UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY W ■!' '*'W«<1» j^iatoda piadtortttn Coronae. THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CEOA¥N BY Bit Mati\)m §ak, lint. SOME TIME LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF KING's BEXCH. riRST PUBLISHED FROM HIS LORDSHIP'S ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT, AND THE SEVERAL REFER- ENCES TO THE RECORDS EXAMINED BY THE ORIGINALS, WITH NOTES BY S O L L O M E M L Y N OF LINCOLN'S INN, ESQ. WITH A TABLE OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS. Jirst :^merican (Kbition. WITH NOTES AND REFERENCES TO LATER CASES BY W. A. STOKES AND E. INGERSOLL OF THE PHILADELPHIA BAR. ^ IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. I. |]i)ilab'Clpl)ia: ROBERT H. SMALL 25 MINOR STREET. 1847. Y.1 r Entered according to act of Congress in the year 1847, by ROBERT H. SMALL, In the office of the Clerk of the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. ^ M Ui r4 ''j.M t3 ..J O (1. TO HENEY J. WILLIAMS THIS EDITION OP ft HALE'S HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED. 28Cf)S0 EXTRACT FROM THE JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. LUN^ 29° DIE NOVEMB. 1680. Ordered, That the executors of Sir Matthew Hale, late Lord Chief Justice of the court of King's Bench be desired to print the MSS. relating to the crown law and that a committee be appointed to take care in the printing thereof; and it is referred to Sir Will. Jones, Mr. Sacheverel, Serj. Maynard, Mr. Geo. Pelham, Sir Fra. Winnington, Mr. Paul Foley. R. EMLYN'S PREFACE (to the original edition.) The following treatise being the genuine offspring of that truly learned and worthy judge Sir Matthew Hak,{a) stands in need of no other recommendation, than what that great and good name will always carry along with it. Whoever is in the least acquainted with the extensive learning, the solid judgment, the indefatigable labours, and above all the unshaken integrity of the author, cannot but highly esteem whatever comes from so valuable an hand. Being brought up to the profession of the law, he soon grew eminent in it, discharging his duty therein with great courage and faithfulness; and tho he lived in critical times, when disputes ran so high between king and parliament^ as at last broke out into a civil war, yet he engaged in no party, but carried himself with such moderation and even- ness of temper, as made him loved and courted by all. It was this great and universal esteem he was then in, that made Cromwel so desirous to have him for one of his judges; which offer he would willingly have declined. Being prest by Cromwel to give his reason, he at last plainly told him, that he was not satisfied with the lawful- ness of his authority, and therefore scrupled the accepting (a) He was born at Alderley, in Gloucestershire, Nov. 1, 1609. Was entered at Magdalen- Hall, in Oxford, in the 17th year of his age. Admitted oi" Lincoln' s-Inn, Nov. 8, 1629, » Made a judge of the court of Common Pleas, 1653. Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, Nov. 7, 1660. And at last Lord Chief Justice of the court of King's Bench, May 18, 1671. Which place he resigned Feb. 20, 1675-6. And died the Christmas following, Dec. 25, 1676. vi MR. EMLYN'S any commission under it; to which Cromwel rephed, that since he had got the possession of the government, he was resolved to keep it, and would not be argued out of it ; that however it was his desire to rule according to the laws of the land, for which purpose he had pitched upon him as a person proper to hQ employed in the administration of justice; yet if they would not permit him to govern by red gowns, he was resolved to govern by red coats. Upon t*his consideration, as also of the necessity there at all times is, that justice and property should be preserved, he was prevailed with to accept of a judge's place in the court of common-pleas, wherein he behaved with great impartiality, constantly avoiding the being concerned in any state-affairs ; and tho for the first two or three circuits he sat indifferently on the plea-side, or the crown-side, yet afterwards he absolutely refused to sit on the crown-side, thinking it the safer course in so dubious a case. But notwitstanding his dislike to CromweVs government, yet this did not drive him, as it did some others, into the extremes of the contrary party; for upon the restoration, of which he was no inconsiderable promoter, he was not for making a surrender of all, and receiving the king without any restrictions; on the contrary, he thought this an oppor- tunity not to be lost for limiting the prerogative, and cutting off some useless branches, that served only as instruments of oppression; for which purpose he moved, as bishop Bur- net relates,(Z>) "That a committee might be appointed to look into the propositions that had been made, and the con- cessions that had been offered by the late king, and from thence to digest such propositions, as they should think fit to be sent over to the king." This motion was seconded, and tho through general Monk's means it failed of success, yet it shewed our author's tender regard for the liberties of the subject, and that he was far from being of a mind with those, who looked on every branch of the prerogative ^■s,jure divino and indefeasible. But notwithstanding this attempt, which shewed he was not cut out for such compliances as usually render a man acceptable to a court, yet such was his unblemished charac- . ter, that it was thought an honour to his majesty's govern- ment to advance him first to the station of Lord Chief {h) Burnet's Hist, of own. Times, Vol. I. p. 88. PREFACE. vii Baron, and afterwards to that of Lord Chief Justice of the king's bench; nor indeed could so great a trust be lodged in better hands. When he was first promoted, the Lord Chancellor Cla- rendon, upon delivering to him his commission, told him, among other things, " That if the king could have found out an honester or fitter man for that employment, he had not advanced him to it, and that he had therefore preferred him, because he knew none that deserved so well. "(c) He behaved in each of these places with such uncorrupt integrity, such impartial justice, such diligence, candor, and affability, as justly drew the chief practice after him, whith- ersoever he went; he constantly shunned not only the being corrupt, but every thing w^hich had any appearance, or might afford the least suspicion of it ; he was sincerely bent on discovering the truth and merits of a cause, and w^ould therefore bear with the meanest counsel, supply the defects of the pleader, and never take it amiss, when summino- up the evidence to be reminded of any circumstance he had omitted ; for being in a high degree possessed of that qualifi- cation so peculiarly necessary to a judge, I mean patience (without which the most excellent talents may become insicr- nificant) no considerations of his own convenience could prevail with him to hurry over a cause, or dispatch it with- out a thorough examination ; for wdiich reason he made it a rule, especially upon the circuits, to be short and sparing at meals, that he might not either by a full stomach unfit him- self for the due discharge of his office, or by a profuse w-aste of time, be obliged to put off", or precipitate the business that came before him.[l] (c) Burnet's life oi: Hale, Edit. 1682. p. 53. [1] Lord Hale wrote the following rules for his judicial guidance: Things necessary to be continually had in remembrance. I. That in the administration of justice I am entrusted for God, the kinn^ and country ; and therefore, IT. That it be done, 1st, uprightly; 2dly, deliberately; 3dly, resolutely. III. That I rest not upon my own understanding or strength, but implore and rest upon the direction and strength of God. n . That in the execution of justice I carefully lay aside my own passions, and do not give way to them, however provoked. V. That I be wholly intent upon the business I am about, remitting all Other cares and thoughts as unseasonable, and interruptions. viii MR. EMLYN'S He was a great lamenter of the divisions and animosities which raged so fiercely at that time among us, especially about the smaller matters of external ceremonies, which he feared might in the end subvert the fundamentals of all reli- gion: and tho he thought the principles of the non-conform- ists too narrow and strait-laced, yet he could by no means approve the penal laws which were then made against them ; he knew many of them to be sober, peaceable men, who were well affected to the government, and had shewn as much dislike as any to the late usurpation, and therefore he thought they deserved a better treatment ; besides, he looked on it as an infringement on the rights of conscience, which ought always to be held sacred and inviolable, and therefore used to say, that the only way to heal our breaches was a new act of uniformity; for which purpose he concurred with Lord Keeper Bridgman and Bishop Wilkins, in setting on foot a scheme for the comprehension of the more mode- rate dissenters, and an indulgence towards others, and drew the same up into the form of a bill, altho by a vote of the house of commons it was prevented from being laid before the parliament. VI. That I suffer not myself to be prepossessed with any judgment at all, till the whole business, and both parties be heard. VII. That I never engage myself in the beginning of a cause, but reserve myself unprejudiced till the whole be heard. VIII. That in business capital, though my nature prompt me to pity, yet to consider that there is also a pity due to the country. IX. That I be not too rigid in matters purely conscientious, where all the harm is diversity of judgment. X. That I be not biassed with compassion to the poor or favor to the rich, in point of justice. XI. That popular or court applause, or distaste, have no influence upon any thing I do in point of distribution of justice. XII. Not to be solicitous what men will say or think, so long as I keep myself exactly according to the rules of justice. XIII. If in criminals it be a measuring cast, to incline to mercy and acquittal. XIV. In criminals that consist merely in words when no more harm ensues, moderation is no injustice. XV. In criminals of blood, if the fact be evident, severity is justice. XVI. To abhor all private solicitations, of what kind soever, and by whomsoever, in matters depending. XVII. To charge my servants; 1st, not to interpose in any business whatsoever; 2d, not to take more than their known fees; 3d, not to give any undue precedence to causes ; 4th, not to recommend counsel. XVIII. To be short and sparing at meals, that I may be fitter for business. PREFACE. ix Tho by this means he was hindered from obtaining a re- peal of those laws, yet could he never be brought to give any countenance to the execution of them, I have heard it cre- dibly related, that once when he was upon the circuit, there happened to be a grand jury, who thought to make a merit of presenting a worthy peaceable non-conformist, that lived in their neighbourhood ; upon this occasion our judge could not avoid reprimanding them for their ill-placed zeal, which vented itself this way, while no notice was taken of the prophaneness, drunkenness and other immoralities, which abounded daily amongst them ; in short, he told them, that if they were resolved to persist, he would remove the affair to Westminster- Hail, and if he could not then prevail to have a stop put to it, he would resign his place ; for he had told the king, when he first accepted it, that if any thing 'w^as pressed upon him, which was against his judgment, he would quit his post. He always retained a serious impression of religion, and in particular was a punctual observer of any vow or engage- ment he had laid himself under. Having in his younger days on a particular occasion made a vow never to drink an health again, he could never be prevailed on upon any con- sideration to dispense with it, altho drinking healths was then grown to be the fashionable loyalty of the times. And thus in every character of life he was a pattern well worthy of imitation : in short, he was a public blessing to the age he lived in, and not to that only, but by his bright and amiable example to succeeding generations; for as a pattern of virtue and goodness will always be a silent, tho sharp reproof to those who deviate from it, so to noble and generous minds it will not fail of being a mighty spur and incentive to the imitation of it, and by that means leave a real and lasting, tho secret, influence, behind it. As he justly merited the esteem of all, so in particular he has well deserved of the profession of the law, to which he was so shining an ornament; he contributed more by his example to the removal of the vulf^r prejudices against them, than any argument whatever could do. The great Archbishop Usher had entertained >some preju- dices of th-at kind, but by conversation with our author and the learned Selde?i, he was convinced of his mistake; our author declaring, " That by his acquaintance with them, he believed there was as many honest men among the lawyers X MR. EMLYN'S proportion ably, as among any profession of men in E7ig' landy Never was the old monkish maxim, Bonus Jurista malus Christa, more thoroughly confuted, than by his example. He demonstrated by a living argument, how practicable it was to be both an able lawyer and a good christian; indeed he saw nothing in the one that was any way incompatible with the other, nor did he think, that an unaffected piety sat with an ill grace on any, be his station never so high, or his learning never so great ; for tho he diligently applied him- self to the business of his profession, yet would he never suffer it so to engross his time as to leave no room for mat- ters of a more serious concernment, as may appear from the many tracts he has wrote on moral and religious subjects. Fir this reason, when he found the decays of nature gain- ing ground upon him, he could no longer be prevailed with to suspend the resolution he had taken to resign his place; that after the example of that great emperor Charles V. he might have an interstice between the business of life and the hour of death.((i) No wonder then that one so great, so good, should be loved and esteemed while living, should be revered and admired when dead; no wonder the king should be loth to part with him, who had been such a credit to his govern- ment; tho had he held his place some few years longer, such a scene of affairs did then open, as in all likelihood would have greatly distressed him how to behave, as well as the court how to get rid of one, who could not have been removed without great reproach, nor continued without great obstruction to the violent measures that were then pursued. But it is time to stop, for I mean not to write the history of his life; this would require a volume of itself, and is long ago performed by an able hand;(e) I shall therefore only subjoin his character, as drawn by that learned prelate, and other eminent co temporaries, by which it will appear, that future times cannot outgo his own in the veneration and esteem they bore him,# The bishop expresses it in short thus : " That he was one of the greatest patterns this age has afforded, whether in his private deportment as a christian, or in his public employ- (d) Inter vitcB negotia <^ mortis diem oportere spatium intercedere. Strada de hello Belgico, Vol. I. sub anno 1555. (e) Bp. Burnet. PREFACE. xi merits, either at the bar or on the bench ;"(y) having given it more at large(^) in the words of a noble person, whom he styles one of the greatest men of the profession of the law:(/i) "he would never be brought to discourse of pubHc matters in private conversation; but in questions of law, w^ien any young lawyer put a case to him, he was very communicative, especially while he was at the bar: but when he came to the bench, he grew more reserved, and would never suffer his opinion in any case to be known, till he was obliged to declare it judicially; and he concealed his opinion in great cases so carefully, that the rest of the judges in the same court could never perceive it: his reason was, because every judge ought to give sentence according to his own persuasio7i and conscience, and not to he swayed hy any respect or deference to another man's opinion : and by this means it happened sometimes, that when all the barons of the Ex- chequer had delivered their opinions, and agreed in their reasons and arguments, yet he coming to speak last, and differing in judgment from them, hath expressed himself with so much weight and solidity, that the barons have immediately retracted their votes, and concurred with him. He hath sat as a judge in all the courts of law, and in, two of them as chief; but still wherever he sat, all business of consequence followed him, and no man was content to sit down by the judgment of any court, till the case was brought before him, to see whether he were of the same mind; and his opinion being once known, men did readily acquiesce in it; and it was very rarely seen, that any man attempted to bring it about again ; and he thM did so, did it upon great disadvantages, and was always looked upon as a very con- tentious person; so that what Cicero says of Brutus, did very often happen to him, Etiam quos contra statuit, cequos placatosque dimisit. " Nor did men reverence his judgment and opinion in courts of law only; but his authority was as great in courts of equity, and the same respect and submission was paid him there too; and this appeared not only in his own court of equity in the Exchequer chamber, but in the Chancery too, for thither he was often called to advise and assist the lord chancellor, or lord keeper for the time being; and if the (/) P- 218. {g) p, 172. (/») Supposed to be the then earl of Nottingham. xii MR. EMLYN'S cause were of difficult examination, or intricated and en- tangled with variety of settlements, no msm ever shewed a more clear and discerning judgment; if it were of great value, and great persons interested in it, no man shewed greater courage and integrity in laying aside all respect of persons. When he came to deliver his opinion, he always put his discourse into such a method, that one part of it gave light to the other ; and where the proceedings of Chan- cery might prove inconvenient to the subject, he never spared to observe and reprove them : And from his observa- tions and discourses, the Chancery hath taken occasion to establish many of those rules by which it governs itself at this day. " He did look upon equity as a part of the common law, and one of the grounds of it ; and therefore, as near as he could, he did always reduce it to certain rules and princi- ples, that men might study it as a science, and not think the administration of it had any thing arbitrary in it. Thus eminent was this man in every station, and into what course soever he was called, he quickly made it appear, that he deserved the chief seat there. " As great a lawyer as he was, he would never suffer the strictness of law to prevail against conscience ; as great a chancellor as he was, he would make use of all the niceties and subtilties in law, when it tended to support right and equity. But nothing was more admirable in him, than his patience : he did not affect the reputation of quickness and dispatch, by a hasty and ,^captious hearing of the counsel : he would bear with the meanest, and gave every man his full scope, thinking it much better to lose time than patience : in summing up of an evidence to a jury, he would always require the bar to interrupt him if he did mistake, and to put him in mind of it, if he did forget the least circum- stance : some judges have been disturbed at this as a rude- ness, which he always looked upon as a service and respect done to him. " His whole life was nothing else but a continual course of labour and industry, and when he could borrow any time from the public service, it was wholly employed either in philosophical or divine meditations: and even that was a public service too, as it hath proved; for they have occa- sioned his writing of such treatises as are become the choicest entertainment ojf wise and good men, and the world hath PREFACE. xiii reason to wish that more of them were printed. He that considers the active part of his Ufa, and with what unwea- ried diligence and appUcation of mind he dispatched all mens business which came under his care, will wonder how he could find any time for contemplation : he that considers again the various studies he past thro, and the many collec- tions and observations he hath made, may as justly wonder how he could find any time for action : but no man can won- der at the exemplary piety and innocence of such a life so spent as this was, wherein as he was careful to avoid every idle word, so it was manifest he never spent an idle day. They who came far short of this great man, will be apt enough to think that this is a panegyric, which indeed is a history, and but a little part of that history which was with great truth to be related of him. Men who despair of attain- ing such perfection, are not willing to believe that any man. else did ever arrive at such a height. " He was the greatest lawyer of the age, and might have had what practice he pleased ; but tho he did most conscien- tiously affect the labours of his profession, yet at the same time he despised the gain of it ; and of those profits which he would allow himself to receive, he always set apart a tenth penny for the poor, which he ever dispensed with that secresy, that they who were relieved, seldom or never knew their benefactor. He took more pains to avoid the honours and preferments of the gown, than others do to compass them. His modesty was beyond all example; for where some men who never attained to half his knowledge, have been puffed up with a high conceit of themselves, and have affected all occasions of raising their own esteem- by depre- ciating other men, he on the contrary was the most obliging man that ever practised. If a young gentleman happened to be retained to argue a point in law, where he was on the contrary side, he would very often mend the objections when he came to repeat them, and always commend the gentle- man, if there were room for it ; and one good word of his was of more advantage to a young man, than all the favour of the court could be. [2] [2] Williams, in his life of Hale, gives the following account of his intro- duction to a student of law, taken from a manuscript formerly in the posses- sion of Bennet Langton, the friend of Dr. Johnson, and found in the hand- writing of Mr. Langton's great grandfather, who studied law with Lord Hale : " Dec. 13, 1672. — I was sent to by Mr. Barker, to come to him to my Lord Chief Justice Hale's lodgings, at Sergeant's Inn. I was informed by xiv MR. EMLYN'S Upon the promotion of lord chief i\is,iice Rainsford, who sncceeded him in that office, the then lord chancellor exprest himself thus :{i) " The vacancy of the seat of the chief jus- (i) Burnet, p. 213, 217. Mr. Godolphin, about a month ago, that my Lord Chief Justice had decljared, at supper, at Mr. Justice Twisden's, that if he could meet with a sober young man, that would entirely addict himself to his lordship's directions, he would take delight to communicate to him, and discourse with him at meals, and at leisure times ; and, in three year's time, make him perfect in the practice of the law. I discoursed several times with Mr. Godolphin, of the great advan- tage that a student would make by his lordship's learned communications, and what influence it would have on a practiser, as well as honour, to be regarded as my lord's friend ; and persuaded him to use his interest, and the offers of his friends, to procure his lordship's favour. But his inclinations leading him to travel, and his design afterwards, to rely upon his interest at court, he had no thoughts to pursue it, but offered to engage friends on my behalf, which I refused, and told him, I would make use of no other person than my worthy friend, Mr. Barker, whose acquaintance with my lord, I knew, was very particular. After I had often reflected upon the nobleness of my lord's proposition, and the happiness of that person that should be preferred by so learned and pious a man, to whose opinion every court paid such a venera- tion that he was regarded as the oracle of the law, I made my application to Mr. Barker to intercede with my lord in my behalf, who assented to it with much readiness, as he always had been very obliging to me since I had the honour to be known to him. He made a visit to my lord, and told him that he heard of the declaration my lord made at Mr. Justice Twisden's. My lord said it was true, and he had entertained the same resolution a long time; but, not having met with any body to his purpose^ he had discarded those thoughts, which Mr. B. did beg of his lordship to resume, in behalf of a person that he would recommend to him, and would be surety for his industry, and diligent observation of his lordship's directions. My lord then inquired who it was, and he mentioned me. Then he asked how long I had been at the law, of what country I was, and what estate I had ; which he told him, and that I was my father's eldest son. To which he replied, that he might talk no farther of it, for there was no likelihood that I would attend to the study of the law as I ought. But Mr. B. gave him assurances that I would ; that his lordship might rely upon his word ; and that I had not taken this resolution without deliberation ; that I had often been at Westminster Hall, where I had heard his lordship speak, and had a very great veneration for his lordship, and did earnestly desire this favour; that my father had lately purchased the seat of the family, which was sold by the elder house, and by that means had run himself into five or six thousand pounds debt. " ' Well then,' said my lord, ' pray bring him to me.' " Dec. 13. — I went to my lord and Mr. B. (for till that time my lord was either busy or out of town) about four in the afternoon. My lord prayed us to sit, and after some silence, Mr. B. acquainted my lord, that I was the per- son on whose behalf he had spoken to his lordship. My lord then said, that he understood I had a fortune, and, therefore, would not so strictly engage myself in the crabbed study of the law, as was necessary for one that must PREFACE. XV tice of this court, and that by a way and means so unusual, as the resignation of him, that lately held it, and this too proceeding from so deplorable a cause as the infirmity of that body, which began to forsake the ablest mind that ever make his dependence on it. I told his lordship, that if he pleased to admit me to that favor I heard he designed to such a person he had inquired after, that I should be very studious. My lord replied quick, that Mr. B. had given him assurances of it ; that Mr. B. was his worthy friend, with whom he had been acquainted a long time, and that, for his sake, he should be ready to do me any kindness; for which I humbly gave his lordship thanks, as did, like- wise, Mr. B. My lord asked me, how I had passed my time, and what standing I was of. I told him that I was almost six years of the Temple ; that I had travelled into France about two years ago, since when I had dis- continued my studies of the law, applying myself to the reading French books, and some histories. My lord discoursed of the necessity of a firm, uninterrupted prosecution of that study which any man designed, in the midst of which Mr, Justice Twisden came in, so that his lordship bid us come to him again in two hours after. " About eight the same evening, we found his lordship alone. After we sat down, my lord bid me tell him, what I read in Oxford, what here, and what in France. I told him I read Smith's Logic, Burgersdicius' Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy ; that in the afternoons I used to read the classic authors ; that, at my first coming to the inns of court, I read Lyttleton, and Doctor and Student, Perkins, my Lord Coke's Institutes, and some cases in his Reports; that after I went into France, I applied myself to the learning of the language, and reading some French memoirs, as the Life of Mazarin, Memoirs of the D. of Guise, the Hii^- tory of the Academic Francoise, and others; that since I came away, I con- tinued to read some French books, as the History of the Turkish government by , the account of the last Dutch war, the State of Holland, &c. ; that [read a great deal in Heylin's Geography, some of Sir Walter Rawleigh, my Lord Bacon of the Advancement of Learning, Tully's Offices, Rush- worth's Collections. " My lord said, that the study of the law was to one of two ends ; first, to fit a man with so much knowledge as will enable him to understand his own estate, and live in some repute among his neighbours in the country ; or secondly, to design the practice of it as an employment to be advantaged by it ; and asked which of them was my purpose. I acquainted his lordship, that when I first came to the temple I did not design to prosecute the study of the law, so as to make advantage by it ; but now, by the advice of my father and my uncle, and Dr. Peirse, in whose college I had my education, and received many instances of his great kindness to me, I had formed reso- lutions to practise it, and, therefore, made my suit to his lordship, for his directions. '* ' Well,' said my Lord, * since I see your intentions, I will give what assistance I can.' " My lord said, that there were two ways of applying one's-self to the study of the law ; one was to attain the great learning and knowledge of it, which was to be had in all the old books, but that did require great time, and xvi MR. EMLYN'S presided here, hath filled the kingdom with lamentations, and given the king many and pensive thoughts how to sup- ply that vacancy again." And then addressing himself to his successor: "The very labours of the place, and that would be at least seven years before a man would be fit to make any benefit by it ; the other was, by fitting one's-self for the practice of the court, by reading the new reports, and the present constitution of the law ; and, to this latter my lord advised me, having already passed so much time, a great many of the cases seldom coming in practice, and several of them anti- quated. " In order tp which study, his lordship did direct -that I should be very exact in Lyttleton, and after, read carefully my lord Coke's Lyttleton, and then his Reports. After which Plowden, Dyer, Croke and Moore. That I should keep constantly to the exercises of the house, and, in term, to West- minster Hall, to the King's Bench, because the young lawyers began their practice there ; that I should associate with studious persons, rather above, than below my standing ; and, after next term, get me a common place book, and that I must spoil one book, binding Rolle's Abr. with white paper between the leaves, and according to those titles insert what I did not find there before, according to the preface to that book, which my lord said came from his hands, and that he did obtain of Sir Francis RoUe to suffer it to be printed, to be a platform to the young students. My lord said that he would, at any time that I should come to him, shew me the method he used, and direct me, and that if he were busy he would (ell me so. "He said that he studied sixteen hours a day, for the first two years that he came to the inns of court, but almost brought himself to his grave, though he were of a very strong constitution, and afterwards reduced himself to eight hours; but that he would not advise anybody to so much ; that he thought six hours a day, with attention and constancy, was sufficient ; that a man must use his body as he would use his horse, and his stomach — not tire him at once, but rise with an appetite. That his father did order in his will that he should follow the law; that he came from the university with some aversion for lawyers, and thought them a barbarous sort of people, unfit for any thing but their own trade; but having occasion to speak about business with Serjeant Glanvil, he found him of such prudence and candour, that from that time he altered his apprehensions, and betook himself to the study of the law, and oft told Serjeant Glanvil that he was the cause of his application to the law. " That constantly, after meals, every one in his turn, proposed a case, in which every one argued. " That he took up a resolution, which he punctually observed ever since, that he would never more see a play, having spent all his money at Oxford, and having experienced that it was so great an alienation of his mind from his studies, by the recurring of the speeches and actions into his thoughts, a^ well as the loss of his time when he saw them; that he had often had dis- putes with Mr. Selden, who was his great friend, and used to say he found so great refreshment by it; but my lord told him, he had so much knowledge of the inconvenience of them, that he would not see one for a hundred pounds. But he said he was not one of Mr. Prynne's judgment (which I PREFACE. xvii weight and fatigue of business, wliicli attends it, are no small discouragements; for what shoulders may not justly fear that burden, which made* him stoop, that went before you? Yet I confess you have a greater discouragement than the mere burden of your place, and that is the unimi- table example of your predecessor. Onerosum est succedere bono principi vfdi^ the saying of him in the panegyric, and you will find it so too, that are to succeed such a chief jus- tice, of so indefatigable an industry, so invincible a patience, so exemplary an integrity, and so magnanimous a contempt of worldly things, without which no man can be truly great; minded him of,) for he did not think it unlawful, but very fit for gentlemen sometimes, but not for students. " My lord said, at the beginning of his discourse, that my friends might expect that I should marry, to take off the present debt from the estate, which else would increase, and then there could be no thoughts of a very earnest prosecution of study ; to which Mr. B. said, that my father, when he made this purchase that put him into debt, did resolve to sell other land, and by that might either discharge, or lessen it. " My lord said that his rule of health was, to be temperate, and keep him- self warm. He never made breakfasts, but used, in the morning, to drink a glass of some sort of ale. That he went to bed at nine, and rose between six and seven, allowing himself a good refreshment for sleep. That the law will admit of no rival, nothing to go even with it ; but that sometimes one may, for diversion, read in the Latin historians of England, Hoveden, and Matthew Paris, &:c. ; but after it is conquered, it. will admit of other studies. " 1 asked whether his lordship read the same law in the afternoon, as he did in the morning. He said no : he read the old books in the morning, and the new in the afternoon, because of fitting himself for conversation. I asked if he kept constantly to one court, which he said he did. " He said, a little law, a good tongue, and a good memory, would fit a man for the chancery ; and he said it was a golden practice, for the lawyers there got more money than in all the other courts of Westminster Hall. I told his lordship what my lord chancellor lately said, that he would reduce the practice of the court to another method, and not suffer above one counsel, or two at the most, in one cause. " My lord said, that lOOOZ. a year was a great deal for any common law- yer to get ; and Mr. B. said that Mr. Winnington did make 2000Z. per year by it. My lord answered, that Mr. W. made great advantage by his city practice, but did not believe he made so much of it. I told his lordship of what Mr. W. had said before the counsel on Wednesday, on the behalf of stage coaches, which were then attempted to be overthrown. " At our coming away, my lord did reiterate his willingness to direct and assist me ; and I did beg of his lordship, that he would permit me to consult his lordship in the reason of any thing that I was ignorant of; and that his lordship would be pleased to examine me in what I should read, that he might find in what measure I did apply myself to the execution of his com- mands." VOL. I. — B xviii MR. EMLYN'S and to all this a man that was so absolute a master of the science of the law, and even of the most.abstruse and hidden parts of it, that one may truly say of his knowledge of the law, what St. Austin said of St. Hierom's knowledge in di- vinity. Quod Hieromjmus nescivit, nullus mortalium unquam scivit. And therefore the king would not suffer himself to part with so great a man, till he had placed upon him all the marks of bounty and esteem, which his retired and weak condition was capable of." To this the new chief justice, speaking of his predecessor, answered in the following words. *' A person in whom his eminent virtues and deep learning have long managed a contest for the superior- ity, which is not decided to this day, nor will it ever be determined, I suppose, which shall get the upper hand: A person that has sat in this court many years, of whose actions there I have been an eye and ear witness; that by the greatness of his learning always charmed his auditors to reverence and attention : A person of whom I think I may boldly say, that as former times cannot show any superior to him, so I am confident succeeding and future time will never shew any equal. These considerations, heightened by w'hat I have heard from your lordship concerning him, made me anxious and doubtful, and put me to a stand how I should succeed so able, so good, and so great a man. It doth very much trouble me, that I, who, in comparison of him, am but like a candle lighted in the sun-shine, or like a glow-worm at mid-day, should succeed so great a person, that is and will be so eminently famous to all posterity; and I must ever wear this motto in my breast to comfort me, and in my actions to excuse me, " Sequitur, quamvis non passibits cBquis^ Mr. Baxter, with whom our author was very intimate towards the latter part of his life, describes him in these words :(^) *'Sir Matthe?v Hale, that unwearied student, that prudent man, that solid philosopher, that famous lawyer, that pillar and basis of justice, who would not have done an unjust act for any worldly price or motive, the ornament of his majesty's government" and honour of England, the highest faculty of the soul of Westminster-Hall, and pattern to all the reverend and honourable judges; that godly serious {h) Baxter's Notes on Lord Hale's Life, p. 43. PREFACE. xLx practical christian, the lover of goodness and all good men, a lamenter of the clergies selfishness and unfaithfulness and discord and of the sad divisions following hereupon ; an earnest desirer of their reformation, concord and the church's peace, and of a reformed act of uniformity, as the best and necessary means thereto; that great con- temner of the riches, pomp and vanity of the world; that pattern of honest plainness and humility, who while he fled from the honour that pursued him, was yet lord chief justice of the king's bench, after being long lord chief baron of the Exchequer; living and dying, entring on, using, and volun- tarily surrendering his place of judicature with the most universal love, honour and praise, that ever did Efiglish sub- ject in this age, or any that just history doth acquaint us with," <^c. 6fC. SfC. Thus far for the author. As to the work itself, if any of our author's performances might challenge the precedence of the rest, this seems to have the justest claim to it, as being a favourite work, which he often reviewed, and was at vast pains and charge in fur- nishing himself with proper materials for it. His compassionate concern for the lives and liberties of mankind on the one hand, and for preserving the public peace and tranquility on the other, had possessed him with an opinion of the high importance, that the pleas of the crown, especially those relating to capital offenses, should be reduced to certain rules, and those rules clearly and plainly understood, that so there might be as little room left as possible either for erring in, or perverting of judgment. It was this led him to make the crown law his principal study, to which he applied himself with great assiduity ; for as bishop Burnet speaking of this treatise informs us,(/) " It was by much search and long observation he composed that great work concerning it." The same author acquaints us,{m) that he had begun his collections relating hereto in the reign of King Charles I. "But after the king was murdered he laid them by; and that they might not fall into ill hands, he hid them behind the wainscotting of his study, for he said, there rvas no rtiore occasion to use them, till the king should he again restored to his right; and so upon his ma- j6sty'« restoration he took them out, and went on in his desigit to perfect that great work." {I) p. 90. (m) p. 39. XX MR. EMLYN'S Hence it appears liighly probable, that he intended this work for the pubhc, altho the business of his station did not afford him leisure to publish it during his life; however, about four years after his death, the house of Commons took singular notice of it, and thought it a work of such conse- quence, as to pass a vote,(;^) desiring his executors to print it; and appointed a committee to take care thereof: but that parliament being soon after dissolved, (o) this design dropt. Some years since there was published a treatise, intitled, Pleas of the Crown by »Sir Matthew Hale ; but this was only a plan of this work, containing little more than the heads or divisions thereof, concerning which the editor in his preface expresses himself thus, " He [our author] hath written a large work upon this subject, intitled, A?i History of the Pleas of the Crown, wherein he shews what the law an- ciently was in these matters, what alterations have from time to time been made in it, and what it is at this day. He wrote it on purpose to he pri?ited, finished it, had it all tran- scribed for the press in his life-time, and had revised part of it after it was transcribed." It is therefore to be hoped, the publication hereof will not be thought any way to interfere with the direction of his will. That none of his MSS. should be printed after his death, except such as he should give order for during his life, his intention for printing it being so apparent, as may well amount to an order for so doing. Besides, as bishop Burnet observes,(j9) this prohibitory clause in the will seems in some measure to be revoked by his codicil, wherein he orders, that if amj book of his writing should be printed, then what should be given as a consideration for the copy should be divided, &c. a kind of implication, that he had left the printing thereof to the discretion of his ex- ecutors. The above-mentioned writer further observes,(^) that his unwillingness to have any of his works printed after his death, preceded from an apprehension, lest they should undergo any expurgations or interpolations in the licensing them; for this, he said, might in matters of law prove to be of such mischievous consequence, that he was resolved none of his writings should be at the mercy of the licensers. (n) iVo». 29, 1680. (o) Jan. 18, 1680. (p) p. 185. ($) p. 186, PREFACE. xxi But as there is no such thing required by the laws now in being, that reason is at an end, and the reader may be assured, that the edition here offered to the public is printed faithfully from the author's original manuscript. This manuscript consists of one thick folio volume, all in our author's own hand-writing, from whence it was tran- scribed in his life-time, and the transcript has since been bound up in seven small volumes in folio. It had been by him revised as far as Chap. 27. in the first part, viz. about the middle of the third volume, as appears from many interlineations and additions in his own hand ; the corrections in the remaining part are in another (very modern) hand, and in some places not very agreeable to the scope of the argument. This transcript, therefore, so far as revised and corrected by our author (and no farther), may be deemed the original finished and perfected ; but since even in this part there are in some places leaves taken out, and others inserted in their room in a different hand, unauthenticated by our author, and sometimes quite disturbing the coherence and connexion of the discourse, it was not thought warrantable to consider such interpolations as a part of this treatise; for as it cannot be doubted but great regard will be always paid to the per- formance of so esteemed an author, it is a piece of justice due both to the author and the public, that nothing should be herein inserted, but what is undeniably his, and carries evident marks of being by him intended as part of this work. The title hereof was named by our author himself Histo- ria Placitorwn Cornce; for he intended, as appears from the Proemium, to have taken in the whole body of the crown- law, as well in relation to matters civil, as matters criminal; for which purpose he once designed to have added two more books upon this subject, the one concerning offenses not capital, the other touching franchises and liberties ; but to the great detriment of the public, neither of these appears ever to have been composed by him; so that, as it now stands, it treats only of offenses capital, which is indeed the most important branch of the crown-law, being what most nearly affects the life and liberty of the subject; besides, in treating hereof, he has unavoidably explained many inci- dental matters equally applicable to offenses not capital. The Jirst part of 'this work relates to the nature of the xxii MR. EMLYN'S offenses, viz. the several kinds of treason, lieresy and felony, the second of these, heresy, being an offense of a spiritual nature, of which it was not our author's purpose to treat, w'as at first wholly omitted by him; but afterwards con- sidering, as I suppose, that by its being circumscribed by act of parliament, viz. 1 Uliz. it became an offense of tem- poral cognizance, he thought proper to insert a chapter upon that head. The second part relates to the manner of proceeding against offenders; wherein are considered the jurisdiction of the several courts; the manner of apprehending, committing, bailing, and arraigning offenders; their several pleas, bring- ing them to trial, judgment, and execution. Having thus given some general account of the author and the work, it will be proper, in the next place, to acquaint the reader with the part I have had in this addition, which has been to supervise the printing thereof, that it be agree- able to our author's manuscript, which being written in a very obscure hand, might, by one wholly unacquainted w^ith the law, have been frequently mistaken. To make this work the more authentic, the several refer- ences herein made to the records have been compared with the originals at the respective offices in the Tower and West- minster. I have also carefully examined the several quotations from the year-books, reports, &c. many of which being quoted without folio or page, or else mis-quoted, have with no small trouble been supplied and rectified ; for our author, not hav- ing always had leisure to consult the books themselves, has frequently copied from the mis-printed quotations in the margin of lord CoMs third volume of his Institutes. As it cannot be expected, but in the writing so large a manuscript, some words must, currente calamo, have been omitted or wrong written, I have in some few places taken the liberty to add or alter a word or two to preserve the sense; but have been particularly careful to distinguish such addition or alteration within crotchets, that -I might not impose my judgment on the reader, but leave him to judge for himself, whether the drift of our author's reason- ing do not require it. I have likewise subjoined a few notes, containing some observations from the records; as also remarking, where the law hath been since explained by later resolutions, or altered PREFACE. xxiii by subsequent acts of parliament; but as these acts are some- times very long, consisting of many clauses, the reader is desired to use the same caution here, which is recom- mended by our author(r) with regard to those recited in the work itself, viz. " that he rely not barely upon the ab- stracts thereof here given, but peruse the statutes them- selves in the books at large." I am sensible many slips and omissions must needs have happened in the supervising so large a work of so critical a nature, but hope that will plead my excuse, at least to those, who consider the wide difference between perusing it in a fair print and in a difficult manuscript. (r) Part I. p. 261. March 30, 1736. (Q* For Table of Cases (cited in the notes,) and Table of Abbre- viations, see the beginning of Vol. II, A TABLE SEVERAL CHAPTERS CONTAINED IN THE FIRST PART. PAGE. Chapter I. Concerning capital punishments 1 Chapter II. Concerning the several incapacities of persons, and their exemptions from penalties by reason thereof 14 Chapter III. Touching the defect of infancy and non-age 16 Chapter IV. Concerning the defect of ideocy, madness, and lunacy, in reference to criminal punishments 29 Chapter V. Concerning casualty and misfortune, how far it excuseth in criminals 38 Chapter VI. Concerning ignorance, and how far it prevails to excuse in capital crimes 42 Chapter VII. Touching incapacities or excuses by reason of civil subjection * 43 Chapter VIII. Concerning the civil incapacities by compulsion and fear 49 Chapter IX. Concerning the privilege by reason of necessity 52 Chapter X. Concerning the offense of high treason, the person against whom committed, and the reason of the greatness of the offense; and touching alligeance 58 Chapter XI. Concerning treason at the common law, and their uncertainty 76 Chapter XII. Touching the statute of 25 E. 3. and the high treasons therein declared 87 xxvi A TABLE OF THE SEVERAL CHAPTERS PAGE. Chapter XHI. Touching high treason in compassing the death of the icing, queen, or prince 91 Chapter XIV. Concerning levying of war against the king 130 Chapter XV. Concerning treason in adhering to the king's enemies within the knd or without 159 Chapter XVL Concerning treason in counterfeiting the great seal, or privy seal 170 Chapter XVH. Concerning high treason in counterfeiting the king's coin, and in the first place touching the history of the coin and coinage of England 188 Chapter XVHI. Concerning the adulteration or impairing of coin, and the antient means used to remedy it 205 Chapter XIX. Concerning the counterfeiting of the king's coin, what it is, what the penalty thereof antiently, and what at this day 210 Chapter XX. Concerning treason in bringing in false money 225 Chapter XXI. Concerning high treason in killing the chan- cellor, &c. 230 Chapter XXII. Concerning principals and accessaries in treason 233 Chapter XXIII. Concerning forfeitures by treason 239 Chapter XXIV. Concerning declaring of treasons by parlia- ment, and those treasons that were enacted or declared by parliament between the 25 E. 3. and the 1 Mar. 258 Chapter XXV. Concerning treasons declared and enacted from 1 Mar. till this day, viz. 13 Car. 2. 307 Chapter XXVI. Concerning the judgments in high treason, and the particulars relating thereunto, and to attainders 342 Chapter XXVII. Touching corruption of blood, and restitution thereof, loss of dower, forfeiture of goods, and execution 354 Chapter XXVIII. Touching the crime of misprision of treason and felony, &c. . 371 Chapter XXIX. Concerning petit treason 377 Chapter XXX. Concerning heresy and apostacy, and the pun- ishment thereof 383 Chapter XXXI. Concerning homicide and first of self killing, or felo de se 411 Chapter XXXII. Of deodands 419 Chapter XXXIII. Of homicide, and its several kinds, and first of those considerations, that are applicable as well to murder as to manslaughter . 424 CONTAINED IN THE FIRST PART. xxvii PAGE. Chapter XXXIV. Concerning commanding, counselling, or abetting of murder or. manslaughter 435 Chapter XXXV. Concerning the death of a person unknown, and the proceedings thereupon 447 Chapter XXXVI. Touching murder, what it is, and the kinds thereof 449 Chapter XXXVII. Concerning murder by malice implied pre- sumptive, or malice in law 455 Chapter XXXVIII. Of manslaughter, and particularly of man- slaughter exempt from clergy by the statute of 1 Jac. cap. 8. 466 Chapter XXXIX. Touching involuntary homicide, and first of chance-medley, or killing per infortunium 471 Chapter XL. Of manslaughter ex necessitate, and first se de- fendendo H 473 Chapter LXI. Concerning the forfeiture of him that kills in his own defense, or per infortunium 492 Chapter XLII. Concerning the taking away of the life of man by the course of law, or in execution of justice 496 Chapter XLIII. Of larciny and its kinds 503 Chapter XLIV. Concerning the divershies of grand larcinies among themselves in relation to clergy 517 Chapter XLV. Concerning petit larciny , 530 Chapter XLVI. Of robbery 532 Chapter XLVII. Concerning restitution of goods stolen, and the confiscation of goods omitted in the indictment or the appeal 538 Chapter XLVIII. Of burglary, the kinds and punishments 547 Chapter XLIX. Of arson, or wilful burning of houses 566 Chapter L. Concerning felonies by the common law, relating to the bringing of felons to justice, and the impediments thereof, as escape, breach of prison, and rescue; and first touching arrests 575 Chapter LI. Of felony by voluntary escapes, and touching felony by escapes of felons 590 Chapter LI I. Of negligent escapes 600 Chapter LIII. Concerning rescues of prisoners in custody for felony 606 Chapter LIV. Concerning escapes and breach of prison by the party himself, that is imprisoned for felony 607 Chapter LV. Of principals and accessaries in felony, and first of accessaries before the fact 612 xxviii A TABLE OF THE SEVERAL CHAPTERS, &c. PAGE. Chapter LVL Of acqessaries after the fact 618 Chapter LVIL Concerning the order of proceeding against accessaries 623 Chapter LVHI. Concerning felonies by act of parliament, and first concerning rape 626 Chapter LIX. Concerning the felony de uxore abdncta sive rapta cum bonis viri, super statutum Westm. 2. cap. 34. 637 Chapter LX. Of felony by purveyors taking victuals without warrant - / 639 Chapter LXL Concerning the new felonies enacted in the times of E. 2. E. 3. and R. 2. 620 Chapter LXH, Concerning the new felonies enacted in the time of H. 4. H. 5, H. 6. E. 4. 644 Chap'sUr LXHL Concerning the new felonies enacted in the times of R. 3. H. 7. H. 8. E. 6. and Q. Mary 656 Chapter LXIV. Concerning felonies newly enacted in the time of Q. Elizabeth, K. James, and K. Charles L 681 Felonies enacted in the time of K. Charles H. K. James H. . K. WilUam HL Q. Anne, K. George I. and K. George H. 697 Chapter LXV. Certain general observations concerning felo- nies by act of parliament 703 Felonies enacted since the last edition of this book in the year 1778 725 THE PROEMIUM. THE METHOD OF THE WORK INTENDED. Having an intention to make a full collection of the Pleas of the Crown, I shall divide those Pleas into two general Tracts. The first, concerning pleas of the crown in matters criminal. The second, concerning pleas of the crown in matters civil; namely, concerning franchises and liberties. The former will be the subject of the first and second books, the latter of the third book. First, therefore, I shall begin with the several kinds of crimes, that make up the subject matter of my first and second book. Crimes that are punishable by the laws of England, are for their matter of two kinds, 1. Ecclesiastical. 2. Temporal. The former of these, namely, such crimes as I call Eccle- siastical, are of ecclesiastical cognizance; and though all external jurisdiction^ as well ecclesiastical as temporal, is derived from the Crown of Engla7id, and all criminal pro- ceedings in the ecclesiastical courts, are in some kind Pla- cita Cor once suits for the king, and such as he may pardon or discharge, as being his own suits, yet these I shall not meddle with at this time. The second sort, viz. Temporal crimes, which are offenses against the laws of this realm, whether the common law or acts of parliament, are divided into two general ranks or distributions in respect of the punishments that are by law appointed for them, or in respect of their nature or degree: XXX THE PROEMIUM TO and thus they may be divided into capital offenses, or offenses only criminal; or rather, and more properly, into ■ ■ Felotiies and Misdemeanors, " because there is no capital offense but hath in it the crime of felony : and yet there be some felonies, that are not in their nature capital, whereof hereafter. Crimen capitale, or felony, in this acceptation is of two kinds, namely, That which is complicated, and hath a greater offense joined with it, namely Treason, and That which is simple Felony. Touching the former of these, namely Treason, it is that capital offense, which is committed against some special civil obligation, of subjection and faith more than is found in other capital offenses, and therefore it hath the denomina- tion oiproditio, and the offense is laid to be done prodilorie. This offense of Treason is of two kinds, namely, That which is against the highest civil obligation, namely, against the king, his crown and dignity, which is called High-treason. Or against some other, to whom a civil obligation of faith is made or implied, which is called Petit-treason. The offenses of high-treason are of two kinds, .?;zV. Such as were treasons by the common law, or, Such as were made so by special acts of parliament. The offenses of simple felony are likewise of the same distribution, namely. Such as were felonies at common law, and, Such as are by act of parliament put into the degree, or under the punishment of felony. And the same distribution is to be made touching misde- meanors, namely they are. Such as are so by the common law, or Such as are specially rpade punishable as misdemeanors by acts of parliament. This is the general order and distribution of the first and second book of this tractate, namely, concerning the matters of the Pleas of the Crown in criminals; or those crimes, which come under the cognizance of the laws of this king- dom, wherein the prosecution is pro rege, or in his name or right, as the common vindex of public injuries or crimes. The particular enumeration of these several offenses is HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. xxxi much of the business of those charges, that are given to the grand jury by the justices in their several sessions; and they were for the most part heretofore contained in certain arti- cles or heads of inquiry delivered out in writing to the several inquests, and were often stiled Capitula Placitonim Coronce; such were those of i^. 1. mentioned by Hovede?i, p. 744, 783. which were delivered to the inquisitors in every wappentach or hundred, and to the justices itinerant to make inquiry upon, and by them to the grand inquests; and such were those Articuli itineris declared by Bracton, Lib. III. de corona, cap. 1. and printed in the old Magna Charta for the justices in eyre to make inquiry upon, which I shall not here repeat at large, but shall take them up as I shall have occasion to use them. The order which I shall observe in these Pleas of the Crown will be this : I. In the first book I will consider of capital offenses, Treason and Felonies; which book will be divided into two parts : 1. The enumeration of the hinds of treasons and felonies as well by common law, as by acts of parliament. 2. The whole method of proceedings in or upon them. II. The second book will treat of matters criminal, that are not capital; and III. The third book will be touching franchises and liher- ties.{*) (*) That which is here offered to the public, is only the first of these books, consisting of two parts ; the other two books having, as I have been credibly informed, never been composed by our author. HISTOlilA PLACITORUM COW^M. PART I. CHAPTER I. CONCERNING CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS. Being to treat concerning capital offences, it will not be amiss to pre- mise something touching capital punishments. Laws, that are introdnced by custom, or instituted by the legislative authority for the good of civil societies, would be of little effect, unless they had also their sanctions, imposing penalties upon the offenders of those laws. These penalties are various according to the several natures of the offences, or the detriment that comes thereby to civil societies ; some are only pecuniary; some corporal, but not capital, such as imprison- ment, stigmatizing, banishment, servitude, and the like; others are capital, ultimum siippUcium, or death; and that death sometimes accompanied with greater, sometimes with less degrees of severity. So that, although offences against the good of human society be many of ihem prohibited by the laws of God and nature, yet the punishments of all such offences are not determined by the law of natiu-e to this or that particular kind, but are for the most part, if not altogether, left to the positive laws and constitutions of several kingdoms and states. And therefore, although most certainly the penalties instituted by God himself among his ancient people upon the breach of their laws were with the highest wisdom fitted to that state, and all lavv^s and instituted punishments should come up as near to [ 2 ] that pattern, as may be ; yet as to the degrees and kinds of punishments of offences in foro civiii vel judicinrio they are not obliging to all other kingdoms or states, but all states, as well chris- tian as heathen, have varied from them. And therefore it will not be amiss to instance in the various kinds of punishments inflicted by the several laws of several countries, es- pecially in those two offences of homicide and theft, which are the most common and obvious offences in all countries. By th.eancientest divine law, that we read, the punishment of homi- VOL. I. — 1 2 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. cide was with death. Gen. ix. G. "Whosoever sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be slied."(^/) And the judicial law given by Moses was pnrsnantto it, with some temperaments and explanations. Exod. xxi. 12, 1,3, 14. "He, tliat smiteth a man, so that he die, shall surely be put to death. And if a man lie not in wait, but God deliver him into his hand ; then 1 will appoint thee a place, whither he shall flee. But if a man come pre- sumptuously upon his neighbour to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him awa.y from mine altar, that he may die." And v. 18, 19. "And if men strive together, and one smite another with a stone, or with his fist, and he die not, but keepeth his bed ; if he rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him, be quit; only he shall pay (pr the loss of his time, and for his cure." And what this delivery by God of a man into his neighbour's hand is, is best expounded Deut. xix. 4, 5, 6, 11, 12. "Whoso killeth his neighbour ignorantly, whom he hated not in time past, as where a man cleaveth wood, and the ax flieth from the helve, and killeth a man, he shall fly to the city of refuge, (6) lest the avenger(c) [ 3 ] of blood pursue, and slay him while his heart is hot; where- as he was not worthy of death, in that he hated him not in time past: But if any man hate his neighbour, and lie in wait for him, and rise up against him, and smite him mortally, that he die, and he fleeth to one of those cities, the elders of his city shall send and fetch him thence, and deliver him into the hand of the avenger of blood, that he may die."(rf) Again ; Exod. xxii. 2. " If a thief be found breaking-up, and be smitten, that lie die, there shall no blood be shed for him ; if the sun {a) Tliis law being given to Noah, from whom all men are derived, is not peculiar to the Israelites ; but, as our author observes below, is binding on all mankind. {i) Concerning these cities of refuge, see Exod. xxi. 13. Numb. xxxv. Deut. iv. 41 Sf ssg. Josh. XX. xxi. Selden : de jure natvruli, &;c. Lib. IV. cap. 2. (c) Who this avenger of blood was, is no where expressly said, it is generally supposed that he was the next heir to the person slain. See Selden: de jur. nat. Lib. IV. cap. 1. 6f de successionibvs in bona defuncti : but tiie truth is, the Hebrew words Gael ha dam, here rendered the avenper of blood, should be rendered ihenext of blood, for Gael properly signifies one of the same kindred; it is so rendered Ruth ii. 20. and iii. 9, 12. and is usually expressed in the Septuagint by ay^Hwcvv, which denotes one near of kin. (d) If tiiere was no avenger of blood, or if he would not or could not kill the slayer, the slayer was capitally punished by a judicial sentence ; and no ransom or recompense was admitted. Numb. xxxv. 31. Selden: de jur. not. Lib. IV. cap. 1. in fine; even though the person slain should before his death desire that the slayer should be forgiven. Maimonides More Ncvochim, Pars III. c. 41. for all voluntary homicide was inexpiable, as appears from Numb. xv. 27. 31. and the ease of David in the matter of Uriah, Ps. li. 16. There was one case indeed of capital homicide, wherein a ransom was allowed, viz. If an ox were wont to push with his horn, and it had been testified to his owner, and he had not kept liim in, so that he had killed a man or a woman, the owner was to be put to death, he being looked on as the author of the murder, who would not prevent it, when lie had warning, and might have done it; however, this being a case of gross negligence, rather than wilful malice, he was permitlcd to redeem his life by paying the ransom, which was laid upon him. Exod. xxi. 21), 30. the price of a servant was thirty shekels of silver. Ibid. v. 32, and that of a freeman was generally double, viz. sixty shekels. Maimon. More Neiwchim, Pars III. cap. 40. This was also felony liy the eomtrion law of E norland, for by such sufferance the owner scorned to have a will to kill. Stamf. P. C. 17. Filz. Cor. 311. Vide post c. 33 note. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 3 be risen upon him (here shall be blood shed for him ; for he should make full reslitulion ; if he have notliing, then he shall be sold for his theft." Upon these judicial laws, these things are observable ; 1. That by these laws the killing of a man by malice forethought, or upon a sud- den falhng out, were both iwider the same punishment of death. (e) 2. That the killing of a man by misfortune was not liable to the punishment of death, by the sentence of the judge; but yet [ 4 ] tile avenger of blood might kill him. before he got to the city of refuge. (/) 3. The killing of a thief in the night was not liable to punishment of death ; but if it were in the day-time, it was pun- isliable with death. 4. Though there is no express law touching killing a man in his own defence, (,§•) yet it seems the custom of the Jeios, and the interpretation of the Jewish doctors, excused that fact from the punishment of death. (A) 5. Tliat the usual manner of the exe- cution of the sentence of death was stoning, and sometimes strangu- lation. (/) Now I will consider some of the laws of other nations in reference to homicide; wherein though there is a great analogy in many things between the laws of tlie Jews, and the laws of other countries; so that a man may reasonably collect, that these judicial laws of the Jews were taken up by other nations, as the grand exemplar of their judi- cial laws ; yet in some things they departed from them in tlie particular constitutions and customs of other countries. Among the leges JUticcC collected by Mr Petit, Lib. VII, tit. 1. these were many of the laws concerning homicide. (e) The law was general, "That whoever smiteth a man, so that he die, shall surely be pat to death." Exod. xxi. 12. There were indeed some e.vceptions from this general law, but setting aside the case of a house-breaker in the night, they all related to casual invohintary homicides; there is not one exception of a voluntary designed killing, whether sudden or premeditated, whatever interpretations might be afterwards made by the Jeioish Rabins, who made the commandments of God of none eftect through their traditions, (Matt. xv. 6.) so that there is nothing in the Jewish law to countenance the distinction made by the laws of England between murder and manslaughter; a distinc- tion, which serves to show, that though the laws of England be mucli severer than the other in tlie case oi theft, yet tiiey are much milder in the case of homicide. (/) Unless he fled to the altar, which was also looked on as a place of refuo-e, it hcm(r probable from Es.od. xxi. 13, 14. that the altar was the place of refuge before the cities of refuge were appointed. (See Bracton of the English Law of Asylum.) See Selden: dc jur. not. Lib. IV. cap. 2. If he did escape to the city of refuge, he was obliged to remain there till the death of the high priest, tor the avenger of blood might kill him wherever he found him out of the borders of the city. Numb. xxxv. 25—32. Selden: uln supra ^ de Synedriis, Lib. II. cap. 7. But after the death of the high-priest, he was at liberty to go where he would ; for the reason hereof see Maimonides More JSevochim, Pars 111. cap. 40, and Ainsworlh on Numbers xxxv. 25. (g) This was a case so plainly justifiable by the law of nature, that it needed no positive law; however, the permission to kill a thief, who should be found breaking up in the night, seems to be an express allowance of killing in one's own defence; for the reason ot that law is manifestly founded on the principle of self preservation. Nam adversus periculum naturalis ratio permiltit se defeiidere. Digest. Lib. 9. Tit. 2. I. 4. (h) When done in defence of life or cliastity; because, when lost, they are irreparable, sec Selden: de jur. riatur. Lib. IV. cap. 3. Maimon. More Nevichim, Pars III. cap. 40. (i) Soinetiines the execution was by burning; as in the ca-e of a priest's daughter, who had played the whore. Levit. xxi. 9. Sometimes by decollation, which was the usual way for murder. Selden: de Synedriis, Lib. II. cap. 13. De jur. natur. Lib. IV. cap. 1. 5' HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. Senatus Areopagiticiis jus dicifo de cgede, ant vulnere, non casn, sed voluntate inflicto; de incendio item, & malo veneno hommis necandi causa dato. Thesmothetae in homicidas animadvertiinto. Si quis hominem sciens morti duit, capital esto. Qui alium casu fortuito necassit, in annum deportator, donee aliquem e cognatis occisi placarit; revertitor vero peractis sacris & lustrationibus. Si quis imprudens in certaminibus alium necassit, aut insidiantem aut ignotum in prselio, aut in uxore, vel matre, vel sorore, vel filia, vel concubina, vel ea, quam infuis liberis, habet deprehensum, csedis ergo ne exulato. Si quis alium injuste vim inferentem incontinent! necassit, jure csesus esto. Si quis homicidam foro, urbis ferritorio, publicis certaminibus & sacris Amphictyonicis abstinentem occiderit, aut mortis causam pre- buerit, perinde ac si Atheniensem civem necassit, capital esto, & Ephetas jus dicunto. So that by this law a man conscious to himself of homicide might, before he was apprehended, undertake a volun- tary exile, and during such an exile was privileged from the penalty of homicide. (^) Homicidas morte multanto in patria occisi terra, et abducunto, ut lege cautum est; in eos ne sasviunto, neve pecuniam(/) exigunto. Before judgment the kindred of the party slain that prosecuted the manslayer might compound the otfence, and release the offender, but after judgment once given, neither the judge nor prosecutor could remit it.(m) Caedis ne postulator nnquam is qui homicidam exulantem &redeun- tem quo non licet, in jus ad magistratum rapuerit aut detulerit. And eodeni libro tit. 5. si nox furtum faxit, si ini ali- r 6 "1 quis occisit,JHre csesus esto, according to the Mosaical law, and from tlience transcribed into the Jlttic laws, and from thence by the Decemviri into the Roman laws of the twelve tables in lotidem. ve7'bis. Among the Romans the laws concerning homicide differed in some things both from the Jeivs and Greeks, as appears Dii^est. Lib. XL VIII. tit. 8. Jid legem Corueliam de sicariis ^^ venejiciis. Qui hominem occiderit punitor non habita differentia cujus condi- tionis hominem(/?) interemit. Qui hominis occidendi furtive faciendi causa cum telo ambulave- (t) This was the case of Theoclymenus in Homer Odijss. o. v. 224, 270. 4- "• UT- (l) The Greek word aTravAv here rendered pecuniam, properly signifies a ransom. Horn. Iliad, a., v. 13, 20, 23, !)5, for by the ancient law of Greece the punishment of honii- cide was redeemable by the payment of a sum of money to tiie relations of the slain, which recompense was termed uTctva or ttciviI. Homer. Iliad. 1. v. 628. ir. v. 498. (m) That this was the meaning of the foregoing law, see Petit in lecres Atticas, Lib, VII. tit. I. p. 500. !^ee also the Oration of Demosthenes against Aristocrates, wherein most of the Athenian laws relating to homicide arc explained. (n) I. 1. §. 2. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 6 rif(o) qui hominem non occidit sed viilneravit ut occidat, iit homi- cida datiiiiandiis, nam si gladium striiixerit & cum eo percusserit, indubitate occidendi animo admissit, sed si clavi aut cuccuma in rixa, qiiamvis ferro, percusserit, tainen non occidendi aninio lenienda psena ejus, qui in rixa casu magis, quam voluntate, homicidium adniisit.(/)) But if it were merely by misfortune, it was not punished. (5?) Qui stuprum sibi vel suis per vim inferentem occidit, dimiitendus est,(>) sed is, qui uxorem in adulterio deprehensam occidit, humi- liore loco positus in exilium perpetuum dandus, in aliqua dignitate positus ad tempus relegandus.(.s) Furem nocturnum qui occiclerit, impune feret, si parcere ei sine periculo suo non potuit;(/) wliich law, though like to that of the Jews and Greeks, the Roman lawyers have construed, (?/) that it is lawful to kill furem nocturnum recedentem & [| 7 1 fugientetn cum rebus, licet se non defendat telo, sed non diurnum, nisi se defendat telo. The punishment of homicide, unless it were merely casual, among the Romans was deportatio in insulas & omnium bonorum adenip- tio, sed solent hodie capite puiiiri, nisi houestiore loco positi fuerint, ut pcenam legis sustineant; humiliores enim solent bestiis subjici;(a7) altiores vero deportantur in insulas,(^) Some temperaments they added in other cases of homicide, as banishment for five years, (z) deportation, &c. but regularly the punishment of homicide, unless in case of simple misfortune, (a) or defence of life, (6) was death, viz. bestiis siibjicianfur. Among the Saxons{c) the punishment of homicide was not always, (0) /. 1. pr. ^ Cod. eod. tit. Lib. IX. tit. 16. I. 7. {p) I. 1. §. 3. (9) I. 1. §. 3. c. g. If a man, wlio was cutting a tree, should without calling out throw down a great hranch of it upon one who was passing by, and kill him, he was to be acquitted, that is to say, he was not to be proceeded against criminally by the lex Cor- nelia de sicariis; for so is the expression in l. 7, adhnjus legis coercilionem non pertinet; but still he was liable by the lex Aquilia to make a pecuniary satisfaction for the dam- age. Jnstit. Lib. IV. tit.3. §. 5. And tliough that law mentions only the case of killing a slave, yet there lay an utilis actio in the case of killing a freeman. See Noodt ad Leg, Aquil. cup. 2. (r) L 1. §. 4. (s) I. 1. §. 5. (t) I. 9. (m) This was not a mere construction of the Roman lawyers, but is expressly provided by the law of the twelve tables, as appears from Digest. Lib. IX. tit. 6. ad leg. Aquil. I. 4. §. I. Cic. pro Mtlone, cap. 3. A. Gell. Lib. 18. cap. Macrob. saturnal. Lib. 1. cap. 4. The reason of this distinction between a night-thief and a day-thief, see in Grot, de jur. lei. ac. pac. Lib. II. cap. 1. §. 12. (a) Dig. Lib. XLVIII. tit. 19. de panis. I. 28. § 15. (y) Dig. ad leg. Cornel, de sicariis 1. 16. (z) I. 4. § 1. (a) Cod. eod. tit. I. 1. {b) Cod. eod. tit. I. 2. Sf 3. (c) It seems to have buen the general practice of most of the northern nations to com- mute the punishment of the most heinous crimes for a pecuniary mulct. Lindenbroo-ii Codex Leg. Antiq. Lib. IV. cap. 3G. Tacitus speaking of the ancient Germans, .says^it was customary among them to punish homicide with a certain number of sheep and oxen, out of which the relations of him that was slain received satisfaction. Tac. de ^nor. Germ. cap. 21. From hence probably our Saxon ancestors brought the custom into Britairt. 7 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. nor for the most part capital; for it might be redeemed by a recom- pense which went under the name of IVeru and ff'ere- r 8 ] gi/(/,{d) which was a rate set down upon the head of per- sons of several ranks; and if any of tlieni were killed, tlie offender was to make good that rate, or fVeregild or capitis sestima- iio, to the kindred of the party slain; or, as some think, part to the king, part to the lord of the fee and part to the relations of the party slain ; which if he conid not do, lie was to suffer death. (e) Vide Spelrn. in Gloss, ad verba IVe^'a Sf- Weregild. This custom continued long, even to the time o{ Hen. I. here in Englatid, as appears by his laws in libro rubro, sect. ll.(/) but shortly after grew obsolete, as being too much contradictory to the divine law.(^) Vide Covarr. Tonio 2 Lib. 11. cap. 9. sect. 2. {d) This Weregild or capitis cBstimatio, according' to the laws of Ethelbei-t, was usually 100s. Lag. Ethelhert, I. 21. though in some particular cases it was more, I. 5. 6. 22. If tlie slayer escaped, the relations were to pay half the ordinary Weregild, I. 2.3. By the laws of Ina the Weregild was different according to the rank and degree of the person killed, of a man worth 200s. was 30s. of a man worth 600s. was 80s. of a man worth 1200s. was 120s. Leg. Ina. I. 70. This rule admitted of some exceptions, I, 34. /. 74. By tlie laws of Alfred, the bare attempt on the king's life was punished with death, unless the offender redeemed it by the payment of the king's weregild: the same law was in case a slave attempted the life of his lord, unless he redeemed it by paying his lord's weregild. Leg. Alfred. I. 4. the weregilds were, of the same value, as under Lia. Leg. Alfred. I. 9. /. 26. By the league between Alfred and Guthrun, I. 2. the value of a common person was 200s. the same by the league between Edward and Guthrun in fine. By the laws of Athelstan, whoever should attempt his lord's life, was to be put to death, and there is no nienlion made of any ransom. Leg. Athelstan, I. 4. but at the end of his laws, and of the Judicia Civitatis Lundoniits.{n) By the ancient law among the Jews, he that was but a day above thirteen years, was, as to criminals adjudged in virili statu, but not if under that age.(t) 3. JEtas pubertati proxima, herein there is great difference among \he Roman lawyers; and though they make a disparity here- in between males and females, yet I think as to point of crimes the measure is the same for both: Some assign this JEtas pubertati proxima to ten years and a half; others to eleven yeajrs.(o) If they be under the age which they call JEtas pubertati proxima, they are presumed incapaces doli,{p) and therefore regularly not liable to a capital punishment for a capital offence: but this holds not always true; for according to the opinion of very learned civilians, before ten years and a half they may be doli capaces, and therefore it must be left ad arbitrium jndicis upon the circumstances of the case; yet with this caution, Judex, qui ante illam getatem arbitrari debet pue- rum esse proximum pubertati, maximis adducendus est conjecturis, & cautissime id aget, ac tandem raro. Covarr. ubi supra. (q) And with this agrees our law, as shall be showed. But if [ 19 1 the offender be in setate pubertati proxima, viz. according to some ten years and a half, according to others eleven years old, he is more easily presumed to be doli capax, and therefore may suffer as another man, unless by great circumstances it appear, that he is incapax doll. But this hath also its temperaments, 1. By ex- press provision of the constitution in Codice de falsa Monetd-: "Im- puberes, si conscii fuerint, nullum sustineant detrimentum, quia setas eorum, quid videat ignorat ;" but a penalty is laid upon the tutor.(r) 2. Though setas pubertati proxima is regularly presumed Ca;r?«a: doli, and so may be guilty of a capital offence. — Digest Be regulis juris. (s) Pupillum, qui proximus est pubertati, capacem esse fumiidi, yet as it is in arbitriojudicis to judge an infant within ten il) Dig. Lib. IV. tif. 4. de mimribus, I. 37. ^. 1. Lib. XLVIII. tit. 5. ad leg. Jul. de adult. I. 36. Cod. Lib. 2. tit. 35. Si adversus delictum. 1. 1. (m) Tom. I. p. 157. (n) Par. III. §. 5. Tom. I. p. 558. (+) Seld. de Synedriis, Lib. II. cap. 13. §. 132. (o) Tlie prevailing opinion is, that the males are pubertati proximi at fen and a half^ and the females at nine and a half, because when tliey had passed the middle distance between infancy and puberty, they might then be properly said to be mtatis pubertati proxima. (?) Dig. Lib. XLVII. tit. 12. de sepulchro violato, I. 3. §. 1. (9) Tom, l.p. 157. (r) Lib. IX. tit. 24. I. 4. (s) Lih.'L.tit.ll.l 111, Lift. XXIX. tit. 5. de Senatusconsulto Silaniano.l.U. Lib. yihW. lit. 4. de doli mnli exccptinne, I. 4. §. 26. Instit. Lib. IV. tit. 1. de obligat. qua ex delicto, §. 18. Dig. Lib. XLVIII. tit. 2. defuriis, I. 23. 19 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. years and a half capax doli, as before; so it is in arhilrio judicls upon consideration of circumstance to judge one above ten years and a half, nay of twelve, thirteen years, or but a day within four- teen years, to be incapax doli^ and so privileged from punishment, as appearing upon the circumstances of the fact not yet Qonstitulus in Delate proximd pitbertati, or at least not doli capax; and with this our law doth in a great measure agree. 3. That if he be above ten years and a half, and appears doIi ca- pax, yet if under fourteen years, he is not to be punished poena oi^di- narld, but it may have some relaxation ex arbilrio jiidicis.{t) But although our law indulges a power to the judge to reprieve before or after judgment an infant convict of a capital offence in order to the King's pardon, yet it allows no arbitrary power to the judge to change the piniishment that the law inflicts; and thus far for the third age or period, JEtas piiberlali proxima. 4. The fourth age or period is infantia, which lasts till seven years; within this age there can be no guilt of a capital offence; the infant may be chastised by his parents or tutors, but cannot be capi- tally punished, because he cannot be guilty;(7/) and if [] 20 ] indicted for such an oftence as is in its nature capital, he must be acquitted ; and therefore the severity of the gloss upon the decretal De delictis puerorum, cap. \.{x) is justly rejected in this case \[y) and with this agrees the law of England. But now let us consider the laws of England more particularly touching the privilege of infancy in relation to crimes and their punishments, and that in relation to two kinds of crimes, 1. Such as are not capital. 2. Such as are capital. First, As to misdemeanors and offences that are not capital: in. some cases an infant is privileged by his non-age, and herein the pri- vilege is all one, whether he be above the age of fourteen years or under, -if he be under one and twenty years; but yet with these dif- ferences : If an infant under the age of twenty-one years be indicted of any misdemeanor, as a riot or battery, he shall not be privileged barely by reason that he is under twenty-one years,[l] but if he be con- victed thereof by due trial, he shall be fined and imprisoned ; and the reason is, because upon his trial the court ex ojficio ought to consider and examine the circumstances of the fact, whether he was doli capax, and had discretion to do the act wherewith he is charged ; and the same law is of a femme covert. 2. But if the oflence charged by the indictment be a mere non-feasance, (unless it be of such a thing as he is bound to by reason of tenure, or the like as to repair a bridge, <5*c.)(c) there in some cases he shall be privileged by (0 Dig- Lib. IV. t')t. 4. de minorilnis, I. 37. §. In delictis, (u) iJifT. Lib. XLVII. tit. 2. de furtis, I. 23. Ld,. XLVIII. tit. 8. ad les;. Cornel, de aicariis l. 12. {x) Decretal. Lib. \. til. 23. (y) 3b/n. l.p. 157. (2) 2 Co. Inst. 70.3. [1] See 4 Dl. Com. 23. 1 Huss. on Crimes 2. Co. Litt. 274. b. IIISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON^E. 20 his nonage, if under twenty one, though above fourteen years, because Lnches in such a case shall no.t be imputed to him.(Q) 36 E. 3. Jlssis. 443. 4 //. T. 11. b. If an infant in Assise vouch a record, and fail at the day, he shall not be imprisoned, (6) nor it seems di feme covert. 13 Assis. l.(c) and yet the statute of IVestminst. 2. cap. 25. that gives imprisonment in such a case, is general. 8 E. 2. Corone 395. l( A. kills B. and C. S,- D. are pre- sent, and do not attach(r/) the offender, they shall be fined [ 21 ] or imprisoned; yet if C. were within the age of twenty-one years, he shall not be fined nor imprisoned. 3. Where the corporal punishment is but collateral, and not the direct intention of the proceeding against the infant for his misde- meanor, there, in many cases, the infant uiider the age of twenty- one shall be spared, though possibly the punishment be enacted by parliament. 14 Jiss. 17.(e) If an infant of the age of eighteen be convict of a disseisin with force, yet he shall not be imprisoned. Vide 26 Ass. 9. 43 E. 3. Imprisonment 16. 40 E. 3. 44. a.{f) and yet a feme covert shall be imprisoned in such case. 16 Ass. 7. If an infant be convict in an action of trespass vi <§• armis, the entry must be nihil de fine, sed pardonatnr, quia infans ; for if a cupiatur be entered against him, it is error, for it appears judicially to the court, that he was within age when he appears by guardian. P. 8. Jac. B. R. Holbrooke v. Dogley, Croke, n.'3.;{g) the like law is that he shall not be in misericordia pro fa/so clamore.(h) B. Coverture 68. General statutes that give corporal punishment are not to extend to infants, and therefore Fl. Com. 364, a per Walsh, if an infant be convict in ravishment of ward, he shall not be imprisoned, though the statute of I\ferto7i cap. 6. be general in that case:(/) but this nmst be understood where it is, as before said, a punishment as it were collateral to the offence, as in the cases before- mentioned : but where a fact is made felony or treason, it extends as well to infants, if above fourteen years,(/t) as [ 22 ]] to others, as shall be said. And this appears by several acts of parliament, and particularly by I Jac. cap. 11. of felony for marrying two wives, &c. where there is a special exception of mar- riages within the age. of consent, which in females is twelve, in males (a) B. Saver default, 50. Cro. Juc. 465, 466. PI. Com. 364. a. Co. Lit. 246. 6. (6) 2 Co. liisti't. 414. (c) B. Coverture 35. Resceit 87. {d) The words of the book are ne leve le main d^attach. (e) F. Imprisonment 8. _ (/) " Et le cause est, pur ceo que la ley eiitend', que un enfant ne poit my conustr' bien &, mal' ne le quel foil advant.iije pour luy, ou neiny ; ne nul foly serra adjudge ea un enfant." Mes. 12. H. 4. 22. b. Hank, dit que enfant d'age de 18 ans poit estre dissei- sor ove-force & estre emprison per cella. {g) Cro. Jac. 274. (/') Co. Lit. 127. a. yet this was not a settled point, for 2. E. 3. 5. tiie court doubted of it; and in 17 E. 3, 75. 6. and 41 Assis. 14. the plaintiffs, though infants, were amerced pro falso clamore; but though tiiey were amerced, yet it appears from the same cases that ihey were entitled on account of tlieir infancy to a pardon of course. See 1 R. A. 214. (i) Anotlier like case is there put, if an infant be a receiver and account before audi- tors, and be found in arrears, the auditors cannot commit him to prison notwithstanding the general words of the statute of W. 2. cap. 11. {k) Co. Lit. 247. 6. VOL. I. — 3 22 HISTORIA PLACITORUM C0R0NJ5:. fourteen years; so that if the marriage were above the age of con- sent, though within the age of twenty-one )^ears, it is not exempted from the penalty. So by the statnte of 21 H. S. cap. 7. concerning felony by servants thai embezzle their Tnasler^s goods delivered to them, there is a spe- cial proviso, that it shall not extend to servants under the age of eighteen years, who certainly liad been within the penalty, if above the age of discretion, viz. fonrteen years, though under eighteen years, unless a special provision had been to exclude them.(/) I come therefore to consider the privilege of infancy in cases of capital offences and punishments according to the laws oi England, wherein I shall examine, 1. How the ancient law stood. 2. How it stands at this day in relation to infants. I, As to the ancient law: 1. By what has been before said it appears that the Civil law was very uncertain in defining what was tliat setas pubertati proxima, and consequently such as might subject the offender to capital guilt or punishment; some taking it to be ten years and a half, some eleven years, others more, others less. The laws of Engtund there- fore, that always aflect certainty, determined anciently the setas pubertati proxima to be twelve years for both sexes; under that age none could be regularly guilty of a capital offeuce, and above that age and under fonrteen years, he might or might not be guilty according to the circumstances of the fact that might induce the court and jury to judge liim doli capux, vel incapax.{m) This appears by the laws of king Jithelstan mentioned r 23 1 in the first chapter, " Non parcatur alicui latroni super 12 annos & supra 12 d. quin occidotur.'-' And although his successor Edmund{n) reduced it to fifteen years, unless he fled, yet it will appear that the standard of twelve years obtained in after ages.(o) 2. It appears that an infant of twelve years was compellable to take the oath of allegiance in the leet, and under that age none were to take the oalh, or to do suit to the leet. Bract. Lib. \\\.{p) cap. (/) The like exception there is in tlie 12 Ann. cap. 7. where apprentices under the age of fiflren years, who t-liall rob their masters, are excepted out of the act. (?«) By the laws of Ina, I. 7. an infant of ten years of age might be guilty of being accessary to a thcfl, and was punished accordingly with servitude. \Mlk. Leg. Anglo- Sax, p. 1 6. ■ , (7j) This is a mistake, for it was not Edmund but king Alhiislan himself, who think- ing it a piliable case tluit a youth but twelve years old should be put to death, as was permitted by the former l.iw, changed tlic time from twelve years to rifteen, and ordered that none who was but fifteen years of age should be put to death, unless he resisted or fled; if he surrendered himself, hu was only to be imprisoned until some of his rela- tions or friends would become security for him jiixia pleufi7)i capitis (Estimationein, ut semper uli unini malu ahslineal : if he could not get any such security, then lie was to take an o:ith,to tiie same purpose in such manner as the liisliop sliould direct him, and was to rcinain in servitutc pro capitis siii astiuialionc ; but if alter this he should be again guilty then he was to be put to death without any regard to his age. Sec WHk. Lrpes An:jlo-Siix. p.lO. (o) In tl:c time of king Henry I. the old ^w of king Athehtan took place, viz. twelve years of ago, and 8c/, valiiC. I.id.p.2o'J. {p) Dc Corona. ; " . . HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. 23 l.{q) Britton, cap. 29, in Jine, Calvin's case, 7 Co. Ecp. 6. h. So that at that age, and not before, he was taken notice of by the law to be under the obligation of an oath, and consequently capable of discretion. 3. The ordinary process against capital offenders was and is by Capias and Exii^enl, aiid Vtlary thereui)on; but against an infant under twelve, process of iitlary in cases of indictment was not awardable, and if awarded, it was error: but if above that age, that process was awardable; and Bract. Lib. Ill.(r) cap. 11, sect. 4 «5* 5. gives the reason, "Elinor vero, qui infra astatetn 12 annorum fiicrit utlegari non debet, quia ante talem setatem non est sub lege alitjua nee in decenna ;" and ibidem cap. 10 sext. 1, he mentions an old law of k\\\2, EdLvard,{s) "Omnis, qui aitatis 12 annorum fuerit, facere debet sacramentum in visd franciplegii, quod nee latro vult esse, nee latroni consentire;" and .Stamf. Lib. I. cap. [] 24 ] 19, cites out of a book of Bracton, De Visit Franci plegii, "Quod quilibetduodecini annorum potest felonise judicium sustinere," which implies also that within that age, regularly at least, he could not be a felon, 4. Again, T. 32. E. I. Hot. 32. " Eboracum, coram rege, Adam filins Adae de Arnhale captus noctanter in domo Johannis Somere coram rege ductus cognovit, quod furtive cepit, &c.- 9s. per preceptum & missionem Richardi Short :" Richard Short had his clergy, '■' Et prasdictus Adam commissus fuit custodiae mariscalli custodiend', quia infra aetaten); postea habito respectu ad imprisonamentum, quod praedictus Adam habuit, & etiam ad teneram a^tatem ejusdem Adas, 60 quod non est nisi ajtatis 12 annorum, qui talis setaiis judicium ferre non potest, ideo de gratia regis deliberetur, &c," Upon this record these things are observable, viz. 1. The court recorded his confession; but regularly that ought not to be, for if an infant under the age of twenty-one shall confess an indictment, the court in jus- tice ought not to record the confession, but put him to plead not guilty, or at least ought also to have inquired by an inquest of office of tlie truth and circumstances of the fact, 2. That liere he was twelve years old, and yet judgment s[)ared,- and the reason given,- (^ui talis setaiis judicium ferre non potest. Yet 3. There is some- what still of gratia regis interposed, as it seems, in respect he was past the old standard of twelve years. U. But now let us come to the Common law as it stood in after- {q) This seems to be a mistake, for cap. 11. sert. 4. for the oath mentioned in cap. 1. wiis to be taken by knights and others of the age of fifteen years and upwards. (r) De Corona. ((••J There is no such law extant among those of king Edward, biit the law here quoted is a law of Cnute, Leg. Cnuti, I. 1!J. which is in tlicse words, Vuliimus ut quiU. Let homo \2 annos iiatus jiisjurandum prceslet se nol'.e fiirem esse neque furi consenta- nenm, which oath is to the same purpose witli tliat mentioned by Brnclon, Lib. iii. de corona, Clip. 1. to l)e taken at the age of fifteen ; and though there be a difiVrcncc as to the age, yet probably it is tlie same oath, for it is very easj' and natural to mistake xii for XV. See the statute of Marlliridrre, cap. 10. i^- 25. and lord Coke's comment thereon, 2 Instil. ,141. where he takes notice that the old books are misprinted. See also 2 InstiU 72. Mirror, cap, 1, §. 3. Britlon, cup. 12. 24 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. times; for in process of time, especially in and after the reign of king Edwitrd III. the Common law received a greater perfection, not by the change of the Common law, as some have thought, for that could not be but by act of parliament ; but men grew to greater. learning, judgment and experience, and rectified the mistakes of for- j^ 25 3 mer ages and judgments, and the law in relation to infants and their punishments for capital offences was and to this day is as foUoweth. 1. It is clear that an infant above fourteen and under twenty-one ia equally subject to capital punishments, as well as others of full age ; for it is prsesumplio jin^is, that after fourteen years they are doli capaces, and can discern between good and evil ; and if the law should not animadvert upon such offenders by reason of their nonage, the kingdom would come to confusion. Experience makes us know that every day murders, bloodsheds, burglaries, larcenies, burning of houses, rapes, clipping and counterfeiting of money, are committed by 3'ouths above fourteen and under twenty-one; and if they should have impunity by the privilege of such their minority, no man's life or estate could be safe.(/) In my remembrance at Thetfurd a young lad of sixteen years old was convict for successive wilful burning of three dwelling houses, and in the last of them burning a child to death, and yet had carried the matter so subtilly,that by a false accu- sation of another person for burning the first house an innocent per- spn was brought in danger, if it had not been strangely discovered: he had judgment to die, and was accordingly executed. (?/) Fourteen years of age therefore is the common standard, at which age both males and females are by the law obnoxious to capital punishments for offences committed by them at any time after that age; and with this agrees Fltz. N. B. 202. b.{x) Co. Lilt. § 405.(^) VideMw Dallon^s Justice of Peace, cup. 95. and 104.(z) 2. An infant under the age of fourteen years and above r 26 ]] the age of twelve years is not prima facie presumed to be doli capax, and therefore regularly for a capital offence committed under fourteen years he is not to be convicted or have judgment as a felon, but may be found not guilty. [2] {t) Our aulhor'.s arg-umcnt concludes very strongly against tlicir escajjingf with unpu. nity, hut loses much of its force when urged in behalf of capital punishments, for there is no necessity that if they be not capitally punisliedtiiey must therefore go unpunished; 80 that whatever severity may be needful in cases of murders and aets'of violence, yet in tlie common instances of larceny and stealing, some other punisiiment might be found, which niiglit leave room for tlic reformation of young offenders. ((/■) At Abingdon assizes, l'\li. 23, lG2i), before \\'hitlock justice, one John Dean, an infant, between ciglit and nine years, was indicted, arraigned, and found guilty of burn- ing two barns in the town of Windsor ; and it ajipcaring ujjon exaiiiinatiim that he )iad malice, revenge, craft, and cunning, he had judgment to lje lianged, and was hanged accordingly. MS. Report. (x) N. Edit. p. 450. (y) ;j. 247. b. {z) 'J'he first edition, but in the last edition, cap. 147 and 157. [2] " By the ancient Saxon law, tiie age of twelve years was estabhshcd for the ago of possible discretion when first the understanding might o|K'n; and from thence until the offender was fourteen, it was wtas pubertuti proxima, in whith he miglit or might HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. 26 But {hou2;h prima facie and in common presumption this be true, y€t if it appear to the court and jury that he was f/oii capax, and could discern between good and evil at the time of the offence com- mitted, he may be convicted and undergo judgment and execution not be guilty of a crime, according- to his natural capacity or incapacity. Ttiis was the dubious stage of discretion ; but under twelve it was held that he could not be guilty ia will, neitlier after fourteen could be supposed to be innocent, of any capital crime which he in fact committed. By the law as it now stands, and has stood at least since the time of Edward the Third, the capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt, is not so much mea- surcd by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent's understanding and judg- ment. For one lad of eleven )'ears old may have as much cunning as another of four- teen, and in these cases our maxim is, ' malitia supple.l (Btatem.'' Under seven years of age, indeed, an infiint cannot be guilty of felony, for then a felonious discretion is almost an impossibility in nature; but at eight years old he may be guilty of felony. Also under fourteen, though an infant, shall be prima facie adjudged to be doli incapnx; yet if it appear to tlie court and jury that he was doli capax, and could discern between good and evil, he may be convicted and sutler death." 4 Stephen's Comrn. 75, 76. 4 Black. Cowm. 23. 2 Stephen's Comrn. 331, 332. Land. Ed, The case cited by Blachslone from Foster, 70, is Yorke's case, and is deemed an im- portant one by Sir William Russell, (I Russ. on Crimes, 4.) It was this. At Bury Summer Assizes, 1748, Williarn Yorke, a boy of ten years of age, was convicted before Lord Chief Justice lV?7/?s for the murder of a girl, of about five years of age, and received sentence of death ; but the Chief Justice out of regard to the tender years of the prisoner, respited execution till he should liave an opportunity of taking the opinion of the rest of the judges whether it was proper to execute him or not upon the special circumstances of the case; on which he reported to the judges at SergeanVs Inn in Miciiaclmas Term following. The boy and girl were parish children, put under the care of a parishioner at whose house they were lodged and maintained; on the day the mur- der happened, tlic man of the house and his wife went out to their work early in the morning, and left the children in bed together: when they returned from work, the girl was missing, and the boy being asked what was become of her, answered that he had helped her up and put on her clothes, and that she had gone he knew not whither. Upon this, strict search was made in the ditches and pools of water near the house, from an apprehension that the child might have fallen into the water. During this search, the man under whose care the children were, observed that a heap of dung near the liouse had been newly turned up, and upon removing the upper part of the heap, he found the body of the child about a foot's depth under the surface, cut and mangled in a most barbarous and horrid manner. Upon this discovery, the boyj who was the only person capable of committing the fact, that was left at home with the child, was charged with the fact, which he stiffly denied. When the coroner's jury met, the boy vvas again charged, but persisted still to deny the fact. At length being closely interrogated, he fell to crying, and said he would tell the whole truth. He then said that the child had been used to foul lierself in bed; that she did so that morning, (which was not true, for the bed was searched and found to be clean,) that thereupon he took her out of bed and carried her to the dung heap, and with a large knife which he found about the house, cut her in the manner the body appeared to be mangled, and buried her in the dung heap, placing the dung and straw that was bloody under the body, and covering it up with what was clean ; and having so done, he got water and washed himself as clean as he could. The boy was the next morning carried before a neighbouring justice of the peace, before whom he repealed his confession, with all the circumstances lie had related to the coroner and his jury. 'I'he justice of the peace very prudently deferred proceeding to a commitment until the boy should have an opportunity of recollecting himself. Ac- cordingly he warned him of the danger he was in if he should be thougiit guilty of the fact he stood charged with, and admonished him not to wrong himself, and then ordered him into a room where none of the crowd that attended should have access to him. \Vhen the boy had, been some hours in this room, where victuals and drink were pfo- vided for him, he was brought a second time before the justice, and then he repeated his former confession, upon which he was committed to jail. On the trial, evidence was gi^n of the declarations before mentioned to have been made lx;fore the coroner and his jii^, and before the justice of the peace; and of many declarations to the same purpose 26 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. of death, though he hath not attained annum pnberfatis, viz. four- teen years; though according to the nature of the oflence aird cir- cumstances of the case the judge may or may not in discretion reprieve him before or after judgment, in order to the obtaining the wliich the boy made to other people after he came to jail, and even down to -the day of his trial: for he constantly told the same story in substance, commonly adding that the devil put him upon committing the foot. Upon this evidence, with some other circum- stances tending; to corroborate tlie confessions, he was convicted. U|ion this report of {he Chief Justice, the judges, having taken time to consider of, it, unanimously agreed, 1. Tliat the declarations stated in the report were evidence proper to be left to the jury. 2. That supposing the boy to have been guilty of this fact, there were so many circumstances stated in the report which were undoubtedly tokens of what Lord Hale calls mischievous discretion, that he was certainly a proper subject for capital punishment, and ought to sutTer ; for it would be of very dangerous consequence to have it thought that children may commit such atrocious crimes with impunity. That there are many crimes of the most heinous nature, such as (in the present case) the murder of young children, poisoning parents or masters, burning houses, &e., which children are very capable of committing, and, which they may in some circumstances be under strong temptations to commit; and therefore, though the taking away the life of a boy often years old might savour of cruelty, yet, as the example of that boy's punish- ment mjght be a means of deterring other children from the like offences, and as the sparing the boy, merely on account of his age, woidd probably have a quite*contrary tendency; in justice to the public, the law ought to take its course, unless there re- mained any doubt touching his guilt. In this general principle, all the judges concurred ; but two or three of them, out ot great tenderness and caution, advised the Chief Justice to send another reprieve lor the prisoner, suggesting tliat it might possibly appear, on further inquiry, that the boy had taken this matter upon himself at the instigation of some person or other who hoped by this artifice to screen the real offender from justice. Accordingly the Chief Justice granted one or two more reprieves; and desired the jus- tice of the peace who took the boy's examination, and also some other persons in whose prudence he could confide, to make the strictest inquiry they could into the affair and' report to him. At length he, receiving no farther light, determined to send no more reprieves, and to leave the prisoner to tlie justice of the law at the expiration of the last : but, before the expiration of that reprieve, execution vi^as respited till further order, by warrant from one of the secretaries of state: and at the Summer Assizes, 1757, the pri- soner had the benefit of His Majesty's pardon, upon condition of liis entering imme- diately into the sea service. Yorkers Case. Fost. li. 70. Two remarkable cases of commission of the crime of murder by boys under fourteen years of age, have occurred in New Jersey. In^ April, 1818, Aaron, (a coloured boy,) was tried tor the murder of a child, StejJien Condlij, little more than two years old, by throwing him over the curb into a well. The whole material testimony in the case was a confession made by the boy. The Chief Justice, {Kirkpatrick,) in the course of liis opinion, holds the following language: " With respect to the liability of infants to punish- ment, and to the giving of their confessions in evidence against them, much might be said, and ought to be said with great caution. It is periijctly settled, that an infant within the age of seven years cannot be punished for any capital offence, whatever cir-- cumstances of mischievous intention may be proved against him, for by the presumption of law, he cannot have discretion to discern between good and evil, and against this ' jjrcsumption no averment can be admitted. It is perfectly settled also, that between the age of seven and the ago of fourteen years, the infant shall be presumed to be incapable ot' committing crime upon the same principle, the presumption being very strong at seven, and decreasing with the progress of' his years; but then this prcsu)n[)tion, in this case, may be encountered by proof; and if it shall appear by stronir and irretiistiljle evi- dence that he had sufficient discernment to distinguish good from evil, to comprehend the nature and consequences of his acts, he may be convicted and have judgment of death." The Slate v. Aaron, I South. R. 231. 238. 247. Mr. Justice SoiiiharJ, in the same case, holds,much the same language. "The distinctions which have been taken in the books, as to age, when crimes may be eoinmitted. and the criminal punished, are in no ineonsidiu'ablc degree arbitrary. The great subject of iixpiiry in all cases ou'rht to be, the legal capacity of the prisoner; and this is found in some much earlier flRn IIISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 26 kins's pardon. 12 .^.vv. 30. Coroiie 118 8^- 170. t.^lice de Waldho- rnui^h of the age of tliirteen years was burnt by judgment for killing her mistress; and it is there said, that by the ancient law none shall be hanged within age which is intended the age of discretion, viz. others. The real value of the distinetions, is, to fix the part}', upon whom this capacity lies. There is, indeed, an age so tender, tiiat the nature and consequences of acts can- not be comprehended, and every uncorrupted feeling of the heart, as well as every moral and Icjfal principle forbids punishment. 13ut after we pass tliis age and progress towards maturity, there have been periods settled, which ascertain the presumption of law, as to the existence of tiiis capacity. If under fourteen, especially under twelve years, the law presumes that it does not exist, and if the Slate seek to punish, it must conclusively estab- lish it. If above the age of fourteen, the law presumes its existence, and if the accused would seek to avoid punishment, he must overcome that presumption by suflicicnt evi- dence. But wherever the capacity is established, either by this presumption of law or the testimony of witnesses, punishment always follows the infraction of the law. If the intelligence to apprehend the consequences of acts; to reason upon duty, to distinguish between right and wrongj if the consciousness of guilt and innocence be clearly mani- fested, then this capacity is shown ; in the language of the books, the accused is capax (loli, and "as a rational and moral agent must abide the results of his own conduct." Id. 245, 246. The prisoner, in this case, was ten years and ten months old. From the printed report it only appears that a new trial was granted; but the Editor has been informed by one of the counsel for the defendant, that the prisoner was acquitted by the jury on the second trial. In 1828, J«mcs Guild, a coloured boy, of the age of twelve years and- five months, was indicted for the murder of Catharine Be-jkes, and found guilty. On a motion for a new trial made to the Court of Oyer and Terminer, the Supreme Court in an advisory opinion, held themselves bound to advise the Court of Oyer and Terminer not to grant a new trial, but to proceed to discharge their duty by pronouncing the sentence of the law on the crime of murder. After an elaborate examination of the authorities, the then Chief Justice (Ewing,) re-iteraied the ojjinions of Chief Justice Kirkpairick, and Mr. Justice Southard, in The State v. Aaron, cited supra. "The age of the pri- soner was earnestly pressed on our consideration by his counsel, who strenuously insi-tcd he was too young to be exposed to punishment on such evidence, (his own con- fession.) At the perpetration of the oiFcnce he was aged twelve years and somewhat more than five months. The sound, sensible, and legal rule on this head is, in our opinion, judiciously as well as lucidly stated by Justice Southard in the case oi' Aaron, (supra.) In Leaclis edition of Hawkins, B. I. c 1, page 1, in note, it is said, "from the supposed imbecility of mind, the protective humanity of the law, will not, without anxi- ous circumspection, permit an infant to be convicted on his own confession. Yet if it appear by strong and pregnant evidence and circumstances, that he was perfectly con- sciiius of the nature and malignity of the crime, the verdict of a jury may find him g^uilty, and judgment of death be given against him." The Slate v. Guild, 5 Halst, R. 189. 1 Gveenl. on Ev. § 217. 219. 221. 222. 223. If a child more than seven and under fourteen years of age, is indicted for felony, it will be left to the jury to say whether the offence was committed by the prisoner, and, if so, whether at the time of the offence, the prisoner had a guilty knowledge that he or 6h& was doing wrong. The presumption of law is, that a child of that age has not such guiliy knowledge, unless the contrary be proved by the evidence. Rex v. Owen, 4 Carr. S( Pay. iJ.236, per Littledale, J. See Rex v. Gronmrid^e, 7 Carr. 4- Pay. R. 582, per Gasclee, J. BcH on Presump. 22, citing a MS. Report of the S. C. 2 M. C. C. R. 122. S. C. 1 Gree.nL on Ev. § 28. The People v. Davis, 1 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 2.30. The People V. Teller, 1 /on Law. See Somes v. Skinner, 16 Mans. R. 348; Webster V. Woodford, 3 Day, R. 90-100; Mitchdl v. Kin^inan, 5 Fick. R. 431, In modern times, tlie English C^ouits of Jiaw seem to be disposed, as far as possible, to escajie from the maxim. Ball v. Maunin,3 Bli^h. R. (new series) 1. And even in Eng- land, although the party himself could not set aside his own act, yet the King as having the general custody of idiots and lun>ili<;s, mii^ht by l)is attornty general, on a bill set aside the same acts. Bullcr, N. I'rins, 172 ; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 255, note (4); 2 (Jreenl. Ev. § 369; 3 Bucari's Ah. Idiots and Lunatics, V. The ancient rule of the common law must now be considered as entirely exploded. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.gi:. _ 30 organs; and as it comes from several canses, so it is of several kinds ordeo:rees ; which as to the purpose in hand may be thus distributed : 1. There is a partial insanity of mind ; and 2. a total insanity. The former is either in respect to things quoad hoc vel illud insa- nire; some persons, that liave a competent use of reason in respect of some subjects, are yet under a particular dementia in respect of some particular discourses, subjects, or applications; or else it is partial in respect of degrees: and this is the condition of v^ry many, especially melancholy persons, who for the most part discover their defect in excessive fears and griefs, and yet are not wholly destitute of the use of reason; and this partial insanity seems not to excuse them in the committing of any offence for its matter capital; for doubtless most persons that are felons of themselves, and others are under a degree of partial insanity, when they commit these offences: it is very diffi- cult to define the indivisble line tliat divides perfect and partial in- sanity; but it must rest upon circumstances duly to be weighed and considered both by the judge and jury, lest on the one side there be a kind of inhumanity towards the defects of human nature, or on the other side too great an indulgence given to great crimes: the best measure that I can think of is this ; such a person as labouring under melancholy distempers hath yet ordinarily as great understanding, as ordinarily a child of fourteen years hath, is such a person as may be guilty of treason or felony. Again, a total alienation of the mind, or perfect madness; this ex- cuseth from the guilt of felony and treason :(<:/) de qiiibus infra. This is that, which in my lord Cuke's Pleas of the Crown, p. 6. is called by him absolute madness, and total deprivation of memory. Again, this accidental dementia, whether total or partial, is distinguished into that which is permanent or fixed, and [ 3i ]] that which is interpolated, and by certain periods and vicis- situdes: the former is phrenesis or madness; the latter is that, which is usually called lunacy, for the moon hath a great influence in all diseases of the-brain, especially in this kind of dementia; such persons commonly in the full and change of the moon, especially about the equinoxes and summer solstice, are usually in the height of their dis- temper ; and therefore crimes committed by them in such their distem- pers are under the same judgment as those whereof we have before spoken, namely, according to the measure or degree of their distem- per ; the person that is absolutely mad for a day, killino; a man in tliat distemper, is equally not guilty, as if he were mad without intermis- sion. But such persons as have their lucid intervals, (which ordi- narily hap[)ens between the full and change of the moon) in such in- tervals have usually at least a competent use of reason, and crimes committed by them in these intervals are of the same nature, and subject to the same punishment, as if they had no such deficiency ;(e) nay, the alienations and contracts made by them in such intervals are obliging to their heirs and executors. (/) (d) 21 //. 7. 31. b. (e) F. Corone, 324. (/) 4 Co. 125. a. 31 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON^E. Again, tliis accidental demenlia, whether temporary or permanentj is eitlier the more dangerous and pernicious, commonly axWed furor-y rabies, mania, which commonly ariseth from adus.t choler, or the vio- lent inflammation of the blood and spirits, which doth not only take away the use of reason, but also superadds to the unhappy state of the patient, rage, fury, and tempestuous violence ; or else it is such as only takes away the use and exercise of reason, leaving the person otiierwise rarely noxious, such as is a deep delirium, stiijjo7\ memory quite lost, the phantasy quite broken, or extremely disordered. And as to criminals these dementes are both in the same rank; if they are totally deprived of the use of reason, they cannot be guilty ordinarily of capital otfences, for they have not the use of understand- [ 32 ] ing, and act not as reasonable creatures, but their actions are in eflect in the condition of brutes. (^) III. The third sort of dementia is that, whicli is dementia affec-' tata, namely drunkenness.lo^^ This vice doth deprive men of the use (g-) Braci, 420. h. F. Corone, 1^3, 351. [3] With regard to drunkenness, it is now settled that a man cannot avail himself of his own gross misconduct and vicious acts, to shelter himself from the legal conseriuen- ces of crime. But to make him criminally responsible, the act must take place and be the immedinte result of the fit of intoxication, and while it lasts; and not tlie result of insanity remotely occasioned by previous habits of gross indulgence in spirituous liquors. The law looks to the immediate, and not to the remote cause; to the actual state of tho party, and not to the causes which remotely produced it. 2 Gieenl. onEv. § 374. Drunken- ness, it was said in an early case, can never be received as a ground to excuse or palliate an offence: this is not merely the opinion of a speculative philosopher, the argument of counsel, or the obiter dictum of a single judge, but it is a sound and long established maxim of judicial policy, from wiiich perhaps a single dissenting voice cannot be found. But if no other authority could be adduced, the uniform decisions of our own Courts from the first establishment of the government, would constitute it now a part of the coinmua la.w of the land. Wharton''s Am. Crim. Law, 13, 14 ; 2 Rice^s Dig. Tit. Murder and Man- slaughter, p. 105; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 230, 231, and cases there cited in notes, which, though mostly civil cases, are still valuable for the analogies in principle there to be found. " If a person that is drunk kills another, this shall be felony, and he shall be hanged for it, and yet he did it through ignorance, for when he was drunk he had no understand- ing or memory; but inasmuch as that ignorance was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he might have avoided it, he shall not be privileged thereby. And Aristotle says, such a man deserves double punishment, because he has doubly offended, viz: in being drunk to the evil example of others, and in committing the crime of homicide." Per I'oUard, Serg., arguendo in Reniger v. Fogossa, I'lowd. R. 19 ; Beverlei/s CasCy 4 Rep. 125. " The prisoner's being intoxicated docs not alter the nature of the offence. If a man chooses to get drunk, it is his own voluntary act; it is very diifercnt from a madness •which is not caused by any act of the person. That voluntary sj)ocies of madness which it is in tlic party's power to abstain from, he must answer for." Per Alderson, B., in Rex \.]\lealdn,l C.&; P.2[n. ~ "If a nian makes himself voluntarily drunk, that is no excuse for any crime be nia'y commit whilst he is so; he must take the conscqilence of his own voluntary act, or most crimes would otherwise go unpunished. But drunkenness may be taken into considera- tion in cases where what the law deems suHicient provocation has been given, because the question is, in such cases, wiiethcr the fatal act is to be attributed to the paAsion of anger excited by the previous provocation, and that passion is more easily excitable in a person when in a state of intoxication than when be is sober. So, when the question is, whether words have been uttered vv'ith a deliberate purpose, or are merely low and idle expressions, the drunkenness of the person uttering them is ])roner to be considered. But if there is really a previous determination to resent a slight affront in a barbarous HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 32 of reason, and puts many men into a perfect, but temporary phrenzy; and-therefore, according to some Civilians, (/^) such a person comniit- ing fiojnicide sliall not be punished simply for the crime of homicide, but shall suifer for his drunkenness answerable to ttie nature of the (A) Bartholinus and others. See Covarruvias, Tom, 1. p. 557. in relect. ad Clem. Si furiosus. Far. iii. §. 3. ^- 4. manner, the state of drunkenness in which the prisoner was, oug-htnot to be regarded, for it would furnish no excuse." Per Parke, B., in Rex v. Thomas, 1 C. ^ P. 820. " It is a maxim of law, that, if a man gets himself intoxicated, he is liable to tlie con- sequences, and is not excusable on account of any crime he may commit when infuriated by liquor, provided he was previously in a fit state of reason to know right from wrong. If, indeed, the infuriated state at which he arrives should continue and become a lasting malady, then he is not amenable." Per Holroyd, J. in Burrom^s Case, 1 Lew. C. C. 75. "If either the insanity has supervened from drinking, without the panel's having been aware that such an indulgence in his case leads to such a consequence, or if it has arisen from the combination of drinking, with a half crazy or infirm state of mind, or a previous wound, or illness which rendered spirits fatal to his intellect, to a degree unusual in otlier men, or which could not have been anticipated, it seems inhuman to visit him with the c.\treme punishment which was suitable in the other ease.'"' In such a case, the proper course is to convict; but in consideration of the degree of infirmity proved, recommend to the royal mercy." Alison's Princ. of the Crim. Law of Scotland, 654, quoted in Gui/s Med. Jur. 277. Moreover there seems to be little doubt, that in these cases, the occa- sional thirst for spirituous drinks, is, itself, but one of the symptoms or effects of the dis- eased condition of the brain, as we see it occurring in persons who are not habitually in- temperate, and who even abstain for weeks or months from all use of intoxicating liquors.- If this be so, which we think none will dispute, then the intoxication itself is but an accidental and involuntary consequence of a maniacal state of the mind, depending on cerebral disorder, and can, by no means, impart a character of criminality to any action to which it may give rise. Guy's Med. Jur. 217 ; Ray on Insanity, c. 25. The following cases are given by the American Editor of Guy, (Dr. Lee) in a note to page 277, above cited. I. N. M. Thomas was tried May 13, 1840, for the murder o? Hallet Greenman, at Flo- rida, Montgomery Co., N. Y., Nov. 24, 183D. The homicide was committed during a fit of intoxication, and the prisoner was found guilty. The Judges of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General certified to the legality of the conviction and the sufficiency of the evidence. The sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life. II. John Smock was tried in Dec. 1839, for the murder of his wife in the city of New York, Tuesday, June 25, 1839. They were both very intemperate, and in a fit of drunk- enness the wound was inflicted, of which she died, a few days aftqr. The physician of the city prison testified that he was labouring under delirium tremens at the time. He was found guilty, with a recommendation to mercy; in accordance with which the sen- tence was commuted to imprisonment for life. III. Robert Miller was tried in Oct. 1839, for the murder of Barney Leddy, at Utica, April, 1839. On the trial it was proved that the killing grew out of a drunken quarrel and light, (without previous animosity,) brought on by a jug of liquor which the deceased brought to Miller's house. The accused was convicted and hung. IV. Jabtz Fuller was tried in March, 1840, for the murder of his wife at Somerstoicn, Westchester Co., May 26, 1839. They were both very intemperate, and in a fit of in. toxication, prompted by jealousy, he injured her so severely b}^ stamping upon her, that she died four days afterward from the effect of her bruises. It appeared from the testi- mony, that he was of intemperate habits, and quick tempered; but when sober, of a civil and quiet demeanour. He was convicted, and hung. May 22, 1840. V. Johri Johnson was tried in AW. 1840, for the murder of his wife at Buffalo, Aug. 19, 1840. It was proved on the trial that he was much intoxicated on the day of the murder, though several witnesses gave him a good character, as a quiet and peaceable man, industrious and trusty. He was convicted and hung on the 19th of June, 1841. The law will be found fiilly discussed in the following cases. Perm v. McFall, Add. 257. U. S. v. Drew, 5 Mason R. 29, 30. 3 Am. Jur. 7. S. C. 32 HISTORIA PLACITORUM C0R0NJ5:. crime occasioned thereby; so tiiat yet the formal cause of his punish- ment is rather the drunkenness, than the crime committed in it: but by the laws of England such a person (^■) shall have no privilege by this voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same judg- ment as if he were in his right senses. Plowd. 19. a. Crompt. Just. 29. a. But yet there seems to be two allays to be allowed in this case. 1. That if a person by the unskilfulness of his physician, or by the contiivance of his enemies^ eat or drink such a thing as causeth such a temporary or permanent phrenzy,as aconituni ox nux vomica,\\\\s puts him into the same condition, in reference to crimes, as any other phrenzy, and equally excuseth him. 2. Tliat although ihe simplex phrenzy occasioned zmwef/Zc/e/y by- drunkenness excuse not in criminals, yet if by one or more such prac- tices, an habitual or fixed phrenzy be caused, though this madness was contracted by the vice and will of the party, yet this habitual and fixed phrenzy thereby caused puts the man into the same condi- tion in relation to criajes, as if the same were. contracted involuntarily at first. Now touching the trial of this incapacity, and who shall be ad- judged in such a degree thereof to excuse from the guilt of capital offences, this is a matter of great difficulty, partly from the easiness of counterfeiting this disability, when it is to excuse a nocent, and partly from the variety of the degrees of this infirmity, [ 33 ] whereof some are sufficient, and some are insufficient to ex- cuse persons in capital offences. Yet the law of England hath afforded the best method of trial, that is possible, of this and all other matters of fact, namely, by a jury of twelve men all concurring in the same judgment, by the testimony (0 4 Co. 125. a. l^ennet v. The Slate, Mart. Sf Yer for him the defence of insanity. The prisoner, however, objected to such a defence, asserting that he was not insane ; and he was allowed by the judge to suggest questions, to be put by his lordshi|) to the witnesses for the pro- secution, to negative the supposition that he was insane; and the learned judge also, at the request ofthe priscmer, allowed additional witnesses to be called on his behalf for tlie same purpose. Tiiey, however, failed in showing that the dcfince was an incorrect one ; and on the contrary, their evidence tended to establish it, more clearly, and the prisoner, H'as acquitted on the ground of insanity. Reg. v, Piarce, 9 Car. Sf P, 667. A party having been indicted for a misdemeanor, in uttering seditious words, and upon HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 37 his arrai.inmcnt refusing to plead, and showing- symptoms of insanity ; and an inquest being for'tliwith takc-n under 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 1)4, s. 2, to try whetlicr he was insane or not: — Held, first, that the jury might form their own judgment of the present state of the prisoner's mind, from his demeanor while the inquest was being taken ; and might thereupon find him to be insane, without any evidence being given as to his present state : — Seeondly, that upon the prisoner showing strong symptoms of insanity in Court during the taking uf the inquest, it became unnecessary to ask him whether he would cross-examine the witnesses, or would offer any remark on the evidence. Reg. v. Goode, 7 Ad. Sf E. 536. A grand jury have no authority by law to ignore a bill for murder on the ground of insanity; it is their duty to find the bill; otherwise the Court cannot order the detention of the party during the pleasure of the crown either on arraignment or trial, under Utat. 3y & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94, ss. 1 & 2. Reg. v. Hodges, 8 Car. <^ P. 195. In Massachusctls, when one indicted for murder would make no distinct plea, and appeared to be deranged, a jury were empanelled to try whether he neglected to plead wilfully, or by the act of God ; and on the finding of the jury that it was for the latter reason, the court remanded him to jail. Commonwealth v. Braley, 1 Mass. 103. "The great object of punishment by law, (said Chief Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts^ in Roger's case,) is to atford security to the community against crimes, by [>unishing those who violate the laws; and this object is accomplished by holding out the fear of punishment, as the certain consequence of such violation. Its effect is to present to the minds of those who are tempted to commit crime, in order to some present gratification, a strqng counteracting motive in the fear of punishment. But this object can only be accomplished when such motive acts on an intelligent being capable of remembering that the act about to be committed is wrong, contrary to duty, and such as in any well ordered society would subject the offender to punishment. It might in some respects be more accurate to say that the party thus acting under a temptation, must have memory and intelligence to recollect and know that the act he is about to commit is a violation of the l;nv of the land. But this mode of stating the rnle might lead to a mistake of another kind, inasmuch as it would seem to hold up the idea, that before a man can be justly punished, it must appear that he knew that the act was contrary to the law of the land. But the law assumes that every man has knowledge of the laws prohibiting crimes; an assumption not strictly true in fact, but necessary to the security of society, and sulliciently near the truth for practical purposes. It is expressed by the well known maxim, ignorantia legis neminem excusat — ignorance of the law cannot be pleaded as an excuse for crime. The law assumes the existence of the power of conscience in all persons of ordinary intelligence — a capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in reference to particular actions: a sense of duty and of right. It may also be safely assumed that every man of ordinary intelligence knows that the laws of society are so framed and administered, as to prohibit and punish wrong acts — violation of duty towards others — by penalties in some measure adapted to the nature and aggravation of the wrong and injurious acts thus done. If, therefore, it happens to be true in any particular ease, that a person tempted to commit a crime does not know that the particular act is contrary to positive law, or what precise punishment the municipal law annexes to such act; yet, if the act is palpably wrong in itself; if it be manifestly injurious to the rights of another, as by destroying his life, maiming his person, taking away his property, breaking into or burning his dwelling-house, and the like, there is no injustice in assuming that every man knows that such acts are wrong, and must subject him to punishment by law; and, therefore, it may be assumed for all practical purposes, and without injustice, that he knows the act is contrary to law. This is the ground upon which tiie rule has been Usually laid down by judges, when the question is whether a person has sutHcient men- tal capacity to be amenable for the commission of a crime, that he must have sufficient mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, as applied to the act he is about to commit, and to be conscious that the act is wrong; instead of saying, that he must have sufficient capacity to know that it is contrary to the law of the land, because this power to distinguish between right and wrong as applied to the particular act — a power which every human being, who is at the same time a moral agent and a subject of civil government, is assumed to possess — is the medium by which tliC law assumes that he knows that the same act which is a violation of high moral duty is also a violation of the law of the land. Whereas, if it were stated that a person must have sufficient mental capacity to know and understand that the act he is about committing is a violation of the law of the land, it might lead to a wrong conclusion, and raise a doubt in regard to 37 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. persons igrnorant of tlie law. There is no doubt that many a man is held responsible for crime, and that rightfully, who might not know that the act he was about committing was contrary to tlie law of the land, otherwise than as a moral being he knows that it is wrong — a violation of the dictates of his own natural sense of right and wrong. To recur, then, to what has already been stated. In order that punishment may ope- rate by way of example, to deter others from committing criminal acts when under temptation to do so, by presenting a strong counteracting motive, the person tempted must have memory and intelligence to know that the act he is about to commit is wrong, to remember and understand, that if he commits the act he will be subject to the punish- ment, and reason and will to enable hiin to compare, and choose between the supposed advantage or gratification to be obtained by the criminal act, and the impunity from punishment which he will secure by abstaining from it. A person, therefore, in order to be punishable by law, or in order that his punishment by law may operate as an example to deter others from committing criminal acts under like circumstances, must have sufficient memory, intelligence, reason, and will, to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong in regard to the particular act about to be done, to know and understand that it will be wrong, and that he will deserve punishment by commitiing it. This is necessary on two grounds: 1st. To render it just and reasonable to inflict punishment on the accused individual, and 2d. To render his punishment by way of example, of any utility to deter others in like situations from doing similar acts, by hold- ing up a counteracting motive in the dread of punishment which they can feel and com- prehend. With more immediate reference to the case, the Chief Justice proceeded as follows: In order to constitute a crime, a man must have intelligence and capacity enough, to have a criminal intent and purpose; and if his reason and mental powers are either so deficient that he has no will, no conscience, or controlling mental power, or if through the overwhelming violence of mental disease, his intellectual power is for the time oblite- rated, he is not a responsible moral agent, and is not punishable for criminal acts. But these are extremes easily distinguished, and not to be mistaken. The dillicully lies between these extremes in the ease of partial insanity, where the mind may be clouded and weakened, but not incapable of remembering, reasoning, and judging, or so per- verted by insane delusion, as to act under false impressions and influences. In these cases, the rule of law, as we understand it, is this: A man is not to be excused from responsibility if he has capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish be- tween right and wrong as to the particular act he is then doing, a knowledge and con- sciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and criminal, and will subject him to punish- ment. In order to be responsible, lie must have sufficient power of memory to recollect the relation in which he stands to others, and in which others stand to him; that the act he is doing is contrary to the plain dictates of justice and right, injurious to others, and a violation of the dictates of duty. On the contrary, although he may be labouring under partial insanity, if he still understands the nature and character of his act and its conse- qucnces; if he has a knowledge that it is wrong and criminal, and a mental power suffi- cient to a|iply that knowledge to his own case, and to know that if he does the act he will do wrong and receive punishment, such partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him from responsibility for criminal acts. If, then, it is proved to the satisfaction of the jury, that the mind of the accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will be, whether the disease existed to so high a degree that for the time being it ovgrwlielmed the reason, conscience, and judgment; and whether the prisoner committing the liomL- cidc acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse; if so, then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body without the concurrence of a mind directing it. The character of the mental disease relied upon to excuse the accused in this case, is partial insanity, consisting of melancholy, accompanied by delu- sion. The conduct may be in many respects regular, the mind acute, and tlie conduct a[)()arcntly governed by rules of propriety, and at the same time there may be insane delusion, by which the niiiul is perverted. The most common in these cases is that of monomania, where the mind broods over one idea, and cannot be reasoned out of it. This may operate as an excuse for a criminal act in one of two modes. Either the delu. sion is such that the |)erson under its influence has a real and firm belief of some fact, not true in itself, but which if it were true, would excuse his act ; as where the belief is that the party killed had an immediate design upon his lilc, and under that belief the iasane man killed him in supposed self-defence. A common instance is where he fully HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 37 t believes that the act he is doing is done by the immediate command of God, and he acts under the delusive, but sincere belief, that what he is doing is by the command of a supe- rior power, which supercedes all liuman laws, and the laws of nature; or, 2d. This st;ite of delusion indicates to an experienced person that the mind is in a diseased slate, that the known tendency of that diseased s^tate of mind is to break out into sudden parox- ysms of violence, venting itself into acts of homicide or other violent acts towards friend or foe indiscriminately, so that although there was no previous symptoms and indications of violeHce, yet the subsequent act connecting itself with the previous symptoms and indications, will enable an experienced person to say that the outbreak was of such a character, that for the time being it must have overborne memory and reason: that the act was the result of the disease, and not of a mind capable of choosing: in short, that it was tlie result of uncontrollable impulse, and not of a person acted- upon by motives, and governed by the will." Roger's Trial, Boston, 1844, ^.273., Charge of Ch. Just. Shaw. A case of great interest and importance has recently occurred in England, Reg. v. McNaughton, 10 Clark Sf Fin. 210. In that case, the following questions were pro- pounded to the judges of England by the House of Lords: "1st. What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion in respect of one or more particular subjects or persons; as, for instance, w^ere at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was act- ing contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of pro- ducing some supposed public benefit ? "2d. What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury, when a person alle- ged to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime, (murder, for example,) and insanity is set up as a defence? " 3d. In what terms ought the question to be left the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed? " 4th. If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts, commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused? "5th. Can a medical man, conversant with the disease of insanity, who never saw tlie prisoner previous to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial and the exami- nation of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was conscious, at the time of doing the act, that he was acting contrary to law ; or whether be was labouring under any or what delusion at the time?" The joint opinion of all the judges, except Mr. Justice Maule, was delivered by Lord Chief Justice Tindal, as follows: — " My Lords, her Majesty's Judges, with the exception of Mr. Justice Maule, who has statpd his opinion to your Lordships, in answering the qaestions proposed to them by your Lordship's House, think it right in the first place to state that they have forborne entering into any particular discussion o])on these ques- tions, from tlie extreme and almost insuperable difficulty of applying those answers to cases in which the facts are brought judicially before them. The facts of each particular case must of necessity present themselves with endless variety, and with every shade of difference in each case, and it is their duty to declare the law upon each particular case on facts proved before them, and after hearing argument of counsel thereon. Tiiey deem it at once impracticable, and at the same time dangerous to the, administration of justice, if it were practicable, to attempt to make minute applications of the principles involved in the answers given them by your Lordships' questions; they have therelbre confined their answers to the statements of that which they hold to be the law upon the abstract questions proposed by your Lordships; and as they deem it unnecessary in this particu- lar case to deliver their opinions seriatim, and as all concur in the same opinions, they desire me to express such their unanimous opinion to your Lordships, " In answer to the first question, assuming that your Lordships' inquiries are confined to those persons who labour under such partial delusions only, and are not in other re- spects insane, we are of opinion, that notwitlistanding the party accused did the act complained of with a view under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or aveng. ing some supposed grievances or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is, nevertheless, punishable according to the nature of the crime comn)ittcd, if he knew at tl»e time of committing such crime that he was acting contrary to law, — by which ex- pression we understand your Lordships to mean, the law of the land. As the third and Iburth questions appear to us to be more conveniently answered together, we have to 280980 37 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. I submit our opinion to be, tbat the jury ongfht to be told in all cases, that every man ia presumed to be sane and to possess a sutHcient degree of reason, to be responsible fur his crimes, until tiie contrary be proved to tlicir satistiiction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved, that at the time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such, a defect of reason from disease ot the mind as nol to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, ttiat he did not know that lie was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury on tliese occasions has generally been, whether the accused at the time of doing the act, knew the difference between right and wrong ; which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put generally and in tlie abstract, as when put with reference to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in respect to the very act with which he is ciiarged. If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused solely and exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might tend to confound tlie jury, by inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the law was essential in order to lead to a conviction ; whereas the law is administered upon the principle that every one must be taken conclusively to know it, without proof that he does know it. If the ac- cused were conscious thai the act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the usual course, therefore, has been to leave the question to tiie Jury, whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was wrong ; and this course we think is correct, aceOinpanied with such observations and explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may require. The answer to the fourth question must, of course, depend on the nature of the delusion; but, making the same assumption as we did before, namely, that he labours under such a partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsi- bility, as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if under the influence of delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was, that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed in- jury, he would be liable to punishment. In answer to the last question, we state to your Lordships, that we tiiink the medical man, under the circumstances supposed, cannot, in strictness, be asked his opinion in the terms above stated, because each of those ques- tions involves the determination of the truth of the facts deposed, on which it is for the jury to decide; and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case, such evidence is admissible. But where the facts are admitted, or not dis- puted, and the question becomes substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to allow the question to be put in that general form, though the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right." Per Tindal, C. J. delivering the opinion of the Judges in, McAaiiphten's Case, 10 CI. S( Fin. 200. 208. Maule, J., diss. p. 204—208. See also Hansard's Pari. Debates, Vol. Ql.pp. 288. 714. In a late case, {Commonweallh v. Mosler,) before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the defence of insanity was set up on an indictment for murder, and discussed at great Ivngth. Chief Justice Gibson, in delivering the charge to the jury, said: " Insanity is mental or moral — the latter being sometimes called homicidal mania, and properly so. It is my purpose to deliver to you the law on this ground of defence, and not to press upon your consideration, at least to an unusual degree, the circumstances of the present case, on which the law acts. A man may be mad on all subjects; and then, though he may have glimmerings of reason, he is not a responsible agent. This is general insanity; but, if it be not so great in its extent or degree as to blind him to the nature and consequences of his moral duty, it is no defence to an accusation of crime. It must be so great as entirely to destroy his perception of right and wrong; and it is not until that perception is thus destroyed, that he ceases to be responsible. It must amount to delusion or hallucination, controlling his will and making the commission of the act, in his api)rchcnsion, a duty of overruling necessity. The most apt illustration of the latter is the perverted sense of religious obligation, which has caused men some- times to sucrifice their wives and children. " Partial insanity is confined to a particular subject — the man being sane on every other. In that species of madness, it is j)lain that he is a responsible agent, if he were not instigated by his madness to perpetrate the act. He continues to be a legitimate subject of punishment, although he may have been laboring undur a moral obliquity of HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 37 perception, as much so as if he were merely laboring under ah obliquity of vision. A man wliose mind squint'', unless impelled to crime by this very mental obliquity, is as much amenable to punishment as one whose eye squints. On this point, there has been a mistake as melancholy as it is popular. It has been announced by learned doctors, that, if a Jiian has the least taint of insanity entering into his mental structure, it dischariies him of all responsibility to the laws. To this monstrous error may be traced both the fecundity in homicides which has dishonored this country, and the immunity which has attended them. The law is that, whether the insanity be general or partial, the degree of it must be so great as to have controlled the will of its subject, and to have talien from liim the freedom of moral action. " But there is a moral or homicidal insanity consisting of an irresistible inclination to kill, or to commit some other particular offence. There may be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind, drawing it to consequences which it sees, but cannot avoid, and placing it under a coercion which, while lis results are clearly perceived, is incapable of resistance. The doctrine which acknowledges this mania is dangerous in its relations, and can be recognized only in the clearest cases. It ought to be shown to have beea habitual, or at least to have evinced itself in more than a single instance. It is seldom directed against a particular individual ; but that it may be so, is proved by the case of Jtbe young woman who%'as deluded by an irresistible impulse to destroy her child, though aware of the heinous nature of the act. The frequency of tliis constitutional malady is fortunately small, and it is better to confine it within the strictest limits. If juries were to allow it as a general motive operating in cases of this character, its recognition would destroy social order as well as personal safety. To establish it as a justification in any particular case, it is necessary either to show, by clear' proofs, its contemporaneous existence, evinced by present circumstances, or the existence of an. habitual tendency developed in previous cases, becoming in itself a second nature." The jury convicted tlie prisoner, and the Court was unanimous in refusing a new trial. Com. V, Mosler, 6 Penn, L. J. 93, 4 Barr. Rep. The leading works upon the medical jurisprudence of insanity, are Esquirol on In. sanity; Marc de la Folic; Ray on Insanity; Winslow on the Plea af Insanity; Collin- son on Lunacy; Shelford on Lunacy. Taylor's Med. Jur. {London, 1844.) The inquirer will find an article on the value and effect of medical testimony in The British and Foreign Mid. Review for July, 1S43. In Roger's Trial, {Boston, 1844,) reported by Messrs. Bigelow ^ Bemis, counsel for the defendant, will be found all the leading autho- rities, both the text books and the adjudged cases, many of them learnedly and tho- roughly examined. CHAPTER V. CONCERNI^'G CASUALTY AND MISFORTUNE, HOW FAR IT EXCUSETH IN CRIMINALS. I COME to the second kind of accidental defects, viz. casicallr/ and misfortune, and to consider how far it excuseth : and |] 38 ]] first we are to observe in this, and Hkewise in some other of the defects before and hereafter mentioned, a difference between civil suits, that are terminated z?v, cornpensationem damni iUali,Q.\\di criminal suits or prosecutions, that are in vindlclam criminis coni- ?nissi. If a man be shooting in the fields at rovers, and his arrow hurts a person standing near ihe mark, tlie. party hurt shall have his ac- tion of trespass, and recover his daniages, though the hurt were cas- VOL. I.— 6 38 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. iial;(fir) for the party is damnified by him, and the damages are but his reparation ; but if the party had been killed, it had been /;er infor- tunium, and the archer should not suffer death for it, though yet he goes not altogetiier free from all punishment. (6) 6 E. 4. 7. per Cateshy.{c) As to criminal proceedings, if the act that is committed be simply casual, and /?er infortunium, regularly that act, which, were it done ex (inimi intentione, were punishable with death, is not by the laws of England to undergo that punishment; for it is the will and in- tention, that regularly is required, as well as the act and event, to make the offence capital. Now, what shall be said thus simply casual, and what the ^ 39 ]] punishment, will be at large considered, when we come to homicide /je/' infortunium; only something will be neces- sary to be said thereof here. • If a man do ex intent ione and voluntarily an unlawful act tending to bodily hurt of any person, as by striking or beating him, though he did not intend to kill him, but the death of the party struck doth follow thereby within the year and day ;() As if one man arrest anoUicr merely by the kinjr's commandment, that shall be no excuse to hinl, but lie is nevertlielcss liable to an action of false imprisonment. 16 //. 6. F. MunHriiuns de fails 182. 1 //. 7. t. /i. rrerogntir>e 139. (c) Vide liractim Lib. III. Dv nrtiniiihus, cap 9. ((/) I'cr Fineux Cli. Just, but Jiiuke in bis abridgement of this case, Corona 229. says, that other justices in the time of IJcitrij VIII. denied this opinion of Fineux, and held, that it was felony to kill a man in jusimir iitid the like? notwithstanding the command- ment of the king; for that tlie commandment is against law. 3 Co. List. 56. 160. (e) DfiU. Just. Cap. 1.57. N. Edit. (/) 7''. Corone, 199. Uracton de Corone. cap. 32. § 9. (f) Qiioiiiam ipsa superiori suo ohedire dchet. Leg. Incc, I. 57. B. Corone 108. (//) l]ec;iuse the law siipposes her to be then under the coercion of her husband. Kel 31. (i) TV. Edit. cap. 157. ^ [IJ The People v. McLeod, 1 IliWs Re p. 377. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 45 in the cases of the treasons committed by Arden and Somerville{k) against Queen Elizabeth, both their wives were attaint oiliigh trea- son, though their execution was spared; and yet they were only assenters to their husband's treasons, and not immediately actors in it, and so were principals in the second degree; and upon the same account the earl of Somersel and his wife were both attaint, as acces- saries before, in the murder and poisoning of Sir Thomas Over- bury.{l)\_2] (k) 1 And. p. 104. (0 Stat. Trials, Vol. I. TV. 28 ^- 29. [2] Somerville's case, 1 And. 104, which is the only case where husband and wife have been convicted of treason, only shows that a wife may be convicted of treason with her husband. There Arden and iiis wife were cliarcred with procuring- Sotnerville to destroy the Queen, and both found guilty, but as none of the evidence is stated, it may have beea that the wife was the instigator, and both properly convicted. In SomerseVs case, which is the only case of a wife convicted as well as her husband, as an accessary to a murder, according to 3 Inst. 50, the Earl and Countess were indicted as accessaries before the fact, to tlie murder of Sir T. Overhury, the wife was arraigned alone, first, and pleaded guilty, and being asked what she had to say why judgment of death should not be given against her, she said, " I can much aggravate but nothing extenuate my fault." {2 St, Tr. 957.) Assuming, therefore, that the indictment was joint against both, the case only proves tlicLt the wife may properly be convicted upon her own confession, which indicates that she was the more guilty party ; as it is clear she was in this case. See Hume^s Hist, Eng. vol. 6, |». 68, &,c. Bat as the Earl and Countess were separately arraigned, and on ditFurent davs, and as the indictment against the Earl, as recited in his pardon, (2 St. Tr. 1014,) is against him alone, it may be inferred that the Countess was indict- ed alone; if so, the case is merely that of a wife pleading guilty to an indictment charg- ing her alone as accessory, and unless in such a case she either pleaded that she com- mitted the offence in company witii lier husband, (as it seems she may. Post. 47, M. 37 Ed. 3 Rot. 34,) or such appeared to be the case upon her trial, no question as to coercion could arise. In Reg. v. Alison, 8 C. S^ P. 418, Mr. J. Paiteson mentions an old case where a husband and wife intending to destroy themselves, took poison together, the hujiband died but the wife recovered, and was tried for murder, and acquitted solely on the ground that being the wife of the deceased she was under his control, and inasmuch as the proposal to commit suicide had been first suggested by him, it was considered that she was not a free agent; but I know from the best authority, (says Mr. Greaves, in a note in RusseWs C. ioii of treason, murder, or robbery in his presence. In respect to other felonies, and to misdemeanors committed by her, or to which she is accessary before the fict, in prcbcncc of her husband, and in which lie is concerned, she is presumed to act under HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 45 actual coercion of the husband appear, she may be guilty in such a cnse ; for it may many times fall oat, that the husband doth commit larceny by tlie instigation, though he cannot in law do it by the coercion of his wife; but the latter practice hath obtained, that if the husband and wife commit burglary and larceny together, the wife shall be acquitted, and the husband only convicted; and with this agrees the old book, 2 E. 3. Corone 160. And this being the modern practice and infavorem vitasis fittest to be followed ; and the rather, because otherwise for the same felony the husband may be saved by the benefit of his clergy, and the wife hanged, where the case is within clergy ;(?i) though I confess this reason is but (^ 46 ^ (n) The reason of this is, because a woman cannot by law have tlie benefit of the clergy, li Co. 29. b. yet in Fitz. Corone 461, it was admitted, that a woman might claim clerg-y; however, as the law now stands, she may in all cases have the same benefit by the statute of 3 4" 4 W. Sf M. cap. 9. § 7. as a man may by his clergy. See post c, 44 n, compulsion by him, unless such presumption is precluded by the kind, nature, or charac- ter of the offence, as in case of her being a common scold; but such presumption may be rebutted bv the circumstances of the case, or bv other evidence. Archb., P. Q. S. 80. Dick's C, i'Russ. 1G. 1 Hawk, c. 1, s. 12, led. Dixon Sf Wise's C, 10 Mod. 375. Dult, 126. She is not chargeable with instigating her husband to any crime. She is not chargeable for receiving goods stolen, embezzled, or extorted by her hus- band; nor as an accessary after tlie fact to the commission of a crime by her husband. The common law holds the wife answerable for treason, murder, and robbery commit- ted by her in presence of her husband, without any presumption tliat she is under com- pulsion by him. In respect to other felonies, and to misdemeanors so committed by her, the doctrine of the common law is very obscure. It is most frequently laid down that she is presumed to be under compulsion in tiie commission of otlier felonies in his pre- sence. But it is distinctly stated by Mr. Deacon, v. 2, p. 1377, and by Mr. Archbdd, Pr. Q. S., 81, citing 1 Hale, 516, that this presumption may be rebutted by evidence ta the contrary. And yet in case of its being proved that the wife was the active party in receiving stolen goods in her husband's presence, she has been held not to be chargeable with the offence. Draper's C, Ry. ^- M. 234, cited 2 Deac. 178-9. Archer's C, cited Archb., P. Q. S. 80, which is a direct contradiction of the above doctrine ; and see also Squire's C, 1 Russ. 16, ltd., cited 2 Deac. 1378, which was the case of an apprentice being starved to death by the husband and wife. By the Englishlaw, this presumption, though confined to felonies, has a very wide application, since the catalogue of felonies is in England much extended by statutes. It is implied in the English law, though no rule is emphatically laid down to that effect, that the presumption is applicable to mis- demeanors committed by the wife in presence of her husband. Thus Mr. Deacon, v. 2, p. 1378, says, " In inferior misdemeanors, there is another exception to the irresponsi- bilty of the wife, for she may be indicted and punished with her husband for keeping a brothel, this being considered to be an offence touching the domestic economy and govern- ment of the house in which the wife has necessarily a principal share." This distinctly implies that, the presumption extends to misdemeanors. But there are some other misdemeanors to which the exception seems to apply more obviously than to that of keeping a brothel. In case of perjury by the wife, though the husband might be present at the time of her testifying, the presumption of coercion by him would ordinarily be absurd. The presumption of coercion by the husband is also limited in the code re- ported by the commissioners, to offences by the wife in which "the husband is concerned," for otherwise the law would make the husband guilty of a crime committed by the wife, though he should endeavour to prevent her from committing it. This limitation of the presumptmn is not known to be stated in the books of the common law, but it can hardly be supposed that it is not part of that law, though the language in which the presump. *^°" 's "sually stated in the books excludes such limitation. 1 Hawk, c. 1, led. Archb. P. Q. S. 80, 81. See Hammond's Project of a Code of Forgery, a. G33, p. 197. Six v. Cheeney,, Wright's R., 9. Report of the Penal Code of Massachusetts, c. iv. {Boston, lo44.) VOL. I. — 7 46 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. of small value, for in manslaughter committed jointly by husband and wife the husband may have his clergy, and yet the wife is not on that account to be privileged by her coverture. And accordingly in the modern practice, where the husband and wile, by the name of his wife, have been indicted for a larceny, or burglary jointly, and have pleaded to the indictment, and the wife convicted, and the husband acquitted; merciful judges have used to reprieve the wife before judgment, because they have thought, or at least doubted, that the indictment was void against the wife, she ap- pearing by the indictment to be a wife, and yet charged with felony jointly with her husband. But this is not agreeable to law, for the indictment stands good against the wife, in as much as every indictment is as well several as joint; and as upon such an indictment the wife may be acquitted, and the husband found guilty, so e converso the wife may be convicted, and the husb^ind acquitted; for the indictment is in law joint, or sev- eral, as the fact happens; and so is the book of 15 E. 2 Coronse 3S3, and accordingly has been the frequent practice Vide Dull, ubi siip. cap. 104, where there are several instances of the arraigning of hus- band and wife upon a joint indictment of felony; which, if by law she could not be any way guilty, had been erroneous, for the indict- ment itself had been insuflicient: therefore, though the former prac- tice be merciful, and cautious, it is not agreeable to law; for, tliough ordinarily according to the modern practice the wife cannot be guilty, if the husband be guilty of the same larceny or burglary; yet if the husband upon such an indictment be acquitted, and the wife convict, judgment ouglit to be given against her upon that indictment; for every indictment of that nature is joint or several, as the matter falls out upon the evidence. Vide 22 E. 4. 7.(o) 5. But if the husband and wife together commit a treason, r 47 ]] murder, or homicide, though she only assented to the trea- son, they shall both be found guilty, and the wife shall not be acquitted upon the presumption, that it was by the coercion of this husband, for the odiousness, and dangerous consequence of the crin)e;[3] the same law it is, if she be accessary to murder before the fact. 6. If the husband commit a felony or treason, and the wife know- ingly receive him, she shall neither be accessary after as to the felony, nor principal as to the treason, for such bare reception of her hus- band; for she is suh pot est ate viri., and she is bound to receive her husband ; but otherwise it is, of the husband's receiving the wife knowingly after an olfence of this nature committed by lier.(/;) " M. 37. E. 3. Rot. 34. Line, coram liege. lUcardus Dcy t^- Mar- fferia Uxor ejus indictati, pro receptamento felonum ; /l/c/r^fcr/V/ dicit, quod indictamenlum i)redict' super predictam Marge)'ia?n facium mi- Co) B. Charire de pardon 51. {p) Co. P. C. 108. [3] See note ante p. 47. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 47 nussufficiens est, eo quod praed' 3far^eria tempore quo ipsa dictosfel- ones receptasse, seu eis consentire debuisset,fuit cooperta pra:d, Ji/- cardo viro suo, & adliuc est, & omnino sub poteslate sua, cui ipsa in nullo contradicere potuit : & ex quo nou iuseritur in iudictamento praedicto, quod ipsa aliqnod malum fecit, nee eis consentivit,seu ipsos felones receptavit, ignorante viro suo, petit judicium, si ipsa, vivente viro suOjde aliquo receptameuto in prrcsentia viri sui occasionari pos- sit. — Postea viso & diligeuter examinato iudictamento prsedicto super praefatam Murs^eriam facto, videtur curias, quod indictamentum illud minus sufficiens est ad ipsam inde ponere responsuram : Ideo cesset processus versus earn onininu, &c." Upon which record these things are observable: 1. That the wife, if alone and without her husband, may be acces- sary to a ielouy post fa chnn. 2. But she cannot together with her husband be accessary to a felony post factum ; for it shall be entirely adjudged the act of the husband ; and this is partly the reason, why she cannot be accessary in receipt of her husband being a felon, be- cause she is sub potestate viri. 3. That in this case she was not put to plead to the indictment not guilty, but took her excep- tion upon the indictment itself; and so note the diversity [43]) between an indictment of felony, as principal, and the indict- nrent of her, as accessary after; for in the former case she shall be put to plead not guilty to the indictment, though it appear ki the body thereof, that she is covert. 4. That yet the indictment stood good, as to tiie husband ; and upon this consideration, though it is true the husband and wife may be guilty of a treason, as is before shown, yet it seems, she shall never be adjudged a traitor barely for receiving her husband, that is a traitor, or for receiving jointly with her husband any other person that is a traitor, unless she were also consenting to the treason, for it shall be entirely adjudged the act of her husband. It is certain a fetyie covert may be guilty of misprision of treason committed by another man than her husband: but whether she can be guilty of misprision of treason, if she knows her husband's treason, and reveal it. not, is a case of some difficulty: on the one side, the great obligation of duty she owes to the safety of the king and king- dom, the horridness of the offence of treason, and the great danger that may ensue by concealing it, seems to render her guilty of n)is- prision of treason, if she should not detect it; on the other side, it may be said, she is sub potestate viri, she cannot by law be a wit- ness against her husband, and therefore cannot accuse him. Ideo quxre. But, certainly, if she consented to the treason of her husband, though he were the only actor in it, she is guihy as a principal, and hath no privilege herein by her coverture, as is before shown. 49 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THE CIVIL INCAPACITIES BY COMPULSION AND FEAR. I JOIN these two incapacities together, because they are much of the same nature, as to many purposes ; and how far these give a privi- lege, exemption, or mitigation in capital punishments, is now to be considered. First, There is to be observed a difference between the times of war, or public insurrection, or rebellion, and the times of peace; for in the times of war, and public rebellion, when a person is under so great a power, that he cannot resist or avoid, the law in some cases allows an impunity for parties compelled, or drawn by fear of death, to do some acts in tjiemselves capital, which adrnit no excuse in the time of peace. M. 21 E. 3. coram Rege, Rot. 101. Line.'' " Walter deJiJyngton, and divers of his confederates at St. Botolph's Res;iam potestatem assumentes, & ut de Guerra insurgentes' quendam Thomam de Oke- ham sutorem in capitaneum, & majorem suum eligerunt," seized ou two ships, and took away the corn ;(«) appointed a bell to be rung ;(6) and commanded, that at the ringing thereof ipsi Sf eorum quilihet €sser0parati, ^^e. " Et plures homines villae prsedictse, qui ad male- ficia sua consentire noluerunt, ceperunt, & eos sibi jurare fecerunt ad imprisas suas manutenendas." They were arraigned upon the in- dictment, and committed: " lUi, qui coacti fnerunt jurare, dimittun- tur per manucaptionem ; & illi, qui receperunt denarios, petunt quod, ex quo patet per indictamentum prsedictum, quod ipsi coacti fuerunt recipere denarios contra voluntatem suam, petunt, quod possint quieti recedere ; & consideratum est per curiam, quod nihil mali in [ 50 3 his reperitur ; sed quia curia nondum advisatur, dies datus est per manucaptionem ; ideo venit jurata." 1 find no fur- ther proceeding against them. M. 7 H. 5. cnram Rege. Rot. 20. Here/, cited Co. P. C. p. 10. Those, that supplied with victuals '^'w John Oldcasile, and his accom- plices then in rebellion, as is said, were acquitted by judgment of the court ; because it was found to be done pro timore mortis, 8^- quod rccesserunt, qiunn cito jjotiieriint: note, it was only furnishing of victuals, and pro timore mortis, which excused them : for afler the battle of Evesham, n\ 49 //. 3., when that prudent act vi^as made for the settling of the kingdom, called Dictum de Keni/worth, those, iha.t were drawn to assist tlie barons against the king, though they were not put into the rank of those that paid five years value of their lands for their assistance, viz. those, that gratis, S,' voluutarie, ^- non coacti tniscriint servitia sua contra regem, <§• ejus Jiiium; yet, it seems, they were put to a smaller mulct ; for by the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th , (fl) One liuiidrccl and twenty quarters ofcorn, value 36Z. (6) Quondam eoinmunein campanam ordinaverunt pulsari. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 50 articles: " Coacti, vel metu ducti, qui veneriint ad bella, nee pugna- veruiit, HOC male fecerunt ; impotentes, qui vi vel metu coacti mise- ruiit servitia sua contra regem, vel ejus filium ; coacti, vel metu ducti, qui fuerunt deprgedatores, & cum principalibus prcedonibus prseda- tiones fecerunt, & quando commode potuerunt, recesserunt, & ad domos redierunt; [emptores scienter rerum alienarum valorem bo- norum, quse emerunt, restituant, & in misericordia domini regis sint, quia contra justitiam fecerunt, quia rex inhibuit, jam dimidio anno elapso;] illi, qui ad mandatum comitis Leycestrise ingressi sunt Northampton, nee pugnaverunt, nee malum fecerunt, sed ad Eccle- siatn fugerunt, quando regem venientem viderunt, & hoc sit attinctum per bonos,solvant, quantum valet terra eorum per dimidiura annum; illi, qui ex feodo comitis tenebant,sint solum in misericordia domini regis : impotentes, & alii homines, qui nihil mali fe- [ 51 ] cerunt, statim rehabeant terras suas, & damna recuperent in curia domini regis." But even in such cases, if the whole circumstances of the ease be such, that he can sutliciently resist, or avoid the power of such rebels, he is inexcusable, if upon a pretence of fear, or doubt of compulsion, he assist them. Now as to times and places of peace. If a man be menaced with death, unless he will commit an act of treason, murder, or robbery, the fear of death doth not excusejiim, if he commit the fact; for the law hath provided a sufficient remedy against such fears by applying himself to the courts and officers of justice for a writ or precept de securitate pacis.{d) Again, if a man be desperately assualted, and in peril of death, and cannot otherwise escape, unless to satisfy his assailant's fury he Avill kill an innocent person then present, the fear and actual force will not acquit him of the crime and punishment of murder, if he commit the fact; for he ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent : but if he cannot otherwise save his own life, the law per- mits him in his own defence to kill the assailant ; for by the violence of the assault, and the offence committed upon him by the assailant himself, the law of nature, and necessity, hath made him his own protector cxi7n debifo moderamine inculpatse tulelse, as shall be farther showed, when we come to the chapter of homicide se defendendo.{*) But yet farther, it is true in cases of war between sovereign princes the law of nations allows a prince to begin hostility with such a prince that designs a war against him; and if the fear Tdc real, and upon just ground, non tantuni de potentid sed <§• de animq. — Grot de jure belli Sf pacts, Lib. II. cap. 22. § 5. he may prevent the other's actual aggression, and need not expect, till the other actually invade him, when possibly it may be too late to make a safe defence ; and the reason is, because they are not under any superior, that may by his processor interposition secure the prince against [ 52 ] (d) See this writ in the Register, fol. 88. b. F. N. B. Vet. Edit. 79. N. Edit. 177, (•) Postea cap. 33. 52 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. such a just fear; and therefore in such case the law of nations allows a prince to provide for his own safety. But it is otherwise between subjects of the same prince : If Jl. fears upon just grounds, that B. intends to kill him, and is assured, that he provides weapons, and hes in wait so to do ; yet without an actual assault by B. upon Ji. or upon his house, to commit that fact, Ji. may not kill B. by way of prevention ; but he must avoid the danger by flight, or other means; for a bare fear, though upon a just cause, and though it be upon a fear of life, gives not a man power to take away the life of another, but it must be an actual and inevitable danger of his own life ; for the law hath provided a security for him by flight, and recourse to the civil magistrate for protection by a writ or precept de securitate pacts: and thus far touching the privilege by reason of compulsion or fear.[l] CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING THE PRIVILEGE BY REASON OF NECESSITY. Although all compulsion carry with it somewhat of necessity, and abates somewhat of the voluntariness of the act that is done, yet there are some kinds of necessities, that are not by any external com- pulsion or force. Touching the necessity of self-preservation against an injurious as- [1] An apprehension, though ever so well grounded, of having property wasted or destroyed, or of suffering any other mischief not endangering the person, will afford no excuse for joining or continuing with rebels. Rex v. McGrowlher, 1 East. P. C. 71. But it is otherwise if the party join from fear of death, or by compulsion. . Rex v. Gordon, 1 East. P. C. 71. 'On the indictment on the stal. 7, and 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 4, for breaking a threshing machine, the judge allowed a witness to be asked whetiier the mob, by whom the ma- chine was broken, did not compel persons to go with them, and then compel each person to give one blow to the machine; and also at the time when tiie prisoner and himself were forced to join the mob, they did not agree together to run away from the mob the first opportunity. Rex v. Cnitcliley, 5 Car. i^* P- 133. A., who was insane, collected a number of persons together, who armed themselves, having a common purpose of resisting the lawfully constituted authorities; A. having declared that he would cut down any constable who came against him. A., in the pre- sence of C and D., two of the persons of his party, afterwards shot an assistant of a con- stable, who came to apprehend A. under a warrant : — Uv.ld, that C. and D. were guilty of murder, as jjrinciplcs in the first degree, and that any apprehension that C. and L). had of personal danger to tliemselves from A. was no ground of defence for continuing with iiiiii after he had so declared his purpose ; and also that it was no ground of defence that A. and his party had no distinct or particular object in view when they assembled together and armed themselves. Reg. v. Tyler, 8 Cur & /'. 61G, I'er Demnan, Ch.Just. The apprehension of .personal danger does not furnish any excuse for assisting in doing ;iny act which is illegal. The only force that doth excuse, is a force upon the person and present fear of death ; and this force and fear must continue all the time the i)arty forced remains with the party forcing. It is incumbent upon men, who make force their defence, to show an actual force, and that they joined pro liinorc mortex, et rccesserunt tjuam celo poliierunt. Fo.u. Dis. 14, 5^16; 4 Sleph. Com. 8384. The U. S. v. Vigol, 2 Dull. R. 346; U. S. v. JIaskeU, 4 Wash. C. C M. 402. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 52 sault somewhat has been said in the last chapter, and more will be said hereafter in its due place: I shall proceed therefore to other instances. I'iie necessity of the preservation of the peace of the king- dom by the apprehending notorious malefactors excuseth [ 53 ] some acts from being felony, which in the matter of them without such necessity were felony. If a thief resist, and will not sutler himself to be taken upon hue and cry or pursuit, justiciari se iwhlit permit tere,\{ he b'e killed by the pursuants, it is no felony ;(a) de quo vide latins infra. By the statutes of 3 (§• 4 E. 6 cap. 5 and 1 Mar. cap. 12. If there be a riotous assembly to the number of twelve assembled to commit the disorders mentioned in those acts, the justices of the peace, the sheriff, mayor, or other officer of any corporation, &c. may raise a power to suppress and apprehend them; and, if they disperse not upon proclamation, if any of the rioters be killed, or maimed, or hurt by tiie justices, &c. or those assembled by them to suppress the riot, it is by this act dispunishable. It is true, this act(6) continued only during queen Elizabeth's life, and is now expired ;(c) but although, perchance, as to the killing of such persons, as do not presently return upon proclamation to their homes, it needs the aid of an act of parliament to indemnify them ; yet if they attempt any riotous act, "and cannot be otherwise supprest, the sheriff, or justice of the peace may make use of such a force upon them for preservation of the peace, as well by the Common law, as by the statute; quod vide in ^nder.son''s Rep. part 2 n. 49 p. 67. Burton's case in fine ; and the statute of 13 //. 4. cap. 7. in princi- pio, and 2 H. 5. cap. 8, wiiereby all men are bound, upon warning, 10 be assistant to the sheriff and justice for the suppressing of riots even by force, if it cannot be otherwise effected; so that the clauses touching this matter m the temporary statutes of 3 8,' 4 E. 6. and I Mar. are but pursuant to the law and former statutes for necessity of preserving the peace. Some of the casuists, and particularly Covarruvias, Tom .1 Defurti <§♦ rapinx restitutione, § 3. 4. p. 473, and Gro- [ 54 ] tins de jure belli ac pads, Lib. II. cap. 2. § Q.{d) tell us, that in case of extreme necessity, either of hunger, or clothing, the civil distributions of property cease, and by a kind of tacit condition the first community doth return, and upon this, those common asser- tions are grounded ; " Quicquid necessitas cogit, defendit.'' " Ne- cessitas est lex temporis 4* loci.'' " In casu extremse necessitatis omniasunt communia :" and therefore in such case theft is no theft, or at least not punishable as theft; and some even of our own law- (ff) Sec Leg. Ince, I. 25. (/>) Viz. 1 Mar. cap. 12. for 3 Sfi Ed. 6. cap. 5. was repealed by 1 Mar. cap. 12 (c) It was at first made to conlinue only till the end of the next session, but was afterwards by several new acts continued during the life of queen Mary; and by 1 Eliz, cap. IG. was continued during her lite also, and has never since been revived ; but in 1 CrfO. 1. cap. 5. a new act was made to much the same purpose, which is perpetual. {d) See Fujf. dcjure naturm. Lib. 11. cap. 6. § 6. 54 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONyE. yers(e) have asserted the same ; and very bad use hath been made of this concession by some of the Jesuitical casuists in France^ who have thereupon advised apprentices and servants to rob their masters, when they have judged themselves in want of necessaries, of clothes, or victuals; whereof, they tell them, they themselves are the compe- tent judges; and by this means let loose, as much as they can, by their doctrine of probability, all the ligaments of property and civil society. I do therefore take it, that, where persons live under the same civil government, as here in England, that rule, at least by the laws of England, is false ; and therefore, if a person, being under neces- sity for want of victuals, or clothes, shall upon that account clan- destinely, and anirno furandi steal another man's goods, it is felony, (/) and a crime by the laws of England punishable with death; although the judge, before whom the trial is, in this case (as in other cases of extremity) be by the laws of England intrusted •with a power to reprieve the offender before or after judgment, in order to the obtaining the king's mercy. For 1. Men's properties would be under a strange insecurity, being laid open to other men's necessities, whereof no man can pos- sibly judge, but the party himself. 2. Because by the laws of this kingdoTn(^^) sufficient provision is made for the supply of such necessities by collections for the poor, and by the power of the civil magistrate; and consonant r 55 3 hereunto seems to be the law even among the Jeivs, if we may believe the wisest of kings. P?-overbs vi. 30, 31, "Men do not despise a thief, if he steal to satisfy his soul, when he is hungry ; but if he be found, he shall restore seven-fold, and shall give all the substance of his house." It is true, death was not among them the penalty of theft, yet his necessity gave him no ex- emption from the ordinary punishment inflicted by their law upon that offence. (A) . Indeed this rule, "in casu extremse necessitatis omnia sunt com- munia,'^ does hold in some measure in some particular cases, where by the tacit consent of nations,,or of some particular countries or societies, it hath obtained. 1. Among the Jeivs it was lawful in case of hunger to pull ears of standing corn, and eat, Matth. xii. 1. . 49. See Serg. on Const. 304. Raicle on Const. 96. 71 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. mony of kissing the king was dispensed with by reason of the danger of contagion in time of plague. And touching this homage these things are observable : 1. It difiers from the oath of alHgeance, in that this is only hy a profession; but alhgeance is by an oath, though the oath of ailige- ance also accompany it, 2. It differs in this, that, whereas all men above the age of twelve years are to take the oath of alligeance, whether they hold land, or not ; yet lige homage is not to be performed but by three sorts of persons: 1. Such as hold of the king by homage, which though it be performed in respect of tenure, yet it is homaghim ligeum, because performed to the sovereign, and without any exception of the ho- mage due to inferior lords. 2. Such as are dukes, earls, or viscounts, or barons, though they hold nothing of the king, yet at the corona- tion they perform a lige homage; the tenor whereof runs thus: " I become your liege man of life and limb, and of earthly worship, and faith and truth I shall bear unto you to live arid die against all manner of tblk: so God me help!^^ and then he toucheth the crowil, and then toucheth the ground ; nota, it refers not to any lands, 3, By prelates or bishops; and this is not only at the coronation of the king, but after their election, and before the restitution of their tem- poralities. Vide Statute 25 H. S cap. 20. Anciently the clergyman quarrelled at the performance of homage to the prince ; but by the constitutions of Clarendon set down by Maltheio Paris, p. 101. they were bound to perform it, and it hath been hitherto practiced ; only to gratify them in something antiently it was indulged in this manner, viz: "Faciet electus homagium & fidelitatem regi, sicut ligeo domino suo, de vita, & mem- j] 72 ] bris, & de honore terreno, salvo ordine suo, priusquam con- secretur;" and though I do not find this salvo ordine in- serted in after-times, yet there hath been a temperament added to that homage performed by clergymen, which it seems satisfied their scruple, their homage running thus: "I do you homage and faith, and truth bear unto you, our sovereign lord, and to your heirs kings of England, and I shall do, and truly acknowledge the service of the lands, which I claim to hold of you in the right of the church, as God me help." And this is fealty, as well as homage, for it is accompanied with an oath, though it hath the solemnity of genuflexion, and kissing the king's check. 3. The agreements and differences between that homage, that is simply feudal, or by reason of tenure only, and this homage, that is homagium ligcum, are these: 1. Because though homage is not to be done by any, but those that hold by that service, or by the no- bility, or clergy, as before: yet when done to the king, it becomes homagium ligeum in respect of the person to whom it is performed. 2. If it be homage done to the king, it is homagium ligeum, and hatli no exception of homage due to others. 3. But principally the diUcrencc is in the eflect of it, wiiich is excellently described by HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 72 Terrien'm his Comment upon the Custumer of Normandy , Lib. III. cap. 1. Feudal homage, that is simply such, binds only ratione feodi; therefore if the homager alien, pr deliver to his lord his fief, or fee, he is discharged of the obligation; but lige homage, tho' it may be performed by reason of the fee in its kind or species, yet it principally binds the person; and though the fief itself be aliened, or transferred to another, yet the obligation of lige homage continues. 3. There are certain liomages, that are mixt, and partly lige, and partly not; and they are of two kinds: 1. When the homage is per- formed to a prince, that is sovereign in relation to his subjects, yet owes a subjection to some other prince,; this was the case of the prince of tVales, and the king of Scots before mentioned, the homage, that they performed to the king of England, was simply hge homage, as we may read before, and particularly in Walsing- ham's Ypodigma News triss sub anno 1291,(6) where the tenor of the homage of John de Baliol king of Scots is en- [ 73 ] tered in hxc verba : " Domine Edvarde rex Jlnglise, superior damine regni Scofix,ego Johannes Baliol rex Scoiise recognosco me hominem vestrum ligeum de toto regno Scoti3e,&L omnibus pertinentiis, & hiis,quae ad hoc spectant ; quod regnum meum teneo & de jure debeo & clamito tenere haereditarie, de vobis & hseredibus vesiris regibus jingliae, de vita & de membris, & de terreno honore contra omnes homines, qui possunt vivere & mori." I mention this homage of the king of. Scots not to revive the ancient controversy touching the subordination of that kingdom to tliis, for that difference hath been long settled and at peace ; but only to apply my instances of the various sorts of homages performed by sovereign princes. But the homage, that was performed by their subjects to them, was partly lige homage, and partly not; it was lige homage as to between the king of Scots and them, and as to all persons in the world, except the king of England; for the king" of Scots and prince of Wales had the rights of sovereignty ^to'a imperii as in relation to their subjects and all others, but the king of England. But in relation to the king of England, the homage performed to the prince of Wales or king of Scots was not lige homage ; for there was an exception either expressed or implied at least salvd fide domini regis Jinglix,diS appears plainly above. 2. Another instance of a mixt homage is, when a sovereign prince hath a vassalage, or possession in another absolute prince's do- minion; this was the case of the king oi England, in relation to the lordships and seignory he had in France, as Jiquitaine, ^dnjou, and Picardy,^'c. which were all held of the crown of France; these descended to king Edward III. the king of France required lige homage from the king of England for these territories; the king of England, as king of England, had no dependence on France, and therefore for the more caution performed to the king of France for [h) ^1292.p. 477. 479. 480. 73 HISTORY PLACITORUM CORONA. the dntchy of Jlquitaim and other his possessions in France 5 general homage by these words, "Nous entromysin I'hom- [ 74 lage de roy de France per ainsi, come nous et nous pre- decessors dues de Giiyeyi estoient jades enterent en I'homage des royes de France pur temps esteant;" and aUhough afterwards a settled form of homage was prescribed in this case,(c) yet most evident it is, that it was not hornagiimi ligeum, but only a feudal homage relative to those territories of the crown of France, but not at alt. with any relation to the person or crown of the king' of England. For the Ymg oi England had a double capacity, one as an ab- solute prince, that owed no subjection to the crown of France; nor to any other king, or state in the world; in this capacity he neither did nor could do homage to the king of France ; he had another ca- pacity, as duke oi Jiquilaine,VLndi in that capacity he owed di feudal, but not /)er5o?io/_subjection to the crown of France ; and in this latter capacity only, and as a ditierent person from himself, as king of England, he did the homage, which was in truth no lige homage, but a bare feudal homage, which I rather mention to rectify the mistakes of those that call it a lige homage. But by the way 1 must observe, this feudal homage, as duke of K^quitaine, lasted not long ; for in 14 ^. 3 the king of England as- sumed the title of king of France together with the arms of France by hereditary descent, which style his successors have ever since used. And indeed the name of lige homage from him that was king- of England, to the king of France, though purely in the capacity of duke of Aquilaine, sounded so ill, that when a peace was in treaty between, the king of France and Richard II. viz. rot. pari. \1 R. 2 n. 16. the entry is made, "Fait a remember qe le roy, seigneurs, chivalers, et justices assenterent en cest parliament a la pees, purensi cj£ noslre dit seigneur le roy ne face homage lige, et sauant touts dits le liberty de la person nostre seigneur le roy, et de son royalme de Angleterre et de ses liges du dit royalme," and with power to resort to the title of the crown of France, in case of breach of league by the king of France; this is farther arnplified by the speech made openly by the speaker of the house of commons. Ibid. n. [ 75 ] 17. The homage here meant was with relation to the duchy of Jlquilaine, which upon this treaty was to be de- hvered to the king of England. And thus mucli touching these two securilies of the subject's alli- geance to the king of England, wherein I have been the larger, be- cause many things occur in this business, that give some light to antiquity, and do not so commonly occur, and because the great brand of high treason is, that it is a violation or breach of that sacred bond from the subject to his king commonly called alligeancc, for the security whereof this oath of alligeance and lige homage were (c) Vide Vat. 5 E. 3. i)art 1. m. 17. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 75 instituted, and effectually expounds the obligation, and duty of that allig^ance, that is due from the subject to the king. fshall now only mention those two eminent oaths of supremacy, and obedience, though there were besides them other temporary oaths relating to the crown, as that of 25 H. 8. cap. 22. 26 H. 8. cap. 2. 2S H. 8 cap. 7. 35 H. 8. cap. 1. The supremacy of the crown of England in matters ecclesiastical is a most unquestionable right of the crown of England, as might be shewn by records of unquestionable truth ^nd authority, but this is not the business of this place; yet nevertheless the pope made great usurpations and encroachments upon the right of the crown herein. King Henry VIII. in the twenty-fifth year of his reign having pared off those incroachments in a good measure by the statute of 25 H. 8. capp. 19, 20, 21. in the twenty-sixth year of his reign the supremacy in matters ecclesiastical is rejoined and restored to the crown by the statue of 26 H. S. cap. 1. The papal encroachments upon the king's sovereignty in causes and over persons ecclesiastical, yea even in matters civil under that loose pretense of in or dine ad spiritualia, had obtained a great strength, and long continuance, notwithstanding the security the crown had by the oaths of fealty and alligeance; so that there was a necessity to unrivet those usurpations by substituting by authority of parliament a recognition by oath of the king's supremacy as well in causes ecclesiastical as civil. And therefore after those revolutions, that happened in the life, and on the death oi Henry VIII. Edward VI. and [ 76 ] queen Mary,(\\\ee\\ Elizabelh coming to the crown, the oath of supremacy was enacted by the statute of 1 E/iz. cap. l,for the better securing of the supreme authority of the crown of England as well in matters ecclesiastical as temporal ; which I shall not here irepeat, but reserve the same, and what is proper to be said touching it, to a particular chapter hereafter.(fl^) Afterwards the dangerous practices of popish recusants gave the occasions of enacting of the oath of obedience by the statute of 3 Jac. cap. 4, which I shall likewise refer to its proper place. And thus far touching alligeance, and the securities of the same by the oath of alligeance, and the profession of lige homage. [11] (d) Vide postea cap. 25. [11] The Acts of Congress relating to naturalization are, An Act to establish an uni- form rule of naturalization, 26 March, 1790. An Act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on that subject, January 29, 1795. An Act to establish an uniform rule, &.C., and to repeal, &c., April 14, 1802. Ch. '28. An Act in addition to an Act entitled, "An Act to establish, &c., and, to repeal," &c., March *,6, 1804. Ch. 47. An Act relatintr to evidence in cases of naturalization, March 22, 1816. CA. 32. An Act in further addition to an "Act to establish, &,c., and to repeal," Ace, Maij2G, 1824. Ch. 186. An Act to amend the Acts concerning naturaliza- Uon, J»/oy, 24, le28.C/<. 116. • VOL. I. — 10 76 HISTORIA PLx\CITORUM CORONiE. CHAPTER XI. ■* CONCERNING TREASONS AT THE COMMON LAW, AND THEIR UNCER- TAINTY. Having shewn in the former chapter the kinds and bonds of fidelity and alligeance from the subject to the king, I come to consider o/ those crimes, that in a special manner and signally violate that allige- ance, namely high treason. At Common law the crime of high treason had some kinds of limits and bounds to it. In the time of Henry II. Glanvili who then wrote Lib. \_ 11 ~\ IV. cap. 1 4' 7, tells us of four kinds of crimmse Ixsas mojes- tatis, viz. de niorte regis, de seditione regni, de sedilione exercittis regis, and the counterfeiting of the great seal ; for as to the counterfeiting of money, that came under the title of Crimen falsi, and the punishment thereof antiently was various; but of that par- ticular hereafter. Bructon,\\\?ii wrote in the \\mQoiHenry\\\.IAh.\\\.cap.^. "Siquis avisn temerario machinatus sit in mortem domini regis; vel aliquid egerit, vel agi procuraverit ad seditionem(rt) domini regis, vel exer- citus sui ; vel procurantibus auxilium & consilium pra^buerit, vel con- sensum, licet id, quod in voluntate habuerit, non perduxerit ad effec- tum ;" to which he adds counterfeiting of the seal and money; which, though they come under crimen falsi, yet are reckoned by him among the crimina Ixsse niajesiatis; tho in these old authors treason is sometimes expressed by the name of sedition, yet that word is too general and comprehensive of other ofienses not capital, as well as of treason ; and therefore a charge of sedition against the king, or of exciting sedition, or of speaking, writing, or doing any \.\\m2, seditiously, doih not amount to a charge of treason; and there- fore It was, that in the case oi Selden and others, Trin. 5 Car. B.R.{b) when upon an habeas corpus tiie parties were returned committed (a) In the case of Mr. Selden this is supposed to be the true reading, but in most of tlie jli-S'/S. of Bracton tlie word in this place is seductionem, altlio in otlier places of the same chapter the word seditio is used: Fleta makes frequent use of the word Seduc- tio, Lih. I. cap. 20. § 1 cap. 21 . § § 1, 2, 3. (the last of vi^hich places seems to be a direct transcript from Bracton) thou;,'h the word seditio is once used by him dicto capite, § 8. and Bracton afterwards in this same cliajjler styles a traitor sedvctor. Hengham, cap. 2. and Glauvil, Lib. I. cap. 2. botii of them phcc scditionem in the rank of treasons, and so it was esteemed by tiic t'ivil law. Difr. Lib, XLVIII. tit. 4. ad leg. Jul. ' Majeslalis, I. 1. tit. 19. De pasnis, I. 38. § 2. Seditio continued to be the technical word in iejjal proceedings (as will appear from several records hereafter quoted) until the terms proditio ^' prodilorie \nc\ai\cd In its room, which last word must now be necessarily used in every indictment of treason. 3 Co. Inst. 4. 12, 1.5. (6) Mich. 5. Car. I. Vide Rusliv-orlh's Historical Collections, Vol. I. p. 679. Appendix, p. 18, 6(c. Seldeni Opera, Vol. \'\.p. 1938. 'I'lic court was content, that they should be bailed, but said, that tliey ou;rht to find sureties also for their good behaviour: they had their sureties ready for the bail, but they were remanded to the Tower, because they would not find sureties for the good behaviour. SeUhn was notb.iiled till May 1(531, and not discharged from his bail till Januanj 1G31. Vindi^a Maris Clausi. Stldeni Opera, Vol.lV.p.li21,SfC. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. _ 78 ly the privy council by the kim^^s command for stirring up sedition against the king, the prisoners were bailed in the king's court, because it amounted not to a charge of treason, for sedition in a true legal signification doth not import treason.[l] Fleta, who wrote in the time of Edward I. agrees almost verba- tim with Bracton, viz. Lib. I. cap. 20, 21.(c) Brifton, who made his book in the time also of king Edward I. reckons up treasons much in the same manner, yet makes some addi- tions, cap. 8. de treson', " Grand treson est a compasser nostre mort, ou disheriter nous de nostre royalme, on de fauser nostre seal, ou de countrefaire nostre monoye, ou de la retoundre." And cap. 22. de appeles: '• Sont ascunes felonies, que touchent nostre snyt, et poient estre suys pur nous, sicome de vers nos mortels enemies, de nostre seal, de nostre corone, et de nostre monoye fause." Again; " En primes, c'est a dire, de appels de felonies, que poient estre faitz par nous, et nemye pour nous, sicome de treson, et de com- passement purveu vers nostre persone pour nous mettre a mort, ou nostre compayne, ou nostre pere, ou nostre mere, ou nous enfauntz, ou nous disheriter de nostre royalme, ou de trahir nostre hoste, tout ne soit tiel compassement mys en effect." And in the latter end of the same chapter, " Et de fausyn de nostre seal, & de nostre monoye, purra lenseur appels pour nous en mesme la manere, et ausi del purgiserde nostre compayne, ou de nous filles, ou des norices de nos enfauntz :(c() En queiix cases soit le jugement, de estre treyne, et pendu, &c." By these various expres- sions of Britton, it appears that the crime of high treason f 79 ~\ was very uncertain ; sometimes styled under the name of felony, sometimes had the punishment of petit treason applied to the crime of high treason, and some crimes mentioned, as treasons, which were not so taken by Bracton, or Fleta ; and indeed in the farther pursuit of this argument we shall find, that at common law there was a great latitude used in raising of offences into the crime (c) He does not rank the counterfeiting of the seal or of the coin among the crimina l(Bstate Trials, Vol. I. p. 8. 84 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. of treason by certain lords appellors, wherein many were convict of high treason under general words of accroaching royal power, sub- verting the realm, ^^c. and among the rest those very judges, that had thus liberally and arbitrarily expounded treason in answer to the king's questions, were for that very cause adjudged guilty of high treason, and had judgment to be hanged, drawn, and quartered, though the execution was spared ;((7) and they having led the way by an arbitrary construction of treason not within the statute, they fell under the same fate by the like arbitrary construction of the crime of treason. Neither did it rest here, for the tide turned, and in Rot. [ 85 ]] Pari. 21 R. 2. n. 12, 13. the commission before-mentioned, and the whole parliament of 11 R. 2. is repealed, and a new appeal of treason against the duke of Gloucester, esix\ o{ Jirundel, and the commissioners in the former commission, and the procurers thereof under that common style of accroaching royal poiver, where- upon divers of them were condemned as traitors: and n. 18, there were four points of treason farther declared, viz. " Chescun qe com- passe, et purpose la morte le roy, ou de lui deposer, ou de susrend-re son homage liege, ou celuy, qe levy le people, et chivache encountre le roy a faire guerre deins son realme, et de ceo soit dument attaint, et adjugge en parlement, soit adjuggez come traytor de haul treason encountre la corone, et forfeit de lui, et de ses heyres, quecunques touts ses terres, tenements, et possessions, et libertys, et touts autres inheritements, queux il ad, ou ascun autre a son oeps, ou avoit le jour de treason perpetres, si bien en fee tayl, come de fee simple, au roy." These four points of treason seem to be included within the statute of 25 E. 3. as to the matter of them, as shall be hereafter shewed; but with these differences, viz. 1. The forfeiture is extended farther than it was formerly, namely to the forfeiture of estates-tail and uses. 2. Whereas the ancient way of proceeding against commoners was by indictment, and trial thereupon by the country, the trial and judg- ment is here appointed to be in parliament.[4] 3. But that, wherein the principal inconvenience of this act lay, was this, that whereas the statute of 25 E. 3. required an overt-act to be laid in the indict- ment, and proved in evidence, this act hath no such provision, which left a great latitude, and uncertainty in point of treason, and without any open evidence, that could fall under human cognizance, sub- jected men to the great punishment of treason for their very thoughts, {q) Tlicy were all banished to Ireland except Tresilian, wlio was executed according to the judgment. See Slate Trials, Vol. I. p. 13, 14. [4] In 1G81, the House of Commons passed a resolution to impeach one Fitzkarris of high treason, at the bar of llic Mouse of Peers, 'i'ho Lords refused to entertain the cause; und voted that he should he jjrocecded against by indictment in the lower courts. It seems to be the better opinion, that the House of f-ords have no jurisdiction in sucJi a case. 4 BL Cum. 25^, though Mr. Ilallam thinks differently. 2 vol. Cons. Ihs., p. 603. HISTORIA PLACITORUM €0RON.^. 85 which without an overt-act to manifest them are not triable but by- God alone. These were the unhappy effects of the breaking of this great boundary of treason, and letting in of constructive treasons, which, by various vicissitudes and revolutions mischieved all parties first or last, and left a great unquietness, and unsettledness [ 86 ] in the minds of people, and was one of the occasions of the unhappiness of that king. Henry IV". usurping the crown, and the people being sufficiently sensible of the great mischiefs they were brought in by these con- structive treasons, and the great insecurity thereby, Rot. Pari. 1 H. 4. n. 70. the parliament of 21 R. 2. is entirely repealed, that of 11 R. 2. entirely revived; and it was enacted, (r) that a parliamentary au- thority be not for the future lodged in a committee of particular per- sons, as it was done 2IJ?. 2. "Et auxint mesme nostre seigneur le roy de son propre motif reherceant, qe come in le dit parlement tenuz I'an 21, y fueront ordeynes per estatute phiseurs pains de treason, si qe y ne avoit ascun home, qe sauoit, come il se deust savoir, de faire, parler, ou dire pur doubt des tielx paines, dist, qe sa voiunte est tout outrement, qe en nul temps avener ascun trayson soit adjugges autre- ment qil ne feust ordeignez par statute en temps de son noble aiel le roy E. le 3. qe dieu assoyi; dont les dits seigneurs et comens fuerent tres grandment rejoyces, et mult humbleraent ent remercierent nostre dit seigneur le roy."(5) Now although the crime of high treason is the greatest crime against faith, duty, and human society, and brings with it the greatest and most fatal dangers to the government, peace, and happiness of a kingdom, or state, and theretbre is deservedly branded with the highest ignominy, and subjected to the greatest penalties, that the law can inflict; yet by these instances, and more of this kind, that might be given, it appears, 1. How necessary it was, that there should be some fixed and settled boundary for this great crime of treason, and of what great importance the statute of 25 B. 3. was, in order to that end. 2. How dangerous it is to depart from the letter of that statute, and to multiply and enhanse crimes into treason by ambiguous and general words, as accroaching of royal power, suh- vttrling of fundamental laws, and the like; and 3. How dangerous it is by construction and analogy to make treasons, where the letter of the law has not done it: for such a method f 87 ]] admits of no limits or bounds, but runs as far as the wit and invention of accusers, and the odiousness and detestation of persons accused will carry men.(/) (r) See 1 H. 4. cap. 3, 4, ^ 5. (s) See 1 H. 4. cap. 10. (0 This reasoning of our author is equally strong against constructive interpretations of compassing the death of the king, VOL. I. — 11 87 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON^^ CHAPTER XII. TOUCHING THE STATUTE OF 25 E. III. AND THE HIGH TREASONS THEREIN DECLARED. A Parliament was held on Wednesday on the feast of St. Hill. 25 E. ,3. at which parliament the statute declaring the points of treason was made. The petition of the commons, upon which it was made, is Rot. Pari. 25 E. 3. p. 2. n. 17. in these words: " Item come les jus- tices nostre seigneur le roy assignes en diverses countees ajaggent les gents, qe sont empeches devant eux, come treitors par divers causes disconus a la comen estre treison, qe plese a nostre seigneur le roy par son counsel, & par les graunts & sages de la terre declarer les points de treson en cest pres^ent parlement. " Ro\ Quant a la petition touchant treison nostre seigneur le roy ad fait declarer les articles de ycele en manner qe ensuit : cest assa- voir, en case quant home face compaser ou ymaginer la mort nostre seigneur le roy, ou madame sa compaigne, ou de lour fitz primer & heir ; ou si home violast la compaigne le roi, & la eisne fille le roy niente marie, & la compaigne a leisne fitz & heire du roi; & si home leve de guerre centre nostre seigneur le roy en son royahne ; ou soit adhereant as enemies nostre seigneur le roy en le royahne, donant a. eux eide, & confort en son royalme ou par aillours, & de ceo pro- vablement soit atteint de overt fait par gents de lour condi- [ 88 1 cion; Et si home contreface le grant scale le roy, ou sa monoie, & si home apporte fausse monoie en cest royalme contrefait a la monoie dengleterre, si come la monoie appelle Lusse- 6t/r^A, ou autre semblable a la dite monoie dengleterre, sachant la monoie estre fausse, pur marchander ou paiement faire en deceit nostre seigneur le roy & de son people : Et si home tuast chancellory- treasurer, ou justice nostre seigneur le roi delun baunk, ou del autre, justice en eir, des assisez & de touz auters justices assignez a oyer & terminer, esteantz en lour places enfesant lour oflice. Et fait a enten- dre qe en les cases susnomees doit estre ajuggee treisonce, qe estent a nostre seigneur le roi & a sa royale majeste, & de tiels maneres de treison la forfeiture desescheets appertient a nostre seigneur le roy, sibien des terres, & tenementz tenuz des auters, come de lui mesme : ouesque ceo il y ad autre manere de treison, cest assavoir, quant nil servant lue son mestre, une feme, qu tue son baron, quant home se- cular ou de religion tue son prelate, a qi il doit foi & obedience, & tiel manere de treison doun forfeiture des escheets a chescun seigneur de son fee propre; & pur ceo qe plusours aulres cas de semblable trei- son purront eschaier en temps avenir, queux home ne purra penser ne declarer en present, assentu est qe qui autre cas suppose treison, qe ilest especifietz peramont,aviegne de novel deuant ascuns justices, demoerge la justice sanz aler a juggement de treison, tantque per de- vant nostre seigneur le roy & son parlement soit le case monstre, & HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 88 declare, le quel ceo doit estre ajiigge treson, ou aiit' felonie ; & si par cas ascun home de cest royalme chivache armee descovert,ou secret- ment ad geiitz armez coiitre ascun autre pur lui tuer ou desrobber, ou pur lui preudre & retener tanque i I face fyu ou raunceon pur sa deliverance avoir, nest pas lentent du roy & du son counseil, qe en tiel cas soit ajugge treison, eiriz soit ajugee felonie, ou trespass solonc la ley de la terre auncienement usee, & solonc ceo que le cas demand: Et si en tiel cas, ou autre semblable devant ces heures ascun justice eit ajugge treison, & par ycelle cause les terres & tene- [ 89 ] menfz devenuz en la maiue nostre seigneur le roi come for- faitz eient les cheifes seignours de fee lour escheets des tenementz de eux tenuz, le quel qe les tenementz soient en la maine le roi ou en main dauters par doun, ou en autre manere : savant toutes foits a nostre seigneur le roi Ian, & le wast, & auters forfeitu resides chatelx, qe a lui attient en les cas susnomez, & qe briefs de scire facias vers les terre-tenants soient grantez en tiel cas sanz autre original & sanz alouer la protection nostre seigneur le roi en la dite suyte ; & de les terres, qe sont in la maine le roi, soient grantes briefs as viscontz des countees la, ou les terres serront, de ouster la maine sanz autre delaie." The statute itself is drawn up upon this petition and answer, and differs nothing in substance from the answer to the petition upon the parliament-roll : the statute itself runs in these words : " Item, where- as divers opinions have been before this time in what case treason shall be said, and in what not, the king at the request of the lords and of the commons hath made a declaration in the manner, as here- after followeth: that is to say, when a man doth compass or ima- gine[l] the death of our lord the king, or our lady his queen, or of their eldest son and heir; or if a man do violate the king's compa- nion, or the king's eldest daughter unmarried, or the wife of the. king's eldest son and heir; or if a man do levy war against our lord the king in his realm, or be adherent to the king's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm or elsewhere, and thereof be provably(a) attainted of open deed by the people of their condi- tion; and if a man counterfeit the king's great or privy seal, or his money; and if a man bring false money into this realm counterfeit to the money of England, as the money called Lushburgh, or other like to the said money ot England, knowing the money to be false, to merchatidize or make payment in deceit of our lord the king and of his people: and if a man slay the chancellor, treasurer, or the king's justices of the one bench or the other, justices in eyre, or jus- tices of assize, and all other justices assigned to hear and determine, being in their places doing their offices. And it [ 90 ] is to be understood, that in the cases above rehearsed that ought to be judged treason, which extends to our lord the king and liis royal majesty, and of such treason the forfeiture of the escheats pertaineth to our lord the king, as well of the lands and tenements ■ (a) See 3 Co. Inst, p. 12. [1] See Luders' Tracts, 137. m HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. holden of others, as of himself: and moreover there is another man- ner of treason, that is to say, when a servant slayeth his master, or a wife her husband, or when a man secular, or religious, slayeth his prelate, to whom he oweth faith and obedience; and of such treason' the escheats ought to pertain to every lord of his own fee : and be- cause that many other like cases of treason may happen in time to come, which a man cannot think nor declare at this present time, it is accorded, that if any other case supposed treason, which is not above specified, doth happen before any justices, the justices shall tarry without any going to judgment of the treason, till the cause be shewed and declared before the king and his parliament, whether it ought to be judged treason, or other(6) felony: and if par case any man of this realm ride armed[2] covertly, or secretly with men of arms against any other to slay him, or rob him, or take him, or retain him, till he hath made fine or ransom for to have his deliver- ance, it is not the mind of the king, nor his council, that in such case it shall be judged treason, but shall be judged felony, or trespass ac- cording to the laws of the land of old time used, and according as the case requireth. And if in such case, or other like, before this time any justices have judged treason, and for this cause the lands and tenements have come into the king's hands as forfeit, the chief lords of the fee shall have the escheats of the tenements holden of them, whether that the same tenements be in the king's hands, or in others by gift, or in other manner; saving always to our lord the king the year and the wast, and the forfeitures of chattels, [] 91 ] which pertain to him in the cases above-named; and that ' writs of scire facias be granted in such case against the land-tenants without other original, and without allowing any pro- tection in the said suit; and that of the lands, which be in the king's hands, writs be granted to the sheriffs of the counties, where the lands be, to deliver them out of the king's hands without de- lay."[3] The several high treasons hereby declared are these: 1. The compassing of the death of the king, queen, or prince, and declaring the same by an overt -act. 2. The violation or carnal knov/ledge of the king's consort, the king's eldest daughter unmarried, or the prince's wife. 3. The levying of war against the king. 4. The adhering to the king's enemies within the land or without, and declaring the same by some overt-act. 5. The counterfeiting of the great seal or privy seal. 6. The counterfeiting of the king's coiti, or bringing counterfeit coin into this realm. (6) The old transl.ition seems here to be preferable, viz. else; for auV being abbreviated may be cither autre or autrement. [2] Liidcrs, 141. [3] Mr. Luderf translation of this statute is somewhat different from the one here given. I'ract i. p. 4. IIISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONJE. 91 7. The killing of the chancellor, treasurer, justices of the one bench or the other, justices in eyre, justices of assise, justices oi oyer and terminer in their places doing their offices.[4] [4] By Art. 3. Sect. 3. of the Constitution of the United States, treason against the United Staes shall consist only in levying weur against them; or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witness to the same overt act, or confession in open court. Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted. In furtherance of this constitutional provision, an Act of Confess was passed April 3{)tk, 1790,. for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, by which it is enacted, "That if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United States of America shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States, or elsewhere, and shall be thereof convicted, on confession in open Court, or on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act of the treason whereof he or they shall stand indicted, such person or persons shall be ad- judged guilty of treason against the United Slates, and shall sutfer death." The other parts of the Act of Congress with the decisions of the federal Courts, de- claring what acts amount to the two species of treason defined by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the cases that have come within the cognizance of the courts of the different States, will be given in their proper places. It may, however, be here observed, that under the old confederation there was no judicial power organized or clothed with authority for the trial and punishment of treason against the United States. It became necessary therefore to provide for it under the judicial powers of the several States. But since the framing of the Constitution, the jurisdiction is exclusively in the United States Courts, II Johns. 553. Many of the States have provisions in their Con- stitutions respecting this crime; thus: "Treason against the State shall consist only in levying' war against it; or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on ths testimony of Iwo witnesses, or on confession in open court," is to be found in the Constitutions of Maine, Connecticut, New Jersey, Kentucky, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Missouri, Michigan, and Arkansas. And most of them have enacted laws, some of which contain treasons un- known to the Constitution of the United States, It has been doubted by several learned gentlemen whether, since the making of the Constitution of the United Stales, treason can in any case be committed against a State. Mr. Livingston, in his System of Penal Laws, p. 148, says that, " from the nature of the federal union, a levy of war against one member of the Union is a levy of war against the whole; therefore it is concluded that treason against the State, being treason against the United Slates, it is to be punished under their laws and in their courts." See also p. 380. A writer in the American Law Magazine, vol. 4, p. 318, argues in the same manner; and Mr. Justice Story says, that a State cannot take cognizance, or punish the offence, (treason against the United States,) whatever it may do in relation to the offence of trea- son committed exclusively against itself, if, indeed, any case can, under the Constitution, exist, which is not at the same time treason against the United States. Const. 3 vol. p. 173; but in his charge to the Grand Jury, {June 15, 1842,) he speaks thus, " Treason may be, and often is, aimed altogether against the sovereignty of a partieu'ar State. Thus, for example, if the object of an assembly of persons, met with force to overturn the government or constitution of a State; or to prevent the due exercise of its sovereign powers, or to resist the execution of any one or more of its general laws; but without any intention whatsoever to intermeddle with the relations of that State with the national government, or to displace the national laws or sovereignty therein, every overt act done with force towards the execution of such a treasonable purpose, is treason against the Slate, and against the State only." 1 Story's Rep. 616. That this offence may be com- milted against a State, seems to be recognized by the second section of article four of the Constitution of the United Slates, which provides that, "a person charged in any State with treason, &.C., who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime;" it was assumed in the case of The People v. Lynch, U Johns. 54'J, where the court said, " that it might be by an open and armed opposition to the laws of the State, or a combination and forcible attempt to 91 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. overturn or usurp the government. And, indeed, the State in Its political capacity, may, under certain special circumstances pointed out by ttie Constitution of the United Slates, be engag'ed in war with a foreign enemy;" and it was directly decided, after argument, in Dorr's case, Pamph. p. 123. See also 4 Tucker's Bl. Com. Apdx. 21. Serg. on Const. 382. Rawle on Const. 305. CHAPTER XIII. TOUCHING HIGH TREASON IN COMPASSING THE DEATH OF THE KING, QUEEN, OR PRINCE. The first article of high treason declared by the statute of 25 E. 3. is this, and in these words: ^^ fV/ien a man doth compass or imagine the death of our lord the king, or of our lady the queen, or of their eldest son [ 92 ] and heir." Upon this division there will be these considerations. I. What shall be said a man that compasseth. II. What shall be said the king, queen, or their eldest son. III. What shall be said a compassing or imagining of any of their deaths. IV. Wliat shall be evidence, or an overt-act to prove such ima- gining.. V. The form of an indictment of compassing the death of the king, queen, or prince. I. What shall be said a man compassing, S,'C. The general learning of this point in relation to natural, accidental, or civil incapacities hath been at large handled in the former chap- ters; but there is something peculiar to the case of high treason, which is considerable in this division. If an alien amy comes into England, and here compass the death of the king, queen, or prince, this is a man compassing within this law; for, tlio he be the natural subject of another prince, yet during his residence here he owes a local alligeance to the king o[ England, and tho the indictment shall not style hiiti natnralis subditiis, nor style the king naturalem dominuni, yet it shall run prodilorie <5' contra ligeantise sute dehituni. Co. P. C. p. 5. 7 Hep. Calvin^s ccise.{a) Dyer. 144. • If an alien amy subject of another prince comes into this kingdom and here settles his abode, and afterwards war is proclaimed between the two kings, and yet the alien contiimes here and takes the benefit of the king's laws and protection, and yet compasses the death of the king, this is a man compassing within this law; for, tho he be the natural subject of another prince, lie shall be dealt with as an English subject in this case, unless he first openly remove himself from the king's protection bypassing to the other prince, or byapub- (a) fol. 6, 17. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 92 lie renunciation of the king of England^s protection, which hath some analogy with that, which they call diffidatio, or defiance. And the same law I take to be, if the subject of a forein prince in war with ours come into England and here trade [ 93 1 and inhabit either as a merchant, dweller, or sojourner, if such a person compass the death of the king, he may be dealt with as a traitor, because he comes not hither as an enemy, or by way of hostility, but partakes of the king's protection: with this agrees the case oi Stephano Farrara de Gama, and Emanuel Lewes Tinoco, Portugueze born, and then subjects to the king of Spain, between whom and the queen of England there was then open war, who were indicted and attaint of high treason for conspiring with Dr. Lo- pez to poison the queen. (6) 37 Eliz. Calvin's case. 7 Co. Rep. p. 6. And, though they came hither with the queen's protection, it alters not the case, for every foreigner living publicly and trading here is under the king's protection : and this appears by the statute of Magna Charta, cap. 30. " Et si sint de terra contra nos guerrina, &. tales in- veniantur in terra nostra in principio guerraB,attachientur sine damno corporum suorum vel rerum, donee sciatur a nobis vel a capitali jus- tieiario nostro, quomodo mercatores terras nostras tractentur, qui tunc inveniantur in terra ilia contra nos guerria; & si nostri salvi sint ibi, alii salvi sint in terra nostra." The statute speaks indeed of mercatores, but under that name all foreigners living or trading here are comprised. And therefore in ancient times before the subjects of forein princes in hostility residing here were dealt with as enemies, a proclamation issued for their avoidance out of the kingdom; and in default of their avoidance within the time limited by such proclamation they lost the benefit of the king's protection. And after such proclamation, yet upon caution given sometimes by mainprise de se bene gerendo, sometimes by oaths of fidelity to the king, they had sometimes special, and oftentimes general protec- tions, notwithstanding such hostility. Rot. Vascon. 18 E. 2. 21, 24. Pat. \4 H. 6. part. 2. m. 34, 35. The statute of the Staple,{c) cap. 17. hath made provision for mer- chants strangers, in case war shall happen between their prince and the king of England, viz. that they shall have convenient ■ warning by forty days by proclamation to avoid the realm; [ 94 1 and if they cannot do it by that time by reason of some acci- dent, they shall have forty days more, and in the mean time liberty to sell their merchandizes: during these eighty days they have the king'sprotection, andif they do any treasonable act above-mentioned, they shall be indicted of treason, notwithstanding the hostility be- tween their sovereign and the king oi England; but it seems, that if he remain here in a way of trade after proclamation so made, and the time of his demurrage allowed by this act, he may be dealt with as an alien enemy; but yet if he after that time continues in his way (6) Vide Camdeni Eliz. sub anno 1594. (c) 27 E. 3. 94 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. of trade or living as before, and shall then conspire the king's death,' &c. the king may deal with him as an alien enemy by the law of nations, or as a traitor by the law of the land; because de facto he continues as a subject, and under the benefit de facto of the king's protection. Therefore the general words in Co. P. C. p. 5. wherein he supposeth an alien enemy cannot be guilty of treason, but must be dealt with by martial law, are to be taken with that allay, that is given in Calciii's case, foL 6. b. in these words : " But if an alien enemy come to invade this realm, and be taken in war, he cannot be indicted of treason, for the indictment cannot conclude co;i/?'a ligean- iiae suse dehitum-P the like may be said of such as are sent over merely as spies by a foreign prince in hostility ; but an alien enemy living here in the condition of an inhabitant or trader may be guilty of treason as well as an alien amy, for he doth it praditoriedin& treacher- ously, and against the obligation that lies upon him, as well as any others, to be true to the prince, the benefit of whose laws and protec- tion he holds, so long as he is under the same.[l] But yet this is observable upon the statute of Magna Charta, cap. 30. and what hath been before said, 1. That if an alien enemy comes into England a.{{ex the war begun, and lives here under the king's pro- tection as a subject, yet if he practise treason against the king during such his abode hefe, he may be indicted of high treason contra ligean- tias sux de.hitum. 2. Yet such an alien, coming in after the war begun without the king's licence or safe-conduct, cannot [[ 95 ] claim the privilege allowed by the statute of 7V/a^;irt CAar/fl?, cap. 30. to those that were here before the beginning of the war. 2 Co. Inst. 58. 3. That by the law of England debts and goods found in this realm belonging to alien enemies belong to the king, and may be seized by him. 19 E. 4. 6. 7 E. 4. 13. and there- fore in debt brought by an alien enemy it is a good plea in bar prima facie, that the person is an alien born m G. in partibus transmarinis sub obedientid Phillippi regis Hispaniae hostis Sf' inirnici domini regis; so that, though to some purposes he is under the king's pro- tection, so as to be guilty of treason, if he conspire against the king's • life, yet his goods are not by law privileged from confiscation ; and the reason is, because he might secure his goods by purchase of let- ters patents of denization, and he shall not take away the king's rights by his neglect therein. But then, what if in truth our merchants have liberty of reclaiming their goods and recovering their debts in the hostile country ? May the merchant plaintiif reply with this clause of the statute oi Magna Charta, that " Nostri mercatores salvi sunt ibi, &c. ?" I answer, he cannot, for it is reserved to another kind of trial ; for the words are "donee sciatur a nobis vcl a capitali justiciario nostro, quomodo mercatores nostri ibi tractentur." The king must be as- certained of the truth of the fact, in whose cognizance it best lies; [1] See De la Motte'a case, 21 St. Tr. (by Howell), 687. IIISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 95 and if he be satisfied, that our merchants are permitted to recover their debts in the hostile kingdom without impediment or confiscation, this is to be notified and declared by some proclamation, or instru- ment under the great seal declaring the fact, and allowing them to prosecute for their debts here ; and then, by virtue of this statute or public declaration, the merchant alien plaintiff, may reply with this special matter in maintenence of his action. [2] Here somewhat may be of use to be said -touching treasons by embassadors of foreign princes, wherein altho sometimes reason of state and the common interest of princes do de facto govern in these cases, yet it will not be amiss to consider the opinions and practices of former times in relation to this matter. [ 96 J First, If an Englishman born, though he never took the oath of alligeance, becomes a sworn subject to a foreign prince, and is employed by him into England as his minister, agent, or em- bassador, and here conspires against the king's life, he shall be in- dicted and tried for treason, as another subject should be ; and the reason is, because no man can shake off his country wherein he was born, nor abjure his native soil or prince at his pleasure. This was the case of Dr. Story, who had sworn alligeance to the crown of Spain, and was here condemned and executed for treason. Vide Camden's Eliz. 14 Eliz. p. 168.((/)[3] Secondly, But if a foreigner being the agent, minister, or embas- sador of a foreign prince either in amity or enmity with the king of England come over with or without the king's safe-conduct, and here conspire against the life of the king, or to raise rebellion or war against him, some have been of opinion, that he may be indicted of treason; but by the civilians he cannot, because he came in as a foreign embassador representing the person of his prince, and there- fore is not to be so dealt with in such case, but by the law of nations may be dealt with as an enemy, not as a traitor ; and though he have the pfotection and safe-conduct of the king of England, yet it is imder a special capacity, and for a special end, namely, as a foreign agent ; but if he be criminally proceeded against, it must be as an enemy by the law of war or nations, and not as a traitor; but how far and in what cases he may be dealt with as an enemy, remains to be further considered. Camden\'i Eliz. sub anno \51\. p. \Q4:. Thirdly, therefore those, that are most strict after the rights and privileges of embassadors, yet seem to agree, that if he do not only {(1) English folio. [2] See ante, p. 60. in notis. »■ [3] It has always been the law of England, that a natural born subject owes an alle- giance to the crown, which is intrinsic and perpetual, and whic!) cannot be divested by anyactorbisown. Storie's case, Dyer, 228, b. 1 Bl. Com. 370; and that no foreign letters ol natilralization can in any manner take from him his allegiance, or alter his duty to his lawful sovereign, Macdnnald's case, Fost. 60. And yet the British parliament nnt unfreqiiently passes acts of naturalization, tiiereby aiding a foreigner to shake off that natural allegiance to his own country, wliich they deny every other nation the power to do in regard to British subjects. VOL. I. 12 96 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. conspire the death of the king or the raising a rebellion against him, but actually attempt such an act, as actually or interpretatively is a consummation thereof, though possibly the full effect thereof r 97 3 ^° ^^^^ ensue, yet he may be dealt withal as an enemy, and by the law of nations he may be put to death, as if he should stab or poison the prince, and yet dotli not kill him, or raise an actual rebellious army, or should levy an actual war against the prince to whom he was sent, and in that prince's country, as Fabius{e) the Roriian embassador to the Gauls, by challenging and fighting with the champion of the Gauls ; Plutarch in vita jYumse, the prince, to whom he is sent, may, without consulting the prince that sends him, inflict death upon such an embassador by the law of nations, as an enemy: " Consummata autem sunt, quoe eousque pro- ducta sunt, quo produci ab hominibus solent, & quae delinquendi iinem statuere solemus. Vide Albericus Gentilis, Lib. II. cap. 2. de legationibus.^^ Fourthly, But in case of a bare conspiracy against the life of the king, or a conspiracy of a rebellion or change of government, no- varuni rerum molimina, there is great diversity of opinions among learned men, how far the privilege of an embassador exempts him from penal prosecution as an enemy for such conspiracies or incon- summate attempts, that do not proceed farther than the machination, solicitation, or conspiracy. Upon ah attempt of this nature by the bishop of Rosse, agent and embassador of the queen of Scots, 14 Eliz. the question was pro- pounded to Lewes, Dale, Drury, Jlubry, and Jones, doctors of law, viz. "Whether an embassador, who stirreth up rebellion against the prince to whom he is sent, should enjoy the privileges of an em- bassador, and not be liable to the punishments of an enemy?" They answered, that such an embassador hath by the law of na- tions, and by the civil law of the Romans, forfeited all the privileges of an embassador, and is liable to pimishment. See the rest of the resolutions touching this matter Camden^s Eliz. sub anjio 1571. p. 164, 165. <5' ibidem p. 370. Hereupon he was committed to the Tower, but yet no criminal process against him as an enemy. [4] (c) Fahivs Amhustus. [4] See Ward's Hist. 2 vol. 486; Somers' Tracts, 1 vol. 186; 4 Inst. 153; Hawk. e. 17. 8. 5 ; Hah. 211 ; Salk. 630. It was lield in Rex v. Owen, 1 Rolle, 185, that if an am- bassador corn|)ass the king's death, it is treason in him, althougli he would not be punished for otlier treasons. Mr. Justice Foster says, that for murder and other offences of great enormity, whieh are agait)st tlie liglit of nature and the fundatneiitai laws of all society, ambassadors arc certainly liable to answer in the ordinary course of justice, as other persons offendingr in the like manner are. For tliough they may not be thought to owe allegiance to the sovereign, and so incapable of committing high treason, yet they are to be considered as members of society, and* consequently bound by that eternal, uni- versal law by which all civil societies are united and kept together. Disc. 1. s, 7. After stating the above doctrine, Blackttone says, "But however these principles might HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 98 And Mendoza, the Spanish embassador, who here in Eni^land fostered and encouraged treason, was not dealt [ 98 ] with according to the utmost severity, that possibly in such cases might be used, but^as only sent away, sub anno 21 Eliz. Camder/s Eliz. p. 2dQ. The lord U Jluhespine also, the French embassador, that conspired the queen's death, was not proceeded against criminally, but only reproved by Burghley, and advised to be more careful for the future. Camden'' s Eliz. sub anno 15S7. p. 378, 379. And upon these and some antient instances among the Romans and Carthaginians learned men have been of opinion, that an embassador is not to be punished as an enemy for traitorous con- spiracy against the prince, to whom he is sent, but is only to be remitted to the prince that sent him. Albericus Gentilis de Lega- iionibus, Lib. II. cap. 18. Grolins de Jure Belli, Lib. II. cap. 18.(/) who gives these two instances in confirmation thereof. The truth is, the business of embassadors is rather managed ac- cording to rules of prudence, and mutual concerns and temperaments among princes, where possibly a severe construction of an embas- sador's actions, and prosecutions of them by one prince may at another time return to the like disadvantage of his own agents and embassadors; and therefore they are rather temperaments measured by politic prudence and indulgence, than according to the strict rules of reason and justice; for surely conspiracies of this kind by embassadors are contrary to the trust of their employments, and may be destructive to the state whereunto they are sent, and accord- ing to true measures of justice deserve to be punished, as acts of enmity, hostility, and treachery by private persons. And altho of all hands it is admitted, that the prince, to wirom the embassador is sent, is the judge of the miscarriage of such for- eign embassador without any application to the master from whom he is sent, and without any actual dedition or giving him up to the judg- ment of the law; yet they assign this reason of the difference be- tween a bare conspiracy or machination against the prince, and an (/) in notis ad § 4. n. 5. formerly obtain, tlie general practice of this country, as well as of the rest of Europe, seems now to pursue the sentiments of the learned Groiius, that the security of ambassadors is of more importance than the punishment of a particular crime." 1 Co?n. 254. See Vatd, ZJ. 4. c. 7. The Schooner Exchange \. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, }38, and 1 Kent's Cum. 37. 38, where the learned author comes to the contilusion that an ambas- sador cannot, in any case, be made amenable to the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the country to wliich lie is sent. The Act of Congress of the 30th April, 1790, declares {srcts. 25. Sf 26.) void any writ or proces.s, whereby the person of any ambassador, or oilier public minister, their domestic or domestic servants, may be arrested or im- prisoned, or his or their goods or chattels may be distrained, seized or attached ; and subjects the parties concerned to fine and imprisonment. This Act seems to take away ail process of execation, civil as well as criminal, against the person or goods. Serg. oa Cons. 90. But if a foreign minister commits the first assault he forfeits his immunity, so far as to excuse the defendant for returning it. U. S. v. Ortega, 11 Wteal. 467. 98 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON,^. actual attempt of treason, whether against his person or [ 99 ]] government, which hath attained as great a consumma- tion as such embassador is able to effect, as procuring the wounding of the prince, or an actual attempt to poison him, tho death ensue not, or an actual raising of a rebellious army against him; because in these latter the mischief is consummate, as far as the embassador could effect it, and so prohibited not only by the civil and municipal laws, but by tlie laws of nations; but incon- sumnjate machinations, according to their opinions, are raised to the crimen Ixsx majestatis by civil or municipal laws or constitutions; and they think it too hard, that an embassador or foreign agent, who doth sustinere personayn principis, should be obnoxious to a capital punishment for bare machination or conspiracy, which is a, secret thing and of great latitude; but this, as I have said, is rather a prudential and politic consideration, and not according to the strict measure of justice. But now, altho it should be admitted that a foreign embassa- dor committing a consummate treason is not to be proceeded againsJ^ as a traitor, but as an enemy; yet if he or his associates commit any other capital offence, as rape, murder, theft, they may be indicted and proceeded against by indictment in an ordinary course of justice, as other aliens committing like offences ; for though those indictments run contra paceyn regis, yet they run not contra ligeantise siias del)i- tiim; and therefore, when in the late troubles the brother and ser- vants of the Portugal embassador committed a murder in the Ex- change,{g) they were tried and convicted by a special commission of oyer and terminer directed to two judges of the common law, some civilians, and some gentlemen, to proceed according to the ordinary course, secundum, legem (§' consuetudinem regni Angliae, whereupon some of them were convict by jury, and had judgment ; and, as I re- member, some of them were executed.(A) And yet many [ 100 ] civilians(/) allow the same privilege to the comites legati, as to the embassador himself. And the difference between proceeding against an alien (whether embassador or other) in cases of felony and treason, is well illustrated by the book of 40 ^ss. 25, where a Norman captain of a ship with the help of English mariners committed robbery and piracy upon the narrow seas ; the English pirates were convict and attaint of trea- son, (>^) but the Norman captain was attaint of felony, but not of trea- son, because it could not be said contra ligeantix sux debitum. (ff) The New Exchange in llie Strand. (h) Don Panlah'.on Sa, tlie embassador's brother, was condemned to die for it: he had like to have prevented iiis execution by makin£f iiis escape out of Newgate; but he was retaken, and belieaded on Towerhill, July 10, 1G54, tiic same day tlie embassador signed the peace between England and Portugal. (i) Dig. Lib, XLVIII. tit. G. ad leg. Jul. de vi puhlica. I. 7. Grot, de jur. Belli, Lib. II. cap. 18. § 8. . . (k) For before the 25 E. 3. piracy was petit treason. Co. P. C. 113. and tho' tijis case be quoted in the 40 E. 3. yet it must be intended to have happened before the sta- tute of 2.5 Ed. 3. because piracy, not bcin) yet in majorem cautelam it was specially repealed by the statute of 21 Jac. cap. 10. 2, The heir of the king is a king within this act the next moment after the death of his ancestor, and commenceth his reign the same day the ancestor dies; and therefore tlie compassing his death before coronation, yea before proclamation of him, is a compassing of the king's death, for he is a king presently upon the ancestor's death; and the proclamation or coronation are but honorable ceremonies(5') (Z) Vide Co. P. C. p. 6, (w) Of these statutes the first only is so limited; but the 23 H. 8, cap. 4. sect. 5, 14. and 27 Hen. S. cap. 24. sect. 10. only name the king- without the addition of his heirs and successors. 10 H. 7. 7. b. it is said by Kcble with relation to 9. H. G. cop. 2. and not denied by the court, that where a statute limits to continue so long as it shall please our lord the king, it continues in force, if no proclamation be made to the contrary in the times of that king or of any of his successors. (n) This statute comes not up to the point, because the words of it are not, our lord the king, but the king and sovereign lord of this land for the time being. Our author seems to have intended the Irish statute of 10 H. 7. called Poijning^s act, upon which act a doubt was conceived, whether it extended to the successors of H. 7. for that the act speaks only of the kin;^ generally, and not of his successors; the chief justices, chief baron, attorney and solicitor general were of opinion, that the word king imported his politic capacity, which never dies; and therefore being spoke indefinitely, extended in law to all his successors, and was so expounded by an Irish act in the 3 «.V 4 Fhil. &■ Mar. 12.Co.Rep.H)9. i J i i (o) The case in Moore relates to statutes during the pleasure of the king: the words are, " Wahnesley moved a question, whether the demise of the king determines a statute limited to continue during the king's pleasure, and the whole court agreed that the de- mise of the king determines his will." (p) The words of that statute, § 119. are, "That the king's most royal majesty shall and may, &,c. as to his most excellent wisdom and discretion shall be thouglit conveni- cnt; and also to make laws, .Slc. at his majesty's pleasure." It was resolved by the justices, nil. 5 Jac. 12 Co. Rep. 48. that this was a temporary power, and confined to the person of king //cnry VIII. Vide Plowden, 176. b. &;c. 458. a. iq) The coronation is something more than only an honourable ceremony, for it is a Bolenin engagement to govern according to law, which was always required by the 101 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. for the farther notification thereof: resolved 1 Jac. in the case of Watson and Clerk. Co. P. C. p. 7. 3. Tlie queen regent, as were queen Mary and queen EUzabethj is a king within this act.(r)[5] 4. A iiing de facto but not de Jiire,{s) such as were H. 4. H. 5. ancient constitution of the iiingdom. Brompton speaking of the coronation of W. I. says, the archbishop of York performed the office. Ipsumque Gulielmum regem ad jura eccle. sice AnglicanoB luenda Sf conservanda, populumque suum rede regendum, Sf le'/es rectus statuendum sacrumento solemniter adstrinxit; and Brad. Lib. 111. cap. 9. says, that the king of^ England debet in coronations sua in no?nine Jesu Ckristi pnestito Sacramento h(EC tria promittere populo sibi subdito, Sfc, See also 1. W. S( M. cap. 6. (r) Vide Co. P. C. p. 7. This appears by the declarative law in favour of queen Mar II, 1 Mar. cap. 1 sess. 3. (s) This distinction, which with respect to the kingly office was never known \n our law before the statute of 1 E. 4. seems to have been purposely invented to serve the turn of the house of York; nor do I find any such distinction ever mentioned or supposed in any of our ancient law-books, save only in BagoVs case, 9 E. 4. \.b. cited by our author, p. 61. for the doubt conceived by Markham, 4 E. 4. 43. a, concerning the authority of coroners chosen in the time of H. 6. was not founded (as some have supposed) on H. 6. being only king de facto, but on another point, viz. whether the demise of the crown did not determine the power of coroners, as it does the commissions of judges and other com- missioners; and as to BagoVs case, if carefully considered, it will but little serve the purpose of such a distinction, for the principal point in that case was concerning the validity of letters patent of denization granted to Bagot by H. 6. whether they were void by the act of 1 E. 4. set forth in the pleadings; this point was not argued by the judges, but by the searjeants and apprentices, 9 E. 4. 2. a. ii; will therefore be necessary to dis- tinguish the discourse of the counsel from the resolution of the court. BagoVs counsel asserted, "That all judicial acts relating to royal jurisdiction, which were not in diminution of the' crown, though done by an usurper, would nevertheless bind the king de jure upon his regress, that H. 6. was not merely an usurper, the crown having been entailed on him by parliament, that BagoVs denization was an advantage to the prince on tiie throne, for tlie more subjects he had, the better it was for him ; and they likened it to the case of recoveries suffered in a court-baron, while the disseisor was in possession, which would continue in force notwithstanding the re-entry of the dis- eeisee." This was all that could be expected for them to say, considering tliat E. 4. was then on the throne, and they were obliged to admit, that grants of the regal revenue made by H. 6. were void against E. 4. because tiie act of parliament of E. 4. which declared H. 4. H. 5. and H. 6. usurpers, vested in E. 4. all such manors, castles, honours, liberties, fran. chises, reversions, remainders, &c. and all hereditaments with their appurtenances, whatso. ever they icere, in England, Wales, and Ireland, arid in Calais, as king Richard //. hud on the feast of St. Matthew the twenty-third year of his reign in right of the crown of England and lordship o/ Ireland: all mesne grants therefore of such manors, Sfc. were by this act indisputably defeated. l^he counsel on the other side objected, *' That the letters patent of denization were void, for that the king ought not to be in a worse condition than a common person; and that if a common person were disseised and re-entered, his re-entry would defeat all mesne acts; and that therefore E. 4. being in by descent from king Richard, and this act being but an affirmance of the common law, his regress would avoid ail acts done by the usurper, for wliicii reason provision was made in that act for grants of wards, licenses of mortmains, charters of pardon, and judicial acts, but no provision was made for grants of denization ; tiiat the patent in controversy was to the disadvantage of the king, since it was not reasonable, that such an alien should be made his subject against his will, for by the same reason H. 6. might have made twenty thousand Frenchmen denizens ; that if a league was made between //. 6. and another king, it would not bind E. 4. and yet such league is intended for the advantage of the realm; that an exeniption granted by //. G. from being put ujion juries in assises, iSpn. would now be void." Here Billing the chief justice interposed and said, / do not agree to this; he added, " It pertains to every king by reason pf his f^ice to do justice and grace, justice in execu- [5] R. V. Oxford, 9 C. Sf P. 525. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 102 H. 6. /?. 3. H. 7. being in the actual possession of the crown is a king within this act, so that compassing his death is treason within this law; and therefore the 4 E.4.20. a.,{t) a person [ 103] that compassed the death of H. 6. was attainted for that trea- son in the time of the rightful king; but had it been an act of hos- tility in assistance of the rightful heir of the crown, (*) which after- wards obtained, this had not been treason, but e converso those that assisted the usurper, though in actual possession of the crown, have sutfered as traitors, as appears by the statute of 1 E. 4,(t) and as was done upon the assistants of H. G. after his temporary re-adeption of the crown in 10 ^. 4. and 49 i/. 6. 5. A king admitting by act of parliament his son in consortium imperii, as was done by H. 2. whereby there was rex pater and rex filius, only the father reserved to iiimself the lige homage or allige- ance of his subjects, yet tlie son actually administered the kingdom; • ting the laws, &c. and grace in granting pardon to felons, and such legitimation as this is." Yelverlon seemed at first to think that the denization was void, not because the regress of E. 4. avoided all mesne acts done by H. 6. but because the acl of 1 E. 4. re- sumed all liberties and franchises, and denization being a liberty was therefore resumed. The cause was adjourned, during wiiich time it was abated by the death oi Swirenden one of the plaintiffs; a new assise was brought by Bwrot, and the same matter was pleaded as before; the assise was taken, and the verdict was in fitvour of Bagot 9 E. 4. 5. the defendant's counsel moved in arrest of judgment, and Brian (who was of counsel against Ba^ol, and not one of the judges) repeated the former objection, that since E. 4. was in possession by remitter, as cousin and fieir of king Richard, the patent of deniza- tion by H. 6. who was but an usurper and intruder was void, 9 JF. 4. 11. but the justices said, that they had conferred upon all points of this case with the justices of tlie common pleas, and they were all of opinion, that those matters were not sufficient to arrest judg- ment; and accordingly judgment was given for Bagot 9 E. 4. 12. a. abridged in Br. Pa- tents 21. Denizen 'i, Chartre de Pardon 22. Exemption 4, Judgment i2. F. Assise 29. Denizen 1. _ From this state of the case it appears, that the question was entirely upon the con- struction of an act of parliament, and not upon any maxims of common laic; and tho it was said, that that act was an affirmance of the comrn'on law, yet that was only the saying oi counsel, and unsupported by any book-case or record: so that the distinction here taken by our author between a rex de facto and a rex de jure being no way war- ranted by the constitution or common law of this kingdom, all that is here said by him on that supposition must fall to the ground. {() This case is cited before by our author, p. 61. but is somewhat differently related in Sloio's Annals, p. 418. Seld. Titles of Honour, cap. 5. p. 654. (*) But who shall take upon them to determine who that is? Our author therefore prudently adds, which afterwards obtained, for this is the most effectual way of deciding questions of this nature; hut then by the same rule, if he should not obtain, such act of hostility had been treason, for it cannot be imagined, that any prince in the actual pos- session of the government will suffer his own title to be disputed, nor indeed is it fitting, that private subjects should set themselves up for judges in such an affair, whose duty it IS to pay a legal obedience to the powers that are in i'act set over them ; for the powers that be, are ordained of God. Rom. xiii. 1. This serves to show how idle the distinction is between a rex de jure and a rex de facto, which is not only founded on a precarious bottom, but also must in fact prove a distinction without a difference, being equally serviceable to all sides and parties; and thus it was iu regard of H. 6. and E. 4. who were both of them by turns declared by par- liament to be rij/hlful kings and usurpers. (t) This must have been for acts before E. 4. first obtained the crown, and therefore was wrong according to our author's own doctrine, because, as he says below, even the nghtdil heir before he has got possession of the crown is not a king within the statute of 25 £. 3. -- 103 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. the father continued a king, and a treason committed against [ 104 ] liiiii by his son or any of iiis subjects was treason within this act; and so was the son a king within this act, as in. refer- ence to all but the father, a subordinate king, that had the j.ura imperii, as the king ei Scots was after his homage done to king Edward I. and therefore compassing his death by any of his subjects had been high treason within this act, if it had been then made; for it is mistaken in lord Coke's P. C. p. 7. that H. 2. resigned his crown, for he continued still rex de facto 4* de jure, as Hoveden tells us. Vide snpra cap. 10. Having thus shewn who is a kii]g within this act, we shall the more easily see who is not a king within this act. 1. The right heir of the crown, during such time as the usurper is in plenary possession of it, and no possession thereof in the heir, is not a king within this act ;[6] such was the case of the house of York during tlie plenary possession of the crown in H. 4. H. 5, H. 6. but if the right heir had once the possession of the crown as king, though an usurper hath gotten the possession thereof, yet the other continues his style, title and claim thereuilto, and afterwards re-obtains the full possession thereof, a compassing the death of the rightful heir during that interval, is a compassing of the king's death within this act, for he continued a king still, quasi in possession of his kingdom ;[7] this was the case of E. 4. in that small interval, wherein H. 6. re-obtained the crown, and the case of E. 5. notwithstanding the usurpation of his uncle ^.3. 2. If a king voluntarily resign, as some in other countries have done, and this resignation admitted and ratified in parliament, he is not afterwards a king within tliis act;(?/) but we never had such an example in England, for that of ^. 2. was a constrained act, touch- ing which and tlie deposition of E. 2. I shall not say farther, for they were acts of great violence and oppression. Only thus much is certain, that although E. 2. had a kind £ 105] of pretended deposing, and his son E. 3. took upon him the kingly name, and office, yet in the opinion of those times E. 2. continued, as to some purposes, his regal character, for in the par- liament of 4 E. 3. Mortimer, Berisford, Guerney, and others had judgment of high treason given against them for the death of E. 2. after his deposition. Neither was this judgment grounded simply upon that old opinion (m) Tlie same reason holds in tlic case of a king-, who is deemed by parliament to have abdicated, or by actions subversive, of the cotisliliition virtually to have renounced the government; this was the case of king Jumes II. who, tho not in words, yet by acts and deeds equally expressive had renounced liolding the crown upon the terms of the constitution. .' • . -. T ■■ . ,, , • - • _ [6] A king may be kept out of the exercise of the kingly office, (as Charles II. was for twelve year.s, Ijy Croitiiiull,) and still be a king, bntli de facto and de jure; and all acts done to keep liim out are high treason. Sir Henry Vane's case, Kel. 15. Fost, 402, [7] This is denied by Foster, pp. Icti. 398. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 105 in Bn'/fo}i,{x) that killing of the king's father was treason ; for, though in some parts of that record, as in the judgment of the lords against Mortimer, the words are, Touchant le mort seigneur Ed- ward pere nostre seigneur le ,roy, qe ore est, — countes, barons, & peres, come jugges de parlement, agarderent & adjuggerent le dit Foster, come trelor & enemy de roy & de realme, feust treine & pendu; yet in other parts of that roll of parliament he is styled at the time of his murder seignior lige, and sometimes rex, as n. 6. The lords make their protestation, that they are not to judge any but their peers; yet they declare that they gave judgment upon some that were not their peers, in respect of the greatness of their crimes ; et ce per encheson de murder de seigneur lige, fyc. and in the arraignment of Thomas lord Berkele for that oifense, the words of the record are, Qualiter se velit acquietare de morte ipsius domine regis, who pleaded, Quod ipse de viorle ipsius douiini regis in nullo est inde culpabilis; and the verdict, as it was given in parlia- ment, 4 E. 3. n. 16. and the record is. Quod prsedictus Thomas iti nullo est culpabilis de m,orte prsedicti domini regis patris domini regis nunc ; so that the record styles him rex at the time of his death, and yet every one acquainted with history knows, that his son was declared king, and took upon him the kingly office, and title upon the twenty-fifth, or, according to IVulsinghani, the twentieth of January; and E. 2. was not murdered till the twenty-first oi Sep- tember following. I have been the longer in this instance, though it were before the making of the statute of 25 E. 3. when treason was determined according to the common law, that it may appear, that this judgment was not singly upon this account, that he was f 106 1 father to king E. 3. but that notwithstanding the formal deposing of him, and that pretended or extorted resignation of the crown mentioned by the histories of that age, yet they still thought the character regius remained upon him, and the murder of him was no less than high treason, namely, the killing of him who was still a king, though deprived of the actual administration of his king- dom. 3. The husband of a queen regent is not a king within this law, for the queen still holds her sovereignty entirely, as if she were sole : vide 1 Mar. cap. 2. sess. 3. and for the remedy hereof there was a special temporary act made enacting and extending treason as well to the compassing of the death of king Philip of Spain husband to queen Mary, as of the queen, and for the making of other acts against the king, as against the queen, within the compass of high treason, during the continuance of the marriage between them. 1 (§• 2 Phil. Sf' Mar. cap. 10. so that it seems, tho the husband of a queen regent be as near to him, as the wife of a king regnant, the statute Ot 25 E. 3. declaring the comi)as^ing of the death of the king's wife to be treason, did not extend to the husband of a queen regent. (y) (j:) Brit. cap. 22. Co. P. C. p. 7. (y) Co. P. C. p. 6, 7. VOL. I, — 13 106 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON,^. 4. A prorex, viceroy, custos resent, ox jiisticiorius Jlnglix, which import ill substance the same office, viz. the king's heiitenant in his absence out of the kingdom, is not a king within this act,(2) though his power be very great, and all commissions, writs and patents pass under his teste ; and the same law is touching the lord lieutenant or justitia7'it(s Hiberniae or his deputy. Vide .statu/. Hibernian. Rot.. Pari. 31 H. 6. n. 3S. 4- 39. Richard duke of York by the king's letters patent, and by consent of parliament, was constituted protector &)- defensor regni, S,' ecclesix Anglicanse S/- consiliarius regis principalis, till the full age of the prmce, or till discharged of that employment by the king in parliament by the consent of the lords spiritual and temporal; though this were a high office, and. exceeded much the power of a protector of the king during [ 107]] his minority, such as were the earl of Per)ibroke to H. 3. and the duke oi Somerset to E. 6, yet this protector was not a king within this statute, III. I come to the third division, what shall be said a compassing or imagining of the death of the king, queen, or prince. The words compass or imagine are of a great latitude. 1. They refer to the purpose or design of the mind or will, tho the purpose or design take not etfect. 2. Compassing or imagining singly of itself is an internal act, and without something to manifest it, could not possibly fall under any judicial cognizance, but of God alone; and therefore this statute requires such an overt-act, as may render the coiupassing or imagin- ing capable of a trial and sentence by human judicatories. And yet we find that other laws, as well as ours, make compassing or conspiring the death of the prince to be crimen Isesx mojestatis, though the effect be tfoi attained. Ad legem Jitliam majesiatis in Codice(«) in the law of Honorius and Arcadius, Quisquis cum militibus, vel privatis, vel barbaris sce- lestam inierit factionem, vel factionis ipsius susceperit sacramentum vel dederit, de nece etiam virorum illustrium, qui consiliis & consis- torio nostro iiUersunt, senatorum etiam (nam & ipsi pars corporis nos- trisutU,) velcujustibet postremu, qui nobis militat,cogitaverit, (eadem enim severitate voluntatem sceieris, qua etfectum, puniri jura volue- runt) ipse quidem, utpote majesiatis reus, gladio feriatur, bonis ejus omnibus fisco nostro addilis. A bare accidental hurt to the king's person, in doing a lawful act, without any design or compassing of bodily harm to the king, seems not a compassing of the king's deatli within this act. Walter Tirrcl by command of IViUiam Rufus shot at a deer; the arrow glanced from an oak, and killed the knig; Tirrcl fi'd, but i this being purely accideutal, without intention of doing tlie king any harm, hath been held not to be a compassing of the king's death. Co. P. C.p. 6. Paris ^' Hovcden anno tilt. IVillieimi secundi. Calculating of the king's nativity, or thereby or by witchcraft, &c. (2) Co. I\ C. p. 8. (a) Lib. IX. tit. 8. I. 5. pr. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 108 seeking to know, and by express words, writing, &c. publishing and declaring how long the king shall live, or who shall succeed him, or advisedly or mahciously to that intent uttering any prophecies, seems not a compassing of the king's death within the statute of 25 E. 3.{h) but was made felony during the life of queen Elizabeth by 23 Eliz. cap. 2 and before that, was only punishable by fine and ransom. Co. P. C. p. 6, Compassing the death of the king is high treason, (c) though it be not edected ; but because the compassing is only an act of the mind, and cannot of itself be tried without some overt-act to evidence it, such an overt-act is requisite to make such compassing or imagina- tion high treason. [S] Ee quo infra. IV, Therefore as to the overt-act in case of compassing the death of the king, queen, or prince. 1. Tiiough the words in the statute of 25 E. 3. and he provably thereof attaint by open deed, &c. come after the clause of levying of war, yet it refers to all the treasons before-mentioned, viz. compass- ing tlie death of the king, queen, or prince. Co. P. C. 6. 12. and therefore what is said here concerning the compassing of the death of the king is applicable to queen and prince. And therefore in an indictment of treason for compassing the death of the king, queen, or prince, there ought to be set down both the treason itself, viz. Quod preditorie compassavit & imaginatus fuit mortem & destructionem domiui regis, & ipsum dominum regem in- terficere, and also the overt-act, & ad illam nefandam & preditoriam compassationem & propositum perimplend', and then set down the particular overt-act certainly and sufficiently, without which the in- dictment is not good. Co. P. C. p. 12. 2. If men conspire the death of the king and' the manner, and thereupon provide weapons, powder, harness, poison, or [ 109 ] send letters for the execution thereof, this is an overt-act within this statute. Co. P. C.p. 12. 3. Though the conspiracy be not immediately and directly and expressly the death of the king, but the conspiracy is of something that in all probability must induce it, and the overt-act is of such a thing as must induce it ; this is an overt act to prove the compassing of the king's death, which will be better explained by the instances themselves, and therefore, 4. If men conspire to imprison the king by force and a strong hand, till he hath yielded to certain demands, and for that purpose gather company or write letters, this is an overt-act to prove the compassing (h) Even before UiA statute, viz. Hit. 18. E.2, Rot. 24. rex coram rege, there was an instance of several persons charged with endeavouring to conipass the king's death by necromancy by making his image in wax, 6fC. yet they were appealed only de felonio 6f malrjicio, and were all aequilled by the jury. (f) Insomuch that where the king is actually murdered, it is the compassing his death which is the Ueason, and not the killing, which is only an overt-act. Kel. 8. [8] Overt acts must not only show the intentions of the heart ; but they are tiie means made use of to effectuate the purposes of the heart. Fusi. 203. 109 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. of the king's death, for it is in effect to despoil him of his kingly government, and so adjudged by all the judges in the lord Cohham's case, 1 Jac.(d) and in the case of the Earl of Essex, 43 Eliz.,{e) Co. P. C. p. 12. But then there must be an overt-act to prove that con- spiracy to restrain the king, and then that overt-act to prove such a design is an overt-act to prove the compassing the death of the king. But then this must be intended of a conspiracy forcibly to detain or imprison the king; and therefore, when in the time of E. 2. in parliament a commission was somewhat hardly gotten from the king, which seemed to curb his prerogative too much, the answer of the judges to the general question, " Qualem poenam merentur illi, qui compulerunt sive arctarunt regem ad consentiendum diet' statut' ordi- nation' & commission' ? ad quam qusestionem unanimiter responde- runt, quod sunt, ut proditores, merito puniendi, ^o/. Par/. 11. R, 2."(/) was too rash and inconsiderate, and for which the judges them- selves were condemned as traitors, as before is shown ;{g) for compiil- er\inldi\'\A arctaverunt may have a double construction ; either it may be intended of an actual force used upon the person of the king, as by restraint, imprisonment, or injury to his person, to enforce [ 110 3 his consent to that commission ; and then it had not differed from the execrable treason of the Spencers, who declared, that since the king could not be reformed by suit of law, it ought to be done per aspertee, for which they were banished by two acts of parliaraent.(A) Vide 7 Co. Rep. fol. 11. in Calvin's case. 2. Or it might be intended, not of a personal compulsion upon the king, but by not granting supplies, or great persuasion or importunity, and then it could not be treason; the latter whereof was the only compulsion or arctation, which was used for the obtaining that commission. And therefore the judges that delivered that opinion, were inex- cusable in their decision of treason under such ambiguous and large expressions of cojnpulerunt <5' arctaverxini; and tho the parlia- ment of 11 R. 2. was repealed by 21 R. 2. yet that again was re- pealed 1 H. 4. cap. 3. 5. A conspiring to depose the king, and manifesting the same by some overt-act, is an overt-act to prove the compassing of the death of the king within this act of 25 E. 3. Videl Mar. B. Treason 24. {i) Co. P. C. p. 12. (d) Slate Trials, Vol. J. p. 206. (e) State Trials, Vol. I. p. 199. (/) State Trials, Vol. I. p. 9. > i) In the case of queen Katharine Howard, [17] A wife de facto until a divorce, is a queen within this statute. But after a di- rce, though it be only a mensa et thoro, she is not. Hob. 13. 3G. See 1 East, F. C. 64. VOL. I. — 15 126 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. o{ Cormvall, because not ^lius, yet, (contrary to the opinion deli- vered in the prince's case 8 Co. Rep. 30. a) H. 8. after the dearh of his brother prince v/^r//iwr, and our late king Charles, after the death of bis eldest brother prince Henry, were dukes of Cornwall in the life of their fathers: the latter appears expressly by the statute of 21 Jac. cap. 29. wherein it is so declared by judgment of parliament; and Richard of Biirdeaux was also duke of Cornwall after the death of his father the Black Prince, and comes in the catalogue of dukes of Cornwall in the collection of Fincent and Mills of the nobility of England; and had the revenues thereunto belonging, as appears undeniably. Rot. Pari. 51 E. 3. n. 65. But it seems it was not by virtue of that limitation in the grant to the Black Prince, but by a new special creation; for Rot. Pari. 50 E. 3. n. 50. the common petition, that he might be created duke of Cormvall, earl of Chester, and prince of Wales; the king declined the doing of it at their request, as being a thing proper only for the king to do his pleasure therein: the truth is, the king had done it before the request made, viz. Rot. Cart. 47, 48 c^' 49 E. 3. n. 10. the words of the charier are, '■^ Ex consilio Sc consensu prssla torn m, du- cum, comituni 4' horonurn, ipsum Ricardum principem Walliee ducem Cornubise, 8^- coniitem Cestria3 fecimus Sc creavirniis,''^ and grants him the possessions thereunto belonging, which he accordingly enjoyed: vide Rot. Pari. 51 E. 3. n. 9. and observe a certain estate is limited by the patent of creation for life; or otherwise, it seems, it was thought fit to leave it to the construction of law, whether he had it purely by a new creation, or by the construction of the charter 11 E. 2. to the Black Prince. This case therefore touching conspiring the death of such a prince, as Richard of Burdeaux then was, tho it may be probable to be treason within the intent of this act, is fittest to be first decided by parliament according to the caution used in the statute of 25 E. 3. 3. If the king of England hath two daughters only, and no son, the eldest daughter is not within tFie words or intent of the [ 127 ] king^s eldest son within this clause, for a son may be after born; but several statutes have made temporary pro- visions iu this case; vide the statutes of 25 H. 8. cap. 22. 2Q M, 8. cap. 7. It is true the implication of Co. P. C. p. 9. where it is said, "If the heir apparent be collateral heir apparent, lie is not within this statute, until it be declared by parliament," implies that the lineal heir, male or female, is within this statute. But the implication of the statute itself is against it, because this act. almost in the same breath takes notice of the king's eldest daughter upon anotlier rank of treason, namely defiling her; and it is not safe to extend this act by construction. The second daughter, living the first, is certainly not within this law, because not immediately inheritable to the crown. Yet by the statute of 25 //. 8. cap. 22. which was but temporary, provision is made, that if any thing should be written or done to the J HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 127 peril, slander or disherison of any of the issues and heirs between, him and queen Jntie, the same should be treason. Thus far touching»lie persons of the queen or prince. Now what shall be said a compassing of their death, or an overt-act to prove the same: what shall be said a compassing of the king's death, hath been at large declared, much whereof may be ap- plied to the queen or prince, but not universally; for the king is above the coercion of the law, tho his actions are not exempted from the direction of the law in many cases; but the queen and prince are subjects of the king, and subjects to the laws; whence it comes to pass, that there are certain overt-acts manifesting com- passing the king's death, which are specifical and appropriate to the king and his sovereign power and royal dignity, which are not applicable to the queen or prince. If a man compass to imprison the king, tho it be colorably done by process of law, it is a compassing of the king's death within this act, as hath been shewn. But if the queen or prince commit a misdemeanor of such a na- ture, as is a contempt against the king's laws, to which im- prisonment is proper, as in case of treason, felony, rescue, [128 ^ they may be imprisoned by process of law without danger of treason: thus was the son of Henry IV. committed by Gascoign chief justice for rescuing a prisoner from the bar; and several acts of attainder of treason have passed in parliament against some queen- consorts, as appears by 28 H. 8. cap. 7. 33 H. 8. cap. 21. against queen Catharine Howard. Rot. Pari. 5 H. 5. n. 11. Again, to compass to depose the king is treason, but to compass a divorce between the king and queen by the king's commission by due process of law was no treason, as appears in the process before the archbishop of Canterbury, whereupon queen Catherine, and afterwards queen Anne were divorced. The compassing therefore of the death of the queen or prince, which is treason within this act, is where a man without due process of law expressly compasseth the wounding or death of them either by force or poison.[18] (18] The following^ are some of the instances, under the English law, as it is laid down by the writers or decided by the cases, of what are deemed sufficient overt acts of compassing the king's death. Every thing- wilfully or deliberately done or attempted, whereby the king's life may be endangered, is an overt act of compassing his death. Fast. l;)5. Killing the king is an overt act of compassing -liis death, and was so laid in the case of the regicides of Charles I. Kel. 8. So, going armed for the purpose of kill- ing the king, R. v. Som.err.ille et al; 1 And. 104; providing arms, ammunition, poison, or the like, lor the purpose of killing the king, 3 Ins. 12; conspirators meeting and con- sulting of the means of killing the iiing, Fosl. 195, R. v. Vane, Kel. 15, R. v. Ton g el al, id. 1 / ; or of deposing him, or of usurping the powers of government, R. v. Hardy et al, I East, P. V. GO; or resolving to do it, R. v. Rookwood, 4 St. Tr. 661, R. v. Charnnck, Iff. SG"-, Salk. G31 ; acting as counsel against the king, in order to take away his life, R. V. (Jokr, Kel. 12, R. v. Harrison, 2 St. Tr. 314. So, other species of high treason, which are distinct heads of treason in themselves, may be laid as overt acts of compass- ing the death of the king; thus levying war directly against the king, Fost. 195. 210. 4i'4, Kel. .,1,3 Jnst. 12; or a conspiracy to levy war directly against the king for the purpose of detiironing him, or obliging him to change his measures, or the like, Fosf. 128 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. And thus much for treason in compassing the death of the king, queen, or prince; and because the next treason declared, namely the violation of the king's wife, the king's eldest Sten's wife, the king's eldest daughter, hath not much to be said concerning it, I shall close this chapter with it. 1. The violating; the Icing's companion, that is the king's wife, the queen consort, her husband being now living; this is liigh trea- son, and so it is in her if she consent. P. 28 H. 8. 33 H. 8. cap. 21. Co. P. C. p. 9. 2. The wife of the king's eldest son and heir, a princess consort, and during the coverture between them; and if she consent, it is treason in her. 3. The king^s eldest daughter not married: this extends to a second daughter, the eldest being dead; for she is now eldest, and, for want of issue male, inheritable to the crown; but at common law this treason extended to any of the daughters. Briton, cap. 22. §. 11. It extends to an eldest daughter, tho there be sons ; and qudere, whe- ther to an eldest daughter, that hath been married, and is now a widow, nient marry may be construed either way; or if it [^ 129 ] doth, yet whether it extends to an eldest daughter, that is a widow, and hath children by her husband; the words of the old books are avant ceo, qel est marry: it seems, that if the eldest daughter hath been once married, she is not within this law, because of tiie words nient marry, tho the reason may possibly be the same ; and it seems, tho there be sons, yet the violating of the king's eldest daughter, being within the express words of the law, the violation of her is within this law, because within the words; and yet the viola- tion of the wife of the king's second son is not within this statute, yet he and his issue is inheritable to the crown before the eldest daughter ; in this case therefore the words of the law are to govern. Altho it should seem probable, that the eldest son of the prince after the death of his father may be the king's eldest son within this act, as is before observed ; yet the daughter of the king's eldest daughter, after her mother's death, seems not an eldest daughter 197. 211, R. V. Friend, 4 Si. Tr. 599, R. v. Darrell, 10 Mod. 321, R. v. Layer, 4 St. Tr. 229. 332. R. v. Campion et al. Saville, 3, R. v. Lord Russel, 3 St. Tr. 705. R. v. Sydney, 3 St. Tr. 807. R. v. Cook, 4 St. Tr. 737. (But not a conspiracy to eftect a general rising for the purpose of throwinjSf down all enclosures, &c. or of any otlier species of construc- tive levying of war. Fast, 213, per Holt, C. J., Holt, 682. 10 Mod. 322.) Adhering to the king's enemies, Fast. li)(), R v. Harding, 2 Vcntr. 315, R. v. Liird Preston, 4 St. Tr. 410, R. V. Stoup, 6 7'. R. 527; inciting foreigners to invade the realm. Fost. 196. R. v. Parkyns, 4 St. Tr. 627. Writings which import a compassing of the king's death, are suflicient overt acts of this species of treason, if pubhshed, Fost. 198, 1 Hawk. c. 17, s. 31 ; as for instance, writings inciting persons to kill the king. R. v. Tioyn, Kel. 22. Sqe I'yne^s case, Cro. Car. 1 17. So, words of advice or persuasion arc sutficient overt acts of this species of treason, if they advise or persuade to an act which would of itself (if comniitted) be a sufficient overt act. Fost. 195. R. v. Charnock, 4 iS7. Tr. 562. Salk. 631. So, words may be laid in the indictment, to cx[)lain an act; as for instance, an act seem- ingly innocent in itself^ may he shown to be an act of treason, by its connexion with words spoken by the party at the time. R. v. Crohugan, Cro. Car. 332. R. v. Lee, 7 St. Tr. 43. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 129 within this act, her grandfather being Hving, for the grandson, who is heir apparent of the crown, is of more consideration than the daughter of a daughter, who cannot be heir apparent, because a son may be born. Quxre, Whether violating the eldest daughter, after the death of the king her father, be treason within this act, where a son succeeds to the crown : it seems not, for the relatioti is ceased.(c) And thus far for the two first branches of high treason. CHAPTER XIV. [ 130 ] CONCERNING LEVYING OF WAR AGAINST THE KING. The JKs ^ladii, both military and civil, is one of the j^ira mojes- tatisy and therefore no man can levy war within this kingdom with- out the king's commission. Co. P. C. p. 9. See the statute, or rather proclamation(tf) de defensione portandi armo, wherein it is recited by the king, that the prelates, earls, barons, and commonalty illueque asembles en evisement sur cest besoigne nous eiont dit, que a nous appent (§• de nous par nostre royal seignorie defendre^fort- ment des armes, 4* de tout\iulre force contre nostre pees, a touts lesfoitz, que nous plerra ;{b) and hence it is in all declarations and indictments touching things done against the peace, the conclusion goes contra pacem domini regis. It is true, there have been great disputes in this kingdom touching the disposition of the militia o{ \h\s kingdom, which are now all set- tled, and declared to be the right of the crown by the statutes of 13 Car. 2. cap. 6, and 13 & 14 Car. 2. cap. 3.[1] •(c) She is no longer leigne file le roy. It having been before observed that a queen regent is a king within this act, it follows of course that the eldest son and eldest daugh- ter of such a queen is likewise within it. Co. P. C. p. 8. (a) In the seventh year of Edward I. {b) This statute is only a proof of the king's power to issue his proclamation against coming armed to the parliament. Vide Rot. Pari. 25 E. 3. pars. I. n. 58. dorso. [1] By the Constitution of the United States, Art. 1, Sect. 8, Congress shall have power to provide for the calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress in- surrections, and repel invasions : To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the mihtia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the Liiited States ; reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Con- gress. Accordingly the following acts of Congress for the establishment of an uniform system for the government of the militia, have been passed: An Act more eftectualiy to provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States; May 8, 1792, ch. 33. An Act providing arms for the militia throughout the United States, July G, 1798, ch. 65. An Act in addition to an Act entitled, "An Act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United Slates,'' March 2, 1803, eh. 15. An Act more effectually to pro- vivle for the organizing of the mihtia of the Districtof Columbia, March 3, 1803, ch. 28. An Act establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United 130 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. Now as to this clause of high treason, Ou si home levy guerre coiintre. noslre seigneur le roy en son realme. To make a treason within this clause of this statute there must be three things concurring, I. It must be a levying of war. II. It must be a levying of war against the king. III. It must be a levying of war against the king in his realm. I. For the first of these, the act saith levy guerre; what shall be said a levying of war, is in truth a question of fact, and re- \_ 131 3 quires many circumstances to give it. that denomination, which may be difficult to enumerate or to define ; and com- monly is expressed by the words more guerrino arraiati. As where people are assembled in great numbers armed with weapons offensive, or weapons of war, if tliey march thus armed in a body, if they have chosen commanders or officers, if they march cum vexillis explicatis or with drums or trumpets, and the like ; whether the greatness of their numbers, and their continuance together doing these acts may not amount to more guerrino arraiati, may be con- siderable. • But a bare conspiracy or consultations of persons to levy a war, and to provide weapons for that purpose ; this, tho it may in some eases amount to an overt-act of compassing the king's death, yet it is not a levying of war within this clause of this statute ; and therefore there have been many temporary acts of parliament to make such a conspiracy to levy war treason during the life of the prince, as 13 Eliz. cap. 1. 13 Car. 2, cap. 1. and others. Vide accordant Co. P. c.p. 10. Again, the actual assembling of many rioters in great numbers to do unlawful acts if it be not modo guerrino or in specie belli, as if they have no military arms, nor march or continue together in the posture of war, may make a great riot, yet doth not always amount to a levying of war : vide statute 3 4' 4 J5?. 6. cap. 5. 1 Mar. cap. 12.(C)[2J (c) See also 1 Geo. 1 cap. 5. States, April 10, 1806, ch. 20. An Act in addition to the Act entitled, "An Act to pro- vide for calling forth the militia to execute tlie laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and to re])eal the Act now in force for these purposes," April 18, 1814, ch, 82. An Act coticernin3 & 4 ^. 6. cap. 5. " If any to the number of twelve shall intend, go about, practise, or put in ure by force to alter the religion establiyhed by law, or any other laws, and depart (e) Co. P. C.p. d. Kelyng.p. 19. [4] Post. 219, bamaree's case, 8 St. Tr. 218. Purchase's case, id. 267. 4 Bl. C'om.'&i. Mr. Luders iirfres that none of tlicso acts can be treason by a fair construction of tiie Slat. 25 Edw. 3. p. &2 el seq. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 133 not within an hour after proclamation, or after that shall wilfully in a forcible manner attempt to put in ure the things above specified, then it is high treason." If men levy war to break prisons to deliver one or more particular persons out of prison, wherein they are lawfully imprisoned, unless such as are imprisoned for treason; this upon advice [ 134 ] of the judges upon a special verdict found at the Old Bailey, was ruled not to be high treason, but only a great riot 1668, but if it were to break prisons, or deliver persons generally out of prison, this is treason, Co. P. C. p. 9. There was a special verdict found at the Old Bailey, anno 20 Car. II.,(/) that ^. B. and C. with divers persons to the number of an hundred assembled themselves rnodo gnerrino to pull down bawdy- houses, and that they marched with a flag upon a staff, and weapons, and pulled down certain houses in prosecution of their conspiracy: this by all the judges assembled, except one, (o-) was ruled to be levy- ing of war, and so high treason within this statute ; and accordingly they were executed. But the reason that made the doubt to him that doubted it, was 1. Because it seemed but an unruly company of apprentices, among whom that custom of pulling down bawdy-houses had long obtained, and therefore was usually repressed by officers, and not punished as traitors. 2. Because the finding to pull down bawdy-houses might reasonably be intended two or three particular bawdy-houses, and the indefinite expression should not in materia odioscl be construed either universally or generally. And 3. Because the statute of 1 Mar. cap. 12. though now discontinued makes assemblies of above twelve per- sons and of as high a nature only felony, and that not without a con- tinuance together an hour after proclamation made; as namely an assembly to pull down bawdy-houses, burn mills or bays, or to abate the rents of any manors, lands or tenements, or the price of victuals, corn or grain ; or if any person shall ring a bell, beat a drum, or sound a trumpet, and thereby raise above the muiiber of twelve for the pur- poses aforesaid, which are raised accordingly and do the fact, and dissolve not within an hour after proclamation, or that shall convey money, harness, artillery, it is enacted to be felony ; and if any above the number of' two, and under twelve, do practise with force of arms unlawfully, and of their own authority to kill any of the queen's subjects, to dig up pales, throw down inclosures of parks, pull down any house, mill, or burn any stack of corn, or [ 135 1 abate rents of manors, lands or tenements, or price of corn or victual, and do not depart within an hour. after proclamation, and continue to attempt to do or put in ure any of the things above- mentioned, they are to have a year's imprisonment. And the statute of 3 & 4 E. 6. cap. 5. is to the same purpose, only if the number of forty, or above, come together to do such acts as (/) V\de Kehpg, p. 70. ^-c. ig) Tliis was our author himself. Vide Kelyng, 75. VOL. I. — 16 135 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. before, or any other felonious, rebellious, or traiterous acts, and con- tinue together two hours, it is made high treason. (A) But yet the greater opinion obtained, as it was fit; and these ap- prentices had judgment, and some of them were executed, as for high treason. Yet this use may be made of those statutes : 1. That there may be several riots of a great and notorious nature, which yet amount not to high treason. 2. But again, those acts and attempts possibly might not be general, but might be directed only to some particular instances, as for the purpose not to pulldown all houses or mills, but some spe- cial ones, wliich they thought offensive to them; nor to abate the rents of all manors, but of some particular manor, whereof they were tenants; nor to make a general abatement of the prices of victuals or corn, but in some particular market, or within some precinct; and so crosseth not the general learning before given of constructive treason. 3. It seems by that act also, they did not take the bare assembly to that intent to be a sufficient overt-act of levying of war; that was but an attempt and putting in ure, unless they had actually begun the execution of that intention, going aboiU, practising or putting in ure; for this act puts a difference between the same and the doing thereof. In the parliament of 20 E. 1. now printed in Mr. Ryley.p. 77. it appears there arose a private quarrel between the earls of Gloucester and Hereford, two great lords marchers; and hereupon divers of the earl of Gloucester's party with his consent cum multitudine r 136 1 tam equiium quam peditum exierunt de terra ipsius comitis de Morgannon cum vexillo de armis ipsius comitis expli- cato versus terram comitis Heref de Brecknock, & ingressi fuerunt terram illam per spatium duarum leucarum, & iilam deprsedati fue- runt, & bona ilia depra3data usque in terram dicti comitis Glocestrix adduxerunt, and killed many, and burnt houses and committed divers outrages; and the like was done by the earl of Hereford and his party upon the earl of Gloucester: they endeavoured to excuse them- selves by certain customs between the lords marchers; by the judg- ment of the lords in parliament their royal franchise' were seised as forfeited during their lives, and they committed to prison, till ran- somed at the king's pleasure. Altho here was really a war levied between these two earls, yet in as much as it was upon a private quarrel between them, it was only a great riot and contempt, and no levying of war against the king; and so neither at common law, nor within. the statute o{ 25 E. 3. if it had been then made, was it high treason. It appears by IValsingham sub anno 1403. a great rebellion was raised against Henry W. by Henry Percy son of the earl o[ North- timberland and others: the earl gathered a great force, and actually took part with neither, but marched with his force, as some thought, towards his son, and, as others thought, towards the kiugpro redinte- (/t) See also 1 Geo. I. cap. 5. HISTORIA PLACITORUM COROx\.^. 136 grando pacts negolio; he was hindered in his march by the earl of fFesfmorehind and returned to his house at fVerkworth; the king had the victory; the earl petitioned the king; the whole fact was examined in parliament, Rot. Pari. 5 H. 4. n. 12. The king de- manded the opinion of the judges and his counsel touching it: the lords protest the judgment belongs in this case to them; the lords by the king's command take the business into examination, and upon view of the statute of 25 E. 3. and the statute of Liveries " Adjuge- rent, qe ceo, qe fuit fait par le counte, nest pas treason, ne felony, raes trespass tantsolement, pur quel trespass le dit counte deust faire fine & ransom a volunte du roy ;" but Henry the son was attaint of treason. It appears not what the reason of that judgment was, whether they thought it only a compassing to levy war, and P 137 ~\ no war actually levied by him, because not actually joined with his son; or whether they thought his intention was only to come to the king to mediate peace, and not to levy a war, nor to do him any bodily harm; that it was indeed an offense in him to raise an army without the king's commission, but not an offense, of high treason, because it did not appear that he raised arms to oppose the king, but possibly to assist him; but whatever was the reason of it, it was a very mild and gentle judgment, for the earl was doubtful of a more severe judgment : no?«, he returns thanks to the lords and commons de lour bone &)- entyre coers a lui monslre, and thanks the king for liis grace.- The clause in the statute of 25 E. 3. If any man ride armed covertly or secretly with men of arms against any other to slay, rob, or take him, or to detain him, till he hath made fine or ransom, or have his deliverance, it is not in the mind of the king or his council, that in such case it shall be judged treason, but shall be judged »felony or trespass according to the laws of the land of old times used, and according as the case requireth; and if in such case or-other like(«) before this time any judges have judged treason, and for this cause the lands and tenements have come to the king's hands as for- feited, the chief lords of the fee shall have the escheat. This declares the law, that a riding armed with men of arms upon a private quarrel or design against a common person is not a levying of war against the king ;(/t) and the especial reason of the express (i) Vide simile H. 26. E. 3. coram re.ge. Rot. 30. Rex. Hale. This case was in the county of Essex, and was no more than this; Sir John Fitzwau- ter and IVilliam Baltrip, his steward, . [7] Fost. 218. Vaughan's case, 5 St, Tr. 17. Salt. G31. I HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 144 war within this act; and by the name of levying of war it must be expressed in the indictment. Co. P. C. p. 10. And in Anderson'' s Rep. part 2 n. 2. after Trinity-term 37 Eliz.{x) before the two chief justices, master of the rolls, baron Clerk and Efvens, the case was, that divers apprentices of London and South- wark were committed to prison for riots, and for making proclamation concerning the prices of victuals, some whereof were sentenced in the star-chamber to be set in the pillory and whipt; after which divers other apprentices and one Grant of Uxbridge conspire to take and deliver those apprentices out of ward, to kill the mayor of London, and to burn his hoiise, and to break open two houses near the Tower, where there were divers weapons and arms for three hundred men, and there to furnish themselves with weapons; after which divers apprentices devised libels, moving others to take part with them in their cLevices, and to assemble themselves at Bun- [ 145 l AzV/and Tower-hill ; and accordingly divers assembled them- selves at Bun-hill, and three hundred at the Tower, where they had a trumpet, and one that held a cloak upon a pole in lieu of a flag, and in going towards the lord mayor's house the sheriffs and sword- bearer with others otfered to resist them, against whom the appren- tices offered violence. And it was agreed by the judges referees, that this was treason wiihin the statute of 13 Eliz. for intending to levy war against the queen; for they held, that if any do intend to levy war for any thing, that the queen by her laws or justice ought or may do in government as queen, that shall be intended a levying of war against the queen; and it is not material, that they intended no ill to the person of the queen, but if intended against the office and authority of the queen, to levy war, this is within the words and intent of the statute, and hereupon Grant and divers others were indicted and executed. And eodem libro n. 49. (y) the case of Burton mentioned by my lord Coke, P. C.p. 10. is reported, viz. in the county of Oxford di- vers persons conspire to assemble themselves, and move others to rise and pull down inclosures, and to effect it they determined to go to the lord Norris's house and others, to take their arms, horses, and other things, and to kill divers gentlemen, and thence to go to Lofi- don, where they said many would take their parts ; and this appeared by their confessions: and it was agreed, 1. That this was treason within the statute of 13 Eliz. for conspiring to levy war against the queen. 2. But not within the statute of 25 E. 3. because no war was levied, and that statute extended not to a conspiracy to levy war. ^ota; in both these cases there was a conspiring to arm them- selves as well as to assemble, which had they effected and so assem- bled viore guerrino, it had been a war levied, atid by construction and interpretation a war levied against the queen. If any with weapons invasive or defensive doth hold and f 146 "l defend a castle or fort against the king and his power, this is (r) 2 And. 4. (j,) 2 And. 66. VOL. I. — 17 146 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. a levying of war against the king within this act. Co. P. C. p. 10. Vide the statute 13 Eliz. cup. 1 <§• dicta ibid postea. There is a great difference hetween an insurrection upon the ac- count of a civil interest and a levying of war.[S] ,/^. recovers possession against B. of a house, &c. in a real action, or in an ejectione Jirrnx, and a writ of seisin or possession goes to the sheriff, B. holds his house against the slierilf with force, and as- sembles persons with weapons for that purpose, who keep the house with a strong hand against the sheriff, tho assisted with the pofise coniitatus: this is no treason either in B. or his accomj)lices, but only a great riot and misdemeanor; the like is to be said touching a man that keeps possession against a restitution upon an indictment of for- cible entry. But if B. either fortifies his own house or the house of r *142 1 another with weapons defensive or invasive purposely to make head against the king and to secure himself against the king's regal army or forces, then that is a levying of war against the king. But the bare detaining of the king's castles or ships seems no levy- ing of war within this statute: vide infra 13 Eliz. cap. 1 <§- dicta ^■6^V/e7n.[9] If the king's lieutenant in a time of hostility or rebellion within the realm be assaulted upon their march or in their quarters as enemies, this is a levying of war; but if upon some sudden falling out or in- jury done by the soldiers, the countrymen rise upon them and drive them out, this may be a great riot, and if any be killed by the assail- ants it is felony in them ; but this seems not a levying of war against the king, unless there be some traitorous design under the cover of it : and clans. 26 E. 3. mx. 24. it appears, that an open resistance of the justices of oyer and terminer in the county of Surrey, viz. re- sistendo justiciariis, & ipsos justiciarios, quo minus contenta in coni- missione nostra eis inde facta exequi & facere potuerunt, impediendo, was felony, and the offenders were executed for the same as felons. I shall conclude this matter with a consultation of the [ *143 ] judges, where I was present. All the judges except J. Windham and J. Atkins were assembled by my lord keeper, September 1675. to consider of this case, as it was stated in writing by the attorney general in manner following: " A great number of the weavers in and about London being offended at the engine-looms (which are instruments, that have been used above these sixty years,) because thereby one man can do as much in a day, as near twenty men without them, and by consequence can afford his ribbands at a much cheaper rate, after attempts in parlia- ment and elsewhere to suppress them did agree among themselves to .rise and go from house to house to take and destroy the engine- [8] Crirryinjj off or destroyiiifj tiic kinfr's stores, provided for the defence of the king'- dom, if done in eonjunclioii witit, or in aid of rebels or enemies, will he treason; but Scots, ifdorie only lor lucre, or some jtrivatc malicious motive. 1 East., V. C. 66. ['.)] '-That case is denied," per Mnrshall, C. J. 2 Burr's Trial, 224. It is denied by East, 1'. C. 1 vol. 68. Sec also Fast, 2VJ. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. ^143 looms; in pursuance of which they did on the 9th, 10th, and 11th of this instant v^up;ust assemhle themselves in great numbers at some places to an Imndred, at others to four hundred, and at others, particularly at St nil ford- Bow to about fifteen hundred. *' Thev did in a most violent manner break open the houses of many of the king's subjects, in which such engine-looms were, or were by them suspected to be, they took away the engines, and making great fires burnt the same, and not only the looms, but in many places the ribbands made thereby, and several other goods of the persons whose houses they broke open; this they did not in one place only, but in several places and counties, viz. Middlesex, London, Essex, Kent, and Sitrrei/, in the last of which, viz. at Southwark tliey stormed the house of one Thomas Byhhy, and tho they were resisted and one of them killed and another wounded, yet at last they forced their way in, took away his looms and burnt them ; the value of the damage they did, is computed to several thousand pounds. <' This they did after several proclamations made and command given by the justices of peace and the sheriffs of Middlesex to de- part, but instead of obeying they resisted and affronted the magistrates and officers: It is true they had no war- [*144] like arms, but that was supplied by their number, and they had such weapons, as such a rabble could get, as staves, clubs, sledges, hammers, and other such instruments to force open doors. "There was this further evil attending this insurrection, that the soldiers and officers of the militia were so far from doing their duty in suppressing them, that some, tho in arms and drawn up in com- panies, stood still looking on while their neighbours houses were broken open and their goods destroyed, others incouraged them, and others, to whose custody some of the oflenders, who were taken, were committed, suffered them to escape, so that during all the time of the tumult little or nothing was done to suppress them, until the lords of the council were constrained at a time extraordinary to assemble, by whose directions and orders as well to the civil magis- trates, as to the king's guards, they were at last quieted." Five of the judges seemed to be of opinion that this was treason witliin the act of 25 E. 3. upon the clause of levying war against the king, or at least upon the clause of the statute of 13 Car. 2. cap. l.[10.] 1. In respect of the manner of their assembling, who, tho they had no weapons or ensigns of war, yet their multitudes supplied that defect, being able to do that by their multitudes, which a lesser num- ber of armed men might scarce be able to effect by their weapons; and besides, they had staves, and clubs, and some hammers or sledges to break open houses, and accordingly they acted by break- ing open doors and burning the engine-looms and many of the wares made by them. 2, In respect of the design itself, which was to burn and destroy [10] Fost. 210. *144 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. not the single engine-looms of this or that particniar person, but engine-looms in general, and that not in one county only, [[*1453 hut in sev^eral comities, and so agreeable to Burton's case. The other five jndges were not satisfied, that this was treason within the clause of 25 E. 3. against levying of war, nor within the statute of 13 Car. 2. for conspiring to levy war. 1. It was agreed, thai if men assemble together and consult to raise a force inmiediately or directly against the king's persoji, or to restrain or depose him, whether the number of the persons were more or less, or whether armed or unarmed, tho this were not a trea- son within this clause of the statute of 25 E. 3. yet it was treason within the first clause of compassing the king's death, and an overt- act sufficient to make good such an indictment, tho no war was ac- tually levied; and with this accord the resolutions before cited, especiahy that of the insurrection in the north at Farley wood;(*) but no such conspiracy or compassing appears in this case, and so that is not now in question, but we are only upon a point of con- structive or interpretative levying of war. 2. Here is nothing in this case of any conspiring to do any thing, but what they really and fully effected; they agreed to rise in multi- tudes to burn the looms, and accordingly they did it, but nothing of conspiring against the safety of the king's person, or to arm them- selves; therefore if what they did were not a levying of war against the king within the statute of 25 E. 3. here appears no conspiring to levy such war within the statute of 13 Car. 2. cap. 1. for, for what appears, all was done, which they conspired to do. 3. It seemed very doubtful to them, whether in the manner of this assembling it was any levying of war, or whether it were more than a riot, for in all indictments of this kind for levying af war r*146l it is laid, that they were more guerrino arraiati, and upon the evidence, that they were assembled in a posture of war nrmis offensivis <5' de/ensivis, and sometimes particular circum- stances also proved or found, as banners, trumpets, drums, &c. and where they were indicted for conspiring only to levy war, yet there was this circumstance accompanied it, viz. a confederacy to get arms and arm themselves, as in GranVs case, and Burlon^s case. 4. It seemed very doubtful to them, whether this design to burn engine-looms were such a design, as would make it a levying of wax against the king,*[ll] for it was not like the designs of altering (*) Vide supra p. 120. * By 12 Geo. 1. cap. '.H. "If any person shall wilfully break any tools used in the •wodlleii manufacture, not having- the consent of the owner, or shall break or enter by force into any liousc or shop by night or by day for such purpose, he shall be adjudged guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. [11] By the 7^8 Geo. 4. c. 30. «. 3. it is made felony, punishable with transportation tfr ini[>risonment, to damage or destroy any silk, woolen, linen, or cotton goods, being in the loom or frame, &c. or to destroy or damage any loom, frame, machine, &c. or to enter by forCe into any house, shop, building, &c. with intent to commit any of the said ofFencoH. R. V. Tacey, R. Sf R. C. C. 452. R. v. Hill, id. 483. R. v. Ashton, 2 B. ^ Ad. 750. niSTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. *146 relision, laws, pulling down inclosures generally, as in Biirton^s case, nor to destroy any trade, but only a particular quarrel and grievance between men of the same trade against a particular engine, that they thought a grievance to them, which, tho it was an enor- mous riot, yet it would be difficult to make it treason. Vide statutes S H. 6. cap. 27. 9 H. 6. cnp. 5.(t) Many of them therefore concluded, that if Mr. Attorney should think fit to proceed as for a treason, the matter might be specially found and so left to farther advice, or rather that according to the clause of the statute of 25 E. 3. the declarative judgment of the king and both houses of parliament might be had, because it was a new case and materially differed from other cases of like nature formerly resolved. Upon the conclusion of this debate we all departed, and Mr. Attor- ney upon consideration of the whole matter, it seems, thought fit to pi-oceed for a riot, and caused many of them to be indicted for riots, for which they were convicted and had great fines set upon them, and were committed in execution and adjudged to stand upon the pillory. Touching the laws of treason in Ireland, by the statute of [ 147 j IS H. 6. cap. 3. levying horse or foot upon the king's sub- jects against their will shall be treason ; this they call cessing of sol- diers upon men, and hath been often done by the lieutenants or deputies of Ireland by consent of the council in some cases. Among many cumulative treasons charged upon the late earl of Strafford the king's deputy in Ireland, this one thing of cessing of soldiers upon the king's subjects in Ireland was the chief particular treason charged upon him. It was insisted upon for the earl's defence, that by the statute of 10 H. 7. in Ireland, cap. 22. called Foyninsi's law, all the statutes of England are at once enacted to be observed in Ireland; and there- fore the statute of 25 E. 3. declaring treasons, and the statute of 1 H. 4. cap. 10. enacting, that nothing shall be treason but what was with- in that statute, the treasons enacted in Ireland in the time of H. 6. and afterwards before 10 H. 7. were repealed, and consequently this statute of 18 H. 6. cap. 3. But that seems not to be so, for the general introduction of the statutes of England being an affirmative law could not be intended to take away those particular statutes, that were made in Ireland for the declaring of treason, as this and that also of the same year, cap. 2. for taking Comericke.{z) But surely this was no levying of war within this statute, (a) either in respect -of the matter itself or of the person that did it, he being (+) Concerning the riots committed by the Welsh upon the dragmen of Severn, vide infra, p. 151. (z) That is, for taking thieves, robbers, or rebels into safe guard. (a) Tho this were not levying of war, yet being cessing of soldiers upon the subject, it was treason within the express words of that statute; nor does our author assign any reason, why an act of lord deputy and council is not within tlie penally of thut law. See Camd.Eliz.p.2ld. 147 HISTORTA PLACITORUM CORONJE. the king's lieutenant, neither could an act by the lord deputy and council of this nature be construed to be within the penalty of this act, if it were in force ; yet for this and other cumulative treasons he was attainted by act of parliament, but that attainder was very justly repealed by the statute of 14 Car. 2. Now I shall draw out some observations and conclusions [ 148 ] from the precedents and instances before given touching this ■' . obscure clause of levying war against the king. 1. A conspiracy or confederacy to levy war against the king is not a levying of war within this clause of the statute of 25 E. 3. for this clause requires a war actually levied. Co. 1\ C. p. 10. And this appears j^/-^/ by those temporary laws, that were made to continue during the king's or queen's life, which made conspiring to levy war with an overt act evidencing such conspiracy to be treason, as the statutes of I S,- 2 Ph. 8,^ M. cap. 10. 13 Eliz. cap. 1. and 13 Car. 2. cap. 1. and secondly by the resolution of the judges in the case oi Burton 39 Eliz. cited by my lord Coke, P. C.p. 9, 10.[12] 2. That yet such a conspiracy or compassing to levy war against the king directly or against his forces, and meeting and consulting for the eflecting of it, whether the number of the conspirators be more or less, or disguised under any other pretence whatsoever, as of re- formation of abuses, casting down inclosures particular or generally, nay of wrestling, football-playing, cock-fighting; yet if it can appear, that they consulted or resolved to raise a power immediately against the king, or the liberty or safety of his person, this congregating of people for this intent, tho no war be actually levied, is an overt-act to maintain an indictment, for compassing the king's death within the first clause of the statute of 25 E. 3. for it is a kind of natural or necessary consequence, that he, that attempts to subdue and conquer the king, cannot intend less than the taking away his life; and indeed it hath been always the miserable consequence of such a conquest, as is witnessed by the miserable tragedies of E. 2. and B. 2. and this was the case of Oldcastle and Essex. 3. That yet conspiring to levy war, {viz. to do such an act, which if it were accomplished and attained its end would be an actual levy- ing of war) and being accompanied with an overt-act evidencing it, (tho it be not treason within this clause of the act of 25 E. 3.) yet was treason during the queen's life by the statute of 13 [ 149 ] Eliz. cap. 1. and is treason at this day by the statute of 13 Car. 2. cap. 1. during the life of our now sovereign. But then the overt-act (be it speaking, writing, or acting) required by these statutes to evidence the same must be specially laid in the ilidictment, and proved upon the evidence : thus in Grant's case and JJnrlon's case the conspiring to fetch arms at the houses therein mentioned Was an overt-act proving this conspiracy to levy war. 4. That a levying of war with all the circumstances imaginable io [12] And the Act of 3G Geo. 3. c. 7. whicli was to continue in force during the king's life. niSTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 149 eive it that denotinnation, as cum vexiUis explicating cum mnliitu^ dine i^enlium armatarum &," modo guerrino arraiaC, yet if it be upon a mere private quarrel between private, tho great persons, or to throw down the inclosures of such a manor or park, where the party tho without title claims a common, or upon dispute concerning the propriety of liberties or franchises, this, tho it be in the manner of it a levying of war, yet it is not a levying of war against the king, ttio bloodshed or burning of houses ensue in that attempt, but is a great riot, for which the oftenders ought to be fined and imprison- ed ;[13] and if any be killed by the rioters in the riot, it may be murder in the assailant. This was the case of the earls of Gloucester and Hereford, anno 20 £. 1. tho before the statute of 25 E. 3. and the several great riots above-mentioned, to which we may add Rot. Pari. 50 E. 3. n. 140, 164. 11 H. 4. n. 36, 57. 13 ^. 4. n. 14. IS H. 6. n. 30. 5. An actual levying of war therefore against tlie king to make a treason, for which the offender may be indicted upon this clause of the statute for levying of war against the king, consists of two princi- pal parts or ingredients, viz. 1. It must be a levying of war. 2. It must be a levying of war against the king. 6. What shall be said a levying of war is partly a question of fact, for it is not every unlawful or riotous assembly of many persons to do an unlawful act, tho de facto they commit the act they intend, that makes a levying of war, for then every riot would be trea- son, and all the acts against riotous and unlawful assem- (] 150 ~\ blies, as 13 ^. 4. cap. 7. 2 H. 5. cap. 8. 8 H. 6. cap. 14. and many more(6) had been vain and needless; but it must be such an assembly as carries with it specieni belli, as if they ride or march vexillis explicatis, or if they be formed into companies, or furnished with military officers, or if they are armed with military weapons, as swords, guns, bills, halberds, pikes, and are so circumstanced, that it may be reasonably concluded they are in a posture of war, whicli circumstances are so various, that it is hard to define them all par- ticularly. Only the general expression in all the indictments of this nature, that I have seen, are more guerrino arraiati, and sometimes other particulars added as the fact will bear, as cum vexillis explicatis, cum armis defensivis 4* offensivis, cum tympanis Sf tuhis: but altho it be a question of fact, whether war be levied or conspired to be levied, which depends upon evidence, yet some overt-act nuist be shewn in the indictment, upon which the court may judge ; and this is usually modo guerrino arraiati, ov armati, ox conspirmg to get arms to arm themselves. And tlierefore in the cases of Burton and Grant before-men- tioned, who were indicted and convicted upon the statute of 13 Eliz. (6) See 3 <^ 4 Edw. VI. cap. 5. 1 Mar. cap. 12. 1 Geo. I. cap. 5. [13] Post. 210. Havok. c. 17. s. 25. ]50 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. cap. 1. for conspiring to levy war for pulling down inclosnres, &c. tiiere is not only a conspiracy to do (he thing, but also to gain arms and weapons at the lord Norri&'s house, and elsewhere to arm them- selves lor that attempt. And the reason hereof seems to be, because, when an assembly of people thus arm themselves, it is a plain evidence, that they mean to defend themselves, and make good their attempts by a military force, and to resist and subdue all power, that shall be used to suppress them; and besides, the very use of weapons by such an assembly without the king's licence, unless in some lawful and special cases, carries a terror with it, and a presumption of warlike force^ and therefore under a distinct and special restraint by the sta- [ 151 ] tute of Wtstminst. 2.(c) and the statute(fi^) of 7 E. 1. de defensione portandi arma. 7. Whether the bare assembling of an enormous multitude for doing of these unlawful acts without any weapons, or being tnore giierrino arraiati, especially in case of interpretative or construc- tive levying of war, be a sufficient overt-act to make a levying of war within this act, especially if they commit some of these acts themselves, is very considerable and seems to me doubtful. 1. Be- cause I have not known any such case ruled. 2. Because the acts of 3 & 4 Ed. 6. cap. 5. and 1 Mar. cap. 12. (which must be intended of such unarmed assemblies) makes it in some cases felony, in some cases only misdemeanor. 3, Because it is very difficult to determine what that number must be, that must make treason, and less than which must be only a riot ; this therefore should be well considered, and the direction of the statute of 25 E. 3. to expect the declaration of parliament in like cases is a safe direct-ion, and so much the rather, because the statutes of E. 6. and queen Mary seem to look the other way,(f') to which may be added the great riots committed by the foresters and Welsh upon the dragmen of Severn, hewing all their boats to pieces, and drowning the bargemen in a warlike pos- ture. Rot. Pari. 8 H. 6. n. 30, 45. 9 H. 6. n. 37. upon which the statute of 9 H. 6. cap. 5. was made : I forbear therefore any opinion herein. S. But whether the assembly were greater or less, or armed or not armed, yet if the design were directly against the king, as to do him bodily harm, to imprison, to restrain him, or to offer any force or violence to him, it will be treason within the first clause of com- passing the king's death, and this assembling and consulting or practising together to this purpose, tho of but two or three, will be an overt-act to prove it; therefore all the question will be [ 152 3 only touching interpretative or constructive levying of war, whereof hereafter. (c) I don't find any tliinp to tliis purpose in tlic statute of Westminst. 2. so suppose the btiitutc here meant is llic statute of Nortliamplun 2 E. 3. caj). 3. wliercby it is pro- hiliitcd that any one briiiQ; forrc in aflVay of the people, or go armed by night or by day. See Co. J'. C. p. 158 Sf ] t;(). F. N. li. p. 552. (d) Or rallier jjroelumalion ; see the beginnihg of this chapter, (c) As docs also 1 Geo. I. cap. 5. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 152 9. If there be war levied as is above declared, viz. an assembly more !^uerri?io arrciiati, and so in the posture of war for any trea- sonable attempt ; this is helium levatiim, tho not helium percussurn : and thus far touching the levying of war, as in relation to the man- ner of it. 10. But besides the circumstances requisite to denominate a levy- ing of war in respect to the manner of it, there is also requisite to make a treason witliin this clause, that it be a levying of war against the king, which is the scope, end and termination thereof, for, as hath been said, there may be a levying of war between private per- sons upon private quarrels, which is not a levying of war against the king, and so not treason within this clause of this act. 11. A levying of war against the king therefore is of two kinds, either expressly and directly, or by way of interpretation, construc- tion or exposition of this act : the former is, when a war is levied against the person of the king, or against his general, or army by him appointed, or to do the king any bodily harm, or to imprison him, or to restrain him of his liberty, or to get him into their power, or to enforce him to put away his ministers, or to depose him; many instances of this kind may be given, such as was in truth the riding of the earl of Essex into London armed with swords and pistols, his solliciting of the citizens to go with him to court to remove from the queen her ministers and counsellors, his fortifying of his house against the queen's officers, which were in truth a levying of war, tho his indictment was upon the first clause of compassing the queen's death, which was more clearly included within these actions. 12. Constructive or interpretative levying of war is not so much against the king's person, as against his government: if men as- semble together 97iore guet-rino to kill one of his majesty's privy council, this hath been ruled to be levying of war against the king. P. 16 Car. 1. Cro. 583. Betisted's case before cited, and accord- ingly was the resolution of the house of lords 17 B. 2. Talbot's case above-mentioned. So in the case mentioned by my lord Coke in the time of H. 8. Co. P. C. p. 10. levying war against the statute of riSS"] L(ibotirers[l4'\ and to itihance servants wages was a levy- ing of war against the king; and altho levying of war to demolish some pari icular inclosures is not a levying of war against the king, Co. P. C.p. 9. yet if it be to alter religion established by law, or to go from town to town generally to cast down inclosures, or to (\e- liver generally out of prison persons lawfully imprisoned, this hath been held to be levying of war against the king within this act, and the conspiring to levy war for tliose purposes treason within that clause of the act of 13 Eliz. cap. 1. as was resolved in Barton's case and Grant's case above-mentioned ; and the like resolution [14] Hatch, c. 17. s. 25. Fosf. 211. Lord Georfie Gordon's case, 21. CobhetCs St. Tr. 485. Douirl. 590. 4 lil. Com. bl. VOL. I. — IS 153 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. was in the case of the apprentices that assembled more guerrino to pull down bawdy-houses. It is considerable how these resolutions stand with the judgment of parliament in 3 & 4 Ed. G. cap. 12. which makes special provi- sions to make assemblies above twelve to alter the laws and statutes of tlie kingdom, or the religion established by law, or if above forty- assemble for pulling down inclosures, burning of houses, or stacks of corn, treason, if they departed not to their homes witliin an hour after proclamation, or after proclamation put any of these designs in practice, which is nevertheless reduced to felony within clergy by the statute of 1 Mar. sess. 2. cap. 12. Th^se oifenses being the same with those adjudged treason in Burfon's case and some others be- fore cited, why was it thought necessary for an act of parliament 3 S,' 4 Ed. 6. to make it treason under certain qualifications, and why reduced to felony within clergy by the statute of 1 Mar. cap. 12. and the statute of 3 ^ 4 ^. 6. repealed? It seems that altho the unlaw- ful ends of these assemblies thus punished by 3 4' 4 Ed. 6. and 1 3'Iar. were much the same with those of Burlon and Grant and others, that were adjudged treason, yet the difterence between the cases stood not in that, but in the manner of their assembly; those that w-ere adjudged treasons in Burton's and Grant's case were, because it was a conspiracy to arm themselves and levy a war more guerrino. But those, that were thus heightened to treason by 3 8; A r 154 ] E. 6. and reduced to felony by 1 Mar. were not intended of such, as were more giiei'inno arraiati, dov a levying of war, tho their multitudes were often great, and tho they they did put in lire the things they conspired to effect, and so were but great riots and not levying war within this clause of 25 E. 3. and therefore those acts inflicted a new and farther punishment on them. III. Efi son realme : hitherto it hath been said what is a levying of war ; we are now to consider the place. En son realme. The realm of England comprehends the narrow seas, and there- fore if a war be levied upon those seas, as if any of the king's sub- jects hostily invade any of the king's ships, (which are so many royal castles) this is a levying of war within his realm, for the nar- row seas are of the ligeance of the crown of England : vide Seldeni Mare clansum. And this may be tried in the county next adjacent to the coast by an indictment taken by the jurors for that county before special com- missioners o{ oyer and terminer, de quo vide infra, ^\\& in tlie chap- ter of piracy : vide 5 R. 2. Trial 54. It is true, before the statute of 28 H. 8. cap. 15. those treasons were usually inijuircd and tried by special connihssion, wherein the admiral and his lieutenant were named, as likewise other felonies conmiitted upon the sea. lint divers instances were in the time of E. 3. whereby such oflenses upon the sea were punished as treason or felony in the king's bench. 40 ^Iss. 25. A Norman captain of a ship robs the king's HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 154 subjects upon the sea, he being taken was hanged as a felon, but the English that assisted him were drawn and hanged as traitors ; and by the statute of 2S H. 8. cap. 15. there is a direction of a special commission to try them in such counties or places as shall be assign- ed by such commission according to the method of trials of such offenses at the common law, but before that statute they might be tried by special commission at the common law, and according to the course of the common law ; but of this alibi in tractatu de ^dmiruUtale. For treasons and other capital offenses in Scotland there is a provision made by the statute of 4 Jac. cap. 1 and 7 Jac. [ 155 ]] cap. 1. Ireland, tho part of the dominions of the crown of England, yet is no part of the realm of England, nor infra quatuor mar la, as hath been ruled temp. E. 1. Morrice Howard'' s case : the like is to be said for Scotland even while it was under the power of the crown of England, as it was in sometimes of E. 1. and some part of the time of E. 3. S Rich. 2. Continual claim 13. For Ireland hath the same laws for treason that England, tho it hath some more ; yet for a levying war, or other treason in Ireland the offender may be tried here in England by the statute of 35 H. Q. cap. 2. for treasons done out of the realm, as was resolved in the case of 0-Rork, H. 33. Eliz.{*) and after that in Sir John Perrot's case,(/) Co. P. C.p. 11. 7 Co. Rep. Calvin's case, 23. a. In the case of the lord Macguire{g) an Irish peer, who was in- dicted in Middlesex for high treason for levying war again the king in Ireland, he pleaded to the indictment, that he was one of the peers and lords of parliament in Ireland, and demanded judgment, if he should be arraigned in England for a treason committed in Ireland, whereby he should lose the benefit of trial by his peers; but it was resolved, 1. That for a treason in Ireland a man may be tried here in England by the statute of 35 H. 8. for it is a treason committed out of the realm. 2. That altho Macguire, if tried in Ireland for his treason, should have had his trial by his peers, as one of the lords in parliament, which he cannot have here, but must be tried by a common jury, yet that altered not the case; he was therefore put upon his trial by a Middlesex jury, and was convicted and had judgment, and was executed. H. 20 Car. 1. B. R. so that the opinion 20 Eliz. Dy. 360. b. was ruled no law : vide Co. Lift. 261. And the same that is said of Ireland may be said in all particulars of the isle o{ Man, Jersey, Guernsey, Surk, and [ 156 ] ^Ilderney, which are parcel of the dominions of the crown of England, but not within the realm of England as to this purpose concerning treason ; yet they have special laws of their own appli- cable to criminals and jurisdiction for their trials : as touching treason conmiitted in fVales before the statute of 26 H. S. cap. 6. no treason, ( * ) Camd. Eliz. p. 458. (/) See his trial in Stale Tr. Vol. I. p. 181. (£•) State Tr. Vol. I. p. 928. 156 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. murder, or felony committed in fFa/es was inquirable or triable be- fore commissioners of o?/er and teinniner, or in the king's bench in England, but before justices or commissioners assigned by the king in those counties of Wales where the fact was committed. P. 2 H. 4. Rot. 18. Salop'': ^'■Johannes Kynaston indictatus fuit quod ipse con- sentiens fuit ad falsam & proditiosam insurrectionem Oweyn Glyn- dour & aliorum fVallicoriirn, & sciens de toto proposito eorundem, qui proditiose combussernnt villas de Glyndour Dyiiby, &c. & quod, proditiose misit Johannem iilium sunm bene armatum & arraiatum pro guerra & IVillielmum Hunte sagittarium ad prsedictum Oweyn & exercitum JVallicorum, &c. dicit quod prsedictaB villse, in quibus supponitur proditiones pra3dictas factas fuisse, sunt infra terrani fValllae & extra corpus com' Salop' & legem terras Ans^lisa, unde non intendit quod dominus rex de proditionibus prgedictis in hoc casu ipsum impetire velit, sen ipsum ponere velit inde responsurum, & quia plenarie & certitudinaliter testificatum est, quod proedictge villiB sunt infra terram Wallix & extra corpus comitates Salop' & legem terra3 Angliae, & Thomas Covele attornatus ipsius regis coram ipso rege inde examinatus hoc non dedicit, & sic justiciarii ad inquiren- dum de proditionibus prsedictis infra IValliam factis virtute com- missionis pra3dictse inquirere minime potuerunt nee proditiones prae- dicias sic in terra /^Fa/Z/c-e fact a3 per legem terrse ./^//^//a? triari nee terminari possunt, consideratum est, quod quoad prasdictas pro- ditiones praidictus Johannes Kynaston eat inde quietus, &c." But it is true by the statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 6. counterfeiting of coin, washing,clipping or minishing of the same, felonies, murders, wilful burnings of houses, manslaugliters, robberies, burglaries, rapes, and accessaries of the same and other oifenses feloniously done \_ 157 ] iu Wales,{h) or any lordship marcher may be inquired of, heard and determined before the justices of gaol-delivery and of the peace and every of them in the next adjacent county : this act is confirmed by the great statute of Wales 34 & 35 H. 8. cap. 2-6. which settles the grand sessions and justices thereof, and gives the jus- tices of the grand sessions power to hold all manner of pleas of the crown, and to hear and determine all treasons, felonies, &c. within the precinct of their commissions, as fully as the court of king's bench may do in their places within the realm of England; so that as to those offenses enumerated in the statute of 26 //. 8. the justices of gaol-delivery in the adjacent counties, viz Gloucester, Hereford, Salop and Wigorn, had thereby a concurrent jurisdiction with the justices of the grand session. (/) But whether the statute of 26 //. S. extended to treason for com- passing the king's death or levying of war,(/L') or whether the same (/() For this act extends to all the anticnt counties of Wales, as well as the lordships marchers; and so it was resolved in Althoc's case for a murder in Pembrokeshire. T. 9 Geo. I. B. R. (i) 1 Mod. G4, 68. {k) It should seem that it did not, and that was one reason of making the statute of 32 H. cap. 4. whcrehy all treasons or misprisons of treasons cominitted in Wales may be presented and tried in such shires and hefore such commissioners as the king shall appoint, in like manner as if the facts had been committed in such sliires. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 157 remained only triable by the justices of the grand sessions, seems doubtful, and the rather, because that statute is not construed by equity, and therefore it extends not to an appeal of murder in an ad- jacent county, and so it was adjudged Hil. 7 Cur. B. R. Senllrj and Price;{l) but at this day 26 H. S. cup. 6. stands repealed by 1 & 2 Ph. & M. cup. 10. as to the trials of treason. (m) It is true, that in other criminal causes, that are not capital, as in cases of indictments of riots, they may he removed by certioruri into the king's bench, and when issue is joined they may be tried in the next Eii'j^lish county, T. 16 Juc. Sir John Cureid's case(/i) and divers others, as well as in a q\w minus, whicii is at tlie king's suit : but whether a certioruri lies into Wales upon an f 158 1 indictment of treason or felony hath been doubted M. 9 Car. B. R. Chedley^s case:(o) it seems a certiorari may issue for a special purpiose, as to quash the indictment for insufficiency or to plead his pardon, but not as to trial of the fact,(/7) hut it shall be Sent down by mittimus according to the statute of 6 H. 8 cap. 6. be- cause it is in a manner essential for felony or treason to be tried in the proper county, unless where a statute particularly enables it, which it did in the case of 26 H. 8. only whilst it was in force, where the indictment as well as the trial is in the adjacent county. But certainly IVules is within the kingdom of England,{cj) and therefore not within the statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 2. for trial of foreign treasons. If a felony or treason be committed in Durham, a certiorari lies to remove it into the king's bench out of Durham directed to the justices of peace, ojiyer and terminer, or gaol-delivery there; for since the statute of 27 H. 8. cap. 24. they are all made by the king's com- mission, and so the proceedings before them are his own suit, and thus it was done in Ruttabie^s case(r) upon debate; but if the party plead not guilty it shall be sent down thither to be tried, as was done in that case. T. 1653. They o{ Durhum claim a privilege not to be sworn out of the precinct of the county palatine. Vide the statute of 2 H. 5. cap. 5. 9 //. 5. cap. 7. \\ H. 7. cap. 9. for treasons and felonies in Tinda I and Hexamshire.il 5] (') Cro. Car. 247. W. Jones 255. ('") The I & 2 Ph. Sf M. reducing all trials for treason to the order and course of the common law is a virtual repeal of 26 H. 8. and by the same reason of 32 H. 8. also as to treason. in) Cro. Jac. 484. 2 Rol. 28. 1 Rol. Abr. 394. (0) Crp. Car. 331. (p) But yet it has been done in felony as to the trial of the fact, as in the case of Morris 1 Ven. 93, 146. Herbert's case, Latch. 12. (7) 2 Rol. 28. (r) Vide infra, p. 467. and Part U.p. 212. [15] As to the place at which the accused is to be tried, the Constitution of tlie United Stales, (Art. 3. Sect. 2, c. 3.) provides that the trial sliiill be held in the Slate where the crime shall have been commilled; but, when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as Congress may by law have directed. By sect. 2'Jth of the .\ct ofCongrcss of24, quae ad ipsum pertinet, de onmimodis feloniis & transgres- sionibus, iStc. jam per tres annos in prisona regis steterint oceasione pra?dicta &, non aHa causa, dictum est quod deliberet cos, &c. &. ipsi cant inde quieti, &e. Et carta illacanoollutur in cur." Mirh. 11 E.2 B. R. Rot. 156. Heref. from hence it appears that the judgment alterwards in Leake's case 4 Jac. 1. was agreeable to the antient resolu- tions. {k) This is the case of Philip Burden, but is by no means similar to that of John de Bosco, ioi this was a direct actual counterfeiting of the great seal: vide infra in notis. 181 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. It appears not, whether it were a writ under the great seal r 181 ] or a judicial writ of some court, but whether it were the one or the other, it seems to be capital, for he had the benefit of clergy, which in those times was allowable in some cases of trea- son ; so that it seems a counterfeiting of any of the king's seals was felony at common law, but whether it so continues, notwithstanding the statute of 25 E. 3. hath degraded jt from treason, unless it be the great Or privy seal, shall be farther examined. II. Having thus considered the seals, it remains to consider what shall be said a counterfeiting of the great or privy seal. [4] A conspiracy or compassing to counterfeit the great or privy seal is not a counterfeiting nor treason within this act, for it must be an actual counterfeiting. Co. P. C.p. 15. A taking the great seal off from a true patent and clapping it on a forged patent in former times hath been held high treason ; in 40 ^ss. 33. it is plainly held to be high treason, (tho my lord Coke{l) saith otherwise) for the woman, that did it, could not be let to main- prise, which if it had been only a great misprision, she had been bail- able upon that indictment.(m) • 2 H. 25. which is entered H. 2. H. 4. B. R. Rot. 16. Midd. Cle- ment Petitson^s case, the taking off the true seal from one patent and fixing it to a forged patent is adjudged high treason; yet the judgment is only quod distrahatur 4' suspendatur, which is the judgment in petit treason. This case and the reporting of it is disliked by my lord Coke P. C. p. I5.;{n) but Stanf. PL C. p. 3. seems to agree with this resolution. See also another case to this purpose for counterfeiting the privy seal, Rot. part. Q. E.'H. part. 2. m. 18. '' John de Redynpes was arraigned and tried coram senescallo & mares- callo hospitii domini regis pro contrafactionc privati sigilli domini re^is, & pro quibus- dam litteris prisdlcto sigillo controfactis [contrafacto] consignalis cum co inventis," and being found guilty had judgment, "Quod pro pra;dicta seducione [seditione] sit dctrac- ' tus, (fc pro manuopcre cum sigillo prcedicto postea suspensus.". Vide Rylcifs Flacita Parluinenturia, p. 542 — 545. (/) Co. P. C.p. 115. (m) This argument of our author is very far from being conclusive, for by the statute o{ Westtn. 1. cap. 15. where the offense is open and manifest (which for what ajjpoars was tlic case here) the ofiender is not bailable, altho it were only a misprision. 2 Co. insM88, 189. (n) And well it might be, for that case appears by the record to have been thus: ^^ Clement I'eijlenyn was indicted, quod contraiccit magimm sigillum domini regis failso & malitiose &, proditoiic, & cum dicto sigillo sic contrafacto quasdam liieras, quro pre- sent' pra;dict' sunt consul', sigill'. he jjleads not guilty, the jury find, quod quoad con- Iratactioncm sigilli prajdicti idem Clemens in nullo est culpabilis, sed dicuut, quod idem Clemens falso &, dcccptoric dfe. in deceptionem populi de assensu aliorum de covinq. sua [4] Neither the Congress of the United States, nor the legislature of the Common- wealth have as yet declared the bare counterfeiting the public seal of the federal or state government, to be an offence, of itself But if such seal were used in the counterfeiting or forging any certificate, indent, or other public security, to which a. seal was by law necessary to be nflixcd, it might bring the offence under the laws which respect coun- terfeits and forgeries. Act of (congress, April .30, 17!)(). ch. 19. set.t. 14. L(iws of Virg. 1794. ch. 13.'}. sict. 3. 4 Ttickrr''s lU. Com. 83. Several of the States have passed laws against counterfeiting the seals of the Stale, courts, &,c. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 182 But the later authorities are against it, and that it is only a great misprision and offense, but not high treason, no nor yet felony, as it seems by the book hereafter cited. 37 //. S. B. Treason 3. A chaplain taking a goOd seal off from an. old patent, and fixing it to a forged dispensation of non-residence no treason, but only a great misprision punishable by fine and imprison- ment. H. 4 Jac. cited by lord Coke, P. C. p. 16. Leakeys case, who joined two parchments together with glew so close, that it could not be dis- cerned, and put a label through both, and on the one a true patent granted, which passed the seal, and then afterwards upon the other parchment wrote a forged patent, then he cut off the true patent and published the other as a true patent; this was ruled by the advice of all the judges, 1. That this was no counterfeiting of the great seal, nor treason within this act. 2. But if it had been a counterfeiting of the seal, he might have been generally indicted of treason for coun- terfeiting the great seal, but it was ruled to be a great misprision ot offense, but not high treason ; and with this opinion agrees my lord Cuke, and it is the safer and later opinion and fit to be followed. If the patentee of the king, of lands under the great seal, faze the name of one of the manors and make it another name, this is not counterfeiting of the seal nor treason within this sta- [ 183 ] tute, but a great oflense or misprision, for which the abbot of Bnier was sentenced before the king and his council, and the abbot delivered up the charter to be cancelled. Claus. 42 E. 3. m. 8. dors. Co. P. C. p. 16. If the chancellor or keeper affix the great seal to a charter without warraut, tho this be a misdemeanor in him, it is not treason within this statute, tho Britton and Fleta uhi supra make it treason at common law ; and altho it should be supposed treason at common law, but not comprised within the statute, yet it is not now felony; therefore the rule taken 3 H. 7. 10. that those treasons at common law, which are not within the declaration of 25 E. 3, yet remain 'felony, is not true, as might be made appear by many instances. scribi fecit, & finxit literas illas pendi fecit sigillum magnum domini regis, quod antea pendebat super aliam magnain patentam domini regis. Si. sigillum dominii regis praedic- tura subtiliter &l private consui fecit super literas falsas prsedictas, & illas falsas literas una cum sigiUo domini regis prcedicto in diversis partibus regni AngliiB tanquam veras literas pateiitcs, prout eapdem litcrce faciunt mentionem, usus est & exercebat in decep- tioiiem domini regis & populi sui ; propter quod pro eo, quod curia non avisatur, quale judicium praidictus Clemens in hac parte subire debeat, remittitur prisonao marescli' : Afterwards in the Easter term next following, viso indictamento necnon veredicto prse- dictis videtur curiiE liic, quod fal-sse literjE prsedictfe sic in deceptionem domini regis & populi sui facta; & sigillatag, una cum usu &- exercitio earundem, alta proditio sunt, con- sideratum est, quod praedictus Clemens Feyteni/n distrahatur &. suspendatur." This mvst be owned to be a very extraordinary case, for as lord Coke justly observes, whatever offcQso this were, yet this judgment ought not to have been given upon this verdict, for the jury had ex))ressly acquitted him oT the offense charged in the iudictment ; not to mention, that it is directly contrary to the case above-mentioned of Geoffrey de Hunlyn. ) But altho it were proditoril and so applied to treason, it was not a treason of so deep a die, as that of compassing the king's death, adhering to the king's enemies, ^r levying war, which strikes at the head, and therefore in comparison thereof it was a kind of petit treason. Clans. 6 Johan. M. 12. doi^s. " Scias quod dedimus Jldsed^o, Essex clerico nostro pro servito sno omnia terras, tenementa & jura, quae fuerunt JVilliehni de Siriibby, cujus terrae & tenementa sunt eschaeta nostra per feloniam, quam fecit de falsificatione figilli nostri." Et nota the king had the escheat, yet the offense was styled felony. At the parliament 18 E. 1. Co. P. C. p. 16. Clergy was allowed to a man convict pro falsificatione sigilti regis, deliberatur ordi- nario,{q) but in tali casti non admittenda est purgatio ; and yet in these greater cases of treason of levying war or [ 186 ] compassing the king's death clergy was not allowed at com- mon law. T. 21 E. 3. B. R. Rot. 23. Rex.{r) (p) Co. P. C. p. 15. (9) This is confirmed by Philip Burton's case, (P. 18 E.2. B. R. Rot. 25. Rex South') who together with Richard de Bourne was indicted Quod nequiter & seditiose contra- fecit figillum de metallo ad modum inagrii figilli regis, de quo quidem figillo contratacto diversa brcvia quarnplurima eonsignavit; he pleads quod clericus est, the jury find him • guilty de feloniu Sf seditione prccdicfis ei imposilis, and lie was thereupon delivered to his ordinary, tanquam clericus convictus, from hence it appears that at common law clergy was allowed in cases of treason, where it was not inmicdiately against the king's person. (r) That case was thus, Peter de Thorpe son of John de Thorpe was indicted, and afterwards outlawed anno 18 E. 3. pro diversis feloniis 6f seditionibus, viz. going to little Yarmouth and Gorleston cum tribus vexillis exteusis in modum guerrcc, breaking open houses there, feloniously taking away goods there, &fc. and also five ships, " Quae pra;parat8B crant de victualibus &. aliis necessariis eundi cum domino rcge in guerra fua, &.C. Altcrwards coram regc ([Uiesitum est a prajfato Pelro, si quid pro so habeat vel diccre scial, quare ad executioncm judicii de eo super utlagaria praidicta procedi non dcbeat, &,c. Qui dicit, quod clericus est &. membrura sacra) ecclesia?, &,c. Et quiBsitum 186 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. M. 1. E. 3. Charter de Pardon I3.(f) A man arraigned for counterfeiting the king's seal pleaded a charter of pardon of all felo- nies, arjd it was allowed ; yet there it is agreed, that the judgment for such an ofjense is, that he shall be drawn and hanged, but such a pardon will not serve in such a case since the statute of 25 E. 3. Trin. 10 E. 2. Rot. 132. B. R. Bucks. " Boberius Legat k Johannes Salecok per ballivos coram rege ducti ad respondendum domino regi de hoc, quod ipsi cum aliis ignotis in pleno mercato villse de Olneye, cum quadam falsa commissione & ficta cum quodam sigillo regis controfacto signata, quam ballivi in curia regis hie por- rexerunt, asserentes, illam super eos inveniri die, quo attachiati fuerunt & dicentes, quod virtute illius commissionis prisas fecerunt ad opus domini regis, usque ad summam sexaginta besliarum, de quibus quatuor bestir inventae fuerunt in eorum possessione & cum eis hie ductse ; they both plead not guilty ; the jury find John Sale- cok guilty de falsitatibus & feloniis praedictis, judgment given against him pro falsitatesigilli regis & commissione praedictis quod detrahatur & pro furtiva abduclione prasdictarum besliarum suspendatur." Nota, an arraignment of treason without indictment upon r 187 ] the 7nainouer[t) found upon them: vide P. 21 E. 3. B. R. Rot. 46. Midd'' Rex. According to the old books above-mentioned, Fleta, ^-c. ubi st(pra,dis(rohi debet &; siispendi ; and so it was practised in the case of 2 H. 4. above-mentioned, where the judgment is only (//■?- Irahi Sf suspendi. And it may be reasonably argued, that as in the case of counter- feiting the king's coin, which was a treason at common law, tho it be so declared by the statute of 25 E. 3. yet the judgment, that wa^ at common law, which was only to be drawn and hanged, is not altered by that statute. M. 10 Car. B. R. iMorgan's case ;(«/) so in case of counterfeiting the seal ; but at this day the law is generally held, that for counterfeiting of the great or privy seal, or of the privy signet or sign manual, the judgment is to be hanged, beheaded and quartered, as in other high treasons, and so was the judgment in the case of 16 Jac. above-mentioned; and it is safest to follow the modern practice in judgments of high treason, tho I think it no error, if the judgment be only guod distrahatur (5* snspendatur according to the antient precedents, because the judgment is still capital, and tho it be less, than the highest judgment in treason, yet it is still included in it.[5] est scepius ab eo, si qnid aliud velit dicere pro responsione in rctardationem judicii, &c. Qui dicit, ut prius, &i, niliil aliud rcspondet, &-c. Et inspcctis indictamentis praedictis, &i, etiam recordo &- j)rocessu utiagar' pricdictre; manifestiE compcrtuin est in cisdem,quod utlagar' prtedicta nuper arliculo sedilionis proniulgatur, in quo casu prtedictus Petrus privilegio cicricali gaudere non potest secundum legem & consactudinem regni, &c. Ideo idem I'elrus distrahatur & suspendatur, &,c." (s) 1 E. 3. 23. b. - • (/) See for this kind of arraignment, 7 H. 4. 43. b. S. P. C. 148. c. 2 Co. Instit. 188. (u) Cro. Car. 383. [5] The Statutes of treason relating to the great seal, privy seal, privy signet, sign manuul, &c. have all been repealed by the H Geo. 4. ^T 1 Will. 4. c. 66. s. 2. by which HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. 187 it is enacted, " That if any person shall forge, or counterfeit, or shall utter, knowing the same to be forged, or counterfeited, the great seal of the united kingdom, his majesty's privy seal, any privy signet of his majesty, his majesty's royal sigft manuel, any of his majesty's seals appointed by the twenty-fourth article of the union, to be kept, used, and continued in Scotland, tiie great seal of Ireland, every such offender shall be guilty of high treason, and shall suffer death accordingly; provided always, that nothing contained in an act passed in the seventh year of the reign of King \¥illia?n the Third, entitled, ■' An act for regulating of trials incases of treason and misprision of treason,' or in an act passed in the seventh year of the reign of Queen ylnJie, entitled, ' An act for improving the union of the two kingdoms,' shall extend to any indictment, or to any proceedings thereupon, for any of the treasons herein before mentioned." The 7 Will. 4. <^ 1 Vict. c. 84. s. 1. after reciting the enactments of the 11 Geo. 4. Sf 1 Will. 4. c. 66. enacts, " That if any person shall after the commencement of this act, be convicted of any of the offences herein before mentioned, such person shall not suffer death, or have sentence of death awarded against him for the same, but shall be liable at the discretion of the court, to be transported beyond the seas for life, or for any term not less than seven years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding four years nor less tlian two years." CHAPTER XVII.[l] [ 188 ] CONCERNING HIGH TREASON IN COUNTERFEITING THE KING's COIN, AND IN THE FIR.ST PLACE TOUCHING THE HISTORY OF THE C0IN[2] AND COINAGE OF ENGLAND. The legitimation of money and the giving it its denominated value is justly reckoned ijiter jura majestuf is, and in England it is one special part of \he king's prerogative. [1] The law as it is written in the ensuing chapters, which treat of treasons relating to the coin, has undergone very great alterations by a late Act of Parliament. Milder and more suitable punishments have been attached to these offences, and the guilt of treason has in every instance, been taken away from them. They now range under the heads of felony and misdemeanor; which seems to be the proper classification; and the one adopted by the old law writers, in whose treatises they always rank as a species of \\i& crimen falsi. See 4 Bl. Com. 88. But there still remains a great deal of curious and useful information untouched by the provisions of this Act. The statute alluded to is the 2 Will. 4. c. 34. which repeals wholly or in part the undermentioned statutes relating to the coin. {Statutes wholly repealed.) Stat, de Moneta vulgo. 21 Edw. 1. Stats. 4. 5. Sf 6. 27 Edw. 1. Stat. 1. 9 Edw. 3. Stat. 2. 17 Edw. 3. 25 Edw. 3. Stat. 5. c. 12. Sf 13. 3 Hen. 5 Stat. 2. c. 6. Sf 7. 19 Hen. 7. c. 5. 5 t^ 6 Edw. 6. c. 19. 1 Mar. Stat. 2. c. 6. 1 P. ^ M. c. 11. 5 Eliz. c. 11. 14 Eliz. c. 3. 18 Eliz. c. 1. 8. Sf 9. Will. 3. c. 26. 9. Sf 10. Will. 3. c. 21. 1 Ann. Stat. 1. c. 9. 15 Geo. 2. c. 28. 11 Geo. 3. c. 40. 13 Geo. 3. c. 71. 7 Geo. 4. c. 9. (Statvteg partially repealed.) 18 Edw. 3. Stat. 1. 25 Edw. 3. Stat. 5. e. 2. (the famous statute of treasons: repealed as far as regards the coin) 27 Edw. 3. Stat. 2. c. 14. 6 Sf 7 Will. 3. c. 17. 7 Ann. c. 24. 7 Ann. c. 25. 37 Geo. 3. c. 126. 56 Geo. 3. c. 68. 3 Geo. 4. c. 114. It repeals the following Scotch Acts relating to the coin. 6 Pari. Jac. 2. 5 Pari. Jac. 3. 8 Pari. Jac. 3. 7 Pari. Jac. 5. 7 Pari. Jac. 5. 9 Pari. Mary. 1 Pari. Jac. 6. 1 Pari. Will. And also these Irish Acts. 3 Edw. 4. c. 3. 28 Eliz. c. 6. 8 Ann. 6. 23 Sf 24 Geo. 3. c. 50. 26 Geo. 3. c. 39. The principal provisions of the 2 Will. 4. will be found in their appropriate places throughout these pages. [2] Coin, in French, signifieth a corner, and from thence hath its name, because in ancient times money was square as it is in some countries to this day. 1 Ins. 207. 188 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. Before I enter into the particulars concerning money I will give a history or narrative of the various states and conditions and changes of money in the several ages of this kingdom, and then shall descend to some more particular observations, which will be useful in this business. [3] Money is the common measure of all commerce almost through the world; it consists principally of three parts; 1. The material^ whereof it is made. 2. The denomination or extrinsic value. 3. The impression or stamp. I. The material in England is either pure silver, or pure gold, whereof possibly some money was antiently made here in England, or else silver or gold mixed with an allay, which was usually and is hitherto a small proportion of copper. The standard of the money of England, that hath for many ages obtained, is that, which is commonly called Sterling{a) gold or Sler- ling silver, for tho the denomination o{ Sterling was at first applied to the coin of silver and to that coin, which was the penny \_ 189 ] commonly called Slerlingus, yet use huth made it af)plica- ble not only to all kind of English coin of silver, but also to coin of gold, and this is called the standard of coin. But before this can.be well understood, we must make some digression touching the measures applicable to these materials. In silver the measure or weights applicable thereunto are princi- pally these: 1. The pound, which being not averdupois, but troy weight, con- sists of twelve ounces. 2. The ounce consisting of twenty penny weight. 3. The penny, or Sterling, consisting of thirty-two grains of wheat taken out of the middle of the ear. This is the old compositiomensurariiniseii\ed in the time o{ E. \.{b) viz., quud denarius Jlnglix, qui denominatur Sterlingus rotundus, sine tonsura ponderabit triginta duo grana frumenti medio spicse, & viginti denarii faciunt unciam, & duodecim uncise faciunt libram, & octo librEG faciunt gallonem, & octo gallones busselum.(c) Arid it is to be remembered, that at that time a penny did really weigh the twentieth part of an ounce of silver, and twenty pennies did really weigh an ounce of silver, and two hundred and forty pence (n) Some imafrinc tliis word to come from the town of Sterling in Scotland, where they protend tlic purest money was formerly made; otlicrs that it is derived from the Sdxou word Stcore, which signifies rule or standard; others that it was taken from some Flemish workmen, wlio in the reign of I\in E. 1. m. 6. quod pro qualibet libra pollar dor um una marca Sterlingorum solvitur ad Scaccarium: they were both decried in the 28 E. l.{u) Vide Dy. SI. This rate oi Sterling cow- tinued during some time of Edward II. {q) William of Newbury writes tlius under the reign of king Stephen, Erant in Anglia qundammodo tot rcises vel potius tijranni quot doviini castelloruTn,habente8 singuli ptrcui- suram pioprii numismntis. (r) iSee Wilk. Leir.Ucnrij 11. p. 320. where these Words are also jiddcd, ahdicata jam procermn ilia; the truth is, this reformation of the money began to be made towards the Jatlcr end oi' Siephe.n^s reign, for among tlie artieles of pcaec between Stephen and Henry this was one, that the silver coin should be one and the same throughout the liingdoin. Jbid. p. '315. Mat. Paris, p. 13:). (s) See a charter of king Julin allowing this privilege to Hubert archbishop o( Canter- bury. Wilk. Leg. Johannis, p. 355. (t) p. I'll. (w) As appears by the proclamation, Quad J'ollardi Sf Crokardi nan currant in regno AngliiB, Claus. .28 E. 1. m. 12. dors, by which record it also appears, tiiat two Ptillards and cne Sterling were much about the same value; for the words are Licet nnper pro communi vtilitate reirni nnstri dc concilia nostra ordinavimns, quod duo I'ollardi, vcl duo Crokardi currerent in eodein regno pro uno Stcrlingo. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 201 I have not seen anv indentures of the mint between the time of Edward II. and the 46 Edward\l\{x) and then by [201 ] the indenture of the mint Clans. 46 E. 3. m. 18. a pound of gold made forty-five nobles, each noble six shillings and eight pence, and was to consist of twenty-three carets, three grains and an half of fine gold, the rest allay; the coinage to be four shillings for each pound for the master of the mint, and twelve pence for the king; the pound valued at fifteen pounds, and the merchant upon the return to have out of the Tower fourteen pounds fifteen shillings. A pound of silver was to make three hundred pence, and so in that proportion groats, half-pence, and farthings, which was to be of the allay du viel Esterling.viz. eleven ounces two-penny weight of fine silver, and eighteen penny weight of allay; eight pence to be allowed for coinage. The next Indenture I find is 3 H. 4. p. 2. m. 9. dors, whereby a farther alteration was made. The pound of gold made the same quantity of nobles, and was of the same' allay as before, only upon every pound was allowed three shillings and six pence to the master, and one shilling and six pence to the king for coinage. Tlie silver coin of the same fineness, weight and allay, as by the iadenture of 46 E. 3. the coinage eight pence, whereof seven pence to the master, and one penny to the king upon every pound weight. Claus. 1 H. 5. m. 35. dors, the allay of gold and silver still the same as before, but some other variance there was. The pound of gold was now to make fifty nobles, the value of the whole, pound to be sixteen pounds thirteen shillings and four pence, the coinage five shillings. The pound of silver was to make three hundred and sixty pence, the coinage was nine pence to the master, and three- [ 202 ] pence to the king; so that now the pound of silver made thirty shillings Sterling, whiWi began in Rot. Pari. 13 H. A. n. 28. by ordinance of parliament. Claus. 9 H. 5. m. 2. dors, the same weight and allay of gold, viz. every pound of gold to make fifty nobles, the coinage to the king three sliillings and six pence, to the master eighteen pence. The like as to silver in all points as by the indenture of 1 H. 5. only the master to have nine pence, the king three pence for coinage. Claus. 1. H. 6. m. 13 ^-15. The indenture agrees in all things with that of 9 H. 5. Clans. 4. E. 4. m. 20. The king by proclamation inhanseth the v^lue of coin, so that the noble of gold, which before was six shillings (ar^ But among the records in the Tower there are several indentures to be found within that time, viz. Clavs. 18 E. S.p.Q.m. 19. d. Pat. 18 E. 3. p. I. m. 27. Claus. 23 E. 'S. p. I. m. 21. d. Claus. 25. E. 3. m. 15. d. Clans. 29. E. 3. in. 6. d. Claus. 35 E. 3. m. 10. d. VOL. I. — 23 202 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. and eight pence, is now raised to eight shilHngs and four pence, three groats make a shilling, and so do twelve pence, and twenty shilUngs make a pound. And afterwards he made new coins according to the standard of gold aforesaid, viz. the nohle of gold eight shillings and four pence, and the pound of silver raised to thirty-seven shillings and six pence ; and now I shall follow John S/owe in his Survey of London, p. 47. H. 7. raised the rate of Sterling silver coin to forty pence the ounce. 18 H. 8. the pound of silver coin was raised to forty shillings. ■ 35 H. 8. the coin of gold was raised to forty shillings the ounce, the coin of silver to four shillings the ounce, and coins of base money of allay'below Sterling were coined, viz. shillings, six-pences, four- pences, two-pences, pennies: these were decried in 5 E. 6. and the shilling reduced to nine-pence, and after to six pence. (y) 30 Octob. 5 E. 6. Silver sterling coin inl)ansed to five [203] shillings the ounce, and so proportionably ; and coins of fine gold, a whole sovereign was thirty shillings, an angel ten- shillings, and base money to pass as before. 2 Eliz. The base money was called in and brought to the mint and reduced to Sterling and new coined, and the dross given to re- pair the highways, 16 Novemb. 2 Jac. By proclamation the new coins of gold and silver then made, together with their impressions, inscriptions, weight, and values were proclaimed; and 23 Novemb. 9 Jac. per proclama- tion the coins of gold are inhansed, r/^r. thirty shillings to thirty-three shillings, twenty shillings to twenty-two shillings, fifteen shillings to sixteen shillings, ten shillings to eleven shillings, five shillings to five shillings and six-pence. Upon these variations these things are nevertheless observable, First, That the old Sterling gold is this, that one pound of Sterling gold contains twenty-three carets three, grains and a half of fine gold, the rest to make it up twenty-four carets is of allay of copper. Se- condly, That the old standard oi Sterling silver is, that every pound weight of Sterling silver consist of eleven ounces two penny weight of fine silver, and eighteen penny weight of allay of copper. Thirdly, That this rate of *S'/er//«^gold and silver hath most plainly coiuinued to be the standard of English gold and silver coin, at least from the time o{ Henry III. until this day in jGn^/an^/ without any considera- ble alteration, saving that base money, which was stampt in the time o{ Henry VIII. and then reduced to a lower valuation by Edward VI. and after re-established by Edward VI. to its former value. Fourthly, That, as well in England diS Ireland, there hath been im- basing of the species of money, as appears in these two instances in the time of Henry VIII. and Edward VI. which are yet the only instances that I find of that nature in England. Fifthly, That queen Elizabeth decried by proclamation all tliat base money, which was in use in the time of her father and brother, and ever since that pro- (y) Dyer 82. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 203 clamation, viz. 2 Eliz. the true old Sterling standard both of gold and silver hath been the only standard of the English current money. Sixthly, That all ho the standard of Stey^ling hath with great constancy obtained in England, yet the denomination or ex- [ 204 ] trinsic or imposed value hath varied according to the plea- sure of the king both as to gold and silver coin, as appears by what goes before ; for in Edward I's time the ounce of Sterling silver was twenty pence, the pound twenty shillings or two hundred and forty pence ; in Edward UVs time the pound of Sterling was three hundred pence; in the time of Henry V. and so downward to Edward W. three hundred and sixty pence, or, which is all one, thirty shillings; in the time of Edward IV. the pound of silver was thirty-seven shil- lings and sixpence; in 35 H. 8. the pound of Sterling silver was forty shillings ; in 5 £. 6, and so down to this day the ounce of silver five shillings or sixty pence, and the pound of Sterling silver three pounds or seven hundred and twenty pence, which in Edward Ps time was only two hundred and forty pence, which now is thrice as much as then it was. Seventhly, That I find rarely any proclama- tion for the setting of the rate of new coin, but only as before, when the denomination of wliat is in being is inhansed, or abated, or re- called ; so that the indenture of the mint and common reputation is that, which must try what is English money. Eighthly, That I never find either in the indentures of the mint or any proclamation the stamp, impression, or inscription described, unless in that of king James, because the stamps are agreed upon between the king and the master of the mint, and delivered to him by the king, or his warrant either of the great seal, privy seal, signet, or secretary of state. CHAPTER XVIII. [205] CONCERNING THE ADULTERATION OR IMPAIRING OP COIN, AND THE ANTIENT MEANS USED TO REMEDY IT. The decays or impairment of coin is either in weight or allay, the former may happen by some abuse of the moniers or minters; or by the subtiliy of clippers, washers and other impairers of coin ; the latter, viz. impairment in allay, can only happen either by the dis- honesty of the moniers or minters, or by the counterfeiting of coin. Antiently, all money was paid in number, namely so many pieces made a pound, and this was the common reservation and account of all farms, and the estimating of accounts, vicecumes A. reddit compo- tuni de 100/. numero, or in thesanro 100/. niimero. But this did not answer all intentions, for the money that was paid in, might be dipt, or otherwise rendered light, or might be counterfeit, or of base allay. For. remedy whereof there was practised these three methods of 205 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. rectifications of payments at the exchequer, that the king might not be deceived, and these were successively used in the excliequefy which we may read Gervafi. Tilb. Lib. I. supra guibus. 1. Solutio ad sca/am, which it seems was a dish or measure, whereby they measured their money, as well as told it, for that is llie proper signification of scula: but in process of time this was turned into a measure of money, which was an addition of six- pence for every pound, to avoid the trouble of that probation, whereby an hundred pounds mimero amounted to an hundred pounds and fifty shillings ad scalam; and so we have frequently in the old pipe rolls of Henry II., Richard I., king John, &c. in the sauro lOOl, ad scalam. 2. Solutio ad pensum, which was the answering of every r 206 ] pound of money by weight of a pound weight troy, for ia those times the libra argenti com d^xA or was to answer a pound weight troy, and therefore the payer was to make it good of that weight by answering the full weight; this gave the frequent title of the old pipe-rolls, also in thesauro 100/. ad pensum. But altho this solutio ad scalam or ad pensum^ especially both together, did give some help against the defect of coin in weight, as by clipping, washing, or the like, yet it did not help as to adulterate money of baser allay than the standard: Therefore, 3. There was found out in the time of Henry II. a third trial, namely trial by fire or combustion, and if it were of the just allay it was allowed, if below the allay the payer was to make it good, and hence he was said dealbare Jirmam ; and hence grew quickly a difi'erence between reservations and payments of so much money 7^^m^t?/'o, and so much money blafic. A reservation of so much money generally was intended of so much niirnero, as if a pound were reserved, it was in effect but twenty shillings in pecuniis numeratis ; but if it were expressly- said so much money blanc, then it was answered in blanc money, but yet with this difference, that if a farm were letten and so much rent generally reserved, it should be intended so much numero, in pecuniis numeratis; but if a franchise or liberty were granted, and so much rent generally reserved without sayiiig blanc or numero, it Was commonly intended blanc, unless expressly said reddendo so much money numero, and therefore in such a case the former was bound dealbare Jirmam, that is, to answer so much as would make his payment to be so much good in fine silver, or very near it at least, Gervus. Tilb. Lib. II. cap. quid sit, quosdam fundqs dari blanc, quosdam numero. And therefore upon all the antient accounts in the pipe, made by the sheriff, we shall find some of his accounts of rents to run mimero, some of them to run blanc, viz. Jirma comitatus numero, <§• firma comitatus blanc, according to the variety of their reserva- ("2071 tions or the things out of which they are reserved; now what the proportion was, between so much money blanc HIST0RIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 207 and so much money nurnero in those antient times, or what this blanc money was, is worth the inquiring. I have formerly thought that blanc money was nothing else but Sterling, and that dealbare firmam was no more, than to reduce money to the true allay oi Sterling ; but upon consideration I think blanc money was truly so much tine silver without any allay, and that the true allay of Sterling silver or the antient standard was twelve penny weight only of copper to every pound weight of silver; and tlierefore he, that upon his reservation was to pay one hundred pounds of blanc money, was to answer to the king upon every pound of Sterling money one shilling to countervail the value of the allay of copper in every pound weight troy of silver. And hence it is, that the farms of most corporations antiently let with liberties, if one hundred pounds per annum were reserved, usually answered one hundred and five pounds, the five pounds being to answer the allay of one of copper in the whole quantity. 21 H. 3. in compoto comitatus North' ton summa totalis 102/. 3.?. Id. de quo 4/. \is. 4d. blanc, quae sunt extensae ad 4/. 13s.. 9a?. subtra- huntur ad perficiendum corpus comitatus & remanet 97/. 13^. lO^.(a) de quibus respondet de proficuo in magno rotulo. Clans. 19 H. 3. p. 1. w. 2. Sciatiis quod pardonavimus dilectse & fideli nostrse J2. comitissa3 Pembroch centum triginta & quinque libras blanc, (\\\^ extensse sunt ad 141/. \5s. 13 E. 3. m compotu Bedford & Bucks, Nicholaus Basselew IS/. 45. 4^. ninnero pro 111. Is. blanc. That of 19 H. 3. exactly answers twelve pence per pound, which amounts to six pounds fifteen shillings, and added to one hundred thirty-five pounds make just one hundred forty-one pounds fifteen shillings. And the other estimate is very near the same account, bating the difficulty of small fractions, four pounds nine shillings and four pence, with the adding of twelve pence for every pound [ 208 jj to make it Sterling, amounts to about four shillings and six pence, which added to four pounds nine shillings and four pence make four pounds thirteen shillings and ten pence; so the allay of Sterli}ig at that time seems to be twelve pence of copper to every pound of silver. The sum therefore is, 1. That blanc ferme ox blanc money was the estimate of money in pure silver without allay, and accordingly it was to be answered, viz. one hundred pounds blanc was to answer one hundred and five pounds numero. 2. That di ferme or sum of money numero was so much Sterling money according to the stand- ard of those times. 3. That the standard of Sterling money in those times was finer than it hath been since the time of Edward I. name- ly Sterling was then eleven ounces eigiit penny weight finer silver, and twelve penny weight of allay. 4. That when at the exchequer they burnt the money to make assay of it, in case twenty shillings (a) This should be 97/. 9s. lOd. 208 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. numej'O were reserved, it sufficed if it held the allay of Sterling, vi^. eleven ounces, eight penny weight of pure silver, and twelve penny weight of allay ; but if it were reserved 6/ffnc, tlien tho good Ster- ling vyas brought to the test, yet it went for less than Sterling by twelve penny weight in every pound, and therefore they were to add five pounds in the hundred to make it up blanc. 5. But when this probation grew troublesome, and Sterling money was well estab- lished, then they, that were to pay one hundred pounds blanc, paid one hundred and five pounds Sterling, as the common estimate of blanc money: it seems that in king John's time the standard of »S7er- ling money was far lower and worse, than at any lime before or after, especially towards the latter end of his reign. The borough of f'Fich was antiently from the conquest till 17 Jo- hann. held at the yearly rent of eighty pounds per annum blunc, which was answered by the sheriff in the times of Henry II. and Richard I. 7 Johann. the king granted the borough of Wich to the town at the farm rent of one hundred pounds Sterling: in the pipe- ~\ 209 ] roll of 24 H. 3. homines de Wico reddunt compotiim de 100/. numero, pro 80/. blanc, which imports these sums to be equal, and afterwards 43 H. 3. homines c?e Wico reddunt compotum deSOl. bhuic, qux sunt extensx ad S-il. and in 17^. 3. this eighty-four pounds was raised to eighty-nine pounds five shillings numero upon the extent, \M\\\c\\ferme of eighty-nine pounds five shillings they have ever since answered; whereby it appears the standard of iS/er///?^ was but low in king John's time, for eighty pounds blanc was in his charter estimated at one hundred pounds Sterling: again it was high in 43 H. 3. viz. after the rate of twelve penny weight of allay in a pound of fine silver; for there, eighty-four pounds Sterling \s rated to be eighty pounds blanc; and in Edward III. the standard was lower, than twelve penny weight of allay, viz. above tweniy- four penny-weight of allay and more in a pound weight of fine silver; but afterwards raised to eighteen peimy weight of allay to- wards the latter end of his reign, which hath hitherto continued as the true standard of Sterling silver. These curiosities, tho they be not much in use at this day, yet they are fit to be known for understanding the old rolls.[l] [1] By the 2 Will. 3. c. 34. sects. 4. S^ 5. it is felony, with transportation or imprison- ment, to colour, file, alter, or impair the gold or silver coin. See Rose, on Coin. 19. By the Act of 21 April, 1806, ch. 49. sect. 3. if any person shall fraudulently and for gain's sake, by any art, way, or means whatsoever, impair, diminish, falsity, scale, or lighten the gold or silver coins, which have been, or which shall hereafter be coined at the mint of the United States; or any foreign gold or silver coins, which are by law made current, or are in actual use and circulation as money within the United States, every per- son so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding two years, and fined not exceeding two thousand dollars. 2 Slats, at Larse. 405. By the Act of 3 March, 1825, ch. 65, sect. 24. if any of the gold or silver coins which shall be struck or coined at the mint of the United States, shall be debased or made worse, as to the proportion of fine gold or fine silver therein contained, or shall be of Jess weight or value than the same ought to be, pursuant to the several acts relative thereto, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 209 through the default or with the connivance of any of the officers or persons who shall be employed at the said mint, for the purpose of profit or gain, or otherwise, witii a fraudu- lent intent, and if any of the said officers or persons shall embezzle any of the metals which shall, at any time, be committed to their charge for the purpose of being coined, or any of tlie coins which shall be struck or coined at the said mint, every such officer, or person who shall commit any, or either of the said offences, shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment and hard labour for a term not less than one year, nor more than ten years, and shall be fined in a sum not exceeding ten thousand dollars. By sect. 26. nothihg in this act contained shall be construed to deprive the courts of the individual States, of jurisdiction, under the laws of the several States, over oflences made punishable by this act. 4 id. 122. CHAPTER XIX. [210] CONCERNING THE COUNTERFEITING OF THE KING's COIN WHAT IT IS, WHAT THE PENALTY THEREOF ANTIENTLY, AND WHAT AT THIS DAY. Having taken this compass I now descend to the offense itself, where- in I shall consider, 1. What is the coin or money of the i) Si ipse, qui facit monetam in Jinglid authoritate regia infra turrim London vel alibi in Jlnglia vel Calicia, iliam facit minus in pondere per dimidium ordinationis antiqui ponderis, &c. vel falso metallo, est proditio, & tamen ipsi, qui illam monetam utterant ligeis domini regis infra Jingliam non sunt proditores nee proditio, sed misprisio. J3ut it is not every mistake in weight or allay, that chargeth the moneyers with so high a crime as treason, for the master is charge- able by his indentures to a fine and ransom for some mistakes of this nature; but it must be a wilful gross proditorious doing it, for the indictment runs froditori^y and so it must be proved, for it is difficult for the best artist to make every piece of the precise [ 214 ] weight. Touching others that either counterfeit or imbase the coin. First, there must be an actual counterfeiting, for a cornpassing, conspiracy or attempt to counterfeit is not treason within this statute without an actual counterfeiting. But if many conspire to counterfeit, or counsel or abet it, and one of them doth the fact upon that counselling or conspiracy, it is treason in all, and they may be all indicted for counterfeiting generally within this statute, for in such case in treason all are principals.[6j {h) pi. 3. [6] But since the late Act of Parliament, only the party who actually counterfeits would be the principal felon, and the otliers accessories before the fact. Archb.CP.Ald. " Wliile 1 declare that this doctrine contradicts every idea I had ever entertained on the subject of indictments, (since it admits tliat one case may be stated, and a very dif- ferent case may be proved,) I will acknowledge that it is countenanced by the aulliorities adduced in its support. To counsel -or advise a treasonable assemblage, and to he one of that assemblage, are certainly distinct acts, and therefore ought not to be charged as the same act. Tlie great objection to this mode of proceeding is, that the proof essen- tially varies from the charge in the character and essence of the offence, and in the tes- timony by which the accused is to defend himself. These dicta of Lord ifaZ?, therefore, seem to be repugnant to the declarations we find every where that an overt act must be laid, and must be proved. No case is cited by Hale in support of them, and I am strongly inclined to the opinion, that had the public received his corrected, instead of his original manuscript, they would, if not expunged, have been restrained in their appli- cation to cases of a particular description. Laid down generally, and applied univer- sally to all cases of treason, they are repugnant to the principles for which Hale contends, for which all the elementary writers contend, and from which courts have in no case, eitiier directly reported or referred to in the books, ever departed. These prin- ciples are, that the indictment must give notice of the offence; that the accused is only bound to answer the particular charge which the indictment contains, and that the overt HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 214 How far a receiver is a principal, videbimus infra Co. Pla. Cor. 13S. Bjjer 296. If t/2. counterfeits, and by agreement before that counterfeiting B. is to take off and vent tiie counterfeit money, B. is an aider and abetter to such counterfeiting, and consequently a principal traitor within this law ; but if B. knowing that ^. hath counterfeited money, put off this false money for him after the fact, without any such agree- ment precedent to the counterfeiting, he seems to be all one with a receiver of him, because he maintains him. [7] U ,/9. counterfeit money, and B. knowing the money to be coun- terfeit vent the same for his own benefit, B. is neither guilty of trea- son nor misprision of treason, but it is only a cheat and. misdemeanor in him punishable by fine and imprisonment. But if B. know that ^. counterfeited it, and doth neither receive, maintain, or abet him, but conceals his knowledge, this is misprision of treason ; and with this difference the book of 3 H. 7. above-cited is to be understood, and so it was ruled upon debate at the sessions at Newgate Car. 2. ex libro Bridgman.{c) Jl. fashions stamps for the counterfeiting of money, but he is dis- covered and apprehended before he hath actually counterfeited it ; this is no treason within this statute, (of) for tho he hath counterfeited the stamps, yet he hath not counterfeited the money of England.\p\ r . 109. [3] The words " may be otherwise" do not clearly convey the idea that it is univer- sally otherwise. In all cases of a receiver the indictment must be special on the receipt, and not general. The words " may be otherwise in case of a procurer, tfcc." signify that it may be otherwise in all treasons, or that it may be otherwise in some treasons. If it may be otherwise in some treasons, without contradicting the doctrines of Hale himself as well as of other writers, but cannot be otherwise in all treasons without such contradiction, the fair construction is, that Hale used these words in their restricted sense; that he used them in reference to treasons in which a general indictment would lie, not to treasons where a general indictment would not lie, but an overt act of the treason must be charged. Per Marshall, C. J. 2 Burr's Tr. 434. [4] Tiie conviction of some person, who has committed the treason, must precede the trial of him who advised or procured it. 2 Burr's Tr. 461. But in all acts of approbation, incitement, advice, or procuring, in case of treason in compassing the king's death, the party may be tried before the person who acted upon such incitement; because the bare advising or encouraging such acts, is in itself an overt-act of compassing; and it is immaterial whether the attempt was ever made or not. But in the other treasons in the 25 Edw. 3. if one advise another to commit them, or furnisli him means for that purpose, and tlie fact is committed, the adviser will be a principal traitor; for such advice would have made him an accessary before the fact in felony ; but if the act were not committed, the adviser could not be a traitor. In these cases the treason is of a derivative nature and depends upon the guilt of the agent, the proof of which can only be legally ascertained by his conviction. Fast. 346. 342, 1 East, PL 100. 4 Bl. Com. 35. . HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 238 How far Mortimer^s case agrees with law at this day, vidcbimus infra, 8f vide supra. That, which will not make an accessary to felony after the fact, will not make a man'principal in treason; therefore [ 239] sending of a letter for his deliverance, or speaking a good word for him, ^-c. will not be treason. Slum/. PL Cor. 41. b. how far charitable relief will do'\t.,xide infra super staluium 13 Eliz. cap. l.[5] [5] The principle that the same acts which make a man an accessary in felony, make him a principal in treason applies, it is presumed, in respect to treason in tlie state of Virginia ; but whether it does in respect to treason against the United States is doubt- ful; because the acts in which treason against the United States shall consist are pre- cisely defined by the federal constitution in terms which seem to exclude all accessorial treasons ; and because, too, the common law, of which this doctrine is a part, is not the law of the United States, though it has been severally adopted by all of them except one. Davis's Virg. Cr. Law, 38. But it was laid down by Judge Chase, in Fries' Trial, 199. that in treason all ibe pa rticepes criininis are principals; that there are no accessaries in this crime. All persons who are present, and countenancing and are ready to afford assistance, if necessary, to those who actually commit any treasonable act, are also prin- cipals. If a number of persons assemble and set out upon a common design, as to resist and prevent by force, the execution of any law, and some of them commit acts of force and violence with intent to oppose the execution of any law, and others are present to aid and assist if necessary, they are all principals. If any man joins and acts with an assembly of people, his intent is alwaj's to be considered and adjudged to be the same as theirs; and the law in this case, judgeth of the intent by the fact. If a number of per- sons combine or conspire to effect a certain purpose, as to oppose by force, the execution of a law, any act of violence done by any one of them, in pursuance of such combination and with intent to effect such object, is in consideration of law, the act of all who are present when such act of violence is committed. If persons collect together to act for one and the same common end, any act done by any one of them, with intent to effectu- ate such common end, is a fact that may be given in evidence against all of them. It appears to the court, says Chief Justice Marshall, (2 Burr's Tr. 405.) that those who perform a part in the prosecution of the war may correctly be said to levy war and to com- mit treason under the constitution. It will be observed that this opinion does not extend to the case of a person who performs no act in the prosecution of the war — who counsels and advises it — or who, being engaged in the conspiracy, fails to perform his part. Whether such persons may be implicated by the doctrine, that whatever would make a man an accessary in felony makes him a principal in treason, or are excluded, because that doctrine is inapplicable to the United States, the constitution having declared that treason shall consist only in levying war, and having made the proof of overt acts neces- sary to conviction, is a question ot vast importance, which it would be proper for the Supreme Court to take a fit occasion to decide ; but which an inferior tribunal would not willingly determine unless the case before them would require it. This doctrine remains still in uncertainty, having never come up before the Supreme Court of the United Slates. See 4 Tucker's Bl. Com. Appdx. 41. 1 East, P. C. 93. 4 Bl. Com. 34. 323. Fosl. 341. Hawk. c. 17. s. 39. 239 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. CHAPTER XXIII. CONCERNING FORFEITURES BY TREASON. Having gone thro the several treasons declared by this statute, I shall now proceed to what follows in this statute, which is, 1. Touch- ing forfeitures of high treason. [1] 2. Touching declaring of treason by parliament, and under this head shall consider those several de- clarations and new enacted treasons since the statute of 25 E. 3. and how they stand at this day. The forfeitures for treason are either goods or lands. As to goods: the king's prerogative as to goods forfeit for treason is the same as to forfeitures for felony, only there seems to be some diflerence in relation to grants thereof. 22 Jiss. 49. The king grants to the master of St. Leonard's Omnia bona S^" catalla tenenliuni stioruni fugitivorum, and felonum qualitercunque damnatorum. A tenant of the master's was convict and attaint for killing of the king's messenger, which at that time was held higli treason; it was ruled, that the master shall not have the goods of this person by force >-' of this general grant. As to lands this statute of 25 E. 3. goes farther, Et soit a entendus, qe les cases suisnosmes doit estre adjugge treason, qe se extend a nostre seigneur le roy & sa royal majesty, & de tiel manners de trea- sons le forfeiture des eschetes appertenont a nostre seigneur le roy,ci bien de terres & tenements tonus des autres, come de Ini mesme. I shall here examine, 1. Of what lands the king shall have r 240 ] the eschete upon attainder of treason, and 2. In what man- ner or degree he shall have those eschetes. 3. Where a subject in point of privilege or franchise shall have these royal eschetes. I. As to the first of these, what lands are forfeit to the king by attainder of treason, my lord Coke, PL Cor. p. 19. gives a full ac- count of them, which I shall repeat with some additional observa- tions: 1. At common law the lands entailed were forfeited for trea- son, because it was a fee-simple conditional; but by the statute IV. 2. de donis conditionalibus the forfeiture of lands entailed, even in case of treason, was taken away, and the general words of this statute of 25 E. 3. doth not repeal the statute of Westm. 2. But some later statutes have given to the king the forfeiture for treason of lands entailed: the statute of 21 jff. 2. cap. 3. did give the forfeiture of lands entailed to the king for the treasons therein men- tioned; but that statute with the whole parliament of 21 li. 2. was repealed by the statute of 1 H. 4. cap. 3. [1] The Constitution (Art. 3. Sect. 3.) declares that no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted. By the 24 Sect, of the Act. of 30 April, 1790, it is enacted, That no conviction or judgment, &c. shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. 240 By the statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. in fine lands entailed are for- feited by attainder of treason, viz. "All such lands, tenements, and hereditaments, which any such offender shall have of any estate of inheritance in use or possession, by any right, title, or means, within any of the kitig's dominions at the time of any such treason commit- ted, or at any time after, saving to all persons, other than the otren-^- ders, their heirs and successors, and such persons as claim to any of their uses, all such right, title, interest, possession, 4*c. as they might have had if this act had not been made." And by the statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20.(a) "That if any person be attaint of high treason by the course of the common law such, attainder shall be of as good force, as if it had been by parliament; and the king, his heirs and successors, shall have as much benefit by such attainder, as well of uses, rights, entries, conditions, as posses- sions, reversions, remainders and all other things, and shall be deemed in the actual and real possession of the lands, [ 241 J tenements, hereditaments, uses, goods, chatties, and all other things of the offender, which his highness ought to have, if the attain- der had been by authority of parliament, without any olBce or inqui- sition to be found for the same, saving to all persons, (other than the offenders and their heirs and assigns, and other persons claimirig by, from or under them or to their uses after the treason committed) all such right, title, use, possession, entry, reversion, remainder, interest, condition, fees, offices, rents, annuities, commons, leases, and all other commodities, and hereditaments whatsoever, which, they should, might, or ought to have, if this act had not been made." And the statute of 5 4* 6 Ed. 6. cap. 11. is to the same effect. These statutes as to the forfeiture of lands entailed remain in force, and are not repealed by the statute of 1 Mar. and so it hath been often ruled, and particiilarly by all the judges in the lord Sheffield's case 21 Jac de quo postea. And the reason is, because the statute of-1 Mar. cap. 1. enacting, that no treason shall be, but what was enacted by 25 E. 3. and that no pains of death, penalties or forfeitures shall ensue for doing any treason, other than be in the statute of 25 E. 3. these words other than be mentioned in the statute of 25 E. 3. refer to treasons, not to forfeitures or penalties; and therefore tho by the statutes of 2Q and 33 H. 8. new penalties, viz. forfeitures of lands intailed, are introduced, this forfeiture is not repealed, but only new treasons not mentioned in 25 E. 3. so that at this day, if tenant in tail be attaint of treason, the estate-tail is forfeited, and yet this attainder works no corruption of blood as in relation to the heir in tail : vide the lord Lumley's case cited in Doiufy's case, 3 Co. Rep. 10. b. Grandfather tenant in tail, father, and son, the father is attaint of treason and dies, the grandfather dies, the land shall descend to the grandchild, for the father could forfeit nothing, for he had nothing to forfeit; (a) See the cause of making this act, 3. Co. Rep. 10. b, VOL. I. — 27 S41 HISTORL\ PLACITORUM CORONA. and the statute of 26 H. 8, that gives the forfeiture of tenant in tail, yet corrupts not the. blood by the attainder of the father. And therefore it is agreed in the principal case, that if [242] after 26 H. 8. and before 33 //. 8. which vests all in the king without office, if tenant in tail had been attainted of treason, and died in that interval, the land would have descended to his son till office found; but otherwise in case of tenant in fee-simple attainted and dying before office, the freehold is cast upon the king without office, because none could take it else, 2. The king at common law and by virtue of this statute was entitled to a right of entry, where the party was in merely by dis- seisin or abatement, but not to a right of entry, where the possessor was in by title; but at this day by virtue of the statute of 33 H. 8. above-mentioned the king is entitled to a right of entry iri both cases, and that without office, but then there must be an inquisition or seizure to bring the king into the actual possession ; and if he grant it over before such seizure, the grant must be special, not of the land simply, but of the right to the land, otherwise neither land nor the right of entry passelh; it is so adjudged in Dowfy^s case, 3 Co. Rep. 10. b. 3. If a person committing treason hath at the time of the treason committed a bare right of action touching any lands, or a right to reverse a judgment given against him by writ of error, or a right to bring a formedon, or writ of entry, but hath no right of entry with- out such recovery in such action; this right neither at common law nor by the statute of 33 H. 8. is given to the king by the attainder of treason, 3 Co. Rep. 3. a. marquis of TVinchester^s case, 3. Co. Rep. 10. b. Doivty^s case so adjudged; but yet there have been two great cases resolved, that tread hard upon the heels of this judgment. H. 15 Eliz. PL Com. 552. b. Walsins;ham^s case: Wyat tenant in tail of the gift of king Henry VII. the reversion in the crown, made a feoffment in fee, and then was attaint of treason, and died leaving issue, tho the feotfor, against his own feotl'ment, could not claim any right at the time of the treason; yet it was adjudged, 1. That there remained in him such a right of the entail, as was forfeited to the king. 2. And that the king was in as of \_ 243 ] his reversion, and should not be subject to leases duly made by JVyat before his attainder. 21. Jac. in Camera Scaccarii Stone and Newman's case, it was adjudged in B. R. and affirmed i)i Catnera Scaccarii by the greater number of justices. Bii^ott tenant in tail general makes a feoff- ment to the use of himself and his heirs; and before the statute of 26 or 27 H. 8. commits treason, and is attaint of treason, and dies leavitiij issue inheritable to the entail, then a special statute is made 31 //. 8. whereby he was to forfeit all estates and rights; yet it was adjudged, 1. That against his own feoflment the tenant in tail could have no right, and therefore if the case had stood barely so, the right of the entail could not have been forfeited by the attainder. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 043 2. But when an estate returns to him, that is forfeited by the attainder, tlie king shall hold this estate discharged of the right of the old entail, and that right shall never revive to the issue. 3. That the retrospect of the king's title by the attainder shall over-reach and avoid the remitter, which was wrought in the issue before the king's actual seisin by the attainder or office thereupon. But it is to be noted, that if the king makes a gift in tail, saving the reversion to himself, the attainder of treason of such tenant in tail shall not bar his issue, because the statute of 34 H. 8. cap. 20. enacts, " That the heir in tail in such case shall have the lands, any recovery, or any other thing or things hereafter to be had, done, or suffered by or against such tenant in tail to the contrary notwith- standing;" which act coming after 26 H. 8. and 33 H. 8. that gave the forfeiture of lands entailed, is a repeal of those statutes as to this case, and a restitution of the statute de donis condilionulibus in this special case: and therefore, where in Plowden^s Co7Jimenlaries {fJ'\i /sing ham's ca.sc) PFi/af, who was tenant in tail of the gift of the crown, the reversion in the crown, was attaint of treason 1 Mar. he had not forfeited his^ land by virtue of the statutes of 26 or 33 H. 8. if there had been no more in the case; but in that case he lost it, because by special act of 1 <§' 2 Fh. <§' 3Iar. that attainder was confirmed, and farther it was enacted, " That he should for- feit all the laflds, tenements, and hereditaments, whereof he f 244 1 or any to his use was seized the day of the treason com- mitted, saving the right of all persons other than the person attainted and his heirs, and all claiming under them after the treason com- mitted;" and this act coming after 34 H. 8. cap. 20. repealed that act as to this case, as the act of 34 H. 8. repealed the acts of 26 and 33 H. S. as to entails of the gift of the crown, where the reversioa continues in the crown. But since all these statutes it is enacted by the statute of 5 <§' 6 Ed. 6. cap. 11. "That every offender being lawfully convict of any man- ner of high treason according to the course and custom of the com- mon law shall lose and forfeit to the king's highness, his heirs and successors, all such lands, tenements, and hereditaments, which any such offender or offenders shall have of any estate of inheritance, in his own right, in use, or possession, within this realm of Englandj or elsewhere within the king's dominions at the time of such treason committed, or at any time after:" this act coming after 34 H. 8. makes lands of the gift of the king in tail subject to forfeiture for treasons, as well as other lands entail. 16 Eliz. Dy. 332. h. 4. At common law the king was not entitled to a condition, that was in the party attainted; but now by the express words of the statute of 33 H. 8. the king is in some cases entitled to a condition of re-entry belonging to the party attainted, viz. not to the land itself but to the benefit of that condition, which might reduce the land into the possession of the party attainted, if he had not been attainted, and now to the benefit of the king : but herein this difierence is to be observed. 244 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 1. If the condition be such, as that the substance of the perforln- ance thereof is not bound up strictly to the person attaint, then such a condition is given to the crown, and he may perform it, as the party himself might have done in case the condition hath a continu- ance. 7 Co. Bep. W.h. Engle field's case: Sir Francia Engle field con- veyed his lands to the use of himself for life, the remainder [ 245 ] to his nephew and the heirs male of his body, 4'c. with a proviso, Xhvki in as much as he might turn prodigal, and there- fore for a bridle to him, if Sir Francis by himself, or any other dur- ing his life, should deliver or offer to his nephew a ring of gold to the intent to make void the uses, then the uses should cease — Sir Francis is attaint of treason; it was ruled, that the queen in the life- time of Sir Francis may by commission, SfC. tender the ring and make void the uses, for it was not personally annexed to him, but might be performed by the queen. This case was judged M. 33 <§' 34 Eliz. but it was not thought safe to rely upon this judgment; but 35 Eliz. cap. 5. there was a special act of parliament reciting the attainder and the conveyance with the provisio: "And it is declared and enacted, that the attainder be confirmed, and that the queen was lawfully entitled to take bene- fit and advantage of that proviso in the same form, as Sir Francis Englefield might have done, and that the said provi^ or condition was well performed by the queen's commission:" But suppose Sir Francis had died before the queen had made the tender, then the condition which was only limited to him during his life, had been determined, and the queen could not have tendered, for the attainder could not lengthen the condition longer than the first limitation; but on the other side, if the condition be appropriated and applied to the person of the party attaint, then such condition is not given to the crown. The duke oi NorfoWs case 11 Eliz.{b) cited in Englefield's case to be adjudged and then agreed by the court: the duke conveyed land to uses, provided that if he shall be minded to revoke, and shall signify his mind in writing under his proper hand and seal subscribed by three witnesses, that then the uses should be revoked; it was ruled, that this condition was not given to the crown by his at- tainder. 2. Car. 1. B. B. Sir William Shelly,{c) made a feoffment to the use of himself for life, the remainder to his first, second, third, J^ 246 ] and other sons in tail, provided, that if Sir Hilliam Shelly at any time during his life give or deliver, or lawfully ten- der to the feoffees or any of them, their heirs or assigns, a gold ring, or a pair of gloves of the price of twelve-pence ipso Willielmo tunc declarante Sf" expressante, that the tender was to the intent to avoid the deed, that then it should be void, and the feofees should stand (b) 7 Co. 13, a. (c) See this case by the name of Warner and Hardwin in Latch 25,69,102. W. Jones 134. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 246 seised to the use of Sir William and his heirs; and it was adjudged in the common pleas, tliat this condition was so personal, that it was not given to the khig, but upon a writ of error in B. JR. the court was "divided; Whitlock and Jones, that it was given, Croke and Doderidge, that it was not given to the king, <§• sic stetit. In the case of Wheeler and Smi/h,{d) Simon Mayne being pos- sessed of the rectory of Haddenharn for sixty years, in 1613, assigned it over to trustees in trust for himself for life, and afterwards to di- vers other trusts for payment of debts and oiher things, provided nevertheless and upon condition, that if the said Simon iV/c/r/ne shall at the time of his decease have issue of his body, that then and from thenceforth the trustees shall stand possessed for such person and persons, and such estate and estates, as Simon Mayne by his last will and testament shall limit and appoint, and for want of such Hmitation and appointment, in trust for such after-born child ; pro- vided also, that if the said Simon Mayne shall hereafter during his life be minded to make void these present indentures, or any use or trust therein, or to limit new uses, and the same his mind shall de- clare or signify under his hand and seal in the presence of two wit- nesses, then the uses shall cease, and then the trustees shall stand possessed to such uses, as he by such deed or writing, or by his last will and testament in writing shall limit and appoint. Simon Mayne was guilty of the execrable murder of the king, had issue a son, was attainted, and died without making any such will or revo- cation or declaration, and by act of parliament all the estates, which he had or any in trust for him, and all rights, conditions, ^-c. were vested in the crown, who granted this rectory to the duke of Yorkj and by him the same was granted to Sir William Smyth-: it was adjudged in the common pleas, and upon a writ of [247]] error affirmed in the king's bench, P. 23 Car. 2. that Sir William Smyth had no title to this rectory : 1. That this was a per- sonal condition and not given to the king, under his hand and under his proper hand, being all one in sense and appropriate to his person. 2. That, if it were given, yet the same expiring by the death of Mayne could not be performed after his death by the king. 3. Admitting it might, yet nothing but the condition was in the king, and not the rectory itself, till the condition performed. 4. That consequently the rectory passed not to the duke of York, because the condition was not performed. 5. Neither the performance of the condition nor the benefit thereof passed to the duke by the general grant of the rectory, but it must have been specially granted, or otherwise nothing passed. 6. That here was no estate m trust for Simon Mayne longer than during his life, because the whole residue of the trust was out of him, and was not reducible back to him, but by a strict performance of the condition or power, which was strictly tied to the person of Simon Mayne, and determined by his death, and therefore not given to the crown; but if it had been given to the crown, and might by the crown be transferred to the patentee, yet it seems the patentee id) See this case reported 2 i£e6. 564, 608, 6763, 772. 1 Mod. 16, 38. 247 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. could not transfer or assign that condition over to another; but this last question was not moved, as I remember, for the resolution of the former points made an end of the case. 5. At common law the king by attainder of treason was not en- titled to uses or trusts belonging to the party attaint : thus it is recited to be the law by the statute of 27 H. S. cap. 10. and was one of the reasons of the making of that statute for transferring of uses into possession ; and hence it was, that in some general acts touching treason, as that of 21 ^. 2. cap. 3. and in most particular acts of attainder, that were made after that time, there was special provision made, that the parties attaint should forfeit all the lands, whereof they or any other to their use were seized, and in most of those acts provision was also made to save from forfeiture such lands, whereof the persons attaint were seized to the use of any other, as [ 248] may be seen in the acts of attainder: vide Rot. Pari. 1 E. 4. w. 18. 3 E. 4. n. 28. 4'C.[2] And yet, altho the statute of 27 H. S. cap. 10. had executed uses into possession, so that after that statute all uses were drowned in the land, yet there have succeeded certain equitable interests called trusts, which differ not in substance from uses; nay, by the very statute of 27 H. 8. cap, 10. they come under the same name, viz. uses or trusts. And by the statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. there is a special clause, that the person attainted shall forfeit all uses, &c. and the saving is to all persons other than the person attainted, and his heirs, and all persons claiming to the use of them or any of them. And what other uses there could be at the naaking of the statute of 33 H. 8. but only trusts, such as are now in practice and retained in chancery, I know not, and yet such hath been the opinion of men, or rather their necessity in respect of frequent emergencies in estates and their dispositions thereof, that these trusts since the statute have not only been kept from being executed by the statute of 27 H. 8. but have been held and used quite as other things ditferent from uses, and from all those burdens, with which uses were incumbred by several acts of parliament made before 27 H. 8. And therefore //. 55. Eliz. Croke, ?i. 2. B. B. Ridler and Pun- ter,{e) such a trust not within the statute of 3 H. 1. cap. 4. or any other statute of that nature, M. 16 Jac. B. B. Croke, n. 23.{f) the king made a lease for years to Sir John Duncomhe of the provision of wines for the king, but in trust for the earl of Somerset, who was afterwards attainted of felony ; by the opinion of all the judges the king shall have this trust, and so if a person outlawed have a bond made to another in trust for iiim, it shall be executed by an information in the exche- quer chamber or chancery; but it was agreed by them all, and so (e) Cro Eliz. 291. (/) Cro. Jac. 512. Hob. 214. [2] By the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 2.3. s. 3. no lands or chaUels vested in any trustee shall be forltit to the king by the attainder of such trustee. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 248 resolved in i/1bingfon''s case, that a trust, if a freehold, was not for- feited by attainder of treason. But iiow this resokition in ^bingtori's case can stand [249"] with the statute of 33 H. 8. I see not, for certainly the uses there mentioned could then be no other than trusts, and therefore the equity or the trust itself in cases of attainder of treason seems forfeited by the statute of 33 //. 8. upon an attainder of cesty qe trust of an inheritance; tho possibly the land itself be not in the kin^. But indeed, where the king or a common person is entitled to an eschete by an attainder of felony, there, by the attainder of cesty qe trust in fee-simple the land nor trust doth not come to the king or lord by eschete, for the eschete is only oh defectum tenentis, and in this case the king or lord hath his tenant, as before, namely the feoffee in trust, who is to be attendant for the services to the king or lord, and by the attainder of felony of the feoffee, the lord shall have his eschete of the lands discharged of the trust ;[3] and besides, an attainder of felony is not within the statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. and so it was resolved by all the court in the exchequer, Al. 21. Car. 2. wherein the case was thus. (A) 10 Martii 1 Car. a long lease of the manor oi Bony Tracy came to Sir Ralph Freeman. 4 Car. 1. The fee-simple thereof was conveyed to Sir George Sands and his heirs in trust for Sir Ralph Freeman. July 1633, Sir George having issue two sons. Freeman Sands and George Sands, Sir Ralph Freeman devised part of the m.anor to Freeman Sands and his heirs, and other part thsreof to George the son and his heirs, and devised all the rest of the manor to Free- man Sands and George his brother, and all such other sons as Sir George should have by Jane his wife, and their heirs, and made Sir George Sands and Ralph Freeman executors, and appointed them to convey the term according to these trusts. Ralph Freeman the executor refused, Sir George took administra- tion alone to him and his wife cum testarnento aniiexo. 1635. Freeman Sands died without issue, George being his bro- ther and heir. Afterwards Sir George by ./a ??e his wife had issue another Freeman Sands, but no conveyance was executed of the [ 250 "j term or inheritance. 1655. Freeman Sands murdered his brother George, who dying without issue all that right or trust, that was in George the brother, descended and survived to Freeman. 7 ^ug. 1655. Freeman the son was attainted of felony. 22 Nov. 1655. Sir George takes administration to his son George. The land being held of the king, as of the manor of East-Green- (h) 1 Sid. 403. [3] Copyhold estates, in treason, are forfeited to the lord of the manor, not to the crown. Com. Dig. "Coprjhold." {M.) 1. But see 2 Haick. c. 119. s. 7. 250 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. wich, the king's attorney preferred an information against Sir Georsre Sands in the exchequer-chamber to have a conveyance both of the term and inheritance to be executed by Sir George Sands unto the king, being the lord of whom the land was held; but it was una voce resolved, I. That as to the inheritance, tho there were a trust for George the son, and that trust descended unto Freeman the mur- derer, as his brother and heir, and was in him at the time of the death of his brother and at his attainder, as to the greatest part of the lands, and as to the residue of the lands the trust was originally for Freeman Sands, yet in as much as Sir George Sands continued seized of the fee-simple, and so was tenant to the king, tho subject to a trust; yet the trust escheted not to the crown, but Sir George held it discharged of the trust, 2. That the term for years was not extinguished in law by the accession thereof to Sir George, as execu- tor or administrator, tho Sir George had the fee-simple, because it was en autre droit, that he had the term. 3. That if the term for years had been a term in gross in trust for the party attaint, then by the attainder of felony the king had been entitled thereunto, not in point of eschete, but by his prerogative, having bona <§' catallafelo- num. 4. But this term being to attend the inheritance the trust thereof was not like the trust of a chattle in gross, but was to wait upon the inheritance (and otherwise it had been impossible for the greatest part to have descended from George Sands to his brother Freeman Sands, unless it waited upon, the trust of the inheritance) therefore the inheritance remaining in Sir George now dis- r 251 3 charged of the trust by the attainder of Freeman Sands the trust of the term shall also remain in him, for it is a kind of incident or appurtenant to the inheritance. And in this case the case of Sir fValter Raleigh was cited, which- was Mich. 7 Jac. in Camera Scaccarii. Sir Waller Raleigh being possessed of a long term for years of the manor of Sherburn, intend- ing to obtain the inheritance assigned this term to his son an infant upon pretense for a trust for his son, but really in trust for himself. Sir Walter Raleigh then purchased the inheritance and made a settlement upon his son, but the same was defective, whereby the fee-simple remained in Sir Waller. 1 Jac. Sir Walter was attainted of treason, and afterwards the king granted all the goods and chattels real and personal of Sir Walter to Shelbury and Smith in trust for Sir Walter's wife and children. Sir Walter Raleigh was executed, and upon an information in the exchequer, M. 7 Jac. it is declared and decreed, that the lease was in trust for Sir Walter, and therefore forfeited by his attainder, as well as if it had continued in him, and that it should be cancelled, and not incumber the reversion in fee-simple. So that according to this resolution this trust for Sir Walter was not a chattle, for then it had passed to Shelbury and Smith; but it was a kind of appurtenant to the inheritance, and together with it was forfeited by the attainder, the conveyance of the inheritance HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 251 being defective, and accordingly at this day it is held by those that derived under the patent of king James. 6. At common law the king by attainder of treason was not entitled to any chatties, that the party had en uulre droit, as exe- cutor, or administrator, or in right of a corporation aggregate. But the husband possessed of a term in right of his wife forfeits it by attainder of treason, felony, or out-lawry; but as to lands of inheritance, if the husband be seized in right of his wife, and is attainted of treason, the king hath the freehold during the coverture; and so if tenant for life be attainted of treason, the king hath the freehold during the life of the party attainted ; and [ 252]] so he had before the statute of 26 H. S. by the attainder of tenant in tail. Touching forfeitures for treason by a corporation sole, or aggre- gate, somewhat is observable. At common law and still to this day in the case of a corporation aggregate, as dean and chapter, mayor and commonalty, where the possessions are in common in the aggregate corporation, nothing was or is forfeited by the attainder of the head of the corporation, as the dean, mayor, ^^c. At common law a sole corporation, as an abbot, bishop, dean, prebendary, parson, vicar, by attainder of treason forfeited to the king the profits of their abbey, bishoprick, prebend, during their incumbency; but their successors were not bound by that forfeiture, for tho the profits as they arose belonged to their persons, yet the inheritance was in right of their church, and so not forfeited. But by the general words of the statutes of 26 and 33 H. 8. and by the exclusive saving of the rights of others, other than the suc- cessors of the persons attaint, these sole corporations forfeited the inheritance, and their successors were bound by such attainder ; for it is apparent that //, 8. had not only in prospect the dissolution of monasteries, but had a resolution to curb the clergy, who were too obsequious to the pope and his power. And therefore there were several attainders of abbots of high treason, whereupon the king seized their possessions, as dissolved thereby, as appears by the statutes of 27 H. 8. cap. 28. and 3\ H. Q. cup. 13. touching monasteries, tho the king rested not barely upon such attainders; but by the statutes of 27 and 31 H. S. their posses- sions are settled in the crown by those acts, and with this agrees the book of Dy. 289. And therefore we may observe in the statute of 1 Mar. sess. 2. cap. 16. for the attainder of the archbishop of Canterbury a cautious pro- viso was added, that it should not prejudice his successors touching the possessions of his see; this was to avoid the question, that other- wise might have arisen upon the general words of the forfeitures thereby enacted. But now by the act of 5 <5' 6 Ed. 6. cap. 11. this matter seems to be settled, for whereas by the statute of 26 //. S. [ 253 ] cap. 12. a person attaint of treason is to forfeit all the lands , VOL. I. — 28 253 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON^E. which he had by any right, title or means, saving the right of others, other than the heirs and successors of the person attaint, which con- fiscated the inheritance of sole corporations attaint of treason, the statute of 5 Sr 6 E. 6. cap. 11, enacts specially^ that persons attaint of treason shall forfeit the lands, which they have of any state of inhe- ritance in tlieir own right, and saves the right of all persons, other than the persons attaint^ and their heirs, which restores and preserves the right of successors, as it was at common law, 7. By the common law all hereditaments, whether lying in tenure or not, as rents, advowsons, commons, corodies certain, are forfeited to the king by attainder of treason ; but such inheritances, as lie purely in privity, appropriate to the person, are not forfeited neither at common law, nor by any special statute, as a foundership, or corody uncertain, 8. At the common law by attainder of felony or treason of the husband the wife lost her dower: by the statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 12, no attainder of treason or felony excludes her dower; but by the statute of 5 <^' 6 ^. 6 c. 11. the husband attaint of treason the wife shall lose her dower; and so it stands at this day, except in treasons enacted by particular statutes, where dower is saved to the wife, notwithstanding the attainder of her husband of treason, as upon the statute of 5 Eliz. cap. 11, for clipping money, 18 Eliz. cap. 1, for impairing money, 5 Eliz. cap. 1. refusing the oath of supremacy the second time, and some others. And thus far concerning the things forfeited by attainder of trea- son, now, II. I shall consider in what kind or degree the king hath these for- feitures of lands, 1, Altho these be called royal eschetes, yet the king is not in, purely, as by an eschete, for he hath those forfeitures injure coronae of whomsoever the lands be immediately held; yea, tho they are held immediately of the king, he hath them not in point of eschete, but jure coronse or prerogativae regalis. 47 E. 3. 21 b. A manor is held of the king as of his [ 254 ] honor of D. and the manor eschetes for the felony of the tenant, it is now parcel of the honor, and therefore by the book if the king grant it out again generally, it shall be held of the honor, but if it eschete for treason, it is no parcel of the honor, and if it be granted out generally it shall be held in capite, 6 E. 3, 32. a. accordant adjudge: vide the case of Saffron IValden, Morels Rpp. n. 301. (e) <§• ibidem n. 405, the case of the borough of South- war k.{k) 2, Where land comes to the crown by attainder of treason all mesne temires of common persons are extinct; but if the king grants it out, he is de jure to revive the former tenure, for which a petition of right lies. 46. E. 3. 19.(/) 3, If tenant in tail of the gift of the king, the reversion in the (i) Mo. 159. {k) Ma. 251. (/) I lake it, this should be H. 46 E. 3, Petition 19, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 254 king, makes a lease for years, and then is attainted of treason, the king shall avoid that lease, for the king is in of his reversion, tho tl:e tenant in tail have issue living: this hard case is so adjudged in Conilnentaries jJustin's case(/«) in fine, and yet if such tenant in tail had, after such lease, bargained atid sold, or levied a fine to the king, he should be bound by such lease as long as there is issue. H. 22 Jac. B. R. Croker and Kelsey.{n) 1 Rep. %Alton Woods case.(o) III. The third thing I propounded was the consideration of the eschetes in case of treason to such as have royal franchises, or counties palatine, as Durham, S,'C. 1. At common law divers lords had by special grant or in right of their counties palatine royal eschetes of the lands held within their franchises of persons attaint of treason against the king. Such was the royal franchise of the manor of Wreck in John Darcy's case, 6 E. 3. 31. 6. It appears in the parliament-roll 9 E. 2. m. 8. that the bishop of Durham claimed among divers franchises between the waters of Tyne and Tese, and Norhamshire and Bedlingtonshire in the county of Northumberland , the forfeitures of war, namely the lands of those who held lands within that precinct, who adhered [255 3 to the enemies of the king. And after many debates in parliament 2 E. 3. that liberty was allowed him by the judgment of the king and liis council in parlia- ment. Clans. 1 E. 3. part 1. m. 10. and p. 2. m,. 20. the precedents of the allowance of that liberty being produced, viz. that Anthony bishop o{ Durham had the forfeiture of Castrum Bernardi by the forfei- fure oi John de Baliol, the manors of Hert and Hertness by the for- feiture of Robert Bruce, the manor of Gretham, that was Peter of MontforV s ; and, upon the consideration of the several pleadings in those cases, concordatum est per nos & totum concilium nostrum in ultimo parliamento, quod episcopus habeat suam libertatem de hu- jusmodi forisfacturis juxta tenorem & effectum cartae proavi nostri, ideo vobis mandamus, [viz. the custos of these lands) quod de terns & tenementis infra libertatem episcopatCis prsedicti, & in pra3dictis locis de Norhamshire & Bedlingtonshire, in manu nostra & in cus- todia nostra per forisfacturam guerras existentibus manum nostram amoventes vos ulterius de eisdem non intromittatis, and the like par- ticularly after Claus. 1 E. 3. part 2. m. 20. an amoveas mantis for all the lands of Guido de Bello Campo Comes Warwick, §'Z/i de rege te- nuit in capite infra libertatem cpiscojiatus Dunelmensis, and likewise for the manors of Gainsford, Hert, and Hertness in the hands of Roger de Clifford seised for the forfeiture of war of John de Baliol and Robert Bruce; only the patentees not to be put out without an answer. So that it is apparent, that at common law the bishop of Durham im) Plowd. 560. a. (n) Cro. Jac. 688. 1 R. A. 843. (o) 1 Co. 40. b. 555 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. liad the royal forfeitures of war (which was treason) for such lands as were within his liberty, tho they were formerly held of the king immediately in capite, if they lay within the precinct of his county palatine; and tho by the statute of IE. 6. the said bishopricie was dissolved, yet by the statute of 1 Mar. Pari. 2. cap. 3. that act is re- pealed and the bishoprick with its franchises revived. 2. Yet farther, tho this act of 25 E. 3. declares, that all such for- feitures belong to the king, yet this act did not derogate from the franchise of the bishop of Durham or others, that had that [] 256 ]| royal liberty of forfeitures for treason, because it was in effect but a declaration of the common law, or at least an ascertaining of it without prejudice to those, that had these franchises of royal forfeitiu'es, either by charter, or by reason of their county palatine by prescription; and this is agreed by all the judges in the case of the bishop of Durham P. 12. E/iz. Dy. 288. and accordingly Hot. Pari. 1. E. 4. n. 20. 8,' sequentibiis, where by act of parliament a great many noblemen, that were of the party of .^. 6. were upon the coming of E. 4. to the crown attainted and their lands forfeited to the king; and such as were within the county palatine oi Lancas- ter ^xme.xe& to the duchy of Z^ancfirs/er, and the rest lodged in the crown; yet there is a special provision and exception of the latids within the bishoprick o{ Durham, viz. between the waters of Tyne. and Tese, and in the places called Norhamshire and Bedlingtonshire within the county of Northumberland, in which liberty and place the bishop o( Durham and his predecessors of time, whereof there is no memory, have had royal right and forfeiture of war in the right of the cathedral church of .9/. Cuthbert o{ Durham, as by concord in parliament in the time of the progenitors of our lord the king Ed- ward IV. it hath been assented. 3. Altho by the statute of 26 H. 8. and 33 H. 8. before-mentioned it is enacted, that the king shall have the forfeiture of all lands, Sf-c. of the persons attainted of treason, yet in as much as in those acts there is a saving of the rights of others, the forfeitures for all trea- sons, that were within the statute 25 E. 3. and consequently were treasons at common law, by tenant in fee-simple, are saved to the bishop of Durham, and those that have such royal franchises of for- feiture of treasons; for these stand as they did before, by the opinion of five judges agaitist four. P. 12. Eliz. Dy. 289. in the bishop of Durham'' s case. 4. But as to the forfeiture for new treasons enacted by any of those statutes the lords of franchises shall not have their franchise; this was agreed by all : but those new treasons that were enacted in the time of H. 8. or before, are all repealed by the statute of 1. Mar. cap. 1. [ 257 ] 5. But as to treasons, that stood by the statute of 25 E. 3. and therefore not repealed by 1 Mar. cap. 1. yet as to the forfeitures of tenants in tail, or of lands in the right of churches or monasteries, the person that hath jura regalia shall not have them, because the king before the act of 26 //. 8. was not entitled to the HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON^E. 057 forfeitures of those estates; and the statute of 26 H. 8. stands unre- pealed as to the forfeitures for treasons wiihin the statute of 25 E. 3. these are the points resolved in that case of 12 Rliz. And therefore it is observable, that in the statutes of 5 EHz. c. 11. whereby cli|)pina^ is made treason, tho the forfeiture of lands is only during the offender's life, and no corruption of blood, nor loss of dower, yet there are special proviso's, that ail persons, which have any lawful grant to hold and enjoy the forfeitures of lands, tene- ments, goods, or chattels of offenders, and men attaint of iiigh trea- son within any manor, lordship, town, parish, hundred, or other pre- cinct within the realm oi England and IVales shall and may at all times have like liberty to take, seize, and enjoy all such forfeitures of lands, tenements, goods, and chattels, as shall come or grow within their liberties by force of the attainder of any person upon any offense made treason by this act, as they might have done by virtue of any grant to them heretofore made. I do not find the like clause to my remembrance in any other acts of new treason either in that of 1 Mar. sess. 2. cap. 6. for counterfeit- ing the privy signet or sign manual, or in that of 1 (§• 2 F/i. <§• Mar. cap. 11. for importing foreign counterfeit coin made current by pro- clamation, or in that of 18 Eliz. cap. 1. concerning washitig of coin, nor in any of those temporary acts made for the safeguard of the queen's person, (§'C. so that upon the reason of the resolution of 12 Eliz. the patentees of goods or lands of traitors by patents granted before those acts, and particularly the bishop of Durham, Whose claim is by prescription, caiuiot have the goods or lands of persons attainted for those new treasons: vide 13 Eliz. cap. 16, a special provision in the act of attainder of the earl of IVeslmoreland and others for the rebellion in the North, that the queen shall have and hold against the bishop o{ Durham and his sue- [ 258] cessors the lands, tenements, goods and chattels of the per- sons attainted wuhin the county palatine and franchise of the said bishop. Nay, I cannot see how the bishop of Durham can either by his antient charters or prescription claim the goods or lands of persons attaint for bringing in counterfeit coin contrary to the statute of 25 E. 3. for it seems that that was not treason at common law, as may reasonably appear by what has been before said touching that subject. [3] See a learned treatise, intitutled, Considerations on the Law of Forfeitures for High Treason; (supposed to be) written by the Hon. Cha.Yorke, sometime Attorney General to King George III. and atlerwards Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, per totum. Wilson. [3] The clause in the 1 Ann. c.21.and that in the 17 Geo. 2. c. 39. limiting the periods when forfeiture for treason should be abolished, are repealed by the 39 Geo. 3. c. 93. So that forfeiture remains in England as at common law, in the cases of treason and mur- der; in other crimes, no attainder, by the 54 Geo. 3. c. 145. shall extend to the disinherit- ing of any heir. See Consider, on the Law of Forfeitures, by Yorke. 2 Hawk. c. 119. 4 Bl. Com. 381. 3 Burn's Just. {edit, of 1845.) 106. 258 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. CHAPTER XXIV. CONCERNING DECLARING OF TREASONS BY PARLIAMENT, AND THOSE TREASONS THAT WERE ENACTED OR DECLARED BY PARLIAMENT BETWEEN THE 25 OF E. 3. AND THE 1 MAR. Altho the order of the statute leads us to consider of petit treason in the next place, yet because I intend to absolve the whole dis- course of high treason and naisprision of treason, before I descend to crimes of an inferior nature, I shall proceed to a full consideration of the whole matter specially relating to high treason, and so far as the same is not common to other capital offenses: the statute therefore proceeds, ''And because many other like cases of treason may hap- pen in time to come, which a man cannot think nor declare at this present time, it is accorded, that if any other case supposed treason, which is not above specified, doth happen before any justice, the jus- tice shall tarry without going to judgment of the treason, till the cause be shewed and declared before the king and his parliament, |[ 259 ]] whether it ought to be judged treason or other felony; and \{ per case any man of this realm ride armed covertly or secretly with men of arms against any other to slay him or rob him, or take him or detain hiiTi, till he hath made fine or ransom to have his deliverance, it is not the mind of the king or his council, that in such case it shall be judged treason, but shall be judged felony or trespass according to the law of the land of old time used, and ac- cording as the case requireth, (§'c." This clause consists of two parts, the former, how treasons not specially declared by this statute shall for the future be settled. 2. It declareth, that a particular offense therein mentioned, that was in truth formerly held to be treason, shall not for the future be taken to be so. As to the former of these clauses touching the declaring of trea- sons not declared by this act, I shall pursue the history thereof at large in what follows, only at present I shall subjoin these few ob- servations. 1. The great wisdom and care of the parliament to keep judges within the bounds and express limits of this act, and not to suffer them to run out upon their own opinions into constructive treasons, iho in cases, that seem to have a parity of reason {like cases of trea- son) but reserves them to the decision of parliament: this is a great security, as well as direction, to judges, and a great safeguard even to this sacred act itself. And therefore, as before I observed in the chapter of levying of war, this clause of the statute leaves a weighty memento for judges to be careful, that they be not over hasty in letting m constructive or interpretative treasons, not within the letter of the law, at least in HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 259 such new cases, as have not been formerly expressly resolved and settled by more than one precedent. 2. That the authoritative decision of these casus omissi is reserv- ed tothe king and his parliament, viz. the king and both his houses of parliament, and the most regular and ordinary way is to do it by a bill declaratively; and therefore aliho we meet with some declarations by the lords house alone in some particular [ 260 ]] cases, as in that of the earl of Northumberland, anno 5 H. 4. and that of Talbot 17 B. 2. tho they be decisions and judgments of great weight, yet they are not authoritative declarations to serve this act of 25 E. 3. but it must be by the king and both houses of parlia- ment. As to the latter oi these, it has been formerly discussed in the second chapter. This, at common law, was held treason, and the particular reason of the adding thereof in this place was, in effect, to reverse the judg- ment given in B. R. P. 2\ E. 3. Rot. 23. in Sir John Gorbegge's case;(a) and touching this whole matter of riding armed, <5*c. vide qux dicta sunt supra cap. 14. p. 135. (§• seq. Only the printed statute varies from the parliament-roll of 25 E. 3. p. 2. n. 17. for whereas it is printed in the late statutes [covertly or secretly) the parliament roll is chivach arme descovert ou secret- ment, and accordingly the old written manuscript statutes are writ- ten thus, chivach arme descovert ou en privy en le realm 4"C., which misprmting possibly hath made some mistakes in judgments given of high treason, as if to ride privily and covertly upon such a private attempt were not treason; but to ride discovert, openly, were treason, when in truth neither in one case or the other it is treason, neither at this day nor at common law, if it be only upon a particular or pri- vate quarrel, as in the case of 20 ^. 1. between the earls of G/ouces/er and Hereford;[b) and this of Gerbegge, tho it were more guerrino <§• vexillis explicatis. But now to resume what is before promised, r;/r. touching the first matter, namely treasons not declared by the statute of 25 E. 3. we shall find, that between that statute and 1 Mar. there were treasons enacted or declared of these kinds: 1. Such as were simply declarative treasons, or so many exposi- tions of the statute of 25. E. 3. 2. There were new treasons, that were simply enacted, and not declared only that were perpetual in their institution, but repealed by the statute of 1 Marias. 3. There were new treasons, that seem only temporary or fitted to the reigns of those kings, in whose time they were [261 ] made. 4. There were some treasons, that were perpetual, but more ex- plicite declarations or rather expositions of the statute of 25 E. 3. which yet stand repealed by the statute of 1 Mar. (a) Videavlea p. 80^183. (6) Supra p. 135. Ryl. piac.parl. p. 11. 261 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. And here 1 must advise the reader to take notice of these cau- tions. 1. Because the hereafter mentioned statutes are many, and con- sisting of divers clauses, that he rely not barely upon the abstracts thereof here given, because possibly there may be mistakes or omis- sions in those abstracts, but peruse the statutes themselves in the boolfs at large. 2. That tho generally it be a fair topical argument, that when offenses are made treasons by new and temporary acts, they were not treasons within the statute of 25 E. 3, for if they were, they needed not to have been enacted to be treason by new statutes, as introduc- tive of new laws in such cases; yet that doth not hold universally true, for some things are enacted to be treason by new, yea and temporary laws, which yet were treason by the statute of 25 E. 3. as will appear in the sequel. And therefore the statutes of 1 <§- 2 Ph. { \\ Sf 2\ R.2. are repealed. And tho those opinions of the judges Tresilian, Thirlinge and the rest had the countenance of the parliament of 21 R. 2. yet they had the discountenance of the parliament of 11 iff. 2. and 1 //. 4. which repealed the parliament of 21 R. 2. and stand at this day unrepealed in their full strength, excepting only such treasons as were newly made, or newly declared by those parliaments: tho the statutes of 1 E. 6. and 1 Mar. have taken away those treasons, which either the statute of 11 ^. 2. or 1 H. 4. had introduced more than were in the statute of 25 E. 3. yet it hath not taken away the (A) Co. P. C. p. 22. 266 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. efficacy of the parliaments of 11 7?. 2. and 3 H. 4. as to their decla- rations, that the extrajudicial opinions of those judges were false and erroneous; but in that respect the parliaments of 1 H. 4. and 11 7?. 2. are of force, as to the damning of those extravagant and unwarrantable opinions and declarations. I come now to the time of Henry IV. wherein I find little: in anno primo in parliament inter Placila Coronse, John Hall wdiS convict before the lords in parliament of the murder of the duke of Gloucester, and judgment given by the \oxAs per assent dn ray, that altho it were only murder, yet the offender should have the judg- ment of high treason, viz. to be drawn, hanged, embovvelled, [ 267 ] his bowels burnt, his head cut off, and quartered, and his head sent to Cnlice, where the murder was committed, which was executed by the marshal accordingly: this was no decla- ration of treason, but a transcendent punishment of the murder of so eminent a person. 1 H. 4. cap. 10. " It is accorded, that in no time to come any treason be judged otherwise than it was ordained by the statute of king Edward III," Tliis at once swept away all the extravagant treasons introduced in the time of R. 2. either in over much favour of popularity, or over much flattery to prerogative, for they were of both sorts. Rot. Pari. 5 H. 4. n. 12. There is a declaration of an acquittal of the earl of Northumberland from treason; quod vide antea cap. 14. p. 136. but I find no declaration nor act of new treason, in the time of H 4. he was as good as his promise by the act of 1 H. 4. cap. 10. for he contented himself with the declaration made by 25 E. 3. In the time of H 5. By the statute of 2 H. 5. cap. 6. " It is ordained and declared that manslanghter, robbery, spoiling, breaking of truce, and safe- conducts, and voluntary receipt, abetment, procurement, concealing, hiring, sustaining, and maintainitig of such persons to be done in time to come by any of the king's subjects within England, Ireland, or PVales, or upon the main sea shall be judged and determined treason done against the king's crown and dignity ; and the conser- vator of the truce to have power by the king's commission and by the commission of the admiral to inquire thereof:" But this statute as to treason is particularly repealed by the statute of 20 H 6. cup. 11. but whether the general statutes of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. 1 Mar. cap. 1. had repealed it as to treasons done upon the sea may be a question, because it hath been ruled, that those statutes extend not as to trials of treason done upon the sea by the statute of 28 H. 8. cap. 1,5. de quo infra. The statute of 3 H. 5. cap 6 S,- 7. it is true, is a declarative law, that clipping, washing and filing the king's coin is treason within the statute of 25 E. 3. and judges of assise and justices of [ 268 1 peace have cognisance thereof; but even this declarative HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 268 law is repealed by the statute of 1 Mar. as it is declared in the statute of 5. Eliz. de quo an tea. As to the judgment of treason given in Sir John Oldcaslle^s case Rot. Pari. 5 H. 5. par. 1. n. U. tho the judgment be given in par- liament, yet it is barely upon the account of compassing the king's death, and of levying of war, which was expressly within the statute of 25. E. 3. as appears before, cap. 14. p. 142. Touching the times of H. 6. Rot. Pari. 2. H. 6. n. 18. It appears, that John Mortimer was committed for suspicion of treason against H. 5. and 23 Feb. 2 i/. 6. brake prison, and escaped, for which he was indicted 25 Feb. 2 H. 6. at GuHdhall, London, before commissioners o{ oyer and terminer setting forth the matter, and that prisonam prxdictam, falso 8^- volun- tarie /regit; the record by the king's command was sent into parlia- ment, and by the king's commissioner ad tenendum parliament iim^ and the lords at the request of the commons, it was affirmed a good, indictment, and Mortimer liad judgment to be drawn, hanged, and quartered, and his lands and goods forfeited to the king by the judg- ment of the lieutenant, lords, and commons, by an act made then for that purpose. This it is true was an authoritative declaration of treason in this particular case pursuant to the clause of the statute of 25 E. 3. But it rested not here, for in the same parliament, n. 60. a general statute passed, "Que si ascun person soite indite, appelle ou prise par suspicion de grand treason and pur cest cause soit commisse & detenus in prison & escape volunterement hors du dit prison, que tiel escape soit adjudge and declare treason, si tiel person ent soit duement attaint selon la ley de terre. Et eient les seigneurs de fee en tiel cas les eschetes and forfeitures de terres & tenements de eux tenus par tiel persons issint attaints, come de ceux, que sont attaints de petit trea- son; Et teigne cest estatute lieu & effect del 20 'our de Octobre dar- rein passe tanque al prochein parliament. " Ro'. Soit fait, come est desyre par la petition.". This parliament began 20 Oct. 2. H. 6. [ 269 ] The tilings observable hereupon are these, 1. That to rescue a person, that is a traitor, out of prison was treason at com- mon law, and so continues at this day within the statute of 25 E. 3. 2 Co. Instil, p. 589. and 1 H. 6. 5. b. 2. But if a man committed for treason breaks prison and escapes, this is not treason at common law. ■ 3. Tho it be felony by the statute de frangentibus prisonam, yet it is not made treason by that statute. 4. But if it were treason by that statute, yet it is corrected and made not treason by the statute of 25 E. 3. and 1 H.A. and therefore in this case it was made treason merely by the judgment of parliament, and statute of 2 H. 6, was but temporary and expired by the next parliament. 5. That the judg- ment itself in Mortimer'' s case, tho an authoritative declaration, was not at all binding in other cases for two reasons, 1. Because it is checked and controled as to any such effect by the general act of par- liament of 2 //. 6. which was to continue only to the next parlia- 269 HISTORY PLACITORUM CORONA. ment; and 2. Because it was but a particular judgment of parlia- ment in that particular case, to wliich it was particularly applied. But howsoever, that question is now put out of question by the general act of 1 Mar. cap. 1. which enervates the force of this judg- ment and declaration; for 1 A/«r. repeals declarative laws of treasons as well as enacting laws, and leaves the judges to judge strictly ac- cording to the statute of 25 E. 3. as if no such judgment had been given in parliament. 2 Co. Instit. p. 589. and therefore it seems strange to me, that the judges took any notice of 2 H. 6. in Bensted's case to ground any opinion ou.{i) And therefore, aUho in the late act of attainder of the earl of Straf- ford, there was a proviso added, that it should not be construed, that the treasons therein cFiarged should be a rule for judges to proceed by, in other cases, it seems a cautious but needless proviso, [7 0] because it was a particular judgment, that did not egredi personam, and no general declarative law to serve the statute of 25 E. 3. For there may be collateral reasons not only in policy, but in justice sometimes for a parliament to vary the punish- ment of crimes, in substance the same, when differenced by circum- stances, in several persons. 8 H. 6. cap. 6. Burning of houses maliciously or wickedly to ex- tort sums of money from those, whom the malefactors spare, is made high treason with a retrospect to the first year of the king's reign, saving to the lords their liberties, as in case of felony. Two things are observable upon this act, 1. That had it not been specially provided against, the lords had lost their eschetes by mak- ing it treason. 2. That this act, tho perpetual in its constitution, yet was repealed by 1 Mar. cap. 1. and alter that repeal it remained felony, as it was before, and so continues to this day. Rot. Pari. 11 H. %. n. 43. A petition that John Carpenter, who had committed a barbarous murder upon his wife, for wliich he was outlawed and in prison in the king's bench, might for example's sake by authority of parliament be judged a traitor, and that the judges might give judgment against him to be drawn and hanged, saving to the lords their eschetes. Ro'. Pur ceo, quil semble encountre le liberty de seint esglis le roy se avisera. 20 H. 6. cap. 3. Thecomingof people out of fFa/e* or the marches of the same into the counties adjacent, and taking and driving away cattle, and their abettors and receivers knowing thereof, is made treason against the king, saving to the lords marchers, of whom the offenders, receivers, or abetters held their lands, the forfeiture thereof and of their goods and chatties, when attainted ; this act was to con- ti'nue for six years : nota, the lords had lost their eschetes and for- (i) Cro. Car. 563. Janes 455. It was tlie case in 1 //. 6. 5. h. and not the statute of 2 //. 6. on vvliicli the jiulfres {rrouiidcd their opinion, altlio as tliat opinion is exprcst in Cro. Car. 583. and KeL 77. viz. that the breaking of a prison, wherein traitors be, is high treason, tho the parties did not know, that there were traitors there, is not warranted by' that case, which is of one, who brake prison, knoiving certain persons to be j^i'isoners in the said prison for treason. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONvE. 270 feiture of the offenders goods, if it had not been specially provided for, because made treason and a new treason, which was not before, for the lords marchers had not only forfeiture of goods of felons, but royal eschetes and forfeiture of traitors goods for the most part; but that franchise, which was by prescription, could [271 ] not extend to new treasons. I find nothing more relating to this matter in the time of Henry VI. The impeachment of the duke of Suffolk by the commons for treasons and misdemeanors contained many articles of high treason wiihin the statute of 25 E. 3. namely, adhering to the king's ene- mies; but the whole matter being at last left to the king, he was declared by the king clear of the treasons, and for the rest the king by a kind of composition ordered liim to be banished for five years. Rot. Pari. 28 H. 6 n. 18, 19, 20, S^-c. As to the reigns of Edward IV. and Richard III. tho in those great revolutions, that happened in the latter end of Henry VI. the beginning of Edward IV. the time of Richard III. there are many acts of attainder of treason of particular persons, that adhered to either party then contending for the crown, according as the success of war fell to one side or the other, as namely Rot. Pari. 38 H. 6. n. 1. — 36, &,-c. many of the duke of York's party were attainted of treason by act of parliament. Rot. Pari. 1 E. 4. n. 6. — 15, <§'C. the numerous companies of the party of Henry VI. were attainted by parliament; the like was done in the short regress of H. Q. 11 E. 4. in a parliament held in that short resumption of the crown by Henry VI. Again, the like was done in the parliament of 12 E. 4. upoti the regress and re-expulsion of Henry VI. Again, Rot. Pari, 1 R. 3. divers persons of great quality, that opposed the pretensions of Richard III. were attainted by act of parliament; and the like was again done in the parliament of 1 H. 7. against the assistants of Richard III. Every new revolution occasioned the attainder by parliament of the most considerable of the adverse party ; yet in all this time I find no general declaration or general enacting of new treasons by parliament. I come to the time of Henry VII. In this time I find but one new treason, namely the statute of 4 H. 7. cap. IS. whereby the counterfeiting of foreign coin made current in this realm is made high treason. . But this act was repealed by the statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. and 1 Mar. cap. 1. and another act made to the same pur- [ 272 ~\ pose in 1 Mar. sess. 2. cap. 6. This wise prince duly considering the various revolutions, that had formerly happened in this kingdom touching the crown especially to the houses of Fork and Lancaster, and that every success of any party presently subjected all that opposed the conqueror, to the pen- alties of treason ; and weighing that, altho by his marriage with the heir of the house of York, he had reasonably well secured his pos- session of the crown, yet otherwise his title, as in his own right, was 272 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. not without some difficulties; he therefore made a law, not to enact treason, but to give some security against it, viz. 11 //. 7. cap. L " That all persons, that attend upon the king and sovereign lord of this land for the time being in his person, and do him true and faith- ful service of alligeance in the same, or be in other places by his commandment in the wars within this land or v/ithout, that for the said deed and true duty of alligeance he or they shall be in no wise convict or attaint of high treason, nor of other otfenses for that cause by act of parliament, or otherwise by any process of law, whereby he or any of them shall now forfeit life, lands, tenements, rents^ pos- sessions, hereditaments, goods, chatties, or any other thing, but be for that service utterly discharged of any vexation, trouble, or loss; and if any act or acts, or other process of law hereafter thereupon for the same happen to be made contrary to this ordinance, that then that act or acts or other process of law whatsoever they be, stand and be utterly void; provided always, that no .person or persons shall take any benefit or advantage by this act, which shall hereafter decline from his or their said alligeance." Upon this act these things are observable. 1. That this act was not temporary or for the life of king Henri/ VII. but was perpetual, and extended to all succeeding kings and queens of this realm, for it is for attendants upon the king or sove- reign lord of this land for the tirne being. 2. It is observable, that this act extendeth to a king de [ 273 ] facto, tho not de Jure, for in truth such was Henri/ VII. for his wife was the right heir to the crown, and his regal power was principally by an act of parliament made 1 H. 7. before his intermarriage with his queen, tho both titles were derived to his descendants, viz. Henry VIII. and in default of issue, to his sister, from whom our present sovereign is descended : and this act, tho extended to his successors, which were kings de jure, as well as de facto, yet was made for the security of himself and his servants in the first place, which appeareth more fully also by the preamble. 3. That tho this act might secure the attendants on the king in his wars against impeachments in an ordinary course of law, and might, as to this purpose, exempt them from the danger of any treason by the statute of 25 E. 3. as adherers to the king's enemies, yet it was a vain provision against future acts of parliament, whose hands could not be bound by a former act from repealing it, or taking away the effect thereof in part or in all. It is true, since that time this kingdom hath had no great experi- ence of changes of this nature, nor need to make use of the advan- tage of this statute: it is true queen Mary began her reign 6 July, 1553, she was crowned 6 Octob. following, her first session of parlia- ment began 5 Octob. 1553. which was the day before her coronation, and the second session thereof was held by prorogation 24 Octob, 1 Mar. Upon that 6th of July, which was the day of king Edward^s death, and before queen Mary was actually settled, the lady JanQ HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 273 Gray set up a title for herself, and continued in some kind of regal power, until the 1st of Jlugust following, and during those twenty- four days the styles of deeds, statutes and other things (and possibly also processes) were made in her name, and a special act was made 1 Mar. sess. 2 cap. 4. to make them effectual, and to be pleadable in the style, name, and year of queen Mary ; so that the lady Jane seemed an intruder for about twenty-four days; but the truth is, she was not so much as an usurper, or a queen de facto: and these her assistants in that business, viz. the archbishop of [ 274 ] Canterbury, the duke of Northitmberland, the said lady Jane and divers others were attainted before commissioners of oyer and terminer ; and those attainders confirmed by parliament I Mar. sess. 2. cap. 16. and note in that act of attainder a special proviso, that the possessions of the archbishopriek of Canterbury should not he forfeited by that attainder or act of parliament; possibly they thought that the general words of that act, or at least the statutes of 26 H. 8. and 33 H. 8. which gave forfeitures for treason against successors, and were not repealed by 1 Mar. might otherwise have forfeited the lands of the archbishopriek by the attainder of the arch- bisop; but of this supra cap. 23. p. 252. 4. But what was the meaning of the proviso in that act of 11 H. 7. " That no pei-sons shall have the benefit of this act who shall decline from his alligeance," is dark and dubious. But these questions never failed to be soon decided on the victor's part by their parliaments, which were always obsequious enough in these matters to the victor, and ready to pass acts of attainders for his safety and their own, against which no security was, nor could be given by this act of 11 //. 7. I come now to the reign of Henry VIII. which was a reign wherein acts concerning treason were exceedingly multiplied, and they are of three kinds: 1. Such acts, as constituted or declared treason. 2. Such acts, as concerned the trial of treason. 3, Such as concerned the punishment or forfeiture of treason. By the statute of 22 H. 8. cap. 9. Ricfiard Rose for wilful poison- ing of dingers persons is by authority of parliament attainted of high treason, and that he be boiled to death: and by authority of parlia- ment murder by wilful poisoning is made treason for the future, and the offender to be boiled to death, and not to have benefit of the clergy: justices of peace to have power to inquire of this offense, and also of counterfeiting coin of any foreign kingdom, suffered to be current here, the title of lords to eschete of the lands of offenders in poisoning is saved to them (A-) This treason is repealed by 1 Mar. cap. 1. and the same [275] remains felony as before. By 26 H. cap. 13. " Maliciously to wish, will, or desire by words or writing, or by craft to imagine, invent, practise, or attempt any bodily harm to the king, queen, or their heirs apparent, to deprive Qi) Co. P. C. p. 48, 275 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. them, ov any of them of their dignity, title, or name, or slanderously, or riialicionsly to publish by express writing, or words, that the king our sovereign lord is an heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel, or usurper, or rebelliously to detain any of his castles, &c. in this realm, or other his dominions, or rebelliously to detain or keep any of liis ships, ammunition, or artillery, and do not humbly render the said casiles, fortresses, ships, or artillery, to our sovereign lord, his heirs or successors, or such as shall be deputed by them, within six days after they be commanded thereunto by proclamation under the great seat, is enacted to be treason in the offenders, their aiders, counsellors, consenters and abetters: foreign treason to be tried in any connty, where the king shall appoint by commission," 1. It should seem, that this act was intended to be perpetual, for in it and the subsequent clause of forfeitures it mentions the king, his heirs and successors. 2. Part of this seems to be treason by the sta- tute of 25 E. 3. viz. the practising any bodily harm, if there be an overt-act, and also the rebellious detaining of the king's castles after summons by proclamation; the rest are purely new treasons. 3. But whether it was temporary or perpetual, all treason resting singly, as enacted by authority of this act, is repealed by 1 E. 6. and 1 Mar. and yet the latter clause(/) concerning .forfeiture in relation to all treasons within 25. E. 3. stands unrepealed; de quo vide supra 4' infra. By 27 H. 8. cap. 2. counterfeiting privy seal, privy signet, or sign manual is made treason, and the offenders, their counsellors, aiders, and abetters to suffer and forfeit, as in case of treason; this is repealed by 1 Mar. cap. 1. and then re-enacted by 1 Mar. cap. 6. By 25H. 8. cap. 22. the divorce between the king and queen [276 3 C'<7//j«r//ie is affirmed by parliament, and also the marriage between him andr^nne Bullen, and the crown with all dig- nities, honours, pre-eminences, prerogatives, authorities, and juris- dictions to the same annext or belonging, is entailed after the king's death to the heirs of his body lawfully begotten, viz. to the first, second, and other sons of the king and of the said queen Jlnne, and to the heirs of their bodies successively; and for want of s«ch issue male, to the heirs male of the king, and the heirs of their several bodies; and for want of such issue, to the lady Elizabeth, their daughter and the heirs of her body, and so to their second, third and other daughters; and for want of such issue, to the king's right heirs. " If any by writing, printing, or exterior act maliciously do or procure any thing to the peril of the king's person, or to the disturb- ance of the king's enjoyment of the crown, or to the prejudice or derogation of the marriage between him and queen Anne, or to the peril, slander, or disherison of any of the issues or heirs made by this act inheritable to the crown, it shall be high treason. " If any bywords without writing, <5'C. maliciously publish any {I) By this laUer clause the offender, S^c. sliall forfeit to the kingf, his heirs and succes- Bors all hinds, tencnicnts, and iicreditaaicnts of any estate of inheritance in use or pos- session, by any right, title, or means. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 276 thing to the slander of the said marriage between the king and queen Anne, or to the slander or disherison of the issues of the king's body begotten on the said queen Anne, or other heirs inheritable to the crown, by virtue of this act, it shall be misprision of treason :" an oath is appointed to be taken in pursuance hereof, and the refusers are guilty of misprision of treason; provision is made for the custody of the heir of the crown during minority. 28 H. 8. cap. 7. the last act is repealed, and all intermediate of- fenses against that act in relation to queen Anne or the lady Eliza- beth pardoned; <\\\Q%wAnne and others attainted of treason; the mar- riage between the king and queen Catharine annulled and judged void, and the issues between them to be illegitimate; the marriage between the king and queen ./^«;?e judged void by sentence of divorce of the archbishop; the Same sentence confirmed, and the marriage with queen Anne judged and declared null and void, and tlie issues between them declared illegitimate and excluded from inhe- riting the crown: Levitical degrees settled. Children be- [277] tween the king and queen Jane shall be adjudged the king's lawful children, and inheritable to the crown; the crown entailed to king Henry VIII. and the heirs of his body lawfully begotten, that is to say, to the first, second,.and other sons of the king on the body of queen Jane begotten, and the heirs of their bodies severally; and in default of such issue male, then to the first son and heir male of his body, and so to the second and other sons in tail; and for the want thereof, to the first and other issue female between the king and queen Jane in tail; and for want of such issue, to the king's first and other issue female in tail; and for lack of issue of the king's body, to such person, and in such manner as he shall appoint by his last will or letters patent ; provision against disturbances of the heir of his body so nominated under pain of treason; "And if any shall by words, writing, printing, or other exterior act directly or indirectly do or procure maliciously any thing to the peril of the person of the king, his heirs or successors having the royal estate of the crown, or ma- Uciously or willingly by words, c^-c. give occasion, whereby the king, his heirs or successors might be interrupted of the crown, or for the interruption, repeal or adnullation of this act, or the king's disposal of the crown according to it, or to the slander, disturbance, or dero- gation of the marriage between the king and queen Jane, or any other lawful wife, which he shall hereafter marry, or to the peril, slander, or disherison of any of the issues and heirs of the king limited to be inheritable to the crown, or to whom the king shall by autho- rity of this act dispose it, or that affirm, c^'C. the marriage between the king and queen Catharine, or between the king and queen Anne to be good, or slander the sentences of divorce above said, or publish their issues to be the king's lawful children, or shall attempt to de- prive the king, the queen, or any made inheritable to the crown by this act, or to whom the king by authority of this act shall dispose thereof, of their titles, styles, names, degrees, or royal estate or regal power, or refuse to take an oath to answer such [ 278 ~\ questions, as shall be objected to them upon any clause of 278 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. this act, or after taking the oath do contemptuously refuse to answer such interrogatories, as shall be objected concerning the same, or shall refuse to take the oath enjoined by this act, they, their aiders, counsellors, maintainers and abetters shall be guilty of treason, and forfeit all their lands, S,'C. and all sanctuary excluded." The form of the oath is set down in the act, and power is given to the king by will to dispose of the custody of the king's issue within age. It is made treason to disturb such disposal, and also power is given to the king to dispose or give by will, (§'C. to any of his blood any title, style, name, honors, tenements, or hereditaments. No/a, This act doubted whether the attempting any thing in par- liament against the marriage of queen Jinne might not bring them in danger of the act of 25 H. 8. and therefore took care both to repeal the act, and to discharge and pardon what had been attempted against it. The clause enabling the king to dispose of any honours or lands to those of his blood by will was necessary, for without such an enabling act of parliament the king could not dispose thereof by will, but only by letters patent under the great seal, or for lands parcel of the duchy o{ Lancaster under the seal of the duchy. But it seems, that as to the disposal of lands belonging to the crown or duchy by letters patent under these respective seals, the king had power without this act, or the 35 H. 8. cap. 1. to dispose thereof, and to bind his successors. And this by reason of the special penning of those acts, which, as I think, did not entail the lands, that the king had in jure coronss or injure diicatus Lancastrise, but only limits the succession of the crown and of the dignities, honors, prerogatives, pre-eminences, authorities, or jurisdictions to the same annext or belonging, which are but so many expressions of the parts or incidents of the regal dignity, and not of the lands or possessions of the crown, but those rested in the crown in fee-simple, as they were before those acts made. And hence it is, that in the several acts of 34 H. S. cap. [279 ] 21. 1 £?. 6. cap. 8. 18 Eliz. cap. 2. 35 Eliz. cap. 3. 43 Eliz. cap. 1. for confirmation of letters patent, there is no' clause to make them good, notwithstanding the entail of the crown, for it was not needful; but the lands granted by king Henri/ VIII. Ediuard VI. queen Mary., queen Elizabeth, stand eflectual without any such confirmation, and yet the entail of the crown by these acts continued till the death of queen Elizabeth, at which time it was spent, and king James succeeded to the crown as the true heir thereof, without the help of any entail or nomination by Henry VIII. And yet after all this the whole scheme was altered by the statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 1. for thereby after recital of the statute of 28 H. 8 and that the king had issue by queen Jane prince Edward, and the king had since married the lady Catharine ; It is enacted, "That if the king and prince Edward die without heirs of either of their HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 279 bodies, the crown shall remain to the lady Mary and the heirs of her body under such conditions, as shall be limited by the king by his letters patent, or his last will; and for want of such issue, or upon breach of such conditions, to the lady Elizabeth and the heirs of her body under such conditions, as shall be limited by the king by his last will or letters patent; and in default of such issue, or upon breach of such conditions, to such persons and ibr such estates, as the king shall limit by his will or letters patent. This act repeals the former oath of 28 H. 8. and directs the form of a new oath to be taken for the extirpation of the pope's pretended supremacy,. and limits it to be taken by all that sue livery, have any office of the king's gift, receive orders, take degrees, and by all per- sons whom the king, (§'C. shall appoint, and that it shall be treason in such, who obstinately refuse to take the oath. It is also enacted, "That if any person by words, writing, printing, or exterior act maliciously or willingly do or procure any thing directly or indirectly for the repeal, annullation or interruption of this act, or any thing therein contained, or of any thing that shall be done by the king in the limitation of the crown to be [280] made as aforesaid, or to the peril, disherison or slander of any of the issues and heirs of the king being limited by this act to inherit and to be inheritable to the crown, or to the disherison or in- terruption of any person, to whom the crown is by this act, or shall be limited by the king as aforesaid, whereby they may be destroyed or interrupted in body or title of the inheritance of the crown, the same shall be high treason in the offenders, their maintainers, aiders, counsellors, and abetters, saving to all persons, other than the par- ties attainted, their heirs and successors, all rights, S^c. in the lands of the persons attaint." And note, that notwithstanding the caution used in the act of 28 H. 8. for the pardon of the attempting to repeal the act of 25 H. 8. no such care was thought necessary here for the attempt or procure- ment to alter the law by act of parliament; for as it could not be restrained by a precedent act, so neither was it concerned within the penalty. And thus much for those treasons, that related to the succession of the crown, which I have put together, notwithstanding many of them come after those other acts, which I shall hereafter mention. [1] [1] Of the statutes of treason passed in the reigfn of Henry 8, Hume says, they were multiplied beyond all former precedent. Even words to the disparagement of the king, queen, or royal issue, were subjected to that penalty; and so little care was taken in framing those rigorous statutes that tiiey contain obvious contradiclions; insomuch that had they been strictly executed, every man without exception must have fallen under the penalty of treason. By one statute, for instance, it was declared treason to assert the validity of the king's marriage, either with Catherine of Arragon, or Anne Bolyn ; by an- other, it was treason to say any thing to the disparagement or slander of the princesses Mary and Elizabelh; and to call them spurious, would no doubt have been construed to their slander. Nor would even a profound silence with regard to these delicate points be able to save a person from such penalties. For by the former statute, whoever refused to answer upon oath to any point contained in that act was subjected to the pains of treason. The king therefore, needed only propose to any one a question with regard to the legality 280 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. By the 28 H. 2. cap. 10. which was the great concluding act against the papal authority, the asserting or maintaining of the papal autho- rity is brought within the statute of prsemttnire, and he that obsti- nately refuseth the taking of the oath of abjuration thereby enacted, is subjected to the penalty of high treason. By 28 H. 8. cap. IS. marrying any of the king's children or re- puted children, or his sisters, or aunts of the father's part, or the children of the king's brethren, or sisters without the king's license under his great seal, or deflowering of any of them, is enacted to be treason. By 31 H. 8. cap. 8, the king and council's proclamation concern- ing religion or other matters are to be obeyed under such penalties, as they shall think requisite; they, that disobey them and then go beyond sea contemptuously to avoid answering such offense, ["281 ] shall be guilty of treason, <§'c. saving to every person, other than the offenders, their heirs and successors, all right, S,^c. By 32 H. 8. cap. 25. the marriage between the king and hdy ^/inne Cleve, which had been dissolved by the sentence of convocation, was confirmed by parliament, with liberty for each party to marry else- where: if any by writing, printing, or exterior act, word, or deed, accept, take, judge, or believe the said marriage to be good, or attempt any thing for the repeal or adnuUation of this act, it shall be high treason in them, their aiders, counsellors, abetters, or maintam- ers, saving the rights of all, other than the oflenders, their heirs and successors; and all persons that have acted against the said marriage are pardoned. By 33 H. 8. cap. 21. Queen Catharine Howard was attainted of high treason, and all persons that had acted against her were pardon- ed : any woman, whom the king or his successors shall intend to take to wife, thinking her a pure and clean maid, if she be not so, and shall willingly couple herself in marriage to the king notwithstanding, without discovering it to the king before marriage, shall be guilty of high treason; and if any other know it and reveal it not, it shall be misprision of treason: the queen or prince's wife soUiciting any per- son to have carnal knowledge of her, or any person solliciting the queen or prince's wife to have carnal knowledge of her, is treason in them respectively, their counsellors, aiders and abetters. By 35 //. 8. cap. 3. The king's style (Henricus octaviis Dei gratia Angliffi, Francia) & Hiberniec rex,Jidei defensor, 4' in terra ecclesias Anglicaiise & IliberniaB supremum, caput) is united and annexed to the imperial crown of England; and if any shall imagine to deprive the king, queen, prince, or the heirs of the king's body, or any to whom the crown is or shall be limited, of any of their titles, styles, names, degrees, royal estate, or regal power annext to the crown uf of cither of his first rnarriagres; if the person was silent, he was a traitor by law; if he an- swered either in the ncg-alivc or in tlic affirmative, he was no less a traitor. So mon- strous were the inconsistencies which arose from the furious passions of the king, and the slavish submission ofliis parliaments. Hisl. Engl. vol. Y.p. G40. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. 281 England, it shall be high treason, saving the right of all other than the offenders, their heirs and successors. And thus far concerning the Several treasons enacted in [ 282] this king's time, all which are nevertheless now abrogated and repealed by 1 E. 6. and 1 Mar. as shall be shewn. II. There are several acts of parliament in this king's time, which concern trials of treason, some of which are in force at this day, and not repealed by any statute. By 26 H. 8. cap. 6. The treason concerning counterfeiting, wash- ing, clipping and minishing of money current within this realm, as likewise other felonies committed in Wales or the marches thereof, may be heard and determined before justices of goal-delivery in the next English county; but note, this extends not to other treasons, nor, at this day, to clipping or minishing the coin ; for the acts, that made them treason at that time, viz. 3 H. 5. and 4 H. 7. stand now repealed, and the statutes of 5 Eliz. cap. 11. for clipping, and 18 E/iz. cap. 1. for minishing the coin, direct it to be tried by the course and order of the law; and so it is also for counterfeiting of foreign coin by the statute of 1 Mar. yea, and as to counterfeiting the coin of this kingdom, or any other offense touching coin, by the statute of 1 <^' 2 F. €>' M. cap. 11. the indictment and trial is directed to be according to the course of the common law; so that as to coin also the statute of 26 H. 8. is now out of doors. 28 H. 8. cap. 15. For trial of treason committed upon the high sea before the admiral, 8j-c. by commission under the great seal ; this statute. as to trial of treason upon the sea stands unrepealed by 1 Mar. and whether as to treasons committed in any rivers, or ports, or creeks within the bodies of counties, it be not repealed by 1 4- 2 P. (§• M. cap. 10. or by the statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 2. for trial of foreign treasons, is considerable. By 32 H. 8. cap. 4. Treasons and misprisions of treason committed in Wales, ox in other places where the king's writ doth not run, shall be tried before such commissioners of oyer and terminer, as tlie king shall appoint, as if committed in the same counties into which the commission is directed. This is repealed by the statute of 1 4' 2 P. ^- M. cap. 10. cited to be so adjudged in H. 14 Eliz.{vi) Co. P. C.p. 24. [283] because it is done within this realm, and so may be tried in Wales. 33 H. 8. cap. 20. Concerning the proceeding touching the enquiry and trial of treason committed by persons, that become lunatic after the treason committed, without putting them to answer, and touch- ing the execution of persons attainted of treason, and afterwards becoming lunatic, is repealed by the stattUe of 1 4' 2 P. (5* M. cap. 10. vide Co. P. C.p. 4 4' 6. both as to the indictment and as to the trial; but the forfeiture of persons attainted of treason, as to old treasons, stands in force. (jn) Lord Lumley^s case. 283 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 33 H. 8. cap. 23. Treason or misprision of treason or murder com- mitted by a person examined before three of the council, and found by them guihy, or suspected, may be enquired of, heard and deter- mined before commissioners of oyer and terminer in any county of England to be named by the king, by jurors of the county in such commission : challenge for lack of forty shillings freehold allowed peremptory challenge is ousted in treason or misprision of treason: trial by peers is saved. This statute as to the indictment and trial of treason in any foreign county stands repealed by 1 <§• 2 P. Sr M. cap. 10. as was ruled by all the judges of England'm Som ervil I e's case, M. 26 EUz. reported by justice Clench n. 17. (n) against the opinion of Stam- ford, PI. Cor. Lib. II. cap. 26. both as to the indictment and also as to the trial, for Somerville was indicted in the county where the offense was, and by a commission in Middlesex was tried by a jury of the county, where the offense was committed ; but as to murder, it seems to stand unrepealed, and accordingly put in ure; Cramp- ton's jUs{[ce.{o) 35 //. 8. cap. 2. Treasons, misprisions and concealments of trea- sons committed out of the realm shall be heard and determined by the court of king's bench, and tried by a jury of that county, where the court sits, or before commissioners and in such shire, where the king shall appoint by his commission, by good and lawful [_ 284 2 f^sn of the same shire, as if committed in the same shire: trial of a nobleman by his peers is saved. Upon this statute these points have been resolved : 1. That this act is not repealed by 1 E. 6. or 1 S,' 2 P. S,^ M. cap. 10. thus it was resolved in Orurk's case, Co. P. C. p. 24. 2. It extends to a trea- son committed in Ireland, xesoXvadi in Sir John PerroVs case,(/)) Co. P. C.p. 11. 3. It extends to a treason committed in Ireland, by a peer of Ireland, so resolved in 22 Car. 1. in B. R. in Mac- guire's case. (9) 4. The commission in this act mentioned may be signed by the king's sign manual, or the warrant to the chancellor to issue the commission may be signed by the king's sign manual, and either of them is warranted by this statute, so resolved H. 36 Eliz. cited Co. Pla. Cor. p. 11. in the case of Patrick Ocullen. 5. If an indictment be taken by virtue of this statute in the county of Middlesex, and then the bench is remaved by adjournment into another county, if the prisoner pleads not guilty, it shall be tried by a jury of that county where the indictment is taken, because the words are, that it shall be inquired, heard and determined by good and lawful men of the same county, luhere the said bench shall sit. M. 35 4' 36 EUz. B. R. in the case of Francis Dacres cited Co. PI. Cor. p. 34. but otherwise upon an indictment upon the statute of 5 EUz. cap. 1. for refusing the oath of supremacy. Co. PL Cor. ibidem. {r) (n) This is reported 1. And p. 104. {p) State Tr. Vol. I. p. 181. (0) p. 22. lord Grevil's case. {q) State Tr. Vol. I. p. 928. (r) Tlic case of Edmund Bonner, Bishop of London. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 284 III. As touching the third point of forfeitures by treason I shall say little more, than what is said before in the preceding chapter con- cerning the forfeiture of tenant in tail. Only it seems, that the law was taken upon the statutes of 33 and 36 H. 8. before mentioned, that if an abbot or a bishop were attaint- ed of treason, that by force of the general words o{ forfeiting all their lands, tenements and hereditaments they forfeit the lands of their church, tho they had them in autre droit. 1. Because in the savings of these statutes, yea and in all the new statutes of treason made in the time of Henry VIII. above- mentioned, the saving ywns, saving to all persons other than [ 285 ] the offenders, their heirs and successors such right, ^-c. and the exception of successors makes it probable, that they intended, when a sole corporation was attainted of treason, he should forfeit the lands of his church. 2. Because in the act of attainder of the archbishop of Canter- bury, 1 Mar. cap. 16. there is a special proviso, that it should not extend to the lands which he had in right of his archbishoprick ; but that these should be saved, as if he had not been attainted. 3. Because by the act of 31 i^. 8. cap. 13. it appears plainly, that the possessions of Monasteries, where the abbots were attainted of treason, came thereby to the crown, tho they are not annexed to the court of augmentations of the king's revenues. 4. It is clearly admitted by the judges in the case of the Bishop of Durham, By. 289. that by force of the statute of 26 H. 8. the lands of abbeys, &c. came to the crown by the attainder of treason of the abbots, &c. and possibly it was in design at the time of the making of that statute. But it is true, that before that statute of 26 H. 8. 1. The lands, which a person had in right of his church, were not forfeited by attainder of treason. 2. That altho the lands of a sole corporation such as were an abbot, prior, bishop, might be forfeited by attainder by the special penning of 26 and 33 H. S. yet the lands of an aggre- gate corporation, as dean and chapter, mayor and commonalty, were not forfeited by the treason of the dean, or mayor, by virtue of those statutes, for the right of the land was in the commonalty and chap- ter, as well as in the dean or mayor, and not in them alone. 3. That at this day the attainder of treason doth not forfeit the lands of a bishop, parson or other sole ecclesiastical corporation: 1. Because the statutes of 1 Eliz.{s) and 13 Eliz. cap. \0.{t) disabling bishops, masters of hospitals, &c. to alien their possessions, disable them to forfeit as well as alien, or otherwise the statute would be illu- sory. 2. By the special penning of the statutes of E. 6. cap. 12. and 1 Mar. whereby it is enacted, that no penal- [ 286 ] ties shall be inflicted for treason, other than such as be by 25 E. 3. (s) This is not among the printed statutes. (t) Ttiis statute made perpetual by 3 Cur. 1. cap. 4. VOL. I. 30 286 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. Concerning the forfeiture of lands in a county palatine by the attainder of treason out of a county palatine, or e converso. By the statutes of 9 H. 5. cap. 2. 18 ff. 6. cap. 13. 20 H. 6. cap. 2. 31 H. 6. cap. 6. outlawries of treason, &c. in the county palatine of Lancaster were not to cause a disability of the person outlawed, nor induce any forfeiture of the lands or goods of the party outlawed lying out of that county ; but by the statute of 33 H. 6. cap. 2. these acts are repealed, and it is ordained, that the indicters in a county palatine (where the indictment supposes any person to be inhabiting out of the county of Lancaster within some other county of the realm) have lands to the yearly value of five pounds in that county, and that upon indictment to be taken out of the county palatine of persons residing there, the indicters shall have a yearly freehold of five pounds, and that no process be made out upon any such indict- ments, till it has been examined by the king's justices, whether the indicters be so qualified. J3ut now by the statute of 27 H. 8. cap. 24. all powers in county palatines for making of justices in eyre, of assise, of peace, of goal- delivery, are resumed, and such commissions are to pass under the great seal of England, only in Lancaster they are to be under the usual seal of Lancaster : all processes to be in the king's name under the teste of him, that hath the county palatine; all indictments, ^"c. are to conclude contra pacem regis, and all fines and amerciaments upon officers are resumed: so that now all process of outlawry, attainder, <5'c. in county palatines are of the same efl'ect and induce the san^ie forfeitures, as if the offenses were committed, tried and determined in any other county of England. Bnt this alters not the title of the bishop o( Durham or any other, that had royal forfeitures of treasons of lands within their liberty,* or county palatine, for that is a distinct franchise, and not at all touched by the act of resumption, as appears by the case in Dijer{u) before cited, and by what is said in the precedent chapter [| 287 ] touching forfeitures by treason: and thus far for acts touch- ing treason in the time of Henry VIII. As touching treasons in the verge 1 shall particularly mention the same hereafter. 1 come now to the time of king Edward VI. 1 E. 6. cap. 12. There are these several changes made by these several clauses. 1. It is enacted, that no act, deed or ofl'ense being by statute made treason or [)etit treason bywords, writing, cyphering, deeds or other- wise whatsoever, shall be deemed or adjudged high treason or petit treasons but only such as be treasons or petit treasons in or by the statute of 25 E. 3. for declaring treasOa, and such ofiences, as here- after by this act are expressed and declared to be treason or petit treason ; and no other penalties to be inflicted upon the offenders in treason or petit treason, but what are ordained by that, or this statute. (m) Dyer 289. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 287 2cl clause repeals the statutes concerning heretics, Lollards, tjie six articles, selling of books of the scriptures, ^-c. ordained in the time of R. 2. H. 5 and H. 8. 3d clause repeals all felonies made by act of parliament, since 23 Jlpril 1 H. 8. that were not felonies before, and all penalties touch- ing the same. 4th clause repeals the act of 31 H. 8. touching obedience to the king's proclamations, and the statute of 34 H. 8. imposing penalties upon the disobedient. 5th clause enacts certain new offenses, viz. "If any shall by preaching, express words or sayings athrm and set forth that the king, his heirs or successors, kings of this realm, is not or ought not to be supreme head on earth of the church of England 2ind Ireland immediately under God, or that the bisliop of Rome, or any besides the king for the time being, ought by the laws of God to be supreme head of the same churches, or that the king, his heirs or successors, kings of this realm, ought not to be king of England, France, and Ireland, ox any of them, or do compass by open preaching, express words or sayings to depose or deprive the king, his heirs or suc- cessors kings of this realm, from his royal estate or titles to the same kingdoms, or do openly publish, or say by express [^ 288 ] words or sayings, that any person, other than the king, his heirs or successors kings of this realm, of right ought to be king of the realms aforesaid, or any of them, or to have or enjoy the same or any of them, the offenders, their counsellors, aiders, abettors, pro- curers and comforters, for the first offense shall lose his goods, and suffer imprisonment during the king's pleasure; and if after such conviction he shall commit the same offense again, other than such as be expressed in the statute of 25 E. 3. he shall forfeit to the king the profits of his lands, benefices, and ecclesiastical promotions during his life, and all his goods, and suffer perpetual imprisonment; and for the third offense after a second conviction, he shall be guilty of treason, and suffer and forfeit as a traitor. 6th clause enacts that, " If any person shall by writing, printing, overt-act or deed, affirm or set forth, that the king of this realm for the time being, is not or ought not to be supreme head on earth of the churches of England and Ireland, or any of them immediately under God, or that the bishop oi Rome or any person, than the king of England for the time being, is or ought to be supreme head on earth of the same churches or any of them, or do compass or ima- gine by writing, printing, overt-deed or act to depose or deprive the king, his heirs or successors from the royal estate or titles of king of England, France and Ireland, or any of them, or by writing, printing, overt-act or deed, do affirm, that any person, other than the king, his heirs and successors, of right ought to be king of the realms of England, France and Ireland, or any of them, then every such offender shall be guilty of treason, and suffer and forfeit, as in case of high treason. 7th clause enacts, "That this act shall not extend to repeal any 288 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. statutes touching the counterfeiting, clipping, filing or washing the coin current of this kingdom, or importing counterfeit coin, or coun- terfeiting the king's sign manual, privy seal, or privy signet, their abettors, &c. 8th clause enacts, "That if the persons declared by the act of 35 H. 8. to be inheritable to the crown do usurp one upon the [289 ] other, or interrupt the king's possession of the crown, they, their abettors, &c. shall be traitors. 9th clause takes away clergy from persons found guilty by verdict, confession, or not directly answering or standing mute in cases of murder of malice prepense, of wilful poisoning, house-breaking, any person being in the house and put in fear, robbing in or near the highway, horse-stealing, sacrilege ; but in all other cases of felony clergy allowed, and sanctuary the same as before the 24 April 1 ^.8. 10th clause provides, that all the statutes of H. 8. concerning chal- lenge, or concerning trial of foreign pleas, shall stand in force. 1 Ith clause declares, that no person already arrested or imprisoned, indicted or convicted, or outlawed for treason, petty treason or mis- prision of treason, shall have any advantage of this act. 12th clause provides, that wilful killing by poison shall be deemed wilful murder, and the offenders, their aiders, abettors, counsellors or procurers shall suffer, as murderers. 13th clause enacts, that a lord of parliament in all cases within the benefit of clergy, tho he cannot read, yet shall be delivered as a clerk convict without burning in the hand, or loss of lands, &c. 14th clause saves the trial by peers for any offenses within this statute. 15th clause enacts, that clergy be allowed, notwithstanding the offender have been married to a single woman or widow, or to two wives or more. 16th clause enacts, that notwithstanding attainder of treason, petit treason, misprision of treason, murder or felony, the wife shall have her dower, and saves to all and every person, other than to the offender attained, convict or outlawed, all such right, title, interest, entry, leases, possession, condition, "profit, commodity, and heredita- ments, as they had before or at the time of the attainder, conviction, or outlawry. 17th clause provides, that the statute of 27 H. 8. for felony in ser- vants stealing the goods of their masters, shall stand in force. IStli clause provides, that no person be put to answer for [ 290 ~\ any of the offenses abovesaid concerning treason by preach- ing or words only, unless accused before one of the king's council, justice of assise or peace, &c. within thirty days after the offense committed. 19ih clause, concealing and keeping secret any high treason shall be misprision of treason, and the offender shall forfeit as iieretofore hath been used in case of misprision of treason. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 090 20th clause, calling, writing or printing the French king king of France shall not be adjudged any oftense within this act. 21st clause provides, that no person shall be indicted, arraigned, condemned or convicted for any offense of treason, petit treason, misprision of treason, or for any words before mentioned, whereby he shall sulfer pains of death, loss of goods, imprisonment, &c. unless the otTender be accused by two sufficient and lawful witnesses, or shall willingly without violence confess the same. I have mentioned the clauses of this statute at large, and by their numbers, because there be many things observable thereupon. By the first clause of this statute all those numerous treasons and petit treasons, that were enacted or declared at any time since 25 E. 3. are wholly taken away, except that of counterfeiting, clipping, washing, or filing of coin, &c. excepted in the 7th clause ; but this doth not mention misprisions of treason, but only declares what mis- prision of treason is, for by taking away the treasons themselves, the misprisions of those treasons must needs cease, as a crime. But this act did not extend to alter the trials in case of treason, and therefore notwithstanding this act the statute of 28 H. 8. cap. 15. for treasons at sea, 26 H. 8. cup. 6, for counterfeiting, &c. in Wales. 32 H. S. cap. 4. for treasons in Wales, 33 H. 8. cap. 23. for treasons to be tried out of their county, 35 H. 8. cap. 2. for trial of foreign treasons, stood yet in their force, until the statute of 1 <§• 2 P. <§• M. cap. 10. . Again, notwithstanding that by some former statutes certain of- fences, which were felony before, as wilful burning of houses and poisoning, were made treason, yet the repeal of those [ 291 l acts that made them treason leaves them nevertheless in the state, wherein they before were, namely felony. Again, upon consideration and comparison of the 5lh and 6th clauses these things are observable, namely, 1. The wisdom of the law-makers, that put the very same offenses in words spoken in a lower rank of punishment than the same things written or printed, making the former but a misdemeanor in the first offense, which in printing or writing was treason in the first offense. 2. it is observable upon that fifth clause, that there were some things within the fifth clause, that might be treason or an overt-act of treason within the statute of 25 E. 3. {other than such as be expressed in the statute of 25 E. 3.) vide quse supra dicta sunt cap. 13. touching the treason in compassing the king's death. It is also observable upon the 11th clause, that when an offense is made treason or felony by an act of parliament, and then those acts are repealed, the offenses committed before such repeal, and the pro- ceedings thereupon are discharged by such repeal, and cannot be pro- ceeded upon after such repeal, unless a special clause in the act of repeal be made enabling such proceeding after the repeal, for offenses committed before the repeal, as there is in this case. 3 «§• 4 Ed. 6. cup. 5. Tho it primarily concerns riots, yet conse- quently it concerns treason also : tiiereby it is enacted, 291 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 1. " That if any persons to the number of twelve or more assem- bled together shall intend, go about, practise or put in ure with force of arms unlawfully, and of their own authority to kill, take or im- prison any of the king's privy council, or unlawfully to alter or change any laws established by parliament for religion, or any other laws or statutes of this realm, and being commanded by the sheriff, justice of peace, mayor, t^-c. by proclamation in the king's name to repair to their houses, if they shall continue together by the space of one, whole hour after such proclamation, or after that shall willingly in forcible and riotous manner attempt to do or put in ure any of the things aforesaid ; this shall be adjudged treason in all the [ 292 2 offenders, their aiders, abetters and procurers." See before in chapter XIV. concerning levying of war, liow much of this high treason is within the statute of 25 E. 3. 2. " That if any persons to the number of twelve or more shall intend, go about, practise or put in ure in manner aforesaid to over- throw, cut, break or dig up pales, hedges, ditches or other inclosure of any park, inclosed grounds, banks of pools or fish-ponds, conduits, conduit-heads, or pipes to the same, which may remain open, or un- lawfully to have common or way in the said park or grounds, or to destroy the deer, warrens of conies, dove-houses, fish, or to pull down houses, mills, bays or barns, or to burn stacks of corn or grain, or to diminish the rents or yearly values of any manors, lands, S,'C. or the price of any victuals, corn or grain, or any other thing usual for the sustenance of man, and being required, as before, shall not depart, but continue an whole hour, or shall after that forcibly attempt to do or put in ure the things aforesaid they shall be adjudged felons with- out benefit of clergy." T'lde supra cap. 14. which of these offenses were a levying of war against the king. 3. " That if any person unlawfully and without authority by ring- ing of bells, sounding of drums, trumpet, horn, or other instrument, by firii]g of beacons, by malicious uttering of words, casting of bills or writings, or by any act whatsoever raise or cause to be assembled any persons to the number of twelve, or above, to the intent that they shall do any of the acts aforesaid, who shall not dissolve their assem- bly upon such proclamation within an hour, or shall con'imit any of the said acts, then they, that raise such assemblies, shall suffer as felons." 4. " If such assemblies to the number of forty, and above, shall continue together two hours, or shall bring weapons, meat, (§'C. to the persons so assembled, it shall be high treason. 5. If above the nimibor of two and under twelve attempt such things, «§'C. as abovesaid, they are to suffer imprisonment for a year, and make fine and ransom, with treble damages to persons damni- fied. 6. In the cases of treason within this act tenant in tail is [ 293 3 to forfeit to the king during life only, and tenant in fee simple to forfeit only as upon attainder of felony. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 293 7. Power is given to the sheriffs, justices, mayor, ^-c. to raise power, and array them in manner of war against the rioters, to the intent to apprehend the rioters; and if the said rioters do not depart upon proclamation hut continue together, it shall be lawful for the sheriff, 4'C. after such commands to kill the rioters; if after such commandment if fortune any of the riotors be killed upon such ac- count, the sheriff, S,'C. or any assembled by him shall thereof be dis- charged: then follows the punishment of those, who refuse to assist the sheriff, or justice in the repression of riots. Movers to such riots are guilty of felony without clergy, and per- sons solicited thereunto not revealing it to suffer three months im- prisonment. This act being made in a great measure for the support of the re- formed religion under Edward VI. was as to all points of treason therein contained, repealed by 1 Mcir. cap. 1. but in eflect the very same offenses were enacted felonies within clergy by 1 Alar. sess. 2. cap. 12. which was to continue to the end of the next parliament, and after the death of queen Mary was re-enacted by 1 Eliz. cap. 16. to continue during her life, and till the end of the next session after her death, but then expired. That which I would observe upon this act is this, how careful they were in this time not to be over-hasty in introducing construc- tive treasons, and to shew how the opinions of the parliaments of Edward VI. queen Mary, queen Elizabeth went, as to the point of constructive treason, and how careful they were not to go far in ex- tending the statute of 25 E. 3. beyond the letter thereof As to the point of indenmifying those, that killed the rioters in assistance of the sheriff, it is true, that the killing of rioters barely for continuing together after proclamation required a new law to indemnify it, as in the statute is provided; but if rioters resist the sherifi' in his endeavour to apprehend them, or make head against him, or continue to put in ure their riotous acting, as pull- ing down houses, inclosures, d^'C. if the sheriff, or those that [ 294 '\ come in aid of him, kill any of them, the law and the statute of 2 H. 5. cap. 8. do indemnify them, as shall be hereafter more fully declared. By 5 «§• 6 ^. 6. cap.W. "If any person by open preaching, ex- press words or sayings do expressly, directly and advisedly set forth and affirm, that the king, that now is, is an heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel, or usurper of the crown, or that any his heirs or suc- cessors, to whom the crown is to come by the statute of 35 H. S. being in lawful possession of the crown, is an heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel, or usurper of the crown then such person, his aiders, abettors, procurers, counsellors, and comforters knowing the same, shall for the first offense lose their goods and be imprisoned at the king's will, for the second offense, after conviction for the first, lose the profits of their lands and ecclesiastical benefices during their lives, and be perpetually imprisoned, and for the third offense, after 294 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. the second conviction, be adjudged traitors, and lose tlieir lives, and forfeit as in case of high treason. " If any person shall by writing, printing, painting, carving, or graving, directly, expressly and advisedly publish, set forth and affirm, that the king, or any his heirs or successors, 4'c. is an heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel, or usurper, it shall be high treason, and he shall forfeit as in case of high treason. " If any person or persons rebelliously detain the king's castles, or fortresses, ships, ordinance, artillery or fortifications, and do not render them up to the king, his heirs or successors within six days after proclamation under the great seal, it shall be treason, and the offender, his aiders, 4'C. knowing of the said offenses shall suffer and forfeit as in case of high treason. " If any the king's subjects commit treason contrary to this act or any other act in force out of the realm, it shall be inquired and pre- sented by twelve men of any county, which the king by commis- sion shall assign, as if committed within the realm, and the like process thereupon, as if done within the realm, and the [^295] outlawry against an offender inhabiting out of the realm shall be as effectual as if he had been resident within the realm. " But if he render himself upon the outlawry within a year, he shall be received to traverse the indictment. (a*) " Persons attainted of any treason shall forfeit to the king all their lands of any estate of inheritance in their own right at the time of the treason committed, or at any time after. " No proceeding shall be on any the offenses aforesaid committed only by preaching or words, unless the offender be accused thereof within three months before one of the king's council, justice of as- sise, justice of peace being of the quorum, or two justices of peace in the shire where the offense is committed : concealment of any high treason, shall be adjudged only misprision of treason, and the offender to forfeit as in misprision of treason. "Provided that no person shall be indicted, arraigned, condemned, convicted or attainted for any of the treasons or offenses aforesaid, or for any other treasons, that now be, or hereafter shall be, which shall be hereafter perpetrated, committed, or done, unless the same offender or offenders be therefore accused by two lawful accusers, which said accusers at the time of the arraignment of the party ac- cused, if they be living, shall be brought in person before the party so accused, and avow and maintain that which they have to say against the said party to prove him guilty of the treasons or offenses (x) This clause remains, as our author observes below, unrepealed to tliis day, so that it was great injustice to deny tlie benefit of a trial witliin the year to Sir Thomas Arm- stronir, who was out-lawed, while he was beyond sea, 36 Car. 2. and of this opinion was tlie house of commons by their vole Nov. 1!), l()8!i, when it was resolved, that Sir T/wmas Armstrimfi'' s pica ought to have been admitted according- to the statute of 5 t^ 6 E. G. see Slate Tr. Vol. III. //. 8!)G. and accordingly the like plea was allowed io.John- soy, who was indicted for counterfeiting the coin, Mich. 2 Geo. 2, B. R. altho he had broke prison, and was retaken in England. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 295 contained in ihe bill of indictment laid against the party arraigned, unless the party arraigned shall willingly without violence confess the same: a saving of the right of all, other than the offenders and their heirs, or such as claim to their or any of their use: the wife of the party attainted of these or any other treasons shall be barred of dower of the lands of the party attainted, so long [ 296 ] as the attainder stand in force. "[2] Upon this statute many things are observable. 1. That it should seem, that neither the writing of these scandalous words, nor the bare detaining of the king's forts or ships were treason within the statute of.25 E. 3. for if they had been such, this act would not have been made. [3] 2. The second thing observable is the great discrimi- nation, which in this act is made between words and writing, the latter being made treason, the former only misdemeanor in the two first offenses, altho the words be the same in both. 3. That so much of this act, as is introductive of new treason, is repealed by the statute of 1 Mar. cap. 1. but whether those two penalties previous to trea- son in case of words, viz. for the first and second offense, be repealed by any statute, seems doubtful, for those are not treason, 4. But those clauses in this statute, that concern trial of foreign treasons, concerning outlawry of persons beyond the sea, forfeiture of lands of inheritance of the party attainted,, loss of dower by the wife of the party attainted, stand unrepealed to this day; and so it is held by many, that the clause concerning two accusers stands still on foot; de quo vide postea. Touching the clause for the forfeiture of the lands of the party at- tainted there are these things considerable, 1. That by this clause tenant in tail of the gift of the king doth by his attainder forfeit his estate-tail, notwithstanding the statute of 34 H. 8. cap. 20. for as that statute coming after 26 S,- 33 H. S. did, as to that case, repeal so much of those acts; so this statute of 5 <§' 6 E. 6. coining after 34 H. 8, doth repeal that statute, as to the case of attainder of treason of such donee in tail, 2, That this act varies much from the penning of the acts of 26 and 33 H. 8. for they seemed, as hath been observed, to fasten upon lands in right of a corporation sole, as bishop, abbot, 4'C. but this limits it only to lands in their own right, which possibly, tho an affirmative clause, may correct the extent of the statutes of 26 and 33 H. 8. and bind up the forfeiture to lands only in their own right. As to the point concerning the two lawful accusers these things will be considerable, 1, Whether it extends in law to [ 297 3 new treasons made after this act. 2. Whether by any statute [2] " I do not find upon looking- over the State Trials that in crown prosecutions any great regard was paid to the acts of Edw. 6. for near a century after they were passed ; or indeed to the common well known rules of legfal evidence. This every man who will do so much penance as to read over Ihc State Trials during the reigns of queen Eliz. and king James, will find to have been the doctrine and practice of the limes." Fosl. 234. [3J See ante, p. 146, 297 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. this be repealed. 3. Admitting it be not, what shall be said two law- ful ascusers. 4. What a confession. I. The statute of 5 S,- 6 E. 6. above-mentioned appoints two law- ful accusers in case of all treason enacted or to be enacted; therefore if a new treason were made by a subsequent act of parhament with- out any clause that directs the indictment or trial in any other man- ner than is appointed by 5 <5' 6 E. by the words of this act there must be two lawful accusers, both upon the trial and indictment. But there iiave been great opinions, that tho the words of 5 <5' 6 E. 6. extends to treasons that shall be hereafter enacted, yet this clause doth not extend in law to such new treasons, unless special provision be made for the same in the act making such new treason: others have been of a contrary opinion, because it only concerns the manner of proceeding, which may be directed by a precedent act, as upon the statute of IS Eliz. cap. 5. 21 Jac. cap. 4. II. But certainly, if there be, by a subsequent statute, any deroga- tory clause from this statute, then there need not be two lawful ac- cusers. Therefore upon the statutes of 1 <§• 2 P. <§• M. cap. 11. in treason for counterfeiting the coin current here, or for clipping and impairing of coin (which was then conceived a treason not repealed by 1 Mar. cap. 1.) the evidence and course of proceeding at common law both upon the indictment and trial are restored, and so no necessity of two witnesses; this is agreed on all hands. Co. PL Cur. p. 25. Again, tho the treason for clipping or wasliing of coin declared by 3 H. 5. cap. 6. were repealed by the statute of 1 Mar. cap. I. as is declared by the preamble of the statutes of 5 Eliz. cap. II. and 18 E/iz. cap. 1. and that the same is newly made treason by the statutes of 5 and 18 Eliz. and consequently, were there no more in the case, two witnesses might be requisite by the words of the act of 5 S^ 6 Ed. 6. because those are newly made treasons, yet by the pennmg of those statutes of 5 and IS Eliz. it is not necessary,, be- [] 298 ] cause the words in both statutes are being' lawfully con- victed or attainted according to the order and course of the law, which takes in the whole proceeding, as well indictment as trial; for the course of law therein mentioned seems to be intended the common law, and at common law there was no necessity of two witnesses in any case of treason. And altho the statute of I 4- 2 P. S,-' M. cap. 11. did take clipping and washing to be continuing treasons, and therein might mistake, yet there being an express clause in that statute, that in those cases the evidences at common law should be restored; this direction might take off the statutes of 1 <^' 5 E. G. as to the two witnesses in those cases, and so have an influence upon the statutes of 5 <^' 18 Eliz. or at least may go far in expounding them to restore the evidence required at common law in those cases. But wliether, as to all other treasons, the general clause in the statute of 1 .112. 313 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. advisedly, and directly declare or publish, that the king during the marriage ought not to have jointly with the queen the style, honor and kingly name of this realm, or that any person, being neither the now king or queen, during the marriage between them ought to have the style, honor and kingly name of this realm, or that the now queen is not, or of right ought not to be queen of this realm, or after her death the heirs of her body, being kings or queens of this realm, ought not so to be or to enjoy the same, or that any person, other than the queen during her life, or after death, other than the heirs of her body, as long as one of the heirs of her body, shall be in life, ought to be queen or king of this realm, then every such offender shall lose to the queen all his goods and chatties, and forfeit the issues of his lands during his life, and have perpetual imprisonment; the second offense after a former conviction shall be treason. 2. " And if any by writing, printing, overt-act, or deed (]314] shall maliciously, advisedly and directly utter the things aforesaid, then they, their abetters, procurers, counsellors, aiders, and comforters knowing the said offense to be done, and being thereof convicted and attainted by the laws and statutes of this realm, shall be adjudged high traitors, and forfeit their goods, lands and tenements to the queen, her heirs aud successors, as ia case of high treason. 3. " Provision for the government of the qiieen's children. 4. " If any person, during the time that the king shall have the ordering of the queen's children, shall compass to destroy the king, or to remove him from the government of the said children, it shall be treason. 5. " That all trials hereafter to be had, awarded or made for any treason, shall be had and used only according to the due order and course of the common laws of. this realm, and not otherwise, saving to all persons, (other than the offenders and their heirs, and such: persons as claim to any of their uses,) all such rights, titles, interests, possession, leases, 4*c. which they had at the day of the committing of such treasons, or at any time before, as if this act had never been made. 6. " Concealment of any high treason shall be adjudged only mis- prision of treason, and to forfeit and suffer as in case of misprision notwithstanding this act. 7. " Trial by peers is saved in treason or misprision of treason. 8. " None to be impeached for words, unless indicted within six months after the offense. 9. " Witnesses examined to or deposing any treasons in this act, or at least two of them shall be brought forth before the party arraigned, if he require the same, and say openly in his hearing what they can say against him concerning the treasons in the indict- ment, unless the party arraigned shall willingly confess the same upon his arraignment. 10. " In all cases of high treason concerning coin current £315 3 within this realm, or counterfeiting the king's or queen's HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 315 signet, privy seal, great seal, or sign manual, such manner of trial, and no other, shall be observed and kept, as heretofore hath been used by the common laws of this realm, any law, statute or other thing to the contrary notwithstanding. " The counsellors, procurers, comforters, and abetters for the first offense to suffer as tfie principal in the first offense, and procurers, comforters and abetters for the second offense to forfeit as the princi- pal in the second offense." This statute for so much as concerns the forfeiture or punishment inflicted for words, S,^c. and likewise the treasons newly enacted was but temporary, and died when the queen died without issue. But there is still observable, 1. The great distinction, that was used between words and writing; those very things, which written were made in the first offense treason, being only spoken were in the first offense bul mis- demeanor, altho many of the words there mentioned sounded high, as namely that the queen is not or ought not to be queen, but some person else, whereby we may gather the opinion of parliaments in those times, that regularly words, tho of a high nature, were not treason, nor an overt-act of compassing the king's death. The second thing observable is, that here are some treasons newly enacted, which yet were treasons within 25 E. 3. as compassing to destroy and depose the queen, and declaring the same by writing or overt-act; and therefore this clause was omitted in the statute of 1 E/iz. cap. 6. and left to the statute of 25 E. 3. The 3d thing observable herein is, that the queen's husband is not within the act of 25 E. 3. therefore it was necessary to have an act of parliament for the securing of him, who was only the queen's husband. 4. That tho there was a communication of the regal title to the queen's husband, yet even that could not have been but by act of parliament, and yet no more is communicated, but the title and name, not the authority and rule of a king of [316] Enj^land. The fifth clause concerning restoring of trial of treason according to the course of the common law is of great consequence and use, and is perpetual. 1. By this clause of the statute as to the case of high treason, the statutes of 27 E. 3. cap. 8. 28 E. 3. cap. 13. 8 H. 6. cap. 29. for trial of an alien per medielatem linguse are wholly repealed, and the trial shall be by Englishmen, 1 Mar. Dy. 144. Shirly's case, H. 36 Sliz. Dr. Lopezes case[l] ruled per omnes jiisticiarios. Co. P. C. p. 27. 2. The trial of a lunatic without issue joined by 33 H. 8. cap. 20. and in a foreign county by 33 H. 8. cap. 23. and for treasons in fVales 26 H. 8. cap. 6, 32 H. S. cap. 4. are all repealed by this statute. Co. P. C.p. 24, 27. 3. But whether the statute of 1 E. 6. and 5 S,^ 6 E. 6. concerning [1] There is an account of Dr. Lopez's treason in Lord Bacon's Works, 2 vol. p. 216. 316 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. two witnesses be hereby repealed vide sitpra p. 29S. only the 9th and 10th clauses of this statute seem' strongly to imply, that this statute intended the repealof it, for otherwise why should that special provision be added in this statute, for at least two of the witnesses formerly examined to repeat their testimony to the prisoner, if he desires it, when the statute of 5 «§• 6 E. 6. had more effectually pro- vided for the same thing. 4. But the statute of 28 H. 8. cap. 15. concerning the trial of trea- son committed upon the high sea is not repealed, nor the statute of 35 H. 8. cop. 2. for trials of treasons out of the realm, because there was no way regularly appointed at common law for the trial of those treasons being done out of the bodies of counties; but it seems the trial of treasons committed in any place in rivers, or parts within the bodies of counties, tho the admiral claimed jurisdiction there, is restored to the common law, where it was originally triable. [2] Neither doth the act extend to petit treason, for treason generally spoken is intended of high treason ; therefore the trial, as to that, stands in the same manner, as it was before the making of that act. 5. Peremptory challenge in case of high treason is restored [317 ] by this act, and the statute of .33 H. 8. cap. 23. as to that point repeald, vide accordant Co. P. C. p. 27. <§• libros ibi ; so that at this day he may challenge thirty-five, viz. under three juries peremptorily. Co. P. C. ibidem. \ k.2 P. &f M. cap. 11. " Whosoever shall bring from the parts beyond sea into this realm, or into any of the dominions of the same, any false and counterfeit money, being current within this realm by the sufferance and consent of the queen, knowing the same coin to be false and counterfeit, to the intent to utter or make pay- ment with the same within this realm, or any of the dominions of the same, by merchandizing or otherwise, the offenders, their counsel- lors, procurers, aiders and abetters in that behalf, shall be adjudged offenders in high treason, and after lawful conviction shall suffer and forfeit, as in cases of high treason. " If any be accused or impeached of any offense within this statute, or of any other offense concerning the impairing, forging, or counter- feiting any coin current within this kingdom, he shall be indicted, arraigned, tried, convicted, or attainted by such like evidence, and in such manner and form, as hath been used and accustomed within this realm before the first year of the reign of Edward VI. any law, statute, Sf'c. to tlie contrary notwithstanding." Upon this statute several things are observable. 1. That the foreign coin in this case must be such, as is made cur- rent in this realm by the consent of the queen, which cannot be without proclamation by writ under the great seal, as hath been before said ;?. 213 & 310. 2. That the party, that brings it in, must know it to be counterfeit. [2J 1 East P. C. 103. [ ' HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. 317 . 3. That it must be brought into the king's dominions from some place, that is out of the king's dominions, and therefore the importa- tation out of Ireland is held not to be an importation witliin this statute, for that is within the dominions of this reahn, tho not within the realm. [3] 3 H. 7. 10. Sr vide supra cap. 20. p. 225. Co. P. C. p. 18. 4. It must be brought with an intent to merchandize or make payment within this realm, and this intent maybe [318] tried by circumstances, tho the offender hath not yet actually made payment or merchandize with it: vide antea p. 229. 5. This is a new law, for the statute of 4 //. 7. cap. 18. whereby it was formerly enacted, is repealed by 1 Mar. cap. 1. 6. It is a law perpetual, tho it speaks only of coin made current by the consent of the king and queen our sovereign lord and lady, and so it hatli been still taken. 7. That at this time it was taken, that impairing of the coin cur- rent within this realm was treason as to the proper coin of this realm by force of the declarative law of 3 H. 5. cap. 6. and that this was not repealed by 1 Mar. cap. 1. for there was no other law in force newly enacted for making impairing of the coin treason between 1 Mar. cap. 1. and 1 4* 2 P. S; M. cap. 11. but this error is reformed by the declaration of 5 EHz. cap. 11. 8. That without any difficulty in the case of counterfeiting coin current in this kingdom there is no necessity of two witnesses, neither upon the trial nor upon the indictment, so that questionless, as to this treason, the clause of the statutes of 1 and 5 E. 6. concerning two witnesses is wholly repealed, for the statute saiih, he shall be indicted, S,-'C. the omission of which word in the general clause of 1 S,' 2 P. <§• M. cap. 10. which concerns treasons in general, is that which gave the great countenance to that opinion of my lord Coke, that in other treasons there must be two witnesses upon the indict- ment, tho that statute, as to the trial, remitted the course of the com* mon law, I come now to the time of queen Elizabeth. The statutes, that concern treason, I shall range in three ranks: 1. Such as more immediately concern the safety of the queen's per- son. 2. Such as concern the money of the kingdom. 3. Such as concern the safety of the queen's government in relation to papal usurpations and matter of religion. I. I begin with the first rank, such as concern more immediately the safety of the queen's person. 1 Eliz. cap. 5. The statute of 1 <§- 2 P. 8,- M. cap. 10. is recited, and that that statute extended only to queen [319] Mary and the heirs of her body, the very same statute in effect is enacted over again, only with an application thereof to queen Elizabeth, and the heirs of her body, and almost all the same clauses are over again, except that which concerns the trial of [3J Arch. C. P. 477. 319 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONJi:. treason according to the common law, and the clause of compassing to destroy the queen, and manifesting the same by writing or overt- act; two witnesses are required to the indictment and arraignment of the prisoner: this act expired upon the queen's death without issue. 1 Eliz. cap. 6. The statute of 1 Mar. sess. 2. cap. 3. concerning seditious and false rumours is revived, as in relation to queen Eliza- beth, under the same pains and penalties, as are therein contained, as tho the same act had extended to the heirs and successors of queen 7l/«ry, any doubt to the contrary notwithstanding ; but this was personal to the queen and the heirs of her body, and was re- pealed by 23 Eliz. cap. 2. 13 Eliz. cap. 1. "If any person during the natural life of the queen siiall, within the realm or without, compass or imagine the death or destruction, or bodily harm tending to death or destruction, maiming or wounding of her person, or to deprive or depose her from the style, honour, or kingly name of the crown of this realm, or of any other realm or dominion belonging to her majesty, or to levy war against her majesty within the realm or without, or to move or stir any foreigners with force to invade this realm, or any other her majesty's dominions being under her obeysance, and such compasses, imaginations, devices, or intentions, or any of them shall maliciously, advisedly, and directly publish, hold opinion, affirm or say by any speech, express words or sayings, that the queen during her hfe is not, or ought not to be queen of this realm of England, and also of France and Ireland, or of any other her majesty's dominions being under her obeysance during her life, or shall by writing, printing, preaching, speech, express words or say- [[320 ] ings, maliciously, advisedly, and directly publish and affirm, that the queen is an heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel, or usurper of the crown, every such offense shall be taken, deemed, and declared by authority of this parliament to be high treason ; and the offenders, their abetters, counsellors and procurers, and the aiders and comforters of the same offenders, knowing the same, being indicted, convicted, and attaint according to the usual order and course of the common law, or according to the act of 35 H. 8. for trial of treasons out of the realm, shall be deemed traitors, and suffer and forfeit as traitors. 2. " If any person of any condition, place, or nation during the queen's life pretend, utter, or publish themselves, or any of them, or any other, than the now queen, to have right to enjoy the crown of England during the now queen's life, or shall during the queen's life usurp the crown, or the royal title, style or dignity of the crown of England, or shall during the queen's life, hold, or affirm, that the now queen hath not right to hold the said crown, realm, style, title, or dignity, or shall not, after demand made on the behalf of the queen, acknowledge effectually, that the now queen is true and right- ful queen of this realm, they shall be disabled during their natural HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 320 lives only to enjoy the crown by succession after the queen's death, as if such person were naturally dead. 3. " If any person shall during the queen's Hfe hold or affirm a right, interest or snccesssion to the crown to be in any siich claimer, usurper, or pretender, or not acknowledger after notification by pro- clamation of such claim, usurpation or pretense, such person shall suffer as a traitor. 4. *' If any shall maintain, that the common laws, not altered by parliament, ought not to direct the right of the crown of England, or that the queen [Elizabel/i] with and by the authority of par- liament is not able to make laws of sufficient force to limit and bind the crown of England, and the descent, limitation, inherit- ance, and government thereof, or that this statute, or any statute to be made by authority of parliament with the queen's royal assent for the limiting of the crown to be justly in the queen's person is not, or ought not to be of sufficient force to bind, F 321 ] limit, restrain, and govern all persons, their rights and titles, that in any way might claim an interest, or possibility in ot to the crown of England in possession, remainder, inheritance, suc- cession, or otherwise, every such person so holding, affirming or maintaining during the queen's life shall be judged a high traitor, and every person so holding after the queen's death shall forfeit all his goods and cliattles. 5. *' If any by writing or printing declare, before the same be de- clared and established by act of parliament, that any particular per- son ought to be right heir to the queen (except the natural issue of her body) or that shall print, set up, or sell such book, for the first offense he shall suffer one year's imprisonment, and forfeit half his goods, and for the second offense it shall be a. praemunire. 6. " Trial of a peer by his peers is saved. 7. " Saves the right of all, other than the offenders and their heirs, claiming only as heir to the offender. 8. " Offender within the queen's dominions shall be indicted with- in six months, and out of the dominions within twelve months. 9. " No person to be arraigned for any offense within this act, unless it be proved by the testimony, deposition, or oath of two lawful and sufficient witnesses, who shall at the time of the ar- raignment of such person be brought before the party offending face to face, and there declare all they can say against the party arraigned, unless the party arraigned shall without violence confess the same. 10. " The aider or comforter of such, as shall affirm the queen a schismatic, heretic, tyrant, infidel, or usurper, shall for his first offense, knowing the same to be comnrtlted, incur a praemunire, and for his second oflense, after conviction of the former, shall be a traitor. 11. " Provided, that giving charitable alms in money, meat, drink, apparel or bedding for snstentation of the body, or health of any offender in any offense, made treason ox prxmunire, [ 322 ] 323 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. during the time of his imprisonment, shall not be taken to be any offense." Tho this act be antiquated by the death of queen Elizabeth, yet there are (as in other acts of this nature that are expired,) divers matters that are observable for the true understanding of the com- mon law, and therefore I have repeated many acts of this nature at large. 1. This act doth contain and enact some treasons as new trea- sons, which certainly were treasons by the statute of 25 E. 3. as compassing to destroy or depose the queen, and manifesting the same by writing, printing, or overt-act; but it was thought or at least doubted, that manifesting the same barely by words were not within 25 E. 3. and it appears by the preamble, that this act was made to take away some doubts, as well as to provide new re- medies. 2. It partly appears by this act, that the bare conspiracy to levy war was not treason by the statute of 25 E. 3. without a war levied, and accordingly it was resolved P. 39 Eliz. Burton's case, Co. P. C.p. 10. and therefore we are to be careful not to apply all convictions of treason in the queen's time, as judgments declarative of the statute of 25 E. 3. de proditionibus, because they were oftentimes indicted upon this statute in the queen's time, and the general conclusion of the indictment contra forman statuti, and sometimes generally contra formam statut. with an abbreviation was applicable to any statute then in force, which was most efiectual to this purpose. In Anderson's reports, />ar/. 2. n. 2.{c) it appears that in 37 E/iz. divers apprentices were committed for great riots, divers other ap- prentices conspired to deliver them out of prison, to kill the lord mayor of London, to burn his house, to break open two houses near the Tower, where there were arms for three hundred men, and to furnish themselves; after which divers apprentices threw about libels moving others to join with them and to assemble at Bunhill, where divers to the number of three hundred assembled, where they had a trumpet and a cloke upon a pole instead of a flag, and as they were going towards the mayor's house, they were [ 323 ] met by the sheriffs and swordbearer, against whom the ap- prentices offered resistance. It was resolved, that this was treason within the statute of 13 Eliz. for it was an intention to levy war, and altho they intended no harm to the person of the queen, yet because it concerned her in her office and authority, and was for such things, which the queen by law and justice ought to do, it was a levying war against the queen, and they were condemned and executed. This proceeding was upon this statute, and yet perchance, the cir- cumstances of the case wholly laid together, this might have been (c) 2 Anders, p. 4. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 323 an actual levying of war within the 25 E. 3. but they thought it safer to proceed upon this statute. 3. That, tho regularly words alone make not an overt-act of com- passing of the queen's death, yet printing or writing may do it. Co. P. C. p. 12, 14, and therefore an act of parliament was requisite to make it an overt-act; yet observe how cautiously it is penned, ma- liciously, advisedly, and directly, <§'C. leaving as little, as possibly may be, to construction. 4. That defamatory words, tho of a very high nature, do not always make treason; there cannot be more venomous words ordi- narily thought of, than to say, the queen was an heretic, schismatic, tyrant, usurper, yet an act of parliament was necessary to make it treason. 5. That to make a man a principal in treason by comfort or aid after the offense committed it must be knowingly, and therefore I never thought that opinion of Stamford, fol. 41. 6. to be law, that a receipt of a felon after attainder in the same county made a person accessary without notice, because he is bound at his peril to take no- tice, that he was attainted, for it oftentimes lies as little in the know- ledge of many persons, who are convict or attainted of felony or treason, as whether a man be guilty of it: vide tamen Dyer 355. 6. That regularly in a new treason the aiding and comforting of the traitors, knowing them to be such, makes a man guilty of trea- son, and therefore here is care by express provision to make the first offense 2. praemunire. 7. Here is great care to disable the heir to the crown from succeeding, if he usurp during the queen's life; but tho [ 324 ] all the care imaginable was there used, yet it hath been held, that by the accession of the crown to the person so disabled, all these disabihties have vanished, z;«fl^e 1 H. 7. 4.:(af) see Mv. Plowden's learned tract touching the right of succession of Mary queen of Scot- land. 8. Nota concerning the power of the king to limit the crown by consent of parhament. 9. That they took the statutes of 1 and of 5 <§' 6 E. 6. concerning two witnesses to be determined, or at least not to extend to treasons afterwards enacted, for otherwise there needed not this special care and provision de novo for two witnesses. 10. Tliat as the aiding or comforting of one, that speaks seditious words, made treason on the second conviction, must be for the second {d) The words of that book, are, That the king was a person able and discharged from any attainder eo facto, that he touk upon him the government and the being king; so that it was not the bare accession or descent of the crown, but the being in actual pos- session of the regal government, which was construed to remove all disabilities; this case therefore is no argument that the statute of 13 Eliz, could not bar the right of the Buccessof, and hinder him from succeeding, but only that if notwithstanding he should g:et possession of the government, that possession would purge all disabilities, which is just as much as to say, that he, who can get the power into his hands notwithstanding an attainder or act of parliament to the contrary, will not think himself hound by such attainder or act of parliament. 324 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. offense, after a conviction of the former, so the second offense, tho committed after a former, is not treason, unless it be also committed after a former conviction: the hke method is in forgery upon tiie statute of 5 Ellz. cap. 14. and generally that exposition holds in most cases, where the second offense is subjected to a severer punishment than the former, for it is intended of such offense committed after the conviction of a former, Co. P. C. 172. 1 1, It is provided that charitable relief shall not make a party guilty of treason ov prse7niinire,ViS an aider or abetter: this was a necessary provision to av.oid question. Regularly relief by victuals or clothes of a felon or of a traitor, after lie is in custody or under bail, makes not a man an accessary in felony, nor a principal in treason; but if he help him to [3253 escape, that makes him an accessary in one case and a principal in the other, Dalt. cap. 108. p. 286. ,(e) and with this agrees this proviso in the case of high treason; but nota it ex- tends no farther than during the time of his imprisonment, yet the law is all. one, if he be under bail, for he is in custodid still, for the. bail are in law his keepers, and he, that is delivered to bail in the king's bench, is nevertheless said to be m custodid marescalli. 14 Eliz. cap. 1. "If any person do within this realm, or else- where unlawfully, and of his own authority compass, imagine, con- spire, practise, or devise by any ways or means with force, or by craft maliciously and rebelliously to take, detain or keep from the queen any of her towers, castles, fortresses or holds, or maliciously and rebelliously take, burn or destroy them, having any of the queen's munition in them, or being appointed to be guarded with soldiers within the queen's dominions, and the same compassing do' advisedly by express words or deeds utter and declare for any the malicious or rebellious intents aforesaid, it shall be adjudged felony in the offenders, their aiders, comforters, counsellers and abetters without clergy. " If any shall with force maliciously or rebelliously detain from the queen any of her majesty's castles, towns, fortresses or holds within any of her dominions, or any of her ships, ordinance or artillery, or munition of war, and not render the same within six days after proclamation, or wilfully or maliciously burn or destroy any of her ships, or bar any of her havens, this shall be treason.'! This act to continue during the queen's life. We may see by this act, that the opinion of the parliament in that time was, that this conspiring to take forts or ships by force or deceit was not treason; but indeed the actual taking them by force was levying of war against the king by the statute of 25 E. 3. But if a man detains the king's town, or castle, or ships, and when any commissionated by the king demands the same, and it is refused to be delivered, and thereupon the king's commissioner r 326 ]] raiseth a power, makes an assault, and they within stand upon their guard, and repel force with force, this had been (e) N. Edit. cap. 161. p. 531. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 326 treason within the statute of 25 E. 3. for it is a levying war, and so not a bare detaining; quod vide Co. P. C. p. 10. bis in eddem pcis^ind. Again, if this detaining the king's castle or fort, or the castle of any other be barely such and without assault, yet if it be in com- pliance with a foreign enemy, or in confederacy with him, this is treason within the act of 25 E. 3. and an overt-act of adhering to the king's ene.mies; that therefore, which this act makes treason in detaining after proclamation, is a simple detaining without the con- currence of the circumstances above-mentioned, which was not trea- son before the making of this act. 14 Eliz. cap. 2. " If any person shall conspire, imagine, or go about unlawfully and maliciously to set at liberty any person com- mitted by the queen's special command for any treason or suspicion of treason concerning the person of the queen before indictment of the person imprisoned, and such imagination or conspiracy shall set forth, utter or declare by express words, writing, or other matter, it shall be misprision of treasons; but if the party imprisoned be in- dicted of any treason concerning the person of the queen, it shall be felony so to conspire and declare such conspiracy, ut supra. '• If it be after attainder or conviction, then such conspiracy so declared as aforesaid shall be high treason:" this act to last during the que€?n's life. These things are observable upon this act, 1. Here is no provision against the actual discharge or setting at liberty, neither needed it, for if the party committed had really committed treason, this was treason even within the statute of 25 E. 3. but if it were only a commitment for treason, but no treason committed by the person in custody, such delivery was not treason, as appears before cap. 22. But 2. The conspiracy to do this, tho manifested by open act, was neither treason, misprision of treason, nor felony; neither is it at this day, but only a bare misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment, tho the party imprisoned were indicted, [ 327 ~\ yea attainted. And 3. This act extends only to such trea- sons as concerned immediately the queen's person, not to treasons touching her seal or coin. And these are all the acts, that were made in the queen's time touching treasons, which more especially related to the safety of her person, all which expired at her death. II. I come to those treasons, which were enacted in the queen's time concerning coin, and they are three. 5 Eliz. cap. 11. " Makes the filing, washing, rounding, and clip- ping of the coin of this realm, or foreign coin made current by pro- clamation, for lucre or gain, and their counsellors, consenters, and aiders to he high treason by virtue of this act." 14 Eliz. cap. 3. " Makes the counterfeiting of foreign coin of gold or silver, not current within this realm, misprision of treason in the ofienders, their procurer's, aiders and abetters." 15 Eliz. cap. 1. *' Makes the impairing, diminishing, falsifying, VOL. I. — 32 327 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. sealing or lightning of the coin of this kingdom or foreign coin made current by proclamation for kicre-sake to be high treason in the offenders, their counsellors, consenters and aiders." But of these sufficient hath been said before in the business of money, forfeiture and upon the statutes of 1 and 5 S,' Q E. 6. The sum of which is this; 1. That tlie treasons made by the acts of 5 and 18 E/iz. are new treasons, newly made by virtue of this act, and every body is estop- ped to say the contrary by reason of the special recital and penning of this act, viz. shall be ac/juds^ed treason by virtue of this act. 2. That the foreign coin, the clipping and impairing whereof is made treason by this act, must be such as is made current by pro- clamation, for it cannot be otherwise current by reason of the prohi- bition of the statute of 17 R. 2 cap. 1. and also, the word proclama- tion in those acts refer to foreign coin so legitimated by proclamation, not to the proper coin of this kingdom, which needs not a proclama- tion to legitimate it. 3. The trial and whole proceeding is to be according to r 328 3 the course of the law by the express words of these acts and of 1 <§' 2 P. 4' M. cap. 11. and therefore there need not two witnesses required by the acts of 1 and the 5 S,^ 6 E. 6. 4. Not only the offenders themselves, but the counsellors, consent- ers and aiders are within those acts; but altho regularly in case of any old or new treason made, the comforters and receivers of the offender are impliedly guilty of treason by a kind of necessary con- comitance, yet it seems to me by the special peiming of this act, it extends only to counsellors, aiders and consenters (according to the resolution in Conner's case, Dy. 296.) as to the offenses made trea- son by those acts, tho possibly it may be treason, as to the receiver of a coutUerfeiter within the statute of 25 E. 3. according to my lord Cokeys opinion, Co. P. C. cap. 64. p. 188. for that is an old treason, and no such restriction by express words to counsellors, aiders and assent ers. 5. The clipping and impairing, that makes treason within these acts, must by the express words of the act he for gain or lucre, and so laid in the indictment. 6. Counterfeiting of coin not current to bring it within a praemu- nire by the statute of 14 Eliz. cap. 3. nutst be a counterfeiting of such foreign coin, as is of gold or silver, or consists thereof for the greatest part, and extends not to the foreign copper, or leather coin. 7. No corruption of blood or loss of dower are to be by attainders of these treasons. III. Therefore I come to the third sort of statutes made in this queen's time, which relate to the queen's government, and especially in relation to papal usurpation. 1 Eliz. cap. 3. is an act. of recognition of the queen to be rightful sovereign of this realm, and all acts repugnant thereunto are repeal- ed; and cap. 1. the oath of supremacy is enacted to be taken by the HISTORIA PLACflTORUM CORONA. 328 persons therein described : the tenor of which oath followeth in these words, viz. "I t/2. B. do utterly testify and declare in my conscience, that the queen's iiighness is the only supreme governor of this realm, and of all other her highness's dominions and countries, as [ 329 ] well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal, and that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state, or po- tentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, preeminence or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm, and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdic- tions, powers, superiorities and authorities, and do promise, that from henceforth I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the queen's high- ness, her heirs and lawful successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, privileges, preeminences and authorities granted or belonging to the qu6en's highness, her heirs and succes- sors, or united and annexed to the imperial crown of this realm." So help me God and by the contents of this bool\.(/) Every person appointed to take the oath, and refusing, shall lose his offices and benefices, and be disabled to take any office or bene- fice, S,'C. and then proceeds to other penalties upon refusers. And by that act it is enacted, "That if any person inhabiting within the queen's dominions shall by writing, printing, teaching, preaching, express words, deed or act advisedly, maliciously, and directly affirm, hold, stand with, set forth, maintain, or defend the authority, preeminence, power or jurisdiction, spiritual or ecclesiasti- cal of any foreign prince, prelate, person, state or potentate whatso- ever, heretofore claimed, used or usurped within this realm, or any dominion or country under the queen's obeysance,or shall advisedly, maliciously, and directly put in ure, or execute any thing for the extolling, advancement, setting forth, maintenance, or defence of any such pretended or usurped jurisdiction, power, preeminence or au- thority, or any part thereof, every person so ofiending, his abetters, aiders, procurers and counsellors, being convicted according to the course of the common law, shall for the first offense forfeit his goods and chatties, and, if not worth twenty pounds, [ 330 J shall also suffer a year's imprisonment, and all his ecclesias- tical benefices and dignities shall be void, and for a se#&nd offense committed after attainder of the first shall be within penalty oi prse- munire, and for the third offense committed after his second convic- tion, it shall be adjudged high treason." None to be impeached for words only, unless indicted within a year after the offense committed; and if imprisoned, to be set at liberty, unless indicted within half a year after the offense; trial of a peer by peers. None to be indicted, (§'c. without two witnesses, which if living shall be brought face to face before the prisoner upon his arraign- ment, and testify what they can say, if the prisoner require it. (/) This oath, and tliis statute so far as relates to the said oath, are abrogated by a W. A- M. cap. 8. 330 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. Giving of relief, aid or comfort to offenders siiall not be punishable, unless proved by two witnesses, that he had notice of the offence at the time of such relief given. 5 Eliz. cap. 1. "If any person dwelling, inhabiting, or resiant within the queen's dominions or under her obeysance, shall by writ- ing, cyphering, printing, preaching, deed or act, advisedly and wit- tingly hold, or stand with, to extol, set forth, maintain or defend the authority, jurisdiction, or power of the bishop of jRome, or his see, heretofore claimed, used, or usurped within this realm or any dominion or country under the gueen's obeysance, or by speech, open act or deed advisedly and wittingly attribute any such manner of jurisdic- tion, authority, or preeminence to the said see or bishop of Borne for the time being within this realm or any the queen's dominions, then every such person, their procurers, abetters and counsellors, and also their aiders, comforters and assistants upon the purpose aforesaid, to extol the authority of the bishop of Rome, being lawfully convicted within one year shall incur a prasfmoiire. It directs who shall take, and give the oath of supremacy. Any person appointed to take this oath by this statute or the statute of 1 Eliz. who shall refuse to take the same, being r 331 "] thereof lawfully indicted witliin one year, and convict or attaint at any time after, shall incur a praemunire, 16 ^. 2. Certificate of refusal to be made into the king's bench witliin forty days after refusal; the king's bench may proceed to indict the party refusing within a year by a jury of the same county, where the court sits. If any person convict of the offenses within the first clause of the statute shall after conviction thereof do the said offenses or any of them, or if any person appointed to take the oath, do after three months after the first tender refuse to take the same being tendred a second time, the offender shall suffer as in case of high treason. Attainder of treason upon this act shall not make corruption of blood, disherit the heir, or forfeit dower. Members of the house of commons shall take the said oath, other- wise shall be disabled to sit. Temporal lords of parliament shall not be bound to take the bath, nor subject*#o the penalties for ret^ising the same. The charitable giving of reasonable alms to an offender without fraud or covin shall not be construed an abetting, counselling, aiding^ assisting, procuring or comforting of an offender within this act: peers indicted shall be tried by peers, as in other cases of treason. No person compellible to take the oath upon second tender, but such as have ecclesiastical preferments, or such as have offices in ecclesiastical courts, or such as refuse wilfully to observe the orders established for divine service, or such as- shall deprave the rites jtnd ceremonies of the church of England, or that shall say or hear pri- vate mass. Not lawful to kill person attaint m prmmunire. No person to be indicted for aiding, assisting, comforting, abetting HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 331 any person for extolling the power of the bishop of Rome, unless accused by such lawful proof, as shall be thought by the jury suffi- cient to prove him guilty of the offence. Tlie things observcible upon tliis act, 1. Tho the indictment for the refusal of the oath upon the first tender may be in the county, where tlie king's bench sits, yet the trial must be by a jury of the county where the refusal [332 ] is, 6 ec. 1688. without licence from the king or queen, or who have at any time during the late war with France born arms in the service of the French king, or who have since the Ibth Febru- ary 1688. been in arms under the command or in the service of the late king James in Europe, shall return into this kingdom of England, or any other the king's dominions without licence from the king under the privy seal, such person shall be adjudged guilty of high treason. Where the offense shall be committed out of the realm, it may be tried in any county." r 340 1 Upon tills act these things are observable. 1. Tliat this act doth enact some treasons, which certainly were so by 25 E.3. as bearing arms in the service of the French king during the war with France, which is plainly an adhering to the king's enenucs ; and tho' 25 E- 3. says adhering to the king''s enemies in the realm, yet it immediately adds giving them aid and comfort in his realm or elsewhere, Co. F. C.p. 11. Vaughan''8 case, 2 Salk. 635. indeed all the trea- sons by this act are compounded of this old treason, altho' they be new in form for the sake of facilitating the proof in some instances, Hil. 2 Ann. Boucher^s case, State Tr, Vol. V. p. 511. 2. That a pardon under the great seal (after having been in the service of the French king and before returning) of all treasons, Sfc. will not amount to a licence to return, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 340 because it is the returning, which is the treason punishable by this act. 3 Ann. Lindsay^s case, State Tr. Vol. V. p. 528. 3. That a. Scotchman going out of Scotland into France (especially if formerly resi- dent in England) after the time mcntiou'd in the act, and returning into England is within the words and meaning of tlie act, even tho' he had a licence to return into Scotland. Ilnd. 4. That a person offending against this act by returning into England may be in- dicted in any county where he is taken, altho' it be not the first English county into which he came. Ihid. 5. That this act is perpetual and extends to the king's successors, altho' the act speak only of the king generally and not of his successors, according to the resolution 12 Co. Rep. lOl). vide-siipra p. 100. By 13 <^ 14 iy. 3. cap. 3. " The pretended prince of Wales is attainted of high trea- son, and it is made higli treason for any of the king's subjects by letters, messages or otherwise to hold correspondence with him or any person employed by him, or to remit any money for his use knowing tlie same. And by the 17 Geo. 2. tliis is extended to the pretender's son. Provides that offenses against this act committed out of the realm may be tried in any county. ^^By 1 Ann. cap. 17. "It is made high treason to attempt by overt act or deed to de- prive or hinder any person next in succession to the crown (according to the limitation of the crown by 1 \V. Sf M. sess. 2 cap. 2. and 12 W. 3. cap. 2.) from succeeding after the decease of the queen; but this succession has now happily taken place, and thereby put an end to this statute. By 3 «//. .53. 401. During the revolutionary war, says Mr. Justice Story, bills of attainder were passed to a wide extent; and the evils resulting' therefrom", were supposed, in times of more cool reflection, to have far outweiglied any imagined good. I'he injustice and inifiiiity of such acts, in general, constitute an irre- sistible argument against the existence of the power. In a lice government it would be intolerable; and in the hands of a reigning (action, it might bo, and possibly would be, abused to the ruin and death of the most virtuous citizens. Story on Const. 211. 239. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 343 ment, if present, or process of outlawry, if absent, so neither could he be arraigned without an accusation; and this accusation was of three kinds: 1. If he were taken with the mainouer. 2. By way of appeal. 3. By way of indictment. 1. In antient time, sometimes as well in case of treason, as in case of felony a man, that was taken cum maun opere, f 349 1 was thereupon arraigned, an instance we have thereof, T. 10. E. 2. Rot. 132. Bucks cited before;;?. 186. But this is wholly disused and ousted by the statutes of 5 E. 3. cap. 9. and 25 E. 3. cop. 4. by which statutes none shall be put to answer without indictment or presentment of good and lawful men of the neighbourhood. 2. By appeal, and this was usual at common law, as appears by Britton, cap. 22. but this kind of proceeding by appeal in the king's ordinary courts in cases of treason hath been long disused, and it seems is wholly taken away by the statutes of 5 and 25 E. 3. above- mentioned.[2] But yet notwithstanding that course of appeal continued still in parliament, as appears by several instances, especially in the great appeal of treason by the lords appellants in 11 and 21 ^. 2.,{d) but by the statute of 1 H. 4. cap. 14. all appeals in parliament are wholly taken away, and accordingly upon reference to the judges upon the impeachment made in the lord's house by the earl o{ Bristol against the earl of Clarendon in the present parliament, it was resolved and reported by all the judges.(e) But yet that statute hath not taken away impeachments by the house of commons in cases of treason or other misdemeanors, and therefore tho' since 1 H. 4. cap. 14. all appeals of treason by par- ticular persons are taken away, and have been wholly disused, yet impeachments by the commons have been ever since very frequently used, because they are rather in the nature of grand indictments, than appeals. 3. By way of indictment, this is the regular and legal way of pro- ceeding in case of treason. And thus far for the persons against whom judgment of treason may be given, and the manner of deducing them unto judgment. II. As touching the persons, by whom judgment of treason may be given; this concerns more especially the jurisdiction of courts: a word touching it, 1. Justices of peace cannot regularly arraign, try or give judgment in case of treason, unless in such cases, as are by [SSO] special act of parliament committed to their cognizance, as (rf) state Tr.Vol. I. p. 4. (e) State Tr. Vol. II. p. 552. [2] In 1631 there was a trial by battle awarded in the court of chivalry, on an appeal of treason beyond the seas. Lord Rea v. David Ramsey, Rushworth, vol. 2. part. 2. p. 112. But it is expressly taken away by the 59 Geo. 3. c. 46. which enacts, that it shall thence. forth not be lawful for any person to sue an appeal for treason, murder, felony, or other offence. This act was occasioned by Thornton's case. 1 B. Sf Aid. 405. 350 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 26 H. 8. cap. 6. 5 Eliz. cap. 1.13 Eliz. cap. 2. 23 Eliz. cap. 1. and some others, because their commission extends not to it, yet they may take examinations touching treason in order to the discovery thereof and preservation of the peace. 2. Justices of or/er and terminer may give- judgment in case of high treason, for it is expressly witliin their commission. 3. Justices of goal-dehvery may give judgment in case of treason on any person in prison before them, and that is proved by the sta- tute of 1 E. 6. cap. 7. and by the constant practice. 4. Justices of Nisi prius may give judgment in case of treason by the statute of 14 H. 6. cap. 1. but quxre, whether it be barely by force of that commission, or whether it must be by virtue of some other commission. 5. Justices of the king's bench in the court of king's bench may give judgment in case of treason, for it is the highest court of ordi- nary justice, especially in criminals. 6. If a peer be indicted and plead not guilty to his indictment, and is tried by his peers and found guilty, the lord steward com- missionated by the king for that office gives the judgment, and orders execution. 7. If a peer be tried in parliament by the lords, they usually elect a person to be lord steward to gather up their votes and pronounce the judgment, but for the most part that steward so elected, tho in parliament, is commissionated by the king under his great seal ; but of this more hereafter. III. I come to the form of the judgment. The judgments in case of treason are of two kinds, viz. the solemn and severe judgment, and the less. The solemn or severe judgment against a man convict of high treason is set down, Co. P. C.p. 210. Stamf. Lib. III. cap. 19,(/) 1 H. 1. 24. a Stafford's case 4' alibi, " Et super hoc visis & per curiam hie intellectis omnibus & singulis prsemissis consideratum est, 1. Quod praedictus R. usque furcas T. trahatur.[3] 2. Ibi- r 351 ]] dem supendatur per collum, & vivus ad terram prosternatur. 3. Interiora sua extra Ventrem suum capiantur. 4. Ipsoque vivente(,g-) comburantur, & 5. Caput suum amputelur. 6. Qiiodque corpus suum in quatuor partes dividatur. 7. Et quod caput & quar- teria ilia ponantur, ubi dominus rex ea assignare voluerit.[4] (/)p. 182.fl. {g) These words are so material, that the judgment was reversed for want of them in the case of Walcot. 35 Cor, 2. Show.^Ca. Pari. 127. 1 Sulk. 632. [3] Tiie "drawinjr" in the judsrmcnt for treason, was performed by tying the culprit's feet to the horse's tail and drag^irig- liirn along the ground. Luders. 151. [4] By tlie 54 Oeo. 3. c. 14G. untitled, "An act to alter the punishment in certain cases of high treason," after reciting the judgment formerly required by the law in high treason, it is enacted, " 'i'hat in all cases of high treason, in which, as the law now stands, the sentence or judgment ordained by law is as aforesaid, the sentence or judg- ment to he pronounced or awarded, from and after the passing of this act, against any person convicted or adjudged guilty, shall be, that such ])erson shall be drawn on a hurdle to the place of execution, and be there hanged by the neck until such person b& HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 351 The king may and often doth discharge or pardon all the punish- ment, except beheading, and in as much as that is part of this judg- ment, it may be executed by the king's special command, tho the rest be omitted. In the case of a woman her judgment is to be drawn and burnt, as well in high treason, as petit treason, and she is neither hanged nor beheaded. [5] The less solemn judgment is only to he drawn and hanged, and this is regularly the judgment in case of counterfeiting the coin of this kingdom, for that was the judgment in that case at common law, which was not altered by the statute of 25 E. 3. viz. " Super quo visis, &c. consideratum est, quod B. usque furcas de T. trahatur, & ibidem suspendatur per collum, quousque mortuus fuerit." But the judgment in that case also for a woman is to be drawn and burnt, 25 E. 3. 85. h. And it seems the same judgment was also for importing counter- feit coin, and yet that was not treason at common law. And the same judgment was for counterfeiting the great or privy seal at common law, as may be easily gathered out of Bracton, Lib. III. de Corona, cap. 3. but expressly by Fleta, Lib. I. cap. 22. Crimen falsi dicitur, cum quis accusatus fnerit quod sigillum regis, vel appellatus, quod sigillum domini sui de cujus familia fuerit, faisa- verit, & brevia inde consignaverit, vel cartam aliquam vel literam ad exhacredationem domini vel alterius damnum sic sigillaverit, & -quibns casibus, si quis inde convictus fuerit, detractari meruit & sus- pends And accordingly the like judgment hath been given, as in case of petit treason, for counterfeiting the great seal after the statute of 25 E. 3. as appears by 2 H. 4. 25. and the record [ 352 ] is accordingly ;(A) and tho it is true my lord Coke saith, it is a mistake Co. P. C. p. 15. yet I rather think it was a mistake in my lord Coke, and that the judgment may be given either way, viz, dis- (Ji) Vide supra in nolis p. 181. dead ; and that afterwards the head shall be severed from the body of such person, and the body divided into four quarters, shall be disposed of as his majesty and his suc- cessors shall think fit." Sect. 2. enacts, that the kingf, after judgment pronounced may, by warrant under his sign manual, countersigned by one of the principal secretaries of state, declare it to be his pleasure, and may order and direct that such person shall not be drawn, but shall be taken in such manner as in the said warrant shall be expressed, to the place of execu- tion, and that such person shall not be hanged by the neck, but in stead thereof the head shall be there severed from the body of such person whilst alive, and in such war- rant may direct and order how and in what manner the body, head, and quarters of such person shall be disposed of, and it shall be lawful for the sheriff or other person to "whom such warrant shall be directed and whom it shall concern, to carry the same into execution accordingly. By the 33d Sect, of the act of Congress of April 30, 1790, the manner of in- flicting the punishment of death shall be by hanging the person convicted by the neck until dead. [5] But now by the 30 Geo. 3. c. 48. women are to be drawn to the place of execution and hanged. 352 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. trahalur «§• suspendatur, or distrahatur, suspendalur <§' decapi- tetur. Ill the case(/) 16 Jac. for counterfeiting the privy signet, which was made treason by the statute of 1 Mar. cap. 6. the judgment was the great and solemn judgment of drawing, hanging and quar- tering. But suppose the judgment were so in case of counterfeiting the seal, great or privy, yet the question is whether the same judgment must be in those new treasons enacted by 1 <5' 2 P. <§• M. cap. 11. for counterfeiting foreign coin made current by proclamation, and also npon the statutes of 5 Eliz. and 18 Eliz. for clipping and wash- ing, whether must they have the solemn judgment to be hanged and quartered, or only the judgment of petit treason to be drawn and hanged. And herein by Stamf. Lib. Ill, cap. \9.{k) and Co. P. C. p. 17. the judgment is to be the solemn judgment, and not the judgment to be drawn and hanged, because it is a new treason made by act of parliament, and therefore must have the solemnity of the great judg- ment in case of high treason. And surely this is regularly true, and therefore in the case of popish priests, and those other acts of treason newly enacted in the queen's time, the judgment is to be drawn, hanged and quartered; but it seems to me, that the law is otherwise in relation to those new treasons enacted in the time of queen Mary and queen Elizabeth relating to coin, and that in all those cases the judgment at least may be only to be drawn and hanged; and my reasons are, 1, Because they are in co^nata materia falsijicalionis monetve, and therefore tho they are made treason, yet they are within the verge of the crime of falsification of money, and are to be under the same punishment. 2. It were unreasonable to think, that the parliament should make the counterfeiting of foreign coin to have a greater kind of punish- ment, than the counterfeiting of the coin of this kingdom, [ 353 ] or that clipping English or foreign coin should have a greater punishment, than counterfeiting of the coin of tliis kingdom. 3. As the statute of 25 E. 3. tho it declares as well coun- terteiting of money as levying of war to be high treason, yet leaves them under the several degrees of punishments proportionable to their nature, and what they had before, so tho these statutes make those to be new treasons, that were not before, yet in as much as the pun- ishments of treasons were not equal, but tliat concerning coin was a punishment of a lower allay, therefore the subject matter of those acts shall govern the degree of their punishment accordiiag to that punishment of treason, that relates to coin. 4. And accordingly in the book of T. 6 Eliz. By. 230. b. it is agreed by the justices, that the punishment pro tonsiird monetve. is only to be drawn and hanged, and upon a strict search into the precedents of Ae^^j^a/e from 5 Eliz. downwards, tho some judgments for clipping be the solemn judg- ments, yet the most and latest are only to be drawn and hanged, and (i) Robinson's case, 2 Kol. Rep. 50. (Jc) p. 182. b. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 353 accordingly it was resolved and done upon great deliberation lately in the king's bench upon the conviction of two Frenchmen for clip- ping of the king's coin.(/) But however it seems, that the judgment either of one kind or the other seems not to be erroneous, for hanging and drawing is part of the solemn judgment, and tho either may be perchance warrantable enough, yet certainly the judgment of petit treason in all treasons touching coin is the most warrantable and safe. [6] IV. I come to consider of the consequents of a judgment in treason. If the judgment be given by him, that hath authority, and it be erroneous, it was at common law reversible by writ of error; only the statute of 29 Eliz. cap. 2. secures all former attainders, where the party is executed, from reversal by writ of error, but meddles not with other attainders, neither doth the statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. take away writs of error upon attainder of treason, as hath, been resolved against the opinion of Stamf. P. C. Lib. III. cap. \9.{m) Co. P. C.p. 31. But it is true, that the statutes of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. and 5 8f Q E. 6. cap. 11, take away from a person outlawed in [ 354 ~\ treason the advantage of reversal of an outlawry, because the party outlawed was out of the realm, but extends not to other offenses. The consequents of a judgment in treason are, 1. Corruption of blood of the party attaint. 2. Loss of dower to his wife. 3. For- feiture to the king of all his lands, goods and chatties. 4. Execution, whereof in the next chapter.[7] CHAPTER XXVII. TOUCHING CORRUPTION OF BLOOD AND RESTITUTIONS THEREOF, LOSS OF DOWER, FORFEITURE OF GOODS, AND EXECUTION. The consequence of the judgment in high treason, petit treason, or felony, is corruption of blood of the party attaint ; unless it be in such special treasons or felonies enacted by parliament, wherein it is espe- cially provided, that the attainder thereof shall make no corruption of blood, as upon the statutes of 5 and 18 Eliz. in treason for clip- ping and washing of coin; and upon the statutes of 21 Juc. cap. 2G. for acknowledging a recognizance, S^c. in another's name, 1 Jac. Ctf/7. 11. for bigamy, and many others. • , \{l) The cdise oi Bellew and Norman, Raym. 234. 1 Ventr. 254. (jn) p. 182. b. ,[6] The 2 Will. 4. c. 34. abolishes the punishment of death in ail cases of offences rekting to the coin. By the 3 sect, the counterfeiting the gold and silver coin is pun- ishcd, at the discretion of tiie court, by transportation for life, or for seven years, or imprisonment not exceeding four years. The subsequent sections provide for the pun- ishment of the several other offences of this nature. [7] For the learning relating to the judgment in high treason, see Luders' Tracts, 149. 1 East, P. C. 137. 354 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONJE. If a man be attaint of piracy before commissioners of oyer and ter- miner grounded upon the statute of 28 H. 8. cap, 15. by indictment and verdict of twelve men according to the course of the common law, he forfeits his lands and goods by the statute of 28 H. 8. cup. 15. but this works no corruption of blood, because it is an offense where- of the common law takes no notice, and tho it be enacted, [ 355 3 they shall suffer and forfeit as in case of felony, yet it alters not the offense, Co. P. C. cap. 49. p. 112. vide iamen con- tra Co. Litt. § 145. p. 391. If a man be attainted before the admiraKof treason or felony com- mitted upon the sea, or before the constable and marshal for treason or murder committed beyond the sea, according to the course of the civil law, it works no corruption of blood, for tho these offenses within the cognizance of the common law are felonies or treasons, yet the manner of the trial being according to the course of the civil law, the judgment thereupon, tho capital, corrupts not the blood. If there be an attainder of treason or felony done upon the sea upon this statute of 28 H. 8. by jury, according to the course of the common law, it seems that the judgment thereupon works a corrup- tion of blood, because the commission itself is under the great seal warranted by act of parliament, and the trial is according to the course of the common law, and therefore the proceeding and judgment thereupon is of the same effect, as an attainder of foreign treason by commission upon the statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 2. or any other attain- der by course of the common law, and with this agrees Co. Litt. § 745. p. 391. nay, I think farther, that if the indictment of piracy before such commissioners upon the statute of 28 H. 8. be formed as an indictment of robbery at common law, viz. vi %■ armis Sffelunic^y ^■c. that he might be thereupon attainted, and the blood corrupted; for whatever any say to the contrary, it is out of question, that piracy upon the statute is robbery, and the offenders have been indicted, convicted, and executed for it in the king's bench, as for a robbery, as I have elsewhere made it evident. But indeed, if the indictment before these commissioners run only according to the style of the civil law, viz. piralicl deprxdavit, then the attainder thereupon upon the statute of 28 //. 8. though it gives the forfeiture of lands and goods, corrupts not the blood, and so are those two books of the same author, Co. P. C. cap. 49. and Co. Litt. § 745. to be reconciled, which without this diversity would be con- tradictory: vide H. 13. Car. B. R. Ililliar 6,- Moore. By the statute of Westminster 2. de dunis conditionalibus, [ 356 3 if tenant in tail be attaint of felony or treason, there is no corruption of blood wrought as to the issue in tail, because the very blood as well as the land, is entailed, and yet for the advan- tage of the issue there is a corruption of blood, as if the tenant in tail alien with the warranty and assets, and then is attainted, the lien of the warranty is gone, for that lien was not entailed. Litt. § 747. but if the warranty were annexed to the gift in tail, the attainder of the donee doth not destroy the warranty to the issue, for the warranty is entailed. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 356 The statutes of 26 and 33 H. 8. subject estates-tail to forfeiture by attainder of treason, and so the law stands at this day, notwithstand- in£^ the statutes of 1 E. 6. and 1 Mar. whereof before. [1] But yet these acts are not absolutely a repeal of the statute of donis coridilionalihus, lor notwithstanding the forfeiture of the lands en- tailed by the attainder, yet the blood is not corrupted as to the issue in tail. And therefore if the son of the donee in tail be attainted of treason in the life of the father, and dies having issue, and then the father dies, the estate shall descend to the grandchild, notwithstanding the father's atiamder; but otherwise it would have been in case of a fee-simj)le. 3 Co. Rep. Dowtie^s case, 10 b. In all cases (but only in cases of entails as before) attainder of treason or felony corrupts the blood upward and downward, so that no person that must make his derivation of descent to, or through the parties attaint, can inherit, as if there be grandfather, father, and son, the father is attainted, and dies in the life of the grandfather, the sou cannot inherit the grandfather.(«) In cases of collateral descents of lands in fee simple, if there be father and two sons, and the eldest is attainted in the life of the father, and dies without issue in the life of the father, the younger son shall inherit the father, for he needs not mention his elder brother in the conveying of his title; but if the elder son attaint survive the father but a day, and die without issue, the second son cannot in- herit, but the land shall eschete yjro defectu haeredis, for the [ 357 ]] corruption of blood in the elder son surviving the father im- pedes the descent. 31 E. 1. Barr. 315. But otherwise it is in case the eldest son had been an alien nee,{or then notwithstanding such son alien were living, the land will des- cend from the father to the youngest son born a denizen. If a man hath two sons and then is attaint of treason or felony, the elder son purchaseth land and dies without issue, either in the life- time or after the death of the father, the attainder of the father is no impediment of the descent from the brother to the brother. Sir Philip Hobby's case, Co. Litt. 8. And the same law is in case the father were first attaint, and then had issue two sons, the elder purchases lands in fee simple and dies without issue, the younger shall inherit, for tho both derive their blood from the father, yet the descent from the brother to the bro- ther is immediate, and is not impeached by the attainder of the father, this tho made a doubt, Co. Lilt. p. S. yet was agreed generally by the judges in the exchequer-chamber in the case of the earl of Hol- derness.{b) ■ (a) Dyer 274. (i) P. 16 Car. 2. reported by the name of Collingwood and Pace, 1 Sid. 193. 1 Yen. 413. [1] Tenant in tail attainted of treason by the act of the legislature o? New Jersey of the 11th December, 1778, forfeits his lite estate only. Denn ex dein. Hinchman v. Clark et al. Coxe's Rep. 340. 357 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. But if there be two brothers, the elder is attaint and have issue, and dies in the hfe of the youns^er^and then the younger die without issue, the lands in fee-simple of the younger shall not descend to the nephew, for the attainder of his father is an impediment to the deri- vation of his descent. And accordingly it is, if the son of the person attaint purchases lands and dies without issue, it shall not descend to his uncle, for the attainder of his father corrupted his blood, whereby the bridge is broken between the nephew and uncle, and the one cannot inlierit the other, but the land shall eschete pro defectn hxredis: vide ac- cordant ruled in Courtney\1. ibidem §. 747. but not upon attainder of misprision of treason; but by the statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. and 5 E. 6. cap. 11. tho her husband be attainted of felony or murder, she shall not lose her dower. But by attainder of her husband of high treason or petit treason the wife shall lose her dower at this day, unless in case of attainders of such treasons, where by special provision of parliament the wife's dower is saved, as upon the statutes of 5 and IS Eliz. touching coin. But if the husband seised in right of the wife hath issue by her, and then the wife commits treason, and is attainted and dies, it seems the husband shall be tenant by the courtesy, otherwise it were, if the treason were committed before issue had: vide Co. Lilt. §. 35. III. As to the third thing, namely the forfeitures, that happen by attainder, they are of these kinds, of lands, or of goods and chattels, or of dignities and honours. 1. As to the forfeiture of lands, generally the lands of all persons attainted of treason belong to the king, but by special privilege they may belong to a subject, as in case of the bishop ol Durham, Sfc. de quo supra p. 254. ^-c. If at common law tenant in tail were attainted of treason, or at this day be attainted of felony, tho the inheritance neither eschete nor be forfeited, yet the king hath (tipon office found) the freehold during the life of the tenant in tail, and not barely [360 ]] a pernancy of profits: adjudged T. 29 Eliz. Clenche's rep. Venable^s case, and 3 Leon. n. 236. (c) Co. Litt. §. 747. and the same law it is for tenant of life attaint. •. But an attainder of treason or felony of a copyholder gives the (c);>. 185. 360 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. king no forfeiture, but regularly it belongs to the lord, unless special custom be to the contrary. By the custom of Kent, if the ancestors be attaint of felony and executed, yet his lands shall not eschete but descend to the heir; but if he be attaint by outlawry, or abjure, they are not priviledged by the custom from eschete. But if he be any way attaint of treason, yet the forfeiture thereof belongs to the king notwithstanding that custom. 8 E. 2. Prescrip- tion 50. Lambard^s Ferambidatio Kcnitix, p. 551. If the tenant hold lands of a common person, and commit treason and be attaint, yet the forfeiture belongs to the king of common right, as a royal eschete; but if such person commit felony or petit treason and be attaint, the lands eschete to the lord, of whom they were immediately held, only the king shall have the year, day, and waste of the tenement so escheted for felony or petit treason. Stamf. Prserogativa Begis, cap. \Q.{d) The commencement of this year and day is neither from the attainder nor from the death of the party attaint, but from the time of the inquisition found, tho the same be not found for many years after the death of the person attaint. 49 E. 3. 11. If tenant in tail or for life, or the husband seised in right of his wife be attaint of felony, the king shall have the year, day and waste against the wife, the issue in tail, and him in reversion. Stamf. P. C. Lib. III. cap. 30.(e) 3 E. 3. Coro. 327, but of this more hereafter. The relation of the forfeiture or eschete of lands for treason or felony to avoid all mesne incumbrances is to the time of the offense committed. t^. and B. joint tenants in fee, ,^. is attaint of treason or felony and dies, the land survives to B. but vet subject to the title [361 ] of the forfeiture. H. 10 Car. Bat/ 342. B. R. Harrison and Walden. If a man seised in fee alien, and then be attaint of treason or felony by confession or abjuration upon an indictment supposing the felony committed before the alienation, the alienee may not only falsify the attainder in the point of the time of the felony supposed, but also in the very point of the felony or treason itself, and is not concluded by the confession of the alienor, tho the alienor himself be concluded. 49 E. 3. 11. 7 E. 4. 1. Co. P. C. cap. 104.;?. 231. But if he be attaint of felony or treason by verdict upon an indict- ment, supposing the offense before the alienation, tho the alienee cannot falsify the attainder by supposing there was no felony com- mitted, yet he may falsify it as to the point of time, viz. he may allege contrary to the indictment, that the felony or treason was com- mitted after the alienaiion, and not before, Co. P. C. ubi supra 32 Eliz. Syer's case. If a man be indicted of a felony or treason supposed the 1st of Jlpril 24 Car. and in truth it was committed 1 Junii 24 Car. yet he {d) See Mag. Chart, ca'p. 22, 2 Co. Inst. 3G. (e) 190 b. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 361 shall be convicted notwithstanding that variance, for the day is not material; yet in such case for the avoiding of the danger and trouble, that may ensue by tiie relation of such attainder to the day men- tioned in the indictment, it is fit for the jury to find the true day: vide Syer^s case, ubi supra. If a man be outlawed upon an indictment of felony or treason, and pending the process he alien the land, yet the king or lord shall have the land, which he held at the time of the felony committed, for the indictment contains the year and day, when it was done, unto which the attainder by outlawry relates. But if a man sue an appeal by writ of felony or murder, and pend- ing it the party aliens, and then is outlawed before appearance, the lords eschete is lost, because it relates only to the time of the out- lawry pronounced, in as much as the writ of appeal is general, and contains no certain time of the ofiense committed, cited to be adjudged 5 E.e Co. Lilt. § 4./0/. 13 «. But it seems, that if the defendant had appeared and the plaintiff" had declared upon his writ, and the defendant had f 362 ] been convict and attaint by verdict or confession, or if the appeal had been by bill, and thereupon the party had been outlawed, iho before appearance, the eschete had related to the time of the fact committed to avoid mesne incumbrances, for in the declaration in the one case, and in the bill in the other case, the year and day of the felony is set forth. Touching forfeiture of goods. The goods of a person convict of felony or treason, or put in exi- gent for the same, or that fled for these offenses, or that stands mute, are forfeit to the king. But the relation of these forfeitures refer not to the time of the oflense committed, nor to the time of the flight, but only to the con- viction or to the time presented, or to the time of the exigent awarded. And therefore an alienation made by the felon or traitor, or person flying bond fide and without fraud, mesne between the offense or the flight, and the conviction or presentment of the flight is good, and binds the king, but if fraudulent, then it is avoidable by the statute of 13 EUz. cap. 5. 3 E. 3. Coron. 296. ibidem 344. If a man commits a felony and be pursued, and in the flight be killed, whereby he can neither be indicted nor convict, yet if this matter be found by inquisition before the justices in eyre or of oyer and termi7ier, he shall forfeit the goods he had at the time of the flight, and not those only, which were his at the time of the inqui- sition found, for there it must relate to the flight, because the party is dead, and can be no farther proceeded against, 3 E. 3. Coron. '290. 312. If a party be acquitted of treason or felony, the jury that acquits him ought to enquire of his flight for it, and if they find he fled, what goods he had, for his goods and chatties are thereby for- 362 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. feited ;(4) but this is but an inquest of office, and therefore is tra- versable by the party : vide Stamf. P. C. Lib. III. cap. 21.(/) But upon an inquisition before the coroner of the death of [ 363 J a man super visum corporis, tho the party accused be acquitted, yet if it be presented, that he fled for it, it is doubted whether that inquisition as to the flight be traversable : vide Slamf. P. C. Lib. III. cap. 21. But on all hands it is agreed, that if the coroner upon the inquest super visum corporis presents one as guilty, and that he fled for it, and the party is arraigned and found not guilty, and also that he did not fly, yet that doth not avoid the first inquisition as to the flight, but the best shall be taken for the king, tho both are in the nature of inquests of office. 22 ^ss. 96. Forfeitures 27. 3 E. 4. Forfeit- ures 35. H. 13 H. 4. Forfeitures 32. 7 Eliz. Dif. 238. b. ' A fugam fecit by the principal or accessary before, in murder, if the fact be presented before the coroner, entitles the king to the goods of the offender, for these are within the cognizance of the coroner, but the coroner hath no power to enquire of accessaries after, nor consequently of their flight, and therefore a presentment before the coroner of the flight of an accessary after gives the king no title to the goods. 4 H. 7. 18. The usage was always upon a presentment of homicide before the coroner, or of flight for the same, or upon a conviction of felony by the petit jury, or the finding of a flight for the same, to charge the inquest or jury to enquire, what goods and chattels he hath, and where they are, and thereupon to charge the Villata where such goods are with the goods to be answerable to the king : vide 3 E. 3. Corone 296. S,' alibi, vide statute 31 E. 3. cap. 3. But tho the goods of an off'ender be not forfeited till the conviction or flight found by inquest, yet whether they may be seised upon the ofl"ense committed, hath been controverted. 1? It seems clear, ihat at common law if a man had committed felony or treason, or tho possibly he had committed none, yet if he had been indicted or appealed by an approver, the sheriff, coroner, or other officer could not seize and carry away the goods of the offen- der or party accused. 2. Again, he could not in that case have removed the \_ 364 ~\ goods out of the custody of the offender or party accused, and deliver them over to the constables or to the Villata to answer for them. 13. H. 4. 13. 3. But if the party were indicted or appealed by an approver, the sheriff, or other officer might make a simple seizure of them, only to inventory and appraise them, and leave them in the custody of the servants or bailiifof the party indicted, in case he would give secu- (/) p. 183. h. [4] By the 7^8 Cfeo. 4. c. 28. s. 5. it is enacted, that where any person shall be in- dicted for treason or felonv, the jury impaniicicd to try such person shall not be charged to inquire concerning his lands, tenements, or goods, nor whether he fled for such treason or felony. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 364 rity against their being imbezzled, or in default thereof he might de- hver them to the constable or Villata to be answerable for them, but yet so that the party accused and his family have sufficient out of them for their livelihood and maintenance, (§•) viz. Salvis capto & familise snai necessariisestoveriis suis, & si captns convictus fuerit de felonia unde rettatus est, residuum bonorum ultra estoveriuni illud regi remaneat. Bract. Lib. III. 123. Fleta, Lib. I. cap. 26. 43 E. 3. 24. 44 Jiss. 14. Stamf. P. C Lib. III. cap. 32. Co. P. C. 228, 229. 4. And possibly the same law was, tho he were not indicted or appealed, but de facto had committed a felony, but with this differ- ence, if he had been indicted or appealed by an approver, this kind of seizure might have been niade, whether he conmiitted the felony or not; for in the books of 43 E. 3. and AAJiss. there is no averment, that the felony was committed, but only that he was thus accused of record, and so is the book of 13 H. 4. 13. But in case there were no indictment, then it is at the peril of him that seiseth, if he committed not the felony, and therefore it is issu- able. Now touching alterations by the statutes after made. It seems, that by the statute of 5 E. 3. cap. 9. and the ensuing sta- tutes, whereby it is enacted, that no man's goods shall be seized into (he king's hands without indictment or due process of law, that it was held, that this kind of seizure of the goods of a person accused of felony, tho it be only in custodiam Sf causa rei servandse, hath been held unlawful, if the person were not first indicted, or at least appeald by an approver; and so the books seem to P 365 ] import of 43 E. 3. 24. and 13 ^. 4. 13. and expresly my lord Coke, P. C. cap. 103.;?. 228. By the statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 14. where a party is indicted of felony, the process directed by that statute is first a capias, and if he be not found a second capias togetlier with a precept to seize his goods, and if he be not found then, an exigent and the goods to be forfeit. And this is more than a simple seizure, such as was before at com- mon law, for if the party came not in,Jiis goods are forfeit upon the award of the exigent; and if he came in, tho his goods be saved, yet there is no direction for delivering his goods upon security; but it s^ems the sheriff is to take them into his custody, and yet out of them must allow sufficient for the sustenance of the prisoner and his family. Qiiasre, Whether in the case of such a seizure, a sale for a valuable consideration before conviction and after seizure do not bind the king, as it seems it doth in a case of seizure and delivery to the Villata: vide 8. Co. Rep. 171. Fleetivood\s case. This statute extends as well to treason as to felony, and yet it men- tions only felony, and therefore at this day the exigent goes out upon the second Capias returned non inventus, as well in treason, as felony. ig) See State Tr. Vol. IV. p. 615. Sir W. Parkin's case. 365 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. By the statute of 1 R. 3. cap. 3. it is enacted, " That neither she- riff, Si'c. nor other person take or seize the goods of any person ar- rested or imprisoned before he be convict of the felony according to the law of England, or before the goods be otherwise lawfully tbr- feited, upon pain of forfeiting the double value of the goods so taken." Mr. Stamford thinks this is but an atlirmance of the common law, only that it gives a penalty, but it seems to be somewhat more than so, for this prohibits the seizure of the goods of a party imprisoned, tho he were also indicted, but not yet convicted, where unquestion- ably the connnon law allowed such a seizure, as is before declared, if the party or his friends did not secure the forth-coming of the goods, where the party was indicted. But upon this statute these things are considerable. 1. Whether it extends to treason; it seems it doth, for as r 366 1 all treason is felony and more, so in a statute of this nature for advancing of justice it seems comprised in it, for it is within the reason of the law, and vide Co. P. C. p. 228, tho I know it was otherwise held, or at least doubted in the case of Sir Henri/ Vane, whose rents were stopt in the tenants hands, and no precept was granted for their delivery, tho before conviction, yea and before the indictment, tho after imprisonment 1661. 2. Whether it extends to a party, that is at large and out of prison, whether indicted or not indicted, and as to that, 1. It seems clearly, that it doth not repeal the statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 14, touching the second Capias with a seizure of goods. But 2. As to other persons, that are at large and not indicted, nor process, as before, made upon their indictment, it seems to me, that if they fly not, there can be no seizure at all made, whether they are indicted or not, for the statute did not intend a greater privilege to a party imprisoned for an offense of this nature, than he that is at large. 3. That if he be at large and fly for it, yet his goods cannot be seized and removed, whether he be indicted or not indicted. 4. That if he be indicted and at large, 5'^et the goods cannot be removed, but only viewed, appraised, and in- ventoried in the house or place, where they lie. 5. That altho the goods may not be removed, because the statute now hath taken away that removal, that was in some cases at common law, yet nei- ther in case of treason nor in case of felony, where the party is at large, is it within the penalty of the statute as to the point of forfei- ture of the double value, for as to that the statute is penal, but it is within the directive and prohibitory part of the statute, which by an equal construction and interpretation prohibits the thing to be prac- tised, and hath altered the law as to the removing of the goods of the party before conviction. And yet I know not how it comes to pass, the use of seizing of the goods of persons accused of felony, tho imprisoned or not imprisoned, hath so far obtained notwithstanding this statute, that it passeth for law and common practice as well by constables, sheriffs ("3671 and other tho king's oflicers, as by lords of franchises, that there is nothing more usual : vide IJallon's Justice 0/ Peace, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 367 cap. 110.(/i) in affirmation of it, viz. that the officer may still take surety, that the goods be not embezzled, and for want of sureties may seize and praise them, and then deliver them to the town safely to be kept, until the prisoner be convict or acquit, and cites for it Stamf. 192. 8 Rep. 171. and B. Forfeiture 44. It seems the opinion therefore of my lord Coke., P. c9cap. 103. hath truly stated the law, at least as it stands upon the statute of 1 R. 3. 1. That before the indictment the goods of any person cannot be searched, inventoried, nor in any sort seized. 2. That after indictment they cannot be seized and removed, or taken away before conviction or attainder; but then it may be said, to what purpose may they be searched and inventoried after indict- ment, if they may not be removed, but are equally liable to embez- zling as before. I think he is not bound to find sureties, neither hath the offiCer at this day any power to remove them in default of sureties, and com- mit them to the vill, but only to inventory them and leave them where he found them, (unless in case of the second Capias, whereof before) for the prisoner or party indicted may sell them bond fide; and if he may do so, the vendee may take them, and the Villata cannot refuse the delivery of them to the vendee, tho the goods had been delivered to them. But there is this advantage by the viewing and appraising, that thereby the king is ascertained what the goods are, and may pursue them that take or embezzle them, by information, (if the party hap- pen to be convict) and try the property with them, whether they are really sold, or sold only fraudulently without valuable consideration to prevent the forfeiture, and so forfeited by the statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 5. notwiihstandiug such fraudulent sale. [5] IV. Lastly, touching execution of judgments of treason, they are directed by the judgment, whereof before. There be nevertheless some things, that accidentally hap- [ 368 "1 pen, that suspend or abate the execution. 1. Reprieves ex arbitrio regis vel judicis, the king may by com- mand or precept under his great or privy seal, privy signet, or sign manual, yea by signification under the hand of the secretary of state, Qi) New Edit. cap. 163. p. 538. [5] By the Constitution of the United States, Art. 3. Sect. 3. it is provided that, Con- gress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attaint- ed. The constitutions of Connecticut, Peiinsylvania, Delaware, Tennessee, Ohio, Indi- ona, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, and Arkansas, contain similar provisions. By «Seci. 24 of the Act of Congress o{ April 30, 1790, it is enacted, that no conviction or judgment for any capital or other offences, shall work corruption of blood, or any forteiture of estate. See Hylton v. Brown, 1 l-^'. C. C. R. 343. The doctrine of corruption of blood, says Mr. Rawle, {Cuns. 146.) arises from an odious fiction, founded on a compound of cruelty and avarice, springing from a perversion of the system of tenures, and at vari- ajice with the liberal principles of modern times, and the very elements of justice. VOL. i.^ — 34 368 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. or at this day by the subscription of a master of requests, command the reprieve of one condemned of treason or felony. And ahho the judge, by whom judgment is given, ought to be very cautious in granting a reprieve of one condemned for treason before him, yet he may, upon due circumstances do it, as well in case of treason, as felony. And this reprieve he may grant, and after he hath granted it may command execution after the sessions and adjournment of the com- mission, Dy. 205. • There are other reprieves, which are not arbitrary, but quasi de j^ire. 1. In respect of pregnancy, for tho pregnancy be no plea to delay judgment, yet it is a plea to delay execution, and therefore whenever any judgment in treason or felony is given against a woman, it is the duty of the judge, before he finish his sessions, to demand of her what she can allege why execution should not be made; yea in all cases, where a prisoner attaint is brought into another court, or reprieved to another sessions, he ought not to have any award of execution against him, till he be first demanded, what he can say, why it should not be, for possibly he may have a pardon after judgment. 22 j3ss. 71. This plea of pregnancy in retardationem exeai/ionis hath these incidents to it: 1, She must be with child of a quick child. 2, If it be' alleged, the judge, before whom it is alleged, must impanel an inquest of women ex officio to enquire of the truth of her allega- tion, viz. whether she be with child of a quick child, and if they find she is, then her execution is to be respited, if not, she is to be executed. If it be found by the jury of women, that she is so with child, some have used to command a respite of her execution till a convenient time, for instance a month after her delivery, and then to be [ 369 ] executed ; but this seems irregular, for she may have a par- don to plead, and therefore it is to be respited till another sessions. 12 ^ss. 10. If she have once had the benefit of this reprieve and be delivered, and afterwards be with child again with another quick child, she shall not have the benefit of a farther respite of the same judgment for that cause; gnod vide 23 ^.ss. 2 Coran. 188. 22 E. 3, ibidem 253. K the jury of women be mistaken in their verdict, and find her quick with child, where in truth she was not at all with child, (as .once it happened at Akshriry,) if the next sessions of goal-delivery, or oyer and lerviiner happen at that distance, that it is impossible by the course of nature, that she could be with child, but she must be delivered mesne between the former sessions and this, as if it were ten months, 4*c, she shall be executed; but if the second sessions hap- pen within such time after the first, that by course of nature she may still continue with child, as if it be within the distance of six months or the like, then she shall continue under the first reprieve till an- other session, nam licet lempus ordinurium vilalis foetus sit post HIStORIA PLACiTORUM CORON.^. 369 16. vel IS. septimanas post impregnatam, tamen in quibusdam citiiis contingere potest juxta medicoriim placita. If in truth she were not with child with a quick child at the time, when the jury gave their verdict, but became quick after, nay tho she were not at all with child then, but became with child before the time of the second session with a quick child, in my opinion she shall have a second reprieve by reason of pregnancy, for the advantage that she had at first was not really because of pregnancy, but by a mis- take of the jury of women, and therefore in favorern prolis she shall now have it. And therefore, as hath been said, in all cases of reprieves for pregr nancy the judge ought to make a new demand, what the prisoner hath to say, wherefore execution should not be awarded, for the first respite being by a kind of matter of record shall not be determined withoiit a new award of execution; and altho clerks of as- sises enter those respites and awards only in a book of [ 370 ~\ Jigenda, yet regularly they are supposed to be entered of record, and these memorials are warrants for such entries, tho de facto it be not usually done. [6] Another cause of regular reprieve is, if mesne between the judg- ment and the award of execution the offender become non compos 7nentis,{i) the judge in that case may both in case of treason and felony swear a jury to inquire ex officio, whether he be really so, or only feigned or counterfeit; and thereupon if it be found that he be really distracted, must award a reprieve de jure till another sessions, Co. P. C. p. 4. and the statute of 33 H. S. cap. 20. that directed an execution of parties convict of treason notwithstanding insanity inter- vening after judgment is repeald, by 1 4* 2 P. <^' M. de quo supra p. 283. Now as to the abating of some parts of the execution in case of high treason, as drawing, hanging, evisceration and quartering, and leaving the offender only to be beheaded, this may be, and usually is by the king's warrant under his great seal, privy seal, yea or his privy signet, or sign manual, as usually is done in case of noblemen or great men falling under that judgment, for one part of the judgment, viz. decollation, and the substance of the whole judgment, ?;<>. the death of the party, is performed. [7] (i) See Sir John Hawles^s remarks on the trial of diaries Bateman, Slate Tr. Vol. IV. p. 204. [6] The warrant to execute a man in England is nothing more than a marginal note! 4 Bl. Com. 403. [7J 2 BL Com. 251. 4 id. 380. 388. 1 Burn's Just. 306. ''Attainder:' 1 Chit. Cr. Law. 723. 371 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. CHAPTER XXVIII. TOUCHING THE CRIME OF MISPRISION OP TREASON, AND FELONY, &C. Tho the order proposed in the beginning should refer misprision of treason to that series of offenses, that are not capital, yet because this offense hath relation to treason, and may be of use to explain the nature of it, I shall here take it into consideration, referring misprision in its large and comprehensive nature to its proper place. Misprision of treason is of two kinds. 1. That which is properly such by the'common law. 2. That wliich is made misprision of treason by act of parliament. Misprision of treason by the common law is, when a person knows of treason, tho no party or consenter to it, yet conceals it and doth not reveal it in convenient time. Tho' some question was antiently, whether bare concealment of high" treason were treason, yet that is settled by the statute of 5 4' 6 E. 6. cap. 11. and 1 4' 2 P. fy M. cap. 10. viz. that concealment or keeping secret of high treason shall be deemed and ta:ken only mis- prision of treason, and the offender therein to suffer and forfeit, as in cases of misprision of treason, as hath heretofore been used: tho in the time of Henry VIII. and Edward VI. some things were made misprision of treason, that were not so formerly, yet by the statute of 1 Mar. cap. 1. it is enacted, that nothing be adjudged to be trea- son, petit treason, or misprision of treason, but what is contained in the statute of 25 E. 3. and altho that act of 25 E. 3. do not make or declare misprision of treason, yet it doth it in effect by declaring and enacting what is treason, which is the matter or subject of ["372 1 misprision of treason, tho the misprision or concealment thereof be a crime, which the common law defines what it is. Therefore since the statute of 25 E. 3. is by the statute of 1 Mar. cap. 1. made the standard of treason, it remains to be enquired, what shall be said the concealment of such a treason according to the reason and rule of the common law. If a man knew of a treason, by the old'law in Bracton's time he was bound to reveal it to the king or some of his council within two days, r/iiod si ad tempiis dissimulaverit ^' sub/icucrii, quasi con- sentiens, 4* assentiens erit sedtictor domini regis ;{a) but at this day it is but misprision, if he reveals it not as soon as he can to some judge of assise, or it seems to some justice of peace, for tho the crimes of treason or misprision of treason be not within the com- mission of a justice of peace to hear and determine, yet, as it is a breach of the peace, the justices of peace may take information upon oath touching it, and take the examination of the offenders (o) Bract. Lib. III. de corona, cap. 3. HISTORIA PLACITORUxM CORONA. 372 and imprison them, and bind over witnesses, and transmit these examinations and informations to the next sessions of gaol-delivery or oyer and terminer to be further proceeded npon as is truly- observed by Mr. Dalton,{h) cap. 90. nay, I have known chief jus- tice Rolls affirm, that justices of the peace may take an indictment of treason, tho they cannot determine, viz. as an information or accusation tending to the preservation of the peace. But some treasons enacted by some statutes are limited to be heard and determined by them, as appears in some of the statutes before mentioned, p. 350. It is said 3 H. 7. 10. Stamf. 38. n. Dalton, cap. 89.,(c) the utter- ing of false money known to be false is misprision of treason ; but it is a mistake; indeed it is a great misprision, but not misprision of treason, unless the utterer know him that counterfeited it, and con- ceal it, this indeed is misprision of treason, but not the uttering of it, for the money is not the traitor, but he that [ 373 ] counterfeited it, and his counterfeiting is the treason. As all treasons and declarations of treasons between 25 E. 3. and 1 Mar. are repealed by 1 ]\Tar. cap. 1. so consequently" all mispri- sions of any other treason not contained in 25 E. 3. are thereby repealed. Coke P. C. p. 24. hath these words, Misprision of treason is taken for concealment of high treason or petit treason, and onlij of high treason or petit treason specified and expressed in the act of 25 E. 3. and in the margin, that is of such treason high or petit, as is expressed in the act of 25 E. 3. and of no other treason /and accordingly uttering of counterfeit coin was agreed by the court(c^) at Newgate., Jill gust 1661. to be neither treason or misprision of treason within the statute of 25 E. 3. but only punishable with fine and imprisonment; ex libra domini Bridgman manii sua scripto. If a subsequent act of parliament after 1 Mar. make a new trea- son, the concealment of such a treason is certainly misprision of trea- son for these reasons, 1. Because misprision of treason is not any substantive crime of itself, but relative to that, which is, or is made treason, and a kind of necessary consequent and result from it, as the shadow follows the substance. 2. And hence it is, that tho the statute of 25 E. 3. does not by express words enact misprision of treason, to be an offense, yet treasons being settled by that act, the statute of 1 Mar. cap. 1. enacts there shall be no misprision of trea- son but what is enacted by the statute of 25 E. 3. for tho that act speaks not of misprision of treason, yet settling those things that are treason, it doth virtually and consequentially make the concealing of 'any of them misprision of treas'^n ; but yet farther, when the act of •1 4* 2 P. 4' M. cap. 10. enacts divers new treasons, tho it enacts nothing to make the concealment thereof misprision, yet in the pro- viso abovementioned it takes notice, that concealment of any of these (6) New Edit. cap. ]41.p. 460. ' (c) New Edit. cap. 140. p. 452. This last book says it is misprision of treason, but the other two only say it is a misprision, {d) In the case of Richard Oliver, Kel. 33. 373 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA, treasons would be at least misprision of treason, and therefore pro- vides that the concealment thereof shall not be adjudged [374] treason, but only misprision of treason, any thing above- mentioned to the contrary thereof notwithstanding; and the like clause is in the abovementioned statute of 5 <§• 6 E. 6. cap. 11. Again, my lord Coke, P.C. cup. 65. p. 139. says, As in case of high f}'eason, tvhethe?' the treason be by the common law or statute, the concealment of it is misprision of treason ; so in case of felony, whether the felony be by the common law or by statute, the con-- cealment of it is misprision of felony; so that certainly, if a felony or a treason be enacted by a new law, the concealment of the former falls under the crime of misprision of felony, and the latter under the crime of misprision of treason, as a consequent of it without any spe-' cial words enacting it to be so. All treason is misprision of treason and more, and therefore, he tliat is assisting to a treason, may be indicted of misprision of trea- son, if the kills pkase. Stamf P. C. 37. b. Co. P. C. 36. 2 R. 3. 10 b. Altho the, statute of 1 S,' 2 P. S,- M. cap. 10. hath as to treasons repealed the statute of 33 //. 8. cap. 23. for trying treasons in one county committed in another, yet it hath not repealed the same statute as to the trial of murder and misprision of treason, which may yet be tried according to the statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 23. In case of misprision of treason and misprision of felony, as well as in case of treason or felony, or accessary thereunto a peer of this kingdom shall be tried by peers, but the indictment is to be by a common grand inquest. 2 Co. Inst. 49. The judgment in case of misprision of treason is loss of the profits of his lands during his life, forfeiture of goods, and imprisonment during life. Ey what hath been said touching misprision of treason v/e may easily collect what is the crime of misprision of felony, namely, that it is the concealing of a felony which a man knows, but never con- sented to, for if he consented, he is either principal or accessary in the felony, and consequently guilty of misprision of felony and more. The judgment in case of misprision of felony in case the concealer be an officer, as sheriff or bailiff, S^c. is by the statute of \_ 375 ~\ PFestminst. 1 cap. 9.(e) imprisonment for a year and ransom at the king's pleasure; if by a common person, it is only fine and imprisonment. And note once for all, that all those acts of parliament, that speak of fines or ransoms at the king's pleasure, are always interpreted of the king's justices : vide Co. Magna Carta super slat. Westtninst. 1 cap. 4. in fine{f) <§• saepius alibi. 2 R. 3. 11. a. voluntas regis in curia, not in camerd.' And it seems, that misprision of petit treason is not subject to the judgment of misprision of high treason, but only is punishable by fine and imprisonment, as in case of misprision of felony. (e) 2 Co. Inst. 172. (/) 2 Co. Inst. 168. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 375 II. I come to misprisions of treason so enacted by acts of parlia- ment since 1 Mar. cap. 1. for, as before is observed, by that act all misprisions, that by any statnte made after 25 E. 3, are either expressly or consequentially made misprisions of treason, are repealed and set aside. All acts of parliament, that after 1 Mar. enacted any thing to be high treason, do consequentially make the concealment thereof to be misprision of treason, tho it do not in express words enact the con- cealment thereof to be misprision of treason, as hath been before shewn, and the like in case of felony. And consequently those acts of parliament, which enacted tempo- rary treasons, as the statute of 1 4* 2 P. 4' M. cap. 10, the act of 1 Eliz. cap. 5. (^'C. so far forth as they are temporary, the misprisions of such treasons are also temporary, and expire with the act, and where the acts of treason are perpetual, or being but temporary, are made perpetual by some other act of parliament, the misprision of such treasons remains such, as long as the act of parliament making such treason continues, or is continued, as upon the statutes of 5 Eiiz. and 18 Eliz. 1 Mar. touching counterfeiting of foreign coin made current by proclamation, or clipping or washing coin. And the like is to be said in all respects of misprision of felony made so by act of parliament. But besides these crimes, that are consequentially mispri- sion of treason, some oifenses are made misprision of trea- [376 J son, as a kind of substantive offense, and not consequential upon the making of treason, but particularly enacted. Those of that kind, that are perpetual and have continuance, are as follow : 14 Eiiz. cap. 3. "They that counterfeit foreign coin of gold or silver not permitted to be current in this kingdom, their procurers, aiders, and abetters shall suffer, as in case of misprision of treason. And note, that in that act (aiders) are intended of aiders in the fact, not aiders of their persons, as receivers and comforters, for, as hath been observed /?. 236. in some acts of parliament aiders being joined with procurers, counsellors and abetters are intended of those, that are aiding to the fact; but in other acts of parliament, where the word aiders is joined with maintainers and comforters, it is intended of those, that are aiders ex post facto to their persons; see this diifer- ence in the penning of several acts of parliament, for the first part 5 Eliz. cap. 11. 18 Eliz. cap. 1. 1 Mar. sess. 2. cap. 6. touching coin, and for the second part this express distinction observed 13 Eliz. cap. 2. touching publishing of bulls of absolution, where the former kind are enacted to be traitors; the second incur a prxmunirc; the like 23 Eliz. cap. 1. 13 Eliz. cap. 2. "If any bull or absolution, or instrument of re- conciliation to the see oi Rome be offered to any person, or if any person be moved or perswaded to be reconciled, if he conceal the said of!er, motion or perswasion and. doth not discover or signify it by writing or otherwise within six weeks to some of the privy 376 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. council, Sf'C. he shall incur the penalty and forfeiture of misprision of treason, and that no person shall be impeached for misprision of treason or any offense made treason by this act, other tiian sucii as are before declared to be in case of misprision of treason:" noia, had it not been for this cause the concealment generally of any treason within this act had been misprision of treason. [1] 23 Eliz. cap. 1. "All persons, that shall put in practice to [ 377 ]] absolve or withdraw the subjects of the queen from their obedience, or to that end perswade them from the religion here established, or if any person shall be so absolved, every such person, and their counsellors and procurers thereunto, shall bead- judged guilty of high treason. "And all persons, that shall wittingly be aiders and maintainors of such person so offending, or any of them, knowing the same, or which shall conceal any offense aforesaid, and not reveal it within twenty days after his knowledge thereof to some justice of peace, or other higher officer, he shall suffer and forfeit, as in misprision of treason. [2] CHAPTER XXIX. CONCERNING PETIT TREASON. As at common law there was great uncertainty in high treason, so there was in petit treason. It is true, that all the petit treasons declared in this statute(«) were petit treasons at common law, as for a servant to kill his master or mistress, 12 ^ss. 30. a woman to kill her husband, as appears 15 E. 2. Corone 383. and the judgment was the same at common law in such cases, as now, and the lands of him, that was attaint of petit treason, escheted to the mesne lord, of whom they were held, 22 Jiss. 49. so that as to these things the act of 25 E. 3. was but an affirmance of the common law. But yet there were certain offences, that Were petit treason atcom- (o) viz. 25 Edw. 3. [1] See 1 East, P. C. 139. 4 Bl. Com. 120. [2] It has been enacted by Sect. 2. of the act of Congress of April 30, 1790, that if any person or persons having knowledge of the commission of any ot'the treasons defined by tiiat act, shall conceal and not as soon as may be disclose and make known the same to the President of the United States, or some one of the Judges thereof, or to the President or Governor of a particular State, or some one of the Judges or Justices thereof, such person or persons on conviction shall be adjudged guilty of misprision of treason, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding seven years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars. Weidle''s case, 2 Dall. 88. was an indictment for misprision of treason for speak- ing certain words tending to excite resistance to the government of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. No instance of this offence has occurred against the government of the United States. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 377 mon law, that are restrained and abrogated by this statute from being petit treason. 15 E. 2. Corone 383. A woman intending to kill her husband beat him so, that she left him for dead, but yet he [ 378 ] recovered, for this attempt the wife had judgment to be burned. Fleta, Lib. I. cap. 22. Britton, cap. 8. If the homager or servant falsify the seal of his lord, or had committed adultery with the lord's wife or daughter,(A) it was petit treason. But these are taken away by this act of 25 E. 3. and are reduced only to these three ranks: 1. The servant killing his master or mistress, 2. The wife killing her husband. 3. The clergyman killing his prelate or superior, to whom he owes faith and obedience. All petit treason comes under the name of felony, and a pardon of all felonies, where petit treason is not excepted, at common law par- doned petit treason, and so at this day doth a pardon of murder. A man or woman, that commits petit treason, may be indicted of murder, but if all felonies, S^c. are pardoned by act of parliament, wherein there is an exception of murder, it seems that a murder, which is a petit treason also, is discharged and not within the excep- tion, M. 6^-7 Eliz. Dyer. 235.(c) The killing of a master or husband is not petit treason, unless it be such a killing, as in case of another person would be murder, and therefore upon an indictment of petit treason for a servant killing his master, if upon the circumstances of the case it appears to be a sud- den falling out, and the servant upon a sudden provocation kills his master, which, in case it had been between other persons, had been only manslaughter, the jury may acquit him of petit treason, and find him guilty of manslaughter; and thus it was once done before me at Dorchester assizes, and another time before justice Windham at Coventry assizes, tho the indictment were for petit treason. If a wife conspire to kill her husband, or a servant to kill his mas- ter, and this is done by a stranger in pursuance of that con- spiracy, it is not petit treason in the servant or wife, because [^379 ] the principal is only murder, and the being only accessary, where the principal is but murder, cannot be petit treason; but if the wife and a servant conspire the death of the husband, being his mas- ter, and the servant etiect it in the absence of the wife, it is petit treason in the servant, and she is accessary before to the petit treason, and shall accordingly be indicted and burnt P. 16. Eliz. Dy. 332. a. 40 Jiss. 25. If the servant and a stranger, or the wife and a stranger conspire to rob the husband or master, and the servant or wife be present and (J)) Biitlon adds, or the nurses of Ms children. (c) The reason of this is, because petit treason is an offense of another species, 6 Co. Rep. 13. b. but then by the same reason a pardon o( imirde.r does not include a pardon of petit treason, nor can one guilty of jietit treason be indicted of murder. See Rex versus Crispe, State Tri. Vol. VI. p. 224, 225. 379 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. hold the candle, [while the husband or master is killed,*] the stranger is guilty of murder, and the wife or servant guilty of pelit treason as principal, because present, 2 S,^ 3 P. 8,- M. Dy. 128. a. So that the statute of 25 E. 3. doth not only extend to the party, that actually commits the offense, but also to those that were procu- rers, aiders or abetters, scilicet, if they be present, they are guiity of petit treason as principals, if absent, yet if the offense in the prmcipal be petit treason, the offense in the accessary before is petit treason, as accessary, as in BroiDn^s case, Dy. 332. a. If a wife or a servant intending to poison or kill a stranger, and missing the blow the wife by mistake kills or poisons her husband, or the servant his master, this, that would have been murder, if it had taken etlect against the stranger, becomes petit treason in the death of the husband or master. Plowd. Com. 475. b. Crompt. de pace regis 20. b. and Dolt. cap. d\.{d) so if he shoot at J. *SVand missing him kills his master. Ibid. If the wife or servant conspire with a stranger to kill the husband or master, if the wife or servant be in the same house, where the fact is done, tho not in thd* same room, it is petit treason in them, and they are principals in law, because in law adjudged to be present, when in the same house; but if they had been absent, then [ 380 3 they had been only accessaries before the fact to murder. Crompt. de pace regis 21. a. Blechendeii's case. If the wife or servant conunand one to beat (he husband or master, and he beat him, whereof he dies, if the wife or servant be in the same house, it is petit treason in the wife or servant as principals, but murder in the stranger. Crumpt. 20. b. Plowd. Com. 475. b. For whatsoever will make a man guilty of murder will make a woman guilty of petit treason, if committed upon the husband, or the servant, if committed upon the master. Eadem lex mutatis mutandis for an inferior clergyman in relation to his superior. But now to descend to particulars. I. A servant killing his master. Who shall be said a servant or a master. If the servant kills his mistress or his master's wife, this is petit treason within this act. 19 H. 6. 47. Plowd. Com. 86. b. Co. P. C. 20. 12 JJss. 30. If a servant, being gone from his master, kills him upon a grudge, that he conceived against his master, while he was in his service, which he attempted while his servant, but was disappointed, it is petit treason. 33 Jlss. 7. Plowd. Com. 260. a. Co. P. C. 20. If a child live with his father as a servant, as if he receive wages from him, or meat and drink for his service, or be bound apprentice to him, and kills his father or mother, this is petit treason at this day.(/) . * These words arc not in the MS. but they are in the case cited from Dyer, and the eense plainly re()uires tliem. {d) New Edit, cap, 142. p. 462. (/) 1 Mar.Dalison 14. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 380 But if he receives no wages, nor meat and drink for his service, or be not bound apprentice to him, but only is his son and not his ser- vant, and kills his father, this was petit treason at common law. 21 E. 3. 17. b. per Tfinrp;{g) but the better opinion is, that it is not petit treason at this day, because this statute of 25 E. 3. shall not in this case be extended by equity: quod vide Co. P. C. 20. Lamhart Jiistic. 248. Crompt 19. 6., II. The wife killing her husband. If the husband kill the wife it is murder, not petit treason, [ 381 ] because there is subjection due from the wife to the hus- band, but not ^ converso. If the wife be divorced from the husband causa aduUerii vel saevi/iK, she is yet a wife within this law, because this dissolves not the vincuiu7?i matrimonii by our law, for they may cohabit again, but otherwise it is, if they be divorced causa consanguinitatis or prxcontractdsf for then the vinculum is dissolved, they are no more husband and wife. If*.'?, be married to B. and during that intermarriage t/?. marries Cf tho C. be, as to some purposes, a wife de facto, yet she is not a wife within this law, for the second marriage was merely void, tho perchance she may, upon circumstances, be a servant within the for- mer clause, if she cohabit with Ji. and he finds her necessaries for her subsistence; tamen quxre. III. The clergyman killing his prelate, &;c. If a clergyman living and beneficed in tbe diocese o{ Ji. kills the bishop o{ that diocese, it is petit treason; but if he kills the- bishop of the diocese of jB. it is only murder. If a clergyman hath a benefice in the diocese of .^. and after, by dispensation takes a benefice in the diocese of B. if he kills the bishop of one diocese or the other, it is petit treason, for he owes and swears upon his institution canonical obedience to the bishop of each diocese. If a clergyman beneficed in the diocese o{ A. within the province of C. kills his metropolitan, it seems it is petit treason, tho he be not his immediate superior. If a clergyman be ordained by the bishop of A. in ordinem diaconi, sive preshyteri sine titulo, yet it seems if he kills the bishop it is peiit treason, for he professeth canonical obedience upon his ordination. , ^ Concerning proceedings in petit treasons. •. In high treason all are principals, but in petit treason there are principals and accessaries, as well before, as after. If the principal be only murder, as being committed by a stranger, the accessary cannot be petit treason, tho she be a wife or servant. Dy. 332. Brown's case ubi supra. ig) The book says, he was indicted for killing his mere (Iiis mother) but Coke P. C. ■ p. 20. says it is misprinted, and that it should be read maistre, (his master) for mre being abreviated, (as periiaps it was in the MS. of tlje year booko) muy be read either way, tho the last seems the most probable. 382 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. But if the principal be petit treason, as being committed by a wife upon her husband, or by a servant upon his master or mis- tress, if the accessary be of the same relation, viz. a servant or wife, the judgment shall be given against the accessary, as in petit treason; but if the accessary, whether before or after, be a stranger, (ho such stranger be an accessary to petit treason, yet. the judg- ment shall be as in a case of felony ^against the accessary, viz. qiind snspendatttr, for tho he be an accessary to petit treason, which is the principal, yet such accessary being a stranger is not, nor can be guilty of petit treason, because a stranger to the party killed, and neither wife nor servant. At common law, and by the statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 4. clergy was allowable in case of petit treason, but not in case of high treason; but now by the statute of 23 //. 8. cap. 1. 1 ^. 6. cap. 12. clergy is ex- cluded from petit treason, as well as murder, and in the same kind. If a person arraigned of high treason stands wilfully mute, he shall be convicted as hath been formerly shewn ;[1] but if arraigned of petiftreason, he stand mute, he shall have judgment of {*) peine fort S,' dure. Crompt. 19. h. Co. P. C. 217. The judgment of a woman convict of petit treason is to be burnt, (//)[2] but (by Stamf. P. C.fol. 182. b.) in high treason to be drawn and burnt, unless it be in case of coin, and then only to be burnt, as in case of petit treason. But the judgment against a man convict of petit treason is to be drawn and hanged, trahatur 8^^ svspendatur per collum. Stamford in P. C. 182. tells us, that the execution of drawing is to be upon a hurdle, but 33 tdss. 7. Shard justice commanded, that nothing should be brought, whereupon he should be drawn, mes que sans cley ou autre chose a desouth lui soil tray de chivaux hors de la sale, ou il avoit judgement, tanque a les furc, S^-c. but that severity is disused: he is in such cases drawn upon a hurdle to the place of execution. And thus far touching petit treason. [3] (*) [Peine fort and dure] but now see the Stat. 12. Geo. 3. cK 20. as to a person, ar- raigned on any indictment, standing- mute. And 3 Burn. Edit. 1776. p. 211. (A) The judgment of a woman convict of petit treason (or in case of coin) is all one as in high treason, viz. tohe drawn and burnt. Co. P. C.p. 211. and so is the constant prac- tice. [1] Ante, p. 224. [2] Altered by the 30 Geo. 3. c. 48, to hanging. [3] By the 9 Geo. 4. c. 31. s. 2, "every offence whicli before the commencement of this act wouUl have amounted to petit treason, shall be deemed to be murder only, and no grciiter offence; and ail persons guilty in respect tliereof, wlietlier as principals or as accessaries, shall bo dealt with, indicted, tried, and punished as principals and accessa- ries in murder." The crime of petit treason seems to be unknown to the jurisprudence of the United.Statcs ; the otFender would in such case bo tried as for any other liind of murder. Davis' V}rg.,C. L. iQ'J. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 383 CHAPTER XXX. CONCERNING HERESY AND APOSTACY, AND THE PUNISHMENT THEREOF. Under the general name of heresy there hath been in ordinary- speech comprehended three sorts of crimes: 1. ^.^Ipostacy, when a christian did apostatize to Paganism or to Judaism, and the punish- ment hereof, as well by the law of this kingdom, as by the imperial laws, seems to have been by death, namely burning. Bract. Lib. III. de corona, cap. 9. (a) by the imperial law he was subject to loss of goods, Cod. de apostatis, tit. 7. lege 1. but it appears not, whether he. were to suffer death. Ibid. I. 6. unless he solicited others to apos- tacy.(6) 2. Witclicraft, Sortilegium was by the antient laws of England of ecclesiastical cognizance, and upon conviction thereof without abjuration, or relapse after abjuration, was punishable witli death by writ de hxretico comburendo, vide Co. P. C. cap. 6. «§• lihros ibi, Extr^ de hsereticis, cap. 8. §. 5. n. 6. 3* Formal heresy; the old popish canonists define an heretic to be such, qui male sentit vel docet de fide, de corpore Christi, de baptismate, peccatorum con- fessione, matrimonio, vel aliis sacramentis ecclesise, & generaliter, qui de aliquo prasdictorum vel de articulis fidei aliter praedicat, sentit vel doceat, quam docet sancta mater ecclesia: and whereas the antient councils and imperial constitutions grounded thereupon kept the business of heresy within certain bounds and descriptions, as the Manichees, Nestorians, Eufychians, 4'C. quod vide in Codice, Lib. I. tit. 5. de hsereticis, I. 5. in the edict of Theodosius and Valentinian; the papal canonists have by ample and general terms extended heresy so far, and left so much in the discretion of the ordinary to determine it, that there is scarce any the smallest deviation from them, but it may be reduced to heresy according to the great generality, latitude, and extent of their definitions and f 384 ] descriptions, whereof see the gloss of Lindwood in titulo de Hsereticis, cup. 1. Beverendissimse ad verbum declarentur: the definition of Grostead, tho somewhat general, is much more rea- sonable as we have it given by Mr. Fox, Acts <§' Mon. part. 1. p. 420. Est sententia hnrnano sensu electa, palani docta, pertinaciter defensa; but of this more hereafter. In this business of heresy, and the punishment thereof, I shall, as near as I can, use this method: 1. I will consider in general who is the judge of heresy according to the common and imperial law. 2* Who shall be said an heretic according to tliose laws. 3. What the punishment of an heretic is according to those laws: then I shall consider more specially, viz. 1. What was the method of the con- viction of heresy according to the antient law used in England (a) p. 123. h. (b) Then it was capital, Lib. I. Cod. tit. 7. I. 5. 384 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. before the time of Richard II, and Henry IV. And 2, What was the usual punishment of heresy liere m England before the time t)f Richard II. and Henry IV. 3. I shall give an account touching the proceeding against heretics from the beginning of Richard II. to the twenty-fifth year of king Henry VIII. 4. What is the method of proceeding, and how the law touching heresy, heretics, and their punishment from 25 H. 8, until the first year of queen Elizabeth. 5. How the law stood from 1 Eliz. to this day touching this matter. I. According to the common and imperial law, and generally by other laws in kingdoms and states, where the canon law obtained, the ecclesiastical judge was the judge of heresies, and hereby they obtained a large jurisdiction touching it, so that there was scarce any thing, wherein a man dissented from the doctrine or practice of the Roman church, but they took the liberty to determine heretical, qui a recto tramite, & judicio ecclesise catholicse delectus fuerit deviare, & is qui dubitat de fide catholica, yea even, qui despicit & negligit servare ea, que Romana ecclesia statuit vel servare decreve- rat: vide Zy//?f/!ooo^ de haereticis in cap. Reverendissimse «rf 2^er6i^m declarentur, which left an excessive arbitrary latitude in the eccle- siastical judge, and a great servitude and uncertainty upon men subject to their censures: the ecclesiastical judge was either r 385 3 extraordinary, viz. certain inquisitors thereunto deputed by the pope, or ordinary, which was the bishop of the diocese, as appears by Lindwood de hsereticis, cap. finaliter verb, ordinarius in glossa;{*) only for the more solemnity of the business of degra- dation, which accompanied the sentence of heresy upon one in orders before the offender was left to the secular power, there were six, but afterwards three bishops to be present in degradation a sacris ordi- nihus, viz. the episcopal^ Presbyteratns, Diaconatus <§' subdiaco- 7ialus, but in minoribus ordinibus there was only required the bishop and his chapter, canonici sive clerici, 6 decretal, cap. 2. after- ward the business of degradation was reduced to one bishop, viz. the ordinary of the place, so far at least as the same respected the ordo Presbytcratus and inferior orders. But I do not find, that by the canon or civil law the declaratory sentence of heresy was necessary in a provincial synod, tho in great cases, especially where a priest was to be degraded, it was most com- monly done in a provincial synod, partly for the greater solemnity of the business, and partly because in such synods more bishops and others of the clergy were present; but how the use was in England we shall hereafter see. II. As to the second, touching heretics and their discriminations according to the canon law, they may be distinguished into three ranks: 1. Simplex hxreticus. 2. Hserelicus contumax. 3. Hasreticus rela/j.s7is. 1. A simple heretic was such, as held an heretical opinion, but being convened before tlie ordinary, and the opinion being substan- (*) See also Lindwood de hareticis, cap, item quia verb, ordinarii. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 385 tially declared heretical, and the party convicted thereof, declares his penitence and abjnres his opinion, in this case he was dismissed with- out farther punishment, and this abjuration might be required by the ordinary, and was of two kinds, viz. a special abjuration, whereby he abjured that single heretical opinion, for which he was condemned, or a general abjuration, whereby he renounced all heretical opinions: vide Lindwond de hssrelicis, cap. Reverendissimse verb, nisi resipis- cant & abjuraverint in forma ecclesias consneta: and this ab- juration might be required not only of those, that were de- [ 386 ] tected and convicted of heresy, but even of those, that were graviter suspecti; and if they refused it, they proceeded to sentence them as convict: Extr'' de Hsereticis, cap. ad aboleiidam. 2. A contumacious heretic was among them of two kinds: 1. Such. as refused to appear before the ordinary, being accused of heresy, and thereupon were duly excommunicate and so continued excom- municate for one year, turn velut hxreticiis condernnetur, and was thereupon delivered or left to the secular power, de hxrelicisy cap. 7. cum conlumacid in 6io, 4'C. 2. Where the party accused of heresy was convict by testimony of his own confession, and refused to repent and abjure, such a one might thereupon be sentenced as an heretic, and delivered over to the secular power, but yet he had this favour or privilege, if even after such sentence he willingly repented and abjured, the ordinary ought to accept thereof, and not deliver him over to the secular power, but he was spared. Lindwood de Hx- reticis, cap. Reverendissimse verb, resipiscant, 4' Extr^ de Hsereticis^ cap. ad abolend. verb, sponte recurrere; but then tlie ordinary might detain him in prison: vide accordant 1 Mar. Br. Heresy. 3. A relapsed heretic: and herein they distinguish between Jicth relapsus, <^' vert relapsiis: Lindwood de hsereticis cap. item quia, wrb. relapso: 1. The former is where a man is accused of heresy, and is under a great suspicion thereof, but not convicted, only the ordi- nary puts him to abjure, which accordmgly he doth, and afterwards doth entertain, visit, or comfort heretics, such a person by the canon law may be sentenced as an heretic relapsed, and delivered over to the secular power, but yet the ordinary may, as before, detain him in prison without actual delivering of him over to the secular judge to be executed. Lindwood ubi supra, <§• in 6to decretal, cap. S.^rcu- sat' de hsereticis. 2. Vere relapsus is, when a man being convicted of heresy, and abjuring again falls into heresy, if he be thereupon convicted and sentenced, there can be no suspension of the sentence by the ordinary, tho the party repent and conform, but he must be delivered over to the secular power, and the sentence ought to be given, and is not by any means to be suspended from [ 387 J execution : (ito de Hsereticis, cap. 4. But this relapsing is of two kinds according to the quality of his abjuration: if the abjuration be general of all heresies, if he after fall into any heresy, either that whereof he was formerly accused and convicted, or any other, lie is to be sentenced as a relapsed heretic; but if the abjuration be only special of that heresy whereof he is accused, then he is not to be sentenced, as a relapsed heretic, unless 387 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. he after fall again into the same heresy, which he so specially abjured; but herein there is some difference among the doctors, for some think even after a special abjuration of one particular heresy, if he falls into another heresy, cense fur relapsiis: vide Extr. de Haereticis, cap.Ac- ciisat. § 2, Eum vero in 6/0 S,' Lindwood de hvereticis, cap. Item quia verbo sirapliciter in glossa : but the ordinary may put this out of question, for it seems by the canon law he may at his pleasure in cases of heresy requre a general abjuration, viz. de haeresi generali- ter <5' simpliciter. III. Now as to the punishment itself of heresy, especially of those that are either contnmaces ov relapsi : 1. By the civil law; it is true, that the conviction and sentencing of heretics is as well thereby, as by the canon law, left to the ecclesiastical judge, so that without a declaration or sentence of the ecclesiastical judge the civil jurisdic- tion cannot proceed to inflict any punishment, Lindwood de hscreti- cis, cap. Reverendissimge verb, contiscata in glosse tho confiscation of goods of the heretic followed upon his conviction, necessaria tamen est sententia declarativa judicis super ipsa confiscatione, & hsec sententia fieri solummodo debet per judicem ecclesiasticum, & non per judicem saecularem: vide in Glo de hxreticis, cap.. secundam leges. But tho the decision and judicial sentence of heresy was belonging only to the ecclesiastical judge, yet the civil constitutions of emperors and princes did institute and enact several penalties, as consequential upon such sentence, such as were confiscation of goods, disherison of heirs, and in some cases death, as we shall see hereafter: quod vide in Codice, Lib. I. tit. 5. de hvcreticis per totam. As to the penalty of death ultimum supplicium: it ["388 3 ^'lo'-^'^i seem the antient imperial constitutions made a dif- ference between heresies in relation to that punishment: it appears by the edict of Theodosius Codice, cap. 4. the Manichees and Do7iatists were punished with death, and possibly so were the Nestorians, ibidem cap. 6. and generally all heretics, that seduced the orthodox to rebaptizatioii, ibid. cap. 23. many other heretics were under milder sentences, some were punished with exile, some with extermination from the city, some with pecuniary mulcts, and some with confiscation, which, it seems, was the most usual punish- ment: but it seems that by the constitution of the emperor Frederic, (which yet is not extant) Hodie indistincte illi, qui per judicem eccle- siasticum sunt damnati de haeresi, quales sunt pertinaces & relapsi, qui non petunt misericordiam ante sententiam, sunt damnaudi ad mortem per sa^culares potestates, & per eas debent comburi sen igne cremari. Lindwood de hmreiicis, cap. Reverendissima; ve^^b. pcenas ; and from this constitution of Frederic the course of burning gene- rally all heretics indistinctly, if pertinacious or relapsed, took its rise. Now as to the penalties by the canon law, it is true they go no farther than ecclesiastical censiu'es, injunction of penance, excommu- nication, and deprivation of ecclesiastical benefices; but yet they made bold by some of their constitutions to proceed farther, and HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 388 indeed farther than they had authority; such were among others imprisonment by the ordhiary, and confiscation of goods,(c) but whether they adventured hereupon only in subservience to civil con- stitutions, or whether by their own pretended power, may be doubt- ful; but howsoever, it is so decreed in their canons and constitutions: vide Linchvnod de hsereticisy cap. Reverendissimse verb, confiscata, Sf' ibidem Item quia verb, sententialiter. But indeed as to the inflicting of death upon heretics, their canons, go not so far as that ; neither indeed need they, for emperors and princes being induced by them to enact such severe constitutions, they did in effect the business by sentencing the heretic, and then leaving him to the secular power, so that the secular f 389 ] power was only in nature of their executioner; and altho they direct in some cases of treason an intercession to be made to the secular power to spare the life of the offender thus committed over to the secular power, Extr. de verborum significatione cap. Novi- nius, yet we find no such curtesy for heretics, but the princes, that do not effectually proceed according to the utmost of their power to eradicate them, are threatned with excommunication, and accordingly they are required to take an oath to perform it, Extr. de hsereticis, cap. Ad abolendam.(*) Therefore as to the punishment of heretics with death, of an here- tic so declared by the bishop, it was left to the secular power with this difference, if the person convicted were a layman, he was imme- diately after his sentence to be delivered to the secular power to be burnt; but if he were a clergyman within the greater or lesser orders, he was first solemnly degraded, beginning with the chiefest order he had, as that of priesthood, and so to the lowest, damnati per ecclesiam judici saeculari relinquentur animadversione debita puni- endi, clericis a suis ordinibus primo degradatis. Extr. de hsereticis, cap. excommunicamus:(t) the solemnity whereof see at large in Qto decretal de poenis cap. Degradatio, Fox's acts afid monuments part \. p. 674. the degradation of William Saivtre. This degradation by the latter cannons might be by one bishop, tho formerly it required more. •When the sentence was given by the ordinary, and the offender thus left to the secular power, he was delivered over to the lay- officer, and then a mandate or writ issued from the chief magistrate to execute the offender according to the secular law; but of this more particularly hereafter, I have been the longer in these particulars, th^t we thereby may observe these two things: 1. How miserable the servitude of chris- tians was under the papal hierarchy, who used 50 arbitrary and un- limited a power to determine what they pleased to be heresy, and (c) For in Ennrland before the statute of 2 H. 5. cap. 7., neither lands nor goods were forfeited by a conviction for heresy. 3 Co, Instit. 43. (*) Vide Constit. Frederici, § 6. (+) Vide Lindwood de hccreticis, cap. Finaliter verb, sententiet. VOL. I. — 35 390 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. then 0771721 appeUatione postposita subjecting men's lives to their sentence.* 2. How finely they made the secular power their vas- sals in execution of this odious piece of drudgery, as it was managed and practised by them. I come now to a closer consideration of heresy, and its punish- ment according to the usage received in Engla7id, and the laws re- lating thereunto, according to the method above propounded. 1. Therefore how the usage and law obtained concerning this matter in England before the time of Richa7'd II. As the romish religion was generally received here in E7igland in this period, so the manner of proceeding touching heresy was much according to the papal decretals and constitutions, whereof a large account is above given. The jurisdiction, wherein heresy was proceeded against, was at the common law of two kinds: 1. The convocation of a provincial synod. 2. The diocesan or bishop of the diocese, where the heresy was publi&lied, and the heretic resided. .1. As to the former it is without question, that in a convocation of the clergy or provincial synod they might and frequently did here in Engla7id proceed to the sentencing of heretics, and when convicted, left them to the secular power, whereupon the writ of Hssretico combiire7ido might issue, (thus it was done in the case of the apostate Jew, Bract de Corona, Lib. \\\,{d) and the case of Sawtre,{e) 2 H. 4. who was convict in the convocation of Lo7idon,y and then the archbishop, who was prasces conci/ii, pronounced the sentence, degraded the offender, if in orders, and signified the con- viction into chancery, whereupon the writ de hxretico comburendo issued. 2. As to the power of the bishop or diocesan alone there hath been diversity of opinions ; some have thought, that the bishop of the diocese might proceed against heresy by ecclesiastical ("391 ~\ censures, but as to the loss of life the conviction ought to be at least in a provincial council, without which the heretic ought not to undergo death by the writ de hairetico comburendo.^ 1. For that in the case mentioned by Br acton, Lib. III. de Corond^ the conviction of that heresy, or rather apostacy, whereupon the offender was burnt, was in the provincial council at Oxford. 2. The writ de hseretico cornbnrendo in the register, and F. N. B. recites the conviction to be in a provincial council, and according to it is the opinion of Filzherbert, ibidem fol. 269. and the statute of 2 H. 4.' (hereafter mentioned) giving ))ower to the ordinary finally to sen- tence an heretic, so that death should ensue thereupon, was novx jiirisdiclionis i/i hac parte i7itroductse. Again my lord Coke, (*) Oodfridus Coloniensia anno 1234. spealjing of the severity of the pope and th^ emperor Frederic, (the antlior of the constitution afore-mcntioned for buininor heretics) sayn, Kodem die, quo quid uocnsatus est sou juste, scu injustd, niillius appcllationi.s, nul- tius dcfcnsionis relujrio proficientc, damnalur, & llaiiunas crudclitcr iiijicitur. See also Mat. Paris, p. 4-2[). {d) Lib. III. cap. 0. fol. 124.0. (e) State Tr. Vol. VL Append, p. 2. Foz's Acts and Mon. Vol. I. p. 586. Rymer's Fad. Vol. Vni.p. 178. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 391 12 Jiep. p. 56, 57. recites this to be the opinion of all the judges in 2 Mar. and ii} effect agreed unto 43 Eliz. by Sir John Popham, and others, 5 Rep. Cawdrie's case, p. 23. a. accordant^ and Brooke seems to accord. 1 Mar. Br. Heresy. On the other side others have holden, that the diocesan alone by the canon law might convict of heresy, and that thereupon this writ may be issued: 1. This is consonant to the old decretals, and likewise to the provincial constitutions of Arundel, Courtney and Others, that the diocesan alone without the assistance of a provincial council might convict of heresy, and deliver over the offender to the secular power. 2. Again, the statute of 2 H. 4. cap. 15. recites and admits the power of the diocesan in this case, but that by reason of the offender's going from diocese to diocese, and refusing to appear before the ordinary, he was interrupted in his proceeding, and there- upon the statute gives farther remedy. 3. That accordingly it was practised in the time of queen Elizabeth, when all former statutes concerning heresy were repealed, and the case stood as it was at common law, 4. That it was accordingly resolved by Fleming, Ttmfield, Williams and Crake, in 9 Jac.,(f) when Legate wa.s burnt for heresy; arid accordingly my lord Coke, P. C. cap. 5. p. 40. seems to be of the same opinion, (^) and so f 392 ] seems to retract what he had before delivered in his 12th report. This business will be further considered in the sequel of this chap- ter, for the present I shall only say thus much. 1. That the diocesan, as to ecclesiastical censures, may doubtless proceed to sentence heresy. 2. I think that at common law, and so at this day, (all former statutes being now repealed by 1 Eliz. cap. 1.) if the diocesan con- victs a man of heresy, and either upon his refusal to abjure, or upon a relapse decree him to be delivered over to the secular power, and this be signified under the seal of the ordinary into the chancery, the king might thereupon by special warrant command a writ de hasretico cornhurendo^h) to issue, tho this were a matter that lay in his discretion to grant, suspend, or refuse, as the case might be cir- cumstantiated. And what is here said of the diocesan or bishop of the diocese is (/) 12 Co. Rpp. 92. . ig) Lord Cuke does not intimate as if he was of this opinion, or had retracted what . hahad (said in his 12th report, and had been solemnly resolved in Cawdrie^s case;) he says indeed, that from the statute of 2 H. 4. may be gathered this conclusion, that the diocesan hath jurisdiction of heresy, and accordingly it was resolved in Legate's case, aind^ that upon a conviction before the ordinary of heresy, the writ de hcsretico com- burendo doth lie; this he mentions as also resolved in Legate''s case, as in truth it was; but to this last resolution he doth not declare any assent, for it is the first only, which he says may be gathered from the act of 2 H. 4. (A) Whether this writ lay at common law, or was introduced by the clergy about the time of Henry IV. hath been made matter of question: see State Tr. Vol. II. p. 275. if the common law gave such a writ; it will be difficult to reconcile it with what our au- thor says a little below, that the usual penalty was confiscation and banishment, and that 5 R.2. was the first temporal law against heresy, which yet went not so high as death, but only to imprisonment and ecclesiastical censure. 392 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. true als6 of the guardiaji of the spiritualities sede vacanfk, bilt 'till the statute of 2 H. 4. the vicar general, commissary, or official of the diocesan had no cognizance, unless by special commission as an inr quisitor from the pope; and Lindwood gives the reason de hxreticis cap. Item quia turpis verb, ordinarii in glossd, Est enirn causa hsej'esis una de majoribus caitsis, qiix pertinent ad solos episcopos; but the statutes of 2 H. A. cap. 15. 2 H. 5. c(ip. 7. while they were in force, gave the cognizance of heresy, as well to the bishop's commis- sary, as the bishop. . , 3. But yet I never find before the time of Etchard II. r 393 3 that any man was put to death upon a bare conviction of heresy, tho after a relapse, unless he were sentenced in a provincial council: and the reason seems to me to be this, when the offender was convicted of heresy either thro pertinacity, or after a relapse, and so delivered over to the secular power, the ecclesiastical judge had done his business, and the rest that follows was to be the act of the temporal or civil power, who were never obliged nor thought themselves obliged here in England to take away the life of a person upon so slender an account, as the judgment of a single bishop, (i) nor indeed, unless it were a sentence by the weighty body of a provincial council: vide Bracton, nbi supra. For as this kingdom was never obliged by the canons or decretals of popes or of provincial councils, further, than they were admitted, so neither were they bound by the imperial constitutions of the em- peror Frederic or others, who by their edicts inflict death upon all persons censured by the diocesan to be relapsed or contumacious heretics; but herein they did' as the laws and usages of the kingdom, and their own prudence, and the circumstances of the case required or directed. But yet I take it, that the conviction before the diocesan alone was a good conviction, and the party might thereupon be left to the secular power, and so burnt by a writ de hxretico comburendo,\{ the king and his council thought fit, tho de facto it was not at all, or at least not usually so done, till the time of Henry IV. unless the conviction and sentence were in a provincial council, for the reason before given. Fitzherbert therefore was herein mistaken, and also when he saith, it was to issue only in case of relapse; for a relapse could not be with- out conviction, and if the party were thereby convicted of the heresy, whereof he was accused, and persisted in it 'till after sentence, and refused to abjure, such a contu77iax or pertinax hvereticiis might be proceeded against as a relapsed heretic, and a writ de hseretico com- burendo might thereupon issue, as it seems, for the writ in r394 3 the register being formed upon a relapsed heretic, pursues the case as it finds it, but is not exclusive of the other case of a contumacious heretic, that persists therein before and after the sentence; de quo vide supra; vide accordant 1 Mar. Br. Heresy, I. and 25 H. 8. cap. 14. (i) 12 Co, Rep. 56. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 394 Touching the penalty of convicts of heresy here in England,! find very rarely death inflicted; before the reign oi Richard II. the usual penalty was confiscation, and seizure of goods; quod vide C/aus. 20. H. 3. 7n. 1 1, dors, touching Ernald de Peregard, who was convict of heresy, and his goods seized to the king's use ; the hke, Clans. 26 H. 3. in. 15. pro Stephana Peliter, and as to corporal punishment of such convicts, it was usually in antient time banishment and stigma- tizing, as appears by Ralph de Diceto, sub anno 11 60. in the time of Henry II. and Brampton H. 2. suh anno 1159.,(*) but their convic- tion was in a provincial council held at Oxon prsesente rege, <§• prx" sentibus episcopis. But quo jure the forfeiture of goods was then practised, is consid- erable: vide Co. P. C. cap. 5. the forfeiture of goods was introduced by 2 H. 5. and that statute being repealed, ceaseth. And in the first temporal law, or pretended law(^) made against such oflenders, viz. 5 R. 2. cap. 5. where, upon certificate by the prelates into the chancery, commissions shall issue to the sheriffs to apprehend and imprison the offender, it is only until they will justify themselves according to the law and reason of holy church, so that it seems the punishment did not hitherto de facto exceed imprisonment and ecclesiastical censures ; and yet it seems that Swinderly and others in the time of Richard II. before the statute of 2 H. 4. were ordered to be executed for heresy: vide Fox part I. p. 5S0, 618. but none by name appear to be executed, ibidem p. 659. but of this here- after, (t) As touching the writ de hseretico cofnbiirendo it was no writ of course, nor issued by the chancellor, but by special war- [[ 395 ^ rant from the king upon the certificate of the conviction and sentence made to the king under the seal of the archbishop, if it were in a provincial council. And thus far what I find concerning heresy at common law before, the lime of Richard II. II. As to the times of Richard II. Henry IV. Henry V. and so to 25 Henry VIII. The first temporal law, or pretended law against heretics in this kingdom, was 5 R. 2. cap. 5. which did not go so high as death, but only to imprisonment and ecclesiastical censure, as appears by the printed statute; but this was in truth no act of parliament, for the commons never assented; and accordingly Rot. Pari. 6 R. 2. n. 52. the same is declared by the king and parliament, which it is true, i; * See also Mat. Paris, p. 1 05. . (k) Our author here calls it a pretended law, and lord Colie calls it a supposed act, because the commons never consented to it, for which reason in the next sest^ion of par- liament it was annuld, altho by the prelates means it hath been continually printed, and the act, which annuld the same, hath been from time to time kept from the print. 12 Co, Rep. p. 57. (t) It does not appear, that any were ordered to be executed for heresy in this reign, and as to Swinderby, Mr. Fox says, he was declared an heretic, but suffered no great harxn during the lite of king Richard II. and if he was burnt, it was not till after the statute of 2 H. 4. See Fox's Acts and Mon. p. 620. 395 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONyE. was never printed among the statutes, but is at large recited by Mr. Fox, part \.p, 576. and therefore we find no other punishment du- ring this king's time, but imprisonmentand ecclesiastical censures. But in the time of Henry IV. the power of the diocesan was en- \diX2.Qdi, viz. by the statute of 2 H. 4. cap. \5.{l.) viz. the diocesan hath power given him to arrest and imprison persons suspect of he- resy, till purgation or abjuration, and hath also power to fine and imprison persons for those offenses, and estreat the fines; and if a person be convict of heresy before the diocesan and his commissaries, and do refuse to abjure, or having abjured fall into relapse, so that according to the canons he ought to be left to the secular court, whereupon credence shall be given to the diocesan or his commissa- ries, then the sheriff' of the same county shall be personally present at the preferring of the same sentence, when required by the diocesan, and shall receive the person sentenced, and cause him before the people in an high place to be burnt. This statute gave in effect the whole power to the dioce- [^ 396 ] san, and upon this account William Saivtre{rn) after sen- tence and degradation in the provincial synod of London was burnt in the beginning of Henry IV. 's usurpation; the whole process and history of whereof is delivered by Mr. Fox in his acts and monuments, part 1. p. 674, 675. and yet it is observable, this- was not done barely by the order of the diocesan,(n) but a special writ de hseretica comburendo issued to the mayor and sheriffs of London to perform the same, which writ is there mentioned verba- tim, and is the very same, which is recited by F. N. B./ol.269. and was the warrant for the burning of William Sawtre. Now touching this matter we are to observe, that the parliament of 2. H. 4. began the 20th diViy o{ January in octabis Hilarii, it con- tinued till the 10th of March following, JVilliam Sawtre, having the year before been convicted for heresy before the bishop of Norwich, was upon the 22d and 24th of Febr. 2 H. 4. (which was sitting the parliament) in the provincial comicil held in St. PauPs, London, con- victed and sentenced, as a relapsed heretic, and an heretic to be pu- nished; this was done in the provincial council before Thomas Jirun- clel, archbishop of Canterbury, as appears by the acts of the registry of Canterbury collected by Mr. Fox, part I. p. 673, 674, 675. upon the 26th of Febr. the writ de hseretico comburendo was formed and (I) This statute was afterwards repeal'd by 25 //. 8. cap. 14. (m) He was a parisli-pricst, first of St. Margaret oi Lynn in the county of Noi'fulk, and afterwards of St. Sythc's churcli in Sythe-lane, London, and was the first, who appears to have been executed for formal heresy in England. " (n) Nor could it be so done, because lie was not sentenced by virtue of the act of H. 4. which extended only to eonvietions before the diocesan or iiis commissary, wliereasiStfJO- tre was convicted before the convocation; and even on a conviction before the diocesan the sheriff" had no power to burn the party convict without a writ, unless he was preseat at the pronounciiijj the sentence, see Slate Tr. Vol. VI. Append, p. I. besides, as our author observes helow, this act did not pass till after Sawtre was sentenced, so that how it can be said, that it was upon account of this act that Sawtre was burnt, 1 know not, except it be with regard to the cncourojreunent the elerpy might take from the prospect of its passing for anticipating the exercise of such a cruel (tlio to them desirable) powet. HISTORIA, PLACITORUM CORONA. 396 made by the advice of the lords temporal in parliament, which writ bears teste 26 Fcbj\ 2 H. 4. "per ipsinn rc^em Sc consilium in par- liament o,?i\\(l isetnered.verbatijn in the parliament-roll 2 H. 4. n. 29. and is the very same with that in Filzh. N. R. [397] before-mentioned, and agrees verhalim ysi\\\\ it; and upon this writ Saivtre was burnt, being first solemnly degraded. This conviction, sentence, and writ, iho after the commencement of the the parliament, was before the end of that parliament, and con- sequently before the statute of 2 H. 4, cap. 15. passed, which passed not till the last day of the parliament, viz. 10 Martii; so that at that time the offender could not be executed but by a writ de hxretico comburendo, for the diocesan had not power by his own immediate warrant to command execution, till that passed, which passed not, till after the definitive sentence. In this parliament there was a petition of the clergy against here- tics which was the foundation of the statute of 2 H. 4. cap. 15. and was granted by the king de consensu magnatnm S,' aliorum proce- rum regni in prsesenti parliamento existentium, with some addi- tional clauses, which were also drawn up into the act of 2 H. 4. cap. 15. but in that answer no consent of the commons appears, and yet the act was drawn up, and proclaimed, and, as it is now printed, is recited to be at the petition of the prelates, clergy and commons of the realm in parliament, and the enacting clause is by the king by the assent of the states and other discreet men of the realm being in the said parliament: this is observed by Mr. Fox in h\s Jlcts and Monuments, part 1. p. 773. whereupon he concludes, that this was no act of parliament, but an act of the king and clergy like that of 5 B. 2. before-mentioned, which was declared void, because the com- mons never assented, as is before observed. But the truth is, the commons did assent to this act, tho their assent be not expressed in the parliament-roll as it is entered, as appears in the speech of the speaker of the commons to the king the last day of the parliament, Rot. Part. 2 H. 4. n. 47. where they thank the king for the remedy he had ordained in destruction of the heretical doc- trine of the sects; and besides in the same parliament-roll, n. 81. " Inter petitiones communitatis, Item prient les communes, qe quant, ascun home ou feme, de qel estate ou condition qil soit, soit prise & imprisone per LoUardie, qe maintenant soit mesn [ 398 ] en respons, et eit tiel judgement, come il ad deservy en ex- ample dauires de tiel male sect per ligierment cesser lour malveys predications, & lour tenir al a foy christian. Ro'. le Roy le voet. It is true this was never drawn up into a distinct act, for the pro- vision by the statute of 2 H. 4. cap. 15. had a full and effectual pro- vision for it; but this petition of the commons with the king's assent was the principal basis, upon which the statute of 2 H. 4. cop. 15. was built, and the statute was drawn up upon both petitions, as well that of the commons, as that of the clergy both put together, as was usual in those times, and so warrants the recital of the preamble of the printed statute of 2 H. 4. of the petition both of the clergy and 398 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. commons,(*) and every man knows, that in the time of Henry IT. and afterwards tlie true j3rofessors of the' christian rehgion, (that yei for the same were sentenced as heretics,) came under the reproachful title of Lollards. This act of 2 H. 4. doth hot determine what is heresy or what not, but leaves it to the decision of the diocesan, which wild and un- bounded jurisdiction they had and used, till 25 H. 8. this therefore was their power at common law, and the temporal judge or power was to give credence herein to their sentence, but yet the consequeuce thereof being but to be left to the secular power, the secular power might exercise his own discretion, and grant a writ dehwretico com- burendo,i{ he were satisfied of the justice of the sentence, or forbear the granting it, if he were not satisfied, that the thing charged was a real heresy, or that the ecclesiastical judge had proceeded fairly in the case.t But there were some points of power introduced by this [ 399 ] act, and given to the diocesan, which he had not at the common law, viz. 1. Power to arrest and imprison persons suspect of heresy, for altho the pope's decretals had before this pretended to give power of imprisonment to the diocesan, Extr. de psenis, cap. 3. in. 6to, yet that power never obtaind in England, till this act of 2 H. 4. 2. Power to set and estreat fines upon the offender. 3. Power to deliver over immediately to the temporal officer a relapsed or contumacious heretic to be burnt without expecting the king's writ de hperetico comhurendo, with this notable advantageous clause whereupon credence shall be given to the diocesan or his commissary. And accordingly the bishops after this act put the same in ure hy their own immediate warrant or order delivering the party to the sheriff to be executed; but yet the conclusion of their sentence ran most commonly as formerly, viz. appointing him to be left to the secular power, and so leaves him, but sometimes, as in the definitive sentence against the lord Cobham, Fox, part 1. p. 734. committing him from henceforth to the secular power, and judgment to do him thereupon to death. Now it is true, that upon the sentence of the diocesan the' sheriff or officer, or any other were not to dispute, whether the same were truly heresy or not. 1. Because it was an act within their cogni- (*) This petition of tlie commons amounts to no more, than that the Lollards should be cald to an account and punished according to their deserts, but contains nothing in it, w.Licii can be a warrant lor such severe penalties, as are provided by that act, these proceeded from the petition of the clergy. (t) But by tije pa[)al constitutions this liberty is not allowed to the secular power, for by those constitutions it is provided. That the punishment of heretics must not be relaxed or delayed. Consiil. Inmc. IV. caj>. 24 and 32. Clem. IV. Constit. XIII. and "That all magistrates under the penally of excommunication must execute the penalties by the ' inquisitors imposed on her(;ties without revising the justice of them, for heresy is a crime merely ecclesiastical." Connlil.X. Bull. Rom. Tom. 1.^.453. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 399 zance and jurisdiction. 2. Because it is by 2 H. 4. enacted, that credence herein shall be given to the diocesan or his commissary. But yet as to the first point of the statute, the imprisoning of per- sons suspect of heresy, the temporal judge had cognizance and power to determine, whether fhai for which the party was imprisoned by the diocesan were heresy or not; and if it appeared to the temporal judge not to be heresy, tho the diocesan had certified it to be heresy, the temporal judge might deliver the party imprisoned upon an Habeas Corpus, as was done M. 5 E. 4. Rot. 143. B. R. in Key- ser^s case.(o) and the party detaining him is punishable in an action of false imprisonment, as was done in Warner^s [ 400 ] case,(/;) M. \\ H. 7. Rot. 327. both which cases are at large reported, Co. P. C. cap. 5. p. 42. and therefore in cases of such return upon an Habeas Corpus, or justification by this act in false imprisonment, the particular heresy must be set forth, what it is, that the temporal judge may judge, whether it be heresy or no. By this statute it appears, 1. That the ditjcesan might convict of heresy, and thereupon the party convict be left to the secular power, which settles the doubt raised by Fitzh. N. B. 269. 2. That he might convict an heretic, so as to subject him to the punishment of death not only in case of relapse after abjuration, but also in case of refusal to abjure. 3. The power of convicting an heretic is not limited to the diocesan only, but also to his commissary in order to his execution by the secular power. After this ensued the statute of 2 H. 5. cap. 7. against heretics and LoJ/ards, and thereby it is enacted. 1. " That all temporal officers be sworn to destroy all heresies and errors, commonly called Lollardy, and tliat they be assisting to the ordinary, when required, at the ordinary's charge. 2. "That when persons are convict of heresy, and left to the secular power by the ordinaries or their commissaries, their lands in fee-simple shall after their death be forfeit to the king or lords, of whom they are held, others than the ordinaries and commissaries themselves, and all their goods. 3. " That the justices of the king's bench, of the peace, and assize, shall have power to inquire of such errors and heresies called Lollardy, and their abetters, iyc. and make out process of Capias against them. 4. " That such Lollards and their indictments be de- hvered over by indenture to the ordinaries or their commis- [ 401 ] saries, who thereupon are to proceed to their acquittal or conviction, but the indictment to be only as an information, not as evidence against the oflender, but the ordinaries to commence their process against them, as if there were no indictriient. (0) Keijser^s heresy was, that being- excommunicated by the archbishop of Canter, vry; he said, that notwithstanding that, he wns riot excommunicated before God, for his corn yielded as well, as any of his neighbuurs, 10. H. 7. 17. (p) Warner's licrcsy was, that he said he was not bound to pay tithes to the curate of the parish, where he dwelt. 1 Rol. Rep. 110. 3 Co. Inst. 42. 401 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 5. " Piinisbtnent for escapes is by forfeiture of goods and seizure of lauds till he returns;" and some other provisions. This is the first law, that gave forfeiture of lands in fee-simple of an heretic convict, and executed, and the first law, that settled the forfeiture of their goods, tho forfeiture of goods were de facto used before. (9') Tlio in some respects it enlarged the ordinary's power, yet it may seem some kind of curb upon tliem to have an indictment previous, yet I find them not restrained from proceeding, tho there were no such previous indictment. Hitherto there was no limitation or restraint, what should be or what should not be heresy, whereupon death might be inflicted, but the ordinary's power was left arbitrary and unlimited therein. By the statute of 25 H. 8. cap. 14. there was a great alteration made as to the point of heresy. 1. The ordinaries were not to proceed against any for heresy with- out presentment or indictment thereof before the king's justices, or an accusation by two lawful witnesses at the least, and that before any citation or process by the ordinary. 2. That persons convict by the ordinary of heresy, and refusing to abjure, or having abjured relapsing, shall be burnt by the king's writ de hserctico comburendo first had and obtained for the same. 3. Tho it do not positively limit what only shall be heresy, yet it enacts what shall not be accounted heresy. 1. Speaking against the authority of the pope. 2. Speaking against spiritual laws made by the authority of the see of Rome repugnant to the laws of this realm, or the king's prerogative, and indeed it was time to make |] 402 j this provision, the papal authority being now in a great measure taken away by act of parliament. 4. Persons accused of heresy shall and may be letten to bail either by the ordinary, or in their default by two justices of the peace. IV. By the statute of 31 ^. S. cap. 14. a farther alteration was made touching heresy. 1. Six articles are "declared and enacted, 1. That in the sacrament of the altar after consecration there remains no substance of bread and wine, but the substance of Christ. 2. That communion in both kinds is not necessary ad salutem. 3. That priests may not marry by tlie law of God. 4. That vows of chastity ought to be kept by the law of God. 5. That private mass is necessary to be continued. 6. That auricular confession is necessary to be retained and used. 2. That to preach or to declare, or hold opinion against the first article touching transubstantiation shall be adjudged heresy, and the persons convict thereof, their aiders, ^-c. convicted thereof in the form underwritten shall be adjudged heretics, and suffer death by burning without any benefit of abjuration, sanctuary, or clergy, and shall for-, feit his lands to the king, as in case of high treason. {(I) Co. P. C. 43. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 402 3. That if any openly preach against the last five articles, and be thereof convict or attaint by the laws nnderwritten, every such offender shall suffer death as a felon without benefit of clergy or sanc- tuary. 4,' That if any person publish or declare his opinion against the five articles last mentioned, he shall for the first offense forfeit his goods, the profits of iiis lands during his life, and ecclesiastical pro- motions, and he imprisoned at the king's will, and upon the second conviction shall suffer as a felon without benefit of clergy. 5. The king is empowered to issue commissions directed to the archbishop or bishop of the diocese, and the chancellor and others, or three of them, whereof the archbishop or bishop, or chancellor to be one, to take information by oath of twelve men, or the testimony of two lawful persons of all heresies, Sf'C. 6. The ordinaries within their several jurisdictions to take information of heresies, and justices of peace, 4'C. to take [403] inquisitions touching heresies; these informations and inqui- sitions to be certified to the commissioners above-mentioned. 7. The commissioners or any three of them to make process against the offenders into all the shires of England and ^^ales, as in case of felony, and upon their appearance shall have full power and authority to hear and determine the said offenses according the laws of this realm and this statute. 8. Commissioners or two of them have power to bail persons, ac- cused, till trial. 9. No challenge to be admitted but for malice or enmity, trial of foreign pleas by the commissioners, no eschetes to the lords, with some other clauses. This act, tho it doth not, in express terms, repeal the statute of 2 H. 5. yet it doth, in a great measure, alter it. 1. In point of juris- diction; for, here the proceeding to judgment is to be by commis- sioners under the great seal, and not by the ordinary or ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 2. The offense of heresy now in a great measure is made a secular offense, especially in the five last articles which are made felony. 3. Tho the commissioners have power to proceed upon accusations, as well as indictment, yet the trial of the offender was to be by jury, and the words hear and determine, &;c. import the same. Thus the law stood until 1 E. &. with some small variations in 34 <§• 35 H. 8. cap. 1. but by the statute of 1 E. 6, cap. 12. all the before-mentioned statutes, viz. 5 li. 2. 2 H. 4. 2 H. 5. 25 //. S. 31 H. 8. 35 H. 8. and all other statutes made in the time of Henry VIII. concerning religion are repealed. (r) (r) So that the punishment of heresy then stood as it was at common law before any statute made against it,' notwithstanding which there were some examples in this reign of persons burnt for heresy, viz. Joan Backer and George van Parre, wlio were put to death much against the will of that good king by the over-persuasion of archbishop Cranmer, fur which reason (as bishop Burnet remarks) what that archbishop afterwards suffered in the succeeding reign was thought a just retaliation on him. Burnet's Hist. of lieforination, To/. II. p. 112. 403 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. By the statute of 1 <§• 2 P. S,^ M. cap. 6. the statutes of 5 7?. 2. 2 H. 4. and 2 H. 5. are revived: but the statutes in Henry VIII.'s time, and repealed by 1 E. 6. stood still repealed, and thus [404] they continued till 1 Eliz. and if there had needed any far- ther repeal of the statutes of 25 and 31 H. 8. besides what was done by 1 E. 6. yet the statute of 1 (§• 2 P. S,^ M. cup. 8. in fine hath this clause, that was never repealed by the statute of 1 Eliz. nor any other statute since made, viz. "That the ecclesiastical juris- diction of archbishops, bishops and ordinaries be in the same state for process of suits, punishments of crimes, and execution of censures of the church, with knowledge of causes belonging to the same, and as large in these points as the said jurisdiction was in the 20th year of Henry VIII." which doubtless repealed all acts made between 20 H. 8. and 1 8^" 2 P. <§• M. in derogation or alteration of the eccle- siastical jurisdiction, or the styles or forms of their proceeding by Henry VIII. or Edward VI. V. I come now to the time of queen Elizabeth. '■ " • '• By the act of 1 Eliz. cap. 1. there are these alterations: 1. The statutes of I S,^ 2 P. <§- M. cap. 6. 5 R.2.2 H. 4. 2 H. 5. are repealed, so that now the whole jurisdiction touching heresy stands as it did at common law, with such farther additions as are made by that statute of 1 Eliz. 2. The queen, her heirs and successors to have power to issue commissions under the great seal to exercise all jurisdictions spiritual and ecclesiastical within this kingdom, and to visit, reform, redress, order, correct, and amend all errors, heresies, schisms, S,'c. which by any spiritual or ecclesiastical power can or may be law- fully reformed. 3. That such commissioners shall not have power to determine any matter to be heresy, but only such as have been heretofore determined to be heresy: 1. By the authority of the canonical scriptures. 2. Or by any of the first four general councils, or any other general council, wherein the same was declared heresy by the express and plain words of the said canonical scriptures. •3. Or such as shall hereafter be determined heresy by parliament with the assent of the clergy in their convocation. Upon this statute these things are observable : 1. By this statute the ancient common law was revived for the conviction of heretics,and delivering them over to the secular power, which might at common law be done either in a provincial [ 405 ] .council, or by the diocesan alone, and accordingly, it is said Co. P. C. cap. 5.(.s) the conviction of heretics was practised ill, the queen's time, but I find no particular instance thereof in the queen's time,(^) but in the case of Legal, 9 Jac. it was so resolved' by four judges, and accordingly put in ure, and upon such a convic- tion before the diocesan a writ de /lasrelico comburendo might and did issue in the cases o{ Legal and Wighlman convict oi Jirianisni is) p. 40. (<) Tliat is of a conviction in a provincial council, or before the diocesan alone, for of convictions before the commissioners some instances are here mentioned by our author. I. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA.. 405 befjre the diocesan and left to the secular power, who were accord- ingly burnt :(i<) vide Baker's Chronicle, p. 446. 2. There was another method of conviction of heresy, and there- upon deUvering over to the secular power, and execution of the offender by writ de hseretico comburendo, namely by sentence of the commissioners for ecclesiastical causes instituted by the statute of 1 Eliz. but this takes not away the conviction of heresy by the dio- cesan or in a provincial council, but these remain as they did at com- mon law, and thus it was done 17 Eliz. upon John Peters and Henry Dirwert,{x) Flemings, convict of heresy before the commis- sioners for Jlnabaptism, and thereupon a writ de hseretico com- burendo issued. 3, That this act restored the issuing of a writ de hseretico com- burendo{ij) according to the course of the common law against a man convict of heresy, and refusing to abjure, or having abjured relapsed, and thereupon delivered to the secular power. And note, that this writ is no writ of course, nor can the chan- cellor or keeper issue this writ upon a signijicavit by the commis- sioners or diocesan without a special warrant, for that the king may see cause to suspend the issuing thereof, or wholly supersede it, or pardon the sentence, for it may so fall out, that the diocesan hath adjudged a thing to be heresy, or a party to be an heretic, which in truth and reality is not so, or it may be the [ 406 J party may retract, and so be capable of mercy. But the course was for the diocesan alone, if the conviction were singly before him, or for the diocesan with the consent of the com- missioners, if the conviction were before them, by signijicavit under the seal of the diocesaii to return the conviction into the chancery, and then the same is brought before the king and his council, and after deliberation by the king with his council, a special warrant issues from the king by the advice of his council, to the chancellor or keeper, together with the tenor of the writ de hseretico combu- rendo expressed in the warrant, and commanding the chancellor or keeper to issue it under the great seal, which warrant is filed for the keeper's indemnity: this was the form which was used 17 Eliz. in the case of the Jinabaptists above-named; and note, altho the con- viction were before the commissioners, yet the diocesan was one of the conunissioners, and his seal to the signijicavit, so that there were the junctures of both authorities, viz. the authority of the dio- cesan according to the course* of the common law, and of the com- missioners according to the power given by the statute of 1 Eliz. and we have reason to believe, that the subsequent convictions in {ii) But yet ought not to have been so by law, according to tlie opinion of lord Coke, for that the statute of 2 H. 4. cap. 15. which gave the writ de harelico comburendo was repealed, and at common law no such writ lay upon a conviction by the ordinary, 5 Co. Rep. 23. a. 12 Co. Rep. 5(i. 92. {JC) Their names were John Wiehnacker and Hendrick Ter Wqort. iy) Tlie act says notliing about this writ one way or other, but only repeals the several statutes relating to heresy, and so leaves the matter, as it was at common law. 406 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. the queen's time pursued this form, and possibly that of Legates in 9 Jac. might be in the same nature, the the resolution of the judges, upon which it seems the process was formed, takes notice only of the diocesan. 4. That the forfeiture of goods or lands by conviction of heresy is by this act repealed. 5. Here is the first boundary, that was set to the extent of heresy as to the matter thereof, what only shall be adjudged heresy ;(z) and altho this clause refers expressly only to the commissioners, yet it is to be the measure and rule for diocesans, and the convictions in their proceedings against heretics. But it is true, it is not so particular and certain, as might [ 407 3 have been wished, for according to the inclination of the judge possibly some would determine that to be heresy by the canonical scriptures, which possibly is not at all heresy, nor con- trary to the canonical scriptures but iiowsoever it brought heresy to a greater certainty than before. Upon this statute of 1 Eliz. these things seem to me to be true: 1. That the sig7iijicavit of the conviction of heresy ought to con- tain, even at common law, the particular heresy, whereof the party was convict, and without such particular signijicavit no writ de hseretico comburendo ought to issue; and the reasons are, 1. Be- cause it concerns the highest temporal interest that any man can have, namely his life, and for this reason even in smaller temporal concerns a general cause or return of heresy or criminousness is not sufficient; it is not a sufficient cause of refusal or non-admission of a clerk to allege, that he is crimiiiosus (§' non idonenSyOX that he is schismuticus inveterutus 5 Co. Hep. 58 a Specofs case, and the reason is very well given, coment que nappent al court la roygne a determiner schismes ou heresies, uncore I'original cause del suit esteant mafter, dont le court le roy ad conusance, le cause del schisme ou heresie, purque le presentee est refuse, covient estre al- ledge en certain al entent le court le roy poit consult ove divines a scaver, si ceo soit schisme ou nemy; and upon the same reason it is, that in Keyser^s case upon an Habeas Corpits, and fVarner's case upon a false imprisonment, that altho the statute of 2 H, 4. .enable the ordinary to arrest for heresy, it is not a sufficient return or justi- fication to say the party was an heretic, or suspect of heresy, but he must return the particular heresy, for which he was so arrested, that the court may judge upon it; and tho the temporal court hath no original cognizance of heresy, yet it being incident to a temporal in- terest, namely the liberty of a man's person, the temporal court shall judge, whether it be heresy or no;(*) and accordingly in («) And great cause there was for tliis limitation, as appears from the fore-mentioned cases oi^ Keijser and Warner, and otiiors, 12 Cu, Hep. 58. aUho, as our author says, there still is too ijreat a latitude left, since it is unavoidable, but difierent interpretations will in many cases be put even ui)on scripture, so long as tiie use of reason and liberty of thouglit continues. (*) This is certainly agreeable to the law of the land, 2 Co. lustit. G15, 623. altho it J HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 408 those cases they did adjudge that to be no heresy, which the bishop returned as an heresy, and in one case the prisoner was discharged, and in the other case recovered by an action of false imprisonment. Co, P. C. cap. 5. 2. Altho heresy be a case of eccle- siastical cognizance and jurisdiction, and as long as it only con- cerns ecclesiastical censures, and (so far forth only) faith is to be given to them, 'till reversed by appeal, yea altho it should in the sentence itself most evidently appear, that it was not heresy, yet as to the inflicting of death at common law they had no pow^r, but all they could do was to commit him to the secular power, their busi- ness was then at an end ; but now begins tlie concern of the secular povver, and herein they were not, as lacqueys, only to follow what the ecclesiastical judge had done, for now the life of a subject was concerned either to be taken away or not, and that merely by the secular power, and herein the secular power had a judgment of discretion of their own, which they are to exercise, but yet cannot do it, unless the special matter of the heresy be certified to them. 2. Admit a general certificate without shewing the particular cause of heresy were good at common law, yet since the statute of 1 Eliz. it must be particular, because an act of parliament, which belongs to the interpretation of the common law, directs what shall be heresy and what not, and the king and his council are to give the warrant for issuing the writ, and therefore must be ascertained, whether it be an heresy within the description of this act, and the chancellor or keeper of the great seal is to affix the seal and issue the writ, and therefore ought to be satisfied by the signjicavit, that it is an heresy within that act, and if he be not, he is not to seal it, for it concerns the life of a subject; these are not bare ministerial acts by the king and his council or chancellor in subservience to theeccle- [409]] siastical jurisdiction, but they are acts judicial, where they are to exercise both a legal and well warranted discretionary judg- ment, and therefore must have the cause before them upon the sig- nijicavit, and not by a bare general story of a conviction of heresy, and therefore if upon the return o{ the significavU, whereby the party is convict and sentenced either as an obstinate or relapsed heretic, it shall, by the particularity of the return, appear, that it is not heresy, there ought no warrant to be granted for the issuing of the v/rit, and be what the clergy have always disrelished, wlio never liked to submit their proceedings to the judgment of the king's courts, or of any authority but what was ecclesiastical, accordingly we find a decree of BonifaceY. " WJiereby all powers, lords temporal, and rectors with their officers are forbid to judge or take cognizance of heresy, it being merely ecclesiastical, or to refuse to execute the punishments enjoined by them, or any way directly or indirectly to hinder their process or sentence under the pain of excom- munication, which if they obstinately lie under for a year, they are to be condemned aa heretics ;" Sixt. decretal. I. 5 tit. 2 cop. Inquisitionis ncgotium : this decree is con- firmed by the general council of Constance, sess. 45. See the constitutions of arch- bishop Boniface, cap. de impetranlibus prohibitiones, (Sec. cap. de malitia judicis secularis, &c. cSj- cap. dc poena impedicntium, &,c. See also archbishop Bancroft's ob- jections, 2 Co. Instil. GO I, 609, Sfc. Codex Leg. Ecclesiast. Anglic, p. 1066. Fref. to Codex, p. VJ, 409 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. if granted, yet the writ ought not to be sealed, and therefore the cer- tificate or signijicavit must be special and certaip.(*) Again, tiiis definition or circumscription of heresy is by an act of parliament, and tho the matter of it, viz. Heresy, be of ecclesiastical cognizance, yet the interpretation of the act of parliament is of a temporal cognizance, especially where a temporal interest, and the greatest temporal interest in the world, namely life, is concerned: we have many acts of parliament, that concern matters of ecclesiastical cognizance, as touching clergy and purgation, touching matrimony and the prohibited degrees, yet when these acts of parliament come to be expounded, the temporal judge hath the cognizance of them. The statute of 2 H. 4. hath two notable clauses, one whereby the ordinary hath power to arrest for heresy, there is in that clause no express provision, that credence shall be given to the ordinary and therefore if he arrest for that, which is not heresy, the arrest is un- lawful, and as an incident to an interest at common law, z;/z. the liberty of the subject, the temporal court hath power to determine, whether it be heresy or not, as is above-shewn: the other clause is a power committed to the ordinary to deliver over the party convict to the sheritf to be executed without any writ de hseretico comburendo. This was introductory of a new law, and therefore the sheritf or officer might possibly scruple not only whether there were [410] such a sentence, («) but whether the thing, for which the party was condemned as an heretic, were really heresy; but to avoid all difficulties of this kind this imusual clause is added, that herein credence shall be given to the diocesan or his commissary. We are here in the case of an act of parliament, an act that intro- duceth a new circumscription of heresy, an act that concerns the life of the subject, in a business, which after the ordinary hath passed his sentence, is now wholly left to the king, who, tho he be supreme in matters ecclesiastical as well as temporal, yet in the issuing of his writ de hseretico comburendo is looked upon by the ecclesiastical judge, as acting by his secular power, for that is the conclusion of the sentence, niz, that tie be left to the secular power, in this he acts not ministerially but judicially, and therefore upon all accounts must have a certain return of the cause of the heresy, and if it shall appear to him, or to the chancellor, that is to seal the writ, that the return contains not any certainty of the heresy, or that which is returned as an he- resy, be not such as is described by the statute of 1 Eliz. no writ de hseretico comburendo ought to issue, whether the conviction be by the high commission, or diocesan, or convocation. (6) Blacks. Com. Lib. iv. ch. 4. p. 43, 44. &c. 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 23, (*) The same reasoning holds in granting the writ de excommunicato capiendo, for that, affecting tlie liberty of a man's person, concerns a temporal interest. (») Tiiere could be no room for this scruple, because, unless the sheriff was present at , pronouncing the sentence, the ordinary had no ])ower by 2 //. 4. to deliver the heretic to the sheriff", nor could the shcriiF proceed to execute him without a writ. (6) Since our author wrote, ahlio no alteration has been made in tlie definition of he- resy, whicli still subsists upon the loot of the statute of 1 Eliz. yet tlie severer part of the punishment is taken away, and the doubt removed, whether the party be liable to a writ HISTORIA PLACITORUxM CORONA. 411 CHAPTER XXXI. CONCERNING HOMICIDE AND FIRST OF SELF-KILLING OR FELO DE SE: Having gone thro the pleas of the crown touching high treason, mis- prision- of treason, and petit treason, the order that I have proposed leads me to consider of felony, S,'C. and these are of two kinds, felonies by the common law, and felonies made such by act of parliament. Felonies by common law are such, as either concern the taking away of life, or concern the taking away of goods, or concern the habitation, or concern the obstruction of the execution of justice in criminal and capital causes, as escapes, rescues, ^^c. In the first place therefore come to be considered those felonies or offenses, that relate to life or the taking away thereof without due process of law; and this again is either that, which concerns the loss of life happening to a man's self, or happening to another. As to the first of these, namely the consideration of that offense or crime, that concerns a man's own Ufe, where there is no other offen- der but the sufferer, this falls under these two heads or divisions. I.-Homicidiurn sui-ipsius, or felony of a man's self II. Infortunium, or pure accident, or at least, where no other reasonable creature is concerned in the effecting of it. Of the former of these in this chapter. Felo de se or suicide is, where a man of the age of discretion, and compos mentis, voluntarily kills himself by stabbing, poison, or any other way. , No man hath the absolute interest of himself, but 1. God almighty Kath an interest and propriety in him, and therefore self- murder is a sin against God. 2. The king hath an interest [ 412 ]] in him, and therefore the inquisition in case of self-murder is felonicl Sr voluntarit seipsum, interfecit fy murderavit contra paceni domini regis. Co. Lift. § 194. fol. 127. a. M. 11. Jac. Wright's case, a man to the itUent to make himself impotent, and thereby to have the more colour to beg, caused another to strike off his hand, for this they were both indicted, fined and ransomed. de h ner super visum corporis, that a man is felo de se, that inquisition shall be conclusive, and is not traversable by the executors or ad- ministrators of the deceased, Co. P. C.p. 55. and the like seems to be held by Stamford, P. C. p. 183. b. where a [415 ] fugani fecit is presented before the coroner super visum {b) In Margine. 415 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. corporis, where it is found, that a murder was committed, and the murderer fled; and yet (he offender himself shall be received to plead not guilty to the indictment or inquisition before the coroner, as by daily experience it appears, tho Stamford makes it there a question whether the fit g am fee il be traversable. And therefore I remember in the king's bench in the case o{ Bar- clay it was ruled, that in case of an inquest before the coroner stiper visum corporis, wherein the party was found y^/o de se, the inquisi- tion was quashed in the king's bench, because upon examination it appeared, that the coroner refused to let the jury hear .witness on the part of him that was dead, to prove that he was not felo de se, for the coroner ought to hear evidence on both sides, partly because it was doubted, that the inquisition in this case was conclusive, and a conviction, and not traversable, and the court of king's bench, who are the sovereign coroner, did set aside that inquisition, and order the coroner to inquire de novo super visum, corporis, because the body was yet to be viewed. H. 1658. B. R. Barclay'' s case.(c) If an inquisition be taken before the coxonex super visum corporis, whereby the party dead is found to have died per infortunium, if it is suggested on the part of the king or almoner, that he was felo de se, and in the king's bench a writ of melius inqiiirendum is prayed to the sheriff", it seems j^t ought not to be granted, because the coroner is theproper officer, and accordingly it was denied in Pasch. 24Car. 2. and if granted, and an inquisition taken, it hath been held vo\d{d) by the statute of 28 E. 3. cap 9. tho many precedents of such writs are extant. H. 37 Eliz. B. R. Croke,7i. 13, Harks Ion's case, F. N. B. 144, 250.(<>) But it seems, if the coroner's inquisition omit the finding of the goods of the/e/o de se, that may be supplied by a writ of melius' in- quire7idum directed to the sheriff, for that is not witiiin the statute of 2Q E. 3. But whensoever any inquisition is taken by the sheriff by ["416 3 ^ writ or con\m\s,?\o\\o{ melius inquirendum, without ques- tion that inquisition is traversable. If an inquisition be taken before the coroner super visum corporis de villis Ji. B. C. and D. and says not de quatuor villatis proximo adjacent, according to the statute of 4 E. 1. de coro7iatoribus,{f) yet it hath been held the inquisition is good, because the statute is only directory. H. 1658. B. R. Barclay's case.(,g') But altho an inquisition taken before the coYon*^,x super visuvi cor- poris in the point oi felo de se is of great authority and a sufficient record, whereupon process may be made against those that detain the goods found in the inquisition, yet it seems to me, that it is tra- versable in the very point so found, for it is but an inquest of office, and whereupon the party grieved thereby can have no attaint; but • (c) 2 Sid. 90. 101. id) 2 Ander. 204. (r) Edit. 1718. jj. 322,554. ( /") Tliis statute was but an afFirmancc oftlie common law, Brit. 7. a. (g) 2 Std, 144. See also the King versus Crosse, Sfc. 1 Sid. 204. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 416 otherwise it is of a presentment oi ^ fugam fecit before the coroner. 8 E. 4 4. The coroner hath power super visum corporis to inquire touching the murder or interfection of the party that is dead, and also of all accessaries before, and of their flight, but not of accessaries after the fact. 4 H. 7. IS. b.{h), yet the party presented before the coroner to be principal or accessary before is not convict by such presentment, but shall be arraigned and plead to the felony, and I know no diff"er- ence between that and this; and it seems unreasonable, that by an inquest taken against a dead person, whereby he is found /e/o de sCy that the executors, administrators, legatees, and children of the de- ceased should be concluded, and lose the goods of the deceased with- out an answer, by an inqusition which may be taken by the coroner behind their backs, and I find no book express [417 ] in it, but the opinion of my lord Coke, P. C. 55.,{i) for the doubt of Mr. Stamford, P. C 1S3. is only upon a fugam fecit, and in the case of Barclay 1658, the Court of King's Bench were not satisfied, that it was conclusive. P. 45 E. 3. inter communia scaccarii there was a presentment (before the coroner, as it seems, but it is not so expressed in the record) that Walter Page felonice se siibmersit, <§' sic felo de se devenit, ^nd thereupon a writ issued out of the Exchequer to inquire what debts were due to Walter Page ; the sheriff's of London, took an inquisition, whereby it was found that Simon Long of Essex was indebted to Walter Page at the time of his death in 40/. by bill, thereupon process issued against Simon Long to answer the debt, who came in and confessed he owed the debt to Walter Page, dicit tamen, quod domino regi reddere non debet, quia qualitercunque praesentatum fuit, quod dictus Walteriis Page nequiter and felonice se submersit, ut praedicitur, idem Walteriis Page interfectus fuit per emulos suos, & per ipsos in quodam fossato in loco vocato the wilds in com. Surrey projectus, absque hoc, quod ipse aliqualiter se submersit; and thereupon isssue was joined, and by a jury of Surrey found, quod dictus Walterus Page fuit interfectus per emu- los suos, & in fossato projectus, absque hoc, quod ipse aliqualiter se . submersit. There a traverse was taken to the presentment, which nfiust needs be before the coroner by the whole circumstance of the case, tho the coroner be not mentioned in the record. And with this agrees the book of 8 E. 4. 4. that the finding of one to he felo de se is traversable, tho found before the coroner; but {h) This case says notliing directly of the coroner's power to inquire of accessaries, yet by resolvinj;;, that in case ot' an accessary before the iact presented before tlie coroner, it it was found he fled, lie should forfeit iiis groods, but not so in case of an accessary after the fact, it seems strongly to imply, that the coroner had jurisdiction in the one case, but not in the otiier; and Stamford says, tiiat the judgres in that case of 4 H. 7. abridged the coroner of a power, which lie would have usurped in inquiring of those, who were acces- saries after the murder. See to this purpose Dalison 32, (i) See also to the same purpose Hob. 317. 417 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. indeed it holds, that a fugam fecit presented before the coroner is not traversable, quia aimtient ley de corone.{k) . If there be two coroners in a county, the outlawry must be given by both, ullagatns est per judicium coronatorum, yet one of them may take an inquisition super visum co?y)oris, M. 6 4* 7 Eliz.C. B.{1) By the statute of 3 H. 7. cap. 1. the coroner ought to re- {[418]] turn and certify the inquisition taken by him to the next goal-delivery, or into the king's bench. And thus far touching felodese and his forfeiture. There is another kind of death of a man, which may be consider- able in this place, namely the death of a manner infortunium, and/ this is of two kinds, viz. 1. Where one man is the cause of another man's death withoift any ill-intent, and by misfortune: of this I shall treat under the dis- tribution of homicide. 2. When a man comes to an untimely end, where no other rea- sonable creature concnrs to it, and this is properly per infortunium. As where a man falls from an horse, or house, or boat, or into a pit, or a tree or tile fall upon him and kill him, or is killed by a beast, in this case the coroner ought to take an inquiry super visum cor- poris, and also of the manner and means, how he came by his death, and of the thing, whereby it happened, and of the value thereof, be- cause in many cases there is a forfeit belonging to the king as a deo- dand, whereof in the next chapter.[l] (A-) See Slamf. Prerog. 46. b. (I) See Hob. 70. [1] By 4 Geo. IV. c. 52, s. 1, it shall not be lawful for any coroner, or other officer having authority to hold inquests, to issue any warrant or other process directing the interment of tiic remains of persons against whom a finding of fclo de se shall be had, in any public higliway; but such coroner or other officer shall give directions for the private interment of the remains of such person felo de se, without any stake being driven through the body of such person, in the church-yard, or other burial-ground of the parish or place in which the remains of such person might, by the laws or customs of England, be interred, if the verdict of felo de se had not been found against such person, such interment to be made within twenty-four hours fi^om the finding of the inquisition, and to take place between the hours of nine and twelve at nigiit. Proviso not to authorize the performing of any of the rites of Christian burial on the interment of the remains of any such person, nor to alter the laws or usages relating to the burial of such person, except so far as relates to the interment of such remains in such church-yard or burial-ground at such time and in such manner. By self-murder all the chattels, real and personal, which the felo de se has in his own right are forfeited, and also all chattels real whereof he is possessed either jointly with his wife or in her right, and also all bonds and other personal things in action belonging solely to himself, and also all personal things in action, and, as some say, entire chattels in possession to which he was entitled jointly with another, on any account except that of merchandise. But it is said thut he shall forfeit a moiety only of such joint chattels as may be severed, and nothing at all of what he was possessed of as executor or ad- ministrator. His lands of inheritance are not forfeited, nor his wife barred of dower. No part of his personal estate vests in the king before the self-murder is found by some inquisition. But after inquisition it is forfeited from the time the act done. 4 Bl, Com. 190. n. 22. Stephens, C. L. 145-7. See post, ch. 32, note. Suicide consists in a man's deliberately putting an end to his own existence, or com- mitting any unlawful malicious act, the consequence of wliich is his own death — as if HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 418 attempting to kill another he runs upon his antagonist's sword, or shooting at another the gun bursals and kills himself. 4 Bl. Com. 189. But the act must be strictly his own, for if a man desire another to kill him, who com- plies, the person killed is noifelo de se.though the killer is a murderer. 1 Hawk. c. 27, s. 6. 1 Russell, 424, 426. So he must be of years of discretion, and in his senses. 4 Bl. C. 189. There may be an accessary before the fact to self-murder, for if a man persuades another to kill himself, and he does so, the adviser is guilty of murder, as an accessary before the fact. 4 Bl. C. 189. Keilw. 136. Rex v. Russell, R. Sf M. C. C. R. 356. Vaux's Case, 4 Rep. 44. b. Where two persons agree to die together, and one of them, at the persuasion of the other, buys poison and mixes it in a potion, and both drink of it, and he who bought and made the potion survives by using proper remedies, and tlie other dies; it is said to be the better opinion, that he who dies shall be adjudged a felo de se, because all that happened was originally owing to his own wicked purpose, and the other only put it in his power to execute it in that particular manner. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 27, «. 6. Keilw. 136. Moor, Ibi. If a man, intending to shoot at another, mortally wound himself by the bursting of the gun, he is felo dese; his own death being the consequence of an unlawful, ma- licious act towards another. It has also been said, that if A. strike B. to the ground, and B. draw a knife and hold it up for his own defence, and A. in haste falling upon B. to kill him, fall upon tiie knife and be thereby killed, A. is felo de se; 3 Inst. 54. Dalt. c. 144; but this has been doubted. 1 Hawkins, F. C. c. 27, s 4. A husband and wife being in extreme poverty and great distress of mind, the husband said, " I am weary of life, and will destroy myself;" upon which the wife replied, " If you do, I will too." The man bought some poison, mixed it with some drink, and they both partook of it. The husband died ; but the wife, by drinking salad-oil, which caused sickness, recovered, and was tried for the murder of her husband, and acquitted ; but solely on the ground that, being the wife of the deceased, she was under his con- trol ; and inasmucli as the proposal to commit suicide had been first suggested by him, it was considered that she was not a free agent, and therefore the jury, under the direc- tion of the judge who tried the case, pronounced a verdict of not guilty. Anonymous referred to in Reg. v. Allison, 8 C. Sf F. 418. Maore, 754. 1 Russ. on C. 508. Hawkins speaks with some warmth against an unaccountable notion, which he says prevailed even in his time, that every one who kills himself must be non compos of course; because it is said to be impossible that a man in his senses should do a thing so contrary to nature and all sense and reason. But he argues, that if this doctrine were allowable, it might be applied in excuse of many other crimes as well as tiiis; as, for instance, that of a mother murdering her child, which is also against nature and reason; and this consideration, instead of being the highest aggravation of a crime, would make it no crime at all ; for it is certain a person non compos mentis can be guilty of no crime. 1 Hawk. c. 27, s. 3. If one encourages another to commit suicide, and is present abetting him while he does 60, such person is guilty of murder as a principal; and if two encourage each other to murder themselves, and one does so, the other being present, but failing in the attempt on himself, the latter is a principal in the murder of the first; but if it be un- certain whether the deceased really killed himself, or whether he came to his death by accident before the moment when he meant to destroy himself, it will not be murder in either. R. v. Dyson, R. Sf R. C. C. 523. R. v. Allison, 8 C. Sf P. 418. See Post, Chap. 34, Note. 419 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. CHAPTER XXXII. OF UEODANDS. Regularly that moveable good, that brings a man to an untimely death, is forfeit to the king, and it is usually granted by the king to his almoner to distribute in charitable uses. But they are not forfeit till the death be found, which is regularly by the coroner, and may be before the commissioners of goal-delivery, oyer and terminer, or of the peace, if omitted by the coroner, and hence it is, that these goods, as neither the goods of felons of them- selves, felons and other outlawed persons, cannot be claimed by pre- scription, because there must appear a title to them by matter of record, before they are forfeited. Upon the d6ath of a man by misadventure, &cc. the inquisition ought to inquire of the goods, that occasioned the death, and the value of them, and the Villafa, where the n>ischance happened, shall be charged with process for the said goods or their value, tho they were not delivered to them,(«) 3 E. 3. Cor. 298. And this is the reason, that in every indictment of murder, man- slaughter, <5'C. the indictment finding, that he was killed with a sword, staff, 4'C. ought to find also the price, viz. 5 solidorum, be- cause the king is entitled to that instrument, whereby the party was killed, or the. value thereof, &nd that altho it were the sword of another man, and not his, that gave the stroke, Co. P. C. 57, 58. tho this doth not vitiate the indictment as to the offense itself, tho the price be omitted. . Deodands are of two natures: 1. Such as do mover e ad r 420 ] mortem. 2. Such as, tho they are qidescentia, yet occasion the party's death: v/flfe statute 4 E. 1. de officio coronatoris. 1. Things moving to death: as if a beast kill a man, 8 E. 2. Co- ron. 403. if a man be cutting of a tree, and the tree fall upon another tree and break down a limb, which falls upon a man and kills him, botli the limb, and the tree that fell, are deodands, 8 E. 2. Co- ron. 398. If a man be driving of a cart, and the cart fall and kill a man, the cart and horses are a deodand. 8 E. 2. Coron. 388. and so if a cart run over a man and kill him, the cart and horses are forfeit, 8 E. 2. Coron. 403. 3 E. 3. Coron. 326, 342. ((^) so if tlie timber that hangs a bell, fall and kill a man, the timber and bell are both forfeit. (c) (rt) This case is cited from an Iter, by Fitzherbert, who adds at the end of it, quod mirum. (b) A cart met a wag-jE^on loaded upon the road, and the cart endeavouring to pass by the wajTgon, was driven ui)on an Iiiffh bank and over-turned, and threw a person, that was in the cart, just before tlic wheels of the waggon, and the vvagfjTon ran over him and liild him; it was resolved in tliis case in the Jiorne circuit by Pollexfen and Gregory, tiiat the cart, wapjjon, loading, and all the horses were deodands, because they all moved ad Jftor- te7n. 1 Salk. 220. (c) 8 E. 2. Corone 405. vide contra Rex versus Crosse, Sfc. 1 Sid. 207. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 420 If a man in watering his horse is drowned, the horse is a deodand. 8 E. 2. Coron. 401. If a man fall into the water, and the water carry him under the wheel of a mill, whereby he is killed, the wheel is forfeited, but not the miW. 8 E. 2.. Coron. 389. If a weight of earth fall upon a worker in a mine and kill him, the weight of earth is forfeit, not the whole mine. 12 B. 2. For- feiture 20, A man falls from his horse against a trunk, whereof he dies, the horse is forfeit as a deodand, but not the trunk. 3 E. 3. Coron. 341. And yet I find strong authority, that in that case the horse is not forfeited, unless he throw his rider. Clans. 5. E. 3. pai^t 2. m. 9. It was found by inquisition, " Quod Willielmus Daventrise in parochia beatse Murix Strond in com. Middlesex., cum ad-aquavit quendam equum magistri sui, dictusque Willielmus redeundo de eodem equo per infortunium cecidit, & cum eodem eqno per amicos suos semivivus deductus fnit ad hospitium praedicti magistri sui apud Fleelstreet in suburbio London, & ibidem languidus vixit usque occasum solis, quo tempore [ 421 ] obiit ex casu praedicto; & quod prsedictus equus tempore casus prsedicti per aliquem vel aliquam non fuit perterritus, per quod habuit occasionem recalcitrandi. This inquisition being removed into the chancery by Certiorari, thereupon it was adjudged coram rege 4* concilio, quod equus prse- diclus lanquam deodand' regi in hoc casu non debet adjudicari,^\\^ thereupon a writ issues to the sheritls and coroners of London recit- ing the inquisition: " Jamque dicta certificatione coram nobis & con- cilio nostro inspecta & plenius examinata, nobis &. dicto concilio nos- tro videtur, quod equus praedictus tanquam deodand' nobis in hoc casu non debet adjiidicari," commands the sheriff and coroners, " quod exactionem, quam Johanni Bleburgh (the master of the horse) vel plegiis, vel manucaptoribus suis in hac parte pro equo proedicto vel ejus pretio nobis tanquam deodand' reddend' fecistis, supersede- atis omnino & districtionem in hac parte factam sine dilatione relax- etis." 7! R. apud Guildford 18 Novemb. Which judgment is of greater weight, than any above cited, and may be a great guide in cases of this nature, and therefore I have cited it at large: 1. It is a resolution subsequent to all those judgments, that are above-raentiond, for the last of them is the 3 E. 3. and this is 5 E. 3. Again, 2. It is a solemn judgment given in Chancery coram rege S,' concilio upon great examination, and the whole case stated in the inquisition, and every man knows, that understands any thing of records of those times, that coram rege 8," concilio was the king's legal council, namely the Chancellor, Treasurer, Keeper of the Privy Seal, justices of the one bench and the other, chancellor and barons of the Exchequer: these usually met in chancery upon such occasions under the style of co?iC27n/m. 3. It is a judgment given by the king and council against the for- feiture, the whole case appearing upon the inquisition, which is of 421 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. greater moment, than a judgment given for the king, because given by liimself and his officers against his own interest. 2. Now touching deodands of things not moveable. [^422 ] If a man be drowned in a pit, tho the pit cannot be for- feited, the coroner may charge the township to stop the pit, and make entry thereof in his roils; and if it be not done before the next eyre or goal-dehvery, the township shall be amerced. 8. E. 2. Coron. 416. If a man falls from a hay-rick, whereby he dies, it is said {noia, not adjudged) that it shall be forfeit. 3 E. 3. Coron. 348. If a man be getting up a cart by the wheel to gather plums, and neither the cart nor horses moving, the man falls and dies, neither the cart nor horses are forfeit, but only the wheel. 8 E. 2. Coron. 409. It seems, that if a man be under the age of fourteen years, and falls from a cart or horse, it shall not be a deodand, because he was not of discretion to look to himself; but if a horse, bull, or the like kill him, or if a cart run over him, there it shall be a deodand 8 E. 2. Coron. 389. StamforcTs P. Cor. 21. a. Co. P. C. p. 57. for there it shall be imputed to the neglect of the keeper of the goods, that did the mischief, and so it is, if a tree fall upon one within the age of discretion, it is a deodand. Touching deodands in ships or boats, these things are observable: 1. If a ship or boat be laden with merchandize, tho it fall out that a man be killed by the motion of the ship or boat, yet the merchan- dize are no deodand, tho it be in the fresh water; but if any particular merchandize fall upon a party, whereby he dies, that particular merchandize shall be a deodand, and not the ship. Britton, cap. 1. de office de coroner, § 13 <§' 14. 2. If a ship or vessel be sailing upon the sea, and a person falls out of the ship and is drowned, the ship is no deodand. By the antient constitutions of the admiralty it seems, that if a man were drowned upon the sea by falling off from the ship under sail, there was no deodand due, nor if he died by the fall of a mast or sail- yard, or otherwise; but indeed in the articles of inquiry in the court of admiralty, mentiond in the black book of the admiralty, one of the articles is to inquire of them, that take any deodands, [ 423 ] besides the admiral of any gold, silver or jewels found upon any man slain upon the sea, drowned in the sea, or slain with a mast in the ship, or with the yard of the ship, or with any other thing, which is the cause of the death of any man, that in such case appurtient al admiral per prendre and administre per I'alme, ce quest mort, le moiety, & I'autre moiety a doner al feme celui, quest mort,ses inlans, freres au soers,sil ad aucunes: but certainly this never obtaind, for without question the goods of the deceased were no deodands, but only the goods that moved to his death. Rot. Par. 51 E. 3. n. 73. The commons pray, Que come il ad un custome use parmy cest njalme, que si ascun home ou garson eschie hors de ascun niefe, batelle, ou autre vessel en le mere, haven, ou auire ewe, &, soil pcrisse, le dit vessel ud estre forfeite au roy, ou HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 423 autres seigneurs de franchises, to the great prejudice of mariners and shipping, and tiierefore pray, que nul neife, batell, ne autre vessel soil forfeitable desormes pur le cause avant dit. Resp. En le mere ne doit pes deodand estre ajugge, mes quant al ewe fresh le roy ent ferra sa grace, on lui pleyst. The like petitions were renewed Rot. Par. 1 H. 4. n. 154. 1 H. 5. n. 35. 14 H, 6. n. 2Q. but tiiey obtained no other answer, than that the law be observed. Yet that answer in 51 E. 3. is a sufficient declaration, that no deo- dand is to be upon such a death happening upon the sea, and with this difference touching the forfeiture of a ship or other thing, as deodands in mari 4" in aqua diilci, agrees Bract. Lib. III. cap. 5. p. 122, and cup. 17. p. 136. in fine, viz. that de submersis in aqua dulci batelli, de quibus tales submersi fuerunt, apprecieiUur, sed non in mari, nee sunt deodanda ex infortunio in mari. And with the same agrees Fleta. Lib. I. cap. 25, §. 9. de submer- sis, si de molendino ceciderit vel carecta vel de batello, quamvis car- catis, duni tamen in acqua dulci, secus quam in falsa, and goes far- ther, but too far, viz. that the vessel with its lading, and the cart with its lading, and the mill, with all that is moveable in it, are deo- datids. But now, what shall be said the sea or salt water? My lord Coke, ubi supra, viz. p. 58. saith,and that truly, [ 424 ~\ the arm of the sea is included herein; and by the book of 22 Jissize, j)l. 93. so far as the sea flows and reflows is an arm of the sea. And thus far of deodands. I shall only add this one thing more relating to the coroner's office touching those that come to a violent death de subito mortuis: if the township bury the body before the coroner be sent for, the township shall be amerced; and if the coroner come not to make his inquiry upon notice given, he shall be fined in eyre, or in the king's bench, or before the justices of goal-delivery. [1] [1] By deodand, is meant whatever personal chattel is the immediate occasion of the death of any reasonable creature; which is forfeited to the king to be applied to pious uses, and distributed in alms by his high almoner: though formerly destined to a more religious purpose. It seems to have been originally designed, in the days of Catho- licity, as an expiation for the souls of such as were snatched away by sudden death, and for that purpose ought properly to have been given to the church ; in the same manner as the apparel of a stranger, who was found dead, was applied to purchase masses for the good of his soul. And this may account for that rule of law, that no deo- dand is due where an infant under the age of discretion is killed by a fall froin a cart, a horse, or the like, not being in motion; whereas if an adult person falls from thence, and is killed, the thing is certainly forfeited. For the reason given by Sir Matthew Hale, (ante. p. 422,) seems to be very inadequate, viz. because an infant is not able to take care of himsiflf; lor why should the owner save his forfeiture on account of the imbecility of the child, wiiich ought to have made him more cautious to prevent any accident of mis- chief? The true ground of this rule seems rather to have been, that the child, by reason of its want of discretion, was presumed incapable of actual sin, and tfierefore needed rio deodand to purchase propitiatory masses; but every adult, who died in actual sin, stood in need of such atonement, according to the humane belief of the founders of the 424 HISTORTA PLACITORUM CORONA. English law. 1 Blac. Comm. 300. 301. and note (21) in 2lst Land. Ed. 1844. 2 Steph. Comm. 5G5. The origin of this law (of deodands) is traced back to the oldest periods of European religious faith, when the belief in the efticacy of. masses for the souls of the dead to rescue them from the pains of purgatory, was as prevalent and as thoroughly rooted in the mind of all Christendom, as the disbelief of it is now in this country. It was in tiiose days a general practice, naturally flowing from this belief, among tlie classes of society whose means would permit, for fliasses to be said for the souls of the dead, particularly of those who died on the field of battle, or otherwise came to sudden death, and were sup- posed, therefore, to pass from this world witiiout due preparation, and without absolution; and to this practice is traced tlie law of dcodand. Anciently, it seems, when any person came suddenly by his death by the accidental agency of any animate or inanimate chat- tel, the chattel was to be given to the cliurch for masses for the soul of the deceased. Such a law was manifestly a wise and humane one, while it was the fervent belief of the people that saying of such masses was essential to the eternal welfare of the souls of deceased persons; for in all times, persons of the poorer sort are those who are most exposed to death by accidents, and this would be particularly the case in the times of wiiich we speak, when the higher classes of society took care, by their continual state of warfare and mutual destruction, to allow little room for accidental death among them- selves, so that but for the law which devoted to the procurement of masses the thing that caused accidental death, there could have been for the poor no provision for that species of spiritual aid, which was considered, both by rich and poor, as much an essential as decent burial is at this day. In process of time, however, the law appears to have been perverted from its original intention; and, while the ulterior object for which the forfeiture was inflicted, appears to have been gradually lost sight of, the forfeiture itself was retained, but in favour of the crown; and the fruits of it became and have continued, even down to this day, a mere source of revenue to the crown. The notion upon which dendands have been principally levied in our own times, and which appears indeed, to have been always considered as, partly, the reason of the law, has been that they operate as a sort of penalty on carelessness, tending to make the owners of chattels of a dangerous character, more cautious in using them. Tiiis is simply an attempt to fasten some extraneous attribute of utility, upon a process in itself almost ■wholly denied of fitness and utility. As a law lending to enforce caution, it is manifest- ly one sided; for the forfeiture of the thing which is the cause of a man's death can, of course, operate only as an inducement to caution, (if indeed it does operate at all) upon the owner of the thing, whose caution or incaution has, in general, very little to do with the matter; while upon the persons who expose themselves to the injurious action of the thing, it can have no effect; yet it is the incaution of the latter class much more than of the former, that is the cause of accidental death. 9 Lond. Jur. 49, 50. P. II. See also 1 Blac. Comm. note (22) p. 302. 2lst Ed. In the Parliamentary Session of 1845, Lord Campbell introduced a " Bill to abolish Deodand<," and Lord Lyttlelon introduced anotlier entitled " An Act for Compensating the Families of Persoris killed by Accidents;"(*) neither of which however were passed; and the Law of Deodands in England still rests upon its ancient principles and foundations.(t) (*) This Bill has now (/4;)riZ 1847) become a law, 9 4- 10 Vict. c.93.2m August, 18i6. The provisions of the law are as follow: § 1. An action to be maintainable against any person causing death through neglect, &c. notwithstanding the death of the person injured. (} 2. Actie claimed. § 5. The mode of construing the words and expressions in the act. § 6. The act to take efl'eot immediately after passing, and not to apply to Scotlan/i. ^ 7. The act may he amended or repealed the present session of Parliament. See the Slat, at large in 10 /i«;if/. J(/r. 370. /^<. 2. (+) When this note was written {July 134fi) such was the law of England, but now, (April 1847) the learning of the law of deodands has yielded to the spirit of legal reform, i'lie lirilish Parliament passed "An Act to abolish l)(M)dands," the 18th August, 1846. Whereas the law respecting the forfeiture of chattels which have moved to or caused the death of man, and respecting deodands, is unreasonable and inconvenient: be it euacied, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 404 It was never introduced into this conntry, except in a very infornaal manner, and no such title as Deodand is to be found in the United States Digests. The introduction of Lord Campbell's Bill, together with some recent cases has caused the learning of this branch of the law to be much investigated. However important such investigations may liave been in England, they are liere rather matters of curious anti- quarian law, tlian of any daily practical utility. An edition o{ Hale^s Pleas uf the Crown would nevertheless be incomplete without a discussion of the subject, and hence, this note has been prepared. "Tiie principles upon which they (the doctrines of deodands) were established," ob- serves the present Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, in delivering a recent and important judgment, {Reg. v. Polwart, 1 Q. B. 824.) -'are so entirely matter of conjec- ture that we do not feel called upon or justified at the present day to extend their appli- cation, but rather to limit them strictly to the cases in which we' find them established by practice and recognised by law." ^ . ' ' It will be convenient to notice here the distinction which exists between the forfeiture of a weapon or other instrument with which a felony has been ccmmilted, and the value of which is for the purpose of such forfeiture always found by the jury, and that parti- cular species of forfeiture which is designated as a deodand. To these two kinds of for- feiture the name of deodand is by some authors, and amongst others by Sir William Blackstone {vol. \. p. 302.) indifferently applied, but according to the weight of authority, it is strictly applicable in those cases only where death has been caused accidentally, and without the intervention of human means. Poster's Crown L. 266. Indeed it is quite clear from the older cases, and has recently been expressly decided by the Court of Queen's Bench that the coroner's jury has no power to lay a deodand if the verdict returned be one of murder or manslaughter. In Reg. v. Polwart, 1 Q. B. 818. to which we here allude, the coroner's jury returned a verdict of manslaughter against one Joseph Polwart, for occasioning the death of one Robert Mason, by his improper and negligent navigation of a steamboat; and the inquisition further found that "the said steamboat was moving to the death of the said Robert Mason, and is of the value of X800, and the property of and in the possession of J. W. D. The late Sir William- Follett in support of the rule for quashing the inquisition, contended that, a deodand could not be given in a case of felony, and that consequently so much of the inquisition as related to the deodand ought to be quashed, as was done in Ex Parte Carrutkers, 2 Man. ^ Ry. 397. A deodand, observed the learned counsel, is only where death happens by misadventure. The instrument of death may indeed be forfeited to the king in cases of felony, but that is not an instance of deodand properly speaking; and he cited Slaund. Pleas del Cor. Lib. I. e. -U.fol. 20. a. 3 Inst. c. 9. p 57. Foxley's case, 3 Rep. 109, 110. Fost. Cr. Law, 265. Rex V. Rope, 2 Barnardislon, R. 82. 111. Com. Dig. Waife, E. 1. which certainly fully support this view of the question. Judgment was accordingly given that so much of the inquisition, as related to the deodand therein mentioned should be quashed. "All the authorities in our law books, said the lord Ch. Justice, treat deodands as being due where the death is by misadventure; and no one instance has been adduced or can be found, where a deodand has been laid, where a verdict of murder or manslaughter has been found." The same learned judge, amongst other authorities referred to the following passage from lord Coke, (3 Inst. c. 9. p. 57.) cittd by Sir William in his argument p. 820, which is apposite for our present purpose; "deodands" he describes as being laid when " any moveable thing inanimate, or beast animate, do move to or cause the untimely death of any reasonable creature by mischance in any county of the realm, (and not upon the sea or upon any salt water,) without the will, offence or fault of himself or of any person." The rule of law as finally established in this case in 1 Q. B. 818, will be found very material in guiding us to a correct conclusion as to the utility of the power at present possessed by a coroner's jury of imposing deodands. This power, it will be observed, ceases to exist whenever the degree of negligence which has occasioned death comes within the definition of legal guilt; and in order to place this matter in the clcar- &c. that from and after the first of September, 1846, there shall be no forfeiture of any chattel tor or in respect of the same having moved to or caused the death of man; and no coroner's jury sworn to inquire, upon the sight of any dead body, how the decased came by his death, shall find any forfeiture of any chattel which may have moved to or caused the death of the deceased, or any deodand whatsoever, and it shall not be necessary in apy indictment or inquisition for homicide, to allege the value of the instrument which caused the death of the deceased, or to allege that the same was of no value, 10 Lond, Jur. p. 424 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. est point of view, we shall divide cases of violent death into three classes : 1st. where the death is purely accidental, in which case only a nominal deodand or none at all oug-ht of course to be imposed; 2d. where death has resulted from negligence and misconduct, not amounting in contemplation of law to manslaughter, in which class of cases the power of awarding deodands may undoubtedly be used for the purpose of punishing the guilty party; and 3d. where death has resulted from manslaughter where, as we have just seen, no deodand can be laid. 5 Land. Law. Mag. 191-193. The same learned writer in the 5lh vol. of the Land. Law. Mag. investigates the origin and history of deodands; (see p. 194-198.) and gives abstracts of both lord CampheWs and lord Lyttleton's Bills, (seep. 199-203.) See Hansard's Pari. Deb. vol. 18. p. 947. Id. vol. 19. p. 1053, for dis- cussions upon the respective bills before referred to. A few modern cases in which the law of deodands is investigated have been adjudica- ted and are here cited. Reg. v. Brownlow, 11 Ad. Sf El. R. 119. Reg. v. Tlie Grand Junction Railway, Id. 123, and note, (a) Reg. v. Polwart, 1 Q. B. 818. Reg. v. The Great Western Railway Company, 3 Id. 341. Ex parte Caruthers, 2 Man. Sf Ry. Rep. 397. Attorney GenHv. J'he Easttrn Counties Railway Company, 3 Railw, Cas. 145. CHAPTER XXXIII. OF HOMICIDE, AND IT's SEVERAL KINDS, AND FIRST OP THOSE CON- SIDERATIONS THAT ARE APPLICABLE, AS WELL TO MURDER AS MANSLAUGHTER. Having dispatched the business of suicidiiim or self-murder, and per infortunium simplex, I come now to consider of homicide, as it relates to others. And this is of three kinds: Purely voluntary, r/r. murder and manslaughter. Purely involuntary, as that other kind of homicide per infortuni\im. 3. Mixt, partly voluntary, and partly involuntary, or in a kind necessary, and this again of two kinds, viz. inducing a forfeiture, as se defendendo, or not inducing a forfeiture, as, 1. In defense of a man's house. 2. Defense of his person against [ 425 ~\ an assault in vid regid. 3. In advancement or execution of justice, and according to this distribution I shall proceed. I shall begin with those matters considerable, which are applicable as well to homicide, as to murder. Murd>;r is a killing of a man ex malitid prsecogitatd;{2'] homicide is killing a man without forethought malice.[l] [1] It will be perceived that the word homicide is here used not in the present general sense of killing, but as the term manslaughter is now used. [2] Coke's definition of murder, (3 Inst. 41,) as modified by Blarkstone, is so accurate, comprehensive and elegant that it has been universally recognized wherever English law prevails. " Murder (says Blarkstone, 4 Comm. 198) is when a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killcth any reasonable creature in being and under the king's peace, with malice aforethought, cither express or implied." This is substantially the dcHiiilion of this crime as known for several hundred years in England, and as now understood in the United States. Wilkins's Laws of the Anglo- Saxnns, 480; Glari. L. 1 4, c. 3 ; Home's il/n ror, 4G; Dait. c. 145 ; St. 52, //. 3, 25 ; Bracton, L. 3, c. 4, s. 1; Britt. c. (J, s. I ; Fletn, L. 1, c. 30; Kelham's Norman Diet. "Murder;" CoweWs Diet. "Murder;" BlounCs Law Dirt. "Murder;" Stauud. b. 1, c. 10; 1 Hoick. c. 31, s. 3; Vin. Abr. "Murder," a. 1; 2 McNally, 553; Foster, 25ti; 1 East, P. C. 215; HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 425 It is a mistake in those, that think, that before the statute of Mar- lebridgc, cap. 2G, all killing of a man, tho per infortunium or se de- fendendo, was murder, for the statute saith, that murdrum de csetero non adjudicetur coram justiciariis, ubi infortunium tantummodo ad- judicatur, sed locum habet murdrum de interfectis per feloniam tan- turn, & non aliter, and therefore they thought that before this statute a man should be hanged for killing another in his own defense.. 21 E. 3. 17. b.{a) But the truth is, murdrum in this case was but an amercement, that was antiently imposed upon a township, where the death of a man happened ;(Z») and this appears by many hundred old charters of the kings of England., especially to bishops and monasteries, whereby it was granted, that they and their possessions should be quit de murdro Sf latrocinio among divers other immunities, where- by we must not think that they had power granted them to commit murder or theft, but they were thereby acquitted of those common amercements, usually in those antient times imposed in eyre upon vills for murder and theft committed there. To make up the crime of homicide or murder there must be these three concurring circumstances. I. The party must be killed, antiently indeed a barbarous assault with an intent to murder, so that the party was left for dead, but yet recovered again, was adjudged murder and petit treason, 15 E. 2. Coron. 3S3. but that holds not now, for the stroke [ 426 ] without the death of the party stricken, nor the death with- out the stroke or other violence makes not the homicide or murder, for the death consummates the crime. It remains therefore to be considered, to what intents the offense of murder or manslaughter relates to the stroke or other cause of the death, and to what purposes it relates to the death only. (a) See also 2 Co. Instit.p. 148, who is of tliat opinion. (b) This is so plain, that it is matter of surprize, that any should mistake it; the word murdrum usually signifying a secret killing of another, so that the murderer was not known, for if the murderer was known, it was not in this sense murder; as if the murderer was taken, Sf judicium sustinuerit, nullum erit murdrum, quia convincitur felunia, or if the murdered person lived for some time after his wounds, it was no murder because he might discover the murderers, the meaning of which is not, that the offender would not in those cases be liable to be indicted and punished for murder, but that the vill or township would not in such cases be liable to any amerciament. Bract. Lib. HI. de corona, cap. 15. p. 135. a. Wilk. Le^. Anglo-Sax. p. 280. vide supra p. 39. in notis, vide fostea cap. 35. See also Kelynge, 121. Bac. Abr. " Murder," A.; Jacob's Law Diet., " Murder;" 2 Ld. Rnym. 1487; Kehjnge^ 1-21-127; 3 Chithj, 123; 3 Slarkie, 513; 1 Russell, 421 ; ^rchbold, 818; 2 Deacon, 896; Roscoe, 5G2 ; Davis, Cr, L '92 ; C. J. Parsons's def. {Selfridge's Tr. 3,) Brockenbo. rough, J. in 6 Randolph's Va. R. 723; 6 Mass. R. J39 ; 7 Dnn'e, Abr. c. 212; State v. Ze'ler, 2 Halsted's R. N. Jersey, 242 ; Comm. v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391; The People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159; Respublica v. Mulatto Bob. 4 Dallas, 149; Commonwealth v. Har. man, 4 Barr. ; Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Barr. ; U. S. v. McGill, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 463. Some of the authorities above quoted are from "A Report of tlie Penal Code of Massachusetts, prepared under a resolulion of the Legislature," Boston, 1844. To the authors of this very able and comprehensive work, Messrs. James C. Alvord, Luther .S Cus«iN<5,WiLLARD PiiiLLirs, and Samuel B. Walcott, the editors, are largely indebted for the notes to this and some of the immediately succeeding chapters. 426 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. If a man gives another a mortal stroke, and he lives a month, two or three, or more, and die within the year and day, the title of the lord by eschete to avoid mesne incumbrances relates to the stroke given, and not only to the death. Plowd. Com. 263. Dame Hale's case. [3] If a man give another a mortal stroke, and he dies thereof within a year and a day, but mesne between the stroke and the death there comes a general pardon, whereby all misdemeanors are pardoned, this doth pardon the felony consequentially, because the act, that is the offense, is pardoned, tho it be not a felony till the party die. Ibid. 401. CoWs case. If a mortal stroke be given on the high sea, and the party comes to land in England and die, the admiral shall not have jurisdiction in this case to try the felon, because the death that consummated the felony, happened upon the land, nor the common law shall not try him, because the stroke, that made the offense, was not infra corpus comitatus, 5 Co. Rep. 106. h. Sir Henry Constable's case, 2 Co. Rep. 93. a. Biyigham^s case, Co. P. C. p. 48. and Lade's case, 25 Eliz. cited there to that purpose; de quo alibi; see 9. Geo. IV. c. 31, s. 7, «§'C. At common law, if a man had been stricken in one county and died in another, it was doubtful whether he were indictable or tri- able in either, but the more common opinion was, that he might be indicted where the stroke was given, for the death is but a con- sequent, and might be found tho in another county, 9 E. 4. 48. 7 H. 7. 8. and if the party died in another county, the body was removed into the county, where the stroke was given, for the coro- ner to take an inquest super visum corporis, 6 H. 7. 10. but now by the statute of 2 <§' 3 E. 6. cap. 24. the justices or coroner [] 427 3 of the county, where the party died, shall inquire and pro- ceed, as if the stroke had been in the same county, where the party died. On the other side, as to some respects, the law regards the death as the consummation of the crime, and not merely the stroke. If a party be kild in one county, the coroner super visum corporis might at common law inquire of all accessaries or procurers before the fact, tho the procurement were in another county, 20 H. 7. Kelw. 67. b. per omnes justiciarios Anglise; but now by the statute of 2 (§• 3 E. 6, cap. 24. the indictment and trial of the accessaries shall be in the county, where they were accessary, viz. procuring, abetting or receiving. If a party be mortally wounded, and the offender taken and in the custody of the constable, and he suffers him to escape before the [3] The death must ensue within a year and a day after tho stroke received or cause of deatli adtiiinistcred, in the compulation of wliich tlie whole day upon which the hurt was done shall he reckoned the first. .3 Initt. l.'iS; 1 Ihiwk. c. 31, s. 9; 1 East. P. C. 343- 344; 1 Russell, 428; 4 lil. Com. 1!)7; 3 Chdly, 72G. Sec Nicholos' case, Foster, 64, where it is doubled whether Cule\ E. 3. Coron. 314. \i Ji. counsel B. to poison his wife, B. accordingly obtains' [ 436 '\ poison from ./^. and gives it to his wife in a roasted apple, the wife gives it to a child of B. not knowing it was poison, who eats it and dies, this is murder in B. tho he intended nothing to the child. Plowd. Com. 474. Saunder''s case: and so it is, if an apo- thecary send a potion to the wife, and the husband mingle poison with it, and upon some dislike of the physic the apothecary is sent for, who to justify it to be wholesome voluntarily eats part of it, and (a) See Slate Tr. Vol. I. p. 331. (c) New Edit. cap. 145. p. 472. (Jb) State Tr.Vol. I./). 313. [19] 4 Bl. Com. 28. 1 Hawk. I'. C. 3. Wif*e not guilty of any breach of duty, in ne- glectinw- to provide an uppreiifice of her Iiusband with sufHcicnt food and necessaries, whereby he died, as she was only the servant of her husband. Rex v. Squire, 1 Rus- sell, 16. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 436 is poisoned and dies, this is murder in B. tho the apothecary was never intended to be hurt, but voluntarily look it. 9 Co. Rep. 81. Ji^nes Gore^s case. But in this case, he who was absent, and counselled the poisoning of the wife, is not accessary to the murder, because as to him the command shall not be construed further, than as to the person in- tended by him. Plowd. Com. 474. Saunder^s case.{d) l( ,/i. counsel or commands B. to beat C. with a small wand or rod, which could not, in all human reason, cause death, if ^. beats C. with a great club, or wound him with a sword, whereof he dies, it seems, that ^'i. is not accessary, because there was no conmiand of death, nor of any thing, that could probably cause death, and B. hath varied from the command in substance, and not in circum- stance. If t^. command or counsel B. to kill C. and before the fact done t/9. repents, and comes to B. and expressly discharges him from the fact, and countermands it, if after this countermand B. doth it, it is murder in B. but .^. is not accessary, but if ^. repent of it, but before any discharge orcountermand given to B. B. kills C. yet »^. remains accessary notwithstanding his private repentance, for in as much as his express counsel or command occasions the fact, he must at his peril see, that he countermand B. and so remedy as much as in him lies the mischief, that his former command occa- [ 437 1 sioned. Co. P. C. p. 51. Plowd. Com. 476. a. Saiinder's case. In manslaughter there can be no accessaries before the fact, for it is presumed to be sudden, for if it were with advice, command, or deliberation, it is murder and not manslaughter, and the like of se defendendo. And therefore in an indictment of manslaughter only, if others be indicted as accessaries before the fact, the indictment is void against them. And if j1. be indicted of murder, and B. as accessary before by procurement, 4'c. and ,j3. is found guilty only of manslaughter, B. shall be discharged. 4 Co. Hep. 43. b. Goffe versus Bibilhe a.nd Hodl David. And anciently, he that struck the stroke, whereof the party died was only the principal, and those, that were present, aiding, and assisting, were but in the nature of accessaries, and should not be put upon their trial, till he that gave the stroke were attaint by outlawry or judgment. 40 Ass. 25. 40 E. 2. 42. a. But at this day, and long since, the law hath been taken otherwise, and namely, that all that are present, aiding, and assisting, are equally . (d) But tho the judges were of opinion in this case, tliat he was not accessary, yet they thought it properest tliat he should be delivered rather by a pardon, tlian otiiervvise, and accordingly they kept him in prison from one session till another, till he procured a pardon; and master Plowden, the reporter, says, it was his opinion, that whoever coun- sels or commands an evil thing should be adjudged accessary to all which follows from tliat evil action, but not from any other distinct thing. 437 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. . principal with him that ga-ve the stroke, whereof the party died. 4 H. 7. IS. a- per omnes justiciarios ntriusque band, for tho one gave the stroke, yet in interpretation of law it is the stroke of every per- son, tliat was present, aiding, and assisting, and tho they are called principals in the second degree, yet they are principals, and the law was altered herein, in tempore H. 4 Ploivd. Com. 100. a. and there- fore, if there be an indictment of murder or manslaughter against ./?. that A. felonice, ^-c. percnssit B. whereof lie died, and that C and D. were present,abetting, aiding, and assisting to r^. «f//e/onmm 8^' mur- drum S^-c. niodo Sj- forma prsedictd f(iciend\ and J2. appears not, but B. and C. appear, they shall be arraigned, and receive their judgment if convict, tho A. neither appear, nor be outlawed. Plowd. Com. 97. and 100. Gyt tin's case. \i A. be indicted as having given the mortal stroke, and B. and C. as present, aiding, and assisting, and upon the evidence it ("438] appear that B. gave the stroke, and Ji. and C were only aiding and assisting, it maintains the indictment, and judg- ment shall be given against them all, for it is only a circumstantial variance, for in law it is the stroke of all that were present, aiding, and abetting. Ploivd. Com. 98. a. 9 Co. Rep. 67. b. Mackally^s case. Yet the circumstances of the case may vary the degree of the offense in those that are in this kind parties to the homicide. \i t/i. have malice against B. and lies in wait to kill him, and C. the servant of.^. being present, but not privy to the intent of his master, finds his master fighting with B. takes part with his master, and the servant or master kill B. this is murder in A. because he had malice forethought, but only homicide in C. PIovkI. Com. 100. b. Salisbury'' s case, where it was also resolved, that where Ji. had ma- lice against D. the master of ^. but by mistake assaults and kills B. the servant, or having malice against D. the master, and B. his ser- vant, comes in aid of his master, and Ji. kills him, it is murder ni Ji. as much as if he had killed the master, for the malice shall be carried over to make the killing of i9. murder. Upon an indictment of murder, tho the party upon his trial be acquit of murder, and convict of manslaughter, he shall receive judg- meiu, as if the indictment had been of manslaughter, for the offense in substance is the same. And upon the same reason it is in case of malice implied, if .^. B. and C. be in a tumult together, and D. the constable comes to ap- pease the affray, and Ji. knowing him to be the constable, kill him, and B. and C. not knowing him to be the constable, come in, and finding./^, and J), struggling, assist and abet ./^. in killing the consta- ble, this is murder in Jl. but manslaughter in B. and C. To make an abetter to u murder or homicide principal in the felo- ny, there are regularly two thnigs requisite, 1. He must be present. 2. He must be aiding and abettnig ad fcloniam ^" murdrum, sive homicidium. If he were procuring, or abetting, and absent, he is acces- r 439 ] sary in case of murder, and not principal, as hath been shewn, unless in some cases of poisoning, ut supra. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 439 If he be present, and not aiding or abetting to the felony, he is ueither principal nor accessary. If A. and B. be fighting, and C. a man of fnll age comes by chance, and is a looker on only, and assists neither, he is not gnilty of murder or homicide, asf>rincipal in the second degree, but it is a misprision, for which he shall be fined, unless he use means to apprehend the felon. 8. E. 2 Coron. 395. 3 E. 3. ibidem 293. 14 H. 7. 31. b. Stam- ford's P. C. 40. b. Dalton, cup. lOS. p. 2SA.{e) Therefore it remains to be inquired, 1. Who shall be said to be present. 2. Who shall be said abetting, aiding or assisting to the felony. I. As to the first: if divers persons come to make an affray, 4*c. and are of the same party, and come into the same house, but are in several rooms of the same house, and one be killed in one of the rooms, those that are of that party, and that came for that purpose, tho in other rooms of the same house, shall be said to be present. Dull. cap. 93. p. 241. (/) The lord Uacre and divers others came to steel deer in the park of one Pelham, Rayden one of the company killed the keeper in the park, the lord Dacre and the rest of the company being in other parts of the park, it was ruled, that it was murder in them all, and they died fo»* it. Crompt. 25. a. Dalt. ubi supra, 34 H. 8. B. Co- ron. 172.(5-) The like in case of burglary, tho some stood at the lane's end or field-gate to watch if any came to disturb them, Co. P. C.p. 64. 11 H. A. 13 b. yet they are said to be burglars, because present, aiding, and assisting to the burglary. II. Who shall be said abetting, aiding and assisting. If A. comes and kills a man, and B. rnns with an intent to be assisting to him, if there should be occasion, tho de facto he doth nothing, yet he is principal being present, as well as Ji. 3 E. 3. Co- ron. 309. If divers come with one assent to do mischief, {male f aire) as to kill, rob or beat, and one doth it, they are all princi- [440"] pals in the felony, (^-c. 3 E. 3. Coron. 314. \{ A. and divers others in his company intending to rob a person charge him with felony, and as they are carrying him to gaol, some of the company rob the person attached, this is robbery in all, but if the rest of the company come without any such intent, it seems they are not guilty. 3 E. 3. Coron. 350. If .,^. comes in company with B. to beat C. and B. beats C. that he die, A. is principal, but then, according to those elder times, the indictment must not be only, that he was present, aiding, and assist- ing, for that, as the law was then taken, makes him only accessary, but the indictment mu.st shew the special matter, that they came to that intent, 19 ^. 2. Coron. 433. but now that course is altered, and (e) New Edit. cap. 161. p. 527. (/) New Edit. c.ip. 145. p. 472. {g) See also Moor 86. Kelyuge 56. ' ' 440 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. the indictment only runs, that A. was present, aiding, and assisting, and that is sufficient to make iiim principal. So if Ji. being present command B. to kill C. and he doth it, both are principals. 13 H.l. 10. «.(A) If many be present, and one only gives the strc^e, whereof the party dies, they are all principals, if they came for that purpose. 21 E. 4. 71. a. The case of Drayton Basset reported by Mr. Crompton, fol. 28. was- this: ./?. with thirty others and more entered with force uppu the manor-house of Drayton Basset, and ejected B. his children, and servants out of the same ; afterwards twenty others on the behalf of B. three days after, in the night, came with weapons vvith intent to re-enter, and one of the twenty, about ten of the clock in the night, cast fire into a thatcht house adjoining to the house, •whereupon one that was in the house shot otf a gun, and killed one of the party of B. and then the rest of the party of B. fled, and Jl. and his company continued the forcible possession of the house for many days after, whereupon t^. and twenty-seven more [ 441 ] were indicted of murder, and arraigned in the king's bench, and the matter aforesaid given in evidence against him, and Mich. 22 4' 23 Eliz. he was found guilty of manslaughter, & divers outres de rioters, que fueront in le meason al temps, que le home fuit tue, fueront arraigns come principals, coment que ne assent al setter del gunne ne al tuer, purceo que fueront la illoyalment assem- blies, & in forcible manner gard le meason one Ji. que fuit convict. And consonant to this is Mr. Dalton, p. 241. (e) in these words: " Note also, that if divers persons come in one company to do any unlawful thing, as to kill, rob or beat a man, or to commit a riot, or to do any other trespass, and one of them iii doing thereof kill a man, this shall be adjudged murder in them all that are present of that party abetting him, and consenting to the act, or ready to aid him, altho they did but look on. A man seizeth the goods of a Frenchman in time of war, and carries them" to his house, a stranger pretending to be deputy- admiral with a great multitude of men came with force to the house, where the goods were, and at the gate of the house made an assault upon them that were in the house, a woman issued out of the house without any weapon, and is killed by one of the servants, who came to take the goods, by throwing a stone at another, that was in the gate, and the person, that came to seize the goods, said, (before his coming) he would make him a cokes that kept the goods and would make him to know the basest in his house. By five judges, two Serjeants, the queen's attorney, and solicitor, it was held, that if it appear that the woman came in defense of the master of the house, then it was murder in the vice-admiral and all (h) This ■case was something more tlian a l^are command, for one hold him, while the other killed him; but wliat our author hero says is jnorc directly proved by the case in A.n.i. 18. «. {i) New Edit. p. 472. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 441 his companions : but by other five judges contrary, for no malice was against the woman, and murder shall not be extended further, than it was intended', and the former held, that if JI. and B. fight by appointment betore-hand, and a stranger comes between them to part them, and he is killed by A. it is murder in [] 442 ] him, and some said in both, but the others noluerunt ad hoc concordare. Mansell and Herbert^s case, H. 2 S,- 3 P. 4' M. Dyer 12S. 6. • That point, wherein the judges differed, was whether, the -mistake of the person excuseth it from murder, but it seems not questioned, but ail agreed it manslaughter, and that not only in him, that gave the blow but in all the companions of that party: but now the former point is sufficiently settled, that if it had been murder, in case the man had been killed, that was meant, it is murder in killing the woman, and that, whether she came as a partizan to Mansell, the owner of the house, or not, quod vide supra: and in the last case put, in Herberts case before, it is certainly murder in him that kil's the man that comes to part them, and if it had been only a sudden quarrel, it had been manslaughter in him that kills him, and Dalt. cap. 93. p. 240.(/t) yea, and if the combating were hy malice prepense, it it is held, that the killing of him, that comes to part them, is murder in both, and both were hanged for it, be- cause each of them had a purpose to have kild the other. 22 E, 3. Corone 262. Lambert out of Dallison^s report, p. 217. but that seems to- me to be mistaken, it is not murder in both, unless both struck him that came to part them; and by the book of 22 t/2ss. 1\. Coron. ISO. (which seems to be the same case, tho more at large,) he only that gave the stroke, had judgment, and was exe- cuted. (/)[!] And therefore it is a mistake in those that say, if it be not known which of them did it, they shall both have judgment, for the jury ought precisely to inquire, and upon circumstances to sa- tisfy themselves, whether the one, or the other, or both did it, and neither to acquit, nor convict both, because they know not who did it. But to return to the aiders and abetters again. By the cases of Drayton Basset and Herbert it appears, that if many come to commit a riotous unlawful act, if in the pursuit of that action one of them commits murder or manslaughter, they are all guilty, that are of that party, that committed the dis- [ 443 ] order; wherein nevertheless these things must be observed. 1. In that case it must be intended, when one of the same party Qc) New Edit. cap. 145. p. 472. (/) Tlie other doth not appear to have been before the court, but upon puttingf the case, the court said, he that struck is guilty of felony, but said nothing as to him who did net strike. [1] Dyer, 128. Kel. Ill, 112, 1]7. Foster, 261. 1 Hawk. c. 31. s. 42. Slate w, Cooper, 1 Green, [N. J.) State v. Bentry, 2 Dev. ^ Bat. 19G. VOL. I. — 38 443 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. commits the murder or manslaughter upon one of the other party, or upon those that came to appease or part them, or by due course of law to disperse them. ' And therefore I have always taken the law to be, that if *^. and B. have a design to fight one with another upon premeditation or malice, and ^. takes C. for his second, and B. take D. for his second, t/i. kills B. in this case C. is principal, as present, aiding, and abet- ting, but D. is not a principal, because he was of the part of him, that was killed, and yet I know, that some have held, that D. is principal as well as C. because it is a compact, and rely much upon tl)e book of 22 E. 3. Coron. 262. before-mentioned, but, as I think, the law was strained too far in that case, and so it is much more in making D. a principal in the death of B. that was his friend, tho it be, I confess, a great misdemeanor, yet I think it is not mur- der in D. And the books in all the instances of this nature say, that it is murder or manslaughter in that party, that abetted him,(*) and con- sented to the act, that Z>. never abetted A. to kill B. but abetted B. indeed to have killed t^.[8] 2. It must be a killing in pursuit of that unlawful act, that they were all engaged in, as in the case of the lord Dacre before-men- tioned, they all came with an intent to steal the deer, and conse- quently the law "presumes they came all with intent to oppose all that should hinder them in that design, and consequently when one killed the keeper, it is presumed to be the act of all, because pursuant to that intent: but suppose, thai A. i?. and C. and divers others come together to commit a riot, as to steal deer, or pull down inclosures, and in their march upon tjieir design, t/^. meets with D. or some other with whom he had a former quarrel, or that by reason of some col- lateral provocation given by D. to A. A. kills him without any abet- ting by any of the rest of liis company, this doth not make all the (*) Yiz. who committed the homicide. [2] When upon a previous agreement, and after there has been time for theblood to cool, two persons meet with deadly weapons, and one of them is killed, the party who occa- sions the death is guilty of murder, and the seconds also are equally guilty ; and with respect to others shown to be present, the question is, did they give their aid and assist- ance by their countenance and encouragement of the principals in the contest? Merc presence will not be sufficient; but if they sustain the principals, cither by advice or assistance, or go to the ground for the purpose of encouraging and forwarding the un- lawful conflicts, although they do not say or do any thing, yet, if they are present assist- ing and encouraging by their presence at the moment when the fatal shot is fired, they are, in law, guilty of the crime of murder. lieg.y. Young, 8 Car. eSf P. 644. If two persons diliberatcly fight a duel, and one of them be killed, the other and bis second are guilty of murder. 1 Hawk. c. 31. s. 31. liix v. Onel.y,2 Sb-unge, 776. No matter how grievous the [)rovocation, or by which p;irty given. The second of the deceased also is now deemed guilty of murder, as being present, aiding and abetting; and altliougli Lord Hale scorns to think the rule of law, as to |)rincipals in the second degree, too far strained in that case, yet in several late cases it has been laid down that boili the seconfls arc guilly, if they are present assisting and encouraging. Sec Smith v. The. Sl„te, 1 Yerger, 228. Tiwcrnie's case, 3 liulstrode, 171-2. 1 Roll. Hep. 361. Hex V. Murphy, 6 (J. df P. 103. Jirg v. Caddij, 1 Car. Sf P. 210. Foster, 297. 4 ^l. Com. I'Jl. 3 inst. 51. Rex v. Rice, 3 East, Gtil, post, 453. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 444 party oft/?, tho present, to be therefore aiding and abetting, and con- sequently priiicipals in this murder or manslaughter, which was acci- dental, and not within the compass of their original intention. But if, when they had come to steal the deer, or throw down the inclosure, any had opposed them in it, either by words or actual re- sistance, and A. had killed him, it had been murder in all the rest of the company, that came with the intent to do that unlawful act, tho there were no express intention to. kill any person in the first enterprize, because the law presumes they come to make good their design against all opposition. And this is the reason of the book 3 E. 3. Coron. 350. where many came to commit a disseisin, and one was killed, and all that were of the company were arraigned as principals, and the fact found and they were condemned, tho the jury said they did nothing {de male voliint) of malice, but were of the company; tho possibly, as the cir- cumstances of that case were, it was only manslaughter, as in the case of Drayton Basset, because it was upon a sudden, and upon a pretense of title. 3. Again, altho if many come upon an unlawful design, and one of the company kill one of the adverse party in pursuance of that de- sign, all are principals; yet if many be together upon a lawful account, and one of the company kill another of an adverse' party without any particular abetment of the rest to this fact of homicide, they are not all guilty that are of the company, but only those, that gave the stroke, or actually abetted him to do it. There is a common nuisance committed in the highway by A. B. C. D. in the vill of M. and E. F. G. H. J. <§-c. and twenty more of the inhabitants of M. come to remove the nuisance, Jl. B. C. and D. oppose, F. strikes A. suddenly, and kills him, F. is guilty of man- slaughter, but the rest of the party of F. are not therefore guilty, barely upon this account that they were of the company, but only such of the company, as did actually assist or abet F. to strike or kill A. But if in truth it were no nuisance, but an act that was lawfully done by A. and then JJ. had been killed by F. all the rest of the party and company of F. had been guilty, that came with design to remove Ihat which they thought a nuisance, but [445] was not, because it was a riotous and unlawi'ul assembly. If t/^. hath a good title to his house, or hath been in possession thereof tor three years, (in which case he may detain it with force by the statute of 8 H. 6. cap. 9.) if any person come to rob him or kill liinr, and he shoot and kill him, it is not felony, nor doth he forfeit his goods, as in case of homicide se defendenilo. 11 Co. Rep. 82. b. 5 Co. Rep. 91. h. But '\{ A. comes to enter with force, and in order thereunto shoots at his house, and B. the possessor, having other company in his house, shoots and kills A. this is manslaughter in B. and so it is ruled 5 Eliz. in Hdrcourt^s case, Crompt. 29. a. Dalt. cap. IS. p. 105. (m) Ibid. cup. 98. p. 250.(n) (m) New Edit, cap. 121. p. 427. (n) cap. 150. p. 483. 445 HTSTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. And in this case, if B. shoot out of liis house, and killeth ^. I think it plain, that it is not felony in the rest of the honsehold, nay, tho he had hired extraordinary company to help to guard his house upon such an occasion, (as by law it seems he may do, notwithstand- ing the opinion of Crompton,fol. 70. u. to the contrary, vide 21. H. 7. 39. a. 5 Co. Rep. Q\. b. Seamati's case,. 11 Co. Rep. 82. b. Leioes Bowlegs case) yet this is not manslaughter in the rest of the com- pany, because the assembly was lawful and justifiable. And therefore in that case, no others of the company, that are in the liouse, shall be said guilty, but only such as actually abet him to do the fact; and these indeed will be principals by reason of actual abetting, but not barely upon the account of being in the house, and jof the same company, because the assembly to defend the house by lawful means was lawful. But in the case of a riotous assembly to rob, or steal deer, or do any unlawful act of violence, there the offense of one is the offense of all the company; as in the case of the lord Dacre, and of the house of Drayton Basset, where there was first a riotous and unlawful entry, and keeping possession by those that shot. 4. If there be many, that are present, abetting, aiding, r 446 ] and assistuig, tho all may, as in the cases afore shewn, be guilty of homicide, yet upon different circumstances some may be guilty of homicide, and not of murder, others may be guilty of murder; vide the case o{ Salisbury before, Ploivd Com. 101. a. The master assaults with malice prepense, the servant being igno- rant of the malice of his master, takes part with his master, and kills the other, it is manslaughter in the servant, and murder in the master. Upon a sudden falling out between ^. and B. in the street, ./?. gathers^ many of his friends together to assault B. and B. doth the like, the constable, and some .in his aid, come to part the affray, and keep the peace. Jl. hath notice, that he is the constable, but divers of his company know it not, nor could reasonably or probably know it, ^. kills the constable, this is murder in Jl. but the rest of his company, that knew it not^ are not guilty of the murder. But such of them, as knowing it to be the constable, yet abetted ^. to kill him, are guilty of murder, those that knew it not, and ■yet abetted J2.\o kill him, are guilty of manslaughter; and those, that neither knew him to be the constable, nor did actually abet nor assist ^. to kill him, are not guilty, as it seems, because this was a new emergency, and out of the bounds and verge of the quarrel, wherein they were before engaged, and such whereunto these were not privy; quod I amen (juxre.\^o) Sec Foster 121-131. and his discourse III. p. 341. — per lot. 4 Blacks. Com. ch. 3. p. 34-40. See Index to I Hawk. P. C. tit. Accessary. ' [3] One who procures, counsels, or commands another, but is absent when the crime is consurinnatcd, is an accessary before the fact. I'ost, 612. G1.5,G16. Dyer., I8G. 3 Ind. 108. 139. 2 Hawk. P. C.315-VJ. Foster, 73. 125.361. 1 Moody C. C..417. 7 C. <.^ F. 836. 4 Bl. Com. 3,'). 40. 323. If several persons meet together for the prosecution of some ui^lawful design, and in HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. 446 furtherance of that design a man be killed, tlie gfuilt of the iiillin^ will attacii to all pre'- senl, whetlier it be murder or manslaughter. Foster, 2G1. M'jickiin''s case, 2 Leu}. 225. As to what will excuse persons otherwise liable as accessaries, see ante 52 et seq. Rex V. Sawyer, 1 Russ. 424. Rex v. Dyson, R. Sg R. C. C. 523. Reg. v. Tyler, 8 C. df F. 616. On indictment for murder against several, one cannot be convicted of an assault com- mitted on the deceased in a previous scuffle, such assault not being in any way con- nected with the cause of death. Re^. v. t kelps, 2 M. C. C. R. 240. All present at the time of committing an otfence are principals, although one only acts, if they are confederated and engaged in a common design, of which the offence is part. Rex v. Tattersall, 1 Russ. 22. Rex v. Dyson, R. ^ R. C. C. 523. AH those who assemble themselves together, with an intent, even to commit a tres- pass, the execution whereof causes a felony to be committed, and continue together, abetting one another till they have actually put their design into execution, and also, ail those who are present when a felony is committed, and abet the doing of it are prin- cipals in felony. Reg^. v. Howell, 9 Car. Sf F. 437. Where persons combine to stand by one another in a breach of the peace, with a general resolution to resist all opposers, and in the execution of their design a murder is committed; all of the company are eciuajly principals in the murder, though at the time of the fact some of them were at such a distance as to be out of view. Reg. v. Howell, cited supra. If several are out for the purpose of committing a felony, and upon an alarm run dif- ferent ways, and one of them maim a pursuer, to avoid being taken, the others are not to be considered principals in such act. Rex v. White, R. S^ R. C. C. 99. If a charge against an accessary is, that the principal felony was committed by per- sons unknown, it is no objection that the same grand jury have found a bill imputing the principal felony to another person. Rex v. Bush, R. tSf R. C. C. 372. It is nut essential that there should have been any direct communication between an accessary before the fact and the principal felon. It is enough if the accessary direct an intermediate agent, to procure another to commit a felony, and it will be sufficient even if the accessary does not name the person to be procured, but merely directs the agent to employ some person. Rex v. Cooper, 5 Car. 6f P. 535. Rex v. Morris, 2 Leach C. C. 1096. Rex v. Giles, R. ^ M. 166. Rex v. Badcock, R. S^ R. C. C. 249. Rex v. Stewart, R. 6; R. C. C. 363. If A. is charged in the indictment as principal, and B. as accessary, and the jury find B. to be the principal and A. the accessary, the indictment is sustained. Statev. Mairs, Coxe, N. J. 453. Tiie crime of an accessary before the fact to a murder is murder. The Feople v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229. An accessary in a capital felony cannot be tried without his own consent when the principal has died before conviction. Commonwealth v. FhiUips, 16 Mass. 423. But he must answer to an indictment charging him as accessary to two principals, one of whom only has been convicted, the other liavmg died. Conimonwealth v. Kiiapp, 10 Pick. 477. Conviction of the principal is prima facie evidence of his guilt, on the trial (jf an ac- cessary, and throws the burden of proof, as to his innocence, on the accessary; but the accessary is not ms^tricted to the proof of new facts. Idem.. The charge of King, P. in the case of Daily (4 Penna. Law J., 155, Philadelphia, 1845,) contains an excellent summary of the common law doctrine of the responsibility of per- sons engaged in unlawful combinations resulting in death. "When divers persons, (says Judge King) resolve generally to resist all officers in the commission of a breach of the peace, and to execute it in such a manner as naturally tends to raise tumults and affrays, and in doing so happen to kill a man, they are all guilty of murder, for they must at their peril abide the event of their actions, who unlawfully engage in such bold disturbances of the public peace in opposition to, and in defiance of the justice of the nation. Malice in sucii a killing is implied by law, in all who were engaged in the unlawful enterprise; whetiicr the deceased fall by the hand of the accused in particular, or otherwise, is im- material. AH are responsible for the acts of each, if done in pursuance and furtiierance of the common design. This doctrine may seem hard and severe, but has been found necessary to prevent riotous combinations committing murder with Impunity. For when su-jh illegal associates are numerous, it would scarcely be practicable to establish the identity of the individual actually guilty of the homicide. When, however, a homi- cide is committed by one or more of a body unlawfully associated, from causes .having no 446 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. connexion with the common object, the responsibility for such homicides attaches ex- clusively to its actual perpetrators." If several persons combine to commit murder, and before the killing is actually effected, one of them withdraws from tlie combination and leaves the others, doing no- tiling to aid or encourage them in any way, he is not responsible for their acts, although they carry out the object of the original combination by committing murder. Common- wealth V. Hnuphey, M S. before the Oyer and Terminer for Philadelphia county, March, 1845. King, President. See also, U.S. v. Cornell, 2 Mason, C. C. R. 91. U. S. v. Ross, 1 Gallison, C. C. R. 524. He who kills another upon his desire or command is, in the judgment of the law, as much a'murderer as if lie had done it merely of his own head. 1 Hawk. c. 21, s. 6; Saw- yer's case, O. 5. 1815, MS. 1 Riiss. 485. If two persons mutually agree to commit suicide together, and the means employed to produce death only take effect on one, the survivor will, in point of law, be guilty of the murder of the one who died. R. v. Alison, 8 Car. ^ P. 418. If one counsel another to commit suicide, and the other, through the influence of the advice, kill himself, the adviser is guilty of murder as principal. The presumption of law in such case is, that the advice had the effect intended by the adviser, unless the contrary be shown. Commonivealth v. Bowcn, 13 Mass. 359. See Rex v. Dyson, R. Sf R. C. C. 523. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 27, s. 4. But Alderson, J. in Regina v. Leddinston, 9 C. Sf P. 79, ruled that a person cannot be tried for inciting another to commit suicide, although that other commit suicide. [447] CHAPTER XXXV. CONCERNING THE DEATH OF A PERSON UNKNOWN, AND THE PROCEED- INGS THEREUPON. Because this chapter as well concerns murder as mayislmis^hter., before I come to examine the particular offenses themselves, I shall subjoin a few words touching* this title. Antiently there was a law introduced by Caniitiis the Dane, that if any man were slain in the fields, and the manslayer were unknown, and could not be taken, the township, where he was slain, should be amerced to sixty-six marks,(*) and if it were not sufficient to pay it, the hundred should be charged, unless it could be made appear be- fore the coroner, upon the view of the body, that the party slain were an Englishman, and this making it appear was varicfiis, according to the custom of several places, but most ordinarily it was by the testimony of two males of the part of the father of him that was slain, and by two females of the part of his mother. And this amercement was usually called murdrum ; and the pre- sentment and proof, that the party slain was an Englishman, was called Englesbury, and presentment of Engleshury. And this was tlierefore provided to avoid the secret murder of the Danes, who were hated by the English, and oftentimes privily mur- (*) Sec the laws nf Edward the confessor, Lih XV. Sf XVI. by which it appears the amerciament was XLVI. marks, and not LXVI. marks, as Bracton says, whicli mistake might probably be occasioned, as Wilkins observes in liis notes ad Leg. Anglo-Sax. p. 280. by thq transposition of the numeral letters L and X. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 447 dered ; this appears by Bracton,{a) and is transcribed out of him by Stomf. Lib. I. cup. 10. fol. 17. When JVillicnn the first came in, he found the like animosity by the Danes and Saxons against the French and Normans, who were many times secretly icilled by the natives, and therefore he did in effect continue this lavv,(J) only he applied it to the French and Normans, viz. that if a person were slain by an un- [ 448 ] known hand, if he were a Frenchman or a Norman, the hundred was amerced, where he was found, and if they were insufficient, then the county, which was sometimes 36/. some- times 24/. And tho this was instituted for the preservation of the French and Normans, yet intermarriages happening between the natives and them, so that in process of time they became, as it were, one people, the same custom was continued as to all persons that were killed by unknown hands, and this amerciament was called murdrum.^ This appears at large by the black book of the Exchequer written by Gervasius Tilbiiriehsis, Lib. I. cap. Quid niitrdrum, &r qnare sit dictum, which expounds the true scope of the statute of Marl- bridge, cap. 2G. Quod miirdriim de cxtero non adjudicetur pro niortuo per infortunium. But as well the presentment of Englesbery, as the amerciament for secret homicide by persons unknown, was taken away by the statute of 14 E. 3. cap. 4. yet there remained a certain amerciament upon the township, where a person was slain, and the offender escaped, viz. If a person were slain in the day-time, in a town walled, or not walled, the town is to be amerced, if the vill be not suffi- cient, the hundred shall be charged, and on default of them the county. If he be slain in the day-time out of any vill, the hundred shall be amerced, and on their disability the county shall be charged with the amerciament. If a man be killed either in day or night, and the offender be taken and committed to the constable, or to the vill, if he escape, the town- ship where the party was slain, or where the offender was taken, shall be fined. (/>) But if a person be slain in the day or night in a walled town, and the offender be not taken, the town or city shall be fined. If any private person be present when a murder or man- slaughter is committed, and doth not his best endeavour [449] to apprehend the malefactor, he shall be fined and impri- soned. All which differences appear by comparing the books of Stamf. (a) Lib. III. de corona cap. 15. p. 134. b. vide Spelm. verb. Engleckeria. Blacks. Com. Lib. IV. cap. 14. p. 195. (t) Vide Leg. Gul. Con. I. 2G. Sf Leg. Hen. I. I. 91. Wilk. Leg. Anglo-Sax.p. 224. 280. t By tlie word " murder" in g^rants, the grantee claimed to have amerciaments of mur. derers. Bro. tit. quo icarranto. HI. 2. {b) For the vill is not discharged till he be delivered into goal, or to the custody of the sheriff, after which the sheriff will be chargeable. Stamf. If. C. cap. 31. 449 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. P. C. cap. 30 4' 31. Coke P. C. cap. 1. p. 53. 3 H. 7. cap. 1. and, the books there cited.[lj — s:^ — [1] All persons who are present when a felony is committed, or a dang-erous wound given, are bound to apprehend the offender, on pain of being- fined and imprisoned for their neg-lect, unless they are under age at the time. 2 Hawk. c. 12. s. 1. Also every private person is bound to assist any officer demanding his help for the taking of a felon, or the suppression of an affr^iy, id. s. 12, and may be indicted if he refuses without lawful excuse. Reg. v. Brown, 1 C. S^ Mar. 314. And it is the duty of all private persons to arrest without warrant any person detected in the attempt to commit a felony. R. v. Hunt, R. 8^ M. C C. 93; R. v. Howarth, R. Sf M. C C. 207. And though the otfender run away, and give over his intention of com- mitting the felony, still it seems, on firesh pursuit, he may be apprehended by any one. R. V. Howarth, R. 4f M. G. C. 207. If a felony has been actually committed by some one, a private person may arrest, or direct a peace officer to arrest a party whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to have been guilty of it, though in fact such party be really innocent; but he is not abso- lutely bound to do so, like a peace officer; and he does so at his peril, for if these grounds for suspecting the party be not reasonable, or there has been no felony committed, the person arresting is guilty of a false imprisonment, and liable accordingly. Pauton v. Williams, 1 G. <.y D. 504. 2 Ad. Sf E. {N. S.) 69; Allen v. Wright, 8 C. ^ P. .522. A bare surmise, however, is plainly insufficient. Davis v. Russel, 5 Bing. 364. 2 M, Sf P. 590, S. C. 4 Inst. 144. See Vol. 2d, chapter 10. CHAPTER XXXVI. TOUCHING MURDER, WHAT IT IS, AND THE KINDS THEREOF. Murder and manslaughter differ not in the kind or nature of the offense, but only in the degree, the former being the killing of a man of malice prepense,[2] the latter upon a sudden provocation and fall- ing out.[l] [1] For manslaughter, see chapter' XXXVIII. p. 466. [2] The best explanation of the legal meaning of malice, is that of Justice Foster. Its brevity, accuracy and felicity of language have recommended it and caused its almost universal recognition as well in America as in England, particularly the closing clause, in which an act is declared to be malicious, which shows " a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief" When (says Foster) the law maketh use of the term molice aforethought, as descriptive of the crime of murder, it is not to be understood in that narrow restrained sense, to which the modern use of the word malice is apt to lead one, a principle of malcvoltnce to particulars ; for the law by the term malice in this in- stance rneancth, that the fact hath been attended with sucli circumstances as are the ordinary symptoms of a wicked, depraved, malignant spirit. In the case of an appeal of death, which was anciently the ordinary method of prose- cution, the term malice is not made use of as descriptive of the offence of murder, in contradistinction to simple felonious homicide. The precedents charge, that the fact wits done nequitir <^- in felouid, which fully takclli in tiie legal sense of the word malice. The words per malitiam and malitiosc our oldest writers do indeed frequently use in some other cases; and tliey constantly mean an action flowing from a wicked and corrupt motive, a tiling done malo animo, mala conscientid, as they express themselves. Of which many instances might be given. I will mention one or two. Tlie method of proceeding in ancient times in a case of robbery or larceny, when the stolen goods were found upon tlic defendant, was, that if he alleged that he bought them of another, whom he named and vouched to warranty, the voucher, if he appearedand entered into warranty was to stand in tiie place of the defendant pro bono Sf malo. The HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 449 And therefore it is, that upon an indictment of murder the party offending may be acquitted of murder, and yet found guilty of man- legislature hath likewise frequently used the terms malice and malicioushj in the same gene- ral sense, as denoting a wicked, perverse, and incorrigible disposition." Foster refers to the statutes 28 Ed. 1. st. '2. 4 Sf 5 W. S( M. c. 4. and continues: " In the same latitude are the words malice aforethought to be understood in the statutes which oust clergy in the ease of wilful murder. The malus animus, which is to be collected from all the circumstances is what bringeth tlie offence within the denomination of wilful malicious murder, what- ever might be the immediate motive to it; wlicther it be done as the old writers express themselves, ' Iiu vtl odio, v^l causa lucii,' or from any other wicked or mischievous in- centive. And most if not ail the cases, which in the hooks are ranged under the head of implied malice, will if carefully adverted to, be found to turn upon this single point, that the fact hath been attended with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indica- tions of an heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent upon mischief." Foster, 256, 257. An act " flowing from a wicked heart, a mind grievously depraved, and acting from mo- lives highly criminal, is the genuine notion of malice in our law." Curtis'' ease. Foster, 138. Lord Hult says upon this subject, " some have been led into mistakes by not -well con- sidering what the passion of malice is; tboy have construed it to be a rancour of mind lodged in the person killing for some considerable time before the commission of the fact; which is a mistake, arising from a not well distinguishing between hatred and malice. Envy, hatred and malice, are three distinct passions of the mind." Kel. 127. Amongst the Romans, and in the civil law, malitia appears to have imported a mixture of fraud, and of that which is opposite to simplicity and honesty. Cicero speaks of it De Nat. Deor. Lib. 3. s. 30. as " ver.suta et falleax nocendi ratio;" and in other work De Ojjic. Lib. 3. s. 18. he says, " mihi quidem etiam vertp hsereditatcs non honestte videntur si sint malitiosis, (i. e. according to Pearce, a malo animo profe'ctis,) blanditiis officiorum ; non veritate sed simnlatione qucesitcB." And see Dig. Lib. 2. Tit. 13. Lex 8. where, in speaking of a banker or cashier giving his accounts, it is said, " Ubi exigitur argentarius rationes edere, tunc punitur cum dolo malo non exhibet. * * * Dolo malo autem non edit, et qui maliliose edidit, et qui in totum non edit." "Amongst us malice is a term of law importing directly wickedness, and excluding a just cause or excuse." 1 Russell on Cri tries, 483. Lord Coke, in his comment on the words per 7nalitia7n, says, " if one be appealed of murder, and it is found by verdict that he killed the party se defendendo, this shall not be said to be per malitiam, because he had a just cause." 2 Inst. 384. And where the statutes speak of a prisoner on his arraignment standing mute of malice, the word clearly cannot be understood in its common acceptation of anger or desire of revenge against another. Thus, where the 25 Hen. VIIL c. 3. says, that persons arraigned of petit trea- son, cSfc. standing " mute of malice or froward mind," or challenging tSj-c, shall be ex- eluded from clergy, the word malice, explained by the accompanying words, seems to signify a wickedness or frowardness of mind in refusing to submit to the course of jus- tice; in opposition to cases where some just cause may be assigned for the silence, as that it proceeds from madness, or some other disability or distemper. And in the statute 21 Edw. 1. De malefactoribns in parcis, trespassers are mentioned who shall not yield themselves to the foresters, dfc. but " immo malitiam suam prosequendo et continuando," shall fly or stand upon their defence. And where the question of malice has arisen in cases of homicide, the matter for consideration has been whetlicr the act were done with or without just cause or excuse; so that it has been suggested that what is usually called malice, implied by the law, would perhaps be expressed more intelligibly and familiarly to the understanding if it were called malice in a legal sense. Malice, " in its legal sense, denotes a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse." I'er Little- dale, J., McPherson v. Daniels, 10 B. i^ C. 272. " We must settle what is meant by the term malice. The legal import of this term differs from its acceptation in common con- versation. It is not, as in ordinary speech, only an expression of hatred and ill will to an individual, but means any wicked or mischievous intention of the mind. Thus in the crime of murder, which is always stated in the indictment to be committed with malice aforethought, it is neither necessary in support of such indictment to show that the pri- soner had any enmity to the deceased, nor would proof of absence of ill will furnish the accused with any dol'cnoe, when it is proved that the act of killing was intentional, and done without any justifiable cause." Per Best, J., Rex v. Harvey, 2 B. S( C. 268. 1 Russ. on Crimes, 483. note i. See 4 Bl. Com. 199. 1 East. P. C. 215. 1 Haivk. P. C. c. 29. s. 12. 449 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. slaughter, as daily experience witnesseth,(fl) and they may not find him generally not guilly, if guilty of manslaughter.[3] In an appeal of murder it is agreed on all hands, that the jury may find him not guilty of the murder, and guilty of manslaughter; this was accordingly ruled(i6) P. 34 Eliz. B. R. the case of Wroth and Wig,s;es,{c) P. 5 Jac. B. R. n. 20. Pellet and Barendon, P. 7. Jac. B. R. n. 11. ;(^) hut it hath been held, that altho upon an indictment of murder, if the party appear to be guilty of manslaughter, the jury ought not to acquit him generally, but' find him guilty of manslaugh- ter; yet in an appeal of murder, tho the jury may, if they please, find him guilty of manslaughter, if the fact be such, yet they [[450 ] may find generally, that he is not g^dlty, because it is the suit of the party, and he should lay his case according to the truth. With this agrees H. 38 Eliz. B. R. Penryn and Corbett,{e) H. 38 Eliz. B. R. B. 183. (/) M. 22 Jac. B. R. L. 278. Blount's case,(o-) but it was held P. 2. Car. 1. in Bassage's case, (A) that they may not in such a case find a general verdict of jiol guilty, but must find him guilty of manslaughter, because included in murder, as well in case of an appeal, as in case of an indictment, and so it seems the law is. The difference betwe'en the offenses of murder and manslaughter seems to rest in these particulars. 1. In the degree and quality of the offense, for murder, as hath been said, is accompanied wiih malice forethought, either express or presumed; but bare homicide is upon a sudden provocation or falling out. 2. A lid therefore in murder there may be accessaries before, as well as after, because ordinarily it is an act of deliberation, and not merely of sudden passion; but in bare homicide or manslaughter there can be no accessaries before, tho there may be accessaries after, and therefore, if an indictment be of murder against ,/2. and that 5. and" C were counselling and abetting as accessaries before only, (and not as present, aiding and abetting, for such are princi- pals, as hath been said) if ^5. be found guilty only of homicide, and acquit of the murder, the accessaries before are hereby discharged. (4) (a) See Dalison 14. (ft) Or ratlier taken for granted. (c) Cro. Eliz. 276. See also Cro. Eliz. 296. 1 Sid. 325. {d) These two cases I do not find any wiiere among the printed reports. (e) Cm. Eliz. 464. (/) I suppose this may be the case of Gojf and Byhij, Cro. Eliz. 540. (g) 2 Roll. Rep. 460. (/t) Latch. 126. Rex V. Grcenricre,S Car. Sf P. 35. Rrx v. Walters, 1 Car. ^- M. 164. Reg. v. Kirkham, 8 Car. ^ P. 115. 7?^ir. v. Marryntt, 8 Car. c^ P. 425. Rex v. Self, 1 Lench, 137. Rex V. Bailey, R. &; R. ('. C. 1. Commonweallk v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391. Respublica v. Mulatto Boh, 4 Dallas, 146. Pennsylvania v. Lewis Addison, 282. Commonweulth v. Green, I As/imcad, 289. Coffee v. 'J'/te Slate, 3 Yerjrer, 283. and post in this ciiapter and chapter 37. [3] Tills is unchanged cither in England or the United Stales. [4J Those who arc charged only as accessaries before the fact, when the principal is HISTORIA PLACITORUxM CORONA. 450 3. The indictment of murder essentially requires these words, /e/o- nich ex malitid sua prsecogitatd interfecit 8^- ninrdravit, but the indictment of simple homicide is ouXy felon ice interfecit. 4. Altho at common law, and by tlie statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 4. clergy was promiscuously allowed, as well in case of murder, as of homicide and manslaughter, yet by the statute of 23 H. 8. cap. 1. 25 H. 8. cap. 3. 1 £. 6. cap. 12. 5 (§• 6. E. 6. cap. 10. clergy is taken away from murder ex malitid prxcogitald.[^5'\ Now having before, cap. 33. declared those things, that are common to the oftenses of murder and manslaughter, it f 45L ] remains, that I consider those things, that are specificial and peculiar to murder, which is what shall be said a killing ex malitid pi'secogifatd, or what in law is said such a malice, as makes tlie offense of killing a person thereby to be murder. Such a malice tlierefore, that makes the killing of a man to be murder, is of two kinds, 1. Malice in fact, or 2. Malice in law, or ex prscsximptione legifs. ]\lalice in fact is a deliberate intention of doing some corporal harm to the person of another. Malice in law, or presumed malice, is of several kinds, viz. 1. In respect of the manner of the homicide, when without provocation. 2. In respect of the person V\\^,viz. a minister of justice in execution of his office. 3. In respect of the person killing. Touching the first of these in this chapter, viz. malice in fact. Malice in fact is a deliberate intention of doing any bodily harm to another, whereunto by law lie is not authorized. The evidences of such a malice must arise from external circum- stances discovering that inward intention, as lying in wait, menacings antecedent, former grudges, deliberate compassings, and the like, which are various according to variety of circumstances. It must be a compassing or designing to do some bodily harm. [6] found guilty of manslaughter, cannot be punished, because that necessarily supposes the fact to have happened on a sudden, for if it had been done on premeditation, it would have been murder. 4 Coke, 43, 44. Moore, 461. Da!t. c. 108. Hawkins suggests that under the law of principal and accessary as it stood before the statute 1 Anne, c. 9. they who are charged as accessaries after the fact should be dis- charged at common law when the principal is found guilty of manslaughter, and admit- ted to the benefit of clergy, because in such case it could not appear by any" judgment that there was a princioal. 2 Hawk. c. 29. s. 24. 3 Inst. 25. Co, Eliz. 540. Fos- ter, 3G3. ^ But see Rex v. Greenacre, 8 C.Sf P. 35. where it was ruled that an accessary after the fact was liable. [5] For the English statutes, since Hale's time, see note at the end of this chapter, 454, d. [6] It has been suggested that the distinction between express malice (malice in fact) and implied malice (malice in law,) is not of practical importance. It is not, perhaps, in a tnere classification of crime with reference to punishment, but as an aid to the ascertainment of guilt, its antiquity and frequent observation show its value. When the act alleged is one from which the law presumes malice, the examination of a jury may be confined to the sirvgle question of whether or not the act was committed, in order to arrive at a conclusion of the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is true that the classification of murder in most of the Untied States into murder of the first and second degrees, usually renders it necessary fur the jury in their deliberations, 451 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. If there have been a long suit in law between A. and B. either touching interest or wrong done, as if A. sue B. or threaten to sue him, this alone is not a sufficient evidence of mahce prepense, tho possibly they meet and fall out, and fight, and one kills the other, if after havin» ascertained that the party is gruilty of murder, to pursue the investigation so as to deteruiine to which degree the killing belongs, and on this point the question of intention, which is the great test, often involves substantially the points connected with the malice in fact of the text. The value of the distinction, as applied to murder gene- rally or manslaughter, remains notwithstanding. Hawkins says that express malice exists in such murder as is occasioned through an express purpose to do some personal injury to him who is slain in particular. As to murder in this sense, sucii acts as show a direct and deliberate intent to kill another, as poisoning, stabbing, and such like, are clearly murder. 1 Hawk. P. C. 31. s. 19. Implied malice is where there is such killing as happens in the execution of an unlaw- ful action, principally intended for some other purpose, and not to do a personal injury to him in particular wlio is slain, in which case the malice seems to be most properly said to be implied. The cases which have borne dispute have generally happened in the following instai^ces: First, in duelling. Secondly, in killing another without any provocation, or but upon a slight one. Thirdly, in killing one whom the person killing intended to hurt in a less degree. 1 Hawk. c. 'A\. s. 20. Blackstone, who quotes Hale in the first sentence, and follows him and Hawkins, says of the distinction between express and implied malice: " Express malice is when one, with a sedate, deliberate mind and formed design, doth kill another: which formed design is evidenced by external circumstances discovering that inward intention ; as ly- ing in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do him some bodily harm. Tjiis takes in the case of deliberate duelling, where both parties meet avowedly with an intent to murder. Also, if even upon a sudden provocation one beats another in a cruel and unusual manner, so that he dies, though he did not intend his death, yet he is guilty of murder by express malice; that is, by an express evil design, the genuine sense of malitia. As when a park-keeper tied a boy, that was stealing wood, to a horse's tail, and dragged him along the park; when a master corrected his' servant with an iron bar; and a schoolmaster stamped on liis scholar's belly; so that each of the sufferers died; these were justly held to be murders, because the correction being excessive, and such as could not proceed but from a bad heart, it was equivalent to a deliberate act of slaughter. Neither shall he be guilty of a less crime, who kills another in consequence of such a wilful act, as shows him to be an enemy to all man- kind in general; as going deliberately, and with an intent to do mischief, upon a horse used to strike, or coolly discharging a gun among a multitude of people. So if a man resolves to kill the next man he meets, and docs kill him, it is murder, although he knew him not; for this is universal malice. And, if two or more come together to do an un- lawful act against the king's peace, of which the probable consequence migiit be blood- shed, as to beat a man, tq conmiit a riot, or to rob a park: and one of them kills a man, it is murder in them all, because of the unlawful act; the malitia prcacogilata, or evil intended beforehand." 4 lU. Com, 19!). • , . And of implied malice, he adds: " In many cases where no malice is expressed, the law will imjjly it: as where a man wilfully poisons another, in such a deliberate act the law presumes malice, though no particular cnmil}' can be [)r(Wed. And if a man kills another suddenly, without any, or without a considerable provocation, the law implies malice, for no person, unless of an abandoned hi^art, would be guilty of such an act, upon a slight or no apj)arent cause. No affront, by words or gestures only, is a sufh- cicnt provocation, so as to excuse or extenuate such acts of violence as manifestly en- danger the life of another. But if tiie person so provoked had unfortunately killed the other, by beating him in such a manner as showed only an intent to chastise and not to kill him, tlic law so far considers the provocation of contumelious behaviour, as to adjudge it only manslaughter, and not murder. In like manner if one kills an officer of justice;, either civil or criminal, in tiie execution of his duly, or any of his assistants endeavouring to conserve the peace, or any private person endeavouring to suppress an pffray or apprehend a felon, knowing his authority or the intention with which he interposes, the law will imply malice, and the killer shall be guilty of murder. And if HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON^E. 451 it happen upon sudden provocation ; but this may by circumstances be lieightened info a malice prepense, as if .^. without any new pro- vocation strike B. U[)on the account of that difference in law, where- of B. dies, or t convcrso, or if he lie in wait to kill him, or come one intends to do another felony, and undesig-nedly kills a man, this is also murder. Thus if one shoots at A. and misses him, but kills B. this is murder; because of the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other. The same is the case where one lays poison for A. and B. against whom the prisoner had no mali- cious intent, takes it, and it kills him; this is likewise murder. So also, if one gives a woman with child a medicine to procure abortion, and it operates so violently as to kill the woman, this is murder in the person who gave it." 4 HI. Com. 200. Roscoe, Cr. Ev. 579 ; Archbold, Cr. PL 3d8; and Russell, 1 C. S( M. 482, follow, and quote Hale and Hawkins. The collections of cases do not always accurately indicate the distinctions between the two sorts of malice, less, perhaps, in Hale's Pleas of the Croicn, than in the more modern works; so that many of the cases which might be introduced in the notes under the head of malice in fact, will be found in the next chapter, being there put the more fully to illustrate the text. Whenever malice is shown to exist, the offence is murder, though there may have been intervening provocation. If one seek another, and enter into a fight with him, with the pur|)osc, under the pretence of fighting, to stab him; if a^omicide ensue, it will be clearly murder in the assailant, no matter what provocation was apparently then given, or how high the assailant's passion rose during the combat, for the malice is ex- press. Slate v. Ferguson, 2 Hill, 619. Slate v. Lane, 4 Iredell, 113, (N. C'irolina.) So if ^., from previous angry feelings, on meeting with B. strike him with a whip, with the view of inducing B. to draw a pistol, or believing he will do so in resentment of the insult, and determines, if he do so, to shoot B. as soon as he draws, and B. does draw, and A. immediately shoots and kills B., this is murder. State v. Martin, 2 Iredell. 101. Blows previously received will not extenuate homicide- upon deliberate malice and revenge; especially where it is to be collected from the circumstances that the pro- vocation was sougiit for the purpose of colouring the revenge. Rex v. Mason, 1 East, P. C. 239. If a party, under colour of fighting upon equal terms, uses from the beginning of the contest a deadly weapon, without the knowledge of the other party, whom he kills with such weapon; or if at the beginning of tlic contest he prepares a deadly weapon, so as to have the power of using it in some part of the contest, and accordingly does so, and kills the other party ; the killing in both these cases will be murder. Rex v. Whiteley, 1 Lewin, C. C. 173. If a person, being in possession of a deadly weapon, enter into a contest with another, intending at the time to avail himself of it, and in the course of the contest actually use it, and kill the other, it will be murder ; but if he did not intend to use it when he began the contest, but used it in the heat of passion, in consequence of an attack made upon him, it will be manslaughter. If he use it to protect his own life, or to protect himself from such serious bodily harm as would give him a reasonable apprehension that his life was in immediate danger, having no other means of defence, and no means of escape, and retreating as far as he can, it will be justifiable homicide. Reg v. Smith, 8 Car. Sc P. 160. If A. had formed a deliberate design to kill B., and afler this they meet and have a quarrel, and many blows pass, and A. kill B., this will be murder, if the jury are of opi- hion that the death was in consequence of previous malice, and not of the sudden provo- cation. Reg v. Kirkham, 8 Car. S^- P. 115. Although a person may not go in search of, or lie in wait for another, whom he kills, yet, if he has formed the purpose to kill him, and within a short time afler forming and avowing such purpose, he duly armed, meets the other, by chance, whether in public or in secret, and slays him immediately, there is a presumption that he did it on the pre- vious purpose and grudge, if there be no evidence of a change of purpose. State v. Tilly^ 3 Iredell, 424. When a deliberate purpose to kill, or to do great bodily harm, is ascertained, and there is a consequent unlawful act of killing, the provocation, whatever it may be, which im- 451 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. with a resolution to strike or kill him, for in such a ease the differ- ence in the law-suit, (which alone makes not mahce) is coupled and joined with circumstances, that prove the purpose of the [452 ] party was more, than the law allows in a legal vindication of wrong done. mediately precedes the act, is to be thrown out of the case and goes for nothing, unless it can be shown, that this purpose was abandoned, before the act was done. Slate v. Johnson, 1 Iredell, 354. If, upon a provocation received, one party deliberately and advisedly denounce ven- geance against the other, as by declaring that he will have his blood, or by preparing for the conflict, or the like, and afterwards carry his design into execution, he will be guilty of murder, although the death happened so recently after the provocation, as that the law might, apart from such evidence of express malice, have imputed the act to unad- vised passion. 1 Vent. 159. Onely's case, 2 Ld. Raymond, 190. Thus, where two persons quarrel, and one throws a brick-bat at the other, who has privately armed himself with a deadly weapon, and keeps it concealed, in expectation of the affray, and, on such an assault being made upon him, immediately draws forth the weapon, and, with it, kills the assailant, though then retreating; it was held, that a ver- diet of murder would not be disturbed, though there was no proof of previous malice, malice being implied from tlie res gestcB, and from the preparation of the defendant. Slaughter v. The Conffuonwealth, 1 Leigh, 681. And where two parties had previously had words, and a general challenge to fight passed, and, three hours afterwards, the defendant, belonging to one of them, renewed the challenge, which was accepted, and a fight ensued, which resulted in the death of one of the other party, it was held murder. Commonwealth v. Crane, General Court of Virginia, Nov. 1791. 2 Wheeler'' s cases, 587. Where it appeared that the deceased had threatened the prisoner, about three weeks before, that he would kill him, that they met in the street, on a star-light night, when they could see each other, that the deceased pressed for a fight, but the prisoner retreated a short distance, that when the deceased overtook him the prisoner stabbed him with some sharp instrument which caused his death, and that, at the time of this meeting, the deceased had no deadly weapon, it was held, that the offence was murder. State \. Scott, 4 Iredell, 409. , ._ Where the deceased, after being married for some years, left the country; and his wife, not hearing from him for two years, marrieu the defendant, though not under cir- cumstances which would make the second marriage legal under the Pennsylvania statute, and the deceased returned, after a lapse of a year from the second marriage, and found his wife living with the defendant, upon which a quarrel arose, which was partially composed, but wliicli ended in the defendant deliberately shooting the deceased at his own house; it was held murder in the first degree. Commonwealth v. Smith, 7 Sniith''s Pa. Laws, Appendix, 2 Whfieler''s cases, 80. Where, however, fresh provocation occurs between pre-conccived malice and death, it ought clearly to appear that the killing was upon the antecedent malice; which may be difficult, in some cases, to show satisfactorily, if the new provocation be a grievous one. In such cases, it should not be presumed that they fought on the old grudge, unless it appear by the whole circumstances of the fact. But, with respect to poisoning, that necessarily im|ilics malice, however great the provocation may have been, because it is a deliberate act, though no other proof of malice exists. 1 Hank. c. 31. s. 30. 3 Inst. 48. 4 Bl. Com. 193-200. F«.s/cr, (J8. Commonwealth v. Norton, 3 Boston Law Re. porter, 241. Commonwr.nllh v. Kinney, ihid. 405. By the common law, independent of all local legislation, it is not only murder for one man to kill another in a duel, but his second, also, is guilty of murder: and the better opinion is that this extends even to the second of him who was killed, because the death iiaj>pcned u[>on a compact in which all were engaged. See ante, 443, and post, 453. 'i'o make a man principal in a murder, it is not necessary that he should inflict the mortal wound. It is sufficient if he be present, aiding and abetting the act. Nor is it nccesMary that there should be a particular malice against the deceased. It is sufficient if there lie drlihcrate malignity and depravity in the conduct of the party. U. Slates v. Ross, 1 Gallison. C. V. R. 524. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 452 If there be an old quarrel betwixt Ji. and B. and they are recon- ciled again, and then upon a new and sudden falling out A. kills B. this is not murder, but if upon circumstances it appears, that the reconciliation was but pretended or counterfeit, and that the hurt done was upon the score of the old malice, then it is murder. Malice may be exerted against a party in his absence ; as where A. lays poison for B. in liis victuals, which B. afterwards takes and dies. So, where A. procures an idiot or lunatic to kill B., whicli he does. In both instances A. is guilty of the murder as prin- cipal, and B. is merely an instrument. Fauar's case, 4 Coke^ 446. Rex v. Giles, 1 Moodij, C. C. 166. Hawkins, c.l.s.2. ^ Most of the above cases on the subject of express malice are collected in Wharton^s Am. Cr.L.p.22't-9. If two persons fight, and one overpower the other, and knock hfm down, and put a rope round his neck and strangle him, this will be murder. Rex v. Shaw, 6 Car. 4" p. 372. If persons cover another with straw and set fire to it, intending to do him a serious injury, and he die, it is murder, though they did not intend to kill him. But if they intended to act in sport, and merely to frighten him, it is manslaughter. Eriingtori's case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 217. Semble, that where guns are fired by one vessel at another vessel, and those on board her generally, those guns are to be considered as shot at each individual on board her. Rex v. Bailey, R. Sf R. C. C. 1. 1 Russ. C. Sf M. 109. If a person being attacked should, from an apprehension of immediate violence — an apprehension which must be well grounded and justified by the circumstances — throw himself for escape into a river, and be drowned, the person attacking him is guilty of murder. Reg. v. Pitts, 1 Car. Sf M. 284. If a master, by premeditated negligence, or harsh usage, cause the death of his ap- prentice, it is murder. Rex v. Self, 1 Leach, C. C. 137; 1 East, P. C. 226. It is murder to cause the death of an infant of tender years, unable to provide food for and take care of itself, by not providing sufficient food and nourishment, whether such infant be child, apprentice or servant, whom the party is obliged by duty or contract to provide for. Rex v. Squires, 1 Russ. C. Sf M. 426. Where a person in loco parentis, inflicts corporal punishment on a child, and compels it to work for an unreasonable number of hours, and beyond its strength, and the child dies, the deatii being of consumption, but hastened by the ill-treatment, it will not be murder, but only manslaughter in the person inflicting the punishment, although it was cruel and excessive, and accompanied by violent and threatening language, if such per- son believed that the child was shamming illness, and was really able to do the quantity of work required. Rex v. Cheeseman, 7 Car. Sf P. 454. On an indictment for the murder of an aged and infirm woman, by confining Ijer' against her will, and not providing her with meat, drink, clothing, firing, medicines, and other necessaries, and not allowing her the enjoyment of the open air, in breach of an alleged duty; if the jury think that the prisoner was guilty of wilful neglect, so gross and wilful that they are satisfied he must have contemplated her death, he will be guilty of murder; but if they only think that he was so careless that her death was occa- sioned by his negligence, though he did not contemplate it, he will be guilty of man- slaughter. Reg. v. Marriott, 8 Car. Sf P. 425. If a woman left her child, a young infant, at a gentleman's door, or other place where it was likely to be found and taken care of, and tiie child died, it would be manslaughter only; but if the cliild were left in a remote place, where it was not likely to be found, e.g. on a barren heath, and the death of the child ensued, it would be murder, lb. If a person do an act towards another wlio is helpless, which must necessarily lead to the death of tiiat other, the crime amounts to murder; but if the circumstances are such that the person could not have been aware that the result would be death, that would reduce the crime to manslaughter, provided that the death was occasioned by an unlawful act, but not such an act as showed a malicious mind. Reg- v. Walters, 1 Car. Sf M. 1 64. "Malice is express" (says Chief Justice Parsons, Selfridire's Trial, p. 5.) "where there was a premeditated intention to kill. Malice is implied when tiie killing is attended 452 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. « If there be malice by Ji. against B. and by B. against A. and they meet, and upon the account of that malice A. strii^es B. and B. thereupon kills Ji. (otherwise than in his own necessary defense) it is murder in B. but if they meet accidently, and Ji. assaults B. first, and B. merely in his own defense, witliout any other malicious design kills Ji. this is not murder in B. for it was not upon the ac- count of the former malice, but upon a new and siidden emergency for the safe-guard of his life; but if ,/?. and B. had met deliberately lo fight, and A. strikes B. and pursues B. so closely, that B. in safe- guard of his own life kills A. this is murder in B. because their meeting was a compact, and an act of deliberation, and therefore all, that follows thereupon, is presumed to be done in pursuance thereof, and thus is Mr. Ballon, cap. 93. p. 241. (e) to be under- stood. But yet qusere, whether if B. had really and truly declined the fight, ran away as far as he could, (suppose it half a mile,) ofFerd to (i) New Edit, cap. 145. p. 471. with circumstances which indicate great wickedness and depravity of disposition, a heart void of social duty and fatally bent on mischief." " Malice is implied," says Mr. East^ " from any deliberate act. however sudden." And he adds, (225.) " He who wilfully and deliberately does any act which apparently endangers another's life, and thereby occasions his death shall, unless he clearly prove the contrary, be adjudged to kill him of malice prepense." " Malice," says Judge Addison, quoted and approved by Judge Rush, (trial of Richard Smith, in Philadelphia, for murder of John Carson, May, 1816, p. 83.) "is a deliberate, wicked, vindictive temper, regardless of social duty, and bent on miscliief. When a wilful killing is proved, the law presumes malice, unless the killer prove the contrary," {page 84.) Deliberate killing witliout passion, whatever may have been the provocation, is murder. In pape 231 it is said, the law does not fix the time of such deliberation. " If the defendant has time to think," said Judge Rush, in that trial, {paportunity for self defence, when stabs are given from behind) pursuing a man, selecting him from among others, advancing on him in a studied, cir- cuitous manner which could not be perceived, intercepted, or prevented, also show calcu- lation, deliberation, and malice. Finally, ifthere was cause, real or imaginary, for. resentment ; if the purpose of killing was long harboured; if no motive but revenge can be assigned for the fatal deed; if re- venge was harboured, and if previous threats have been made, these facts would be evi- dcnee of express malice. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 452 yield, and yet A. refusing to decline it had attempted his death, and B. after all this kills A. in his own defence, whether it excuseth him from murder; but if the running away were only a pretense to save his own life, but was really designed to draw out A. to kill him, it were murder. [7] Ji. commands B. to kill C. and before the act done repents, and countermands B. and charges him not to do it, yet B. doth it, Ji. is not guilty. Coke P. C. p. 51. A. challenges C. to meet in the field to fight, C declines it as much as he can, but is threatened by A. to be posted for a coward, 4-c. if he meet not, and thereupon A. and B. his second, and C. and D. his second, meet and fight, and C. kills A. [453] this is murder in C. and D. his second, and so ruled in P. 14 Jac. in 2\ivernerh case,(A^) tho C. unwillingly accepted the chal- lenge.[S] But if it seems not to be murder in B. because tho he had malice against C. and D. his opponents, yet he had none against ./?. tho some have thought it to be murder also in B. because done by com- pact and agreement. 22 Eliz. 3. 262. sed quaere de Aoc.[9] If A. challenge B. to fight, B. declines the challenge, but lets A. know, that he will not be beaten, but will defend himself; if B. going about his occasions wears his sword, is assaulted by A. and kild, this is murder in A. but if B. had kild A. upon that assault, it (it) 1 Rol. Rep. 360. 3 Bui. 171. [7] This quere of lord Hale is discussed by Mr. East, and it is observed that Black- atone (4 Bl. Com. 185,) expressly puts the same case of a duel as Hale, but does not subjoin the same doubt; and that it was considered as settled law by tlie Cliief Justice in Onely^s case, {Ld. Raymond, 1489.) Mr. East, after reasoning in extenuation of the crime of one so declining to tight, proceeds thus : "Yet still it may be doubtful, whether, admitting the full force of this reasoning, the offence can be less than manslaughter, or whether in such case the party can altogether excuse himself upon tlie foot of necessity in self-defence, because the necessity which was induced from his own faulty and illegal act, namely, the agreement to fight, was in the first instance deliberately foreseen and resolved upon, in defiance of the law." 1 East, P. C. c. 5. s. 54. p. 284. [8] Upon this principle, deliberate duelling if death ensuelh, is in the eye of the law murder; for duels are generally founded in deep revenge; and though a person should be drawn into a duel, not upon a motive so criminal, but merely upon the punctilio of what the swordsmen falsely call honour, that will not excuse; for he that deliberately seeketh the blood of another upon a private quarrel, actetli in defiance of all laws, human and divine, whatever his motive may be. Foster, 297. 1 Hawk.c. 31. s. 21, 22- 29. 4 Bl. Com. 191. 3 Inst. 51. Lord Morlei/s case, 7 St. Tr. 421. Both principals and seconds are liable for murder if either of the parties are killed, all being engaged in an unlawful act, having for its direct object the taking of life. The old view, that the second of the killed is not liable, is now not law, if it ever was. Rrg. V. Young. 8 Car. &; P. 644. See also Smith v. The State, 1 Yerger, 228. Rex v. Rice, 3 East, 581. Rex v. Murphy, 6 C. Sf P. 103. 1 Rol. Rep. 360. ante, 443. If, however, the comhat is not deliberate, but the immediate consequence of sudden quarrel, it does not fall within this doctrine, and must be judged of by the circum- stances attending the particular case. Foster, 295. 1 East, P. C. 242. [9] The later cases consider all present, aiding and abetting, alike guilty of murder, and do not recognise the distinction made in the text. See ante, p. 443, and p. 453, note. VOL. I.— 39 453 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. had been se defendetido, if he could not otherwise escape, or bare homicide, if he could escape, and did not. But if B. had only made this as a disguise to secure himself from the danger of the law, and purposely went to the place, where pro- bably he might meet ./?. and there they fight, and he kills »/?. then it had been murder in B. but herein circumstances of the fact must guide the jury. If ./?. and B. fall suddenly, out, and they presently agree to fight in the field, and run and fetch their weapons, and go into the field and fight, and ./?. kills B. this is not murder but homicide, for it is but a continuance of the sudden falling out, and the blood was never cooled ; but if there were deliberation, as that they meet the next day, nay, tho it were the same day, if there were such a com- petent distance of time, that in common presumption they had time of deliberation, then it is murder. Co. P. C. p. 51. Jac. B. R. Ferrer^s case, Al. 8 Jac. B. R. Morgan'' s case. [10] A. the son of B. and C. the son of D. fall out in the field and fight, A. is beaten, and runs home to his father all bloody, B. pre- sently takes a staff, runs into the field, being three-quarters of a mile distant, and strikes C that he dies, this is not murder in B. because done in sudden heat and passion. T. 9 Jac. B. R, 12 Co. Rep. p. 87.(/)[ll] (Z) Cro. Jac. 296. Royleifs case. [10] Foster, 296. Rex v. Lynch, 5 C. 4" P. 324. Reg. v. Kiikham, 8 C. Sf P. 115. [11] In every case of homicide upoa provocation, how great soever it be, it' there is suffi- cient time for passion to subside, and for reason to interpose, sucii homicide will be mur- der. A. findelh a man in the act of adultery with his wife, and in the first transport of passion kiUeth liim; this is no more than manslaughter. But had he killed the adulterer deliberately and upon revenge after the fact and sufficient cooling time, it had been un- doubtedly murder. For let it be observed, that in all possible cases deliberate homicide upon a principle of revenge is murder. No man under the protection of the law is to be the avenger of his own wrongs. If they are of such a nature for which the laws of so- cicty will give him an adequate remedy, thither he ought to resort. But be they of what nature soever, he ought to bear his lot with patience, and remember that vengeance be- longeth only to the Most High. 1 Vent, 158. Sir T. Raijm. 212, But if, upon a sudden quarrel, the parties fight upon the spot, or if they presently fetch their weapons and go into the field and figlit, and one of tlicm falleth, it will be but manslaughter; because it may be presumed the blood never cooled. It will be otiierwise if they ap[)()iiit to fight the ne.\t day, or even upon the same day at such an interval as that llie jiassion might have subsided: or if from any circumstances attending the case it may be reasonably concluded, that their judgment had aetnully controlled the first trans])orts of passion before they engaged, 'i'he same rule will hold, if after a quarrel tiiey liiU into other discourse or diversions, and continue so engaged a reasonable time for cooling. Foster, 297. AeZ. 27. 1 /i«icA:, c. 31. s. 22, 29. 4 /«. Com. 191. ^ Inst. 51. 1 Bulut, 86. See Murlcy's case, 7 St. Tr. 421. Croinp. 23. Kel. 56. Where a man assailed has retreated from the assailant, and is secure in his separation from further personal aggression, he has no right to return armed to the scene of con- fliet, and voluntarily engage in a new contest with the aggressor. If he do so, and slay liiin, he is guilty of miarder or munslaughler, according to the circumstances under which the homicide is committed. If, on receiving such a deadly assault, he suddenly leave the scene of outrage, procure arms, and in the heat of blood consequent upon the wrong, return and renew the combat, and slay his adversary, both being armed, sucii an homicide would be hut manslaughter. For the law from its sense of and te iderness to- wards human infirmity, would consider that sufficient time had not elapsed for the blood HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 454^ A boy came into Osterhj park to steal wood, and seeing the woodward climbs up a tree to hide himself, the woodward bids him come down, he comes down, and the woodward struck iiiin to cool and reason to resume its empire over the mind, smarting under the original wrong. Com. v. Hare, 4 Penn. Law Jour. 257. The law assigns no limits within which cooling time may be said to take place. Every case must depend on its own circum- stances, Coin. V. Dougherty, 7 Smith's Law, 695, but the time in which an ordinary man, in like circumstances, would have cooled, may be said to be the reasonable time. Stale V. MCards, 1 Spear, 384. In 1725, John Onelij was indicted for the murder o^ William Gower, and a special ver- dict was found, stating that the prisoner, being in company with the deceased and three other persons at a tavern in a friendly manner, after some time began playing at hazard, when Rich, one of tlie company, asked if any one would set him three half-crowns, whereupon the deceased, in a jocular manner, laid down three half-pence, telling Rich he had set him tliree pieces, and the prisoner at the same time set Rich three half- crowns, and lost them to him; immediately after which the prisoner, in an angry man- ner, turned about to the deceased, and said, "it was an impertinent thing to set half- pence, and that he was an impertinent puppy for so doing;" to which the deceased answered, "whoever called him so was a rascal." Thereupon tlie prisoner took up a bottle, and witli great force threw it at the deceased's head, but did not hit him, the bottle only brushing some of the powder out of his hair. The deceased, in return, immediately tossed a candlestick or bottle at the prisoner, which missed him; upon wiiich lliey both rose up to fetch their swords, which then hung up in the room, and the deceased drew his sword, but the prisoner was prevented from drawing liis by the com- pany; tlie deceased thereupon tlirew away his sword, and the company interposing, they sat down again for the space of an hour. At the expiration of that time the de- ceased said to the prisoner, " we have had hot words, but you were the aggressor; but I think we may pass it over, and at the same time offered his hand to the prisoner, who made answer, "No, damn you, I will have your blood;" after which, the reckonino- being paid, all the company except the prisoner left the room; but he, calling back the deceased, closed the door, and the rest of the company, shortly after, hearing a clashing of swords, found the deceased had received from the prisoner a mortal wound. It was further found, that from the throwing of the bottles there had been no reconciliation. Upon these facts all the judges were of opinion, that the defendant had been guilty of murder, and that from the period which had elapsed there had been reasonable time for cooling. In delivering the opinion in this case, Raymond, C. J. discussed the subject of coolino- time at length, and said, among other things, that " in cases of this nature the judges are to determine what is malice, or what is a reasonable time to cool; and they must do it upon the circumstances of the case; the jury are judges only of the fact, and we must determine whether it be deliberate or not. Hence it is, that in summing up an evidence, the judges direct the jury, — if you believe such a fact, it is so; if not, it is otherwise; and they find either a general or a special verdict upon it. There is no instance where the jury ever found that the fact was done of malice, or that the party had or had not time to cool; but that must be left to the judges upon the circumstances of the case. In Holloway^s case, it was left to the court to determine whether the tying the boy to the horse's tail was not a malicious act. So in the case of the two boys who had quarrelled, and the father ran after one of them and killed him, the court, and not the jury, determined whether it was malice or not. Palm. 545. In Bromicick's case, 1 Lev. 180, the declining an immediate encounter, because of the disadvantage of his high heels, was held to be a deliberate act, that manitestcd a coolness : and the same has been held, where the parties have debated about the cou- veniency of place. A'e/yng, 56. If A. says to B. I will give you a pot of ale to strike me, and B. strikes hi-hi, and immediately A. kills B , it is murder; for A. knew what he was about, and deliberated with himself how he might perpetrate the fact, and be at the same time (as he thought) witliin the protection of the law. Crnmp. 49. From all which cases it appears, that though the law of England is peculiarly favour- able m making this distinction with regard to the passions of men, yet it must be such a paission as for the time deprives a man of the exercise of his reason ; and wherever it 454^ HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. twice, and then bound him to his horse-tail, and dragged him till liis shoulder was broke, whereof he died; it was ruled murder, be- has appeared that he had the exercise of his reason, he is out of the protection of the law, and has been held guilty of murder. Here was a reasonable titne to cool, and it is plain it had its operation : the prisoner was cool enough to discourse for an hour; he de- termined in his own mind upon deliberation what he would do; and declared his inten- tion in those bitter and deliberate expressions : '* No, he would not pass it over, damn him, he would have his blood;" the young man must come back, for he had something to say to him. The interchange of blovv's, where there is malice, will make no altera- tion : it does not, indeed, appear who struck first upon his returning into the room ; but it is sufficient that the verdict finds no act inconsistent with the malicious declaration of the party; nor can the declaration of the party deceased avail in this case, for that goes only to his receiving the wound in a fair manner with regard to the nature of the com- bat." Rex V. Onely, 2 Strange, 766. , Where the defendant, having been violently beaten and abused, made his escape, ran to his house, eighty yards off, got a knife, ran back, and on meeting with the deceased, stabbed him, it was held but manslaughter; but it was said that if, on the second meeting, the defendant had disguised the fact of having a weapon for the purpose of inducing the deceased to come witliin his reach, it would have been murder, such concealment affording ground for the presumption of dehberation. Slate v. Norris, 1 Bay, 429. In order to mitigate a homicide, committed in a second combat, by vi^hat oc- curred at a previous one, which had fairly began on the sudden, both contests must be considered as making one combat, or the first as a separate combat, must be con- sidered as a sufficient sudden provocation for either a second combat, or for a sub- sequent attack producing a contest not entitled to be called a mutual combat. Where it appeared that the prisoner and the deceased, alter having been engaged in mutual combat, on sudden occasion, fairly begun, were separated at the request of the priso- ner, who was overcome and beaten in the contest; that the prisoner was held by one of the persons present, but drew his knife and swore he would kill the deceased ; that after releasing himself from the person holding him, he pursued the deceased, who had left the place of combat, and who, upon being apprized of the pursuit by a call from the person holding the prisoner, left the road on which he was walking, and provided himself with a rail from a neighbouring fence; that on his return towards the road he met the prisoner, gave back and struck liim several blows upon the head as he rushed on, with the rail, which, breaking some ten paces from the point where the deceased began to give back, the prisoner closed and inflicted the mortal blow; and that suffi- cient time liad transpired, not only for the deceased to adjust himself after the fight and walk deliberately two hundred and twenty-five yards, but for the prisoner after- wards to pass over the same ground, as also for a person at a neighbouring house, within hearing of the noise of the second quarrel, to reach the place of strife. The court, under this state of facts, were of opinion, that both contests could not have con- stituted one combat, nor could the second, in which the prisoner rushed with his drawn knife upon his adversary, who had snatched the readiest means of defence at hand, but was neither equally armed, nor willing to meet such a weapon, have been that fair struggle which the law denominates a mutual combat. The jury having found a ver- dict of guilty, the court refused to dif^turb it. State v. McCunts, 1 Spear, 384. If a father see a person in the act of committing an unnatural offence with his son, and insitantly kill him, it seems that it would be only manslaughter, and that of the low- est degree; but if he only hear of it, and go in search of the person, and meeting liim, strike him with a stick, and afterwards stab him with a knife and kill fiim, in point of law, it will be murder. Kerr. v. Fisher, 8 Car. t^- P. 182. In the same case, jier Park Baron, and Recorder Law. In a case of killing, whether the blood has hud time to cool or not, is a question for the court and not for the jury; hut it is for the jury to find what length of time elapsed between the provocation received and the act done. lb. Where the prisoner and the deceased, who were previously on intimate terms, were at a public house drinking, when a scuflle ensued, and tlie deceased struck the prisoner in the eye and gave Jiiin a black eye, the prisoner called for the police, and went away upon HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON^E. 454*= cause, 1. The correction was excessive, and 2. It was an act of deliberate cruelty. M 4 Car. B. R. HoUowcnfa case. (m) [12] If the master desigiieth moderate correction to his servant, and ac- cordingly iiseth it, and the servant by some misfortune dieth thereof, this is not murder, but per infortunium. Crompt. 136. b. Dalt. Clip. ^%. p. 245.,(?j) because the law alloweth him to use moderate correction, and therefore the deliberate purpose thereof is not ex malitid prsccogitata. But if the master design an immoderate or unreasonable cor- rection, either in respect of the measure, or manner, or instrument thereof, and the servant die thereof, I see not how this can be ex- cused from murder, if done with deliberation and design, nor from manslaughter, if done liastily, passionately, and without delibera- tion ; and herein consideration must be had of the manner of the provocation, the danger of the instrument, which the master useth, and the age or condition of the servant that is stricken, and the like of a school-master towards his scholar.(o) The sheriff hath a warrant to hang a man for felony, and he beheads him, this is held murder, for it is an act of deliberation. Co. P. C.;?. 52.[13] A man hath the liberty of Infangthief€,{p) the steward of the court gives judgment of death against a prisoner against law, this was a cause of seizure of the liberty, but was not murder in the (m) Cro. Car. 131. W. Jones, 198. Kelyng, 127. (o) Kehjng, 64, 65. (n) Cap. 148. p. 478. {p) See Spelman's Glossary, 313. the policeman coming up; in about five minutes, iiowever, he returned and stabbed the deceased vvitli a Itnife, which he usually carried about him: Lord Tenterden, C. J., said, that it was not every slight provocation, even by a blow, which will, when the party re- ceiving it striiies with a deadly weapon, reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter; and that, if there had been any evidence of an old grudge between tiie parties, the crime would probably be murder; but he left it to the jury to say, whether, in the interval during which the prisoner was absent, there was time for his passion to cool and reasoa to gain dominion over his mind: if not, they should find him guilty of manslaughter only. Rex v. Lynch, 5 C. Sf P. 324. If, in fine, there be a sufficient cooling time for passion to subside and reason to inter- pose, and the person so provoked afterwards kill the other this is deliberate revenge, and not heat of blood, and accordingly amounts to murder. Wh. A7n. C. L. 247. State v. Yarborough, 1 Hawks, 78. Rex v. Tliomas, 1 C. Sf P. 817. 1 Hawkins, P. C. c. 31. s. 29. State v. Ruthfrford, 1 Haieks. 329. U. S. v. Thayer, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 503. People v. Garretson, 2 Wheeler's C. C. 347. Rex v. Rankin, 1 R. i^- R. 43. Rex v. Ayres, ibid. 1 East, P. C. 243. Rex v. Anderson, 1 Russ. 447. Rex v. Kissell, 1 C. &; P. 43T. Commonwealth v. Daily, 4 Penn. Law Journal, 156. Comnionwealth v. Green, 1 Ash- vuad, 289. [12] So in all other cases when, upon a sudden provocation, one beats another in a cruel and unusual manner so that he dies, it is murder. 4 Bl. Com. 199. R. v. Tranter, et al, 1 Strange, 499. Foster, 291. So also when tlie instrument used evidently en- dangers life, malice will be implied. Rex v. Howland, 1 C. S^ P. 274. Macklin's case, 1 Lew. 225. I Hawk. P. C. c. 31. s. 39. Com. v. Drew, 4 Mass. 3d\. State v. Morgan, 3 Iredell, 136. Com. v. Murray, 2 Ashmead, 41. Penna. v. Bell Addison, 1G3; and the intention to kill, see Murder of First and Second Degrees, post, page 454. [13] See post. 406-502. 454* HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. judge, quia factnm judiciqUter, licet ignoranter. 2 R. 3. 10. a. the case of the steward of the hberty of the abbot of Crowland.{\'\'\ [14] The statutes which have chiefly affected the law of homicide since Holers time are as follow : The act, 9 Geo. 4. c. 31. " for consolidating- and amending the statutes oi England rela- tive to offences against the person," provides: I. Tliat so much of the great charter made in tiie nintli year of the reign of king Henry the Third, as relates to inquisitions of life or member; and so much of a statute made in the fifty -second year of the same reign, as relates to murder; and so much of a statute made in the third year of the reign of king Edward the First, as relates to inquests of murder ; and sr much of a statute made in the sixth year of the same reign, as relates to any person killing another by mistbrtune or in his own de- fence, or in other manner without felony ; and so much of a statute made in the second year of the reign of king Henry the Fifth as relates to persons fleeing for mur- ders, manslaughters, robberies, and batteries; an act passed in the twenty-fourth year of the reign of king Henry the Eighth, intituled, ''An act where a man killing a thief shall not forfeit his goods;" so much of an act passed the thirty-third year of the same reign, intituled "An act for murther and malicious bloodshed within tiie Courts," as relates to the punishment of manslaughter and of malicious striking, by reason where- of blood shall be shed ; so mucli of an act passed in the first year of the reign of king Edward the Sixth, intituled "An act for the repeal of certain statutes concern- ing treasons, felonies, &c.," as relates to petty treason, murder, &c. ; an act passed the fourth and fifth years of the reign of king Philip and queen Mari/, intituled "An act that accessaries in murder and divers felonies shall not have the benefits of the clergy;" an act passed in the first year of the reign of king Jumes the First, intituled "An act to take away the benefit of clergy from some kind of manslaughter;" an act passed in the second year of the reign of king George the Second, intituled, "An act for the trial of murders in eases where either the stroke or death only happens within that part of Great Britain called England;" tiiat part of the act of the twelfth year of king George the First which is hereinbefore referred to, and the whole of an act in the twenty-fifth year of the reign of king George the Second, intituled, " An act for better preventing the horrid crime of murder," except so far as relates to rescues and attempts to re?cue; an act passed in the forty-third year of the reign of king George the Third, intituled, "An act for the further prevention of malicious shooting, and attempting to discharge loaded fire arms, stabbing, cutting, wounding, poisoning, and the malicious using of means to procure the miscarriage of women, and also the malicious setting fire to buildings ; and also for repealing a certain act made in England in the twenty-first year of the late king James ihe First, intituled, " An act to prevent the destroying and murthering bastard children," and also an act made in Ireland in the sixth year of the reign of the late queen Anne, also intituled '' An act to prevent the destroying and murdering of bastard chil- dren," and for making other provisions in lieu thereof^ and an act passed in the same forty-third year, intituled, " An act for the more effectually providing for the punishment of offences in wilfully casting away, burning or destroying ships and vessels, and for the more convenient trial of accessaries in felonies, and for extending the powers of an act made in the thirty-third year of the reign of king Henry tiie Eighth, as far as relates to murders, to accessaries to murders, and to manslaughters;" so much of an act passed in the first year of the reign of his ])resent majesty, intituled, "An act to remove doubts and to remedy defects in the law with respect to certain offences committed upon the sea or within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty," as refers to the act of the forty. third year of the reign of George the Third hereinbefore first mentioned; an act passed the first year of the reign of his present majesty, intituled, "An act to repeal so much of the several acts passed in the thirty-ninth year of the reign of Elizabeth, tho fourilt of George the First, the fifth and eighth of George the Second, as inflicts capitiil i)unishnient on certain offences therein specified, and to ])rovide more suitable and effectual punish- ment for such offences;" and an act pass-ed in the third year of the present reign, inti- tuled "An act for the further and more adequate punishment of persons convicted of manslaughter, and of servants convicted of robbing tlieir masters, and of accessaries be- fore the fact of grand larceny, and certain other felonies," sliall continue in force until and throughout the last day oi' June in the present year, and shall from and ailcr that HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 454« day as to that part of the United Kingdom called England, and as to offences committed witliiii the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England, be repealed, except so far as any of the said acts may repeal the whole or any part of any other acts, and except as to otfences committed before or upon the said last day of June, which shall be dealt with and punished as if tiiis act had not been passed; and this act shall commence and take effect (except as hereinbefore excepted) on the first day of July in the present year. II. That every offence which before the commencement of this act would have amounted to petit treason, shall be deemed to be murder only, and no greater offence; and all persons guilty in respect thereof, whether as principals or as accessaries, shall be dealt with, indicted, tried and punished as principals and accessaries in murder. III. Provides for the punishment of principals and accessaries in murder. IV. Provides for period of execution as to marks of infamy — sentence to be pronounced immediately — judges power to respite. , V. Provides for the dissection of the bodies of murderers. VL Prison regulation as to murderers under sentence. VII. British subjects charged in England may be tried there for murder or man- slaugliter committed abroad. VIII. Provides for the trial of murder and manslaughter in England when the death or the cause of the death only happens in England. IX. Provides for the punishment of manslaughter. The Act of 2 t^ 3 Will. IV. c. 7.5. s. IG. repeals so much of the foregoing act of 9 Geo. IV. c. 31. as directs that the bodies of murderers may be dissected — and provides that such bodies may be hung in chains or buried as the court shall direct. The Act of 4 Sf 5 Will. IV. c. 26. I. Recites that whereas by an act passed in the 9th year of Geo. IV. it was enacted, That the body of every person convicted of murder should after execution either be dissected or hung in chains as to the court which tried the offender should seem meet. And whereas by an act passed in the 10th year of the same reign alike provision is made with re.>pect to persons convicted of murder in Ireland. And whereas by an act passed in the second and third years of Will. IV. so much of the provision of the act passed in the ninth year of Gen. IV. as authorized the court to direct that the body of a person convicted of murder slmuld after execution be dissected is repealed, and instead thereof it was enacted that such court shall direct that a prisoner so convicted shall be either hung in chains or buried within the precincts of the prison in which such prisoner shall have been confined after conviction, as to the court should seem meet; and that the sentence to be pronounced by the court should express that llie body of such prisoner shall be either hung in chains or buried within the precincts of the prison — and whereas it is expedient to amend these acts — enacts, That so much of the Act of 9 Geo. IV. as authorizes the court to direct that the body of a person convicted of murder should, after execution, be hung in chains, and also so much of the Act of 10 Geo. IV. as authorizes the court to direct that the body of a person convicted of murder should, after execution, be dissected or hung in chains, and also so much of the Act of the 2d & 3d Will. IV. as provides, that in every case of conviction of any prisoner for murder, the court shall direct such prisoner to be hung in chains, is hereby repealed. II. That in every case of conviction in Ireland, of any prisoner for murder, the court shall direct such prisoner to be buried within the precincts of the prison where he shall have been confined after conviction. ■ ' The Act of 6 &- 7 Will. IV. c. 30. I. Repeals so much of two Acts of 9 and 10 Geo. IV, as directs the period "of execution, and the prison discipline of persons convicted of the crime of murder; and II. Enacts, that sentence of death may be pronounced after convictions for murder, in the same manner, and the judge shall have the same power, in all respects, as after con- viction for other capital offences. UNITED STATES. In the United States statutory enactments have made some changes in the ancient doctrines of homicide. The rules of construction, however, remain the same and the meaning of technical terms is unaffected. In questions of the law of homicide, the com- mon law authorities are the basis on which courts apply the. statutes of the several states. U. S. V. Manrill, 1 TV. C. C. R. 4G3. Pa. v. M Fall, Add. A56. Com. v. Thompson, G Mass. 134. Slate \: ZAler, 3 Halslcad, 220. State v. Norris, 1 Hay, 429. State v. Weaver, 2 Hay. Com. v. Daily, 4 Fcnn. Law Journal, 154. 454^ HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. The Act of Congress of April 30, 1790, provides: If any person or persons shall com- mit, upon tlie higli seas, or in any river, liaven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, murder or robbery, or any other offence, which, if Gommittcd with- in tlie body of a county, would, by tiie laws of the United Stales, be punisliable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and felo- niously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merciiandise to the value of filty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship, or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof convicted shall suffer death; and the trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, shall be in the district where the offender is appreiiended or into which he may first be brought. — Act 30th April, 1790, sect. 8. See post. Act of 3d March, 1845, sec. 4. If any seaman or other person shall commit manslaughter upon the high seas, or confederate, or attempt or endeavour to corrupt any commander, master, officer, or mari- ner, to yield up, or to run away with any vessel, or with any goods, or to turn pirate, or to go over to or confederate with pirates, or in any wise trade with any pirate' know- ing him to be such, or siiall furnish such pirate with any ammunition, stores or provi- sions of any kind, or shall fit out any vessel knowingly and with a design to trade with or supply or correspond with any pirate or robber upon the seas; or if any person shall any ways consult, combine, confederate or correspond with any pirate or robber on the seas, knowing him to be guilty of any such piracy or robbery; or if any seaman shall confine the master of any vessel, or endeavour to make a revolt in such vessel; such per- son so offending, and being thereof convicted, shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars. Ihid. sect. 12. If any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United Stales, commit the crime of wilful murder, such person or persons, on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death. Ibid. sect. 3. If any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of manslaughter, and shall be thereof convicted, such person or persons shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars. Act 30th April, 1790, sec. 7. If any person upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin or bay, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, shall commit the crime of wilful murder, or rape, or shall, wilfully and maliciously, strike, stab, wound, poison, or shoot at, any other person, of which striking, stabbing, wounding, poisoning, or shooting, such person shall afterwards die upon land within or without the United States, every person so offending, his or her counsellors, aiders or abettors, shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall upon conviction thereof, suffer death. Act 3d March, 1 825, sect. 4. Whenever any criminal, convicted of any offence against the United Slates, shall be imprisoned in pursuance of such conviction, and of the sentence thereupon in the prison or penitentiary of any state or territory, such criminal shall, in all respects, be subject to the same discipline and treatment as convicts sentenced by the courts of the state or ter- ritory in which such prison or penitentiary is situated; and, while so confined therein, shall also be exclusively under the control of the oflicers having charge of the same, under the laws of the said state or territory. Act of June 30, 1834. In a case before the Supreme Court of the United States, in 181 8, the cotlrt said, that admitting that the third article of the constitution of the United States, which declares that, ''The judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic- tion," vests in the United Stall s exclusive jurisdiction of all such cases, and that a nmr- der committed in the waters of a state, where the tide ebbs and flows, is a case of admi- ralty and maritime jurisdiction; Congress have not, in the 8th section of the act of 1791, ch. 9. " for the punishment of certain offences against the United Slates," so exercised this power as to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over such murder. United States v. liivans, 3 Whcaton, 33G. Congress having in the 8th section of the act of 1790, chapter 0th, provided for the punishtnent of murder, iVc. committed " upon the hijrh seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any ijarticiilar State," it is not the offence com- mitted, but the bay, &.C. in which it is conunittcd, that must be out of the jurisdiction of the State. Ibid. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 4546 • The grant to the United States in the constitution of all cases of admiralty and mari- time jurisdiction, does not extend to a cession of the waters in which these cases may arise, or of general jurisdiction over the same. Congress may pass all Inws which are necessary for giving the most complete effect to the exercise of the admiralty and mari- time jurisdiction granted to the government of the Unon; but the general jurisdiction over the place, subject to this grant, adheres to the territory as a portion of territory not yet given away; and the residuary powers of legislation still remain in the state. The United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheaton, 336. On an indictment for murder, founded on the 8th Sect, of the Act of Congress of April 3'yith, 1790, Ck. 36, the death as well as the mortal stroke must happen on the high seas. United States v.'Mai{ill, 4 Dallas, 426. The Federal Courts have no cognizance of a case where the mortal stroke w^as given on the high seas, and the death occurred on shore in a foreign country. Ibid. Murder, &.c. committed by persons on board a vessel not at the time belonging to the subjects of any foreign power, but in possession of a crew acting in defiance of all law, and acknowledging obedience to no government whatever, is within the 8th Section of the Act of Congress of April 30, 1790, Ch. 36, and is punishable in the Courts of the United States. United States v. Fabner and others, 3 Wh en t on, 6\0. United States v. Pirates, 5 IVheaton, 192. See also U. S. v. Furlong, 5 Wheaton, 134. Under the 12lh Sect, of the Act of Congress oC April 30, 1790, Ch. 3^, manslaughter is not punishable in the Courts of the United States, unless it be committed on the high seas. United States v. Wilthcrger, 5 Wheaton, 56. The Courts of the United States have jurisdiction of murder, committed on the high seas, from a vessel belonging to the United States, by a foreigner being on board of such vessel, upon another -foreigner being on board of a foreign vessel. Ibid, The Courts of the United States have not jurisdiction of a murder committed by one foreigner on another foreigner, on board a foreign vessel on the high seas. lind. There is a distinction between the crimes of murder and piracy. The latter is an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations; not so with murder; it is punish- able under the laws of each State. Pud. The Courts of the United States have jurisdiction, under the Act of April 30th, 1790, Ch. 36, of murder or robbery committed on the higli seas, although not committed on board of a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States; as if she had no national character, but was held by pirates, or persons not lawfully sailing under the flag of any foreign nation. United States v. Holmes et al., 5 Wheat. 412. In the same case, and under the same act, if the offence be committed oa board 'of a foreign vessel, by a citizen of the United States, or on board a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States by a foreigner, or by a citizen or foreigner, on board of a piratical vessel, the offence is equally cognizable by the Courts of the United States. Ibid. It is immaterial whether the offence was committed on board of a vessel, or in the sea, by throwing the deceased overboard and drowning him, or by shooting him in the sea, though he was not thrown overboard. Ibid, In an indictment for a piratical murder, under the eighth section of the Act of April 30th, 1790, Ch. 36, it is not necessary to allege the prisoner to be a citizen of the United States, nor that the crime was committed on board a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, but it is sufficient to charge it as committed from on board such a vessel, by a mariner sailing on board such a vessel. United States v. Pirates, 5 Whea. ton, 184. To make a man a principal in a murder, it is not necessary that he should inflict the niortul wound. It is sufficient if he be present, aiding and abetting the act. Nor is it necessary tlinrt there should be a particular malice against the deceased. It is suflicient if there be deliberate malignity and depravity in the conduct of the party. United States T. Ross, 1 Gallison, C. C. R. 524. If a number of persons conspire together to do an unlawful act, and death happen in the prosecution of the design, it is murder in all. If the unlawful act was a trespass, the murder, to affect all, must be done in the prosecution of the design. If the unlawful act be a felony, it will be murder in all, although the death happen collaterally, or beside the princi|)al design, lliid. If several persons conspire to seize, with force and violence, a vessel, and run away with her, and if necessary, to kill any person who shall oppose them in the execution of the design, and death ensue in the prosecution of the desi^-n, it is murder in all who are present, aiding and ahelting in executing the design. Ibid. 454*^ HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. The legal meaning' of "malice aforetlioucrlit," in cases of homicide, is not confined to Iiomicide committed in cold blood witii settled design and premeditation, but extends to all cases of homicide, however sudden tiie occasion, where the act is done with such cruel circumstances as are the ordinary indications of a wicked, depraved, and malignant spirit; as where the punishment inflicted by a party, even upon provocation, is out- rageous in its nature and continuance, and beyond all proportion to the offence ; so that it is rather to he attributed to diabolical malignity and brutality than to human infirmity. And much, in these cases, depends on tlie instrument employed — whether dangerous to life or not. The United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason's C. C. R. 91. NEW YORK. Revised Statutes, Part IV. Chap. 1. Title 1. Sec. 4, The killing of a human being without the authority of lavp, by jioison, shooting, stabbing, or any other means, or in any other manner, is either murder, manslaughter, or excusable or justifiable homicide, according to the facts and circumstances of each case. Sec. 5. Such killing, unless it be manslaughter or excusable or justifiable homicide, as hereinafter provided, shall be murder in the following cases : 1st. When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any human being. 2d. When perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a de- praved mind, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual. 3d. When perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commissionof any felony. Sec. 6. Every inhabitant or resident of this State, who shall by previous appointment or engagement, fight a duel without the jurisdiction of this State, and in so doing, shall inflict a wound upon his antagonist or ajiy other person, whereof the person thus injured shall die within this State, and every second, engaged in such duel, shall be deemed guilty of murder within this State, and may be indicted, tried and convicted in the county where such death shall happen. Sec. 7. Every person indicted under the provisions of the last section may plead a former conviction or acquittal for the same offence, iii another State or country ; and if such plea be admitted or established, it shall be a bar to any further or other proceedings against such person for the same offence, within this State. Sec. 8. The killing of a master by his servant, or of a husband by his wif5, shall «ot be deemed any other or higher offence than if committed by any other perscm. Sec. 9. Arson in the first degree, the punishment of which is prescribed in this title, consists in wilfully setting fire to or burning in the night time, a dwelling-house, in which there shall be, at the time, some human being; and every house, prison, jail, or other edifice, which shall have been usually occupied by persons lodging therein at night, shall be deemed a dwelling-house of any person so lodging therein. Sec. 10. But no warehouse, barn, shed, or other out-house, shall be deemfed a dwelling- house, or part of a dwelling-house, within the meaning of the last section, unless the same be joined to, immediately connected with, and part of a dwelling-house. Sec. 11. Whenever any convict shall be sentenced to the punishment of death, the Court, or a mayor thereof — of whom the presiding judge shall always be one, shall make out, sign and deliver to the Sheriff of the county, a warrant stating such conviction and sentence, and ap|)ointing the day on which such sentence shall be executed. Sec. 12. Such day shall not be less than four weeks, and not more than eight weeks from the time of the sentence. Sec. 13. The presiding judge of the Court at which such conviction shall have taken place, shall immediately thereupon transmit to the Governor of this State, by mail, a statement of such conviction and sentence, with the notes of testimony taken by such judge on the trial. The expense of such statement, to be estimated at the rate allowed for drafts and copies of pleadings in the Sujireme Court, shall be audited by the Comp- triiller, and paid out of tiie treasury. Sec. 14. The fJovonior sliall he authorized to require the opinion of the Chancellor, the justices of the Su|)rein(; C^ourt, and of the attorney general, or of any of them, upon any stiit they have unquestionably suc- ceeded in restricting some cases to the grade f)f manslaugliler, which, upon tiie princi- ples of the common law, never ouglit to have been considered or adjudfjed to be olfoiices of a higher grade; such as the unintentional killing of a person, or an offender who was eng.-ijred in a riot or otiicr offence, that was a mere misdemeanor, and not a felony. 'I'hcre is another class of cases, referred to on the argument as cases of murder at the common law, which, under the provisions of the revised statutes, must hereafter unques- tionably he considered and adjti(lg( d to be manshiughter, and not murder. And tlicre is also another and much larger class of cases which hereafter must be deemed murder, by HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 454'" reason of the implied malice that will now attach to the unlawful killin(r; which cases, before the rcvi.^ion of the statutes, were cases of manshiugliter only. Tlie two classes to wliicli I allude, depend however, upon a principle which does not require any change ■to be made in the common law form of the indictment for murder. Malice was implied in many eases at the common law, where it was evident that the offenders could not haTe had any intention of destroying human life, merely on the ground that the homicide 'was committed, while the person who did the act was engaged in the commission of some other felonj', or in an attempt to peri)etrate some offence of that grade. Every felony, by the common law, involved a forfeiture of the lands or goods of the offender, upon a conviction of the offence; and nearly all offences of that grade were punishable with death, with or without benefit of clergy. In such cases, therefore, the malicious and premeditated intent to perpetrate one kind of felony, was, by implication of law, trans- ferred from such offence to the homicide which was actually committed, so as to make the latter offence a killing with malice aforethought, contrary to the real fact of the case as it appeared in evidence. This principle is still retained in the law of homicide ; and it necessarily follows, from the principle itself, that as often as the legislature creates new felonies, or raises offences which were only misdemeanors at the common law to the grade of felony, a new class of murders is created by the application of this principle to the case of a killing of a human being, by a person'who is engaged in the perpetration of a newly created felony. So, on the other hand, when the legislature abolishes an offence which at the common law was a felony, or reduces it to the grade of a misde- meanor oidy, the case of an unlawful killing, by a person engaged in the act which was before a felony, will no longer be considered to be murder, but manslaughter merely. Such changes in the law of murder have often occurred, both in this country and in England; yet it never has before been thought necessary to change the common law form of the indictment to meet cases of this description. The court and jury in such cases immediately apply the common law principle, and the killing is adjudged to be murder er manslaughter, according to the nature and quality of the crime that the offen- der was perpetrating at the time the homicide was committed. Let us then apply these principles to the case now under consideration. The revised statutes having declared tliat hereafter offences punishable with death or with imprisomnent in the state prison, and such offences only, shall be deemed felonies, it follows, of course, that an accessary to a suicide, or a person who unintentionally kills in an attempt to perpetrate a first offence of petit larceny, could not now be guilty of the common law offence of murder; and therefore the jury could not have found him guilty under an indictment like the one now before us. The unintentional killing of a female, in an attempt to produce an abortion, with her own consent, was not in itself murder, although at the common law, if she was quick with child, it formed a very aggravated case of felonious homicide; and it is now made murder in England, by the operation of the statute which makes the de- struction of the child a capital felony. It was also murder here, by the operation of the third subdivision of the fifth section of the revised statutes, which attempt to define the crime of murder, until the legislature, by the amendment of the ninth section of the next title, 2 R. S. 661. § 9. 3. R. S. npp. 158. § 58. made the killing of the mother, as well as the child, a case of manslaughter only. Some other eases of unintentional killing, by persons engaged in riots and other misdemeanors below the grade of felonies, which pre- vious to the revision had also been improperly considered as cases of murder contrary to principles of the ancient common law, are now restored to that grade of homicide to which tlicy properly belong. All offences of that description are now placed in the class of homicides committed without malice aforetiiaught; except where the killing is perpe- trated by an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind, regard- less of human life; which circumstances now, as at the common law, are sufHcicnt to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of killing with malice aforethought. 2 R. .S. 657. § 5. sub. 2. From this examination of the subject, I have arrived at the conclusion that a common law indictment for murder is proper, under the provision of the revised statutes. And a defendant cannot be convicted on such an indictment of a felonious homicide with malice aforethought, unless the evidence is such as to bring the case within the statutory definition of murder." Tlie People v. Enoch, 13 Wendell, lod. Vide The People v. Mc- Leod, 1 Hill, 377. The People v. Jackson, 3 Hill, 92. On the trial of an indictment for murder, where there is no pretence that the prisoner killed the deceased, while engaged in a riot or other misdemeanor, not amounting to a felony, by misadventure, but the death ensued in consequence of an intentional violence upon the person of the deceased; whether tiie prisoner designed to kill or nut, he is not entitled to have the jury instructed that they cannot convict of murder, if they should 454° HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. come to the conclusion that tlie mortal wound was inflicted in committing, or attempt- ing to commit an otfence which of itself is less than felony. Homicide, occasioned by committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor, though murder at the common law, is by the revised statutes reduced to manslaughter in the first degree. The People v. Rector, 19 Wendell, 569. Manslaughter ditfers from murder in this, that though the act which occasioned the death be unlawful, or likely to be attended with bodily mischief, yet tlie malice, eitlier express or implied, wliich is the very essence of murder, is presumed to be wanting; and the act being imputed to the infirmity of human nature, the punishment is proportionably lenient. Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cowen, 51. On a trial for murder, where it appeared that the deceased sought to gain admittance into a house of ill fame by violence and against the will of the keeper thereof, who made an attack upon the aggressor, and death ensued, it was held, that testimony that threats made a week previous to the assault by persons who had broken into the house, that tliey would return some other night and break in again, might be received and submitted to the consideration of the jury, under the" instruction of the court; although it seems that for the rejection of such evidence, where it was not shown that the deceased was of the party who made the threats, a new trial would not be granted. The People v. Rector, 19 Wendell, 569. As to bail in homicide, see Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cowen, 51. Goodwin's case, 1 Wit. Cr. C. 443. MASSACHUSETTS. Every person who shall commit the crime of murder, shall suffer the punishment of death for the same. Rev. Stat. chap. 125, sect. 1. In every case of conviction of the crime of murder, the court may, in their dis- cretion, order the body of the convict, after his execution, to be dissected, and the sheriff, in such case, shall deliver the dead body of such convict, to a professor of anatomy and surgery, in some college or public seminary, if requested ; otherwise, it shall be delivered to any surgeon, who may be attending to receive it, and who will engage for the dissection therepf. Ihid. sect. 2. Every person, being an inhabitant or resident of this state, who shall, by previous appointment or engagement made within the same, fight a duel without the jurisdiction of the state, and in so doing, shall inflict a mortal wound upon any person, whereof the person so injured shall afterwards die, within this state, shall be deemed guilty of mur- der witliin this state, and may be indicted, tried, and convicted in the county where such death shall happen. Ibid. sect. 3. Every person, being an inhabitant or resident of this state, who shall, by previous appointment or engagement made within the same, be the second of either party, in such as is mentioned in the preceding section, and shall be present as second, when such mortal wound is inflicted, whereof death shall ensue within this state, shall be deemed to be an accessary before the fact to the crime of murder in this state, and may be indicted, tried, and convicted in the county where death shall happen. Ibid. sect'. 4. Any person indicted under either of the two preceding sections, may plead a former conviction or acquittal of the same offence, in any other state or county, and such plea, if admitted or established, shall be a bar to all further or other proceedings against such person, for the same offence, within this slate. Ibid. sect. 5. Every person, who shall commit the crime of manslaughter, shall be punished by irn^ prisonmcnt in the state prison, not more than twenty years, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment in the county jail not more than three years. Ibid. sect. 9. Where the act is committed deliberately, and is likely to be attended with dangerous consequences, the malice requisite to murder will be presumed ; for the law infers that the natural or probable eflccts of any act deliberately done, were intended by the actor. Commonwealth v. Drew, 4 Muss. 391. A bare trespass against the property of another, not his dwelling-house, is not a suflicieiit provocation to warrant the owner in using a deadly weapon in its defence; and if lie do, and with it kill the trespasser, it will be murder. Ibid. If the boating, liowcvcr, he with an instrument and in a manner not likely to kill, it will bo no more than manslaughter. Ibid. So, if any one, under colour or claim of legal auliiority, unlawAilIy arrest, or actually attempt or -offtSr to arrest another, and this latter in his resistance kills the aggrcssqr, it will be no more than manslaughter. Ibid. So if one, not a stranger, aids the injured party by endeavouring to rescue him, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 454° or to prevent an unlawful arrest when actually attempted. Commonwealth v. Drew, 4 Mass. 39 1 . If one, assuming to be a physician, however ignorant of the medical art, administers to his patient remedies which result in his death, he is not guilty of manslaughter, unless he has so much knowledge or probable information of the fatal tendency of his prescriptions as to raise a presumption of obstinate, wilful rashness. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 6 Mass. 134. Where, however, such person has opportunity to know of the injurious effects of his remedies, and then administers them, it would be competent for the jury to find him g-uilty of manslaughter, even though he might not have intended any bodily harm to his patient. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 6 Muss. 134. Where one, having' committed a homicide, had been sent to the house of correction, pursuant to Stat. 1797, c. 61, § 3, as a person dangerous to go at large, and was then tried for murder, and acquitted on the ground of insanity, tiie court remanded him to the house of correction till he should be duly discharged. Commonwealth v. Meriam, 7 Mass. 168. If one counsel another to commit suicide, and the other, through the influence of the advice, kill himself, the adviser is guilty of murder as principal. The presumption of law in such case is, that the advice had the effect intended by the adviser, unless tlie contrary be shown. Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 339. When on the trial of an indictment for murder, the killing is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing further is shown, the presumption of law is, that it was malicious, and an act of murder, and proof of matter of excuse or extenuation lies on the defendant. Commonwealth v. York, 9 Metcalf, 93. PENNSYLVANIA. The Act o^ Ap-il 22d, 1794, reciting that, whereas the design of punishment is to pre- vent the commission of crimes, and to repair the injury that hath been done thereby to society, or the individual; and it hath been found by experience, that these objects are better obtained by moderate, but certain penalties, than by severe and excessive punish- ments; and whereas it is the duty of every government to endeavour to reform, rather than exterminate offenders, and the punishment of death ought never to be inflicted where it is not absolutely necessary to the public safety; provides that No crime whatsoever, hereafter committed, except murder of the first degree, shall be punished with death in the state oi Pennsylvaniq.. And whereas the several offences which are included under the general denomination of murder, differ so greatly from each other in the degree of their atrociousness, that it is unjust to involve them in the same punishment. Sect. 1 ; 3 Dallas, 600; 3 Smith, 18C; Phr. 1th ed. 861. All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree ; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree, and the jury before whom any person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, ascertain in their verdict whether it be murder of the first or second degree; but if such person shall be convicted by confession, the court shall proceed, by examination of witnesses, to determine the de- gree of the crime, and to give sentence accordingly, lb, sect. 2. See^ost. Murder in the first and second degree. Every person liable to be prosecuted for petit treason shall in future, be indicted, pro- ceeded against, and punished as \s directed in other kinds of murder. Act of 23d April, 1829, Pamphlet, p. 341 ; Purdon, 7th ed. 861. Wheresoever any person shall be charged with involuntary manslaughter, happening in consequence of an unlawful act, it shall and may be lawful for the attorney-general, or other person prosecuting the pleas of the commonwealth, with the leave of the court, to waive the felony, and to proceed against and charge such person with a misdemeanor, and to give in evidence any act or acts of manslaughter ; and such person or persons, on conviction, shall be fined or imprisoned, as in cases of misdemeanor; or the said attor- ney-general, or other person prosecuting the pleas of the commonwealth, may charge both offences in the same indictment, in which case the jury may acquit the party of one, and find him or her guilty of the other charge. lb. sect. 8. Every person covicted of murder in the first degree, his or her aiders, abetters and counsellors, shall suffer death by hanging by the neck. Sec. 15. VOL. I. 40 454P HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. Instead of the penitentiary punishment heretofore prescribed, the punishment by solitary confinement at labour, shall be inflicted upon the several offenders- who shall, after the first day o? July next, commit and be legally convicted of any of t-he offences jiereinafter enumerated and specified; that is to say : , Every person convicted of murder in the second degree, shall be sentenced to undergo imprisonment in one of the state penitentiaries, as tlie case may be, and be kept in sepa- rate or solitary confinement at labour for the first offence, for a period of not less than lour, nor more than twelve years, and for the second offence for the period of iiis natural life, and be fed, clothed and treated as is provided in tiiis act. Every person duly convicted of voluntary manslaughter, shall be sentenced to undergo a similar confinement at labor for the first offence, for a period not less than two, nor more than six years; for a second offence for a period of not less than six, nor more tiian twelve years, under the same conditions as are expressed in the first clause of this section, and to give security on conviction either for the first or second offence, for good beliaviour during life, or for any less time, according to tlie nature and enormity of the offence. Act of 23d April, 1329, sect, i, Pamph. p. 341 ; 7th ed. Put don, 862. The act of Jl^riM 0th, 1834, provides : • - . Whenever hereafter any person shall be condemned to suffer death by hanging* for any crime of which he or she shall have been convicted, the said punishment shall be inflicted on him or her within the walls or yard of the jail of the county in which he or she shall have been convicted; and it sliall bo the diity of the sheriff or coroner of the said county to attend and be present at such execution, to which he shall invite the presence of a pliysician, attorney-general or deputy attorney-general of the county, and twelve reputable citizens, who shall be selected by the sheriff"; and the said sheriff shall, at the request of the criminal, permit such ministers of the gospel, not ex- ceeding two, as he or she may name, and any of his or her immediate relatives, to attend and be present at sucli execution, together with such officers of the prison and such of the sheriff's deputies as the said sheriff* or coroner in his discretion may think it expedient to have present, and it shall be only permitted to the persons above designated to witness the said execution: Provided, That no person under age shall be permitted on any account to witness the same. Sec. 1. After the execution, the said sheriff or coroner shall make oath or affirmation in writing, that he proceed to execute the said criminal within the walls or yard afore- said, at the time designated by tiie death-warrant of the Governor, and the same shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the court of Oyer and Terminer of the aforesaid county, and ^ copy thereof published in two or more newspapers, one at least of which shall be printed in the county where the execution took place. Sec. 2. Pamph. L. 234. I'urd. Dig. 7 ed.p. 945. Manslaughter, though distinguished by the act of 1794, into voluntary and involuntary, remains in other respects in Pennsylvania as in England. Pennsylvania v. M'Fall, Addison, 256. In order to constitute the crime of voluntary manslaughter, evidence of a positive intent to kill is not necessary; it is sufficient if there be such acts of violence as may be expected to produce great bodily harm. Involuntary manslaughter is where it plainly appears that neither death nor any great bodily harm was intended, bijt death is accidentally caused by some unlawful act, or an act not strictly unlawful in itself, but done in an unlawful manner, and without due caution. Com. v. Gable, IS. Sf R. 428. Under the act of 1794, the attorney general must prosecute involuntary rtian- siaughtcr as a misdemeanor, lliid. One who 'is indicted for murder, cannot be convicted of involuntary manslautshter ; because it is well settled that one cannot be convicted of a misdemeanor on an indict- ment for felony. Com. v. Cahle, 7 iS. Sf It. 423. Passion, arising from sufficient provocation, is evidence of the absence of malice, and reduces homicide to manslaughter; but passion, without provocation, or provocation without passion, is not sulFicieut : and when tiicre is both ]>rovocation and passion, the provocation must be sufficient. Pennsylvania v. Honeyman, Add. 149. Pennsylvania v. Bell, id. 162. In order to constitute the crime of vduntary manslaughter, evidence of a positive in- tent to kill, is not necessary; it is sufficient if there he such acts of violence as may be expected to produce great bodily harm. Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S. Sf K. '^28. Til'^liman, C. .J. Every act which apparently must do harm; which is done with intent to do harnij HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 454'« ai)d without provocation, and of which death is the consequence, is murder. Pennsylva- nia V. Honeyrnan, Add. 148. Unlawful killing, with a design to kill, is murder in the first degree; if with a design only to hurt, it is murder in the second degree. Pennsylvania v. Lewis, Add. 2B3. Premeditation is an essential ingredient to constitute murder in the first degree, under the act of 1794; but the intention slill remains the true criterion of tlie crime, and the intention of the party can only be collected from his words and actions. Respuhlica v. Mulatto Bob, 4 Dull. 146. If one, without uttering a word, should strike another on the head with an axe, this would be deemed a. premeditated violence, within the act of 1794. Ibid. With respect to tlje three modes of killing, first mentioned in the act of 1794, viz. by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of wilful and deliberate killing, the intention is the essence of the crime. But in the last enumerated mode, viz. in the perpetration of the crimes mentioned in the act, the intention is excluded as not necessary to constitute mur- der in the first degree. Com. v. Dougherty, before Rush, Pres. 1 Br. Appx. xviii. Wlierever it appears, from the whole evidence, ihat the crime was, at the moment, deliberately or intentionally executed, the killing is murder in the first degree. Ibid. It is sufficient to constitute the crime if the circumstances of wilfulness and delibera- tion were proven, although they arose and were generated at \he period of the transaction. Jbid. Pennsylvania v. McFall, Add. 257. If the party killing had time to think, and did intend to kill, for a minute, as well as an hour or a day, it is a deliberate, wiltul, and premeditated killing, constituting murder in the first degree, within the act of Assembly. Com. v. Richard Smith, Oyer and Ter- miner, Philad. 1816, before Rush, Pres., Pamphlet 231. Com. v. O'Hara, before McKean, C. J., cited ibid. The common law implied malice in every unlawful killing, and the burden of proof of extenuating circumstances lay on the defendant. Pennsylvania v. Honeyrnan, Add. 148. Pennsylvania \. Bell, id. 171. Pennsylvania v. McFall, id. 257. Pennsylvania v. Lewis ^ al., id. 282. Involuntary manslaughter is, where it plainly appears that neither death nor any great bodily harm was intended, but death is accidentally caused by some unlawful act, or an act not strictly unlawful in itself, but done in an unlawful manner, and without due caution. Ibid, Killing by a blow, in mutual conflict, without necessity either for the protection of life, or the possession of house, &c. is manslaughter. If necessary for such purpose, it is homicide in self defence. Pennsylvania v. Robertson, Add. 248. Manslaughter, though distinguished by the act of 1794, into voluntary and involuntary, remains in other respects here as in England. Pennsylvania v. McFall, Add. 256. But since the Act of 1794, the burthen of proof lies on the Commonwealth; unless the circumstances of malice are proved, it is murder only of the second degree. Co7n. v. O'Hara, ut supra. Under the Act of Assembly, an unlawful killing, though it may he presumed murder, will not be presumed murder in the Jirst degree. Pennsylvania v. Lewis, Add. 282-3. Drunkenness does not incapacitate a man from forming a premeditated design of mur- der; but as drunkenness clouds the understanding, and excites passion, it may be evi- dence of passion onl}-, and of want of malice and design. Pennsylvania v. McFall, Add. 257. If a person who has determined to take the life of another, seizes a musket to carry that intention into effect, not knowing whether it was loaded or otherwise, but with the expectation and desire that it should be, he is guilty of murder in any killing consequent upon its discharge. Cominonwealth v. Green, 1 Ashmead, 289. When a wound is not mortal in itself, but for want of proper application or from ne- glect, turns to gangrene or fever, and that gangrene or fever is the immediate cause of the death of the party wounded, the party by whom the wound was given is guilty of murder or manslaughter, according to the circumstances of the case. Ibid. To warrant a conviction of murder in the first degree, it is not essential that the weapons used should necessarily nroduce death. Com. v. Murray, 2 Ashmead, 41. When the deceased was killft by means of blows inflicted by a club not quite as thick as an axe handle, held and used by one person, and by a leather strap with a metal buckle at each end, held and used by another person, it was held that this was murder in Uie first degree. Ibid. If a pregnant woman be killed in an attempt by another person to produce abortion in 454' HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. her, this will only be murder in the second degree, IT the perpetrator did not intend to take the life of the mother. Ex parte Chauncey, 2 Ashmead, 2'27. per King, Frest. It is a fixed principle, that if, from tlie weapon or the manner of striking-, an intention to kill may or must be collected ; provocation by words only, is not sufficient to make the killing, but manslaughter. ^Pennsylvania v. Bdl, Add. 163. See 2)ost, 454, t. MARYLAND. The Act of 1809, Ch. 138, may be considered the basis of the law of homicide, and indeed of the whole criminal jurisprudence of the state of Maryland. The od Section of this Act defines murder of the first degree to be, " all murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any kind of wilfiil, deliberate, and pre- meditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to per- petrate any arson, or to burn any barn, tobacco-house, stable, warehouse, or other out- house, not parcel of any dwelling-house, having therein any tobacco, grain, hay, horses, cattle or goods, wares and merchandize, rape, sodomy, mayhem, robbery or burglary." All other murder is deemed murder of the second degree. Manslaughter is not defined in the statute, and the offence remains the same as at common law. Sec. 4tl), thus determines the punishment of these crimes. Every person convicted of murder of the first degree, his or her aiders or abettors and councillors shall suffer death by hanging ; every person duly convicted of murder in the second degree, or as acces- sory thereto, shall be confined in the penitentiary for from five to eighteen years; every person convicted of manslaughter, shall be confined in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding ten years. The Act of 1825, Ch. 93, Sec. 1, enacts that no sentence to the penitentiary shall be for less than two years. The terms of confinement with the limita- tions aforesaid, are in the discretion of the Court. Sec. 16. No conviction or attainder works corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate; nor can sentence of death be executed within less than twenty days after judgment. The Governor, in whom is lodged the pardoning and commuting power, is empowered and required to issue a warrant to the Sheriff, and appoint the day of execution. 1795, CA. 82, Sec. 1. Thougli forfeiture of estate does not result, the estate of persons sentenced to be hung is still liable, after repa- ration made to the injured party for the expenses of the State. Standing mute is equiva- lent to a plea of not guilty, and the trial proceeds as if such plea had been actually put in. Sec. 12. In all capital cases the right of cliallenge exists without cause to twenty jurors, and with cause to any number. Sec. 13. Foreigners who are indicted for an offence committed within the State, are to be tried by a jury of the county, and cannot challenge for want of foreigners on the panel returned. Sec. 15. The venue is laid in the county where the mortal stroke or poison has been given, and not where the conse- quent death occurs; unless the mortal stroke be given on Chesapeake Bay and the death take place in any county of tlie State, when the place of death becomes the venue. So where the blow and death both occur on the bay, the place of arrest is the place of trial. Sees. 17, 18, 19. The venue may be changed to an adjoining county, on suggestion sup- ported by affidavit, that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the indict- ment is found. Sec. 20. But the person moving the change, must have resided in the county at least twelve months before indictment. 1821, Ch. 244. By the Act of 1817, Ch. 72, Svc. 2, convicts confined in the penitentiary may be wit- nesses against each other for crimes committed in tlie penitentiary. No slave can be confined in the penitentiary, but when not punishable with death, ia punished with whipping, banishment, or sale into some foreign country. 1818, ch. 1^7. And a free negro after having once been an inmate of the penitentiary, may be, upon conviction of a second offence, sold into foreign bondage. 1835, ch. 200, sec. 3. The act of 1824, ch. 144, presents a new element in murder of the first degree. It is there enacted, that all murder committed in the arrest and imprisonment, or attempt to arrest or imprison, with a view to a forcible removal from the state, any free person or one entitled to freedom after a certain time, by one who knows such person to be free, shall be deemed murder of the first degree. ^ The Maryland Reports contain no cases which elucidate the law of homicide. It was, however, decided in the case of The State of Maryland v. Negro Jesse Evans, 7 Gill Sf John. 290, that where a statute creates an offence which did not exist at common law, or changes the nature or degree of an offence existing at common law, there an indictment for such an oftence must conclude ngainst the form of the statute; but if a statute only direct a dillerent mode of punishment for a common law offence, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 454' the indictment may conclude ag-ainst the peace. An indictment concluding contra pacem, charges only a violation of the common law, and with such an indictment the accused need only refer when preparing for his defence to the criminal code of the common law to ascertain what are the ingredients constituting the offence charged, and what will vindicate or excuse him. By the l[)th section of the Bill of Rights, it is the right of every man to be informed of a criminal accusation against him, and to have a copy of the indictment in due time to prepare for his defence. SOUTH CAROLINA. The acts of this State on the subject of homicide are — The act of 1821, 6 Sts. at large, 158, which makes the "malicious, wilful, and deliberate murder" of a slave, a capital felony; and punishes the killing a slave " on sudden heat tfnd passion," with fine and imprisonment. It has been decided on these acts» that the offences punished by it, contain no other ingredients than murder and manslaughter at common law, and that the common law definitions of murder and man- slaughter apply to them respectively. MS. The act of 1833, 6 -S. L. 489, abolishes branding, and substitutes fine and im- prisonment in all cases. This applies to homicide by manslaughter. The act of 1840, § 39. 7 S. L. 411, makes the master, or person having charge of a slave, responsible for the death of a slave killed when no other white person is present; but in such case, the master, or other person in charge, may exculpate himself by oath. The statute of stabbing, 1 Jac. 1, c. 8, has been made of force in South Carolina. 2S. Z/. 507. So also the .S'(s. 52. Hen. 3. c. 25; 2 S. L. 418. and all other ancient statutes, ousting murder of clergy are understood to be offeree by virtue of the general provisions oftheact of 1712, 2-S: L. 413. §2. In this State the following cases recognise the common law doctrine: The general distinction between murder and manslaughter is, that the killing in the first instance must be accompanied with malice aforethought, either express or implied. To constitute the latter, it must be the result of sudden heat and passion. State v. Toohey, 2 Rice, S. C. Dig. 104. But although this general distinction is well understood and universally admitted, yet the shades of difference are many times so small as to render them difficult to be per- ceived, and in the application of the rule to particular cases, much must always be left to the sound discretion of the court and jury. It is true in general, that when death ensues from a sudden affray, it is considered only as manslaughter; but that is where a sudden quarrel rises without any intention to kill or injure another materially, and in the course of the scuffle, after the parties are heated by the contest, one kills the other with a deadly weapon. But there is no case where an unprovoked attack has been made on a person with a deadly weapon, and death has ensued, that it has been held to be manslaughter merely because it was sudden. Such a decision would go to protect one who should fall upon another suddenly, and take his life, though actuated by the most deep-rooted malignity. There is a difference between a sudden affray and sudden attack. An affray means something like a mutual contest suddenly enacted without an appar- ent intention to do great bodily harm. But malice is implied from every unprovoked attack upon a person with a deadly weapon, without any apparent cause. Ibid. In an indictment against two persons, Michael and Martin Toohey, for murder, where the jury found one {Michael) guilty of manslaughter, and the other {Martin) guilty of murder; on a motion for a new trial on behalf of Martin Toohey, the court held, among other things, that it belonged to the jury to determine who gave the mortal blow, and observed, "Even if we admit that it was given by Michael., yet this verdict might be supported if they were acting in concert." It would only prove that they ought both to have been convicted, and the wrongful acquittal of one, would not entitle the other to exemj)lion. It is abundantly manifest that the deceased came to his death by one of these defendants, and it belonged to the jury to judge of their respective guilt. Another fact assumed by the- defendants' counsel, that the passions of tiie defendant were excited by an unintended jostle of the prisoner or his wife by the deceased, is equally unsupported by proof, and unavailing if true. In a city like Charleston, where many persons are constantly passing until a late hour of the night, the accidental im- pinging of one upon another in the dark would not authorize such a murderous attack upon him. Such iii act of itself would be a sure indication of a "depraved and wicked •454* HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. heart, void of all social duty, and fatally bent on mischief." Slate v. Toohey, 2 Rice, S. C. Digest, lOi. Every homicide must be accompanied with malice to make it murder; but so regard- ful is the law of'human life, that it presumes every homicide to be accompanied with malice, unless the contrary shall appear. Malice is said to exist whenever the circum- stances attending the homicide exhibit the feelings of a wicked heart, regardless of social duty and fatally bent on miscliief. It is inconsistent with the lessons of expe- rience, the dictates of reason, and the highest authority to conclude, because the homi- cide was committed in a passion, {furor brevis,) he was not under the influence of a wicked heart. If without provocation he let loose his angry passions, which social duty required him to control, and inflicted a death blow upon an unoffending brother, he exhibits that malevolence of heart which makes him in the language of the law, hostis humani generis. State v. Peters, 2 Rice, S. C. Digest, 105. If a slave kill his master whilst the latter is correcting him, it is murder at common law; and those present aiding and abetting arc guilty of the same offence. They would even be guilty as principals in the first degree, although the actual perpetrator himself were guilty of no crime if they made use of him as the instrument to effect their own deliberate purpose of destroying the deceased. State v. Crank, 2 Bail. Rep. 64. 2 Rice's S.C. Dig. IQC). So long as a party liable to arrest endeavours peaceably to avoid it he may not be killed; but whenever, by his conduct, lie puts in jeopardy the life of any attempting to arrest him, he may be killed, and the act may be excusable. State v. Anderson, 1 Hill, S.C. Rep. •627. If one in sudden heat of passion take the life of another, it is manslaughter, and not murder; but there must be reasonable provocation, and what will constitute it, is the principal difficulty in applying the distinction. The line which distinguishes between those provocations, which will and will not extenuate the offences, cannot be certainly defined. Such provocations as are in themselves calculated to provoke a high degree of resentment, and ordinarily induce a great degree of violence wlien compared with those which are slight and trivial, and from which a great degree of violence does not usually follow, may serve to mark the distinction. But no provocation, however grievous, will excuse from the crime of murder, where from the weapon, or the manner of the assault, an intention to kill or to do some great bodily harm was manifest. If one interfere in an aff'ray to separate the combatants, and give notice of his intent, and is slain by one of the combatants, it is nmrder. The prisoner and one W. engaged in a fight, and were separated by the deceased. Some time after tlie fight was renewed, and tlie deceased again interfered ; but being unable to take the prisoner off', called a negro to his assistance, who, in tlie act of sepa- rating the combatants, threw the prisoner against the wall. The prisoner then made at the deceased (who endeavoured to avoid him) with a knife, and inflicted a mortal blow: Held, that this was a case of murder. State v. Ferguson, 2 Hill, S. C. Rep. 619. 2 Rice's Digest, 106, 107. MURDER OF THE FIRST AND SECOND DEGREES. The murder of the common law is, in many parts of the United States, divided into murder of the first and second degrees. The distinction of murder into two degrees, is found in Pennsylvania, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Virginia, Alabama, Ten- nessee, Maryland, Michigan and Ohio. The distinctions in all these states, except Ohio and Maiyland, are substantially the same, and nearly in the same language. In Maine. — Whoever shall, unlawfully, kill any human being, with malice afore- thought, either express or implied, shall be deemed guilty of murder. — Rev. Stat.ch. 154. sect. 1. Whoever shall commit murder, with express malice aforethought, or in perpetrating, or attempting to [)cr])etrate any crime punishable with death, or imprisonment in the state prison for life, or liir an unlimited term of years, shall be deemed guilty of murder of the first degree, and shall be punished with death. — Iliid. sect. 2. Whoever shall commit murder, otherwise than is set forth in the preceding section, shall be deemed guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by impri- BOTiment for life in the state prison. — Jliid. sect. .'J. % Section 4, provides that, upon an indictment for murder, the jury shall inquire and find HISTORIA PLACITORUxM CORON.E. 454^ whether the offence be of the first or second degree, or, if confessed, the court shall make the inquiry. In New Hampshire. — All murder committed by poi>on, starvinsr, torture, or other de- liberate and premeditated killinjr, or committed in the pcqietration, or in the attempt at the perpetration of arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, is murder of the first degree; and all murder not of the first degree is of the second degree. If the jury shall find any per- son guilty of murder,they shall also find, by their verdict, whether it is of the first or second degree. — Rev. Stat. chap. 214. sect. 1. If any person shall plead guilty to an indictment for murder, the court having cogni- zance tlierecf shall determine the degree. — Ihid. sect. 2. 'J he punishment of murder in the first degree shall be death, and the punishment .of murder in the second degree shall be solitary imprisonment, not exceeding three years, and confinement to hard labour for life. — Jbid. sect. 3. In Pennsylvania. — No crime, whatsoever, hereafter committed, (except murder in the first degree,) shall be punished with death in the state of Pennsylvania. — Act 22d April, 1794. 3 Smith's Laws, 136; 7th. ed. Purdon, 861. All murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by an}' other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be com- mitted in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder siiall be deemed murder of the second degree; and the jury, before whom any person indicted for mur- der, shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, ascertain, in their ver- dict, whether it be murder in the first or -second degree; but if such person siiall be convicted by confession, the court siiall proceed, by examination of witnesses, to deter- mine the degree of the crime, and to give sentence accordingly. — Ibid. Sect. 2. See ante, p. 554." In New Jersey. — All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or bv lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in perpetrating, or attempting to perpetrate, any arson, rape, sodo^ny, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree; and the jury, before whom any person indicted for murder, shall be tried shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, designate, by their verdict, whether it be murder in the first or second decree; but if such person shall be convicted on confession, in open court, the court shall proceed, by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of the crime, and give sentence accordingly — (An act, supplementary to an act entitled, " An act for the punishment of crimes," passed the seventeenth day of February, eighteen hundred and twenty-nine, sect. 1.) Every person convicted of murder of the first degree, his or her aiders, abettors, counsellors and procurers shall suffer death; and every person convicted of murder of the second degree, shall suffer imprisonment at hard labour, for any term, not less than five, nor more than twenty years. — Sec. 2. In Virginia. — All murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by duress of imprisonment or confinement, or by starving, or by wilful, ma- licious and excessive whipi)ing, beating, or other cruel treatment or torture, or by any othor kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be conmiitted in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, or burglar}', shall henceforth be deemed murder in the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree; and the jury, before whom any person, indicted for murder, shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, ascertain, in their verdict, whether it be murder in the first or second degree; but if such person shall bo convicted by confession, the court shall proceed by examination of witnesses, to de- tcrmine the degree of the crime, and to give sentence accordingly.— iZ. C. chap. 171. sect. 2, In Alabama. — Every homicide, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which 454" HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. shall be committed in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder in the first degre(i; so, also, every homicide perpetrutcd from a premeditated design, unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being, other than him who is slain, or perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to the life of others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without any preconceived purpose to deprive of life any particular individual; and every person, guilty of murder in the first degree, shall, on conviction, sutfer death, or confinement in the penitentiary for life, at the discretion of the jury trying the same. Penal Code, chap. 111. sect. 1. Clay's Digest, 412. The next section provides that all other cases of murder, at common law, shall be murder in the second degree; and punishable by imprisonment for not less than ten years. In Tennessee, — All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in ■wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing, or shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or larceny, shall be deemed murder in the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree; and the jury, before whom any person indicted for rnurder shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, ascertain, in tiieir verdict, whether it be murder in the first or second degree; but if such person sliall confess his guilt, the court shall proceed by the empanelling of a jury and examination of testimony, to find and determine the degree of tlie crime, and to give sentence accordingly. — Act ]829, sect. 3. Laws of Tennessee, p. 316. In Michigan. — All murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait, or any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or bur- glary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree, and shall be punished with deatli; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree, and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or any term of years at the discre- tion of the court trying the same. — Rev. Stat, part 4. tit. 1. ch. 3. sect. 1. In Maryland. — All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying wait, or by any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, or to burn any barn, tobacco-house, stable, warehouse, or other out-house, not parcel of any dwelling-house, having therein any tobacco, grain, hay, horses, cattle or goods, wares and merchandize, rape, sodomy, mayhem or burglary, is murder of the first degree, and all other murder, is murder of the second degree. Act of 1809, ch, 138. In Ohio. If any person shall purposely, and of deliberate and premeditated malice, or in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, or by administering poison, or causing the same to be done, kill another, every such person shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree, and upon conviction thereof, shall suffer death. If any person shall purposely and maliciously, but without delibera- tion and premeditation, kill another, every such person shall be deemed guilty of mur- der in the second degree, and on conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the peniten- tiary, and be kept at hard labour during life. Act of March 7, 18.35, {Statutes p. 229.) These acts have not affected the meaning of the term murder, nor changed the common law doctrine, exce])ting to designate certain classes of murder, by the prefix, /irst, and all other kinds by the prefix second, and to assign to each kind of killing a distinct punish- ment — both kinds being murder, at common law. The tests by which to ascertain — mur- dcr generally being proved — to which degree; the case belongs, are to be found, either, IQ the existence of certain facts connected with the manner or circumstances of the killing, or in the condition of the mind of the accused at or before the moment of the killing. As to the former, if murder be by poison, by lying in wait, by starving, or in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, ra|)e, robbery, or burglary, &c. as set forth in the several statutes; and, as to tho latter, if it be murder, with express malice aforethought, wilful, deliberate, premeditated, &c. as also set forth in the several statutes — in eillier of these HISTORIA PLACrrORUM CORONA. 4M' cases, the killing is murder of the first degree — all other species of killing, which are murder at common law, are murder of the second degree. It'tlie killing be in either of tiie modes, or under either of the circumstances specifically mentioned in the statutes, the conclusion is inevitable that the accused is guilty of mur- der of the first degree. The chief points for discussion and decision, and the material ditHculty in applying the law to particular cases, arises under the second clause. What is deliberation, express malice aforethought, wilfulness and premeditation, and what state of facts includes a conclusion of their e.\istence? The earliest case in Pennsylvania, under the act of Assembly of 1794, (the earliest in any of the States,) is the Commonwealth v. Mulatto Boh, 4 Dallas, 137. Cliief Justice McKean presided at the trial. Judge Smith being also on the bench. It appeared that, a number of negroes being assembled, about ten o'clock at night, a quarrel arose between the prisoner and negro David, the deceased. For a while, the parties fought with fists; and the prisoner was heard to exclaim " enough." The aflTray, however, became general, and continued so for some time. When it was over, the prisoner went to a neighbouring pile of wood, and furnished himself with a club. He was advi.sed not to use it, but declared that he would, and entered the crowd witii it in his hand. After remaining there about ten minutes, he left the crowd without his club; and, again repairing to the wood-pile, took up an axe. Being, likewise, dissuaded from returning to the crowd with the axe, he said "he would do it;" and striking the instrument, with great passion, into the ground, swore tiiat he would " split down any fellows that were saucy." Accordingly, he mixed once more among the people; a struggle was immediately heard about the axe; the pri- soner then struck the deceased with it on the head; the deceased fell; and as he was attempting to rise, the prisoner gave him a second blow on the head with the sharp edge, wliicli penetrated to the brain. After languishing three days, death was the consequence of tliis wound. " From these facts," said the Ciiief Justice, in summing up the evidence, "we are to inquire what crime the prisoner has committed? Murder, in the first degree, is the wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of another. There are various inferior kinds of homicide; but, on the present indictment, our attention is confined to a conside- ration of the highest and most aggravated description of crime. Then, let us ask, did the prisoner wilfully kill the deceased ? It is not pretended that there was any accident in tlie case; and, therefore, the act must have been wilful. Was the killing deliberate and premeditated ? or was it the effect of sudden passion, produced by a reasonable pro- vocation? There had been a combat with fists; but this was over, when the prisoner, without any new provocation, first procured a club, and losing that weapon, afterwards armed himself witii an axe. It cannot surely be thought that the original combat was a sufficient provocation for tiie prisoner's taking the life of his antagonist. An assault and battery may, indeed, be resisted and repelled by a battery more violent; but the life of a fellow creature must not be taken, unless in self defence. It has been objected, however, that the amendment of our penal code, renders premeditation an indispensable ingredient to constitute murder of the first degree. But still, it must be allowed, that the intention remains, as much as ever, the true criterion of crimes, in law, as well as in ethics; and the intention of the party can only be collected from his words and actions. In the pre- sent case, the prisoner declared, that he would 'split the skull of any fellows who should be saucy;' and he actually killed the deceased in the way which he had menaced. But, let it be supposed, that a man, without uttering a word, should strike another on the head with an axe, it must, on every principle by which we can judge of human actions, be deemed a premeditated violence. The construction which is now given to the act of • assembly, on this point, must decide, whether the law shall have a beneficial or a pcrni- cious operation. Before the act was passed, the prisoner's offence would clearly have amounted to murder; all the circumstances implying that malice, which is the gist of the definition of the crime at common law: and if he escapes with impunity, under an intcrpretdtion of the act different from the one which we have delivered, a case can liardly occur to warrant a conviction for murder in the first degree. Tenderness and mercy are amiable qualities of the mind; but if they are exercised and indulged beyond the control of reason and the limit of justice, for the sake of individuals, the peace, order and happiness of society, will inevitably be impaired and endangered. As far as respects the prisoner, I lament the tendency of these observations : but as far as respects the pub. lie, I have felt it a sacred duty to submit them to your consideration" The prisoner was convicted of murder in the first degree, Resp. v. Mulatto Bob, 4 Dallas, 145. See also, Bennett v. Com. 8 Leiah, 781. In a case in Viririnia, it appeared on trial, that about nine o'clock of the morning on which the homicide was committed, the prisoner and the deceased were seen together in 454^^ HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. the streets of Dumfries, as if about 1o engag^e in a personal conflict, but before any blow they were separated. They had both remained in town from tiiat time until between one and two o'clock of the same day, but how employed it did not appear; about the latter liour, the prisoner was seen passings a tavern on the street, about four hundred yards distant from the spot wiiere the murder was committed, and. on being accosted by the witness, who was in the said tavern, he said he had been much injured by a man, whose name he knew not, who had kicked him in the face; and the witness saw on the side. of the prisoner's nose a fresh wound, from whicli the skin had been abraded to the superfi- cial extent of a four-pence-half-penny, or nine-penny piece. The prisoner seemed angry, and said he was determined to kill tiie man who had thus injured him. He then pro- ceeded on about thirty yards farther, to the house of a butcher, and calling out the wife of the butcher, who was then at dinner, told her that her fatlier (who was also concerned with her husband in the trade of a butcher,) had sent him to borrow her husband's butcher knife, whicli she immediately delivered to him. The shop where this took place was about four hundred and tliirty yards from that where the murder was committed. Upon his return in about five or six minutes from the last mentioned shop with the knife in his hand, as lie was repassing the tavern before mentioned, a short conversation took place between him and the first mentioned witness, in which lie reiterated his determination to kill the deceased, and was warned against the act by the witness. He proceeded along the same street about three hundred yards farther and stopped at the ware-room of a merchant, where he asked the young man who was in attendance, for a steel to sharpen the butcher's knife, declaring his intention to kill tlic man who had injured him. About twenty yards from the ware-room he turned into a cross street, and was heard denouncing loud threats of vengeance against the deceased, and declaring his intention to kill liim. At the further corner of tlie first square, after entering the cross street, the prisoner found the deceased on the steps of a house, with his head hanging on his breast, apparently asleep. He roused the deceased by kicking him, and as the deceased, who was unarmed, and made no attempt at resist- ance, rose, the prisoner said he had come to kill him, and as tlie deceased answered that " he reckoned no man wanted to kill him," the prisoner thrust the butcher's knife into the breast of the deceased. Tlie deceased cried out, " You have stabbed' me," and the prisoner replied, "damn you, if you don't Imsh, I will put the knife into you again." The deceased walked about one hundred and fifty yards, fell, and expired. The prisoner immediately going into a shop where he had a bundle, took it up, and walked quietly out of town to a house about two miles distant, where he was domesti- cated. To the owner of this house he related the incidents, and said he had given the deceased his death wound, and would keep out of the way some days, until he could ascertain whether or not he was dead. The prisoner and the deceased were both labor- ers. It was proved that the deceased was a turbulent man, and reputed a hard fighter. Nothing was said of the character of the prisoner. It did not appear that they had ever been together until the day preceding the death, when they were at a cock-fight; but whether they had any association there did not appear. At tl)e time of the murder the prisoner eitlier did not know, or had forgotten the name of tlie deceased. Under the charge of the court a verdict of murder in the first degree was rendered. Burgess v. Cominonivralth, 2 Virginia cases, 484. In another case under the Pennsylvarda act, it appeared that the prisoner was an hon- est and industrious man, but addicted to intoxication, and when in that state was quar- relsome. It also appeared that his wife occasionally drank too much; and that on the day of the fatal occurrence they had fallen into a drunken squabble. During the quarrel the wife threw several stones at him, one of which struck him on the arm. A few moments after they were seen struggling together, but soon after the wife was discovered fleeing with her infant in her arms, the prisoner pursuing her with an axe in his hand. When he came within reach of her he aimed a blow at her which fell on the head of the child as it lay upon the wife's shoulder, and caused a mortal wound, of which the child died. The prisoner soon recovered himself and showed many signs of repentance and manifested much distress at the manner of the child's death. The judge who tried the case, in the course of his charge to the jury, said, "We now come to this point: — what was the intention of the jirisoncr at the bar, when he killed Daniel DougliCrty, his child ? for, if his intent was to kill his wife, and killing iier would have been murder in the first degree, killing his child will also be murder in the same degree; as nnich as if he had prepared a cup of poison for his wife and his child had drank it. You, however, are in this case to judge of the law and facts. If you are of opinion the injury the prisoner received from ids wife throwing stones at him, and hitting, him, kept HISTORIA PLACITORUIM CORONiE. 454' his passion boiling until he g^ave the fatal blow, we think it your duty to find him g-nilty of manslaughter. But if you are of the opinion his passion had time to cool, or in fact had cooled, after the assault on him by his wifr, it is your duty to convict him of murder in tlie first degree." The verdict was manslaugiiter. Cojiunonicealih v. Dougherty^ 7 Smithes Laics, 695. In Tennessee, a verdict of murder in the first degree was sustained, where it appeared that the deceased was killed on the night of the 3d of October, 1841 ; that the prisoner and he had had angry difficulties from a period long anterior up to the time of the commission of the offence, which resulted from mutual wrongs done or charged; that the prisoner accused the deceased of having harboured his wife, to his great personal injury, and the deceased accused him of having fired his house; that on the 11th day of September, 1841, not many days before the murder, the prisoner left the country in a steamboat, with threats in his mouth of vengeance for his injuries, which he declared he would have before he left; that one week before the murder, he returned and kept himself so concealed that but one person saw him certainly, others saw what they took to be his tracks, and one, a person in. disguise, whom he supposed might have been him; that on the night the deceased took possession of the building which had formed the subject of tiie controversy between them, he was killed, cowardly and treacherously ; and that the prisoner immediately fled the country again, and being captured at Memphis, denied that he had been in the County of Obion since his first departure on the 11th of September, but admitted that he had returned up the river to within fitly miles of the residence of the deceased. Stone \. The State, 4 Humphrey, 34. Murder in the second degree includes all cases of deliberate homicide where the inten- tion is not to take life, of which, homicide by a workman throwing timber from a house into the street of a populous city, without warning, or pf a person shooting at a fowl, animo furandi. and killing a man, are instances frequently given. Whiteford v. Coin. 6 Randolph, 7"21; There may, also, be cases where death ensues during a riotous affray, under circumstances which would constitute murder at common law, but which, in consequence of the want of a specific intent to take life being shown, amount but to murder in the second degree. Thus, where it appeared that the deceased, during the riots in Philadelphia in 1844, was killed while a desultory fire was going on, the object of which was to prevent either of two contending parties from taking possession of a position which both of them were desirous of obtaining, it was said that a homicide, oonmiitted under such circumstances, though murder at common law, deliberation being shown, might not be murder in the first degree, and a verdict of murder in the second degree was consequently rendered. King, Pres't, who tried the case, how- ever, charged the jury, "that if one or more of the parties sO engaged in an unlawful combat, deliberately fire at and kill an innocent tiiird person, taking no part in tiie con- flict, liaving no just reason to regard him as one of the belligerents, such killing would be murder of the first degree. It would present the case of a wilful, deliberate and pre- meditated killing, perpetrated with an instrument likely to take life, rendering the actual perpetrators guilty of the highest grade of crime known to our criminal code. If the testimony, in your judgment," he said, " brings clearly home to the defendant such a charge, he should be convicted. If, however, the commonwealth has not fully satisfied your minds in the affirmative of this position, or if the proofs adduced by the defen- dant have rebutted this allegation, or thrown a fair doubt upon its certainty, you ought not and cannot justly convict him of that part of the charge involving capital punish- ment." Com. V. Hare, 4 Penns. Laic Jour. 401. If a pregnant woman be killed in an attempt to produce abortion in her, and it appears that the design of the operator was not to take the life of the mother, it is mur- der in the second degree. Ex parte Chauncey, 2 Ashnead, 227. Wherever the deliberate intention is to take life, and death ensues, it is murder in the first degree ; wherever it is to do bodily harm, or other mischief, and death ensues, it is murder in the second degree; while the common law definition of manslaughter remains unaltered. But however clear may be the distinction between the two degrees, juries not untrequcntly make use of murder in the second degree as a compromise, when they believe murder to have been committed, but are unwilling, in consequence of circum- stances of mitigation, to expose the defendant to its full penalties. In such cases courts are not disposed to disturb verdicts, but permit them to stand, though technically incor- rect. Thus, where S. having conceived and declared a design to kill P., the parties met afterwards in front of S.'s own house, and a quarrel ensued, in which S. gave the first offence; Pi proposed a fight; upon which S. retired for a very brief ti^ue into 454^ HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. his house, armed himself witli a loaded pistol, which he concealed in his pocket, and instantly returned so armed to the scene of quarrel; then P. threw a brickbat at S, which did not hit him, but falling short of him, broke, and a small fragment struck S.'s child, standing within his own door, who cried out, and his hearing his child cry out, but without looking to see whether he was hurt or not, exclaimed, '* he has killed my cliild and I will kill him," advanced towards P. deliberately aimed and fired the pistol at him, then retreating with his face towards S., and the shot took effect and killed P. A verdict of murder in tiie second degree being rendered, the court refused to set it aside. Slaughters v. Com, 11 Leigh, 682. There are, however, certain features which, in cases of deliberate homicide, draw forth, generally from the courts instructions to the jury that by them a deliberate intent to take life is shown. Where a man makes use of a weapon likely to take life; where he declares his intentions to be deadly; where he makes preparations for the concealing of the body; where, before the death, he lays a train of circumstances which may be calculated to break the surprise, or bafHe the curiosity which would probably be occa- sioned by it; wJiere, in any way, evidence arises which shows a harboured design against the life of another; — such evidence goes a great way to fix the grade of homicide at murder in tlie first degree; as in Resp. v. Mulatto Boh, quoted ante, 454.^" Where a man loaded a pistol, took aim at, and shot another, it was held murder in the first degree. Com. V. Smith, 7 Smith's Laws, 6'J6. If one man shoot another through the head with a musket or pistol ball, — if he stab him in a vital part with a sword or dagger, — if he cleave his skull with an axe or the like, — it is almost impossible for a reflecting and intelligent mind to come to any other conclusion than that the perpetrator of such acts of deadly violence intended to kill. Com. v. Daily, 4 Penn. Law Journal, 157. Where the defendant delib- erately procured a butcher's knife, and sharpened it for the avowed purpose of killing the deceased; Com. v. Burgess, 2 Va. Cases, 484; where lie concealed a dirk in his breast, stating, shortly before the attack, that he knew where the seat of life was; BennetVs case, 11 Zi(io-/i, 749; where he thrust a hand-spike deeply into the forehead of the deceased; Swan v. State, 4 Humphrey, 139; the presumption was held to exist, that the killing was wilful. See U. S.\. Cornell, 2 Mason, 94; Woodside v. State, 2 Howard, 656; State v, Tuohey,2 Rice''s Digest, 104; Com. v. Webb, 6 Randolph, 121. But it is not necessary, to warrant a conviction of murder in tlie first degree, that the instrument should be such as Would necessarily produce death. Thus, where the weapon of death was a club not so thick as an axe-handle, the jury, under the charge of the court, rendered a verdict of murder in the first degree, it appearing that the blow was induced by a deliberate inten- tion to take life. Com. v. Murray, 2 Ashmead, 57. The same presumption of intention is drawn with still greater strength from the declared purpose of the defendant. Thus, where the prisoner, a negro, said he intended " to lay for the deceased, if he froze, the next Saturday night," and where the homicide took place that night; Jim v. State, 5 Humphrey, 174; where it was said, "I am determined to kill the man who injured me;" Com. v. Burgess, 2 Va. Cases, 484; where the prisoner had declared, the day before the murder, that he would certainly shoot the deceased; Com. v. Smith, 7 Smit.h''s Laws, 697; where, in another case, the language was, " I will split down any fellow that is saucy;" Com. v. Mulatto Bob, 4 Dallas, 146; where the prisoner rushed rapidly to the deceased, and aimed at a vital part; Com. v. O'Hara, 7 Smith's Laws, 694; where a grave had been prepared a short time before the homicide, though the deceased was not ultimately placed in it, the whole plan of action being changed; Com. v. Zephon, Oyer Sf Term. Phila. July, 1844, MSS. Wharton's Am. C. L. 289; in each of these cases it was lield murder in the first degree. It must be noticed that premeditation, in the eye of the law, has no defined limits; and if a design be but the conception of a moment it is as deliberate, so fiir as judicial examination is concerned, as if it were the plan of years. If the party killing had time to think, and did intend to kill, for a minute, as well as an hour or a day, it is a deliberate, wilful, and premeditated^ killing, constituting murder in the first degree. Com. v. Smith, 7 Smith's Laws, 697. In an early ciise in Tennessee, it is true, it was said that a previous intent to take life must be positively shown; Mitchell v. Slate, 5 Yerger, 340.; but such is not the opinion which now obtains even in that state. State v. Anderson, 2 Tenness. 6; Dale v. State, 10 Yerger, 551. If the accused, as he ajiproached the deceased, and first came within view of him at a slmrt distance, then formed the design to kill, and walked up with a quick pace, and killed him without any |)rovoeation then, or recently received, it is mur- der in the first degree. Whiteford v. ('om. 6 Randolph, 721; Anthony v. State, 1 Meigs, 265; Resp. v. Mulatto Boh, 'I Vullus, 1 16. " It is true," as was said in a late case, "the act says the killing must be wilful, deliberate, and premeditated. But every intentional HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 454** act is, of course, a wilful one, and deliberation and premeditation simply mean that the act was done with reflection, was conceived beforehand. No specific length of time is required for such deliberation. It would be a most difficult task for human wit to furnish any safe standard in this particular. Every case must rest on its own circumstances. The law, reason, and common sense unite in declaring' that an apparently instantaneous act may be accompanied with such circumstances as to leave no doubt of its being' the result of predetermination." Com. v. Daley, 4 Penn. Law Journal, 156; Davis v. State, S Humphrey, 439. It is not necessary, nor is it the practice to desigriate the grade of homicide in the in- dictment, nor that tlie killing should be charged to be wilful, deliberate, and premedi- tated. Com. V. VV'tc/rs, 2 Va. Cases, 387; Mitchell v. Slate, .5 Yerger, 340 ; Com. v. Flan. nagan, 8 Watts «.5" ^^rg. 415 ; Com. v. White, 6 Binney, 183 ; Com. v. Miller, 1 Va. Cases, 3lO; Com. v. -Gilbert, 2 Va. Cases, 70. So if murder be committed in the perpetration of arson, rape, burglary, or robbery, it is not necessary that it should be so set out in the indictment. Com. v. Flannagan, 8 Watts Sf Serg. 415. In Pennsylvania it is not neces- sary that the indictment should conclude, contrary to the form of the act of assembjj/', &,c. Com. V. White, 6 Binney, 183. On an indictment for murder, perpetrated by means of poison, a verdict finding the prisoner "guilty in manner and form as stated in the in- dictment," is as correct as of murder in the first degree, and sufficient to authorize the judgment of death. Com. v. Earl, 1 Wharton, 525. In Maine, the same line of distinction seems to have been taken as appears in the fore- going cases. In the case of The Commonwealth v. Vurney, Shepley, J., charged the jury that they could find either of four verdicts, not guilty, guilty of manslaughter, guilty of murder in the second degree, or murder in the first degree. " If it was proved that the prisoner killed Otis, the burden was upon him to reduce the offence from murder. The distinction between murder in the first and second degree was, that it must be proved that the deed was done with express malice, and with an intent to take life. Murder in the second degree might be found where there was no intention to take life, but it was taken not upon a mutual combat or sudden provocation, but in an assault made in consequence of preconceived anger or resentment, although not amounting to an intention to kill. That, in this case, to reduce the offence to manslaughter, the prisoner must satisfy them, or they must be satisfied from the facts proved by the government, that the assault was not the result of preconceived anger, but upon some new and sudden provocation given at the time, or in the mutual combat. If the prisoner went there for the purpose of flog- ging the deceased, and did make the assault accordingly, and there was no sutiicient pro- vocation to excite him anew, and no mutual combat, then, although he did not intend to kill, he would be guilty of murder in the second degree." Com.\. Varney, 8 Boston Law, R.5i2. Vide Wh. Am. C. L. 287-290, where the above cases are collected. The distinction taken, in Ohio, between murder in the first and murder in the second degree, is different from that which obtains in other States. Thus it was said, in a charge by Judge Wrisht ; "To convict of mudder in the first degree, you must, in addition to the points I have mentioned, be satisfied, 1. That the prisoner perpetrated the act purposely. 2. That he did it with intent to kill. 3. That he did it of deliberate and premeditated malice. To constitute deliberate and premeditated malice, the intention to do the injury must have been deliberated upon, and the design to do it formed, before the act was done, though it is not required that either should have been for any considerable time before. This supposes the party, by reflec- tion, understood what he was about to do, and intended to do it in order to do harm. If these things are all proved; and you find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, you need examine- no further. If not proven to your satisfaction, you will then examine further. To convict of murder in the second degree, you must be satisfied of the general facts common to all the offences, which I have stated, and also of the follow- ing: I. That the prisoner perpetrated the act purposely and maliciously ; 2, with intent to kill; and 3, without deliberation or premeditation. If you are not satisfied of the con- currence of these facts, you should acquit him of murder in the second degree, and will be under the necessity of examining further." State v. Turner, Wright, 2Q; State v. Town, Wright, 75 ; State v. Gardiner, Wright, 392. To constitute the crime of murder in the first degree, when the purpose to maliciously kill, with premeditation and deliberation, is found, the leno^th of time between the design so formed and its execution, is immaterial. Shoemoher v. State, 12 Stanton, 43. If the jury do not in a murder case specify in their verdict whether they find the pri. 454^" HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. soner guilty of murder in the first or second degree, or of manslaughter, the court will refuse to pass sentence, and award a new trial, even if not asked for. State v. Town, Wright, 75. In Kentucky, a statute was passed in 1801, 2 Morehead S^ Brown, 1267, by which a similar distinction was supposed to have been created, but at the next session of the legislature it was enacted that the former statute should not be so construed as " in any way to alter or cliange the idea of murder, as it stands at common law." Ibid. 1281. See Wharton's Am. Cr. L. p. 287-292, where most of the statutes and cases are col- lected. [ 455 ] CHAPTER XXXVII.j CONCERNING MURDER BY MALICE IMPLIED PRESUMPTIVE, OR MALICE IN LAW. I HAVE before distinguished malice implied into these kinds : 1. When the homicide is voluntarily committed without provocation. 2. When done upon an officer or minister of justice. 3. When done by a per- son, that intends a theft or burglary, &c. 1. Therefore touching the former of these. When one voluntarily kills another without any provocation, it is murder, for the law presumes it to be malicious, and that he is hoslis humaiii genet-is ;[1] it remains therefore to be inquired, what is such [1] The killing being proved, the inference is, that it was malicious, and that the party is guilty of murder, and it is for the accused to show the circumstances which justify, extenuate, or excuse the act; and this is accordant with the ordinary rule of evidence, that the party alleging the afHrmative must prove it — a rule which usually ap- plies in criminal as in civil cases. Kclyns;, 27, 1 East, P. C. 224, 340; 4 Bl. Com. 20i; Roscoe Cr. Ev. (2tZ ed.) 20; The King v.^Onelij, 2 Ld. Ray. 149.3, and 2 Strange, 773; Mitchell V. The State, 5 Yergcr, 340; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 PicA, 484 ; Kespub. lica V. Mulatto Bob, 4 Dallas, 146; Mackalley's case, 9 Co. 67 h; Mavgridge^s case, Kelynt) otherwise it had been, if it had been upon an Habere facias possessionem, (l) 2. But it was manslaughter, because he knew him to be a bailiff. But 3. Had he not known him to be a bailiff, or one that came upon that business, it had been no felony, because done in defense of his house. P. 15. Car. B. JR.{m) But if a sheriff enter the house by the outward door open, he or his bailiff may break open the inward doors, tho the process r459 ] be without a Non omittas, and therefore the killing of him in such case is murder. Af. 17. Jac. B. R. White and JVilt- shire.(n) If the sheriff or bailiff have once laid hands upon the prisoner, and so began his execution, he may break open the outward doors to take him, Sir William Fishers csLse,{o) and if the warrant be directed to five bailiffsjtwo or three may make execution; resolved in White's case, ubi supra. Upon a warrant against a felon, or one that hath dangerously wounded another, or for surety of the peace, or good behaviour, the constable may break open the door where the offender is, Dalt. cap^ 78. (p) and so may the sheriff or his bailifi' upon a Capias ntlega- ium, Capias pro fine, or other process for the king, if not opened upon demand. The constable of the vill of .^. comes into the vill of B. to sup- press some disorder, and in the tumult the constable is kild in the vill of B. this is only manslaughter, because he had no authority in B. as constable. But it seems, that if the constable of the vill of ^. had a particu- lar precept from a justice of peace directed to him by name, or by the name of the constable of J^. to suppress a riot in the vill of B. or to apprehend a person in the vill of B. for some misdemeanor, and within the jurisdiction and conusance of the juslice of peace, and in pursuance of that warrant he go to arrest the party in B. and in exe- cution of his warrant is killed in B. this is murder ; for tho, in such (A) 9 Co. 69. a. (m) Cro. Car. 537. W. Jones, 420. (i) Cro. Car. 183. («) I'almer 5-2. (k) 5 Co. 92. 6. Semayne's case. . (o) Cited in White's case, Palmer 53. (/) 5 Co. 91. b. {!>) New Edit. cap. 121. p. 426. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 459 case, it seems the constable was not bound to execute the warrant out of his jurisdiction, neither could he do it singly virtute officii, as constable of A. yet he may do it as baihff or minister by virtue of the warrant, artd the kilHn§ of him is murder, as well as if he had been constable of the hundred wherein J2. and B. lie, or sheriff of the county ; for a justice of peace may for a matter within his juris- diction issue his warrant to a private person, as servant ; but then such person must shew his warrant, or signify the contents of it. 14 H. 8. 16. a. And altho the warrant of the justice be not in strictness lawful, as if it express not the cause particularly enough, [460] yet if the matter be withiti hisjurisdiction as justice of peace, the killing of such officer in execution of his warrant is murder; for in such case the officer cannot dispute the validity of the warrant, if it be under seal of the justice. 14 H. 8. 16. If A. and B. are constables of the vill of C. and there happens a riot or quarrel between several persons, Ji. joins with one party, and commands the adverse party to keep the peace, B. joins with the other party, and in like manner commands the adverse party to keep the peace, and the assistants and party of A. in the tumult kill B. it. seems that this is but manslaughter, and not murder, in as much as the officers and their assistants were one engaged against the other, and each had as much authority as the other. But if the sheriff having a writ of Habere facias possessionem against the house and lands of A. and */i. pretending it to be a riot upon him, gain the constable of the vili to assist him, and to suppress the sheriff or his baihffs, and in the conflict the constable is killed, this is not so much as manslaughter ; but if any of the sheriff's offi- cers were killed, it is murder, because the constable had no authority to encounter the sheriff's proceeding or acting by virtue of the king's writ. If a constable, or tithing-man, or watchman be in execution of his office, and be killed, it is murder; and in all cases of implied malice, or malice in. law, the indictment need not be special, but general ex malitiu sua prsecogitatd interfecit tS* murdravit, and the malice in law maintains the indictmant. 9 Co. Rep. 68. Mackally^s case. But now toucliing the point of notice. 1. It is not necessary to make it murder, that the party killing know the person of the bailiff, constable, or watchman. 2. If he be a h-d^xW'S. jurus cS* conns, it seems there is no necessity for him to notify himself to be such by express words, but it shall be ;)resumed that the offender knew him, as it seems by the book 9 Co. Bep. 69. b. Mdckally^s case ; qusere. 3. But if it be a private baililf, either the party must know that he is so, as in Pew\s case before, or there must be some [ 461 ] such notific»ation thereof, whereby the party may know it, as by saying, / an-est you, which is of itself sufficient notice, and it is at the peril of the party, if he kill him after these words, or words to that effect pronounced, for it is murder, if de facio it 461 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. falls out, that he were a bailiff, and had a warrant. 9 Co. Rep. iibi 4. A constable coming to appease a sudden afTray in the day time in the village, whereof he is constable, it seems every man e.r officio is bound to take notice that he is the constable, because he is to be chosen and sworn in the leet, where all resiants are to attend, 4 Co. Rep. 40. b. Youns;''s case \{q) but it is not so in the night-time, unless there be some notification, that he is the constable. 5. But whether it be in the day or night, it is sufficient notice, if he declare himself to be the constable, or command the peace in king's name, and the like for any that come in his assistance, or for a watchman, &c. and therefore, if any of them are killed after such a notification, it is murder in them that kill him. 9 Co. Rep. 68. b. Mackalhfs case. And these dijTerences may be collected out of the books, 4 Co. Rep. 40. YoiiJig^s case. '» Et en cest case fuit tenus per totani cu- riam, que si sur affray fait le constable and autres en son assist- ance veignont a suppresser le affray & a preserver le peace, & en fesant lour office le constable ou ascun de ses assistants spit tue, ceo est murder en ley, coment que le murderer ne scavoit le party, que fuit tue, & coment que le affray fuit sodein, pur ceo que le con- stable & ses assistants veigne per authoritie del ley pur le garder del peace & a preventer le danger, que poit ensuer per le infreinder de ceo, & pur ceo le ley adjudgera ceo murder, & que le murderer avoit malice prepense, pur ceo, que il oppose luy mesme enconter le justice del realme, & issint de le viscont, ou son bailili^, [ 462 ] ou watchman en fesant son office." And 9 Co. Rep. 69. Mackally''s case, where it was objected, that the serjeant at mace did not show his mace, whereby the offender might know him to be an officer; yet it was ruled, that the killing of him was murder, 1. Because it was found, that he was serviens ad clavam, juratvs 4* cognitufi, and a hdiW'i^ ju7ms 8^- conns need not show his. warrant, tho demanded, nor another bailiff without demand ; and when the books speak of ?ih^'\\\Q jurus <§• conus, it is not necessary that he be known to the party arrested, but it is sufficient if he be commonly known. 2. " Si notice fuit requisite il done sufficient notice, quant il dit jeo toy arrest in le nosme le roy, cVc. Et le party a son peril doit luy obeyer, & sil nad loyall garrant, il poit aver son action de faux imprisonment, issint que in cest case sans question le serjant ne besoigne a monstrc son mace, car sils serra chase a monstre lour mace, ceo serra warning al party destre arrest a fuer. H. 24 (5' 25 Car. 2. A groat number of persons assembled in a house called Sissinghurst iu Kent, issued out and committed a great riot and battery upon the possessors of the wood adjacent. One of • ' (5) The reason here pivcn by our author is not mentioned in tliivS case, but it is tljere held, that a person's acting as constable is a sufficient notification, altho the party do not otherwise know him to be so. HISTORTA PLACITORUM CORONA. 462 their names, viz. A. was known, the rest were not known ; a war- rant was obtain'd from a justice of peace to apprehend the said Jl. and divers other persons unknown, which were all together in Sis- smghnrst-fiouse. The constable, with abont sixteen or twenty called to his assistance, came with the warrant to the house, and demanded entrance, and acquainted some of the persons within, that he was the constable, and came with tlie justice's warrant, and demanded A. with the rest of the offenders, that were then in the house, and one of the persons within came and read the warrant, but denied admission to the constable, or to deliver A. or any of the malefactors, but going in commanded the rest of the company to stand to their staves: the constable and his assistants fearing mis- chief went away, and being about five rod from the door, B. C. D. E. F. 6,'c. about fourteen in number, issued out and pursued the constable and his assistants; the constable commanded the peace, yet they fell on and kild one of the assistants of the con- stable, and wounded others, and then retired into the house [ 463 J to the rest of their company, which were in the house, whereof the said A. and one G. that read the warrant, were two, for which the said A. B. C. D. E. F. G. and divers others were in- dicted of murder, and tried at the king's bench bar, wherein these points were unanimously agreed. 1. That altho the indictment were, that B. gave the stroke, and th^ rest were preseut, aiding and assisting, tho in truth C. gave the stroke, or that it did not appear upon the evidence, which of them gave the stroke, but only that it was given by one of the rioters, yet that evidence was sufficient to maintain the indictment, for in law it was the stroke of all that party, according to the resolution in MackaUy\^ case, 9 Co. Rep. 67. b. 2. That in this case all, that were present and assisting to the rioters, were guilty of the death of the party slain, tho they did not all actually strike liim, or any of the constable's company. 3. Thai those within the house, if they abetted or counselled this riot, were in law present, aiding, and assisting, and principals as well as those that issued out and actually coiumitted the assault, for it was but within five rod of the house, and in view thereof, and all done as it were in the same instant ; vide lord Dacre's case before. 4. That here was sufficient notice, that it was the constable before the man was killed, 1. Because he was constable of tlie same vill. 2. Because he notified his business at the door before the assault, viz. that he came with the justice's warrant. 3. Be- cause after his retreat, and before the man slain, the constable com- manded the peace, and notwithstanding it, tiie rioters fell on, and kild the party. 5. It was4-esolved, that the killing of the assistant of the constable was murder, as well as the killing of the constable himself. 6. That those, that came in the assistance of the constable, tho not 463 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. specially called thereunto, are under the same protection as they that are called to his assistance by name. 7, That altho the constable retired with his company upon the not delivering up of .^. yet the killing of the assistant of the con- ["4643 stable in that retreat was murder. 1. Because it was one continued act in the pursuance of his office, his retiring was as necessary, when he could not attain the effect of his warrant, and was in effect a continuation of the execution of his office, and under the same protection of the law, as his coming was. 2. Principally, because the constable in the beginning of the assault, and before the man was stricken, commanded the peace, and is all one with Yunge''s case. 8. It seems, that tho the constable had not commanded the peace, yet when he and his company came about what the law allowd them, and, when they could not effect it fairly, were going their way, that the rioters pursuing them, and killing one, was murder in them all, because it was done without provocation, for they were peace- ably retiring ; but this point was not stood upon, because there was enough upon the former point to convict the offenders, and in the conclusion the jury found nine of them guilty, and acquitted those within, not because they were absent, but because there was no clear evidence, thattliey consented to the assault, as the jury thought, and thereupon judgment was given against the nine to be hanged: and note, that the award was for the marshal to do execution, be- cause they were remanded to the custody of the marshal, and he is the immediate officer of the court, and precedents in cases of judg- ment given in the king's bench have commonly run, Et dictum est 7narescallo, 4'C. qnod faciat executionem periculo incu7nbente.{r) At Newgate in Lent vacation, 26 Car. 2. the case was thus : five persons committed a robbery about Hoxinslow-heath in Middlesex, viz. Jackson and four others, the party robbed raised hue and cry, the country pursued them, and at Hampstead Jackson one of the five turned upon his pursuers, the rest being in the same field, and having often resisted the pursuers, and refusing to yield, killd one of the pursuers, by five judges then present it was ruled. 1. That this was murder, because the country, upon hue and cry levied, are authorized by law to pursue and apprehend the malefactors; and ia this case here was a felony done, and a felony done by those per- sons, that were thus pursued. 2. Tliat altho there was no warrant of a justice of peace to raise hue and cry, and tho there was no con- stable in the pursuit, yet the hue andcrywas a good warrant in law (r) And thus it was in the case of the Althoes, T. 9. Geo. I. B. R. who were convicted of a barbarous jiiurdcr in Pemhroknshirc, at Hertford assizes, being the next English county ; the indictment was removed by Certiorari into the iunliceman had died, this would have been murder. The case would not have been altered had the policeman, without 1 emg called upon, gone in of his own accord upon hearing any noise at such a time of night; as thereby he would not only have acted within the Ime of his duty, but have been guilty of a breach of it had he done otherwise; and in this case, any blow given after the above occurrences, with a cutting instrument, would be precisely the same as if it had beeri given witliout any thing having been done by the policeman. Rex v. Herns, 1 C ^ P. 312. So when a policeman saw the prisoner playing the bagpipes, in a street, at half past eleven o'clock at night, by which he collected a large crowd round him, among whom were prostitutes and thieves, and the policeman told him he could not be allowed to play at that time of night, and he must go on, but he said he would be damned if he would, and the policeman took hold of him by the shoulder, and slightly pushed him, on which the prisoner wounded him with a razor; it was held that if the prisoner was col- 465 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. III. The third kind of malice implied is in relation to the person kiUing. \i A. come to rob B. in his house, or upon the highway, or oth^r- lectinor a crowd of persons al tliat time of night, and the policeman desired him to go on, and laid his hand upon Jiis shoulder with that view only, he did not exceed liis duty, and if the prisoner then wounded him, it would have been murder if he had died; but if the policeman gave the prisoner a blow and knocked him down, he was not justified in so doing. Reg. v. Hagan, 8 C. 4-. F. 167. It is a general rule that, when persons have authority to arrest or imprison, and using the proper means for that purpose, are resisted in so doing, and killed, it will be mur- der in all who take part in such resistance. Foster, 270. But three things are to be attended to in matters of this kind; the legality of the deceased's authority, the legality of the niamier in which he executed it, and the defendant's knowledge of that authority; for if an officer be killed in attempting to execute a writ or warrant invalid on the face of it, (or if issued with a blank in it and the blank afterwards filled up; or if issued with an insufficient description of the defendant. 1 East. P. C 310. Hoiisin v. Barrow, 6 T. R. 122. Rex v. Wimcick, 8 T. R. 454 ; Rex v. Hood, 1 Moudy, C. C. 81 ;) or against a wrong person, or out of the district in which alone it could legally be executed ; or if a private person interfere and act in a case where lie has no authority by law to do so; or if the defendant have no knowledge of the officer's business, or of the intention with which a private person interferes, and the officer or private person be resisted or killed ; the killing will be manslaughter only. Jerv. Arch. Crim. Law, 9th ed. 429. But when any officer is in the legal execution of" his duty, or a private person endeavouring to sup- press an affray, or apprehend a felon, and is resisted and killed ; if it appear that the slayer knew the officer's business or the intent of the private person, either expressly from the deceased, or impliedly from the circumstances, {R, v. Howarth, 1 Mood, C. C. 207,) the killing is murder; if it appear he was ignorant in this respect, it is manslaughter only. 1 Hawk. c. 31. ss. 49, 50; Fast. 310. So if a constable having a charge of felony against a defendant, take him without a warrant, and the defendant, knowing the constable, kill him, it will be murder, even though the constable do not tell him of the charge, and the defendant, in fact, has done nothing for which he is liable to be arrested. R. v. Woolmer, R. 4- M. C. C. 334. If a constable show his staff of office, this, it seems, is a sufficient intimation of his authority. Post. 311. And in such a case it is not necessary to prove the deceased's appointment as constable; proof that he was accustomed to act as constable is sufficient. 1 East, P. C. 315. But private persons, when they interfere, must expressly intiihate their intention, otherwise killing them will be manslaughter only. Foster, 310, 311. An officer is justified in arresting on a charge of felony, though the charge does not in terms specify all the particulars necessary to constitute the felony. Rex v. Ford, R. S( R. 329, But where a constable attempted to arrest a man while in a privy, without ariy charge having been made against him, but upon a simple direction to take him; where- upon the man immediately stabbed the constable; it was holden, by a majority of the judges, that, as the actual arrest would have been illegal, the attempt to arrest when the defendant was in such a situation that he could not get away, and when the waiting to give notice miglit have enabled the constable to make the arrest, was such a provocation as reduced the ofience to manslaughter only. Rex v. Thompson, R. 6f M. 80. A consta- ble who had verbal orders from the magistrates to apprehend all thiinble-riggers, at- tempted to apprehend the defendant and iiis companions, who were playing at thimble- rig, in a public fair, and succeeded in apprehending one of his companions, whotn the defendant rescued, and afterwards, in the evening, seeing the defendant in a public house, endeavoured to apprehend him, telling that he did so for what he had been doing in the fair; the defendant escaped into a [>rivy, and the constable calling others to his assistance, broke open tiie l)rivy and attempted to apprehend the prisoner, who stabbed one of the party; a conviction for feloniously cutting and maiming was held wrong. R. v. Gard- ner, 1 Mood. C. C. 390. A [>olice officer found N. witli potatoes under his shirt, which had been recently dug from the ground, and apprehended him. The policeman called O. to assist him : O. did so; and a rescue being attempted, O. was struck by A, who went away, and O. was afterwards killed by other persons who attempted the res- cue: — Held by the judges that the police officer had no right to apprehend iV.'and that the killing of O., tlierefore, did not amount to murder, and that, on an indictment for niurder, A. could not be cpnvicted of an assault. Reg. v. Phelps, 1 Car, Sf M. 180. If a HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 465 wise, without any precedent intention of killing him, yet if in the attempt, either without or upon the resistance of B. A. kills B. this is murder. Co. P. C. p. 52. constable take a man without warrant, upon a chargfc which gives him no authority to do so, and the prisoner run away, and is pursued by J. S. who was with the constable all the time, and charged by him to arrest, and the man kill J. S, it is manslaughter only, because the arrest was iliegal, and J. S. ought to have known it; and, therelbrc, the at- tempt to retake the prisoner was illegal also. R. v. Ciirvun, R. ^- M. 132. If a warrant commanding the arrest of an individual in the name of the State have no eeal, it is void. If an officer attempt to arrest the party named upon such authority, he proceeds at his peril, and is a wrong doer; and if he be killed in the attempt bv the party, the shiycr is guilty of manslaught.er and not murder. Tackete v. The Slate, 3 Yerger, 392. If any one, under color or claim of authority, unlawfully arrest or actually attempt or offer to arrest another, and this latter, in liis resistance, kills the aggressor, it will be no more than manslaughter. Com. v. Drevj, 4 Mass. 39 1 . The same principle applies where one, not a stranger, aids the injured party by endeavoring to rescue him, or to pre- vent an unlawful arrest, when actually attempted. Ibid.; and see U. S. v. Trovers, per Story, J. 2 Wlieeler''s C. C. 509. Where an affray had taken place, and a quarterly ser- geant appeared and ordered the wranglers to desist, and on their not doing so, reported to the orderly Serjeant, who called at tlic room, and ordered the persons engaged to the guard-house, but the prisoner remained behind on some pretence connected with his clothes, and when the serjeant was temporaril}' absent declared he would be the death of any one who attempted to take him to the guard-house, retired to a corner of the room where a number of unloaded muskets had been left, loaded one, and when the serjeant entered, with another, accosted him, ''Stand off; if you approach, I will take your life." He immediately afterwards fired, and mortally wounded the sergeant and his companion. The case depended on the question whether or no at the time the defendant was legally liable to arrest, and the court. Story, J. and Davis, J., charged the jury if such was the case, the offence was manslangiiter, if otherwise, murder. 2 Wheeler''s C. C. 405. Where an officer of a British ship of war, in the year 1769, attempted, without a speci;il warrant, to impress several seamen in a., Massachusetts merchant vessel, and was killed in the attempt, it was held but manslaughter, the deceased acting without authority. Case of the Crew of the Pitt packet, 4 Boston Law Reporter, 369. \yharton''s Atn, C. L. 236. If a person be impressed who is not a proper object of impressment, or if the impress- ment be made without any legal warrant, it is lawful for the party to make resistance; and if the death of any of the parties concerned ensue, it is murder. Rex v. Dixon, 1 East, P. C. 313. R. Sf R. C. C. 53. Rex. v. Rokeby, I East, P. C. 312. But if a seaman be impressed, and the pressgang be resisted, and any of them be killed ; if the pressgang at the time were under the direction of a commissioned officer, and such officer were then acting with them, the killing would be murder, otherwise but manslaughter. R. v. Broad foot. Fast. 154. A special constable duly appointed under the statute 1^2 Will. IV. c. 41. is appointed for an indefinite time, and retains all the authority of a constable at common law, until his services are suspended or determined under the 9th section of that statute. Reg. v. Porter, 9 C. ^ P. 778. In all cases where the outer door of a dwelling-house may be broken open in order to execute process, there must be a demand of admittance, or something equivalent thereto, and a refusal. Fast. 320. 136; see Hancock v. Brown, 2 B. <^- Aid. 592. otherwise if the officer be killed, it will be manslaughter only. Arch. Cr. Law, by Jervis, 434, 9th ed. In all cases, however, above stated to be manslaughter only, if there be evidence of express malice in the party killing, the homicide will be murder. R, v. Stocklcy, 1 East, P. C. 310. R. v. Curtis, Fast. 135. ■ With respect to private persons using their endeavours to bring felons to justice, it should be observed by way of caution, that they must be careful to ascertain, in the first instance, that a felony has actually been committed, and that it has been committed by the person whom they would pursue and arrest. For if no felony has been committed, no suspicion, however well founded, will bring the person so interposing within tiie espe- cial protection of the law, Cro. Jac. 194. 2 Inst. 32. 172. nor will it be extended to 465 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. So if men come to steal deer in a park or forest, or to rob a war- ren of conies, and the paricer, forester, or warrener resists and is killed, this is murder ; the lord Bacre^s case. [8] If a prisoner die by reason of duress and hard usage [ 466 2 by the gaoler, it is murder in the gaoler. Co. P. C. p. 52. [9] those who, when a felony has actually been committed, upon suspicion possibly well founded, pursue and arrest the wrong person. Fost. 318. But the law is otherwise in the case of an officer acting in pursuance of a warrant. 1 Russ. on Cr. 534. And per Lord Tenterden, C. J., Beckwith v. Philby, 6 B. Sf C. 638. " There is this distinction between a private individual and a constable; in order to justify the former in causing the imprisonment of a person, he must not only make out a reasonable ground of sus- picion, but he must prove that a felony has actually been committed ; whereas a con- stable, having reasonable ground to suspect that a felony has been committed, is author- ized to detain the party suspected until inquiry can be made by the proper authorities." If an innocent person be indicted for a felony, and an attempt be made to arrest him for it, .without warrant, and he resist and kill the party attempting to arrest him ; if the party attempting the arrest were a constable, the killing is murder; 1 Hawk. c. 28. s. 12. if a private person, manslaughter ; because the constable has authority by law to arrest in such a case, but a private person has not. And the same in all cases where a person is arrested or attempted to be arrested upon a reasonable suspicion of felony. Samuel V. Payne, Doug^. 359. But a private {\erson may arrest another whom he sees attempting to commit a felony, and if he be killed in the attempt, it will be murder. 2 Hawk. c. 12, s. 19. Where one interferes to stop a brawl, and exercises no other force than is necessary for the object, having previously announced his purpose, the killing of him by one of the assailants will be murder. Thus, when A., in order to prevent B. from fighting with his brother, laid hold of him and held him down, striking no blow, upon which B. stabbed A., it was decided, that if in such case A. did nothing more than was necessary to prevent B. from beating his brother, tlie killing of him was murder; if otherwise, it wou'd have been manslaughter only. R. v. Brown, 5 P. Sf C 120. The prisoner and one VV. engaged in a fight, and were separated by the deceased. Some time after the fight was renewed, and the deceased again interfered, but being unable to take the prisoner off, called a negro to his assistance, who, in the act of sepa. rating the combatants, threw the prisoner against the wall. The prisoner then made at the deceased (who endeavoured to avoid him,) with a knife, and inflicted a mortal blow; it was held that this was a case of murder. State v. Ferguson, 2 Hill, 619. [8] It is a general principle that, if in the execution of or attempt to execute a felony, a man kill another, he will be guilty of murder. Thus if C, having malice against A., strikes at and misses him, but kills B., this is murder in C. 1 East, P. C. 230: or if A. feloniously shoot at the poultry of another, and kill a man, this will be murder. Fost. 258. Accidental homicide may be murder, if it happen in the prosecution of any illegal act; as in carrying away furniture to avoid a distress for rent. Rex v. Hodgson, 1 Leach, C C. 6; Rex v. Huhson, 1 East, P. C. 258. On the trial of an indictment for murder, where there is no pretence that the prisoner killed the deceased, while engaged in a riot or other misdemeanor, not amounting to a felony, or by misadventure, but the death ensued in consequence of an intentional violence upon the person of the deceased; whether the prispner designed to kill or not, he is not entitled to have the jury instructed that they cannot convict of murder, if they should conic to the conclusion that the mortal wound was inflicted in comriiilting, or atlempting to comHiit an offbnoo, which of itself is less than a felony. The People v. Rector, 19 Wen. 569; M. S. Sum. 145, 175, 37. 46; Palm. 546, 2 Roll. Rep. 120. [9] The case of Husgins and Barnes (2 Strange, 882) has been often referred to as to this mode of murder. It was this: Huggins was warden of the Fleet Prison, with power to execute the office by deputy, and appointed one Gibbon, who acted as deputy. Gibbon had a servant, Barnes, wliosc business it was to take care of the prisoners, and HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 466 So if a sheriff have a precept to hang a man for felony, and he beheads him, it is murder. Co. P. C. Ibidem. [^\0'\ To these may be added the cases abovementioned, viz. if ^^. by mahce forethought strikes at B. and missing him strikes C. whereof he dies, tho he never bore any mahce to C. yet it is murder, and the law transfers the mahce to the party slain; the like of poisoning, sed de his supra cap. [I Ij particularly of one Arne: and Barnes put Arne into a new built room, oVer the com- mon sewer, the walls of which were damp and unwholesome, and kept him without fire, chamber-pot, or other necessary convenience, for forty-four days, when he died. It ap. peared that Barnes knew the unwholesome situation of the room, and IhatHuggins knew the condition of the room, fifteen days at least hefore the death of Arne, as he liad been once present at tlie prison, and seen Arne under such duress of imprisonment, and turned away^ at which time Barnes shut the door of the room, in which Arne con- tinued till h*died. It was found that Arne had sickened and died by duress of im- prisonment, and that during the time Gibbon was deputy, Huggins sometimes acted as warden. Upon these facts the court were clearly of opinion, that Barnes was guilty of murder. But they thought that Huggins was not guilty, as it could not be interred, from merely seeing the deceased once during his confinement, that Huggins knew that his situation was occasioned by the improper treatment, or that he consented to the continuance of it: and they said, that it was material that the species of duress, by wliich the deceased came to his death, could not be known by a bare looking-in upon him. Huggins could not know the circumstances under which he was placed in the room against his consent, or the length of his confinement, or how long he had been without the decent necessaries of life: and it was likewise material, that no application was made to Huggins, which perhaps might have altered the case. And the court seemed also to thmk, that as Barnes was the servant of Gibbon, and Gibbon had the actual management of the prison, the accidental presence of tlie principal would not amount to a revocation of the authority of the deputy. Rex v. Hugi^ins, and Barnes, 2 Str. 882. 2 Lord Raym. 1574. Fost. 332. 1 East, P. C. 331, 332. " [10] With respect to the duty of officers in the execution of criminals, it has been laid down as a rule, that the execution ought not to vary from the judgment; for if it doth, the officer will be guilty of felony at least, if not of murder. 3 Inst. 52. 211; 4 Bl. Com. 179. And in conformity to this rule it has been holden, that if the judgment be to he hanged, and the officer behead the party, it is murder; 3 Inst. 52; 4 Blac. Com. 179. And that even the king cannot change the punishment of the law, l)y altering the hanging or burning into beheading, though, when beheading is part of the sentence, the king may remit the rest. 3 Inst. 52. But others have thought, that this prerogative of the crown, founded in mercy ^nd immemorially exercised, is part of the common law: Fost. 270. F. N. B. 244, h. 19 Rym. Foed. 264. And that though the king can- not by his prerogative vary the execution so as to aggravate the punishment beyond the intention of the law, yet he may mitigate the pain or infamy of it: and, accord, ingly, that an officer, acting upon a warrant from the crown for beheading a person under sentence of death for felony, would not be guilty of any offence. Fost. 268; 4 Blac. Cum. 405; 1 East, P. C. 335. But the rule may apply to an officer vary- ing from the judgment of his own head, and without warrant or the colour of au- thority. [11] Where a blow aimed at one person lighteth upon another and killeth him, this ia murder. Fost. 261. Thus A., having malice against B., strikes at and misses him, but kills C, this is murder in A.: and if it had been without malice and under such circumstances that if B. had died, it would have been but manslaughter, the killing of C. also would have been but manslaughter. Dyer, 128; Kel. Ill, 112, 117; Fost. 261; 1 Hawk.c. 31, s. 42; State v. Cooper, 1 Green, N. J. R. Again, A., liaving malice against B., assaults him, and kills C, the servant of B., who had come in aid of his master: this is murder in A.; for C. was justified in attacking A. in defence of his master, who was thus assaulted. In another case, if A. give a poisoned apple to B., intending to poison 466 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. her, and B., ignorant of it, give it to a child, who took it and died; this is murder in A., but no offence in B.; and lliis, though A., who was present at the time, endeavoured to dissuade B, from giving it to tlxe child. 2 IHoioden Com. 474. So where Plummer and seven others, opposed the king's olKcers in the act of seizing wool. One of those per- sons shot off a lusee and killed one of his own party. The court held, in giving judg- ment upon a special verdict, that as the prisoner was upon an unlawful design, if he had in pursuance tliereof discharged the fusee against any of the king's officers that came to resist him, in the prosecution of that design, and by accident had killed one of his own accomplices, it would have been murder in him. As if a man out of malice to A. shoot at him, but miss him and kill B., it is no less a murder than if he had killed the person intended. Kelijng, 111; Lord Raym. 1581; 9 St. Tr. 112; Hig. gins's case; Di/er, 128; Fl. 6U; Cromp. lUl; 9 Co. 81, Agnes Gore^s case; D. WiL liains^s case, cited in the Queen v. Mawgridge; Kelyng, 131, 132; 9 St. Tr. 61. In another case, the prisoner mixed poison in an electuary, of which her husband, and' her father, and anotlier, took part and fell sick. Martin, the apothecary, who had made the electuary, on being questioned about it, to clear himself, took part of it and died. On this evidence a question arose, whether Agnes Gore, the defendant, bad committed murder; and the doubt was, because Martin, of his own will, without invitation or procurement of any, had not only eaten of the electuary, but had by ftirring it so incorporated the poison with the electuary, that it was the occasion of his death. The judges resolved, that the prisoner was guilty of the murder of Martin, for the law conjoins the murderous intention of Agnes in putting the poison into the electuary to kill her husband, with the event which thence ensued; quia eventus est qui ex causa sequitur, et dicuntur eventus quia ex causis eveniunt, and the stirring of the electuary by Martin, without putting in the poison by Agnes, could not have been the cause of his death. 9 Co. 11; Jenk. Cent. 220; 3 Inst. 51; Plowd. Com. 514; 1 Hawk. P. C. Sf C. 31, s. 3. Under the same head may be classed the case of one who gave rnedicine to a woman; and that of another who put skewers in her womb, with a view in each case to procure an abortion ; whereby the women were killed. The case, at common law, was murder; though the original intent, had it succeeded, would not have been so, but only a great misdemeanor; for tlie acts were in their nature malicious and delibe- rate, and necessarily attended with great danger to the person on whom they were practised. Com. v. Chauncey, 2 Ashmead, 227. ante, 90. If a man have a sudden quarrel, and fight with A., by which his passions are strongly excited, and while his passions are thus excited, he without any real or supposed provo- cation kill B., who is an utter stranger to the whole affair, and has not interfered in the quarrel, nor been in any way connected therewith, even in the party's own supposition, it will be murder. U. S. v. Trovers, 2 W/teeZer's C. C. 503, per Story, J. But, where the prisoner, having had a quarrel with his wife, pursued her, and aimed a blow at her with an axe, which fell on the head of his infant son, then in her arras, by which he was instantly killed, it being shown that the prisoner was ignorant of his child's posi- tibn, and was at the time in the heat of blood, seeking to avenge himself on his wife for a supposed injury, it was held, that as the case was to be considered as if the wife had been the victim, the same grade of homicide would attach to the killing of the child as it would have done to that of the wife, if she had been killed. Comwonvjealth v. Dough, erty, 7 SmitWs Laws, 296. But in this, as in cases of malice prepense and express, if the blow intended for one would in law only have amounted to manslaughter, it will still be the same, though by mistake or accident it kill another. Thus, in an old case, a quarrel arising between some soldiers and a number of keelmen at Sandgate, a violent affray ensued, and one of the soldiers was very much beaten. The prisoner, a soldier who had before driven part of the mob down the street with his sword in the scabbard, on his return, seeing liis comrade thus used, drew his sword, and bid the mob stand clear, saying he would sweep the street; and on their pressing on him he struck at them with the flat-side, and as they fled pursued them. Tiie other soldier in the mean time had got away, and when the [jrisotier returned he asked whether they had murdered his comrade; and being several times again assaulted by the mob, he brandished his sword, and bid them keep off. At this time the deceased, who from his dress might be mis- taken for a keelman, was going along about live yards from the prisoner; but before he passed the prisoner went up to hiin and struck him on the head with the sword, of which he presently died. 'I'his was holdcn manslaughter: it was not murder, because there was a previous provocation, and- the blood was heated in the contest: nor was it in self-defence, because there was no inevitable necessity to excuse the killing in that HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 466 manner. Foster, 262; 1 Hawk. c. 31, s. U; Leach, C. C. R. 151, S. C.f Wharton's Am Cr.L. 231-3. . At the Old Bailey, in 1690, the prisoners with twenty mote were- hired by J. S. to remove his goods, in order to prevent a distress. The landlord with some assistants endeavoured to prevent tliem, and an affray happened. The constable ordered them to disperse, but could not prevail; as they were fighting, one of the company, to tiie jurors unknown, killed a boy who had no concern in the quarrel, as lie was standing at his father's door. These facts being found in a special verdict, Holt and Pollexfen were of opinion that it was murder in all the party. For though the removing of the goods might be lawful, yet the continuing of the party together alter the constable had ordered tliem to be dis- persed was unlawful; and besides, the great numbers that were thus assembled, and the unusual weapons they were armed with, did also make the assembly unlawful. But the majority of the judges held, that as the boy was totally unconcerned in the affray, the killing of him could not be imputed to tjie rest who were merely engaged in the general affray. That the boy could not be deemed an opposer of the party, so as to make him an object of their contention ; and that they could no more be said to have abetted the killing of him, than if one of the company had killed a person looking out of a window. The King against Hubson and others, Chappets, M.S. 1. M.S. Sum. 187. Title, Accomplices and Accessaries in Murder. CHAPTER XXXVIII. or MANSLAUGHTER, AND PARTICULARLY OP MANSLAUGHTER EXEMPT FROM CLERGY, BY THE STATUTE OF 1 JAC. 8. Manslaughter, or simple homicide, is the voluntary killing of an- other without malice express or implied, and differs not in substance of the fact from murder, but only differs in these ensuing circum- stances. 1. In the degree of the offense, mtirder being aggravated with malice presumed or implied, but manslaughter not, and therefore in manslaughter there can be no accessaries before. 3. In the form of the indictment, the former being always /e/on2ce exmalilici prxcogi- tatd interfecit S,' murdravit, the latter only felunict interfecit. 3. In the point of clergy, murder being by the statute of 23 H. cap. 1. exempt from the benefit of clergy, but not manslaughter. 4. In the form of the pardon of murder, for tho at common law a pardon of all felonies had pardoned murder; yet by the statute of 13 /?. 2. cap. 1. the pardon of murder must either be by the express word of murder, or else it must be a pardon o{ felonica inlerftctio with a special non obstante of the statutes of 13 i?. 2. H. 1. Jac. [ 467 ] Lucases case. (a) But the pardon of manslaughter may be general by the Avords of felonia ov fclonica interfectio, and hence it is, that if a man indicted of murder obtains a pardon of felony, or felonica interfectio only, and be afterwards arraigned upon an indictment of murder, he must plead quoad murdrum <§• inteifectionem ex malitid precozHatd, not guilty, and as to the felony and interfection must plead his pardon j (a) Moor, n. 1033, _p. 752. 467 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. and then if the jury behig charged to inquire of the plea of not griilfy, find it to be only a simple felony and interfection without malice fore- thouglit,his pardon is to be allowd; and thus upon good deliberation it was done in the year 1668, at No7'wich, Sir Thomas Pot la's case, and is pursuant to the statute of 13 iff. 2. Which saith, " That before a pardon of felonies shall be allowed as to murder, it shall be inquired by good inquest, if he were slain by await or malice prepensed." And I remember very, well in the case o( Rntaby T. 1653, wlio was indicted of murder in Durham, the defendant pleaded a pardon of felonica interfectio, and a general non obstante of all statutes; and the attorney general demurred; it was ruled, 1. That the pardon was insufficient with only a general non obstante, unless murder had been containd in the body of the pardon by express words. 2. But tho the pardon was disallowed as to murder, yet the prisoner was remitted into Durham to be tried, whether guilty of murder, and being so found was executed; but had it been found only man- slaughter, he should have been discharged, and altho his plea of the pardon to the indictment of murder was disallowd, yet it had stood, good, if the conviction were of manslaughter: by the statute of 1 Jac. cap. 8. " Any person that shall stab or thrust any person, that hath not any weapon drawn, or hath not first stricken the party that shall so stab or thrust, if the party die within six months, the offender is ousted of clergy, provided it shall not extend to him, that kills se defendendo, or by misfortune, or in preserving the peace, or chastiz- ing his child or servant. This act, tho but temporary, is continued till some other r 468 ] act of parliament shall be made touching the continuance or discontinuance thereof. 17 Car. I. cap. 4. The use hath been in cases of this nature to prefer two indictments against ofienders in this kind, viz. one of murder, another upon this statute, and put the prisoner to plead to both, and io charge the jury first with the indictments of murder, and if they find it not to be" murder, then to charge them to inquire upon the other bill, because, if convict upon either, the offender is ousted of clergy. The indictment to put the prisoner from his clergy must be spe- cially formed pursuant to the statute, viz. that he did with a sword, «^'C. stab the party dead, he having no weapon drawn, nor having struck first, otherwise it will be but a common manslaughter, -and the party will have his clergy. The indictment need not conclude contra formam statnii, no more than in burglary or robbery, for the statute doth not make the offense to be felony, but ousts the prisoner of his clergy, where the crime is so circumstantiated as the statute cxpresseth; tliis was agreed in the case of Page and Harwood. H. 23 Car. 1 B. P.{b) i3ut yet it doth not, vitiate the indictment, tho it do conclude, Et sic inlerfecit contra formam staluti, as was adjudged Trin. 9 Jac. (h) In this case, as reported in Styles SG. it is not agreed to be so, on the contrary it was denied per Roll, and doubted per Bacon. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 468 B. R. Bradley and Banks ;{c) and accordingly for the most part to this day tlie indictments upon this statute do conclude contra for- mam statuti, so it is good with or without such conclusion, but it is best to follow the common usage, because every man dolh not readily observe the reason of the omission of that conclusion. In the case of Page and Harwood, H. 23 Car. 1. before cited, these points were resolved in the king's bench, viz. 1. That no man is ousted of his clergy by this statute, but he that actually stabs, and therefore those, that are laid in the indictment to be present, aiding, and abetting in such a case, shall be admitted to the benefit of clergy; and therefore, tho the indictment of such a manslaughter be specially formed upon the sta- [469] tute, and conclude contra formam statuti, yet it is a good indictment of manslaughter against them that were present, aiding, and abetting, and therefore upon such a special indictment of man- slaughter upon the statute, the prisoner may be convict of simple manslaughter, and acquitted of manslaughter upon the statute, and. the indictment serves for a common manslaughter, as well as a man upon an indictment of murder may be acquit of murder, and convict of manslaughter. 22 Mart'ii, 14 Car. 1. At Newgate sessions David Williams was indicted specially upon this statute for the death of Francis Marbury ,[d) viz. Quod felonice, 6i-c. unum malleum de ferro <§• ligno, anglice an hammer of wood and iron, ^ manu sua dextrd erga <§• ad anteriorem partem capitis ipsius Francisci /'elo7iicb vio- lenter S,' in furore sua projecit, 4* cum malleo prsedicto ipsum Franciscum in 4* super anteriorem partem capitis 4'C. percussit <§• pupugit, anglice did stab and thrust the said Marhury having no weapon drawn, nor struck first, whereof he presently died, 4' sic viodo (§* forrnd prsedictd interfecit SfC. contra formam statuti 8fC. The prisoner pleaded not guilty, and a special verdict was found, viz. that upon St. David'^s day the prisoner being a Welshman had a leek in his hat, and there was at the same time in waggery a Jacka-lent in the street put up with a leek, and one Nicholas Red- man, a porter, spake to the prisoner, and pointing to the Jack-a- lent said. Look at your countryman, and the prisoner being there- with enraged, threw an hammer a\ Redman to the intent feloniously to hit him, but missing him, the hammer did hit Francis Marhury^ whereof he died, ^' sic prsedictus Da.v[d praf at um Franciscum cu?n tnalleo prsedicto pupugit <§• percussit, anglice did stab and ihrustf the said Francis then not having any weapon drawn, nor then having first stricken the said David ; and it was judged by Bram- ston, Jones, and the recorder Gardiner, that Williams was guilty of manslaughter at the common law, sed non contra formam sta- tuti, so that it seems they thought not this to be a stubbing within the statute, being done with the throwing of the hammer, or at least they took this killing of Marbury, which was [470] (c) Cro. Jac. 283. (d) W. Jones, 432. VOL. I. — 42 470 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. not at all intended by Williams, to be out of the statute, tho it ex- cused him not for manslaughter at common lavv.(£') The words of the statute are stab or thrust, if the stabbing or thrusting were with a sword, or with a pikestaff, it is within the statute, so it seems, if it be a shot with a pistol, or a blow with a sword or staff, yet quaere, i'or J^one^ justice denied it. In M. 5 Jac. it was ruled, that if the party slain had a cudgel ia his hand, it is a weapon drawn within this statute, and the prisoner was admitted to his clergy at Newgate ; but it seems it must be in- tended of such a cudgel, as might probably do hurt, not a small riding-rod or cane. In the year 1657.(/) at Newgate before Glynn, who then sat as chief-justice, a man was indicted upon this statute, and a special verdict found, that a bailiff havhig a warrant to arrest a man, pressed early into his chamber with violence, but not mentioning his business, nor the man knowing him to be a bailiff, nor that he came to make an arrest, snatched down a sword, that hanged in his chamber, and stabbed the bailiff, whereof he presently died : there was some diversity of opinion among the judges, whether this were within the statute, but at length the prisoner was admitted to his clergy, for tho this case was within the words of the statute, and not within the particular exceptions, yet it was held, that this case was never intended in the statute, for the prisoner did not know, but that the party came into rob or kill him, when he thus violently brake into his chamber without declaring his business.(^)[l] (e) Lord chief justice Holt in Mawgridge^s case, Kel. 131. concurs with this judg- ment, for that it was not such a weapon or act, as is within the statute ot" stabbing, but ■he is of opinion, that Williams ought to have been found guilty of murder, if the indict- ment had been so laid, for that there was not a sutficient provocation to lessen the offense to manslaughter. (/) Qiiare, whether the case here m^ant be not Buckner^s case, M. 1655. reported in Styles 467. but that, as it is there reported, was not the case of a bailiff, but of a creditor, who stood at the door with a sword undrawn to keep the debtor in, till they could send for a bailiff, and was killed by the debtor. ig) See Kel. 136. [1] There is no difference between murder and voluntary manslaughter, but that murder is upon malice aforethought, and manslaughter is upon a sudden occasion. 4 Bl, Com. VJl. 1 Hawk. c. Si.s. 1. 1 East, P. C. 218. The following are some of the more usual modes in which manslaughter occurs: In fighting. — The character of the con)bat, the nature of the weapon used, if any, the relative strength and positions of the parties, and all tho attendant and preceding circum- stances must be considered in order to determine whether a killing in combat be mur- der, manslaughter, or no felony whatever. 3 Inst. 55. Rex v. Kensell, I C. Sf P. 437. 1 East, P. C. 243. Hex v. Taylor, 5 Burr. 27!)3. Rex v. Anderson, 1 Russell, 447. Rex V. Ayers, R. 6( R. IGG. Rix v. Rankin, R. S( R. 443. R. v Smith, 8 C. S( P. 160. R. V. Lynch, 5 C 4" /'. 324. R. v. Kirkham, 8 f. S^ I'. 115. State v. Scott, 4 Iredell, 10!). Slide V. Rutherwood, 1 Hawks. 34!). Com. v. Daily, 4 Penna, L. J. 158. State v. McCants, I Spear, 484. When a tinrd party interferes, and kills one of the combatants. 1 Hawk. c. 31. 8. 35, 36.55. 1 East, P. C. 2^1,2^2. 12 Co. 87. Kel. 5d. Conner v. The State, 4 Yer- ger, 137. I HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 470 Even in an attempt to part them when more force is used than is necessary. Rex v. Bourne, 5 C. Sf P. 120. So also aiming at one person and killing another. Rex v. Conner, T C. Sf P. 438. Provocation by words will not reduce the killing to manslaughter. Ante, chap. 37. note. . But a personal indignity will. Idem. Or finding a man in adultery with his wife. Rex v. Manning, T. Raym. 212. People V. Ryan, 2 Wheeler's C. C. 54. Or a father seeing one committing an unnatural crime with his son. Reg, v. Fisher, 8 C. Sf P. 162. Or an unwarrantable imprisonment of a man's person. Rex v. Buckner, Sly. 467. Reg. V. Curvin, R. if M. 132. R. v. Thompson, R. Sf M. 88. R. v. Withers, 1 East, P.C. 233. Killing by excessive correction, if with an instrument not likely to kill, is manslaugh- ter — if with a deadly weapon, murder. Foster, 262. R. v. Conner, 7 C. Sf P. 438. Rex V. Turner, Comb. 407, 408. Rex v. Wigg, 1 Leach, 378. n. Anon. 1 East, P. C, 261. R. V. Lrggitt, 8 C. Sf P. Idl. R. v. fia;/, 1 £as<, P. C. 236. i?. v. Cheesman, 1 C.S( P. 425. Killing an officer attempting to make an irregular arrest may be manslaughter. Jer. Arch. C. L. 429. 1 Russ. on C. 592. Ante, chap. 37, note. C'o?n. v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391. jRe^. V. Phelps, 1 Car. Sf Mars. 180. So also killing in prize fights or unlawful sports ; the former under some circumstances may be murder; but if the sport is lawful and rightly conducted, the killing is, if acci- dental, only misadventure. R. v. Perkins, 4 C. iSj- P. 537. -R. v. Hargrave, 5 C. Sf P. 170. R. V. Murphy, 6 C. S( P. 103. 4 Bl. Coin. 183. Foster, 259. sed vide infra, 472. Reg. V. Canniff, 9 C. Sf P. 359. ' And killing by wanton and heedless acts is manslaughter. R. V. Mastin, G C. Sf P, 396. R. V. Timmins,! C. Sf P. 499. R. v. Sullivan, 1 C. Sf P. 641. Fenton's case, 1 Lewin, 179. And by improper medical treatment which shows a criminal disregard of human life. R. V. Long, iC. Sf P. 423. R. v. 5'enior, iJ. 4- M. C. C. 346. ii. v. Webb, 1 M. Sf Rob. 410. R. v, Siinpson, Willcock's Laws Medical Profession, Append. 227. Com, v. Thompson, 6 Mass. 124. Or gross neglect in delivering medicines of which death is the consequence. Tessy- mond's case, 1 Lew. 169. Death ensuing from gross neglect of natural duty, in the case of children or infirm persons, is manslaughter. R. v. Edwards, 8 C. Sf P. 611. R. v. Saunders, 7 C. S( P. 277. R. v. Smith, 8 C. Sf P. 153. /Z. v. Duties, per Patterson, Justice, Hertford 6'ujn. mer Jssizes, 1831. Burns' Justice, 808, fd. 1845. i?. v. Marriott, 8 C". ^ P. 425. An indictment for manslaughter stated that the prisoners gave, administered, and delivered to one M. A. divers large and excessive quantities of spirits and water, wine and porter, and induced, procured, and persuaded him to drink them, the said quantities, &c. being likely to cause death, which they well knew. It then averred tliat M. A., by their persuasion, &c. drank, &c. and became greatlj' drunk and distempered, and while he was so, the prisoner assaulted him, and forced him to go into, and placed and confined him in a cabriolet, and drove and carried him about in it for two hours, and thereby greatly shook and knocked him about, by means whereof he became mortally sick, &c., and of the said large and excessive quantities, «Sfc., and of the said drunkenness, &.C., occasioned tliereby, and of the said shaking, &c., and of the sickness and distemper occasioned by it, he instantly died. The deceased was a man in possession under the sheriff, and one of the prisoners, of whose goods he was in possession, assisted by his brother and a friend, plied the man with liquor, themselves drinking freely also, and when he was very drunk put him into a cabriolet and caused him to be driven about the streets ; and about two hours after he had been put into tiie cabriolet he was found dead : Held, that, if it were essential to prove that the prisoners knew that the liquors were likely to cause death, the case would be one of murder and not of manslaughter, but that such allegation was not a material part of the indictment, but might be dismissed from the jury's consideration. Held also, that if the prisoners, when the deceased was drunk, put him into a cabriolet and drove hirn about in order to keep him out of possession, and by so doing accelerated his death, it would be manslaushler. Rrg. v. Packard, 1 Car. ^ M. 236. 471 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. CHAPTER XXXIX. TOUCHING INVOLUNTARY HOMICIDE, AND FIRST OF CHANCE-MEDLEY OR KILLING PER INFORTUNIUM. Involuntary ?iomicide is the death or hurt of the person of a man against or besides the will of [lim that kills him. And in these cases, to speak once for all, the indictment itself must find the special matter, or in case the indictment be of murder or manslaughter, and upon the trial it appears to the jury it was invo- luntary, (as by misfortune, or in his own defense) the jury ought to find the special matter, and so conclude. El sic per itifortunivm, or se defendendo, and not generally, that it was/7er infortunium^ or se defendendo, because the court must jndge upon the special matter, whether it be murder, homicide, ov per infortunium, ox se defenden- do, and the jury is only to find the fact, and leave the judgment thereupon to the court; and in such case the prisoner must not plead the special matter, and so justify, but must plead not guilty, and the special matter must be found by the jury, Stamf P. C. Lib. I, cap. 7. fol. 15. a. Lib. III. cap. 9. fol. 165. a. for upon the special matter found, the court may give judgment against the conclusion of the verdict, as that the fact is manslaughter, tho the conclusion of the verdict be per infortunium, or se defendendo. 44 E. 3. Coron. 94. This involuntary homicide is of two kinds, viz. either 1. When it is purely involuntary and casual, as the killing of a man ;7er infortu- nium, or 2. When it is partly involuntary, and partly voluntary, but occasioned by a necessity, tliat the law allows, which is commonly called homicide ex necessitate, as killing a man in his own defense, or the like; de quibus postea. Homicide per infortunium is, where a man is doing a [^ 47*2 ]j lawful act, and without intention of bodily harm to any person, and by that act death of another ensues, as if a man be shooting at buts or pricks, and by casualty his hand shakes, and the arrow kills a by-stander. 21 H.l. 28. a. 6 E. 4. 7. b. Or if a carpenter or mason in building casually let fall a piece of timber or stone, and kills another. 21 //. 7. B. Coron. 59. But if he voluntarily let it fall, whereby it kills another, if he giyes not due warning to tliose that are under, it will be at least man- ' slaughter; quia debt tarn diiigentiam non adhibuit. So if a man be felling a tree in his own ground, and it fall and kill a person, it is chance-medley. 6 E. 4. 7. IJut in all these cases, if it doth only hurt a man by such an acci- dent, it is nevertlieless a trespass, and the person hurt shall recover his damages, for tho the chance excuse from felony, yet it excuseth not from trespass. 6 E. 4. 7. Regularly he that voluntarily and knowingly intends hurt to the person of a man, tho he intend not death, yet if death ensues, it ex- HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 472 cuseth not from the guilt of murder, or manslaughter at least; as if A. intends to beat B. but not to kill him, yet if death ensues, this is not per infortunium, but murder or manslaughter, as the circum- stances of the case happen. And therefore I have known it ruled, that if two men are playing at cudgels together, or wrestling by consent, if one with a blow or fall kill the other, it is manslaughter, and not per infortunium, tho Mr, Dalton, cap. 96,{a) seems to doubt it; and accordingly it was resolved P. 2. Car. 2. by all the judges upon a special verdict from Newgate, where two friends were playing at foils at a fencing school, one casually kild the other; resolved to be manslaughter.[l] Sir John Chichester, and his man-servant, whom he very well loved, were playing together, the man had a bedstafF in his hand, and Sir John had his rapier in the scabbard, Sir John, according to the usual sport between them, bids his man guard his thrust or pass, which he was making at him with his rapier in the scabbard, the servant with the bedstatf brake the thrust, but withal [473] struck off the chape of the scabbard, whereby the end of the rapier came out of the scabbard, but the thrust was not so effectually broken, but the end of the rapier prickt the servant in the groin, whereof he died : Sir John Chichester was for this indicted of murder, and tried at the king's bench bar, where all this evidence was given ; and it was ruled, 1. That it was not murder, tho the act itself was not lawful, because there was no malice or ill will between them. 2. That it was not barely chance-medley, or per infortunium, be- cause altho the act, which occasioned the death, intended no harm, nor could it have done harm, if the chape had not been stricken off by the party kild, and tho the parties were in sport, yet the act itself, the thrusting at his servant, was unlawful, and consequently the death, that ensued thereupon, was manslaughter, and was accord- ingly found and adjudged, which I heard, 23 Car. I, ,(6) 11 H.l. 23. a. Kelw. 108, 136. But if two play at barriers, or run a -tilt without the king's com- mandment, and one kill the other, it is manslaughter; but if it be by the king's command, it is not felony, or at most per infortunium. 11 H. 7. 23. B. Coron. 229. Dalton, cap. 96. Co. P. C.p. 56. (c)* If t/5. come into the wood of B. and pull his hedges, or cut his (a) New Edit. cnp. 148. p. 479. (6) AleifTi 12. This seems a very hard case, and indeed the foundation of it fails, for the pusliing with a sword in the scabbard by consent seems not to be an unlawful act, for it is not a dangerous weapon likely to occasion death, nor did it do so in this case but by an u\]fireseen accident, and therein differs from the case of justing, (or prize- fighting) wherein such weapons are made use of, as are fitted, and likely to give mortal wounds. (c) Brooke, after having taken notice of this as Fincux^s opinion, says, That other justices in the time of Henry VIII. denied this, and held it felony to kill a man in justing, or spoiling after tliat manner, notwithstanding the king's command, for such command is against law. [I] See Foster, 259 ; 1 Hawk. c. 29. s. 5; Ward's case, I East, P. C. 270. * See post p. 475, note 4. 473 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. wood, and B. beat him, whereof he dies, this is manslaughter, because, tho it was not lawful for Ji. to cut the wood, it was not lawful for B. to beat him, but either to bring him to a justice of peace, or punish him otherwise according to law. But if a school-master correct his scholar, or a master his servant, or a parent his child, and by struggling or otherwise, the [ 474 ~\ child or scholar, or servant die, this is only per infortunkim, Crom.pt. Just. 28 b. But this is to be understood^ when it happens only upon moderate correction, for if the correction be with an unfit instrument, (^) or too outragious. then it is murder, as it happened in a case at Norwich. assizes 1670, where the master struck a child, that was his appren- tice, with a great staff, of which he died, it was ruled murder. [2] Several persons come to enter the house of ^/I. as trespassers, ,/^. shoots and kills one, this is manslaughter, otherwise it had been, if they had entered to commit a felony. Crompt. de Pace, fol. 29. a. Harcourt'.s case. But in the case of Levet indicted for the death of Frances Free- mail, the case was. That William Levet being in bed and asleep in the night in his house, his servant hired Frances Freeman to help her to do her work, and about twelve of the clock in the night the servant going to let out Frances thought she heard thieves breaking open the door, she therefore ran up speedily to her master, and in- formed him, that she thought thieves were breaking open the door, {d) As with a bar of iron, or a sword, or a great cudgel, Kel. 64, 133. [2] In all cases where the correction is inflicted with a deadly weapon, and the party dies of it, it will be murder; if with an instrument not likely to kill, though improper for the purpose of correction, it will be manslaughter. Foster, 262; Reg. v. Connor, 7 C. 4- P. 438; R. V. Turner, Comb. 407-8; R. v. Wigg, 1 Leach, 378, n. 1 EosI, 262; R. v, Leggit, I C Sf P. 191. And though the correction exceeds the bounds of moderation, the court will pay a tender regard to the nature of the provocation, where the act is ma- nifestly accompanied with a good intent, and the instrument not such as must in all probability occasion death; though tiie party were hurried to great excess. As was liie case of a father {Worcester, Sp. Ass. 1775,) whose son had frequently been guilty of stealing, complaints of which had come to the father, who had often corrected him. At length, the son being charged with another theft, and resolutely denying it, though proved against him, the father, in a passion, beat his son with a rope, by way of chas- tisement for tlic offence, so much, that he died. The father expressed the utmost horror, and was in the greatest affliction for what he had done, intending only to have punished him with such severity as to have cured him of his wickedness. The learned judge who tried the father, consulted his colleagues in office, and the principal counsel on the cir- cuit, who all concurred in opinion that it was only manslaughter, and so it was ruled. 1 East's P. C. 261. Persons on board a ship arc necessarily subject to soniethitig like a despotic government, and it is extremely important that tiie law should regulate the conduct of those who exercise dominion over them. 'J'lierefore, in a case of manslaugh- ter, against the captain and mate of a vessel, for accelerating the death of a seaman, really in ill health, but whom, they alleged, they believed to be a skulker, the question will be, in determining whether it is a slight or an aggravated case, whether the pheno- mena of the dcatii were such as would excite tiic attention of reasonable and humane men; and, in such a case, if the deceased be taken on board after be was discharged from an lios[)ital, it is important to inquire whether he was sent on board by the surgeon' of the hospital as a person in a fit state of health to perform the duties of a seaman. Reg. V. Ltggatt, 8 Car. Sf P. lUl. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 474 the master rising suddenly, and taking a rapier ran down suddenly, Frances hid herself in the buttery lest she should be discovered. Leveies wife spying Frances in th6 buttery, and not knowing her cried out. Here they he that wonld undo 11s: Level runs into the buttery in the dark, not knowing Frances, but thinking her to be a thief, and thrusting with his rapier before hini hit Frances in the breast mortally, whereof she instantly died: this was resolved to be neither murder, nor manslaughter, uor felony: vide the case cited by justice Jones, P. 15. Car. 1. B. R. and Croke, n. l.[3] (in Cook^s case,(e) for kilUng a baihff, that broke a window to execute a Capias, which was judged to be manslaughter;) where the book says it was not felony, qnsere whether it be not homicide by misadventure, for the party kild was in truth no thief, tho mistaken for one, and tho it be not homicide vohintary, yet it seems to he per infortunium. If a man knowing that people are passing along the street throws a stone, or shoots an iarrow over the house or wall, [[ 475 ] with intent to do hurt to people, and one is thereby slain, this is murder, and if it were without such intent, yet it is manslaugh- ter, and not barely ;;er infortunium, because the act itself was un- lawful; but if the man were tiling an house, and let fall a tile know- ingly, and gave warning, and yet a person is kild, this is per infor- tunium, but if he gave not convenient warning, it is manslaughter, quia non udhihuit debitam diligentiam.{f) \i Ji. \v\ his own park shoot at a deer, and the arrow glancing against a tree hits and kills B. this is homicide per infortunium, be- cause it was lawful for him to shoot in his own park. But if ^. without the licence of B. hunt in the park of B. and his arrow glancing from a tree killeth a by-stander, to whom he in- tended no hurt, this is manslaughter, because the act was unlawful. So if ^. throw a stone at a bird, and the stone striketh and killeth another, to whom he intended no harm, it is per infortunium. But if he had thrown a stone to kill the poultry or cattle of B. and the stone hit and kill a by-stander, it is manslaughter, because the act was unlawful, but not murder, because he did it not maliciously, or with an intent to hurt the by-stander.[4] (e) Cro. Car. 538. W. Jones 429. (/) This is upon supposition, that the house do not stand near an liiahway or place of resort, for then, tho he should cry out first, it is manslaughter. See hull's case 1664. Kel. 41). [.3] " Possibly it might have better been ruled manslaughter at common law ; due cir- cimispection not having been used, but it was not manslaughter within the statute." Foster, 299. See 1 East, P. C. 274, 275 ; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 28. s. 27. [4] There are many cases in which a party causing the death of another, without positive intention of inflicting injury, is criminally responsible, though he is never chargeable with murder under such circumstances. The test of responsibihty is whether the conduct of the accused was contrary to any law, or not being so forbidden, was so gross, negligent, or violent as necessarily to produce the belief that the act which remotely or immediately caused death was such an act, or '.vas done in such manner as to involve moral impropriety. The conclusion of guilt is not to be hastily drawn nor inferred from remote circumstances, and it is only when a clear case is 475 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. By the statute of 33 //. 8. cap. 6. " No person not having lands, 4*c, of the yearly value of one luuidred pounds jier annum may keep or shoot in a gun upon pain of forfeiture of ten pounds." Suppose therefore such a person not quahfied shoots with a gun at a bird, or at crows, and by mischance it kills a by-stander by the breaking of the gun, or some other accident, that in another case would iiave amounted only to chance-medley, this will be no more than chance-medley in him, for though the statute prohibit him to keep or use a gun, yet the same was but malum prohibi- I] 476 3 /«w,and that only under a penalty, and will not inhanse the effect beyond its nature. «/^. having deer frequenting his corn-field out of the precinct of any forest or chace sets himself in the night-time to watch in a Wedge, and sets B. his servant to watch in another corner of the field with a gun charged with bullets, giving him order to shoot, when he hears any bustle in the corn by the deer, the master himself im- providently rushes into the corn, the servant supposing it to be the deer shoots, and thereby kills his master in the night, this is neither petit treason, murder, nor manslaughter, but chance-medley, for the servant was misguided by his master's own direction, and was igno- rant, that it was any thing else but the deer. This was my opinion in a case happening at Peterborough session ; but it seemed to me, that if the master had not given such direction, that was the occasion of his mistake, it would have been manslaughter to have shot at a man, tho by mistaking it for the deer, because he did not adhibere debilam diligentiam to discover his mark, but shot directly at the person of a man, tho mistaking it for a deer. Ji. drives his cart carelessly, and it runs over a child in the street, if Ji. have seen the child, and yet drives on upon him, it is murder; but if he saw not the child, yet it is manslaughter; but if the child had run cross the way, and the cart run over the child before it was possible for the carter to make a stop, it is per infortunium^ and accordingly this direction was given by us at Newgate sessions in 1672, and the carter convict of manslaughter. If a man or boy riding in the street whip his horse to put him into speed, and run over a child and kill him, this is homicide, and not per infortunium, and if he rid so in a press of people with intent to do hurt, and the horse had kild another, it had been murder in the rider,[5] established tli.it the party is liable for the consequences of an act which may be in itself legal. Various adjudications illustrate this kind of responsibility for the death of another. As an accidental killing by shootitifr, furious driving, taking an unruly horse into a Crowd, carelessly laying poison for rats, want of caution towards drunken persons, care- less navigation of vessels, firing guns in a populous place, &c., &c. Foster, 'i^%, 263; 4 Bl. Com. 182-3; H. y. rimmins, 7 C. 4- P. 42iJ ; R. v. Grout, 6 C. &; P.'G29 ; Anon. 1 East, P. C. 2G1 ; R. v. Walker, 1 C. ^ /'. 320; R. v. Mustin, 6 C. Sf P. 3!)6; R. v. Green, 7 C. Sf P. I. 50; R. v. Allen, idem 153; Burton's case, 1 Strange, 481; Comm, V. York, 7 Boston Law. Rep. 517; 1 Russ. on Cr. 657. [5] See 1 Geo. IV. c. 4. 7 Sf8; Geo. IV. c. 75, as to accidents from furious driving of HISTORIA PLACITORUM C0R0N7E. 476 BtU if a man or boy be riding in the street, and a by-stander whip the horse, whereby he runs away against the will of the rider, and in his course runs over and kills a child or man, it is chance-medley only, and in that case the jury ought not to find him not guilty generally, but the special matter; [477]] but yet, because the coroner's inquest, which stood untra- versed, had found the special matter, the court received the verdict of not guilty upon the indictment by the grand inquest of mur- der, and the party confessed the indictment by the coroner, and had his pardon of course, and this was said by Lee secondary to be the course at Newgate, 1 Sept. 16 Car. 2. Eicfiard Pretty''s case. Tho the killing of another per infortunium be not in truth felony, nor subjects the party to a capital punishment, and there- fore usually in such cases the verdict concludes, quod inter- fecit per infortunium, 8f' no7i per feloniain,^^X. the party forfeits his goods, and tho he ought to have quasi de jure a pardon of course upon the certificate of the conviction, yet he is not to be discharged out of prison, but bailed till the next term or sessions to sue out his pardon of course, for tho it was not his crime, but his misfortune, yet because the king hath lost his subject, and that men may be the more careful, he forfeits his goods, and is not presently absolutely "discharged of his imprisonment, but bailed, t^^ supra. And so strict was the judicial law of the Jews in relation to the life of man, that even in this case the avenger of blood might kill the manslayer per infortunium before he got to the city of refuge, Duet. xix. 5, 6. [6] . . stage-coaches, and accidents by unloading of boats. 4 Bl, Com. 200; 1 East, P. C. 231; 3 Wilson, 407-8 ; Foster, 2G2, 263, 259, 280, 299 ; Keil. 40. [6] Homicide by misadventure is where a man is doing a lawful act, without intent to hurt another, and death casually ensues. Hale's Sum. 31 ; 1 East's, F. C. 221. As where a labourer, being at work with a hatchet, and the head flies oft' and kills one who stands by; or when a third person whips a horse on which a man is riding-, whereupon he springs out and luns over a child, and kills him ; in which case the rider is guilty of homicide by misadventure, and he who gave the blow of manslaughter, 1 Hawk. c. 29. s. 3. It is not sufficient that the act upon which death ensues be lawful and innocent in itself. It must be done in a proper manner, and with due caution to prevent mischief. Fost.262; 1 East's P. C. 261. A p:irty causing the death of a child by giving it spirituous liquors in a quantity quite unfit for its tender age, is guilty of manslaughter. R. v. Martin, 3 C. ^- F. 211. In the case of workmen throwing stones and rubbish from a house in the ordinary course of their business, by which a person underneath happens to be killed; if they de- liberately saw danger, or betrayed any consciousness of it, from whence a general ma. lignity of heart might be inferred, and yet gave no warning, it will be murder, on account of the gross impropriety of the act. If they did not look out, or not till it was too late, and there was even a small probability of persons passing by, it will be manslaughter. But if it had been a retired place, where there was no probability of persons passing by, and none had been seen about the spot before, it seems to be no more than accidental death; for though the act itself might breed danger, yet the degree of caution requisite being only in proportion to the apparent necessity of it, and there being no apparent call 477 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. for it in the instance put, the rule applies, de non existentibus et non apparentihus eadem est ratio. So, if any person had been seen on the spot, but due warning were given, it will be misadventure. Hull's case, 1664; Kel. 40; 1 Russ. 769. On the otlier hand, in London and other populous towns, at a time of day when the streets are usually thronjTed, it would be manslaughter, notwithstanding the ordinary caution used on other occasions of giving warning; for in the hurry and noise of a crowded street, few people hear the warning, or sufficiently attend to it, however loud. 1 East's P. C. 262, Again, if a person driving a carriage happens to kill another: if he saw or had timely notice of the mischief likely to ensue, and yet wilfully drove on, it will be murder; for the presumption of malice arises from the doing of a dangerous act intentionally; there is the heart regardless of social duty. If he might have seen the danger, but did not look before him, it will be manslaughter, for want of due circumspection. But if the accident happened in such a manner that no want of due care could be imputed to the driver, it will be accidental death, and he will be excused. 1 EasVs P. C, 263. The rricre calling out will not excuse the offender. R. v. Walker, \ C. Sf P. 320. A. was driving a cart with four horses, in the highway at VVhitechapel, and, he being in the cart, and the horses upon a trot, they threw down a woman who was going the same way with a burthen upon her head, and killed her: Holt, C. J., Tracy, J., Bar- ron Bury, and the Recorder hotel, held this to be only misadventure. But, by Lord Hull, if it had been in a street where people usually pass, this had been manslaughter; but it was clearly agreed it could not be murder. O. B. Sess. before M. T. 1704; 1 EasVs P. €. 263. To make the captain of a steam-vessel guilty of manslaughter, in causing a person to be drowned by running down a boat, the prosecutor must show some act done by the captain^ and a mere omission on his part in not doing tiie whole of his duty is not suffi- cient. But if there be sufficient light, and the captain of a steamer is either at the helm or in a situation to be giving the command, and does that which causes the injury, he is guilty of manslaughter. R. v. Gree, 7 C. S( P. 156. The captain and pilot of a stcamv boat were both indicted for the manslaughter of a person who was on board of a smack, by running the smack down. The running down was attributed, on the part of the pro- secution, to improper steerage of the steamboat, arising from there not being a man at the bow to keep a look-out at the time of the accident. It was proved that there was a man on the look-out when the vessel started, about an hour previous. According to one witness, the captain and pilot were both on the bridge between the paddle-boxes; accord- ing to another, the pilot was alone on the paddle-box. Held, that under these circum- stances there was not such personal misconduct on the part of either as to make them guilty of felony. R. v. Allen and another, 7 C. Sf P. 153. The law does not require the utmost caution that can be used ; it is sufficient that a reasonable precaution, what is usual and ordinary in the like cases, be taken; such as hath been found by long experience in the course of human affiiirs to answer the end; for such conduct shows that the party was regardful of social duly, and free from any manner of guilt. Fost. 264; 1 EasVs P. C. 266. And therefore upon that principle, Mr. Justice Foster denies Ramptori's case {Kel. 41,) to be law; and indeed there is a qi/cere put to it in the margin ot the report. The prisoner had found a pistol in the street, which he had reason to believe was not loaded, having tried it with the rammer, which had gone down into the muzzle of the pistol; the rammer, in fact, being too short. He carried the pistol home, and his wife standing before him, he cocked it and touched the trigger; on which the pistol went off and killed the woman. This was ruled manslaugh- ter. In truth the man had used the ordinary precaution adapted to the probability of danger in such cases: he had examined the pistol by the usual method of trial. And though it was doubtless an idle frolic, yet the heart was free from all sort of guilt, even the guilt of negligence; and therefore tlie act ought to have been excused. And the same learned judge delermined accordingly in a case something similar. Upon a Sundiiy morning, a man and his wife going to dine at a friend's house in the neighbourhood, he carried his gun with him, to divert himself on the way; but before dinner he discharged it, and set it up in a private place in his friend's house. After dinner he \vent to church, and in the evening returned home with his wife and neigh- bours, bringing his gun with him ; which was put into the room where his wife was, she having brought it [).irl of the way. He, taking it U[), touched the trigger, and the gun went off, and killed his wife. It came out in evidence, that, while the man was at church, a person belonging to the family privately charged the gun, and went alter some game; but bcf'orc tlie service at church was ended, returned it loaded to the place "from whence he had taken it; and where the defendant, who was ignorant of all that had passed, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 477 found it to all appearance as be had left it. Mr. Justice Foster tlioug^ht it unnecessary to inquire wlietlier tlie man had examined the gun before he carried it home; hut bein^ of opinion, upon the whole evidence, that he had reasonable grounds to believe that it was not loaded, he directed the jury, that if they were of the same opinion, they should acquit liim: and he was acquitted. Fast. 265. A gentleman came to town in a chaise, and before he got out of it fired his pistols in the street, which by accident killed a woman. This was ruled manslaughter; the act was likely to breed danger, ar\d manifestly improper. Benton's case, 1 Str. 481. It has already been observed, that this kind of homicide is only when it happeneth upon a man's doing a lawful act; for if the act be done in the prosecution of a felonious intention, it will be murder. 1 Russ. 540. For it is a general rule in case of all felonies, that, when- ever a man intending to commit one felony happens to commit another, he is as much guilty as if he had intended the felony which he actually commits. J Hawk. c. 29. s. 11. As, if A. shoot at the poultry of B., intending to steal them, and by accident kill a man, this is murder. Fast. 258, 259. Further, if there be an evil intent, though that intent extendeth not to death, it is mur- der. Tims, if a man, knowing that many people are in the street, throw a stone over a wall, intending only to frighten them, or to give them a little hurt, and thereupon one is killed, this is murder; for he had an ill intent, though that intent extended not to death, and though he knew not the party slain. 3 Inst. 57. Although this species of homicide is not properly a man's crime, but his misfortune, yet, because a human being is killed, and in respect of tl>e great favour the law has to the life of man, and to the end that men should use all care, diligence, and circumspec- tion, in all they do, that no hurt should come of their actions, a person convicted tliereof, before the 9 Geo. IV. c. 31. s. 10. forfeited his goods; but by that statute he is exempted from all punishment. See ante, chap. 38. note. 3 Burns' Justice, 800*. ed. 1845, CHAPTER XL. [ 478 ] OF MANSLAUGHTER EX NECESSITATE, AND FIRST SE DEFENDENDO. I COME to those homicides that are ex necessitate, and this necessity- makes the homicide not simply voluntary, but mixed, partly volun- tary and partly involuntary, and is of two kinds. 1. That necessity, which is of a private nature. 2. That necessity, which relates to the pubhc justice and safety. The former is that necessity, which obligeth a man to his own defense and safeguard, and this takes in these inquiries, 1. What may be done for the safeguard of a man's own life. 2. What may be done for the safeguard of the life of another. 3. What may be done for the safeguard of a man's goods. 4. What may be done for the safe- guard of a man's house of habitation. I. As touching the first of these, viz. homicide in defense of a man's own life, which is usually styled se defendendo. It is generally to be observed, that in case of any indictment or charge of felony the prisoner cannot plead any thing by way of jus- tification, as that he did it in his own defense, or per iuforfiniium, but must plead 7wi quil/i/ ; and upon his trial the special n)aiter is to be found by the jury, and thereujion the court gives judgment. Homicide se defendendo is of two kinds. 1. Such, as tho it excusetli from death, yet it excuseth not the 478 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. forfeiture of goods, nor is the party to be absolutely discharged out of prison, but bailed, and to purchase his pardon of course. 2. Such as wholly acquits from all kinds of forfeiture. First, therefore, of common homicide se defendendo. [479] Homicide ^e defendendo is the killing of another person in the nece6\s«ry defence of himself against him that assaults him.[l] In this case of homicide se defendendo^ there are these circum- stances observable. 1. It is not necessary that the party killed be the first aggressor or assailant, or of his party, tho commonly it holds. There is a malice between A. and B. they appoint a time and place to fight, and meet accordingly, A. gives the first onset, B. re- treats as far as he can with safety, and then kills Ji. who had other- wise killed him; this is murder, for they met by cotnpact and design, and therefore neither shall have the advantage of what they them- selves each of them created. There is malice between Ji. and B. they meet casually, ./5. assaults B. and drives him to the wall, B. in his own defense kills A. this is se dcfendendo^^w(\ shall not be heightened by the former malice into murder or homicide at large, Copston''s case cited Crompt. de Pace 21. b. and Dalt. cap. 98. (a) for it was not a killing upon the account of the former malice, but upon a necessity imposed upon him by the assault oi A. A. assaults B. and B. presently thereupon strikes./?, without flight, whereof.^, dies, this is manslaughter in B. and not se defendendo, 43. Assiz. 31. but if B. strikes A. again, but not mortally, and blows pass between them, and at length B. retires to the wall, and being pressed upon hy A. gives him a mortal wound, whereof./?, dies, this is only liomicide se defendendo, altho that B. had given divers other (a) New Edit. cap. 150. p. 484. [1] Foster divides homicide in self-defence into two classes; the first he calls justifiable self-defence, tlic second self-defence culpable. In the former, the injured party may repel force by force in defence of his person, habitation, or property, against one who manifestly intendeth and endeavoureth by violence or surprise to commit a known felony upon either. In these cases he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary till he findeth himself out of danger, and if in a conflict between them he happeneth to kill, such killing is justifiable. Kel. 128, 129. The right of self-defence in these cases is founded in the law of nature, and is not, nor can be, superseded by the law of society. For before civil societies were formed, for mutual defence and preservation, the right of self-defence resided in individuals; it could not reside elsewhere; and since in cases of necessity, individuals incorporated into society cannot resort for |)rotection to the law of the society, that law with great propriety and strict justice considereth them, as still, in that instance, under the piotcction of the law of nature. In the latter — homicide, cul- pable but excusable, or homicide se defevdrndo, upon chance medley — as when a person engaged in a sudden aftVay, (juits the combat before a mortal wound given, and retreats or flees as far as he can with safety, and then urged by mere necessity, kills his adver- sary for tiie preservation of his own lilc. Foster, 273-7. 1 Hawkins, c. 29. s. 13. 'I'he general rule is that, in order to excuse a homicide, on the ground of self-defence, it must clearly appear that it was a necessary act, in order to avoid destruction, or some great bodily harm. • HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 479 strokes, that were not mortal before he retired to the wall, or as far as he could. Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 1. fol. 15. a. Dalt. cup. 98. Crump. 28. a. But now suppose, that ^. by malice makes a sudden assault upon B. who strikes again, and pursuing hard upon j3. A. retreats to the wall, and in saving his own life kills B. some have held this to be murder, and not se defendendo, because A. gave the first assault, Cromp. fol. 22. b. grounding upon the book of 3 E. 3. Itin. North. Coron. 287. but Mr. Ballon., ubi supra, thinketh it to be ^e defendendo, {b) tho A. made the first assault, either with or [480 ] without malice, and then retreated; therefore the book of 3 E. 3. Coron. 284, 287. which occasioned the doubt, is to be ex- amined, which is thus. It seems to me, that li A. did retreat to the wall upon a real intent to save his life, and then merely in his own defense killed B. that it is se defendendo, and with this agrees Slamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 7. fol. 15. a. But if on the other side A. knowing his advantage of strength, or skill, or weapon, retreated to the wall merely as a design to protect himself under the shelter of the law, as in his own defense, but really intended the killing of B. then it is murder, or manslaugh- ter, as the circumstance of the case requires, and that was the reason, why the judges demanded of the jury 3 E. 3, whether he killed B. of malice, or otherwise to save himself, and when the jury answered, // was to save his life, he was remitted to prison to have his pardon of course. 3 E. 3. Coron. 284. 287.[2] 2. In homicide se defendendo, there seems necessary some act to be done by the party killing, for if he be merely passive, this will make it only a killing per infortunium. A. assaults B. who flies to the wall, or falls, holding his sword knife, or pike in his hand, A. runs violently, or falls upon the knife of B. without any thrust or stroke offered at him by B. and there- upon dies, this is death per infortunium, and some have said, that in this case A. is felo de se, de quo antea, vide [ 481 ] Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 1. p. 16. 8,- libros ibi. (6) The case here referred to in Dalton is the case of an affray, (which is likewise the case put by Stamford) of this he says there was a difference of opinions, but delivers no opinion of his own ; but as to the case here put by our author of a maliciovs assault, which he afterwards mentions, he seems plainly to be of the contrary opinion, and to think it murder; nor do I see any thing in Coron. 284, 287. that could occa.sion any doubt about this matter, or any way relates to this case, for both those cases (which seem to be but one and the same) were of an affray, in wliich he that struck first, was the party killed, and the party killing struck not at all, till after he had fled as fur as he could, and was necessitated to do it in his own defense; so that the reason assigned by our author for demanding the question of the jury is grounded on a mistake; that, which to me seems the reason of putting that question to the jury, is this, the jury had found the fact specially, but had not drawn any general conclusion from it, the ques- tion was therefore asked, tliat they might make the usual conclusion, unde dicuiit. quod prcedictus, A. (the defendant) se defendendo prcedictum B. (the deceased) iiiterfecit, Sf non per feloniam aut malitiam pracuffitatum, which was done accordingly; and there- fore in the first of those places, viz, Cornn. 284. the usual conclusion being inserted, no notice is taken of the question put to the jury. [2j Foster, 277. 1 Hawk. c. 29. «. 17. 481 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 3. Regularly it is necessary, that the person that kills another in his own defense, fly as far as he may to avoid the violence of the assault before he turn upon his assailant; for tho in cases of hostility between two nations it is a reproach and piece of cowardice to fly from an enemy, yet in cases of assaults and affrays between subjects under the same law, the law owns not any such point of honour, because the king and his laws are to be the vindices injuriaruni, and private persons are not trusted to take capital revenge one of anotlier.[3] But this hath some exceptions. 1. In respect of the person killing. If a gaoler be assaulted by his prisoner, or if the sheriff or his minister be assaulted in the execution of his office, he is not bound to give back to the wall ; but if he kills the assailant, it is in law adjudged se clef oidendo, iho he give not back to tlie wall ;[4] the like of a constable or watchman, for they are ministers of justice, and under a more special protection in the execution of their office, than private persons. Co. P. C.p. 56. 9 Co. Rep. 68. b. Mackally^s case. But if the prisoner makes no resistance, but flies, yet the officer either for fear that he, or some other of his party will rescue the prisoner, strikes the prisoner, whereof he dies, this is murder, for here was no assault first made by the prisoner, and so it cannot be se dejendendo in the officer.[5] And here is the diff^erence between civil actions and felonies. If a man be in danger of arrest by a Capias in debt or trespass, and he flies, and the bailifl' kills him, it is murder;[6] but if a felon flies, and he cannot be otherwise taken, if he be killed, it is no felony, [3] State V. Wells, 1 Cuxe, 424. U S. v. Trovers, 2 Wlieeler's C. C. 498. 507. Hay. don V. The State, 4 Blackford, 547. People v. Gurretson, 2 Wheeler's C. C. 348. People V, Anderson, idem, 408. [4| 3 Inst. 56. 1 Hawk. c. 28. s. 11. c. 29. 16. MS. Sum. 36, 37. Foster, 321. [5] So long as a party, liable to arrest, endeavours peaceably to avoid it he may not be killed; but whenever, by his conduct, he puts in jeopardy the life of any attempting to arrest him, he may be killed, and the act will be excusable. State v. Anderson, 1 HiWs S. C. R. 327. See The State v. Rutherford, 1 Hawks. 457. Selfridge's Trial, 160. R. v. Haworth, 1 Moody, C. C. 207. R. v. Willia7ns, ibid. 387. R. v. Langden, R. Ss R. 228. It has been said that perhaps the killing of dangerous rioters may be justified by any private persons who cannot otherwise suppress thern, or defend themselves from them, inasmuch as every private person seems to be authorized by the law to arm himself for the preservation of the peace. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 28. s. 14, and see Foster, 272. It was so resolved by all the judges in Easter Term, 39 Eliz. though they thought it more discreet for every one in such a case to attend and assist the king's officers in pre- serving the peace. And certainly, if private persons interfere to suppress a riot they must give notice of their intention. See Rex v. Finney, 5 C. t^ P. 254. Reg. v. Neale, 9 C. c^ P. 431. The charge of Tindai., C. J. to the Bristol Grand Jury, 1832. 5 C. & P. 261, and charge of King, P. to the Philadelphia Grand Jury, 1844. 4 Penn. Law J. 29. The latter is a practical and accurate statement of the law on this subject. [6] 1 Roll. R. 189. Foster, 271. Rex v. Browning, 1 East, P. C. 312. Rex v. Borth. wick, 1 Doug. 207. M. S. Sum. 37. If the warrant was irregular and void, the killing would be only manslaughter. Rex v. Stockley, 1 East, P. C 210. Hoiisia v. Barrow, 6 T. R. 122, R. v. Winnock, 8 T. R. 454. R. v. Hood, Moody, C. C. 281. PIISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 481 and in that case the officer so killing forfeits nothing, but the person so assaulted and killed forfeits his goods. 2. In relation to the person killed. If a thief assaults a true man either abroad or in his house to rob or kill him, the true man is not bound to give back, but may kill the assailant, and it is not felony. Co. P. C. p. 56. [7] 3. In respect of the manner of the assault. If ^. assault B. so fiercely, that B. cannot save his life [482] if he give back, or if in the assault B. fall to tlie ground, whereby he cannot fly, in such case if ^. kill ^. it is se defendendo, Co. P. C.p.56. but now here will be occasion to resume the former debate, where the first assailer may be said to kill the assailed se uefendendo.{S'] If A. assault B. and B. thereupon re-assault ji. and A. really flies to avoid the assault of B. who pursues him, and then A. being driven to the wall turns again and kills B. it seems this may be se defendendo, as hath been said ; for it appears de facto, that ji. fled from the assault of ^. till he could fly no farther. But if A. assaults B. first, and upon that assault B. re-assaults Ji. and that so fiercely, that A. cannot retreat to the wall or other noti ultra without danger of his life, nay, tho j1. falls upon the ground upon the assault of B. and then kills B. this shall not be interpreted [7] Foster, 273. Kel. 126. 128. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 28. s. 21. 24, When a known felony is attempted upon the person, be it to rob or murder, the party assailed may repel force by force; and even his servant attendant on him, or any other person present, may inter- pose for preventingf mischief, and if death ensue, the party so interposingf will be justi- fied. 1 East, P. C.271. Com. v. Riley, Thacher's C. C. 471. Selfridge's case, 160. Commonwealth v. Daily, 3 Pa. L. I. 153. The danger must be actual and urgent, U. S. v, Vigol, 2 Dallas, 346. No contingent necessity will avail; and when the pretended necessity exists in tlie, as yet, unexecuted machinations of another, it forms no defence. People v, McLeod, 1 Hill, 377. State v. Morgan, 3 Iredell, 186. In Tennessee it has been ruled, that if a man, though in no danger of serious bodily harm, through fear, alarm, or cowardice, kill another under the impression that great bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him, it is a case of homicide in self-defence. Granger v. The State, 5 Yerger, 459. In North Carolina, the safer and better doctrine is, that the belief that a person designs to kill one, will not reduce the killing him below murder, unless he is making some attempt to execute his design, or, at least, is in an apparent situation to do so, and thereby induces the reasonable belief that he intends to do so immediately. State v. Green, 4 Iredell, 409. The killing of a man on the highway is not justifiable homicide, unless there was an intention on the part of the person killed, to rob or murder, or do some dreadful bodily injury to the person killing; or, in other words, the conduct of the party must be such as to render it necessary on the part of the party killing, to do the act in self-defence. Reg. V. Bull, 9 Car. Sf P. 22, A well-grounded belief that a felony is about to be perpetrated, will extenuate a homicide committed in prevention of it, though the defendant be but a private citizen; but not a homicide committed in pursuit, unless special authority be given. State v, Rutherford, 1 Hawks. 457. Selfridge's Trial, 160. R. v. Haworlh, 1 Mood. C. C. 207. R. V. Williams, ibid, 387. R. v, Largden, R. Sf R. 228, But the slayer, in such cases, must not only -show that a homicide was actually com- mitted, but tliiit he avowed his object, and that the felon refused to submit, and that the killing was necessary to make the arrest. State v. Roane, 2 Dtv. 58. [8] 4 Bl. Com. 185. 3 Inst. 56, 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 29. s. 14. 482 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. to be se defendendo,{c) but to be murder, or simple homicide, accord- ing to the circiimstatices of the case, for otherwise we should have all cases of murders or manslaughters by way of interpretation turned into se defendendo. The party assaulted indeed shall, by the favourable interpretation of the law, liave the advantage of this necessity to be interpreted as a fiight(^) to give him the advantage of se defendendo, when the necessity put upon him by the assailant makes his flight impossible ; but he that first assaulted hath done the first wrong, and brought upon himself this necessity, and shall not have advantage of his own wrong to gain the favourable interpretation of the law, that that necessity, which he brought upon liimself, should, by way of inter- pretation, be accounted a flight to save himself from the guilt of mur- der or manslaughter.[9] If./?, after the assault, had really and bond fide fled from [|483] B. or that they had been parted by by-standers, that had given a kind of interruption to the affray, and a declining of any farther aftray by B. and therefore when B. pursues him to kill him, and t^. after his flight, upon necessity of saving his life, kills B. this is apparent to be se defendendo; but when it is done altogether with- out any interval of flight or parting, and B. that was first assaulted, gains the present advantage by his strength, courage or fortune, to preclude the flight of./?, and then A. kills him, this seems to be man- slaughter, and not se defendendo. And it must be observed, that the flight to gain the advantage of se defendendo to the party killing, must not be a feigned flight, or a flight to gain advantage of breath, or opportunity to fall on a fresh, as fighting cocks retire to gain advantage, but it must be a flight from the danger, as far as the party can, either by reason of some wall, ditch, company, or as the fierceness of the assailant will permit.[10] In Fleet street A. and B. were walking together, B. gave some provoking language to Jl. who thereupon gave B. a box on the ear, they closed; B. was thrown down, and his arm broken, he runs to his brother's house presently, which was hard by, C his brother, taking the alarm, came out with his sword drawn and made towards Jl. who retreated ten or twelve yards, C. pursued him, Ji. drew his sword and made a pass at C and killed him; A. being indicted at (c) Because his fall not being voluntary, as a flight is, it does not appear, that he declined fighting, so that the party first assaulted cannot safely quit the advantage he has got. (t?j Not that the law esteems this necessity to be a flight, but the party not having opportunity of flying, the law does not require it of him; but excuses him in the same manner, as if he had fled. [9] I Ihivok. c. 20. s. 17. On this subject jMr. East says: " I think there is great diffi- culty in applying the distinction taken by Lord Hale and Hawkins against him who makes the first assault, to the case of mutual combat by consent, though upon a sudden occasion, when neither of the parties makes an attack till the other is prepared; because in these cases it maticrs not who gives the first blow; it forms no ingredient in the merits of the question." 1 East, P. C. 281-2. [10] Foster, 277. 4 Bl. Com. 1B5. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 433 Newgate sessions for murder, the court directed the jury upon the trial to find this manslaughter, not murder, because upon a sudden falling out; not se defendendo, partly because ./?. made the first breach of the peace by striking B. and partly because, unless he had fled as far as might be, it could not, by way of interpretation, be said to be in his own defense: and it appeared plainly upon the evidence, that he might have retreated out of danger, and his stepping back was rather to have an opportunity to draw his sword, and with more advantage to come upon C. than to avoid him; and accordingly, at last, it was found manslaughter 1671, at Newgaie-lll] II. I come to the second consideration, namely, what the offense is, if a man kill another in the necessary saving of [ 484 ] the hfe of a man assaulted by the party slain. - ^. assaults the master, who flies as far as he can to avoid death, the servant kills Ji. in defense of his master; this is homicide defen- dendo of the master, and the servant shall have a pardon of course, 21 H.l. 39. a. but if the master had- not been driven to that extre- mity, it had been manslaughter at large in the servant, if he had no precedent malice in him. Plowd. Com. 100. The like law had been for a master killing in the necessary defense of his servant, the husband in the defense of the wife, the wife of the husband, the child of the parent, or the parent of the child, for the act of the assistant shall have the same construction in such cases, as the act of the party assisted should have had, if it had been done by 'himself, for they are in a mutual relation one to another.[12] \i Ji. and B. and C. be of a company together, and walking in the field C. assaults B. who flies, C. pursues him, and is in danger to kill him, unless present help, Ji. thereupon kills C. in defense of the hfe of B. it seems that in this case of such an inevitable danger of the life of B. this occision of C. by Ji. is in nature of ^e defendendo, but then it must appear plainly by the circumstances of the case, as the manner of the assault, the weapon with which C. made the assault, ^•c. that the imminent danger of the life of B. be [apparent and evi- dent. [13] And the reason seems to be, because every man is bound to use all possible lawful means to prevent a felony, as well as to take the felon, and if he doth not, he is liable to a fine and imprisonment, therefore if B. and C, be at strife, »/5, a by-stander, is to use all lawful means that he may, without hazard of himself, to part them; and the [11] Before a person can avail himself of the defence, that he used a weapon in defence of his life, he must satisfy the jury that that defence was necessary ; that he did all he could to avoid it ; and that it was necessary 1o protect his own life, or to protect himself from such serious bodily harm, as would give him a reasonable apprehension that his life was in immediate danger. If he used the weapon, having no other means of resist- ance, and no means of escape, in such case, if he retreated as far as he could, he would be justified. Reg. v. Smith, 8 C. 4- P. 160. See Reg. v. Bull, 9 C. ^ P. 22. [12] 4 Bl. Com. 182-184. 1 J?uss. on Cr. 542. Foster, 274. [13] This rule does not extend to felonies without force, nor to misdemeanors of any kind. I Hawk. P. C. c.28. s. 23. 4 Bl. Com. 180. 1 East, P. C. 290. VOL. I. — 43 484 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. very relation of acquaintance, and mntnal society between A. B. and C. seems to excuse the fact of Jl. in the necessary safeguard of the \\{q oi B. from the crime of simple homicide; tamen quaere. If Ji. be travelling, and B. comes to rob him, if C. falls into the company, he may kill B. in defense of A. and therefore much more if he come to kill him, and such his intent be apparent, for \_ 485]] in such case of a felony attempted, as well as of a felony committed, every man is thus far an officer, that'at least his killing of the attempter in case of necessity puts him in the con- dition oi se defendendo in defending his neighbour; but of this more hereafter. A. makes an assault upon B. a woman or maid with intent to ravish her, she kills him in the attempt, it is se defendendo because he intended to commit a felony. Bait. cap. 98. p. 250,[14] And so it is if C. the husband or father of B. had killed him in the attempt, if it could not be otherwise prevented ; but if it might be otherwise prevented, it is manslaughter; therefore circumstances must guide in that case. [15] III. I come to consider, what the offense is in killing him that takes the goods, or doth injury to the house or possession of another. And herein there will be many diversities, as first, between a trespassable act and a felonious act, and between felonious acts them- selves. If J2. pretending a title to the goods of B. takes them away from B. as a trespasser, B. may justify the beating of A. but if he beat him so that he die, it is neither justifiable, nor within the privilege of se defendendo, but it is manslaughter. Dalt. cap. 98. jo. 251.[16]. Ji. is in possession of the house of B. B. endeavours to enter upon him, Jl. can neither justify the assault nor beating of B. for B. had the right of entry into the house, but if A. be in possession of a house, and B. as a trespasser enters without title upon him, A. may not beat him, but may gently lay his hands upon him to put him out, and if B. resists and assaults A. then A. may justify the beating of him, as of his own assault. But li A. kills him in defense of his house, it is neither justifiable, nor within the privilege of se defendendo, for he entered only as a trespasser, and therefore it is at least common manslaughter: this was HarcourVs case Crumpt. 27. a. who being in possession of a house by title, as it seems, A. endeavoured to enter and shot an arrow at them within tlie house, and Harcourt from within [ 486 ~\ shot an arrow at those that would have entered, and killed one of the company, this was ruled manslaughter, 5 Eliz. [14] M. S. Sum. 39. [15] Foster, 274 ; Handock v. Baker, 2 B. Sf P. 265. [16j State V. Murgan, 3 Iredell, 186; Vom. v. Drew, 4 Mass, 391; Claxton T. 2%< State,2 Humphrey, 181. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 486 and it was not se defendendo, because there was no danger of his life from them without. But if ^i. had entered into the house, and Harcourt had gently- laid his hands upon him to turn him out, and then ^. had turned upon him, and assaulted him, and Harcourt had killed him, it had been ^e defendendo^ and so it had been if J2. had entered upon him, and assaulted him first, tho he intended not to kill him, yet if Harcourt had thereupon killed •/?. it had been only se defendendo, and not manslaughter, tho the entry of ^1. was not with intent to murder him, but only as a trespasser to gain the possession, 3 E. 3. Coron. 305. Cramp. 27 b. and it seems to me in such a case Har- conrt, being in his own house, need not fly as far as he can, as in other cases of se defendendo, for he hath the protection of his house to excuse him from flying, for that would be to give up the posses- sion of his house to his adversary by his flight. [17] A. commits adultery with B. the wife of C who comes up and takes them in the very act, and with a staff" kills the adulterer upon the place; this is manslaughter, and neither murder, nor under the privilege of se dejendendo: but if J9. had been taken by C. in the very attempt of a rape upon the wife, and she crying out, her hus- band had come and killed Jl. in the act of his ravishment, it had been within the privilege of se defendendo, because it was a felony; the former case was adjudged manslaughter by the court, B. R. M. 23 Car. 2.{d) Now concerning felonies, as there is a difference between them and trespasses, so there is a difference among themselves in relation to the point of se dejendendo. 'If a man come to take my goods as a trespasser, I may justify the beating of him in defense of my goods, as hath been said ; but if I kill him, it is manslaughter. But if a man come to rob me, or take my goods as a felon, and in (rf) Manning's case, Raym. 212. When he was to be burnt in the hand, the court directed it to be done gently, because they said there could not be a greater provocation. [17] As the killing in these cases is only justifiable on the ground of necessity, it can- not be justified unless all other convenient means of preventing the violence are absent or exhausted; thus a person set to watch a yard or garden, is not justified in shooting' one who comes into it in the night, even if he should see him go into his master's hen- roost ; for he ought first to see if he could not take measures for his apprehension ; but if, from the conduct of the party, he has fair ground for believing his own life in actual and immediate danger, he is justified in shooting him. R. v. Scully, 1 C. Sf P. 319. Nor is a person justified in firing a pistol on every forcible intrusion mto his house at sight; he ought, if he have reasonable opportunity, to endeavour to remove him without having recourse to the last extremity. Mead's case, 1 Lew. 184. And it would seem that in no case is a mati justified in intentionally taking away the life of a mere trespasser, his own life not being in jeopardy; he is only protected from the consequences of such force as is reasonably necessary to turn the wrong-doer out. A kick has been held an unjustifiable mode of doing so; Child''s case, 2 Lew, 214; throwing a stone has been held a proper mode. HinchcUffe's case, 1 Lew. 161. 487 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. . my resistance of his attempt I kill him, it is se defendendo at least, and in some cases not so much. At common law, if a thief had assaulted a man to rob him, and he had kild the thief in the assault, it had been se defendendo, but yet he had forfeited his goods, as some have thought, 1 1 Co. Rep. d>^ h. tho other books be to the contrary. 26 Jissiz. 32. But if Ji. had attempted a burglary upon the house of B. to the intent to steal, or to kill him, or had attempted to burn the house of B. MB. or any of his servants, or any within his house had shot and kild A. this had not been so much as felony, nor had he forfeited ought for it, for his house is his castle of defense, and therefore he may justify assembling persons for the safe guard of his house. 21 H.1.2,% a.W Co. Rep. 82. b. 5 Co. Rep. 9\.b. 26 ^ssiz. 23. S E. 3. Coron. 330. But otherwise it is, as hath been said, in case of a trespassable entry into the house claiming a title, and not to commit felony. But now by the statute of 24 H. 8. cap. 5. " If any person attempt any robbery or murder of any person in or near any common high- way, cartway, horseway, or footway, or in their mansion houses, or do attempt to break any mansion-house in the night-time, and shall happen to be kild by any person or persons, &c. (tho a lodger or servant) they shall upon their trial be acquitted and discharged in like manner, as if he had been acquitted of the death of such person, '^ JP. 15. Car. 1. Cooper's case.(e) This statute was to remove a doubt, and was declarative and enacting, and puts the killing of a robber in or near the highway, <§'c. in the same condition with one, that intends to rob or murder in the dwelling-house, and exempts both from forfeiture, and hath settled the doubt. And upon this statute it was, that when there was malice between ^. and B. and they had fought several times, and after met suddenly in the street near Ludgate, and Jl. said he would fight him, B. declined it, and fled to the wall, and called others to witness it, and Jl. pursued him, and struck him first, and B. in his own defense kild him, he was acquit from any forfeiture by the statute of 24 H. 8. cap. 5. 15 Eliz. Cromp. 27. b. Copstori's case: but upon [] 488 ] this statute these things are observable. 1. It extends not to the case of a bare trespassable entry into a house, but only to such an entry or attempt as is intended to be for murder or robbery, <§'c. or some such felony, and therefore the cases of trespasses, either in houses or near highways, are left is before. 2. It seerns, that it extends not to indemnify the killing of a felon, .where the felony is not accompanied with force, for it speaks of rob- bery, therefore the killing of one that attempts to pick my pocket, is not within the act, for there is ^o such necessity ; indeed, if any felon, after a felony committed, doth resist those, that endeavour to appre- (e) Cro. Car. 544. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. 488 hend him, or fly, and be kild, this killing is no felony, but that is upon another account, for this statute hath relation only to killing before, or in the felony committed, not «/?er.[lS] 3. It speaks only of breaking the house in the night-time, so that it seems it extends not to a breaking the house in the day-time, imless it be such a breaking, as imports, with it apparent robbery, or an intention, or attempt thereof. 4. Tho the statute speaks not of burning of houses, yet he, that attempts the wilful burning of a house, and is kild in that attempt, is free from forfeiture, without the aid of this staute, as appears 26 Jisaiz. 23. By the judicial law, Exod. xxii. 2, 3. "If a thief be found break- ing up, and he be smitten that he die, no blood shall be shed for him, but if the sun be risen upon him, there shall blood be shed for him, for he should make restitution, and if he have nothing, he shall be sold for his theft:" and by the Roman law of the twelve tables, Fur manifesto fur to deprehensiis, siaut, cutn facer et fur turn. , nox esset, aitt inter-diu se telo, cum deprehenderetur, defenderet, im- pune occideretur :{f) upon the latter of these laws the civilians and canonists have made many curious d\s{\nci\ons,quas vide apudOovdiX- ruviam, Tom. I. Par. 3, de homicidio ad defensionem com- misso ;{g) and upon the former the Jewish Rabbles have [489] made the like, quas vide apiid Selden de jure gentium. But as the laws of several nations, in relation to crimes and pun- ishments differ, and yet may be excellently fitted to the exigencies and conveniences of every several state, so the laws of England are excellently fitted in this and most other matters to the conve- niencies of the English government, and full of excellent reason, and therefore I shall not trouble myself about other laws than those of England.{h) IV. There remains yet one other particular, namely, the killing a malefactor, that doth not yield himself to justice upon pursuit. If a person be indicted of felony and flies, or being arrested by warrant or process of law upon such indictment escapes and flies, and will not render himself, whereupon the officer or minister cannot take him without killing of him, this is not felony, neither shall the killer forfeit his goods, or be driven to sue forth his pardon, but upon (/) ^^S' ^*^' IV. tit. 2. ad leg. Aquil. I. 4. § 1. Agel. Lib. XI. cap, 18. vide supra cap. 1. p. 3 Sf 6. ig) p. 561. Edit. Antwerp, 1614. {h) By the common law, Qui latronem occide.rit nocturnum vel diuturnum, non tene- titr, si aliter periculum evadere non possit, tenetur tamen, si possit. Bract. Lib. 111. de corona, fol. 15.5. a. Vide LL. Withred. Edit, ^^^ilk. p. 12. LL. Lim, I. 16. 20, 21. 35. LL. Ethelslani, in. LL. Canuti,l.59. [18] 4 Bl. Com. 180. But, says Mr. East, if one pick my pocket, and I cannot otiier- wise take him than by killings him, this falls under the general rule concerning the arresting of felons. 1 East, P. C. 273. 489 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. his arraignment shall plead 720/ gidlly. and accordingly it ought to be found by the jury. 3 E. 3. Coron. 288. ! But if he may be taken without such severity, it is at least man- slaughter in him, that kills him, therefore the jury is to inquire, whe- ther it were done of necessity or not. 22 *dssiz. 55 Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap.5.ful. 13. b. And the same law it is, if »^. commits felony and flies, or resists the people, that come to apprehend him, so that he cannot be taken without killing him, such killing is not felony, nor does the person, that did it, forfeit any thing, tho J3. were not indicted, nor the per- son, that did it, had any warrant of any court of justice, for in such case the law makes every person an otiicer to apprehend a feloii. 22 E. 3. Coron. 261. And the same law it is, if he be taken, and in bringing to the goal he breaks away, and the people of the vill pursue and cannot take him, unless they kill him, those, that kill him, upon their arraign- ment shall be acquitted of the felony, but yet the township []490 ] shall be amerced for the escape, and the person kild shall forfeit his goods upon the flight found. 3 E. 3. Cor. 328. 340. and by some it hath been held he shall forfeit the issues of his lands, till the year and day be past. 3 E. 3. Coron. 290. If t/^. be suspected by B. to commit a felony, but in truth he com- mitted none, neither is indicted, yet upon the offer to arrest him by B.he resists or flies, whereby B. cannot take him without killing him, and B. kill him, if in truth there were no felony committed, or B. had not a probable cause to suspect him, this killing is at least manslaughter, but if there were a felony committed, and B. hath cause to suspect t/?, but in truth »^. is not guilty of the fact, tho upon this account B. may justify the imprisonment of Ji. yet qustre if B. kill Ji. in the pursuit, whether this will excuse him from man- slaughter. But if a felony be committed, but not by A. but by some other, and B. hath a warrant from a justice of peace to apprehend A. or that a hue and cry comes to B. the constable of Z). to apprehend Ji. who endeavours to escape, or stands in resistance, so that he cannot be taken without killing him, it seems the killer is excused from fe- lony, tho A. were not indicted; vide 'pro hoc 3 E. 3. Coron. 289. and the reason is because he is bound by law to execute his warrant, or pursue the party upon hue and cry and to apprehend him, and is in- dictable for a contempt if he doth not, and so it differs from the for- mer case, for no man is bound to suspect another, but it is the act of his own judgment, and so he is merely his own warrant, and he may not adventure so far as the death of the party, unless he be sure he was the off'ender, tho he may imprison him, for thereupon he shall be brought to his trial; scd de his vide Slamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 5. Crompt.fol. 30. And it is to be observed, that whether the party rescues himself after he is taken, and ffy or resist, or whether lie ffy or resist before his taking, and be kild in the pursuit, it is all one, the killer forfeits HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 491 nothing; but the person kild forfeits his good5?, tho he were kild before attainder, upon an inquisition either by the coroner, or petit jury finding his flight. 3 E. 3. Coron. 288. 328. By the statute of 21 E. 1. de malefactoribns in pr/rcis, if a parker, forester, or warrener, find any trespassers wandering in his park, forest, or warren, intending to do damage therein, and they will not yield to the forester after hue and cry made to stand to the king's peace, but fly or defend themselves, whereupon they are kild, the parker, forester, or warrener, or their assistants shall not lose life or limb for the same, but shall enjoy the king's peace, so it be not done upon any former malice or evil will; but to make good such justifi- cation by a parker, forester, or warrener, there are these things re- quisite: 1. It must be a legal forest, park, or warren, or chace, (for a chase includes warren) and not a bare warren, park, 8,'c. in reputa- tion, for if a man inclose a piece of ground, and put deer or conies in it, this makes it not a park or warren without a prescription time out of mind, or the king's charter. 2. If a man have a park within a forest, where he may hunt, and the forester kills the purloin-man, or his servant hunting in the purloin, this doth not excuse the forester from murder or manslaughter, as the circumstances of the case are. Dyer 327. a. A!id note, that in all these cases of homicide by necessity, as in pursuit of a felon, in killing him that assaults to rob, or comes to burn or break a house, or the like, which are in themselves no -felony, the matter may be specially presented by the grand inquest, (quod vide 3 E. 3. Coron. 305. 289. and several other places,) or by the coro- ner's inquest. And thus it was done in Holme's case, 26 EUz. Crompt. 28. and in the case of a servant of justice Croke, who com- ing with the judge out of the circuit was assaulted in the highway, and he kild the assailant, and the matter presently specially found by the coroner's inquest, whereby he was discharged by the statute of 24 H. 8. cap. 5. and in these cases upon this special presentment the party shall be presently discharged without being put to plead, but then this acquittal by preserUment is no final discharge, for he may be indicted and arraigned again afterwards, if the matter of the former indictment be false ; but if in such a case the present- ment of the grand inquest or coroner's inquest be simply of [ 492 ~\ murder or manslaughter, and ther^ipon he is arraigned and tried, and this special matter given in evidence, he shall be acquitted thereupon, for upon these special matters proved in evidence, he is not guilty, for it is no felony, and this acquittal is a perpetual dis- charge and bar against any other indictment for the same death; therefore this latter way is more advantageous in the conclusion for the party, than a special presentment. Cromp. fol. 28. Holme's case. [19] [19] Lord Bacon says, "if divers be in danger of drovvninir, by the casting away of some boat, or barque, and one of them get to some plank, or on the boat's side to keep iiimself 492 HISTO^IA PLACITORUM CORONA. above water, and another to save his life thrust him from it, whereby he is drowned; tiiis is neither se defendendo, nor by misadventure, but justifiable." Max. Reg. V. • Later writers speak of this as homicide se defendendo. The only case directly involvinjr this doctrine is that of U. S. v. Holmes, C. C. U. S. for Eastern District, of Penn., March, 1842 — an indictment for manslaughter. The defen- dant was a mariner, and tlie deceased a passenger in a ship wrecked and abandoned at sea ; ihe crew and passengers embarking in boats, and witiiin twenty-four hours after the abandonment the danger of destruction by tempest being imminent, the prisoner, together with the remaining sailors, proceeded to throw overboard tliose passengers whose remo- val seemed necessary for the common safety, among whom was the deceased. Relief shortly after came; but the evidence conflicted as to whctiier the boat could have lield out in its original crowded state even during that short period. The question, therefore, whether, with no prospect of aid, acting under the circumstances which surrounded the defendant at the time the act was committed, such necessity existed as would justify the homicide, was one of great doubt. But a new principle was introduced into the case by Judge Baldwin, who presided. Holding, that in such an emergency, there was no mari- time skill required which would make the presence of a sailor of more value than that of a passenger, he maintained, that in such case, it being the stipulated duty of the sailor to preserve the passenger's life at all hazards, if a necessity arose in which the life of one or the other must be lost, the life of the passenger must be preferred. If, on the other hand, the crew was necessary, in its full force, for the management of the vessel, the first reduction to be made ought to take place from among the passen. gers. But under all circumstances, it was held, the proper method of determining who was to be the first victim out of the particular class, was by ballot. The defendant, under the charge of the court, was convicted. U, S. v. Holmes, Pamphlet, Phila., 1842. Sir William Russell observes, that if the commission of treason may be extenuated by the fear of present death, and while the party is under actual compulsion, (I East, P. C. 70.) there seems to be no reason why homicide may not also be mitigated upon the like consideration, of human infirmity; though in case the party might have recourse to the law for his protection from the threats used against him, his fears will certainly furnish no excuse for*committing the murder. 1 East, P. C. 294. It must further be observed, that as the excuse of selt-defence is founded on necessity, it can, in no case, extend be- yotid the actual continuance of that necessity by whicli alone it is warranted; 1 East, P. C. 293. for if a person assaulted does not fall upon the aggressor, till the affray is over, or when he is running away, this is revenge, and not defence. 4 BL Com. 293. I Russ. on Cr. 665. See Foster, 271. 277. 318. CHAPTER XLI. CONCERNING THE FORFEITURE OF HIM, THAT KILLS IN HIS OWN DEFENSE, OR PER INFORTUNIUM. If a man kill another by misfortune, yet he sliall forfeit his goods in strictness of law, in respect o^ the great favour the law hath to the life of a man, and to the end that men should use all care, dili- gence and circumspection in all they do, that no such hurt ensue by their actions. But if the occision or killing can by no means be attributed to the act of the person, but to the act of him, that is kild, there it seems, llio the instrument of the death is forfeited as a deodand, there follows no forfeiture of the goods of the person : for instance. If ^. shoots at rovers, as he may lawfully do, if B. after the arrow is delivered runs into the place, where the arrow is to fall, of his own accord, and so is kild, this seems to be such an iiiforliiniuni, that affects not */l. with the loss of goods, for it was not his act that HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONtE. 492 contributed to the death of B. but the wilful or improvident act of B. himself; qunere. If Jl. assaults B. and B, in his own defense kills %8.. yet [ 493 ] B. forfeits his goods. If the coroner's inquest find the killing specially se. defendendo, yet the court shall arraign him, and try him, whether it were se defendendo, before he shall have his pardon of course. 4 H.l.l <§• 2. But if B. having a pitch-fork in his hand, ^. assaults B. so fiercely, that he runs upon the pitch-fork of ^., B. offering no thrust at all against t/?. (tho this be a very difficult matter of fact to sup- pose, yet if the fact be supposed to be so) it seems B. forfeits no goods, because it was the act of ^. himself, and some have said rather, that in that case Jl. is felo de se, and forfeits his goods, de quo supra, 44 E. 3. 44. Coron. 94. tho 3 E. 3. Coron. 286. saith his goods are forfeit in that case. But where the killing of a man in his defense is in the law no felony, but the party upon his arraignment upon the special matter is to be found or judged simply not guilty, there is no forfeiture, but the party ought to be absolutely acquitted, unless he fled, and it be found, that fugam fecit, for that is a distinct forfeiture, altho the party be not guilty of the fact, and therefore always the jury is charged to inquire, whether the prisoner be guilty or not guilty, and if not guilty, whether he fled for the same, and if he fled, then to inquire also of his goods and chatties. And the cases, where the prisoner is not to forfeit any goods or chatties, but is to be absolutely acquitted, if he kills in his own de- fense, are before remembered, and I here recollect them. 1. He that kills a thief, that attempts to rob him. 2. He that kills a person, that attempts to rob or kill him m or near the highway, or in the mansion of the killer, by the statute of 24 H. 8. cap. 5. and this, tho he hath not yet actually robbed. 3^3. Coro7i. 330. 3. He that kills a person, that attempts wilfully to fire his house, or to commit burglary, tho he hath not actually broken or fired the house. 26 Jissiz. 23. 29 t.dssiz. 23. if he came with that purpose. 4. An officer or bailiff, that in execution of his office kills a person, that assaults him, tho the officer gives not back [494]] to the wall, for the officer is under the protection of the law, and the books tell us it is not felony in such case. Co. P. C. p. 65. 5. The same law is of a constable, that commands the king's peace in an affray, and is resisted. 6. He that kills a felon, that resists, ox justiciari se non permit- tit, and the like of a constable or watchman, that is charged to take a person charged with felony, or attempts to take him upon hue and cry, if the person so charged resist or fly, and cannot be otherwise taken, tho perchance he be iiuiocent, for the reason before given, and this either before or after the arrest. 7. If there be a great riot, or rebellious assembly, how far the 494 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. killing of such persons in suppressing of them is criminal is to be seen. By the statute 1 Mar. cap. 1 2. " If any persons to the number of twelve or more shall intend, practise, or put in ure to overthrow pales, hedges, ditches, or inclosures of parks or other grounds, banks of fish-ponds, conduit-heads, or pipes, or to pull down dove-cotes, barns, houses, mills, or burn stacks of corn, or abate rents or price of victual or corn, and being required by the justices of peace, sheriff of the county, mayors, bailitfs, or head officers of cities, by proclamation in the queen's name to retire to their homes, shall remain together one hour after such proclamation, or shall put in ure such things, they shall be adjudged felons. "And if any persons above the number of two shall unlawfully assemble to put in ure the things aforesaid, that it shall be lawful for the sheriff, justices of peace, mayors, bailiffs, and every other person having commission from the queen to raise force in manner of war, to be arrayed to suppress and apprehend the rioters, and if the persons so unlawfully assembled after command and request by proclamation shall continue together, and not return to their habi- tations, and if any of them happen to be kild, maimed or hurt in or about the suppressing or taking them, the sheriff, justice, \_ 495 ~\ mayor, SfC. and their assistants, shall be discharged and unpunishable for the same against the queen and all other:" this act was continued by the statute of 1 Eliz. cap. 16. during her life.(«) And it seems, as to this manner of killing rioters, that resist the ministers of justice in their apprehending, it is no other but what the common law allows, or at least what the statute of 13 H. 4. cap. 7. implicitly allows to two justices of the peace, with the sheriff or under-sheriff of the county, by giving them power to raise the posse comitalics, if need be, and to arrest the rioters, and they are under the penalty of 100/. if they neglect their duty hereim And with this agrees Mr. Dalton, cap. 46. /;. 115., (b) cap 98. p. 249. ,(c) and Crompt. de Pace 62. b. " Nota, que viscount & jus- tices de peace point prendre tants des homes in barneys, quant sont necessary & guns &c. & tuer les rioters, sils ne voilent eux rendre, come fuit pris in case de Drayton Basset, car le statute 13 //". 4. cap. 7. parle, quils eux arrestant, & si les justices ou ascuns de leuir company tue ascun des rioters, qe ne voil render nest offence in lui, come fuit auxi prise in ledit case de Drayton Basset ;^\d) and note, that tho the statute of 1 Eliz. was then in force, yet that was not a case within that statute, nor depending on it. And it seems the same law is for the constable of a vill in case a riot happens within a vill, he may assemble force within liis vill to arrest the rioters, and if he or those assembled in his assistance come to arrest the rioters, and they resist, and be kild by the con- (tf) 1 Geo. cap. 5. a new act was made to the same purport, which is perpetual. lb) New Edit. cap. 182. />. 21^7. {(l) Sec also Crompt. 23 b. (c) Cap. 150. p. 481. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 495 stable or any of his assistants, the constable and his assistants are dispunishable for the same, for he is enabled hereunto by the com- mon law, as being an officer for the preservation of the peace, and may command persons to his assistance, and if they refuse, tiiey are fineable for it. And farther, the statute of HE. 2. cap. 8. commands and authorizes the king's ministers to use all their power [ 496 ] to take and suppress such riots and rioters, and a constable is the king's minister; and the statute of 13 //. 4. cap. 7. is no repeal of this statute, so that the killing of a rioter by a sheriff, justice of peace, or constable, when he will resist and not submit to the arrest, seems to be no felony at common law, nor makes any forfeiture, for they do but their office, and are punishable if they neglect it. S. If the prisoners in goal assault the goaler, and he in his de- fense kills any of them, this is no felony, nor makes any forfeiture. 22 ^ssiz. 5. per Thorp, adjudge per tout le counceL* * See ante p. 424, note I. CHAPTER XLII. CONCERNING THE TAKING AWAY OP THE LIFE OF MAN, BY THE COURSE OF LAW, OR IN EXECUTION OF JUSTICE. This kind of occision of a man according to the laws of the king- dom and in execution thereof ought not to be numbered in the rank of crimes, for it is the execution of justice, without which there were no living, and murders, burglaries, and all capital crimes would be as frequent and common, as petit trespasses and batteries. The taking away of the life, theref^ore, of a malefactor according to law by sentence of the judge, and by the sheriff or other minister of justice pursuant to such sentence, is not only an act of necessity, but of duty, not only excusable, but commendable, where the law requires it.[l] But because there are some cautions and considerations in this matter, I have added it to the close of this title of [ 497 ] homicide. Regularly it is not lawful for any man to take away the life of another, tho a great malefactor, without evident necessity, (whereof before,) or without due process of law, for the deliberate, uncom- pelled extrajudicial killing of a person attaint of treason, felojiy, or murder, or in a prsemunire, tho upon the score of their being such, is niurder.(tf) (a) Coron. 203. [I] Foster, 267; 4 Bl Com. 178. 497 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. Therefore it is necessary, 1. That he, that gives sentence of death against a malefactor, be authorized by lawful commission or charter, or by prescription to have cognizance of the cause. 2. That he that executes such sentence be authorized to make such execution, otherwise it will be murder or manslaughter, or at least a great misprision in the judge that sentenceth, or in the minister that exe- cuteth.[2] I. As touching the authority of the judge, I shall not at large discourse the jurisdiction of the judges or courts in this place; it will be more proper hereafter; but shall mention only some things, that may be seasonable for this place. If he that gives judgment of death against a person, hath no com- mission at all, if sentence of death be commanded to be executed by such person, and it is executed accordingly, it is murder in him that commands it to be executed, for it was coram non judice. If a commission of the peace issue, this extends not to treason, neither can justices of peace hear and determine all treasons by force of this commission, for it extends only to felonies, (tho some treasons are by act of parliament limited to their cognizance, as hath been before observed) if they take an indictment of treason, - and try and give judgment upon the party, this is most certainly erroneous, and possibly avoidable by plea, but I do not think it makes the justices guilty of murder in commanding the execution of such sentence, for they were not without some colour of proceed- ing therein, because all treason is felony, tho it be more, and the king may, if he pleases, proceed against a traitor for felony; [ 498 ] and antiently a pardon of all felonies discharged some trea-, sons. 1 E. 3. Charter de Pardon 13. 22 ^ssiz. 49 Co. P. C. p. 15. but it is a great misprision in such justices. The justices of the common pleas cannot hold plea upon an indictment or appeal in capital causes, it will be at least erro- neous, if not voidable by plea; but if they hold plea in appeal of death by writ, and give judgment therein for the party to be hanged, which is executed accordingly, I think it is an error, and a great misprision in them, but not felony, because they had colour to hold plea thereof by an original writ out of the chancery under the great seal. Upon the same reason I take it, that if there be a writ sent to the sheriff", eschetor, or »/2. B. and C. to hear and determine felonies, whereas it ought to be a commission, 42 ^^ssiz. 12, 13. and they proceed thereupon to a judgment and execution in case of felony, it is a great misprision, but I think it makes not the judge nor execu- tioner guilty of murder; the same law I take to be in Lade's case, quod vide Co. P. C. p. 48. 5 Co. Rep. 106. a Constable's case. The commissioners upon the statute of 28 H. S. had given judg- ment of death against him that struck at sea, and the party died at [2] 3 ImU 52. 211; Foster, 270; f! N. B. 244 A; 19 Rym. Fad. 284; 1 East, P. C. 335. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 498 land ; and the same law I take to be, where he that hath the fran- chise of Infangthief, gives judgment of death against a felon not within his jurisdiction, 2 R. 3. 10. b. the ease of the abbot of Croiv- land; it might be a cause of a seizure of the Uberty, but makes not the steward guilty of murder. And what I have said of a proceeding in capitals without the strict extent of their commission may be said of the like proceed- ing, where, in strictness of law, the commission happens to be determined. A commission of gaol-delivery issues to ,ji. B. <§"c. they sit one day, and forget to adjourn their commission, or the clerk forgets to enter the adjournment, a felony is committed the next day, and they pro- ceed in sessions, and take an indictment, and give judgment of death against the malefactor, this judgment is erroneous, and the clerk of assizes shall never be permitted to amend the record, and enter an adjournment, this judgment is erroneous, and shall be reversed; but it makes not the judges guilty of murder or homicide, tho in strictness of taw their commission was determined by the £ 499 ]] first day's session without adjournment. King James issued out several commissions of gaol-delivery, SfC. the justices went their circuit, the king died, yet they proceeded, and before notice of the king's death condemned and executed many pri- soners; it is held these proceedings were good, and the commissions stood till notice of the king's death, M. 3. Car. C. B. Sir Randolph Creio^s case,(6) tho, in strictness of law, their commissions were de- termined by the king's death; but suppose they were both in law and fact determined, the judgments that happened upon sessions begun after the king's death would be erroneous, but the judges had not been criminal in commanding the execution of their sentence before notice; for if ignorantia juris doth in some cases excuse a judge, much more doth ignorantia facti. If a commission of gaol-delivery issue to A. B. and C. in the coun- ty of D. and afterward a second commission of gaol-delivery in the same county issue to E. F. and G. and there is notice given to the former commissioners, but no session by virtue of the second com- mission, whereupon the former proceed notwithstanding that notice in pays, (as conceiving it insufficient, unless either a writ of Super- sedeas had been sent them, or at least a session by the second com- mission) and they proceed in cases capital, this makes them not guilty of felony, 34 Jlssiz. 8. because tho the second commission be effectual for them to proceed without any actual revocation by Supersedeas, or otherwise of the former, yet the former is not actually determined, till a Supersedeas or a session by virtue of the second commission, upon an extrajudicial notice, or a notice in pays, the first commission- ers may, if they please, forbear any further session, but they are not bound to take notice of rumours and reports ; the like in case of a sheriff", M. 26. Eliz. Moore 333. 5 E. 4. If in the time of peace a commission issue to exercise martial law, (6) Cto. Car. 93 499 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. and such commissioners condemn any of the king's subjects (not being hsted under the military power,) this is without all r 500 ] question a great misprision, and an erroneous proceeding, and accordingly adjudged in parliament in the case of the earl o{ Lancaster, Pari. 1 E. 3. part 1. de quo supra, p. 344. And in that case the exercise of martial law in point of. death in time of peace is declared murder. Co. P. C. p. 52. But suppose they be listed under a general or lieutenant of the king's appointment under the great seal, and modelled into the form and discipline of an army, either in garrison or without, yet as long as it is tempus pads in this kingdom, they cannot be proceeded against as to loss of life by martial law; and the same for mariners that are within the body of the kingdom, but their misdemeanors, at least if capital, are to be punished according to the settled laws of the kingdom, 3 Car. cap. 1. the petition of right; yea, and it seems as to mariners and soldiers at sea, when in actual service in the king's ships, they ought not to be put to death by martial law, unless it be actually in time of hostility ; and this appears by the statute of 28 H. 8. that settled a commission to proceed criminally in cases of treason and felony, and by the late act of 13 Car. 2. cap. 9. settling special orders under pain of death by act of parliament ;(c) but indeed, for crimes committed upon the high sea, the admiral had at common law a jurisdiction even unto death, secundum leges maritimas ; but this was a different thing from martial law. And this appears also by the statute of 13 7?. 2. cap. 2. the constable and marshal, who are the J udices ordinarii in cases belonging to the martial law, are yet thereby declared to have no jurisdiction within the realm, but of things that touch war, which cannot be discussed nor determined by the common law. It must therefore be a time of war, that must give exercise to their jurisdictions, at least in cases of life. And thus far concerning the judicial sentence of death, where and when it is homicide criminally, and when not. II. Now a few words concerning the officer executing such sen- tence, and where and when he is culpable in so doing. Wheresoever the judge hath jurisdiction of the cause, the [ 501 3 officer executing his sentence is not culpable, tho the judge err in his judgment, but if the judge have no manner of juris- diction in the cause, the officer is not altogether excusable, if he exe- cute the sentence. In the great courts of justice, as of oyer and terminer, gaol- delivery, and of the peace, regularly, the sheriff of the county, or those that he substitutes, as under-sheriff, gaoler, or executioner, are the ordinary ministers in execution of malefactors, and they are to pursue the sentence of the court,[3] and therefore, 1. If he vary from (c) And this appears also from the annual statutes for punishing mutiny or desertion. 3 Geo. 1. cap, 2. S^ mullos alios. [3] Sec this rule explained, Foster, 267, sec. 9. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONJ^.. 501 the judgment, as where the judgment is to be hanged, if he behead the party, it is held murder.(c/) 2. It must be done by the proper officer, viz. the sheriff or his substitute, if another doth it of his own head, it is held murder: vide Co. P. C. p. 52. [4] The use heretofore was, and regularly should be so still, that if sentence of death be given by the lord high steward, a warrant under the seal of the lord steward, and in his name should issue for the execution, and the like by three at least of the commissioners of 01/er and terminer, where sentence of death is given by them. Co. P. C.p. 31. But use hath obtaind otherwise before commissioners of goal- delivety, for there is no warrant under the seal of the justices for execution, but only a brief abstract or calendar left with the sheriff or gaoler; and I remember Mr. Justice Rolle would never subscribe a calendar, but after judgment given would command the sheriff in court to do execution, and for not doing it, he fined Varney the sheriff of Warwickshire 2000/. If a prisoner be removed into the king's bench by Habeas Corpus, or taken upon an indictment of felony in Middle- [ 502 ] sex, and be committed to the marshal, and upon his arraign- ment be found guilty, and hath judgment to die, the court may send the person to JVewgafe, and command the sheriff of Middlesex to do execution, but if he be remitted to the marshal, (as regularly he ought to be,) then the marshal is the proper officer of the court to do execution, and he may execute the offender in Middlesex, where- ever the offense was committed, (e) and the court may ore tenus, or by their order, command the sheritfof Middlesex to be assisting, but the entry upon the roll ought to be, Et praeceptum est marescallo, Sj'C. quod facial executionera periculo incumbent e ; and thus it was done H. 24. Car. 2. upon a conviction of murder committed in Kent upon a trial at the king's bench bar, upon search and pro- ducing of many antient and late precedents, for regularly, he that is the (. for the continuance of the as- portation is a new caption; but if he be indicted of robbery, [ 508 ] it must be in the county of C. where the force and putting . in fear was, de quo postea. 4 H. 7. 5. b. II. The words of the indictment are not only cepit, but cepit Sf as- •portavit, or abduxit or effugavit.* \i A. comes into the close of ^. and take his horse with an intent to steal him, and before he gets out of the close is apprehended, this ' is a felonious taking and carrying away, and is larceny. Co. P. C. ]). lOS, 109. Justice Dalison^s reports. So if a guest lodge in an inn, and take the sheets of the bed with an intent to steal them, and carries them out of his chamber into the hall, arid going into the stable to fetch his horse is apprehended, this Qc) See also Kel. 42. [4] Reg. V. Reed, 1 Carr. <^ M. 306. [5] To coiJstitutc the crime of larceny, tlio taking must be invito domino, against the will of the owner, and tlic i)ropcrty in liis actual or constructive possession, tlite v. The iilate, 9 Merger, iU8 ; and there must be a criminal intention on the part of the taker, or an indictment for larceny cannot be sustained. The State v. Hawkins, 8 Porter, R. 461. Wfiarton''s Crim. Law, 3!J4-398, where the American authorities are fully collected. 2 Russell on Crimes, VJ. ruh. Am. Ed. 1845, and see note {l)post.p. 508. » Vide note [1] post. p. 508. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON^E. 508 is felony, and a felonious taking and carrying away, 27 ^^ssiz. 39. Co. P. C. p. lOS. and accordingly it was ruled 16 Car. 2. B. R. upon a special verdict found in Cambridf^eshire,{l) A. comes into the dwelling-house of B. nobody being there, and breaks open a chest and takes out goods to the value of jive shillings, and lays them on the floor of the same room, and is apprehended before he can remove them. [6] he was indicted upon the statute, and ousted of his clergy by the advice of all the judges, except one; for the taking out of the chest was felony by the common law, and the statute of 39 Eliz. cap. 15. alters not the felony, but ousts only the clergy. Ex lihro Bridge- man. A. hath his keys tied to the strings of his purse, B. a cut-purse takes his purse with money in it out of his pocket, but the keys, Avhich were hanged to his purse-strings, hanged in his pocket, Jl. takes B. with his purse in his hand, but the string hanged to his pocket by the keys, it was ruled this was no felony, for the keys and purse strings hanged in the pocket of Ji. whereby A. had still in law the possession of his purse, so that licet cepit non asportavlt^ 40 Eliz, Wilkinson^s case cited M. S. Jac. C. B.{m) 2 East, P. C. 556. III. As it is cepit and asportavil, so it must hefehnicS or animo furandi, otherwise it is not felony, [7] for it is the mind that makes (I) Simpson's case, Kel. 31. (m) See Crompt. Justice 35 a. [fi] Simpson's case, Kel. 31. State v.Wilson, Coxe's N. J. Rep. 439. Amier's case, G C. Sf Pay. 344. 2 East's P. C. 555. Rose. Cr. Ev. 470. Walsh's case, Moody, 14. ' [7] What amounts to a felonious taking. — If a person picks up a thing, when he knows that lie can immediately find the owner, and instead of returning it to the owner, con- verts it to his own use, this is a larceny. Rex v. Pope, 6 Car. Sf P. 34G. If a party finding property knows the owner, or if there be any mark upon it by which 1 the owner can be ascertained, and instead of returning it, converts il to his own use, | such conversion will constitute a felonious taking. Anon. 2 Russ. C. ^ M. 102. Rex v. ' James, id. A. went to a sliop and asked a boy there to give him change for a half-crown; the boy gave him two shillings, and sixpenny worth of copper. The prisoner held out a ' half-crown, which the boy touched, but never got hold of it, and the prisoner ran away with the two shillings and the copper :— //eZ(/ a larceny of the two shillings and the cop- per. Rex. V. Williams, 6 Car. Sf P. 390. A. the owner of a boat was employed by B. the captain of a ship, to carry a number of wooden staves ashore in his boat; B.'s men were put into the boat, but were under the control of A. who did not deliver all the staves, but took one of them away to the house of his mother : — Held, that this was a bailment of the staves to A. and not a charge only ; and that a mere non-delivery of tlie staves would not have been a larceny in A. but that if A. separated one of the staves from the rest, and carried it to a place different from that of its destination with intent to appropriate it to his own use, that was equivalent to a breaking of bulk, and therefore would be sufficient to constitute a larceny. Rex v. Howell, 7 Cur. Sf P. 325. If A. asks li. who is not his servant, to put a letter in tlie post, telling him it contains money, and B. breaks the seal and abstracts the money before he puts the letter into the post, he is guilty of larceny. Rex v. Jones, 7 Car. Sf P. 151. But if a person, from idle curiosity, either personal or political, opens a letter addressed to another |)erson, and 4eeps the letter, tills is no larceny, even though a part of his object may be to prevent the letter from reaching its destination. i?eo-. v. Godfrey, 8 Car. Sf P. 563. To constit'itc a larceny, by a party to whom goods have been delivered on hire, there 508 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. the taking of another's goods to be a felony, or a bare trespass only but because the intention and mind are secret, the intention must be judged by the circumstances of the fact, and tho these cir- [] 509 ] cnmstances are various, and may sometimes deceive, yet must not only be an original intention to convert them to his own use, but a subsequent actual conversion ; and a mere agreement by the liirer to accept a sum ofFc-rcd for the goods is not sucli conversion if the party who makes the oft'er does not intend to pur- chase unless liis suspicions as to the honesty and right of the vendor to sell are removed. Reg. V. Brooks, 8 Car. &f P. 295. A person by false pretences induced a tradesman to send by his servant to a particular house, goods of the value of '2s. 10^/. with change for a crown piece. On tlie way he met the servant, and induced ium to part with the goods and change a crown piece, but whicii afterwards was found to be bad. Both the tradesman and servant swore that the latter had no authority to part with the goods or change without receiving the crowtt piece in payment; though the former admitted that he intended to sell the goods, and never expected them back again: — Held that the offence amounted to larceny. Rex v. Small, 8 Car. S^ P. 46. On an indictment for larceny it appeared that a landlord went to his tenant (who had removed all his goods) to demand rent amounting to £12 10s. taking with him a receipt ready written and signed ; the tenant gave him £2, and asked to look at the receipt. It was given to him, and he refused to return it, or to pay the remainder of the rent. It was proved by the landlord that at the time he gave the prisoner the receipt, he thought the prisoner was going to pay him the rent, and that he should not have parted with the receipt unless he had been paid all the rent, but that when he put the receipt into the prisoner's hands he never expected to have the receipt again; and that he didnot want the receipt again, but wanted his rent to be paid : Held a larceny, and that the fact of the tenant giving the £2 made no difference. Reg. v. Rodnay, 9 Car. ^ P. 784. An ostler assisted in removing from a wagon which stopped at the inn where he was employed, a quantity of hay which had been taken by the waggoner from his master's stables and put into tlie wagon, such hay not being allowed for the horses on the jour- ney: — Held, that the ostler was properly indicted for receiving, because as the hay was not always allowed by tlie master for the horses, tlie moment it was removed by the Vv'aggoner from the stable to the wagonaniiiio furandi, the larceny was complete. Reg. V. Gruncell, 9 Car. Sf P. 365. A person hired to drive cattle to a particular place, who sells the same, and absconds v.'ith the money, is guilty of stealing, though the intention to sell be not conceived till after taking possession of the cattle. Reg. v. Jackson, 2 M. C. C. R. 32. A prisoner was employed as master of a coal vessel. The custom of the trade was that he should receive two-thirds of the freight — he took the whole : — Held, that he was not a. joint proprietor with the master, and that he was properly convicted of stealing the master's third. Anon. '2 Lewin, C. C. 258. S. P. Holmes^ case, id. 256. If a person not being the servant of the party who intrusts him, receive a parcel contain- ing notes to take to a coach-office, and abstract the notes on his way there, and apply them to his use, he is guilty of larceny. Reg. v. Jenkins, 9 Car. iSf P. 28. To constitute ftlony, breach of trust is not sufficient; there must be a felonious taking, but that is satisfied by an act not warranted by the purpose for which the property was delivered. Cartwright v. Green, 8 Ves.jun. 402. To obtain property by fraud, and under a preconcerted plan to rob is felony, but the animus furandi must he found by the jury. Rex v. Horner, 1 Leach, C. C. 270. A banker's clerk enters a fictitious sum in the Icgcr to the credit of a customer, and tells him he has paid the sum to his account, and on the faith of it obtains from the cus- tomer his chock on the bankers, which the prisoner pays to himself by bank notes front the fill, and enters in the waste-book a true account of the check-drawer and notes as p:iid, "to a man." Tjiis was held a felonious taking of the notes ftom thetill. Rex v. Hammon,^ Taunt.'SOi. 2 Leach, C.C. im'S: The assent of a prosecutor to give facility to the commission of a larceny for the puri pose of detecting the offenders, does not do away the felony, although the property was not taken against his will. Rex v. Egginton, 2 Leach, C. C. 913. 2 East, P. C. 494/ C66. 2 li. c^ P. 508. The owner of goods, knowing of an intention in the prisoners to steal them, they hav- HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. SOQ** regularly and ordinarily these circumstances following direct in this case. If ./f. thinking he hath a title to the horse of B. seiseth it as his own, or supposing that B. holds of him distrains the horse of B. ing plotted so to do with liis servant, desired the servant to carry on his business with a view to the detection of the thieves; in consequence of which the servant, with the con.sent of his master, agreed with the prisoners to open the outer door to them, an(> let them intoihe liouse, when tiiey brolie open inner apartments, and took the goods: Held^ by a majority of the judges, to be larceny; one doubting, because of the owner's assent and partial encouragement of the felony by means of his servant. lb. If a man steals goods in one count}', and carry them into another, it will be larceny in the latter, though the goods are not carried into the latter county until long after the original theft. Rex v. Parkin, 1 R. 6; M. C. C. R. 45; 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 174. See infra. An indictment for robbing a mail-bag of letters must be laid in the county where the mail was actually taken, in order to bring the case within the statute; and cannot be laid in the county where the prisoner was in possession of it only; the jury finding that the letters had been taken from tlie bag into some other county through which the mail had passed. Rex v. Thomas, 2 East, F. C. 605. 2 Leach, C. C. 634. To make a taking felonious, it is not necessary that it should be done lucri causa ; taking with an intent to destroy will be sufficient to constitute the offence of larceny, if done to serve the prisoner or another person, though not in a pecuniary way. Rex v. Cabbage, R. Sf R. C. C. 292. 2 Russ. C. 6{ M. 94. If a man steals his own goods from his own bailee, thongh he has no intent to charge the bailee, but his intent is to defraud the king; yet if the bailee had an interest in the possession, and could have withheld it from the owner, the taking is a larceny. Rex v. Wilkinson, R. Sf R. C. C. 470. 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 156. If a part-owner of property steal it from the person in whose custody it is, and who is responsilile for its safety, he is guilty of larceny. Rex v. Bramley, R, Sf R. C. C. 478. 2 Russ.C ^- M.155. To constitute larceny the felonious intention must exist in the mind at the time tlie property was obtained; for if it be obtained by fair contract, and afterwards fraudulently converted, it is no felony. Rex v. Charlewood, 1 Leach, C. C. 409. 2 East, P. C. 689. If, however, a fraudulent conversion takes place after the privity of contract is deter- mined, it is felony. Jb. Obtaining a post-chaise by hiring with a felonious intent to convert it to the use of the hirec, is felony, although the contract of hiring was not for any definite time. Rex v. Semple, 1 Leack, C. C. 420. 2 East, P. C. 691. If a man who is hired to drive cattle, sell them, it is larceny; for he has the custody only, and not the right to the possession; his possession is the owner's possession, though he is a general drover; at least if he is paid by the day. Rex v. McNamie, I M. C, C, R, 368. The prisoner went into a shop in London, and purchased jewelry, and said he would pay in cash; and the seller agreed to deliver the goods at a coach. office belonging to an inn where the prisoner stated tiiat he lodged. The seller made out an invoice and took the goods there, when the prisoner said he had been disappointed in receiving some money he expected by letter. Just afterwards, a two-penny post letter was put in his hands, which he opened in the presence of the seller, and said he had to meet a friend at Tow's Cotfce-house at seven, who could supply the money. The goods were left at the coach-office, and the seller went home. The prisoner had taken a place in the mail, but he countermanded that, and absconded with the goods. The seller swore that he con- sidered the goods sold if he got his cash, but not before. It was left to the jury to say whether the prisoner had any intention of buying and paying for the goods, or whether he gave the order merely to get possession of them to convert them to his own use. The jury found the latter, and the prisoner was convicted; and tlie conviction was held right by the twelve judges. Rex v. Campbell, Car. C. L. 280; R. S^- M. C. C. R. 179. Getting goods delivered into a hired cart, on the express condition that the price shall be paid for tliem before they are taken from the cart, and then getting them from the cart without paying the price, will be larceny, if the prisoner never had any intention of paying, but had ub initio the intention to defraud. Rex v. Pratt, R. Sf M. C. C. R. 250. Taking goods, though prisoner has bargained to buy, is felonious, if by the usage, the 609'' HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. without cause, this regularly makes it no felony, but a trespass, because there is a pretense of title ; but yet this may be but a trick to colour a felony, and the ordinary discovery of a felonious intent price ought to be paid before they are taken, and the owner did not consent to their being taken, and tlie prisoner, when he bargained for them, did not intend to pay for theru, but meant to get them into his possession and dispose of them for his own benefit without paying for them. Rex v. Gilbert, R. Sf M. C. C. R. 185. If a person, having ordered a tradesman to bring goods to his house, look out' a certain quantity, and ask the price of them separate from the rest, and then by sending tlie tradesman home on pretence of wanting other articles, take the opportunity of running away with the goods so looked out, with intent to steal therii, it is larceny, for as the sale was not completed, the possession of the property still remained in the tradesman. Bex V. Skarpless, 1 Leach, C. C. 92 ; 2 East, P. C. 675. Where property, which the prosecutor had bouglit, was weighed out in the presence of his clerk, and delivered to his carman's servant to cart, who let other persons take away the cart and dispose of the property for his benefit jointly with that of the others. The carman's servant, as well as the others, are guilty of larceny at common law. Eexv. Harding, R. Sf R. C. C. 125; 1 Russ. C. S( M. 200. Where the owner sends goods by his servant to be delivered to -4., but B. fraudulently procures the delivery to himself by pretending to be A,, he is guilty of felony. Rex v. Wilkins, 2 East, P. C. 673, 1 Leach, C. C. 520. Getting a parcel from a carrier's servant, by falsely pretending to be the person to whom it is directed, if it be taken aiiimo furandi, it is larceny, for the servant has no authority to part with it but to the right person. Rex v. Longstreth, R. Sf M. C. C. R. 137. Fraudulently obtaining a chest of tea from the India House, though by means of a regular request, note, and permit, was holden to be a larceny. Rex v. Hench, 2 Russ. C. 4- M. 120; R. Sf R. C. C. 163. Where the prisoner having offered to accommodate the prosecutor witli gold for notes, the latter put down a number of bank-notes for the purpose of their being ex- changed, which the prisoner took up and ran away with : Held, a larceny if the jury believed that he intended to run away with them at the time, and not to return the gold. Rex v. Oliver, 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 122. To obtain a bill of exchange from an indorsee under a pretence of getting it dis- counted, is felony, if ihe jury find that the indorsee did not intend to leave the bill in the prisoner's possession witliout the money, and that he undertook to discount with a preconcerted design to convert its produce to his own use. Rex v. Aickels, 1 Leach, C. C. 294 ; 2 East, P. C. 675. Where two planned to rob the prosecutrix of some coats, and one got her to go with him that he might get some money to buy them of lier, and she left the coats with the other, who immediately absconded with them: Held, that the receipt by the onp amounted to a felonious taking of the coats by both. Rex v. County, 2 Russ, p. ^ M. ■ 127-175. , If a bureau be delivered to a carpenfier to repair, and he discover money in a secret drawer of it, which he unnecessarily as to its repairs breaks open, and converts the money to his own use, it is a felonious taking of the property, unless it appear that he did it with intention to restore it to its right owner. Cartwright v. Green, 2 Leach, C. C. 952. 8 Ves.ju7i.i05. A person purchased at public auction a bureau, in which he afterwards discovered, in a secret drawer, a purse containing money, which he appropriated to his own use. At the time of the sale, no person knew that the bureau contained any thing whatever : Held, that if the buyer had exi)rcss notice, that the bureau alone and not its contents, if any, was sold to him; or if he had no reason to believe that any thing more than the bureau itself was sold, the abstraction of the money was a felonious taking, and he was guilty of larceny in appropriating it to his own use. Hut that if he had reasonable ground for believing tiiat he bouglit the bureau with its contents, if any, he had a colourable property, and it was no larceny. Merry v. Green, 7 Mee. Sf W. 623. If a parcel be accidently left in a liackncy-coach, and the coachman, instead of restoring it to the owner, detain it, open it, destroy part of its contents, and borrow HISTORTA PLACITORUM CORON_^. 509^^ is, if the party doth it secretly, or being charged with the goods denies it. If..'?, takes away the goods of B. openly before him or other per- son (otherwise than by apparent robbery) tliis carries with it an money on the rest, he is guilty of felony. Rex v. Wynne^ 1 Leach, C. C, 413; 2 East, P. C. 664-697; S". P. Rex v. Sears, 1 Leach, C. C. 415 n. A servant clandestinely taking his master's corn, though to give to his master's horses, is guilty of larceny. Rex v. Morjit, R. Sf R. C. C. 307; 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 94; iS. P. Reg. V. Usborne, 5 Jur. 200; Reg. v. Careswell, 5 Jur. 251, contra; Reg. v. Cole, Id. n. PuUinff wool from the bodies of live sheep and lambs, animo furandi, is larceny. Rex V. Martin, 1 Leach, C. C. 171; 2 East, P. C. 618. So it is larceny to take the milk from a cow. lb. The prisoner having lifted up a bag from the boot of a coach, was detected before he had got it out; and it did not appear that it was entirely removed from the space it at first occupied in the boot, but the raising it from the bottom had completely removed eacli part of it from the space that specific part occupied : Held, that it was a com- plete asportation. Rex v. Walsh, 1 R. Sf M. C. C. R.U; 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 96. To remove a package from the head to the tail of a wagon with a felonious intent to take it away, is a sufficient asportation to constitute a larceny; but merely to alter the position of a package on the spot where it lies, is not. Rex v. Coslet, 1 Leach, C. C. 236; 2 East, P. C. 556. See Rex v. Cherry, 1 Leach, C. C. 236 n; 2 East, P. C. 556. If a warehouseman lias several bags of wheat delivered to him for safe custody, and he take the whole of the wheat out of one bag, it is no less a larceny than if he had severed a part from the residue of the wheat in the same bag, and had taken only that part, leaving the remainder of the wheat in the bag. Rex v. Brazier, R. S; R. C. C. 337; 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 134. What does not amount to a taking. — A., in consequence of seeing an advertisement, applied to B. to raise money for him. B. said he would procure him i^5000, and pro- duced from his pockct-booli 10 blank 6s. bill-stamps, across each of which' ^. wrote, "Accepted, payable at Messrs. P. Sf Co. 189 F. street, London," and signed his name. B., who was present, took up the stamps, and nothing was said as to what was to be done with tliem. Afterwards bills of excjiange for X"500 each were drawn on these stamps, and B. put them into circulation : Held, that these stamps, with the accept- ances thus written upon them, were neither " bills of exchange," "orders for the pay- ment of money," or "securities for money;" and held also, that a charge of larceny against B for stealing the stamps, and for stealing the ^o^er on which the stamps were, would not be sustained, as this was no larceny. Rex v. Hart, 6 Ca.r Sf F. 106. Stealing by the wife of a member of a friendly society, money of the society, de- posited in a box in the husband's custody, kept locked by the stewards, is not larceny. Rex v. Millis, 1 JVi. C. C. R. 375. Clandestinely taking away articles to induce the owner (a girl) to fetch them, and thereby to give the prisoner an opportunity to solicit her to commit fornication with him, is not felonious. Rex v. Dickenson, R. Sf R. C. C. 420; 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 98. If a larceny be committed out of the kingdom, though within the king's dominions, (e. g. in Jersey) bringing the things stolen into this kingdom, will not make it larceny here. Rex v. Prowes, M. C. C. R. 349. & P; Reg. v. Madge, 9 Car. Sf P. 29 ; see infra. A. delivered his watch to B. to be repaired, instead of repairing it he sold it, and A. being informed of this, told B. that he would either have his watch or the money: Held, no felony. Rex v. Leny, 4 Car. Sf P. 241. Where a g^rson gave his servant a £5 note to get changed, and he got the note changed and made off with the change: Held to be no larceny, but an embezzlement. Rex v. Sullens, Car. C. L. 319 ; R. Sf M. C. C. R. 129. A. had consigned three trusses of hay to B. and had sent them by the prisoner's cart; the prisoner took away one of the trusses, which was found in his stable not broken up. Hdd no larceny, as the prisoner did not break up the truss. Rex v. Pratley, 5 Car. Sf P. 533. If a poacher take a gun by force from a gamekeeper under the impression that it may 509^' HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. evidence only of a trespass, because done openly in the presence of the owner, or of other persons that are known to the owner. l( ji. leaves his harrow or his plovV-strings in the field, and B. having land in the same field useth it, and having done, either return- be used against him, it is no felony, thoug-Ii he state afterwards that he will sell the gun, and it be not subsequently heard of. Rex v. HoUowny, 5 Car. S\- P. 524. It is not an indictiible offence to take away a chattel, unless such a degree of force be used as will make it an offence against the public, and the indictment must show that fact. Rrx V. Gardiner, 1 Russ. C. Sf M. 52. To obtain from a person his note of hand by threatening with aknife held to his throat to take away his life, was not a felonious stealmg of the note within slat. 2. Geo. 2. c. 25; for it never was of value to or in the peaceable possession of such person. Rex v. FMpse, 2 Leach, C. C. 673 ; 2 East, P. C. 599. If a person be induced to play at hiding under the hat, and stake down his money voluntarily on the event, meaning to receive the stake if he wins, and to pay it if he loses, the taking up of the stake so deposited by him on the table, is not a felonious taking, although the taker was made to appear to win the money by fraudulent conspiracy and collusion. Rex v. Nicholson, 2 Leach, C. C. 610 ; 2 East, P. C. 669. Where a prisoner took a packet of diamonds to a pawnbroker, with whom he had pre- viously pledged a broach; and having agreed with the shopman for the amount of the loan, sealed tlicm up and received the amount, deducting the amount for which the broach was pledged; but instead of giving the packet of diamonds to the shopman, gave him a packet of similar appearance, containing only glass : Held, that it was not larceny, but only a fraud. Rex v. Meilheini, Car. C. L. 281. If a pawnbroker's servant, who lias a general authority from his master to act in his business, delivers up a pledge to the pawner on receiving a parcel from the pawner, which he supposes contains valuables he has just seen in the pawner's possession in a similar parcel, the receipt of the pledge by the pawner is not a larceny. Rex v. Jack- son, R. S{ M. C. C. fl. 119. Where a letter enclosing a check was directed to " James Mucklow, St. Marliri's Lane, Birminghnm," and no person of that name lived there, but the prisoner lived about ten yards from St. Martin's Lane and another James Mucklow lived in New Hall street, and the prisoner, in consequence of a message left by the postman, got the letter from the post-office and appropriated the check to his own use : Held, that it was not a felo- nious taking. Rex v. Mucklow, Car. C. L. 280; R. Sf M. C. C. R. 160. A prisoner cannot be found guilty of stealing goods if it appear that he could not other- wise get them than by the delivery of the prosecutor's wife, in which case it may be pre- sumed that he received them from her. Rex v. Harrison, 1 Leach, C. C 47; 2 East, P. C. 5.59. Where a jury found that one who assisted in taking another's goods from a fire in his presence, but without his desire, and who afterwards concealed and denied having them, yet took them honestly at first, and that the evil intention to convert them came on the taker afterwards, it was held no larceny. Rex v. Leigh, 2 East, P. C. 694; 1 Leach, C. C. 411. n. If tlie owner parts with possession of goods for a special purpose, and the bailee, wherj that ])urpose is executed, neglects to return them, and afterwards disposes of them, if he had not a felonious intention when he originally took them, his subsequent withholding' and disposing of them will not constitute a new felonious taking, or make him guilty of felony. Rex v. Banks, R. i^ R. C. C. 411 ; 2 Russ C. Sf M. 1.32. Sernh'e, that if a master of a foreign vessel, captured by a British ship and carried into port, takes goods from the vessel after she has been condemned as a prize, it is not a larceny unless there is evidence that he took them for the purpose of converting them to his private use. Rex v. Van Mayen, R. Sf R. C. (7. 118. 2. Russ. C. ^- M. 10^. If a tradesman sell a stranger goods, enter them to his debit, jjind makes out a bill of parcels for them as goods sold, and the goods are delivered to the purchaser by the servant of the seller, who receives bills for them, it is not felony, altiiough the tradesman sold tliein for ready money, never intending to give the stranger credit, and it appear that he had taken the apartments to which he ordered them to be sent for the purpose of obtain- ing them fraudulently. Rex v. I'arkn-, 2 Leach, C. C. 614. 2 East, P. C. 671. Wiiere the prisoner obtaiued possession of a hat from the maker, which had been HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 509* eth them to the place where they were, or acquaints B. with it, this is no felony, but at most a trespass, \(\ji. and B. being neighbours, and t/^. having an horse on the common, and B. having cattle there, that lie cannot readily find, ordered by a third person, by sending- a boy for it in the nnme of such person. Held, it did not amount to larceny. Rex v. Adums, 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 113. R. Sf R. C. C. 225. Wiiere goods in a shop were lied to a string whicJi was fastened by one end to the bottom of the counter, and a thief took up the goods and carried Ihem away towards the door, as far as the string would permit: Held, that being no severenee there was no as- portation, and consequently it was not a felony. Anon. 2 East, P. C. 556. 1 Leach, C. C. 321. n. Where the prisoner set up a long bale upon end, in a wagon, and cut the wrapper all the way down, with intent to remove tlie contents, but was apprehended before he had taken any thing out of it : Held, that there was not a sufficient asportation to constitute a larceny. Rex v. Cherry, 1 Leach, C. C. 236. n. 2 East., P. C. 556. If a master and owner of a siiip steal some of the goods delivered to him to carry, it is not larceny in him, unless he take the goods out of their packages. Rex v. Madox, R. Sf R. C. C. 92. 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 135. Nor if larceny, would it have been a capital offence within stat. 24, Geo. 2, C. 45. lb. If one employed to carry goods for hire, appropriate them to his own us^, but does not break bulk, this is no larceny, although the person so employed was not a common carrier, but was only employed in this particular instance. Rex v. Fletcher, 4 Car. Sf P. 544. Where a person received a check from Sir T. P. to buy Exchequer-bills, and he car- ried it to the banker's, got the cash, and embezzled part, on being indicted for stealing: Held first, that as there was no fraud to induce Sir T. P. to deliver the check, it was not larceny, although the prisoner intended to misapply the property when he took it, and misapplied accordingly. Secondly, that as Sir T. P. never had possession of the mo- ney received at the banker's, but by the hands of the prisoner, tlie indictment could not be supported. Rex v. Wnlsh, R. Sf R. C. C. 215. 2 Leach, C. C. 1054. 4 Taunt. 258. But see 7^-8 Geo. 4. c. 29, A. v/as indicted at common law, for simple larceny, in stealing in Middlesex a quan- tity of lead. It appeared that the lead was stolen from the roof of the church oi Iver, in BvcJiinghamshire. The prisoner was indicted at the central crijninal court which has jurisdiction in Middlesex, (under 4^5 Will. 4. c. 36.) but not in Buckinghamshire, Held, that he could not be convicted there on the ground that the original taking not being a larceny, but created by statute a felony, the subsequent possession could not be con- eidered a larceny. Rex v. Millar, 7 Car. Sf P. 665. A drover of cattle was employed by a grazier in the country, to drive eight oxen to London, his instructions were, that if he could sell them on the road he might : and those he did not sell on the road he was to take to a particular salesman in Stnilhjicld market, who was to sell them for the grazier. The drover sold two on the road, and instead of taking the remaining six to the salesman, drove them himself to Smithjield market, and sold them there, and received the money, which he applied to his own use : Held, that he could not be convicted either of larceny or embezzlement. Reg. v. Goodbudy, 8 Car. Sf P. 665. Where in a case of ring-dropping the prisoners prevailed on the prosecutor to buy the share of the other party, and the prosecutor was prevailed on to part with his money — intending to part with it forever, and not with the possession of it only: Held, that this was not a larceny, Reg. v. Willson, 8 Car, ^ P. 111. A. was treating B. at a beer-house, and A. wishing to pay, put down a sovereign, de- siring ttie landlady to give him change ; she could not do so, and B. said he would go out and get change. A. said, " You wont come back with tlie change." B. replied, " Never fear." A. allowed B. to take up the sovereign, and B. never returned either with it or the change : Held no larceny, as A. having permitted the sovereign to be taken away, for the purpose of being changed, he could never have expected to receive back the spe- cific coin, and had, therefore, divested himself of the entire possession of it. Reg.w Tho. 7nas, 9 Car. Sf P. HI. It is not larceny for miners, employed to bring ore to the surface, and paid by tha 509^ HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. •takes lip the horse of A. and rides about to find his cattle, and hav- ing done, turns off the horse again in the common, this is no felony, but at most a trespass. So if my servant, without my privity, takes my horse, and rides abroad ten or twelve miles about his own occasions, and returns again, it is no felony, but if in his journey he sells my horse, as his own, this is declarative of his first taking to be felonious, and animo JurandL^S] But in cases of larciny the variety of circumstances is so great, and the complications thereof so mingled, that it is impossible to prescribe all the circumstances evidencing a felonious intent, or the contrary, but the same must be left to the due and attentive consideration of the judge and jury, wherein the best rule is, 171 dubiis, rather to incline to acquittal than conviction. IV. It must be of goods personal, for otherwise no felony can Be committed by taking them. [9] 1. Therefore of chatties real no felony can be committed, r 510 ]] and therefore the taking away of a ward cannot be felony, nor of a box or chest of charters, that concern land. 10 E. 4. 14. d.(w.)[10.] (n) Nor can felony be committed of bonds, notes, or other writings, that are securities for a debt, because they derive their value from choses en action, which cannot be stolen. DalL New Edit. p. 501, 8 Co. Rep. 33. but by a late statute 2 Geo. II. cap. 25. the steal- ing of bonds, bills, notes, &c. is made felony with or without the benefit of the clergy, 'in the same manner as if the offender had stolen goods of the like value, with the money secured by such bonds, &c. owners, according to the quantity produced, to remove from the heaps of other miners ore produced by them, and add it to tiieir own, in order to increase their wages, the ore still remaining in the possession of the owners. Rex v. Webb, 1 M. C. C. R. 431. The cases of Rex v. Fttrie, I Leach, C. C. 294. 2 East, P. C. 740. and Rex v, Farley, 2 East, P. C. 740, relate to petty larceny, which is not now a distinct offence in England. [8] In Cramp's case, 1 Car. Sf Pay. 658. where one took a horse and rode it away, and then turned it loose, and the horse furniture was offered for sale, it was held to be a larceny of the furniture and not of the horse. See also Phillips's case, 2 Russ. C. Sf AL 97. 2 East's P. C. 662. Rose, on Cr. Ev. 472. [10] See Walker's case. Mood. R. 155. Vyse's case. Id. 218. Clarke's case, R. Sf R. 181. U. S.\. Moullon. 5 Mason Rep. 557. Westhur's case, 1 Leach, C. C. 12. U. S. y, Davis, 5 Mason's R. 356. Bingley's case, 5 Car. Sf Pay. 603. [9] Of the thing taken. — It is enough to make the crime larceny that the thing stolen is of any pecuniary value, or valuable to the owner or person having a general or spe- cial property or interest in it, or right of possession of it, though it be not of any value to sell. Rose, on C. Evid. 5\2; Phippoe's case, 2 Leach, C. C. 673; Bryant's case, 2 S. C. Law. Repos. 26t); The People v. Holbrook, 13 Johns. R. 90; 2 Russ. on Crim. 62; Payne v. The People, 6 Johns. R. 103. At common law a chose in action is not the subject of larceny. Culp. v. The State, 1 Port, R. 33. But semble that bank-notes were not chattels within the meaning of Stats. 3 Will. ^ M. c. 9, and 5 Anne, c. 31. Rex v. Morris, 1 Leach, C. C. 468; .2 East, P. C. 748; eee post in this note. Money was not within the meaning of the words "goods and chattels," in the HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 510^ 2. Neither can larciny be committed of things, that adhere to the freehold, as trees, grass, bushes, hedges, stones or lead of a house, or the hke.(o) (0) But now by 4 Geo. II. cap. 32. it is felony to steal, rip, cut, or break with intent to steal any lead, iron bar, iron gate, iron rail or palisado, fixed to any house, or out-house, or fences thereunto belonging, and every person, who shall be aiding or abetting, or shall buy or receive any such lead, S^c. knowing the same to be stolen, is subject to the same punishment. Statutes 3 Will. 4- M. c. 9, and 5 Anne, c. 31. Rex v. Guy, 1 Leach, C. C. 241 ; 2 East P. C. 748; Rex v. Davidson, 1 Leach, C. C. 242. ' But rc-issuable notes, if they cannot properly be called valuable securities whilst in the hands of the maker, may be called (in an indictment) "goods and chattels." U. S. V. Moulton, 5 Mason R. 537; Rex v. Vyse, Ry. 4- M. C. C. 218, cited infra. A check on a banker's, written on unstamped paper, payable to D. F. J.^ and not made payable to bearer, is not a valuable security within 7 4' 8 Geo. 4.c. 29. s. 5. Rex v. Yeates, Car. C. L. 273, 333, R. Sf M. C. C. R. 170. Held, not to be a felony within 2 Geo. 2 c. 25, to steal bankers' notes completely executed, but which have never been put into circulation, on tiie ground that no money was due upon them. Anon. 2 Russ. C. S( M. 147; 2 Leach, C. C. 1061 n. It has been held in this country, that bank bills complete in form, but not issued, are the property of the bank ; and may be so treated in criminal proceedings for re- ceiving them, with knowledge of their having been stolen. The People v. Wiley, 3 HiWs N. Y. Rep. 194. Stealing re-issuable notes after they have been paid, and before they have been re- issued, did not subject the party to an indictment on the 2 Geo. 2. c. 25, for stealing notes, but he may be indicted for stealing paper with valuable stamps upon it. Rex. v. Clark, R. 4- R. C. C. 181, 2 Leach, C. C. 1036. Country bankers' notes which have been paid by the bankers in London, at whose house they were made payable, and by them sent down to country bankers to be re- issued, on the way they were stolen, and the prisoner was indicted for receiving them. The indictment, in some counts, charged the notes to be valuable securities, (see Wilson v. The State, 1 Porter, R. 118,) and in others as pieces of paper of the goods and chattels of the country bankers. The prisoner was convicted, and the conviction held right. Some of the judges doubted whether these notes were to be con- sidered as valuable securities, but if not they all thought they were goods and chattels. Rex v. Vyse,R. Sf. M. C. C. 218. Exchequer bills, although signed by a person not authorized to do so, are securities and effects within the Statute 15 Geo. 2 c. 13. s. 12. Rex v. Aslett, 1 N.R. I; 2 Leach, C. C. 958 ; R. Sf R. C. C. 67. The halves of country bank-notes, sent in a letter, are goods and chattels, and a per- son who steals them is indictable for larceny. Rex v. Mead, 4 Car. Sf P. 535. Dollars or Portugal money, not current by proclamation, are not goods within the meaning of the 24 Geo. 2. c. 45. Rex v. Leigh, 1 Leach, C. C. 52 ; S. P. Rex y. Grimes, 2 East, P. C. 646. A larceny may be committed of window-sashes, which are neither hung nor beaded jnto the frames, but merely fastened by lathes nailed across the frames to prevent their shaking out; as they are not fixed to the freehold. Rex v. Hedges, 1 Leach, C. C. 201; 2 East, P. C. 590 n. Piratically stealing a ship's anchor and cable is a capital offence by the marine laws, and triable under the 28 Hen. 8. c. 15; 39 Geo. 3. c. 37, not extending to this case. Rex V. Curling, R. ^ R. C. C. 123. And the stealing is equally an offence, although the master of the vessel concur in it, and although the object is to defraud the underwriters for the benefit of the owners, lb. The Ownership. — Property cannot be laid in a person who has never had either real or constructive possession. Rex v. Adams, R. S^ R. C. C. 225. 2 Russ. C. 4- M. 113. In an indictment for larceny the property stolen may be described as the real owner's 510'' HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. But if they are severed from the freehold, as wood cut, grass in cocks, stones digged out of a quarry, then felony may be committed by stealing. of tliem, for they are personal goods. IS //. 8. 2. b. 12. 8 E. 3. Coron. 119. although it was never actually in his possession, but in the possession of his agent only. Rex V. Remnant, R. 6( R. C. C. 136. 2 Rvss. C. 4- M. 168. The wife of ^. was employed by her fatlier to sell sheep and receive the amount at K. She did so; but before she left A'. a £5 note wliich she received in payment for the sheep was stolen from her: — Hehl, that in an indictment for a larceny the note was properly described as the property of the husband. Rex v. Roberts, 7 Car. Sf P. 485. In an indictment for larceny of goods, the property of a peer who is a baron, the goods may be laid as the goods and chattels of" G. T. R. Lord Z>." without styling him Baron D. although the more proper way to describe the peer is by his ciiristian name and his degree in the peerage as duke, earl, baron, or the like. Reg, v. Pitts, 8 Car. Sf P. 771. S. P. Reg. V, Caleij, 5 Jur. 709. If goods seized under a writ ofji.fa. are stolen, they may be described as the goods of the party against whom the writ issued ; for though they are in custodid legis, the original owner continues to have a property in them till they are sold. Rex, v. Eadslall, 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 158. 197. An indictment for stealing the wearing apparel of a son who is an apprentice to his father, and furnished with his clothes in pursuance of his indenture must lay them to be the propert)? of the son and not of the father. Rex v. Forsgate, 1 Leach, C, C, 463. In an indictment for stealing property which had belonged to a deceased person who appointed executors who would not prove the will, it was held the property must be laid in the ordinary, and not in a person who alter the commission of the offence, but before the indictment, had taken out letters of administration with the will annexed, because the rights of an administrator only commence from the date of the letters as distinguished from those of an executor, which commence not from the granting of the probate, but from the death of the testator. Rex v. Smith, 7 Car. Sf P. 147. Where two had jointly stock upon a farm, and one died leaving several children: — Held, that the property in sheep stolen was properly alleged to be in the survivor and the children, the former swearing that he considered himself to hold one moiety for the bene- fit of the latter. Rex v. Scott, 2 East, P. C. 655. R. S( R. C. C. 13. Semble, that the property might have been laid in the survivor alone as he was in pos- session of tlie children's moi.ety as their agent. lb. D. and C. were partners, C. died intestate, leaving a widow and children ; from the time of his death the widow acted as partner with D. and attended the business of the shop. Three weeks after C's death part of the goods were stolen ; they were described in the indictment as the goods of D. and the widow: — Held, that the description was right. Rex v. Galy, R. &,■ R. C. C. 178. 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 161. The goods in a dissenting chapel vested in trustees, cannot be described in an indict- ment as the goods of a servant who has merely the custody of the chapel, and things in it to clean and keep in order, althougli he has the key of the chapel, and no other person but the minister has another key. Rex v. Hutchinson, R. Sf R, C, C, 412. 2 Russ, C. SfM. 158. A bible had been given to a society of Wesleyans ; and it had been bound at the ex- pense of the society. B. stated that he was one of the trustees of the chapel, and also a member of the society. No trust-deed was produced : — Held, that in an indictriient foi* stealing the bible the property was rightly laid in B. and others. Rex v. Boulton, 5 Car, Sf P. 537. An unqualified person may have a sufficient legal possession of game to support an in- dictment for stealing it from him. Anon. 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 152. A box belonging to a benefit society was stolen from a r(5om in a public iiouse. Two of the stewards had keys of this box; and by the rules of the society the landlord ought to have had a key, but in fact he had not. Held, that the prisoner might be convicted on a count laying the property in the landlord alone. Rrx v. Wy7ner, 4 Car. Sf P. 391. An indictment for stealmg goods may under the 55 Geo. III. c. 137, state them to be the goods of the overseers of the poor for the time being of the parish of A.; for this will HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. SIO-^ Bat if a man come to steal trees, or the lead of a church or house, and sever it, and after about an hour's time, or so, come and fetch it away, this hatli been held felony, because the act is not conlinuated but interpolated, and in that interval the property lodgeihin the right import that they belong^ed at the time of the theft to the persons who were the then over- seers. Hex V. Went, R. Sf R. C. C. 359. 2 Russ. G. Sf M. 167. In stealing from the Invahd-office at Chelsea, the property must be laid in the house of the king. Rex v. Peyton, 1 Leach, C. C. 324. 2 East, l\ C. 501. ■ Goods belonging to a gnest stolen at an inn may be laid to be the property either of the innkeeper or guest. Rex v. Todd, 1 Leach, C C 557. n. So goods stolen from a washerwoman, may be laid to be her property. Rex v. Par- leer, 1 Leach, C. C. 357, n. So in the case of an agister who takes in sheep to agist for another, they may be laid to be his property. Rex v. Woodward, 1 Leach, C. C. 357 n.; 2 East, P. C. G53. The coach-glass of a gentleman's coach standing in a coachmaster's yard, may be laid to be the property of the coachmaster. Rex v. Taylor, 1 Leach, C. C. 356 ; 2 East, P, C. 653. The property in goods stolen, held to be properly alleged to be in the driver of a coach from the boot of which they were taken* Rex v. Deakin, 2 East, P. C. 653 ; 2 Leacfi, C. C. 862. In larceny, the goods of a furnished lodgings must be described as the lodger's goods, not as the goods of the original owner. Rex v. Belstead, R. S( R. C C 411; 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 154; Rexv. Brunswick, 1 R. Sf M. C. C. R.26; 2 Russ. 154. If a corn factor purchases a ship luden with corn, and send his lighter to fetch it from the ship to his wharf, a delivery of the corn on board the lighter puts it into the possession of the corn factor, altliough the lighter-man never delivers it at the factor's wharf. Rex V. Spears, 2 Leach, C. C. 825 ; 2 East, P. C. 568. If a corn factor purchase the cargo of a vessel laden with corn, and send his servant with a lighter to fetch it from the ship, in loose bulk, and the servant contrive to have a certain portion of it put into sacks by the meters on board the ship, and take the corn so sacked feloniously away in the lighter immediately from the ship, he may be indicted for steal- ing tlie property of tlie corn factor, although it was never put into his lighter, or other- wise reduced into the corn factor's possession. Rex v. Ahrahdt, 2 Leach, C C 824 ; 2 East, P. C. 569. An indictment for larceny, laying the goods stolen to be the property of Victory Ba. roness Turkheim, is good, although her name is Selinda Victoire. Rex v. Sulls, 2 Leach, C. C. 861. An indictment for the larceny of property belonging to trustees who are not incor- porated, must lay the property to be in them as individuals, subjoining a description of tile character in which they are authorized to act. Rex v. Shenington, 1 Leach, C, C. 513. Indictment. — Though to make the thing the subject of an indictment for a larceny, it must be of some value, and stated to be so in the indictment, yet it need not be of the value of some coin known to the law, that is to say a farthing at the least. Reg. v. Mor- ris, 9 Car. Sf P. 349 ; see ante the commencement of this note. An indictment for stealing a bank note did not conclude, contra forviam. statuti — Held, by the fifteen judges, that it was bad. Rev v. Pearson, 5 Car, Sf P. 121 ; S. P. Ratcliffe's case, 1 M. C. C. R. 313 ; 2 Lewin, C. C. 57. In order to warrant a sentence of transportation for life on an indictment for a larceny, after a previous conviction for felony, the indictment need not conclude, contra jo rmam slatiili. Reg. v. Blea, 8 Car. Sf P. 735. , ; Where, on the trial of a man and woman for larceny, it appears by the evidence that they addressed each other as husband and wife, and passed and appeared as such, and were so spoken of by the witnesses for the prosecution, it will be for the jury to say whether they are satisfied that they are in fact husband and wife, even though the woman pleaded to tlie indictment which described lier as " a single woman." Reg. v. Woodw'ird, 8 Car. Sf P. 561. In such a case, a female prisoner ought not to be indicted as a single woman. lb. In an indictment against a servant of the "West India Dock Company" for stealing a quantity of canvass and hcssen belonging to the company from their warehouses, it 510"» HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. owner as a chattel, and so it was agreed by the court of king's bench , 9 Car. 1. upon an indictment for stealing the lead of fVesiminster- Abbey. Dalt. cap. 103.;;. 166. (/j) (p) New Edit. cap. 15G.p. 501. Was held sufficient to state.the property to be "the goods and chattels of the West India Company," and not necessary, notwithstanding the words of the 1^2 Will. 4 c. 11. s. 13'.i, to allege in addition that it was feloniously taken from the said company. Reg. v. Stokes, 8 Car. Sf P. 151. _ ' ' _ An indictment on 2 Geo. 2. c. 25. alleged the stealing of a bill of exchange in L. where- on the names of vl. and B. were endorsed, which was the case when the bill was stolen at M., and it appeared that the bill had an additional name as an indorsee when negoti- ated al L.: Held, no variance. Rex v. Austin, 2 East, P. C. 602. An indictment for larceny of a promissory note, may describe it generally, as " one .promissory note for the payment of one guinea," without setting the note forth. Rex v. Milnes, 2 East, P.C. G02. In an indictment for larceny, if the thing stolen be described as a bank post-bill, be not set out, the court cannot take judicial notice that it is a promissory note, or that it is such an instrument as under stat. 2 Geo. II. c. 25, may be the subject of larceny, although it be described as made for the payment of money. Rex v. Chard, R. Sf R. C. C. 488. Where an indictment described a bank note as signed by A. H. for the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, and a prisoner was convicted: such conviction was held bad, there being no evidence of A. H.^s signature. Rex v. Craven, R. ^ R. C. C. 14. 2 East, P. C. 601. Describing a bank note " as a certain note, commonly called a bank note," was not such a description as will warrant a conviction on 2 Geo. II. c. 25. for stealing it. lb. See as to stealing bank notes, Spangler v. Com. cited infra. Com. v. Messenger, 1 Binn. R. 273. Com. v. McDowell, 1 Browne's, R. 360. Stewart v. The Com. 4 S^ S^ R. 194. 2 Ruis. on C. 1. Note to American Ed. 1845. - An indictment for steaHng £10, in monies numbered, is not sufficient, some of the pieces of which that money consisted, should be specified. Rex v. Fry, R. Sf R. C. C. 482. 2 Russ. C. Sf M. iHd. In an indictment on stat. 2 Geo. II. c. 25. it was improper to lay bank notes as chat- tels, but that word might have been rejected as surplusage, if the indictment be in other respects sufficient. Rex v. Sadi, 2 East, P. C. 601. A set of new handkerchiefs in a piece, may be described as so many handkerchiefs, though they are not separated one from another, if the pattern designates each, and they are described in the trade as so many handkerchiefs. Rex \. Niles, 1 R. Sf M. C. C, R. 25. 2 Russ. C. ^ M. 169. ~ Where an indictment for stealing in a dwelling-house, alleged it to be the dwelling- house of Saiah Lunns, a.nd it appeared in evidence that her name was Sarah London: Held, that the varistnce was fatal to the capital part of the indictment. Rex v. Woodward^ 1 Leach, C. C. 253. n. See The Slate v. France, 1 Overton, ( Tenn.) Rep. 434. In cases of larceny of animals, /cr■) By this statute it is made felony to take hawks eggs out of any nests within tlie king's lands, but this is repealed by the general words of 1 Mar. cap, 1. (s) New Edit. cap. 156. p. 499. Ferrets, though tame and saleable, cannot be the subject of larceny. Rex v. Searing, R. 4f R. C. C. 351, 2 Russ. C. Sf. M. 153, and note 20, post, p 516. See^indlay v. Bear, 8S.SfR.51l. Norton v. Lodd, 5 N. H. Rep. 203. Cum. v. Chase, 9 Fich, R. 15. Wallis T. Mease, 3 Binn. R. 546. Tibbs v. Smith, T. Raym, 33. Brock's case 4 Car. &■ Fay. 131. Ward V. TJie People, 3 Hill, 395. [12] See 2 East's P. C. 587. 2 Russ. on Crimes, 136. 1th ed. 3 Bac. Ab. Felony. 4 Bl. Com. 232. Hodges Cases, 2 East's P. C. 590. n. 1 Leach, 201. Lee v. Ridsun, 7 Taunt. R. 191. 512 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. or bona capellse in ciistodia J. S, felonicl cepit, is good, 7 E. 4. 14. b. Co. P. C.p. 110. Stamf. P. C.p. 25. b. 8^ 95. b. If a man steal bells, or other goods belonging to a church, he may be indicted, quod felonice, Sj-c. cepit bona parochianorum de B. M. 31 Sf 32 Eliz. B. R. Hadman and Green versus Ringwood,{t) and yet an action of trespass lies for the churchwardens in such case, qusere bona S}- catalla parochianorum in custodid sua, or iji custodid A. B. prxdecessorum suorum gardianoruni ecclesiss cepit <§' asportavit ad daynnum parochianorum. T. 36 Eliz. B. R. Alet hod and Barfoot. Dyer 99. \i Jl. have a special property in goods, as by pledge, or a lease for years, and the goods be stolen, they must be supposed in the indict- ment the goods oi A. If Jl. bail goods to B. to keep for him, or to carry for him, (^513 ] and B. be robbed of them, the felon may be indicted for lar- ciny of the goods of A. or B. and it is good either way, for the property is still in A. yet B. hath the possession, and is charge- able to A. if the goods be stolen, and hath the property against all the world but A. A. is indicted, that he stole the goods of B. and it appears in the indictment, that B. was a feme covert at the time, the indictment is i;aught, for they are the goods of her husband, and so if A. be in- dicted for stealing the goods of B. and upon the evidence it appears, that B. had neither interest nor possession in the goods, or was a feme covert, the party ought to be acquitted, but then he may be presently indicted de novo for stealing the goods of the husband or true proprietor ; and so it once happened before me at Aylesbury 1667. in the case oi Ernes, who was convicted and executed upon a second indictment. Regularly a man cannot commit felony of the goods, wherein he hath a property. [13] If A. and B. be joint-tenants or tenants in common of an horse, it) Cro. Eliz. 145, 179. [13] To whatever extent, and for whatever purpose, any one has a property in or right to a thing stolen, to such extent, and in respect to such purpose, it is stolen from him, and a tlieft is from all the proprietors except in the case of theft by one of the owners, in which case it can be a tlieft only from the others. Cowinnr v. Snow, 11 Mass. R. 415. Where an owner, whether his property be absolute or modified, partial or of the entire thing, fraudulently for his own benefit takes it from another in whose hands it is, with intent to subject him to the loss, and despoil him of the value of the thing, the act is, in its essential character, a theft ; and so it has been held in direct cases at the common law; and it is now established beyond question, that an absolute owner may steal from another what belongs to himself. See ante, page 504, note 2, and authorities there cited. Report of the Penal Code of Mass. p. 11. Palmer v. The People, 10 Wend. R. 1G5. By the Slat. 7 4" 8 Geo. IV. FeeVs Act, c. 29, s. 45, the stealing of a chattel or a fixture by the lessee is made larceny. The tenant in this case has the exclusive riglit of actual possession under his contract; that is, one who is possessory owner may commit larceny of the thing of which he is such owner in respect to the proprietary owner. The indictment is as in any other case of simple larceny. 1 Archb. Peel's Acts, 406; The People v. Wiley, 3 HiWs N. Y. R. 199. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 513 and f^. takes the horse, possibly animo furandi,YQX this is not felony, because one tenant in common taking the whole doth but what by law he may do. [14] Yet if ./?. take away the trees of B. and cut them into boards, B. may take them away, and it cannot be felony; so if t^. take the cloth of B. and make it into a doublet, B. may take it, and it cannot be felony. M. 2 Eliz. Mof-e n. 61. p. 19. It\y2. take the hay or corn of B. and mingles it with his own heap or cock, or if ./^. take the cloth of B. and embroider it with silk or gold, B. may retake the whole heap of corn, or cock of hay, or gar- ment and embroidery also, and it is no felony, nor so much as a tres- pass. H. 36 B/iz. B. R. Popham n. 2 p. 38. Yet if t/?. bail goods to B. and afterwards animo furandi steals the goods from B. with design probably to charge him for them in an action of detinue, this is felony; quod vide 7 H. 6.43. a. Co. B.C. p. 110. Stamf. P. a. p. 26. a. Tlie wife cannot commit felony of the goods of her husband, for they are one person in law, 21 H.%. Corone455. Co. P. C. p. 110. and therefore, if she take or steal the goods of her f 514 ~\ husband, and deliver them to B. who knowing it, carries them away, this seems no felony in B. for it is taken, quasi by the consent of her husband, (w) yet trespass lies against B. for such taking, for it is a trespass, but in favorum vitae it shall not be ad- judged a' felony, and so I take the law to be, notwithstanding tlie various opinions. Dalt. cap. 104. p. 268, 269. ex lectura Cooke.{x) But if the husband deliver goods to B. and the wife had taken them feloniously from B. this had been felony in the wife, Dalt. cap. 104. p. 268. for if the husband himself had taken them felo- niously from B. it had been felony, as hath been said; but then it must in both cases be a taking animo furandi. But if a man take away another man's wife against her will citm bonis viri, that is felony by the statute of Westm. 2. cap. 34. which saith, Haheat rex sectam de bonis sic asportatis,{y) 13 Assiz. 6. But if it be by the consent of the wife, tho against the consent of the husband, it seems to be no felony, but a trespass, for it cannot be a felony in the man, unless it be a felony in the woman, who consented to it, 13 JJssiz. 6. but Ballon thinks it felony, ■^^i^■ supra. Yet in some cases the principal agent mayl3e excused from felony, and yet he, that is principal in the second degree, may be guilty, as if a man put a child of seven years to take goods, and bring them to him, and he carry them away, the child is not guilty by reason of his infancy, yet it is felony in the other. («) But in case B. were her adulterer, Mr. Ballon thinks it would be felony, for in such a case no consent of the husband can be presumed. Dalton uhi infra. (x) New Edit. cap. 157. p. 504. (y) 2 Co. Inslit. 434. [14] See 2 East's, P. C. 557; Rose, on Crim. Ev. 514; Bramley'a case, Russ, & Ry. 478; The- teople v. Gay, 1 HilVs R. 364. 514 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. If Jl. die intestate, and the goods of the deceased are stolen before administration conjmitted, it is felony, [15] and the goods shall be supposed to be bona episcopi de D. ordinary of the diocese, and if he made B. his executor, the goods shall be supposed bona B. tho he halh not proved the will, and they need not sliew specially their title as ordinary or executor, because it is of their own pos- [5153 session, ui which case a general indictment, as well as a general action of trespass lies without naming themselves executor or ordinary, and so for an administrator. But if servants in the house imbezzle their master's goods after his decease, this seems not to be felony at common law, but only tres- pass, because the goods were quodammoclo in their custody ; and therefore remedy is provided by the statute of 33 H. 6. cup. l.[16] [15] See Davis's case, 2 S. C. Law Rep. 291; Smith's case, 7 Carr Sf Pay, 147; ScoWs ca.se, Russ. Sc Ry. 13; Gaby's case. Id. 178; Wonson v. Sayward, 13 Rick. R. 402. [IG] The statute of 33 Hen. VI. c. 1. provides against larceny by household servants of the goods of their master after the decease of the master. Tlie Slat. 21 Hen. Vlll. c. 7. provides that it shall be felony in a servant " to whom any caskets, jewels, money, goods or chattels shall be delivered to keep, to withdraw iiimself and go away with said caskets, ^c, with intent to steal tlie same and delraud his master thereof, contrary to the trust so put in him;" and also makes it felony in a servant who, " being in the service of his master without the aSsent of his master, embezzles the said caskets, »Slc., and converts the same to his own use with purpose to steal it;" reciting at the same time that it was doubtful whether this was felony at tlie common law. Mr. Russell, vol, ^.p. 1217. Am, Ed, 1824, remarks that, " this statute is little resorted to at the present day. The clear maxim of the common law is, that where a party has only the bare custody of the goods of another, the legal possession remains in the owner, and the party may be guilty of tres- pass and larceny in fraudulently converting the same to his own use. So that it has been tliought to be more reasonable and consistent to consider this statute as in the nature of a declaratory act." See Paradise's case, 2 East, P. C. 565. of a servant's taking bills of exchange; Robinson's case, 2 East, P. C. 565. of a carter's taking a package of goods which his master in whose general employment he was, entrusted to him to carry ; •Shear's case, 2 Leach, 825 ; 2 East, P. C. 568. of a lighterman who sold part of a lighter- load of oats, which he was sent to fetch from on board of the ship; Lavender's case, 2 Ritss. 1221. Am. Ed. 1824. of money given to a servant to leave with another; Chip- chase's case, 2 Leach, 699. S. C. 2 East, P. C 567. of a clerk's stealing a bill of exchange from the desk of which he had charge. See also Smith's case, 2 Riiss. 208; R. Sf R. 267. Wilkinson's case, 2 Russ. 201. Wait's case, 2 Russ. 204; & C. 2 East, P. C. 570; S. C. 1 Leach, 33; Bazely's case, 2 East, P. C. 571; S. C. 2 Leach, 835; Hammon's case, 2 Russ. 202; S. C.2 Leach, 1083; Murray's case, 2 East, P. C. 683; Jenson's case, Moody, 434; Clew's case, 4 Wash. C. C.R. 700; iHe^coZf s case, Moot/y, 433 ; Bull's c:ise, 2 East, P. C. 572 ; S.C. 2 Leach, 841; Bass's case, 1 Leach, 251 ; Carr's case, 2 Russ. 208 ; R. Sf R. 98 ; Leach's case, 3 Stark, N. P. C. 70 ; 2 Deac. Abr. 780 ; Hartley's case, 2 Russ. 2U9; R. S^ R. 139; Thome's case, 2 East, P. C. 622; Squire's case, 2 Stark, N. P. 349 ; Hutchinson's case, R. Sf R. 412; Eastall's case, 2 Russ. 197 ; Commonwealth v. Morse, 14 Mass. R. 217 ; People \. Norton, SCowen, 137; Dillenhack v. Jerome, 7 Cowen, 294 ; HasseU's case, 1 Leach, 3 ; Baker's case, 1 Dow. 4- Ry. N. P. C. 19 ; 1 Deac. Abr. 778; Robinson's case, 2 Russ. 198; 2 East, P. C. 565; Harding's case, R. Sf R. 125; White's case, 2 Ti/ler, 352; McNamie's case. Rose. jBr. 481; Moody, '3&S; Hughe's case. Moody, 370; 2 Deac. Abr. 1667; Abrahat's case, 2 East, P. C. 569; S. C.2 LeacA, 968; State Y. Self, I Boy. 242; Atkinson's case, 2 Russ. 201; S. C. 1 Leach, 302; n. (a.) Harris's case, 2 Russ. C. &( M. 209; Spenser's case, Russ. Sf Ry. 299; ^^'illiams's case, 7 C. Sf P. 338; Clay's case, 2 East, P. C. 580; Beachy's case, Russ. Sf Ry. 319 ; S. C. 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 110; Williams's case, 6 Car. Sf Pay. 626; Biscall's case, 1 Id. 454; Wittingham's case, 2 Leach, 912; Headge's case, Id. 1033; Freeman's, case, 5 Carr, 4f P. 531 ; Hayden's case, 7 Id. 445 ; Howell's case, /J. 325 ; Prince's case, Moorf. ^ Mai, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 515 that if they appear not upon proclamation, they shall be attaint of felony, but if they appear, they shall answer for it as a trespass. Rut an indictment, quod invenit hominem mortiium, (§• felonict furalus fuit diiaa tunicas without saying de bonis <§' cataUis of the executor or ordinary, is not good, and therefore the party was dis- charged. 11 i?. 2. Enditement, 27. ./?. digged up a dead body out of the grave, and stole his shroud, and buried him again, tiiis is reported by Mr. Dalfon, cap. 103. p. 266. to be no felony, but a misdemeanor, for which the party was whipt. And accordingly I have seen it reported to be held 16 Jac. in Nottingham's case,(r) quia nullius in bonis, but see Co. P. C. p. 110. in Maine's case(a) ruled by the advice of all the judges to be felony, and in the indictment the goods shall be supposed the goods of the executor, administrator, or ordinary. But it is held, that if ^. put a winding-sheet upon the dead body of B. and after his burial a thief digs up the carcase and steals the sheet, he niay be indicted for felony de bonis 4' catallis J2. because it transferd no property to a dead man. [17] 12 Co. Rep. 112. VI. I come to the sixth consideration, who may be said a person committing larciny, but of this I have at large treated before cap. 3, S,'c. and therefore shall say but little here. An infant under the age of discretion regularly cannot be guilty of larciny, viz. under fourteen years, unless it appears by circumstances, that he hath a discretion more than the law presumes. A madman, non compos, or lunatic in the times of his lunacy cannot commit larciny, but ought to be found not [ 516 ]] guilty upon due evidence thereof. A feme covert alone may be guilty of larciny, if done without coercion of her husband. 27 ^ssiz. 40.[1S] But it hath generally now obtaind, tliat she cannot be guilty of larciny jointly with her husband, because presumed to be done by coercion of her husband. Vide Dalt. cap, 104.(6) Stamf. P. C. fol. 26. a. Sf librus ibi. (s) This case is mentioned by Dalton in the place cited by our author, which in New Edit, is cap. 156. p. 502. (a) 12 Co. 112. V (fc) New Edit. cap. 157. p. 503. 21 ; Mellish's case, Russ. ^ Ry. 80; Thornley's case, Mood. 343; Hawton's case, 7 Car, 6f Pay. 281; Snowley's case, 4 C. Sf P. 3:t0 ; Sullen's case, Mood, 129; Walsh's case, Russ. Sf i?y. 215; S. C. 4 Taunt. 258. 284; Hoggen's case. Id. 145; Nettleton's case. Mood, 259 ; Hobson's case, Russ. ^- Ry. 56; Tnytor's case, Id. 63; HaWs case, Id. 463; Jones's case, 7 Car. ^ Pay. 834; Rep. of the Penal. Code. Mass. 22. [-17] As to stealing a human body, see 1 Cri7n. Law Com. Rep. 20. 2 East's P. C. 632. 2 Russ. on Crimes, 163. Rose, on dim. Ev. 517. As to property in grave clothes, see 3 Inst. 110. Haynes' case, 12 Rep. 113. Blackstone remarks {vol. 4. ;). 235.) that by the law of the Franks a person who dusf a corpse up in order to strip it, was to be banislied from society, and no one suffered to relieve his wants till the relutives of the deceased consented to his re-admission: and he cites Montfsqiiieri, Sp. L. b. 30. c. 19. [18] See ante, p. 44, notes; and see further WiJford's case, Russ. Sf Ry. 517. French's case. Id. 491. Clarke's case. Mood. R 376, note. Willises case, id. 375. Solfries' case, id. 243. Harrison's case, 2 East's P. C. 559. Turner's case, 1 Leach, C. C. 536. The People V. Schuyler, 6 Cowen, R; 572. • 516 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. But this I take to be only a presumption till the contrary appear, for I have always thought, that if upon the evidence it can clearly appear, that the wife was not drawn to it by her husband, but that she was the principal actor and inciter of it, she is guilty as well as the husband, but stabilur prsesumptio, donee probetiir in contra- rmm, neither is the book of 2 E. 3. Curone 160, to the contrary, but in the book of 27 ^ssiz. 40. where she was indicted alone, inquiry was made, whether it were by coercion of the husband. And therefore, if .^. and B. his wife be indicted by these names of larciny, the indictment is not void, for the husband may be con- victed, tho the wife be acquitted upon the presumption of her hus- band's coercion. Again, the husband may be acquitted, and the wife found to have done the felony alone, for every indictment is several in law ; or again, Xho prima facie the wife cannot be guilty of larciny, no nor of burglary, where the husband is party in the fact, (tho she may be guilty of murder or manslaughter jointly with her husband) and therefore prima facie the wife in such case must be acquitted, yet for my part I think the circumstances may be such, that the wife may be as well guilty in larciny or burglary, as her husband. If a servant commit felony by the coercion of his nmster, yet it doth not excuse the servant, tho it excuse the wife, as is before said, for the wife is inseperably sub potestate viri, but it is not so with a servant, for as he is not bound to obey his master's unlawful com- mands, so he may recover damages for any wrong done him by his master. Bali. cap. 104, p. 269.{c)ll9] See Black. Com. Lib. iv. cap. 17. p. 229 to 244. and Foster 73, 123, 124, 366. and 1 Hawk. P. C. Index tit. Larciny. (c) New Edit. p. 504. [19] Simple larceny must be in the first place an unlawful taking, which implies that the goods must pass from the possession of the right owner, and without his consent, and therefore where there is no change of possession, or a change of it by consent, or a cliange from the possession of a person witiiout title to that of the right owner,* tliere can in any of tliese cases be no larceny. And as tlie taking must be without consent of the owner, so in general no delivery of goods from the owner to the offender upon trust can ground a larceny. As if A. lends B. a horse, and lie rides away with him. Yet if the delivery be obtained from the owner by a person having animus furandi at the time, and who afterwards unlawfully appropriates tlie goods in pursuance of that intent, it is lar- ceny; as if in the case above supposed, B. solicited tliC loan of the horse with intent to steal him. {Major Semple^s case, 2 Leach, 469, 470.) But in such cases, bare non-de- livery shall not of course be intended to arise from a felonious design; since that may happen from a variety of other accidents. So a person who has received goods by delivery from the owner, will nevertheless be found guilty of larceny by appropriating them, if they were delivered under such circumstances as not to divest the owner of the legal possession ; as when a servant embezzles his master's plate, {Christian''s Blacksione, vol. iv. page 230, note ;) or the guest at an inn or tavern makes away with the articles of which he has temporary use. Hawk, P. C. h. 1. c. 33. s. 6; 4 Bl. Com. 331. Again, there must not only be a taking, hut a carrying away; cepit et asporiavit was the old law Latin. A bare removal from the place in which he found the goods, though the thief does not quite make off with them, is a sufficient asportation, or carrying away. * But if a person has temporary title against the permanent owner, the latter may be guilty of larceny in taking them. R. v. Wilkinson, R. Sf R. C. C. 470; 4 Bl. Com. 231. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 516' As if a man be leading another's horse out of a close and be apprehended in the fact, or if a guest stealing- goods out of an inn, has removed them from his chamber down stairs, these have been adjudged sufficient carryings away to constitute a larceny. Qi Inst. 108, 109;) or if a thief intending to steal plate, takes it out of a chest in which it was, and lays it down upon the floor, but is surprised before he can make his escape with it, this is larceny. Farther, this taking and carrying away must be of personal iroof/s. Lands, tenement?, hereditaments, either corporeal or incorporeal, either freehold or less than freehold, can. not in their nature be taken and carried away. And of things likewise that adhere to the freehold, as corn, grass, trees, and the like, or lead upon a house, no larceny could be committed by the rules of the common law; but the severance of them was merely a trespass, which depended on a subtlety in the legal notions of our ancestors. These things were parcel of the real estate, and therefore, while they continued so, could not by any possibility be the subject of theft, being absolutely fixed and immovable; and if they were severed by violence, so as to be changed into movables, and at the same time by one and the same continued act, carried off by the person who severed them, they could never be said to be taken from the proprieior in this their newly-acquired state of mobi- lity, which is essential to the nature of larceny, being never as such in the actual or constructive possession of any one but him who committed the trespass. He could not in strictness be said to have taken what at that time were the personal goods of another, since the very act of taking was what turned them into personal goods. But if the thief severs them at one time, whereby the trespass is completed, and they are converted into personal cliattels in the constructive possession of him on whose soil they are left or laid, and comes again at another time when they are so turned into personalty, and takes them away, it is larceny at th» common law ; and so it is if the owner or any one else has severed them. So, upon nearly the same principle, the stealing of writings relating to real estate is, at common law, no felony, but a trespass, {Rex v, Westbeer, Stra. 1137,) because they concern the land, or according to our technical language, savour of the realty, and are considered as part of it by the law; so that they descend to the heir together with the land which they concern. Bonds, bills, and notes which concern mere thoses in action, wore also at the common law, held not to be such goods whereof larceny might be committed, being of no intrinsic value, (8 Rep. 33. b.) and not importing any property in possession of the person from whom they were taken. By the common law, also, larceny could not be committed of treasure trove, or wreck, till seized by the king, or him who hath the franchise, for till such seizure, no one has a determinate property therein; nor could it be committed, at the common law, of such animals in which there is no property, either absolute or qualified, as of beasts that are fercE naturcB, and unre- claimed, such as deer. Hawk. P. C. b. 1. c. 33. s. 25; ante, p. 11. It is also said {Dalt. Just. c. 156,) that if swans be lawfully marked, it is felony at common law to steal them, though at large in a public river; and that it is likewise felo- ny to steal them, though unmarked, if in any private river or pond; otherwise it is only a trespass. But of all valuable domesticated animals, as horses and other beasts of draught, and of ail animals, domita natures, which serve for food, as neat or other cattle, swine, poultry, and the like, and of their fruit or produce taken from them while living, as milk or wool, (Dalt. 21 ; Crompt. 36 ; Hawk. P. C. b. 1. c. 33. s. 28. The King v. Mar- tin, by all the judges, P. 17. Geo. III.) larceny may be committed at common law, and also of the flesh of such as are either dornita or ferre the statute of 4 4' 5 Ph. Sf M. cap. 4. was made, whereby acces- saries before in murder, or robbery in any dwelling-house, or in or near the iiighways, are ousted of clergy upon conviction, out-, lawry, standing mute, or challenging above twenty, or not directly answering. So that the statutes of 23 and 25 H. 8. stand at this day in force with this addition, that persons in holy orders stand equally r 5201 exempt from the benefit of clergy with others by the statute of 1 E. 6. as to cases within that statute. But if only a stranger were in the house, and neither the owner, his wife, children or servants, this gives no discharge of clergy by the statute of 23 // 8. and therefore there was provision in that case by the ensuing statute. II. But the statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. breaking of any house by- night or by day, any person being in the house or put in fear, if it HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 520 were with an intent to steal, tiio nothing he stolen, a principal was excluded from clergy in all cases, except outlawry and- challenging above twenty. And also in a foreign county, yet if upon examination it be so found, he is ousted of clergy by the statute of 5 <§• 6 E. 6. cap. 10. but the accessary before or after is not ousted of clergy by this statute. Ill, By the statute of 5 4' 6 E. 6. cap. 9. " If any person be found guilty according to the laws of. the land for robbing any person or persons in his or their dweUing houses, or dwelling-places, the owner or dweller, his wife, children or servants being within the same house or place, or in any place within the precincts thereof, such offender shall not be admitted to clergy, whether the owner or dweller, his wife or children, then or there being, shall be waking or sieeping. ." And also he, that robs any person in any booth or tent, in any fair or market, his wife, children, or servant then being within the booth or tent, shall be excluded from clergy. This statute is of force, and of great and daily use, and therefore it will be convenient to make some observations upon it. Upon this statute tliese things are observable: 1. That it extends not to oust clergy in any case but upon con- viction of the offender, either by verdict or confession, for a man that confesseth is found guilty by his confession, but it extends not to standing mute, challenging above twenty, or not directly answering.(c) And therefore it is considerable, whether, if a man be attaint by outlawry, he may not be admitted to his clergy [521 ^ as a clerk attaint, which, tho it avoids not the attainder, yet . it may take off the execution, for clergy is allowable to a person attaint, if the case be within clergy, Crompf. Jurisdic. of Courts, 126. b.(d) Dy. 205. a. b. and it is held, outlawry upon this statute excludes not clergy. 11 Co. Rep. 29. b. Pouller^s case. 2. That yet by the statute of 4 <§• 5 P. cS* M. cap. 4, clergy is taken away in this case from the accessary before, as well as in case of standing mute and challenging above twenty, or not directly answer- ing, for the statute of 4 <§• 5 P. 4' M. extends to accessaries before in all cases of robbing in dwelling-houses, as well those within this statute, as those upon the statute of 23 H. S. 8. It hath been held by good opinion, that this statute extends only to him that actually enters the house and steals there, and that therefore \{ ^. B. and C. come to a house in the day-time with an intent to enter, and steal goods, and that ,./i. only breaks and enters the house, and takes the goods, that J2. only shall be excluded of his clergy, and B. and C. that were aiding and assisting should have (c) But by 3 ^ 4 W. Sf M. cap. 9. it extends to all these cases, as also to the case of an outlawry. (d) Crompt. Justice 110, b. 621 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. their clergy: this was the opinion of divers jtidges at a meeting in Serjeanis-In?i 30 Novemb. 1664. wiio grounded themselves princi- pally upon Jiudley''s case,(^) upon the statute of 39 Eliz. hereafter cited, but I think they are all to be excluded of their clergy upon this statute of 5 c^' 6 E, G. and there cannot be .a stronger authority in it, than the judgment of parUament in the statute of 4 (§• 5 F. ($' M. cap. 4. whereby it is enacted, " That if any person shall maliciously command, hire, or counsel any person to commit any robbery in any dwelhng-house, he shall be excluded of clergy. And, certainly he, that is present, aiding, and abetting, is more than an-accessary hefore.,\iw\. then perchance the indictment must not run generally, t^;a5/?re*e/z/, aiding, and abei ting, hut that B. andO. did maliciously command, hire, or counsel A. to commit the fact, l)y. 1S3. 6. 11 Co. Rep. 37. a P ou I ter^s case; tho, in my own £ 522 2 opinion, the words maliciously present, aiding,and abetting, do countervail the former, and much more, and it cannot be -intended, that the statute meant to take away clergy from those that maliciously counsel or command, which at most makes but an acces- sary, and yet that he that is present and abetting, shall have his clergy. But, in my opinion, all may be indicted, quod fregerunt &(• intra- verunt, 8fc. as in case of burglary or robbery, and it dift'ers from the statute of 39 Eliz. and the rather, because the statute of 4 4' 5 P. S; M. extends not to offenses made after by 39 Eliz. 4. This statute extends not to breaking of the house with an intent to rob it, but there must be an actual robbing, or taking away goods. 5. The robbing by day or night is within this statute. 6. The dweller, his wife, children or servants must be within the precinct of the house sleeping or waking, but it is not necessary they should be put in fear, neither is it necessary they should be in the same room where the robbery is done. 7. But it is not enough, that a stranger be in the house, unless the owner, his wife, children, servants or some of them be in the house at the time also, tho it be enough upon the statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. ~ S. There must be not only an actual stealing of some goods in the house, but an actual breaking of the house, for the statute speaks o-f robbing, which imports more than a bare taking of goods. t^ug. 14 Car. 1. Thomas Williams, Thomas Bates, and Richard Harper having broken the lodgings of Sir PI. Hungate at Whitehall, and taken thence several goods of Sir H. Hungate, Croke and Crowley were advised with, to pen the indictment, who agreed these points; 1. It must be laid for breaking tho king's mansion-house called Whitehall,{f) and stealing the goods of Sir H. Hungate, for all the lodgings in Whitehall were part of the king's house, and ditfer'd from an inn of court, where each chamber is a seve- [ 5233 '■''^1 mansion-house, because every one hatha several interest in his ciiamber. 2. That upon the statute of 5 <5* 6 E. 6. the indictment need only be, that he broke the king's house called (e) Cro. Car. 473. by the name of Evans. (/) Sec Kel. 27. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 523 Whitehall, and stole the goods of Sir //. Hitngaie, (\ivers of the king's servants then being in the house, without saying, that any- body was put in fear (which was necessary by the statute of 23 H. 8.) but merely upon the statute of 5 <§' 6 E. 6. and accordingly tl^e indictment was drawn. 3. That upon an indictment uj)on 23 //. 8. or upon 5 E. 6, there must be an actual brealung of the house, and also a robbery or stealing of some thing. 4. That if a thief come into the house, the doors being open, and then breaks open a chamber-door, and steals goods from thence, this ig a breaking of the house within those statutes, and accordingly at the gaol-delivery at the Old Bailey, 29 ^t/g. 14 Car. 1. those two justices being present, they were indicted, and Harper being fled,tlie other two were found gnilty; Williams was reprieved before judg- ment, but Bates was executed, ex libro Twisclen. Upon this latter resolution it seems, that Bayne^s case in Pop- ham^s Rep. 36 4' 37 Eliz. n. 10 was somewhat too severe(^), where one came into a tavern to drink, and stole a cup that was brought them to drink in, the owner and his servants being in the house, and upon this lie was ousted of his clergy upon tlie statute of 5 8,' 6 E. 6. which case was doubted by the justices upon a meeting among them Novemb. 1664. but it was then agreed, if two come into a tavern to drink, the door being open, and divers of the family being in the house, and one goes up stairs and breaks a chamber-door, and steals goods, and both depart before the felony be discovered ; resolved by us all, that clergy is taken away from him that breaks open the door, if he be indicted upon the statute of 5 E. 6. but not from the other, for the breaking of the door was an act of violence, and so the break- ing of a counter or chest •,(A) for a chest vide postea. But tho the breaking of the door, or perchance of a counter, may be such an act, as may make it a robbery within the statute of 5 E. 6. yea, and altho in that case before-mentioned, and in a case upon a special verdict out of Cambridgeshire before-men- [[524'] tioned, it was held the breaking of a chest was all one as to this purpose with the breaking of a door, tho the chest were not fixed to the freehold, quod videa ante cap. 43. yet I must needs say, that the course at Newgate hath been always since my time, that the breaking open of a chamber-door, and of -a counter or cupboard fixed to the freehold, hath brought it within the statute of 5 E. 6. to oust of clergy; yet when a party enters the doors open, and breaks up only a chest or trunk, and steals thence goods, that is not such a rob- bery, as is within the statute of 5 E. 6. to oust of clergy, and so was the difference agreed at Newgate 1671. upon the robbery of the cook o( Serjeants-inn in Fleet-street, by certain persons that came in to eat, and slipt up stairs, and picked open a chamber-door, and broke open a chest, and stole plate of good value: it was agreed, that the picking open the lock of the chamber-door brought it within the statute to oust clergy, but the breaking open of a chest or trunk only ig) This case denied to be law, Kel. 68. (A) See Kel. 69. 524 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. would not oust clergy upon the statute of 5 E. 6. or 39 Eliz. and so by Zee secondary was the constant course at Newgate in his time. As to robbery in booths or tents in fairs and markets, within the 5 E. 6. cap. 12. H. A\ Eliz. B. R. the robbing of a shop in West- minsieK-hall was ruled not to be within this statute to be ousted of clergy. If a servant opens a chamber-door in his master's house, and stesiis goods, Sir N. Hyde, wiio was severe enough in cases criminal, doubted whether this were within this statute to oust him of his clergy: vide infra. IV. The next statute relating to this matter of robbing in houses is 39 Eliz. cap. 15. which recites, that the penalty of robbing of houses in the day-time, no persons being in the house at the time of the robbery committed, is not so penal as robbery in any house, any person being therein at the time of the robbery committed, which hath emboldened persons to commit heinous robberies in breaking and entering persons houses, none being in the same, and enacts, " That if any person shall be found guilty by verdict, con- []525]] fession, or otherwise for the felonious taking away in the day-time of money, goods, or chattels to the value of five shillings or upwards, in any dwelling-house, or any part thereof, or any out-house or out-houses belonging and used with the said dwell- ing-house or houses, altho no person shall be in the said house or houses at the time of the felony committed, every such person shall be excluded from the benefit of clergy. Upon this statute these things are observable: 1. That the indictment, whereupon such person is to be excluded of the benefit of his clergy, ought precisely to follow the statute, viz. it must be in the day-time, and no person being in the house, and must appear to be so upon evidence. 2. And therefore, if either the indictment pursue not the statute, or the evidence make not good the indictment, he is to have his clergy, and therefore upon such an indictment he may be acquitted of stealing against tlie form of the statute, and found guilty of simple felony at common law, tho the indictment conclude contra formam. statuti; and the same law it is, if an indictment be formed upon the statute of 23 H. 8. or 5 4* 6 E. 6. for tho the indictments in those cases be special, and conclude sometimes contra formam statuti, yet they include felony at common law, and tho the indictment concluding con- tra formam. statuti be good, it is not necessary, so as the circum- stances required by the statute be pursued, for tlie statutes in these cases make not the felony, but only exclude clergy, when the felony is so circumstantiated, as the statute mentions, and is so expressed in the indictment. ^ .3. If the indictment be formed upon this statute, a« that- he broke and entred the house in the day-time, and stole, no person being in the honse, if it appear upon tho evidence, that the felony was coni- juitted without these circumstances, as if it were committed in the HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 525 night, or not in the day, so that it is burglary, or if committed when some of the family were in the house, in which case he had been ousted of his clergy by the statute of 5 4* 6 E. 6. if the indictment had been ,formed upon that statute, yet in such case the offender being specially indicted upon the statute of 39 Eliz. shall be found guilty of simple felony at common law, and shall not [ 526 ] be ousted of his clergy by the statute of 23 //. 8. 1 ^. 6. 5 & 6 E. 6. or IS Eliz. cap. 7. because the indictment is not formed upon those statutes, but only upon 39 Eliz. and if the circumstances of the statute of 39 Eliz. upon which the indictment is formed, be not pur- sued in the evidence, he must have his clergy, and so is the constant practice, 4^ Altho this statute of 39 Eliz. in the body of the act speaks only of stealing, yet in as much as the preamble speaks of robbery, it hath been always taken, that upon this statute, as well as upon the, statute of 5 E. 6. there must be these three things concur to oust clergy : 1. There must be an actual stealing or taking away of goods of some value upon the statute of 5 <^' 6 E. 6. and of goods to the value of five shillings upon this statute, but it is not necessary, that the goods be carried out of the house, for if he take them out of a trunk or cupboard, and lay them in the room, and be apprehended before he carry them away, it is a stealing within the statutes, and at common law also, as was resolved by all the judges, uno dissentiente, in a case out of Camhridgeshire upon a special verdict there found upon an indictment upon the statute of 5 4* 6 E. 6. anno 1664.(/) 2. It must be a stealing of goods in the house, and therefore he that steals, or is party to the stealing them, being out of the house, is not by this statute to be ousted of his clergy. 3. Upon this statute, as well as upon the statute of 5 <§' 6 E. 6. there must be some act of force or breaking.{k) Now what shall be said such a force, as must bring the party within this statute, hath been touched before, to which I add, 1. That whatsoever breaking will make a burglary, if it were in the night, will make such a force or breaking, as is within this statute and that of 5 E. 6, to oust the thief of iiis clergy, as if he f 527 1 break open the outward or inward door of the house, pick the lock of such door, draw the latch, break open the window, ^-c. 2. Some breaking or force will oust clergy upon the statutes of 5 8c 6 E. 6. and 39 Eliz. which will not make a burglary, if it were in the night, as where he enters by the doors open, and breaks open a (t) This was Simpson's case mentioned below, and is reported Kel. 31. ik) Bui now by 10 i^- 11 W. 3. cap. 23. " Whoever by nig-ht or day shall in any shop, ware-house, c6ach-liouse, or stable, privately and feloniously steal to the value of 5s. or more, tho such shop he not broke open, nor any person therein, or shall assist, hire or command any person to commit such offense, shall be excluded from the benefit of clergy." Now repealed and supplied. And by 12 Ann. cip. 7. "Whoever shall feloniously steal to the value of 40s. in any dwelling-house or out-house thereto belonging, altho it be not broken, nor any person therein, their aiders or assisters arc excluded from clergy." Repealed aqd supplied. 527 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. counter or cupboard fixed to the freehold, as was agreed in the Cam- b?'idgeshire case hefore-mentiond. 7'. 16 Car. 2. Si mson's case, where the case was thus: a man came into a dwelling-house, none being within, and the doors being open, and broke up a chest, and took out goods to the value of five shillings, laid tliem on the floor, and before he could carry them out of the chamber, he was apprehended, and upon this matter specially found he was ousted of his clergy upon the statute of 39 Eliz. for the taking them out of the chest was felony by the common law, and tjie statute of 39 Eliz. did not alter the felony, but only excluded 'clergy; per omnes justiciarios Anglias. Ex lihro Bridgman. But whereas in that case the breaking open of the chest was held such a force or breaking, as excludes clergy upon that statute, I have observed, that the constant practice at Newgate hath not allowed that construction, unless it was a counter or cupboard fixed ; yet note, this resolution of 16 Cur. was by all the judges of England then present, and tho one dissented, 'he after came about to the opinion of the rest, Ideo qusere. T. 13 Car. 1 B. R. Eva}is and Finch{l) were arraigned ai New- gate upon an indictment, that they at twelve of the clock in the day, domiun mansionalern Hugonis Audely de interiuri templo, nulld persona in eadeni domo existente,fregerunt, <5* 40/. from thence did steal, a special verdict was found, that Evans by a ladder climbed up to the upper window of the chamber of H. Audely, and took out of the same forty pounds, and Finch stood upon the ladder in view oi Evans, and saw Evans in the chamber, and was assisting to the robbery, and took part of the money, and that at the time of the rob- bery divers persons were in the Inner Temple-hall, and in [528]] divers other parts of the house ; ruled, 1. That a chamber in an inn of court is domus mansionalis within the statute of 39 Eliz. of him who was the owner of the chamber. 2. That allho this chamber was parcel of the Inner Temple, and other persons were in the hall and other parts of the Inner Temple, yet no person being in the chamber, this o tie nee was within the statute of 39 Eliz. and so it differs from tlie case of Whitehall before-mentioned, where the indictment was upon the statute of 5 4' 6 E. 6. 3, That in as much as Evans was only in the chamber, and Finch entered not the cham- ber, ^t»an.s had judgment of death, and i^/ncA had his clergy. ' And the like law had been upon the statute of 5 c^* 6 E. 6. as is before declared, for these statutes only exclude the parties, that actu- ally take out of the dwelling-house, not those that are present and asscnters,(7;z) as hath been also before declared(?i) upon the statute of 1 Jac. of stabbing. (Z) Cro. Car. 473. (wj) But by 3 4f 4 W. S^ M. cap. 9. clergy is taken away from all, who comfort, aid, abet, assist, counsel, hire, or command any jJorHon feloniously to break any dwelling-liouse; shop, or ware-house thereto belonging, and filoniously to take away any ihoncy, goods, SfC, to the value of 5s. or upwards, allho no person be within the same. (n) Vide antea, p. 4C8. HISTORIA PLACITORUINI CORONiE. 528 And herein it differs from burglary and robbery, for therein all persons, that are present, aiding, and assisting, are equally burglars or robbers with him, that enters or aciually takes; but of this hereafter. But this statute of 39 Eliz. takes not away the benefit of clergy, where the offender stands mute, but only in the case of conviction by verdict, confession, or otherwise according to the laws of the realm; qusere of outlawry, for there the party is attaint indeed, but not found guilty, for if he reverse the outlawry, he shall plead to the felony, (o) And thus far for those larcinies, that relate to the dwelling-house of any wherein clergy is excluded, V. The next statute, that excludes from clergy, is the statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. and 2 Sf- 2 E. 6. cap. 33. which exclude clergy from any person convict by verdict or confession of stealing any horse, mare, or gelding, or wilfully standing mute. But it takes not away clergy from accessaries 6e/bre or [529] after. VI. The statute of 8 Eliz. cap. 4. by which he that takes money or goods feloniously from the person of any other, privily, without his knowledge, is ousted of his clergy, if convict by verdict or con- fession, or if he challenge above twenty peremptorily, or stands mute, or will not directly answer, or be outlawed. Upon this statute these things are observable: 1. It doth not alter the nature of the felony, and therefore, if what he take away so be not above the value of twelve-pence, it is only petit larcmy, as it was before, and so differs from the case of robbery, Co. P. C. cap. 16. p. 68. Crompt. de Pace, fol. 33. b. 2. The indictment must be pur- suant to the statute, viz. quod felonict S^'C. clam <§' secrete a persona^ ^'C. cepit, otherwise the offender hath his clergy. 3. It doth not oust accessaries of their clergy, nor it seems doth it oust any of his clergy but him, that actually picks the pocket, and not those that are present, aiding and assisting, upon the reason of Evan's case before, for it shall be taken literally. By an act of this parliament, viz. * * * (^) See table of the principal matters in Foster, Tit. Clergy. CHAPTER XLV. [530] CONCERNING PETIT LARCINY. Petit larciny is the felonious stealing of money or goods not above the value of twelve-pence without robbery, for altho that by some opinions the value of twelve-pence make grand larciny, 22 ^ssiz. 39. (o) But now by 3 &; 4 W. Sf M. cap. 9. clergy is expressly taken away in case of out- lawry, or of stinding mute, <^c. (/)) This was left unfinislied by our author, but I suppose the statute here meant is 22 Cflrf 2. cap. 5. which "All who shall feloniously steal woollen manufactures from the tenters, or shall embezzle the king-'s naval stores, are excluded from clergy. As to subsequent statutes, which take away clergy from larciny in dwelling-houses, vide postea subjine cap. 48. VOL. I. — 47 530 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. per Thorp, yet the law is settled, that it must exceed twelve-pence to make grand larciny. West 1. cap. \5.{a) 8 E. 2. Coron. 404. [1] The judgment in case of petit larciny is not loss of life, but only to be whipt, or some such corporal punishment less than death, and yet it is felony, and upon conviction thereof the offender Ibseth his goods, for the indictment xnusfelonice. 27 H. 8. 22. A party indicted of petit larciny and acquitted, yet if it be found, he fled for it, forfeits his goods, as in case of grand larciny. • 8 E. 2. Coron. 406. Sfamf. P. C.p. 184. a. But in case of petit larciny there can be no accessaries neither be- fore nor after. P. 9. Jac. 12 Co. Rep. 81. If two or more be indicted of stealing goods above the value of twelve-pence, tho in law the felonies are several, j'-et it is grand lar- ciny in both. 8 E. 2. Coron. 404. ■ But if upon the evidence it appears, that J2. stole twelve-pence at one time, and B. twelve-pence at another time, so that the acts them- selves were several at several times, tho they were the goods of the same person, this is petit larciny in each, and not grand larciny in either. \i Jl. be indicted of larciny of goods to the value of five shillings, yet the petit jury may upon the trial find it to be but of the value of twelve-pence, or under, and so petit larciny. 41 E. 3. Coron. 451. 18 .assiz. 14. Starnf. P. C.p. 24, b. If j3. steal goods of ^. to the value of six-pence, and at fSSl] another time to the value of eight-pence, so that all put to- gether exceed the value of twelve-pence, tho none apart amount to twelve-pence, yet this is held grand larciny, if he be in- dicted of them altogether, [2] Stamf. P. C. p. 24. collected from the book of 8 E. 2. Coron. 415. Daii. cap. lOl. p. 259. (b) But if the goods be stolen at several times from several persons, and each a-part under value, as from ^. four-pence, from B. six- pence, from C. ten-pence, these are several petit larcinies, and tho contained in the same indictment make not grand larciny. But it seems to me, that if at the same time he steals goods of »/S. of the value of six-pence, goods o( B. of the value of six-pence, and goods of C. to the value of six-pence, being perchance in one bundle, or upon a table, or in one shop, this is grand larciny, because it was one entire felony done at the same time, tho the persons had several properties, and therefore, if in one indictment, they make grand larciny.[3] ' « (a) 2 Co. Instit. 190. (b) New Edit. cap. 154. p. 494. [1] Tliis distinction between grand and petit larceny is now aboHshed by 7 & 8' Geo. IV. c. 29, 8. 2. See liyland's note to 4 BL Com. 229. i'dth Land. Ed. 1836. [2] Birdseye's case, 4 Carr. Sf Paij. 38G. Jones's case, Id. 217. 2 East's P. C. 740, [3] It is manifest that the defendant micrht have three different defences as to the taking of tlic property of ihrcc owners. Wi)uld not a sing-lc count, which compelled a defondiint to make thcce distinct dflcnccs, as to three distinct pieces of property of three different owners, be bad for duplicity. See Com. v. Andrews, 2 Mass. R. 409. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 531 If A. steal cJam (§« secretl out of the pocket of B. twelve-pence, tho the statute of 8 Eliz. take away clergy from a pick-pocket, yet it is but petit larciny ; quod vide supra p. 529. And so if a man could possibly steal a horse of the value of twelve-pence only, or under, or break a house in the day-time, and steal goods only of the value of twelve-pence, the owner, his wife or children being in the house, and not put in fear, this will be but petit larciny, notwithstanding the statute of 5 4* Q E. 6. take away clergy, for that statute altered not the nature of the offense, but takes away qlergy, where clergy was before, namely where the offense was capi- tal, as in case of grand larciny. But if they were put in fear, then it would be robbery, how small soever the value were, and so could not sink into the nature of petit larciny 5 but of this in the next chapter.[4] CHAPTER XLVI. [532] OF ROBBERY. Robbery is the felonious and violent taking of any money or goods from the person of another, putting him in fear, be the value thereof above or under one shilling. In this case it is to be considered, 1. What is a felonious taking [4] In Nkvv York, under the statutes, petit larceny is not a felony. Carpenter v. Nixon, 5 HiWs Rep. 520. Ward v. The People, 3 HiWs Rep. 395. In it there are no accessaries, but all concerned in the commission of the offence are principals. Id. 2 N. Y. Rev. St. 690. To constitute petit larceny the sum stolen must be under $25. Id. In Pennsylvania, twenty shillings under the Act o£ April, 1790. Stroud's Purd, 956. eik ed. ; 1052. ith ed. In New Jersey, the same as in New York. Rev. Stat, of 1847, jj. 266. In Virginia, to constitute petit larceny, the sum must be under $10. Sup, Rev. Code, 298. sue. In South Carolina, in the case of The State v. Wood, 1 S. C. Rep. 29. it was ruled that on an indictment for grand Lirceny the jury may find petit larceny. Chase, J, said "he tiad been informed by his brethren thai the Abjection of the indictment being for grand larceny, the verdict for petit larceny was unauthorized, had been often overruled ;" and cited 2 East's P. C. 778. where it is so laid down. In Tennessee, an indictment in the county court for petit larceny in stealing goods of greater value than twelve-pence should conclude against the form of the statute. The second section of the Act of 1807 has changed the nature of this offence in this as in some other States, viz. that petit larceny shall consist in stealing property under the v^lue of $10. At common law it consisted of stealing property under the value of iwclvc-pencc, as stated in Hale's text. See The State v. Humphries, 1 Overton's (Tenn.) R. 107. 532 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. from the person. [1] 2. Who shall be said a felonious taker from the person of a man. 3. What violence or putting in fear is requisite to make up robbery. 4. In what cases such a robber is admissible to his clergy. As to the first. I. There must be in case of robbery (as also in all cases of larciny^ something feloniously taken, for altho antiently an assault to the intent to rob, or an attempt to rob was reputed felony, voluntas reputabatur pro facto, 25 E. 3. 42, 13 H. '\. 7. per Gascoigne 27 Assiz. 38. yet the law is held otherwise at this day,(«) and for a long time since the time of Edward III. and therefore if »^. lie in wait to rob B, and assault him to that purpose, and require him to' deliver his purse, yet if de facto he hath taken nothing from him, this is not felony, but only a misdemeanor, lor which he is punisha- ble by fine and imprisonment. 9 E. 4. 26. b. Stamf. P.C.p. 27. b. Co. P. C. p. 68. There is a double kind of taking, viz. a taking in law, and a taking in fact. If thieves come to rob ,/?. and finding little about him enforce him by menace of death to swear upon a book to fetch them a greater sum, which he doth accordingly, this is a taking by robbery, yet he ■was not in conscience bound by such compelled oath, for the fear continued, tho the oath bound him not, and in that case the in- (a) Plowd. Com. 259. b. [1] The takinjif must be from the person or in the presence of the prosecutor. U. S. v. Jones, 3 Wash. R. 209. Com. v. Snelling, 4 Binn. R. 379. Rex v. Hamilton, 8 Car, 4- ^. 49. Where it appeared 'that the prosecutor was with a third person, who had the prosecu- tor's bundle, and who, when the prosecutor was forcibly attacked by the defendant, dropped the bundle and ran to assist the prosecutor, when the prisoner took up the bun- die and ran off, a learned judge is said to have doubted whether the offence was robbery. Rex V. Fallows, 5 Car. &; P. 501. It is essential that the property should be taken against the will of the party robbed. Rex V. McDaniel, Foster Dis. 121. The goods must also appear to have been taken animo furandi, as in cases of larceny. Archb. Cr. P. 245. There must also be an actual taking and carrying away. But it is immaterial whether the taking were by force or upon delivery; and if by delivery, it is also imma- terial whether the robber compelled the prosecutor to it, by a direct demand in tlic ordi- dinary way or upon any colourable pretence. A carrying away must also be proved; and where one meeting a man carrying a bed, told him to lay it down or he would shoot him, and the man accordingly laid down the bed, but the robber, before he could take it up so as to remove it from the place where it lay, was apprehended : the judges held that the robbery was not complete. Rex v. Fnrrell, 1 Leach, C. C. 362. Rex v. Lapier, Id. 320. Fast. Dis. 128. Rex v. Mason, R Sf Ry. 419. Rex v. Davies, 2 EasVs l\ C. 709. Rex v. Hall, 3 Car. cV P. 409. Rex v. Mncauky, 1 Leach, C. C. 287. Rex v. Baker, Id. 290. Rex V. Stewart, 2 EasCs P. C. 702. Rex v. Homes, Id. 703,* Rex v. Gosnil, I C.Sf P. 304. * It was held in the case of Com. v. Humphries,! Mass. R. 242. that an indictrnent was good at common law which alleged the stealing, &c. by force and violence, but omitted the averment that the party robbed was put in fear. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 533 dictment need not be special, for that evidence will maintain a gene- ral indictment of robbery, 44 E. 3. 14. b. 4 H. 4. 2. a. Co. P. C. p. 68. Dall. cap. 100. p. 257.(6) who saith it was so adjudged also in P. 36 Eliz. If »,'?. assaults B. and bids him deliver his purse, and B. delivers it accordingly, this is a taking, and so it is if B. refuse, and then JJ. prays him to give or lend him money, which B. doth accordingly, this is robbery, for B. doth it under the same fear, Dal. cap. 100. -44 Eliz. Cromp. 34. b. so it is if B. throw his purse or cloak in a bush, and A. takes it up, and carries it away; so if B. flying from the thief lets fall his hat, and the thief take it and carry it away, for all is the effect of the same fear. Dalt. iibi supra. So if A. without drawing his weapon requires B. to deliver his purse, who doth deliver it, and ^. finding but two shillings in it gives it him again, this is a taking by robbery. 20 Eliz. Crompt. 34. Dalt. ubi supra. If ^. have his purse tied to his girdle, B. assaults him to rob him, and in struggling the girdle breaks, and the purse falls to the groiuid, this is no robbery, because no taking ; but if B. take up the purse, or if B. had the purse in his hand, and then the girdle breaks, and striving lets the purse fall to the ground, and never takes it up again, this is a taking and robbery. Co. P. C. p. 69. Dalt. cap. 100. Crompt. fol. 35. It is not always necessary, that in robbery there should be strictly a taking from the person, but it snfRceth if it be in his presence, as appears by some of the foriner instances, in case it be done with a putting in fear : as where a carrier drives his pack-horses, and the thief takes his horse, or cuts his pack, and takes away the goods: so if a thief comes into the presence o{ Jl. and with violence, and putting ^. in fear, drives away his horse, cattle, or sheep. Dalt. ubi supra. Stamf. P. C. p. 27. a. 2 East's P. C. 556. II. Who shall be said a person robbing or taking. If several persons come to rob a man, and they are all present, and one only actually takes the money, this is robbery in all. Piidsey and two others, viz. Jl. and B. assault C. to rob him in the highway, but C. escapes by flight, and as they [534]] were assaulting him Jl. rides from Pudsey and B. and as- saults D. out of the view of Pudsey and B. and takes from him a dagger by robbery, and came back to Pudsey and B. and for this Pudsey was indicted and convict of robbery, tho he assented not to the robbery of Z). neither was it done in his view, because they were all three assembled to commit a robbery, and this taking of the dag- ger was in the mean time. 28 Eliz. B. R. Crompt. 34. And so it is if ^,i. B. and C. come to commit a robbery, and j1. stands centinel at the hedge-corner to watch if any come, and B. and C. commit the robbery, tho *,i. was not actually present, nor within view, but at a distance from them; and the like in burglary. \\ H. 4. 13. Co. P. C.p. 64. (&) iVew Edit. cap. 153. p. 492. 534 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. III. What shall be said a putting in fear, or violent taking.[2] Without putting in fear or violence it is not robbery, but only lar- Giny,and the indictment must run, quod vi S,- armisapud B. in regid via ibidem, S^-c. AOs. in pecuniis nurneralis fclonice S,- violentlr cepit [2] Any threat calculated to produce terror is sufficient to consummate the offence. Thus if a man takes another's cliild and threatens to des^troy him unless the other give him money, this is robbery. Rex v. Reeve, 2 East, P. C. 735. Rex v. Donally, Id. 718. So where the defendant, at the head of a mob, came to the prosecutor's house and demanded money, threatening to destroy the house unless the money were given; the prosecutor thereupon "gave him 5s., but he insisted on more, and the prosecutor being terrified gave him 5s. more; the defendant and the mob took bread, cheese, and cider from the prosecutor's house without his permission and departed: this was holden to be a robbery. Rex v. Lemynons, 2 East, P. C. 731. Rex v. Brown, Id. 731. Rex v. Astley^ Id. 712. Rex v. Winkworth, 4 Carr Sf P. 444. ' It makes no matter wiiat pretences were employed to induce the owner to surrender possession, if he was put in bodily fear. Merriman v. Chippenham, 2 East, P. C. 709. 4 Blac. Comm. 242. Rex v. Taplen, 2 East, P. C. 712. If a robber take a purse of money from a person, and restore it to him immediately, saying, "if you value your purse, take it back, and give me the contents," but is appre- hended before the money is delivered to him, yet the crime is completed. Rex v. Peat, 1 Leach, C. C. 228. 2 East, P. C. 557. Rex v. Thompson, R. Sf M. 78. Taking money from a woman at the time of an attempt to commit a rape, amounts to jobbery, although there was no demand of money made by the prisoner, and it was clearly his original intent only to commit a rape. Rex v. Bhichham, 2 East, P. C. 711. So to take a man by the cravat and squeeze him against a wall, and in the mean time abstract his watch from his fob without his knowledge, is a robbery, though the plaintiff was not afraid, nor aware of the robber's intention. Com. v. Snelling, 4 Binn. R. 379. Where money was given to one of the mob during the riots in London in 1780, upon a knocking at the prosecutor's door in a menacing manner: held that it was robbery. Rex V. Taplin, 2 East, P. C. 712. Where persons, under pretence of an auction, got a woman into a house and compelled her, by threats of carrying her before a magistrate and to prison for not paying for a lot pretended to have been bid for by iier, to pay them one shilling through fear of prison, and for the purpose of obtaining her liberation, but without any fear of any other personal violence: Held, not robbery, but only duress. Rex v. Wood, 2 East, P. C. 732. A woman went into a mock auction shop, and it was pretended that she had bid for certain articles, and the prisoner threatened to take her to Bow-street and have her sent to Newgate, unless she paid earnest for the articles, to avoid which, she paid one shil- ling: Held, that this was not sufficient restraint to make this a robbery. Rex v. Newton, Car. C. L. 285. If the property be not taken by violence, nor parted with through fear, it is no rob- bery, though there were sufficient legal and reasonable ground for fear, as upon a threat to charge one with an unnatural crime. Rex v. Rcane, 2 East, P. C. 734. 2 Leach, C. C. 616. The crime of robbery may be committed by obtaining money from a man, by threat- ening to charge him with having been guilty of sodomitical practices. Rex v. Jones, 1 Leach, C. C. 139. This has, in many cases, been holden to be robbery, see Rex v. Hichnan, post.; Rex v. -Egerton, post, even where it appeiired that the prosecutor parted with his money merely through fear of losing his character or employment by such imputation. E.ttorting money by this or like means has been made a felony in some Stales by statute. See JWass. Rev. Stat.c. 125, sect. 17; N. Y. Rev. Stat. P. IV. c. 1,3, 5,sec<. 58. It is equally a robbery to extort money from a person by threatening to accuse him of an unnatural crifne, whether the party so threatened has been guilty of such crime or not. Rex v. Gardner, 1 Car. Sf I'. 479. If a man obtain property from another by accusing him of having been gfiilty of an unnatural crime, it will amount to robbery, although the party was under no apprehen- sion of personal danger, and felt no other fear than that of losing his character. Rex. v. Hickman, 1 Leach, C. C. 278 ; 2 East, P. C. 728. To constitute robbery, by taking money from another upon a threat of charging him HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 534 a persond; and therefore if the word violenter be omitted in the in- dictment, or not proved upon the evidence, tho it were in iiltd via regid Sf felonicc cepit a persond, it is but larciny, and the offender shall have his clergy. Dy. 224. b. H. 17 Jac. in B. R.{c). Harman (c) 3 Rol. Rep. 154. with an unnatural crime, the money must be taken immediately upon the threat made, and not alter the parties have separated and there has been time for the prosecutor to deliberate and' procure assistance, and especially after he had consulted a friend who was even present at the time when the money was paid, though the prosecutor parted with his money fr^fn fear of losing his character. Rex v. Jackson, 1 East, F. C. Add. xxi; 1 Leach, C. C. 193 n. ; 2 Leach, C. C. 618 n; and see Rex v. Cannon, R. Sf R. C. C. 146; 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 87. Parting with property upon charge of an unnatural crime, will not make the taking a robbery, if it is parted with not from the fear of loss of character, but for the purpose of prosecuting. Rex v. Fuller, R. Sf R. C. C. 408; 2 Russ. C. Sf. M. 88. ■ Where money was obtained by calling a man a sodomite and threatening him, but the money was parted with by the prosecutor not so much from fear of losing his character, as from fear of losing his place: Held, by a majority of the judges, that it was sufficient to constitute a robbery. Rex v. Elmstead, 2 liuss. C. Sf M. 86. The parting with money or goods through fear of loss of character and service, upon a charge of sodomitical practices, is sufficient to constitute robbery, although the party has no fear of being taken into custody, nor any dread of punishment. Rex v. Eger- ton, R. Sf R. C. C. 375; 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 87. See the cases cited and discussed in SDeac.C.L. 1136. Obtaining money from a woman by threatening to accuse her husband of an indecent assault, is not robbing. Rex v. Edwards, 5 Car. Sf P. 518, S. C. nora. Rex. v. Edward, 1 .V. Sf Rob. 257. If a bailiff handcuff a prisoner, under pretence of carrying him to prison with greater safety, and by means of this violence extort money, he is guilty of robbery. Rex v. Gascoigne, 1 Leach, C. C.2b0; 2 East, P. C. 709. If a gang of poachers attack a gamekeeper and leave him senseless on the ground, and one of them return and steal his money, &c.: — Held, that one only can be convicted of the robbery, as it was not in pursuance of any common intent. Rex v. Hawkins, 3 Car. Sf P. 392. Sed aliter, if a number had associated themselves together, for the purpose of commit- ting a robbery, altiiough one alone had perpetrated the act, as all would have been con- structively present. State v. Heyward, 2 N. Sf M. 312. A. had set wires in which game was caught : B. a gamekeeper found them, and took them, with the game cauglit in them, for the use of the lord of the manor. A. demanded them with menaces, and B. gave them up. The jury found that A. acted under a bona fide impression that the wires and game were his property: — Held, that it was no rob- bery. Rex V. Hall, 3 Car. Sf P. 409. A. was attacked by robbers, who, after using very great violence towards him, took from him a piece of paper, on which was written a memorandum respecting some money that a person owed him: — Held, robbery. Rex v. Bingly, 5 Car. Sf P. 602. Snatching an article from a man will constitute robbery, if it is so attached to his person or clothes as to afford resistance. Rex v. Mason, R. Sf R. C. C. 419. 2 Russ. C. Sf M. 69. To snatch a diamond pin from the head-dress of a lady, with such force as to remove it with part of the hair, from the place in which it was fixed, is a sufficient violence to constitute robbery. Rex v. Moore, 1 Leach, C. C. 335. To constitute the crime of highway robbery, the force used must be force with intent to overpower the party, and prevent iiis resistance ; and if the force used is not with that intent, but only to get possession of the property of the party attacked, it is not highway robbery- Rex v. Gnosil. 1 Car. Sf P. 504. Snatching property from the hand of another, is not sufficient force to constitute high- way robbery. Rex v. Baker, 1 Leach, C. C. 290. 2 East, P. C. 702, Indictment. — A servant was sent out by his master to receive money from his master's customers, and, having received the money, he was robbed of it on his way home. Sem- 534 HISTORI A PLACITORUM CORONA. was indicted of the robbery of Halfpenny in the highway; and upon the evidence it appeared, that Harmun was upon his horse, and required Halfpenny to open a gap for him to go out, Halfpenny going up the bank to open the gap, Harman came by him, and slipt ble, that an indictment for this robbery, in which the money was laid to be the property of his master, could not be supported, as the money had never been in the possession of the master. Reg. v. Ruddick, 8 Car. S( P. 237. And when in such a case, the objection was taken during the trial, the judge directed the jury to be discharged, and a new indictment to be sent to the grand jury, containing a count, laying the property in the servant. lb, A. and B. were indicted for the offence of robbery. The jury foTind that A. took the property of the prosecutor from him by violence, and that jB. was present during part of the time, and that he was a party with A. to a design to bring the prosecutor to the place where he was robbed by A, and to obtain property from him on a false charge of an unnatural crime, but that he was not aiding or assisting in, or privy to, the taking of the property from the prosecutor, by violence: Held, by all the judges, that in order to con- vict jB. the indictment should have been framed on the statute 7 Will. IV. Sf I Vict.c. 87. S. 4., and that he could not, since the passing of the statute, under the circumstances of this case, be convicted on an indictment charging the offence of robbery. Reg. v. Taun- ton, 9 Car. Sf P. 309. 2 M. C. C. R. 118. An indictment for robbery need not have the word '• violently," but it must appear upon the whole statement that violence was used. Rex v. Smith, 2 East, P. C. 784. If a prosecutor declare, on an indictment of robbery, tiiat he parted with his property without any fear of violence to his person or injury to his character, the prisoner cannot be convicted. Rex v. Reane, 2 Leach, C. C. 616. 2 East, P. C. 734. Sed vide, Com. v. Snelling, 4 Binn. R. 379. An indictment for a robbery, on an unmarried woman, in her maiden name, is good, although she marry before the indictment is found. Rex v. Turner, 1 Leach, C. C. 536. An indictment for a highway robbery must state, that the assault was feloniously made with an offensive weapon. Rex v. Pelseyman, 2 Leach, C. C. 563. 2 East, P. C. 783. Evidence. — On an indictment for robbery, the declaration in articulo mortis, of the party robbed, is not admissible in evidence. Rex v. Lloyd, 4 Car. Sf P. 233. 1 Greenl. on Ev. § 156. A. and B. were riding in a gig together, were robbed at the same time, A. of his money, B. of his watch, and violence used towards both. There was an indictment for the robbing of -4. and another indictment for the robbing of B. Held, that on the trial of the first indictment, evidence might be given of the fact, of the loss of the watch by B., and that it was found on one of the prisoners, but that no evidence ought to be given of any violence offered to B. by the robbers. Rex v. Rooney, 7 Car. Sf P. 517. Massachusetts — Robbery was always punished as a capital offence in this State, until the passing of the Statute of 1804, c. 143, by which the punishment was reduced to hard labour for life. This statute remained in force until the passing of Stat. 1818, c. 124, when robbery, if committed under certain circumstances of aggravation, was again punished with death. The first case that occurred after the passing of the Statute of 1818, c. 124, was 77(6 Commonwealth v. Michael Martin, 17 Mass. Rep. 539, in which it was decided by the unanimous opinion of the wiiole court, that to make robbery a capital offence within the first section of the statute, it is sufficient if the party be armed with a dangerous weapon with intent to kilt or maim the person assaulted, in case such killing or maim- ing be necessary to his purpose of robbing, and that he have the power of executing such intent. The prisoner wns indicted upon the first clause of the first section of tlie statute tor the robbery of John Bray, "being then and there at the time of committing the assault aforesaid, in manner and form aforesaid, armed with a certain dangerous weapon, called a pistol, with intent him the said John Bray then and there to kill and main." The defence set up was, that to constitute the crime of robbery a capital offence within the statute, it must be proved that there was an absolute intent to kill or maim the party robbed; at all events whether the robbery could be accomplished withr out killing or maiming, or not; and that in the present case the fact of the prisoner's' having left the party robbed, without killing or maiming him, or making an actual HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 534 his hand into his pocket, and took out his purse; Halfpenny not suspecting the taking of his purse, until turning his eye he saw it in Har'mayi^s hand, and then he demanded it, Harmun answered him, Villain if thou speakest of thy purse, I will pluck thy house over ■thine ears, and drive thee out of the country, as I did John Somers, and then went away with his purse ; and because he took it not with such violence, as put Halfpenny in fear, it was ruled to be but stealth, and not robbery, for the words of menace were used after the taking of the purse, wherefore he was found guilty [ 535 ] only of larciny, and had his clergy. (d) IV. As to the point of clergy in robbery. [3] The statute of 23 H. 8. cap. l.(e) and 5 S,^ 6 E. 6. cap. 9. do not oust robbery of. clergy in all cases, but only in two, viz. when the robbery is committed in a mansion-house, the owner, his wife, chil- dren or servants being in the house and put m fear,(/) or when committed in or near the highway. (d) But it should seem, that this was a private stealinor from the person of another, and therefore, if above the value of twelve-pence, would have been ousted of clergy by 8 Eliz. cap. 4. if the indictment had been laid pursuant to that statute. (e) This statute, and that of 25 H. 8. cap. 3. ousts clergy only in cases of conviction, standitig mute, not directly answering, or challenging peremptorily above the number of twenty, but does not extend to the case of an outlawry, but this seems to be includedin the word attainted in 1 E- 6. cap. 12. however it is expressly provided for by 3 ^ 4 W. Sf M. cap. 9. (/) Being put in fear is necessary by the 23 H. cap. 1. (and also by 1 E. 6. cap. 12. which perhaps is the statute intended by our author) but by 5 (^ 6 £. 6. cap. 9. all that is requisite is, that the owner, Sfc. be in the house, tho not put in fear, for the expression of that statute is, the owner, Sfc. being in the house, whether sleeping or waking. attempt to do it, proved that there was no such intent, as by the statute constituted an essential ingredient in the capital offence. This construction of the statute was not adopted by the court; but they instructed the jury, that if they were satisfied from the evidence that the prisoner armed himself with a loaded pistol with intent to kill of maim the party whom he should rob, if such killing or maiming were necessary for his purpose of robbing; and that when he assaulted and robbed Major Bray, he had the power of executing such intent, and meant to do it, if he could not otherwise rob him, the offence was capital according to the statute; and they accordingly found the prisoner guilty. See the opinion of the court at large, delivered by Parker, C. J. in which the above construction of the statute is unanswerably maintained. The Massachusetts Statutes will be found in Rev. St. oh. 125, and Supp. 127. In Pennsylvania. — To constitute robbery there must be a felonious taking of pro- perty from the person of another by force, either actual or constructive; but if force be used, it is not essential that the prosecutor should be either aware or afraid of the taking. So decided, upon special verdict, in the case of The Commonwealth v. Snelling, before cited, in which case it was observed, among other things, by TUghman, C. J. "If a man is knocked down and rendered senseless, and in that situation his money is taken withr out his knowledge, it shall not avail the thief to say that it was not taken against the consent of the man whom he had rendered incapable of exercising the faculty of voli- tion." " Fear is not an essential ingredient of robbery; force is sufficient." See Com- monwealth v. Humphries, 7 Mass. Rep. 242. To constitute the crime of robbery, it is not necessary that tlie taking should be from the person of the owner, it is sufficient if it be done in the presence of the owner, as if by intimidation he is compelled to open his desk or throw down his purse, and then the money is taken in his presence. Wharton^s Digest, 151; U. States v. Jones, C. C. April, 1819, cited by Wharton from MS. Report, (3 Wash. C. C. Rep. 209, S. C.) For tke Lenn, Stats, see Stroud's Purd. *^Tit, Robbery and Larceny.^' [3] See note ante, ch. 44. p. 517, 535 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. And therefore Trin. 38 H. 8. Moore, n. 16. p. 5. A man indicted of robbery in quddam via regid pedestri ducenf de London ad Islington, and accordingly fonnd gnilty, had his clergy, for the words of the statute are for rubbery in or near the highway he shall be ousted of his clergy, and therefore the indictment and conviction must be of a robbery in vel prope. altatn viam regiam, and it is not sufficient to say only via regid or via regid pedestri. For where any person is to be ousted of liis clergy by virtue of any act of parliament, two things are always requisite. 1. Tliat the in- dictment bring the fact within the statute, but need not conclude, contra formam statuti. 2. That the evidence and finding of the jury likewise bring the case wiihin the statute, otherwise the prisoner is to have his clergy. But an indictment of a robbery in vel prope altam viam regiam, tho in the disjunctive is usual at Newgate, for if it be either in or near it, tho an indictment ought to be certain, yet this is not the sub- stance of the indictment, nor that which makes the crime, but only to ascertain the court as to the point of clergy to serve the statute. A robbery is committed upon the Thames in a ship there [ 536 ] lying at anchor below the bridge, on that side of the river which is in Middlesex ; for this robbery Hyde and others were indicted as of a robbery done in vel prope attain viamregiam, and were ousted of their clergy, for the Thames is in truth alta via regia the king's high stream; and if it were not, yet it is not far off from it, and the statute says near not next. By the statute of 25 H. 8. cap. 2.{g) clergy is ousted upon ex- amination, if the original offense were committed in another county, and excluded from clergy by 23 H.Q. cap. Land that statute extends to robbery in a mansion-house, or in or near the highway. ji. robs B. on the highway in the county of C. of goods to the value only of twelve-pence, and carries them into the county of Z). it is certain, that this is larciny in the county of D. as well as in the county of C. but it is only robbery in the county of C. where the first taking was, and for robbery he cannot be indicted or appeald in the county of D. but only in the county of C. but he may be indicted of larciny in the county of Z>. and it is certain, though the robbery were but of the value of one penny, yet if./?, were indicted thereof in the county of C. he should have had judgment of death, and been ex- cluded from clergy. Yet if A. be indicted of larciny in the county of Z). and the jury find the value to be only twelve-pence, he shall only have the judg- ment of petit larciny, and not suffer death, as he should have done, if he had been indicted of robbery in the county of C. altho it appear upon examination upon the trial in the county of D. that it was a robbery; the like law is, if it had been a robbery in a dwelling-house wiihin the statute of 23 //. 8. because it can be no more than petit (ff) This statute was in effect repealed by 1 E. 6. cap. 12. but is revived by 5 ^f 6. E. 6,ca/j, 10. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. 536 larciny in the county of Z>. it being found but of the vakie of twelve- pence, and accordingly resolved by the opinion of all the justices, 31 Eliz. Moore, n. 139. pag. 550. for the statute of 25 H. 8. extended to oust them of clergy, wliere clergy is demandable; but the jury finding the value to be but twelve-pence, or under, no [ 537 ] clergy is demandable, because petit larciny, but the party is to be whipt only. It hath been before observed cap. 44. that upon the statute of 29. ' Eiiz. cap. 15..tho ^. and B. be both present and consenting to the breaking and'entering of a house to rob, and „^. only enters into the house, and B. stands by, ^. shall be ousted of his clergy, but B. shall have his clergy,(A) because ..^. only entered the house, and the words of the statute extend only to him that actually enters the house; yet if./?, and B. be present, and consenting to a robbery in or near the highway, or to a burglary, tho ^d. only actually commits the rob- bery, or actually breaks and enters the house, and B. perchance be watching at another place near, or be about a robbery hard by, which he effects not, yet they are both robbers or burglars, and both shall be ousted of their clergy, as in Pudsei/'s case: and the reason of the difference is, because in this case both are robbers and burglars, but in the former case both steal not in the house, but only ^. and that statute binds up the exclusion of the clergy to stealing in the house._ Anno. 1672. at Newgate, Hyde and A. B. C. and D. conclude to ride out to rob, and accordingly they rode out; but at Hounslow D. parted from the company, and rode away to Colbrook; Hyde, Jl. B. gind C. rode towards £^// a ?72, and about three miles from Hounslow, Hyde, A. and B. assulted a man; but before he was robbed C. see- ing another man coming at a distance, before the assault, rode up to him about a bow-shot or more from the rest, intending either to rob him, or to prevent his coming to assist, and in his absence Hyde, Jl. and B. robbed the first man of divers silk stockings, and then rode back to C. and they all went to Londo7i,and there divided the spoil : it was ruled upon good advice, 1. That I), was not guilty of the rob- bery, tho he rode out with them upon the same design, because he left them at Hoiinsloiu, and fell not in with them, it may be he repented of the design, but at least he pursued it not. 2. That C. tho he was not actually present at the robbery, nor, as I remember, at the assault, but rode back to secure his company, was guilty as well as Hyde, A. and B. and thereupon C. as well as [ 538 ] Hyde, J2. and B. had judgment of death, and was excluded of clergy, the indictment being for robbery on the highway, accord- ing to the resolution in Pndsey^s case, for they were all robbers on the highway. (h) But now by llie statute of 3 ^ 4 W. S^ M. cap. 9. he would not have his clergy, iqt hy that statute clergy is taken away from all aiders, abetters, or astisters, ' . 53S HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. CHAPTER XLVII. CONCERNING RESTITUTION OF GOODS STOLEN, AND THE CONFIS) qusere. 3. Fregit <§' intravit. There must be an entry as well as a break- ing, and both must be in the night, and with an intent to steal, other- wise it is no burglary. [9] t-^. intending to rob B. breaks a hole in his house, but enters not, B. for fear, throws out his money to him, t--?. takes it and carries it away, this is certainly robbery, and some have held it burglary, tho Ji. never entred the house ; and so it is reported to have been ad- judged by Saunders chief baron. Crompt. 31. b. tamen qusere.{c) If t-^. breaks the house o{ B. in the night-time, with intent to steal goods, and breaks the window, and puts in his hand, or puts in a hook, or other engine to reach out goods, or puts a pistol in at the window with an intent to kill, tho his hand be not within the window, this is burglary. Co. P. C. p. 64. Vide infra. (x) New Edit. p. 487. (y) But now this doubt is settled by 12 Ann. cap. 7. whereby breaking' to get out is put upon the same foot with breaking to get in. And see 7^8 W. IV. c. 29. s. 11. (z) Kel. 83. (fl!) Kel. 69. Put it is a felony, for which the offender is ousted of his clergy, by 3 ^T AW.&; M. cap. 9. (/») Kel. vbi supra. ' . ' . (c) It was adjudged by Mountague chief justice C. B. and Saunders only related it [9] Sed vide Pickering v. RuM, 1 Stark. iJ. 48; 4 Campb. R. 220. -S. C. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 555 Bin if he shoots without the window, and the bullet comes in, this seems to be no entry to make burglary; quasre.[lO] ^. B. and C. come in the night by consent to break and enter the house o{ D. to commit a felony, c/^. only actually breaks and enters the house, and B. stands near the door, but actually enters not, C. stands at the lane's end, or orchard gate, or field gate, or the like, to watch that no help come to aid the owner or dweller, or to give notice to the others, if help comes, this is burglary in them all, the •/?. only actually brake and entered the house, and they all, in law, are principals, and excluded from clergy by the statute of IS Eliz. cap. 7. and so it is in robbery, as hath been said, 11 //. 4. 13. b. Cromp 32. a. Co. P. C. p. 64. lt\^. being a man of full age, take a child of seven or eight years old well instructed by him in this villainous art, as some such there be, and the child goes in at the window, takes goods out, and de- livers them to t/2. who carries them away this is burglary in ^. tho the child that made the entry, be not guilty by [ 556 1 reason of his infancy. So if the wife, in the presence of the husband, by his threats or coercion breaks and enters the house of B. in the night, this is bur- glary in the husband, tho the wife, that is the immediate actor, is excused by the coercion of her husband. 4. Domum mansionaletn : what shall be so said. [11] [10] See note (5) •p. 551. It is essential to burglary that there should be an entry, which may be made by introducing any part of the body into the house entered. Rex T. Dams, R. Sf R. 499; Rex v. Bailey, Id. 341; Rex v. Parkts, 1 C. Sf f. 300; Rex V. Roberts, 2 East's P. C. 487. By discharging or throwing any missile into the house, or by introducing any instrument into the house, provided, that such instrument or missile be used as a means of committing or attempting to commit a felony. Rex v. Hughes, 1 Leach, C. C. 406 ; Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. R. 220; Rex v. Rust, Mood. C. C. 183. An entry may be by a door or window, although there be an inside door or shutter to the same opening which is not broken, or an outside door or shuUer which is not closed. Rex v. Bailey, Rex v. Parkes, and Rex v. Haines before cited. [11] As to the Dwelling-house and Residence. — A dwelling-house includes, 1. All apartments under the same roof having a closed and covered communication with the dwelling-house, whether the occupants of the apartments reside within the dwelling-house or not. Sefton's case, R. ^ R.202; Com v. Chevalier, 1 Dane's Abr. IM; CarreVs case, 1 Leach, 237 ; Rex v. Bailey, Moody, 23; Stock^s case, R. &• R. 185 • 2 Taunt. R. 3.39. ^ -/ } , 2. All apartments under the same roof, the occupant of which resides in the dwelling, house, whether they have a closed and covered communication with the dwelling-house or not. Rex v. Burrowes, Moody, 274. Kel. 84. Brown's case, 2 East, P. C. 501. 2 Russ. 22. 2 Leach, 1016. note. 3. Any building within the curtilage of the dwelling-house, although not under the same roof, nor adjoining the dwelling-house, nor having any closed and covered comma- nication with it, provided it be occupied with it. Gibson's case, 2 Eist, 508. Hancock's case, R. Sf R. 170. LHhgo's case. Id. 357. Rex v. Chalking, Id. 334. Waller's case, Moody, 13. Clayburn's case, R. S^ R. 360. . Thompson's case, 1 Lew. 32. 4. It seems that a build ng or apartment is not excluded from bein) 2 Co. Instit. 433. (5) New Edit. p. 489. (r) 2 Co. Inst. 180. [13] Rex V. Knight, 2 East's P. C. 510; Id. 513; Rex v. Smith, R. Sf R. 417; Res V. Brice, Id. 450 ; The State v. Eaton, 3 Harringt. R. 554. [14] See ante note at p. 519. 562 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. are within those statutes, ousted of his clergy, and the accessaries ^before are ousted of their clergy by the statute of 4 Sr 5. P. 8f- M. cap. 4. but the accessaries after have their clergy, as hath been said; but in case of simple burglary, or burglary with theft, laid to be only felonice Sj' burglariter, the principal is ousted of clergy if outlawed or convict by verdict or confession, but is not ousted of crergy in case of standing mute, not directly answering, or challenging above twenty, by the statute of 18 Eliz. cap. 7.{s) But by the statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. "If the breaking of the house be in the day, or night time with intent to rob or [[ 563 ] steal, any person being in the house and put in fear, tho nothing be stolen, yet he shall be ousted of his clergy, if con- vict by verdict or confession, or stand mute, or challenge peremp- torily above twenty ;"(/) for this statute extends to this special kind of burglary, 11 Co. Rep. 36. h. Poulter^s case, tho nothing be stolen, and so differs from the statutes of 23 and 25 H. 8. which require a stealing, as well as a breaking the house. But tho in case of robbery in any dwelling-house, and therewith putting in fear, according to the statute of 23 H. 8. cap. 1. or with- out putting in fear according to the statute of 5 (§' 6 E. 6, cap. 9- the malicious commanding, hiring or counselling of such offense is put out of clergy, if so specially laid in the indictment, Dy. 183. b. by the statute of 4 <§' 5 P. Sf' M. cap. 4. yet such accessaries before, are not oust of clergy in case of breaking a house to commit a rob- bery putting in fear, tho the principal be ousted of clergy by 1 Eliz. cap. 12. But accessaries before or after are not ousted of clergy by this statute, or the statute of 4 (§• 5 P. 4* M. cap. 4. And this statute doth oust of clergy not only those that actually break, or actually enter the house, but also all those that are, in law, principals in burglary, all those that are present, aiding and assist- ing, or that stand to watch at the field-gate, while the others of the confederacy or company break and enter the house. And so it differs from the case of robbing of a person in his dwell- ing-house, none being within, upon the statute of 39 Eliz. cap. 15. for that statute excludes from clergy only those persons that actually enter into the house, and not those who, tho of the confederacy, and present aiding and abetting, yet never entered the house; quod vide supra. But as to accessaries before or after^ they are not ousted of their clergy by the- statute of IS Eliz. cap. 7. nor doth the statute of 4 <5' 5 P. <§* M. extend to oust accessaries before of clergy [564] in cases of burglary ;(w) but in cases of robbing of houses within the qualifications and circumstances of the statute («) This defect is supplied by 3 ^ 4 W. S( M. cap. 9. {t) This statute does not exclude those who challenge peremptorily above twenty; this, according to our author's opinion, {vide postea, Lib. II. cap, 48.) was needless; but they are since excluded by 3 i'^ 4 W. 8( M. cap. 9. («) But they are since ousted hy 3 Sf i W. ^ M. cap. 9. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 564 of 23 H. 8. cap. 1. or ^ ^- % E. 6. cap. 9. and not to burglary at large. (j-) And thus far concerning larciny, robbery and burglary, which are felonies by the common law. [| 565 J (x) Since our author wrote, there have been otlier statutes made to take away clergy in cases of larciny committed in dwelling-houses, &c. By 3^-4 W. ut by 9 Geo. I. cap. 22. it is felony without benefit of clergy to cut down or destroy any trees planted in any avenue, orchard, garden, or plantation. See Archb. Crim. Law, Tit, " Arson,"^. 312, 10 Lond. Ed. be the building of both, and the other to be that of the son. Here it was held, that the building was that of the occupant. In Margaret WalUs^s case, {Moody, C. C. 334, cited 2 Deac. 1496,) it was ruled, that in an indictment for arson, a dwelling-house may be described as in possession of the actual occupier, though his possession be wrongful. In Hohnes^s case, {Cro. Car. 376,) it was held, that possession is a sufficient title. So in The People v. Van Blarcum, 2 Johns. jR. 105. ' In X.hG English \^\v this question, as to whose a dwelling-house is in respect to arson, which, as Mr. East remarks, (2 East, P. C. 1034,) had been one of great nicety ip English jurisprudence, is excluded by the statute of 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 30, s. 1, by which it is enacted, that " if any person shall unlawfully and maliciously set fire to any house, whether the same shall then be in possession of the offender, or in possession of any other person, with the intent to injure or defraud any person, shall suffer death." This provision makes the crime the same, wiicther it be committed by day or night, and whether it be the dwelling-house of the offender or of another. The burning of other buildings is put upon the same footing in the same section. Mass. Corn. Rep. Tit, ^^Arson and Malicious Burning.''^ [3] At common law, the offence could not be committed by a party in burning his own house; and a person seized in fee, or but possessed for years of a house standing by HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 568 A tenant for years of a house sets fire to his own house, thereby intending maliciously to fire the house of B. if he burn his own house, and also thereby burn the house of B. this is felony; but if he burn not the house oi B. according to his design, but only burn his own. house, this is not felony, but a great misdemeanor, for which he was set in the pillory, fined, and perpetually bound to the good beha- viour, and yet it was of a house in the city of London, and laid that he did it eci intentione to burn th? houses of others. M. 10 Car. 1. B. R. Croke 377. Holme's case, adjudged. III. It must be a burning of a house of another, [4] therefore if./?, sets fire to the house of B. maliciously to burn it, but either by some itself, at a distance from all otiiers, could not commit felony in burning the same. So a man so seized or possessed of a house in a town, who burned his own with intent to burn his neighbour's, but in the event burned his own only, was not guilty of felony : it was, however, certainly an offence highly punishable in regard to the malice thereof^ and the great danger to the public which attended it, and the offender was liable to be severely fined and imprisoned during the Queen's pleasure, and set on the pillory, and bound to his good behaviour. 1 Hawk. c. 29, s. 3; Breeme's case, 1 Leach, 220, Ath ed.; Holme's case, Cro. Car, 376. cited in the text supra. The frequent commission of the latter offence, and the very serious mischief that re- sulted from its being merely a misdemeanor, at last attracted the attention of the legis- lature; and the party who would occasion by burning his own possessions an injury to another, the extent of which in many cases cannot be calculated, is now guilty of a felo- ny : formerly, by 43 Geo. III. c. 58, usually called Lord Ellenborough's Act, and now by 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 3. The burning must be done unlawfully and maliciously to constitute the offence ; for if it be done by mischance or negligence, it is no felony. (3 Inst. 67.) As if an unquali- fied person, in sporting, happen to set fire to the thatch of a lioiise; or even if a man were shooting at tlie poultry of another, by which means the house is fired, that is, pro- vided he did not mean to steal the poultry, but merely to commit a trespass, for other- wise the first intent being felonious, the party must abide all the consequences. 2 EasVs P. C. 1019. [4] If a man, by wilfully setting fire to his own house, burn also the house of one of his neighbours, it will be felony. Rex v. Robert, 2 EasVs P. C. 1031. Rex v. Isaac, Id. The law in such case implies malice, particularly if the party's house were so situate that the probable consequence of its taking fire was tliat the fire would communicate to the houses in its neighbourhood. Per Parke, J, in Sweetapple v. Jesse, 5 B. Sf Ad. 31. 2 Nev. Sf Man. 41. S. C. Bait's case, 3 City Hall Rec. 85.; sed vide Bliss v. Tobey, 2 R. SfR. 325. Curtis v. Godley Hundred, 3 B. Sf Cr. 248. Neither a bare intention to burn a house, nor even an actual attempt to do it by put- ting fire to part of a house, will constitute the offence, if no part of it be burned; but if any part of the house, &c. be burned, the offence will be complete, notwithstanding the fire be afterwards put out, or go out of itself. 2 East's P. C. 1020. The State v. Sandy, 3 Iredell, R. 570. Where it was proved that the floor near the hearth was scorched, and it was in fact charred in a trifling way, that it had been at a red heat, though not in a blaze, it was held that the offence was complete. Reg. v. Parker, 9 Car. Sf P. 45. But in another case, where it appeared that a small fagot was set on fire on the boarded floor of a room, and that the fagot was nearly consumed, that the boards of the floor were scorched black, but not burnt, and that no part of the floor was consumed, it was held that the offence was not complete. Rex v. Russ., 1 C. Sf Marsh, SiL Rex v. Taylor, 1 Leach, C. C. 49. Rex v. Judd, 2 T. R. 255. The cases lay down the doctrine generally that it is sufficient if the house be on fire. 3 Inst. 66. 4 Bl. Com. 222, Chitiy's note. 2 EasVs P. C. 21. s. 4. Rex v. Taylor, cited supra. The People v. Cotteral, 18 Johns, R. 115. But in all the cases where this gene- VOL. I. — 50 5^8 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.E. accident or timely prevention the fire takes not, this is no felony, tho it were a malicious attempt, for the words are incendit and combus- sit, but if he had burned part of the house, and the fire is quenched, ral doctrine was laid down, there was an evident intent to burn down the house. Sed quare, whether tliis be not too broadly stated in point of principle. The attempt to commit arson is a misdemeanor at common law, and as such may be punished severely. Rex v. Jngleton, 1 Wils. R. 139. Burns^ Just. vol. 1. tit. ^^ Aiteinpts." The burning must be with intent to injure some person who is not identified with the defendant. Rex V.March, R. Sf M. 182. Rex v. Farrington, R. i^- R. 207. Rex v. Gibson, Id. 138. Jervis's Arch. Cr. Law, 9 ed. 320. As to the forin of the Indictment. — In describing the building, it is sufficient to use the langjuage used by the act calling it a house, &.c. according to the fact. 2- EasVs P. C' lOS'S. Rex v. North, Id. Rex v. Donnevan, 2 Wm. Bl. 682. 2 EasVs P. C. 1020. 1 Uach, C. C. 69. S. C. Rex v. Winter, R. Sf R. 298. The name of the owner of the house must be stated in the same manner as in burglary. Rex v. Standjield, 2 East's P. C. 1034. The Com. v. Wade, 17 Pick. R. 395. The State V. Roe, 12 Venn. R. 93. It is necessary, therefore, to determine the party to whom the premises belong. When any doubt is entertained on the subject, the difficulty may be obviated by the insertion of several counts to correspond with the evidence. 3 Chit. Cr. L. 1126. If the premises be described as in the possession of A. B. proof that they are in the possession of the tenants of A. B. will support the indictment. Rex v. Ball, R. Sf M. C. C. 30. The People v. VarMarcum, 2 Johns. R. 105, So if the possession of a house be obtained wrongfully, it may be described as the house of the wrongful occupier. Rex v. Wallis, Mood. C. C. 334. The People v. Gates, 15 Wend. R. 159. The parish in which the building is situated must be stated according to the fact; a variance will be fatal. Rex v. Woodward, Mood. C. C. 323. A variance between the day stated in the indictment, as that on which the offi^nce was committed, and the day proved will be immaterial. Where the indictment alleges the offence to have been committed in the night-time, and it was proved to have been committed in the day-time, the judges held the variance to be immaterial.. Rex v. Min. ton, 2 East, P. C 1021. It is necessary to aver that the defendant " feloniously, unlawfully, and maliciously," set fire, &c. 2 EasVs P. C..1021. Rex v. Turner, R. Sf M. C. C. 239. Chapman v. Co7n. 5 Whart. R. 427. It was not necessary to aver in an indictment on the statute 9 Geo. I. c. 22. for setting fire to a hay-stack, that the stack " was thereby burnt." Rea: v. Salmon, R. Sf R. C. C. 26. 2 Rvss. Cr. c^- M. 294. S. C. In an indictment on the same statute for the same offence, it is no answer to the charge, that the prisoner had no malice in spite to the owner of the stack; nor that the stack stood upon his ground, if it was not his property. Id. An indictment for setting fire to a barge, the property of another, ought to contain an averment that it was done with an intent to injure the owner. Rex v. Smith, 4Car.Sf P. 569. • - . An indictment on the statute oflSfS Geo.lV.c. 30. §§2. 17. for setting fire to a barn and a stack of straw, charged the offences to have been committed " feloniously, volun- tarily, ar\i\ maliciously," instead of feloniously, wnZaw/wZZf/, and maliciously, held bad. The prisoners had set fire to a stack of stubble, (which in Camhridgeshire is called • haulm;) they were indicted on a first indictment for setting fire to a "stack of straw:" i/e/^ 6 E. 6. when the statute of 25 H. 8. was revived, both principal and accessaries had their clergy in all cases of burning. 5. After 5 8,^ 6 E. 6. till 4 (§- 5 P. (S* M. cap. 4. the principal was excluded in all cases, wherein he was excluded by the statute of 25 H. 8. as well where he stood mute, challenged above twenty, did not directly answer, as where found guilty. (§-) But the accessaries before, as well as after, had their clergy. 6. By the statute of 4 4' 5 F. S)' M. cap. 4. until this day, accessa- ries before are excluded of clergy in all cases, but accessaries after have their clergy. But yet there still remain two doubts. 1. Whereas the statute of 4 <§• 5 P. c^- M. cap. 4. extends to oust clergy from the accessary, as well if he be attainted as convicted, and consequently if outlawed, he shall not have clergy, because it is an attainder; the statute of 25 H. 8. extends only to finding guilty, challenging above twenty, standing mute, or not directly answering, and it seems in attainder of the principal by outlawry he shall have his clergy; therefore quasre, whether an attainder by outlawry ousts the principal of clergy upon the statute of 23 or 25 H. 8. 2. Whereas the statute of 4 <§• 5 P. <§• M. cap. 4. hath no [ 574 3 exception of persons in the order of sub-deacon; but acces- saries before are ousted of their clergy in all cases by that statute, tho in orders. Yet by the statute of 25 H. 8. which is relative to the statute of 23 H. 8. principals in the order of sub-deacon, or above, have their clergy in the case of arson, for by the statute of 23 H. 8. clergy is saved to men in orders, where found guilty; and by the statute of 25 H. 8. in cases of standing mute, <§'c. they are ousted of their clergy as if found guilty, in which case men in orders had their clergy, and so the revivmg of the statute of 25 H. 8. by that of 5 <5' 6 E. 6. lets in men in orders to their clergy in case of arson, wliich seems to make this absurdity, that the principal in arson shall have the beiie- {q) By 3 &. 4 W. Sf M. clergy is taken away in case of outlawry also. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. 574 fit of dergy if in orders, but the accessaries before, tho in orders, are excluded by the general penning of the act of 4 4' 5 P. <§• M. And herein tfiere will arise a difference as to men in orders, in re- lation to the benefit of clergy, between the case of being principal in wilful burning of houses, and the case of being principal in robbery in or near the highway, or robbing in a dwelling-house, putting the dweller in fear, or murder of malice prepense ; for the act of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. excludeth them from their clergy generally without exception of men in orders, tlio they were excepted by the statutes of 23 and 25 U.S. But this statute of 1 E. 6. making no mention of burning of houses, the exclusion of them from clergy, if resting upon tiie statute of 25 H. 8. revived by 5 4- 6 E. 6. excepts them. [8] [8] The State v. Seaborn, 4 Dtp. R. 305 ; Com. v. Posey, 4 CaWs Rep. 109. See ante chap, 44, p. 517, note [1.] CHAPTER L. [ 575 ] CONCERNING FELONIES BY THE COMMON LAW,[1] RELATING TO THE BRINGING OF FELONS, TO -JUSTICE, AND THE IMPEDIMENTS THERE- OF, AS ESCAPE, BREACH OF PRISON, AND RESCUE; AND FIRST TOUCHING- ARRESTS. [2] I COME now, according to the method propounded, to consider those felonies that relate to the public justice of the kingdom in bringing malefactors to their due punishment, and the impediments thereof, and they are principally three, viz. 1. By the party arresting or [2] As to Arrests, see vol. 2, ch. 10, 11, 12, 13, and notes thereto. [1] "Felonies in England, comprised originally every species of crime which occa- sioned the forfeiture of lands and goods. At common law, in addition to the crimes more strictly coming under the head of treason, the chief, if not the only felonies, were murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, robbery, rape, sodomy, mayhem, and larceny. By statutes, however, running from the earliest period, new felonies were, from time to time, created; till finally not only almost every heinous offence against person or pro- perty was included within the class, but it was held that whenever judgment of life or member was affixed by statute, the offence to which it was attached, became felonious by implication, though the word felony was not used in the statute." In this country, with a few exceptions, the common law classification has obtained; the principal felonies being received as they originally existed, and their number being increased as the exi- gencies of society prompted. In New York, however, felony by the revised statutes is construed to mean an offence for which the offender, on conviction, shall be liable by law to be punished by death, or by imprisonment in a State prison. {Rew Stat. N. Y. Part IV. Chap. II. Title 7. s. 30.) And in Virginia it comprehends all offences below trea- son which occasioned a forfeiture of property at common law, all -so denominated by statutes, and all to which statutes have annexed capital punishment or confinement in the penitentiary, excepting thpse which, though subjected to. the latter punishment, are 575 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. imprisoning, as voluntary escapes. 2. By the party arrested, and imprisoned, as breach of prison. 3. By a stranger, as rescue of felons. And in this order I shall examine these offenses ; but as a neces- or may be declared misdemeanors by the statutes Grating them." Barker v. Com. 2 Vir- ginia Cases, 122; Whart. Am. Crim. L. 1, 2. J'elony is supposed to come from tlie Saxon fel, which signifieth fierce or cruel ; of which the verb fell signifieth to throw down or demolish, and the substantive of that name is used to signify a mountain rough and uncultivated. But the same word, with a little variation, runneth througli most of the European languages, and signifieth more gene- rally, an offence at large; and the Saxon word faellan, signifieth to offend, diTid fellnisae, an offence or failure ; and altliough felony, as it is now become a technical term, signi- fieth in a more restrained sense an offence of a higii nature, yet it is not limited to capi. tal offences only, but still retaineth somewhat of this larger acceptation; for petit larceny is felony, although it is not capital Burn's Just. Tit. "Felony," 29iA Ed. According to Sir Henry Spelman's observation, it signifieth such an offence for which, during the feudal institution, a man should lose or forfeit his estate; which he derives of two northern words, fee, which signifieth the fief, feud, beneficiary, estate; and Ion, which signifies price or value. Upon the whole, the only adequate definition of felony seems to be this, viz. " an offence which occasions a total forfeiture of either lands or goods, or both, at the common law, and to which capital or other punishment may be superadded according to the de- gree of guilt. 4 Bl. Com. 94, 95. The idea of felony is, however, so generally connected with that of capital punishment, that it seems hard to separate them, and to this usage the interpretations of law now con- form. For if a statute makes any new offence /e/ony, the law implies it shall be punished With death, (viz. by hanging,) as well as by forfeiture. See 1 Hawk. c. 41. s. 4; 2 Id. c. 48. Where the statute declares that the offender shall, under the particular circumstances, be deemed to have feloniously committed any act, it makes the offence a felony, and im > poses all the common and ordinary consequences attending a felony. Rex v. Johnson, 3 M. Sf Sel. 556. And though a statute make the doing of an act felonious, yet, if a subsequent act make it penal o.nly, the latter is considered as a virtual repeal of the for- mer. 1 Hawk. c. 40. s. 5. All felonies are several, and cannot be joint, so that a pardon of one felon cannot dis- charge another; but the felony of one man may be dependent upon that of another, and the pardon of the one, by a necessary consequence, enure to the benefit of the other, as in cases of principal and accessary, &.c. The Massachusetts Commissioners, in their Report, enumerate as felonies within the provisions of their code, treason, murder, arson, rape, malicious burning, carnal abuse of a female child under ten years of age, burglary, robbery, larceny, kidnapping, child- stealing, and the offence of assault, or assault and battery in the first degree. And in a note they add that the meaning oi" felony as by them defined, is limited to the use of the word in their code, and is not to be confounded with the common law signification of the same term, ''whatever tiiat meaning may be, for it is a matter of no little difficulty to settle it." Rep. tit. " Explanation of Terms." Wliere one is found guilty of acts which amount to a felony, though not charged to be done feloniously, he cannot be sentenced as for a misdemeanor. Commonwealth v. Ivingshury, 5 Mass. 106. Commonwealth v. Rohy, 12 Pick. 496. Commonwealth v. Macomber, 3 Mass. 254. If acts amounting only to a misdemeanor are charged to be done feloniously, the accused cannot be convicted of the misdemeanor. Commonwealth y. Newell, 7 Mass. 245. But see Com. v. Sijuire, 1 Met. 258. The People v. Jackson, 'S HiWs IS. Y. Rep, 92. The People v. White, 22 \Yend. 175. Statutes are to be construed so as not to multiplj' felonies, unless such construction is supported by express words or necessary implication. Commonwealth v. Mucomher, 3 Mass. 254. 257, Commonwealth v. Barlou^, 4 Mass. R. 439. It would be such an im- plication if the statute provided for tlie punishment of accessaries after the fact to the offence in question as distinct oft'enders. Ih. A conviction, judgment and execution upon one indictment for a felony not capital, is HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 575 sary preliminary thereunto, I shall first consider of arrests and im- prisonment for capital offenses, by whom it may be done, and where lawful. Arrests of malefactors are of two kinds, 1. Either by persons thereunto by law deputed, or 2. By private persons. And the former is again of two kinds. Either, 1. By process of law, or 5. Virtute officii. The former again is of two kinds, 1. Either by process in the king's name, 2."0r by warrant in the name of a judge or justice thereunto authorized, and that either in writing or ore ienus. I shall pursue this order, and I. Shall begin with the first of these, namely, arresting by virtue of the king's writ. V Regularly no process issues in the king's name and by his writ to apprehend a felon or other malefactor, unless there be an indictment, or matter of record in the court upon which the [ 576 ] writ issues. Aniiently the process upon an appeal or an indictment of felony was only one Capias, and thereupon an Exigeyit. 22 ^Issiz. 81. By the statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 14. there are to be a Capias and an ^lias with a command to the sheriif to seize the goods of the felon, and then an Exigent. But it should s'eem by the book of 8. H. 5, 6. that this, statute ex- tended not to felony of death, but that there should be only one Capias, and then an Exigent. a bar in Tennessee to all other indictments for felonies not capital, committed previous to such conviction, judgment and execution. Crenshaw v. The Slate, Mart. Sf Yerg. 122. Under an indictment for horse-stealing, it was held that to constitute a felony there must be a trespass in the original taking. The State v. Braden, 2 Overton, 68. In New York, if a prisoner confined in the county prison, on a conviction of petit larceny, break prison, it is a felony for which he may be sentenced to imprisonment in the !^tate prison for a period not exceeding fourteen years. The People v. Duell, 3 Johns. 449. It is felony for a man who elopes with another's wife, to take his goods, though at the solicitation of the wife. The People v. Schuyler, 6 Cow. 572. It is very much to be doubted whether a person ought ever to be convicted of a felony on the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutor, who claims the property in question to which the defendant also claims title. Where the transaction was attended with none of the usual concomitants of larceny, as concealment, for example, the court, upon con- viction, ordered a new trial. The State v. Kane, 1 McCord, 482. In tliis country, where conviction of a felony does not work a forfeiture, a civil action is not merged in a felony. Robinson v. Culp, Const. Rep. 231. It seems that one guilty of a felony should be proceeded against criminally before a civil action can be brought, because he should not be convicted of a felony except on a direct charge of a crime. lb. Wild bees remaining in the tree where they have lived, are not the subject of felony, though the tree is on the land of another who has confined them in it. Waliis v. Mease, 3 I'invey R. .546. A slave in South Carolina can commit a felony. The State v. Wright, 4 McCord, 358. A mere solicitation to commit a felony is an offence, whether it is committed or not. The People v. Bush, 4 HiWs N. Y. Rep. 133. It has been held in New York that petit larceny is not a felony. Carpenter v. Nixon^ 5 Hill R. 260. Ward v. The People, 3 Id. 395. 576 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. Bat by the statute of 6 H. 6. cap. 1. if A. de B. in comitahi S. be indicted in the king's bench in Middlesex, there shall go out one Capias into Middlesex, another into S. and each shall have six weeks at least between the T^e^/eand return, and upon Non iiwentus returned then an Exigent. But if he be not named of another county, then it seems only one Capias shall issue, where the party is indicted, and upon that an Exigent: this statute was made during the king's pleasure; but by the proviso in the statute of 8 //. 6. cap. 10. it seems to be made perpetual. By the statute of 8 //. 6, cap. 10. if./?, de B. in com. S. be indicted or appealed in com. IV. before justices asssigned, there shall go out first a Capias in Com. fV. and upon No7i inventus returned, a Capias, with proclamations in com. S. having three months at least between the Teste s.nd return, or otherwise no Exigent to issue; but the prd- cess in the king's bench is excepted. But this statute only extends, where the party is indicted in another county, than where conversant. By the statute of 5 E. 3. cap. 11. justices of oi/er and terminer may issue process against felons in a foreign county, and these processes ought, or at least may and are most fit to issue in the king's name under the Teste of the chief judge, for which pur- pose all clerks of assizes have a special seal, and issue their pro- cess in the king's name in case of felony, where they go to the outlawry, tho some other warrants are made in the name of the judge. . And in all cases the king's writs are directed to the (]577] sheriff, and he executes the writ himself, or by his warrant under seal to the bailiffs. And upon these writs the sheriff or his bailiff may break open doors to take the offenders, for they are for the king and preserva- tion of the peace, and therefore include a no7i omit tas propter uli- quam libertatem; quod vide 5 Co. Rep. 92. a. And in this case the sheriff or his bailiff may require any per- sons present to assist him in execution of the writ, and he that refuseth to assist him, is indictable and punishable by fine and im- prisonment. II. The second kind of arrest is by warrant under tlie seal of the justices thereunto authorized, as justices of oi/er and terminer, or of gaol-delivery, or justices of peace. And herein these things are considerable: 1. What are the essen- tials of such a warrant, without which it is void in law. 2. Who may grant a warrant to apprehend a felon. 3. To whom, and 4. In what order or method it is to be granted, or 5. Executed, and in what case. 1. As to the first of these. It is necessary that such warrant express the name of the party to be taken: for a wari-anl granted with a blank and sealed, and after HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON.^. 577 filled up with the name of the party to be taken is void in law. Dalt. cap. 117.;;. 329.(«) It must be under seal, tho some have thought it sufficient if it be in writing subscribed by the justice, Dalt. cap. 117. /;. 358. vide 2. Co. Inslit. supra statutum de fraiigentibus prisonain, p. 591. and the faiUng in these things will make the warrant void, and subject the officer to a false imprisonment; tho in some cases, the want of (due formality may be blameable in him that makes the warrant, yet it will not therefore subject the officer to a false imprisonment, if the matter be within the jurisdiction of him that makes it; as for instance, A warrant by a justice to apprehend J. S. to answer such matters as shall be objected against him, ex parte domini regis, without ex- presshig the certainty of the crime, this is not regular, Lamhard' s justice QS, 96. 2 Co. Instit. 591. 615. tho Mr. Dalt. cap. 117, p. 329. gives instances of such warrants granted by [578] Po/^/^f/m chief justice. And therefore, if before commitment a person so apprehended should be removed into the king's bench by Habeas Corpus, upon such a warrant, or should be committed upon such a general Mit- timus, he should be discharged; or in case he should be rescued upon such an apprehension by such a warrant, or be voluntarily let go by him that apprehends him, (tho it may be the true cause of the warrant were felony,) yet it not being expressed in the warrant, such an escape or such a rescue would not be felony. Yet it may excuse the officer in false imprisonment, if the true cause were felony, or any misdemeanor within the cognizance of him that makes the warrant, for it is but an erroneous, not a void warrant, and it is not reasonable to suppose the officer should be conusant of the formalities of law, or advise with counsel upon all occasions, whether the warrant were in strictness of law regular, especially in such a case where the error of this nature hath been seconded with common practice; but of this more hereafter. 2. As to the persons, that may grant a warrant for apprehending a felon. The chief justice of the king's bench or any other judge of that court may issue a warrant in his own name, for the apprehending and bringing before him any person touching whom oath is made of a felony committed, or of suspicion of felony upon him, into any county of England and JVales, for they are intrusted with the con- servation of the peace through all England, and are more than justices of peace or oyer and terminer; and this hath been usual in all ages. . But to avoid the trouble to the country in bringing up offenders they usually direct their warrants to apprehend the parties, and bring them before some justice of peace near adjoining, either to be examined or bound over to the sessions, and farther to be proceeded against according to law. (a) New Edit. p. 574. 578 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. And thus their warrants ought to run in cases of surety of the peace or good behaviour against a person in another county, than where they are, by reason of the statute of 21 Jac. cap. 8. Justices of oyer and terminer may also issue their war- r 579 ~\ rants in the counties within their commission for apprehend- ing felons or other malefactors, or for surety of the peace within their limits ; qiisere, whether they may not issue their warrants for any indicted of felony within their precincts, tho tiiey are abroad « in a foreign county, by the statute of 5 E. 3. before mentioned? Justices of peace may also issue their warrants within the precincts of their commission for apprehending persons charged of crimes within the cognizance of the sessions of the peace, and bind them over to appear at the sessions, and this, tho the offender be not yet indicted. And therefore the opinion of my lord CoJce, 4 Inst it. 111. is too strait-laced in this case, and, if it should be received, would obstruct the peace and good order of the kingdom; and the book of 14 H. 8. 16. upon which he grounded his opinion, was no solemn resolution, but a sudden and extrajudicial opinion, and the defendant had liberty to mend his plea as to the circumstance of time, to the end it might , ^be judicially settled by demurrer, which was never done; and the constant practice hath obtained contrary to that opinion; quod vide Dalt. cap. 117.(6) And whereas my lord Coke^ ubi supra, s^Jiih also, that a justice of peace upon oath made by A. of a felony committed, and that Ji. sus- pects B. and shews his cause, cannot issue a warrant to bring B. before him for farther examination, and thereupon commit or bind him over to the assizes or sessions, because it must be the proper sus- picion of Ji. himself, and Ji. may arrest him upon the score of his. own suspicion, but not by warrant of the justice; I think the law is not so, and the constant practice in all places hath obtained against' it, and it would be pernicious to the kingdom if it should be as he de- livers it, for malefactors would escape unexamined and undiscovered; for a man may have a probable and strong presumption of the guilt of a person, whom yet he cannot positively swear to be guilty. Therefore I think, that if Ji. makes oath before a justice of peace of a felony committed in fact, and that he suspects B. and [ 580 ] shews probable cause of suspicion the justice may grant his warrant to apprehend B. and to bring him before him, of some other justice of peace to be examined, and to be farther pro- ceeded against, as to law shall appertain; and upon this warrant the constable, or he to whom the warrant is directed, may arrest him, and if occasion be may break doors to take him, if within a house, and will not upon demand render himself, as well as if it were an express and positive charge of felony sworn by JI. against'him, and so hath common practice obtained notwithstanding thatopmion: vide statute IVestm. 1 cap. 15.(c) 13 E. 4. 9. a. (6) New Edit. p. 57G. (c) 2 Co. Inst. p. 185. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. 580 But a general warrant upon a complaint of a robbery to apprehend all persons suspected, and to bring them before, ^-c. was ruled void, and false imprisonment lies against him that takes a man upon such a warrant, P. 24 Car. l.upon evidence in a case of justice Swallow^ s warrant before justice Roll. If A. hath committed treason, tho the justices of the peace have no cognizance of it as treason, yet they have cognizance of it as a felony, and as a breach of the peace, and therefore a justice of peace upon information upon oath may issue his warrant to take him, and may take his examination, and commit him to prison. Jl. commits a felony in the county of B. and then goes into the county of C. upon information given to a justice of peace of the county of C he may issue his warrant to take him, may take his examination, and commit him to gaol in the county of C. from whence he may he removed by Habeas Corpus to the county of B. for his trial. If ^^. commit a felony in the county of B. and upon a warrant issued against him by a justice of peace in the county of B. he is pur- sued and flies into the county of C. and there is taken, he must not by virtue of that warrant be carried to a justice of peace of the county oi B. where he committed the felony, but to a justice of peace in the county of C. where he was taken. But if A. were taken by the warrant in the county of B. and break away into the county of C. and be there taken upon fresh suit by them that first took him, he may be either brought [ 581 ] to a justice of the county of C. where he was last taken, or before the justice of the county of ^. by whose warrant he was first taken ; for in supposition of law he was always in custody: vide du- bitahtr, 13. E. 4. 9. a. If./?, be in commission of the peace in the county of i?. and hap- pen to be in the county of C. and there complaint is made to him of a felony in the county of B. where he is in commission, as he can- not issue a warrant out to apprehend the party, so neither can he im- prison in the county of C. because an act of jurisdiction, but he may take an oath of a party robbed in pursuance of the statute of 27 Eliz. or he may take an examination, or information, or recognizance in a foreign county, but cannot compel them by imprisonment. P. 7 Car. 1. Croke, n. 3 Helyar\s case,((/) Dalt. cap. 6. and 117.(e) But if./?, be a justice of peace in two adjacent counties, tho by several commissions, as the recorder oi London is, nothing is more usual for him, that whilst he lives in one county to send .his warrants to apprehend malefactors in another, and to send them to Newgate, which is the common gaol of both counties, London and Middlesex. 3. Touching the persons to whom a warrant may be directed. The justice that issues the warrant, may direct it to a private per- son if he please, and it is good ; but he is not compellable to exe- cute it, unless he be a proper officer. 14 H. 8. 16. Dalt. cap. 117. p- 332.(/) (d) Cro. Car. 211. (e) New Edit. p. 25 ^ 575. (/) New Edit. p. 577. 581 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. The warrant is ordinarily directed to the sheriff or constables, and they are indictable, and subject thereupon to a fine and imprisonment if they neglect or refuse it. If directed to the sheriff, he may make a warrant to his baihff fo execute it. If to a constable, tithing-man, <5'C. he must execute it himself, and may not substitute another ; but he may call any persons to assist him, and they are bound to assist him, and are indictable if they neglect or refuse to assist : vide Dalt. ubi supra. If directed to the constable oi D. he is not bound to'ex- [ 582 ] ecute the warrant out of the precincts of his constablewick, but if he doth it out of his constablewick, it is good; and so it was ruled in Norfolk in an action of trespass. 4. Touching the order in granting it. 1. It is convenient, tho not always necessary, to take an informa- tion upon oath of the person that desires the warrant, that a felony was committed, that he doth suspect or know J. S. to be the felon ; and if suspected, then to set down the causes of his suspicion. 2. If the charge of the felony be positive and express, theft it is fit to bind the party by recognizance to prosecute, before the warrant be issued. But if it be only a charge of suspicion, and the business requires farther examination, then it is neither necessary nor fit to bind over the party to prosecute; for possibly upon the bringing in of the party accused, and farther examination of the fact, there may be cause to discharge him, and thus I think Mr. Balton to be intended, ca/j. 117. J). 334.(^) the case before chief justice Flemming. 3. The warrant may issue to bring the party before the justice that granted the warrant specially, and then the officer is bound to bring him before the same justice; but if the warrant be to bring him be- fore any justice, then it is in the election of the officer to bring him before what justice of the county he thinks fit, and not in the election of the prisoner. 5 Co. Eep. 59. b. Foster's case. 5. Touching the demeanor of the officer in executing the warrant. If it be a warrant for felony, or a warrant for the surety of the peace, the officer may break open the door, if he be sure the offender is there, if after acquainting them of the business, and demanding the prisoner, he refuses to open the door, tho the party be not indicted; and this is the constant practice against the opinion of my lord Co/ce, 4 Inst. 177. guod vide Dalt. cap. 117. p. 333. (A) And so it is if the warrant be only upon suspicion of [ 583 ] felony, as hath been said before, for in both cases the pro- cess is for the king, and therefore a Non omittas is implied, and he that diligently considereth the statute of West. 1. cap. \5.{i) and the statute of 2 ^'3 P. <§• M. cap. 10. will find that an imprison- ment may be tnade by the justice, as well for suspicion of felony, as for an absolute charge of felony, and that as well before indictment as after. (g-) New Edit. cap. 169. p. 579. (Ji) New Edit. p. 578. (0 2 Co. Inst. 185. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 583 And by the book of 13 E. 4, 9. a. A man that arrests upon sus- picion of felony, may break open doors, if the party refuses upon demand to open them, and much more may it be done by tiie justice's warrant. If the officer be demanded he must show his warrant, but if he doth it virtiite officii as a constable, 4'c. it is sufficient to notify that he is the constable, or that he arrests in the king's name. Dalt. iibi supra, 6 Co. Rep. 54. a. 9 Co. Rep. 69. a. Mackally^s case. Lastly, What is to be done after the warrant served, and when the person accused is brought before the justice thereupon. If there be no cause to commit him found by the justice upon examination of the fact, he may discharge him. If the case be bailable, he may bail them. If he have no bail, or the case appears not to be bailable, he must commit him. And being either bailed or committed^ he is not to be discharged till he be convicted or acquitted, or delivered by proclamation. Co. P. C. cap. 100.77.209. And this leads me to the Mittimus, or the warrant to the gaoler to receive him; and this is the ground of the felony in case of a breach of prison. ^ly lord Coke, 2 Inst. 591. makes three essential parts of the Mitti?nus. 1. That it be in writing sealed by the justice that commits, and without this part the commitment is unlawful, the gaoler is liable to a false imprisonment, and the wilful escape by the gaoler, or breach of prison by the prisoner, makes no felony. But this must not be intended of a commitment in a court of record, as the king's bench, gaol delivery, or sessions of [ 584 ] the peace, for there the record itself, or the memorial thereof, which may at any time be entered of record, are a sufficient warrant without any warrant under seal. 2. That it express the cause for which he is committed, namely felony, and what kind of felony. This seems requisite to make the voluntary escape or breach of prison felony, and also it is necessary upon return of the Habeas Corpus out of the king's bench, because that is in nature of a writ of right or writ of error to determine, whether the imprisonment be good or erroneous. But it seems not to make the commitment absolutely void, so as to subject the gaoler to a false imprisonment, but it lies in averment to excuse the gaoler or officer, that the matter was for felony. And also upon such a general warrant without expressing any felony or treason, or surety of the peace, the constable cannot break open a door. T. 9 Jac. B. R. 1 Bulstrode 146. Foster's case. 3. That it have an apt conclusion, viz. There to remain till deliver d by law. But if the conclusion be irregular, I think it makes not the warrant 584 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. void, but the law will reject that which is surplusage, and the rest shall stand. And therefore if the cause be expressed, and the conclusion irregu- lar, as till farther order s^iven by a justice, yet a breach of prison under such a warrant will be felony, yea, if the party be removed by Habeas Cojyus, tho the conclusion be irregular, yet if the matter appears to be such, for which he is to remain in custody, or be bailed, he shall be bailed or committed as the case requires, and not dis- charged ; but the idle conclusion shall be rejected. And therefore I do think that such a warrant is a good justification in a false imprisonment, tho the right conclusion be omitted, or tho the wrong conclusion be inserted, if the matter of the Mittimvs be otherwise sufficient to charge him in custody, and therefore it is a lawful warrant notwithstanding the omission or incongruity r 585 1 of the conclusion, so as to make the voluntary permission of an escape or the breach of prison felony. By the statute of 23 H. 8. cap. 2. the felons are to be sent to the common gaol:(/) and by the statute of 4 jE. 3. cap. 10. the sheriffs and gaolers are bound to receive them, whether committed by jus- tices, or attached ex officio by constables. Previous to the commitment of felons, or such as are charged therewith, there are required three things, 1. The examination of the person accused, but without oath. 2. The farther information of accusers and witnesses upon oath. 3. The binding over of the prosecutor and witnesses unto the next assizes or sessions of the peace, as the case requires. 1. The examination of the person accused, which ought not to be upon oath, and these examinations ought to be put in writing, and returned or certified to the next gaol delivery or sessions of the peace, as the case shall require, by the statute of 2 (§' 3 P. (§• M. cap. 10. and being sworn by the justice or his clerk to be truly taken, may be given in evidence against the offender.(A^) And in order thereunto, if by some reasonable occasion the justice cannot at the return of the warrant take the examination, he may by word of mouth command the constable, or any other person, to de- tain in custody the prisoner till the next day, and then to bring him before the justice for further examination; and this detainer is justi- fiable by the constable, or any other person without showing the particular cause for which he was to be examined, or any war- (i) And not elsewhere; so that it sliould seem that commitments to New Prison or the Gate-house are irregular; see 2 Co. Inst. 43. Cro. Eliz 830. and of this opinion was chief justice Holt, in the case of Kendal and Roe, State Tr, Vol. IV. ^. 862. See also 5 H. 4. cd-p. 10. which ordains, "That none be imprisoned by justices of the peace, save only in the common gaol." \) Co. Rep. 119. b. (k) Altlio tlfey be not evidence against any other person named in them; it was there- fore very irregular in the chief justice to refuse reading the examinations of Slern and Boroski at their trial; see State Tr. Vol. III. p. 470. But qucere by scrjeant TVi/son, if- the chief justice was not right in such rcfusiil? For by ihe opinion of some judges now livin-j-, the statute datli not extend to the examination of the party accused, unless he signed his examination, but only to the witnesses or persons accusing. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON^E. 585 rant in scrip/is. T. 37 Bliz. Hot. 244. B. R. Broughton and Marshaw.{l) But the time of the detainer must be reasonable, therefore a justice cannot justify the detainer of such a person sixteen [ 586 ] or twenty days in order to such examination. (m) 2. He must take information of the prosecutor or witnesses in writing upon oath, and return or certify them at the next sessions or gaol-deUvery, and these being upon the trial sworn to be truly taken by the justice or his clerk, (S*c. may be given in evidence against the prisoner, if the witnesses be dead or not able to travel. 3. Before he commit the prisoner, he is to take surety of the pro- secutor to prefer his bill of indictment at the next gaol delivery or sessions, and likewise to give evidence; but if he be not the accuser, but an unconcerned party that can testify, the justice may bind him over to give evidence ; and upon refusal in either case may commit the refuser to gaol. Slamf. P. C. p. 163. a. Dalt. cap. 116. p. 326. (ti) 2 (§• 3 P. <5- M. cap. 10. and Dalt. cap. 20. p. 55.(o) And thus far of arrests by warrant in writing. Next come to be considered arrests by command ore tenus, or by order. The chief justice, or other justice of the king's bench, may com- mand ore tenus the marshal or any of his deputies, commonly called tipstaves, to arrest any person, and such command is a good justifi- cation in false imprisonment brought; altho 1. It be not in writing. 2. Altho no cause is expressed in the command, but only generally to answer such things as shall be objected against him ex parte domini regis. 3. And tho the command be ita quod habeas corpus coram capitali justiciario, Sf-c. quandocunque, 4'C. for it shall be intended, when the party complains. 4. Altho the defendant declares not in his justification what he did with him in the mean time. P. 11 Car. B. R. Throgmorton and Allen., adjudged upon a demurrer.(*) Altho, as hath been said, a justice cannot grant a warrant to ap- prehend all persons suspected, but must name their names, yet I have known in the king's bench upon a riot committed in the night by persons disguised, and whose names have not been ["587 1 known, the court hath made an order to apprehend persons that the party, who was injured, suspects, and to bring them into the court to be examined, and such order of the court is a good war- rant for the sheriff" or constable to do it ; but what is thus done in the highest court of ordinary justice, is not to be a pattern for particular justices or inferior jurisdictions. I have now done with arrests by writs or warrants. I come in the next place to arrests, ex officio, without any warrant. (Z) This case is reported in Moore, 408. by the name of Broughton and MuhJioe. {m) See the case ofScamge and Tateham, Cro. Eliz, 829. where it was adjudged, that the time of detainer must not exceed three days, (n) New Edit. cap. 168. p. 572. (0) New Edit. cap. 40. p. 106. («) 2 R. A. p. 558. VOL. I. — 51 687 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. If an affray be made in the presence of a justice of peace, or if a felon be in his presence, he may arrest him, and detain him ex officio till he can make a warrant to send him to gaol, but then the warrant must be in writing to the gaoler, P. 23. Car. B. R. SandforcTs case, and so he may by word command any present to arrest. Dalt. cap. in. p. 32S.{p) A constable may ex officio arrest a breaker of the peace in his view, and keep him in his house, or in the stocks, till he can bring him be- fore a justice of peace. So if ,d. be dangerously hurt, and the common voice is, that B. hurt him, or if C. thereupon comes to the constable, and tells him that B. hurt him, the constable may imprison him till he knows whether t/?. dies or lives, T. 43 Eliz. B. R. Dumbletoi's case, or can bring him before a justice. So if a felony be committed, and */?. acquaint him that B. did it, the constable may take him and imprison him, at least till he can bring him before some justice of peace. But if there be only an aftVay, and not in view of the constable, it hath been held he cannot arrest him without a warrant from the jus- tice; but it seems he may to bring the offender before a justice, tho not compellible. Lastly, I come to the authority of every private person in relation to arrests of felons. \i A. commit a felony, B. who is a private person, may arrest him for that felony without any warrant; nay farther, if .^. will [ 588 3 i^ot suffer himself to be taken, but either resists or flies, so that he cannot be taken, unless he be slain, if B. or any in assistance in that case of necessity kill him, it is no felony; de quo antea,p. 481. If A. commit a felony in the sight of B. and B. uses not his best endeavours to apprehend him, or to raise hue and cry upon him, it is punishable by fine and imprisonment. Co. P. C. p. 53. If Ji. strike B. dangerously in the presence of C. C. may justify the imprisoning of ^d. till he can bring him before a justice, or de- liver him to the constable, tho it be not felony till death. If a hue and cry be levied upon a felony, and come to the town, B. the constable, and those of the town are bound to apprehend the felon if in the town, or if not in the town, then to follow the hue and cry, otherwise they are punishable upon an indictment. Co. P. C. cap. 52. If the constable in pursuit of a felon require the aid of J. S. he is bound by law to assist him, and is finable for his neglect.(y) If a felony be committed in fact, and v^. suspects B. did it, and hath probable cause of suspicion, .^. may arrest i?. for it, and justify it in an action of false imprisonment. 2 E. 4. 8, b. The causes of suspicion are many, as common fame finding goods upon him, and many more, de quibus vide Dalt. cup. llS.(r) (jP) New Edit. cap. 169. p. 574. (5) 13 //. 7. 10. b. (r) New Edit. cap. 170. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 588 If a felony be committed, and A. suspects B. and B. being in his house refuse to open the doors, or render himself, it seems A. may break open the doors to take him; and so may the constable, if A. acquaint him therewith, especially if A. be present, 13 ^. 4. 9. a. tho (as hath been said) my lord Coke,A Inst. 111. be to the contrary; yet the common practice and opinion hath obtained in that case against my lord Coke, Dalt. cap. 9S. p. 249. ,(5) cap. 78. p. 204.,(/) 7 E. 3. 16. b. There are special cases where a constable having received informa- tion of the misdemeanors following, or any private person without a warrant may arrest and break open doors to arrest [ 589 ] if they within refuse to open them upon demand, or to deliver up the party. 1. Where a felony or treason is committed, and the offender is within the house. 2. Where a felony or treason is committed, and a man suspects J. S. who is in the house, and hath probable cause of such suspicion, tho the party be not indicted. 7 E. 3. 16. b. 13. E. 4. 9. a. 3. Where A. hath dangerously wounded B. and then A. flies into the house, whether it were done in the presence of the constable, or him that arrests, or not. 7 E. 3. 16. b. Crompt. 171. a. 4. Where there is an affray made in a house, and the doors are shut, and are refused to be opened, during such affray the constable or any other may break open the doors to preserve the peace, and prevent blood shed; but after the affray, it cannot be done without a warrant, unless a man be dangerously wounded or killed in the affray. Yet to avoid question in these cases, it is best to obtain the warrant of a justice, if the time and necessity will permit. When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dismiss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can, he may do either of these things. 1. He may carry him to the common gaol, 20 E. 4. 6. b. but that is now rarely done. 2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either carry him to the common gaol, vide 4. E. 3. cap. 10. or to a justice of peace to be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require. 10 E. 4.(w) 17 6. 3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail, or commit him, as the case shall require. And the bringing the offender either by the constable or [590] private person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler will expect a Mittimus iov his warrant of detaining. And thus far of arrests. («^ New Edit. p. 482. (0 New Edit. p. 426.. (u) This is the same year with 49 H. 6, and is so printed in the year-book. 590 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. CHAPTER LI. OF FELONY BY VOLUNTARY ESCAPES, AND TOUCHING FELONY BY ESCAPES OF FELONS. Having in a former chapter said somewhat of arrests, it remains that somewhat be said touching those felonies that relate to the es- cape of persons arrested or imprisoned. And these escapes are of three kinds, 1. By the person that hath the felon in his custody, and this is properly an escape; and 2. When the escape is caused by a stranger, and this is ordinarily called a res- cue of a felon. 3. By the party himself, which is of two kinds, viz. 1. Without any act of force, and this is a simple escape. 2. With an act of force, viz. by breach of prison. As to the Jirst, touching an escape separate by the person that hath a felon in custody, which is properly an escape; and this is of two kinds, voluntary and negligent. And Jirst concerning the voluntary escape. A voluntary escape is when any person having a felon lawfully in his custody voluntarily permits him to escape from it, or go at large, and this is felony in case the person be imprisoned for felony, and treason in case the person be imprisoned for treason ; for the [ 591 ] latter enough hath been said before; touching the former in this place. And altho Mr. Stamford^ Lib. I. cap. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31. hath collected almost all that can be well said in this case, yet I shall pro- ceed distinctly herein. And therein I shall as near as I can, observe this order. 1. I shall consider who shall be said a felon, whose escape makes a felony in him that voluntarily suffers it;i 2. What shall be said a having of such a felon in his custody. 3. Who shall be said a per- son lawfully having such a felon in his custody. 4. What shall be said a voluntary escape of such a felon out of his custody. 5. Who shall be said voluntarily to suffer such a felon to escape. 6. What is the offense of such a voluntary permission of an escape, and where, and how punishable. And tho I apply these particulars to a voluntary escape, yet many of them are applicable unto, and useful for the learning of a negli- gent escape. I. Who shall be said a felon, whose voluntary escape is felony in him that so permits it. If ..:?. gives B. a mortal wound, and before B. dies the constable takes Jl. into custody, either with or without a justice's warrant, and then lets him voluntarily escape before B. is dead, and then B. dies tho as between A. and B. or »^. and the king, this is is a felony from the stroke given, and the attainder of Jl. as to the forfeiture of his lands relates to the stroke; yet this is no felony in the constable, but HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 591 only a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. 11 //. 4, 12 b. Ploivd. Com. 258. b. If ^. be indicted for felony, and taken by Capias, or by the warrant of a justice, or by the constable 6,-c. and committed to prison, and the gaoler suffers-.^, to escape voluntarily, this is the escape of a felon, tho -'?. be not attainted at the time of the escape, but the gaoler shall not be arraigned thereupon till after the attainder of t^. de quo infra. If a felony be in fact committed, and the constable takes A. upon suspicion of felony, and after voluntarily suffers him to go at large, tho A. be not then indicted, yet this is a felonious [ 592 ]] escape in the constable, tho 42 Assiz. 5. be othervvise,(«) yet 44 Assiz. 12 Dy. 99. a. 43 E. 3. 36. a. accord.{b) And altho the constable be well assured after the arrest by him made, that A. was not the person that did it, yet he may not by the law discharge him, but must bring him before a justice, who may upon due circumstances discharge, bail, or commit him, as he sees cause ; but the constable, if he discharges him, is finable. But if the constable after the arrest finds certainly, that there was no felony committed, it is held he may discharge him both without danger of felony, (which is true,) and without any danger of fine and imprisonment, 13 H. 7. Kelw. 34. a. b. but then it is at his peril, if in truth there were a felony committed, and the party be guilty; sed de his vide infra, Dalt. cap. 106./?. 271. accords. {c) If A. be committed for petit larceny, and so it -appears by the charge of his Mitlirrms, and the gaoler lets him at large, this is a contempt, for which he shall be fined, but not felony in the gaoler; so if he were convicted of petit larceny before the escape. Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 21. p. 33. b. 8. E. 2. Coron. 430. So if a man be originally committed for manslaughter /?er2/?yb;'/?^- niiim or se defendendo, or were convict only se defendendo ov per infortunium, and afterwards the gaoler suffers him voluntarily to escape, it is no felony; but if the commitment or indictment were for manslaughter, tho in truth it were but se defendendo, yet prima facie a voluntary escape is indictable as felony, tho in eventu it may fall out otherwise; de quo infra. If A. be indicted of murder for the death of B. and par- doned or acquitted within the year, but left in jail till the [ 593 ] year be elapsed, upon the statute of 3 H. 7. cap. 1. that the wife may bring her appeal if she pleases, and after that acquittal, and within the year, the gaoler suffers him voluntarily to escape, it is (a) That was the case of a negligent (not a voluntary) escape, and for that reason could not be felony, tho it is there given as a reason, why it sliould not be adjudged an escape, because the thief was not taken with the mainouvre, nor at the suit of the pariy, nor indicted of felony. (&) This case is plainly the same with 44 Assiz. 12. and seems to be the case of a voluntary escape; it does not report any resolution of the court, but only says, that the bailift's who let the thief go, altho he were not indicted, were charged with an escape; and a qucore is added at the end of the case: and as to the case in Dijer, that was not the case of the person arresting letting the thief go, but of a third person's rescuing him, and that is said to be felony, altho he was not indicted. See 1 £. 316. 6. (c) New Edit. p. 511. 693 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. felony prima facie, and the gaoler may be indicted for it as felony; but if the wife brings not her appeal within the year, or bringing her appeal «/?. is acquitted, the gaoler ought to be acquitted : vide infra, JHoivd. Com. 476. b. If ^. commits felony, and being convicted prays his clergy and the court take time to advise upon it till another sessions, and in the mean time he is left in gaol, as he ought to be, and the gaoler volun- tarily suffer him to make his escape, this is felony in the gaoler, for such a prisoner stands yet under a conviction of felony, and there- fore is not by law bailable; but if the felon be retaken, and hath his clergy, the felony in the escape is purged, and the gaoler is not indictable after, or if indicted before the clergy allowed, he is to be acquitted. If ^. be indicted of felony, and hath his clergy, but is continued for six months in custody for his farther correction, according to the power given by the statute of IS Eliz. cap. 7. and the gaoler suffer him to escape voluntarily, it is a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment, but no felony. If a man be delivered to the ordinary as a clerk convict upon his own confession, or as a clerk attaint, in which cases he ought not to be admitted to purgation, and the ordinary notwithstanding admit him to his purgation, and set him at large, this, at common law, had been a misdemeanor fineable; but it seems it had not been felony ill the ordinary ; for in those times there was a pretension, that a clerk was not within the temporal jurisdiction; but the law concerning purgation is altered since by the statute of 18 Eliz. cap. 1. and other statutes; de quo infra, 21 Jlssiz. 12. 9 E. 4. 28. Thus far what shall be said a felony. 11. What shall be said to be a having in custody. Every man is bound by law to pursue and take a felon; and if he makes not pursuit, he is fineable. But if ./^.commits a felony in the presence of B. and B. [ 594] never takes him, nor attempts it, this is not felony in B. for B. had him not in his custody. So it is if .^. commits a felony, and B. receives him knowing him to be a felon, and then B. voluntarily suffers him to depart, tho the receipt makes him accessary after, yet it is no escape by B. because he never arrested him, and so had him not in custody. 9 H. 4. \.{d) If./?, being acquit of felony, judgment is given, that he shall go free paying his fees, tho the gaoler lets him go before fees paid, it is not felony, for by that judgment he is no longer in custody as a felon. 21 //. 7. 17. If the constable arrest a man for felony, and bring him to the gaol, and the gaoler refuse to receive him, yet in law he is in the custody of the constable, and if he lets him go, he is chargeable in an escape. 10 //. 4. 7. a. Escape 8. If A. have a franchise to Iiave the custody of felons in his gaol [for («/) 24 6. ' HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 594 three days,](e) and then to deliver over to the sheriff or county-gaol, and after the three days he offers him to tlie county-gaol, and the gaoler do not receive him, he yet remains a prisoner to Jl. and if he suffers a voluntary escape, it is felony, 27 Jis^iz. 27. yet in both these cases the gaoler is punishable for not receiving the felon by 4 E. 3. cap. 10. If A. arrest /?. of felony, and deliver him to the constable or to the vili, and they receive him, Jl. is discharged of the custody, and the escape after is chargeable upon the constable or vill, and if the constable or vill deliver iiim to the sheriff or his gaoler, and he re- ceive him, the constable and vill are discliarged of the custody, and the sheriff or gaoler is chargeable wuh the escape after. 3 E. 3. Coron. 328. 337. As touching escapes without arrests, they belong not to this title of voluntary escapes; sed hsec vide infra <§• supra. If A. the sheriff of B. hath a felon in gaol, and then C. is made sheriff, till the prisoner be turned over by indenture to the new sheriff, the custody of him remains in J2. and he or his gaoler is chargeable for a negligent escape, and his gaoler chargeable [ 595 ] for a voluntary escape. If the bailiff of a franchise, that hath a gaol, hath the custody of a felon, he is chargeable for his escape, and not the sheriff or his goaler. III. Who shall be said a person lawfully having the custody of a felon: this hath been touched in the former section, but now shall be farther prosecuted. If Ji. a meer private man knows B. to have committed a felony, he may thereupon arrest him of felony, and he is lawfully in the cus- tody of./?, till he be discharged of him by delivering him to the con- stable or common gaol ; and therefore if he voluntarily suffers him to escape out of his custody, tho he were no officer, nor B. indicted, it is felony in A. So it is, if a felony be in fact committed, and A. hath a probable cause to suspect B. and accordingly suspects and arrests him, B. is lawfully in the custody of .^. for suspicion of felony; and if he volun- tarily lets him escape, it is felony in A. in eventit, viz. if B. proves really guilty of the felony. And accordingly if A. deliver the party so arrested to the con- stable's custody, he is lawfully in his custody, and if he suffer the escape voluntarily, it is felony in eventu. 44 Assiz. 12. If a justice of peace make a Mittimus to the gaoler for felony with an unapt conclusion, as //// the justice give order for his delivery, whereas it should be till he be delivered by due course of law, tho this warrant be not formal, yet the felon is lawfully in his custody, and if he let him voluntarily escape, it is felony, for he is sufficiently ascertained of the crime with which he is charged. (e) These words are not in the original MS. but yet are plainly supposed in the argu- ment, and are mentioned in the case here quoted by our author, viz. 27 Assiz. 27. 595 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORON^E. And it seems to me, if the Mittimus be general and contain no certain cause, the the gaoler is not bound to receive him upon such a Mittimus, yet if he be acquainted what the crime is for which he is committed, if he suffer him voluntarily to escape, it is felony. For if a private person or a constable arrests a man for felony, and carry him to the common gaol, (as he may do by law, IS E. A. 9. and the gaoler is bound to receive him by the statute (/) of r 596 ] 4 E. 3. cap. 10. if the constable or person that delivers him, acquaints the gaoler it is for felony, it is at the peril of the gaoler if he lets him escape, and yet there is no Mittimus in that case, but a notice ore tenus. The stocks is the prison of the constable, and so long as he is in the stocks he is in the constable's custody, and therefore if the con- stable wilfully let a felon escape out of the stocks, and go at large, it is felony in the constable, unless it be to bring him to a justice, or to a safer or more convenient custody. IV. What shall be said a voluntary escape of a felon in custody, for it must be voluntary escape to make felony. If the prisoner be rescued, or rescue himself against the will of him that hath him in custody, this is no voluntary escape, nor is the gaoler, &c. punishable for the same. If the prison be fired, and the gaoler lets out the prisoners, there being no other means to save their lives, and uses the best means he can by his officers and irons to keep them safe, and this without fraud, or if enemies force him to open the prison doors, and he doth it to save his life, it excuseth from felony. And if it be done by rebels, tho this excuse not the gaoler or sheriff in civil actions, but he is liable to an action of debt, or upon the case for the escape, because the sheriff hath his remedy over, yet it excuseth the gaoler from felony, and also from a fine, if it be vis major, quam cui resisti potest. If a justice of peace bail a person not bailable by law, it ex- cuseth the gaoler, and it is not felony in the justice, but a negligent escape, for which he is fineable at common law, 25 E. 3, 39. ,(^) and by the justices of gaol-delivery by the statute of 1 <§- 2 P. fy M. cap. 13. And the like in case of a sheriff, under-sheriff, constable, bailiff of a liberty bailing one that is not by law bailable, it is not a volun- tary escape, at least unless done by design to deliver the prisoner for ever, but it is a negligent escape punishable at common [597 ] law, or according to the statute of 3 E. 1. cap. 15. by loss of office, fine, and three years imprisonment. And therefore I think, that if a justice of peace bail a person, that .confesseth a felony before him, it is no voluntary escape, but fineable (/) This statute obliges the gaoler to receive felons by the delivery of the constables or townships, but says nothing as to the delivery by private persons. {. because it differs in the person. Co. P. C. cap. 7. p. 51. Plowd. Com. 475. Saunder^ s case. A. gets B. with child, and before the birth counsels B. to kill it, the child is born, B. murders it, A. is accessary to the murder, yet at the time of the counsel given the child was not in rerum nalurd. 2 Eliz. By. 186. a. Jl. lets out a wild beast, or employs a madman to kill others, whereby any is killed, A. is principal in this case, tho absent, because the instrument cannot be a principal. Bait. cap. \QS.{f) A. commands B. to kill C. but before the execution there- of *^. repents, and countermands B. and yet B. proceeds in [ 618 ] the execution thereof, A. is not accessary, for his consent continues not, and he gave timely countermand to B. Co. P. C. cap. 7. p. 51. Plowd. Com. 474, Sau7if/er's case; but if A. had repented, yet if B. had not been actually countermanded before the fact committed, »/^. had been accessary. [10] (/) New Edit. p. 5^9. [9] Foster, 369, 370. R. v. Cooper, 5 C. Sf P. 535. [10] Among the statutary enactments on this subject in the United States, are the following: collected in Wh(/rton''s American Criminal Law, 24-27. United States. — Every person who shall, either upon the land or the seas, know- ingly and wittingly aid and assist, procure, command, counsel or advise, any persoa or persons, to do or commit any murder or robbery, or other piracy aforesaid, upon the seas, which shall affect the life of such person, and such person or persons shall there- upon do or commit such piracy or robbery, then all and every such person so as aforesaid aidmg, assisting, procuring, commanding, counselling or advising the same, either upon the land or the sea, shall be, and they are hereby declared, deemed and adjudged to be, accessary to such piracies before the fact, and every such person, being thereof convicted, shall suffer death. Act of April 30, 1790. s. 10. That after any murder, felony, robbery, or other piracy whatsoever aforesaid, is or shall be committed by any pirate or robber, every person who, knowing that such pirate or robber has done or committed any such pirac}' or robbery, shall, on the land or at sea, receive, entertain or conceal, any such pirate or robber, or receive or take into his custody any ship, vessel, goods or chattels, which have been, by any such pirate or rob- ber, piratically and feloniously taken, shall be, and are hereby declared, deemed and adjudged, to be accessary to such piracy or robbery, after the fact; and on conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding five hun- dred dollars. Ibid. sect. 11. Massachusetts. — Every person, who shall be aiding in the commission of any offence, which shall be a felony, either at common law, or by any statute now made, or which shall hereafter be made, or who shall be accessary thereto before the fact, by counselling, hiring or otherwise procuring such felony to be committed, shall be punished in the same manner, which is or which shall be prescribed for the punishment of the principal felon. Rev. Stat. chap. 133. sect. 1. Every person, who shall counsel, hire, or otherwise procure any offence to be commit- VOL. I. — 53 618 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. ted, which shall be a felony, either at. common law, or by any statute now made, or which siiall hereafter be made, may be indicted and convicted as an accessary before the fact, either with the principal felon, or after tlie conviction of the principal felon, or he may be indicted and convicted of a substantive felony, whether the principal felon shall or shall not have been convicted, or shall or sliall not be amenable to justice, and in the last mentioned case, may be punished in the same manner as if convicted of being an accesary before the fact. Ibid. scct. 2. It was said by the Supreme Court that stat. 1784, c. 65, (from which the above section was drawn,) providing that if any person shall aid, assist, &c. any person to commit murder, he shall be considered as an accessary before the fact, refers to a person not pre- sent, aiding, &c. If the party be in such a situation as to be able to afford assistance to the principal, although not literally present, he will be a principal. Com. v. Knapp, 9 I'ick. 496. Any person, charged with the offence mentioned in the preceding section, may b® indicted, tried and punished in the same court and the same county, where the principa felon might be indicted and tried, although the offence of counselling, hiring, or pro- curing the commission of such felony may have been committed on tlie high seas, or on land, either within or without the limits of this state. Rev. Stat. chap. 133. sect. 3. Every person, not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grand-parent, child or grand-child, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity, to the offender, whq, after the commission of any felony, shall harbour, conceal, maintain, or assist any prin- cipal felon, or accessary before the fact, or shall give such offender any other aid, know- ing that he had committed a felony, or had been accessary thereto before the fact, with intent that he shall avoid or escape from detection, arrest, trial or punishment, shall be deemed accessary after the fact, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state pri- son, not more than seven years, or in the county jail, not more than three years, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars. Ibid. sect. 4. Every person, who shall become an accessary after the fact, to any felony either at common law, or by any statute now made, or which shall hereafter be made, may be indicted, convicted, and punished, whether the principal felon shall or shall not have been previously convicted, or shall or shall not be amenable to justice, by any court having jurisdiction to try the principal felon, and either in the county where such person shall have become an accessary, or in the county where such principal felony shall have been committed. Jbid. sect. 5. New York. — Every person, who shall be a principal in the second degree, in the com- mission of any felony, or who shall be an accessary to a murder, before the fact, and every person who shall be an accessary to any felony, before the fact, shall, upon conviction, be punished in the same manner herein prescribed, with respect to principals in the first de- gree. 2 R. Stat. 698, sect. 6, 1st Edition. Every person, who shall be convicted of having concealed any offender after the com- mission of any felony, or of having given such offender any other aid, knowing that he has committed a felony, with intent and in order that he may avoid, or escape from, arrest or trial, or conviction, or punishment, and no others, shall be deemed an accessarji' after thp fact, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, not exceeding five years, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not ei- ceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Ihid. sect. 7. An indictment against an accessary to any felony may be found in the county where the offence of such accessary shall have been committed, notwithstanding the principal offence was committed in another county; and the like proceedings shall be had thereon in all respects, as if the principal offence had been committed in the same county. Ibid, 727, sect. 48. An accessary, before or after the fact, may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished, notwithstanding the principal felon may have been pardoned, or otherwise discharged, after his conviction. Ibid, sect. 40. Every person who shall be convicted of having been an accessary after the fact to any kidnapping or confinement, herein before prohihited, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, not exceeding six years, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceding five hundred dollars, or by ,both such fine and imprisonment Ibid. GG5, sect. '31. Pennsylvania. — Where any murder or felony hath been, or hereafter shall be com- mitted in one county of this province, and one or more persons shall be accessary or HIS^TORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 618 accessaries to any such murder or felony in another coun'y, then an indictment found or talsen against such accessary or accessaries, upon tlie circumstances of such matter, before justices of the peace, or otiier justices or commissioners, to inquire of felonies in the county where sucli offences of, accessary or accessaries, in any manner, have been or shall be committed or done, shall be as good and effectual in law as if the said prin- cipal offence had been committed or done within the same county, where the indictment against such accessary hath been or shall be found. Act of 3[st May, 1118, sect. 22; 1 Smith, 405; It/i ed. Furdon, 1)35. The justices of the said Supreme Court, or two of them, upon suit to them made, shall write to the keepers of the records, where such principal is or shall hereafter be attainted or convicted, to certify them whether such principal be attainted, convicted or otherwise discharged of such principal felony; who, upon such writing to them or any of them directed, shall make sufficient certificate in writing, under their seal or seals, to the said justices, whether such principal be attainted, convicted, or otherwise discharged or not. And after they who so have the custody of records, do certify that such principal is attainted, convicted or otherwise discharged of such offence by the law, then the justices of gaol delivery or of oyer and terminer shall proceed upon every such accessary in I he county where he or they became accessary, in such manner and form as if both the said principal offence and accessary had been committed and done in the same county, wiiere the offence or accessary was or shall be committed or done. And every such accessary and other offenders as above expressed, shall answer upon their airaignments, and receive such trial, judgment, order and execution, and suffer such forfeiture, pains and penalties, as is used in other cases of felony, and as the statute made in the second and third years of the reign of king Edward the Sixth, (chap. 24,) entitled, "An act for the trial of murders and felonies committed in several counties," doth direct in such cases; which statute shall be observed in this province, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding. Ibid. sect. 23. Pivery person convicted of bigamy, or being an accessary afler the fact, in any felony, or of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, or of any other offence not capital, for which, by the laws in force, before the act, entitled, "An act lo amend the penal laws of this state," burning in the hand, cutting off the ears, nailing the ear or ears to the pillory, placing in and upon the pillory, whipping or imprisonment for life, is or may be inflicted, shall, instead of such parts of the punishment, be fined and sentenced to undergo in the like manner, and be confined, kept to hard labour, fed and clothed as is hereinafter directed, for any term not exceeding two years, which the court before whom such conviction shall be, may and shall, in their discretion, think adapted to the nature and heinousness of the offence. Act 5th April, 171^0; 2 Dallas, 801 ; 2 Smith, 531 ; 1th ed. Fur. 938, sect. 4. Virginia. — An accessary to a murder or a felony committed, shall be examined by the court of that county or corporation, and tried by the court in that district where he be- came accessary, and shall answer upon his arraignment, and receive such judgments, order, execution, pains and penalties as are used in other cases of murder and felony. R. L. vol. i. 104. If any be accused of an act done as principal, they that be accused as accessary shall be attached also, and safely kept in custody until the principal be attainted or delivered. R. L. vol. i. 126. Persons knowingly harbouring horse-stealers, or receiving from them stolen horses, are to be deemed and punished as accessaries. And if the principal felon cannot be taken so as to be prosecuted and convicted of such offence, nevertheless the acces- sary may be punished as for a misdemeanor, although the principal felon be not before convicted of the felony, which shall exempt the ofi'cnder from being punished as ac- cessary, if the principal offender shall afterwards be taken and convicted. li. L. vol. i. 179. If any principal offenders shall be convicted of any felony, or shall stand mute, or shall peremptorily challenge above twenty persons returned to be of the jury, it shall be lawful to proceed against any accessary either before or after the fact, in the same manner as if the principal felon had been attainted thereof, notwithstanding such prin- cipal shall be admitted to the benefit of his clergy, pardoned or otherwise delivered before his attainder; such accessary to suffer the same punishment as the principal, if he had been attainted. R. L. vol, i. p. 20G. 618 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. CHAPTER LVI. OP ACCESSARIES AFTER THE FACT. This kind of accessary after the fact is, where a person knowing the felony to be committed by another, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon. [1] . This, as hath been siaid, .holds place only in felonies, and in those felonies, where by the law judgment of death regularly ought to ensue, and therefore there is no accessary in petit larciny, homicide joer in- fortunium, or homicide se defendendo. 15 E. 3. Coron. 116. I shall consider, 1. What shall not be a receiving or relieving to make an accessary after; and 2. What shall be such a receiving or relieving to make an accessary after. If A. knows that B. hath committed a felony, but doth not disco- ver it, this doth not make ./^. an accessary after, but it is misprision of felony, for which Ji. may be indicted, and upon his conviction fined and imprisoned. If eA?. sees B. commit a felony, but consents not, nor yet takes care to apprehend him, or to levy hue and cry after him; or upon hue and cry levied doth not pursue him, this is a neglect punishable by fine and imprisonment, but it doth not make ji. an accessary after. S E. 2. Coron. 395. 3 E. 3. Coron. 293. Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. [ 619 ] cap, 45. f 40. b. 14. H. 7. 31. b. and the contrary opinion of some old books in this case is therefore rejected. If B. commit a felony, and come to the house of td. before he be arrested, and A. suff'er him to escape without arrest, knowing him to have committed a felony, this doth not make »^. accessary; but if he takes money of B. to suffer him to escape, this makes him acces- sary, 9 H. 4. 1. and so it is if J2. shut the fore door of his house, whereby the pursuers are deceived, and the felon hath opportunity [1] Generally any assistance whatsoever given to one known to be a felon, in order to hin- der his being approliended or tried, or suffering the punishment to which he is condemned, is sufficient to bring a man within tiiis description, and makes him accessary to the felony: as where one assists him with a horse to ride away with, or with money or vic- tuals to support him in his escape. 2 Hawk. c. 29. s. 26. Also, it seems to be settled that whosoever rescues a felon from an arrest for the felony, or voluntarily suffers him to escape, is an accessary to the felony. 2 Hawk, c, 29. s. 27. It seems agreed, says Haw- kiiis, that the law hath such a regard to that duty, love and tenderness which a wife owes to her husband, as not to make her an accessary to felony by any receipt given to her husband. Yet, if she be any way guilty of procuring her husband to commit it, it seems to make her an accessary before the fact, in tlie same manner as if she had been sole. Also, it seems agreed that no other relation besides tliat of a wife to her husband, will exempt the receiver of a felon from being an accessary to the felony; from whence it follows, that if a master receive a servant or a servant a master, or a brother a brother, or even a husband a wife, they arc accessaries in the same manner as if they liad been mere strangers to one another. 2 IJawk. c. 29. s. 3 [. Where goods are feloniously taken by a servant in his master's absence, and the mas- ter afterwards assists in secreting theni, he is an accessary only, though he directed the original taking. Norton v. People, 8 Co/Oj. 137. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 619 to escape, this makes A. accessary; for here is not a bare omission, but an act done by A. to accommodate his escape, 8 E. 2. Coron. 427. */i. hath his goods stolen by B. \( */9. receives his goods again sim- ply without any contract to favour him in his prosecution, or to forbear prosecution, this is lawful; but if he receives them upoa agreement not to prosecute, or to prosecute faintly, this is theft-bote, punishable by imprisonment and ransom, («) but yet it makes not t'?. an accessary 1 42 Assiz. 5. b. 3 E. 3. Coron. 353. Slamf. P. C.f. 40. a. but if he take money of B. to favour him, whereby he escapes, this makes him accessary. Dalt. 263.{b) Crompt. 41. b. t/i. hath his goods stolen by B. who sells them to C. upon a just value, tho C. know them to be stolen, this makes not C. accessary, unless he receive the felon. Da/L cap. 108./?. 288. (c) But by some opinions, if he buy them at an under value, it makes him accessary, per Crompt. 43. b. and Sir Nlch. Hyde, Dalt. iihi supra; but it seems this makes not an accessary, for if there be any odds, lie that gives more, benefits the felon more than him that gives less than the value, but it may be a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment, and the buying at an under value is a presumptive evidence, that he knew they were stole, but makes him not accessary. If Ji. hath his goods stolen by B. and C. knowing they were stolen, receives them, this simply of itself makes not an accessary, and therefore it hath been often ruled, (^) that to say, J. S. hath re- ceived stolen goods knoiving them to be stolen, is not ac- tionable, because it imports not felony, but only a trespass ["620 ~\ or misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, (e) for the indictment of an accessary after, is that he received and maintained the thief, not the goods.{f)[2] (a) Vide antea, p. 546. Sf notas ibid. (6) New Edit. p. 531. (c) New Edit. ibid. (d) Dawsori's case, Yelv. 4. (e) By 3 & 4 W. ^ M. cap. 9. "Receivers of stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, are to be deemed accessaries after the fact, and suffer as such;" but because these re- ceivers often concealed the principal felons, and thereby escaped being punished as acces- saries; therefore by 1 Ann. cap. 9. "Whosoever shall buy or receive stolen goods know- ing them to be stolen, may be prosecuted for a misdemeanor, and punished by fine and imprisonment, though the principal felon be not convicted;" and this shall exempt them from being punished as accessaries, if the principal shall afterwards be convicted. (/) But by 5 Ann. cap. 31. " If any person shall receive or buy knowingly any stolen goods, or knowingly harbour or conceal any felon, lie shall be taken as accessary to the felon, and shall suffer as a felon:" this statute does not take away the benefit of clergy; but by 4 Geo. I. cap. 11. such person may be transported for fourteen years. [2] The 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29. is novy the only statute in force, affecting receivers of stolen goods in general. All the statutes prior to that statute are repealed, and the only other acts in force on this offence are the 2 Geo. III. c. 28. relating to receiving stoleo goods, &.C. on the river Thames^ and the 1 & 2 Geo. ly. c. 75. relating to anchors, cables, shipping, &c. Where two receivers are charged in the same indictment with separate and distinct acts of receiving, it is too late after verdict, to object that they should have been indicted separately. Reg. v. Hays, 2 M. Sf Rob. 156. Where a person jinowing goods to have been stolen, directs his servant to receive them, and the servant also knowing the?n to be stolen, does so, they are jointly indictable. Reg. v. Parr, 2 M. Sf Rob. 346. Three per- sons were charged with a larceny, and two others as accessaries, in separately receiving portions of the stolen goods. The indictment also contained two other counts, one of 620 mSTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. But yet it seems to me, that if B. had come himself to C. and delivered him the goods to keep for him, C. knowing that they were stolen, and that B. stole them, or if C. receives the goods to facilitate the escape of B. or if C. knowingly receives them upon agreement to furnish B. with supplies out of them, and accordingly supplies him, this makes C. accessary ;(_ij-) and with this seems to agree the preamble of the statute of 2 <§• 3 E. 6. cap. 24. Crompt. 41. b. for it is relieving and comforting. But the bare receiving of stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, makes not an accessary; for he may receive them to keep for the true owner, or till they are recovered or restored by law; and so it seems are the books to be intended of 27 Assiz. 69. 25 E. 3. 39., (A) 9 H. 4. 1. a. If a felon be in prison, he that relieves him with necessary meat, drink, or clothes for the sustentation of life, is not accessary. So if he be bailed out till the next, sessions, 4'C. it is law- [^ 621 ] ful to relieve and maintain him, for he is quodammodo in custody, and is under a certainty of coming to his trial. Crompt. 42. b. Ball. p. 2S6.{i) And therefore it is not treason thus to relieve a traitor, while he is in custody or under bail, and therefore the statute of 27 E/is. cap. 2. that makes it felony to relieve a Jesuit, hath yet this qualification, being at liberty and out of hold. But if a felon be in gaol, for a man to convey instruments to him {g) But because this was difficult to prove, the confederates of snch thiev^es frequently disposing- of suck goods to the owners for a reward, under the notion of helping them again to their stolen goods, it is provided by 4 Geo. I. cap. 11. "That whosoever shall take a reward under tiie pretence of helping any one to stolen goods, shall suffer as a felon, as if he himself had stolen the said goods, unless he cause such felon to be appre- hended and brought to trial, and give evidence against him;" upon this clause the famous Jonathan Wild was convicted and executed. 10 Geo. 1. See statute 6 Geo. 1. ch. 23. for pretending to help one to stolen goods. Receivers of linen goods stolen from the bleaching grounds, are by the statute 18 Geo. II. declared felons, without benefit of clergy. {h) In the last edition of the year-books, which is in this place inispaged, it is 25 E. 3. 82. b. (») Neio Edit. p. 530. them charging each of the receivers separately with a substantive felony, in separately receiving a portion of the stolen goods. The principals were acquitted, but the receivers were convicted on tlie 'last two counts of tlie indictment. Reg. v. Pulham, 9 Car. Sf P. 280. A lad stole a brass weight from his master, and after it had been taken from him in his master's presence, it was restored to him again with his master's consent, in order that he might sell it to a man, to whom he had been in the luibit of selling similar articles, which he had stolen before. The lad did sell it to the man, and the man being indicted for receiving it of an evil disposed person, well knowing it to have been stolen, was convicted, and sentenced to be transported for seven years. Peg. v. Lyons. I C. Sf Mar. 217. Where six .£100 notes were stolen, and the ])arty was indicted for receiving tlicm, it appeared tliat the notes had been changed by tiic thief for £20 notes, which latter notes had been received by the accused ; it was held, that he could not be convicted on tlie indictment, as he did not receive the notes which were stolen. Ilex v. Wulkeley, 4 C. c^- P. 132. A person may be indicted for receiving stolen property, if it remain the same in sub- stance, though the name be changed, and therefore a principal may be indicted for steal- ing'a live sheep, and tiie accessary with receiving twenty pounds of mutton. R'-x v. Cowell, 2 East, P. C. 781 ; and sec R. v. Puckering, R. c^ M. C. C. 242. HISTORIA PLACITOROI CORONA. 621 to break prison to make an escape, or to bribe tbe gaoler to let him. escape makes the party an accessary, for tho common humanity allows every man to aflord them necessary relief, yet common jus- tice prohibits all men unlawful attempts to cause their escapes. If A. speak or write in favour of a prisoner for his favour and deliverance, this makes him not an accessary. 26 Assiz. 47.[3] To instruct a felon to read thereby to save him by his clergy makes not an accessary. M. 7 R. 2.,{k) Co. P. C. cap. 64. p. 139. If A. be cominitted for felony, and B. an attorney advise the friends of./?, to write to the witnesses not to appear against him, who writes accordingly, this makes neither B. nor the friends accessary, but is a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. Co. P. C. iibi supra. A feme covert cannot be an accessary for the receipt of her hus- band, for she ought not to discover him. But the husband may be an accessary for the receipt of his \vife. Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. \9.fol. 26. a. If the wife alone, her husband being ignorant, do knowingly re- ceive B. a felon, the wife is accessary and not the husband. \5 E. 2. Coron. 383. But if the husband and wife both receive a felon knowingly, it shall be judged only the act of the husband, and the wife acquitted. M. 37 E. 3^ Rot. 34. in dors. Rex Coram Rege.{l) To make an accessary to felony there must be a felony f 622 *] committed by him, to whom he is accessary. i^. gives B. a mortal stroke, C. receives or relieves A. or helps him to escape, and then B. dies, C, shall not be an accessary to the felony, because when he received him no felony was done. [4] (it) Rot. 30. Rex Cant. {1} This was the case of Richard Day and Margery his wife, (vide supra p. 47.) wlio bad been indicted before the sheriff of Lincoln pro receptamento felonum ; the indictment was sent coram rege: Richard surrendered himself and alleged, that he had been tried and acquitted on the said indictment before the justices of gaol-delivery at Lincoln, and was admitted to bail ; after which the judge of gaol-delivery sent the record of Richard's acquittal ; Margery the wife pleaded, tFiat she also had been tried and acquitted, and was also bailed, but afterwards she not appearing, a Capias was awarded against her and her bail: upon this her husband and one John Hode two of her bail came into court, Et pe- tunt ipsos admitti adjinem cum domino rege occasione prcedictd faciendum, S^ admittun- tur) sometime afterwards the said John Hode came into court and alleged, that he had been unjustly fined, "Quia praedictum indictamcntum super prjedictam Margcriam fac- tum minus sufficiens est, eo quod preedicta Mnrgeria tempore, quo ipsa dictos felones receptasse seu eis consentire debuisset, fuit coopCrta praedicto Ricardo viro suo, fc adbuc est &. omnino sub potestate sua [ejus], cui ipsa in nuUo contradicere potuit, and ex quo non inseritur in indictamento prtedicto, quod ipsa aliquod malum fecit, nee eis consen- tivit, seu ipsos felones receptavit ignorante viro suo, petit judicium, si ipsa vivente viro Buo dc aliquo receptamento in prcesentia viri sui occasionari possit." The court took time to consider of this plea, and in Michaelmas term, anno Ato gave the following judg- ment. "Viso & diligenter examinato indictamento praedicto super prajfatam Margeriani facto videtur curios, quod indictamentum ilhid minus sufficiens est ad ipsam inde ponere responsuram. Idco cessit processus versus earn omnino. See Co. P. C. p. lOS. [3] But advising witnesses not to appear, though it docs not make an accessary, is a misdemeanor. Hale^s Sum. 219. [4] 2 Hawk. c. 29, s. 35, 4 Bl. Com. 38. ' 622 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. But a man may be accessary to an accessary by the receiving of him knowing him to be an accessary to felony. Slam/. P. C. cap. 46. / 43. b. 22 ^ssiz. 52. [5] There can be no accessary in receipt of a felon, unless he know him to have committed a felony: vide Stamford's P. C. 41. b. But yet it hath been held, that if the party be attaint of felony by outlawry or otherwise in the county of .^. if any one of that county receive him, he is accessary, whether he had notice or not, because he is a felon by matter of record, whereof all in the same county ought to take notice. 12 E. 2. Coron. 317. Stamf. P. C. cap. 46. fol. 41. b. But it seems to me necessary to make an accessary after, that there be notice, aUho the felon were attaint in the same county, for pre- sumption shall not make men criminal, where the punishment is capital.[6] See antea, 612. ch. 55. [5] 3 P. Wyns. 475; 2 Haick. c. 29, s. 1. [6] But some particular evidence is necessary. Cotn. Dig. Justices, t. 2 Hawk. c. 29, s. 33, c. 25, s. 67; R. v. Thompson, 2 Lev. 308; 3 P. Wins. 496. • ■ ' > ' .11 . . . The punishment of accessaries after the fact is at common law trivial, (hey being in most cases allowed the benefit of clergy. Fast. 372. There are several legislative pro- visions pointing out the punishment in different offences. Thus, in abduction, biga. my, assaults, child stealing, rape, and unnatural crimes, the 9 Geo. IV. c. 31. s. 31. provides, "that every accessary after the fact to any felony punishable under this act, (except murder) shall be liable to be ilnprisoned with or without bard labour, in the common gaol or house of correction, for any term not exceeding two years; and every person who shall counsel, aid, or abet the commission of any misdemeanor punish- able under this act, shall be liable to be indicted and punished as a principal offender." In murder, 9 Geo. IV. c. 31. s. 3. "every accessary after the fact to murder, shall be liable at the discretion of the court, to be transported beyond the seas for life, or to be imprisoned, with or without hard labour, in the common gaol or house of correction, for any term not exceeding four }'ears." Accessaries after the fact to offences within the 7 «^ 8 Geo. IV. c. 29. c. 30; 11 Gio. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 66; 2 Will. IV. c. 34; 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 36; c. 85 ; c. 86; c. ,87 ; c. 88, and c. 89, respectively, may be imprisoned not exceeding two years, with or without liard labour, and with or without solitary confinemement, such confinement not exceeding one month at any one time, nor three months in any one year. Where accessaries after the fact are punishable as for a felony, but no specific punishment is provided by the particular stutute, they may be transported for seven years, or impri- soned, with or without hard labour, for the whole or any part of the imprisonment, and with or without solitary confinement; (7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 28. s. 9.) such confinement not exceeding one month at any one time, nor three months in any one year; (7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 90. s. 5,) and if a male, may be once, twice, or thrice publicly or privately whipped, in addition to the imprisonment, if the court shall think fit. 7 &, 8 Geo. IV. c. 28. s. 8. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 623 CHAPTER LVir. CONCERNING THE ORDER OF PROCEEDING AGAINST ACCESSARIES.[1] The accessary may be indicted in the same indictment with the principal, and that is the best and most usual way; but he may be indicted in another indictment, but then such indictment must con- tain the certainty and kind of the principal felony. If a man were accessary before or after in another county, than where the principal felony was committed, at common law it was dispunishable, but now by the statute of 2 (§• 3 E. 6, cap. 24. the accessary is indictable in that county, where he was accessary, and shall be tried there, as if the felony had been committed in the same county; and the justices, before whom the accessary is, shall write to the justices, <5'c. before whom the principal is attainted, for the record of the attainder. This writing is to be by writ in the king's name under the teste of the justice so sending it. Dy. 253. b. If the accessary be indicted either alone or together with the prin- cipal, process of outlawry shall not go against the accessary till the principal be attainted or outlawed, neither shall he be put to plead till the principal appear, but shall be bailed till the principal appear; vide Westm. 1. cup. 14.(«) [2] (a) 2 Co. Instit. 183. This is now alterd by 1 Ann. cap. 9. [1] See statutes 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 9. On the construction of this statute, see Rex V. Russell, Mood. C. C. 356; Recr. v. Leddington, 9 Car. 4- P. 79. This provi- sion in this statute with respect to attaiuder, is substituted lor that of 1 Ann. St. 2. c. 9, 8. 1, which is repealed. [2] Ry. V. Ashmell, 9 C. Sf P. 236; Whitehead v. The Stite, 4 Humphreys, 278. By the common law an accessary cannot be put upon trial against his consent until the principal is convicted. Hence if the principal be dead before conviction the accessary cannot be tried. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 16 Mass. 423. The guilt of the principal must be established before the accessary can be tried, 2 Burr''s Trial, 440. An acces- sary to a felony committed by several, may be tried as accessary to those who have been convicted ; but if tried as accessary to all, and some have not been proceeded against, it is error. Stoops v. Commonwealth, 7 &'. S; R. 491. After conviction of an accessary, it is not ground for arresting judgment that the indictment does not allege that the principal had been convicted. Harty v. The State, 3 Blackf. 386. By statute a receiver of stolen goods may be tried, though the principal is not con- victed. State v. & L. 2 Tyler, 249; Commomvealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 14; Common- wealth y. Frye, 1 Virg. Cases, 18; Butler v. State, 3 McCord, 384. But in North Carolina he cannot be tried before the principal, except " when the latter escapes and eludes the process of law." Slate v. Gross, 1 Murph. 270; State v. Goode, 1 Hawks, 463. But conviction of a principal without judgment warrants the trial of the accessary. Commonwealth v. Williamson, 2 Virg. Cases, 211. A verdict that the defendant indicted as accessary to a murder is guilty, without 623 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. The accessary shall not be constrained to answer to his indictment, till the principal be tried, 9 E. 4. 48. a. but if he will wave that benefit, and put himself upon his trial before *the principal be tried- he may, and his acquittal or conviction upon such trial is good. S/0771/. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 49. / 46. b. But it seems necessary in such case to respite judgment till the principal be convicted and attaint, for if the principal be after ac- quited, that conviction of the accessary is annulled, and no [624] judgment ought to be given against him; but if he be ac- quitted of the accessary, that acquittal is good, and he shall be discharged. 8 H. 5. 6. 6. Corow. 463. If ^. B. and C. be indicted as principals, and D. is indicted as ac- cessary to them all, D. shall not be arraigned till all the principals be attaint or outlawed, for if Jl. and B. be tried, and acquit or attaint, yet D. may be accessary to C and not to Jl. nor B. but if A. B. and C. be indicted as principals, and D. indicted as accessary to A. only, there if ./^. be attaint, tho B. and C. be not, yet D. shall be arraigned. AQAssiz.2b. Coron.2l6. 7 H.4.36.b. S t am f.ubi supra. stating whether accessary to the murder in the first or second degree, is erro- neous, lb. If A. is cliarged in tlie indictment as principal, and B, as accessary, and the jury find B. to he the principal and A, tlie accessary, tiie indictment is sustained. Slate v. Mairs, Coxe, 453. The court may, in its discretion, permit an accessary to be tried separately from the principal. State v. Yancey, 1 Const. Rep. 241. If the principal in murder has absconded, and process of outlawry is seasonably com- menced, but there is not time to finish it at the second term, the accessary, who lias refused to be tried without the principal, aithou2"ii he has been two terms under indict- ment, is not eutitled to be discharged on habeas corpus. Commonwealth v. Sheriffs \&S. cy R. 304. Whatever constitutes one as an accessary in a capital offence, makes him liable as principal in a misdemeanor. State v. Westjield, 1 Baily, 132. The record of the conviction of a slave as principal in a felony, is evidence against a ^ free man as accessary before tlie fact; so of the slave's confession of his own guilt as principal; State v. Sims, 2 Baily, 29 ; State v. Cranky ib. 66. The records of the principal's conviction must be produced on trial of tlie accessary, unless they are tried together, or the latter has consented to be tried before the former, or the former is dead or has been pardoned before trial. But if tiie indictment charge the accessary with being present, aiding and abetting, the principal's guilt may be proved by parol evidence, though the principal has been convicted. State v. Crank, 2 Baily, 66. VVhcrc the principal and accessary are joined in an indictment and tried separately,^ tlie records of the principal's conviction is prima facie evidence of his guilt upon the trial of the accessary, and as tlie burden of proof is on the accessary, he must show- clearly that the principal ought not to have been convicted. Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 481. But the accessary in such case is not restricted to proof of facts that were not shown on the former trial, and wliich arc incompatible with the guilt of the principal. lb. If an indictment allege a burglarious entry with intent to steal, and then and there stealing, it is only the oficuce of burglary, and a count charging one as accessary to " the offence aforesaid," is good. Sloops v. Coinmomoealth, 7 S. iSf R. 491. In an indictment against an accessary before the fact in felony, it is not necessary to set forth tiie conviction or execution of the principal. State v. Crank, 2 Baily, 6G ; State V. Sims, ib. 29. Where one was indicted as accessary to a murder committed by a slave, it was held enfficient to describe the slave by his own name, without setting out that of his master. State V. Crank, 2 Baily, C6. ■ j HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. - 624 Bat yet the court may if they please arraign the accessary in the first case, (6) for if he be found accessary he shall have judgment, but if acquitted of being accessary to A. yet that acquittal dischargcth him not of being accessary to B. or C. and therefore when they come in and plead and are attaint, D. may be arraigned de novo a.s acces- sary to B. and C. Plowd. Com. 9S. b. Gittin^s case. So that it is in the discretion of the court to arraign him or not before B. and C. be attaint, tho it be the safer course to respite the arraignment of the ac- cessary till B. and C. appear or are outlawed. If is. be indicted or appealed as principal, and B. as accessary before or after by the same indictment, and the principal plead in bar or abatement, or autrefoits acquit, the accessary shall not be forced to answer, till that plea be determined, for if it be found for A. the accessary is discharged, if against ./?, yet he shall after plead over to the felony, and may be acquitted. 9 H. 7. 19. b. \i Jl. be indicted as principal, and B. as accessary, they may be both arraigned together, and plead together, and put upon their trial by the same jury, and the jury shall be charged to inquire first of the principal, and if they find him not guilty, then to acquit the accessary; but if they find him guilty, then to inquire of the accessary. Seig- neur Sanchar's case,(c) 40 Assiz. 8. 7 H. 4. 36. ^.[3] Coke super statute Westm. 1. cap. \A.{d) but in that case judg- [625 ] ment must be first given of the principal, for if any thing obstruct judgment, as clergy, a pardon, i^'C. the accessary is to be discharged. If./?, be attaint of murder upon an appeal, and then Jl. is indicted of murder as principal, and B. as accessary, the principal pleads the former attainder,^, shall not be put to answer as accessary, because he is not attaint upon the same suit, and so it is if the attainder of t/^. were first upon the appeal. 7 H. 4. 36. a. Stamf. P. C. 47. a. Coke uhi supra. If the principal be attainted and hath his clergy, or be pardoned after attainder, the accessary shall be put to answer; but if the prin- cipal be only convict and hath his clergy, or be pardoned, or stand mute, or die in prison before judgment, or challenge above thirty- six peremptorily, the accessary shall not be put to answer, for the principal was never attainted, (e) and altho formerly there were diver- sity of opinions in the books in these cases,(/) yet the law is now {b) To make this consistent with what goes before, we must understand the former passage to mean, that where he is indicted as accessary to all, he shall not be nrraigned as accessary to them all till all be attaint or outlawed, and this, that the court may in such case, if they please, arraign him only as accessary to him who is attaint, tho the others do not appear. (c) 9 Co. Rep. 119. a. (d) 2 Co. Inst. 184. (e) It was for this reason, that Weston the principal actor in the murder of Sir Thomas Overbury could not for a long while be prevailed with to plead, that so the earl and coun- tess of Somerset, who were the movers and procurers mio'lit escape. See State Tr. Vol. I, p. 314. (/) See Coron. 51, 58. [3] 9 Rep. 119. Foster's Rep. 361. S. C 625 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. settled as. above, (§•) 4 Co. Hep. 43, 44. Bihith's case and Syer^s case, Coke super PVestm. 1. cap. 14. If the principal be erroneously attaint, the accessary shall be put to answer, and shall not take advantage of the error in that attainder, 2 R. 3. 21, 22. but the principal reversing the attainder, reverseth the attainder of the accessary. IS E. 4. 9. b. li Ji. be indicted as principal, and B. as accessary before or after, and both be acquit, yet B. may be indicted as principal, and the for- mer acquittal as accessary is no bar.[4] 4 E. 6. B. Coron. 186. ■ Knighl ley's case, CrompLf. 43. a. But if ^^. be indicted as principal and acquitted, he shall r 626 3 iio'^ be indicted as accessary before, and if he be, he may plead his former acquittal in bar, for it is in substance the same oflense, Stamf P. C. Lib. II. cap. 36.fol. 105. a. 2 E. 3. Co- ron. 150 Si" 282. but the antient law was otherwise. 8 E. 2. Coron. 424. But if he be indicted as principal and acquitted, he may yet be in- dicted as accessary after, for they are oftenses of several natures. 27 ^ssiz. 10. S H. 5. Coron. 463. Stamf P. C. ubi supra. And so it is if he be indicted as accessary before diU^ acquitted, yet for the same reason he may be indicted as accessary after.\_5^ (g) But since our author wrote, it is settled quite otherwise by 1 Ann. cap. 9. for by that statute, " If any principal offender shall be convicted of felony, stand mute, or chaK lenge above twenty, it shall be lawful to proceed against the accessary, either before or after the fact, in the same manner as if such principal felon had been attainted thereof, notwithstanding such principal felon be admitted to his clergy, or otherwise delivered before attainder; and every such accessary, if convicted, stand mute, SfC, shall suffer the same punishment, as if such principal had been attainted. [4] But Mr. Justice Foster observes upon this, that in the eye of the law the offences of principal and accessary do specially differ; and if a person indicted as principal can- not be convicted upon evidence tending barely to prove him to have been accessary before the fact, which must needs be admitted, it doth not appear how an acquittal upon one indictment can be a bar to a second, for an oftence specially different from it. Fast. 362. And the distinction is also taken in Rex v. Wijifre'd Gordon, 1 EasVs P. C. 352. and there it was held, by all the judges, that W. G. having been indicted as accessary before the fact, and acquitted upon that indictment, might be indicted again as principal. [5] Indictment of Accessary together with his Principal. — Where the parties are thus joined in the same proceeding, the proper course is first to state the guilt of the principal according to the facts, as if he alone had been concerned; and then in case of accessaries before the fact, to aver " that C. D., lute of, &.c. {the procurer) before the committing of the said felony and murder, {or burglary, as the case is,) in form aforesaid, to wit, on, &c., with force and arms, &c., did maliciously and feloniously incite, move, procure, aid and abet," (or counsel, hire, and command,) following the words of the statute, if the de- fendant he made an accessary thereby, or else the efiect of such words, see Rex v. Gre. vil, 1 And. VJ5; "the said A. B., {the principal felon) to do and commit the said felony and murder, and in manner aforesaid, against the peace," &c. And where a man is indicted as accessary after the fiict, together with his principal, the original lelony is to be stated in the same way, and the conclusion must aver that the accessary did receive, harbour, and maintain, &c., the principal felon, well knowing that he had committed the felony. The averment of knowledge is indispensably requisite, because without it the guilt does not manifestly appear. Com. Dig. Justices, t.; 2 Hawk. c. 29. s. 33; c. 25. s. 67 ; R. v. Thompson, 2 Lt any longer, or that from the number of per- sons attacking her, she considered resistance dangerous and absolutely useless, the jury ought to convict the prisoners of the capital charge; but if they think from the whole of the circumstances that although when the prosecutrix was first laid hold of, it was against her will, yet she did not resist afterwards, because she in some degree consented VOL. I.-;— 54 628 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. The essential words in an indictment of rape are rapuU ($• carna- liter cognovit, bi.it carnuUter cognovit, nor any other circimiloculion to what was afterwards done to her, they ought to acquit the prisoners of the capital charge, and convict tliem of an assault only. Ri^g. v. Hallet, 9 Car. iSf P. 748. At the time when the 9 Geo. IV. c. 31. passed, it is perfectly clear that in order to constitute the crime of rape, tliere must have been both penetration and emission, conse- quently it lay upon the prosecutor either to give express evidence of actual emis.sion, or to prove sucli facts as were sufficient to induce the jury to infer that emission had actu- ally taken place. In some cases the woman was unable to prove emission, either be- cause she did not perceive it, or (as was the case in Rex v. Frcston, Stafford Spr. Ass, 1828, where a father was convicted of ravishing two of his daughters) because alter penetration she fainted away. In such cases it was tlie course to leave it to the jury to infer tiiat emission had taken place, as there was nothing to show that the prisoner had not fully completed his purpose, and acquittals sometimes took place because juries were unwilling to infer a fact which had not been clearly proved, especially when such an in- ference subjected the prisoner to capital punishment. Such being the state of things, the 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, was passed; and the question is whether that act has altered the crime of rape so that instead of consisting of both penetratiorl and emission, it now consists of penetration. According to all tlie recent decisions (see Rex v. Great Bently, 10 6. iSf C. 520; Wiiliams v. Roberts, 5 Ttjrw. 421; Flight v. Thomas, 11 Ad. &; E. 688.) this oufht to be determined upon the grammatical construction of the words of the statute alone. In sect. 16 there is a separate substantive clause providing that "every person convicted of tlie crime of rape shall suffer death as a felon." Now here the crime is treated as one as clearly settled and defined as the crime of murder, i. e. as consisting of both penetration and emission. It is, however, upon sect. 18 that the question mainly turns. That section recites that " upon trials" for the crimes {inter alia) of rape, offenders, (that is persons guilty of these crimes) "frequently escape by reason of the difficulty of the proof which has been required of the completion of those several crimes," (the mis- chief therefore was tiiat persons who had committed rapes consisting both of penetration and emission, liad escaped by reason of the difficulty of proving both penetration ^and emission) "for remedy thereof, (that is to remedy the escape of persons who had com- mitted such rapes consisting oi^ both penetration and emission,) be it eiiacted thai it shall not be necessary in any of these cases to prove the actual emission of seed," (not that emission shall be no part of the crime) "but that tlie carnal knowledge" (i. e. both pene- tration and emission) "shall be deemed" (presumed) "complete upon proof of penetration only." Now, it is to be observed that there is no intimation whatever of any intention to alter the crime : on the contrary, the clause evidently treats the crime as continuing the same, but is I'ramed to render the means of proving it more easy. It is submitted that upon the true construction of this clause, its effect is, that whereas before the passing of the statute the prosecutor was bound not only to prove penetration, but to go further and give such evidence as satisfied the jury that emission had actually taken place, he is now only bound to prove penetration : on proof of which a presumption arises by virtue of the clause that emission has also taken place, but that this presumption is liable to be rebutted, by showing that in fact emission did not take place. In other words, all the prosecutor has now to prove is penetration, and upon that the jury ought to convict, unless it be proved by the prisoner that he did not in fact complete his purpose. This is the view which seems to have been taken by Alderson, B. in Coultharfs case, (1 Russ. G, 4" M. note, p. 683, 3(/. ed.) and it is ■submitted is the correct construction of the clause. There are several statutory provisions of a similar character, as the 23 Geo. II. c. 11. s. 3. for remedying the difficulties attending prosecutions for perjury, and the statutes which make a certificate of the clerk of assize evidence of a previous conviction, &c. and it is evident that none of these alter the offence, but only facilitate the proof of it. At all events, the clause does not alter the crime, and it is against all the authorities to hold that felony can be created by an}' but express and clear words. In Searle v. miliams, Hob. 2Lt3, it is laid down that " felonies and capital crimes shall never be made by doubtful and ambiguous words." And in Coinlein''s case, Hob. 210, it was "resolved clearly that no statute could be extended to life by doubtful and ambiguous words;" and see Hawk. F. C. c. 41. s. 3. In Rex v. Cale, R. 4- M. C. C. R. 11, it was held by a majority of the judges that the 3 Geo. IV. c. 24. s. 3. which provided that the receiving stolen goods should be '•'■ deemed and construed to be felony," did not create a felony'; and although that case be overruled by Rex v. Solomons, R. iV ^t- ^- ^' ^- 292, still it is a strong authority to show how clear and distinct the words which create a HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 628 without the word rnpiiit are not sufficient in a legal sense to express rape. 1 H. 6. 1. a. 9 E. 4. 26. a.[2] new felony, are required to be even where the words be such as to leave no doubt that it was inlendcd to create such felony. It may be added that the decision in Rex v. Cox gives a great facility to convict the innocent in those cases which not uiifrequently occur, where the parties being accidentally discovered in coitu, the woman makes a false charge in order to save her character. Greave^s note, 1 Russ. on Vr, & M. 685 3d Land. ed. ^ blh Am. ed. 1845. In this country proof of emission seems never to have been required. The State v. Le Blanc, 3 Brev. Rep. 339. In several instances it has been held that as the essence of the crime is the violence done to the person and feelings of the woman, which is completed by penetration without emission, it is sufficient to prove penetration only. Pennsylvania v. Sullivan, Add. R. 143. Stroud v. Com. \l S. Sf R. 177. Com. v. Thomas 1 Virginia Cas. 307. The slightest penetration is sufficient. Rex v Russen, cited supra. In JSew York, penetration alone without emission will support a conviction under the Rev. Stat. 2 Rev. Slat. 663. For the statutes of the U. S. see the Crimes Act, 3d March, 1825, sect, 4 and sect 7. For the Massachusetts statutes, see Rev. Stat, c. 125, s. 18, ch. 137. s. 11. As to the construction of this stat. see Com. \. Cooper, 15 Mass. R. 197; and see Com. v. Robu 12 Pick. R. 496, 507, though this is upon an earlier statute, still as thev are in pari materia, the authority is valuable. Com. v. Goodhue, 2 Mete. Rep. 193. Com. v. Bruce 6 Penn. L. J. 236. S. P. on a like act. For the New York statutes, see 2 Rev. Stat. 603. sects. 22 &, 23. For the New Jersey statutes, see Statutes of N. J. 1847. tit. " Crimes and Punishments " p. 259. §10. For the Pennsylvania statutes, see Stroud's Purd. Dig. 904. § 4. Gth ed.; Id. 943. Ith ed. § 36; Act of April 23d, 1829; Stroud's Purd. Dig. 992. 1th ed. For statutes of Virginia, see Rev. Code, c. 158, pect, 1 ; Id. c. 258, sect. 3; Act of 1837, c. 71. •' [^] It must be alleged that the rape was committed with violence and against the will of the woman. 3 Chit. C. L. 815. Also, that she was ravished, alleging merely that the defendant carnally knew her is not sufficient. 1 Russ. C. ^ M. 6«6. It is proper to allege that the defendant carnally knew her, but the omission would, it seems, be cured by verdict. Rex y. Warren, 1 Russ. C. ^ M.3d ed. 686; and see 2 Inst. 180; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 25. s. 56. An indictment charging that the defendant in and upon A. B. " feloni- ously and Wolently did make [omitting the words "an assault,"] and her, the said A, B. then and there against her will, violently and feloniously did ravish and carnally know," &.C. was held sufficient in arrest of judgment. Reg, v. Allen, 9 C Sf P. 521. It seems necessary to conclude that the offence was against the form of the statute. 1 Russ C Se M. 687. 3d ed; see Rex v. Scott, R. <^ R. 415. In Rex V. Burgess and others, Chester Spr. Ass. 1813, upon an indictment charging three persons jointly with the commission of a rape, an objection was taken that three persons could not be guilty of the same joint act, but it was overruled upon the ground thai the legal construction of the averment was only' that they had done such acts as subjected them to be punished as principals in the oiTence. The execution was, how- ever, respited, probably with a view to enable the learned judges to consult other autho- rities on the accuracy of their opinion; but the prisoners were afterwards executed. 5 Ev. Col. Stat. CI. 6. p. 244. note (17). 2d ed. and see 1 Russ. C. S( M. 801. A general conviction of a prisoner, charged both as pri-ncipal in the first degree, and as aider and abetter of other men in rape, is valid, on the count charging him as prin- cipal. And on such an indictment evidence may be given of several rapes on the same woman, at the same time by the prisoner and other men, each assisting the other in turn, without putting the prosecutor to elect on which count to proceed. Rex v. Folkes, R. & M. C. C. 354; and see Reg. v. Gray, 7 C. Sf P. 164. An indictment is good which charges that A. committed a rape, and that R. was pre- sent aiding and assisting hirn in his commission of the felony. Reg. v. Crisham, 1 Car. 4" M. 187. In such case the party aiding may be charged either as he was in law, a principal in the first degree, or as he was in fact, a principal in the second degree. lb. See Arch. Crim. P. C. 481. 10(A Lond. Ed. 628 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. To make a rape there must be an actual penetration or res in re, (as also in bnggery) and therefore eiiiissio seniinis is indeed an evi- dence of penetration, but. singly of itself it makes neither rape nor bnggery, but it is only an attempt of rape or bnggery, and is Sjcverely punished by fine and imprisonment. Co. P. C. cap. 10. p. 59. But the least penetration maketh it rape or buggery, yea altho there be not emissio seminis. Co. P. C. uhi.supru; the old expres- sio!i was abstiilit ei virginiiatem, and so\nQ{\n\es pucellagium 8uurn. Bract. Lib. Ill.(e) And therefore I suppose the case in my lord Coke's 12 Pep. 36. 5 Jac. that saith, there must be both, inz. penetratio <§' emissio semi- nis to make a rape or buggery, is mistaken, and contradicts what he saith in his pleas of the crown; and besides, it is possible a rape may be commilteii by some, quihns virgse erectio adsit, <§' emissio seini- nis ex quodam, defectu desi/, as physicians tell us. If t/^. actually ravish a woman, and B. and C. were present, aid- ing, and abetting, they are all equally principal, and all subject to the same punishment both at common law and since the statute of ("Feslm. 2. de quo infra. it appears by Bracton uhi svpra, that in an appeal of rape it was a good exception, quod ante diem S,' annum contentas in appello kabuit earn ul concubinam S,- amicum. t^' inde ponil se super pa- triam, and the reason was, because that unlawful cohabitation car- ried a presumption in law, that it was not against her will. But this is no exception at this day, it may be an evidence of an assent, but it is not necessary that it should be so, for the r 629 "I woman may forsake that unlawful course of life. But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their nuitual matrmionial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her hus- band, which she cannot retract. [3] t^. the husband of B. intends to prostitute her to a rape by C. against her will, and C. accordingly doth ravish her, ./^. being present, and assisting to this rape: in tliis case these points were resolved, 1. That this was a rape in C. notwithstanding the husband assisted in it, for tho in marriage she hath given up her body to her husband, she is not to be by him prostituted to another. 2. That the husband being present, aiding and assisting, is also guiliy as a principal in rape, and therefore, altho the wife cannot have an appeal of rape against her husband, yet he is indictable for it at the king's suit as a principal. 3. That in tins case tlie wife may be a witness against her (e) De corona, cap. 28./. 147 6. [3] A man having^ connexion will) a woman under a deceit practi.«cd on -her, she sup- posinsf him to be her iiusband, i.s not ffuilty of the offence of rape. Rfix v. Jackiion, R. Sf Ry. 487; Rex V. Saunders, 8 Car. Sf /^ 265; Rrx.v. Williams, Id. 286. He might, however, be convicted of an assault under 7 U m. IV. Sf 1 Vict, c, 85. p. 1 1 ; Reg. v. Stanton, 1 Car. Sf Kir. Rep. 415; Hays v. The I'eople, 1 HilVs N. Y.i2e/>. 351; Tlie People V. Metcalf, 1 Wheeler's Cr. Cas. 378. 381. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 629 husband, and accordingly she was admitted, and A. and C. were both executed. 8 Car. 1. Casus comifis Cas//e/iaven.{f)[4'\ If ./^. by force take B. and by force and menace compel ber to marry him, and then with force J?, hath the carnal knowledge of ^. against her will,tho this marriage he voidable, yet it is not so simply void as to enable fier to maintain an appeal of rape against A. for she may by her consent affirm this voidable marriage, and therefore in the like Case, Not. Pari. 15 H. 6. n. 15. there was a special act of parliament to enable the lady Isabel Buffer to bring an appeal of rape against IVilliam Pull in that case notwithstanding that mar- riage ; but that marriage had been dissolvable by a declaratory sen- tence in conrt christian, becanse obtained by a plain force; and if such a dissolution of the marriage had been obtained, then it seems to me, that, if the carnal knowledge of her were forcible and against her will as well as the marriage, that rape was punishable as well by appeal at the suit of the lady, as by indictment at the suit of the king, without the aid of an act of parlian)ent, for it was really a rape, only the marriage de facto was an impediment of its punishment so long as de facto the marriage continued, but now that [ 630] impediment being removed by the declaratory sentence, and the marriage made void ah initio, it is all one as if it had never been, and tho relation be a legal fiction and intenfa ad umtm, yet in this case the marriage and carnal knowledge being one intire act of force, and consecutive one upon another, in the real effect of that first force, it shall remain punishable as if there had been no marriage at all; but the statute of 3 H. 7. cap. 2.{q) hatii provided a remedy in this case, so that this difficulty, need not come in question. An infant under the age of fourteen years is presumed by law un- able to commit a rape, and therefore it seems cannot be guilty of it, and tho in other felonies malitia supplet setatem in some cases as ha^ been shewn, yet it seems as to this fact the law presumes him impotent, as well as wanting discretion. [5] But he may be a principal in the second degree, as aiding and assisting, tho under fourteen years, if it appear by sufficient circum- stances, that he had a mischievous discretion, as well as in other felonies.[6] Thus far of the nature of rape, and who may be culpable of it. Now we will consider upon whom it may be committed, and some other considerations touching this fact. (/) See Hat. 115, Rush. Coll. Vol. II. p. 93.— 101. State Tr. Vol. I. p. 366. 12 Mod. 340. {g) By lliis statute a forcible taking away and marrying a woman against her will is made felony. [4] 1 Russ. on C. ^ M. 676. 3d Ed. [5] See Com. v. Lniigan, 2 Bost. Law Reporter, 49. Per Thatcher, J.; Rex v. Brom. low, 2 Mood. C. C. 12^ ; Rex v. Groomridge, 7 Car. S^ Pay. R. 562; Best on Presump. 22; Reg.x. I'hi'lips, 8 Car. S^ Pay. Ti^;Rex v. Jordan, 9 Id. 118; sed vide Com, v. Green, 2 Pick. R. 380; ante p. 26. note. [6] Lord Audley's case, 3 how. St. Tr. 419; Rex v. Elders^aw, 3 Car. Sf P. 391. 630 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. It was doubted, whether a rape conld be committed upon a female child under ten years old, Mich. 13 r Braclon [Lib. III. de corona cap. 9] Briiton [cap. 9.] Fleta [Lib. I. cap. 29 t^- 37.] speak .n(^ of heretics, but of apostates and infidels: And tho by the imperial law some particular heresies were punishable with ^eath : see Cod. Lib. I. tit. 5.1. 11, 12, ^c. yet it does not appear, that even in the empire he- resy in general was punished capitally, till tiie constitution of Frederic II. about the year 1234, which indistinctly adjudges all heretics to tiie flames: but in England the usual punishment seems to have been imprisonment, and even this was not allowable, tho he were hareticus contumax, before the pretended statute of 5 R. 2. without the king's spe- • cial license, an instance whereof is in Rymer''s Fmdera, Tom. VI. p. 651. Rex venerabili episcopo Londonim salutem. Quia accepimus per inqnisitionem vcstram, quod Nichohius de Drayton coram vobis congrue convictus' &- pro h^retico adjudicatus existit, quodque in suo errore nephando animo induralo nequiter perseverans, ad fidei catholicce unitatem redire non curavit nee curat in prajsenti, licet scepids ad hoc excitatus «& in- ductus, sententiam majoris excommunicationis in hac parte incurrendo. Cum igitur sancta mater ecclesia ita tales hcereticos perseqnitiir, ne suo veneno alios inficiant, ut in carceribus custodiri praecipiat. Super quo nobis f^npplicaslis, Slc. Nos supplicationi vestrae prsedictae gratanl6r concedentes, ad ipsura Nicholaum hsereticum carcerali custo- HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 709 diae ve?trrE mancipare, & ipsum in carcere vestro custodire faciendum, quousque dictum errore(n suuin revocaverit, it ad fidei catholics unitatcni redire voluerit, quan- tum in nobis est, licentiam concedimus specialem. Rot. l^at. 44. E. 3. p. 1. tn. f 710 1 23. doiso. . L J Ad. p. 490. in fine. Placita coram jusliciariis ifinerantibus apiid crucem lapideam in com. Midd. anno 2 E 1. incij.ierde 3. Rot. 13. in dorso. Seyton' Alice de Covale was arraigned /no morte Johannes Lipertung, and pleaded, that she killed him se defendendo, "eoquod burgavit domum suam; & de bono & male ponit se stiper patriam; &, xii jura- tores dicunt, quod prsedicta Alicia occidit pripdictuni Johannem se defendendo, eo quod voluit domum suam burgasse, &, ipsam occidisse, si posset. Ideo inde quieta. Et ca- talla praedicti Johannis confiscantur." Placita coram eisdem jtislic'' ibidem. Rot. 12. in dorso. Thomas le Chapeleyn nequiter ^' in felonid, f regit ostium domus Isabellce Lucas de Bottewell. Hue and cry was raised, and he was pursued, and killed in fugiendo by one William Javene. Javene broujrht the king's pardon pro morte ilia, " Ideo conceditur ei firma pax, & quia praedictus Thomas le Chaieleyn occisus fuit in fugiendo, catalla ejus confiscantur." Ad. p. 508. /. 15. comes into the dwellin. 51. hath continuance to Sept.'^, 1778, &.C. If any persons armed, to the number of three or more, shall be assembled to assist in tlic illegal exportation of wool, or other goods prohibited to be exported, or ia carrying of wool, or other such goods, in order to exportation ; or in rescuing the sanie after seizure; or in rescuing an offender- herein, or preventing his being apprehended; or shall be aiding in any of the premises; or if any person shall have his face disguised when passing with such goods; or shall forcibly hinder or assault any officer in seizing the same, or dangerously wound any such, in attempting to go on board any vessel; or shoot at, or wound him when on board in execution of his office, he shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. — There are several other felonies in this act agaii^t smugglers, too long to be inserted here; so see the act, which is very long. XXIII. To prevent the return of such rebels concerned in rebellion in 1745, as were or should be pardoned on condition of transpor- tation; and to hinder their going into the enemy's country. By 20 Geo. 2. cap. 46. Rebels returning from transportation without licence, or volun- tarily going into France or Spain to suffi;r death without benefit of clerjory ; and aiders of such persons returning, to sutfer death without benefit of clergy. — And subjects hold- ing correspondence with rebels going into France or Spain, or persons employed by thein, to suffijr death without benefit of clergy. XXIV. Quakers oaths. By 27 Geo. 2. cap. 46. sect. 36. In all cases wherein by any act of parliament an oath shall be allowed or required, the solemn affirmation of Quakers shall be allowed instead of such oath, and that altho no express provision be made for that purpose in such act; and if any person shall be lawfully convicted of wilful, false, and corrupt affirming, or declaring any matter or thing, which, if sworn in the usual form, would have amounted to wilful and.corrupt perjury, he shall suffer as in cases of perjury. XXV. For preventing robberies and thefts upon any navigable rivers, ports of entry or discharge, wharfs and keys adjacent. By the 24 Geo. 2. cap. 45. All persons \vho shall feloniously steal any goods of the value of forty shillings in any ship, boat, or vessel, on any navigable r 718 1 river, or in any port of entry or discharge, or from any wharf or key, or shall be present and aiding therein, sliall be excluded from the benefit of clergy. XXVI. For securing mines of black lead from theft and robbery. By 25 Geo. 2. cap. 10, Every person who shall unlawfully break, or by force enter into, any mine or wad-hole of wad, or black cawke, commonly called black lead ; or into any pit, shalt, or vein thereof; or shall unlawfully take and carry away from thence any wad, black cawke, or black lead; or shall aid, hire or command any person to commit any the said offences, shall be guilty of felony, and the court or judge may order him to be committed to prison, or the house of correction not exceeding one year, to be kept to hard labour, and to be publicly whipt by the common hangman, or by the master of such liouse of correction, at the times and places, and in such manner as the court shall think proper; or he may be transported for a term not exceeding seven years; and if he shall voluntiirily escape, or break prison, or return from transportation before the time, he shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy: and if any person shall buy or receive any such wad, knowing the same to be unlawfully taken and carried away as aforesaid, he shall be guilty of felony, and be liable to all the penalties inflicted by the laws on persons knowingly buying or receiving stolen goods. XXVII. For better preventing the horrid crime of murder. By 25 Geo. 2. cap. 37. sect. 9. If any person, shall, by force, set at libarty or rescue HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 718 or attempt to set at liberty or rescue any person out of prison, committed for, or found guilty of murder: or rescue, or attempt to rescue any such person goinfj to, or during execution; he shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. — And by sec. 10. If, after execution, any person shall by lorce rescue, or attempt to rescue the body, he shall be guilty of felony, and transported for seven years. XXVIII. For enforcing the laws against persons who shall steal, or detain ship-wrecked goods, S,'c. By 26 Geo. 2. cop. 19. Persons convicted of plundering, stealing, taking away or destroying any goods or merchandizes, Sfc. ship-wrecked, or of obstructing tlie escape of any person from a wreck, or of putting out false lights, shall be deemed guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. — sec. 2. Provided, where goods of small value shall be stolen without any circumstances of cruelty, the offender may be indicted for petit lar- ceny, and shall suffer such punishment as the laws, in cases of petit larceny, do enjoia or require. XXIX. For the better preventing clandestine marriages. By 26 Geo. 2. cap. 3.3. sect. 8 Sf 9. If any person shall solemnize matrimony in any other place than a church, or public chapel, (unless by special licence from the Arch- bishop of Canlerhiiry) or without publication of bans, or licence in a church or chapel; he shall (on prosecution in three years) be adjudged guilty of felony, and transported for fourteen years; and the marriage shall be void. — But by sec. I" 719 1 18. not to extend to Scotland, nor to the marriages of Quakers, or Jews. By Sec. 16. If any person shall knowingly and wilfully insert, or cause to be inserted in the register book, any false entry, or any matter or thing relating to any marriage, or falsely make, alter, forge, or counterfeit any such entry in the register or any marriage licence, or cause the same to be done, or assent thereunto, or ufter as true any such falsified register, or copy thereof, or any such forged licence, he shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. XXX. Threatening letters. By 27 Geo. 2. cap. 15. If any person shall knowingly send any letter, without any name subscribed thereto, or signed with a fictitious naiue, demanding money or other valuable thing; or threatening to kill or murder any of his Majesty's subjects, or to burn their out-houses, barns, stacks of corn or grain, hay or straw; though no money, or venison, or other valuable thing be demanded by such letter; ox shall rescue any person in custody for such offence, he shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. XXXIi For preventing the stealing, buying and receiving stolen lead, iron, copper, brass, bell-metal and solder. By 29 Geo. 2. cap. .30. Every person who shall buy or receive any of the said mate- rials, knowing the same to be unlawfully come by, or shall privately buy or receive any of tiie said materials (stolen) by suffering any door, window, or shutter, to be lefl opened and unfastened, between sun-setting and .'rocurc any other to personate or falsely assume, the name or r 720 "1 character of any officer, seaman, or other person intitled, or sup|>osed to be intitled to any wages, pay, or other allowances of money, or prize- money, for the service done on board of any of his Majesty's ships or vessels; or wil- lingly or knowingly shall personate or falsely assume the name or character of the executor or administrator, wife, relation, or creditor of any such officer, or seaman, or other person, in order to receive any wages, pay, or other allowances of money, or prize- money as aforesaid, or shall forge or counterfeit, or procure to be forged, or counter- feited (or utter or publish as true, knowing the same to be false, forged or counterfeited, 9 Geo. 3. cap. 30. see. 6.) any letter of attorney, bill, ticket, certificate, assignment, last will, or any other power of authority, in order to receive any such wages, pay, or other allowances of money, or prize-money as aforesaid; or shall willingly and knowingly take a false oath, or procure any other person to take a false oath to obtain the probate of any will, or letter of administration, in order to receive the payment of any vvuges, pay, or other allowances of money, or prize-money due, or that were supposed to be due to any Buch officer, seaman, or other persons as aforesaid, who has really served, or was sup- posed to have served on board of any of his Majesty's-sliips or vessels; every such per- son so offending shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. XXXIV. For preventing frauds and abuses in marking or stamping gold or silver plate. By 31 Geo. 2. cap. 32. sect. 15. If any person shall cast, forge or counterfeit, or cause or procure to be cast, forged or counterfeited, the mark or stamp used for making plate in pursuance of the act of 12 Geo. 2. cap. 26 fcc. lie shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall be transported in manner as by law directed, for a term not exceeding seven jears. LIV. For repeahng the several duties of customs and excise, and granting other duties in lieu thereof, and for applying the said duties, with others, composing the revenue, &;c. and for applying certain unclaimed monies, remaining in tlie Exchequer for the pavment of annuities on lives, to the reduction of the national debt. By 27 Geo. 3. ch. 13. § 46. If any person shall counterfeit, &c. any seal, stamp, or mark, directed by this, or any former act or acts, relating to the duties under the man- agement of the commissioners, &c. or shall counterfeit or resemble the im- pression of the same; or shall utter^ or use, &-c. knowing, &c. he shall be f 735 J adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy.* LV. For making allowances to the dealers in foreign ivlnes, for the stock of certain foreign wines in their possession, at a certain time, upon which the duties on importation have been paid ; and for amending several laws relative to the revenue of excise. By 27 Geo. 3. ch. 31. § 13. If any person shall counterfeit or forge any stamp or seal to resemble any stamp or seal which shall be provided or made in pursuance of this act, or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of the same, upon any printed, stained, painted, or dyed calico, muslin, linen, stuff, fustian, velvet, velveret, dimity, or other figured stuff, with intent, ^c. he shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy. LVI. For making further provisions in regard to such vessels as are particularly described in an act made in the twenty-fourth year of the reign of his present Majesty, for the more effectual prevention of smuggling in this kingdom,{i) and for extending, 4*c. Sf-c. By 27 Geo. 3. ch. 32. § 14. If any person shall forge, Sfc. any stamp or seal, or the impression, <^-c. to resemble, S^c. those provided by this act, hp shall be adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy. LVI I. For taking and swearing affidavits to be made use of in the court of session of the county palatine of Chester, and for taking of special bail in actions and suits depending in the same court. By 27 Geo.S.ch. 43. § 4. Any person who shall before any person or persons em- powered by this act to take special bail, represent or personate any other person or * Repealed as to duties on goat and sheep skins, by 31 Geo. 3. ch. 27. Vide ^o, XCVIII. po8t. CO Vide No. XXXVIII. ante; No. LXVII. and L^Xl. post. 735 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. persons, whereby the person or persons so represented or personated may be liable to the payinent of any sum or sums of money for debt or danjages, to be recovered in tlie same suit or action wlierein such person or persons is or are represented or personated, as if lie, she, or tliey, liati really acknowledged and entered into the same, he shall be adjudged a felon, and sliall sutler and incur the same pains, penalties, and tbrfeitures, as persons convicted of the like offences are liable to by virtue of an act past in the fourth year of the reign of king Willium and queen Mary, intituled An act for takinfr special hails in the country, upon actions and suits depending in the courts of King''8 Bench, Common I'leas, and Exchequer at \V€Stininster.{k) Vide Stat. 34 Geo. 3. ch. 46. § 5, as to personating bail, SfC. in the county palatine of Lancaster, LVIII. For the better and more effectual protection of stockins^ fraiyies. and the machines or engines annexed thereto, or used therewith; and for the punishment of persons destroying or in- juring of such stocking frames, machines, or engines, and the frame-work knitted pieces, «§'C. Vide No. XXXI. ante, and No. LX. post. By 28 Geo. 3, ch. .55. § 4. If any person shall by day or by night, enter by force into any house, shop, or place, with an intent to cut or destroy any frame-work knitted pieces, stoekitigs, or other articles, S>;c. or shall wiitully and maliciously cut or destroy any frame-work kntited pieces, i^c. or shall wilfully and maliciously break, destroy, or dam- age any frame, machine, engine, tool, instrument, or utensil, used in and tor the work- ing and making of any such fran>e-work knitted pieces, «.^-c. not having the consent of the owner so to do, i^c. he shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall be transported to some of his Majesty's dominions beyond the seas, for any space or term of years not ex- ceeding fourteen years nor less than seven years, LIX, For raising a certain sum of money, by way of an- \_ 736 ] mtities, to be attended with the benefit of survivorship, in c/asses. By 29 Geo. 3. ch. 41. § 36. Persons forging, <^c. or altering registers, «^c. or perso- nating lite proprietor of any order, ^c. or nominee, ^c. sliall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer death, as in cases of felony, without benetit of clergy. LX. For preventing the wilfully burning or destroying ships, and and the wilfully and maliciously destroying any ivoollen, silky linen, or cotton goods, ov any implements prepared lor or used in the manufacture thereof, in that part of Great Britain called Scotland. ,• -^ By 20 Geo. 3. ch. 46. Any owner, Sfc. destroying any vessel with intent to defraud underwriters, SfC. shall, upon conviction in Scotland, sutTer death, as in other cases of capital crimes: so as to persons entering forcibly into any house, 6fC. with intent to destroy any goods in the loom, ^-c. or tools, Sfc, upon conviction in Scotland. LXI. For granting to his Majestt/ several additional stamp duties on. newspapers, advertisements, and on cards and dice. By 29 Geo. 3. ch. 50. § 13. If any person shall counterfeit, ^c. any seal, stamp, or mark, directed b}' this or any former act of parliament, or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of the same, or shall utter, or use, ^-c. with intent to defraud his Majesty, S(C. he shall be adjudged a felon, and shall sutfer death as in cases of felony, vrithout benetit of clergy. (A-) See an indictment for personating bail on this statute, viz. 4 W. «^- M. ch. 4. Cr. Cir. Com. 7lh Edit. 185. It does not take away the benefit of clergy, but that of 21 Jac. 1. ch. 26, in certain cases, does. Vide observations on both these statutes same book, p. 186. Vide also ante, 696. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 736 LXII, For granting to his Majesty several additional stamp duties on probates of wills, letters of administration, and on receipts for legacies, or for any share of a personal estate divided by force of the statute of distributions,* By 29 Geo. 3. ch. 51. ^ 8. If any person shall counterfeit, ^c. any seal, stamp, or mark, directed or allowed to be used by this or any former act of parliament, or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of the same, or shall utter, or use, ^c. with intent, Sfc. he shall be adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy. LXIII. For giving relief to such persons as have suffered in their rights and properties, during the late unhappy dissentions in Jlme- ^ rica, 4'C. and also for making compensation to such persons as have suffered in their properties in consequence of the cession of the province of East Florida to the King of Spain. By 30 Geo. 3. ch. 34. § 11. If any person shall forge or counterfeit any- order, which phill have been made forth, or renewed, by virtue of this act, belbre the same shall have been paid off and cancelled, or any indorsement, Sfc. or tender in payment, S[c. with intent to defraud his Majesty, or the person to be ajjpointcd to pay off the same, or to pay any interest thereupon, he shall be adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy. LXIV. For granting to his Majesty ^w additional duty on certificates issued with respect to the killing game.(/) By 31 Geo. 3. ch. 21. § 5. If any person shall counterfeit, «^c. any seal, stamp, or mark, to resemble any seal, stamp, or mark, directed by this act, or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of the same, or shall utter, or use, SfC. he shall suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy. LXV. For repealing the duties now charged on bills of exchange, promissory notes, and other notes, drafts, and orders, and on re- ceipts; and for granting other duties in lieu thereof.(m) By 31 Geo. 3. ch. 25. § 29. If any person shall counterfeit, ^-c. any stamp or mark, directed by this act, or resemble the impression of the same, or shall ] 737 \ utter, or use, ^c. he shall suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy. LXVl. To render persons convicted of petty larceny competent wit- nesses. By 31 Geo. 3. ch. 35, Reciting that " Whereas persons convicted o? grand larceny are by their punishment restored to their credit as witnesses, but persons convicted of /letty larceny are rendered and remain wholly incompetent to be examined as witnesses, it is enacted, that from and after the 24th day of June, one thousand seven hundred and ninety one no person shall be an incompetent witness by reason of a conviction for petty larceny. LXVII. For explaining and amending an act, passed in the thirty- first year of the reign of his late Majesty King George the Second, intituled, ^n Act for the encouragement of seamen employed iji the Royal iVayy, 4'c. and for further extending the benefits thereof » Repealed as to receipts for legacies, and new duties granted, by 36 Geo. 3. ch. 52, abstracted post. {I) Vide No. XLIII. ante. (m) Vide No. LXXVII. and No. XC. post. 737 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. to petty officers and seamen, non-commissioned officers of marines, and marines, serving, or who may have served, on board any of his Majesty^s ships. Vide No. LXXIV. post. By 32 Cleo. 3. rh. 33. § 23. If any person shall falsely make, forge, or counterfeit, c^r. or utter, &fc. any ticket for the wages xit pay due to any petty officer or seamnn, non- commissioned olliccr of marines, or marine, for his services on board any ship or vessel of his Majesty, or any duplicate thereof, i^r. with intention to receive any wages, S^c. shall suffer death as a felon, without benefit of clergy. LXVIII. For explaining and amending an act passed in the twenty- sixth year of the reign of liis present Majesty, intituled ^in act for the further preventhig frauds and abuses attcndhig the pay- ment of wages, prize-money, &,'C. and for further extending llie benefits thereof to petty-olficers, SfC. Vide No. LXXIV. post. By 32 Geo. 3. ek. 34. § 29. If any person shall falsely make, forge, or counterfeit, <^-c. or utter, i^c. any petition for a ceriificate to enable any person or persons, to obtain let- ters of administration to any petty officer, «^-c. or shall falsely make, forge, or counterfeit, i^-c. or utter, i^c. any certitieale for enabling him to obtain probate or letters of adminis- tration, with the win annexed, i^c. he shall suffer death as a lelon, without benefit of clergy. LXIX. For enabling his Majesty to direct the issue of exchequer bills to a limited amount, for the purposes and in the manner there- in mentioned. By 33 Geo. 3. ch. 29. § 48. If any person shall forge, ^'c. any certificate or certificates of the commissioners by this act appointed, or any receipt to be given by the cashier or cashiers of the bank oi' England, in pursuance of this act; or shall willully deliver to the auditor of the reeei[)t of his Majesty's exchequer for the time being, 6(c. or shaU utter, 6fC. with intent to defraud his Mnjestij, or any body or bodies politic or corporate, or any person whomsoever, he shall sufJer death as in cases of felony without benefit of clergy. LXX. For the better preventing forgeries and frauds in the transfers of the several funds transferable at the bank of England. By 33 Geo. 3. ch. 30. § 1, 2, 3. Persons making, or assisting in making, transfers of stock in any other names than the owners; or forging or assisting in forging transfers, ^•c. or making, or assisting in making, false entries in the books of the bank, ^c. shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall suffer death without benefit of clergy. And by § 4. If any clerk, S^c. employed or entrusted by the governor and company, shall knowingly or wilfully make out or deliver, S^c. any dividend icarrant for a greater or less amount than the person or persons, on whose behalf, or pretended behalf, such dividend warrants shall be made out, is or are entitled to, with intent, tSfC. he shall, upon conviction, be transported for seven years. LXXI. For better preventing offences in obstructing, de- [ 738 1 stroying, or damaging ships or other vessels, and in ob- structing seamen, keelmen, casters, and ship-carpenters, from pursuing their lawful occupations.(n) By .33. Geo. 3. ch. 67. § 5. If any seaman, keel-man, caster, ship-carpenter, or other person, shall wilfully and maliciously burn or set fire to any ship, keel, or other vessel, he shall suffer death as in eases of felonv, without benefit of clergy. By § 4. seamen, keel-men, i^c. willully and maliciously destroying or damaging any ship, keel, or other vessel (otherwise than by fire,) shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall be trans- ported for any time not exceeding fourteen years, nor less than seven years. And by (n) Vide No. XXXVIII. LVI. and LX. ante. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 738 $ 8. it ts provided, that no person or persons shall be prosecuted by virtue ortliis act, for any of the offences aforesaid, unless such prosecution be commenced twelve calendar months after the offence committed. LXXII. For granting to his Majesty certain stamp duties on inden- tures of clerkships to solicitors and attorneys in any of the courts in England therein mentioned. By 34 Ceo.Z. ch. 14. ^14. If any person shall counterfeit, Sfc. any seal, stamp, or mark, to resemble any seal, stamp, or marlc directed by this act, or shall utter, vend, or sell any vellum, parchment, or paper liable to such stamp duty, with such counterfeit stamp or mark thereupon, knowing, &fc. he shall suffer death, as in cases of felony, without bene- fit of clergy. LXXIII. For taking of special bail in actions and suits depending in court o( coynmon-pleas^, of the county palatine of Lancaster. By 34 Geo. 3. ch. 46. § 5. Personating ball, ^c. is made felony, upon the same prin- ciple as that for the county palatine of Chester, abstracted ante, No, LVII. LXXIV. To enable petty officers in the navy, seamen, non-commis- sioned officers of marines, and mariners, serving in his Majesty^s navy, to allot part of their pay for the maintenance of their wives and families.(o) By 35 Geo. 3. ch, 28. § 30. If any person shall falsely make, forge, or counterfeit, or cause, or procure to be falsely made, forged, or counterfeited, or willingly act, S^c. any declaration or order for payment, or any certificate or receipt therein Ijefore described, or mentioned ; or shall utter, ^c. he shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer death as a felon, without benefit of clergy, LXXV. For granting to his Majesty several additional duties on stamped vellum, parchment, and paper: and forrepealing a certain exception as far as relates to bonds given as security for the pay- ment of one hundred pounds or under, contained in an act of the twenty-third year of his present Majesty^s reign. By 35 Geo. 3. ch. 30. § 4 If any person shall counterfeit, ^c. any stamp to resemble any stamp directed or allowed to be used by tliis aet, or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of the same; or shall utter, vend, sell, use, ^'C. he shall suffer death as in cases of telony, without benefit of clergy, LXXVI. For granting to his Majesty a duty on certificates issued for using hair-powder. By 35 Geo. 3. ch. 49. § 31. If any person shall counterfeit, S^c, any stamp or mark, directed or allowed to be used by this act; or shall counterfeit or resemble the impressiou of the same; or shall utter, vend, sell, use, Sjc. he shall suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy. LXXVII. For granting to his Majesty certain additional duties on receipts. By 35 Geo. 3. ch. 55. § 17. If any person shall counterfeit, S^c. any stamp or mark, directed or allowed to be used, or provided, made, or used in pursuance of 31 Geo. 3. ch. 35.(p) or this act, or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression f 739 1 of the same; or shall utter, vend, sell, expose to sale, or use, Sfc. he shall be adjudged a felon, and suffer death as in cases of felony without benefit of clergy. (o) Vide No. LXVII. and LXVIII. ante, (p) Vide No. LXV. ante. 739 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. LXXVIII. For granting to his Majesty certain stamp duties on sea insurances. By 35 Geo. 3. ch. 63. ^ 23. If any person sliall counterfeit, ^c. any stamp or mark, direcled or allowed to be used, in pursuance of this act, or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of the same; or shall utter, vend, sell, expose to sale, or use, S^c. he shull be adjudged a felon, and shall Butfer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy. LXXIX. For making part of certain principal sums or stock and annuities raised or created, or to be raised or created by the par- liament of the kingdom of Ireland, on loans for the use of the government of that kingdom, transferable, and the dividends on such stock and annuities payable at the Bank of England, ^'C.{q) By 35 Geo. 3. ch. 66. § 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Persons forging, altering, or uttering, S(C. receipts or debentures, SfC. or forging letters of attorney or other authority or instrument to transfer, assign, sell, or convey any stock, c^c. or personating proprietors ; or forging dividend warrants, Sfc. or (being officers of the bank) embezzling notes, Sfc. or making transfers in the names of any other person or persons, than the proprietor or proprietors, Sfc. or forging transfers, Sfc. or making false entries in the books of the Bank of Eng. laud, with intent to defraud the governor and company of the Bank of England, or any other body politic or corporate, or any person or persons whatsoever, shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy. By § 10. Clerks, Sfc. of the Bank making out false dividend warrants, to be trans- ported for seven years. LXXX. For rendering more effectual an act, passed in the first year of the reign of King James the First, intituled, i:?/i act to restrain all persons fro7)i marriage until their former wives and former husbands be dead. By 35 Geo. 3. ch, 67. § 1. Persons convicted in England of bigamy are subject to the penalties, pains, and punishments as, by the laws now in force, persons are subject and liable to, who are convicted of grand or petit larciny: and by § 2. if they shall be at large within Great Britain, without some lawful cause, before the expiration of the term for which they shall be ordered to be transported, they shall be guilty of felony, and shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy. By ^ 3. If found at large in Great Britain, after order of transportation, they may be tried either in the county where they had been convicted, or in that in which they are apprehended and taken. LXXXI. For establishing a more easy and expeditious method for the punctual and frequent payment of the wages and pay of cer- tain otticers belonging to His Majesty's navy.(r) By 35 Geo. 3. ch, 94. § 34. If any person shall falsely make, forge, Sfc. or willingly act and assist, Sfc. or shall utter and publish as true, knowing, Sfc. any talse, forged, or counterfeited order, bill, extract, or certificate, S(c. for the purpose of defrauding the public, or any commissioned officer, ^c. he shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall sutler death as a felon, without benefit of clergy. • LXXXII. To prohibit, for a limited time, the making of starch, hair-powder, and blue, from wheat, and other articles of food; and for lowering the duties on the importation of starch, and of other articles made thereof. By 36 Geo. 3. ch. 6. § 13. If any person shall forge, Sfc. any stamp or seal, to rescm- ble, ^-c. or counterfeit the impression, SfC. he shall be adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy. iq) Vide No. LXXXVII. post. (r) Vide No. LXVII. LXVIII. and LXXIV. ante. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 740 LXXXIII. For the safety and preservation of his Majesty^s person and government against treasonable and seditious practices and attempts. By 36 Geo. 3. ch. 7. § 1. Persons who shall compass, devise, S^c. the death, restraint, ifc. of his Majesty or liis heirs, or to depose them, or to levy war, or to compel a change of measures, SfC, to be deemed traitms, and slialj sutfer pains .of death, and also lose and forfeit as in cases of high treason. By ^ 2. Persons in England who shall by writing, SfC. incite or stir up the people to hatred or contempt ot bis Majesty, or the government, Sfc. shall be guilty of high misdemeanors; and for a second offence may be punished as in the cases of high misdemeanors, or banished or transported for seven y^ars. And by § 3. Persons banished or transported found at large within Great Bri- tain, without some lawful cause, before the expiration of the term for which, A-c. shall suffer death, as in cases of felony, without lienefit of clergy : And such persons may be tried in any county, ^'c either whereapprehended and taken, or from whejice they were ordered to be banished or transported; and a certificate of the conviction shall be suffi. cient proof, SfC. i LXXXIV. For the more effectually preventing seditious meetings and assemblies. By 36 Ceo. 3. ch. 8. § 4. If any persons, exceeding the number of fifty, being assem- bled contrary to the provisions lierein contained, and being required or commanded by any one or more justice or justices of the peace, or by the sheriff of the county, or his under-sheriff, or by the mayor, Sfc. where such assembly shall be, by proclamation to be made in the king's name, in the form in this act directed, to disperse themselves, and peacfeably to depart to their habitations, or to their lawful business, shall, to the number of twelve, or more, notwithstanding such proclamation made, remain or continue to- gether by the space of one hour after such command or request made by proclamation, S(c. they shall be adjudged felons, and shall suffer death, as in case of felony without benefit of clergy. LXXXV. For repealing certain duties on legacies and shares of personal estates, and for granting other duties thereon, in certain cases. By 36 Geo. 3. ch. 52. § 40. If any person shall counterfeit or forge, S(c. any stamp directed or allowed to be used or provided in pursuance of this act; or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of the same, SfC. or shall utter, vend, sell, expose to sale, or use, ^c. he shall be adjudged a. felon, and shaU auffer deatlijaa in case of felony, without benefit of clergy. 1 w( * ','^'i ■ ( * i < i w ' l'» J i , /•.• ' ■- ?,| .: . • •; ■ * ; J '- : -■" J ■ ... ■ , LXXXVL For the better collection of the duty on hats. . [This slat, repeals part of 24 Geo, 3. aess. 2. c. 51, abstracted ante., p. 732.] By 36 Geo.3. ch. 125. § 19. If any person shall counterfeit or forge, Sfc. any stamp or mark directed to be allowed or used, or provided, made, or used, in pursuance of this act, or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of tlie same; or shall utter, vend, sell, or expose to sale, Sfc. any piece of silk, linen, S(e. with such counterfeit mark or stamp thereon, knowing, SfC. or shall privately or fraudulently use any stamp, Sfc. he shall be adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of LXXaVII. For making certain annuities, created by the parliament of the kingdom of Ireland, transferable, and the dividends thereon payable, at the Bank of England: and for the better security of the proprietors of such annuities, and of the. governor and com- pany of the Ba7ik of England. (s) ■ ;■ r V By 37 Geo. 3. ch. 46. § 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Persons forging, altering, SfC. receipts or debentures; or forging letters of attorney, Sfc. or personating proprietors; or forging or VOL. I. — 60 («) Vide No. LXXIX. ante. 740 IIISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONiE. uttering forged dividend warrants, S^c. or officers of the bank embezzling notes, Sfc. or making transfers in other than proprietors names, ^c. or forging or uttering forced transfers, ^c. or making false entries in the books of the Bunk of England, «.^c. with intent to defraud the governor and company of the said bank, or any other body politic or corporate, or any person or persons wliatsocvcr, shall be deemed guilty of felony, and fshall suffer death, without benefit of clergy. By § 10. Officers of the bank making out false dividend warrants^ to be transported for stven years. LXXWIII. For the better prevention and punishment of \_ 741 J attempts to seduce persons serving ni his Majesty^ s forces^ by sea or land, from their duty and allegiance to his Ma- jesty, or to incite them to mutiny or disobedience. Vide No. XCIV. post. By 37 Geo. 3. ch. 70. § 1. Any person attempting to seduce any sailor or soldier fronn his duty, or inciting him to mutiny, ^c. to be adjudged guilty of felony, and to suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy. By § 4. To continue and be in force until the expiration of one month after the commencement of the then next session of parliament. Continued for a limited time by 38 Geo. 3. ch. 6. And further continued by 39 Geo. 3. ch. 4. till six weeks after the commencement of tlic then next session. LXXXIX. For more etlectnally restraining intercourse with the crews of certain of his Majesfy's ships now in a state of mutiny and rebellion, and for the more effectual suppression of such tnu- tiny and rebellion. ^'ide No. XCIV. post. By 37 Geo. 3. ch. 71. § 3. Persons communicating with the crew or assisting them shall, on conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer ^caih as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy: And by § 4. All persons voluntarily remain- ing on board after knowledge of the declaration therein mentioned, shall be adjudged guilty of piracy and felony, and shall suffer such pains of death and loss of lands, goods, and chattels, as any pirates or felons by virtue of an act, made in the eleventh year(t) of King William the Third, intituled, An act for the more effectual suppression of piracy, or any other ael, ought to suffer. By ^ 9. To be in force until the expiration of one montii after the commencement of the then next session of parliament XC. For granting to his Majesty certain stamp-duties on the seve- ral tnatters{u) therein mentioned, and for better securing the duties on certificates to be taken out by solicitors, attornies, and others, practising in certain courts of justice in Great Britain. By 37 Geo. 3. ch. 90. § 5. If any person shall counterfeit, ^c. any stamp directed or allowed to be used by this act, or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of the same, with intent, S^c. or shall utter, vend, or sell, any vellum, S^c. witli such counterfeit stamp or mark thereupon, knowing the same to be counterfeit, or shall privately or fraudulently use any stamp directed or allowed to be used by this act, with intent, ifc. he shall be adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy. (t) So in the purview of stat. 37 Geo. 3. ch. 71 ; but mentioned 11 & 12 W. 3. c. 7. in the margin, which is right, as appears by 4 Blac. Com. 72, and the several statute books of Haickins, Rvjfhead, and Runnington. If a statute be recited as of the fourth year of the reign, i^c. and it appears to have been made in tJie fourth and fifth years, <^-c. the variance is fatal. Rann v. Green, Coxcp. 474. Vide also Rex v. Trelawney, 1 T. R. 222, and Watson v. Shaw and others, 2 T. R. 654. (u) Promissory Notes are parcel of these matters. Vide No. LXV, &. LXXVII, ante, and also No. CVI, post. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 741 XCI. For granting to his Majesty an additional stamp duty on deeds. By 37 Geo. 3. f A. 111. § 5. If any person shall counterfeit, ^c. any stamp or mark, directed or allowed to be used by this apt, or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of the same, with intent, &jc. or shall utter, vend, or sell, any vellum, parchment, or paper, with such counterfeit mark or stamp thereupon, knowino^, <^c. or shall fraudu- lently Ur^e any stamp or mark directed or allowed to be used by this act, with intent, A-c. he shall be adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy. XCII. For the better preventing the forging or counterfeiting the names of ivitnesses to letters of attorney, or other authorities or instruments, for tlie transfer oi stocks or funds which now are or by any act, or acts of parhament sliall hereafter be made transferable at the Bank of England, or for the transfer f 742 "I of any part of the capital stock of the governor and com- pany of the Bunk of England caWed bank stock; or any part of the stoc/cs or funds under the management of the South Sea Com- pany, or East India Company; or for the receipt of dividends, 4'c. By 37 Geo. 3. ch. 122. § 1. If any person shall falsely make, forge, Sfc. the name or names, hand-writing, or hand- writings, of any witness or witnesses attesting the execu- tion of any letter of attorney, or other authority, or instrument, to transfer, &c. or shall utter, or publish, as true, any such letter of attorney, or other authority, or instrument ^•c. knowing such name or handwriting to be false, forged, or counterfeited, he shall be' adjudged guilty of felony, and shall be transported for seren years, or shall be adjudged to suffer such lesser punishment as the court, before whom such offender shall be tried shall think fit to award. XCIII. To prevent the counterfeiting any copper-coin in this realm made, or to be made, current by proclamation, or any foreign gold or silver coin; and to prevent the bringing into this realm, or uttering, any counierieil foreign gold or silver coin. By 37 Geo. 3. ch. 126. § 4. If any person shall utter or tender in payment, or give in exchange, or pay or put off any such false or counterfeit coin as aforesaid, resembling or made with intent to resemble or look like, any gold or silver coin of any foreign prince, state, or country, or to pass as such foreign coin, knowing the same to be false or counterfeit, he shall suffer six months imprisonment, and find sureties for Jiis good behaviour for six months more; and if he shall be convicted a second time for the like offence, he shall suffer two years imprisonment, and find sureties for his good behaviour for two years more: And if he shall afterwards offend a third time, in like manner he shall be adjudged to be guilty of felony, without benefit of clergy. XCIV. To enable his Majesty more easily and effectually to grant conditional pardons to persons under sentence by nuval courts martial, and to regulate imprisonment under such sentences. Vide No. LXXXVIII. and LXXXIX. ante, and also No. Cll.post. By 37 Geo. 3. ch. 140. § 1. If his Majesty shull extend his mercy to persons liable to death by the sentence of a naval court martial, a justice of the king's bench, or common pleas, or a baron of the exchequer, may, on notification from the secretary of state, allow the benefit of a conditional pardon as if it had passed under the great seal, and shall make orders accordingly : And by § 6. The laws touching the escape of felons under sentence of death shall apply to offenders under like sentence by a naval court, and to all persons aiding, abetting, or assisting in any such escape, if the offender shall have been allowed the benefit of a conditional pardon. 742 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. XCV. For granting to his Majesty an aid and contribution for the prosecution of the war. By 38 Geo. 3. ch. 16. § 95. Persons forging or altering certificates, receipts, or dupli- cates, &c. or knowingly uttering or publishing them as true, with intent, &c. shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy. By § 107, it is provided, tliat the present act may be altered, varied or repealed by any act or acts"i,o be made in this session of parliament. Vide income act, viz. 39 Geo. 3. ch. 13. which, by § 1, repeals the above stat. in part; but § 36, extends the power of it in other respects, &c.(d) XCVI. To continue until the first day of August, one thousand eight hundred, and until the end of the then next session of parlia- ment, and amend an act made in the thirty-third year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, Jin act for establishing regula- tions respecting aliens arriving in this kingdom, or resident therein, in certain cases. [w) By 38 Geo. 3. ch. 50. § 24. In case any person ordered or adjudged to be I 743 I transported in pursuance of this act, shall be found at large within this realm, after sentence of transportation pronounced, he or she shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall suffer death as a felon without benefit of clergy. XCVII. For granting to his Majesty a duty on certificates issued with respect to armorial-bearings or ensigns. By 38 Geo. 3. ch. 53. § 18. If any person shall counterfeit, &c. any stamp or mark directed or allowed to be used or provided, in pursuance of this act; or shall counterfeit or resemble the impression of the same, upon any vellum, parchment, or paper, with intention to defraud, &c. or shall utter, vend, sell, or expose to sale, any vellum, parch- ment, or paper, liable to the said duty, with such counterfeit mark or impression there- upon, knowing, &c. or shall privately or fraudulently use any stamp directed or allowed to be used by this act, with intent, &c. he shall be adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy, XCVIII. To amend several laws of excise relating to coach-makers, auctioneers, beer and cyder exported, certificates and debentures, stamps on hides and s/cifis, drawbacks on wines and sweets, and ale and beer licences. By 38 Geo, 3. ch. 54. § 9. If any person shall, with intent to defVaud his Mdjesty, counterfeit or forge, &c. any debenture in any case in which a debenture is by any act or acts of parliament relating to the duties of excise required or directed to be given or granted, or shall knowingly or willingly utter, publish, or make use of any such coun- terfeited or forged debenture, he shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer death as a felon, and have execution awarded against him, as persons attainted of felony, with- out benefit of clergy. By § 10. The pains of death imposed by the 9 Ann, ch. 11. 10 Ann, ch. 26. and 5 Crto. 1. ch, 2. relating to duties on hides and skins, &c. declared to be in force against persons who counterfeit stamps provided by those three statutes, or in pursuance of the acts of 28 Geo. 3. ch. 37. and 1 Geo. 3. ch. 21. {x) XCIX. For making perpetual, subject to redemption and purchase in the manner therein stated, the several sums of money now (») No repeal by the latter stat. of the felony mentioned in the above act of 38 Geo. 3. ch 16. § 95. (ic) Amended, and further powers given by stat. 38 Geo. 3. ch. 77. vide 33 Geo, 3. cA. 4. (a;) Vide No. LIV. ante. HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONA. 743 charged in Great Britain as a land-tax for one year, from the twenty-fifth day of March one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eiglit.(y) By 38 Geo. 3. ch 60. § 118. If any person shall forisre, counterfeit, or alter, &c. any contract or contracts for the sale of any land-tax, or any assignment or assignments of such contract or contracts, or of any portion of land-tax therein comprised, or any cer- tificate or certificates of the commissioners of land-tax or of supply, or any chief magis- trate authorized by this act to make out the same, or of the surveyor-general of the land revenue of the crown, or of the duchy of Cornwall, or any certificate or receipt of the cashier or cashiers of the governor and company of the bank of England, or any certificate, &c. directed by this act to be made out by the proper officer to the commis- sioners for the affairs of taxes, &c. or shall wilfully delis'gr,