J
THE ^
LOGIC OF STYLE
AN INTRODUCTION TO
Critical Science
By WILLIAM^ENTON
LONDON
LONG M A N S, G E E E N, & C 0.
18 74
\All Rights reserved]
MUIR AND PATERSON, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.
//y<^y6
FAi2.03
CONTEXTS.
PAGE
INTRODUCTION BY WAY OF PREFACE, ... 1
CHAPTER I.
OF STYLE GENERALLY.
Sectiun I. Of Expression Generally, §§ 1 — 3, . . . 41
Section II. Of Style in its relation to Expression, §g 4 — tj, . 56
Section III. Of Style in its relation to Rhetoric, §§ 7 — 9, . . 69
CHAPTEK II.
OF QUALITY. ^
Section I. The Conditions of Quality, §§ 10—12, . ' . . 80
Section II. Of Subtlety, §§ 13— 15, .... 89
Section III. Of Comprehensiveness, §§ 16 — 18, . . . 108
CHAPTEE III.
OF QUANTITY.
Section L The Principle of Quantity, §g 19— 21, . . 121
Section II. Of Extension (Co-ordination), §§ 22—24, . . 130
Section III. Of Intension (Subordination), §§ 25—27, . . 139
^'
Of THf '
TJI^IVEESITY
INTRODUCTION
BY WAY OF PEEFACE.
It is a cumbrous disadvantage for an Introduction to a
Theory of Style, that Style, as a science, stands so closely
in interconnection with other sciences. This connection, on
the one hand, is one of coincidence, on the other, of analogy.
In the one instance, the science seems to support itself on
the facts of the correlative sciences, in the other, on their
principles. And so it is forced into relations that are too
obvious to be repudiated, even while they are too numerous
not to interfere with its free expansion as an independent
system.
This disadvantage, the most awkward that can arise for
any theory claiming for its phenomena a distinct genesis
and a distinct economy, is at the same time one of the least
obvious. Not that the multiplicity in the relationships of
Style to other subjects has been overlooked; since it is the
too common experience that mere redimdancy of suggestion
tends often to confound and perplex. Besides, from the
opposite point of view, it could not fail to be noted, that, in
the midst of any such redundancy, a certain proportion of
ease must hav^e attended the work of recombining materials
which other sciences had discovered, or of organizing fresh
2 INTRODUCTION.
materials according to rules which they had suggested. The
difficulty of the case is hidden by a prior misunderstanding
as to the true scope of Style. And it arises from the doubt
as to whether Style is to be regarded as a science at all,
and as such in a position to be illuminated — with the pri-
vilege of reciprocal illumination — by any science whatsoever.
To the ordinary way of thinking, nothing more is required
for a science than that the facts which it provides shall be
susceptible of a logical classification. But there is also the
negative condition of qualification — viz., that the science shall
have its own lawful complement of facts. In the present
case, Style is regarded somehow as a galaxy of miscellaneous
truths, chiefly of truths practical and applied. If as a science
it is to be considered, it seems to withdraw itself into such
a science as Logic ; so that ultimately it is no science, want-
ing an independent basis. But in this there is the natural
oversight, that certain facts, however eagerly they may sub-
mit to the rules of a system like Logic, as a primary source
of administration, may yet be susceptible of a secondary treat-
ment and valuation. Practical Style may be ; yet, examined
philosophically, it will be found to include a nucleus of
theoretic principles, to which, more immediately than to those
of Logic, its facts may be referred. This skeleton of principle
it is, this nucleus — whether it be one according to which
certain facts common to all mental science are treated, or a
derivative order of facts, or facts entirely original — which
constitutes the Science of Style.
For the coherent exposition of its own facts a theory
requires a tolerably large compass. But, within that compass,
and in the particular illustration of its facts, a science will
infallibly ratify its claim to having special data. The more
INTlvODUCTlON.
unique its position theoretically, the more striking its inter-
pretation of these data. But the burden of doing explicitly
and by anticipation what the science itself does implicitly,
descends upon the Introduction, which has to show with
precision what the principle is, according to which phenomena
that apparently have been pre-engrossed by sciences more
lucky or more precocious, may be treated, virtually, or in
fact, as new. The negative condition being thus satisfied,
Style vaults airily into the cycle of the sciences. But this
ennobling of Style, in claiming a scientific lineage for a
certain order of facts, involves the enlarging of the concep-
tion of science itself. Hence, in the second place, it devolves
upon an Introduction to Style to reflect a principle upon
science generaUy, as discovering a new variety of adaptation,
and possibly of treatment. Bringing thus for the principle
of science fresh facts, it brings for the facts of science a fresh
principle. And so its two aims or results coincide. For the
principle, under which the facts have been discovered to be
amenable to scientific analysis, is precisely the principle
M-hich must underlie and coincide with the supplementary
extension given to the notion of science. An incidental
result is that the scientific meaning of certain acknowledged
facts is established, where it was believed to be impossible ;
and a profounder and more emphatic, because more precise
and consistent, recognition given of them in regions, where,
if in part formally recognised, they were virtually, and in
their distinctive principle, denied.
An operative, and, practically, a new distinction is intro-
duced into science, when a division is made of the Subjective
or Mental sciences into those \vhich are concerned with Sensi-
4 INTRODUCTION.
bility, and those which are not. The facts, and through the
facts, the laws of Style, and, in a greater degree, of Music,
are not to be obtained at first hand by every one. They are
to be gathered only through a special medium, superadded to
the intellectual medium which is essential to all scientific
exposition. To Logic, however, as a branch of mental science,
the term Subjective does not apply in the philosophic sense.
Its phenomena are severely objective, in so far as they may
be observed by everybody, and yield principles which each
one may test for himself. In the same way, the facts of
Style, though subject to a greater fluctuation and diversity
than those of Logic, are also objective, in the sense that ulti-
mately they rest on a common sensibility, not necessarily
morbid in cases where it is high, nor coarse where it is low.
The variations of individual, i.e. truly subjective, sensibility
are infinite. But it is on that account precisely that a wary
science will refuse to compromise itself by an explana-
tion of facts, that, ex hypothesi, are too numerous to be
explained. Such an explanation would be impossible. It
would also be suicidal. For it is only with these variations
as recurrent, and having essential points of agreement, and
a catholic significance, that the science is concerned. All
beyond that is isolated, in many cases contradictory. And
with individual bias or eccentricity, even in a god, science
has nothing to do. The limit, therefore, at wdiich Style
ceases to be objective, is where it ceases to transcend indi-
vidual peculiarity, and where effects become local and capri-
cious. At the same time, and while ultimately there is no
difference in this respect, a distinction may be made between
Style and Logic on the ground of the greater evasiveness of
its phenomena, because adding an element distinct from that
INTRODUCTION.
which makes the logical phenomena themselves evasive as
distinct from those of Physical Science. The sciences fall
most conveniently, therefore, into this order, the Physical,
the Philosophical, and the Esthetic or Critical. The dis-
tinction is valid for ordinary purposes, and must be insisted on
for Style, especially in its relation to Logic, as occupying a
station intermediate between it and the Natural Sciences —
which relation is now illustrated in detail.
1. Style, together with Logic, may in part be distinguished
from the Physical Sciences by the less palpable nature of its
phenomena, and, contingently, by the greater precariousness
of its method. But it is also to be distinguished by the fact
of being more stationary as a system. Not that mental
science, as, for example, in the form of Psychology, where
discoveries are constantly being registered, is not progressive
as a whole, but, in certain fields belonging more exclusively
to speculative analysis, it is improgressive. And a test
(which must be verified historically) may thus be applied to
discriminate the pure sections in pliilosophy from the mixed
or derivative. Accordingly, those which at the very first are
capable of a complete integration, go into the category of the
cardinal sciences, and those which are not, into that of the
derivative sciences. The facts of Style, in contradistinction
to those of Physical Science, may be collected in virtual com-
pleteness by one single observer. The theory is not one that
depends on a complementary observation extending over an
indefinite period of time. And so Style ranges itself, along
with Logic and Grammar, under the category of Pure Mental
Science.
Notwithstanding this, there is no privileged road to dis-
covery in Logic or in Style, other than that of severe
INTRODUCTION.
observation and reflection, by which science universally
travels, so haughtily as regards its warrant, so patiently
as regards its results. It is precisely as evanescent, and
requiring a keener observation, that their phenomena are
discarded for others of a more palpable character. Certainly
there is no monopoly created for Style by the mere oppor-
tunities which the individual theorist has for inquiry.
Scientific success does not go according to the mechanical
facilities wdiicli one man has, as compared wdth another, for
collecting facts— is not given gratuitously — but goes accord-
ing to individual capacity for the collation of facts, for
observation and generalization. Else the savage has more
opportunity of naturalistic acquirement, because more of
naturalistic research, than the man of culture. Hence
it is that mere perception of effects is not operative in
all men alike, nor mediately to the same results. In Style,
for example, the power to write idiomatically and with pre-
cision does not confer the power of scientific analysis ; the
two in all likelihood exist inversely as each other. But the
literary power may evidently become a desirable co-efficient
in an analysis that is dedicated exclusively to literary pheno-
mena. And, in an analysis which aims at a precision as
perfect as that attainable under any other science, it is too
evidently an indispensable co-efficient. Hence the main dis-
tinction between Logic and Style, in a sensibility which
supplies the facts that are to be logically explained ; having,
in so far, no value for Logic, but, on the other hand, being
invaluable for ^Esthetic Criticism.
2. Sensibility is, accordingly, the element which dis-
tinguishes a logical from an aesthetic science. Not, however,
in the sense of being antagonistic to logical analysis. On the
INTRODUCTION. 7
contrary, it is of no value in science without that. For literary
science, therefore, considered in its unity, each is reciprocally
indispensable to the other. The same truth is expressed in
saying that Sensibility is the negative condition for all
systematic inquiry in the region of literary effect ; as may be
illustrated historically in relation to Style itself.
Strictly speaking, Style has no history. For a history
demands a unity of subject, with a series of developments
more or less marked and continuous. The only interest that
Style can have is, in this view, a negative and exoteric
interest. Considered under this limitation, therefore, Style
resolves itself historically into two momenta, or crises, of
which the appearance of Aristotle forms the first. It might
seem curious, that, of two subjects lying parallel to each other,
that one should be chosen for the richer and more explicit
treatment, whose phenomena are, on the whole, the more
recondite. A man is naturally more struck by the use of
a barbarism in speech — i.e. it is more of an event for him,
whether he mentions it to his wife or not — than by the
fact that his neighbour is reasoning in a circle. But the
grossest phenomena are not always the most suggestive.
Especially are they not likely to be suggestive when they
appeal to a capacity, which, not being exceptionally sensitive
itself, is flanked by a capacity that is exceptional for perceiv-
ing and pursuing some other order of phenomena.
This is sufficient to explain, for the moment, why Logic
rather than Literary Science should have met with a con-
clusive treatment at the hands of Aristotle. An attempt, it is
true, was formally made by him to systematize the other class
of facts. But it is clear that he did not apprehend the subject
in its philosophic relations ; else he would have seen that it is
8 INTRODUCTION.
precisely analogous to Logic — persistently and selfishly so —
complementary to it, and erecting itself beside it to whatever
extent, and in what direction soever it may be impelled.
Hence the subordinate place assigned to Style in his complete
system, as a suckling of Oratorical Science ; and in such a
way as to thwart and vitiate its literary significance. Hence
also this very striking circumstance, connected with the fact
of its depreciation. Considered independently, Style allows
of an abstract treatment, in at least as great a degree as Logic.
Sensibility apart, the pure intellect may construct a specula-
tive science of the subject for itself. How much more then
with the light reflected upon it so unequivocally by the
revelations of Logic. But, as in passing from one subject to
another, the two may be affected favourably by their intense
juxtaposition, so sometimes they may be mischievously
affected, and clash with each other. Having the first, a man
will the more readily have the second ; or else, having the
first, he will not have the second. Either his conception of
the one, by implying the conception of the possible whole,
will suggest and illuminate the other; or else, by palming
itself off as the actual whole, will obscure the conception of
the other. This is, to a certain extent, the explanation of
the unimpartial treatment, so to speak, accorded to the
Ehetoric, as compared with the Organon, where, upon a
superficial view, brilliance of analysis might seem to have
been most required. Since if — and if, then precisely because,
his sensibility was not exceptional, Aristotle M-as bound to
supplement it by that which he had in abundance. The case,
however, was otherwise ; theorizing, in the absence of sen-
sibility, being simply impossible. But in part also the want
of susceptibility in this direction, which determined him to-
INTRODUCTION. * ii)R SIT Y
■^-f"' '^' ^ ■.'■■
wards Logic, as a science promising a more ui>tqtie and
opulent result, would determine him at tlie. same time away
from Style, as a field that did not present phenomena con-
genial for exposition, and that did not, therefore, for his
subtlety furnish an adequate stage of illustration.
A proof of this appears in connection with the effects
which more particularly he did note. It was open to him to
have overlooked the whole body of literary appearances.
What he did overlook was that section which is least pro-
minent and most characteristic. Limiting his view thus, he
concentrates attention upon those facts which it belongs to
the average sensibility to descry for itself, and which require
a very moderate effort to systematize. In this latter respect
it is that the Ehetoric of Aristotle compares so meagrely with
his Organon, and precisely because lacking, in its separate
sphere, a corresponding depth of perception. The section of
effects which the Ehetoric represents is concerned with that
identical sphere of perception which is the most common,
and, similarly, the Ehetoric itself is concerned with that
systematizing of effects, whose activity unfolds itself most
easily. Another sphere, which has been already indicated, is
that of the abstract science, in which the principles of Logic
and Style unfold concurrently. But the whole cycle of Stylic
science is not complete, until a third section of still more
complex effects is reduced to system. This order of effects is
more subtle and intricate than any with which the analyst
occupies himself in Logic. The dissertationist on Style in its
more abstract relations does not necessarily possess a com-
mand over this ultimate section; though he cannot investigate
it thoroughly without that command. But, having the quali-
fying sensibility, he wall inevitably, in his analysis of it, recur
10 INTRODUCTION.
to the abstract science as his ultimate ground of reference.
It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that, for want of this
qualification, Aristotle should not have busied himself
seriously with either the one section or the other — the acci-
dent of the Organon apart, as a possible cause predisposing to,
or away from, an equally rigorous and determinative treat-
ment of Style. Within a certain compass his own style is
unexceptionably good. But of any extrinsic brilliance in his
writing, or even of the art of manoeuvring to advantage within
the limits prescribed by philosophic exigencies, there is no
trace. And, which is more important, to compensate for this
want, there is no sign of any aesthetic perception of effects
beyond those reproduced in his own practice. His critical
susceptibility was not pitched (as it might quite well have
been) upon a higher key than that to which he himself daily
conformed. So that, as far as any acquaintance with the
liisher effects was concerned, it must have been drawn from
the practice of his own countrymen. The Greeks, as a rule,
compare favourably with other nations in this respect. As
general practitioners in the art, they are always to be com-
mended for imitation; and they excel in certain of the more
essential qualities that go towards realizing a noble standard
of composition. But that conspicuous excellence is wanting
that might have suggested to a contemporary a very high,
and, in connection with striking deformities of expression
(which in this case were also wanting), a very practical and
thoroughgoing, literary ideal.
So far, indeed, as Greece is concerned, critical science in
Aristotle is not so far behind models of real excellence, as it
is in the rear of such transcendent models as have appeared
in England. Tlie effect of such models, in stimulating
INTRODUCTION. 1 1
criticism and enlarging its area, will be determined by the
way in which these models unite to form a catholic ideal.
Even this chance, however, of accomplishing such an end
will be defeated, should the critic happen to be out of har-
mony with the scope of his materials, and busy himself with
the exposition of certain orders of excellence to the exclusion
of the rest. The greater, therefore, is the necessity for a
catholic sympathy that shall confirm, and not subvert, the
data, which, in having brought near to them the requisite
qualifications for their practical study are, pro tanto, brought
nearer to an appreciable result — a sympathy that shall not
falsify its claims in the moment of substantiating them. One
only case there is, in which this sympathy with pre-existing
effects may be dispensed with, that, viz., in which it is super-
seded by the accident of a critic who exhibits the principle
of these effects in himself De Quincey, with unparalleled
compass of sensibility, and with great analytic acuteness,
might naturally have been expected to furnish a result in
which the two might effectively be combined. To the
materials that Aristotle lacked, he added the power that
was to ratify them ; and, to such an extent, as not merely to
supersede tlie illustrations of older writers, if by chance they
had been orbicular enough in their sweep for an analysis to
found upon, but to anticipate the latest phases of creative
sensibility, if by chance these should not have been already
developed.
The appearance of De Quincey, in fact, constitutes the
second momentum in the history of Style. That this momen-
tum is again a crisis, not an epoch, is due to the fact that the
possible advantages from a susceptibility so complex were
neutralized, for purposes of an exposition that should, in any
1 2 INTRODUCTION.
sense, be final, by his defect of energy for pure speculation. i
So much, at least, of negative constructiveness the world was
justified in expecting, as would have shattered the confusions
besieging the subject. These to have exposed would seem to
have been suited to his peculiar ability and his peculiar mettle.
And that with a result the more favourable, as one might
have presumed, for the diffusion of critical knowledge, from
his rare power of philosophical exposition. No difficulty that
he was not qualified to divest of any preternatural appear-
ance of complexity or abstruseness : no problem whose
spurious simplicity he was not able to detect, and in its mis-
chievousness to counteract, by exposing it in that light which
was best calculated to reveal the lurking perplexity. But
never was there a mind more fitted to mediate between phi-
losophy and the popular good-will, that was more irretrievably
cut off from such communication, by a want of sympathy
with philosophy itself, precisely in those latitudes where a
facile exposition was most needed for the populace, because in
the general case most difficult to obtain from expositors, and
most demanded, because in his individual case most easy to
give.
To this want so clamorous, to this crisis so bewitching, De
Quincey brought nothing but a gleam or two of critical
insight, and with a result that is naturally more tantalizing
than the shortcoming of Aristotle. Against any such short-
coming, as detrimental to his general reputation, Aristotle
had virtually pleaded in the blazing originality of the Organon.
1 This refers not to anything De Quincey failed to do, but evidently to some
positive misunderstanding of certain philosophic problems. The reader of De
Quincey surmises that the special victim of this obliquity — but with no desire
on the part of the critic save to state the matter truthfully, and disarmed as
to the special misinterpretation by its very naiveti — was Kant.
INTKODUCTION. 13
And, which made the matter still more interesting, his power
in the Organon shone not merely by itself, but by an invo-
lution of itself, which upon the arena of Style might have
been illustrated, in a way more comprehensive and theatrical,
by De Quincey. AVhat Aristotle effected had this peculiar
property, that it was effected by a movement of circularity.
It was the judgment itself occupied upon the judgment ; and
such a judgment, occupied on such materials, as to produce a
result in which all men should virtually agree. Deny the
perfection of the judgment, and, a priori, you impugn the
truth of the system. Deny the truth of the system, and, a
posteriori, you infer the weakness of the judgment. Accepting
absolutely the thesis of Aristotle, you admit it as a criterion
of the process by which you pronounce upon the logic of the
thesis itself. Eefusing to accept the thesis as true, you
imply, and are bound to produce, another explanation of that
very process by which you have discovered that the process
is other than that laid down by the theorist. By a parallel
chance in Style, a writer like De Quincey is practically the
exponent of the very principles which in theory he enunciates
and commends. Now, in such a case, it is the Sensibility
which forms the machinery of the involution. Lustre will
unquestionably be given to logical science by beauty of Style.
But this element is adventitious. It is not implicit in the
conception of Logic, as perceptive sympathy is implicit in the
conception of sensibility on such a scale as De Quincey 's.
But Style, besides this element of sensibility, as inseparably
a condition for scientific exposition, demands also the more
palpable element of speculative insight. Where a science of
Logic demands one element, therefore, an adequate science of
Style demands two. And while Logic is thus its own expo-
14 INTRODUCTION.
nent, Style may be mora illustriously so, because having an
involution of scientific insight the same in degree as that
of Logic, to which Logic, on its part, has nothing to answer
in the way of sensibility. This sensibility was neutralized
in De Quincey for its scientific application (despite his fas-
tidious thinking), by the want of that element, which, in the
converse case of Aristotle, was neutralized by the want of
the antithetic sensibility.
The antithesis, which is thus illustrated, is equally true in
relation to its two elements, whether existing in insulation
from each other, or aiding one another in a scientific rationale
of the whole field under review. Wliat is easy to perceive is
p^o tanto easy to systematize. And what tends, by its very
nature, to incarnate itself under universal distinctions is fro
tanto easy to perceive. And here, as suggesting itself from
the special contrast already indicated in the historical rela-
tions of both sciences, a general contrast may be drawn
between Style and Logic. Logic, in the Organon of Aristotle,
was then first recognised as a fact, when it was first recog-
nised as a science. Its phenomena were first matter of general
observation, when their connecting principles were first
formally arranged in their relation to its dominant principle.
Style, on the other hand, has been long recognised as a fact —
certain even of its distinctions are current and popular — but
not earnestly and conscientiously as a science. And so long
as its main distinctions remain ]ieither explicated, nor shown
in their propulsion, nor in their analogical relations, nor in
their speculative significance, there is nothing to contribute to
the science, much less the history, of the subject, which is
also the history of the science.
The final lesson, therefore, of the antithesis between the
INTRODUCTION. 15
two elements is that of their being mutually necessary to each
other, and, as it were, in a certain order ; and precisely, for the
science, in (his order, that it must presuppose and follow the
sensibility. Nothing, indeed, can be more self-evident than
that a man should be unable to give the rationale of certain
facts, when he does not perceive them, or does not perceive
them to the extent that they ought to be perceived. How,
for instance, should he expect to be listened to as a critic,
who pronounces a certain image to be sublime, or the cadence
of a certain passage to be harmonious, ha\'ing no sesthetic
perception whatsoever ? For in Style generally there may be
discriminated three classes of effects : (1) those which the
investigator sees in common with all, (2) those which he sees
in common with a few, and (o) those which possibly he sees
to the exclusion of everybody else. In view of this, and
relying upon the common ground of agreement which he has
with all, it is his business gradually to extend the frontier of
perception as far as he can — initiate the first class of readers
into the secrets of the second, and the second into those of the
third, along with such of the first class as have surmounted
the difficulties of the second sphere. LTuless, indeed, he has
either something special to communicate, or some more con-
cise or more fascinating method of communicating to the
many what as yet is only enjoyed by the few, or of impress-
ing upon all, from his station of authority, what is only held
vaguely, there is no justification for the obtrusion of his views.
But only as founding ultimately on a catholic sensibility, is
he warranted in putting the matter in such a way as to secure
interest for it, and attention for himself. Nor is this a
method which belongs to these facts as an insulated class of
facts. It is the method of the Fine Arts generally. In
16 INTllODUCTION.
Painting, for instance, besides the abstract science, which
treats of the "general divisions of form and colour, &c., there
is the concrete science, which tells, according to the criterion
of the sensibility, why certain individual effects are beautiful,
or tlie opposite. Among such effects, it is the province of the
most ordinary sensibility to recognise the agreeable impres-
sion produced by clusters of scarlet berries upon a background
of green. But a subtler question arisfes, why it is that such
berries are more effective as seen on a tree with feathery
branches, than they would be on a yew tree, for example.
The reason generally is this : — The combination cannot fail to
benefit in effect by the greater disclosure of the wood of the
branches, as in the former case, and of the berries themselves;
leaves, berries, and branches forming, first, a perceptible
variety in material, next, one of colour, and, finally, a
graduated series in regard to stability (as under the possible
movements of the wind), which would not be available to the
same extent in the case of the obscuring branches of the yew.
But, specially, the difference is due (1) to the contrast of the
perky or pensile character of the leaves, in the former case,
Avith the solid and pendulous character of the berries — con-
trast, the sense of which w^ould be stifled in regard to the
clotted or matted branches of the yew. And (2) in the case
of the tree which allows for so much variegation in the super-
ficial outline, and, as it were, so much general transparency,
there is a chance of both leaves and berries being relieved
against a common background.
3. In thus discovering itself to be a Fine Art, Style is not
to be distinguished from Logic, as if it were something
superior, merely because it has something superadded. Any
superiority which it can show must rest iipon its value,
INTRODUCTION. 17
considered teleologically, Here, nevertheless, a practical
superiority is claimed for Style. Not that its aim is abso-
lutely higher than the aim of any art which proposes to
redress the inequalities, and correct the infirmities, of the
human judgment. JSTo intellectual aim can possibly be so
high. Besides, the improvement of the catholic judgment, in
so far as it is corrigible by rules, involves an education
generally for other purposes, by which Art itself must ulti-
mately profit. But the lower art as to aim may yet happen
to approximate more closely to its aim than the higher. The
defence, therefore, which might apply to Logic, as a science
that must be examined formally, before it can yield its full
quota of practical results (notwithstanding that these results
are concerned with rules whose application must already be
presupposed), is irrelevant to Style. For while in Logic the
alternatives are few, under which effects are good or bad, the
particularization of which Style is capable admits of an
indefinite number of examples of good or of vicious expression
being given, having all the vividness of a circumstantial
treatment and all the force of a general principle. It thus
provides for a graduated improvement, to which Logic (as
universally understood) makes no pretension. The reason of
this is plain. In so far as Style is complex, it allows of a
specific treatment in a degree unattainable by Logic ; — for the
same reason a history of Universal Literature is evidently a
much subtler problem than a history of Philosophy. But by
Logic in what guise is this unattainable? It is as being
formally too simple. A certain fallacy may be seen, and not
only seen, but seen to come under a special principle and
category of fallacy; and yet the man who sees it may be
unable to bring it home to the man who uses it, and who per-
18 INTRODUCTION.
sists that his argument does not come within that category.
Did Logic seek to go beyond this, its boundaries would be
inordinately enlarged, and it would have to descend to impos-
sible details. The objection to it in such a case would be, not
that it is too simple, but that it is too complex. And if the
logician will descend into the region of material truth, he
must not be disgusted to find that his researches are circum-
scribed and arbitrary. It is significant, therefore, in this
connection, when such a man chooses liis illustrations from
science: when he analyses foregone conclusions, and builds
up formal results from acknowledged data. In this way he
attains certainty : but it is at the expense of catholicity, and
Logic becomes a science of particular, not of universal appli-
cation. For the sphere, within which the universal science is
practical, is limited, Nor can it become more practical
without becoming special, and ceasing to be a pure science.
Whereas the advantage for science otherwise, and for the arts
generally, is precisely that they are special — that they are
complex, where complexity, in relation to circumstantial con-
clusions, is of use, and not complex, where complexity would
disconcert or confound. And the advantage for Style is
simply that the manifold detaUs which aid its practical
exposition may be gathered into unity in a system whose
formal limits coincide with its material.
To the application of a science which, on such a general
view, promises a wider adaptation than even Logic, there can
be no direct objection, save under that class of objections
which founds on its special pretensions as an art. The sphere'
which is most sanguinely claimed for it is, of course, the very
sphere from which it will be warned off most boisterously.
INTRODUCTION". 19
But the fact remains, that it will always be treated implicitly
as a science. And not the circumstance of its being practical
will supersede all scientific analysis, but analysis will be
summoned to direct the bent of the practical issues; especially
if a loose and flippant criticism is likely to prevail, and train
it into a low and sterile order of performance. Under ordi-
nary conditions, a subject is cultured theoretically because it
is obscure: not comporting with the ease and extent of its
practice, or not tallying with the results which might be
expected from what already is presumed of its elastic powers,
or from the forging ahead of kindred subjects. And if it
remains obscure, it does so in spite of the counterworking
culture. But where the analysis applied to it is superficial,
not merely is the first of these cases reversed, but both are
reversed. And the subject is not only cultured in spite of
remaining obscure, but is obscured by the culture itself The
attitude of such a culture might perhaps be expected to be
hostile to a more decisive analysis, the tendency of which is
inevitably to supersede the other where it is narrow, and to
amend it where it is false. And all the more, that in such a
case it tends to dissipate the feeling of satisfaction with
partial principles accepted as universal, and subordinate prin-
ciples assumed as ultimate and fundamental. But the nature
and beauty of the theme are sufficiently a corrective of any
such illiberal reception. It is always an advantage, when it
is possible to shift the reproach which may attach to the
manner in which a subject is treated upon the subject itself
as necessitating that treatment. Especially is it an advantage,
when the attractiveness of the subject will neutralise the
odium which might otherwise settle upon the particular mode
of the examination. Most of all, however, when the general
20 INTRODUCTION.
opinion is deeply prepossessed in favour of the question, as
being of an interest so directly practical as that which is
inseparable from Style even under the most abstruse mode of
investigation.
It is well for literary criticism, nevertheless, that it should
be fortified in this way against vulgar misconceptions, whether
of a popular cast or of a quasi-philosophic. Its adaptability
for scientific purposes is indeed, to a certain extent, a reason
why it should not be cultivated, in spite of the concurrent
interest attaching to it ; and why a collision arises between
the speculative bias and the practical. For here is a matter
coming under the eye of the ordinary reader every day, and in
so far qualifying him for a speculative interest in it in spite of
himself. Yet, on the other hand, his very familiarity with it
may, in spite of itself, and to the same extent, be a disqualifi-
cation. The general question, however, with regard to the
treatment of such a subject in such a fashion, becomes really a
question of the right to treat it scientifically. Now apart from
the fact that a disgrace attaches to a science undeveloped,
similar to that which attaches to an individual or a nation
that is undeveloped, it is to be observed, that it is not
the absolute minimum of capacity which is addressed,
but only those are addressed, for whom possibly the theme
has attraction and intelligibility. A scientific treatment,
besides, is its own justification. It is nothing more than
an accurate examination of a mass of facts, directly or
indirectly in subordination to the highest known principles.
It can only be shown to fail, therefore, by a reference
to its own criterion, and by being detected to be 7wt scientific,
i.e. not accurate, however pretentious in phrase; — and in so
far as it is inaccurate and pretentious, it is also culpable,
INTRODUCTION. 21
because discrediting sound terms and principles. As to the
reader, he need not feel insulted by the assumption of his
ignorance on the part of the critic. That ignorance on this
particular subject is accidental. And the critic reciprocally
pledges himself to give his most polite attention, at that date
when the reader shall find it convenient to enlighten him on
any subject he may chance to be ignorant of. Being a poor
man, he will naturally wish to learn how to make money.
Being an honest man, he will wish to have an insight into the
way of making it fraudulently; the more especially that, being
also inoffensive, he is disposed to find out how he can render
himself obnoxious to society and to the law. And since he is
farther a person of refinement, he will be seized with a desire
to know upon what minimum scale of luxury a prison discip-
line allows a man to live. There is, in fact, no limit to the
amount of theoretical information which may be supplied in
this way; unless, of course, the reader demurs to such insinua-
tions, as impertinently seeking to exalt his erudition at the
expense of his honesty. Be it so: let the reader be as ignorant
of these subjects as he is of the laws of literary criticism; and
let it be equally an insult to his honesty to suppose him
acquainted with these laws when he is not. But because the
critic does not insult the reader in assuming his ignorance, he
is not bound to insult him by assuming his incapacity. He
dare not do so, indeed, when presenting to him for his profit,
in a systematic form, what in any other would be meaningless.
No pillar of fine proportions exists but what may be broken
and pulverised; with a difficulty, moreover, in pulverising,
corresponding to the difficulty of chiselling into shape. But
the lessons which might be taught regarding the relations of
angle and mass, etc. are not to be learned after the process of
22 INTRODUCTION.
disintegration — else the sea-beacli is the befitting spot for
instruction.
The superficial treatment which is popularly decreed to
Style, is sometimes decreed to it also by pure science. Thus
it is that, under certain aspects, philosophic thought generally
is repudiated by science, as attaining by mere brain-carpentry
to a visionary stateliness of proportion, while it is buffeted by
the populace for a proficiency that is gained only at the
expense of its being communicable. All mental activity,
indeed, is justly at a discount with exact thinkers, where it
does not yield accurate results. It is only by irreflective per-
sons that such rare inaccuracy is tolerated as that of an
analyst, who, having enumerated all the facts (perhaps four or
five) which come under a certain classification, adds, " these
and a score of others," when his enumeration is simply com-
plete. If undetermined in cases where the channel is so clearly
marked out for him, is he likely to be less so, when his survey
is partial or confused from the very outset ? Philosophy itself
is the first to sneer at such bungling. At the same time the
case may appear to it only normal in the circumstances, and
inevitable under a critical regime. And that it does not sneer
in this particular instance, may be owing to the fact that it
has already recorded its formal disapprobation of the entire
critical method. While from analogy, therefore, philosophy
might be expected to support criticism, we must not be dis-
comfited if it should withdraw its support, just at that point
where the interests of the two cease to be common, and repu-
diate connection with it in its peculiar extensions, if not
in toto, as cherishing principles incompatible with its own.
The more the two orders of effects are studied, however, the
more will it be seen that they resemble each other ; and the
INTRODUCTION. 23
more will the thinking appear rustic and provincial, which
sets down the facts of literary science as trivial, and its prin-
ciple as nugatory. And since the relations under which such
a charge may be substantiated are these two — (1) of the pos-
sibility of certain effects being analysed, and (2) of the possi-
bility of their being communicated, it is in these relations that
the validity of a scientific criticism is most happily vindi-
cated.
1. The case suggests itself as to the decomposition of rhe-
torical effects being possible. Sensibility being granted, the
question arises as to whether it is transformable into logical
propositions. A question so simple might be met by a refer-
ence to Art, as a branch of culture whose practical rules found
on effects which are first experienced in the sensitivity and
then brought into system — were it not that the reference
might be considered insufficient. For it might be argued that
the results in that section, in so far as they are parallel, are
due to quackery or self-delusion, or at least are equally unin-
telligible as to principle. Now the distinctive medium is the
same for both — a self-consciousness that yields faithfully, on
the one hand, %o the impressions of sensibility, and readily,
on the other, to the pressure of the analytic intellect, when it
insists upon these impressions being reproduced. The part of
the intellect, therefore, is to suggest the alternative possi-
bilities that might separately, or in combination, have effected
certain results. On equating and confronting these with the
reproduced sensibility, it will be declared which it is that has
been the sole or chief agent. Sometimes this takes place by
a positive and immediate decision. Sometimes, under a less
lively self-consciousness, it is brought about by the rejection
one after another of all the alternatives except those which
24 INTKODUCTION.
are to be received as having instigated the result. The alter-
native (if it is a single one) may happen to be indifferent, and
may refuse to give any positive token of its having operated.
Yet if the others shew positive signs of dissent, there is suffi-
cient reason, in the circumstances, for accepting it as the
influential agent.
Such is the rationale of these effects, which (other things
equal) will shew themselves in exact proportion to the subtlety
of the investigator. And where no such results are found, we
simply infer, not the inviolability of the effects, but the inep-
titude of the analysis. That the presumed sensibility in any
individual case is great, in proportion to the meagreness of its
antecedents (as published through the scientific examination),
argues not that the sensibility is more, but that the critical
faculty is less. The very vagueness of exaltation with which
the critic colours his exposition, so far from testifying to the
exceptional degree of his susceptibility, may be simply the
exponent of his obscurity regarding it. What is possibly an
over-estimate of the delicacy of his individual impressions, can
never become the measure of the real subtlety of the impres-
sions. For an excess of sensibility in regard to certain effects,
being purely subjective, is irrelevant to any purpose of philo-
sophic analysis. It is with an objective sensibility, allowing
for the collation of one man's impressions with those of
another, that the science is concerned. Of two analysts, there-
fore, his conclusions will have most weight, who has inter-
preted his impressions most thoroughly. A critic may be very
modest, as well as very honest, in declaring that the facts with
which he occupies himself are too subtle for explanation. But
he is certainly a nincompoop, if he does not see that that
invalidates not in the least the chances of their being ex-
INTRODUCTION. 25
plained, except in so far as it is a fatal disqualification of
himself, in point of that which is his sole recommendation in
the matter. His assurances do not kill anybody but himself;
they do not frighten, much less wound people of ordinary
respectability. The sole exponent of sensibiKty is analytic
power. That analysis meets the sensibility, therefore, is no
lowering of it, but is an expansion of the parallel energy of
the analytic intellect. Eefuse the mind power to analyse, and
you degrade it without exalting the sensibility. Admit tliis
power, and you exalt it without degrading the sensibility. But
the secret is that the indefiniteness of the sensibility (if it is
indefinite) can only be shewn by at least assuming that it may
be overtaken by analysis. It is either to be analysed, or not.
If it is, this is aU that is demanded. If not, then instead of
the sensibility remaining simply at a point beyond the limits
at which it may be pounced upon by science, it will be seen
to mount indefinitely higher; since the more the analysis
expands, the subtler will be the sensibility if after aU it evades
it, and the greater the indefiniteness of that of which confess-
edly the analysis has not been able to bring back any
account.
The first alternative is the one to be concurred in for less
speculative reasons. Not merely on a sentimental view, such
as that of slighting the subtlety of the human mind in one
sphere for the sake of magnifying it in another — which is fal-
lacious as regards the first and futile as regards the second ;
nor because it is superficial to suppose that a study of the
mind, in any even of its most barren sections, can be dismissed
superficially; nor because the division of effects into those
which may be treated analytically, and those which may not,
is arbitrary, making a distinction of kind, where ^here is only
(( UNIVEE:
26 INTRODUCTION.
warrant for one of degree ; but because tlic theory as to fact
is so erroneous ; and to adopt the other correspondingly a
necessity, from the impulse not so much to embrace what is
psychologically true, as to reject what is psychologically
absurd. The sensibility, we will assume, has yielded to cer-
tain effects, and in yielding has conformed to them. But it
could not thus have conformed to them, except by conforming
to their principles, under an intellectual guidance more or less
subconscious ; which princij)les of guidance are exactly those
which it is the cue and the duty of the analysis to define.
Nor again, if the principles which underlie the sensibility are
not evasive, are they at least so anomalous as to interfere with
scientific completeness. They only appear anomalous to a
critic who either overlooks significant data, or else, having
already confused the data by a false classification, naturally
ascribes to them, by way of heterogeneousness, what is due to
the inconsistency of the method. Ultimate difiiculty of this
order in science there need be none : so much barricade, so
much material for scaffolding. Finally, therefore, the investi-
gator need not be confounded by any multiplicity of details,
in rising to the principles that will enable him to set and
view them in their proper relations. The same complexity is
common to all other sciences. It does not operate in the way of
bafUing artistic insight ; but is the indispensable condition of
artistic culture, and of a culture that is extended in proportion
as the details are numerous.
2. The distinctions which the theorist on Style has to deal
with present themselves first in the way of art, of art passive
and intuitive or perceptional; they are next received by science,
and their principles explicated ; and finally they issue again
in the form of art, but this time of art active and militant,
INTRODUCTION, 27
ministerial and didactic. In this process science has a
double function, reposing on an organic connection, first,
between the actual sensibility of the i ivestigator and his
analytic capacity, and secondly, between the analytic recep-
tivity of those he addresses and their potential susceptibility.
It is with Style in this latter relation that the second problem
is concerned, viz., as to the possibility of culture.
The instructor has to see and point out not merely abstract
varieties of expression, but these varieties under a limited
number of relations as ultimately good or bad. Hence the
farther classification of effects into those (1) which he along
with his readers sees as bad or good, (2) those which he sees,
but which they do not see, and (3) those which they see, but
which he does not see, i.e. those which he sees them to see
through a medium of fallacy or distortion. From the collision
which may ensue between his sensibility and theirs, the
dilemma arises : — on the one hand, it is needless to put in a
scientific form what is abeady recognised as practical truth,
and, on the other, what is not recognised, since that confes-
sedly is transcendental or contradictory. For either the result
which he seeks to establish is within the reach of the pupil,
in which case it is useless to harp upon it ; or else it is out
of his reach, and there is no common ground to go upon.
Now, on a coarse estimate, it is quite possible to speak
of certain effects as being perceptible to the learners in
common with their instructor. But identically the same
effects will not be perceptible to each, or to all in the
same degree. A will represent an order of effects appreci-
able only in part to some who appreciate B, a different order
of effects, or a higher order like C ; and so by permutation all
through — points seen by some in common with the expositor
28 INTRODUCTION.
being missed by those who are more at home in other sections.
Some effects, therefore, there will always be repugnant to some
among the learners, prior to the philosophic explanation. But
besides this distinction, and apart altogether from the manifest
value of holding in a precise form (with increased security for
its practical application and for acquiring facts that move to the
music of similar principles) what otherwise must be held in-
definitely, it is to be observed, that the novice demands for his
satisfaction a systematic rationale that indirectly shall confirm
or correct the impressions which previously he may have
formed. A rationale of such a kind has this value for the
tyro, not merely that he may know what is right or wrong in
the cases that are specified, but that he may decide to what
extent his standard has been just. And for this purpose he
requires in a formal treatise — which is supposed to transcend
at least the hints of conversation and of desultory criticism —
something more than the mere expression of a casual coinci-
dence between himself and the critic. The needs of the case
are not met by a simple statement, that such and such a
passage is beautiful, etc. The vagueness of the assertion may
really be in league with the reader's falser taste to deceive
him, even in cases where, if specific reasons had been alleged,
they might have been repudiated, and the plea resting upon
them dispelled. A more definite statement would be made in
describing the passage as luminous, etc. But the objection to
the use of metaphorical equivalents is not thereby removed.
Practically, indeed, such a term may be definite enough for
the reader. But this can only be through the distinct logical
meaning which he has already attached to it.
A certain number of technical equivalents is thus presup-
posed as known to the student, even in cases where his views
INTRODUCTION. 29
harmonise with those of the preceptor. Where the latter,
however, is concerned to put the matter so as to provide for a
rapprochement, in the event of being misunderstood, he will
do his best fully to explicate his meaning. In cases, there-
fore, where his sensibility is contradictory or transcendental,
it clamours most of all for a scientific exposition. A meta-
phorical expression may be not only vague, but sometimes
unintelligible or paradoxical. To say, for example, that the
following definition is brilliant in a literary sense, is only
puzzling to the mind whose preconceptions of brilliance are
those of vivid metaphor, or racy personality, etc. " I use the
term negative condition as equivalent to the term conditio sine
qua non and both in the scholastic sense. The negative con-
dition of X is that which being absent x cannot exist ; but
which being present x will not therefore exist, unless a posi-
tive ground of x be co-present. Briefly — if not, not : if yes,
not therefore yes." When it is explained, however, that the
brilliance, on which stress is laid in this instance, is that of
condensation (by means of the most exquisite simplicity), the
synthesis of the two ideas becomes apparent. And a new
flexion is given to the idea of brilliance generally, under
which rapidity of execution is subsumed as an element of
rhetorical prowess, and therefore to be admired, and of effect,
and to be imitated. The figurative expressions, regarding
which a sufficient definiteness of opinion prevails, are too
general for the specification which criticism needs, as well as
by far too limited in their number. The public, for the most
part, conceits itself upon the recognition of the principle that
reasons must be assigned for maintaining any proposition. It
does not take much pains, at all events, to remember that
it is specific, not general reasons, which constitute a valid
30 INTRODUCTION.
ground of autJwrity ; and especially that this is the only
ground of authority. It is too obstinately or too languidly
content with phrases, which seem comprehensive, but simply
are vague, neither ultimate, on the one hand, nor specific, on
the other. Most of all, in reference to literary art, it needs
peremptorily to be reminded that every statement which is not
countersigned by distinct reasons is to be received only as a
personal assurance. Individual opinion is virtually private
opinion, though it were published in folio, and had run through
fifty editions. There are occasions, doubtless, on wliich an
unsupported assertion is quite allowable. But these stand in
a class by themselves. And the reader need not hesitate to
reject an assurance in cases where the point at issue is strictly
critical — i.e. admitting a halance of reasons," and calling for a
determination to one side or the other — especially in the
absence of any indirect support given to it by a general
scientific cast of treatment. In the casual absence of such
reasons he will respect the critic for his general judiciousness
(as shown in the accuracy of his explanations, and the tact
with which he selects and varies his examples, etc.), and
give him the reflex benefit and prestige of any success which
lie has fairly won. For the critic, however, to take advantage
of his acknowledged status, for bullying the reader into com-
pliance regarding one solitary fact of which he cannot furnish
the rationale, is the vulgar trick of the electioneering landlord,
in a political contest, who uses his influence to bias the votes
of his tenants.
The sensibility of the communicator is, then, we will
assume, virtually transcendental : since that is a condition for
its being of use to others. The remaining condition, which is
that it shall be intelligibly communicated, is fulfilled in its
INTRODUCTION. 31
scientific exposition, in so far as that is a guarantee of its
tincquh'ocal expression. Anything more, indeed, would be
finical or officious ; in the spirit of the martinet or the pro-
pagandist. We have thus in sensibility, acting concurrently
with analysis, guaranteed the abnegation of all benefit to
be derived from the monopoly of any faculty of aesthetic per-
ception, except in so far as its results are incommunicable.
And to that extent there is a warrant for individual sincerity ;
since it is clearly not for the interest of any one to exhibit
nakedly for imitation effects, which constitute indefeasibly
the ground of a certain superiority on his part. Not that
such a practice is necessarily disinterested. What the analyst
aims at may be simply the advertising of his own peculiar
mode of expression. ■ But it is clear that strict analysis, so far
from lending itself to promote that abuse, is hostile to it.
Since the moment the critic supplies the rationale of certain
efi'ects (to whomsoever they may belong), he places the reader
in a position to appraise them. It is precisely in the absence
of a scientific valuation that impertinent collusion is possible
on the part of the writer with his own individuality, — and a
rhapsody on the art and its divine principles ; which art and
which principles naturally find their illustration in the jack-
anapes himself who commends them.
For his own sake, therefore, the writer is bound to supply
a rationale that shall tally with the results of each artistic
perception, and to free himself from the reproach of an ex-
position too servile in its glorification of a limited or spurious
sensibility. Besides, his appreciation of effects, being possibly
out of proportion to his executive power, may not have
sufficient indirect testimony in the latter to win for it the re-
spect which virtually it might deserve. On the other hand.
32 • INTRODUCTION.
though his executive power may be considerable, it may be
partial ; and narrow, in so far as it may be imitable. He is,
consequently, bound to show that he has a wider appreciation
of what is beautiful in expression than is registered in his
own practice. The contradiction might quite well arise, of
an analyst with inferior executive power, who yet shows a
greater knowledge of effects, not on account of his superior
analytic perception (which might easily happen), but on
account of his wider sympathy with artistic effects, than
another of greater intensive susceptibility. And a methodical
analysis is thus demanded, not merely as a means of the
proper interpretation of sensibility to the reader, or of recon-
ciliation between two hostile modes of artistic perception,
but through a blunt necessity, as the only test of artistic in-
sight, whether existing in connection with executive sen-
sibility, or not.
It scarcely needs to be said that the sort of rationale which
is here contemplated, is in every case a passive rationale ; and
that critical science repudiates the conjuring up of factitious
reasons, as on a level with the practice of the auctioneer who
is paid on commission. It may be added that the philosophic
method is the one to be adopted by the critic, were it for no
other purpose than that of self-defence. The tendency of most
readers is, on the one hand, to agree on indifferent matters
with a critic who agrees with their opinions on other points ;
and, on the other hand, to be ill-disposed on indifferent points
to a critic who generally disagrees with them. It is his
dignity as a critic which the scientific method secures ; since
it enables him to free himself, in the one instance, from the
charge of having failed through his own weakness or bad
taste, and, in the other, of having succeeded merely through
INTRODUCTION. 33
favouritism. Finally, it is the tendency of the method to
lower the apparent transcendence of the effects which are
explained. An effect, unanalysed at two removes, is as trans-
cendent to explication, and, prior to explication, is confounded
under the same category of transcendence, as one at twenty
removes. The critic is not in all cases, therefore, anything so
very portentous in the matter of sensibility. Nor is he in-
terested in concealing that many of his supposed new effects
are only original, because for the first time formally stated, or
explicated in new relations to each other, or from having
been casually overlooked in a field that potentially is open
to all, or having been perceived under circumstances of
accidental facility yielded by proficiency in kindred sciences.
As to the actual results arising in any particidar instance
from the attempted transmission of the sensibility, it is clear
that no absolute maxinnim can be guaranteed, even under a
scientific process. A man whose natural sensibiKty is unequal
in keenness to his intellect will by his unassisted efforts be
unable to rise in the appreciation of artistic beauties. Yet so
great potentially is the energy of the human susceptibility,
acting in connection with the pure intellect, that when the
rationale of the effects is explained to him (which rationale
he could not have devised, simply because for him the effects
did not exist), the sensibility will mount towards the point at
which he has apprehended the other. And if it moves up-
wards by a fraction, the expedient is justified of colleaguing
with it the analytic intellect ; since without such a con-
federate, even under the contemplation of the sublimest
models, the sensibility would not have travelled by that
fraction towards the point which, in spite of its weakness, it
has reached. In the converse case, the sensibility being
34 INTRODUCTION.
great as the analytic force is small, it is the former which
acts by way of stimulus to the latter. The result in this
instance is that of a proper discipline. For the untutored
sensibility, which is apt to be partial and to run riot in
extremes, science points out severer beauties, and beauties
simpler and plainer in th(>ir subordinate value.
It is essentially a corollary from this, and in keeping with
tlie whole tenor of the discussion, that the scientific method
is the invariable regulator and guide, whether for the
development of a sympathy with art where it is rudimentary,
or for the moderating of it where it is in excess. The method
of the instructor is not always positive, but often negative ;
though always for the sake of some positive result. And
that this discipline of his does not necessarily travel from a
lower degree to a higher will counterbalance the objection
which may be raised against the method on the score of
elevating commonplace to the rank of genius, and so
degrading genius to the level of what is too easily to be
reproduced. This objection may now be added as supple-
mentary to the other two.
3. The more transcendental the effect that is to be com-
municated, there is the greater necessity that it shall be
explicitly communicated : but the more explicitly it is com-
municated, the more chance will there be of its becoming
mechanical. Now what the method has to do is not to work
the lowest sensibility immediately, or even ultimately, up to
the highest — any more than it has to do with training the
dray-horse into the racer. What it aims at is a proficiency
from stage to stage, and from an initial stage in each case
to a final stage proportioned to the latent capacity of the
individual. The proficiency which it seeks to establish is
INTRODUCTION. 35
mechanical, in so far as it is easy and complete. But it is
just on that account organic ; since the effects are only repro-
ducible in so far as they involve discrimination, and the
discarding of vicious and less pertinent alternatives. Nor
can that happen without the power to apprehend that this or
tliat turn of thought under formation is or is not allowable
on the score of relevance. What took place in analysing the
presupposed sensibility is now taking place conversely in the
application by the sensibility of what has been given to it
through the presupposed analysis. When, therefore, a writer
shows that he discerns what, in certain circumstances, is or is
not relevant, he must be admitted to be in possession of the
principle — a principle that being continually more under
control works more rapidly, and therefore more organically,
as manifested in its power to vary the form of expression ;
making easy what it holds, and making easy in order to hold.
Otherwise, there is nothing of the nature of a nostrum in
this scientific treatment, any more than of encouragement
to a quavering and paralytic imitation of the more sublime
effects.
In so far as the scientific method is the true method
both of attaining and expounding the rationale of literary
beauties, any illustration of its j^rinciple is not more a
vindication of it than a condemnation of every other. Pro-
perly speaking, it is not vindicated, but freed from mis-
apprehension. Since its merit is not distinguished from
the merit of any other method, in the same way as
homoeopathy might be vindicated by one physician as
against allopathy by another. It is not opposed to any
36 INTRODUCTION.
other as a more catholic to a less catholic, a more dignified
to a less dignified, a more effective to a less effective. It
is blankly the only method; and beside it every other is
false. No absolute vindication of it, therefore, is needed, and
no formal condemnation of any other. The final objection,
however, is not one that applies to it as contradistin-
guished from possible rival methods — the other two do
apply to it in that sense — nor does its being rebutted
imply anything against them. That objection is one that
might be brought against any art, and amounts to the
charge against the art that it is too practical — wdiich is no
objection whatever, but a clumsy compliment. The only
objection, in fact, on that score would be the second, viz.
that it is not practical; which the method evades by
enabling learners to reproduce, and, where that is im-
practicable, to appreciate, effects; distributing a greater
excellence in expression generally, and an increased ap-
preciation of effects that are not imitable.
What concerns finally the positive results of the theory
of Style — its practical relations to other sciences — may be
summarily indicated.
1. For Philosophy generally it may be regarded as a
special introduction, like Logic and Grammar, either as
preliminary or complementary to these. It is quite legiti-
mately a propedeutic, since it contains a special discipline.
The other relations which it has to philosophy — its
secondary relation, as illustrating in its own details the
principle of philosophy, and its final relation, as possibly an
integral moment of philosophy, and having in and for
philosophic science an inseparable significance, as itself the
principle of Critique — do not concern us at this moment.
INTRODUCTION. 37
Psychology in general might be expected to reflect upon
the science of literature a light, and that no intermittent
light. But so much more chance is there of finding re-
current phenomena — apart from all resorts to cross-illumina-
tion from ahnormal phenomena, which of themselves induce
confusion — imbedded in literary expression, that there is
more likelihood of literary science reflecting light upon
psychology. Not otherwise did Logic stand in relation to
psychology, as an offshoot from it, in certain respects, and
derivatively an exponent of mental operations in spheres that
showed themselves by no means so amenable to the laws of
pure psychology as the facts of literature. The science of
Style stands side by side with that of Logic ; and mediates
between the abstract intellect and pure sensibility, which in
turn is bounded by the anomalies that scowl and gibber on
the outskirts of Medical Psychology.
2. Within the sphere of psychology Art in general falls
itself to be treated. And the science of Style, just in pro-
portion as its principles are stated with authority, cannot fail
to reflect a light upon the arts, any more than they re-
ciprocally upon it. Especially it must add its testimony to
that of Painting (an art that is infinitely further advanced),
in regard to the analysis of Music, which, in so far as melody
and the other concrete phenomena are concerned, is scien-
tifically a blank. In this relation it is an isolated science,
not organically connected with fundamental principles of
psychology.
But more decisively, as connected with those effects which
appeal to the eye, on the one hand, and to the ear, on the
other, literary science is central to all artistic criticism. It is
not merely one among the branches of art, and (since it
38 INTRODUCTION.
falls to be taken into account in any complete survey of
art), indispensable to scientific completeness. It comes to
affect and modify the general conception of art, which, being
true only in so far as it takes notice of all the varieties and
in their leading ramifications, is headlong in acknowledgment
of this its most catholic form. Literary science must, there-
fore, radiate an influence upon art that practically will make
itself felt, not merely in the suggestion of individual relations
to the artist, under the rapprochement of the total science, but
in moulding the judgments of artists of one class with regard
to those of another. Supreme pity it is, when jealousy, the
jealousy of irritation to inferiors, and of animosity to men of
equal or of higher powers, is permitted to stifle the genial
sympathy which should belong to art. The landscape painter
knows himself, on the ground of high conception and of
delicate execution, to be above the house-painter. But he
feels much more inclined to sympathy with the latter, when
his spirit is professionally roused : and that not because, but
in spite of the fact that the acknowledgment of the nexus
between the two arts is not so much due to catholic senti-
ment as to a refined intellectual perception. Even if such
jealousy were the rule, however, among artists of the same
class, the widening of the boundaries of art, showing the
inosculation of the various arts with each other, by extending
indefinitely the opportunities for jealousy instead of fostering
bad feeling is more likely to do away with it altogether.
3. There is one sphere, finally, for which, as a preliminary
study, the theory of Style is less of a scientific luxury, and
more of a necessity, that, viz. of literary criticism ; for which
it cannot fail to supply a rich fundus of operative principles.
Owin^ to its scientific cohesion, it has an advantage in in-
INTRODUCTION.
39
^■rJ' ><
fluencing the other branches of literary art that is not
possessed by unsystematic criticism. And from isolated
criticism — the criticism that is applied to separate works or
fragments of works— it is still further distinguished by being
Removed above the element of personality ; and of personality
in both its forms. In the first instance, it is spared the
temptation, or the necessity, of criticising individual writers, f
And in the second, it evades such circumstances of the critic's
own personality as the want of space, the necessity of a treat- yj.-^y^
ment that shall be popular, diffuse, and without regard to any
scientific basis, and more specially, a position on a staff of
writers, where, the general tenor of thought being prescribed,
the critic is not entirely free, or where, if its tenor is pro-
miscuous, he finds little reason for preserving consistency.
Absolutely central to the sciniccs which control literary
criticism Style must always be. Psychological distinctions
manifest themselves here most appreciably. At no point,
therefore, is its culture unattended by a reflex illumination of
these sciences, which present such Pacific expansions of
novelty for speculation. Itself forms the first in the order
of analytical development ; the second being that general
science which has for its main divisions Poetry, Philosophy,
etc. The third is the science of Ehetoric, the synthesis and
application of both; which may be viewed, in the latter
respect, as a special science, in the former, and by way Qf
comprehending the others, as equivalent to the theoretical
generally in literary science.
The sciences in this triad, while they are complementary
to each other, and admit of a natural sequence in their
40 INTRODUCTION.
treatment, admit of being treated independently of one
another. At the same time they all acknowledge the follow-
ing method of division, (1) as a body of facts shown in their
scientific cohesion, (2) as a body of principles shown in their
ultimate significance, and (3) as a body of truth shown in its
relations to praxis. Accordingly the immediate science
divides itself as, in the first place, the Analytic of Style, in
the second, the Logic, and in the third, the Synthetic of Style.
With regard to which partition it is to be noted, in the first
place, that the nomenclature is ambiguous, in so far as the
metliod is concerned, that being in the Logic as much analytic
as in the technical Analytic itself. In the second place, the
Logic, with which this volume is engaged, usurps the place of
the Analytic ; the order is transposed ; the inversion being a
matter of scientific propriety and of convenience. Tlie de-
ductive portion, however, which the Logic represents, founds
exclusively on the inductive, represented by the Analytic (by
which indeed it was suggested). Does the Logic, therefore,
contain more or less than is warranted by the other, it errs,
certainly by inadvertence, possibly by fallacy. The Analytic
of Style, along with the Synthetic, or third and final section,
is for the time withheld. Not unnaturally the speculative
treatment by itself may seem to exhibit a certain lieartless-
ness of abstraction. And to exhibit Style abruptly in its
unity, its principle, is doubtless to make it somewhat ab-
struse for the general reader. Nevertheless it is here, in any
event, that the supreme nisus must be made. The Analytic
is only secured, whetlier by anticipation or not, through a
rationale of the fundamental principles of Style in their
ultimate coherence — after which to pursue the theme into its
separate sections is mere undress and holiday scramble.
THE LOGIC OF STYLE.
CHAPTER I.
Of Style Genekally.
Section I. Of Expression Generally.
1.
That is a natural distinction which obtains between Thought
as it exists in the mind per se — Thought pure and essential —
and Thought as formulated in Expression, The distinction
is natural in so far as it is first fundamental, and secondly
obvious. And it holds not merely of Thought generally, but
of Thought in particular. It is true, therefore, of every result
of mental activity in which Thought and Expression coexist;
what is contemplated being, not an order of cases in which
the antithesis basks between two quasi-equivalent terms, of
which the one is a spurious or precarious form of the other,
but the universal case, in which it glares between the two
relations of any term, considered in the one view as Expres-
sion, and in the other as Thought.
No antithesis can be conceived more universal, since it is
an antithesis whose principle is involved in every expres-
sion. No principle the most universal can be expressed
42 LOGIC OF STYLE.
which does not involve it. But this is not the entire truth.
It has a distinctive mode of involution, superadded to the
otlier and arising from it. Lord S. holds that ]\Ir. Y. is
the proper person to fill a vacant office of state. That he
means what he says is one thing ; but that it implies some-
thing else in addition is another, as is clear from this, that
his assertion gives offence to Lord T., who presumably
holds another view, since he contradicts the view of Lord
S. And he seconds his contradiction by the avowal that
Mr. X. is the person for the situation. But having avowed
so much, he likewise imjjlies (what is painfully disagree-
able to Lord S.) that Mr. Y.'s claims are not for a moment
to be put in comparison with those of his respected friend
■ Mr. X. And if Lord S. cherishes animosity against Lord T.
it will be not so much because it was asserted that ]\Ir. X.
was worthy of the place, as because it was implied that his
candidate and 2^'^'oteg6 Mr. Y. was not. If, indeed, you
accept the expression of favour shown for his client by
each of tlie noble lords, you will be convinced that both
ought to have the place ; but if you accept his implication,
you will see that both are equally unfit. Wherever, there-
fore, a principle is expressed, it is not involved. And con-
versely, where it is involved, it is not expressed. Now the
peculiarity of our principle — that of the distinction be-
tween thought and expression — is that the truth which it
expresses is at the same moment also involved or implied.
For since every principle that is expressed involves this
principle, and this principle is now expressed, it follows
that this principle involves this principle, i.e. involves
itself. Q. E. D. ItseK is involved by itself, and is itself an
illustration of itself The implication in the case we con-
OF STYLE GENEEALLY. 43
siderecl first is not, of course, the same in kind with the latter
implication, which is more strictly an involution. It was
introduced merely by way of oblique illustration. On
reading a proposition, its implication (in the proper sense)
is the first to occur to any one. A higher reflection is
needed to suggest to itself the relation which in addition it
involves — the antithetic relation of thought and expres-
sion — as well as the universality of that involution ; and
still a higher to perceive that this is not merely an abstract
relation, but a concrete — a fact coincident with its own
principle, and a subject amenable to its own laws.
Cor. — No distinction is held with the most lively chance of
being realised, until it is seen in a concrete case. And
generally such an illustration is hardest to bring to light,
when it is most necessary that it should be forthcoming to
vindicate the principle— in many cases to enforce it, in some
even to mahe it intelligible. In this instance there is no
such difficulty. The principle of the distinction is universal.
Allowing for the extreme of abstruseness and complexity, it
provides also for the extreme of simplicity. A simple
thought, therefore, is as completely an illustration of the
antinomy in its relation to expression as a complex.
The independence in the mutual relations of thought and
expression is one that practically holds true only of thought,
and for expression is quite nugatory. For the latter the distinc-
tion is purely an abstract, not an operative distinction. For
the former, too, it is only practical within certain limits.
The activity of thought must, as a rule, be enhanced and
multiplied by permitting a formula, and with a result whose
L.
44 LOGIC OF STYLE.
magnitude is often inversely as the force employed. I do not
mean simply in such a case as that of an intellectual revolu-
tion, whose influences radiate through a purely literary
medium; since that suggests too advantageously for illus-
tration the inseparable element of expression, and its value
as a medium — but in an order of cases where both elements
are combined in by no means a similar degree of harmony
and purity. In a political revolution, for example, there is
one constant and animating element of thought, whether pro-
pagating itself by mere animal contagion of sympathy, or by
sympathy of a more intellectual type. Which element is
radically the same with that in the other case, and its con-
ditions of success are essentially the same, and its mode of
working is in principle the same. The prominent fact in this
instance, as in the other, is the communication of the influ-
ence, which again we will suppose to have radiated from
a solitary individual. Thus between the origin and the
result, the obscure origin and the vast result, there is, if we
look forward, merely the fact of a silence ; if we look back-
ward, merely the fact of a silence negated. Simply in his
own person the initiator could not have affected what, by
this negation of his silence, he has virtually effected. Other-
wise he must single-handed have done the whole work,
manned the batteries, marched in a body to the point of
attack, etc. And just in proportion as he discarded expres-
sion, would he become increasingly unable to fulfil his
mission, when it was becoming increasingly necessary that
he should fulfil it. The more thought is required, therefore,
the more does expression as a coefficient mount into impor-
tance. And if forethought, in certain relations, expression
/A
is indispensable/ much more is thought indispensable to
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 45
expression ; since only in and through thought is expression
possessed of a living and elastic energy.
1. Considered in their idtimatc relation to each other,
thought has a regulative value for expression. To say that
expression has no significance apart from thought is the
same thing as saying that it has no existence apart
from thought: its very existence founds upon its being
significant. For it is to be noted that this significance is
not the figurative thing that is commonly represented by
the term in relation to individual expressions. It is, in
fact, the condition of their existence ; which existence, in
its turn, becomes the condition of the derived significance
as popularly understood. The meaning of the symbol
" brand," for instance, is for us that of a billet under con-
sumption by fire, and reduced more or less to a smoulder-
ing red. So long as it preserves this form, every English-
man understands what is meant. But let the letters be
transposed, so that they shall read " bnard," and instantly
for us it becomes unintelligible. Its total significance has
not disappeared, however ; only its actual significance has
disappeared. Its potential significance remains ; its precise
significance for us now consisting in this that it is un-
iuteUigible, i.e. not directly and immediately significant.
For the savage in the same way a very simple sign may
produce discomfiture, as before something which he can
easily reproduce, but which he cannot interpret. That dis-
comfiture arises not more from ignorance than from know-
ledge ; it being the special aggravation of the case that to
his perception of the sign he adds so much acquaintance
with the principle of signs generally, as to decide that this
sign is not accidental, but for somebody has an obvious
46 LOGIC OF STYLE.
interpretation that is denied to him. The occasion of his
perplexity is the same with that of the art of the pro-
fessional decipherer. In the one case, however, the
possible significance of symbols mediates only to con-
scious recognition of ignorance, in the other to its removal.
2. It is npon thought that the positive and immediate
significance of every expression depends. Expression has
no operative value, except as being the medium of propaga-
tion for thought ; a truth which holds particularly in rela-
tion to expressions connected in a series, since that depends
entirely upon the logical movement of tlie thought, and the
associations inseparably connected with each expression.
Of which express corroboration is found in the fact
(apparently iiTeconcileable with the principle) that a mean-
ing may be gleaned from propositions whose terms are not
separately clear. The onus of the weak terms has simply
been borne by the stronger, which, but for their own
integrity, must themselves have succumbed under the
extra responsibility. The proposition has proved intelli-
gible in spite of the casual unintelligibility of one of the
terms, not in spite of the rule which demands the intelli-
gibility of all the terms. Under the latter alternative the
meaning of the proposition as a whole would not have been
made out. And very specially it is overlooked, in arguing
for the contradiction of the rule by this apparent exception,
that in the final result the word is intelligible ; what is
contemplated in the rule being that no term shall be
introduced which may absolutely withstand the plenary
power of a passage to interpret itself, a power of interpreta-
tion that extends even over its obscure members. For
there is a separate reason why any superficial canon,
OF STYLE GENEUALLV. 47
ordaining tlie exclusion of obscure terms, should be
suspended. What the familiar terms of the proposition are
commissioned to raise to their own status is invariably a
term that is not absolutely unfamiliar, but simply is not
yet quite explicitly comprehended. And what they do is
to ratify, under a specific collocation of ideas, what had
been left inchoate under other collocations, though pre-
pared by tliese successively for that ratification. It is
because the number of alternatives was limited, under
which the unknown term could be understood, that it has
been understood. And it is the other terms in the connec-
tion which have been exactly the agency (for I represent
them collectively, not individually as agents) in reducing
these alternatives from indeterminateness to an operative
and influential definiteness. That agency evidently is not
the one to be overlooked. And yet it is the agency that is
overlooked, in saying that the meaning has been reached
independently of the connection between expression and
thought. To deny the interdependence is in fact as
rational as, in the converse case, to complain of the want
of news in a public journal, in the forgetfulness of the
circumstance that one had previously gone the round of all
the contemporary papers within reach.
3. Indirectly thought is always present in expression.
This is what the mechanical reader chiefly misses — the
suggestiveness of certain collocations of thought. For
there is a very trenchant distinction between the man
who reads with just enough intelligence to surmount
the meaning of every proposition as it reached him,
and the man who reads with active intelligence sufficient
to explicate for himself the associations with which the
48 LOGIC OF STYLE.
terms of a proposition may exalt and reflect its primary
significance.
" She came to tlie village cliurcli
And sat by a pillar alone ;
An angel watching an nrn
Wept over her, carved in stone ;
And once, but once, slie lifted her eyes,
And suddenly, sweetly, strangely l)lu.sli'd,
To find they were met by my own." '■
The situation is infinitely natural — tlie evasive quies-
cence of the maiden, confronted by the eternal, aggressive
masculine gaze — for else how could the boy knoiv that she
had lifted her eyes only once? — and the disruption, in
which, through a mere gleam, a quiver, all is for her
undone, and the very quiescence has become for Aim
treacherously significant. But the circumstances, but the
associations — the fusion of sentiment at that exact point
where the spiritual merges into the sensuous — the intensity
of ritual suggestion, variously expounded by the solemn
agencies of the ceremonial, mystically by the organ,
articulately by the priest, and by the worshippers in a
murmured unison that is half mystical, half articulate —
confounded and overborne by the intensity of human passion,
that ought to be in antagonism to it, but is not, does not
strive with it, therefore, but leagues it subtly with itself,
and so helps to concentrate and amplify the sense of com-
munion — a communion equivocal, and founding expressly
upon a truth equivocally applied, viz. Love — all this
perishes as in a vacuum to the careless reader. In this re-
lation, therefore, he may legitimately be styled mechanical,
either from his want of the power of reflection, or from his
1 From Mr. Tennv-son's "Maud."
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 49
want of the power of attention, interfering with the natural
action of tlie other. Not that every passage will Lear the
same stress of reflection. The difficulty often is to avoid
reflection. Indeed an evil motive in criticism, whether of
partiality for or against a writer, where it does not manifest
itself in tampering with the views expressed by him, will
manifest itself in tampering with the expression of these
views — in reading for profound what is superficial, and for
superficial what is profound. And the rationale of the fact
which is so vaguely expressed in saying that a man sees in
the writing of another more or less than there is to be seen,
is precisely this, that unduly he masses and brings into
relief, or fails duly to integrate and gather into a focus the
collateral suggestions of the text.
Cor. — No distinction more visionary could be drawn than
that which it might be attempted to draw between the
organic in expression and the mechanical. Such a distinction
(if it has any meaning at all, apart from that indicated in § 1)
can only take effect in relation to the movement of full-blown
propositions. Now it is here precisely that the power of
expression in the way of oblique suggestion is most valuable,
for reciprocally controlling and modifying the meaning of the
constituent terms in a proposition, so as to preserve its organic
unity. Let us, for instance, examJne this proposition: "Tlie
prejudices of society have not been found directly to aid its
progress." If we subtract the word "not" from the pro-
position, we sliall have committed a most comprehensive
felony upon the tenor and direction of the thought. It ran
from east to west : we have made it run from west to east.
But if, reintroducing the "not," we expunge the word
" directly," we shall effect substantially the same result. The
50 LOGIC OF STYLE.
well-being of a state would doubtless be increased, if that
malignity of prejudice were absent, which often springs from
local or individual rivalry. Yet that may help to breed com-
petition and higher activity in branches of trade that else
might languish. And so prejudice does not absolutely im-
pede the progress of society, but indirectly abets it. Other
flexions might be given to the proposition, such as that " im-
mediately," or " finally," or " unconsciously," or " impalpably,"
or " paradoxically," or " naturally," " the prejudices of society
have been found to aid its progress." But always another in-
flection is given to the sense. Expressions the most contra-
dictory, such as "paradoxically," and "naturally," may on
occasion be used indifferently; and expressions like "un-
consciously " and " impalpably " (where the one is as it were
the specific form, the other the generic) may be substituted
for each other. But there is no expression, however faintly
differing from another, for which, in precise writing, most
circumstances are not crucial in applying its distinction from
that other.
In. regard to which it may be observed, that the new
specific terms that are continually being made do not tend to
supersede the old, any more than they do in the mind of the
individual writer — old terms revealing themselves to his mind
more explicitly and completely, and new terms filling up
lacunas in thought hitherto unsuspected. In both instances
the movement is universal, that of a tide, not of a wave. And
it is only by relation to the terms of older standing that tlie
new are enabled to maintain their position. The old is not
therefore indefinite, because the new happens to be specific,
nor the new incomplete, because the other is more imiversal.
The coarse and grotesque way of interpreting innovation in
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 51
expression is that all fresh terminology supersedes the ancient,
and is useless ; further that it tends unnecessarily to multiply
terms, and is therefore harmful, which is precisely to say
that the needle tends to supersede the chisel. IMeantime the
value of the needle generally consists in this, that it does not
do every kind of work, and in particular that it is not avail-
able for the work to be done by the chisel. And to put a
stop to the variation of terms before the proper limit, is not
merely to suppress the immediate forms of variation, but the
possible ramifications of these in arrear. For every new
thought there must arise a corresponding expression. Nor
can any other principle be laid down, by which the number
of ideas shall be increased for every term from this limit to
the abracadabra or ideal formula, which shall embrace ex-
plicitly the whole cycle of knowledge and being, the sum of
things actual and possible. An economising of terms has no
use apart from an economising of ideas. But such an ex-
pedient as that of diminishing the number of terms would
never reduce the sum of ideas. If it could, it would do so
wrongly. The only real economy that is possible in the matter
is in the suppression of the riderless and supernumerary
among terms. And so it is that economy is in exact
harmony with the converse canon, viz. that every expression
shall have its independent thought. To multiply expressions,
therefore, for a single idea is not to enhance the chances of its
being distinguished, but to defeat them ; and in this case to
violate the canon of reciprocity by sheer blankness of mean-
ing, as in the other by sheer multiplicity of interconfounded
association. Hence, and on both sides, the essential vice of
modern slang; which may be described generally as the
tendency, on the one hand, to elevate expressions drawn from
52 LOGIC OF STYLE.
the vulgar quasi-professional classes, etc., and on the other to
degrade expression, by drawing into a comical quasi-figurative
reference terms of ordinary and even catholic significance.
Thus, on the one side, we have a pui-poseless multiplication
of terms for such acts as stealing, running away, etc., and on
the other, a burdening of certain terms, such as " governor "
and " lot " (c.ff. " a queer lot " applied to an individual) with a
superfetation of meanings. This happens obviously within
limits. Since no possibility of leisure, no possibility of
malice, could ever enable an individual or a number of in-
dividuals to multiply terms for every thought ; and no
possibility of indolence or of preoccupation can prevent men
from fitting up most of their ideas with an adequate ter-
minology. But excesses and defects do exist more or less in
all languages to disturb the just equilibrium between the in-
novations of language and the stagnation of thought. In so
far as these tend to neutralise each another, thought is kept in
activity. Otherwise, in individual instances, they constitute
separate sources of imperfection — such as might be found in
polyandry superadded to polygamy.
Expression is to be regarded as coinciding Avith thought ;
but inasmuch as every thought (with certain obvious excep-
tions) is complex, a dual or equivocal relation arises for ex-
pression, that, viz., in which it corresponds wholly to the
thought, and that in which it corresponds to it only in part.
This happens constantly in composition, where terms are used
now in relation to their generic meaning, now in relation to
their specific. One may say, for example, that " curiosity led
a man to watch the movements of the celestial bodies,"
OF .STYLE GENERALLY. -to
where he means simply " the desire of knowledge," dis-
engaged from the element of pettiness and gratuitousness
which is implied in the actual statement. Or again, he may-
say that " the desire of knowledge induced a man to open
his friend's writing-case, and examine his correspondence,"
when he means curiosity. In the one instance he says too
much, in the other too little; and in both cases we know
analytically by how much, the measure of excess in the one
being identically the measure of defalcation in the other.
But the novelty is this, that it is by the very inaccuracy of
the statement that we are able to correct it, and by substitut-
ing the one reciprocal for the other to give our amended
version of the truth. The principle of specification has been
abused in the one case, and neglected in the other. But
virtually/ it has righted itself. And by way of compensation
its value now mounts into its place and is realized, when we
present the truth in its authorized form. • Thus it happens
that expression may be represented in two aspects, under the
one of which it is exceedingly vague, and under the other
exceedingly definite. A charge of verbalism, for example, is
a charge of meaninglessness. And, on the other hand, ex-
pression is regarded as the seal and redundance of faithfulness
in all communication. Tlie one founds upon the indisputably
arbitrary nature of signs considered in themselves, the other
on the indisputable teleologic value of signs. Convertibly
thought and expression are the same ; a virtual coincidence
being secured, whether the expression is something more, or
less, or else, than the thought. But their coincidence may be
actual as well as merely virtual. And hence the relation of
expression to thought is equivocal.
If every term as it is met with in general writing were
54 LOGIC OF STYLE.
to be understood ahvays in its sjjccial incidence, and not
with reference to its proximate terms, its genus and
species, it would begin to fluctuate in its meaning ; that
meaning would begin to be shared by other terms, and it
itself by degrees might ((|uite apart from the dialectical
tendency of language) drift into other relationships, and
become the bearer of successive associations widely differing
from each other. That, for the most part, the phrases in
present use have not yielded to such a tendency, is to be
ascribed to the fact of the counter-tendency to revert after
deflection to the original signification. These terms pre-
serve in a double sense the consistency of language, both
in themselves, and for others, by acting as centres of
stability amid fluctuation. But occasionally they them-
selves fluctuate ; and in so far language is elastic and not
rigid ; as, with regard to the essentially unstable terms, it
is elastic, not ductile. It gains its virtual immobility by
seasonable fluctuation. But that literary effect varies, not
in relation to langunge alone, (and, for example, the very
contradictory expression of what one means is a form of
wit) and bears an equivocal relation through what is itself
essentially stable, may be illustrated from mathematics,
which hitherto has shown itself the most adamantine and
inexorable of standards. Fifty pounds are fifty for the
banker and for everybody. But the literary significance
of fifty is different from its financial. Three may be more
significant. But also fifty may be more significant than
three. This significance then is variable, and aifronts
arithmetic, first by discarding its principle of proportion,
and, in the next breath, by coming back to it. But note how
for all that it is indebted to the arithmetical immobility.
OF STYLE GENERALLY. o5
For if the number fifty were not always the same, whether
existing at a premium with regard to three, or at a discount,
who could guarantee that the one, which had stood up with
alacrity to discount the other, should not have transmuted
itself into some third number when the time came for it to be
discounted ? The invariability of the number, therefore, which
is the safeguard of the banker against embezzlement by his
clerks, is precisely the safeguard of literary significance.
Cor. — Writing generally consists in a variation of the two
styles of absolute precision and merely relative precision. And
so long as that variation is preserved, it is to a certain extent
indifferent in individual cases which style is observed. The
ideal absurdity would be to use the generic and the specific as
convertible where they are not, and to neglect using them as
convertible where they are indifferent. To say, therefore, that
it is indifferent which standard is used, does not imply that
the privilege of having alternate standards is to be abused. A
writer, from extreme prepossession or carelessness, may use a
generic term for a specific, and vice versa ; so as to bewilder
his readers by ambiguity, or even absolutely to mislead them.
In this case the alternative standard becomes simply pestilent,
A second order of cases is that in which it is really indifferent,
as to the sense, whether the expression is absolutely precise
or not. Here there is a legitimate use of the standard as sup-
plementary to the other. But thirdly, there are occasions on
which this standard becomes virtually or even absolutely a
complementary standard. Thus, for example — what suits emi-
nently the elliptical method of poetical expression — it is so in
the lines : —
Like form in Scotland is not seen,
Treads not such step on Scottish green —
56 LOGIC OF STYLE.
a rare truism iu itself, since notwithstanding that certain types
of gait might accompany certain types of figure, everybody
knows that no two men have the same shape and carriage.
But for that very reason it is seen that something more is
hinted than the truistic fact — a comparison within the com-
parison, and an expression of pre-eminent or paramount dignity
associated M-ith form and step. Again the antithesis of the
idea may be employed to convey a transferred meaning. Thus
in the expression : —
Fallen heroes want
Yonder in heaven their crown of blessedness
Till the last bondsmmi clasp unfettered hands
O'er the last slaver whelm'd beneath the wave,
the word " bondsman" is taken to designate a special agent
in a significant circumstance, where ex hypothesi the individual
is no longer a bondsman. To such an extent does the prin-
ciple of expression sublate itself in its literal form (and quite
apart from every metaphorical usage of terms) for a relative
and virtual intelligibility ; and in special cases by hinting the
substantial truth where more is expressed, by integrating it
where less, and by rectifying it where the reverse is expressed.
Section II. Of Style in its relation to Expression.
4.
Style is the Differential in Expression : and this, which
exhibits it in its most characteristic reference, is its scientific
definition.
In relation to Style, expression, which tends indefinitely
to extend or differentiate itself as regards thought, must be
assumed to have reached a limit. It is very clear that Style
is not the differential of expression, in the same way that
(( u N J ^- K K ^i n^ \ A\
OK STYLE GENE11ALL\V^ ^ ,„ .//
expression may be regarded as the differential oriTToiiglit.
(1) Expression does not reach a limit in order to aHow style
to take up the process of specification. Such a limit would
he arbitrary ; and it would be unjust to expression to lay
down any terminus at which its distinctive principle was to
be superseded. (2) Style does not consist in stray specifi-
cations made by individual thinkers. That would be unjust
to itself These casual terms can only show themselves in
obedience to the general laws of differentiation ; and in so
far as they do that they belong to expression, not to style.
It is distinctly a proof of this (what might appear in direct
contradiction of it) that every expression in use at any
period must have been struck out by an individual. Since
precisely to the extent that it was necessary M'ould it be
adopted, with a rapidity that would confound the indivi-
duality of the discoverer. Of innovation in terminology
only these four kinds are possible, (1) that which is re-
quired and is adopted, (2) that which is required but is not
adopted (not being published widely enough for immediate
adoption), (3) that which is not required but is adopted,
and (4) that which is not required and is not adopted. These
classes, however, reduce themselves to two, the first and the
last ; since the other two tend to right themselves, and in
part by neutralising each other. Now (with regard to the
fourth) there are many terms that sj^rout up in the spor-
tiveness of correspondence, or in the heat and condensation
of journalism, that are literally ephemeral. And connecting
themselves with no catholic principle of expression, they
cannot be viewed as possibly approaching a thing so organic
as style. As to the terms of the first class, it is clear that
they are few, and can never serve as the exponent of a
58 LOGIC OF STYLE.
writer's individuality. Besides, being engrossed by other
writers, they lose, except to the antiquary, any value as
having been originated by him ; the very permanence of
literature, which guarantees the perpetuation of the term,
gainsaying its permanence as affecting our estimate of the
oriirinator. It is to his use of the common items of expres-
sion that a man owes his individuality. The limit which
expression is assumed to have reached for style is not, there-
fore, a limit at which innovation in expression begins ; which
would be to extend the limit that ex hypothesi is final That
process is the very one which we must assume to have
ceased. For now the movement for style is precisely in the
opposite direction. Accordingly to differentiate expression
is obviously not to distribute it by diversification of indivi-
dual expressions, but (3) to redistribute it, by combining and
unifying a variety of these under a definite idiosyncrasy.
Tlie individuality in the one case is that of a fact, in the
other that of a person — of individuals as against individuals,
writers against writers, speakers against speakers. Formally
the principle of the one is variety, that of the other unity.
Only style tends also to differentiation in a mass, with a
resultant variety of styles proportioned to the variety of
individual expressions.
Cor. — The relation of style to expression is one of complete
interdependence. Expression being distinctively the basis of
the other, there is no point in its extension by which style
does not profit ; being the sphere for the exhibition of style,
which raises the potential in expression to the actual, there
is no extension of style by which it does not profit. All that
is assumed is, therefore, a certain totality of expression.
Which totality, acting, in the second i)lace, in combination
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 59
witli psychological tendencies, is determined, in the third
place, to a known variation and recnrrence of certain forms of
expression, forming in itself that totality of expression,
in its extent or intensity, which we call a man's style.
This is properly illustrated in the relation of the classical
and Saxon elements in the English language. It has
been shown (§ 2, p. 50) to be gratuitous and unscientific to
treat the former element as if by possibility it could supplant
the latter. Together they form a totality of expression, in
which generally (1) the Latin (as the typical exoteric element)
is the differential of the Saxon. " World " for example has its
definite significance, generally considered. But what of it iu
special relations — in relation to totality as compared with its
own local sections ? In that case it is " cosmopolitan." Or
"what of it again by way of relation to the transcendent whole
of the universe, or as equivalent itself to that whole ? It then
becomes " sublunary," or " cosmical." And through the com-
bination of these two elements it is that the genius of the
English nation is realised in that special literary form which
we call its " idiom." Out of that relation, however, arises
another, in which each element becomes a separate function,
or a separate aggregate of functions. Thus, roughly speaking,
the Saxon takes cognisance of facts, the Latin of principles.
More particularly, the Saxon is concerned with the domestic
and the catholic sensibilities (in a nation so keenly alive, on
the one hand, to the tendernesses, and, on the other, to the
sublimities of human sympathy as the English) and the Latin
with the abstract relations of things. Thus (2) in regard to
the totality of expression, each becomes a co-differential with
the other. Each represents a leading psychological distinc-
tion. Latin, as being the element which is not the vernacular,
60 LOGIC OF STYLE.
and being superinduced upon the other (as the thinking of the
adult is superinduced upon the thinking of the child), becomes
valuable not for its Ijeing casually or immediately the nega-
tion of popular thinking, but positively for its catholic
precision, which is the cardinal test and necessity of a
scientific diction. On the other hand, the virtue of our Saxon
lies in its simplicity, which is the necessity of a poetical
diction. A writer's general bias will, therefore, be determined
by the proportion in which the two elements mingle in his
expression. For evidently it is a proportion, in which neither
is found exclusively. And hence (3) the Latin and the Saxon
become each rcd-promlly the differential of the other. If, in
average use, these two elements bear a certain proportion to
each other, then evidently the writer who uses more Latin
than other people has that for the differentia of his literary
manner, — the quantity being supposed equal in all cases, he
will use less of the Saxon. And similarly in the converse
case. A more natural case, of course, is that of subvarieties in
these elements. Thus, of two. writers having a poetical and
philosophic diction, one has in addition a scientific bias ; that
becomes his differentia, not, however, simply in relation to the
Latin compound, but to the whole complement of his ex-
pression. The Saxon is still a co-efficient to discriminate
that complement from any other; what was expressed in
the previous instance by extent, being now represented by
intensity, as measured by recurrence.
5.
Since Style is to be viewed, first, as concerned with the
relation of each individual writer to the totality of expression,
it is concerned, secondly, with the relation of the totality of
writers to the totality of expression, and mediately, in the
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 61
tliiixl place, with tlie individual in relation to the totality of
■svriters. Each style thus becomes reciprocally the differential
of every other. To speak mathematically, the style of every
writer represents some function of every other.
As a literature grows, it becomes obvious that the ten-
dency of its writers in succession is to diverge from each other.
But at a certain point it begins to be suspected that the
mode of the new writers is in part a reproduction of the old.
The principle of variation, in fact, is limited. Moreover, it
tends to a limit, viz, the circumference of all variations,
which is itself a new variety. And under that, either as a
fact realised, or as a possibility, the separate orders of ex-
pression are seen to be vitally connected with each other,
in so far as they are efficients of this common manifesta-
tion. The process is threefold. (1) The resultant varieties
may be regarded independently, as antagonistic and com-
plementary to each other. (2) From their limited number,
and the common relationships existing among all, they tend
to intersect and coincide with one another. (3) These
tendencies are combined, so as to involve an antagonism to
each, and a coincidence with all, in a variety which com-
prehends, and therefore supersedes all the rest. In this
latter case, which is the most interesting and important,
the relation of the writer is equally one of immanence and
transcendence. This transcendence is not that which A
exercises over B because he has so many more effects at
his call ; since B, in respect of that which is immanent in
himself, transcends A. It is because the great writer is
not transcended by any that he transcends all. And though
his transcendence founds on the same basis as theirs, viz.
immanence, that immanence is not of the ordinary type, the
62 LOGIC OF STYLE.
exclusive and siKcial immanence of a distinctive range of
expression absolutely liis own. The ordinary immanence
may be of two kinds, that which is common to all or that
which is peculiar to each. In this case it is neither, but
that which is peculiar to one in so far as it is distributed
separately among all. Other writers of individuality, when
the sum of all other individualities is taken, have sorae-
thins to add to it. To that sum he has nothing to add : it
is identically his own distinction. If it is a sum of 25, in
which A, B and C have each a share of one, it is clear that
he transcends each by 24. Or if X happens to travel in the
same way as himself, and musters up 13, him he transcends
by 12; i.e,. the gross result being taken, otherwise his
superiority to X travels in a geometrical ratio. The ideal
thus formed is no abstract ideal, but one that is essentially
concrete, one in which all the elements are resolved. It is
not meant, for example, that every peddling idiosyncrasy is in-
cluded in the individuality of Shakspere. But those elements
of expression are included like the wit of Ben Jonson, which
are possessed by certain poets in special measure, and
wdiich go to integrate a totality of their own. And
especially those pure and formal elements, which in some
degree are possessed by all true poets, structural felicity and
modulated intensity of expression — in simple terms, mas-
tery of quantity and quality. How the catholic behaves
when united with the individual, may be seen (in a dialec-
tical shape) in relation to nationality. AVhat we mean by
a classic, is a writer who represents adequately the genius
of his country, with sufficient force superadded of his own
to expound that genius and make it interesting. It is only,
therefore, by coalescing with a certain degree of force in
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 63
individuals, that the genius of a nation becomes a co-efficient
for its own illustration. It is quite another question to
what extent the appearance of such an individual may be
accidental, and whether it is the increase of the national
intelligence, or the increasing richness of national charac-
teristic, that is the immediate occasion of that illustration.
I assume simply that the national bias will be found
directly represented in its literature, apart from this as a
possibility, that the very earliest literature was not pre-
served just because it was simple, and reflected no national
complexity of character, while only such legends were pre-
served as were connected ex Jnjpothesi with the doings of
the race. But this very glorification of national tendencies
and national interests, defeats itself by demanding too
necessitously an increase of individual power. For obvi-
ously the supreme poet or the supreme thinker is not
national, but reflects the catholic in all nationality. But
his genius is not therefore anti-national. It is the danger
of a partial acuteness to conceive that a catholic genius is of
necessity opposed to a national. An English writer may,
in the first instance, by accident have the genius of a French-
man; in which case, of course, he is anti-national. Or,
secondly, he may have a truly catholic genius, in which
case his genius would infallibly be anti-national, but for the
chance of its coinciding, in the third place, with the
national genius, the nationality to which he belongs being
the most catholic. The common elements are glorified by
other nations in varying degrees, but by this in so perfect
a degree, as to become indefeasibly its differentia. The
catholic poets, the poets of intensity and compass, are those
of England ; the catholic thinkers, the systematic thinkers,
G4 LOGIC OF STYLE.
are those of Germany. And, as notoriously Sbakspere is
the unique catholic poet, so notoriously Hegel is the unique
catholic metaphysician. Absolutely catholic intellects they
are neither of them, since both are only partial ; and abso-
lutely catholic only that nation can be pronounced which
produces an intellect that shall be equally philosophic and
poetical. But evidently it is unjust, it is a perversion, to
exalt the individuality of either, as if it transcended the
national genius by its catholicity ; "svhen it is expressly as
being an outcome of that genius that it is catholic. Unjust
it is to the individual, since it represents his catholicity as
anti-national, which it is not, and to the nation, since it
represents as accidental what is essential.
CoE. — The function of a Logic is to give universals by
eliminating particulars. That which is common to all men
concretely in the midst of diversity, is the logical faculty;
that which is common to them, in spite of their common
logical faculty, is abstractly their diversity. Logic proper has
to deal with the first universal. And a Logic of Style is con-
cerned with the second, a universal as complete and scientific
as the other ; since every man has a differentia, as well as a
ground of community with other men. This universal is
Mode; a man's style being his mode, his manner, his
mannerism. The general questions concerned with this mode
are three. (1) As to the possible varieties of style which
may be possessed by any writer. In this respect he may
have a very complex differentiation ; from the philosopher, for
example, he may be distinguished by being also a poet, and
vice versa ; or from the poets and philosophers by some
special poetical or philosophic faculty ; or, through the same
faculty, from those who like himself are both. (2) As to the
OF STYLE GENEEALLY". ' 65
possible fluctuations in individual style within certain limits.
Such may be produced by changes in health, by varying
degrees of interest in the subject, or of aptitude for particular
modes of expression, speaking and writing. (3) As to the co-
herence of his literary manner with his manner as a whole ;
how far that is controlled by his temperament, and consists
with his personal habits and social bearing.
6.
The particular varieties of literary effect, with whatsoever
complexity they may manifest themselves, rest notoriously
upon a fundus of natural sensibility. This appears in three
forms, (1) as creative, (2) as reproductive, and (3) as critical
or negative.
That the same kind of power should be possessed by
more than one man, does not make it less original, or what
is meant specially by " genial." It is creative in so far as it
is not communicable. And causing in the reader a desire
to reproduce it, in the same breath it shows him his
impotence to do anything but imitate it. For the
distinction between reproduction and imitation is that
the first obtains a revival of the principles of certain
orders of effect, and the second merely a resemblance
to certain isolated effects. And what imitation is ordi-
narily to reproduction, reproduction is in this case to
creation; and accordingly, since ex hy'pothesi these effects
are unique, any attempt to reproduce them falls to the ^;
level of imitation. For there are two orders of creative
sensibility, which may be described as the faculty of
developing the possibilities of expression. On the one
hand it manifests itself as the jower to devise new fo rms of
E
66 LOGIC OF STYLE.
QQmbmaiioit-^afidr~strapMcation, etc., and on the other to
mature new orders of individual effect. It is, for example,
an approach to the expansion of style in the latter aspect,
to produce a pecidiar mode of fanciful or humorous ex-
pression. And to the expansion of it in its former aspect,
it is a contribution, to discover a principle of transition by
which the general sense of elegance or economy is en-
hanced, at the same time that the demands of the case for
fulness are adequately met. The former element tends
sometimes in the direction of eccentricity ; which is in any
case revolting, because it is either unaffected, in which case
it is monstrous, or assumed, in which case it is insolent.
But the eccentricity, which immediately I speak of, arises
just from attempting externally to reproduce what is
absolutely original in another man's expression, and so fall-
ing into grotesque travestie. And the tendency is the more
dangerous, because the result is for many people so much
more striking than quieter and more perfect effects. Hence
its essential vulgarity, which consists, not in preferring
what is loud to what is unobtrusive, but in preferring what
is simply clumsy to what is forcible. Tor there is a sphere
in which higher effects are attainable, and with the
additional privilege of being legitimate, and not essentially
futile. This is the alternative sphere indicated, in which
the copyists may be as successful as the original artists,
provided they have the power readily to appropriate the
turns of thought devised by earlier writers, and to employ
them in their variety and relevance. To a certain extent,
therefore, this power is accompanied by a power that is
critical or negative. Generally, it manifests itself in
perceiving that certain turns of expression are in them-
OF STYLE GENERALLY, 67
selves vulgar and clumsy, aud for ever, therefore, irrelevant.
Ill its higher form, it consists of a discrimination of effects,
which ill themselves are valid, as invalid in certain relations
— inadequate, redundant, or vicious. For not the perception
merely or chiefly of what is good in itself is the test of true '
sensitiveness, but of what is good in certain circumstances.
Such a sensibility will manifest itself, therefore, in the
repudiation of every mode of expression that is incongruous
with the prevailing cast of thought, or the general structure
of a proposition ; in the perception, that this or that
expression requires to be expunged or modified, as affecting
too severe_a_jp^,lification of a certain idea, or requires
modification before it can operate'^axrequatdy as an
exponent of the spirit of a certain passage. JNIost obviously,
this capacity is useful in critically reorganising and re-
modelling one's own compositions. Every writer feels the
necessity more or less of altering his first draught of a com-
position for the better, not only in the conception and
motif, and the modification of long reaches of thinking, by
the resources of transposition, and the altering of distant
proportions, or the interpolation of new ideas, etc., but in
the diction itself.
CoE. — What is good in an author's expression may be rather
the reflex of good thinking otherwise, than the result of a
general capacity for Style. The more logically, for instance, a
man thinks, the less will he be disposed to write with any
extra measure of gracefulness. Yet that of itself is a guar-
antee for a certain quality of elegance. And where he is
most of all in a condition to benefit by his logic, is where it
coexists with the independent facilities and graces of expres-
sion. There is, in fact, no collateral agency, whether of
68 LOGIC OF STYLE.
intellect or of temper, that may not co-operate to individual
force of style. And no writer is above being improved by
the aid of the machinery which exists internally for ratify-
ing his distinctive brilliance as an artist, in the way of repro-
duction and revision. Naturally, in connection with revision,
it sounds paradoxical to say that a man is inevitably an artist,
whose original execution leaves much to remodel, and no artist,
because it leaves nothing to amend. For evidently it is just
the impracticable blockhead, who will find it most diflBcult
to vary his original conceptions. In this, however, he is
formally on a level with the greatest of impromptu performers.
And what is intended is, that, with every necessity for
amendment, there must exist a corresponding ability to meet
it. In the case of the blockhead, the necessity for improve-
ment exists at a maximum, with the minimum power of
counteraction ; with the supreme artist it exists at a mini-
mum, with the additional pleasant condition of a critical taste
at its maximum. Certainly a happy adjustment applied to
continuous expression is a crucial test of the artist, under con-
ditions of success so liable to disturbance, even from physical
causes. And if in such circumstances the mental balance is
disturbed, it is evident to what extent it must draw^ upon its
facilities for repeal and amendment. Apart from this, the
critical faculty is constantly used in the original composition.
And that it is not needed for subsequent correction is due,
not to the spontaneity of the mind in that original effort
having oveiTidden the necessity for it, but precisely to its
having itself been in full play ; that it is required ultimately,
being a sign ^ro tanto of its not having co-operated originally
to produce a satisfactory residt.
OF STYLE GENERALLY. G9
Section III. Of Style in its relation in Rhetoric.
The method of Style is essentially that of a Critique, i.e. a
separation or dis-cernment of individual expressions from each
other, in so far as it has to do with expression, and of indi-
vidual complements of expression from each other, in so far
as it has to do with individuals. This method, on the one
side, is distinguished from the dialectical, by placing its
specific results and items as ultimate and permanent, and
expressly as not having a tendency to pass into each other.
On the other, the science is distinguished from Ehetoric,
whose function it is to apply the data of expression ; and
which stands, therefore, as l^e practical science of Style. \
A man's literary power is ^?'oTaM7oli fund of expression ;
indestructible, but capable of being modified within certain
limits, of being extended or intensified, limited or sup-
pressed. The final question, in the case where one writer
is pitted against another, is as to the adaptation of their
respective styles jtojthe circumstances. And thus expres-
sions begin to acquire invidiously, so to speak, and by way
of rivalry, a certain value as opposed to each other. The
duty of every artist is accordingly, (1) to develop his own
special skill of diction, (2) to supplement it with whatever
hie may lawfully reproduce from the common fund of ex-
pression, and (3) to adopt the several varieties of diction
to the separate circumstances in which he thinks accommo-
dation is demanded — which may include expressly the abne-
gation of the more luxurious or even more catholic effects
for the sake of the lower and coarser. The science of
70 LOGIC OF STYLE.
jthis distribution, affiliating itself to Style at tliis point,^
Elietoric ; and its function on the negative side is to con-
travene and truncate mere stylic brilliance, where that is
necessary — to reproduce spontaneity in chasteness of propor-
tion, and the transcendental in the practical, and, generally,
to insist on the subordination of immediate to mediate
effect. Thus high literary effort upon a magnificent scale
is a desirable thing in relation to the literary ideal. But
the high style on occasion may be useless, and for effect
virtually lower than one absolutely less forcible. That
collision, however, may be resolved, and the former ideal
restored, if it should happen that culture could be given,
by not condescending to the immediate exigencies. There
are degrees of merit in the different standards. Nor does
the higher artist supersede tlie lower, even if his literary
culture be merely secondary, and superinduced by the
necessity to write, because some men must read him — i.e.
are compelled to apply to him for instruction — who have
no occasion to study the higher models. Even lie, the
journeyman author, the conscript, has it in his power to
raise the art as an art, (1) by raising the average standard
of execution, (2) the standard of appreciation, (3) the pro-
fessional standard, stimulated by the non-professional
sympathy, and reacting upon it.
Cor. — This distinction is the broad external distinction
between Elietoric and Style, according to which the one is the
regidative science of the facts which constitute the other. The
condition of origin being satisfied, in Style, Rhetoric deals with
the conditions of result. A man is bound, in the first instance,
by individual, local, or professional bias; his individuality
combating these elements perhaps, or coalescing with them to
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 71
a good or a bad purpose. These he may wish, in the next
instance, to foster or to overcome for certain ends. And so
there arises the teleologic ideal, according to which it is deter-
mined not what the man ought absolutely to be, but what he
ought relatively to be.
Style is distinguished more especially from Ehetoric, by
taking account of ideas immediately connected with each
other in detail, while PJietoric is the science of passages and
pieces in their totality. To regard an entire paragraph, as
offering a relief to another, for example, is rhetorical and para-
stylic. The two sciences become thus complementary modes
of viewing any particvilar passage. For it may quite easily
happen that the individual expressions are good, but that the
disposition of the larger masses is confused or disproportionate,
or that 'the total conception is clear, but the diction clumsy,
etc., there being thus not one criterion, but two criteria. The
distinction is most easily illustrated from a complete piece,
and one whose outlines are few even if complex, as for example
a poem, which allows a special condensation : —
BIETH AND DEATH.i
Ever gaze to each other two figures, one lit Avith the light
Of earth's sunshine, and one in the shadow thrown back from the
bright
Larger sun of the future. Lo, Birth, but a child : her bright hair,
Thai life's breeze gently stirs on her forehead so snowily fair,
Kipples golden and glad in the sunlight, and mirth's frolic beam
In her eyes' aziue dances, unwitting of that sombre dream
From "First Fruits and Slicd Lecaves : " by the Author of " The Wreck of
the Northlleet."
72 LOGIC OF STYLE.
That darkens the distance. Joy-jmrted, her mouth seems to sip
With cleft coral the exuberant brightness that breaks on her lip.
As frail-seeming and white as a mist- wreath, her garment o'erclings
Her flesh softlj' moulded and rosy as when the light springs
With last kiss from the ardorous sunset to cloud in the east —
So pure are her young limbs and rosy, so dimpled and creased.
As silent and dark as a shadow, unmoved as a stone
That standeth all day in the desert, unseen and alone,
Waiteth Death : no breeze touches her mantle that falleth right
doivn
Over feet that we see not and hands that we see not; a frown
Seems to drift down the distance and blight the fresh pastures of
life,
And an icy breath seems to blow from her and make the air rife
With tremblings. And yet as we gaze in her fathomless eyes
The charm of her beauty awakens, although her hair lies
White and thinly laid over her forehead's mysterious shade
(That looms with a beauty no earth-light may ever invade),
And her fine lips together are set in a sadness divine,
Too deep and too holy for sorrow — each loveliest line
Of her limbs 'neath her raiment of shadow a presence becomes,
And a scent broodeth round her far sweeter than odours of spices
or gums.
This poem in its totality is essentially subtle. There is,
first, a broad and obvious antithesis between Birth and Death
— Birth in her morning beauty, and Death in her austere
repellance. But secondly, a contrast is introduced between
Death in this aspect, and Death in a more auspicious aspect,
as being spiritually its own euthanasy, and the emancipator
of the soul into life. But is this all ? Not, certainly, accord-
ing to the genial significance of the poem. For in the third
instance, there is the contrast between Death, no longer Death
the sullen, but Death the serene, and the unchanged joyous-
ness of Birth. And here is what might be the coincidence of
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 73
Death and Birth. Negate Birth, and you have Death ;
negate Death, and you have Birth. That is, in the ordinary
dialectic. But the special subtlety of this conception is not
merely, having differentiated Death from Birth, to differentiate
it again from itself, but to differentiate it so that, under the
last aspect, it shall still be differentiated from Birth, and not
repeat any of the characteristic imagery there. The dialectic
is the true dialectic, by which hoth elements are held resolved
in a higher medium. Such is the motif, or rhetorical aspect
of the poem. Xow obviously enough, the imagery which runs
in a series of parallels expounding the general conception,
reflects in detail the dominant idea of the piece. But, apart
from that, it has a purely styhc value, according to the degree
of beauty and precision with which it expresses the separate
idea that it is intended to convey. Thus, independently, the
italicised passages are perfect in their effect. The one ex-
presses the redundancy of delicate sensuousness — delicate,
because sipping just catches the aspect of the lingeringly
parted lip, redundant, because the lip is painted as tasting, i.e.
receimng, a radiance, of whicli its own redness is in part the
cause, i.e. diffuses. The other expresses the sense of mystery,
in the veiling of the feet and hands, since the hand and the
foot are just the members that universally in ordinary use,
and for the sake of freedom of touch and movement, are left
uncovered by the mantle.
It happens that, mediately, through their relation to the
common totality, individual expressions have a relation to
each other, which are not immediately connected. Stylic_
connection of individual propositions is with those which
stand next to them in the process of thinking ; rhetorical
connection of separate thoughts is that in which they recip-
74 LOGIC OF STYLE.
rocally illuminate each other at remoter distances. A piece
like " Birth and Death," so rich in felicitous concurrences,
and so frugal in its anxiety not to expend a single unneces-
sary thought or image, abounds in this kind of comple-
mentary significance. The beauty of Death has been
demonstrated not merely to comprehend the beauty of
Birth, but to transcend it. And that is the significance of
" a scent broodeth round her," &c., as opposed rhetorically
to the mere phase of vision in Birth. This reservation
marks a severely intellectual style of treatment. For the
sensuousness in the representation of Birth had reached, it
might have been supposed, a limit. And yet beyond that
limit, upon the necessity arising, the luxuriance is pressed,
the scent expressing a redundance of luxury that the mere
sight could never give. A subtler sense is brought into
action, and, as it happens, a rarer sensory even within that,
for the effect is not deadened by a description of the scent,
which simply is not that " of spices or gums " — an essence
that no flame of earth may ever kindle, and that asons of
ritual will not burn away. The significance of this part is
enhanced by its position as the concluding idea of the piece.
For by drafting the imagery into a separate world of sense,
the movement of the poem, towards its climax, is translated
suddenly into a transcendent region, and locked up into a
perpetual rest, inviolate as cathedrals, and of cathedral
stillness.
Cor. — Apart from the indirect significance every individual
expression ought to have in relation to the piece of which it
forms a part, and from the significance it may reflect upon
other individual expressions, it may occasionally have a direct
rhetorical significance. Why, in the concluding pliase of this
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 75
poem, should death be represented as sad with " a sadness
divine, too deep and too holy for sorrow," when it is felt that
(according to the Christian conception) she is the medium of
immortality ? Obviously enough, the association of jubilance
being preoccupied by Birth, if the totality of the conception is
to be integrated, a contrast must be preserved between the
two. Yet that is quite beside the point. Even literary sym-
metry must vanish, must be abolished, unless it coincides with
the radical truth on the question. It is also evident, but not
more pertinent, that if Death were represented as jubilant, in
a moment would go to ruin the primary conception of her as
sullen. And as a matter of fact in the execution, this cohesion
of the character is beautifully preserved against contradiction
in the contrasted phases late and early — to match the melan-
choly sweetness of the one there is no scowl, but a frown, nor
even a frown, but what " seems" to be a frown. That primary
conception, nevertheless, gives the cue to the representation of
Death, and is determined, antecedently to all artistic consi-
derations, by the natural feeling which it betokens, that of
instinctive awe. For here the poem is entirely subjective :
her dreadful aspect representing our feeling of dread. And
hence in the sequel her sorrow for us means our sorrow, our
anxiety for ourselves ; her attitude being one in spirit with our
own ; neither maliciously jubilant over her power of destruc-
tion, nor gratuitously jubilant over the reversionary gain; too
" holy" for the one, too " deep" for the other. Xor is that any
marvel, seeing that the mood of Death is too " deep" and too
"holy" for sorrow; a fortiori, therefore, as regards rejoicing.
Yet that which is too profound and too spiritual for vulgar
grief, as it is for vulgar jubilation, is not joy, but sadness ; and
necessarily so, in accordance with the subjective feeling. But
76 LOGIC OF SriTE.
why " deep," and why " holy " ? Because, in the one case, it is
associated with reflection, in the other, because it is unselfish.
And the grief of sadness is infinitely deeper than the grief of
sorrow, because expounded by a power of reflection, by which
Death sees herself as a universal agency, remembering all
whom she has destroyed, and thinking of all those whom she
must destroy; and infinitely holier, because she gTieves not
for herself the inevitable destroyer, but for us whom she
destroys. That is the philosophic rendering of the truth of
the distinction, and that is also the stylic significance of the
expression. What now of its rhetorical application to the
whole final conception of Death as sad ? It founds upon the
essential j^assivity, expressed in the words " deep" and " holy."
Death knows no casual victims, and grieves with no petulant
grief, since she is no arbitrary instrument, but the fulfilling of
a fatality, which being necessary must for that very reason be
just, and not to be made the occasion of sickly grief, — and
being just, must be laden with some reversionary hope. StiU
that hope, being yet in reversion, is not to be saluted with
boisterous anticipation. The figure of Death is still turned
toward us, as an experience that must be faced ; though its
illumination is from beyond. But since its significance, if
understood in its intense passivity, is not more that of a uni-
versal than that of a mediate necessity, the indirect suggestion
of the one by the other is infinitely more subtle and pregnant,
than if the figure had been turned round amid the blare of
anthems and the blaze of resurrection.
9.
Besides the indirect significance which any passage may hear,
there is for every passage an indirect literary efl'ect, superadded
OF STYLE GENEKALLY. 77
to its immediate stylic effect. This superadded effect is also
rhetorical, as contradistinguislied from the stylic.
The two canons according to which literary effect is most
rapidly determined are these two — force and artistic beauty.
There is no effective passage, of which we cannot say it is
either forcible or beautiful. But obviously every passage
that is forcible is also to a certain extent beautiful, and
vice versa. That a man does not generally admire the way
in which he has been knocked down, does not disprove
this ; his irritation may interfere to prevent it. But that in
a single instance he has so far abstracted from his personal
feeling as to admire a telling blow of that kind, is a com-
plete proof that the exhibition of modulated power has of
itself a reflex esthetic value. So also the mere view of a
fragile object, a petal, or a piece of porcelain, conveys pro
tanto a sense of power. Even verbally they may be shown to
have a certain identity. By " effect," in common phrase, we
mean, on the one hand, palpable result ; and a thing is effec-
tive just in proportion as it produces such a result. But a
thing done " for effect," on the other hand, expresses the last
definite purpose assignable for any exertion whatever — the
sublation of all ordinary purpose — viz. an aesthetic purpose.
The phrase has become partly one of contempt. But it is
legitimate, seeing that the aesthetic purpose is itself a
teleologic purpose, and the teleologic value in that case is
exactly proportioned to the a3sthetic result. It is the same
with literary effect : —
How sweet is thy love, O my sister, my betrothed !
How sweet is thy love above wine !
And the fragrance of thy perfumes above all the spices !
Thy lips, my betrothed, distil boney ;
Honey and milk are under thy tongue,
78 LOGIC OF STYLE.
And the odoiir of tliy gamients is as the smell of Lebanon.
A closed garden art thou, my sister, my betrothed,
A closed (jarden, a sealed fountain.
Thy shoots like a garden of pomegranates,
With precious fruits.
Cypresses and nards,
Nard and crocus.
Calamus and cinnamon,
With all sorts of frankincense trees,
Myrrh and aloes ;
With all kinds of excellent aromatics,
With a garden-fountain,
A well of living waters,
And streams flowing from Lebanon.
Arise, north wind ! and come, thou south !
Blow upon my garden,
That its perfumes may flow out !
There is no immediate force of expression here ; never-
theless it produces for us not merely a sense of power in
the artist, but a sense of force that is not in spite of, but
directly proportioned to, the beauty in the expression. And
so conversely : —
The mouth is amply developed. Brutalities unspeakable sit upon
the upper lip, which is confluent Avith a snout ; for separate nostrils
there are none. But the lower lip, which is drawn inwards with the
curve of a marine shell — oh, what a convolute of cruelty and revenge
is there! Cruelty! — to whom 1 Eevenge !— for what ? Pause not to
ask ; but look i;pwards to other mysteries. In the very region of his
temples, driving itself downwards into his cruel brain, and breaking
the continuity of his diadem, is a horrid chasm, a ravine, a shaft, that
many centuries would not traverse ; and it is serrated on its posterior
wall with a harrow that is partly liidden. From the anterior wall of
this chasm rise, in vertical directions, two processes ; one per^Dendi-
cular, and rigid as a horn, the other streaming forward before some
portentous breath.^
1 Description of the Kclula in Orion : by De Quincey.
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 79
Not an image of beauty is here ; yet extrinsically, and
because of its essential force, a reflex testlietic sense is pro-
duced. And but for its force this effect would not be given.
Directly it excludes beauty just as much as weakness. But
that which in itself excludes beauty becomes thus the me-
diator of it in relation to expressions which seemed calculated
to express the reverse, viz. repulsiveness. The indirect effect
in both these cases is rhetorical, that is to say, it is not dis-
tinctively the same for either, but alternatively. It may
be difficult at times to say which is the immediate effect,
and which the derived, since they meet in every passage.
But the same causes which operate to make the relation
dual, and, therefore, on occasion, equivocal, necessarily
operate as a ground for distingtushing which is the derived,
and which the immediate, whether beauty or force.
COK. — The rhetorical principle holds true in the converse case,
that whatever is generally inartistic is to that extent weak,
and whatever is weak is inartistic. But whether negatively,
or positively, the rhetorical possibilities of effect, as well as
those of stylic effect on which they found, rest ultimately on
the possibilities of the formation and aggregation, the differen-
tiating and the grouping of individual expressions, in tlieir
simple ultimate relations of Quality and Quantity. Of these
the primary relation is that of Quality.
CHAPTER II.
Of Quality.
Section I. The Conditions of Quality.
10.
The universal criterion for style, first and last, is effect. If a
man calls you a fool, he produces a result, because of some
issue or principle suggested, and connecting itself with some
sentiment — of chagrin or astonishment, of pain or resentment,
etc. Now the inevitable co-factor in all such cases is novelty.
The proposition advanced need not be substantially new ; it
may be identically a repetition of an old charge or statement.
But that mere quantitative or numerical difference is sufficient
to create a sensation of novelty. It is not that you have not
been told so before ; but it is that you are now told so by a
different person. Or perhaps it is not even that ; but it is
that you are now told it by the same person a second time.
That of itself stimulates the attention, apart from the stimulus
otherwise lent by the fact that something was to be said,
which you expected to be something new. And the faculties
of reproduction are known implicitly to be so weak, that your
informant trusts either to your having forgotten it, or else you
politely bear with it, trusting that he has forgotten having
said it. And if not, you revolt. You did not come there,
you say, to learn that, or you did not pay to hear that, etc.
OF QUALITY. 81
And supposing what you are told to be something like this,
that six and five make eleven, you rebel, because an effect is
produced which you cannot get rid of, and which is produced,
just because the statement which occasions it is not novel.
That being your desideratum, perhaps even your sine qua non,
the result is not immediately, because the statement is com-
monplace, but mediately, because it is not original.
In so far as logic is the immediate science of truth, it
supplies any essential virtue that might be found to belong
to an art like style in expounding truth. What style re-
ceives for itself is only a certain percentage of commission
for making the truth tell. The amount of its profits, how-
ever, is determined, not merely by the degree of its success,
but by the amount of truth which it communicates. This
is the second and implicit condition of style, just as logic,
after its own fashion, acknowledges the condition of origi-
nality. There is no need, it is felt there, of illustrating the
multiplication-table ; all that must be left to the illumi-
nator, or embosser on new patterns. And even in testing a
proposition accepted as true, the tester is virtually assuming
that it is not known to be true. When attested, therefore,
it is 2^'i'o tanto original ; truth becoming thus a synthetic idea.
And conversely, originality, instead of meaning simply that
which is not known, comes to mean that which is not
known to be true.
Cor. — The absolute criterion of all suggestion is truth ; novelty
is only relative. But, as it happens, style deals distinctively
with the relative, leaving logic to deal with the absolute. It
is to be distinctly observed, however, that the relativity
of truth ascribed to style is that of novelty, not of particu-
larity. A statement, according to literary modes of dealing.
82 LOGIC OF STYLE.
is relatively true for a man for whom it was not true before,
not as being true for him, because false for some one else.
The purpose of style is not simply to defend or aggrandise a
foregone conclusion in any man's mind, dividing the world on
any particular question into two factions, those who believe
the one phase, and those who believe the other. The division
which it makes is of all men into two sections, those who
know a truth, and those who know it not (a much more uni-
versal division than the other, since that upon most questions
leaves a third space open and indifferent), or, it may be, those
wdio know it adequately, and those who know it inadequately.
For as soon as a truth is announced, and to some extent
recognised, there is a call to intensify the impression at the
moment, and make the truth better known — known more
clearly, more forcibly, more captivatingly. If the idea is ap-
prehended as yet only in figure, explicate it literally ; if it is
scientifically obscure, bring it through figure into a clearer
apprehension. Have the data become stale ? — let them be
vivified by historical illustration ; or superannuated ? — let
them be supplemented by later researches, so as to equate the
interest of the listener, on the one hand, with their importance,
and on the other, with their fertility. The result in this case is
not, as in the first, where the gain to one side is a dead loss to
the other, but always a positive advantage ; and, for the
individual, of knowledge experimental instead of visionary,
and of knowledge coherent instead of confused and partial.
11.
All effect, depending ultimately on the conditions of novelty
and truth, is produced mediately through the terms of separate
propositions, through the mutual relations of subject and pre-
OF QUALITV. 0.3
dicate. This is what constitutes Quality in stylo generally ;
in which if is identical as to its basis with Quantity in lorjic.
The quality of a thought is that wliich makes it to differ
from other thoughts, to be that which distinctively it is.
In logic, all this descends upon the copula; and the
differentiation there is of the simplest; for no matter in
what way the subject and predicate behave, the question
revolves upon us : Is it, or is it not so ? With a different
criterion, the differentiation of style is more complex; it
allows of various kinds and degrees of effect, where logic
allows of none. And hence the fact that the onus of the
differentiation settles upon the subject and predicate. In
logic, novelty being satisfied {i.e. postulated), the question
of truth devolves upon the copula. AVhich implicit canon
of observance being settled for style, the explicit stylic con-
dition is fulfilled in the subject and predicate. It would be
spurious to insist upon the distinction between truth and
novelty, as if the first were related specially to the subject,
and the latter to the predicate. It is to a certain extent
true, that, since the predicate comes last, the attention
apprehends the novelty of the conception, only when the
final term is distinctly rapped out, and its truth, only when
it travels back upon the subject, to compare the one with
the other. In fact neither term acts without the other.
And as logic claims the copula, in which its results are
determined, through the subject and predicate, so style lays
claim to the latter, in which its results are determined
through the copula. And this happens not in spite of, but
because of the fact, that the terms and the copula are
capable of reciprocal variation (by permutation, etc.). Also
it happens not in spite of, but expressly because of the fact.
84 LOGIC OF STYLE.
that each science is governed fundamentally l3y the same
laws.
Cor. — Quality in the scientific sense is obviously to be dis-
criminated from any thoughtless figurative use of the term
applied to what are certain 'properties of style (loosely called
qualities) or quasi -rhetorical criteria (§ 9, p. 77), founding
upon this one elementary and homogeneous fact of quality.
It would evidently be a very coarse and a very gratuitous
confusion, to place such properties of style as Force and
Beauty in the same category with the elements of style, such,
for example, as sublimity. (1.) These properties form a dis-
tinct set of criteria, applicable to any passage, superadded to
the criteria which determine its effect as regulated by the
amount of sentiment. And to place both under a common
category is, therefore, the same thing as to classify together
wool, platinum, hardness and flexibility. Metaphor and
other elements are quite overlooked in this process, which have
equal right to go into the category of so-called qualities
with sublimity. And the gist of their exclusion is, that as
elements they are left to be qualified by the properties includ-
ing sublimity; which means precisely that tin and copper,
etc., are qualified in respect of certain attributes, such as hard-
ness, flexibility — and iron ! (2.) While the properties of style
involve each other reciprocally (§ 9), the elements of style do
not ; they are either indifferent, as in metaphor and sublimity,
or else mutually exclusive, as in sublimity and humour. (3.)
The properties of style are to be found in every thought ; the
elements are only occasional, i.e. variable merely and alterna-
tive. Every thought is more or less clear, more or less beauti-
ful, more or less forcible ; the properties come directly into
question in regard to every expression, and in their totality.
OF QUALITY, 85
Some element of expression must, of course, be in every
thought, but each, as it were, only in rotation.
12.
The principle by which a term is divided, according as it
signifies certain attributes, or the number of objects to which
these may be extended, is known under some name or other
to all readers. It might be supposed that for style, if any
change of nomenclature were required, it would be sufficient to
introduce some phrase which might express the essentially
compound nature of the connotation in its terms. That, in
fact, is not the case, but the reverse ; since the very relation
which calls attention to the connotation of attributes in a
compound, calls attention to the fact that each complex term
is divisible into attributes numerically separate. Accordingly,
by the inclusion of a term is meant, in relation to style, the
aggregation of a certain number of attributes, and by its im-
plication, its comprehension of a certain congeries of in-
dividuals. The implication of " thing," for example, is
universal; since it covers all objects indifferently, and,
without a hint of the brilliance and mass of whatsoever
attributes they may include, itself most meagre in respect of
that inclusion which it vilipends in other terms. This is
borne out in a somewhat paradoxical way. When a boarding-
school young lady does not dare to be directly and maliciously
impudent, or is too excited or too refined to express herself
with vehemence, she calls her friend and enemy a " thing ; "
where the very absence of all positive inclusion is the ground
of the derived significance. The individual is denuded of all
that constitutes individuality in the sense affecting her — is re-
duced to the individuality which distinguishes one farthing
86 LOGIC OF STYLE.
from another. And tlie term is applied witli most effect to j
person, since from a person there is most to take away. This
is the opposite case, viz., depth of inclusion. For, agreeably
to the dual meaning of the term, individuality, which, on tlit
one side, signifies abstract identity, an identity which one other
individual is sufficient to expound, signifies also a concrete
identity, which it may take an infinite variety of others to
expound.
The more common and superficial relations of description
and distribution (as opposed to definition and division) are
essentially stylic in their adaptation. Description, for ex-
ample, by way of simile — e.g. a stammerer being described,
as one who had swallowed the alphabet wdthout chewing it,
and in revenge had to go through the process of mastication
when needing to use it — is highly in the manner of style.
To call a man " both knave and fool " is quite allowable, as
a matter of description. But a very comical mode of de-
scription is to counterfeit the technical machinery of
division, as in saying that a man is " half knave and half
fool," the man being indivisible in that sense, and indescrib-
able, therefore, if he were so divided.
CoE. — Quality as such in style has a definite meaning, in so
far as it is to be distinguished from a possible quantity ; and
a technical meaning, in so far as it is to be contradistinguished
from logical quality. A second meaning which may be
attached to it is the metaphysical. And accordingly, I draw
attention, for the moment, to the fact of the internal relations
of propositions generally, thus : —
Quantity. Qualitij. Mode.
All IMen (are) Hypocrites.
Thirdly, however, it happens that, in common phrase, the
OF QUALITY. 87
relations, wliicli here are seen to commingle, may be spoken
of as convertible with each other. Accordingly, if I proclaim
the fact that all men are hypocrites, I shall receive the next
day anonymous letters, requesting, indifferently as regards the
expression (though peremptorily enough, in all likelihood, as
regards the intention), that the statement shall be " qualified,"
or •• modified." " Quantified," as being a trifle too scientific
and, therefore, too calm for an anonymous letter, would not
be used. Nevertheless, either of the three terms may be
applied to any of the specific functions of the proposition.
And as " modify," which means first of all to accentuate, or be
the cause of the accentuation of any specific difference in
an object, comes to signify a variation of the present state
of the object, so "quantify" comes to signify a variation in
the numerical relations or possibilities of any term. The pre-
dicate, therefore, which strictly is modal, may also be quanti-
fied. Only it is a variation of its inclusion which takes place,
not of its implication; the distinction of the altered term
being, not that it is specifically connected with this or that
subject, to the exclusion of other subjects, but that it is con-
nected with this or that subject to the exclusion of other pre-
dicates. Its value is determined accordingly either by way of
its being preferred to other predicates generally, or differ-
entially, by way of its being preferred to such as from their
resistance are hard to supersede. That being understood, it
does not matter how I amend my statement, whether by
quantifying, qualifying, or modifying. Only that most appro-
priately (according to the scheme already given), when I am
asked to retract my paradox, I quantify it, by saying " some
men are hypocrites ; " being pressed still farther, I qualify it,
by saying "some hoicked men are hypocrites," --and finally,
UNIVEKSITY
iSlZ-IFORNlA.
88 LOGIC OF STYLE.
being pressed into something like the truth, modify it, by
acknowledging in desperation, that " some wicked men are
occasionally hypocrites." With regard to which it may be
noticed (1) that the critical term in every proposition is the
middle term, the qualitative, which preserves an equivocal
relation to the others, changing what is ushered into it from
qiiantity in the shape of implication, into the shape of inclu-
sion when that is transferred to mode. (2) The ratios of
variation are the same, both for implication and inclusion, in
so far as both vary numerically. Thus an "all" is always
greater than a " some." (o) The subject and predicate ex-
pound and modify each other, and that directly, through the
common relations of implication and inclusion. A diminution
of the implication of the subject is followed by an expansion
of the inclusion of the predicate, and conversely. Also a
diminution of the implication or inclusion of the subject is
accompanied by a corresponding diminution in the implication
or inclusion of the predicate ; and similarly in regard to its
expansion. But while the process of variation may be ex-
pounded numerically, the immediate ground of the variation
is essentially one of quality. The union of two attributes is
not simply one of numerical increment, but one of combina-
tion. " Quaint," for example, which, abstractly considered, is
the synthesis of two conceptions, to wit peculiarity, with an
element of simplicity, is really qualitative, in so far as one of
these attributes, at least, is complex, and its,Q\i a fortiori is a
unity of complex meaning. The general principles, according
to which the variation of quality is determined, are Subtlety
and Comprehensiveness.
OF QUALITY,
89
Section II. Of SuUlety.
13.
Every truth that is determined negatively, i.e. by way of
resistance to, or essential variation upon some antecedent con-
ception, falls, like every truth that is simply positive, under
one of three categories : it is either an All, a Some, or a None.
And it does so, by way of contradistinction to some one of the
correlative formulae. The disaffection is organic ; each form
being complementary to the rest, not simply as a positive
resource for meeting a specific emergency, but negatively, as
an exponent of the value and significance of the form against
which for the time being it is measured. Accordingly the
form of every proposition may be explicated thus, the thesis
representing the fallacious version, and the antithesis the
amended version : —
Thesis.
Antithesis.
No P is Q.
{Univ.)
All P is Q.
No P is Q.
{Part.)
Some P is Q.
All P is Q.
{Sing.)
Some P is Q,
and conversely : —
Tliesis.
Antithesis.
All P is Q.
{Univ.)
No P is Q.
Some P is Q.
{Part.)
No P is Q.
Some P is Q.
{Sing.)
All P is Q.
The implication of the terms is thus expanded, in the first
section of the scheme, and restricted in the second. Accord-
ingly, a restrictive universal is formed by reducing an all to a
none, and an expansive universal, by extending a none to an
all ; and the particular is restricted and expanded correspond-
ingly. In the case of singular propositions, however, the
reverse takes place. To reduce an all to a some is to expand
90 LOGIC OF STYLE.
the force of wliat is thus restricted, and to raise the appreci-
able value of the term as singular — as sole and peculiar.
And so to reduce the force of a singular proposition is not to
reduce it to a blank negation, but to make it indistinguishable
and general, by expanding the some to an all. Any fallacy
there consists in equating all P with Q, when what should
have been equated with Q was simply some portion or func-
tion of P, viz. p. But now, let P be measured against other
terms, as being itself the singular equivalent for the predicate
Q ; and the fallacy will consist in equating the generic term,
say S, with Q, to the obscuring of P. P is here a portion of
S ; and, by substituting S for P, you neutralise the specific
value of P. But by substituting S, you have altered the
inclusion of the term : so long as the talk was of P simply,
there was only change of implication ; but now that you have
brought in S, and expanded the implication (from P = some
S, to all S) you have restricted the inclusion. Hitherto, I had
held that only those refined-men-who-were-easily-provoked
were backbiters, but you disabuse me of that belief, by insist-
ins that all refined men, more or less, are backbiters. But
now, upon this suggestion of a variation in the inclusion of a
term, follows another change. You tell me, for example, that
"all language is progressive, save in very rude and early
periods," and I am startled by the proposition, having been
accustomed to regard language as then most aggressive, when
much remained to be discovered in the way of new ideas,
and most stationary, when literature had developed, and made
men everywhere conversant with the whole complement of
ideas. But the form, under which the new conception pre-
sents itself to me is this, surprise that anytliing in language
should be associated with progression — in the technical for-
OF QUALITY.
91
inula, that any P should be Q. By and by, I may realise the
fact, that all language is progressive, by pitting that proposi-
tion (all P is Q) against the other (some P is Q), and so,
mediately, pitting it against the original one, no P is Q. The
distinction, in regard to this form of proposition, is that it
eliminates the negative universal of the first schema, and
substitutes, under a different valuation, what was the singular
form as its particular, having provided itself with a new
singular, determined, not internally and by preserving the
same term (P), but externally, and by repudiating a new
generic form, S, thus : —
Tliesis.
Antithesis.
Some P is Q.
(Univ.)
All P is Q.
No P is Q.
(Part.)
Some P is Q.
All S is Q.
(Sincj.)
Only P is Q.
and negatively: —
Thesis.
Antithesis.
All P is Q.
(Univ.)
Some P is Q.
Some P is Q.
(Part.)
No P is Q.
Only P is Q.
{Sing.)
AU S is Q,
Evidently, therefore, in the positive part of the schema, the
universal antithesis is formed upon the thesis, by expanding the
implication, the particular, by expanding the inclusion, and
the singular, by restricting the implication. And in the
privative section, the iiniversal antithesis is formed, by
restricting the implication, the particular, by restricting the
inclusion, and the singular, by expanding the implication.
Now subtlety, in general, consists precisely (with the help of
surprise) in the legitimate variation of one or other of these
formulae to its antithetic formula ; and always by means of
the inclusion of the proposition. For any variation in a pro-
position, whether real or fancied, depends uj)on some varia-
tion, real or spurious, in its inclusion. Its terms need not
92 LOGIC OF STYLE.
vary verbally ; but they must substantially, so that the varia-
tion shall be reciprocally expounded by each. If a man tells
me that the dogma of Papal Infallibility is a regulative and
practical, as opposed to a constitutive and essential doctrine,
he expands for me the permanent inclusion of the dogma, on
that side at least. But, at the same moment, he has added to
the implication of the term " regulative," as extended to this
very dogma. Accordingly, in this instance, in which it is the
inclusion of the subject that is expanded, the variation is
advertised by a corresponding expansion in the implication of
tlie predicate. Here, however, appears what might be a blank
contradiction to the principle of variation (as expressed on p.
88), affecting the inverse movement of expansion and implica-
tion in subject and predicate. The rationale, nevertheless, is
clear : " any " and " none " cannot be measured the one
against the other, as if they stood to each other as genus and
species, or vice versa ; they are contraries, and not partial coin-
cidents. But the moment it is a question of reciprocal varia-
tion of terms, where they may be compared as genus to
species, or species to genus, the principle of inversion takes
effect ; as in fact it does here with regard to the other forms
of variation in propositions. The subject and predicate vary
reciprocally thus (the particular proposition being here made
to usurp the position of the universal) in the positive
scheme : —
The Particular (some P, as against no P) expands the
inclusion of the subject, and the implication of the pre-
dicate.
The Universal (all P, as against some P) restricts the
inclusion of the subject, and expands the implication of
the predicate.
OF QUALITY. 93
Tlic Singular (only P, as against all S) expands the
inclusion of the subject, and restricts the implication of the
predicate.
In the negative : —
The Particular (no P, as against some P) restricts the
inclusion of the subject, and the implication of the pre-
dicate.
The Universal (some P, as against all P) expands the
inclusion of the subject, and restricts the implication of the
predicate.
The Singular (all S, as against P simply) restricts the
inclusion of the subject, and expands the implication of the
predicate.
So far, however, there is nothing to discriminate what is
subtle from what is novel. You tell us that your brother has
joined a secret society. The terms certainly expound each
other ; but there is no subtlety in your statement, and if there
could be, it would be in the fact, not in you. And were it
not that the subtlety would be in us, for suggesting it, we
should advise you to go and look your brother well round,
and see if he is not immensely corpulent, and then come and
tell us that he had gained admission to the society through
the keyhole. For in some such fashion must you strike the
manner of subtlety, i.e. in a proposition, whose terms do not
appear immediately to reciprocate, as to their differential
restriction and expansion. It will astonish people to hear
that corpulence should include anything like getting through
a keyhole, and that getting through a keyhole should
implicate anything in the shape of corpulence.
Any variation of a truth that is logically coherent must
itself be definite. Only, in logic, it is quite enough, if the
94 ■ LOGIC OF STYLE.
alteration rests with the antithesis, and simply says that
the thesis is not what it was asserted to be. But this is not
sufficient, according to style. Tliere it is indispensable to
assign the counter-position, to say what a thing is or is not,
and hoiv much of it. And thus it happens, that many a
writer, bent simply on the exposition of his subject, and
concerning himself not in the least about his logic, or about
the possible objections he may be meeting, is reversing
whole trains of thought in the minds of his readers, without
being aware that he is overriding theories of which he has
never heard, and without even being reminded that he is
colliding wdth theories wdiich he knows very well. It is a
commonplace fact, that a man may write well, and may
reason well, without knowing how he does it. But the real
point of such a fact is this, that he should write well, with-
out knowing that he is effecting a good deal by his involved
reasoning. After a similar fashion, it happens, that the
perception of a subtle effect on the part of the reader, as
w^ell as of the writer, while it is always positive, and
matches a definite antecedent, does not necessarily involve
the formulating of the antagonist position from which it is
a rebound. At the same time, a process of rapid mediation
does go on in the adjusting of subtle effects — which forms a
distinctive mode of syllogising. To speak of re-entrant
angles as " tedious," for example, is subtle. "What we bar-
gained for in the inclusion of the re-entrant angle was its
intricacy, wdiich we find quite safe, i^lus the idea of weari-
someness, with a trifle of carriage to pay for the additional
hint. Our knoAvledge of the first has been employed to
mediate the conception of the second. Accordingly, this is
the rationale of the stylic syllogism : —
OF QUALITY. 95
Re-entrant angles are tedious.
Since — ? They are intricate.
And forsooth — ? All that is intricate is tedious.
And correspondingly in the negative case. The progress is
from the singular, through the particular, to the universal ;
and consists rigorously in making explicit what in the
subject was implicit.
Cor. — The second and third formulie in both branches of the
scheme, as finally explicated, admit each of a twofold mode of
phrasing. For example, all P, as against some P, may be
read, either as restricting the inclusion of the subject, and
expanding the implication of the predicate, or else as expand-
ing the implication of the former, and restricting the inclu-
sion of the latter. But secondly, the universal in the first
section, and the singular in the second, are identical as to
phrasing, in either of these relations ; and correspondingly,
the singular of the first section is identical in form with the
universal in the second. Accordingly, the formulee reduce
themselves to four. But thirdly, the remaining universal and
singular are really functions of the particular, the one in the
positive, the other in the negative relation. For, having
been accustomed to think, good soid, that some S (viz. P)
was Q, I am naturally surprised to learn that " any S may
be Q," as, for example, X & Y. Or conversely, having
been used to associate X & Y with Q, among other members
of S, I am horrified to discover that, P only being Q, they are
now disimplicated in relation to Q, i.e. that " any S is not Q."
The variation, therefore, in either case (negative or positive),
being a differential variation, and since the universal and
singular may each be expressed in terms of the implication of
the predicate, and the inclusion of the subject, the generic or
representative formula for subtlety in a proposition is this :
96 LOGIC OF STYLE.
that it turns upon the differential inclusion of the subject, as
expounded by the differential implication of the predicate.
14.
Subtlety may appear in three forms, in a proposition, in a
term (which is a condensed form of the proposition), or in the
link between two propositions (which is an expanded form of
the proposition). Now the terms and the propositions have
this in common, that each is concerned either with a fact, a
principle, or an analogy. In regard to the term, for example,
we have the word " fool," to express a fact, " doltish," to
express the principle or tendency, and " donkey," to express
the analogy. And in the proposition, after its own method,
we express the fact, by saying that such and such a man is a
fool, or doltish, or a donkey ; the principle, by saying that all
people who sit long with damp feet are fools, doltish, etc. ;
and the analogue, by saying that such and such a person
looked like a donkey — which is precisely the distinction
between metaphor and simile, the one belonging to the term,
the other to the proposition.
1. In the realm of Fact ; and according to the principle of
Attention. (1) There is the order of cases, in which the
mind simply reproduces individual phenomena, with no
activity beyond wdiat is needed to make these significant.
Thus {a) in the relation of the universal, the expression,
applied to the bee, of " velvet " — because, being in the first
place recondite {i.e. not such as most men would explicate
to themselves), it applies to all bees, and so enhances
differentially the perception of the individual who does
explicate the idea, seeing that other people, from the very
commonness of the fact, have just as much opportunity for
OF QUALITY. 97
explicating it as he. (b) In the region of the particular,
the expression,
Grape-green all the waves are,
is subtle, just for the converse reason, viz. that the effect
thus painted is comparatively rare, and, therefore, evasive.
All waves are not green, nor all green waves grape -green.
(c) In the relation of the singular : —
Yonder bee anon
Muffles low huni in some campanula
Of nectared amethyst, and hums again.
That applies only to the bee. The noise of a blue-bottle,
gratuitously hushed on a window-pane, is a very different
thing. This has all the effect of accident, with all ^the
sanction of necessity. (2) Subtlety in the reproduction of
fact arises from the activity of the mind in relation to the
phenomena, so as to produce a result that is true, but
hypostatised. («) By way of negatively hypostatising the
collateral facts, e.g. to speak of the sea-beach as
Kissed by wavelets by winds forsaken,
(h) By way of abstracting from the real totality of the
facts, e.g.
Green lizards glance among the sunbaked stones,
Or rest at gaze with shoulder on the stone
And half their shadow,
where there is a very quiet oblivion of the other, and, as
the poet perhaps whispers maliciously to himself, the
better half, (c) By way of integrating the conception to
something more than it appears. Thus a writer describes
the ox : —
Audibly ruminating, couch'd at ease
Upon his shadow, in a luminous moon.
G
98 LOGIC OF STYLE.
The idea naturally attached to shadow is that obscuration
which may be seen — which demands some space inter-
mediate between the object and the surface on which the
shade is projected. So that what the animal seems to lie
upon is precisely not its shadow. Now the poet has a
perfect sanction, from the natural science point of view, to
speak as he does. Only, and quite apart from that, he
produces artistically an effect appreciable by all in extend-
ing the ground-shadow, so as to make it bounded on either
side by light, and not on the one side by light, and on the
other by the shade on the animal — in extending the
unilluminated space from what w^e see to what (though it
exists) we do not and never shall see. (3) Subtlety in the
portraiture of fact may show itself in realising to the
reflection truth that is actual and complex, (a) In the
selection of an accidental relation or complexity : —
From the sails the dew did drip —
Till clomb above the eastern bar
The homed moon, with one bright star
Within the nether tip.
There is such a thing in what is casual as profound
verisimilitude, for it is just the fortuitous which is the
constant in all natural phenomena, (h) In the portrayal of
a reflex agency : —
Those angel forms —
Such blush their grain of puiion warms
As in a milk-%vhite lily gloics,
Leaned over by a lovelit rose ;
and (c) in the expression of relief, as here : —
And then away the toddler flew
To bury her wee face where covert grew
Of marestail and of fern, a forest small
Within the forest, taller than them all.
OF QUALITY. 99
2. In the realm of Principle, and according to the
canon of Eeason. By principle, I mean relation substantial
and philosophic ; whose various orders are embraced within
the following schema : —
Relation.
Origination.
Mediation.
Resiiltance.
Disrelatioyi. Correlation.
Transcendence. Community.
Adversation. Reciprocity-
Approximation. Convertibility.
Subtlety of mediation, which is the central conception of
the first group, may be illustrated from the syllogism,
which is expressly the formulating of a conclusion regard-
ing one proposition, through the medium of another. This
paragraph affords a fine example of subtlety (under the
category of origin), in discerning the secret source and
motive of a certain symbolic treatment : — " It has been said
that the fawn belongs to Apollo and Diana, because stags are
sensitive to music. But I have myself no doubt, that in
this particular relation to the gods of morning, it always
stands as the symbol of wavering and glancing motion on the
ground, as well as of the light and shadow through the
leaves, chequering the ground as the fawn is dappled."^
Here the commonplace explanation, relying upon a prin-
ciple that is sometimes subtler than that of the eye, but
which in this case is too remote and visionary, is easily
overthrown by a reference drawn from the more obvious
sense. And in fact, an absolute proof, unique in character
and in dignity, is given of the truth of the latter rendering,
1 Mr. Euskin.
100 LOGIC OF STYLE.
by an expression in a poem^ published a short time
previously : —
" And as they leave her in the rain,
A milk-white doe she often fed
Through the dim forest limps ia pain
To lean its head
Upon the harsh grave-wall and die.
More sweet to it than dells of green,
Where mate and fawn sun-dappled lie,
Thy grave, Kathleen ! "
The effect of transcendence (in the second group of cate-
gories) is always produced by a result that has apparently
broken loose from its mediation, and whose factors it re-
quires a little reflection to rally. Thus : — " If a luminous
body were to be struck out of existence twelve millions of
miles away, an observer would still see it for a minute after
its extinction." And, in mathematics, the principle of
approximation is perfectly exemplified in the asymptote of
a curve, which obviously holds the relations of transcend-
ence and adversation resolved in itself. In the
relations of the circle and the eUipse (under the general
category of correlativity), we have a subtle illustration of
the principle of community. There the coincidence — the
describing of equal areas by the radius vector in equal
times — is expounded by the differences — the equidistance
from the centre, in the one case, as against the varying
distance in the other, and the uniform velocity of the one
moving body, as against the varying velocity of the other.
A frequent way for the principle of reciprocity to manifest
itself is under these three forms, (1) of positive correspond-
ence, (2) of negative, and (o) of inverse correspondence ;
' " Kathleen," in '* Beatrice, and other Poems," by the Hon. Roden Noel.
OF QUALITY. 101
which may be illustrated from one example. In the first
instance, it may be said that the more a people abhors
crime, the more it punishes it. But in the second instance,
the fact arises to neutralise that, viz. that the mitigation of
punishment " does not result from a laxer, but an exacter
estimate of law and justice. It is because the many so cor-
rectly regard the law, that we can afford to punish less the
few who err." And hence, thirdly, " that is the circum-
stance that explains the apparent paradox, the more a
people abhors crime, the less it punishes it," — the readiness
to punish, and the necessity to punish, moving inversely as
each other. A certain form of dialectic will exemplify the
principle of conversion. It is easy to construct such
examples. Thus we may say, it is a universal rule, that
there is no rule without exception; obviously, therefore,
one rule must be excepted, as having no exception, and as
being itself the exception to the general rule ; which rule,
however, is just the universal rule first named (it being the
rule which has no exception), viz. that there is no rule
without exception. It excepts itself in the very moment of
expressing itself, i.e. is at once the rule and the exception,
alternately and convertiUy either.
8. In the realm of Analogy, and according to the canon
of Fancy. (1) Subtlety underlies the differential com-
pleteness of the coincidence between type and thino-
typified, e.g.
There is beauty in the long-ribb'cl hills, in the valley soft and green,
In the trees that stand like sages with their shadow all between,
expressing first, the towering dignity and inevitable calm
beneficence of great minds ; next, the extent of their indi-
vidual overshadowing influence ; and finally, the continuity
102 LOGIC OF STYLE.
in the influence of each — it is " shadow," not shadows —
interblending with tliat of his neighbour. (2) There is an
order of effects, whose subtlety consists in the partial
coincidence of the symbol with what is symbolised, and
where the points of non-coincidence are hinted : —
A wild bee in a dim chapelle,
Hovering near a flower-bell,
With a drowsy mnrmur droning,
Imitates a priest intoning.
With his lowly eyes intent
Upon the Holy Sacrament.
The salient points of resemblance are these : first, in regard
to the sound, as being subdued and continuous ; secondly,
in regard to the solitariness of the sound, it being the only
voice heard amid the surrounding and expectant silence ;
thirdly, in regard to the sound as prelusive to the feast, and
ceasing with it. Again, the points of contrast are, first, the
suggestion of a festive and secular purpose, as compared
with the devotional; secondly, the suggestion of isolation
and self-ministry, as compared with the distributive of&ce
of the priest ; and thirdly, the fact, that wdth the bee the
feast which the sound preludes is merely one of many
rapidly succeeding each other, one that ceases, expressly to
be renewed, while in the other case, it is only occasional,
and ceases, expressly that its influence may be diffused
along the intervals. (3) There is the case in which
subtlety of effect arises from the utter antagonism between
the symbol and the substantial idea which is typified.
As two spent s\vimmers that do cling together
And choke their art. —
What do we gain from that expression ? Why, that two
friendly parties have inopportunely leagued themselves
OF QUALITY.
103
together, to their mutual disadvantage. Now, in fact, it is
the reverse that is meant : the expression is used of enemies
in battle. Nor is this a case like the last, where the image
is divided within itself, and suggests collateral contrast;
the simile takes off at the very root of the coincidence ; as
may easily be proved, for discard it from its connection
with foes in conflict, and immediately it finds a perfect
antitype in the idea of friends in distress " leagued together,"
etc., while if you divorce the other image, with all its train
of coincidences and non-coincidences, what antitype will
you find to suit it ?
CoK. — The degree of subtlety varies according to different
principles. A very complex effect, of course, is produced by
a subtle combination of propositions, each in itself subtle, and
with an involution of subtlety in the phrasing. The effect,
again, may arise from the aggregation of suggestions in one
image, thus : —
Still flames of window, long and thin,
descriptive of the stained glass window-divisions in a cathe-
dral — " long and thin," to call up the stripling look of such
divisions, " flames," to call up their pointed form, quite as
much as the glow of colour, and " still," partly to indicate the
sanctuary peace, and partly to impose a significant limitation
on the " flames." That last effect is, therefore, a complex one.
Again, a subtle principle may be superadded to an image
already subtle from its completeness, as in the expression, used
in speaking of a futile effort, that it is " an attempt to paw
the horizon." The conception is of infinite force, not only
on account of the physical impossibility (since the horizon
recedes just as the animal approaches), but metaphysically,
because " horizon" is virtually an abstraction, and to speak of
104 LOGIC OF STYLE,
pawing it, therefore, pretty mucli as if one should speak of
being first cousin to the equator, or having a pair of trousers
measured for the ecliptic. A conspicuous order of subtlety,
too, is that where the reflex or complex principle is enhanced
by the delicacy of the form or material : —
Eyelash so frail, mlay loith trail
Of shade her eyes, a maze of sweetness !
My soul sinks through their dimlit blue
To find in them her own completeness — •
as if each eyelash left its separate impress of shade, and (as
the " trail " hints) were fringed off in the shading.
15.
Every subtle truth is essentially paradoxical, i.e. it bears, on
its first consideration, a different value from that which it
bears on reflection. It is, at least, abrupt, and possibly sub-
versive of some existing conception. Occasionally it divides
mankind into two classes, those to whom the suggestion is
startling, and those to whom it is contradictory. Possibly it
ranges all under the latter category, as did the discovery of
the earth's motion round the sun. That was a total contra-
diction of everybody's experience. Not, however, an absolute :
the senses were not affronted, as if they had been told that
there was no motion in the circumstances at all. For mani-
festly, if the earth did revolve — not sidle, but turn upon its
axis — round the sun, the very same phenomenon would be
produced ; the one hypothesis, for the reflecting mind, was
just as consonant with the facts as the other, and by much
the more exciting. The popular mind, and the mind educated
up to a certain point, are often alike inconsistent in this
respect; at onetime believing statements just on account of
their paradox, and at another, disbelieving them for their
OF QUALITY. 105
paradox. The educated person repudiates the popular idea,
that a man may he lighter just after his dinner than he was
before it ; but in the same moment he revolts from the not
very unobvious truth, that any two pure abstractions (such as
Being and Non-Being) are identical, as a lie, or if not, a snare,
and if not a snare, a joke. These inconsistencies, nevertheless,
go according to a principle, which it would not be difficult to
frame, so as to anticipate and neutralise the essentially vulgar
and discreditable kind of testimony, in regard to certain ques-
tions, which is derived from majorities. Meantime, the more
commonplace the mind, the less does it value pure originality,
and the more, confounding what is merely fresh with what is
original, does it tend to undervalue the latter by comparison.
For imaginative synthesis the populace has no sympathy what-
ever, and for dialectical truth in particular, as much adapta-
tion as a cow has for getting through a turnstile.
A man cannot be said to have subtlety for his differentia
in style, unless he is equal to a sustained originality in
thinking. Everybody says something subtle now and
again : the dice must occasionally turn out as if the experts
had loaded them. And the modes of thus reaching subtle
truth are just the modes of the expert, only they are not
employed so continuously, or upon the same fields. Sub-
tlety is never more transcendental than reflection; and a
truth is only subtle for those who can fully apprehend it.
It would be inaccurate, therefore, to speak of a thing unin-
telligible, as absolutely subtle ; much rather a suggestion is
absolutely subtle, which is perfectly intelligible, and a truth
not quite intelligible is only relatively subtle, because it can
be valued only indirectly. By reflection, therefore, it is
that such effects are attained ; and often through a man's
106 LOGIC OF STYLE.
discarding his first impressions, or reverting to those which
forsooth he had discarded for others which have now to be
reUnquished as false. Subtlety is not always a second-sight,
that raises a man, as if inspired, above his fellows, but often
a second sight in the coarse numerical sense. Thus an
author, in speaking of a death by drawing asunder, remarks
that the victim was torn " by antagonist, yet confederate
forces " ; where he shows the maximum of reflective power,
since in " confederate " he has given the very antithesis of
his primary drift ; and yet he has only exhibited a power of
fanciful reflection, after alL
Cor. — No man is truly original who is not also subtle to his
finger-ends. But no perception is really subtle, unless it is
also true. And in proportion as the speculative truth in the
world has been brought out by individuals, in that proportion
is it indebted to subtlety. That subtlety should be regarded
as necessarily equivocal, arises in part from this, that men
take pleasure in certain forms of it, without thinking earnestly
of its allied truth ; or even charge the pleasure, attendant on
the perception of the truth, to the account of the other ; and
so come to regard subtle suggestion as a medium of amusement,
not of work — of information and reformation. Nor is this
mode merely to be regarded as one of the ways of attaining
certain truths : there are truths — and truth in many instances
lies on the farther side of a quicksand — which cannot be
attained in any other way. Of which the most natural proof
is in the immediate case of subtlety itself : how should the
truth on that question be attained without subtlety ? It
cannot possibly be attained otherwise, any more than minute
atmospheric changes can be registered, except by an apparatus
correspondingly delicate. Subtlety here becomes an instru-
OF QUALITY. 107
ment as tecbnical as the barometer ; and thus the necessity
for it is demonstrated, precisely in those regions where
its application is most pertinent and unique. And in
literature, subtlety is not applicable to anything but what is
true, whether poetical or scientific. To deny the existence of
the external world, therefore, by affirming it to be an affection
of the senses, etc., is more offensive than the most putrid
commonplace. So to speak of the sun, in poetry, as " burn-
ing without beams," is pure nonsense, and in the spurious
maudlin oriental style of expression. Contrast with that the
unaffected rendering of a natural fact in the lines : —
Dimples, here and there,
That insects dint with long-legged stride.
Everybody kno^s's that what distinguishes a ripple from a wave
is the twitching up of the sJci7i of the water, as it were, under
the wind. Now as a wave is to a ripple, so is the plash of a
stone to the dimple of the water by the limb of an insect : the
plunge goes beyond dinting. But to the limber tonch of the
fly, the surface of the water, so easily shattered by the plunge
of a stone, merely undergoes a shiver or flicker; and the
expression "dint" conveys precisely the momentary im-
pression upon the impervious elastic surface of the pool.
The image is subtle, is poetical, just because it is so loudly
scientific in its truth. The true mode of a man's power, who
has such sensibility to natural effects, it may take a genera-
tion fully to appreciate, even for his fidelity of perception, so
long as people see with their noses. But it is just this same
intensity of truth, in the midst of his characteristic subtlety
of insight, that has made our contemporary poet, Mr. Noel, in
so extraordinary a degree, the greatest among the poetical
draughtsmen and colourists of all time.
108 LOGIC OF STYLE.
Section III. Of Comprehensiveness.
16.
In regard to any statement, no matter whether that con-
cerns a principle or a detail, the question arises, do its subject
and predicate lawfully reciprocate ? The immediate relation
here is one of truth. And the general form of such a question
is this, does the subject as a whole include that specific com-
plement of attributes which form the predicate, and do these
apply in their completeness to everything that is implicated
in the subject ? If that condition is fulfilled, the proposition
is comprehensive. And the formula for such a quality of
thought is this : comprehensiveness in any proposition turns
upon the integral inclusion of its subject, as expounded hy the
integral implication of its predicate.
If the inclusion of many terms were to be explicated, their
momenta would appear to be very heterogeneous. Never-
theless, when once the relations of a term are fixed, it
behaves according to one uniform principle. By which I
do not mean, in the first instance, that every term, being a
singular, must have each of its moments specifically fixed,
as either universal or particular, and not as alternatively
the one or the other, according to the proximate conception
which for the moment regulates its internal significance.
That, no doubt, is true : expressions must not veer or be
bandied about in such a fashion. But it follows as a
corollary from this, that every term has its own complement
of inclusion ; " curiosity," for example, having on the one
side, as its universal, " desire for information," and on the
other " pettiness," as its particular. Now the vitiating of
OF QUALITY. 109
comprehensiveness arises from putting too fine or too blunt
an edge upon the predicate of a proposition, using, e.g., the
proximate singular " prurience," instead of the subordinate
singular, which stands to "prurience" for a universal, viz.
'* curiosity," and vice versa. An uncomprehensive thinker
betrays himself immediately, even to people of not much
general discernment ; probably by a neglect of the singular,
if his temperament is languid, and by an abuse of it, if his
bias is impulsive. Wherever motive is concerned, there is
all the chance in the world of a man's abusing the singular.
Cor. — The universal canon of integrity in the compre-
hensiveness of propositions may be variously expounded. To
a certain extent, it might appear to depend on the nature of
the subject treated of, whether the result were comprehensive,
or the reverse. IVIuch more, however, depends on the indi-
vidual. It is better to hear a man of capacity on midges,
than a noodle on the Trinity. But much depends also on the
mode of writing prescribed. If you prescribe the treatment
solely of details, you proscribe the very essence of a compre-
hensive treatment in style. Hence the second canon of
dignity, which ordains a universal implication in the subject.
Hence, too, the essential dignity of poetry, that, with the
representation of a fact, it may convey a principle. This
image, for example, is as purely analytic as any axiom in
mathematics : —
The moonpath flecking thin and tremulous the sea,
where each expression tells like the explosion of a bomb.
The more perfect such an image, the more does it supersede
and disparage all other renderings of the same phenomenon.
The phrase, " inlaying the sea with pearl," applied to the
glimmer of the moon, is artificial, in comparison, and narrow.
110 LOGIC OF STYLE.
But this happens, because the otlier is so trenchant — apar^
from the fact, that a literal rendering of nature-phases ii
necessarily more forcible than a metaphorical. Hence the
canon of felicity, which ordains that the differentia of every
subject shall be given, by deepening the inclusion of the
predicate. Objection may, therefore, be taken at once to all
such terms as " angelic " and " fairy-like," which are simply the
most dead and ineffective of poetical mannerisms. By the
side of the finesse that reveals itself in the expression just
quoted, " fairy," applied to anything whatsoever, is lumpish,
and " angel " unspiritual. Here it is precisely that the
spurious, and quasi-tautological, in analytic expression is so
offensive : — " But let the sober and serious hour come, which
sooner or later must come to all, the power of truth will soon
prove too strong for all that can he ojJjJosed to it, and pierce
into his heart," which is pretty much the same thing as a
man's saying, that D. V. he intends to shave to-morrow morn-
ing with a razor, if he cannot lay hands on anything else ; —
with this gross difference, that the last man must be a wag,
the other is not. Thus the circle is completed. For it is the
abuse of this principle which constitutes the breach of the
initial principle of integrity. If the predicate includes too
many attributes, it cannot be applied in its integrity to
implicate the subject. Thus " some anachronisms are
solecisms " must be altered to the universal of " solecisms,"
viz. " anomalies," That being accomplished, it is the tui^n of
the subject to raise the " some " to an " all," and, by way of
reversion upon that, it is for the predicate again to expand
the inclusion, by assigning the differentia of anachronism, as,
for example, thus : " All anachronisms are anomalous trans-
positions of different events in time."
OF QUALITY. Ill
17.
Comprehensiveness may appear in two relations, besides that
which it has to simple propositions. On the one hand, it may
appear in the connection between propositions, and, on the
other, in the connection between the clauses or sections of
single propositions.
A tr«>- jition is uncomprehensive when it shoots beside
the mark — either over or under it. For example, it is so,
when the occasion of anything is assigned as the cause.
And, on the other hand, its want of comprehensiveness con-
sists in placing together indefinitely, propositions, w^hose
mediation, from one to the other, should be made explicit;
as, for instance, in putting side by side, as parallel facts,
circumstances, of which the one is the direct outcome of the
other. In such a case, the writer often fails of being incisive,
not because he mistrusts the severer connection, but because
he does not see it at all : he does not shirk it, he misses it.
The proposition again, as divided internally, may be
either a binomial, a trinomial, or a polynomial. (The
mononomial relation has been discussed in the preceding
paragraph.) Thus: — "Endless are the purposes of men,
merely festal, or merely comic, and aiming but at the
momentary life of a cloud, which have earned for them-
selves the distinction and apparatus of a separate art."
Here, in the first clause, "festal" and comic" mark a
bisection in the thought, and in the second, " distinction "
and " apparatus." There is, however, an apparent trisection
in the first, owing to the phrase, "and aiming," etc.; but
that is the statement of a characteristic which is common
to both "festal" and "comic," viz. their intrinsic levity.
A perfect illustration of the threefold division is this : —
112 LOGIC OF STYLE.
" From tlie first intermeddling of law with the movement
of the higher moral affections, there is an end — to freedom
in the act, to purity in the motive, to dignity in the per-
sonal relation;" where there is given, first, the fact, next,
its origin, and finally its result. The polynomial relation
may be illustrated from this proposition: — "We glory
in tribulations also — knowing that tribulation worketh
patience, and patience experience, and experience hope, and
hope maketh not ashamed." It is not hard to discover
what is the critical point for comprehensiveness in such
propositions, or what divisions are imperfect. It does not
follow, that because a statement is broken up into sections,
it is less comprehensive than a simple statement ; although
it may happen that a threefold distribution is necessarily
more comprehensive, because more economical, than a four-
fold. What is required is, on the one hand, that the
divisions shall not be elliptical — no polite proposition ever
yawns to the extent of a third or fourth of its whole
superficies. The principle of distribution must not be blind.
On the other hand, the sections must not overlap each
other. An impetuous writer, or one who writes for im-
pression upon the common mind, is very apt to fall into
slovenly modes of co-ordinating his ideas ; — " Whatsoever
things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever
things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever
things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report ; if
there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on
these things." The last clause contains a very happy
antithesis, as summing up the virtues as they are in them-
selves, on the one hand, and as they are for us, on the other.
And the same antithesis holds in the main division
OF QUALITY, 113
of tlic first clause. Only there the separate phrases are
very loosely connected ; since there is no fundamental
principle of division. And what holds for ordinary
thought, holds also for poetry. It is true that Shakespere
constantly multiplies metaphors ; but only for the sake of
intensifying an impression, by expounding it from different
points of view, which is quite a distinct practice from trail-
ing a mass of particulars in rag-tag-and-bobtail fashion
after the main thought. For if a definite principle of
■ division underlies the conception, any mere details are
superfluous, and if not, they must be more or less arbitrary.
CoK. — The general appearance of a comprehensive thought
may be rendered appropriately by a very genial extension of
the term sententious. The sentence is the full, rounded pro-
position; and whatever causes a thought to assume a robust
appearance, is sententious. By the term generally is under-
stood, whatsoever is characterised by this in excess. Accord-
ingly all such writing is bombastic, and weak. But, in the
milder sense of the term, all good writing is sententious, more
or less ; just in proportion as the thoughts of men who write
carelessly give the idea of limpness, and a want of having
come into being through resistance. Hence it happens that
so much writing is unequivocally fiat, and wanting in relief.
It is not necessary that every thought should be epigrammatic
in its setting ; but it is indispensable that it should be analyti-
cally definite. This is the fundamental order of the senten-
tious; and accordingly there is (1) the simple proposition;
pure in the double sense of being undiluted, and free from
extraneous matter. Thus : " No man escapes the contagion
from contemporary bystanders." Of such, too, are all mathe-
matical theorems, &c. : " The three angles of a triangle are
114 LOGIC OF STYLE.
together equal to two right angles." (2) There is the proposi-
tion, with a clause qualifying the main idea. These sen-
tences are formed in various ways, by augmenting, or limiting,
or simply explicating, the primary thought. E.g. " ]\Iany of
the inhabitants (and all those of respectability) subscribed to
the fund." — " Tliis is a paradox, only in the sense wliich makes
it honourable to be paradoxical." — " Popularly, i.e. amongst
the thoughtless, literature is held to include everything that is
printed in a book." All good writing deals constantly with
the relations of facts — their aim, origin, exceptions, circum-
stances, adverse influences, advantages, proportions, &c., &c.
And as the vocabulary of a bad writer is indefinite, so is his
grouping. (3) There is the proposition with an antithesis;
e.g. " The possibility of selecting books wisely is becoming
more hopeless, as the necessity for selection is becoming con-
tinuall}^ more pressing." A certain distrust might be attached
to effects so glittering, were it not that these very effects are
most exposed to criticism, where they have the chance of
being most telling, and are most brilliant, when they found
upon such principles of reciprocity as are logically the most
just. And wliat becomes thus a habit of good writing is due
to more dignified sources than literary knack and facility : it
is engrained in the thinking. Such effects, of course, are the
most elaborate ; and many men write from year to year, with-
out striking a single antithesis. This mode of setting the
thought gains, accordingly, by comparison, while it cannot
lose by any abuse that might be attempted.
18.
In so far as subtlety and comprehensiveness represent, the
one the differential, the other the integral, in the variation of
OF QUALITY. ' ' ^ J)ll5
terms, they are formally opposed to each other. But they are
so distinguished from each other, just because they are corre-
lative functions. The one takes up what the other leaves
undone ; and where the one is active, the other is in abeyance.
But this is only true formally. And in a very obvious sense,
to integrate a terra is to differentiate it, after a fashion, and to
differentiate it is to integrate it. Alter a term in any way
you please, up or down, and you must integrate its inclusion
or its implication. And at the same time you have caused
the meaning to differ from what it was a moment previously.
Just in the same way it happens that a writer's totality of
expression, forming an integral fact, becomes his differentia in
regard to other individual writers. So long as comprehensive-
ness and subtlety are looked at apart from one another, each is
seen to assume a characteristic form. But the one is involved in
the other, and in practice this involution is of exceeding power
and significance. There may be an isolated remark comprehen-
sive, without being subtle, and vice versa. But there is no such
thing as continuous expression that is comprehensive, without
being subtle — although, of course, either quality can only be
illustrated from individual expressions — and vice versa. For
evidently, if everybody holds that all P is Q, you, who see
that some P only is Q, must have embraced the rejected
members of P with a grasp as comprehensive as that of any
one else, as it is certainly more pertinent than that of every
one else. And if, on the other hand, you embrace all P, as
being implicated by Q, your subtlety must have co-operated to
discover the principle upon which the outcast section of P
has been fallaciously excluded from association with Q. Each
quality is the exponent of the other.
116 LOGIC OF STYLE.
The cattle are grazing,
Their heads never raising,
There are forty feeding like one.
What have we here — an image that is more comprehensive,
or more subtle ? Subtle it is to begin with, from the sudden
combination of ideas — some P is some Q — that by and by
diffuses itself like the dawn. For after the surprise, it is seen
that there is no straining in the predicate, no spurious refine-
ment, or discordance. It is at least generic in relation to
animals as opposed to non-generic, and applies comprehensively
to the subject; — some P is all Q. But is this not merely a
vanishing picture, as applied to that predicate ? The habit
belongs, so far as we can recollect, to no other animal ; but are
cattle found feeding in such fashion so frequently, as to con-
stitute it, for them, a habit ? Surely — only some P is not
all Q. This the comprehensiveness verifies, by summing up
the occasions on which cattle have been remembered to graze
in this manner, and mounts the proposition thus : — all P is
all Q — the predicate being a proprium, not an accident. But
now, again, are there not other animals besides cattle, which
feed after this manner ? No ; — any S is not all Q. Sheep
feed in numbers, too, and of all animals, therefore, most
resemble cattle in that respect. But sheep do not feed
" forty like one." They lack the consentaneousness and
repose of a herd of cattle feeding (and what, by the way,
is the secret distinction between "flock" and "herd"?);
their motion in feeding is a twitching, rather than a
browsing ; and some of them in a flock are always in
impatient motion. This is distinction enough, and is the dis-
tinction indicated in the expression ; — although the diflerence
to the ear in the sound made by the different animals in feed-
1
OF QUALITY. 117
ing might accentuate that distinction, and even if the
spectator were removed out of hearing might associate itself
with what he sees, especially if he is sensitive to the converse
case, that, viz. of passing by a field after nightfall, when the
cattle may be heard and not seen. And this distinction the
comprehensiveness ratifies by showing the predicate to be the
differentia, not applicable to the genus : — only P is all Q.
Subtlety. Comprehensiveness.
1, Some P is some Q. 2. Some P is all Q.
3. Only some P is not all Q. 4. All P is all Q.
5. All S is not all Q. 6. Only P is all Q.
And conversely, instead of beginning with the negation of the
proposition, no P is any Q (viz. some P is some Q), we may
begin by negating the result attained in No. 6. Thus if we
are told that only certain kinds of scientific men are the
authorities on a subject, we may demur, by suggesting (1) that
there may be others who have a claim to be heard, in fact (2)
that all scientific men have an equal claim ; further that the
specialists are (3) not all competent upon the subject, but (4)
that only some of them are competent ; and finally, that (5)
even these are more or less incompetent, because, as it turns
ou.t, this subject is not their subject, but one apart, so that (6)
not one of them has a voice in the matter. Thus, the
predicate being still quantified : —
Subtlety. Comprehensiveness.
1. Only P is not all Q. 2. All S is aU Q.
3. All P is not all Q. 4. Only some P is all Q.
5. Some P is not all Q. 6. No P is any Q.
Novelty is the hidden condition of comprehensiveness,
just as truth is its overt condition. Certain principles, just
by reason of their novelty and subtlety, tend to become
commonplace. They are at first striking, and so come to be
118 LOGIC OF STYLE.
iu everybody's mouth, with the reversionary certainty of
being the opposite of striking. In the same way it
happens with figurative expressions. The simile about the
lion shaking the dewdrops from his mane once was new.
And for central Africa at the present moment undoubtedly
it is new ; that expression being understood to bring down
the house nightly in the Theatre Eoyal of the Sahara.
Only by and by it will come to the ears of the lions, who
will grow sulky, and refuse to do the shake, and so the
metaphor will be no longer true. But meantime, and for
home consumption, the expression must be turned over
to the wags, who will find plenty ways of applying it,
so that it shall blossom like the apple-trees in spring.
Otherwise, such expressions, being derived, involve no com-
prehensiveness on the part of the writer who uses them. A
proverb is equally an exponent of comprehensiveness;
which is a form of expression professing to be com-
prehensive, and not subtle ; though it is not always what it
professes to be, and when it is, that happens because it is
subtle as well, i.e. is that which it does not profess to be.
Cor. — Considered psychologically, and in a strict scientific
sense, it is the union of subtlety and comprehensiveness
which constitutes genius. The term may be used vulgarly to
denote anything, from heat and clap-trap to a rhythmical
felicity that is comparatively mechanical ; and may be bent
to suit a variety of descriptions, which are simply not quack
definitions, because they do not pretend to be scientific. The
term, as commonly used, is itself equivocal. A writer may
quite well be distinct from the crowd, who is yet not to be
classed with men of the highest power ; and would not be so
classed, even by those who confound under the one term
OF QUALITY. 119
catholic power, and power that is merely eccentric. The men
of true power have a bond drawing them together, and
isolating them from men of the second class, plus their
individuality. It is not individuality alone that constitutes
genius. For manifestly, if A, B, and C, are all men of genius,
there must be something common amongst them, just as if
they are Chinese, there must be something common to them
all, whether they wear pigtails or not. In itself, individuality
is the most barren criterion that can be conceived ; for beinf.
in the abstract, common to them all, it denudes each of the
writers of his common, concrete. j)ower; each man's in-
dividuality excludes that of his neighbour. That being the
case, the distinction of genius between the mind of high
originality and the ordinary mind, is just as peremptory
between it and the middle-men or eccentrics. AVhich dis-
tinction is something of a definite intellectual cast. It is, there-
fore, co-present with genial power of whatever kind ; and that
not merely as an accompaniment, but as a substratum. Xo
emotion can possibly be gauged, can possibly express itself in
literature, except through some intellectual medium. Its
force and delicacy are expounded by its comprehensiveness
and subtlety. Nor is this a task to which language is unequal.
Communication of such emotion, now ethereal, now masculine,
is made every day ; and with this proof of the infallibility of
the medium, that all who read do not respond to the feeling,
or respond to it in different degrees. Those who are affected
by it are precisely those of whom we could predict that they
should be affected ; and those who are not, are precisely those
in whom we have seen the want of capacity for appreciating
it. The influence of emotion is, therefore, manifestly regulated
by principle, precisely because it is not indiscriminate. It
120 LOGIC OF STYLE.
might be thought, that the fact of a man's not having seen the
emotional force of a passage, and apprehending it, upon re-
reading the piece, were a proof of the insecurity of this mode
of communication. It is in fact the very opposite ; the mood
simply has not been favourable at first for catching the
peculiar sentiment ; and tlie mode of transit would indeed be
precarious if, when the emotions were inert, the piece had
been adequately apprehended. Hence it is, that the reader
recurs to the passage with undiminished pleasure. All of
which depends upon the permanence of the intellectual co-
efficients. It is not merely that these include the principles
of poetical genius, but that they allow for genius of the philo-
sophic and scientific cast, as well as of the poetical ; — and here
is another source of equivocation, since so few people can
square the idea of poetical genius with scientific, and most
people when they talk of genius mean distinctively the former.
The power, therefore, as not merely (1) concrete, and to be
found in a man's individual expressions, but (2) specifically
intellectual and constant, is (3) essentially recoverable by
analysis, and to be measured in detail. It does not foUow that
because comprehensiveness and subtlety are not to be
predicated of a man's style from single expressions, his genius
can be determined without appraising these expressions. It
is predicable in detail, provided you predicate in regard to a
sufficient number of details. And just because it is so, the
caution needs to be given at all regarding isolated expressions.
These appear as particulars, and form the universal which we
call genius, which, in so far, is not local or individual ; only
the specific form which realises the genius of each man in its
individuality, is just that mode of expression under which the
common element incarnates itself, in art and science.
CHAPTEE III.
Of Quantity.
Section I. The Principle of Quantity.
19.
A VERY important distinction exists in Style between tliouglits
as they are independently, and tlie same thoughts in a process.
It holds both in relation to single propositions and to proposi-
tions in a series. So that, on the one hand, a series of thoughts
may be regarded as containing propositions separately intelli-
gible ; and, on the other, separate propositions may be regarded
in relation to mutual reticulation or coherence, each of them
being potentially a link or item in a series. For the distinct-
ness or completeness of an idea is as necessary for progress as
for positive disconnection — which in fact is just the difference
between insulation and isolation : dig a trench across the home
end of a peninsula, and you insulate it ; wash away the island
now formed, from the side of the canal, till its diameter is less
than the distance which divides it from the mainland, and
you isolate it. And this progression to an indefinite extent,
with transitions more or less severe and artistic, and ap-
pealing more or less to a chain of unexpressed connec-
tion, reposes upon a natural tendency to the evolution, more
or less systematic, of one thought through the medium of
another.
I
122 THE LOGIC OF STYLE.
I apprehend that a person asked to discourse to an
audience on landscape-gardening may formulate his subject
as he pleases, may select for his text a fact, or a proposition,
or a series of propositions, and may deliver accordingly an
essay, a thesis, or a lecture. But, in either case, his very-
first movement towards an elucidation or confirmation of his
theme is a departure from the position he has assumed. He
cannot expound his subject by simply reiterating the phrase
" landscape-gardening." He must proceed by beginning
somewhere else. If he is simply obtuse, he will begin with
a few general remarks on the interesting nature of the art.
If he is pretentious as well as obtuse, he will grasp at futile
analogies in the subject to landscape-painting, led thither
by the coincidence of the term, and proceed to splice the
two subjects according to the correspondence which he has
chipped smooth for them. If he is a master, he will sever
the subject in its differentia from the generic science of
gardening, with a hint of its leaning to landscape to convey
its affinities to the picturesque as well as the stubbornly
useful in art. Nor does this happen from the common usage
with regard to introductions and exordia. On the contrary,
these are possible only through this principle of quantity ;
they derive their proportion to the whole theme entirely
from it ; and their abuse arises through an unseasonable
extension of its peculiar functions. Not one of the propo-
sitions in the series may contain an expression implicating
any of the terms in the text, and yet the whole may be a
perfect exposition of it. Or the terms themselves may be
expressed in every proposition of the discourse, and no illus-
tration given of it whatever. Universally, therefore, it
holds, that the secession of the expositor from his first posi-
OF QUANTITY. 123
tioii is the first condition of his return to it ; the fact bein^
that the thesis, which henceforth is his terminus ad quern,
is, for the moment of its being stated, his terminus a quo.
CoK. — The practical conditions of all interesting thought are
two, that it shall explicate truth, or make it impressive. In
the one case, the communicator takes advantage of the ob-
scurity of a principle, in the other of its simplicity ; or rather
he lessens or remedies the disadvantage attaching on the one
hand to a truth that is profound, and on the other to one that
is commonplace. Now to set the truth in its relations cannot
be effected for either aim, unless he causes the parts of his
exposition in detail to be apprehended mediately through each
other. And since the separate propositions must precede or
succeed one another in time, priority and subsequence become
the exponent of relation in thought. For its own part, the
principle overlooks all difference in the importance of indivi-
dual thoughts. One idea may be worth in quality of sugges-
tion all the rest put together ; or it may be the sole unfertile
thought in a series that is massively and resplendently sug-
gestive. Its value for transition may or may not coincide
with its intrinsic and independent value.
20.
By whatsoever laws of sequence in fact, or of analogy, or of
logical consequence, a thought has reached its position in a
series, it is the rule, that the truth which for the time being
occupies the attention shall have an advantage over every
other — an advantage immediate, in the way of excluding
every other, an advantage derivative, in the way of suggesting
others. It is a supplanter of every other truth to this extent,
that any truth supplanting it shall do so only in virtue of the
124: THE LOGIC OF STYLE,
relation of that truth to itself the proximate truth. Ab-
dicating the throne, it has a right to name its successor ; the
• chances being that this will be a relative, according to its
force at the moment of resignation. That a certain range of
thought has been in occupation for some time is a pre-
sumption that it will soon be displaced ; its displacement, in
fact, is rapidly being carried on, For each idea has two dis-
tinct values, a potential value, as a generating or multiplying
source of ideas, and an actual, as a link in the development
of a succession of ideas. The potential value, therefore, of
such a chain of thought is being reduced with every suc-
cessive proposition to actual value. And correspondingly its
power of resistance to a possible succeeding series of thoughts
is being reduced to zero — a process that, with discontinuous
thinkers, goes on very rapidly.
The two factors requisite for systematic composition are
physical energy and intellectual fertility, Nor will their
conjoint operation be defeated, except on the suspension
of the conditions under which the initial thought was
generated. That suspension will be a mixed result from
physical exhaustion, and a lack of that surplus fund of
unorganized suggestions regarding the immediate theme,
precisely to the extent that the potential energy, or the
potential fund of illustration, has had demands made upon
it. The resistance, in such a case, to the production of
fresh thought would certainly be enormous. In fact, writ-
ing under such circumstances is quite exceptional. It is,
however, the ordinary case which I contemplate, and pre-
cisely the opposite circumstances, viz., those in which
the resistance arises from the tumult and redundancy of
the thought. For every new idea operates by way of dis-
OF QUANTITY. 125
turbing existing relations. If these have been exhausted,
it does not come a moment too soon. If not, it acts in the
way either of delaying the development of the thought, or
of precipitating it. A resistance has, in fact, been inter-
posed which it was beyond its province to interpose, arising
from weakness or impatience. And there are two factors,
as poiccrs, which are affected by a want of distribution of
energy in the mental powers — the powers of suggestion
and modulation ; so that it is not so much they that are
disturbed, as the process of combination which is dis-
turbed, because they do not act in harmony. The fault
may be a defect in either case. Or it may be an abnormal
activity of the suggestive faculty, the elaborative faculty
not being able to weave into shape the materials as they
are passed back to it. i^I'ot that by any means this activity
could be represented as so much surplus energy. It is the
same force applied momentarily in a different direction ;
and viciously applied, because it is not distributed so as
to sustain the modulating agency. Such action of the
imagination is simply spasmodic, and just as much a sign
of vigour as tetanus might be of muscular power. It is not
enough, therefore, that the writer's force is at its maximum,
it must also be, as to its two factors, in eqiLilihrio. "With
diminished total energy a finer result will be attained,
than with increased energy disproportionately applied. The
moment any plethora is felt, the diastole begins to remedy
the disturbance and restore the diminishing clearness.
Otherwise not merely will some of the suggestions founder,
but the elements which were about to consolidate in their
totality wiU be dispersed. To obviate that, a cessation of
the process is necessary, and a revision, to the extent that
126 THE LOGIC OF STYLE.
the attention has failed in its first effort to meet its extra
engagements — has failed to neutralize the resistance offered
by the difficulties of the process augmented by the
difiiculties of the situation. The two functions must again
concur in amending the relations of the thought to their
mutual satisfaction. And they will do so in the converse
order from that in which they concurred to fashion the
combination which now they are called upon to recon-
stitute ; each in that ratio being called out or withheld, in
which, for the original draught, it had unduly been de-
preciated or exalted.
COK. — This tendency to disturbance exists in all composition,
even the most negligent. And, properly controlled, it is the
very springboard of effective composition. It is felt, therefore,
most decidedly in the experience of the best writers, who
precisely are those born with the best resources for managing
it. A writer who has the advantage of a thinking that is
highly complex, must share its partial disadvantages for rapid
improvisation. His tendency is to involve fresh suggestions
with every turn of his argument. But counterworking that,
and with a view to the summary extinction of those intermin-
able ramifications, which make it oftentimes uncertain what is
the leading idea, is a regulative faculty, moving abreast of the
tumultuary flux of ideas, and determining what phases of the
thought are to be rejected, what subordinated, and what re-
served for a more special expansion in arrear. His resource
lies in the exceptional rapidity with which he is able to pass
from the final adjustment of a thought to the rehearsal of an
impending thought, and from the pioneer stage back into the
complementary one of adjustment.
OF QUANTITY. 127
21.
The correspondences, which take effect in the relations of
the suggestive and regulative faculties during composition,
are founded on the reciprocity of relation between Quantity
and Quality. It is self-evident, that you cannot connect two
ideas unless they have some common tenor and significance
(their quality), or, on the other hand, expound that relation-
ship, unless both, and in their individuality (their numerical
distinctness, their quantity), be co-present. For example, a
historian, treating of the causes of a revolution, sums them up
in three propositions. This has been accomplished by their
mutual relevance, depending ultimately on their separate sig-
nificance ; which has been the agency in limiting them to
that precise number as a maximum. The quality in this
instance has determined the quantity. Suppose, however,
that there could not have been less than three. In that case
the effect depends upon the comprehensiveness of each of the
three propositions ; and quantity has become the exponent of
quality. For if another writer requires a larger compass to
produce three truths of equal dimensions, if his complete
truths only alternate with partial truths, it is evident that the
other is the more comprehensive thinker. If you allow
an author to unite two propositions separately obvious, you
may produce a subtle result. For by showing its unexpected
relation to a principle, he may have glorified a fact which
was commonplace, and even the principle, by developing
unexpectedly its wealth of application. Or conversely, by
reading into connection with other truths a truth that in iso-
lation was original, you may make it commonplace. This
proposition : " Fathers of the church are no more to be relied
128 THE LOGIC OF STYLE.
on as authorities in doctrine than lay authors," is docked con-
siderably as to its impressiveness by a preceding statement :
" There have been many heterodox professors of divinity and
freethinking bishops." The function of quantity is thus
precisely to determine the variation of quality. For when I
say that the one expounds the other, I do not mean by way of
illustrating its brilliance ; but simply that it enforces the other,
whether in the way of magnifying or depreciating it — of show-
ing it up as subtle or non-subtle, just according as it is either.
It is a most significant truth, that condensation is a test
of high thinking, and for the profound reason, that it
depends in such great measure on the quality of the think-
ing. An accidental advantage, therefore, it is not ; nor one
^ arising where, we might imagine, it could best be dispensed
with ; but one arising from necessity, since it is pre-
cisely vast combinations that are the most subtle, exquisite
transitions that are the most just. A great writer is
dissatisfied with such relations as do not cause his mean-
ing to subtend a definite angle in the preceding thought.
The inferior writer has usages of transition known only to
himself. When he is at a loss for a connection, he simply
couples his ideas formally together as one, two, three,
without troubling himself to ascertain what cross-division
he may have made, or whether there is any coherence in
his chain of thought at all. Strictly speaking, these are
transitions only in the sense that creeping is walking.
That he does not write very much absolute nonsense is just
owing to this, that he evades definite logical forms of articu-
lating his thoughts. It is not tliat, having to use the
looser forms of transition, he has no occasion for those that
are more severe, but that, being illogical, he instinctively
OF QUA^:TITY. 129
evades them. For confine him entirely to these formulce,
and you will find not that he braces himself np correspond-
ingly to wield them, but that he will commit himself more
than ever ; so closely does the sharpness of a man's transi-
tions depend upon his logical sagacity. JMaking an infre-
quent use of certain forms of combination in his ordinary
composition, he makes inevitably a disproportionate use of
those which remain; thus inverting the practice of all
conscientious artists, which is to apply with discrimination
the most telling transitions, by continually turning over the
whole complement of transitions.
Cor. — The functions of Quantity and Quality, in their inter-
connection, form the essential principle of what we mean by
Style. The varieties of imagery and mood are quite
secondary. It is not that these primary distinctions are
abstract principles, on which the others may rest theoretically ;
nor merely that they are vital functions, with which the
varieties of expression may coalesce and interpenetrate.
They are superlative facts in all composition. The more
catholic, therefore, a style is — the more it relies upon sound
and original thinking, and rapid precision of movement — the
less it is imitable ; in part, because it is wanting in the mere
vividness and the mere agility of the secondary attributes of
expression (and which alone can be imitated), and in part
because it depends on an organic force that is incommuni-
cable. Hence another secret of the vulgarity of imitation ;
for a man can only copy that which is extra-essential, whether
existing in or out of connection with what is really vital.
Hence, too, the utter impotence of charging plagiarism upon
a style that resembles another, so long as the coincidence is
in the cardinal functions ; as if by possibility any writer
130 THE LOGIC OF STYLE.
could counterfeit a manner that is essentially inimitable, and
as if it were not a libellous misreading of his independent
merits to suppose him coveting what, being incommunicable
from himself, he must first have divorced from his own
manner in order to counterfeit.
Section II. Of Extension.
22.
Since the proposition is for Style the unit of length, it
must internally be complete. Directly or indirectly it takes
part in propagating the thought ; and ex hypothesi is an
integral portion of the whole series. Every such unit,
whether disinterestedly, and for the welfare of the series, or
selfishly, and as having a stake in the total application of the
line of thought, is compelled to be distinct, and to realise a
specific identity, with whatsoever detail it may be expressed
in the text, or in whatsoever variety of form it might other-
wise be expressed. There can be no range of thought so great,
as to extend the unit of length in proportion, nor any so short,
as to diminish the necessity for insulating each proposition.
The onus of bearing the thought may be shared by the
subordinate members of a proposition, but only in so far as
they help to preserve its unity. It need not be simple ;
but it must be single. This unity is the necessity for
expression, into wdiatever complexity a thought may run.
A man may wish to compose a sentence of hyperbolical
length, but unless he writes nonsense he does not lose the
unity ; so long as he continues to add to the sentence,
he is simply deferring it ; and his subordinate ideas them-
selves will be capable each of being explicated into a
totality similar to that which he is seeking to evade.
OF QUANTITY. 131
Cor. — xis the basis of Quality in Style is the same as that of
logical Quantity, so the basis of QiLantity in Style is identieal
with that of Quality in Logic. Every thought fully mounted
for transition has first a distinct meaning, in order that it
may have a direction, or what is technically called a drift,
whether it is to be regarded as a synthesis of compatible
elements, or a disjunction of elements that analytically are
involved in each other. Every proposition depends, therefore,
for its coherence on the copula, no matter whether that be
negative or positive.
23.
The principle of movement in composition is from one
complete proposition to another, and so on indefinitely, pro-
vided the nexus is preserved between each. Every proposi-
tion thus becomes alternately complementary to that which
precedes and that which follows. The two conditions of this
movement are, positively, that of advance, and, negatively,
that of connection. Mere succession without connection is
not progress. Discoursing on it matters not what, I an-
nounce, first, " that in savage times men are much more
liable wantonly to provoke each other to bloodshed than in
civihsed times," and, next, " that we are at present in the
middle of harvest." Now a first thought, in relation to any
theme whatsoever, is excused from being directly in connec-
tion, on the express understanding that it will take the first
chance of ingratiating itself with something that will lead it
into that connection. Instead of that, in this instance, it is
as far from the possible theme as ever, and, together with
proposition No. 2, the exponent of a principle that would
reduce all expression to a series of detached remarks, relevant
132 THE LOGIC OF STYLE.
to nothing, and as rigorously introductory to nothing. The
position of the thought is constantly shifting, and so rapidly, as
to make it impossible to say at what angle the new idea meets
the old. The vice of the case lies in its being merely the
repetition of the initial jyrinciple. We do not advance, simply
because we are always beginning ; and, unless we connect, we
never get beyond that beginning.
But it does not follow, on the other hand, that if we state
the same proposition over again with a little variation, we
are fulfilling the law of connection which is outraged in set-
ting side by side two disjunct ideas. For in such a case it is
evidently the minimum of variation which ought to be aimed at.
And it is impossible to multiply to any extent the circumstan-
tial variations of the same substantial thought, even if that were
of any use. But this is just what is demanded, viz., that the
same idea shall be reiterated indefinitely (short of absolute re-
petition), so as not to encroach upon the identity of any other
thought. Now certain thoughts allow of no permutation;
absolute truths have little patience for being tampered with.
And the writer will find that, with every succeeding change of
his capital theme, he is further from the identity he had
agreed to preserve, and more and more in league with the
difference which he was committed to avoid. So far, in fact,
from evading the impropriety of advance without connection
— which was proved to consist in repeating merely the initial
impulse — this is a gross aggravation of it, the truth being that
the initial movement is repeated, and with staleness of matter
superadded to sameness of principle.
An abrupt transition is quite a common thing in writing.
Thus : " The prisoners having no other refuge, saw one in
the sea. The weltering billows might at least hide them
OF QUANTITY. 133
from their enemies ; those hellish faces through the gather-
ing mists of death they might at least shut out. Not so :
not thus were they to be dismissed. The Syrian sea is an
inhospitable chamber of the great central Christian lake."
Understood in its possible relation to what goes before, this
last sentence, so abrupt, cannot have any reference to the
change of death as affected by the volition of the prisoners.
If drown these wretches must, the more turbulently hostile
the sea, the better — the more in secret friendly to their
melancholy purpose, the more solicitous to their despairing
mood. The sentence, therefore, can only indicate either
compassion on the part of the captors, or sarcasm on the
writer's part at their meditating some more elaborately
cruel form of death for the prisoners than suffering them to
drown themselves. In the context, however, it runs: —
" Nothing rose to view but a barren rock," to which, in the
sequel, the captives swam out; and being recalled under
promises of amnesty for the past, were treacherously
massacred. The reference points onward, then, to the
sheltering rock, not to the devouring waves — the sea was
hospitable to the extent of providing a rock ; and it was in
spite of its general inhospitality, and not because of it, that
the catastrophe was deferred. The transition is virtually
the same with the principle of the initial movement in
any piece of composition. ]\Ieantime, its relation to
what succeeds is certain; and it is only by pickiuo-
up the connection to windward of the spot where the
thought flagged and faltered in tacking, that we are
able to ascertain what advance has been made. Even
here it is true that there is no advance without connec-
tion, where the one is precocious and the other dubious.
134 THE LOGIC OF STYLE.
The advance from general inliospitality to the barren rock is
only from a principle to a detail, or, if you prefer it, from a
rule to an exception — according as you find it in or out of
keeping with the shabbiness of the coast. And as to the
connection, what angle of incidence is that, to which for the
life of us we could not adjust our instruments, without an
interregnum of confusion or suspense between alternative
issues ? How of all modes of transition should that be the
coryphaeus and the nonpareil ? There are two criteria of
progress in composition — advance in logic, and advance in
information ; which may be directly or inversely as each
other. Meantime it is sufiicient that all advance in logic
is directly and not inversely as logical connection. What
we mean by reason and consequent is the recognition, in
abstract speech, of a universal fact in nature ; and to express
the relation between them is impossible except by assuming
their duality. We say accordingly: I strike this match,
and therefore it begins to blaze. The matter we may know
to be identical ; but it is the form, by which expression is
bound, both fore and aft, with a necessity as eternal as its
inability to fix by any fraction of a second the instant in
which the one phenomenon shoots into the other amidships.
But what become the forms of a material substance, under
various conditions in nature, are just the material for a
formal existence like expression. Being distinct as forms
of a common fact or substance in the physical world, they
are distinct as separate facts, in the world of expression,
under a common form. The two stand to each other con-
versely : advance in the natural sphere being from phase to
phase, in the formal, from ultimatum to ultimatum, and the
nexus in the natural sphere being one of material, in the
OF QUANTITY. 135
other one of form. Hence the nexus in the illustration is
absolute, founding on physical identity. And similarly, the
advance is absolute, from the one idea to its companion. It
would be impossible to gauge any degree of advance, without
assuming some standard of connection, by which it mio-ht
be expounded. And consider simply how fiercely hostile
two things must be, which, in spite of so perfect a nexus,
are yet distinct. Eeal connection, therefore, being removed
as far from total identity as from total difference, it is self-
evident, that real advance is as far from total difference as
from total identity.
Cor. — There is no prerogative mode of transition in style, any
more than there is a prerogative velocity of descent for a
heavy body, falling a hundred feet, over a light one. Each is
indispensable for its own special function. Nevertheless as
the ponderous body will create more heat when it strikes the
earth then the light body, so a series of thoughts, with a
single order of interconnection (if such a thing were possible),
would be more or less rigorous than another, provided the
principle of connection there were uniform also. Most
passages therefore, and all of any length, exhibit an averac^e
cohesion in their transitions.
24.
The necessity, for composition, of a duality of ideas to act in
combination is also its limit. The principle of extension in
thought has nothing to do with an indefinite series of ideas,
except by way of providing the elementary conditions of each.
In the middle, or at the end, the series does no more than
repeat its experiences at the beginning: it is simply the
bridge of which these are the arches. It is not they, there-
136 LOGIC OF STYLE.
fore, that are subdivisions from the series, but the series which
is an accumulation of such integral portions. And in every
case of transposition or transformation of the larger masses, it
is they that regulate the result — not they through any section
or whole, but the section through them.
In the process, which in composition is continually
going forward, of alternate grasping and releasing by the
attention — grasping that it may release, and releasing
that it may grasp — the motion of style is necessarily
modified by the number of ideas that can be received at
the same moment in sufficient force to be co-ordinated.
Tlie process is one taking place with the full conscious-
ness of the writer. But concurrently with this, there may
be a subconscious process, moulding the thought as a
whole into conformity with one dominant idea, not
dispersed through the thoughts separately, but secretly
determining the bias of all. These influence each other
very greatly ; it depends, for example, on the rigid con-
nection of its members, that a train of thought completes
its curriculum round a given centre, so as to produce a
symmetrical result ; and on the stability of its focus (which
may be complex, but must be distinctly conceived), that a
series of ideas forms a recognisable whole. What, there-
fore, in theory is the evolution of a determinate conception
through its separate phases, is in practice the setting of these
into mosaic — the conscious formation of successive details
to a totality subconsciously fixed, subconsciously regulative.
That totality, having been reached, may be regarded con-
sciously as a whole ; in which event the principle is
reversed, the totality is recognized explicitly, and the
details implicitly. Such a mode of regarding the effect of
OF QUANTITY. 137
a piece of composition is, therefore, the exact converse of
the stylic. Style, being concerned with the process of
movement, has nothing to do with results. In its own way,
it has accounted for every item in the whole composition —
for every slide and pirouette, for every jerk and oscillation
— not a crevice remains for explanation. Any other mode
of explaining the facts must transcend style, and ex
hypothcsi cannot be stylic; it is simply rhetorical. Now
evidently the same function, which deals with the effect of
the sections of a piece, deals a fortiori with the totality of
the piece. And the rhetorical relation of any piece being
that in which it is a universal, and the stylic that in wj^idi
it is regarded in its particulars, the same rhetorical function,
which treats of every complete piece in relation to its
sections, treats also of these in relation to their subsections,
and mediately to the individual reticulations of the latter
in style. — Another mode of viewing a passage, quite dis-
tinct from either of these, but rhetorical also in its applica-
tion, is by estimating its general brilliance of connection.
" Most passages, and all of any length, exhibit an average
cohesion in their transitions." But the total estimate in
such a case founds solely on the aggregation of individual
brilliances, separately noted in any review for purposes of
style. — Casually, of course, the last thought of a section
may inosculate as closely with the first of the succeeding
one, as if the latter were simply a continuation of the self-
same idea. Indeed the more closely a writer mediates his
thoughts the one through the other, in relation to the total
idea, there will be the more difficulty in determining where
his new sections begin, apart from some mechanical device
for advertising such a transition. Which artificial device,
E
138 LOGIC OF STYLE.
as we have it now-a-clays, is quite inadequate to distinguish
the hierarchies of articulation, of section and subsection;
and is in fact often misleading, because it confounds what
is co-ordinate with what is subordinate. But a writer has no
business to play fast and loose with the one distinction that
is recognized so sacredly, that viz. between the section and
the proposition. He may, if he likes, turn a waggon-load
of small paragraphs into one, with a view to keeping the
resources of the paragraph for the grouping of the larger
masses of his thought. But in tliat case, he ought to be
the very last person who should wish to distribute one
section into two. It is very ungenteel to straddle back
against a door-post, one leg in the room, and the other in
the lobby. Indefeasibly his section is one and continuous,
notwithstanding the mechanical division. And when a
Trench novelist writes: "Jacques could not collect his
thoughts — Why?— He w^as mad," — in three parallel lines,
we pass it without remark, because it is too furious an
exaggeration to be harmful, or to escape anybody's notice.
On the other hand, when a section opens, for example, with
a " therefore," we take the first conception to be a resultant
of the preceding section as a whole, and not of its last pro-
position. If the two sections are specifically unconnected
in their drift, our author should either give a different turn
to the inaugural proposition, or omit it altogether.
Cor. — No writer holds more than one total thought at a time
in relation to any other, whether that be one already com-
pleted, or one that suggests itself as the resolution of the
thought under formation. Tliis number is a constant in all
composition. Any variation between man and man occurs in
two ways. In the one instance, it depends upon the rapidity
OF QUANTITY, 139
with which the individual composes. In the other, it de-
j)ends on the complexity of the conception. Virtually there is
often a plurality of suggestions moving abreast at once, and
threatening to break tiie critical nexus ; and there arises a
counteracting force, not to extend the limit, however, but to
cause the thoughts to travel backwards and adapt themselves
to it. The machinery, by which the attention is thus vir-
tually expanded, and the volume of the thought increased, is
that of Intension.
Section III. Of Intension.
25.
There are certain relations (such as that of cause and effect),
to which, from their essential coherence, it is indifferent per se
whether they shall be expressed in one proposition or in two.
These are of a bivalvular form, that no compression will hide,
and no extension disunite. In the second place, there are
many thoughts which are indivisible, and can only be stated
independently ; for example, " The rate of discount varies
with the degree of commercial prosperity." But finally,
there are certain conceptions, which cannot adequately be
expressed, unless their special relation is expressed within the
proposition ; whose totality is not complete, is not significant,
without a limitation. They resemble the second class of
ideas, in so far as they are formally single ; but are unlike, in
so far as the}'' approximate to being substantially dual pro-
positions. And it is in this latter point that they resemble
the first class, while they differ from that by not containing
their two factors in the same exact equilibrium. By way of
illustration, I may say, with reference to the distinction in
140 LOGIC OF STYLE.
point, " This class of marsupial propositions resembles tlie
first, only in so far as it approximates to a division of sub-
stance;" and virtually I have expressed by intension all that
could be expressed by extending the position into a separate
phrase.
If you assert, without its accompanying limitation, tlie
fact that " all persons holding property exercise the right of
suffrage, except women," you assert what is false. If again
it is expressed thus, " No women have the right of suffrage,"
the fact of tlie exception is still omitted ; and there is an
appeal made to the imagination of the reader to supply
what is involved, viz. that every one else has it. Which
appeal is either premature or gratuitous ; since if the reader
does not know anything about the fact, he will not gain it
from such a bare statement ; and if he does know it, and all
that remains is to insist upon it oratoricaUy, you forego the
chance of parading it with that special emphasis which the
discarded relation expressly secures. The thought thus
being coaxed into a simple proposition, there flies into the
wilderness the very point of having a complex formula.
Nor, if you express it in a double proposition, will you
•whistle your hawk back from the wilderness. For express
yourself thus : " All men have the right of suffrage — but
women have it not," — and it will be evident that you have
simply adjusted the two facts as j)articv.lar to 2'>ctTticular.
And meantime, the logical principle, which is radiantly ac-
knowledged in the proposition as it stood originally, and of
whose organic force this is the complete abnegation, is that
of the universal to the ^particular. This form of statement
has its own use in the economy of transitions. By which I
mean to infer, that it only comes into collision with other
OF QUANTITY. 141
forms, upon a question arising of differential propriety.
And on the other hand, I infer that it is liable to be drawn
into spurious comparisons, by the perversions or neglect of
its own principle — by a writer's treating, as if it were
subordinate, what is of cardinal import, and using the
machinery of inter-propositional connection for what is
strictly intra-propositional.
Cor. — Even in a mere literary fashion, the principle of
subordination is of use to preserve the thought against diverg-
ing from the main issue. "Were there no such resource,
co-ordinate and subordinate relations would be confounded
together. And consequently, it relieves the pressure that
otherwise must overtake the function of simple transition;
especially where the new limb of the proposition expresses
no specific limitation, but a casual addition to the thought.
Thus in reporting on the fact that ]\rajorX. (who had recently
returned to this country from the East) was about to publish
a volume of travels, the parenthetical clause is admissible,
which would have been out of place as an independent truth
between that fact and the disjunct fact, that the IMajor's
experiences had extended over a great number of years. In-
deed it would be admissible even as a separate fact {e.g. INlajor
X. is about to publish a volume of travels — He has lately re-
turoed from the East) provided something else be put in the
stead of the third sentence ; upon the principle that you may
ask a person to dine with yourself and a confidential friend,
whom you would not ask to dine with your friends pro-
miscuously. Hence another value of the process of subordina-
tion, as an alternative mode of varying the form of transition
— the first form in which the illustration stood being a variety
of the last — apart from the resource of making the clausal
142 LOGIC OF STYLE.
addition iu any thought the specific link of connection between
it and the next.
26.
Some machinery, then, must plainly be devised for incorporat-
ing into a proposition, without oti'ence, collateral or supple-
mentary statements, that, if explicated in full, would distiirb
the principle of progression, and for i-ecognising as subordinate
those which perforce had incorporated themselves in the
uncompleted thinking. Statements there are, which may be
presers'ed as additions, without encumbering the conception,
and be identified with it, without abating their significance.
The abuses of the process are threefold. (1) The apparatus of
subordination may be applied to an idea which ought to be
explicated in fidl further on, perhaps with a whole flourish
of pendants of its own. (2) There is the case in which a
suggestion is introduced, hanging merely by some happy-go-
lucky connection, or quite irrelevant. Greater laxity is allowed
to a subordinating principle than to one of co-ordination. But
whatever tells in the case of the one tells in a corresponding
degree in the case of the other. (3) There is a chance of the
principle of the minor clause being indefinitely repeated.
This is the chief danger. And it is this which makes any
exasseration of the others so much to be dreaded: in the
second instance, it would be to add irrelevance to irrelevance,
impertinence within impertinence. The abstract ideal and
the practical, with regard to the statement of relative truth,
have no such intimate connection with each other, as in the case
of the integral statement of truth absolute. A single state-
ment of truth in the abstract, that should include in it im-
plicitly every other truth, would be essentially compendious.
OF C2UAyTITY. 143
A single statement of truth in its subordination — in its pro-
cessions and divisions, its oppositions and concessions — would
include every express relation of every truth to every other :
it would be essentially pancyclopccdic. The attention could
not yield to the strain for a moment ; it would not even try-
to prefigure the eternally advancing, eternally receding con-
clusion. It bends, therefore, to the same limitations in inten-
sion as in extension. Being flushed from the primary-
thought, and overflowing, it returns to fill the lacuna which it
had anticipated in the thought that succeeds ; its practical
limit not interfering with, but specifically enhancing any
purposes of literary propriety — of perspicuity, or economy,
or elegance.
The medium for the di.stribution of the energy of subor-
dination in thought is again the faculty of attention. It is
not attention, however (any more than in the preceding
case), in the sense of that which is exhausted during the
evolution of thought, and every exertion of which involves
a separate decrement in the stock of available energy. For
so far as exhaustion goes, it does nut matter to the reader
whether that is effected by fiftj curt propositions, or by
twenty voluminous ones. Fatigue is no independent
criterion, therefore; and even as a symptom it is incon-
stant and precarious. Moreover, its degree, when it does
move in an appreciable ratio, is itseK otherwise predeter-
mined, viz. by the intellectual conditions for apprehending
rapidly the bearing of a new thought, and for sustaining it
without impatience through its development to its technical
sublation in the thought which succeeds. It is not atten-
tion in its length that is meant, but in its breadth — the
capacity for holding a number of conceptions simultane-
144 LOGIC OF STYLE.
ously, so as to form a unity, varying in complexity accord-
ing to the clearness with which these may be combined.
Cor. — The principle of certain writings conducted apparently
in defiance of this limit is really exoteric. The structure of
law documents is often according to a coarse and very
different method. The various clauses, instead of being em-
braced in a unity of consciousness, are held together in the
memory. This, psychologically, is the distinction ; the unity
in transition being often merely arbitrary and precarious.
27.
Every proposition must be either simple or complex. If
simple, however, it may be so by having rejected the chance
of forming a member of a complex proposition ; and if com-
plex, it may be so by refusing to have its members scattered
into separate propositions. The permutations, according to
which the several limbs of an original complex thought may
be arranged, are very numerous. Only each of these, as ulti-
mately placed, is still one of the two alternative forms, either a
simple thought or a compound, and is alternatively that wliich
it is, by having refused to incarnate itself under the correla-
tive form. This is the simple case, in which the reader sees
all the apparent alternatives spread out on the page before
him at once. Nor is it woi-th while inquiring particularly
into the hidden alternatives; — what might have happened,
viz. in the way of sn23];)rcssion, before the thought was per-
mitted to stand as it is. All that moves agreeably to the
same principles. So in tlie case of revision : if a new thought
is to be admitted, it must be either as an integral fact, or as a
fact in affiliation with some other fact (must be a leading fact,
or a secondary, or an offshoot again from that), whether it be
OF QUANTITY. 145
as a total increment, or as a substitute for some other fact
that has been suppressed. Any alteration must take effect
either (1) by way of addition, or (2) by way of retractation,
or (3) of both combined, the new fact being promoted vice the
previous fact superannuated. — Even here of course there is a
mode of keeping the tliought in life, viz. the appendix, or
note ; which may radiate from the original suggestion of the
text at various angles, and with varying degrees of importance.
Only its scope is limited ; otherwise, upon the same principle,
a succession of notes, taking off from each other, might be
continued ad infinitum. And besides, exhibiting in itself the
same principles of composition which govern the primary
text, the note has no special value as illustrating how these
work. — So far there is nothing to alter — to multiply or
diminish— the forms under which the result must appear.
But these processes throw a very searching light upon the
secret rationale of variety in composition, and a very signifi-
cant one upon the reciprocal relations of transition and
subordination. Interpose a thought between two complex
thoughts, and possibly you will attract the allegiance of their
near members to itself, transmuting what is left into a simple
transitional phase from an ultra-transitional. Eliminate a
proposition, and the thoughts, between which it has stood,
may coalesce. Each resultant form, however, will still arise,
just by rejecting the form in which it would not be what it is.
This simply is the differential principle in Quantity, which
by the side of Quality is too apt to appear flaccid and
meagre, and which these external modes of variation tend
vastly to enhance and expound, by illustrating the organic
nature of transitional connection.
To say that one thought may influence the form of
146 LOGIC OF STYLE.
auotlier standing in connection with it, is to say nothing.
It gives no chie to tlie degree or the kind of variation wliich
may be involved. For, transition being known to be the
most important matter in composing, we should each of us
* naturally incline to look upon any modification arising
within that as very trilling. And as a rule it is so : so long
as the change descends upon the subordinate clauses it is
inconsiderable. " An immense majority of the Eoman
people never lighted a candle, unless sometimes in the
early dawn. And this custom w^as the custom of all
nations that lived round the Mediterranean." Let the final
clause be eliminated from the first proposition, and it will
make no difference to the connection of the two sentences ;
since the reference in the latter is to the rule, not to the
exception. Upon the same principle, the corresponding
clause in the text of this sentence, which I have suppressed,
ought to be superfluous. "The daylight furnished gratis
was certainly undeniable in its quality. . . . Seneca even in
his own luxurious period called those men by ugly names
who lived chiefly by candle-light." Yet no ; there is a
hiatus. For why " ugly " ? Because the men were too
ugly themselves to come abroad in the day-time, or because
they were luxurious, or perhaps because they were candle-
making, which being such a public disgrace, itself required
to be prosecuted by artificial (to wit candle) light ? For no
such reason, but for one more obvious, yet still puzzling,
because one of several more or less obvious reasons, — which
is supplied by the intercalated phrase, " quite sufficient for
all purposes that were honest." The difference of variation
in the first instance is at its minimum, in the other at its
maximum, the complex proposition in the one case being
OF QUANTITY. 147
virtually a simple thouglit, in tlie other virtually a
dual.
Now let both clauses, instead of being suppres.sed,
undergo the other change, that of elevation into an in-
dependent thought. Immediately the values are reversed.
The subordinate member of the first instance is seen to be
incompatible with the seriousness of the transition that is
made to rest upon it ; while, in the other case, the altera-
tion makes very little real difference. The degree of varia-
tion is now at its maximum in the first case, and at its
minimum in the second.
The difference of variation, therefore, exists at a maximum
or a minimum, according as in each case the alternative
orders of circumstance take effect ; the same condition in
either producing the opposite result to that which it
produces in the other, and the same ratio of effect being
produced in the one as is produced by the opposite con-
dition in the other. The general principle, however, is (1)
that of intermodification (and not of suppression), and (2)
that of a maximum change under such intermodification — a
subordinate clause being raised to the rank of a separate
proposition. Now if this is the ordinary case, it will not do
simply to say that one proposition affects the form of its
neighbour ; which implies that the change is quite incon-
siderable. Especially the degree of the variation requires
to be specified, when it is the exception to the second rule
that is to be taken into account, and the change is a
mijiimum, the subordinate clause being virtually a co-
ordinate already, and benefiting little by its promotion.
Still more peremptorily does the nature of the variation
require to be adjusted, when (the first law being violated) it
148 LOGIC OF STYLE.
is a suppression, and not a mere alteration of form ; since
that suppression brings this last exceptional minimum
change of the subordinate clause to the normal maximum,
and the first normal maximum change to an exceptional
minimum. It would be utterly vain, therefore, to look in
the mere form of a proposition for a clue to its transitional
value; and just for this reason, that there are only the two
forms — compromise between them tliere is none. No more
palpable distinction of form can exist between a pot with a
handle and a pot without. And it is all the more readily
assumed, that the substantial value of each is uniformly the
same; while none could be more equivocal. Meantime, the
possible modification that may be produced by one pro-
position upon another is modification enough ; in the first
instance the sentence following the clause " unless per-
haps," etc., determines that that clause, if introduced, shall
not be co-ordinate with it, but must be subordinate to
the preceding thought ; and in the second instance,
the subordinate clause determines that the succeeding
proposition shall not supplant it, but must stand
apart.
Cor. — The interaction of the two fundamental processes in
composition is the ground not more of certain average effects
in style, than of certain broad differences. No man writes
without using both ; but they may be used in different pro-
portions, so as to distinguish even diverse nationalities. And
a tariff might even be fixed for certain artificial stimulants,
according to the results of their physiological action upon the
several processes of composition. The effect of wine, for
example, appears to be that of inducing a more brusque and
discontinuous mode of writing, and to discourage a more
OF QUANTITY, 149
elaborate style of movement, the tendeucy to wlucli is doubt-
less exaggerated by opium.
More immediately, however, the power of literary con-
densation depends upon a knowledge of the manner in which
these processes mutually affect each other. Most people seem
to think that the way to condense is by suppression. Let a
writer run his pen through a sentence here, and a clause there,
and he does all that is required. Especially, it would be said,
let the carnage descend most heavily on the clauses. Now
really it is not the derivative and parenthetical clauses that
harbour diffuseness, but the garrulous or querulous iteration
of the same truth in successive propositions. Nevertheless
let the clauses be thinned out. And let your redundant main
propositions be dismissed at the same time. But now, where
many people imagine the work of compression to be over, the
important part of it is just beginning. Only instead of com-
mencing with the secondary clauses, we commence with the
primary ; and instead of lessening the number of subordina-
tions, we increase them, by making the co-ordinate propositions
coalesce, and subordinating one to the other.
All practical instruction in the art of composition j9ows
naturally out of these principles. As for mechanical criteria,
they are of no use. Direct the tyro to write in long sentences,
or in short sentences, and you tell him nothing. There may
be more difference between two short propositions than
between a short and a long. A thought, for example, with a
significant exception attached to it, and that turns back upon
itself at a very acute angle, may make more demand upon the
attention than one which carries the leading idea through a
whole series of antistrophes. To talk of brevity, v/ith a dis-
tinction like that concealed under it, is to give no hint of the
150 LOGIC OF STYLE.
real case, to a pupil who measures results by the square foot,
and possibly to encourage a vicious style of writing, by leav-
ing him to suppose that one curt proposition is as good as
another. Now a staccato movement of thought is not merely
one of the most offensive, but specifically the most unpromis-
ing of all the modes of composition. In its own degree the
most lively, it is in continuity the most monotonous. And
in a higher sense it is vicious, because it generates irreflec-
tion ; which is a vice, just in proportion as the majority of
truths are relative. The most effective mode of statement is
that of a truth in its relations. Accordingly your true rhe-
torician aims chiefly at such results, not because they are the
most elaborate, or the most uncommon, but simply because
they are the most telling. I'antasias he can spin by the
hour, when the mood impels him, but his preference is for a
severer brilliance. He trusts, for his music, to precision, and,
for his artistry, to the rigour of his proportions. It is here
that your ordinary rhetorician discovers another weakness.
Having finished his tale of short propositions, he thinks to
take it out in long boa-constrictor periods, with a good deal
less of the fantasia, and a very great deal more of the spin-
ning. For as there are effects of the turkey-cock order, so
there is a class of people who go about gobbling upon a very
limited amount of provocation — afflicted with a sort of sodden
enthusiasm, borrowed from the memory of platform excite-
ment, or from imitations of such memories. Now the undida-
tion and the swoop, the strenuousness and the ease, which
ought to mark the rhetorical wave are in general all very well
for the sea. Nevertheless, if his foam does not look like
lather, nor the movement of the water betray a surreptitious
besom — so long as his waves slop and lunge, and rally for an
OF QUANTITY. 151
instant before the fall, and flounce over in mist and thunder
— a man does well. And unquestionably, even a pretentious
effect is not nearly so bad as the practice of involution, when
carried to an excess. For that there is no defence. Never-
theless, it may arise sometimes from an exceptional power of
manoeuvring complicated truth, and not from slovenliness,
which in literature is often a species of locomotor ataxy.
And for that reason it is not to be regarded as something
very heinous by the side of the tendency to extreme brevity.
Of the two it is that which promises best for amendment ;
since the positive tendency in it is more easily checked than
the partial tendency in the other is likely to be developed.
This is true, however, only so long as each is regarded speci-
fically as a tendency : as an intermittent effect the subsultory
order of proposition is of great use, but the other never. And
this is the rationale of the value of the short proposition
generally, as opposed to the long, either ^jc?' sc being indifferent
— viz. that as an effect alternating with a proposition of
moderate length, it is better than the other ; it behaves better
in combination. But it is not the normal proposition ; that
is calculated from the medium, not from either extreme.
The proposition of medium length is the constant, and is
relieved most effectively by the one variable which is not the
most cumbrous ; upon the same principle that, in waltzing,
it is better for a man — he being the active or determinino-
force — to have a partner shorter than himself, rather than
one who is proportionately taller.
39 Paternoster Row, E.C.
London, Noz-cmbcr 1874.
GENERAL LIST OF WORKS
rUBLISHEU EY
Messrs. Longmans, Green, and Co.
PAGE
Arts, Manufactures, &c. ... 25
Astronomy & Meteorology . . 17
Biographical Works 6
Chemistry & Physiology ... 23
Dictionaries & other Books of
Reference 14
Fine Arts & Illustrated Edi-
tions 24
History, Politics, Historical
Memoirs, &c i
Index 41 to 44
Knowledge for tlie Young ... 40
PACE
Mental & Political Philosophy S
Miscellaneous & Critical Works 12
Natural History & Physical
Science iS
Poetry & the Drama 35
Religious & Moral Works . . 28
Rural Sports, Horse & Cattle
Management, &c 36
Travels, Voyages, &c 32
Works of Fiction 34
Works of Utility & General
Information 38,
HISTORY, POLITICS, HISTORICAL.
MEMOIRS, &c.
Journal of the Reigns of
King Gcoro'c IV. and King
William IV.
By the late Cliarles C. F.
Grez'ille, Esq. Clerk of
the Council to those
Sovereigns. Edited by
Henry Reeve, Regis tj-ar
of the Privy Coimcil.
3 vols, Zvo. price 36^.
The Life of Napoleon III.
derived from State Records,
Unpublished Family Cor-
respondence, and Personal
Testimony.
By Blanc hard f err old.
Four J'oh. ?,:v. ivith Foi-frails from the
Originals in possession of the Imperial
Family, and Facsimiles of Letters of
A^ipoleon I. N'apoleon III. Queen
Hortcnse, <^c. VoL. I. price \%s.
*^j* Vol. II. will be published in the
Autumn, and Vols. III. and IV. com-
pleting the zi-orh, in the Spring of 1875.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
R.ecollectioiis and Sugges-
tions of Piiblic Life, 1813-
1873-
By John Earl Russell.
1 vol. %vo. \XcarIy ready.
Iiityoductoyy Lectures on
Modern Histoiy delivered
in L.ent Term 1842 ; zvith
the Lnmigiiral Lecture de-
livered in December 1841.
By the late Rev. Thomas
Arnold, D.D.
Svo. price "js. bd.
Essays on the English
Government and Constitu-
tion from the Reign of
Henry VLL. to the Present
Time.
By John Earl Ri esse I I.
Fcp. %vo. 3J'. 6d.
On Parliamentary Go-
vernment in England: its
Origin, Development, and
Practical Operation.
By Alpheus Todd.
2 vols. Zvo. £1. lys.
The Constitutional His-
tory of England since the
Accession of Geoige IIL.
1 760-1870.
By Sir Thomas Erskine
May, K.C.B.
Fourth Edition. 3 vols, croivn Zvo. \%s.
Democracy in Europe ;
a History.
By Sir Thomas Erskine
May, K.C.B.
2 vols. %vo. \Iit preparation.
The History of England
from the Fall of Wolscy to
the Defeat of the Spanish
Armada.
By J. A. Froude, M.A .
Cabinet Edition, \'ivols. cr.Zvo. £■},. \2s.
Library Edition, 12 vols. %vo. £%. \%s.
The English in Treland
iji the Eighteenth Centuiy.
By y. A. Froude, M.A.
3 vols. 8z'o. £2. Ss.
Estimates of the English
L'Cings from William the
Conqueror to George IIL.
By y . L. Sanford.
Crown Svo. 12s. 6d.
The History of Ejtgland
from the Accession of
fames LI
By Lord Macatilay.
Student's Edition, 2 vols. cr. %vo. \2s.
People's Edition, 4 vols. cr. Zvo. ids.
Cabinet Edition, 8 vols, post %vo. 48^-.
Library Edition, 5 vols. %vo, ^4.
Critical and Historical
Essays contributed to the
Edinburgh Review.
By the Right Hon. Lord
Macaulay.
Cheap Edition, authorised and complete,
crozun Zvo. 3^-. dd.
Student's Edition, crown %vo. 6s.
People's Edition, 2 vols, croivn %vo. %s.
Cabinet Edition, 4 vols. 24s.
Library Edition, 3 vols. Svo. 36J.
I^ord Macaulay s Works.
Complete and uniform Li-
brary Edition.
Edited by his Sister, Lady
Trevelyaii.
8 vols. Zvo. with Portrait, £^. ^s.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Lectures on the History
of England from the Ear-
liest Times to the Death of
King Edzuard II.
By W. Longman, F.A.S.
Maps and Illustrations. Zvo. i ^s.
The History of the Life
and Times of Edwaj^d III.
By W. Longman, F.A.S.
With 9 Maps, 8 Plates, and i6 Woodcuts.
2 vols. %vo. 1%s.
History of England
nnder the Duke of Bucking-
ham and Charles the First,
1624-1628.
By S. Rawson Gardiner,
late Student of Ch. Ch.
2 vols. 8z'(7.
[In the press.
H istory of Civilization in
England and France, Spain
and Scotland.
By Henry Thomas Buckle.
3 vols, croiun Zvo. li^s.
A Studenfs Mannal of
the History of Lidia from
the Earliest Period to the
Present.
By Col. Meadoius Taylor,
M.R.A.S.
Second Thousand. Cr. %vo. Maps, "js. 6d.
The French Revolntion
and First Empire; an
Historical Sketch.
By W. G Connor Morris,
sometime Schola r of Oriel
College, Oxford.
With 2 ]\Iaps. Post Zvo. ys. 6d.
The History of India
from the Earliest Period
to the close of Lord Dal-
housies A dministration.
Byfohn Clark Marshman.
3 vols, craivn Zvo. 22s. 6d.
Indian Polity ; a Vieiu of
the System of Administra-
tion in India.
By Lient. -Colonel George
Chesney.
Second Edition, rez'ised, with Map. 2>vo. 21s.
Waterloo Lectures ; a
Study of the Campaign of
1815.
By Colonel Charles C.
Chesney, R.E.
Third Edition. %vo. ivith Map, \os. 6d.
Essays in Modern Mili-
tary Biography.
By Colonel Charles C.
Chesney, R.E.
^vo. I2s. 6d.
The Imperial and Colo-
nial Constitutions of the
Britannic Empire, includ-
ing Indian Institutions.
By Sir E. Creasy, M.A.
With d Maps. %vo. x^^s.
The Oxford Reformers —
John Colet, Erasmtis, and
Thomas More; being a
History of their Fellow-
Work.
By Frederic Scebohm.
Second Edition. %vo. 14J.
NEW WORKS PJ3USHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
The History of Persia
and its present Political
Sitnation ; zvith Abstracts
of all Treaties and Con-
ventions betiveen Persia and
England.
By Clements R. Markhani,
C.B. KR.S.
?>vo. -u<i!k J\IaJ>, 2ls.
The Mythology of the
Aryan Nations.
By Geo. TV. Cox, M.A. late
Scholar of Trinity Col-
lege, Oxford.
2 vols. 8z'£7. 28j-.
A History of Greece.
By the Rev. Geo. W. Cox,
M.A. late Scholar of
Trinity College, Oxford.
Vols. I. and ir. ^vo. Rlaps, 36j-.
The History of Greece.
By C. Thirhvall, D.D.
late Bp. of St. David's.
8 vols. fcp. Zvo. 28^-.
The Tale of the Great
Persian War, from the
Histories of Herodotus.
By Rev. G. W. Cox, M.A.
Fcp. 8:v. is. U.
The History of the Pclo-
ponnesian War, by Thn-
cydides.
Translated by Richd.Craw-
ley, Fellozv of Worcester
College, Oxford.
ZVO. 2\S.
Greek History from The-
viistocles to Alexander, in
a Series of Lives from
Plntarch.
Revised and arranged by
A. H. Clongh.
Fcp. 8t'c. Woodcuts, 6s.
History of the Romans
iindcr the Empire.
By the Very Rev. Charles
Merivalc, D.CL. Dean
of Ely.
8 vols, post Zvo. 48^'.
The Fall of the Roman
Republic ; a Short History
of the Last Century of the
Commomuealth.
By Dean Merivalc, D.CL.
\2mo. ']s. 6d.
The Sixth Oriental Mo-
narchy ; or the Geography,
History, and Antiquities
of Part Ilia. Collected and
Illustrated from Ancient
and Modern sources.
By Geo. Ratvlinson, M.A.
With Maps atid Ilhtstrations. %vo. \(is.
The Seventh Great Ori-
ental ]\Ionarchy ; or, a
History of the Sassanians :
with Notices Geographical
and Antiquarian.
By Geo. Rawlinson, M.A.
8'v. 'coit/'i Maps and Illitstrations.
[/;/ the press.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Encyclopccdia of Chro-
nology, Historical and
Biographical ; comprising
the Dates of all the Great
Events of History, includ-
ing Treaties, Alliances,
JFars, Battles, &c. Inci-
dents in the Lives of Emi-
nent Men, Scientific and
Geog raph ica I DiscoveiHes,
Mechanical Inventio7is, and
Social, Domestic, and Eco-
nomical Improvements.
By B. B. JVoodzuard, B.A.
a? id IF. L. R. Gates.
The History of Rome.
By Wit helm I line.
Vols. I. and II. Zvo. 30j-. ]'ols. III. and
IV. in prcparatiou.
History of European
Morals from Angnstns to
Gharlemagne.
By W. E. H Lecky, M.A.
2 vols. Zvo. 2Sy.
History of the Rise and
Influence of the Spirit of
Rationalism in Europe.
By W. E. H Lec/cy, MA.
Cabinet Edition, 2 vols, croiim %vo. 1 6^.
History of tJie Early
GJinrch from the First
Preachiiig of the Gospel to
the Conncil of N'iccra, a.d.
325.
By Miss E. M. Sezvell.
Fcp. %To. 4J. 6(/.
Introduction to the
Science of Religion : Eoiir
Lectures delivered at the
Royal Institution ; zuith
tzvo Essays on False Ana-
logies and the Philosophy
of Mythology.
By F. Max Miiller, M.A.
Crown Stw. \os. 6d.
The Stoics, Efic7treans,
and Sceptics.
Translated f^om the Ger-
man of Dr. E. Zeller,
by Oszvald y. Rcichcl,
M.A.
Crocvn Szv. 14^.
Socrates and the Socratic
Schools.
Translated from the Ger-
man of Dr. E. Zeller,
by the Rev. O. J. Reich el,
M.A.
Crozv
Sj. 6d.
The History of Philoso-
phy, from T hales to Comte.
By George Henry Lezves.
Fourth Edition, 2 vols. Zvo. 32J.
Sketch of the History of
the Ghnrch of England to
the Revolution ^1688.
By the Rio;ht Rev. T V.
Short, b.D. Bishop of
St. Asaph.
Eighth Edition. Cnnvit %vo. "Js. 6d.
The Historical Geogra-
phy of Europe.
By E. A. Fireman, D.C.L.
%vo. Maps.
[/;/ the press.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO,
Essays on the History of
the C7i7'istian Rcl/'o-ion.
By yohii Earl Russell.
Fcp. %vo. y. 6d.
History of the Reforma-
tion in E^irope in the Time
of Calvin.
By the Rev. J. H. Merle
UAubigni^, D.D.
Vols. I. to V. '&V0. £i. I2J-. Vols. VI. &-
VJI. completion. [/n tlie press.
The Sttidenfs Manual
of Ancient History : con-
taining the Political His-
tory, Geographical Posi-
tio7i, and Social State of
the Principal Nations of
Antiquity.
By W. Cooke Taylor, LL.D.
Crown %vo. 'js. 6d.
The Stndenfs Manual of
Modern History : co7itain-
ing the Rise and Progress
of the Principal European
Natiojis, their Political
History, and the Chajigcs
in their Social Condition.
By W. CookeTaylor, LL.D.
Crown %vo. Js. 6(1.
The Era of the Pro-
testant Revolution.
By F. Seebohm, Author of
' T he Oxford Refoi'mers.'
With 4 l\Taps and 1 2 Diagrams. Fcp. %vo.
2s. 6(1.
The Crusades.
By the Rev. G. W. Cox,
M.A.
Fcp. %vo. with Map, 2s. 6d.
The Thirty Years JVar,
1618-1648.
By Samuel Razvson Gar-
diner.
Fcp. Zvo. "iuith Maps, 2s. 6d.
The Houses of Lancaster
and York ; with the Con-
quest and Loss of Trance.
By y antes Gairdner.
Fcp. ?,vo. with Map, 2s. 6d.
Edward the Third.
By the Rev. W. Warbicrton,
M.A.
Fcp. ?>vo. with Maps, 2s. 6d.
BIOGRAPHICAL V/ORKS.
A utobiography.
By John Stuart Mill
Zvo. ']S. 6d.
Life ajid Correspondence
of Richard Whately, D.D.
late Archbishop of Dublin.
By E. Jane Whately.
Nnv Edition in i vol. Crown Zvo.
[/n the press.
Life and Letters of Gil-
bert Elliot, First Earl of
Minto, f^^om 1751 to 1806,
zvhen his Public Life in
Europe was closed by his
Appointment to the Vice-
Royalty of India.
Edited by the Countess of
Minto.
3 vols, post Zvo. 3IJ-. 6d.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Memoir of Thomas First
Lord Dcnman, formerly
Lord Chief Jiistiee of
England.
By Sir Joseph Arnoidd,
B.A. K.B.
With hvo Portraits. 2 vols. ^vo. 32^.
The Life of Lloyd First
Lord Ken you.
By Hon. G. T. Kenyon,
M.A.
With Portraits. %vo. 14J.
Recollections of Past
Life.
By Sir LLenry Ldolland,
Bart. M.D. F.R.S.
Third Edition. Post%vo. ios.6d.
Lsaac Casatibon, 1559-
16 14.
By Mark Patlison, Rector
of Lincoln College, Oxford.
%vo.
[In the J^ress.
Life of Alexa7ider von
Htimdoldt.
Edited by Karl Bridins,
and translated by Jane
and Caroline Lassell.
With 3 Portraits. 2 vols. Zvo. 36J.
BiograpJiical and Criti-
cal Essays, reprinted f^oni
Reviews, with Additions
and Corrections.
By A. Hay ward, Q.C.
Second Series, 2 vols. Svo. 2Ss. Third
Series, i vol. Svo. 14?.
The Life of Lsambard
Kingdom Brunei, Civil
Engineer.
By L. Brnnel, B.C.L.
With Portrait, Plates, and Woodcuts.
Svo. 21 s.
Lord George Bentinck ;
a Political Biography.
By the Right Hon. B.
Disraeli, M.P.
Eighth Edition. Cro^un Svo. 6s.
Memoir of George Ed-
ward Lynch Cotton, D.D.
Bishop of Calcutta; zuith
Selections from his Jour-
nals and Correspondence.
Edited by Mrs. Cotton.
Second Edition. Croivn Svo. 7j. dd.
The Life and Letters of
the Rev. Sydney Smith.
Edited by his Daughter,
Lady Holland, and
Mrs. Austin.
Civwn Svo. 2s. 6d. sewed ; ^s. 6d. cloth.
Essays in Ecclesiastical
Biography.
By the Right Hon. Sir J.
Stephen, LL.D.
Cabinet Edition. Crown Svo. ']s. 6d.
Leaders of Public Ofi-
7iion ill L r eland ; Siuift,
Flood, Grattan, GConnell.
By W. E. H. Lecky, M.A.
CrcTiVn Svo. "js. 6d.
8 NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LO M G M A N S & CO.
Life of the Duke of
Wellington.
By tJie Rev. G. R. Gleig,
M.A.
Popular Edition, Crmvn %vo. ■zuii/i Por-
trait, 5.f.
Fe lix Me n de IssoJin' s
Letters from Italy and
Siuitzerland, and Letters
from 1833 to 1847.
Translated by Lady Wal-
lace.
With Portrait. 2 vols, crozvn S>vo. ^s. each.
The Rise of Great Fami-
lies ; otiicr Essays and
Stories.
By Sir Bernard Bnr/ce,
C.B. LL.D.
Croivn %vo. I2r. 6u/.
Dictionary of General
BiograpJiy ; containing
Concise Memoirs and No-
tices of tlie most Eminent
Persons of all Countries,
from the Earliest Ages to
tlie Present Time.
Edited by W. L. R. Gates.
%V0. IIS.
Memoirs of Sir Henry
Havelock, K.C.B.
ByJoJin Clark Alarsliman.
People^ s Edition. Cro-wn %vo. ^s. 6d.
Vicissitudes of Families.
By Sir Bernai'd Bnr/ce,
C.B.
jVtia Edition. 2 vols, cro^an Szv. 2ls.
MENTAL and POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
The System of Positive
Polity, or Treatise Jifion So-
ciology, of Angitste Comte,
Atithor of the System of
Positive Philosophy.
Translated from the Paris
Edition of 1 851 -1854,
a ndfn rn ishcd with Ana-
lytical Tables of Contents.
\_In preparation.
In Four Volumes, %vo. io be published sepa-
rately, and each forming in some degree
an independent Treatise : —
Vol. I. The General Vi--M of Positive
Polity and its Philosophical Basis. Trans-
lated by}. H. Bridges, ^\.^. formerly Fellow
Oriel College, Oxford.
Vol. IT. The Social Statics, or the Ab-
stract Laws of Human Order. Translated
by Frederic Harrison, M.A. of Lincoln's
Lnn.
Vol. III. The Social Dynamics, or the
General La'ws of Human Progress {the Phi-
losophy of History'). Translated by E. S.
Becsly, M.A. Professor of LListory in Uni-
versity College, London.
Vol. IV. The Ideal of the Future oj
Alan hind. Translated by Richard Congreve,
M.D. formerly Fello-w and Tutor of Wad-
ham College, Oxford.
Political Problems,
Reprinted chiefly from
the Fortnightly . Reviezu,
revised, and luith N'ezv
Essays.
By Frederic/c Harrison,
of Lincolii s Lin.
I vol. %vo. [/« the press.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS &. CO.
Essays Critical & Nar-
rative, partly original and
partly reprinted from Re-
views.
By W.Forsyth, Q.C. JII.P.
Sev. l6s.
Essays, Political, Social,
and Religioiis.
By Richd. Congrcve, ALA.
Essays on FreetJiinking
ajid Plainspeakiiig.
By Leslie Stephen.
Cnm'/i %7'c. los. Gd.
Essays, Critical and
Biograph ical, contribtUed
to the Edinbnrgh Review.
By LLenry Rogers.
Ki'v Ediiioit. 2 vols, cnncn Sr'c'. I2J.
Essays on some Theolo-
gical Controversies of the
Time, contrihited ehiefiy
to the Edinburgh Review.
By the same Atithor.
Ne'v Edition. Crozon Stv. ds.
Democracy in America.
By Alexis de Tocqueville.
Translated by LLenry
Reeve, C. B. D. C. L.
Corresponding ALcmber
of the Lnstitnte of
France.
New Edition. 2 vols. postZvo. [/n the press.
On Representative Go-
vernment.
By John Stnart ALill.
Eourth Edition, croivn Zvo. 2s.
On Liberty.
By John Stuart Mill.
Post 8:v. 7j. 6</. cro-^i'H Zro. \s. a,d.
Principles of Political
Economy.
By John Stuart ALill.
2 vols. Sr'c. Tps. or i vol. croivn Srv. 5.C
Essays oti someUnsettled
Questions of Political Eco-
nomy.
By John Stuart Mill.
Second Edition. Zvo. 6^. (yd.
Utilitarianism.
By John Stuart ALill.
Foiirt/i Edition. 2,zv. 5.C
^ System of Lo^ic,
Katiocinativc and Lnduc-
tive. By John Stuart Mill.
Eighth Edition. 2 vols. Zvo. 25.?.
Exajnination of Sir
William LLamiltons Phi-
losophy, and of the princi-
pal Philosophical Questions
discussed in his Writings.
By John Stuart ALill.
Fourth Edition. %vo. i6j-.
TlieSubJectioti ofPVomcti.
By John Stuart Mill.
A^w Edition. Post Svo. 5.C
Dissertations and Dis-
cussions.
By John Stuart Mill.
Second Edition. 3 Z'ols. Sr'(i. 36,!-.
B
10
NEW WORKS PUBusHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Analysis of the PJiciw-
mcna of the Human Mind.
By James Mill. New
Edition, with Notes,
Illustrative and Critical.
2 -l'oIs. %V0. 2%S.
A Systematic View of
the Science of Jurispru-
dence.
By Sheldon Amos, M.A.
A Primer of the English
Constitution and Govern-
ment.
By Sheldon Amos, M.A.
Neiv Edition, revised. Post-^vo.
[In the p7-ess.
Principles of Economical
Philosophy.
By H. D. Macleod, M.A.
Barrister-at-L aiu.
Second Edition, in 2 vols. Vol. I. "^vo. x^^s.
The Institutes of Jus-
tinian; with English In-
troduction, Translation,
and Notes.
By T. C. Sandars, M.A.
Sixth Edition. %vo. \%s.
Lord Bacons Works,
Collected and Edited by R.
L.Ellis, M.A. J.Sped-
dino;, M.A. and D. D.
Heath.
Nrcu and Cheaper Edition. 7 '-'^Is- Si'c?.
Cl- I3-*-- ^^■
Letters and Life of
Francis Bacon, including
all his Occasional Works.
Collected and edited, with
a Commentary, by J.
Spcdding.
7 vols. %vo. £,\. 4^.
The Nicomachean Ethics
of Aristotle. Newly trans-
lated into English.
By R. Williams, B.A.
?>V0. \2S.
The Politics of Aristotle;
Greek Text, luith English
Nlotes.
By Richard Congreve, ALA .
Neiv Edition, reznsed. %vo. i8^.
The Ethics of Aristotle;
zoith Essays and Notes.
By Sir A. Grant, Bart.
M.A. LL.D.
Third Edition, revised and partly re-mritten.
{In the press.
Bacon's Essays, with
Annotations.
By R. Whately, D.D.
Nezo Edition. %vo. los. 6d.
Elements of Logic.
By R. Whately, D.D.
A'cii' Edition. 8zc. los. 6d. cr. %vo. 4?. dd.
Elements of Rhetoric.
By R. Whately, D.D.
New Edition. Srv. \os. 6</. er. Zvo. ^r. bd.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
11
All Outline of tJie Neces-
sary Laic's of Tho2ight : a
Treatise on Pure and
Applied Logic.
By the Most Rev. W.
T/io?}ison, D.D. Arch-
bishop of York.
Ninth Thousand. Crown Zvo. ^s. 6d.
An Iiifroduction to Men-
tal Philosop/iy, on the In-
ductive Method.
By y. D. Morell, LL.D.
%V0. I2S.
Elements of Psychology,
containing the A?ialysis of
the Intellectual Powers.
By y. D. Morell, LL.D.
Post Srv. 7 J. 6</.
The Secret of Hegel :
being the Hegelian System
in Origin, Principle, Form,
and Matter.
By y. H. Stirling, LL.D.
2 vols. %vo. 2Sj".
Sir Williani Hamilton ;
being the Philosophy of
Perception : an Analysis.
By y. H. Stirling, LL.D.
%vo. Ss.
The Philosophy of Ne-
cessity ; or, Alatnral Lazu
as applicable to Mental,
Moral, and Social Science.
By Charles Bray.
Second Edition. %vo. QJ.
Ueberweg s System of
Logic, and History of
Logical Doctrines.
Translated, with Notes and
Appendices, by T. M.
Lindsay, M.A. F.R.S.E.
%vo. i6,f
the
The Senses and
Intellect.
By A. Bain, LL.D. Prof
of Logic, Univ. Aberdeen.
%vo. 155.
Mental and Moral
Science ; a Compendium of
Psychology and Ethics.
By A. Bain, LL.D.
Third Edition. Crown %vo. \os. 6d. Or
separately: Fart I. Mental Science, 6s, 6d.
Part II. Moral Science, 45'. 6d.
Humes Treatise on Hu-
man Nature.
Edited, zuith Notes, &c. by
T. H. Green, M.A. and
the Rev. T. H. Grose,
M.A.
2 vols. %vo. 28j-.
Humes Essays Moral,
Political, and Literary.
By the same Editors.
2 vols. Zvo. 28^.
*^* The above form a complete and uniform
Edition of HUME's Philosophical
Works.
12 NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
MISCELLANEOUS &
Miscellaneous and Post-
Jmmous Works of the late
Henry Thomas Buckle.
Edited, with a Biographical
Notice, by Helen Taylor.
3 vols. %vo. £2. 12S. Old.
SJiort Sludies on Great
Siibjects.
By 7. A. Fronde, M.A.
formerly Fellow of
Exeter College, Oxford.
2 vols, croiun %vo. \2s.
Lord Macaiilays Mis-
cellaneoiLS Writings.
Library Edition, 2 w^/j. %vo. Portrait, 2\s.
TEorLE's Edition', i vol. cr. Zvo. 4^-. bd.
Lord Macanlay's Mis-
cellaneous Writings and
Speeches.
Students'' Edition. Cro:i'n ^z'O. 6s.
Speeches of the Right
Hon. Lord Macaiday, cor-
rected by Himself.
FcoplSs Edition. Crozvn %vo. 3^-. 6d.
L ordMacaiilay sS'peeches
on Parliamentary Reform
in 1 83 1 and 1832.
16 //lO. Is.
The Rev. Sydney SniitJis
Essays contribnted to the
Edinbttrgh Review.
Authorised Edition, complete in One Volume,
Cro7iin 2>vo. 2s. 6d. srwed, or y- 6</. elot/i.
CRITICAL WORKS.
The Rev. Sydney Smith's
JMiscellaneoiis Works.
Crown StV. 6^.
The Wit and Wisdom of
the Rev. Sydney Smith.
Cnno7i ivo. jS. 6d.
The Miscellaneotis
Works of Thomas Arnold,
D.D. Late Head Master of
Rugby School and Regins
Professor of Modern His-
tory in the Univ. of Ox-
ford, collected and repub-
lished.
Manual of English Lite-
rature, Historical and
Critical.
By Thomas Arnold, M.A.
A'av Edition. Cro^un Zvo. Js. 6d.
Realities of Irish Life.
By W. Steuart Trench.
Cr. ^vo. 2s. 6d. srcved, or y. 6d. doth.
Lectures on the Science
of Language.
By F. Max Midler, M.A.
&c.
Seventh Edition. 2 vols, crovi'u %vo. i6j-.
Chips from a German
Workshop ; being Essays
on the Science of Religion,
and on Mythology, Tradi-
tions, and Customs.
By F. Max Midler, M.A.
Cfc.
■X voh
Svo.jC:
NEW WORKS puausHED BY LONGMANS Si CO. 13
Families of Speech.
Four Lectures delivered at
the Royal Institution.
By F W. Far ran M-A.
F.R.S.
Ncxi) Edition. Crcui'ii Zvo. 3^. dd.
Chapters on Language.
By F. W. Farrar, M.A.
F.R.S.
New Edition. Croicn Szv. ^s.
Southeys Doctor, com-
plete in One Volnine.
Edited by Rev. J. W.
JVarter, B.D.
Square crc^i.vn Zvo. \is. 6d.
A Budget of Paradoxes.
By Augustus Be JM organ,
F.R.A.S.
Reprinted, with Aiithoi's Additions, from
the AtheiiKum. 8ev. 15^'.
Recreations of a Country
Parson.
By A. K. H. B.
Two Series, y. 6d. caeh.
Landscapes, Churches,
and Moralities.
By A. K. H. B.
Crown %vo. 3^. bd.
Seaside Musings on Sun-
days and Weekdays.
By A. F. H. B.
Crown %zv. Xs. 6d.
Changed A spects of Un-
changed Truths.
By A. LC LI. B.
Croivn Zvo. 3 J. 6(/.
Counsel and Comfort
front a City Ptdpit.
By A. L<. H. B.
Crown ^vo. y. 6d.
Lessons of Middle Age,
By A. L<. H. B.
Crown Se't'. 3.C. dd.
Leisure LLours in Toion
By A. K. H. B.
C?'own 8:w. 3^. Gd.
The Autumn LLolidays
of a Cou?it?y Parson.
By A. L<. H. B.
Crown 'ivo. y. dd.
Sunday Afternoons at
the Parish Clmrch of a
Scottish University City.
By A. L<. H. B.
Croron Src'. 3^'. 6d.
Llie Commonplace Phi-
losopher in Tozvn and
Country.
By A. K. H. B.
Crown %z'o. 3^'. 61/.
Prescnt-Day Thoughts.
By A. L<. H. B.
Cro-wn Sft'. 3^-. 6d.
It
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Critical Essays of a
Country Parson.
By A. K. H. B.
Craiuii %vo. 3^-. dd.
The Gj'avey Thojights of
a Country Parson.
By A. K. H. B.
Tivo Scries, t,s. 6d. each.
Principles of Education,
drawn from N'atnre and
Revelation, and applied to
Female Education in the
Upper Classes.
By the Author of 'Amy
Herbert!
2 vols. fcp. %vo. \2s. 6d
From JaniLary to De-
ce m ber; a Book for Children.
Second Edition. Zvo. 3j-. 6rt'.
The Election of Repre-
sentatives, Parliamentary
and Mtmicipal ; a Treatise.
By Thos. Ha7^e, Barrister.
Foitrth Edition. Post Zvo. *js.
Miscellaneous IVritings
<^f John Co7iington, M7A.
Edited by J. A. Symonds,
M.A. With a Memoir
by H.f. S.Smith, ALA.
2 vols. 8<v. aSj-.
DICTIONARIES and OTHER BOOKS of
REFERENCE.
^ Dictionary of the
English Language.
By R. G. Latham, M.A.
M.D. F.R.S. Founded
on the Dictionaiy of Dr.
S. Johnson, as edited by
the Rev. H. J. Todd,
with mL77zerous Eme7ida-
tio7is and Additio7is.
4 vols. 0^0. £-].
Thesaurus of English
JVo7'ds and Ph7^ases, classi-
fied and ar7'a7igcd so as to
facilitate the expression of
Ldeas, and assist inLite7'a7y
Co77ipositio7i.
By P. M. Roget, M.D.
Crown %vo. \os. 6d.
English Synonynies.
ByE.y. Whately. Edited
by A7'chbishop Whately.
Fifth Edition. Fcp. Zvo. y.
A Practical Dictionary
of the Fre7ich and English
La7io-uao-^s.
By Ldo7i Conta7iscau, 77ta7iy
years Fi-ench Exanmier
for Militaiy a7id Civil
Appoi7it7ne7its, &c.
Post %vo. \os. 6d.
Contanseatt s Pocket Dic-
tionaiy, French and Eng-
lish, abi'idgcd from the
P7'actical Dictiona7y, by
the Author.
Square \Z7n0. y. 6d.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS &, CO.
IS
New Practical Diction-
ary of the Genna?i Lan-
guage ; German -English
and English-German.
By Rev, W. L. Blaekley,
M.A. and Dr. C. M.
F7Hedldnde7''.
Post Zvo. ys. 6(1
A Dictionary of Roman
and Greek Antiquities.
T Vith 2 , ooo Wooden ts
from Ancient Oj^iginals,
illnstrative of tlie Arts
and Life of the Greeks and
Romans.
By Anthony Rich, B.A.
Tliird Edition. Croiun Zvo. 1$. 6d.
The Mastery of Lan-
guages ; or, the Art of
Speaking Foreign Tongues
Idiomatically.
By Thomas Prendergast.
Second Edition. %vo. 6s.
A Practical English Dic-
tionary.
By JoJin T. W/nte, D.D.
Oxon. and T. C. Donkin,
M.A.
I vol. post ^vo. uniform with Contanseaii's
Practical French Dictionary.
[In the press.
A Latin-English Dic-
tionary.
By JoJui T. White, D.D.
Oxon. and J . E. Riddle,
M.A. Oxon.
Third Edition, revised. 2 vols. d^to. \2s.
IVhites College Latin-
E ng I is h D ic lion a ry ;
abridged from tJie Parent
Work for t/ie use of Uni-
versity Students.
Medin/n ?>vo. i8j-.
A Latin -English Dic-
tionary adapted for the use
of Middle-Class Schools,
By John T. White, D.D.
Oxon.
■Sijnarefcp. 2>7v. y.
IVhite syunior Studenfs
Complete Latin - English
and English-Latin Dic-
tionary.
Square i2i/io. I2s.
c,A, ,.,/.;„ /English-Latin, ks. 6d.
cteparatetv < t t- -^ ^ ,
^ -^ \ Latin-English, 'js. 6d.
A Greek-English Lexi-
con.
By H. G. Liddell, D.D.
Dean of ChristcJiurch,
and R. Scott, D.D.
Dean of Rochester.
Sixth Edition. Cj'fftvn ^o. 36J.
A Lexicon, Greek and
English, abridged for
Schools from Liddell and
Scott's Greek
Lexicon.
English
Fourteenth Edition. Square \2mo. 'js. 6d.
16
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
An English-Greek Lexi-
con, containing all the Greek
Words 7iscd by Writers of
good authority.
By C. D. Yonge, B.A.
N^ew Edition. 4/0. 21 s.
Mr. Yonge sNewLexieon,
English and Greek.abridged
from his larger Lexicon.
Square 121110. Sj. 6d.
ALGullocJis Dictionary,
Practical Theoretical and
Historical, of Coninicrce
and. Coniniercial Navio;a-
Hon.
Edited by H. G. Reid.
%vo. dy.
The Post Office Gazetteer
of the United Kingdom : a
Complete Dictionary of all
Cities, Towns, Villages, and,
of the Principal Gentle-
nieii s Seats, in Great Bri-
tain and Ireland, referred
to the nearest Post Tozan,
Railway & Telegraph Sta-
tion ; wit JiNatiiral Features
and Objects of Note.
By y. A. Sharp.
In I vol. %vo. of c.hottt 1,^00 /a^cs.
[/^/i the press.
A General Dictionary
of Geography, Descriptive,
Physical, Statistical, and
Historical; forming a com-
plete Gazetteer of the World.
By A. Keith JohnstoUy
F.R.S.E.
A\\o Edition, thoroughly revised.
[In the press.
The Public Schools A tlas
of Modej'u Geography. In
3 1 Maps, exhibiting clearly
the more important Physi-
cal Features of the Coun-
tries delineated.
Edited, with Litroduction,
by Rev. G. Butler, M.A.
Imperial quarto, 3.r. (yd. srived ; 55. clotli.
The Public Schools Ma-
mmal of Modem Geography
Forming a Companion to
' The Public Schools Atlas
of Modci'n Geography!
By Rev. G Bntler, M.A.
\In the press.
The Public Schools A tlas
of Ancient Geogj^aphy.
Edited, zuith an Litroduc-
tion on the St2idy of An-
cient Gcooraphy, by the
Rev. G. Bntler, M.A.
Imperial Quarto.
\In the press.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO. 17
ASTRONOMY and METEOROLOGY.
The Universe and the
Coming Transits ; Re-
searches into and Neiu
Vicios respecting the Con-
stitution of the Heavens.
By R. A. Proctor, B.A.
]Vith 22 Charts and 22 Diagrams. %vo. i6j-.
The Transits of Venns ;
A Popular Account of Past
and Coming Transits, from
the first obsc7'ved by Hor-
rocks A.D. 1639 to the
Transit of a.d. 2 i i 2,
By R. A. Proctor, B.A.
Cantab.
With 20 Plates and numerous Woodcuts.
Crcnoii Sc'c. \^iVearly ready.
Essays on Astronomy.
A Series of Papers on
Planets and Meteors, the
Sun and Sun-surrotindin^
Space, Stars and Star
Cloudlets.
By R. A. Proctor, B.A.
With^ 10 Plates and 24 Woodcuts. Sty?, i 2s.
The Moon ; her Motions,
Aspect, Scenery, and Phy-
sical Condition.
By R. A. Proctor, B.A.
With Plates, Charts, Woodcuts, ami Lunar
Photographs. CraivnZvo. 15.1-.
The Sun ; Rnlcr, Light,
Fire, and Life of the Pla-
7ictary System.
By R. A. Proctor, B.A.
Second Edition. Plates and Woodcuts. Cr.
^i>o. l^s.
Saturn and its System.
By R. A. Proctor, B.A.
Siv. with 14 Plates, i^.
The Orbs Around Us ; a
Se7'ies of Familiar Essays
on the Moon and Planets,
Meteors and Comets, the
Sun and Coloured Pairs of
Suns.
By R. A. Proctor, B.A.
Civwn Sr'(7. "js. 6d.
Other Worlds than Ours ;
Tlie Plurality of Worlds
Studied -under the Light
of Recent Scientific Re-
searches.
By R. A. Proctor, B.A.
Third Editio7i, ivitti 14 Illustrations. Cr.
8tu IOJ-. bd .
Br ink ley's Astronomy.
Revised and partly rc-writ-
' ten, with Additional Chap-
ters, and an Appendix of
Q uestionsforFxam i nation .
By John W. Stubbs, D.D.
Trin. Coll. Dublin and
F^. Brunnoiu, Ph.D.
Astronomer Royal of
Ireland.
With 49 Diagrams. Cro-vn %vo. ()S.
Outlines of Astronomy.
By Sir y. F. W. Herschel,
Bart. M.A.
Latest Edition, luith Plates and Diagrams.
Square cro^vn 2>vo. 1 2s.
C
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
A New star Atlas, for
the Library, the School, and
the Observatory, in 1 2 Cir-
cular Maps {with 2 Index
Plates).
By R. A. Proctor, B.A.
Crcnvn Sew. 5^.
Celestial Objects for Com-
mon Telescopes.
By T. W. Webb, M.A.
F.R.A.S.
NcM Edition, -with Map of the Moon and
Woodcuts. Crozvn 2>vo. Js. 6d.
LargerStarA t las, for the
Library, in Twelve Cir-
cular Maps, photolitho-
graphed by A. Brothers,
F.R.A.S. With 2 Lidex
Plates and a Letterpress
Introduction.
By R.A. Proctor, BA.
Second Edition. Small folio, 2^s.
Magnetism and Devia-
tion of the Compass. For
the use of Students in Navi-
gation and Science Schools.
By J. Merrifeld, LL.D.
\%tno. \s. 6d.
Doves Law of Storms,
considered in connexion with
the ordinary Movements of
the Atmosphere.
T7^a7islated by R. H. Scott,
M.A.
Zvo. \0S. 6d.
Air and Rain ; the Be-
ginnings of a Che7nical
Climatology.
By R. A. Smith, F.R.S.
Zvo. 24s.
Nautical Snrveying, an
Introductioii to the Practi-
cal and Theoretical Study
of.
By y. K. LaughtoH, M.A.
Small ?)Vo. 6s.
Sc he lien 's SpectnimA dia-
lysis, in its Application to
Terrestrial Substances and
the Physical Constitution of
the Heavenly Bodies.
Translated by Jane and
C. L ass ell ; edited, with
N'otes, by W. Huggins,
LL.D. F.R.S.
With \T, Plates andzzT, JVoodcuts. Svo. 2S.f.
NATURAL HISTORY and PHYSICAL
SCIENCE.
The Correlation of Phy-
sical Forces.
By the Hon. Sir W. R.
Grove, F.R.S. &c.
Sixth Edition, tvith other Contributions to
Science. 8vo. l^s.
Professor Helmholtz
Popular Lectures on Scien-
tific Subjects.
Translated by E. Atkinson,
F.C.S.
With many Illustrative Wood Engravings.
S)VO. 12S. 6d.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
10
Gauofs Natural PJiilo-
sophy for General Readers
and Young Persons; a
Course of Physies divested
of Mathematical FornmUc
and expressed in the lan-
guage of daily life.
Trafislatedby E.Atkinson,
F.C.S.
Cr. %vo. 7vith 404 JVoodcufs, "Js. 6d.
Gauofs Eleinentary
Treatise on Physics, Ex-
perimental and Applied,
for the use of Colleges and
Schools.
Translated and edited by E.
Atkinso7i, F.C.S.
Nciv Edition, with a Coloured Plate and
726 Woodcuts. Post 8c'<?. 15^-.
Principles of Animal
Mechanics.
By the Rev. S. Hanghton,
F.R.S.
Second Edition. ?>vo. 2 is.
IVeinholds Introduction
to Experimental Physics,
Theoretical and Practical ;
including Directions for
Constructing Physical Ap-
paratus and for Making
Experiments.
Translated by B. Loewy,
F.R.A.S. With a Pre-
face by G. C. Foster,
F.R.S.
With numerous Woodcuts. %vo.
\Nearly ready.
Text-Books of Science,
JMcchanical and Physical,
adapted for the use of Arti-
sans and of Students in
Public and other Schools.
{The first Ten edited by
T. M. Goodeve, M.A. Lec-
turer on Applied Science at
the Royal School of Mines;
the remainder edited by
C W. Merrifield, F.R.S.
an Exa77iiner in the De-
partment of Public Educa-
tion})
Small %vo. Woodcuts.
Edited by T. M. Goodeve, M.A.
Anderson's Strength of Materials, y. 6d.
Bloxam's Metals, y. 6d.
Goodeve's Mechanics, y. 6d.
— Mechanism, y. 6d.
Griffin's Algebra &= Trigonometry, y. 6d.
N'otes Oft the same, 7vith Solutions, y. 6d.
Jenkin's Electricity &■= Magnetism, y. 6d.
Maxwell's Theory of Heat, y. 6d.
Merrifield's Technical Arithmetic, y. 6d.
Key, y. 6d.
Miller's Inorganic Chemistry, y. 6d.
Shelley's Workshop Appliances, y. 6d.
Watson's Plane er' Solid Geotnetry, y. 6d.
Edited by C. W. Merrifield, F.R.S.
Annstrong's 0}ganic Chemistry, y. 6d.
Thorpe's Qtiantitative Analysis, i^. 6d.
Thorpe and Muir's Qualitative Analysis,
y. 6d.
Address delivered before
the British Association
assembled at Belfast ; with
Additions and a Preface.
By John Tyndall, F.R.S.
President.
%vo. price y.
Fragments of Science.
By John Tyndall, F.R.S.
Third Edition. Svo. 14s.
20 NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Heat a Mode of Motion.
By Jolm Tyndall, F.R.S.
Fourth EiUtion. Cr. %vo. xvith Woodcuts,
IQS. 6(/.
Sound; a Course of Eight
Lectures delivered at the
Royal IiistitiLtion of Great
Britain.
By John Tyndall, F.R.S.
Portrait and Woodcuts. Cr. Zvo. <^s.
Researches, on Dianiag-
netism and Magne-Crystal-
lic Action; incbtding the
Qncstion of Dianmgnetic
Polarity.
By John Tyjidall, F.R.S.
With 6 Plates andniauy Woodcuts. %vo. li^s.
Contribntions to Mole-
ciilar Physics in the do-
main of Radiant Heat.
By John Tyndall, F.R.S.
With 2 Plates and T^l JFoodcuts. 8r'(7. i6s.
Lectures on Light, de-
livered in the United States
of Amei'ica in 1872 and
1873.
By J. Tyndall, F.R.S.
Croze n Szv. "js. 6d.
Notes of a Course of
Seven Lectttres on Electri-
cal Phenomena and Theo-
ries, delivered at the Royal
Lnstitution.
By y. Tyndall, F.R.S.
CroTi'u 8z'^. is. saved, or \s. 6d. cloth.
Notes of a Course of Nine
Lectures on L ight, delivered
at the Royal Institution.
By y. Tyndall, F.R.S.
Crozun ^vo. is. sczccd, or is. 6d. cloth.
A Treatise on Magne-
tism, General and Terres-
trial.
By Humphrey Lloyd,
D.D. D.C.L. Provost of
Trinity College, Dublin.
%vo. price lOs. 6d.
Elementary Treatise on
the Wave-Theory of Lio-ht.
By H. Lloyd, D.D. D.C.L.
Third Edition. %vo. los. 6d.
Professor Owens I^ec-
tures on the Cojnparative
Anatomy and Physiology
of Invertebrate Animals.
2nd Edition, zvith 235 Woodcuts, "ivo. 2ls.
The Comparative Ana-
tomy and Physiology of the
Vertebrate Animals.
By Richard Ozven, F.R.S.
With 1,472 Woodcuts. 2vols. Svo. /;s. iT,s.6d.
Light Science for Lei-
sure Hours ; a Series of
Familiar Essays on Scien-
tific Subjects, N'atural P/ie-
iiomena, &c.
By R. A. Proctor, B.A.
First and Second Series. 2 z'ols. crozcn Zz'O.
"js. 6d. each.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS &, CO.
21
Kirby and Spenccs In-
troduction to Entomology,
or Elements of the Natural
History of Insects.
Crown Si'(7. 5^.
St ra]ige Dwellings; a De-
scription of the Habitations
of A nimals, abridged from
' Homes without Hands!
By Rev. J. G. Wood, MA.
With Frontispiece and 6o Woodcuts. Cro^vn
%vo. is. 6d.
Homes loithottt Hands ;
a Description of the Habi-
tations of Animals, classed
acco7^ding to their Principle
of Constriiction.
By Rev. y. G. Wood, M.A.
With about 140 Vignettes on ]l\wd. 2>-jo. 2ls.
Out of Doors ; a Selec-
tion of Original Articles
on Practical Natural His-
tory.
By Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A.
With 6 Illustrations from Original Designs
engraved on Wood. Crown 2)V0. ys. 6d.
The Polar World : a
Popular Description of
Man and Nature in the
Arctic and Antarctic Re-
gions of the Globe.
By Dr. G. Hartzcjig.
JFith Chroinoxylographs, Mafs, and Wood-
cuts. 8ew. los. bd.
The Sea and its Living
Wonders.
By Dr. G. Hartwig.
Fourth Edition, enlarged. Zvo. with many
Illustrations, \0s. dd.
The Tropical World ; a
Popular Scientific Account
of the Natural History of
the Equatorial Regions.
By Dr. G. Hartwig.
With about 200 Illustrations. 2>vo. 10s. 6d.
The Snbtei^ranean World.
By Dr. G. Hartwig.
With Maps and many IVoodcuts. ?>vo. 2\s.
The Aerial World.
By Dr. George Hartwig.
With 8 Chromoxylographs and about 60
other Illustrations engraved on Wood.
Zvo. price lis.
Insects at Home; a Popu-
lar Account of British
Insects, their Structure,
Habits, and Transforma-
tions.
By Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A.
With upwards of "tOO Woodcuts. Zvo. 2\s.
Insects Abroad ; being a
Pop ularA ccou nt of Foreign
Insects, theirStructure, Ha-
bits, and Transformations.
By Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A.
With up-ioards of 100 Woodcuts. 8zw. 2l.c
A Familiar History of
Birds.
By E. Stanley, D.D. late
Ld. Bishop of Norwich.
Fcp. 8c'(7. rvith Woodcuts, y. 6</.
22
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS 8c CO.
Rocks Classified and De-
scribed.
By B. Von Cotta.
Ejtglish Edition, by P. H. Lawrence [with
English, German, and Fre)ich Syno-
nymcs), reinscd by the Author. Post
Svo. 14s.
PrimcBval JVorld of Swit-
zerland.
By Professor Oszvald Hccr,
of the University of
Zurich. Translated by
W. S. Dallas, F.L.S.
and edited by ya?}ies
Hey wood, M.A. F.R.S.
2 vols. S)VO. laith miineroiis Illitstrations.
[In the press.
The Origin of Civilisa-
tion, and the Primitive
Conditmi of Man; Men-
tal and Social Condition of
Savao-es.
By Sir y. Dcbbock, Bart.
M.P. F.R.S.
Third Edition, with 25 IVoodcuts. ^vo. 1 6s.
A Manual of AntJiro-
pology, or Science of Man,
based on Modern Research.
By Chaides Bray.
Croiun Zvo. ^s.
A Phrenologist amongst
the Todas, or the Stndy of
a Primitive Tribe in South
India; History, Character,
C^istoms, Religion, Infanti-
cide, Polyandry, Language.
By W. E. Marshall, Lieut. -
Col. Bengal Staff Corps.
With 26 Illustrations. 8z.'o. 21s.
The Ancient Stone Im-
plements, Weapons, and Or-
naments of Great Britain.
By John Evans, F.R.S.
With 2 Plates and 476 Woodaits. 8z'o. 2Ss.
The Elements of Botany
for Families and Schools.
Tenth Edition, revised by
TJiomas Moore, F.L.S.
Fcp. %vo.7vitJi \i,dfWoodcuts 2s. 6d.
Bible Animals; a De-
scription of every Living
Creature mentioned in the
Script7ires, from- the Ape
to the Coral.
By Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A.
With about lOo Vignettes on Wood. %vo. 2\s.
The Rose Amateur s
Guide.
By Thomas Rivers.
Tenth Edition. Fep. %vo. 4J.
A Dictionary of Science,
Literature, and Art.
Fourth Edition, re-editcd
by the late W. T. Bi'ande
( the A7ithor)a7id Rev. G.
W. Cox, M.A.
3 vols, medium Zvo. 63^.
Loudon's EncyclopcBdia
of Plants ; comprising the
specific Character, Descrip-
tion, Cidturc, History, &c.
of all the Pla7its found in
Great Britain.
Jl ithujnvards 0/ i2,ooo]Foodeuts. Stv. 42s.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
23
The Treasury of Botany,
or Popular Dicliojiary of
the Vegetable Kmgdovi ;
with which is incorporated
a Glossary of Botanical
Terms.
Edited by J. Lindley,
F.R.S. and T. Moore,
KL.S.
With 274 Woodcuts and 20 Steel Plates.
Two Paris, fcp. Sz/^. I2j,
Handbook of Hardy
Trees, Shrubs, and Her-
baceous Plants; containing
Descriptions &c. of the
Best Species in C^iltivation ;
with Cnltnral Details,
Comparative Hardiness,
suitability for particular
positions, &c. Based on
the French Work of De-
caisne and Nandin, and
including the 720 Original
Woodcut Illnstrations.
By W. B. Hemsley.
Medium Zvo. 2is.
A General System of
Descriptive and A nalytical
Botany.
Translated from theFrench
of Le Maont and De-
caisne, by Mrs. Hooker.
Edited and arranged
according to the English
Botanical Syste7n, by y .
D. Hooker, M.D. &c.
Director of the Royal
Botanic Gardens, Kew.
With ^,^00 Woodcuts. Imperial Sz'o. ^2s.6d.
Forest Trees and Wood-
la nd Scenery, as described
in Ancient
Poets.
and Modern
By William Mensies, De-
puty Surveyor of Wind-
sor Forest and Parks, &c.
Ill One Vohtme, imperial i^o. ivith Twenty
Plates, Coloured in facsimile of the
original drawings, price £^. ^s.
{Preparing for publication .
CHEMISTRY and PHYSIOLOGY.
Miller s Elements of
Chemistry, Theo7^etical and
Practical.
Re-edited, zvith Additions,
by H. Macleod, F.C.S.
3 vols. ?>vo. £1.
Part I. Chemical Physics, ip.
Part II. Inorganic Chemistry, 2\s.
Part III. Organic Chemistry, 24-f.
A Manual of Chemical
Physiology, including its
Points of Contact with
Pathology.
By J. L. W. Thudiclmm,
M.D.
%vo. with Woodcuts, "js. 6d.
21
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
A Dictionary of CJie-
viistry and the Allied
Branches of other Sciences.
By He7iry Watts, F.C.S.
assisted by eminent
Scientific and Practical
Chemists.
6 vols, medium Zvo. ^8. \\s. 6d.
Second Sttfpleinenf com-
pleting the Record of Dis-
covery to the end of 1872.
\Iii the press.
A Course of Practical
Chemistry, for the 2ise of
Medical Students.
By W. Odling, F.R.S.
Croivn Sr'c. JVooikufs, p. bd.
Select Methods in Chemi-
cal Analysis, chiefiy Inor-
ganic.
By Wm. Crookes, F.R.S.
With 22 JVoodciits. Cro-wn 8rw. I2J-. 6d.
Todd and Bowman s
Physiological A natomy, and
Physiology of Alan.
Vol. II. ivith ininienvis lUiistrations, 2^s.
Vol. I. New Edition by Dr. Lionel S.
Beale, F.R.S. in course of publication,
'with numerous Illustrations. Parts I. and
II. in Zvo. price -]s. 6d. each.
Outlines of Physiology,
Human and Comparative.
By J. Marshall, F.R.C.S.
Surgeon to the Univer-
sity College Hospital.
2 vols. cr. Sz'o. -with 122 Woodcuts, ^2s.
The FINE ARTS and ILLUSTRATED
EDITIONS.
Albert Dnrer, his Life
and Works; including Au-
tobiographical Papers and
Coniplcte Catalogues.
By Willia7n B. Scott.
With 6 Etchings by the Author and other
Illustrations, ^vo. i6j-.
In Fairyland ; Pictures
from the Elf World By
Richard Doyle. With a
Poem by W. Allingham.
With 1 6 coloured Plates, containing ^6 De-
signs. Second Edition, folio, 1 5J-.
A Dictionary of Artists
of the English School:
Painters, Sculptors, Archi-
tects, Engravers, and Orna-
mcntists ; with Isfoticcs of
their Lives and Worhs.
By Samuel Redgrave*
Srv. lbs.
The New Testament, il-
lustrated with Wood En-
gravings after the Early
Masters, chiefly of the
Italian School.
Crozvn ^to. 633-.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS &. CO.
25
T/ie Life of Man Sym-
bolised by flic Moid lis of
tJic Ycai\
Text selected by R. Pigot.
25 Illustralioiis on ]Vood from Dcsi;^its by
John Lcighton, F.S.A. Quarto, 42^.
Lyra Germanica ; the
C/iristian Year and l/ie
CJiristian Life.
Translated by Miss C.
Winkiijorth.
With about 325 Woodcut Illustrations by J.
Leighton, F.S.A. and other Artists.
2 vols. 4/c?. price 42J-.
Lord Macaulays Lays
of Ancient Rome. With
90 Illnstrations on Wood
from Drazvings by G.
Scharf
Fcp. \to. 2\S.
Miniature Edition, with
Scharf s 90 Illustrations
reduced in Litliography.
Imp. \Gino. los. 6d.
Sacred and Legendary
Art.
By Mrs. y a me son.
6 vols, square croion ^zv. price £~,. \<~,s. Gd.
as follozi's : — -
Legends of the Saints
and Martyrs.
N^nv F.dition, -with 19 Etchings and 187
Woodcuts. 2 vols. 3IJ-. bd.
Legends of the Monastic
Orders.
Nezv Edition, ivith li Etchings and 88
Woodcuts. I vol. 2\S.
Legends of the Madonna.
Ne-cU Edition, 'with 27 Etchings and 165
Woodcuts. I vol. 2ls.
The History ofOttrLord,
with that of /lis Types and
Pi^ecnrsors.
Completed by Lady East-
lake.
Rei'ised Edition, with it, Etchings ami 28 1
Woodcuts. 2 vols. 42J.
The USEFUL ARTS, MANUFACTURES, &c.
A Manual of Architec-
ture : beins" a Concise His-
tory and Explanation of the
Principal Styles of Euro-
pean A rchitecture, A neient,
AledicEval, and Renaissance;
zvitJi a Glossary.
By Thomas MitcJiell, Au-
thor of * 77/6' Stepping
Stone to Architecture!
With 150 WoodciHs. Croivn ^vo. los. 6d.
//istory of the Gothic
Revival; an Attempt to
sJiew hozu far the taste for
Alediceval A rcJiitecture luas
retained in Enoland during
the last tcuo centuries, and
has been re-developed in the
present.
By Charles L. East la he,
Architect.
With 48 Illustrations. Imp. Zvo. 3IJ. dd.
D
26
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Indtistrial Chemistry ; a
Manual for Manufactu-
rers and for Colleges or
Technical Schools. Being a
Translation of Professors
Stohniann and Englcrs
German Edition of Pay ens I
'Prdcis de Chimic Indus- '
trielle: by Dr J. D. Barry
Edited, and supplemented
with Chapters on the
Chemistry of the Metals,
by B. H. Paul, Ph.D.
Svo. with Plates and Woodcuts.
[In t/n-fn-ss.
Gwilfs EncyclopcBdia of
Architecttire, with above
1, 600 Woodc2Us.
Fifth Edition, with Altera
tions and Additions, by
Wyatt PapzvortJi.
%vo. 5 2 J. bd.
The Three Cathedrals
dedicated to St. Paul in
London ; their History
from the Foundation of
the First Building in the
Sixth Century to the Pro-
posals for the Adornment
of the Present Cathedral.
By W. Longman, F.S.A.
With numerous Illustrations. Square cnnvn
2>Z'0. 21S.
Hints on Household
Taste in Furniture, Up-
holstery, and other Details.
By Charles L. East lake,
Architect.
Xnv Edition, with about 90 Illustrations.
Square crown Zvo. \\s.
Geometric Turning; com-
prising a Description of
Plant's New Geometric
Chuck, with Directions for
its nse, and a Series of
Patterns cut by it, with \
Explanations.
By H. S. Savory.
With 571 Woodcuts. Square cr.%vo.2\s.
Lathes and Tnrning,
Simple, Mechanical, and
Ornamental.
By W. Henry Northcott.
With Zip Illusti-ations. Zvo. l^s.
Handbook of Practical
Telegraphy.
By R. S. Culley, Memb.
List. C.E. Engineer-in-
Chief of Telegraphs to
the Post- Office.
Sixth Edition, Plates &- IFoodcuts. Szv. 16s.
Principles of Mechanism,
for the use of Students in
the Universities, and for
Engineering Students.
By R. Willis, ALA. FR.S.
Professor in the Univer-
sity of Cambridge.
Second Edition, with 374 Woodcuts. Zvo.xZs.
Perspective ; or, the Art
of Draiuing what one Sees :
for the Use of those Sketch-
ing from Nattire.
By Lieut. W. H. Collins,
R.E. F.R.A.S.
With 37 Woodcuts. Cro-cun 2>vo. S-r.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Eiicyclopcedia of Civil
Engineering, Historical,
Theoretical and Practical.
By E. Cresy, C.E.
With above 3,000 Woodcuts. %vo. \2s.
A Treatise on the Steam
Engine, in its various ap-
plications to Mines^ Mills,
Steam Navigation, Rail-
ways and Agricult2tre.
By J. Bourne, C.E.
With Portrait, 37 Plates, and 546 Wood-
cuts. \to. 42J.
Catechism of the Steam
Engine, in its various Ap-
plications.
By John Bourne, C.E.
Nrcu Edition, with 89 Woodcuts. Fcp. %vo. bs.
Handbook of the Steam
Engine.
By y. Bourne, C.E. form-
ing a Key to the Author s
Catechism of the Steam
Engine.
With 67 Woodcuts. Fcp. Zvo. 95.
Recent Tmprovements in
the Steam Engine.
By J . Boicrjie, C.E.
With 124 Woodcuts. F:p. ^vo. ds.
Lowndes s Engineer's
Handbook ; explaining the
Principles which should
gidde the Young Engineer
in the Const7'uction of Ma-
chinery.
Post ivo. Ss.
Ures Dictionary of Arts,
Manufactures, and Mines.
Sixth Edition, re-written
and greatly enlarged by
R. Hunt, E.R.S. assisted
by numerous Contributors.
IVith 2,000 Woodcuts. 3 vols, medium Zvo.
£\. \\s. bd.
Handbook to the Minera-
logy of Cornwall and
Devon; zuith Instructions
for their Discrimination,
and copious Tables of Lo-
cality.
By J. H Collins, EG.S.
IVith 10 Plates, ^vo. 6s.
Guns and Steel ; Miscel-
laneous Papers on Mechani-
cal S^ibjects.
By Sir J. Whitworth,
C.E. F.R.S.
With Illustrations. Royal %vo. Is. 6d.
Practical Treatise on
Metallurgy,
Adapted from the last Ger-
man Edition ofProfessor
KerVs Metallw^gy by W.
Crookes, F.R.S. &c. and
E. Rohrig, Ph.D.
3 vols. %vo. with 625 Woodcuts. ^4. igs.
Treatise on A/ills and
Millwork.
By Sir W. Fairbairn, Bt.
With 18 Plates and 322 Woodcuts. 2 vols,
Svo. 32^.
28 NEW WORKS PU3USHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Useful Infonnafion for
Engineers.
By Sir W. Fairbairn, Bt.
With many Plates and IVoodcuts. 3 -.<oh.
crown Sz'o. ^is. bd.
The Application of Cast
and Wrought Iron to
Buildijig Purposes.
By Sir W. Fairbairn, Bt.
With 6 Plates and 118 IVoodcuts. ^zv. 16s.
The Strains in Trusses
Computed by means of Dia-
grams ; aiith 20 Exampies.
By F. A. Ranken, C.E.
With 35 Diagrams. Square cr. Zvo. 6s. 6d.
Practical Handbook of
Dyeing and Calico-Print-
ing.
By W. Crookes, F.R.S. &c.
With numerous Illustrations and Specimens
of Dyed Textile Fabrics. %vo. 42s.
MitchelTs Adanual of
Practical Assaying.
Fourth Edition, irvised,
with the Recent Disco-
veries incorporated, by
W. Crookes, F.R.S.
Sz'o. IVoodcuts, 2^s. 6d.
Occasional Papers on
Subjects connected zvith
Civil Engineering, Gun-
nery, and Naval Ai-chi-
tectiLre.
By Michael Scott, Memb.
Inst. CE. & of Inst.
N.A.
2 vols. Sey. ziith Plates, 42J.
Lottdons Encyclopcedia
of Gardening ,- comprising
the Theory and Practice of
Horticulture, Floriculture,
Arboricutture, and Land-
scape Gardening.
With 1,000 IVoodcuts. S:v. 21^.
Loudojis Encyclopcedia
of Agricultui^e : comprising
the Laying-out, Improve-
ment, and Management of
Landed Property, and the
Cultivation and Economy
of the Productions of Agri-
culture.
With 1,100 Woodcuts. Zvo. 21s.
RELIGIOUS and MORAL ^VORKS.
^n Exposition of the 39
Articles, Historical and
Doctrinal.
By E. H. Brozvne, D.D.
Bishop of Winchester.
Neiu Edition, izv. iGs.
An Introduction to the
Theology of the Church of
England, in an Exposition
of the 39 Articles. By Rev.
T. P. Boultbce, LL.D.
Fcp. %vo, 6j-.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS 8c CO. -"J
Historical Lectures on
tJic Lifeof Our Lord Jesus
Christ.
By C. y. L//ico/t, D.D.
Fifth Edition. Zvo. \zs.
Sermons ; including Two
Scrjuojis on tlic Interpre-
tation of PropIiec)\ and an
Essay on tlic Right Inter-
pretation and Understaiui-
ing of the Senptnres.
By the late Rev. Tliornas
Arnold, D.D.
3 z-oh. Zvo. price 2i,s.
CI I r is tian L ife , / ts
Course, its Hindrances,
and its Helps ; Sermons
preaclied mostly in the
Chapel of Rngby School.
By the late Rev. Thomas
Arnold, D.D.
%vo. -js. 6d.
CIi ris tia n L ife, its
Hopes, its Tears, and its
Close ; Sermons preached
mostly in the Chapel of
Ruzbv School.
By the late Rev. Thomas
Arnold, D.D.
Zz'o. 'js. 6i/.
Sermons Chiefly on the
Interpretation of Scrip-
ture.
By the late Rev. Thomas
Arnold, D.D.
%'i.v. price Is. 6d.
Sermons preached in the
Chapel of Rugby School ;
zvith an Address before
Confirmatioji.
By the late Rev. Thomas
Arnold, D.D.
Fcp. Zvo. price y. 6d.
Three Essays on Reli-
gion : N' at lire ; the Utility
of Religion; Theism.
By John Stuart Mill.
%vo. price \os. 6d.
Synonyms of the Old Tes-
tament, their Bearing on
Christian Taith and
Practice.
By Rev. R. B. Girdlestone.
Zvo. \y.
Reasons of Faith ; or,
the Order of the Christian
Argument Developed and
Explained.
By Rev. G. S. Drew, M.A.
Second Edition. Fcp. %z'o. 6s.
The Eclipse of Faith :
or a Visit to a Religious
Sceptic.
By Henrv Rooxrs.
Latest Edition. Fcp. Szv. 5^-.
Defence of the Eclipse of
FaitJi.
By Henry Rogers.
Latest Edition. Fcp. Zvo. y. 6d.
30
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Sermons for the Times
preached in St. Paid's
Cathedral and elsezahere.
By Rev. T. Griffith, M.A.
Crcnvii "ivo. 6s.
The Life and Epistles of
St. Paul.
By Rev. W. J. Conybeare,
M.A. a7id Very Rev. J.
S. Howsou, D.D.
Library Edition, -with all the Original
Illustrations, Maps, Landscapes on Sted,
JVooJcnts, &'c. 2 Tols. Ofto. 48j-.
Intermediate Edition, zvith a Selection
of Maps, Plates, and Woodcuts. 2 vols.
sgua7-e cnnvn 8vo. 21 s.
Student's Edition, rroised and condensed,
-with 46 Illustrations and Maps. I vol.
crozvn Svo. (^s.
A Critical and Gram-
matical Co7nmentary on St.
PauVs Epistles.
By C. 7. Ellicott, D.D.
%vo. Galatians, %s. 6d. Ephesians, Zs. 6d.
Pastoral Epistles, los. 6d. Philippi-
ans, Colossians, & Philemon, igj-. 6d.
Thessalonians, 7^. 6d.
The l^oyage and Ship-
wreck of St. Paid ; with
Dissertations on the Ships
and Navigation of the
Ancients.
By fames Smith, F.R.S.
Cro7vn ?>vo. Charts, \os. Gd.
Evidence of the Tntth
of the Christian Religion
derived from the Literal
Fulfilment of Prophecy.
By Alexander Keith, D.D.
ipth Edition, ivith numerous Plates.
Square S'v. 12^. bd. or in post %vo.
-with 5 Plates, Gs.
Historical and Critical
Commentary on the Old
Testame7it ; with a New
Translation.
By M. M. Kalisch, Ph.D.
Vol. I. Genesis, %vo. \%s. or adapted for the
General Reader, i is. Vol. II. Exodus,
\<,s. or adapted for the Goieral Reader,
I2J-. Vol. III. Leviticus, Part I. \t^s.
or adapted for the General Reader, %s.
Vol. IV. Leviticus, Part II. \^s. or
adapted for the General Reader, %s.
The History and Litera-
ture of the Israelites, ac-
cording to the Old Testa-
ment and the Apocrypha.
By C. De Rothschild and
A. De Rothschild.
Second Edition. 2. vols. crownZvo. I2s. 6d.
Abridged Edition, in I vol. fcp. 8vo. y. 6d.
Ewald' s History of
Israel.
Translated from the Ger-
man by y . E. Caipenter,
M.A. with Preface by
R. Martineau, M.A. .
5 vols. Zvo. 63^".
Commentary on Epistle
to the Romans.
By Rev. W. A. G Conor.
Cnnoji ?ivo. y. 6d.
A Commentary on the
Gospel of St. fohn.
By Rev. W. A. O Conor.
Cnncn ?>vo. los. 6d.
The Epistle to the He-
breivs ; zvith Analytical
Introduction and N'otcs.
By Rev. W. A. G Conor,
Crown Sz'C. 4J. 6d.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
31
TJioitghts for the Age.
By Elizabeth M. SczvclL
A'liv Edition. Fcp. 8tv. 3J. dd.
Passing
ThmigJits on
Religion.
By Elizabeth M. Scwell.
Fcp. %-'o. y. 6d.
Self-examination before
Confirmation.
By Elizabeth M. Sewell.
2)21110. IS. 6d.
Preparation for the Holy
Coniuuinion ; the Devotions
chiefiy from the zuorks of
yeremy Taylor.
By Elizabeth M. Sczuell.
2,21110. 3.r.
Readings for a Month
Preparatory to Confirma-
tion, from Writers of the
Early and English Chiirch.
By Elizabeth M. Sewell.
Fcp. 8vo. 4^.
Readings for Every Day
hi Lenty compiled fro7n the
Writings of Bishop
fereiny Taylor.
By Elizabeth M. Sewell.
Fcp. Zvo. 5J-.
Bishop yere7ny Taylor s
Entii'e Works ; ivith Life
by Bishop Heber.
Revised and corrected by
the Rev. C. P. Eden.
10 vols. ^5. 5J-.
Tlynins of Praise and
Prayer.
Collected and edited by Rev.
y. Martinean, LL.D.
Cro7i.ni Zvo. \s. 6d.
Thoughts for the Holy
Week, for Yoitng Persons.
By Elizabeth M. Sezvell.
Neio Edition. Fcp. Zvo. 2s.
Spiritual Son^s for the
Stmdays and Holidays
thronghont the Year.
Byf. S. B. Mojtsell, LL.D.
Fourth Edition. Fcp. %vo. 4^. 6d.
Lyra Gernianica; Hymns
translatcdfrom the Germa^i
by Miss C. Winkworth.
2 series, fcp. %vo. 3J. 6(/. each.
Endeavours after the
Christian Life; Discourses.
By Rev. y. Martineaii,
LL.D.
Fifth Edition. Cro7vn 2,zv. "Js. 6d.
An Tntroduction to the
Study of the Neiv Testa-
ment, Critical Exegetical,
and Theoloo;ical.
By Rev. S. Davidson, D.D.
2 vols. 8"'c. 30J-.
Supernatural Religion ;
an Piqniry into the Reality
of Divine Revelation.
New Edition. 2 vols. %vo, 24J.
NEW WORKS PUBU3HED BY LONGMANS & CO.
TJie Life of CJirist.
For the use of J ^ouii(^ Per-
sons, selected from the Gos-
pels and ChronoloQ;ically
ari'anged ; luith Siipplc-
vientary Notices from
parallel Passages.
By the Rev. R. B. Gar-
diner, M.A.
Crown Zvo. 2s.
Lectures on the Penta-
teuch & the Moabite Stone;
with Appendices.
By J. JV. Colenso, D.D.
Bishop of Natal.
The PentateucJi and Book
of yoshna Critically Ex-
amined.
By J. JV. Colenso, D.D.
Bishop of A^atal.
Civivii Sr'c. ()S.
The N'eio Bible Com-
mentary, by Bishops and
other Clergy of the An-
glican Church, critically
examined by the Rt. Rev.
y. JV. Colenso, D.D.
Bishop of Natal.
Svo. 2SS.
TRAVELS, VOYAG-ES, &c.
The Valleys of Tirol ;
their Traditions and C21S-
toms, and How to l^isit
the?} I.
By Miss R. H. Busk,
Author of ' The Folk-
Lore of Rome' cfc.
With Frontispiece and 3 J///,c. Cro^cn
Sz'O. 12S. bd.
Eight Years in Ceylon.
By Sir Samuel JV. Baker,
M.A. F.R.G.S.
Xcw Edition, ivith Illitstrations engraved
on Wood by G. Pearson. Cro^vn Zvo.
Price "js. 6d.
The Rifle and the Hound
in Ceylon.
By Sir Saynuel JV. Baker,
M.A. F.R.G.S.
Xew Edition, unth Illustrations enqi-azrd
on Wood by G. Pearson. Crmcn Szc.
Price -js. 6d.
Meeting the Sun ; a
yourney all roujid the
JVorld through Egypt,
China, yapan, a?id Cali-
fornia.
By JVilliam Simpson,
F.R.G.S.
With ILiiotypes and Woodcuts. Zvo. 24s.
The Rural Life of Eng-
land.
By JVilliam Howitt.
Woodcuts, ^vo. I2J-. (yd.
The Dolomite Moun-
tains. Excursions through
Tyrol, Carinthia, Carniola,
and Friuli.
By y. Gilbert and G. C.
Ch u rch ill, F.R.G. S,
With Illustrations. Sq. cr. Zvo. Sir.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
33
The Alpine Club Map
of the Chain of Mont
Blanc, from an actual Sur-
vey in 1 863- 1 864.
By A. Adams-Reilly,
F.R.G.S. M.A.C
In Chroiiiolilhography, on extra stout draw-
ing paper lOj. or mounted on canz'as
in a folding case, 12s. dd.
The Alpine Chtb Map
of the Valpellinc, the Val
Toiirnanche, and the South-
ern Valleys of the Chaiji of
JMonte Rosa, from actual
Survey.
By A. Adams-Reilly ,
F.R.CS. M.A.C
Price ds. on extra Stout Drawing Paper, or
1$. 6d. mounted in a Folding Case.
Hours of Exercise in the
Alps.
By John Tyndall, F.R.S.
Third Edition, with 7 Woodcuts by E.
Whymper. Cro2vn Svo. 12s. 6d.
Gtiide to the Pyrenees, for
the use of Mountaineers.
By Charles Packe.
Second Edition, with Maps c^-v. and Ap-
pendix. Crmvn %vo. "^s. 6d.
Hoiu to See Norway.
By J. R. Campbell
With Map and 5 Woodcuts, fcp. %vo. ^s.
Untrodden Peaks and
Unfrequented Valleys ; a
Midsummer Ramble anions'
the Dolomites.
By Amelia B. Edwards.
With numei-ous Illustrations. S>zo. 21s.
The Alpine Club Map
of Switzerland, with parts
of the Neighbouring Coun-
tries, on the scale of four
miles to an Inch.
Edited by R. C Nichols,
F.S.A. F.R.G.S.
In Four Sheets, in Portfolio, ^2s. or
mounted in a Case, 52^-. Gd. Each
Sheet may be had separately, price \2s.
or mounted in a Case, 1 5 j.
The Alpine Guide.
By John Bad, M.R.I.A.
late President of the
Alpine Club.
Post Zvo. with Maps and other Illustrations.
Eastern Alps.
Price los. 6d.
Central Alps, including
all the Oberland District.
Price 7J-. 6(/.
Western Alps, including
Mont Blanc, Monte Rosa,
Zermatt, &c.
Price 6s. 6d.
Introduction on Alpine
Travelling in general, and
on the Geology of the Alps.
Price IS. Either of the Three Volumes or Parts
of the '■Alpine Guide' may be hadvith
this Introduction prefixed, i.r. extra.
Visits to Remarkable
Places, and Scenes illus-
trative of striking Passages
in English History and
Poetry.
By William Howitt.
2 vols. %T0. Woodcuts, 25J.
E
34
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS 8l CO.
V/ORKS of FICTION.
iVhispers front Fairy-
land.
By the Rt. Hon. E. H.
Knatchbull - Hugcsscn,
M.P. Author of Stories
for my Children' ' Moon-
shine', ' Q2ieer Folk', &c.
IViih 9 Illustrations from Original De-
signs engraved on Wood by G. Pear-
son. Croion %vo. priee 6j-.
Elena, an Italian Fale.
By L. N. Coinyn.
2 vols, post 8iv. 14J.
Fa dy Wi II ugh by ' s
Diary during the Reign of
Charles the First, the Pro-
tectorate, and the Restora-
tion.
Crenvn 8:v. 7.C 6(('.
Centnlle, a Fale of Pan.
By Dcnys Shyne Laivlor,
A uthor of ' Pilgrimages in
the Pyrenees and Landcsi
Crown %vo. los. 6d.
File Folk-Lore of Rome,
collected by Word of Mouth
from the People.
By R. H. Busk, Author of
' The Valleys of Fro I '
&c.
Crown ?>vo. I2s. 6d.
Cyllene ; or, FJie Fall of
Paganism.
By Henry Sneyd, M.A.
2 'i'ols. pos ?>7'0. 14J.
Fales of the Fentonic
Lands.
By Rev. G. W. Cox, M.A.
and E. H. Jones.
Crffivn %vo. \os. 6d.
Beckers Gallus; or Ro-
man Scenes of the Time of
A ugustus.
Post %vo. Js. 6d.
Beckers Charicles : Il-
lustrative of Private Life
of the Ancient Greeks.
Post ?>vo. 7s. 6d.
Fales of Ancient Greece.
By the Rev. G. W. Cox,
M.A.
Cro'wn Zvo. 6s. 6d.
Fhe Modern Novelisfs
Library.
Atherstone Priory, 2s. boards; 2s. 6d. cloth.
The Burgomaster's Family, 2s. boards;
2s. 6d. cloth.
Mri.vii.i.f.'s Digby Grand, 2s. and 2s. 6d.
. Gladiators, 2s. and 2s.6d.
Good for Nothing,2s. (Sr=2J. M.
, Ilolmhy House, 2s. and 2s. 6d.
Interpreter, 2s. and 2S. 6d.
. A'ate Coi'entry, 2s. and 2s. 6d.
. Q/ieen's Maries, 2s. a7id 2s. 6Y.
. . General Bounce, 2s. and2s. dd.
Trollopk's Warden, is. dd. and 2s.
Barchestcr To^oers, 2s. and
2S. 6(/.
Bramley-Moore's Six Sisters of the Val-
leys, 2s. boards ; 2s. 6d cloth.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
3o
Novels and Tales.
By the Right Hon. Benja-
min Disraeli, HI. P.
Cabinet Editions, complete in Ten Volumes,
crffiun %-'o. 6j. each, as follows : —
Lothair, ds. i Venetia, bs.
Coiiingsby, ds. i Alroy,Ixion, ^'c. 6s.
Sybil, 6s. Young Duke, <S^f. 6.r.
Tancred, 6s. \ Vivian Grey, 6s.
Henrietta Temple, 6s.
Contanni Me/niiit^, 6-"^. 6s.
Cabinet Editio7t, in crown
Zvo. of Staines and Tales
by Miss Sezuell : —
Amy Herbert, 2s. 6d.
Gertrude, 2s. 6d.
EarFs Daughter,
2S. 6d.
Experience of Life,
2s. 6d.
Clci'c Hall, 2s. 6d.
Ursula, 2)S. 6d.
h'ors, 2s. 6d.
Katharine Ashton,
2s. 6d.
Margaret Percival,
y. 6d.
Lanelon Parsonage,
is. 6d.
POETRY and THE DRAMA.
Ballads and Lyrics of
Old France; zuith other
Poems.
By A. Lang.
Square fcp. %vo. y.
Moore s Lalla Rookh,
Tenniers Edition, zuith 68
Wood Engravings.
Fcp. i^O. 2 I.e.
Moore s Irish Melodies, .
Jllacliscs Edition, zuith 1 6 1
Steel Plates.
Super-royal ?>vo. 3IJ. 6d.
Miniature Edition of
Jlloores Ldsh Melodies,
ZL'ith Maclise s i6i Illns-
trations reduced in Litho-
graphy.
Imp \6mo. \os. 6d.
Milton's Lycidas and
Epitaphiiim Damonis.
Edited, zuith Notes and
Introduction, bv C. S.
Jerram, M.A. ^
Crozvn Sev. y. 6d.
Lays of Ancient Rome ;
zuith Lory and the Ar-
mada.
By the Right Hon. Lord
Macanlay.
\6mo. 2,s. 6d.
Lord Macanlay s Lays
of Ancient Rome. With
90 niustrations on Wood
from Drazjuings by , G.
Schaif.
Fcp. 4/0. 2 IS.
Miniattire Edition oj
Lord Macanlay s Lays
of Ancient Rome, zuith
Scharfs 90 Illnstrations
reduced in Lithography.
Imp. \6mo. \Os. 6d.
S out hey s Poetical Works
zuith the Author s last Coj'-
rections and Additions.
Mediu7n %vo. with Portrait, 14J.
Boiodlers Family Shak-
spcare, cheaper Genuine
Edition.
Complete in I vol. medium 'ivo. large type,
7vith 36 IVoodcut Illustrations, \\s. or
in 6 vols. fcp. ^vo. price 21s.
36
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Horatii Opa^a, Library
Edition, with English
Notes, Marginal References
and various Readings.
Edited by Rev.J . E. Yonge.
87'(7. 2I.f.
The yEneid of Virgil
Translated into English
Verse.
By y. Conington, 31. A.
Croivn Zvo. gj.
Poems by yean Inge low.
2 7vls. Fcp. Zvo. lO.C
First Series, containing ^ Divided,^ ' The
Star''s Monument,^ ^c. l6t/i Thousand.
Fcp. 8zv. ^s.
Second Series, '■A Story of Doom' ' Gla-
dys and her Island,'' cr'^. ^th Thousand.
Fcp. "ivo. 5j.
Poeriis by yean Ingelow.
First Series, zuith nearly
I oo / Voodcut Illustrations.
Fcp. ^to. 2 IS.
RURAL SPORTS, HORSE and CATTLE
MANAGEMENT, &c.
Down the Road ; or,
Reminiscences of a Gentle-
man Coachman.
By C. T. S. Birch Rey-
nardson.
IFith Twelve Chromolithographic Illnstra-
ticfns from Original Paintings by H.
Alkcn. ATcditim $vo. [^A'early ready.
Blaine's Eiicyclopccdia of
Rni'-al Sports; Complete
Accounts, Historical, Prac-
tical, and Descriptive, of
Hunting, Shooting, Fish-
ing, Racing, &c.
With above 600 JVoodcnts (20 fro>n Designs
/y/ John Leech). ?>vo. 21s.
A Book on Angling:
a Treatise on the Art of
Angling in every branch,
including full Illustrated
Lists of Salmon Flics.
By Francis Francis.
Post^vo. Portrait and Plates, \^s.
Wilcockss Sea -Fisher-
man: comprising the Chief
Methods df Hook and Line
Fishing, a glance at Nets,
and remarks on Boats aiid
Boating.
JWiij Fdition, tvith
Post Zvo. \2s. 6d.
80 IVoodcuts.
The Ox, his Diseases and
their Treatment ; zuith an
Essay on Parturition in the
Coiv.
By y. R. Dobson, Memb.
R.C.V.S.
C 7-0701 ?>vo. with Illustrations, Js. 6d.
A Treatise on Horse-
Shoeing and Lameness.
By J. Gamgee, Vet. Stcrg.
?>vo. ivith 55 Woodcuts, los. 6d.
Yoiiatt on the Horse.
Revised and enlarged by W.
Watson, M.R.C.V.S.
%vo. IVoodcuts, 12s, (yd.
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
37
Youatfs Work on the
Dog, revised and enlarged.
%vo. Woodcttts, 6j.
Horses and Stables,
By Colonel F. Filziuygravi,
X V. the King s Hussars.
With 2\ Plates of Illustrations. 8rv. \os.(id.
The Dog in Health and
Disease.
By Stonehenge.
With 73 Wood Engravings. Square crown
8w. Is. 6d.
The Greyhound.
By Stonehenge.
Rrdised Edition, -with 24 Portraits of Grey-
hounds. Square croiuii %vo. \os. 6d.
Stables and Stable Fit-
tings.
By W. Miles, Esq.
Imp. Zvo. uith 13 Plates, \^s.
The Horses Foot, and
how to keep it Sound.
By W. Miles, Esq.
Ninth Edition. Imp. 8w. Woodcuts, I2s, M.
A Plain Treatise on
Horse-shoeing.
By W. Miles, Esq.
Sixth Edition. Post Svo. Woodcuts, 2s. Cd.
Remarks on Horses
Teeth, addressed to Pur-
chasers.
By W. Miles, Esq.
Post Zvo. \s. 6d.
The Fly-Fisher s Ento-
mology.
By Alfred Ronalds.
With coloured Representa-
tions of the Natural and
Artificial Insect.
With 20 coloured Plates. Zvo. \i^.
TheDeadShot, or Sports-
mans Complete Guide; a-
Treatise on the Use of the
Gun, Dog-breaking,Pigeo7i-
shooting, &c.
By Marksman.
Fcp. Svo. with Plates, $s.
38
NE'.V WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS 8c CO.
WORKS
of UTILITY and
INFORMATION.
GENERAL
Maunders Treasury of
Knowledge and Library of
Reference ; comprising an
English Dictionary and
Grammar, Universal Ga-
zetteer, Classical Diction-
ary, Chronology, Lazo Dic-
tionary, Synopsis of the
Peerage, UsefnlTables,&c.
Fcp. Zvo. 6j-.
Maunder s Biographical
Treastuy.
Latest Edition, recon-
structed and partly 7'e-
written, with about i ,000
additional Memoirs, by
W. L. R. Gates.
Fcp. ^vo. 6s.
Maunder s Scientific and
Literary Treasiiry ; a
Popnlar Encyclopccdia of
Science, Literature, and
Art.
New Edition, in part re-
written, with above i ,000
new articles, by J . Y.
Johnson.
Fcp. ^vo. ds.
Maunder s Treasury of
Geography, Physical, His-
torical, Descriptive, and
Political.
Edited by W. Hughes,
F.R.G.S.
With 7 Maps and 1 6 PlaUs. Fcp. %vo. 6s.
Maunder s IListorical
Treasury ; General Litro-
ductory Outlines of U?ii-
versal History, and a
Series of Separate His-
tories.
Revised by the Rev. G. IV.
Cox, M.A.
Fcp. %vo. 6s.
Maunders Treasury of
N atural History ; or Popu-
lar Dictionary of Zoology.
Rez'iscd and corrected Edition. Fcp. Sz'ft
loith 900 Woodcuts, 6s.
The Treasury of Bible
Knozvledgc ; being a Dic-
tionary of the Books, Per-
sons, Ptaces, Events, and
other Mattel's of zvhich
mentio7i is made in Holy
Scriptttre.
By Rev. J. Ay re, M.A.
With Maps, 15 Plates, and numerous Wood-
cuts. Fcp. %vo. 6s.
Collieries and Colliers :
a Handbook of the Law
and Leading Cases relat-
ing thereto.
By y. C. Fowler.
Third Edition. Fcp. 8-'^. 7^. 6d.
The TJieory and Prac-
tice of Banking.
By H. D. Macleod, M.A.
Second Edition. 2 vols. Svo. 30^-,
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
39
Modern Cookery for Pri-
vate Families, reduced to a
System of Easy Practice in
a Series of carefully-tested
Receipts.
By Eliza Acton.
IVithZriatcs^ 150 Woodcuts. Fcp. '^vo. ()s.
A Practical Treatise on
Brezving ; njith Formtilce
for P2Lblic Brewers, and
Instructions for Private
Families.
By W. Black.
Fifth Edition. %vo. \Qs. 6d.
Three Httndred Original
Chess Problems and Studies.
By fas. Pierce, M.A. and
W. T. Pierce.
With many Diagrams. Sq. fcp. %vo. p. 6d.
Supplc7nc)it, 2s. 6d.
Chess Openings.
By F. W. Longman, Bal-
liol College, Oxford.
Scco7id Edition, revised. Fcp. "ivo. 2s. 6d.
The Theory of the Mo-
dern Scientific Game of
Whist.
By W. Pole, F.R.S.
Fifth Edition. Fcp. %vo. 2s. 6d.
The Cabinet Lawyer ; a
Pop n lar Digest of the L a lus
of England, Civil, Crimi-
nal, and Constitutional.
Twenty -fourth Edition, corrected and ex-
tended. Fcp. Zvo. gj.
Blacks tone Economised ;
being a Compendium of the
Laws of England to the
Present Time.
By D. M. Aird, Barrister.
Revised Edition. Post ^vo. 7s. 6d.
Pewtners Comprehensive
Specifier ; a Guide to the
Practical Specification of
every kind of Building-
Artificer s Work.
Edited by W. Young.
Croicn 2>vo. (>s.
Hints to Mothers on
the Management of their
Health during the Period
of Pregnancy and in the
Lyin^-in Room.
By Thomas Bull, M.D.
Fcp. SiY'. 5j\
The Maternal Manage-
ment of CJiildren in Health
and Disease.
By Thomas Bull, M.D.
Fcp. %vo. 5^.
40
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
KNOWLEDGE
The Stepping-Stonc to Knoiu-
ledge; or upwards of loo Questions
and Ansiuers on Miscellaneous
Subjects, adapted to the capacity of
Infant minds.
i2)>no. IS.
Second Series of the Stcpping-
Stone to Knowledge: Containing
zipwards of 800 Questions and
Anstvers on Miscellajieous Subjects
not contained in the First Series.
iSmo. IS.
The Stepping-Stone to Geo-
graphy : Containing several Hun-
dred Questions and Anstuers on
Geographical Subjects.
\%t)W. \s.
The Stepping-Stone to Eng-
lish History; Questions and An-
swers on the History of England.
iSmo. is.
The Steppi7ig-Stone to Bible
Knowledge; Questions and A Bi-
swas on the Old and New Testa-
ments.
iSmo. is.
The Stepping-Stone to Bio-
graphy; Questions and Answers
on the Lives of Eminent Mm and
Women.
iZino. is.
The Stepping-Stone to Irish
History: Containing several Hun-
dred Questions and Ansicers on
the History of Ireland.
1S//10. is.
The Stepping-Stone to French
History: Containing sroeral Hun-
dred Questions and Answers on
the History of France.
\%mo. \s.
for the YOUNG.
The Stepping-Stone to Roman
History: Contaumig several Hun-
dred Questions and Anstvers on
the History of Rome.
iZmo. IS.
The Stepping- Stone to Grecian
History: Containing several Hun-
dred Questions and Answers on
the History of Greece.
l^ino. IS.
The Stepping-Stone to Eng-
lish Grammar: Containing seve-
ral Hundred Questions and An-
swers on English Grammar.
iZnio. is.
The Stepping-Stone to French
Pronunciation and Conversation :
Containing srceral Hmdred
Questions and Answers.
i%)no. IS.
The Stepping-Stone to Astro-
nomy: Containing srveral Hun-
dred familiar Questions and
Ansiuers on the Earth and the
Solar and Stellar Systems.
1S//10. IS.
The Stepping-Stone to Music:
Containing several Hundred
Questions on the Science; also a
short History of Music.
iSwo. IS.
The Stepping-Stone to Natu-
ral History : Vertebrate or Back-
boned Animals. Part I. Mam-
malia; Part II. Birds, Reptiles,
Fishes.
iSwo. IS. each Part.
The Stepping-Stone to Archi-
tecture; Questions and Ans'wers
explaining the Principles and
Progress of Architecture from the
Earliest Times.
IVith 100 JFmfcuts. iSmJ. is-
INDEX.
Acton's Modern Cookery 39
Aird's Blackstone Economised 39
Alpine Club Map of Switzerland 33
Alpine Guide (The) 33
Amos's Jurisprudence 10
Primer of the Constitution 10
Anderson's Strength of Materials 20
^//-/«j-/;-(7//o''j' Organic Chemistry 20
Arnold's (Dr.) Christian Life 29
Lectures on Modern History 2
Miscellaneous Works 12
School Sermons 29
Sermons 29
(T.) Manual of English Literature 12
Arnoiild's Life of Lord Denman 7
Atherstone Priory 39
Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson ... 13
Ayi-e's Treasury of Bible Knowledge 38
Bacon's Essays, by Wkately 10
Life and Letters, by 5/^(/(////^' ... 10
Works 10
Bain's Mental and Moral Science 11
on the Senses and Intellect 11
Baker's Two Works on Ceylon 32
Z?a//'j Guide to the Central Alps 38
Guide to the Western Alps 38
Guide to the Eastern Alps 38
Becker s Charicles and Gallus 34
^/afi'i- Treatise on Brewing 39
Blackley's German-Enghsh Dictionary 15
Blaine's Rural Sports 36
Bloxam's Metals 20
Boultbee on 39 Articles 28
Bourne's Catechism of the Steam Engine . 27
Handbook of Steam Engine 27
Treatise on the Steam Engine ... 27
Improvements in the same 27
Bawdier s Family Shakspeare 35
Bramley-Moore' s Six Sisters of the Valley . 39
Brande's Dictionary of Science, Literature,
and Art 22
Bray's Manual of Anthropology 22
Philosophy of Necessity 11
Brinkley's Asivonomy 17
Browne's Exposition of the 39 Articles 28
Brunei' s\J\{& oi Brunei 7
Buckle's History of Civilisation 3
Posthumous Remains 12
Bull' s Hints to Mothers 39
Maternal Management of Children . 39
Burgomaster's Family (The) 39
Burke's Rise of Great Families 8
Vicissitudes of Families 8
Busk's Folk-lore of Rome 34.
Valleys of Tirol 32
Cabinet Lawyer 39
Ca7?ipbell's Norway 33
Gates' s Biographical Dictionary 8
and Woodward' s 'E,ncyc\o-pxAn ... 5
Changed Aspects of Unchanged Truths ... 13
Chesney s Indian Polity 3
Modern Military Biography 3
Waterloo Campaign 3
dough's Lives from Plutarch 4
Cy/tvejo on Moabite Stone &c 32
's Pentateuch and Book of Joshua. 32
Speaker's Bible Commentary ... 32
Collins' s Mineralogy of Cornwall 27
Perspective 26
Commonplace Philosopher in Town and
Country, by A. K. H. B 13
Comfe's Positive Polity 8
Comy?is Elena 34
Congreves Essays g
Politics of Aristotle 10
Co?iington's Translation of Virgil's vEneid 36
Miscellaneous Writings 14
Contanseau s Two French Dictionaries ... 14
Conybcare and Hotvsoti's Life and Epistles
of St. Paul 29
Cotton's Memoir and Correspondence 7
Counsel and Comfort from a City Pulpit... 13
Cox's (G. W.) Aryan Mythology 4
Crusades 6
History of Greece 4
Tale of the Great Persian
War 4
Tales of Ancient Greece ... 34
and yones's Teutonic Tales 34
Crawley's Thucydides 4
Cr^fZJv on British Constitution 3
Cresy s Encyclopaedia of Civil Engineering 27
Critical Essays of a Country Parson 14
Crct)/J«'j Chemical Analysis 24
Dyeing and Calico-printing 28
Culley's Handbook of Telegraphy 26
Ci^jac/fe'j^ Student's History of Ireland 3
D' Aubigni's Reformation in the Time of
Calvin 6
42
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
Davidsons Introduction to New Testament 31
Dead Shot (The), hy Marksman 37
Dc Caisne and Le Maoiit's Botany 23
/?£ yW(3r^««'5 Paradoxes 13
De Tocqueville s Democracy in America... 9
Disraeli's Lord George Bentinck 7
Novels and Tales 35
Dobson on the Ox 36
Dove's Law of Storms 18
Doyle's Fairyland 24
Z>r£w'j Reasons of Faith 29
Eastlakes Gothic Revival 25
Hints on Household Taste 26
Edwards's Rambles among the Dolomites 33
Elements of Botany 22
EllicoW s Commentary on Ephesians 30
Galatians 30
Pastoral Epist. 30
Philippians,&c. 30
Thessalonians . 30
Lectures on Life of Christ 29
Epochs of History 6
/jziawji Ancient Stone Implements 22
Ewald's History of Israel 30
Fairbairn s Application of Cast and
Wrought Iron to Building... 28
Information for Engineers 28
Treatise on Mills and Millwork 27
/^(zrrar'j Chapters on Language 13
Families of Speech 13
Fitz'tvygram on Horses and Stables 37
i^orjry/A'j Essays 9
Fowler's Collieries and Colliers 38
Francis's Fishing Book 36
Freeman sW\%\.ox\q.?\ Geography of Europe 5
From January to December 14
/7v«(/<?' J- English in Ireland 2
History of England 2
Short Studies 12
Gairdner's Houses of Lancaster and York 6
Gamgee on Horse-Shoeing 36
Ganot's Elementary Physics 19
Natural Philosophy 19
Gardiner's Buckingham and Charles 3
Life of Christ 32
Thirty Years' War 6
Gilbert a.n<i. Churchill's 'DoXovmX.cs 32
Girdlestone's Bible Synonyms 29
Goodeve's Mechanics 20
Mechanism 20
Grant's Ethics of Aristotle 10
Graver Thoughts of a Country Parson 14
Grcvi lie's Journal i
Griffin's Algebra and Trigonometry 20
Griffith's Sermons for the Times 29
Grove on Correlation of Phy.sical Forces ... 18
Gwilt's Encycloprcdia of Architecture 26
//(?;-^ on Election of Representatives 14
Hai-risoii's Political Problems 8
Hartivig's Aerial World 21
Polar World 21
Sea and its Living Wonders ... 21
Subterranean World 2X
Tropical World 21
Ha i/ghfo!?' s Amm:i\ Mechanics 19
/^(7>'K'<?;'rf'j Biographical and Critical Essays 7
Heer's Switzerland 22
//6'/;;?/zc//'3'j Scientific Lectures 18
Helmsley s Trees, Shrubs, and Herbaceous
Plants 23
Herschel's Outlines of Astronomy 17
Holland's Recollections 7
Hoivitt' s Rural Life of England 32
Visits to Remarkable Places 33
Humboldt' s Life 7
Hume's Essays 11
Treatise on Human Nature 11
Ihnc's History of Rome 5
Ingelow's Poems 36
Jameson s Legends of Saints and Martyrs . 25
Legends of the Madonna 25
Legends of the Monastic Orders 25
Legends of the Saviour 25
Jenkins Electricity and Magnetism 20
_7t';';'(7;«'j Lycidas of Milton 35
J cr raid's Life of Napoleon i
Johnston s Geographical Dictionary 17
KaliscK s Commentary on the Bible 30
jTwV/i'j Evidence of Prophecy 30
Kenyo7i's (Lord) Life 7
Kci'r s Metallurgy, by Crookes and R'dhrig. 27
A''/r/y and .?/<?«(-(.'' J Entomology 21
Knatchhull - Hugesseti s WHiispers from
Fairy-Land 34
Landscapes, Churches, iS:c. by A. K. H. B. 13
Lang's Ballads and Lyrics 35
Lathani s English Dictionary.... 14
Laiigliton's Nautical Surveying 18
Laii'lor' s CentuUe 34
La'wrence on Rocks 22
Lecky's History of European Morals 5
Rationalism 5
Leaders of Public Opinion 7
Leisure Hours in Town, by A. K. H. B 13
Lessons of Middle Age, by A. K. H. B 13
Lewes' s Biographical History of Philosophy 5
Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicons 15
Life of Man Symbolised 25
Lindlcy and Moore s Treasury of Botany... 23
Lloyd's Magnetism 20
Wave-Theory of Light 20
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO.
43
LoiigmaHS Cliess Openings 39
Edward the Third 3
Lectures on History of England 3
Old and Xew St. Paul's 26
Loudon's Eneyclopaidia of Agriculture ... 28
Gardening 28
Plants 22
Lowndes's Engineer's Handbook 27
Lubbock's Origin of Civilisation 22
Lyra Germanica 25, 31
J/7A?///,7y^ (Lord) Essays 2
History of England ... 2
Lays of Ancient Rome 25,35
Miscellaneous Writings 12
Speeches 12
Works 2
McCulloch's Dictionar)' of Commerce 16
Macleod's Principles of Economical Philo-
sophy 10
Theory and Practice of Banking 38
Markhani s History of Persia 4
Marshall's Physiology 24
Todas 22
Marshman' s History of India 3
Life of Havelock 8
.l/<7r////ca/c'j- Christian Life 31
Hymns 31
Maunders Biographical Treasury 38
Geographical Treasury 38
Historical Treasurj' 38
Scientific and Literary Treasury 38
Treasury of Knowledge 38
Treasury of Natural History ... 38
]fax7ccirs Theory of Heat 20
May's History of Democracy 2
History of England 2
Melville's Digby Grand 39
General Bounce 39
Gladiators 39
Good for Nothing 39
Holmby House 39
Interpreter 39
Kate Coventry 39
Queen's Maries 39
A/endelssoAn's 'Letters 8
Menzics' Forest Trees and Woodland
Scenery 23
.l/(,v7tw/4;'j Fall of the Roman Republic ... 4
Romans under the Empire 4
Mcrrificld' s Arithmetic and Mensuration... 20
Magnetism 18
Miles on Horse's Foot and Horse Shoeing 37
on Horse's Teeth and Stables 37
Mill (J.) on the Mind 10
(J. S.) on Liberty 9
Subjection of Women 9
on Representative Government 9
Utilitarianism 9
'5 Autobiography 6
Dissertations and Discussions 9
Essays on Religion (S:c 29
Hamilton's Philosophy 9
System of Logic 9
.Mill's Political Economy 9
Unsettled Questions 9
.1////^/-',? Elements of Chemistry 23
Inorganic Chemistry 20
Mintds (Lord) Lifeand Letters 6
Mitchell's Manual of .Architecture 2,
Manual of Assaying 28
Modern .Novelist's Library 34
J/(>//.f(V/'.f ' .Spiritual Songs ' 31
A/t(c)rt''j Irish Melodies, illustrated 35
Lalla Rookh, illustrated 35
MorcH's Elements of Psychology 11
Mental Philosophy n
Af orris's French Revolution 3
Miiller's Chips from a German Workshop. 12
Science of Language 12
Science of Religion 5
New Testament Illustrated with Wood
Engravings from the Old Masters 24
Northcott on Lathes and Turning 26
O' Conor's Commentary on Hebrews 30
Romans 30
St. John 30
Odling's Course of Practical Chemistry ... 24
Owens Comparative Anatomy and Physio-
logy of Vertebrate Animals 20
Owen's Lectures on the Invertebrata 20
Packe's Guide to the PyTenees 33
Pattison's Casauban 7
Pay en s Industrial Chemistry 26
Pc-wtners Comprehensive Specifier 39
Pierce's Chess Problems 39
Pole's Game of Whist 39
/'rtv/t/t'/'^izj^'j Master)' of Languages 15
Present-Day Thoughts, by A. K. H. B. ... 13
P/vf/fr' J- Astronomical Essays 17
Moon 17
Orbs around Us 17
Other Worlds than Ours 17
Saturn 17
Scientific Essays (New Series) ... 20
Sun 17
Transits of Venus 17
Two Star Atlases 18
Universe 17
Public Schools Atlas 16
Modem Geography 16
Ancient Geoi^aphy 16
Ranken on Strains in Trasses 28
Kawlinson's Parthia 4
Sassanians 4
Recreations of a Country Parson \^
AV(/^ratr'j Dictionary of Artists 24
Keilly's Map of Mont Blanc 37
* Monte Rosa 37
Reynardso)t' s'QowntyieKo'xA 36
Rich's Dictionary of Antiquities 15
AVirr'j Rose Amateur's Guide 22
Rogers' s Eclipse of Faith 29
Defence of Eclipse of Faith 29
Essays. 9
44
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO,
Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and
Phrases 14
Roiiahfs Fly-Fisher's Entomology 37
Nolhsc/iild's Israelites 30
A'««^// on the Christian Religion 6
English Constitution 2
's Recollections and Suggestions ... 2
5(T;/(f(7r/i Justinian's Institutes 10
Saiifoni' s English Kings 2
Savory's Geometric Turning 26
Schelleiis Spectrum Analysis 18
Scott' s A\har\. Durer 24
Papers on Civil Engineering 28
Seaside Musing, by A. K. H. 13 13
Seebohm's Oxford Reformers of 1498 3
Protestant Revolution 6
SewelFs History of the Early Church 5
Passing Thoughts on Religion 31
Prepnration for Communion 31
Principles of Education 14
Readings for Confirmation 31
Readings for Lent 31
Examination for Confirmation ... 31
Stories and Tales 35
Thoughts for the Age 31
Thoughts for the Holy Week 31
Sharp's Post-office Gazetteer 16
Shelley's Workshop Appliances 20
5/;(7ri'j Church History S
Simpson's Meeting the Sun 32
Smith's Paul's Voyage and Shipwreck 30
(Sydney) Essays 12
Life and Letters 7
Miscellaneous Works ... 12
Wit and Wisdom 12
(Dr. R. A.) Air and Rain 18
Sneyd's Cyllene 34
Southey's Doctor 13
• Poetical Works 35
Stanley's History of British Birds 21
Stephen's Ecclesiastical Biography 7
Freethinking and Plainspeaking 9
Stepping Stones (the Series) 40
.Si'/r//;/^'j Secret of Hegel 11
Sir William Hamilton 11
Stonchenge on the Dog 37
on the Greyhound 37
Sunday Afternoons at the Parish Church of
a University City, by A. K. H. B 13
Supernatural Religion 31
7V»'/i3/-'j History of India 3
Manual of Ancient History 6
Manual of Modern History 6
(y(?r-^;«)') Works, edited by /;Vi;//. 31
Teft-Books of Science 19
y/!/r/(y<z//'j History of Greece 4
Thomson s Laws of Thought 11
7";^(7;'/«'.r Quantitative Analysis 20
and Muir's Qualitative Analysis ... 20
y/^/^a^/cZ/wwi'^ Chemical Physiology 23
Todd (A.) on Parliamentary Government... 2
and Bowman's Anatomy and
Physiology of Man 2\
Trench's Realities of Irish Life 12
Trollope's Barchester Towers 39
Warden 39
Tyndall's American Lectures on Light ... 20
Belfast Address 19
Diamagnetism 20
Fragments of Science 19
Hours of Exercise in the Alps... 33
Lectures on Electricity 20
Lectures on Light 20
Lectures on Sound 20
Heat a Mode of Motion 20
■ Molecular Physics 20
6'6'i^«-wt;o-'j System of Logic n
Ure's Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures,
and Mines 27
Warburton s Edward the Third 6
\Vatso7is Geometry 20
I Fa^/j' J Dictionary of Chemistry 24
Webb's Objects for Common Telescopes ... 18
Weinhola' s Experimental Physics 19
Wellington's Life, by Glcig 8
Whately s English Synonymes 14
Life and Correspondence 6
Logic 10
Rhetoric 10
White and Donkin's English Dictionary... 15
and Riddle's Latin Dictionaries ... 15
Whilu'orth on Guns and Steel 27
Wilcocks's Sea-Fisherman 36
H^/7//rt;«j' J- Aristotle's Ethics 10
Willis's Principles of Mechanism 26
Willoiighhy's (Lady) Diary 34
Wood's Bible Animals 22
Homes without Hands 21
Insects at Home 21
Insects Abroad 21
Out of Doors 21
Strange Dwellings 21
Yongc's English-Greek Lexicons 16
Horace 36
F(?//i?/^ on the Dog 37
on the Horse 36
Zf//c/j Socrates 5
Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics... 5
Spoitiswoode S;' Co., Printers, New-street Square, Loudon,
t-/^
K/
ES
RETURN CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT
TO— i^ 202 Main Library
LOAN PERIOD 1
- HOME USE
2 3
4
5 6
ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS
I^BOnlh loans m»y be renewed by calling 642-3405
1-year loar»s may be recharged by bringino the hooKS lo the ClfCulatWn Oesk
^•newals and recharges may be made 4 Jays prior to Oua data
DUE AS STAMPED BELOW
iaLCIR.I»2«'8*
7 09 1988
AUTO. OISC
»>
v.tLV.-iVi \yi3
7
< CD UJ
-J GO r
-1- '^^
ID
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
FORM NO. DD6, 60m, 1/83 BERKELEY, CA 94720
U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES
€004854378