocate of Washington's ideal of a 
 strong national government than Jay, especially when speaking 
 from the fulness of his bitter experience as an ill-treated diplo- 
 matic agent of Congress abroad, and as the ill-treated foreign 
 secretary of that same incompetent body at home. Congress, he 
 complained, uniformly refused to consult him about the persons 
 to be appointed to places in the consular and diplomatic services, 
 whether small or great. But what better was to be expected of 
 a governing body which could make war but could not enlist 
 men or raise money to carry it on; which could make peace but 
 could not enforce the terms of the treaty ; which could form alli- 
 ances but could not comply with their obligations; which could 
 enter into commercial treaties but could not enforce them at 
 home or abroad; which could borrow money but had not the 
 means of repayment? 
 
 Long in advance of the Constitution, therefore, and in ad- 
 vance of the assembling of the convention which was to frame 
 that instrument, Jay, in his correspondence with Jefferson, 
 blazed the assured way to the essential and fundamental prin- 
 ciples of the new order. ' ' To vest legislative, judicial and execu- 
 tive powers in one and the same body," he said, "and that, too, 
 in a body daily changing its members, can never be wise. In 
 my opinion those three great departments of sovereignty should 
 be forever separated, and so distributed as to serve as checks on
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 147 
 
 each other." And he added that a degree of coercive power in 
 the central government, to make its decrees effective, was essen- 
 tial. "A mere government of reason and persuasion is little 
 adapted to the actual state of human nature." There spoke the 
 prophet of the Constitution. Yet by a strange irony of fate — 
 or, shall we say, through the crass ignorance and stupid preju- 
 dice of his constituents? — Jay was not permitted to be a mem- 
 ber of the Constitutional Convention ! And he was excluded 
 from it because of his expression of these very opinions which 
 we have recalled. Just because he, above most men, realized 
 the need of a constitution, and pointed out what its chief pro- 
 visions should be, he was adjudged unworthy or unsafe to have 
 a part in making that instrument. 
 
 Jay, however, was not idle during the formative period of the 
 Constitution. He and Hamilton conceived the idea of writing 
 and publishing the remarkable series of papers on the Constitu- 
 tion known as ' ' The Federalist, ' ' intended to explain the Consti- 
 tution, to vindicate its provisions, and to commend it to the peo- 
 ple for their ratification. Jay meant himself to write many of 
 the papers, but being wounded in a riot in New York he was un- 
 able to contribute more than five, and the rest of the work, or 
 most of it, was done by Hamilton and Madison. Jay's papers 
 were naturally largely devoted to foreign affairs. Indeed, the 
 need of the Constitution for the direction of our foreign relations 
 was greatly emphasized. A national government was needed, it 
 was urged, in order to avert "dangers from foreign force and in- 
 fluence." It was pointed out that the States which bordered 
 upon British and Spanish ten'itory would be most likely, under 
 the sway of impulse or sudden irritation, to plunge into war 
 with those nations, without adequate cause. Nothing, said Jay, 
 could so effectively avert that danger as a national government. 
 Nor could anything more surely command respect for us abroad. 
 Foreign nations would know our condition and act accordingly. 
 If we remained separate States these would probably become 
 discordant. One would incline toward alliance with England, 
 another with France, a third with Spain. They would be played 
 off against eacli other, and would fall an easy prey to foreign in- 
 vasion or encroachment. But by a united nation unreasonable 
 causes of war would be avoided, just causes would seldom be in-
 
 148 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 curred. and the safety of the States would be secured ' ' by plac- 
 ing them in a situation not to invite hostility." With Spain 
 shutting us away from the lower Mississippi, with Great Britain 
 excluding us from the St. Lawrence, and with both Great Brit- 
 ain and France seeking to exclude us from the North Atlantic 
 fisheries and from commerce, the possibility of war must be con- 
 sidered. "War may arise; will not union tend to discourage 
 it?" On the other hand, with separate States making separate 
 and perhaps inharmonious treaties with foreign powers, would 
 not lack of union encourage and provoke war? In this manner 
 considerations of foreign policy exerted a powerful reflex influ- 
 ence upon our domestic constitution. We became a nation at 
 home largely for the sake of presenting a united front to the rest 
 of the world. 
 
 The second, third, fourth, and fifth numbers of "The Federal- 
 ist" were devoted to foreign relations and the services which the 
 Constitution would render to the nation in the conduct of affairs 
 with other nations. In the eleventh number the theme was 
 again taken up. It was pointed out that foreign nations were 
 already jealous of our commerce, that that commerce was de- 
 pendent for protection upon a navy, and that for the creation 
 and maintenance of a navy uniformity of action through national 
 union was necessary. The forty-second number discussed the 
 provisions of the Constitution for the regulation of our inter- 
 course with other nations. It was agreed that the making of 
 treaties, the sending and receiving of ambassadors, ministers, 
 and consuls, the defining and punishing of offenses against inter- 
 national law, and the regulation of foreign commerce, were ob- 
 vious and essential functions of a national government. This 
 fact was indeed recognized in the old Articles of Confederation, 
 and the Constitution merely amplified the powers of the Con- 
 gress, made them effective for enforcement, and vested them in 
 specified departments of the general government. In the forty- 
 fourth number the necessity of providing for the enforcement of 
 treaties, as part of the supreme law of the land, was pointed out. 
 
 In the sixty-fourth number, which was written by Jay, there 
 was an elaborate discussion of the proposal to invest the Federal 
 Senate with the power of ratifying or rejecting treaties. Its 
 text was the passage in the Constitution which gives the Presi-
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 149 
 
 dent power, "by and with the consent of the Senate, to make 
 treaties provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." 
 It may be that there were some, even in the convention, who 
 would have given that power to the President alone, without re- 
 gard to either branch of Congress; just as it was thus enjoyed 
 by the crown in monarchical countries. And indeed this was not 
 illogical. For if the Government was to be divided into three 
 separate and coordinate branches — executive, legislative, and ju- 
 dicial — and if the conduct of foreign affairs was a function of 
 the executive, there was from one point of view no more reason 
 for legislative participation in treaty-making than in the render- 
 ing of judicial opinions. On the other hand, there were many 
 who would have had the treaty-making power retained by Con- 
 gress. And this, too, from one point of view, was logical. For 
 if the treaties were to be a part of the supreme law of the land, 
 they ought to be made by the law-making body. Between these 
 two views, the plan of the Constitution was an adroit and con- 
 vincing compromise. It made one branch of the national legis- 
 lature a participant in the conduct of foreign relations, and it 
 selected for that purpose that branch which was the smaller and 
 the more permanent, and which was the better able to consider 
 treaties and other foreign affairs with the secrecy and the expedi- 
 tion which were often essential. In other legislation Congress 
 took the initiative, and the President gave or withheld his ap- 
 proval. In treaty-making the President was to take the initia- 
 tive, and one branch of Congress was to give or withhold its ap- 
 proval. And both classes of acts were to be equally the law of 
 the land. 
 
 In one respect, however, upon which Jay dwelt with masterly 
 skill, there was a radical difference between them. Laws of 
 Congress could be repealed or altered at any time, by Congress 
 itself. There were those who urged that treaties should be sub- 
 ject to the same treatment. But Jay convincingly pointed out 
 that treaties were contracts, made between and by two equal 
 parties, "and consequently, that as the consent of both was es- 
 sential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterward be 
 to alter or cancel them." Again, he argued that "a treaty is 
 only another name for a bargain, and it would be impossible to 
 find any nation who would make any bargain with us, which
 
 150 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 should be binding on them absolutely, but on us only so long and 
 so far as we may think proper to be bound by it." The same 
 phase of the subject was further considered by Hamilton in the 
 seventy -fifth number. He dwelt upon the importance and sanc- 
 tity of contracts between nations, and the need of the utmost cir- 
 cumspection in making them. The power of making them 
 seemed to belong, he said, neither to the executive nor to the leg- 
 islative branch of government, but to a separate department; 
 but it was practically fitting for it to be exercised by a certain 
 conjuncture of the two. "The qualities elsewhere detailed as 
 indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations, point 
 out the executive as the most fit agent in these transactions; 
 while the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of 
 treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole 
 or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them. ' ' 
 
 Finally, in the eightieth number, Hamilton discussed the pro- 
 vision giving the federal judiciary authority in all cases relating 
 to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. 
 The Union, he argued, would undoubtedly be answerable to for- 
 eign powers for the conduct of its members; and the responsi- 
 bility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the fac- 
 ulty of preventing it. A distinction might perhaps be imagined 
 between cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations and 
 those standing merely upon the footing of municipal law; the 
 former being supposed proper for the federal and the latter for 
 state jurisdiction. But it was a question whether an unjust sen- 
 tence against a foreigner, even on a matter of purely local law, 
 would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his sovereign, 
 just as much as one which violated a treaty or international law. 
 Besides, there would be vast difficulty in discriminating between 
 the two classes of cases. Therefore it was by far safest and most 
 expedient to refer all such cases to the federal courts. 
 
 The Constitution, then, dealt as follows with the foreign rela- 
 tions and transactions of the nation: It gave to Congress, in 
 both houses, the power to lay duties on foreign commerce, to 
 regulate commerce with foreign nations, to define and punish 
 offenses against the law of nations, to declare war, to pro- 
 vide and maintain a navy, and to provide for the common de- 
 fense and general welfare. It forbade^any officer of the United
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 151 
 
 States to accept any present, emolument, office, or title from any- 
 foreign authority, save with the consent of Congress. It for- 
 bade any State of the Union to enter into any treaty, alliance, 
 confederation, agreement, or compact with any foreign power, 
 save with the consent of Congress, It gave to the President the 
 power, by and with the advice of the Senate, to make treaties 
 and appoint ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, and to receive 
 ambassadors and other public ministers. It gave to the federal 
 courts of the United States jurisdiction in all cases arising under 
 treaties; in all cases affecting ambassadors, ministers, and con- 
 suls, and in all cases between States or their citizens and foreign 
 States or their citizens or subjects ; but in the Eleventh Amend- 
 ment, which went into effect nine years later, it was provided 
 that the judicial power should not be extended to any suit 
 against one of the States by citizens or subjects of any foreign 
 State, the result being to debar the bringing of such suits. 
 
 In such fashion the makers of the Constitution purposed to 
 remedy the defects of the old Confederation so far as the con- 
 duct of foreign affairs was concerned. The plan had twofold 
 merits. In the first place it provided for a suitable and logical 
 distribution and vesting of powers over foreign affairs among 
 and in the three great departments of government which Jay 
 had suggested. In the second and still more important place, 
 it provided for a responsible and efficient central government 
 such as Washington had recommended, which could present the 
 nation with an undivided front to the outside world, which could 
 enforce treaties as well as make them, and which could cause 
 other powers to realize that in America they were at least deal- 
 ing with a responsible and authoritative sovereign nation. 
 
 The Constitution was duly adopted, and in 1789 a new Na- 
 tional Government was established upon its basis. One of the 
 earliest acts of that Government was to organize an efficient de- 
 partment of foreign affairs, to complete the unfinished business 
 of the old Congress, and to undertake those new neootiations 
 which were hoped for and which were indeed essential to the 
 progress of the nation. The old Congress of the Confederation, 
 as one of its last acts, in September, 1788, had voted "that no 
 further progress be made in the negotiations with Spain, but 
 that the subjects to which they relate be referred to the Federal
 
 152 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Government which is to assemble in March next." There were 
 other matters of unfinished business awaiting execution, and 
 then there were further efforts to be made to negotiate with for- 
 eign powers the treaties which for the last four years had been 
 sought and solicited in vain. So the twenty-eighth statute en- 
 acted by Congress, which was approved on July 27, 1789, pro- 
 vided for the establishment of an executive department, under 
 the President, to be known as the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
 its principal officer to be known as the Secretary for the Depart- 
 ment of Foreign Affairs. That secretary was to perform and 
 execute such duties as might be assigned to him by the President 
 relative to correspondence, commissions, or instructions to or 
 with public ministers or consuls from the United States, or with 
 ministers or consuls from foreign States; or to memorials or 
 other applications from foreign public ministers or other for- 
 eigners; or to such other matters respecting foreign affairs as 
 the President might assign to him, A little later this was 
 amended by Statute No. 68, approved on September 15, 1789, 
 so as to change the name of the department to "Department of 
 State" and the title of its chief officer to "Secretary of State." 
 This was an unfortunate and misleading change. It was made 
 because Congress wanted this secretary to have charge of the 
 correspondence between the President and the governors of the 
 various States of the Union. That was a duty which should have 
 been assigned to a secretary of the interior, but Congress was 
 at that time unwilling to create another department. But that 
 early law, of 1789, still stands as the organic law of the state 
 department, which is in fact if not in name the department of 
 foreign affairs. 
 
 It would not be easy to conceive circumstances at once more 
 embarrassing and more momentous than those which surrounded 
 the new Government at the time of its establishment in the 
 spring of 1789, and of these untoward circumstances some of 
 the worst were in the foreign relations of America. We had 
 literally not a friend in the world. There was probably not a 
 nation that had confidence in the stability or the success of the 
 republic. It is not certain that there was one that wished us 
 well. Whatever little sympathy and favorable expectation had 
 been excited by our struggles in the Revolution had been for-
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 153 
 
 feited and lost by the miserable ineptitude of the Confederation. 
 We were as bankrupt in reputation abroad as we were in pecuni- 
 ary fortune at home. And to extricate us from that deplorable 
 plight and to give us an assured and honorable place among the 
 nations, an untried system had been adopted and an unprece- 
 dented experiment was to be made. All that had gone before, 
 save perhaps the single principle of neutrality to which reference 
 has already been made, was eliminated and abolished. Our alli- 
 ance with France was practically as much a thing of the past as 
 was our war with England. We had to begin de novo the culti- 
 vation of foreign relationships with all nations of the world. 
 
 Three salient features of that situation must be recalled for a 
 proper understanding of the task which confronted our first ad- 
 ministration. One was the troublous condition of European 
 affairs. France was on the verge of her colossal revolution, 
 which was destined to transform all Europe. Washington was 
 inaugurated president on April 30, and five days later the States 
 General of France assembled at Versailles and began the Revo- 
 lution. Spain was rapidly declining toward utter impotence 
 and civil chaos. Great Britain was undergoing a profound 
 transformation suggested by our own revolt against arbitrary 
 power. And these three powers came into very direct contact 
 with us, so that it was certain that in their conflicts we should 
 be in danger of being involved. 
 
 The second feature of the case was that the American people 
 had ever been accustomed to take their politics, at any rate their 
 foreign politics, from Europe, and they were unprepared to do 
 otherwise. They instinctively continued to look to England 
 and France for diplomatic cues, and it was a difficult task to 
 teach them to have regard for a system of their own and for a 
 foreign policy based on the interests of America and not on those 
 of Europe. A few Americans did indeed appreciate the need 
 of so doing, chief among them Washington himself. Writing, 
 before his election as president, to Sir Edward Newenham, he 
 said: "I hope the United States of America will be able to 
 keep disengaged from the labyrinth of European politics and 
 wars ; and that before long they will, by the adoption of a good 
 National Government, have become respectable in the eyes of 
 the world, so that none of the maritime powers, especially none
 
 154 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of those who hold possessions in the New World or the "West 
 Indies, shall presume to treat them with insult or contempt. It 
 should be the policy of the United States to administer to their 
 wants without being engaged in their quarrels. ' ' There could be 
 no sounder or wiser statesmanship than that. But the very fact 
 that Washington deemed it necessary to write thus shows how 
 far the country then was from realizing his ideal. He was con. 
 vinced that one of the most important duties, perhaps the most 
 important of all, for developing us into a true nation, was the 
 breaking of all political bonds with Europe. To the perform- 
 ance of that duty he addressed himself. But it was his mis- 
 fortune to be compelled to do so at the very time when the great- 
 est civil storm the world had known for ages was beginning to 
 break in fury, and when in spite of itself this country was caught 
 at least in the outskirts of the vast disturbance. 
 
 The third element of the case, and perhaps the worst of all, 
 was the rise of faction in the United States, and the injection 
 of it into our foreign relations. During the Revolution party 
 feelings had been held in abeyance. Massachusetts and Vir- 
 ginia, Puritan and Cavalier, worked and fought the common foe 
 in harmony. But with the coming of peace faction began to 
 manifest itself, and in the constitutional convention it expanded 
 to vast proportions and displayed an ominous malignity. Pri- 
 marily, the schism occurred over the question of the Central 
 Government. Some favored a strong Federal Government and 
 a Union of the States in an indivisible nation. Others would 
 have perpetuated the mere league of independent States which 
 existed under the Confederation. So the Federalists and Anti- 
 Federalists arose. That would have been bad enough had the 
 party differences been confined, as party differences always 
 should be, to purely domestic affairs. But unfortunately they 
 were not thus confined. The two parties soon differed as much 
 in external policy as in internal policy. Domestic differences 
 caused the young republic to present too often a divided front to 
 the outside world, and because of such differences American 
 statesmen allied themselves with foreign powers against their 
 own countrymen. 
 
 In these circumstances the salvation of the country depended 
 upon the statesmanship of Washington, no less than years be-
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 155 
 
 fore it had depended upon his military genius; and he worked 
 out its salvation in an extraordinary manner. There fell to him 
 at once the responsibility of appointing a secretary of state, 
 who should under his directions conduct the foreign affairs of 
 the nation. Probably the fittest choice for that place would 
 have been John Jay, whose superb diplomacy had been the re- 
 deeming feature of our otherwise too often ignoble foreign rela- 
 tions under the Confederation. But Jay, with his spotless 
 integrity and great legal ability, was needed at the head of the 
 federal judiciary as our first chief justice. Adams was vice- 
 president and therefore debarred from the secretaryship. 
 Franklin was too old for further service. Next to these in 
 prominence, in both domestic and foreign affairs, was Jefferson, 
 and upon him the choice fell. It was an extraordinary choice 
 from every point of view save that of purely public policy. 
 There had been no personal friendship between Washington and 
 Jefferson. They knew each other only slightly, and neither liked 
 the other. In all of Washington's correspondence before this 
 time there had occurred only a single mention of Jefferson, and 
 that by no means favorable. Writing to Robert Livingston in 
 January, 1783, before the conclusion of peace with Great Brit- 
 ain, and referring to the negotiations, Washington said: "What 
 office is Mr. Jefferson appointed to that he has, you say, lately 
 accepted? If it is that of commissioner of peace, / hope lie will 
 arrive too late to have any hand in it." When we remember 
 how little Washington was ever given to criticizing other men 
 in his letters, this passage must be regarded as a striking revela- 
 tion of his distrust of Jefferson and his antipathy toward him. 
 It is indeed difficult to imagine two men more radically unlike, 
 save in one respect, than these two: in natural disposition, in 
 habitual manner, and in views of public policy. Washington 
 was a natural fighter, strong, direct, masculine; while Jefferson 
 was a noncombatant, adroit, subtle, and feminine. The one was 
 deliberate and conservative, the other impulsive and radical. 
 The one judged policies by their demonstrated merits, the other 
 eagerly embraced anything that was new just for the sake of its 
 novelty. The one was constant and consistent, the other fickle 
 and inconsistent. Yet in the one after all supreme respect of 
 devotion to America and its interests, as they saw them from
 
 156 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 their diametrically opposite points of view, the two were in exact 
 accord. 
 
 "We must conclude, then, that Washington selected Jefferson 
 for the secretaryship of state against his own personal inclina- 
 tions, but on the ground of public welfare. He recognized Jef- 
 ferson's ability, his integrity, his patriotism, and his consider- 
 able experience in diplomacy; for Jefferson was then and had 
 been for some time the American minister to France. He recog- 
 nized the fact, too, that Jefferson had a very large personal fol- 
 lowing in this country and commanded the confidence and affec- 
 tion of the people to an exceptional degree. True, Jefferson 
 was one of the leaders of the political party opposed to that with 
 which Washington himself was affiliated. But was it not for 
 that very reason good policy to put him into the cabinet, so that 
 the new Government might be representative of both parties? 
 And at the worst, if Jefferson should be inclined to exhibit fac- 
 tional animosity toward Washington, it might be better to have 
 him in the cabinet, where his doings could be constantly ob- 
 served, than to leave him a free lance outside. 
 
 There was, indeed, some danger that Jefferson would cause 
 trouble in our foreign relations, because he was of all men most 
 inclined to meddle in the affairs of other lands and to shape 
 American policies according to alien likes and dislikes; and this 
 in spite of his subsequent exhortation to avoid entangling alli- 
 ances. Thus in 1786 he spent a few weeks in London, cooperat- 
 ing with Adams, and his brief experience and observation filled 
 him with a passionate and unreasoning distrust and hatred of 
 England, which lasted for many years, "That nation," he 
 wrote, "hates us, their ministers hate us, and their king more 
 than all other men. . . . Their hostility toward us is much more 
 deeply rooted at present than during the war. In spite of trea- 
 ties, England is still our enemy. Her hatred is deep rooted and 
 cordial and nothing is wanting with her but the power to wipe 
 us and the land we live in out of existence." The English "do 
 not conceive that any circumstances will arise which shall render 
 it expedient for them to have any political connection with us. 
 There is no party in our favor here, either in power or out of 
 power. . . . The spirit of hostility to us has always existed in 
 the mind of the king, but it has now extended itself through the
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 157 
 
 whole mass of the people." Nor were his feelings toward Eng- 
 land different from those which he believed England cherished 
 toward us. "I had never concealed," he said, "that I consid- 
 ered the British as our natural enemies and as the only nation 
 on earth who wished us ill from the bottom of their souls. ' ' He 
 even suggested that the English were capable of aiding the pi- 
 rates of Algiers in preying upon our commerce. He explicitly 
 accused England of being responsible for the coolness of the rest 
 of Europe toward us. "There was," he said, "an enthusiasm 
 toward us all over Europe at the moment of the peace. The tor- 
 rent of lies published unremittingly in every day's London 
 papers first made an impression and produced a coolness. The 
 republication of these lies in most of the papers of Europe car- 
 ried them home to the belief of every mind." The wretched 
 credit of the United States abroad he attributed partly to the 
 real deficiencies of the country but partly also ' ' to the lies propa- 
 gated by the London papers, which are probably paid for by the 
 ministers to reconcile the people to the loss of us." 
 
 These expressions we must consider as little better than fantas- 
 tic. There was, as a matter of fact, no such incessant campaign 
 against America in the English press; while if there were 
 sharper criticism of this country then than there had been be- 
 fore and during the war, that circumstance was quite natural. 
 Any nation feels, of course, more free to criticize and condemn 
 another independent and alien country than a part of its own 
 empire, even though the latter be rebellious. It would have been 
 extraordinary if British criticisms had not, therefore, increased 
 after the recognition of our independence. That there had been 
 any general enthusiasm toward us all over Europe was certainly 
 untrue. There was little in France, none in Spain, none in 
 Russia, none in Austria. In Holland, in Sweden, and in Prussia 
 there was an inclination toward friendly relations with us, but 
 to call it enthusiasm involves gross exaggeration. IMoreover, if 
 there had been any such feeling, British hostility could scarcely 
 have affected it. Great Britain was openly hostile toward France. 
 Spain, and Holland, and was on bad terms with Prussia, while 
 she had not one close and confidential friend in all Europe. In 
 such circumstances to say that all Europe took its cues from 
 England, and turned against America because of English rail-
 
 158 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ings against us, was simply preposterous. If Jefferson had pos- 
 sessed even a rudimentary sense of liumor, he would never have 
 made the statement. 
 
 From London, Jefferson had gone to Paris, where he became 
 as much enamored of France as he was embittered against Eng- 
 land. The wildest excesses of the French Revolution won his 
 enthusiastic admiration, and he wished to see some of its spirit 
 transplanted to America. "A little rebellion," he wrote, re- 
 ferring to Shays 's Rebellion in Massachusetts, "now and then, is 
 a good thing. An observation of this truth should render honest 
 republican governors so mild in their punishment of rebellions 
 as not to discourage them too much. . . . God forbid we should 
 ever be twenty years without such a rebellion. . . . The tree 
 of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood 
 of patriots and tyrants It is its natural manure. ' ' And again, 
 "I am convinced," he said, "that those societies (as the Indians) 
 which live without government enjoy in their general mass an 
 infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under 
 European governments. ' ' 
 
 Certainly these were strange and by no means auspicious 
 views to be held by the secretary of state who was to lay the 
 foundations of our foreign policies and was to conduct our for- 
 eign negotiations and relationships during the critical years of 
 national infancy. If we pass over the astonishing sentiments in 
 favor of occasional rebellions and against government of any 
 kind, we must regard his intense partiality in his attitude toward 
 European nations as most unfortunate ; and as a matter of fact 
 it entailed upon the young nation most unfortunate results. 
 Beyond doubt, the true and wise attitude of one nation toward 
 another is that which was expressed by Washington, when he 
 said that "Nothing is more essential than that permanent, in- 
 veterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate 
 attachments for others should be excluded ; and that in place of 
 them, just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. 
 The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or 
 an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to 
 its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to 
 lead it astray from its duty and its interest." This was the 
 counsel of Washington to the whole people. It was and is obvi-
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 159 
 
 ously still more pertinent and important to those officers of Gov- 
 ernment who have in hand the shaping of our foreign relations 
 and the conduct of foreign transactions. And most of all was it 
 pertinent and important to such officers in the first years of our 
 national life, when we were just being introduced into the soci- 
 ety of nations and were laying for all time the foundations of 
 our foreign policy and our international relationships. 
 
 Jefferson had, however, two commanding principles of fitness 
 for the task upon which he was entering. One was a passionate 
 love for his own country and a devotion to its interests which 
 surpassed every other consideration. There is no doubt that this 
 love was the cause of his hatred of England and his affection for 
 France. For, less than a score of years afterward, as we shall 
 presently see, he exactly reversed himself, and gave to England 
 his confidence and friendship, while he regarded the once beloved 
 France as our deadliest foe. In his loves and hates, and all his 
 astounding changes and inconsistencies, he was supremely ani- 
 mated by a passion of patriotism. The other principle was his 
 belief in an undivided and indivisible nationality in our foreign 
 affairs. He did not believe in a nation. Federalism was ab- 
 horrent to him. The powers given to the general Government 
 by the Constitution seemed to him too great. He would have 
 had the States remain separate and independent of each other. 
 But still he wanted them to present a united front to the rest 
 of the world. "My general plan," he said, "would be to make 
 the States one as to everything connected with foreign nations, 
 and several as to everything purely domestic." 
 
 Jefferson was not permitted, however, to organize the state 
 department and to open our intercourse with foreign nations en- 
 tirely according to his own will. He was still in France, as our 
 minister, when the first Government was formed under the Con- 
 stitution. Washington was inaugurated on April 30. It was 
 not until the following December that Jefferson returned to this 
 country, and it was not until the latter part of March in the 
 next year that he entered upon his duties as secretary of state. 
 For those nearly eleven months, John Jay remained in charge 
 of the foreign affairs of the Government, and in that time he 
 was able to put upon them a degree of his own impress. But 
 there were two other still more potent forces at work. One of
 
 160 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 these was Alexander Hamilton, who was secretary of the treas- 
 ury, and who was on the closest possible terms of confidence 
 and influence with the President. Indeed, he was always far 
 more influential with the President than Jefferson, even in mat- 
 ters relating to Jefferson's own department. And Hamilton 
 was in many respects the very antithesis of Jefferson. He in- 
 clined toward friendship with England rather than with France. 
 But he had none of the passionate loves and hates for any for- 
 eign powers which Jefferson had, or appeared to have. He was 
 calm, impartial, and moved by reason rather than impulse. He 
 was, moreover, the advocate of two principles of supreme impor- 
 tance in our foreign relations which in after years became tri- 
 umphant and which are among the most marked characteristics 
 of our record. One was, that the United States, as an indivisible 
 nation, should expand until it occupied or at least dominated 
 the whole North American continent, and exercised the hegem- 
 ony of the Western Hemisphere, To this policy Jefferson him- 
 self was forced by the logic of events in after years to become a 
 convert, and much of his greatest fame rests upon his practical 
 application of Hamilton's ideas. Hamilton's other great prin- 
 ciple was that of the substitution of arbitration and international 
 adjudication for war as a means of composing differences be- 
 tween nations; a principle with which this country has long 
 been conspicuously and honorably identified. Through the im- 
 mense importance of the treasury department, and through his 
 personal influence with the President, Hamilton was able to im- 
 press these and others of his principles upon our state depart- 
 ment at the beginning of its career. 
 
 But the dominant factor in the whole situation was, after all, 
 Washington himself; and in no department of the Government 
 did he more inexorably exert his mastery than in that of foreign 
 affairs. It may have been because of that distrust of Jefferson 
 which we have already recalled, or for some other reason. The 
 fact is that he was in a notable degree his own secretary for for- 
 eign affairs. In several instances negotiations which usually 
 would have been conducted by the secretary were conducted by 
 Washington himself, and he never hesitated to overrule the sec- 
 retary when that officer's word did not command his approval. 
 Before he was chosen president he had expressed the hope, which
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 161 
 
 we have quoted, that the United States would be able to keep 
 itself entirely detached from the politics and the wars of Europe, 
 and to the attainment of that end he addressed himself perhaps 
 more vigilantly and energetically than to any other of his mul- 
 tifarious and arduous labors. His first great task on entering 
 office was personally to examine, reading page by page, line by 
 line, word by word, the entire record of the foreign transactions 
 of the Confederation, in order to inform himself of the exact 
 status of this country toward its neighbors ; and as he did so he 
 made copious notes, for further inquiry and consideration, and 
 for guidance in the settling up of the vast and intricate mass of 
 unfinished business which the Confederation had left to the new 
 Government. 
 
 Nor must we underrate the statesmanship of Washington or 
 his extraordinary juderment in seeing and understanding the 
 great movements of the world. Talleyrand said of Hamilton, 
 not extravagantly, that he "divined Europe." Jefferson, Ad- 
 ams, Jay, Morris, and others had spent much time abroad and 
 had studied Europe on the spot. But Washington, who had 
 never crossed the sea, and who had spent most of his career with 
 the army, immersed in military problems, had a vision of the 
 world more keen, more comprehensive, and more luminous than 
 any of them. Note what he wrote in October, 1789, in the first 
 year of his administration, about the French Revolution, which 
 was then in its early stages. "If it ends," he said, "as our best 
 accounts predict, that nation will be the most powerful and 
 happy in Europe; but I fear, though it has gone triumphantly 
 through the first paroxysm, it is not the last it has to encounter 
 before matters are finally settled. In a word, the revolution is 
 of too great magnitude to be eff'ected in so short space, and with 
 the loss of so little blood. ... To forbear running from one ex- 
 treme to another is no easy matter; and should this be the case, 
 rocks and shelves, not visible at present, may wreck the vessel, 
 and give a higher-toned despotism than the one which existed 
 before." 
 
 Fortunate indeed was it for the young republic that its chief 
 magistrate was a statesman of such serenity and genius of vision. 
 For the inept diplomacy of the Confederation had left a legacy 
 of actual embarrassment and of potential disaster; the gravest 
 
 VOI-. I — 11
 
 162 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 problems which can confront any nation in its foreign relation- 
 ships were just before us demanding a solution big with the fate 
 of America ; and the whole civilized world was at the very verge 
 of the most tremendous cataclysm it had known for centuries. 
 Never was a new State inducted into the fellowship of nations 
 under more hazardous and trying circumstances. Never was 
 one controlled at such a conjuncture by a spirit of greater in- 
 tegrity, of greater prudence, or of greater resolution. 
 
 Early in our constitutional history a number of important 
 principles concerning diplomatic intercourse with other nations 
 were established. One, proceeding directly from the Constitu- 
 tion, was that the executive department of the Government was 
 the sole source of diplomatic authority. At first, it is true, the 
 President met with the Senate and discussed with it, face to face, 
 the proposed terms of treaties which were to be negotiated ; but 
 that practice was soon discontinued and it was recognized to be 
 the prerogative of the President to negotiate treaties, perhaps in 
 secret, and not to lay them before the Senate for its "advice and 
 consent," until they were completed and signed. It was simi- 
 larly recognized that he should in like manner appoint all am- 
 bassadors, ministers, and consuls, of any rank. 
 
 Another principle was that foreign ministers must recognize 
 the secretary of state as the sole organ of the executive. John 
 Adams blazed the way to this in 1788, when he wrote in a letter 
 to Jay : * ' There is no maxim more clearly settled in all courts, 
 and in all negotiations between nations, than that sovereign 
 should always speak to sovereign and minister to minister." 
 One of the first acts of Washington on becoming President in 
 1789 was to remind the French minister, the Count de Moustier, 
 of that salutary principle, and to insist upon its observance. A 
 little later Jefferson, as secretary of state, laid down the rule for 
 all time: "He (the President) being the only channel of com- 
 munication between the country and foreign nations, it is from 
 him alone that foreign nations or their agents are to learn what 
 is or has been the will of the nation, and whatever he communi- 
 cates as such they have a right and are bound to consider as 
 the expression of the nation; and no foreign nation can be al- 
 lowed to question it; (or) to interpose between him and any 
 branch of Government."
 
 CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 163 
 
 A third principle was that the withdrawal or renewal of min- 
 isters and missions was to be determined by executive discretion. 
 It will be recalled that John Adams was sent by the Confedera- 
 tion as minister to England, but that England sent none to 
 America in return. In the fall of 1789 the President instructed 
 Gouverneur Morris, then minister to France, to proceed to Lon- 
 don as a private agent and to discuss with the British ministers 
 the project of a treaty of commerce with the United States. 
 He did so, and reported that when Mr. Pitt and the Duke of 
 Leeds asked him why a regular minister was not sent he an- 
 swered them that the United States could not send one on ac- 
 count of the neglect with which the former appointment had 
 been treated. They asked him if America would appoint a min- 
 ister if Great Britain would do the same. He replied that he 
 thought so, but was not authorized to give any positive assurance. 
 Writing to the President on this subject, John Adams, speaking 
 from the fullness of his own unpleasant experience, said: ''As 
 the King of Great Britain twice proposed to the United States 
 an exchange of ministers, and when the United States agreed to 
 the proposition flew from it, to send a minister again to St. 
 James till that court explicitly promises to send one to America 
 is a humiliation to which the United States ought never to sub- 
 mit. The utmost length that can now be gone, with dignity, 
 would be to send a minister to the court of London, with in- 
 structions to present his credentials, demand an audience, make 
 his remonstrance; but to make no establishment, and demand 
 his audience of leave and quit the kingdom in one, two, or throe 
 months if a minister of equal degree were not appointed and 
 actually sent to the President of the United States from the King 
 of Great Britain." 
 
 Again, it was decided that a nonacceptable minister might be 
 refused by the Government to which he was accredited. "It is 
 a general rule," said Jefferson, "that no nation has a right to 
 keep an agent within the limits of another without the consent 
 of that other." And again: "Every foreign agent depends 
 upon the double will of the two Governments — of that which 
 sends him, and of that which is to permit the exercise of his 
 functions within its territory — and when either of these wills is 
 refused or withdrawTi, his authority to act within that territory
 
 164 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 becomes incomplete. By what member of the (our) Government 
 the right of giving or withdrawing permission is to be exercised 
 here is a question on which no foreign agent can be permitted to 
 make himself the umpire. It is sufficient for him, under our 
 Government, that he is informed of it by the executive. ' ' 
 
 It was also, as we shall presently see, in a very noteworthy 
 case, determined that a minister who misconducted himself so as 
 to make himself offensive or inacceptable to the nation which had 
 received him, might be sent back. Diplomatic correspondence 
 was to be held confidential, unless otherwise ordered by the state 
 department; it was not to be disclosed even at the demand of 
 Congress. The President and department of state were to re- 
 ceive no self-constituted missions from foreign lands, and no 
 communications from foreigners on international matters ex- 
 cepting through the official channels of duly accredited minis- 
 ters. The general manner of a minister's intercourse Avith the 
 foreign Government to which he was accredited was admirably 
 prescribed by Jefferson in his instructions to Thomas Pinckney, 
 when the latter was sent as our second minister to England: 
 *'To you, sir," he said, "it will be unnecessary to undertake a 
 general delineation of the duties of the office to which you are 
 appointed. I shall, therefore, only express a desire that they 
 may be constantly exercised in that spirit of sincere friendship 
 which we bear to the English nation and that in all transactions 
 with the minister his good dispositions be conciliated by whatever 
 in language or attentions may tend to that effect. With respect 
 to their Government or policy, as concerning themselves or other 
 nations, we wish not to intermeddle in word or deed, and that it 
 be not understood that our Government permits itself to enter- 
 tain either a will or opinion on that subject." 
 
 In such manner were the organic and operative details of the 
 state department arranged at the beginning of its career. It 
 then remained for those rules and principles to be practically ap- 
 plied to the conduct of our foreign relations.
 
 VII 
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 
 
 THE beginning of our constitutional career, under the ad- 
 ministration of Washington, found our foreign relations 
 in a primitive and fragmentary state. With Great Britain we 
 had recently been fighting, and our peace treaty with her was 
 as yet unfulfilled in some important details ; and all efforts to 
 cultivate closer diplomatic or commercial relations had thus far 
 come to naught. France had been and was still nominally our 
 ally, and we were trying to make a new consular convention 
 with her, while she was manifesting an increasing disposition to 
 patronize us and to draw us into her quarrels as a tool for her 
 own use. With Spain our controversy over the Mississippi River 
 and the Yazoo lands was still unsettled. Holland had loaned us 
 money and sent a minister to us ; and with her and Sweden and 
 Prussia we had commercial treaties. To the piratical Barbary 
 States we were paying tribute, or blackmail. With the rest of 
 the world our relations were nil. To most foreign nations we 
 were almost unknown, and the potentialities of our development 
 were quite unappreciated. 
 
 It was a curious turn of the irony of fate that the first diplo- 
 matic conflict of the administration, a slight but significant one, 
 should be with France. Immediately upon his inauguration as 
 President, Washington was approached by the French minister, 
 the Count de Moustier, in a patronizing manner, with a request, 
 almost a demand, for private personal interviews, in which mat- 
 ters of international business might be orally discussed. It may 
 be that he thought that such a privilege was his due in view of 
 the services France had rendered to us in the Revolution, and of 
 the close relationship which still existed between the two coun- 
 tries. It is more probable that he thought that he would bo 
 able to patronize Washington, and that the new republic would 
 
 be glad thus to make itself a tail to the French diplomatic kite. 
 
 165
 
 166 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 In either case he was quickly made to realize his mistake. Wash- 
 ington was not a skilled diplomat in the European sense of the 
 word, but he had the supreme quality of common sense, and that 
 revealed to him the unwisdom of pursuing such a course. He 
 therefore replied to the French minister in phrases which set 
 for all time the standard of American diplomatic inter- 
 course. He protested that he had no thought of impeding the 
 despatch or frustrating the success of business by giving atten- 
 tion to idle forms or by standing upon imaginary dignity. But 
 if there were rules of procedure which had originated from the 
 wisdom of statesmen and were sanctioned by the common con- 
 sent of nations, it would not be prudent for a young State to 
 dispense with them altogether, at least without substantial cause 
 for so doing. He believed that, in order to avoid accidental 
 mistakes or unintentional misrepresentations, it was best to con- 
 duct such negotiations in writing ; and this method he would him- 
 self pursue if he were obliged personally to conduct negotiations. 
 But he had been informed that in most polished nations there 
 was an established system under which for the sake of utility, 
 as well as from necessity and the reason of the thing, foreign as 
 well as other business was digested and prepared by the heads 
 of the great departments of state. 
 
 This was a masterpiece. In words of consummate courtesy, 
 yet veiling a stinging rebuke which the French diplomat could 
 not fail to feel, Washington made it clear that the President of 
 the United States must be considered the peer of any European 
 sovereign in dignity, and that foreign ministers must address 
 themselves not directly to him but to his secretary of state for 
 foreign affairs. Moreover, no nation, not even France, was to 
 have any special privileges in dealing with this Government. 
 France was not our superior. She was merely our equal; and 
 all other nations were her equals. The United States regarded 
 them all impartially. The Count de Moustier quickly realized 
 his error and sought to repair it with apologies, excuses, and 
 efforts to show that what he had asked was not unusual among 
 nations ; but it was in vain. Washington had spoken, and from 
 the safe and sane position which he had taken he would not re- 
 cede. He had fixed, once and for all time, the fundamental 
 principles of American intercourse with foreign powers. Nor
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 167 
 
 were those principles again seriously challenged ; or, if they were 
 in one or two instances, the results were disastrous to the chal- 
 lengers. The whole world was given unmistakably to under- 
 stand that the United States was, at least in foreign affairs, a na- 
 tion, the peer of all nations, and was to be treated with the 
 deference due to any other sovereign State. It does not appear 
 that Washington took counsel in this matter with any one else. 
 Had he done so it would have been with either Hamilton or Jay, 
 since Jefferson was still in France. Doubtless either Hamilton 
 or Jay would have taken the same stand that he did. But the 
 tone of his utterance sounds like Washington himself and alone. 
 It was he who had a few months before laid the foundation of 
 our foreign policy in the principle of keeping the United States 
 ''disengaged from the labyrinth of European politics and wars." 
 It was he who now similarly laid the foundation of our diplo- 
 matic practice; and of such service of his there was, as we shall 
 see, still more to come. 
 
 One of the earliest pieces of international business transacted 
 by the administration was the consular convention with France. 
 Such a treaty had been negotiated in 1784 by Franklin, but had 
 not been approved by Congress. In 1788, Jefferson, under con- 
 gressional instructions, had negotiated another, which was sup- 
 posed to be free from the objectionable features of the former, 
 and in the first year of the new Government, before its author 
 had returned from France to become secretary of state, it was 
 laid before the President and the Senate for approval. Jay was 
 acting as secretary of state, and while he did not altogether like 
 all the provisions of the treaty he advised its ratification, as 
 probably the best we could get at that time and as calculated to 
 serve an urgent and important purpose. Thereupon the Senate 
 gave, by the necessary two-thirds vote, its advice and consent to 
 its ratification, according to the provisions of the Constitution. 
 That was the first participation of the Senate in the treaty-mak- 
 ing power of the United States. 
 
 There speedily came a marked and salutarv^ change in the at- 
 titude of the world at large toward this country, due not so 
 much to our diplomacy as to our domestic economy. The tran- 
 scendent genius of Alexander Hamilton as a financier and as 
 an organizer of national prosperity — one of the very greatest
 
 168 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 constructive statesmen the world has ever known — produced 
 prompt and gratifying results. Order was brought out of 
 chaos, and impending bankruptcy was transformed into pecuni- 
 ary abundance. A year or two before our credit had been one 
 of the poorest in the world. Now it became the best. Not Ham- 
 ilton, nor any friend of his, but his most persistent and unre- 
 lenting enemy, Jefferson himself, reported to Jay from Paris 
 in September, 1789, only six months after Hamilton had taken 
 charge of the national Treasury, that in Amsterdam, then the 
 financial capital and money market of the world, the credit of 
 the United States stood first of all nations that had need to bor- 
 row. A short time before our bonds had stood at 93, but now 
 had risen to 99 ; our securities were being eagerly sought by in- 
 dividuals and corporations in Holland, France, and England, 
 and in a short time every dollar of our public debt would prob- 
 ably be held in Europe. At the same time American commerce 
 advanced literally by leaps and bounds. Every port was a 
 shipyard for the construction of vessels. Exports enormously 
 increased. American ships began to throng the ports of Europe, 
 and even visited those of India and China. On Jay's recom- 
 mendation an American consul had been appointed at Canton 
 in 1786, and he now soon had work enough to keep him busy. 
 In 1791, Captain Gray took his ship Columhia first of all Amer- 
 ican vessels around the world; on the way visiting the Oregon 
 coast and discovering the Columbia River, thus giving us our 
 claim to the Oregon territory and to a frontage on the Pacific 
 Ocean. In a year America became commercially a world power. 
 This extraordinary prosperity began, it is true, before the 
 administration of Washington as President and of Hamilton as 
 secretary of the treasury ; yet it is none the less to be credited 
 thereto. The fact was advertised abroad that "Washington's ad- 
 vice would be followed in the creation of a strong Federal Gov- 
 ernment with power to levy and collect taxes ; and that announce- 
 ment, believed, caused immediate improvement in American 
 credit. So when it was known here that Hamilton's policy of 
 a protective tariff was to be followed by Congress, industry was 
 greatly stimulated, in advance of the actual enactment. It was 
 the confident anticipation of Hamilton's policy at first, and aft- 
 erward the practical working of that policy, that caused the
 
 ALEXANDER HAMILTON
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 169 
 
 revolution in our affairs, and that won for him the not exag- 
 gerated tribute of Daniel Webster: "He touched the dead 
 corpse of Public Credit and it sprung upon its feet. . . . The 
 fabled birth of Minerva from, the brain of Jove was hardly more 
 sudden or more perfect than that of the financial system of the 
 United States from the conceptions of Alexander Hamilton." 
 
 These changed conditions correspondingly changed the atti- 
 tude of the world toward the United States. It was realized 
 everywhere that here was a new force, to be seriously reckoned 
 with and appreciated. Nations began to seek relations with us; 
 to send ministers hither and to receive our ministers with con- 
 sideration. Our diplomatic service was pretty completely or- 
 ganized in 1791 and 1792, in the appointment of five ministers 
 to European countries. Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina, a 
 man of exceptional force of character and high ability, was sent 
 to Great Britain. In France, Jefferson had been temporarily 
 succeeded by William Short of Virginia, but he was now re- 
 placed by the expert and masterful Gouverneur Morris of New 
 York, while Short was transferred to Holland, there to serve 
 for two years and then give way to John Quincy Adams. To 
 Portugal, David Humphreys of Connecticut was accredited ; while 
 to Spain was sent William Carraichael of Marj-land, who had 
 served there as Jay's secretary and had since been charge d'af- 
 faires at that court. These were all the legations which were es- 
 tablished under that administration. 
 
 The appointment of IMorris as minister to France was not 
 accomplished without an unfortunate manifestation of factional- 
 ism and the intrusion of foreign influences into American affairs. 
 Ratification was opposed in the Senate by a few partisan friends 
 of France, who did not regard him as sufficiently sympathetic 
 toward the revolutionists in that country — as though a man's 
 fitness to represent and to serve his own Government was deter- 
 mined by his personal opinions on some matters of foreign poli- 
 tics ! Washington chose Morris to transact the diplomatic busi- 
 ness of the United States, not to be a propagandist either for or 
 against the French Revolution. There is only too good reason 
 for suspecting that this opposition to him was clandestinely in- 
 cited and promoted by more or less corrupt French agencies, 
 following the practice which had prevailed under the Confedera-
 
 170 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tion, when such influences notoriously prevailed. However, the 
 opposition failed, and Morris proved himself, during a too brief 
 career, a singularly capable and worthy minister. Indeed, his 
 two years of valiant and brilliant service at Paris form one of 
 the brightest passages in our early diplomatic history. Morris 
 was, of course, accredited to the court of France while there was 
 yet a royal court at least in name, and while Louis XVI was 
 still nominally king. When that sovereign and his family were 
 seen to be in danger of the death, which in fact soon overtook 
 them, Morris chivalrously engaged in an undertaking to facili- 
 tate their escape to a place of safety. This plan failed at the 
 last moment through the indecision and timidity of the king; 
 though the king preferred it to any other scheme for safety 
 which had been proposed. Morris reluctantly accepted the cus- 
 tody of the king's personal money, and succeeded in withholding 
 it from the revolutionists who sought to confiscate it. He had 
 the perilous distinction of being the only foreign minister who 
 remained in Paris during the Reign of Terror ; as another Amer- 
 ican minister, Mr. Washbume, many years afterward was the 
 only one to remain there during the double siege of that city in 
 the Terrible Year of 1870-71. During that tragic era it was his 
 grateful privilege to succor Lafayette and his family, when that 
 noble friend of America was cast into prison. The unscrupulou* 
 French minister for foreign affairs tried at first to tempt and 
 then to bully him into a corrupt bargain concerning the Amer- 
 ican debt which was held in France, from which that minister 
 would personally derive dishonest profits. Morris's reply was a 
 blunt refusal and a demand for his passport. At this the scoun- 
 drelly minister apologized and begged him not to leave. Ulti- 
 mately Morris had the satisfaction of paying off honestly the 
 entire American indebtedness to France. 
 
 There now arose for the first time in our history the always 
 important and delicate question of the recognition of a new 
 National Government; in this case the more delicate because the 
 country involved was our own recent ally, France. In August, 
 1792, Morris reported that the king had been deposed and a new 
 Government established. The new Government might prove 
 permanent, or it might last only a short time. He found himself, 
 therefore, "in a state of contingent responsibility of the most
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 171 
 
 delicate kind," and asked for instructions. Jefferson, as secre- 
 tary of state, did not reply until the following November, and 
 during the interval watched the progress of the Revolution 
 closely and took counsel with the President and the other mem- 
 bers of the cabinet. Finally he wrote: "It accords with our 
 principles to acknowledge any Government to be rightful which 
 is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared. The 
 late Government was of this kind, and was accordingly acknowl- 
 edged by all the branches of ours ; so any alteration of it which 
 shall be made by the will of the nation, substantially declared, 
 will doubtless be acknowledged in like manner. With such a 
 Government every kind of business may be done. But there are 
 some matters which I conceive might be transacted with a gov- 
 ernment de facto, such, for instance, as the reforming the un- 
 friendly restrictions on our commerce and navigation." 
 
 There was in this latter a strange misconception of the func- 
 tions of governmental departments, in the reference to recogni- 
 tion "by all the branches" of our Government. Surely recogni- 
 tion was and is exclusively the function of that branch of the 
 Government which is charged with the conduct of foreign af- 
 fairs. There was also a touch of hesitancy in the mere promise 
 that the new Government would doubtless be acknowledged. A 
 more resolute and decisive secretary would have given positive 
 instructions to recognize or not to recognize the revolutionary 
 regime. Nevertheless, as this was the first ease of recognition 
 in our histoiy, a certain hesitancy was pardonable, the more so 
 since Jefferson in the following March, 1793, wrote again a letter 
 more positive in tone, which served as a foundation for our who^e 
 subsequent policy toward new Governments. "We surely can- 
 not," he said, "deny to any nation that right whereon our own 
 Government is founded — that every one may govern itself ac- 
 cording to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at 
 its own will ; and that it may transact its business with foreign 
 nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether king, 
 convention, assembly, committee, president, or anything else it 
 may choose. The will of the nation is the only thing essential 
 to be regarded." 
 
 In January, 1793, the King of France was put to death, and 
 in February Mr. Ternant, the French minister to the United
 
 172 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 States, notified our Government, in the name of the Provisional 
 Executive Council, that the French nation had formed itself into 
 a republic. Jefferson promptly acknowledged the receipt of this 
 information, in the name of the President, and expressed the 
 great pleasure which the Government and all citizens of the 
 United States felt in seeing the liberties of France "rise su- 
 perior to foreign invasion and domestic trouble, ' ' a phrase which 
 certainly went as far as neutrality would permit, if not somewhat 
 further, in its expression of sympathy with France in her con- 
 flict with other nations with which we were on equally friendly 
 terms. Had the foreign invaders of France been so inclined, 
 they might have regarded that expression as the manifestation 
 of an unfriendly disposition toward them ; though to be sure it 
 was technically justifiable on the ground that we were still 
 France's ally, for defense if not for aggression, and therefore 
 properly sympathized with her in her resistance to alien attacks. 
 The question of recognition was revived a little later, when 
 Ternant was succeeded as French minister to the United States 
 by an erratic young revolutionist of the Girondin faction, named 
 Genet, who had little diplomatic training, no fitness, no courteous 
 manners, and a minimum of common sense on any topic. It was 
 he over whom the question had risen, whether he was to be re- 
 ceived by the Government and in what capacity. That question 
 was, of course, more than personal. It involved again the grave 
 problem of the recognition of a new Government, since Genet was 
 the first minister appointed since the execution of the king, whom 
 we had recognized as the lawful ruler of that country. What 
 was to be the attitude of the United States toward this change ? 
 Should this country recognize the new revolutionary Govern- 
 ment and receive its minister? Or should it give such recogni- 
 tion to the man who assumed to act as regent in the late king's 
 stead? Hamilton sought the judicial counsel of Jay, then chief 
 justice of the Supreme Court. Jay replied that he would not re- 
 ceive any minister from the regent until he was regent de facto; 
 which meant that the regent was not to be recognized at all, since 
 he was quite unable to establish his authority in fact. Jay also, 
 at Hamilton's request, prepared a draft of a neutrality declara- 
 tion, which said nothing about treaties, and which carefully 
 avoided using the word "neutrality" because at that time that
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 173 
 
 word was associated with the idea of nonintercourse between na- 
 tions, and there was no wish to proceed to that extreme; and 
 this draft probably served as the outline of the neutrality proc- 
 lamation which was written by Edmund Randolph and promul- 
 gated by Washington. 
 
 The second question of recognition arose only a little later. 
 In the fall of 1794 the conquest of Holland by France seemed 
 imminent, and the American minister to that country, John 
 Quincy Adams, wrote home for instructions as to his course in 
 that contingency. By that time Jefferson had retired from the 
 state department, and Edmund Randolph was secretary in his 
 stead, and he replied: "The maxim of the president toward 
 France has been to follow the government of the people. What- 
 soever regimen a majority of them shall establish is both de facto 
 and de jwe that to which our minister there addresses himself. 
 If therefore the independency of the United Netherlands con- 
 tinues, it is wished that you make no difficulty in passing from 
 the old to any new constitution of the people." Should, how- 
 ever, he continued, the Netherlands become a dependency of 
 France, the minister's mission would ipso facto be ended, by the 
 extinction of the Government to which he was accredited. In 
 that case he should remain on the ground, to observe and re- 
 port the progress of affairs, avoiding the giving of offense ; and, 
 so long as the issue was doubtful, he should discreetly avoid 
 committing himself and his Government to either side. 
 
 Just here, in passing, there should be noted another of Wash- 
 ington's masterful contributions to the upbuilding of the na- 
 tion's foreign policy. He saw with prophetic vision the im- 
 pending conflict between England and France, and the certainty 
 that each party would strive to implicate the United States in it 
 to its own advantage, and he determined to forefend so far as 
 possible any such catastrophe. Accordingly he lost no favorable 
 opportunity of emphasizing the neutrality and the fearless in- 
 dependence of the United States. In 1792 we were having 
 troubles with the Indian tribes, and a rumor arose that we were 
 seeking or would seek the aid of England in composing them. 
 Upon that Washington wrote to Morris, in France, saying: 
 "One thing I must not pass over in silence, lest you should in- 
 fer from it that Mr. D had authority for reporting that the
 
 174 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 United States had asked the mediation of Great Britain to bring 
 about a peace between them and the Indians. You may be fully 
 assured that such mediation never was asked, that the asking 
 of it never was in contemplation, and I think I might go further 
 and say that it not only never will be asked, but would be re- 
 jected if offered. The United States will never have occasion, 
 I hope, to ask for the interposition of that power or any other to 
 establish peace within their own territory." Thus temperately 
 but with just pride was notice served upon the world that the 
 new American republic was sufficient unto itself. 
 
 But now the war clouds which had been gathering over Europe 
 began to break in fury, and it was evident that the two great na- 
 tions with which our relations were closest would soon be in- 
 volved in strife. Washington was not unsympathetic toward 
 France, but neither was he willing to be subservient to her. In 
 July, 1791, he wrote to Lafayette a sympathetic letter, but con- 
 veyed in it a warning which was none the less marked because 
 it was couched in courteous and kindly terms. "The decrees 
 of the National Assembly respecting our tobacco and oil do not, ' ' 
 he said, "appear to be very pleasing to the people of this coun- 
 try; but I do not presume that any hasty measures will be 
 adopted in consequence thereof; for we have never entertained 
 a doubt of the friendly disposition of the French nation toward 
 us, and are therefore persuaded that, if they have done any- 
 thing which seems to bear hard upon us at a time when the 
 Assembly must have been occupied in very important matters, 
 and which, perhaps, would not allow time for due consideration 
 of the subject, they will in the moment of calm deliberation alter 
 it and do what is right." Later, in March, 1793, he saw that 
 the general war in Europe was at hand. "I trust," he said, 
 "that we shall have too just a sense of our own interest to origi- 
 nate any cause that may involve us in it. ' ' 
 
 Then the storm broke, and Great Britain declared war against 
 France, or against the Reign of Terror. The news reached 
 "Washington at ]\Iount Vernon. He prepared for immediate at- 
 tendance at the seat of National Government, and meanwhile 
 wrote to Jefferson, the secretary of state, as follows: "War 
 having actually commenced between France and Great Britain, 
 it behooves the Government of this country to use every means
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 175 
 
 in its power to prevent the citizens thereof from embroiling us 
 with either of those powers, by endeavoring to maintain a strict 
 neutrality." And he requested Jefferson to give the matter 
 consideration so that appropriate action might be taken without 
 delay. Such was Washington's personal policy, but he was not 
 the autocrat to impose it as his own will. He consulted his 
 cabinet, submitting to them a series of questions, of which there 
 was no lack in either number or importance. He recognized 
 the fact that our treaty with France did bind us to guarantee 
 her possession of her West India Islands in any defensive war 
 which she might wage. But, on the other hand, France had de- 
 clared war against England, and this was therefore not a defen- 
 sive but an aggressive war. Did the treaty of alliance, in such 
 circumstances, bind us to be France's ally in this war? Or 
 were we to stand aloof, in strict neutrality between our recent 
 antagonist and our helpful friend? What reception was to be 
 given to the French minister who was on his way hither to en- 
 list our aid ? Should the administration act according to its own 
 judgment, or should it assemble Congress in a special session to 
 deal with the crisis? 
 
 The result was the confirmation of Washington's policy. Jef- 
 ferson would probably have preferred alliance with France; but 
 he acceded to the opinion of his colleagues and the cabinet 
 unanimously advised Washington to issue a proclamation of neu- 
 trality. Jefferson agreed to the promulgation of a neutrality 
 treaty, but he opposed using the word "neutrality" in it, not for 
 the reasons for which it was actually omitted, but because he 
 thought that it had a market value and should not be used gratis ! 
 Our neutrality was, he said, "worth something to the powers at 
 war. They would bid for it, and we might reasonably ask a 
 price, the broadest privileges of neutral nations." This was 
 certainly an extraordinary course to propose, which would have 
 put our foreign policy on a commercial rather than an ethical 
 basis. It would obviously, moreover, have subjected us to grave 
 danger of embroilment with one or both of the belligerent pow- 
 ers. The proposal seems not to have been seriously considered 
 by the other members of the Government. It was also decided 
 to receive the French minister in a spirit of benevolent neutrality, 
 and not to call Congress together. Thus Washington's will pre-
 
 176 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 vailed. Hamilton drafted the questions, it is said, and Edmund 
 Randolph, the attorney general, wrote the proclamation of neu- 
 trality. But in doing so they were the mere secretaries of the 
 President. The policy which was thus executed was Washing- 
 ton's own. It had been repeatedly forecast by him, in many 
 utterances, on many occasions, and it was unmistakably re- 
 hearsed in his terse and pithy letter to Jefferson just before this 
 cabinet council was held. 
 
 The neutral proclamation of April 22, 1793, was epochal. 
 Brief and to the point, it fixed forever the attitude of the United 
 States toward European wars. **The duty and interest of the 
 United States require, ' ' it said, ' ' that they should with sincerity 
 and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impar- 
 tial toward the belligerent powers." Therefore it was declared 
 to be the disposition of the United States to observe such con- 
 duct ; citizens of the United States were warned that they would 
 subject themselves to punishment or forfeiture under the law of 
 nations by joining in the hostilities in any way or by carrying 
 contraband goods, from which punishment and forfeiture the 
 United States would not protect them ; and that all persons who 
 violated the law of nations within the jurisdiction of the United 
 States would be prosecuted by this Government. That was the 
 approved foundation of the unbroken policy of the American 
 government from that time to the present, as expressed and 
 maintained in numerous proclamations and statutes. Its estab- 
 lishment at that time was startling, and fraught with momentous 
 consequences both at home and abroad. In the latter respect it 
 served notice upon the nations of the world that America, which 
 hitherto had been involved in every European war in which 
 Great Britain, France, and Spain were participants, was never 
 again to be made a party to alien feuds. In domestic affairs it 
 reminded Americans that we were at last a nation, by ourselves, 
 with our own interests, and that we were no longer to regard our- 
 selves as colonists or as an appendage to any other power. At 
 last the words of the Declaration of Independence were to be ful- 
 filled, and we were to hold Great Britain, and France, and "the 
 rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends." This proc- 
 lamation was supplemented in 1794 by an Act of Congress de- 
 fining offenses against neutrality and prescribing penalties there-
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 177 
 
 for. Long afterward, in 1823, speaking in the British Parlia- 
 ment, Canning said: "If I wished for a guide in a system of 
 neutrality, I should take that laid down by America in the days 
 of the presidency of Washington and the secretaryship of Jeffer- 
 son." 
 
 The course of independence and neutrality was, however, per- 
 sistently beset with formidable difficulties of two kinds. One 
 arose from faction at home. Under the dominance of Washing- 
 ton the cabinet was nominally a unit, but in fact there was a bit- 
 ter and irreconcilable conflict of policy between its two chief 
 members. Hamilton doubtless inclined toward Great Britain 
 rather than France, but he was above all for strict neutrality 
 between the two and for the national independence of America 
 in the highest degree. Jefferson had a passionate hatred of Eng- 
 land and was at this time indulging in blind adulation of France 
 and especially of the French Revolution. While, therefore, 
 Jefferson officially agreed to Washington's policy of neutrality, 
 he personally opposed it, and insisted that, under our treaty of 
 alliance with France, we should give that country all possible aid 
 short of going to war with Great Britain. This difference of 
 opinion between Jefferson and Hamilton was carried into the 
 public press, in a series of controversial articles of the most 
 extreme and violent tone, tliose on Jefferson's side being written, 
 however, not by himself but, at his earnest request, by James 
 Madison, who went so far as to denounce the neutrality procla- 
 mation as "a most unfortunate error." This disgraceful 
 wrangle had no influence upon the policy of the Government, 
 but it caused it much embarrassment and was mischievous in 
 its effect upon the public mind. 
 
 But the supreme difficulties in the way of neutrality arose 
 with the coming of the new French minister. Genet arrived in 
 this country on April 8, at Charleston, South Carolina, and in- 
 stantly showed that he regarded the United States not as a neu- 
 tral power but as an ally of France ; and not even an equal ally 
 but a subordinate appanage to that country, which was to be 
 treated much as though it were a French colony. Instead of 
 hastening to the seat of government and presenting his creden- 
 tials, he halted at Charleston long enough to flt out privateers 
 and organize an admiralty court at the French consulate for the 
 
 VOL. I 12
 
 178 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 condemning of prizes. Then he proceeded northward, making 
 inflammatory speeches to the public, distributing commissions 
 in the French army and navy, recruiting volunteers, and or- 
 ganizing the country for war with England, and for the in- 
 vasion of the Spanish territories of Florida and Louisiana. He 
 acted, in brief, as though the United States were the recruiting 
 ground of France. Nor did he lack popular encouragement. 
 Almost everywhere he was greeted with enthusiastic acclaim by 
 a large part of the people. In a considerable part of the Ameri- 
 can press, too, he was supported with a zeal which suggested 
 the influence of French subsidies. The nation was, in fact, di- 
 vided into two parties, not over any domestic policy but over a 
 purely foreign concern. One was the French party, led by 
 Jefferson, which would involve us in a foreign war in which we 
 had no interest and would put us back into the very plight of 
 subordination to European interests from which we had sought 
 to extricate ourselves by the Revolution. The other, led by 
 Washington and Hamilton, was the party of neutrality and 
 Americanism. Generally speaking, these parties corresponded 
 with the Federalist and Anti-Federalist or Republican parties 
 which had arisen over the Constitution. The Federalists were 
 now known as the Anglican or Anti-Gallican party, while the 
 Anti-Federalists were the Galliean or French party. In this un- 
 happy conflict "Washington himself was not spared, but was pub- 
 licly attacked with virulence. It was the most critical time in 
 the history of the young republic. Said the Jeffersonian organ 
 at Philadelphia, the national capital : ' ' The minister of France, 
 I hope, will act with firmness and spirit. The people are his 
 friends, or the friends of France, and he will have nothing to 
 apprehend, for, as yet, the people are the sovereigns of the 
 United States. ' ' There could have been no more direct approval 
 and encouragement of Genet's monstrous course, nor any more 
 flagrant defiance of the President's proclamation of neutrality 
 than these utterances, for which the American secretary of state 
 was himself responsible. 
 
 Nor were these pernicious activities confined to words alone. 
 Privateers commissioned by Genet began preying upon British 
 commerce ; not alone on the high seas but in the territorial waters 
 of the United States, one actually inside of the Capes of the
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 179 
 
 Delaware. Genet himself reported to the French government 
 that he had fitted out fourteen privateers and that these had 
 captured eighty British vessels; adding that his activities would 
 have been still more extended had it not been for the meddlesome 
 obstruction of the United States government. Even before he 
 reached Philadelphia and was received by Washington, his pri- 
 vateers had seized British ships in American waters and brought 
 them into American ports to sell them as prizes ; and the British 
 government had remonstrated against such a breach of neutral- 
 ity. When finally he reached Philadelphia, as a crowning act 
 of insolence he had one of his law-breaking privateers fire a 
 salute in his honor. It was on April 22 that Washington issued 
 his proclamation of neutrality. It was not until May 18 that 
 Genet deigned to present himself with his credentials. Wash- 
 ington received him with courtesy and dignity, and probably 
 with some coolness, which was amply justified by Genet's out- 
 rageous conduct. The Frenchman doubtless expected Wash- 
 ington to embrace him and salute him as "Citizen"; wherefore 
 he was much chagrined and went away grumbling against the 
 "old man," as he called Washington, as an enemy of liberty. 
 He declared that Washington was jealous of his popularity, and 
 that he would force Washington to call a special session of Con- 
 gress. 
 
 There were those, however, who would not stomach the French 
 minister's scandalous antics. Two renegade Americans who had 
 accepted French commissions were indicted by a grand jury ; an 
 act against which Genet bitterly remonstrated, declaring it to 
 be something which his pen almost refused to record. Then 
 the administration ordered the seizure of the privateers which 
 he was fitting out in our ports, and Governor Clinton seized the 
 first one, at New York. At this Genet erupted again, with a 
 tirade of remonstrance and impertinent abuse, in which he was 
 vigorously backed by the so-called French party, Jefferson him- 
 self was in private disgusted. He tried in vain to restrain Genet 
 within the bounds of decency, ignoring the fact that he himself 
 had given the minister his chief encouragement ; and he wrote 
 to Madison that the appointment of Genet was the most calami- 
 tous ever made, and that the political party to which they be- 
 longed would have to repudiate him if it did not wish to be
 
 180 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ruined. But a host of Jefferson's followers continued their ac- 
 clamations of Genet and their savage abuse and denunciation of 
 Washington, to the very end. 
 
 Amid all this madness and menace one commanding good 
 arose at an early day, at the hand of that knight-errant of our 
 early statesmanship, without fear and without reproach, to whom 
 we owe more than to any other man of that era, with the ex- 
 ception of Washington and Hamilton, and who indeed often 
 seemed to vie with if not actually to surpass them in the varied 
 splendor and priceless value of his services. John Jay was then 
 the first chief justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, and in a notable manner he demonstrated at an early date 
 the importance and power of the national judiciary. A federal 
 grand jury met at Richmond, Virginia, on May 22, 1793. It 
 was only four days after Genet's reception by Washington at 
 Philadelphia, and in the very midst of the mad heyday of his 
 privateering, recruiting, and other violations of law. Jay was 
 the presiding justice at that court, and mindful of what was 
 going on and of the perils to the republic which were involved 
 therein, he adverted to the subject in his charge to the grand 
 jury. "The laws of nations," he said, ''make part of the laws 
 of this and of every other civilized nation. They consist of those 
 rules for regulating the conduct of nations toward each other 
 which, resulting from right reason, receive their obligations from 
 that principle and from general assent and practice. To this 
 head also belong these rules or laws which, by agreement, become 
 established between nations. . . . We are now a nation, and it 
 equally becomes us to perform our duties and to assert our 
 rights. . . . The United States are in a state of neutrality re- 
 lating to all powers at war. . . . Therefore they who commit, 
 aid, or abet hostilities against those powers, or either of them, 
 offend against the laws of the United States, and ought to be 
 punished." 
 
 No estimate can be too high of that noble and epoch-making 
 utterance. At least equally with any other utterance of any 
 other man, it was and is a foundation stone of American foreign 
 policy, and should be of the foreign policy of every nation. 
 That "it equally becomes us to perform our duties as to assert 
 our rights" is the expression of absolute perfection in interna-
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY l&l 
 
 tional ethics, which, if it could be practically realized among the 
 nations, would result in universal and perpetual peace. It was, 
 moreover, the first enunciation of the principle, which indeed 
 was recognized in the Constitution but which needed Jay's dic- 
 tum to give it vital force, that international law and treaties are 
 a part of the law of the land and are even superior to mere na- 
 tional, state, or municipal law. Sir Henry Maine has said, on 
 this point, that "international has precedence of both federal 
 and municipal law, unless in the exceptional case when federal 
 law has deliberately departed from it"; and he calls this a "dis- 
 tinctively American doctrine." If so, America may well be 
 proud of the distinction, for it is the supreme indication of scru- 
 pulous honor and benevolence in foreign policy. 
 
 This was Jay 's irrefragable logic : International law is a part 
 of the common law of all civilized nations. International law 
 assumes neutrality — that is, non-belligerency — to exist and to be 
 practised until there is an actual declaration of war. A neutral 
 must give no aid in arms or men or vessels or otherwise, to either 
 belligerent. Therefore any one giving such aid prior to a decla- 
 ration of war violates international law and common law, and is a 
 criminal. This was epoch-making, for it marked a flat reversal 
 of our former policy in revolutionary times. For our revolu- 
 tionary treaties contemplated partiality toward whichever nation 
 we favored in a strife. If that policy had been continued, we 
 should incessantly have been a party to European wars. Jay's 
 wiser course elected that we should identify ourselves with the 
 common law rather than with the common quarrels of Euro- 
 pean powers. It is interesting to recall, by the way, that this 
 great dictum of Jay's was, eighty years afterward, embodied al- 
 most verbatim in the Treaty of Washington. A subsequent de- 
 cision of Jay's was to the effect that "no foreign power can, of 
 right, institute or erect any court of judicature of any kind 
 within the jurisdiction of the United States, but only such as 
 may be in pursuance of treaties." Therefore the jurisdiction 
 of the French consular prize courts which Genet had established 
 was unwarranted and void. 
 
 It is mournful to record that rabid partizanship inspired the 
 denunciation of these dicta, and of Jay for making them, and 
 succeeded in so prejudicing the public mind against tlioin that. 
 
 \x
 
 1§2 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 while a man was indicted by the grand jury for violation of 
 neutrality, it was impossible to find in Virginia a petit jury 
 that would convict him. Following Jay's declarations, how- 
 ever, the Government informed Genet that he must send his pri- 
 vateers out of American territorial waters ; which he reluctantly 
 did. For a few weeks comparative quiet prevailed. Genet, 
 however, was incorrigible, and soon committed renewed and ag- 
 gravated acts of lawless folly. 
 
 Early in July it became known in Philadelphia that the Brit- 
 ish ship Little Sarah, which had been captured by a French 
 warship and brought into that port as a prize, was being fitted 
 out as a privateer. This was, of course, a most flagrant breach 
 of neutrality, which Jefferson and other friends of France real- 
 ized was going too far. They remonstrated with Genet, who 
 passionately and defiantly told them that the vessel would sail 
 in spite of them. At that Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania, al- 
 though an ardent Galilean, sent a company of militia to hold 
 the ship; and next day Jefferson personally got from Genet a 
 declaration that the vessel would not be ready to sail until a 
 certain date. Jefferson strangely regarded this as a promise 
 that the vessel would not sail, and accordingly had the troops 
 withdrawn. Immediately Genet sent the vessel from Philadel- 
 phia down to Chester, where it would be much easier for her to 
 slip out to sea. This was not bad faith, for Genet had explicitly 
 declined to make any promise of detention of the vessel. But 
 it was open defiance of the neutrality proclamation and inter- 
 national law. When it was made known to the cabinet, Ham- 
 ilton and Knox wanted to mount a battery near the ship, to sink 
 her if she attempted to put out to sea; and it would probably 
 have been well had their counsel prevailed. But Jefferson ex- 
 postulated and protested, and succeeded in postponing all action 
 until Washington arrived from Mount Vernon. Then, appar- 
 ently not wishing to meet in person his angry chief, Jefferson 
 himself hastened away home. Washington was angry, as he 
 had cause to be, and he wrote to Jefferson a vigorous letter. 
 "Is the minister of the French republic," he demanded, ''to set 
 the acts of this Government at defiance with impunity? What 
 must the world think of such conduct, and of the Government 
 of the United States in submitting to it?" He reminded Jeffer-
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 183 
 
 son that this was a matter for him, as secretary of state, to deal 
 with, and he demanded an immediate reply. 
 
 Jefferson's reply was that Genet had promised him that the 
 vessel would not sail until the President had considered her case 
 and had reached a decision about her. But unluckily for the 
 secretary of state, at almost the very moment when he made 
 this reply to Washington, Genet surreptitiously sent the vessel 
 to sea. If he had made any such promise to Jefferson, he broke 
 it. If he had not, Jefferson deluded himself and the Govern- 
 ment. In either case, the Government was humiliated and em- 
 barrassed, and Washington was justly enraged. He had to sum- 
 mon all his self-control to keep from summarily ordering Genet 
 out of the country, and perhaps, too, from dismissing Jefferson 
 from his cabinet. But he was a man of marvelous restraint and 
 he realized that so long as the country was unhappily divided 
 into factions over the matter, it was desirable to keep the peace. 
 Before long, he felt sure, Genet would fill the cup of folly and 
 wrath so full that even the most rabid Galileans would be glad 
 to get rid of him. He therefore contented himself for the time 
 with taking the management of the case out of Jefferson's hands 
 into his own. He wrote Jefferson a severe letter, directing that 
 thereafter all correspondence with Genet should be submitted to 
 himself and to the attorney-general; and he stated plainly that 
 Genet's official conduct would have to undergo ''very serious con- 
 sideration. ' ' Within ten days thereafter the cabinet determined 
 to ask France to recall the unacceptable minister. 
 
 But at the very time when this was being decided upon, 
 though all unknown to him, Genet went on with greater inso- 
 lence and folly than ever before. The French consuls at various 
 ports, under his direction, arrogated to themselves powers which 
 grossly infringed upon the sovereignty of the United States.- 
 The most flagrant case w^as at Boston, and Washington, on learn- 
 ing the facts, revoked the exequatur of the offending consul. 
 At this Genet seemed to go quite mad, and in a monumentally 
 impudent note he declared that the President had overstepped 
 his authority, and that he, Genet, would appeal against liim to 
 the sovereign State of Massachusetts ! It was also made known 
 that Genet had threatened to appeal to the people at large 
 against the President. This brought matters to a crisis. Some 
 
 v/
 
 184 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of the Galileans approved even such fantastic extremes of their 
 idol. "Is the President," demanded one paper, "a consecrated 
 character, that an appeal from his decision must be considered 
 criminal ? Or are the people in such a state of degradation that 
 to speak of consulting them is an offense as great as if America 
 groaned under a dominion equally tyrannical with the old mon- 
 archy of France?" With such utterances extant, reflecting 
 the sentiments of the secretary of state, America seemed upon 
 the brink of a Convention government, with a march of Msenads 
 upon the capital ! But most of the Galileans denied that Genet 
 had ever made such a threat, and demanded a retraction of the 
 story. They realized that if he had made the threat, his con- 
 duct was indefensible. The retraction, however, was not forth- 
 coming. On the contrary, John Jay and Rufus King published 
 a statement reasserting the truth of the story and making them- 
 selves responsible for it. This turned the day against Genet, 
 the public generally believing Jay and King. The last support 
 that Genet had was quickly forfeited by himself, when he wrote 
 to Washington demanding that he should deny the story. Wash- 
 ington curtly replied that the President of the United States 
 did not consider it proper or material to make such a denial, 
 and that Mr. Genet's correspondence should be addressed to 
 >^he state department! Genet blustered, threatened to sue Jay 
 and King for libel, demanded that the attorney-general should 
 prosecute them, and lamented that America was no longer free. 
 But the deed was done. The country had recovered its sanity 
 and was now united in support of the president. Genet's re- 
 moval was speedily effected, and in February following a new 
 minister, Mr. Fauchet, took his place. When Congress met the 
 whole case was reported to it, and it approved the course of the 
 administration, whereupon Genet shrieked: "Congress has 
 met! Washington has unmasked himself! America is be- 
 fouled!" But it was a curious bit of fate's proverbial and in 
 this case beneficent irony, that Genet presently was indebted to 
 Washington for the saving of his life. Robespierre was now in 
 power in France, and wished to make Genet share the tragic 
 fate of the other Girondins, so he gave the new minister, Fauchet, 
 orders to arrest him and send him back to France, and to the 
 guillotine. But Washington intervened and refused to let Genet
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 185 
 
 be extradited. So that extraordinary person remained in the 
 United States for the rest of his life. Moreover, he married a 
 daughter of that Governor Clinton, who had caused the seizure 
 of one of his privateers; and with her lived happily forever 
 after ! 
 
 The practical dismissal of Genet had two personal results, 
 affecting far more important men than he. One was, the re- 
 tirement of Gouverneur Morris from the place of American min- 
 ister to France. This was done at the request or practical de- 
 mand of the French government, made immediately after 
 Genet's removal, and ostensibly on that account. Morris had in- 
 deed long been a thorn in the side of the French Revolutionists, 
 of whom they had been seeking an opportunity to get rid. He 
 was by far too honest for those patriots of the itching palm, 
 and too high-minded. He maintained a self-respecting dignity 
 which was offensive to the Sansculottes. He was also annoy- 
 ingly insistent in his protests against French seizures of Ameri- 
 can shipping, a practice which was then in full blast; but his 
 remonstrances were in vain. Nothing but a navy could make 
 them effective, as was demonstrated a few years later. Of course 
 on France's request Washington had no alternative but to recall 
 that particularly loyal and efficient minister; an incident the 
 more regrettable because of the error which "Washington com- 
 mitted in appointing Morris's successor. Washington sought to 
 hold himself, like a constitutional monarch, above and apart 
 from party politics. He belonged, at least nominally and pro- 
 fessedly, to neither the Federalists nor the Anti-Federalists, to 
 neither the Galileans nor the Anti-Gallicans. As a matter of 
 fact he was strongly inclined toward the Federalists and the 
 Anti-Gallicans, and the course of events steadily increased that 
 inclination. When, however, he had to appoint Morris's suc- 
 cessor he purposely selected a pronounced Anti-Federalist and 
 Galilean and follower of Jefferson, to wit, James Monroe. This 
 was done presumably in order to demonstrate his own impar- 
 tiality between the two parties. It was, however, for that very 
 reason an error, because it set the example of selecting a man 
 for an important foreign post because of considerations pertain- 
 ing to domestic politics. If foreign influences should not be per- 
 mitted to affect domestic affairs, neither should domestic politics
 
 186 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 be injected into our foreign diplomacy. The act was an error, 
 too, because Monroe proved himself to be conspicuously unfitted 
 for the place. He became enamored of the revolution, even of 
 its excesses, and comported himself in a most fantastic manner. 
 He thus made himself as popular as his predecessor had been 
 unpopular. Unfortunately he partly neglected and partly mis- 
 managed the business of the nation to such a degree that Wash- 
 ington was presently compelled to recall him. His chief errors 
 were, first, in flamboyantly addressing himself to the whole 
 French people through the Convention, instead of to the com- 
 mittee of public safety, in which he emulated the error of Genet 
 in America; second, in expressing sentiments of sympathy and 
 moral alliance with France far beyond the limits of diplomatic 
 neutrality; and third, in deliberately working against his col- 
 league, the American minister to Great Britain. He was re- 
 called in August, 1796, and was succeeded by Charles Cotesworth 
 Pinckney. 
 
 '^ The other result of Genet's recall, if indeed not of his whole 
 career in this country, was Jefferson's resignation of the office 
 of secretary of state. This was irrevocably announced by Jeffer- 
 son in July, 1793, at the climax of the Genet episode, but at the 
 special urging of Washington he remained in office until the end 
 of the year; Washington strongly representing to him that he 
 ought not to leave office while important matters which he had 
 in hand were still unsettled. Jeffersan's pretext for resigning 
 was a desire for rest and relief from official cares; which was 
 doubtless true. He was particularly tired of the incessant con- 
 flict which he had been waging with Hamilton, and in which 
 he usually got the worse. He felt personally humiliated by the 
 Genet episode. And he felt, undoubtedly, that he was com- 
 manding steadily less and less of the confidence of Washing- 
 ton. The two parted good friends, however, and with sincere 
 expressions of Washington's appreciation of the really excellent 
 work which Jefferson had done. He was succeeded by Edmund 
 Randolph, who had been attorney-general. 
 
 While these things were going on in our relations with France, 
 our relations with Great Britain were almost equally unsatis- 
 factory. The peace treaty of 1783, after all these years, was 
 still unfulfilled. The British still held a chain of forts along
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 187 
 
 the American frontier on American soil. Adams had come home 
 with the humiliating reminder ringing in his ears that until the 
 United States paid its debts and otherwise fulfilled its obliga- 
 tions it would not be worth while for it to send another min- 
 ister to England, As soon as the war began between France 
 and Great Britain, the British government showed itself equally 
 with that of France regardless of American neutrality. Like 
 France, Great Britain purposed to use America for her own 
 advantage, or to sacrifice American interests whenever it would 
 be to her profit so to do. The rise of the Gallican party here, 
 too, and the extravagant expressions of sympathy with France, 
 some of them made by our secretary of state, naturally gave 
 much offense, particularly as there were no similar counter- 
 demonstrations in favor of Great Britain. The opponents of 
 the Gallican party were Anti-Gallicans far more than they were 
 Pro-Anglicans. British action was directed, then, chiefly 
 against American commerce, and in that direction it was dis- 
 astrous to us. 
 
 France began with a decree of the National Convention on 
 May 9, 1793, authorizing French warships and privateers to seize 
 and to take to France all merchant vessels carrying provisions 
 which were neutral property and bound for a British port. 
 This would have meant seizure of many American vessels. But 
 a supplementary decree on May 23 specially exempted American 
 commerce, doubtless in the expectation of an American alliance. 
 The reply of the British government was a similar order, signed 
 on June 8, with, of course, no exception in favor of America. 
 The theory of these orders was that food was contraband of war. 
 The neutral cargoes were not, however, to be confiscated, but 
 were to be purchased by the Government making the seizure, for 
 its own uses ; the object being to prevent the supplies from get- 
 ting to the enemy. Another British order, in November, ex- 
 tended the scope of seizures to vessels bound for any French col- 
 ony; and a tliird, in January following, restricted it to the 
 French West Indies, in which, of course, American commerce 
 was very largely concerned. Although this last order was in- 
 tended to mitigate the hardships of the situation to American 
 commerce, and although it did in fact allay much American re- 
 sentment and proliably obviated some harsh retaliatory measures.
 
 188 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 the commerce of the United States suffered greatly, and the 
 American government had ground for vigorous remonstrances; 
 which however were long in vain; Hundreds of American ships 
 were seized, and their crews and passengers were subjected to 
 insult, imprisonment, and other indignities. Owners dared no 
 longer to send out ships, commerce was paralyzed, and business 
 in the United States suffered grave depression. 
 
 At this time, as one of his last acts as secretary of state, Jeffer- 
 son presented a report which he had been asked by Congress 
 away back in 1791 to prepare, but which he had neglected. It 
 was a report upon our foreign commerce and the means of regu- 
 lating and protecting it. Its foundation was the economic doc- 
 trine of free trade, upon which he based the theory of equal trade 
 privileges for all nations; but with retaliatory restrictions and 
 penalties upon the trade of any nation which discriminated 
 against our own. This report was laid before Congress in Decem- 
 ber, 1793, and, on January 3 following, James Madison, in the 
 House of Representatives, offered a series of seven resolutions 
 for putting Jefferson's recommendations into effect. The pur- 
 pose was to bring Great Britain to terms. Her trade would 
 suffer the same restrictions which her orders in council had 
 practically placed upon ours. France, it was thought, would 
 quickly make a commercial treaty with us, and Great Britain 
 would have to do the same or else lose her American trade, 
 which was of much value to her. This policy was, however, 
 vigorously and cogently opposed by the representatives of Ameri- 
 can commerce, who pointed out that the effects would be more 
 harmful to America than to England. About seven eighths of 
 our imports came from England, and we could not so advan- 
 tageously get them elsewhere. England alone could furnish the 
 capital needed for the promotion of American commerce. To 
 forbid our merchants to trade with England, therefore, and to 
 compel them to turn to other markets, would be disastrous. 
 These representations had so much weight that action upon 
 Madison's resolutions were postponed. 
 
 Meantime, direct diplomatic relations had been established by 
 the sending hither, in the fall of 1791, of George Hammond as 
 the first British minister to the United States, and the sending, a 
 few months later, of Thomas Pinckney to be the second American
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 189 
 
 minister to Great Britain. It was fitting that the British min- 
 ister should come hither first, because of the former failure of 
 that Government to send a minister in response to such action 
 by this country. Pinekney was a particularly loyal, able, and 
 resolute man. Hammond, who had been secretary of the Brit- 
 ish Peace Commission at Paris in 1783 and afterward secretar}' 
 of legation at Madrid, was expert but undiplomatic in tempera- 
 ment, and his natural obstinacy and arrogance were increased by 
 his resentment at the reception which was given to Genet. He 
 doubtless influenced his Government to proceed harshly and to 
 issue the offensive orders in council. The work of these minis- 
 ters, therefore, accomplished little or nothing toward a settle- 
 ment of the issues between the two countries. On the contrary, 
 the hardships imposed upon American commerce by the British 
 navy, and an unauthorized but mischievous speech of Lord 
 Dorchester's at Quebec in which he told the Indians that they 
 would soon have an opportunity of going upon the warpath 
 against the United States, brought relations between the nations 
 dangerously near to the breaking point. 
 
 America was contending for Frederick the Great's principle, 
 which Franklin had embodied in our treaty with Prussia, "free 
 ships make free goods," a principle then far in advance of the 
 times. A recent English writer of high authority, Mr. W. E. 
 Hall, in his fine treatise on international law, remarks upon this 
 attitude of Washington's administration: "The policy of the 
 United States in 1793 constitutes an epoch in the development 
 of the usages of neutrality. There can be no doubt that it was 
 intended and believed to give effect to the obligations then in- 
 cumbent upon neutrals. But it represented by far the most 
 advanced existing opinions as to what these obligations were, 
 and in some points it even went further than authoritative in- 
 ternational custom has up to the present time advanced. In the 
 main, however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which 
 is now adopted by the community of nations." That is a high 
 but well-deserved tribute, that America in 1783 set up a standard 
 of international ethics more than a century in advance of the 
 world at large, to which, however, all nations have since approxi- 
 mated. England, on the other hand, was at that time acting 
 upon the fine old medieval theoiy that there could be no real
 
 190 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 neutrality, but that all who were not for her must be against 
 her and were thus to be treated as enemies. Between these 
 two policies there could be no agreement, and so day by day the 
 two countries drifted apart and toward war. A demand was 
 arising in America for reprisals against England, which, merely 
 in the form of nonintercourse, would inevitably mean war. 
 Now, George Washington was never a man who dreaded fighting. 
 But he was never, either, a rash or imprudent man. He real- 
 ized that America was in no condition for fighting England at 
 that time. If we had had an adequate navy, we should have 
 been more ready for war. Indeed, a navy would probably have 
 so protected our commerce as to have permitted no occasion for 
 war. So he pursued the prudent policy of seeking adjustment 
 of affairs by diplomatic means. He determined to send another 
 minister to England, for the express purpose of negotiating a 
 treaty with that Government which should settle present troubles 
 as well as the long-delayed provisions of the treaty of 1783. 
 
 On April 7, 1794, a resolution was introduced into the House 
 of Representatives, ordering an embargo upon British commerce 
 until such time as the British should surrender the frontier forts 
 and pay certain heavy indemnities. The enactment of this 
 would doubtless have meant war. The proposal passed the 
 House, however, and was defeated in the Senate only by the cast- 
 ing of the vote of the vice-president, the Senate voting half for 
 it and half against it. This menacing action moved Washing- 
 ton to send the treaty-seeking minister to England without de- 
 lay. He wished to send Hamilton, who was of all men perhaps 
 best fitted for it. But it was made plain to him that ratifica- 
 tion of his appointment would be bitterly opposed in the Senate 
 by the Gallican party, and it was doubtful if a two-thirds vote 
 could be secured for him. Accordingly, on Hamilton's sugges- 
 tion, Washington appointed Jay instead, believing that his high 
 position as chief justice would lend weight and authority to the 
 mission, and realizing, too, Jay's transcendent abilities and val- 
 uable experience. There was strong opposition to Jay in the 
 Senate, based largely upon some remarks of his while he was 
 secretary for foreign affairs under the old Confederation, and 
 partly upon the entirely logical ground that as chief justice — for 
 he still held that office — he might be called upon to pass ju-
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 191 
 
 dieially upon his own treaty ; but he was finally confirmed, by a 
 vote of eighteen to eight. The Galileans throughout the coun- 
 try, however, publicly denounced both him and his mission up 
 to the very hour of his departure. 
 
 Jay was confirmed on April 19, and on May 6 he received his 
 instructions, which had been prepared by Randolph and which 
 covered five points. He was to ask compensation for the injuries 
 which had been done to American commerce. He was to seek 
 adjustment of the unsettled matters under the treaty of 1783, 
 If these two points were gained, he was to try to negotiate a 
 general commercial treaty, on lines which were indicated; look- 
 ing chiefly to an enlargement of commercial privileges and the 
 protection of neutral property at sea. He was to make over- 
 tures to the ministers of Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, if nec- 
 essary, for the forming of an alliance with them for the mainte- 
 nance of neutral rights. And he was to make no treaty that 
 would be inconsistent with our existing treaty obligations to 
 France. Jay at once proceeded to London, where our resident 
 minister, Pinckney, cordially cooperated with him, although he 
 probably could not help feeling that the appointment of Jay 
 was in some degree a reflection upon him, or at least a deroga- 
 tion of his importance. Jay was cordially received by Lord 
 Grenville, and the negotiations proceeded agreeably and auspi- 
 ciously. Concessions were made on both sides, and a treaty was 
 made which Jay and Grenville signed on November 19. This 
 famous and greatly criticised instrument provided for the 
 evacuation of the frontier forts by June 1, 1796. England 
 was not required to pay for the Negro slaves who had been 
 taken out of the country. Citizens of one country were to be 
 permitted to continue in possession of lands then held by them 
 in the other country, and to dispose of them at will. Neither 
 public nor private debts were thereafter to be sequestered in 
 peace or war. Certain restrictions were imposed upon Ameri- 
 can commerce in the British West Indies, and also in the East 
 Indies. Naval stores and in some cases provisions were made 
 contraband of war, but provisions when seized were to be paid 
 for. Commanders of privateers were to be put under bonds to 
 observe the treaty. Foreign privateers were not to be permitted 
 to use the ports of one nation against the other, either for fitting
 
 192 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 and arming or for refuge. Each country was to guard the neu- 
 trality of its own territorial waters. And, finally, there was to 
 be extradition for the crimes of murder and forgery. This was 
 the first extradition treaty ever made by the United States. 
 
 If there had been a storm of denunciation of Jay and his mis- 
 sion before he sailed for England, there was a tempest of it when 
 the terms of this treaty became known. There came on what 
 John Quincy Adams described as "the severest trial which the 
 character of Washington and the fortunes of our country have 
 ever passed through. No period of the "War of Independence, 
 no other emergency of our history since its close, not even the or- 
 deal of establishing the Constitution, . . . has convulsed to its 
 inmost fibers the political association of the North American 
 people with such excruciating agonies as the consummation and 
 fulfilment of this great national composition of the conflicting 
 rights, interests, and pretensions of this country and Great 
 Britain. ' ' Jay was hanged and burned in effigy in many places. 
 North and South. Hamilton, attempting to speak publicly in 
 behalf of the treaty in New York City, was mobbed, stoned, and 
 narrowly escaped death at the hands of the infuriated populace. 
 The British minister's house was threatened with sacking. 
 
 The grounds for thus raging against the treaty were several, 
 though none seemed adequate for such extravagant demonstra- 
 tions of hostility. It was objected that the date of evacuation 
 of the forts was too long postponed, and that the surrender of 
 the Negroes was unjust. These were, however, specific details. 
 More important for the present purpose were the objections on 
 grounds of general principle. It was thus contended that the 
 prohibition of the confiscation of debts was injurious, as the 
 United States might need to resort to that practice, or to the 
 menace of it, for her own protection ; an argument which no 
 reputable statesman would venture to put forward at this time. 
 It was urged that to permit aliens to own and bequeath land in 
 this country would encourage mischief ; another contention which 
 time has repudiated and condemned. The limitations of trade 
 with the Indies would be a hardship, while the inclusion of pro- 
 visions among contraband of war would ruin American com- 
 merce. 
 
 A few specific objections were doubtless well founded. Jay
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 193 
 
 himself realized very keenly the unsatisfactory nature of some 
 of the provisions. He did not attempt, in his letter to Randolph 
 transmitting the treaty, to justify them per se. His chief argu- 
 ment in support, or perhaps we should say in defense, of the 
 treaty, was that it was the best that could be made at that time, 
 and that it would be much better than none at all ; both of which 
 propositions were entirely true. Moreover, the objectionable 
 clause about West India trade was to last for only two years, the 
 clause about contraband did not abandon the position thitherto 
 taken by the United States, and the privateering clauses were 
 identical with those in treaties thitherto made between England, 
 France, and Holland. It may be added that Jay had endeav- 
 ored to secure the insertion of a clause abolishing privateering 
 altogether, and thus anticipating the action of the powers at 
 Paris sixty years later, but Grenville was not prepared for so 
 radical a step. In spite of violent opposition, the arguments 
 of Jay, supported by those of Hamilton, won the day. The 
 treaty was ratified by the Senate by a bare two-thirds vote, of 
 twenty to ten. The clause relating to "West India commerce 
 was omitted, and to this omission Great Britain assented. 
 
 This treaty gave occasion for another deplorable manifestation 
 of the power of foreign intrigue in American politics. A Brit- 
 ish ship had captured some time before a letter from the French 
 minister to America, Fauchet, to his Government, speaking of 
 certain "precious confessions" which Randolph, our secretary 
 of state, had made to him. This was forwarded to Hammond, 
 the British minister at Philadelphia, for use against Randolph, 
 to compel him either to mend his ways or to retire from the 
 cabinet. The construction put upon that phrase was that Ran- 
 dolph had been involved in some corrupt intrigue with Fauchet 
 or some one else. Hammond had the matter brought to Wash- 
 ington's attention, and the President gave the letter to Randolph 
 in a cabinet meeting and asked him to read it. Randolph asked 
 for time in which to explain it, but a few hours later tendered 
 his resignation as secretary of state and was succeeded in that 
 ofifice by Timothy Pickering. Fauchet afterward gave a some- 
 what halting explanation of his o\vn words, which seemed to ac- 
 quit Randolph of the imputation of pecuniary corruption, 
 though there remained no doubt that he had very indiscreetly 
 
 VOL. 1—13
 
 194 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 lent himself to the French side in the pending controversies, and 
 had shown himself unfit to be secretary of state. 
 
 There then arose for the first time the important question 
 whether the House of Representatives was bound to provide the 
 fiscal means for putting the treaty into effect. The treaty was 
 made by the executive, by and with the consent of the Senate. 
 The House of Representatives had nothing to do with it. But 
 some of its provisions could not be carried out without appro- 
 priations of public money, and those appropriations must, under 
 the constitution, originate in the House. Was the House under 
 any constitutional or legal compulsion to vote them ? The House 
 took the ground that it was not thus obligated, but was free to act 
 according to its own discretion. Accordingly, in order to secure 
 a basis on which to make its judgment of the treaty and to de- 
 termine whether or not to provide for its execution, the House 
 requested the President to send to it all the papers relative to 
 the negotiations of the treaty. This would obviously have been 
 tantamount to making the House a part of the treaty-making or 
 at least the treaty-reviewing power, and the President very prop- 
 erly declined to comply with the request. Thereupon ensued a 
 protracted and animated debate, lasting for three weeks and cov- 
 ering the general relations of Congress to the treaty-making 
 power. Madison, Gallatin, and others vigorously opposed the 
 President's attitude and insisted that he must obey the mandate 
 of the House. The deciding speech in favor of the treaty was 
 made by Fisher Ames, who was an invalid and forbidden by his 
 physician to speak at all, but who made on this matter perhaps 
 the greatest address of his life. Finally three votes were taken. 
 The first and second, on the question of approving the treaty, 
 were tied and were decided for the treaty by the vote of the 
 speaker, Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey. The third, directing 
 the House to carry the treaty into effect, was carried, because of a 
 few absences, by fifty-one to forty-eight. There followed a popu- 
 lar storm of wrath against Jay, and even against Washington 
 himself, but the treaty stood. It saved us from war with Eng- 
 land, for which we were unprepared, and it settled a number of 
 vexatious controversies which had already dragged on too long. 
 
 While there was legitimate ground for dissatisfaction with 
 some provisions of the treaty, there was no possible justification
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 195 
 
 for the wild and savage brutalities of the campaign against it, 
 which would have been more befitting the Reign of Terror in the 
 days of Marat and Robespierre than the United States mider 
 George Washington. The chief reasons for these monstrous out- 
 breaks were two. One was the unfortunate prevalence of the 
 spirit of faction which then rose higher than ever before in our 
 history, which was ready to sacrifice national interest to party 
 advantage, and which was incited and intensified by foreign 
 intrigues, suggestions, and subsidies — for under Jefferson and 
 Randolph a clerk in the state department was regularly subsi- 
 dized by France to write and publish lampoons and libels upon 
 Washington himself. The other reason was that the American 
 people had not yet come to the point of thinking diplomatically. 
 They had not yet got rid of the habit of either taking their for- 
 eign policy readymade from some European power or else doing 
 as they pleased without regard to the wishes or even the rights 
 of others. They had still to learn the great lesson that there 
 are two sides to every international dispute, that generally diplo- 
 matic dealings are processes of give and take, and that a treaty is 
 a mutual contract between two equal powers in which each party 
 must receive a quid pro quo. It was our first essay in important 
 treaty-making, at least of what we may call a business treaty, 
 and it was not surprising that we showed ourselves unused to 
 the process. Looking back at it from this distance, it is impossi- 
 ble to deny that with all its faults the treaty was beneficent and 
 that the negotiation of it was by no means the least of Jay's great 
 services to the young republic. 
 
 As already observed, IMonroe, our minister at Paris, had tried 
 to embarrass and defeat Jay in his negotiations of this treaty at 
 London, and when he learned that in spite of him Jay had suc- 
 ceeded, he denounced the treaty in violent terms. In September, 
 1795, following the ratification and execution of the treaty, Mr. 
 Pickering, who had then become secretary of state, sent to Mon- 
 roe a letter designed chiefly for the French government, in 
 which he defended the treaty, and especially argued that it did 
 not proceed from any predilection for Great Britain — which was 
 true enough — and that it was not meant to be and would not 
 prove to be inimical or detrimental to France. In this latter 
 contention Pickering was probably sincere. Nevertheless the
 
 196 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 treaty was generally regarded, both here and in Europe, as a 
 serious blow to France. The French government so regarded 
 it, and, partly for that reason and partly out of resentment at 
 the recalling of Monroe, practically broke off diplomatic rela- 
 tions with this country. In his farewell address to Monroe the 
 President of the French Directory uttered studied insults to the 
 United States, speaking of "the condescension of the American 
 government to the wishes of its ancient tyrants"; and Monroe 
 was warned that no successor to him would be received until the 
 United States made reparation for the injuries which it w^as 
 charged with having inflicted upon France. In September, 
 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney was accredited as minister to 
 France, but, true to its threat, the Government refused to re- 
 ceive him, it grossly insulted him, placed him under police sur- 
 veillance as a suspicious character, and finally compelled him to 
 quit the country and retire to Holland. In October, P. A. Adet, 
 the French minister to America, was recalled. Then the French 
 government entered upon a systematic course of aggressions 
 against America. Decrees were issued, directly intended to 
 harass and destroy American commerce. Neutral ships carrying 
 an enemy 's property were to be seized. An enemy 's goods on a 
 neutral ship were to be confiscated. The American principle 
 of "free ships, free goods," was scouted. The treaty of 1778 be- 
 tween France and America was arbitrarily treated as if modified 
 so as to conform with the French interpretation of Jay's treaty 
 with England; quite regardless of the fundamental fact that a 
 treaty is a contract between two parties and can be modified 
 only with the consent of both. The French government was ob- 
 viously doing its utmost to provoke war. 
 
 Meantime we had also been having trouble with Spain. The 
 Congress of the Confederation had abandoned negotiations with 
 that country in despair and had remitted the whole tangled web 
 to the new Government under the Constitution. Not the least 
 ominous feature of the case was the rising discontent and dis- 
 loyalty in the Southwest, in Kentucky and Tennessee; feelings 
 which were partly inspired by a real fear that the interests of 
 that region would be sacrificed by the Eastern States in abandon- 
 ment of the right to navigate the Mississippi, and partly by the 
 influence of Spanish gold. Wilkinson, Sevier, 'Fallon, McGil-
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 197 
 
 livray, and other unhanged traitors and scoundrels, with pockets 
 filled with Spanish subsidies, were busy organizing secession, in- 
 citing the Indians to war, and in general committing all possible 
 deviltry. In 1790, Tennessee was ceded by North Carolina to 
 the Federal Government, and two years later Kentucky was ad- 
 mitted to th'e Union as a new State, and these acts allayed the 
 trouble in a measure. 
 
 In 1791, the Spanish government intimated to Jefferson that 
 it was desirous of renewing negotiations for a settlement, and 
 Jefferson accordingly sent Short, who was our charge d'aft'aires 
 in France, to proceed to Madrid and join Carmiehael, our charge 
 there, to form a commission for the negotiation of a treaty, which 
 was to deal with the navigation of the Mississippi River, the Ya- 
 zoo lands and the Florida boundary, and the return of fugitives. 
 The Spanish government at first delayed to act, and then ap- 
 pointed as its negotiator Diego de Gardoqui, who had conducted 
 the futile negotiations with Jay, years before. This appoint- 
 ment defeated the negotiations in advance. Gardoqui arro- 
 gantly declared that he was ready to make a treaty on the lines 
 of that proposed in 1786 and no others. For a year the two 
 parties were in a deadlock, and then Carmiehael became dis- 
 gusted, abandoned the task, and came home. 
 
 It was during these negotiations that Genet came to the United 
 States. As France was then at war with Spain, a part of his 
 scheme was to organize here expeditions for the invasion and con- 
 quest of Florida and Louisiana. Three expeditions were 
 planned by him and several thousand men were recruited. Two 
 of them collapsed as soon as Genet was repudiated by his Gov- 
 ernment, but the third gave promise of achievement. It was led 
 by George Rogers Clark, the hero of our revolutionary conquest 
 of the Northwest. He had offered his services to Genet for an 
 attack upon New Orleans, and had been commissioned by him 
 an officer of the French army. A really formidable movement 
 was under way, when the arrival of a new French minister in 
 1794 changed the policy and halted operations. 
 
 Washington realized by this time, however, how strong were 
 the feelings of the West and what danger there was of alienating 
 that region from the Union, and he accordingly resolved upon 
 more strenuous diplomacy. He shifted the able and resolute
 
 198 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Thomas Pinckney from London to Madrid as our minister, and 
 instructed him to make if possible a treaty covering merely the 
 navigation of the Mississippi and the Florida boundary. Pinck- 
 ney had to deal at Madrid v^ith the notorious Godoy, ''The 
 Prince of the Peace," who had just made peace with France and 
 who was the real ruler of Spain. At first all went well. Then 
 Godoy began to procrastinate and delay negotiations in every 
 possible manner. For a year matters were at a standstill. Then 
 one day Pinckney gave warning that if negotiations were not at 
 once resumed and pushed to a conclusion, he would demand his 
 passports. This brought Godoy to terms, and in October, 1795, 
 the treaty was made. Under it the boundary of West Florida 
 was fixed at the thirty-first parallel of latitude, according to the 
 American contention; and the United States was permitted to 
 navigate the Mississippi freely, to the Gulf, and to use New Or- 
 leans as a port of deposit and transfer from river to sea-going 
 craft. In brief, Pinckney gained all that had been asked by 
 this country. As a result incipient treason and secession in the 
 Southwest were quickly snuffed out. Washington had written 
 in 1790 that the United States wanted in that quarter "scarcely 
 anything but the free navigation of the Mississippi, which we 
 must have and as certainly shall have if we remain a nation." 
 In fact Pinckney, in one of the most brilliant achievements of 
 our early diplomacy, had gained more than that; for, exceed- 
 ing his instructions, he included in the treaty important com- 
 mercial provisions, and a pledge from Spain to cause no more 
 troubles among the Indians. 
 
 One other incident of inestimable importance marked the 
 course of these negotiations. At one time there was a not un- 
 founded apprehension that Great Britain might seize some of the 
 Spanish territory adjacent to the United States. At that, Jeffer- 
 son instructed Gouverneur Morris to intimate to the British gov- 
 ernment that "we should contemplate a change of neighbors 
 with extreme uneasiness," and that "a balance of power on our 
 borders is not less desirable to us than a balance of power in 
 Europe has always appeared to them." In all his career Jef- 
 ferson never made a wiser or more statesmanlike utterance 
 than that. It was really one of the great landmarks of Ameri- 
 can diplomacy. It foreshadowed the later declarations of our
 
 ESTABLISHING NEUTRALITY 199 
 
 Government concerning Louisiana, Florida and Cuba, the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine, and the Polk Doctrine. At the time it passed with 
 little notice, but in after years it loomed into commanding pro- 
 portions. 
 
 In May, 1796, a convention relating to the Indians was con-, 
 eluded with Great Britain. In September, 1795, a treaty nomi- 
 nally of peace and amity was made with Algiers, and in Novem- 
 ber of the following year one of peace and friendship was made 
 with Tripoli ; but both of these latter were little more than agree- 
 ments to continue paying to those piratical powers the blackmail 
 which we were not yet strong enough at sea to refuse. Beyond 
 these there were no other diplomatic transactions of moment in 
 Washington's administration. But those which we have re- 
 counted were sufficient to make it forever memorable. The 
 great foundation stones of our foreign policy were laid: inde- 
 pendence, neutrality, the freedom of the seas, complete separa- 
 tion from European politics, and the dominance of the United 
 States on the North American continent. Well might Washing- 
 ton, who was supremely to be credited vdth these achievements, 
 write as he did to Pickering: ''I have always given it as my 
 decided opinion that no nation had a right to meddle in the in- 
 ternal concerns of another; that every one had a right to form 
 and adopt whatever government they liked best to live under 
 themselves; and that if this country could, consistently with its 
 engagements, maintain a strict neutrality, and thereby preserve 
 peace, it was bound to do so by motives of policy, interest, and 
 every other consideration." That policy was founded by Wash- 
 ington and was maintained inviolate by him for transmission to 
 his successors and to his country for all time.
 
 VIII 
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 
 
 THE first eight years of our national life under the Con- 
 stitution, the two-termed administration of our first Presi- 
 dent, and also the first fourteen years of independence and 
 peace, were thus completed. Through them the United States 
 had attained an improved though not yet altogether satisfactory 
 position among nations, and it had made itself the conspicuous 
 protagonist of principles of international law so advanced and 
 exalted as to command the wonder and the not always ungi-udg- 
 ing admiration of the world. But its position and its policies 
 were by no means confirmed beyond dispute or challenge. 
 Spain, perhaps, though she was our oldest and most constant 
 enemy, conceded our just status more fully than any other. 
 But she did so against her vnll, being in her decadence and un- 
 able effectually to resist our rising power. Great Britain gave 
 us a partial acknowledgment, and had probably a more just ap- 
 preciation of this country and of its assured destiny than any 
 other. But, with a characteristic combination of conservatism 
 and arrogance, she persisted in arbitrarily imposing upon us 
 her own rules and practices. France, for twenty years at least 
 our nominal ally and often hailed with unthinking enthusiasm 
 as our one friend, scarcely acknowledged our national and in- 
 ternational status at all, and was actually beginning to wage 
 war against us to subvert that status and to make us if possible 
 subservient to her own selfish interests. These three powers had 
 almost a monopoly thus far of our foreign relations, as indeed 
 they had had from the beginning of our history. "We had com- 
 mercial conventions with a few others. With the bulk of the 
 world we still had no formal and official relations whatever. 
 We had made no treaties with and sent no ministers to a major- 
 ity of the powers. Our commerce with them was increasing, 
 
 200
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 201 
 
 however, and to some countries we had sent consuls wdthout 
 having treaties, under a sort of unwritten common law of the 
 world. 
 
 Nevertheless we had accomplished much. There is no exag- 
 geration in saying that we had done as much in foreign as in 
 home affairs; we had done as much in organizing foreign rela- 
 tionships and establishing foreign policies as we had done in 
 the development of constitutional principles at home and the pro- 
 motion of domestic prosperity. We had in these years estab- 
 lished, though the fact was not altogether recognized at the time 
 by the world, the great fundamental principles upon which all 
 subsequent extensions and developments of external relationships 
 and policies have been based. In all the more than a century of 
 foreign relationships which remains for us to consider, we shall 
 find scarcely a single new principle, but merely a further work- 
 ing out of the principles of Washington's administration. The 
 first of these cardinal doctrines was that of impregnable inde-^ 
 pendence, and the equal sovereignty of the United States with 
 any and all other nations of the world. France more than any 
 other had striven to deny and to prevent this, and to make us a 
 mere dependency upon her. But we had wisely and indeed ne- 
 cessitously insisted upon fulfilment of the Declaration of Inde- 
 pendence. We were no quasi-state, no dwarf or cripple, no 
 mere probationer on sufferance. We were a full-fledged, full- 
 grown nation, possessed of all the functions, powers, and rights 
 of national sovereignty, the peer in legal standing of any other 
 nation in the world ; inalienably endowed with full powers, in 
 Jefferson's pithy phrase, "to do all acts and things which inde- 
 pendent States may of right do." 
 
 The second doctrine was neutrality, which was a far greater • 
 novelty, both to America and to all other powers. Thitherto 
 every nation had instinctively, as a matter of course, inclined 
 toward one or the other belligerent in every war, so that a war 
 between two considerable powers often meant war among all 
 and generally meant the division of the world in sympathies. 
 And certainly never before in history had the American States 
 been neutral in any war in which Great Britain, France, or 
 Spain was concerned. We had therefore at this time our first 
 subjective experience in the exercise of neutrality, a strange and
 
 202 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 unwonted thing to us, and it is not to be wondered at that we 
 did not at first know how to exercise it aright. At the same 
 time we set to the world the great objective example of a power 
 thus practising neutrality in the face of exceptionally strong 
 motives to do otherwise. Seldom had any country resisted so 
 strong temptations, urgings, threats, and what not, to array it- 
 self on the side of an alien belligerent. The world stood aston- 
 ished at the measure of our resistance and forbearance. 
 
 The third great doctrine may be described in a much misused 
 
 ' word as Americanism. These States began to realize that they 
 were indeed a new nation and no longer a colony or an appan- 
 age of any kind, and that therefore they had their own set of 
 interests which were quite separate and different from those of 
 European nations. That did not mean that our interests were 
 antagonistic to theirs. But we had our own way to pursue, our 
 own institutions to develop, and we were to do these things our- 
 selves, without the aid, the meddling, or the duress of any for- 
 eign power. The principle of neutrality forbade us to inter- 
 vene in the affairs of Europe, and so, equally, the principle of 
 Americanism forbade Europe, or constrained us to forbid 
 Europe, to intervene in any of our affairs. Europe was no 
 more to use this continent as a fighting ground in her wars, and 
 she was no more to manipulate our politics, our laws and customs, 
 our commercial and fiscal systems, for her advantage. 
 
 4 Fourth, there was the doctrine of the freedom of the seas and 
 the application to naval warfare of a measure of the interna- 
 tional law which prevailed in warfare on land. That was ex- 
 pressed in the historic phrase, "free ships, free goods." It is 
 true that this doctrine did not originate with us, but it was be- 
 cause of America that Frederick the Great first put it forward, 
 and other European powers nominally inclined themselves to- 
 ward its adoption. It was embodied in one of our earliest 
 treaties, and it was certainly and altogether in respect of Ameri- 
 can commerce that the principle was first practically tested. A 
 
 " fifth doctrine was that of the arbitration of international dis- 
 putes, which in our day has arisen to a predominant place in 
 the affairs of the world at large. Franklin and Hamilton were 
 the earliest advocates of this principle in its modern form. It 
 is true that international arbitration was frequently practised by
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 203 
 
 Greece, Rome, and other nations in classic times, and by Euro- 
 pean States in the Middle Ages and later. It is equally true that 
 arbitration in the form in which it became so effective during 
 the nineteenth century was practically introduced to the world 
 in two of the earliest American treaties, namely, Jay's treaty - 
 with Great Britain and Pinckney's with Spain. We may add 
 the sixth principle, of extradition of criminals from one country-^ 
 to another, which also was established in Jay's treaty. In the 
 century and a quarter which has elapsed since the administration 
 of Washington began, no new principle additional to these has 
 been established. All our vast development of international re- 
 lationships has been merely a logical enlargement of the super- 
 structure which rests upon this foundation. 
 
 Not less in importance than these principles themselves, per- 
 haps, was the growth of the American spirit of legitimate self- - 
 consciousness, or of realization of these things. It is true that 
 faction was strong, too strong; and it seemed to be increasing 
 in strength and virulence. But it was running an acute course, 
 and was rapidly approaching a crisis which would end its per- 
 nicious activity. It rose to a higher and more dangerous pitch 
 in Washington's time than ever in our day — I mean factional- 
 ism in our foreign relationships — and it reached its culmination 
 in the succeeding administration of John Adams. Never since 
 then — save perhaps in a few isolated and not highly important 
 cases — has it exerted a serious influence upon our diplomacy. 
 And even when its madness rose to its most menacing height the 
 people, though unconsciously, were coming to realize that the 
 nation must be sufficient unto itself. They continued and might 
 continue to disagree upon some details of foreign policy. But 
 they began to agree that whatever our policy was, it should be 
 dictated by and based upon our own interests and not those of 
 any foreign power; then, that whatever policy was adopted by 
 the administration in power should be loyally supported by the 
 whole country, so that however divided we were at home we 
 should present a united front to the rest of the world ; and finally 
 that our foreign policies should be, in their essential principles, 
 continuous and unaffected by the changes of domestic politics. 
 
 The best expression that has ever been made of this dawning 
 philosophy of American foreign relationships was made by
 
 204 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Washington in his farewell address, at the close of his adminis- 
 tration. We need not trouble ourselves with the question how 
 far that utterance was his own composition, or to what extent it 
 was prepared for him by Hamilton or inspired by Jay. The 
 dominant sentiments of it were characteristically his own; ex- 
 pressed by him in fragmentary form on many occasions years 
 before; and if they were also cherished by Hamilton and Jay, 
 it is no secret that those three great men were to an exceptional 
 degree in accord upon nearly all governmental principles. The 
 address is hortatory and advisory in tone, and in that capacity 
 was no doubt needed. But it was also, though perhaps uncon- 
 sciously, a definition and a description of the status which the 
 country had already attained and of the attitude which under 
 Washington's supreme leadership it had already assumed toward 
 the nations of the world. At the beginning of his administra- 
 tion it would have been incongruous, unappreciated, incompre- 
 hensible to the people, and might even have provoked antagonism 
 and resentment. At the end of it, it was appropriate, appre- 
 ciated, and acceptable ; itself the inspiring measure of the prog- 
 ress which had been made in those eight years of storm and 
 stress. It will be enlightening and profitable for us to recall 
 some of its salient passages : 
 
 ' ' For this you have every inducement of sympathy and inter- 
 est. Citizens by birth or choice of a common country, that coun- 
 try has a right to concentrate your affections. . . . 
 
 "Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate 
 peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this 
 conduct, and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin 
 it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant 
 period a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and 
 too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted jus- 
 tice and benevolence. . . . 
 
 "In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential 
 than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular 
 nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be ex- 
 cluded; and that in place of them, just and amicable feelings 
 towards all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges to- 
 wards another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in 
 some degree a slave. It is a slave of its animosity or to its af-
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 205 
 
 fection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its 
 duty and its interest. . . . 
 
 "Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure 
 you to believe me, fellow-citizens), the jealousy of a free people 
 ought to be constantly awake ; since history and experience prove 
 that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of repub- 
 lican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be im- 
 partial ; else it becomes an instrument of the very influence to 
 be avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality 
 for one foreign nation, and excessive dislike of another, cause 
 those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve 
 to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. . . . 
 
 ' ' The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations 
 is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as 
 little political connection as possible. So far as we have already 
 formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good 
 faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests, 
 which to us have no, or a very remote, relation. Hence she must 
 be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are 
 essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must 
 be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in 
 the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary 
 combinations and collusions of her friendships or enmities. 
 Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us 
 to pursue a difi:"erent course. If we remain one people, under 
 an efficient Government, the period is not far off when we may 
 defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may 
 take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any 
 time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected ; when belligerent 
 nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon 
 us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we 
 may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall 
 counsel. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation ? 
 Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground ? Why, by in- 
 terweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entan- 
 gle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, 
 rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? 
 
 "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances 
 with any portion of the foreign world — so far, I mean, as we are
 
 206 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 now at liberty to do it ; for let me not be understood as capable 
 of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the 
 maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that 
 honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those 
 engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my 
 opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. 
 Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, 
 on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to tem- 
 porary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. 
 
 "Harmony, liberal intercourses with all nations, are recom- 
 mended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our com- 
 mercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand ; neither 
 seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences ; consulting 
 the natural course of things ; diffusing and diversifying by gentle 
 means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establish- 
 ing with powers so disposed — in order to give trade a stable 
 course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the 
 Government to support them — conventional rules of intercourse, 
 the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will per- 
 mit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time aban- 
 doned or varied as experience and circumstances shall dictate; 
 constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look 
 for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a 
 portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under 
 that character ; that by such acceptance it may place itself in the 
 condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and 
 yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. 
 There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon 
 real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which expe- 
 rience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard." 
 
 Such was the foreign policy of Washington. Such was the 
 policy which he impressed upon the nation in its infancy, and 
 bequeathed as a priceless legacy to its maturer years. There 
 can be no doubt that it was accepted, fully, completely, and loy- 
 ally by his successor, and that its continuance and maintenance 
 were sincerely undertaken. They were, indeed, in the end ef- 
 fected; but only after the most violent crisis and the most dis- 
 creditable eruption of factional fury in all our history. 
 
 John Adams intended and honestly strove to continue the for-
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 207 
 
 eign policy of Washington. But unfortunately he was not an- 
 other Wasliington, either in his personal qualities or in the 
 regard of the nation for him. We may unhesitatingly concede 
 that he was as honest as Washington. His bitter enemy, Jeffer- 
 son, declared that God never made a more honest man. He 
 was also as fearless, as resolute, and as patriotic as Washington 
 himself. But he was singularly devoid of tact, vain and sensitive 
 to an extraordinary degree, irascible, and quite unable to be a 
 leader or a manager of men, or to curry favor with the individu- 
 als or with the populace. In his attitude toward the two parties 
 into which the nation was divided he at first strove to be impar- 
 tial. He endeavored to disarm the suspicion of inclination 
 toward a monarchy by showing special consideration for Jeffer- 
 son and the Anti-Federalists; but in the end he was bitterly 
 antagonized and assailed by them. Nor could he command the 
 support of the Federalists, for between him and Hamilton, their 
 leader, there arose implacable enmity, which resulted in the 
 defeat and practical extinction of that once great party. No 
 man ever possessed less of the arts of a politician than Adams, 
 and none ever possessed them all in a higher degree than Jeffer- 
 son, and the result of the partizan strife between them was 
 therefore a foregone conclusion. ]\Ioreover, the people at large 
 felt toward Adams little of the reverence which most of them 
 cherished for Washington. They felt no restraint in attack- 
 ing him, any more than in attacking any other public man of 
 the day. With his accession to the Presidency, therefore, a 
 profound, significant, and permanent change came over the spirit 
 of American politics, which affected foreign as well as domestic 
 affairs. 
 
 In his attitude toward England and France, and therefore 
 toward the chief issues of foreign policy, Adams was notably 
 impartial ; probably the most impartial statesman in America. 
 He was himself of English ancestry, and was profoundly imbued 
 with the characteristic English spirit. His natural sympathies 
 were with England and English institutions, principles, and poli- 
 cies. Yet for many years he had cultivated intense opposition 
 to England. He had suffered neglect and insult for three years 
 as our scarcely recognized minister to that country. He had 
 become convinced that the English government was unrelent-
 
 208 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ingly hostile to America and meant if possible to compass our 
 destruction. Therefore, while he scouted with contempt the 
 notion that we owed France eternal gratitude for our independ- 
 ence, he was well fitted to hold the balance true between these 
 two powers. Neither of them, to his mind, was our friend, but 
 with neither of them should we quarrel and fight, if it was pos- 
 sible to avoid doing so. He had bluntly told King George to his 
 face that America was the only country for which he eared, and 
 he was convinced that the supreme welfare of America required 
 that we should keep the peace. This was for two reasons. One 
 was that we had no navy fit to compete with that of England 
 or France, and for a nation thus unarmed to engage in w^r 
 would be folly. The other was, that a war with one of the two 
 countries named would mean an alliance with the other, and he 
 had from the beginning been the resolute opponent of European 
 alliances of any kind. The one paramount motive of his foreign 
 policy was, therefore, to keep the peace; a difficult task when 
 half of the nation was clamoring for war with one country and 
 the other half was clamoring for war with the other country. 
 But so transparent was Adams's honesty and so manifest was 
 his high and noble purpose that Jefferson himself was con- 
 strained to say of him: ''I do not believe Mr. Adams wishes 
 war with France, nor do I believe he will truckle to England as 
 servilely as has been done." 
 
 At the very beginning of Adams's administration, however, 
 war with France seemed inevitable. That country, in its refusal 
 to receive our minister, Pinckney, and in the scandalous manner 
 of that refusal, had added insult to injury. That we did not 
 promptly declare war against her indicated either our military 
 or naval impotence or an almost superhuman degree of patience 
 and forbearance. In fact, it indicated both. But certainly the 
 circumstances were most embarrassing to Adams; particularly 
 when, soon after his inauguration, a full report was received 
 from Pinckney, relating that the French government had threat- 
 ened to arrest him as a criminal for remaining in that country 
 without its permission. Adams turned to his advisers, the cab- 
 inet, which he had received from Washington and had retained 
 without change. Pickering was secretary of state, Wolcott of 
 the Treasury, and McHenry of the war department. They were
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 209 
 
 able and patriotic men, but not in sympathy with his policy nor 
 attached to him personally, and he got little aid or comfort from 
 them. Thrown upon his own resources, he at first tried to emu- 
 late Washington's plan. Washington had withdraw;n Gouv- 
 erneur Morris from the French mission because he was unac- 
 ceptable to the revolutionists, and had sent the rabid Gallican, 
 Monroe, in his place. Now Adams thought of similarly replac- 
 ing the sturdy Federalist Pinckney, who was unacceptable to 
 France, with some conspicuous Anti-Federalist and Gallican. 
 His first choice was Jefferson himself, but Jefferson was vice- 
 president and therefore could not go. His next choice was IVIadi- 
 son, with whom he would have sent Hamilton as a colleague; 
 but Madison would not go, preferring to remain here to promote 
 the progress of the Anti-Federalist party, in which he was Jef- 
 ferson's first lieutenant. Unfortunately the secret of these de- 
 liberations was betrayed to France, and as soon as it was known 
 there that neither Jefferson nor Madison would be sent, and 
 there was no hope that Monroe would be returned, there was a 
 fresh accession of anti-American brutality, and the Directory 
 issued against American shipping and commerce a still more 
 hostile decree than any which had been made before. Bonaparte 
 was winning his great victories in Italy, and France was drunk 
 with military pride; and America had no navy. Why should 
 America have any rights which France was bound to respect? 
 
 In these circumstances Adams called Congress together in 
 special session. It met on May 15, 1797. His address to it at 
 its opening was as temperate yet as forceful and dignified as 
 Washington himself could have made it. He resented the 
 French insults to America at the time of Monroe's leave-taking. 
 He declared that for France to refuse to receive Pinckney until 
 we had acceded to her demands without discussion and without 
 investigation of them, was "to treat us neither as allies, nor as 
 friends, nor as a sovereign State," He noted the offensive at- 
 tempt of the French government to discriminate between the 
 Government and the people of America, and insisted that there 
 should never be a time when the nation would fail to support 
 its chosen agents in foreign negotiations. Nevertheless, it was 
 his sincere desire to keep the peace with France as with all na- 
 tions, and therefore, believing that neither the honor nor the 
 
 VOL. I — 14
 
 210 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 interest of the United States absolutely forbade the repetition 
 of friendly overtures to France, he would institute a fresh at- 
 tempt at negotiation. At the same time the depredations which 
 France was committing upon our commerce, the personal injuries 
 which were being inflicted upon our citizens, and the general 
 complexion of affairs rendered it his indispensable duty to 
 recommend to Congress the consideration of effectual measures 
 of defense. The measures suggested by him comprised an in- 
 crease of the regular army in artillery and cavalry, the enlist- 
 ment of a volunteer army, and the prompt construction of an 
 adequate navy. Indeed, Adams was — he had been long before 
 this date — the first great advocate of the development of Amer- 
 ican power at sea. 
 
 There could have been no wiser or more worthy policy than 
 this, but unfortunately Adams was not a sufficiently tactful and 
 politic leader of men to execute it with facility, and the spirit 
 of faction was too perniciously active to permit him to have the 
 undivided support which he deserved. The Anti-Federalists 
 were unsympathetic, while the Federalists were divided among 
 themselves into two factions, neither of which gave him loyal 
 support. Adams's plan was to send a commission of three emi- 
 nent men to France. One of them must be Pinckney, to vindi- 
 cate him against the scandalous treatment which he had suffered. 
 The second was John Marshall of Virginia, also a Federalist. 
 For the third place another Federalist, Francis Dana of Massa- 
 chusetts, was selected, but he declined it, and Adams thereupon 
 offered it to Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who was an Anti- 
 Federalist and friend of Jefferson. This division of the com- 
 mission between the two parties was vigorously disapproved by 
 the cabinet; six Federalist senators voted against confirm- 
 ing Gerry; and the alienation of Adams from the Hamil- 
 tonian majority of the Federalist party was intensified. Mean- 
 time Congress acted upon the President's recommendation. In 
 order to restrain warlike passions an act was passed forbidding 
 privateering in advance of a declaration of war, and an order 
 was issued forbidding the arming of merchant ships. The ex- 
 portation of arms was also forbidden. On the other hand bills 
 were enacted for the enlistment of an army of 80,000 volunteers, 
 for the fortification of our harbors, and for the completion and
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 211 
 
 heavy arming of three frigates, the building of which had been 
 begun in view of our troubles with the Barbary pirates. It is 
 interesting to recall that the equipment of these vessels excited 
 much merriment and ridicule in France and England ; still more 
 interesting when we remember that these three frigates were the 
 United States, the Constellation, and the Constitution. Thus the 
 nation strove to keep the peace, prepared for war, and awaited 
 the result of its extraordinary mission to France. 
 
 France was at that time still under the Directory, the author- 
 ity of which, however, Bonaparte was beginning to undermine. 
 The minister for foreign affairs was Bonaparte's close friend, 
 Talleyrand, one of the shrewdest but most unscrupulous and 
 dishonest of men. The French government, flushed with the 
 military successes of Bonaparte, had already begun a course of 
 arrogance and oppression toward all European States which were 
 weak enough to make such a policy safe. As for the individual 
 members of the Government, they were habitually practising 
 blackmail, extortion, bribery, and eveiy form of pecuniary cor- 
 ruption which would line their pockets with unclean gold; both 
 States and individuals being their victims. Chief among the 
 practitioners and beneficiaries of this sordid scoundrelism was 
 Talleyrand himself, and since France was already practising 
 oppression against America with impunity, he determined in 
 addition to try blackmail and extortion. 
 
 The three commissioners reached Paris early in October, 1797, 
 and presented their credentials to Talleyrand. He received 
 them civilly enough, and for a few days all seemed to be going 
 well. Then Talleyrand declined further personal intercourse 
 with the commissioners and sent to them in his stead three agents 
 as his representatives. These men began by dwelling upon the 
 difficulties to be overcome in reaching an adjustment of affairs. 
 The President's address at the opening of Congress had given 
 offense and must be apologized for or explained. Then, France 
 was in need of money for public uses, and would expect a large 
 contribution from America. Finally, if the negotiations were 
 to continue, a gift of $240,000, to be divided personally and pri- 
 vately among the members of the Directory and Talleyrand, 
 would be necessary. This demand for a bribe the American com- 
 missioners curtly rejected. They were, they said, neither em-
 
 212 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 powered nor disposed to bribe the members of the Govermnent 
 to which they were accredited. They then, repressing their in- 
 dignation and disgust, proceeded to deal with the other proposals. 
 America could not make a loan to France, because that would 
 be a violation of the principles of neutrality which had been 
 proclaimed and which this country intended to maintain. The 
 three Frenchmen interrupted them with blackmailing menaces. 
 Let America remember, they said, the fate of the Venetian 
 republic. Let her remember that the diplomacy of France had 
 formerly reached and could again reach to the internal affairs of 
 America; to incite a conflict between domestic factions and to 
 change the character of the Government itself. The Americans 
 were reminded that they had no navy and that their coasts were 
 defenseless. They replied that to ravage our coasts would be a 
 very different thing from subduing and destroying the nation. 
 
 Thus the bickering went on, until at last one of the Frenchmen 
 exclaimed, "Gentlemen, you do not speak to the point. It is 
 money; it is expected that you will offer money." The Amer- 
 icans replied that they had already definitely answered that 
 point. "No," said the Frenchmen, "you have not. What is 
 your answer?" "It is," replied the Americans, "no; and no; 
 and again, no! Not a single sixpence." "We will spend mil- 
 lions for defense," said Pinckney, "but not one cent for tribute." 
 
 That ended the matter. On November 1 the American com- 
 missioners determined to have no further intercourse with the 
 three Frenchmen. They prepared, however, a complete state- 
 ment of the American case, which was written in vigorous lan- 
 guage by Marshall, and sent it to Talleyrand, for him to com- 
 municate to the Directory. This was about the middle of Janu- 
 ary, 1798. Talleyrand paid no attention to it for two months. 
 Then he sent an insulting and contemptuous reply. He had 
 the effrontery to charge America with deliberately delaying pro- 
 ceedings and prolonging the misunderstanding, and with select- 
 ing envoys who were known to be prejudiced against France — 
 both wanton falsehoods. He declared that Jay had been sent 
 to negotiate with England because he was known to be a partizan 
 of England, which also was not true ; and he asked why a parti- 
 zan of France could not have been sent to that country. In 
 conclusion he said that he desired to continue the negotiations,
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 213 
 
 not with Marshall and Pinckney but with Gerry alone. That 
 was discourteous to Marshall and Pinckney, but it was an un- 
 speakable insult to Gerry, since the plain intimation was that 
 he was expected to betray his country by yielding to the corrupt 
 proposals of Talleyrand. The reply of the commissioners was 
 that they must negotiate together or not at all. Marshall then 
 demanded his passport, which was grudgingly given to him. 
 Pinckney got permission, which was given still more grudgingly, 
 to spend some time in the south of France for the benefit of his 
 daughter's health. Gerry decided to accept Talleyrand's invi- 
 tation to remain in Paris, but said that he would do so merely 
 as a private citizen. His colleagues protested against this course, 
 but in vain. Gerry was made by Talleyrand to believe that 
 there was danger of a declaration of war, which his presence 
 there might avert, and he doubtless thought that he was per- 
 forming a patriotic service in remaining. In that, however, he 
 was mistaken. Talleyrand wanted him to stay solely in order 
 through him to carry on further intrigues with the Anti-Federal- 
 ist party and to exert a mischievous alien influence in American 
 domestic politics. At home his staying there was much con- 
 demned, and the President, although his close personal friend, 
 angrily ordered him to return to America at once. He was able 
 to vindicate his integrity of purpose, but his judgment was fa- 
 tally discredited. 
 
 Early in March, 1798, Adams received and laid before Con- 
 gress a report of all that had occurred down to the sending of 
 the three commissioners' statement to Talleyrand. This dis- 
 closure roused the war spirit of the Federalists, and a demand 
 arose, led by Pickering himself, for an immediate declaration. 
 Adams, however, resolutely opposed it. To declare war would 
 probably mean, he said, to sacrifice the lives of the three com- 
 mis.sioners who were still in France. The demand for a bribe 
 and the other insults were monstrous — to nobody could they be 
 more offensive than to Adams himself — but they would not jus- 
 tify a weak and unprepared nation in declaring war. Our true 
 course was to wait, and to let France declare war if she would; 
 and in the meantime, to prepare for hostilities. Fortunately, 
 Hamilton approved these views and thus far gave Adams his 
 support. j\Iany of the Republicans, as the Anti-Federalists now
 
 214 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 called themselves, took the same stand. Jefferson and the ma- 
 jority of his party, however, strongly opposed the President, 
 whose message he denounced as "insane." He proposed to ad- 
 journ Congress until passions had time to cool, but in this he had 
 no support. He incited his followers in Congress, however, to 
 challenge tlie correctness of Adams's report that there was no 
 hope of further negotiations. 
 
 Then Hamilton instigated a master stroke. He had some of 
 his followers in Congress propose a resolution, which was 
 adopted, demanding to see the original correspondence relating 
 to the negotiations with Talleyrand's three bribe-solicitors. 
 Nothing could have pleased Adams better. On a former occa- 
 sion Washington had refused such a demand, as he had a right 
 in his discretion to do. Adams had the same right, but he chose, 
 with grim satisfaction, to comply with the demand ; merely with- 
 holding the names of the three agents and designating them in- 
 stead as Messrs. X., Y,, and Z. Otherwise the monstrous story 
 of insult and blackmail was laid before Congress and published 
 to the whole country. The effect was electric. A tidal wave of 
 amazement, indignation, and wrath swept over the country, 
 against the venal French government. Adams was the hero of 
 the hour. Republicans and Federalists alike rallied to his sup- 
 port. Only Jefferson himself and a few extreme Republicans 
 held aloof. The national anthem, "Hail, Columbia!" was writ- 
 ten as a war-song against France, and was sung on every hand; 
 as was also "Adams and Liberty," set to the music now known 
 as "The Star-Spangled Banner." 
 
 Congress rose to the emergency and enacted twenty laws for 
 strengthening the national defense and preparing for war. One 
 of these created the navy department. Others provided for the 
 building or purchase of twelve new warships, for the arming of 
 American merchantmen and authorization of their self-defense, 
 and for the seizure by our navy of all French vessels which in- 
 terfered with our commerce. There was no declaration of war, 
 but the navy and all American merchant vessels were authorized 
 to seize French privateers and even French naval vessels. 
 Finally, Congress on July 7, 1798, abrogated the existing trea- 
 ties with France, and we were thus no longer even nominally in 
 alliance with a European power. Before the end of the year we
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 215 
 
 had more than a score of efficient naval vessels at sea, making 
 stern retaliation upon France for her depredations upon our 
 commerce. The frigate Constellation, one of the three of which 
 the French had made sport, began the work by attacking and 
 capturing a French frigate, L' Insurgent e, and before normal 
 relations were restored no fewer than eighty-four French ves- 
 sels were captured. Despite all this, however, France did not 
 declare war against us, a fact which demonstrated that she was 
 unprepared for such a war and that the threats of it which Tal- 
 leyrand had made to Gerry were mere pretense. Steps were also 
 taken for enlarging the American army, and Washington came 
 out of retirement to assume supreme command; but the chief 
 result was a discreditable dispute over precedence among the 
 three major-generals, which led to the further disruption of the 
 Federalist party and deepened the hostility of Hamilton toward 
 Adams. 
 
 Marshall arrived in this country in June, 1798, and laid before 
 Adams full details of the remainder of the case. Adams there- 
 upon peremptorily summoned Gerry home and sent another 
 message to Congress reporting that fact and its circumstances, 
 and adding: *'I will never send another minister to France 
 without assurances that he will be received, respected, and hon- 
 ored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and inde- 
 pendent nation. ' ' He was and has since been criticized for that 
 utterance. It did savor a little of rodomontade and probably 
 was unnecessary. But there can be no question that there was 
 ample provocation for it. Indeed, the amplest justification for 
 it presently came from France itself. The govenunent of that 
 country was engaged in too many European wars to relish add- 
 ing an American war to the list, and therefore, finding that 
 neither by cajoling nor by bullying, neither by bribery nor by 
 blackmail, was America to be made subservient to its wishes, it 
 presently decided to change its tactics and treat this country, in 
 Adams's words, as "a great, free, powerful, and independent 
 nation." 
 
 An intimation to that effect was made to Gerry, and he re- 
 ported it on his arrival here, but little attention was paid to him. 
 Then occurred the extraordinary "mission" of Dr. Logan, a 
 Philadelphia Quaker and political follower of Jefferson, who
 
 216 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 went on his own initiative to Paris and entered into negotiations 
 with the French government. He pleaded strongly for peace, 
 told Talleyrand how much damage his policy had done to the 
 reputation of France in America, and persuaded him to release 
 some American prisoners. The man doubtless meant well; he 
 was well received in Paris, and he succeeded in effecting some 
 good. But he was severely criticized at home by those who 
 recognized the potential dangers of that sort of unauthorized 
 and unofficial meddling in diplomacy. Washington treated 
 Logan with studied contempt and said that if France really 
 wanted peace, as Talleyrand had assured Logan, she could get 
 it by stopping her seizures of our ships. A bill was enacted by 
 Congress forbidding any private citizen thus to enter into com- 
 munication with a foreign government. But Adams, in his ear- 
 nest desire for peace, treated Logan with some consideration, 
 listened to him, and credited the assurances of peaceful inten- 
 tions which he conveyed from Talleyrand. 
 
 In that Adams was doubtless right, as the prompt sequel 
 showed. Already Talleyrand had begun practical efforts to 
 reconciliate America and to secure the resumption of diplomatic 
 relations. Under his instructions, M. Pichon, the French min- 
 ister to Holland, sought intercourse with William Vans Murray, 
 the American minister there, and intimated to him that the 
 French government would properly receive another American 
 minister if one were sent. Murray reported this to Adams, in 
 October, and the President conveyed the news to the members 
 of his cabinet, together with a list of questions on which he 
 w^anted their advice or opinions, as a guide for his address to 
 Congress at its reassembling. The principal questions were, 
 whether he should recommend a declaration of war, and whether 
 he should say that he was ready to send a new minister to 
 France on satisfactory assurances that he would be well re- 
 ceived. Pickering and the other members of the cabinet, being 
 intensely anti-French, called a conclave of their Federalist 
 friends, including Hamilton and Pinckney, and prepared a 
 draft of the address which they desired him to deliver to Con- 
 gress. This draft pleased Adams so well that he used it as it 
 stood with the exception of a single clause. That, however, was 
 one of the most important. The draft as prepared by the cau-
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 217 
 
 cus declared that to send another minister to France would be 
 an act of humiliation, to which the United States ought not to 
 submit, save in a necessity which did not then exist; adding 
 that if France should send a minister he would be "received 
 with honor and treated with candor." Adams struck this out 
 and instead spoke as follows: 
 
 "But in demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear 
 war in the necessary protection of our rights and honor, we shall 
 give no room to infer that we abandon the desire of peace. An 
 efficient preparation for war can alone insure peace. It is peace 
 that we have uniforaaly and perseveringly cultivated; and har- 
 mony between us and France may be restored at her option. 
 But to send another minister without more determined assur- 
 ances that he would be received, would be an act of humiliation 
 to which the United States ought not to submit. It must there- 
 fore be left to France, if she is indeed desirous of accommoda- 
 tion, to take the requisite steps. 
 
 ' ' The United States will steadily observe the maxims by which 
 they have hitherto been governed. They will respect the sacred 
 rights of embassy. And with a sincere disposition on the part 
 of France to desist from hostility, to make reparation for the in- 
 juries heretofore inflicted upon our commerce, and to do justice 
 in the future, there will be no obstacle to the restoration of a 
 friendly intercourse. In making to you this declaration, I give 
 pledge to France and to the Avorld that the executive authority 
 of this country still adheres to the humane and pacific policy 
 which has invariably governed its proceedings, in conformity with 
 the wishes of the other branches of the Government, and of the 
 people of the United States. But considering the late manifesta- 
 tions of her policy toward foreign nations, I deem it a duty de- 
 liberately and solemnly to declare my opinion, that, whether we 
 negotiate with her or not, vigorous preparations for war will be 
 alike indispensable. These alone will give us an equal treaty 
 and insure its observation." 
 
 These were worthy and statesmanlike utterances, but they did 
 not please the extreme Federalists, who wished to provoke 
 France into declaring war, and the making of them widened 
 the breach between the President and his party. But he was 
 resolute. Advices from Murray confirmed his belief that France
 
 218 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 was ready to negotiate, and at last, in February, 1799, Murray 
 sent an official despatch, from Talleyrand to Pichon, explicitly 
 saying that if the United States would send another minister to 
 negotiate for the settlement of the differences between the two 
 countries, he would be "received with the regard due to the 
 representative of a free, powerful, and independent nation." 
 This was a fine vindication of Adams's message to Congress in 
 the preceding summer, with its threat not to send another min- 
 ister until he had received the precise assurances which Talley- 
 rand now gave, and also of his later policy in his address to 
 Congress as well as in listening to Dr. Logan. On February 18, 
 1799, therefore, lie sent to the Senate the nomination of Wil- 
 liam Vans Murray to be minister to France as soon as the 
 French government should give public and official assurances 
 that it would properly receive him and would appoint a minister 
 of equal rank to treat with him. 
 
 At this the Federalist enemies of the President were furious. 
 The secretary of state himself declared that they were all 
 ''shocked and grieved." Another, Sedgwick, the speaker of the 
 House of Representatives, declared that "had the foulest heart 
 and the ablest head in the world been permitted to select the 
 most embarrassing and ruinous measure, perhaps it would have 
 been the one which has been adopted." The Federalist sen- 
 ators determined to vote against Murray's confirmation, and 
 were doubtless able to defeat it. Thereupon Adams withdrew it 
 and substituted the nomination of a commission of three, con- 
 sisting of Murray, Oliver Ellsworth, the chief justice of the 
 Supreme Court, and Patrick Henry. On account of his ad- 
 vanced age Henry declined, and W. R. Davis, Governor of North 
 Carolina, was substituted. The three nominations were then 
 ratified by the Senate, strangely enough Murray being the only 
 one who obtained a unanimous vote. 
 
 Early in May, 1799, Talleyrand formally and officially gave 
 the assurance which Adams had stipulated, but unfortunately, 
 in his irritation, coupled with it some insulting references to 
 what he deemed the disingenuousness and captiousness of the 
 Americans. This gave Pickering and the others a chance to 
 work for delay. They at first urged that Talleyrand's assur- 
 ances were not satisfactory. Adams overruled this and ordered
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 219 
 
 the instructions for the three envoys to be prepared. Picker- 
 ing deliberately delayed doing so until, more than a month later, 
 there was a change of government in France which put Talley- 
 rand out of office ; whereupon Adams himself assented to further 
 delay. At the middle of October the cabinet and its allies, led 
 by Hamilton himself, made a final effort to prevent the sending 
 of the mission. But Adams quietly took the matter into his 
 own hands, overruled his secretaries, and ordered a frigate to 
 be detailed to convey the commissioners to France. They set 
 sail on November 5. 
 
 When the envoys reached Paris they found a most salutary 
 change in the French government. The Directory had fallen 
 and Bonaparte was supreme. They were promptly and courte- 
 ously received and negotiations were begun. These were not 
 expeditious. The French government was overwhelmed with 
 business, and the American question was intricate and formid- 
 able. Nevertheless steady progress was made, and on Septem- 
 ber 30, 1800, the treaty was signed and Davis brought home its 
 text for ratification. The treaty did away with the old treaty 
 of 1788, which bound America to France as an ally, and which 
 our Congress had already voted to abrogate. But in return for 
 that concession Bonaparte insisted upon our releasing France 
 from all responsibility for the American vessels which had been 
 seized. This was unsatisfactory to America, but it was ac- 
 cepted. The Senate, under Federalist control, ratified the treaty 
 for a term of eight years and reserved the right subsequently 
 to claim indemnity. But a year later, when the Federalists 
 were out of power, the treaty was ratified unconditionally. 
 France, of course, never paid for the vessels she had seized. 
 
 The formal war was averted and the informal but destructive 
 war which had been raging for two years was ended. It was a 
 noble achievement. Adams himself regarded his sending of the 
 mission to France as the most meritorious and disinterested ac- 
 tion of his life, and desired that upon his tombstone should be 
 engraved as his sole epitaph the words: "Here lies John 
 Adams, who took upon himself the responsibility of the peace 
 with France in the year 1800." But thus also Adams's political 
 career was ended, and so was the effective existence of the Fed- 
 eralist party. For the revolt of the Hamiltonians against
 
 220 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Adams not only prevented his reelection to the Presidency; it 
 destroyed the party itself. We may add, with gratification, that 
 it marked the abrupt and lasting decline of factionalism as a 
 material force in the conduct of our foreign affairs. Never be- 
 fore had that passion been carried to so high and dangerous a 
 pitch as in the fight over the French missions. Never had its 
 menace to the welfare of the country been so great. The people 
 saw this and realized its import, and decided that they would 
 have no more of it. From that time forward there was an 
 increasing degree of unity in our attitude toward the outside 
 world; or if faction ever did assert itself, it was impotent for 
 more than its own discredit and defeat. 
 
 There arose, however, out of these factional contests a note- 
 worthy episode in domestic legislation which had a strong and 
 direct relationship to our foreign affairs. This was the enact- 
 ment of a group of laws dealing with naturalization, with the 
 status of aliens in the United States in peace and war, and with 
 the publishing of seditious libels upon the Government. The 
 provocation was strong. Americans were justly indignant at 
 the political activity of newly landed aliens, at the intrigues 
 and corruption which agents of foreign countries were flagrantly 
 conducting, and at the monstrous calumnies upon public men 
 with which the press teemed. Chief Justice McKean of Penn- 
 sylvania said of this last-named evil, that "every one who has 
 in him the sentiments of either a Christian or a gentleman can- 
 not but be highly offended at the envenomed scurrility that has 
 raged in pamphlets and newspapers, insomuch that libeling has 
 become a sort of national crime, and distinguishes us not only 
 from all the States around us but from the whole civilized world. 
 Our satire has been nothing but ribaldry and billingsgate; the 
 contest has been who could call names in the greatest variety 
 of phrases, who could mangle the greatest number of characters, 
 or who would excel in the magnitude and virulence of lies. 
 Hence the honor of families has been strained, the highest posts 
 rendered cheap and vile in the sight of the people, and the 
 greatest services and virtue blasted." There was beyond doubt 
 urgent need of the abatement of these evils. 
 
 A new naturalization law was first enacted, requiring an alien 
 to live in this country fourteen years before he could become a
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 221 
 
 citizen, and also to give formal notice of his intention to apply 
 for citizenship five years in advance. There were many Fed- 
 eralists who would have prohibited naturalization altogether, but 
 for fear that such action would not be constitutional. The 
 law also required all aliens to report themselves to registry of- 
 ficers and be enrolled, so that the state department would have 
 a complete roster of them. Next came a law applicable to aliens 
 domiciled in this country in time of peace. It gave the Presi- 
 dent authority to expel from the country any alien whom he 
 might judge to be dangerous to the public welfare and safety, 
 or whom he might suspect of treasonable or secret machinations 
 against this country ; and every person thus expelled who should 
 be found trespassing upon United States territory was to be 
 imprisoned for not less than three years and forever excluded 
 from citizenship. Another act dealt with aliens in time of war. 
 It gave the President power to arrest, imprison, and expel all 
 adult males who were citizens or subjects of any power with 
 which we were at war. These two alien acts were mild in com- 
 parison with the laws which were at that time in force in France 
 and other European lands; but they were widely regarded here 
 as in conflict with American principles of liberty, and they cer- 
 tainly invested the President with too autocratic power. These 
 alien laws were enacted for a term of only two years, and no ac- 
 tion was ever taken under them. But they had the effect of cre- 
 ating a panic among Frenchmen residing here and of causing 
 many of them to leave the country. 
 
 The sedition act was also a temporary measure. It imposed 
 a heavy fine or imprisonment upon all persons who unlawfully 
 conspired or combined to oppose any measure of the Govern- 
 ment, to impede the operation of any law of the United States, 
 or to intimidate any federal officer or prevent him from doing 
 his duty. It prescribed a heavy fine, or imprisonment, also, for 
 the publication in any way of any false, scandalous, or malicious 
 utterance against the Government or Congress or the President, 
 or anything calculated to stir up sedition, or to aid and abet 
 the hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United 
 States. There can be no doubt of the magnitude of the evils 
 against which this act was aimed. We have already considered 
 the infamous intrigues of "Wilkinson and other renegades and
 
 222 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 traitors, and have recalled the characterization of current libels 
 by an eminent judge, whose words were not in the least exag- 
 gerated. But the law was so drafted as to make it easy to use 
 it for purposes of political persecution, and it was in fact thus 
 used, and those who were prosecuted under it were popularly 
 regarded as martyrs. Our present interest in the acts arises 
 from the fact that they were an outgrowth of our foreign rela- 
 tions; that, severe as they were, they provoked little remon- 
 strance from other lands; and that, oppressive and reactionary 
 as they seemed to most Americans, and justly as they have been 
 generally condemned, they were on the whole more liberal than 
 the laws of European countries on the same subjects. 
 
 While all this sound and fury prevailed between the United 
 States on the one hand and France and Great Britain on the 
 other, a noteworthy treaty was made between this country and 
 Prussia, in substitution for that of 1785, which expired by its 
 own limitations in 1796. The new treaty of amity and com- 
 merce was negotiated in 1799 by John Quincy Adams, who was 
 appointed minister in June, 1797; it was signed on July 11, 
 1799, was ratified by the Senate, and was proclaimed in force on 
 November 4, 1800. Like the former convention negotiated by 
 Franklin, it took advanced and elevated ground on the subject 
 of neutrality. It was agreed that in case of war, private mer- 
 chandise of contraband, including arms, ammunition, and mili- 
 tary supplies of every kind, should not be subject to confiscation 
 when captured at sea. It might be detained or appropriated to 
 the uses of the captor, but it must be paid for at full value, and 
 the vessel carrying it must be permitted to proceed on her voy- 
 age without further detention than was necessary for the re- 
 moval of contraband goods. Privateering was forbidden under 
 pain of punishment as piracy. Prisoners of war were not to be 
 sent into remote exile, nor confined in loathsome dungeons like 
 the prison-ships of the Revolution, but were to be humanely 
 treated. There were also enlightened stipulations concerning 
 the examination of ships' papers, the visiting of neutral ships, 
 embargoes, seizures, prizes, asylum, and other such matters, far in 
 advance of the common practice of the world at that time, and 
 all going to mark a decided advance in international law. It 
 is not, indeed, too much to say that in the vindication of neutral
 
 THE CRISIS OF NATIONALITY 223 
 
 rights at sea, and in the amelioration of the hardships of naval 
 warfare, both to neutrals and to the belligerents themselves, the 
 best impulses of the world and the best achievements of the last 
 century and a quarter had their origin in these conventions be- 
 tween the country of Washington and the country of Frederick 
 the Great. 
 
 This period of our history was marked with an attempt on 
 the part of Russia to establish treaty relations with us ; not ap- 
 parently because of any regard for America, but in order to 
 complete the isolation of France. The Russian ambassador in 
 London, Count Worontzoff, addressed himself to the American 
 minister there, Rufus King, in November, 1798, with proposals 
 for a commercial treaty, and with an offer of assistance to 
 America in securing a similar treaty with Turkey. King made 
 a discreetly noncommittal reply, and reported to the Washing- 
 ton government that he did not know whether the Russian am- 
 bassador had spoken on his own authority only or under orders 
 from his government. The President assumed that the latter 
 was the case, and at once nominated King to be a special minis- 
 ter for negotiating a treaty of amity and commerce with Rus- 
 sia, and gave him detailed instructions regarding it. King made 
 this known in due time to Worontzoff, who replied that he would 
 have to consult his government on the matter. Meantime it 
 came to King's ears that Great Britain and Russia were plan- 
 ning to prevent all trade of neutral nations with France, and 
 that the United States was expected to join them in the under- 
 taking. This was substantially confirmed in June, 1799, when 
 Worontzoff told King that Russia was ready to make a com- 
 mercial treaty with America, provided that this country would 
 adopt toward France an attitude and course of conduct satis- 
 factory to Russia, and provided also that the negotiations could 
 be conducted at St. Petersburg or at Philadelphia. King re- 
 plied that the United States was determined to make peace with 
 France and that he was empowered to negotiate only in London. 
 At that the whole matter was dropped. Russia would make a 
 treaty only if America would become a tail to the European 
 kite, and America would agree to no such arrangement. 
 
 A treaty of amity, commerce, and na^^gation waK made with 
 Tunis in 1797, it being negotiated through the intermediation
 
 224 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of Joseph Stephen Fanin, a French merchant residing in Tunis, 
 who was then the American charge d 'affaires, and signed by Wil- 
 liam Eaton and James Leander Cathcart, commissioners ap- 
 pointed by the President. This treaty proclaimed peace and 
 friendship, forbade the further molestation of American com- 
 merce by what were frankly described as "the corsairs of Tu- 
 nis," and in general established a civilized modus Vivendi be- 
 tween the two nations; though the actual fulfilment of such 
 principles was deferred to a later date. If to these we add the 
 adoption of an article explanatory of a part of Jay's treaty of 
 1794 between America and Great Britain, in March, 1798, we 
 complete the list of diplomatic transactions during the adminis- 
 tration of John Adams, This article merely authorized a com- 
 mission created under the treaty to designate the source of the 
 St. Croix River. 
 
 The close of Adams's administration ended an era of Amer- 
 ican history, in foreign relations as well as in domestic affairs. 
 At its conclusion we still had few treaties with other nations, 
 and few ministers accredited to their governments. The triple 
 commission had done its work in France. Young John Quincy 
 Adams had served in Portugal and then in Prussia, and had 
 been recalled at his own request, leaving the Prussian mission 
 vacant, Rufus King of New York was minister to Great Brit- 
 ain. Murray was in Holland, William Smith of South Caro- 
 lina had succeeded Adams in Portugal, and David Humphreys 
 of Connecticut was in Spain. Russia had not yet received an 
 American minister, nor was one accredited to any other land. 
 After twenty-five years of proclaimed and eighteen years of ac- 
 knowledged independence, and after twelve years of constitu- 
 tional establishment, we were still a novice and almost a 
 stranger among the nations of the world.
 
 IX 
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 
 
 THE change from the Presidency of John Adams to that of 
 Thomas Jefferson, in 1801, was in some respects the most 
 remarkable political change in the history of the United States. 
 It was much more than a change from one party to another, 
 from Federalist to Republican or Democratic. It was at least 
 in theory a radical change of governmental policy, and that in 
 foreign at least as much as in domestic affairs. It was, in theory, 
 a change from Anglican to Gallican; and from what in later 
 years we have been accustomed to call a strong or a ''jingo" 
 policy to one of peace and nonparticipation in the affairs of the 
 rest of the world. Jefferson's own phrases have become his- 
 toric: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all; en- 
 tangling alliances with none." 
 
 But the strangest feature of this epochal change was the lack 
 of radical change, excepting in Jefferson himself. For in a 
 very short time, as we shall see, he completely reversed every 
 item of his foreign policy, and adopted and maintained the pol- 
 icy of those whom he had been most bitterly opposing. From 
 being a Gallican he became an intense Anglican ; from opposing 
 "entangling alliances" he became an advocate of them; and 
 from being an apostle of peace, almost of peace at any price, he 
 became the truculent champion of war, almost of war at any cost. 
 Having once opposed and condemned Hamilton's conception of 
 American domination of the continent, he out-Harailtoned Ham- 
 ilton as the propagandist of the "manifest destiny" of the 
 United States to "whip all creation." 
 
 Jefferson, of course, dispensed with the services of his prede- 
 cessor's cabinet minister, and also of his foreign ministers, and 
 filled their places with his own appointees. And whereas both 
 Washington and Adams had aimed at and had largely achieved 
 
 nonpartizanship in these offices, filling them with men of either 
 VOL. 1—15 225
 
 226 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 party indifferently on the basis of their eligibility and merit, 
 Jefferson filled them from the ranks of his own party followers. 
 His secretary of state, who was to have under him the conduct of 
 foreign relations, was James Madison, a man of spotless integ- 
 rity, of exceptional scholarship, and of persuasive eloquence. 
 A dozen years before he had been the associate of Hamilton and 
 Jay in advocating the adoption of the Constitution, and at that 
 time was apparently a stalwart Federalist. But he had gone 
 over to the Anti-Federalist side, had become an ardent Galil- 
 ean, and was in all things Jefferson's most loyal and devoted 
 follower. His weak point was, that he had no diplomatic ex- 
 perience whatever, his public life having thus far been spent 
 in Congress. But that really mattered little, for Jefferson in 
 an exceptional degree was his own secretary of state. More 
 perhaps than any other President we have ever had, he was the 
 autocrat of his administration, giving his cabinet ministers little 
 or no initiative, and being himself the author of all important 
 measures. This autocracy of his was least marked in respect 
 to the treasury department, since he probably realized his own 
 weakness as a financier, and it was most marked in foreign af- 
 fairs, of which, because of his experience as secretary of state 
 and as minister to France, he regarded himself, and not un- 
 justly, as a past master. His secretary of the treasury was 
 Albert Gallatin, who was comparable with Hamilton himself in 
 ability; of war, Henry Dearborn; of the navy, Robert Smith; 
 his postmaster-general was Gideon Granger; and his attorney- 
 general was Levi Lincoln. The only important names on the list 
 were those of Madison and Gallatin. 
 
 He established no new foreign missions. But he sent Robert 
 R. Livingston of New York as minister to France. Livingston 
 had been a member of the committee of the Continental Con- 
 gress which drafted the Declaration of Independence, and sec- 
 retary for foreign affaire under the Congress of the Confedera- 
 tion; in which latter place French intriguers claimed, probably 
 without much truth, to have him under their control. Wash- 
 ington had offered him the mission to France in 1794, but he 
 had declined it. Perhaps his greatest service to the nation and 
 to the world was his invaluable encouragement and aid to 
 Robert Fulton in perfecting the steamboat. To Great Britain,
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 227 
 
 Jefferson sent James Monroe, who had been so unsatisfactory a 
 minister to France and had been recalled by Washington in 
 disgrace. The mission to Spain was filled with Charles Pinck- 
 ney of South Carolina, a man of experience and ability, a worthy 
 member of one of the most distinguished Carolinian families 
 of revolutionary times. These three were the only foreign rep- 
 resentatives sent out by Jefferson, the missions to Holland, 
 Prussia, and Portugal being left vacant. 
 
 It was the good fortune of Jefferson and his colleagues to 
 enter office at a time of peace and friendliness in all our foreign 
 relations. "Washington had established a modus vivendi with 
 Spain, which still prevailed, and had effected full treaty rela- 
 tions with Great Britain. Adams had fought successfully an 
 undeclared war with France, and had sacrificed the remainder 
 of his political career in his noble endeavor to prevent an open 
 declaration of war and to restore peace ; so that the first diplo- 
 matic act of Jefferson's administration was to exchange the 
 ratifications of the treaty with France, which his predecessor 
 had negotiated. There were, however, in respect to various 
 foreign powers grave and complicated problems which had ex- 
 isted for many years; and which despite postponement were 
 more and more exigent in their demands for ultimate solution. 
 
 The first of these in point of time was the trouble with the 
 pirates of Tripoli. With all the four Barbary powers we had 
 made an agreement under which we were securing a certain de- 
 gree of security for our commerce by virtue of paying yearly 
 tributes of blackmail. But none of them fully respected our 
 commercial rights, while Tripoli openly ignored them ; and it 
 became evident that a settlement must be effected not by the 
 state department but by the navy. And here arose one of Jef- 
 ferson's self-reversals. Hitherto he had literally hated the 
 nav}'. He did not want the United States to have a real navy 
 at all. A few gunboats, which could be dragged up out of the 
 water and stored somewhere under cover, would in his opinion 
 be sufficient. When he became President he found the seven 
 fine frigates which had been built in the preceding administra- 
 tion, and he quickly laid up five of them at the Washington 
 navy yard, out of commission. But very soon he was compelled 
 to send the ships into vigorous action. The Pasha of Tripoli
 
 228 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 was at this time receiving $83,000 a year in tribute, or black- 
 mail, from the United States. But he regarded this as too little 
 in comparison vnih what the piratical rulers of Morocco, Al- 
 giers and Tunis received, and accordingly he began making 
 trouble. In May, 1801, he declared war against the United 
 States by cutting down the flagstaff of the American consulate. 
 Some weeks later the American frigate George Washington 
 came home from the Mediterranean with the news of that per- 
 formance, and also with the news of other outrages and insults 
 which had been heaped upon the American flag and upon that 
 ship by the Dey of Algiers. Jefferson had already sent two 
 frigates and a schooner to those waters, and on the receipt of 
 these reports he sent another frigate. On August 1 a clash oc- 
 curred, when one of the American ships captured a Tripolitan 
 cruiser. But it did not keep it as a prize, Jefferson was a 
 stickler for strict construction of the Constitution, and that in- 
 strument gave to Congress alone the power to declare war. 
 To seize and to keep a vessel as a prize would be an act of war, 
 and that, he thought, he had no right to commit vrithout formal 
 declaration by Congress. So he instructed the naval com- 
 manders on seizing a ship belonging to one of those powers to 
 dismantle it, to throw its guns and ammunition overboard, and 
 then to let it go again with just enough sail to enable it to reach 
 the nearest home port. That, he thought, would not be waging 
 war, as the taking of prizes would. In the case of this one Tri- 
 politan vessel the process was effective, for it gave the pirates 
 a wholesome fear of American warships and constrained them 
 to mend their ways for a time. 
 
 But in 1803 it was found necessary to wage a vigorous cam- 
 paign, with all the characteristics of actual war though without 
 a formal declaration by Congress. This was conducted with 
 great gallantry by Preble, Bainbridge, Decatur, and other com- 
 manders. A land expedition was also organized, though with- 
 out official authority, which carried the American flag across 
 five hundred miles of Libyan desert, overran half of Tripoli, and 
 captured the important city of Derne. That brought the Pasha 
 of Tripoli to his senses, and he agreed to release the American 
 captives whom he held for a ransom, and thereafter to waive all 
 tribute and to respect American commerce. This treaty of peace
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 229 
 
 and amity was made in 1805. It was not, however, until years 
 afterward, in 1815, that our relations with the Barbary States 
 were put upon a permanently satisfactory basis. It was then 
 that Decatur, with a veteran squadron from the War of 1812, 
 revisited that coast and under the muzzles of his cannon com- 
 pelled the piratical despots to sign treaties in which there was 
 no hint of tribute or blackmail. It was in 1815 that a new treaty 
 of peace and amity was made with Alters, with the abolition 
 of the hateful and humiliating- tribute which we had re^larly 
 paid down to that time. 
 
 The next matter to be taken up from the arrears of the former 
 administrations was the dispute with Spain over the navigation 
 of the Mississippi River, of which we have already had an ac- 
 count down to the making of a treaty by Thomas Pinckney in 
 1795. Under that treaty, it will be recalled, the United States 
 had the right to navigate the river, and also to use New Orleans 
 as a port of deposit and transfer. That treaty was made for only 
 three years. At the end of that term it was renewed for three 
 years more, but it became increasingly evident that it could not 
 be permanently maintained. Spain had from the first been 
 seeking a way to get rid of it; and she subjected our enjoyment 
 of its privileges to increasing annoyances which became little 
 short of intolerable. It became obvious that a radical settlement 
 of some sort would have speedily to be made, and the impression 
 gained weight that such a settlement, to be permanent and satis- 
 factory, would have to be on the basis which Hamilton had long 
 before suggested, namely, the proprietorship of the territory 
 fronting upon the river. 
 
 That territory was known as Louisiana. It comprised some- 
 thing like one third of the entire present area of the United 
 States. It extended from the Gulf of Mexico northward to the 
 Canada line. It stretched east and west from the Mississippi 
 River to the Rocky IMountains. At the south it comprised a 
 small area on the eastern side of the river, thus giving it sov- 
 ereign control of both banks of that stream, and it extended 
 westward along the Gulf coast, some said to the Sabine River, 
 some to the Nueces, and some to the Rio Grande. That was a 
 boundary dispute of which more was to be heard in after years. 
 By virtue of original discoveiy, exploration, and settlement it
 
 230 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 was a French possession. La Salle, Iberville, and Bienville had 
 planted there the lily flag of the Bourbons, and in 1718 New 
 Orleans had been founded, on the lower part of the Mississippi, 
 where both shores of that river were the property of France. 
 For many years the colony led a comparatively peaceful life. 
 It was too far removed from the North Atlantic coast to be much 
 involved in the wars which raged in New England and Canada. 
 But in 1763, at the end of the French and Indian War, France 
 ceded it to Spain, partly to avoid its being taken by the triumph- 
 ant British and Americans who were taking all else that France 
 had on this continent, and partly to compensate Spain for the 
 losses which she had suffered through her efforts to aid France 
 in that war. It remained Spanish to the end of that century, 
 and thus gave Spain the opportunity to annoy and to embar- 
 rass the United States in the matter of navigating the Missis- 
 sippi. 
 
 There occurred at that time, however, a series of incidents 
 which are too much ignored in history, but which had a most 
 pertinent bearing upon subsequent events. "When France ceded 
 Louisiana to Spain in 1763, it ceded the little part of it east of 
 the Mississippi, on the lower part of that river, to Great Britain 
 — all save the island on which stood the city of New Orleans. 
 That gave Great Britain ownership of the entire eastern shore 
 of the river, clear to the Gulf, with the exception of the city of 
 New Orleans. France, moreover, guaranteed by treaty to Great 
 Britain the freedom of the river, ' ' from its source to the sea, and 
 expressly that part which is between the Island of New Orleans 
 and the right bank of that river, as well as the passage both in 
 and out of its mouth." That treaty should, of course, have 
 averted any further dispute over the river, for the United States 
 in 1783 should have succeeded to all the rights which Great 
 Britain had secured twenty years before. But we must not for- 
 get the capacity of the British government at that time for 
 blundering, especially in American affairs. All of Florida, 
 which included the whole Gulf coast westward to Louisiana, was 
 at that time temporarily transferred to Great Britain by Spain, 
 in exchange for Cuba. The British government thereupon 
 divided it into two provinces. East Florida comprised the pres- 
 ent State of Florida. West Florida comprised the southern
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 231 
 
 ends of what are now the States of Alabama and Mississippi, and 
 also that bit of Louisiana east of the big river. Then the limits 
 of West Florida were extended northward, so as to include the 
 east bank of the Mississippi as far up as Natchez. 
 
 In this creation and enlargement of the province of West 
 Florida were sown the seeds of trouble. For at the close of 
 our revolution Great Britain ceded the two Floridas back to 
 Spain, and Spain shrewdly and not altogether unreasonably in- 
 sisted that she was entitled to West Florida, not merely as it was 
 twenty years before but as it had now become through the Brit- 
 ish enlargement of it. She claimed, that is to say, possession of 
 the small corner of Louisiana east of the Mississippi, and of the 
 territory northward to Natchez. In the former claim, of the 
 corner of Louisiana, Great Britain acquiesced, and thus gave to 
 Spain both sides of the Mississippi River for mare than two 
 hundred miles up from its mouth. The latter claim, of the lands 
 northward to Natchez, was not granted, but the territory in 
 question constituted the disputed Yazoo lands, which under our 
 treaty of peace with Great Britain were to belong to us if Florida 
 was given back to Spain, but to Great Britain if she should re- 
 tain possession of Florida. Under Pinckney's treaty of 1795 
 Spain finally relinquished the Yazoo lands to the United States, 
 but she remained in possession of that southeastern comer of 
 Louisiana. Great Britain and the United States agreed in their 
 treaty of peace that the Mississippi should be open and free to 
 them both throughout its entire course, according to the French 
 and British treaty of 1763. But Spain refused to recognize 
 the validity of that agreement, on the ground of the radical 
 change in conditions which had been effected by her acquisition 
 of that corner of Louisiana and consequently of both banks of 
 the river. 
 
 There were then, as indeed there still are, two theories concern- 
 ing national and international rights on such a river. One was 
 that the stream was absolutely owned and controlled by the 
 power which owned its banks, so that others could navigate it 
 only through courtesy and on sufferance. The other was, that ^ 
 any power which had a frontage upon any part of the river had 
 a natural right to navigate all parts of it. International law 
 has never yet completely decided between the two, though the
 
 232 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 weight of logic and of practice is certainly on the side of the 
 former. Germany would scarcely concede that Russia had 
 a natural right to send merchant ships and ships of war up 
 and down the Vistula, across Prussian territory; nor that her 
 own shipping was entitled to navigate the Danube, clear across 
 the Austro-Hungarian Empire. If there were a navigable pas- 
 sage from Lake Champlain to the Hudson, we should scarcely 
 admit the natural right of Canadian shipping to come down 
 the Hudson to the sea without so much as saying, "By your 
 leave." Such navigation of such rivers as the St. Lawrence, 
 the Danube, and the Rhine is a matter of treaty stipulation. 
 Technically, therefore, Spain was in the right and our use of 
 the lower Mississippi was to be enjoyed by us as a grant from 
 her. 
 
 Hamilton inclined to this view. But he also realized that 
 treaty arrangements between the United States and Spain would 
 not prove permanently satisfactory. The navigation of the 
 Mississippi was of so great and indeed vital importance to us that 
 it must be not merely our privilege but our right. To that end 
 he at an early date insisted that we must acquire the Louisiana 
 Territory, so as to own both shores of the river from its source 
 to its mouth ; just as we already owned the Ohio and the Hud- 
 son. ]\Iore than that, he similarly advocated the acquisition of 
 Florida, in order that we might control the narrow seas through 
 which commerce must pass between the Mississippi and the At- 
 lantic. Meantime, until such acquisition of territory could be 
 effected, he would demand free navigation of the Mississippi, 
 on the ground that it was essential. One of his last acts, if 
 not his very last, as a member of the Congress of the old Con- 
 federation, was to introduce a resolution declaring that the navi- 
 gation of the Mississippi to the sea was a clear and essential 
 right of the United States and was to be insisted upon and main-- 
 tained as such; which unfortunately was not adopted. Again, 
 as secretary of the treasury in Washington's cabinet, he de- 
 clared that the free use of the river was "essential to the 
 unity of the empire. ' ' He was supremely the prophet of Ameri- 
 can territorial expansion to a predominant position on the con- 
 tinent. Referring to Louisiana and Florida, he wrote to Picker- 
 ing, in the Adams administration, "I have long been in the
 
 THOMAS JEFFERSON
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 233 
 
 habit of considering the acquisition of those countries as essen- 
 tial to the permanence of the Union," and in "The Federalist" 
 he had written, ' ' Our situation invites and prompts us to aim at 
 an ascendant in American affairs." His idea was that we 
 should occupy the continent from sea to sea, as we do to-day; 
 and of course the absolute ownership of the Mississippi was es- 
 sential to the realization of that scheme. 
 
 Jefferson, Madison, and the Republicans generally inclined 
 toward the other view, that we had somehow a natural right to 
 navigate a river which was undisputably a territorial water of 
 Spain. Madison, indeed, was before Hamilton himself in point 
 of time in demanding the opening of the Mississippi to Ameri- 
 can commerce. During the Revolution he urged that as an in- 
 dispensable condition to the making of any treaty with Spain, 
 and he resolutely maintained that position even after his own 
 State of Virginia had relinquished it. When Jay, in 1786, pro- 
 posed a treaty with Spain under which the right to navigate the 
 river would be temporarily held in abeyance, JMadison strenu- 
 ously opposed it and made personal appeals to Washington and 
 Lafayette against it. Such were the sentiments of the man who 
 now had to deal with the matter as Jefferson 's secretary of state. 
 Nor was Jefferson himself less insistent upon the opening of 
 the river. He, too, had opposed the treaty of 1786 on that 
 ground. ' ' The act which abandons it, ' ' he said, referring to our 
 claim to navigate the Mississippi, "is an act of separation be- 
 tween the eastern and western country." He had in view, of 
 course, the threats of secession which Kentucky was making, 
 in 1787, and which he believed would be fulfilled if the river 
 were not freely opened and kept open. Again, as Washington's 
 secretary of state, he argued that Spain's ownership of the 
 shores of the river gave her no power to close the stream against 
 our commerce, and he warned the Spanish government that if it 
 did not grant our just demands for freedom of transit, it would 
 be impossible to assure the forbearance of our western citizens. 
 In brief, if Spain would not open the river peaceably, we should 
 do so with force and arms. 
 
 Upon the fundamental principle, then, that we must have free 
 navigation of the Mississippi, all were agreed. A confident hope 
 of the maintenance of that principle had checked the rising mad-
 
 234 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ness of disaffection and secession in the West; a madness of 
 which only one permanent memorial remains. To this day there 
 stands in the southwestern corner of Missouri the city of New 
 Madrid, which was founded by renegade Americans, who, at the 
 incitement of Spain, moved across the river from the United 
 States to Spanish soil, renounced American citizenship, and 
 swore allegiance to the King of Spain, in order that thus they 
 might obtain the right to navigate the river. It is well to keep 
 that disgraceful name upon the map, "lest we forget," as a re- 
 minder that Americans as well as other peoples have at times 
 been capable of declining to the very nadir of pusillanimity, 
 baseness, and treason. 
 
 All that had passed, or at least was for the time held in innocu- 
 ous abeyance. But Spain was by no means reconciled to the 
 state of affairs established by the treaty of 1785. At the end 
 of the Revolution she had tried her utmost to keep the United 
 States shut away from any frontage upon the Mississippi and 
 from any direct contact with her colonies, and it was now a 
 constant cause of annoyance and exasperation to have this coun- 
 try seated upon the eastern shore of the river, navigating it 
 freely through exclusively Spanish territory, and actually using 
 Spanish soil for the purposes of a commercial landing and ship- 
 ping place. The passage of time did not allay but rather deep- 
 ened and intensified this resentful passion, and strengthened the 
 resolution of Spain in some way to get rid of these hateful con- 
 ditions. Of course the treaty giving us the use of the river and 
 port had to be made when Pinckney so strenuously demanded 
 it, and it had to be renewed at the end of three years. Spain 
 was not strong enough to incur the danger of war with America 
 which would have been involved in her refusal. But during 
 the existence of the treaty she sought in every way to make our 
 enjoyment of it as little profitable as possible, and after it had 
 been renewed once she determined that it should not be renewed 
 a second time; at any rate, not by her. We must remember, 
 indeed, that it was only on a showing of military force by the 
 United States that Spain fulfilled that treaty at all. The treaty 
 was made in 1795 and was ratified in 1796, but it was not until 
 1798, and after the sending of a detachment of United States 
 troops to that region, that Spain withdrew her garrison from
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 235 
 
 Natchez, relinquished the Yazoo lands to this country, and 
 opened the river fully to our shipping. 
 
 The plan adopted by Spain for getting out of a distasteful 
 situation was quite simple and effective. "If the Mountain will 
 not come to Mohammed," said the Arabian prophet, "Mo- 
 hammed will go to the Mountain," If the United States would 
 not keep away from Spain, Spain would move away from the 
 United States. She had tried for years to secure a buffer State 
 between herself and us on the eastern side of the Mississippi, 
 and had failed. The restless, inexorable Americans had pushed 
 their way westward to the Mississippi, and southward almost to 
 the Gulf, and might at any time go further still, Spain could 
 not resist them. Their ships had gone around into the Pacific, 
 and they might soon gain a foothold on the shores of that sea, 
 menacing her possessions in California and Mexico. Her only 
 recourse for safety was, therefore, to call in some other great 
 power to her aid. If she could sell Louisiana to some nation 
 which would be sufficiently powerful to hold it forever as a bar- 
 rier against the further westward march of the Americans, she 
 could herself retire beyond the mountains and rest in peace and 
 quiet. 
 
 Circumstances favored and facilitated the execution of this 
 plan, for France was as ready and as eager to repurchase Louis- 
 iana as Spain was to sell. France had never been reconciled to 
 her loss of her North American empire, and she particularly re- 
 gretted the loss of Louisiana, for she realized the inestimable 
 value of that province in either peace or war. In peace, it was 
 capable of becoming one of the richest and most populous coun- 
 tries on the globe. In war, it was the key to the entire continent. 
 So it was that in the treaty-making at the end of our Revolution 
 France had sided with Spain in tiying to shut us away from 
 the Mississippi, hoping thus to keep the door open for her own 
 reentry into Louisiana, So it was that Genet, on his extraordi- 
 nary mission to this countiy, sought first of all to organize ex- 
 peditions for the invasion of Florida and Louisiana, hoping by 
 the aid of renegade Americans to conquer those territories for 
 France, All these efforts had failed. But now a new and po- 
 tent factor had entered the problem. Napoleon Bonaparte had 
 become the practical autocrat of France, with unbounded ambi-
 
 236 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tion and unrivaled military genius ; and he had as his aid Talley- 
 rand, one of the most skilful and most unscrupulous diplomats 
 in the world. 
 
 Three considerations moved Bonaparte to anticipate Spanish 
 desires by making overtures for the transfer of Louisiana to 
 France. One was, the actual worth of the territory, with its 
 priceless natural resources and its vast field for colonization. A 
 second was its strategic utility in the war to the bitter end, which 
 he knew he had to wage with England. He was already plan- 
 ning to recover Santo Domingo as a base of operations for the 
 conquest of the West Indies. If he should acquire Louisiana, 
 he could send a fleet and an army up the ]\Iississippi and attack 
 Canada at the southwest, and thus perhaps regain that country 
 and drive Great Britain out of North America. The third and 
 by no means the least consideration was the personal prestige 
 which he would gain. He was the idol of the army, and of the 
 republican part of the populace. But he meant presently to dis- 
 card the mask of consul and assume the crown of emperor, and 
 he wished to ingratiate himself with all the people and to 
 strengthen his position in every way, in order that that great 
 usurpation might be favorably received. To that end, nothing 
 could be more effective than for him to regain Louisiana, the 
 vast region which had been won and then lost by the Bourbon 
 kings of France and which still bore the name of the Grand 
 Monarque. 
 
 With these ends in view, Bonaparte and Talleyrand found 
 little difficulty in inveigling Spain into what we might describe, 
 in the apt jargon of the street, as the biggest bunko game in 
 history. They purposed deliberately to swindle her out of Louis- 
 iana, and they achieved that purpose. At that time the titular 
 King of Spain was Charles IV, one of the most pitiable speci- 
 mens of weakness and unworthiness that ever occupied a deca- 
 dent throne. The real rulers of Spain were the king's wife, 
 Maria Louisa of Parma, who was a compound of Messalina of 
 Rome and Catherine the Great of Russia, and her favorite para- 
 mour, Don ]\Ianuel Godoy, who because of his negotiation of a 
 peace treaty with France was called the Prince of the Peace. 
 Knowing the fondness of this crowned harlot for her native 
 Italy, Bonaparte and Talleyrand made her an offer of an Italian
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 237 
 
 kingdom in exchange for Louisiana. The kingdom in question 
 was Tuscany, which Bonaparte had conquered and annexed in 
 the French invasion of Italy. It was a rich and splendid do- 
 main, with more than a million inhabitants, one of the finest 
 parts of all Italy, and Bonaparte's proposal was to bestow it 
 upon Louis, the prince-presumptive of Parma, who was the 
 nephew and son-in-law of the Spanish sovereigns, giving him 
 with it the title of King of Etruria. In return, France was to 
 have Louisiana, which she would pledge herself never to alienate 
 to the United States or any other country, but to hold as her 
 own forever as an effective buffer State between the remaining 
 American possessions of Spain and the much-dreaded and de- 
 tested United States. 
 
 This proposition was readily accepted by the queen, and by her 
 and her lover the complaisant king was led by the nose to give 
 his assent. Godoy did not, in fact, openly figure in the transac- 
 tion. He retired from the office of prime minister for a time, 
 partly perhaps because, with all his villainies, he had some de- 
 gree of patriotism and did not wish to appear a party to what 
 he knew was a bad bargain for Spain, and partly because he 
 was not on good terms with the French government and could 
 not comfortably conduct the negotiations. He therefore re- 
 tired from office when the negotiations began, and did not re- 
 sume it until their close. In his absence the compact was made, 
 in a secret treaty which was signed at San Ildefonso on October 
 1, 1800. It is interesting to recall that the treaty between 
 France and the United States, composing their serious differ- 
 ences, had been signed on the very day before, September 30. 
 Before the ink was fairly dry on the one, with the same pen 
 another was signed which was at least in spirit absolutely in- 
 compatible with it. 
 
 Spain and France both exulted over the secrecy with which 
 the treaty of San Ildefonso was made, a secrecy which was to 
 be maintained as long as possible. In that, they thought they 
 were repaying the United States for making the treaty of peace 
 with England in 1783 without their knowledge or consent, and 
 for inserting therein the secret clause about the Yazoo lands. 
 One feature of the treaty contained the germ of much subse- 
 quent trouble. That was, its failure to define the boundaries of
 
 238 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Louisiana, that territory being described simply as that pos- 
 sessed by Spain and formerly possessed by France. There was 
 no indication of the dividing line between it and the remaining 
 Spanish possessions at the southwest; whether that line was the 
 Sabine River or the Rio Grande. As for the purchase price for 
 Louisiana, the kingdom of Etruria or Tuscany, Bonaparte never 
 delivered it to Spain, more than in name. The pledge that 
 France would keep the territory as her own forever was speedily 
 repudiated. As for the stipulation of secrecy, it was manifestly 
 impossible that it should long be observed. It was agreed, in 
 pursuance of the policy of secrecy, that Spain should continue 
 in possession of the territory and should continue to administer 
 its government, just as she had been doing since 1763, until such 
 time as France was ready to let the bargain be known and to 
 take possession of the country with an adequate force. As a 
 matter of fact, such Spanish occupation continued throughout 
 all of France's brief ownership of Louisiana. 
 
 For a time the secret was well kept. Within a year, however, 
 inklings of it began to leak out. In the latter part of May, 1801, 
 Jefferson wrote to Monroe that there was reason to apprehend 
 that Spain had ceded or was about to cede both Louisiana and 
 the Floridas to France; and he added that such a transaction 
 would be very unwise for both of those countries, and "very 
 ominous to us." This apprehension was strengthened in the 
 fall of that year, when in November an expedition of thirty 
 thousand soldiers was despatched from France, under the com- 
 mand of Leclerc, Bonaparte's brother-in-law, for the reconquest 
 of Santo Domingo. Livingston, the American minister at Paris, 
 rightly discerned and reported the object of the expedition to be 
 first to reestablish French sovereignty in that island and then, 
 with the necessary reinforcements, to proceed to Louisiana and 
 to occupy that province. It was, moreover, expected that the 
 conquest of Santo Domingo would be effected with little trouble 
 or delay. The French assumed that Toussaint I'Ouverture 
 could readily be bribed to submit himself to their authority, or 
 if not could easily be subdued by force. But in that they were 
 tremendously disappointed. Leclerc succeeded in betraying 
 Toussaint to captivity and slow assassination, but that infamous 
 performance only roused the islanders to more resolute resist-
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 239 
 
 ance, with yellow fever as their ally. Within a year less than 
 one seventh of the French force remained alive and well, Leclere 
 himself was dead, and Santo Domingo was forever lost to France. 
 
 Before that catastrophe, however, the French operations in 
 that island and their evident intent, as set forth by Livingston, 
 to make Santo Domingo a stepping stone to Louisiana, created a 
 profound impression upon the always impressible Jefferson. 
 Soon after Leclere 's arrival in the island, and while the suc- 
 cess of his enterprise still seemed probable, the President, who 
 had been watching the progress of affairs with extreme anxiety, 
 wrote to Livingston at Paris one of the most remarkable letters 
 that ever were produced by his gifted pen. It was remarkable 
 alike for its account of the attitude of the United States toward 
 the supposed designs of France upon Louisiana, and for its ex- 
 hibition of his complete self-reversal in policy toward France 
 and England and toward peace and war. By the stroke of a 
 pen he transformed himself from a foe of England to her friend 
 and wooer, from a lover of France to her relentless enemy, from 
 an opponent of naval construction to an advocate of its extreme 
 expansion, from the opponent of entangling alliances to their ar- 
 dent advocate, from a stickler for peace to a passionate propa- 
 gandist of war. But above all as a sane and statesmanlike view 
 of essential policies of national protection, and as an adumbration 
 of that supreme doctrine of the right of self-preservation and 
 self-defense which was in a later administration explicitly enun- 
 ciated and executed, Jefferson's letter deserves rehearsal and re- 
 membrance. He said : 
 
 "The cession of Louisiana and the Floridas by Spain to France 
 works most sorely on the United States. On this subject the 
 secretary of state has written to you fully ; yet I cannot forbear 
 recurring to it personally, so deep is the impression it makes on 
 my mind. It completely reverses all the political relations of 
 the United States, and will form a new epoch in our political 
 course. Of all nations of any consideration, France is the one 
 which, hitherto, has offered the fewest points on which we could 
 have conflict of right, and the most points of a communion of 
 interests. From these causes we have ever looked to her as our 
 natural friend, as one with which we never could have an occa- 
 sion of difference. Her growth, therefore, we viewed as our
 
 240 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 own, her misfortunes ours. There is on the globe one single spot, 
 the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is 
 New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our 
 territory must pass to market, and from its fertility it will ere 
 long yield more than half of our whole produce, and contain 
 more than half of our inhabitants. France, placing herself in 
 that door, assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might 
 have retained it quietly for years. Her pacific disposition, her 
 feeble state, would induce her to increase our facilities there so 
 that her possession of the place would hardly be felt by us, and 
 it would not, perhaps, be very long before some circumstance 
 might arise which might make the cession of it to us the price 
 of something of more worth to her. Not so can it ever be in the 
 hands of France ; the impetuosity of her temper, the energy and 
 restlessness of her character, placed in a point of eternal friction 
 with us, and our character, which though quiet and loving peace 
 and the pursuit of wealth, is high-minded, despising wealth in 
 competition with insult or injury, enterprising and energetic as 
 any nation on earth. 
 
 "These circumstances render it impossible that France and 
 the United States can continue long friends when they meet in 
 so irritable a position. They, as well as we, must be blind if 
 they do not see this, and we must be very improvident if we 
 do not begin to make arrangements on that hypothesis. The day 
 that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence 
 which is to retain her forever within her low-water mark. It 
 seals the union of two nations who, in conjunction, can main- 
 tain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we 
 must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must 
 turn all our attention to a maritime force, for which our re- 
 sources place us on very high ground, and having formed and 
 connected together a power which may render reinforcement of 
 her settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon 
 which shall be fired in Europe the signal for the tearing up of 
 any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two 
 continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes 
 of the united British and American nations. 
 
 "This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is one 
 which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us as neces-
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 241 
 
 sarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its 
 necessary effect. It is not from a fear of France that we depre- 
 cate this measure proposed by her, for, however greater her force 
 is than ours, compared in the abstract, it is nothing in comparison 
 to ours when to be exerted on our soil ; but it is from a sincere 
 love of peace, and a firm persuasion that, bound to France by 
 the interests and strong sympathies still existing in the minds 
 of our citizens, and holding relative positions which insure their 
 continuance, we are secure of a long course of peace, whereas the 
 change of friends, which will be rendered necessary if France 
 changes that position, embarks us necessarily as a belligerent 
 power in the first war o:^ Europe. In that case France will 
 have held possession of New Orleans during the interval of 
 peace, long or short, at the end of which it will be wrested from 
 her. Will this short-lived possession have been an equivalent 
 to her for the transfer of such a weight into the scale of her 
 enemy ? Will not the amalgamation of a young, thriving nation 
 continue to that enemy the health and force which are now so 
 evidently on the decline? And will a few years' possession of 
 New Orleans add equally to the strength of France? She may 
 say she needs Louisiana for the supply of her West Indies. She 
 does not need it in time of peace, and in war she could not de- 
 pend on them, because they would be so easily intercepted. 
 
 * ' I should suppose that all these considerations might in some 
 proper form be brought into view of the Government of France. 
 Though stated by us, it ought not to give offense, because we 
 do not bring them forward as a menace, but as consequences not 
 controllable by us, but inevitable from the course of things. We 
 mention them not as things which we desire by any means, but 
 as things we deprecate, and we beseech a friend to look forward, 
 and to prevent them for our common interest." 
 
 Six months later, on October 16, 1802, either Morales, the 
 Spanish intendant, or Salcedo, the Spanish governor, at New 
 Orleans, arbitrarily and without warning revoked the American 
 right to use that city as a port of deposit. That was the first 
 step toward disclosing the terms of the treaty of San Ildefonso 
 and toward turning Louisiana over to its new owners. The 
 news of this did not reach Washington for several weeks. But 
 when it did it created one of the most profound sensations the 
 
 VOL. I 16
 
 242 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 American republic had thus far known. The whole country 
 was swept with fiery tides of passion, amid which, strange to 
 say, the one man who remained cool, calm, conservative, and 
 master of himself was the usually impressionable and impulsive 
 Jefferson. In the West, in Illinois and Kentucky, the settlers 
 were furious. Years before they had exercised immeasurable 
 patience and forbearance in the face of great provocation, trust- 
 ing to the promise that their interests would be protected and 
 their rights would be vindicated. But now all seemed to be in 
 vain. The treaty which secured their rights was wantonly repu- 
 diated and their vital interests were sacrificed. They were 
 chiefly political followers of Jefferson, but here was a crisis su- 
 perior to party politics. If Jefferson could not or would not 
 protect them in their rights, they would no longer have regard 
 for him. For the moment they hesitated on the tumiug of a 
 hair, whether to revolt against the Government which seemed 
 unable to protect them and to secede from the Union, or to rush 
 into war against Spain or France or whatever power barred 
 their free access to the sea. Nor were Jefferson's opponents, 
 the Federalists, at the East, less strenuous. Moved partly by 
 patriotic indignation, and partly by a malicious factional desire 
 to embarrass Jefferson, they too clamored for instant war. 
 
 In this crisis, the most serious he ever had to meet, Jefferson 
 comported himself in a manner worthy of Washington himself. 
 His serenity remained unruffled. There was not a touch of the 
 excitement which he had betrayed in his letter to Livingston, 
 months before. The situation was too grave. With a singular 
 combination of the broad and masterful principles of a states- 
 man and of the shrewd and adroit tactics of the most astute and 
 consummate politician America has ever produced, he set him- 
 self to the double task of allaying popular excitement and of 
 seeking a radical and permanent settlement of the long-vexing 
 problem. In both he was splendidly successful. His first 
 thought was to calm the mind of the West; for which purpose 
 he sent Breckinridge thither to intimate to influential men what 
 his policy would be. Then Congress met, confronting an issue 
 of portentous gravity, with the nation clamoring for action. 
 Every one listened for the report and recommendations which 
 Jefferson would make in his message at the opening of the ses-
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 243 
 
 sion. Had he recommended war it would have been voted in 
 an hour. Had he acquiesced in the action of the Spanish au- 
 thorities, the whole West would have risen in revolt. He did 
 neither. Calmly and unconcernedly, as though nothing extra- 
 ordinary was happening, he contented himself with observing 
 that Spain appeared to be transferring Louisiana to France, and 
 that the transaction, if completed, would cause some changes in 
 the aspect of our foreign relations. That was all. Of the na- 
 ture of the impending changes he said nothing, nor did he dis- 
 close the course which he intended to pursue in regard to them. 
 This device, audacious in its insouciant simplicity, and exhibiting 
 a confidence and an unconcern which it is impossible to imagine 
 Jefferson really felt, was for the time effective. But a few weeks 
 later some definite action was inevitable. ^ 
 
 Early in January, 1803, General Smith of Maryland, one of 
 the foremost members of the House of Representatives, one day 
 moved a secret session of that body; and when the public had 
 been excluded and the doors closed he further moved "that a 
 sum of two million dollars be appropriated to defray any ex- 
 penses which may be incurred between the United States and 
 foreign nations, to be applied under the direction of the Presi- 
 dent." It was explained, in offering this resolution, that its 
 object was "to enable the executive to commence with more 
 effect a negotiation with the French and Spanish governments 
 relative to the purchase of the Islands of New Orleans and the 
 provinces of East and West Florida." In further explanation 
 the report of the committee which had the revolution in charge 
 continued: "If we look forward to the free use of the Miss- 
 issippi and the other rivers of the West, New Orleans and the 
 Floridas must become a part of the United States, either by pur- 
 chase or by conquest. The great question, then, which presents 
 itself is. Shall we at this time lay the foundation for future 
 peace by offering a fair equivalent consideration, or shall we 
 hereafter incur the hazards and the horrors of war?" This 
 resolution was adopted, and a few weeks later Congress author- 
 ized the enlistment of 80,000 volunteers. 
 
 It is probable that many of those who voted for these meas- 
 ures were trying to embarrass the President, or to force his 
 hand. But Jefferson was not to be beaten at any game of poli-
 
 244 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tics, nor was he idle at this crucial time. On the very day when 
 General Smith's resolution was presented, he nominated Mon- 
 roe to be minister extraordinary to France and Spain, to co- 
 operate with Livingston at Paris in negotiating a settlement. 
 If negotiations at Madrid were needed, Pinckney, our minister 
 there, was to act with them. He explained to Monroe that the 
 Federalists were seeking either to plunge the country into war, 
 or to win the people of the West away from him and so defeat 
 him at the next election. Something must therefore be done 
 which would produce a profound effect upon the public mind for 
 the counteracting of such schemes. He regretted the necessity 
 for doing anjrthing, because an entanglement in European poli- 
 tics would not be to the advantage of the United States. Never- 
 theless, action was necessary. He urged Monroe to make haste, 
 "as the moment in France is critical." And so he instructed 
 Monroe and Livingston to negotiate for the purchase of New 
 Orleans and the other Louisiana territory on the east bank of 
 the Mississippi, and perhaps also of East and West Florida, or 
 so much of them as the possessor could be prevailed upon to part 
 with. His idea was that ownership of the entire eastern shore 
 of the river would sufficiently safeguard our right to navigate. 
 The greater scheme, of acquiring the whole Louisiana territory, 
 was left in abeyance, and it is probable that he regarded it with 
 disfavor. Nevertheless, he at the same time sent the Lewis and 
 Clark expedition across the northern part of that territory, to 
 explore the Oregon country, the Pacific coast of which had al- 
 ready been visited by American vessels. 
 
 Jefferson's state of mind was disclosed in another letter which 
 he wrote to Livingston, in which he said that "the future desti- 
 nies of our country hang on the event of this negotiation," for 
 if we could not acquire New Orleans, war was inevitable. To 
 Dupont de Nemours he wrote: "The use of the Mississippi is 
 so indispensable that we cannot one moment hesitate to hazard 
 our existence for its maintenance." And a little later he wrote 
 to Monroe and Livingston that if their negotiations with the 
 French government failed, they should withdraw from Paris, 
 go over to London, and negotiate with the British government 
 an aggressive alliance against France. Indeed, Jefferson had 
 himself, weeks before, told Thornton, the British charge d'af-
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 245 
 
 faires at "Washington, that he thought such a course probable, 
 and that if it was necessary to employ force against France 
 or Spain, the United States, having once drawn the sword, 
 would throw away the scabbard. Pichon, the French charge 
 at Washington, was much alarmed, and informed Talleyrand 
 that the American government was intensely bitter against 
 France, and that Jefferson was likely to make an alliance with 
 Great Britain. Madison personally told Pichon that the pos- 
 session of New Orleans and West Florida was a necessity for 
 this country. The Spanish government, too, was much con- 
 cerned, although it was merely a locum tenens for France, and 
 in April its minister at Washington informed Madison that the 
 right to use New Orleans as a port of deposit would be at. once 
 restored, and he thanked our government for its patience and 
 forbearance. 
 
 Meantime, negotiations had been proceeding in Paris for a 
 final settlement. In advance of Monroe's arrival Livingston 
 had broached the matter to Talleyrand, with no success and with 
 little encouragement. Bonaparte was still possessed of the ideas 
 which he had cherished when Louisiana was acquired from 
 Spain. He would not part with a single rood of ground on 
 which he meant to build up a great American Empire. Living- 
 ston was told that, in effect, and was much disheartened, seeing 
 no alternative to a war. But then there came a sudden and 
 complete transformation of the scene. Bonaparte realized the 
 disastrous failure of French arms in Santo Domingo, and was 
 for that reason disgusted with colonial enterprises. He could 
 not hope to conquer that island without sending over large re- 
 inforcements, and he could not send them, for two reasons: 
 First, that he would need all his soldiers at home in the war 
 which he knew was impending with Great Britain and probably 
 some continental allies ; and second, that the British fleet would 
 render it impossible for him to send such an expedition across the 
 ocean. For these same reasons he could not send an expedition 
 to take possession of Louisiana. Indeed, it would be folly to 
 attempt to occupy and to hold Louisiana without first making 
 sure of Santo Domingo. He realized that Louisiana would be 
 exceedingly vulnerable and easily taken from him in war even 
 by the United States alone, while against a hostile combination
 
 246 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of the American army and the British fleet resistance would be 
 folly. It is probable, also, that he saw with prophetic eye the 
 development of a powerful American navy, which would contest 
 with Great Britain the mastery of the seas, and he hoped 
 through it to see the power of his great rival humbled ; to which 
 end it was worth while to give America scope for development. 
 Finally, he realized that a round sum of American money would 
 be uncommonly convenient to add to his war-chest, as soon as 
 the brief peace of Amiens was broken. Of course, in the treaty 
 of San Ildefonso he had solemnly covenanted with the King of 
 Spain that he would not alienate Louisiana to any other power. 
 But it does not appear that he took the trouble to remember that 
 promise. Certainly he did not let it stand for a moment in the 
 way of his designs, 
 
 Monroe arrived in France early in April. On April 10 Liv- 
 ingston wrote to him at Havre, saying: "We have long and 
 anxiously waited for you. God grant that your mission may 
 answer your and the public expectation. War may do some- 
 thing for us; nothing else would," That was Sunday, Easter 
 day. That evening Bonaparte had with him at St. Cloud his 
 foreign minister, Talleyrand, and his treasury minister, Mar- 
 bois. The latter had spent some time in the diplomatic service 
 in America. He also differed from Talleyrand in being truth- 
 ful and pecuniarily honest. The three held a long conference 
 over the Louisiana business and the stormy outlook in England ; 
 which was prolonged so late that the ministers remained at St. 
 Cloud all night. Talleyrand opposed the sale of New Orleans, 
 while Marbois advocated it. Bonaparte himself was undecided, 
 but, because of bad news from England, was inclined to make 
 the sale. He feared, indeed, that England had already seized, 
 or was about to seize, Louisiana. "If," he said, "I leave the 
 least time to our enemies, I shall transmit only an empty title 
 to those Republicans whose friendship I seek. They ask of me 
 only one town in Louisiana ; but I consider that the whole colony 
 is already lost. Besides, in the hands of that growing power the 
 province will be more useful to the policy and even to the com- 
 merce of France than it will be if I attempt to retain it." 
 
 Early the next morning Bonaparte sent for Marbois, doubt- 
 less selecting him rather than Talleyrand to conduct a financial
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 247 
 
 transaction because he believed Marbois to be honest. To him 
 he said: "There is no more time for irresolution and delibera- 
 tion. I renounce Louisiana. I will cede not only New Orleans 
 but the entire territory, without reservation. Therefore nego- 
 tiate at once to that end. Do not wait for Mr. Monroe to get 
 here to-morrow. See Mt. Livingston about it to-day. I want 
 fifty million francs for the territory, and will take no less. Let 
 me know hour by hour how your negotiations proceed. Keep 
 Talleyrand also informed." It does not appear whether Mar- 
 bois told this to Talleyrand before he went to Livingston, or, 
 which is more probable, Talleyrand listened at the keyhole. But 
 iit any rate Talleyrand learned of it and got to Livingston ahead 
 o*" Marbois. He asked him if the United States wanted to buy 
 the whole of Louisiana. Livingston, mindful of his instructions 
 to negotiate for only New Orleans and Florida, answered. No; 
 adding, however, that he thought it would be good policy for 
 France to sell it all, or at least the northern part, above the 
 Arkansas River, which would never be of practical use to her. 
 Talleyrand retorted that without New Orleans the whole of 
 Louisiana would be useless to France, and he asked what Living- 
 ston thought the United States would be willing to pay for it 
 Livingston replied that he was not prepared to name a price, 
 as he had no instructions to that end and had given the matter 
 no thought, but he supposed that the United States would pay 
 as much as twenty million francs, provided that France would 
 pay the claims of American citizens for spoliations. Talleyrand 
 objected that this was too little, whereupon Livingston said that 
 lie would discuss the subject with Monroe immediately upon his 
 arrival. 
 
 Marbois, despite Bonaparte's urging, appears not to have seen 
 Livingston that day. The next day, Tuesday, Monroe arrived 
 and W£is much surprised to learn from Livingston of Talley- 
 rand's overtures. In the evening as they were discussing at 
 dinner the question of price, Marbois called. As Monroe had 
 not yet been formally received as minister by Bonaparte, Mar- 
 bois did not negotiate with him, but with Livingston alone. 
 They discussed the matter until a late hour, and then Living- 
 ston went to Marbois 's house and remained there until midnight. 
 Bonaparte had named fifty million francs as the minimum price,
 
 248 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 but Marbois, like a faithful minister and shrewd dealer, sought 
 to get as much more as possible. He asked first for 125,000,000, 
 but at midnight lowered his demand to 100,000,000; though he 
 confessed to Livingston that it was still an exorbitant price. 
 After leaving Marbois, with the bargain still unsettled, Living- 
 ston, without waiting to confer with Monroe, wrote to Madison, 
 telling of the offer and saying that he believed it would be wise 
 to purchase the territory at that price. He admitted that the 
 price was too high. But, he said, some of the purchase price 
 could be got back by reselling the territory west of the Miss- 
 issippi to some European power whose presence there we should 
 not fear ! That was perhaps the most astounding proposal ever 
 made by a minister of the United States. It of course never re- 
 ceived serious consideration, and has never been repeated. 
 
 The negotiations then dragged on slowly, partly because of the 
 malicious obstruction of Talleyrand, who postponed presenting 
 Monroe to Bonaparte until May 1, thus compelling all the direct 
 negotiations to be conducted by Livingston alone. Livingston 
 and Monroe agreed that it would be safe to offer fifty million 
 francs, but that they should first trj^ a smaller sum. So Liv- 
 ingston offered forty millions, of which one half should be re- 
 turned to satisfy American claims for spoliations. Marbois re- 
 ported this to Bonaparte, who was much displeased; so that 
 Marbois reported to Livingston that the whole matter would 
 have to be dropped unless Bonaparte should graciously be moved 
 to reopen negotiations. At that Livingston offered to increase 
 the bid to fifty millions, which was the exact sum that Bonaparte 
 had named. No answer was made for some days, but on April 
 17 announcement was made of the declaration of war between 
 France and England. That meant that France would have to 
 make terms with America over Louisiana. Ten days later the 
 end was reached. Marbois drafted a treaty providing for the 
 cession of all Louisiana for the sum of eighty million francs, of 
 which twenty millions should go for the payment of the American 
 spoliation claims, leaving a net purchase price of sixty million 
 francs. Livingston and Monroe tried to get a reduction of ten 
 million francs, but in vain. In the end they accepted the fig- 
 ures of Marbois, and on May 2, the treaty, dated April 30, was 
 signed. On signing it, Livingston remarked to Monroe, '*We
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 249 
 
 have lived long, but this is the noblest work of our lives." 
 Bonaparte at first, ignoring his own prescription of fifty millions, 
 objected to the price as too low ; but presently agreed to it and 
 ratified the treaty. "I have given England," he said, exult- 
 ingly, "a maritime rival who will some day humble her pride." 
 He also remarked : ' ' Sixty millions for a territory which we 
 may not occupy for a single day ! ' ' 
 
 This latter remark suggested the extraordinary circumstances 
 that France was thus selling us something which she did not in 
 fact possess, which she had never paid for, which she was 
 solemnly bound not to sell to us, and which the French Con- 
 stitution itself forbade her to dispose of in that way. For 
 France had never taken possession of the country ; she had never 
 given Tuscany to Spain, or to the Prince of Parma; she was 
 pledged by the treaty of San Ildefonso not to alienate the terri- 
 tory ; and the Constitution forbade the consul on his own author- 
 ity to alienate any of the national domain. Another circum- 
 stance is worthy of notice. That is, that in signing the treaty 
 Livingston and Monroe violated, or at least enormously exceeded, 
 their instructions. They had been authorized to purchase only 
 New Orleans and the Floridas, and they knew that Jefferson 
 had only $2,000,000 at his disposal for the transaction. Yet they 
 purchased the whole of Louisiana and agreed to pay $16,000,000 
 for it. Evidently the spirit of John Jay was still extant in 
 American diplomacy ! 
 
 The treaty of cession was protested by the Spanish govern- 
 ment, both to the American minister at Madrid and by the Span- 
 ish minister at Washington, on the dual ground that France 
 was prohibited by treaty from alienating the Louisiana Terri- 
 tory, and that France had failed to secure for the so-called 
 King of Tuscany the recognition from England and Russia which 
 she had promised to secure as a part of the bargain for the 
 transfer of Louisiana. The reply of IMadison to these protests 
 was that they were matters of no concern to the United States, 
 as this country was not a party to the treaty of San Ildefonso. 
 Jefferson himself in a letter to Livingston stated the case tersely 
 and conclusively: "We have answered, that these were private 
 questions between France and Spain, which they must settle to- 
 gether; that we derived our title from the First Consul, and
 
 250 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 did not doubt his ^arantee of it. ' ' The protests were reported 
 to the United States Senate, but had little weight with it. In- 
 deed, they deserved no consideration, for the view of them which 
 was taken by Jefferson and Madison was undoubtedly right. 
 The treaty was submitted to the Senate on October 17 and was 
 ratified four days later, and was then immediately proclaimed as 
 in force. 
 
 Bonaparte 's remark that the territory might not be in France 's 
 actual possession a single day was almost literally verified. 
 When the treaty was ratified and proclaimed on October 21 the 
 Spanish were still in possession. It was soon arranged that 
 France should take possession on November 30, and on that day 
 the Spanish authorities did in fact make a formal transfer of 
 title to the French. But the French prefect had no troops, not 
 so much as a corporal 's guard, to support his authority. There- 
 fore a volunteer force of French residents of New Orleans and 
 American residents and visitors, to the number of more than 
 two hundred, was organized into a mDitia body under the com- 
 mand of the American consul, and it maintained order until a 
 detachment of the American army could be brought upon the 
 scene. Thus in a sense the actual possession, or at least the mili- 
 tary occupation and control, passed from Spain to the United 
 States. Then on December 20 the formal transfer of France's 
 nominal and shadowy possession to the United States was made. 
 American troops were massed in the military square in front of 
 the New Orleans City Hall. At the top of a tall flag staff 
 floated the French Tricolor. At the bottom an American Stars 
 and Stripes was attached to the halyard. Then as the rope was 
 pulled the one descended and the other ascended. Midway they 
 met and for a moment floated side by side. A gun was fired, 
 followed by salutes from all the batteries in and around the city. 
 The French flag was then hauled down and removed, while the 
 Stars and Stripes rose to the top of the pole. Thus was effected 
 a transfer of property which must be regarded as one of the 
 most momentous and most far-reaching in its effects of all in 
 the history of the world. 
 
 We are not now concerned with the epoch-making effects of 
 this transaction upon the domestic affairs of the United States ; 
 though scarcely any other event in all history has exerted so pro-
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 251 
 
 found and comprehensive an influence upon American political 
 institutions, upon the interpretation of the Constitution, and 
 upon the whole subsequent course of our history and the tenor of 
 our national life. At present we are concerned with its effect 
 upon our foreign relations, and this, too, was of transcendent 
 importance. It was the acquisition of Louisiana that gave us 
 our frontage upon the Gulf of Mexico and therefore our inter- 
 est in the West Indies, Central America, and South America, 
 where at this very time great doings were in preparation. It 
 brought us into contact with Mexico, and opened the way di- 
 rectly for our annexation of Texas and our seizure of New 
 Mexico, Arizona, and California. It thus was the preface to 
 development of our interests on the Pacific coast and in the 
 Pacific Oce;an and to the scheme of an Isthmian canal, and our 
 relationships with the great Asiatic nations beyond the Pacific. 
 With these matters we shall deal in their due order. The first 
 effects upon our foreign relations were immediately perceived, 
 in an increase of friendship with France, and an increase of 
 irritation toward us on the part of Spain. The latter country, 
 not without cause, felt that it had been badly treated by France^ 
 and it vented much of its resentment and anger upon the United 
 States. Before that time relations had been strained and ir- 
 ritable. Thereafter they were dangerously near the breaking 
 point. So great was the Spanish animosity, in fact, that it was 
 not deemed prudent to attempt any further negotiations with 
 that power at that time. Monroe, flushed with triumph and ex- 
 ultation, at first was hot for proceeding straight from Paris to 
 Madrid, to negotiate a supplementary treaty concerning Florida ; 
 but he was dissuaded by the French government from so doing. 
 The matter was postponed, to be settled in after years at great 
 cost. 
 
 One of the most important international results of the Louis- 
 iana purchase was that it involved us in a boundary dispute; 
 or rather in two boundary disputes. That was because the 
 treaty of cession did not define the limits of the territory. In 
 the treaty of San Ildefonso the territory had been described as 
 "The colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that 
 it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France 
 possessed it, and such as it sliould be after the treaties subse-
 
 252 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 quently entered into between Spain and other States." Those 
 same phrases were copied into our treaty of cession. But there 
 was nothing to indicate what they meant, and immediately after 
 signing the treaty Livingston and Monroe began to wonder 
 what it was, after all, that they had bought. They asked the 
 French ministers, but go no satisfaction. Talleyrand advised 
 them to make the most of their bargain. Marbois admitted that 
 the boundaries were indefinite and said that it was well that they 
 should be, Monroe wanted to claim as a part of Louisiana all 
 of West Florida, as far as the Perdido River, which is the west- 
 ern boundary of our present State of Florida, and he wanted, 
 too, to go straight to Madrid and to try to purchase all the rest 
 of Florida for a million or two dollars. In all probability he 
 would have failed in his mission, though it would have been 
 well if the matter could have been settled at that time. The 
 other boundary dispute was at the western side of Louisiana, 
 between it and the remaining Spanish territory of Mexico, which 
 then included Texas. The Spanish contention was that the 
 boundary was the Sabine River, which now divides Louisiana 
 from Texas, or even the Mermenteau River, midway between 
 the Sabine and New Orleans, and that all of Texas still be- 
 longed to Spain. The French claim, on the other hand, was 
 that the boundary was the Rio Bravo, which we now call the 
 Rio Grande, which is the boundary between Texas and Mexico, 
 and that thus the whole of Texas was included in the Louisiana 
 purchase. There were arguments on each side of the case, and 
 though much research and consideration have been given to the 
 matter in the century since, it has never been possible to say 
 with certainty which side was right. Jefferson, Madison, Mon- 
 roe, and John Quincy Adams seem to have inclined to the 
 French view of the case, as was not unnatural. But nothing 
 material was done about it at that time, for two reasons. One 
 was that Jefferson was seeking simply the possession and con- 
 trol of the Mississippi River, and these were assured with the 
 western boundary at the Sabine just as well as with it at the 
 Rio Grande. The other was that Texas was then supposed to 
 be chiefly an uninhabitable desert, not worth possessing. 
 
 With West Florida the case was different. That region was 
 known to be of value, and it was adjacent to our own southern
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 253 
 
 territories, so that the question of its ownership soon arose in 
 an acute form. Jefferson in August, 1803, declared that the 
 United States had "some pretensions" to consider the Rio Grande 
 as the western boundary of Louisiana, and still more ground for 
 claiming the Perdido River as its eastern boundary. This was 
 disputed by the Spanish minister at Washington, the Marquis 
 of Casa Yrujo, who indeed protested against the whole Louis- 
 iana business on the ground that the United States was purchas- 
 ing stolen goods ; which was substantially true. Jefferson disre- 
 garded him, and proceeded to occupy the land. But it is note- 
 worthy that the French government never, either at the time of 
 making the treaty nor at that of making the actual transfer of 
 government, could be prevailed upon to say that West Florida 
 belonged to us. It did assure us, confidentially, that Texas was 
 included in the sale, but was mute concerning West Florida. 
 The Spanish minister, finding himself practically ignored by the 
 state department, harked back to the practices of Genet and 
 other French intriguers of years before, and tried to get the 
 Federalist or opposition press of the United States to wage a 
 campaign in his behalf against Jefferson. But the day for that 
 was past. He had difficulty in getting any American paper 
 to attack its own Government in behalf of a semi-hostile foreign 
 power; and on the protests of our Government he was presently 
 recalled. 
 
 Our Government then proceeded with the actual occupation 
 and administration of a part of West Florida. An act of Con- 
 gress of February, 1804, and a Presidential proclamation of 
 May following, established a United States customs district in 
 the Mississippi territory, north of Mobile. At the same time 
 recourse was had to diplomacy to effect a settlement of the dis- 
 pute; but unfortunately the negotiations were conducted at 
 Madrid instead of at Washington. The American minister there 
 was Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, whom Jefferson had 
 appointed in payment for his political services in securing the 
 vote of South Carolina for Jefferson in 1800. But Jefferson 
 apparently now had no further use for him and wanted to get 
 rid of him and send his favorite diplomat. Monroe, in his place. 
 In these circumstances, without support at home, Pinckney could 
 do little. He strove earnestly to get Spain to recognize our title
 
 254 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 to West Florida, and at the same time to get satisfaction for 
 American claims against Spain on account of Spanish seizure 
 of American vessels and Spanish aid to French privateers during 
 our undeclared war with France in the preceding administra- 
 tion. He succeeded in making a treaty under which Spain was 
 to pay for her own depredations on our commerce but not for 
 those of the French ; and he urged that it should be ratified as 
 a partial settlement and as a basis for subsequently pressing the 
 remaining claims. Our Government, however, waited two years 
 before the Senate would ratify this treaty, and by that time the 
 Spanish government refused to accept it. That marked the 
 end of Pinckney's career at Madrid, and Jefferson with avidity 
 sent Monroe to take his place as an active negotiator, though 
 Pinckney nominally remained in the legation. 
 
 Monroe reached Madrid in high feather, with expectations of 
 repeating his Paris success, only to discover in a very short time 
 that Pinckney had done all that could be done. Godoy, the 
 Prince of the Peace, was reckless of the issue. Peace or war 
 were all the same to him. He was simply determined to yield 
 nothing to America. In fact, he was no longer the master of 
 Spanish affairs, but was waiting for orders from France. One 
 of his subordinates temporized with Monroe for a time until those 
 orders came. They were unfavorable to America. Having re- 
 fused itself to declare that West Florida belonged with Louis- 
 iana and thus had become the property of the United States, 
 the French government now directed Spain to make no such con- 
 cession. Indeed, Talleyrand argued openly that we had no claim 
 upon West Florida. The result was that Monroe soon left Ma- 
 drid in utter failure and a bad temper. Soon after this the 
 American settlers in West Florida attempted a rebellion, with 
 the object of securing their independence of Spain, but the ef- 
 fort ended in failure. 
 
 The next move was made in Paris. John Armstrong of New 
 York was now our minister there, and he advised in a letter to 
 Monroe that the United States should send an army into Texas, 
 clear across to the Rio Grande, and thus take possession of that 
 disputed territory. France had told us that it belonged to us 
 as a part of Louisiana, while Spain denied it; therefore, said 
 Armstrong, "A stroke of this kind would at once bring Spain to
 
 COMPLETE NATIONALITY 255 
 
 her senses and France to her rescue, and without giving either 
 room to quarrel." Having done that, we could go on to do as 
 we pleased in Florida. This was wise and courageous counsel, 
 but Jefferson regarded it as contradictory to his own policy in 
 Florida, and did not follow it. However, the French govern- 
 ment soon realized that it must recede, or cause Spain to recede, 
 from the position which had been taken by Godoy, So a few 
 months later Talleyrand gave Armstrong an unsigned memoran- 
 dum to be forwarded to Washington, proposing that the United 
 States should reopen negotiations with Spain on the basis of re- 
 ferring the Florida dispute to Bonaparte as arbitrator. It was 
 further proposed by Talleyrand that if Bonaparte should decide 
 that Spain must give up Florida, the United States should pay 
 Spain ten million dollars, relinquish the southern part of Texas, 
 and accept Spanish colonial bills in payment of our claims 
 against Spain for Spanish injuries to our shipping, dropping the 
 claims for French depredations. Armstrong objected that ten 
 millions was too much, whereupon Talleyrand or his messenger 
 said that seven millions would be accepted, and that nearly three 
 millions would be paid in satisfaction of American claims, leav- 
 ing only about four millions actually to be paid over to Spain. 
 
 Armstrong reported this to Madison, with the result that in- 
 stead of accepting the proposal Jefferson at once prepared to 
 repeat in Florida his former policy in Louisiana. He began 
 talking of war, while quietly working for peace. He reported 
 to Congress in December, 1805, that peaceful and friendly ef- 
 forts to settle the boundaries of Louisiana had not succeeded, but 
 that Spain had made inroads into the territories of Orleans and 
 the Mississippi — the latter meaning West Florida, He had been 
 compelled to send troops to that region to redress injuries and 
 prevent further aggressions. He therefore asked for a strength- 
 ening of the array and navy, including the building of some large 
 battleships, and also for a law forbidding in what he described 
 as that time of "violence and wrong," the exportation of arms 
 and ammunition. This was his public message to Congress, 
 But three days later he sent a secret message, in which he ad- 
 mitted that the former was merely for effect upon Europe, and 
 that in fact there was a good prospect of settling the dispute 
 peacefully, if Congi'ess would only vote him the necessary money,
 
 256 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 as it had done in the case of Louisiana. Gallatin, the secretary 
 of the treasury, sent to Congress for passage a resolution appro- 
 priating two million dollars "for the purchase of Florida." 
 But the temper of Congress had changed since 1803, a strong op- 
 position arose in the President 's own party, and it was some time 
 before the passage of the resolution could be secured. Then it 
 was too late. Bonaparte had by this time determined to seize 
 Spain and all her colonies for his own. So all negotiations for 
 Florida, both East and West, were abandoned, Spain remained 
 in possession of those territories, and diplomatic relations be- 
 tween Spain and the United States were suspended for the next 
 ten years.
 
 X 
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 THE acquisition of Louisiana gave the United States unques- 
 tionable territorial dominance of North America, and in a 
 sense completed the purpose for which in great part these colonies 
 had been founded. Many men had come hither in the seventeenth 
 century to escape the vicissitudes and afflictions of European wars 
 and oppressions, but found themselves still subject thereto because 
 of their continued subjection to European sovereignty. In hope 
 of consummating the desired deliverance in the eighteenth cen- 
 tury they achieved political independence, but found the work 
 still imperfect because of the immediate adjacence of vast alien 
 possessions. So in the opening years of the nineteenth century 
 they took those possessions for themselves to such an extent as to 
 leave no potentially hostile power in occupancy of what might be 
 developed into a hostile State ; hoping by this third step to perfect 
 their separation from Europe and European affairs. But the 
 hope was vain ; necessarily so since America and Europe were on 
 the same globe, their shores washed by the same sea, and their 
 commercial relations growing more and more intimate. Nat- 
 urally, therefore, we came more and more into touch, either 
 friendly or hostile, with the chief maritime power, Great Britain. 
 Jefferson's old antipathy toward that country had vanished at 
 the beginning of the Louisiana episode. In the fall of 1802 he 
 had written that "We stand completely corrected of the en'or that- 
 either the Government or the nation of France has any remains 
 of friendship for us " ; and in the summer of the next year he 
 added, "We are friendly, cordially and conscientiously friendly, 
 to England." At the same time he had "a perfect horror at 
 everything like connecting ourselves with the politics of Europe." 
 His policy was "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with 
 all; entangling alliances with none." He looked for the day 
 
 when we should be strong enough to say by what laws other na- 
 voL. 1—17 257
 
 258 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tions should treat us on the sea. Meantime he did not expect so 
 much ill-treatment on the sea from either France or England as 
 had been suffered a few years before. In fact, however, he was 
 disappointed. England and France were at war, in a life or 
 death struggle which was not to end until Waterloo, and neither 
 of them could afford to lose a single point in the tragic game. 
 Neutrality was an empty word to them. ''Inter arma, leges 
 y silent." Each was determined to have the United States, with 
 its great commerce, for an ally, or else to prevent it from trading 
 with the enemy. Both pursued that course, England the more 
 vigorously of the two since she was the more powerful at sea. 
 And after the battle of Trafalgar, in October, 1805, in which Eng- 
 land won the undisputed mastery of the seas, American commerce 
 was more victimized by British cruisers than ever before. "No 
 two countries on earth," said Jefferson, speaking of Great Brit- 
 ain and America, "have so many points of common interest and 
 friendship, and their rulers must be great bunglers indeed if, 
 with such dispositions, they break them asunder." But asun- 
 der they were broken, and the drift was far and irretrievable 
 in that direction during Jefferson's own administration. 
 
 In November, 1804, he confessed that American vessels, even 
 in our own harbor waters, were not safe from British depreda- 
 tions and attacks. A year later he reported to Congress that 
 our coasts were infested and our harbors watched by privateers, 
 some of which committed acts of sheer piracy. "They have cap- 
 tured in the very entrance of our harbors not only the vessels 
 of our friends coming to trade with us, but our own also. ' ' Yet 
 at this very same time he also wrote: "We begin to broach the 
 idea that we consider the whole Gulf Stream as of our waters, 
 in which hostilities and cruising are to be prohibited so soon as 
 either consent or force will permit us. We shall never permit 
 another privateer to cruise within it, and we shall forbid our 
 harbors to national cruisers." Jefferson's policy was, however, 
 to avoid war. He believed that all needed pressure could be ex- 
 erted upon any nation by means of commercial reprisals, and to 
 this policy he now resorted. In the winter of 1805-06 he se- 
 cured the adoption by Congress of resolutions forbidding the 
 importation of such goods from Great Britain as might be pro- 
 duced at home or be procured from some other country. This
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 259 
 
 so-called Non-Importation Act was for a time used merely as a 
 menace and was not to go into actual effect until November 15 
 following. That, he vainly hoped, would compel Great Britain 
 to respect our commerce. The answer within a month was the 
 firing upon an American vessel in American coast waters and 
 the killing of one of her men by a British cruiser. Jefferson 
 ordered the offender out of American waters, but was unable to 
 enforce the order, and presently apologized for having made it ! 
 So humiliating was the result of his navy-hating policy. He 
 had not yet learned the importance of sea-power as a factor in 
 international transactions. At the opening of Congress in the 
 fall of 1806 he expressed an expectation that before the session 
 closed he would be able to report a complete adjustment of af- 
 fairs with Great Britain; and two days later he asked for the 
 further suspension of the Non-Importation Act, which had not 
 yet been put into force, although it was to have been applied 
 two weeks before, and this was granted. 
 
 Monroe and William Pinckney, who had been sent to coop- 
 erate with him, were meanwhile busy with negotiations at Lon- 
 don. Their instructions had been to make a treaty under which 
 Great Britain should abandon the impressment of seamen from 
 American ships, repeal certain restrictions upon our trade in 
 the West Indies, and make indemnity for certain seizures. In 
 return for these concessions they were authorized to promise that 
 the Non-Importation Act would not be enforced. But it was 
 impossible to make a treaty on these terms, and so the envoys 
 followed Jay's example and made the best terms they could. 
 They made a treaty which did not mention impressment, though 
 in an appended note the British commissioners promised that 
 care should be taken not to impress hoiia fide Americans and that 
 redress should be given for all injuries inflicted in the taking of 
 British deserters. No indemnity was provided for the seizures, 
 but most of the restrictions were removed from American com- 
 merce in the West Indies. It was, moreover, provided that for 
 ten years thereafter the United States would not discriminate 
 against British commerce. This treaty was submitted to Jef- 
 ferson in March, 1807, and was instantly regarded by him as 
 unacceptable, chiefly because it did not put a stop to the im- 
 pressment of American seamen by the British navy, which was
 
 260 . AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 by far the most galling of our grievances. Now Jefferson was 
 not willing to go to war to stop such outrages, but neither would 
 he seem to condone them by accepting a treaty which passed 
 them over as negligible. So without reporting it to the Senate 
 he sent the treaty back to Monroe with orders to try again on 
 a very different basis. The great British minister, Pitt, mean- 
 while had died, and the foreign office was occupied by Canning, 
 who was less amicably inclined. The very day after negotiations 
 were resumed, word came that the British ship Leopard, in quest 
 of deserters, had fired upon the American cruiser Chesapeake 
 in our own coast waters, killing and wounding several men ; and 
 had boarded her and carried off four sailors. These men really 
 were deserters from British ships, although three of them were 
 native American citizens. One of these captives was taken to 
 Halifax and hanged as a deserter. The fact is that at this time 
 many Americans did ship as seamen on British vessels, for the 
 sake of profit and adventure ; and many of them deserted, largely 
 because of the brutally harsh treatment which prevailed in the 
 British service. But in addition to taking such deserters, the 
 British undoubtedly seized hundreds and perhaps thousands of 
 Americans upon whom they had no claim. Another circum- 
 stance which must be considered was that at that time the British 
 government did not concede the right of its subjects to expatriate 
 themselves. Once a British subject, always a British subject, 
 was its rule. Consequently, when Englishmen deserted to 
 America and procured certificates of naturalization, it ignored 
 that procedure and claimed that they were still its subjects. 
 The action of the Leopard toward the Chesapeake was taken 
 without orders from the British government, upon the personal 
 initiative and authority of the naval commander at Halifax, who 
 instructed his captains to search American ships for deserters 
 and also to permit Americans to search their British ships for de- 
 serters from the American service, if they had cause to suspect 
 their presence there. The exceptional violence of this incident, 
 however, interrupted negotiations in London and convulsed 
 America with rage. ' ' Never, ' ' said Jefferson, ' ' since the battle of 
 Lexington have I seen this country in such a state of exasperation 
 as at present." Yet he exercised restraint. He anticipated 
 war, but he purposed giving England time for disavowal and
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 261 
 
 reparation, and also giving our own country time for warlike 
 preparations which his own anti-naval policy had incapacitated 
 it for making. A vessel was sent to England with a demand for 
 reparation, and Congress was called together in special session. 
 The outcome of it all was that England, some months later, sent 
 a special envoy over to discuss the matter. 
 
 England and France were now increasingly intent upon injur- 
 ing each other by cutting off supplies of the necessaries of life 
 from neutral countries, and particularly from America. In 
 1806 the British government declared a blockade of the coast of 
 Europe from the River Elbe to the port of Brest, but let it be 
 known that it would be strictly enforced only between Ostend 
 and Havre. The French government, or the emperor, replied 
 with a decree from the conquered capital of Berlin, declaring 
 a complete blockade of the British Isles and prohibiting all trade 
 and communication with them ; though, of course, since the 
 French navy had been practically destroyed, it was impossible 
 for this decree to be enforced. The British retort was an order 
 in council, in January, 1807, forbidding all foreign vessels to 
 trade in European ports which were under French control, or 
 from which British commerce was excluded. Later in that year 
 other orders proclaimed a blockade of all ports from which the 
 British flag was excluded, declared unlawful all trade in articles 
 coming from such ports, and provided that neutral vessels which 
 were warned away from such ports might proceed to some open 
 port on payment of a fee to the British government. To this 
 the French reply was a decree from IMilan, to the effect that 
 every neutral ship which submitted to British search, or paid a 
 fee or tax to the British government, or was on the way to a Brit- 
 ish port, should be seized and confiscated. 
 
 Both these policies were severe, as war measures generally ^ 
 are. But those of France were by far the worse. The British 
 policy gave neutral traders fair warning and a chance to go else- 
 where with their cargoes. The French policy was that of arbi- 
 trary confiscation. An American merchant ship, for example, 
 which was caught by a British privateer, taken into a British 
 port against its will in spite of its resistance, and then released, 
 was seized and confiscated by the French. Others were similarly 
 seized just because they had been spoken at sea by English ships
 
 262 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 before the French decrees were issued. In some cases vessels 
 were seized while actually entering French ports. While, how- 
 ever, the French policy was by far the more oppressive and un- 
 just, the paucity of French sea power made its enforcement 
 comparatively limited in extent. On the other hand, the vast 
 sea power of England enabled her to enforce her milder orders 
 almost everywhere. The result was that American commerce 
 suffered far more from British than from French interference, 
 and American resentment and wrath rose against Great Britain 
 far more than against France. Certainly American commerce 
 was in a grave dilemma. Our ships must comply with certain 
 regulations or else be seized by British cruisers, while if they 
 did comply with them, they would be subject to seizure by the 
 French. The case might have been described by Lorenzo Dow's 
 epigram on predestination: 
 
 ' ' You '11 be damned if you do ; you '11 be damned if you don 't. ' ' 
 American commerce was thus confined to our own domestic 
 waters, and even there it was not safe from search and from 
 impressment, as the Leopard and Chesapeake incident demon- 
 strated. Literally, thousands of American seamen were seized 
 by the British under the pretense that they were British desert- 
 ers, and many of them were shockingly ill used. The climax 
 seemed to be reached when the British government sent its 
 special envoy, Mr. Rose, a member of the cabinet, to treat on the 
 Leopard-Chesapeake incident, but charged him with conditions 
 which made his mission a failure in advance. He came hither, 
 reported his orders, and sailed for home again. Jefferson's 
 reply to these things was a complete embargo. At his behest 
 Congress enacted a law forbidding American vessels to depart 
 from American harbors. The Non-Intercourse Act went into 
 j force at the same time. Since England and France would not 
 respect American commerce, and since we were ourselves unable 
 to protect it, our commerce was ordered by act of Congress to 
 go out of existence. This policy might have been justifiable if 
 it had been accompanied with vigorous preparations to give our 
 commerce the protection to which it was entitled. But nothing 
 of that sort was done. The result was that the embargo harmed 
 us a great deal more than it harmed either England or France, 
 and instead of averting war it actually provoked it by greatly
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 263 
 
 embittering the feelings between America and Great Britain. 
 Jefferson himself seemed to realize this, for six months after the 
 establishment of the embargo he declared that the time was not 
 distant when war would be preferable to its continuance. In 
 the fall of 1808 he confessed to Congress that the embargo, his 
 "candid and liberal experiment," had failed of its purpose, and 
 that Congress itself must decide what the future course should 
 be. Meantime we suffered the humiliation of insult added to 
 injury. When Pinckney in London told Canning that the 
 United States would repeal the embargo if England would re- 
 scind the orders in council, Canning scornfully replied that he 
 was not minded to change British policy just to help America out 
 of the scrape it had put itself into. As for the French emperor, 
 he ordered the seizure of every American vessel that could be 
 found anywhere, saying that this was out of friendship for the 
 United States, to prevent its ships from sailing in violation of 
 the law ! To this state were American commercial relations 
 brought, at the close of Jefferson's administration. 
 
 In passing, we must here notice some other features of our 
 foreign relations at this time. In May, 1803, a convention was 
 made between the United States and Great Britain concerning 
 the Canada and New England boundary. In 1804 the Lewis and 
 Clarke expedition was sent to the Oregon coast, to secure for the 
 United States a frontage on the Pacific Ocean, with the vast ex- 
 tension of foreign relations which that implied, and especially 
 with a direct contact and presently something like a clash with 
 Russia over her pretensions in that region. For Russia laid 
 claim to the whole coast down to Bodega Bay in California, a 
 little north of San Francisco, where she planted a garrison in 
 1806. A treaty was made with Tripoli in 1805, under which 
 American prisoners were ransomed and relations were estab- 
 lished between the two countries which continued unbroken 
 thereafter as long as Tripoli remained a sovereign power. It 
 was made as a result of a vigorous attack upon Tripoli by a 
 competent American squadron; a demonstration of the utility 
 of that naval power which Jefferson so much abhorred. 
 
 Jefferson's administration was also marked with some interest- 
 ing negotiations with Russia. On November 11, 1803, Levett 
 Harris, one of Jefferson's Pennsylvania retainers, was appointed
 
 264 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 consul at St. Petersburg, although there was still no treaty be- 
 tween the two countries, and he soon got himself received at 
 court with "flattering attentions." When the United States 
 frigate Philadelphia was stranded at Tripoli and captured, the 
 Russian emperor interposed his good offices for the release of 
 the crew, and for this Jefferson wrote him a letter of thanks. 
 Between Alexander and Jefferson there then arose a strong 
 mutual admiration, and occasional correspondence followed. It 
 was Jefferson's conviction that the friendship of the emperor 
 for the United States was strong and sincere, and that through- 
 out his reign Russia would of all powers on earth be the most 
 friendly to the United States. From these opinions and utter- 
 ances of Jefferson's arose the legend of Russia's "traditional 
 friendship" for America. 
 
 The emperor congratulated Jefferson on his reelection to a 
 second term, and wrote his regrets at his refusal to be a candi- 
 date for a third term. In May, 1808, the Russia foreign minister 
 asked for the negotiation of a treaty regulating trade with the 
 natives of Alaska, but nothing was done at that time. A month 
 later the Russian government appointed Andre Daschkoff con- 
 sul-general at Philadelphia and charge d'affaires at "Washing- 
 ton, and at about the same time Jefferson sent William Short as 
 minister plenipotentiary to St. Petersburg, to secure the aid of 
 Russia in protecting American commerce against the aggressions 
 of Great Britain and France. This was to be a special mission, 
 not permanent, and Short was sent secretly, without the Sen- 
 ate's knowledge. In Paris, Short met Count Romanzoff, the 
 Russian chancellor and minister for foreign affairs, and dis- 
 cussed intimately with him the relations of the two countries. 
 As winter then came on, he decided to remain in Paris until 
 spring, awaiting news of his confirmation by the Senate and 
 further instructions from Jefferson. But Jefferson did not send 
 the nomination to the Senate until February, 1809, a few days 
 before the end of his administration, and then it was rejected. 
 In consequence Short did not go on to Russia. But before news 
 of this reached St. Petersburg the emperor, assuming that Short 's 
 nomination was confirmed, appointed Count Pahlen to be minis- 
 ter to the United States. In June, 1809, Daschkoff arrived at 
 Washington and was received as charge d 'affaires.
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 265 
 
 One other feature of our foreign relations under Jefferson 
 needs notice, as a reminder of the part which personal and social 
 relations may still play in affairs of State. In his intense democ- 
 racy Jefferson ignored many of the conventionalities which had 
 prevailed under the Washington and Adams administrations 
 and which, of course, still more prevailed at European courts. 
 He ignored the rules of precedence among official callers, and ex- 
 ercised the free-and-easy hospitality which had been his boast 
 on his Virginia plantation. When Anthony ]\Ierry, therefore, 
 called at the White House to present his credentials as British 
 minister, wearing an elaborate court suit, Jefferson received him 
 clad in a much worn, faded, and soiled every-day suit, and wear- 
 ing a pair of slippers without heels. A little later Jefferson 
 invited Merry to a dinner at which the French charge d'affaires 
 was present, although England and France were then at war; 
 and when the door of the dining-room was opened, Jefferson took 
 Mrs. Madison on his arm and walked in, leaving his guests to 
 follow helter-skelter and seat themselves at table as best they 
 could. Had Merry been himself a man of good breeding and 
 refined taste, even such extraordinary etiquette would have 
 caused no serious trouble. But he was ill-bred, stupid, and a 
 stickler for every possible formality, and he persisted in regard- 
 ing Jefferson's conduct as deliberately intended to be insulting 
 to him and to his Government. At about the same time some 
 marked social discourtesies were shown to Monroe in London; 
 and these incidents not only indicated a groAving estrangement 
 between the two countries, but actually contributed to its prog- 
 ress in a material degree. The gross result was that in March, 
 1809, Jefferson retired from the Presidency, leaving the foreign 
 relations of the country in a particularly humiliating and om- 
 inous condition. 
 
 He was succeeded by Madison, who had been his secretary of 
 state and who was fully committed to a continuance of his policy. 
 To such a course, indeed, Madison pledged himself in his inau- 
 gural address: "To cherish peace and friendly intercourse with 
 all nations having corresponding dispositions," and "to prefer 
 in all cases amicable discussion and reasonable accommodation 
 of differences to a decision of them by an appeal to arms." But 
 the legacy of European complications which he received from his
 
 266 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 predecessor was so heavy as to force Mm to break the peace which 
 he wished to cherish, and to resort to the warfare which he 
 abhorred. The unhappy Merry had been replaced as British 
 minister at Washington by David M. Erskine, who had married 
 an American wife and was strongly inclined toward friendly 
 relations with America. Indeed, he was quite out of sympathy 
 with the Tory government at London, being himself a Whig in 
 politics. Unfortunately he was thus led to give the American 
 government too favorable an impression of British official sen- 
 timents toward this country. Still more unfortunately, he got 
 from Gallatin an erroneous idea that Madison was opposed to 
 the embargo policy and was much more kindly disposed toward 
 England than Jefferson had been. Early in 1809 Erskine was 
 instructed by Canning to make if possible a treaty under which 
 the fullest possible reparation should be made for the Leopard- 
 Chesapeake affair, provided that America would exclude French 
 and British naval vessels alike and impartially from its waters, 
 and would disavow retention of British deserters and agree not 
 to harbor any more of them. The orders in council were to be 
 rescinded if America would repeal the Non-Importation and Em- 
 bargo Acts so far as Great Britain was concerned while retain- 
 ing them for France, and would permit British vessels to cap- 
 ture American vessels which engaged in the prohibited trade 
 with France. Erskine did not show the text of his instructions 
 at Washington, but he gave the substance of them, with most of 
 the harshness omitted and with some rose-color added. 
 
 The consequences were disastrous. Deluded into false con- 
 ceptions of British friendliness, and false expectations of the 
 prompt repeal of the obnoxious orders in council, Robert Smith, 
 our secretary of state — not a good man for the place, by the way 
 — hastened into arrangements with Erskine for the resumption 
 of normal relations between the two countries. Erskine an- 
 nounced that the orders in council would be withdrawn on June 
 10, 1809, Madison issued a proclamation renewing intercourse 
 with Great Britain, and the vessels which had been lying idle at 
 American wharves were loaded with cargoes and despatched to 
 Europe to reach ports there as soon as the orders were with- 
 drawn. Then came the news from England that, while a former 
 order in council had been withdrawn, a new one declared the.
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 267 
 
 ports of Holland, France, and Italy to be still blockaded. It 
 was also announced that the British foreign office repudiated 
 Erskine and all his works and had recalled him from his mis- 
 sion. With admirable fairness, however, Canning said that all 
 American vessels which had been sent out relying upon Er- 
 skine 's representations should be permitted to go unmolested to 
 their destinations. 
 
 Erskine 's successor was Francis James Jackson, who was 
 frankly described by Canning to Pinckney as the possessor of all 
 those British characteristics which were sometimes offensive to 
 other nations. Jackson showed himself worthy of this account. 
 He was one of the most arrogant and despotic of men, and he 
 came hither with instructions of the most offensive character. 
 On entering upon negotiations he comported himself in a way 
 which soon gave Madison cause to hint pretty plainly that he 
 must mend his manners if he wished to remain at his post. Jack- 
 son replied that he would do as he pleased, and Madison's retort 
 was a curt notification that no further communications would 
 be received from him. Jackson thereupon departed from the 
 capital. He lingered in New England for a time, seeking con- 
 solation from political opponents of the administration and hop- 
 ing that his own Government would support him in the course 
 he had pursued. But it did not, and he presently sailed for 
 home. Soon afterward Smith, who had in this affair shown his 
 unfitness for the state department, was retired and his place was 
 taken by the expert and forceful James Monroe. 
 
 While these transactions with England were taking place, 
 French relations were by no means stagnant. The French min- 
 ister at Washington was General Turreau, and he had been much 
 chagrined over Erskine 's negotiations, which he feared would 
 work great harm to France. Armstrong at Paris meantime was 
 suggesting that a repeal of the hostile decrees would be followed 
 by a repeal of our Non-Intercourse Act as applied to France, 
 and he succeeded in securing a new decree to the effect that in- 
 asmuch as the United States had obtained revocation of the 
 British orders in council, the Milan Decree should be withdrawn. 
 But hard upon this came the news that the British government 
 had repudiated Erskine 's promises, and the French government 
 ordered the confiscation of every American ship that might en-
 
 268 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ter the ports of France, Spain, Italy, or Holland. This decree 
 was never published, but the framing of it brought France 
 and America within measurable distance of war. After much 
 debate Congress early in 1810 enacted a bill repealing the Non- 
 Intercourse Act and authorizing the President to prohibit com- 
 merce with either England or France in case the other nation 
 should before March 3 abandon its policy of warring upon neu- 
 trals, leaving Americans meanwhile free to trade with both. 
 
 There then came on as a prelude to war one of the most ex- 
 traordinary passages in American, history. For a full under- 
 standing of it we must consider carefully the conditions of the 
 three countries concerned. The United States was at that time 
 increasing in population, wealth, industries, and commerce at a 
 rapid rate, and it had all the ambition and aggressiveness of an 
 expanding young country. Between 1800 and 1810 our popu- 
 lation had increased more than 35 per cent. Four new States 
 had been added to the original thirteen, and half a dozen more 
 territories were preparing for statehood. In the Louisiana Pur- 
 chase the United States had at last risen to the full self-con- 
 sciousness of complete nationality ; it now demanded in all parts 
 of the world all the privileges of that status ; and it was growing 
 more and more impatient and resentful of the restraint which 
 was put upon it by the lingering influences of the old European 
 system. 
 
 France was under the absolute autocracy of the Emperor Na- 
 poleon, who had subjugated to his control nearly all of the Euro- 
 pean continent, save Russia, and who was seeking, as the supreme 
 achievement of his life, the conquest of Great Britain, the only 
 power on earth that opposed him with consistent and effective 
 resistance. To compass that conquest he was willing to adopt 
 any measure, and to make any sacrifice. Even at that time, 
 because of the density of its population and the smallness of its 
 area, Great Britain was largely dependent upon foreign com- 
 merce with America, and the emperor conceived the idea that if 
 he could interrupt that trade and thus isolate Great Britain 
 from the rest of the world, he could starve the "nation of shop- 
 keepers" into submission. With that end in view he engaged 
 in a policy of characteristic duplicity toward the United States. 
 He sought to avoid the threatened war with this country, which
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 269 
 
 would have been disastrous to him, and therefore instructed his 
 foreign minister, the Duke of Cadore, to tell our minister at 
 Paris, General Armstrong, that the hostile and offensive Berliii 
 and Milan decrees would be abrogated, so far as America was 
 concerned, on and after November 1, 1810; provided that Great 
 Britain meanwhile withdrew her orders in council, or, in default 
 of that, that the United States declared nonintercourse with 
 that country. Thus France would revoke decrees which she was 
 unable effectively to enforce, and in return would either have 
 the blockade of her coasts removed or secure America as an ally. 
 In making this specious proposal, Napoleon was profuse in his 
 expressions of love for America and of desire for its prosperity. 
 Yet at the same time he issued a decree condemning all Ameri- 
 can vessels which had recently arrived in French ports, and 
 imposing upon all thereafter a vexatious license fee and a sys- 
 tem of secret cipher letters by which alone they would be per- 
 mitted to enter the ports of France. His scheme was to delude 
 America with an appearance of commercial freedom and thus 
 tempt this country into a course which would .lead straight to 
 war with Great Britain. Unhappily, our Government fell into 
 the trap. Madison was a man of so transparent integrity that 
 he seemed to be incapable of recognizing duplicity in others. 
 So he took Napoleon's professions at their face value. Believing 
 that all French restrictions upon American commerce had been 
 abolished in good faith, he demanded the same of Great Britain, 
 and, not securing a favorable reply, on November 2, 1810, he 
 proclaimed nonintercourse with that country, beginning on Feb- 
 ruary 2, 1811. 
 
 Meantime Great Britain was practically alone in the world, 
 with her back to the wall, fighting for life, and in that desperate 
 conflict she would hesitate at nothing that would be to her ad- 
 vantage. Her Government was in the hands of the Tory party, 
 which consisted largely of landlords and merchants. Now both 
 of these classes were directly benefited by the suppression of 
 American commerce, the merchants because it threw the carry- 
 ing trade of the world into their hands, and the landowners 
 because the shutting off of American supplies meant higher 
 prices for their own agricultural produce. Under their influ- 
 ence, therefore, the Government was not inclined to move toward
 
 270 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 freer American trade, but was quite content to let the Non- 
 Intercourse and Embargo Acts prevail until America herself 
 got tired of them. It had little fear of anything worse, partly 
 because of Madison's well-known aversion to war, and partly 
 because it got most of its information of American afiPairs from 
 sources which were friendly to Great Britain. The American 
 administration party was supposed to be for peace at any price, 
 and the opposition party was composed of sympathizers with 
 Great Britain. Therefore there was nothing to fear. The 
 American minister in London, William Pinckney, did his best 
 to dispel this delusion, but in vain. The British foreign minis- 
 ter was the Marquis of Wellesley, brother of the Duke of Well- 
 ington. He was exceedingly friendly toward Pinckney and 
 toward America, but would make no concessions. Indeed, he 
 was probably unable to do so, for the insanity of George III 
 made the establishment of a regency necessary, with a prospect 
 of a complete change of ministry. Moreover, he saw that Na- 
 poleon's professed abrogation of the decrees was delusive, and 
 therefore declined to withdraw the orders in council until the 
 decrees were effectively abolished. The result was that in 
 March, 1811, Pinckney came home on leave of absence. For 
 some time the British legation at Washington was in the charge 
 of a secretary, or charge d 'affaires, but now a new and acceptable 
 minister, Augustus J. Foster, was sent to this country, and, as 
 already mentioned, Monroe became secretary of state at Wash- 
 ington. 
 
 One other factor of great importance, already referred to, 
 meanwhile entered into the problem. This was the establish- 
 ment of relations the United States and Russia, the only im- 
 portant continental power that was not in some measure subject 
 to French control. Thus far no treaty had been made between 
 America and Russia. Indeed, Russia had never yet formally 
 recognized American independence, and might have been sup- 
 posed still to cherish the sympathy with England and the hos- 
 tility toward America which had been shown during our Revo- 
 lution. But at the very end of his administration Jefferson had 
 determined to send a minister to Russia. His nominee for that 
 place, as already related, was rejected by the Senate. But soon 
 afterward his successor, Madison, selected for the place the son
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 271 
 
 of Jefferson's old colleague and foe, John Adams. This envoy, 
 John Quincy Adams, still a young man but destined to become 
 one of our greatest statesmen, particularly in foreign affairs, 
 did not go to Russia until the fall of 1809. But then it was his 
 fortime to arrive at the czar's capital at the psychological mo- 
 ment. Indeed, on his way thither he was abruptly plunged into 
 important diplomatic transactions. England and Denmark were 
 then at war, and every ship passing in or out of the Baltic had to 
 endure searching scrutiny. The American merchantman upon 
 which Adams and his family traveled was first overhauled by a 
 British cruiser, and allowed to proceed. A few hours later a 
 Danish cruiser repeated the performance, and ordered the vessel 
 to Christiansand. There Adams found thirty-eight other Amer- 
 ican vessels, whicli had been held captive for months, awaiting 
 action of the prize court. Sixteen of them had been condemned, 
 and had appealed to a higher court. The spectacle of these ships 
 thus detained aroused Adams's patriotic wrath and zeal, and he 
 resolved to seek, on his own initiative, relief from such oppres- 
 sion. 
 
 Adams's reception by the Russian emperor occurred on No- 
 vember 5, 1809, and it was noteworthy in two respects. One 
 was, that it was the first reception of an American minister by a 
 Russian sovereign, and thus marked for the first time, after 
 more than a quarter of a century of American independence, full 
 recognition of this country by the power which has so often 
 been called our "traditional friend." The other was, that the 
 interview was private, no third person being present. At this 
 interview Adams promptly entered upon the practical business 
 of his mission, especially in soliciting the inten^ention of the em- 
 peror in behalf of American commerce. He represented to him 
 that, because of nonintercourse with most of western Europe, an 
 unusually large proportion of American commerce sought the 
 Baltic ports, and it was a great hardship to have it thus seized. 
 He also reminded the emperor that his predecessor, the Empress 
 Catherine, had given her adherence to the principle of the im- 
 munity of neutrals from capture, and on that ground he be- 
 sought the emperor to vindicate that principle in the seas adja- 
 cent to his domain. The emperor responded in a most cordial 
 manner. He expressed strong disapproval of England's mari-
 
 272 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 time policy, and promised to promote so far as possible commerce 
 between his own empire and America. Between these two coun- 
 tries, he said, there was no occasion for jealousy or rivalry, but 
 there was a possibility of mutually advantageous cooperation. 
 He added the interesting remark, doubly interesting in view of 
 his own acts six or seven years later, that it was a wise and just 
 policy for the United States to keep itself disconnected from 
 the politics of Europe and the disturbances to which the coun- 
 tries of that continent were subject; and he pledged him- 
 self to do nothing to withdraw the United States from that atti- 
 tude. 
 
 This interview had prompt and highly important results. The 
 emperor had been w^avering on the edge of indecision, whether 
 to side with or against Napoleon. If he decided for Napoleon, he 
 would approve the Danish seizures of American commerce and 
 exclude American ships from his ports. If he decided against 
 him, he would be hospitable to American ships and would pro- 
 tect them in the Baltic. Adams's representations turned the 
 scale. Alexander I decided to break with Napoleon and to defy 
 his power, and one of the first results of that decision was a per- 
 emptory message to Denmark that the emperor was not pleased 
 with the seizures of American vessels, and wished them to be 
 restored forthwith to their owners ; which was done. Following 
 this, an imperial decree was issued, welcoming American com- 
 merce to the Russian Empire. A little later, Sweden issued a 
 similar decree. This triumph of Adams's diplomacy was the 
 more noteworthy for the fact that we had at that time no treaty 
 relations whatever with Russia; not even a commercial treaty. 
 We must doubt that the Russian government had any especial 
 love for America, or sympathy with American institutions. It 
 more probably was moved to the course it took by selfish con- 
 siderations. In the then existing condition of Russia, imports 
 from America were much needed. Also, the emperor was ambi- 
 tious to pose, in rivalry to Napoleon, as the arbiter of Europe. 
 Indeed, Count Romanzoff frankly told Adams that there were 
 strong prejudices and predilections in Russia in favor of Eng- 
 land, and that the Russian government would cultivate relations 
 with America only because it was, in existing circumstances, to 
 its interest to do so. England was arrogating to herseK too
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 273 
 
 much authority on the sea, and it was necessary for some other 
 great commercial State to arise as her rival. Russia recognized 
 America to be such a State, and would therefore support her. 
 But, for whatever reason, Russia became at this time, and for a 
 short time, our most useful if not our only active friend in Eu- 
 rope. 
 
 It should be recalled in passing that under the treaty of Til- 
 sit, in 1807, Bonaparte had required the exclusion of British 
 commerce from Russia. But Russia had to have foreign trade, 
 such as only Great Britain or America could supply, and she 
 therefore turned to the United States for it. This was displeas- 
 ing to Bonaparte, who had put American commerce also under 
 his ban, and in order to keep peace with France the Russian 
 government had to resort to false pretenses. It affected to en- 
 force Bonaparte 's decrees against American vessels, and in 1810 
 excluded many of them, or their cargoes, from Russian ports. 
 So shrewdly was this done that Adams was deceived, and made 
 appeals against this ill-treatment ; with the result that after some 
 delay his appeals were always granted and the vessels were ad- 
 mitted. But Bonaparte was not deceived. Seeing that Russia 
 was playing him false, on October 23, 1810, he ordered the czar 
 to seize all American ships in his harbors and confiscate their 
 cargoes. On December 1 the czar explicitly refused to do this, 
 and at the end of the same month he issued a decree opening his 
 ports to all non-English vessels. This astonished Adams, and 
 of course greatly gratified him ; though he feared that this policy 
 might not prove la.sting, since the first principle of Russian pol- 
 icy was, he thought, to keep on good terms with France. 
 
 In June, 1811, Adams sought to negotiate a commercial treaty 
 with Russia, and his proposal was at first very favorably re- 
 ceived. Romanzoff promised to discuss the matter with him in 
 a few days. But he never did. Adams was piqued, and some 
 time afterward sought an explanation. He was told that in 
 the uncertain and critical state of affairs, with a war with 
 France impending, it was useless to attempt any such negotia- 
 tions. The fact was that as Russia, in a war with France, would 
 become again an ally of Great Britain, she could not grant to 
 America any commercial privileges which she would not be will- 
 ing to let Great Britain share. The result was that no treaty 
 
 VOL. 1—18
 
 274 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 was made, though Russia continued to treat America with 
 marked friendship. 
 
 The friendship of Russia was, however, of little value to Amer- 
 ica excepting in the matter of Baltic Sea commerce. It had no 
 effect upon the policies of Great Britain and France, and those 
 policies became more and more obnoxious and oppressive as the 
 great conflict between those countries proceeded toward its cul- 
 mination. In that struggle, in some respects the greatest that 
 the world had seen for a thousand years, it was not strange that 
 the combatants regarded lightly the rights and interests of the 
 comparatively weak young nation three thousand miles away. 
 Nor, indeed, were they logically censurable for their conduct 
 toward us. We must remember that in their disregard of neu- 
 tral rights they were simply maintaining the policy and practice 
 which had thitherto been consistently pursued. It was the pol- 
 icy of the United States which was new and strange. We were, 
 in fact, asking Europe to reverse the principles and to abandon 
 the practices which had prevailed for centuries. Doubtless we 
 were right in doing so, for we were leading the world into a 
 better way than the old one, and the world has now come to 
 recognize that fact. But at that time it was too much to expect 
 that the new doctrines would be at once accepted, especially by 
 nations which were engaged in a life or death struggle. Russia 
 and Sweden, not actually involved in that conflict, might take our 
 side; especially since it was to their economic advantage to do 
 so. But for Great Britain and Prance to do so would have 
 been an anomaly such as we could not expect nations to perform. 
 The result was that, as Everett said in after years, ''from the 
 breaking out of the wars of the French Revolution to the year 
 1812, the United States knew the law of nations only as the vic- 
 tim of its systematic violation by the great maritime powers of 
 Europe." 
 
 As matters approached their climax, the French government, 
 which had been the more arbitrary and offensive, appeared to 
 assume a conciliatory attitude; largely because the destruction 
 of French power at sea made that nation unable to do us any 
 considerable harm. On the other hand, Great Britain, enjoying 
 almost universal command of the sea, became increasingly ag- 
 gressive and offensive; in some directions in a quite inexcusable
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 275 
 
 manner. It was bad enough to oppress our commerce and to 
 impress our seamen. But it was worse to foment sedition in 
 our domestic affairs. Yet this was apparently done. The Brit- 
 ish governor of Canada, Sir James Craig, sent to Boston as a 
 secret agent an Irish adventurer named John Henry, if not to 
 intrigue and conspire for treason at least to ascertain and to 
 report upon the sentiment of New England toward secession 
 from the Union and reunion with England. The mercantile 
 interests of New England were known to be much dissatisfied 
 with the nonintercourse policy, and to be in strong opposition 
 to the administration, and there was apparently a hope on the 
 part of the British governor — possibly of the British govern- 
 ment itself, though this was not clear — that an insurrection 
 could be provoked which would result in the secession of New 
 England from the United States and its reannexation to the 
 British Empire. Nor was this an extravagant hope, seeing that 
 some of the foremost New England representatives m both 
 Houses of Congress were openly declaring that it was the right 
 and would probably soon be the duty of those States thus to se- 
 cede and to dissolve the bonds of the Federal Union. This pre- 
 cious scoundrel, Henry, spent several months in Boston and sent 
 to Craig numerous reports, which were forwarded to the British 
 government in London. The fact that these reports were re- 
 ceived there, without rebuke or repudiation, indicated that that 
 government was at least in a receptive mood, and that if it had 
 not authorized this intrigue it was not unwilling to reap the 
 fruits of it. However, when Henry demanded payment for his 
 services as a political spy, to the amount of more than $150,000, 
 the British government refused it and bade him go about his busi- 
 ness. His efforts to blackmail Great Britain proving ineffectual, 
 he determined to swindle America. He therefore came hither 
 with a French adventurer who called himself Count Crillon, and 
 who was in fact one of Napoleon's political spies; and the two, 
 acting under the patronage of Serruier, the French minister at 
 Washington, actually persuaded IMadison and Monroe to pay 
 them $50,000 for a mass of tlieir papers. It may be added that 
 Crillon speedily swindled Henry out of the entire booty. Madi- 
 son sent the purchased rubbish to Congress, with a message de- 
 claring that it convicted Great Britain of seeking to incite dis-
 
 276 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 affection and foment sedition and secession in New England, 
 with a view of destroying the United States and reannexing a 
 part of it to the British Empire. It was soon perceived that the 
 papers were not nearly so serious or important as that. Never- 
 theless, much harm was done in the embittering of the public 
 mind against Great Britain. It was, of course, a flagrant ojffense 
 for a British agent, official or semiofficial, to visit this country 
 on any such errand, and the revelation of his intrigues created a 
 natural and justifiable stonn of indignation in this country. 
 The British government also sought to interfere in our policy in 
 West Florida. The United States was intent upon taking and 
 keeping possession of that region, on the theory that it was in- 
 cluded in the Louisiana purchase; and it actually and perma- 
 nently seized it in 1810, Whether our contention was right or 
 wrong was regarded as a question between us and Spain, with 
 France incidentally concerned. Great Britain was held to have 
 no business to meddle in it. But she did so, partly because it 
 was then her policy to champion Spain, and partly because she 
 expected herself to become the owner of all the Floridas. 
 
 Another grave charge — and an inexcusable offense, if it was 
 true — was the British incitement of Indian hostilities in the 
 Northwest. The policy of our Government was to secure exten- 
 sive grants of land from the Indian tribes in Indiana and else- 
 where, for opening to agricultural settlement. Unhappily, then 
 as since, our Government was not particularly scrupulous in its 
 dealings with the Indians. It was quite ready to swindle them, 
 and Jefferson himself regarded it as fitting to inveigle them into 
 debt, under pressure of which they would sell their lands at al- 
 most any price that was offered. The famous Indian chief Te- 
 cumseh, and his brother, the ' ' Prophet, ' ' headed an organization 
 against such spoliation of their tribes. They resisted the de- 
 bauching of Indians with whiskj^ which was then as since a 
 favorite device of the w^hite men on the frontier, and they organ- 
 ized a large community of Indians of various tribes as agricul- 
 turists, to improve the land instead of alienating it or using it 
 merely as a hunting ground. In this laudable and noble en- 
 deavor, unfortunately, the Indians fell prey to British traders, 
 who supplied them with arms and ammunition, and incited them 
 to violent resistance to the American government. An Amer-
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 277 
 
 ican army was sent to the scene, and hostilities occurred. The 
 attack was made by the Indians, though they were obviously un- 
 prepared for it and it was contrary to the policy of Tecumseh. 
 The Americans narrowly escaped a serious disaster, and pres- 
 ently withdrew from that region. Blame for the occurrence was 
 laid upon the British for the reason that it was certain that they 
 had provided the Indians with arms and had incited them to 
 violence. There has never been any proof, however, that the 
 British government, or the British governor of Canada, or any 
 one else in authority, was in any way responsible for these 
 wrongs. The British minister and the Governor of Upper Can- 
 ada made the most positive denials of responsibility, the latter 
 declaring that he had exerted all his influence to restrain the 
 Indians from hostility ; and there is no reason for doubting that 
 they spoke the truth. The incitement of the Indians to warfare, 
 and the supplying of arms and ammunition to them, were the 
 acts of individual British traders, intent on sordid gain. But 
 the belief prevailed in this country that the British government 
 itself was behind the work, and that belief naturally intensified 
 popular wrath against Great Britain. 
 
 These, then, were the counts in America's indictment of Great 
 Britain : The orders in council, which were oppressive to Amer- 
 ican commerce and a violation of neutral rights ; the impressment 
 of American seamen for service on British vessels; the incite- 
 ment of Indian hostilities in the Northwest; and unwarranted 
 meddling in American affairs in New England and in West 
 Florida. Had England been well served by her diplomatic rep- 
 resentatives in this country, the problem might have been solved 
 peacefully, for IMadison was supremely intent upon avoiding 
 war. But it had been badly served by IMerry and Jackson, and 
 Foster, in his negotiations with Monroe, was handicapped by ill- 
 advised instructions, and the situation was further complicated 
 by the duplicity of France. Foster was authorized to make and 
 did make the fullest possible reparation for the Leopard-Chesa- 
 peake affair. But that was of comparatively little importance 
 at this time. Americans were much more interested in the gen- 
 eral question of impressment, in the blockades, neutral rights, 
 and the orders in council, and on all these matters Foster was 
 compelled to maintain an unyielding attitude. He threatened
 
 278 AMERICA'S FOEEIGN RELATIONS 
 
 retaliation against American eonmierce if the Nonintercourse Act 
 were not abandoned, and in fulfilment of that threat a million 
 dollars' worth of American shipping was actually seized and con- 
 demned. If this policy was harsh and ill-conceived, the attitude 
 of our Government was certainly illogical. It demanded that the 
 British orders in council should be withdrawn on the ground that 
 the French decrees had been abrogated. Yet it knew, as every- 
 body knew, that the French decrees were still being enforced 
 whenever and wherever possible. Monroe would in one breath 
 assure the British minister that the decrees had been completely 
 repealed by France, and in the next he would complain to the 
 French minister that they had not been repealed ! 
 
 All this was the more unfortunate because there was rising in 
 Great Britain itself a strong demand for an adjustment of the 
 differences with this country. Nonintercourse with America was 
 having a disastrous effect upon British industries and commerce, 
 and pressure was brought to bear upon the Government for a 
 change of policy which would give relief from conditions which 
 were fast becoming intolerable. 
 
 France, meanwhile, was unrelenting toward Great Britain and 
 was no less resolute against all who would not side with her 
 against that power. English commerce with the Continent, Na- 
 poleon declared, must be abolished. Even the Baltic ports must 
 be closed. American commerce would be permitted, provided it 
 submitted to the requirements of the decrees, which were the 
 "fundamental laws" of the British Empire. But there a new 
 complication arose. British shippers began displaying Ameri- 
 can flags upon their vessels, in order to enjoy immunity from 
 seizure by the French. Of course, all such were seized whenever 
 they were detected, and the French began seizing American ships 
 too, on the ground that they were suspected of being British in 
 disguise. The demand was made that America should prevent 
 this misuse of her flag by the British, under penalty of being 
 held to sanction it and of being thus regarded as an ally of 
 Great Britain. Practically the United States was required to 
 go to war with Great Britain in order to prevent France from 
 being deceived by a false use of the American flag ; or else France 
 would disregard our neutrality and treat us as an ally of her 
 enemy.
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 279 
 
 When the American Congress met in the fall of 1811, a cli- 
 max was obviously at hand. The House of Representatives was 
 composed largely of new men, under the leadership of Henry 
 Clay and John C. Calhoun, both young and aggressive men, in- 
 clined toward war. They rightly held that the United States as 
 a sovereign power was entitled to the respectful treatment which 
 other powers received ; but they were impatient and undiplomatic 
 in the means by which they sought to vindicate that title. The 
 President in his message reported the grievances which the 
 United States was suffering. The reply of Congress was to pre- 
 pare for war. By dint of a coalition with the Federalists who 
 were opposed to the administration, resolutions M^ere adopted 
 providing for the enlistment of 25,000 men in the regular army, 
 for the arming of the navy, and for the levying of direct taxes in 
 case of war. The British minister, Foster, although cognizant 
 of this action, underrated its signficance. He persisted in re- 
 porting to his Government that there was little danger of war; 
 and indeed from one point of view war seemed improbable, for 
 the United States had no army worth considering, its navy was 
 unfinished and lacking equipment, and the Treasury was empty. 
 These circumstances, however, were not the slightest deterrent 
 to the war party. Their idea was to begin war, trusting blindly 
 to the ** manifest destiny" of America to provide soldiers, ships, 
 and funds. Madison himself, down to this time the most peace- 
 ful of men, became so hot for war that he declared that he would 
 hurl the flag of the country into the ranks of the enemy, confi- 
 dently trusting to the American people to follow it and to rescue 
 it. The British minister here was blind and deaf to these things, 
 and he kept his Government at home in similar ignorance. In 
 April, 1812, that Government in one letter practically agreed to 
 accept and adopt the American contention that a blockade to be 
 legal must be effective; which has since become a part of the 
 international law of the world. But unfortunately in another 
 letter it declared that the obnoxious ordere in council would not 
 be withdrawn until France absolutely and unconditionally with- 
 drew her Berlin and Milan decrees. To do otherwise, it added, 
 would be "utterly subversive of the most important and indis- 
 putable maritime rights of the British Empire." 
 
 That ended it. The American government regarded this as a
 
 280 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 definite refusal of its demands. On June 1, 1812, Madison sent 
 a special message to Congress, repeating his complaints against 
 England and asking for a declaration of war. Had there been 
 telegraphic communication across the Atlantic the peace might 
 still have been preserved, for on June 16 the British government 
 announced that the orders in council would be immediately with- 
 drawn. But that was not known at Washington, and two days 
 later, on June 18, the act of Congress declaring war was signed 
 by the President. Neither, of course, was that known in Lon- 
 don, and five days later the decree repealing the orders in council 
 was signed and issued. 
 
 We need not here follow in detail the course of the war which 
 ensued ; a war which was loudly proclaimed in this country to be 
 ' ' a war of the people of America against the Government of Eng- 
 land. ' ' In fact, it was undoubtedly clamored for by a large part 
 of the American people, and it was probably not desired by the 
 people of Great Britain. But Lord Liverpool was much nearer 
 right when he declared, in the middle of the conflict, that "the 
 war on the part of America had been a war of passion, of party 
 spirit, and not a war of policy, of interest, or of necessity." 
 It is worthy of note that in the act of declaring war no reasons 
 for such action were given. There was just a single sentence, 
 "that war be and the same is hereby declared to exist" between 
 the two countries. The vote in the House was 79 to 49, and in 
 the Senate 19 to 13. Other war measures quickly followed, 
 authorizing privateering and reprisals, and forbidding commerce 
 with the enemy. As for the war itself, it was what might have 
 been expected after such a welter of cross-purposes and precipi- 
 tate folly. We had an army of fewer than 7,000 men, with few 
 high officers who were both loyal and competent. The chief 
 commander was a colonel of militia far past the age for efficient 
 service; the most active and influential was a traitor who had 
 repeatedly betrayed his country for foreign gold. The natural 
 result was that on the land, with two or three grateful exceptions, 
 our operations were one of the most humiliating and disgraceful 
 of travesties upon warfare. On the water we fared better. 
 Small as our navy was in contrast to the power which had won 
 the mastery of the Seven Seas at Trafalgar, it contained a few 
 good ships, and officers and men not unworthy of the race that
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 281 
 
 had produced in the same generation a Nelson and a Dundonald. 
 The hardy and expert fishermen of New England and the crews 
 of our merchant ships provided more competent recruits for the 
 navy than there were ships to carry them. Moreover, American 
 ingenuity had devised a system of sights upon naval artillery 
 which made the aim of American guns at sea far more accurate 
 and effective than that of those on British ships. For these rea- 
 sons our navy was able to win a number of exceedingly brilliant 
 engagements, on the sea and on the Great Lakes, for which no 
 praise could be too high. It was indeed a naval victory, the 
 battle of Lake Erie, that redeemed us from utter disaster in our 
 land campaigns and that probably saved us from invasion and 
 sequestration of much of the Northwest Territory. In view, too, 
 of the traditional opposition of America to privateering, it is 
 interesting to recall that such operations were among the most 
 efficient adjuncts to our naval war. American privateers prob- 
 ably did more than the navy itself to bring the British govern- 
 ment and nation to a disposition to make peace. 
 
 So gross was the failure of our land campaign that its prime 
 object has, for very shame, been consigned to forget fulness. Yet 
 it is well, for the truth of history, to recall it. The lust of land 
 possessed us. The dream of conquering and annexing Canada 
 deluded us. "The conquest of Canada," cried Clay, "is in your 
 power. The militia of Kentucky alone are competent to place 
 Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet. ' ' To this rabid rodo- 
 montade, Jefferson, speaking from the retirement of Monticello, 
 added: "The acquisition of Canada this year as far as the 
 neighborhood of Quebec will be a mere matter of marching, and 
 will give us experience for the attack on Halifax the next, and 
 the final expulsion of England from the American continent." 
 No wonder that Randolph of Roanoke with bitterness declared: 
 "Agrarian cupidity, not maritime right, urges the war." Thus 
 beginning with flamboyant visions of universal conquest, America 
 soon had the indelible mortification of seeing its national capital 
 abandoned to the foe with scarcely the firing of a single shot in 
 its defense. We must condemn the British burning of Washing- 
 ton as an inexcusable piece of vandalism, violatiniz the principles 
 of civilized warfare ; but we cannot excuse the purblind folly and 
 the foul poltroonery which made it possible. The names of
 
 282 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Miller, and Scott, and Brown, and Jackson, on land ; and of Law 
 rence, Perry, Isaac Hull, McDonough, Rodgers, Porter, Bain- 
 bridge, Decatur, and others at sea, won immortal and richly 
 merited renown ; while those of William Hull, Winder, Dearborn, 
 Smyth, Van Rensselaer, and above all the unspeakable Wilkinson, 
 incurred imperishable contempt. 
 
 One of the salient features of the war was the arising of dis- 
 affection little short of treason at home. We have already seen 
 that in New England there was strong opposition to the war 
 and to the whole policy of the administration, and that talk of 
 secession was openly heard, from the lips of some of the fore- 
 most public men. We must glance at this for a moment, as a 
 baleful illustration of. the reflex influence of foreign relations 
 upon domestic affairs, as also of the extent to which domestic 
 partizanship intruded itself into the foreign affairs of the na- 
 tion. The opposition to the war and the suggestions of secession 
 increased as the war proceeded and as defeat and disgrace fell 
 too often upon the American arms. At the beginning of the war 
 the great jurist, Joseph Story, expressed the conviction that the 
 leading Federalists meditated a severance of the Union, and that 
 they would make a public avowal of this design as soon as they 
 thought that public opinion would support them in it. Two 
 years later, in the latter part of the war, Pickering, who had 
 been secretary of state, vsrrote to Gouverneur Morris that "the 
 separation of the northern section of the States would be ulti- 
 mately advantageous," Finally in 1814 there met at Hartford, 
 Connecticut, a convention composed of delegates officially ap- 
 pointed by the legislatures of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and 
 Rhode Island, and by local authorities in New Hampshire and 
 Vermont, which adopted a series of resolutions calling for amend- 
 ment and interpretation of the Federal Constitution in accord- 
 ance with the view of the anti-war party ; in default of which it 
 was recommended that another convention be called ''with such 
 powers and instructions as the exigencies of a crisis so moment- 
 ous may require." There can be little doubt that the purpose 
 of the convention was revolutionary, looking straight toward 
 secession. John Quincy Adams declared it to be unconstitu- 
 tional, treasonable, abnormal, hideous, and wicked — in which he 
 was guilty of extravagant exaggeration. The directors of that
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 283 
 
 convention shrewdly copied their resolutions in large part ver- 
 batim from the Virginia resolutions of 1798 which Madison him- 
 self had written, and they recalled the fact that Jefferson had 
 spoken in favor of division of the Union and had expressed a 
 hope that twenty years would not be permitted to pass without a 
 rebellion. For the Republicans or Democrats to chide the Hart- 
 ford Federalists for disloyalty was therefore merely for the pot 
 to call the kettle black. And as a matter of fact, when a re- 
 port of the proceedings of the convention, which had been held 
 in secret, was finally disclosed, it was seen that there had been 
 no talk of treason. Nevertheless, the convention was generally 
 regarded with severe disapproval, and its members lost and 
 never regained political standing. A committee of the conven- 
 tion was sent to Washington to urge its report upon Congress, 
 but before it could accomplish its mission the triumphant battle 
 of New Orleans was fought and news came of the treaty of 
 Ghent ; at which the committee dispersed and went home and the 
 episode ended in a mixture of ridicule and reproach. 
 
 Interest in the war and a desire for the restoration of peace 
 were not confined, however, to the actual belligerents. The re- 
 lations with Russia which John Quincy Adams had established 
 led the Government of that country to observe closely the prog- 
 ress of American affairs. Moreover, only four days after 
 America's declaration of war against Great Britain, France de- 
 clared war against Russia, and Napoleon began preparing for his 
 march to Moscow, which was effected that summer. This of 
 course made Russia and Great Britain allies, and the Russian 
 emperor therefore regarded the war between his friend, America, 
 and his ally, Great Britain, with much regret. His feelings were 
 indeed more than those of regret. He had a lively fear that 
 America might ally herself with France against the common 
 enemy of both. Great Britain. For this fear there never was 
 any groiuid. Monroe wrote to Adams on July 1, 1812, that if 
 Russia became involved in war with France, and therefore an 
 ally of Great Britain, there was no reason why the United States 
 should not continue on the best of terms with her even while 
 warring against her ally. Before Adams received this despatch, 
 however, he was called upon by Romanzoff, who brought to him 
 a message from the emperor, expressing much regi-et at the war
 
 284 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 between America and England, and offering tentative sugges- 
 tions of Russian mediation between the two. Adams had re- 
 ceived no instructions from Washington to guide him in the mat- 
 ter, but on his own authority he replied that he felt sure that the 
 United States would welcome such action, provided that Great 
 Britain would also accept it. Romanzoff replied that he had al- 
 ready made the suggestion to the British ambassador, who had 
 forwarded it to his Government. A few weeks later Adams re- 
 ceived Monroe's despatch about maintaining friendly relations 
 with Russia despite all other complications, and communicated 
 a part of its contents to Romanzoff, who was of course much 
 pleased and, with Adams's not altogether judicious consent, con- 
 veyed to the British government the assurance that America 
 would not ally herself with France. Adams then inquired what 
 answer if any the British government had made to the mediation 
 proposal, and was told that it had neither accepted nor rejected 
 it, but had expressed the belief that America would not accept 
 it and the opinion that the time for such action had not yet ar- 
 rived. Nevertheless it had sent out Admiral Sir John B. War- 
 ren with authority to negotiate. 
 
 In January, 1813, Daschkoff, the Russian minister at Wash- 
 ington, apparently without official instructions, suggested to 
 Madison that the czar would be glad to mediate; but the Presi- 
 dent was irresponsive and unsympathetic. A month later Dasch- 
 koff renewed the suggestion, under orders from St. Petersburg, 
 and at the same time Madison received from Adams despatches 
 containing the Russian proposals which had been made to him. 
 Madison wished to avoid any clash with Congress over the mat- 
 ter, and so waited until that body had adjourned, in March, 
 when he told Daschkoff that the offer would be accepted. There- 
 upon, on March 8, Daschkoff reported to Monroe that he had 
 just received orders from Russia to make a formal tender of the 
 emperor's mediation, and three days later Monroe replied, stat- 
 ing that the President formally accepted the offer. Madison and 
 Monroe apparently did not wait to learn the intentions of Great 
 Britain, but precipitately assumed that that country also had 
 accepted the offer. Next they consulted with Jefferson, and on 
 his advice appointed a commission of three members to conduct 
 the negotiations. One, of course, was Adams. The second was
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 285 
 
 James A. Bayard of Delaware, a Federalist who was chosen in 
 order to give the commission a nonpartizan air. It was in- 
 tended to select a Western man for the third member in order 
 to give that part of the country representation; but Gallatin, 
 who felt that his services as secretary of the treasury were no 
 longer profitable, asked for the appointment and received it. By 
 this time it was known that the decision of Great Britain had 
 not yet been announced, but Monroe was confident that it would 
 be favorable to the proposed mediation. He instructed the com- 
 missioners to explain fully to the Russian government the claims 
 of the United States for neutral rights and the grounds upon 
 which they were based. They were to make no treaty which did 
 not explicitly renounce for Great Britain the rights of search 
 and impressment. In addition, they were to seek a treaty of 
 amity and commerce with Russia, on the basis of reciprocity in 
 the rights of the "most favored nation." 
 
 There was then soon made a most extraordinary revelation of 
 deception which had been practised by the Russian government 
 or some of its officers, which had the result of causing great em- 
 barrassment and of defeating the negotiations for peace. Ro- 
 manzoff had assured Adams, and also Gallatin, on the latter 's 
 arrival at St. Petersburg, that the offer of mediation had been 
 made to the British government at exactly the same time and in 
 exactly the same manner as to the United States; as of course 
 it should have been. But now it appeared that this had not 
 been done. The offer had not been made at all to the British 
 government, and the first intimation which it had of the project 
 of mediation was conveyed in the report of Admiral Warren, 
 commander of the British fleet in the Chesapeake, that he had 
 granted a passport to the American vessel which conveyed Galla- 
 tin and Bayard from Washington to St. Petersburg. The fact 
 that Russia had thus failed to extend the offer of mediation to 
 Great Britain, or even to notify her of it, was in itself sufficient 
 to cause British rejection of the whole scheme. In addition the 
 question of maritime rights, which was fundamental to the war, 
 was considered to be of so vital importance to Great Britain that 
 under no circumstances could she submit it to the arbitration of 
 a third party. The cabinet therefore unanimously resolved not 
 to accept the proposed mediation, and the Russian government
 
 286 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 was promptly informed to that effect. This information was 
 repeated to the three American commissioners, who thus found 
 that they had nothing to do. They did, indeed, seek the nego- 
 tiation of a treaty of amity and commerce with Russia, but were 
 told that in the then existing state of European affairs the em- 
 peror did not think the time propitious for such negotiations. 
 The emperor also declared that since Great Britain had declined 
 his offer of mediation he would have nothing more to do with 
 the matter. Romanzoff, however, made several further efforts 
 to have the offer renewed, without result. He was indeed him- 
 self being at this time discredited and forced out of office, hav- 
 ing been replaced in the czar's favor and confidence by Count 
 Nesselrode. 
 
 At this juncture, happily, it became known that the British 
 government had expressed its willingness to enter into direct 
 peace negotiations with the United States, without Russian or 
 other mediation, the negotiations to be conducted either at Goth- 
 enburg, in Sweden, or in London. This information was with- 
 held from the Americans by Romanzoff as long as possible, and 
 various amazing misrepresentations were made by him both to 
 them and to the British ambassador, justifying the declaration 
 which the latter made to Adams, that the Russian chancellor had 
 been cheating both parties. When the possibility of direct ne- 
 gotiations became known, however, the situation was materially 
 cleared up. The British offer to that effect was not received at 
 Washington until January 3, 1814; though Lord Castlereagh 's 
 note conveying it was dated November 4, preceding. It was 
 promptly accepted by Monroe, two days later, and the whole 
 correspondence in the case was laid before Congress. The com- 
 mission was increased to five in number, by the addition of Henry 
 Clay and Jonathan Russell; and new instructions were issued 
 to it, to suit the new circumstances, authorizing it to proceed to 
 London at its discretion ; which it did. 
 
 Gallatin and Bayard were the first of the American commis- 
 sioners to come into touch with the British government, but they 
 arrived in London at an inopportune moment. They reached 
 that capital on April 9, 1814. Two days later Napoleon abdi- 
 cated the imperial throne of France, and the whole aspect of 
 European affairs was transformed. Great Britain particularly
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 287 
 
 was exultant. Her navy, long mistress of the European seas, 
 was freed from duty there and could be sent in a body to block- 
 ade and scourge the American coast. Her veteran army, re- 
 leased from continental wars, could be transferred to Canada 
 for the invasion and conquest of New England; an achievement 
 which the cabinet confidently anticipated. There was a wide- 
 spread inclination to continue the war until America was 
 crushed. It was seriously purposed to challenge our title to 
 Louisiana, to compel us to relinquish West Florida, to exclude 
 Americans from the fisheries of the Nova Scotia and Newfound- 
 land coasts and from the navigation of the Niagara and St. Law- 
 rence rivers, and to take the northern parts of Indiana and Illi- 
 nois and all of Michigan and Wisconsin from us, to be erected 
 into an Indian territory under British protection and suzerainty. 
 The British government might have persisted in this course, 
 backed with the military power which had crushed Napoleon, but 
 for two considerations. One was that it had already committed 
 itself to negotiations for peace; and the other, that the general 
 sentiment of its allies on the continent of Europe was opposed to 
 such measures. 
 
 Gallatin and Bayard were, however, alarmed and depressed, 
 and wrote to Monroe that they could expect nothing better than 
 to make a treaty which would put things back just where they 
 were before the war, leaving the questions of the blockade, the 
 searching of vessels, and the impressment of seamen as unsettled 
 as ever. At Gallatin's request our minister at Paris tried to 
 make an appeal to the Russian emperor, but was denied any in- 
 terview with him or with his minister, Nesselrode. Appeal was 
 then made to Lafayette, who was known to be our friend and 
 who was supposed to have much influence with the czar. Lafay- 
 ette took up the cause with generous zeal, discussed it with the 
 czar in a long interview at the house of Mme. de Stael, and se- 
 cured from him a promise to do what he could for us when he 
 reached London. Lafayette also got a promise of aid from 
 Humboldt, the Prussian minister at Paris, who had visited the 
 United States on his way home from his scientific researches in 
 Mexico and South America. When the czar went over to Lon- 
 don, however, he told Gallatin that he could do nothing for him. 
 He had already made three fruitless efforts in our behalf, and
 
 288 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 was convinced that Great Britain would not be moved by the 
 intervention of any third power. The fact was that the czar 
 had never had any other than a purely selfish motive in his 
 offer of mediation and his profession of friendship for the 
 United States; and now that it was no longer to his interest to 
 befriend this country, he reversed his policy and became as un- 
 sympathetic as he had at first been effusive. He was also already 
 beginning to meditate upon the distinctly and aggressively anti- 
 American policy of the Holy Alliance. This outcome of the 
 Rirssian mediation proposals was a bitter disappointment to the 
 United States, and the evident duplicity of the Russian chancel- 
 lor, if not of the czar himself, created a most unfavorable im- 
 pression. But it was considered to be good policy to say noth- 
 ing about it and to proceed with negotiations with Great Brit- 
 ain as though nothing had ever been said or done by Russia on 
 the subject. Gallatin urged, meanwhile, upon Clay, who was 
 at Gothenberg, that the negotiations should not be conducted 
 there, but should be transferred to some place more accessible 
 to the continental powers upon whose friendly offices and influ- 
 ence America must rely. London itself would be preferable to 
 so out-of-the-way a spot as Gothenberg. Clay hesitated, being 
 quite unwilling to go to London and fearing that removal from 
 Gothenberg would offend the Swedish government. Finally it 
 was agreed that the negotiations should be conducted on neutral 
 soil at Ghent, and Gallatin set out thither at the beginning of 
 July, 1814, in an almost hopeless frame of mind. He knew, and 
 had warned Monroe, that the British government was preparing 
 to send 20,000 veteran troops to America for the capture of 
 Washington, New York, and other coast cities, and he had no 
 hope of any aid whatever from any other country. 
 
 The commissioners met at Ghent on August 8, and between 
 the two sides there was a striking contrast. The five Americans 
 were among the ablest and most resolute men this country then 
 possessed. John Quiney Adams, the chairman, was one of the 
 most masterful statesmen of his time in any country of the 
 world, profoundly versed in all the issues of both European and 
 American diplomacy and without a superior in the world in men- 
 tal keenness and controversial skill. Gallatin was a man of 
 exceptional ability and of a fine diplomatic temperament, well
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 289 
 
 fitted to counteract the somewhat harsh and arrogant manner 
 of Adams. Clay was a fine representative of the younger ele- 
 ment of the West, Russell was an equally good representative 
 of the mercantile interests of New England, and Bayard united 
 in himself the principles of both the great political parties of 
 America. The British commissioners were only three in num- 
 ber. One was Lord Gambler, a naval officer of discreditable re- 
 pute ; Henry Goulbourn, a youthful tyro in diplomacy ; and Wil- 
 liam Adams, an academic jurist. The three had apparently been 
 selected because they were mediocrities and could therefore be 
 trusted to take no initiative but mechanically to reflect the mind 
 of the British ministry. 
 
 At the very beginning of the conferences the British commis- 
 sioners demanded, as prerequisite to further negotiations, the 
 surrender of the Northwest Territories as an Indian domain. 
 The Americans replied with a flat refusal to consider the propo- 
 sition at all. A deadlock was thus caused, which came peril- 
 ously near to putting an end to the negotiations before they were 
 fairly begun. It is a matter of uncertainty whether the British 
 government seriously expected this extravagant demand to be 
 granted. It is quite possible that the intention was to create a 
 deadlock, abandon the negotiations, and continue the war. In- 
 deed, the war was actually being continued, Chippewa and 
 Lundy's Lane were fought while the commissioners were pro- 
 ceeding to Ghent, and the British raid upon Washington and 
 Baltimore and the battle of Lake Champlain followed hard upon 
 their first meetings. On the other hand, the unconcealed though 
 pitifully futile attempt of the Americans to conquer and an- 
 nex Canada warranted the British in seeking a counter-conquest 
 of United States territory. It is not improbable, either, that a 
 design was cherished of making the establishment of a British 
 Indian State on the LTpper Mississippi an entering wedge to the 
 British acquisition of Louisiana itself and control of the river 
 all the way to the gulf. Florida would then have been taken 
 in return for the British expulsion of Napoleon from Spain, and 
 the United States, confined to little more than the area of the 
 original thirteen colonies, would be hemmed in at north, west, 
 and south by a British domain. 
 
 The negotiations were thus suspended and the American com- 
 
 VOL. I 19
 
 290 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 missioners prepared to leave Ghent and return home to rally a 
 united American nation to a desperate struggle for life itself. 
 Ten days later, however, Lord Castlereagh passed through Ghent 
 on his way to the Congress of Vienna which was to reorganize 
 the continent of Europe, and he gave fresh instructions for the 
 reopening of negotiations. He renewed the demand for relin- 
 quishment of territory, which would give the western three of 
 the Great Lakes to Great Britain, and also for cession of the 
 northern and eastern part of Maine so as to give Canada a direct 
 line from Quebec to Halifax; Great Britain was to have full 
 rights of navigation of the Mississippi, and America was to 
 have no naval vessels on any of the Great Lakes. Adams re- 
 quired these propositions to be submitted in writing, and he and 
 Gallatin and their colleagues framed a singularly resolute and 
 forceful reply, the gist of which was that they would not so 
 much as consider, or refer to their home Government, the pro- 
 posals respecting the relinquishment of territory and the ex- 
 elusion of our flag from the lakes. The negotiations were there- 
 fore again abandoned. Adams packed his trunks for a return 
 to St. Petersburg, Clay planned to go to Paris, Russell prepared 
 to begin his new duties as minister to Sweden, and Gallatin and 
 Bayard turned their faces toward America. On August 31 a 
 messenger was sent to Washington, reporting the failure of the 
 peace negotiations. The news was circulated here when Ameri- 
 cans were still exulting over the victories at Lundy's Lane and 
 on Lake Champlain, and when they were exasperated over the 
 burning of Washington and the attack on Baltimore ; and it was 
 received with a grim determination to prosecute the war if nec- 
 essary to the bitter end. 
 
 When Castlereagh learned that the negotiations were again 
 broken off he was much concerned, and doubtless realized the 
 error of appointing commissioners who could exericse no dis- 
 cretion and take no initiative. He gave his commissioners a 
 wigging, and issued new instructions, in which he admitted that 
 the questions of the Indian territory^ the Canadian boundary, 
 and the control of the lakes had nothing to do with the real is- 
 sues of war, and that these demands had been made not as a sine 
 qua non but merely as a diplomatic offset to the aggressive de- 
 signs of the United States against Canada and in West Florida.
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 291 
 
 These demands were therefore to be dropped, and the British 
 government would be satisfied with a guarantee of amnesty to 
 the Indians who had engaged in the war against the United 
 States. With this triumph for the Americans the negotiations 
 were resumed. The next question to be considered was that 
 of the disposition of the lands occupied by the belligerents dur- 
 ing the war. The Americans contended that the old boundaries, 
 which existed before the war, should be restored at all points. 
 The British proposed, on the other hand, that new lines should 
 be drawn so as to give each country the territory which was 
 actually in its possession at the time of the making of the treaty. 
 To this latter proposal the Americans replied with a positive 
 refusal, and they added that they would proceed no further 
 with the negotiations excepting on the basis of the territorial 
 status quo ante helium. In this attitude they were strongly en- 
 couraged by the news which reached Ghent on that very day 
 of the victory on Lake Champlain, the repulse of the British at 
 Baltimore, and the retreat of Prevost's army. 
 
 For a moment the British were inclined to abandon negotia- 
 tions and enlarge their efforts in the war, and it was actually 
 suggested that the Duke of Wellington should be sent to America 
 either to negotiate peace or to command the army. But Well- 
 ington replied that if he came hither he could do nothing in war- 
 fare without the control of the lakes, and he saw no way in 
 which that was to be secured ; and in respect to peace-making he 
 added that in his opinion the Americans were right in demand- 
 ing the restoration of the old boundaries. Moreover, affairs at 
 Vienna were not proceeding favorably to the British, talk of 
 Russian intervention was renewed, and the taxpayers of the 
 United Kingdom were grumbling at the prospect of more war 
 bills. The British government therefore reluctantly conceded 
 the American demand and requested the American commission- 
 ers to draft a definitive treaty of peace. In this work the Amer- 
 icans had a reasonably free hand. It is true that their original 
 instructions made the complete abandonment of impressments by 
 Great l^i-itain essential. If that was not granted, they were to 
 quit negotiations and return home. Later they were told by 
 Monroe that that point was important but not indispensable. 
 Finally they were told that they might waive that point alto-
 
 292 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 gether if they could not otherwise make a treaty for ending the 
 war. 
 
 But even with this liberty of action the five American com- 
 missioners were much embarrassed by their own strong dif- 
 ferences of opinion. Adams and Russell, New Englanders, 
 wanted to insist upon the fishery rights, and cared less about 
 the Mississippi. Clay and Bayard, on the other hand, wanted 
 the British to be excluded from navigating the Mississippi, while 
 they were little interested in the fisheries. The question arose, 
 as a matter of international law, whether the treaty of peace 
 of 1783 was still in force, or whether it had, like other treaties, 
 been automatically voided by the declaration of war. Clay in- 
 clined to the latter view, and held that the British rights in the 
 Mississippi had thus been abolished. Adams argued with much 
 force that the treaty of 1783 was of so extraordinary a charac- 
 ter that it had survived the incidence of war and was still in 
 force, and that therefore the American rights in the fisheries 
 and the British rights in the Mississippi were still intact. In 
 this Adams was probably right, but Clay could not be convinced, 
 and would listen to no treaty-making which opened or left open 
 the Mississippi to the British. For a time this disagreement 
 threatened the defeat of the negotiations, but in the end the tact 
 and humor of Gallatin composed the controversy, and both 
 Adams and Clay agreed to the making of a treaty which should 
 make no reference to either of those disputed points. A draft of 
 such a treaty was submitted to the British on November 10. At 
 about that time General Jackson was seizing Pensacola in return 
 for the British use of that Spanish Floridan city as their base of 
 operations against Southern Georgia. 
 
 The British reply was to throw a firebrand among the Amer- 
 ican commissioners. They returned the treaty on November 25 
 with a number of changes, chief among which was the insertion 
 of a specific grant to them of the right to navigate the Missis- 
 sippi, while no allusion was made to the fisheries. That of course 
 set Adams and Clay at their former dispute, hammer and tongs,, 
 and again Gallatin's diplomacy was taxed to restore peace and 
 unity between his colleagues. A proposal to grant the naviga- 
 tion of the Mississippi in return for a grant of the fisheries, which 
 would have restored the conditions which prevailed before the
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 293 
 
 war, was rejected by the British. The Americans then offered 
 to proceed with negotiations under a tacit reservation of all their 
 rights, but refused to have a clause to that effect inserted in the 
 treaty lest it should be interpreted in an undesirable manner. 
 
 In the end, all reference to these questions was omitted, and the 
 amazing anomaly was presented, on December 24, of the mak- 
 ing and signing of a treaty of peace which did not settle 
 or so much as refer in any way to even a single one of the 
 issues over which the war had ostensibly been declared and 
 fought. Search, impressment, blockade, maritime rights of neu- 
 trals, indemnities, and the other matters which had loomed 
 so large at the beginning of the war and for years before, were 
 as completely ignored as though they had never existed. The 
 treaty realized the title of the last chapter of "Rasselas": 
 **The conclusion, in which nothing is concluded." It simply 
 provided for peace, for the restoration of all conquests to the 
 ante hellimi status, for the appointment of commissioners to de- 
 fine disputed boundaries, for the ending of Indian wars, and for 
 the abolition of the slave trade. The last-named provision was 
 not, unfortunately, made really effective for many years there- 
 after, owing to the fact that its enforcement would have involved 
 the exercise of that right of search which both countries were 
 now desirous of dropping into desuetude. Gallatin had tried to 
 get inserted a provision forbidding the employment of savages 
 in warfare, but this did not appear in the final draft of the 
 treaty. 
 
 The chief credit for the making of this treaty is due to Galla- 
 tin, though his colleagues must all share in it, and even the 
 sometimes acrimonious differences of Adams and Clay, on the 
 whole, contributed to rather than obstructed the gaining of the 
 end. Gallatin described the treaty to IMonroe as being "as 
 favorable as could be expected under existing circumstances, so 
 far as they were known to us," and this estimate of it was 
 probably just. Before the news of the signing of it could reach 
 America, the battle of New Orleans was fought and the British 
 there suffered their one really stinging land defeat of the whole 
 war. Indeed, the news of the peace was not known in America 
 until near the middle of February, 1815, when it was received 
 by all parties with a mingling of satisfaction and regret. There
 
 294 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 was occasion for the administration party to feel humiliated, 
 because of the failure of the high and resounding boasts with 
 which they had begun the war. Their designs for the conquest 
 of Canada had ended in a hopeless fiasco, and most of the land 
 eompaigns had been little else than disgraceful. Nevertheless 
 Madison reported to Congress that the treaty ended "with pe- 
 culiar felicity a campaign signalized by the most brilliant suc- 
 cesses." The treaty was submitted to the Senate on February 
 15 and was ratified two days later. There was an instant re- 
 sponse in business and finance, stocks in New York and Phila- 
 delphia rising from ten to eighteen points within a week, and 
 the whole country hastening into a general revival of industrial 
 and commercial prosperity. Nor was there less gratification in 
 Great Britain, especially since a few days after the ratification 
 of the treaty Napoleon escaped from Elba and resumed his wars. 
 
 It is of interest to recall some authoritative British expressions 
 concerning the proceedings. The Duke of Wellington publicly 
 testified in the House of Lords that the American commissioners 
 in making the treaty ''had shown a most astonishing superiority 
 over the British" during the whole of the negotiations. This 
 superiority was undoubted and was very great, but it was 
 scarcely astonishing, seeing that the British government had de- 
 liberately and purposely selected three men of not more than 
 third-rate ability. A few years later the British lord chief jus- 
 tice expressed the judicial opinion that the orders in council 
 were not only grievously unjust to neutrals but also, according 
 to the general belief, were contrary to British law and the law 
 of nations. As to our military achievements, while most of those 
 on land were contemptible, the few exceptions to that rule cre- 
 ated a profound impression upon the whole world ; particularly 
 that post helium battle in which 'Jackson's rude frontiersmen 
 routed the disciplined veterans of Wellington 's Peninsular War ; 
 and that impression was strengthened by the brilliant achieve- 
 ments of the few ships which our navy then contained; so that 
 "The London Times" was moved to say of the Americans in 
 1817: "Their first war with England made them independent; 
 their second made them formidable." 
 
 The issues left unsettled by the treaty were, however, numer- 
 ous and formidable, and some of them were urgent. Among
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 295 
 
 them were the fisheries, the navigation of the Mississippi, West 
 Indian commerce, the northeast and northwest boundaries, and 
 indemnity for slaves carried off by the British during the war. 
 Adams, Gallatin, and Clay soon began negotiations which lasted 
 for two months and resulted in the making of a commercial con- 
 vention, on July 3, 1815, which was to last for four years, a 
 term which was extended to ten years. Under this convention 
 many of the American demands were ignored or denied. But it 
 was agreed that there should be reciprocal freedom of commerce 
 between the United States and all the European possessions of 
 Great Britain, and that all the discriminating duties and vexa- 
 tious restrictions of past years should be abolished. The Brit- 
 ish government refused, however, to extend these conditions to 
 commerce with its West Indian and Canadian possessions, and 
 the East Indian trade was to be open to Americans for only 
 American products or direct importation of East Indian goods 
 to America, and vessels in that trade were forbidden to call at 
 the Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena, or any other British pos- 
 sessions on the way. The consistent and resolute purpose of 
 Great Britain was to retain for herself a monopoly of trade 
 among the various parts of her empire. The result was that the 
 bulk of the West Indian trade, comprising American exports of 
 lumber, cattle, flour, and other food products, remained in Brit- 
 ish hands. The fisheries question was not touched in the con- 
 vention, and the British authorities began to act upon the as- 
 sumption that all American rights had lapsed, and therefore to 
 seize all American fishermen found operating along the coasts 
 without special license, and also to warn them not to approach 
 within sixty miles of the coast — a perfectly indefensible arroga- 
 tion of sovereignty over the high seas which a few years later 
 led to some sharp correspondence and to vigorous negotiations. 
 But this and the other issues were postponed for action by the 
 next administration. 
 
 Despite the unfortunate circumstances attendant upon the 
 Russian offer of mediation, the Russian government expressed 
 itself as much pleased with the making of the treaty of Ghent, 
 and its relations with the United States remained most friendly. 
 In 1815 it offered to secure, through its minister at Constantino- 
 ple, tlie good offices of the Sultan of Turkey in the adjustment
 
 296 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of relations between America and Algiers on a more satisfac- 
 tory basis. Daschkoff, at Washington, intimated to Monroe that 
 he had been authorized to negotiate a reciprocity trade treaty 
 with this country, and preparations to that end were begun, 
 when a most unpleasant incident occurred which not only 
 abruptly ended them but also strained the relations between the 
 two countries. This was the arrest, in November, 1815, of Kos- 
 loff, the Russian consul-general at Philadelphia, on the atrocious 
 charge of committing rape upon a child of tender years, the 
 penalty for which under American law was death. Kosloff was 
 committed to prison and was there confined over night. The 
 next day he obtained a writ of habeas corpus, and as a result 
 was permitted to go on bail, to await trial at the next term of 
 court. Daschkoff at once protested to Monroe that the arrest 
 was a breach of international law and of consular immunity, 
 which was likely to lead to unpleasant complications between the 
 two nations, and two days later he issued a circular letter to all 
 foreign ministers in this country to the same effect. No formal 
 reply was made to Daschkoff 's letter, but he was privately as- 
 sured that the United States district-attorney would see to it 
 that Kosloff's rights under the law of nations were respected. 
 Indictment by a grand jury followed, and the case came before 
 the trial court. There Kosloff's counsel moved for dismissal on 
 two grounds: First, that the law of nations conferred upon 
 consuls immunity from criminal prosecution; and second, that 
 the Constitution of the United States vested the federal courts 
 with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases affecting consuls. The 
 former ground was obviously untenable. Consular immunity 
 cannot be interpreted as a charter for felony. The second was, 
 however, perfectly valid, and on it the case was dismissed. Kos- 
 loff was still under the imputation of crime, however, and Dasch- 
 koff demanded that he should be taken before a federal court 
 so that he could prove his innocence. This was obviously a flat 
 contradiction of the former contention of consular immunity. 
 It was denied by the Government, on the ground that rape was 
 an offense at common law over which the federal courts did not 
 have jurisdiction, and that therefore there could be no trial for 
 it before such a tribunal. It was added that if Kosloff wanted 
 a vindication he could seek it by prosecuting the person on whose
 
 ALBERT (iALLATlN
 
 THE SECOND WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 297 
 
 complaint he had been arrested ; but this he declined to do. He 
 might also have had a vindication in the state court, had he not 
 set up the plea of its lack of jurisdiction. At this Daschkoff 
 addressed the secretary of state, demanding redress for an out- 
 rage against international law, for which, he insisted, the Execu- 
 tive of the United States was responsible. His tone was so in- 
 temperate that the President and secretary of state declined to 
 answer his note or to discuss the matter with him. Instead, they 
 sent his note and a full statement of the American side of the 
 case to Nesselrode at St. Petersburg. This communication was 
 first handed to Daschkoff, for him to transmit to his chief. But 
 he refused to do so and returned it, saying that he considered 
 it improper for him to transmit it. Monroe then announced his 
 intention of sending it to Nesselrode by special messenger. A 
 few weeks later, on October 31, 1816, Daschkoff severed diplo- 
 matic relations with the United States. He told Monroe that 
 this was done at the command of the emperor who, on learning 
 of the outrage upon his consul-general, had refused to receive 
 Levett Harris, the American charge d'affaires, and had directed 
 Daschkoff to withdraw from a country where the laws of nations 
 were disregarded and where the representative of a great power 
 was not properly treated. 
 
 This extreme action was a great and unwelcome surprise to 
 the American government, which had not anticipated anything 
 of the sort, and which had meantime, in February, 1816, ap- 
 pointed William Pinckney, one of the most accomplished men 
 of the time, to be minister to Russia. It had also instructed 
 Harris, at St. Petersburg, to seek the removal of the Russian 
 consul at Boston for a number of offenses, including that of con- 
 cealing and protecting from confiscation some British goods 
 which had been captured as prizes in the late war. Nesselrode 
 agreed to the withdrawal of this consul, and then intimated that 
 if the secretary of state would write to him, or if the President 
 would write to the emperor, expressing regret for the treatment 
 of Kosloff, that incident would be ended and new and more 
 acceptable agents of the Russian government would be sent to 
 the United States. There followed some weeks of vigorous con- 
 troversy between Harris and Count Capo d'Istria, Nesselrode 's 
 colleague in the Russian ministr}^ The latter had by this time
 
 298 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 been convinced that Kosloff and Daschkoff had acted badly and 
 that the emperor had acted hastily in banishing Harris from 
 court, but he sought some settlement which would not have even 
 the appearance of any humiliation of the emperor. He also 
 strove to stand out for the principle of consular immunity to an 
 extreme degree. Harris, with fine tact and resolution, main- 
 tained that the action of the American government had been 
 perfectly correct in all respects, and that the form and degree 
 of consular immunity which had been demanded for Kosloff was 
 unknown to American jurisprudence and could not be consid- 
 ered as admissible. His last word was that the American gov- 
 ernment had acted with remarkable patience and deference to 
 the emperor, and that it could and would concede nothing more. 
 
 At this the Russian government yielded unconditionally, and 
 the incident ended in a complete victory for the United States. 
 Harris was restored to his place at the Russian court, and Pinck- 
 ney on his arrival was received with all possible distinction, 
 while Daschkoff, in consequence of full revelations of his violent 
 and unreasonable course, was recalled. It was also agreed that 
 thereafter the Russian minister to the United States should be 
 required to live at Washington, instead of at Philadelphia as 
 Daschkoff had persisted in doing. The reception of Pinckney 
 was, indeed, unprecedented. He had an audience with the czar 
 on New Year's day, and at the court ball that evening he was 
 invited within the imperial circle, where the empress talked with 
 him for nearly half an hour. That was the first time that an 
 envoy of less than ambassadorial rank was ever admitted to that 
 circle. In other ways the Russian sovereign also demonstrated 
 uncommon solicitude for the favor of the United States. It was 
 even intimated to Harris, before Pinckney 's arrival, that the 
 emperor was desirous of securing the adherence of this country 
 to the compact of the Holy Alliance. The explanation of this 
 course was simple. Russia was at that time finding herself and 
 her policies opposed by Great Britain at every turn, and the 
 emperor aimed at overcoming that hostile power by favoring the 
 only nation which promised to become a successful maritime 
 rival of it. He hoped, indeed, to secure a practical alliance with 
 the United States against Great Britain. 
 
 Pinckney was received at the beginning of the year. In May
 
 THE SECOND "WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN 299 
 
 following Baron Tuyll was appointed to succeed the egregious 
 Daschkoff as Russian minister to the United States. Tuyll, like 
 more than one other eminent Russian, was a Hollander by birth 
 and training, and was a diplomat of much ability. On learning 
 of his appointment, and thus the complete restoration of diplo- 
 matic relations between the two countries, Pinckney broached 
 the subject of a commercial treaty, which he had been authorized 
 to negotiate. Nesselrode told him that the emperor did not 
 believe in such treaties, considering them unnecessary and actu- 
 ally harmful; and the subject was thereupon dropped. Pijack- 
 ney also took up the matter of the boundaries of the Russian 
 possessions in America, and while he accomplished nothing in 
 the way of negotiation he learned enough of Russian designs to 
 enable him to warn the Washington government of them. 'But 
 his health failed, and early in 1818 he returned home, leaving 
 the settlement of the Alaska boundary and the disposition of the 
 United States toward Russia's "Holy Alliance" to be deter- 
 mined by others. 
 
 During Madison's administration William Shaler was main- 
 tained as our consul-general at Algiers, but in 1815 and 1816 
 Commodores Bainbridge, Decatur, and Chauncey, on the decks 
 of good fighting ships, conducted our principal negotiations with 
 that country, and secured a new treaty of peace and amity in 
 1816, under which blackmailing tribute was finally renounced. 
 In 1811, George W. Erving of INIassachusetts was sent as minis- 
 ter to Denmark. Following the making of the treaty of peace 
 with Great Britain, John Quincy Adams became our minister 
 to that country, while Gallatin was accredited to France. Wil- 
 liam Eustis of Massachusetts was sent to the Netherlands; in 
 August, 1814, relations with Spain were resumed by the com- 
 missioning of George W. Erving as minister; Thomas Sumter, 
 Jr., of South Carolina was sent as minister to Portugal in 1809 ; 
 and Jonathan Russell, as already mentioned, was made minister 
 to Sweden (including Norway) in 1814, where he concluded a 
 treaty of amity and commerce in 1816.
 
 XI 
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 
 
 ANOTHER new era in foreign relations began with the ad- 
 ministration of Monroe, in which the most forceful Amer- 
 ican diplomat of his time, John Quincy Adams, was secretary of 
 state. There were waiting to be settled some of the unfinished 
 tasks of the former administration, and first among these was 
 the question of the North Atlantic fisheries. The British gov- 
 ernment was impelled to assume a hostile attitude toward Amer- 
 ican fishermen chiefly by the rancor of its Canadian subjects, 
 among whom were thousands of loyalists and their children who 
 had been scandalously illtreated and expelled from the United 
 States at the close of the Revolution and who still cherished a 
 bitter and by no means unnatural or unjustifiable resentment 
 against this country. The British contention was that all Amer- 
 ican rights and privileges in the fisheries had been based upon 
 the treaty of 1783, that the subsequent War of 1812 had auto- 
 matically annulled that and all other preceding treaties, and 
 that therefore those rights and privileges were no longer exist- 
 ent. The American reply, which Adams urged with convincing 
 force, was that the treaty of 1783 in its very nature was per- 
 petual and was not annulled by the subsequent war, but was still 
 in force. It was that treaty by virtue of which Great Britain 
 recognized the independence and sovereignty of America, and 
 if it had been annulled then Great Britain would in the treaty 
 of Ghent have put herself in the absurd position of negotiating 
 with a power whose independence and sovereignty she no longer 
 recognized. Adams therefore urged that the fishing rights were 
 still unimpaired, just as much as independence itself. 
 
 Richard Rush, who had been attorney general of the United 
 States and for a time acting secretary of state, was appointed 
 minister to England, and Gallatin, our minister to France, went 
 
 over to London to assist him in the negotiations. These envoys 
 
 300
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 301 
 
 were instructed to make, if necessary, some concessions, but not 
 to relinquish the general fishery rights and privileges of this 
 country. The result was a treaty which was signed at London 
 on October 20, 1818, which confirmed an important part of the 
 American rights but renounced others. Americans were to have 
 forever the right to fish along the northern, western, and south- 
 ern coasts of Newfoundland and the coast of Labrador, and to 
 land, and to cure and to dry fish, on any of the unsettled bays 
 and creeks of those coasts. But they relinquished their rights 
 on all the other coasts and waters of British North America, to 
 wit, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Lower Canada, and the 
 eastern coast of Newfoundland; excepting that they still might 
 visit those coasts for shelter in storm, for necessary repairs, and 
 for supplies of wood and water. This arrangement was re- 
 garded as quite satisfactory, and was so, for a time ; but event- 
 ually grave disputes arose concerning the interpretation of the 
 treaty and a final settlement was not effected until the beginning 
 of the twentieth century. 
 
 Another question which was dealt with in this treaty of 1818 
 was the northern boundary of the Louisiana territory. That 
 territory, though repeatedly transferred from one sovereignty to 
 another, had never been accurately defined, either at the north or 
 at the southwest. The watershed between the IMississippi River 
 and its tributaries, at the south, and the Red River of the North 
 and its tributaries, flowing north, was the natural boundary, but 
 it was winding and unsatisfactory, and an arbitrary, straight line 
 was desired. Even the short stretch of boundary between Can- 
 ada and our Northwestern Territory, from the Great Lakes to 
 the Mississippi River, was undefined. The treaty of 1783, made 
 before that region was surveyed, described it as running from 
 the northwestern extremity of the Lake of the Woods "on a due 
 west course to the River Mississippi." But that was impossible, 
 since the source of the Mississippi was found to lie almost ex- 
 actly south of that lake. Under the treaty of 1818 the matter 
 was pormanontly settled by establishing the boundary line along 
 the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, from the Lake of the 
 Woods to the Rocky Mountains. 
 
 Beyond the mountains there was another still more serious 
 boundary dispute, involving the ownership of the vast Oregon
 
 302 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Territory, extending from California to Russian America. Both 
 countries claimed it all. The British based their title upon Cap- 
 tain Cook's visit to that part of the Pacific coast in 1778, upon 
 the explorations of Mackenzie and Vancouver in 1793, upon the 
 establishment of settlements on Nootka Sound which were recog- 
 nized by Spain in 1790, and upon the existence in that region of 
 various posts of the Hudson Bay Company. The United States 
 based its claim upon the discovery and exploration of the Colum- 
 bia River by Captain Gray in 1792, upon the overland expedition 
 and exploration of Lewis and Clarke in 1803, and upon the 
 founding of Astorigj by John Jacob Astor in 1811 and the res- 
 toration of that place to the Americans at the end of the War 
 of 1812, in accordance with the treaty of Ghent. That region 
 was so remote, however, and its value so little developed, that a 
 settlement of the question of ownership was postponed. The 
 treaty of 1818 provided merely that for ten years thereafter the 
 whole region was to be jointly occupied, "free and open to the 
 vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two powers," without preju- 
 dice to the claims of either. This arrangement was renewed for 
 a second period of ten years, and a final settlement was not made 
 until 1846. 
 
 A third subject of this treaty was that of the claims of Amer- 
 ican citizens for payment for slaves which had been carried off 
 by the British during the late war. It was agreed that this 
 should be referred for adjudication to some friendly power, and 
 accordingly the emperor of Russia was selected as umpire, and 
 he in 1822 decided that the Americans were entitled to indemnity 
 for whatever losses they could prove they had suffered. This 
 was of much interest, as the first such example of arbitration, or 
 adjudication, in our history. The facts were these: In the 
 War of 1812 the British naval and land forces came into posses- 
 sion of many Negro slaves, some of whom came to them volun- 
 tarily as fugitives and some of whom were forcibly seized. The 
 treaty of Ghent provided that "all territory, places, and pos- 
 sessions whatsoever" which had been taken by one party from 
 the other, should be restored, without destroying or carrying 
 away therefrom any artillery or other public property originally 
 captured there and remaining there when the treaty was made, 
 "or any slaves or other private property." The clause was
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 303 
 
 drawn in a slipshod and indefinite way, and its meaning was 
 disputed. The British held thdt it required the surrender of 
 only such slaves as had originally been taken or found in places 
 seized and were still remaining there ; while those who had been 
 removed from the places where they were taken, or who had 
 come to British vessels from other places not occupied by the 
 British, were not to be surrendered or paid for. In brief, the 
 Negroes were to be regarded in precisely the same category as 
 cannon or other inanimate property. The American contention 
 was that slaves and other private property stood in an entirely 
 different light from public property. Thus the stipulation that 
 property was not to be destroyed was obviously inapplicable to 
 slaves. 
 
 The matter was much debated, and finally it was agreed 
 to submit "the true intent and meaning" of that clause of the 
 treaty to "some friendly sovereign or State," whose decision 
 should be final and conclusive. The award was made by the 
 Emperor of Russia, on April 22, 1822, and was to the effect that 
 the United States was entitled to the restoration of or payment 
 for all slaves who had been carried away from the places and 
 territories which the British had seized and which were to be 
 restored, but not for any which had been taken from other places. 
 The emperor offered to act as mediator in the further and final 
 settlement of these claims; his offer was accepted, and on June 
 30, 1822, a convention was concluded providing for the appoint- 
 ment of mixed commissions, each consisting of one commissioner 
 and one arbitrator appointed by each of the two powers, with the 
 Russian minister as an umpire to cast the deciding vote in case 
 of an equal division of the four. These commissions were to as- 
 certain the number of slaves and the amount of other private 
 property taken and the value thereof. The work was not con- 
 cluded until August 31, 1828, and resulted in the payment by 
 the British government of claims amounting in all to $1,204,960. 
 
 An attempt was made by the Americans, in negotiating the 
 treaty of 1818, to secure larger privileges in the West India 
 trade, and to define the northeast boundary between Maine and 
 New Bmnswick, and the British tried to insert a clause ef- 
 fectively providing for the regulation or suppression of the Af- 
 rican slave trade; but all these failed. The invention of the
 
 304 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 cotton gin had made the slave system of immense importance to 
 the Southern States, and there was a strong disinclination to 
 interfere with the trade in human chattels. The chief objection 
 by Americans to the British proposal on this subject was, how- 
 ever, based upon the fact that its adoption would assert and con- 
 firm that right of search of vessels at sea against which this 
 country had so long and so strenuously protested, and the exer- 
 cise of which the British had so grossly abused. It is interesting 
 to recall that Adams himself, who later for many years was the 
 chief adversary of the whole slave system, at this time opposed 
 the British request for its suppression. "It is," he said, "a 
 bare-faced and impudent attempt of the British to obtain, in 
 time of peace, that right of searching and seizing ships of other 
 nations which they so outrageously abused during the war." 
 And so, at his direction, the American minister in London re- 
 fused to negotiate any treaty provision for the suppression of 
 the slave trade. To what extent Adams's biting criticism was 
 warranted — to what extent the British really wanted to suppress 
 slavery, or merely wanted to legalize the right of search — is not 
 confidently to be determined. But the United States was justi- 
 fiable in refusing to accede to the British proposal ; and it showed, 
 moreover, that in doing so it had not been moved by love of the 
 slave trade when, in the next two years, it ordered the seizure 
 of all vessels engaged in that trade and proscribed them as guilty 
 of piracy. 
 
 While thus some disputes with Great Britain were settled and 
 others postponed under a modus vivendi or otherwise for future 
 settlement, relations with Spain assumed a more strenuous char- 
 acter. The objects of contention were the Floridas, or by this 
 time East Florida alone, since West Florida had been forcibly 
 disposed of in Madison's time. The United States had from 
 the beginning contended that at least half of West Florida, to 
 wit, from the Mississippi to the East Pearl River, now forming 
 a part of the State of Louisiana, was included in the Louisiana 
 Purchase ; and in 1810, in anticipation of the admission of Lou- 
 isiana to the Union two years later, it took possession of that 
 region and never again relinquished it. By that time the terri- 
 tories of Mississippi and Alabama were rapidly reaching a con- 
 dition which would warrant their admission as States, and it
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 305 
 
 was regarded as essential that they should have frontages upon 
 the gulf. This need was the greater in the case of Alabama, 
 since Mississippi would have a commercial outlet by way of the 
 great river whose name it bore, while Alabama would be entirely 
 inland and would be debarred from direct access to any deep 
 water. In addition, it was felt that it would not be propitious 
 to have those States bordered at the south by alien and poten- 
 tially hostile territor3^ For these reasons, and with a firm reli- 
 ance upon the right of superior might, in 1813 the United States 
 seized that remaining portion of West Florida lying between the 
 Pearl River and the Perdido River, which now forms the south- 
 ern extremities of the States of Mississippi and Alabama. Span- 
 ish protests and British representations were in vain. The law 
 that "they shall take who have the power, and they shall keep 
 who can," was in effective force. 
 
 There was thus left to Spain only the territory of East Florida, 
 identical in extent with our present State of Florida, and already 
 American aggressiveness, or prudence, or both, had marked it 
 to share the fate of the smaller western districts. As early as 
 1803, in the midst of the Louisiana business, Jefferson had de- 
 clared that as soon as Spain became engaged in another war, 
 Florida or the Floridas would become ours. His attention was 
 chiefly fixed upon West Florida, though he doubtless had East 
 Florida in mind when he spoke of the whole Gulf Stream as 
 belonging to the United States. Indeed, the acquisition of Lou- 
 isiana made the acquisition of Florida inevitable, since it was in- 
 tolerable that our commerce between the Mississippi River and 
 the Atlantic should have to skirt for hundreds of miles the shores 
 of an alien country, and should have to pass through a strait 
 both shores of which were held by a foreign, always antagonistic, 
 and sometimes hostile power. Florida, moreover, abutted directly 
 upon the entire southern border of Georgia, which was not pleas- 
 ant and would not have been pleasant under any circumstances. 
 It was far worse than unpleasant ; it was gravely detrimental to 
 our peace, security, and general welfare, in the circumstances 
 which then existed and which were steadily becoming worse. 
 For Florida was the home of Indian tribes which frequently 
 made raids across the border into Georgia. It was the resort of 
 outlaw bands, which committed all sorts of depredations upon 
 
 VOL. I — 20
 
 306 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Georgia. It was the refuge of runaway slaves and of absconding 
 criminals. These things made it a serious nuisance, which Spain 
 either would not or could not abate. There was, finally, always 
 present the danger that Spain w&uld transfer Florida to some 
 other power, or that it would be taken from her by some other. 
 Spain herself, in her decadence, could not imperil us, but for 
 Great Britain or France to own Florida and to use it as a base 
 of operations against us, would be a very different thing. 
 
 It was with this latter contingency in view that the first spe- 
 cific action toward annexing Florida was taken ; at a time in the 
 later Napoleonic wars, when Spain was almost at the mercy of 
 any despoiler. Congress, in secret session on January 15, 1811, 
 adopted the following joint resolution : 
 
 "Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and of 
 her American provinces ; and considering the influence which the 
 destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the 
 United States may have upon their security, tranquillity, and 
 commerce, 
 
 "Be it Resolved: That the United States, under the peculiar 
 circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot without serious in- 
 quietude see any part of the said territory pass into the hands 
 of any foreign power; and that a due regard for their own 
 safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies, for 
 the temporary occupation of the said territory ; they at the same 
 time declaring that the said territory shall, in their hands, re- 
 main subject to future negotiations. ' ' 
 
 At the same time Congress enacted a law, authorizing the 
 President to take possession of Florida or any part of it in case 
 of any attempt of a European power other than Spain herself 
 to occupy it, using to that end the army and navy of the United 
 States ; and it appropriated public funds to the amount of $100,- 
 000 for ' ' contingent expenses. ' ' In pursuance of this policy the 
 President directed General Matthews, commanding the military 
 forces of the United States in Georgia, to guard against the 
 entry of any foreign power into Florida, and also to sound the 
 people of Florida as to their willingness to be annexed to the 
 United States. Nothing needed to be done at that time; but 
 during the War of 1812, as already related, the western part of 
 Florida was occupied by a British force, which used that Span-
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 307 
 
 ish territory as a basis of hostile operations against the United 
 States. Whether this was done with or without the assent of 
 the Spanish government does not appear, nor does it matter. In 
 either case the wrong and menace to the United States of such 
 use of nominally neutral territory were obvious. At the very 
 outbreak of that war Andrew Jackson had suggested the seizure 
 of Florida, and had offered to effect it. His offer was not ap- 
 proved — though neither was it disapproved — by the Govern- 
 ment. But toward the close of the war, after the British had 
 used Florida as a base of operations against us, Jackson, then a 
 major-general, led his army thither and drove the British out 
 of Pensacola. Thus was set a precedent for disregarding Span- 
 ish sovereignty and neutrality whenever it seemed necessary to 
 do so for the self -protection of the United States. Again, dur- 
 ing that war a British officer established a fort on the Appa- 
 lachicola River, where he remained for some months after the 
 conclusion of peace, gathering thither Indians and runaway 
 slaves and inciting them to hostility against the United States. 
 By falsely telling the Indians that the United States was under 
 obligations to restore to them their former holdings of land in 
 Georgia, he came close to provoking a general Indian war. 
 When at last he departed, he left behind him a considerable 
 Negro and Indian garrison, with stores of ammunition. The 
 place thus remained a danger spot for more than a year; until, 
 since the Spanish authorities would do nothing about it, the 
 United States sent a gunboat thither, which invaded Spanish 
 waters and destroyed the outlaw fort. 
 
 While there was a cessation of activities for a few years, there 
 was no improvement in conditions, and early in Monroe's terra 
 a vigorous policy was prescribed. Our Government took the 
 consistent and logical view that if Spain could not or would not 
 keep order in her territory so as to prevent its becoming a peril 
 and an actual injury to us, we were under no requirement to re- 
 spect the sovereignty, but were at liberty to invade her territory 
 whenever it was necessary to do so for our own protection. In 
 1817 a notorious freebooter named Aury settled on Amelia Island, 
 in the northeastern corner of Florida, and made that place head- 
 quarters for himself and a gang of criminal associates in raids 
 upon Georgia. lie had formerly been on Galveston Island,
 
 308 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Texas, but had been compelled by an American expedition to 
 decamp. Spain had failed to check his criminal activities there, 
 and she similarly failed to interfere at Amelia Island. A United 
 States naval expedition was therefore sent thither, which not 
 only drove him away but also raised the American flag over that 
 piece of Spanish territory and practically annexed it to the 
 territories of the United States. Later in the same year Jack- 
 son was directed to proceed with vigor against the hostile In- 
 dians on the southern frontier and, if necessary, to follow them 
 across the boundary into Florida. This command was welcome 
 to him, and he replied with a letter to the President in which he 
 said: "Let it be signified to me through any channel that the 
 possession of the Floridas would be desirable to the United 
 States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished." Jackson 
 suggested in the letter that the desired intimation might be 
 transmitted to him through one "Mr. J. Rhea," who had for 
 some time been a leader of some American filibusters who were 
 trying to set up a government in Florida and to get it recog- 
 nized by and admitted to the United States. He called himself 
 "president" of that State, When this letter reached Washing- 
 ton, Monroe- was ill, and he did not see it nor even hear of it 
 until a year afterward. But, according to Jackson 's subsequent 
 statement, Rhea wrote to Jackson that IMonroe had seen it and 
 approved it. It is safe to assume that Rhea did write to that 
 effect, for there is a thousand times better reason for suspecting 
 him than Jackson to have been a liar. Jackson also probably 
 knew of the secret action of Congress and the orders to General 
 Matthews in 1811. He may therefore be believed to have acted 
 in good faith in supposing his offer of conquest to have been 
 approved and in construing the orders of the war department 
 as a hint that the administration would be pleased to have him 
 invade and annex Florida. 
 
 At any rate Jackson acted with promptness and vigor. In 
 March, 1818, he was on the Florida frontier. Meantime he had 
 supplies sent around by water, to come to him up the Escambia 
 and Appalachicola rivers, sending word to the Spanish authori- 
 ties that any interference with their passage through Spanish 
 territory would be regarded as an act of war against the United 
 States. In continuation of this high-handed and arbitrary pol-
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 309 
 
 icy, he advanced across the border to St. Mark's, and seized that 
 place. There he arrested Alexander Arbuthuot, a Scotch trader, 
 whom he charged with complicity in the Indian war; and at 
 Suwanee, some miles away, he seized Robert Ambrister, also a 
 British subject, on a similar charge. The two men were tried, 
 and Arbuthnot was found guilty of inciting the Indians to war, 
 though there was no evidence whatever against him and pre- 
 sumptions were all in his favor, and he was condemLQed to be 
 hanged. Ambrister was charged with inciting and aiding the 
 Indians to levy war. He made no defense but threw himself 
 upon the mercy of the court. Moreover, he had no legitimate 
 business in Florida, as Arbuthnot had, but was confessedly an 
 adventurer. He was condemned to be shot; then the sentence 
 was commuted to flogging and imprisonment; and finally Jack- 
 son disapproved the commutation and ordered him to be shot. 
 Both men were accordingly put to death. Of course this caused 
 much indignation in England. Lord Castlereagh told the Amer- 
 ican minister that such was the temper of Parliament and of the 
 country that war might have been produced by the holding up 
 of a finger, and an address to the crown in favor of war would 
 have been carried by an almost unanimous vote. The diplomacy 
 of Adams and Rush, however, averted serious consequences. 
 
 The Spanish government, through its minister at Washington, 
 Don Luis de Onis, made prompt and vigorous inquiries concern- 
 ing the invasion of Florida and the seizure of St. i\Iark's and 
 other places. Were these things done by order or with the sanc- 
 tion of the American government? If yes, the implication was 
 that they would be regarded as acts of war. If no, then the 
 places must be surrendered to Spain, reparation for the insult 
 must be made, and Jackson must be repudiated and punished. 
 He added that all other negotiations would be suspended until 
 satisfaction was given in this matter. In the controversy which 
 followed the French minister at Washington, Hyde de Neuville, 
 acted as a benevolent intermediary. The culmination of it was 
 in a powerful letter which Adams sent in November, 1818, to 
 Erving, the American minister at Madrid, which amounted to 
 an ultimatum to the Spanish government. After reviewing in a 
 scathing manner the provocations which the United States had 
 long suffered, and the failure of Spain to fulfil her treaty obliga-
 
 310 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tions and her actual complicity in the outrages, Adams said that 
 the places which had been seized would be restored to Spain as 
 soon as that power would give satisfactory guarantees of good 
 behavior. But Jackson would not be punished nor censured; 
 for even if he had exceeded his orders, he had done so from mo- 
 tives of pure patriotism and had acted according to his con- 
 ception of a necessity of which he was the best judge. Counter- 
 demands of the United States were presented, especially for the 
 investigation of the conduct of Spanish officials and their pun- 
 ishment for violation of treaty engagements. Then, in his most 
 vigorous style, Adams declared that Spain could not excuse her 
 conduct on the ground of weakness ; that the United States could 
 make no more allowance for impotence than for perfidy; and 
 that Spain must immediately make her election, either to place 
 a force in Florida at once adequate for the protection of her 
 territory and the fulfilment of her engagements, or cede to the 
 United States a province of which she retained nothing but the 
 nominal possession, but which was in fact a derelict, open to the 
 occupancy of every enemy, civilized or savage, of the United 
 States, and serving no other earthly purpose than as a point of 
 annoyance to this country. "We shall," he added, "hear no 
 more apologies from Spanish governors and commandants of 
 their inability to perform the duties of the offices and the solemn 
 contracts of their country. The duty of this Government to 
 protect the persons and property of our fellow-citizens on the 
 borders of the United States is imperative — it must be dis- 
 charged. ' ' 
 
 The purport of this language was unmistakable. The United 
 States government was tremendously in earnest in its vindica- 
 tion of "the immutable principle of self-defense." It was, of 
 course, obvious that Spain was physically incapable of complying 
 with the just demands of this country. Throughout all Span- 
 ish America, from Mexico to La Plata, there was rebellion 
 against her sovereignty, which she was quite unable to suppress 
 or even to check. The Madrid government therefore directed 
 De Onis to renew negotiations for the cession of Florida. He 
 did so, with all the coolness and cunning of one of the most astute 
 diplomats of a nation to which diplomacy was second nature. 
 But in the resourceful, imperturbable, and inflexible Adams he
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 311 
 
 found more than his match. Baffled, he turned the matter over 
 to his home government, at Madrid, which presently sent it 
 back to him. An offer of friendly mediation was made by the 
 British government, but Adams declined it; mindful, no doubt, 
 of the British refusal of Russian mediation between Great Brit- 
 ain and the United States half a dozen years before. There 
 was, however, another and a stronger reason for declining it. 
 This was a controversy between America and Spain over exclu- 
 sively American affairs, in which no other power was concerned, 
 and America and Spain must settle it between themselves. The 
 precedent was established of nonacceptance of European inter- 
 vention in American controversies. 
 
 The outcome was that at last the Spanish pride of De Onis 
 yielded to the Yankee inflexibility of Adams, and on February 
 22, 1819, a treaty of amity, settlements, and limits was signed. 
 Under it, Spain was to cede the whole of Florida, and also what- 
 ever shadowy title she had to Oregon, to the United States. 
 On the other hand, the United States was to recognize the Sa- 
 bine River instead of the Rio Grande as the southwestern 
 boundary of Louisiana, thus conceding all of Texas to Spain — 
 or to Mexico, since that country was about to establish its inde- 
 pendence. Both parties renounced all claims for damages to 
 themselves or their people. The United States was not to pay 
 Spain any price whatever for Florida, but was itself to satisfy 
 the claims of its citizens to the extent of not more than $5,000,- 
 000, for damages for which Spain was responsible. On the whole 
 this was an eminently fair settlement. The United States Sen- 
 ate promptly and unanimously ratified it. But the Spanish 
 government declined to do so, unless the United States would 
 recognize as valid a number of extensive grants of public lands 
 in Florida to Spanish noblemen, which were made after the 
 terms of the treaty had been practically agi-eed upon ; and unless 
 the United States would also promise not to recognize the inde- 
 pendence of the revolted Spanish colonies in Central and South 
 America, and not to permit aid to be sent to the revolutionists 
 in Texas and Mexico. These things the United States refused to 
 do, and the treaty lapsed. Monroe and Adams thereupon argued 
 that Spain had rejected the treaty upon insufficient grounds, and 
 that the United States would be justified in carrying its provi-
 
 312 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 sions into effect just as though it had been ratified by Spain. 
 Congress did not, however, sanction so strenuous a course, and 
 counsels of patience prevailed. Spain sent over another minis- 
 ter. General Vives, in the hope that he could secure better terms, 
 but the hope was vain. Adams was inflexible. He would make 
 no concessions. He would not even enter into a discussion of 
 any. All he would do would be to sign a duplicate of the lapsed 
 treaty, with, however, one addition. That was, that Spain must 
 specifically annul the land grants which she had made in Flor- 
 ida. At the last. General Vives yielded, and the treaty was 
 signed, and was ratified by the Madrid government in October, 
 1820, and by the United States Senate in February, 1821; 
 though in the latter body it encountered some opposition on 
 personal and factional grounds. This opposition was inspired 
 by Clay, in the House of Representatives, who was angry be- 
 cause Monroe had made Adams instead of himself secretary of 
 state. He urged that the Senate alone could not by treaty re- 
 nounce Texas, since that territory was property of the United 
 States and the Constitution vested the power to dispose of prop- 
 erty not in the President and Senate but in Congress as a whole, 
 including both Houses. The treaty was finally ratified by a 
 vote of 40 to 4. 
 
 In two directions the acquisition of Florida had immediate 
 and considerable effects upon our foreign relations. One was 
 to arouse in the United States a keen interest in the island of 
 Cuba. This "Pearl of the Antilles" still remained in the pos- 
 session of Spain, while all her mainland colonies were revolting 
 and establishing their independence. But its situation, almost 
 within sight from the coast of our new territory of Florida, and 
 commanding the southern side of the Florida Channel through 
 which our commerce between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlan- 
 tic Ocean must pass, invested it with peculiar importance to 
 this country and caused projects for its annexation to be formed. 
 Nor was it lacking in importance to Great Britain and France. 
 Those powers already possessed considerable holdings in the 
 West Indies, and they were rivals for the reversionary title to 
 the remaining Spanish islands, Cuba and Porto Rico. Each real- 
 ized that whichever of them should secure those islands would 
 by virtue of that fact become the dominant power in the West
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 313 
 
 Indies; and they both felt sure that Spain would soon have to 
 relinquish them. This latter belief prevailed widely in the 
 United States, and was by no means unknown in Cuba itself. 
 Indeed, a party was organized in that island in 1822 for the ex- 
 press purpose of securing annexation, and in September of that 
 year direct overtures to that end were made to the American 
 government. Monroe received them cautiously and in a non- 
 committal manner. He sent a confidential agent to Cuba to 
 observe and report upon conditions there, but gave the annexa- 
 tion movement no direct encouragement. 
 
 At this time George Canning became Prime Minister of Eng- 
 land, a statesman of exceptional acuteness, vigilance, and ag- 
 gressive patriotism, devoted to the safeguarding of British in- 
 terests in all parts of the world. He quickly perceived the trend 
 of affairs in relation to Cuba, and was convinced that the trans- 
 fer of that island to any other power than Spain would be a mat- 
 ter of vital concern to Great Britain. Learning of the Cuban 
 overtures to the United States, in December, 1822, he brought 
 the subject before his cabinet and suggested that annexation 
 of Cuba by this country would be one of the most serious blows 
 that could be struck at British interests. He made, however, 
 no diplomatic representations in the subject, but sent a consid- 
 erable naval squadron to the coasts of Cuba and Porto Rico, 
 doubtless with the strenuous purpose of preventing, by force if 
 necessary, any such change in the sovereignty and occupancy of 
 the island. In this he was probably over-anxious, for there is 
 no indication that the American government contemplated any 
 such step, or that it would have essayed it if the island had been 
 left unguarded. On the other hand, Canning's action quickly 
 aroused American concern, and gave rise to a not unnatural 
 suspicion that Great Britain was meditating the seizure or other 
 acquisition of the island. The outcome of that feeling was the 
 writing by Adams of a document which marked the dawn of a 
 new epoch in American foreign policy. This was a letter to 
 Hugh Nelson, of Virginia, who at the beginning of 1823 had suc- 
 ceeded John Forsyth as minister to Spain ; Forsyth having suc- 
 ceeded Erving in 1819. It was dated April 28, 1823, and con- 
 tained official instructions to Nelson as to his conduct in the 
 war which was impending between Spain and France, because
 
 314 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of the latter 's intervention in behalf of Ferdinand VII. It then 
 continued, on the subject of Cuba, as follows: 
 
 "Whatever may be the issue of this war, it may be taken for 
 granted that the dominion of Spain upon the American conti- 
 nents, north and south, is irrevocably gone. But the islands of 
 Cuba and Porto Rico still remain nominally, and so far really, 
 dependent upon her, that she yet possesses the power of trans- 
 ferring her own dominion over them, together with the posses- 
 sion of them, to others. These islands are natural appendages 
 to the North American continent, and one of them, almost in 
 sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has be- 
 come an object of transcendent importance to the commercial 
 and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position 
 with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas, 
 its situation midway between our southern coast and the Island 
 of San Domingo, its safe and capacious harbor of the Havana, 
 fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advan- 
 tages, the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing 
 the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely 
 profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the 
 sum of our national interests with which that of no other for- 
 eign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which 
 binds the different members of this Union together. Such in- 
 deed are, between the interests of that island and of this coun- 
 try, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations 
 formed by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even now 
 verging to maturity, that in looking forward to the probable 
 course of events for the short period of half a century, it is 
 scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of 
 Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the con- 
 tinuance and integrity of the Union itself. . . . There are laws 
 of political as well as of physical gravitation. And if an apple, 
 severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but 
 to fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its unnatural 
 connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravi- 
 tate only toward the North American Union, which, by the same 
 law of nature, cannot cast her off from her bosom. The transfer 
 of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the 
 interests of this Union. . . . The question both of our right and
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 315 
 
 of our power to prevent it, if necessary, by force, already ob- 
 trudes itself upon our councils, and the administration is called 
 upon in the performance of its duties to the nation, at least to 
 use all the means within its competency to guard against and 
 forefend it." 
 
 That was in effect a more concrete statement concerning Cuba 
 of the principle which had already been less explicitly yet un- 
 mistakably made concerning Florida, and before that concern- 
 ing Louisiana, to wit, that while Spain might continue to hold 
 her North American possessions, so long as she administered 
 them satisfactorily, they must not pass from her possession to 
 that of any other European power, but upon her relinquishment 
 of them must become the property of the United States. That 
 was the beginning of what presently became perhaps the most 
 important principle of all the American code of foreign policy. 
 In that declaration Adams had general support and little or no 
 antagonism. Jefferson, writing from his retirement to Monroe 
 only a few weeks later, expressed in part the same view, though 
 he coupled it with an unfortunate and quite inadmissible sug- 
 gestion of an "entangling alliance" — such as he had formerly 
 deprecated — with Great Britain. He wrote: 
 
 * * Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. 
 Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity 
 to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its in- 
 dependence against all the world, except Spain, it would be 
 nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But should she take 
 it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first 
 war on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will give 
 herself to us when able to do so." 
 
 This resolute attitude of the American government served its 
 purpose without being reinforced with any overt act. Spain 
 continued to decline, and her American colonies on the mainland 
 all seceded, leaving to her only the two islands of Cuba and 
 Porto Rico. But no other power ventured to take them from 
 her. 
 
 The other direct result of the Florida annexation was felt 
 in a remote quarter, on the shores of the northern Pacific Ocean. 
 In 1808 tlie Russian government had complained that Americans 
 were conducting a clandestine trade in arms and ammunition
 
 316 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 with the Indians of the northern Pacific coast, and asked that 
 Congress forbid such practices. This request was not granted, 
 and in 1810 another proposal was made, to the effect that as Rus- 
 sian vessels were not admitted to the Chinese port of Canton, 
 while Americans were, the latter should do the carrying trade 
 from Russian America to China, but should not supply the In- 
 dians with powder and arms. This also was refused by John 
 Quincy Adams, then our minister to Russia, on the ground that 
 there had as yet been no satisfactory definition of the extent of 
 Russian territory in North America. The Russian government 
 then proposed, through Daschkoff, its charge d'affaires at Wash- 
 ington, that the limit of Russian territory should be tentatively 
 fixed at a parallel some degrees south of the southernmost Rus- 
 sian establishment, until a final definition could be effected. 
 This suggestion was rejected by the United States, which also 
 declined to restrain its citizens from trading with the Indians. 
 It held that if the Indians were Russian subjects, Americans 
 were free to trade with them under the penalties operating 
 within that territory. If they were not Russian subjects but 
 independent tribes, then Russia had nothing to say to us on the 
 subject. In any case, the United States was under no obligation 
 to comply with the Russian request ; it could not make a treaty 
 on the subject without getting into a controversy with Spain, 
 whose territorial claims extended up that coast to the Russian 
 line, wherever it was ; and it would have no further negotiations 
 until the Russian government was ready to fix authoritatively its 
 southern boundary line. 
 
 The matter was soon taken up again by Romanzoff with 
 Adams at St. Petersburg, and the Russian chancellor astonished 
 the American minister with the information that his Govern- 
 ment claimed the whole coast, down to the Columbia River. 
 Adams refused to discuss seriously so extravagant a claim, but 
 resolved in his own mind to oppose it if ever an attempt should 
 be made practically to assert it; and the subject was then 
 dropped. Thus matters stood when in 1821 in the Florida 
 treaty Spain transferred to the United States all her right and 
 title to the Oregon territory. Her right and title were in fact 
 only nominal; but her formal grant of them was not devoid 
 of value for diplomatic purposes. It gave us that additional
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 317 
 
 confirmation of the rights which we already claimed by virtue 
 of discovery, exploration, and settlement, and this speedily be- 
 came of practical service to us. A modus vivendi had been 
 established with Great Britain, for holding in abeyance her and 
 our rival claims to Oregon. But now Russia reappeared upon 
 the scene as another and more arrogant claimant. The emperor 
 on September 4, 1821, issued a decree claiming, for the Rus- 
 sian-American Company, the entire Pacific coast of America 
 north of the fifty-first parallel of latitude — at about the north- 
 ern end of Vancouver Island — and forbidding the vessels of all 
 other nations to approach within one hundred Italian miles of 
 that coast. This would have made the whole of Bering Sea and 
 much of the North Pacific a Tnare claicsum, from America to 
 Siberia. Adams instantly challenged this decree and refused to 
 recognize it as legitimate or valid, and a spirited controversy fol- 
 lowed. Adams recalled the Russian proposal of 1810, and per- 
 ceived in this attempt at a territorial grant a fulfilment of his 
 apprehensions at that time. Poletica, the Russian minister at 
 Washington, explained that in the Russian view these territorial 
 claims were exceedingly moderate and that Russia might justly 
 demand much more ; even to the extent of declaring the whole 
 North Pacific, four thousand miles wide, from the fifty-first de- 
 gree on the American coast to the forty-fifth on the Asian coast, 
 a closed sea, into which no vessels but Russian might enter. 
 Adams replied that in 1799 the emperor had designated the 
 fifty-fifth parallel of latitude as the southern boundary of his 
 possessions in America. Poletica then referred the matter to St. 
 Petersburg, to be disposed of there; hoping that our minister 
 there, Henry Middleton, would prove less resolute than Adams. 
 But Adams sent stiff instructions to Middleton, which the latter 
 vigorously upheld. He denied Russia's claims to the coast south 
 of the fifty-fifth parallel, and also her claims to the sea beyond 
 the three-mile line. While these negotiations were in progress 
 Poletica was replaced at Washington by Baron Tuyll, and to 
 him on July 17, 1823, Adams bluntly declared that "we should 
 contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on 
 this continent, and should assume distinctly the principle that 
 the American continents are no longer subjects for any new 
 European colonial establishments." This was a further devel-
 
 318 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 opment of the great principle already broached in relation to 
 Cuba, to wit, the hegemony of the United States in the Western 
 Hemisphere; of immense importance in its bearings upon our 
 subsequent relations. 
 
 The negotiations were thereafter conducted at St. Petersburg, 
 between Middleton and Count Nesselrode, the Russian minister 
 for foreign affairs, and the former showed himself as resolute 
 as Adams himself in upholding American rights and opposing 
 Russia's extravagant claims. In a formal memorandum Middle- 
 ton declared that by virtue of the discovery of the mouth of the 
 Columbia River and the real occupation and continued posses- 
 sion of territory, the United States had perfected its title to 
 sovereignty on that coast; that by virtue of the Florida treaty 
 the United States had acquired all of Spain's former rights and 
 title on that coast; that Great Britain had no possession on that 
 coast nor any right to a portion of it except such as she might 
 have acquired from Spain, which was therefore concurrent with 
 the claims of the United States ; that Russia and England could 
 therefore make no compact concerning the coast which would 
 affect American rights ; and that the United States was willing 
 to recognize Russian title to the coast as far south as the fifty- 
 fifth degree of latitude. This memorandum had, in fact, been 
 sent to Middleton by Adams. Nesselrode submitted it to the 
 emperor, and at a second interview suggested some changes in 
 it, including that of the line of demarcation from the fifty -fifth 
 parallel to that of 54 degrees, 40 minutes. This change was ac- 
 cepted by Middleton at the third interview, and thus that bound- 
 ary line, which has become historic, was fixed. Further confer- 
 ences were held, devoted chiefly to discussion of trade and fishery 
 rights, until April 17, 1824, when the first treaty ever made be- 
 tween the United States and Russia was signed by Middleton, 
 Nesselrode, and Poletica. In this convention Russia relin- 
 quished all claims upon the coast south of the latitude of 54 de- 
 grees, 40 minutes, the southern boundary of Alaska, and recog- 
 nized the common three-mile limit of her coastal waters. Free- 
 dom of trade was to be enjoyed by both nations for ten years, 
 but neither was to traffic with Indians in intoxicating liquors, 
 firearms, or ammunition; and neither power was to search the 
 vessels of the other. With this treaty the Russian-American
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 319 
 
 Company was greatly displeased, regarding it as a fatal blow 
 to its prosperity. The Russian government itself, however, pro- 
 fessed to be much pleased, and to regard it as a triumph for its 
 diplomacy. In fact, the treaty was a great victory for the 
 United States; and it was the more gratifying to this country 
 and to the President personally for the reason that it had been 
 made after the publication in Europe of the Monroe Doctrine 
 with its direct defiance of the schemes of American reconquest 
 which Russia had been foremost in pushing. It was promptly 
 ratified by the Senate, and was proclaimed on January 12, 1825. 
 
 It had been expected that as Great Britain was a joint claim- 
 ant with us in Oregon, and was therefore equally interested in 
 resisting Russian pretensions, she would cooperate with us in 
 making this treaty. But Canning declined to do so. He was 
 unwilling to acknowledge American title to any portion of the 
 Pacific coast. He was not pleased with Adams 's notice to Baron 
 Tuyll, not so much in its challenge of Russia 's right to any estab- 
 lishment on the coast as in its intimation of resistance to any 
 further colonization of America by European powers; which he 
 interpreted as a menace to Canadian development. He feared 
 that in a tripartite conference Russia and America might unite 
 to force Great Britain into some undesirable course. He also 
 anticipated the possibility of Russia's being so displeased at 
 Adams's declaration and at the Monroe Doctrine as to discon- 
 tinue negotiations with the United States, an event which might 
 be of advantage to Great Britain. He therefore decided to ne- 
 gotiate separately and independently with Russia, But when 
 the American treaty was made, it excited the envy of the British 
 government and was used by it as the basis of its own subsequent 
 treaty with Russia, 
 
 It should be added that in 1823 Middleton undertook another 
 interesting negotiation with Nesselrode, This was to gain Rus- 
 sian adherence to a convention for the perpetual abolition of 
 privateering; the exemption of private goods and vessels from 
 capture in war; the establishment of the principle that "free 
 ships make free goods and persons," and that neutral property 
 is free even when on an enemy's vessel ; the making of shipbuild- 
 ing material noneontraband ; and the abolition of the impress- 
 ment of American sailors. Nesselrode, after much delay, re-
 
 320 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 plied that the emperor sympathized with those objects, but 
 deemed it not worth while to make any agreement concerning 
 them until the other great powers were ready to join in "an 
 act which would be a crown of glory to modern diplo- 
 macy. ' ' 
 
 Another great issue in American foreign affairs now began 
 to loom up at the south. Many years before, the patriotic 
 dreamer Miranda, who had served on Washington's staff in our 
 Revolution, had broached the scheme of South American inde- 
 pendence, and had won the sympathy and encouragement of 
 Hamilton, but had attained no practical success. The seeds of 
 revolution were planted, however, and as Spain steadily declined 
 in authority these germinated and grew in a fertile soil. The 
 conquest of Spain by Napoleon in 1807 caused a reaction of 
 loyalty and then gave an impetus to the revolution. The colo- 
 nists were at first inclined to resent the deposition of Charles 
 IV and the imposition of Joseph Bonaparte upon the Spanish 
 throne in his place, and they formed various juntas in the prov- 
 inces, like those in Spain itself, for resisting the usurper and 
 maintaining the title of Ferdinand VII, the son of Charles. 
 These sought the aid or at least the sympathy of the United 
 States, but in vain. They also sought the recognition of and 
 cooperation with the royalist regency at Cadiz, which was work- 
 ing for the enthronement of Ferdinand VII. But that body 
 with characteristic fatuity refused to recognize them in any way. 
 Thereupon, since Spain would not accept their help in restoring 
 her legitimate sovereign, they decided to have no more to do 
 with her, and to seek independence. When in 1810 Napoleon 
 seemed to be master of Spain, the leading men of Caracas deposed 
 the Spanish colonial officers and organized a ''Junta Conserva- 
 toria," which presently sent two envoys to the United States, 
 Don Juan Vincente Bolivar and Don Telesforo Ozea, with the 
 announcement that Venezuela had seceded from Spain. During 
 the following two years various papers relating to the independ- 
 ence of Venezuela were presented to our state department, with 
 the result that in his annual message in December, 1811, Madison 
 wrote as follows: 
 
 "In contemplating the scenes which distinguish this moment- 
 ous epoch, and estimating their claims to our attention, it is
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 321 
 
 impossible to overlook those developing themselves among the 
 great communities which occupy the southern portion of our own 
 hemisphere and extend into our neighborhood. An enlarged 
 philanthropy and an enlightened forecast concur in imposing 
 on the national councils an obligation to take a deep interest 
 in their destinies, to cherish reciprocal sentiments of good will, 
 to regard the progress of events, and not to be unprepared for 
 whatever order of things may be ultimately established." This 
 part of the message was referred in the House to a select com- 
 mittee, which required of the secretary of state whether it was 
 known to the Government that any of the Spanish-American 
 provinces "have declared themselves independent, or that ma- 
 terial changes have taken place in their political relations." 
 Mr. IMonroe in reply transmitted a copy of the Venezuelan decla- 
 ration, and added: "This act was communicated to this Gov- 
 ernment by order of the congress, composed of deputies from 
 those provinces, assembled at Caracas. It is not ascertained that 
 any other of the Spanish provinces have as yet entered into sim- 
 ilar declarations; but it is known that most if not all of them 
 on the continent are in a revolutionary state. The progress 
 made in that direction by some of them will best appear in the 
 documents which have already been communicated to you." 
 The committee, on December 10, 1811, reported a joint resolution 
 to the effect that the United States beheld "with friendly inter- 
 est the establishment of independent sovereignties by the Span- 
 ish provinces in America, consequent upon the actual state of the 
 monarchy to which they belonged ; that, as neighbors and inhabi- 
 tants of the same hemisphere, the United States feel great solici- 
 tude for their welfare; and that, when these provinces shall 
 have attained the condition of nations by the just exercise of their 
 rights, the Senate and the House of Representatives will unite 
 with the executive in establishing with them, as sovereign and 
 independent States, such amicable relations and commercial in- 
 tercourse as may require their legislative authority." No ac- 
 tion on this resolution was taken. 
 
 A few weeks after the Congress at Caracas, in May, 1810, a 
 junta at Buenos Aires began a revolution against the Napoleonic 
 usurpation, which was sanctioned by the viceroy; and sent 
 Colonel Don Martin Thompson as an envoy to the United States. 
 
 VOL. 1—21
 
 322 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Six years later, on July 9, 1816, a congress at Tueuman declared 
 the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata to be a free and in- 
 dependent nation. Thereupon Colonel Thompson was super- 
 seded as agent of that country by Don Manuel Hermengildo 
 de Aguirre, who also bore semiprivate authority from Chile to 
 purchase ships of war and warlike materials. His commission 
 did not invest him with rank as a public minister, nor did he 
 bear full power to negotiate as such. "Neither the letter of 
 which he was the bearer, nor he himself, at his first interviews 
 with the secretary of state, suggested that he was authorized to 
 ask the acknowledgment of his Government as independent; a 
 circumstance which derived additional weight from the fact that 
 his predecessor, Don Martin Thompson, had been dismissed for 
 having transcended his powers." Such a demand was made 
 by him, however, in a letter of December 16, 1817, which was 
 followed by conferences with the secretary of state. In these 
 conferences he stated, in response to Mr. Adams's inquiries, 
 that the Government whose acknowledgment he desired "was 
 the country which had, before the revolution, been the vice- 
 royalty of La Plata. ' ' When asked whether this did not include 
 Montevideo, and the territory occupied by the Portuguese, the 
 Banda Oriental, understood to be under the government of 
 Artigas, and several provinces still in the undisputed possession 
 of Spain, he replied that it did, but that Artigas, though hostile 
 to the Government of Buenos Aires, supported the cause of in- 
 dependence, and that Portugal could not ultimately maintain 
 possession of Montevideo. Mr. Adams stated that any acknowl- 
 edgment of the Government of La Plata was deemed by the Presi- 
 dent to be for the time inexpedient. 
 
 In advising the President at this time Adams observed that in 
 Venezuela the contending forces seemed to be at a deadlock, in 
 which neither was making progress. "In this state the inde- 
 pendence of Venezuela can scarcely be considered in a condition 
 to claim the recognition of neutral powers. But there is a stage 
 in such contests when the parties struggling for independence 
 have, as I conceive, a right to demand its acknowledgment by 
 neutral parties, and when the acknowledgment may be granted 
 without departure from the obligations of neutrality. It is the 
 stage when independence is established as a matter of fact so
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 323 
 
 as to leave the chances of the opposite party to recover their 
 dominion utterly desperate. The neutral nation must, of course, 
 judge for itself when this period has arrived ; and as the belliger- 
 ent nation has the same right to judge for itself, it is very likely 
 to judge differently from the neutral and to make it a cause or 
 pretext for war, as Great Britain did expressly against France 
 in our Revolution, and substantially against Holland. If war 
 thus results in point of fact from the measure of recognizing 
 a contested independence, the moral right or wrong of the war 
 depends upon the justice and sincerity and prudence with which 
 the recognizing nation took the step. I am satisfied that the 
 cause of the South Americans, so far as it consists in the asser- 
 tion of independence against Spain, is just. But the justice of 
 a cause, however it may enlist individual feelings in its favor, 
 is not sufficient to justify third parties in siding with it. The 
 fact and the right combined can alone authorize a neutral to 
 acknowledge a new and disputed sovereignty. The neutral may, 
 indeed, infer the right from the fact, but not the fact from the 
 right. If Buenos Aires confined its demand of recognition to 
 the provinces of which it is in actual possession, and if it would 
 a.ssert its entire independence by agreeing to place the United 
 States upon the footing of the most favored nation, I should 
 tliink the time now" arrived when its Government might be recog- 
 nized without a breach of neutrality." 
 
 Material aid was extended to the South American revolution- 
 ists unofficially by Great Britain, whose merchants gave money 
 and many of whose army and navy officers gave their services. 
 In 1817, General San Martin, with the aid of the illustrious Duu- 
 donald, began the liberation of Chile and Peru. Bolivar, who 
 had dedicated himself to the cause of freedom at the tomb of 
 "Washington, achieved with much British aid the independence 
 of the northern part of the continent, and in 1821 Mexico be- 
 came an independent empire, soon to be transformed into a re- 
 public. In the early years of these movements, the relations of 
 South America were far more intimate with Great Britain than 
 with the United States. We were busy, at firet quarreling with 
 Great Britain and France and later dealing with Spain in 
 Florida, while Great Britain, seeking to maintain and extend her 
 trade, was playing in South America a part similar to that of
 
 324 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 France in the American Revolution. Nevertheless the revolu- 
 tions at the south did not pass unnoticed. In 1817, being done 
 with our second British war, Madison sent commissioners to 
 South America to see what was going on and to report upon the 
 merits and prospects of the case. These were Csesar A. Rodney 
 of Delaware, John Graham of Virginia, and Theodoric Bland of 
 Virginia. They were sent specially to the United Provinces of 
 the Rio de la Plata, afterward the Argentine Confederation and 
 Argentine Republic, but were also desired to report so far as 
 possible upon all the other provinces. Their reports were not at 
 once favorable to the recognition of the independence of the 
 revolted provinces, though they indicated that fitness for recog- 
 nition would probably be attained in the not distant future. 
 Meantime American trade was pushing its way into the ports 
 of those countries and it was soon considered by our Govern- 
 ment, early in Monroe's administration, necessary to send com- 
 mercial agents thither to care for its interests. Between 1817 
 and 1820 such agents were sent to the chief States of South 
 America, and in addition such vessels as the revolutionists were 
 able to send hither were received in the harbors of the United 
 States and were permitted to enjoy and to exercise the rights of 
 belligerents. 
 
 ^Meantime a strong cleavage of American official opinion arose 
 as to the policy to be pursued by our Government. Adams fav- 
 ored caution and delay. He had no love for Spain, but neither 
 had he much faith in the self-governing capacities of the Span- 
 ish colonies. He could see little in common between their cause 
 and that of the United States, and he doubted the right or the 
 morality of our aiding in any way revolutionists who disre- 
 garded civil rights and pursued the courses of pirates and free- 
 booters. He recalled the fact that the miscreants of Galveston 
 and Amelia Island had posed as South American patriots. 
 Moreover, he was intent on the Florida negotiations with Spain, 
 and he felt that they would be impeded if not defeated by any 
 marked display of sjTnpathy with the South American revolu- 
 tionists. He even seemed inclined to act in the matter in co- 
 operation with Great Britain and other European powers, thus 
 contradicting his own policy in respect to North American af- 
 fairs. In this he was in accord with Monroe, who, as Madison's
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 325 
 
 secretary of state, in December, 1815, had written to Adams, 
 then minister to England, as follows: 
 
 "The Revolution which is making rapid progress in South 
 America becomes daily more interesting to the United States. 
 From the best information that we can obtain there is much 
 cause to believe that those provinces will separate from the 
 mother country. Several of them have already abrogated its 
 authority, and established independent Governments. They in- 
 sist on the acknowledgment of their Governments by the United 
 States, and when it is considered that the alternative is between 
 Governments, which in the event of their independence would 
 be free and friendly, and the relation which, reasoning from 
 the past, must be expected from them, as colonies, there is no 
 cause to doubt in which scale our interest lies. What are the 
 views and intentions of the British government on this important 
 subject? Is it not to the interest of Great Britain that the Span- 
 ish provinces should become independent? Will her Govern- 
 ment promote it, at what time and under what circumstances? 
 In case of a rupture between the United States and Spain at any 
 future time, what part will Great Britain take in the contest, 
 it being distinctly to be understood that we shall ask, in regard 
 to the Spanish provinces, no privileges in trade which shall not 
 be common to other nations? Spain has long been unfriendly 
 to the United States, and done them positive injuries, for which 
 reparation has been withheld, and her Government still assumes 
 a tone which, in other respects, is far from being satisfactory'. 
 The part which the United States may act hereafter towards that 
 power must depend on circumstances. Should the Spanish gov- 
 ernment persevere in its unjust policy, it might have some in- 
 fluence on our measures, and it would be advantageous to know 
 the views of the British government in these respects." 
 
 In August, 1818, as Adams recorded, a formal proposal was 
 made to the British government for a concerted and contempo- 
 . rary recognition of the independence of Buenos Aires, then the 
 only one of the South American States which, having declared 
 independence, had no Spanish force contending against it within 
 its borders; and where independence therefore most unequivo- 
 cally existed in fact. The British government declined accept- 
 ing the proposal themselves, without however expressing any dis-
 
 326 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 approbation of it, without discussing it as a question of principle, 
 and without assigning any reason for the refusal, other than that 
 it did not then suit with their policy. 
 
 Henry Clay, on the other hand, was a radical advocate of im- 
 mediate recognition. This was partly because of his Western 
 origin and training, where hatred of Spain was in the very air. 
 It was partly because of his impulsive and enthusiastic disposi- 
 tion. It was also partly because of his enmity toward Monroe 
 and still more toward Adams, and his truculent desire to oppose 
 their policies and embarrass and discredit them. In May, 1818, 
 he made in the House of Representatives a two days' speech in 
 which he exhausted imagination and tore all passions to tatters 
 in an appeal for recognition of the South American republics. 
 The speech was redeemed by its cogent argument for the estab- 
 lishment of an American system, under which those States would 
 be drawn into the sphere of influence of the United States in 
 diplomacy and commerce, rather than that of Europe. His 
 motion for recognition was overwhelmingly defeated, but his 
 speech produced a deep and lasting impression, upon his oppo- 
 nents as well as his friends. 
 
 For two years the matter slumbered and then, in May, 1820, 
 Clay broke forth again with another resolution in favor of 
 recognizing the South American States and sending ministers 
 to them. This resolution he supported in a speech less flamboy- 
 ant than its predecessor but on the whole more forcible and 
 statesmanlike. It was savagely severe toward Adams, whom he 
 charged with subserviency to Great Britain. Indeed, he made 
 that accusation against Monroe himself. He urged again the 
 establishment of an American system which should counteract 
 and oppose the despotic system of Europe and should organize 
 and array the New World against the Old. * ' We look, ' ' he said, 
 **too much abroad. Let us break these commercial and political 
 fetters. Let us no longer watch the nod of any European poli- 
 tician. Let us become real and true Americans, and place our- 
 selves at the head of the American system." The ostensible 
 purport of this was unquestionably correct. It was the time 
 American policy, which was presently adopted, and which has 
 since been consistently maintained. The error in it was that 
 Clay was moved too much by personal jealousy and spite, and
 
 OPENING A NEW ERA 327 
 
 by factional rancor, and that he was thus led into gross exag- 
 geration of the attitude of the administration. To charge either 
 Adams or Monroe with truckling to British or European influ- 
 ences, was simply absurd. 
 
 Clay had, however, the popular ear and his glowing eloquence 
 was powerful in its appeal. This time his resolution was 
 adopted by the House by a considerable majority, although he 
 was not able to get it through the Senate. In February, 1821, 
 he made another appeal to the House and secured the almost 
 unanimous adoption of a resolution of sympathy with the revo- 
 lutionists, and of another pledging the House to support the 
 President in recognizing the new republics whenever he should 
 consider such action expedient. This latter resolution was laid 
 before Monroe by a committee of which Clay was the chairman, 
 and the expectation was that it would move him in his forthcom- 
 ing second inaugural address, on March 4, 1821, to declare for 
 immediate recognition. The President's hand was not, however, 
 thus to be forced. 
 
 In his second inaugural address he referred to the South 
 American revolution in cautious and tentative terms, urging that 
 the United States should maintain scrupulous neutrality between 
 Spain and her rebellious colonies. In the following December 
 he referred to the subject in similar tones in his message to Con- 
 gress. But in March, 1822, with the Florida treaty signed and 
 that territory fully in our possession, an important change in 
 liis attitude was made. He sent to Congress a special message 
 on the subject, in which he expressed the opinion that the South 
 American colonies had in fact secured their independence, and 
 that they were certain to retain it. Recognition of that fact 
 should, he said, therefore be made by the United States. Such 
 action, in view of existing circumstances, could not be regarded 
 by Spain as improper, and it would probably have the beneficent 
 effect of shortening the struggle and restoring peace to the south- 
 ern continent. He therefore asked for an appropriation to de- 
 fray the cost of sending rainistere to the new republics. Con- 
 gress promptly responded. On March 19, 1822, the house com- 
 mittee on foreign affairs presented a unanimous report, in which, 
 after reviewing the facts and expressing the opinion that "it is 
 just and expedient to acknowledge the independence of the sev-
 
 328 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 eral nations of Spanish America, without any reference to the 
 diversity in the forms of their Governments," it proposed that 
 the House "concur in the opinion expressed by the President in 
 his message of the 8th of March, 1822, that the American prov- 
 inces of Spain, which have declared their independence and are 
 in the enjoyment of it, ought to be recognized by the United 
 States as independent nations, ' ' and that the committee on ways 
 and means be instructed to report a bill appropriating not more 
 than $100,000 "to enable the President of the United States to 
 give due effect to such recognition." 
 
 On May 4, 1822, an act was approved entitled "An act mak- 
 ing an appropriation to defray the expenses of missions to the 
 independent nations of the American continent." By this act 
 the sum of $100,000 was appropriated "for such missions to the 
 independent nations of the American continent as the President 
 of the United States may deem proper." In June following 
 Manuel Torres was received as charge d'affaires of Colombia. 
 On January 27, 1823, Cgesar A. Rodney of Delaware was com- 
 missioned as minister to the Argentine Confederation ; Herman 
 Allen of Vermont to Chile, and Richard C. Anderson of Ken- 
 tucky to Colombia, which then comprised Venezuela and 
 Ecuador. In 1825, Condy Raquet of Pennsylvania was sent to 
 Brazil, John Williams of Tennessee to the Central American 
 States, and Joel R. Poinsett of South Carolina to Mexico; and 
 in 1826, James Cooley of Pennsylvania was sent as minister to 
 Peru.
 
 JAMES MONROE
 
 XII 
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 THE title of the Monroe Doctrine is in some respects a mis- 
 nomer. The impression is given by it that that fun- 
 damental principle of American foreign policy originated with 
 President Monroe. That, however, is a grievous error. INIonroe 
 did indeed proclaim it to the world in his annual message to 
 Congress in December, 1823, and despite some pretensions to the 
 contrary it was probably he who gave it its verbal form. But 
 the principle had long been in existence, developing and 
 strengthening, and it had received expression from various men 
 on various occasions. Hamilton forecast it, in the Congress of 
 the old Confederation, and in ''The Federalist," when he wrote 
 that "our situation invites and prompts us to aim at an ascend- 
 ant in American affairs," and when he advocated giving aid to 
 South America in throwing off Spanish rule and establishing in- 
 dependent republics; so that these two continents should form 
 a political system of their own, independent of that of Europe. 
 Jefferson, in 1793, writing as secretary of state to Carmichael 
 and Short, our ministers to Spain, made application of the same 
 general theory. Washington, in his Farewell Address, expressed 
 it in much detail, dwelling upon the radical difference between 
 European and American interests. In relation to Louisiana, to 
 . Florida, and to Cuba, as we have seen, it was repeated in various 
 ways and phases. It reappeared in terse and vigorous words 
 in Adams's warning to the Russian minister. Baron Tuyll. For 
 thirty-odd years it had been growing into shape and substance, 
 and it needed only an urgent occasion to be crystallized into the 
 imperious form of a national decree. 
 
 That occasion was provided by the European powers, in their 
 last vain and fatuous attempt to reduce America to a state of 
 political vassalage. We have already seen how much this coun- 
 try suffered from the intrigues and wars of the Napoleonic era. 
 
 329
 
 330 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 At the conclusion of that era a final effort was made to subject 
 America perpetually to that bondage and torment. In that the 
 initiative was taken by Alexander I of Russia, a visionary bigot, 
 seconded by Francis of Austria and Frederick William of 
 Prussia. These monarchs regarded the disturbances which had 
 kept Europe in an uproar for a quarter of a century, and had 
 menaced the security of their own thrones, as the direct results 
 of democratic meddling with the divine right of kings, and they 
 determined so far as in them lay to prevent any further such 
 manifestations of impiety and sacrilege. Accordingly at Paris, 
 on September 26, 1815, they made a compact, which has ever 
 since been called the Holy Alliance, the object of which was to 
 administer government, both domestic and foreign, on a basis of 
 justice, charity, and peace, "in accordance with the precepts of 
 the Gospel of Jesus Christ"; to which end, ''looking upon 
 themselves as delegated by Providence" to rule their respective 
 countries, and to seek the happiness and religious welfare of their 
 subjects, they pledged each other their aid and support at all 
 times and in all places. "The sole principle of force," they said, 
 "whether between the said Governments or between their sub- 
 jects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and of 
 testifying the mutual good will with which they ought to be ani- 
 mated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the 
 same Christian nation." They also agreed to invite all other 
 sovereigns to join them in these counsels of perfection. This, 
 on the face of it, was a pious undertaking, well worthy of the 
 pretentious name which has been given to it, and not at all de- 
 serving of John Quincy Adams's scathing description of it as 
 "a hypocritical fraud," or of Castlereagh 's as "sublime mys- 
 ticism and nonsense." 
 
 But it did not maintain that face. Another meeting was held 
 at Aix-la-Chapelle, in October, 1818, which was participated in 
 by the three powers of the Holy Alliance, by Great Britain, 
 which had informally joined them, and also by France. Its first 
 purpose was to provide for the evacuation of France by the allied 
 armies. Then was taken up the general question of the protec- 
 tion of Europe against further revolutionary outbreaks. The 
 Russian emperor, who was present in person, urged ' ' a universal 
 union of guarantee" on the basis of the Holy Alliance, which
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 331 
 
 should maintain all "legitimate" sovereigns on their thrones; 
 and incidentally should force all revolted provinces back under 
 their former rulers. Castlereagh, on behalf of England, stub- 
 bornly opposed this and the proposal was dropped after much 
 debate. There was adopted, however, an agreement of the pow- 
 ers to maintain their intimate union "strengthened by the ties 
 of Christian brotherhood," and thus to preserve peace through 
 the respect of treaties. Numerous matters of European interest 
 were acted upon, and the meeting marked the highest point ever 
 reached in the effort to govern Europe through a congress of 
 the powers. What concerns present consideration most is the 
 part which American affairs indirectly played, in causing the 
 British envoy to resist and to defeat the Russian proposal of a 
 universal guarantee of "legitimate" sovereignty. A year be- 
 fore. Great Britain had warned the other members of the Holy 
 Alliance that she would not assist in forcing the revolted Spanish 
 colonies back under King Ferdinand's rule. It was on that 
 ground that Castlereagh opposed the czar's proposal. Ferdi- 
 nand had appealed to the congress for aid in resubjugating South 
 America. Russia and France were for aiding him, at least to 
 the extent of having England mediate between him and his re- 
 volted subjects. This appeal of Spain's was known to Monroe, 
 who in a message to Congress in November, 1818, shrewdly pre- 
 dicted that while the allies at Aix-la-Chapelle might express 
 sentiments favorable to Ferdinand, they would not employ force. 
 What took place was accurately related by John Quincy Adams 
 in a letter to Smith Thompson, the secretary of the navy, on ]\Iay 
 20, 1819, as follows: 
 
 "It is now well ascertained that, before the congi'ess of the 
 great European powers at Aix-la-Chapelle, their mediation had 
 been solicited by Spain, and agreed to be given by them for the 
 purpose of restoring the Spanish dominion throughout South 
 America, under certain conditions of commercial privileges to be 
 guaranteed to the inha1)itants. The Government of the United 
 States had been informed of this project before the meeting at 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, and that it had been proposed by some of the 
 allied powers that the United States should be invited to join 
 them in tliis mediation. When this information was received, 
 the ministers of the United States to France, England, and Rus-
 
 332 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 sia were immediately instructed to make known to those respec- 
 tive Governments that the United States would take no part in 
 any plan of mediation or interference in the contest between 
 Spain and South America, which should be founded on any 
 other basis than that of the total independence of the colonies. 
 "This declaration was communicated before the meeting to 
 Lord Castlereagh, and to the Duke of Richelieu at the congress. 
 It occasioned some dissatisfaction to the principal allies, particu- 
 larly France and Russia, as it undoubtedly disconcerted their 
 proposed mediation. Great Britain, concurring with them in 
 the plan of restoring the Spanish authority but aware that it 
 could not be carried into effect without the concurrence of the 
 United States, declared it an indispensable condition to her 
 participation in the mediation that there should be no resort to 
 force against the South Americans, whatever the result of the 
 mediation might be. To this condition, France and Russia 
 after some hesitation assented. But they proposed that, if the 
 South Americans should reject the terms of accommodation to be 
 offered them with the sanction of the mediating powers, they 
 should prohibit all commercial intercourse of their subjects re- 
 spectively with them. To this condition Great Britain declined 
 giving her assent; her motive for which is sufficiently obvious, 
 when it is considered that, after the declaration of the United 
 States, the practical operation of such a nonintercourse between 
 the allies and the South Americans would have been to transfer 
 to the United States the whole of the valuable commerce carried 
 on with them by the merchants of Great Britain. As a last ex- 
 pedient it was proposed that the Duke of Wellington should be 
 sent to Madrid with the joint powers of all the allied sovereigns, 
 to arrange with the Spanish cabinet the terms to be offered to 
 the South Americans, which was again defeated by the duke's 
 insisting that, if he should go, a previous entry should be made 
 upon the protocol at Aix-la-Chapelle that no force against the 
 South Americans was, in any result of his embassy, to be used. 
 But Spain had always connected with the project of the media- 
 tion a demand that the allies should ultimately guarantee the 
 restoration of her authority ; and, finding that this was not to be 
 obtained, she declined accepting the interposition upon any other 
 terms.
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 333 
 
 ''But while the Government of the United States have thus 
 taken ever}^ occasion offered them in the course of events to mani- 
 fest their good wishes in favor of the South Americans, they 
 have never lost sight of the obligations incumbent on them, as 
 avowedly neutral to the contest between them and Spain." 
 
 This failure at Aix-la-Chapelle did not, however, discourage 
 the allies, or at any rate the czar, from the scheme of resubjugat- 
 ing South America. The czar provided Ferdinand with the nec- 
 essary ships for a great expedition, which was to sail from Cadiz 
 for America at the end of 1819 or the beginning of 1820. But 
 on New Year's day, 1820, a part of the army mutinied, revolu- 
 tion became rampant, and, early in March, Ferdinand was com- 
 pelled to take oath to support the radical constitution of 1812. 
 Portugal and Naples followed with similar revolutions, and the 
 principles of the Holy Alliance were flouted. The czar was 
 quick to move for vindication of ''legitimacy," and wished to 
 intervene in Spain. Austria and Prussia agreed that action 
 ought to be taken. But again Great Britain opposed such reac- 
 tionary meddling. The result was the calling of another confer- 
 ence at Troppau, at which the five powers of Aix-la-Chapelle 
 were present, but most of the business was done by the three 
 original holy allies in secret sessions. These powers on Novem- 
 ber 19, 1820, adopted resolutions practically identical with those 
 which Castlereagh had defeated at Aix-la-Chapelle, pledging 
 themselves to support, by force of arms, princes against their 
 insurgent subjects. Later, on December 8, a public declaration 
 was made by the three powers, concerning the measures, "pacific 
 or coercive," which might be employed to force all States under 
 the system of the alliance. This was a direct challenge to Great 
 Britain, to which prompt reply was made in reaffirmation of her 
 former stand. In January, 1821, the congress met again at Lai- 
 bach, and agreed upon the principle of armed intervention in 
 the affairs of nations which did not conduct themselves to the 
 liking of the allied powers. They also explicitly denounced as 
 null, and disallowed by the public law of Europe, any pretended 
 reform effected by revolt and open force. In 1822 the congress 
 met at Verona, and authorized France to invade Spain, to abol- 
 ish the constitution and to reestablish the old Bourbon despotism ; 
 promising the aid of other powers if needed. Canning was now
 
 334 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 at the head of affairs in Great Britain, and he strongly disap- 
 proved such coercion of Spain. He accordingly directed the 
 British envoy at Verona, the Duke of Wellington, to oppose the 
 resolution to the bitter end; which was done, but in vain. In- 
 tervention in Spain was thus decided upon in spite of England 's 
 opposition, and it was made quite clear that if it were successful 
 it would, if possible, be extended to the Spanish colonies in 
 America. The Russian minister of state. Count Nesselrode, in 
 a letter to the Russian charge d'affaires at Madrid, specifically 
 ascribed the revolution in the colonies to the success of the revolt 
 at Madrid, and declared that all Europe had offered to the King 
 of Spain intervention for the reestablishment of his authority 
 in those colonies. Nesselrode also addressed to the envoys of the 
 three holy alliance powers at Verona a despatch to similar ef- 
 fect. Incidentally it may be added that the Verona congress 
 adopted an agreement "to put an end to the system of represen- 
 tative governments, ' ' and to adopt measures to suppress the lib- 
 erty of the press. These measures were applicable, of course, 
 only to European countries; but that phrase was interpreted as 
 comprising the colonies of European powers in whatever part 
 of the world. 
 
 Powerless to prevent the congress from adopting this course, 
 Canning essayed a counterblast by directing Wellington to raise 
 the question of recognizing the independence of the South 
 American republics. This raised a storm. All the other powers 
 protested. The Emperor of Austria declared that he would 
 never give such recognition until the King of Spain himself had 
 done so, while Russia and Prussia clung to the hope of a restora- 
 tion of the rebel States to Spanish allegiance. Wellington was 
 resolute, however, and it soon became clear that Great Britain 
 would act on her own initiative in dealing with the South 
 American republics, without regard to the congress. In the 
 spring of 1823 the French invasion of Spain occurred, and Great 
 Britain announced that she would remain neutral only on the 
 condition that France 's meddling did not extend to any of the se- 
 ceding Spanish colonies. Finally, in October of that year. Can- 
 ning informed the French ambassador in London that while the 
 British government would remain neutral as between Spain and 
 her American colonies, "the junction of any foreign power in an
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 335 
 
 enterprise of Spain against the colonies would be viewed by them 
 as constituting an entirely new question, and one upon which 
 they must take such decision as the interests of Great Britain 
 might require." 
 
 Realizing thus his complete separation from the continental 
 alliance, and realizing, also, its antagonism to British principles 
 and British interests. Canning turned to America. In August, 
 1823, he had a long interview with Rush, the American minister, 
 in which Rush expressed satisfaction in the belief that even if 
 France intervened in Spain, Great Britain would restrain her 
 from meddling with the Spanish colonies. Canning replied 
 with a suggestion that Great Britain and the United States, be- 
 cause of their large common maritime interests and great naval 
 power, ought to cooperate to that end. A few days later, on 
 August 20, Canning wrote to Rush as follows: 
 
 "Is not the moment come when our Governments might un- 
 derstand each other as to the Spanish- American colonies? And 
 if we can arrive at such an understanding, would it not be 
 expedient for ourselves, and beneficial for all the world, that the 
 principles of it should be clearly settled and plainly avowed? 
 For ourselves we have no disguise. 
 
 "1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to 
 be hopeless. 
 
 "2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as 
 independent States, to be one of time and circumstances. 
 
 "3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any 
 impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and 
 the mother country by amicable negotiation. 
 
 "4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them our- 
 selves. 
 
 "5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any 
 other power with indifference. 
 
 "If these opinions and feelings are, as I firmly believe them to 
 be, common to your Government with ours, why should we hesi- 
 tate mutually to confide them to each other, and to declare them 
 in the face of the world? If there be any European power 
 which cherishes other projects, which looks to a forcible enter- 
 prise for reducing the colonies to subjugation, on the behalf or 
 in the name of Spain, or which meditates the acquisition of any
 
 336 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 part of them to itself, by cession or by conquest, such a declara- 
 tion on the part of your Government and ours would be at once 
 the most effectual and the least offensive mode of intimating our 
 joint disapprobation of such projects. It would at the same 
 time put an end to all the jealousies of Spain with respect to her 
 remaining colonies, and to the agitation which prevails in those 
 colonies, an agitation which it would be but humane to allay, 
 being determined (as we are) not to profit by encouraging it. 
 
 "Do you conceive that, under the power which you have re- 
 cently received, you are authorized to enter into negotiation, and 
 to sign any convention upon this subject? Do you conceive, if 
 that be not within your competence, you could exchange with 
 me ministerial notes upon it? Nothing could be more gratify- 
 ing to me than to join with you in such a work, and I am per- 
 suaded there has seldom, in the history of the world, occurred 
 an opportunity when so small an effort of two friendly Govern- 
 ments might produce so unequivocal a good, and prevent such 
 extensive calamities. ' ' 
 
 To this Rush replied three days later. He seems to have 
 thought, in the previous interview, that Canning, if not insin- 
 cere, was at least not franklj^ disclosing his real purpose, which, 
 Rush suspected, was not so much to befriend South America as 
 to thwart France and to promote British commercial and politi- 
 cal interests, and he had then sought to get Canning to com- 
 mit himself to immediate recognition of the republics, undiplo- 
 matically regardless of European considerations which might 
 make that course inexpedient. But in his correspondence he 
 showed little if any distrust. He wrote: 
 
 "The Government of the United States, having, in the most 
 formal manner, acknowledged the independence of the late 
 Spanish provinces in America, desires nothing more anxiously 
 than to see this independence maintained with stability, and 
 under auspices that may promise prosperity and happiness to 
 these new States themselves, as well as advantage to the rest of 
 the world. As conducing to these great ends, my Government 
 has always desired, and still desires, to see them received into 
 the family of nations by the powers of Europe, and especially, 
 I may add, by Great Britain. 
 
 "My Government is also under a sincere conviction that the
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 337 
 
 epoch has arrived when the interests of humanity and justice, 
 as well as all other interests, would be essentially subserved by 
 the general recognition of these States. 
 
 "Making these remarks, I believe I may confidently say that 
 the sentiments unfolded in your note are fully those which be- 
 long also to my Government. 
 
 ' ' It conceives the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hope- 
 less. 
 
 "It would throw no impediment in the way of an arrange- 
 ment between them and the mother country, by amicable nego- 
 tiation, supposing an arrangement of this nature to be possible. 
 
 * ' It does not aim at the possession of any portion of those com- 
 munities for or on behalf of the United States. 
 
 "It would regard as highly unjust and fruitful of disastrous 
 consequences any attempt on the part of any European power 
 to take possession of them by conquest or by cession, or on any 
 ground or pretext whatever. 
 
 "But in what manner my Government might deem it expedi- 
 ent to avow these principles and feelings, or express its disap- 
 probation of such projects as the last, are points which none 
 of my instructions, or the power which I have recently received, 
 embrace ; and they involve, I am forced to add, considerations of 
 too much delicacy for me to act upon them in advance. It will 
 yield me particular pleasure to be the organ of promptly causing 
 to be brought under the notice of the President the opinions and 
 views of which you have made me the depositary upon this sub- 
 ject, and I am of nothing more sure than that he will fully ap- 
 preciate their intrinsic interest, and not less the frank and 
 friendly feelings towards the United States in which they have 
 been conceived and communicated to me on your part. Nor do 
 I take too much upon myself when I anticipate the peculiar satis- 
 faction the President will also derive from the intimation which 
 you have not scrupled to afford me as to the just and liberal de- 
 terminations of his Majesty's government in regard to the colo- 
 nies which still remain to Spain." 
 
 In transmitting copies of this correspondence to Adams at 
 Washington, Rush expressed his sense of British sincerity, and 
 of the serious importance of the matter, as follows: 
 
 "The tone of earnestness in Mr. Canning's note, and the force 
 
 VOL. I — 22
 
 338 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of some of his expressions, naturally start the inference that the 
 British cabinet cannot be without its serious apprehensions that 
 ambitious enterprises are meditated against the independence of 
 the South American states. Whether by France alone I cannot 
 now say on any authentic grounds. ' ' 
 
 On the same day on which Rush wrote to Canning, as above, 
 Canning wrote to Rush a brief note as follows: 
 
 "Since I wrote you on the 20th, an additional motive has oc- 
 curred for wishing that we might be able to come to some un- 
 derstanding on the part of our respective Governments on the 
 subject of my letter; to come to it soon, and to be at liberty to 
 announce it to the world. 
 
 "It is this. I have received notice — ^but not such a notice as 
 imposes upon me the necessity of any immediate answer or pro- 
 ceeding — that as soon as the military objects in Spain are 
 achieved (of which the French expect, how justly I know not, 
 a very speedy achievement) a proposal will be made for a con- 
 gress, or some less formal concert and consultation, especially 
 upon the affairs of South America. I need not point out to 
 you all the complications to which this proposal, however dealt 
 with by us, may lead." 
 
 Those were days of slow communications across the Atlantic, 
 and Canning realized that weeks must elapse before any word 
 could be received from Washington. Such delay might prove 
 disastrous. So he decided to act alone, without waiting for an 
 opportunity to make a joint or identical declaration with the 
 United States. On October 9 he informed the French ambassa- 
 dor: 
 
 "That the British Government were of opinion that any at- 
 tempt to bring Spanish America again under its ancient submis- 
 sion to Spain must be utterly hopeless ; that all negotiations for 
 that purpose would be unsuccessful, and that the prolongation 
 or renewal of war for the same object would be only a waste of 
 human life, and an infliction of calamity on both parties to no 
 end. 
 
 "That the British Government would, however, not only ab- 
 stain from interposing any obstacle, on their part, to any at- 
 tempt at negotiation which Spain might think proper to make, 
 but would aid and countenance such negotiation, provided it
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 339 
 
 were founded upon a basis which appeared to them to be prac- 
 ticable, and that they would in any case remain strictly neutral 
 in a war between Spain and the colonies, if war should be un- 
 happily prolonged. 
 
 "But that the junction of any foreign power in an enterprise 
 of Spain against the colonies would be viewed by them as con- 
 stituting an entirely new question, and one upon which they 
 must take such decision as the interests of Great Britain might 
 require. . . . 
 
 "That, completely convinced that the ancient system of the 
 colonies could not be restored, the British Government could not 
 enter into any stipulation binding itself either to refuse or to 
 delay its recognition of their independence. 
 
 "That the British Government had no desire to precipitate 
 that recognition so long as there was any reasonable chance of 
 an accommodation with the mother country by which such a 
 recogntion might come first from Spain. 
 
 "But that it could not wait indefinitely for that result, that 
 it could not consent to make its recognition of the new States de- 
 pendent upon that of Spain ; and that it would consider any for- 
 eign interference, by force or by menace, in the dispute between 
 Spain and the colonies, as a motive for recognizing the latter 
 without delay." 
 
 It may here be added that on January 30, 1824, Canning in- 
 structed the British ambassador at Madrid to explain the rea- 
 sons of Great Britain for refusing to enter into the proposed 
 conference of European powers at Paris. Great Britain, he 
 said, would prefer Spain ' ' to have the grace and the advantage ' ' 
 of leading the way in recognizing the new States; but recogni- 
 tion could not in any case be much longer postponed. 
 
 The correspondence between Rush and Canning was received 
 by Monroe in Octol)er, 1823, and was promptly referred to Jef- 
 ferson, for consideration and advice. "My own impression," 
 said Monroe, "is that we ought to meet the proposal of the 
 British government, and to make it kno^^^l, that we would view 
 an interference on the part of the European powers, and espe- 
 cially an attack on the colonies by them, as an attack on ourselves, 
 presuming that if they succeeded with them they would extend it 
 to us." To this Jefferson replied as follows:
 
 340 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 "The question presented by the letters you have sent me is 
 the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contem- 
 plation since that of independence. That made us a nation; 
 this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer 
 through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we 
 embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first 
 and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves 
 in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to 
 intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and 
 South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and 
 particularly her own. She should therefore have a system of 
 her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the 
 last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor 
 should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom. 
 
 "One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; 
 she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acced- 
 ing to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her 
 mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate 
 a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in 
 doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do 
 us the most harm of any one or all on earth; and with her on 
 our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we 
 should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and noth- 
 ing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting 
 once more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would 
 purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. 
 
 "But the war in which the present proposition might engage 
 us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its 
 object is to introduce and establish the American system, of 
 keeping out of our land all foreign powers — of never permitting 
 those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. 
 It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. 
 And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body 
 of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most pow- 
 erful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. 
 Canning's opinion, that it will prevent instead of provoking 
 war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and 
 shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined 
 would not undertake such a war, for how would they propose
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 341 
 
 to get at either enemy without superior fleets'? Nor is the oc- 
 casion to be slighted which this proposition offers of declaring 
 our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of na- 
 tions by the interference of any one in the internal affaii'^ of 
 another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte and now continued 
 by the equally lawless alliance calling itself holy. 
 
 "But we have first to ask ourselves a question. Do we wish to 
 acquire to our own confederacy any one or more of the Spanish 
 provinces? I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba 
 as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our 
 system of States. The control which, with Florida Point, this 
 island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries 
 and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose waters 
 flow into it, would fill up the measure of our well-being. Yet, as 
 I am sensible that this can never be obtained, even with her own 
 consent, but by war, and its independence, which is our second 
 interest (and especially its independence of England), can be 
 secured without it, I have no hesitation in abandoning my first 
 wish to future chances, and accepting its independence, with 
 peace and the friendship of England, rather than its association, 
 at the expense of war and her enmity. 
 
 "I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, 
 that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, 
 that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement 
 between them and the mother country; but that we will oppose 
 with all our means the forcible interposition of any other power, 
 as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, 
 and most especially their transfer to any power by conquest, 
 cession or acquisition in any other way. I should think it, there- 
 fore, advisable, that the Executive should encourage the Brit- 
 ish Government to a continuance in the dispositions expressed 
 in these letters by an assurance of his concurrence with them 
 as far as his authority goes ; and that as it may lead to war, the 
 declaration of which requires an act of Congress, the case shall 
 be laid before them for consideration at their first meeting, and 
 under the reasonable aspect in which it is seen by himself." 
 
 A similar request for Madison's advice elicited from him a 
 similar response: 
 
 "From the disclosures of Mr. Canning it appears, as was
 
 342 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 otherwise to be inferred, that the success of France against Spain 
 would be followed by an attempt of the holy allies to reduce 
 the revolutionized colonies of the latter to their former depend- 
 ence. 
 
 ' ' The professions we have made to these neighbors, our sympa- 
 thies with their liberties and independence, the deep interest 
 we have in the most friendly relations with them, and the con- 
 sequences threatened by a command of their resources by the 
 great powers, confederated against the rights and reforms of 
 which we have given so conspicuous and persuasive an example, 
 all unite in calling for our efforts to defeat the meditated cru- 
 sade. It is particularly fortunate that the policy of Great 
 Britain, though guided by calculations different from ours, has 
 presented a cooperation for an object the same with ours. With 
 that cooperation we have nothing to fear from the rest of Europe, 
 and with it the best assurance of success to our laudable views. 
 There ought not, therefore, to be any backwardness, I think, in 
 meeting her in the way she has proposed, keeping in view, of 
 course, the spirit and forms of the Constitution in every step 
 taken in the road to war, which must be the last step if those 
 short of war should be without avail. 
 
 "It cannot be doubted that Mr. Canning's proposal, though 
 made with the air of consultation, as well as concert, was founded 
 on a predetermination to take the course marked out, whatever 
 might be the reception given here to his invitation. But this 
 consideration ought not to divert us from what is just and 
 proper in itself. Our cooperation is due to ourselves and to the 
 world ; and whilst it must ensure success in the event of an ap- 
 peal to force, it doubles the chance of success without that ap- 
 peal. It is not improbable that Great Britain would like best to 
 have the merit of being the sole champion of her new friends, not- 
 withstanding the greater difficulty to be encountered, but for 
 the dilemma in which she would be placed. She must, in that 
 case, either leave us, as neutrals, to extend our commerce and 
 navigation at the expense of hers, or make us enemies, by renew- 
 ing her paper blockades and other arbitrary proceedings on the 
 ocean. It may be hoped that such a dilemma will not be with- 
 out a permanent tendency to check her proneness to unneces- 
 sary wars.
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 343 
 
 "Why the British cabinet should have scrupled to arrest the 
 calamity it now apprehends, by applying to the threats of France 
 against Spain the small effort which it scruples not to employ 
 in behalf of Spanish America, is best known to itself. It is 
 difficult to find any other explanation than that interest in the 
 one ease has more weight in its casuistry than principle had in 
 the other. 
 
 "Will it not be honorable to our country, and possibly not 
 altogether in vain, to invite the British Government to extend 
 the 'avowed disapprobation' of the project against the Spanish 
 colonies to the enterprise of France against Spain herself, and 
 even to join in some declaratory act in behalf of the Greeks? 
 On the supposition that no form could be given to the act clear- 
 ing it of a pledge to follow it up by war, we ought to compare 
 the good to be done with the little injury to be apprehended to 
 the United States, shielded as their interests would be by the 
 power and the fleets of Great Britain united with their ovm. 
 These are questions, however, which may require more informa- 
 tion than I possess, and more reflection than I can now give 
 them. 
 
 "What is the extent of Mr. Canning's disclaimer as to 'the re- 
 maining possessions of Spain in America'? Does it exclude fu- 
 ture views of acquiring Porto Rico, etc., as well as Cuba? It 
 leaves Great Britain free, as I understand it, in relation to 
 other quarters of the globe." 
 
 It was on October 17 that Monroe sent the correspondence 
 to Jefferson, which Jefferson received on October 23. But be- 
 fore that, on October 16, Baron Tuyll, the Russian minister at 
 Washington, informed Adams, at the state department, that the 
 Russian government had determined not to receive a minister 
 from Colombia, who had been appointed, or indeed one from any 
 of the South American States which had revolted from Spain. 
 He added an expression of the czar 's hope that the United States 
 would maintain an attitude of neutrality in the contest between 
 Spain and her rebellious colonies. Adams replied that he would 
 transmit this information to the President, and added that the 
 United States would doubtless observe neutrality, so long as all 
 the European powers did the same; but that if one or more of 
 the latter should depart from that policy, that change of circum-
 
 344 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 stances would have to be considered by the United States, with 
 results which could not be foretold. 
 
 During October and November, 1823, Monroe and his cabinet 
 gave much time to discussions of this matter. Adams thought 
 that Canning wanted the United States to pledge itself both to 
 resist European intervention in South America and also not to 
 take for itself any part of those countries, and he opposed at 
 least the latter undertaking. Calhoun, on the other hand, fav- 
 ored pledging ourselves, if necessary, not to take even Texas and 
 Cuba, although the acquisition of both had been considered. 
 Monroe would probably have adopted Calhoun's policy, had it 
 not been for Adams's resolute opposition. Adams urged that in 
 the forthcoming message the President should take strong ground 
 against the meddling of the Holy Alliance in American affairs. 
 "Wirt objected that the people of the United States would not 
 support the Government in a war for the protection of South 
 America. Calhoun, who seems to have been almost panic- 
 stricken with fear of Europe, believed that the Holy Alliance 
 "had an ultimate eye to us; that they would, if not resisted, 
 subdue South America. Violent parties would arise in this 
 country, one for and one against them, and we should have to 
 fight upon our own shores for our own institutions." Adams 
 did not fear any attack upon the United States, but thought 
 that if the allies intervened in South America they would prob- 
 ably divide that continent among themselves. France would 
 take Mexico, Russia would take California, Peru and Chile, and 
 England would take Cuba. That would be disastrous to the 
 United States. On the other hand, said Adams, if the United 
 States hesitated and let Great Britain alone save South America 
 from subjugation, all those colonies would become tributary to 
 her. The United States must therefore act promptly and de- 
 cisively. A pledge of war was not required. The President alone 
 could not make that, and Canning did not ask it. All that was 
 required was an expression of policy, which would leave Con- 
 gress free to act thereafter as occasion might require. 
 
 The last act before the delivery of IMonroe's message was the 
 adoption by the cabinet of a note prepared by Adams for pre- 
 sentation to Baron Tuyll. This was dated November 27, 1823. 
 It contained an explicit statement of American policy concerning
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 345 
 
 South America, and concluded as follows: "That the United 
 States of America and their Government could not see with in- 
 difference the forcible interposition of any European power, 
 other than Spain, either to restore the dominion of Spain over 
 her emancipated colonies in America, or to establish monarchi- 
 cal governments in those countries, or to transfer any of the 
 possessions heretofore or yet subject to Spain in the American 
 hemisphere to any other European power." 
 
 The message containing the so-called doctrine was Monroe's 
 regular annual message to Congress at the opening of the session, 
 on December 2, 1823. The message began with the usual rou- 
 tine report of transactions and relations with the various foreign 
 countries, in the course of which, in speaking of the negotiations 
 with Russia, one part of the Doctrine was set forth, in terms simi- 
 lar to those addressed by Adams to Baron Tuyll in July pre- 
 ceding, as follows : 
 
 "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a prin- 
 ciple in which the rights and interests of the United States are 
 involved, that the American continents, by the free and inde- 
 pendent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are 
 henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future coloniza- 
 tion by any European powers. ' ' 
 
 This was, indeed, simply a reference to and a direct reaffirma- 
 tion of Adams's words to Tuyll. The message continued with a 
 review of domestic interests and transactions. Then, near the 
 close, it reverted to foreign affairs. Ardent sympathy was ex- 
 pressed with Greece in her struggle for independence. Refer- 
 ence was made to the unhappy condition of Spain and Portugal, 
 and the message then proceeded as follows : 
 
 "The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the 
 most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their 
 fellow men on that side of tlie Atlantic. In the wars of the 
 European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have 
 never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to 
 do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced 
 that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. 
 "With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, 
 more Immediately connected, and by causes which must be ob- 
 vious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political
 
 346 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 System of the allied powers is essentially different in this re- 
 spect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that 
 which exists in their respective Governments. And to the de- 
 fense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much 
 blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most 
 enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unex- 
 ampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, there- 
 fore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between 
 the United States and those powers, to declare that we should 
 consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to 
 any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
 safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any Euro- 
 pean power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. 
 But with the Governments who have declared their independ- 
 ence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on 
 great consideration and on just principle, acknowledged, we 
 could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing 
 them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any 
 European power, in any other light than as the manifestation 
 of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the 
 war between those new Governments and Spain we declared 
 our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we 
 have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change 
 shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities 
 of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the 
 part of the United States indispensable to their security. 
 
 *'The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is 
 still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can 
 be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it 
 proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have in- 
 terposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what 
 extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, 
 is a question in which all independent powers whose Govern- 
 ments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, 
 and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in 
 regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the 
 wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, never- 
 theless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal 
 concerns of any of its powers, to consider the Government de
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 347 
 
 facto as the legitimate Government for us, to cultivate friendly 
 relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, 
 firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims 
 of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in re- 
 gard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and con- 
 spicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers 
 should extend their political system to any portion of either 
 continent without endangering our peace and happiness, nor 
 can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to them- 
 selves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impos- 
 sible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any 
 form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength 
 and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their 
 distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never 
 subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to 
 leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers 
 will pursue the same course." 
 
 The reception and appreciation of the doctrine in the United 
 States may perhaps best be briefly described in the words of 
 Daniel Webster, who did not exaggerate when he said : "It met 
 with the entire concurrence and hearty approbation of the coun- 
 try. One general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of 
 gratified love of liberty, one conscious and proud perception of 
 the consideration which our country possessed, and of the respect 
 and honor which belonged to it, pervaded all bosoms." In Great 
 Britain, also, it was regarded with gratification, "We shall 
 hear no more," said one journal, "of a congress to settle the fate 
 of the South American States." "It is worthy," said another, 
 ' ' the occasion and the people destined to occupy so large a space 
 in the future history of the world." Brougham declared: 
 "The question wath regard to South America is now disposed 
 of, or nearly so, for an event has recently happened than which 
 no event has dispensed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude 
 over all the freemen of Europe; that event, which is decisive on 
 the subject in respect to South America, is the message of the 
 President of the United States to Congress." The noncoloniza- 
 tion clauses were not, indeed, approved in England nor accepted 
 by the British government. On the contrary, in a "general ne- 
 gotiation" which soon after occurred between the plenipoten-
 
 348 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tiaries of Great Britain and the United States it was expressly- 
 declared that Great Britain considered the whole of the unoc- 
 cupied parts of America as being open to her future settlements. 
 But as a matter of fact few such settlements were attempted 
 save in the regions already assigned to Great Britain, and that 
 feature of the message was soon lost sight of before the superior 
 significance of the remainder. As for South America itself, its 
 diplomatic representatives in Europe were "wild with joy," and 
 South American securities of all kinds rose greatly in value. 
 On the Continent, among the allied powers, there was a mixture 
 of chagrin and disappointment, together with a general feeling 
 that all further designs upon America must forthwith be 
 dropped; as they were. 
 
 Credit for the authorship of the doctrine has been variously 
 claimed. Canning afterward boasted in Parliament that it was 
 his work and that he had "called the New World into existence, 
 to redress the balance of the Old. ' ' But that was surely an ex- 
 aggeration. Canning was entitled to much credit for the en- 
 couragement which he gave to the United States, and for his 
 warnings of the urgency of the situation and the need of prompt 
 action; but that was all. That, moreover, related to only one 
 half of the doctrine, namely, the declaration of complete sepa- 
 ration between the European and American systems and the in- 
 sistence that it must be maintained both by American abstention 
 from meddling in European affairs and by European abstention 
 from meddling in American affairs. And even that half of the 
 doctrine appeared in essentially different form from that which 
 Canning had intended. For he had meant that the United 
 States and Great Britain should act jointly, or identically ; which 
 was not done. On the contrary, that plan was specifically re- 
 jected, Adams declaring that "it would be more candid, as well 
 as more dignified, to avow our principles directly to Russia and 
 France, than to come in as a cock boat in the wake of the Brit- 
 ish man-of-war." In addition. Canning seems to have wished, 
 or at any rate Adams supposed that he wished, the United States 
 to pledge itself to seek no special privileges and to exercise no 
 special influence, in Spanish America, and to that Adams so 
 strenuously and effectively objected that not a hint of such self- 
 abnegation is anywhere perceptible in the message. These are
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 349 
 
 the certain exceptions to or rather the limitations of Canning's 
 connection with that portion of the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 The other part of the doctrine, quite distinct from that already 
 described, was a flat prohibition of further European coloniza- 
 tion of the American continents. It is quite certain that Can- 
 ning was not the author of that. He did not encourage it. He 
 did not approve it, but to the end maintained an attitude of chal- 
 lenge and antagonism toward it, incorrectly imagining that it 
 would militate against Great Britain's further colonization of 
 her great northwest territories, and against her designs of ac- 
 quiring by colonization a part of the disputed Oregon territory. 
 To one part of the doctrine, therefore, he gave a qualified en- 
 couragement, while with the other part he had absolutely no 
 concern and no sympathy. 
 
 •- The claim of authorship for Adams rests on immeasurably bet- 
 ter ground. It is quite certain that he was in full sympathy 
 with every word of it. The portion relating to the distinction 
 between the European and American political systems he did 
 not conceive, but received it from his predecessors, Washington,. 
 Hamilton, Jefferson, and others. The other portion, prohibit- 
 ing further European colonization, may, however, be largely if 
 not entirely attributed to him. It was, as we have seen, closely 
 anticipated in his note to Baron Tuyll, which was his own com- 
 position, though it was discussed and approved by the whole 
 cabinet before it was delivered. It is supposable, then, that 
 Adams, himself practically conceiving one part and formulating 
 the other part from antecedent utterances of former statesmen, 
 drafted the doctrine and submitted it to Monroe for incorpora- 
 tion in his message — a common practice of cabinet ministers. 
 But there are intrinsic indications that the verbal form of it was 
 largely recast by IMonroe himself. It is in his rather than 
 Adams's style of expression. 
 
 That portion of the doctrine prohibiting European coloniza- 
 tion of the American continents was long ago rendered obsolete. 
 Its purpose was accomplished in the occupation and settlement 
 of all parts of the continents by the existing powers, leaving no 
 room for such European colonization. The other part, relating 
 to the separation of the European and American systems, is on 
 the contrary as vital and essential to-day as it was when it was
 
 350 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 first enunciated, and it is to it that chief consideration is to be 
 given. It rests, obviously, upon that fundamental, immutable, 
 and perpetual principle of the right of self-defense, which Mon- 
 roe so vigorously proclaimed during the controversy over Flor- 
 ida. It was for the sake of "our peace and safety" that Euro- 
 pean nations were warned to keep hands off South America. It 
 was declared to be impossible for the European powers to ex- 
 tend their system to any part of America "without endanger- 
 ing our peace and happiness." That principle of self-defense 
 crops up in almost every sentence. It is the essential spirit of 
 the Monroe Doctrine, its very excuse for being. 
 
 We may thus regard the doctrine as adding the final capstone 
 to the edifice of American independence. First, the colonists 
 came hither to escape the evils of European systems. But they 
 found that as colonies of European powers they were still sub- 
 ject to the same old evils. Next, they established their political 
 independence, in hope of thus completing the work. But they 
 found that with great abutting territories in the hands of foreign 
 powers, and being transferred from one power to another, they 
 were not yet entirely freed from European menaces. So Lou- 
 isiana and Florida were taken, to give us geographical inde- 
 pendence. But even that was not enough, and so Monroe sought 
 to complete the work in this declaration of diplomatic inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 It is not the present purpose to attempt a detailed exposition 
 or interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, or a commentary upon 
 it. From the text of the message and the circumstances of its 
 origin, it is obvious that there was no thought of making it a 
 part of the international law of the world. It was not even a 
 fixed rule binding upon the United States. It neither created 
 nor proposed any conventional obligation, either with Europe 
 or with South America. It was no menace of hostility to the 
 former and no pledge of protection to the latter. It was an ex- 
 pression of the policy which the United States purposed to pur- 
 sue, at its own discretion, and solely for the sake of its own peace 
 and security, in respect to a single specific contingency. So 
 much, at least, concerning that second part of the doctrine, upon 
 which by far the greater stress has ever been laid. The first 
 part, relative to European colonization of these continents, was
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 351 
 
 indeed perpetual in its intent, though, as we have said, the logic 
 of events soon rendered it apparently superfluous. But in time 
 the perpetual intent of the first part became shifted to the purely 
 temporary and occasional provision of the second, and caused 
 the expansion and confirmation of the latter into a fixed prin- 
 ciple of national policy. 
 
 In even the fullest of such development, however, the doctrine 
 has its manifest limitations. It pledges America not to meddle 
 in European matters and warns Europe not to meddle in Amer- 
 ica. But the reference is solely to politics. There is no hint 
 at prohibition of commercial, fiscal, and other relations; nor of 
 diplomatic relations; nor of the exercise of ordinary measures, 
 peaceful or forcible, for the satisfaction of just claims or the 
 settlement of disputes ; nor even of the waging of war. All these 
 things have, in fact, been done under the doctrine, without vio- 
 lation of its letter or spirit. The doctrine affords no screen be- 
 hind which South American States can enjoy immunity from 
 the penalty of misconduct, or «vade their just obligations, or in 
 any way escape the common responsibilities of civilized nations. 
 Of course the doctrine gives us no authority over those States, 
 and no right to intervene in their domestic affairs. These latter 
 relations might have been established if the doctrine had been 
 promulgated at the request of those States and primarily for 
 their protection. But it was not. It was made at our own in- 
 itiative, and for our own good, and while as a matter of fact the 
 South American States welcomed and rejoiced in it, they were 
 under no compulsion, moral or legal, to do so, or even to regard 
 it with gratitude. The title of the United States to intervene 
 in any way among its southern neighbors rests not upon the 
 Monroe Doctrine, but upon that vastly more important, primal 
 principle upon which the doctrine itself was based, namely, the 
 law of self-protection. It was to protect ourselves that we for- 
 bade European monarchies to intrude their systems into this 
 hemisphere; and it will be to protect ourselves from annoyance 
 and to abate for our own good intolerable nuisances that we in- 
 tervene, if ever we do so, in the affairs of our southern neighbors. 
 
 There is ground for believing that Adams had a somewhat 
 more ambitious view of the application of the doctrine than that 
 which now generally prevails. The word "hegemony" had not
 
 352 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 then come into use, but the idea which it conveys was and had 
 long been familiar. It was as old at least as ancient Greece, 
 and Adams, as a classical student, was familiar with the su- 
 premacy and leadership which sometimes Athens and sometimes 
 Sparta had exercised among the States of Hellas. He was famil- 
 iar, also, through his long residence in Europe, with the similar 
 leadership which one State there sometimes had over others, as 
 in the German confederation. There is little doubt that he had 
 in mind such a hegemony of the United States over its lesser 
 neighbors at the south. He indicated this a little later, in his 
 own administration, in his policy toward the Panama Congress. 
 It is not impossible that if it had then been judiciously broached 
 that system would have been accepted by the Spanish American 
 States, and would have proved beneficial to all concerned. But 
 it was not even hinted at in the doctrine, though of course it was 
 not denied nor forbidden. There was simply nothing said about 
 it. Perhaps this silence was judicious; since a declaration of 
 such hegemony, or of the possibility of it, would certainly have 
 provoked protest and antagonism from Canning, whom, as we 
 have seen, Adams credited with a desire to have us explicitly 
 pledge ourselves not to take such a course. At any rate, noth- 
 ing was said, and the matter was left entirely open and unde- 
 cided, to be disposed of as future contingencies might require. 
 The radical contrast between the two parties over the matter of 
 human slavery soon disinclined the Latin States to enter into 
 such relations, and of course their own growth in population 
 and strength confirmed that disinclination ; until to-day nothing 
 could be more offensive than the suggestion of such hegemony. 
 This is also to be particularly observed, that the doctrine did 
 not and does not in any way apply to any other parts of the 
 world than Europe and America, and perhaps to European and 
 American colonies or possessions elsewhere. There was no men- 
 tion of Asia, or Africa, or the islands of the sea. The United 
 States did not warn the European powers against extending their 
 system thither, and it certainly did not bind itself not to extend 
 its own authority and ownership. All other parts of the world 
 were left open and free, for American as well as for European 
 cultivation and — if need be — conquest. Accordingly the con- 
 quest and annexation of the Philippine Islands, three quarters of
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 353 
 
 a century later, was in no sense a violation of the doctrine, and 
 indeed had not the slightest relation to it; any more than the 
 French conquest of Anam, or the European partition of Africa. 
 One more point. Since the doctrine was not law or treaty, it 
 is not to be construed as such according to its literal terms, nor 
 is its application to be confined to facts or conditions precisely 
 similar to those which called it forth. The application of it is 
 to be determined, rather, upon the broad ground of general 
 principles; inquiring whether the specific facts of any case lie 
 within the spirit and purpose of the policy to which Monroe 
 gave enunciation. It is scarcely to be supposed, for example, 
 that Monroe and his colleagues had in mind the making and 
 control of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, and the doc- 
 trine was not intentionally framed for application to such a 
 work. But it is not only supposable but substantially certain 
 that if the matter had been brought to their attention they would 
 unhesitatingly have held that the doctrine fully applied to the 
 canal and forbade its being subject to European control. Or 
 perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they would have 
 held that the same principle of self-protection which inspired 
 and justified the Monroe Doctrine also made it right and essen- 
 tial that any such canal should be "an American canal under 
 American control." The Monroe Doctrine was and is, in brief, 
 not itself a universal law, but merely the application of a uni- 
 versal law to a certain specific contingency; and its supreme 
 value and validity are in its reminder of the just and inevitable 
 application of that same law to every contingency of our national 
 life — the universal and immutable law of self -protection. 
 
 VOL. 1—23
 
 XIII 
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 
 
 THE enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine was promptly fol- 
 lowed by a marked expansion of American interests, and 
 especially of the foreign relationships of the country. This was 
 natural, because of three attendant circumstances. One was, 
 that the doctrine was the most advanced proclamation of what 
 we may term "world power status" that the United States had 
 thus far made. In the Declaration of Independence, it is true, 
 we had proclaimed ourselves a peer among the nations in author- 
 ity and responsibility, but we had not by any means always com- 
 ported ourselves as such. But now in the most direct and em- 
 phatic manner the United States announced itself to be a true 
 ''world power," and a member — if not by implication the head 
 — of a rival international system to that of Europe. No longer 
 subject to the vicissitudes and caprices of European politics, we 
 were setting up a scheme of American politics to counterbal- 
 ance that from which we had divorced ourselves, and in conse- 
 quence we began to readjust all our international relationships 
 on that new basis. 
 
 The second circumstance was the establishment of the inde- 
 pendence of the Latin American States. This gave us a num- 
 ber of new neighbors with which to enter into diplomatic and 
 commercial relations. They were, moreover, neighbors which it 
 was peculiarly appropriate, and indeed incumbent upon us, to 
 take into intimate relations. That we did not do so must be 
 accounted one of the most regrettable failures of our govern- 
 mental policy at that time and for many years since. But de- 
 spite that failure, there was in that direction a marked expan- 
 sion of American interests. 
 
 The third circumstance was our own rapid growth in popula- 
 tion, wealth, and commerce, which not only made us more and 
 more powerful in peace and in war but also made it necessary 
 
 354
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 355 
 
 for us to enlarge our scope of interests in order to afford room 
 for the activities of the expanding nation. 
 
 One of the first diplomatic problems presented to the Gov- 
 ernment at this time was that of recognition of new powers. 
 The only occasion on which it had hitherto been raised was when 
 the French Revolution overthew the Bourbon monarchy and es- 
 tablished the First Republic. Now, in the presence of a number 
 of new States in Latin America, it was renewed in a much more 
 important form. It had first to be determined by what depart- 
 ment of the Government the act of recognition was to be per- 
 formed. For several years Congress, under the leadership of 
 Clay, strove at least to force the President to recognize the new 
 countries at its bidding. This compulsion was resisted with 
 success, and the principle was securely established that the act 
 of recognition was to be performed by the President, at his own 
 discretion ; though it would generally be necessary for the House 
 of Representatives to acquiesce in that action and to comple- 
 ment it by appropriating the means for sending diplomatic rep- 
 resentatives to the new governments. In default of such appro- 
 priation, however, recognition would still be valid and effective 
 for legal and diplomatic purposes, since the accrediting of min- 
 isters is not an essential function of recognition. 
 
 That point determined, it became obvious that various circum- 
 stances were to be considered by the executive in the exercise 
 of his discretion. The chief of these, and their application to 
 the cases of the Latin-American States, were well stated by John 
 Quincy Adams in a letter to the Spanish minister, Mr. Anduaga, 
 in 1822, prior to the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. 
 Adams said: 
 
 "In every question relating to the independence of a nation 
 two principles are involved, one of right and the other of fact; 
 the former exclusively depending upon the detennination of 
 the nation itself, and the latter resulting from the successful 
 execution of that determination. This right has been recently 
 exercised as well by the Spanish nation in Europe as by sev- 
 eral of those countries in the American hemisphere which had 
 for two or three centuries been connected, as colonies, with 
 Spain. In the conflicts which have attended these revolutions 
 the United States have carefully abstained from taking any
 
 356 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 part, respecting the right of the nations concerned in them to 
 maintain or reorganize their own political constitutions, and 
 observing, wherever it was a contest by arms, a most impartial 
 neutrality ; but the civil war in which Spain was for some years 
 involved with the inhabitants of her colonies in America has, 
 in substance, ceased to exist. Treaties equivalent to an acknowl- 
 edgment of independence have been concluded by the com- 
 manders and viceroys of Spain herself with the Republic of 
 Colombia, with Mexico, and with Peru, while in the provinces 
 of La Plata and in Chile no Spanish force has for several years 
 existed to dispute the independence which the inhabitants of 
 those countries had declared. 
 
 "Under these circumstances, the Government of the United 
 States, far from consulting the dictates of a policy questionable 
 in its morality, yielded to an obligation of duty of the highest 
 order by recognizing as independent States nations which, after 
 deliberately asserting their right to that character, have main- 
 tained and established it against all resistance which had been 
 or could be brought to oppose it. This recognition is neither in- 
 tended to invalidate any right of Spain nor to affect the em- 
 ployment of any means which she may yet be disposed or 
 enabled to use with the view of reuniting those provinces to the 
 rest of her dominions. It is the mere acknowledgment of ex- 
 isting facts with the view to the regular establishment with the 
 nations newly formed of those relations, political or commercial, 
 which it is the moral obligation of civilized and Christian nations 
 to entertain reciprocally with one another." 
 
 Again, in 1823, Adams wrote to Anderson, the American en- 
 voy to Colombia, as follows: 
 
 "While Spain maintained a doubtful contest with arms to 
 recover her dominion, it was regarded as a civil war. When 
 that contest became so manifestly desperate that Spanish vice- 
 roys, governors, and captains-general themselves concluded 
 treaties with the insurgents, virtually acknowledging their in- 
 dependence, then the United States frankly and unreservedly 
 recognized the fact, without making their acknowledgment the 
 price of any favor to themselves, and although at the hazard 
 of incurring the displeasure of Spain. In this measure they 
 have taken the lead of the whole civilized world; for although
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 357 
 
 the Portugese-Brazilian government had a few months before 
 recognized the revolutionary government of Buenos Aires, it 
 was at a moment when a projected declaration of its own inde- 
 pendence made the question substantially their own cause, and 
 it was presented as an equivalent for a reciprocal recognition 
 of their own much more questionable right to the eastern shore 
 of La Plata." 
 
 At the time of its recognition in 1822 Colombia comprised New 
 Granada, which is the present Colombia, and also Venezuela 
 and Ecuador. In 1835 the country was divided into the three 
 separate and independent States, and these were individually 
 recognized by the United States. It does not appear that the 
 United States ever recognized the "United Provinces of the Rio 
 de la Plata" under. that name; but it recognized Buenos Aires 
 in 1823, at which time that government exercised its sway 
 over the United Provinces and also over Uruguay and Paraguay. 
 The latter two States were in turn individually recognized re- 
 spectively in 1836 and 1852. Chile and Mexico were recognized 
 in 1823, on the same day with Buenos Aires. Recognition was 
 given to Brazil and to the Federation of Central American 
 States in 1824, and to Peru in 1826. It is worthy of note that 
 the independence of Mexico and Brazil was recogtiized as 
 promptly as that of any other States, though they were not re- 
 publics but empires. The political form of their government 
 caused no hesitation nor discrimination on our part in recog- 
 nizing them. 
 
 In addition to thus itself recognizing the independence of 
 the Latin American States, this country promptly sought by 
 the exercise of its friendly offices to persuade Spain to do the 
 same. In 1825 John Quincy Adams became President and 
 Henry Clay secretary of state, and one of the earliest acts 
 of that administration was the sending of instructions to the 
 American minister to Spain, A. H. Everett, to urge upon the 
 Spanish government the desirability of such recognition. 
 Clay also instructed the American minister to Russia, Henry 
 Middleton, to ask the czar to offer his services and good offices 
 as a mediator, and to represent to Spain the hopelessness of 
 the struggle and the necessity of prompt recognition of the in- 
 dependence of the States. Irenic instructions were given to
 
 358 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Everett's successor, C. P. Van Ness, in 1830, and in 1834 he 
 was able to report that Spain was willing to enter into negotia- 
 tions with her former provinces to that end. He was then 
 further instructed to tender the good offices of this government 
 to the fullest extent for the facilitation of the negotiations, and 
 also, in view of the natural ties of race and tradition between 
 South America and Spain, he was directed to guard against 
 any effort on the part of Spain "to obtain, in consideration of 
 her recognition of the independence of her former colonies, 
 some peculiar advantages in trade, or some extraordinary privi- 
 leges for her citizens, to the prejudice of other friendly nations." 
 Such an arrangement, it was declared, "would be peculiarly 
 prejudicial to the interests of this country, and would form 
 a just ground of complaint against those whom the Govern- 
 ment of the United States was the first to recognize in their in- 
 dependent character, and for whose prosperity it has never 
 ceased to manifest the most friendly and anxious concern." 
 
 The United States did not, however, consistently maintain 
 the interest in the Latin American States which it professed 
 to feel and which it naturally should have felt. On the con- 
 trary, it soon committed an act which largely stultified its 
 professions and which caused a certain estrangement between it 
 and its southern neighbors which has not even yet been entirely 
 outgrown. In December, 1824, Bolivar issued an invitation to 
 all the republics of the New World excepting the United States 
 to assemble in the first "Pan-American Congress" at Panama. 
 " It is time, ' ' he wrote, ' ' that the interest and sympathy uniting 
 the American republics should have a fundamental basis that 
 shall perpetuate, if possible, their governments." So he pro- 
 posed a congress of plenipotentiaries from all the States, "that 
 shall act as a council in great conflicts to be appealed to in 
 case of common danger, be a faithful interpreter of public 
 treaties when difficulties shall arise, and conciliate all our differ- 
 ences. " This benevolent scheme may have been suggested by 
 or copied after the European congresses at Laibach, Verona, 
 and elsewhere, but that it was well conceived there can be no 
 question. Had the United States participated, this country 
 would undoubtedly have dominated the congress and by common 
 consent would have been invested with a certain moral hegemony
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 359 
 
 of the Americans. But it was not invited by Bolivar, because 
 he feared that it would not accept, and because he knew, also, 
 that he and his principles were not regarded with favor in this 
 country. For he was an enemy of human slavery. ''All, 
 whether white or black," he said, "are equally entitled to the 
 just recompense of valor, of honor, of intelligence, of sacrifice, 
 and of virtue." It was his purpose to continue his efforts until 
 Cuba, Porto Rico, and other countries were liberated and human 
 slavery was banished from the Americas. In this ambition he 
 recognized the United States as his chief obstacle. He knew, 
 moreover, that it was because of his opposition to slavery that 
 the United States had given him so little sympathy and aid 
 in his struggles in South America. 
 
 Colombia was the first to accept the invitation, and Mexico, 
 which had become a republic, the second; and then those two 
 powers united in extending to the United States the invitation 
 which Bolivar himself had not given. President Adams, the 
 great pioneer of himian freedom in the United States, gladly 
 accepted it, as another important step in the policy which had 
 been begun with the Monroe Doctrine, and as calculated to 
 make that doctrine not merely a formal pronouncement but a 
 vital force and method of life. In his annual message of De- 
 cember 6, 1825, he announced to Congress the receipt and ac- 
 ceptance of the invitation. But Congress, then under pro- 
 slavery domination, received the announcement with marked 
 disfavor. Twenty days later he sent a special message, explain- 
 ing the purpose of the congress and the reasons why the 
 United States ought to participate in it. Having been the first 
 to recognize the independence of the Latin American States, he 
 said, and the first to sympathize with them so far as was com- 
 patible with our neutral duties, we had laid the foundations 
 of future intercourse with them in the broadest principles of 
 reciprocity and the most cordial feelings of fraternal friend- 
 ship. "To extend those principles to all our commercial rela- 
 tions with them, and to hand down that friendship to future 
 ages, is congenial to the highest policy of this union, as it will 
 be to all those nations and their posterity." In confidence that 
 tliose sentiments would meet the approval of the Senate, he 
 nominated two envoys and a secretary, to represent the United
 
 360 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 States at the congress. Henry Clay, as secretary of state, wrote 
 at the same time a long and forceful letter to the same effect; 
 perhaps the ablest of all his state documents; in which he 
 characterized the Panama Congress as "the boundary stone of 
 a new epoch in the world's history." Adams in subsequent 
 messages urged senatorial approval of the scheme. He doubted, 
 he said, whether for centuries to come there would again be 
 offered to this nation such a favorable opportunity for sub- 
 serving the benevolent purposes of Divine Providence and dis- 
 pensing the promised blessings of the Redeemer of mankind. 
 
 But Adams and Clay did not appreciate the power of the 
 slave-holding interests of our Southern States, nor the extent 
 to which, for the sake of those sordid interests, senators were 
 ready to sacrifice the external interests of the whole nation and 
 the welfare of the Western Hemisphere. The pro-slavery sena- 
 tors saw in the Panama Congress a direct menace to their 
 "peculiar institution." They recalled the Negro revolution in 
 Haiti and saw in it a forecast of what would happen in the 
 United States if there were any meddling with the "divine 
 right" to enslave the Negro. The example of Haiti, said their 
 most eloquent spokesman, Hayne of South Carolina, was fatal 
 to our repose. Speaking of the Latin American republics gen- 
 erally, he said: "Those governments have proclaimed the 
 principles of liberty and equality, and have marched to victory 
 under the banner of universal emancipation." For that reason 
 he and his pro-slavery colleagues opposed American representa- 
 tion or participation in the congress. In their view the nation 
 which had come into being on the principle that all men are 
 created equal had no place in the company of States which pro- 
 claimed and practised that self -same principle. 
 
 The foreign relations conunittee of the Senate, of which 
 Mason of Virginia was chairman, accordingly reported a resolu- 
 tion to the effect that it was not expedient for the United 
 States to send any ministers to the Congress at Panama, and 
 supported it in a long document full of sophistry and self- 
 stultification. The declarations were made that for us to par- 
 ticipate in the congress would be in conflict with the whole 
 course of policy hitherto pursued by the United States ; that be- 
 cause of our great interest in Cuba and Porto Rico we ought not
 
 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 361 
 
 to discuss the destinies of those islands, which Colombia and 
 Mexico were threatening to invade and conquer; and that no 
 compacts were needed to promote the growth of commercial 
 relations. It was also plainly revealed that the chief reason 
 for disapproving participation in the congress was the anti- 
 slavery principles of the other States, though disinclination to 
 enter into "entangling alliances" was put forward as the stalk- 
 ing horse. In the debates which ensued in both Houses of Con- 
 gress factional passions ran high, and the Monroe Doctrine was 
 much discussed. Polk and Buchanan, who afterward, as presi- 
 dents, far out-Monroed Monroe himself in advocacy and applica- 
 tion of his doctrine, at this time insisted upon its strictest and 
 narrowest interpretation. Buchanan introduced a resolution, 
 which was passed by the House, declaring that the United States 
 ought not to enter into any joint declaration with the South 
 American republics "for the purpose of preventing the inter- 
 ference of any of the European powers with their independence 
 or form of government," nor to enter into any compact for the 
 purpose of preventing colonization upon the continents of 
 America. This was provoked by the proposal by Bolivar that 
 the Congress of Panama should unite in a reaffirmation of the 
 Monroe Doctrine as a policy of all the American States. It 
 was, of course, argued that Buchanan's resolution was not a 
 repudiation of the doctrine, but was really a confirmation of it, 
 in that it emphasized the fact that the doctrine was intended 
 solely for the protection of the United States and not for that 
 of other countries. It was held that it would be unwise for us 
 to enter into a compact which might give to our allies the de- 
 cision of the question whether some given act was inimical 
 to our own peace and safety. 
 
 In the end the Senate did ratify the nominations of envoys, 
 and Congress voted an appropriation for their expenses. But 
 the delay had been so great that the Panama Congress had 
 adjourned before the envoys reached it. The United States was 
 therefore not represented in it, and suffered the imputation 
 of being unsympathetic toward it. Because of the conduct of 
 the United States, moreover, the congress was little better than 
 a failure. The only nations represented at it were Mexico, 
 Colombia, Peru, and Central America. Few international
 
 362 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 bodies have ever had a program of equal merit, in benevo- 
 lence and practical statesmanship ; a progi'am which antici- 
 pated half of the progress toward international peace and 
 justice which the whole world has since made. But the outcome 
 of the congress was inconclusive and futile, chiefly because of 
 the lack of precisely that authoritative leadership which at that 
 time the United States alone could have supplied; and it ad- 
 journed in disappointment among its members and with an un- 
 pleasant feeling throughout Latin America that the Monroe 
 Doctrine had been merely a "resounding and glittering gen- 
 erality" which the United States had no thought of putting 
 into vital and effective force. 
 
 An important question of foreign policy was meantime raised 
 in connection with Cuba. The South American States were 
 casting interested eyes upon that island and Porto Rico, and 
 were planning either to conquer them from Spain or to incite 
 and to assist them to establish their independence. But the 
 proximity of the islands to the British and French possessions 
 in the West Indies caused those powers also to view them with 
 interest, and to desire that, if they could not take them for 
 themselves, at least no other power should take them from Spain. 
 Accordingly, in August, 1825, the British government laid before 
 King, the American minister in London, a proposal that 
 America should unite with Great Britain and France in an un- 
 dertaking that neither of the three would take Cuba for itself 
 or would acquiesce in the taking of it by either of the others. 
 This was promptly transmitted to Washington, and was de- 
 clined by Adams on several grounds. One was that thus prac- 
 tically to guarantee Spain in the possession of Cuba and Porto 
 Rico might encourage that country to prolong indefinitely its 
 struggle with its colonies. Another was, that the course already 
 pursued by this country made it unnecessary for it to assume 
 any such obligations; it having made it clear by both declara- 
 tion and practice that it did not mean to seize Cuba for itself 
 and would not permit the seizure of it by another power. There 
 was no fear that Great Britain would seize the island, since her 
 so doing would certainly cause a rupture with the United States. 
 As for France, there was reason to suspect her of designs upon 
 Cuba, and there would be no great objection to having her bound
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 363 
 
 not to fulfil them. But negotiations were in progress to secure 
 peace between Spain and her colonies through Russian media- 
 tion, and until their result was ascertained the United States 
 would do nothing in the matter. France at first indicated a 
 willingness to accept the British proposal and to bind herself 
 to stay out of Cuba; but then suddenly changed her attitude 
 and refused to enter any such agTeement. As a result the 
 American government, in September, 1825, declined to unite 
 with Great Britain in renewing the invitation to France ; and in 
 addition instructed its minister in Paris to inform the French 
 government that under no contingency, either with or without 
 the consent of Spain, would this country permit French occupa- 
 tion of the two islands. While, therefore, there was no definite 
 and unqualified refusal, or principle, to enter with European 
 powers into a joint guarantee concerning American territory, 
 there was an explicit declaration that the United States, acting 
 alone, would prevent any further acquisition of adjacent Ameri- 
 can territory by a European power, or transfer of it from one 
 European power to another. 
 
 There also arose in this country a strong opposition to any 
 schemes of acquisition of Cuba by one of the American repub- 
 lics. Following close upon the correspondence concerning the 
 proposed tripartite guarantee. Clay addressed a note to the 
 Colombian and Mexican ministers, urging them to prevail upon 
 their respective governments to suspend the expeditions which 
 they were fitting out against Cuba and Porto Rico, at least until 
 after the Congress of Panama had met and Imd expressed itself 
 concerning the disposition of those islands. This was urged in 
 the belief that an attack upon Cuba would make it more difficult 
 to negotiate peace between Spain and South America, and for 
 some other reasons. The Colombian government acceded to the 
 request, and informed to that effect the Russian government, 
 which was then striving to mediate between Spain and the Latin 
 American States. Mexico, on the contrary, received the request 
 unfavorably, but did not proceed with the expedition. It is 
 doubtless not unfair or unreasonable, however, to assume that 
 the United States government was in fact chiefly moved in the 
 matter by a consideration which could not well be openly pro- 
 claimed. That is, its desire and even its intention to secure
 
 364 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 those islands for itself. Adams, as secretary of state under 
 Monroe, had already expressed confidence that Cuba would in 
 time gravitate to the United States, and there is no hint that 
 he relinquished that expectation when he became President. A 
 few years later, in 1829, Van Buren, secretary of state in Jack- 
 son's administration, openly admitted still another reason for 
 desiring no change in the ownership of Cuba at that time. That 
 had to do with the slavery question. So long as Spain held 
 Cuba, slavery would be maintained. But if any other power 
 took the island, that "peculiar institution" would be abolished, 
 and the effect of such abolition "could not but be very sensibly 
 felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States." 
 
 Brazil was the one monarchy among all the independent States 
 of Latin America, but it was treated by the United States much 
 the same as were the republics. Early in 1825 the Brazilian 
 government proposed to this country an alliance, under which 
 the United States should aid Brazil against any foreign power 
 which might assist Portugal in trying to reestablish her sov- 
 ereignty, and also against Portugal herself if she should invade 
 Brazil. Clay replied that the prospect of a speedy conclusion 
 of peace between Brazil and Portugal seemed to make such an 
 arrangement unnecessary ; but that if European powers should 
 renew their menace against Brazil or any other American State, 
 this country would give to the case the consideration which it 
 deserved. It was the policy of this country, he added, not to 
 intervene in a war which was confined to the parent country 
 and its former colony, but to remain neutral and to extend 
 friendship and justice equally to both. A few years later, 
 in 1828, the United States declined to intervene in a war be- 
 tween Argentina and Brazil, even though the one was a re- 
 public and the other an empire; holding that it was a war 
 strictly American in its origin and its object, in which the allies 
 of Europe had taken no part, and that therefore it presented 
 no analogy to the case which the Monroe Doctrine anticipated. 
 
 In the West Indies the United States was still suffering from 
 the restrictions upon trade which were imposed by the British 
 shipping laws. The long-established policy of Great Britain was 
 to keep in her own hands the commerce of her colonies, and 
 particularly those in the West Indies. Repeated attempts had
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 365 
 
 been made, beginning in the administration of Washington, to 
 secure the opening of the British West Indian ports to American 
 vessels, but in vain. Commercial treaties in 1815 and 1818 im- 
 proved our relations in some respects, but direct trade with the 
 West Indies, which would have been highly profitable to this 
 country, remained forbidden. The only way in which it could 
 be conducted was by smuggling. In 1822, Parliament opened 
 certain West Indian ports to American trade, but imposed 
 heavy customs duties and excluded some important classes of 
 goods. The concessions granted were valuable, however, and in 
 return Congress opened American ports to direct trade between 
 this country and the West Indies in British vessels. The 
 promise of better relations which was thus made was not, how- 
 ever, at once fulfilled, the fault lying largely with the American 
 Congress. In 1825, Parliament offered to open direct foreign 
 trade in the West Indies to the vessels of those countries which 
 granted to Great Britain the privileges of the ''most favored 
 nation," and proposed that American vessels in Canadian ports 
 and British vessels in American ports should pay the same ton- 
 nage dues. The United St-ates Congress demurred to this prac- 
 tical offer of commercial reciprocity, or at least failed to accept 
 it, whereupon in 1826 the British government by an order in 
 council again closed all West Indian ports against American 
 commerce. Gallatin, who was then appointed minister to Eng- 
 land in place of Rufus King, whose health had failed, tried 
 to get this order withdrawn, but was somewhat curtly informed 
 by Canning that the matter was closed and that the British gov- 
 ernment would not reopen discussion of it. In March, 1827, 
 Adams issued a proclamation renewing the prohibitions of 1818 
 and 1820, under which British vessels could not ply between 
 American and British West Indian ports. The result was that 
 all direct trade between American and British West Indian 
 ports, in either American or British vessels, was abolished. 
 Upon the death of Canning, soon after. Lord Goderich became 
 prime minister, and made a treaty with Gallatin restoring the 
 conditions which had been established in 1815. This was not 
 a satisfactory conclusion of the matter, though it was dignified 
 and friendly and it left the way open for future negotiations. 
 The loss of or the failure to secure the West India trade was,
 
 366 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 however, severely felt in the United States, and provoked no 
 small degree of displeasure toward the Adams administration. 
 A similar disposition was made by Adams and Clay of the 
 dispute over the Oregon territory. The modus vivendi estab- 
 lished in 1818 for ten years was renewed for another such term, 
 during which the whole territory was to be open to settlement 
 from both the United States and Great Britain. More progress 
 was made, however, with the settlement of the northeastern 
 boundary question, between Maine and New Brunswick. Galla- 
 tin in 1827 effected an agreement under which the questions at 
 issue were to be submitted to arbitration. There was much 
 debate over the selection of an arbitrator, the King of Prussia 
 and the Emperor of Russia being suggested but not accepted. 
 Finally, in April, 1828, after the exchange of ratifications of 
 the convention, the King of the Netherlands was mutually agreed 
 upon, and he consented to act. Gallatin conducted the case for 
 the United States with the consummate skill and unfailing tact 
 which made him one of the most efficient American diplomats 
 of his time, and the whole matter was elucidated and discussed 
 perhaps more thoroughly than any other of the kind in the his- 
 tory of arbitrations. The arbitral verdict was not announced 
 until January, 1831, and it then made no positive award, but 
 recommended that there be given to the United States 7908 
 and to Great Britain 4119 square miles of the disputed region 
 to which both had laid claim. William Pitt Preble of Maine, 
 who had been Gallatin's associate in conducting the case, was 
 then the American minister at The Hague, and he immediately 
 protested against the verdict, on the ground that the arbitrator 
 had exceeded his powers. The British government was not un- 
 willing to abide by the verdict, but it intimated to the United 
 States that it would not insist upon so doing but would resume 
 direct negotiations with a view to its modification. Over this 
 the United States hesitated. Preble's protest had been made 
 entirely on his own responsibility and without authorization 
 from Washington, and President Jackson — for it was now in his 
 administration — was much inclined to disavow it and to accept 
 the recommendatory award as conclusive. But New England 
 sentiment strongly supported Preble in his protest, and Jackson, 
 though he had little regard for that part of the Union, finally
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 367 
 
 determined to submit the matter to the Senate. That body con- 
 sidered the case for six months and then, by an overwhelming 
 vote, declared against acceptance of the award and in favor of 
 renewing direct negotiations with Great Britain. To this the 
 British government cordially acceded, and it was mutually 
 agreed that until a final determination was effected neither party 
 would attempt to exercise jurisdiction beyond the limits of the 
 territory which it actually possessed. 
 
 During the remainder of the eight years of Jackson's admin- 
 istration frequent attempts were made to settle the controversy 
 but without result. The United States was much hampered 
 in its efforts by the State of Maine, which insisted upon what it 
 claimed as its sovereign rights. The Federal Government en- 
 deavored to make a compact with the state government, under 
 which the former would have a free hand and the latter would 
 be indemnified for the relinquishment of any territory to which 
 it laid claim. Such an agreement was indeed signed in 1832, 
 but was never ratified. In the succeeding administration, of 
 Van Buren, attempts at settlement were renewed, but the State 
 of Maine, by legislative resolution, took a still more resolute 
 and uncompromising attitude. It insisted that the boundary 
 line prescribed in tlie treaty of 1783 should be maintained, that 
 no subsequent arbitration should be recognized, and that the 
 United States, either with or without British cooperation, should 
 promptly proceed to its survey and delimitation. Of course 
 passions among the inhabitants of the disputed territory rose 
 higher and higher until in 1838-39 they culminated in the so- 
 called "Restook" or Aroostook War. The State authorities of 
 Maine sent an agent with a posse to arrest British subjects who 
 were cutting timber, and tlie agent was seized by the New 
 Brunswick authorities and imprisoned. Maine raised a large 
 civil posse, erected fortifications, and appropriated $800,000 for 
 the governor to use at his discretion for military defense. Nor 
 was the Federal Government less aggressive. Congress au- 
 thorized the President to call out the militia and to enlist 50,000 
 volunteers, and voted him an extra credit of $10,000,000 for the 
 purpose. Happily war was averted by a man of war. General 
 Scott was sent to the scene, and he soon persuaded the authori- 
 ties of both I\Iaine and New Brunswick to cease their bickerings
 
 368 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 and to keep the peace. At his suggestion the governors of 
 Maine and New Brunswick issued public declarations, disclaim- 
 ing any intention of aggressiveness or belligerence. 
 
 So the matter rested until the spring of 1841, when Tyler was 
 President and Daniel Webster was secretary of state. Webster, 
 who was familiar with the controversy, deprecated the tedious 
 plan of new surveys and arbitration, to which the two govern- 
 ments seemed inclined, and urged instead the shorter and simpler 
 course of direct negotiation on the basis of known facts. To 
 this proposal the British government promptly responded by 
 sending Lord Ashburton hither with full powers to negotiate 
 settlements of all matters in dispute between the two coun- 
 tries. Ashburton reached Washington in April, 1842, and ne- 
 gotiations were promptly begun. For some weeks they were 
 conducted in writing, and little was accomplished. Then 
 Webster and Ashburton got together and talked face to face, 
 and in a few days a settlement was reached. The United States 
 was to get 7015 and Great Britain 4012 square miles of the dis- 
 puted territory. This division was thus apparently less favor- 
 able to this country than that which had been proposed by the 
 King of the Netherlands, but it was explained that the land 
 assigned to New Brunswick was chiefly mountainous, while that 
 given to Maine was much more valuable, so that this country 
 was reaUy getting about four fifths of the total value of the 
 region. The United States government undertook, also, to pay 
 the States of Maine and Massachusetts each $150,000 indemnity, 
 and their expenses for civil posses and surveys. On these terms 
 a treaty, known by the names of its makers as the Webster- 
 Ashburton treaty, was signed on August 9, 1842. This instru- 
 ment defined the boundary between Maine, New Hampshire, 
 Vermont, and New York on the one hand, and Canada on the 
 other, and also the boundary line from Lake Huron through 
 St. Mary's River and Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods 
 and thence to the Rocky Mountains; and it provided for the 
 free navigation of the St. John River and other international 
 boundary waters. In addition it dealt with two important topics 
 entirely separate and remote from the boundary question. The 
 signatory powers bound themselves each to maintain on the 
 coast of Africa an adequate naval force for the suppression
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 369 
 
 of the slave trade, and to use all proper influences to persuade 
 ail other countries to close slave markets at once and forever. 
 They also agreed to the extradition of all persons charged with 
 actual or attempted murder, piracy, arson, robbery, or forgery. 
 The treaty met with violent opposition in both countries. In 
 the United States Senate it was attacked because of its pro- 
 visions concerning the slave trade and extradition of criminals; 
 yet it was ratified by an overwhelming vote. In England it was 
 condemned for its concessions to America. Lord Palmerston 
 called it the "Ashburton capitulation" and insinuated that Lord 
 Ashburton in the making of it had been influenced by his wife, 
 who was an American ! Nevertheless the treaty went into effect, 
 to the great good of both the signatory powers. 
 
 To revert to the Adams administration. Among the diplo- 
 matic questions which it found awaiting settlement was one 
 which had been left by the treaty of Ghent, namely, that of in- 
 denmity for the slaves which were carried off by the British 
 in the War of 1812. After years of fruitless negotiation this 
 had been submitted to the arbitration of the Emperor of Russia, 
 who decided in favor of the American claim. But the British 
 government demurred, and new negotiations followed. Finally, 
 a lump sum was paid to this country in 1827 and the matter 
 was ended. The next year, however, the slave question arose 
 between the two countries in another form. Fugitive slaves 
 from America were taking refuge in Canada, and on May 10, 
 1828, the House of Representatives asked the President to enter 
 into negotiations with the British government for their sur- 
 render. This must have been distasteful to Adams, and only less 
 so to Clay and Gallatin. Nevertheless the desired action was un- 
 dertaken. Clay, as secretary of state, directed Gallatin, as min- 
 ister to Great Britain, to propose to the British government 
 "the mutual surrender of deserters from the military and naval 
 service, ' ' and ' ' a mutual surrender of all persons held to service 
 of labor." The former proposal was expected to appeal to 
 Great Britain, which suffered much from desertions, while of 
 course the latter was for the benefit of American slaveholders. 
 The two t^ken together were on the whole among the most dis- 
 creditable propositions ever made in American diplomacy. It 
 was bad enough for a republic to offer to surrender fugitives 
 
 VOL. I— 24
 
 370 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 from the notorious cruelty of the military and naval services 
 of a monarchy — in the days when for trivial faults men were 
 flogged into mincemeat. It was even worse for a professedly 
 free country to ask a less free country to seize and to return its 
 "bondsmen flying from slavery's hateful hell." It is impos- 
 sible to imagine that Adams regarded it otherwise than with 
 detestation. Clay displayed no earnestness or power of argu- 
 ment in his despatches, and Gallatin presented the matter to the 
 British government in the most perfunctory manner. Doubt- 
 less all three hoped and expected that the proposal would be re- 
 jected, as of course it was. Without hesitation the British gov- 
 ernment replied that it was "utterly impossible to agree to a 
 stipulation for the surrender of fugitive slaves." 
 
 "With the accession of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency, in 
 1829, a new era began in American domestic politics and gov- 
 ernment, and for a time there was a scarcely less striking change 
 in the conduct of foreign affairs. This was manifested in two 
 notable incidents, the first of which concerned our relations with 
 Great Britain. The Monroe and Adams administrations, as al- 
 ready related, had persistently but ineffectually tried to improve 
 our commercial relations with that country, particularly so as 
 to secure the opening of the West Indies to American commerce. 
 Under Jackson, with Martin Van Buren as secretary of state 
 and Louis McLane as minister to Great Britain, the efforts were 
 renewed, but on an entirely different basis. On July 20, 1829, 
 Van Buren sent to McLane probably the most remarkable and 
 most discreditable letter of instructions ever issued by an 
 American secretary of state. "You will," he wrote, "be able 
 to tell the British minister that you and I, and the leading per- 
 sons in this administration, have opposed the course heretofore 
 pursued by the Government and the country on the subject 
 of the colonial trade. Be sure to let him know that, on that 
 subject, we have held with England and not with our own 
 government." He added that the matter had been submitted 
 to the people at the last general election, and that they had 
 repudiated the policy of Adams. 
 
 This last statement was false, for the question had scarcely 
 entered into the electoral campaign, and there had of course 
 been nothing remotely resembling a plebiscite upon it. But
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 371 
 
 even had it been true, it would be difficult to conceive anjrthing 
 more indecent than the making of such representations to a 
 foreign government and the taking of it into the rivalries of 
 domestic politics. The letter was a notification to the British 
 government that our foreign relations were governed by con- 
 siderations of domestic partizanship and that our policy toward 
 any foreign country was liable to be reversed at any time on 
 account of a change of domestic politics. Jackson was the first 
 President who announced and practised the spoils system and 
 made a ''clean sweep" of all office holders in order to fill the 
 places with his own friends and political retainers, and it seemed 
 in this incident to be his policy similarly to make a "clean 
 sweep" in foreign policies and relations. The letter was the 
 more remarkable because its author, Van Buren, while a con- 
 summate politician, was a man of culture, of tact, and of diplo- 
 matic skill, who should have realized the gross impropriety of 
 such an utterance. We can only suppose that the violence of 
 partizan rancor, and the fury of hatred which the whole Jack- 
 son administration had for John Quincy Adams and all his 
 works, blinded his better judgment. 
 
 Almost at the same time with this a violent personal and social 
 quarrel arose in Washington, over the recognition of the wife 
 of a member of the cabinet. Because of a scandal over the 
 circumstances of her marriage, the ladies of official society, 
 including the President's niece, the wife of the vice-president, 
 and the wives of the other cabinet ministers, refused to recognize 
 her. The President, who was a widower, stoutly championed 
 her, and so did Van Buren, who was also a widower without 
 daughters. The British and Russian ministers were bachelors, 
 and they invited her to balls at their legations; but the wives 
 of the other ministers refused to dance in the same cotillion 
 \vith her or to sit near her at table, on which account Jackson 
 threatened to have one of the ministers recalled. The incident 
 caused a dissolution of the cabinet. Edward Livingston was 
 made secretary of state in Van Buren 's place, and the President 
 showed his appreciation of Van Buren 's conduct in the social 
 feud by rewarding him with the appointment of minister to 
 Great Britain, which the former secretary' coveted. Van Buren 
 went to London and acquitted himself creditably, but soon had
 
 372 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 to return for the reason that the Senate, under the lead of 
 Daniel Webster, refused to ratify his appointment. The chief 
 reason for its refusal was the letter to McLane, which we have 
 quoted. Speaking of it, Webster said in the Senate : "I think 
 these instructions derogatory, in a high degree, to the character 
 and the honor of the country. I think they show a manifest 
 disposition in the writer of them to establish a distinction be- 
 tween his country and his party; to place that party above the 
 country; to make interest at a foreign court for that party 
 rather than for the country; to persuade the English ministry 
 and the English monarch that they have an interest in main- 
 taining in the United States the ascendancy of the party to 
 which the writer belongs. I cannot be of the opinion that the 
 author of those instructions is a proper representative of the 
 United States at that court. In the presence of foreign courts, 
 amidst the monarchies of Europe, the American minister is to 
 stand up for his country; he is to forget self, and forget party." 
 There can be no doubt that the letter and its author richly 
 merited Webster's strictures, and it is probable that these were 
 taken to heart by the President as well as by Van Buren him- 
 self, and that Webster's vigorous and enlightened words served 
 to check a tendency which otherwise might have degraded our 
 diplomacy to partizan ends almost as much as the civil service 
 was thus prostituted. 
 
 Despite these untoward occurrences, however, the diplomacy 
 of Jackson's administration was not devoid of profit. McLane, 
 though acting under that scandalous letter of instructions, 
 effected a satisfactory readjustment of our commercial relations 
 with Great Britain. This was done, however, not by means of 
 a treaty, but through legislation, by Congress on the one hand 
 and Parliament on the other. McLane proposed to the British 
 government a renewal of trade relations on the basis of that 
 act of Parliament of 1825 to which the American Congress had 
 failed to respond; explaining that this country was prepared 
 to accept as a privilege what it had formerly demanded as a 
 right. In his annual message in December following Jackson 
 made complimentary references to Great Britain which were 
 almost fulsome. In the spring of 1830 he had Van Buren draft 
 a communication to Congress asking that a bill be prepared pro-
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 373 
 
 viding for nonintercourse between the United States and Canada, 
 and for the equipment of a sufficient revenue-cutter force 
 to make it effective. At almost the same time he had Congress 
 authorize him to proclaim American ports open to British 
 colonial trade whenever he was satisfied that British colonial 
 ports were open to American commerce. The latter act was 
 effective and it was unnecessary to resort to the former. Early 
 in October, Jackson was able to issue the proclamation. There- 
 after American vessels were free to trade in British West Indian 
 ports, excepting between them and other British ports. The 
 result was, of course, an immediate and enormous increase of 
 trade. In 1830 we imported from the West Indies goods to the 
 amount of only $101,843, and exported thither only $140 ; while 
 in the very next year the figures rose respectively to $873,855 
 and $1,439,593. For this achievement Jackson's administra- 
 tion received and deserved much praise; though its beneficence 
 cannot condone the gross impropriety of the initial means em- 
 ployed in effecting it. Moreover, for "the old hero," who had 
 ''driven the Britishers out of New Orleans," to truckle to Great 
 Britain, was as incongruous as it had been for Adams to permit 
 a proposal for a fugitive slave treaty. 
 
 An important transaction with France also signalized Jack- 
 son's administration. No settlement had yet been made of the 
 American claims for indemnity for losses sustained by American 
 shipping during the Napoleonic wars, and when William C. 
 Rives of Virginia was sent as minister to France in 1829 he was 
 instructed to begin negotiations to that end. The next year 
 occurred the revolution of July, by which Charles X was de- 
 posed and Louis Philippe was made king in his place. This 
 gave Jackson an opportunity to repeat the tactics of flattery 
 which he had employed toward Great Britain, and in his next 
 message he praised the "citizen king" as one "borne to the 
 throne by the paramount authority of the public will." On 
 July 4, 1831, Rives signed a treaty providing for the payment 
 of $5,000,000 by France, in six annual instalments, and also 
 for the reduction of the tariff duty on French wines imported 
 into America. The treaty was duly ratified, ratifications were 
 exchanged on February 2, 1832, and on July 13 following Con- 
 gress fulfilled the American obligations by making the promised
 
 374 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 reduction of the wine tariff. The French Chamber, on the other 
 hand, refused to fulfil the obligations of that country by making 
 the necessary appropriation, and in consequence when the 
 United States made a draft upon the French treasury for the 
 first instalment of the indemnity, payment was refused. The 
 king sent a message to the Chamber, urging it to honor the 
 treaty by making the appropriation, but the Chamber ignored 
 it. At the moment there was no American minister in France, 
 Rives having come home and having been elected a United 
 States senator. In August, 1833, however, Edward Livingston 
 of Louisiana, who had been secretary of state, was sent over. 
 The king and his cabinet were sympathetic and exerted all their 
 constitutional powers to prevail upon the Chamber to order the 
 appropriation, but that body remained stubborn. After another 
 year of dissatisfaction, Jackson, in December, 1834, reported 
 the case to Congress in strong language, recommending that 
 vigorous reprisals be made if the indemnity were not paid when 
 the next instalment fell due. In the Senate this policy was 
 opposed, and it was voted, on the initiative of Clay, that it was 
 inexpedient to adopt any legislative measures on the subject at 
 that time. It is not improbable that this was done partly be- 
 cause of Clay's personal antagonism toward Jackson, but it 
 was also based on the perfectly soimd principle that the re- 
 sources of diplomacy had not yet been exhausted and that until 
 they were Congress should not intervene. In the House of 
 Representatives, on the contrary, Adams, who surely had no 
 less cause for antagonism to the President, took the lead in 
 supporting Jackson with a declaration that the fulfilment of 
 the treaty ought to be insisted upon; though a proposal to ap- 
 propriate $3,000,000 for war preparations was negatived. 
 
 "When these things were reported in France, excitement rose 
 high. The Chamber again refused the appropriation, and the 
 French minister to America was recalled. Then the Chamber 
 voted to make the appropriation on condition that Jackson 
 would give a satisfactory explanation of his references to France 
 in his message. The reply to this insulting demand was prompt 
 and emphatic. Livingston wrote a vigorous note to the Due de 
 Broglie, the king's minister, vindicating Jackson, and then 
 withdrew from the legation. Jackson in his next annual mes-
 
 EXPANSION OF INTERESTS 375 
 
 sage declared that he would never stain the honor of his country 
 by apologizing for telling the truth and doing his duty. In 
 January, 1836, he sent in another special message, recommend- 
 ing reprisals, and urged the building of coast forts and war- 
 ships. Before any such action was taken, however, a friendly 
 settlement was sought. For this Jackson himself suggested the 
 way. He made the amazing declaration that anything which 
 the President might say to Congress was a purely domestic 
 matter, with which a foreign power had no concern unless it led 
 to action ! Preposterous as this was, France seized upon it with 
 serious avidity as affording escape from a situation of which 
 she was both tired and ashamed. An offer of mediation by the 
 British government, near the end of January, 1836, was eagerly 
 accepted, and a month later the British minister at Washing- 
 ton — who must have struggled hard to maintain a grave and 
 decorous demeanor amid such absurdity — informed the secretai7 
 of state that the difficulties in the way of executing the treaty 
 of 1831 had been removed by the "frank and honorable manner" 
 in which the President had expressed himself. A little later the 
 overdue instalments of the indemnity were paid, and normal 
 relations between the two countries were resumed. This emi- 
 nently satisfactory result made", however, none the less repre- 
 hensible the utterance of Jackson's which gave the cue for it; 
 an utterance which only escaped being vicious by being absurd. 
 The incident was chiefly significant for its raising again the 
 question to what extent the money-appropriating power of a 
 government may be bound by the treaty-making power. That 
 question was then raised concerning the French government, 
 but it had before been raised in this country in connection with 
 Jay's treaty in 1796, and has several times since been raised 
 here. If the President makes and the Senate ratifies a treaty 
 calling for the payment of a large sum of money, to what ex- 
 tent is it incumbent upon the House of Representatives to vote 
 the necessary appropriation ? In 1835 our Government was con- 
 tending that it was compulsory for such an appropriation to be 
 voted, and that whatever treaty the French treaty-making power 
 might conclude, the French Chamber must fulfil with the neces- 
 sary legislation. Consistently, our own House of Representa- 
 tives in that same episode promptly made the changes in the
 
 376 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tariff which the President and Senate had stipulated in the 
 treaty. "We thus established, both by example and by precept 
 to another nation, a principle which we should certainly ever 
 regard as binding upon ourselves. Indeed, there ought to be 
 no question concerning the matter. The same fundamental prin- 
 ciple which requires a nation, however divided into parties and 
 factions at home, to present a united front to foreign powers, 
 surely prescribes similar harmony among the various depart- 
 ments of the Government in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
 
 American claims were also pressed by Jackson's administra- 
 tion against other European countries, on grounds similar to 
 those against France. A treaty was made in 1830 with Den- 
 mark, providing for the payment of claims amounting to 
 $650,000, and in 1832 a similar treaty was made with the Two 
 Sicilies, for a smaller sum. A settlement with Spain for such 
 claims was made in 1834. Diplomatic relations with Portugal, 
 which had been suspended after the revolution of June, 1828, 
 were renewed in 1829, and claim was made for indemnity for 
 the destruction of the American privateer General Armstrong 
 by British vessels in Portuguese waters at Fayal in 1814. The 
 claim was that Portugal, as a neutral power, should have 
 afforded protection to the American vessel. The Portuguese 
 reply was that the American captain did not ask protection, 
 and that in fact he was the aggressor. The case dragged on 
 until 1851, when it was submitted to the arbitration of Louis 
 Napoleon, prince-president of the French Republic, who decided 
 it against the United States on the ground that if the American 
 was not the aggressor he at least engaged in armed conflict in 
 Portuguese waters without demanding protection. 
 
 The rapid extension of American interests was further de- 
 noted in the making of numerous commercial and other treaties ; 
 with Austria-Hungary in 1827, with Turkey in 1830, with 
 Mexico in 1831, with Russia and Chile in 1832, with Siam and 
 with Muscat in 1833, with Morocco, with Venezuela, with Peru, 
 and with Bolivia in 1836. Treaties with Prussia and with 
 Brazil were ratified in 1829. Reciprocal arrangements con- 
 cerning tonnage dues on vessels were made with Austria- 
 Hungary in 1829, with Oldenburg in 1830, with Spain in 1832, 
 with Mecklenberg-Schwerin in 1835, and with Tuscany in 1836.
 
 XIV 
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 
 
 THE boundaries of the Louisiana Territory, as already re- 
 called, were never defined in any of the various treaties 
 of cession to which that domain was subjected; not even in the 
 final treaty by virtue of which in 1803 permanent possession 
 of it was acquired by the United States. The most serious 
 doubt concerned the southwestern boundary, the question being 
 whether the line was to be drawn at the Sabine River or at the 
 Rio Bravo, later known as the Rio Grande del Norte and now 
 simply as the Rio Grande. In brief, it was whether Texas was 
 or was not included in Louisiana. If it was, it became in 1803 
 the property of the United States ; if not, it remained the prop- 
 erty of Spain. This question might have been answered at 
 the outset if France had taken actual and full possession of 
 Louisiana after the purchase of it under the treaty of San 
 Udefonso, for she either would or would not have taken posses- 
 sion of Texas, and her course in that respect would have de- 
 termined ours when we in turn purchased Louisiana of her. 
 But France did not take actual possession, and the whole matter 
 was therefore left in doubt. 
 
 In the negotiations over Florida, in 1817-19, John Quincy 
 Adams stoutly maintained our right and title to Texas, with the 
 Rio Grande as its southwestern boundary, and wished to insist 
 upon recognition of that title in the Florida treaty. There is 
 little doubt that if he had been permitted to have his way he 
 would have compelled Spain to yield on that point and all sub- 
 sequent controversy and trouble would have been avoided. Nor 
 is there much doubt that his contention was historically correct 
 and just. But he was not permitted to have his way, the in- 
 terests of the country in this foreign affair being sacrificed to 
 the sordid purposes of domestic faction and of personal jealousy 
 and spite. Adams was recognized as the foremost candidate 
 
 377
 
 378 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 for the next term in the Presidency, but in that candidacy he 
 had several rivals, while his peculiarly aggressive and autocratic 
 disposition had made for him a number of enemies. The leader 
 of the cabal against him was William H. Crawford, the secretary 
 of the treasury, who was ambitious to secure the Presidential 
 nomination, and who succeeded in winning a majority of the 
 cabinet to his side. His ostensible ground for opposing Adams 's 
 policy was that the acquisition of Florida was so essential to 
 the welfare of the Southeastern States that it must not be im- 
 periled or delayed by making a debatable demand for Texas; 
 but his real motive was doubtless chiefly to thwart Adams and 
 to deny him the great popular prestige which the winning of 
 Texas would have assured him. There was, in fact, little reason 
 to fear that the demand for Texas would delay the acquisition 
 of Florida, while the notion that it could defeat it was palpably 
 absurd, seeing that we had already practically taken possession 
 of Florida and were fully resolved to annex it by conquest if 
 we could not by purchase. Outside of the cabinet, Clay, who 
 often strongly disagreed with Adams, on this matter supported 
 him vigorously, holding that Texas rightfully belonged to the 
 United States as a part of Louisiana, and also that the possession 
 of it was of paramount importance to the States of the Missis- 
 sippi Valley. Indeed, he declared that to the whole United 
 States the possession of Texas was far more important than 
 the acquisition of Florida. Appeal was made by Adams to 
 General Jackson, as a man deeply interested in both Louisiana 
 and Florida, and Adams understood him to advise the Presi- 
 dent not to demand the recognition of our title to Texas. At 
 any rate, Adams so recorded Jackson in the diary which he kept 
 with much detail and with general accuracy, and in after years 
 he charged Jackson with having taken that course. This Jack- 
 son vigorously denied. It seems probable that Adams was mis- 
 taken, and that Jackson simply urged the immediate acquisition 
 of Florida, without regard to anything else. That Jackson 
 actually opposed the inclusion of Texas is not susceptible of 
 confirmation. 
 
 The attitude of Monroe himself was most interesting of all, 
 for while he has not been credited with as high a degree of 
 statesmanship as some of his contemporaries he seems to have
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 379 
 
 surpassed them all in his prescient grasp of this subject and 
 his appreciation of what the possession of Texas would ulti- 
 mately involve. He was the one man who recognized in ad- 
 vance the relationship of Texas to the slavery question. Now, 
 he was himself a slaveholder and a nominal supporter of the 
 slave system. But he was not so ardent or enthusiastic a sup- 
 porter of it as to put it above the other interests of the nation. 
 Indeed, he probably at heart deprecated any material extension 
 of slave territory or slave power, and he saw that the acquisition 
 of Texas would mean such extension, and would mean also a 
 stimulus to the surreptitious slave trade. Just then the sec- 
 tional controversy between the Free States and the Slave States 
 was becoming acute, over the Missouri question, and Monroe 
 regarded it with grave apprehension and dreaded the further 
 complication of it and the exacerbation of passions which the 
 acquisition of Texas would cause. He had studied the ques- 
 tion of the Louisiana boundary with great care, and was con- 
 vinced that our title to Texas was good. He regarded our ulti- 
 mate annexation of that territory as certain, and he was fre- 
 quently outspoken in declaring that we should not permit it to 
 pass into the hands of any other European power than Spain. 
 But because of the ominous aspects of the rising conflict over 
 slavery as a sectional and territorial question, he regarded it as 
 inexpedient at that time to insist upon our title to Texas. 
 
 The issue as between us and Spain was thus passed by, to be 
 raised between us and Mexico when the latter became inde- 
 pendent and succeeded Spain in the actual occupancy of Texas. 
 Upon our recognition of Mexico the President, Adams, wished 
 to send Jackson as minister to that country, but Jackson de- 
 clined the appointment for fear that it would injure his chances 
 of securing the Presidency at the next election. Joel R. Poinsett 
 of South Carolina was therefore appointed, on March 8, 1825, 
 and Clay, as secretary of state, immediately instructed him to 
 suggest to the Mexican government that if it would modify 
 the boundary so as to give us some of the territory west of the 
 Sabine and all the valleys of the Red and Arkansas rivers and 
 their tributaries — the eastern and northern parts of Texas — 
 the United States would, so far as it could, restrain its Indian 
 tribes from committing depredations in Mexico. Poinsett did
 
 380 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 not think it discreet to submit this proposal to the Mexican 
 government, knowing that it would be regarded as offensive. 
 He did negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce, similar to 
 that which had just been made with Colombia, but the Senate 
 would not ratify it excepting on conditions unacceptable to 
 Mexico, and it therefore failed. In 1827, Coahuila and Texas 
 were united as a single State of the United States of Mexico, 
 with a state constitution abolishing and prohibiting human 
 slavery. 
 
 In January, 1828, a treaty was made with Mexico in which the 
 Sabine River was recognized as the boundary between the two 
 countries, thus conceding the whole of Texas to Mexico. It was 
 not acted upon promptly by the Senate, however, and in the 
 meantime efforts at annexation were renewed. When Jackson 
 came to the Presidency in 1829 he instructed Poinsett to renew 
 negotiations for purchase, offering five million dollars for all 
 of Texas as far as a line midway between the Nueces River and 
 the Rio Grande. The offer was declined, and Mexico made it 
 quite clear that she did not desire to part with any portion of 
 Texas on any terms. About this time Samuel Houston, an 
 officer in Jackson's army in the War of 1812 and afterward gov- 
 ernor of Tennessee, proposed a scheme of colonizing Texas with 
 Americans, who, when sufficiently numerous, should organize 
 a revolution, secede from Mexico, and annex Texas to the United 
 States. To this scheme, which was little else than piracy, Jack- 
 son seems to have assented. Previous to this Austin and others 
 had established considerable colonies of Americans in Texas, 
 not only with the assent but on the cordial invitation and with 
 the encouragement of Mexico; that Government assuming that 
 these settlers would become Mexican citizens. When Houston's 
 scheme was broached, however, the Mexican government, sus- 
 pecting what the design was, reversed its policy and forbade 
 any further settlement of Americans in Texas. But this pro- 
 hibition was openly disregarded. Land companies were or- 
 ganized in the United States for the colonization of Texas, and 
 settlers flocked in in great numbers. No forcible resistance was 
 made by Mexico, and in his message of December, 1830, Jackson 
 reported to Congress that "the unfortunate and unfounded sus- 
 picions" of Mexico concerning the purposes of American set-
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 381 
 
 tiers had been "entirely removed," and that "friendship and 
 mutual confidence" had been restored between the two coun- 
 tries. The delayed treaty recognizing the Sabine boundary was 
 at last ratified in April, 1832, together with a treaty of commerce 
 which had been negotiated a year before. In 1835, Poinsett 
 was succeeded by Colonel Anthony Butler, who under Jackson's 
 instructions made several efforts at purchase. One proposition 
 was to purchase all of Texas as far as the Rio Grande, thence 
 north and west on that river to the thirty-seventh parallel of 
 latitude, and thence on that line to the Pacific. This would 
 have given us all Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, and the 
 southern half of California. Another was to purchase the Bay 
 of San Francisco, California, and some adjacent territory. Both 
 proposals were declined. 
 
 Meantime, taking advantage of the disturbed state of affairs 
 in Mexico, where frequent revolutions rendered the Government 
 impotent for self-defense, Houston and his followers continued 
 their work of colonization, and on March 2, 1836, they felt them- 
 selves sufficiently strong to call a state convention, adopt an or- 
 dinance of secession, and proclaim Texas to be an independent 
 republic. There was no attempt to conceal the fact that this 
 action was intended as a mere stepping stone to annexation to 
 the United States, and the further intention thus to provide 
 for an increase of slave territory was proclaimed in the con- 
 stitution of Texas, which reestablished slavery in a particularly 
 extreme form, and forbade the presence in that republic of any 
 Negroes who were not slaves. In the course of a few weeks, after 
 three small battles, Mexican authority was practically expelled 
 and Texas became in fact independent. As nearly all the Texan 
 leaders, in both politics and fighting, were colonists or filibusters 
 from the United States, the sympathy of this country was largely 
 given to them. Within a few weeks after the declaration of 
 Texan independence, application was made by that republic 
 for annexation to the United States, numerous petitions to that 
 end were presented to Congress, and a strong popular demand 
 for such action arose, particularly in the "West and South. 
 Jackson favored the scheme, and John C. Calhoun, the leader 
 of the administration party in the Senate, was most urgent for 
 the immediate recognition of Texan independence and the in-
 
 382 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 corporation of that country into the Union as a State. Webster, 
 the opposition leader in the Senate, was also favorably disposed 
 toward recognition and annexation, but prudently counseled 
 delay until the de facto independence of Texas and the stability 
 and efficiency of her government were assured. Accordingly, on 
 June 18, 1836, three and a half months after the declaration of 
 Texan independence, the Senate unanimously voted that the in- 
 dependence of Texas should be recognized whenever satisfactory 
 information should be received that it had in successful operation 
 a civil government capable of performing the duties and fulfilling 
 the obligations of an independent power. The House of Repre- 
 sentatives adopted a like resolution by an overwhelming vote, 
 the opposition nimibering only twenty-one votes from the Free 
 States and one from a slave State. It is quite probable that 
 Congress would have gone to the extent of immediately recog- 
 nizing the independence of Texas and admitting her to the 
 Union, had not John Quincy Adams, who was now a member 
 of the House of Representatives, made a powerful speech against 
 such action, basing his opposition not upon unwillingness to 
 acquire new territory but upon the certainty that the course 
 proposed would immediately involve us in a war with Mexico. 
 This speech produced a marked impression, especially in the 
 North, and provoked Jackson to denounce Adams as his "arch 
 enemy" and to charge him with having defeated the annexation 
 of Texas. It was even said, by Jackson 's partizans, that Adams 
 had deliberately sacrificed and renounced Texas in the Florida 
 treaty, the fact being, of course, just the reverse — that Adams 
 had demanded the inclusion of Texas as a part of the Louisiana 
 purchase, but was overruled by his colleagues in the cabinet. 
 Even at this time Adams was doubtless inclined toward the an- 
 nexation of Texas, but he did not want to do in a dishonorable 
 way and at the cost of war what might have been done honor- 
 ably and without a single blow. If there was one man in 
 America whose record concerning Texas was above reproach, it 
 was Adams. 
 
 A desultory war ensued between Texas and Mexico, in which 
 the United States government, under Jackson's directions, prac- 
 tically ignored all the obligations of neutrality. Volunteers for 
 the Texan army were recruited in this country, and vessels
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 383 
 
 of war were fitted out, as openly as though they were to serve 
 in a war waged by the United States itself. Jackson even went 
 so far as to send an American army, under General Gaines, into 
 Texas, to cooperate with the Texan army; the insincere pre- 
 text being that it was to prevent an uprising of the Indians! 
 At this the Mexican minister withdrew from Washington and 
 diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed. 
 Jackson then recalled the troops, and in his annual message 
 in the following December, 1836, attempted a specious defense 
 of his course, in terms which were little less than insulting to 
 Mexico and its minister. A few days later the government of 
 Texas declared the Rio Grande to be the southwestern boundary 
 of that republic. A special message from Jackson in the same 
 month reported that he had taken no steps toward acknowledg- 
 ing the independence of Texas, and remitted that matter — 
 properly an executive function — to Congress, with the recom- 
 mendation that in acting upon it that body should proceed 
 with more than ordinary caution. The response was for the 
 Senate, ten weeks later, to vote by the narrow margin of four 
 votes — twenty-three to nineteen — in favor of immediate recogni- 
 tion. The House by a vote of ninety-eight to eighty-six laid 
 that resolution upon the table, but at the same time voted 
 overwhelmingly an appropriation for the expenses of a diplo- 
 matic agent to Texas whenever the President should find 
 Texas to be in fact an independent power worthy of such recog- 
 nition . 
 
 Jackson disliked, however, to assume the responsibility for 
 such action, and continued his efforts to secure Texas by using 
 Congress as a cat's-paw. In a message in February, 1837, he 
 dwelt upon the monstrous injuries and insults which, he de- 
 clared, Mexico had heaped upon this country, its citizens, its 
 ofBcers, its government, and its flag ; and he made a contemptuous 
 reference to the late Mexican minister. There was, he said, 
 ample cause for declaring war, and he recommended that a 
 warship be sent to the Mexican coast with a peremptory de- 
 mand for redress, and that if Mexico did not give a satisfactory 
 response our navy should begin violent reprisals upon her. 
 Congress was not so bellicose, and contented itself with adopting 
 resolutions favoring another demand for redress in accordance
 
 384 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 with the terms of the treaty of 1831. The claims, which were 
 largely valid, had not been preferred until 1836, so that Jack- 
 son's reference to them as long standing was unwarranted. In 
 1838 a treaty was made for their settlement, which Mexico re- 
 fused to ratify, and another was made and ratified in 1839. 
 Congress in 1840 and 1841 enacted laws to carry this treaty 
 into effect, and American and Mexican commissioners met to 
 effect a settlement. But a dispute at once arose on a funda- 
 mental matter, the Mexicans insisting that the commissions were 
 diplomatic bodies, and the Americans maintaining that the two 
 jointly constituted a judicial body. The result was much delay 
 and consequent failure to act on many claims. Mexico did not 
 honor such findings as were made, and in 1843 a new treaty was 
 made, to complete the work, but before anything could be done 
 under it the war of 1846 occurred between the United States and 
 Mexico. 
 
 The independence of Texas was finally recognized in the clos- 
 ing days of Jackson's administration, and the further prosecu- 
 tion of the problem was remitted to his successor. Van Buren. 
 Another request from Texas for annexation and admission to 
 the Union was promptly made, but Van Buren regarded it with 
 disfavor. He had no love for slavery, and he did not care to do 
 an act of doubtful morality, the chief purpose of which was 
 to extend slave territory and thus to increase the power of the 
 pro-slavery party. The whole Texas question was therefore 
 practically laid upon the shelf during his four years' adminis- 
 tration. Nor were those years marked with any important 
 achievements in the domain of foreign relationships. Perhaps 
 the chief incident was an unpleasant but happily not disastrous 
 one which occurred in 1837, during the Canadian rebellion of 
 that time. There were in this country, and particularly in New 
 York State, many sympathizers with the insurgents, and much 
 aid was given to them in violation of the neutrality laws. 
 Finally an insurgent expedition was organized in New York, 
 which seized Navy Island, a Canadian island in the Niagara 
 River. The Canadian government retaliated by sending an ex- 
 pedition to the American shore, and capturing and destroying 
 a vessel — the Caroline — belonging to the insurgents. President 
 Van Buren promptly issued a proclamation forbidding further
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 385 
 
 violations of the neutrality laws and calling out the New York 
 militia to prevent them. This action was of course correct and 
 commendable, but it brought upon Van Buren much criticism 
 from those who let their prejudices and passions overcome their 
 regard for law and international obligations. 
 
 The incident of the Caroline had one important effect upon 
 our judicial system. In the seizure and destruction of that ves- 
 sel an American was killed. Three years later, in 1840, a British 
 subject, named McLeod, visited New York and was arrested by 
 the authorities on a charge of participating in the expedition 
 which destroyed the Caroline, and was brought to trial for mur- 
 der. The British government protested against this, on the 
 ground that McLeod, if he had been in the expedition, had sim- 
 ply obeyed its orders and that it and not he was to be held ac- 
 countable. Webster, then secretary of state, held that McLeod 
 was subject to trial, but in a federal and not in a state court. 
 The New York court, backed by the governor of the State, per- 
 sisted in trying him, however, and the Federal Government had 
 to be content with sending the attorney-general to watch the 
 case and to see that justice was done. The ease was ended by 
 McLeod 's proving an alibi, and thus securing acquittal. But 
 Webster drafted an act, which was passed by Congress and made 
 law, conferring jurisdiction in all such cases upon the federal 
 courts. 
 
 A new era in our Mexican-Texan relations began in 1841, 
 when Harrison became president, a month later to be succeeded 
 by Tyler, and Webster was secretaiy of state. In December of 
 that year Houston, who for a second time had become president 
 of Texas, sent James Riley to Washington as charge d'affaires, 
 with instructions to renew efforts for annexation. There was 
 apparently little hope in Texas that he would be successful, and 
 there was little surprise though doubtless much regret when, 
 in March, 1842, he wrote to the Texas secretary of state that 
 nothing could be done in that direction. At his own request he 
 was then recalled and Isaac Van Zandt was sent in his place, 
 with instructions to watch for a favorable opportunity to renew 
 the overtures. The strange spectacle was presented of an ex- 
 tensive, rich, and populous country humbly begging to be an- 
 nexed to this Union, and being repeatedly refused. ^Meantime 
 
 VOL. 1—25
 
 386 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Mexico had not recognized the independence of Texas, nor made 
 peace with that State, and now gave indication of an active and 
 aggressive renewal of military operations for its reconquest. 
 Webster wrote to Thompson, our minister to Mexico, that the 
 United States saw that prospect with pain, and could not be 
 indifferent to it, though it claimed no right to intervene. He 
 pointed out that for nearly seven years Texas had in fact main- 
 tained its independence, it had made treaties with other powers, 
 it was making much progress in the arts of peace, and in lan- 
 guage, laws, and habits of the people it was so radically dif- 
 ferent from Mexico that reunion of the two would be incon- 
 gruous. He therefore directed Thompson to watch for an op- 
 portunity for tendering the good offices of this country for the 
 composition of the controversy and the establishment of peace. 
 He also referred in a significant manner to the danger that, in a 
 renewal of war between Mexico and Texas, many Americans 
 would flock to the support of the latter, and enforcement of the 
 neutrality laws would be difficult if not impossible. 
 
 Mexican animosity toward the United States was further pro- 
 voked in the fall of 1842 by an unfortunate incident based upon 
 misunderstanding. Commodore Jones of the United States 
 navy, while cruising off the coast of Peru, heard rumors that 
 Great Britain had purchased California of Mexico, and was send- 
 ing a naval expedition thither to take possession, and that the 
 United States had declared war against Mexico on that and 
 other accounts. Thinking to forestall British occupation and 
 to gain great advantage for the United States, he hastened to 
 the California coast without orders and on his own initiative 
 seized the city of Monterey and proclaimed American possession 
 of the country. That was on October 20. The very next day 
 he was convinced that the reports on which he had so precipi- 
 tately acted were false, and he therefore surrendered the place 
 to the Mexican authorities and took his departure with such 
 grace as was possible. The President of course disavowed the 
 act and made apologies for it to the Mexican minister, but de- 
 clined the latter 's demand for the punishment of Jones, on the 
 ground that he had acted in good faith though under misappre- 
 hension, and had "intended no indignity to the government 
 of Mexico, nor anything unlawful toward her citizens." But
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 387 
 
 the incident was remembered for years as a grievance against the 
 United States. 
 
 Nothing more was effected by the United States diplomatically 
 at this time, and the Mexican government regarded this coun- 
 try with increasing suspicion. It was therefore much more 
 inclined to listen to the representations of other powers, and 
 in the summer of 1843 it yielded to the persuasions of the Brit- 
 ish and French ministers so far as to agree to an armistice for 
 the consideration of terms of peace between it and Texas. Those 
 countries had long before recognized the independence of 
 Texas, and had been urging Mexico to do the same. The United 
 States, therefore, was confronted with the unwelcome spectacle 
 of European mediation between two neighboring American 
 States in a case in which its own good offices had been rejected. 
 And this within twenty years after the promulgation of the 
 Monroe Doctrine ! Nor was that the only humiliation of this 
 country. As soon as the armistice was established through Eu- 
 ropean mediation, Texas, exulting in the support of Great 
 Britain and France, reversed its attitude toward the United 
 States and in a curt and cavalier fashion announced that it had 
 no more any wish for annexation and would not thereafter con- 
 sider that question open for discussion. Texas, in brief, was 
 quite content to remain an independent State, at peace with 
 IMexico, and under the gMasi-protection of Great Britain and 
 France. 
 
 There may be some question as to whether Texas really meant 
 this, or was merely playing a shrewd diplomatic game and seek- 
 ing to gain through indifference that which it had not been 
 able to gain through humble suing. In either case, the effect 
 of the change of tone was instantaneous and effective. The 
 United States was startled and alarmed. It awakened to a 
 realization of the grave risks which it had incurred in refusing 
 to annex Texas when it had a chance to do so. The anxiety 
 which was thus aroused was much heightened by rumors that 
 under Britisli influence Texas was on the point of amending its 
 constitution so as to abolish slavery. Of course the prospect 
 of having a free State made of the territory which had been 
 designed for the extension of slavery was regarded with little 
 less than consternation by the pro-slavery leaders of the South-
 
 388 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ern States. Whether this danger was real or imaginary is not 
 clear. There were those who believed the rumors to be mere 
 concoctions of political schemers in this country, to frighten 
 our government into action for the acquisition of Texas at any 
 cost. There is no doubt, however, that S. P. Andrews, a Massa- 
 chusetts lawyer and intense opponent of slavery, who had set- 
 tled at Houston, Texas, did get into negotiations with British 
 diplomats with a view to some such end. But when the people 
 of Houston learned what he had been doing they forcibly drove 
 him out of that place and forbade him ever to return. His 
 scheme, whether practical or fantastic, and the rumors based 
 thereon, had, however, a marked effect upon the United States 
 government. A. P. Upshur was secretary of state, and doubt- 
 less reflecting the mind of the President, Tyler, he fully cred- 
 ited all the rumors and believed that Great Britain was elabo- 
 rating an extensive scheme for destroying slavery in the United 
 States in order to protect the industries of her West India 
 colonies from its competition; and also for securing advantages 
 in the commerce of Texas and political influence in the councils 
 of that State. He indeed ascertained that somebody connected 
 with the British government had asked the Texan minister to 
 Great Britain and France if Texas would abolish slavery in 
 return for some substantial recompense, and also whether Texas 
 could not be divided into two States, that east of the Col- 
 orado River to be slaveholding and that west of it to be free. 
 The maker of these inquiries declared that he was acting with 
 the knowledge and approval of the Earl of Aberdeen, the Brit- 
 ish foreign minister, who expected that if Texas were thus di- 
 vided the free State would outgrow the slave State and soon 
 compel the latter also to become free. Indeed, some remarks of 
 Aberdeen's in Parliament seemed to indicate that it was the 
 British policy to secure abolition of slavery in Texas and then 
 in the United States. Our government thereupon, through its 
 minister at London, Mr. Everett, made inquiry and complaint 
 concerning this utterance; in reply to which Aberdeen de- 
 clared explicitly that his government had no occult design, 
 either with reference to any peculiar influence which it might 
 seek to establish in Mexico or in Texas, or even with reference 
 to the slavery which then existed in Texas. He admitted that
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 389 
 
 the British government desired to see slavery everywhere abol- 
 ished, and that it was ready to give advice to that effect wher- 
 ever it was proper for it to do so, but he denied any intention 
 of making a treaty on the subject with Texas. 
 
 As a result of these things Tyler and Upshur determined 
 to checkmate the supposed designs of Great Britain by secur- 
 ing in some way the annexation of Texas. In October, 1843, 
 therefore, Upshur wrote to Van Zandt, the Texan minister, ask- 
 ing for a conference and negotiations on the subject. It was 
 only a few months before that Van Zandt had declared that the 
 matter was closed and was not to be reopened. He now, there- 
 fore, replied that he would have to consult his own government 
 on the subject, and when he did so the president, Houston, af- 
 fected to be quite indifferent if not actually opposed to any 
 further consideration of the matter. Even if Texas were will- 
 ing to be annexed, he said, it was doubtful if the treaty would 
 be ratified by the United States Senate. If it were not rati- 
 fied, Texas would lose the valuable friendship of Great Britain 
 without gaining anything in return, and would thus be placed 
 "in an extremely awkward situation." He also feared that 
 Mexico would attack and invade Texas as soon as it was known 
 that an annexation treaty was being made, and that if the 
 treaty failed, Texas would again have to fight for independence. 
 
 There was indeed good cause, as the event showed, for fear- 
 ing rejection of the treaty. The moment it was known that 
 such a measure was contemplated, vigorous opposition arose. 
 John Quincy Adams and twelve of his colleagues in Congress 
 signed an address to the people of the Free States, protesting 
 against it and declaring that the adoption of the treaty would 
 mean the dissolution of the Union. Upshur, however, assured 
 Houston that the treaty would be ratified if it were made, and 
 that United States troops would be held in readiness to pro- 
 tect Texas against a Mexican attack during the negotiations. 
 Over the latter point a protracted controversy arose. Van 
 Zandt 's first request was for such use of American troops in 
 the interval between the signing and the ratification of the 
 treaty. This request remained imanswered at the time of Up- 
 shur's death, on February 28, 1844. But a demand by Houston 
 himself, on February 14, that troops should be used at any time
 
 390 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 after negotiations were opened, was immediately answered by 
 Murphy, the American charge d'affaires in Texas, with a 
 promise that it would be granted. John C. Calhoun succeeded 
 Upshur, and on April 11, the day before the signing of the 
 treaty, he answered the note from Van Zandt which Upshur 
 had left unanswered, saying that troops had already been placed 
 in readiness for use, if necessary, after the signing of the treaty ; 
 and the next day Murphy told the Texas government that his 
 promise to Houston that troops would be used before the sign- 
 ing of the treaty had been repudiated by his government and 
 must therefore be annulled. On that very day, however, the 
 treaty was signed and so the troops became available for use. 
 The intention of the United States government was thus made 
 plain, that it would not intervene for the protection of Texas 
 before the treaty was signed, but would do so after that event. 
 The forces in question were 1150 soldiers at Fort Jesup, in 
 Louisiana, near the Texas border, and six vessels of the navy, 
 cruising in the Gulf and occasionally displaying themselves off 
 the Mexican port of Vera Cruz. 
 
 It should be added that a delayed despatch from the Earl 
 of Aberdeen, disclaiming any ulterior designs in Texas, Mexico 
 or elsewhere, reached our government only two days before 
 Upshur's death and was therefore left unanswered by him. 
 Nearly two months later, and some days after the signing of the 
 Texas annexation treaty, Calhoun as Upshur's successor an- 
 swered it in characteristic fashion. He expressed concern at 
 the avowal of Great Britain's desire for universal abolition of 
 slavery, and argued that abolition in Texas, which Great Britain 
 specially desired, would be disastrous to the interests of the 
 United States and of the Negroes themselves, whose emanci- 
 pation would be neither humane nor wise. He, moreover, an- 
 nounced that the treaty of annexation had been made "in self- 
 defense," for the purpose of preventing Great Britain from se- 
 curing the abolition of slavery in Texas. The British minis- 
 ter at "Washington, Pakenham, responded that Great Britain 
 had given no cause for such action and was in no sense respon- 
 sible for it, Calhoun's retort was a reassertion of his former 
 statements, and a declaration that the United States would shun 
 no responsibility in the matter which fairly belonged to it.
 
 AGGEESSION AND EXPANSION 391 
 
 The treaty of annexation was thus made and signed on April 
 12, 1844. Its terms, which had been kept a profound secret, 
 were found on disclosure to be far less favorable to Texas than 
 that country desired. Texas was not to be annexed as a State 
 of the Union, but as a territory subject to the same congressional 
 control as the other territories; so that Congress might abolish 
 slavery in it and require constitutional prohibition of slavery 
 as a prerequisite to statehood. It was provided that Texas 
 should surrender to the United States all its public lands, and 
 that the United States should assume the public debt of Texas 
 to the amount of not more than ten million dollars. Tyler sent 
 the treaty to the Senate ten days after the signing of it, with 
 a message earnestly urging its ratification. An animated and 
 protracted discussion ensued, in which domestic politics figured 
 more than foreign policy. Clay had been nominated by the 
 Whigs for the Presidency, and was outspoken in his opposi- 
 tion to the treaty and to the whole annexation scheme, though 
 not a word was said on the subject in the platform, Polk had 
 been nominated by the Democrats, on a platform vigorously de- 
 manding annexation. Moreover, Ex-President Jackson pub- 
 lished a letter in which he declared that any senator who voted 
 against the treaty would be a traitor to the best interests of 
 the nation. There were in the Senate twenty-nine Whigs and 
 twenty-three Democrats, and a two-thirds vote was necessary for 
 ratification. The outcome, on June 8, was the overwhelming 
 rejection of the treaty. One Whig, Henderson of Mississippi, 
 was moved by slaveholding interests to vote for ratification, but 
 the other twenty-eight voted against it and were joined in so 
 doing by seven Democrats, while one Democrat refrained from 
 voting and the remaining fifteen voted for ratification. The 
 vote thus stood sixteen ayes to thirty-five nays, whereas to have 
 secured ratification the figures should have been exactly re- 
 versed. 
 
 Two days after this rejection by the Senate, Tyler sent the 
 treaty to the House of Representatives with all the documents 
 relating to it and with a message strongly pleading for annex- 
 ation by any means which might be found practicable. It had 
 boon argued by opponents of the treaty that Mexico's assent 
 should first have been secured, and also that the question of the
 
 392 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 boundary between Texas and Mexico should have been settled. 
 To this Tyler, not without force, replied that the former course 
 would have been offensive to Mexico and would have been an 
 admission that our recognition of Texan independence was 
 "fraudulent, delusive or void"; and that the boundary ques- 
 tion could not properly be taken up by the United States until 
 after annexation. Nothing was done by the House, however, 
 while the Senate for a few days longer discussed the matter 
 in various phases. A motion by McDuffie of South Carolina 
 for a joint resolution annexing Texas on the same terms as those 
 of the treaty was laid on the table by a vote of twenty-seven 
 to nineteen, and a like disposition, by a vote of twenty-five to 
 twenty, was made of a bill introduced by Benton of Missouri, 
 authorizing the President to negotiate with both Texas and Mex- 
 ico for annexation of the former and for adjustment of bound- 
 aries. Congress then adjourned without further action. 
 
 Before the defeat of the treaty was known in England, 
 though really after its occurrence, the British government told 
 the minister from Texas that Great Britain and France would 
 join the United States and Texas in a "diplomatic act" fixing 
 the boundaries and guaranteeing the independence of Texas, to 
 which Mexico would be forced, if need be, to agree. This, of 
 course, was to be in case the annexation treaty failed of rati- 
 fication ; as it did. Houston, the president of Texas, instructed 
 his secretary of state, Anson Jones, to accept the offer, but Jones, 
 who in a short time himself became president, suppressed the 
 order and nothing was publicly known of it until years after- 
 ward. 
 
 The question of annexation — or "re-annexation," as the 
 Democrats affected to call it — was thus remitted to the popular 
 electoral campaign for discussion. Clay adopted toward it a 
 somewhat uncertain and equivocal tone, which lost him many 
 votes. The result of the election was, however, chiefly deter- 
 mined by the rise of a third party, the so-called Liberty party, 
 composed of aggressive enemies of slavery, which drew from the 
 Whigs just enough to compass Clay's defeat. Polk was elected 
 by a substantial majority of the electoral college but by only 
 a bare plurality of the popular vote. This victory greatly 
 strengthened President Tyler in his insistence upon annexa-
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 393 
 
 tion, and he renewed his efforts to complete the work before the 
 end of his administration. In his message to Congress in De- 
 cember, 1844, he recommended the adoption of a joint resolu- 
 tion annexing Texas on the terms of the treaty which had been 
 agreed upon by the representatives of both countries. Mc- 
 Duffie and Benton thereupon reintroduced their measures which 
 had been tabled, and some others were proposed, and a great 
 flood of petitions pro and contra poured in from the public and 
 from the legislatures of States. In the debate which ensued 
 two points were salient. One was that raised by John Quincy 
 Adams, who had already declared that to annex foreign terri- 
 tory in such fashion would be to dissolve the Union. It was 
 true that the treaty-making power of a sovereign government in- 
 cluded the power to acquire territory; as indeed in his own 
 negotiations Florida had been acquired. But there was no 
 power to transfer the inhabitants of one country to the sov- 
 ereignty of another without their consent. The merging of one 
 sovereignty into another must therefore be done by the people 
 themselves. This was an argument entitled to serious consid- 
 eration, and it was theoretically sound. But practically it was 
 ruled out of court by the universal practice of nations. Adams 
 himself did not consult the people of Florida when he annexed 
 that territory. 
 
 The other point was the practical certainty of war with Mex- 
 ico if we annexed Texas. For nine years, nearly, Texas had 
 been independent, but ]\Iexico had never acknowledged the fact. 
 On the contrary she insisted that her title to continued sover- 
 eignty over Texas should be treated with respect even by those 
 powers which had recognized Texan independence. The war 
 for restoration of Texas to Mexican authority had dwindled into 
 occasional sporadic border raids, but it had never yet been 
 formally abandoned. The acquisition of Texas by the United 
 States would of course alter the military aspects of the case, 
 and continuance of border raids would mean w^ar. This pros- 
 pect was not, however, feared, if indeed it was altogether un- 
 welcome. Already there had arisen American desires which 
 could scarcely be gratified without a war of conquest. Amer- 
 ican voyagers were visiting the Californiau coast in increasing 
 numbers, and were bringing or sending back glowing reports
 
 394 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of the salubrity and rich resources of that country. There was 
 no doubt of Mexico 's title to it, but neither was there any doubt 
 of Mexico's inability to hold it with a strong hand. Russia had 
 attempted to seize a part of it, but had been warned off by the 
 United States. France had some thought of at least becom- 
 ing, as a Catholic power, the protector of the Catholic people of 
 California. Great Britain recalled the discoveries of Drake 
 along that coast, and coveted California as an annex to the 
 Oregon territory which she claimed. But the United States also 
 claimed Oregon, and cherished the scheme of continental domin- 
 ion from the Atlantic to the Pacific. So an American army of- 
 ficer, John Charles Fremont, was sent to explore the passes of 
 the Rocky Mountains and to spy out avenues of invasion of the 
 coveted region, while Americans in California itself more and 
 more assumed an air of proprietorship superior to that of the 
 Spanish-Mexican inhabitants. A war with Mexico would make 
 that region ours. 
 
 The joint resolution suggested by Tyler passed the House on 
 January 25, 1845, by a vote of 120 to 98. It provided that the 
 territory rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas might 
 be erected into a new State of this Union, to be called the State 
 of Texas, with a republican form of government; that all 
 boundary disputes between Texas and other countries should be 
 settled by the United States; and various other details of do- 
 mestic interest. In the Senate it was objected that it would be 
 unconstitutional for Congress thus to admit into the Union a 
 State formed of foreign territory, and accordingly an amend- 
 ment was added, giving the President the alternative of nego- 
 tiating another treaty of annexation. Thus amended, the reso- 
 lution was adopted by the Senate by a vote of twenty-seven to 
 twenty-five, and it was readopted by the House by a vote of one 
 hundred and thirty-two to seventy-six. That was on March 1, 
 1845, three days before the end of Tyler's administration. Two 
 Democratic senators, Benton and Tappan, voted for the resolu- 
 tion only because McDuffie had given them to understand that 
 Tyler would take no action upon it but would leave it for his 
 successor, Polk, and Polk was believed to be in favor of negoti- 
 ating another treaty. McDuffie 's forecast of Tyler's course was, 
 however, an error, and so was that belief concerning Polk.
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 395 
 
 Without an hour's delay Tyler sent a messenger to the govern- 
 ment of Texas with the offer of annexation and admission to the 
 Union. A few days later the Mexican minister at Washington 
 demanded his passports and went home, and in May following, 
 the United States minister was recalled from Mexico. 
 
 Meantime Great Britain and France were untiring in their 
 efforts to defeat annexation, even at the eleventh hour. In 
 March, before the news of the passage of the resolution was 
 known in Texas, the preliminaries of a treaty were signed, under 
 which Mexico was to recognize the independence of Texas and 
 Texas was to pledge herself not to become annexed to the United 
 States or any other power. Before this compact was finally 
 completed and ratified, however, the news of the passage of the 
 annexation resolution reached Texas, and all other schemes were 
 incontinently dropped in favor of accepting the offer of the 
 United States. A convention was called to act upon it, which 
 met on July 4. The first question put was. Shall the treaty 
 with Mexico, negotiated by Great Britain and France, be rati- 
 fied? Every delegate save one voted. No. The next question 
 was, Shall the offer of annexation to and admission into the 
 United States be accepted? Every delegate save one voted, 
 Yes. A popular election on the question was then ordered, and 
 on October 13 the people of Texas, with only a few dissenting 
 votes, ratified the action of the convention. In his message to 
 Congress at the opening of its session in December, President 
 Polk recited what had been done, and recommended the adop- 
 tion of a joint resolution erecting Texas into a State of the 
 Union. Innumerable protests and petitions against this action 
 were presented to Congress, from the Free States, but in vain. 
 The resolution was adopted and was approved by the President 
 on December 29. On February 19, 1846, the new state govern- 
 ment of Texas was formally installed. 
 
 The course of Mexico was a foregone conclusion. Back in 
 August, 1843, the Mexican president, Santa Anna, had informed 
 our government that the incorporation of Texas into the terri- 
 tory of the United States would be considered equivalent to a 
 declaration of war, and that immediately upon such incorpora- 
 tion Mexico would declare war, "leaving to the civilized world 
 to determine with regard to the justice of the cause." To this
 
 396 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 a resentful but evasive reply was made, the United States chal- 
 lenging the correctness of Mexico's information of its annexa- 
 tionist designs, but giving no counter-facts. Three months later 
 Mexico repeated the warning, and the United States replied 
 that its conduct would not be affected by anything which the 
 Mexican government might say or do; and that it regarded 
 Texas as an independent nation with which it was free to deal 
 without consulting any other country. After these things the 
 prompt suspension of diplomatic relations between the two coun- 
 tries, already noted, was inevitable. A little later, in June, 
 1845, the Mexican army was placed on a war footing, and in 
 July Santa Anna recommended to his Congress a declaration of 
 war as soon as annexation was actually effected or Texas was 
 invaded by American troops. The American reply was to send 
 General Taylor with an army not merely into Texas but across 
 it to the Nueces River, with headquarters about a hundred and 
 •fifty miles from the Mexican frontier. A few months later he 
 asked permission to move directly to the Rio Grande. 
 
 The United States was just then, however, trying diplomatic 
 methods to gain its ends without war. Acting upon a mistaken 
 hint from a confidential agent that Mexico desired to reestab- 
 lish relations, the President and his cabinet prepared to send 
 John Slidell as a special commissioner to that country, to nego- 
 tiate for the purchase of California and New Mexico. It was 
 supposed that those regions could be bought for from fifteen to 
 twenty million dollars, but Polk and his cabinet were willing 
 to pay forty millions if necessary. Polk afterward said that 
 he sought this action for fear of British designs upon California. 
 In this he was doubtless sincere, and there was some apparent 
 ground for his apprehensions. 
 
 Before actually sending Slidell, inquiries were made through 
 Black, the American consul who still remained in Mexico City, 
 as to the probable attitude of the Mexican government toward 
 such a proposal. He reported that the Mexican government 
 was disposed to receive a commissioner who should come with 
 full powers to settle the disputes between the two countries "in 
 a peaceable, reasonable, and honorable manner." But an indis- 
 pensable prerequisite was the withdrawal of the American naval 
 squadron which was menacing Vera Cruz. Polk and his cabinet
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 397 
 
 accordingly withdrew the fleet and instructed Slidell to pro- 
 ceed to Mexico. He was first to seek settlement of the long- 
 standing claims for indemnities. In connection therewith he 
 was to take up the boundary question. He was to contend that 
 Texas clear to the Rio Grande and up that stream to El Paso 
 was included in the Louisiana purchase and therefore belonged 
 to the United States. For the recognition of that boundary, 
 and the cession of New Mexico, the United States would itself 
 pay the old claims of its citizens and would in addition pay 
 Mexico five million dollars. An effort was also to be made to 
 purchase California, or as much of it as possible. For the north- 
 ern part of it, down to and including San Francisco, twenty 
 millions would be paid, and for all down to Monterey, twenty- 
 five millions, in addition to the claims. It may be doubted, how- 
 ever, that Polk would at that time have insisted upon the pur- 
 chase of California as a sine qua non. Some of Slidell's 
 subsequent correspondence indicated that a settlement would 
 have been accepted merely on the basis of recognition of the 
 Rio Grande boundary and the payment of the claims. On the 
 face of his instructions, however, as known to and understood 
 by the Mexican government, he was to seek all those further ac- 
 quisitions. 
 
 Thus commissioned, Slidell went to Vera Cruz at the end of 
 November; but when Black told the Mexican foreign minister 
 of his approach he was told that the Mexican government was 
 not expecting him and was not prepared to receive him, and 
 that his appearance at the capital might be disastrous. Black 
 was asked, therefore, to stop Slidell from coming up from Vera 
 Cruz. It was too late, but he managed to intercept him at 
 Puebla, where he gave him the message from the foreign minis- 
 ter. Slidell's answer was to push right on to Mexico City, and 
 to send a copy of his credentials to the minister with an in- 
 quiry as to when he could be received. The reply came that 
 the matter would have to be referred to the Council of State. 
 Delay ensued, and tmmppry objections were made to Slidell's 
 credentials, with the result that the Council of State finally de- 
 cided that he ought not to be received. The fact was, doubtless, 
 that the government of President Herrera wanted to receive 
 Slidell and treat with him, but it was just then fighting for its
 
 398 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 life against a revolution and feared that by so doing it would 
 injure itself. A few weeks later, in January, the revolution was 
 successful, and Herrera was succeeded by Paredes. Slidell left 
 Mexico City and went to Jalapa; where he continued his cor- 
 respondence with the new government and sought to be received. 
 But at last, on March 15, he was finally and decisively told that 
 he could not be received. The United States, he was told, was 
 threatening Mexico with troops on the Rio Grande, the rights 
 of Mexico had been violated in the annexation of Texas, and 
 the United States, instead of treating on Texas alone, was seek- 
 ing to introduce other subjects — to wit, the old claims, and 
 the purchase of California — which Mexico was not willing to 
 consider. Slidell thereupon asked for his passports and re- 
 turned home. It was unfortunate that he was not received, but 
 the fault lay largely with the insecure status of the Mexican 
 government, and with its suspicions of and resentment toward 
 the United States. Meantime American troops were sent to 
 the Rio Grande. On April 12 they were warned by the Mexican 
 commander at Matamoros to retire beyond the Nueces. They re- 
 fused. On April 24 a party of American dragoons was am- 
 bushed by Mexicans, on the Texan side of the Rio Grande, and 
 was captured after a fight in which several were killed. News 
 of this reached Washington on May 9, and four days later Con- 
 gress overwhelmingly approved the president 's assertion that war 
 had been begun by Mexico's own act, and authorized him to 
 prosecute it in return. 
 
 "With the war which ensued we have here little to do. Its 
 story belongs not to diplomatic but to military history. It was 
 intensely unpopular throughout a large part of the United 
 States, where it was recognized as a needless aggression designed 
 and waged for the extension of the slave power, an estimate of 
 it which in the last analysis was correct. The decisive victories 
 which were won by our troops aroused much enthusiasm among 
 a part of the nation, but did not blind others to the iniquitous 
 nature of the whole proceeding. In the first general election 
 in the United States after the beginning of the war, in Novem- 
 ber, 1846, a House of Representatives was chosen with a ma- 
 jority hostile to the administration and its war policy, and when 
 that House assembled in the fall of 1847, it adopted a resolu-
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 399 
 
 tion declaring that the war had been "unnecessarily and un- 
 constitutionally begun by the President of the United States." 
 Nevertheless, Congress did not refuse the money appropriations 
 necessary for prosecuting the campaign, and the war went on. 
 The theater of operations was extended so as to involve not 
 merely Texas and the Rio Grande boundary, but also New Mexico 
 and California. The discrepancy in belligerent efficiency be- 
 tween the two countries was of course enormous, and the result 
 of the conflict was never for a moment in doubt. Early in the 
 war another domestic revolution occurred in Mexico, the result 
 of which was the downfall of the Paredes government and the 
 accession of Santa Anna to the presidency. That restless and 
 ambitious chieftain had been in exile at Havana, Cuba, and in 
 some way the impression was received that if he were permitted 
 to return to Mexico and could regain authority there, he would 
 make peace with the United States. This impression, received by 
 Slidell, was by liim conveyed to Polk, who thereupon gave orders 
 to the naval officers who were blockading the Gulf ports of Mex- 
 ico that Santa Anna should be permitted to pass them and enter 
 the country. This was done, but the result was disappointing. 
 Santa Anna showed himself no more inclined toward peace than 
 Paredes had been, while he was a far more formidable military 
 opponent. 
 
 Repeated attempts at negotiations were made by Polk during 
 the progress of the war, notably through the agency of N. P. 
 Trist, the chief clerk of the state department, who was sent for 
 the purpose along with the army which advanced from Vera 
 Cruz upon the Mexican capital. Trist was commissioned to offer 
 peace upon the same general terms as were proposed by Slidell, 
 excepting that the cash prices offered were to be reduced by five 
 million dollars each, and he was to seek the acquisition of the 
 Lower California Peninsula, and the right of way for a canal 
 or railroad across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The beginning 
 of Trist 's mission was marred with an unseemly quarrel between 
 him and General Scott, the commander of the army, over prece- 
 dence, as a result of which Trist was compelled to seek the as- 
 sistance of the British minister to Mexico and his secretary, in 
 transmitting to the Mexican government a letter from the Amer- 
 ican secretary of state, James Buchanan. The difficulty was
 
 400 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 soon afterward, however, composed. In reply to the overtures 
 of Trist, or of Buchanan, Santa Anna intimated that he would 
 enter upon negotiations for peace at once if he were paid ten 
 thousand dollars in advance, as a sort of retaining fee, and were 
 promised one million dollars on the conclusion of peace. The 
 former sum was accordingly paid by General Scott, at the be- 
 ginning of August, 1847, but Santa Anna made no movement 
 toward peace and in the course of a few weeks two more im- 
 portant battles were fought. Then Scott proposed an armis- 
 tice for the purpose of negotiation, to which Santa Anna agreed. 
 Mexican commissioners met Trist and negotiations began. Trist 
 was naturally in doubt as to the effect of the recent military 
 operations upon the terms of peace which he had previously 
 been authorized to offer, and was somewhat hesitant if not waver- 
 ing in his attitude, and when the Mexicans submitted counter- 
 proposals decidedly at variance with his instructions he deemed 
 it prudent to make no reply to them until he had submitted 
 them to his principals at Washington, The President was 
 strangely displeased at this, and, hearing that Trist was thus 
 sending home for instructions, and without waiting for Trist 's 
 own letter to arrive, he ordered the immediate recall of the em- 
 barrassed envoy. The armistice was meanwhile terminated, hos- 
 tilities were resumed, the Mexican capital was entered by the 
 American troops, and Santa Anna abdicated the presidency. 
 Soon afterward the new Mexican government sent commission- 
 ers to Trist to seek terms of peace. Trist had by this time re- 
 ceived notice of his recall, but the Mexicans had not been offi- 
 cially informed of that fact, and were therefore willing to as- 
 sume that he was still commissioned to treat with them. Trist 
 accepted their suggestion and negotiated with them the treaty 
 of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which was signed on February 2, 1848. 
 Despite the fact that Trist 's authority to negotiate it had been 
 withdrawn, Polk accepted the treaty and submitted it to the 
 Senate; by which body it was ratified on March 10, 1848. The 
 vote on ratification was 38 to 14, most of the opposing votes com- 
 ing from those who wished to proceed to the conquest and an- 
 nexation of the whole of Mexico. This extravagant policy was 
 advocated by Buchanan, the secretary of state, and by Walker, 
 the secretary of war, and indeed by all the cabinet excepting
 
 AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 401 
 
 the attorney general, Clifford, as well as by a number of sena- 
 tors, and it was approved by a considerable part of the public. 
 Polk resolutely resisted it, however, and overruled his own cabi- 
 net in accepting and pressing to ratification the treaty negotiated 
 by the commissioner whom he himself had deprived of authority 
 and had recalled. 
 
 The treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, then, restored peace between 
 the United States and Mexico and of course confirmed the title 
 of this country to Texas. It also gave to the United States all 
 the territory north of the Rio Grande and Gila River, includ- 
 ing nearly all of what is now New Mexico and Arizona, Cali- 
 fornia, Nevada, Utah, etc. In return for this vast and inval- 
 uable acquisition of territory, the United States paid to Mexico 
 the sum of fifteen million dollars, and assumed in addition the 
 satisfaction of the claims of American citizens against Mexico 
 to an amount not exceeding $3,250,000. The United States, 
 moreover, undertook to protect Mexico from the incursions of 
 Indian tribes along the Gila River boundary, a stipulation which 
 was not efficiently fulfilled. As a result of the failure to ful- 
 fil it, Mexico suffered much from Indian depredations, and many 
 complaints were made and claims for indemnity were preferred 
 by the Mexican government and its citizens against the United 
 States. On the other hand, the United States put forward coun- 
 ter-claims concerning the control of the Mesilla Valley, and 
 manifested a desire to acquire a considerable strip of land south 
 of the Gila River, as a route for a projected railroad across the 
 continent. A protracted controversy arose, which grew steadily 
 more acrimonious and indeed seemed to threaten the peaceful 
 relations between the two countries. In 1853, however, a solu- 
 tion of the problem was sought and found through diplomatic 
 means. James Gadsden of South Carolina was sent to Mexico 
 to negotiate with the foreign minister of that country for a 
 rectification of the boundary and general settlement of claims. 
 He first made a treaty under which Mexico was to cede to the 
 United States the northern part of the State of Sonora, the 
 United States was to be released from all Mexican claims, public 
 or private, and the United States was to pay Mexico fifteen 
 million dollars and to assume responsibility for all American 
 claims against Mexico and to pay them to the amount of not 
 
 VOL. I — 26
 
 402 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 more than five million dollars. The Senate, however, insisted 
 upon radically amending this treaty before ratifying it. Under 
 the amendment Mexico was to cede much less territory, merely 
 the strip long shown on the maps as the "Gadsden purchase," 
 the United States was to be freed from all obligations to prevent 
 Indian raids, the matter of claims on both sides was left un- 
 settled and unmentioned, and the United States was to pay 
 Mexico the sum of ten million dollars.
 
 XV 
 
 OREGON 
 
 ANOTHER important issue in our foreign relationships 
 was associated with that of Texas and Mexico politically 
 and popularly in the closest possible manner, while geographic- 
 ally and diplomatically it had scarcely the slightest connection 
 with it. Indeed, the only real point of contact with Texas 
 and Mexico was in the fact that at the climax of the Mississippi 
 controversy, when preparations were begun to take Louisiana 
 from France either by purchase or by force, and we began those 
 negotiations which gave us a claim upon Texas, the Lewis and 
 Clark expedition was sent up the IMissouri River and over the 
 mountains to explore the Oregon region from inland, and thus 
 to confirm the claim to it which had first been established by 
 Gray's discovery of the Columbia River. In the same year, 
 therefore, and as a part of the same extended activities, we se- 
 cured a quasi-tiile to both Texas and Oregon, which, however, in 
 both cases we long neglected to enforce. In order justly to ap- 
 preciate the various aspects of the Oregon controversy, however, 
 we must go back to an earlier date. 
 
 At the beginning of the sixteenth century Spain claimed all 
 of the Western Hemisphere. Before its end Drake had entered 
 the Pacific Ocean and visited the California and Oregon coasts, 
 reaching the latter perhaps first of all white men; but it does 
 not appear that any claim of English ownership was then or 
 therefore made. At the partitioning of the world under the 
 treaty of Ryswick, while much of the eastern part of North 
 America was conceded to France, and a little to England, all 
 west of the Rocky IMountains was still Spain's, from Mexico to 
 Alaska. Fifty years later the Russians, under the lead of Ber- 
 ing the Dane, visited and claimed the northern part of the Pa- 
 cific coast. The Spanish sought to retain the coast as far north 
 
 403
 
 404 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 as Prince William Sound, in latitude 60, while the Russians in- 
 sisted upon taking actual possession for more than a dozen de- 
 grees further south, and manifested an inclination to seize the 
 coast as far as San Francisco, if not all the way to Mexico. In 
 1778 the great British voyager. Cook, skirted and surveyed the 
 coast from south of the Columbia River — though he did not dis- 
 cover that stream — northward to Bering Strait, but his errand 
 was geographical rather than political, and he established no 
 claims of title and made no settlements. French voyagers also 
 visited the coast at various points, and some proclamations 
 of sovereignty were made, but were not substantiated with ac- 
 tual occupation. In 1788 two American masters of trading ves- 
 sels went up the coast to Nootka Sound and spent several years 
 in those waters. One of them, Kendrick, with the Washington, 
 discovered and explored the Strait of San Juan de Fuca, and 
 the other, Gray, with the Columbia, in 1791, discovered the 
 Columbia River and explored it for some distance. Two years 
 later the British explorer, Mackenzie, scaled the Rocky Moun- 
 tains and crossed Oregon to the coast. Meantime in 1789 both 
 England and Spain, following in the wake of Kendrick and 
 Gray, strove to make settlements on Nootka Sound. Both failed, 
 but a diplomatic controversy over sovereignty arose, which cul- 
 minated in the Nootka treaty of 1790, under which Spanish 
 sovereignty was nominally recognized but Great Britain was 
 confirmed in full commercial rights. Five years later, without 
 any public or formal statement, Spain abandoned the entire coast 
 north of the present northern boundary of California. 
 
 There was some pretense on the part of France that the Oregon 
 territory was included in Louisiana. For this there was no con- 
 vincing ground. Louisiana did not extend west of the Rocky 
 Mountains. But certainly if Oregon had been a part of the 
 Louisiana territory, France's title to it was completely extin- 
 guished by her sale of Louisiana to the United States in 1803. 
 Such title was not, however, seriously regarded by the United 
 States, and our claim to Oregon was based upon discovery and 
 exploration, and attempts were made to confirm it by occupa- 
 tion. In 1811 the American trading settlement of Astoria was 
 made, on the site of the present Oregon city of that name, and 
 though a year later it was betrayed into British hands it was
 
 OREGON 405 
 
 restored to American possession, at least in name, by the treaty 
 of Ghent in 1814. At about the same time British settlements 
 were made west of the Rocky Mountains ^ and rivalry for pos- 
 session began. In the Florida treaty of 1819 the United States 
 explicitly acquired all of whatever title Spain still nominally 
 had to the region north of California; and soon afterward the 
 Russians were warned off that part of the coast and by the 
 treaty of 1824 were confined to the region north of latitude 
 54 degrees, 40 minutes. With France, Spain, and Russia thus 
 eliminated, the Oregon region was left to the dual competition 
 of Great Britain and the United States. That region extended 
 from latitude 42 to 54 degrees, 40 minutes north, and from the 
 watershed of the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, The 
 whole of it was claimed by both of the two powers. 
 
 The American claim of title had five major grounds. One 
 was that of the Spanish cession under the Florida treaty. 
 There was no question but that Spain had originally had a bet- 
 ter title than any other power to that region. There was in it, 
 no doubt, this serious flaw, that she had failed actually to occupy 
 and settle the country. But even so, her title remained su- 
 perior to any other. For neither had Great Britain made any 
 settlements on that coast, and the Nootka treaty granted to 
 her only conmiercial rights. As for France and Russia, their 
 claims were much weaker still. The second basis of the Ameri- 
 can claim was the discovery and exploration of the Columbia 
 River by an American citizen; the old rule being that the dis- 
 coverer of the mouth of a river could claim title to all lands 
 drained by it. The third was the explorations of Lewis and 
 Clark. The fourth was the Louisiana purchase, by which we 
 certainly acquired any title which France may have had to the 
 region. The fifth was the making by Americans of the first 
 permanent settlement in the territory, at Astoria. The British 
 claim was based partly on Cook's voyage along that coast, partly 
 on the Nootka treaty, and partly on the explorations and dis- 
 coveries of Mackenzie and others at the headwaters and on 
 the upper reaches and tributaries of the Columbia River. The 
 weak points of these were that Cook made no settlements, that 
 the treaty in question was purely commercial and not at all 
 political, and that it was, according to custom, the discovery
 
 406 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 of the mouth and not the source of a river that gave title to its 
 valley. 
 
 The diplomatic controversy began in 1801, when Rufus King 
 for the United States and Lord Hawkesbury for Great Britain 
 sought to settle various boundary disputes. These related chiefly 
 to Passamaquoddy Bay and other parts of the eastern boundary, 
 but an attempt was made to define the line all the way across 
 the continent. Before the treaty could be ratified, the Louisiana 
 purchase was effected, and the interests of this country in the 
 Northwest were thus enormously increased. The Senate there- 
 fore struck out of the King-Hawkesbury treaty all matter re- 
 lating to that boundary, whereupon the British government 
 refused to accept it, and the convention came to naught. In 
 1807 the matter came up again. Monroe and Pinckney for 
 the United States, and Lords Holland and Auckland for Great 
 Britain, concluded a treaty of amity and commerce to succeed 
 the commercial clauses of Jay's treaty, which were expiring. 
 The British commissioners then suggested some additional ar- 
 ticles, one of which would deal with the northwestern boundary. 
 Their proposal was that the forty-ninth parallel of latitude 
 should be the boundary westward from the Lake of the Woods 
 "as far as the territories of the United States extend," but only 
 as far as the Rocky Mountains; for it was expressly stipulated 
 by them that nothing in the article should apply "to the North- 
 west coast of America, or to the territories belonging to or 
 claimed by either party to the westward of the Stony Moun- 
 tains." The American commissioners objected to the phrase 
 first quoted above, as discriminating against the United States, 
 and it was changed to read ' ' as far as their respective territories 
 extend," and was thus agreed to. When this article was re- 
 ported at Washington the Government accepted it, though with 
 a desire that the proviso excluding from its operation the terri- 
 tory west of the mountains should be dropped. That proviso, 
 Madison declared, was unnecessary, and could have little effect 
 beyond an offensive intimation to Spain that the claims of the 
 United States extended to the Pacific coast, and any such offense 
 to Spain would be impolitic. The whole treaty, however, was 
 withheld from the Senate on other grounds, and so never came 
 into effect. •
 
 OREGON 407 
 
 After these futile negotiations the whole question lapsed, with 
 the exception of the seizure of Astoria and its nominal — but not 
 actual — restoration in 1814, to be taken up again in 1818, when 
 Gallatin and Rush sought to dispose of the matters which had 
 been left unsettled by the treaty of Ghent. Adams, as secre- 
 tary of state, informed the American commissioners that the 
 Spanish claimed title on the Pacific coast, which the United 
 States was about to acquire in the Florida treaty, as far north 
 as latitude 56, at the northern end of Prince of Wales 
 Island, though the Russians had some settlements south of that 
 point; and he authorized them to renew the terms which the 
 British had proposed in 1807, fixing the boundary on the forty- 
 ninth parallel as far as the Rocky Mountains. To this the 
 British commissioners agreed. The Americans then proposed 
 to continue that line straight to the Pacific coast. They argued 
 that the treaty of Utrecht in 1763 had fixed that line as the 
 boundary between th^ British possessions at the north and 
 Louisiana and other territories at the south ; that Gray had first 
 discovered the Columbia River; that Lewis and Clark had first 
 explored the inland regions; and that Americans had made at 
 Astoria the first permanent settlement. The British commis- 
 sioners demurred. They insisted that they had acquired title 
 to the region by virtue of Cook's voyage, and of certain alleged 
 purchases of land from natives south of the Columbia River 
 prior to the Revolution. While proposing no specific boundary, 
 therefore, they declined to consider any which would not give 
 them at least an equal share with the United States in the mouth 
 of the Columbia River, and they suggested that that stream 
 would form a convenient and definite boundary line. Finally, 
 despairing of agreement upon the boundary at that time, the 
 British commissioners proposed a modus vivendi for ten years, 
 under which the whole region between the Rocky IMountains and 
 the Pacific, or any portion of it wiiich might be claimed by 
 either party, with all its waters, should be free and open to 
 the vessels, citizens, and subjects of both countries on equal 
 terms. This was accepted by the Americans, with the added 
 proviso that the agreement should not be construed to the preju- 
 dice of any claim which either party or any other power might 
 have to any part of that country, the only object being to prevent
 
 408 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 disputes and differences between the signatories. This agree- 
 ment was accepted by both governments and went into effect 
 in 1818. 
 
 Following this, in February, 1819, came the Florida treaty, 
 reinforcing our title to Oregon with a specific grant of all the 
 Spanish title north of California. Two years later the Russian 
 ukase was issued claiming everything north of the fifty-first 
 parallel, near the northern end of Vancouver Island. Against 
 this America and Great Britain protested, the former taking the 
 lead. In July, 1823, Adams instructed Rush, at London, to 
 make an agreement with the British government that there- 
 after no settlement should be made by Russians on the coast 
 or coastal islands south of latitude fifty-five (the middle of 
 Prince of Wales Island) ; or by Americans north of latitude 
 fifty-one (the northern end of Vancouver Island) ; or by the 
 British south of fifty-one or north of fifty-five. ' ' I mention the 
 latitude of fifty-one degrees," wrote Adams, "as the bound 
 within which we are willing to limit the future settlement of 
 the United States, because it is not to be doubted that the Colum- 
 bia River branches as far north as fifty-one degrees." The 
 Columbia River itself, in fact, touches the fifty-second parallel, 
 and its tributary, the Canoe River, rises above the fifty-third. 
 **As, however," Adams continued, '*the line already runs in 
 latitude forty-nine degrees to the Stony Mountains, should it 
 be earnestly insisted upon by Great Britain, we will consent 
 to carry it in continuance on the same parallel to the sea." 
 Again he wrote: "The right of the United States from the 
 forty-second to the forty-ninth parallel of latitude on the Pacific 
 Ocean, we consider as unquestionable; being founded, first, on 
 the acquisition by the treaty of February 22, 1819, of all the 
 rights of Spain ; second, by the discovery of the Columbia River, 
 first from the sea, at its mouth, and then by land, by Lewis 
 and Clark; and third, by the settlement at its mouth in 1811." 
 
 Canning, the British foreign minister, requested an interview 
 with Rush in December, 1823, to learn from him as fully as 
 possible the views of the United States government concerning 
 the partition of the Pacific littoral, in order the more intelli- 
 gently to prepare instructions for the British minister to Russia ; 
 it being the mutual feeling that America and Great Britain
 
 OREGON 409 
 
 should cooperate harmoniously in resisting Russia's extravagant 
 pretentions. This interview took place at Canning's home, to 
 which he was confined by illness. Rush repeated to Canning 
 the views of Adams, and pointed out upon a large map the 
 boundary lines proposed by him. The United States was to 
 have the coast from the forty-second to the fifty-first parallel, or 
 nine degrees, while Great Britain was to have from the fifty- 
 first to the fifty-fifth parallel, or only four degrees. Russia 
 was of course to have vastly more, from the fifty-fifth parallel 
 indefinitely northward; but those regions were sub- Arctic and 
 largely uninhabitable. The United States was not inhibited 
 from going south of the forty-second parallel, but that region 
 belonged to Mexico and seemed likely to remain hers. Great 
 Britain was obviously to get by far the smallest of the three 
 shares, and Canning quickly realized that feature of Adams's 
 proposal. He merely observed to Rush, however, that the 
 American claim seemed to be much more extended than the 
 British government had anticipated. Rush replied that he 
 hoped to be able, in the course of fuller negotiations, to estab- 
 lish its validity, and he left with Canning, at the latter 's re- 
 quest, a brief written memorandum of the American proposals. 
 A few days later Canning inquired of Rush why the United 
 States wanted to stipulate anything concerning the northern 
 boundary of the British territory. "Our northern question," 
 he said, ' ' is with Russia, as our southern with the United States. 
 But do the United States mean to travel north, to get between 
 us and Russia ? Do they mean to stipulate against Great Britain 
 in favor of Russia? Or to reserve for themselves whatever 
 Russia may not want?" These inquiries were pertinent, for it 
 certainly seemed strange that the United States should attempt 
 to prescribe the boundary between the British and Russian 
 possessions; unless through some subconscious adumbration of 
 the great national policy years afterward promulgated by Presi- 
 dent Polk. Rush replied that the fifty-fifth parallel had been 
 named as the southern boundary of Russian America, because it 
 was the line within which the czar had in 1799 granted privi- 
 leges to his Russian-American company, but the United States 
 did not mean to concede to Russia any system of colonial ex- 
 clusion north of that line, or to forego for itself the right of
 
 410 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 trading with the natives there. As for the fifty-first parallel, 
 it was named as the northern limit of the United States in order 
 to include the Columbia River and its tributaries. Canning re- 
 ceived this explanation in a noncommittal way and promised 
 to consider it. 
 
 Before these negotiations between Rush and Canning took 
 place the Monroe Doctrine had been promulgated, but the news 
 of it did not reach London until after them. As soon as it was 
 received Canning inquired of Rush what was meant by the 
 declaration, which he said was new to him, that the American 
 continents were not to be considered as subjects for future col- 
 onization by European powers. Rush was unable to answer, 
 as he had not yet received instructions on the subject. Canning 
 then said that he would either have to be satisfactorily advised 
 upon the matter before sending instructions to the British min- 
 ister at St. Petersburg, or else have to decline the American 
 proposal for joint negotiations with Russia. He added that he 
 would prefer the latter course, anyway, as Great Britain would 
 certainly object to the noncolonization principle ; yet she did not 
 wish to have it discussed at present. Rush readily agreed to 
 the plan of separate instead of joint negotiations with Russia, 
 realizing that if the noncolonization question were raised in 
 tripartite negotiations. Great Britain and Russia would join 
 forces against America, and he preferred to deal with them 
 separately. 
 
 Thereupon formal negotiations between Great Britain and the 
 United States began. The British commissioners were Messrs. 
 Huskisson and Stratford Canning. The latter was a cousin of 
 the foreign secretary, who had been British minister at Wash- 
 ington and had there discussed with Adams the question of the 
 partition of the Pacific littoral. A resolution had been offered 
 in the House of Representatives to the effect that the United 
 States should establish its sovereignty on the Columbia River. 
 Against this Stratford Canning had protested to Adams, in- 
 timating that Great Britain laid claim to that territory. Adams 
 in reply had disputed the right of Great Britain to any frontage 
 whatever on the Pacific, though of course she might claim one. 
 "I do not know," he said, "what you claim nor what you do 
 not claim. You claim India; you claim Africa; you claim — "
 
 OKEGON 411 
 
 "Perhaps," interrupted Stratford Canning, "a piece of the 
 moon ! " ' ' N-no, ' ' said Adams, ' ' I have not heard that you claim 
 exclusively any part of the moon ; but there is not a spot on this 
 habitable globe that I could affirm you do not claim; and there 
 is none which you may not claim with as much color of right as 
 you can have to the Columbia River or its mouth!" 
 
 After this striking of fire between the flint and steel of these 
 two mighty statesmen, the Englishman went home on a leave 
 of absence and never returned to Washington. When he and 
 Huskisson took up the Oregon negotiations with Rush, however, 
 they began by strongly disputing the American claims, saying 
 that the Spanish title, which had passed to America in the 
 Florida treaty, was invalid, and that Gray's discovery of the 
 mouth of the Columbia River gave no title to the country. 
 They added that Great Britain considered the region down to 
 the California line to be open to her colonization, together with 
 all other unoccupied areas of the American continents; thus 
 challenging not only Adams's proposals and claims concerning 
 Oregon but a part of the Monroe Doctrine as well. After long 
 discussions the British commissioners offered to continue the 
 forty-ninth parallel as the boundary west of the Rocky Moun- 
 tains until it reached the Columbia River, and thence run the 
 line down the center of that stream to the ocean, navigation of 
 the river to be free to both parties. Rush rejected this plan, 
 and proposed as an alternative that the line should follow the 
 forty-ninth parallel all the way to the ocean, giving the United 
 States the seven degrees between the forty-second and forty- 
 ninth, and Great Britain the six degrees between the forty-ninth 
 and fifty-fifth parallels. The British commissioners pondered 
 this proposal for a fortnight and then declined it, and the nego- 
 tiations were abandoned. 
 
 Soon after this the United States concluded, on April 17, 1824, 
 a treaty with Russia. The year before, in July, 1823, Adams, 
 bristling with the same aggressive spirit that he had manifested 
 toward Stratford Canning, had told the Russian minister, Baron 
 Tuyll, that the United States would "contest the right of Russia 
 to any territorial establishment on this continent." We have 
 seen, however, thai in his instructions to Rush, Adams receded 
 far from the extreme attitude which he had assumed toward
 
 412 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Stratford Canning, conceding to Great Britain four or even 
 six degrees of latitude where he had disputed her right to any 
 space whatever. So now, in his negotiations with the Russians, 
 Poletica and Nesselrode, he conceded to Russia the ownership 
 of all the coast lands north of the parallel of 54 degrees, 40 min- 
 utes, a third of a degree further south than the line which 
 he had proposed in the British negotiations. Adams first 
 expressed surprise that Russia, without any negotiations with 
 the United States, had claimed all the coast down to the fifty- 
 first parallel and all waters within a hundred Italian miles of 
 the shore, and he asked an explanation of that act. Poletica 
 replied that Russia had a historical title to the land in question, 
 and that she claimed the seas for a hundred miles in order to 
 protect herself against adventurers, the most and worst of whom 
 were Americans. Moreover, he said, Russia really had a right 
 to the entire sweep of the Pacific Ocean, from America to Asia, 
 north of the fifty-first parallel, and she was exercising much 
 moderation in limiting her sovereignty to a coast strip only a 
 hundred miles wide, Adams vigorously retorted that Russia 
 had no "historic title" south of the fifty-fifth parallel, which 
 the czar had named as her boundary in 1799, and that the claim 
 down to the fifty-first parallel was a new pretention without color 
 of sanction. The claim of exclusive sovereignty on the Pacific 
 Ocean, or even for a hundred miles from shore, he scouted as 
 unworthy of serious discussion. Finally Henry Middleton, who 
 had been sent by Monroe as our minister to Russia in 1820, was 
 authorized to negotiate a treaty at St. Petersburg, with Poletica 
 and Nesselrode, which he did, as stated, in April, 1824. Under 
 this treaty the Pacific Ocean was recognized by Russia to be a 
 free and open part of the high seas, to within the customary 
 three miles from the shore. The people of one country were 
 not to resort without permission to any place in the dominions 
 of the other where there was any settlement. It was agreed that 
 the United States would make no official establishment north of 
 the parallel of 54 degrees, 40 minutes, nor Russia any south of it. 
 Thus Russia was eliminated from the Oregon controversy. It 
 was left to Russia and Great Britain to contest the territory 
 north of 54 degrees, 40 minutes, and to Great Britain and the 
 United States to contest that south of that line.
 
 OREGON 413 
 
 It will be pertinent here to record, as having highly important 
 bearings upon long subsequent negotiations between Great Brit- 
 ain and America, the terms upon which Great Britain and Russia 
 settled their boundary dispute at the northwest. It was only a 
 year after the settlement between Russia and America, and the 
 Russian commissioners were, as before, Nesselrode and Poletica, 
 while the British were Stratford Canning and Sir Charles Bagot. 
 The line of 54 degrees, 40 minutes, agreed upon by Russia and 
 America, was challenged by Great Britain. She apparently 
 feared that the United States would be able to establish its own- 
 ership of all the coast up to that point, although this country 
 had repeatedly offered to limit itself to the fifty-first or even 
 the forty-ninth parallel. Of course a juncture between the 
 American and Russian holdings would shut Great Britain away 
 from the sea altogether. So the British sought earnestly to 
 get access to the sea north of 54 degrees, 40 minutes. At first 
 they proposed that the Russian territory should stop at the 
 141st meridian, near Mt. St. Elias, in latitude 60 north. 
 Next they proposed Christian Sound, Chatham Strait, and Lynn 
 Canal as the boundary, giving Great Britain all below the fifty- 
 sixth parallel. Again they named Clarence Strait and the 
 Stickeen River, giving them access to the sea through Dixon 
 Entrance. All these requests were successively refused by the 
 Russians, who insisted upon a continuous coast strip not more 
 than thirty geographical miles wide, all the way down to 54 
 degrees, 40 minutes. Finally, the British pleaded that the 
 boundary line of this strip, "parallel to the winding of the 
 coast," should be drawn straight across such arms of the sea as 
 Lynn Canal, instead of around their heads; so that the British 
 might own their heads and thus have access to the sea through 
 them. This also the Russians refused, and the treaty as finally 
 made conceded to Russia all the coastal islands and a continuous 
 strip of mainland coast not more than thirty geographical miles 
 wide, carried around the heads of all bays and inlets. Thus the 
 British were entirely excluded from the sea north of 54 degrees, 
 40 minutes, as the Russian government intended they should be. 
 It was the Russian hope that the United States would assert and 
 maintain sovereignty up to 54 degrees, 40 minutes, and thus 
 entirely shut the British away from the sea. But this only
 
 414 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 made the British more determined to get a share of the Oregon 
 territory and a coast line south of 54 degrees, 40 minutes. 
 
 Negotiations between Great Britain and America were re- 
 sumed at the former's request in 1826. Canning was still for- 
 eign secretary, and Rufus King was the American minister to 
 Great Britain, but was about to return home and be succeeded 
 by Gallatin. Adams was President and Clay was secretary of 
 state. King brought over a note from Canning, suggesting the 
 reopening of negotiations, and Gallatin was accordingly author- 
 ized to discuss the Oregon question on substantially the same lines 
 as those followed by Rush. There was, however, this modification, 
 that if the forty-ninth parallel were adopted as the boundary, 
 and if it crossed the Coliunbia River or any of its branches at a 
 point from which navigation to the sea was possible, the river 
 should be open to the British for such navigation as freely as to 
 Americans. The British commissioners, Huskisson' and Adding- 
 ton, demurred to the adoption of the forty-ninth parallel as the 
 boundary, largely on the ground that it would cut off and give 
 to the United States the southern part of Vancouver's Island, 
 which they regarded as quite inadmissible. 
 
 Gallatin did not insist upon the forty -ninth parallel as an ul- 
 timatum, but said that the United States would adhere to it as 
 a basis of tinal settlement. His idea was that an arrangement 
 might be effected whereby the United States would concede to 
 Great Britain that portion of Vancouver's Island which lay south 
 of forty-nine degrees, and Great Britain would in return concede 
 to the United States that portion of the Columbia River and its 
 branches which lay north of that parallel. Huskisson and 
 Addington, however, were equally resolute in sticking to the 
 Columbia River as the boundary line. But as that would give 
 to Great Britain a very large territory south of forty-nine de- 
 grees, they suggested that the United States might have, as com- 
 pensation, the comparatively small area comprised in the penin- 
 sula between Puget Sound and the ocean, now forming five coun- 
 ties of the State of Washington. This tract was not one tenth 
 as large as the territory below the forty-ninth parallel which 
 they were claiming for Great Britain, and it would have been, 
 moreover, entirely detached from the rest of the United States 
 and accessible only by way of the high seas or by crossing
 
 OREGON 415 
 
 British territory. Gallatin instantly rejected this proposal, de- 
 clining even to discuss it. No matter what might be said in 
 favor of some of its details, the principle of it was wholly in- 
 admissible. At this it became evident that agreement was 
 impossible, and the commissioners therefore decided to continue 
 the status quo. In August, 1827, a convention was concluded 
 extending indefinitely the arrangement for joint occupation of 
 the entire Oregon territory on equal terms. This convention 
 was ratified by the Senate, but a long and acrimonious debate 
 arose in Congress, and a resolution was introduced but not 
 passed authorizing the President to survey and take possession 
 of the entire region, from California to Alaska. When this was 
 defeated, interest in the matter lapsed and nothing more was 
 heard of it in Congress for many years. 
 
 The problem was thus left to the logic of events as developed 
 in the actual occupation of the territory by the two rival powers. 
 This was an unsatisfactory method, and it gave rise to much 
 needless friction and ill will. The first important settlement 
 there was that of Astoria, in 1811, made by an American fur 
 trader, John Jacob Astor. The British Northwest Company 
 regarded it with jealousy and animosity, and the British govern- 
 ment actually asked the American government to repudiate 
 Mr. Astor 's enterprise and to recognize the Northwest Company 
 as the rightful proprietor of the place. This request was of 
 course refused. Then the British company, by means of busi- 
 ness trickery and dishonorable practices, succeeded in getting 
 control of the place, so that when the War of 1812 broke out, 
 and a British naval force went thither with orders "to take and 
 destroy everything American on the northwest coast," Astoria 
 was found to be not American but British, and so was left un- 
 scathed. At the end of the war the British continued in pos- 
 session of the place. True, it was stipulated in the peace treaty 
 that all territory, places, and possessions taken by one party from 
 the other during the war should be restored to its former owner 
 without delay. But the British pointed out that before the war 
 had begun Astoria had passed into the ownership of a British 
 company, and had been renamed St. George, and therefore it 
 was not relinquished. To this Rush, at London, vigorously 
 objected, and was so earnest and cogent in his demands for the
 
 416 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 restoration of Astoria to the United States that the British gov- 
 ernment finally yielded. It reserved, however, for future con- 
 sideration the question of absolute title to that place; and the 
 Northwest Company under one diplomatic pretext or another 
 continued to occupy it until the final settlement in 1845. 
 
 During the thirty years between the end of the War of 1812 
 and the final settlement of the Oregon controversy, British 
 policy in the region was intensely hostile to Americans, but was 
 ultimately disastrous to British interests themselves. The entire 
 territory was assigned by the British government to the Hudson 
 Bay Company, and that corporation exploited it solely as a fur 
 preserve. Civilized colonization was not promoted. On the 
 contrary, it was discouraged. Trading posts and factories were 
 dotted over the territory, manned by British agents and their 
 Indian or half-breed retainers. No other settlement of any kind 
 was permitted to be made within hundreds of miles of one of 
 these establishments, which meant practically that there could 
 be few others in any part of the territory. The Indians were 
 taught to regard Americans with aversion, and to believe that 
 nobody had any rights in Oregon save under the British flag, 
 and they did not venture to trade at the two or three posts 
 which Americans did succeed in establishing. British or Cana- 
 dian law was declared to prevail in all parts of the territory, 
 and the agents of the company did not hesitate to use violence, 
 if necessary, to enforce that law and to enforce their own will. 
 Doubtless an American company, similarly organized and con- 
 ducted, and similarly backed up by the American government, 
 could have gained an equal footing and could have held its 
 ground against the Hudson Bay corporation. But no such 
 company arose, and the United States government had no 
 thought of chartering and supporting one. The few Americans 
 who did go thither as fur traders were helpless before the ten 
 times greater numbers of their British rivals. At no time, 
 probably, were there more than two hundred Americans in the 
 territory, while there were more than two thousand British. 
 Simpson, the governor of the Hudson Bay Company, declared 
 that they were "resolved to expel the Americans from traffic 
 on that coast," even if it cost them as much as a hundred 
 thousand pounds sterling ; and a little later, in 1839, one of the
 
 OREGON 417 
 
 American pioneers there declared that the United States as a 
 nation was unknown west of the Rocky Mountains. 
 
 The British policy was not, obviously, well designed for the 
 establishment of secure and permanent sovereignty. An empire 
 cannot be built upon scattered trading posts, factories, and forts. 
 Semi-military agents with Indian "wives" and half-breed 
 children, cannot found a nation. It was obvious that the men 
 who finally came in, with wives and families of their own race, 
 to develop agriculture and the other industries of civilization, 
 would become the real possessors of the land. The initial over- 
 ture for such colonization was effected in a peculiar, probably 
 a unique, manner. In 1832, four Flathead Indians appeared in 
 St. Louis. Many others of their tribe frequented that city on 
 various errands, chiefly pernicious to themselves. But these 
 four were earnest seekers after spiritual light and leading. Up 
 in "the continuous woods where rolls the Oregon and hears 
 no sound save his own dashings," they had heard from some 
 trapper something of the white man's God. From some wan- 
 dering Iroquis, also, they had heard that the worship of God, 
 and the study of a book called the Bible, were the secrets of 
 the superior strength of the pale-faced race. Therefore these 
 four men, two aged braves and two young warriors, traveled 
 the long trail from the Columbia to the Mississippi, in quest of 
 what they hoped would be the salvation of their people. They 
 knew General Clark, who a generation before had visited their 
 country with his companion, Lewis, and they sought him out, 
 and were hospitably received. But they were disappointed in 
 their quest for spiritual light. The two old men died at St. 
 Louis, and the two young men returned to Oregon empty- 
 handed and heavy-hearted. 
 
 But a young clerk in a shipping office noted their departure 
 and its circumstances, and reported the sad incident to friends 
 in the East, at Pittsburgh. George Catlin, also, the writer and 
 painter of Indian scenes, was conversant with the case and added 
 his testimony. As a result. Christian people were shamed and 
 spurred to action, and several missionaries hastened to Oregon. 
 Chief among them were H. H. Spalding and Marcus Whitman, 
 young men, just married, who took their brides with them to 
 the western rim of the continent. They reached Fort Walla 
 
 Vol. 1—27
 
 418 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 "Walla on September 2, 1836; and a new epoch in Oregon his- 
 tory was that day begun. We need not here review the ro- 
 mantic story of their journey, or of Whitman's subsequent ride 
 back to the East; and the interminable controversies which 
 have arisen over it. What is pertinent and indisputable is that 
 Spalding and Whitman were followed by other missionaries, 
 and by practical colonists with their wives and families, intent 
 on establishing in Oregon a genuine civilization radically dif- 
 ferent from and incompatible with the sway of the trappers and 
 fur traders. The agents of the Hudson Bay Company strove 
 to keep them back, by suasion, by deceit, by menace, and some- 
 times by actual violence. Especially did they, and did Sir 
 George Simpson, the governor of the company himself, spread 
 through the United States the false impression that there was 
 no wagon trail across the mountains and that Oregon was 
 practically inaccessible by the overland route. "The United 
 States," prophesied Simpson, oracularly, "will never possess 
 more than a nominal jurisdiction, nor long possess even that, on 
 the west side of the Rocky Mountains. Great Britain and 
 Russia," he continued, "would control the destiny of the human 
 race, particularly on the western coast of this continent"; and 
 to promote that object he urged British seizure and occupation 
 of San Francisco. 
 
 The persistence of Americans in seeking to get to Oregon, 
 however, convinced the British that they must change their tac- 
 tics, and must colonize the country with actual settlers if they 
 would hold it permanently. In 1841 and 1842, accordingly, some 
 hundreds of families were brought in from Canada, and a 
 steady stream of such migration was started. Exultation was 
 openly expressed over the fact that thus the land would be 
 possessed in advance of the coming of the Americans and that 
 the latter would be shut out. Whitman was a keen and in- 
 terested observer of these things, as he had also been of the vast 
 possibilities of colonization in Oregon. He had heard, too, that 
 Webster and Ashburton were negotiating at Washington a treaty 
 which would establish the boundary between the United States 
 and British America, and he feared that in it Oregon would be 
 sacrificed. Accordingly, having other business in the East, 
 he determined to return thither at once and to utilize the op-
 
 OREGON 419 
 
 portunity by bearing to Washington first-hand information of 
 the value of Oregon and of the efforts which the British were 
 making to monopolize it. He made the arduous and perilous 
 trip across the continent in midwinter, and reached "Washing- 
 ton early in March; to find that the boundary drawn in the 
 Webster- Ashburton treaty stopped at the Rocky Mountains and 
 that the Oregon question had been left untouched. 
 
 There are no authoritative records of Whitman's visit to Wash- 
 ington or of his doings there. His old associate, Spalding, how- 
 ever, subsequently related that he had an interview with Webster, 
 whom he failed to convince of the value of Oregon; and also 
 one with President Tyler, whom he did convince. Others have 
 said much the same ; adding that Whitman found Webster about 
 to renounce all title to Oregon in exchange for fishery rights 
 in Newfoundland, and was unable to stop him; but that Tyler, 
 on hearing Whitman's story, did stop those negotiations. For 
 this latter story there seems to be no good foundation, while 
 circumstantial evidence against it is literally overwhelming. No 
 reproach can truly fall upon the fame of Webster for his attitude 
 toward Oregon. There is no reason to suppose that he ever for 
 a moment thought of sacrificing it. Nor is there reason for 
 regarding Whitman as the sole savior of Oregon, without whom 
 that territory would have been lost. But his ride was heroic, 
 his purpose was patriotic, and the service which he rendered in 
 giving the Government and the public accurate information 
 was exceedingly valuable. His greatest service was rendered in 
 arousing public interest in Oregon, in promoting migration 
 thither, and in demonstrating the entire practicability of send- 
 ing wagon trains across the mountains; disproving the senten- 
 tious dictum of "The Edinburgh Review" in July, 1843, that 
 "Oregon will never be colonized overland from the Eastern 
 States." At the time when those words were publislied. Whit- 
 man was leading hundreds of wagons overland into the Colum- 
 bia Valley, with Fremont, the "pathfinder," in his train. 
 
 That winter Oregon loomed large in Congress. On January 
 8, 1844, news reached Washington that Whitman had reached 
 Oregon with his great train of colonists, in complete success. 
 That very day a resolution was introduced in the Senate asking 
 for copies of all the diplomatic correspondence relating to Ore-
 
 420 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 gon. It did not pass, but two days later a like resolution was 
 passed by the House. The impression was deepened that Great 
 Britain was gaining undue advantages from the joint occupation 
 system, and it was urged in Congress that the required twelve 
 months' notice for terminating that arrangement should be 
 given. This was coupled with the demand, probably at this time 
 first voiced by James Buchanan, in the Senate, that we should 
 insist upon having the whole territory up to the Russian line at 
 latitude 54 degrees, 40 minutes. 
 
 Unhappily, there also arose, in Congress and in the nation, 
 a bitter and unreasoning animosity toward England, for the 
 first time since the War of 1812. The old grievances of George 
 Ill's time, including the Stamp Act and the tea tax, were re- 
 vamped, and there were even wild appeals for war. Benton, in 
 the Senate, said: "Let the emigrants go on and carry their 
 rifles. We want thirty thousand rifles in the valley of the Ore- 
 gon ; they will make all quiet there, in the event of a war with 
 Great Britain for the dominion of that country. Thirty thou- 
 sand rifles on the Oregon will annihilate the Hudson Bay Com- 
 pany and drive them off our continent." And he added that 
 the war would not be confined to Oregon, but would embrace 
 the possessions of the two powers throughout the globe. There 
 were, it is true, men of light and leading who not only did not 
 share but strongly rebuked these violent sentiments; but the 
 jingo spirit was in the ascendant, toward Oregon as toward 
 Mexico, and there was soon formulated the campaign war-cry 
 of that year, "Fifty-four forty, or fight!" 
 
 Meantime diplomacy was again busy. Richard Pakenham 
 was sent over by the British government early in 1844 to nego- 
 tiate a settlement in Oregon. His work was interrupted by the 
 tragic death of Upshur, the secretary of state, at the end of 
 February, but was renewed in the summer, with Upshur's suc- 
 cessor, Calhoun. The proposals of Pakenham were the same 
 as those of Huskisson and Addington, in 1827, while Calhoun 
 renewed those of Rush and Gallatin, offering, however, the forty- 
 ninth parallel as an ultimatum. Neither could make any im- 
 pression upon the other by the mere rethreshing of old straw. 
 At the same time James K. Polk was standing successfully for 
 the Presidency on a platform which asserted that the American
 
 OREGON 421 
 
 title to the whole of Oregon up to the Russian line was ''clear 
 and unquestionable," and that "no part of the same ought to 
 be ceded to England or any other power"; and his followers 
 were convulsing the country with the cry of "Fifty-four forty, 
 or fight ! ' ' Pakenham therefore despaired of reaching an agree- 
 ment with Calhoun, who confessed himself committed to a policy 
 of "masterly inactivity," and in January, 1845, proposed that 
 the dispute be referred to arbitration. After a few days' con- 
 sideration Calhoun declined this offer, saying that the President 
 (Tyler) held that it would be unadvisable to entertain a proposal 
 to resort to any other mode, so long as there was hope of ar- 
 riving at a satisfactory settlement by negotiation. If such hope 
 existed, however, it was certainly not shared by Pakenham, nor 
 did Tyler or Calhoun give other evidence of its possession. 
 Negotiations were dropped, not to be resumed until after Polk 
 had been installed as President and had in his inaugural address 
 reafifirmed the identical words of his campaign platform about 
 the "clear and unquestionable" title of the United States to 
 the entire territory of Oregon, from California to Russian 
 America. This declaration of Polk's was regarded in Great 
 Britain, both officially and popularly, as a direct defiance, and 
 'it was answered in like spirit. Not since 1815 had the two coun- 
 tries been so near to war as at that time. 
 
 Calhoun had returned to the Senate and had been succeeded 
 as secretary of state by James Buchanan; the annexation of 
 Texas had been effected, providing the desired expansion of 
 slave territory at the South ; a war with Mexico was inevitably 
 impending; and the pro-slavery leaders who were in control of 
 the Government saw no reason why they should embarrass them- 
 selves with another war, with the greatest power in the world, 
 for the sake of enlarging free territory at the North. True, the 
 vehement and passionate demand of their part}'^ platform, their 
 campaign cry, and the President's inaugural address, all pledged 
 the Government to insist upon having the whole of Oregon even 
 at cost of war with England — "Fifty-four forty, or fight!" 
 But when one has climbed up to the coveted coign of vantage, 
 why should he not kick down the ladder behind him? The 
 campaign for Polk and the party had been won by virtue of the 
 Oregon demand. Now let Oregon be repudiated! In the Sen-
 
 422 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ate, Calhoun still counseled "masterly inactivity." Whitman 
 had opened the way for colonization of the territory, and if more 
 Americans than British flocked in, why, Oregon would become 
 ours. 
 
 Buchanan, as secretary of state, however, thought otherwise, 
 and soon reopened negotiations with the British minister, Paken- 
 ham. On July 12, 1845, he proposed that the territory should 
 be divided by running the line on the forty-ninth parallel, clear 
 through to the Pacific. That would cut Vancouver's Island into 
 two parts, but Buchanan offered to make free to Great Britain 
 any port or ports that might be desired on the southern half. 
 There was no mention of the free navigation of the Columbia 
 River, which Great Britain much desired. Pakenham recog- 
 nized this to be a marked recession from the extreme ground 
 taken in Polk's inaugural, but he regarded it as quite unac- 
 ceptable, chiefly because of the division of Vancouver's Island 
 and the failure to grant free navigation of the Columbia River. 
 He therefore did not take the trouble to refer it to his govern- 
 ment, but on July 29 rejected it on his own responsibility and 
 in terms which fell little short of being offensive. He hoped, 
 he said, that Buchanan would "be prepared to offer some further 
 proposals, more consistent with fairness and equity and within 
 the reasonable expectations of the British government." A 
 month later Buchanan made a tart rejoinder, and withdrew the 
 rejected proposal, without suggesting anything in its place. 
 Meantime throughout the United States the cry of "Fifty -four 
 forty, or fight ! ' ' was raised again ; and ' ' All Oregon or none ! ' ' 
 The North saw no reason why we should not fight for Oregon 
 as well as for Texas. 
 
 Nothing more was done, however, until December 2, when 
 Polk sent his first annual message to Congress. On March 4 
 he had insisted upon "Fifty-four forty." On July 12 he re- 
 ceded to forty-nine with some concessions below that line. On 
 December 2 he swung back, inferentially, to fifty-four forty. 
 It was necessary, he said, to determine whether the national 
 rights in Oregon were to be abandoned or firmly maintained. 
 "That they cannot be abandoned without a sacrifice of both 
 national honor and interest, is too clear to admit of doubt." 
 And he himself had defined those rights as indisputably cov-
 
 OREGON 423 
 
 ering the entire territory. So, to bring matters to a crisis, he 
 recommended that the required year's notice be given for the 
 abrogation of the joint occupation treaty of 1827. What this 
 would mean was suggested in the further recommendation that 
 the laws and general jurisdiction of the United States be ex- 
 tended over all American settlers in all parts of Oregon, that 
 an Indian agency and sub-agencies be established there, that 
 an overland mail route to the Pacific be opened, and that ade- 
 quate military protection be afforded to the Oregon trail — 
 the route followed by colonists entering that territory. 
 
 Even before this, as early as the latter part of October, the 
 British government had made it known that it did not approve 
 Pakenham's course in July, in so cavalierly rejecting Buchanan's 
 offer, and it now renewed those representations, and Pakenham 
 besought Buchanan to revive his proposal. Two cabinet coun- 
 cils were held over the matter, with the result that Polk directed 
 Buchanan to refuse the request; adding that it was for the 
 British government itself to make the next proposal, if it wished 
 to resume negotiations. Congress and the country meanwhile 
 made it clear that they heartily supported Polk 's policy. Paken- 
 ham again sought out Buchanan, on December 27, begged him 
 to renew his former offer, and handed him a note stating that 
 the British government had instructed him "again to represent, 
 in pressing terms, the expediency of referring the whole ques- 
 tion of an equitable division of the territory to the arbitration 
 of some friendly sovereign or state." Pakenham personally 
 suggested that Switzerland, or the city of Hamburg, or Bremen, 
 be chosen as arbitrator. Buchanan replied, in conversation, 
 that he was strongly opposed to arbitration, but that if it were 
 decided upon he would prefer the Pope of Rome as an arbi- 
 trator. As both the disputing nations were Protestant, and 
 therefore heretic, the pope would have no partiality toward 
 either. In this Buchanan was more bantering than earnest, 
 a fact which Pakenliam perceived, and the latter suggested in 
 reply that instead of to an arbitrator the dispute be referred 
 to a joint commission representing the two countries. Buchanan 
 then said seriously that it was useless to talk of arbitration, 
 for the President would prol)ably not sanction, and even if he 
 did the Senate would certainly refuse to ratify any such treaty.
 
 424 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 On January 3, 1846, therefore, Buchanan formally declined the 
 arbitration proposal, on the ground that it assumed in advance 
 the validity of the British title to some part of Oregon, which 
 the United States was not willing to admit. Pakenham replied 
 with an offer to submit to arbitration the question whether 
 either of the powers had valid title to any or all of the territory, 
 and this also Buchanan declined. 
 
 The negotiations were next transferred to London. Buchanan 
 wrote on February 26 to McLane, the American minister there, 
 that, judging from the speeches and proceedings in the Senate, 
 a proposition to fix the boundary on the forty-ninth parallel 
 would probably be favorably received. This was somewhat sur- 
 prising, seeing that the majority of senators had emphatically 
 expressed their adherence to the "Fifty-four forty" demand. 
 Nevertheless, McLane acted upon the hint, and on May 18 he 
 wrote that he had had a full and free conversation with the 
 British foreign minister, the Earl of Aberdeen, as a result of 
 which the British government would send by the next steamer 
 "a new and further proposition for a partition of the territory 
 in dispute." Meantime, after prolonged debate, both Houses 
 of Congress passed by large majorities a resolution authorizing 
 the President to give notice of the abrogation of the treaty of 
 1827, in order that the attention of the two Governments might 
 be "the more earnestly directed to the adoption of all proper 
 measures for a speedy and amicable adjustment" of their dif- 
 ferences and disputes. The notice was given through McLane 
 to the Earl of Aberdeen on May 22. 
 
 The proposition from the British government, the coming 
 of which McLane had announced in advance, reached Washing- 
 ton on June 6, and was presented by Pakenham to Buchanan. 
 It proved to be a complete draft of a treaty, which provided for 
 the adoption of the forty-ninth parallel as the boundary as far 
 as the sea, that is to say, that great arm of the sea known as 
 Birch's Bay; thence it was to run down the Canal de Haro 
 and the Strait of San Juan de Fuca to the Pacific Ocean. This 
 gave all of Vancouver's Island to Great Britain; but it was 
 stipulated that the United States should have the right of free 
 navigation of the strait and canal named — a superfluity, since 
 the United States would have had that right in any event, by
 
 OREGON 425 
 
 virtue of its ownership of one shore of those waters. All British 
 subjects in all parts of Oregon were to be confirmed in owner- 
 ship of the lands which they were actually occupying, and the 
 Hudson Bay Company was to have the right to navigate the 
 Columbia River. This was obviously a marked withdrawal from 
 the former claims of Great Britain, as also from those of the 
 United States. It was, however, a reasonably equitable com- 
 promise between them. 
 
 Polk was favorably impressed by it. But he remembered 
 the extreme demands of his campaign, his inaugural, and his 
 message, and he was in doubt as to the reception which the 
 Senate would give to so sweeping an abandonment of them. 
 One senator, Hannegan, of Indiana, had declared that if Polk 
 were willing to compromise on the forty-ninth parallel, or to 
 recede at all from "Fifty-four forty," then he had "spoken 
 words of falsehood, and with the tongue of a serpent"; and 
 many of his colleagues, particularly from the West, agreed with 
 that sentiment. Before authorizing the secretary of state to sign 
 the treaty, therefore, Polk took the unprecedented and unique 
 step of submitting it to the Senate in advance and asking that 
 body whether it would ratify it if the secretary should sign it ! 
 That extraordinary procedure was described by Daniel Webster 
 as follows: "In the general operation of government treaties 
 are negotiated by the President and ratified by the Senate; but 
 here is the reverse — here is a treaty negotiated by the Senate and 
 only agreed to by the President." The Senate, however, acqui- 
 esced in this course. After three days' deliberation it approved 
 the treaty, by a vote of thirty-seven to twelve, and on June 15 
 the document was signed, precisely as it had been drafted by 
 the British government, without the change of a single word 
 or letter. After its signature it was again submitted to the 
 Senate and was ratified by a vote of forty-one to fourteen. 
 
 It was recognized by Buchanan at the time of the making of 
 the treaty that there was left some uncertainty as to the rights 
 of navigation of the Strait of San Juan de Fuca north of the 
 forty-ninth parallel, and also as to the exact course of the 
 boundary line through the Canal de Haro, and in the latter part 
 of 1846 there arose a dispute as to the right of the British to 
 colonize some of the islands lying east of the Canal de Haro,
 
 426 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 and between it and the mainland. Some correspondence on the 
 subject passed between George Bancroft, the American minister 
 in London, and Lord Palmerston, and it was continued in 1848 
 between Buchanan and Crampton, the British minister at 
 Washington. These negotiations resulted in nothing, however, 
 and as settlers were then flocking into the territory there arose 
 danger of awkward complications. The northern half of the 
 American share of the Oregon country was organized into the 
 Territory of Washington, and in 1854 the legislature met for 
 its first session and undertook to incorporate the Island of San 
 Juan into one of the counties of that territory. The next year 
 William L. Marcy, who had become secretary of state, urged the 
 Governor of Washington Territory to refrain from and to re- 
 strain all acts which might provoke a conflict, but without 
 waiving any of the rights or claims of this country. In August, 
 
 1856, it was agreed that a joint commission, consisting of a 
 commissioner, an astronomer, and a surveyor from each country, 
 should be appointed to determine the boundary. These com- 
 missioners held a number of meetings, from June to December, 
 
 1857, which ended in hopeless disagreement. The Americans 
 insisted that the line should pass through the Canal de Haro, 
 immediately adjacent to Vancouver's Island, thus giving to the 
 United States the archipelago between Vancouver's Island and 
 the mainland at Bellingham Bay. The British on the other 
 hand wanted it to run along Rosario Channel, next to the main- 
 land, giving the islands to Great Britain. A suggestion was 
 made by the British commissioner of a line through San Juan 
 Channel, giving San Juan Island to Great Britain and the rest 
 of the archipelago to the United States; but this was rejected 
 by the American commissioner. 
 
 In 1859 there was danger of a violent clash, when Hudson 
 Bay Company officers on San Juan Island threatened to exercise 
 jurisdiction over some of the American settlers there. The re- 
 sult was the prompt occupation of the island by American mili- 
 tary forces. Diplomatic negotiations were then resumed, be- 
 tween Lewis Cass, the American secretary of state, and Lord 
 Lyons, the British minister at Washington, and in December, 
 1860, the latter proposed a reference of the dispute to arbitra- 
 tion by the King of the Netherlands, the King of Sweden and
 
 OREGON 427 
 
 Norway, or the President of Switzerland. It does not appear 
 that any reply was made to this proposal, the United States 
 being then on the verge of the Civil War, nor were there any 
 further negotiations for several years. But in 1866, the Civil 
 War then being ended, the United States government again 
 turned its attention to the matter, chiefly on account of the 
 conflict between its own civil and military authorities, each of 
 whom claimed sole jurisdiction over San Juan Island. The 
 result was that Reverdy Johnson, the American minister to 
 Great Britain, and Lord Clarendon made, on January 14, 1869, 
 a convention for submitting the boundary question to the ar- 
 bitration of the Swiss president. But the United States Senate 
 declined to take any action upon this treaty, and it lapsed for 
 lack of ratification. Wlien the Joint High Commission of 1871 
 met at Washington the matter was again taken up and the 
 British commissioners proposed arbitration on the basis of the 
 Johnson-Clarendon agreement. The Americans declined this, 
 but suggested that the Joint High Commission itself might effect 
 a settlement. To this the British assented, and a general dis- 
 cussion of the conflicting claims ensued. After some weeks, 
 however, they were no nearer agreement than at the beginning, 
 and then, on April 22, 1871, it was decided to submit the mat- 
 ter to the arbitration of the German emperor. The question to 
 be submitted to him was whether the boundary should pass 
 through the Canal de Haro or Rosario Strait, and his decision 
 was to be final, without appeal. 
 
 The case was presented for the United States by the venerable 
 George Bancroft, then minister at Berlin, who had been a mem- 
 ber of Polk's cabinet at the time of the making of the Oregon 
 treaty; and it was presented for Great Britain by Admiral 
 Prevost, who in 1856 was a British commissioner for the de- 
 marcation of the boundary. Neither government could have 
 selected a man more thoroughly conversant with the dispute 
 or more competent to present its various phases to the dis- 
 tinguished arbitrator. The arbitral process was begun on July 
 29, 1871, when the emperor was formally requested, through his 
 chancellor, Prince Bismarck, to act as umpire. Acceptance was 
 expressed on September 1. The American argument was de- 
 livered, in writing, on December 12, and the British on Decern-
 
 428 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ber 15. The second and final statement was made by Great 
 Britain on June 10, and by the United States on July 11, 1872. 
 The emperor summoned to his assistance three eminent experts : 
 Dr. Grimm, vice-president of the Supreme Court at Berlin; 
 Dr. Goldschmidt, a member of the Supreme Commercial Court 
 at Leipsic; and Dr. Kiepert, a pupil of Karl Ritter, the great 
 geographer; each of whom made an individual report. The 
 result was that on October 21, 1872, the emperor gave his 
 award, to the effect that the claim of the United States, that the 
 boundary should be drawn through the Canal de Haro, was 
 "most in accordance with the true interpretations" of the treaty 
 of 1846. 
 
 Admiral Prevost was greatly disappointed at this, as he had 
 confidently expected a verdict in his favor. The British govern- 
 ment itself was sharply criticized in the House of Commons for 
 having let the arbitration be limited to a choice between those 
 two channels, instead of leaving it open for the arbitrator to 
 select some intermediate line as a compromise. There was, how- 
 ever, no substantial ground for supposing that the emperor 
 would have chosen any other line. An intimation was made that 
 he was biased in favor of America, or at least against Great 
 Britain, because of English friendliness toward France during 
 the Franco-German War of the preceding year, but this was 
 probably quite unfounded. The award was impartially made, 
 on the merits of the case, and it was instantly and loyally ac- 
 cepted on both sides. Immediately upon receiving a copy of it 
 the British government withdrew from San Juan Island the 
 company of marines which it had stationed there, and a little 
 later quadruplicate charts, with the boundary marked, were 
 signed at Washington by Hamilton Fish, secretary of state, and 
 by Admiral Prevost and Sir Edward Thornton, the British 
 minister, together with a protocol defining the line. In his 
 annual message on December 2 following. President Grant re- 
 ported this achievement, and declared that it left us, "for the 
 first time in the history of the United States as a nation, without 
 a question of disputed boundary between our territory and the 
 possessions of Great Britain on this continent." In after years 
 another dispute did arise, which was not then foreseen, but at the 
 time that statement of Grant's was quite true.
 
 OREGON 429 
 
 Meantime some other issues arose in connection with Oregon. 
 "When all the mainland south of the forty-ninth parallel was 
 conceded to the United States by the treaty of 1846, the Hudson 
 Bay Company had thirteen forts and other establishments 
 therein, and the Puget Sound Agricultural Company had two 
 farm establishments. The treaty provided that the property 
 rights of these corporations should be respected, and that naviga- 
 tion of the Columbia River should be open to the British; but 
 that if the United States government should at any time desire 
 to take these lands, it might do so at a mutually agreed valua- 
 tion. Both companies soon began to complain of the encroach- 
 ments of American settlers and of the failure of the United 
 States to give them due protection, and they offered to sell out 
 all their holdings to this country. Negotiations were conducted 
 for several years, from 1848 to 1850, without result, but in 1863 
 W, II. Seward, the American secretary of state, and Lord Lyons, 
 the British minister at Washington, made a treaty for the pur- 
 chase of the property and rights of the two companies by the 
 United States. Alexander S. Johnson of New York and Sir John 
 Rose of Canada were appointed commissioners, and Caleb 
 Cushing was chosen as counsel for the United States and Charles 
 Dewey Day for the British companies. Benjamin R. Curtis of 
 the United States was selected by the commissioners as umpire. 
 The case lasted from January 9, 1865, to July 11, 1869, when 
 the commissioners made a final award. Under this the United 
 States was to pay to the Hudson Bay Company on account 
 of its possessory rights and claims the sura of $450,000, and 
 similarly to the Puget Sound Agricultural Company $200,000. 
 The award was accepted and fulfilled. An attempt was made 
 by Pierce County, Washington Territory, to have a considerable 
 sum withheld from the Puget Sound Agricultural Company, 
 on account of local taxes which the company was said to be 
 owing, but the Attorney-General of the United States held that 
 this could not be done; for since the award provided that the 
 sums named should be paid "without any deduction whatever," 
 any such withholding would be a breach of treaty. The pur- 
 chase sums were therefore paid in full, and the two companies 
 deeded all their possessory rights and claims to the United 
 States.
 
 XVI 
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 
 
 THE Panama Congress, which the United States treated 
 so shabbily in 1825-26, was intended to discuss and to pro- 
 mote, among other topics, the project of an interoceanic canal 
 across the Central American Isthmus at some one of the various 
 points which had been under consideration since the days of 
 Hernando Cortez, three centuries before. This intention was 
 brought to the notice of the American government, and the 
 secretary of state, Clay, replied to the envoys that the question 
 of such a canal might properly be discussed at the Congress, 
 and that the canal itself, if it should be constructed, would con- 
 fer its greatest benefits upon the American continents, and 
 would be of interest to the entire world. At about that same 
 time Jose Canaz, the first Central American envoy to the United 
 States, also broached the subject. In a written communication 
 he invited the United States to join Central America in the en- 
 terprise of constructing a canal, and to share, also, in the special 
 benefits which the work would confer; to that end suggesting 
 a treaty between the two nations which would perpetually secure 
 the canal as their joint possession. There was an insuperable 
 objection to entering into such an alliance. But Clay was at 
 least sympathetic toward the project, and assured Canaz of ''the 
 deep interest taken by the Government of the United States in 
 an undertaking so highly calculated to diffuse an extensive 
 influence on the affairs of mankind." He also instructed 
 Williams, the United States minister to Central America, to 
 investigate the matter carefully and to report all obtainable 
 data concerning the practicability of constructing a canal at 
 Nicaragua. The Central American government, disappointed in 
 its hope of making an alliance with the United States and of 
 having this country for a partner in the canal enterprise, or- 
 dered on its own account the construction of a canal at 
 Nicaragua, and gave a concession for the work to one Beniski. 
 
 430
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 431 
 
 This concession was presently transferred to an American con- 
 cern known as the Central American and United States Atlantic 
 and Pacific Canal Company, of which De Witt Clinton and 
 other prominent men were members. Another company was 
 organized just after the Congress of Panama by General Wer- 
 weer of Belgium. He secured from Nicaragua a concession for 
 the canal and a monopoly of the coasting trade, for the King 
 of Holland. This was regarded in the United States as in- 
 compatible with the Monroe Doctrine, and the scheme was in 
 consequence eventually abandoned. 
 
 The United States Senate in 1835 resumed consideration of 
 the project, and adopted a resolution in favor of constructing 
 a canal at Nicaragua. President Jackson sent Charles Biddle 
 thither to make surveys and to negotiate a treaty. But Biddle 
 went to Panama instead, and there secured a concession which 
 had originally been granted by Bolivar to Baron Thierry, an 
 adventurer who had got the Maoris to elect him "King of New 
 Zealand." At this the United States government repudiated 
 Biddle and all that he had done. In 1837 and 1838 prominent 
 citizens of New York and Philadelphia besought Congress to in- 
 vite the Central American States and all the great powers of 
 Europe to join the United States in constructing a canal. All 
 that came of this was the adoption by Congress of a resolution 
 expressing interest in the scheme. In 1839, however, John L. 
 Stephens was officially commissioned to proceed to Nicaragua 
 and to do the work which Biddle a few years before had failed 
 to do. He went, surveyed the route, and reported the prac- 
 ticability of constructing a canal at Nicaragua, for $25,000,000 ; 
 but added that the country was in so unsettled and revolutionary 
 a state that the investment of capital there would be hazardous. 
 
 The next important step was taken some years later. The 
 United States had annexed Texas, was colonizing Oregon, and 
 was conquering Mexico and despoiling her by the seizure of 
 California. Marcus Whitman had proved the feasibility of 
 traveling the Oregon Trail, and John Charles Fremont had 
 marked the pathways of the Rocky Mountains. But those 
 routes across the continent were long, arduous, and beset with 
 perils. The sea route, even around Cape Horn or through the 
 Strait of Magellan, was preferable. Better still was the route
 
 432 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 by way of the Isthmus of Panama, though it did involve an 
 overland carry of fifty miles and transshipment. Best of all 
 possible routes, at least until a transcontinental railroad could 
 be built, would be that through an isthmian canal. Now at this 
 time Great Britain was dominating Nicaragua, and had actually 
 seized the proposed canal route there, under some trumped up 
 and spurious claims, and the United States, involved in a war 
 with Mexico and hoping for a peaceful compromise in Oregon, 
 had had no mind just then to challenge her, even for the sake 
 of vindicating the Monroe Doctrine. Instead, it turned to other 
 routes of transit across the isthmus. First it sought Tehuante- 
 pec, in Southern Mexico. This was the nearest to the United 
 States of all possible routes. It had been carefully surveyed 
 by Mexico, and had been found practicable for a railroad or for 
 a canal with locks. It was on Mexican soil, but we were con- 
 quering Mexico and might make a transit concession a part of 
 the terms of peace. So President Polk instructed Trist, his com- 
 missioner for peace with Mexico, to offer to double the indem- 
 nity of $15,000,000 which we were about to pay for the seizure 
 of California and New Mexico, if Mexico would grant us the 
 exclusive right of way across that isthmus. This offer was re- 
 fused, but American capitalists presently bought a concession 
 which Mexico had formerly granted to a Mexican promoter for 
 a railroad there, and so got the right of way, after all, without 
 government aid. The American company began preparations 
 for building a railroad across the Tehuantepec Isthmus, but it 
 was so hampered by obstacles thrown in the way by the Mexican 
 government that it finally abandoned the scheme. 
 
 Meantime other Americans had turned to that Panama route 
 which the United States had repeatedly scorned. That isthmus 
 was then the property of New Granada, now Colombia, and that 
 republic was in a parlous state. A dozen years of domestic 
 strife had reduced it to little better than a ruin, and both the 
 contending factions were glad to accept overtures from the 
 United States for an enterprise which would restore prosperity 
 and for a treaty which would protect them from external foes. 
 Negotiations were easily begun and were swiftly pushed, and a 
 treaty was made, ratified, and put into effect on June 10, 1848, 
 which marked something like a new era in our relations with
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 433 
 
 that part of the world. This treaty gave to the United States 
 a full and exclusive right of transit, by railroad, canal, or other- 
 wise, across that part of the American Isthmus which lay within 
 New Granadan territory, to wit, the Chiriqui, Panama, San Bias, 
 Caledonian Bay, Mandingo, Atrato, and other proposed canal 
 routes. An American company promptly constructed a rail- 
 road across the isthmus at Panama, and that forthwith became 
 the chief route of interoceanic transit. A canal route was also 
 surveyed, but no other work was done on it at that time. 
 
 In return for this concession, the United States formally 
 recognized New Granada's rights of sovereignty over the Pan- 
 ama Isthmus, and undertook "positively and efficaciously" to 
 guarantee that country's possession of it against any and all 
 attacks from whatever source; and also to make absolutely 
 neutral all routes of transit across that territory. In brief, 
 the United States established a protectorate over New Granada, 
 so far as the isthmus was concerned. It guaranteed the inde- 
 pendence and integrity of that foreign country. It was the most 
 advanced step in that direction that the United States had 
 ever taken, if indeed it has ever since exceeded it, and it was a 
 development of the Monroe Doctrine which might well have 
 aroused the attention of the world, and might have provoked 
 some challenge had there been any nation in a position to chal- 
 lenge it. But all the nations of the European continent were 
 involved in revolutionary movements at that time, and Great 
 Britain was too intent on breaking down the Monroe Doctrine 
 in Nicaragua to care much how greatly it was exploited at 
 Panama. So the treaty stood unchallenged, destined to have 
 a profound effect in after years. 
 
 No sooner had this been done, than we turned again to 
 Nicaragua. That country had begun to resent the aggressions 
 of Great Britain and was desirous of escaping from the terms 
 of a treaty which that power had extorted from it. Moreover, 
 the natural waterway which the San Juan River and Lake 
 Nicaragua afforded for the greater part of the distance across 
 the isthmus made that region particularly attractive to enter- 
 prising capitalists. An American company, therefore, in 1849, 
 sought a contract with the Nicaraguan government for the con- 
 struction of a canal, and that Government, in direct defiance of 
 
 VOL, 1—28
 
 434 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 its treaty with Great Britain, made the desired bargain. The 
 American promoters essayed to begin work, but found the 
 British in possession of the San Juan River, an essential part of 
 the route. That fact was reported in the United States, and, 
 as the Nicaraguans had shrewdly calculated, a vigorous anti- 
 British stonn of popular sentiment arose. President Polk there- 
 upon hastily despatched Elijah Hise to the scene, advising him in 
 vigorous terms as follows: "The object of Great Britain in this 
 seizure is evident from the policy which she has uniformly pur- 
 sued throughout her history, of seizing upon every available 
 commercial point in the world whenever circumstances have 
 placed it in her power; and now it seems her evident purpose, 
 by assuming the title of protector over a miserable, degraded, 
 and insignificant tribe of Indians, to acquire an absolute 
 dominion over the vast extent of sea coast in Nicaragua, and to 
 obtain control of the route for a railroad and canal between 
 the Atlantic and Pacific oceans." The scandal of the British 
 assumption of a protectorate over the Moscoes or Mosquito In- 
 dians was indeed flagrant, and was not undeserving of Polk's 
 characterization. Yet no explicit instructions were given to 
 Hise as to his course of procedure, excepting that he was not 
 to make any treaty with Nicaragua, for the reason that the 
 United States, as Buchanan told him, had not yet determined 
 what course it would pursue in regard to the British encroach- 
 ments. He was simply reminded that ' ' the United States would 
 not look with indifference on encroachments of European powers 
 in the domestic affairs of the American republics." 
 
 Hise, however, was possessed of enough of the spirit of some 
 former and greater diplomats not to be fettered by timorous or 
 ill-formed instructions. On reaching Nicaragua he quickly per- 
 ceived the real state of affairs, and his patriotic zeal arose to 
 a high pitch. To his mind the Monroe Doctrine and the pur- 
 pose of the treaty which had just been made with New Granada 
 greatly transcended the instructions which he had received. He 
 therefore hastened from the San Juan coast up to the capital and 
 requested the Nicaraguan government to designate a commis- 
 sioner to negotiate a treaty. The Government was eager to re- 
 spond and Beneventura Silva was named to treat with him. In 
 a short time they prepared and on June 21, 1849, signed a com-
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 435 
 
 prehensive treaty, which granted to the United States or a com- 
 pany of its citizens the exclusive right to construct and operate 
 a transit route across Nicaragua, and to take without cost all 
 lands needed for the purpose. Free ports were to be established 
 at the terminals, but the United States was to construct any 
 fortifications which it might desire along the route. The neu- 
 trality of the canal was to be guaranteed by the United States. 
 This country was, moreover, to guarantee Nicaragua 's sovereignty 
 over all the territory which she claimed, from sea to sea, and 
 was forever to ''protect and defend" that country in its "sov- 
 ereign rights and dominion over the coasts, ports, lakes, rivers, 
 and territory" which were justly within its jurisdiction. 
 
 This was vigorous diplomacy with a vengeance. In general 
 and in detail this treaty traversed and defied the British claims. 
 The recognition of Nicaraguan sovereignty over the Caribbean 
 coast was a flat denial of the British protectorate over the al- 
 leged "Kingdom of Mosquitia," and the constitution of Grey- 
 town into a free port under the protection of American fortifi- 
 fications was blunt notice to the British to abandon their 
 occupation of that town. This treaty was sent home to Wash- 
 ington, but Polk did not submit it to the Senate and it was never 
 ratified. Perhaps that was well, for in the conditions which 
 then prevailed it might easily have led to war. Its terms were 
 made public, however, and commanded universal applause 
 throughout the United States. Polk's term then expired and he 
 left the Presidency without having to explain to the American 
 people his negligence in permitting flagrant British aggressions 
 in Nicaragua, or to Great Britain the meaning of Hise's defiant 
 and pugnacious diplomacy. 
 
 Taylor succeeded Polk as President, with John M. Clayton as 
 his secretary of state. This was a Whig administration, instead 
 of Democratic, as Polk's had been, and the policy of the Gov- 
 ernment was radically changed. Instead of continuing the ex- 
 pansionist and belligerent views which Southern statesmen had 
 indulged, the Northern Whigs now looked at matters with calm, 
 commercial eyes. The isthmian canal scheme was to them a 
 financial rather than a diplomatic enterprise. American capi- 
 talists were eager to invest their money in what they believed 
 would be a profitable undertaking, provided that the Govern-
 
 436 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ment would assure them protection. English capitalists were 
 also ready to join in the work, and indeed their funds would 
 probably be needed. The administration saw, therefore, no rea- 
 son why America and Great Britain should not be partners in 
 the enterprise. Toward such a consummation the first step was 
 the repudiation of Hise. He was recalled and his treaty was dis- 
 avowed. In his place E. G. Squier was sent to the isthmus, 
 with instructions from Clayton to make a new treaty with 
 Nicaragua which would assure ** equal right of transit for all 
 nations through a canal which should be hampered by no re- 
 strictions, either from the local government or from the com- 
 pany which should undertake the work." Above all things, 
 he was "not to involve this country in any entangling alliances, 
 or any unnecessary controversy." Meantime the American Ca- 
 nal Company at Nicaragua had been reorganized and expanded, 
 and was eager to begin work as soon as a satisfactory concession 
 could be secured. 
 
 _§c|uier went to Nicaragua promptly, and he, too, at once be- 
 came possessed of the same spirit that had animated Hise, though 
 it was tempered with more diplomatic discretion. He vigorously 
 resisted and condemned the extravagant British claims, and 
 promoted the interests of the American company to so good pur- 
 pose that on September 23, 1849, it was able to secure the favor- 
 able concession which it desired. It secured the right to con- 
 struct a canal from any point on the Caribbean coast, quite 
 regardless of British pretensions, to any point on the Pacific; 
 to have a monopoly of steam navigation on all Nicaraguan lakes 
 and rivers; and to take land for canal purposes and for Amer- 
 ican colonization. Squier also made a treaty with the Nica- 
 raguan government, in which the company was assured of its 
 right of way from sea to sea, and the neutrality of the canal 
 was guaranteed and Nicaragua's rights of sovereignty were rec- 
 ognized and were to be protected by the United States. A spe- 
 cial clause was inserted, offering similar rights to other nations 
 which might negotiate similar treaties with Nicaragua. Thus Mr. 
 Squier imagined that he had gained substantially the same end 
 that Hise had sought, but in a more diplomatic way and with- 
 out binding the United States to any exclusive control of the 
 canal.
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 437 
 
 At this time, it is to be remembered, the British had actual 
 possession of Grey town, the Caribbean terminal of the route, 
 and they now, while Squier was at work in Nicaragua, began 
 intrigues for gaining possession of the Pacific terminal. This 
 was in the Gulf of Fonseca, upon which not only Nicaragua 
 but also Honduras and Salvador fronted. Honduras owned 
 Tigre and other islands in the gulf, which dominated any possi- 
 ble outlet of the canal in those waters. On the basis of some 
 old claims for debts or damages Great Britain probably hoped 
 to seize some or all of those islands. Getting some inkling of 
 this, the expeditious and intrepid Squier, without waiting for 
 instructions, rushed up into Honduras and on September 28, 
 1849, made a treaty securing land on Tigre Island and on other 
 parts of the shore of the Gulf of Fonseca, for naval stations 
 and fortifications. A protocol was added, ceding the whole of 
 Tigre Island to the United States for a year and a half, pend- 
 ing the ratification of the treaty. The British response to this 
 bold defiance came quickly. A squadron was sent to the Gulf 
 of Fonseca, Tigre Island was seized in alleged satisfaction of 
 claims, and the British flag was raised upon it in token of the 
 sovereignty of the crown. This was on October 16. Squier in- 
 stantly notified the British plenipotentiary, Chatfield, that he 
 had illegally seized land belonging to the United States, and 
 ordered him to evacuate it. Chatfield returned a flat refusal. 
 Squier thereupon told him that if he did not evacuate Tigre 
 Island in six days, his occupancy would thereafter be regarded 
 and dealt with as an act of unfriendly and violent aggression. 
 So close were the nations to war, when diplomacy at Washing- 
 ton intervened to quiet the angry passions which had arisen on 
 the isthmus. 
 
 The Taylor administration at Washington was in an awkward 
 predicament. It was Wliig in politics. But there was a Demo- 
 cratic majority in the Senate. Treaties must therefore be made 
 with foreign countries with a view to the approval of the op- 
 position. If the administration backed down too far from the 
 advanced ground taken by Hise, whom it had repudiated, and 
 by Squier, whom it had commissioned in his place, it would incur 
 the reproach of cowardice in the face of British bullying. On 
 the other hand, if it stood its ground too resolutely, it might
 
 438 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 incur war with Great Britain, which it certairily did not want 
 to do. Clayton, therefore, sought escape from the dilemma by 
 negotiating for an immediate agreement with Great Britain, 
 under which the two nations would cooperate in the construc- 
 tion of the canal. This would, he hoped, gratify those whose 
 chief aim was commercial and who wanted a canal on almost 
 any terms; and he hoped that this sentiment would be strong 
 enough to overcome the opposition which pugnacious and ag- 
 gressive senators would be likely to offer. Secrecy and expedi- 
 tion were essential to the success of the scheme. He therefore 
 took Crampton, the British minister, into his confidence, ex- 
 plained to him the embarrassing plight in which the adminis- 
 tration found itself, and asked him to help it out of it on some 
 terms which would be mutually satisfactory. He suggested that 
 the Hise treaty should be totally abandoned; that Great Britain 
 should so modify her claim to the Mosquito coast as to give 
 the canal a neutral outlet; and that treaties should be made by 
 both powers with Nicaragua giving exclusive rights to neither. 
 The United States, he declared, "sought no exclusive advantage, 
 and rather wished the canal to be a bond of peace between the 
 two countries than a subject of jealousy." 
 
 Abbott Lawrence had then just been appointed minister to 
 Great Britain, but had not started for that country, and as all 
 possible haste was desirable, Clayton directed William C. Rives, 
 who had been appointed minister to France and who was set- 
 ting out thither in advance of Lawrence, to go first to London 
 and lay the matter before Lord Palmerston, the British foreign 
 minister. Rives did so, and secured from Palmerston a most 
 cordial response, to the effect that the British government would 
 regard with favor any plan for making the canal a common 
 highway for all nations. This was not at all surprising, seeing 
 that the United States was practically acquiescing in the Brit- 
 ish claims to the Mosquito coast — nearly all the Caribbean coast 
 of Nicaragua. A little later Lawrence reached London and took 
 up the negotiations which Rives had begun, but proceeded on 
 slightly different lines. He reminded Palmerston that although 
 the United States had an exclusive treaty with New Granada 
 at Panama, yet British and American capitalists were jointly 
 interested and working in the construction of the railroad across
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 439 
 
 that isthmus. Similarly, they should cooperate in the Nicaragua 
 Canal. He further suggested, to complete the parallel, that 
 Great Britain should join the United States on equal terms in 
 the treaty guarantees to New Granada, just as the two nations 
 should unite in such provisions at Nicaragua. In one respect, 
 however, Lawrence did not follow the plan outlined by Clay- 
 ton. He was not willing to concede the British title to the 
 Mosquito coast, or to San Juan (Greytown), which was to be 
 the eastern terminus of the canal. The United States claimed 
 no land at Panama, and so he thought that Great Britain should 
 renounce her claims at Nicaragua. He soon found, however, 
 that Palmerston had no idea of doing any such thing, but meant 
 to hold on to all that Great Britain had claimed. This was, in- 
 deed, the crux of the whole case, as Lawrence presently per- 
 ceived. Great Britain cared far more for the seizure and pos- 
 session of the Nicaraguan coast than for the construction of the 
 canal. This moved Lawrence to look carefully into the ques- 
 tion of the British claims. He went carefully and laboriously 
 through a vast mass of historical documents and records, with 
 the result that he became convinced, as he wrote home to Clay- 
 ton, that the British claim of a protectorate over the Mosquito 
 coast had no basis in history, public law, or justice. 
 
 Clayton, unfortunately, was too intent upon pushing his own 
 plan through to give due weight to Lawrence's findings and 
 recommendations. To enter upon diplomatic discussion of the 
 Mosquito business would mean delay which might be fatal to the 
 canal scheme. So he directed Lawrence to cut the matter short 
 by asking Palmerston whether the British government "in- 
 tended to occupy or colonize Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito 
 coast, or any part of Central America," and also "whether Great 
 Britain would unite with the United States in guaranteeing 
 the neutrality of a ship canal, railway, or other communication, 
 to be open to the world and common to all nations." Law- 
 rence was most reluctant to abandon the ^Tosquito controversy 
 and practically to concede the British claims; but he obeyed 
 orders, and absolved himself of all further responsibility for 
 what he considered a betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine and of 
 American interests. 
 
 Palmerston promptly answered the question which Clayton.
 
 440 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 through Lawrence, put to him. Since Clayton acquiesced in the 
 British seizure of the Mosquito coast, he was quite willing to 
 say that Great Britain had no thought of further occupation or 
 colonization. Being secure in the possession of all it had 
 grabbed, that country was quite willing to cooperate with the 
 United States in the construction of the canal and in the main- 
 tenance of it open to all the world on equal terms. Palmerston, 
 however, determined if possible to reinforce the British posi- 
 tion by securing from the American government not merely a 
 tacit but a categorical recognition of the Mosquito protectorate. 
 Accordingly he added to his answers to Clayton's questions the 
 statement that ''though there existed a close political connec- 
 tion between the Crown of Great Britain and the State and 
 Territory of Mosquito," the British government claimed no do- 
 minion there; and he promised that the British government 
 "would freely undertake to obtain the consent of Mosquito" 
 to arangements which would make that territory and its ports 
 available for the purposes of the desired canal. Of course, if 
 the United States took no exception to this, it would be very ex- 
 plicitly acquiescing in the British pretensions to the Mosquito 
 protectorate. 
 
 Clayton fell into the trap. It may be matter of speculation 
 whether or not he fully appreciated the purport of Palmer- 
 ston 's words and the significance of his own acquiescence in 
 them. At any rate he took no exception to them, but on the 
 contrary declared himself to be fully satisfied with the British 
 reply to his questions. Lawrence doubtless saw the trick and 
 would have resisted and defeated it if he had been permitted 
 to do so. But again Palmerston was too shrewd for the Amer- 
 ican state department. Instead of having the negotiations 
 completed at London, by Lawrence and himself, he proposed to 
 compliment Clayton by sending a special envoy to negotiate di- 
 rectly with him at Washington. To this Clayton agreed, and 
 a particularly astute diplomat, Sir Henry Bulwer, was sent to 
 "Washington expressly to negotiate a treaty on the lines already 
 indicated. Lawrence felt himself rebuked and passed over be- 
 cause of his too zealous regard for American interests ; but could 
 do nothing save to send to Clayton the voluminous report of 
 his researches into the British claims in Mosquitia, with a note
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 441 
 
 of transmittal in which he said, with truthful prophecy, that 
 whenever the history of the conduct of Great Britain should be 
 published to the world, it would not stand for one hour before 
 the bar of public opinion without universal condemnation. His 
 report was laid aside, almost unnoticed ; but in after years it was 
 taken up, verified, and vindicated. 
 
 Clayton and Bulwer promptly began negotiations for a treaty, 
 and from the first the former was overmatched by his wily 
 antagonist. Bulwer reported to Palmerstou that American inter- 
 est in the Mosquito business was solely commercial, and arose 
 merely from Nicaragua's having granted the canal concession 
 to an American company. America and Great Britain would 
 certainly never agree on it if the case were thoroughly discussed, 
 and therefore he thought it best to avoid discussing it. He 
 would give all his attention to making a treaty which would 
 give to American commerce all it desired at Nicaragua, in a 
 manner corresponding with the dignity and honor of Great 
 Britain "and the disinterestedness of her protectorate over the 
 Mosquito territory." Hardly, however, had negotiations on 
 these lines fairly begun when news reached Washington of the 
 British seizure of Tigre Island and the refusal to vacate it at 
 the demand of the American minister who had made a treaty 
 for its occupation by the United States. The Whigs in the Sen- 
 ate, supporting the administration, sought to minimize the im- 
 portance of this incident; but the Democrats, in the majority, 
 insisted upon exploiting it, and upon taking up at once for con- 
 sideration and probable ratification the treaty which Squier had 
 made with Nicaragua and which, if ratified, would preclude any 
 such arrangements as those which Clayton and Bulwer had in 
 view. When the Squier treaty was thus taken up, the senate 
 committee on foreign relations asked the state department for all 
 the correspondence, reports, etc., relating to it. This embar- 
 rassed Clayton. He knew that the examination of the papers 
 by the committee would mean mischief for his negotiations with 
 Bulwer, if indeed it did not mean war with Great Britain. 
 
 Accordingly he declined, or delayed, to give up the papers 
 at that time, on the pretext that the matter to which they re- 
 lated was then under negotiation with the British minister. 
 Then he hurried to Bulwer, disclosed to him his predicament and
 
 442 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 his fears, and begged him to waive formalities and to make a 
 treaty at once. This was a unique performance, the American 
 secretary of state seeking the aid of a foreign envoy against 
 the American senate! Bulwer was without instructions from 
 Palmerston, but he appreciated his opportunity, acted upon his 
 own responsibility, and sought to do as Clayton desired. But 
 the Squier treaty was out of Clayton's reach and in the hands 
 of the Senate. Moreover, Clayton had not ventured to disclaim 
 Squier 's ultimatum to Chatfield concerning Tigre Island. Of 
 course the British government had not disavowed Chatfield 's 
 seizures of that island and his defiance of the United States. 
 But Bulwer shrewdly suggested that such a disavowal would 
 be made, if in return the United States would recognize British 
 rights along the San Juan River and let Great Britain have a 
 half interest in the canal. 
 
 Clayton accepted this suggestion with avidity. He assured 
 Bulwer that the Squier treaty would, if ratified, first be so modi- 
 fied as to be entirely inoffensive and acceptable to Great Britain, 
 provided the latter would keep the Mosquito Indians from inter- 
 fering with the canal. This was exactly in line with Bulwer 's 
 own scheme, and he unhesitatingly agreed to it. He disavowed 
 Chatfield 's seizure of Tigre Island, and Clayton disavowed 
 Squier 's ultimatum. Then they set to work to draft the treaty 
 which has ever since borne their names. 
 
 When the first rough draft was made, Bulwer insisted that 
 it must be sent to London, for Palmerston 's approval. The de- 
 lay was agonizing to Clayton, but had to be endured. The fact 
 was known to Clayton's colleagues in the cabinet that a treaty 
 was being negotiated, though its proposed terms were kept se- 
 cret, and they urged him to insist, as a prerequisite to any 
 agreement concerning the canal, that Great Britain should 
 abandon the Mosquito protectorate. Clayton replied that he 
 had attended to that phase of the situation satisfactorily, and 
 it soon appeared that he had indeed done so, but it was to 
 the satisfaction of Great Britain rather than of the United 
 States. The treaty as drafted by Bulwer was approved by Pal- 
 merston, and the instrument was thereupon completed and 
 signed, on April 19, 1850. It was sent to the Senate for rati- 
 fication, and was rushed through that body with little debate
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 443 
 
 or consideration, senators accepting the assurance that Great 
 Britain had forever abandoned her policy of encroachment. Of 
 course it was an inspiring idea that the two great nations were 
 harmoniously to cooperate in the doing of an unprecedented 
 work for the commerce of the world. The ratification of the 
 treaty was therefore hailed with much enthusiasm, and Clayton 
 won for a time much popularity. 
 
 The treaty provided that neither of the two countries should 
 ever obtain or exercise exclusive control over the proposed canal, 
 or build fortifications along its route ; that neither should ever 
 take possession of any part of Central America, or fortify it, 
 or establish colonies there, or exert any dominion, or make use 
 of any alliance or protectorate to that end; that they should 
 mutually guard the neutrality and safety of the canal, and in- 
 vite other nations to do the same; that they should jointly pro- 
 tect and support any satisfactory company in the construction 
 of the canal; and that the same general principles were to be 
 extended to any other transit route across the isthmus, at Pan- 
 ama, Tehuantepec, or elsewhere. Unfortunately, its language 
 in places was so vague as to give rise to much uncertainty and 
 dispute as to its interpretation. Clayton appears to have 
 thought that it would require Great Britain to renounce her 
 claims upon the Mosquito coast. If so, he was soon unde- 
 ceived. Bulwer wrote him a note, giving the British interpre- 
 tation of the treaty, to the effect that it did not apply to the 
 British settlement at Honduras, or Belize, "or its dependen- 
 cies." To this Clayton agreed. He was quite willing to admit 
 that the treaty did not interfere with British rights in Hon- 
 duras, and he wrote to King, the chairman of the foreign rela- 
 tions committee of the Senate, asking him to confirm that 
 principle. King had not seen the text of Bulwer 's note, and 
 he accordingly replied that "the Senate perfectly understood 
 that the treaty did not include British Honduras." He cau- 
 tiously added, however, that Clayton in his reply to Bulwer 
 "should be careful not to use any expression which would seem 
 to recognize the right of England to any portion of Honduras" 
 — meaning outside of British Honduras, or Belize. Clayton 
 then wrote to Bulwer that British Honduras was exempted from 
 the terms of the treaty, but he carefully declined either to af-
 
 444 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 firm or to deny the British title to that settlement or its al- 
 leged dependencies. The treaty was thereupon ratified, and the 
 ratifications were exchanged, and it was promulgated without 
 being understood. Clayton filed away in the archives of the 
 state department the note from Bulwer and his reply to it, and 
 these remained unknown to the Senate and to the President. 
 
 A few weeks later President Taylor died and was succeeded 
 by the vice-president, Millard Fillmore, and Daniel Webster be- 
 came secretary of state in Clayton's place. This change caused 
 Bulwer some apprehension, lest the Squier treaty should be 
 brought forward again, and he accordingly went to "Webster 
 and reminded him of Clayton's promise that, in return for the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty, certain parts of the Squier treaty should 
 be dropped. Webster felt himself bound by his predecessor's 
 promise, and accordingly assured Bulwer that no further ac- 
 tion would be taken in that matter. Soon afterward Congress 
 adjourned, and the Squier and Hise treaties both perished. 
 The canal company proceeded with its surveys under joint Brit- 
 ish and. American patronage, and for a time there were expecta- 
 tions that it would be successful. 
 
 Great Britain, however, soon demonstrated in a practical way 
 her interpretation of the treaty, as not at all interfering with 
 her pretensions and designs on the Mosquito coast, which was 
 what Bulwer had shrewdly referred to as one of the * ' dependen- 
 cies" of British Honduras, to which the treaty did not apply. 
 A British warship promptly proceeded to San Juan, or Grey- 
 town, and landed a force of marines. Chatfield informed the 
 astonished Nicaraguan authorities that this was done under the 
 terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which recognized the claims 
 of the Mosquito "King" and the British protectorate, and de- 
 nied wholly the claims of Nicaragua. He added that the Mos- 
 quito "Kingdom" extended from Honduras to the San Juan 
 River, and he advised the Nicaraguans to place themselves un- 
 der the patronage of Great Britain, as able to do far more for 
 them than the United States. A little later an American vessel, 
 the Prometheus, arrived at Greytown, and British custom-house 
 officers tried to collect from her some port dues. The captain 
 refused them, an English man-of-war fired upon the ship, and 
 the agent of the canal company appealed to the United States
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 445 
 
 government for protection and redress. Webster took the mat- 
 ter up, promptly and vigorously, with the result that a sharp 
 issue was drawn between the two countries over the interpreta- 
 tion of a treaty which was not yet a year old. 
 
 Meanwhile, having done all the mischief he could in Nica- 
 ragua, Chatfield went to Costa Rica. That State was half un- 
 friendly to Nicaragua and not cordial toward the United States, 
 and therefore it lent a ready ear to his suggestions. He made 
 a treaty of amity and commerce, which was harmless enough 
 in its terms, but which encouraged Costa Rica to assume an 
 aggressive attitude toward Nicaragua, and to demand of the 
 United States a recognition of her equal share with Nicaragua 
 in the canal enterprise ; this latter claim being based upon the 
 perfectly plausible ground that Costa Rica o^vned half of the 
 San Juan River, There thus arose a quarrel between Nicaragua 
 and Costa Rica, in which Honduras and Salvador joined the 
 former and Guatemala the latter. Open hostilities did not oc- 
 cur, but Central American politics and diplomacy fell into hope- 
 less confusion. 
 
 The Government at Washington was much concerned over 
 these things, but gave its first attention to settling accounts with 
 Great Britain. Webster plumply demanded a distinct disavowal 
 of the attempt to collect port dues from the Prametlieus and 
 of the firing upon that vessel. Palmerston had now been suc- 
 ceeded in the British foreign office by the more suave and sub- 
 tle Granville, and the latter deemed it politic to yield on what 
 was after all a miuor point. So he replied that both the acts 
 complained of had been committed without the authority of the 
 British government. This was accepted as satisfactory, and 
 Webster then took up with Crampton, who had resumed his du- 
 ties as British minister at Washington after Bulwer's departure, 
 the questions which had been raised by Costa Rica. As a re- 
 sult of their negotiations, a basis of settlement was agreed upon. 
 Under this, a reservation of territory was to be made for the 
 Indians on the Mosquito Shore, in which the Indians were to 
 enjoy complete autonomy, and for three years Nicaragua was 
 to pay them a small tribute. The municipal government of 
 Greytown was to be surrendered to Nicaragua, but the port, 
 as a port of entry, was to be under the administration of the
 
 446 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 canal company, under British and American joint protection. 
 Costa Rica was to have the boundary adjusted in accordance 
 with her claims. This scheme was readily accepted by Costa 
 Rica, but Nicaragua revolted against it. She considered her- 
 self betrayed and abandoned by the United States, to which she 
 had confidently looked for protection under the Monroe Doctrine, 
 and she not only rejected the basis of settlement but issued a 
 formal protest against any further meddling in her domestic af- 
 fairs by foreign powers. The plan devised by Webster and 
 Crampton was therefore abandoned, and Great Britain was left 
 in possession of practically the whole coast of Nicaragua. 
 
 The controversy was then shifted to Roatan and the other 
 Bay Islands, in the Bay of Honduras, north of the Mosquito 
 coast. These had been seized by the British in 1841, but had 
 since been so neglected that it was not clear whether Great 
 Britain still claimed them or not. Americans had settled there, 
 and one of them, "William Fitzgibbon, had been elected by the 
 Carib-Negro inhabitants to be their chief. Against this the Eng- 
 lish settlers protested, and a British warship was sent thither 
 and Fitzgibbon was deposed. Then, on July 17, 1852, a for- 
 mal proclamation was made by the British government, that the 
 ** Colony of the Bay Islands" had been created, with a governor 
 and assembly, under the British crown. "When news of this 
 reached the United States there was much indignation, and on 
 the reopening of Congress in December, 1852, a vigorous dis- 
 cussion of it arose. To bring the matter to a climax, Clayton's 
 acceptance of Bulwer's adroit reservation concerning the treaty 
 was brought to light and was laid before the astounded and 
 embarrassed Senate. A profound sensation was created, when 
 senators for the first time realized what they had done in rati- 
 fying that treaty. Many senators rose and avowed that this was 
 the first they had known of Bulwer's note and Clayton's reply. 
 Some blamed Clayton ; others, King. But all these protestations 
 and personal recriminations amounted to nothing in the face of 
 the fact that the treaty had been ratified and was now a part 
 of the supreme law of the land. 
 
 The Senate promptly set to work to devise, if possible, some 
 way out of the predicament into which it had fallen. It could 
 not deny the British right to all the ''dependencies" of British
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 447 
 
 Honduras. But it did want to deny that right to the Mosquito 
 coast and the Bay Islands. Therefore it must prove, if pos- 
 sible, that those re^ons were not "dependencies" of British 
 Honduras. The committee on foreign relations addressed itself 
 to this task, with all the ingenuity at its command, and suc- 
 ceeded in framing on historical grounds a pretty good case, 
 convincing at least to itself, and thereupon adopted a resolution 
 declaring that the establishment of a British colony in the Bay 
 Islands and British control of the Mosquito coast were both 
 in violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. But this had, of 
 course, no effect, save to put upon the state department and its 
 diplomats the task of persuading Great Britain to acquiesce 
 in it. 
 
 It was now the early part of 1853. Franklin Pierce was 
 entering upon his administration as President, William L. Marcy 
 was secretary of state, and James Buchanan was minister to 
 Great Britain. Solon Borland was sent to Central America, 
 with instructions to win back Nicaragua to friendship with this 
 country by insisting upon respect for the Clayton-Bulwer treaty 
 as our Senate's resolution had just interpreted it, namely, as 
 meaning that Great Britain was to recede from the Mosquito 
 shore, to renounce her protectorate over the Indians there, and 
 to make no attempt to colonize any part of Central America. 
 On reaching Greytown he found passions running high between 
 the American Canal Company and the British-Mosquito author- 
 ities, the latter having demanded certain things which the former 
 refused to grant. The captain of one of the company's steam- 
 ers, Smith by name, killed a Mosquito Negro in an affray, and 
 took refuge from arrest in the house of the American consul, 
 where Borland was also living. The house was attacked by a 
 mob, and the passengers and crew of the Northern Light, an 
 American merchantman, came ashore to protect it, but were 
 fired upon and driven back; taking Borland and Smith with 
 them to the vessel. A volunteer guard was then placed over the 
 canal company's office, and the Northern Light, with Borland 
 and Smith aboard, hastened back to the United States. As soon 
 as the doings at Greytown were known at Washington, the 
 sloop of war Cijane was sent thither to protect American inter- 
 ests and to demand redress for the deeds of the mob. Its cap-
 
 448 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tain, Hollins, on his arrival demanded from the town authorities 
 indemnity for the attack upon the consulate. This was refused. 
 Then he went to the commander of the one British warship 
 which was in the harbor and told him that unless the satisfac- 
 tion demanded were given he would bombard the place. The 
 British commander protested against such action, but did noth- 
 ing more. Hollins then, after giving the inhabitants a day's 
 notice, and offering them all safe conveyance to the adjacent 
 American settlement of Punta Arenas, bombarded Greytown, 
 and afterward landed marines to burn and destroy all that was 
 left of the place. This was on July 9, 1854. The Americans 
 then organized a provisional government, to control the port. 
 
 Meantime Buchanan went to London, with instructions sim- 
 ilar to Borland's, and presented the American view of the Clay- 
 ton-Bulwer treaty to Lord Clarendon. The United States, he 
 said, would not dispute certain British rights in British Hon- 
 duras ; but it would insist that the Mosquito protectorate should 
 be entirely abandoned, and that the Bay Islands should be sur- 
 rendered to Honduras, as they were in no sense "dependen- 
 cies" of Belize. These demands, Buchanan insisted, were justi- 
 fied by the plain meaning of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. To 
 this Clarendon replied at great length and with much detail of 
 historic facts and circumstances. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
 he argued, did not require relinquishment of existing possessions 
 but merely forbade further acquisition of territory in Central 
 America. Therefore it did not call for British abandonment of 
 the Mosquito protectorate ; or of Belize, which the United States 
 had recognized to be British territory by sending a consul 
 thither. The Bay Islands, he insisted, were in fact depend- 
 encies of Belize. In conclusion, he declared that the British 
 government would not recognize the Monroe Doctrine as a prin- 
 ciple of international law, and would engage in no further dis- 
 cussion of British rights in Central America. 
 
 This brought matters to a deadlock, which might fittingly 
 have been solved by abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
 for the ample cause that there was an irreconcilable difference 
 of opinion as to its essential interpretation. That would have 
 been an honorable and amicable course, but it was not taken. 
 If indeed the United States had simply moved in that direc-
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 449 
 
 tion it is not improbable that Great Britain would have yielded 
 and would have agreed to an interpretation or a modification 
 satisfactory to the United States. For Great Britain was just 
 then entering upon the conflict with Russia which culminated 
 the next year in the Crimean War, and she would have been 
 most reluctant to break the peace with the United States. But 
 if the treaty was to be abrogated or revised the initiative would 
 have to be taken by this country, for Great Britain was quite 
 content to stand by her own interpretation. The United 
 States did not, however, take such initiative. Instead, many 
 violent anti-British speeches were made in Congress, and much 
 popular ill-feeling against the United Kingdom was engendered. 
 A little later British authorities resorted to the quite unjusti- 
 fiable practice of enlisting recruits in the United States for the 
 British army in the war against Russia. Our government or- 
 dered this stopped, and both powers strengthened their fleets in 
 "West Indian waters. 
 
 The United States did much worse than to neglect the oppor- 
 tunity, almost the duty, to abrogate or modify the Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty. It entered upon, or at least openly counte- 
 nanced, a course of aggression in the West Indies and Central 
 America which belied its professions and was little short of 
 criminal. The slavery question, as a sectional issue, was rap- 
 idly becoming acute, and the pro-slavery leaders were looking 
 about in frantic desperation for new slave territory in addition 
 to that which had been wrested from Mexico. 
 
 Opportunely for them, a serious domestic conflict arose in 
 Nicaragua between Conservatives and Liberals, and the latter, 
 being the pro-American party, called upon Americans for aid. 
 Response was made by William Walker, a Southerner, who had 
 already become widely known as the leader of a filibustering 
 expedition which unsuccessfully invaded Lower California. 
 This "gray-eyed man of destiny," as he was called, hastened to 
 Nicaragua in June, 1855, with fifty-eight other American ad- 
 venturers. He assumed the leadership of the Liberal forces, 
 and in three months secured possession of the capital and con- 
 trol of most of the country. The Conservative government was 
 ousted and a new government was formed in its place, with 
 Patricio Rivas, a native, as president, but with Walker in real 
 
 VOL. 1—29
 
 ^ 
 
 450 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 control as commander of the forces. Then one Kinney, an- 
 other adventurer, who was supposed to be working in the Brit- 
 ish interest, landed on the Mosquito coast and organized a force 
 of Indians and Negroes, with which to oppose "Walker. On 
 hearing of this. Walker hastened thither and drove him out of 
 the country. This victory united all Americans in Nicaragua 
 in enthusiastic support of Walker. The United States diplo- 
 matic agent, John H. Wheeler, who had succeeded Borland at 
 Greytown, officially recognized the Rivas- Walker government, 
 and P. H. French, one of Walker's fellow-filibusters, was ap- 
 pointed Nicaraguan minister to the United States. 
 
 This put the President in an awkward dilemma. If he recog- 
 nized and received French, he would be countenancing Walker's 
 scheme for annexing Nicaragua to the United States after the 
 fashion of Texas, and that would enrage the Free State party in 
 this country and precipitate the sectional conflict which was 
 already menacing. On the other hand if he did not receive him, 
 he would be accused of cowardice and betrayal of the Amer- 
 ican cause on the isthmus in the face of British aggressions. 
 He finally elected to temporize, by having Marcy politely de- 
 cline to receive French until he could be assured that the new 
 government in Nicaragua, which the latter represented, was 
 accepted by the people of that country and was likely to be 
 stable and efficient. This was obviously the correct course to 
 pursue. But it offended and infuriated Walker. That fire-eat- 
 ing Southerner discerned in it, he thought, the influence of 
 Northern anti-slavery propagandists, even of the Northern capi- 
 talists of the canal company. In consequence, he had Rivas, 
 who was his facile tool, on February 18, 1856, issue a decree 
 annulling the charter of that company, and then seize all the 
 company's property for debts. The officers of the company 
 called upon the United States for protection, but the Government 
 hesitated, as if uncertain what to do. 
 
 At this juncture a strong force from Costa Rica entered 
 Nicaragua, defeated Walker, and seized all the property of the 
 canal company. It was suspected that this was done at Brit- 
 ish incitement, if not with direct British aid, and this suspicion 
 was vigorously promoted by Walker's partizans. The result 
 was that another outburst of anti-British passion occurred in
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 451 
 
 Congress and throughout the nation. The Monroe Doctrine 
 was rehearsed, the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was 
 demanded — but not actually undertaken — and a new minister 
 from Nicaragua in French's place, Father Augustin Virgil, was 
 received at Washington, Thinking himself thus sure of the 
 support of the United States, Walker then threw off his mask 
 and revealed his real purpose. He deposed his puppet Rivas, 
 and had himself declared dictator by the troops — ostensibly 
 "elected president" by those parts of the country which were 
 under army control. Then he issued a decree annulling the 
 national law which had abolished and forever prohibited slavery 
 in Nicaragua. But in his expectations of material support from 
 the Southern States he was grievously disappointed. The 
 crime was too flagrant; and the sectional controversy here was 
 too grave to permit any such campaign for more slave territory. 
 The United States abandoned him to his fate, and the Nica- 
 raguans of all parties united against him and called upon the 
 neighboring States to help them to drive from the land this 
 would-be conqueror. An allied army of all the Central Amer- 
 ican States except Costa Rica soon defeated Walker and be- 
 sieged him in a town on the Pacific coast. Before he could be 
 captured, however. President Pierce, desperately seeking to clear 
 up the dreadful mess into which the Government was getting 
 in its Central American relations, hurried a vessel thither, to 
 the commander of which Walker surrendered. With the con- 
 sent of the allies the filibuster was taken to New Orleans for 
 trial. This left Costa Rica, which alone had taken no part with 
 the other allies against Walker, in possession of the canal route 
 and the company's property, to which state of affairs Nicaragua 
 objected, and a renewal of hostilities was imminent. At this 
 Walker forfeited his bail in New Orleans, and returned to 
 Nicaragua with nearly two hundred Southern filibusters. As 
 soon as he landed, he was seized by Commodore Paulding, of the 
 United States navy, and the whole party was brought back to 
 New York. 
 
 About this time, in 1856, the Democratic National Convention 
 met at Cincinnati to nominate a Presidential candidate. Pierce 
 was discarded, partly because he had failed to support the 
 Nicaraguan filibusters, and Buchanan was nominated in his
 
 452 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 place, on a platform which strove to minimize the slavery ques- 
 tion at home by exploiting the importance of foreign affairs; 
 declared that the Monroe Doctrine must be upheld, the isthmian 
 transit route be controlled by us, and our ascendancy in the 
 Gulf of Mexico be assured; and expressed sympathy with 
 Walker and his fellow-filibusters in their efforts "to regener- 
 ate that portion of the continent." Buchanan of course ap- 
 proved these sentiments, and on becoming President he refused 
 to hold Walker and the others as prisoners, and actually sent 
 a message to Congress condemning Commodore Paulding for 
 arresting them ! With such encouragement Walker made a tour 
 of the South, organized a third band of filibusters intent on the 
 extension of slavery, and in June, 1860, returned to Central 
 America, He landed on the Bay Island of Roatan, still in 
 British possession. A Honduran force hastened against him, 
 and he was captured while trying to get into Nicaragua. The 
 Honduran authorities tried him by court martial, and con- 
 demned him to death; and he was shot at Truxillo on Septem- 
 ber 12, 1860. 
 
 Meantime, while the United States was giving its attention 
 to these follies and crimes, British diplomacy was active and 
 British aggression was inexorable. Great Britain had held its 
 ground in both Nicaragua and Honduras, but by refraining for 
 a time from further advance was able to present a contrast to the 
 United States and its filibusters; so that both Nicaragua and 
 Honduras began to look upon that country rather than the 
 United States as their friend. Honduras made two treaties in 
 1856, under which the Bay Islands were to be made ''a free 
 territory," distinct from her sovereignty, and concessions were 
 granted for a British railroad line across Honduras from sea 
 to sea, the neutrality of which was to be guaranteed by Great 
 Britain, though not under exclusive British control. The 
 British protectorate over the Mosquito Indians in Honduras was 
 to be withdrawn, but the Indians were to have an independent 
 reservation of their own. At about this time Buchanan sent 
 George M. Dallas to be minister to Great Britain, and a treaty 
 was presently negotiated which on its face seemed to be a vic- 
 tory for America. Great Britain was to abandon her protec- 
 torate over the Mosquito Indians in both Honduras and
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 453 
 
 Nicaragua, and instead of it was to make arrangements in 
 their behalf which would be satisfactory to the United States; 
 the limits of Belize were to be defined ; and the Bay Islands were 
 to be given back to Honduras. But — and this was the winning 
 card for Great Britain — all this was to be conditioned upon 
 Honduras 's ratification — and our acquiescence in — the two 
 treaties which the British government had just made with that 
 country. 
 
 Happily, the United States Senate was able to tell a hawk 
 from a handsaw. It saw through this shrewd British trick and 
 amended the treaty which Dallas made by striking out that con- 
 ditional clause. Then the British government declined to ac- 
 cept it, offering instead a new basis of settlement, on which 
 the Bay Islands would be recognized as a part of Honduras as 
 soon as Honduras would make a treaty accepting the cession of 
 them, subject to certain provisions and conditions to be set forth 
 in that treaty. This was practically a proposal that we should 
 sanction in advance a set of provisions and conditions the pur- 
 port of which was entirely unknown. Manifestly, the Senate 
 could not agree to this, and Honduras, too, concluded that she 
 could not ratify the treaties which she had made. So all these 
 negotiations ended in vanity and vexation of spirit. 
 
 In December, 1857, in his annual message to Congress, 
 Buchanan directly suggested the abrogation of the Clayton-Bul- 
 wer treaty, in a temperate manner. "When two nations," he 
 said, "like Great Britain and the United States, mutually de- 
 sirous as they are of maintaining the most friendly relations 
 with each other, have unfortunately concluded a treaty which 
 they understood in senses directly opposite, the wisest course is 
 to abrogate such treaty by mutual consent and to commence 
 anew." That was no surprise to the British government, for 
 Buchanan had made no secret of his purpose to make such a 
 recommendation. Indeed, some time before, Lord Napier, the 
 British minister at Washington, had written home that an at- 
 tempt would be made at the next session gf Congress to abrogate 
 the treaty, and that Buchanan and his cabinet were in favor of 
 such action. The British government, however, did not want 
 that treaty to be abrogated, and did not mean that it should be, 
 if it could prevent it. Napier therefore exerted all his diplo-
 
 454 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 matie skill against it, and was effectively supported by his gov- 
 ernment. Taking advantage of the death of Walker, the end of 
 filibustering, and the restoration of tranquillity to Central 
 America except for a little friction on the Nicaragua-Costa 
 Rica boundary, Sir William Ouseley was sent to Central America 
 as a special representative of the British crown, to play the part 
 of a general peacemaker and to compose all the lingering dis- 
 putes among the States. 
 
 Napier, in reporting to Buchanan's secretary of state. General 
 Lewis Cass, the mission of Ouseley, suggested that the differ- 
 ences between the two governments might be settled in either 
 of two ways. One was, to submit the disputed points of the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty to arbitration; the arbitrator, however, 
 to be some European power — which would have meant in ad- 
 vance defeat for the United States. The other was, to abrogate 
 the treaty and return to the status quo of 1852, in which the 
 United States would practically recognize British sovereignty 
 over Belize, the Bay Islands, and the Mosquito coast, and thus 
 practically surrender the whole American case. The presenta- 
 tion of these alternatives considerably cooled Buchanan's ardor 
 for abrogation, and he listened meekly to Napier's further sug- 
 gestion that he should trust the good intentions of Great Britain, 
 and that in this forthcoming message he should say nothing 
 that might lead to immediate abrogation, since such action 
 would probably frustrate Ouseley 's benevolent mission and 
 ' ' have a calamitous influence on the future relations of England 
 and America." Buchanan walked into the trap, and, credu- 
 lously imagining that the British government would accept the 
 American interpretation of the treaty, said nothing in his mes- 
 sage in favor of abrogation. 
 
 Ouseley found Central America quiescent, the five States in- 
 clined to draw together for their general good, and all some- 
 what ill-disposed toward the United States and therefore favor- 
 ably disposed toward Great Britain. The result of his mission 
 was the making of three treaties, all highly favorable to the 
 British claims and designs. One, with Guatemala, trebled the 
 area of Belize and confirmed the British title to it. The second, 
 with Honduras, restored to that country the nominal ownership 
 of the Bay Islands, but imposed this condition, that Honduras
 
 ISTHMIAN INTERESTS 455 
 
 should never surrender them on any terms to any other power. 
 Under the third, with Nicaragua, Great Britain nominally 
 withdrew from her protectorate over the Mosquito Indians and 
 surrendered that coast to Nicaragua, but stipulated that a reser- 
 vation should be set apart for the Indians comprising a great 
 stretch of coast, in which the Indians were to have complete 
 local self-government; Greytown was to be a free port; and 
 all land grants which the Indians had made to Englishmen were 
 to be confirmed. Thus Nicaragua was trapped into conceding 
 Great Britain's right to intervene between her and the Mos- 
 quito Indians. 
 
 The British government promptly communicated these treaties 
 to the United States, with an expression of hope that they 
 would meet with approval and would finally settle all differences 
 over the interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Bu- 
 chanan again walked into the trap, and announced to Congress 
 that "a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this Govern- 
 ment" had been effected. As a matter of fact, the United States 
 lost practically all for which it had contended, while Great 
 Britain gained nearly all at which she had aimed. The Central 
 American States were put into the position of receiving from 
 Great Britain, as grants of her bounty, the very things which 
 they and we had formerly declared to be their own by original 
 right and title. The project of a canal across the isthmus was 
 dismissed to the indefinite future. And then the Civil War 
 in the United States came on, during which our Government 
 had little time to give to the petty politics of Central America.
 
 XVII 
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 
 
 AMERICAN relations with the lands of the Pacific began 
 at an early date, though it was many years before they 
 reached an important stage of development. In the year fol- 
 lowing the making of peace at the end of the revolution, an 
 American ship first entered the Chinese port of Canton. This 
 was on August 30, 1784. The ship was named The Empress of 
 China, in compliment to the country it was to visit, it hailed 
 from New York, and it was commanded by Captain John Green. 
 The supercargo, Samuel Shaw, wrote home to John Jay, the 
 secretary of foreign affairs of the Congress of the Confederation, 
 that the American flag had been treated with respect by the 
 Chinese, and that because of this visit Americans had been 
 placed "in a more conspicuous point of view than has com- 
 monly attended the introduction of other nations" into China. 
 The vessel had been saluted cordially by two French men-of- 
 war in the Straits of Sunda, and on its arrival at Canton, or 
 Macao, it was similarly greeted by all the foreign vessels which 
 were assembled there. The officers of these vessels and of the 
 various European establishments visited the ship and made it 
 plain that they recognized the United States as a new sovereign 
 power in commerce as well as in war or politics. The Chinese 
 were naturally at a loss to understand the difference between 
 Americans and Englishmen, since both spoke the same language 
 and dressed in the same garb. They were able, however, to 
 appreciate the significance of a map of North America, which 
 was shown to them, and they expressed much pleasure at 
 the establishment of commercial intercourse with so extensive 
 and populous a country. Thereafter many American vessels 
 sought that part of the world. ''They plowed the wide ocean 
 in every direction," says Gutzlaff, the German historian. Ships 
 
 bound for Canton by way of the Atlantic and Indian oceans 
 
 456
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 457 
 
 touched on the way at ports of Africa, India, and the Dutch 
 East Indies, and did much commerce there. Those going by 
 way of Cape Horn engaged largely in the fur trade, taking seal 
 and other skins from both the south and the north Pacific to 
 China, where there was always an insatiable market for them. 
 In a few years, indeed, Americans secured almost a monopoly 
 of the fur trade on the Pacific. In 1801 they carried to Canton 
 no fewer than 427,000 seal skins. 
 
 It was on the strength of the report which was made to him 
 by Shaw, the supercargo of that first American ship at Canton, 
 that Jay, on January 20, 1786, recommended to Congress con- 
 sideration of the propriety of appointing consular officers at 
 Canton and other Chinese ports. The suggestion was favorably 
 received, and seven days later Shaw was made consul at Canton. 
 No salary or perquisites were attached to the office, but Jay, 
 in his letter transmitting the commission, remarked that ''so 
 distinguished a mark of the confidence and esteem of the United 
 States" would naturally give its recipient a great degree of 
 ''weight and respectability" in China. Shaw was a man of 
 fine character and high ability, who had served with distinction 
 in the Revolution, and he was admirably fitted to be the first 
 official representative of his country in the great Oriental Em- 
 pire. At that time foreign vessels were not permitted to go 
 directly to Canton. They halted at the Portuguese settlement 
 of Macao, and there received special permission to proceed to 
 Whampoa, fourteen miles from Canton, where they were com- 
 pelled to be moored and to send their cargoes in native boats 
 to a market place outside the walls of Canton. There the bar- 
 gaining with Chinese merchants was done, and cargoes for the 
 return voyage were secured by purchase or barter. Shaw re- 
 ported that the Chinese merchants were punctual, exact, jealous 
 of their good repute, and "a set of as respectable men as are 
 commonly found in other ports of the world." Shaw died in 
 1794, while returning to the United States for a visit, and was 
 succeeded by Samuel Snow, who had much difficulty in get- 
 ting permission from the Portuguese government for him to 
 live at Macao. Such permission had to be granted specially to 
 each foreigner who wished to reside there, and it was granted 
 only through the application of the secretary of state. Snow
 
 458 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 made application in due form, but never, apparently, received 
 the permit. But he remained there on sufferance for ten 
 years. In 1804 Edward Carrington succeeded to the place, and 
 found that even in those remote regions British warships were 
 searching American vessels and impressing members of their 
 crews. 
 
 When the "War of 1812 came on, American trade with Canton 
 nearly ceased. There were some exchanges of prisoners be- 
 tween British and American vessels at Macao, and one British 
 ship, the Doris, cruised for a time off that port, to seize all 
 American ships which might approach. This gave great offense 
 to the Chinese authorities, who told the commander of the Doris 
 that if the British and Americans wanted to fight, or had any 
 quarrels to settle, they must go elsewhere to do it and not violate 
 the neutrality of Chinese waters. The commander refused to 
 take the hint, and remained there and continued his seizures; 
 at which the Chinese suspended all dealings with British mer- 
 chants. After the war commerce rapidly revived and continued 
 undisturbed until 1821, when a tragic incident occurred. An 
 Italian member of the crew of an American vessel — the Ter- 
 ranova — accidentally dropped a heavy earthen jar over the side 
 of the ship, which fell upon and killed a Chinese woman in a 
 > boat. The captain of the ship refused to surrender the man 
 for trial ashore, but offered to let the authorities come aboard 
 the ship and try him there. The Chinese thereupon invaded 
 the ship in force, took the man ashore, tried, condemned, and 
 executed him, and returned his body to the ship. During this 
 incident all trade with Americans was suspended, but after the 
 execution the viceroy issued an edict reopening trade, arguing 
 in vindication of his course, and saying : "In every similar case 
 foreigners ought to give up murderers, and thus they will act 
 in a manner becoming the tenderness and gracious kindness 
 with which the Celestial Empire treats them." No action was 
 taken by the American government concerning this, but the in- 
 cident was remembered and had weight when formal treaty 
 relations were established between the two countries. 
 
 China was not, however, to be the first Asiatic country to 
 enter into treaty relations with the United States. Various 
 depredations upon American commerce in the Indian seas, cul-
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 459 
 
 minating in the plundering of the ship Friendship and the mur- 
 der of her crew by natives of Sumatra in 1831, moved the 
 American government to send Edmund Roberts of New Hamp- 
 shire as a special envoy to observe the conditions of commerce 
 in that part of the world and to make such treaties or other 
 arrangements as would conduce to its greater security. He went 
 on this errand, in the United States ship Peacock, accompanied 
 by a naval schooner, in 1832. Going by the way of the Cape 
 of Good Hope he went first to Manila and Canton. On reach- 
 ing the latter port, it was observed that his ship was not a 
 merchantman, but "had on board an unusual number of sea- 
 men, cannon, and weapons." Whereupon, said the imperial 
 commissioner in a decree, ''she is not allowed, under any pre- 
 text, to anchor and create disturbances. Let her be driven 
 away! The captain is not allowed to frame excuses, linger 
 about, and create disturbances, and so involve offenses. Let the 
 day of her departure be reported. Haste! Haste!" Roberts 
 took no notice of this, however, but remained at Canton, or 
 Macao, for six weeks. His ship, he said, could have destroyed 
 the whole Chinese fleet. 
 
 From Canton he went to Anara and Cochin China, but would 
 not submit to the humiliating formalities which were demanded 
 as precedent to the making of a treaty, and so accomplished 
 nothing there. There was, however, a fine touch of humor in 
 his brief intercourse with the Anamese government. He was 
 asked what titles of nobility he bore, and replied that he had 
 none. He was then told that nobody could approach a minister 
 of state who had not at least a number of titles equal to his. 
 At this Roberts confessed that he had a few titles, which he 
 would humbly submit, and to the bewildered scribe he enumer- 
 ated them as follows: "Edmund Roberts, a special envoy from 
 the United States, a citizen of Portsmouth, in the State of New 
 Hampshire; of Rockingham, Coos, Strafford," etc., naming all 
 the counties of the State; "of Nashua, Concord, IManchester, " 
 etc., naming all the cities; "of Merrimack, Ammonoosuc, 
 Androscoggin," etc., naming all the rivers; "of Monadnock, 
 Winnepesaukee, Chocorua," etc., enumerating all the lakes, 
 mountains, and what not that he could recall ; and he was about 
 to proceed with various other catalogues when the officials de-
 
 460 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 clared that the list already far exceeded that of the most distin- 
 guished nobleman in the empire; if not of the emperor himself! 
 So there was no further question of Roberts's rank and worth. 
 
 In the neighboring Kingdom of Siam he was received in a 
 more hospitable and reasonable manner, characteristic of the 
 amiable people of that land, and in the course of a few weeks 
 was able to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce. This 
 was signed on March 20, 18837and was the first treaty ever made 
 by the United States with an Asiatic power. It was written in 
 both English and Siamese, but as the Americans could not un- 
 derstand Siamese and the Siamese knew no English, there were 
 appended Portuguese and Chinese translations. This treaty re- 
 moved various difficulties from the way of trade, abolished some 
 barbarous rules, and not only placed American commerce with 
 Siam upon a friendly basis but established cordial relations 
 between the two countries, which have ever since continued. 
 
 From Siam, Roberts went to various ports on the Malay 
 Peninsula, but made no treaties, though presents were given 
 to various potentates and civilities were exchanged. Thence he 
 proceeded to Muscat, whose sultan ruled over a large and rich 
 empire, extending from the Persian Gulf to Zanzibar, whose 
 merchantmen conducted commerce with all countries between 
 Manila and the Cape of Good Hope, and whose navy was by 
 far the most formidable in all that part of the world. Here he 
 was received in a manner gratefully contrasting with that which 
 had prevailed in the lands of the Far East. There was none 
 of the "abasing, crawling, and crouching, and 'knocking head,' 
 like a parcel of slaves; but all was manly, and every one stood 
 on his feet." The sultan was a man and he received his visitor 
 as a man. Their intercourse was straightforward and practical, 
 and soon produced results. A treaty was made with little diffi- 
 culty and no needless delay. Trade was granted. with no port 
 charges or other burdens, save a tariff of five per cent. Roberts 
 suggested an article providing that American seamen who were 
 shipwrecked on the sultan's coasts should be cared for at the 
 expense of their own government, but to this the sultan de- 
 murred. It was contrary, he said, to the principles of hos- 
 pitality which prevailed in his empire. And so he inserted 
 instead a provision that shipwrecked seamen should be succored.
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 461 
 
 maintained, and returned to their homes at his expense, "for," 
 the treaty ran, as dictated by him, "the sultan can never receive 
 any remuneration whatever for rendering succor to the dis- 
 tressed. ' ' 
 
 After the making of this highly satisfactory treaty the sultan 
 wrote a personal letter to the President, which ran in part as 
 follows : the effusive rhetoric being much more sincere than that 
 of most oriental potentates in similar utterances: 
 
 "In the name of God, amen! To the most high and mighty 
 Andrew Jackson, President of the United States of America, 
 whose name shines with so much splendor throughout the 
 world. I pray most sincerely that on the receipt of this letter 
 it may find his Highness, the President of the United States, in 
 high health, and that his happiness may be constantly on the 
 increase. On a most fortunate day and at a happy hour, I had 
 the honor to receive your Highness 's letter, every word of which 
 is clear and distinct as the sun at noonday and every letter shone 
 forth as brilliantly as the stars in the heavens ; your Highness 's 
 letter was received from your faithful and highly honorable 
 representative and ambassador, Edmund Roberts, who made me 
 supremely happy in explaining the object of his mission, and I 
 have complied in every respect with the wishes of your honor- 
 able ambassador, in concluding a treaty of friendship and com- 
 merce between our respective countries, which shall be faithfully 
 observed by myself and my successors, as long as the world 
 endures. ' ' 
 
 The treaties with Siam and Muscat were accepted by the 
 President and ratified by the Senate, and Roberts was sent back 
 again, on a naval vessel, to exchange ratifications. After per- 
 forming that duty, he proceeded to Canton, where he was again 
 ordered to leave at once, and where he again ignored the order. 
 Unhappily, there was an outbreak of a virulent epidemic at 
 Macao, to which he succumbed, dying on June 12, 1836. A 
 monument was erected over his grave at Macao, and a memorial 
 window was placed in St. John's Church, Portsmouth, New 
 Hampshire, the city of his birth; in honor of the founder of 
 American diplomatic relations with the countries of the Far 
 East. It should be added that Roberts was also commissioned to 
 visit Japan and to undertake the establishment of relations with
 
 462 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 that country, but was unable to do so before his illness and death. 
 
 While this accomplished envoy was conducting his dignified 
 and effective negotiations, a grave controversy was brewing be- 
 tween Great Britain and China into which the United States 
 was eventually drawn. In 1834 the British East India Com- 
 pany withdrew its agents from Canton, and the British gov- 
 ernment sent an envoy. Lord Napier, thither to negotiate a 
 treaty for the regulation of trade. The Chinese authorities 
 declined to receive him excepting on conditions which he justly 
 regarded as intolerably humiliating. He was called a "bar- 
 barian" and the British generally were similarly insulted. 
 Napier exercised all possible patience, but after some months of 
 fruitless effort to open negotiations he replied with spirit to 
 the insults of the Chinese governor, warning him that the King 
 of England was a far more powerful monarch than the Chinese 
 Emperor. He was ordered to leave Macao, but refused. Then 
 all trade with the British was stopped. A British force was 
 sent up to Macao to guard the British establishments there, and 
 British warships came up the river and exchanged fire with the 
 forts. Then a truce was arranged. Napier withdrew to await 
 further instructions from home, and trade was resumed. But 
 a few weeks later, worn out with labor, anxiety, and exposure 
 to the elements, Napier died at Macao on September 11, 1834. 
 
 The American consul at Macao reported these things in detail 
 to the Government at Washington, adding that a war between 
 China and Great Britain was imminent, in which it might be 
 well for the United States to intervene, either as an ally of 
 Great Britain, since that country was manifestly in the right, or 
 else with an independent display of force sufficient to make 
 effective the demand that this country should be permitted to 
 share in whatever advantages might be granted to or be secured 
 by its Anglo-Saxon colleague. To the surprise of the American 
 government, however, the British ministry declined to support 
 the stand which Napier had taken, or to take any further action 
 in the case, and the incident closed with the Chinese more con- 
 firmed than ever in their policy of exclusion and in their con- 
 temptuous regard of all foreigners as "barbarians." Instead 
 of waging war at that time, when it had just cause for doing 
 so, the British government waited a few years and then began
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 463 
 
 hostilities on grounds which have generally been regarded as not 
 only inadequate but positively disgraceful. 
 
 This was what is known as the Opium War, in the beginning 
 of which America was somewhat interested. Two merchants 
 at Macao, Innes, an Englishman, and Talbot, an American, were 
 accused of smuggling opium into China and were ordered to be 
 expelled. Innes was perhaps guilty; but Talbot was certainly 
 innocent, as investigation proved. The British superintendent 
 hesitated to expel Innes, and the Chinese organized violent mob 
 demonstrations against both the British and American con- 
 sulates. As a further mark of hostility the Chinese attempted 
 to execute, directly in front of the American consulate, the death 
 sentence upon a Chinaman who had been caught smuggling 
 opium. This indignity was frustrated by a united sally of the 
 foreign merchants, but a little later a death sentence was actually 
 executed by the Chinese on the grounds of the American factory. 
 At this insulting outrage all the foreign consuls hauled down 
 their flags and closed their offices, and all trade was suspended. 
 
 Following this, the Chinese government demanded that the 
 foreign merchants should at once surrender all the opium in 
 their possession. They demurred, whereupon the foreign set- 
 tlement was completely surrounded by an overwhelming force 
 of Chinese soldiers, no communication with the outer world 
 was permitted, the foreign merchants and their clerks were held 
 as close prisoners, all their books and papers were seized, and 
 about $8,000,000 worth of opium was confiscated. A small por- 
 tion of this was in the possession of American merchants, 
 though none of it actually belonged to them. After this trade 
 was resumed, but all the British merchants left Canton. The 
 Americans remained, though the American consul declared him- 
 self in full sympathy with the British. The British govern- 
 ment at once began preparations for a war, which began in June, 
 1840, at which time all Americans left Canton. The Chinese 
 were of course easily beaten by the British, and at the end of 
 the war, two years later, were compelled to pay heavy indemni- 
 ties; though strangely enough in the treaty of peace not a word 
 was said about the real cause of the war, the opium traffic. 
 After the war that traffic was openly renewed and maintained 
 for seventy years.
 
 464 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 We need not here enter into a discussion of the merits of the 
 Opium War, concerning which innumerable volumes have been 
 written. It should be kept clearly in mind, however, that while 
 on its face it was a war to compel submission to the importation 
 of opium into China, it had in fact a far deeper purpose, namely, 
 to do the work which Napier had vainly undertaken, in com- 
 pelling the Chinese government to treat other nations with 
 decency and respect, as its equals, and to establish friendly re- 
 lations with the world at large. As a mere opium war, it was 
 thoroughly reprehensible; but as a conflict for international 
 rights and for improved relations between China and the rest of 
 the world, it was of great beneficence, to China itself as well as 
 to other nations. 
 
 The United States did not take part in this war, but it main- 
 tained a naval squadron under Commodore Kearny in the ad- 
 jacent waters, for purposes of observation and protection of 
 American interests. There was much mob violence against 
 Americans and their property, and there were some illegal ar- 
 rests; for which Kearny exacted a heavy indemnity from the 
 Governor of Canton. Still more important were the services 
 which he performed at the end of the war. Learning that in 
 the peace treaty new tariff and trade regulations were to be 
 made between China and Great Britain, he resolutely demanded 
 that American citizens should be included, to enjoy the same ad- 
 vantages; in brief, that the "most favored nation" principle 
 should be established in their behalf. The Governor of Canton 
 agreed that this should be done, testifying that American mer- 
 chants in China had not been guilty of smuggling or other 
 illicit practices but had confined themselves to honorable trade. 
 On receiving this assurance Kearny would have taken his de- 
 parture, but the American consul urged him to stay, as the 
 presence of his vessels would have a salutary effect upon the 
 Chinese commissioners who were coming thither to make the 
 treaty. Kearny accordingly remained, and secured from the 
 commissioners the formal and explicit assurance that whatever 
 trade concessions were made to Great Britain should be fully 
 and equally extended also to the United States. This was done, 
 and as a result an "open door" was first secured in China, for 
 all nations on equal terms; a result which, according to one of
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 465 
 
 the British commissioners who negotiated that treaty, was due 
 to Commodore Kearny's wise and resolute action. 
 
 Steps were promptly taken to clinch the matter by the nego- 
 tiation of a commercial treaty with China. On December 30, 
 1842, a few months after the reestablishment of peace between 
 Great Britain and China, the President sent a special message 
 to Congress recommending the appointment of an envoy to 
 China, for that purpose. This message, which was drafted by 
 Daniel Webster, secretary of state, was a convincing exposition 
 of the importance of our Chinese commerce and the need of such 
 a treaty. Congress promptly approved the plan and made an 
 appropriation for its execution. Webster prevailed upon the 
 President to nominate for the mission Edward Everett, who was 
 then minister to England, in order, it was assumed, that he 
 might himself retire from the state department and go to Lon- 
 don in Everett's place. But Everett declined the appointment, 
 preferring to remain in London, and so Caleb Cushing, a rep- 
 resentative from Massachusetts, was sent to China; a better 
 choice, on the whole, than the former, as Cushing, an astute 
 lawyer and resolute man, was eminently fitted to deal with the 
 subtleties of Chinese diplomacy. Webster's son, Fletcher 
 Webster, was made secretary of the legation, and Dr. Peter 
 Parker, a medical missionary, and the Rev. E. C. Bridgman, 
 also a missionary at Canton, were made assistant secretaries, 
 because of their knowledge of the Chinese language. A surgeon 
 and five attaches also accompanied the legation, Webster holding 
 that such numbers would add dignity and importance to the 
 mission in the eyes of the Chinese. In further pursuance of 
 the same idea, the mission was conveyed to China on a naval 
 squadron of two frigates and a sloop of war. 
 
 At Macao, Cushing established himself in the palace of a 
 former Portuguese governor, and assumed the air of the repre- 
 sentative of a power fully the equal of China in importance. 
 In his first official interviews he made it plain, as Webster had 
 instructed him to do, that he was no suppliant for favors nor 
 tribute-bearer, that he had come neither to give nor to receive 
 presents, that he was the envoy of a great, rich, powerful, and 
 peaceful nation, which sought no conquests and would brook no 
 condescension, and that he sought the establishment of relations 
 
 VOL. I — 30
 
 466 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 between equal powers which would be for their mutual advan- 
 tage. The one handicap which he had to bear, fortunately not 
 heavy, was the letter from the President to the emperor, of 
 which he was the bearer, and which was pitifully trite and 
 puerile. It is worth quoting as a curiosity in public documents : 
 
 **I, John Tyler, President of the United States of America — 
 which States are (here follow the list)— send you this letter of 
 peace and fnendship, signed by my own hand. 
 
 "I hope your health is good. China is a great empire, ex- 
 tending over a great part of the earth. The Chinese are numer- 
 ous. You have millions and millions of subjects. The twenty- 
 six United States are as large as China, though our people are 
 not" so numerous. The rising sun looks upon the great moun- 
 tains and rivers of China. When he sets, he looks upon rivers 
 and mountains equally large in the United States. . . . Now 
 my words are, that the governments of two such great countries 
 should be at peace. It is proper, and according to the will of 
 Heaven, that we should respect each other, and act wisely. 
 I therefore send to you Count Caleb Cushing, one of the wise 
 and learned men of this country. On his arrival in your coun- 
 try, he will inquire for your health. . . . Our Minister is au- 
 thorized to make a treaty to regulate trade. Let it be just. Let 
 there be no unfair advantage on either side. . . . And so may 
 your health be good, and may peace reign." 
 
 Cushing reached Macao on February 24, 1844, and three days 
 later wrote to the governor apprising him of his errand, and say- 
 ing that he had of necessity stopped there for a few days before 
 proceeding to Peking to deliver the President's letter to the 
 emperor. The governor replied with the elaborate and flowery 
 courtesy of a mandarin, but insisted that Cushing must not go 
 to Peking until the emperor's wishes in the matter had been re- 
 vealed to him. For a warship to go to the Pei-ho hastily or 
 uninvited would be "to put an end to civility." If Cushing's 
 errand was to negotiate a trade treaty, the emperor would doubt- 
 less send a commissioner to deal with him at the frontier. In 
 any event, Cushing must wait at Macao until the emperor could 
 be informed of his mission and could make known his imperial 
 pleasure. 
 
 Cushing's reply must have been a shock to the slow-going
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 467 
 
 Chinese. He said that the Chinese government, and presumably 
 the emperor, had been informed of his mission by the American 
 consul months before ; that if the emperor had wanted the nego- 
 tiations to take place at the frontier, he should have sent his 
 commissioner to Canton; that he (Cushing) had been directed 
 by the President to deliver his letter to the emperor at Peking, 
 and he proposed to do so ; and that if it was contrary to etiquette 
 for a warship to approach the capital, he would go thither from 
 Canton by land. Further correspondence ensued, and Cushing 
 concluded that it would be diplomatic to humor the Chinese 
 love of ceremonious delay, so he waited at Macao for about two 
 and a half months. Then word came from the emperor, to the 
 effect that it would be quite irregular for an American envoy 
 to come to Peking, or even to Tientsin, to negotiate, for the 
 reason that America had never yet paid tribute to China, but 
 that a commissioner with the imperial seal was being despatched 
 post-haste to Canton, to meet Cushing and conduct the nego- 
 tiations there. 
 
 Cushing decided to accept this as satisfactory, partly because 
 of the recognition of America as a nation that had never paid 
 tribute to China. If going to Peking was a mark of inferiority 
 or of a tributary State, he had no desire to go thither. Also, 
 the commissioner who was being sent was no other than Tsiyeng, 
 who enjoyed the emperor's special confidence, and who was the 
 same who had negotiated that treaty with Great Britain of 
 which Cushing hoped to secure a duplicate for the United 
 States. Early in June Tsiyeng arrived at Canton, and negotia- 
 tions proceeded with reasonable expedition, with only a single 
 hitch. This occurred when in two of Tsiyeng 's letters the name 
 of the Chinese government was so written as to indicate superior 
 dignity to that of the United States. Cushing immediately 
 returned the letters, with a courteous but resolute insistence 
 upon the recognition of equality between the two nations. 
 Tsiyeng promptly acquiesced and corrected the letters, and the 
 negotiations proceeded so expeditiously that within two weeks 
 the treaty was made and signed. Tsiyeng reached Macao on 
 June 16, actual discussion of the treaty began on June 21, and 
 the instrument was signed on July 3, in a temple in the suburbs 
 of Macao. Cushing then gave up the design of going to Peking,
 
 468 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 and entrusted to Tsiyeng the President's letter for the emperor. 
 It was a noteworthy circumstance that down to the time of 
 signing the treaty the American envoy had not set foot on 
 Chiuese soil — Macao being Portuguese — and had not met a single 
 high official of China save Tsiyeng and his attendants. 
 
 Cushing had been instructed and had expected to make a 
 practical duplicate of the British treaty. In fact, he did much 
 better than that. His treaty embodied every provision of the 
 British treaty, and no fewer than sixteen others of real im- 
 portance. This was a great triumph for the United States, but 
 it was an equal benefit to Great Britain, since under the ''most 
 favored nation" principle that country would enjoy the same 
 advantages as the United States. In referring to these circum- 
 stances in his letter transmitting the treaty to the secretary of 
 state, Cushing pointed out that the United States and all other 
 nations were much indebted to Great Britain for opening the 
 door in China with her treaty; and that now similarly Great 
 Britain and all other nations would be indebted to the United 
 States for opening the same door a little wider for all the world. 
 "Whatever progress either government makes in opening this 
 vast empire to the influence of foreign commerce, is for the 
 common good of each other and of all Christendom." Thus 
 early was there promulgated that doctrine of "the open door 
 and equality of opportunity," which John Hay so greatly mag- 
 nified in later years ; and the four men whose names should for- 
 ever be associated with it were, in the order of time of their 
 services. Commodore Kearny of the United States Navy; Sir 
 Henry Pottinger, the British envoy, and Tsiyeng, the Chinese 
 commissioner, who negotiated the Anglo-Chinese treaty; and 
 Caleb Cushing, the American envoy. Unless, indeed, we were 
 to name Lord Napier, first of all, as the martyred forerunner of 
 these. 
 
 One of the noteworthy features of Cushing 's treaty was the 
 recognition of the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction, or 
 "exterritoriality," as it is commonly known in international 
 law. This provided that in eases of crimes committed by 
 Americans in China, the culprits were to be tried and punished 
 according to American law and by American judicial authori- 
 ties; that in civil suits between Americans in China the Ameri-
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 469 
 
 can consuls were to have jurisdiction; and that civil cases be- 
 tween Americans and Chinese were to be disposed of by the 
 joint action of American and Chinese officials. This highly im- 
 portant provision was suggested, no doubt, by recollection of the 
 Terranova incident in 1821, hitherto related in these pages. 
 This principle had been in operation for centuries to a limited 
 extent between European and some Mohammedan countries, and 
 China had granted it in a measure to some foreign powers, 
 but Cushing was the first to insist upon its general application 
 as a world-wide rule between Christian and all non-Christian 
 nations. "The United States," he said, in explaining his in- 
 troduction of the provision into the treaty, ** ought not to con- 
 cede to any foreign State, under any circumstances, jurisdiction 
 over the life and liberty of any citizen of the United States, 
 unless that foreign State be of our own family of nations ; in a 
 word, a Christian State." This was not because of any in- 
 feriority of the other States in sovereignty, or in their right to 
 their own codes of law. It was simply a practical recognition 
 of the radical difference between them and the Christian States. 
 "Between them and us," he said, "there is no community of 
 ideas, no common law of nations, no interchange of good offices." 
 Of course the treaty provision thus secured by Cushing for the 
 United States was of equal value to all other nations. It is of 
 interest to recall that the first practical application of the ex- 
 territoriality rule was made while the treaty was still under 
 negotiation. A mob of Chinese attacked the foreign settlement 
 at Macao, some Americans fired upon them, and one Chinaman 
 was killed. The Chinese authorities demanded the surrender 
 of the slayer, as in the Terranova case, but Cushing demurred 
 in a vigorous letter to Tsiyeng. A jury of Americans was then 
 empaneled by the consul, and the man was tried and acquitted 
 on the ground of self-defense; a disposition of the case which 
 the Chinese, on Cushing 's urging, finally accepted. 
 
 The great value of Cushing 's services to the world in these 
 transactions was widely recognized, nowhere more tlian in Great 
 Britain. In China alone was he not only underestimated but 
 regarded with aversion and contempt. He himself esteemed 
 Tsiyeng highly, and eulogized him in his correspondence with 
 the Washington government. But of him Tsiyeng seems to have
 
 470 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 had a very poor opinion. Complimentary to the point of ful- 
 someness as the Chinese commissioner was to Gushing to his 
 face, when he came to write of him to the emperor, in the 
 memorial accompanying the treaty, he adopted a very different 
 tone. **The original copy of the treaty," he wrote, "presented 
 by the said barbarian envoy, contained forty-seven stipulations. 
 Of these some were difficult of execution, others foolish demands ; 
 and the treaty was, moreover, so meanly and coarsely expressed, 
 the words and sentences were so obscure, and there was such a 
 variety of errors, that it was next to impossible to point them 
 out. Your slave Tsiyeng, therefore, directed the treasurer 
 Hwang and all the deputed mandarins to hold interviews with 
 the Americans for days together. We clearly pointed out what- 
 ever was comprehensible to reason, in order to dispel their stupid 
 ignorance, and to put a stop to delusive hopes; and we were 
 obliged to polish those passages which were scarcely intelligible. 
 . . . Some points have been discussed more than a thousand 
 times at least, others five or six times. It was then that the said 
 barbarian envoy submitted to reason, and being at a loss what 
 to say, was willing and agreed to have the objectionable clauses 
 expunged." As a matter of fact, it was Tsiyeng himself who 
 was ignorant of international law, and to whom the first draft 
 of the treaty was therefore scarcely intelligible. 
 
 Cushing was criticized for not persisting in going on to Peking, 
 but on the whole his course in not doing so seems to have 
 been commendable. He was sent to China primarily and es- 
 sentially to negotiate the treaty, and that he did in a highly 
 satisfactory manner. He doubtless did it more quickly and 
 to greater advantage at Canton, or Macao, than would have been 
 possible at Peking, or Tientsin, especially in view of the sus- 
 picion and resentment which his going thither would have 
 caused. It is a diplomat's duty to do business in the easiest 
 and most acceptable way, provided it be rightly done, and that 
 was what he did in consenting to negotiate at Macao instead of 
 at the capital. Moreover, to go on to Peking after making the 
 treaty would have been regarded as sharp practice and would 
 have strained the very relations which he had just established. 
 A French embassy arrived at Macao soon after he had concluded 
 the treaty, and negotiated a convention on similar lines. The
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 471 
 
 French envoy is said to have proposed to Gushing that they 
 should join forces and insist upon going up to Peking together, 
 but Gushing declined. He remained at Macao for a time, doing 
 several things for the good of the American settlement there, 
 and then returned home. He was succeeded as minister or 
 commissioner to China in 1846 by Alexander H. Everett, who 
 died at Ganton the next year and who was in turn succeeded 
 by John W. Davis. 
 
 Further controversies with Ghina arose a few years later. In 
 1840-50 the American minister, Davis, was engaged in es- 
 tablishing and organizing the consular system of exterritorial 
 jurisdiction. In 1852, Humphrey Marshall of Kentucky be- 
 came minister, and attempted to secure an interview with Mr. 
 Yeh, who had been designated by the emperor as a commissioner 
 to treat with all foreign ministers at Ganton. Yeh sent word 
 to Marshall that he was too busy to see him at the time re- 
 quested, but would at some future time give himself that pleas- 
 ure. Marshall sharply replied that such delay was unsatisfac- 
 tory, and that he purposed to go to Shanghai and secure, if 
 possible, transmission of the President's letter to the emperor 
 through the viceroy of that province. Failing this, he would 
 take a warship and go to Tientsin. He did go to Shanghai and 
 was courteously received, but was told that while the President's 
 letter would be forwarded promptly, the \aceroy had no au- 
 thority to do business with him. The letter was forwarded, 
 and an answer was returned; in the somewhat discourteous 
 form, however, of a letter to the viceroy, instructing him to 
 tell the American minister to go back to Macao and deal with 
 Yeh. This made Marshall the more eager to go to Tientsin. 
 But Gommodore Perry, who was then in command, could not or 
 would not spare him a ship for the purpose, regarding his plans, 
 in fact, as visionary ; and Marshall had to content himself with 
 sarcastic railings at Perry and the expedition to Japan which 
 he was about to undertake. After some months at Shanghai, 
 Marshall returned to Macao and again sought an interview with 
 Yeh, but in vain; and in 1853 he returned to America without 
 even having seen that elusive commissioner. 
 
 The next American minister to Ghina was Robert M. Mc- 
 Lane, in 1853, an accomplished and expert diplomat. He had
 
 472 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 with Yeh practically the same experience that Marshall had 
 suffered; and he, too, went to Shanghai, but found the viceroy 
 unwilling to transmit the letter to the emperor. Then he went 
 to Hongkong and conferred with the British governor of that 
 place, and also with the French minister. They were agreed 
 that there was no use in submitting to Yeh 's trifling any longer, 
 but that pressure must be brought to bear upon the Chinese 
 government for redress of grievances ; wherefore if Yeh or some 
 other official would not promptly give them satisfaction at Can- 
 ton or Shanghai, they would go on with force to Tientsin. They 
 waited for some weeks at Shanghai, and then proceeded to the 
 Pei-ho, arriving there on October 15. There they had to wait 
 weeks longer before an envoy from the emperor came to treat 
 with them, and when he did so his conduct was grossly insulting. 
 He met them in a shabby tent, pitched upon the muddy bank 
 of the river, and told them that he had no power to transact 
 business with them, but merely to hear what they had to say 
 and report to the emperor. 
 
 The demand of the envoys was for a revision of their treaties 
 with China according to the clause in the American-Chinese 
 treaty of 1844, which bound the two governments at the expira- 
 tion of twelve years to treat amicably for revision in view of 
 the need of modifications which by that time might be apparent. 
 The Chinese commissioner, while disclaiming authority to nego- 
 tiate, told McLane that the modifications which seemed to be 
 needed were not sufficient to warrant revision; and he told 
 Bowring, the British envoy, that Great Britain had no title to 
 claim revision merely because of the clause in the American 
 treaty. The conference thus ended in failure and the envoys 
 returned to Shanghai. McLane reported the whole matter to 
 the President, and recommended that the next attempt at nego- 
 tiation be backed up with a strong naval force, precisely as that 
 of Perry had been in Japan. At the end of 1854 McLane re- 
 turned to America and resigned his mission, leaving Dr. Parker 
 in charge. The latter had much difficulty in protecting 
 American commerce during the Tai-Ping rebellion which was 
 then raging, and also in enforcing the neutrality laws. He was 
 highly efficient, however, and in 1855 was appointed full com- 
 missioner to China in McLane 's place.
 
 DANIEL WEBSTER
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 473 
 
 It should be remarked in passing that America was peculiarly- 
 interested, in a personal sense, in the Tai-Ping rebellion. That 
 gigantic conflict was started by a young Chinaman who had 
 studied under an American missionary, the Rev. J. J. Roberts. 
 He professed conversion to Christianity, but was not accepted 
 by the mission church; whereupon he proclaimed himself to be 
 a younger brother of Jesus Christ, who had been sent into the 
 world to overthrow the Manchu dynasty because of its idolatry. 
 He professed to have divine revelations, and organized a vast 
 but fantastic social and religious system, the practices of which 
 were a gross and vicious travesty upon Christianity. For a 
 time he and his followers were victorious, and seemed likely 
 to overthrow the dynasty and conquer all China. When they 
 had captured Nankin and made it their capital they invited 
 Roberts to go thither as a counselor to their court. The 
 missionary went merely, however, as a private visitor, and was 
 disgusted with all that he saw, and returned, testifying that no 
 trace of real Christianity was perceptible in the whole move- 
 ment. In the summer of 1853 McLane was called upon to con- 
 sider the possibility of having to recognize the insurgent court 
 as the de facto government of China. Accordingly he visited 
 Nankin, for investigation; but he, too, was disgusted with the 
 arrogance and vice of the rebels, and declined to give them any 
 political recognition. The tide of war was finally turned 
 against the Tai-Pings by an American, Frederick T. Ward, who 
 organized a Chinese army, with American and European 
 officers, in support of the Peking government. He won many 
 victories, but was eventually killed in battle. His ''ever vic- 
 torious army ' ' was then placed under command of the illustrious 
 Englishman, Charles Gordon, and succeeded in suppressing the 
 rebellion. 
 
 At the beginning of 1856 Dr. Parker renewed efforts to 
 transmit a letter from the President to the emperor and to nego- 
 tiate for treaty revision, but found Yeh as evasive as before. 
 He warned that worthy that such conduct would not much 
 longer be tolerated by the United States, and then set out for 
 the Pei-ho, as McLane had done before him. But at Shanghai 
 he was moved to turn back, for lack of a naval force, because 
 of the lateness of the season, and because of promises that the
 
 474 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 viceroy would transmit the letter. The letter was entrusted to 
 the viceroy, who presently returned it, with the seals broken, 
 and with the statement that the emperor would receive through 
 nobody but Yeh, whom he had designated for that purpose. 
 Simultaneously with this incident, Great Britain began war upon 
 China on account of the looting of the lorcha or schooner 
 Arrow, and Parker was inclined to recommend that the United 
 States join in it as an ally of Great Britain. This was not done, 
 but an incident near Canton came perilously near to provoking 
 war. Two American boats, belonging to naval vessels, were 
 fired upon by Chinese forts, and one man was killed. There- 
 upon an American warship attacked and silenced the forts. 
 The next day a note was sent to Yeh, demanding an explanation 
 and apology. Instead of sending these, Yeh hurried the work 
 of rebuilding the forts. At this the Americans made another 
 attack, landed, and demolished the forts, with a loss of seven 
 killed and twenty-two wounded. The Chinese losses were sev- 
 eral hundred. Then Yeh explained that the American flag had 
 been mistaken for the British, and that while China and Great 
 Britain were at war all other nationalities ought to keep away, 
 and then no such mistakes would occur. The Washington gov- 
 ernment expressed some doubts of the propriety of the vigorous 
 reprisals against the forts, and urged Parker and the naval 
 authorities to refrain from any acts which would look like join- 
 ing in England's quarrel, or would impair friendly relations 
 with China. This was contrary to Parker's policy, he favoring 
 a vigorous assertion of American rights and aggressive coopera- 
 tion with Great Britain and France in bringing China to terms. 
 It was with some relief, therefore, that in August, 1857, he re- 
 tired from the office which he had filled with singular fidelity 
 and efficiency but in the conduct of which he was no longer in 
 accord with his own government. 
 
 William B. Reed, who succeeded him, was the first envoy to 
 China who bore the official title of Minister Plenipotentiary. 
 He was at first committed to the Government's passive policy, 
 but after a little experience with Yeh and other Chinese officials 
 he took precisely the same view that Parker had taken. He 
 reported that nothing but an actual advance upon Peking with 
 a decisive force would bring the Chinese government to a fulfil-
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 475 
 
 ment of its treaty obligations. "Steadfast neutrality and con- 
 sistent friendship," he said, "make no impression on the isolated 
 obduracy of this empire." He united with the British and 
 French representatives in identical notes to the Peking govern- 
 ment, and reported to W«,shington that if a satisfactory reply 
 was not received the powers would proceed in force to the 
 Pei-ho, and he asked for authority to join in a campaign of 
 coercion. He was told in reply that the time for such action 
 had not yet come. Accordingly, when an altogether unsatis- 
 factory reply was received to the note to the Peking govern- 
 ment, he was compelled to remain a passive spectator of events, 
 while the British and French stormed the Taku forts and went 
 to Tientsin. Thither he followed, and found the Chinese au- 
 thorities more amenable to reason ; and in a short time a treaty 
 was negotiated. In this work Reed was assisted by Dr. W. A. 
 P. Martin, a Presbyterian missionary who afterward rose to 
 great eminence in Chinese educational affairs. 
 
 Four treaties were made at that time; first with Russia, 
 second with America, third with Great Britain, and fourth with 
 France. They were in general much alike, and each of them 
 contained the " most favored nation " proviso, so that the 
 stipulations in each became available for all the powers. The 
 chief improvements over the former treaties were in brief that 
 there should be direct access by foreign ministers to the Chinese 
 government, that ministers might reside at Peking, that privi- 
 leges of travel, trade, and ownership of property should be en- 
 larged, and that the Christian religion should be tolerated and 
 its native converts should be protected. After making these 
 treaties the envoys went to Shanghai and there made supple- 
 mentary convections for regulating trade and revising the tariff. 
 Reed was also successful in securing an indemnity of $753,288 
 in payment of long-standing claims of American citizens against 
 China because of losses during the British hostilities. The 
 United States permitted all these claims to be examined and 
 adjudicated in China, and some years afterward returned to 
 China the balance of $453,400 which had been left after the sat- 
 isfaction of all claims that were justly established. 
 
 Reed was succeeded in 1859 by John E. Ward, who started 
 for Peking to exchange ratifications of Reed's treaty. The
 
 476 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Chinese asked him to come thither in company with the British 
 and French envoys who were on similar errands. When they 
 reached the Pei-ho they found the entrance barred, and orders 
 issued against their ascending the river. The commander of 
 the British squadron purposed to fight his way through to 
 Peking. "Ward desired to avoid hostilities, and therefore crossed 
 the bar in a small Chinese steamer, which ran aground. The 
 British commander sent a tug to pull her afloat again, but in 
 vain. Ward succeeded in communicating with the Chinese au- 
 thorities, however, and was informed that no one would be 
 allowed to pass up the river, but that ratifications would be ex- 
 changed at another point, some ten miles away. This was made 
 known to the British, with the result of quickening their de- 
 termination to force the passage; the more so because it was 
 known that the Russian minister had already reached Peking 
 and exchanged ratifications, and had taken up his residence 
 there; and it was suspected that in order to establish Russian 
 ascendancy over the Chinese government he was secretly en- 
 couraging the exclusion of all others. 
 
 Accordingly the next day the British and French ships made 
 a general attack upon the forts, in which they were repulsed with 
 heavy losses. Ward and the American commodore, Tatnall, re- 
 mained passive spectators of the conflict for a time. Then, 
 learning that the British admiral, Hope, was wounded and his 
 vessel was disabled, and remembering the service which he had 
 rendered the Americans the day before, the gallant Tatnall ex- 
 claimed, **I can't stand this! Blood is thicker than water!" 
 and set out with a boatload of his men to Hope's relief. On 
 the way the coxswain at Tatnall 's side was shot and killed, 
 but the rest of the company reached Hope's vessel, and while 
 Tatnall tendered his sympathy to the wounded admiral, his men 
 assisted the British crew in working the guns. Tatnall also 
 used his steamer to tow into action some British boats which 
 could not make their own way against the tide, and also to 
 receive the wounded from the British ships. This conduct won 
 him much praise and fame, in both the United States and Great 
 Britain, but it was resented by the Chinese, and made Ward's 
 dealings with them more difficult. 
 
 After their repulse the British and French withdrew to
 
 EARLY EASTERN RELATIONS 477 
 
 Shanghai and desired Ward to do the same. He, however, de- 
 clined, on the ground that while he had gone to the Pei-ho in 
 company with them, he had done so on the request of the 
 Chinese, as a matter of convenience, and was in no way bound 
 to them as an ally. He therefore determined to pursue his way 
 independently and if possible to proceed to Peking and ex- 
 change ratifications. He went to tJie designated place for the 
 meeting with the governor-general and was received in a most 
 courteous and respectful manner, and was escorted by him to 
 Peking. There he and his suite of thirty persons were made 
 the guests of the emperor and were entertained with imperial 
 munificence. The treaty commissioners, with whom he had ne- 
 gotiated at Shanghai, told him that he must be personally pre- 
 sented to the emperor, and for two weeks discussions continued 
 as to the manner of presentation. The commissioners insisted 
 that he must prostrate himself before the emperor, but this 
 Ward indignantly refused to do, as Perry had refused to grovel 
 before the Japanese throne. Then they offered to compromise 
 on his kneeling, on both knees. This he also refused. Finally 
 they asked if he would touch one knee to the floor, as the British 
 envoy, Lord Elgin, had consented to do. This also Ward re- 
 fused, saying that he knelt only to God and to woman, and the 
 emperor was neither. "The emperor is the same as God," said 
 the Chinese. * ' Not to me, ' ' persisted Ward ; and his ultimatum 
 was that he would salute the emperor just as foreign diplomats 
 saluted the President of the United States, and not otherwise. 
 To this the Chinese would not assent, and the audience was ac- 
 cordingly abandoned. 
 
 Ward then demanded exchange of ratifications, since the 
 British treaty provided that this should be done at Peking and 
 under the "most favored nation" clause the United States was 
 entitled to the same privilege. The Chinese shrewdly replied 
 that the British treaty was not yet in force, since its ratifications 
 had not been exchanged, and the American treaty did not say 
 where the exchange was to take place. Ward was thus con- 
 strained to yield and to accept the exchange at the place desig- 
 nated by the Chinese at the mouth of the Pei-ho. Before going 
 thither, however, he delivered to tlie emperor's prime minister 
 the President 's letter to the emperor. During his stay in Peking
 
 478 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 he was virtually kept a prisoner within his house, not being 
 permitted to communicate even with the Russian minister. He 
 then returned to the mouth of the Pei-ho, where ratifications 
 were exchanged. It was explained to him that the authorities 
 at Peking had insisted upon his prostrating himself before the 
 emperor as an act of atonement for Tatnall's conduct in aiding 
 the British. Now, however, as an act of special favor to him, 
 the emperor would surrender to him an American who had 
 been taken prisoner in the attack upon the forts. The prisoner 
 proved to be a Canadian, in the British service, who had pre- 
 tended to the Chinese that he was an American in order to secure 
 better treatment. "Ward way criticized and ridiculed by many 
 for his course in retiring from Peking, but he was sustained 
 and approved by his own Government, and the verdict of his- 
 tory is that he acted on the whole with dignity and discretion 
 and made the best of a difficult situation.
 
 XVIII 
 
 THE OPENING OF JAPAN 
 
 AMERICAN intercourse with Japan dates from 1797, in 
 which year the merchant ship Eliza, commanded by Cap- 
 tain Stewart, visited the harbor of Nagasaki. The Dutch East 
 India Company had then for some time had relations with 
 Japan, and possessed a factory on one of the islands in that 
 harbor, to which a Dutch ship was permitted to make not more 
 than one visit a year. But Holland was at that time under 
 Napoleon's domination and was therefore at war with Great 
 Britain, and it was perilous for Dutch ships to undertake the 
 voyage to Japan. This American vessel was therefore chartered 
 by the company to make the visit of that year. Thus it was 
 through European complications that the United States was 
 first brought into contact with Japan. The Japanese at that 
 time maintained their empire in singular seclusion, and were 
 ignorant of the rise of the United States as a new power; and 
 they were in consequence much surprised at the appearance of a 
 ship in the employ of the Dutch but under a strange flag, with 
 a crew that spoke English but which gave no allegiance to the 
 British crown. They permitted the vessel to fulfil her errand, 
 however, and gave similar treatment to the other American ves- 
 sels which came thither yearly on like errands during the con- 
 tinuance of the Napoleonic wars. In this way Japan became 
 aware of the existence of the United States, and in return some 
 knowledge of that isolated empire was imparted to the American 
 commercial world. 
 
 It was just forty years after that first visit, in 1837, however, 
 that the first serious attempt was made to establish relations 
 with Japan. In former ages the Japanese had been a great 
 seafaring people, the veritable Vikings of the North Pacific ; but 
 under one of their Shoguns, lyemitsu, in 1636, all ocean-going 
 
 vessels were destroyed and the building of more was prohibited, 
 
 479
 
 480 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 so that the Japanese were thereafter restricted to the use of 
 small coasting vessels. These small craft were occasionally car- 
 ried by the strong ocean currents and violent storms to remote 
 regions, even to the coasts of North America. Thus seven ship- 
 wrecked Japanese were picked up on the Oregon coast by agents 
 of the Hudson Bay Company. As there was no means of send- 
 ing them directly home across the Pacific they were taken over- 
 land to Canada, thence to England, and thence by the way of 
 the Cape of Good Hope to Macao, from which latter place they 
 could be sent up the Chinese coast to Japan. Their arrival at 
 Macao attracted the attention of D. W. C. Olyphant of New 
 York, the founder of one of the chief American trading houses 
 at Macao, and an earnest, enlightened, and generous promoter 
 of missionary efforts in China. He accordingly fitted out a 
 vessel to carry these Japanese sailors to their home, with the 
 hope that thus a way would be opened for the establishment of 
 commercial and other relations with Japan, and the entrance 
 of missionaries into that country. The vessel was named the 
 Morrison, after Robert Morrison, the first English Protestant 
 missionary in China, who had gone thither under Olyphant 's 
 patronage. Among the ship's company were Mr. King, a mem- 
 ber of Olyphant 's firm, and his wife; Dr. Peter Parker, the 
 American medical missionary; the Rev. W. S. Williams of the 
 American Board of Missions ; and Dr. Gutzlaff, the German mis- 
 sionary and historian of China. In order to allay suspicion and 
 animosity, the vessel carried, or at least displayed, no arms, but 
 was stocked with commercial goods. It was hoped that a land- 
 ing would be permitted and that the Japanese would accept the 
 contents of the vessel as presents, and would listen to explana- 
 tions of the greatness and the friendly disposition and desires 
 of the United States. Instead of going to Nagasaki, however, 
 the only port open to foreigners, the vessel went straight to 
 Yeddo or Tokio, the capital, where she was fired upon from the 
 forts and compelled to beat a hasty retreat, pursued by a flotilla 
 of armed boats. Similar repulses were encountered at other 
 places along the coast, the last being at Kagoshima, the capital 
 of the great Satsuma elan. The vessel was then compelled to 
 return to Macao, without having effected a moment's landing 
 or having in any way communicated with the Japanese.
 
 THE OPENING OF JAPAN 481 
 
 The failure of this enterprise discouraged further attempts 
 in that direction until 1845. In that year Captain Cooper, of 
 Sag Harbor, New York, with his ship Manhattan, found eleven 
 shipwrecked Japanese on a barren island in the Pacific, and 
 rescued eleven more from a foundering junk. With these he 
 sailed to Yeddo, purposing there to return them to their homes 
 and "to impress the Japanese government with the civilization 
 of the United States and its friendly disposition toward the em- 
 peror and the Japanese people." Before reaching Yeddo he 
 sent messengers forward to inform the Government of his ap- 
 proach and his purpose, and in consequence he was permitted to 
 enter the Bay of Yeddo and to anchor near that city. His 
 vessel was, however, surrounded by a cordon of Japanese boats 
 and a guard of military officers was put aboard; and he was 
 warned that none of his company must go ashore, under pain 
 of death. He was permitted to remain there a few days and to 
 secure fresh supplies of food and water, "because the emperor 
 felt assured that he could not be a bad-hearted foreigner by his 
 having come so far out of his way to bring poor people to their 
 native countiy, who were wholly strangers to him." But he 
 was requested not to do it again, but to land at some Dutch port 
 any other Japanese castaways whom he might pick up. The 
 emperor, he was told, would rather have such castaways aban- 
 doned and lost than to have strangers enter Japan. 
 
 Following this incident, in the fall of 1845, a resolution was 
 introduced into Congress by Zadok Pratt, a representative from 
 New York, recommending the taking of steps for making com- 
 mercial treaties with Japan and Corea. In consequence Com- 
 modore Biddle, commanding the American squadron in the East, 
 was directed to ascertain what ports of Japan were accessible 
 to foreigners, and to assist Mr. Everett, the American minister 
 to China, who was also accredited to Japan, in going thither, 
 if he should be inclined to make the attempt. It was added that 
 if Everett shrank from the mission. Commodore Biddle might 
 himself undertake it if he wished. Everett did shrink from it, 
 and transferred his credentials to Biddle, who undertook the 
 task. He reached Yeddo with his two ships on July 20, 1846, 
 and was received much as Captain Cooper had been before him. 
 He told the authorities — at their request, in writing — that he 
 
 VOL. 1—31
 
 482 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 had come to find if Japan had opened her ports to commerce 
 and was willing to make a treaty with the United States. A 
 few days later the reply came, nominally from the mikado, but 
 in fact from the shogun, to the effect that Nagasaki was the only 
 port open to foreigners, that no treaty would be made with the 
 United States, and that Biddle and his ships must leave Yeddo 
 at once and never return to Japan, Either by intention or 
 accident a Japanese soldier jostled heavily against Biddle at the 
 moment of the delivery of this letter to him; an act, according 
 to Japanese etiquette, of unspeakable indignity. An apology 
 was made by the Japanese officers, and it was promised that the 
 offender should be punished, but it does not appear that the 
 promise was fulfilled. On the contrary, the incident inspired 
 the Japanese with a certain contempt for Americans, as people 
 who might be insulted with impunity. 
 
 Biddle then left Japan and returned to Macao. The report 
 of his doings was made to the state department by Everett, who 
 took an unfavorable view of the whole affair. He said that Bid- 
 dle had shown lack of discretion, and had left matters in a worse 
 condition than that in which he found them. The reply of the 
 mikado to Biddle 's request he considered to be intentionally in- 
 sulting, as it was without address, date, or signature. It should 
 be added that Biddle had been expressly forbidden, in his in- 
 structions, to exercise or to display any military force in his 
 intercourse with the Japanese. 
 
 The next year news came that the crews of two wrecked Amer- 
 ican vessels were being harshly treated as prisoners in Japan, 
 in striking contrast to the way in which shipwrecked Japanese 
 had been treated by Americans. Accordingly the American 
 naval commander in the East sent Commander Glynn, with the 
 ship Preble, to Nagasaki, in 1849, to demand redress. Glynn 
 defied the rules requiring foreign vessels to stop near the en- 
 trance of the bay, and boldly sailed into the inner harbor and 
 demanded communication with the governor. The result was 
 that after some parley the Americans were delivered to him, and 
 he sailed away in triumph. 
 
 The sailors who were thus rescued reported that they had 
 been treated with monstrous insults and cruelties, in consequence 
 of which some of their comrades had died. Whether this was
 
 THE OPENING OF JAPAN 483 
 
 by order of the Japanese government, or was a mere excess of 
 zeal of some of its subordinate agents, was not clear, though 
 the latter was the more probable. In any case, the experience 
 of these men roused much indignation, and contributed to the 
 resolution of the United States to force a reckoning with Japan. 
 Another consideration was, the frequenting of that part of 
 the Pacific by American whalers. These went thither by hun- 
 dreds, cruising within sight of the Japanese coast, and it was 
 felt to be a hardship that they could not enter Japanese har- 
 bors for supplies or for refuge in case of distress. A third was 
 that, with the acquisition of California, the discovery of gold, 
 and the rapid growth of that State, a steamship line across the 
 Pacific to China was projected, and a stopping place in Japan 
 was deemed necessary. Accordingly, President Fillmore gave 
 close attention to the report and reconunendations of Commo- 
 dore Glynn, suggesting an armed expedition to Japan, which 
 would compel a respectful hearing. Webster was now secre- 
 tary of state for a second time, and he also took a deep interest 
 in the matter. As a result of numerous cabinet councils, the 
 expedition was finally decided upon, and Commodore Aulick 
 was appointed to the command of the East India naval station 
 in order to undertake the momentous mission. On June 10, 
 1851, the President wrote a letter to the mikado, which Aulick 
 was to deliver, and Webster wrote a letter of instructions, giv- 
 ing Aulick full power to negotiate a treaty. Thus equipped, 
 Aulick set out for Japan, only to find, on reaching Macao, a 
 letter from the secretary of the navy recalling him from the 
 command. 
 
 Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry had been selected to re- 
 place him, and the choice must be accounted a felicitous one. 
 He was the son of an officer in the revolutionary navy, the 
 brother of the hero of the battle of Lake Erie, and himself a 
 naval officer of approved discretion and resolution; realizing 
 John Paul Jones's theory, that a naval commander should be 
 also a statesman and diplomat. Perry was granted ample time 
 in which to make his preparations and full power to select his 
 own subordinates for probably the most momentous expedition 
 ever undertaken by the American navy. IMany thousands of 
 dollars' worth of books on Japan, charts, and what not were
 
 484 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 secured in America and Europe, and interviews were had with 
 all sea captains who had visited Japanese waters. Elaborate in- 
 structions were prepared by the state department, authoriz- 
 ing him to secure protection and succor for shipwrecked Amer- 
 ican sailors, the opening of Japanese ports to vessels in need 
 of supplies, and the opening of ports, also, for commerce. 
 These instructions were drafted chiefly by Webster, but he died 
 before they were completed. The letter from the President to 
 the mikado was prepared and countersigned by Edward Ever- 
 ett, who had become Webster's successor in office. The instruc- 
 tions were widely published in America and Europe, and 
 the two continents watched with intense interest the preparation 
 and departure of an expedition which would, if it succeeded, be 
 of epoch-making importance to the whole world. Perry fully 
 appreciated the honor and the responsibility which were con- 
 ferred upon him, and comported himself appropriately. The 
 President and cabinet bade him good speed, and on November 
 24, 1852, he left the Capes of Virginia on his momentous voyage. 
 
 Seeing that the Dutch had an establishment at Deshima, just 
 off Nagasaki, our government requested their good offices for 
 facilitating Perry's reception in Japan. The Dutch govern- 
 ment promptly acceded to the request, and sent instructions to 
 that effect to the officers of the Dutch East India Company; 
 but these apparently did not reach Deshima until after Perry 
 had fulfilled his mission. It has been stated, also, that on learn- 
 ing of the first preparations for Perry 's mission the Dutch them- 
 selves attempted to forestall him by making a treaty with Japan. 
 If so, they suffered complete failure. 
 
 Perry went first to Macao, where he took into his company 
 Dr. S. W. Williams, who was to serve as chief interpreter for 
 the mission. There, too, he was joined by several vessels of the 
 American East India squadron, so that he approached Japan 
 with by far the most impressive and formidable fleet that had 
 ever been seen in the waters of that empire. His flagship was 
 the Susquelmnna, a fine new steam frigate, the first steamship 
 that had visited Japan. In such state the expedition, on the 
 morning of July 8, 1853, entered the spacious bay of Yeddo. 
 With all sails furled, and under steam power alone, the ships 
 kept their way unchecked amid the swarming boats and junks
 
 THE OPENING OF JAPAN 485 
 
 of the Japanese, disregarding all signals and commands to stop, 
 until they were just off Uraga, where, late in the afternoon, 
 they stopped and cast anchor. The appearance of these strange 
 vessels, belching forth clouds of smoke and moving swiftly with- 
 out sails or oars against both wind and tide, created indescribable 
 consternation among the Japanese, to whom they seemed a ful- 
 filment of an old legend about the "black ships" which should 
 come from afar to wreak evil upon Japan. Even the high offi- 
 cials regarded them with wonder and apprehension. When the 
 vessels anchored, one of the neighboring Japanese forts fired 
 two signal guns and sent up a rocket, as an announcement of 
 the arrival of the portentous invaders whose coming had been 
 announced by the Dutch at Deshima. The effect was electric 
 throughout the whole capital city of Yeddo. "The popular 
 commotion," said a native writer, "at the news of a 'foreign 
 invasion' was beyond description. The whole city was in an 
 uproar. In all directions were seen mothers flying with chil- 
 dren in their arms, and men with mothers on their backs. Ru- 
 mors of an immediate action, exaggerated each time they were 
 communicated from mouth to mouth, added horror to the hor- 
 ror-stricken. The tramp of warhorses, the clatter of armed 
 warriors, the noise of carts, the parade of firemen, the incessant 
 tolling of bells, the shrieks of women, the cries of children, 
 dinning all the streets of a city of more than a million souls, 
 made confusion worse confounded." 
 
 Perry at once adopted toward the Japanese an attitude of 
 what proved to be extraordinary diplomatic efficiency. The 
 keynote of it was the unquestionable equality of the United 
 States with Japan, and therefore the equality of the President 
 with the emperor. This invested his own mission, and indeed 
 himself, with great dignity. Moreover, he was there not to 
 ask favors but to demand rights and, if need be, to take them 
 by force. Thus when his vessels, on anchoring, were at once 
 surrounded by a multitude of boats of all kinds, nobody was 
 permitted to come aboard until at last there came a large boat 
 evidently bearing an important functionary. Learning that this 
 was the Vice-Govenior of T^raga, Perry permitted him to come 
 aboard the flagship, but not to approach himself or his quar- 
 ters, where he maintained himself in almost imperial state and
 
 486 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 seclusion. One of Perry's aides was commissioned to receive 
 the vice-governor, and to tell him that Perry himself could be 
 approached by nobody save some prince of the highest rank 
 who stood next to the emperor; that the mission was friendly, 
 bearing a letter from the President to the emperor; and that 
 Perry expected to meet one of the highest dignitaries of the 
 empire to whom he could entrust the letter for delivery. The 
 vice-governor then said that all such business was to be trans- 
 acted only at Nagasaki, and that the fleet must at once leave 
 the sacred waters of the Bay of Yeddo and go thither. To 
 this the reply was a flat refusal. Perry would not go to Na- 
 gasaki, but would remain at Uraga. Moreover, he would ex- 
 pect himself and his vessels to be treated with respect, and if 
 the Japanese guard boats which were forming a cordon about 
 the fleet were not removed, he would drive them away by force. 
 At this the vice-governor departed, and the guard boats went 
 away with him. 
 
 Next day the Governor of Uraga came, asking to see Perry, 
 but again Perry declined to meet so inferior a functionary, and 
 sent one of his subordinates to deal with him. A colloquy sim- 
 ilar to that of the day before ensued, with this addition, that 
 the governor was warned that if a sufficiently exalted digni- 
 tary were not soon sent to receive the President's letter, Perry 
 himself would go ashore to deliver it, accompanied by an irre- 
 sistible force. The governor then withdrew, promising to come 
 again in a few days with an answer from the imperial court. 
 Perry then set about to improve the time of waiting by send- 
 ing out boats to make soundings and to survey the harbor. The 
 governor sent word that this was contrary to Japanese law and 
 must be stopped. Perry sent reply that it was according to 
 American law and would not be stopped ; whereon there was no 
 further interference nor protest. 
 
 July 10 was Sunday, religious services were held on the ships, 
 and no conununieation was held with the Japanese. The next 
 day one of the ships, conve3dng a surveying party, moved some 
 distance up the bay toward the capital. At this the governor 
 came aboard to expostulate, but was told that the ship was 
 seeking anchorage nearer the imperial court, for the much larger 
 fleet which would presently come thither if the President's letter
 
 THE OPENING OF JAPAN 487 
 
 were not promptly and properly received. This brought the 
 governor to terms and on the following day he reported that 
 a suitable officer would be designated to receive the letter as 
 soon as an appropriate place could be prepared on shore for 
 the ceremony; but, while the letter would be received there, 
 the answer would be sent to Nagasaki, whither Perry must go 
 to get it through one of the Dutch or Chinese superintendents. 
 To this Perry returned in writing the curt and peremptory 
 reply that he would not go to Nagasaki; that he would receive 
 no communications through Dutch and Chinese agencies; that 
 he would deliver the President's letter to the emperor him- 
 self or to his foreign secretary, and to nobody else; that he 
 would expect a reply of some sort in a few days, to be given 
 to him there, at Uraga; and finally that if the President's 
 friendly letter to the emperor were not received in a proper 
 manner, he would consider that the United States had been in- 
 sulted and would not answer for the consequences. 
 
 That was enough. In a few hours the governor reported that 
 a very exalted personage, accredited by the emperor, would 
 receive Perry ashore the next day but one. This promise was 
 fulfilled, and on the morning of July 14 the ceremony occurred. 
 The American ships moved close to the meeting-place which 
 had been prepared. The governor with a brilliant retinue came 
 to the flagship to escort Perry ashore. A salute was fired from 
 all the ships, and Perry, who now for the first time was so 
 much as seen by any Japanese, entered a decorated barge and 
 went ashore, accompanied by about three hundred officers and 
 men and two bands of music, two stalwart Negroes as a body- 
 guard, and two boys bearing the golden caskets in which re- 
 posed the President's letter and Perry's own credentials. 
 Thousands of Japanese troops were stationed about the recep- 
 tion hall as a guard of honor. In the hall two of the most 
 illustrious princes of the empire awaited Perry and received 
 him with respectful obeisance. The boys brought forward the 
 golden caskets, which were opened by the Negro guards; the 
 letter and credentials, richly engrossed on vellum and bearing 
 seals and chains of gold, were taken out, displayed to the 
 princes, and laid upon the lid of the box which the latter had 
 brought for their reception ; and the governor, reverently kneel-
 
 488 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 ing, placed them within the box. An interpreter from the fleet 
 then explained to a Japanese interpreter the purport of the 
 documents. The governor knelt before the princes and received 
 from them a scroll, which he transferred to Perry, kneeling 
 before him as he did so. This was a receipt for the documents, 
 and a statement that nothing further could be done there, but 
 that the fleet must at once go to Nagasaki, where it would in 
 due time receive an answer. When this was interpreted to 
 Perry he replied that he would indeed go away in a few days 
 to give the Japanese government time to consider the important 
 business in hand; but he would not go to Nagasaki, but would 
 return to Uraga the next spring, and would then and there ex- 
 pect to receive the emperor's answer. The governor asked if 
 he would come back with all these vessels. Perry replied that 
 he would, and probably with many more, as these were only a 
 few of his fleet. 
 
 This closed the interview, and the Americans returned to their 
 ships with all possible dignity and state, feeling well satisfied 
 with what had been done. The wall of Japanese reserve had 
 been broken down. Perry had been received as no other for- 
 eigner had been for centuries. The full equality of the United 
 States had been recognized, and direct intercourse with the em- 
 peror 's personal representatives had been secured. Moreover, no 
 cause of offense had been given to Japan. There had been no 
 violence, no disorder of any kind, and no wrong committed to 
 any Japanese. That afternoon the squadron weighed anchor, 
 but instead of departing steamed some miles up the bay to- 
 ward Yeddo, made surveys, and took soundings. Perry wrote 
 a letter to the emperor, telling him that he would return the 
 next spring. And then, on July 17, the fleet departed from 
 Yeddo and from Japan, to leave the imperial government free, 
 without appearance of coercion, to consider the momentous mat- 
 ters which had been laid before it. 
 
 Perry went back to Chinese waters, to look after American 
 interests during the Tai-ping rebellion which was then raging. 
 The Japanese government promptly and earnestly addressed it- 
 self to the consideration of the President's letter and the terms 
 of the proposed treaty. At the same time all possible prepa- 
 rations for war were made, the millitary leaders advising that
 
 THE OPENING OF JAPAN 489 
 
 the American proposals be rejected. The anxiety and concern 
 of the government and nation were much increased by the ar- 
 rival of a Russian squadron at Nagasaki that fall, with de- 
 mands for a treaty; after presenting which it withdrew to 
 Shanghai to await a reply. Learning of the Russian operations, 
 and also of the sailing of a French squadron from Macao for 
 an unknown destination, which he feared might be Japan, Perry 
 prudently decided to cut short his stay in Chinese waters and 
 to return to Yeddo somewhat sooner than he had at first in- 
 tended. On his way, at midwinter, he called at the Loo-Choo 
 Islands, and there received word that the Emperor of Japan 
 had died, and that the Japanese government requested that both 
 his return and all further negotiations might be postponed until 
 after the expiration of the period of mourning. He sent a reply 
 to the effect that while he profoundly regretted his Majesty's de- 
 mise, he was sure that the Japanese government would not on 
 that account delay the establishment of a friendly understand- 
 ing with the United States. 
 
 He therefore continued his voyage, and on February 12, 1854, 
 entered the Bay of Yeddo with ten vessels, or more than twice 
 as many as on his former visit. This time, as before, he ig- 
 nored the Japanese boats which clustered around him, and 
 steamed on, not merely to Uraga but to a point twelve miles be- 
 yond. There he pursued his former policy, delegating subordi- 
 nates to meet the officials who called upon him, and reserving 
 himself for intercourse with some personal representative of the 
 emperor. When it was announced to him that the emperor had 
 designated a place in the outer bay for the conference, and 
 wished him to remove his fleet thither, he flatly refused, and de- 
 clared that if the Japanese would not treat with him on the 
 shore opposite his present anchorage, he would take his fleet 
 right on to Yeddo. At this the Japanese yielded, and the nego- 
 tiations were conducted at the point selected by Perry. 
 
 The conferences finally began on March 8, at the site of the 
 present city of Yokohama. The Japanese made no such mili- 
 tary display as before, but their commission was composed of 
 five princes of the highest rank. Perry, on the other hand, 
 was accompanied by the same imposing retinue as before, and 
 maintained the same dignity and reserve. The reply of the
 
 490 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 emperor to the President's letter was presented and was found 
 to be largely favorable. A few days later Perry delivered with 
 much ceremony the numerous and costly presents which had 
 been brought for the emperor and other officials, and later still 
 the Japanese gave equally rich gifts in return, for everybody 
 from the President down to the humblest person who had taken 
 part in the conference. The American gifts included a fully 
 equipped miniature railroad, a telegraph line, and a steamboat, 
 all of which were put into practical operation, to the great as- 
 tonishment and edification of tJie Japanese, who were thus for 
 the first time inspired to seek the adoption of the arts of West- 
 ern civilization. 
 
 Meantime the negotiations for a treaty proceeded amicably 
 and expeditiously, and on March 31, 1854, that epoch-making 
 instrument was completed and signed. It provided for the pro- 
 tection of shipwrecked sailors; for the opening of two more 
 ports in addition to Nagasaki for foreign commerce, for the resi- 
 dence of a consul at Shimoda, which was the open port nearest 
 to the capital; and for the enjoyment by America of all priv- 
 ileges which might in subsequent treaties be granted to other 
 nations. This was about all that Perry had hoped to secure, 
 excepting in the matter of commerce ; he having at first aimed at 
 a general opening of all Japan. Throughout the Western world 
 the treaty was hailed as an unsurpassed triumph, and the high- 
 est credit was everywhere given to Perry for the diplomatic 
 genius which he had exercised. Nor was the achievement ap- 
 preciated in Japan less than elsewhere. The Japanese were 
 quick to realize the enormous benefits which would accrue to 
 them through thus entering the common family of civilized na- 
 tions. When ratifications of the treaty were exchanged, on 
 February 21, 1855, the Japanese commissioners assured Perry 
 that ''his name would live forever in the history of Japan." 
 In later years his fame and honor steadily increased, and in 
 1901 a stately monument was erected by the Japanese nation 
 — the emperor himself subscribing to the fund — on the spot 
 where Perry first landed and delivered the President's letter, 
 and was dedicated with imposing ceremonies to the memory of 
 the great commodore, whose visit was described by the Japa- 
 nese government as "the most memorable event in our annals
 
 THE OPENING OF JAPAN 491 
 
 — an event which enabled the country to enter upon the un- 
 precedented era of national ascendancy in which we are now 
 living. ' ' 
 
 Other nations quickly showed in a most practical way their 
 appreciation of the importance of Perry's work. In the early 
 fall of the same year in which he "opened" Japan, a British 
 admiral entered the harbor of Nagasaki with his squadron, 
 seeking a similar treaty, which was made, and a few months 
 later Russia and Holland successfully followed the example. 
 The treaty made by Perry went into immediate effect, and its 
 results were marked. In fact, its terms were observed by the 
 Japanese even before the exchange of ratifications. A fort- 
 night after Perry had left Yeddo an American clipper ship 
 entered that harbor and was hospitably received. Soon after 
 the exchange of ratifications American consuls were sent to the 
 two new open ports of Shimoda and Hakodate. To the former 
 place Townsend Harris of New York was sent as consul-gen- 
 eral, and that very remarkable man had there a most memorable 
 and historical career. On his way to Japan he visited Siam 
 and negotiated a new treaty with that country, and then, on 
 August 21, 1856, arrived at Shimoda. In .his journal he made 
 this entry : "I shall be the first recognized agent from a civ- 
 ilized power to reside in Japan. This forms an epoch in my 
 life, and may be the beginning of a new order of things in 
 Japan. I hope I may so conduct myself that I may have hon- 
 orable mention in the histories which will be written on Japan 
 and its future destiny." 
 
 That noble ambition was nobly fulfilled. At first Harris met 
 with innumerable difficulties and obstacles, but with almost in- 
 finite tact, patience, and resolution he overcame them all. He 
 exercised both consular and diplomatic functions, and on June 
 17, 1857, he signed a new treaty, correcting some misunder- 
 standings which had arisen concerning Perry's treaty, and giv- 
 ing to Americans important new rights. Harris was also en- 
 trusted with the transmission of a letter from the President 
 to the emperor, and he requested permission to go to the capital 
 and deliver it in person. This was an unprecedented demand, 
 and was regarded with much hesitation. Finally, however, it 
 was granted; probably for fear that otherwise Perry's fleet
 
 492 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 would return and compel it. So with a picturesque retinue of 
 several hundred attendants Harris set out by land from Shi- 
 moda for Yeddo. The trip took a week for its accomplish- 
 ment, the populace and officials lining the "imperial highway" 
 as the novel procession passed, reverently saluting the envoy 
 and his flag. At the boundary of the metropolitan province 
 an attempt was made, in accordance with law, to examine the 
 visitor's baggage; but Harris objected, and insisted upon the 
 general principle that an ambassador's or minister's baggage 
 must be exempt. 
 
 He reached the gates of Yeddo on Saturday, and the Japa- 
 nese expected that he would make his entry the next day. But 
 he declined. He had always consistently refused to transact 
 any business on Sunday, and the Japanese had come to under- 
 stand and respect his principles. So he devoted that day, the 
 first Sunday in Advent, to rest and religious exercises, himself 
 reading the church service for the day to his secretary, who 
 formed the whole congregation. The next day he entered 
 Yeddo, under the American flag, while the multitudes looked 
 on in wonder at the unprecedented occurrence. A few days 
 later he was received by the shogun, or tycoon, who stood in 
 lieu of the mikado as the actual sovereign. It was intimated to 
 him that he should prostrate himself before the shogun, in ac- 
 cordance with Japanese custom ; but he not only refused to do 
 so but declared that any further suggestion of the kind would 
 be regarded by him as an insult. At the interview the Japa- 
 nese noblemen, including the shogun 's own brothers, crawled 
 to the throne on their hands and knees, while Harris alone of 
 all the company remained erect, and merely bowed to the sov- 
 ereign, as he would have done to the President of the United 
 State or to a European monarch. 
 
 Having thus gained self-respecting access to the presence of 
 the shogun, Harris set about securing for foreign ministers the 
 right to reside at the imperial capital, and also the fuller open- 
 ing of Japan to commerce and travel. For months his confer- 
 ences and negotiations continued, during which time he was 
 literally teaching the statesmen of Japan the elements of po- 
 litical economy and international law. They asked him what 
 were the rank and duties of a minister; what was international
 
 THE OPENING OF JAPAN 493 
 
 law; what were open ports; and innumerable other such ques- 
 tions, which he answered in the manner of a teacher instructing 
 his pupils. He was doubtless assisted in his efforts by the fact 
 that at this time Great Britain and France were waging war 
 upon China, and it was anticipated that as soon as they had 
 completed their victory they would send their fleets to Japan to 
 exact new treaties. So the Japanese government, under the lead- 
 ership of Prince li-Kamon, decided to forestall them by making 
 a treaty with the United States. 
 
 This convention was signed by Harris on July 29, 1858. It 
 provided for the residence of ministers at the capital, and of 
 consuls at all open ports; it opened additonal ports, authorized 
 general commerce, established a tariff and trade regulations, and 
 fixed the Japanese value of American coins. Residence of un- 
 official Americans in Japanese cities was also granted, their ex- 
 ercise of religious freedom was guaranteed, and civil and crim- 
 inal jurisdiction over them was given to their consuls. The 
 principles thus established were so broad and comprehensive that 
 for the succeeding forty years they formed the basis of Japan's 
 relations not only with the United States but also with the na- 
 tions of Europe. A few weeks later, as had been anticipated, the 
 British, French, and Russian fleets came flocking to the Bay of 
 Yeddo, in quest of similar treaties, which were in due time se- 
 cured. 
 
 One highly interesting feature of the Harris treaty was the 
 provision that ratifications of it should be exchanged not at 
 Yeddo but at Washington. It was Harris's shrewd but benevo- 
 lent purpose that, just as the first foreign mission to Japan had 
 been from America, so the first mission which Japan sent abroad 
 should be to America. Before this could be done it was neces- 
 sary for the Japanese government to modify the law which im- 
 posed the penalty of death upon any Japanese subject who 
 voluntarily ({uitted the empire. Then, in February, 1860, a mis- 
 sion consisting of seventy-one persons departed from Japan for 
 America, going to Washington by the way of San Francisco 
 and Panama. These visitors were cordially and gracefully re- 
 ceived in America, and returned home filled with admiration of 
 what they had seen, and with ardent desires for Japan's adop- 
 tion of many of the arts of American civilization. After the
 
 494 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 exchange of ratifications, Harris was appointed the first Amer- 
 ican minister to Japan, and he remained in that office until May, 
 1862, when, to the great regret of both countries, he resigned on 
 account of impaired health and advancing years. He left a 
 name and fame comparable with Perry's, in honorable place in 
 the annals of Japan, 
 
 At the time of Harris's mission Japan was beginning to enter 
 upon the throes of that great domestic conflict which ulti- 
 mately abolished the rule of the shogun and restored the mikado 
 to actual as well as theoretical sovereignty. Many disorders oc- 
 curred, which in January, 1861, involved the murder of Harris's 
 secretary, Mr, Heusken, in the streets of Yeddo, and in 1863 
 the burning of the American legation, which was then occupied 
 by Harris's successor, R. H. Pruyn. Other foreigners and for- 
 eign legations suffered similar outrages, and all foreign minis- 
 ters but the American fled to Yokohama and sought the protec- 
 tion of their ships of war. Pruyn, however, persisted in re- 
 maining at Yeddo. He simply moved into another house and 
 demanded indemnity for the injuries which had been done. The 
 Government, however, informed him that it could not guaran- 
 tee his safety from the anti-foreign mob, and accordingly it 
 escorted him with a strong force to Yokohama. He exacted from 
 the shogun 's government an indemnity of $10,000 for the mur- 
 der of Heusken, a like sum for the destruction of the legation, 
 and other indemnities for other wrongs to Americans. In these 
 transactions he recognized, however, that the Japanese govern- 
 ment was much embarrassed by the mob which was rebelling 
 against its authority, and he maintained relations with it of so 
 friendly a nature as to provoke other foreign ministers unjustly 
 to suspect him of complicity with it against them ! 
 
 The rising power of the mikado and his supporters presently 
 compelled the shogun, for the first time in several centuries, to 
 go to the mikado's secluded capital, Kioto, and there take or- 
 ders from the titular emperor. As a result, a decree was is- 
 sued that all foreigners should be driven out of Japan and the 
 ports be closed against them, as of old. When this was made 
 known to Pruyn, he refused to recognize it as valid. The rights 
 of entrance, residence, and trade had been granted to American 
 citizens by treaty, he said, and they would not and could not
 
 THE OPENING OF JAPAN 495 
 
 be relinquished. The very suggestion of such a thing was an 
 insult to America and might well be considered equivalent to a 
 declaration of war. If persisted in, it would certainly mean 
 war between Japan and all the treaty powers. Although Pruyn 
 had been more friendly with the Government than any other 
 foreign minister, he now made it plain, with the authority of the 
 secretary of state, William H. Seward, that the United States 
 would stand with the other powers in insisting upon loyal ob- 
 servance of the treaties. It was recognized that this was tanta- 
 mount to committing this country to cooperation and practical 
 alliance with European powers, a procedure contrary to its estab- 
 lished policy, but it was felt that in the exceptional circum- 
 stances such a course was justifiable. Ultimately, Pruyn single- 
 handed prevailed upon the Japanese government to withdraw the 
 offensive decree. 
 
 Another menacing complication was caused by the rebellion 
 of the Cho-Shiu clan against the shogun. The rebels attempted 
 to close against all vessels the Strait of Simonoseki, between 
 the Inland Sea of Japan and the China Seas, and when an 
 American merchant vessel tried to pass through it was fired upon. 
 News of this was despatched to Yokohama, and the American 
 warship Wyoming was, at Pruyn 's request, sent to the scene. 
 It was also fired upon, whereupon it returned the fire, sunk one 
 vessel, damaged two others, and engaged the land batteries; 
 suffering a loss of four men killed and seven wounded. As ves- 
 sels of other nations had also been fired upon, a conference of 
 ministers was held, at which it was decided to send an inter- 
 national expedition to open the strait if Japan herself did not 
 do it within twenty days. The shogun would or could do noth- 
 ing, and so the expedition was sent. It was comprised of nine 
 British ships, four Dutch, three French, and one American, the 
 Civil War in the United States requiring the presence of the 
 American navy there and leaving only a single vessel in Japa- 
 nese waters. This expedition fought the Cho-Shiu forts and ves- 
 sels for three days early in September, 1863, and compelled the 
 reopening of the strait. An indemnity of $3,000,000 was ex- 
 acted from the shogun, and was divided among the four pow- 
 ers. The American government and people looked, however, 
 with disfavor upon this exaction, in such circumstances, and
 
 496 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 after holding it in the Treasury untouched for twenty years 
 the United States returned its share of the indemnity to Japan, 
 as an act of justice and friendship. 
 
 These incidents further weakened the declining power of the 
 shogun, and finally he acceded, in 1865, to the urgings of Pruyn 
 and the other ministers, that he should go to Kioto and secure 
 the mikado's formal approval of the treaties, all of which had 
 thus far been made only by the shogun. After this was done, 
 the people generally treated foreigners with much more respect, 
 and there was no more talk of annulling the treaties. In 1866 
 Pruyn retired and was succeeded by R. B. Van Valkenburg. 
 In the next two years the rule of the shogun was finally and com- 
 pletely ended, and the mikado, Mutsu Hito, became the one 
 actual sovereign, removing his capital from Kioto to Yeddo, 
 which thereafter was known as Tokio. In 1867 and 1868 an 
 attempt was made to revive a law of centuries before, prohibiting 
 Christianity in Japan. Van Valkenburg called the other minis- 
 ters together, and a strongly worded protest was made, which was 
 effective for the revocation of all laws against Christianity and 
 the establishment of religious freedom.
 
 XIX 
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 
 
 WHILE relations were being cultivated with the great na- 
 tions on the Asian rim of the Pacific, they were also 
 growing up in an interesting manner with an isolated people 
 in the midst of that ocean. The first discovery of the Hawaiian 
 Islands was probably made by Spanish voyagers in the six- 
 teenth century, who were shipwrecked there, were succored and 
 well cared for, intermarried among the natives, and spent the 
 remainder of their lives in those "summer isles of Eden." In 
 1555 Juan Gaetano also espied the group, but made no attempt 
 at conquest or settlement. The first effective discovery, or re- 
 discovery, was doubtless that of Cook, on flTanuary 18, 1778, who 
 named the islands after his patron, the Earl of Sandwich. It 
 does not appear that he attempted to claim sovereignty of them 
 for the British crown, however, and at the time of his lamentable 
 death there the islands were quite independent, under various 
 tribal princes. A few years later they were made a single king- 
 dom, under Kamehameha I. British vessels called there in 1786, 
 and so did the French navigator, La Perouse. 
 
 It was in 1789 that the first Americans reached those islands, 
 in circumstances not pleasant to remember. The Eleanor, Cap- 
 tain Metcalfe, and the Fair American, commanded by Metcalfe 's 
 son, stopped at Maui that fall, on their way to China. One 
 of the Eleanor's boats was stolen and broken up by the natives, 
 and in revenge for the act Metcalfe a few days later lured to 
 the waters about the ship many canoes filled with natives flock- 
 ing thither for purposes of trade, and then fired upon them with 
 cannon and small arms, with great slaughter. ]\Iore than a 
 hundred innocent people, including women and children, were 
 thus killed. Metcalfe then sailed away. But a little later the 
 Fair American was surprised and captured by the natives, and 
 
 all aboard, including Metcalfe's son, were killed, save two. 
 VOL. 1—32 497
 
 498 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 These, Isaac Davis, the mate, and John Young, the boatswain of 
 the Eleanor, were held as prisoners. But they were so kindly 
 treated that they presently married native women, became chiefs, 
 and spent the rest of their lives on the islands, teaching the na- 
 tives many of the arts of civilization. 
 
 Thereafter occasional visits were made to the islands by Amer- 
 icans and Europeans. In 1792, 1793, and 1794 the British ex- 
 plorer Vancouver visited them, and introduced to the islands 
 for the first time cattle, sheep, oranges, and grapes. To Van- 
 couver also we may credit the first implanting there of the 
 principles of Christianity. So highly were his ministrations 
 appreciated that on February 21, 1794, Kamehameha I held a 
 grand council of his chiefs aboard Vancouver's ship. Discovery, 
 and formally placed the islands under the protection of the 
 British crown ; and raised and saluted the British flag on shore. 
 Strange to say, however, this act was never ratified by the British 
 government, which thereafter for many years entirely neglected 
 the islands. 
 
 Baranoff, the great Russian governor of Alaska, in 1809 
 planned the founding of a Russian colony in Hawaii, and for the 
 next half-dozen years visits of Russian vessels to the islands were 
 frequent. At Honolulu a small fort was built, the Russian flag 
 was raised upon it, and efforts were made to secure a commer- 
 cial lease of the islands; which was not successful. Then, on 
 the advice of John Young, the former boatswain of the Eleanor, 
 the Hawaiians themselves built a fort, of coral rock, to com- 
 mand the harbor of Honolulu, and equipped it with cannon. 
 The Russians were then requested to retire from the islands, 
 which they did; their aggressions being not only unsupported 
 but disavowed by their own government. Thereafter the king- 
 dom of Kamehameha I was undisturbed, save by domestic feuds, 
 for many years. Tribal conflicts, however, were frequent, and 
 increasing commercial intercourse with Europe and America 
 brought to the islands more of the vices than of the virtues 
 of civilization. 
 
 American commercial relations with the islands were begun 
 at an early date by the same enterprising and intrepid voyagers 
 who established our title to the Oregon coast, John Kendriek 
 of Wareham, Massachusetts, with the ship Columbia, and Robert
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 499 
 
 Gray of Boston, with the sloop Lady Washington. It was in 
 1787 that they set out from Boston, upon their first memorable 
 voyage to the Pacific, on which, apart from their other important 
 achievements, they visited the Hawaiian Islands and began a 
 trade with them in sandal-wood which later increased to great 
 proportions. On their return to Boston in the summer of 1790 
 these pioneers were received as though they were great con- 
 querors returning from their wars. Bells, banners, cannon, 
 the cheers of the multitude, and the hospitality of the governor 
 of the State, testified to the appreciation of their achievements ; 
 and conspicuous among these festivities was a stately Hawaiian 
 chief, in royal attire, who had accompanied Captain Gray and 
 who was the first of his race to visit the United States. A few 
 years later the first horse ever seen on the islands was taken 
 thither from Boston. Others followed, from the California 
 coast, and soon the islands were well stocked with the animals 
 and the natives became expert horsemen. 
 
 Thereafter commercial intercourse with the islands steadily 
 increased and Hawaii became a regular stopping place for 
 American vessels bound to and from China. This was partly 
 because of the advantageous situation of the group, in mid- 
 Pacific, and partly because of the sandal-wood trade. That 
 commodity was in great demand in China, and American ves- 
 sels found it profitable to call at the islands for cargoes of it, 
 which they carried to China and there exchanged for tea, silk, 
 porcelain, and the other commodities of Cathay. Captain 
 Kendrick, indeed, left a number of men permanently ashore on 
 the islands, to promote the cultivation and gathering of the 
 wood. The whale fisheries and mother-of-pearl trade also took 
 many American vessels to those waters and shores, and in the 
 first quarter of the nineteenth century it was no uncommon 
 thing for as many as fifty American vessels to be seen at once 
 in and about the harbor of Honolulu. The people and rulers 
 of the islands were generally most hospitable to them, partly 
 because of their naturally amiable disposition and partly because 
 of the rich profits which they derived from the commerce. 
 
 In the year of Baranoff's first designs upon Hawaii, 1809, 
 American interest was attracted to the islands in a peculiarly 
 romantic way, and a train of incidents was started which had a
 
 500 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 more profound effect upon the people of the isolated kingdom 
 than anything else in all their history. The story runs that one 
 day a strange, brown boy was found seated on the doorstep of 
 one of the buildings of Yale College, at New Haven, Connecti- 
 cut, weeping and evidently suffering much physical and mental 
 distress. In broken English he revealed himself to be Obookiah, 
 the son of a Hawaiian chief, fourteen years old. His father, 
 mother, and brother had been butchered before his eyes in 
 one of the inter-tribal conflicts which at that time frequently 
 raged on the islands, and he had himself narrowly escaped the 
 same fate. With two other boys, Hopu and Tamoree, the latter 
 the son of the tributary king of the Island of Kauai, he had made 
 his way to the coast. There the three had been received aboard 
 BJi American vessel and brought to New Haven. 
 
 The lad was renamed Henry, was kindly cared for, and steps 
 were begun for his education, but he presently fell ill and died, 
 from the results of the privations and exposures which he had 
 suffered during his flight. Hopu and Tamoree survived, how- 
 ever, and so did another refugee, John Honoree, who joined 
 them. The three received the best education which New Eng- 
 land could afford, and were converted to Christianity, and ten 
 years after their arrival here, having grown to manhood, they 
 desired to return to Hawaii, to take the lead in the regenera- 
 tion and civilization of their fellow countrymen. This design 
 aroused much interest in New England, and a company of four- 
 teen men and women decided to accompany them. These com- 
 prised two clergymen, a teacher, a physician, a printer, a me- 
 chanic, and a farmer. Impressive farewell services were held 
 in the historic Park Street Church, Boston, and on October 23, 
 1819, the expedition sailed from Boston, on the brig Thaddeus, 
 on an errand of nothing less than epochal importance. 
 
 They reached Hawaii in the following March, to find that 
 Kamehameha was dead, that the queen regent who suc- 
 ceeded him had abolished idol-worship and other pagan prac- 
 tices, and that the islands were in a peculiarly receptive state 
 for the implanting of Christianity and American civilization. 
 They were received with much cordiality, and Samuel Rug- 
 gles, the teacher among them, was adopted as a son by Tamoree 's 
 father, the tributary king of Kauai, and was made a royal chief.
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 501 
 
 The missionaries devoted themselves not merely to the preach- 
 ing of Christianity but also to the promotion of the general wel- 
 fare of the people. The physician healed the sick and taught 
 the people how to care for their health. The farmer instructed 
 them in agriculture. The mechanic developed various industrial 
 arts. The printer set up a printing press and began publishing 
 text books and other works in the native language. The teacher 
 organized a system of public schools. Other missionaries, on 
 similar errands, followed in the succeeding years, and civiliza- 
 tion made more rapid advances in Hawaii than it was ever known 
 to do in any other land in similar circumstances. Within five 
 years Sunday was officially adopted as a holy day, and im- 
 portant decrees for the moral welfare of the people were pro- 
 mulgated and, best of all, were earnestly and effectively en- 
 forced. Some of the missionaries themselves engaged in com- 
 mercial and industrial enterprises, as did their sons, and of 
 course they were followed to the islands by many men who had 
 no other object than trade. Thus the missionary movement had 
 important commercial results. But the fact remains that it was 
 conceived and primarily conducted with the sole view of achiev- 
 ing the moral redemption and the civilization of the people of 
 the islands, with an unselfish and sincere devotion never sur- 
 passed in the history of the world. By the year 1828 there were 
 440 native teachers assisting the missionaries in their work and 
 in 1840 the insular government took over the extensive system 
 of schools which the missionaries had founded, as a national 
 system of free public schools. 
 
 The importance of American intercourse with the islands in 
 early years may be estimated from the fact that in the six years 
 1836-41 three hundred and fifty-eight vessels from this country 
 called at Honolulu, the companies of which were estimated to 
 have spent an average of probably seven hundred dollars each 
 ashore, a total of a quarter of a million dollars. In the same 
 period only eighty-two British and seven French ships visited 
 Honolulu. The other ports of the islands were less frequented, 
 though many American whalers touched at Lahaina. The mag- 
 nitude of American commercial interests in the islands, and the 
 assured prospect of further growth thereof, prompted our gov- 
 ernment on September 19, 1820, to designate John C. Jones to 
 
 ■;
 
 502 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 reside at Honolulu as "agent of the United States for commerce 
 and seamen," practically a consul. He had general supervision 
 of American affairs in the islands, and made reports thereon 
 to the department of state. In 1823 he was succeeded by- 
 Thomas Crocker, who first bore the title of consul. It is of in- 
 terest to recall that Crocker went to the islands on the Boston 
 ship Paragon, whose second officer was John Dominis of Bos- 
 ton. This latter officer spent much time ashore at Honolulu, 
 and he and his family cultivated intimate social relations with 
 the royal family and the chiefs ; and years later his son, John 0. 
 Dominis, married the native Princess Lydia, sister of David 
 Kalakaua, the last king of the islands, who herself succeeded 
 him as Queen Liliuokalani and who was the last sovereign of 
 Hawaii. 
 
 Contact with visitors from other lands inspired some of the 
 principal men of the islands with a desire to see for themselves 
 something of the rest of the world; among them the king him- 
 self, Liholiho, who in October, 1823, with his queen and a con- 
 siderable retinue, sailed for England on a British ship. The 
 royal party was courteously welcomed by King George IV, 
 and the visit would probably have resulted in the establishment 
 of particularly close relations between the two countries, had 
 not both the Hawaiian sovereigns sickened and died of measles 
 within two months of their arrival in England. Their death 
 caused a revolution in the islands, and the prime minister 
 eventually became king, under the title of Kamehameha III. 
 
 During this revolutionary period American interests suffered 
 somewhat and deserters from American ships fomented trouble 
 ashore, so that the Washington government deemed it desirable 
 to send some agent thither to adjust matters. Commodore Hull, 
 commanding the fleet in the Pacific, then at Callao, Peru, re- 
 ceived in May, 1825, orders to send a vessel to Honolulu on such 
 a mission, and he accordingly selected the ship Peacock, com- 
 manded by Captain Thomas ap Catesby Jones. This officer, 
 invested with quasi-diplomatic functions, reached Honololu in 
 the fall of 1826 and soon succeeded in settling the little contro- 
 versies which had arisen and in ridding both the natives and 
 the American settlers of annoyance. He did more than that. 
 Although he had not been specially directed to do so he pro-
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 503 
 
 ceeded to negotiate with the Hawaiian government a general 
 treaty of friendship and commerce; the first ever made between 
 Hawaii and any other country. This instrument provided for 
 perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries, for 
 the protection of American citizens and vessels from harm dur- 
 ing domestic wars in the islands, for the proper care of ship- 
 wrecked crews, for the protection and civil rights of Americans 
 in the islands, for the prevention of desertion from American 
 vessels and the arrest and return of deserters, for the promotion 
 of trade between the two countries, and for the establishment 
 of the "most favored nation" principle. It was an eminently 
 just and beneficent compact, and it embodied the terms on which 
 American relations with the islands had been and were there- 
 after conducted. Unfortunately, however, the United States 
 Senate neglected to ratify it, and it therefore never became 
 technically effective, and the distinction and advantage of being 
 the first actually to establish treaty relations with Hawaii were 
 forfeited by the United States in favor of its two rivals. For a 
 treaty was made and ratified between Hawaii and Great Britain 
 in November, 1836, and another was made with France in 1839, 
 both of which, like that of Captain Jones, were negotiated by 
 commanders of warships invested with diplomatic powers. 
 
 It is a lamentable fact to record that while American mission- 
 aries, as already related, were doing much for the moral wel- 
 fare and civilization of the islands, and the insular rulers cor- 
 dially seconded their efforts, not only American traders but 
 also men and even officers of the United States navy at times 
 exerted violent measures for the discouragement of such prog- 
 ress and for the degradation of the people. In 1825, in addition 
 to the adoption of Sunday as a day of divine worship, the 
 Hawaiian government issued a decree forbidding native women 
 to go aboard or to be taken aboard ships for purposes of pros- 
 titution; as had formerly been done on a vast and demoralizing 
 scale. The crews of various British and American whaling and 
 trading vessels attempted in a riotous fashion to compel the 
 restoration of the former immoral and criminal practices, but it 
 was reserved for the company of a United States national vessel 
 to engage most actively in that infamous work. In January, 
 1826, the United States schooner Dolphin-, commanded by Lieu-
 
 504 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 tenant John Percival, entered the harbor of Honolulu, and re- 
 mained several weeks. At first the crew was orderly and the 
 new code of morals was respected. But one Sunday in February 
 a number of the men went ashore, in quest of native women 
 whom they might take back to the vessel with them, or with 
 whom they might indulge in debaucheries ashore. Finding 
 these things forbidden, they violently invaded the house of one 
 of the chiefs, in which at the time divine worship was being 
 conducted, and threatened to loot and destroy it if they were 
 not permitted to have the women. The authorities appealed to 
 Lieutenant Percival to restrain his men from their lawlessness, 
 but he instead supported the men and by dint of threats com- 
 pelled the Hawaiian authorities to permit gross violations of 
 the law. It is charitable to assume that he took this course 
 through weakness, feeling unable to control his men, However 
 that may have been, the effect of the incident was pernicious, 
 both in encouraging lawlessness and immorality and in creating 
 suspicion and antagonism toward the United States. 
 
 A few years later, indeed, a certain attempt at reparation 
 was made by the United States government. President Jackson 
 had presumably heard of the incident of the Dolphin and of 
 Percival's evil conduct, and in 1829 he sent Captain Finch, 
 with the United States ship Vincennes, to Honolulu on an 
 official errand. Finch bore numerous costly gifts from the presi- 
 dent to the king, queen, and principal chiefs, and a letter from 
 the secretary of the navy, in which occurred this significant pas- 
 sage : 
 
 "The President anxiously hopes that peace and kindness and 
 justice will prevail between your people and those citizens of 
 the United States who visit your islands, and that the regula- 
 tions of your Government will be such as to enforce them upon 
 all. Our citizens who violate your laws, or interfere with your 
 regulations, violate at the same time their duty to their own 
 Government and country, and merit censure and punishment." 
 
 Finch remained at Honolulu for several weeks, cultivating the 
 most friendly relations with the Government and people, seek- 
 ing to counteract the bad effects of the Dolphin outrage, and 
 gathering information concerning the trade and resources of the 
 islands.
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 505 
 
 Two years later serious trouble arose in the islands over the 
 conflicting claims of rival religious organizations, or perhaps 
 more correctly through governmental partiality in religious 
 affairs. The British consul, Richard Charleton, had ever since 
 his appointment some years before manifested intense hostility 
 toward the American missionaries and their works. It is prob- 
 able that he was actuated by political rather than religious mo- 
 tives, having an ambition to increase British influence in the 
 islands with a view to their eventual annexation and recognizing 
 the American missionaries to be the most formidable obstacle to 
 such schemes. The influence of the Americans was, of course, 
 toward republicanism rather than monarchy, and toward closer 
 relations of all kinds with the United States rather than with 
 Europe. In his efforts to combat these influences, Charleton 
 resorted to religious rivalries, and sought the introduction of 
 Roman Catholic missionaries, who would build up an organiza- 
 tion antagonistic, he hoped, to that of the New England Protes- 
 tants. 
 
 In this campaign Charleton was unexpectedly aided by the 
 machinations of a French adventurer of unsavory antecedents, 
 named Rives, who had been a menial in the service of King 
 Liholiho. He had desired to go to England with that monarch, 
 and when his request was refused he went aboard the vessel as 
 a stowaway. When the ship was well on her way he revealed 
 his presence; and soon regained the favor of the king, whom he 
 encouraged in his vices of drinking and gambling. Rives man- 
 aged to involve the royal party in some unpleasant episodes, 
 as a result of which he was dismissed from it, and went to 
 France to organize commercial speculations for the Hawaiian 
 trade. He was also instrumental in securing the sending of 
 seven Jesuit missionaries to the islands under an apostolic pre- 
 fect, the Rev. J. A. Bachelot. These missionaries went to the 
 islands in 1826, and soon found themselves regarded with dis- 
 favor by the Hawaiian government, which regarded tlie New 
 England Protestant missionaries as its best friends and was 
 therefore inclined to be hostile to any religionists who differed 
 from them in faith. Of course the American missionaries did 
 not attempt to allay this official hostility toward the newcomers, 
 and the outcome was that in April, 1831, the Jesuits were ex-
 
 506 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 pelled from the islands, and went to San Gabriel, California. 
 They left behind them, however, converts and friends, who were 
 treated with disfavor if not with actual persecution by the Gov- 
 ernment, and who were easily made the tools of Charleton in his 
 anti-American campaign. 
 
 The friction became so acute that in August, 1832, Commander 
 Downes was sent thither with the United States ship Potomac 
 to observe the state of affairs and to do what he could for 
 its amelioration, in which latter he succeeded to some extent, 
 though for some years thereafter the island government con- 
 tinued to discriminate against the Jesuits and did not establish 
 complete religious freedom and equality until 1839. The net 
 result of Charleton 's machinations was, however, the coming 
 thither of the British warship Actce^n, under the command of 
 Lord Edward Russel, and the making, in November, 1836, of 
 the treaty between Hawaii and Great Britain, which has already 
 been referred to. There is no doubt that the Hawaiian govern- 
 ment was partly coerced into making this treaty by the circum- 
 stance that the guns of the Actceon were at the time trained upon 
 Honolulu; but the treaty itself was an entirely proper one; 
 providing chiefly for the suitable protection of British subjects 
 and their property in the islands. 
 
 It was in somewhat similar fashion that the French treaty 
 was made three years later. In July, 1839, the French warship 
 Artemise, commanded by Captain Laplace, visited the islands, 
 and, under a practical threat of hostilities, required the making 
 of a treaty guaranteeing religious eciuality and permitting the 
 return of the Jesuits. By strange irony the French commander 
 at the same time extorted a second treaty permitting the im- 
 portation of intoxicating liquors into the islands, a provision 
 which worked irreparable mischief upon the people. With in- 
 solence which should have been intolerable, and which should 
 have been sharply resented by our Government, the French cap- 
 tain told the American consul that he would better not encour- 
 age the king to resist any of these demands, since in case of 
 hostilities resulting from such refusal the American Protestant 
 missionaries would be treated as enemies equally with the na- 
 tives. But there were times when no insult or humiliation was 
 too great for the American official maw to receive. Following
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 507 
 
 this episode Charleton went home to England to inform his 
 Government of the state of affairs and to suggest to it that the 
 United States was practically a negligible quantity and that 
 there was to be merely a scramble between Great Britain and 
 France for the possession of the islands. 
 
 Meanwhile the Hawaiian government was striving to secure 
 recognition and protection from the United States and other 
 powers. In 1836 the Rev. William Richards, one of the Ameri- 
 can missionaries, had visited the United States in an endeavor 
 to get some American competent and willing to serve the king 
 as an adviser and instructor in diplomacy and statecraft. His 
 efforts were unsuccessful, but in 1842 he and Timothy Haalilio, 
 an educated native, visited England, France, and the United 
 States successively, asking for the recognition of Hawaiian in- 
 dependence, which had never yet been given by any power. On 
 December 14 of that year they addressed a letter to the secretary 
 of state, giving an interesting sketch of the progress which the 
 islands had made toward civilization, and making an earnest 
 plea for such recognition as would assure them of a continued 
 opportunity to work out their national destiny undisturbed. 
 They said, in part: 
 
 ''Twenty-three years ago the nation had no written language 
 and no characters in which to write it. The language had never 
 been systematized nor reduced to any kind of form. The people 
 had no acquaintance with Christianity, nor with the valuable 
 institutions or usages of civilized life. The nation had no fixed 
 form or regulation of government, except as they were dictated 
 by those in authority or who might by any means acquire power. 
 The right of property was not acknowledged, and was, therefore, 
 but partially enjoyed. There were no courts of justice, and the 
 will of the chieftains was absolute. The property of foreigners 
 had no protection except in the kind disposition of individuals. 
 But, under the fostering influence, patronage, and care of his 
 Majesty and of his predecessors, the language has been reduced 
 to visible and systematized form, and is now written by a large 
 and respectable portion of the people. Schools have been estab- 
 lished throughout his dominions, and are supported principally 
 by the Government ; and there are but few, among the younger 
 people, who are unable to read. They have now, in their own
 
 508 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 language, a library embracing a considerable variety of books 
 on a variety of subjects, including the Holy Scriptures, works 
 on natural history, civil history, church history, geography, po- 
 litical economy, mathematics, and statute law, besides a number 
 of elementary books. A regular monarchical government has 
 been organized, of a limited and representative character. . . . 
 It has, moreover, been the uniform practice of consuls and com- 
 mercial agents, resident in his Majesty's dominions, to demand 
 all that protection, both of persons and property, which is de- 
 manded of sovereign and independent States; and this, his 
 Majesty believes, has been duly and efficiently extended. While, 
 therefore, all is demanded of his Government, and all is ren- 
 dered by it which is demanded of or rendered by the Govern- 
 ments of sovereign and independent States, he feels that he has 
 a right to expect his State to be acknowledged as such, and thus 
 be formally received into the general compact of sovereign na- 
 tions. ' ' 
 
 Fortunately the American secretary of state at that time was 
 Daniel Webster, who had the prescience and the courage to deal 
 fittingly with the case. Five days after the receipt of this com- 
 munication he replied with a straightforward and sympathetic 
 letter, in which he said : 
 
 "The United States have regarded the existing authorities 
 in the Sandwich Islands as a government suited to the condi- 
 tion of the people, and resting on their own choice; and the 
 President is of opinion that the interests of all commercial na- 
 tions require that that Government should not be interfered with 
 by foreign powers. Of the vessels which visit the islands, it is 
 known that the great majority belong to the United States. 
 The United States, therefore, are more interested in the fate of 
 the islands and of their Government than any other nation can 
 be; and this consideration induces the President to be quite 
 willing to declare, as the sense of the Government of the United 
 States, that the Government of the Sandwich Islands ought to be 
 respected; that no power ought either to take possession of the 
 islands as a conquest or for the purpose of colonization, and 
 that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the 
 existing Government, or any exclusive privileges or preferences 
 with it in matters of commerce."
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 509 
 
 Nor was this the extent of Webster's interest in the islands. 
 He laid the matter before the President, Tyler, with the result 
 that the latter on December 30 sent to Congress a special mes- 
 sage on the subject, recommending recognition of Hawaii and a 
 practical guarantee of its independence. He said in the course 
 of this document: 
 
 ''It cannot but be in conformity with the interest and the 
 wishes of the Government and the people of the United States 
 that this community, thus existing in the midst of a vast ex- 
 panse of ocean, should be respected, and all its rights strictly 
 and conscientiously regarded. And this must also be the true 
 interest of all other commercial States. Far remote from the 
 dominions of European powers, its growth and prosperity as an 
 independent State may yet be in a high degree useful to all 
 whose trade is extended to those regions, while its nearer ap- 
 proach to this continent and the intercourse which American 
 vessels have with it, such vessels constituting five sixths of all 
 which annually visit it, could not but create dissatisfaction on 
 the part of the United States at any attempt by another power, 
 should such an attempt be threatened or feared, to take posses- 
 sion of the islands, colonize them, and subvert the native Gov- 
 ernment. Considering, therefore, that the United States possess 
 so very large a share in the intercourse with those islands, it is 
 deemed not unfit to make the declaration that their Government 
 seeks, nevertheless, no peculiar advantages, no exclusive control 
 over the Hawaiian government, but is content with its inde- 
 pendent existence, and anxiously wishes for its security and 
 prosperity. Its forbearance in this respect, under the circum- 
 stances of the very large intercourse which American vessels 
 have with the islands, would justify this Government, should 
 events hereafter arise to require it, in making a decided re- 
 monstrance against the adoption of an opposite policy by any 
 other power. Under the circumstances, I recommend to Con- 
 gress to provide for a moderate allowance, to be made out of 
 the Treasury, to the consul residing there, that, in a govern- 
 ment so new and a country so remote, American citizens may 
 have respectable authority to which to apply for redress in case 
 of injury to their persons and property, and to whom the Gov- 
 ernment of the country may also make kno\vn any acts com-
 
 510 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 mitted by American citizens of which, it may think it has a right 
 to complain." 
 
 The one weakness of the attitude thus taken by our Govern- 
 ment was in its failure at once to make a formal treaty with the 
 islands, and indeed in "Webster's strange statement that the 
 President did not see the need of any formal treaty or the ap- 
 pointment of a diplomatic representative at that time. Perhaps 
 if the President had known what was at that very moment in 
 preparation he would have thought and acted differently. 
 
 For on February 11, 1842, only a few weeks after the Presi- 
 dent's message had been delivered to Congress, the British war- 
 ship Garysfort, commanded by Sir George Paulet, entered Hono- 
 lulu harbor. It had come to demand satisfaction for a claim 
 which Charleton had preferred against the Government. Cer- 
 tain lands to which he had title had been attached in some legal 
 proceedings. No execution was issued against them, but notice 
 was given that until the legal proceedings were ended the lands 
 could not be transferred to any other owner. Charleton pro- 
 tested that this was an infringement of his rights as a British 
 subject, and on this ground secured the sending of this ship. 
 Immediately upon anchoring Paulet sent to the Governor of the 
 Island of Oahu a curt message, demanding an interview with 
 the king in person, for the satisfaction of the repeated insults 
 which, he said, British subjects had received from the Hawaiian 
 government. The king was then absent, on the Island of Maui, 
 but five days later he returned to Honolulu, whereupon Paulet 
 wrote directly to him, again demanding an interview. The king 
 sent his personal representative. Dr. George P. Judd, to see 
 Paulet, but the latter insultingly rejected him, and then ex- 
 plicitly threatened to attack the city at four o'clock p.m. the 
 next day, if the king had not complied with his demands before 
 that time. 
 
 The demands in question were that the attachment should be 
 removed from Charleton 's lands, that reparation should be made 
 to Charleton for alleged losses which in fact he had not suffered, 
 that a man named Simpson should be recognized as consul in 
 Charleton 's place on the mere strength of Charleton 's personal 
 designation of him, that a new trial should be granted to one 
 Henry Skinner who claimed that he had been improperly con-
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 511 
 
 victed, that no British subject should be put in irons unless 
 charged with a crime which would warrant such treatment under 
 British law, and that British subjects should be tried by juries 
 one half of the members of which should be British subjects 
 approved by the consul. Some of these demands were wholly 
 unreasonable, while the manner in which they were made and 
 the threat with which they were accompanied were quite in- 
 excusable. It is impossible to avoid the supposition that Paulet 
 was deliberately seeking to "rush" the islands and to annex 
 them by force to the British Empire. The king realized this. 
 But he was helpless. He had no means of resistance, and de- 
 fiance would mean the destruction of the city and the slaughter 
 of the people. There was every reason to expect that Paulet 's 
 threat would be fulfilled, as doubtless it would have been. 
 There seemed nothing to do, therefore, but to yield to the inevit- 
 able. But on the principle that death was better than dishonor, 
 the king preferred the extinction of his sovereignty to its hu- 
 miliation through compliance with unjust demands. Instead, 
 therefore, of complying with the demands he announced the 
 surrender of his sovereignty and the cession of the islands to 
 Great Britain, subject to whatever terms might be subsequently 
 agreed upon between his commissioners and those of the British 
 government appointed for the purpose. 
 
 This was really shrewd policy on the part of the king, since 
 it gave time for the arrival of help from the only source from 
 which it could be secured. At the moment when he made this 
 extraordinary act of cession, therefore, he sent an account of the 
 whole matter to the United States government, where Daniel 
 Webster was still secretary of state, reminding it of the senti- 
 ments which had been expressed by Webster and by the Presi- 
 dent, and imploring it to "interpose the high influence of the 
 United States with the court of England" for the undoing of the 
 great wrong. As for Paulet, he accepted the cession, and ap- 
 pointed a commission for the provisional government of the 
 islands, of which the king or his representative was to be a 
 member, the others being British subjects. The British flag 
 was raised, and a regiment called the "Queen's Own" was or- 
 ganized. The king protested against some of these acts, and 
 withdrew from tlie commission, but the others continued their
 
 512 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 rule without him. Soon, however, something was heard from 
 headquarters. *' 
 
 The President and the secretary of state acted promptly on 
 receipt of the Hawaiian appeal, sending instructions to Everett, 
 the minister to Great Britain, and also accrediting to him some 
 special Hawaiian commissioners to London, to protest against 
 Paulet's act. Everett was specially prepared for the business, 
 for the reason that a little time before Webster had written to 
 him about Charleton's performances and the conduct of the 
 French, had reminded him of the policy already set forth by 
 the President, and had expressed the hope that Great Britain 
 and France would adopt a pacific, just, and conservative course 
 toward the Government and people of the islands. Acting 
 promptly on the basis of this note, Everett had secured from 
 the British government the assurance that the independence 
 of the islands would be recognized, and also the information 
 that the British government had warned France that no en- 
 croachments upon the islands would be tolerated, and that 
 France had replied that none was intended. When, therefore, 
 the news reached London that Paulet had practically seized the 
 islands, the British government was much embarrassed, and 
 Everett had the whiphand of it in demanding that it should 
 fulfil the assurances which it had recently given to him. To its 
 everlasting credit the British government promptly vindicated 
 its good faith. It distinctly disavowed Paulet's act, both to 
 Everett and to the Hawaiian commissioners, and renounced the 
 sovereignty which that overzealous officer had proclaimed. It 
 was a little reluctant to do the latter, not on principle but for 
 prudential reasons. France had just seized the Marquesas 
 Islands and was believed to have despatched an expedition to 
 Hawaii for the same purpose there, and it was suggested that 
 the temporary retention of British sovereignty would be the best 
 protection of the islands against such a peril. It was made plain 
 by Everett, however, that such protection would not be neces- 
 sary, and accordingly on June 25, 1843, the British minister at 
 Washington formally announced that his Government had dis- 
 avowed the seizure of the islands and had renounced sovereignty 
 over them. On July 11, before news of this could reach the 
 islands. Commodore Kearney arrived at Honolulu with the
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 513 
 
 United States frigate Constellation, and made a formal protest 
 against the British occupation and against the acts of Paulet's 
 commissioners so far as they affected the interests of American 
 citizens. But twenty days later Rear- Admiral Thomas, of the 
 British navy, arrived with the man-of-war Duhlin, hauled down 
 the British flag, reraised and saluted the Hawaiian flag, and re- 
 peated the formal declaration of disavowal. He further de- 
 clared that the Queen of Great Britain recognized Kamehameha 
 as the legitimate King of the Hawaiian Islands, that her senti- 
 ments toward him were those of esteem and friendship, and 
 that she desired him to be treated as an independent sovereign. 
 
 The attitude of the United States was tersely expressed on 
 June 13, 1843, by Legare, the acting secretary of state, in a 
 note to Everett, in which he said that ''we might even feel justi- 
 fied, consistently with our principles, in interfering by force 
 to prevent its (the Hawaiian kingdom's) falling into the hands 
 of one of the great powers of Europe." In that pithy declara- 
 tion the United States applied to Hawaii the identical policy 
 which many years before had been enunciated concerning 
 Florida and Cuba, if not, indeed, concerning Louisiana. The 
 attitude which, in consequence, was assumed by the British and 
 French governments was unmistakably set forth on November 
 28, 1843, when the British foreign secretary and the French am- 
 bassador in London signed a declaration to the effect that those 
 countries, "taking into consideration the existence in the Sand- 
 wich Islands of a government capable of providing for the regu- 
 larity of its relations with foreign nations, have thought it right 
 to engage, reciprocally, to consider the Sandwich Islands as an 
 independent State, and never to take possession, either directly 
 or under the title of protectorate, or under any other form, of 
 any part of the territory of which they are composed." 
 
 Concurrently with these transactions the United States took 
 the long-delayed step of establishing regular diplomatic relations 
 with Hawaii. In pursuance of the recommendations in the 
 President's special message of the preceding December, Con- 
 gress provided for the sending of a "commissioner," who was 
 to be practically a minister, to the islands, and on March 3, 1843, 
 George Brown of Massachusetts was appointed to the place. He 
 reached Honolulu in the following October, and was the first 
 
 VOL. I — 33
 
 514 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 such envoy ever received by a Hawaiian king. His reception 
 was cordial, the king and people feeling grateful to the United 
 States for rescuing them from British aggression. In his in- 
 troductory address to the king he expressed the hope that the 
 friendship between the two countries would be maintained and 
 strengthened; to which the king replied that citizens of the 
 United States would always receive from him the privileges ac- 
 corded to those of the most favored nation. This was an inter- 
 esting assurance, seeing that at that time Hawaii had treaties 
 with Great Britain and France but none with the United States. 
 Unfortunately, it was not always fulfilled. Only a short time 
 afterward an American, John Wiley, was put on trial for some 
 offense at Honolulu. He asked to be tried before a jury of 
 Americans or other foreigners. The request was refused, and 
 he appealed to Brown. The latter repeated the request, point- 
 ing out that the Hawaiian treaty with France provided that no 
 Frenchman should be tried save before a jury composed of for- 
 eigners approved by the French consul. The appeal was again 
 denied, and Wiley was tried before a jury composed, according 
 to Hawaiian law, half of foreigners and half of natives. The 
 verdict was against him, and an appeal was made. While it 
 was pending, on February 12, 1844, a treaty was made with 
 Great Britain which contained the same provision concerning 
 juries as that with France. Despite this, and in the face of the 
 king's promise about "most favored nation" treatment, the ap- 
 peal was denied on the ground that the United States had no 
 treaty stipulations to that effect. President Tyler approved the 
 contentions of Brown, and the latter then proceeded to protest 
 against the British-Hawaiian treaty on the ground that it dis- 
 criminated against the United States. At this the king asked 
 the United States to recall Brown, as no longer persona grata. 
 
 Anthony Ten Eyck of Michigan was appointed in his place 
 in 1845 and was duly received, though he did not succeed in 
 greatly ingratiating himself at the Hawaiian court. Calhoun, 
 who had become secretary of state, maintained the ' ' most favored 
 nation" claim, even in the absence of a treaty, but instructed 
 Ten Eyck to seek the making of a treaty at the earliest possible 
 date. This, however, he was not able to do. New treaties were 
 made by Great Britain and France in 1846, in which the pro-
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 515 
 
 visions conceniing juries were materially modified, so as to per- 
 mit trial before mixed juries, according to Hawaiian law. 
 Despite this. Ten Eyck foolishly persisted in demanding a treaty 
 providing for juries on the basis of the former and then abol- 
 ished British and French treaties. This naturally offended 
 the Hawaiian government, and it came near to requesting Ten 
 Eyck's recall. Indeed, it might have done so had he not an- 
 ticipated its action by voluntarily resigning, in September, 1848. 
 He remained in the islands about a year longer, awaiting the 
 coming of his successor, but was quite ignored by the United 
 States government. He afterward wrote and forwarded to 
 Washington a letter full of bitter criticisms of the President 
 (Polk) and the secretary of state (Buchanan) which made 
 their further recognition of him practically impossible. His 
 course was the more foolish and unfortunate for the reason that 
 Buchanan, while he warned him against the folly of his jury 
 policy, strongly supported him in his efforts to secure some sort 
 of treaty. Indeed, Buchanan went about as far as possible 
 in putting pressure to bear upon the Hawaiian government, 
 writing to Ten Eyck, on August 28, 1848, for repetition to the 
 Hawaiian government, as follows: 
 
 ''The President has learned with regret and astonishment the 
 probable refusal of the Hawaiian government to conclude a 
 treaty with the United States upon the terms of the treaty with 
 Great Britain. He entertains the hope that this may not be 
 their final determination. If it should be, he will be compelled 
 to consider it as evidence of a want of friendly feeling toward 
 this Government. . . , This Government, having . . . pledged 
 itself to accord to that of the Hawaiian Islands the rights and 
 privileges of a sovereign State, cannot in honor and justice de- 
 mand from it anything which, under like circumstances, it would 
 not demand from the most powerful nations. I can discover 
 nothing that would justify this Government in objecting to the 
 decisions of the Hawaiian courts in ordinary cases arising under 
 the municipal laws of the country or in dictating the policy 
 which that Government should pursue upon any domestic sub- 
 ject, and especially that of the tenare of real estate by resident 
 foreigners. . . . We ardently desire that the Hawaiian Islands 
 may maintain their independence. It would be highly injurious
 
 516 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 to our interests, if, tempted by their weakness, they should be 
 seized by Great Britain or France; more especially so since 
 our recent acquisitions from Mexico on the Pacific Ocean." 
 
 The most serious crisis of all thus far in Hawaiian history 
 came in 1849. At the beginning of that year Charles Eames 
 of New York was appointed United States commissioner in 
 Hawaii, but did not go thither for some time; J. Turrill, the 
 American consul at Honolulu, in the interim filling his place, as 
 he had done ever since the resignation of Ten Eyck. On August 
 13 two French warships, commanded by Rear-Admiral Trome- 
 lin, entered the harbor of Honolulu, and some extraordinary de- 
 mands, coupled with threats, were presented to the Hawaiian 
 government, on the pretext that it had wantonly violated certain 
 provisions of the treaty with France. The American consul was 
 informed by the French commander that no conquest, occupation, 
 or protectorate was contemplated, but merely redress of griev- 
 ances, and he was assured that in case of trouble the property 
 of Americans would be respected and protected. Turrill, how- 
 ever, protested against the proceedings, and in so doing was 
 supported by the British and all other consuls. Tromelin ig- 
 nored the protests, and when the king failed to comply with his 
 demands, landed a company of marines, and took forcible pos- 
 session of the fort, custom house and other government build- 
 ings, and a number of vessels. The Hawaiian flag was not 
 hauled down, nor that of France raised, but the buildings were 
 held for five days, and much public property was damaged and 
 destroyed. No resistance was offered by the king, but he 
 commissioned James Jackson Jarves, an American resident of 
 Honolulu, to solicit the friendly mediation of the President of 
 the United States. George R. Judd, who had already served 
 as the king's representative, was a little later appointed as 
 Jarves 's colleague, with instructions to enlist also the attention 
 of the British government. President Fillmore readily complied 
 with the request, and negotiations were begun to secure the 
 joint intervention of Great Britain. While these were slowly 
 proceeding, with little promise of success, a highly important 
 achievement was effected, in the negotiation and ratification of 
 the long-desired treaty between Hawaii and the United States. 
 This was done at Washington, on December 20, 1849, by John
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 517 
 
 M. Clayton, secretary of state, and J. J. Jarves, the Hawaiian 
 commissioner. It was a treaty of friendship, commerce, naviga- 
 tion, and extradition. It was ratified on February 4, 1850, and 
 was proclaimed on November 9 of that year. Thus for the first 
 time the treaty relations which Captain ap Catesby Jones had 
 sought nearly thirty years before were secured. 
 
 The French crisis remained, however, not only unsettled but 
 increasingly menacing. In July, 1850, Clayton, as secretary of 
 state, felt constrained vigorously to reassert the attitude of the 
 United States as follows, in a note to Rives, the American minis- 
 ter to France : 
 
 "The Department will be slow to believe that the French have 
 any intention to adopt with reference to the Sandwich Islands 
 the same policy which they have pursued in regard to Tahiti. 
 If, however, in your judgment, it should be warranted by cir- 
 cumstances, you may take a proper opportunity to intimate to 
 the minister for foreign affairs of France that the situation 
 of the Sandwich Islands in respect to our possessions on the 
 Pacific, and the bonds, commercial and of other descriptions, 
 between them and the United States are such that we could never 
 with indifference allow them to pass under the dominion or ex- 
 clusive control of any other power. We do not ourselves covet 
 sovereignty over them. We would be content that they should 
 remain under their present rulers, who, we believe, are disposed 
 to be just and impartial in their dealings with all nations. ' ' 
 
 The conduct of the French became, however, more and more 
 aggressive and menacing, with the result that in March, 1851, 
 King Kamehameha resolved upon the extraordinary course of 
 placing the islands under the protection, temporary or per- 
 manent, of the United States. On March 10 he signed a decree 
 to tliat effect, to take effect upon its publication. In this unique 
 document he declared his despair of obtaining justice and equity 
 from France, and his intention of placing all his possessions 
 under the protection and safeguard of the United States until 
 some arrangement could be made with France compatible with 
 his rights as an independent sovereign and with his treaty en- 
 gagements with other nations; or, if such arrangements were 
 found impossible, under the perpetual protection of this coun- 
 try. It may be added that this document was disclosed to the
 
 518 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Hawaiian Parliament and was ratified by both Houses on June 
 21, 1851. The document was shown to Luther Severance, who 
 had become American commissioner in Hawaii, on March 12, and 
 was then sealed and left with him, with the superscription: 
 "The King requests the Commissioner of the United States, in 
 case the flag of the United States is raised above the Hawaiian, 
 that he will open the enclosed and act accordingly. ' ' It was the 
 purpose of the king, in the event of extreme measures by the 
 French, to raise the American flag above the Hawaiian on all 
 public buildings, as a signal to the American commissioner to 
 proclaim an American protectorate, and as a warning to the 
 French that they would have the United States to deal with if 
 they proceeded further. A flag showing the Stars and Stripes 
 on one side and the Hawaiian colors on the other was also pre- 
 pared for use by the ladies of the Hawaiian court. 
 
 Severance reported all these things and the detailed progress 
 of affairs to Webster, who had now succeeded Clayton at the 
 state department, and Webster in reply urged him to be firm 
 but cautious. He was to return the protectorate document to 
 the king, and he was not to let the naval forces of the United 
 Sates become embroiled with those of France, the making of 
 war being a congressional function. He was to avoid encour- 
 aging any one in "any idea or expectation that the islands 
 will become annexed to the United States. ' ' These were private 
 instructions to Severance. For official and public purposes 
 Webster wrote as follows: 
 
 "The Government of the United States was the first to 
 acknowledge the national existence of the Hawaiian government, 
 and to treat with it as an independent state. Its example was 
 soon followed by several of the Governments of Europe, and 
 the United States, true to its treaty obligations, has in no case 
 interfered with the Hawaiian Government for the purpose of 
 opposing the course of its own independent conduct, or of dic- 
 tating to it any particular line of policy. ... It declared its 
 real purpose to be to favor the establishment of a Government 
 at a very important point in the Pacific Ocean, which should 
 be able to maintain such relations with the rest of the world 
 as are maintained between civilized States. . . . 
 
 "This Government still desired to see the nationality of the
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 519 
 
 Hawaiian Government maintained, its independent administra- 
 tion of public affairs respected, and its prosperity and reputation 
 
 increased. 
 
 *'But while thus indisposed to exercise any sinister influence 
 itself over the councils of Hawaii, or to overawe the proceedings 
 of its Government by the menace or the actual application of 
 superior military force, it expects to see other powerful nations 
 act in the same spirit. It is, therefore, with unfeigned regret 
 that the President has read the correspondence and become 
 acquainted with the circumstances occurring between the 
 Hawaiian Government and Mr. Perrin, the commissioner of 
 France at Honolulu. . . . The Hawaiian Islands are ten times 
 nearer to the United States than to any of the powers of Europe. 
 Five sixths of all their commercial intercourse is with the United 
 States, and these considerations, together with others of a more 
 general character, have fixed the course which the Government 
 of the United States will pursue in regard to them. The an- 
 nunciation of this policy will not surprise the Governments of 
 Europe, nor be thought to be unreasonable by the nations of the 
 civilized world; and that policy is, that while the Government 
 of the United States itself, faithful to its original assurance, 
 scrupulously regards the independence of the Hawaiian Islands, 
 it can never consent to see those islands taken possession of by 
 either of the great commercial powers of Europe, nor can it 
 consent that demands manifestly unjust and derogatory, and 
 inconsistent with a bona fide independence, shall be enforced 
 against that Government." 
 
 Most significant as a warning to France was this addendum 
 to the foregoing: 
 
 "The Navy Department will receive instructions to place and 
 to keep the naval armament of the United States in the Pacific 
 Ocean in such a state of strength and preparation as shall be 
 requisite for the preserv^ation of the honor and dignity of the 
 United States and the safety of the Government of the Hawaiian 
 Islands," 
 
 This was tantamount to a declaration that our navy would 
 be used if necessary for the protection of Hawaiian independence 
 against French aggression. A little before this, also, Webster 
 had written to Rives at Paris, for communication to the French
 
 520 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 government, that enforcement of the French demands ''would 
 be tantamount to a subjugation of the islands to the dominion 
 of France. A step like this could not fail to be viewed by the 
 Government and people of the United States with a dissatisfac- 
 tion which would tend seriously to disturb our existing friendly 
 relations with the French Government. This is a result to be 
 deplored. If, therefore, it would not be too late, it is hoped 
 that you will make such representations upon the subject to the 
 minister of foreign affairs of France as will induce that Govern- 
 ment to desist from measures incompatible with the sovereignty 
 and independence of the Hawaiian Islands, and to make amends 
 for the acts which the French agents have already committed 
 there in contravention of the law of nations, and of the treaty 
 between the Hawaiian Government and France." 
 
 Copies of the letter to Severance were transmitted to Paris 
 and were placed in the hands of the French minister at Wash- 
 ington, with a prompt and gratifying result. Louis Napoleon 
 had no stomach at that stage of his usurpation for a war with 
 the United States. His Government therefore, while expressing 
 "surprise" at the course and utterances of the American govern- 
 ment, disclaimed any intention of intervening improperly in 
 Hawaiian affairs, particularly of claiming sovereignty over the 
 islands, and the incident was closed with a practical withdrawal 
 of the extravagant French demands. 
 
 Thus far the United States government had been profuse in 
 its protestations that it had no desire to annex the Hawaiian 
 Islands and no thought of doing so; in which it was doubtless 
 sincere. But Great Britain and France were becoming increas- 
 ingly skeptical of the perpetuity of that policy of renunciation, 
 and the sequence of events in the near future showed that they 
 were justified in that feeling. We need not assume, as some 
 did, that the United States had all along been warning others 
 off Hawaii in order to grab it herself. There is certainly no 
 cause for questioning Webster's entire sincerity in his disclaim- 
 ers. But it sometimes happens that the logic of events becomes 
 too strong for even the most resolute intentions. Had the 
 Hawaiian government steadfastly desired to retain its inde- 
 pendence, the United States would most probably have main- 
 tained its renunciatory policy. But beginning with that offer
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 521 
 
 to come under our protection in March, 1851, the annexationist 
 spirit in Hawaii grew rapidly, and it was met half way by the 
 expansionist spirit which prevailed at Washington under 
 Marey's administration of the state department. As early as 
 September 22, 1853, Marcy wrote to David L. Gregg, the Ameri- 
 can commissioner in Hawaii, that it seemed likely that the islands 
 at a future date, perhaps not distant, would be transferred to or 
 come under the protectorate of some other power than their own. 
 It was not the policy of the United States to accelerate such a 
 change. But if in the course of events it became inevitable, the 
 United States would take the islands itself rather than have 
 them pass to any third power, an event which would be unfavor- 
 able to our welfare. To this Gregg replied that the Hawaiian 
 government was becoming more and more convinced of the 
 impossibility of its maintaining permanent independence, and 
 that it was in consequence more and more inclining toward an- 
 nexation to the United States. At this Marcy wrote, on De- 
 cember 16, to Mason, the minister to France, that it seemed to 
 him inevitable that the islands must come under the control of 
 this Government, and also, that it would be only reasonable and 
 fair that Great Britain and France should acquiesce in such a 
 transfer, provided that it were effected by fair means. Both 
 those countries had already been apprised of our determination 
 not to let the islands pass to one of them or to any other nation, 
 and they ought to realize that in case of the inability of the 
 islands to maintain an independent status, they must come to 
 us. He therefore desired Mason to "ascertain, if possible, with- 
 out making it a matter of direct discussion, what would prob- 
 ably be the course of France in case of an attempt on the part 
 of the United States to add these islands to our territorial pos- 
 sessions by negotiation or other peaceable means. ' ' 
 
 The results of Mason's inquiries were negative, but it was 
 pretty generally understood that Great Britain and France 
 would both protest against American annexation of the islands. 
 Marcy was not discouraged, however, and in April, 1854, he in- 
 structed Gregg to negotiate a treaty of annexation. He pointed 
 out that if the United States established a protectorate over the 
 islands it would take upon itself heavy and responsible duties 
 for which it could hardly expect to receive compensating ad-
 
 522 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 vantages. He understood, he added, that the people of the 
 islands desired to have the islands "become a part of our ter- 
 ritories and be under the control of this Government as fully 
 as any other of its territorial possessions." It would be neces- 
 sary, and just, for the United States to pay annuities to the 
 native chiefs whose rule would be extinguished, and this should 
 be done liberally, perhaps to the gross amount of a hundred 
 thousand dollars a year. Gregg proceeded with negotiations, 
 which were facilitated by the influence of commercial interests, 
 and by rumors of uprisings against the native dynasty and of 
 filibustering enterprises from our Pacific coast. 
 
 As soon as it became known that such negotiations were in 
 progress, the British and French representatives in the islands 
 addressed to the king a strong joint remonstrance against an- 
 nexation of the islands to the United States, while on the other 
 hand many petitions from the natives were presented to him 
 in favor of annexation. Then there appeared one day at Hono- 
 lulu a combined British and French fleet of eight vessels of 
 war, which had been ordered thither in haste from Callao, Peru. 
 Its commanders called upon the king and urged him not to listen 
 to any proposals of annexation to the United States, since the 
 consummation of such an act would certainly cause trouble and 
 would possibly lead to war with both their countries. To this 
 the king made a noncommittal reply, and the fleet departed after 
 a few days. At a later date the British consul had an audience 
 of the king, and for more than an hour argued, pleaded, and 
 threatened against the annexation scheme. He literally railed 
 against the United States, and warned the king that it would 
 be disastrous for the islands to fall under its corrupting influ- 
 ence. The king listened patiently, and at the end made a non- 
 committal reply, but shrewdly and strongly intimated that 
 thenceforth all communications of importance would better be 
 submitted in writing. 
 
 Finally, the treaty was made, and was sent to Marcy at "Wash- 
 ington, who disapproved it in two major respects. One objec- 
 tion was, to the amount of the annuities to the chiefs, which 
 had been fixed, against Gregg's will, at three times the maxi- 
 mum amount which Marcy had suggested. The other and more 
 serious objection was to the proposed status of the islands after
 
 EARLY DEALINGS WITH HAWAII 523 
 
 annexation. Marcy had written to Gregg, as also to Mason 
 in Paris, of the addition of the islands "to our territorial pos- 
 sessions," at that date wisely discerning the prudence and in- 
 deed the necessity for our national integrity that the constitu- 
 tional United States should be strictly confined to contiguous 
 territory on the North American continent, and that all out- 
 lying and insular possessions should be held permanently in 
 a territorial status. But the Hawaiians were intent not merely 
 upon ultimate but upon proximate if not immediate statehood 
 in the Union, and they therefore insisted upon the incorpora- 
 tion in the treaty of annexation of a provision to that effect. 
 That damned it in Marcy 's eyes; and if in his, surely in those 
 of all other serious statesmen. The treaty was therefore not 
 referred to the Senate, but was returned to Gregg for revision. 
 But before Gregg could obtain the needed changes, if indeed 
 he could have done so at all, which is doubtful, the king died, 
 and his successor was disinclined to annexation on any terms. 
 The matter was therefore dropped for the time. 
 
 Reciprocity was next considered. For this both countries 
 were ready, if not eager. Hawaii sent commissioners to Wash- 
 ington to seek it, and Marcy was responsive and sympathetic. 
 On July 20, 1855, a treaty of commercial reciprocity was made, 
 and was sent to the Senate for ratification. It was understood 
 that the committee on foreign relations, to which it was referred, 
 was favorably inclined toward it, but for some reason which 
 never was disclosed it was never brought up for action. Dur- 
 ing the Civil War in the United States, in 1863 and 1864, ef- 
 forts were made by the Hawaiian government to get the reci- 
 procity treaty taken up again and ratified, but in view of the 
 probable effect of it upon the public revenues at that time the 
 United States government declined to consider such a course. 
 At this time, however, the rank of the American representa- 
 tive in Hawaii was raised from that of commissioner to that of 
 minister resident. In 1866 the Dowager Queen of Hawaii vis- 
 isted the United States, on her way home from England. In 
 1867 a new reciprocity treaty was negotiated, but after being 
 pigeon-holed for three years it was rejected by the Senate. 
 Again in 1867, 1868, and 1871 the question of annexation was 
 reopened. Seward, as secretaiy of state, in the first named year
 
 524 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 declared that ''a lawful and peaceful annexation of the islands 
 to the United States, with the consent of the people of the 
 islands, is deemed desirable by this Government"; adding that 
 "if the policy of annexation should really conflict with the pol- 
 icy of reciprocity, annexation is in every case to be preferred." 
 The next year, however, Seward confessed that the settlement 
 of the issues arising out of the Civil War dominated the national 
 mind and attention to the exclusion even of "the higher but 
 more remote questions of national extension and aggrandize- 
 ment." In the early part of 1871 the minister of the United 
 States to Hawaii, Henry A. Pierce, reopened the annexation 
 question, and his despatch to the President was confidentially 
 submitted to the Senate without recommendation, though the 
 opinion of the Senate was solicited as a guide to future action. 
 The result was that nothing was done in that direction for many 
 years.
 
 XX 
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 
 
 IN the decade of 1831 to 1840 a material change in the rela- 
 tions of the United States to some of the chief European 
 countries began to be effected through the medium of greatly 
 increased immigration. Thitherto the number of aliens entering 
 this country had been comparatively small, and had been chiefly 
 from the British Isles. Thus in the eleven years from 1820 to 
 1830, less than 100,000 persons came hither from Europe, of 
 whom more than 75,000 were from the United Kingdom, nearly 
 51,000 being from Ireland, over 22,000 from England and 
 Wales, and nearly 3000 from Scotland. In that period 8497 
 came from France and 6761 from Germany. These were not 
 sufficient to produce any marked effect upon either the do- 
 mestic economy or the foreign relations of the United States, the 
 total population of which at that time ranged from 10,000,000 
 in 1820 to 13,000,000 in 1830. But following 1830 the tide of 
 immigration was enormously increased, and its sources were 
 greatly changed. In the ten years from 1831 to 1840 the in- 
 flux from Europe rose to 495,688, or five times as great as m 
 the preceding decade. The United Kingdom still contributed 
 the major part, though not as large a majority as before, 
 its total being something over 283,000, of whom 207,000 were 
 from Ireland and 73,000 from England. The number from 
 France increased fivefold, to 45,500. But most marked and 
 significant of all was the increase in German immigration, which 
 rose to 152,454, or considerably more than the total from all 
 countries in the preceding decade. The process continues in 
 the succeeding years, owing chiefly to industrial distress in Ire- 
 land and to political unrest in Germany. In the years 1841 
 to 1850 Europe sent us a total of 1,597,000, of whom 263,000 
 were from England, 780,000 from Ireland, 77,000 from France, 
 
 434,600 from Germany, and 14,000 from Sweden and Norway. 
 
 526
 
 526 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 The influx of 1,500,000 aliens into a nation of only 23,000,000 
 was sufficient to produce a marked social and economic effect, 
 and also a perceptible influence upon the attitude of this coun- 
 try toward some foreign lands. The succeeding decade, 1851 
 to 1860, saw similar causes produce similar results. The total 
 influx from Europe was 2,452,657, of which number Ireland con- 
 tributed 914,119, the largest number on record from that coun- 
 try; England sent 385,643, Scotland 38,331, Switzerland 25,- 
 011, Spain and Portugal 10,353, Sweden and Norway 20,931, 
 the Netherlands 10,789, Italy 9231, the first considerable num- 
 ber from that country, France 76,358, and Germany the enor- 
 mous total of 951,667, the largest number from any country at 
 that time. And in 1860 the total population of the United 
 States was only about 30,000,000. 
 
 One effect of this increase of naturalized citizenship was 
 the formation, in the years between 1850 and 1860, of the short- 
 lived American or "Know Nothing" party, one of whose pur- 
 poses was to resist foreign influence in American affairs by ex- 
 cluding foreign-born citizens from official place. It was a 
 secret, oath-bound organization which soon fell into disrepute 
 and vanished with the dissolution of the Wliig party, of which 
 it was really a part. Far more important and more lasting was 
 the effect produced by the addition of naturalized citizens in 
 great masses to one or the other of the political parties; this 
 being sufficient in several States to control domestic poli- 
 tics and to decide the results of elections. Most regrettable 
 of all, however, was the attempt, which was occasionally made, 
 to use this control of domestic politics as a means of influenc- 
 ing governmental policy in foreign affairs. 
 
 The various revolutionary movements in Europe inevitably 
 attracted much attention here, and on several occasions involved 
 the United States in diplomatic controversies. One of the most 
 notable examples of this was in 1849 and the two or three suc- 
 ceeding years. At that time occurred the revolt of Hungary 
 against the reactionary despotism of Austria. American sym- 
 pathies had already been greatly aroused and drawn out by 
 the revolutionary and democratic movements of the preceding 
 year throughout most of the continental countries, and they were 
 further intensified by the representations of tHe tens of thou-
 
 SOME VIGOKOUS SELF-ASSERTION 527 
 
 sands of political exiles and refugees who flocked to America 
 upon the suppression of those uprisings. Accordingly when 
 Louis Kossuth and his fellow Magyars raised the standard of 
 Hungarian republicanism against the imperialistic absolutism 
 of Austria, a popular wave of interest and enthusiasm in their 
 behalf swept over the United States, of which the Government 
 could not help feeling the influence. As a matter of fact Hun- 
 garian republicanism was very far removed from that of Amer- 
 ica. But it bore the same name ; and it presented a grateful 
 contrast to the autocracy with which the Habsburg emperor began 
 his reign. 
 
 In 1849 the American secretary of state, Clayton, sent Dud- 
 ley A. Mann as a special envoy to observe the progress of the 
 struggle and to recognize the Hungarian republic in case he 
 found it sufficiently well established to warrant such action. 
 Before Mann arrived in Hungary, however, the Russian czar 
 had sent an army down to aid the Austrians, and these imperial 
 and absolutist allies had crushed the Magyar revolt beyond all 
 hope of success and Kossuth and the other leaders had fled to 
 Turkey for asylum. He therefore took no action toward the 
 recognition of Hungary, but sent a detailed report of his mis- 
 sion home to "Washington. The President, Taylor, in his mes- 
 sage to Congress in December, 1849, referred to this incident, 
 and said that he had sent Mann on the errand because he had 
 deemed it his duty in accordance with the general sentiment of 
 the American people to be prepared to be the first to welcome 
 Hungary into the family of nations in case she should succeed 
 in establishing her independence. The propriety of this was 
 perhaps open to dispute, though there was much to be said in 
 its favor. Hungary was by right entirely independent of Aus- 
 tria, though having the same sovereign, and her revolt was 
 against an unacceptable king and not against Austria, to which 
 country she was in no sense subject. But the Austrians took 
 great umbrage at the incident, and the charge d'affaires at 
 Washington, Huelsemann, sent to Clayton a note vigorously 
 protesting against what he considered an unwarranted and un- 
 friendly intrusion into the domestic concerns of a sovereign 
 and friendly power. While this controversy was in progress 
 President Taylor died, and in the reorganization of the cabinet
 
 528 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 which followed Daniel Webster succeeded Clayton as secretary 
 of state. To him Huelsemann addressed another note, still 
 stronger in tone. Indeed, it may fairly be considered as hector- 
 ing and offensive. Webster so regarded it, and he determined 
 to administer a sharp rebuke, which he did. He asserted, with 
 irresistible logic, the right and the intention of the United 
 States to recognize any de facto revolutionary government which 
 it deemed worthy of recognition; and consequently its right to 
 seek, in any proper way, the information necessary to guide its 
 action aright. Such information was the object of Mann's mis- 
 sion, and there was no ground for complaint against it. Hav- 
 ing thus vindicated the course of this Government, he proceeded 
 with a rebuke to Austria, in a contrast between that empire and 
 this republic. "The power of this republic," he wrote, "at 
 the present moment is spread over a region one of the richest 
 and most fertile on the globe, and of an extent in comparison 
 with which the possessions of the House of Habsburg are but 
 a patch on the earth's surface. Life, liberty, property, and per- 
 sonal rights are amply secured to all citizens and protected by 
 just and stable laws; and credit, public and private, is as well 
 established as in any government of continental Europe. Cer- 
 tainly the United States may be pardoned, even by those who 
 profess adherence to the principle of absolute governments, if 
 they entertain an ardent affection for those popular forms of 
 political organization which have so rapidly advanced their own 
 prosperity and happiness, and enabled them in so short a period 
 to bring their country and the hemisphere to which it belongs 
 to the notice and respectful regard — not to say the admiration — 
 of the civilized world." 
 
 That was not in Webster's best style. It was not one of the 
 worthiest of state documents. It has, indeed, been described 
 by a judicious and not unfriendly historian, John F. Rhodes, 
 as "hardly more than a stump speech under diplomatic guise." 
 Webster himself realized it to be such, and so intended it. Writ- 
 ing to a correspondent he said: "If you say that my Huelse- 
 mann letter is boastful and rough, I shall own the soft impeach- 
 ment. My exciise is twofold. First, I thought it well enough 
 to speak out and tell the people of Europe who and what we 
 are, and awaken them to a just sense of the unparalleled growth
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 529 
 
 of this country. Second, I wished to write a paper which 
 would touch the national pride." In this latter object he cer- 
 tainly succeeded. No utterance from the state department ever 
 met with more prompt and passionate approval from the whole 
 nation. The time was, of course, psychologically well chosen. 
 The militant fever of the Mexican War had not yet subsided, 
 and the American people were regarding it as their "manifest 
 destiny" to ''whip all creation" and to cause the United States 
 to be "bounded on the north by the Aurora Borealis, on the 
 south by the Precession of the Equinoxes, on the east by 
 Primeval Chaos, and on the west by the Day of Judgment." 
 There was, moreover, legitimate ground for hatred of the op- 
 pression which Austria and Russia had exerted upon Hungary; 
 and for resentment at what Lowell aptly termed — and rightly 
 execrated — "a certain condescension in foreigners." So on the 
 whole it is impossible to remember without a thrill of patriotic 
 exultation this intrepid American challenge to that ancient and 
 immeasurably proud and haughty House of Habsburg which 
 vaunted itself as the direct political successor of the Caesars of 
 Imperial Rome. 
 
 This utterance was promptly followed with both official and 
 popular action still more ruffling to Austrian susceptibilities. 
 A resolution was adopted by Congress formally inviting Kos- 
 suth and his fellow exiles to become the guests of the United 
 States, and in order to avert danger of their capture by the 
 Austrian government while on their way hither a warship of 
 the United States navy was despatched to Turkey to convey 
 them. Kossuth was received upon his arrival in New York with 
 public and official demonstrations of welcome such as not even 
 Lafayette had enjoyed. He was taken to "Washington, received 
 by the secretary of state, presented to the President, and re- 
 ceived by both Houses of Congress with elaborate ceremonies. 
 Had he been the sovereign or the president of some great and 
 friendly nation, no more marked and flattering attention could 
 have been paid to him. Much of this arose from the spirit which 
 had been manifested in Webster's letter to Huelsemann, from 
 a sincere sympathy with European liberalism and hatred of the 
 reactionaiy course of Austria and Russia, which was likened 
 not inaptly to that of the Holy Alliance thirty years before. 
 
 VOL. 1—34
 
 530 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 Much of it was also inspired by the remarkable personality of 
 Kossuth himself, his picturesque appearance, his magnetic elo- 
 quence, and the romantic features of his career. Much, too, 
 it must be confessed, was prompted by sordid and selfish politi- 
 cal ambition, political leaders of the two American parties com- 
 peting in their laudations of him, in the hope of thus using 
 the popular enthusiasm over him for the promotion of their own 
 ends. 
 
 All this was of course intensely annoying to the Austrian 
 charge d'affaires, who was still smarting under the castigation 
 of Webster's letter, and when, as he thought, the matter was 
 brought to a climax by Webster's attendance and eulogistic 
 speech at a public banquet given to Kossuth, he addressed a 
 letter of remonstrance and protest to the secretary of state. To 
 this no reply was given. Huelsemann thereupon sought an in- 
 terview with the President himself, and repeated to him the 
 protest which Webster had ignored. The sequel to this was a 
 note to him from Webster, informing him that the United States 
 government wished no further intercourse with him save such 
 as might be comprised in written communications addressed to 
 the secretary of state. This was almost tantamount to dismissal ; 
 and Huelsemann so regarded it. He promptly left Washington 
 and returned to Austria, declaring in a note of farewell to Web- 
 ster that his Government was recalling him because it could 
 not permit him to remain any longer "to continue an official 
 intercourse with the principal promoters of the much to be la- 
 mented Kossuth episode." Webster reported this to the Amer- 
 ican minister at Vienna in a letter in which he sought to vindi- 
 cate his own course and to put Huelsemann entirely in the 
 wrong. He pointed out that as a mere secretary of legation and 
 charge d'affaires ad mterim Huelsemann had no right to dis- 
 cuss diplomatic business with the President, and certainly none 
 to appeal to the President over the head of the secretary of 
 state, especially against mere newspaper utterances and the re- 
 marks of private citizens. His own remarks at the Kossuth ban- 
 quet, he insisted, were made in his private capacity and not 
 officially as secretary of state, and therefore the Austrian govern- 
 ment had no occasion to take offense at them. 
 
 All this was technically true enough, though of its substan-
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 531 
 
 tial sincerity there may be some doubt. There can be no doubt 
 that the craze over Kossuth was carried much too far. Indeed, 
 it had a disastrous effect upon that impulsive patriot himself, 
 in giving him an exaggerated estimate of the attitude and pur- 
 poses of the American government. He did not content him- 
 self with traveling from city to city, making public addresses 
 intended to arouse sympathy and secure pecuniary aid for the 
 Hungarian cause. He actually sought to enlist the United States 
 government officially in the campaign and to get it to intervene 
 with force and arms in behalf of European revolutionists. Some 
 of the speeches of public men, including senators and representa- 
 tives, undoubtedly encouraged him to indulge in such vagaries 
 of hope, but the sounder sense of the nation soon reasserted 
 itself to his disappointment. Webster, despite his words, would 
 commit the Government to no official act in behalf of Hungary, 
 and the conclusion of the whole matter was that in 1852 Kos- 
 suth returned to Europe, to find asylum in Switzerland, with 
 only a small sum of money contributed by his American admir- 
 ers, and amid a popular indifference which presented a striking 
 contrast to the delirium of enthusiasm which had marked his 
 coming to America. 
 
 The fact was that the American people, when they recovered 
 from the first flush of passion, realized that they had been in 
 danger of going too far. They were being tempted through 
 over-generous sympathies, if not through less creditable motives, 
 to intrude themselves unduly into European affairs, and thus 
 to do the very thing which in the Monroe Doctrine this nation 
 had pledged itself not to do, and the analogue of which in Euro- 
 pean meddling with American affairs would have been most 
 vigorously resented. 
 
 A sequel to the Kossuth episode occurred in 1853, when 
 William L. Marcy had succeeded Webster in the state depart- 
 ment. Among the Hungarian revolutionistvS who had come 
 hither with Kossuth was one Martin Koszta, who declared his 
 intention of becoming an American citizen and took the first 
 steps in that direction. Before the process of naturalization was 
 complete, however, he desired to visit Asia Minor on matters 
 of business, and did so, with the result that at Smyrna he was 
 arrested by Austrian authorities and placed aboard an Aus-
 
 532 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 trian warship to be conveyed to Trieste. This was a violation of 
 Turkish neutrality, but the Turkish government was unable or 
 unwilling to prevent it. The American consul protested, how- 
 ever, and demanded Koszta's release, on the ground that he had 
 declared his intention of becoming an American citizen and 
 was therefore under American protection. This sufficed to de- 
 lay Koszta's removal from Smyrna to an Austrian port until 
 the arrival of the United States warship St. Louis, whose com- 
 mander. Captain Ingraham, at once resorted to strenuous meas- 
 ures for the release of the refugee. Clearing his decks for ac- 
 tion, he notified the Austrian commander that he would employ 
 whatever force was necesvsary for the rescue of Koszta unless 
 he was released by an appointed time. The result was that 
 Koszta was released and delivered to the neutral custody of the 
 French consul until the dispute could be settled by diplomatic 
 means. Eventually he was returned to the United States, though 
 without prejudice to the conflicting claims over the points of 
 international law which were involved. The Austrian govern- 
 ment protested against the actions of the American consul and 
 captain, and demanded disavowal of them and reparation. 
 Marcy, however, refused even to consider such a concession, and 
 in a detailed state paper fully supported the conduct of Cap- 
 tain Ingraham ; which of course had been hailed with great popu- 
 lar enthusiasm throughout the United States. 
 
 In this famous Koszta case it must be frankly recognized that 
 both Austria and the United States were in error. There can 
 be no question that the action of the Austrian consul and naval 
 commander was a gross violation of the rights of sovereignty 
 of Turkey. But Captain Ingraham 's employment of force, or 
 his threat to employ it, was no less void of warrant in law. 
 The ground on which it was justified at the time was that it 
 was a vindication of Turkish sovereignty against Austrian ag- 
 gression. But that would have been valid only if done at the 
 request of Turkey, which was not the case. The pretense that 
 Koszta was entitled to American protection because he had de- 
 clared his intention of becoming an American citizen was utterly 
 fallacious and void, at any rate when presented to Austria. It 
 is probable that it was valid as between the United States and 
 Turkey. The American consul at Smyrna had indeed given
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 533 
 
 Koszta a traveling pass which explicitly declared that he was en- 
 titled to American protection and which was respected by the 
 Turkish government. If its declaration was unwarranted, that 
 was a matter for controversy between only the American and 
 Turkish governments and no other, Koszta had never been other 
 than an alien to Turkey, and the Government of that country 
 could have no claim upon his allegiance; wherefore even the 
 slightest shadow of protection by any other country had to be 
 respected. But never has the proposition been maintainable that 
 mere declaration of intention to become naturalized invests a 
 man with the rights of citizenship or with title to protection 
 as a citizen, against the demands of his native country. The 
 fact is that at that time and down to a much later date the 
 United States courts were generally inclined to accept the old 
 common-law doctrine that a man could not at his own will, 
 and without the consent of his Government, renounce his al- 
 legiance. The principle of individual freedom of expatriation 
 was not generally and explicitly adopted until the enactment 
 of a law to that effect by Congress in 1868. Buchanan as secre- 
 tary of state did indeed insist upon that principle, and at va- 
 rious other times in our early history it was asserted, but it was 
 not or would not have been sustained by the courts. As for 
 the nonacquirement of citizenship rights by the mere act of 
 declaring intention, there can be no doubt on that subject what- 
 ever. Upshur, as secretary of state in 1843, Buchanan in 1848, 
 Marcy in 1856, and Cass in 1857, unmistakably declared or con- 
 ceded that the preliminary act of declaring intention to become 
 a citizen gave no title to protection as against the country from 
 which the subject was about to expatriate himself. Later secre- 
 taries of state have been still more emphatic, to the same effect. 
 The course of Captain Ingraham, and that of Marcy in sustain- 
 ing him diplomatically, must really be esteemed as merely a 
 colossal piece of "bluffing," which happily, however, accorded 
 with the equities of the case. 
 
 During Pierce's administration Marcy, as secretary of state, 
 dealt with three other European matters in a similarly resolute 
 manner, but on far more valid grounds of law and right. Dur- 
 ing the Crimean War various British agents, including the min- 
 ister at Washington and the consuls at New York, PhiladelphiEj
 
 534 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 and Cincinnati, undertook to enlist men in the United States 
 for service in the British army. That was of course a grave vio- 
 lation of the principle of neutrality, as well as of the statutes 
 of the United States. It also aroused much popular indigna- 
 tion in this country, and actually turned toward Russia the 
 American friendship and sympathy which had been alienated by 
 her assistance of Austria against Hungary. The offense was so 
 flagrant — though far less on the part of the minister than of the 
 consuls — that the Government could not help taking cognizance 
 of it. Crampton, the British minister, had been in this coun- 
 try for a long time and was much liked, both in society and by 
 the officials with whom he came into contact. For that reason 
 Marcy at first merely protested against his indiscretions. This 
 being ineffective, he suggested to the British government that 
 Crampton should be transferred, without reproach, to some 
 other post. Lord Clarendon, however, positively declined to 
 take this course, and refused to concede that Crampton had 
 done anything amiss. Thereupon in May, 1856, Marcy sent the 
 minister his passports and dismissed him from the country. The 
 three consuls mentioned were also dismissed. Much indignation 
 was expressed in the British press, and there were demands 
 that the American minister at London should be dismissed by 
 way of retaliation. The British government apparently recog- 
 nized, however, that Crampton had at least been indiscreet and 
 that the American government was justified in its action ; where- 
 fore it did nothing in return but to leave its Washington mission 
 vacant until the beginning of the next administration. 
 
 At the end of the Crimean War the various European powers 
 which had participated in it, and which therefore united in the 
 treaty of peace, adopted at Paris in 1856 a series of regulations 
 for the conduct of warfare at sea, to which they invited the ad- 
 herence of other nations with a view to making them a part 
 of the international law of the world. These regulations, con- 
 stituting what is historically known as the Declaration of Paris, 
 were four in number. The first provided for the abolition of 
 privateering. The second exempted from seizure an enemy's 
 goods under a neutral flag. The third exempted from seizure 
 neutral goods under an enemy's flag. The fourth declared that 
 a blockade in order to be valid must be effectively maintained
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 535 
 
 with an adequate naval force. As all of these but the first had 
 long been advocated by the United States, it was expected that 
 this country would at once subscribe to them. But Marcy re- 
 fused to do so. The abolition of privateering was to be ap- 
 proved, he held, in principle. But in practice it would be 
 greatly to the advantage of nations with strong navies, and 
 to the disadvantage of the United States with its comparatively 
 small navy and very large mercantile marine. He therefore 
 declined to accept that declaration, unless there should be added 
 another rule exempting from seizure in naval warfare all pri- 
 vate property, save only contraband of war. This, which was 
 in effect the adoption in sea warfare of the rule which pre- 
 vailed on land, had been advocated long before by Franklin, 
 when it had been derided as visionary and Utopian. The Euro- 
 pean powers declined to accept it, and consequently the United 
 States did not become a party to the Declaration of Paris. 
 
 In 1857 the American government protested to the Danish 
 government against the further imposition of dues upon ves- 
 sels for passage through the Sound, between the North Sea and 
 the Baltic. This exaction had been made from time immemorial, 
 and European powers had been unable to effect its abatement. 
 Marcy took the matter up in vigorous and resolute fashion, and 
 succeeded in securing a treaty under which the dues were for- 
 ever abolished in consideration of a cash commutation. This 
 important reform was, of course, for the equal benefit of all 
 maritime powers. 
 
 It is a pity to be compelled to record that Marcy 's masterful 
 administration of the state department was marred with one 
 conspicuous triviality which involved American ministers abroad 
 in no little ridicule. This was the issuing of a note advising 
 all American diplomatic representatives at foreign courts to 
 wear no ceremonial uniforms or ''court dress," but to insist upon 
 appearing, at all functions, "like Franklin, in the simple cos- 
 tume of an American citizen." Thitherto, a simple but appro- 
 priate uniform had been prescribed for their wearing, but 
 Marcy seemed to regard it as "undemocratic." The effect of his 
 advice, which was practically an order, was in some cases simply 
 ludicrous and in others gravely embarrassing, actually endanger- 
 ing the friendly relations of the United States with several
 
 536 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 European countries. In France, Spain, and Prussia it was 
 found to be impossible to appear at court in ordinary civilian 
 attire, and in order to avoid an open breach and withdrawal 
 from their missions the ministers were compelled to devise court 
 costumes of their own. It is said that that worn by Mason, 
 in Paris, was copied by a tailor from a model furnished by the 
 servants of the Austrian embassy! In London, Buchanan was 
 plumply informed by the authorities that while he might wear 
 what he pleased on ordinary occasions, he could not hope to be 
 invited to court dinners and balls unless he came in court dress. 
 He insisted upon following Marcy's advice, however, and ac- 
 cordingly when he was invited to attend the opening of Parlia- 
 ment he declined to go, because the invitation stated that no 
 one not in full uniform could be admitted to the diplomatic gal- 
 lery. His absence was of course much observed, and besides caus- 
 ing a social sensation gave rise to much unfavorable political 
 comment. Later he compromised the matter by buckling at the 
 side of his ordinary evening dress a small dress sword with a 
 plain black hilt and scabbard. This at least served to distinguish 
 him from the servants, and it was accepted by the authorities as 
 constituting a * ' uniform. ' ' Thus attired he was received by the 
 queen, and he expressed in his correspondence much pride at hav- 
 ing been able to stand * * in that brilliant circle in the simple dress 
 of an American citizen." It did not seem to occur to him, or 
 to Marcy, that in thus refusing to don conventional attire he was 
 in fact practising the most extreme ostentation ; and that it was 
 no more "undemocratic" for American ministers to wear a 
 diplomatic uniform prescribed by their own Government than 
 for American army and navy officers to wear their uniforms. 
 
 The period between the Mexican "War and the Civil War was 
 marked with the beginning of American attempts to purchase 
 Cuba from Spain, or in some fashion to annex that much coveted 
 island as an addition to the slave-holding territory of the United 
 States. Long before that time our peculiar interest in Cuba had 
 been made manifest. John Quincy Adams, as secretary of state 
 in 1823, in view of the supposed danger of French seizure or 
 British purchase of it, in the war which then seemed to be im- 
 pending between France and Spain, expressed the conviction 
 that the annexation of Cuba must in time become "indispensable
 
 WILLIAM L. MARCY
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 537 
 
 to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. The trans- 
 fer of Cuba to Great Britain, ' ' he continued, ' ' would be an event 
 unpropitious to the interests of this Union. The question both 
 of our right and of our power to prevent it, if necessary by 
 force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils, and the admin- 
 istration is called upon in the performance of its duties to the 
 nation to use all the means within its competency to guard 
 against and forefend it." Two years later Clay, as secretary 
 of state in Adams 's cabinet, declared that the United States was 
 willing to leave Cuba in Spain's possession, but would not with 
 indifference see it passing from Spain to any other European 
 power; and that "we could not consent to the occupation of 
 Cuba and Porto Rico by any other European power than Spain 
 under any contingency whatever." A little later in the same 
 year, 1825, the United States declined to enter with Great Britain 
 and France into a tripartite declaration that the wresting of 
 Cuba from Spain would not be permitted, on the ground that 
 Spain and the United States alone were concerned in that island. 
 Finally, in 1840, Forsyth as secretary of state assured the Span- 
 ish government that in case of any attempt, by any power, to 
 wrest Cuba from her, Spain might ''securely depend upon the 
 military and naval resources of the United States to aid her 
 either in preserving or recovering it." 
 
 Such was the policy of the United States in relation to Cuba 
 down to the time of Polk's administration. Then there came a 
 change. In 1848 Saunders, the American minister at Madrid, 
 was instructed to sound the Spanish government as to the terms 
 in which it would sell Cuba to the United States. The answer 
 was emphatic. It was that under no circumstances would any 
 offer be considered. No Spanish minister would dare to enter- 
 tain such a proposal. Such was the feeling of the nation that 
 it would rather see Cuba sunk in the sea than transferred to any 
 other power. The overtures for purchase were thereupon aban- 
 doned, but unfortunately other and less worthy measures were 
 resorted to, though not by the Government. Narcisso Lopez, an 
 adventurer from Venezuela, came to the United States and be- 
 gan organizing a filibustering expedition, which was to land 
 in Cuba and lead a revolution there. In this he was eagerly 
 aided by many Americans, who saw in the scheme a chance to
 
 538 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 wrest Cuba from Spain as Texas had been wrested from Mexico. 
 The Spanish minister at Washington, Calderon de la Barea, 
 called attention to what was going on, and protested strongly 
 against such violation of neutrality; but in vain. The Govern- 
 ment was sincerely desirous of maintaining the neutrality laws, 
 and in 1849 President Taylor issued a vigorous proclamation 
 against filibustering, which had the effect of preventing the de- 
 parture of Lopez's first expedition. But the sentiment and sym- 
 pathies of the people in the Southern States were so strongly 
 with the filibusters that the laws could not be enforced, and the 
 second expedition got away in triumph. It proved a disas- 
 trous failure, and Lopez fled back to Key West, while a number 
 of his followers were captured in Cuba and were tried for piracy. 
 They would doubtless have been put to death had not our Gov- 
 ernment interested itself vigorously in their behalf ; .when, after 
 much trouble, Webster secured their release through the agency 
 of Barringer, the American minister at Madrid. 
 
 Meantime Lopez himself was put on trial in the United States 
 for violation of the neutrality laws, but no jury could be found 
 in the Southern States which would convict him, even on the 
 plainest evidence of his guilt, and he was accordingly acquitted. 
 He immediately organized another expedition with which he 
 invaded Cuba in 1851. There he failed to receive the support 
 which he had expected and which Cuban refugees had assured 
 him he would get, and he and about fifty of his followers, the 
 latter including a number of young men belonging to prominent 
 families in our Southern States, were captured, summarily tried 
 by court martial, and put to death. The news of this tragedy, 
 which was perfectly justifiable under Spanish law, roused a 
 storm of wrath in the South, and at New Orleans, where most 
 of the filibusters belonged, a mob stormed and destroyed the 
 Spanish consulate, defaced a portrait of the Spanish queen, and 
 looted a number of shops owned by Spanish merchants. In this 
 episode the United States was of course so clearly in the wrong 
 that there could be no thought of action against Spain for put- 
 ting to death the American prisoners. Webster, however, se- 
 cured the release of some remaining captives through the 
 straightforward course of apologizing for the New Orleans out- 
 rage and recommending to Congress the voting of an adequate
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 539 
 
 indemnity for the damage. In doing this, it is true, Webster 
 took occasion to remind the Spanish government that it had 
 technically no valid claim against the United States, which was 
 not bound to give Spanish subjects domiciled here any more pro- 
 tection against mob violence than it gave its own citizens; and 
 that its appeal for redress and reparation must be made, if at 
 all, to the municipality of New Orleans or to the State of Lou- 
 isiana. Of course any such appeal would have been vain, since 
 popular sentiment was overwhelmingly on the side of the rioters 
 and it would have been impossible to secure a jury which would 
 render a verdict of conviction. There was involved in the mat- 
 ter the same issue that had arisen so greatly to the reproach and 
 injury of the republic during the era of the Confederation, the 
 issue between state and national authority. It seemed pitiable 
 and humiliating to confess that the United States had no power 
 to protect or to give legal redress to the subjects and officials 
 of another sovereign State with which it had treaty relations, 
 or even to punish the most flagrant crimes against them, but must 
 remit the case to local authorities which were not parties to any 
 treaty. Yet that was what Webster had to do, and his course 
 was afterward repeatedly sustained by his successors as in ac- 
 cordance with American law. In such circumstances his offer 
 of reparation was an entirely gratuitous act of courtesy, which 
 reflected much credit upon him and upon the nation. Palmer- 
 ston, the British foreign secretary, pronounced it "highly cred- 
 itable to the good faith and sense of justice of the United States 
 government. ' ' The Spanish government, however, was not alto- 
 gether mollified, and its Cuban administration thereafter ex- 
 hibited much animosity toward Americans. Many harsh imposi- 
 tions were put upon American merchants, for which no redress 
 could be had, and relations between the two countries became 
 ominously strained. 
 
 Spain had unquestionably ground for feeling aggrieved at 
 the United States. It may be granted that the intentions and 
 the conduct of the American government were friendly and law- 
 ful. It must also be recognized that they were inefficient for 
 the prevention of serious wrongs to Spain. Certainly the inten- 
 tions and the conduct of a considerable part of the American 
 people were wholly lawless and hostile to Spain, and conspicuous
 
 540 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 among the offenders were men standing high in official life or 
 exerting great political influence. It is not always possible to 
 discriminate between what a man does as a private citizen and 
 as a member of Congress or other public officer; or indeed be- 
 tween the official and the popular attitude of a country. When 
 a widespread and numerous organization, the "Order of the 
 Lone Star," comprising many men of light and leading, openly 
 proclaimed its purpose to be the looting of Spain by the seizure 
 of Cuba, and shipped men and munitions to aid the revolt in 
 that island, it was not strange if Spain, accustomed herself to 
 regarding such things as existing only with the permission and 
 sanction of the government, assumed our government to be re- 
 sponsible for it. There was, however, another influence at work, 
 which was unquestionably potent in stiffening Spanish resent- 
 ment and animosity. That was the attitude, if not indeed the 
 direct representations, of the British government, which was 
 then not altogether cordial to the United States and which gave 
 Spain cause to believe that she could count upon its support. 
 In 1851 the British and French governments announced that 
 their navies had been instructed to prevent filibustering expedi- 
 tions from the United States against Cuba. That was unwar- 
 rantable meddling in affairs which concerned only Spain and the 
 United States, for which no justification could be found in in- 
 ternational law, and it provoked from Crittenden, who was act- 
 ing as secretary of state during Webster's illness, a vigorous 
 protest, and a warning that it would not be permitted by this 
 government. But of course it greatly ingratiated the Spanish 
 government and persuaded it that Great Britain was its friend 
 and would aid it in any clash with the United States. 
 
 Following this, Spain made a direct appeal to Great Britain 
 for treaty guarantees against American aggression, with the 
 result that in April, 1852, the British government proposed to 
 the United States that this country should join it and France 
 in a tripartite convention, all guaranteeing Spain in the posses- 
 sion of Cuba, and all explicitly renouncing any designs of their 
 own for the acquisition of that island. Edward Everett was 
 then acting as secretary of state, and he replied with a firm and 
 positive refusal to enter into any such compact, on the ground 
 that American interests in Cuba and relations toward that island
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 541 
 
 were radically different from those of any other power. That 
 was quite true, and it was a perfectly logical and commendable 
 application of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine and of the 
 traditional policy of the United States to refuse to admit such 
 European intervention in American affairs, or in affairs ex- 
 clusively concerning America and a single European power. "We 
 had long before laid down the rule that a European power must 
 not transfer its American possessions to another European power, 
 in the cases of Louisiana, of Florida, and of Cuba itself; and a 
 convincing corollary thereof prohibited any such guarantee of 
 European possessions here by other European powers; though 
 Jefferson on one occasion had advocated precisely such a tri- 
 partite compact. The weak point in our position was, of course, 
 the notorious inclination of this country to acquire Cuba for 
 itself, by fair means or foul. But that, after all, was a matter 
 between us and Spain, with which neither Great Britain nor 
 France had any legitimate concern. 
 
 The accession of Pierce to the Presidency and of the strenuous 
 and aggressive Marcy to the secretaryship of state was expected 
 to lead promptly to the annexation of Cuba, even at the cost of 
 war with Spain. Doubtless Marcy, a strong expansionist, would 
 have welcomed annexation, though he was not enamored of the 
 extension of slavery; and he probably would not have shrunk 
 from the contingency of a w^r with Spain or indeed with any 
 other power. But Marcy was both a lawyer and a statesman, 
 and he carefully considered all sides of the subject, with cool 
 and conservative calculation, and resisted all efforts to stampede 
 the Government into a course for which there was not full justifi- 
 cation. This prudent policy was not pleasing to the impetuous 
 pro-slavery propagandists of the South, who were exasperated 
 at the disappointment of their designs in Texas and California 
 and were passionately eager to gain recompense therefor in the 
 acquisition of Cuba. It was unfortunate for INIarc}', and indeed 
 for the good fame of the nation, that he felt constrained to 
 acquiesce in the sending of Pierre Soule to replace the resolute 
 but conservative Barringer as minister to Spain. For Soule, a 
 man of French birth and over-gifted with the impulsiveness and 
 idealism of that race, had been a political conspirator and 
 prisoner in France, had come hither as a refugee, and then, as
 
 542 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 a Louisianian, had been in the closest and most active sympathy 
 with the filibustering enterprises and even with the anti-Spanish 
 mob at New Orleans, and was known to be an ardent advocate 
 of the annexation of Cuba. The choice of such a man as minis- 
 ter to Spain was extraordinary, and might reasonably have been 
 regarded as intentionally provocative. 
 
 Marcy was presumably apprehensive of the outcome of such 
 a mission, for he was particularly explicit and emphatic in his 
 instructions to Soule, urging him to avoid anything which might 
 increase Spanish irritation, and to be exceedingly cautious in 
 overtures for the annexation of Cuba. He instructed him, how- 
 ever, to be firm in demanding reparation for the gross outrages 
 which Americans had suffered in Cuba, and in urging the Span- 
 ish government to invest the Cuban governor or captain-general 
 with diplomatic authority and functions, so that complaints 
 could be addressed to him and matters be negotiated with him, 
 instead of their all being referred to the Government at Madrid. 
 He finally authorized him to negotiate for the purchase of Cuba, 
 if he found the Spanish government inclined to such a transac- 
 tion. But Soule was not to be bound by any such prudent coun- 
 sels. He went to Spain by the way of France, which in itself 
 was injudicious ; and although as an American citizen and diplo- 
 matic envoy he was of course permitted to pass through the 
 country in which he had been a prisoner of state, he had to do 
 so under police surveillance. This circumstance revived his old 
 animosity toward the French government, and especially toward 
 Louis Napoleon, who cordially reciprocated his hatred, and on 
 his arrival at Madrid he quickly became involved in hostilities 
 with the French party there. Arrayed against him were the 
 mother of the French Empress Eugenie ; the French ambassador ; 
 the Duke of Alva, brother of Eugenie ; and the Spanish minister 
 for foreign affairs, Calderon de la Barca, who had formerly been 
 minister to the United States and with whom at "Washington 
 Soule had violently quarreled. In these circumstances Soule 's 
 position at Madrid verged upon the preposterously impossible. 
 He might have redeemed his mission by discreet conduct, but 
 instead he gave himself up to the wildest extravagances. Be- 
 cause of a supposed slight to Mrs. Soule, soon after his arrival, 
 his son fought a duel with the Duke of Alva, and he himself
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 543 
 
 fought another with the French ambassador, in which the latter 
 was crippled for life. 
 
 This was a bad beginning, but worse followed. News came 
 that an American steamer, the Black Warrior, had been seized 
 by the Cuban authorities at Havana. The circumstances of the 
 seizure were certainly provoking, and it is impossible to avoid 
 belief that they were deliberately intended to be so. The vessel 
 had long been making regular and entirely legitimate trips to 
 that port. But on the latest of them she was arbitrarily seized 
 and her cargo was condemned; not for filibustering or illicit 
 trade but for alleged disregard of some obsolete port regulations 
 which had long been ignored. In consequence, the master of 
 the vessel felt constrained to abandon her altogether. The Presi- 
 dent reported the incident to Congress, and stated that a de- 
 mand for redress and indemnity was being made. Some violent 
 speeches were made in Congress by Southern members, and there 
 were even demands for war and the conquest of Cuba. Marcy, 
 however, kept his head, and instructed Soule to demand an in- 
 demnity of $300,000 and to express a hope that the Cuban au- 
 thorities would be appropriately rebuked for an act which it 
 was confidently assumed the Spanish government could not ap- 
 prove. A fine opportunity was thus presented to Soule, for 
 Spain was manifestly in the wrong; but with characteristic in- 
 discretion he not only failed to improve it but actually used it 
 as a means of still further compromising his mission. He at 
 first, indeed, followed his instructions closely, in an interview 
 with the Spanish minister for foreign affairs. But when three 
 days elapsed without bringing him a satisfactory reply, he flew 
 into a passion and sent the minister a note in which he went far 
 beyond his instructions. He demanded not only the indemnity 
 which Marcy had prescribed but also the immediate dismissal 
 from the Spanish service of all persons implicated in the outrage 
 upon the Black Warrior. He added a peremptory and ulti- 
 matum-like demand that all this should be done within forty- 
 eight hours under penalty of at once giving him his passports 
 and severing diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
 Soule even instructed his messenger on delivering the note to 
 the Spanish minister to point to the clock and remind him that 
 in exactly forty-eight hours from that moment an answer would
 
 544 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 be required. The case was aggravated by the fact that it oc- 
 curred in Holy Week, when it was not customary at Madrid to 
 transact business which could possibly be postponed. Calderon, 
 however, with punctilious courtesy, replied within twenty-four 
 hours, to the effect that the matter would be most carefully con- 
 sidered at the earliest possible moment, but that it was mani- 
 festly not practicable nor would it be just to dispose of so grave 
 a matter so hastily and upon the hearing of only one side of it. 
 He added, quite properly, that the Spanish government was 
 not accustomed to being addressed in so harsh and imperious a 
 manner, which it could not regard as the most adequate for 
 attaining the amicable settlement which was desired. Intem- 
 perate conduct had, of course, placed Soule at a hopeless disad- 
 vantage. He could do nothing but send his unauthorized ulti- 
 matum and Calderon 's dignified and temperate reply to Marey. 
 Probably he expected, and certainly he hoped, that Marcy would 
 support the attitude he had taken, and would instruct him im- 
 mediately to demand his passports and quit Madrid. But Marcy 
 had no thought of doing so. He probably would not have done 
 so in any event, but it was out of the question for him to consider 
 it in the then Existing circumstances, for before Soule 's corre- 
 spondence reached Washington the Cuban authorities had re- 
 stored the Black Warrior to her owners with the amplest possible 
 amends, and the whole incident was ended and on the way to be 
 forgotten. So Soule was left to eat his own words. 
 
 Marcy, however, still cherished the desire to annex Cuba, 
 partly for the sake of securing so valuable a property for the 
 United States and partly to remove what he saw would be a 
 perennial cause of annoyance and even of danger; though he 
 contemplated nothing more than purchase through amicable ne- 
 gotiations. With this end in view he directed Soule to place him- 
 self in conference with the American ministers to Great Britain 
 and France, to consider the best method of persuading Spain 
 to dispose of Cuba and of avoiding objection on the part of the 
 other two powers. Now Buchanan, at London, was a Northern 
 man with strong Southern sympathies, while Mason, at Paris, 
 was an ardent Southern advocate of the extension of slavery. 
 When the three came together at Ostend, in the summer of 1854, 
 and later at Aix-la-Chapelle, therefore, they naturally took ex-
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 545 
 
 tremely aggressive ground. They signed and sent to Marcy, 
 in October of that year, the extraordinary document known as 
 the Ostend Manifesto, as the result of their deliberations. In 
 this document, which was chiefly written by Soule, various rea- 
 sons were set forth why Cuba ought to belong to the United 
 States, foremost of them being that such acquisition was neces- 
 sary for the security of the slave system; why Spain ought to 
 sell it; and why the other European powers ought to acquiesce 
 in the transfer. The price, it continued, ought not to exceed 
 a certain maximum, which was not stated but which was un- 
 derstood to be $120,000,000. Then, with almost incredible 
 cynicism and effrontery, it was added that if Spain should be so 
 "dead to the voice of her own interest and actuated by a false 
 sense of honor" as to refuse to sell Cuba, then "by every law 
 human and divine" the United States would be justified in 
 wresting it from her, if it had the power to do so. The specious 
 pretext was added that such seizure would be made to protect 
 the internal peace of the United States. Soule sent this astound- 
 ing document to Marcy, with the suggestion that that was a good 
 time to begin war upon Spain, since Great Britain and France 
 were engaged in fighting Russia in the Crimea and would there- 
 fore be unable to intervene in Spain's behalf. 
 
 The receipt of this message both astounded and embarrassed 
 Marcy. He could not for a moment think of approving it, and 
 he knew that the weight of American opinion would be against 
 it. Even in the South all but the most extreme realized that 
 Soule and his colleagues had gone too far, while the North was 
 almost unanimous in denouncing the "manifesto" as an act of 
 potential brigandage. In Great Britain and on the Continent 
 a most unfortunate impression was produced, and the good re- 
 pute of American diplomacy was seriously impaired. In these 
 circumstances Marcy discreetly refused to recognize the obvious 
 purport of the "manifesto." He affected to assume that it did 
 not recommend the alternative of cession or seizure, and pro- 
 ceeded to argue the inadmissibility of such a course. If Spain 
 was unwilling to sell, he said, the negotiations must necessarily 
 be abandoned. This was doubtless the wisest course that Marcy 
 could have pursued. Had he taken this "manifesto" at its real 
 meaning, his repudiation and rebuke of it, no matter how severe, 
 
 VOL. 1—35
 
 546 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 would still have left an opportunity for complaint on the part 
 of Spain. But by pretending that it did not mean any such 
 thing he protected himself and the United States against such 
 representations, while the palpable irony of his tone was far 
 more stinging to Soule than direct censure would have been. 
 Soule was unspeakably chagrined and enraged, and at once re- 
 signed his office; and thus the episode came to a serio-comic end. 
 A few years later, in December, 1858, Buchanan, then President 
 sought to revive it in his second annual message. He referred 
 to the possibility of its being at some time necessary to seize 
 Cuba under "the law of self-preservation," and at his request 
 a bill was introduced into Congress appropriating $30,000,000 
 for the purchase of the island ; but no decisive vote was ever 
 taken on it. A year later he again mentioned the subject, but 
 his reference to it was ignored. 
 
 While these things were going on at the South, a highly im- 
 portant change in foreign relations was being effected in the 
 North. Ever since the treaty of 1818 had been made with 
 Great Britain, supposedly for the definition of American rights 
 in the North Atlantic fisheries, there had been dispute concern- 
 ing its interpretation and application. One of the chief points 
 of dispute was whether the line marking the three-mile limit 
 of territorial waters should follow all the windings of the coast, 
 or should be drawn boldly, straight across from headland to 
 headland so as to include such bodies of water as the Bay of 
 Fundy and the Bay of Chaleurs within the territorial limits and 
 make them closed seas. The Canadians and Newfoundlanders 
 inclined to this latter interpretation, while Americans were in- 
 sistent upon the former. Another question was whether the 
 Strait of Canso, between Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, which 
 in some places is not more than a mile wide, should be regarded 
 as a part of the two high seas which it connects, or whether 
 vessels passing through it should be required to pay tolls, as in 
 inland waters. Much friction arose over these matters, and ill 
 feeling was engendered between the two countries. 
 
 About 1847, however, the adoption of the free trade system 
 in Great Britain began to affect the commercial relations of that 
 country and its colonies. The ports of the United Kingdom were 
 open to the commerce of all countries, and Canadian trade, hav-
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 547 
 
 ing no preferential privileges there, was crowded out by more 
 successful rivals. In these circumstances Canada turned to the 
 United States for a market, and finding herself barred out by 
 the American tariff asked for a system of reciprocity and offered 
 in return for access to American markets to grant American 
 fishermen the largest possible freedom in Canadian coast waters. 
 Our Congress declined to consider the proposal favorably, and 
 the strife over the fisheries continued. An increased British 
 naval force was placed on the Canadian coast, to terrorize Ameri- 
 can fishermen, in the hope of thus coercing the United States 
 into granting reciprocity. The effect was chiefly to arouse 
 a strong sentiment in favor of reprisals, in sending an American 
 naval force to the scene; and one was sent, Webster as secre- 
 tary of state declaring that American fishermen should be pro- 
 tected, '^hook and line, bob and sinker." A British agent came 
 hither to seek adjustment of the trouble, but in vain, and talk 
 of war began to arise. In 1854, however, Lord Elgin, the Gov- 
 ernor-General of Canada, came to the United States for the pur- 
 pose of negotiating a commercial treaty. He was accompanied 
 by a large staff of secretaries and other assistants, and was 
 cordially welcomed at Washington, although at first little en- 
 couragement was given to his hopes of success. Marcy told him 
 frankly that while he was himself in favor of making a reci- 
 procity treaty, there would be no chance of getting it ratified 
 in the Senate, as the senators of IMarcy's own party were opposed 
 to it. But Elgin refused to be discouraged. He addressed 
 himself socially to the senators, and in the course of a week 
 or two so ingratiated himself personally as to win them to 
 a more favorable view of his mission. A treaty was negotiated 
 and was signed on June 5, 1854, providing for free trade be- 
 tween the United States and Canada in all the natural products 
 of both land and sea, for the reciprocal privilege of fishing in all 
 coast waters, and the free reciprocal navigation of all rivers, 
 canals, and straits. This treaty was ratified by the Senate, and 
 had the fortunate results of putting an end to the fisheries dis- 
 pute and of greatly increasing trade between the two countries. 
 It was made for a term of ten years, at the end of which, in 
 1865, it was terminated by an act of the American Congress, 
 not on its own merits, or its lack of merits, for despite some
 
 548 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 faults it was really highly beneficial to both countries, but be- 
 cause of ill-feelings growing out of our Civil War and the Cana- 
 dian sympathies with the Southern Confederacy, 
 
 During the administration of President Buchanan, Lewis Cass 
 was secretary of state; a man of advanced years and inactive 
 habits, and American diplomacy was much of the time in a 
 quiet slack-water. One of its successes was attained in a some- 
 what dubious manner, namely, by disputing the British right 
 to interfere with the American slave trade. The anti-slavery 
 agitation in the United States had increased the value of slaves, 
 and there was a corresponding increase in the activity of slave 
 traders, between Africa and the United States, despite the illegal 
 status of that traffic. In fact, the Buchanan administration was 
 either unable or unwilling to enforce the law against it — perhaps 
 both. British vessels were active in repressing it, however, and 
 in so doing frequently fired upon, stopped, and searched Ameri- 
 can vessels which were suspected of being slavers, not only on the 
 African coast but even in the Gulf of Mexico. Cass vigorously 
 protested against this, recalling the fact that the War of 1812 
 had been fought largely to protect American vessels from such 
 "outrages," and at his request the secretary of the navy ordered 
 American warships to those waters to prevent any further pro- 
 ceedings of that kind. Cass wrote on April 10, 1858, to Lord 
 Napier, the British minister, a powerful letter upon the subject, 
 in which he declared that for an officer to board the vessel of 
 another nation, take command of her, examine her papers, pass 
 judgment upon her character, decide whether she was or was 
 not complying with the laws of her own country, and send her 
 to port for trial, was something to which an independent country 
 could not submit. It had been argued that unless search were 
 permitted a vessel of any other nation might carry on the slave 
 trade with impunity simply by hoisting the American flag. To 
 this he replied that such a vessel would be entitled to no pro- 
 tection, but the vessel stopping and searching it must do so at its 
 own risk. "As the identity of a person must be determined by 
 the officer bearing a process for his arrest, and determined at the 
 risk of such officer, so must the national identity of a vessel be 
 determined at the like hazard of him who, doubting the flag she 
 displays, searches her to ascertain her true character." His
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 549 
 
 citations from British authorities were copious and his logic was 
 so cogent that reply was practically impossible. Some corre- 
 spondence did indeed follow, but the British foreign minister, 
 Lord Malraesbury, promptly expressed to the American minister 
 at London, Dallas, his entire assent to Cass's contention as to the 
 illegality of search, and in a written memorandum said : ' ' Her 
 Majesty's government recognizes the principle of international 
 law as laid down by General Cass in his note of the 10th of 
 April. ' ' Thus at last was ended one of the most vexatious con- 
 troversies which had ever arisen between the two nations, and 
 one which had been in existence for just three quarters of a 
 century. This was indeed a notable triumph for Cass, though it 
 must be regretted that it had even the appearance of being in 
 the interest of the most abhorrent traffic ever known to man. 
 It was made the more complete during the next year, when Cass 
 secured from the British and French governments a formal 
 agreement upon rules and instructions to seamen concerning the 
 right of visitation ; in which the British government, which had 
 once so strenuously insisted upon the ** right of search," ex- 
 plicitly instructed its naval officers that **no merchant vessel 
 navigating the high seas is subject to any foreign jurisdiction. 
 A vessel of war cannot, therefore, visit, detain, or seize (except 
 under treaty) any merchant vessel not recognized as belonging 
 to her own nation." 
 
 Later in that administration, on June 27, 1859, on the oc-* 
 casion of the outbreak of the Italian war against Austria, Cass 
 sent important instructions to the American ministers through- 
 out Europe, defining the character and policy of the United 
 States as a neutral power, and particularly setting forth the prin- 
 ciples by which this country was to be governed in the recogni- 
 tion of commercial blockades. This circular letter was weighty 
 and judicious, as an expression of abstract and general princi- 
 ples, and • has frequently been quoted since as an authority. 
 It was effective enough during the Italian war. But unfor- 
 tunately its admirable principles were not always advantageous 
 to our own national practice in the Civil War which began here 
 two years later, and it had to be largely repudiated in the main- 
 tenance of the blockade of Confederate ports. 
 
 Mexican affairs became increasingly troublesome because of
 
 550 AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 the chaotic condition of that Government, and in 1858 Buchanan 
 recommended that in order to stop intolerable outrages upon 
 American citizens the United States should establish by force a 
 protectorate over the northern part of that country. Congress 
 declined, however, to authorize such action ; and it v^as similarly 
 irresponsive in the following year when Buchanan asked for 
 authorization to invade Mexico and reestablish order. The 
 treaties were made by him in 1859, under which the United 
 States was to assume responsibility for various foreign claims 
 against Mexico in return for the granting of valuable and ex- 
 clusive commercial concessions, but the Senate declined to ratify 
 them, or even so much as to consider them ; although Buchanan 
 gave the warning, which a few years later was only too much 
 justified by events, that if the United States did not do something 
 in Mexico, some European nation would, and the United States 
 would be put to the task of dealing with it as well as with 
 Mexico itself, "under circumstances of increased difficulty, for 
 the maintenance of our established policy." The fact was, the 
 North, which was then becoming dominant in Congress, sus- 
 pected all such proposals by Buchanan to be in the interest of 
 the extension of slavery, and it had no mind to further the 
 schemes. Moreover, the aspect of domestic politics was becom- 
 ing so ominous as to forbid any enterprises in other lands. In 
 one direction alone did Congress assent to a feature of Bu- 
 chanan's "vigorous and aggressive" foreign policy. That was 
 in 1857, when in response to a message from the President it 
 authorized the sending of a naval expedition of nineteen vessels 
 to the little South American republic of Paraguay to exact an 
 apology for an insult which had two years before been offered 
 to the American vessel Water Witch. The apology was made, 
 a commercial treaty was negotiated, and an agreement was made 
 for a commission to investigate an American claim for damages. 
 Elsewhere the embarrassment of domestic controversy and im- 
 pending civil strife held diplomacy in abeyance, and remitted 
 to some unknown future date the settlement of various ques- 
 tions of real and increasing importance. 
 
 The various treaties and conventions which were made by the 
 United States in the years preceding the Civil War, including 
 some elsewhere mentioned and others calling for nothing more
 
 SOME VIGOROUS SELF-ASSERTION 551 
 
 than enumeration, were as follows : With Argentina, treaties of 
 navigation, and of friendship, commerce, and navigation, 1855; 
 Austria-Hungary, commerce and navigation, 1831, and consular 
 jurisdiction and personal property, 1850; Bavaria, immigration 
 tax, 1846 ; Belgium, commerce and navigation, 1846 and 1859 ; 
 Bolivia, peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation, 1858 and 
 1863 ; Borneo, amity, commerce, and navigation, 1850 and 1854 ; 
 Brazil, amity, commerce, and navigation, 1828, and claims, 1849 
 and 1850; Brunswick and Luneberg, disposal of personal prop- 
 erty, 1855 ; Chile, peace, amity, commerce, and navigation, 1832 
 and 1834, and claims, 1856 ; China, peace, amity, and commerce, 
 1844, 1846, 1858, 1860, trade and tariff, 1858, and claims, 1858 ; 
 Colombia, amity, commerce, and navigation, 1824 and 1825, 
 peace, amity, commerce, and navigation, 1846 and 1848, consular, 
 1850, and claims, 1857 and I860; Costa Rica, friendship, com- 
 merce, and navigation, 1851, and claims, 1860 and 1861 ; Den- 
 mark, friendship, commerce, and navigation, 1826, claims, 1830, 
 and Sound dues, 1857 and 1858 ; Ecuador, peace, friendship, 
 navigation, and commerce, 1839 and 1842; France, consular, 
 1853 and 1858 ; Greece, commerce, and navigation, 1837 ; Guate- 
 mala, peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation, 1849 ; Haiti, 
 amity, commerce, navigation, and extradition, 1864; Hanover, 
 commerce and navigation, 1840 and 1846, and abolishing State 
 dues, 1861 ; the Hanseatie Cities, friendship, commerce, and 
 navigation, 1827, arrest of deserters, 1828, consular, 1852; 
 Hesse, immigration tax, 1844; Japan, peace, amity, and com- 
 merce, 1854, commerce and consular, 1857, commerce and naviga- 
 tion, 1858 ; Loo Choo Islands, friendship and commerce, 1854 ; 
 Mecklenburg, commerce and navigation, 1847 ; Netherlands 
 (Holland), commerce and navigation, 1852, consular, 1855; 
 Paraguay, friendship, commerce, and navigation, 1859 ; Persia, 
 friendship and commerce, 1856; Peru, claims, 1841, friendship, 
 commerce, and navigation, 1851, neutrality, 1856, whaling ships, 
 1857; Saxony, immigration tax, 1845; Siam, amity and com- 
 merce, 1856; Switzerland, property rights, 1847, friendship and 
 commerce, 1850; Turkey, commerce and navigation, 1830; the 
 Two Sicilies, claims, 1832, commerce and navigation, 1845, rights 
 of neutrals, 1855, amity, commerce, and navigation, 1855; 
 Venezuela, claims, 1859, amity, commerce, and navigation, 1860.
 
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