-8£jtCs«r^-aay.i UC-NRLF B 3 T2M M23 STUDIES IN THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC BY THE SAME AUTHOR STUDIES IN HEGELIAN COSMOLOGY. 8s. net. A COMMENTAEY ON HEGEL'S LOGIC. 12s. net. THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE. Vol. I. 22s. 6d. net. (Cambridge University Press) SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION. 10s. 6d. net. HUMAN IMMORTALITY AND PRE-EXISTENCE. (Reprinted from " Some Dogmas of Religion.") 2s. net. (Edward Arnold) STUDIES IN THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC BY JOHN McTAGGART ELLIS McTAGGART LITT.D. CAMBRIDGE, LL.D. ST ANDREWS, FELLOW AND LECTURER OF TRINITY COLLEGE IN CAMBRIDGE, FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY SECOND EDITION CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1922 CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS C. F. CLAY, Manager LONDON : FETTERLANE, E.C.4 NEW YORK: THE MACMILLANCO. BOMBAY \ CALCUTTA [ MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd. iMADRAS J TORONTO : THE MACMILLAN CO. OP CANADA, Ltd. TOKYO : MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA ALL BIGHTS RESERVED Fir»t Edition, 1896 Second Edition, 1922 TO MISS FRANCES POWER COBBE WITH MUCH GRATITUDE 583471 PREFACE THE first four chapters of this book are based on a disserta- tion submitted at the Fellowship Examination of Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1891. The fourth and fifth chapters, nearly in their present form, were pubhshed in Mind (New Series, Nos. 1, 2, 8, and 10). A part of the second chapter appeared in the Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale for November 1893. In quoting from the Smaller Logic and the Philosophy of Spirit, I have generally availed myself of Professor Wallace's valuable translations. I am most deeply indebted to Professor J. S. Mackenzie, of University College, Cardiff, for his kindness in reading the proof- sheets of these Studies, and in assisting me with many most helpful suggestions and corrections. The changes in the second edition are not numerous. When they are more than verbal, I have called attention to them in notes. J. E. McT. December, 1921. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE DIALECTIC PAGE 1. The logical connection of categories ...... 1 2. The form of this connection is progressively modified . . 2 ^_^_^. The dialectic is a process of reconstruction .... 3 ^yi. Which takes place by alternate production and removal of contradictions ......... 4 5. An objection to this raised by Hartmann ..... 6 ^. In what sense the dialectic may be said to be objective . . 6 J. The imperfection of finite things does not involve, for Hegel, the objective reality of the dialectic as a process .... 7 8. The dialectic does not violate the law of contradiction . . 8 9. The importance of the idea of negation is only secondary . . 10 ^^0. The relation of the dialectic to ordinary thought . . .11 11. Hartmann' s criticisms of this relation 12 12. The same continued 14 '13. The dialectic must prove its validity to the Understanding . 14 ^^4. The relation of the dialectic to experience 16 15. The relation of the dialectic to experience further defined . . 17 J 6. The basis upon which the dialectic works is the nature of ex- perience 19 17. The postulate which it assumes is the vaUdity of the category of Being 19 18. And the denial of this postulate is contradictory ... 20 19. The argument of the dialectic is transcendental . . .21 20. The epistemological result of the dialectic 22 21. The negative effects of this 22 22. Its positive effects . . . . . . . . .23 23. We are not entitled to consider pure thought as independent of experience .......... 24 24. The relation of Hegel's epistemology to Kant's . . . .25 ^&5. The ontological result of the dialectic — ambiguity of the phrase 26 26. Hegel's deduction of Nature and Spirit from the Logic . . 27 27. This deduction does not treat pure thought as independent of experience .......... 28 2%. The importance of the ontological result of the dialectic . . 29 29. Comparison of Hegel with his immediate predecessors in philo- sophy 30 TABLE OF CONTENTS ix CHAPTER II DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DIALECTIC PAGB 30. Introductory 32 A 31. Trendelenburg's view that the dialectic is per se sterile, and gains its advance by illegitimate appeals to experience ... 32 32. The errors involved in this view .33 33-43. Passages from the Encyclopaedia bearing on this view . . 35 44. The true relation of the dialectic to experience is not made clear by Hegel 48 45. Reasons for this 48 46. Hegel's assertion that the dialectic is without presupposition . 50 B 47. The relation of the Absolute Idea to experience . . .51 48. The Absolute Idea transcends contingency, but not immediacy 52 49. Hegel's definition of the Absolute Idea ..... 53 c 50. Professor Seth's view as to the ontological claims of the dialectic 54 61. Hegel's description of the transition from Logic to Nature and Spirit ........... 55 52. The interpretation placed on this by Professor Seth ... 56 53. Who confuses two charges — that Hegel tried to synthetically deduce Nature and Spirit from thought, and that he tried to deduce Existence from Essence ...... 58 54. But the first of these does not involve the second ... 60 55. Hegel would have been wrong in trying to do the first . . 61 56. But the arguments in support of the theory that he did try are untenable .......... 62 57. And Hegel says himself that his deduction is of a different nature 63 58. There is a deduction, but it is not purely synthetic ... 64 59. The treatment of Contingency in the Logic as bearing on this question ........... 65 60. The second charge — deducing Existence from Essence. We cannot do this 67 61. But if the deduction of Nature and Spirit is purely analytic, this second charge must fall to the ground ..... 67 62. The meaning of the phrase "absolute" as used by Hegel of his own philosophy 68 x^: X TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 63. Hegel's treatment of Kant's objections to the ontological argument .......... 69 64. It depends on the different definitions of God adopted by Hegel and Kant 70 65. Professor Seth's assertion that Hegel depreciates the individual 72 66. And that his Absolute Spirit is a mere abstraction ... 74 CHAPTER III THE VALIDITY OF THE DIALECTIC 67. Introductory 76 A Mr Balfour's criticism of transcendental arguments ... 76 69. Which rests on a confusion of the different senses in which we may be said to be conscious of an element in experience . 78 70. The same subject continued 79 3^- The justification of the Reason to the Understanding. The -"""^ longing for the Absolute is not merely ethical or emotional 80 72. The Understanding demands a complete explanation of the universe 82 73. Which it carmot itself supply 82 74. Since many of its categories lead to contradictions ... 84 ,75. And this must lead to scepticism; not, as Hartmann suggests, to y/^ separation between thought and being ..... 85 76. The Reason can supply such an explanation .... 86 77. Which the Understanding must therefore accept ... 87 78. The Understanding and the Reason are not separate and un- cormected faculties 88 B 79. We are justified in assuming the validity of the category of Being as a starting-point 89 80. As to the process — first from a synthesis to the new thesis . 90 81. The process from thesis to antithesis. Neither sterile nor em- pirical 91 82. The consideration of the categories in detail is impossible here . 92 ?3 The process from thesis and antithesis to synthesis ... 93 ^^4. Hartmann's objection to the possibihty of this .... 94 j^'^ 85. Trendelenburg's objection that the dialectic is merely a history of subjective knowledge ........ 95 86. But, although it only retraces abstractions, it gives new know- ledge 97 87. And reverses the order of explanation current in science . . 98 88. Nor is it merely a process of subjective thought ... 99 .^. TABLE OF CONTENTS xi PAGE 89. The dialectic does not displace the finite sciences, but does not depend on them 100 90. Though an advanced state of the finite sciences may be an aid in discovering the dialectic . . . . . . .101 91. The idea of Motion — according to Trendelenburg introduced empirically in the category of Becoming .... 103 92. But in reahty it is deducible by pure thought .... 103 93. Nor does Becoming specially involve time or space • . 105 94. Nor is it, if taken correctly, much more concrete than Being . 106 c 95. The ontological validity of the dialectic. The denial of the thing-in-itself is justifiable ....... 107 96. ]VIr Schiller's objection that thought may be inadequate to reality 109 97. Unjustifiable, since reality itself can only be known to us by thought 110 98. Transition from Logic to Nature and Spirit . . . .112 99. Thought can never be self-subsistent, but must have a given datum . . . . . . . . . . .113 100. The transition might have been made differently. Importance of this 114 101. Lotze's criticism of "the identity of Thought and Being." Ambiguity of this phrase . . . . . . .115 102. Lotze seems to take it as meaning that Being is identical with' what is thought about Being 116 103. In this sense Hegel did not hold the doctrine . . . .117 104. He held it in the sense that Being is identical with what it thinks: — perhaps he was mistaken . . . . .117 105. The essence of Idealism is the assertion that Being is rational, not that it is Thought 118 CHAPTER IV THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHOD 106. Introductory 119 A 107. Hegel's own expressions on this subject . . . . .119 108. As the process continues the categories become less stable and self-contained . . . . . . . . .121 109. And the antithesis marks an advance from the thesis . . 122 1 10. This second change is connected with the first . . . 123 111. The first is explicitly mentioned by Hegel. The second is not 124 xii TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 112. The change seems to be continuous from category to category 125 113. Such a change in the method of the dialectic is antecedently probable 127 114. And it is antecedently probable that it will be continuous . 128 115. The change consists in combining the search for completeness and the search for harmony, which were originally separate stages 129 116. Hence the change does not destroy the validity of the process . 131 117. The subordinate importance of negation in the dialectic is thus made still clearer than before 131 B 118. Hegel asserts that the dialectic process is an adequate analysis of the Absolute Idea 133 119. But this we now see reasons to doubt 133 120. Hegel's own premises lead us, on this point, to reject his con- clusion 135 121. The dialectic thus becomes, in a sense, subjective . . . 136 122. Owing to an inevitable characteristic of our thought . . 138 123. It does not give a fully adequate account of its own natiu"e . 139 124. This does not diminish its power of demonstrating that the Absolute Idea alone is completely valid of reaUty . . 140 125. Nor of determining the relative truth of the different categories 142 126. Nor are we left ignorant of the natiu-e of the Absolute Idea . 142 127. The essential and unessential elements in the process . . 144 128. The dialectic process may be looked on as primarily con- tinuous. This is confirmed by the inequahty of the sub- divisions of the Logic ........ 145 129. And by the possibility of discovering direct dialectic connection between divisions which are not the lowest .... 146 130. The effect of this with regard to any error in the detail of the dialectic 147 c 131. The triad of Logic, Nature, and Spirit 147 132. This transition is made by a triad of the Notion- type . . 148 133. But it could be made by a triad of the Being-type . . . 150 134. This confirms the view taken above of the change of method . 151 135. The alternative adopted by Hegel was on the whole the best . 152 136. But the other has some advantages . . . . .153 137. Which Hegel's does not share 153 138. The same continued 154 139. Conclusion 155 TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii CHAPTER V THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME A PAGE 140. Difficulties in the way of taking the development of the dialectic in time as ultimately real 157 141. Such a process in time must be finite in length . . . 158 142. And the question would arise: Why did it begin where it did? 159 143. Which cannot be avoided by referring it to a timeless basis . 161 144. Nor by the suggestion that time only begins when change begins 162 145. Nor by arguing that the idea of finite time cannot be con- tradictory, since that of infinite time is impossible . . 163 146. We must rather suppose that the idea of time is not ultimate . 164 147. The lower stages of the dialectic cannot exist by themselves, since they are contradictory ...... 164 148. And we saw above that the dialectic must be a process of reconstruction ......... 166 149. Hegel's own language is against the theory of development in time 167 B 150. But the rejection of this theory involves that the universe is now perfect 169 151. Which involves us again in serious difficulties , . . 170 152. Hegel's answer that evil is a delusion is unsatisfactory . . 171 153. Since on his theory a delusion could never be completely rational .......... 172 154. The suggestion that the universe is perfect sub specie aetemitatis 173 155. It is more effective than Hegel's own answer .... 174 156. And must not be confounded with the theory that imperfec- tions of the parts disappear in the whole .... 175 157. But it was not Hegel's own view — nor wiU it solve the difficulty 176 158. Which seems to be insoluble ....... 177 159. And naturally so, since it is, in fact, the problem of the origin of evil 178 C 160. Can any other theory extricate us from the difficulties which are involved in the assertion that the universe is eternally perfect? 180 161. Not the theory that it is fundamentally irrational . . . 181 162. An absolute duaUsm is impossible 182 163. And, if possible, would not solve the difficulty, supposing one side predominated 184 xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 164. Or supposing both were exactly balanced .... 184 165. We should succeed no better with the theory that reality is totally indifferent to reason 185 166. Or indifferent to the higher categories 186 167. And to take refuge in scepticism proves equally impossible . 187 168. Oiu' diificulty does not arise from a reductio ad absurdum . 188 169. And we have no more right to reject the dialectic than we have to reject the arguments against it . . . . .189 170. We may hope for a synthesis of the opposed positions . . 190 171. Since they are opposed as contraries, not as contradictories . 191 172. But we do not know of what nature such a synthesis could be, nor have we any positive evidence for its existence . . 192 173. We should have such evidence if we knew that the detail of the dialectic were correct throughout 193 174. Conclusion 194 175-178. Note on Mr Schiller's paper "The Metaphysics of the Time-Process" 195 CHAPTER VI THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC A 179. Hegel makes the highest stage in the nature of Spirit to be Philosophy 201 180. His account of this 202 181. Philosophy must be considered to be merely a state of know- ledge 203 182. Philosophy, as we have it at present, is clearly not adequate for this position 204 183. And Hegel never attempted to deduce facts from the nature of pm'e thought ......... 205 184. Nor will it suffice to make philosophy end by proving the necessity of philosophy 206 185. Taking a wider meaning of philosophy — ^we shall never be able to dispense with immediate data ...... 207 186. But a perfect system of knowledge is conceivable, in which contingency vanishes ........ 208 187. Such an ideal is remote, but not contradictory . . . 209 188. It would leave no question unanswered, except Why is the universe as a whole what it is? — which is an unmeaning question 211 TABLE OF CONTENTS XV B PAGE 189. Even such knowledge, however, is not a complete expression of Spirit 212 190. For volition is not reducible to knowledge .... 213 191. Though both of them may perhaps be synthesised in a higher unity 214 192. Nor are pleasure and pain reducible to knowledge . . . 214 193. Though, like volition, they are inseparable from it . . . 215 194. But can knowledge, as such, be even part of the true nature of Spirit? 216 195. It postulates complete unity and differentiation between subject and object . . . . . . . .216 196. The TAis in knowledge 217 197. Which is essential to knowledge, and which knowledge must always regard as aUen . . . . . . . .218 198. The This prevents knowledge reaching complete unity and differentiation 219 199. Thus knowledge can never express quite adequately the harmony of the universe ....... 220 200. Nor does the possibihty of self-knowledge get over the difficulty 221 201. This defect is the reason why we cannot cease to ask. Why is the vuiiverse as a whole what it is? — though we know the question to be unmeaning ....... 222 202. We find some support for this view in the Logic . . . 223 203. Since philosophy there comes under the subordinate category of Cognition 225 204. Hegel's treatment of the last stages of the Philosophy of Spirit is imperfect ......... 226 205. Philosophy should rather be part of the antithesis — not the synthesis . 227 206. Conclusion 229 CHAPTER VII THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC 207. Introductory 230 208. The application of the dialectic to determine the nature of ultimate reaUty . . . . . . . . .231 209. The practical importance of this 232 210. The apphcation of the dialectic to the interpretation of the facts round us 233 211. This is the part of Hegel's system which is now most generally received 234 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 212. But it seems doubtful if it is valid 235 ,213. The first difficulty — we cannot recognise theses, antitheses, or syntheses, except in relation to one another . . . 236 214. Thus we shall require points independently fixed to begin from or end at. We have such in the Logic .... 237 215. But not in the appUcations of the Logic ..... 238 216. The terms of which, till seen in relation to each other, only differ quantitatively ........ 238 217. The initial point of the Philosophy of Nature, and the final point of the Philosophy of Spirit, are exceptions . . . 239 218. Attempts to fix the extreme points in the Philosophies of Nature, Spirit, and Religion ...... 240 219. in the History of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Law . 241 220. and in the Philosophy of History. A criticism by Lotze . . 242 221. The reason of the exceptions mentioned in Section 217 . . 243 _^222. The second difficulty. In Religion, History, Law, and Philo- sophy, the dialectic process is affected by external influences 245 223. And, in another manner, in Natiure and Spirit . . . 246 224. We know that there is a dialectic process in facts, but are unable to trace it . . 247 225. The third difficulty. The extent and intricacy of the subject- matter 248 226. These difficulties can be avoided by taking abstract qualities, rather than actual facts, as the terms of our dialectic . . 249 227. As in Hegel's treatment of Innocence, Sin, and Virtue . . 251 228. Or of the conception of Dying to live 252 229. But the main practical interest of philosophy lies in upholding the abstract assertion that reaUty is rational and righteous 252 230. For this cannot be done at all, except by philosophy . . 253 231. Nor is this view imduly abstract 255 y CHAPTER I THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE DIALECTIC 1 . Hegel's primary object in his dialectic is to est ablish the existence of a logical connection between the various categ ories which are involved in the constitution of experien ce. He teaches tnat this connec tion is of such a kind that any categor y, if s crutinised with sufficient care and attention , is found to lead o n to another, and to involve^it, in snnh a manner t|^^ ,|. f ip, f^f,|,^.Tr>pf. t o^use the first of any subje ct while we refuse to use the second of the same subject results in a contradiction. The category thus* reached leads on in a similar way to a third, and the process continues until at last we reach the goal of the dialectic in a ■ category which betrays no instability. - — ^ If we examine the process in more detail, we shall find that it advances, not directly, but by moving from side to side, like a ship tacking against an unfavourable wind. The simplest and best known form of this advance, as it is to be found in the earlier transitions of the logic, is as follows. TJie examinatiofr-ef -a- c e rtain category leads us to the conclusion thaLt, if we p redicate if/ of any subject, we are compelled by consistency to predicate of the same subject the contrary of that category. This brings us to an absurdity, since the predication of two contrary attributes of the same thing at the same time violates the law of contra- diction. On examining the two r:nntrnry p7-p,(^jp.a.tps fnrf-.lipr, they are seen to be ■Capable of reconciliation in a J^gher_categor^ which combines the contents of both of them, not merely placed side by side, but..absoxbed,.iiito. a wider idea, as moments or aspects of which they can exist without contradiction. This idea of the synthesis of opposites is perhaps the most characteristic in the whole of Hegel's system. It is certainly one of the most difficult to explain. Indeed the only way of grasping what Hegel meant by it is to observe in detail how he uses it, and in what manner the lower categories are partly altered and partly preserved in the higher one, so that, while their opposition ,.if-werat \ \ 2 THE GENERAL NATURE [CH. vanishes, the significance of both is nevertheless to be found in the unity which follows. Since in this way, and in this way only so far as we can see, two ^ntrary cat egories can be simultaneously true of a subj.ect, and since we must hold these two to be simultaneously true, we arrive at the conclusion that whenever we use the first category we shall be forced on to use the third, since by it alone can the contradictions be removed, in which we should otherwise be in- volved. This third category, however, when it in its turn is viewed as a single unity, similarly discloses that its predication involves that of_its contrary^ and the Thesis and Antithesis thus opposed have again to be resolved in a Syntheses. Nor can we rest any- where in this alternate production and removal of contradictions until we reach the end of the ladder of categories. It begins with tl;e cate gory of Pure Being, the simplest idea of the human mi nd. I t ends with the category which Hegel declares to be th e highest — t heldea which recognises itself in all things. 2, It must be remarked that the type of transition, which we have just sketched, is one which is modified as the dialectic advances. It is only natural, in a system in which matter and form are so closely connected, that the gradual changes of the matter, which forms the content of the system, should react on the nature of the movement by which the changes take place. Even when we deal with physical action and reaction we find this true. All tools are affected, each time they are used, so as to change, more or less, their manner of working in the future. It is not surprising, therefore, that so delicate a tool as that which is used by thought should not remain unchanged among changing materials. "The abstract form of the continuation or advance" says Hegel "is, in Being, an Qtbe3^Qr_.antithesis)jin^tmnsit^ anotJigr; ir^ th e Essenpe , showing or, reflection in its opposite; in ti ie Noti on, the distinction^ of the individual from the uni- versality, which continues itself as such into, and is as an identity with, what is distinguished from it^." This indicates a gradual increase in the directness of the advance, and a diminished im- portance of the movement from contrary to contraxy. But this ^ Encyclopcedia, Section 240. OF THE DIALECTIC point, which Hegel leaves undeveloped, will require further con- sideration i. 3. The ground of the necessity which the dialectic process claims cannot, it is evident, lie merely in the category from which we start. For in that case the conclusion of the process could, if it were valid, have no greater content than was contained in the starting point. All that can be done with a single premise is to analyse it, and the mere analysis of an idea could never lead us necessarily onwards to any other idea incompatible with it, and therefore could never lead us to its contrary. But th^ (^alectic claims to^j)2:QG£ed,iri:)m thB.lQWJQi.±Q..±ha higher, and it claims to _add^ to our knowled^e^ and not merdy.iQ. expound it . At the same time it asserts that no premise other than the validity of the lower category is requisite to enable us to affirm the validity of the higher. ^^ The solution of this difficulty, which has bee5.-the-^EQLy.«:a of many attacks on Hegel, lies in the fact t hat/p.e dialectic\iust be looked on as a process , not of constructiqitH ^ttt;^gr^econ- struction . If the lower categories lead on to the higher, and these to the highest, the reason is that the lower categories have no independent existence, bjit arp. only a.bstra.p,t,in|]pi frnn^ thp highest . It is this alone which is independent and real. In it all one-sidedness has been destroyed by the successive reconcilia- tion of opposites. It is thus the completely concrete, and for Hegel the real is always the concrete. Moreover, according to Hegel, the real is always the completely rational. (''The con- summation of the infinite aim... consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem as yet unaccomplished^.") JJ^qw no category except the highest can be completel y rational., since e very lower one involves its contrary . The Absolute Ide a is p resent to us in all reality , in all the phenomena of experience , a nd in our own selves. EverYwhere it is the soul of all reality . But although it is always present to u s, it is not always explicitly present . In the content of consciousness it is present implicitly. But we do not always attempt to unravel that content, nor are our attempts always successful. Very often all that is explicitly before our minds is some finite and incomplete category. When ^ Chap. rv. ^ Enc. Section 212, lecture note. t yji^aJSJ-^ THE GENERAL NATURE [CH. this is so, the dialectic process can begin, and indeed must begin, if we are sufficiently acute and attentive, — because the ideal which is latent in the nature of all experience, and of the mind itself, forbids us to rest content with the inadequate category. The in- complete reality before the mind is inevitably measured against the complete reality of th§ mind itself, and it is in this process that it betrays its incompleteness, and demands its contrary to supplement its one-sidedness. " Before the mind there is a single conception, but the whole mind itself, which does not appear, engages in the process, operates on the datum, and produces the result!." 4. Thg dialecti,c„prjocess_ ig^ not a mere addition to thfi__con- c eption before _as of one casually^ selec^ed^moment after another, but obeys a definite law. The reason of this is that at any point the finite category explicitly before us stands in a definite relation to the complete and absolute idea which is implicit in our con- sciousness. Any category, except the most abstract of all, can be analysed, according to Hegel, into two others, which in the unity of the higher truth were reconciled, but which, when separated, stand in opposition to each other as contraries. If abstraction consists in this separation, then, when we are using the most abstract of the categories, we fall short of the truth, because one side of the completely concrete truth has been taken in abstraction, and from that relatively concrete truth again one side has been abstracted, and so on, until the greatest abstraction possible has been reached. It must therefore cause unrest in the mind which implicitly contains the concrete whole from .which it was abstracted. And through this unrest the imperfection will be removed in the manner described above, that is, by affirming, in the first place, that contrary category, the removal of which had been the last stage of the abstraction, then by restoring the whole in which those two opposites had been reconciled, and so on. Thus the first and deepest cause of the dialectic movement is t he instability of all finite categori es, due to their imperfect ature. The immediate TQi}\}] t of this instability is the production o f^ cont r adictio ns. For, as we have already seen, since the im- * Bradley's Logic, Book in. Part i. Chap. 2, Section 20. I] OF THE DIALECTIC 5 perfect category p.nrlp.a.vnnr!^ \,q fp.tnrn to thp. more r.onnr gtfi unity of which it is one side, it is found to involve the other side of that un ity, w hich i s its own contrar y. And, again, to the existence of the contradiction we owe the advance of the dialectic. For i t is the contradiction involved in the impo ssibility of predicating a c ategory "without predicating its opposite which causes us to abandon t hat c ategory as inadequate. We are driven on firs t to its antitheses. And when we find that this inyoly es the predication of the thesis, as much as this latter hadjnvolyed the predication of the antithesis, the_impossibi]ity_of j&icapingfrqm^ontradic in either extreme drives us to remove them by combining both extremes in a synthesis which transcends them. 5. It has been asserted that Hegel sometimes declares the A contradictions to be the cause of the dialectic movementj^nd j sometimes to be the effect of that movement. This is maintarned<--J by Hartmann^. TS^o~3ouFt~the contradictions are considered as the immediate cause of the movement. But the only evidence which Hartmann gives for supposing that they are also held to be the effect, is a quotation from the second volume of the Logic. In this, speaking of that finite activity of thought which he calls Vorstellung, Hegel says that it has the contradictions as part of its content, but is not conscious of this, because it does not contain "das Uebergehen, welches das Wesentliche ist, und den Wilderspruch enthalt^." Now all that this implies seems to be that the contradictions first become manifest in the movement, which is not at all identical with the assertion that they are caused by it, and is quite compatible with the counter-assertion that it is caused by them. Moreover, Hartmann also gives the same account of the origin of the contradictions which I have suggested above. He says "Der (im Hegel'schen Geiste) tiefer liegende Grund der Erschei- nung ist aber die Fliissigkeit des Begriffes selbst^." Fliissigkeit is certainly not equivalent to movement, and may fairly be translated instability. There is then no inconsistency. It is quite possible that the instability of the notion may be the cause of the contradictions, and that the contradictions again may be 1 Ueber die dialektische Methode, B. ii. 3. * Logic, Vol. n. p. 71. 3 Op. cit. B. u. 3. 6 THE GENERAL NATURE [ch. the cause of the actual motion. Hartmann does not, apparently, see that there is any change in his position when he gives first instability and then motion as the cause of the contradictions, and it is this confusion on his own part which causes him to accuse Hegel of inconsistency. He endeavours to account for Hegel's supposed error by saying that the contradictions were given as the cause of the dialectic movement when Hegel desired to show the subjective action of the individual mind, while the dialectic movement was given as the cause of the contradictions when he wished to represent the process as objective. If, as I have endeavoured to show, there is no reason for supposing that Hegel ever did hold the dialectic movement to be the cause of the contradictions, there will be no further necessity for this theory. But it may be well to remark that it involves a false conception of the meaning in which it is possible to apply the term objective to the dialectic at all. 6. There is a sense of the word objective in which it may be correctly said that the dependence of the contradictions on. the instability of the notion is more objective. than the dependence of the dialectic movement on the contradictions. For the former is present in all thought, which is not the case with the latter. A contradiction can be said to be present in thought, when it is implied in it, even though it is not clearly seen. But it can oply caHiSP th*^ dif^le^tic mj:) yement. when it is clearlv seen . When- ever a finite category is used it is abstract, and consequently unstable, and, implicitly at least, involves its contrary, though this may not be perceived, and, indeed, in ordinary thought is not perceived. On the other hand, the actual dialectic movement does not take place whenever a category is used, for in that case finite thought would not exist at all. It is only when the contradic- tions are perceived, when they are recognised as incompatible, in their unreconciled form, with truth, and when the synthesis which can reconcile them has been discovered, that the dialectic process is before us. The contradiction has therefore more objectivity, in one sense of the word, because it is more inevitable and less dependent on particular and contingent circumstances. But we are not entitled to draw the sort of distinction between them which ■mmLm» I] OF THE DIALECTIC 7 Hartmann makes, and to say that while the one is only an action of the thinking subject, the other is based on the nature of things independently of the subject who thinks them. Both relations are objective in the sense that they are universal, and have validity as a description of the nature of reality. Neither is objective in the sense that it takes place otherwise than in thought. We shall have to consider this point in detail later^ : at present wje, can only say thj,t^jtj)j3.ughtkejdialectic process is a valid de scription of reality, r eality itself is not, in its truest nature, a process but a stable and timeless state. Hegel says indeed that reason is to be found in actual existence, but it is reason injts complete and concrete shape , unjier.the highest and absolute foifli of the n otion , a nd not travelling u p from category to category Till the highest is reached, all the results are expressly termed abstract, and do not, therefore, come up to the level of reality. Moreover they contain unsynthesised contradictions, and that which is contradictory, though it may have a certain relative truth, can never exist independently, as would be the case if it existed in the world of fact. XJi© dialectic movement Js indejgd a guidejtO-that world, since the highest category, under whieJi — y~ alone reality c an be constru ed, contains all the lower categories as moments, bu t the gra dual passage from one stage of the notion to anoth^, d uring which the highest yet reached is for the moment regarded as independent and subst antial, is an inadequate ex- wession of the truth . 7. This is not incompatible with the admission that various isolated phenomena, considered as phenomena and as isolated, are imperfect, for in considering them in this way we do not consider them as they really are. Hegel speaks of the untruth of an external object as consisting in the disagreement between the objective notion, and the object^. From this it might be inferred that even in the world of real objects there existed imperfections and contradictions. But, on looking more closely, we see that the imperfection and contradiction are really, ac- cording to Hegel, due only to our manner of contemplating the object. A particular thing may or may not correspond to the notion. But the universe is not merely an aggregation of particular ^ Chap. V. 2 Enc. Section 24, lecture note. 8 THE GENERAL NATURE [ch. things, but a system in which they are connected, and a thing which in itself is imperfect and irrational may be a part of a perfect and rational universe. Its imperfection was artificial, caused by our regarding it, in an artificial and unreal abstraction, as if it could exist apart from other things. A diseased body, for example, is in an untrue state, if we merely regard it by itself, since it is obviously faiUng to fulfil the ideal of a body. But if we look at it in connection with the intellectual and spiritual life of its occupant, the bodily imper- fection might in some cases be seen, without going further, to be a part in a rational whole. And, taking the universe as a whole, Hegel declares " God alone exhibits axealagrefiment jolthp, notion and the reahty. All finite things involve an untruth." God, however, is held by Hegel to be the reahty which underlies all finite t hings . It is therefore only when looked at as finite that they involve an untruth. Looked at sub specie Dei they are true. The untruth is therefore in our manner of apprehending them only. It would indeed, as Hartmann remarks, be senseless tautology for Hegel to talk of the objective truth of the world. But this Hegel does not do, ^ It is in the nature of the world.as a whole that it must be objeetivBly-tnie^. But isolated fragments of the world, just because they are isolated, cannot fully agree with the notion, and may or may not agree with a particular aspect of it. According as they do or do not do this Hegel calls them true or false. Hegel's theory that the world as a whole must be objectively trujij so rational, and therefore, as he would continue, perfect, conies no doubt in rather rude contact with some of the facts of life. The consideration of this must for the present be deferred^. 8. We have seen that the motive power of the dialectic lies in the relation of the abstract idea ex plicitly b efoxeJJie-niindto th£_£.Qnci:fitfi_Ldea_ impHcitlyi-before-it-itL. all experience and all consciousness. This will enable us to determine the relation in which the T3eas of contradiction and negation stand to the dialectic. It is sometimes supposed that the Hegelian logic rests on a defiance of the law of contradiction. That law says that whatever ^ Cp. Enc. Section 212, quoted on p. 3 above. ^ Chap. v. I] OF THE DIALECTIC 9 is A can never at the same time be not- A. But the dialectic asserts that, when A is any category, except the Absolute Idea, whatever is A may be, and indeed must be, not-A also. Now if the law of contradiction is rej ected, argument becomes impossible. It is impossible to refute any proposition without the help of this law. The refutation can only take place by the establishment of another proposition incompatible with the first. But if we are to regard the simultaneous assertion of two contradictories, not as a mark of error, but as an indication of truth, we shall find it impossible to disprove any proposition at all. Nothing, however, can ever claim to be considered as true, which could never be refuted, even if it were false. And indeed it is impossible, as Hegel himself has pointed out to us, even to assert anything without involving the law of contradiction, for every positive assertion has meaning only in so far as it is defined, and therefore negative. If the statement All men are mortal, for example, did not exclude the statement Some men are immortal, it would be meaningless. And it only excludes it by virtue of the law of contradiction. If then the dialectic rejected the law of contra- diction, it would reduce itself to an absurdity, by rendering all argument, and even all assertion, unmeaning. The dialectic, however, does not reject that law. An un- resolved contradiction is, for Hegel as for every one else, a sign of error. The relation of the thesis and antithesis derives its whole meaning from the synthesis, which follows them, and in which the contradiction ceases to exist as such. "Contradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself^." An unreconciled predication of two contrary categories, for instance Being and not-Being, of the same thing, would lead in the dialectic, as it would lead elsewhere, to scepticism, if it was not for the recon- ciliation in Becoming. "jUie-^yJ^^'^P"'^^^ a.lone iias^iealityy and its el ements derive such importance as^ they have from being, in , so far as their truth goes, members of a unity in which their .jJ^^jrv-X- opposition is overcome. In fact, so far is the dialectic from denying the law of con- tradiction, that it is especially based on it. The contradictions are the cause of the d ialectic process. But they can only be this * Enc. Section 119, lecture note. 10 THE GENERAL NATURE [cH. if they are received as marks of error. We are obliged to say ti^at we_fimi the_txuth pLBeing^ not-Being in Beconiing^_ajid inJBecomin^ only^ because, if we endeavour to take them in their independence, and not as synthesised, we find an unreconciled contradiction. But why should we not find an unreconciled contradiction and acquiesce in it without going further, except for the law that two contradictory propositions about the same subject are a sign of error? Truth consists, not of contradictions, but of moments which, if separated, would be contradictions^ but which in their synthesis are reconciled and consistent. 9. It follows also from this view of the paramount importance of the synthesis in the dialectic process that the. place of negation i&Jhji^jocess is only secojadary^ The really fundamental aspect of^_the_ dialectic is not the tendency of the finite category to negate itself but to complete itself. Since the various relatively perfect and concrete categories are, according to Hegel, made up each of two moments or aspects which stand to one another ^ in the relation of contrary ideas, it follows that one characteristic of the process will be the passage from an idea to its contrary. But this is not due, as has occasionally been supposed, to an inherent tendency in all finite categories to affirm their own negation as such. It is due to their inherent tendency to affirm their own complement. It is indeed, according to Hegel, no empirical and contingent fact, but an absolute and necessary law, that their complement is in some degree their negation. But the one category passes into the other, because the second completes the meaning of the first, not because it denies it. This, however, is one of the points at which the difficulty, always great, of distinguishing what Hegel did say from that which he ought in consistency to have said becomes almost in- superable. It may safely be asserted that the motive force of the dialectic was clearly held by him to rest in the implicit presence in us of its goal. This is admitted by his opponents as well as his supporters. That he did to some extent recognise the consequence of this — the subordinate importance which it assigned to the idea of negation — seems also probable, especially when we consider the passage quoted above^, in which the ^ Enc. Section 240, quoted on p. 2 above. I] OF THE DIALECTIC 11 element of negation appears to enter into the dialectic process with very different degrees of prominence in the three stages of which that process consists. On the other hand, the absence of any detailed exposition of a principle so fundamental as that of the gradually decreasing share taken by negation in the dialectic, and the failure to follow out all its consequences, seem to indicate that he had either not clearly realised it, or had not perceived its full importance. But to this point it will be necessary to return. 10. What relation, we must now enquire, exists between thought as engaged in the dialectic process, and thought as engaged in the ordinary affairs of life? In these latter we con- tinually employ the more abstract categories, which, according to Hegel, are the more imperfect, as if they were satisfactory and ultimate determinations of thought. So far as we do this we must contrive to arrest for the time the dialectic movement. While a category is undergoing the changes and transformations in which that movement consists, it is as unfit to be used as an instrument of thought, as an expanding rod would be for a yard measure. We may observe, and even argue about, the growth of the idea, as we may observe the expansion of a rod under heat, but the argument must be conducted with stable ideas, as the observation must be made with measures of unaltering size. For if, for example, a notion, when employed as a middle term, is capable of changing its meaning between the major and the minor premises, it renders the whole syllogism invalid. And all reasoning depends on the assumption that a term can be trusted to retain the same meaning on different occasions. Other- wise, any inference would be impossible, since all connection between propositions would be destroyed. There are two ways in which we may treat the categories. The first is, in the language of Hegel, the function of the Reason — to perform, namely, the dialectic process, and when that culminates in the highest category, which alone is without con- tradiction, to construe the world by its means. As this category has no contradictions in it, it is stable and can be used without any fear of its transforming itself under our hands. The second function is that of the Understanding, whose characteristic it is 12 THE GENERAL NATURE [ch. to treat abstractions as if they were independent realities. They are thus forced into an artificial stability and permanence, and can be used for the work of ordinary thought. Of course the attempt to use an imperfect and unbalanced category as if it were perfect and self-subsistent leads to errors and contradictions — it is just these errors and contradictions which are the proof that the category is imperfect. But for many purposes the limit of error is so small, that the work of the Understanding possesses practical use and validity. If we take an arc three feet long of the circumference of a circle a mile in diameter, it will be curved, and will show itself to be so, if examined with sufficient accuracy. But in practice it would often produce no inconvenience to treat it as a straight line. So, if an attempt is made to explain ex- perience exclusively by the category, for example, of causality, it will be found, if the matter is considered with enough care, that any explanation, in which no higher category is employed, involves a contradiction^. Nevertheless, for many of the every- day occurrences on which we exercise our thoughts, an explanation by the Understanding, by means of the category of causality only, will be found to rationalise the event sufficiently for the needs of the moment. 11. To this explanation an objection has been raised by Hartmann^. He "emphatically denies" our power to arrest the progress of the Notion in this manner. It might, he admits, be possible to do so, if the Notion were changed by us, but it is represented as changing itself. The human thinker is thus only " the fifth wheel to the cart," and quite unable to arrest a process which is entirely independent of him. Now in one sense of the words it is perfectly true, that, if the Notion changes at all, the change is caused by its own nature, and not by us. If the arguments of the dialectic are true, they must appeal with irresistible force to every one who looks into the question with sufficient ability and attention, and thus the process may be said to be due to the Notion, and not to the thinker. But this is no more than may be said of every argument. If it is valid, it is not in the power of any man who has examined it, to deny its validity. But when there is no logical alternative 1 E-nc. Sections 153, 154. « Op. cit. B. ii. 6. I] OF THE DIALECTIC 13 there may be a psychological one. No intelligent man, who care- fully examines the proofs, can doubt that the earth goes round the sun. But any person who will not examine them, or cannot understand them, may remain convinced all his life that the sun goes round the earth. And any one, however clearly he understands the truth, can, by diverting his attention from com- paratively remote astronomical arguments, and fixing it on the familiar and daily appearances, speak of and picture the move- ment as that of the sun, as most men, I suppose, generally do. So with the dialectic. The arguments are, if Hegel is right, such as to leave the man who examines them no option. But for those who have no time, inclination, or ability to examine them, the categories will continue to be quite separate and in- dependent, while the contradictions which this view will produce in experience will either be treated as ultimate, or, more probably, will not be noticed at all. And even for the student of philosophy, the arguments remain so comparatively abstruse and unfamiliar that he finds no difficulty, when practical life requires it, in assuming for a time the point of view of the Understanding, and regarding each category as unchanging and self-supporting. This he does merely by diverting his attention from the arguments by which their instability is proved. Although therefore the change in the Notion is due to its nature, it does not follow that it cannot be stopped by peculiarities in the nature of the thinker, or by his arbitrary choice. The positive element in the change lies wholly in the Notion, but that it should take place at all in any particular case requires certain conditions in the individual mind in question, and by changing these conditions we can at will arrest the process of the categories, and use any one of them as fixed and un- changing. Any other view of the dialectic process would require us to suppose that the movement of the categories became obvious to us, not as the result of much hard thinking, but spontaneously and involuntarily. It can scarcely be asserted that Hegel held such a theory, which would lead to the conclusion that every one who ever used the category of Being — that is every one who ever thought at all, whether he reflected on thought or not, — had gone k 14 THE GENERAL NATURE [CH. through all the stages of the Hegelian logic, and arrived at all its conclusions. 12. Another difficulty which Hartmann brings forward in this 'connection arises from a misapprehension of Hegel's meaning. He affirms^ that, so far from stopping the dialectic process, we could not even perceive it when it took place. For we can only become aware of the change by comparing stage A with stage B, and how is it possible that we should do this, if A turns into B, beyond our control, whenever it appears? In the first place, we may answer, it is possible, as we have seen, to arrest the dialectic movement, in any given case, at will, so that the development of the categories is not beyond our control. In the second place the thesis is not held by Hegel to turn into the antithesis in the simple and complete way which this objection supposes. TJLe. one categor y le ads up to_and postulates th e other but does not become c o mpletely the sam e as_ its successor. The thesis and antithesis ar e said no doubt to be the same, but the same with a^ difference. If we predicate_4, we" are forced to predicate B, but there remains neverthelessL^ distinction between A and B. Itjs just the coexistence of this distinction with the necessary implication of the one category injthe other, which renders the synthesis necessary^ as a recon- ciliati on. If the thesis and antithesis were not different, the simultaneous predication of both of them would involve no difficulty. 13. Such is the general nature of the dialectic as conceived by Hegel. How does he attempt to prove its truth and necessity? "The proof must be based on something already understood and granted by those to whom it is addressed. And since the proof should be one which must be accepted by all men, we must base it on that which all men allow to be justifiable — the ordinary procedure, that it, of thought in common sense and science, which Hegel calls the Understanding as opposed to the Reason, We must show that if we grant, as we cannot help granting, the validity of the ordinary exercise of our thought, we must also grant the validity of the dialectic. This necessity Hegel recognises. He says, it is true, that, since 1 Op. cit. B. n. 6. I] OF THE DIALECTIC 15 only the Reason possesses the complete truth, up to which the merely partial truth of the Understanding leads, the real ex- planation must be of the Understanding by the Reason^. But this is not inconsistent with a recognition of the necessity of justifying the Reason to the Understanding. The course of real explanation must always run from ground to consequent, and, according to Hegel, from concrete to abstract. On the other hand, the order of proof must run from whatever is known to whatever is unknown. When, as we have seen is the case with the dialectic, we start from explicit knowledge of the abstract only, and proceed to knowledge of the concrete, which alone gives reality to that abstract, the order of explanation and the order of proof must clearly be exactly opposite to one another. The justification of the Reason at the bar of the Under- standing, depends upon two facts. The one is the search for the Absolute which is involved in the Understanding, the other is the existence in the Understanding of contradictions which render it impossible that it should succeed in the search. The Understanding demands an answer to every question it can ask. But every question which it succeeds in answering suggests fresh questions. Any explanation requires some reference to surrounding phenomena, and these in their turn must be ex- plained by reference to others, and nothing can therefore be fully explained unless everything else which is in direct or in- direct connection with it, unless, that is, the whole universe, be fully explained also. And the explanation of a phenomenon requires, besides this, the knowledge of its causes and effects, while these again require a knowledge of their causes and effects, so that not only the whole present universe, but the whole of the past and future must be known before any single fact can be really understood. Again, since the knowledge of a pheno- menon involves the knowledge of its parts, and all phenomena, occurring as they do in space and time, are infinitely divisible, our knowledge must not only be infinitely extended over space and time, but also infinitely minute. The connection of the phenomenal universe by the law of reciprocity has a double effect on knowledge. It is true, as Tennyson tells us, that we 1 Logic, Vol. I. p. 198. 16 THE GENERAL NATURE [CH. could not know a single flower completely without also knowing God and man. But it is also true that, till we know everything about God and man, we cannot answer satisfactorily a single question about the flower. In asking any question whatever, the Understanding implicitly asks for a complete account of the whole Universe, throughout all space and all time. It demands a solution which shall really solve the question without raising fresh ones — a complete and symmetrical system of knowledge. This ideal it cannot, as Hegel maintains, reach by its own exertions, because it is the nature of the Understanding to treat the various finite categories as self-subsistent unities, and this attempt leads it into the various contradictions pointed out throughout the dialectic, owing to the inevitable connection of every finite category with its contrary. Since, then, it postulates in all its actions an ideal which cannot be reached by itself, it is obliged, unless it would deny its own validity, to admit the validity of the Reason, since by the Reason alone can the con- tradictions be removed, and the ideal be realised. And, when it has done this, it loses the false independence which made it suppose itself to be something different from the Reason. 14. One of the most difficult and important points in deter- mining the nature of the Hegelian logic is to find its exact relation to experience. Whatever theory we may adopt has to fall within certain limits. On the one hand it is asserted by Hegel's critics, and generally admitted by his followers, that, rightly or wrongly, there is some indispensable reference to experience in the dialectic — so that, without the aid of experience it would be impossible for the cogency of the dialectic process to display itself. On the other hand it is impossible to deny that, in some sense, Hegel believed.that by the dialectic process takfiS^^^lace in pure thought, that, however incomplete the Logic might be without the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit, however much the existence of Nature and Spirit might be involved in the existence of pure thought, yet nevertheless within the sphere of logic we had arrived at pure thought, un- conditioned in respect of its development as thought. And both these characteristics of the dialectic are, indepen- dently of Hegel's assertion, clearly necessary for the validity of I] OF THE DIALECTIC 17 any possible dialectic. The consideration of pure thought, without any reference to experience, would be absolutely sterile, or rather impossible. For we are as unable to employ "empty" pure thought (to borrow Kant's phrase) as to employ "blind" in- tuition. Thought is a process of mediation and relation, and implies something immediate to be related, which cannot be found in thought. Even if a stage of thought could be conceived as existing, in which it was self-subsistent, and in which it had no reference to any data — and it is impossible to imagine such a state, or to give any reason for supposing thought thus to change its essential nature — at any rate this is not the ordinary thought of common life. And as the dialectic process professes to start from a basis common to every one, so as to enable it to claim universal validity for its conclusions, it is certain that it will be necessary for thought, in the dialectic process, to have some relation to data given immediately, and independent of that thought itself. Even if the dialectic should finally tran- scend this condition it would have at starting to take thought as we use it in every-day life — as merely mediating, and not self-subsistent. And I shall try to show later on that it never does transcend, or try to transcend that limitation^. On the other hand it is no less true that any argument would be incapable of leading us to general conclusions relating to pure thought, which was based on the nature of any particular piece of experience in its particularity, and that, whatever reference to experience Hegel may or may not have admitted into his system, his language is conclusive against the possibility that he has admitted any empirical or contingent basis to the dialectic. 15. The two conditions can, however, be reconciled. There is a sense in which conclusions relating to pure thought may properly be based on an observation of experience, and in this sense, as I believe, we must take the Logic in order to arrive at Hegel's true meaning. According to this view, what is observed is the spontaneous and unconditioned movement of the pure notion, which does not in any way depend on the matter of intuition for its validity, which, on the contrary, is derived from the character of the pure reason itself. But the process, although 1 Chap. n. 18 THE GENERAL NATURE [ch. independent of the matter of intuition, can only be perceived when the pure notion is taken in conjunction with matter of intuition — that is to say when it is taken in experience — because it is impossible for us to grasp thought in absolute purity, or except as applied to an immediate datum. Since we cannot observe pure thought at all, except in experience, it is clear that it is only in experience that we can observe the change from the less to the more adequate form which thought undergoes in the dialectic process. But this change of form is due to the nature of thought alone, and not to the other element in experience — the matter of intuition^. The presence of this other element in experience is thus a condition of our perceiving the dialectical movement of pure thought. We may go further. It does not follow, from the fact that the movement is due to the nature of pure thought alone, that pure thought can ever exist, or ever be imagined to exist, by itself. We may regard pure thought as a mere abstraction of one side of experience, which is the only concrete reality, while the matter of intuition is an abstraction of the other side of the same reality — each, when considered by itself, being false and misleading. This, as we shall see, is the position which Hegel does take up. Even so, it will still remain true that, in experience, the dialectic process was due exclusively to that element of experience which we call pure thought, the other element — that of intuition — being indeed an indispensable condition of the dialectic movement, but one which remains passive throughout, and one by which the movement is not determined. It is only necessary to the movement of the idea because it is necessary to its existence. It is not itself a principle of change, which may as fairly be said to be independent of it, as the changes in the pictures of a magic lantern may be ascribed exclusively to the ^ Since I am here dealing only with the question of epistemology, it will be allowable, I think, to assume that there is a matter of intuition, distinct from thought, and not reducible to it, (though incapable of existing apart from it,) since this is the position taken up within Hegel's Logic. Whether the dialectic process has any relation to it or not, its existence is, in the Logic, admitted, at least provisionally. If Hegel did make any attempt to reduce the whole universe to a manifestation of pure thought, without any other element, he certainly did not do so till the transition to the world of Nature at the end of the Logic. Even there I believe no such attempt is to be found. I] OF THE DIALECTIC 19 camera, and not at all to the canvas on which they are reflected, although, without the canvas, the pictures themselves, and therefore the transition from one to another of them would be impossible. 16. If this is the relation of the dialectic process to the medium in which it works, what postulate does it require to start from? We must distinguish its postulate from its basis. Its basis is the reality which it requires to have presented to itself, in order that it may develop itself. Its postulate is the proposition which it requires to have admitted, in order that from this premise it may demonstrate its own logical validity as a consequence. Jhe basi&^tthe_dialectic isto be found in the nature of ^ure thought itself, since the reason of the process being what it is, is due, as we have seen, to the nature of the highest and most concrete form of the notion, implicit in all experience. Since pure thought, as we have seen, even if it iJauld-e^dstJ-.t jalLm-aJiy_o.thei.mannfir, CQiild,QDly_ become evident to us in exp eripinr.pi. the basis which the dialectic method will require to work on, may be called the nature^of exp„eriencjB.in, general. It is only the general nature of experience — those charac- teristics which are common to all of it — which forms the basis of the process, E or it is not the only o bject of the dialecticjo proye_thatJ;^e_ lower and subordinate categories are unable to explain all parts of experience withou t resorting to the higher c ategories, and finally to the Absolute Idea . It undertakes also to show that thfi_JaH:ex categories ar£ inadequate^-when . con- s idered with sufficient in telligence andjpersistence^ to explain any part of the world. What is required, therefore, is not so much the collection of a large mass of experience to work on, but the close and careful scrutiny of some part, however small. The whole jr hain of ratp.gnrjps is itppli ed in any and every phennz. menon . Particular fragments of experience may no doubt place the inadequacy of some finite category in a specially clear light, or may render the transition to the next stage of the idea par- ticularly ob\aous and easy, but it is only greater convenience which is thus gained; \\ath sufficient power any part, however unpromising, would yield the same result. 17. The basis of the dialectic process, then, is the nature of \ I _ -^v^><' ^ po rtance by means of a transcendental argume nt. T iie highe r n^^^^n^*'' categori es are con nected with the lower in such a ms|.pner tha t ^- doubt, if we attach an unfair prominence to the fact of mediation, ^ and represent it as implying a state of conditionedness (Beding- theit), it may be said — not that the remark would mean much — ^ that philosophy is the child of experience, and owes its rise to *^ "^ an a posteriori fact. (As a matter of fact, thinking is always the ^ negation of what we have immediately before us.) With as much ^^ ^ truth however we may be said to owe eating to the means of t^ ^ nourishment, so long as we can have no eating without them. ji^ JT If we take this view, eating is certainly represented as ungrateful ; vf> it devours that to which it owes itself. Thinking, upon this view of its action, is equally ungrateful." And again, "In relation to the first abstract universality of thought there is a correct and well-grounded sense in which we may say, that we may thank h^ ^ experience for the development of philosophy. For, firstly, the empirical sciences do not stop short at the perception of the individual features of a phenomenon. By the aid of thought, they come forward to meet philosophy with materials for it, in 5c yu 38 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [oh. the shape of general uniformities, i.e. laws and classifications of the phenomena. When this is done, the particular facts which they contain are ready to be received into philosophy. This, secondly, implies a certain compulsion on thought itself to pro- ceed to these concrete specific truths. The reception into philo- sophy of these scientific materials, now that thought has removed its immediacy, and made it cease to be mere data forms at the same time a development of thought out of itself. Philosophy then owes its development to the empirical sciences. In return it gives their contents what is so vital to them, the freedom of thought — gives them, in short, an a priori character. These contents are now warranted necessary, and no longer depend on the evidence of facts merely, that they were so found and so experienced. The fact of experience thus becomes an illustration and image of the original and completely self-supporting activity of thought." 36. The peculiar importance of this section lies in the emphasis laid simultaneously on both the elements of the dialectic process. On the one hand the start is definitely asserted, as in the quota- tion from Section 9, to be made from experience. On the other hand we are told that the result relates itself negatively towards the point from which it draws its origin. This precludes on the one side the theory that Hegel endeavoured to produce the dialectic process by mere reflection on the nature of pure thought in abstraction, and, on the other side, denies that a reference to experience involves a merely empirical argument. The reception into philosophy of the material furnished by science is declared to be identical with the development of thought out of itself. We are enabled also to understand correctly, by means of this Section, certain expressions with regard to the dialectic process which are occasionally interpreted by critics as meaning that the medium of the Logic is abstract pure thought. For example, here as in other places, Hegel repudiates the idea that "philo- sophy is a child of experience, and owes its existence to an a fosteriori element." Such an idea, we are told, is "unfair." Such expressions might lead us to reject the theory of the dialectic offered above, if it was not for the explanation which here follows them. It is only unfair to say this, Hegel continues, in n] OF THE DIALECTIC 39 the same sense in which it would be unfair to say that we owe eating to the means of nourishment. Now it is unquestionable that, without something to eat, eating is impossible, and if eating does not depend on the existence of something to eat, it follows that the existence of experience may be indispensable to the existence of philosophy, although philosophy has been declared not to depend on experience. Mediation, as Hegel uses the word, is not equivalent to dependence, and it is possible for thought to require a mediation by sense, and therefore to be helpless without it, while it is nevertheless, in Hegelian ter- minology, not in a state of dependence (Bedingtheit) on it. Without the data which are supplied to us by sense, the dialectic could not exist. It is not, however, caused by those data, but is necessarily combined with them in a higher unity. It is no more dependent on them than any other abstraction from a whole is on its fellow abstractions from the same whole. Each step which it takes depends, as we have seen, on the relation which the previous step bears to the goal of the process. The whole process may thus fairly be said not to be dependent at all. The independence of the idea of God is declared to rest on its negation and exaltation above the empirical side of conscious- ness. This independence cannot possibly mean, therefore, the absence of all connection between the two, for to be related to a thing even negatively, is, as Hegel himself points out on occasion (as in his treatment of the ideas of finitude and infinity, Section 95), itself a condition, and in this sense a dependence. The independence here can only consist in the fact that, although the beginning is in experience, which contains an empirical side, yet in the result the idea of God is separated from the particular empirical facts with which the process started, and is free from all likeness to them, although they form its demonstration and justification. Whether this is possible or not, it appears to be this which Hegel means in asserting his dialectic to be independent of all experience, and this is quite compatible with an experi- ential basis. It may be objected that in this Section Hegel is not speaking of his own system, but of the origin of philosophy in general. It is, no doubt, true that the origin of philosophy from a 40 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [ch. liistorical standpoint is one of the points discussed here. But if we look at Section 14, we shall find that the two questions are considered by Hegel as identical. "The same evolution of thought," he says, "which is exhibited in the history of philo- sophy is presented in the System of Philosophy itself." It is clear, therefore, that he regards the process traced in Section 12 as one which is not only historically accurate but also philo- sophically valid, and that he holds the relation of experience to the dialectic, which is there defined, as that which really exists. 37. We find similar statements in his criticism of the In- tuitionist School. In explaining their position, he says (Section 70), "What this theory asserts is that truth lies neither in the Idea as a merely subjective thought, nor in mere being on its own account; that mere being fer se, a being that is not of the Idea, is the sensible and finite being of the world. Now all this only affirms, without demonstration, that the Idea has truth only by means of being, and being has truth only by means of the Idea. The maxim of immediate knowledge rejects an in- definite empty immediacy (and such is abstract being, or pure unity taken by itself) and affirms in its stead the unity of the Idea with being. And it acts rightly in so doing. But it is stupid not to see that the unity of distinct terms or modes is not merely a purely immediate unity, i.e. unity empty and indeterminate, but that it involves the principle that one term has truth only as mediated through the other, or, if the phrase be preferred, that either term is only mediated with truth through the other." On the one hand then he asserts that truth does not lie in the idea as separated from the sensible and finite being of the world. But the idea in its unity with the sensible and finite being of the world is experience. This unity, however, is only mediate — that is to say, it is not, as the Intuitionists supposed it to be, perceived immediately, nor evident from the nature of thought itself. It lies rather in the mediation of each with truth only by means of the other, which supports the view asserted above — that Hegel makes no attempt to use pure thought in abstraction from the data of sense, but holds truth to lie only in the whole from which these two elements are abstracted. Hegel here denies one immediacy and admits another, both U] OF THE DIALECTIC 41 of which are called by the same name in English. He denies the validity of intuition, if by intuition is meant Jacobi's unmittel- bares Wissen, which perceives immediately the unity of thought and being. But he admits that intuition, if we mean by it the Kantian Anschauung, is essential to knowledge, for without " the sensible and finite being of the world " the idea has no truth. 38. Bearing this in mind we are able to see that there is nothing in Section 75 inconsistent with the position I have attributed to Hegel. He there says, "It has been shown to be untrue in fact to say that there is an immediate knowledge, a knowledge without mediation either by means of something else or in itself. It has also been explained to be false in fact to say that thought advances through finite and conditioned categories only, which are always mediated by something else, and to forget that in the very act of mediation the mediation itself vanishes." The first of these statements will present no difficulties, for it is quite consistent to deny the existence of immediate know- ledge, while admitting the existence of an immediate element in knowledge. Indeed, the assertion that all knowledge consists in the mediation of the immediate at once affirms that there is an immediate, and denies that it is knowledge. Hegel's reminder that in the act of mediation the mediation itself vanishes does not concern us here. For we are now con- sidering the basis on which the dialectic process rests, and not the end which it reaches. The latter must be considered further on. The fact that the dialectic process consists in mediating the immediate is enough to show that it must have some relation to experience, since only in experience can the immediate be found. 39. Passing on to the Doctrine of the Notion, we have (Section 166, lecture note): "The notion does not, as under- standing supposes, stand still in its own immobility. It is rather an infinite form, of boundless activity, as it were the punctum saliens of all vitahty, and thereby self-differentiating (sich von sich selbst unterscheidend). This disruption of the notion into the difference of its constituent functions, — a disruption imposed by the native act of the notion, is the judgment. A judgment therefore, means the particularising of the notion. No doubt the 42 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [ch. notion is implicitly tlie particular. But in the notion as notion, the particular is not yet explicit, and still remains in transparent unity with the universal. Thus for example, as we remarked before (Section 160, lecture note), the germ of a plant contains I ^ its particular, such as root, branches, leaves, &c., but these details are at first present only potentially, and are not realised till the germ uncloses. This unclosing is, as it were, the judgment of the plant. The illustration may also serve to show how neither the notion nor the judgment is merely found in our head, or merely framed by us. The notion is the very heart of things, and makes them what they are. To form a notion of an object means therefore to become aware of its notion; and when we proceed to a criticism or judgment of the object, we are not Hil performing a subjective act, and merely ascribing this or that predicate to the object. We are, on the contrary, observing the object in the specific character imposed by its notion." This analogy may illustrate the view which we have been considering. In the growth of a tree the positive element is in the seed only. The air, earth, and water, although they are necessary to the development of the tree, do not play a positive part in its growth. It is the nature of the seed alone which determines that a plant shall be produced, and what sort of plant it shall be. But the surrounding conditions, of suitable soil and so on, are conditions without which the seed cannot realise the end of its nature. In this analogy, the seed will correspond to the category of Being, the completely mature plant to the Absolute Idea, and the air, earth, and water, to the matter of intuition. If we look more closely, the resemblance to actual plant life is not perfect, since different amounts of light, heat, and manure will change the size and colour, though not the ^i species of the flower, which gives to these surroundings a more ''' active part than Hegel allows to the matter of intuition. But since Hegel says, without restriction, that the germ of the plant |u| contains its particulars, he must be supposed to ignore the nil amount of quantitative change which depends on the circum- ■i^ stances in which the plant is placed, and in this case the analogy i J IS exact. ^ The point of the comparison, if the above explanation is ,!«( n] OF THE DIALECTIC 43 correct, lies in the fact that the growth of the plant has certain conditions which do not determine the nature of the develop- ment, though without their presence the development could not exist at all. That this is the point which Hegel wished to make is rendered probable by his having taken as his example a case of organic life. For in organic life we are able to distinguish between the cause of growth and the essential conditions of it in a way that would be impossible if we were considering an event governed only by mechanical laws. In the latter case we can only say that the cause is the sum of all the necessary con- ditions, and we are unable to consider any one of them as more fundamental than the others. But with organic life we have introduced the idea of a final cause, and we are thus enabled to distinguish between the positive cause and the conditions which are necessary but not positive. Hegel's declaration that the growth of the notion must be judged by the principles of organic growth, enables us to make this distinction, without which we should be unable to understand that the relation held ; by the data of sense to the dialectic process should be indis- fp I pensable, and yet negative. 40. Again (Section 232, lecture note) he says, "The necessity which cognition (Erkennen) reaches by means of demonstration is the reverse of what formed its starting-point. In its starting- point cognition had a given and a contingent content ; but now, at the close of its movement, it knows its content to be necessary. This necessity is reached by means of subjective activity. Similarly, subjectivity at starting was quite abstract, a bare tabula rasa. It now shows itself as a modifying and determining principle. In this way we pass from the idea of cognition to that of will. The passage, as will be apparent on a closer examination, means that the universal, to be truly apprehended, must be apprehended as subjectivity, as a notion self -moving, active, and form-imposing." Hegel is speaking here of finite cognition at the point at which it passes over into volition. But he is speaking of it before the change has yet been made, for the "it," which knows its content to be necessary, can only be taken as meaning cognition. The process here described starts with finite cognition, which is not philosophy, but the ordinary thought of 44 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [OH. every-day life. By this process the passage is made to volition. The advance lies in the fact that, while knowledge started from the given and contingent, it now knows its content to be necessary. But when this change has taken place in the content, cognition has become philosophy. (Compare Section 9, quoted on p. 35 above. "The second defect is that the beginnings are in every case data and postulates, neither accounted for nor deduced. In both these points the form of necessity fails to get its due. Hence, reflection whenever it sets itself to remedy these defects, becomes speculative thinking, the thinking proper to philo- sophy.") And the universal, under the form of subjectivity, has been apprehended as a self-moving notion, which also shows that by this point knowledge has become philosophy. And the process by which it has advanced begins with the given and the contingent, which can only be found in sense. The advance of the dialectic towards the Absolute Idea has therefore a basis in experience. 41. In Section 238, Hegel, in considering the organic elements of the speculative method, states that its beginning is being or immediacy. "When it means immediate being the beginning is taken from intuition (Anschauung) and perception — the initial stage in the analytical method of finite cognition. When it means universality, it is the beginning of the synthetic method. But since the Logical Idea (das Logische) is as much a universal as it is in being, since it is as much presupposed by the notion as the notion itself immediately is, its beginning is a synthetical as well as an analytical beginning. (Lecture note.) "Philosophical method is analytical as well as synthetical, not indeed in the sense of a bare juxtaposition or mere alternating employment of these two methods of finite cognition, but rather in such a way that it holds them merged in itself. In every one of its movements, therefore, it displays an attitude at once analytical and synthetical. Philosophic thought proceeds analytically, in so far as it only accepts its object, the Idea, and while allowing it its own way is only, as it were, an onlooker at its movement and development. To this extent philosophising is wholly passive. Philosophic thought, however, is equally synthetic, and evinces itself to be the action n] OF THE DIALECTIC 45 of the notion itself. To that end, however, there is required an effort to keep back the incessant impertinence of our own fancies and private opinions." Continuing the same subject, he says in Section 239, "The advance renders explicit the judgment implicit in the Idea. The immediate universal, as the notion implicit, is the dialectical force, which on its own part deposes its immediacy and uni- versality to the level of a mere stage or 'moment.' Thus is produced the negative of the beginning, the original datum is made determinate: it exists for something, as related to those things which are distinguished from it — the stage of Reflection. "Seeing that the immanent dialectic only states explicitly what was involved in the immediate notion, this advance is analytical, but seeing that in this notion this distinction was not yet stated, it is equally synthetical. (Lecture note.) "In the advance of the idea the beginning exhibits itself as what it implicitly is. It is seen to be mediated and derivative, and neither to have proper being nor proper immediacy. It is only for the consciousness which is itself immediate, that Nature forms the commencement or immediacy, and that Spirit appears as what is mediated by Nature. The truth is that Nature is due to the statuting of Spirit, (das durch den Geist Gesetzte,) and it is Spirit itself which gives itself a pre- supposition in Nature." 42. In this passage the double foundation of the dialectic is clearly admitted, and its connection with the double aspect of the process is made clear. We must have, in the first place, pure thought given to us as a fact — we cannot know the nature of thought unless thinking has taken place. From one point of view, then, the dialectic process is the observation of a subject matter already before us. In this aspect philosophy "allows the idea its own way" and "is only, as it were, an onlooker at its movement and development." And in so far as this is so we have the unequivocal declaration that "the beginning is taken from sensation or perception" — since pure thought is never found except as an element in the whole of experience. But at the same time the process is not merely one of empirical selection of first one character and then another from the concrete whole. 46 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [cm When once the first and simplest judgment has been made about experience — the judgment which is involved in the application of the category of Being — the various steps of the dialectic process will grow by an inner necessity out of that judgment. This judgment will be the beginning as universality, as the other aspect was the beginning as immediate being; and, in so far as the beginning is universal, the process is synthetic and "evinces itself to be the action of the notion itself." The explanation of the union of the two processes lies in the fact that the reality present to our minds in experience is always the full and concrete notion. This is the logical frius of the move- ment, although the unanalysed mass and the abstract notion of Being may be the temporal 'prius in that stage of finite reflection which precedes philosophy. "In the onward movement of the idea the beginning exhibits itself as what it is implicitly. It is seen to be mediated and derivative, and neither to have proper being nor proper immediacy." And again, in Section 242, the notion "is the idea, which, as absolutely first (in the method) regards this terminus as merely the annihilation of the show or semblance, which made the beginning appear immediate, and made itself seem a result. It is the knowledge that the idea is one systematic whole." All less complete ideas are illegitimate abstractions from this whole, and naturally tend therefore to approximate to it. And such a process may be viewed from two sides. It may be regarded from the point of view of the whole — in which case the dialectic process will be viewed as gradually retracing the steps of abstraction which had led to the idea of pure Being, and rebuilding the concrete object till it again co- incided with reality. Or it may be regarded from the point of view of the incomplete and growing notion, when the advance will seem to be purely out of the notion itself. " Seeing that the immanent dialectic only states explicitly what was involved in the immediate notion, this advance is analytical, but seeing that in this notion this distinction was not yet stated, it is equally synthetical." And these two aspects — the analytic from the standpoint of the concrete and perfect notion, and the synthetic from the standpoint of the yet imperfect notion, — correspond respectively n] OF THE DIALECTIC 47 to aspects for which the beginning is taken from sensation or perception, and from the action of the notion itself. In so far as we look on the motive force of the dialectic process as residing in the completeness of the concrete notion, the process depends on the contemplation of reality and therefore of sensation and perception. For the sensation, although contributing no positive element to the process, is the necessary condition of our becoming conscious of the nature of thought. But in so far as we look on the motive force of the process as supplied by the incompleteness of the growing notion, we shall bring into prominence the fact that the process is after all one of pure thought. And we only get a true view of the whole when we combine the two and see that the stimulus is in the relation of the abstract and explicit idea to the complete and implicit idea, that the process is one of pure thought perceived in a medium of sensation and therefore synthetic and analytic at once. 43. To this we may add the following extract from the Philosophy of Spirit (Encyclopaedia, Section 447, lecture note), *'In sensation there is present the whole Reason — the collected material of Spirit. All our images, thoughts, and ideas, of ex- ternal nature, of justice, of ethics, and of the content of religion, develop themselves from our intelligence as used in sensation; as they themselves, on the other hand, when they have received their complete explanation are again concentrated in the simple form of sensation.... This development of Spirit out of sensation, however, has commonly been understood as if the intelhgence was originally completely empty, and therefore received all content from outside as something quite strange to it. This is a mistake. For that which the intelligence appears to take in from outside is in reality nothing else than the reasonable, which is therefore identical with spirit, and immanent in it. The activity of spirit has therefore no other goal, except, by the removal of the apparent externality to self of the implicitly reasonable object, to remove also the apparent externaUty of the object to spirit." Here we learn that the reasonable, with which the Logic deals, is first given to us in sensation, and as apparently external to self, and that it is by starting from that which is given in 48 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [CH. sensation that we learn the nature of spirit. To act in this way is a fundamental characteristic of spirit — "the activity of spirit has no other goal" — and therefore it must be in this way that our minds act when they are engaged on the dialectic process. 44. I have endeavoured to show, by the consideration of these passages from Hegel's writings, that his method possesses two characteristics. These are, first, that it is a process of pure thought, but only possible in the presence of matter of intuition ; second, that the motive force of the whole process is involved in the relation between the incomplete form of the notion, which at any moment may be explicitly before us, and the complete form which is present imphcitly in all our thought as in all other reality. We must now pass to another question. The vaHdity of each stage of the dialectic, as we have seen, depended on the one before, and all of them ultimately on the first stage — the category of Being. The validity of this again we found to depend on the fact that its denial would be suicidal^. Now it must be admitted that this is a mere inference, and not explicitly stated by Hegel. Such a statement would be most natural at the beginning of the whole dialectic process, but it is neither there nor elsewhere. No justification whatever is given of the idea of Being. It is merely assumed and all the consequences that follow from it, however cogent in themselves, are left, so to speak, suspended in the air with no explicit argument any- where to attach them to reality. The explanation of this strange peculiarity is, I think, largely to be found in the state of philo- sophy at the time when Hegel wrote. 45. The argument of the dialectic could, if the theory in the previous chapter is correct, have been arranged as follows. The basis of the whole would be the existence of the world of experience, which no sceptic can wholly deny, since denial itself always imphes the existence of something. The barest admission that could be made, however, with regard to this world of experience, would involve that it should be brought under the category of Being, whose validity would be therefore granted. But as, in the process of the dialectic, the 1 Chap. I. Section 18. n] OF THE DIALECTIC 49 category of Being developed contradictions which led up to fresh categories, and so on, the validity of these categories also, as applied to reality, must be granted, since they follow from the validity of the category of Being. Kant, who had to establish his system in the face of sceptical criticism, naturally emphasised the transcendental character of the argument, and the cogency with which his conclusions could be applied to the world of reality, involved as they were in propositions which his adversaries were not prepared to dispute. But Hegel's position was different. He lived in an age of Idealism, when the pure scepticism of Hume had ceased to be a living force, and when it was a generally accepted view that the mind was adequate to the knowledge of reality. Under such cir- cumstances Hegel would naturally lay stress on the conclusions of his system, in which he more or less differed from his con- temporaries, rather than on the original premises, in which he chiefly agreed with them, and would point out how far the end was from the beginning, rather than how clearly it might be derived from it. To this must be added Hegel's marked preference for a constructive, rather than a polemical treatment, which appears so strongly in all his works^. But this has exposed his system to severe disadvantages in the reaction against all Idealism which has taken place since his death. For the transcendental form becomes necessary when the attacks of scepticism have to be met, and its absence, though due chiefly to the special char- acter of the audience to whom the philosophy was first addressed, has led to the reproaches which have been so freely directed against Absolute Idealism, as a mere fairy tale, or as a theory with internal consistency, but without any relation to facts. The same causes may perhaps account for the prominence of the synthetic over the analytic aspect of the dialectic, which may be noticed occasionally throughout the Logic. The criticism of idealists would naturally be devoted more to the internal con- sistency of the system than to its right to exist at all, on which point they would probably have no objection to raise. To meet such criticisms it would be necessary to lay emphasis on the ^ Note to Second Edition. I have omitted a sentence which implied that Hegel's arguments were transcendental in the Kantian sense. M.H. 4 50 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [ch. synthetic side of the process, while to us, who in most cases approach the whole question from a comparatively negative standpoint, it would seem more natural to bring forward the analytic side, and to show that the whole system was involved in any admission of the existence of reality. 46. Hegel speaks of his logic as without any pre-supposition. This is taken by Trendelenburg as equivalent to an assertion that it has no basis in experience. But we have seen that the only postulate which Hegel assumed was the validity of the category of Being — that is, the existence of something. Now this, though not directly proved, can scarcely be said to be assumed, if it is involved in all other assertions. And a system which requires no other postulate than this might fairly be said to have no pre- supposition. The very fact that the argument exists proves that it was entitled to its assumption, for if the argument exists, then the category of Being has validity, at any rate, of one thing — the argument itself. And this is compatible with all the relation to experience which the dialectic needs, or will admit. A parallel case will be found in Hegel's criticism of Kant's refutation of the ontological argument^. He there treats the actual existence of God, who for him is equivalent to the Absolute Reality, as a matter which can be passed over in silence, since its denial — the denial of any reality in the universe — is suicidal. It is really the same fact — the existence of some reality — which, under another aspect, is assumed at the beginning of the Logic. We may reasonably suppose that Hegel treated it in the same way, holding that a postulate which could not be denied without self-contradiction need not be considered as a pre-supposition at all. From all more particular pre-suppositions he doubtless claims that his logic is free. But this claim is not incompatible with the relation of the dialectic to experience, which was suggested in the last chapter. It must also be noted that Hegel says of the proofs of the existence of God which are derived from the finite world "the process of exaltation might thus appear to be transition, and to involve a means, but it is not a whit less true that every trace of transition and means is absorbed, since the world, which 1 Cp. Sections 63, 64. n] OF THE DIALECTIC 51 might have seemed to be the means of reaching God, is explained to be a nullity '^Z' And in Section 12, in the passage quoted above, he tells us that philosophy is unfairly said to be the child of experience, since it "involves a negative attitude to the initial acts of the senses." Now in the Logic the result certainly stands in a negative relation to the beginning, for the inadequacy of the category of Being to express reality has been demonstrated in the course of the dialectic. The category of Being would then, in Hegel's language, have been absorbed, and it would be unfair to say that the dialectic depended on it. Under these circum- stances it is only natural that he should not call its validity a pre-supposition. 47. There is, then, a constant relation to experience through- out the course of the dialectic. But, even if this is so, does that relation remain at the end of the process? It has been asserted that, although throughout the Logic Hegel may treat thought as mediate, and as only existing as an element in a whole of which the other element is an immediate datum, yet, when we reach the Absolute Idea, that Idea is held to be self-centred and capable of existing by itself in abstraction from everything else. It must be admitted that such a transition would be unjustifiable^, but I am unable to see any reason to suppose that Hegel held any such belief. We must discriminate between those characteristics of the immediate element of experience which are indispensable if experience is to be constituted at all, and those which are not indispensable. The essential characteristics may all be summed up in immediacy. All thought that we know, or that we can conceive, has its action only in mediation, and its existence without something immediate on which it may act would be a contradiction. On the other hand it is not essential that this immediate should be also contingent. "The contingent may be described as what has the ground of its being, not in itself, but in somewhat else^." Now it is quite possible that, in a more advanced state of knowledge, we might be able to trace back all the data immediately given in experience till we had referred 1 Enc. Section 50. ^ Cp. Chap. ra. Section 99. ' Enc. Section 145, lecture note. 52 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [CH. them to an individuality or organic whole from the nature of which they could all be deduced. Contingency would be here eliminated, for all experience would be referred to a single unity and determined by its notion. The only question which could then arise would be, "Why was the ultimate nature of reality thus and not otherwise? " The question would, no doubt, be one to which no answer could be given. This would not, however, render the nature of reality in any way contingent. For such a question would be meaningless. Enquiries as to the reasons of things have their place only within the universe, whose existence they presuppose. We have no right to make them with regard to the universe itself. Thus in the case we have supposed con- tingency would be entirely eliminated, yet immediacy would remain untouched. We should still know reality, not by thought alone, but because it was given to us. 48. It seems probable that Hegel did suppose that the Absolute Idea, when completely realised, involved the elimination of the contingent, w^hich indeed he treats^ as part of a lower category, which is, of course, transcended in the highest. It may certainly be doubted whether human knowledge could ever attain, as a matter of fact, to this height of perfection. In particular, it may be asked whether such a state of knowledge would not require other means than our present senses for the perception of reality outside ourselves. But whether the elimination of Contingency is or is not possible, the point which is important to us here is that, should it take place, it does not involve the elimination of the immediate, and therefore does not prove that Hegel had any intention of declaring thought to be self-sufficing, even when it reached the Absolute Idea. In the stage immediately before the Absolute Idea — that of ordinary cognition and volition — it is evident that the idea is not self-sufficing, since it is certain that we can neither think nor resolve in every-day life without some immediate data. Now the point of transition between this category and the Absolute Idea is stated to be "the unity of the theoretical and practical idea, and thus at the same time the unity of the idea of life with that of cognition. In cognition we had the idea in the shape of 1 Enc. Section 145. n] OF THE DIALECTIC 53 differentiation. The process of cognition has issued in the over- throw of this differentiation, and the restoration of that unity which, as unity, and in its immediacy, is in the first instance the Idea of Life^." In this there is nothing which tends to the elimination of immediacy, or to the self-sufficiency of thought, but only the complete discovery in the outside world of the pure thought which is also in us. Again, in the idea of Life, thought is certainly not self-sufficing, since one of the essential characteristics of this category is that the soul is in relation to a body, which involves, of course, sensa- tion. Now the Absolute Idea is a synthesis of this category and the category of Cognition. Thought is mediate in both of these. How then can it be immediate in the synthesis? The correction of inadequacies in the Hegelian logic comes by the emphasis of one side in the thesis and of the other in the antithesis, the synthesis reconciling the two. The synthesis, throughout the entire dialectic, can only advance on the thesis and antithesis on points in which they disagree with one another. On points in which they agree it can make no change. And when, in Absolute Spirit, Hegel reaches that which he unquestionably believes to be self-mediated and self-sufficing, he only does so because it is a synthesis of the mediating logic and the element of immediacy or "givenness" which first occurs in nature. But within the logic there is no immediacy to balance the admitted mere mediacy of the finite categories, and the distinction of mediacy and immediacy cannot therefore, within the logic, be transcended. 49. We find no sign again of transcended mediation in the direct definition of the Absolute Idea. "Dieses aus der Dif^erenz und Endlichkeit des Erkennens zu sich zuriickgekommene und durch die Thatigkeit des Begriffs mit ihm identisch gewordene Leben ist die speculative oder absolute Idee. Die Idee als Einheit der subjectiven und der objectiven Idee ist der Begriff der Idee, dem die Idee als solche der Gegenstand, dem das Objekt sie ist; ein Objekt, in welches alle Bestimmungen zusammen gegangen sind2." The second sentence of the definition asserts that the idea is 1 Enc. Section 236, lecture note. ^ Enr. Sections 235, 236. 54 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS [ch. the "Gegenstand und Objekt" to the notion of the idea. This cannot, it appears to me, be taken as equivalent to a statement that thought here becomes self-subsistent and self-mediating. It seems rather to signify that that which is immediately given to thought to mediate, is now known to be itself thought, although still immediately given. In other words, the Absolute Idea is realised when the thinker sees in the whole world round him nothing but the realisation of the same idea which forms his own essential nature — is at once conscious of the existence of the other, and of its fundamental similarity to himself. The expression that the idea as such is the object to the notion of the idea seems rather to support this view by indicating that the idea as object is viewed in a different aspect from the idea as subject. If im- mediacy was here gained by thought, so that it required no object given from outside, it would have been more natural to say that the idea was its own object, or indeed that the dis- tinction of subject and object had vanished altogether. If this is the correct interpretation of this passage, then thought remains, for Hegel, in the Absolute Idea, what it has been in all the finite categories. Although the content of all experience contains, in such a case, nothing which is not a mani- festation of the pure Absolute Idea, yet to every subject in whom that idea is realised, the idea is presented in the form of immediate data, which are mediated by the subject's own action. The fundamental nature of subject and object is the same, but the distinction between them remains in their relation to one another. No doubt Hegel regards as the highest ideal of the dialectic process something which shall be self-mediated, and in which mediation as an external process vanishes. But this he finds in Absolute Spirit, which is a synthesis of the Absolute Idea with the element of immediate presentation. The Absolute Idea is still an abstraction, as compared with the whole of Absolute Spirit, and is not self-mediated. 50. We have now to consider the third objection which has been raised to the theory of Hegel's meaning explained in the first chapter. This objection is that Hegel has ascribed ontological validity to his dialectic to a greater extent than this theory admits, and that he has attempted to account by pure thought. II] OF THE DIALECTIC 55 not only for the rationality, but also for the entire existence of the universe. This is maintained by Professor Seth, who objects to the system chiefly, it would seem, on this ground. He says, for example, "Hegel apparently says, on one occasion, that his own elaborate phraseology means no more than the ancient position that vov -^ ^ ^ ^ arise in any system of complete idealism. Every such system 3^"^ ^ ^ '^ * •■ *^ > * question. O '^ •• ^ ^ ^ 152. Hegel's answer has been indicated in the passage quoted ^^ ^ ■ .'^ above^. The infinite end is really accomplished eternally. It is "^ "^ * 3b 5 t ^ tt only a delusion on our part which makes us suppose otherwise. \ '^v t^ ^ H "*• 11 And the only real progress is the removal of the delusion. The ^ ^ S '^ ^ universe is eternally the same, and eternally perfect. The move- ^ ^ X -^ qj ment is only in our minds. They trace one after another in ^ "^ ^ ^ ^ \ uif) succession the difierent categories of the Logic, which in reality 3^^ ^ ^"Cihave no time order, but continually coexist as elements of the^ ^ ^ ^ )2 t "^ ^Absolute Idea which transcends and unites them. "** ^ -^ H ^ \^^ \ This solution can, however, scarcely be accepted, for the ^ I^ f> ^ \ reasons given above. How can we account for the delusion that^ f^ JT ** "^ ^j- ^ Enc, Section 212, lecture note. ^C ^\ ft / ^ ^ W\ ^ ^ 5HX Jo ^CNJ H10^ IVWI ^^^ s>^\n^!i>40^ ^ ' J.N3i.y9 Ml 3i,iNy ^\ Uy\^^ JloV s^^, -\^ /,; 172 THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME [ch. the world is partially irrational, if, as a matter of fact, it is completely rational? How, in particular, can we regard such a delusion as compatible with our own complete rationality? To this it may be possibly objected that our argument is based on a confusion. That a thought is a delusion need not imply that it, or the being who thinks it, is irrational. Everything which, like a thought, is used as a symbol, can be viewed in two aspects — firstly as a fact, and secondly as representing, as a symbol, some other fact. In the first aspect we say that it is real or unreal ; in the second that it is true or false. These two pairs of predicates have no intrinsic connection. A false judgment is just as really a fact as a true one. Now the conclusion from the Hegelian dialectic was that what- ever was real was rational. We are, therefore, compelled to assert that every thought, and every thinking being, is completely rational — can be explained in a way which gives entire rest and satisfaction to reason. But, it may be said, this is not in the least interfered with by the fact that many real thoughts are defective symbols of the other reality which they profess to represent. The false can be, and, indeed, must be, real, for a thought cannot misrepresent reality unless it is itself real. Till it is real it can do nothing. And if the false can be real, why can it not be rational? Indeed we often, in every-day life, and in science, do find the false to be more or less rational. It is as possible to account, psychologically, for the course of thought which brings out an erroneous conclusion as for the course of thought which brings out a correct one. We can explain our failures to arrive at the truth as well as our successes. It would seem then that there is nothing to prevent ourselves and our thoughts being part of a completely rational universe, although our thoughts are in some respects incorrect symbols. 153. But it must be remembered that the rationality which Hegel requires of the universe is much more than complete deter- mination under the category of cause and effect — a category which the dialectic maintains to be quite insufficient, unless transcended by a higher one. He requires, among other things, the validity of the idea of final cause. And if this is brought in, it is difficult to see how delusions can exist in a rational world. For a delusion V] THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME 173 involves a thwarted purpose. If a man makes a mistake, it means that he wishes to know the truth, and that he does not know it. Whether this is the case or not, with regard to simple perception of the facts before us, it cannot be denied that wherever there is a long chain of argument, to which the mind is voluntarily kept attentive, there must be a desire to know the truth. And if this desire is unsuccessful, the universe could not be, in Hegel's sense, completely rational. This becomes more evident if we look at Hegel's definition of complete rationality, as we find it in the Absolute Idea. The essence of it is that reality is only completely rational in so far as it is conscious of its own rationality. The idea is to be " Gegen- stand" and " Objekt" to itself. If this is the case, it follows that the rationality of Spirit, as an existent object, depends upon its being a faithful symbol of the rationality expressed in other manifestations of Spirit. The delusion by which Hegel explains all imperfection will of course prevent its being a faithful symbol of that rationality, and will therefore destroy the rationality itself. In so far as we do not see the perfection of the universe, we are not perfect ourselves. And as we are part of the universe, that too cannot be perfect. And yet its perfection appears to be a necessary consequence of Hegel's position. . 154. HegeFs attempt to make the imperfection which is evident round us compatible with the perfection of the universe must, then, be rejected. Can we find any other solution which would be more successful? One such solution suggests itself. It was the denial of the ultimate reality of time which caused our difficulty, since it forced us to assert that the perfect rationality, which idealism claims for the universe, cannot be postponed to the future, but must be timelessly and eternally present. Can the denial of the reality of time be made to cure the wound, which it has itself made? Would it not be possible, it might be said, to escape from our dilemma as follows? The dialectic itself teaches us that it is only the concrete whole which is completely rational, and that any abstraction from it, by the very fact that it is an abstraction, must be to some extent false and contra- dictory. An attempt to take reality moment by moment, ele- ment by element, must make reahty appear imperfect. The 174 THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME [ch. complete rationality is only in the whole which transcends all these elements, and any one of them, considered as more or less independent, must be false. Now, if we look at the universe as in time, it will appear to be a succession of separate events, so that only part of it is existing at any given instant, the rest being either past or future. Each of these events will be represented as real in itself, and not merely a moment in a real whole. And in so far as events in time are taken to be, as such, real, it must follow that reality does not appear rational. If an organic whole is perfect, then any one of its parts, taken separately from the whole, cannot possibly be perfect. For in such a whole all the parts presuppose one another, and any one, taken by itself, must bear the traces of its isolation and incompleteness. Now the connection of the different parts of the universe, viewed in their ultimate reality, is, according to the dialectic, even closer than the connection of the parts of an organism. And thus not only each event, but the whole universe taken as a series of separate events, would appear imperfect. Even if such a series could ever be complete, it could not fully represent the reality, since the parts would still, by their existence in time, be isolated from one another, and claim some amount of independence. Thus the apparent imperfection of the universe would be due to the fact that we are regarding it sub specie temforis — an aspect which we have seen reason to conclude that Hegel himself did not regard as adequate to reality. If we could only see it sub specie aeternitatis, we should see it in its real perfection. 155. It is true, I think, that in this way we get a step nearer to the goal required than we do by Hegel's own theory, which we previously considered. Our task is to find, for the apparent imperfection, some cause whose existence will not interfere with the real perfection. We shall clearly be more likely to succeed in this, in proportion as the cause we assign is a purely negative one. The appearance of imperfection was accounted for by Hegel as a delusion of our own minds. Now a delusion is as much a positive fact as a true judgment is, and requires just as much a positive cause. And, as we have seen, we are unable to con- ceive this positive cause, except as something which will prevent the appearance from being a delusion at all, since it will make V] THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME 175 the universe really imperfect. On the theory just propounded, however, the cause of the imperfection is nothing but the fact that we do not see everything at once. Seen as we see things now, reality must be imperfect. But if we can attain to the point of looking at the whole universe sub specie aeternifatis, we shall see just the same subject-matter as in time; but it will appear perfect, because seen as a single concrete whole, and not as a succession of separated abstractions. The only cause of the apparent imperfection will be the negative consideration that we do not now see the whole at once. 156. This theory would be free from some of the objections which are fatal to a rather similar apology for the universe which is often found in systems of optimism. It is admitted in such apologies that, from the point of \'iew of individuals, the world is imperfect and irrational. But, it is asserted, these blemishes would disappear if we could look at the world as a whole. The part which, taken by itself, is defective, may, we are told, be an element in a perfect harmony. Such a theory, since it declares that the universe can be really perfect, although imperfect for individuals, implies that some individuals, at any rate, can be treated merely as means, and not as ends in themselves. Without enquiring whether such a view is at all tenable, it is at any rate clear that it is incompatible with what is usually called optimism, since it would permit of many— indeed of all — individuals being doomed to eternal and infinite misery. We might be led to the formula in which Mr Bradley sums up optimism: — "The world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil^." For if the universal harmony can make any evil to indi- viduals compatible with its own purposes, there is no principle upon which we can limit the amount which it can tolerate. It is more to our present purpose to remark that such a view could not possibly be accepted as in any way consistent with Hegel's system. It would be in direct opposition to its whole tendency, which is to regard the universal as only gaining reality and validity when, by its union with the particular, it becomes the individual. For Hegel the ideal must lie, not in ignoring the claims of indi- viduals, but in seeing in them the embodiment of the universal. ^ Appearance and Reality, Preface, p. xiv. 176 THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME [ch. Mr Bradley's own treatment of the problem is, as far as I can see, of a rather similar type. He has to reconcile the harmony which he attributes to the Absolute, with the disharmony which undoubtedly prevails, to some extent, in experience. This he does by taking the finite individual to be, as such, only appearance and not reality, from which it follows that it must distort the harmony of the Absolute, and cannot adequately manifest it. It may be doubted whether we do not fall into more difficulties than we avoid by this low estimate of the conscious individual. But, at any rate, such a solution would be impracticable for anyone who accepted HegeFs version of the Absolute Idea, to which the individual is the highest form that the universal can take. Some of the objections which apply to such attempts to save the perfection of the Absolute by ignoring the claims of indi- viduals will not hold against our endeavour to escape from our difficulty by ignoring, so to speak, the claims of particular moments of time. None of those considerations which make us consider each separate person as an ultimate reality, whose claims to self-realisation must be satisfied and cannot be transcended, lead us to attribute the same importance to separate periods of time. Indeed the whole drift of Hegel's system is as much against the ultimate reality of a succession of phenomena, as such, as it is in favour of the ultimate reality of individual persons, as such. To deny any reality in what now presents itself to us as a time-series would indeed be suicidal. For we have no data given us for our thought, except in the form of a time-series, and to destroy our data would be to destroy the super-structure. But while philosophy could not start if it did not accept its data, it could not proceed if it did not alter them. There is then nothing obviously impossible in the supposition that the whole appearance of succession in our experience is, as such, unreal, and that reality is one timeless whole, in which all that appears successive is really co-existent, as the houses are co-existent which we see successively from the windows of a train. 157. It cannot, however, be said that this view is held by Hegel himself. In the Philosophy of Nature he treats time as a stage in the development of nature, and not as a cause why V] THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME 177 there is any appearance of successive development at all. Indeed he says there that things are not finite because they are in time, but are in time because they are finite^. It would be thus im- possible, without departing from Hegel, to make time the cause of the apparent imperfection of the universe. Everything else in the HegeHan philosophy may indeed be considered as of subordinate importance to the Dialectic, and to its goal, the Absolute Idea. If it were necessary, we might, to save the validity of the Dialectic, reject Hegel's views even on a subject so important as time, and yet call ourselves Hegehans. But we should not gain much by this reconstruction of the system. For it leaves the problem no more solved than it was before. The difficulty which proved fatal to Hegel's own attempt to explain the imperfection comes back as surely as before, though it may not be quite so obvious. However much we may treat time as mere appearance, it must, hke all other appearance, have reality behind it. The reality, it may be answered, is in this case the timeless Absolute. But this reality will have to account, not merely for the facts which appear to us in time, but for the appearance of succession which they do undoubtedly assume. How can this be done? What reason can be given why the eternal reality should manifest itself in a time process at all? If we tried to find the reason outside the nature of the eternal reality, we should be admitting that time had some independent validity, and we should fall back into all the difficulties mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter. But if we try to find the reason inside the nature of the eternal reality, we shall find it to be incompatible with the complete rationality which, according to Hegel's theory, that reality must possess. For the process in time is, by the hypothesis, the root of all irrationality, and how can it spring from anything which is quite free of irrationality? Why should a concrete and perfect whole proceed to make itself imperfect, for the sake of gradually getting rid of the imper- fection again? If it gained nothing by the change, could it be completely rational to undergo it? But if it had anything to gain by the change, how could it previously have been perfect? 158. We have thus failed again to solve the difficulty. How- ^ Enc. Section 258, lecture note. 178 THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME [ch. ever much we may endeavour to make the imperfection of the universe merely negative, it is impossible to escape from the fact that, as an element in presentation, it requires a positive ground. If we denied this, we should be forced into the position that not only was our experience of imperfection a delusion, but that it was actually non-existent. And this, as was mentioned above, is an impossibility. All reasoning depends on the fact that every appearance has a reality of which it is the appearance. Without this we could have no possible basis upon which to rest any conclusion. Yet, on the other hand, so long as we admit a positive ground for the imperfection, we find ourselves to be inconsistent with the original position from which we started. For that position asserted that the sole reality was absolutely perfect. On this hangs the appearance of imperfection, and to this real perfection as cause we have to ascribe apparent imperfection as effect. Now it is not impossible, under certain circumstances, to imagine a cause as driven on, by a dialectic necessity, to produce an effect different from itself. But in this case it does seem impossible. For any self-determination of a cause to produce its effect must be due to some incompleteness in the former without the latter. But if the cause, by itself, was incomplete, it could not, by itself, be perfect. If, on the other hand it was perfect, it is impossible to see how it could produce anything else as an effect. Its per- fection makes it in complete harmony with itself. And, since it is all reality, there is nothing outside it with which it could be out of harmony. What could determine it to production? Thus we oscillate between two extremes, each equally fatal. If we endeavour to treat evil as absolutely unreal, we have to reject the one basis of all knowledge — experience. But in so far as we accept evil as a manifestation of reality, we find it im- possible to avoid qualifying the cause by the nature of the effect which it produces, and so contradicting the main result of the dialectic — the harmony and perfection of the Absolute. 159. We need not, after all, be surprised at the apparently insoluble problem which confronts us. For the question has developed into the old difficulty of the origin of evil, which has always baffled both theologians and philosophers. An idealism V] THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME 179 which declares that the universe is in reality perfect, can find, as most forms of popular idealism do, an escape from the diffi- culties of the existence of evil, by declaring that the world is as yet only growing towards its ideal perfection. But this refuge disappears with the reality of time, and we are left with an awkward difference between what our philosophy tells us must be, and what our life tells us actually is. The aim of the dialectic was to prove that all reality was completely rational. And Hegel's arguments led him to the conclusion that the universe as a whole could not be rational, except in so far as each of its parts found its own self-realisation. It followed that the universe, if harmonious on the theoretical side, would be harmonious also in a practical aspect — that is, would be in every respect perfect. This produces a dilemma. Either the evil round us is real, or it is not. If it is real, then reality is not perfectly rational. But if it is absolutely unreal, then all our finite experience — and we know of no other — must have an element in it which is absolutely irrational, and which, however much we may pronounce it to be unreal, has a dis- agreeably powerful influence in moulding the events of our present life. Nor can we even hope that this element is transitory, and comfort ourselves, in orthodox fashion, with the hope of a heaven in which the evil shall have died away, while the good remains. For we cannot assure ourselves of such a result by any empirical arguments from particular data, which would be hope- lessly inadequate to support such a conclusion. The only chance would be an a 'priori argument founded on the essential rationality of the universe, which might be held to render the imperfection transitory. But we should have no right to use such an argument. To escape the difficulties involved in the present coexistence of rationality and irrationality, we have reduced the latter to such complete unreality that it is not incompatible with the former. But this cuts both ways. If the irrationality cannot interfere with the rationality so as to render their present coexistence impossible, there can be no reason why their future coexistence should ever become impossible. If the irrational is absolutely unreal now, it can never become less real in the future. Thus our ascription of complete rationality to the universe leads us to a 180 THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME [ch. belief that one factor in experience, as it presents itself to us, is fundamentally and permanently irrational — a somewhat sin- gular conclusion from such a premise. To put the difficulty from a more practical point of view, either the imperfection in experience leaves a stain on the per- fection of the Absolute, or it does not. If it does, there is no absolute perfection, and we have no right to expect that the imperfection around us is a delusion or a transitory phase. But if it does not, then there is no reason why the perfection should ever feel intolerant of it, and again we have no right to hope for its disappearance. The whole practical interest of philosophy is thus completely overthrown. It asserts an abstract perfection beyond experience, but that is all. Such a perfection might almost as well be a Thing-in-itself, since it is unable to explain any single fact of experience without the aid of another factor, which it may call unreal, but which it finds indispensable. It entirely fails to rationalise reality or to reconcile it with our aspirations. 160. The conclusion we have reached is one which it certainly seems difficult enough to reconcile with continued adherence to Hegelianism. Of the two possible theories as to the relation of time to the dialectic process, we have found that one, besides involving grave difficulties in itself, is quite inconsistent with the spirit of Hegel's system. The other, again, while consistent with that system, and, indeed, appearing to be its logical con- sequence, has landed us in what seems to be a glaring contradic- tion to the facts. Is it not inevitable that we must reject a system which leads us to such a result? Before deciding on such a course, however, it might be wise to see if we can really escape from the difficulty in such a way. If the same problem, or one of like nature, proves equally in- soluble in any possible system, we may be forced to admit the existence of an incompleteness in our philosophy, but we shall no longer have any reason to reject one system in favour of another. Now, besides the theory which has brought us into this trouble — the theory that reality is fundamentally rational — there are, it would seem, three other possibilities. Reality may be fundamentally irrational. (I shall use "irrational" here to V] THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME 181 signify anything whose nature and operation are not merely devoid of reason, but opposed to it, so that its influence is always in the opposite direction to that exercised by reason.) Or reality may be the product of two independent principles of rationality and irrationality. Or it may be the work of some principle to which rationality and irrationality are equally indifferent — some blind fate, or mechanical chance. These possibilities may be taken as exhaustive. It is true that, on Hegelian principles, a fifth alternative has to be added, when we are considering the different combinations in which two predicates may be asserted or denied of a subject. We may say that it is also possible that the two predicates should be combined in a higher unity. This would leave it scarcely correct to say, without quahfication, that either is asserted or either denied of the sub j ect. But synthesis is itself a process of reasoning, and unites its two terms by a category in which we recognise the nature of each extreme as a subordinate moment, which is harmonised with the other. The harmony involves that, wherever a synthesis is possible, reason is supreme. And so, if the truth were to be found in a synthesis of the rational and irrational, that synthesis would itself be rational — resolving, as it would, the whole universe into a unity expressible by thought. Thus we should have come round again to Hegel's position that the world is fundamentally rational. 161. We need not spend much time over the supposition that the world is fundamentally irrational — not only regardless of reason, but contrary to reason. To begin with, such a hypothesis refutes itself. The completely irrational cannot be real, for even to say that a thing is real implies its determination by at least one predicate, and therefore its comparative rationality. And our hypothesis would meet with a difficulty precisely analogous to that which conflicts with Hegel's theory. In that case the stumbling-block lay in the existence of some irrationality, here it lies in the existence of some rationality. We can no more deny that there are signs of rationality in the universe, than we can deny that there are signs of irrationality. Yet it is at least as impossible to conceive how the fundamentally irrational should manifest itseK as rationality, as it is to conceive the converse 182 THE RELATION OP THE DIALECTIC TO TIME [ch. process. We shall gain nothing, then, by deserting Hegel for such a theory as this. 162. It might seem as if a dualistic theory would be well adapted to the chequered condition of the actual world. But as soon as we try to construct such a theory, difficulties arise. The two principles, of rationality and irrationality, to which the universe is referred, will have to be absolutely separate and independent. For if there were any common unity to which they should be referred, it would be that unity, and not its two manifestations, which would be the ultimate explanation of the universe, and the theory, having become monistic, resolves itself into one of the others, according to the attitude of this single principle towards reason, whether favourable, hostile, or in- different. We must then refer the universe to two independent and opposed forces. Nor will it make any important difference if we make the second force to be, not irrationality, but some blind force not in itself hostile to reason. For, in order to account for the thwarted rationahty which meets us so often in the universe, we shall have to suppose that the result of the force is, as a fact, opposed to reason, even if opposition to reason is not its essential nature. In the first place can there be really two independent powers in the universe? Surely there cannot. As Mr Bradley points out : "Plurality must contradict independence. If the beings are not in relation, they cannot be many; but if they are in relation, they cease forthwith to be absolute. For, on the one hand, plurality has no meaning, unless the units are somehow taken together. If you abolish and remove all relations, there seems no sense left in which you can speak of pluraUty. But, on the other hand, relations destroy the real's self-dependence. For it is impossible to treat relations as adjectives, falling simply inside the many beings. And it is impossible to take them as falhng outside somewhere in a sort of unreal void, which makes no difference to anything. Hence... the essence of the related terms is carried beyond their proper selves by means of their relations. And, again, the relations themselves must belong to a larger reality. To stand in a relation and not to be relative, to support V] THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME 183 it and yet not to be infected and undermined by it, seem out of the question. Diversity in the real cannot be the plurality of independent beings. And the oneness of the Absolute must hence be more than a mere diffused adjective. It possesses unity, as a whole, and is a single system^." The argument has additional strength in this case. For the two forces which we are asked to take as absolutely opposed are, by the hypothesis which assumed them, indissolubly united. Both forces are regarded as all-pervading. Neither can exist by itself anywhere. Every fact in the universe is due to the inter- action of the two. And, further, they can only be described and defined in relation to one another. If the dualism is between the rational and the irrational as such, it is obvious that the latter, at any rate, has only meaning in relation to its opposite. And if we assume that the second principle is not directly opposed to rationality, but simply indifferent to it, we shall get no further in our task of explaining the imperfect rationality which appears in our data, unless we go on to assume that its action is contrary to that of a rational principle. Thus a reference to reason would be necessary, if not to define our second principle, at any rate to allow us to understand how we could make it available for our purpose. We cannot, besides, describe anything as irrational, or as in- different to reason, without ascribing to it certain predicates — Being, Substance, Limitation, for example. Nor can we refer to a principle as an explanation of the universe without attributing to it Causality. These determinations may be transcended by higher ones, but they must be there, at least as moments. Yet anything to which all these predicates can be ascribed cannot be said to be entirely hostile or indifferent to reason, for it has some determinations common to it and to reason, and must be, therefore, in more or less harmony with the latter. But if this is so, our complete dualism has been surrendered. The two principles then can scarcely be taken as absolutely independent. But if they cannot our dualism fails to help us, and indeed vanishes. We were tempted to resort to it because the two elements in experience — the rationality and the want ^ Appearance and Reality, Chap. 13, p. 141. 184 THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME [ch. of rationality — were so heterogeneous as to defy reduction to a single principle. And if we cannot keep our two principles distinct, but are compelled to regard them as joined in a higher unity, we might as well return expHcitly to monism. 163. But, even if we could keep the two principles indepen- dent, it seems doubtful if we should be able to reach, by means of this theory, a solution of our difficulty. The forces working for and against the rationaUty of the universe must either be in equilibrium or not. If they are not in equilibrium, then one must be gaining on the other. The universe is thus fundamentally a process. In this case we shall gain nothing by adopting dualism. For the difficulties attendant on conceiving the world as a process were just the reason which compelled us to adopt the theory that the universe was at present perfectly rational, and so pro- duced the further difficulties which are now driving us to look round for a substitute for idealism. If we could have taken development in time as ultimately real, we should have found no hindrance in our way when we endeavoured to conceive the universe as the product of a single rational principle. But we could not do so then, and we shall find it as impossible now. The process must be finite in length, since we can attach no meaning to an actual infinite process. And, since it is still continuing, we shall have to suppose that the two principles came into operation at a given moment, and not before. And since these principles are, on the hypothesis, ultimate, there can be nothing to deter- mine them to begin to act at that point, rather than any other. In this way we shall be reduced, as before, to suppose an event to happen in time without antecedents and without cause — a solution which cannot be accepted as satisfactory. 164. Shall we succeed any better on the supposition that the forces which work for and against rationaUty are exactly balanced? In the first place we should have to admit that the odds against this occurring were infinity to one. For the two forces are, by the hypothesis, absolutely independent of one another. And, therefore, we cannot suppose any common influence acting on both of them, which should tend to make their forces equal, nor any relationship between them, which should bring about this result. The equilibrium could only be the result of mere chance, V] THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME 185 and the probability of this producing infinitely exact equilibrium would be infinitely small. And the absence of any a friori reason for believing in such an equilibrium could not, of course, be supplied by empirical observation. For the equilibrium would have to extend over the whole universe, and we cannot carry our observations so far. Nor can we support the theory by the consideration that it, and no other, will explain the undoubted co-existence of the rational and irrational in our present world. For it fails to account for the facts. It fails to explain the existence of change — at any rate of that change which leaves anything more or less rational, more or less perfect, than it was before. It is a fact which cannot be denied that sometimes that which was good becomes evil, and sometimes that which was evil becomes good. Now, if the two principles are exactly balanced, how could such a change take place? Of course we cannot prove that the balance between the two forces does not remain the same, if we consider the whole universe. Every movement in the one direction, in one part of the whole, may be balanced by a corresponding move in the other direction somewhere else. As we do not know the entire universe in detail it is impossible for us to refute this supposition. But even this supposition will not remove the diflficulty. We have two principles whose relations to one another are constant. Yet the facts around us, which are manifestations of these two principles, and of these two principles only, manifest them in proportions which constantly change. How is this change to be accounted for? If we are to take time and change as ultimate facts, such a contradiction seems insuperable. On the other hand, to deny the ultimate validity of time and change, commits us to the series of arguments, the failure of which first led us to doubt Hegel's position. If time could be viewed as a manifestation of the timeless, we need not have abandoned monism, for the difficulty of imperfection could then have been solved. If, however, time cannot be viewed in this way, the contradiction between the unchanging relation of the principles and the constant change of their effects appears hopeless. 165. There remains the theory that the world is exclusively the product of a principle which regards neither rationality nor 186 THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME [ch, irrationality, but is directed to some aim outside them, or to na aim at all. Such a theory might account, no doubt, for the fact that the world is not a complete and perfect manifestation either of rationality or irrationality. But it is hardly exaggerated ta say that this is the only fact about the world which it would account for. The idea of such a principle is contradictory. We can have no conception of its operation, of its nature, or even of its existence, without bringing it under some predicates of the reason. And if this is valid, the principle is, to some extent at least, rational. 166. So far indeed, the rationahty would be but slight. And it might be suggested that the solution of the difl&culty would be found in the idea that reality was, if we might so express it, moderately rational. Up to this point we have supposed that our only choice was between a principle manifesting the com- plete and perfect rationahty, which is embodied in Hegel's Absolute Idea, and a principle entirely hostile or indifferent to reason. But what if the ultimate principle of the universe was one of which, for example, the categories of Being and Essence were valid, while those of the Notion remained unjustified ideals? This would account, it might be said, at once for the fact that the universe was sufficiently in accord viath our reason for us to perceive it and attempt to comprehend it, and also for the fact that we fail to comprehend it completely. It would explain the judgment that the world, as we see it, might be better and might also be worse, which common sense pronounces, and which philosophy, whether it accepts it or not, is bound to explain somehow. The supporters of such a theory, however, would have a difficult task before them. They might claim to reject Hegel's general theory of the universe on the ground that, on this ques- tion of imperfection, it was hopelessly in conflict with the facts. But when they, in their turn, set up a positive system, and asserted the earher categories to be vahd of reality, while the later ones were delusions, they would have to meet in detail Hegel's arguments that the earlier categories, unless synthesised by the later ones, plunge us in contradictions. The dialectic, being now merely negative and critical of another system, could V] THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME 187 not be disposed of on the ground that its own system broke down as a whole. Its arguments against the independent validity of the earlier categories would have to be met directly. What the issue of the conflict would be cannot be considered here, as considerations of space have prevented me from including in this book any discussion of the steps of the dialectic in detail. It may be remarked in passing, however, that several of the commentators, who unhesitatingly reject the system as a whole, admit the cogency of the argument from step to step in the Logic — which is all that is wanted here. This, at any rate, is certain, that the possibility of explaining the existence of imperfection by such a theory as we have been considering, can give us no grounds for rejecting Hegel's system which we did not possess before. For if the deduction of the categories is defective, Hegelianism must be rejected as unproved, independently of its success or failure in interpreting the facts. And if the deduction of the categories is correct, then the theory of the partial rationality of reality must be given up. For, in that case, to assert the validity of the lower categories without the higher would be to assert a contradiction, and to do this is to destroy all possibihty of coherent thought. 167. It would seem then that any other system offers as many obstacles to a satisfactory explanation of our difficulty as were presented by Hegel's theory. Is the inquirer then bound to take refuge in complete scepticism, and reject all systems of philosophy, since none can avoid inconsistencies or absurdities on this point? This might perhaps be the proper course to pursue, if it were possible. But it is not possible. For every word and every action implies some theory of metaphysics. Every assertion or denial of fact — including the denial that anything is certain — implies that something is certain ; and a doubt, also, implies our certainty that we doubt. Now to admit this, and yet to reject all ultimate explanations of the universe, is a contradiction at least as serious as any of those into which we were led by our attempt to explain away imperfection in obedience to the demands of Hegel's system. We find then as many, and as grave, difficulties in our way when we take up any other system, or when we attempt to take up no system at all, as met us when we considered Hegel's theory, 188 THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME [ch. and our position towards the latter must be to some degree modified. We can no longer reject it, because it appears to lead to an absurdity, if every possible form in which it can be rejected involves a similar absurdity. At the same time we cannot possibly acquiesce in an unreconciled contradiction. Is there any other course open to us? 168. We must remark, in the first place, that the position in which the system finds itself, though difficult enough, is not a reductio ad absurdum. When an argument ends in such a reduction, there can never be any hesitation or doubt about rejecting the hypothesis with which it started. It is desired to know if a certain proposition is true. The assumption is made that the proposition is true, and it is found that the assumption leads to a contradiction. Thus there is no conflict of arguments. The hypothesis was made, not because it had been proved true, but to see what results would follow. Hence there is nothing to contradict the inference that the hypothesis must be false, which we draw from the absurdity of its consequences. On the one side is only a supposition, on the other ascertained facts. This, however, is not the case here. The conclusion, that the universe is timelessly perfect, which appears to be in conflict with certain facts, is not a mere hypothesis, but asserts itself to be a correct deduction from other facts as certain as those which oppose it. Hence there is no reason why one should yield to the other. The inference that the universe is completely rational, and the inference that it is not, are both deduced by reasoning from the facts of experience. Unless we find a flaw in one or the other of the chains of deduction, we have no more right to say that Hegel's dialectic is wrong because the world is imperfect, than to deny that the world is imperfect, because Hegel's dialectic proves that it cannot be so. It might appear at first sight as if the imperfection of the world was an immediate certainty. But in reality only the data of sense, upon which, in the last resort, all propositions must depend for their connection with reality, are here immediate. All judgments require mediation. And, even if the existence of imperfection in experience was an immediate certainty, yet the conclusion that its existence was incompatible with the perfection of the V] THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME 189 universe as a whole, could clearly only be reached mediately, by the refutation of the various arguments by means of which a reconciliation has been attempted. It is, no doubt, our first duty, when two chains of reasoning appear to lead to directly opposite results, to go over them with the greatest care, that we may ascertain whether the apparent discrepancy is not due to some mistake of our own. It is also true that the chain of arguments, by which we arrive at the conclusion that the world is perfect, is both longer and less generally accepted than the other chain by which we reach the conclusion that there is imperfection in the world, and that this prevents the world from being perfect. We may, therefore, possibly be right in expecting beforehand to find a flaw in the first chain of reasoning, rather than in the second. This, however, will not entitle us to adopt the one view as against the other. We may expect beforehand to find an error in an argument, but if in point of fact we do not succeed in finding one, we are bound to continue to accept the conclusion. For we are compelled to yield our assent to each step in the argument, so long as we do not see any mistake in it, and we shall in this way be conducted as inevitably to the end of the long chain as of the short one. 169. We may, I think, assume, for the purposes of our enquiry, that no discovery of error will occur to relieve us from our perplexity, since we are endeavouring to discuss here, not the truth of the Hegelian dialectic, but the consequences which will follow from it if it is true. And we have now to consider what we must do in the presence of two equally authoritative judg- ments which contradict one another. The only course which it is possible to take appears to me that described by Mr Balfour. The thinker must "accept both contradictories, thinking thereby to obtain, under however un- satisfactory a form, the fullest measure of truth which he is at present able to grasp^."' Of course we cannot adopt the same mental attitude which we should have a right to take in case our conclusions harmonised with one another. W^e must never lose sight of the fact that the two results do not harmonise, and ^ Defence of Philosophic Doubt, p. 313. 190 THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME [ch. that there must be something wrong somewhere. But we do not know where. And to take any step except this, would imply that we did know where the error lay. If we rejected the one conclusion in favour of the other, or if we rejected both in favour of scepticism, we should thereby assert, in the first case, that there was an error on the one side and not on the other, in the second case that there were errors on both sides. Now, if the case is as it has been stated above, we have no right to make such assertions, for we have been unable to detect errors on either side. All that we can do is to hold to both sides, and to recognise that, till one is refuted, or both are reconciled, our knowledge is in a very unsatisfactory state. At the same time we shall have to be very careful not to let our dissatisfaction with the conflict, from which we cannot escape, carry us into either an exphcit avowal or a tacit acceptance of any form of scepticism. For this would mean more than the mere equipoise of the two lines of argument. It would mean, at least, the entire rejection of the one which asserts that the universe is completely rational. And, as has been said, we have no right to reject either side of the contradiction, for no flaw has been found in either. 170. The position in which we are left appears to be this: If we cannot reject Hegel's dialectic, our system of knowledge will contain an unsolved contradiction. But that contradiction gives us no more reason for rejecting the Hegelian dialectic than for doing anything else, since a similar contradiction appears wherever we turn. We are merely left with the conviction that something is fundamentally wrong in knowledge which all looks equally trustworthy. Where to find the error we cannot tell. Such a result is sufficiently unsatisfactory. Is it possible to find a conclusion not quite so negative? We cannot, as it seems to us at present, deny that both the propositions are true, nor deny that they are contradictory. Yet we know that one must be false, or else that they cannot be contradictory. Is there any reason to hope that the solution lies in the last alternative? This result would be less sceptical and destructive than any other. It would not involve any positive mistake in our previous reasonings, as far as they went, such as V] THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME 191 would be involved if harmony was restored by the discovery that one of the two conclusions was fallacious. It would only mean that we had not gone on far enough. The two contradictory pro- positions — that the world was fundamentally perfect, and that imperfection did exist — would be harmonised and reconciled by a synthesis, in the same way that the contradictions within the dialectic itself are overcome. The two sides of the opposition would not so much be both false as both true. They would be taken up into a higher sphere where the truth of both is preserved. Moreover, the solution in this case would be exactly what might be expected if the Hegelian dialectic were true. For, as has been said, the dialectic always advances by combining on a higher plane two things which were contradictory on a lower one. And so, if, in some way now inconceivable to us, the eternal realisation of the Absolute Idea were so synthesised with the -existence of imperfection as to be reconciled with it, we should harmonise the two sides by a principle already exemplified in one of them. 171. It must be noticed also that the contradiction before us satisfies at any rate one of the conditions which are necessary if a synthesis is to be effected. It is a case of contrary and not merely of contradictory opposition. The opposition would be coherence of our knowledge as a systematic whole would be the '^ Q~ warrant for the completeness of the enumeration. But even ^ ^_j v-', here the abstract This would still remain, and prove itself irre- •^ dugible to anything else. To attempt to know it is like attempting ,^ .. ^ to jump on the shadow of one's own head. For all propositions ^ are the assertion of a partial unity between the subject and the I "^ predicate. The This on the other hand is just what distinguishes I ->^ the subject from its predicates. ^ -osf 197. It is the existence of the This which renders it impossible >. "^ to regard knowledge as a self-subsistent whole, and makes it ™ necessary to consider it merely as an approximation to the /«* ' -J !?r- n,/A-- roHef<<^ -^1 5 HOT U-He^t VI] THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC 219 complete activity of spirit for which we search. In the This we have something which is at once within and without knowledge, which it dares not neglect, and yet cannot deal with. For when we say that the This cannot be known, we do not mean, of course, that we cannot know of its existence. We know of its existence, because we can perceive, by analysis, that it is an essential element of the concrete object. But the very definition which this analysis gives us shows that we can know nothing about it but this — that there is indeed nothing more about it to know, and that even so much cannot be put into words without involving a contradiction. Now to know merely that something exists is to present a problem to knowledge which it must seek to answer. To know that a thing exists, is to know it as immediate and contingent. Knowledge demands that such a thing should be mediated and rationalised. This, as we have seen, cannot be done here. This impossibility is no reproach to the rationality of the universe, for reality is no more mere mediation than it is mere immediacy, and the immediacy of the This combines with the mediation of the What to make up the concrete whole of Spirit. But it is a reproach to the adequacy of knowledge as an activity of Spirit that it should persist in demanding what cannot and should not be obtained. Without immediacy, without the central unity of the object, the media- tion and the predicates which make up knowledge would vanish as unmeaning. Yet knowledge is compelled by its own nature to try and remove them, and to feel itself baffled and thwarted when it cannot succeed. Surely an activity with such a con- tradiction inherent in it can never be a complete expression of the Absolute. 198. In the first place the existence of the This is incom- patible with the attainment of the ideal of unity in knowledge. For here we have an element, whose existence in reality we are forced to admit, but which is characterised by the presence of that which is essentially alien to the nature of the knowing consciousness in its activity. In so far as reality contains a This, it cannot be brought into complete unison with the knowing mind, which, as an object, has of course its aspect of immediacy like any other object, but which, as the knowing subject, finds 220 THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. all unresolvable immediacy to be fundamentally opposed to its work of rationalisation. The real cannot be completely expressed in the mind, and the unity of knowledge is therefore defective. And this brings with it a defective differentiation. For while the This cannot be brought into the unity of knowledge, it is unquestionably a part of reality. And so the failure of knowledge to bring it into unity with itself involves that the part of the object which is brought into unity with the subject is only an abstraction from the full object. The individuality of the object thus fails to be represented, and so its full differentiation from the subject fails to be represented also. The result is that we know objects, so to speak, from the outside, whereas, to know them in their full truth, we ought to know them from inside. That every object^ has a real centre of its own appears from the dialectic. For we have seen that the conclusion from the dialectic is that all reality consists of spirits, which are individuals. And, apart from this, the fact that the object is more or less indepen- dent as against us — and without some independence knowledge would be impossible, as has already been pointed out — renders it certain that every object has an individual unity to some extent. Now knowledge fails to give this unity its rights. The meaning of the object is found in its This, and its This is, to knowledge, something alien. Knowledge sees it to be, in a sense, the centre of the object, but only a dead centre, a mere residuum produced by abstracting all possible predicates, not a living and unifying centre, such as we know that the synthetic unity of apperception is to our own lives, which we have the advantage of seeing from inside. And since it thus views it from a stand- point which is merely external, knowledge can never represent the object so faithfully as to attain its own ideal. 199. And here we see the reason why knowledge can never represent quite accurately that harmony of the universe which ^ In saying "every object" I do not necessarily mean every chair, every crystal, or even every amoeba. Behind all appearance there is reality. This reality we believe, on the authority of the dialectic, to consist of individuals. But how many such centres there may be behind a given mass of appearance we do not know. Every self-conscious spirit is, no doubt, one object and no more. It is with regard to the reality behind what is called inorganic matter and the lower forms of life that the uncertainty arises. < -e VI] THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC 221 J- knowledge itself proves. We saw above that when knowledge ^ should have reached the greatest perfection of which it is capable ^ there would still remain one question unanswered — Why is the ^ universe what it is and not something else? We may prove the ^^ question unmeaning and absurd, but we cannot help asking it. ^ And the possibility of asking it depends on the existence of the "" This, which knowledge is unable to bring into unity with the ^^ knowing subject. The This is essential to the reality of the object, "^i and is that part of the object to which it owes its independence of the subject. And the question naturally arises, Why should UJ 2^ not this core of objectivity have been clothed with other qualities ;;^ than those which it has, and with which the subject finds itself in harmony? The question arises because the existence of this harmony is 'j ZL I — dependent on the This. The This alone gives reality to the object. If it vanished, the harmony would not change into a disharmony, but disappear altogether. And the This, as we have seen, must always be for knowledge a something alien and irrational, I because it must always be an unresolved immediate. Now a harmony which depends on something alien and irrational must always appear contingent and defective. Why is there a This at all? Why is it just those qualities which give a harmony for us that the favour of the This has raised into reality? To answer these questions would be to mediate the This, and that w^ould destroy it. 200. It may be urged, as against this argument, that we do not stand in such a position of opposition and alienation towards the This in knowledge. For we ourselves are objects of know- ledge as well as knowing subjects, and our abstract personaUty, which is the centre of our knowledge is also the This of an object. Now it might be maintained that the inter-connection of the qualities of all different objects, which would be perfect in perfect knowledge, would enable us to show why all reahty existed, and why it is what it is, if we could only show it of a single fragment of reahty. The difficulty, it might be said, hes in reaching the abstract realness of the real by means of knowledge at all. And if, by means of our own existence as objects we were able to establish a single connection with the objective world, in which 222 THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. the immediate would not mean the alien, it is possible that no other connection would be required. The last remaining opposition of the subject to the object would disappear. The difficulty, however, cannot be escaped in this way. For the self as the object of knowledge is as much opposed to the self as the subject as any other object could be. We learn its qualities by arguments from data based on the "internal sense," as we learn the qualities of other objects by arguments from data given by the external senses. We are immediately certain of the first, but we are immediately certain of the second. And the central unity of our own nature can no more be known directly in itself, apart from its qualities, than can the central unities of other objects^. ¥/e become aware of its existence by analysing what is implied in having ourselves for objects, and we become aware of the central unities of other things by analysing what is implied in having them for objects. We have no more direct knowledge of the one than of the other. Of course nothing in our own selves is really alien to us, — not even the element of immediacy which makes their This. But then the existence of knowledge implies, as we have seen, that the reality of other things is not really alien to us, although we know it immediately. It is the defect of knowledge that it fails to represent the im- mediate except as alien. " 201. Here, then, we seem to have the reason why our minds could never, in the most perfect state of knowledge possible, get rid of the abstract idea of the contingency of the whole system. We saw, in the first part of this chapter, that such an idea was unmeaning, since it would be impossible for any reality to be destroyed or altered, unless the same happened to all reality, and the possibility of this, which has no common ground with actuality, is an unmeaning phrase. And we have now seen another reason why the possibility is unmeaning. For we have traced it to the persistence of thought in considering its essential condition as its essential enemy. The existence of such a mis- called possibility, therefore, tells nothing against the rationality of the universe. But it does tell against the adequacy of know- ^ Note to Second Edition. I now think that a self can directly perceive itself Cp. my article on Personality in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. VI] THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC 223 ledge as an expression of the universe. By finding a flLaw in perfection, where no flaw exists, it pronounces its own condemna- tion. If the possibility is unmeaning, knowledge is imperfect in being compelled to regard it as a possibiUty. It may seem at first sight absurd to talk of knowledge as in- adequate. If it were imperfect, how could we know it? What right have we to condemn it as imperfect when the judge is of necessity the same person as the culprit? This is, of course, so far true, that if knowledge did not show us its own ideal, we could never know that it did not realise it. But there is a great dijEEerence between realising an ideal and indicatiixg it. It is possible, and I have endeavoured to show that it is actually the case, that knowledge can do the one, and not the other. When we ask about the abstract conditions of reality, it is able to demonstrate that harmony must exist, and that immediacy is compatible with it, and essential to it. But when it is asked to show in detail hoiv the harmony exists, which it has shown must exist, it is unable to do so. There is here no contradiction in our estimate of knowledge, but there is a contradiction in knowledge, which prevents us from regarding it as adequate, and which forces us to look further in search of the ultimate activity of Spirit. We saw before that this activity could not consist solely of knowledge, but we have now reached the further conclusion that knowledge, as knowledge, could not form even a part of that activity. For it carries a mark of imperfection about it, in its inability to completely attain the goal which it cannot cease to strive for, and in its dependence on that which it must consider an imperfection. We must therefore look for the ultimate nature of Spirit in something which transcends and surpasses cognition, including it indeed as a moment, but transforming it and raising it into a higher sphere, where its imperfections vanish. 202. In doing this we are compelled, of course, to reject Hegel's own treatment of the subject, in the Philosophy of Spirit. But we may, I think, find some support for our position in the Logic. For there, as it seems to me, we find the sketch of a more com- plete and adequate representation of Absolute Reality, than the one which is worked out in the Philosophy of Spirit. 224 THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. We have in the Logic, immediately before the Absolute Idea^ a category called Cognition in general. This is again divided into Cognition proper and Volition. These two categories are treated by Hegel as a thesis and antithesis, and, according to the method pursued in every other part of the Logic, the triad should have been completed by a synthesis, before we pass out of Cognition in general to the final synthesis — the Absolute Idea. No such synthesis, however, is given by Hegel as a separate term. Ac- cording to his exposition, the Absolute Idea itself forms the synthesis of the opposition of Cognition proper and Volition, as it does also of the larger opposition of Life and Cognition in general. The significance of this part of the Logic for us lies in the fact that Cognition proper requires to be synthesised with Vohtion before we can reach the absolute reality. Of course Hegel is not dealing, in the Logic, with the concrete activities of cognition and voHtion, any more than he is dealing, rather earlier in the Logic, with the concrete activities of mechanism and chemistry. The Logic deals only with the element of pure thought in reality, and, when its categories bear the names of concrete relations, all that is meant is that the pure idea, which is the category in question, is the idea which comes most prominently forward in that concrete relation, and which therefore can be usefully and significantly called by its name. This, however, does not destroy the importance of the Logic for our present purpose. Although the concrete activities are not merely their own logical ideas, they must stand in the same relation inter se as the logical ideas do inter se. For the process in the Philosophy of Spirit, as in all the applications of the dialectic, while it does not profess to be logical in the sense that all its details can be logically deduced, certainly professes to be logical in the sense that the relation of its stages to one another can be logically explained^. Indeed, if it did not do this, it could no longer be called an application of the Logic at all, but would be a mere empirical collection of facts. If then the idea of cognition proper — that is, of knowledge as opposed to volition — is by itself so imperfect and one-sided, that it must be tran- 1 Op. Chap. VII. Sections 207, 210. VI] THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC 225 scended, and must be synthesised with the idea of vohtion, before the adequate and Absolute Idea can be reached, it would seem to follow that a concrete application of this philosophy is bound to regard cognition as an inadequate expression of the full nature of reahty, and to endeavour to find some higher expression which shall unite cognition and vohtion, preserving that which is true in each, while escaping from their imperfections and one-sided- ness. 203. It may be objected that Cognition proper, which is treated by Hegel as an inadequate category, denotes only that knowledge which is found in ordinary experience and in science, and that the place of knowledge in its highest shape — the shape of philosophy — must be looked for under the Absolute Idea. This view does not appear tenable on closer examination. At the end of Cognition proper, Hegel tells us, the content of cog- nition is seen to be necessary. This would indicate philosophic knowledge, if "necessary" is taken as referring to the necessity of freedom, which is its normal use in the Doctrine of the Notion, There is certainly a good deal of discussion of philosophic method under the head of the Absolute Idea. But this appears to be introduced, not because this category is the one under which our philosophising comes, but because it is the last category of the philosophy, and it is therefore natural to look back, at this point, on the method which has been pursued. The most cogent argument, however, against this view is that the Absolute Idea is defined as the union of Cognition proper with Volition. Therefore the Absolute Idea must be an idea richer and fuller than that of Cognition — richer and fuller by the content of the idea of Vohtion, Now we can have no reason to suppose that philosophic knowledge is the union of ordinary knowledge with volition. For philosophy stands in just the same relation to vohtion as ordinary knowledge does. We never have know- ledge without having vohtion, but neither can be reduced to the other. The Absolute Idea then contains within itself the idea of Knowledge only as a transcended moment. If there is any difference between them, indeed, we must consider the idea of Volition the higher of the two, since it is Volition which forms the antithesis, and we have seen that, in the Doctrine of the 15 foRe : m00m CAAL M4KX 'i ,i!; 226 THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. Notion, the antithesis may be expected to be more adequate than the thesis to which it is opposed^. I am not attempting to argue from this that we ought to take Hegel as putting anything more concrete than philosophy into the nature of absolute reality. We are especially bound in the case of so systematic a writer as Hegel, to look for the authori- tative exposition of his views on any subject in the part of his work which professedly deals with that subject. And in the Philosophy of Spirit it seems clear that Hegel means the highest stage of Spirit to be nothing but philosophy. But, in giving the abstract framework of absolute reality in the Logic, he has given, as we have seen above, a framework for something which, what- ever it is, is more than any form of mere cognition. And so, when saying that the conclusion of the Philosophy of Spirit is inconsistent with the general tenor of Hegel's philosophy, we can strengthen our position by adding that it is inconsistent with the final result of the Logic. 204. Let us now turn to the Philosophy of Spirit, and con- sider the way in which Hegel introduces Philosophy as the culminating point of reality. The three terms which form the triad of Absolute Spirit are Art, Revealed Religion, and Philo- sophy. Of the relation of these three stages he speaks as follows : "Whereas the vision-method of Art, external in point of form, is but subjective production and shivers the substantial content into many separate shapes, and whereas Religion, with its separa- tion into parts, opens it out in mental picture, and mediates what is thus opened out ; Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a total, but even unifies them into the simple spiritual vision, and then in that raises them to self-conscious thought. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognised by thought) of art and religion, in which the diverse elements in the content are cognised as necessary, and this necessary as free^." On examining this more closely, doubts present themselves. Is Philosophy really capable of acting as a synthesis between Art and Religion? Should it not rather form part of the anti- thesis, together with Religion? All the stages in this triad of.;^ 1 Chap. IV. Sections 109, 110. 2 Enc. Section 572. vil THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC 227 Absolute Spirit are occupied in endeavouring to find a harmony ^ between the individual spirit — now developed into full conscious- • * v^ ness of his own nature — on the one hand, and the rest of the Vi» """ universe on the other hand. Such a harmony is directly and QC ^pt* immediately presented in beauty. But the immediacy makes \P v^j the harmony contingent and defective. Where beauty is present, ^ t^ the harmony exists; where it is not present — a case not un- n shall enable us to attribute rationality and righteousness to all things, independently of their immediate and superficial aspect. This ground, according to Hegel, is afforded us by the doctrines of Revealed Religion, which declares that all things are depen- dent on and the manifestation of a reality in which we recognise the fulfilment of our ideals of. rationality and righteousness. Thus Revealed Religion assures us that all things must be in harmony, instead of showing us, as Art does, that some things are in harmony. 205. Now Philosophy, it seems to me, can do no more than this. It is true that it does it, in what, from Hegel's point of view, is a higher and better way. It is true that it substitutes a completely reasoned process for one which, in the last resort, rests on authority. It is true that it changes the external har- mony, which Revealed Religion offers, into a harmony inherent in the nature of things. It is true that the process, which is known to Revealed Religion as "a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought," and as "a separation into parts, with a temporal and external sequence," is in Philosophy "known as an indivisible coherence of the universal, simple, and eternal spirit in itself^." But all this does not avail to bring back the simplicity and directness of Art, which must be brought back in the synthesis. Art shows us that something is as we would have it. Its harmony with our ideals is visible on the surface. But Philosophy, like Religion, leaving the surface of things un- touched, points to their inner nature, and proves that, in spite , of the superficial discord and evil, the true reality is harmonious and good. To unite these we should require a state of spirit which 1 Enc. Section 57 L 15- 228 THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. should present us with a harmony direct and immediate on the one hand, and universal and necessary on the other. Art gives the first and Philosophy the second, but Philosophy can no more unite the two than Art can. This is clear of philosophy, as we have it now, and so long as it has not absorbed into itself all other knowledge. For it is the knowledge of the general conditions only of reality. As such, it can lay down general laws for all reality. But it is not able to show how they are carried out in detail. It may arrive at the conclusion that all that is real is rational. This will apply, among other things, to toothache or cowardice. Now we are shown by the whole history of religion that optimism based on general grounds may be of great importance to the lives of those who beheve it, and philosophy, if it can give us this, will have given us no small gift. But philosophy will not be able to show us how the rationality or the righteousness come in, either in toothache or in cowardice. It can only convince us that they are there, though we cannot see them. It is obvious that we have as yet no synthesis with the directness and immediacy of art. If philosophy should ever, as was suggested in the earlier part of this chapter, develop so as to include all knowledge in one complete harmony, then, no doubt, we should not only know of every fact in the universe that it was rational, but we should also see how it was so. Even here, however, the required syn- thesis would not be attained. Our knowledge would still be only mediate knowledge, and thus could not be the synthesis for two reasons. Firstly, because, as we have seen, it has to regard the immediate element in reality as to some extent alien. Secondly, because the synthesis must contain in itself, as a transcended moment, the immediate harmony of art, and must therefore be hfted above the distinction of mediate and immediate. Besides this, a merely intellectual activity could not be the ultimate truth of which art and rehgion are lower stages. For both of these involve not merely knowledge, but vohtion, and also feeling. And so the highest stage of spirit would have to include, not only the perception of the rationahty of all things, which is offered by philosophy, but also the complete acqui- VI] THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC 229 escence which is the goal of successful volition, and the pleasure which is the inevitable result of conscious harmony. 206. The result of all this would appear to be, that, in order to render the highest form of Absolute Spirit capable, as it must be on Hegel's theory, of transcending and summing up all other aspects of reality, we shall have to recast the last steps of the Philosophy of Spirit, so as to bring the result more in accordance with the general outlines laid down at the end of the Logic. Philosophy, together with Revealed Religion, will be the anti- thesis to Art. And a place will be left vacant for a new synthesis. It forms no part of the object of this work to enquire what this synthesis may be. My purpose has been only to give some reasons for thinking that Hegel had not found an adequate expression for the absolute reality, and I do not venture to suggest one myself. But we can, within very wide and general limits, say what the nature of such an expression must be. It must be some state of conscious spirit in which the opposition of cognition and vohtion is overcome — in which we neither judge our ideas by the world, nor the world by our ideas, but are aware that inner and outer are in such close and necessary harmony that even the thought of possible discord has become impossible. In its unity not only cognition and volition, but feeling also, must be blended and united. In some way or another it must have overcome the rift in discursive knowledge, and the im- mediate must for it be no longer the ahen. It must be as direct as art, as certain and universal as philosophy^. ^ Note to Second Edition. I have discussed this subject further in my Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, Chap. ix. CHAPTER VII THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC 207. We have now to enquire in what manner the results which we have gained by the dialectic process are applicable to ly real life. I do not propose to discuss the utility of these results as a guide to conduct, but there is another question more closely connected with the dialectic itself. How, if at all, can the pure theory, which is expounded in the Logic, be so used as to assist in the explanation of the various facts presented to us in ex- perience? Hegel divides the world into two parts — Nature and Spirit. What can his philosophy tell us about them ? We have seen in our consideration of the dialectic that there are certain functions, with regard to our knowledge of Nature and Spirit, which pure thought cannot perform, and which there is no reason to think, in spite of the assertions of some critics, that Hegel ever intended it to perform. In the first place, we saw that the concrete world of reality cannot be held to be a mere condescension of the Logic to an outward shape, nor a mere dependent emanation from the self-subsistent perfection of pure thought. For, so far from pure thought being able to create immediate reaHty, it cannot itself exist unless something immediate is given to it, which it may mediate and relate. And we saw that, so far from Hegel's theory being inconsistent with this truth, it is entirely dependent on it. The force of his deduc- tion of Nature and Spirit from Logic lies in the fact that pure thought is a mere abstraction which, taken by itself, is con- tradictory. A ^d therefore, since pure thought unquest ionably exists som ehow, we are led to the conclusion that it cannot exist ind ependently, but must be a moment in that more concr ete f orm of reality, which is expressed imperfectly in Nature a nd a dequate ly in Spi^i^t And we saw, in the second place, that even this deduction can only extend to the general nature of the reality, because it is only that general nature which we can prove to be essential OH. VII] THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC 231 for the existence of pure thought. We know, a priori, that the reality must contain an immediate moment, in order that thought may mediate it, that something must be given in order that thought may deal with it. But further than this we cannot go without the aid of empirical observation. No consideration of the nature of pure thought can demonstrate to us the necessity that a particular man should have red hair. To do this we require immediate data. And here again we found no reason to suppose that this limitation of pure thought was ignored by Hegel. His attempts to apply his logical results may have gone too far, but he never, attempted to deduce the necessity of all the facts he was attempting to rationalise. His object was to point out that through every part of reaUty there runs a thread of logical connection, so that the different parts stand in intelligible rela- tions to one another, and to Absolute Reality. But he never tried to deduce the necessity of each detail of reality from the nature of pure thought, or even to hold out such a deduction as an ideal. This is evident, both from the number of details which he mentions without even an attempt to explain them, and also from his own direct statement^. 208. This then is one way in which we can apply the con- clusions of the Logic in the solution o| more concrete problems. We may trace the manifestations of the dialectic process in the experience round us, and in so far as we do this we shall have rationalised that experience. But, besides this, we may gain some information from the dialectic concerning the ultimate nature of Absolute Being. It will be convenient to consider this latter point first. No idea which is self-contradictory can be true until it is so transformed that the contradictions have vanished. Now no category in the Logic is free from contradictions except the Absolute Idea. Reality can therefore be fully apprehended under no category but this. We shall find it to be true of all reality, that in it is found "der BegrifE der Idee, dem die Idee als solche der Gegenstand, dem das Objekt sie ist^." From this ^ Cp. Chap. I. Section 27, and the passage from the Philosophy of Spirit there quoted. Also Chap. vi. Section ] 83. 2 Enc. Section 236. 232 THE APPLICATION OP THE DIALECTIC [ch. we can deduce several consequences. All reality must, on this view, be Spirit, and be differentiated. Moreover, it must be Spirit for which its differentiations are, in Hegel's phrase, "trans- parent," that is, it must find in them nothing alien to itself. It might also be maintained, though the point is too large to be discussed here, that it must consist of finite self-conscious spirits, united into a closely connected whole. And it might not be impossible to determine whether the whole in question was also a self-conscious being, or whether it is a unity of persons without being itself a person. The questions discussed in the last chapter are also examples of the use that may be made, in this con- nection, of the results of the dialectic. 209, The information thus attained would be enough to justify us in saying that the results of Hegel's philosophy, apart from their theoretic interest, were of the greatest practical im- portance. It is true that such results as these can but rarely be available as guides to action. We learn by them what is the nature of that ideal, which, sub specie aeternitatis, is present in all reality, and which, sm6 specie temporis, is the goal towards which all reality is moving. But such an ideal is, sub specie aeternitatis, far too implicit, and, sub specie temporis, far too distant, to allow us to use it in deciding on any definite course of action in the present. Nor can it be taken to indicate even the direction in which our present action should move. For one of the great lessons of Hegel's philosophy is that, in any progress, we never move directly forwards, but oscillate from side to side as we advance. And so a step which seems to be almost directly away from our ideal may sometimes be the next step on the only road by which that ideal can be attained. But those who estimate the practical utility of a theory only by its power of guiding our action, take too confined a view. Action, after all, is always directed to some end. And, whatever view we may take of the supreme end, it cannot be denied that many of our actions are directed, and rightly directed, to the production of happiness for ourselves and others. Surely, then, a philosophical theory which tended to the production of happi- ness would have as much claim to be called practically important, as if it had afforded guidance in action. vn] THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC 233 Now such conclusions as to the ultimate nature of things as we have seen can be reached by Hegel's philosophy have obviously a very intimate connection with the problems which may be classed as religious. Is the universe rational and righteous? Is spirit or matter the fundamental reaUty? Have our standards of perfection any objective validity? Is our personaUty an ultimate fact or a transitory episode? All experience and all history show that for many men the answers to these questions are the source of some of the most intense and persistent joys and sorrows known in human life. Nor is there any reason to think that the proportion of such people is diminishing. Any system of philosophy which gives any reasons for deciding such questions, in one way rather than another, will have a practical interest, even if it should fail to provide us with counsel as to the organisation of society, or with explanations in detail of the phenomena of science. 210. We must now turn to the second way in which Hegel endeavours to apply the dialectic to experience. It is to this that he gives the greater prominence. His views on the nature of absolute reality are to be found in the Philosophy of Spirit, and also in the Philosophy of Religion, but they are not given at any length. On many important points we have no further guide than the development of the Absolute Idea in the Logic, and we must judge for ourselves what consequences can be drawn, from that development, as to the concrete whole of which the Absolute Idea is one moment. A much larger portion of his writings is occupied in tracing, in the succession of events in time, the gradual development of the Absolute Idea. To this purpose are devoted almost the whole of the Philosophies of Nature, Spirit, Religion, Law and History, as well as the History of Philosophy. He does not, as has been already remarked, endeavour to deduce the facts, of which he treats, from the Absolute Idea. Nor does he ever attempt to deduce each stage from the one before it. We pass, for example, from Moralitat to Sittlichkeit, from the Persian religion to the Syrian, or from the Greek civilisation to the Roman. But there are, in each case, many details in the second which are not the consequence of anything in the first, and which must be 234 THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. explained empirically by science, or else left unexplained. His object is to show that the central ideas of each stage are such that each follows from its predecessor — either as a reaction from its one-sidedness, or as a reconciliation of its contradictions — and that these ideas express, more and more adequately as the process gets nearer to its end, the Absolute Idea which had been expounded in the Logic. It is sometimes said that Hegel endeavoured to show that the stages of development, in the various spheres of activity which he considered in his different treatises, corresponded to the various categories of the Logic. This, however, seems an exaggeration. His theories of Nature, Spirit, Religion, and Law are each divided into three main sections, which doubtless corre- spond, and are meant to correspond, to the three primary divisions of the Logic — Being, Essence, and the Notion. But to trace any definite correspondence between the secondary divisions of these works (to say nothing of divisions still more minute) and the secondary divisions of the Logic, appears impossible. At any rate no such correspondence is mentioned by Hegel. The con- nection with the Logic seems rather to lie in the similarity of development, by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and in the gradually increasing adequacy of the manifestation of the Absolute Idea, as the process gradually develops itself. Of the Philosophy of History, indeed, we cannot say even as much as this. For it is divided, not into three, but into four main divisions, thus destroying the triadic form and the analogy to the three divisions of the Logic. And although Hegel would probably have found no difficulty, on his own principles, in reducing the second and third divisions to one, it is a fact of some significance that he did not think it worth while to do so. It seems to indicate that he attached less importance, than has sometimes been supposed, to the exact resemblance of the scheme of the concrete processes to the scheme of pure thought in the Logic. In the History of Philosophy, again, many of the subordinate divisions are not triple. 211. The applications of the dialectic to various aspects of reality have been the part of Hegel's work which has received of late years the most notice and approbation. This is, no doubt. vn] THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC 235 largely due to a reaction against Hegel's general position. To those who reject that position the whole of the dialectic of pure thought must seem a stupendous blunder — magnificent or ridiculous according to the taste of the critic. With the dialectic of pure thought would fall also, of course, all general and demon- strated validity of its applications. But the brilliance and suggestiveness of ma ny of the details of these app lications Jia.ve of ten_b een acknowledged b y those who_reje ct the syste m, in which they were arranged, and the bas is from which it is sought t o iu stify them . Among the followers of Hegel a different cause has led to the same effect. The attraction of Hegel's philosophy to many of them appears to lie in the explanations it can give of garticulaL p arts of experience rather than in its general theory of the natur e of reality . These explanations — attractive by their aesthetic com- pleteness, or because of the practical consequences that follow from them — are adopted and defended by such writers in an empirical way. It is maintained that we can see that they do explain the facts, while others do not, and they are believed for this reason, and not because they follow from the dialectic of pure thought. Hegelian views of religion, of morals, of history, of the state are common enough among us. They appear to be gaining ground in many directions. Nor can it be said that their advocates are neglectful of the source from which they derive their theories. They often style themselves Hegelians. But the dialectic of pure thought tends to fall into the background. HegeTs^explanations of the^ation ality to be found in par ticular s pheres of ^existence a re accepted by many who ignore or rej ect hisjiemonstratio ns that everything w hi ch exists must be rational . 212. I wish to put forward a different view — that the really valid part of Hegel's system is his Logic, and not his applica- tions of it. In the preceding chapters I have given some reasons in support of the view that the general position of the Logic is justifiable. With regard to its appHcations, on the other hand, although they doubtless contain much that is most valuable, their general and systematic vaHdity seems indefensible. As we have already seen, there is nothing in the nature of Hegel's object here, which should render his success impossible 236 THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC [CH. / a friori. The difficulties which arise are due rather to the great- ness of the task, and to the imperfection of our present knowledge. These difficulties we have now to consider. 213. The movement of the Idea, as we learned in the Logic, is by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the first two being opposed, and the third reconciling them. If we are able to trace the progressive manifestations of the Idea in facts, these manifesta- tions will arrange themselves in triads of this kind. And Hegel has attempted to show that they do so. But how are we to determine which stages are theses, which are antitheses, and which again syntheses? This can, I believe, onlyT)e done safely, in the case of any one term, by observing its relation to others, which have already been grasped in the system. And, as these again will require determination by their relation to others previously determined, we shall be able to build up a dialectic system only if we have fixed points at one or both ends of the chain to start from. We cannot safely begin in the middle and work backwards and forwards. TJiere-is -nothing in the nature of any term which can tell us, if we take it in isolation from others, whether it is a thesis or an antithesis — that is, whether it will require, as the process goes forward, the development of another term opposite and complementary to itself, before a synthesis can be reached, or whether it is itself opposed and complementary to some term that came before it, so that a reconciliation will be the next step to be expected in the process. Theses may be said to be positive, antitheses negative. But no term is either positive or negative per se. In a dialectic process we call those terms positive which reaffirm, on a higher level, the position with which the process started, the negative terms being the complementary denials which are necessary as means to gain the higher level. But to apply this test we should have to know beforehand the term with which the process started. Or we may say that the terms are positive which express the reality to which the process is advancing, though they express it inadequately, while the negative terms are those which, in recognising the inadequacy, temporarily sacrifice the resemblance^. But this distinction, 1 Cp. Enc. Section 85. vn] THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC 237 again, is useless until we know what is the last term of the whole process, Korjvould it be possible to recognise any term, taken in isola- tion, as a^mtheaia, TTvefy^ernT in a dialectic process, except the first two, contains within itself some synthesis of opposition, for all that is accomplished is transferred to all succeeding terms. On the other hand, every synthesis in a process, except the last, contains within itself a latent one-sidedness, which will break out in the opposition of the next thesis and antithesis, and require for its reconciliation another synthesis. We can therefore only determine that a term is a synthesis if we see that it does reconcile the two terms immediately in front of it — in other words, if we see it in relation to other terms. And the impossibility of recog- nising a synthesis as such, if seen by itself, would be far greater in the applications of the Logic than in the Logic itself. For every fact or event has many sides or aspects, in some of which it may appear to be a reconciliation of two opposites, and in others to be one of two opposites which need a reconcihation. (So Hegel, for example, appears to regard Protestantism as the synthesis of the oppositions of Christianity, and as its highest point, while Schelling opposes it as the "rehgion of Paul" to the "religion of Peter," and looks forward to a "religion of John" which shall unite the two.) Now which of these aspects is the significant one for our purpose at any time cannot be known if the term is looked at in isolation. We can only know that we must take it as a synthesis by seeing that it does unite and reconcile the opposition of the two terms that go before it. That is to say, we can only ascertain its place in the series if we have previously ascertained the places of the adjacent terms. 214. It would seem, then, that we can only hope to arrive at a knowledge of any dialectic process, when we know, at least, either the beginning or the end of the process as a fixed point. For no other points can be fixed, unless those round them have been fixed previously, and unless we get a starting-point in this manner, we shall never be able to start at all. Now in the Logic we do know the beginning and end. We know the beginning before we start, and, although we do not know the end before we start, yet, when we have reached it, we know that it must be 238 THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. the last category of the Logic. We know that the category of Being must be the beginning, because it is the simplest of all the categories. And we should defend this proposition, if it were doubted, by showing that all attempts to analyse it into simpler categories fail, while in any other category the idea of Being can be discovered by analysis. Again, we know that the Absolute Idea is the last of the categories because it does not develop any contradiction, which will require a reconciliation in a higher category. 215. We can determine in this way the highest and lowest points of the Logic, because all the steps in the Logic are cate- gories of pure thought, and all those categories are implicit in every act of thought. All we have to do, in order to construct the Logic, is to analyse and make explicit what is thus presented. The subject-matter of the analysis can never be wanting, since it is presented in every act of thought, (j^ut when we are trying to discover, in a series of concrete facts, the successive manifesta- tions of the pure Idea, the case is different J For these facts can only be known empirically, and the further off they are in time the more difficult they will be to remember or to predict. We are situated at neither end of the process. Philosophy, religion, history — all the activities whose course Hegel strives to demon- strate — stretch backwards till they are lost in obscurity. Nor are we yet at the end of any of them. Years go on, and new forms of reality present themselves. And this is the first difficulty in the way of our attempts to find the fixed points from which we may start our dialectic. The beginnings of the series are too far back to be remembered. The ends, so far as we can tell, are too far forward to be foreseen. 216. And, even if we did happen to know the stage which was, as a matter of fact, the first or the last of a dialectic process, should we be able to recognise it as such on inspection? By the hypothesis, its relation to the other terms of the process is not yet known — for we are looking for an independent fixed point in order that we may begin to relate the terms to one another. And, since this is so, one term can, so far, only differ from the others in expressing the Absolute Idea more or less adequately. This is so far, therefore, only a quantitative difference, and thus, vn] THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC 239 below the lowest stage that we know, and above the highest stage that we know, we can imagine others yet, so that our fixed points are still not found. If, indeed, each stage in each of the applications of the dialectic clearly corresponded to some one category of the Logic, we might know that the stage which corresponded to the category of Being was the lowest, and that the stage which corresponded to the Absolute Idea was the highest. But this is not the case. As has been mentioned above, the stages in each of Hegel's applications of the Logic are arranged, in some cases, on the same principle as the categories of the Logic, but without any suggestion of such definite correspondence. And so, until the mutual relations of the stages are determined, they can only be distinguished by quantitative differences which can never define the beginning and end of their own series. We cannot say of any stage, in any one of the applications of the Logic, that it completely fails to embody the Absolute Idea. For then, according to Hegel, it would have lost all sem- blance of reality, and could not be given in experience. And, if it does embody the Absolute Idea at all, we can always imagine that something may exist which embodies that Idea still less completely, still more abstractly. And so we can never be sure that we have got to the right basis, from which our dialectic process may start. Of course, such quantitative estimates are succeeded by far deeper and more significant relations when once the dialectic process is established. But these will not help us here, where we are seeking the point on which to establish the dialectic process. 217. In the Philosophy of Nature, indeed, the risk which we run in taking space as our starting-point is perhaps not great. For, since the process of Nature includes all reahty below the level of Spirit, its lowest stage must be that at which reality is on the point of vanishing altogether. And we may take space as representing the absolute minimum of reality without much danger of finding ourselves deceived. But it will be different in dealing with religion, history, law, or philosophy, where the lowest point of the particular process is still relatively concrete, and leaves room for possible stages below it. 240 THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. And, except in the Philosophy of Spirit, the same may be said of the highest stage in any process. In none of the applica- tions of the dialectic but this can we hope to meet with a perfect embodiment of the Absolute Idea. For all the other processes deal only with an aspect of reality, and their realisation of the Absolute Idea must be partial, and therefore imperfect. In no religion, in no national spirit, or form of government, in no system of metaphysics^, can we find a complete realisation of the Absolute Idea. And so we are always in uncertainty lest some new stage should arise in each of these activities, which should embody the Absolute Idea a little less imperfectly than any yet known. 218. Let us consider this in more detail. In the first place, although the Philosophy of Spirit has a well-defined end, and the Philosophy of Nature a fairly certain beginning, yet it is impossible to find a point at which it is certain that the Philo- sophy of Nature ends, and the Philosophy of Spirit begins. What form can we take as the lowest in which Spirit is present? The series of forms is continuous from those which certainly belong to Spirit to those which certainly belong to Nature. If we call everjrthing Spirit, which has the germs of self-consciousness in it, however latent, then we should have to include the whole of Nature, since on Hegel's principles, the lower always has the higher implicit in it. On the other hand, if we reserved the name of Spirit for the forms in which anything like our own life was explicit, we should have to begin far higher up than Hegel did, and we should have the same difficulty as before in finding the exact place to draw the line. In the Philosophy of Religion, the points at each end of the process seem uncertain. Might not something be found, by further historical investigation, which was lower even than Magic, and which yet contained the germ of religion, and ought to be treated as a form of it? And at the other end of the series a similar doubt ^ In the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel says that Philosophy is the highest stage of Spirit. But it is clear that Philosophy must here mean more than the existence of a system of metaphysics held by professed metaphysicians as a theory. It must be something which is universally accepted, and which modifies all spiritual life. The highest point which could be reached in such a History of Philosophy as Hegel's would leave much to be done before Spirit had reached its full develop- ment. vn] THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC 241 occurs. It is clear, from the Philosophy of Spirit, that Hegel regards Christianity, like all other forms of "revealed religion," as in some degree an inadequate representation of the Absolute Idea. How can his system guard against the possibility that a yet more perfect reUgion may arise, or against the possibility that Christianity may develop into higher forms? Hegel would probably have answered that the Philosophy of Religion has demonstrated Christianity to be the synthesis of all other religions. But if, as we have seen reason to think, the relations of the stages cannot be accurately determined, until one end at least of the series has been independently fixed, we cannot rely on the relation of the stages to determine what stage is to be taken as the highest, beyond which no other is possible^. 219. In the History of Philosophy we find the same difficulty. Hegel begins his systematic exposition with Thales, excluding all Oriental philosophy. This distinction can scarcely be based on any qualitative difference. The reason that Hegel assigns for it is that seLf-consciousness was not free in the earlier systems^. But in what sense is this to be taken? If implicit freedom is to be taken into account, Hegel himself points out, in the Philo- sophy of Religion, that the Oriental religions had the germ of freedom in them. But if we are only to consider freedom in so far as it is explicit, then we might find it difficult to justify the inclusion of the earlier Greek philosophies, in which the idea of freedom is still very rudimentary. The end of the History of Philosophy, as expounded by Hegel, is his own philosophy. Yet since his death several new systems have already arisen. There is no ground to attribute to Hegel any excessive degree of self-confidence. The system in which anyone believes fully and completely will always appear to him the culminating point of the whole process of philosophy. For it has solved for him all the contradictions which he has perceived in former systems, and the fresh contradictions which are latent in it cannot yet have revealed themselves to him, or he would 1 This criticism does not apply to Hegel's demonstration of the nature of Absolute Religion, which is really an attempt to determine the ultimate nature of reality. (Cp. Section 208.) The difficulty arises when he tries to connect his own idea of Absolute Religion with historical Christianity. =' History of Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 117. (Vol. i. p. 99 of Haldane's translation.) M.H. ' i6 242 THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. not have complete confidence in it. Thus it naturally seems to him the one coherent system, and therefore the ultimate system. But the appearance is deceptive, and we cannot regard with confidence any theory of the growth of philosophical systems which leaves no room for fresh systems in the future. The Philosophy of Law has not quite the same difficulties to meet, since it is rather an analysis of the functions of a state, and of the ethical notions which they involve, than an attempt to describe a historical progression. But it is significant that it ends by demonstrating that the ideal form of government was very like the one under which Hegel was living. There seems no reason to suspect that he was influenced by interested motives. The more probable supposition is that he had come to the con- clusion that constitutional monarchy was the best possible form of government for an European nation in 1820. This is a legitimate opinion, but what is not legitimate is the attempt to lay down a priori that it will always be the best possible form. No form of government can completely embody the Absolute Idea, since the idea of government, as we learn in the Philosophy of Spirit, is itself but a subordinate one. And it is very difficult to predict social changes which are still far distant. So Hegel passed to the conclusion that the best which had appeared was the best which could appear. He thus imposed on empirical variety an d priori hmit, which was not critical but dogmatic, and liable to be upset at any moment by the course of events. 220. In the Philosophy of History the contingency of the starting-point is still plainer. He begins with China, it is clear, only because he did not happen to know anything older. He had indeed a right, by his own definition of history, to exclude tribes of mere savages. But he could have no reason to assert — and he did not assert — that, before the rise of Chinese civilisa- tion, there was no succession of nation to nation, each with its distinct character and distinct work, such as he traces in later times. He did not know that there was such a succession, and he could not take it into account. But this leaves the beginning quite empirical. And he admits in so many words that history will not stop where his Philosophy of History stops. His scheme does not vn] THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC 243 include the Sclavonic races, nor the European inhabitants of America. But he expressly says that the Sclavonic races may have hereafter a place in the series of national developments, and, still more positively, that the United States will have such a place^. All attempt to fix the final point of history, or to put limits to the development which takes place in it, is thus given up. In view of passages hke these, it would seem that there is not much truth in Lotze's reproach, that modern Idealism confined the spiritual development of the Absolute to the shores of the Mediterranean^. In the first place Hegel speaks only of this planet, and leaves it quite open to us to suppose that the Absolute Idea might be realised in other developments elsewhere. It is scarcely fair, therefore, to charge such a philosophy with ignoring the discoveries of Copernicus. And, as to what does happen on the earth, Hegel devotes a large — perhaps disproportionately large — part of the Philosophies of Religion and History to China and India, which do not lie very near the Mediterranean. We have seen also that he reahsed that room must be left for the development of Russia and the United States. 221. It appears, then, that of all the terminal points of the different applications of the dialectic, only two can be indepen- dently recognised, so as to give us the fixed points which we find to be necessary in constructing the processes. These are at the beginning of the Philosophy of Nature, and at the end of the Philosophy of Spirit. Now Nature and Spirit, taken together, form the chief and all-embracing process reaching from the most superficial abstraction to the most absolute reahty, in which the evolution of society, of religion, and of philosophy are only episodes. And it may at first sight seem improbable that we should be able to determine, with comparative certainty, the two points most remote from our present experience — the one as the barest of abstractions, the other as absolute and almost unimaginable perfection — while points less remote are far more obscure. But further reflection shows us that it is just because these points are the extremes of all reality that they are 1 Philosophy of History, pp. 360, and 83. (pp. 363 and 90 of Sibree's trans- lation.) 2 Metaphysic. Section 217. 1 6 — 2 244 THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. comparatively determinable. Of the first we know that it must be that aspect of reality which, of all conceivable ways of looking at reality, is the least true, the least significant, the least adequate to the Absolute Idea. Of the second we know that it must be a conception of reality in which the Absolute Idea is expressed with perfect adequacy. We have thus the power, since the Logic tells us the nature of the Absolute Idea, to anticipate to some degree the nature of the first and last terms in the main process of reality. We may be justified in recognising Space as the one, and in predicting more or less what is to be expected in the other. But in the subordinate processes of History, Law, Religion and Philosophy, the highest and lowest points are not highest and lowest absolutely, but only the highest and lowest degrees of reality which can be expressed in a society, a creed, or a meta- physical system. How low or how high these can be, we can only know empirically, since this depends on the nature of societies, of creeds, and of systems, all of which contain empirical elements^. And if it can only be known empirically, it can never be known certainly. We can never be sure that the boundaries we place are not due to casual limitations of our actual know- ledge, which may be broken down in the immediate future. And so there is nothing mysterious or suspicious in the fact that many philosophers would be quite prepared to predict, within certain limits, the nature of Heaven, while they would own their philosophy quite incompetent to give any information about the probable form of local government which will prevail in London one hundred years hence. For on such a theory as Hegel's we should know that in Heaven the Absolute Idea was completely and adequately manifested. But of the government of London we should only know that, like all earthly things, it would manifest the Absolute Idea to some extent, but not com- pletely. And to determine, by the aid of the dialectic, how much 1 The subject-matter of metaphysical systems is, no doubt, pure thought. But the circumstances which determine that a particular view shall be held at a particular time and in a particular shape are to a large extent contingent and only to be known empirically. Nor can we determine by pure thought how large an element in the complete perfection of Spirit consists in correct views on general questions of metaphysics — or in other words, what is the relation of the process given in the History of Philosophy to the main process of Spirit. vu] THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC 245 and in what form it would manifest it, we should have to begin by determining the position of the municipal organisation of London in 1996 in a chain which stretches from the barest possible abstraction to the fullest possible reaUty, This we cannot do. Philosophers are in much the same position as Mr Kipling's muleteer — "We know what heaven and hell may bring, But no man knoweth the mind of the king^." For they are on firmer ground in theology than in sociology. And perhaps there is not much to regret in this. 222. We_ must now. passi on to a second defect in Hegel's appUcation of his Logic to experience. The difficulty of fixing the first and last points in the dialectic process is not the only obstacle in our way. Much of Hegel's work, as we have seen, consisted in applying the dialectic process to various special fields — to Religion, to History, to Law, and to Philosophy. Now in doing this, he is in each case dealing with only one aspect of reality, leaving out of account many others. Can we expect such a fragment of reality^.taken-hyjitafilf, -tQj3£Lan_example--oi-the dialectiQ4irQ£esS? T^ si rip nf rpalit y pan be. rp.fl.lly ygo la-tad-ff^^fn ajl the^others, and, u nless we fall in to q"ite r false aibstraction, we^iust allow for the interaction of ^ very asp ect of reality: upian every other aspect TKis is a truth which Hegel fully recognises, and on which, indeed, he emphatically insists. For example, he points out that the constitution possible for a country at any time must depend on its character, and both History and Philo- sophy are, in his exposition, closely connected with Rehgion. But these various dialectical processes are not, according to Hegel, synchronous. Philosophy, for example, begins for him in Greece, which in historical development is already in the second stage. History, again, begins for him in China, whose religion on the other hand represents an advance on primitive simphcity. If, then, these three processes react on one another, it follows that the spontaneous development of each according to the dialectic will be comphcated and obscured by an indefinite number of side influences introduced from other aspects of reaUty then in difierent stages. It is true that everything which ^ The Ballad of the King^s Jest. !^ -^ W 246 THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC [ch. ■^ influences, like that wliich is influenced, is obeying the same law ^ of the dialectic. But still the result will not exhibit that law. ''' ii ^ , Suppose a hundred pianos were to play the same piece of music, p^ ^. 1^ >:. each beginning a few seconds after its neighbour, while the length ^ ^ I ^ «^ of these intervals was unequal and regulated by no principle. "T T% T* The effect on the ear, when all the hundred had started, would ^tr s^ \, he one of mere confusion, in spite of the fact that they were all ^ "3^ ^ playing the same piece. jjf jj!I ^ 223. 'The same difficulty will not occur in the process of ■^ ^ o Nature and Spirit. For this relates, not to one side of reality ^ O SjC only, but to the whole of it, and there are therefore no influences "*■ *«A^ •«-- '-^ from outside to be considered. But there is an analogous difficulty, ■"^"^ %^ ^ & J ' "^ j^ Q J and an equally serious one. 44^ Si> .^ It is a fact, which may perhaps be explained, but which ^** »L* Ck, cannot be disputed, that, if we consider the world as a dialectic . ^ ft/ process, we shall find, when we look at it sub specie temforis, ^ that its different parts are, at any moment, very unequally advanced in that process. One part of the world is explicitly *<^ ^ O > Spirit, another part is that implicit form of Spirit which we call ^ I^ t~" ^^ Matter. One creature is a jelly-fish, and another is a man. One '*"^^ U.C.BERKELEY LIBRARIES CDMb7afl^31 58347i LgM4 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY r.