ALVMHVS BOOK FYND Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from Microsoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/ethicsgeneralspeOOhillrich ETHICS GENERAL AND SPECIAL THE MACMILLAN COMPANY HKW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DAUAS ATLAKTA • SAN FKANCISCO MACMILLAN & CO., Limited LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA MELBOURNK THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ln>. TORONTO ETHICS GENERAL AND SPECIAL BY OWEN A. HILL, S.J., Ph.D. Lecturer on Psychology, Natural Theology, Ethics and Religion, at Fordham University, New York City, N. Y. iiaeto gotfe THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1920 AU rights reserved OOPTEIGHT, 1920, By the MACMILLAN COMPANY Set up and electrotyped. PubUshed, July, 1920 !'• 1 r i^iy:\.l "^f . 'V. Jtsqtrimi patteL JOSEPHUS H. ROCKWELL, S.J., Praepositus Prov. Marylandiae Neo-Ehoracensis. N!1|U obBtat ARTHURUS J. SCANLAN, S.T.D., Censor Librorum. Imiiriinatnr. PATRITIUS J. HAYES, D.D., Archiepiscopus Neo-Ehoracensis. Neo-Ebobaci, die 15 Aprilis, 1920. 435851 FREFACB The whole trouble with all Modern Philosophy is rank sub- jectivism, and subjectivism is, perhaps, most destructive in the domain of Ethics. Protestantism and Modern Philosophy grow on the same tree, and the root of the tree is subjectivism. This fact accounts for all the atheism, all the materialism, all the socialism in the world. It is to blame for all the irreli- gion, all the injustice, all the tyranny now afflicting large and small nations; and the World War did not settle matters, the Peace Conference, in spite of all its good intentions, prac- tically left things where it found them. Evils persevere as long as their causes; and till men think right, till Modern Philosophy js killed from men's minds, till Scholastic Phi- losophy gets everywhere the hearing it deserves, these evils, far from being eliminated, will prosper, grow and multiply. No body of men can regulate mankind, unless mankind itself is amenable to direction, unless mankind entertains correct notions regarding God, the Soul, and the nature of author- ity. I^aws are no better than the men who make them, and laws are little worth, unless subjects are minded to see and obey divinity in them. It is awfully hard, in fact it is im- possible, to persuade anybody to think that any single man or any collection of men, whether a majority or a minority, possess independent right over the free wills of other men, and are empowered to make and execute laws on their own initiative. God alone holds that supreme prerogative; and this fact is clear proof not only that all authority is imme- diately from God, but also that all authority passes imme- diately from God to ruler, without effective interference with authority itself on the part of the people. God is immediate maker of the Natural Law, He is mediate maker of all civil law; and the presence of God in civil law makes civil law a sacred obligation. Unjust law is no law at all, because God has no part in its making. Unjust law has all the force men VIU PREFACE can give it. It has physical force in its favor, because men can contribute that; and physical force never binds men's free wills. Unjust law has no moral force, the kind that God gives; and free wills are servants to moral force alone. All the moral force in civil law comes from God, men are able to back it up with physical force; but moral force, because it touches free wills, is beyond the jurisdiction of mere men, and necessarily leans for its validity on God alone. Consent of the governed is one thing before the establish- ment of government, it is an entirely different thing after government is once established. Physical freedom is man's birthright, and remains intact before and after the establish- ment of government. Civil law is made by the state, and before government is constituted there is no state, and there- fore no adequate human lawmaker. Before government be- comes a fact, natural law is the one restraint on moral free- dom ; and natural law wants a multitude without government to form a government at its earliest convenience. A people, therefore, is not morally free to live with or without govern- ment. Nature wants men to live in a state, under law and authority; and nature's wishes are what God wants, nature's wishes are the Natural Law. A government de jure and de facto is, of course, better than a government merely de facto; but when a government de jure is impossible without continuous strife and universal bloodshed, a government de facto is better than no govern- ment at all. Even rights must be prosecuted with prudence, and in case of such a government de facto, right must await a more favorable opportunity to assert itself, it must not work with headlong rashness to its own harm and the destruction of order. In common sense and the natural law legitimate conquest is as just and secure a title to authority as inheritance or suffrage or purchase ; and in the words of Suarez nearly every government in modern times traces its origin to right of con- quest. This is far from meaning that modem states are built on physical force for single title. They are built immediately on physical force, mediately on moral right. Physical force when employed to pursue a right has all the sacredness of PEEFACE ix moral right itself. To take a familiar and up-to-date instance, the Allies had a perfect moral right to impose on Germany and Austria all the terms of the armistice. Whatever terms the Allies exacted from the defeated Germans they exacted by force; but this force was backed up by clear moral right, the indisputable right nations have to defend themselves against an open, bold and aggressive oppressor, to punish his crime with becoming penalties, and to make it effectively and forever impossible for him to repeat his dastardly act. When criminals are captured and convicted, they are not straight- way liberated. They are fined light or heavy sums, they are imprisoned for short or long terms; and if the criminal hap- pens to be a murderer, reason quite approves of his utter de- struction. Conquest, of course, can be illegitimate or legiti- mate. Illegitimate conquest is no valid title. Illegitimate conquest, like everything else illegitimate, is of no value in the court of morality. A government or State always implies a body of laws, or a constitution; and, prior to the establishment of a govern- ment, the people enjoy full moral freedom to select some set form of government and appoint a ruler. Moral freedom is removed by law, law is the denial of moral freedom, because law means obligation, and obligation means moral necessity, the diametrical opposite of moral freedom. Self-determination implies full moral freedom to choose a form of government and select a ruler. Where no government exists, no civil law exists, no constitution exists, and this right to self-determination is sacred; where government is already established, civil law exists, a constitution or fixed body of civil laws, exists; and the principle of self-determination is all wrong. Correct Ethics recognizes no such independent right in ruler or subjects. Law restricts moral freedom, and the constitution is law. The constitution stands for the Royal Compact championed by Suarez. Neither ruler nor people must override the constitution. This constitution embodies the respective rights and privileges of ruler and subjects, and defines the method of procedure to be followed in case of a dispute between ruler and subjects. As long as the ruler keeps within the terms of the constitution, his right to author- PREFACE ity is beyond question, and subjects by themselves are not at liberty to change the form of government or curtail the ruler's prerogatives. The ruler can at intervals make concessions to his subjects, subjects can at intervals do the same favor to their ruler; but every such transaction must be mutual and agreeable to both parties. The ruler can voluntarily abdicate or forfeit his authority by abuse of his prerogative; and in either case, unless succession is otherwise settled by the con- stitution, the multitude reverts to its original condition of no government, and the people have full moral freedom to select a form of government and choose a ruler. In the prose- cution of an unjust war the ruler can lose his authority by legitimate conquest ; and in this case ruler and subjects pass under the authority of the conqueror. In pursuance of this truth the Allies at the Peace Conference imposed a form of government on Germany and Austria, allowing them a small measure of liberty in their selection of rulers, disarmed them, taxed them, and in every way treated them as subject peoples. The small states previously belonging to Germany and Aus- tria got from the Allies, for purposes of peace, the right to self-determination, and in granting this favor the Allies as victors were clearly within their rights. CONTENTS PART I GENERAL ETHICS Introduction- Pages 1-7 Thesis I. Every agent worka unto an end. This end is truly a cause. The will in all its deliberate movements has some definite last end, whether strictly or relatively such Pages 7-18 Thesis II. Man of his very nature desires complete happiness. Complete happiness is man's absolutely last end subjectively taken. This natural desire must be possible of fulfilment. No created good can secure to man complete happiness. The possession of God is alone complete happiness, and God is man's absolutely last end objectively taken . . Pages 18--28 Thesis III. Man's destiny in this life, his supremest happiness on earth, consists in drawing closer and closer to his last end by the establishment of moral rectitude in his actions. Between good and bad in the moral order, between right and wrong, an essential, intrinsic difference exists. The immediate measure of moral rectitude is the objective order of things as understood by the intellect ; the mediate measure is God's wisdom and goodness Pages 28-41 Thesis IV. A Natural Law, unchangeable, universal, eternal, has place in man ; its complete and full sanction is reserved for the next life; and eternal punishment is not opposed to God's goodness. This Natural Law is the foundation and corner-stone of all Positive Law Pages 41-70 Thesis V. The five causes of morality, final, material, formal, . model and efficient. Generic and specific morality. Ob- jective and subjective morality. Good, bad and indifferent acts. Morality's subjective measure is synderesis and con- science. Morality's efficient case is intellect and will. Appe- xii * CONTENTS tite, the passions, and will. Morality's root is freedom of will. Voluntary and involuntary acts. End and intention. Morality's obstacles, ignorance and error affect the intellect ; the passions, notably fear, affect the will; violence affects executive not appetitive faculties, ordered not elicited acts Pages 70-92 Thesis VI. A human act gets its specific morality from the ob- ject of the act, from the agent's end or purpose, and from circumstances affecting both ....... Pages 92-101 Thesis VII. Probabilism is a safe and correct system in mat- ters of conscience Pages 101-110 Thesis VIII. Virtues and Vices Pages 110-122 Thesis IX. Character and Habits Pages 122-127 Thesis X. Rights and Duties Pages 127-137 Thesis XI. Contracts Pages 137-144 Thesis XII. Interest Pages 144-149 Thesis XIII. Merit and Demerit Pages 149-152 Thesis XIV. Utilitarianism is wrong, dangerous and ab- surd Pages 152-170 Thesis XV. Kant's autonomy of reason is wrong . Pages 170-175 PART II SPECIAL ETHICS Introduction Pages 175-177 Thesis I. Religion is man's first duty, a matter of essential necessity to the individual and to the state. Worship, in- terior and exterior, public and private, is God's due. Man's duty towards revelation is to accept it, when known as such ; to diligently seek and find it, when hidden, and when he has reason to suppose that it exists. Toleration in matter of dogma is absurd Pages 177-201 CONTENTS xiii Thesis II. Suicide is a sin against nature. Death inflicted in self-defense is under certain conditions justifiable. Private duels are highly absurd and contrary to the Law of Nature Pages 201-225 Thesis III. A lie is always and of its very nature wrong. To safeguard a proportionate right the use of a broad mental reservation is allowed Pages 225-241 Thesis IV. Man's right to ownership, whether temporary or lasting, is derived to him not from any formal compact nor from any civil law, but from nature . . Pages 241-260 Thesis V. Socialism is false in its principles, morally impos- sible in itself, and quite absurd Pages 260-280 Thesis VI. The right remedy for labor troubles is union be- tween employers and workmen, based on inequality; con- sulting the interests of both in such a way, that they enjoy life and its comforts along with freedom and peace Pages 280-289 Thesis VII. Marriage is honorable and in harmony with man's dignity Pages 289-300 Thesis VIII. Celibacy, when love of virtue is its motive, is more excellent than marriage . . . . . Pages 300-311 Thesis IX. Polygamy, though not against strict Natural Law, little accords with it ....... . Pages 311-318 Thesis X. Incomplete divorce, or separation without any at- tempt to contract a new marriage, is sometimes allowable. Complete divorce, or separation affecting the marriage tie, though not evidently opposed to strict Natural Law in every conceivable case, is nevertheless out of harmony with that secondary Law of Nature, which counsels the proper Pages 318-342 Thesis XL Education of children belongs to parents first; to State, last Pages 342-358 Thesis XII. Man is by very nature a social being Pages 358-366 Thesis XIII. A multitude and authority, or subjects and a ruler, are elements essential to civil society or the state Pages 366-371 3UV CONTENTS :)-V/j! ■ t^- i^/v* Thesis XIV. Authority proceeds immediately from God. In the nature of things and ordinarily authority is not cou' ferred on the people. Ordinarily and in the nature of things the consent of the people fixes or determines the person in whom authority resides. It may be implied or expressed; immediate or gradual; and cannot always b© withheld Pages 371-388 Thesis XV. Woman suffrage, though legitimate in exceptional eases, is fraught with dangers Pages 388-398 Thesis XVI. The State enjoys full Legislative Executive and Judicial rights, the prerogative of Eminent Domain, and the War-Power Pages 39ft-404 ETHICS, GENERAL AND SPECIAL PART I GENERAL ETHICS INTEODUCTION A WORD about the importance of our subject. This work is intended to throw some additional light on the topic of morality. For Ethics is our theme, and Ethics is the science of morality. And if any detail of thought has a vital bear- ing on man's destiny, if any branch of study helps shape his life, that detail of thought is suggested by Ethics, morality is that study. Ethics is the science of putting order in man's free acts; and, when you reflect that all sin, and much trouble, and hell itself are only varying phases of disorder, it must be evident that this science, theoretically mastered and sys- tematically reduced to practice, could effect a revolution in the world. And the revelutionists would be hailed as the Emancipators of mankind. They would go down in history, and they do go down in history as the supremest benefactors of our race. Witness the instance of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Even His bitterest enemies, even men who deny Him every other vestige of divinity, acknowledge that the world was made better by His presence among men, and attribute to His maxims and example an abiding influence for good. He was a teacher of Ethics for whom the world waited with long- ing for full four thousand years. He was a teacher of Ethics, whose like the world of to-day misses exceedingly. The wis- dom of His utterances even from a purely human standpoint, without regard at all to the spirit of faith and grace's en- vironment, in which they ought to be accepted, is as much a subject of concern to the learned of to-day as it was in His ^lyUym \ S\ 'GENERAL ETHICS own lifetime to the doctors in the temple, to the Scribes and the Pharisees deeply read in the Law. The wisdom of His utterances extorts praise from unbelievers, and compels the attention of the universe. Men who will not worship Him as God are unable, when face to face with His heavenly doc- trine and precepts, to withhold the homage due superhuman intelligence. I insist upon this point as a conclusive proof of the deep importance attaching to Ethics, because Christ's ethical teaching is the only claim Christ has on the reverence and respect of men completely abandoned by faith, and not wholly bereft of reason. He has other and far more cogent claims on our homage; but we, as well as strangers to faith, can learn with profit to appreciate the human side of the God-man's character. And Christ, apart from His tran- scending dignity as God, ranks first among the most consum- mate legislators the world ever entertained, and merits as such unstinted praise from all mankind, from believer and unbeliever alike. He owes the homage wrung from unwilling unbelievers not to the influence of grace, nor yet to the miracles of wonder He wrought in favor of suffering and sickness, but mainly to the fact that His discourses breathe an unerring love for rectitude; and half His lifework was the ethical instruction of humanity. Teachers, who appeal to the curious in human nature, will hold the ears of men until supplanted by other teachers with more startling novelties for wares; but teachers of morality will never be without an audience, though they deal out truths as old as time. Such is the passion of mankind for what tends to put men in improved relations with themselves, with one another, and with God, that, as long as a human heart beats, due importance will be attached to problems of morality, and propounders of morality will have their uses in the universe. We men are eminently practical beings, and the almost total absence of pure theory, and of the strictly academic discussions common in Logic and Metaphysics from Moral Philosophy, makes this branch of the science more in- teresting and absorbing. After all, we were equipped with minds only to borrow light from them for the operations of the will, the head is servant to the heart, and life takes all its true color from action, not from knowledge. To this simple I INTRODUCTION 3 fact must be ascribed the undoubted superiority of Ethics in the kingdom of study. Then, too, we are born with an in- alienable and harassing love of happiness. We want to be happy here, we want to be happy hereafter, and the wish lives of our very life. Every glance of the eye aims at the discovery of happiness' hiding place, every throb of the heart is an invitation to happiness' pity, and every single thought of saint and sinner alike has happiness for mainspring and motive. There is no help for it ; we were made that way ; and, to lose the inclination, we should have to get outside of our- selves. Moral Philosophy professes to mark out the lines along which we can without loss pursue this fleeting phantom of happiness, and at the same time makes distinct record of blunders to which the history of our race bears witness. It puts on a solid basis principles, that, if practically ful- filled, can have but one result, the inward approbation of a conscience, working on and up to the right. And when con- science approves, remorse is still, this life knows no truer happiness than peace, and thorough blamelessness is bonded promise of eternal blessedness. Moral Philosophy puts us right with the world of being in which we move, and does the thing in the neatest way con- ceivable. It first discusses general notions of morality; mo- tives for action, standards of measure, methods and means of discovery, palliative circumstances, characteristics, responsi- bility, merit and blame, helps and hindrances, law. These abstract questions pave the way for more tangible and posi- tive considerations. They partake of the nature of principles, that run through the second or practical part of Moral Phil- osophy. A man's duties and a man's rights are definitely settled in this second part, by applying to the different emer- gencies, in which a man may find himself, all the truths ac- cumulated and made good in the first part. Thus, the first condition that confronts us, when brought into being, is that of dependence on God. Moral Philosophy takes hold of this con- dition, examines it in every detail, and sternly decrees the rigid demands of reason with regard to religion, worship and revelation. It then lays down rules for man's behavior to- wards himself and towards his fellow-men, taken as indi- viduals. These rules are far reaching, and define exactly his 4 GENERAL ETHICS obligations with respect to his body, his soul, his life, and his neighbor's body, soul and life. They determine the nature and fairness of private property, and establish the sanctity of contracts. Society in all its ramifications is the next study. The family and the State are the topics ; and each meets with the fullest treatment. The family presents such vital ques- tions as marriage, its oneness, its perpetuity, its obligations, its relations with the civil power, parents and children. The State leads to an analysis of men's inclination to band them- selves together, of the purpose that actuates the inclination, of the elements entering into society 's structure ; of authority, its origin, its phases, its constituents, and of the mutual relations between ruler and subjects. Tongiorgi offers this other di- vision of Ethics from its causes: 1, Final cause, or man's last end; 2, Material cause, or man's moral acts; 3, Formal cause, or good and evil; 4, Model cause, or Natural Law; 5, Efficient cause, mind, will and habits, behavior. These, therefore, are some of the topics destined to occupy our attention. The field is so vast that we can hope to do any- thing like justice to only the leading points; and it shall be my endeavor, while making my treatment of the matter as thorough as possible, to omit nothing of primary importance. While devoting no little time to the forward part of Moral, or General Ethics, we intend to pay more special attention to the after-part, designated by some authors as Natural Right. The spirit of Catholicity will of course pervade our whole work. We shall never forget that we are men of faith, with the light of the Scriptures as interpreted by the Church for guide, with the traditions of two thousand years at our serv- ice, and the example of an army of saints before our eyes. We enter not into this enquiry in the disposition of Rational- ists, who exercise to-day so wide an influence in the world of thought, outside the one true Church. We hesitate to re- move God's messages to men from the field of morality. We refuse to regard man as an absolute, self-sufficient being, in- dependent of his surroundings, accountable to no superior for his conduct, his own guide, his own reward, his own punish- ment. We maintain, on the contrary, that every instant of his life is beset with well defined relations; that he is poor, and weak, and erring ; that he is affected by his environment, INTRODUCTION 5 strictly responsible before an all-wise, an all-holy, and an all- powerful God for his thoughts, his words and his acts; and a candidate for the Heaven or hell of Scripture, for the place of delight with golden streets, or the prison house of fire that knows no surcease of pain. Reason with us is quite as important a factor in morality as it is with the Rationalists. "We hold it in even higher esteem than they. We follow as far as it leads, accept all its legitimate conclusions, and allow neither prejudice nor passion to meddle with our loyalty to its counsels. We take no half -measures, we journey not to a certain point and then stop short. But, when reason makes clear the undoubted existence of a teaching Church, the real- ity of a code of law harassing in the extreme to human na- ture, we adopt its teaching with all the responsibilities and all the sacrifices implied. When reason proclaims in a loud voice its own proneness to confound the false with the true, its inability to cope with problems, capable of taxing even angelic minds, we take reason's word for the statement, and accept on God's authority what reason cannot even under- stand. Reason without a guide is not sufficient in the deli- cate task of arranging the moral details of a man 's life. Rea- son was made to adopt the truth, not to fathom all truth ; and reason is then exerting its proper activity, when in matters beyond its grasp it humbly submits to instructions from a superior. Reason is of its nature infallible, but it is by acci- dent capable of mistake, and accidents are nowhere so likely to occur as in the domain of moral teaching. IntellectuaJ pride is the forerunner of unbelief, unbelief gives loose rein to license, license kills conscience; and, when conscience is once dead, man sinks lower than the level of a beast, and becomes a veritable monster of iniquity. There are certain basic truths we take for granted in all these discussions, not because they cannot be proved, but be- cause they belong to other departments of philosophy. They are all abundantly proved elsewhere, and we are justified in carrying over truths made good in other portions of the study. Chief among these truths I should reckon the existence of God; His supreme ownership of all else, man not excepted; the immortality of the soul; free will; and man's ability to compass certainty in the domain of knowledge. Atheism, Ma- 6 GENERAL ETHICS terialism, Determinism, and Scepticism are theories opposed to these several points of doctrine, and are overwhelmingly refuted in Natural Theology, Psychology, and Logic. We prove God a living reality from the need of one unproduced actual being, to explain the produced beings that fall under our experience. Deny God, and the universe of creatures is without explanation, an effect with no cause. We prove God a living reality from the wonderful order apparent in the physical universe, written large across the sky, the earth, and the sea. We prove God a living reality from a moral order embodied in the voice of conscience, proclaiming aloud the wishes of a superior compelling us with threats and promises to cherish right and despise wrong, to do good and avoid evil. We prove God a living reality from the common con- sent of mankind, dating back to the earliest ages of history, and enduring with undiminished vigor down to our own times. God is supreme owner of all else in virtue of the principle that to the maker belongs the thing he makes; and God cre- ated, made from nothing, the world and all the minerals, plants, brutes and men the world contains. Apart from other compelling arguments, the soul's immortality is settled by its simplicity and spirituality. It has no parts, and is, therefore, in itself incorruptible or indestructible. It is intrinsically independent of matter, and is, therefore, safe from accidental corruption or destruction. The omnipotence of God cannot annihilate a human soul without doing violence to God's other attributes; and no one attribute in God runs counter to an- other. Every individual man is a living witness to his pos- session of free will. All human intercourse is based on this quality of men; and in any other hypothesis law and social order would have no meaning; honesty and virtue would perish from the earth ; reward and punishment would be idle terms without a show of significance. Scepticism is a huge joke in philosophy; a direct insult to the goodness and wis- dom of God; and its own completest refutation. Therefore, with perfect right we suppose everywhere in these discussions that God exists, that man is His property to dispose of as He pleases, that man's soul will live forever, that man is free, and that all doubt is a diseased condition of the mind that study and observation can cure. THESIS I Every agent works unto an end. This end is truly a cause. The will in all its deliberate movements has some definite last end, whether absolutely or relatively such. Jomn, 5-19; Rickaby, 3-6. QUESTION By a sort of paradox we begin our Ethics with the end. Ethics is a set of rules for conduct, man's conduct is a series of his deliberate acts, and the beginning of every deliberate act is some end or purpose the man proposes to himself to accomplish or effect. And so the paradox ceases. While true to its name in one order, the end is false to its name in another. It is last in the order of execution, first in the order of intention. The house as a finished product is the last thing to reward the builder's eyes, after weeks and months of work; the same house, as it existed in his mind and will, was the first thing to suggest plans and operations, running all the way from cellar to roof. We are therefore justified in beginning with the end, because intention precedes execution, and no- body builds a house without prior thought of plans, without prior wish of a habitation. People never build a house with- out caring what will be the result of their endeavors; they never build a house, when they want an automobile. Inten- tion is end energizing the will, and on this account intentional and deliberate are practically synonymous. To energize the will, the end must first fall under the notice of the intellect ; and a deliberate act is an act done with full knowledge and consent. Unintentional for the same reason is in our language an equivalent for indeliberate. The philosophy of the thing is plain in our expression, ''Where no offense is intended, no offense can be taken." Wise men pay no attention to a hurt, when the wrong-doer has no desire to hurt, or hardly knows that his conduct causes pain. Intention, therefore, presup- poses an intellect and a will working together in mutual har- 7 8 GENERAL ETHICS mony, and the use of the word is regularly restricted to man. In brutes, plants and minerals the same phenomenon of finality, or seeking an end, is verified in every exertion of their energy, and is best named appetency, tendency, nature. A brute has instinct for guide and appetite for root of de- sire, both are constrained faculties without a vestige of free- dom ; and they base a certain imperfect deliberation, a certain show of intention, attributed in philosophy to brutes. Brutes never in reality choose, when of two or more alternatives they adopt or embrace one ; the transaction is due not to choice or selection, but to an inexorable law imposed on them by their Maker, and instinct is with us a handy term for that law. The whole process in brutes is not intention, but appetency; and the perfect deliberation present in man's acts is always absent from the acts of brutes. Plants enjoy neither sense nor appetite; and they grow, nourish and reproduce themselves without any knowledge whatever on their part, without any desire whatever, but wholly in virtue of a tendency or bent communicated to them by their Maker. In their case, all knowledge of end and all desire of its accomplishment are in God. And what is true of plants is true of minerals, with this single difference that capacity for self-motion attaches to plants, while it is absent from minerals. Minerals, there- fore, prosecute their end by very nature, in virtue of obedi- ence to the law of gravity, and to whatever other physical and chemical laws obtain in creation, God imposing this duty of obedience. Every agent works unto an end; and the saying, when re- stricted to minerals, plants and brutes, is of small or no im- portance in Ethics, because every such agent is outside the sphere of morality. In common with other creatures, man works towards an end ; and, what is more important in Ethics, man in all his deliberate movements works towards a definite last end, whether absolutely and unreservedly or only rela- tively such. God Himself is no exception to this rule of finality; and in creation He must have purposed His own glory, as nothing short of God is worthy of God, and God can slave to no unworthy end. God's glory is, therefore, the absolutely last end of all creatures; and, in the words of our catechism, we are all here to praise, worship and serve END AND DESTINY 9 God, and to save our souls. God's glory is creatures' ex- ternal last end, because it is primarily for God, not for crea- tures. Besides this external last end, we must recognize an internal last end ; and in the course of our work we shall see that it is for man complete happiness, the vision of God, salvation. In the event of wishing to create, God simply had to intend creatures for His glory, and we know from man's natural craving for complete happiness that God meant man to compass this surpassing good. And all morality dates back to this single fact. Man must respect his Maker's wishes, because it rests with the maker to dispose of his work as an owner ; and God 's wishes are plain ; man must glorify God by a life of virtue here, and by com- plete happiness hereafter. Good and evil must, therefore, be differentiated, law must be kept under penalty of punish- ment, and duties must be fulfilled with scrupulous exactness. Hence, we begin with end, show that while God's glory is man's absolutely last extrinsic end, the possession of God is man's absolutely last intrinsic end; that virtue is his rela- tively last intrinsic end; that virtue can be differentiated from vice; that the objective order of things is the standard or measure enabling men to distinguish virtue from vice ; that man is under strict law to avoid evil and do good, and satisfy every relation in force between himself on the one hand, and God, self and the neighbor on the other. Destiny is end viewed as an obligation imposed by a superior; and man's destiny, taking into account his present and future life, is complete happiness or the intellectual possession of God; man's destiny, restricting the question to this present life alone, is virtue, or a closer and closer approach to God by the introduction of moral rectitude into his conduct. And the enemies of finality want to feel free from all restraint, and escape responsibility for their misdeeds, on the plea of total and complete independence. Finality is the most obvious phenomenon in nature; and yet, to escape the manifest responsibility resulting from final- ity, some philosophers have denied its existence. Epicurus and men of his stamp felt themselves hampered in their dreams of pleasure by the unwelcome notion of a final cause, and in their intellectual impotence strove to shake it off, by agreeing 10 GENERAL ETHICS to regard it an empty fancy. They maintained that every- thing happened by a sort of unavoidable chance, and claimed that man trifled with himself in supposing that he had any destiny to fulfil. Of course the doctrine would prove con- venient to men set on living at haphazard, unwilling to bor- row any worry from possible consequences of their rash con- duct. Whatever obscurity may cloak the truth in the case of inanimate and irrational agents, the thing is too plain in the case of man to admit of the slightest doubt. Man knows that he has a destiny to fulfil, and because of his power of choice, coupled with the inevitable conviction, that in his every act he is pursuing some definite purpose, he knows that he will be rewarded or punished according to his deserts. TERMS Every Agent. Agents can be separated into three classes, beings without any knowledge whatever, beings with sensible knowledge or instinct, and beings with intellects and wills. Agents of the first class work unto an end under direction; minerals without any motion of their own, plants with self- motion. Agents of the second class work unto an end appre- hensively or with knowledge, and with motion of their own, but by instinct which is a necessary cause. Agents of the third class work apprehensively, with motion of their own, and with the power to select and reject means. Examples of all three are an arrow on its way to the target, a dog walk- ing home, a man making money. End. Finis est id propter quod aliquid fit, id cujus gratia aliquid fit. The end is that on account of which, for the sake of which something is done. It is what induces the agent to work; that towards which the agent strives, to rest in it, to quit the activity of seeking, not the activity of enjoyment. Ends are classified thuswise: Last or farthest away; proxi- mate or closest; and intermediate, between last and proxi- mate. Last is sometimes absolutely and unreservedly last, sometimes relatively last. An end is absolutely last, when it cannot in reason be referred to any higher end, any end be- yond or farther away; when the agent can in reason devote himself and all his endeavors to its accomplishment; when DIVISION OF ENDS 11 it is the possession of God, and only then. It is relatively last, when it is in reality referred to no end heyond, like money in the case of a miser, though it can he in reason, and in conscience ought to he referred to some higher end, like money in the case of a saint; when it cannot in reason claim all a man's endeavors, hut only a certain corner of his ener- gies and attention. A proximate end is virtually a means to some last or intermediate end. An intermediate end is a means lying between a proximate and last, the first interme- diate being a means to the second, and so on to the finish. In the present classification we distinguish two orders, that of execution and that of intention ; and our division is in the order of execution. The possession of God, or complete hap- piness, is first thing in the order of intention, last in the order of execution. Thought of reward starts effort, reward stands to the winner after effort is over. Ends are likewise divided into end which, end for which, and end in which. They are, respectively, the good sought, the person advan- taged, and possession. Examples are, learning, student and education, in the matter of study. An end to he produced is a good without physical existence prior to the agent 's activ- ity; an end to he ohtained is a physical reality prior to the agent's effort. Health in the case of a sick man, and gold in the ease of a miser are instances. End of deed and end of doer, in Latin, operis and operantis, are important. The first is that to which the agent's work is by its very nature suited and fitted ; the other is whatever good the agent selects for purpose of his work. Ends of deed are, a house with a builder, a song with a singer, time with a watchmaker. Ends of doer are, worship, fame, money with all three. Cause. Whatever produces another with influence on its very heing, the influence issuing in dependence, is a cause. There are four leading causes, two of them internal, material and formal; two of them external, efficient and final. Each of the four has its own proper and peculiar activity, each producing the effect, each contributing in its own special way to the production of the effect or new existence. An efficient cause has direct bearing on the effect, without enter- ing its intrinsic constitution, and contributes of its own to the effect, whether its activity be physical or moral. A final 12 GENERAL ETHICS cause directly affects the efficient cause, and through it in- fluences the effect, contributing of its own to the effect by moral activity alone. The influence of an efficient cause is exerted first and foremost on the effect; the influence of a final cause is exercised first and foremost on the mind and will of the agent, and through them on the effect. The difference between a physical efficient cause and a final cause is too plain to be missed, but the same is not true of a moral efficient cause and a final. Moral efficients are close images of finals, and yet the two must not be confounded together. A moral efficient has a more direct bearing on the effect than a final. One man bribes another with money to commit murder. The briber is moral efficient cause of the murder, the money offered is final cause of the murder. The activity of the briber bears on the murder, he uses the murderer as an instrument, and the moral phase of the affair passes to physical. The money bears on the mind and will of the mur- derer, and all its activity remains moral. Neither is a final cause a mere condition. Like all causes, it is a condition too ; but to the notion of condition it adds the quality of a thing more intimately connected with the work or effect. A condi- tion as such enters into no part of the effect proper. All its ultility ceases, when the effect proper begins. It makes things ready, and then disappears. The final cause, on the contrary, really sets the agent in motion by the influence it exerts on his will, if the agent is rational, or by the influence it exerts on the will of the First Cause, God, if the agent is irrational. Besides, a condition is no sufficient reason for the effect. In the process of burning compare the dryness of the waste burnt, and its juxtaposition, with a fire that consumes it. Some final cause must urge the builder to begin opera- tions, and this final cause influences him all the way from beginning to finish, from cellar to roof. The end is a cause only in the order of intention ; in the order of execution it is in proper language an effect. The Will. A spiritual faculty^ proper and peculiar to man, capable of seeking good hy acts elicited under the di- rection of the intellect. Appetite is of three kinds; natural, proper to minerals and plants; sensible, proper to brutes; and intellectual or rational, proper to man. All three are in man, HUMAN ACTS 13 natural and sensible alone are in brutes, natural alone is in minerals and plants. The will is rational appetite, and meets with full and complete treatment in Psychology. Deliberate. Man is capable of two kinds of acts, deliberate and indeliherate. Toying with the beard or aimlessly rub- bing the chin, is the classical instance of an indeliberate act. Deliberate acts are so familiar that an example would be superfluous. The will aside, intellectual knowledge and a degree of attention are really the distinguishing characteris- tics of a deliberate act, as compared with an indeliberate act. Will separates it not from indeliberate, but from spontaneous acts. Perfect deliberation is itself defined to be an act of the reason, by which, at the instigation of the will, the mind compares together different ends, different means, with a view to making a choice. In deliberation it will be noted that the third operation of the mind, not merely the first or second, has play. In other words, a comparison is instituted, and this process necessitates the employment of argumentation. Phi- losophers recognize a kind of imperfect deliberation, which they attribute to brute animals. The knowledge requisite is limited to sole perception of the end by means of the ex- ternal senses, aided principally by sensile discrimination. And men are as capable as brutes of this imperfect delibera- tion, or real indeliberateness. It nowise reaches, like the knowledge of perfect deliberation, to the nature of the end, or to the connection between a certain act and a certain pur- pose. In imperfect deliberation the motion of the agent is ordinarily quick and sudden; in perfect deliberation it is ordinarily slow and measured. Human acts, distinctively such, have three elements, intellectual knowledge, desire and freedom., activities of intellect and will, man's two specific functions. Desire and freedom can be expressed together by the one word, selection. Selection always presupposes knowl- edge, in much the same way as operations of the mind have operations of the senses for foundation. Hence the adage, ''Nil volitum, nisi praecognitum, " "Things unknown are not matter for wishes." Freedom in the same way has for sup- port the two faculties of intellect and will; and, in the ab- sence of either, freedom is impossible. A voluntary or delib- erate act is an act proceeding from the will accompanied by 14 GENERAL ETHICS intellectual knowledge of the end sought. Deliberate, or vol- untary acts in strict sense, are arranged in different classes. Perfectly voluntary acts are accomplished with full knowl- edge, and with fall consent of the will. Imperfectly voluntary acts imply that either knowledge, or consent, or both are imperfect. Absolutely voluntary acts are accomplished with full delib- eration, attention and bias. Acts are relatively or after a manner voluntary, when con- sent is present, but mingled with a certain aversion and lean- ing of the will towards the opposite act. E.g., sailors throw- ing cargo overboard in storm. A directly voluntary act turns on some immediate object of the will, intended in itself and for its own sake. E.g., theft, murder. Indirectly voluntary acts turn on some object necessarily connected with immediate object. E.g., effect in cause, drunk- enness in excessive drinking, death and a thrown stone. In a positively voluntary act the will acts, as in a sin of commission. In a negatively voluntary act the will refuses to act, as in a sin of omission. Expressly voluntary acts are clear from words or signs. Tacitly voluntary acts are gathered from facts. An act is actually voluntary, when willed here and now, without question of break or interruption. An act is virtually voluntary, when voluntary by force of an original actual voluntary, the actual wish being broken or interrupted, without detriment to its moral continuity and influence. An act is habitually voluntary, when its original was actu- ally willed once, and was never taken back; but the actual wish was broken or interrupted to such an extent by sleep, or delay, or something such that it no longer lasts or influ- ences by way of an act, but only by way of a habit. An act is interpret atively voluntary, when never actually willed, but would be willed if thought were had of the thing, e. g., desire of salvation combined with opposition to baptism. PROOFS 15 Division Three parts. I. End. II. Cause. III. Last end. Proofs I, II, III I. Every agent works unto some determined and well de- fined effect. Otherwise all effects would be indifferent, or of the same attractiveness; and there would be no reason why one effect should be produced rather than another. Very pro- duction is a sign that the effect produced was more attractive to the agent than other effects. But such an effect has all the constituents of an end, which is that on account of which the agent works. Ergo, every agent works unto an end. II. Whatever produces another with influence on its very being, the influence issuing in dependence, is truly a cause. But such is the end. Ergo, the end is truly a cause. With regard to the Minor. The builder's purpose contributes even more to the building of the house than his saw or hammer, be- cause it starts things and stays with him to the finish. The saw does its own work, the hammer its own; and that is all. The end is responsible for their work and for the work of everything else employed in the construction of the building. In rational agents the end's influence is immediate; in min- erals, plants and brutes it is mediate, directly influencing God, their Maker and First Cause, to furnish them with such and such natures, tendencies and faculties, or instincts, in preference to others, because best suited and adapted to the works He intends them to accomplish. III. 1°. In every series of causes there ought to be a flrst cause. But if the will had no definite last end, there would be no first cause. Ergo. With regard to the Major. The second cause, to be second, would be an effect. But an effect without a cause is impos- sible. Ergo. With regard to the Minor. The last end is the first cause. Ergo. With regard to this Antecedent. The first cause is what first excites the agent to activity. But this is the office of the last end. Ergo. With regard to this Minor. Axiom — The end is first thing in a man's intention, last thing in the order of execution. 16 GENERAL ETHICS 2°. The last end, with regard to an act of the will, fills the place of motion's first principle. But remove the first principle of motion, and no motion exists. Ergo, in the event of no definite last end, no act of the will ensues. 3°. When one thing in nature is the reason why another thing receives such or such a denomination, the first of the two is more deserving of the denomination than the second, which actually receives it. But all intermediate ends owe their whole being, and consequently their every denomination, to some last end; and these intermediate ends, at least, are purposes worked unto by every agent. An intermediate is sought only with a view to some corresponding last end. Otherwise it is not an intermediate end. Ergo, the last end is all the more so such a purpose; that is, the will in all its deliberate movements has some definite last end, whether strictly or relatively such. 4°. Every particular or individual good tends of its nature to some common or universal good, as to its proper end. But God, the absolute good, is common or universal good, and every created good is particular or individual good. Ergo, every created good, or things in general tend of their nature to one good, God, as to their last end. With regard to the Major. Parts exist for the sake of the whole. With regard to the Minor. All good comes from, and de- pends for its being on God. N.B. This last argument proves that nature wants man in all his deliberate movements to have God for definite last end. Man's every wish is implicitly, if not explicitly, an ef- fort towards complete happiness, and complete happiness is the possession of God. Implicitly, therefore, this definite last end is always the absolutely last or God ; and implicitly speak- ing God is necessarily the last end of every deliberate act or series of actions. What nature wants, God wants. We can- not improve on God, and when we try to do so we fail. PRINCIPLES A. The single difference between a means and an end is this, that the former is striven after merely for the sake of PRIiNCIPLES 17 the end, while the latter is striven after for itself. In fact, a means is an end before it is compassed ; it becomes a means only after it ceases to be an end only after it is compassed. Means in process of making, means in fieri, is an end; means formally taken, means in facto esse is not an end. Before it can be used, it has to be compassed or sought ; and what the will seeks, is the man's end. Hence the absurdity of writers, who claim that Jesuit philosophers and moralists advocate the wicked theory, that a laudable end justifies any means whatever, no matter how immoral and wrong. Jesuits would be blind, indeed, if they failed to see at a glance that such a theory, because of the unimportant difference between means and end, would be a virtual advocacy of this evidently iniqui- tous principle, that all ends, good, bad and indefferent, are justified ; and that murder and forgiving charity, robbery and alms-deeds are equally worthy of our aspirations and en- deavors. B. An intention is an a-ot by which the will embraces the end as its peculiar good. Any reason urging the will to this act is called a motive. Whatever helps to the possession of the end is a means ; and such means as simply remove impedi- ments from the path are remedies. C. The motion the end communicates to the agent is not physical, but of equivalent efficacy in another order, namely, in the logical order, the order of thought. Its whole effi- ciency lies in the love it stirs in the agent's will, after its presentation by the intellect of the agent; and this love con- tributes as much to the production of the effect as the physical efficient cause. D. Man in his indeliberate actions, works unto an end much as brutes, apprehensively, with motion of his own, but by in- stinct. Such acts are called acts of the man, not acts of man or human acts. E. The end, or final cause, considered in the order of exe- cution, is no cause of the effect, since its place is behind that of the effect, and causes precede their ffects. We maintain only this, that the end is a true and real cause, when con- sidered in the order of intention. Objectively speaking, end in the order of execution is a built house, end in the order of intention is a thought house. THESIS II Man of his very nature desires complete happiness. Com- plete happiness is man's ah&olutely last end subjectively taken. This natural desire must he possible of fulfilment. No created good can secure to man complete happiness. The possession of God is alone complete happiness, and God is alone complete happiness, and God is man's absolutely last end objectively taken. Jouin, 5-19 ; Rickaby, 6-26. QUESTION Here on the threshold of morality a multitude of questions besets us. We know from Metaphysics that every agent, man included, works unto some end. We know, further, that man excels all other creatures in this, that he chooses his end and selects means to its accomplishment. He is not an accumu- lation of blind forces, working along lines mapped out for him by another. He thinks for himself, he decides for himself, he weighs, examines, approves, condemns. We have from our previous acquaintance with philosophy a fair insight into his faculties. From experience we have a fair knowledge of the motives, that clamor for his attention in the routine of everyday affairs. Some are money-makers, some are chiselling for themselves a niche in the temple of fame, some are in continual search for health or the means to preserve it, some keep busy nursing an appetite for palatable dishes, and others travel in pursuit of a good they can expect to come up with only after death. We have to range ourselves in some class. Nay, we are placed already. For the present we want to look at things with the cold, calculating eyes of reason, to profit by our own mistakes and the mistakes of others, and stand just where common sense would have us stand in life's struggles. We want to find out what craving is in reality at the bottom of human d-esires, and what one object in the uni- verse can sate the craving. Our thesis is the answer. Hap- 18 COMPLETE HAPPINESS 19 piness is last in the series of wish-factt)rs, and God is alone large enough, when possessed, to leave no room for further desire. We mean by wish-factors the reasons prompting our wishes; and money, pleasure, honor are wished in last analy- sis because they hold out promise of happiness. Man cannot in reason want anything beyond God, man cannot in reason rest in the enjoyment of anything this side of God. TERMS Happiness. This is the theme with which the Lord Christ opened His sublime discourse on the Mount. The beatitudes are eight steps in the ladder to God ; and, when the wisest of men communicated the secret of success in life to the listen- ing multitude. He knew best with what word to preface His remarks. Beati, He said, blessed, happy are the poor in spirit, and so on through the catalogue. His mission was in part the instruction of mankind and the conquest of souls. Redemption and merit aside, He aimed in all His movements at spreading the kingdom of virtue in the hearts of men. And the happiness born of virtue was the most tremendous motive at His command. He thought no reward a more ap- pealing incentive to virtue than happiness, and God's ideas are right. He knew in His infinite wisdom that other re- wards, while possibly exerting a temporary influence over men's minds, would in the last resort fail of effect. He knew that other rewards, from their very nature and the constitu- tion of man, would prove only partial incentives, subject to all the varying phases of human conduct. He knew that wealth, for instance, with all its attractiveness for some, would act as a deterrent on others ; that fame would appeal to the instincts of a circle limited indeed in numbers. But happi- ness is a universal good, it is at the root of all the world's wishes, it holds its own against the ravages of time, against all the vicissitudes with which humanity is acquainted. Boethius thus defines complete happiness, ''A lasting condi- tion blessed with everything good." ''The enduring posses- sion of every good." These are no idle words, and their right understanding will remove many difficulties. They vindi- cate to complete happiness at least two characteristic ele- 20 GENERAL ETHICS ments, a Jieaped-iip measure of good, and imending diiration. These elements are thoroughly wanting in all the varied joys this earth affords. Mundane or incomplete happiness has inseparably linked with itself a twofold curse. While it fills one comer of a man 's heart with pleasure, it fills another with pain. Its near departure haunts its possessor like a spectre. Partial pain and possible loss are ingredients of all the happi- ness with which this earth is acquainted; and no amount of reasoning, no amount of care can quite eradicate them. St. Augustine, insisting on its fulness, thus describes complete happiness, ^'That man is happy who has all that he wants, and wants only what he can hav^ without sin." Complete happiness is, therefore, an unending round of delights, in which no legitimate craving goes unfulfilled, in which no ille- gitimate craving has existence. This is perfect hliss. Philos- ophers besides recognize an inferior sort of blessedness, which for clearness' sake they call imperfect hliss. It is the only sort of incomplete happiness, truly deserving the name, this present life affords ; and it consists in a close union with our last end by the establishment of moral rectitude in our ac- tioTis. It is peace of conscience, it is holiness, it is the inher- itance of the saints. It is the initial step in our progress to- wards complete happiness, or perfect bliss ; and, while haunted with the fear of loss and mingled with misery, wretchedness and pain, it procures in the grand total of blessings and ills a preponderance of blessings. Philosophers likewise distin- guish between objective or material happiness, and subjective or formal happiness. The first, or objective, is the object or thing, whose presence fills out man's every desire, God. The second, or subjective, is the actual possession of that object or thing. The first is called the end which; the second, the end in which. The definition quoted from Boethius tallies exactly with subjective complete happiness. Of His Very Nature. This longing for happiness is there- fore a natural craving, and things may be natural to man in either one of two ways. They may be born and live with him in a manner entirely independent of his free will, or they may be in strict accord with his nature, and yet entirely de- pendent on his free choice for their existence within him. The desire of which we at present speak is natural to man in CREATED GOODS 21 the first way. It is a necessity of his nature, it cannot be schooled out of his thoughts, it cannot be shaken off or gotten rid of. It is as much a part of the man as upward motion is part of fire 's essence. It is different from an acquired desire, which may of course be natural to man in the second way. Marriage is usually alleged by writers on the subject as an instance of something natural to man, with full dependence on his own free choice. Desires. Many in their folly miss the proper means to make good this desire. Many seek its accomplishment in very dubious occupations, in pleasures decidedly illegitimate, and are sadly disappointed in their expectations. But, as it is possible of fulfilment, it must be within man's reach. There must be a line of conduct unfailingly able to lead to its con- summation. It can never happen that complete happiness will fail him, who honestly does his utmost to win it, and steadily keeps his record clean of fault and defect. No Created Good. The assertion is sweeping, and excludes from the dignity of man's last end everything but God. In the history of philosophy not a few ancients went astray on this point. Epicurus contended that pleasure was man's su- premest desire, his highest good. He sometimes bestowed a scant praise On virtue, only because opposite vices interfered with the full enjoyment of physical pleasure. Zeno, a leader among the stoics, reckoned wisdom combined with virtue the summit of man's aspirations. Aristotle, the founder of the Peripatetic school, contended for a union of virtue and pleas- ure. It may be noticed that the dignity of last end, or high- est good, is ascribed by no one to wealth. Misers alone love wealth for wealth's sake, and misers are not numerous. Prac- tical men of sense regard wealth as only a useful commodity, a means to the acquirement of other blessings more eagerly coveted. As a merely useful good, wealth must of course yield precedence to virtue, pleasure, wisdom, and every good catalogued as either becoming or pleasurable. Possession of God. In purely ethical discussions theology of course has no place, and statements advanced must be made good without any reference to Holy Scripture, as a source of argument. We Catholics know from our catechism that Heaven is our last end, and we know that Heaven is the ac- 22 GENERAL ETHICS cumulation of all good centered in the beatific vision, or closest kind of union with God. Bliss in Heaven consists entirely in seeing God face to face, and this intellectual pos- session of God, supernaturally accomplished, constitutes man's supremest happiness. Strip the beatific vision of its super- natural qualities, and you have at once the doctrine of phi- losophy concerning man's last end. Though able to make surmises, philosophy teaches nothing positive regarding the resurrection of the body; but in Psychology we saw how clearly it makes good the immortality of the soul. There- fore, the only possession of God, possible of conception to unaided human thought, is intellectual possession, based on an intimate union of intellect and will with Him. Last End. This complete happiness, or possession of God, is therefore the ultimate purpose of man's every movement. His proximate and explicit purpose may be limited happi- ness, but his ultimate and implicit purpose is always complete happiness. Its influence is not always evident, because some- what below the surface of things; but its influence is none the less present. It has a twofold value, implicit and explicit. Thus, when, for instance, knowledge because of its manifold advantages urges the student to labor, the hiding principle is that all-pervading desire of perfect happiness. Love of knowledge merely seems to be the sole motive. Complete hap- piness has in this case an implicit value, and its efficacy is none the less real than when it explicitly asserts itself. Proofs I, II, III, IV, V I. 1st. Complete happiness is the satisfaction of man 's every legitimate wish. But man of his very nature desires the sat- isfaction of his every legitimate wish. Ergo, man of his very nature desires complete happiness. With regard to the Major. Perfect or finished good is the all important and characteristic element of complete happi- ness; and since good is subject-matter of the will's legitimate wishes, complete happiness is the satisfaction of man's every legitimate wish. N.B. Nature prompts no illegitimate wish. Perverted passion, wrong prejudices, faulty education are responsible for such wishes. PROOFS 23 With regard to the Minor. Man's will would be otherwise doomed to perpetual unrest, and would become an instrument of unending torture. 2nd. Nature, impediments aside, exerts its utmost activity. But human nature or man is capable of desiring complete happiness, and no impediment is conceivable. Ergo, man of his very nature desires complete happiness. With regard to the Minor. Man's mind is able to grasp the highest truth. His will, to keep equal pace with his mind, must be able to desire the highest good, or complete happi- ness. II. Man 's last end must have these three qualities : It must be the supremest good, fully equal to all the wants of all his faculties, even vegetative and sensitive. Needless to say, it must satisfy vegetative and sensitive wants eminently, not formally. It must so contain within itself all the good resi- dent in other conceivable ends, that these other ends be only stages in man's progress toward its acquisition. In other words, it must be of such sort, as to attract man's heart of its own single self, and be at the same time the thing of in- terest in every object of man's desires. It must be the de- sire of every man's heart, whether formally and explicitly, or materially and implicitly. But complete happiness is the only good answering this description. Ergo, complete happi- ness is man's last end. III. A desire with nature for origin and author, cannot be impossible of fulfilment. But man's desire for complete hap- piness is a desire of this sort. Ergo, it is possible of fulfil- ment. With regard to the Major. Denial of this Major would be an open denial of the axiom, that every effect demands a cor- responding cause. For the effect, or natural desire, is admit- tedly alive in every man's bosom, and its cause is assuredly nothing short of at least possibility of fulfilment. Besides, God, the Author of our nature and all its inborn longings, would be, were complete happiness an empty dream, a most consummate torturer and executioner, not the beneficent cre- ator reason requires Him to be. IV. The good things, proposed by adversaries for man's last end, are signal failures. Thus, 24 GENERAL ETHICS a, physical pleasure ministers to only senses of the body, and neglects the soul 's interests ; b, physical pleasure likewise involves pain for some member or organ not actually participating in it, and nearly always threatens harm to the soul; c, physical pleasure is an utter stranger to that endless duration, which is happiness' first requisite; d, spiritual delight is at most an effect of the good we seek, and as such inferior to the good productive of this delight; and, therefore, an impossible last end; e, spiritual delight would then be the motive for search after becoming good; and the becoming and the agreeable would be without distinctive characteristics ; f, pleasure, whether physical or spiritual, is change or mo- tion ; and man 's last end is complete rest ; g, the wisdom and virtue of this life leave manj things yet to be desired, health, wealth, beauty, strength, long years. Certainly wisdom and virtue, accompanied by these several blessings, are more an incentive to desire than wisdom and virtue, considered apart from them; h, pleasure, wisdom and virtue combined, or the joint pos- session of all the blessings this earth affords, is so full of con- flicting elements, as to be quite out of the question, and im- possible of fulfilment ; i, danger of change, fear of loss, actual loss, gnawing anx- iety, toil and a thousand other evils poison all the good things of this exile, and emphatically forbid man to look for satis- faction or rest in their acquisition; j, virtue alone excepted, every other good with which earth is acquainted, even life itself, may without discredit he sacri- ficed on the altar of patriotism. V. 1st. Some good, created or uncreated, is man's last end, or complete happiness. But no created good is equal to the task, and God alone is uncreated good. Ergo, God is man's complete happiness, his last end. 2nd. God, when creating man, necessarily appointed him an end wholly worthy of Himself. But God alone is wholly worthy of God. Ergo, God is the end appointed man, the end established in man's creation. But the end assigned by God to man is man's last end. Ergo, God is man's last end. PRINCIPLES 25 3rd. Nothing short of the universal and supreme good can be man's last end. But God alone is the universal and su- preme good. Ergo, God, and nothing short of God, is man's last end. With regard to the Major. Man's last end, from the very- nature of things, must be a good, whose possession leaves nothing further to be desired ; and universal or supreme good alone enjoys this prerogative. With regard to the Miliar. Were there another universal and supreme good, there would be two gods. PRINCIPLES A. Our every desire, if we follow the laws imposed upon us by our Maker, will be abundantly satisfied in the next life. Some of these desires will have their fulfilment formally, or exactly as they are shaped. Others, on account of the pe- culiar circumstances attaching to a future state, will be ac- complished, as philosophers say, eminently, in a grander way, or equivalently. The possession of God will be the sum of our delights, and God is infinite in resources to make up for whatever pleasures our future condition will render impos- sible. Thus, there will be no eating, no drinking in Heaven; but, apart from the fact that our lower nature will then make no clamor for sweets it now so much covets, God will be able to pour into our souls a measure of happiness, more than able to atone for these paltry losses. Some philosophers think they see, in the completeness of good things involved in this natural desire of happiness, a proof of the future resurrec- tion of the body. They contend that happiness would be incomplete, unless the body somehow shared after death in the joys accorded the soul. But the time-honored distinction between intensity and extent is an answer to their difficulty. Unless our Creator could in some way make up in intensity for the loss extent, or number of parts affected by bliss, suf- fers, the body would surely have to arise, and live forever like the soul, to enjoy its proper reward. Reason throws no light on the body's destiny after death, because, in the event of its total disappearance, though man's happiness would be 26 GENERAL ETHICS less in extent, its intensity could be so multiplied, that his loss would become a gain. B. God, because simple, and therefore without parts, must be known wholly, if known at all. This circumstance is, how- ever, far from rendering it necessary for the blessed in Heaven to know Him totally or exhaustively, or in such a way that nothing in His nature escapes their knowledge. God is infinite, and to know Him totally is the work of an infinite, not a finite intellect like man's. The familiar example of a mountain seen in the distance may serve to elucidate the point. The whole mountain is seen, without being wholly seen. C. We must in our language guard against making God a means to an end. He is not the instrument, through which we attain to happiness. He is our happiness. He is not a thing designed for our use or commodity, but we are things designed for His glory; and, in furthering His glory, we are filling out our destiny. D. As a principle of activity, man's intellect is of course finite and limited; but, when the objects, to which man's in- tellect can reach, are taken into consideration, no finite or limited number can represent them. Because of the limita- tions inherent in its activity, man's intellect can know God in only a limited way; because of the multitude of objects, to which it can reach, man's intellect can be filled by nothing created, and therefore by God alone. All being is the ade- quate object of man's intellect, and created being is not all being. Created and uncreated are that, and created is con- tained in uncreated, or actual unproduced, or God. E. Between the mind and its object some sort of propor- tion must have place. But this proportion, or likeness, need not necessarily be that of being, or nature. Proportion of fit- ness, constituted by the circumstance, that God as a being can fill a place in man's thoughts, is enough. F. Pleasure is good sought on its own single account, and in this particular resembles a last end. It is not, however, a supreme good, able to satisfy every desire; and, in this par- ticular, pleasure falls away from the requirements of an abso- lutely last end. G. Individual men tend towards a last end, not that ab- straction called human nature. Pantheists, therefore, are PRINCIPLES 27 wrong, when they admit the existence of a last end for human nature, and deny last ends in connection with individuals. H. Man's natural desire for happiness is a something he cannot lose. Its accomplishment, because dependent on the acts of his free will, can readily enough be frustrated. I. God, pure and simple, is the material object of man's thoughts. God, as He assumes shape in man's mind, is the formal object of these thoughts. Since, therefore, God is in- finite only in Himself, or as material object, man's mind, to have knowledge of Him, need not be infinite. The formal object of a faculty, not its material object, denominates it, puts it in the class of infinites or finites. J. As long as man obeys the dictates of reason, so long is he tending towards God, if not formally, at least by inter- pretation. He may not advert to the fact that he is tending towards God, and that would be formal tendency; but in sub- stance he is doing what he would do if he formally tended towards God, and this is tendency by interpretation. THESIS III Man's destiny in this life, his supremest happiness on earth, his relatively last end, consists in drawing closer and closer to his absolutely last end, by the establishment of moral recti- tude in his actions. Between good and bad in the moral order, between right and wrong, an essential, intrinsic differ- ence exists. The immediate measure of moral rectitude is the objective order of things, as understood by the intellect; the mediate measure is God's wisdom and goodness. Jouin, 5-19; Bickaby, 109-126. QUESTION /Man's last end is eternal happiness in the possession of God Life is but a stage in our progress towards God, it is a period (of proof of trial./ We are from the outset vested with heads, ^and hearts, and hands; with all the needed light, and cour- age, and strength, to pursue our appointed journey without mishap. Our supremest happiness here below hinges en- tirely on our present destiny, and our present destiny is of a complexion with our destiny hereafter. Man's history ex- tends beyond the grave, death is far from closing the record. This present life forms, as it were, the first chapter, the years without end to follow make up the rest of the story. But this first chapter is a thing of the utmost concern, it is a thing of the highest importance. All the succeeding chapters borrow from it their light and shade, with it all succeeding chapters must be fair or hideous. Union with God consti- tutes complete happiness; and, unless a man's last moments find him close by the ties of righteousness to his Maker, that man can hope for nothing but most wretched misery. Unless a man's every moment finds him struggling towards this happy consummation, misery will not wait till the hour of death to fasten its hold upon him. What for want of a bet- ter term we call imperfect misery, is the perpetual lot of the 28 INCOMPLETE HAPPINESS 29 wicked here on earth. The graduated scale of happiness and woe is the same. A life lived in preparation for supreme felicity constitutes imperfect beatitude, the supremest pos- sible on earth. A life lived in preparation for supreme woe constitutes incomplete wretchedness, the most irksome pos- sible on earth. The comparison is between virtue and vice, and between things inseparably connected with both. ^$4^eace of conscience is the one thing inseparably connected with virtue, remorse is the one thing inseparably connected with vicey/ Wealth, pleas- ure and honor are inseparably connected wifii neither virtue nor vice ; and must, therefore, be kept out of the comparison. Virtue with these three concupiscences of life is, of course, happier in point of extent or quantity than virtue without them, though their presence fails to affect necessarily the in- tensity or quality of virtue's happiness. Vice with these three goods of life is less unhappy in point of extent or quantity than vice without them, though their presence never diminishes the annoyance of remorse itself in point of intensity or quality. Poverty, pain and obscurity cannot destroy or diminish peace of conscience ; money, pleasure and honor cannot cure or alle- viate remorse. And again we are talking of normal minds, wide awake to their condition, with a practical realization of peace and remorse. In this whole business intensity or qual- ity counts for more than extent or quantity. There is more money from the viewpoint of extent or quantity in five one- dollar bills than in a single hundred-dollar bill, and yet every- body knows what way a sensible person would look, if invited to choose. Intensity or quality is what makes the difference. A bad life with all the other goods of earth except virtue is more irksome in point of peace and remorse than a good life without all the other goods of earth ; and this is sufficient for our present purpose. Peace of conscience is the hundred- dollar bill, wealth and the other goods of life without virtue are five one-dollar bills. Even if experience failed to bear us out in this statement, philosophy itself is witness that any contrary event would imperil the fitness of things. /t*repara- tion, then, for that absorbing union with God, at the root of every human desire, is the limit set by common sense for well directed act ivity//^ Virtue is as indispensable to happiness 30 GENERAL ETHICS A ere below as it is to happiness in the world to come; and virtue is moral rectitude, the avoidance of evil, the accom- plishment of good/ Unless we close our eyes to the light, and do to death the instincts implanted within us, we cannot mistake vice for virtue, we cannot confound evil with good. Between them there is an impassable chasm. No merely accidental, but an essential difference exists between one and the other. And the standard marking this difference is plain. It is the ob- jective order of things, things as they are, things as they ought to seem to you and to me, things as they shall inev- itably seem to you and to me, if we only follow the light vouchsafed us, and cherish conscience for a "friend. This standard never shifts place. Styles of dress change with the season, the etiquette of to-day is other than that of our forefathers; bu^/ne measure of moral rectitude is the same to-day, yesterday and forever. It is founded on the good- ness and wisdom of God/ and partakes of their immutability. TERMS Destiny. End, when viewed as a something imposed on an- other by on'e in a position to exercise this prerogative, is called destiny. Man's last end is an inheritance of his na- ture, and as such proceeds from the author of nature, God. Its fulfilment is a law of nature, and the initial step towards the same, or the right ordering of his life, may with justice be called his destiny. Happiness on Earth. We speak at present of incomplete, or imperfect happiness, which consists wholly in the fact that the sum of blessings enjoyed outweighs the sum of evils en- dured, considering only the blessings and evils inseparably connected with virtue and vice, with intensity not extent for standard. Moral rectitude. Rectitude is straightness, and the figure of speech at the root of the word fits the thought. Moral rectitude is the shortest distance between two points, our present condition and the felicity of bliss eternal. Its duties lie along a path that never winds to right or left, but keeps straight on. Measured by its requirements, a man's exact OBJECTIVE MORALITY 31 position in the matter of living up to his destiny is easily and readily discernible. Morality is the badge of human nature. A moral act necessarily calls for an intellect and a will in the agent. Intellect and will in an agent necessarily call for moral acts. Acts are first said to he moral, and then good or had in the moral order. They are moral from the mere cir- cumstance that they have their origin in an enlightened rea- son, and a will free in its activity. They are good or bad, they derive their righteousness or their malice from their agreement with or divergence from some set standard. This standard is primarily for us the ohjective order of things. When an act falls away from this standard, it is bad ; when it covers the standard, as the rule covers a straight line, the act is good. Men's minds of course differ, and allowance must be made for differences of views sanctioned by Providence. But no believer in God's wisdom, and power, and truthfulness, can for a moment suspect that men's minds in normal condi- tion can confound evil with good, vice with virtue. Had God so constructed intellect. He would be inviting confusion into the universe of morality. He would be cursing our race more heavily than if He allowed the stars to drop from their places, the sun to depart from its course, and baleful comets to run hither and thither at random in the sky. Of course there are intellects, dependent on diseased organs, capable of confound- ing black with white; but these are beside the purpose. Philosophy deals with what is the general rule, not with ex- ceptions. She discusses men taken from the busy walks of life, she does not go to madhouses for subjects. Neither does she pretend to make models of conduct the lives of unfor- tunates, who would be in strait-jackets, if the madhouse had its due. There is, however, such a thing as subjective moral- ity ; and we must recognize the part it plays in the affairs of life. But, be it remarked and well understood that there is in truth no such thing as suhjective morality, pure and simple. My way of thinking, your way of thinking, when they fail to square with the objective order of things, are what I mean by subjective morality, pure and simple; and that kind of morality is a contradiction in terms. Such morality is as little deserving of the name as purely subjective adhesion to a false statement is deserving of the name of certainty. Cer- 32 GENERAL ETHICS tainty of that kind is perverse stubbornness, has no part with the truth, and is more lamentable than thorough uncertainty or ignorance. Even so, my way of thinking, your way of thinking, if not what they ought to be, are indications of either monstrous iniquity or ignorance. I can by repeated assaults on conscience reduce it to comparative silence, I can by repeated abuse of the light, set up within my bosom, practically extinguish it, I can by constant contact with men given over to a reprobate sense put on their ways, assume their habits of thought, and sin almost without remorse.^^^ut I cannot, no man can, make wrong right. No man can by any process of thought make the crooked line of wickedness identical with the straight line of virtue. ^ The man with a moral squint was either born that way, and took no pains to cure the defect, or acquired the habit later in life by repeated acts of disloyalty to conscience. If he was born that way, and honestly tried without any success to better himself, he is a moral imbecile, an idiot, and irre- sponsible. If he acquired the habit, he is a monster of in- iquity ; he has put himself into a hole from which he will never, perhaps, rise; and he is clearly responsible, indirectly or in cause, for every wrong he does the laws of morality. This suhjective morality is a modification, extrinsic and super- added to the action of which there is question. It depends for all its force on the intention, and therefore the knowledge of the agent. It differs entirely from objective morality, which resides wholly in the deed done, which is a something intrinsic and essential to that deed, and is entirely inde- pendent of the agent's intention and knowledge. One is mo- rality of the man, the other is morality of his acts; and, as a man is not good unless his acts are good, subjective morality of itself without objective morality is worth nothing. And here new questions arise, those of responsibility and merit. The man whose morality is purely subjective, who does wrong without scruple, may be in one of three classes. He may be an idiot, and is no more responsible for his acts than brute animals. He deserves no reward for whatever is virtuous in his conduct ; he deserves no blame for what would be in another highly reprehensible. He may be the victim of ignorance in no way imputable to him, of ignorance that can SUMMARY 33 with no amount of reasonable endeavor be shaken off. In this case, if any such exists, he is ag'ain irresponsible for his con- dition, and for all the wrong it occasions. In neither of these two cases do the acts elicited cease to be immoral or wicked from an objective standpoint. Objective morality is some- thing outside the agent's power, and no ignorance, no idiocy can destroy or change it. Of course the insane and the grossly ignorant are not responsible before the sovereign Judge for their deeds; but responsibility, imputability and demerit are not morality, and should not be confounded with it. Last of all, a man may be the willing victim of ignorance, that he could have easily remedied at some point in his downward career, that he on the contrary fostered and encouraged by every means at his disposal. Such ignorance is of course inexcusable; and purely subjective morality, or immorality, based on it is deserving of condign punishment. By way of summary, therefore, we maintain that subjec- tive morality of itself, without objective morality for foun- dation, is nothing. Subjective morality, combined with in- vincible ignorance, is of weight in moral questions ; but such subjective morality is not subjective morality considered in itself. Invincible ignorance makes a wrong conscience right, it never makes an objectively evil act objectively good. The man's intellect is inculpably wrong, his will is right. His Jwill embraces what his intellect represents as right, and the settlement of what is right and wrong, subjectively speaking, is with the intellect, not with the will./ The cases in which subjective morality, or the agent's intention, can justify or condemn a course of conduct, are limited to such sort of acts as are indifferent in themselves to the denominations good and bad. Thus, walking is a healthful exercise for the legs, and depends entirely on purpose and circumstances for its morality. If a man uses his legs on an errand of robbery, walking becomes for him morally culpable. If he uses them on an errand of mercy, or for purposes of worship in the church, walking becomes a virtue, .g^ilful murder of the in- nocent will forever continue to be a crime, no matter what view deluded men take of the tiling. Wilful murder of the guilty by any man or body of men, not vested with the right of life and death, resident in the State, will never be any- 34 GEJnERAL ethics thing short of murder/ Lynching, for instance, is on the face of the thing immoral. Circumstances may indeed render its authors more or less responsible for their sin. Zeal for law and order may palliate the crime, a spirit of indignation may fan men's minds to a fury, and rob them for the time being of common-sense; but their method of procediire is wrong, and no amount of zeal, no degree of excitement, no influence of early education can utterly transform the nature of things, and invest crime with the properties of virtue, though in- vincible ignorance or insanity can free the criminal from blame. An Essential Difference. This is opposed to an accidental difference. Another name for the same thing is an intrinsic difference, as opposed to extrinsic. The difference between good and bad is essential, inasmuch as no power can remove this quality from good and bad actions. It is intrinsic, inas- much as the acts denominate themselves, independently of all outside interference. This difference would be merely acci- dental, if it were not wrapped up in the very being of the act ; if it could, the act remaining to all intents and purposes identically the same, be present to it to-day and absent from it to-morrow. It would be merely extrinsic, if it owed its whole force to something foreign to the act. Some philos- ophers, whatever their motive, have seen fit to set up a merely accidental and extrinsic difference betweeen good and evil. Thus, Hohhes, Rousseau and Hegel contended- that civil law is the standard of morality. Saint Lambert and Montaigne thought public opinion and tradition the rule. Von H&rf- mann ascribed everything to the stage of evolution compassed by individual consciences. We are ready with good grace to grant that these several standards are immense helps towards detecting the difference between right and wrong. Civil law, for instance, though not very universal in its applica- tions, though it leaves untouched many emergencies liable to occur in a man's daily conduct, is nevertheless uniformly fair in its enactments, and draws a sharp line between good and bad. Public opinion can generally be trusted, tradition is an abundant source of correct moral notions, and conscience when free from bias is unerring. But these measures are all open to serious objection on more scores than one. They are too ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE 35 limited in extent. They are too much subject to change. They are too liable to shift with the whims and fancies of fickle and unstable men. They are entirely subjective, and deliver over to the empire of man responsibilities, more dread- ful than he can with justice be expected to acquit himself of, vesting him with jGod^s prerogative as sole arbiter of right and wrong^Morality, unless it rests on the very nature of things, is settled on altogether too uncertain a foundation. Immediate Measure. The measure nearest to hand for practical use. The mediate measure is the more remote, more difficult of access, the last reason and final support of the im- mediate measure, the model according to which the immediate measure is shaped. Room of Measures in the Tower of Lon- don, and measures throughout the kingdom can serve for illustration. Objective Order of Things. Order is defined, ^^the arrange- ment of two or more units according to certain definite rela- tions.' ' The order spoken of in the thesis is moral order, not physical; the units composing it are moral beings, with intel- lect and free will, God and men. This moral order is two- fold, objective and subjective. The first depends altogether on things themselves, the second adds to the first the further circumstance of reception into an intellect. The objective order of things is something established by nature, or more properly by the Author of nature. Subjective order is ob- jective order grasped and recognized by the mind, or knowl- edge of things based on the relations in force between the multiplied moral units of creation. Thus, one element of objective order is the place God occupies towards men in the universe. This order, the very nature of things, requires that men acknowledge and worship God. His prerogatives as first cause and last end can be satisfied with nothing short of that twofold homage. Parents are such by nature that order is disturbed, unless children pay them the reverence, obedience and deference due their station. An innocent man has an inalienable right to his life, and only the rankest kind of disorder would refuse to respect his right. But this objec- tive order would be of little avail as a rule of conduct, unless it became part and parcel of a man's intellectual wares by entering his mind. Hence, the standard of morality in its 36 ge5teral ethics completeness, is said to be the objective order of things as un- derstood by the intellect. Ood's Wisdom and Goodness. God's wisdom, as far as we are at present concerned, is the mind of God made manifest to us in creation. His goodness is His will made manifest to us in the same mirror. Proofs I, II, III I. a, Man^s destiny in this life consists in drawing closer and closer to his last end. b, His destiny is made good by the establishment of moral rectitude in his actions. c, This moral rectitude constitutes man's supremest hap- piness on earth. a, This life and the future life are integral parts of man's whole duration. Ergo, man's destiny in this life should be as far as possible identical with that of his future life. But man 's destiny in the life to come is complete happiness, or the secure enjoyment of God forever; and the only condition re- sembling this final state, and at present possible to man, is in- complete happiness, or a closer and closer union with his last end. Ergo, man's destiny in this life consists in drawing closer and closer to his last end. b, Near union with God, as man's last end or destiny in this life, 1st, ought to imply man 's highest perfection ; 2nd, ought to be something in man's power; 3rd, ought to contribute its share towards the consummation of nature's universal end. But such is the establishment of moral rectitude in man's actions. Ergo, man's destiny in this life is the establishment of moral rectitude in his actions. With regard to the Major. 1st, Because every end implies the agent 's good, the last end implies the agent 's highest good. 2nd, Because^an is free, and the working out of his destiny must depend on his own efforts./ 3rd, Because man is a unit in nature, and God's wisdom makes it necessary for the units in nature to work together in harmony. With regard to the Minor. 1st, Man's highest good affects what is noblest in man, his reason; reason's most perfect work is order; and moral rectitude or virtue is a life in harmony PROOFS 37 with objective order. 2nd, Gifts of body like health, wealth, beauty, are independent of our wishes ; but moral rectitude is the man's own handiwork. 3rd, Creatures inferior to man work unto their ends by nature, or instinct, and necessarily ; man works unto his end by the use of free will, with full lib- erty; and so completes the graded scale of being in the uni- verse. /^c, Man 's supremest happiness on earth consists in this, that in the sum total of evil and good, good preponderates. But moral rectitude in a man's life procures this result. Ergo, moral rectitude constitutes man's supremest happiness on earth. With regard to the Minor. Apart from the fact that there are higher joys than delights of the body, just men are always the least unhappy. They own a peace the world knows not. Their wills are developed in the right direction by constant exercise in the pursuit of good. Their minds are sharpened by intellectual employment. They escape all the penalties of the law. They are strangers to the annoyance of remorse. They are free from the pains, diseases and early death that wickedness often engenders. Confirmation. The happiness bom of moral rectitude, is a figure and shadow of the happiness the blessed enjoy in Heaven. Ergo. II. 1st, Were there no essential and intrinsic difference be- tween right and wrong, there would be no acts essentially and intrinsically right and wrong. But many such acts in reality exist. Ergo, between right and wrong an essential and intrinsic difference exists. With regard to the Minor. Love of God is an act essen- tially and intrinsically right. It is right now, it was always right, and will forever continue to be right, even if the whole world entered into a conspiracy to call it wrong. Hatred of God is in precisely the same way an act essentially and in- trinsically wrong. 2nd, Right and wrong have characteristics essentially dif- ferent. Ergo, between right and wrong an essential dif- ference exists. With regard to the Antecedent. From proof of next part it will appear, that right is harmony with the objective order 38 GENERAL ETHICS of things; and wrong, absence of this harmony. Harmony and discord are essentially different. III. a, immediate measure; h, mediate measure. a, 1st, Acts are right, when in perfect agreement with the dictates of reason ; acts are wrong, when beside these dictates. But the dictates of reason are objective order, as understood by the intellect. Ergo, the immediate measure of moral rec- titude is the objective order of things, as understood by the intellect. With regard to the Major. Reason is the guide vouchsafed to man by Grod for his safe conduct, and reason's dictates are the rule of morality. With regard ta the Minor. Not to be a purely subjective standard, the dictates of reason must be founded on the ob- jective order of things. Otherwise the dictates are vagaries and hallucinations. N.B. The dictates of reason are moral obligations an- nounced by reason, the herald of the Natural Law, and they get fuller consideration in our next thesis. They are practi- cal judgments, not mere speculative statements, and always involve moral necessity or strict obligation, denoted by the word *'must" or ''ought." God must be worshipped, par- ents must be obeyed. "Must" means moral obligation or necessity, not physical. Free agents as such are incapable of physical. Moral obligation means moral necessity of putting or omitting a physically free act, absolutely required for the procurement of a good absolutely necessary for the mun in the moral order. This good is his last end. Moral obligation arises from objective order and divine command together. Kant derives it from objective order alone without God, and this is what his categorical imperative in substance means. Moral obligation arises in part from objective order, because virtue is way to last end, and virtue is harmony with objective order. Not every good act is necessary to last end, but only such good acts as cannot be omitted without detriment to ob- jective order, and reason acquaints us with them. Moral obligation arises in part from divine command, because God alone as Creator is empowered to set man a last end, tie him with a perfect moral bond and give him by way of source and origin virtue and every other perfection. PROOFS 39 2nd, Right and wrong proceed from harmony and dis- agreement with nature ; and the immediate measure of moral rectitude is what primarily enables us to distinguish with certainty between them. But to distinguish is to know, and this harmony and disagreement with nature can reach our knowledge only through the intellect, understanding things just as they are, or the objective order of things. Ergo, the immediate measure of moral rectitude is the objective order of things, as understood by the intellect. With regard to the Minor. Nature means things as God made them, things just as they are, the objective order of things. 3rd, Rejection of other standards. Not public opinion, be- cause opinion is rather measured by our standard; opinion is uncertain, changeable and unsafe. Not civil law, because law is rather measured by our standard; law cannot make cer- tain acts good, certain acts bad. b, The mediate measure of morality is that on which the immediate measure depends. But its immediate measure, the objective order of things, depends on the wisdom and good- ness of God. Ergo, the mediate measure of moral rectitude is God's wisdom and goodness. With regard to the Minor. All creation, signified by the objective order of things, proceeds from the wisdom and goodness of God. PRINCIPLES A. Man's supreme happiness is absence of pain, sickness, sorrow. Answer. Man is made up of body and soul. His body, or sense-appetite, seeks agreeable good, like animals, by instinct ; his soul, or rational appetite or will, seeks becoming good, desirable in itself, without heed to pain and sorrow, when opposed to becoming good. Soul surpasses body, and man's will is man's highest faculty in the order of morality. B. Senses ought to be consulted in this life. A^iswer. Complete happiness is impossible in this life. Man's highest good appeals to what is spiritual within him, because intelli- gence is his specific characteristic. When sense wars against reason, it must be repressed. Deficiencies will be more toler- 40 GENERAL ETHICS able, if in the domain of sense. Of course, the less pain, the better; the more at ease the sense, the better; provided only that reason, or the spiritual element in man, suffers thereby no detriment. If pain of sense, want of bodily comfort, sor- row of soul, contribute to progress in morality, they are to be welcomed with the enthusiasm of fortitude. C. Fear of loss is compatible with incomplete happiness, not with complete. THESIS IV A natural law, unchangeable, universal, eternal, has place in men; its complete and full sanction is reserved for the next life; and eternal punishment is not opposed to God's good- ness. This natural law is the foundation and corner-stone of all positive laiv. Jouin, 36-48 ; Rickahy, 133-177. QUESTION We are now satisfied, that the promotion of morality's in- terests in himself and others, is man's present destiny. For the happiness, which righteousness alone can purchase for him, is the nearest possible approach to complete bliss this earth knows. It makes of life a veritable antechamber to a blessed eternity; it leads a man right up to the threshold of God's presence; and God's enduring presence is the ne plus ultra of man 's hopes and desires. We are likewise the happy possessors of a standard sound and true, which will infallibly enable us to detect the ever present difference between right and wrong. The objective order of things, as grasped by the intellect, is our measure; and we feel secure in our posi- tion. For, in trusting our lot to this rule or measure, we are ultimately leaning on the wisdom and goodness of an all-wise and beneficent God. But here a difficulty arises. We know that a shadow and image of complete happiness will result to us from steady compliance with the exactions of morality. We know that any falling away from rectitude will be visited with punish- ment, such at least that our days will be more acquainted with woes than with blessings. Incomplete happiness at- taches to virtue ; incomplete misery, to vice. But beyond this we are at sea. Unless we establish in this matter of morality the living presence of law, framed and backed by a being of high authority, rectitude becomes a thing of mere taste, choice between incomplete happiness and incomplete misery, its obli- 41 42 GENERAL ETHICS gations are trivial indeed, because self-imposed. Some phi- losophers venture an answer to the difficulty by setting up what they call the autonomy of reason. They follow Kant. They wish wickedness, pure and simple, to be its own full chastisement, and virtue its own reward. In other words, they want no external influence whatever brought to bear on man, in the problem of mapping out his conduct. They want the disgust experienced in deeds of crime, the mind's ill-ease, to be sole bar to the commission of wrong. They would rec- ognize no sin but that superior airy sort of transgression styled philosophic. Theological sin, and the unrest it occa- sions by fear of some personal avenger, they cry down, and declare creatures of superstitious imagination. But the au- tonomy of reason is an afterthought of godlessness, and has atheism for single excuse. As a system, if reduced to prac- tice, it would in one generation involve the world in moral ruin. If reason were its own law, and judge, and headsman, our cities would soon teem with cutthroats, thieves and as- sassins. They are not a polite crew, and the shock their better instincts experience, when engaged in wrong-doing, hardly restrains their hands. The noise made by mere con- sciousness of being out of harmony with nature, makes them lose no very appreciable amount of sleep. Such sanction might possibly exert a check on high-strung, very correct dis- positions ; but it would never reach the multitude in anything like an effective way. Law alone, with its tremendous sense of obligation, with its terrifying dread of penalty, can hold our race to the ob- servance of right and the avoidance of wrong. And God would be doing mankind an incalculable injury, He would be raining down evils upon our heads, did He not step into the breach as a legislator, and confirm us in rectitude by law and all the vast machinery of retributive sanction. Were man responsible to himself only for his misdeeds, he would escape with scant justice, and would deny himself in nothing. It is our business to prove that mere knowledge of wrong done, and the confusion springing from such knowledge, are not morality's naked sanction. We have to establish the ex- istence of a law, born with the man, imperatively ordering the fulfilment of all justice, imperatively forbidding the accom- DIVISION OF LAW 43 plishment of any evil. We intend to vindicate to this law characteristics wholly its own, ranking it high above all the enactments of human positive law. We intend, further, to make good by positive argument the nature of its sanction, and show that it is the root, foundation and support of all positive law. Unless a man approaches the work of intro- ducing rectitude into his conduct with the deepest respect for natural law, and with a live consciousness of its obliga- tions, he is not fully equipped for the task imposed upon him by nature, and will inevitably miss his destiny. Hence the importance, the necessity, of setting these notions on a firm basis, of demonstrating their objective value, and placing it beyond the reach of dispute and cavil. TERMS Natural Law. Law, taken in its widest sense, is a stand- ard or rule of action, directive of the agent to its proper end. The following table presents at a glance the various possible kinds of law. Law, 3^ In widest sense, ? In less wide sense, ^ In strict and proper sense, ^ Divine, ^ Human, ^ Eternal, ^ Natural, ^ Positive, ^ Ecclesiastical, ^9 Civil, 11/ 1? The word law is a derivative from the Latin ligare, to bind ; and invariably suggests the idea of obligation. ^ Standard or rule of action, directive of agent to proper end. E.g., laws of nutrition, &c., &c. Applicable not only to man and beasts, but to dead matter as well. N.B. Action, or motion, from without is not life. 5 Standard or rule, directive of artistic efforts. E.g., laws 44 GENERAL ETHICS of painting, sculpture, poetry, oratory. Applicable to be- ings endowed with intellect, and therefore to man alone. ^ An ordinance founded on right reason, drawn up and promulgated for the common good by him who has charge of the community affected. Applicable to moral acts alone, to acts proceeding from an intellect and a free will. This defi- nition is taken bodily from St. Thomas, Summa Theol. 1. 2; Q. 90; a. 4., All four causes, material, formal, final and ef- ficient, enter into its composition. It separates law from every conceivable notion resembling the same. It observes due bounds, and keeps law within its own limits. On ac- count of these several qualities the definition is all that can be desired, and commends itself to everybody. Thus, the matter of law is derived from principles vouched for by right reason. No other rule can be of binding force on men possessed of intellects. This is so true that a clearly unrea- sonable law is no law at all. It may be well, however, to remark that, commonly speaking, the only safe position to occupy in this matter is voiced in that saying of moralists, ^'In doubt acquiescence in the will of the superior is a duty.'' The care of a community is so complex a thing, affected by circumstances so far above the understanding and apprecia- tion of individuals governed, that the superior alone, with multiplied advantages at his disposal, and a clear vision of intricate details, can best judge what ruling the exigencies of the case demand. He alone knows best the wants of his em- pire. He alone knows best what good results, in the long run, this or that enactment will, in spite of appearances to the contrary, effect. His practised eye is accustomed to look at things from a higher plane. Individuals in the state look not beyond personal convenience and inconvenience, and would, perhaps, in their selfishness little reck what fate be- fell the government, if only they escaped unhurt from the ruins. Hence, they are wide awake to detect in every new ruling some semblance of injustice. Men are born rebels, and are apt to be prejudiced judges, when passing on a law that interferes with their privileges, or cuts down the measure of their liberties. They easily lose sight of the circumstance, that legislation is primarily for the community 's benefit ; that the individual must on occasions retire into the background, NATURAL LAW 45 and submit to the indignity of being trampled upon, just to push the community's interests to the front. Hence, a law is not to be set aside the very first moment a cry of injustice is raised against it. It must be viewed on all sides, its prac- tical workings must be followed down to their minutest de- tails, and the common good, not private advantage, must be the standard of measurement. If, however, it plainly offends against the demands of right reason, it can be rated no law at all, and neglected as such. A law is not a precept. The former affects equally the whole community, the latter is re- stricted to this or that individual. The distinction between the two is brought out in the definition. Of course law is binding, only when it proceeds from a legitimate source, from the representative of authority, who alone enjoys legislative rights, as means to the discharge of his duties. Due promul- gation may be called a necessary property of law. Law is in- tended for human beings; and, as knowledge is the main- spring of all their deliberate acts, knowledge of the law must precede its fulfilment. This necessary condition must not be understood to run counter to that common saying in the courts, ''Ignorance of the law is no excuse." A law may be thoroughly well promulgated, and yet escape the notice of stray members in the community. Promulgation means simply advertisement sufficiently public and widespread to catch the attention of citizens blessed with the ordinary amount of prudence and care. It by no means ensures knowl- edge of the law to such as are too ignorant or too indifferent to help themselves. Sanction, too, capable of frightening off violators, and creating in men a salutary respect for the law, is considered a requisite for every enactment meant to be seri- ously taken. ^ Divine law has God for author, and that too in an im- mediate sense. All law proceeds from God as origin. It is strictly divine, only when God is its framer, whether He ac- complishes everything by Himself solely, or uses man as His mouthpiece. ? Human law is framed by man without immediate in- terference on the part of God. "^ Eternal law. St. Augustine, contra Faustum, 122, c. 27., offers this definition, ^* God's reason or will commanding the 46 GENERAL ETHICS preservation of natural order, forbidding its disturbance/' God is the supreme Lord of nature. He is King, with the universe for throne, and all the creatures of the universe for subjects. He is, therefore, a legislator as well; and His kingdom is under the sway of laws chosen and appointed by Himself. But He is unchangeable, and what He is to-day, He was and is from all eternity. This code of laws, therefore, for the government of His creatures, had been in His thoughts endless ages of ages before creation proceeded from the strength of His hands. Every lawmaker first submits to his mind for approval, whatever enactments he intends to later on promulgate. He likewise lays before his will tentative drafts of the same, for rejection or adoption. And, when the work of inspection is over, he stands ready to acquaint the world with his wishes. Barring whatever imperfection clings to this method of procedure, God is no exception to the rule in its fundamental points. The laws that now govern nature were first passed upon by His wisdom, and constitute in that stage of the process what we call eternal law. 5 Natural law, objectively taken, that is, viewed with ref- erence to the source from which it proceeds, is eternal law in its application to man, or become evident in rational nature ; it is man's half of God's eternal law. Subjectively taken, that is, viewed with reference to man, it is an inborn habit of mind, enabling a man to detect the harmony or discord in force between the notions that constitute morality's first prin- ciples. By principles of morality we here mean statements vouched for by reason, and indicative of right and wrong. These principles are various, and are rated in importance according to their different degi'ees of cogency. Thus, first or pmmary principles are such as have in their favor the clearest kind of evidence, and are so plain that even at first sight no man of ordinary common sense can doubt their accuracy. Instances are, ''Man must do good and avoid evil; Man must lead an orderly life ; God must be loved. ' ' Principles of this first class can under no conceivable supposition become void of effect or untrue, and they admit of no ignorance, vincible or invincible. And all this, simply because the above statements, on account of relations intervening between subject and pred- icate, contain necessary truths. Principles, immediately and GLASSES OF PRECEPTS 47 with little effort derived from these first or primary prin- ciples, constitute a second class. The ten commandments of the Decalogue are said to be laws of this second class. Some writers except the third, because it singles out the Sabbath. These principles admit of vincible not invincible ignorance. Finally, a third place is occupied hy principles, flowing indeed from first or primary and secondary principles, hut in a some- what hidden and obscure way. They become evident only after mature consideration, and on this account, perhaps, are thoroughly well grasped by only the learned. Polygamy and divorce are examples, alleged by some authors, of laws con- tained in this third class. These last principles admit of even invincible ignorance. Eternal law provides for physical and moral order alike; natural law, because meant for men, provides for moral order alone. Substitute moral order for natural order in St. Augus- tine 's definition of eternal law, add promulgated or made manifest in the light of reason, and you have at once natural law objectively taken. Objectively, then, natural law is a divine command issuing from God's reason or will, prescrib- ing the preservation of moral order, forbidding its disturb- ance. Natural law objectively taken is natural law as it exists in God, its maker ; subjectively taken, it is natural law as it exists in man, the person it affects or binds. Subjec- tively taken, natural law is an inborn habit of mind, enabling man to know what he must do and what he must avoid. Man must do only what is in harmony with moral objective order, he must avoid what is at discord with the same order ; and we already proved that this objective order is the measure of morality. He must, therefore, be able to detect this har- mony and discord, and natural law is the means put at his disposal by God. Natural law objectively taken is made up of what we call morality's first principles, commands issuing from the reason or will of God; each of the principles, like all judgments, contains a subject and predicate, and the har- mony or discord the natural law subjectively taken helps the mind to detect is between these subjects and predicates in morality's first principles. Instances are, God is a person who must be worshipped by man. Parents are persons who must be obeyed by their children. Worship is in harmony 48 GENERAL ETHICS with God, the creator. Obedience is in harmony with parents, makers and guides. Killing is at discord with innocent per- sons. Taking is at discord with what belongs to another. Untruth is at discord with the purpose of language. These principles of morality are not mere speculative state- ments, they are practical judgments, with a must or an ought. The harmony or discord is between the subject and predicate, the must or ought is from the divine command prescribing to human nature the preservation of order, forbidding its dis- turbance. This is right or this is wrong, is a mere speculative 'statement ; this ought to be done, or this ought to be avoided, is a practical judgment. Mind is not the maker of the nat- ural law, but its herald. God is its maker, man is its subject, and his mind helps him to a knowledge of it, much as the medium that advertises state legislation. In this sense the natural law is said to be written or printed in the mind or heart of man. Therefore principles of morality are practical judgments vouched for by reason, and indicative of right and wrong. '^Do good and avoid evil/' is the one first principle by ex- cellence of the natural law, because it implicitly contains the whole law, and because from it all a man's duties are deriv- able. Other principles are variously classified by various au- thors as first, second and third principles; as primary, sec- ondary and remote conclusions from both; as immediate, prox- imate and remote. First, primary and immediate admit of no ignorance, vincible or invincible ; second, secondary and prox- imate admit of vincible ignorance ; third principles and re- mote conclusions admit of even invincible ignorance. In every principle of the natural law the predicate is somehow con- tained in the subject. Otherwise some principles of the nat- ural law would be false. In first or primary principles the predicate is contained in the subject, and its presence cannot be missed by normal minds; it can be seen at a glance. In second or secondary principles the predicate can be discov- ered in the subject with ease, with small or no study. In third principles or remote conclusions the discovery is made with difficulty and at the expense of considerable study. Worship of God is a prescription of the natural law. Wor- ship of God in general, without any qualifications, is a pri- CLASSES OF PRECEPTS 49 mary principle; external worship is a secondary principle; and worship on the Sabbath, as distinct from other days of the week, can be called a remote conclusion from the other two principles. No ignorance, vincible or invincible, regarding the need of worship in general is possible. Ignorance regard- ing the need of exterior worship is possible, but always vin- cible and inexcusable. Invincible ignorance regarding wor- ship on the Sabbath is easily conceivable. Lies are forbidden by the natural law. The prohibition against lies in general, without any qualifications, is a primary principle. '^Tliou shalt not lie," is a secondary principle easily deduced from the first; and it leaves room for vincible ignorance. Thou shalt not lie, to save an important secret, to avert war, to prevent murder, is a remote conclusion deducible with some difficulty from primary and secondary, and it admits of even invincible ignorance. Theft and murder are against the nat- ural law. Avoid theft, avoid murder are primary principles. Thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not kill are secondary prin- ciples. Thou shalt not steal from motives of kindness to the poor, from motives of religion or piety, to get an education, is a remote conclusion from primary and secondary. Thou shalt not kill at the request of your victim, to do your victim a favor, to benefit the race, to send your victim to Heaven, to propagate the true religion, is a remote conclusion from pri- mary and secondary. The nature or substance of the act forbidden by natural law suggests this other division. Some principles turn on acts had in themselves, on their own account, absolutely, in a way in- dependent of every outside consideration. Instances are, hatred of God, blasphemy, idolatry, a lie. Others turn on acts had in themselves, not on their own account, hut on account of a violated right involved in the act itself; not ahsolutely, hut conditionally; not independently, hut with dependence on the right in question. Instances are, theft and murder. Others again turn on acts had in themselves, not on their own account, hut on account of moral risk or danger involved in the act. Instances are, px)lygamy, divorce, heretical and impure read- ing. Things wrong the first way admit no change of matter and are always and everywhere wrong. Things wrong the second and third waj^s admit change of matter; and, the 50 GENERAL ETHICS change made, they cease to be wrong. God can take away the right involved or the owner can lose it. God can remove the risk and danger or a proportionate cause can justify the risk or danger. In their attempts to explain God's approval of polygamy in the Old Law, writers experience trouble, and have recourse to various interpretations of natural law. One school recog- nizes three different types of precepts urged hy the natural law. These types are much the same in nature as the precepts just explained, and are called most universal, remote and more remote; or, with Meyer, primary, secondary and more remote. Examples are, *'Do good, and avoid evil." "Honor thy father and mother." "Be a man of one wife." The Thom- ists, who insist on this classification, teach that God can dis- pense with the natural law in precepts of the third class. Suarez objects to the statement, that God is at liberty to dis- pense with the natural law in any of its enactments. Since we have agreed to regard the natural law as a mere manifesta- tion of the eternal law, his position is well taken ; and we hold with him that God in sanctioning polygamy nowise inter- fered with the operation of the natural law. He procured such a change of circumstances and conditions, that polygamy fell outside of matter under the ban of the natural law. Another school, to meet the same difficulty, assigns three ways in which things can run counter to the natural law. It is agreed on all sides that natural law forbids whatever is in itself and intrinsically wrong, not merely in its consequences, not in virtue of some outside prohibition, like civil law or the injunction of a parent. Then come the distinctions. A thing, they say, can be in itself and intrinsically wrong in a threefold way. First, it can he wrong in itself, and abso- lutely; like blasphemy, idolatry and lying. The moral dis- order in this case is something wrapped up in the physical being of the act. Secondly, it can be wrong in itself, not on its own account, and not absolutely; like theft and murder. The moral disorder results not precisely from the physical act, but from the presence of some right connected with it, and violated. The self-same physical act can be entirely blame- less, when exerted to come into one's own property, or to kill a criminal condemned by the state to death. Thirdly, it CLASSES OF PRECEPTS 51 can he wrong in itself, not on its own account, hut on account of moral risk or danger it involves, like the perusal of un- chaste or irreligious literature. The moral disorder results in this case from the danger to faith and morals attendant on such reading. With regard to these divisions, it must be remarked that even natural law has no application, when the matter of the act undergoes a certain change. Thus, the forcible removal of what was another 's property will cease to be theft, if the intruder is first invested with a sound claim to it. The midwives of Israel committed no wrong, when they carried off the vessels and ornaments of the Egyptians, simply because God, who is the absolute Lord of everything, transferred to them through Moses dominion or ownership. The same remark holds good in the case of an executed crim- inal. Students of theology and medicine are obliged by their calling to read books, the mere curious perusal of which would be highly sinful, and the need of such reading in their case justifies the risk. The first of the classes just enumerated includes only such cases as admit no change of matter. God Himself cannot render blasphemy, lying, idolatry commendable. With re- gard to polygamy, all writers grant, and must maintain, that it is not a crime against the natural law in the first way, and in the same sense as blasphemy, idolatry and lying. Some contend that it resembles theft, inasmuch as the woman's rights are not respected. It must be evident that, were this supposition true, God could have made polygamy in the Old Law legitimate by depriving the woman of whatever rights it would otherwise violate. The most approved writers, how- ever, agree to regard polygamy a wrong against the natural law, inasmuch as it menaces the well-being of marriage, and so damages the race in its origin. It is fraught with danger to the stability and happiness of wedlock, and exposes children to heavy evils. Discontent, jealousy and attendant quarrels are, naturally speaking, sure to reign where polygamy is a recognized practice. God favored the patriarchs and their wives with dispositions above petty grievances of this sort, and in removing danger rendered the condition legitimate. A third school professes to find all the sinfulness attaching to polygamy in the single circumstance, that, God's prohihi- 52 GENERAL ETHICS tion presupposed, the polygamist invades the rights of God, and runs counter to His express wishes. A Catholic eating meat on Friday, would in this supposition be no less an of- fender against the natural law than the Mormon with a house full of wives. A fourth school, finally, distinguishes between enactments of the natural law strictly so called, and mere rec- ommendations urged hy nature as highly becoming, though not of binding necessity. They group under enactments of the first class universal maxims, like, "Do good and avoid evil"; conclusions readily and plainly derivable from these maxims, like the Ten Commandments; and precepts ordaining the avoidance of things intrinsically and absolutely bad, like blas- phemy. Under recommendations urging the proper they group conclusions derivable after some study from univer- sal maxims, like the statutes against polygamy and divorce; precepts ordaining the avoidance of things bad in themselves, not because of themselves, but because of danger attached, like the perusal of immoral literature. To choose, now, between the different schools, I venture to think that the explanation offered by the second school is clearest, best defined, and most to the point. Natural laWj therefore, is a mandate of reason, ordering the performance of whatever is good intrinsically and in itself, forbidding things intrinsically and in themselves bad. Seeming exceptions made in the Old Law in the cases of Isaac's intended slaughter, the Hebrew midwives, and polygamy among the patriarchs were simply no violations at all of the natural law. God worked a change in the matter on which these acts turned. He in- vested Abraham with full dominion over his son's life; He transferred to the Hebrew women rights in property that once belonged to the Egyptians; He removed from polygamy all the dangerous abuses that naturally surround such a con- dition, and so rendered it as salutary and secure as mo- nogamy. ? Positive divine law is a decree, proceeding with full free- dom from the mind of God, in the interests of common good. The ceremonial prescribed in the Old Law was positive divine law for the chosen people. The utterances in the gospels for- bidding absolute divorce and polygamy, are positive divine law in the new dispensation. Natural law is separated from POSITIVE DIVINE LAW 53 positive divine law by the absence of freedom in the legisla- tor, and by the nature of the promulgation it demands. God is not free to make lying sinful or virtuous, and the same is true of theft, murder, polygamy and divorce, when no change of matter has taken place. While ordaining certain rites and ceremonies for use in His service, He remained entirely free to select some and reject others. The natural law is such that its actual promulgation has place in the very fact of a hu- man being's existence. Up to that hour it is still possessed of what philosophy calls promulgation in aptitude. Knowl- edge of the natural law escapes a man during the period of infancy, but knowledge of the law must not be confounded with its promulgation-. Positive divine law on the contrary has all its effect, only when received by the subject bound to its -observance, and necessarily supposes some such subject actually existent, and capable at least of grasping its content. Natural law is a means indispensably necessary to the end of man. Positive divine law is, indeed, a means more or less necessary to man's end, but nohow indispensably necessary. This or that positive divine law need never have existed, and man could still compass his end. This or that positive divine law can at any time cease to ex:ist, without in the least jeopar- dizing man 's final interests. Natural law is the eternal law in its application to creatures^ endowed with reason, and as such cannot long remain hidden from an enquiring mind. Its decrees are not inscribed on tsfblets of stone, or wood, or written pages, but on a man's heart. Its promptings are ever present, and defy forgetting. The light vouchsafed by nature to all her sons is able to con- vey notions of the natural law, and interpret its dictates. No training in the schools is needed, no labor over long lists of ^^ rules and regulations. These features, peculiar to natural law, constitute another vast difference between itself and posi- tive law, whether human or divine. Positive law is of no avail whatever, unless promulgated or brought to man's no- tice by some such external sign as language, written or spoken. Any body of positive laws can of course include obligations and restrictions already imposed by the natural law. In fact, owing to the weakness inherent in men's minds and wills, it is eminently proper for legislators to insist in clearer terms 54 GENERAL ETHICS on points already defined by the natural law. This method has a twofold advantage. It makes ignorance less excusable, and adds to the sanction, already awaiting in the next life every violence done the natural law, the further punishment of immediate fine, pain or imprisonment. Law is only then purely and simply positive, when it decrees things not pre- viously settled by natural law ; when it turns on acts, which, in themselves indifferent, become right or wrong according to the good pleasure or wishes of a superior. Positive divine law has God for immediate author. Human positive law has man for immediate author. This human law is either ecclesiastical or civil. 19 Ecclesiastical law is law uttered hy the Church. ^^ Civil law is law uttered hy the state; or hy him in whose person the authority of the state resides. TJnchangeahle. The first or primary principles of natural law are absolutely unchangeable. God Himself cannot re- verse them. All its other principles, of an inferior order, are, strictly speaking, as unchangeable as these first or primary principles. God, however, as absolute Lord of the universe, can introduce into the matter, with which these inferior prin- ciples are concerned, changes that modify the whole face of things, and leave no room for the law's application. E.g., Isaac, midwives, capital punishment. Universal^ in a Twofold Sense. It hinds all without excep- tion. It is within the reach of every one^s knowledge. There can be no ignorance of primary principles. Whatever igno- rance exists regarding secondary principles, is due entirely to personal and private negligence. It is therefore voluntary, can be readily overcome, and is utterly inexcusable. Invinc- ible ignorance is conceivable in the case of remote conclusions. The essence of human nature is the same in all mankind, and this essence is the foundation of the natural law. We con- tend merely that the natural law is within easy reach of every man's knowledge. We by no means maintain that nations made up of men, whom long centuries of crime have practi- cally changed into beasts, necessarily retain a clear knowledge of nature's requirements in the matter of morality. Neither do we intend to prove that natural law is universally ob- served, or that its principles in their application invariably SANCTION 55 fare well. These first principles of morality may be firmly fixed in the minds of a pjeopla, and thearetically respected, without at all hindering that people from making serious mis- takes in their application and practical emplojonent. Eternal. It is of as long duration as its counterpart or model, eternal law. It had of course no practical application, until rational creatures appeared on the scene; but the law itself had being from all eternity in the mind of God. No enactment ceases to be a law, simply because actual subjects are wanting to observe it. It is enough if it can later on have such subjects; if, as a matter of fact, it is certainly going to have such subjects at some future period. Eternal law and natural law differ not in point of duration, but in point of subjects. The distinction between the two laws is real and inadequate. In point of subjects from eternity natural law is no worse off than eternal. Sanction Means Bernard or Punishment Fixed hy the Law- maker for the Observance or Violation, of His Law. This sanction can be of many kinds. It is internal, when the re- ward or punishment is wholly within the man himself, not due to outside influences. E.g., joy of a good conscience, and remorse. It is external, when some outside agent rewards or punishes. E.g., Heaven or hell. With regard to its effi- ciency, a sanction may be sufficient or insufficient, and that too either absolutely or relatively. It is absolutely sufficient, when it is of itself motive enough to urge a man in every case to the law's observance. It is relatively sufficient, when, of some- what less force, it avails only to urge certain kinds of men in certain kinds of cases to the law's observance. From this description one can easily derive the notion of absolutely and relatively insufficient sanction. Sanction is, besides, perfect or imperfect. Perfect, when the due proportions of justice are kept between a man's deserts and his reward or punish- ment. When the contrary happens, when sanction falls short of justice, it is called imperfect. All sanction has a twofold end or object. It is designed on the one hand to promote the reign of moral order, to keep men to their duty; on the other, to reinstate justice when dethroned by wrong; to dis- charge the debts of justice, when men deserve well of her by the performance of right. Meyer derives the difference in 56 GENERAL ETHICS force between penalties inflicted from the object this or that sanction proposes to itself. All depends, he says, on the order at stake. If punishment is meted out with reference pri- marily and principally to procuring order in the moral af- fairs of a private individual, the sanction will consist of pains destined almost wholly to cure and correct. Sanction of this sort is proper to boys receiving instruction at the hands of a tutor, and is called medicinal. If punishment is meted out primarily and principally to procure social or political order in the state, the sanction will consist of penalties in- flicted almost wholly with a view to avenging social wrongs, and is called punitive. The amendment of the transgressor, because the common good is in this case of paramount im- portance, occupies only a secondary place. It can be entirely neglected, if any attempt to secure it runs counter to the common good. This observation of Father Meyer is emi- nently correct, and can be of service later on, when the moral- ity of capital punishment is in question. Next Life. We are far from wishing to deny that viola- tions of the natural law meet with heavy punishment in this life, or that compliance with its precepts has a reward even in this life. Seneca says, Epist. 22, ' ' AVickedness takes a big swallow of its own poison." St. Augustine, Confess. I, ''It is thy good pleasure, Lx)rd, and it is a fact, that every soul out of harmony with right is its own greatest tormentor." We merely hold that the sanction, as a matter of fact attend- ant on the natural law here below, is wholly inadequate, and far from satisfying the demands of justice. The immortal- ity of the soul is warrant for the reality of a future exist- ence; and reason, apart from revelation, even if solid proofs are wanting, hints darkly at a place of eternal torments. From revelation the prison-house of fire, denominated hell, is an established fact. Philosophy can proceed no farther than prove the need and the compatibility of such a place of torment with God's attributes. Positive Law. About the justice and binding force of God's positive enactments there can be no controversy. He is in- finitely wise, infinitely just, and cannot, in virtue of these two attributes, impose on men obligations lacking any essential or necessary characteristic. His true Church, strengthened CIVIL LAW 57 by reiterated promises of guidance and assistance, can make no mistake in the field of legislation. But that branch of human positive law denominated civil, because subject to the immediate influence of men, swayed by prejudice and pas- sion, open to moments of forgetfulness and ignorance, can readily enoug^h admit of blunders, and can carry on its rec- ords rules and regulations decidedly wrong and opposed to reason. Such laws, as we have already seen^ are laws only in appearance, and have in reality no binding force what- ever. It may be well, then, to discuss what qualities are needed to render any positive law, notably civil, worthy of consideration, respect and obedience. A law, to be worthy of the name, must, along with due and sufficient promulga- tion, fulfil certain conditions classified under three heads. Some affect the lawmaker; others, the matter contained in the law. The lawmaker must he possessed of genuine authority over the persons, for whom he legislates, in points the law touches. The vitality of all law has its origin in God, and God can seal with His approval only such mandates as pro- ceed from legitimately constituted superiors. In the matter of its prescriptions the law must he just and possihle. It must be just, because otherwise it would not have natural law for foundation and support. It must be possible, in accordance with that worn truth, ''Ad impossible nemo tene- tur." "No man is bound to do the impossible." Justice brands as worthless whatever law conflicts with a citizen's higher duty, whatever law is neither necessary nor useful for the common good. Natural law cries out against any- thing like the sacrifice of a higher duty to lower offices, and the very essence of law, as set forth in its definition, makes the common good an indispensable requisite. The common good must be sought, too, in a fair way. To secure this fairness, the law must with an impartial hand distribute burdens over the whole commonwealth. It must not enrich the wealthy at the expense of the poor. It must not rob the rich, to confirm the idle in their wicked ways. But everything must, as far as possible, be so nicely adjusted that neither the rich, nor the poor, nor the idle can with justice complain. Jus- tice likewise brands as worthless whatever law imposes obli- gations impossible of fulfilment. Impossibility is either phys- 58 GENERAL ETHICS ical or moral. An obligation is physically impossible of ful- filment, when it simply surpasses the physical strength at a man's disposal, e.g., a law ordering subjects to push moun- tains into the sea. It is morally impossible of fulfilment, when its observance is beyond measure difficult. Liberty can have no play, when a man 's physical force is unequal to some task assigned; and law without liberty is a dead letter. Suarez remarks that the difficulty involved in compliance with voluntary poverty, chastity and obedience, induced God, per- haps, to make these several virtues matter of counsel, not law, in the new dispensation. Several maxims well worth re- membering flow as corollaries from the doctrine just made good. A human enactment at open variance with God's law is no law at all, and entirely void of value. An enactment favoring injustice is no law. Rulers have no right to impose unjust laws on their subjects. Despotism and absolutism are species of government opposed to these maxims; and some philosophers, untrue to their calling, have upheld systems favoring these crimes. MachiavelU, for instance (1469-1527), allows the advantage of men in power to usurp the place of justice. Hohhes (1588-1679) is of opinion that supreme au- thority can make no mistake, incur no blame. Spinoza (1632- 1677), because of his pantheistic notions, is guilty of the same folly. Rousseau (1712-1778) attributes to democracy the prerogatives ascribed by Hobbes to monarchy. Hegel and his followers make the state God, and pass by easy steps to the absurdity of a public conscience, the standard and rule of private morality. We who advocate the right are accused of introducing into public affairs baneful subjectivism, deroga- tory to the majesty of the law, and subversive of its efficacy. But the accusation is a vile slander. Our enemies are, on the contrary, subjectivism's most steadfast allies, they degrade law to the level of conscienceless bullying, substitute might for right, and, robbing law of all moral efficacy, arm it with the force and violence of unprincipled coercion and tyranny. Our platform rests on the eternal principles of justice, founded on the eternal law of God, and manifest to man in his reason. These principles are certainly a more objective reality than the empty whims and selfish enactments of greedy rulers. To clothe an unjust enactment with a majesty borrowed from CIVIL LAW 59 so sacred a thing as law, is like blasphemy ; and to set might over right is to step from civilization to savagery. To avoid mistakes in practice, too much stress cannot be laid on that principle advanced earlier in the course of these remarks, '\In doubt y acquiescence in the will of a superior is a duty." Duly constituted authority is always in possession, and its rulings must be considered just and fair, until their injus- tice and unfairness are solidly and incontrovertibly proved. If, however, there can be no doubt about a law's injustice, resistance to the law may become a duty or a privilege. If it antagonises some divine good, if it stands up against some law of God, we enjoy no liberty in the matter ; we are bound to disregard the unjust law, and die martyrs rather than observe it. ''We must obey God rather than men.'* A.A.4. If it plainly antagonises some human good, whether it tends to promote private greed at the expense of the public wel- fare, or oversteps the bounds of authority to work harm, or fosters favoritism to the detriment of justice, disobedience be- comes a privilege, of which subjects may avail themselves or not, as they please. Such a law certainly has of itself no claims on the conscience. Conscience, however, may exact the personal inconvenience, arising from obedience, as a lesser evil than the consequent scandal and disturbance. But in that case the obligation arises not from the unjust law, but from the natural duty men lie under of at times sacrificing their own interests to further the interests of society. Foundation and Corner-stone. This question has a more important bearing on Ethics than might at first sight be sup- posed. We are at present grounding ourselves in principles, that will afterwards serve us in the solution of difficulties, aris- ing from the post we occupy in affairs. As citizens, we shall be amenable to the law ; and, unless we recognize God in the law, we shall be possessed of only half the truth, and little able to faithfully discharge our duties. Every enactment emanat- ing from legitimate authority has God at its back, and phi- losophy is witness to the fact. If, as we hope to prove, nat- ural law is the foundation and corner-stone of all positive law, and if natural law is God's own decree, men cannot do violence to civil or ecclesiastical law without dishonor to God. Law, therefore, has a double avenger, God and the 60 GENERAL ETHICS State; and good citizenship becomes a matter of conscience. Law owes only half its efficacy to the legislator's will, the other half descends from Heaven. Fear of God 's wrath must act along with dread of fine and imprisonment, to exercise a salutary restraint on the passions of men. In law, as in everything else, we can, with the Scholastics, consider matter and form. Its matter is the substance of the order it contains. Its form is that binding force it possesses, that moral necessity it imposes. We cannot contend that the body or substance of every positive law is contained in the natural law. Many positive laws have for object the per- formance of acts in themselves quite indifferent, about which natural law has not a word to say. But no matter how in- different in itself an act prescribed by positive law may be, we hold that natural law, after human legislation has spoken, vests the act with all the binding force any dictate of the natural law owns. We further hold that, by a process of reasoning, every ruling made by positive law is reducible to a principle hidden somewhere in the natural law. Pkoofs I. A natural law has place in man. II. This natural law is, ^ unchangeable, ^ universal, ° eter- nal. III. Its complete and full sanction is reserved for the next life. IV. Eternal punishment is not opposed to God's goodness. V. Natural law is the foundation of all positive law. I. 1st, Experience is witness, through the medium of con- science, that certain rules of conduct, exacting obedience, wring acknowledgment from the mind by their clearness. But laws of the kind constitute what we call natural law. Ergo, nat- ural law has place in man. With Regard to the Major. Worship God, honor parents, do unto others as you would have others do unto you. With Regard to the Minor. These rules have their origin in human nature, not in prejudice, education or ignorance. They carry authority, and impress man with a sense of re- sponsibility and obligation. PROOFS FOR PROPERTIES 61 2nd, Every force in nature, to produce its own proper ef- fect, must be furnished with a certain determinant suited to itself, holding it to a fixed line of action. But natural law is to the human will such a determinant. Ergo, natural law has place in man. With Regard to the Major. The most holy will of God and His wisdom demand as much. God cannot be indifferent to the promotion of order in the universe; and, in any hy- pothesis but that set down in the Major, He would have been at too small pains to promote order. With Regard to the Minor. Natural law alone exercises proper and becoming restraint over man. As a free agent no chain but law can bind him. Other agents are limited to this or that effect by a something implanted in their very na- ture. Man, therefore, should be held in check by a law bound up in his nature, born with him, and antecedent to all the declarations of divine and human positive law. 3rd, The whole world is willing witness to the reality of a natural law. The noblest among the minds of antiquity, poets, philosophers and statesmen, have left us their senti- ments, couched in the choicest and sublimest language, e.g., Oedipus Rex, line 863-871; Antigone, lines 446-460. Plato, Apologia, par. 29, D. Ch. 17. Republic, Bk. 4, par. 427. Gorgias, par. 483, E; par. 4^8, b; par. 491, E; Cicero, pro Milone, Ch. 4, § 10. Philippics XI, C. 12, § 28. De Legibus, I, c. 6 ; II, c. 4. Lactantius, Institut VI, 8. II. a, b, c. That is unchangeable, universal and eternal, which is necessarily connected with the essence of rational creatures, which is contained in God's wisdom. But the nat- ural law fulfils this twofold condition. Ergo. With Regard to the Major. ^' Essences are unchangeable, i.e., that by which a thing is what it is, cannot change, as long as the thing remains what it is, for instance, a man. ^' Essences are universal, i.e., wherever a man exists, there also a man's essence exists. N.B. The natural law is for this reason, at least in point of being or reality, universal. It is universally known, from the fact that no human being can be unequal to the task of acquainting himself with his own nature. Ignorance, therefore, of the natural law is the result of accident, not a necessity. Besides, no one is ignorant 62 GENERAL ETHICS of a certain few very evident principles. ^' Essences are eternal metaphysically, not physically ; in the sense that they have a being without beginning and without end in God's thoughts. Law can exist before its actual subjects exist, as happens when kings make laws with intent that they go into effect a year after their promulgation. With Regard to the Minor. Natural law is reason's inter- pretation of the eternal law, and reason combined with ani- mality is man's essence. The eternal law is God's wisdom, and the natural law is a reflection of the eternal. Objectively, natural law is eternal law, restricted to rational creatures, and in this sense it is eternal. Subjectively, natural law is rea- son's interpretation of eternal law, and in this sense it is tem- poral. III. N.B. That some sanction is necessary, must be evi- dent from elementary notions of justice, holiness, wisdom and providence. God could not consistently with His attributes impose on mankind so serious an obligation as the natural law, and then view with indifference its fulfilment and con- tempt. He would be unjust to men, if He failed to reward the doers of the law, and punish its violators. Men can merit de condigno with God because of the implicit promise in God 's gift of free will. This supposed indifference, resulting from the absence of all sanction, would likewise be a blot on His sanctity. He would be decidedly unholy, if He treated alike sinner and saint, rebel and servant. His wisdom could be called into question, and His providence would be empty as a dream. Even human legislators are far-seeing enough, and zealous enough for law and order, to visit with punishment every infraction of their behests. When discussing Kant's autonomy of reason, we agreed that mere consciousness of duty done is not a sufficient reward for virtue, and that mere consciousness of a quarrel with ourselves is not an effective bar against crime. To prove, therefore, that complete and full sanction is reserved for the next life, we argue thus. ^' Virtue's complete and full reward cannot be contained in things, that must on occasions be sacrificed for virtue's preservation. But all the good things of this life, yea, life itself, must on occasions be sacrificed for virtue 's preservation. Ergo, complete and full sanction is reserved for the next life. HELL AND BOD'S GOODNESS 63 N.B. Reward must be more attractive than the sacrifice. Cause cannot be inferior to effect. The sum of 499 dollars could never be full and complete return for 500 dollars. ^' Punishment must be such, that within reason no greater can be devised, because an infinite person is seriously offended. But present punishment falls short of this. Ergo, sanction is reserved for next life. N.B. The Major could read. Sanc- tion, while not unduly severe, must be efficacious. With Regard to the Minor. Defects of present punish- ment. The just in this life suffer grievous ills, the wicked flourish. The pangs of conscience are trivial compared with the ad- vantages reaped from crime. The good always enjoy a pre- ponderance of blessings over ills. This preponderance ad- mits of degrees. It would be greater than it now is, if the prosperity of the wicked and the grievous ills of the just were interchanged. An eternal hell is weak at times to stay the arm of sin; any threat of temporal punishment would on such occasions prove empty and worthless. The wicked, who die in their sins, would be able to boast for all eternity of their superiority over God. IV. 1st, From the Very Meaning of God's Goodness. In- finite goodness consists in a willingness to so far share itself with free beings as free beings desire union. But eternal punishment is not opposed to this willingness. Ergo, eternal punishment is not opposed to God's infinite goodness. With Regard to the Minor. If free beings deliberately put themselves out of condition for union with God, the fault lies with themselves alone. God's goodness must not interfere with man's freedom. God stands ever ready to lavish His affections on the sons of men, and pour Himself out on them. He is not otherwise minded even towards sons who have for- feited their inheritance, and consort with the damned. But these sons are now unfortunately capable of hatred only, and utter strangers to emotions of love. They have rejected God, the universal good. Outside of universal good nothing but evil exists, and evil is the formal object of hatred. God's readiness, therefore, meets with an insuperable impediment, and is destined to remain forever void of effect. If the 64 GENERAL ETHICS damned could love God, there would be no hell. Confirma- fiQfi — God need not give to free creatures favors which they deliberately refuse. God wishes all to be saved with antece- dent will. 2nd, From the Absurdity Apparent in the Opposite Doc- trine. The denial of eternal punishment involves an absurd- ity. Ergo, eternal punishment is not opposed to God's good- ness. With Regard to the Antecedent. Union with God and per- severance in hatred of God are conflicting notions; and, were the punishment of sin anything short of eternal pain, sinners would after death, at some point of time or other, enjoy union with God and remain His enemies. Since man's period of probation closes with death, no power can avail him to change the relation he holds with God in his last mo- ment. Any other view of probation would encourage crime in this life by unduly exalting God's mercy at the expense of His justice and holiness. 3rd, From the Very Meaning of Sanction. Complete and full sanction necessarily calls for eternal punishment. Ergo, eternal punishment is not opposed to God's goodness. With Regard to Antecedent. Complete and full sanction calls for penalties, severe enough to ensure observance of the law. But, in the present order of things, nothing short of eternal pains can effect this result. Even with hell open before them, men daily commit crimes, and, driven by pas- sion, take the dread risk. 4th, God's goodness suffers no loss, when He allows free beings to choose what they will. But free beings, when they spurn aside their true end, make deliberate choice of ever- lasting pains. Ergo, eternal punishment is not opposed to God's goodness. With Regard to the Minor. They make choice of God's eternal hatred, without any chance of remedy; and hell is nothing more, nothing less, than God's eternal hatred. V. Positive law derives from natural law its binding force, it is void of all effect when opposed to natural law, and is, in the main, only an application of natural law to particular places, times and persons. Ergo, natural law is the foundation and corner-stone of positive law. PRINCIPLES 65 With Regard to the Antecedent, God alone is vested with full and independent right to impose obligations on free- born men; and, if natural law contained no injunction re- garding the duty of subjects to their superiors, positive law would be little better than an idle waste of words. The chief reason why most sensible men submit to the requirements of positive law, is found in the circumstance that they recog- nize divinity at its back. They know themselves smart enough to break the law without falling into the law's clutches, they regard it a too easy matter to cheat the law of imprisonment and chains ; but they fear with a wholesome dread that eternal avenger of the law, whose eye never sleeps, whose prison- house never yields up its dead. All human positive law, from whatsoever source its matter is derived, gets its form or binding force from natural law. Some positive laws urge matter already prescribed by the natural law, others urge matter in itself indifferent; and even in the latter case some natural law counsels the law- maker to legislate. We are talking in the main of positive laws belonging to the first class, though what we say is in a measure true of so-called purely positive laws. All author- ity is immediately from God; and, the gift once made, nat- ural law prescribes obedience. Without this authority from God, no ruler has the right to make laws for free men against their consent, that is a prerogative of God alone; and God's connection with authority makes the presence of natural law imperative. As a matter of right, positive law without nat- ural law for support, is not worth the paper it is written on. A king may have all the physical force needed to exe- cute his rulings; but might is not right, and, unless natural law sustains him, he has no right whatever to impose his wishes on a free people. More men and better men are kept from theft and murder by fear of God than by fear of fine and im- prisonment ; and the few restrained by these lesser considera- tions alone are beneath our notice. They are not good citi- zens in the full sense of the word. Principles I, II, III, IV, V I. A. God depends not on eternal law, and yet He owes it to His wisdom to work in harmony with order; and order is * 66 GENERAL ETHICS eternal law. Self-imposed dependence is no real dependence, and, therefore, no imperfection. Dependence implies two, and God is one. The lawmaker is superior to his law, but can elect to observe it. God must choose to observe His law, be- cause He enjoys no freedom of contrariety regarding virtue and sin. B. Reason is not the natural law. It makes the law manifest to men. The New York Sun is not the law, though it prints and publishes the law. Were reason the natural law, each individual would be a law to himself; and law is an obligation imposed by another. C. The natural law leaves room for civil, because it omits details; and two sanctions are better than one. Some principles in the natural law are obscure, particularly in sec- ond and third classes. D. The natural law depends not on the free will of God, but on His wisdom or essence. E. First principles of the natural law are the same with all men. Men differ, when they come to apply these first principles. We instance the treatment some savages accord their parents and wives. F. Before creation there was no actual subject for nat- ural law. Possible subjects destined to become actual were enough. Distinguish between natural law objectively taken, and subjectively taken. G. Natural law is against man's nature, because it de- stroys his freedom. Answer: It destroys his moral freedom, not his physical freedom; the licere, not the posse. H. Natural law would be inseparable from man 's nature. And yet it is separate from infants and madmen. Answer: It is separable from them in nearest first act, and in second act ; not in farthest first act. Second act means actual judgment; nearest first act means readiness due to habits; farthest first act means intellect. I. God is free; and, therefore, natural law is not neces- sary. Answer: God is free to create, not free to impose law in the hypothesis of creation. Absolutely speaking, God is free ; PRINCIPLES 67 hypothetically speaking, He is not free. No outside force compels Him, but His infinite perfection. II. J. Principles of natural law. Three classes. First, evident; second, easily deducible from first; third, deducible froan fir^t and second with some difficulty. Examples are, Do good and avoid evil; worship God, honor your parents; fight no duel, tell no lie. Principles of first and second classes are called more general, and cannot be invincibly unknown to any man vested with the use of reason. Prin- ciples of first class are known per se and with evidence. Their matter is evident from study of terms ; their obligation, from study of human nature, inasmuch as man is a being ab alio, not a being a se. K. Whole nations went astray regarding theft, suicide, murder. Answer: They knew the natural law, and went wrong in its application to particular cases. They killed their parents, to save them from greater evils. Parents asked children to slay them, not to be old and decrepit in next life. Theft was reputed skill; suicide, bravery; wives were sent ahead to be company for husbands. L. God can change physical laws. Ergo, natural law. Answer: No parity. Not against the nature of a phys- ical force to refuse it cooperation, or oppose impediments, or use it for a contrary purpose, like fire for cooling. Physical forces are mere means, and can be howsoever employed. Man is more than a mere means. He is free, and has initiative of his own. To put an act intrinsically wrong, is against his nature, and God cannot hinder the thing. If God allowed it approvingly, He would be running counter to His wisdom and holiness. M. In the cases of Abraham and Isaac, the midwives and Egyptian property, the patriarchs and polygamy, God changed the matter of the law. He did not dispense. III. N. There would seem to be no sanction in this life, because pleasure attaches to vice, injustice is profitable, and virtue begets pain. Answer: The pleasures of vice are not straight, but blended with manifold evils, that the wicked are little able 68 GENERAL ETHICS to bear. Profit attaches to injustice, not essentially, but accidentally. Injustice on occasions proves most unprofitable. The pain virtue begets is easily borne, with the help of a good conscience and hope of future ble^edness. One reward is essential to virtue, and can never be absent. It is a help to honorable conduct. Three rewards are connatural, su- premacy of reason, resulting peace, and health of body. Re- wards of a third class morally speaking accrue to virtue ; and they are wealth, honor, esteem, and the like. Such rewards as naturally and morally speaking fall to the lot of virtue, can by accident fail, though not regularly. Virtue, besides, procures untold social advantages, touching family, state and Church. God sometimes visits His friends with adversity in the capacity of a Father, not a lawmaker. He sometimes re- wards the wicked in this life, because the future life will admit of no recompense for the little good they do. IV. 0. Heaven and hell encourage men to work from an imperfect motive. But God recommends these motives not in an absolute way, but only in the supposition that other motives fail of influence with human imperfection. The proc- ess is negatively imperfect, or less perfect; not positively, or altogether imperfect. P. There would seem to be no proportion between a momentary sin and an eternal hell. Answer: No proportion of time, but of justice. Q. The purpose of sanction is to correct the criminal, or restrain him from wrong. Eternal punishment defeats purpose. Answer: Sanction can be viewed as a threat or an actual- ity. Its purpose as a threat is secondary; its purpose as an actuality is primary. Its complete or combined purpose is the preservation of order. Before order takes harm, it threat- ens; after order takes harm, it punishes, and so restores things to primitive condition of equity. The pendulum swings back. In this life sanction has for secondary purpose the correction of the criminal and restraint of others. Here we are in probation. In the next life probation is at an end, and sanction strikes a balance. Sinners, who refused God glory here, do unwilling homage to His holiness and justice hereafter. PRINCIPLES 69 R. Many atheists know nothing of hell. Ergo, no hell for them. Answer: They doubt regarding hell, and by their own fault. They are not certain regarding its non-existence. It is enough for the criminal to put an act deserving the pen- alty. Murderers are hanged, whether they know the penalty or not. S. Hell itself is not sufficient sanction. Ergo. Answer: It furnishes motive enough for the law's observ- ance, though it fails to coerce free men. V. T. Every offense against positive law is against nat- ural law, mediately not immediately. A fault against positive law is not necessarily against natural law, because natural law is the remote, not the near cause of positive law. In every such case no natural law would be broken, were it not for the positive law. THESIS V VARIOUS MORAL NOTIONS The five caUses of morality, final, material, formal, model and efficient. Generic and specific morality. Objective and subjective morality. Good, bad and indifferent acts. Moral- ity's subjective measure is synderesis and conscience. Moral- ity's efficient cause is intellect and will. Appetite, the pas- sions, and will. Morality's root is freedom of will. Volun- tary and involuntary acts. End and intention. Morality's obstacles, ignorance and error affect the intellect; the pas- sions, notably fear, affect the will; violence affects executive not appetitive factdties, ordered not elicited acts. Jouin, 19- 28; 48-56; Bickaby, 27-64. Ethics is the science of putting order in man's free acts, with principles derived from reason for ultimate basis, the principles themselves being of the rock-bottom variety, last, farthest away, remotest from the student. Ethics is the study of morality in its last causes, compassed in the light of rea- son. Like everything else, morality has five causes, final, ma- terial, formal, efficient and model. Its final cause, its pur- pose, what the agent seeks in its prosecution, is happiness, complete and incomplete; and this phase of morality was discussed in our first three theses. Its end of deed is order in man's free acts, its end of doer is resulting happiness. Recall clock and clockmaker. Its material cause, its subject- matter, its content, the determinable element of which moral- ity is made, like the body in a man, the bricks and mortar in a house, is distinctively human acts, acts proceeding from a free will and an intellect, adverting to the moral good or evil in a thing. And, though we gave these acts some notice in our first thesis, we delayed their full discussion to this present occasion, because persuaded that we can now under- 70 OBJECT, END, CIRCUMSTANCES 71 stand them better. Its formal cause is good and evil in the moral order; and these notions await fuller development. Good and evil in the moral order are regularly designated right and wrong. The second and third paragraphs of our third thesis deal with the formal cause of morality, inas- much as they establish an essential, intrinsic difference be- tween right and wrong acts, and supply us with a standard of measurement, enabling us to detect this essential, intrinsic difference. In other words, some acts are so right, that they get their rightness from nothing outside themselves ; so right, that viewed in themselves they cannot be made wrong by Al- mighty God Himself ; so right, that rightness is of their very essence and inamissible. Other acts are so wrong, that irreg- ularity is in their very substance, irremovable therefrom by God Himself, and beyond being changed by law, custom, con- science or whatever else. Instances of the two classes are, love of God, worship, obedience to parents; and hatred of God, blasphemy, a lie. We distinguish between generic morality, and specific. Generic merely denominates an act moral; specific morality denominates it good or bad, virtue or vice. The generic morality of an act, making it moral, is settled by its origination in an intellect and a will. The spe- cific morality of an act, making it good or bad, is gotten from its harmony in whole, or discord in part, with the objective order of things. The determinants of an act's morality, specifically considered, are its object, its agent's end or in- tention, its circumstances. If all three are in harmony with the objective order, the act in question is morally good; if any one of the three is at discord with the objective order, the act is morally bad. This last statement remains to be proved, and it will get our attention later. For the better understanding of generic and specific morality, it may prove a help to recall animal, man and brute, with their endless varieties. Animal is the genus; man and brute, the species; races of men and breeds of brutes are classes, not species. In much the same way, moral acts are the genus; good and bad acts, or virtues and vices, are the species; while virtues and vices, grouped under particular names, are classes, not species. Moral acts, constituted by the fact that they proceed from 72 GENERAL ETHICS intellect and will, are a genus capable of division into the two species, good and bad acts. Harmony and discord with the objective order are their specific differences. Ethics is practical, and there is question always of an individual con- crete act, and we want to know to what species it belongs. We say that object, end and circumstances are its specific determinants, and we are practically saying that the act is morally good or bad inasmuch as the whole individual moral act is in harmony, or part of it is at discord with the objec- tive order. "Whole individual moral act means object, end and circumstances. Ohject means act, end means moral, cir- cumstances mean individual. Different virtues and different vices are not species properly so called. They are classes under species. Like man and brute in Porphyry's Tree vir- tues and vices are infimae or lowest species. They admit of different classes, but not of different species. An infima species cannot be conceived as a genus containing different species, but only as a species containing different individ- uals, and these in turn constitute different classes. There are no different species of men, though there are different races or classes of men; and so there are no different species of virtue or vice, but only different classes or kinds. Man and brute are different species of animal, because they differ in essence. Justice and charity are not different species of virtue, because they do not differ in essence, inasmuch as they are moral goods. Their essences, namely genus and specific difference, are the same, moral acts in harmony with objective order. Different species must have different essences, differ- ent classes have the same essence and different accidents. No one act can belong to two different species, but the same act can belong to two different classes. One act cannot be at the same time virtuous and vicious, though one act ordered by the will can be at the same time justice and charity, as when a man owes five dollars and gives ten. It is quite possible for a charitable man to become a just man, without ceasing to be charitable; it is quite impossible for a rational animal or a man to become an irrational animal or a brute. And what is true of man as a lowest species, is true of virtue as a lowest species. Though we are not now specially concerned with the classification of the different virtues and different J OBJECT, END, CIRCUMSTANCES 73 vices, but with the specification of generically moral acts, it is quite true to say that object, end and circumstances classify virtues and vices as well as specify moral acts. Ob- ject, end and circumstances are not the specific differences of good and bad acts, but the specific determinants limited or determined by the specific differences, harmony and dis- cord with the objective order. All three must be in har- mony with the objective order to constitute a good act, dis- cord in any one of the three with the objective order constitutes a bad act. In conjunction with harmony and discord they determine the specific morality of a generically moral act. They contribute jointly with harmony and discord to the whole essence of a morally good or a morally bad act. There are no different species of moral good and moral evil, though tliere are different species of morally good and morally evil acts. Justice is a species of morally good acts, it is not a species of moral good, because no moral good is contradic- torily opposed to it. Man is a species of animal, because brute is contradictorily opposed to him. Justice and injus- tice are not species of virtue, because virtue is not common to the two. Justice and charity are not species of virtue, 'because, though virtue is common to the two, their specific differences are the same, and one is not contradictorily op- posed to the other. St. Thomas, S. T. 1, 2, q. 19, a. 1, contends that acts get their specific morality from object alone, to later share the preroga- tive with end and circumstances. Therefore object must admit of several meanings. In one sense or Avide sense it includes end and circumstances, in the other it excludes them. In wide sense object of act means the whole term of the man's wish, the whole good thing known to the intellect and sought or chosen by the will, with every attendant circumstance. Like every whole the whole term or whole good has parts, and these parts are what we call the object in strict sense, end and circumstances. Object, therefore, in strict sense, is what the will on its own account and primarily wishes with a bearing on morality. Circumstances are accidents morally affecting the act, whether by way of object or by way of agent; and they are what the will wishes, not on their own account primarily, but on account of object or end and sec- 74 GENERAL ETHICS ondarily. They are answers to the questions, quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando; meaning who, what, where, with what helps, why, how, when. Some circum- stances physically affect the act, and we are not talking of them. An instance would be to give an alms with the left hand or the right hand. Person is a circumstance, quis, or who, and it means here not the bare substance of a person, a mere man, a mere woman, a mere child, but a person as af- fected with modifications that base moral relations, like a father, a mother, a son, a laymam, a priest. Some circum- stances, like quantity, leave their acts in the same class of virtues or vices, as &ve or ten dollars in the case of theft; others, like place, put their acts in different classes, as theft in a church becomes theft and sacrilege. End is itself a cir- cumstance, cur or why, and the same is true of object, quid or what; but just as quid or what, taken as a circumstance, is made to mean quantum, how much, or quale, of what sort, so cur or why taken as a circumstance is made to mean end of deed or finis operis, reducible itself to object. End as dis- tinguished from circumstance means end of doer, finis operan- tis, an intrinsic accident of the agent, not an intrinsic acci- dent of the deed; not the purpose nature attached to the work, but the purpose actuating the agent to perform it. Think of clock, time and money, with time for end of deed, or thing made, and money for end of doer or person making. To constitute an act good all the determinants must be good, to constitute an act evil, only one of the three need be evil; and St. Thomas sees in this circumstance another proof of the difficulty attaching to virtue as compared with vice, declaring that the surpassing value of virtue makes the trou- ble worth while. This fact is gathered up in the terse say- ing, ^'Bonum ex Integra causa, malum ex quocunque defectu.^' Good results from a complete and total cause , evil from any defect in the cause. What the agent chooses must be right, the reason why he chooses it must be right, and the circum- stances attaching to what and why must be right. If any of the three happens to be wrong, the whole act is morally wrong. Object is finis operis, end of deed; end is finis operantis, end of doer. The object of murder is the destruction of an OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE MORALITY 75 innocent man's life, the object of theft is the seizure of an- other's property against his rational wishes, the object of a clock is the indication of time. The end of murder may be revenge, or plunder, or removal of an unfriendly witness, removal of a Church persecutor, kindness to a parent, and the like. The end of theft may be the purchase of an auto, alms to the poor, gift to a benefactor, payment of a debt and the like. Circumstances affect both object and end. Murder of a father by his son, in a church, to keep him from sin. Object can likewise mean the term of the act, terminus ac- tionis; the person or thing the act touches or affects, God, self, the neighbor, creatures without reason. When God is object, because He is good, without any admixture of evil, no concrete act can be indifferent with regard to object, be- cause turning towards complete good is necessarily good, turn- ing away from complete good is necessarily evil. With self, neighbor and irrational creatures it is different; they are mixtures of good and evil, and turning towards them is not necessarily good, turning away from them is not necessarily evil. To turn towards the good in them, and to turn away from the evil in them are good acts; to turn away from the good in them, and to turn towards the evil in them are bad acts. Therefore, acts bearing on creatures, even in the con- crete, are of indifferent morality on the part of object of the act. This is far from meaning that individual acts in the concrete are ever indifferent. They are always definitely good or evil, but they get their specific or definite morality not from object of act, but from end of agent, and no indi- vidual concrete act is without its definite and determined purpose. Hatred is all right, when aversion from evil in- volves tendency towards good; hate is all wrong, when aver- sion from evil involves aversion from good. To walk, to drink, to talk, are acts with self for object, and these acts are never put without a purpose or motive different from and prior to the acts themselves. Walking, drinking and talking cannot be motives for the wish to walk, drink or talk, because they do not exist before the wish is conceived, and cause must precede effect. Therefore, some motive prior to the wish inspires these several acts, and changes these morally indiffer- ent acts on the part of object to specifically good or evil acts 76 GENERAL ETHICS on the part of agent. Purposes like prayer, health, temper- ance, kindness, make these acts morally good; purposes like theft, gluttony, drunkenness, anger make these acts morally evil. And what is true of acts with self for object, is true of acts with the neighbor and irrational creatures for object. Again, we distinguish between objective morality and sub- jective morality, much as we distinguish between objective certainty and subjective; and, just as purely subjective cer- tainty, without objective for basis and foundation, is error rather than truth, so purely subjective morality, or subjec- tive goodness without objective goodness for basis and founda- tion, is badness or vice rather than goodness or virtue. Hence, a man can be good, though he puts a bad act, he can be bad though he puts a good act, meaning always in the matter of conscience, or subjectively. He can tell a lie and think it a duty. His will is right, his mind is wrong. He can tell the truth and think it a sin. His mind and will are both wrong. One is morality of the man, conscience apart from act; the other is morality of his act, act apart from conscience. Objec- tive morality is in the whole deed or act itself, without any reference whatever to the truth or falsehood of the doer's knowledge ; and of this kind of morality there was question in the second and third paragraphs of our third thesis. The only kind of subjective morality, that regularly deserves notice, is the kind based on objective ; and of this we speak when we say that the specific determinants of morality are the act's object, its doer's end or intention, and the circumstances affecting both. Conscience is the measure of pure subjective morality, and will get our attention later. Certainty is entirely a matter of intellect, morality is a matter of intellect and will together. Certainty turns on truth, morality on conduct, and the will has more to do with conduct than the intellect. The intellect is true, objectively and subjectively certain, only when it grasps things as they are, only when it sees murder as murder, theft as theft. It is false, subjectively certain, objectively ignorant or wrong, when it grasps things otherwise than as they are, when it views murder as charity, theft as commendable skill. Intellect is only one factor in morality, will is the other and more im- portant. MORAL ACTS 77 All three determinants, object, end and circumstances, have their own objective and subjective morality. Their objective morality is like a fact, and quite independent of the agent's thinking ; their subjective morality is not a fact, but the view the agent 's mind takes of them. Per se, and therefore regu- larly, man's mind hits the truth; per accidens, and therefore in rare and exceptional cases, the mind can miss the truth. In such exceptional cases subjective morality is at variance with objective, and ignorance is usually responsible for the mistake. This ignorance is either vincible or invincible, within the thinker's control or beyond it. Some degree of carelessness attaches to vincible ignorance, and carelessness is blameable and punishable. No such carelessness attaches to invincible, and it is therefore without blame and unpun- ishable. Objective morality, as distinguished from subjective, is the morality of the object of the act in strict sense, and end, and circumstances, viewed as facts, as they are in themselves; subjective morality is morality of the same three determinants, as they are viewed by the mind of the agent. And this. is what we mean when we say that subjective is the morality of the man, objective is the morality of his act. A man is not good, unless his purpose and its attendant circumstances are good, as well as the object of his act. Neither is he good, unless the object of his act is good, as well as his end and its attendant circumstances. Every act implies two things, a cause and an effect. A moral act implies a cause viewed morally, and an effect viewed morally. A cause viewed mor- ally involves intellectual knowledge and free will with a bear- ing on moral right and wrong. An effect viewed morally is what results from the activity of a cause viewed morally; it is a physical act proceeding from a free agent, not consid- ered merely in itself, but in its bearing on right and wrong. In every moral act the effect or term of the act fixes its objec- tive morality; the cause, a composite of intellectual knowl- edge and free will, fixes its subjective morality. Only free acts are matter for moral acts, choice is exercise of freedom, and choice is impossible without prior intellectual knowledge. Man's one free faculty is his will. His intellect, senses, appetite, locomotion are all necessary faculties, and 78 GENERAL ETHICS they borrow whatever freedom we attribute to them from the will. Therefore, in strict sense only acts elicited by the will, only wishes as such, only internal acts of the will, begun and finished in the will, elicited and executed by the will, deserve and get the appellation, moral. Every act external to the will, whether it be a thought, or a sensation, or a passion, murder, or theft, viewed as proceeding from intellect, sense, appetite, or hands, is a necessary act, and therefore without its own proper morality ; and every such act borrows morality from intimate connection with the will, from dependence in its first origin on the will, from the fact that, while it is fin- ished or executed by another faculty, it is begun, elicited in the shape of a wish, ordered, commanded, prescribed by the will. Hence our distinction between acts elicited by the will and acts ordered by the will. Elicited acts are internal acts, ordered acts are external. Both are moral acts, but after a different manner. Internal acts have their own independent morality, ordered acts have no morality of their own, but a morality derived from and dependent on the influence of the will, the part played by the will in their accomplishment. Murder and theft are always done in the will before they are done by the hands, and as outward or external acts their morality is exactly the same as that of the wish or internal act prompting them. In murder the outward act is in itself necessary, free by participation; the inward act is free in itself. The will makes the murderer kill, much as instinct makes the bird fly, with this difference, that while the will is free, instinct is a necessary agent. In the concrete, and viewed as products of an individual man, all acts are either good or bad. In real life there is no such thing as an indifferent human act, a deliberate act neither good nor bad, but between both. In the abstract, and in the field of theory, walking, singing, and a thousand such acts are indifferent in themselves; but in practical every-day life all such acts are necessarily good or bad. Ethics has nothing to do with indifferent acts, because they fall outside its sphere. It is a practical, not a theoretical study. There never was an animal, without its being a man or a brute ; and there never was a moral or distinctively human act, without SUMMARY 79 its being definitely good or bad, from a moral point of view. Acts are morally good or bad, when they respectively help or hinder a man in his progress towards his last end, the possession of God in Heaven, the practice of virtue on earth. Man's destiny is the fulfilment of God's wishes in his regard, and we gather God's designs on man from a study of man's nature. Complete happiness is last factor in man's wishes; and, therefore his last end, because there is no good beyond. Because it leads to God or complete happiness, virtue consti- tutes incomplete happiness, the highest possible on earth. Virtue in turn means order in man's free acts, it means the performance of duty ; duty springs from man 's relations with the other moral units in the universe, God and neighbor ; and these relations are based on the objective order of things, things as God made them, things as God views them. And now to sum up, an act is first moral, then good or bad. All distinctively human acts are moral. Some are good, others bad; good, when they square with the objective order of things, as grasped by the intellect ; bad, when they are at angles with this order. Objective order is embodied in the eternal law, made manifest to man in the natural law, and pushed to the limit of clearness in positive law; and for this reason, the natural law is morality's model cause. Eternal law is God's reason or will, commanding the preservation of natural order, forbidding its disturbance. Natural law is eternal law, become evident in rational nature; or, an inborn habit of mind enabling man to detect the harmony or discord in force between notions constituting morality's first prin- ciples. Positive law is an obligation founded on right rea- son, drawn up and promulgated for the common good by him who has charge of the community affected. Creatures in- ferior to man, from minerals to brutes, always keep the eternal law, the law set them by God, that aspect of eternal law applicable to irrational nature. A stone miraculously sus- pended in the air, is keeping the law of gravity as far as in it lies. Man is the only rebel in the universe, because man alone is free. Morality's efficient cause is man, viewed as an intelligent, free being. Morality is restricted to man, intel- lect and will are the two faculties in man directly concerned with morality, and of the two will is the more vitally impor- 80 GENERAL ETHICS tant. It is the work of the intellect to know right and wrong, it is the work of the will to choose between them. In the -field of knowing synderesis and conscience are man's mentors, they are functions of the intellect in its bearing on morality, they are reason restricted to the department of right and wrong. Synderesis is the hahit of morality's first principles; and we saw in our fourth thesis that synderesis is unerring. The natural law is universally known, as well as universally existent. Conscience is the application of synderesis to per- sonal and concrete acts; and conscience can be false as well as true, wrong as well as right. Synderesis is intellect as it comes from the hand of God, conscience is intellect as modi- fied hy man; and the whole truth is summed up in that state- ment from Major Logic, the intellect is per se infallible, and fallible per accidens. Synderesis elicits a speculative judg- ment only, conscience elicits a speculative and a practieal judg- ment. One is Major ; the other theoretically viewed is Minor in the Moral Syllogism, practically viewed it is the conclu- sion. One regulates our thinking, the other our doing. One is truth, the other is morality ; and they are related like Logic and Ethics, inasmuch as Logic lays down rules for right thinking, Ethics lays down rules for right conduct. An ex- ample may make things clearer. Murder is wrong and a thing to be avoided. This particular killing I contemplate would be murder. Therefore I must avoid this particular killing. Intellect, therefore, and will, or knowing and choosing, are what give being and essence to our moral acts, and they deserve most serious attention. They get full and complete treatment in Psychology; but, for present purposes, we must be pardoned introducing here certain truths, there proved beyond dispute. We begin with the consideration of man, as composed of body and soul. The two appetitive faculties in man are appetite and will ; the passions are manifestations of appetite, and are nine in number. The will's freedom, the different classes of voluntary acts, the different kinds of intentions need to be explained. The parts ignorance and error, the passions and violence play in morality are questions to be settled. Composition of Man. Man is a mystery. He is the mi- APPETITE AND WILL 81 crocosm; a mineral, a plant, a brute and an angel. He is a body and soul, matter and spirit. He is one complete sub- stance and nature, made up of two incomplete substances and natures. Only live bodies are human bodies, and they alone are one incomplete substance. A dead body is no hu- man body, it is an aggregate of many different complete sub- stances. The incompleteness of the body, as a substance, is situate in the circumstance, that it unites with the soul to form the complete substance, man. Its incompleteness, as a nature, is due to the fact that it derives its activity from the soul. The whole man is a complete substance, because he stands by him- self, and enters into no combination with another. He is a complete nature, because he is the root and principle of all his operations. Body and soul are incomplete after different manners. The body is incomplete and non-subsistent. With- out the soul it falls away and perishes. The soul is incom- plete and subsistent. Without the body it goes on living and acting. And yet the soul is no angel, because its sub- sistence is incomplete; accompanied always by a connatural capacity for union with the body, to constitute one complete substance, man. An angel's subsistence is complete, and void of every such connatural capacity. Only as a composite of body and soul is man a complete substance and a complete nature. As such he is not a body, nor yet a soul; but a man. He is not a body-substance or nature, nor yet a soul- substance or nature ; but a human substance and nature, with activities partaking of the two kingdoms of matter and spirit. Hence, he has sense as well as intellect; he has appetite as well as will. In man's present condition his soul is root and principle of his thoughts and wishes, but with extrinsic de- pendence on his body, and this dependence is far from interfering with the soul's spirituality. This extrinsic de- pendence on the body, in a mediate way follows the soul to the next life, because in even its separated condition it thinks and wishes with the mediate help of species or images it carries, and these owe their first origin to phantasms, them- selves products of the composite man. Appetite and Will. But we are now concerned with man in this present life ; and, because our topic is Ethics, his will 82 GENERAL ETHICS demands most immediate attention. In this business of morality the will is the thing, and a man's will is his heart. The will is best defined as a spiritual, inorganic faculty of the soul, appetitive of good at the instigation of the intellect. It is a blind faculty, and gets light from the intellect. It can act with or against the light. Good is its object, and that is the quality intellect calls to its notice. Greater and lesser have weight of course with the will, but no determining or absolute weight. It is free, and can reject the greater good to select the lesser, and all this with an abiding knowledge of their relative worth. Experience is proof, and facts are more stubborn than wrong principles, doped out to strengthen the weak limbs of a lame theory. As soon as the smallest conceivable particle of good sails into the mind's vision, the will is ready to exert its energy. The will is free, we say, and the world agrees with us. We mean the world of common sense. There are a few restless spirits, who stand for determination of will. But they are off the right track, they purposely go wide of common-sense, they are chasing rainbows in a wild search for novelty, no sober study of the truth. The truth of the thing is that the will is free, and Determinists are well acquainted with the fact. They feel free to reject as attractive a good as the truth, and actions are louder than words. When a man says one thing and does another, we claim the privilege of gathering his real sentiments from his deeds; and these idle philosophers talk Determinism to do freedom. The will then is free, and it is too late in the day to endeavor to correct the notion. Omitting for the present the soul's executive energies, we attribute to the soul the power to know, and the power to wish; and this twofold power we denominate its cognoscitive and appetitive faculties. Man wishes as he knows, and his knowledge covers two kingdoms, that of sense and that of intellect. His soul is the root of all his activity. Sight and hearing are just as much rooted in his soul as understanding or thought. But here again there is a difference. In opera- tions of sense the soul is intrinsically dependent on matter, in thought its dependence is merely extrinsic. Had man no higher faculty than sense, his soul would be just as material as the brute's. But he has a higher faculty, that of thought; THE PASSIONS 83 its operations are intrinsically independent of matter, spirit- ual, inorganic ; and what is highest in a thing gives the thing its name. For present purposes we can call thought the soul's superior knowledge, sensation its inferior knowledge, with intellect and sense for corresponding faculties. Becmise man wishes as he knows, we must recognize a double capacity for willing, a superior will and an inferior will, rational appetite and sensile appetite, one intrinsically independent of organs, the other intrinsically dependent on same. Both are wills, both are appetites ; but for the sake of clearness we call the first, will simply ; the second, appetite. The passions are displays of the appetite, wishes are displays of the will. The Passions. Our passions are as dependent on the body as our senses; our wishes are as clear of the body as our thoughts. The passions, like appetite their root, turn always on some particular good or its opposite; and, like sensation as compared with thought, are more manifest and closer to hand than wishes or acts of the will proper. The will has universal good for object, and it always embraces particu- lar goods under the aspect of universals. Man wishes the office of president, not inasmuch as it is the office of presi- dent, but inasmuch as it is honor; he wishes the salary, not inasmuch as it is a set sum of money, but inasmuch as it is money. A hungry man wants food of any kind, food in general. A hungry horse wants this or that particular food, oats, or corn, or hay. Passion, if we consult the word's origin, means suffering, a modification induced by impact from another. In oratory the passions are stimulations of pain or pleasure, meant to shape or color a man's opinions. In ethics passions are move- ments of the appetite, set on foot by the actual presence, or vivid representation, of an object wearing the appearance of good or evil. They are acts of the appetite, and have no part in angels or separate souls. And yet these passions have their counterparts in the thoughts and wishes of angels. Love, hate, desire are as native to angels as they are to brutes ; but in angels they exist without any admixture of appetite; they are affairs of the soul, not affairs of the body. Man is capable of the love peculiar to angels, and of the love peculiar to brutes. His will is affected by the senses as well as by 84 GENERAL ETHICS the intellect. Orators reach the hearts of their listeners by the passions as well as by arguments. And in his own case a man can be orator and audience. Passion always manifests itself in body-change, ''the diffusive wave of emotion." All passion is emotion, but not all emotion is passion. Surprise, laughter, shame, are not passions, because they are impos- sible without intellect. Passions turn on good and evil affecting sense. The ancients enumerated nine passions. They are all species of the generic passions, love and hate. Love has good for object; hate, evil. Hate is the negation of love, as evil is the negation of good. Desire has absent good for ob- ject. Delight has present good for object. Hope has hard, but possible good for object. Despair has hard and impos- sible good for object. Love; good is object, no limit Abhorrence has absent evil for object. Displeasure has present evil Hate; evil is object, no limit^ ^ ^^^ ^^J^^t- Fear has hard and unavoid- able evil for object. Courage has hard, but avoid- able evil for object. Anger is a mixture of desire, displeasure, hope. . Desires are physical and psychical. Both are from senses. Imagination has wider play in latter. Physical craves for quantity; psychical, for quality, e.g. A thirsty man crav- ing water and champagne. Physical craves for limited ob- jects ; psychical, for unlimited, not in sense of universal, but in sense of colossal particulars, e. g. A thirsty man wants, not ocean, but enough; a miser' wants all gold. Psychical desires are not intellectual desires. These last contemplate FREEDOM OF WILL 85 immaterial goods and material goods viewed in an immate- rial way. Desire of perfect happiness is intellectual. Delight, like desire, may be sensual or intellectual. The passion is sensual delight. Like desire, delight may be phys- ical or psychical. Play of imagination makes difference, e. g. a wine-taster. Intellectual delights are superior to sensual, where minds and hearts are cultivated. Regarding the mor- ality of an act done for pleasure, there is a difference between acting for pleasure and living for pleasure. The first is right. Delight, like desire, may be sensual or intellectual. The second is wrong. Anger is a mixed passion; it is desire of open vengeance for an open slight, attended with displeasure at slight. Hatred is usually chronic, anger is frequently acute. Hatred wishes evil as it is evil ; anger, as it is just. Anger regularly wishes evil in sight of all ; hatred is not seldom content with hidden evil. Anger stops, hatred continues. The Will's Freedom. And now we leave the passions, these affections of appetite, to return to the will. Again, the will is a spiritual, inorganic faculty of the soul, appetitive of good at the instigation of the intellect. A voluntary act is such as proceeds from the will with a purpose in mind. Voluntary acts may be necessary or free ; necessary, when the will is cut off from all choice; free, when choice is in its power. In Heaven love of God is a voluntary necessary act. In this life all our deliberate voluntary acts are free. Every good in our acquaintance is a mixture of good and evil, it falls short of the summum bonum or God, who is alone unmixed good. The good in the object stirs desire; the &vil in the object stirs aversion. To desire is to select, to turn aside from is to reject. Therefore, whatever created good falls under our notice is, because of its mixed nature, capable material for selection or rejection, for desire or aversion; and when the will is able to wish or not wish, its act is free. Freedom is an attribute of the will, enabling it, after equipment with every needed prerequisite, to still wish or not wish, to choose this or choose that. This attribute follows the will all the way up to actual exertion of its energy. When it once makes choice, its freedom regarding this particular act is straightway at an end. It cannot wish a thing, and at the 86 GENERAL ETHICS same time remain free to wish or not wish it. But up to the precise moment wherein it wishes, it certainly remains free to do one thing or the other. In perhaps plainer words, it enjoys antecedent not consequent freedom. When freedom turns on the power to will or not will, it is known as freedom of contradiction. When it turns on the power to positively wish or positively reject a certain thing, it is known as free- dom of contrariety. When it turns on the power to wish this or wish that, it is known as freedom of specification. Thus, when I choose between reading and not reading, I am exercising my freedom of contradiction; when between lov- ing and hating a person, my freedom of contrariety; when between reading and singing, my freedom of specification. The most obvious meaning of freedom is separation or immunity from something. Freedom of will is immunity from determination, from necessary adhesion to some set line of conduct. The determining force can be conceived as intrinsic or extrinsic to the will. Immunity from a de- termining force intrinsic to the will is called freedom from necessity. The other is called freedom from violence. In our present condition, the will in all its deliberate acts enjoys freedom of the first sort. Things would be different, if we saw God face to face. The will in its elicited acts, in acts it begins and finishes, in acts the will itself executes, always enjoys freedom of the second kind. In ordered acts, in acts it begins, to leave to another to finish, in acts it commands another agent to execute, freedom of the second sort may be present or absent. When it is absent, the ordered act is not free. A prisoner in his cell is free to wish as he likes, and the law has no restraining influence over his will in the matter of its elicted acts. It can, however, with chains pre- vent him from walking, and so spoil him of freedom in ordered acts, dependent on his legs for execution. No elic- ited act of the will can be forced, because, in that case, the will would object and not object, a contradiction in terms. Freedom from necessity is the kind we vindicate to the will, and it is called freedom of indifference^ freedom of choice, free will, freedom simply. A spontaneous act is opposed to a forced act, and force is extrinsic. All vital or immanent acts are of such sort. Acts proceeding from VOLUNTARY ACTS 87 appetite, whether natural in minerals and plants, sensitive in brutes, or intellectual in man, are spontaneous. The high- est spontaneity of man on earth is freedom, the highest spon- taneity of inferior agents is necessity. Man's indeliberate acts are spontaneous with necessity. A voluntary and fully deliberate act proceeds from the will, with knowledge of end as such, and may be either necessary or free. A free act is an act of the will held to no set shape by anything in the will's nature or constitution. In this life, elicited acts of the will are free, not because they are elicited, but because their every object is a mixture of good and evil. Love of God in Heaven is an elicited act and necessary. Necessity is compatible with elicited acts of the will, as is plain from the case of the blessed in Heaven. Freedom of indifference or choice, or free willy consists in passive and active capacity to wish or not wish in the presence of every needed prerequis- ite for wishing; or it is a power of choice, enabling us in the event of several alternatives to freely choose one and neglect or reject the others. Freedom belongs formally and intrinsically to the will alone. The intellect is not free in the presence of immediately evident truth. Acts of other faculties are free in cause and extrinsically, inasmuch as the will orders or commands them. The will is superior to whatever preponderating influence or inclination urges, it can choose what we here and now know to be worse in pref- erence to what we here and now know to be better, in spite of what Leibnitz says to the contrary. Voluntary Acts. Whether free or necessary, all elicited acts of the will are voluntary. No elicited acts of the will are altogether involuntary. Ordered or commanded acts, viewed in their execution, may be altogether involuntary, e. g. im- prisonment or upright position with arm extended. Elicited acts of the will begin and end in the will, ordered acts begin in the will and end in another faculty. Hence, we distinguish between acts altogether voluntary or involuntary, and acts partly voluntary or involuntary. When the act turns on an object desired in itself, and on its own account, it is wholly voluntary. When it turns on an object desired in no way whatever, it is wholly involuntary. When it turns on an object desired indeed, not however on its own account, 88 GENERAL ETHICS but on account of another closely connected object, it is partly voluntary and partly involuntary. In a partly vol- untary act the will embraces its object, but would never em- brace it, if it could otherwise avoid some evil or compass some good. Sailors, unloading their cargo into the sea dur- ing a storm, are the classical example. We likewise dis- tinguish between a directly voluntary and an indirectly voluntary act. The first turns on an object wished imme- diately and on its own account ; the other, on an object wished not on its own account, but because it follows necessarily in the wake of the wisher's purpose. An indirectly voluntary act differs from a partially voluntary act in this, that the former has for object a good consequent on the wisher's pur- pose, while the latter has for object a good antecedent to the wisher's purpose, a means to his end. Examples may serve to make things clearer. Sailors in a storm lighten their ship of its cargo as a means to securing their safety. Drunk- enness is the indirect voluntary of excessive drinking. Indi- rect voluntary and voluntary in cause are of a kind. The omission of an act likewise constitutes an indirect voluntary. Intentions. Whatever influences the will is called an end or purpose. This end or purpose, viewed as energizing the will, is called the man's intention; and it may be formal and actual or virtual, explicit or implicit, habitual or interpreta- tive. It is formal and actual, when actually known and wished, in a distinct way. Ordinarily our intentions are of this sort. It is virtual, when, ceasing to be actual, it goes on shaping our conduct with force borrowed from its original impulse as an actual intention. In the course of a journey our intention insensibly passes from actual to virtual. A priest baptizing with distractions is another example. It is explicit, when it keeps in view some distinct object ; and our intentions are regularly such at the first. It is implicit, when it keeps in view some object not known with distinctness, but involved in another. Thus, to explicitly purpose a jour- ney is to implicitly purpose car-fare. It is habitual, when once entertained it falls from memory, without being repu- diated or knowingly withdrawn. The Morning Offering influences after this manner all the day's acts. The inten- tion perseveres not in act or in effect, but in habit; and it IGNORANCE, ERROR, PASSIONS 89 influences subsequent acts. It is interpretative, when, of no actual or virtual or explicit habitual force, it would influence our conduct, if recognized with distinctness. Interpreta- tive is same as implicit habitual, e.g., desire to be saved is interpretative desire to be baptized. Such an intention suf- fices for the valid reception of Baptism, when intention of a superior kind is impossible. Virtual at least is always re- quired in minister. Ignorance and Error. Intellect and will combine to pro- duce free acts. Choice pertains to the will, knowledge to the intellect. Freedom, therefore, can be diminished by hind- rance to choice and hindrance to knowledge. Ignorance and error can affect our minds, passion and fear can affect our wills. Ignorance is described as absence of knowledge. It is that state of mind wherein no judgment or idea is had of the thing unknown. If a man ought to have the knowl- edge in question, his ignorance is positive. If no such obli- gation exists, his ignorance is negative. Examples of neg- ative are ignorance of medicine in a farmer and of philoso- phy in a Freshman. Examples of positive are ignorance of medicine in a physician and of philosophy in a Senior. Ig- norance is vincible, if, with the amount of study, to which a man is held, it can be set aside; if such a measure of study is of no avail to set it aside, the man's ignorance is invin- cible. Vincible ignorance is culpable; invincible, inculpable. Antecedent ignorance has place before the man wakes up to the duty of investigation, and it is invincible as well as in- culpable. Consequent ignorance has place after the man wakes up to the duty of investigation, and it may be vin- cible as well as culpable. Vincible ignorance is of three kinds ; simple^ when some study is employed, but not enough ; stupid or lazy, when little or no study is employed; and. affected, when one purposely avoids every source of infor- mation to continue in his perverse ways. Acts are rendered involuntary by invincible ignorance; not, of course, invol- untary under every respect, but under such respect alone as the ignorance affects or touches them; vincible ignorance leaves them voluntary, but in a diminished degree. Invin- cible ignorance is wished in no way; neither in itself nor in cause. Vincible ignorance is wished in cause. To strike a 90 GENERAL ETHICS priest, thinking him a layman, is no sacrilege. To eat meat on Friday, without taking means to clear up a suspicion, is sinful. When no such suspicion is present, no sin is com- mitted. To studiously avoid enquiry about a fast-day, for the purpose of enjoying a full meal, is to incur guilt. Error is positive want of conformity between mind and object, it is that state of mind wherein a false judgment is had of some- thing. It is material and formal. Material turns on wrong appearances of things. Formal confounds appearances with facts. Formal error is the acceptance of the false for the true, and admits of distinctions parallel with those of ignor- ance. Examples of material and formal are, men seem trees, and men are trees. Passion. Passion is sensile appetite, and we have already enumerated its different kinds. With consent of the will for point of departure, passion is antecedent or consequent. When passion turns on moral good, it is altogether honorable. When it turns on moral evil, antecedent passion is involun- tary and without moral blame. Consent of the will changes antecedent to consequent passion, and such passion is volun- tary ; directly, when the will urges or commands it ; indirectly, when disturbance ensues from will 's vehemence. Motus primo primus is altogether antecedent passion. Motus secundo pri- mus means incomplete consent ; it is passion adverted to, and not resisted. Motus secundus means full consent and conse- quent passion. Fear and Violence. We single out fear, because it is less a home-product than the other passions, and therefore more compelling. Fear can be serious or light, intrinsic or extrinsic. Fear is dread of a threatening evil, apprehended as unavoidable. Serious dreads a great evil, certain or very probable, e. g. death, wounds, property, imprisonment. Absolutely serious fear affects an ordinary person. Rela- tively serious fear affects a person of a certain age, sex or disposition. Absolutely light can be relatively serious. Light dreads a lesser evil, or a great evil barely probable. Reverential awe can become relatively serious fear, especially in girls. FEAR 91 Fear is intrinsic when its cause is a necessary agent whether extrinsic or intrinsic to the person who fears, e. g. a con- tracted disease, meditation on hell, earthquake. Fear is extrinsic, when its cause is outside the man and a free agent, e. g. enemy, highwayman, threats. Free fear resembles extrinsic and is caused by the free act of a human being, e. g. highwayman. Free fear is just if the person causing it seeks to repel harm. Free fear is un- just, if the person causing it seeks to inflict harm. Nec- essary fear resembles intrinsic and is prompted by a neces- sary cause, e. g. earthquake, volcano, lightning. Solutions: In case reason is not dethroned, fear, no matter how serious, leaves the act voluntary in a diminished degree, e. g. martyrs and apostates. Serious fear excuses from posi- tive law, especially human. Unjust fear makes law-instru- ments invalid. Light fear is generally neglected before the law; in conscience it can have some weight in questions of compensation for loss. Violence cannot be done the will. Under violence the man makes free choice of escape from pain. An external act due entirely to violence is no crime in the unwilling agent. THESIS VI A human act gets its specific morality from the object of the act, from the agent's end or purpose, and from circum- stances affecting both. — Jouin, 32-36; Rickaby, 31-41. QUESTION This present thesis fixes the specific determinants of moral- ity. It ai '>vvcrs the question, What makes a moral act good or bad, what makes a moral act the act of one particular vir- tue or vice rather than the act of another? TERMS Specific Morality. Specific morality is opposed to generic. Specific makes an act good or bad, an act 'of this or that particular virtue or vice. All virtuous acts are specifically the same in first sense, because harmony with objective order is the specific difference. All virtuous acts of different par- ticular virtues are specifically different in second sense, be- cause each particular virtue has its own specific difference; justice being specified by another's due; charity, by kindness to another ; humility, by right esteem of self ; and so of all the different virtues. Object, End, Circumstances. All three, object, end and circumstances are specific determinants, and in both senses, fixing classes as well as species. In the briefest language possible, objective morality arises from the object of the act, subjective morality from the agent's purpose, and circum- stances modify object and purpose. Circumstances are summed up in the Latin verse, Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando ? The verse means. Who, what, where, with what helps, why, how, when? Circumstances are ob- jective, when they modify the matter or substance of the act ; subjective when they modify the purpose of the agent. The 92 OBJECT 93 object contributes essential, intrinsic morality to the act; the end contributes accidental, extrinsic morality; circumstances, when limited to the object, contribute accidental, intrinsic morality; when limited to the agent, accidental, extrinsic morality. The end contributes essential intrinsic morality to the agent, circumstances contribute essential intrinsic morality to object and agent ; and therefore end and circum- stances are as much specific determinants as object, because a moral act is not object alone, but object, agent and circum- stances taken together. To be a moral act, it must be an in- dividual free act, voluntary and deliberate; and this quality implies end and circumstances. Acts indifferent in themselves, because neither good nor bad from the viewpoint of object or matter, get all their morality from the agent's purpose and from circumstances. No deliberate act of the individual is indifferent. To walk and to write are in themselves indifferent ; but no individual can deliberately walk or write without a purpose and circum- stances, that commend or vitiate the act. Object. When discussing the natural law in fourth thesis, we already described acts good or evil in themselves. They are opposed to morally indifferent acts, which, having no morality in themselves, get all their morality from purpose and circumstances. Acts are good in themselves, their object is good, when positive harmony with the objective order en-^ ters their constitution; they are bad in themselves, when discord with same attaches to them. We distinguish between inward acts and outward, or overt acts. The will is the moral faculty in man, the intellect is only its helper; and all a man's acts get their moral color from his will. Inward acts are acts elicited and executed by the will, they begin and end in that faculty; outward acts are acts elicited by the will and executed by another faculty ; they begin in the will and finish in some other faculty. Elicited or inward acts have their own independent morality, gotten from object, end, and circum- stances. Ordered or outward acts derive all their morality from their corresponding elicited or inward acts. Murder and theft are perpetrated in the heart, before they are ac- complished by the hands. In every moral act three distinct things are wished, the object of the act, the end or purpose 94 GENERAL ETHICS selected^ and attendant circumstances, objective and sub- jective. Briefly, all three things are wished, object, end and circumstances. All the three things wished must be morally good, to constitute the act a morally good act. An act is bad, when any one of the three is bad. Hence the axiom, **Bonum ex Integra causa, malum ex quocunque defectu.** *'Good results from a full and complete cause, evil results from a defective cause.'' In plain English, an act is good, when all three constituents or determinants of morality are good; it is bad, when any one of the three is bad. A moral act is a chain made up of three links; it is good, when all three links are good; it is bad, when any one of the three is bad. A chain is no stronger than its weakest link, and this moral chain is no better than its worst link. Therefore, the fact that a deed is good in object, is far from settling its morality. A wrong intention can make the best thing in the world wicked. The fact that a deed is bad in object, quite settles its morality, no intention in the world can save it from blame. When discussing the natural law in our fourth thesis, we described acts good or bad in themselves; and we were talking about object, as distinct from end and circumstances. Whatever good act gets its morality solely from end and circumstances, is in itself morally indifferent. It is not mor- ally good in itself, because in that case object would contribute to its morality. It is not bad in itself, because in that case it could never become good. Whatever act is good or bad prior to end and circumstances, is good or bad in itself, be- cause end and circumstances are the only other sources, the only moral coefficients other than the act itself. Acts, there- fore, are good or bad in themselves, when, abstracting from end and subjective circumstances, they are in harmony or at discord with the objective order; when, morally speaking, they are or are not what they ought to be. Physical good is divided into becoming, agreeable and useful, and moral good admits of the same division. All three physical goods can be basis for moral good, and they eventuate in moral good, only when reason's controlling influence vests them with the qual- ity of becoming good. Viewing man as a moral being, his one true and real good is virtue, because it alone appeals to the morally specific por- END AND CIRCUMSTANCES 95 tion of his being, the will as arbiter of good and evil. Even study, in itself becoming and real physical good, can by abuse readily become moral evil, and sink to the level of apparent good. Pleasure and wealth, in themselves apparent good, can, under the control of reason and an orderly will, rise to the dignity of true and real goods. Acts can be morally good or evil in themselves in a three-fold way. In themselves, on their own account, and absolutely ; in themselves, on their own account, but not absolutely; in themselves, not on their own account, nor absolutely. Familiar examples of such goods are worship, charity and pious reading. Familiar examples of such evils are blasphemy, theft and dangerous reading. Good and evil of the first kind admit no change of matter. There is a something in the physical act of worship that makes its acceptance by the will a moral good, and this some- thing cannot possibly be separated from the act. There is a something of the same kind in the physical act of blasphemy, and this something makes blasphemy irremediably and neces- sarily bad. Charity and pious reading become evil, when the money given as alms is stolen, when pious reading interferes with some higher duty. Theft and dangerous reading admit change of matter ; and, this change supposed, they cease to be bad. What belonged to another may become mine, and its seizure by me is no theft. What would otherwise be danger- ous reading and wrong, may become a necessary help to the acquisition of medicine or theology and entirely right. And now to explain what we mean by in themselves, on their own account and absolutely. Blasphemy, theft and dan- gerous reading are wrong in themselves, because of wrong- ness involved in the three physical acts, because of native and inborn discord with the objective order of things. Blasphemy and theft are wrong on their own account, not on account of an outside cause, like the prohibition of a superior. Danger- ous reading is wrong not on its own account, but on account of nature's decree against incurring danger without good and sufficient reason. Absolutely, implies no possibility of change in matter, and of the three blasphemy alone is absolutely wrong. In no hypothesis can the physical act of blasphemy fail of turpitude. The physical act of deliberately taking something in theft is wrong, only in the hypothesis that it 96 GENERAL ETHICS is concerned with property belonging to another. The pByS ical act of deliberate dangerous reading is wrong, only in the supposition that the risk is taken without due and sufficient reason. In the case of a child, play on the street against a parent's wishes, is not wrong in itself, or on its own account, or absolutely. The wrongness is not in the play, but in dis- obedience; the wrongness is due to the parent's prohibition, and with the parent's permission it would be entirely right. End. In question of ends we hold discourse primarily of the end designated operantis, not operis; the end of doer, not the end of deed. The finis operis is independent of the doer, the finis operantis is wholly under his control. Recall the example of clock and clockmaker. The finis operis of a clock is to tell time, whether the clockmaker likes it or no. In fact, the end of deed cannot be entirely absent from the end of doer. The clockmaker can hardly make a clock without intending it to measure the flight of time. These two ends are like a combination of the object of the act and the agent's purpose, if the act's goodness in itself or badness in itself is conceived as the clock. The end of doer can be best called intention, or end energizing the agent. It gives morality to an act in- different in the abstract, making it a morally good or evil act in the concrete. An evil intention vitiates an act morally good in point of object or circumstances. A good intention cannot change the evil nature of an act bad in point of object or circumstances. And all this is true of good and evil cir- cumstances, with regard to good and evil objects and inten- tions. The agent's intention is his act inwardly taken, and our outward acts get their morality from their corresponding inward acts. Intention is an elicited act of the will, its exe- cution is an ordered act of the will; and ordered acts of the will get their morality from corresponding elicited acts. Circumstances. They are modifications of the act and agent due to person, quantity, place, helps, motives, manner and time. That circumstances alter the morality of an act, is evident from the following familiar examples. The execution of a condemned criminal by some private citizen, and by the proper public official. The circumstance of person makes the execution in one case an act of legal justice ; in the other, an act of murder. To steal five cents, and to steal five dollars. SPECIFIC MORALITY 97 Quantity makes one sin venial ; the other, mortal. To eat and drink in a hotel, and to eat and drink in a church. Place makes the difference between a meal and a sacrilege. To lie, and to confirm the lie with an oath. Manner adds perjury to falsehood. To drink, and to drink to excess. Quantity changes temperance to drunkenness or gluttony. Time makes eating meat on Friday a sin, likewise the omission of com- munion during the Paschal season. The circumstance, *'in church,'* is as identical with ''meal in church," as meal it- self, circumstance is as identical with individual act as object. Specific Morality. A moral act is an act making its agent good or bad, making its agent worthy of praise or of blame. There are three elements in every moral act. It must be in the power of the agent, subject to his ownership, to make him worthy of praise or of blame. It must possess goodness or badness, to communicate the quality good or bad to the agent. It must be known for good or bad to the agent, to stir the agent's mil. Because of the first element, the agent must be able to do or not do the act, and the act itself must originate in free will. The second element is required, because nothing gives but what it first possesses, and the act must be in har- mony or at discord with the objective order. The third ele- ment is needed, to stir the will, which is blind, and wishes only what the intellect first offers. A father's care of his child is a moral act, because it is in his power ; a bird 's care of its young is not a moral act, because it is a matter of in- stinct and beyond the bird's control. The man is physically free to care for or neglect his child; the bird is not free, it is physically necessitated by instinct to care for its young, or in certain contingencies to neglect its young. Instinct in man is subject to the control of his will. Generic morality is the feature common to good and bad acts, like animality in man and horse; and origination in in- tellect and will is the one thing common to good and bad acts. Specific morality is one thing for good acts, another thing for bad acts, like reason in man, and sense in horse ; harmony and discord with the objective order being the two differences. Higher species can be considered genera with regard to lower species; and the one thing common to all the virtues is har- mony with the objective order of things ; the one thing com- 98 GENERAL ETHICS mon to all the vices is discord with the same order. Charity, justice, humility are species of the genus, virtue; injury, in- justice, pride are species of the genus, vice. Virtue and vice are themselves species of the genus, moral acts. Object in our thesis means object in strict sense, term of the wish, finis operis. End means intention, and intention means the agent 's apprehension and choice of the act in ques- tion. Circumstances mean modifications, whether of object or of end. These things premised, we are now ready to prove that a human act gets its specific morality, that a moral act gets its goodness or badness, that the act of a set virtue and the act of a set vice get their denomination from the object of the act, from the agent ^s end or purpose, and from circum- stances affecting both. PROOF Acts are specified by their formal objects, and moral acts are no exception to the rule. But the formal object of a generically moral act is an object good or bad in substance, with all its objective circumstances; apprehended as such by the intellect, and chosen as such by the will, with all its sub- jective circumstances; not the object simply, nor yet the agent ^s apprehension or choice of it, but all three things to- gether. Ergo, human acts get their specific morality from object, end and circumstances. With Regard to the Major. The truth is clear in physical acts. Sight is sight because of color, hearing is hearing be- cause of sound. To use the eyes on sweetness, or smoothness, or sound is not to see ; to use the ears on color is not to hear. In moral acts good and evil play the parts of color and sound in vision and hearing. Freedom demands knowledge and choice, or purpose; individuality of act demands circum- stances. With Regard to the Minor. The object is the subject-mat- ter, substance of the act ; the agent 's apprehension and choice of same are his end or intention; objective circumstances are identified with the object; subjective circumstances, with the agent 's end or intention. When the eye sees green, a particu- lar and present green is its formal object, and the eye makes I PROOF 99 the green object its own by entering into knowledge-relations with it. Its formal object is not red or an absent green, or a green with which it has no intimate relations. In a parallel way, when the will elicits a moral act, it chooses a particular good or evil object, represented to it as such by the intellect. Its formal object is not an object viewed as true, or one, or beautiful, but an object viewed as good or evil; not a good or evil object, that never through the intellect appealed to the will; not a good or evil object, that, after word from the intellect, the will never concerned itself with. When end vitiates a good object, the will puts a good thing to bad use, and the intellect is its accomplice. When circumstances vitiate an object good in substance and good in purpose, some accidental badness resided in object, or purpose, or both. P.S. Examples Wherein One or Several Elements are Pres- ent: To collect money from a debtor, for the purpose of get- ting drunk ; and to steal money from a neighbor for the same purpose. To deny self for the purpose of giving dinner to a beggar. To walk to church for purposes of prayer. To give alms to a poor man, with the design of making him an accom- plice to murder. To give an alms, that a simple lie may be told. Firm will, purposing the lie, vitiates; not inefficax velleitas, mere advertence to wish, caring little whether the lie be told or not, ready to give the alms anyhow. Alms from pity and from vainglory; antecedent purpose vitiates, not concomitant or consequent. A person moved by vainglory to practise daily communion ; intention disappears at the altar ; non est in executione, sed fuit. To give an alms when for- bidden, or though forbidden, or because forbidden; against poverty, against obedience. N.B. No good end can justify a bad act ; good end never justifies a bad means ; murder of a Church persecutor, to help religion; defiance of Constitution, to promote Catholic educa- tion. Every bad end vitiates a good act. A good or bad end changes an indifferent act to a good or bad act respec- tively; and this is the one case where end justifies means. It is lawful at times to put a good act, though evil by accident results. The times are, when the good surpasses the evil, and the evil is neither directly nor indirectly intended. The evil is not even indirectly intended, when the good is equally 100 GENERAL ETHICS immediate with the evil, and not accomplished with the evil for means. The good act is not lawful, if any of the above conditions fail of verification. A general in time of war is allowed to lay waste the enemy's territory to the harm of innocent citizens. A drunken man is guilty of the curses he utters, if he foresees them in some confused way when sober. Cursing is in this case an indirect voluntary, a voluntary in cause. A doctor is not allowed to kill the child to save the mother. He may remove a certainly dead fetus, not a prob- ably dead fetus. He must never expose the child to danger of death without Baptism. He is allowed to administer medi- cine, that may by accident result in the child's death. His whole purpose must be to cure the mother, not to kill the child. THESIS VII Prohabilism is a safe and correct system in matters of con- science. Jouin, 51-56; Rickahy, 152-159. QUESTION Rigorism or Absolute Tutiorism, Moderate Tutiorism, Prob- abiliorism, uEquiprobabilism, Probabilism and Laxism are systems in Ethics meant to help a man choose the right line of conduct, when doubt about right and wrong agitates his mind. As long as the doubt remains, he must do nothing, because it is highly immoral to even expose oneself to the danger of doing wrong. It would be in any case to sin, to act with this principle in mind, ^'I don't know, but I'll take the risk." To act with a doubtful conscience is to sin, he- cause it involves contempt of the law. The man acting with a doubtful conscience cares not whether he keeps the law or breaks it. Among all the above systems, Laxism excepted, Probabilism apparently savors most of a risk ; but, as we shall see, the Probabilist runs no risk, enters on no uncertainty, though he neglects the so-called safer course. He is certain that he is right, because a doubtful law certainly has no bind- ing force. Rigorism and Laxism have been condemned by the Church in the persons of Alexander VII, in 1656, and Innocent XI, in 1679. Rigorism was taught by the Jansen- ists, and held that the opinion favoring the law must be fol- lowed as long as the opposing view is not certain. In doubt about Friday, you must abstain from meat, till certain it is not Friday. Laxism held that any opinion, with small or no sound reason in its favor, may be followed. In doubt about Friday, with no good reason for the doubt, you may eat meat. Tenuiter probabile non est probabile pro prudenti. In the case of a prudent man, what is only slightly probable is not probable at all. Moderate Tutiorism and Prohahilior- 101 ^''^'''^^<^' '^'(jiNBRAL ETHICS ism have no advocates to-day, and can be neglected. The first held that the opinion favoring the law must be followed, un- less the opposing view is most probable ; the second prescribes the same course, unless the opposite opinion is more probable. Mquiprdbdbilism allows departure from the law, if reasons for its non-existence are as strong, or nearly as strong, as rea- sons for its existence. Things are reversed, if doubt turns on the lapse or cessation of a law. Many Redemptorists pro- fess to derive this last system from St. Alphonsus, though the saint is Probabilism 's staunch defender. Prohdbilism teaches that, in doubt whether an act is permissible or not, true and real probability in favor of the act or its omission makes one or other quite legitirmite, though greater probability attaches to the contrary or so-called safer course. If you have good and solid reasons for thinking that the day of the week is not Friday, you may eat meat, even if you have better and stronger reasons for thinking that it is Friday, provided only that you are not really and truly certain that it is Fri- day. If certain that it is Friday, of course you have no good and solid reason for thinking that it is not Friday. Your reasons must be good and solid, even if weaker than their opposites, because slight reasons are reckoned no reasons by the prudent, and Laxism is condemned by common sense as well as by the Church. TERMS Probabilism. Probabilism is as old as Christianity, and was in common use with the early Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Years ago it was called into question by decisions rendered against Laxism by Alexander VII and Innocent XI ; but it always counted among its defenders the most cele- brated theologians. More recently a wrong understanding of St. Alphonsus gave rise to ^quiprobabilism, and the Church has not directly settled the controversy between ^qui- probabilism and Probabilism. In ^quiprobabilism, if one of the two views is less probable than the other, it must not be followed; if the two views are equally probable, either may be chosen. In some few passages of St. Alphonsus, because of his zeal against Laxism, the less probable view is rated CONSCIENCE 103 slightly probable and negligible in itself; and, therefore, its opposite becomes morally certain. Even with Probabilists, when moral certainty arises, only one course of conduct is open, because conscience is in that case certain and not doubt- ful. Moral certainty is firm assent of mind without dread of opposite, all based on laws governing human nature. Phys- ical certainty is a parallel state of mind, based on laws gov- erning physical nature. Metaphysical certainty is a parallel state of mind based on connection of identity between ideas in subject and predicate. Therefore, there are three kinds of certainty, metaphysical, physical and moral; and all three kinds imply firm assent of the mind, and exclude dread of the opposite, possibility of the opposite. In the abstract, physical and moral admit of the dread of possibility, due to a miracle, or to a departure from the laws governing human acts. In the concrete and in particular, even physical and moral as completely exclude this dread and possibility as metaphysical. Abstract possibility of the opposite is com- patible with concrete impossibility of the same; and, unless circumstances rule out the concrete possibility of a miracle or of a departure from said laws, physical and moral certainty are out of the question. Moral certainty is, therefore, just as tight and solid as metaphysical, in point of excluding dread of the opposite; and prohahility never rises to the dignity of moral certainty. Probability always leaves the opposite a concrete possibility. Moral certainty, in strict sense, ex- cludes possibility of opposite ; in wide sense, it excludes posi- tive probability of opposite, admitting its negative probabil- ity, based on slender reasons, accounted none at all by the prudent. Conscience. Conscience is from cum and scientia, and means knowledge with a bearing on the good or evil of a par- ticular human act. It is the subjective element in law's application, it is the immediate and proximate measure of a man's moral conduct. It is the work of the intellect in what we already established as the standard of morality, namely the objective order of things as grasped by the intellect. Consciousness is likewise from cum and scientia, and means knowledge with a bearing on the operations of the soul's other faculties. Conscience is not consciousness, nor is it GENERAL ETHICS synderesis, which is the habit of morality's first principles. Conscience is rather the application of synderesis to concrete and particular acts. Both are applications of law to moral acts, both measure man's conduct with law for standard; but, while synderesis in an academic way and out of court decides that murder, for instance, is wrong and must be avoided, conscience in a practical way and in court decides that this particular act, because murder, must be avoided. The object of the particular act, with end and circumstances, and their harmony or discord with the objective order of things embodied in the law, are the objective element in law's application; and this objective element is quite independent of morality's subjective element or conscience. When the moral value of a man*s act is under consideration, objective order measures conscience; when the moral value of the man himself is under consideration, things are reversed, and con- science measures objective order. Morally speaking, a man's act has its matter and form from the act itself, without any reference to conscience; a man's conduct has its matter from his acts, its form from his conscience. A materially bad act is likewise a formally bad act; but materially bad conduct can easily be fonnally good conduct, and vice-versa. God can reward a wicked deed and punish an act of virtue, when con- science is invincibly false. He looks not to the act but to the heart of the agent ; and material virtue, when accompanied by formal wickedness, is unspeakably worse than material sin accompanied by formal righteousness. Beyond doubt, the lay-brother, who drowned Chinese babies, after baptizing them, wafi rewarded for material and formal murder, and the igno- rant fellow who lied, because invincibly persuaded that charity demanded it, was rewarded for a material and formal untruth. Their acts were wrong, their conduct was right. They were false to objective order, but true to conscience, and conscience measures objective order when a man's con- duct is in question, not his acts. Conscience is antecedent, when it turns on present or future acts, and discharges the functions of a guide. It is consequent, when it turns on past acts, and plays the part of a judge. Conscience in strict sense is antecedent. Conscience is reason decreeing the law- fulness or unlawfulness of a particular act. Its decree al- CONSCIENCE 106 ways assumes the shape of a practical judgment, the conclu- sion of a moral syllogism, therefore I must do this or avoid that. Distinguish between conscience and its decree. Con- science is the mind exercising a particular function. Its decree is an act of the mind, a judgment. In strict sense, conscience has to do with acts on the eve of being accom- plished here and now. ThB Major in a moral syllogism rep- resents synderesis, the Minor represents conscience theoret- ically viewed, the conclusion represents conscience practically viewed; and therefore the conclusion best deserves the title, decree of conscience. The Major is remote principle or syn- deresis, the Minor is conscience in actu primo proximo, the conclusion is conscience in second act. With truth or har- mony with objective order for viewpoint, conscience is true or false, right or wrong. If the premisses are true, or if they are invincibly false, conscience is right. If the premisses are vincibly false, conscience is wrong. With degree of certainty, or mind's acquiescence, for measure, conscience is certain, probable or doubtful. Recall the states of mind discussed in Logic, certainty, opinion^ doubt. Doubt may be positive or negative. Positive has weighty reasons in its favor; nega- tive has slight or no reasons in its favor. In matters of con- science negative doubt is neglected, because it is of no weight with the prudent. Doubt may be juris or facti. The first turns on a law's existence; the second, on some particular fact. Similar expressions are de jure and de facto in ques- tions of property and authority ; owner de jure and owner de facto ; king de jure and king de facto. A doubtful conscience is in reality no conscience at all, because no actual decision is made. Darkness is the absence of light. In question of lawfulness or unlawfulness, not in question of validity or invalidity, in question of law not of fact, Probabilism with the help of a reflex principle changes a doubtful conscience to a certain conscience, and opens the way to action. A per- plexed conscience sees sin in both alternatives, tender is se- vere with the slightest defects, lax unduly favors freedom. Here is the whole truth about the bearing of conscience on morality. To be right, a man must act with at least a morally certain conscience in strict or wide sense, his final practical judgment regarding the lawfulness of an act must be at least lOe GENERAL ETHICS morally certain. His final practical judgment must admit no sound or positive doubt, because to act otherwise would be to expose oneself deliberately to the danger of doing wrong; and moral certainty in wide sense is the highest we regularly reach in daily life. Without detriment to the moral certainty of his final practical judgment, his remote practical judgment can be even positively doubtful or probable, because his con- duct is not based on his remote practical judgment, but on his final practical judgment; and with the help of a reflex prin- ciple he can transform his probable remote judgment into a morally certain final practical judgment; and this in sub- stance is Probabilism. By supposition, then, in Probabilism a man^s remote practical judgment is positively doubtful or probable, the doubt is based on good and sound reasons in the eyes of the wise, the doubt cannot be removed by study or investigation ; one or other course must be taken ; he must not even doubtfully go against the law; with the help of a reflex principle he changes his conscience from doubtful to certain, and neglects the doubtful law. As long as the law remains doubtful, he is of course at liberty to keep it. He is likewise at liberty to neglect it without wrong. PROOFS When conscience returns a clear and positive answer, it must be followed. When conscience is perplexed, a man's first duty is to enquire and seek information. If doubt re- mains after due enquiry, he is not held to the so-called safer course, he is not held to suppose an obligation. Neither is he allowed to act with a doubtful conscience. The Probabilist runs no risk, enters on no uncertainty, though he neglects the safer course so-called. Lacking available direct principles, he calls a reflex principle to his aid. A direct principle lays down the law, when conscience returns a clear and positive answer. A direct principle is no help in this man's case. He judges of his own act, taking into account his imperfect knowledge and limited powers. He makes no attempt to determine what another man with clear and positive knowl- edge ought to do. He calls to his aid this reflex principle, ^*A doubtful law has no binding force/' This is a reflex or PROOF AND PRINCIPLES 107 mind-principle, because objectively and outside of the mind nothing is doubtful. The question is, not the law absolutely, but the law as far as I can make it out. Liberty is prior to the law. Liberty is in possession. The law, to bind, must with certainty restrict liberty. Besides, no law binds, till promulgated. Promulgation connotes certain knowledge, not doubtful or probable merely; and, as long as doubt remains, the law is not promulgated for me, and the fault is not on my side. Authority is overwhelmingly on the side of Probabil- ism, and it would be long to quote authors. St. Alphonsus seems to favor ^quiprobabilism and Tutiorism, but he can be explained aright. With St. Alphonsus the safer course is alone morally certain; the safe course is not probable at all, and he is talking against Laxism. PRINCIPLES A. My doubt must be serious, and hold out against argu- ments for the existence of an obligation. No indulgence must be shown laxity of conscience, which leans on slender doubt. My doubt must persevere after due enquiry, and must be based on positive reasons against the obligation. My doubt must not be simple ignorance, it must be able to tell why. Some minds doubt without being able to give their reasons why. These minds must have recourse to others in moral questions. My reason for doubt can be an intrinsic or extrinsic argument. Hence another's opinion, when creative of solid probability, can suffice. The probability must be compara- tive, it must hold ground in face of opposing arguments. After all has been said, it must be not unlikely. It need not be more likely. That means more probable, not probable simply. My doubt must be practical, not speculative, because Ethics is a matter of conduct, not a matter of theorizing. Theoretically speaking, a man can be saved with confession once a year ; practically speaking, and when easy opportunity offers, he must approach the sacrament oftener to be saved. All the difficulty turns on the varying amount of diligence necessary in enquiry to constitute it moral diligence. Deeper investigation is needed when matter in question is of vital interest, like confession, than when mere observance, like a 108 GENERAL ETHICS fast-day. In question of rolling stones over a precipice, the doubt must be about the act itself, not about its consequences. It is certainly wrong to take any such risk, and Probabilism has no play. B. Frohahilism is availahle only in cases involving the law- fulness or unlawfulness of an act, never in cases involving validity or invalidity; in cases of law, never in cases of fact; because, while doubtful laws are a reality on account of need- ful knowledge and promulgation, facts are nothing unless sure and certain. Lawfulness has an element of suhjectivityy which is altogether absent from validity. The phase of mind of the agent has no influence on the validity or invalidity of an act, or on the reality of a fact ; it has a very perceptible influence on the binding force of a law. A law binds only when known, a fact is a fact whether it is known or not. Examples of lawfulness are abstinence on Friday, Mass on Sunday, the Lenten fast. Examples of validity are marriage, ordination, baptism, real bread and real wine, wills, medi- cine. Examples of facts are utterance of a vow, seven years of age, baptism, priesthood, fast broken, debts paid. When a certainly valid sacrament is impossible, a dubiously valid sacrament is better than no sacrament at all, e.g., baptism with perfume, especially when necessity urges, and the sacrament can be afterwards repeated either conditionally or absolutely. Sometimes doubt regarding the lawfulness of an act arises from doubt regarding validity, and Probabilism is of no avail ; because such conduct would betray contempt of virtue and too small fear of sin. To be husband and wife, a man and woman must be certainly married; and a doubtful marriage never makes a man and woman husband and wife; it leaves them single from the viewpoint of morality. Doubt regard- ing facts must be settled some other way, usually by an appeal to fixed principles, deriving their certainty from authority. Some principles of the kind follow. ''Possession is nine- tenths of the law," for money in hand. ''Apart from ques- tions of justice, the probable fulfilment of a law is on a level with its certain fulfilment," for sins told or omitted at con- fession. "Facts must not be presumed, they must be proved," for fast before communion and for utterance of a PROOF AND PRINCIPLES 109 vow. ''In doubt stand to presumption," ''Doubts must be settled with the help of what ordinarily happens," for a priest at Communion afraid that he has omitted the Pater Noster, for parts of Office. THESIS VIII VIRTUES AND VICES Jouin, 56-70 ; Rickahy, 64^-109. Virtue is a Jiahitus operativus bonus, vice is a habitus operativus mains. To translate, virtue and vice are good and had habits with a bearing on work. The expression, with a bearing on work, serves to separate virtue from grace. Vir- tue in simple and strict sense belongs exclusively to the will ; in qualified and wide sense it is applicable to whatsoever fac- ulty in the man. Though prudence resides in the mind, it is directive of the will. A man is simply and in strict sense good, when his will is right. He is good in qualified and wide sense, when his legs are swift, when his eye and hand are ready to art, when his wit is quick ; and we call him not good without any qualification, but a good runner, a good painter, a good scholar. Virtue is not said of irrational agents, be- cause their conduct is fixed for them by instinct. Virtue postulates free will, because it helps to choose between good and evil. Silence is no virtue in a dumb person, temperance in food and drink is no virtue in an angel, because the dumb person and the angel are without any power to choose in these particulars. Silence in a talkative person, and temper- ance in a man are very decided virtues. Virtue, therefore, is a habit; and Aristotle describes habit as a quality super- added to a faculty, rendering it well or ill disposed towards itself or something else. Virtue, whether in strict or wide sense, dwells in some faculty of the soul, and favorably dis- poses that faculty towards itself or towards another. The soul is remote principle of all the man's activities; faculties are proximate connatural principles, superadded by nature to the soul; habits are proximate acquired principles, superadded not by nature but by personal endeavor to the faculties. Therefore, the soul helps the man, faculties help 110 VIRTUES AND VICES 111 the soul, and habits help the faculties. Suarez offers this defi- nition of a faculty -habit, a quality hard to remove, super- added to the faculty, and meant of itself and primarily to assist the faculty. This definition separates a faculty-habit from a soul-habit, from faculty, from act, from passing dis- positions, and assigns its purpose and efficiency. Habits re- side in faculties, that are vital and somehow intellectual. Infused or supernatural habits are communicated to the fac- ulty by God, and procure, not readiness in supernatural activity, but the very activity itself. Faith as a natural habit, and faith as a supernatural habit can serve for ex- planation. Natural or acquired habits result from reiterated acts of some one kind; they confer not the power to act, but the power to act with ease and readiness. The faculty with- out the habit is simple power to act, the faculty with the habit is power to act with ease and facility. Custom, because par- ent to habit, gets the name second nature. Faculty is first nature, habit is second nature. Habits of sense and habits of appetite explain themselves, likewise habits of mind and habits of will. Habits of will are moral habits, and are good or bad, virtues or vices. Physical habits are of indifferent moral worth, like study, talk, walk, thought. To include virtue in qualified and wide sense, as well as virtue in simple and strict sense, virtue is in general defined a habit perfect- ing, improving, rounding out a rational faculty and bend- ing it towards good. Good here means physical as well as moral good for the faculty, and good in the sense of con- duct ; good for any faculty, and good for the will exclusively. Virtue in simple and strict sense perfects the will, and in- clines it to moral good. Virtue in qualified and wide sense perfects any other faculty, and inclines it to its own improve- ment. A habit that never betrays itself in acts is no virtue, because it falls away from its purpose. It is for facility, and facility without acts is impossible. Prudence, recta ratio agibilium, right order in conduct, is a practical, intellectual virtue ; and for that reason, a moral virtue. It has a directive bearing on the will, and virtues concerned with the will are moral virtues. Here are four definitions of virtue, taken in simple and strict sense. St. Thomas defines virtue as, ''habitus operativus bonus," a good faculty-habit, a good 112 GENERAL ETHICS habit bearing on activity; and good means moral good, not physical. Aristotle defines virtue as a habit, that makes its owner and his work good. Aristotle again defines virtue as a habit, that chooses the middle course with respect to our- selves, said middle course being fixed by reason, as a man of prudence would determine it; a habit of avoiding what would be excess or defect in the esteem of a prudent man. St. Augustine defines virtue as a good quality of will, a help to right living, and no help to wrong. When St. Augustine adds, ''produced in us by God without our assistance," he is talking of infused virtue. Like freedom, virtue resides in the will as in subject, and in other faculties only inasmuch as they work in connection with, under motion from, or under control of the will. Prudence directs the will. Virtue is a moral habit, moral habits result from moral acts, and moral acts are one way or another acts of the will. Scattered acts of virtue, no result of habit, never make a man simply and un- qualifiedly good. They make him good with a qualification and circumstances. The regularity and constancy secured by habit, alone constitute a man simply and unqualifiedly good. As St. Thomas says, regularity and constancy in good demand that good acts be elicited with readiness, with unbroken uni- formity, and with delight; and these requisites are verified only when virtuous deeds become a habit, a species of second nature. The moral virtues are divided into the four cardinal vir- tues, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance. St. Thomas offers these two reasons for the division. Objective order is the standard of morality, reason must discover this order and propose its commands to the will; the will in turn must exe- cute these commands in its own field and in the field of the passions, whether they tend towards good or away from evil, whether concupiscible or irascible, desire or aversion. Pru- dence, the habit of doing the right thing at the right time, is reason 's helper ; justice, the habit of giving everybody his due, is helper to the will in its own operations; temperance helps the will in its management of appetite's desires; fortitude helps to manage appetite's aversions. Four faculties con- tribute to man's moral acts, intellect, will, appetite of desire VIRTUES AND VICES 113 and appetite of aversion; and the four cardinal virtues in order keep these faculties right. Circumspice, age, ahstine, sustine. Be sure you're right, then go ahead. These virtues are called cardinal, because they are to all the other virtues what the hinges are to the door; their support, basis of their utility, and surpassing them all in point of worth and neces- sity. All the other virtues can be referred to these four as parts to a whole. It is easy to see that no moral virtue is complete and perfect without these others. Obedience, for instance, is hard because of pride, sensuality, laziness, dread ; and complete obedience is next to impossible without humility, temperance, diligence, courage. Want of temperance and avarice are often responsible for injustice, and there is no justice where these vices are in control. Vice is virtue's contrary. It is habitus operativus malus, a habit helping a faculty to moral evil. We must distinguish in an evil habit or vice, as we distinguish in an evil act, a positive entity and a negative. The negative entity is its malice, and lies in its lack of moral goodness, its lack of har- mony with the objective order. The formal object of a vice is some aspect of inferior good, at odds with the objective order, and inseparably connected with malice. Every virtue can count at least two opposite vices, one by way of excess, the other by way of defect. The seven capital or cardinal sins are rooted in the seven good things most calculated to excite the will to rebellion against reason or the objective order. They are vainglory, gluttony, lust, avarice, sloth, envy and anger. The first four seek good in a disorderly way, the other three shun good because of some evil connected with it. Goods of soul, like praise and honor, excite vain- glory; goods of body with a bearing on the race's preserva- tion, like unholy pleasure, are matter for lust ; goods of body with a bearing on the individual's preservation, like food and drink, excite gluttony ; outside goods like wealth provoke avarice. The good shunned may bo one's own or another's. Sloth shuns one's own good to avoid labor; envy shuns an- other's good without thought of revenge, it is sadness at an- other's good because rated an obstacle to one's own. Anger shuns another's good with thought of revenge. Pride is 114 GENERAL ETHICS queen of all the vices. In the order of intention pride is first of all the vices, in the order of execution avarice enjoys the prerogative. Prudence. Aristotle defines prudence as recta ratio agi- bilium, right decision in things to do, habit of practical not speculative reason, helping to right decisions in question of moral conduct. Art is different, it is recta ratio factihilium, right decision in things to make. Art tends to make some outside work right in physical sense, prudence tends to make some act of the man morally good. Lessius defines prudence as a habit of intellect helping us to know in every emergency what is right and^ what is wrong. There are two kinds of pru- dence, personal and political or state prudence. The chief functions of prudence are euboulia, synesis, gnome, which mean habit of taking advice, habit of giving advice, habit of interpretation. The integral parts of prudence are mem- ory, intellect, foresight, argumentation, skill, openness to in- struction, caution, and wide range of vision. Christ in the mystery of His loss in the temple is teaching a profound lesson in prudence. St. Luke tells the story in the ten last verses of his second chapter. ''Did you not know that I must be about my Father's business?" Prudence in practice is the art of doing the right thing at the right time. Wisdom is her handmaid, her counsellor. She guides pru- dence in her choice of conduct. Wisdom is in the mind, pru- dence directs the will ; and both together hath a perfect work. In the realm of conduct the will knows nothing, wishes every- thing; the mind knows everything, wishes nothing. The will stings the mind to industry and borrows in turn from its servant the light it needs. Prudence, then, with the help of wisdom, enables its owner to choose aright, when two lines of conduct are submitted to him for selection. Generally it manifests itself in a fixed phase of mind and will, perpetually ready to abandon the less for the greater. In the case under consideration Jesus had to choose between His Heavenly Fa- ther's business and His Mother's pleasure. His infinite pru- dence saw only one way open; and He tarried three days in the temple, in spite of the pang His stay inflicted on Mary's heart and Joseph's. A mere man, abandoned in the same predicament by prudence, would go terribly wrong and jour- JUSTICE 115 ney down to Nazareth with his parents. All our mistakes are due to want of prudence. Every duty we neglect betokens absence of the quality. Every law we break is a departure from its salutary promptings. We are abandoning the greater for the less ; we are sacrificing the service of God for sloth, for selfishness, for personal comfort. It must have cost the Child Christ a heavy pang to inflict this pain on His Mother and St. Joseph. He was as desirous of their holy company as they were of His, His sorrow was an answering echo to theirs. But His Father's business beckoned Him from afar, and He had to follow. Everything must yield before God's service. Next to virtue, life is man's supremest good on earth, and the martyrs surrendered that. In the catalogue of present goods, parents, home and friends rank next to life ; and religious surrender them, making every vocation to the monastery or convent a re-enactment of the sacred mystery we study. Justice. Justice is a constant and lasting readiness to ren- der to everybody his due, it is a habit of will prompt and ready to render to everybody his due. Constant and lasting are implied in the word, habit. One act of justice never makes a just man, because justice is a habit. Justice is divided into commutative, distributive and legal. St. Thomas calls legal justice general; he calls commutative and distributive, par- ticular justice. St. Thomas treats this virtue of justice in his Summa 2.2. between Questions 57 and 122. Legal justice, he says, makes a good citizen, commutative and distributive make a good man. 2.2. Q.58. a.6. Justice is directive of a man's conduct towards others, under the aspect of what is due these others. Man can be taken as an individual or as a unit in the state. He has relations with the state as a whole, and legal justice helps him fulfil them. The state as a whole has relations with him, and distributive justice manages them. He has relations with individuals in the state as men, and not as citizens, and commutative justice is the virtue concerned. Legal justice is in the ruler effectively, in the subject executively. The ruler makes the laws, the subject keeps them. The ruler is rendering the state its due, when he makes laws; the subject, when he keeps them; both con- tributing to the common good. Distributive justice is di- 116 GENERAL ETHICS rective of the state or its head in the distribution of priv- ileges and duties, dignities and burdens, rewards and pen- alties, influencing citizens to accept one and the other with satisfied content. Commutative justice is directive of the individual in transactions with his neighbor, involving sale and purchase and kindred processes, designated in a general way as exchange. Commutare means to exchange, as dis- tribuere means to distribute. Justice makes equality between two. In commutative the transaction is between two individuals, buyer and seller, or thief and his victim, as the case may be. One gives money and gets wares, the other gives wares and gets money, and there is equality or justice. One gets wares and gives noth- ing, the other gives wares and gets nothing; and there is in- equality or injustice. The equality and inequality are arithmetical, like 5 and 5, because such equality and inequal- ity are possible in commutative. In distributive the trans- action is between state and citizens. The citizens give serv- ice and get office, the state gets service and gives office. Dis- tributive is less concerned with rewarding citizens than with rewarding them in a proportionate way. If the state with- holds reward, it is offending against legal and commutative rather than against distributive justice. Distributive is hurt, only when some citizen, as compared with another citizen, gets a reward out of all proportion with his deserts. In dis- tributive two citizens deserve well of the whole community or state in different degrees. John is worth 4 degrees to the state in point of meritorious service, and gets in return 8 degrees of reward in the shape of honor, dignity or office. If James deserves well of the state to the extent of 2 degrees, distributive justice demands that he get in return 4 degrees of reward, not 6. John gets 4 more degrees than he gave, James gets only 2 more than he gave. The citizens give of their persons and get things, the state gets of their persons and gives things; and, as between persons and things, the only equality possible is geometrical or proportional, in this case, 4:8::2:4. Arithmetical equality is possible between things and things, and commutative justice is concerned ex- clusively with things. In legal justice the transaction is be- tween citizen and state. The state gives law securing com- JUSTICE 117 mon good, and gets obedience. The citizen gives obedience, and gets common good. Here there is question of things; and, because of arithmetical equality, if the ruler makes 4 laws, every citizen has to keep all 4. The ruler as seat and centre of authority is the state formally taken, citizens are the state materially taken, and the ruler in his capacity of citizen is part of it. In distributive the debt is owed the citizen, and the state pays it. In legal the debt is due the ruler or state, and the citizen pays it. Law is a debt the ruler owes the community, obedience is a debt the community owes the ruler. The ruler gets obedience, and gives common good; the citizen gets common good, and gives obedience. Of the three kinds of justice, distributive and legal are the least definite; and, because restitution is practically impos- sible, they are of less importance than commutative in the event of infringement. They are in the main observed, when the ruler does his utmost to distribute favors and burdens with a fair and even hand, when citizens abide by the law in all its details. If worthy citizens fail of their due reward, the ruler cannot make amends without doing injustice to others already in possession of dignities; and to make resti- tution out of his own pocket would not be distributive justice, which is concerned with the state's property, offices and such, not with the ruler's private property. Favoritism and nepotism are offenses against distributive, and they meet with full treatment in the Summa, 2.2. Q.63. God plays no fa- vorites, He is not a respecter of persons, A.A.IO, 34. Pen- alties are restitution in the case of offended legal justice, and the law never expects a criminal to bear witness against him- self. Offenses against commutative justice are clear-cut and well defined, the amount of restitution is a matter of arith- metic, and the obligation stands till the last penny is paid. Commutative justice is a process of exchange, and all ex- changes are voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary exchanges constitute business, and base the virtue of justice; involun- tary exchanges base the vice of injustice. With this twofold fact in mind, St. Thomas in his Summa, 2.2. Q.61, a.3, fur- nishes us with a list of ordinary business transactions with a bearing on justice, and a list of ordinary offenses against jus- tice. Voluntary exchanges are involved in buying and sell- 118 GENERAL ETHICS ing, usufruct, lending and borrowing, renting and hiring, pawning, bailing. Involuntary exchanges are theft, robbery, murder, assault, imprisonment, blows, wounds, lies, detrac- tion, false witness, insult, adultery with wife, seduction of slave. The whole of Question 62 deals with restitution in 8 articles. Between Questions 64 and 77, involuntary ex- changes, or species of injustice, are discussed and explained. Between Questions 77 and 79, voluntary exchanges are treated, with special attention to buying, and selling, and interest. Question 79 deals with the integral parts of justice, do good and avoid evil, give everybody his due, and refuse nobody his due. From Question 80 to Question 123, virtues closely connected with justice are discussed, and they are nine in number; religion, filial piety, esteem, truthfulness, gratitude, defense, all enumerated by Cicero in his De Inventione, Book 2, along with friendship, generosity and equity. Connected virtues in part differ from, and in part resemble justice. Jus- tice gives everybody his due according to equality. Equality is absent from religion, filial piety and esteem; due is want- ing in the other six. Religion or duties to God cover QQ. 81-101; filial piety, 101; esteem, 101-106; gratitude, 106- 108; defense, 108; truthfulness, 109-114; friendship or af- fability, 114-117 ; generosity, 117-120 ; equity, 120. He closes with a brief discussion of the Ten Commandments, or pre- cepts of justice, 122. Equity or epikeia, supra justum, is a superior kind of legal justice, because it interprets law not according to words, but according to the mind of the law- maker. No lawmaker can formulate a law able to touch every single occurrence. He legislates for ordinary contin- gencies, for what commonly happens ; and circumstances can quite change cases. Fortitude. Cicero defines fortitude as a judicious encoun- ter with danger, and sufferance of trouble, or endurance of effort. It regulates the irascible passions embodying diffi- culty, just as temperance has to do with the concupiscible passions. Fear and courage are the two passions with which fortitude is especially concerned, keeping them both within the bounds of reason. Fear is dread of an evil conceived as unavoidable, courage is dread of an evil avoidable only at the expense of great effort. Fortitude is conspicuous in mar- FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE 119 tyrdom, and naturally speaking fear of death is the greatest of all fears. Fortitude is more prominent in repressing fear than in exciting courage. It is harder to bear trouble than to attack it ; because, in bearing trouble, the victim is weaker than trouble; in attacking trouble, the threatened victim is stronger than trouble. Besides, trouble in the case of fear is nearer being present, in courage trouble is future and farther in the distance. Fear is long, courage is short. Fear is a sin, when against order; when it flees evils that ought to be met in the performance of duty. Fear is no sin, when it flees evils that ought to be avoided, evils that can be avoided with- out detriment to duty. Timidity is excessive fear, rashness is excessive courage. The four virtues connected with fortitude are spirited- nesSy grandeur, patience and perseverance. Inasmuch as it is a judicious encounter with danger, fortitude displays it- self as spiritedness by way of preparation, and as grandeur by way of execution. Inasmuch as it is a judicious endur- ance of effort, fortitude displays itself as patience when trou- ble is short, and as perseverance when trouble is long. Mag- nanimity is grandeur in general, magnificence is grandeur in the department of expense. The latter moves men to make large outlays of money to ensure some grand project. Con- fidence and security are parts of spiritedness. Presumption is an excess of spiritedness. So is ambition, or inordinate greed of honor. Vainglory is likewise an excess of spirited- ness. Desire of glory is not in itself wrong, when the glory sought is solid and true, when the seeker's purpose is right, and the means he uses are legitimate. Desire of vain or empty glory is wrong ; and glory is vain or empty, when based on a thing that deserves no praise, when tribute from a man whose judgment is little worth, when turned to wrong account, not directed to the glory of God or the neighbor's salvation. Vainglory is one of the capital sins, and counts for daughters* disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, novelty, stubbornness of opinion, contrariness of will, and disputatiousness. Want of spirit is opposed to spiritedness by way of defect ; presump- tion, by way of excess. One attempts less than it ought to attempt; the other, more; while spiritedness attempts what it ought to attempt. Stinginess is opposed to magnificence. 120 GENERAL ETHICS One rates the cost and neglects results; the other rates re- sults and neglects the cost. Extravagance is the opposite of stinginess. One makes man a spendthrift, the other makes him a miser. Patience is a remedy against sadness. All the moral virtues are helps to prevent the passions, in the pres- ence of good or evil, from dragging reason to wrong. Pa- tience, therefore, enables us to bear ills with an even mind, and not desert the right in an attempt to escape them. It is a virtue inferior to prudence, justice, fortitude and temper- ance, as well as to the theological virtues. Perseverance is part of fortitude, because it weakens fear and strengthens courage, always with a view to length of duration. Forti- tude can be the work of a minute, perseverance is the work of years. Softness and stubbornness are opposed to perse- verance by way of defect and excess respectively. St. Thomas deals with fortitude in his Summa, 2.2. QQ. 123-141. Temperance. Fortitude controls the irascible passions in their retreat from evil, temperance controls the concupiscible passions in their pursuit of good. Pleasure is the one great good appealing to the concupiscible passions; and God, as a reward and incentive, attaches pleasure to conservation of the race and conservation of the individual. Pleasures of touch contribute to the conservation of the race, pleasures of taste to that of the individual. Therefore, temperance is most conspicuous in control of pleasures of the flesh, and pleasures of the table. Temperance restrains impurity and gluttony. Temperance is not abstinence. One uses pleasure within the bounds prescribed by reason, the other refrains from pleas- ure altogether. Naturally speaking, abstinence from all food and drink would be wrong, because use of some food and drink is a law of nature imposed on the individual. Absti- nence from some certain food or drink would not be wrong, because no set food or drink is necessary to conservation of the individual. Abstinence from all the pleasures of the flesh would not be wrong in any individual, because conserva- tion of the race is a law imposed on no individuals in par- ticular, but on the race in general. If scattered individuals refuse to propagate, the race can still continue; if any in- dividual refuses to eat, he will die. Others can propagate the race in our stead, nobody can eat for us. Therefore, while FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE 121 total abstinence from wine is quite right and highly com- mendable in any individual, the moderate use of wine is far from wrong. Total abstinence from pleasures of the flesh is the only line of conduct open to individuals outside the condition of marriage, because these pleasures of the flesh are for the conservation of the race, and marriage is the one process appointed by God and nature for the propagation of the race. Moderate use of these pleasures with a view to reproduction is temperance, and peculiarly a virtue of the married. No use of these pleasures, whether moderate or excessive, is alone legitimate with the unmarried. Temper- ance is abstinence from illegitimate pleasure, it is the mod- erate and sensible use of legitimate pleasure. Fasting in food, sobriety in drink, chastity in pleasures of the flesh are forms of temperance. Shame is a kind of chastity. Purity and decency are parts of temperance. Continence, humility, modesty, mildness, mercy, moderation, politeness have family- resemblances with temperance. St. Thomas treats temper- ance in his Summa, 2.2. QQ. 141-171. THESIS IX CHAKACTER AND HABITS Morally speaking, character is the man; every man's character is his own work; and our destiny for weal or woe is in our own hands. Character is no very profound mys- tery, it is the plainest of problems. All has been said, when we remark that character is compounded of temperament and habits. Our temperaments are common with other hereditary qualities we get from our parents ; and, whether they are helps or hindrances to virtue and honesty, we must be content to employ them with thankfulness when they are helps, and supplement them with an abundant measure of good will when they are hindrances. No mortal can shift on temperament the blame for mediocrity. Parents are indeed responsible for tendencies and traits their children inherit, they are not responsible for their children's crimes. No man can allow temperament to bind him hand and foot and drag him to ruin, without proclaiming himself an abject slave, without trailing his dignity in the mire, without surrendering his birthright of liberty. Free will holds the key to the situa- tion. Temperament is not omnipotent. It is a mighty factor for good or evil, but it is far from settling the question. Free will is mightier than temperament; the man born for con- spiracy, treason and murder, can by dint of assiduous care become conspicuous for honorable valor, a red-hot patriot, a martyr in the cause of charity. The temperament of a de- generate, when free will is not yet submerged, is as much an instrument for good as the temperament of a saint. The de- generate has a harder road to travel; he has to walk with more care, more circumspection and more courage; but his feet are mercifully fitted for rough as well as smoother roads, and the precautions enumerated are within his power. Tend- encies and traits he inherited from his progenitors can bend, 122 CHARACTER AND HABITS 123 without being able to break, his will; and with the iron in his nature he can stiffen his courage to meet whatever strain. Temperament is, therefore, no insuperable hindrance to the cultivation of character; and of the two elements making up character, temperament is less within our power than habit. Our temperament we never make, we receive it ; but free will is its mistress, and, when the heart is alert, temperament never slips control. Our habits we make for ourselves, they are the growth of scattered acts ; and we form habits with our eyes wide open to the process and its consequences. Habits are even less a mystery than temperament. They are facilities along certain lines due to the frequent repetition of separate and distinct acts. Nobody knows with certainty the exact number of times an act has to be repeated to form a habit ; but everybody is agreed that a habit of music, for instance, is out of the ques- tion without days, and weeks, and years of practice. And what is true of music is true of painting, oratory, honesty, veracity, all the arts and all the virtues, our moral as well as our physical activities. Even walking is a habit ; and, though men and women pass from point to point in space with small reflection and less endeavor, it would pay the philosopher to know what mental exertion it costs baby to master this simple habit. But what we would most of all insist on, is the circum- stance that our habits are distinctively home-products. We make them, we never receive them ; and we are entirely and utterly responsible for the part they play in our lives. Even when habits are once formed, our wills are free, and quite able to resist them; and, before they are formed, our wills are absolute, and supreme, and omnipotent lords of the sep- arate and distinct acts that originate them. Hence, nobody can hide behind habit for excuse. The criminal who is such from habit, is even more blameworthy than the criminal such by surprise. Habitual crime is the growth of misspent years, and betokens an accumulation of shame. Wrong not rooted in habit may result from defective vigilance, want of experi- ence, overwhelming temptation; and the law is more lenient with first offenders than with veterans in vice. Though not omnipotent, habit is a mighty factor in the 124 GENEEAL ETHICS formation of character and consequent conduct; and, there- fore, our habits call for supremest care. Education is little worth, unless it contributes to the formation of mental and moral habits bej^ond reproach. Family is a wasted blessing, unless boys and girls come out of it better prepared for the battle of life. Government is a curse, unless its representa- tives are a perpetual incentive to the mental and moral uplift of its citizens. Church itself and religion are of little use, unless their professing members are bettered by contact with their aspirations and ideals. An ideal father and an ideal mother are mortals, whose behavior uniformly provokes chil- dren to the cultivation of every virtue, domestic, civic and religious. The education that ministers merely to the mind, with little or no concern for the heart, is as empty as a game of hazard, and bound to work equal harm to familj^, state and Church. Our years at school are the critical period in our lives. Men and women are made and unmade during this all-important season^ and, if we leave school with wrong habits, we are in imminent danger of ultimate loss, and strenuous endeavor becomes the price of salvation. Therefore, we ought to be supremely solicitous about the quality of our habits, and we ought to take serious thought of our equipment in habits. Measures must be taken to break with undesirable habits, and precautions must be em- ployed to strengthen and multiply right tendencies in our character. We must encourage the good in us, keep down the evil; and the whole process is summed up in the one word, control. Nothing so develops character as self-control. Good habits result from repeated acts of virtue, bad habits are broken by repeated victories over temptation to wrong; and control is fully equal to the double task. It is a two-edged sword, it cuts both ways. Man, as now constituted, is in- clined to evil from his youth; he leans towards vice and away from virtue; he is swift to one, slow to the other; and self-control, while it keeps him from slaving to base instincts, urges him to develop the better side of his character. With- out an abiding habit of self-control, success in life is abso- lutely out of the question. Without it, you cannot hope for Heaven; without it, you cannot reasonably expect to escape hell. Self-control is what makes men temperate, pure and SELF-CONTROL 125 honest ; want of this quality is responsible for the drunkards, the libertines and the thieves that infest our large and small cities. No one agency that I know is more conducive to the cultivation of self-restraint than family-discipline, school- discipline and the discipline of government or society. Every time a boy obeys his parents at home, he is adding a new asset to his worth as a man. Every time he breaks off play at the sound of the bell, he is laying deep and strong the broad foundation for the towering edifice of a splendid career. These instances of self-control are but the small and humble beginnings of future greatness ; and, if the habit accompanies the boy into the world of industry, politics and business, he will as a rule be soon discovered, he will prove a winner, and the world will love him, the world will load him with the highest honors at its disposal. Self-control, then, is the readiest measure of a man's char- acter, and this sober truth deserves a large place in your thoughts. It is the one bit of advice I would impress on your hearts. "Whatever books you read or study in after-life, read and study them with a view to growth in self-control. Cul- tivate a close acquaintance with the sturdy heroes of ancient and modern times, men of stout character, able to encounter and overcome hardships in their campaign for the right. Have nothing but contempt for the mean specimens of hu- manity, glorified in the modern novel and the morning news- paper, men and women that weak they cannot withstand temptation, men and women at the mercy of every vile de- sire that stirs in their bosoms. Have high ideals, live always a little superior to your environment, and never strike your colors to degraded public opinion. Know the right, and do it. Choose your friends with care, be citizens in the republic of saints, and keep company with heroes. To achieve great- ness, is an arduous task, we need every little help; and the example of the illustrious is a tonic for activity in the up- ward process. Scorn to borrow your religion or morality from the world. The Church is their appointed teacher, and to look elsewhere for guidance is like drawing water in a sieve, or planting pumpkins for a harvest of roses. Be men of principle. Be the hero described by Horace. If the world falls in ruins at your feet, present a bold front to the crash. 126 GENERAL ETHICS Map out your lives along a line of conduct approved of by- faith and reason, and then, whatever happens, keep your course undaunted. You may fail of success, as the term goes; you cannot fail of honor; and to go down to defeat with right, is better than to be crowned a winner with wrong. THESIS X RIGHTS AND DUTIES Jouin, 71-75; Bickahy, 244-253. Rights are meant by nature to shield men from harm in their intercourse with others, and they accomplish this pur- pose by creating duties in others. They procure the same advantage for God, and prevent men from wronging their Creator. Right equips its owner with the moral power to do or exact something, duty compels its subject to render another his due. Right has at least three meanings, justice, law, moral power. Because right is opposed to wrong or in- justice, right itself is justice or the just thing ; and, because justice is a man's due, discharge of duty is the consumma- tion of justice. Right is a man's due, duty is respect for another's rights; and, therefore, any refusal to fulfil a duty is an injustice or wrong. Because the essential purpose of all law is the establishment of justice, law itself has a claim to the title, right. In fact law, when couched in language, is but the concrete expression of a right; and this is true of every single law, of every collection of laws, and of whatever law borrows part of its compelling force from sources ex- traneous to the subject affected by the law. Civil law is largely a collection of rights the state undertakes to safe- guard; canon law discharges the same function in matters ecclesiastical ; and a law against burglary, with imprisonment for penalty, is concerned with a man's right to his property. Last of all, and in strict sense, right, viewed in its owner or possessor, is the moral and legitimate power to do something oneself, or exact its doing from another; the moral power to demand something, to hold something, or to use something as one's own. We have thus far taken three views of right. Viewed as justice or the right thing, it is a something to be 127 128 GENERAL ETHICS rendered by another. Viewed as law, it is a something out- side the owner and compelling others. Viewed as a moral power, it is a something in the owner ; and from this circum- stance right has all its practical value and worth. Right primarily means justice. Law is called right, be- cause it is an expression of justice. The moral power to do or exact something is called right, because justice vindicates to everybody his due. Suarez calls law preceptive right; the moral-power, dominion-right. A right, therefore, is man's moral power over what is due him. Duty is not a power, but an obligation. Right means, I can ; duty means, I ought. A right is called a moral power to distinguish it from might, which is physical power. Right touches only what is due the man, because justice is its foundation, and justice gives to everybody only his due, only what belongs to him. A thing is said to belong to a person, when the objective order of things makes it his, when between him and it a necessary re- lationship of connection ensues. This connection is physical and substantial in the case of a man and his life, a man and parts of his body; it is physical and accidental in the case of health, knowledge and the like ; it is moral, when between the man and things external to him, like money, land, repu- tation, esteem, glory or fame. A right would be little worth unless it created a duty in others. A right is, therefore, a relation, with its subject, title and term. The subject is owner, the title is whatever fact creates connection between the owner and the thing he owns, and the term is the subject-matter of the right, as well as the person in whom the corresponding duty resides. Holland distinguishes in every right a person of inherence, a person of incidence, a thing and a fact. He omits title, and makes fact mean the peculiar use of the thing or matter conferred on the owner by the right. God has no duties strictly so called, because duty taken that way, connotes a superior. Therefore, as between right and duty, right comes first. In the case of men, right in the person of inherence causes duty in the person of incidence; and, therefore, right precedes duty in the order of nature, though as regards the order of time both are simultaneous. Duty in the person of inherence always causes right in the same; and, therefore, restricting 3 RIGHT AND MIGHT 129 the question to the person of inherence, duty always pre- cedes right in the order of nature. Right is reducible to justice ; and, because justice is three- fold, commutative, legal, distributive, rights are of three kinds with distinctively peculiar purposes. In commutative justice, the purpose of right is liberty and independence in the disposal of one's goods. In legal justice, the purpose of right is the common welfare. In distributive justice, it is to safeguard the citizen against state-wrongs. A right in com- mutative justice can be surrendered, because no law forbids a man to submit to private wrong. Hence the axioms, "No harm is done a willing victim," and ''Nobody is obliged to use his rights." In legal justice the ruler cannot legitimately cede his right, because laws are made and executed not for the ruler's advantage, but for the welfare of citizens. Hence the ruler is obliged to use his right. Right connotes the moral power to employ physical force in its realization, because order demands that the inferior, or physical force be always at the call of the superior, or moral power. In society, to guard against abuses, the ap- plication of this physical force is reserved to the state, and is not left to the caprice of individuals. Physical compulsion, in potency or in act, is not of the essence of a right, it is a complementary property. Rights persevere in the absence of physical compulsion. No citizen is allowed to urge his rights against the state with the help of physical force, though the state enjoys this prerogative as against a citizen. Right order demands as much. In commutative justice, where help from the state is beyond reach, one citizen is allowed to use force against another, when his rights are endangered. Other- wise wrong would be without remedy. When talking about good and bad acts, we contended and proved that some acts are intrinsically and essentially good or bad ; that they get their goodness or badness from nothing outside of themselves, like law, or custom, or opinion; and that they are good or bad always, everywhere and in what- ever circumstances. Moral Positivism is opposed to our doc- trine, and maintains that nothing is good or bad in itself and unchangeably, but that good and bad acts are made such by something outside of, and extraneous to the acts themselves. 130 GENEKAL ETHICS Hohhes ascribes all the difference to civil law; Lambert, to custom and public opinion; Mandeville, to the research of eminent scholars; Nietzsche, to pity for the weak; Descartes and Puffendorf, to the will of God ; Darwinists and Positivists in general, to evolution. Because rights are but prescriptions of justice, naturally enough they get the same treatment as good and bad acts, at the hands of these enemies to morality. Their sytsem is called Juridical Positivism; and, in a very few words, while refusing independent validity to natural rights, it vindicates validity to only whatever rights are declared such by vested authority. All Moral Positivists belong to this school, along with men like Hobbes, Bentley, Lasson, Hartmann, who make the state sole and single cause of all rights. Rousseau and his followers ascribe right to tacit or expressed agreement among men. Savigny, the founder of the historical school, refers everything to history, public law, and a people's cus- toms. According to him natural rights are no rights at all, but only rules and standards for the establishment of rights. With him rights begin and grow in much the same way as a people's language. Against all such false philosophers we contend for a defi- nite collection of natural rights, vested with a validity inde- pendent of all positive law. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are three such rights, enumerated and acknowledged by our Constitution. These rights and a multitude of others descend to man from his Creator, and positive law has noth- ing to do with their creation or production. Its whole busi- ness is to safeguard these rights, by hemming them round with the physical force at its abundant disposal. Bight is reducible to justice, justice gives everybody his due, gives everybody what belongs to him ; and life is ours not by favor of the state, but by the free gift of God. The state has its right to make laws and insist on their observance, not from consent, or agreement, or history; but from God, who gave being to the state, and equipped it with all the means it needs to fulfil its purpose. God never imposed a duty on anybody, without investing him with a right to all needed means. He has imposed a multitude of duties on men ; and, just as these duties bind men without reference to positive law, so the JURIDICAL POSITIVISM 131 rights attaching to them are quite independent of human legislation and authority. Positive law, without prior nat- ural law, is a house without a foundation. Kings could make laws till doomsday without any appreciable effect, beyond physical force, unless natural law held subjects to reverence for authority, and obedience to legitimate rulers. Agreements and compacts would be empty scraps of paper, if fidelity to promises were not a prescription of the natural law. No in- ternational law would be possible, because there would be no competent legislator. Every civil law and every custom would be by the very fact just, law could make murder right, cus- tom could make impurity a virtue. And just as every positive law borrows all its efficacy from prior natural law, even so every positive right borrows all its strength and force from prior natural right. Positive law is an application of natural law, it makes natural law clearer, it adds to the moral sense of obligation and future sanction, attaching to natural law,, the physical sense of present pen- alty in the shape of fine or imprisonment, attaching to every positive law enacted. When Kant distinguishes between ju- ridical rights and ethical rights, when he separates the jurid- ical order from the ethical order, he forgets that ethical rights, as compared with juridical rights, are the same as natural law, as compared with positive law. When he attributes greater efficacy and sacredness to juridical rights than he at- tributes to ethical rights, he is virtually declaring positive law superior to natural law, man superior to God; he is putting tlie cart before the horse, subordinating cause to effect, attach- ing more importance to the roof than to the foundation. Na- ture confers ethical, or natural rights; law confers juridical rights. Ethical or natural rights are unchangeable at the hands of men, they do allegiance to God alone, and God is their single executive. Juridical rights are open to change with change of legislators, and are in force only as long as the laws creating them remain on the statute-books. Law is law, only when based on justice ; and juridical rights, opposed to ethical rights, are no rights at all. Juridical order is, there- fore, only an integral part of moral or ethical order, and no more separable from the same than the head is from the man. The head cannot be separated from the man, without 132 GENERAL ETHICS changing its entire complexion and substance. Juridical or- der, separated from ethical order, ceases altogether to be moral order; and rights conferred by law, in opposition to rights conferred by nature, are no rights at all. God the author of nature seems destined to get small notice and smaller reverence from present-day writers on Ethics, thanks to the atheistic and irreligious trend of our times. And natural law, which has God for its maker, meets with the same full measure of contempt. One writer on Jurisprudence, Holland by name, wants law in strict sense limited to human positive or civil law; barring from the title natural law, di- vine positive law in Scripture, and Church law. He bars natural law, because it is formulated by an indeterminate authority; Scriptural law, because it is formulated by a su- perhuman authority ; Church law, because it is formulated by a politically subordinate authority. All this is purely arbi- trary, and betrays the man's atheistic tendencies. We grant that law in strict sense cannot be formulated by an indetermi- nate authority, but God in nature, God in Scripture, and Church, are no indeterminate authority, unless we want to turn atheists and infidels. Natural law and Scriptural law are divine law, divine law is as much law as civil law, God is its formulating authority, God is no indeterminate being, and only atheists and infidels can think the thing. Church law is as much law as civil law, the true Church is no inde- terminate authority; and, whatever may be said of other churches, the true or Catholic Church is in its own sphere quite independent of the state, and it never presumes to legis- late outside its own sphere. True, God is a superhuman au- thority; but even civil law, without superhuman authority at its back, is a dead letter and nothing worth. No mere man has a right to legislate for other men. All men are born free and equal, nobody is born a king; and the authority he gets immediately from God is what makes the ruler's pronounce- ments law. Without this authority, his pronouncements are empty words, and of no more worth than mine or yours. Therefore, God must not be denied the quality of lawmaker, simply because He is a superhuman authority. Therefore God's law, whether natural or Scriptural, is more law than civil law. HOLLAND, KANT AND POSITIVISM 133 What Mr. Holland, perhaps, means is that God and the Church are less visible and less tangible than the state. But that is his own view of the thing. To the religious mind, and the man of faith, God and the Church are more solemn reali- ties than the state. With Thomasius, Holland wants us to keep our sickles out of theology, forgetting that natural theol- ogy is as much philosophy as logic or psychology or Ethics, and that no part of philosophy, which is knowledge of things in their last cause, can be rightly understood without a fair knowledge of God, the first and last cause of all things. To doubt the propriety of conceiving God as a lawmaker, as Mr. Holland ventures to do, is not to keep one's sickle out of theology, but to assail all theology and all religion with an axe. God is more than a mere information-bureau, equally well satisfied whether His children accept His doctrine or not. He teaches with authority, and He wants His lessons learned ; He is eminently a lawmaker, and sanctions His legislation with hell. He is a Father of too wise a kind to allow His sons to go what way they will. He wants their full obedience ; and, if they refuse it, they know what to expect. And all this is clear from Natural Theology, without any appeal whatever to Supernatural Theology or revelation. Law in strict sense is an obligation or ruling founded on right reason, drawn up and promulgated for the common good by him who has charge of the community affected ; and this definition is as fully veri- fied in natural. Scriptural and Church law as it is in civil law. Natural law is from eternity; positive law, whether di- vine or human, is made or placed in time. Holland is imitating Kant when he makes a difference be- tween Ethics and Nomology. Ethics, he says, touches the will, the interior act, and it is a matter of conscience; Nomology touches the outward act, exterior conduct. Civil law belongs to Nomology, and it cannot fathom a man's thoughts or in- tentions with any degree of certainty, and very sensibly leaves them alone. It agrees to interpret them with the help of external acts. Divine law has God for author, and men's thoughts as well as their intentions are no mystery to God. Juridical legality is a different thing from Ethical morality. An act can be all right in the eyes of the law, and all wrong in the eyes of conscience. Civil law makes only indifferent 134 GENERAL ETHICS acts good or bad, it leaves other acts where it finds them, and makes them merely legal. Ethics makes an act morally good or bad, prior to and independent of all civil law ; and this is the big difference between natural law and positive law. The ethical order must not be separated from the juridical order, because the latter is an integral part of the former. Ethical order is like the whole man, juridical order is like his head. Natural law prescribes civil law as a necessary requisite for the welfare of the state, and therefore all civil or positive law is but an emanation from natural law. The juridical order is right, taken as positive law; and all posi- tive law is a derivation from natural law, which in turn is right in the ethical order. When Kant separates the jurid- ical order from the ethical or moral order, when he ascribes all the force and efficacy of juridical rights to positive law, without any reference whatever to natural law, he virtually reduces all right to preceptive, and rejects dominion-right. Preceptive right is a prescription of positive law ; and, without the support of natural law, positive law has no binding force. Dominion-right is a prescription of the natural law, and nat- ural law binds, whether positive law supports it or not. Kant denies all ethical or moral right, to admit only jurid- ical right; and, therefore, he denies dominion-right to admit only preceptive right. It is wrong to say that laws urged by civil authority are not in themselves binding on conscience. Civil law looks to the external act, without a care for the motive; natural law looks to external act and motive both. No matter what his motive, civil law certainly binds the man in conscience to put the prescribed external act. Penal laws exert no strain on conscience beyond the acceptance of the penalty incurred; but that is due to the mercy of the law- maker, and a matter of common understanding between ruler and subjects. Obligation to the law is no product of the man himself, it is imposed on him by another, and proceeds from the natural law and its author, God. Therefore, every illegal act is wrong; and yet not every legal act is right, be- cause the juridical order is only a part of the ethical or moral order, and not the whole of it. A man's head can be sound, while the rest of his body is unhealthy. Right as law is preceptive right, right as a moral power DIVISION OF RIGHTS ' 135 is dominion-right; and the two admit of many divisions. Law is private, public, international. Law is private, when the two parties to the action are citizens, and the state is arbiter; public, when the state has action against the citizen or the citizen against the state, the state in both cases being arbiter ; international, when the parties to the action are two independent states, and the world is arbiter. Private law is substantive and adjective, normal and abnormal, antecedent and remedial, in rem and in personam. Private law is be- tween citizen and citizen. Substantive law defines the rights of individuals, adjective law indicates the process of their en- forcement. Normal law is for persons of ordinary type, ab- normal is for deviations from ordinary type. Antecedent law is for cases before wrong has been committed, remedial is for cases after wrong has been committed. Law in rem is against the world, law in personam is against some definite individual. The six normal antecedent rights in rem are, 1, right to per- sonal safety and liberty; 2, right to society and control of family; 3, right to good name; 4, right to advantages of life in community and free exercise of profession; 5, right to property; 6, right against fraud and deceit. The first of the six secures owner against threats, assault, wounds, imprison- ment, dangerous things and dangerous places. The second secures owner marital rights of husband over wife, parental rights of father over child, tutelary rights of guardian over ward, dominical rights of master over servant. The third secures owner against libel and such like injury. The fourth secures owner a livelihood, use of harbors and rivers, free- dom from malicious prosecution. The fifth secures owner in his possessions. The sixth secures owner against damage accruing from fraud and deceit. The two normal antecedent rights in personam are quasi-contract and contract. Quasi- contract embraces these four headings, domestic, fiduciary, meritorious, officious. Domestic means one member of the family against another member. Fiduciary means trusts, matters of confidence, executors. Meritorious means right to indemnity for services rendered. Officious means use of pub- lic officials like postmen. Contracts are principal and acces- sory. Principal contracts imply no ulterior object, accessory imply security for another contract. Principal contracts are 136 GENERAL ETHICS six, alienation, permissive use, marriage, service, negative service, aleatory gain. Accessory contracts are seven in num- ber, suretyship, indemnity, pledge, warranty, ratification, ac- count stated, for further assurance. Remedial law deals with offenses against rights in rem and in personam. Abnormal law is for deviations from ordinary type. Adjective law is opposed to substantive. Substantive creates rights, adjective enforces them. Adjective law is procedure. THESIS XI CONTRACTS Jouin, 140-154; Eickdhy, 253-255. The jurisprudence of contracts is a large question, and cannot obviously be treated here in detail. We are studying ethics, not law ; and we necessarily restrict ourselves to what natural law has to say on the subject, leaving the question of positive or civil law in its bearing on contracts to the school of law. A contract is an agreement and consent be- tween several persons regarding some set object. A one-sided or unilateral contract is in itself a mere promise ; and, because of its nature it obliges or binds only one of the two parties to the transaction, hardly deserves the name. Its fulfilment is regularly a matter of fidelity to one's word, not a matter of justice. When, however, it raises the hopes of the prom- isee, and induces him to incur expense, it assumes the pro- portions of a two-sided contract, and involves strict justice. Justice likewise intervenes when the promiser means to bind himself in justice. Contract in strict sense creates a mutual obligation between two or more; and, therefore, only two- sided or bilateral contracts deserve the name in its completest significance. A contract creates rights and duties in both parties to the transaction. Take, for example, the common- est form of contract, that of buying and selling. The buyer assumes the duty of paying the price, and is invested with the right to receive the goods purchased. The seller assumes the duty of delivering the purchase, and is vested with the right to receive the price. The two persons are the efficient cause of the contract, the set object is its material cause, consent and agreement are its formal cause ; and all three causes must fulfil certain conditions. The persons must be fit agents, they must enjoy the use of reason, and they must have full and free dominion over what they dispose of in the contract. 137 138 GENERAL ETHICS Natural law is sponsor for these two conditions. A contract means free consent, and that demands the use of reason. A contract is a function of ownership, and nobody gives but what he first possesses. Civil law can for the common good prescribe other condi- tions, and their discussion belongs to the school of law. The matter of the contract must be possible, morally as well as physically; and, for obvious reasons, it must be legitimate. The consent given must be of such a nature that it really and truly creates an obligation. In other words, it must be true internal consent as well as external, and it must be entirely free. Natural law stands for the invalidity of feigned con- tracts, empty ceremonies without any intention to form a con- tract or assume an obligation, because natural law's avenger, or God, sees the heart as well as external facts. Civil law, because its maker's vision is restricted to external facts, counts valid every such feigned contract. It argues that the deceiver has violated another's rights, and must indemnify him even to the extent of putting true internal consent. Besides, the party deceived is never obliged to believe the deceiver, when he says that he made no true contract. A contract made with a full sense of obligation, and a determination to never fulfil it, is valid even in natural law. Freedom is interfered with by want of knowledge or mis- take, by fear and by violence. Substantial mistake invalidates a contract, e.g., wine and vinegar in a purchase. Accidental mistake, when responsible for the transaction, renders gratui- tous contracts invalid, -onerous contracts repudiable. Ex- ternal violence invalidates contracts. Internal fear, as long as it leaves freedom unimpaired, never invalidates. External fear, induced unjustly to effect contract, invalidates gratui- tous, makes onerous repudiable. Quasi-contracts get their validity from law, rather than from self-imposed obligation. Law imposes the obligation, not parties to the contract. No contract is made, law sup- plies, and deals with case in much the same way as if a con- tract had been made. Law casts duty on person of incidence without his agreement. Its four kinds are, family, trust, meritorious, officious. Savigny defines a contract, as the union of several in ac- DIVISION OF CONTRACTS 139 cordant expression of will, to create an obligation between them. Hence his analysis of a contract into these four ele- ments, several parties, agreement of wills, mutual communi- cation of agreement, intention to create legal relations. About expression of agreement. Pollock says, ''Courts hold men to fulfilment of intention, only when expressed in a manner that would convey to an indifferent person, reasonable and rea- sonably competent in the matter in hand, the sense in which the expression is relied on by the parties claiming satisfac- tion." Justice Blackburn, 1871, says, "Whatever a man's real intention, if he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe he was assenting to another's terms, and that the other party agrees, the man would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree." Therefore, not what the man intended, not what the other party supposed him to intend, hut what a reasonable man, i.e., judge or jury, would put upon such acts. This is the objective theory of contracts. Holland sees these six elements in a contract, 1, several par- ties; 2, two-sided act expressing agreement; 3, matter agreed upon both possible and legal; 4, agreement of a nature to produce a legally binding result; 5, such a result as affects the relations of the parties to one another; 6, very generally a solemn form, or some fact affording a motive for the agree- ment. A formal contract observes formalities prescribed by law, usually writing. An informal contract is without pre- scribed formalities, but is based on some fact or considera- tion. The result of a contract is obligation between parties, conferring rights on one, imposing duties on other, partly stipulated in agreement, partly implied by law. Holland divides contracts into principal and accessory, and we already enumerated them. Under permissive use he groups loan for consumption, loan for use, and loan for hire. In olden times loan of money ranked as loan of food, and it was a species of permissive use, the kind called loan for con- sumption, as opposed to the kind called loan for use. Inter- est then fell under the contract denominated permissive use for consumption. Such a contract calls for mere return of the food or money borrowed, or their equivalent ; it is of its nature gratuitous, and the right to interest depends on special agreement. Hence the Church's condemnation of interest in 140 GENERAL ETHICS olden times. All interest was considered usury or excessive interest, because increment, to which the lender was not en- titled. Cathrein divides contracts into gratuitous and onerous. Gratuitous are made in the interest of one party; onerous, in the interest of both. In gratuitous all the burden is on one party, in onerous both parties assume burdens. Gratui- tous contracts are promise, gift, loan, deposit. Onerous con- tracts are buying and selling, letting for hire, partnership, interest. In a contract of buying and selling two mutually agree on merchandise to be received or given for a set price, and price usually means money. Between value received and price given there must be some equality, because people are not supposd to be making presents, when assuming onerous contracts. A thing's value is fixed in great measure by its perfection or usefulness in the eyes of men. We distinguish between use-value and exchange-value. Use-value is abso- lute, and depends on the thing's substantial usefulness. Ex- change-value is relative, and depends on the thing's worth, as compared with other salable articles. Air, water, light have great use-value, small exchange-value. Price is exchange- value expressed in terms of money. To be fair and just, a thing's price and its value ought to be equal. Prices go into legal, natural and conventional. Law fixes the legal price, many circumstances fix the natural price, mutual agreement fixes the conventional price. Natural price, because depend- ent on circumstances, admits of a certain latitude; and can be high, medium or low. These circumstances are, the use- fulness of an article, its scarcity, multitude of buyers, abun- dance of money. It is quite fair and proper to charge a price rated just by common opinion. Where law and opin- ion fail to fix prices, agreement must settle things. Among other applications, the contract of letting for hire has place between employer and employee. This species of the contract is peculiar, inasmuch as the energies of a hu- man being are involved in the transaction. Besides the pay- ment of just and fair wages, the employer must impose on his workman no condition or burden derogatory to his dignity as a human being. The workman has no right to dispose of his energies in a way unsuited to his dignity as a man, and EMPLOYER AND WORKMAN 141 whatever employer compels him to do so is guilty of injus- tice. A just wage is a living wage, and that means money enough to enable the workman to live, and to live comfort- ably; to procure not only the necessaries of life, but a mod- erate share of its luxuries. The workman has no right to a fixed percentage of his employer's profits, because he is not precisely a partner; and yet, other things equal, the more an employer derives from a workman's labor, the higher are the wages due the workman, if price is to be regulated by the usefulness of the commodity purchased. It is extortion pure and simple, to coerce a workman into selling his labor at a price, altogether out of proportion with its value to the pur- chaser. And the immense fortunes, amassed by employers in short intervals of time, quite satisfy me that, whether awake to the fact or not, most employers are enriching them- selves at the expense of their workmen, and actually stealing from the poor. Law, public opinion, agreement, unaided by religion, will never be able to establish . justice, as between employer and workman; because money can buy labor-leaders as well as lawmakers, capital can afford to laugh at public opinion, and free agreement is out of the question, when labor has to choose between low wages and starvation. The chiefest rem- edy for injustice is religion and dread of a future punish- ment. ''All things obey money." Eccles. 10.19. God is the only judge industrial thieves need to be absolutely afraid of, because they can on occasions switch human judges with money, nearly everybody having his price; and the one way to escape fear of God and fear of hell, is to shake off all allegiance to religion. This labor-problem, because of its bear- ing on morality, is as much an affair of the Church as it is of the state. Till this problem is satisfactorily settled, it must remain a menace to the salvation of menu's souls; and it is the Church's business to fight every such menace to a fin- ish. All the world is her kingdom, workmen and employers alike belong to her jurisdiction; they are children in her house, and like a good mother she must keep down quarrels in the family. And here is the plan our Church proposes. She counsels employers to cultivate with enthusiasm the two virtues of 142 GENERAL ETHICS justice and charity; she counsels workmen to cultivate with no smaller enthusiasm the two virtues of honest content and conscientious industry. In the matter of pay, justice means a living wage for all, defectives out of the question, and for workmen of superior ability a corresponding increase. A living wage means money enough to decently support the workman and his family, without extraordinary labor on the part of his wife and young children. His wife must care for his home, his young children must get an education, and strengthen their weak bodies by play and exercise for the years ahead. The employer, who holds his workman to starvation wages, is guilty of injustice; and the workman's consent to the unholy transaction relieves the employer of no moral re- sponsibilitiy. To take advantage of a poor man's needs, is to rob him ; and to force a hungry man to choose a half loaf, when a whole loaf is his due, differs only a little from holding up a traveler with a pistol. The traveler yields up his purse, to escape with his life ; and the oppressed workman yields up his whole loaf, to escape from starvation. In the one case it is the surrender of the purse or death; in the other it is surrender of the whole loaf or no bread at all. And charity is an altogether different virtue from justice. Justice is close and tight, charity is a stranger to narrow notions; it is as wide as the sea. Charity is more than mere justice; to coin a word, it is super justice. Justice gives everybody his due, no more no less; and, if it leans at all, it leans toward severity. Charity leans towards leniency, and its donor glories in his dishonesty towards himself. It gives to everybody more than his due, in the matter of wages as well as of praise ; less than his due, in the matter of penalties as well as of blame. Charity, therefore, is a species of divine superjustice, mercifully meant to correct the shortsighted jus- tice of men. The employer is not absolute owner of his wealth, when God is taken into account. No man can, in the name of justice or of charity, appropriate to himself a dollar of the employ- er's legitimate wealth; but God is first owner, God has prior rights, and God can stipulate to what uses the employer must put his wealth. The rich are God's almoners to the poor. EMPLOYER AND WORKMAN 143 It is their sacred and solemn duty to relieve the wants of the needy with their superfluous wealth, and to give their work- men sometimes, not in the name of justice, but in the name of charity, a little more than they earn. When employers heed the demands of justice and charity, workmen will have no cause to complain, honest content and conscientious in- dustry will be as easy as they are natural, differences between employers and workmen will disappear, and strife will be at an end. THESIS XII INTEREST Jouin, 154-160; Bickahy, 255-263. Loan is regularly a gratuitous contract, whether loan for consumption or loan for use. Thus, when a person borrows a loaf of bread to eat it, he is obliged to return to the lender only another loaf of bread of the same quantity and quality. When a person borrows a book to read it, he is obliged to return only the book. In olden times, because money was borrowed only for the purpose of purchasing food and the like, things consumed in their use, without producing new wealth, money-lending was a purely gratuitous contract, and all interest ii^as rightly considered usury or extortion from the poor. Hence, St. Thomas and all Church writers up to his time are violently opposed to the interest, considered per- fectly legitimate in present economic circumstances. All the difference is due to the different uses of money in their times and ours. With them money was reckoned a good consumed in its use, a good productive of no new wealth. With us, money is a good not consumed in its use, a good decidedly productive of new and greater wealth, when com- bined with human endeavor. Capital was of no practical use in olden times, to-day it is one of the chief factors in business of whatever sort. Money-lending has passed from loan to letting-for-hire in the catalogue of contracts, from gratuitous to onerous, and all because of different economic conditions. People now rent money to another, as they rent a house ; and they have a perfect right to any just rate of interest they demand. And yet the frauds and thefts, perpetrated in mod- ern times under cover of interest, almost persuade one to think that the world was certainly more honest, even if worse off materially, when all interest was condemned as usury, and 144 INTEREST AND CHURCH 145 injustice and extortion ; and, in the esteem of religious minds, growth in material prosperity is small recompense for moral degeneracy. To make interest universally legitimate, there must be a something in money, that makes use of it by lender or bor- rower profitable, or productive of ulterior wealth. In other words, money must be fruitful, not barren ; it must resemble a field ready for planting, not a loaf of bread ready for a hungry man. The money-lender must have a title to the interest he claims, and that title must somehow or other be intrinsic to the money itself. A title extrinsic to the money, might suffice to justify interest in the event of some agree- ment between lender and borrower; but nothing short of a title intrinsic in some way to the money, can justify interest in the event of no agreement whatever ; and we contend that money loaned demands interest to-day of its very nature. Four extrinsic titles justified interest, even when the Church was loudest in its condemnation of the practice ; and they were, 1, loss of opportunity to make money incurred by the loan, or interruption of profit, lucrum cessans; 2, damnum emerg- ens; unusual risk; 3, penalty for delay in payment; 4, legal reward meant for incentive to business. The Church always recognized the legitimacy of these several titles. Besides, peo- ple of great wealth could buy the right to farm revenues, and they could enter partnership, wherein without personal labor their money could earn an increment. It must be remarked that these several titles are extrinsic to the money loaned, and never created a right to compensation without prior agree- ment. Hence, the Church regularly and consistently considered interest wrong, and branded all interest usury. It defined usury as any attempt to draw profit and increment without labor, without cost, and without risk, out of the use of a thing that does not fructify. It forbade a man to lend his horse to a neighbor as a gratuitous gift, and then without any warn- ing charge him for the use of it, changing a purely gratuitous contract into an onerous contract. Men of early times saw only one value in money, its substantial value; and interest was something in excess of that value. They saw no fruitful- ness in money, it was Shakespeare's "barren breed of metal" ; 146 GENERAL ETHICS and to charge extra for fruitfulness, it was on all sides con- ceded not to have, was robbery, injustice, extortion. To-day all is changed. Commerce is so easy and extensive, remote regions are so close together because of steam and electricity, communication is so rapid because of telegraph and telephone, that for purposes of business the whole world is no larger than a single trading block in any city; and money has uses it never before enjoyed. Money is become a species of seed, a dollar judiciously planted can grow a thou- sand; and the seed-dealer is justified in charging one price and another for different varieties of seed, not precisely be- cause of their substance, but because of the flowers or fruits they produce. And whereas in olden times the only legiti- mate titles to interest were extrinsic to the money itself, the four enumerated and explained awhile ago, to-day the title to interest is intrinsic to the money itself; not, indeed, simply and without any qualification intrinsic, hut after a manner and with a qualification, accruing to money from modern methods of business. This kind of intrinsic title partakes of the nature of extrinsic and intrinsic titles. It is extrinsic, inasmuch as it is not rooted in the nature of money itself, independent of all circumstances. It is intrinsic, inasmuch as it attaches to money in fixed economic conditions like our own. Therefore, the right to interest is not dependent on any civil law, but on the nature of things. For the common good, law can regulate rates of interest, it has no jurisdiction over the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of interest. Laws regulat- ing interest may be just or unjust, and the state framing such laws must consult the objective order of things. In general, a fair rate of interest would be that portion of the profit, made by the borrower, left after deducting a fair recompense for his skill, labor and industry ; and, in the main, that is the ratio just laws everywhere try to determine. Law cannot make wrong right, and plainly exorbitant rates, though sanc- tioned by law, continue offenses against justice. And yet, because, in the matter of justice, the presumption is always in favor of law, nobody need as a rule be disturbed, when he keeps within the limits of the law. Money itself is only a medium of exchange, a standard or INTEREST AND CHURCH 147 measure of value. When business was small, all trade was simply an exchange of one article for another, and the trans- action was called barter. As business grew, some set article was chosen as a general medium; and it became a standard, a unit for the measurement of value resident in other articles. A sheep could be made the standard ; and horses, cows, houses, everything could be valued in terms of sheep. After cen- turies of experience the world seems to have settled on the precious metals, gold and silver, as money or media of ex- change. Animals, shells, skins, wheat, tobacco, and a multi- tude of other objects have been employed in history as money; but all have yielded place to silver and gold, or to paper, entitling its owner to a definite quantity of silver and gold, when presented to proper authorities. Gold and silver were chosen because of becoming qualities they possess. They are durable, and wear well ; their scarcity adds to their intrinsic value, and gives greater worth to small portions ; they can be carried with ease from place to place ; they are readily di- vided, measured and shaped ; they are homogeneous through- out, and the Same the world over. Coinage, reserved to the ruler, secures citizens, regarding the genuine quality of the realm's money. Money, therefore, has a twofold value, material and formal, or moral. Its material value is its use in the arts and the trades. Gold and silver dollars can be turned into jewelery and the like. Its formal or moral value is its use as a me- dium of exchange, its purchasing power. In olden times money's purchasing power was restricted to things consumed in their use ; when loaned, it was lent to purchase things of the kind; and so money never rose to the dignity of a fruit- ful good, productive of new wealth in its use. To-day money purchases things not consumed in their use, things productive of new wealth; and money, assuming the quality of what it can purchase, becomes by the very fact a fruitful good. In consequence, whoever lends money to another, has a right to the profit he might have earned with his money, while it remained with the borrower; and all this, not by virtue of any agreement, but in virtue of the change made in money by modern conditions. In other words, money is now an instrument of business and trade, and it demands a price, 148 GENERAL ETHICS mucli as the store you rent to another, or the machine hired to manufacture some product. Money, therefore, is a fruit- ful good, because it stands for all purchasable commodities; and the loan of a fruitful good, in strict justice demands more than the mere return of the good, it demands a return of the fruit as well. Ballerini thinks that custom made interest illicit in olden times, because he reckoned it impossible to prove that anything in the nature of money forbids such recompense for its use. But St. Thomas and the others regu- larly appeal to the very nature of money, viewed as a thing consumed in its use. Others favor leaving everything to the intention of the borrower. They would consider interest wrong, in case the borrower meant to purchase food and the like; right, in case he meant to trade with it for purposes of profit. Charity might recognize a difference between the two cases, not justice. The two are onerous contracts. THESIS XIII MERIT AND DEMERIT Jcmin, 21-23; Bickahy, 152. Merit and demerit are fruits of morality. A man can merit with God and with other men. He can so behave to- wards God and men as to deserve in justice reward at their hands. Merit and demerit result from imputability, that quality which makes man the cause and proprietor of his acts. Only rational beings are capable of merit and demerit, be- cause freedom is a requisite. Imputability implies ownership, and freedom alone vests man with ownership in his acts. Necessary agents are not owners. Merit means right to pay- ment for favor done another, it means reward. Demerit means right or liahility to payment for harm done another, it means punishment or penalty. Justice is the measure of merit and demerit. They even up justice, when the balance swings one side. Justice is the virtue that renders to every- body his due. It is of three kinds, commutative, man to man ; distributive, state to citizen ; legal, citizen to state, cor- porately and individually. Commutative demands strict or arithmetical equality between favor and reward. Distribu- tive demands geometrical equality between favor and reward. Ordinarily a fair distribution of emoluments and burdens satisfies its claims. Legal regularly demands arithmetical equality, and is secured by law. Equity is a merciful provi- sion meant to he corrective of justice. It has application, tvhere reward is due, not in strict justice, hut from a view- point of fairness and honor. It ministers to the incomplete- ness of legal justice. Commutative gets its name from the process of exchange, at the basis of business transactions, like trading, and buying, and selling. In this species of justice arithmetical equality, or that of 5 to 5, is possible, because 149 150 GENERAL ETHICS both favor and reward are things, money, for instance, and a horse. Distributive gets its name from the distribution in play, when offices in a government are parcelled out to de- serving citizens. In this species, geometrical equality, or that of 6 and 4 to 3 and 2, is alone possible; because, while the favor is, as it were, a person, the reward is a thing. If a citizen doing 6 points of service gets an office worth 4, a citizen doing 3 points of service ought to get and office worth 2. Legal justice in point of equality resembles commutative, differing merely in origin. Physical violence does away with merit and demerit, because it destroys freedom of execution; but the moral violence duty or obligation exerts, because it leaves even the ordered act voluntary, has no destroying in- fluence on merit or demerit. Duty or obligation removes the element of supererogation. God can be said to owe things to Himself and creatures. He owes it to Himself to see to the fulfilment of His wisdom, will, and goodness in creatures. He owes creatures equip- ment with requisites to their nature. This second debt is rooted in the first, and so God is under obligation to nobody but Himself. God is just to the wicked, when He punishes the wicked, because it is what the wicked deserve. He is just to Himself, when He spares the wicked, because mercy is what He owes His own goodness. Merit is of two kinds, de condigno and de congruo. One is based on strict justice, the other on equity. Harmony or dis- cord with the objective order of things makes an act good or bad. Imputability has its origin in freedom of will, and makes an act blamable or praiseworthy. Justice measures an act's merit or demerit. To merit with men, the favor done must not be payment for antecedent debt, and it must be -a favor asked or desired, or reasonably supposed such. Man can merit with God and other men, because he can freely do them a favor. The favor changes the prior condi- tion of justice, and calls for recompense to reestablish justice. Man's merit with God is not absolute, but conditional; and God has put the condition. Man owes everything to God, without right to any return. And yet, in making man free, God changes the aspect of things, and agrees to consider a favor, what is in reality a debt. This gift of free will is a MERIT AND DEMERIT 151 virtual promise on the part of God to reward its right use, and punish its abuse, God is incapable of intrinsic addition; but man can do God a kindness, by adding to His extrinsic glory; and virtue se- cures this addition. Man is at the same time a servant and a son of God. He merits with God as a son, and as a serv- ant ; supernatural reward as a son, natural reward as a serv- ant. God is first cause of a man's free will, as He is first cause of every effect in the universe. But man is second cause of His free acts, in such manner that he contributes of his own to their reality, and exerts his own independent activ- ity. Man in God's hands is no mere passive instrument, but active as well. God's promise, makes man's merit de con- digno. In the supernatural order this promise is writ in revelation ; in the natural order, on the open page of creation. The discrepancy between man's acts and a supernatural re- ward, is atoned for by the addition of sanctifying grace. That quality renders them supernatural, and enables them to merit de condigno supernatural recompense, or Heaven. THESIS XIV Utilitarianism is wrong, dangerous and absurd. Jouin, 31 j Rickahy, 177-191. QUESTION Utilitarianism is a standard of morality, set up by men who want to keep God and a future life out of the question. They ignore immortality, and with it the spiritual side of man's nature. They ?ire not everywhere consistent in their views ; and, when trapped by their own words into some dam- aging admission, never hesitate to seek a refuge in self-contra- diction. William Paley, 1743-1805 ; Jeremy Bentham, 1748- 1832 ; James Mill, 1773-1836 ; John Stuart Mill, his son, 1806- 1873; John Austin, 1790-1859; and George Grote belong to this school. TERMS Utilitarianism. Its creed is formulated in two principles and a law. First Principle : Man 's last end lies in this world, and is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, mean- ing pleasure as well of the senses as of the understanding. N.B. Cudworth, Butler, Paley, and others, notably older Utilitarians, mention God and a future life with respect. John Stuart Mill and moderns in general resent all reference to God and a future life. Second Principle: Useful acts are right, hurtful acts are wrong. Acts are useful, when they result in pleasure; hurt- ful, when they result in pain. Law: General results must be taken into account, not particular; not the immediate re- sult of this particular act, but what would result to society, if this sort of act were generally allowed. This last is what Paley calls the Law of General Conse- 152 UTILITARIANISM 158 quences. It hits near our standard of morality, the objective order of things; and we have no quarrel with it. But we have a very serious quarrel with the Principle of Greatest Happiness, and the Principle of Utility. We have already proved that man 's absolutely last end, his greatest happiness, lies outside of this world, and is God, intuitively possessed. We have besides proved that his greatest happiness on earth, his relatively last end, is the introduction of moral rectitude into his acts ; and that moral right and wrong are constituted by harmony or discord with the objective order of things. Our three theses are a direct refutation of Utilitarianism. If somebody wants to believe in the reality of a future life, the Utilitarians assure him that their doctrine menaces no harm to his aspirations. They are quite accommodating. * ' Take care of the things of earth, ' ' they say, ' ' and the things of Heaven will take care of themselves." Christ taught the contrary, when He called the cares, and riches, and pleasures of life thorns that choke the seed and hinder it of fruit. Our friends meet this difficulty with a new distinction between Hedonism, pleasure for me, and Altruism, pleasure for the other fellow. These thorns of the gospel are the pleasures of Hedonism, not the pleasures of Altruism. Altruism then is their last end. To meet Utilitarianism on common ground, we must for the time being neglect the future life, and dis- cuss with them man's highest good in this present life. We maintain that man's highest good in this life is the establish- ment of moral rectitude in his acts, calling the condition in- complete happiness, because, in life's sum of good and evil, moral rectitude procures the preponderance of good over evil. They maintain that man's highest good in life consists in the greatest happiness of the greatest number of mankind, and they seem to mean by happiness pleasure as well of the senses as of the understanding, physical as well as intellectual. It must be evident that we both agree in making happiness of some kind man's supremest good; and, if we contend for exactly the same kind of happiness, we are fools to quarrel. Our happiness is virtue, it is compatible with pain; it rates one unit of intellectual pleasure superior to many units of physical pleasure; it counts the intensest physical pain man can suffer, death amid the cruellest torments, martyrdom at 154 GENERAL ETHICS the hands of Nero, less an evil than the slightest departure from the straight line of morality. Of course, an ideal conception of incomplete happiness even in our theory would be a blessed aggregate of unvarying vir- tue, pleasure of body, and pleasure of soul, without the small- est trace of pain anywhere in the mixture. It would mean holiness fit for the altars, along with the money of a million- aire ; the wisdom of the most consummate sage history knows ; a mind free from business cares, a heart free from the aches of love; a body without the ills of disease, a soul without a sorrow ; nights of refreshing sleep, days of uninterrupted ease, luxury and exhilarating enjoyment. But we are not the fools to think any such ideal condition possible since the fall. Apart even from the teachings of faith, we know that, ages before the parable of the seed and the sower, pagans like Diogenes and Zeno, Socrates and Plato, in the full light of reason, regarded the riches and pleasures of this life thorns in the field of virtue. Before the ominous words, ''Go sell what thou hast, and give it to the poor," sounded on human ears, mere philosophers had buried their wealth in the sea, as a preliminary to the acquisition of virtue and wisdom. We must be content with the world as it is, we must be practical even in our Ethics, and write down man's highest good a species of happiness possible of attainment. This happiness is necessarily limited, it is incomplete, and we have reason to be thankful for the circumstance. It whets desire for the beyond, holds us to duty, and makes us stronger than un- avoidable pain, that might otherwise overwhelm us with dread. Happiness with Utilitarians would seem to be sometimes Hedonism, sometimes Altruism; pleasure for me, and pleas- ure for the other fellow. We repeat again, that if we mis- interpret their writings, we honestly mean no wrong, and stand ready to make them due reparation for our mistake. If their greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number is virtue, or moral rectitude in man's acts, the fight is over, and we are everlasting friends. If, on the contrary, it is either the Hedonism of Epicurus or the Altruism of mod- ern atheists and materialists, the fight is on, and we are deadly enemies. Mill would seem to make it Hedonism, when he says that acts are right in proportion as they tend to pro- HAPPINESS 155 mote happiness, meaning by happiness pleasure and the ab- sence of pain. This doctrine makes good and pleasure iden- tical, accounting the most pleasant pleasure the best pleasure. Paley very logically accepts this view of the thing, and main- tains that pleasures ^differ only in duration or intensity, not in kind. With him pleasure of sense can surpass pleasure of mind. We maintain, on the contrary, that pleasures differ in quality as well as in quantity; that pleasure is not iden- tical with good, but one of its three kinds or species; and that intellectual delight is a better pleasure than sensual, not because it is the more pleasant or lasting, but because it is nobler. Good IS of three sorts, becoming, agreeable and useful; honestum, dulce et utile. Becoming good appeals to what is specific in man's nature, his intellect; the agreeable is oftener than not a loud cry to what is generic in man, his animality; the useful is a mere help to the other two. The becoming is loved for itself singly; the agreeable, for the pleasure it creates; the useful, for an ulterior advantage altogether distinct from itself. Good itself is an analogical term; and, arguing from the word perfect, it means, in root, finish, completeness. That is man's good, which finishes, rounds out, completes his being. Primarily, therefore, good signifies the becoming; secondarily, and by analogy of attri- bution, the agreeable; secondarily still, but by analogy of proportion, the useful. Becoming good is loved on its own single account, not because of some third reality its posses- sion secures. Agreeable good is not loved on its own single account, but on account of a third reality its possession se- cures, the satisfied feeling it induces. Useful good would never be missed, if only the advantage it helps to procure could be obtained without its assistance. Examples are knowl- edge, a banquet, and money. Real good is suited to the de- sires most in harmony with the nature that seeks it. What- ever good is opposed to real good is called apparent good. Man's real good is intellectual and spiritual, and, therefore, the becoming. When the agreeable and useful are directly opposed to the becoming, they are only apparent goods. Whatever real goodness they possess, is derived from the becoming, and dependent on the degree in which they meas- 156 GENERAL ETHICS ure up to the same. An apparent good is a real evil. Nearly every good in nature is a mixture of the three, and it is one or other according to the light in which it is viewed. Thus, knowledge is in itself a becoming good. And yet, because of the pleasure it ministers, and because of the opportunities it affords for honor and wealth, it can readily enough descend to the level of an agreeable or useful good. A banquet is a becoming good, inasmuch as it is quite in harmony with man's rational nature; it is an agreeable good, inasmuch as it procures bodily pleasure; it is a useful good, inasmuch as it wins for the host the favor of his guests. Between agree- able and useful good the distinction is clear and marked. It is not so easy to discern between the becoming and the agreeable. Pain can never be reckoned agreeable good ; it can be reckoned becoming good. Pleasure and Pain. Therefore, these few words about .pleasure may help us to better understand things. Feeling cuts so important a figure in modern Psychology that writers assign it a faculty of its own, distinct from the faculties of knowledge and desire, denominated cognoscitive and appeti- tive. Our English word feeling is fruitful in meaning. Maher notes these four, outer sensations, pain or pleasure, excitement, certainty without motives. Examples are, smooth feeling of velvet, to feel hot or cold ; to feel hurt, sad, joyful ; I have a feeling for you ; to feel that it will rain. Emotion occurs often in second and third senses. Passion is intense excitement; affection turns on likes and dislikes with persons for objects; sentiment is emotion in abstract and highly wrought characters, as opposed to practical men. On this question of pleasure and pain rare old Aristotle wrote the final word centuries ago. St. Thomas in this particular makes the Stagirite his model, and voices his sentiments with hardly ' a word of correction. Modern writers are true, only when they keep close to these master-minds; and the measure of their departure from Aristotle is the measure of their folly. Plato is responsible for the opinion that all pleasure is nega- tive and relative. It is negative, inasmuch as it is mere ab- sence of pain. It is relative, inasmuch as it is transition from state of pain to opposite condition. And some pleasures of sense lend color to his theory. Thus, the joy of eating and PLEASURE AND PAIN 157 drinking would seem to be dependent on antecedent hunger and thirst. Aristotle, however, calls attention to the fact that pleasures without number betray no such dependence on previous pain. He alleges for examples the delight attaching to mathematics, agreeable sounds and smells, the pleasures of memory, and hope, and imagination. He makes all the reality of pleasure dependent on activity, calling it activity's efflorescence or hloom, — ''nil sine magno Vita labore dedit mortalibus. ' ' Each faculty in man has its own pleasure, de- rivable from judicious exercise. Count the antecedent exer- cise pain, and you have Plato's opinion of relativity. St. Thomas remarks that nobody enjoys uninterrupted pleasure, simply because the quality follows work. The faculty em- ployed, and the object stimulating the faculty, gauge the in- tensity of a pleasure ; and in point of duration it lasts as long as faculty and stimulus are in harmonious relations, one fresh and vigorous, the other fit and suitable. During early pe- riods in the process, pleasure reacts to stimulate energy; but by degrees fatigue results, to first lessen the feeling and eventually close in pain. Hence the need of variety in this business of pleasure. The faculty is dulled by use, and a new stimulus must supplant the old, when fatigue ensues. As faculties are specifically different, pleasures of intellect and sense differ as much as the faculties themselves. Conflicting pleasures neutralize each other, and the faculty in question determines the moral rank of the pleasure. The nobler the faculty, the nobler the pleasure. Pain is pleasure's oppo- site, and eadem est ratio oppositorum. The nature of pain is manifest from our description of pleasure. It can have its origin in faculty or object. It accompanies excess or defect of energy or exercise, and is regularly due to pressure of an unfit or unsuited stimulus. These different characteristics of pleasure and pain have been gathered by Maher into two laws, — 1, Pleasure is healthy exercise or activity, pain is excess or defect of same. 2, Pleasure grows up to a certain limit, then it diminishes and becomes pain. Variety con- tributes to pleasure, because the interval of change is a period of rest, and gives the dulled activity an opportunity to recover its sharpness. Accommodation can explain factitious pleas- ures as well as insensibility to pain. From long use the fac- 158 GENERAL ETHICS iilty of taste, for instance, loses its edge, and tobacco passes from disagreeable to pleasant. Constant pain in much the same way operates to diminish or quite destroy the discom- fort. We maintain against modern writers that pleasure and pain call for no third faculty ^ distinct from man's cognoscitive and appetitive powers. They are hut different aspects of cogni- tion and desire. Touch and taste call for new faculties, dis- tinct and different among themselves; not feeling. Feeling is best described as the tone of a function. The function is exercise of a cognoscitive or appetitive faculty ; the tone in case of pleasure is spontaneous, healthy, harmonious exercise; in case of pain, restrained, unhealthy, excessive exercise. The theories about pleasure and pain are numerous, most of them substantially the same as Aristotle 's ; and, as before remarked regarding wrong theories, the measure of their departure from Aristotle is the measure of their folly. Spinoza leans to Plato 's notion of transition from pain. Kant makes pleasure the promotion of life-processes; pain, the hindrance of life- processes. Schopenhauer and the pessimists view pleasure as escape from pain by filling a want. Descartes and Leib- nitz make it consciousness of perfection possessed. Hamilton calls pleasure the reflex of conscious activity; pain, the reflex of overstrained or repressed exertion. Bain describes them as increase and abatement of vital functions. Physiologists in general view pleasure and pain as integration or disintegra- tion of neural elements. Grant Allen makes pain a destruc- tive act, or insufficient nutrition in sentient tissue. Spen- cer calls pleasure organic equilibrium, or harmonious func- tioning, or struggle for life. PROOFS I. Principle of Greatest Happiness. To return now to Utilitarianism. In its selection of man's highest good, as already seen, it veers between Hedonism and Altruism, pleasure for me, and pleasure for the other fellow. Indeed some defenders of the theory try to combine the two. But that is impossible. They are opposite poles. Hedonism is gross selfishness, Altruism rates selfishness the unforgiven PROOFS 159 sin. Hedonifsm certainly cannot be man's highest good, be- cause it is pleasure ; pleasure in turn is the effect, activity the cause; and the cause is always superior to the effect. Activ- ity, therefore, is a higher good than the pleasure it pro- duces; and no pleasure, whatever its kind, can be man's high- est good. Becoming good is sought for itself, and for noth- ing beyond. Even knowledge, when sought for pleasure or gain, becomes an agreeable or useful good. Man's highest good, therefore, cannot he pleasure of whatever sort, whether intellectual or sensual, because pleasure is at most an agree- able good, and magi's highest good ought to he a becoming good. Besides, pleasure is always an effect, and effects are inferior to their causes. PRINCIPLE A. The end is superior to the means. Pleasure is the end, activity is the means. Answer: This is in the order of inten- tion, not in the order of being or reality. Redemption of mankind is the end; the tears and the blood of God are the means. Operis and operantis. Priority in order of being or reality settles dignity. Reversed in two orders of inten- tion and being. End first in intention, last in being. Means last in intention, first in being. Ergo, activity is superior to pleasure, as cause is superior to effect. Therefore, knowledge, clear of the pleasure it occasions, can alone be man's highest good. The pleasure may be in- separable from the knowledge, but this is far from consti- tuting the pleasure knowledge itself. God known is man's absolutely highest good, and virtue is his relatively highest good, his highest good in this life. Altruism cannot be man's highest good, because, as understood by the Utilitarians, it neglects two important factors in the makeup of virtue, self and God. Again, if their Altruism means virtue, if it means measuring up to the objective order of things, the exact pay- ment of all our debts to the neighbor, self and God, we have no quarrel with Utilitarianism, and we are Altruists as well as they. But, whatever their real sentiments, the writings of Utilitarians are proof conclusive that they ignore the interior life of the soul, the inner man of the heart, and give human 160 GENERAL ETHICS society, the neighbor, the place that belongs to God. They mistake the political for the ethical end of life. They provide for a good citizen, a good husband, a good father; but not for a good man. They exaggerate a secondary concern, to minimize or altogether nullify what ought to be man's pri- mary concern and first consideration. Therefore, the Al- truism of the Utilitarians is no more man 's highest good than the Hedonism of Epicureans. It wears a more decent ap- pearance, but there is more logic or common sense in Hedon- ism than in Altruism. Both are vile errors, one from the viewpoint of gentility, the other from the viewpoint of phi- losophy; and only in the eyes of shallow thinkers are of- fenses against gentility viler than offenses against philosophy. Hedonism banishes God and the neighbor from morality, to set up self for idol. Altruism does the same unkindness to God and self, to fall down and worship the neighbor. And there you are. II. Principle of Utility. The Principle of Utility, which makes acts right or wrong, according as they are useful or hurtful to the greatest num- ber, stands condemned on these four counts: 1, It makes no difference between acts good and had in themselves, confound- ing intrinsic value with extrinsic results; 2, affirms that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action; 3, levels all distinction between injury and harm; 4, a7id favors the theory confuted by Plato in his Republic, personal indulgence at expense of neighbor. We already proved in Thesis III, that an essential, intrinsic difference exists be- tween right and wrong in the moral order. We argued from example, alleging love and hatred of God as instances; and, for every believer in God, the argument is conclusive. Un- fortunately for them, the Utilitarians prefer to keep God out of the question, and might logically take exception to our method. Love of parents and a lie might, perhaps, prove more acceptable examples; and they are equally well suited to our purpose. Therefore, according to us a lie is essentially and intrinsically bad, because of its very nature it is at odds with the objective order of things, imperatively demanding conformity of language with thought. A lie is radically PROOFS IW wrong, because it is an abuse of language. It is wrong now, it was always wrong, and will forever continue to be wrong, even if God could wish otherwise, even if the whole world entered into a conspiracy to call it right. Love of parents is in precisely the same way an act intrinsically and essentially right. With Utilitarians a lie would be wrong, simply be- cause of its consequences or effects; love of parents would be right for the same reason; and the Law of General Conse- quences, they think, makes their position impregnable. They would contend that lying and hatred of parents, if universally allowed, would work harm to society; and they are not far wrong in their contention. A bad act always breeds bad consequences, and in most cases this secondary norm of util- ity coincides with our own. As a rule. Utilitarians would scruple calling right whatever acts we call wrong, and theo- retically their standard is not blameworthy. But in practice it is open to flagrant abuse, and it is responsible for much of the evil now prevalent in society. Its advocates easily lose sight of the Law of General Consequences, and measure the quality of their acts hy the advantage or disadvantage accru- ing to themselves personally. If he is a Hedonist, the Utili- tarian can see nothing but advantage in a lie, that procures him thousands of dollars to purchase the luxuries of life. If he is an Altruist and a diplomat, the Utilitarian can see noth- ing but advantage in a lie, that would save an entire com- munity from the disasters of war. The temptation, then, is to think a lie right on occasions, and account so-called pru- dential departures from the truth no breach of morality. How often men yield to the temptation, every-day history is witness. Individualism is the rich man's creed, Utilitarian- ism is the hasis of his ethics; and the had philosophyy taught in our present day universities strengthens him in his position of greed and injustice. Less conscientious Utilitarians teach, and avaricious misers among their followers ardently hold, that acts are morally right, when they tend to the doer's profit ; and virtue comes to mean the accumulation of wealth by fair means and foul. If Utilitarianism were not wrong in itself, abuse of its principles is easy, and this abuse is most damaging in its consequences. 2. We have alsewhere shown motive to be one of morality's 162 GENERAL ETHICS determinants. Motive is the act in its subjective aspect, and its morality is quite as important as that of the object itself. We are agreed that no individual human act is indifferent, though in the abstract many such acts occur to mind, like walking, singing, study. Acts of the kind derive all their morality from the motive prompting their execution. To walk to the church for purposes of prayer, is right; to make the same journey for purposes of theft, is wrong; and all the difference is constituted by the walker's motive. Motive makes one man a worshipper, the other a thief. And we are not talking about the act of prayer or the theft ; we are talk- ing of the journey itself. The journey made by the pros- pective thief is as morally wrong as the theft he afterwards commits. This truth is even more evident in the case of a good act, done with an evil design. To give alms for the express purpose of making the beggar accomplice to a mur- der, is out and out bad. No matter how useful the gift may prove to the beggar, the act of the giver is thoroughl}'- wicked ; and what would be otherwise virtuous charity, is changed by mere motive to downright murder. This example slightly changed proves Utilitarianism immoral. Suppose the alms given without any wrong intention ; later on, the beggar finds his benefactor engaged in murder, and out of gratitude goes to his assistance. The alms would have bad results and would therefore be wicked, an opinion altogether against common-sense. Our kindness would, then, depend on how people used it. I am aware that a man's motive, when once conceived and embraced, becomes part and parcel of his act, because the motive is the man. I am aware that honest Utili- tarians' would never reckon right, alms bestowed for so un- holy a purpose; and all because conduct of the sort, if uni- versally tolerated, would prove damaging in the extreme. And yet they are highly unphilosophical, when they brand such alms wrong, simply because of consequences or inde- pendently of motive. The fact of the matter is that the act in question is damaging in its consequences, because it is morally wrong, and not vice-versa. Causes never follow their effects; and the act is not, first damaging in its consequences, and then morally wrong; but it is first morally wrong, and then damaging in its consequences. The horse pulls the PROOFS 163 wagon; not the wagon, the horse. Scripture is of small weight with the average Utilitarian ; and yet he may, in com- mon with respectable unbelievers, have a measure of reverence for Christ's wisdom. Motive in His divine eyes makes a su- preme difference between acts; and the first half of St. Mat- thew's sixth chapter contains His doctrine on the subject. We commend His words to the careful and reverent perusal of searchers for the truth. The acts discussed are alms, prayer and fasting. 3. If use and harm are the measures of morality, all differ- ence between mere harm and injury disappears ; and balanced minds are not ready to accept this view of things. Injury adds wilfulness and malice to mere harm, which oftener than not is wholly without the stigma of moral hlame. The pedes- trian, who tramples your watch to pieces on the dark street, works you a lot of harm, but no injury. The enemy, who deliberately and knowingly smashes the same with an axe, over and above the harm he works, does you a downright in- jury. In both cases the harm is practically the same; while injury is absent from one case, present to the other. Even if all men without a single exception were allowed to repeat the act of the innocent pedestrian, it could never become morally wrong, in spite of the harm consequent on its occur- rence. And yet the harm done would prove as much a hard- ship to the watch's owner as the injury done him by his enemy. The effects of the harm and the injury are the same, the moral difference between the two is due to the agent's purpose, motive, intention. 4. Plato in his Republic confutes a theory of morals, that would seem to coincide in all respects with Utilitarianism. Briefly, it stands for the contention that a man's highest good in this life is his own personal indulgence, at the expense of his neighbors. Society, to keep down fighting and save the race from suicide, hampers this inclination, and blocks each individual citizen's aspirations for his own highest good. It forces him to forego the natural right he has to prosecute his own happiness, at the expense of his neighbors. In this way the interest of society is opposed to the interests of the individual, and life in a state is a real curse and only a makeshift blessing. Tyrants alone, in this theory, compass 164 GENERAL ETHICS highest good; their subjects, through no fault of their own, are hopelessly unable to realize their destinj^ in this life, that natural desire all men have to enjoy incomplete happiness, the preponderance of good things over evil things. And all be- cause these shortsighted mortals, in common with the Utili- tarians, establish man's highest good in pleasure or advan- tage, his supremest evil in pain or hurt. Our theory makes moral rectitude or virtue man's highest good, and no tyrant can effectively keep his subjects from the attainment of this result in their lives. Again, it would be foully wrong to suppose that Christ or the early martyrs failed of man's highest good; and their entire lives were empty of what a Utilitarian world calls happiness or pleas- ure, and were crowded full of misery and pain. They com- passed supremest good or incomplete happiness, simply be- cause what the world calls happiness or pleasure cuts no figure whatever in the thing, and one unit of virtue out- weighs units without number of mere physical pain or men- tal distress. Virtue is no artificial happiness, it is happiness of the solidest sort; and the pain endured for virtue's sake never loses its quality of bitterness. Saints never come to directly like self-denial, they like it only in an indirect way, inasmuch as it secures to them that virtue or holiness, which is the basis and foundation of man's supremest good on earth. PRINCIPLES A. Stoic Formalism. Stoic Formalism is from Kant, and Kant's system of Ethics is a profound mistake. The whole trouble with Kant would seem to be that he has hazy no- tions about God, and denies Him the quality of lawgiver. And all this in spite of an utterance on page 322, to this effect, ''Conscience must be conceived as the subjective prin- ciple of a responsibility for one's deeds before God." Abbott. He recognizes only two lawmakers, self and the state. Self is responsible for ethical law; the state, for juridical law. Hence his autonomy of reason in matter of ethical law. Rea- son is self, reason makes law, defines and imposes duty, sits in judgment, rewards virtue, punishes offenders in the domain of Ethics or internal morality. The state performs exactly KANT AND ETHICAL DUTY 165 the same functions in the domain of Nomology, Jurisprudence or external morality. God occurs nowhere, no doubt because He is a noumenon. Natural law with Kant is not divine law at all, it is as much human law as civil law itself, the only difference between the two being that the man makes natural law for himself, the state sets him civil law. In the field of internal morality, in the matter of acts not prescribed by positive law, in question of commands issued by what we persist in calling the natural law, man, according to Kant, is subject to no outside constraint ; he has no Heaven to hope for, no hell to fear. In the field of external morality, in mat- ters provided for by the statutes, in question of murder, eft and other penal offenses enumerated in the code, man is sub- ject to constraint of the state, and enjoys the favor of pos- sible fine or imprisonment as a deterrent from crime. With Kant, natural law ought to fare worse at men^s hands than positive law. When a man makes a law for himself, he can as easily neglect it ; when a man is judge and jury in his own case, he is seldom convicted; when he executes law on himself, he gets off with a light sentence. When the state exercises these several prerogatives, the culprit is more likely to get his deserts ; and this single thought would make positive law surer of fulfilment than natural law. God would neglect in the enforcement of His law a most efficacious help, em- ployed by men in the enforcement of their laws. Ethical duty with Kant is self-imposed constraint; juridical duty is constraint imposed by positive law and its author, the state. Self-imposed constraint is no constraint at all; and ethical duty, to have any force, must be constraint imposed by the natural law and its author, God. Therefore, to act from a sense of ethical duty, is to act with an eye to God's attitude towards right and wrong, as well as with an eye to our own attitude towards the same; and Kant's autonomy of reason, and his principle about duty for duty's sake, are only half the truth; and, what is still worse, they are that half of the truth, which apppeals to only a select few in the republic of refined minds and critically exact moral tastes. The sanction of the natural law embodied in an eternal hell, is a much more appealing incentive to virtue than Stoic Formalism or subjective feelings of shame. Remorse of conscience means 166 GENERAL ETHICS more than shame, it means dread of hell; and the sinner is wide awake to the fact, that he has offended somebody dis- tinct from and greater than himself. Utilitarians contend that happiness, or pleasure of mind and body, is man's destiny on earth, his supreme good, his last end; and many contend that it is folly to look higher. We already proved with irrefutable arguments that pleasure, whether of mind or of body, cannot be man's last end, either in this life or in the next. Stoic Formalism, a product of Kant 's philosophy, is the opposite pole to Utilitarianism ; and it contends that duty is man's destiny on earth, to such an extent that it is the single motive able to make his acts moral ; and that pleasure, or whatsoever other motive, renders them unmoral. Duty for duty's sake, is its slogan, and it accounts acts morally good, only when done from a sense of duty; unmoral, when done for pleasure or from any motive save sense of duty. Kant is responsible for the system, and it is in line with his autonomy of reason, to be explained and re- futed in our next thesis. Against Utilitarianism and Stoic Formalism we contend that man's absolutely last end, his destiny in the next life, is complete happiness, the possession of God in the beatific vision; that his relatively last end, his destiny on earth, is incomplete happiness or virtue and resulting peace of con- science. The happiness we contend for is not the pleasure of Utilitarianism, nor is it the sense of duty advocated by Stoic Formalism. Happiness, whether complete or incomplete, is not pleasure of mind or body. Complete happiness is a heaped up measure of good with unending duration, a measure of good from which no particle of good is absent, altogether in- compatible with pain and discomfort. Complete happiness is a natural desire, the one necessary wish of every man's heart, the hiding principle of every wish we conceive; and, therefore, our happiness in this sense cannot be excluded ; and, if Kant were right, all our acts would necessarily be un- moral. Virtue is our destiny on earth, and therefore our duty; and the peace of conscience resulting from virtue can- not be excluded from our motive, and again all our acts would be unmoral. The consciousness of duty done is only another STOIC FORMALISM 167 pleasure; and, before we do our duty, this pleasure in the order of intention can move us to act, without any detriment to morality. Whatever motive is compatible with virtue, be it pleasure, or wealth, or honor, health, wisdom or charity, can originate a morally good act; and there are virtuous as well as vicious pleasures. Arguments against Stoic Formalism 'by Father Cronin, pp. 245-263. 1. It demands too much of human nature. 2. It is not contained in the idea of moral good. 3. It is disproved by works of supererogation. 4. All moral acts would be equally moral. 5. Eadem est ratio oppositorum. If acts were good solely on account of respect for law, acts would be bad solely on account of disrespect for the law. No criminal ever acts from disrespect for the law ; but from motives of gain, revenge and the like. Ergo, no bad act. 6. There would be no room for merit. Every good act would be owed. 7. Happiness is inseparable from moral acts ; and acts would be unmoral, when done from motives of happiness. 8. Motive would be respect for law as such. Bad legisla- tion is law as such, and bad legislation never bases moral act. 9. Law is meant for common good, as means to end. To act not for common good, but for law, would be to make means superior to end. Arguments in Favor of Stoic Formalism are Fallacious. 1. It is the creed of the crowd. Morality is in the will, not in the external act. Answer: True, but the will gets its morality from object, end, and circumstances ; pure selfishness does not of itself vitiate act ; pleasure is good or bad according to object ; duty is only one object of pleasure ; love of duty is as much a moral principle as duty. 2. AH outer objects are mere means to pleasure. Ergo, no proper motive. Answer: The summum bonum is not a mere means to pleasure, it is happiness itself. It is man's end, not a means 168 GENERAL ETHICS to his end. It is an affair of the intellect, not of the will. Law varies with the individual, the summum bonum or last principle of morality is the same for all. B. Hedonism.. Father Cronin discusses Hedonism between pages 264 and 304. Hedonism of whatever kind is wrong, when it makes pleas- ure man 's last end. Egoistic Hedonism is Hedonism proper ; Universal Hedonism is Altruism or Utilitarianism. Pleasure for me, and pleasure for the other fellow. Some Hedonists: Hohhes says that any object of desire is man's last end, and this is Hedonism's most degraded type. Aristippus makes mental pleasure man's last end. Mill makes higher pleas- ures of mind man's last end; and this is a more refined type. Cudworth makes pleasures of virtue man's last end; and this is higher still. Butler makes pleasures awaiting men in Heaven man 's last end ; and this is the highest of all. Answer: Pleasure is not our sole natural end, because it can be spurned aside. Happiness is our sole natural end, be- cause it cannot be spurned aside. Pleasure is not man's last end, because it resides in the will, as the passion of delight resides in the appetite; and no act of the will can be man's last end. Five Arguments from St. Thomas, C.G.3. 26. 1. Happiness is man's last end, and happiness is not de- light or r pleasure. Pleasure is an act of the will, object is prior to act, and will's object is prior to will's pleasure. Ob- ject is mover, pleasure is movement. Ergo, happiness cannot be an act of the will, it cannot be pleasure. 2. Happiness is no act of the will, it is not pleasure. It would he either a, desire; h, love; or c, delight, a, Not desire, which tends towards something not yet gotten, b. Not love, because love turns on absent as well as present good, c, Not delight, because delight is the effect ; possession is the cause. 3. Happiness is not in act of the will, not in pleasure; be- cause pleasure can be true or false, and ever the same with respect to rest or quiescence on part of the will, e.g., a drunken man and a philosopher. Real man and painted man differ by constituents of substance, and intellect makes pleas- ure true or false, not act of the will. 4. Delight is not desirable of itself, and, therefore, not STOIC FORMALISM 169 man's last end. Otherwise all delight would be desirable. Pleasure is of indifferent ethical value, sometimes good, some- times bad; some delight is desirable, other delight is to be shunned. 5. Nature uses pleasure as means only. Ergo, not man's last end. Right order coincides with order of nature, nature orders things without mistake. Nature orders man as well as animals. Delight is for activity, not the other way about, e.g., use of food for preservation of individual. We eat to live; we do not live to eat. Without delight animals would not eat. Delight is the means, preservation the end. Pleas- ures of marriage are for preservation of race. P.S. Title of last end is assigned to activity, whereby ex- terior thing is gained, e.g., act of getting the money is last end, not desire or love of money. God is last end, activity getting God is understanding. We cannot wish what we do not understand. Ergo, happiness is act of the intellect, not act of the will, not pleasure of whatever kind. THESIS XV Ecmt's autonomy of reason is wrong. Russo, pp. 67-70. The greatest of all goods in the moral order, because true and absolute, is a good will. All other faculties are good in the moral order, because of something they borrow from the will. Morality is like freedom. It belongs primarily to the will, and is passed along by the will to mind, senses, and all else in the man. Mind in itself is a physical, not a moral good. It is often an apparent good, and always a relative good. It makes a good writer, a good philosopher, but not a good man. Nobody deserves Heaven for proficiency in mathematics pure and simple. Some of the greatest minds history knows are buried in hell. No good will is buried there, because good will means virtue, and virtue is passport to the kingdom of God. Will is choice, and the best will, or the best good, is the best chooser. In morality choice lies be- tween obedience to law and disobedience; and the motive prompting the choice has a decided bearing on its dignity and worth. Respect for the law would seem to be the highest conceivable motive; and therefore two factors conspire to make a perfect will, obedience to law, with respect for the law for single motive or reason why. Obedience and respect are paid to persons, not to things; and, therefore, we might better say, obedience to the lawmaker, and respect for the same. Fear and hope are negatively imperfect motives as compared with love. Up to this point we are a unit with Kant. All the differ- ence between us starts here, and it is rooted in the man's stupid conception of the law in question, and of the relative worth of motives urging to its observance. With him, the law to be obeyed is his categorical imperative, "So act that, if you had your way, your conduct would have to be made universal standard for the race.'' His categorical imperative 170 AUTONOMY AND HETBRONOMY 171 emanates from his own reason, his practical reason, his will, without God or man at its back to urge its observance. It is his own private affair, a matter of business between himself and himself. If he follows orders, he does himself a kindness ; if he breaks orders, he does himself an unkindness ; and that is all. No created thing is capable of uttering a categorical im- perative, an absolute and necessary imperative, because no created thing is the absolute and necessary, and no effect can surpass its cause. From relative and contingent beings like creatures, and practical reason is a creature, no higher than a relative and contingent imperative can issue. And this is what we call Kant's autonomy or autocracy of reason, the enthronement of self as supreme arbiter of every man's destiny, the impudent usurpation by man of rights vested in the Creator, a virtual declaration of man's inde- pendence of everybody, God included, subservient to nobody but himself, subject to only such laws as he makes for him- self, accountable for his conduct to nobody but himself, his own judge, his own jury, his own executioner. He gathers the purely subjective nature of his categorical imperative, the fact that all obligation in the man is due to a command he, and he alone, imposes on himself, from the circumstance that no other absolute and necessary command is conceivable. Everything falling under the experience of our senses is rela- tive and contingent, the categorical imperative, as an abso- lute and necessary something, must have its origin in the practical reason, considered in action, the one phenomenon apart and distinct from sensile occurrences. He sees the absurdity of attributing the qualities, absolute and necessary, to any product of the practical reason; and, therefore, ac- knovjledging his inability to prove the absolute and necessary nature of his categorical imperative, he contends that these two qualities of his categorical imperative are a postulate of his system, and must be accepted without proof. He could have easily avoided all trouble by introducing God, the one absolute and necessary being in the universe, and ascribing his categorical imperative not to practical rea- son but to the natural law imposed on man by God, and brought to man's notice by reason. But the poor man is hounded everywhere by that ghost of his own making, nou- 172 GENERAL ETHICS menaj spirits, thirigs in themselves, too far removed from the senses to base certain knowledge, matter for empty conjecture, sure in the event to propagate ignorance and superstition. God is a noumenon, a pure spirit, beyond the reach of eye, and ear, and all the senses, but quite within the reach of reason, arguing from the reality of patent effects in the uni- verse to the reality of their cause. Man's reason is for nou- mena, as his senses are for phenomena; and if our knowledge is restricted to phenomena, if we have no certain knowledge of noumena, we are little better than brutes, and in many respects their inferiors. With practical reason for single origin of the categorical imperative, reason is oMtonomous, its own lawmaker, and every man is his own standard of morality. More than this, every man manufactures his own moral obligations, imposes on himself whatever duties he sees fit to impose, selecting some, rejecting others, always with the proviso that he can reject to-morrow what he selects to-day. In other words, he is morally bound to the performance of this or that particular act, simply because he holds himself to its performance, not because any outside superior issues a command to that effect. Kant stands for autonomy of will, as opposed to heteronomy. We stand for heteronomy of the will, maintaining that God is single author of moral obligation, that reason is the herald God employs to make His wishes known, that the true cate- gorical imperative is the natural law, which is divine legisla- tion, not human, which is found indeed in man 's reason, with- out being derived from it. We can all be found in the Wool- worth Building Friday evening, but the Woolworth is no ex- planation of our origin. The laws of New York can be found in certain printed books, but the printer never made them. Kant wants us to think that we impose obligations on our- selves, simply because we wake up to the fact that we are under obligations. The objective order of things, as set forth in the natural law, arouses us to a sense of obligation, and this objective order of things is the handiwork of God, as well as the natural law embodying it. If man himself is altogether responsible for Kant's categorical imperative, man imposes this obligation on himself either with full freedom or with strict necessity. If with full freedom, it ceases to AUTONOMY AND HETERONOMY 173 be real and true obligation ; if with strict necessity, something distinct from the will forces its wishes on the will, and God alone, as maker of the will, enjoys this prerogative. Kant's imperative is a self-imposed command, one and the same per- son is ruler and subject ; and a self-imposed command, because open always to revocation at the will of the subject, carries no binding authority. To save himself from open folly, Kant makes the reason ruler, the will subject ; but reason and will belong to the same man, and no two persons are present. When a man binds himself hy agreement, or vow, the obliga- tion arises not from the man himself, but from a precept of the natural law, an ordinance of God holding rational crea- tures to their promises. The obligation is independent of man's will. He is free to make the agreement or not; but, once the agreement is made, he is not free to assume the obli- gation or not. He is free to put the condition or not; but, with the condition once placed, the obligation follows, no matter what he wishes. Besides missing the true nature of the only categorical im- perative worthy of the name, the natural law issuing as a command from God to do good and avoid evil, Kant beauti- fully mixes things in his discussion of motives and their relative dignity. The motive of obedience is the reason why the will obeys, and three possible motives for observance of the natural law at once suggest themselves, respect for the lawmaker, fear of penalty and hope of reward. All three mo- tives are equally relative and contingent. The most perfect motive of the three is respect for the lawmaker; but this is far from rendering the other two positively imperfect or bad. They are at most negatively imperfect, or less good. They possess their own worth, they have their own goodness, though it happens to be inferior to the goodness attaching to respect for the lawmaker. The whole thing is like saying that im- perfect love for God is inferior to perfect love for God, with- out ever becoming hatred. Only a bad motive is a positively imperfect motive. Negatively imperfect motives are good mo- tives of varying degrees. A five-dollar-bill is always money, though it is worth less than a hundred-dollar-bill. Only a counterfeit is no money at all. And all three motives are com- patible, not mutually destructive of one another. Nothing 174 GENERAL ETHICS prevents a man from keeping the law out of respect for the lawmaker, from dread of penalty, and from hope of reward. In fact, three motives are better than one, especially when the one chosen is the weakest of the three; and man^s innate selfishness will always make penalty and reward more effective for good thari respect for the lawmaker. PART II SPECIAL ETHICS INTRODUCTION We have thus far dealt in speculation of a general nature, without adverting much to individual emergencies in an indi- vidual life. We have rather laid down rules, sure to find application in every step taken with a bearing on morality. Now we proceed to examine the obligations arising from rela- tions involved in certain conditions and contingencies of life. Man has dealings with God, with himself, and with his fellow- men. He occupies a well defined position in the universe, and his moral worth stands or falls with the attitude he adopts in his every day acts towards God, towards himself, and to- wards his neighbor. This threefold source of duty is common to every man born into the world, and independent of every later arrangement or added condition. It aifects the indi- vidual as such. Nature, however, has besides constituted man a social being. It has ordained that at his very birth he belong to a family, and has made it quite impossible for him to continue in existence without entering into certain amicable relations with his fellows. Hence he finds himself by a very necessity of nature constituted at once a member of civil so- ciety or the state, as well as of domestic society or the family. Besides, God the author of nature has in the person of Jesus Christ established a third society, the Church, and has made membership in it an inevitable duty. These three societies, differing in scope and machinery, secure advantages and im- pose in return corresponding burdens. Fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, children, rulers and subjects have set func- tions to discharge, and rectitude consists in strict compliance with their several duties. It therefore belongs to this part of Moral Philosophy to put in as clear a light as possible 175 176 SPECIAL ETHICS man^s obligations as an individual to God, himself and his neighbor, and man 's obligations as a social being to his family, to his government and its citizens, und to the Church ap- pointed of God. Religion is the one word expressive of man's duty towards God, and this religion includes worship of mind and body, and steadfast belief in revelation, or the utterances of God. Man is loyal to himself, when he makes good all the claims urged by reason in behalf of his own proper soul and body. Suicide, self-defense and duelling are topics of vital interest in this subject. Truthfulness in speech and the right to prop- erty are points particularly offended against in man 's conduct towards his fellows. In the field of the family, or domestic society, marriage itself, celibacy, polygamy, divorce, education of child and the mutual relations between family and state, are questions of weighty importance. Man's natural instinct for political or civil society, society's end, its constituents, forms of government, state prerogatives, and sedition will occur for discussion in our consideration of civil society. SECTION I. MAN AS AN INDIVIDUAL THESIS I Religion is man*s first duty, a matter of essential necessity to the individual and the state. Worship, interior and ex- terior, private and public, is God^s due. Man's duty towards revelation is to accept it, when. known as such; to diligently seek and find it, when hidden, and when he has reason to sup- pose that it exists. Toleration in matter of dogma is absurd. Jouin, 71-96 ; Bickaby, 191-202. QUESTION We are by supposition dealing with men honest enough to admit God's existence and the fact of creation. We likewise take for granted the possibility and the fact of creation. For proofs of these several points we refer to Natural Theology and forward parts of Metaphysics. Man's duties towards others are based on relations in force between himself and these others; and the first condition that confronts him is, from the very fact of creation, that of utter dependence on God. Man is God 's handiwork, and belongs to Him body and soul. In virtue of His supreme dominion God has an in- alienable right to the completest service of His creature; and must, from the very nature of things, stand vested with a master's control over man's every faculty and energy. Wor- ship, interior and exterior, submission of intellect and will, are the highest conceivable tributes of superiority one ra- tional being can pay another, and religion embodies both. Faith and trust in God's messages, or the acceptance of reve- lation, is an element of religion on which champions of God's cause cannot with too much force insist in these days of irre- ligion and unbelief. Revelation is the channel through which men are advertised of the sort of service God wants, and ex- 177 178 SPECIAL ETHICS perience is witness that worship weakens and falls dead, when the truths of revelation are once called into question and doubted. TERMS Religion. The word is of Latin origin, and authors are divided between three possible derivations. Lactantius, an eminent scholar and Church-writer, favors religare for root- word. Religion with him means a second bond or moral obli- gation, added to man's first or physical dependence on God for being, preservation, activity and care. Cicero, with whom Lactantius finds fault, ventures relegere, meaning to dwell on in thought, or meditate. His derivation gives large prom- inence to the theoretical side of religion. St. Augustine, see- ing in the Redemption a second choice of God made by fallen man, traces the word to religere, to choose again. In classical Latinity religion is regularly identified with the feeling of respect and veneration entertained towards parents, relatives and friends. But whatever may be said of ancient usage, it is quite cer- tain that religion to-day, taken in a strict and technical sense, denotes a something referred to God alone. It is a duty, a moral attitude, or condition, or relation, based on man 's phys- ical dependence on God for existence, preservation, activity and control. It has for foundation the circumstance that God is man's first cause and last end. Hence religion is gen- erally defined, the duty to acknowledge and worship God as first cause and last end. Acknowledgment denotes the free acceptance of a truth, and of whatever responsibilities attach to it. It supposes knowledge, and adds thereto an act of the will. Worship is testimony rendered to divine excellence, coupled with due submission. It is honor combined with sub- mission. Religion may be considered objectively or subjectively. Objectively taken, it is a collection of truths expressive of the relations in force between God and man, and a catalogue of the duties hinging on these relations. Subjectively taken, it is the actual or habitual acknowledgment of these truths and performance of these duties. Religion is a branch of justice, because it is God 's due. It includes, among others, truths like RIGHTS AND DUTIES 179 the following, God created man, preserves him, exercises over him the controlling influence of a ruler and helper, rewards and punishes him in the next life as a most just judge. It includes the duties of adoration, sacrifice, prayer and faith in God's word. Religion is a branch of justice under the formality of God's due, not under other formalities. Reli- gion is something more than mere good conduct and respect- able behavior. Pagans and modern heretics in reducing the notion to limits so narrow forget that the will, the mainspring of conduct, depends for all its vigor on the mind or intellect. Luther's rule was, faith without good works; now the rule reads, good works without faith. Viewed as a body of truths, religion is said to be theoretical, dogmatic, speculative. Viewed as a body of duties, it is said to be practical. Religion in both senses is essential. Theo- retical religion without practical religion is imperfect. Prac- tical religion without theoretical religion is often no better, no more sincere ; and is always subject to decay and death. A religion may be false and wrong in one of two ways, either by paying homage to a false god, or by worshipping the true God in a way opposed to His wishes. Natural religion would be a thing no higher than human reason, with precepts possible of fulfilment to man's unaided resources. But we live in the blessed light of revelation, and the only religion now in vogue, and in vogue from the beginning, is revealed or supernatural. God has in His goodness deigned to stamp with the seal of His own word even such truths and such plain obligations as reason of itself can fathom. Duty. Right and duty are correlative terms and insep- arable. Right is one of the terms in our language, conveying notions at first sight whole seas different. Thus, the right is confounded with rectitude and conveys the notion of exact agreement with that straight line of conduct morality bids us walk. A right is something altogether other, and can be best perhaps described as, the moral and inviolable power or strength to do or exact something. The Romans had two words for our one. Right in the first sense, they expressed by rectum; right in the second sense, they expressed by jus. This jus is clearly connected with jubere, to order or legis- late; and since all law is founded on rectitude, the choice 180 SPECIAL ETHICS of the word was happy. A jus or right is an emphatic com- mand, forbidding anybody to interfere with its enforcement. It is creative of a duty in outside agencies, restraining them from opposition to its peaceful fulfilment. Four elements of a right are person of inherence, person of incidence, object, and act. Take for example ownership in a house and lot or parcel of ground. The person of inherence is owner, the person of incidence is the rest of the world, the object is the building and piece of ground, the act is use for purposes of residence, sale, changes, repairs, and against trespass. Right, therefore, is an order issuing from the person of inherence or owner, backed by the omnipotence of nature or God, and command- ing the person of incidence, whether a set and definite indi- vidual or the world at large, to reverence the wishes of its owner in at least one respect. God is the avenger of broken rights, and nobody violates a right without disputing the authority of God, and running counter to His wishes. Na- ture, and nature here means God, vests the owner of a right with the authority of a king, and word from him in the mat- ter of his right is word from God. Men on occasions lack the physical strength needed to enforce their rights ; but God is their champion, strength never fails Him, and, whether in this life or the next, God ultimately makes right prevail, by actual accomplishment or, in event of its failure, by penalty. Right and duty are therefore closely related, and a knowl- edge of one helps much to a knowledge of the other. A right is a moral force, and depends by no means for its validity on physical superiority. Rights are on this account often tram- pled and violated by might in a world of iniquity and wrong ; but nobody ever maintained that a right lapsed when borne down by might. For the simple reason that they have no intellect or will, and are therefore outside the category of moral beings, animals have no rights. We owe it to ourselves to treat them humanely; but, as far as they are themselves concerned, cruelty to animals is no violation of a right. The obligation engendered in others by the existence of a right is sometimes negative, sometimes positive. There are in other words rights of such a nature that they merely forbid outside interference, without obliging others to help positively to their MIGHT AND RIGHT ISl realization. There are others, on the contrary, of such a nature that they lay on others the responsibility of contrib- uting by positive acts to their issue. Finally, right is founded on law ; and since law without God is a dead letter, any recog- nition of right is silent and sure testimony to the existence Of God. Rights are personal or real. A personal right immediately affects the person of the possessor; a real right affects him only through the medium of some second thing. Instances are, the right to life and the right to a piece of property. Rights are likewise natural and inborn, or acquired. They are natural, if derived to man from his very nature. They are acquired, if due to some free act, of which he acquits him- self. Thus, the rights to improve the mind, to defend life when unjustly attacked, to acquire land, are all natural ; and, as such, beyond all possibility of loss or forfeiture. The right, on the other hand, to ownership in this or that particular strip of land, because largely dependent on some special ac- tivity freely exerted, is an acquired right, and admits, of loss or change. Might can with justice and propriety be employed to effect the enforcement of a right. Right, resident as it is in the mind and the will, has claims on man's inferior facul- ties, and can call these forces that constitute physical strength to its assistance. Neither is injustice done the party against whom violence is used. If right primarily binds his mind and will, small wonder if its influence extends to the mem- bers of his body. A conflict or collision of rights is quite possible in certain contingencies. In such an emergency only one of the two rights is real. The other is no right at all, but only a shadow. Right cannot in the nature of things be opposed to right. When a clash of the kind occurs, the relative merit of the two claims must be weighed, and the worthier must prevail. Nature again furnishes us with the standard of measurement, and the question must be decided in strict accordance with the demands of nature's order. Thus, when some human enact- ment is in open contradiction with God's law, the human law is no law at all. It must yield, and its framers are vested with no prerogative of authority, as against the source and author of all authority. In every well organized community 182 SPECIAL ETHIQS; courts are established, and their word is supreme in the set- tlement of disputes turning on civil rights. No private citi- zen has the power to take the law into his own hands, and decide quarrels with his neighbor. In this plan, justice may on some rare occasions be defeated ; but the order maintained, and the bloodshed avoided, more than compensate for these scattered wrongs. Eights have limits, beyond which they can- not be pushed. No right however valid can sanction the com- mission of sin. When pursuing a right, we must proceed with caution, and avoid offending against the duties of others and our own plain duty. Rights in many cases assume the nature of privileges, and there is no law compelling a man to everywhere make use of his privileges. Duty is the source of that inner consciousness of moral re- straint which accompanies every dictate of the natural law. It invariably presents itself in the shape of a command, ordering man to do or avoid something. It is a strict obliga- tion, and man knows that, if he wants to remain true to him- self and his nature, he must satisfy its demands. A duty, in concrete terms, is this or that act urged or forbidden by law and order. God 's rights are the origin of men 's duties ; and God, independent as He is of every superior, is a stranger to duties properly so called. In figurative language we some- times speak of God's duties to Himself and even to men. But in strict usage duty always connotes a superior, a being with full authority to impose the duty. Absolutely speaking, then, right is first of the two in order of time. Confining the question to man, duty always precedes right. All man's rights are founded on the duty binding him to the accom- plishment of the end designed for him by nature's Creator. Whatever conduces to that end, without disturbing the reign of justice, constitutes matter for a right. He is armed with a right to repel whatever seriously and unjustly interferes with his destiny's consummation. N.B. Duty manifests the claims of moral rectitude, and rectitude is the observance of relations, or conduct in har- mony with the objective order of things. The order of excel- lence and importance prevalent in duties is, God, self, and the neighbor. Compare Hedonism and Altruism. Ahrens and Damiron would recognize rights in animals, because they are RELIGION A NECESSITY 183 called in Holy Writ sons of God, and because we are forbidden to do them injury or cause them pain. We answer, Holy Writ is on occasions poetic, and these scattered passages are to be so interpreted. The Church is judge, not our op- ponents or ourselves. We slay animals for purposes of sus- tenance, comfort and ornament. We must not be wanton in our treatment of animals, because all such conduct is hostile to the growth of mildness and meekness. First Duty. In point of time and in point of excellence. This duty of religion, to ensure good results in after life, ought to be impressed on the child 's thoughts from the earliest dawn of reason, and all other duties, even towards his parents, should be unfolded to his growing mind as corollaries flowing from the first. He should be taught that parents, country and friends, high as they stand in his esteem and love, occupy only second place to God, and that at God's call all these and much else besides must be abandoned. Essential Necessity. Philosophy recognizes two kinds of necessity, accidental and essential. The former hardly de- serves the name. It represents a thing necessary only after such a fashion that the effect can in certain circumstances have place in its absence, and its functions can always be discharged by some other object. Thus, for instance, brown bread is said to be an accidental necessity of life. Essential necessity truly deserves the name. It represents a thing so necessary that in the event of its absence the effect is simply out of the question. Thus, food of some sort is an essential necessity for continuance in life. This essential necessity, however, admits of degrees. It may be physical, or quasi- physical, or moral. A physical essential necessity forms part of a thing's very being, body in man. A quasi-physical es- sential necessity contributes to a thing's well-being. Want of a necessity of this kind makes itself felt in a wholly differ- ent way from want of an accidental necessity. Sound health, for instance, is a quasi-physical essential necessity for the enjoyment of life. It cannot, like bread, be replaced by some other commodity. A moral essential necessity is an object, thoroughly requisite for the rounding out of a man's moral being. It is an imperative call of conscience, a heavy and unavoidable obligation. Failure to comply with its demands 184 SPECIAL ETHICS disturbs that harmony with the objective order which con- stitutes man's last end or destiny in this life. We contend that religion, objective and subjective, dogmatic and prac- tical, while not a physical essential necessity for individual and state, is for one and the other a quasi-physical and a moral essential necessity. We contend, in other words, that without religion man's physical life is beset with trials, trou- bles and dangers, that the state's welfare is seriously harmed, and that individual and state are out of harmony with recti- tude. Individual and State. Religion's bearing on the lives of individual citizens presents no difficulty whatever. Its bear- ing on the state becomes as clear, when we regard the state a moral person, affected with rights it can enforce, with duties it must discharge. With this view of the state we are ac- quainted from common every day experience. Our President and our Governors pay religious tribute to God, by proclaim- ing once a year the advent of Thanksgiving Day, by coun- tenancing religious observance throughout the land, by prayer in our legislative assemblies, and at other functions of state. In distinctively Catholic countries the duty is accomplished with more solemn ceremony. Worship. Testimony to divine excellence coupled with due submission. It is honor of a peculiar sort combined with submission. When the acts of homage are internal and unseen of men, the worship is interior. When these acts are external, and plain to the senses, the worship is exterior. Public worship, or social, is homage done God by the state in its representatives, not in private individuals. The ob- servance paid God by citizens in their private capacity con- stitutes private worship. Only the godless deny the necessity of interior worship. But scores of writers endeavor to do away with the need of exterior worship, and public or social worship of whatever sort. Many are urged to take this step by hostility to the Catholic Church, so insistent on exterior worship. As a matter of fact, the vast majority of men to-day outside of the true faith, regard attendance at Sunday service a thing of minor importance, wholly beneath their notice, and no matter of conscience at all. Some, with a fam- ily resemblance to the traitor Judas, prate about the useless WORSHIP 185 expenditure of money, wasted in the erection of edifices for purposes of worship. These proclaim with loud mouths that the green fields are God's temple, and that the birds of the air are His choristers. They declare external observances and ceremonies a hollow mockery, superstition ; and never lose an opportunity to inveigh against them. But their own conduct is the weightiest argument against their words. They are monuments of decayed religious spirit, the unfailing growth of negligence in matters external. Of the two kinds of worship, interior is, of course, the higher and more precious ; but, constituted as he is, man de- pends for inner emotions on his outward behavior and deport- ment of body. When minded to pray, he needs to be sur- rounded with all the holy images, and with that atmosphere of quiet resident in our churches. He needs to go down on his knees, and fold his hands, and shut his eyes against the thousand distracting objects clamoring for his attention. Even with all the varied helps present in our houses of prayer, it is no easy task to check our senses, and address God with the profound respect, which is His due. Then too, the Creator made our hands, arms, eyes and the other members of the body, as well as the soul; and mind-worship to the exclusion of body-worship is paying only half our debt. Thomasius, Dunzi and Kemmerichius concede a measure of usefulness to exterior worship, but deny reason's ability to prove its necessity. Ahrens, infected with modem rational- ism, frames up a definition of religion, from which he en- tirely excludes the necessity of exterior worship. ''Reli- gion," he says, "is a union of mind and heart with the su- preme being." ''Worship, therefore," with him, "is an intellectual and spiritual work only, which ought to refrain from representing God and His attributes by sensible signs." ' ' One may, ' ' he continues, ' ' call to his assistance some of the fine arts, such for instance as music and song, because these serve to more vividly express our notions of the infinite. ' ' He allows the sense of hearing to play a part in divine wor- ship, he has no place for the eyes, and scents from afar Catholicity's veneration of images Eevelation. The word is a Latin derivative from re, back, and velum, a veil. It means therefore the removal of a veil. 186 SPECIAL ETHICS the lifting of some hidden truth into the light. In theology, revelation is defined as, '' A communication from God in lan- guage strictly so called, hy which, on the authority of His testimony. He makes known to men truths in the order of salvation.' ' All creation is said to be a book, which sets forth with a great wealth of detail God's guiding presence, His attributes, and His wishes in our regard. But it conveys lessons through a medium different from language properly so called, and therefore falls short of being revelation. Reve- lation is the word of God, something once uttered by God for men 's spiritual advantage. Its channels are direct speech, the written word, and tradition. He held immediate converse with Moses and the prophets, who afterwards at His express command committed His wishes to writing for the benefit of future ages. This body of revelation is contained in the Old Testament. Later on. He appeared among men, and in the person of Jesus Christ changed much of the old dispensation, and instituted the New Law, destined to govern His people without change or alteration till the end of time. He bade His apostles preach and teach His doctrine throughout the world. St. Matthew and St. John, with the disciples St. Mark and St. Luke, compiled the four Gospels, or narratives of Christ's life. St. Paul and others, under the influence of divine inspiration, wrote a series of letters or documents abounding with rules for the right ordering of Christian life. God ordained that these writings should always remain in the custody of a living Church, which He solemnly founded and placed under the control of St. Peter and his successors forever. This Church is to be the arbiter of all religious disputes, and this Church is to decide beyond all appeal the amplitude of revelation. There is no higher court, empowered to review or reverse its decisions; and God has promised it immunity from error in matters of dogma. It is the guardian and authoritative interpreter of God's word, as contained in the Old and New Testaments; the witness to and the dis- penser of tradition. For revelation is of wider extent than the mere written word, and embraces all the points of* belief insisted on and taught by the Catholic and true Church of Christ, though not explicitly set forth in the pages of Holy Scripture. REVELATION 187 Scripture itself bears us out in all these statements, but their further discussion belongs to the domain of theology. "We have said enough to convince any honest mind that revela- tion is no empty dream. Scripture and tradition are its abundant sources, and he who diligently searches can easily recognize the contents of the Bible and the doctrines of the Catholic Church for the word of God. Miracles and proph- ecies are the most obvious of the seals divinity has stamped upon them; and the miracles and the prophecies we appeal to for the heavenly character of our religion, are beyond denial, and beyond serious dispute or doubt. God alone is equal to the infinite task of working real miracles, and utter- ing real prophecies; and when He invests a messenger with these dread prerogatives for credentials of his mission, that messenger is God 's mouthpiece, and the tidings he brings are fresh from the lips of God. Faith is the virtue called into play by revelation, and faith is not knowing, but believing. The truths of faith are not blessed with all the light, thrown round the axioms of algebra and geometry. They are obscure, hard to understand, and in some cases absolutely beyond human comprehension. More than any other act of the mind, faith makes large demands on free will ; and this circumstance, constituting faith 's merit, is responsible for faith's small influence with the ill-disposed. As an act of supremest homage, it is only just that it carry along with itself submission of will, the faculty whose sur- render is a most pleasing sacrifice in God's sight. Faith of the right kind, faith with the authority of God's word for root and motive, leaves a man no room for choice between dogmas that flatter and dogmas that pinch self. Everj^ statement, whether it pictures forth the ravishing joys of Heaven, or the terrifying flames of hell, must be accepted with the same readiness and good-will. Of course, some of Scripture's utterances have a more important bearing on morality, a more intimate connection with eternal salvation than others; but all, all without a single exception, rest for credence on the self-same support, the knowledge and the truthfulness of God. If God could stoop to the meanness of deceiving man in the most trivial particular, man's trust and confidence in God would be at an end. Faith in any utter- 18d SPECIAL ETHICS ance of God, no matter how solemn and weighty, would then degenerate to stupidity. People outside our Church, people whose faith is measured by the canons of convenience, set apart certain far-reaching, general and palatable dogmas, and label them fundamental articles. They preach that these alone are to be believed under pain of eternal loss. Other articles of minor importance deserve no attention, though out of respect for God's word they ought not to be wantonly denied. With them, individuals are judge and jury in the selection; and confusion reigns supreme. "We too recognize a difference in importance between various parts of Holy Scripture; but no one sentence is so unimpor- tant as not to demand our full faith and belief. We feel at liberty to deny nothing, we feel bound to believe at least implicitly the whole of Scripture's contents, and explicitly believe every dogma duly proposed to our consideration. And since every clause in the Bible descends to us from the same God who teaches the more important articles, our position is alone logical, our position alone approves itself to reason. To accept revelation as such means, therefore, a vast deal more than half-hearted and insincere believers to-day make it mean. To diligently seek and find revelation when hidden, implies a larger amount of labor than most strangers to the truth devote to this undeniable duty. Doubts daily cross their minds, and suspicions concerning the dangerous risks they are taking constantly arise within them. And yet these improv- ident philosophers, because the consequences of their mistake will become fully apparent only in the next life, prefer the ease of uncertainty, and the license their pretended ignorance lends to their low instincts. Toleration. Nobody need be informed that the world is sadly full of different religious sects. A walk through our own city, with now and then a glance at the sign-boards con- spicuously displayed at temple entrances, must effectually cure any doubt on the subject. Indifferentism is a rampant sin among us, so rampant that the early signers felt con- strained to introduce into our Constitution a clause ensuring to every citizen immunity from persecution on the score of religion. Be it noted, however, that the toleration sanctioned by our government is merely political ; and therefore not to be TOLERATION 189 branded in virtue of our thesis absurd. Dogmatic toleration is as eminently absurd a notion as can well be conceived. Only a disordered mind could seriously entertain it. Political toleration is mere permission, without the declaration of any absolute right, to practise false as well as true religions. Dog- matic toleration is permission along with the assertion of an absolute right to practise false as well as true religions. Political tolerance tolerates not mistakes, but people who make the mistakes. It can at heart abominate all false wor- ship, and yet have a word of kindness for the victims of error. It takes men as it finds them, and merely permits all without distinction to practise whatever system of public worship they choose. It seals with its sanction no form of worship at all, but in the interests of peace allows the false and the true to grow up together till the harvest. And God allows that, in a permissive, though not in an approving way. Ar- dent lovers of the truth at first sight revolt against any such proceeding; but after calm consideration they settle down to the conviction, that in the present lamentable state of affairs it is the only feasible method. Christ once rebuked indigna- tion of the kind in St. James and St. John. The Samaritans had shut their gates against His coming and these disciples said, "Lord, wilt thou that we command fire to come down from heaven and consume them? And turning He rebuked them, saying. You know not of what spirit you are. The Son of man came, not to destroy souls, but to save." St. Luke 9.54. When authority permits a practice as abominable in the sight of God as heresy, it can still be justified on the double plea of inability to remedy the abuse, and refraining from the crime of formal cooperation. Were there no such escape from the difficulty, our rulers would be obliged in conscience to do one of two things. They would have either to expel all sec- taries from the country, or whip them into submission to the true faith. But the one alternative is quite as impracticable and impossible as the other. Adherents to the true religion are not in the majority, and truth's victory would be uncer- tain. It is criminal to undertake any kind of a war without reasonable hope of winning. Catholics outnumber every single sect taken separately; but, in the event of force, error would 190 SPECIAL ETHICS unite against the truth, as against a common foe. Then, too, even were the triumph of truth an assured possibility, the land would have to be deluged with blood, and life would perish from the state. Submission procured by force is simply out of the question. Religion subjectively taken is largely a matter of free will. Liberty enters religion as an essen- tial element, and religion embraced under stress of physical violence is hypocrisy. Besides, the state by supposition lends no peculiar support or encouragement to false creeds, and in this particular es- capes censure. Dogmatic toleration would be in effect, if our Constitution anywhere committed itself to the stupidity of declaring all forms of worship equally good. But you will look in vain throughout its pages for any such assertion. Well-meaning Catholics, to conciliate the esteem and friend- ship of separated brethren, sometimes stoop to the meanness of giving expression to sentiments of the kind. But their excuse lies in the fact that they are over-zealous for peace, and speak without due reflection. Rome recognises no com- promise with error. She teaches her children to put on the feelings of charity and forbearance towards error's deluded victims, but denounces error as an unpardonable sin, and commends its slaves to the mercy and justice of God. Absurd. The full force of this term implies something more than mere falsehood. It further conveys the notion of silli- ness and open war with reason's most evident dictates. A statement can well be false without being absurd. We are acquainted with many such statements. The falsehood they contain, lies deep beneath the surface, mixed with much that is true, and only diligent search can detect it. But dogmatic tolerance is so repugnant to common sense that we hesitate not to brand it absurd. DIVISION Four Parts— I, II, III, IV I. Religion is (a) man's first duty, of essential necessity to (b) individual and (c) State. II. Worship, interior and exterior, private and public is God's due. PROOFS 191 III. Man's duty towards revelation is (a) to accept, or (b) seek it. IV. Toleration in matter of dogma is absurd. PROOFS I. (a) The position and standing of relations fix the po- sition and standing of duties. But of all man's relations those with God are first in time and first in excellence. Ergo, man's duty towards God, or religion, is man's first duty. With Regard to the Major. Duties are the growth of rela- tions in force between a man and God, himself and his neigh- bors. They are, as it were, an effect, with these several rela- tions for cause ; and effects partake of the nobility inherent in necessary causes. With Regard to the Minor. Existence and reality derived from God and Creator are first requisites for whatever events crowd into a man's after-life. To none therefore are we more under obligation than to God. Nobody has more sacred rights to our homage and service. No conceivable object is worthier of our energies. (b) A duty based on a relation arising from man's very nature is a thing of moral essential necessity to the indi- vidual. But religion is a duty arising from just such a rela- tion. Ergo, religion is a thing of moral essential necessity to the individual. With Regard to the Major. Duties are strict moral neces- sities. Duties arising from man's nature are as close and present to man as his very nature. They can no more be absent from him, they can no more loosen their hold on his allegiance than nature can abandon him, or reside somewhere apart from him. That religion is a quasi-physical essential necessity to the individual, favorable to his happiness, peace and well-being must be evident from the line of reasoning followed in proof of next clause. (c) 1°. A moral person immediately dependent on God for maker, helper, guide and rewarder lies under moral essential necessity to acknowledge and worship God. But the state is such a moral person, and religion is this acknowledgment and 192 SPECIAL ETHICS worship. Ergo, religion is a moral essential necessity to the state. 2°. That without which duties of justice, honesty, and mu- tual harmony can in no wise stand is a quasi-physical essential necessity to the state as such. But religion is a thing of the kind. Ergo. With Regard to the Major. Nobody will deny that the du- ties enumerated are of vital importance and large factors in the state's well being. With Regard to the Minor. Remove God from the universe, destroy religion, and all moral obligation falls, sanction is idle, and states go down in ruin. II. N.B. Worship offered to God, divine excellence itself, is called, latria. Worship offered the Blessed Virgin Mary, who borrows all her excellence from God, is called, hyperdulia. Worship offered the saints is called dulia. The worship belonging to God is at least interior. In the case of individuals it must likewise be exterior or bodily, since man's dependence on God, extending as it does to body and soul, must be shown whole and entire. The worship rendered by the state must be social, and therefore visible or exterior. Public worship is worship rendered by the individuals com- posing a state, not in their private capacity, but as welded together by authority into one body politic. III. Man's duty towards revelation is to (a) accept it, or (b) seek it. (a) 1°. It is a rational creature's duty to accept for true every statement made by the God of truth and known for such. But man is a rational creature, and revelation is a body of statements made by the God of truth. Ergo, man's duty towards revelation is to accept it when known as such. With Regard to the Major. Duties are the result of rela- tions, and the relations in force between the Creator and His rational creatures make faith in the Creator's word an im- perative necessity. God therefore has a right to man's men- tal submission when He speaks. That He invariably insists on this right, is evident from the circumstance that He is all- wise and all-true. He cannot, like limited and finite mortals, give expression to utterances, that owing to dearth of knowl- edge are tainted with falsehood. He cannot like fools talk PROOFS 198 for the mere sake of talking, without caring whether His listeners heed His words or not. Men can be guilty of folly of the sort; but God has too much reverence for language's end and purpose to so abuse it. When a man of ordinary common sense, blessed with a fair measure of seriousness, vouches for the truth of some fact, he can with reason feel offended at a refusal to abide by his declaration. God's at- tributes would make such a refusal a monstrous crime, and God's attributes make faith in His word an absolute duty. With Regard to the Minor. That Scripture and tradition, or revelation, are a body of statements made by the God of truth is proved at great length in works on Theology. Phi- losophy left to itself can proceed no farther than demonstrate the necessity of accepting revelation in the event of its being made. It cannot, alone and single handed, conclusively prove that this or that set of truths constitutes revelation. History furnishes us with well attested facts, and philosophy can dis- cover in these facts traces of God's presence. Thus, the records of history are witness to the reality of Moses and the prophets, and to certain wonderful or miracu- lous events in their lives. They claimed for themselves the dignity of messengers from God to men, and left in writing to posterity facts, principles, and maxims, that God commis- sioned them to communicate. For credentials they appealed to miracles and prophecies, worked and uttered by them in the name of God. Philosophy is within its own province, when it undertakes to show that the writings of Moses and the prophets derive from these miracles and prophecies a divinity peculiarly their own. These two species of effects are be- yond the reach of power inferior to God's, and God could never sanction lies by the performance of prodigies. When, therefore. He stamped with these seals of His omnipotence and wisdom the claims of Moses and the prophets, He signi- fied as plainly as possible how He wished their statements to be regarded. He signified as plainly as possible that the words they committed to writing were His own words and had Him for author. 2°. From analogy. To God as the supreme being adora- tion is due ; to God as the supreme good love is due. Ergo, to God as the highest truth faith is due. IM SPECIAL ETHICS (b) Contempt of revelation is contempt of God, and in- difference to eternal salvation. But avoidance of contempt for God, and of indifference to salvation, is man's plain duty. Ergo, avoidance of contempt for revelation, diligent search for the truth, is man's duty. With Regard to the Major. God wastes no words, and means His every message to be seriously taken. He is like- wise anxious that all His children, without any exception, take full advantage of the instruction He proffers. He occupies the position of Lord and Father, and resents negligent atten- tion on the part of such as He deigns to address. Revelation teems with documents designed for helps to attain to the King- dom of Heaven, and the loss of these necessary helps through sloth is attended with damage and serious responsibility. It is quite impossible for me to think, that to-day's scoffers at religion and revelation are absolutely free from suspicion and anxiety, concerning the doubtful and preposterous position they occupy. And to let one single doubt in this matter of revelation remain unsettled, is to take sides with God's enemies, and to confide to chance eternal destiny for weal or woe. Plungers at a race-track, when placing money on horses, display more skill and prudence than the wiseacres, who, be- cause of trivial difficulties, gamble in risks, and leave Heaven to a game of chance. With Regard to the Minor. God has well founded claims on our reverence; and, apart from other considerations, we owe it to our souls and bodies to procure for them an abode of comfort, and happiness, and security against the endless ages of ages in store for them beyond the grave. IV. 1°. Toleration in matter of dogma supposes that a system of religion false in itself, yea, immoral and unclean in its tendencies, can be an instrument in God's worship. But this supposition is eminently absurd. Ergo. With Regard to the Minor. God is truth, God is purity; and falsehood, immorality, and uncleanness can have no part in His service. Any other notion would be unworthy of God 's infinite majesty and degrading in the extreme. 2°. Toleration in matter of dogma supposes that religion can be manifold in such sort that a duty prescribed by one system can be neglected by another system, or totally con- PEINCIPLES 195 demned as dishonest by a third system. But this supposition is eminently absurd. Ergo. With Regard to the Minor. The collection of truths and duties embraced in a religion, truly deserving of the name, ought to be one and the same for all mankind. Religion is the outcome of man's dependence on God; and, since the two terms of the relation, human nature and an unchangeable God, are the same the world over and for all time, religion the result of the relation ought to be the same, without shadow or suspicion of change or difference. Artificial changes, wrought in men's minds by education, prejudice, and other external agencies, are no excuse and no ground whatever for declaring that human nature in me is different from human nature in my neighbor. PRINCIPLES A. In every free act of the will, whether it be prayer or murder, man necessarily keeps his relations with God, mani- festing and acknowledging his quality of dependence on God. Ergo, no religion needed. Answer: Materially, I grant; formally, I deny. The de- pendence must not be in the free act, but in the very free- dom of the act. The dependence manifest in the free act it- self never bases religion. Otherwise brutes, plants and min- erals would be capable of religion, and there would be no dis- tinction between the service of brutes and the service of men. The difference would be merely on the part of the servant, not on the part of the service. Other creatures serve God, no matter what they do. Man in his free acts serves God only when he uses his will aright. The service God exacts from men is different from the service He exacts from brutes ; and free will is index of His wishes. B. God cannot be acted on. Ergo, He cannot be wor- shipped. Answer: He cannot be acted on physically, I grant; morally, as in case of wrong or honor, I deny. Worship in- duces no intrinsic change in God. All the change is outside God. Worship changes us. 196 SPECIAL ETHICS C. God is infinitely perfect. Ergo, He has no need of wor- ship. Answer: He has no need of worship, as of a perfection antecedently absent from His being, I grant. He has no need of worship, as of homage which is His due, I deny. The mil- lionaire may have no need of the five dollars you owe him, but the circumstance never excuses you from payment. D. Reason would be the basis of moral obligation and the single origin of good and evil. Answer: Reason manifests moral obligation, I grant. Reason makes or constitutes it, I deny. E. Society owes worship. Ergo the family, and literary, scientific, athletic societies. Answer: Complete society, I grant; incomplete, I deny. The family because complete and independent is a moral per- son and held to worship. Private societies of the kind men- tioned, because incomplete and dependent on the state, are no moral persons, and under no such obligation. F. The state has a temporal end or purpose. Ergo, no re- ligion. Answer: Its first and chief purpose is the temporal pros- perity of its citizens. This purpose it must accomplish in a way befitting its nature, and by nature it is a moral person, under obligations to God. Ergo, while pursuing temporal good, it must not neglect the knowledge and worship of God. G. Society is immediately dependent on the free will of man. Ergo, independent of God. Answer: In its making, when not yet a person, I grant; when constituted and now a person, I deny. H. In spirit and in truth, John 4.23. Ergo, no external worship needed. Answer: The true meaning of the passage is a contrast be- tween the Old Law and the New, between the letter or figure, and spirit or truth. Besides, insistence on internal worship is far from condemning external. Christ on no few occasions employed external worship. I. The State can get along without religion. Ergo. Schiff, p. 511, n. 510. Answer: We could transmit the antecedent and deny the PRINCIPLES ^ 197 conclusion as inconsequent. Worship is a need to the state, not precisely because of advantage, but because of the nature of things. The state can get along somehow and imperfectly, I grant ; as nature intended and perfectly, I deny. J. Other incentives would hold men to honesty; a sense of honor, for instance. Ergo. Answer: We could again transmit. Our argument is not based on advantage, but on the nature of things. These other incentives would be sufficient and efficacious, I deny; insuffi- cient and inefficacious, I grant. K. State and religion have two different ends, temporal good and spiritual. Ergo. Answer: Different, when incompletely viewed, I grant; w^hen viewed in their completeness, I deny. When viewed in their completeness, the ends of the two are one and the same, the glory of God. God is the absolutely last end of every- thing. L. Church and state are distinct. Ergo. Answer: Distinct and separate, I deny; distinct and not separate ; I again distinguish. In the present order of things, with revelation, I grant; in the order of pure nature, with- out revelation, I again distinguish, completely distinct, I deny, incompletely distinct, I grant. In the order of pure nature, the state as supreme authority would determine religion; in the present order, revelation appoints the Church to that office. M. *'It would be easier, I think, to build a city without ground, than to establish or preserve a state without God and religion. ' ' Plutarch. ' ' Time destroys extravagant opin- ions, it solidifies the judgments of nature." Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, 2. N. No need to pray, because God knows everything. Kant. Answer: S. Th. 2.2. q. 83, a. 2. ''Men ought to do things, not for the purpose of changing the arrangements of Provi- dence, but to accomplish results in accordance with these arrangements." We pray to change God's decrees, I deny; we pray to fulfil them, I grant. His decrees are conditioned. Gifts are made us, if we pray ; withheld, if we neglect to do so. He knows from eternity whether He will relieve men 198 SPECIAL ETHICS or not; but this knowledge is terminatively speaking conse- quent on our use of free will, on our choice or rejection of prayer. O. Truths above understanding would be a contradiction. Ergo, no revelation. Answer: Above all understanding both divine and human, I grant ; above merely human understanding, I deny. P. No truth above human understanding, because its object is all being. Ergo. Answer: Its proportionate object is all being, I deny; all material being is that ; its adequate object is all being, I again distinguish ; inasmuch as the human intellect can understand whatever being is duly presented or brought to its notice, I grant ; inasmuch as all being is as a matter of fact thus duly presented or brought to its notice, I deny. There are more things in Heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our phi- losophy. Q. A truth above reason would be against reason, because out of harmony with reason. Answer: Out of harmony in a contradictory way, I grant ; in a contrary way, I deny. There is a difference between not being a mjin's friend, not loving him; and being his enemy, hating him. In much the same way to be on no terms of intimacy with reason is not the same as to be opposed to reason. R. God has a right not only to worship, but to worship of the kind He wants. S. Religion is truth and justice. Truth is one, error is manifold. Justice is one. T. Christianity and Judaism are two opposite religions. Ergo, if one was ever right, the other must always be wrong. Ansiver: Opposite essentially, with regard to Christ, I deny; opposite accidentally, with regard to circumstances of time and form, with regard to Christ already come and Christ yet to come, I grant. Christianity worships Christ already come, Judaism worships Christ yet to come, the Messiah. U. If an opponent admits Scripture. Christ wants one Church, one fold, one Baptism. Christ wants His people to guard against false prophets, and in the event of dogmatic toleration false prophets must grow and multiply. Christ PRINCIPLES 199 wants His Church to endure forever. St. Luke, 11.17. * ' Every kingdom divided against itself shall fall. " * ' Now I beseech you, brethren, to mark them who make dissensions and offences contrary to the doctrine which you have learnt, and to avoid them." Rom. 16.17. ''But though we, or an angel from Heaven, preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema." Gal. 1.8. V. Indifferentism and Liberalism are two theories based on toleration. Indifferentism f Absolute = No religion is necessary = Altogether wrong is of two J ^"^ against whole thesis, kinds 2 1 Relative = Some religion necessary, no one form before t another, f Universal = All forms equally good. -I Particular == All Christianity equally L good. Philosophy refutes universal; theology, particular, because revelation enters question. Toleration f l^ogmatic = All religions equally good = Toleration of is of two -l error == Indifferentism. kinds 1 Political = All public worship is allowed = Toleration of I the erring = Liberalism. Dogmatic is freedom of conscience, meaning immunity from all restraint, moral as well as physical ; from all law of nature and all law of God. Political is freedom of worship, im- munity from the moral restraint imposed by law of state and Church, not from law of nature or of God. In a Catholic country, Indifferentism of whatever kind and Liberalism are regularly wrong, circumstances may condone Liberalism. In a mixed country, absolute and relative universal Indifferent- isms are wrong, and the aid of theology must be invoked to prove relative particular Indifferentism wrong. In a mixed country, that Liberalism is right, which for grave reasons tolerates whatever false religions threaten no harm to the first principles of morality; and every other species of Liberalism is wrong. When a false religion threatens the first princi- ples of morality, it must not be tolerated, because it is a menace to not only the welfare but the very life of the state. In the event of legitimate toleration, some grave reason, like the violent disturbance of social order, must be present ; be- 200 SPECIAL ETHICS cause every false religion is an obstacle to the public good, and no risk of the kind can be legitimately taken without a serious and proportionate reason. The religion of the state ought to be one and true; but facts, over which we have no control, make this condition impossible in certain countries called mixed, and a sane Liberalism is the only alternative for them. By a Catholic country we mean a country, wherein morally speaking all the inhabitants profess the true reli- gion. By a mixed country we mean a country, wherein men in sufficiently large numbers to destroy this moral unanimity profess false religions. W. A Catholic country has no right to insist on the Cath- olic religion, (1) because God leaves men free; (2) because human reason is open to mistake in the matter of religion; (3) because the state has temporal good for end or purpose; (4) because a Protestant country would have the same right; (5) because the Catholic religion will prevail anyhow, as truth is stronger than falsehood; (6) because peace would be disturbed; (7) because such interference is everywhere re- garded a species of tyranny. Answers: (1) God leaves men free physically, I grant; morally, I deny; (2) Reason is fallible with regard to moral- ity's first principles and immediate deductions from same, I deny ; with regard to remoter conclusions, I again distinguish ; if revelation lends reason no support, I grant; if revelation supplements reason, I deny. (3) The state has temporal good for immediate and incomplete end, I grant; for remote and complete end, I deny; that is the glory of God. (4) Ob- jectively, I deny; subjectively, I again distinguish; if error has any right against the truth, I grant ; if error has no such right, I deny. (5) Truth is stronger than falsehood objec- tively and intrinsically, I grant ; subjectively and extrinsically, I deny. Men's passions commonly favor falsehood. (6) Peace would be disturbed in the very nature of things, I deny ; by accident, I again distinguish ; and for this very rea- son toleration is to be conditionally permitted, I grant ; tolera- tion is to be absolutely permitted, I deny. (7) Such inter- ference is erroneously accounted tyranny, I grant; rightly accounted tyranny, I deny. THESIS II Suicide is a sin against nature. Death inflicted in self- defense is under certain conditions justifiable. Private duels are highly absurd, and contrary to the law of nature. Jouin, 96-118 ; Rickaby, 202-224. QUESTION Religion is the one word expressive of our duties towards God. It is a word of wide significance, and we were able in our first thesis to discuss only its most salient features. From among its varied contents we selected for study worship, revelation, and its concomitant question of religious tolera- tion. Religion, of course, imposes on us the obligation of cultivating whatever virtues have a direct bearing on God. These virtues are in especial, faith, hope and charity; and they are for this reason called the theological virtues. There must, however, be a limit to our treatise, and we prefer to leave the fuller examination of these several topics to cate- chism and the Sunday-school. These theological virtues as such would have no place in the natural order, because they have God as known from revelation for material and formal object. And yet corre- sponding virtues in the shape of love, hope, obedience, grati- tude and fidelity would be serious obligations in even the natural order, and God as known by reason would be their object. Man is certainly bound to seek his end or purpose in life. "We described it as proximately the introduction of moral order into his conduct, and ultimately the intellectual possession of God. Viewed one way or the other, this end is an arduous or difficult good, and tendency towards every such good is hope. Man is likewise bound to love God above everything, because right order demands that we make the dignity of love's object the measure of love's quality. God 201 202 SPECIAL ETHICS is infinite good, the source and origin of all created good, and as such deserves to be loved above everything. Our duty of obedience flows from our relation of creature. We are the work of God's hands, and the artificer is absolute owner of the thing he makes. Gratitude and fidelity are obligations in view of the multitudinous favors conferred on us. And now we pass from God to self. Man has duties towards his soul, he has duties towards his body. Obviously we can- not enter into all the questions suggested by these two com- ponent parts of man's being. We choose to busy ourselves in the main with his body, dismissing the soul with these few remarks. Man was created to the image and likeness of God, and this resemblance with the Creator is principally resident in the soul. His intellect and will must be there- fore developed and made grow more and more like their divine prototype by steady improvement. With the Child Jesus he must grow in wisdom, age and grace. His mind must be stored with knowledge, human and divine; his will must strengthen itself in good. All the virtues with a bear- ing on the mind, all the virtues with a bearing on the will, must be sedulously cultivated; and passions, ready helps to wrong conduct, must be subdued and kept in tight check. Intellect and will must be shaped by diligent care into instru- ments calculated to procure their owner's welfare here and hereafter. Mind and heart must be trained along right lines ; and this means education in its fullest and completest sense. This topic of education will get fuller attention when we come to discuss the duties of parents in particular. Suicide, with everything suggestive of suicide, is the chiefest offense man can do his own body ; but this question is so closely connected with self-defense and duelling, that we choose to gather all three topics into one thesis. Suicide is destruction of life, self-defense is its preservation, and duelling partakes of the double malice of murder and suicide. We say nothing of murder, because it is too evident a violation of natural law to need notice. Some philosophers, like Thomasius and Schopenhauer, ob- ject to the expression, man's duties towards himself. Regu- larly duties are between two different persons, and even in this case the relations establishing man's duty towards his SUICIDE 203 own proper person are fundamentally between himself and God. His duties towards his neighbor rest ultimately on the same foundation; and merely to keep one set of duties apart from the other, we denominate them duties towards self and duties towards the neighbor. The whole man can be said to differ from his parts or faculties, and this circumstance would be basis enough for the expression, duty towards self. TERMS Suicide. Suicide is direct killing of self on one's own initio^ tive. Life, because the root of all succeeding favors, is Heav- en 's first and highest gift ; and, no matter how crowded with misfortunes, it never loses this quality of a gift. All things considered, its chief good lies in the circumstance that it is the one road leading to a happy eternity. Any other view of life's utility is a mistake, and sure to work sad havoc. Some enjoy a gilt-edged existence from the cradle to the grave. Others drag out a short or long period of disease, and want, and disappointment. But all, without a single exception, the poor as well as the rich, the unfortunate as well as the fortunate, can still count life a priceless jewel. When turned to good and proper uses, it can purchase a seat in the kingdom, a title to that supreme happiness, which constitutes man's last end. And yet life is something more than a mere gift. It is a responsibility, and its giver attaches to it obligations, that its recipient is not free to abide by or shirk at will. When bom into the world, a man, without being at all consulted beforehand, is set down in the midst of a multitude of rela- tions, which produce unavoidable and stem duties. No man can escape them, no man can afford to trifle with them, with- out diminishing his dignity and suffering irreparable loss. Life is not given to mortals to be squandered on every chance attraction that happens along. It is not a toy meant by its gracious author to be used till it loses the power to please, and then be cast aside. Everything in nature points to the fact that God created men as well as other beings to add their little measure to His glory. Everything in nature proclaims Him the author of life 204 SPECIAL ETHICS and death, and He is jealous of His prerogatives. Men, whether they will or not, have to procure the spread of His kingdom, and proclaim His sovereignty. In His all-wise plans every creature has its allotted time for life, and woe to the man who attempts to interfere with the plan. Men cannot call life out of nothing; men usurp a right belonging to God Himself, when without His sanction they put an end to their existence. They deny God service, they rob them- selves of eternal glory, they plunge their families and friends into the depths of disgrace, they bequeath to their descendants a name of ignominy and shame, they curse their country with an example of craven-hearted cowardice and sottish impiety. The crime of suicide is thoroughly wicked, and has noth- ing whatever to recommend it to the esteem of men born with high instincts. It is the mad act of a coward, and bravery is dishonored by being mentioned in the same breath with suicide. Fortitude impels the courageous to bear up under troubles that crush men of weaker mould. Fortitude is blessed with long vision, and in the very excess of pain looks forward to the hour when pain will be no more. It knows the weakness inherent in all the ills of this life, and is satis- fied from experience that sufferance is their infallible remedy. With time they wear themselves out, and joy succeeds to sor- row. But the suicide, whose vision is as short as his patience, madly rushes through the first avenue open to escape. In- stead of meeting an enemy to his happiness with a bold front, he turns his back and flees. The pit of hell-fire into which he falls has been robbed by his irreligion of all its dread reality. In the minds of the unfortunates, who trifle with thoughts of suicide, hell and Heaven are dreams, and never awaken serious consideration. They play the coward; and, choosing between a present and a distant evil, between a cer- tain and an uncertain calamity, they avoid the one and fall headlong into the other. Climate, heredity, racial characteristics, are not responsible for suicide. They may be occasions, but they are not causes. They may pave the way to self-destruction, but freedom of will always holds the balance of power ; and, if freedom of will has been instructed along right lines of morality, virtue will always assert itself, and suicide will be hated with all the hate SUICIDE 205 it deserves. Apart from their piety and religion, the people of Ireland, because of the misery attendant on hundreds of years of oppression, have small incentive indeed to continue a tiresome and from a worldly point of view hopeless exist- ence. And yet consulting tables prepared for the World Almanac by Barker in 1894, Ireland and Spain contribute fewest to the army of suicides. Protestantism, with its im- pious^ principle of private interpretation, is the parent of unbelief, and countries cursed with its blight are rich in un- natural crimes of the sort. Here are a few interesting and instructive statistics culled from the table referred to. Rate per Rate per Catholic 100,000 Protestant 100,000 Saxony, 31.1 Austria, 21.2 Denmark, 25.8 France, 16.7 Prussia, 13.3 Bavaria, 9.1 Sweden, 8.1 Ireland, 1.7 England, 6.9 Spain, 1.4 Common sense would lead us to expect no other result. Un- belief unsettles all the convictions implanted by faith, and faith is busiest with the reality of life beyond the grave. Faith is our soundest argument for the existence of Heaven and hell ; and, when Heaven and hell become dim realities in men's minds, small wonder if they take all risks to avoid impending evils like disease, disgrace, poverty and disap- pointment. Some ancient philosophers, like Seneca, Plato, Socrates and others, defended suicide, but on grounds far different from the silly pretenses set up by their modem imitators. It may be well to remark that the ancients never regarded suicide justifiable, when used as an exit from ills for which the suicide was himself responsible. Socrates thought self-murder eth- ically correct, only because he knew that after condemnation by the state authorities he had to die anyhow. Seneca and the rest thought it a laudable subterfuge only when cornered by adverse circumstances, over which they had no control. The old Romans considered these seven, justifiable causes for suicide. A disgust for life. The wish to be rid of a dis- tressing disease. Regret for the decease of some dear com- panion. Shame at being an insolvent debtor. Ambition to 206 SPECIAL ETHICS be spoken of after death, when there had been no honor in this life. Dementia or insanity. Outrage to a woman's chastity. But modern advocates of the revolting theory preach its adaptability to every occasion. They draw no fine distinctions between evils for which the victim of poison, pis- tol or the knife is himself responsible, and evils brought to his door by friends or strangers. When life from whatever cause grows disagreeably heavy, life, they say, should be pushed aside. We have no excuse to offer for the mistakes made by the wise of old, when defending the theory and practice of suicide. It is explanation enough for us to know that faith in God never had a tight or loose hold on their minds and hearts, that their natural knowledge of God and a future life was dim, obscure and imperfect, and that selfishness, with an inborn tendency to comfort and ease, is as native to the sa- pient philosopher as it is to the ignorant clod. But it is at the same time worth noting, that the higher they climbed in the scale of true wisdom, the less they conceded to this basest of sins. See Cicero, De Senectute, c. 20; Somnium Scipionis, c. 3 ; Virgil, ^neid, VI, 434. No well balanced mind can for a moment doubt of the guilt resident in suicide. In every well organized community any attempt at self-murder is a crime punishable with short or long terms of imprisonment. By measures of the sort the state loudly proclaims its belief that suicide is not only a sin against God and reason, but also a crime against a govern- ment 's very existence. In general the state has small concern for sins against God .and reason. It rouses itself to persistent activity against transgressors, mostly when its own life is threatened. With the aid of a little reflection, we can read- ily understand that the encouragement of suicide in a re- public would lead to annihilation. The godless among its citizens, and they always constitute a large number, would be apt at any moment to disappear from its ranks, and leave to survivors an inheritance of untold shame and misery. Suicide is so shocking a crime, an act so far beside the promptings of nature, that men usually reckon its perpetrators insane. Intense grief and overwhelmingly sharp pain can, of course, unbalance the mind of a sufferer; and our Church, with this fact in view, and because of the mystery that al- SUICIDE 207 ways attaches to a man's last moments, is extremely lenient in the application of its laws against suicide. The circum- stance should not, however, lead us to conclude that every single act of self-murder is the freak of a lunatic. The care- ful preparations, the secrecy of proceeding, the efficacy of the means chosen, the schemes employed, often point to the criminal's full possession of his wits up to the latest breath. Besides, it is ill-directed charity to invariably excuse the folly of the dead by fastening on their posterity the hereditary taint of a reputation for insanity. Thoughts of suicide cannot, of course, be seriously enter- tained by minds alive to religious instincts, to the true mean- ing of life and its attendant woes and joys. Minds dead to faith can easily fall a prey to the temptation, when their cup of sorrow overflows, and the future holds out no promise of respite. Incurable disease, disappointment in love or busi- ness, loss of motive, or purpose, or ambition, these several causes will operate to drag down to a suicide's grave the fool, who has cut loose from religion, and entertains only hazy and uncertain opinions concerning Heaven and hell. To the well instructed Christian these several misfortunes present no in- superable difficulty. He knows that disappointment here was the lot God's Son chose for Himself, when He condescended to put on our nature. He knows that every motive or pur- pose, his soul's salvation excepted, is beneath his contempt, unequal to the full dignity of his sublime calling, and worthy of only his waste energies. He reckons it a sin to allow any lesser aim to completely absorb his attention. The Christian, therefore, goaded by despair, and urged in weaker moments to the crime of self-murder, must be com- pelled to refresh his memory of the lessons learned from a pious mother in childhood; and, if reason is at his call, he can pass through the temptation with safety. To the irreli- gious we can give no solid advice till they mend their ways, and get into the trend of mind God wants them to follow in His service. We might perhaps endeavor to convince them that no disease is absolutely incurable, that every cloud has a silver lining, that disappointment in love or business has often paved the way to life-long happiness and unprecedented prosperity, and that there is plenty of work in the world for 208 SPECIAL ETHICS the energetic and industrious. But they will find it possible to answer somehow every argument of the sort we have to offer, and we shall find ourselves reduced to silence, or driven in the end to the only true method, the only trustworthy source of encouragement and comfort, religion and faith in its principles. A sovereign remedy for suicide is Shake- speare's ''dread of something after death, that undiscovered country," that pit of fire, a sterner and more substantial reality to men blessed with the instincts of faith than the very ground they tread. Nor ever yet did man or woman take the sad and unholy step of self-murder, until hell by repeated insults to conscience had worn in his or her mind to a thin shadow of itself. Against Nature. We intend to prove our verdict against suicide without once appealing to Scripture or the teachings of the Church. And we emphatically condemn the conduct of whatever sages, modern or ancient, from motives of moral cowardice and selfishness ran counter in this respect to the canons of right reason. No man is so wise but that free will, influenced by mean and ungodly motives, can lead him into the commission of horrible crimes. Socrates, Plato and others were lying to their own hearts, when they endeavored to find in philosophy an excuse for turpitude, into which want of courage forced them. Self-defense. This term is commonly used to denote the act of opposing force to violence when unjustly attacked. When it results in the death of the offender, no moral wrong attaches to the slayer, if certain conditions have place. One is at liberty to use this prerogative of self-defense, not only when his life is in danger, but also when threatened with the loss of some other great good, like wealth, virtue, bodily in- tegrity. It likewise enables a friend to rescue a friend from death or other heavy loss at the hands of an assassin or thief. Self-defense is no legitimate plea for excuse, when harm is threatened by one in a position to inflict just punish- ment. For instance, the criminal condemned to death by the state has no right whatever to defend himself against the executioner of the law's sentence. A child has no right to SELF-DEFENSE 209 resist a parent when chastised ; a pupil has no right to quarrel with a punishment. Philosophy further recognises these four conditions as neces- sary of fulfilment. First, the violence done the aggressor must be exerted only while the danger actually exists, not before, not after the attack. Besides, no other method of escape than a return of violence for violence must be in the innocent party's power. If flight is possible, flight must be had recourse to. No amount of dread concerning a reputa- tion for cowardice will justify the killing of another. Sec- ondly, no severer measures must be taken than are absolutely necessary. If a blow in the face will prove sufficient safe- guard, a severe wound with a weapon is not justifiable. If a severe wound will serve to stay the aggressor, the party attacked must rest satisfied with inflicting the wound, and must not proceed to slay his assailant. Thirdly, there must exist between the good defended and the harm done the wrong-doer a well defined proportion. This provision is of special importance, when the protection of wealth or property is in question. Thus, a small sum of money is so little worth in comparison with a human life, that reason cries out against murdering a petty thief to save the contents of a pocketbook. Fourthly, revenge must have no part in the proceeding. No motive but that of self-defense pure and simple will justify an act so serious in its consequences as the destruction of a fellow-being. These four conditions combine to rid an act done in self defense of the moral wrong under other cir- cumstances resident in it. They operate to bring about the state of things expressed by that phrase consecrated in the Latin tongue. ''Servato moderamine inculpatae tutelae," ** Observing always the due measure or moderation that frees self-defense from blame. ' ' Of course, these precautions approve themselves to reason. It is, however, one thing to see their force and fairness, when coolly studying the subject; another, to apply them in the heat of action, when pressed into a tight corner, where a second's delay may mean death for the irresolute. Many a crime of murder, we are aware, is committed under the cloak of self-defense, and the Universal Reckoner alone can dis- 210 SPECIAL ETHICS tinguish genuine from spurious cases. Civil law can hardly enter into men's motives. It decides, and generally has to decide, with the help of whatever light facts lend. It must of necessity exercise leniency towards the accused, who enters a plea of self-defense ; and must give him the benefit of every little circumstance that favors his cause. We are ourselves disposed to be easy with the man brought face to face with death through no fault of his own, and forced by a mad adversary to make up his mind without much time for re- flection. Theologians introduce into this question topics, that, without affecting the irreligious, have a practical bearing on the lives of religious people. They ask, for instance, if it is lawful to kill a drunken or mad assailant; if it is lawful to kill in defense of a neighbor ; if it is lawful to kill when limbs are endangered, when chastity is assailed, or honor. They discuss what manner of threat constitutes an assault, and the relative weight of a blow in the face, when aimed at a man of dignity and an ordinary person. Duels. Some regard the duel a species of self-defense. It is a means to which so-called gentlemen resort when their honor, not their life or material wealth, is in danger. The barbarous practice is now well nigh dead; but less than a hundred years ago it was conspicuously alive in our own country. Public opinion has finally succeeded in frowning it down, and, though preliminaries are even now arranged in the newspapers, the hostile meeting seldom or never has place. The custom has a long history. Traces of it are found in the earliest writings. It is, however, safe to say that the private duel is an invention of comparatively modern times. David and Goliath, the heroes of Homer, Livy's triplets, the Horatii and Curiatii, fought duels of a harmless and legiti- mate kind. The combatants in these several cases engaged in what for distinction's sake we style a public duel. They were representatives chosen by the leaders of two contending armies to defend by their prowess the fortunes of their re- spective sides, and no moral blame whatever attached to their act or its promoters. If reason sanctions war and allows whole armies of men to perish for the reestablishment of equity and peace, it is difficult to see how reason can enter a disclaimer against a species of combat, which settles the DUEL 211 question of supremacy at the expense of one or a half dozen lives. Public duelling would on the contrary appear to be a humane substitute for the horrors of war. If the late rebellion or the recent World-Conflict could have been settled in some such way, a world of loss would have been saved the coun- try. Barbarians first gave to single combat a color of religion. They counted it an appeal to the God of right; and, when other testimony was wanting, called on Heaven in this crude way for a decision. The Trial by Ordeal had its origin in the same mistaken notion of Providence. Legislators of the Middle Ages had to consult these superstitions of their people, and enacted stringent measures to regulate loss of life. The Truce of God, established in 1041, forbidding duels, out of respect for the Saviour's Passion, between Wednesday and Monday, served as a check to frequency of duels. Every na- tion in history had its troubles with this abuse. As long as parties to a dispute agreed to submit their differences to the court of single combat, with the approval and under the direction of judicial authority, the evil was somewhat re- stricted, and wore a less repugnant appearance. But, when individuals, without any permission from the state, took jus- tice into their own hands, and made skill in the use of weapons the sole arbiter of right and wrong, duelling lost its religious aspect, and degenerated to wholesale butchery. It was in any event a sad spectacle, and a growth of ignorance; but under these new conditions it was revolting in the extreme and attended with dreadful consequences. Frenchmen have always kept well to the front in this par- ticular branch of barbarity. Richelieu opposed the practice with all the strength of his legislative genius; and, to strike terror into its patrons, stopped not at beheading in 1627 one of the nobility. Count Francois de Montmorency. In Ger- many duelling is much in use at the universities; but, as swords are the weapons, and the bodies of the contestants are well protected, these encounters usually result in a few face- scratches, and seldom prove fatal. Among Irishmen Daniel 'Council killed at least one adversary on the field of honor, D'Esterre, and his conduct in this particular filled the later years of his life with regret and sorrow. In America Hamil- 212 SPECIAL ETHICS ton and Burr fought a historic duel in 1804. Hamilton, the first treasurer of the United States, was killed, and Burr passed into obscurity and oblivion. Barron and Decatur, a man universally loved and one of our most celebrated commo- dores, fought soon after the War of 1812 at Bladensburg, a village about seven miles outside of Washington. Decatur was killed, Barron was severely wounded. The near neigh- borhood of Bladensburg to Washington, a rendezvous for all the political worthies of the country, made it a desirable loca- tion for battle-ground, and many a duel was negotiated there in the early days of the last century. Clay and Randolph fought in 1826. Andrew Jackson killed a Charles Dickinson, and participated in other affairs. Benton of Missouri killed a Mr. Lucas. Two members of Congress, Cilley of Maine and Graves of Kentucky, fought near Washington in 1838. Cilley was killed. Richard Somers had a record of three duels in one day. Debates on the floor of Congress often precipitated disputes, a challenge followed, and one or both of two fools died in the gray of the morning. The custom may fairly be said to have taken its rise from the false notion that chance would favor the party in the right, and so manage matters that the wrong-doer would fall. But chance has no real existence, and God, who disposes of things in creation, has nowhere promised to turn the tide of victory this way or that. He has put at men's disposal other and more efficient remedies for wrongs done their honor, and these remedies are to be sought at the bar of duly constituted tribunals. If survival means vindication, that principal in a duel generally won it, who had the steadier arm, the truer aim, and the better education in the use of weapons. Duel- ling, therefore, defeats the very purpose for which it was instituted. Of course, a certain amount of bull-dog courage is displayed in the acceptance of a challenge, and this circum- stance may help to commend the practice to some. They feel, no doubt, that, whether victor or victim, they have at least proved to the world that they are no cowards, and that friends will applaud their heroism in spite of the insult or insinuation that provoked the combat. But common sense has at last begun to assert itself, and the civilization of to-day reserves its applause for valor of a PROOFS 213 sterner sort than the recklessness common to duellists and in- furiated bulls. Public opinion' frowns down exhibitions of the kind, and >the makers of our literature have done much to bring about this happy result. Sheridan in his play, ' ' The Rivals," mercilessly ridicules the custom. Writers poke fun at the abominable practice, and take advantage of every op- portunity to show it up in its true colors. The consequence is that lucky rascals, who escaped the death they richly de- served, are no longer reckoned heroes. They are banished from good society, they are approached with horror, and their company is always productive of unease and discomfort. They are rated for what they in reality are, genteel murder- ers, with the blood of fellow-men on their guilty heads, and crying out to Heaven for vengeance. A prize fight would not Seem to be a duel, with this for definition: ^'A combat with deadly weapons, fought in a private cause, without the sanc- tion of public authority, with prior agreement concerning weapons, seconds, place and time.'' DIVISION Three Parts— I, II, III I. Suicide. II. Self-defense. III. Duelling. PROOFS • I. 1°. An act subversive of man's duty to God is a sin against nature. But suicide is an act of the sort. Ergo. With Regard to the Major. Reason or nature insists on the observance of relations in force between God and rational creatures. These relations constitute duties, and violence done them is denominated a sin against nature. With Regard to the Minor. We know from experience, from man's inability to produce life, that God alone is the author and preserver of life. We know, further, that God bestows life with a definite end in view. It is to be scrupu- lously used as a means towards establishing in ourselves and others moral order, and compassing eternal happiness. He 214 SPECIAL ETHICS gives man no absolute dominion over his life, but only what philosophers term use-ownership. Man is therefore obliged to apply life to the uses for which it is plainly intended, and keep to his post just as long as God sees fit to continue his existence. The fact that man is vested with the physical power to put a period to his life, is no sign that God has con- ferred on him absolute dominion over it. The same argument would hold good in the case of a thief unjustly possessed of another's property, or a murderer sending some weaker victim to death. Man's ability to inflict death on himself is only another effect of God's determination to leave His creature absolute freedom of will, and another proof that willingness or refusal to serve is a matter entirely within the domain of man's unrestrained choice. 2°. An act subversive of man's duty to himself is a sin against nature. But suicide is an act of the kind. Ergo. With Regard to the Major. Man has duties towards his soul and body, and by deliberately cutting short his days he works irreparable injury to both. With Regard to the Minor. Life, because of the chance to hope, is always and under whatever circumstances better even for the body than death. As far as the mind is concerned, no ills of life can rob it of opportunities to improve and enjoy itself. No matter what misfortunes overtake a man, no matter what pains and diseases distress him, he has it always in his power to compass his supremely last end, which we long ago agreed to call eternal happiness. He has it always in his power to add by repeated acts of virtue to the degree of glory awaiting him after death. Fortitude, pa- tience, resignation to the Creator's will, all these meritorious acts put on new splendor, when exercised in the midst of trials and difficulties. Pagan poets and philosophers pause in their writings to contemplate and praise the heroism of suffering undergone in the cause of conscience; the sub- limity of manly virtue struggling against odds that would overwhelm natures of a weaker sort. Seneca thinks no spec- tacle so worthy of Jove as that presented by a just man, en- gaged in a battle with adversity. Horace has these lines, **Justum et tenacem propositi virum — Si fractus illabatur orbis — Impavidum ferient ruinae." ''If the world fell in PROOFS 215 ruins at his feet, the just and resolute man of principle would present a bold front to the crash." 3°. An act subversive of man's duty to society is a sin against nature. But suicide is an act of the kind. Ergo. With Regard to the Major. Man's birth into society gives rise to a kind of contract. Neighbors, banded together with him for the common good, tacitly agree to procure for him blessings absolutely out of reach in other contingencies. He, on his part, promises in effect to make due return to society for the advantages procured, and in cutting short his life he ignominiously falls away from his promise. With Regard to the Minor. Every member of society is in justice bound to contribute his share towards advancing the interests of the community of which he forms part. He proves recreant to this solemn obligation when from shame, cowardice, or impatience he sneaks from the ranks and lays new burdens on other men's shoulders. I say nothing of the infinite harm a suicide does his family and intimate friends. It may happen that he leaves a wife and children to starve, or eke out a miserable existence on the charity of others. Cer- tainly, he leaves as an inheritance to connections a blot of shame and a measure of disgrace, that no time or endeavor can wholly eradicate. Society has a right to expect from him an example of constancy, courage and magnanimity, and he slinks away conspicuous for weakness, cowardice, and a mean- ness of spirit without parallel. II. A legitimate means to the effective preservation of a well founded right is justifiable. But death inflicted in self- defense is a legitimate means to the effective preservation of a well founded right. Ergo. With Regard to the Major. A right vests its owner with the moral prerogative to enforce in others respect for its sacredness. It privileges the owner to use even physical violence, when men deaf to moral instincts attempt to assail it. A right would in any other supposition lose much of its efficacy, and would be of small practical utility. The world would be reduced to chaos, and injustice would everywhere prevail. With Regard to the Minor. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are in the words of our Constitution inalienable 216 SPECIAL ETHICS rights, and all three may be seriously interfered with by at- tempts from without. The death of the offender is at times the only effective bar against loss of life or property, and, as a consequence, desirable and morally correct. In such an event the transgressor, by deliberately putting himself in the wrong, forfeits his right to live, and, if killed, is done no injustice. Nobody can hesitate to regard the assailant 's death an effective means to the preservation of rights involved. That it is a legitimate means, is evident from the circumstance that the innocent party would have to otherwise yield up his own life, or some possession a little less valuable, merely out of kindness to the offender. But kindness or charity of that sort is prescribed by no law of God or man. Love of neighbor sins by excess, when it moves a man to love his neighbor more than himself. To sacrifice one's life for a neighbor's salvation is not to love the neighbor more than self. That would be to sacrifice one's salvation for a neigh- bor's. The killing of an aggressor is not always obligatory. III. A means founded on false principles, unsuited to the purpose intended, and wrong in itself, is highly absurd and contrary to the law of nature. But private duels are such a means. Ergo. With Regard to the Major. Ethics can borrow no princi- ples from falsehood, and wickedness shields itself behind ex- cuses full of error, and easily detected. It is the mark of a fool to employ in the prosecution of some work agencies cal- culated to operate against and not in favor of the agent's aim. Foolishness degenerates to heinous crime, when the methods adopted, besides being unequal to the end proposed, are at- tended by consequences as serious as those that accompany private duels. A lavish waste of life is a direct insult to Almighty God, and as such deserves the severest condemna- tion on the score of morality. With Regard to the Minor. The private duel had its origin among barbarians. The Lombards, with whom might always prevailed over right, introduced it throughout Europe. The Greeks and Romans, though acquainted with public duels, were strangers to the other custom. In its origin, therefore, this brutal practice rested on a notion subversive of all moral- ity and truth, the sacredness of physical as compared with PROOFS 217 moral force. It was in a manner a necessary growth of early- times, when law and order were subject to great upheavals, and tribunals of justice were little respected. The supersti- tious belief that God would interfere in an extraordinary way to save the innocent and destroy the guilty, was a new and grievous mistake added to the first blunder. In later times revenge was the element uppermost in the minds of com- batants, and duels were tolerated on the plea that individuals have a right to seek on their own private account satisfaction for injury done their honor. But no principle can be falser. No community, no society or state could long subsist, if such a mode of procedure were once sanctioned and came into general use. For the settlement of disputes and reparation of assailed honor we have courts by law established, and death would result to authority, were any other process introduced. Were duels not prohibited by conscience, by reason proclaim- ing the truth, enemies in private life would fall to butchering one another, and the State would become a wilderness. The absurdity of duelling is manifest from the fact that it shockingly fails to serve the purpose for which it was insti- tuted. Whether it be viewed as a means of repairing the wrong done a man's honor and reputation, or considered a possible means of revenge, it has no one -feature to recommend it. It is not an apt instrument for satisfaction, because the innocent party is just as likely to forfeit his life as the guilty. The event of the combat proves simply that the survivor man- aged his sword or pistol with more skill and dexterity than his victim. It certainly leaves the guilt or innocence of the sur- vivor as much an open question as it was before the meeting. If the innocent party falls, where is the revenge? Certainly the man guilty of the wrong done by the injury or insult had no claims to revenge, and entered not into the struggle to vindicate himself. Honor is not man's highest good. And true honor is not praise in the mouths of men, but inward consciousness of right conduct and a virtuous life. But the characteristic that emphatically condemns duelling is its own objective immorality. It involves a two-fold mal- ice. The duellist commits a double crime with all the malice of attempted murder and attempted suicide; and on no few occasions the two attempts become accomplished realities. 218 SPECIAL ETHICS The duellist, therefore, incurs whatever blame attaches to murder and suicide. In morality, because will is the pre- dominating factor, the difference between the attempt to do evil and the actual accomplishment of evil is accidental, and therefore negligible. PEINCIPLES— SUICIDE A. Distinguish between direct and indirect killing of self. Direct is suicide. Indirect is death foreseen in some act put for a legitimate purpose. Instances are, a fatal operation, jump from a high window in time of fire, nurse to plague- stricken. B. Destruction is supreme act of ownership. Man is vested with no such ownership in life, because its primary purpose is not man's advantage, but the greater glory of God. C. Instinct of self-preservation is index of God's will in the matter, and of His disapproval of suicide. D. God's permission can be presumed when serious spirit- ual dangers threaten, or life becomes oppressive. Answer: Life's chief purpose, the greater glory of God, never becomes impossible; and only in this case can He be supposed to give permission. With His grace, whatsoever spiritual danger can be met and overcome ; and patience is a virtue. E. Direct mutilation partakes of the malice of suicide. And yet man is the steward of his life, if not its absolute owner. He is allowed to preserve his life at the expense of a limb. The part ranks lower than the whole. P. Saints, who rushed to death, acted under inspiration, or through invincible ignorance, or committed indirect self- killing. G. Our second and third arguments against suicide pre- suppose the first. Thus, the drunkard committing suicide after a mission and a good confession would perhaps be con- sulting his own interests, but at the expense of God's rights as owner. With St. Paul we can long to be dissolved and be with Christ, but always in a spirit of resignation to God's will. H. We can reject a gift. Life is a gift. Ergo. PRINCIPLES 219 Answer: A gift meant primarily for our advantage and subject to absolute ownership, I grant ; a gift meant primarily for the giver's advantage, and subject to only use-ownership, I deny. N.B. Suicide is more than rejection, it is destruction of life. I. Hume argues thuswise. If we cannot interfere with the course of nature to shorten life, we cannot interfere with the course of nature to prolong it. Eadem est contrariorum ratio. Ergo, it would be wrong to push aside a falling stone that threatened destruction. Answer: Use-ownership empowers and obliges us to pre- serve or prolong our life. It vests us with no right to destroy same. That is the exclusive prerogative of absolute owner- ship. We are stewards, not proprietors. J. It is lawful to choose a lesser evil for the purpose of escaping a greater. Answer: The saying has some force in question of phys- ical evil, none in question of moral evil. In the case of self, it can never become necessary to commit one sin to avoid others. It is always quite possible to avoid all sin. In the case of others, it would be highly wrong to commit one sin to prevent them from committing a thousand. Moral evil is never justified by good. The end never 'justifies the means. Suicide would be the lesser evil only in the supposition that it is not sinful. The smallest sin is a greater evil than phys- ical evil of whatever magnitude. K. Suicide is wrong because the man does himself an in- justice. Nobody can do himself an injustice. Volenti nulla fit injuria. Answer: Suicide is an injustice to God as well as to its perpetrator. Man has duties towards himself, and to fall away from them is injustice. The saying admits of excep- tions, e.g., fraud in law. L. Hunters dispose of birds and beasts without ownership in them. Ergo, a pari, a man ought to be able to dispose of his life without ownership in it. Answer: Hunters have no particular or private owner- ship empowering them to exclude others. I grant. Hunters have no universal or general ownership as in things belong- S30 SPECIAL ETHICS ing to nobody in particulai*, I deny. Birds, beasts and all lower creation are by nature man's property to use them and destroy them as he sees fit. M. A criminal condemned to death may lawfully execute himself at the bidding of authority. Ergo. Answer: In suicide there is question not of public, but of private authority. Besides, some authors deny the legitimacy of every such proceeding, and they assign two reasons. The state is allowed to kill only as a measure of justice, and no- body can be expected to execute justice on himself. Nobody is a good judge in his own case, and therefore nobody is a fit executioner of himself. Every such arrangement is directly opposed to nature's instinct for self-preservation. Law must be possible. N. One must take means to preserve his life and health; generally speaking he need not take extraordinary means, such as occasion serious inconvenience. Serious inconvenience excuses from affirmative law, and God is a prudent law-maker. The penances and fasts of the saints are opposed to no law of nature, even though they weaken the body and shorten life. Spiritual good is of a higher order than life and health. The harm done the body and life is indirect, not direct. 0. It is often lawful to expose oneself to death, when death is not directly intended, and a proportionate cause justifies the proceeding. Soldiers taken prisoners are not allowed to kill themselves to escape doing service to their captors. Sailors are allowed to jump from a burning vessel into the sea to es- cape death by fire. A soldier in time of war is allowed to set fire to a ship or tower, though it means instant death for him- self, if the act causes heavy damage to the enemy. PRINCIPLES— SELF-DEFENSE A. This privilege of self-defense extends farther than life or property. A woman has a right to kill an assailant in de- fense of her chastity. Nobody has the right to kill another in defense of his honor or reputation. B. An insane or drunken person is an unjust assailant, not formally but materially. The child in a mother's womb is in no sense of the word an unjust assailant. The mother PRINCIPLES 221 causes the collision of rights, and must yield to the child. When violence is done her, neither she nor the child is to blame; and yet she comes closer to blame than the child for the condition of affairs, and must suffer accordingly. C. Self-defense procures damnation of the assailant. Ergo, wrong. Self-defense sacrifices greater good to lesser. Ergo, wrong. Answer: Essentially and of itself, I deny ; accidentally and by way of occasion, I grant. Charity forbids us to procure another's damnation the first way, not the second way, unless the thing can be avoided without great inconvenience, and the neighbor is in extreme need. The thing can be avoided only at the expense of the innocent party's life, and that would be a rather serious inconvenience. The assailant is not in ex- treme need, because he can refrain from attack. Besides, the common good must be taken into account. Without this priv- ilege life would be insecure. D. In the case of a drunken or mad assailant damnation would be sure. Ergo, wrong. Answer: No moral certainty on these three points, the ex- act spiritual condition of innocent party and assailant, and future salvation of party in the wrong, if spared for con- version. E. It is wrong to kill another in defense of reputation or honor, not because reputation is a smaller good than life, property is that, but because the moderamen inculpatae tu- telae is seldom or never verified. It is next to impossible to be sure of the serious harm attaching to slander, calumny and detraction before the harm is actually done, and then it is too late for defense ; defense is out of the question, revenge alone is in order. Besides, escape from the harm is within easy reach of less radical measures. Opposite doctrine would be open to great abuse, and, though no doctrine is to be con- demned because of extrinsic and accidental abuses, every doc- trine, accompanied like this by intrinsic and essential abuses, deserves condemnation. F. Reputation is a more precious possession than life. Ergo. Answer: Fundamentally taken, inner virtue and honesty, I grant; formally taken, outer esteem and credit, I deny. 222 SPECIAL ETHICS Reputation is the judgment passed by others on our conduct and affairs. Honor is outward manifestation of the good esteem we have of others. Fama from fando, to talk, the way men talk about us. G. The end never justifies the means. Ergo. Answer: Homicide is the means, and homicide is not in- trinsically evil. Otherwise capital punishment would be wrong. It is a physical evil and in itself morally indifferent. While the end never justifies an intrinsically evil means, it often justifies a physically evil and a morally indifferent means. H. God's right as Master of life and death is violated by the assailant, not by the innocent party. I. We must love our enemies, but not more than we love ourselves. In all honesty we could account ourselves worthy of no better fate, were we the unjust assailant. J. In this case, we should be in duty bound to kill our assailant. Answer: Homicide is an extraordinary means, and we are held to only ordinary means. Circumstances like the support of a family can render self-defense a serious obligation. K. Self-defense is not a morally bad act put to compass a good end. It is a morally good act, the preservation of one's life, and from this good act a physical evil follows, loss of life on the part of the unjust assailant. This death is not to be imputed to the innocent slayer, but to the unjust assailant. PRINCIPLES— DUELLING A. The duel is a species of defense against loss of prop- erty. To refuse a duel means dismissal from the army, re- duction in rank, and consequent loss of livelihood. Ergo. Answer: One must lose his livelihood rather than per- petrate an intrinsically evil deed. A duel contracts the mal- ice of attempted murder and attempted suicide, and both deeds are intrinsically evil. A duel is no defense against an unjust assailant; and, therefore, the attempt on a rival's life has all the malice of murder. It is no mere exposure of life to a risk justified by a proportionate cause ; and, therefore, it has all the malice of suicide. We are allowed to undergo dan- PRINCIPLES 223 ger to life with a proportionate reason. We are never al- lowed to seek danger to life with or without a proportionate reason. The duellist more than undergoes danger, he seeks it; because by the very seeking of danger he vindicates his reputation for bravery. A nurse in time of the plague merely exposes himself to danger, because his whole purpose is to minister to the sick, and danger contributes nothing to this purpose. In other words, the duellist makes risk to life a means to his end; the nurse employs other means like medi- cine, food, care and attention, and to these means danger is, much against his wishes, inseparably attached. B. The state has no right to authorize a duel for the set- tlement of justice between two disputants. It is the state's duty to settle such disputes on their merits, punishing the guilty and freeing the innocent. If unable to arrive at a de- cision, it must give the benefit of the doubt to the accused. The state is not allowed to arbitrarily treat guilty and inno- cent alike by exposing them to the same risk. The state ought to put down duelling, and not encourage it. The Trial by Ordeal was all wrong and the Church consistently opposed it. God has nowhere promised to favor the innocent in tests of the kind. C. Duels between students are sometimes against the law of nature, because they lead to serious wounds and mutilation. D. Though a prize-fight is not a duel properly so called, on occasions it would seem to be against the law of nature. E. It is lawful to use the one and fit means for defending honor. But the duel is such. Ergo. Answer: If the one and fit means is at the same time legi- timate, I grant ; otherwise, I deny. A duel is the one and fit means not of itself and by nature, but by accident and the wrong views of men. F. The duel is said to be wrong, because the good it effects is out of proportion with the evil. But the preservation of honor, rank and wealth is not out of proportion with risk to life. Ergo. Answer: Because the immediate effect is out of propor- tion, I grant; because the remote effect is out of proportion, I deny. The immediate effect is to show courage, and that is out of proportion. Honor, rank, property are but the remote 224 SPECIAL ETHICS effects and even they are out of proportion. Honor is two- fold, honor in root, virtue and other good qualities provoking the esteem of others; and formal honor, the good esteem of others. Honor in first sense is intrinsic to the man and su- perior to life. Honor in the second sense is extrinsic to the man and far inferior to life. Honor in root is the man's own affair and cannot be touched by the neighbor. Formal honor, the kind duels mend, is beyond a man 's own control and alto- gether dependent on the neighbor's whim and fancy. G. A duel in no way resembles self-defense, because prior agreement is of its essence. This circumstance separates the duel from an ordinary fight or shooting-match. H. The man who refuses to honor a challenge is a coward in the eyes of fools alone, and their opinion is no safe stand- ard of morality. Moral courage is of a higher order than physical. I. A woman is allowed to defend her honor to the extent of killing an assailant. Ergo. Answer: Honor in this case means more than mere es- teem ; it means bodily integrity or chastity. THESIS III A lie is always and of its very nature wrong. To safeguard a proportionate right, the use of a broad mental reservation is allowed. Jouin, 106-109 ; Rickahy, 224-237. QUESTION In this matter of man 's duty towards his neighbor, we single out the obligation of truthfulness and respect for the right of property in others. We treat these questions in separate theses, giving our first attention to the moral aspect of lying. Because truth is due the neighbor, and because men have an inviolable right to whatever they legitimately make their own, these two duties are branches or departments of the compre- hensive virtue called justice, that habit of mind and will eternally ready to give to everybody his due. We shall see later that the lie is formally a sin against truth, not against justice. DIVISION Thesis has two parts — I. The lie. II. The reservation. PART I. LIE— TERMS I. A Lie. The Latin verb mentiri, meaning to lie, fur- nishes us with a true definition of the thing. It is supposed to be a shortened form of the expression, contra mentem ire, or menti ire, and signifies to go against the mind. Hence, a lie is best described as locutio contra mentem, speech or language conveying the opposite of what we have in our mind. It is want of harmony between what we say and what we think. It is opposed to moral truth. Truth is threefold: logical, ontological and moral; and harmony with something is the generic notion common to all three. Logical is har- 225 226 SPECIAL ETHICS mony of mind with outside things, and affects our knowledge; ; ontological is harmony of things outside with the mind of their fashioner, and is said with reference to creatures and God; moral is harmony of language with thought, and is pe- culiar to intercourse of man with man. As we shall imme- diately see from St. Thomas, deception and intention to de- ceive play no part in the essential constitution of a lie. A material lie can be formal truth, and a formal lie can be ma- terial truth. No moral guilt, of course, attaches to a mere material lie, because moral blame attaches to the will alone, and in a material lie the will is right, the intellect is at fault. St. Thomas is a safe guide in philosophy, as well as in theology, and it may, therefore, be useful to here note down what he has to say on the subject. I quote, therefore, at some length from his Summary of Theology. In the 2nd of the 2nd part, quest. 110, art. I, he has what follows : *' Truth and falsehood are the proper objects of speech. A disordered will can in this matter have one of two intentions or both, either to communicate a falsehood or, as an effect of the communication, to deceive some one. If therefore these three elements are present, viz. : falsehood of communication, a wish to communicate falseness and the desire to deceive, then is the lie a material one, because a falsehood is communi- cated ; a formal one, because it is wilfully and knowingly com- municated; and effective, because deception is wilfully and knowingly intended. Nevertheless, the lie derives its essence from the second element, i.e., the wish to communicate false- ness, or a falsehood wilfully and knowingly communicated. Wherefore a lie receives its name in Latin from the fact that it is something said contrary to the mind's conviction. The circumstance that one designs to affect another 's opinion with falseness belongs not to the nature or essence of a lie, but to a further perfection of the same. Even so with things in nature, an object, when once it assumes the form, attains to its allotted place in the universe of existences, even though the effect generally accompanying the form is for the time being absent, as is evident for instance, in a thing of weight when forcibly held aloft. ' ' In the same part and question art. Ill in answer to the 4th difficulty he says: LIE AND DECEPTION 227 **The sinfulness of a lie is derived not from the damage alone which it does our neighbor, but from its want of har- mony with the order of reason." The learned Doctor 's words are quite plain. His idea seems to be this — A moral falsehood or a lie consists, as far as mat- ter goes, in want of harmony between what is in the mind and the language used to express it. It, therefore, differs from logical falsehood, which means a want of harmony be- tween some object in nature and the mind's conception of it. Hence a logical falsehood can readily enough be foundation for a moral truth ; and a logical truth, foundation for a moral falsehood. Yet, such a factor is the will in all questions of morality, that the material moral falsehood is blameless until the intention of communicating as true matter known and understood to be false accrues to it and by union completes, perfects and finishes the lie properly so called. He insists very much on this point because the introduction of a third element, viz., the deception of our neighbor, is made too much account of by some authors. The third element is a merely accidental circumstance, and contributes nothing to the naked essence of a lie. It is quite true that every lie will be accompanied by this third element or characteristic. For, it is difficult to conceive of a false communication known to be such, which will not at the same time procure, at least in intention, a neighbor's deception. But the lie is in full consummated, though this element be entirely wanting. As soon as the speaker attempts in his language to convey an untruth known to be such, so soon does he lie, whether he intends to deceive, or to amuse, or to help, or to injure his neighbor. The injury done his neighbor may be inseparably connected with the lie, and may have been uppermost in the liar's mind; but the injury derives its mal- ice not from the circumstance that it is a lie, but from the fact that it is a wounding of charity, something quite distinct from the virtue of truth. PROOF I. The lie has its intrinsic malice from this, that it is a falling away from our duty, not precisely to our neighbor, 228 SPECIAL ETHICS but to God and to ourselves. He has wisely ordained, for the good of society, that words should communicate ideas, which would otherwise be so much dead lumber, for purposes of use to the neighbor. He has imbedded within us an instinct, as present as the nose on our face, influencing us to cherish truthfulness in our dealings one with another. The liar reck- lessly tramples this ordinance of God, and stifles within him- self an instinct, which is among Heaven's purest and best gifts. Hence it is that God, who is avenger of broken ordi- nances and a jealous watcher of His gifts to man, punishes in a way known only to His victims the deliberate and down- right liar. I should call for no more potent proof of God's interference in this matter than that furnished by the blush of shame and the self-condemning perturbation, visible all over the countenance of a liar in the beginning of his career, or of the ingenuous youth whose poorly ordered self-love has ensnared him into a cowardly untruth. PRINCIPLES— LYING A. Hugo Grote, a Hollander, for the seeming purpose of de- ducing principles subversive of society, though flattering the self-love of a dangerous few, offers this wrong definition of a lie: ''A lie,'' he says, '4s language or a manifestation in conflict with a right, which exists and belongs to him to whom the language or manifestation is addressed or directed." Were this the proper notion of a lie, to say nothing of other absurdities painfully apparent in it, the liar's sin would in- herit its essence from the injury done his neighbor. The con- clusion, of course, would be that lies told by way of joke, helpful lies, and lies told by men in responsible positions to save a secret, are truths. We have already met this difficulty and shown conclusively enough that the idea of the injury done our neighbor by no means enters into the essential con- struction of a lie, and that it is an after and accidental effect, which may with the same influence on the act denominated a lie be present or absent. Besides, let the two latter species of a lie, countenanced by such false philosophers as Grote, become prevalent, and the intercourse of man with man will soon grow a scourge and a gift for which we should have PROOF AND PRINCIPLES 229 small occasion to thank Heaven. Remember, however, that our decided and clearly expressed conviction with regard to the intrinsic evil of lying is based not on the injury done the neighbor, but on this one circumstance that it is an abuse of language, that God and nature intended to be used as a vehicle of thought. The inconvenience done the neighbor is a weighty argument to deter men from lying, and perhaps exerts a more universally dissuasive influence than our meta- physical argument. Still it is an extrinsic element and may lead to false, unfounded notions. B. Milton, to prove that lying is at times admissible, asks this empty question: ''If all killing be not murder; nor all taking from another, theft; why must all untruths be lies?" The answer at once suggests itself. Man must not kill an- other when innocent, he must not take from another unless necessity is extremely urgent ; because in the one case and the other man has a right to his life and his property which he has nowise forfeited. It is not his nature to live forever but only as long as the body continues a fit tenement for the soul. Universal ownership is of nature and inamissible ; but particu- lar ownership is based on the man's own individual activity, open to loss, accidental in itself, and natural only inasmuch as it is rooted in the universal ownership which forever re- mains. But the sheriff commits no murder ; the wretch dying of hunger, no theft; because the capital offender against so- ciety loses all prior claims to life, the former owner of the property is, in case of another's dire necessity, divested of his rights, nature depriving the property of any particular and specific owner. The obligation a man owes his rational nature in point of telling the truth can never change. In other words man's claims to life and property do not turn directly and wholly on his rational nature. His bounden duty to tell the truth flows directly from his rational nature. C. One author insists very much on what he styles his meta- physical and absolute definition of a lie, viz., the privation of truth that is or ought to be due. The definition goes to greater lengths than is necessary, but its length does not lessen its correctness. It is emphatically correct. His ex- planation, however, of the word "due" is as emphatically incorrect, and evidently introduced to remove difficulties that 230 SPECIAL ETHICS were better removed otherwise. Of course, lying is the priva- tion of truth that is due ; but does it hence necessarily follow that lying is the privation of such truth only as is due the neighbor? Decidedly no! The truth in question may not perhaps be due my neighbor, but I owe it to the God who made me and to myself to use on all occasions language in exact accordance with the ideas in my mind. D. If deceit entered into the essential constitution of a lie, the above author's remarks about primary and secondary intentions, or secrecy and deceit, would be to the point. St. Thomas a short while ago made it clear that the lie exists in a finished state before deception enters upon the scene at all. Deception may or may not be present. Its influence on the lie as such is the same. Like all accidents it can, indeed, modify the evil done. It can make it greater by adding a sin of unkindness to that of cheating God's intent, but it cannot make a bit of language truth or falsehood. Like all things intrinsically or of their very nature evil, no conceiv- able intention can make a lie good and praiseworthy. Who can blaspheme without sinning, who can hate God without sinning? But this impossibility arises from the mere cir- cumstance that blasphemy and hatred of God are intrinsically evil. In the same way the second, third, fourth and all the intentions possible in a lie are swallowed up in the first, viz., the wilful and deliberate communication of falseness as truth. This intention comes first, this intention is the life and being of a lie, and not even the gaining of Heaven can justify it. E. A lie is wrong because it is an abuse of speech. But other abuses are not wrong. Ergo, neither is a lie for this single reason wrong. To walk on the hands is an abuse of the hands, but not therefore wrong. Answer: To walk on the hands is abuse of the hands in strict sense, I deny; in wide sense, I grant. Abuse in strict sense is use that destroys or hinders the purpose intended by nature. Walking on the hands leaves them wholly capable of the functions for which nature intended them. But a lie aims at the destruction of speech's natural purpose, the com- munication of our ideas or of truth. F. The purpose of speech is the good of society and the lie far from being a hindrance or a damage to society, is on PRINCIPLES 231 no few occasions a positive help and advantage to same. Ergo. A lie can at times happen to be the readiest means to avert a war or a murder. Answer: Material advantage is not the criterion of moral- ity, but the objective order of things. A lie is not primarily wrong because it works evil to society, nor is the truth pri- marily good because it is of advantage to society. Harmony with the purpose of speech and discord with same constitute the goodness of truth and the^ malice of lying respectively. Even material advantage can never in the long run result from an intrinsic evil like lying, and this is evident from the Law of General Consequences discussed in the matter of Utili- tarianism. But this is not the root-reason for the immorality of lying. If a lie were allowed, to avert some particular evil like war, or procure some particular good like a livelihood, its approbation would work to the complete destruction of credit among men, and that evil would be worse than a hun- dred wars. G. A lie might be permitted for very grave reasons, and within these limits all danger would be removed. Ergo. Answer: The danger would still stand, because in that case every individual would be absolute judge of the weight of his reasons; and credit would be universally shaken. Be- sides, the lie is intrinsically and of its very nature wrong, deriving its malice from no such accidental and extrinsic cir- cumstances as harm and advantage. H. Homicide in self-defense is right. Ergo, a pari, a lie in self-defense is right. Answer: Homicide is not an intrinsic evil, as is evident from war, hanging and self-defense. Homicide is changed to murder by the injustice done the person slain, and by the usurpation of God's rights as the Lord and Master of life and death. A lie is intrinsically wrong, and God Himself cannot make it right. God cannot bestow on others a right, in which He is not Himself vested. I. To lie is to talk otherwise than as you think. But the objector on a circle talks otherwise than as he thinks. Ergo. Answer: The objector talks as he thinks, but he is at the same time playing the part of another. Actor on stage. J. Communication of thought to another, whether by speech 232 SPECIAL ETHICS or other arbitrary signs, is of the essence of a lie. It takes two to converse, and in strict language nobody ever talks to or addresses himself. Therefore, a false statement shouted to vacancy or the wind is not in strict sense a lie. K. Lies are usually divided into jocose, officious, official and injurious. Not all jokes are jocose lies. Equivocation and mental reservation save many jokes from the malice of sin. Others, while plain misstatements, are so openly absurd that they can be rated mere material falsehoods, free from the guilt of a formal lie. Instances are, Washington is not dead. Miss Liberty is walking the harbor. And yet many jokes are lies, and their perpetrators incur all the blame of sin. Offi- cious lies are meant to be helpful, injurious are meant to harm. Outside of injurious lies, which wound charity as well as truth, the sin is never more than venial. Official lies are sin- ful subterfuges employed by men in authority to keep state secrets, and are no less blameworthy than the rest. L. The mouth that lies kills the soul. Wisdom 1-11. Ergo. Answer: Formally, I deny; preparatively, I grant. PART II— RESERVATION II. We now take up a few difficulties, which to some ap- peared so formidable, that only a wide departure from phi- losophy's common notion regarding a lie seemed capable of solving them. TERMS Reservation. Everybody grants that there are secrets with- out end, which must under no consideration be delivered over to unauthorized enquirers. Philosophers are a unit on this point. But how to perform this nice and difficult duty with- out at the same time wounding truth, is a task nowise easy. Deep silence will not, it is quite certain, always extricate the honest man from his straits. His secret may be natural, or a secret of promise, or a secret of trust. We may suppose, too, that matters are come to such a head that a direct answer alone will satisfy the questioner. An innocent mental reser- MENTAL RESERVATION 233 vation seems to be on such an occasion the only means of escape. It can be reconciled, too, with our rigorous doctrine on lying, and needs no such laxity of principle as is advocated by some authors. In mental reservation several very impor- tant items must be carefully attended to, not precisely because a lie is told, but because even though the truth is told, such manner of telling the truth is full of danger to mutual con- verse, to the union of families, and to the well-being of the state. Observe, therefore, that the notion uppermost with us in thus hedging about mental reservation with cautious con- ditions is not at all to make lies less frequent, for on no occa- sion do we consider a lie lawful, but only to shield man in his dealings with his fellows. There are, then, two sorts of mental reservation, one always to be abominated, the other to be sometimes commended. They are the pure and the broad. He uses a mental reserva- tion, who, when conveying information, so manipulates his words, that the listener will in all probability derive from them only false notions. The pure mental reservation fur- nishes the listener with no external clew to the truth, and renders it absolutely impossible for him to escape the mis- take ; and is in simple language a lie, under no circumstance excusable. Pure means language of itself, and from present circum- stances, restricted to one meaning, out of harynony with mind of speaker, in harmony with same when something retained in the mind is added, e.g., ' ' Have you eaten anything ? ' ' "Noth- ing at all," understanding meat. Broad means language externally conveying the speaker ^s true mind, intelligible from circumstances, in spite of a cer- tain ambiguity and obscurity. Listener is cause per se of deception, not talker. Proximate end is to convey mind. Remote is to hide truth. Remote end must be legitimate. Hence no broad in contracts, questions of justice, courts of law. Only proportionate cause justifies. Protestants are fond of reproaching us with the laxity of our moral theologians in this matter of mental reservations. But, whereas our moralists utterly condemn the pure, to ad- mit the broad mental reservation only for the safeguarding of a proportionate right, Cranmer, Henry VIII 's archbishop 234 SPECIAL ETHICS of London, when taking his oath of fealty to the Pope, con- trived a pure mental reservation, a lie, and so stained his im- mortal soul with a perjury unexampled. PROOF The broad mental reservation, available only when great interests are at stake, not in every trifling affair, leaves it pos- sible though difficult for the listener to still detect, if he proceeds with prudence, the speaker's meaning. In other words, the speaker returns to the questioner a double answer, a jumble of what is in his mind and what is outside of it. That part of his answer, which is language in harmony with his mind, he considers, and every fair-minded man must con- sider, a sufficiently truthful answer to the question; that which is wide of the mark may be considered something super- added, not intended indeed to form part of the answer to the enquiry made, but to some enquiry that might have been made. If the imprudent listener confounds one part with the other, he has himself to blame ; and no great unkindness is done him. But the lie is absent, not because no injury is directly done the neighbor, but because the group of words can be con- strued into a meaning in perfect harmony with the speaker's mind. This I recognize as the limit to which mental reservation can be pushed, when it is borne in mind that only motives as serious and grave as the saving of an innocent life, the reten- tion of a close secret, liable if revealed to undo somebody, the life of a state, can counterbalance, the baneful effects not of a lie ; for, I repeat it, no lie is told ; but of the apparent unkind- ness contained in the very act of giving to the person ad- dressed an opportunity to go astray, and fervently wishing that he may do so. The preservation of a cigarette is not motive enough for a broad mental reservation. For a pure mental reservation, between which and a lie I can see no difference, even the preservation of the innocent is not mo- tive enough. Remark, however, that, when an innocent life is at stake, common charity obliges you to take all legitimate means to its defense; and, therefore, common charity im- peratively demands a broad mental reservation, that namely PROOF AND PRINCIPLES 235 which through the agency of some external sign leaves it pos- sible for the person deceived to avoid deception. PRINCIPLES— RESERVATION A. About the prisoner at the bar in the civil court of jus- tice, this solution appears most praiseworthy and is wholly satisfactory. Words are but arbitrary signs. When, there- fore, the expression, ''Not guilty," has come by the common consent of mankind to mean, "Not proved guilty," a man, though actually guilty, says nothing contrary to what he has in his mind when he answers, ''Not guilty." For, even in his own mind he is not proved guilty, and according to com- mon usage or agreement, which alone imparts meaning to words, he has made no other statement. B. The priest is bound by his duty to an authority far higher than that attached to any civil court of justice to pre- serve inviolate a confessional secret. No sane, unprejudiced judge will require at his hands the communication of such a secret. But there are on record instances of bigoted and unscrupulous ministers of the law, who endeavored to wrest from the priest's bosom truths more sacred than fall to the lot of physicians, lawyers or friends. In such cases it is a sacred duty imposed upon the priest to maintain even unto death his seal of secrecy. He is not, however, in any sense of the word permitted to lie. He is at liberty to profess that he knows nothing whatever of the matter in question, but must contrive to give his hearers an opportunity to under- stand, if they will, that he represents a twofold character, that of the priest or representative of Christ, and that of the citizen or subject of the law. He must, without at all com- promising his penitent or endangering the seal of the confes- sional, advertise the questioner of his determination and right to answer all enquiries put to him as a citizen or witness in his capacity of man or of individual of the community, not in his capacity of representative and vice-gerent of God. His answer, therefore, which intimates entire ignorance of the subject under discussion, is not language out of harmony with what he has in his mind, and therefore not a lie. As citizen, he has no knowledge whatever of the point in question ; and 23t SPBGEAL ETHIGS ht ImalgBifted Ikis detcnunatkia and lif^ to ipeik in that tmpmaltj on^. As fv as in liim Ucb, Iub language ahould also QoiiTqr to tibe minds of liis bearers an exact represents- of vbat ke widMS to eoHununieate. If tliey foolishly that his denial extends also to knowledge acq[iiired in tibe eonfesBbaal, they ha^e to Uame aaij thenselYes for their ignorances In faet» if. after takinf^ the ground that he is hff ri^ divine entitled to aesuBe these two charaeters of ■an or citiaen and T i c e - gerc nt of CSnist, he should affirm as a wifcnesB on the stand aeqinaintanee with the secrets of Gonfiecsion, he would be guilty of apeecb oat of harmony with what he has in Ins mind, Le^ of a lie. C In point of li nt idninii the seercts of lawyos, j^ysiciaiis next to those of the priest. ProfeBsionsl idiose futh is ^i^ited to £riends» have dotieB in this regard to wbidi tbcy mnst nowise prove ddinquent. Xcw eitl i el cag, socb men, tboof^ tb^ be lawyers, mnst cherish tnith in their ereryday dealings with themselves and others ; thar rfo te, tb^ are not allowed to save a secret at the of truth. But no sodi nnlawfol proceeding is neces- The secret can be saved without any baim to troth. For, apart from profesaonal knowledge which he is by no means sspposed to rereal to an unauthoritative enquirer, the ndnd of the lawyer, physician or friend is a perfect Uank the infocmation desired. An imprudent man may and may so miseonstrue the rei^y made by the lawyer or friend as to &ncy that, when be pr«> €i4y partial ignorance or ign