ID 00 Os! CO o CD POLITICAL PROGRESS NOT NECESSARILY DEMOCRATIC: OB RELATIVE EQUALITY THE TRUE FOUNDATION OF LIBERTY. JAMES LORIMER Esq. ADVOCATE. WILLIAMS AND NORGATE, 14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON; AND 20 SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH. 1857. LEIPZIG: PRINTED BY B. G. TEUBNER. EGTL ds TIKOK nohs x TOV noiov KKI nocov' Af'yco dz noibv /if v 8 tev&tQiav, Ttkov- tov , Ttaidfiav, fvyivsiuv noGov de rj\v xov Aristot. Politic. Lib. IV. cap. 10. Movov yug fiovifjiov TO "Actr K&ICCV i'oov, Y.O.I TO f%lV TK KVT&V. Ibid. V. 6. PREFACE. No less bold an innovator than Lord Bacon, made it reproach against no less justly self reliant a speculator than Aristotle, that "he did proceed in a spirit of difference and con- tradiction to all antiquity." Mindful of a fact so significant of the consequences of similar trans- gressions in smaller men, I have been careful, wherever I suggested anything new, to shew that it was, at the least, a legitimate consequence of something old. But for the feeling that for the most part I had humbly followed in the foot-prints of those whom the wisest of my readers would most re- vere, I should not have ventured to run counter to prevailing opinions so confidently as I have done; and in instances where I felt most hesi- VI tation, it has been an unspeakable comfort to me to know that those who called my views in question would not have to do with me alone. If out of the history of former times or of formerly received opinions, I have succeeded in gathering anything which shall be capable of present application, such a result will furnish no insignificant incentive to me to prosecute, and to others to pursue those studies in which I have most delighted, and in the dignity and fruitfulness of which, beyond all other human studies, I have been wont to believe. It is impossible not to feel that in a work which deals with so weighty a subject as the constitution of his country, the author acts un- der the heaviest responsibility. The effect pro- duced may be JVt7, but it is not his intention that such should be the case, and therefore the moral responsibility is not lessened by the insignificance of what is accomplished. On the other hand, the more important the subject the more imperative is the duty which lies VII at the door of every good citizen to bring to its elucidation whatever portion of light may have been imparted to him. It is the fearless- ness with which Englishmen have spoken their thoughts on subjects of public interest, which has given to England the place which she occupies in the civilised world, and the mo- ment that Englishmen cease by appealing from present usage to permanent principle, courage- ously to pursue truth their preeminence will be gone, even although the race (which is scarcely likely) should retain the physical intrepidity which has hitherto characterised it. If on the present occasion I have suceeded in removing the sources of theoretical conflict between po- litical doctrines which have hitherto been sup- posed to be irreconcilable, and thus by shew- ing the possibility of their simultaneous re- cognition, have paved the way for a safer pro- gress on a road which not Englishmen only, but every civilized people must inevitably tread, a good work will have been accomplished. If, on VIII the contrary, my reading of the past has been er- roneous ; or my application of its lessons to the future inconsiderate or inept, I shall find perso- nal consolation in the reflection that I have not been wholly devoid of that singleness of pur- pose, for the possession of which alone man is responsible. The results of our labours are in other hands, and all that either modesty suggests or piety demands in handing them over to our fellow men, I find to have been said on a similar occasion by a great man , in words which merit to be used as a perpetual formulary. "Et jam adeo, si quid hie pietati , si quid bonis moribus, si quid sacris literis, si quidEcclesiae Christianae consensui, si quid ulli veritati dissentaneum a me dictum est, id ne dictum esto." * * Grotius. De jure belli et pacis. Proleg. TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. PAGE Of the degree of certainty which may be attained in political speculation 1 CHAPTER II. Of the relation between legislation and the spirit of the people 8 CHAPTER III. Of the relation between legislation and political speculation 23 CHAPTER IV. The Problem of Politics. ......... 31 CHAPTER V. The method of solution. 42 CHAPTER VI. Of the principle according to which our choice of historical precedents must be regulated. . . 53 CHAPTER VII. What historical precedents bear most closely on the present condition of England? .... 59 CHAPTER VIII. Of the danger of adopting the Experience of Anti- quity. . . . . ' 73 CHAPTER IX. The Publicists the interpreters of Antiquity. . . 88 CHAPTER X. PAGE The Dicta of the ancient Publicists 104 CHAPTER XI. How did the ancients propose to escape from the Cycle? .... 133 CHAPTER XII. How do the moderns propose to escape from the Cycle? .... 155 CHAPTER XIII. )( Do any public rights belong to man as man? . . . 199 CHAPTER XIV. The Suffrage. 221 CHAPTER XV. Farther Characteristics of the ultimate suffrage. . 231 CHAPTER XVI. A graduated property suffrage considered. . . . 237 CHAPTER XVII. )\Other methods of giving political recognition to so- cial inequality. 245 CHAPTER XVIII. \ By what means may the public spirit be influen- ced and directed? 254 ^ CHAPTER XIX. )\Of the leaders of thought scientific and popular. 261 CHAPTER XX. Of the universal duty of active - mindedness. . . 276 CHAPTER XXI. X Of political Education 286 CHAPTER XXII. X^Of the Church in its political relations. ... . 295 EEEATA. Page 14, line 9,/v%fj$ svsQysiu Y.KX' d^BT^v}. Ibid. Cap. VII. But man is a social being (itohrLKov o5o>) and for such, the perfect life is possible only in the state, hence sv- daL^iovLcc. cannot be the object of Ethics when taken as the science of individual, but only of politics as that of social , relations. In this view it is clear that Politics come to be the master science, to which Ethics are subordinated ; though it is equally manifest that the reasoning proceeds on a limitation of the province of Ethics which is by no jtneans constant in the writings of Aristotle. The diffi- culty , indeed, which we have in fixing the relation of Ethics and Politics to each other arises from the fact that the terms which are used to designate both have 93 was made the subject of a very thorough or systematic investigation. The chief interest of two significations, a wider and a narrower one, and con- sequently that the relations of genus and species alter- nately belong to each. When Politics (TK TTOUTLKK), as here, are taken in their wider sense, that of a common term for the whole of the social sciences , and Ethics (TO. TyoHxof) in their narrower, that of the science of individual relations exclusively, then Politics are the genus , and Ethics the species. On the other hand, when Ethics are viewed as the primary human science, having for their object the whole range of man's rational and responsible life, then they become the genus and Po- litics the species. There is still a third sense in which Ethics are used, that, viz., in which they comprehend only individual and social relations; and in this they are co- extensive with Politics in their widest sense. It is in this sense that Aristotle says of Ethics, Ethic. Nic., Lib. I. Cap. II., noUTMjj TI$ OVGCC, that they are a kind of Politics. In addition to these considerations it must be borne in mind that , even where no such interchange of reJa- tions takes place, the species at all times contains the genus (i. e. implies it) it is a metaphysical, as opposed to a logical whole. Whately, p. 140; Aldridge Com- pendium Artis Logicae, p. 9. That Aristotle habitually regarded Ethics as the genus , and Politics as the spe cies, is practically demonstrated by the fact that he laid the foundation for his treatise on Politics by that on Ethics. Such also is the modern view: "Fille de la morale, la politique a la meme charactere que sa mere." Cousin, Discours Politiques; Introd. IV. Ed. 1851. 94 antiquity centred in the science of government, which was zealously, profoundly, and at length systematically studied; and the consequence of the attention thus bestowed on it was the tracing out of the tendencies by which not only the growth and gradual developement of states were affected, but of those by which, apart altogether from violent changes ; a gradual and, so to speak, normal decay was brought about. Plato and Aristotle, who for antiquity, and probably for all time, represent most com- pletely the two leading mental tendencies of mankind, the subjective and the objective, were likewise the greatest of all politicians, and, in their political as in their other in- vestigations, their methods were the direct consequences of these tendencies *. Plato, look- ing inward for the laws no.t only of the indi- * Warnkonig in speaking of the turbulent life of the Greek states, says: "Doch erreichte mitten in diesen Stiirmen die griechische Humanitatsbildung, und insbe- sondere die Philosophic ihre gliinzendste Hb'he, und durch sie auch die theoretische Entwickelung der Staats- idee. Es entstanden die in der Weltgeschichte ewig denkwiirdigen Theorieen der Politik oder Staatswissen- schaft , die in zwei, schon in der Natur der Sache lie- genden , entgegengesetzten Richtungen sich bewegten, der idealistischen, die in Plato, und der historisch-practischen, 95 vidual, but also of the social man, regarded the several excellencies of the state only as larger and more perfect manifestations of those of the citizen , and its corruptions and perver- sions, in like manner, as analogous to the various forms of human depravity. It is to the consciousness of the individual that he ad- dresses himself in his search, not only after the immutable relations of social life, but the varying and apparently almost accidental forms which social organisation assumes. His method, in a word , was purely psychological, though by no means, as has generally been believed, to the total exclusion of historical considerations. His measure of perfection is an ideal, not de- rived by abstraction and generalisation from the phenomena presented by a study of reality, but directly revealed to the human spirit, more or less completely as it strives upwards to- wards its realisation. Aristotle, on the other hand, was preeminently an observer of ex- ternal existences; and, if proofs were wanting of the fact that the inductive method was not new with Bacon they would be found in the die in Aristoteles ihren grossten Vertreter fand. " Juri- stische Encyclopadie. p. 177. see also Stahl. Philosophic des Kechts. Vol. I. p. 9. 96 care which Aristotle took to root the Science of Politics in a sound and wide-spreading in- vestigation of political phenomena. Before forming his political system he passed in re- view the constitutions of most of the states which had existed before his time and which existed then; and compiled , or caused to be compiled*, a work in which he described the constitutions of 150, or ; according to others, of 258 different states, and detailed the principal revolutions which they had undergone. Of this work fragments only remain, and these have scarcely yet been collated with sufficient care; but from the materials which it contained he com- posed the invaluable treatise on Politics which we possess. The confidence with which this method inspired him, if it does not justify, to some extent explains, the depreciating manner in which Aristotle frequently speaks of the po- litical speculations of Plato, and which contrasts strangely with the deference with which he treats his opinions on other subjects**. Each * Ethic. Nicom,, Lib. X. c. 7. ** The circumstances of Aristotle's life were such as to render him much more of a practical statesman than Plato , and probably to inspire him with an idea of the futility of mere speculation. Our readers will remem- 97 of these methods when pursued to the exclu- sion of the other to the extent to which Plato and Aristotle pursued them, is liable to ge- nerate serious error; but, if the historical me- thod be less productive of profound and ori- ginal truth, there is little doubt on the other hand that it is the safer of the two*; and it is very remarkable that it was from a neglect of its use, in an age of which the application of the inductive method to physics was the chief boast, that politicians towards the end of last century were led into most of the errors of which Europe has since been reaping the bitter fruits. When first principles which are true only partially and relatively are enunciated her the slighting manner in which he speaks of the po- litical studies of the Architect of Piraeus. It must be borne in mind, besides, that the Stagirite had a trick of indulging in contemptuous epithets. * For a discussion of the comparative merits of the two methods v. Preface to Aristotle's Politics by J. Bar- thelemy Saint Hilaire. It is valuable for its apprecia- tion of the psychological method. In Stahl's Philosophic des Rechts will be found an admirable statement of the manner in which Aristotle derived his standard of right from a contemplation of nature, not in part, where ap- parent contradictions continually present themselves, but in whole, where the natural and moral laws are coin- cident. Vol. I. p. 21., et seq. 98 as invariably and absolutely true, it is no easy matter, from psychological considerations alone, to point out the limits within which they may be admitted with safety; and once taken for granted, it is still more difficult to stop short of the consequences to which they lead. When it is asserted, for instance, that all men are born with equal rights , and when a writer such as Rousseau descants eloquently " sur 1'egalite que la nature a mise entre les homines , et sur 1'inegalite qu'ils ont institute ", the portion of truth which the proposition contains is so much more obvious than the limitations within which alone it can be admitted without violating other principles equally fundamental, and the passions of the majority of men are so much more readily enlisted for it than against it, that the greater number will always be dis- posed to receive it as a principle of human society absolutely true, and will not permit themselves to be undeceived till they have tasted the consequences of their error in some form of social disorganisation*. Now, in place * Rousseau's Princip schmeichelt den selbstandigen Neigungen der Menschen durch ein Minimum des Staats- zwanges; daher der stiirmische Beifall. Dahlmann, Poli- tik. p. 230. 99 of taking their principle for granted in its pu- rity, had they had recourse to history, and endeavoured to discover to what extent it had been found possible for mankind practically to recognise it, they would not only have found that experience had pronounced its absolute recognition to be irreconcilable with the ex- istence of society, but they would have come in contact with opposing principles which, whilst human nature continues as it is, must permanently modify it. They would have seen, (as we shall see afterwards*), the distinction between equality before the law and equality of political rights and honours recognised by the forms of government under which man- kind had enjoyed the greatest amount of li- berty; and on analysing this distinction they would have found it to depend on prin- ciples of our ' nature as fundamental as those by which at first sight it seemed to be ex- cluded. The great advantage of the historical method is that if faithfully adhered to it will never lead us astray from human nature altogether, as even in the most skilful hands the psycholo- * Vide infra, and Thucydides, II. 37. 02 100 gical method too frequently does. The ideal which we reach by the processes of the under- standing may be inferior to that which the reason directly reveals, and we may fail thus to reach the depth or height of which our na- ture is capable, and to which it may after- wards attain, but we shall scarcely frame in- stitutions for circumstances which are impos- sible, nor in those which we do frame will our miscalculations of social tendencies be other than in degree. When Aristotle defended slavery as a result of the inequality which naturally exists among men, the error which he com- mitted was the converse of that of which he accuses those who make no distinction between absolute and relative equality. He forgot that all men have an equal claim to be recognised as human beings, just as the demagogue for- gets that they have not an equal claim to power and honour; and thus far it may be said that he was as much led astray by the faulty in- stitutions of his country, as Rousseau, for ex- ample, was by a deficient psychology. But when Plato recommended a similar training for both sexes, he overlooked the distinction between the natural functions of each, and in commu- nity of women he proposed an institution 101 which not only psychology and physiology unite in pronouncing to be impracticable, but which no organised society ever recognised *. - It is in a complete union of the two methods ; " un- questionably, that the perfection* of ir/etliod consists; but there is too much truth in the saying that all men are born either Platonists or Aristotelians to permit us to hope for such * "Aristotle's refutation of Plato" says Stahl, "had not the ordinary meaning, ' These your schemes are just indeed and noble , but impracticable ' ; on the contrary it was this 'They contradict the conditions of Nature, and are consequently not what she, the source of Ethics, will and strives after; they are untrue and unjust. 11 Plato's reply of course would have been that not Nature, but the idea, was "the source of Ethics." But then came the further question, whence sprang the idea itself ; was its source in the last instance not the very same as that of those human tendencies which Aristotle traced in their effects. "It is one and the same power," says Stahl , working out the common origin of the two rival methods through several very instructive pages, " it is the same power which produces the natural conditions and propensities, and by which the goal is assigned to- wards which humanity in its individual and corporate capacity has to strive. This view explains the rela- tion between Nature and Ethics which reality exhi- bits , and at the same time clears up to us the rela- tion between Plato and Aristotle." Philos. des Rechts, V. I. p. 29. 102 a result. So long as our intellectual faculties are imperfect our habits of thinking will be one sided ,* a'ad it is hopeless to look for any one who* shall be both an Aristotle and a Plato. TiU r 'the advent of such a mental prodigy a perfectly " satisfactory treatise on Politics will continue a desideratum in literature. Invo- luntarily the one method or the other will gain the ascendant , but ; as no sound mind is destitute of any faculty , so no sound writer will be altogether the slave of either. If the institutions of Sparta were not with- out their influence in the formation of Plato's ideal of the state, the dicta of consciousness contributed even a more important element towards that conception of the necessary laws of social existence which Aristotle pro- fessed to derive mainly from external obser- vation. But we must not permit ourselves to be tempted, either by the extreme interest of the subject itself, or by the fact that nothing of importance has hitherto been written on it in English, to dwell further on the rise of the Science of Politics in antiquity. Our only pre- sent concern with the political studies of the ancients is to obtain from them the results 103 which the history of that civilisation to which they belonged yielded to their investigation., and thus to read with the eyes of those among them who were its professed interpreters, a history in some important points more ana- logous to our own than that of the modern world. For this purpose we shall at once be- take ourselves to Aristotle: for, though the labours of his predecessors had by no means been barren of results, these results, for the most part, were adopted by him, and he it was who first placed the study on a properly scientific basis. From the time at which he lived , also, he had the benefit of an experience which enabled him to evolve general laws, both of developement and declension, with far greater security than was possible half a century earlier; and it is this circumstance which gives to his dicta their peculiar value for those whose stage of political development (unlike that of his countrymen when he wrote) may still be such as to enable them to avail themselves of the lessons which they convey. Above all, there is the peculiarly dispassionate and observant character of the old* man himself, a circumstance * It is probable that the Politics were written towards 104 which enabled him to a greater extent than per- haps any other writer, either ancient or modern, to conform to what ought to be maxim of every political enquirer: Unto thee Let thine own time like an old story be. CHAP. X. , THE DICTA OP THE PUBLICISTS. According to Aristotle, the test of a govern- ment being legitimate or illegitimate consists in the fact of the power and influences of the governing body having for their object the common benefit, or the reverse*. "Govern- the close of Aristotle's life, and he hints (Ethic. Nic., Lib. I. c. 3) that, in his opinion, the subject was not suited for the young. The Republic of Plato on the con- trary was an earlier production than the Laws in which something like an approach to the Aristotelian mode of thinking is traceable. " * Politic. Lib. III. c. 5. 105 ment", he says, "which is the supreme autho- rity, must be in the hands either of the one, or the few, or the many. If the one, the few, or the many govern with a view to the benefit of the whole*, these governments are legiti- mate (o()9m TCoAiTsicti) ; whereas those of which the object is the peculiar benefit of the one, the few, or the many, are degenerate or per- verted forms (TtaQsxfldGsig) **. Following in the main the views of Plato, and probably of other members of the So- cratic School, he then enumerates as legiti- mate forms; 1. Monarchy; 2. Aristocracy; 3. Polity; and along side of them, as the corresponding de- generate forms; * He elsewhere (Polit. III. 4. 7.) opposes vcti to OQ&Ki noliTBicu. The same idea is in some de- gree conveyed by what Plato calls GTKOLOJTSIKI and Plu- tarch TtCtQUTQOTtCti Y.O.I V7lQ%V6SlV KTTO- Q&V. Lib. III. c. 5). In explaining the nature of the different le- gitimate forms Aristotle says of the "Polity" that it arises "where the many govern for the common benefit*"; that it is a "mixture of oligarchy and democracy " ; and elsewhere, that in order to form it we must take the elements of these two forms separately, and bringing them together construct it from their union**. In the passage in the Ethics*** in which he first enunciates the law of political degeneracy, he speaks of the Polity as synonymous with what is sometimes called Timocracy f, or government according to wealth ; and, in contrasting it with * Lib. III. c. 5. IV. c. 6. ** Lib. IV. c. 8. *** Ethic. Lib. VIII. c. 10. j- Plato's Timocracy is a government according to honour, rtfiij, not 108 aristocracy*, he says that it differs from it chiefly in leaning more towards the side of de- mocracy, whereas the tendency of the other is to render the oligarchic element preponderating. From these passages it appears that according to Aristotle, the Polity is the only form in which popular government could realise] the true idea of the state, that, viz., of an organisa- tion for the benefit of the whole community**, which, whilst it took cognisance of the interests of the possessors of wealth and intelligence, by appropriating to them an influence in the go- vernment in some degree corresponding to that which they possessed in society, and conse- quently exceeding that to which their mere numbers would have entitled them, still pre- served in the hands of the great body of the people such a preponderating influence in the last resort, as to prevent the higher classes, by availing themselves of the indirect influence which must always belong to them, from as- * Polit. Lib. IV. c. 6. ** " Res publica , res populi". Cicero. Republ. Lib. I. c. 25. "Did God create the Hebrews that Saul might reign over them"? Algernon Sidney on government. V. I. p. 8. Edit 1750. 109 suming the attitude either of a dominant faction, or of a privileged class. The Polity was thus, in Aristotle's political system, the form of government which ap- proached most nearly to our own free English Constitution, and in seeking practical lessons from his teaching our object must be to trace the principles according to which he found its development and decay to be regulated. It will be remarked that in Aristotle's classifi- cation no place is allotted to that tripartite go- vernment which has played so great a part in the modern world. The Polity, a.s conceived by him, unquestionably wanted the monarchical element; and this fact seems the more remarkable when we consider that the idea of combining the three primary forms must have been perfectly fami- liar to his mind. Plato had shadowed forth such a government in the Laws*, and Aristotle himself tells us that it had been treated of by other writers**. There has been much specu- lation as to who these writers were. The com- mon opinion has fixed on Hippodamus of Mi- letus and Archytas of Tarentum, two Pytha- * Lib. III. c. 2. See also Lib. IV. c. 5. ** Polit. Lib. II. c. 3. 110 goreans to whom 'Stobaeus has attributed very remarkable fragments, which, if genuine ; are quite unequivocal as to the acquaintance of Aristotle's predecessors with the idea of the mixed government. But as Aristotle frequently speaks of both of these persons, and particu- larly at very considerable length of Hippoda- rnus and his system, there is some reason to think that, if the passages referred to had been theirs, he would have mentioned them speci- fically; and it is at any rate extremely pro- bable that, in order to explain the allusion in question, we do not require to go so far as to the school of Pythagoras. We know that the teaching of Socrates engendered a whole family of political speculators, all of whose writings except those of Xenophon and Plato have perished; and it is very possible that any one of them may have discussed a combination to which their master had referred, and which could scarcely have failed to suggest itself to an ingenious mind, occupied as the minds of all the publicists of antiquity were with the institutions of Sparta. But, whencesoever he may have derived it, we are not left to conjecture as to Aristotle's acquaintance with the idea of the tripartite go- Ill vernment. In two places* at least he not only describes it with accuracy, but bestows on it a commendation which, though passing and careless, and by no means indicating a high sense of its importance, still quite clearly marks his conviction that it was a step in the direction of permanence and safety. That such should have been his opinion seems necessarily to follow from the fact of his being so fully alive to the danger to which the Polity was exposed from the democratic element, as actually to fix on democracy as its appropriate degenerate form. Nor was he in any degree averse to monarchy in the abstract; on the contrary he frequently seems to prefer it to all the other forms, and particularly to the Polity, which from its nearness to democracy he regarded with a species of distrust**. It is possible that the very insignificant role which the monarchical element played in the constitutions of Sparta*** and Carthage, in place * Polit. Lib. II. c. 3. and 6. ** GVVOQOL ya^ SiOiv ctvrai. Ethic. Nic. Lib. VIII. c. 10. *** In the Cretan institutions which resembled those of Sparta in so many respects , the monarchical element was altogether omitted; its place, as a separate executive, being supplied by the y.dff/u-ot, who were ten in number. 112 of raising Aristotle's notion of its value may actually have depressed it. But, incomplete and inefficient though the mixed government was in its existing form, one would have expected it to suggest to a mind such as Aristotle's the possi- bility of its far more extensive application ; and on the whole we know no more striking proof of the fact -that nothing but the fulness of time can so ripen theoretical conceptions as to fit them for practical purposes than the little fruit which the discovery of the mixed government bore to the states of antiquity. There can be no doubt that to the mind of Aristotle it presented it- /self simply as a modification of the Polity, so unimportant* as to leave it exposed to the same influences and prone to the same form of degeneracy. Though he no where pursues the subject, his declining to assign to the mixed government either a separate place or a sepa- Polybius however denies that there was any similarity betAveen the political institutions of Crete and those of Sparta. Lib. VI. 3. * Aristotle probably was sagacious enough to feel the real difficulty which attends the admission of the mo- narchical element as an efficient power , viz. the ten- dency which it has to unsettle the minds of men. as to the real centre of sovereignty in the popular will. rate name is conclusive as to the fact that he regarded the additional barriers which it op- posed to democracy as likely to prove ultimate- ly insufficient, and the modern world may per- haps derive a not uninstructive hint from the fact that in this opinion he is followed by writers whose practical acquaintance with it has been greater, and who have attached to it far more importance than he seems to have done. Polybius, so far as we know, is the earliest writer who fully appreciates the tripartite go- vernment, and distinctly sets forth its advan- tages ; and in this , as in other respects, he has been followed by Cicero in his Kepublic so close- ly as greatly to invalidate the claims to ori- ginality which, in the tumult of joy which its discovery excited, were made on all hands in behalf of that long lost treasure. M. Sudre suggests * that a tradition may have existed to the effect that Scipio .ZEmilianus was an ad- mirer of the mixed government 5 and there was at any rate an appropriateness in attributing to him, as Cicero has done, sentiments which, if he did not arrive at them by means of his * Histoire de la Souverainete p. 503. 114 own reflections on the constitution of his coun- try, the conversation of his friend and tutor must assuredly have suggested. "That kind of Government", says Polybius*, u is undoubtedly to be esteemed the best, which is composed of all the three." "Itaque quartum quoddam ge- nus reipublicae maxime probandum esse censeo, quod ex his, quae prima dixi, moderatum et permixtum tribus**," is the echo of Scipio; and he elsewhere aptly characterises it as that form "quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus***". Both Polybius and Cicero give as examples of the political trinity: first the constitution of Rome, and then those of Sparta and Car- thage. Cicero dwells upon the early kingly government of Rome, particularly the consti- tution of Servius Tullius, as his principal ex- ample; and in appearance it unquestionably was so, for in it alone of the three was the executive power centred in one individual ; but Polybius seems to have felt that a monarchy in which the king was elected f by the as- * Lib. VI. c. 1. ** Republ. Lib. L c. 29. *** Cap. 35. f Cicero approved of elective monarchy, not only as exemplified in the Roman kingly government but abso- 115 sembly of the people, which from internal causes of disorganisation had long since ceased to exist, and with reference to which the tra- ditions were in many respects confused and contradictory, went very little farther towards giving historical roots to his theory than any other form of government in which the execu- tive were separated from the legislative func- tions, and he consequently rests his case, so far as it depends on Roman history, on the consular rather than the kingly institution*. The chief reason of this diversity of view is probably to be found in the changes which* had taken place in the Roman government in the time which intervened between Polybius and Cicero. During his seventeen jfcars resi- lutely, and Sismondi in our own time has very ably taken the same side, a view, which the experience of France since he wrote has by no means invalidated. "In politics", as he has elsewhere well said, "there is no orthodoxy out of which there is no salvation." Sis- mondi, Essays 350. * It is remarkable that neither Polybius nor Cicero mention the Dictatorship as a temporary recognition of the monarchical principle. The reason probably is that they had both but too much reason personally to regard it with disfavor. H2 116 dence in Italy as a state prisoner, Poly bins had contemplated with admiration and wonder the efficiency of that government "through which almost the whole habitable world, in less than the course of fifty three years, was reduced beneath the Roman yoke, an event of which there is no example in any former time*". To the Greek detenu the Roman in- stitutions, then in the pride and prime of their purity and power, seemed, to combine more than the vigour of a monarchy with the ad- vantages which, in their best days, had be- longed to the freest states of his native coun- try. In Cicero's eyes, even before his own misfortunes came upon him, they appeared in a very diijerent light; for, notwithstanding the extravagant value which he attached to his own administration, he could not have faile'd to see, that, whilst the consulship had ceased to be a check on democratic influences, it was eagerly courted, both by civil demagogues and military commanders, as a constitutional step- ping stone to unconstitutional powers. In such circumstances it is not astonishing that he turned with longing from the manifest evils of * Lib. I. c. 1. 117 the consular to the shadowy glories of kingly times *. When the monarchical element was restricted to a separation of the executive from the other functions of the state, Sparta and Carthage at once took their places as appropriate instances both of its existence and its good effects. In one respect indeed Sparta came nearer to the modern state than Rome, even during the kingly period; for in Sparta the custom which was universal in the heroic ages had been pre- served, and the kingly office was hereditary; but then on the other hand it was not only modified, even before the creation of the rival power of the Ephors, by the peculiarities which belonged to the whole of the Doric institutions, but was farther deprived of all proper mo- narchical character, in substance as in name, by the fact that there was not one king but two. * There is no subject on which Cicero is so much in earnest as the political and social degeneracy of his time. The following words are as sad as if they had dropped from the pen of Tacitus. Hac tamen in oppressione sermo , in circulis durntaxat, et conviviis, est liberior quam fuit. Vincere incipit timorem dolor, sed ita, ut omnia .sint plenissima desperationis. (Epist. ad Atticum, L. II. Ep. XVIII., Caesare et Eibulo cos.). 118 Carthage, again, in this respect was more nearly on a footing of equality with the Roman consular government ; for the heads of the exe- cutive, though their office endured for life, besides being two in number, were elective*. It thus appears that the historical examples of Polybius and Cicero scarcely bear out even their views of the union of the monarchical with the other political elements ; and still less can they be regarded as anticipations in anti- quity of that constitutional state, which has with justice been regarded as the great politi- cal discovery of the Germanic nations. But however imperfect may have been the form in which the constitutions of these states exhibited the monarchical element, it is in- structive to remark that the opinion of the publicists was decidedly to the effect that they were invigorated by the infusion of it which they did possess. Aristotle says, with reference to Carthage,** that "the sound organisation of the state is proved by the fact, that, though the people took part in the government neither in- * Niebuhr says that in regard to the political consti- tution of Carthage we are quite in the dark. Lectures, V. I. p. 107. ** Polit. Lib. II. c. VIII. 119 surrection nor tyranny arose"; and Polybius is not less unequivocal in attributing its sudden rise and great prosperity to its original consti- tution than in ascribing its downfall, of which he was an eye witness, to its departure from it*. On the subject of the balance of power in Sparta he has the following observations, which seem almost as if he had borrowed them from a modern constitutional lawyer. "The dread of the people, to whom a certain share was al- lotted in the government, restrained the ex- cesses and abuses of royalty. The people, on the other hand, were maintained in due sub- mission to the kings by the apprehension of the power of the senate. For the mem- bers of the senate, being all selected from the best among the citizens, were always ready to support the cause of justice by throw- ing their own weight into the scale; when either side was in danger of being oppressed by the other, to give such strength to the weaker party as the constitution of the state required. By these means the Lacedaemonians preserved their liberty entire for a much lon- ger time than any other people". * Polyb., Lib. VI. c. II. ex. 3. 120 But though these governments, by recognis- ing the executive as a separate power , are thus admitted by the publicists' to have raised up an additional barrier against that form of degeneracy to which the Polity was prone, we have already seen that they did not so far change its character as to induce Aristotle to treat them as exceptional cases. He still re- garded their besetting danger as on the side of the people , and as neither of them perished till long after his death, if their final downfall was in accordance with the law which he enun- ciated, it must be regarded as a proof of its accuracy, and a very striking fulfilment of the prophecy which it implied. Polybius on the other hand not only saw democracy assume the ascendant both in Car- thage and Sparta, but was a witness to the consequences of the event. Immediately after the passage which we formerly quoted in which he commends the original constitution of Sparta he continues: "But at the time of the war of Annibal the Carthaginian constitution was worse in its condition than the Roman ******. Among the Carthaginians the people possessed the greatest sway in all deliberations, but the se- nate among the Romans ; and, as in one repub- 121 lie all measures were determined by the mul- titude, and in the other by the most eminent citizens, of so great force was this advantage in the conduct of affairs, that the Romans, though brought by repeated losses into the greatest danger, became through the wisdom of their counsels superior to the Carthaginians in the war*". The ultimate fate of the con- stitution of Sparta came scarcely less directly under the observation of Polybius than that of Carthage 5 for its seven hundred years existence was terminated in his youth by Philopoemen, his father's friend and his own, who establish- ed a. democracy in its stead, and, if in this particular instance that measure was not the sole cause, it was the immediate forerunner of political dissolution. Before the history of Polybius was written, Laconia was an incon- siderable portion of a Roman province, and the will of its universal people as powerless for good or evil as that of a mob of Helots and Slaves in the streets of Sparta a hundred years before. But there is another political doctrine of the * B. VI. ex. III. c. II. p. 172. 122 ancient publicists, which to some extent was probably suggested by the classification of which we have spoken, and of which the re- sult was a still farther generalisation of the same conclusions. The idea of the "Cycle" probably originated with Plato, but Polybius was the first to reduce it to an intelligible form. According to Polybius not only had each of the legitimate forms a corresponding degene- rate form, but there existed farther a general system of progression, in accordance with which all these forms succeeded each other. His own exposition is so clear that we shall give it in the excellent old translation of Mr. Hampton. "Of all these," i. e. the six primary and secondary, "the first in order is Monarchy, which is established by the bare work of na- ture, without preparation or design. From Monarchy arises Royalty, when art has been applied to correct the Views of the former; and when Royalty has degenerated into its conge- nial evil, which is Tyranny, the destruction of the latter gives birth to Aristocracy. This again being changed, according to the natural order of things, into Oligarchy, the subjects, roused to vengeance by oppression, resist the injustice of their governors, and establish 123 Democracy*. And in the last place when the people themselves become haughty and un- tractable and reject all law, to Democracy succeeds, in the course of time, the government of the multitude (Ochlocracy)** ". The next and last step leads to utter political disorganization, analogous to the savage condition which pre- ceded the commencement of political life; and in a subsequent passage he discribes it. "They/* i. e. the multitude, " run together in tumultuous assemblies, and are hurried into every kind of violence, assassinations, banishments, and di- visions of lands; till being reduced at last to a state of savage anarchy they at once find a master and a monarch, and submit them- selves to arbitrary sway***". "Such", he adds, " is the circle in which political societies are revolved, and such the natural order in which the several kinds of government are varied, * Democracy is here , in accordance with Plato's no- menclature , used in the sense of Aristotle's Polity , or legitimate popular government. ** B. VI. ex. 1. *** Eixdrcog xoivvv , flnov , ovv. e cdlrjs TtohrsLCcg Xa&lOTCCTCCl 7] iv. drjUOKQKTLCIS , g|j , OiftCCt, Trj$ svd'Qia$ dovlsicx. Tt'ksiGrri TS v.cd Plato. Republ. Lib VIII. c. 15. 124 till they are at last brought back to that ori- ginal form from which the progress was begun". In this enumeration it is obvious that no new forms or even combinations of forms are in- troduced; (for the first two Monarchy and Koyalty are merely different names for the same form) ; but what is both remarkable and / instructive is the order in which they follow each other , which is the same as that in which / Aristotle invariably mentions them*. Some- ( times, it is true, he gives the pure apart from the degenerate forms, but on all occasions he begins with the rule of the one, and ends with that of the many**. Such, moreover, is the * Polit. III. c. 6. IV. c. 11. Ethic. Nic. VIII. 10. ** The observations which Aristotle, Lib. V. c. 10., makes on the Mystical Cycle of the Pythagoreans, as adopted by Plato, are totally inapplicable to the Cycle of Polybius, which is little more than an inference from his own classification of forms of government. When Sir Cornwall Lewis said, Vol. II. p. 443, that the Platonic theory of the cyclical revolutions of governments was overthrown by the decisive criticism of Aristotle, and ap^ plied that observation to Polybius , he forgot that, whilst the "criticism" might have been known to Polybius, the theory supposed to be criticised, in so far as it was modified by Polybius , could not possibly be known to Aristotle. 125 order which was adopted by Plato , and pro- bably by the whole Socratic School, who pre- ceded Aristotle, and by Cicero, who followed Po- lybius ; and such also has been the sequence in which modern systematic writers have generally treated the forms of government. Macchiavelli, in his Discourses on Livy, followed Polybius closely without mentioning him ; and one of the last and greatest of German Scholars*, without acknowledging Polybius, or indeed any of the ancients as a guide, and proceeding on the re- sults of his own researches into ancient history, has adopted this very cycle. Such a coinci- dence, which in the case of such a writer could not be accidental , a,nd which therefore may be regarded in a certain sense as involuntary, is far more important than a formal adoption of the speculative doctrine. Amongst professed political speculators ** the Cycle has been almost as frequent a theme as the Ideal State; and were it not that for the purposes of the present discussion our interest in its truth is a very limited one, we should * K. J. Hermann in his Staatsalterthiimer. ** Hegel , Gervinus , Comte and Vico, have all treated of it from their respective points of view. See also Za- charia vom Staate Vol. II. p. 231. 126 have felt bound to consider at length the ar- guments by which it has been supported or impugned. The conclusion to which such an investigation would have led us would pro- bably have been, that the divergencies of opi- nion were by no means so great in reality as the undue confidence with which half truths were advanced on either side had made them to ap- pear. Those who repudiated the doctrine most strenuously would often have been willing enough to admit, that, in so far as it asserted simply that the tendency of political societies was, first to progress towards liberty, and then to degenerate into licence, it had a vast pre- ponderance of experience in its favour. On the other hand it is but fair to those who, like Polybius *, attached to it more importance than it seems to deserve, that we should bear in mind that no limit in point of time is as- signed by them to its various stages, and that * In the case of Polybius himself, so great was the confidence which he had in its invariable character, that he pronounces it easy, the present place of any govern- ment being given, to predict the next change which awaits it, and he applies his formula to the govern- ment of Rome , with a success which those will best appreciate who are most conversant with the subsequent history of that country. 127 in this we have probably an indication of the general latitude of construction with which they intended that it should be applied. It could not, of course, be the meaning of Po- lybius, or of any other sensible person, in enun- ciating this, or any other political law, that we should expect from it the same regularity or precision of action which is observable in the laws by which the development or decay of physical nature is governed*. The subjects with which morals and politics are conversant preclude the expectation of such regularity. The changes are here dependent on an infin- itely greater number of influences than those which bear on the development of a plant or an animal. Apart from the- constitutional pe- culiarities, which, being inherent in the origi- nal structure of the state, necessarily influence its after changes, these changes are dependent, at every stage, on the manner in which the previous phase was passed through; they are influenced by the temperament of the people, the physical character of the country in which they live, the views of gifted and energetic men who at irregular intervals spring up among * Vide ante chap. I. 128 them, by the amount of internal and external communication , by the spirit of the age of the world to which they belong, and especially by that of conterminous nations. Circumstances are continually occurring which no human sa- gacity could foresee, which no human power could avert, and the effects of which, even if they were anticipated, could be measured by no invariable standard, which nevertheless roll back for a time the tide of progress, or stay the headlong torrent of decline. Even in progressive communities ages may pass with less change than a single week or day may witness at another period. In some the patriarchal monarchy, with which political life begins , may be of long endurance ; in others, as America, circumstances may so favor democracy as to enable it to hang together for several generations. Such an in- stitution as feudalism may for centuries give to the whole world the character of an aristo- cracy, whereas in other circumstances a middle class may divide with the crown the whole in- fluences of the state, thus rendering the pas- sage from Monarchy to Democracy almost im- mediate. Even apparent relapses are by no means unfrequent, in consequence of which a 129 state of society which seemed on the point of disappearing for ever is again firmly estab- lished. The short lived tyrannies of Greece* * Gervinus has justly remarked that u The fact that modern absolutism , like the tyranny of antiquity, only forms the transition from aristocracy to democracy, is sufficient to decide the resemblance of the two pheno- mena' 1 . Introduction to the History of the 19 th century. Section II. p. 7. Miss Homer's translation. The whole section is very instructive. The general conclusion at which he arrives is, that "The development of the states of Eu- rope in modern times has followed the same course as those of antiquity, although in wider relations of num- bers, space and time". In enunciating the doctrine in the outset , he carries his generalization even farther. "In the history, of the whole human race this law may be again observed in its largest manifestations. From oriental despotism to aristocracy, from the government of the ancients and of the middle ages , founded on slavery and serfdom, to the state policy of modern times, which is yet in the course of development, a regular progress may be perceived from the intellectual and civil freedom of one alone , to that of the few and many. But where states have completed their term of existence, we may again observe a descent in civiliza- tion, freedom and power, from the highest point in this ascending scale of development, from the many to the few , and from the few again to the one alone. This law may be traced throughout history in every separate state, as well as in the above mentioned group of states". p. 3. i 130 are an example of a relapse of this description, altogether inconsistent with the general ten- dency of the time, which was clearly in the direction of democracy. The same apparent result may be produced by an accidental anti- cipation of a condition of affairs for which the general spirit is not yet ripe. During the Pro- tectorate the probable future of England must have seemed to be divided between a military despotism and a republic, but the protectorate turned out to be nothing more than a tempo- rary interruption of the more regular march of events towards the very goal which it seemed to have attained. It is such irregularities as these, together with the vastness of the field and our limited means of survey, which have rendered men hopeless of tracing any principle of progress or decline in political societies, and yet, if all allowances are made, we agree with Macchiavelli* in thinking that it may well be questioned if there is one of them which in- validates the general truth of the ancient law. For the purposes of the present argument, how- ever, it is obvious that the accuracy of the last stage alone is important. Whatever may be the * Discours. Lib. I. c. II. p. 26. 131 variations in the earlier steps of the sequence, if the final result to which it points be trust- worthy , it conveys to us this very pregnant fact, that the rule of the numerical majority is the degenerate form to which not only po- pular governments are prone, but that it is the; final form of degeneracy of all governments whatsoever. In every case the change by which it is introduced is the last act of social organic existence, and its brief and troubled sway the deathbed sickness of the body politic. These conclusions of the fathers of political science, in place of being invalidated, as some have supposed*, are enhanced by the fact that they were arrived at in circumstances in which a democracy, even of the most unlimited kind, partook largely of the character of an oligar- chy; and where its degeneracy into an irra- tional mob-government ought consequently to have been less imminent than in modern times when the drj^iog includes the whole body of the people. It seems to us that the narrow limits of the governing body in the states of Greece went far to neutralize the influences adverse to stability which we alluded to when * Sudre, Lewis, etc. i 2 132 speaking of the demoralising effects of slavery ; and even to counterbalance the advantages which in the modern world, the cause of order has derived from the system of repre- sentation. We shall have occasion again to speak of the effects of representative govern- ment, but even here we are unwilling to omit the remark of M. Sismondi that the discovery of printing and the diffusion of intelligence by newspapers has placed the government , as of old, in presence of the whole nation, and ren- dered the sesvants of the nation as com- pletely dependant on it, even where, as in Ame- rica, it covers an immense space, as they for- merly were on the people of Athens. CHAP. XI. HOW DID THE ANCIENTS PROPOSE TO ESCAPE FROM THE CYCLE? The dicta which we have brought together in the preceding chapter seem to warrant us in stating the following as the results of the ex- perience of antiquity, in so far as that expe- rience throws light on our present subject. 1 st The two tendencies of which we have spoken, those namely of permanence and pro- gress, contended for the mastery during the whole course of ancient civilization. 2 nd The progressive tendency invariably gained the ascendancy to the effect of assert- ing in the end an exclusive recognition. 3 rd The form of government which its vic- tory imposed was democracy, by which a po- litical equality of all citizens was understood*. 4 th Democracy in every instance proved to be the government of a class (the tyranny of * Aristot. Polit. , Lib. VI. c. 1. 134 the many) and as such, being inconsistent with the individual freedom of action of the whole body of the people, was destructive to perma- nence and progress alike. The response thus pronounced by the oracle of experience in the ancient world ; as read by its most cunning interpreters, is a solemn and at first light a very sorrowful one for human progress. The last, and, as it appeared, the in- variable result of political development was a form of government which rendered progress impossible, and, there being no standing still, de- cline consequently became inevitable. Accord- ing to this theory, when the last stage had been reached, there was nothing farther to be done but to permit society to resolve itself into its elements, and again to commence the dreary cycle which was again to terminate in a similar dissolution. That an organisation which had at- tained its completion should fall to pieces and crumble away, till in the end it served no other purpose than to fertilise by its traditions the soil from which a fresh and vigorous political life is to spring, seems so much in harmony with the general scheme of the world's govern- ment, that mankind have made up their minds to it pretty much as they have done to their 135 own dissolution*. And perhaps they have been right in doing so; at all events the world's previous history furnishes us with no secure ground for asserting that they have been wrong. But the analogy between the physical and the social world in this respect , though a strik- ing, is not in reality a close one. As regards the dissolution of animals and plants our in- duction is sufficiently extensive to warrant an universal conclusion; and even if it had been far less extensive than it is, the similarity be- tween the animal and vegetable organisations which now exist, and those which have ceased to exist is so great, and the surrounding circum- stances so nearly identical , as to give to the conclusion a very high probability. In politics all this is reversed. The instances are so few as scarcely to warrant any conclusion at all ; and if they were far more numerous than they are, their character is so dissimilar, and the circumstances in which they are placed so wholly unlike, as almost to defy the application of induction altogether. The question however whether any society can be rendered absolutely * Egli e cosa verissima , come tutte le cose del mondo hanno il termine della vita loro. Macchiavelli Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio lib. III. cap. 1. 136 permanent; (permanent, i. e., whilst human affairs remain as they have hitherto been -- for the world too has its day) is a question which is, and is likely to continue to be insoluble by mankind. But, like most insoluble questions it is one which happily does not bear on our pre- sent conduct. Whether there be absolute li- mits to the perfectibility and endurance of so- cial organization or not is a matter of no practical moment, so long as it is clear that these limits, if they exist, are separated from our present position by a vast untrodden region which is as open to human endeavour as any over which mankind have hitherto passed. Now notwithstanding their theory of the cycle, which seemed to cut them off from it, the ancients were firm believers in the ex- istence of this field of farther human possibili- ties, and it was this belief which forced upon them a farther analysis of that doctrine itself. That democracy had hitherto invariably become the government of a class might be reason enough for its hitherto having been invariably the forerunner of disorganization and decline, for class government of all kinds they believ- ed to be degenerate government , and not least the government of the lowest class of 137 all. But was it a necessary consequence of political development that it should end as it had hitherto ended? Must every attempt to give unlimited recognition to liberty inevi- tably lead to a form of government which was thus inconsistent with liberty and progress alike? These were questions which, notwith- standing their sorrowful experience, the publi- cists of antiquity did not cease to ask them- selves ; and they knew that, if, from the fact that such a government was a degenerate go- vernment, they could ascend to the cause why it was so, a door to indefinite progress might still be opened. In offering us the results of this investigation the publicists abandon the character of chroniclers and classifiers of events, and assume the higher attitude of propounders of political theory. Those who represent Aris- totle as a mere collector of phenomena, who, from the order in which he found them to have occurred in times past, evolved laws for their future occurrence, do him full as great a wrong as those do Plato who assert that he contented himself with psychological results, heedless how much they were contradicted by the facts of human experience. Although, as we formerly remarked, the one adopted the 138 historical , the other the psychological method, and each, from the very opposite direction of their mental tendencies, adhered to his own method perhaps to excess, they were both far too clear sighted to do so exclusively, and in the case of Aristotle at all events we conti- nually see that, so soon as a result is histori- cally ascertained, he sets about analysing it, and inquiring into its causes, with a view to ascertaining whether its character be accidental or necessary, and whether its presence be ex- ceptional and transitory or general and per- manent*. It is thus with the most rigid ad- herence to scientific method that he carries po- litical facts beyond the limits of the states in which he observed their occurrence, and sets them forth in the broader light of laws of hu- man society**. If, in what have been ascer- tained in fact to have been well ordered and progressive states, he finds on farther inquiry * Politic., Lib. II. cap. 7. ** Was aber Aristoteles beobachtet , kann als solches nicht das Maass des Gerechten sein. Er muss es erst mit einander vergleichen und das Allgemeine aus dem Besondern herausfinden; er ist daher nothwendig in ste- tem Abstrahiren begriffen. Stahl , Philosophic des Rechts. V. I. p. 26. 139 that their stability and progress have been coincident with forms which recognised and conformed themselves to the principles of hu- man life in the abstract, he hesitates not to pronounce these to be legitimate forms for all time. If , on the contrary, he finds that a form , which has proved in times past to be incon- sistent with order and progress can be farther proved to violate an universal and abiding law, on the same principle he pronounces a perma- nent sentence of condemnation against it. In both cases his confidence in his previous ge- neralization is confirmed by the agreement of its results with those obtained by the subse- quent psychological investigations which it was the means of suggesting. In assigning the reasons which led him. to class democracy and oligarchy among the de- generate forms of government, he applies pre- cisely the method which we have here pointed out-, and the psychological result which he re- gards as the ultimate ground of condemnation is that, though from opposite directions, they each commit the error o'f mistaking a partial for an universal truth. "Democracy", he says, " arises from the circumstance that, being equal in certain respects, men believe themselves to 140 te equal in all respects; being equally free, for example, they think that an absolute equality subsists among them. Oligarchy on the other hand, arises from those who are unequal in some respects supposing that they are unequal in all respects; e. g., being unequal in riches, they imagine that there is no longer any kind, of equality that exists among them*." The law which these two forms thus violate in common is that by which nature has made men, not absolutely and universally, but rela- tively and partially equal. The distinction between absolute, and relative or proportional equality is one to which we have often already alluded, and to some of our readers it may seem so obvious as scarce- ly to require that we should dwell upon it in detail. To the speculative politicians of the ancient world, however, it seemed to be faught with consequences so vast that they are never weary of expounding it by illustration and en- forcing it by argument ; and , as we concur with them in believing that by its application alone can the escape which we desiderate be effect- ed, and a practical answer given to the de- * Politic., Lib. V. cap. 1. 141 mands of progress without impairing that very liberty in name of which these demands are propounded, we shall make no apology for devoting to it a few additional pages. The whole organisation of society in the an- cient world rested on the hypothesis of human inequality 5 and of the elements of disorgani- sation which it exhibited not a few are to be traced directly to an unqualified and undistin- guishing recognition of this hypothesis in prac- tice. From the earliest times it found expres- sion in two celebrated institutions , of which the consequences have been strangely different; but of which the origins probably were not very dissimilar , castes and slavery. The first, peculiar to the East or to those nations which partook of a decidedly oriental character*, received its complete development in Egypt and in India. The second divided mankind, not in the classical nations of antiquity alone, but in all the progressive nations of the world, into what may also be regarded as the two great castes of the bond and the free. The assumption on * Sudre observes that the principal merit of Solon's re- form consisted in his repudiating the principle of caste, by transferring political power from an aristocracy of birth to a timocracy. Histoire de la Souverainete* p. 155. 142 which these distinctions respectively proceeded, and to which that of castes unswervingly ad- hered, was that of a difference, not between man and man, but between one class of men and another, and this not accidentally and temporarily but necessarily and permanently. Now this assumption, had it been correct in point of fact, would have gone far towards the theoretical justification of these institutions, though it might have done little to reconcile us to the manner in which they were practi- cally administered. If it were true that every Brahmin differed from every Sudra, not as a fortunately born and cultivated differs from an unfortunately born and uncultivated man, but as a man capable of cultivation differs from a man incapable of it, then with reason might the one as an entire tribe be permanently placed at the top and the other at the bottom of Hindoo society. The same is true of the distinction between slaves and freemen in the cities of Greece. If Aristotle's premise,* "that by nature some men are free and some men slaves," be granted him, his conclusion,** that TLVSg fV ** Otg KCtl 6V[JiCpQSt, TO SoviSVSLV KCtl SlY.KiOV S6TL. it is "both profitable and just that the latter should act as slaves", becomes irresistible, for his middle term, that political justice is but another name for the recognition of natural law, is a proposition which he rightly assumes as an axiom. But the ground on which, in modern times, we feel entitled to repudiate both of these in- stitutions alike is not that the arguments by which they are sought to be defended are in- consequent, but that the premises on which these arguments rested are false. Without entering either on physiological or psychological discus- sions as to the respective merits of different races of men, we hold that the possession of a common humanity in this world and a com- mon hope in the next constitutes an equality sufficient to render it an act of injustice that we should so far prejudge the capabilities of any individual, as to shut the door from his birth against his social progress. The simple fact of his being born, for aught that we can assert to the contrary, with the responsibilities of a man entitles him, according to our modern view, to the hopes of a man, and consequently to have the question of how high he shall rise in the social scale left open to be settled by 144 his own efforts, and by those mysterious in- fluences from a higher source by which the destiny of every individual is guided. If he belongs to a race or even a family that has hitherto been unprogressive, there is a presump- tion against his progress; but the moment that this presumption has been belied by the fact, we feel that it is according to the fact and not the presumption that his social position must be assigned to him. At first sight it seems strange that the in- stitution of castes should have been so much more adverse to progress than that of slavery. That the larger number of human beings in a country should be regarded not as men but as things, not as the subjects merely but as the absolute property, they and their children, of the smaller number seems to outrage our sense of justice more flagrantly, and do more grie- vous violence to our feelings of humanity, than that the whole inhabitants should be divided into classes and that too, as was actually the case, according to principles of classification which were not only reasonable but enlightened. The explanation lies mainly in the fact that the distinction between caste and caste was more indelible than that between the slave and 145 ils master. If the slave succeeded in raising himself morally and intellectually to the level of a freeman , it was always possible that his actual equality might be recognised, legally and even politically, by one or other of the many forms of emancipation which always ex- isted alongside of slavery; but where the sys- tem of castes prevailed no amount of wisdom could convert a warrior into a priest, no amount of valour could confer on a tiller of the ground the dignity of a warrior. The first had proceeded from the mouth of Brahma, the se- cond from his arms, and the third from his loins, and there the matter rested once and for ever. Another vast distinction consisted in the fact, that, whilst the system of castes extended to the whole population, that of slavery left a very considerable minority* free from its fetters. But, though free from the obstructions which * It must be borne in mind that in almost all the states of antiquity there was a numerous class of per- sons who held an anomalous position between the slave and the citizen. For the most part they enjoyed private but no public rights, and for the purposes of the present discussion may all be regarded as belonging to the category of the politically unfree. 146 it directly imposed, they were not free from its influences ; and this fact introduces an element of which, as we have elsewhere observed, we must never lose sight when we compare an- cient with modern society. "Der Mensch fangt mit dem Barone an " was the saying of a mo- dern politician : "Mankind begins with the Citizen (7t***). Of this kind of justice, as * ev TOL$ cvvKUdypKGi in contracts, bargains, and the like. ** Ethic. Nic. Lib. V. c. 4. *** Is not the rule, " Si inaequalibus aequalia addas, 152 opposed to the other, it may be said that it consists not in equality but in proportion, and, as opposed to injustice, that it consists not in inequality but in disproportion. (TO per ovv dixcuov rovto avakoyov' TO $' cidixov, TO Ttaga TO dvdA.cc'yov.) It is this species of justice which forms the basis of the political relations between the ci- tizen and the state. ('En, in rov tear' atyctv TOVTO <5?JAoi>. TO yccQ SLXCCIOV sv iat$ diavo[iccis 6/ioAoyovfffc 7tdvT$ xccz' atyav nvcc dsiv dvcu. etc.* The idea of proportional equality, which in its abstract form is thus worked out in the Ethics, is exhibited in various applications in Aristotle's treatise on the Politics**. In the 5 th Book particularly, in treating of the causes of revolutions, he exhibits the con- sequences of its neglect. It is to this cause, that he traces the rise of democracy***; and by omnia erunt inaequalia," an axiom as well of justice, as of the mathematics? And is there not a true coin- cidence between commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Bacon; Advarict. of learning. * Ethic. Lib. V. c. 3. ** Politic. Lib. III. c. 5. quoted above. *** Lib. V. c. 1. 153 way of corrective he again expounds this dis- tinction with the same arithmetical and geo- metrical illustrations which he had used in the Ethics. In the 6 th chap.* we have the fol- lowing very remarkable expression : povov ya.Q [iovL[iov TO XKT' atyav Itiov, xal TO e%iv Ta CCVTCOV. For the only durable government is that which is based on the principle of relative or pro- portional equality **, and which thus assigns to every one what really is his. (Suum cuique). In so far as Aristotle is concerned therefore, there can be no mistake as to the fact, that it was to the doctrine of proportional equality that he looked for escape from the cycle, and that it was by means of its application that he believed in the possibility of a more stable condition of affairs, and a longer political life, than had been granted to any of the states of his own time. If these views were suggested by the timo- cratic institutions of Solon, practical politics owe more to the Athenian constitution than * Lib. V. c. VI. ** It is by no means easy to find satisfactory equi- valents in English for KCCT' POPULAR. We have said that over the appearance of such political leaders as Pericles mankind can exercise no more controul than over that of any other man of extraordinary gifts. Homer or Socrates were not less within the reach of systems of national education. As regards important individual characters of a less pro- minent description, the same, though less ob- viously and strikingly, is scarcely less literally the fact. Their numbers , their endowments, and to a great extent also the intensity of their action in each individual people and generation, depend as little on human volition, or human exertions, as do the sunshine or the shower. The rise of every creative, or even powerfully and originally adaptive mind, among a people, if not a special in the sense of an exceptional, is still so manifest an interference of providence on their behalf, that it has often. 262 seemed to us to be a form , of blessing for which the prayers of the Christian Church might not unbecomingly be offered up. But are we hence to infer that we can do nothing for our own guidance by the ordinary means which God has put at the command of ordinary men in ordinary circumstances ; and that we are bound , or entitled , to leave the course of events to be ordered by accident, or manifest folly, till men of genius are rained down upon us, like manna on the Israelites? Such we believe to be very far from our duty. Though we cannot call forth men of this class, and perhaps cannot even do so much as we are apt to imagine towards their individual training when we have got them, we can sup- ply the conditions of their working, we can train and form their instruments. Pericles could have been Pericles only in Athens; and in a tribe of barbarians he would perhaps have been inferior to many a man who was simply three inches taller or three stones heavier than himself. Nor was such general cultivation as enabled his auditors to attach meaning to his words sufficient to ensure his influence on the public spirit. The prevalence of his opinions depended far more on the interpreters who 263 stood between him and the general under- standing of his age, than on his own personal contact with it. Had he been the sole disciple of Anaxagoras, or the solitary instance of an Athenian who made music a pretext for stu- dying politics under Damon, he and his mas- ters would have stood in isolated grandeur, inoperative on the age in which they lived, however important might have been their in- fluence on civilization at large, and on men in other stages of developement. As it was, their strength consisted in their being sur- rounded on all sides by a class of persons whom kindred modes of thinking and common culture had made not ready recipients alone, but precise systematisers and clear and pos- sibly eloquent expositors of what the greater gifts of those whom nature had more rarely endowed enabled them to originate; and this class of persons it is fortunately in the power of every civilized state to call into existence. The office which we here contemplate for the leaders of thought is very closely analogous to that which Plato assigned to the (pvAa%, which Coleridge ascribed to the "Lay Pastor", and of which Fichte treated in his admirable lectures on the "Nature of the Scholar; " and as it 264 is to persons holding this position, by what- ever name we may choose to call them, that in our opinion the state must look as the instruments by which alone the public spirit can be consciously and designedly modified, we shall endeavour very briefly to trace the out- line of their function, more especially in its relation to political progress. There are two capacities, in one or other, but rarely in both, of which, such individuals are in a condition to be serviceable to the general community. If they are genuine spe- cimens of the class at all, they are fitted by nature, and by that last and best part of edu- cation , that self education which invariably takes its colour from nature, to play the part either of scientific or of popular leaders of thought, in those directions which thought has already received from the more suggestive and progressive spirits either of the present or of former times, or it may be from those turns of external events which sometimes assume the character almost of a revelation. In neither case is the exercise of those inventive facul- ties of which nature is so chary requisite to the most efficient discharge of their duties; and when these forces are at work the appro- 265 priate attitude of both of the classes of per- sons whom we have mentioned will be that of the Commons at the Council of Toledo, "to see, to hear and to praise God". But, humble though it may seem in such a contrast, the office of the leaders of existing thought is nevertheless the most important and most dig- nified which ordinary men can exercise to- wards their fellow men. We shall speak first of the scientific leader of thought, not in consequence of the preemi- nent importance of his office , but because he occupies, as it were, a middle position between the inventor and the expositor. The inventive mincl is rarely scientific, and its results are consequently given to the world for the most part in a form which sacrifices accuracy and completeness to depth and originality. Work- ing by means rather of the reason than the understanding, it is besides almost necessarily uncritical, and its results consequently for the most part are a mixture of truth and error. If the process has been genuine, the out-come will be not only truth but new truth; gold which no human eye has seen will be unmis- takeably present, but gold in combination with much base alloy. To suppose the case 266 otherwise would be to attribute to the man of inventive mind the character of a very prophet, an error which, not without detriment , has been committed rather too frequently of late. Now here the scientific leader of thought conies into play. His office is to test, and verify or refute, whatever pretended result may be pre- sented to him, and this not only by the ab- stract processes of the understanding, but by actual comparison with the results of previous experience or of preceding thought. He must be conversant not alone with the occurrences which history has transmitted, but with the theories and principles in which she is not less rich. In one word he must be a man of learning in the highest and manliest sense, not a pedantic word-critic, or an indiscriminate searcher for the curious (though such persons are not without their uses), but one who can see in words the vehicles of thought and dis- tinguish between what is novel in form and what is new in substance. From what we have said it is clear that the scientific leader of thought will by no means contribute to popularise the materials on which he works ; on the contrary his labours will very often have an opposite tendency. These ma- 267 terials, as they come from the mind of the dis- coverer, often possess elements of popularity of which it will be his duty to strip them; they partake, for example, of the colouring of that imaginative faculty which almost invaria- bly forms a large ingredient in the composition of an original mind, and which more than any other quality commends itself to the common human heart, or they are mingled with that element of falsehood which forms the staple of all spontaneous human thinking and conse- quently presents no element of strangeness to the common mind. From both of these in- gredients it will manifestly be the first duty of the scientific labourer to free the subject with which he deals. The results which he gives forth will be far more clear, far more precise, and consequently far safer for appli- cation than those of the discoverer, but on this very account they will be far less attractive. The subject, be it what it may, when thus arrived at the stage at which it may be popu- larised with safety and advantage, will be pre- cisely at the stage at which it is least popular, and the person who has carried it through this indispensable ordeal will be precisely the least popular individual of all who have had to do 268 with it from its first germination as a theory till its final application to life and practice. For these reasons, then, it is obvious that, if the scientific labourer is to devote himself to our service, to him above all is it necessary that the helping hand of state endowment, or of some provision which is independent of the immediate popular will, should be held out. His labours, in order to be unfettered must be ir- respective of popular prejudices; in order to be fruitful and trustworthy they must be pro- secuted in that tranquillity which freedom from external anxiety alone can secure. It is in the nature of things impossible that these condi- tions can be supplied by popular sympathy, however unquestionable or even unquestioned may be the obligation under which the scien- tific labourer lays his fellow men; and hence the necessity that every community which aims at combining progress with safety should shut the door against its own caprices by placing him beyond the reach either of its admiration, its antipathy, or its indifference. Next in the order of their labours, though scarcely second in importance, at least for po- litical purposes, comes the popular leader of thought. His office is to present to the gene- 269 ral understanding, in a form at least partially consistent with existing modes of thought, truths which, where error has been prevalent on the subject to which they relate, must necessa- rily be strange; and to modify views which a rigorous logic has almost necessarily presented in a form too undiluted for practical purposes, by bringing them in contact with existing re- lations. The efficiency with which his task is performed will of course depend, on the one hand, on the completeness with which he him- self grasps the new idea , and, on the other, on the clearness and fulness of his appreciation of the circumstances in which it is called into action. But though he follows in the track of the scientific labourer, and profits by what he has accomplished, it must not be supposed that the duties of the popular leader, even in their poli- tical bearings are confined to the exposition, adaptation, and inculcation of such truths or principles as his contemporaries have discovered or elaborated. His task is the same in kind, and if possible more important , as regards the great leading human truths which inventive genius or scientific labour has thought out in former times, or which the rude teaching of 270 experience has forced upon them. To him, not less than to others, the state confides the great book of the past, and entrusts the office of keeping the attention of living men fixed on the wisdom which it reveals. The present purport of this teaching he will of course expound ac- cording to the measure of insight which has been given to the generation to which he be- longs. If he outstrips the thinking of his time he throws aside the character which we assign to him here, and claims a higher one; if he falls behind the foremost rank of his contem- poraries, he relinquishes his claim to be re- garded as a leader altogether. In speaking of the man of inventive mind we said that he commonly is genial, and that his character commends itself to the popular heart by wide human sympathy. We believe the fact to be as we have stated it because his nature has a character of completeness which belongs to no other. Still when viewed as a discoverer simply this is an accident. As regards the populariser, again, these qua- lities belong to the essentials of his character. Without geniality he cannot discharge his function at all; and it is highly desirable that he should possess other external qualities the 271 presence or absence of which as regards the other labourers in the field of progress is matter of comparative indifference. In conse- quence of the presence of these qualities, and the absence of others which in the scientific labourer particularly have so often the effect of scaring and alienating the generality of men, the popular leader will stand least of all in need of support from sources independent of immediate sympathy. But then, precisely as the subject which he treats rises in importance, and the style of his exposition assumes that scientific accuracy which, though not its pri- mary object, is indispensable to its usefulness, does his claim for such support also emerge. If he is to do anything for progress in the abs- truser departments of human effort, he must go beyond a clever dressing up of opinions which have already taken hold of the public mind; and the moment he does so he comes in contact with the very dangers which we have seen to beset his fellow workers. But it may be said that persons holding these various characters, and discharging these various functions, will spontaneously arise in every generation of civilized men; the ne- cessity which is felt for their services will call 272 them forth, the demand, which is a conse- quence of civilization, will create the supply, and we need therefore occupy ourselves with the matter no farther than thankfully to re- flect that we have such a guarantee as their services afford, for the healthy progress of the public spirit. By many the freedom and activ- ity of the press in all directions in this coun- try will be taken as a decisive proof of the correctness of this view and consequently as an argument for inactivity. A very little reflection however will show that the view it- self involves a begging of the whole question which has been at issue in these discussions. To suppose that the public spirit will thus spontaneously provide for its own guidance, is neither more nor less than to suppose that it requires no guidance at all, and consequently will continue to generate healthy political in- stitutions ; a supposition which we have en- deavoured to show is inconsistent with the teaching of history, and in so far as we can judge, with existing social tendencies. That a class of persons ostensibly discharging the func- tions which we have mentioned will spontan- eously arise is unquestionable; but it is not less certain that, so long as they are the spon- 273 taneous products of the general spirit , they will be its followers, not its guides. They will not be exponents of the views of the leading spi- rits of this or of former ages, but stirring and loquacious advocates of prevalent opinions.. Here then is the point at which interposition on the part of the state, i. e. conscious politi- cal action on the part of those who see reason to distrust the workings of an unguided public spirit, is called for. We have shown that it is impossible to exclude its influence or modify its character by means of a representative sys- tem, the very name of which shows that its object is to give political expression to this spirit as it exists. No such impossibility how- ever stands in the way of setting apart a por- tion of the middle class for occupations and duties the effect of which will be to prevent the growth of evils with which when matured we cannot cope. As regards the endowment of a learned class the public spirit is, 110 doubt, as omnipotent as it is with reference to any other measure, and if we once allow it to go so far in the op- posite direction, in which it is at present tend- ing, as to pronounce against such endowment, it will then be as impossible to carry it, as 274 directly to resist the inroads of democracy. Such however is by no means the present state of matters. We believe that the public spirit would not only tolerate, but would gladly acquiesce in the propriety of making provision for the permanent existence of a class whose office should be to remind it of its truest in- terests, not less by admonition and warning than by approval and encouragement. If we are right in our assertion that a class of con- scious labourers is required to watch over the development of the public spirit, it is scarcely consistent with the character of our age, cer- tainly distinguished for a wide diffusion of ge- neral intelligence, to suppose that it will refuse to them the support which it bestows on those who protect it from external injury or from internal disorder. The reality of his function once recognised and acknowledged, the leader of thought immediately becomes, to all intelli- gent and prudent men, an object of equal so- licitude with the soldier, the sailor, or the ma- gistrate. Nor need it be objected that in many coun- tries a learned class, numerous and important, has existed, whilst the social and political be- nefits which we anticipate from its interposition 275 have not been realized. Wherever such a class has existed hitherto, it has invariably been so far removed from the ordinary external occu- pations and interests of the cititizen, as to render its influence on him, in his citizen ca- pacity, well-Iigh impossible. In Germany it has come in contact with him only in periods of political excitement, and it is not strange that inexperienced officers have failed to lead an undisciplined army to victory. In Roman Ca- tholic countries it has been confined within the walls of monasteries, and Jesuit colleges 5 and in England, where, though now flagrantly in- adequate to the duties which manifestly lie at its door, it has existed in a healthier form than elsewhere, it has all along possessed so much of an ecclesiastical* character as to prevent it from acting otherwise than indirectly through means of that religion of the influences of which we have already spoken. * "Clergymen understand the least and take the worst measure of human affairs, of all mankind that can write and read," Clarendon, Vol. II. p. 48. S2 CHAP. XX. OF THE UNIVERSAL DUTY OP ACTIVE-MINDEDNESS. Important as we believe the considerations to be to which we have called attention in the immediately preceding chapters, and guarded as has been our expression of them, we feel that we should incur the risk of not unmerited reproach if we permitted them to go forth without an additional caveat. No class of professional thinkers, however numerous and efficient, can supply the place of thoughtfulness on the part of the general com- munity; or exculpate one individual, however humble in station, for neglecting the highest function of an intelligent being, the search after truth. Nay farther it is impossible to conceal from ourselves that, in calling into ex- istence such a class as we have indicated, there does exist a risk, more or less great ac- cording to the temperament or circumstances of a people, that the natural disinclination and frequent inaptitude of mankind for mental 277 labour will induce them to hand over to their recognised guides the duty of thinking for them. Now, if it be true of an individual that pro- found and original thoughts will not drop into his mouth like ripe fruit from a tree, it is equally true of a community that, if such thoughts waved before them like the richest and yellowest harvest, no hired reapers could ever gather them for their use without their own active cooperation. If we take no part in the reaping, the harvest, however abundant will not be ours, and experience tells us that, but for the countenance and encouragement of the age of which they are the servants, the activ- ity of the most numerous, and in point of ex- ternal position the most favoured, class of pro- fessional labourers will soon change to listless inaction or to formal and lifeless pedantry. The Buddhists of Thibet are amongst the least active, and the Chinese amongst the least pro- gressive of Orientals, and yet both possess a very large class of persons exclusively devoted to the interests of mind, or at least freed from care for the body, whilst the latter have ri- gorously adhered for ages to the system of in- tellectual examinations which we are but now inaugurating, and from which we hope so much. 278 Turning to Europe, we are reminded that the schools of Athens in the period of her deepest degradation, and of Alexandria under the Pto- lemies, were better manned and equipped with all the appliances of learned labour, than were those of Greece in the days of Anaxagoras and Plato. In Byzantium, under the grammarians, rhetoricians, and sophists, there was more formal learning than there ever was either in Athens or Rome during the most active period of either. During the whole period indeed which we are accustomed to call the dark ages, there is reason to believe that there existed, in the capital of the Eastern Empire, learned labourers and learned labour, perhaps even accurate know- ledge of facts and opinions , which might, with- out prejudice, compare with what is at present possessed by many of the states of modern Europe. There were popularisers of science too, and learned ladies who had gone through the Quadrivium. Still, neither there, nor in the West of Europe, where the monastic life afford- ed at least one of the most indispensable requi- sites of intellectual activity, that of physical re- pose and wellbeing, was there either progress or life. The Sursum corda on the part of the whole community, the great object of all learning, for 279 political purposes at any rate ; was unattained; and ; even scientifically considered, there pro- bably was less productive mental effort in the refined and pedantic Byzantium than in many a half savage state. Now these things are not written for the discouragement but for the warning of men of future times , not to show that the reduction of truth to scientific forms is unimportant (for without that there is no test whereby we may distinguish truth from error) ; but to prove to us that we may waste in learned trifling ener- gies which were given for far nobler puposes, till in the end truth escapes us in our very efforts to bind her in our systems*. The best guarantee for life and progress consists, at all times , in the mutual action of practice upon theory, and theory upon practice. Whilst theo- ry is tested by a contact with reality, it will * Surely, like as many substances in nature, which are solid , do putrify and corrupt into worms ; so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrify and dissolve into numbers of subtle, idle, unwholesome, and, as I may term them, vermicular questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and life of spirit, but no soundness of matter, or goodness of quality. Bacon, Advancement of Learning. 280 scarcely degenerate into objectless and unpro- ductive subtility; and practice from being led back to principle will have within itself a per- petual germ of life and growth. But where, on the contrary, a separation has taken place, and the learned class has become a separate caste, it is a rule which admits of fewer exceptions than almost any other which we derive from human experience, that, though by no means suspended, or even diminished in apparent in- tensity, mental effort is stricken with barrenness. So far then it is a hopeful sign of the present time that the general community, far from lag- ging behind, seems positively to have outrun its leaders. But let us not plume ourselves too greatly on this aspect, of our affairs. It is but a very negative and sterile consolation which will be afforded us by the reflection that we do not hand over the duty of thinking to others, unless we have well grounded reasons for be- lieving that we discharge this duty satisfactor- ily ourselves. The absence of an isolated learn- ed caste may pretty wfll protect us, it is true, against the evils of unfruitful theory, but does it follow that, whilst we congratulate ourselves on our escape from this form of misfortune, w r e are not exposing ourselves to another of 281 at least equal magnitude in a lifeless and irra- tional practice. The most hopeless of all so- cieties is surely that in which no one thinks, i. e. in which no one exhibits anything beyond that amount of active - mindedness which the immediate necessities of his position force upon him. Let us take an illustration from the sub- ject with which we are here mainly concerned. There is no way in which the vessel of the state is more likely to deviate from its course than by creeping on from day to day in what seems to the steerrnan's eye to be the course of yesterday. The deviation may be gradual, but if no reference is made to principle, if no reliable observation is taken, with the inevi- table changes of wind and current, it is not on that account the less certain. But it is un- deniable that in this country there is a ten- dency (which unhappily is not confined to the vulgar in position), to regard theory not as the guide, but as the antagonist of practice; and to receive every attempt to call in its aid with feelings little short of indignation. In the eyes of Englishmen such a proceeding is too often regarded as equivalent to an appeal from the known, the safe, and the sane, to the un- known, the dangerous, and the crazy; or at 282 the very least as a transition from the easy to the irksome. They affect to be scared and frightened by the novelty, and their love of ease is in truth rudely broken in upon by the unwonted effort which it imposes. "We are an industrious people'', they cry, "and we have no objection to labour of our own kind. We are an intelligent people and we have no objection to the acquisition of positive know- ledge. But, we are not a speculative people, and so we hate to theorise ; and farther" (they pretty unmistakeably insinuate) "we hate those whose theorising imposes on us a task so distasteful!* Now this is a frame of mind which is not hopeful for the future of a great people. It is the every opposite of the temper which, either in an individual or a community, marks the period of progress, the invariable accompaniment of senility and mental decre- pitude. We know that the development of that exclusively practical character of which we boast so loudly has sunk our neighbours * <&i\oGoyov [isv CCQCC, TfV d' f'yeo, fivcci. 'ASvvarov. Keel rovs (pihoGocpovvrccs KQCC avccy- v.r\ ipfysG&tti vn Kvraiv. 'Ava.yv.Ti. -^^ ^ no rovrcav dr) taiv ldi(OT