J 
 
THE ^ 
 
 LOGIC OF STYLE 
 
 AN INTRODUCTION TO 
 
 Critical Science 
 
 By WILLIAM^ENTON 
 
 LONDON 
 
 LONG M A N S, G E E E N, & C 0. 
 18 74 
 
 \All Rights reserved] 
 
MUIR AND PATERSON, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH. 
 
 //y<^y6 
 
FAi2.03 
 
 CONTEXTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION BY WAY OF PREFACE, ... 1 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OF STYLE GENERALLY. 
 
 Sectiun I. Of Expression Generally, §§ 1 — 3, . . . 41 
 
 Section II. Of Style in its relation to Expression, §g 4 — tj, . 56 
 
 Section III. Of Style in its relation to Rhetoric, §§ 7 — 9, . . 69 
 
 CHAPTEK II. 
 
 OF QUALITY. ^ 
 
 Section I. The Conditions of Quality, §§ 10—12, . ' . . 80 
 
 Section II. Of Subtlety, §§ 13— 15, .... 89 
 
 Section III. Of Comprehensiveness, §§ 16 — 18, . . . 108 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 OF QUANTITY. 
 
 Section L The Principle of Quantity, §g 19— 21, . . 121 
 
 Section II. Of Extension (Co-ordination), §§ 22—24, . . 130 
 
 Section III. Of Intension (Subordination), §§ 25—27, . . 139 
 
^' 
 
 Of THf ' 
 
 TJI^IVEESITY 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 BY WAY OF PEEFACE. 
 
 It is a cumbrous disadvantage for an Introduction to a 
 Theory of Style, that Style, as a science, stands so closely 
 in interconnection with other sciences. This connection, on 
 the one hand, is one of coincidence, on the other, of analogy. 
 In the one instance, the science seems to support itself on 
 the facts of the correlative sciences, in the other, on their 
 principles. And so it is forced into relations that are too 
 obvious to be repudiated, even while they are too numerous 
 not to interfere with its free expansion as an independent 
 system. 
 
 This disadvantage, the most awkward that can arise for 
 any theory claiming for its phenomena a distinct genesis 
 and a distinct economy, is at the same time one of the least 
 obvious. Not that the multiplicity in the relationships of 
 Style to other subjects has been overlooked; since it is the 
 too common experience that mere redimdancy of suggestion 
 tends often to confound and perplex. Besides, from the 
 opposite point of view, it could not fail to be noted, that, in 
 the midst of any such redundancy, a certain proportion of 
 ease must hav^e attended the work of recombining materials 
 which other sciences had discovered, or of organizing fresh 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 materials according to rules which they had suggested. The 
 difficulty of the case is hidden by a prior misunderstanding 
 as to the true scope of Style. And it arises from the doubt 
 as to whether Style is to be regarded as a science at all, 
 and as such in a position to be illuminated — with the pri- 
 vilege of reciprocal illumination — by any science whatsoever. 
 
 To the ordinary way of thinking, nothing more is required 
 for a science than that the facts which it provides shall be 
 susceptible of a logical classification. But there is also the 
 negative condition of qualification — viz., that the science shall 
 have its own lawful complement of facts. In the present 
 case, Style is regarded somehow as a galaxy of miscellaneous 
 truths, chiefly of truths practical and applied. If as a science 
 it is to be considered, it seems to withdraw itself into such 
 a science as Logic ; so that ultimately it is no science, want- 
 ing an independent basis. But in this there is the natural 
 oversight, that certain facts, however eagerly they may sub- 
 mit to the rules of a system like Logic, as a primary source 
 of administration, may yet be susceptible of a secondary treat- 
 ment and valuation. Practical Style may be ; yet, examined 
 philosophically, it will be found to include a nucleus of 
 theoretic principles, to which, more immediately than to those 
 of Logic, its facts may be referred. This skeleton of principle 
 it is, this nucleus — whether it be one according to which 
 certain facts common to all mental science are treated, or a 
 derivative order of facts, or facts entirely original — which 
 constitutes the Science of Style. 
 
 For the coherent exposition of its own facts a theory 
 requires a tolerably large compass. But, within that compass, 
 and in the particular illustration of its facts, a science will 
 infallibly ratify its claim to having special data. The more 
 
INTlvODUCTlON. 
 
 unique its position theoretically, the more striking its inter- 
 pretation of these data. But the burden of doing explicitly 
 and by anticipation what the science itself does implicitly, 
 descends upon the Introduction, which has to show with 
 precision what the principle is, according to which phenomena 
 that apparently have been pre-engrossed by sciences more 
 lucky or more precocious, may be treated, virtually, or in 
 fact, as new. The negative condition being thus satisfied, 
 Style vaults airily into the cycle of the sciences. But this 
 ennobling of Style, in claiming a scientific lineage for a 
 certain order of facts, involves the enlarging of the concep- 
 tion of science itself. Hence, in the second place, it devolves 
 upon an Introduction to Style to reflect a principle upon 
 science generaUy, as discovering a new variety of adaptation, 
 and possibly of treatment. Bringing thus for the principle 
 of science fresh facts, it brings for the facts of science a fresh 
 principle. And so its two aims or results coincide. For the 
 principle, under which the facts have been discovered to be 
 amenable to scientific analysis, is precisely the principle 
 M-hich must underlie and coincide with the supplementary 
 extension given to the notion of science. An incidental 
 result is that the scientific meaning of certain acknowledged 
 facts is established, where it was believed to be impossible ; 
 and a profounder and more emphatic, because more precise 
 and consistent, recognition given of them in regions, where, 
 if in part formally recognised, they were virtually, and in 
 their distinctive principle, denied. 
 
 An operative, and, practically, a new distinction is intro- 
 duced into science, when a division is made of the Subjective 
 or Mental sciences into those \vhich are concerned with Sensi- 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 bility, and those which are not. The facts, and through the 
 facts, the laws of Style, and, in a greater degree, of Music, 
 are not to be obtained at first hand by every one. They are 
 to be gathered only through a special medium, superadded to 
 the intellectual medium which is essential to all scientific 
 exposition. To Logic, however, as a branch of mental science, 
 the term Subjective does not apply in the philosophic sense. 
 Its phenomena are severely objective, in so far as they may 
 be observed by everybody, and yield principles which each 
 one may test for himself. In the same way, the facts of 
 Style, though subject to a greater fluctuation and diversity 
 than those of Logic, are also objective, in the sense that ulti- 
 mately they rest on a common sensibility, not necessarily 
 morbid in cases where it is high, nor coarse where it is low. 
 The variations of individual, i.e. truly subjective, sensibility 
 are infinite. But it is on that account precisely that a wary 
 science will refuse to compromise itself by an explana- 
 tion of facts, that, ex hypothesi, are too numerous to be 
 explained. Such an explanation would be impossible. It 
 would also be suicidal. For it is only with these variations 
 as recurrent, and having essential points of agreement, and 
 a catholic significance, that the science is concerned. All 
 beyond that is isolated, in many cases contradictory. And 
 with individual bias or eccentricity, even in a god, science 
 has nothing to do. The limit, therefore, at wdiich Style 
 ceases to be objective, is where it ceases to transcend indi- 
 vidual peculiarity, and where effects become local and capri- 
 cious. At the same time, and while ultimately there is no 
 difference in this respect, a distinction may be made between 
 Style and Logic on the ground of the greater evasiveness of 
 its phenomena, because adding an element distinct from that 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 which makes the logical phenomena themselves evasive as 
 distinct from those of Physical Science. The sciences fall 
 most conveniently, therefore, into this order, the Physical, 
 the Philosophical, and the Esthetic or Critical. The dis- 
 tinction is valid for ordinary purposes, and must be insisted on 
 for Style, especially in its relation to Logic, as occupying a 
 station intermediate between it and the Natural Sciences — 
 which relation is now illustrated in detail. 
 
 1. Style, together with Logic, may in part be distinguished 
 from the Physical Sciences by the less palpable nature of its 
 phenomena, and, contingently, by the greater precariousness 
 of its method. But it is also to be distinguished by the fact 
 of being more stationary as a system. Not that mental 
 science, as, for example, in the form of Psychology, where 
 discoveries are constantly being registered, is not progressive 
 as a whole, but, in certain fields belonging more exclusively 
 to speculative analysis, it is improgressive. And a test 
 (which must be verified historically) may thus be applied to 
 discriminate the pure sections in pliilosophy from the mixed 
 or derivative. Accordingly, those which at the very first are 
 capable of a complete integration, go into the category of the 
 cardinal sciences, and those which are not, into that of the 
 derivative sciences. The facts of Style, in contradistinction 
 to those of Physical Science, may be collected in virtual com- 
 pleteness by one single observer. The theory is not one that 
 depends on a complementary observation extending over an 
 indefinite period of time. And so Style ranges itself, along 
 with Logic and Grammar, under the category of Pure Mental 
 Science. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, there is no privileged road to dis- 
 covery in Logic or in Style, other than that of severe 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 observation and reflection, by which science universally 
 travels, so haughtily as regards its warrant, so patiently 
 as regards its results. It is precisely as evanescent, and 
 requiring a keener observation, that their phenomena are 
 discarded for others of a more palpable character. Certainly 
 there is no monopoly created for Style by the mere oppor- 
 tunities which the individual theorist has for inquiry. 
 Scientific success does not go according to the mechanical 
 facilities wdiicli one man has, as compared wdth another, for 
 collecting facts— is not given gratuitously — but goes accord- 
 ing to individual capacity for the collation of facts, for 
 observation and generalization. Else the savage has more 
 opportunity of naturalistic acquirement, because more of 
 naturalistic research, than the man of culture. Hence 
 it is that mere perception of effects is not operative in 
 all men alike, nor mediately to the same results. In Style, 
 for example, the power to write idiomatically and with pre- 
 cision does not confer the power of scientific analysis ; the 
 two in all likelihood exist inversely as each other. But the 
 literary power may evidently become a desirable co-efficient 
 in an analysis that is dedicated exclusively to literary pheno- 
 mena. And, in an analysis which aims at a precision as 
 perfect as that attainable under any other science, it is too 
 evidently an indispensable co-efficient. Hence the main dis- 
 tinction between Logic and Style, in a sensibility which 
 supplies the facts that are to be logically explained ; having, 
 in so far, no value for Logic, but, on the other hand, being 
 invaluable for ^Esthetic Criticism. 
 
 2. Sensibility is, accordingly, the element which dis- 
 tinguishes a logical from an aesthetic science. Not, however, 
 in the sense of being antagonistic to logical analysis. On the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 contrary, it is of no value in science without that. For literary 
 science, therefore, considered in its unity, each is reciprocally 
 indispensable to the other. The same truth is expressed in 
 saying that Sensibility is the negative condition for all 
 systematic inquiry in the region of literary effect ; as may be 
 illustrated historically in relation to Style itself. 
 
 Strictly speaking, Style has no history. For a history 
 demands a unity of subject, with a series of developments 
 more or less marked and continuous. The only interest that 
 Style can have is, in this view, a negative and exoteric 
 interest. Considered under this limitation, therefore, Style 
 resolves itself historically into two momenta, or crises, of 
 which the appearance of Aristotle forms the first. It might 
 seem curious, that, of two subjects lying parallel to each other, 
 that one should be chosen for the richer and more explicit 
 treatment, whose phenomena are, on the whole, the more 
 recondite. A man is naturally more struck by the use of 
 a barbarism in speech — i.e. it is more of an event for him, 
 whether he mentions it to his wife or not — than by the 
 fact that his neighbour is reasoning in a circle. But the 
 grossest phenomena are not always the most suggestive. 
 Especially are they not likely to be suggestive when they 
 appeal to a capacity, which, not being exceptionally sensitive 
 itself, is flanked by a capacity that is exceptional for perceiv- 
 ing and pursuing some other order of phenomena. 
 
 This is sufficient to explain, for the moment, why Logic 
 rather than Literary Science should have met with a con- 
 clusive treatment at the hands of Aristotle. An attempt, it is 
 true, was formally made by him to systematize the other class 
 of facts. But it is clear that he did not apprehend the subject 
 in its philosophic relations ; else he would have seen that it is 
 
8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 precisely analogous to Logic — persistently and selfishly so — 
 complementary to it, and erecting itself beside it to whatever 
 extent, and in what direction soever it may be impelled. 
 Hence the subordinate place assigned to Style in his complete 
 system, as a suckling of Oratorical Science ; and in such a 
 way as to thwart and vitiate its literary significance. Hence 
 also this very striking circumstance, connected with the fact 
 of its depreciation. Considered independently, Style allows 
 of an abstract treatment, in at least as great a degree as Logic. 
 Sensibility apart, the pure intellect may construct a specula- 
 tive science of the subject for itself. How much more then 
 with the light reflected upon it so unequivocally by the 
 revelations of Logic. But, as in passing from one subject to 
 another, the two may be affected favourably by their intense 
 juxtaposition, so sometimes they may be mischievously 
 affected, and clash with each other. Having the first, a man 
 will the more readily have the second ; or else, having the 
 first, he will not have the second. Either his conception of 
 the one, by implying the conception of the possible whole, 
 will suggest and illuminate the other; or else, by palming 
 itself off as the actual whole, will obscure the conception of 
 the other. This is, to a certain extent, the explanation of 
 the unimpartial treatment, so to speak, accorded to the 
 Ehetoric, as compared with the Organon, where, upon a 
 superficial view, brilliance of analysis might seem to have 
 been most required. Since if — and if, then precisely because, 
 his sensibility was not exceptional, Aristotle M-as bound to 
 supplement it by that which he had in abundance. The case, 
 however, was otherwise ; theorizing, in the absence of sen- 
 sibility, being simply impossible. But in part also the want 
 of susceptibility in this direction, which determined him to- 
 
INTRODUCTION. * ii)R SIT Y 
 
 ■^-f"' '^' ^ ■.'■■ 
 
 wards Logic, as a science promising a more ui>tqtie and 
 opulent result, would determine him at tlie. same time away 
 from Style, as a field that did not present phenomena con- 
 genial for exposition, and that did not, therefore, for his 
 subtlety furnish an adequate stage of illustration. 
 
 A proof of this appears in connection with the effects 
 which more particularly he did note. It was open to him to 
 have overlooked the whole body of literary appearances. 
 What he did overlook was that section which is least pro- 
 minent and most characteristic. Limiting his view thus, he 
 concentrates attention upon those facts which it belongs to 
 the average sensibility to descry for itself, and which require 
 a very moderate effort to systematize. In this latter respect 
 it is that the Ehetoric of Aristotle compares so meagrely with 
 his Organon, and precisely because lacking, in its separate 
 sphere, a corresponding depth of perception. The section of 
 effects which the Ehetoric represents is concerned with that 
 identical sphere of perception which is the most common, 
 and, similarly, the Ehetoric itself is concerned with that 
 systematizing of effects, whose activity unfolds itself most 
 easily. Another sphere, which has been already indicated, is 
 that of the abstract science, in which the principles of Logic 
 and Style unfold concurrently. But the whole cycle of Stylic 
 science is not complete, until a third section of still more 
 complex effects is reduced to system. This order of effects is 
 more subtle and intricate than any with which the analyst 
 occupies himself in Logic. The dissertationist on Style in its 
 more abstract relations does not necessarily possess a com- 
 mand over this ultimate section; though he cannot investigate 
 it thoroughly without that command. But, having the quali- 
 fying sensibility, he wall inevitably, in his analysis of it, recur 
 
10 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 to the abstract science as his ultimate ground of reference. 
 It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that, for want of this 
 qualification, Aristotle should not have busied himself 
 seriously with either the one section or the other — the acci- 
 dent of the Organon apart, as a possible cause predisposing to, 
 or away from, an equally rigorous and determinative treat- 
 ment of Style. Within a certain compass his own style is 
 unexceptionably good. But of any extrinsic brilliance in his 
 writing, or even of the art of manoeuvring to advantage within 
 the limits prescribed by philosophic exigencies, there is no 
 trace. And, which is more important, to compensate for this 
 want, there is no sign of any aesthetic perception of effects 
 beyond those reproduced in his own practice. His critical 
 susceptibility was not pitched (as it might quite well have 
 been) upon a higher key than that to which he himself daily 
 conformed. So that, as far as any acquaintance with the 
 liisher effects was concerned, it must have been drawn from 
 the practice of his own countrymen. The Greeks, as a rule, 
 compare favourably with other nations in this respect. As 
 general practitioners in the art, they are always to be com- 
 mended for imitation; and they excel in certain of the more 
 essential qualities that go towards realizing a noble standard 
 of composition. But that conspicuous excellence is wanting 
 that might have suggested to a contemporary a very high, 
 and, in connection with striking deformities of expression 
 (which in this case were also wanting), a very practical and 
 thoroughgoing, literary ideal. 
 
 So far, indeed, as Greece is concerned, critical science in 
 Aristotle is not so far behind models of real excellence, as it 
 is in the rear of such transcendent models as have appeared 
 in England. Tlie effect of such models, in stimulating 
 
INTRODUCTION. 1 1 
 
 criticism and enlarging its area, will be determined by the 
 way in which these models unite to form a catholic ideal. 
 Even this chance, however, of accomplishing such an end 
 will be defeated, should the critic happen to be out of har- 
 mony with the scope of his materials, and busy himself with 
 the exposition of certain orders of excellence to the exclusion 
 of the rest. The greater, therefore, is the necessity for a 
 catholic sympathy that shall confirm, and not subvert, the 
 data, which, in having brought near to them the requisite 
 qualifications for their practical study are, pro tanto, brought 
 nearer to an appreciable result — a sympathy that shall not 
 falsify its claims in the moment of substantiating them. One 
 only case there is, in which this sympathy with pre-existing 
 effects may be dispensed with, that, viz., in which it is super- 
 seded by the accident of a critic who exhibits the principle 
 of these effects in himself De Quincey, with unparalleled 
 compass of sensibility, and with great analytic acuteness, 
 might naturally have been expected to furnish a result in 
 which the two might effectively be combined. To the 
 materials that Aristotle lacked, he added the power that 
 was to ratify them ; and, to such an extent, as not merely to 
 supersede tlie illustrations of older writers, if by chance they 
 had been orbicular enough in their sweep for an analysis to 
 found upon, but to anticipate the latest phases of creative 
 sensibility, if by chance these should not have been already 
 developed. 
 
 The appearance of De Quincey, in fact, constitutes the 
 second momentum in the history of Style. That this momen- 
 tum is again a crisis, not an epoch, is due to the fact that the 
 possible advantages from a susceptibility so complex were 
 neutralized, for purposes of an exposition that should, in any 
 
1 2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 sense, be final, by his defect of energy for pure speculation. i 
 So much, at least, of negative constructiveness the world was 
 justified in expecting, as would have shattered the confusions 
 besieging the subject. These to have exposed would seem to 
 have been suited to his peculiar ability and his peculiar mettle. 
 And that with a result the more favourable, as one might 
 have presumed, for the diffusion of critical knowledge, from 
 his rare power of philosophical exposition. No difficulty that 
 he was not qualified to divest of any preternatural appear- 
 ance of complexity or abstruseness : no problem whose 
 spurious simplicity he was not able to detect, and in its mis- 
 chievousness to counteract, by exposing it in that light which 
 was best calculated to reveal the lurking perplexity. But 
 never was there a mind more fitted to mediate between phi- 
 losophy and the popular good-will, that was more irretrievably 
 cut off from such communication, by a want of sympathy 
 with philosophy itself, precisely in those latitudes where a 
 facile exposition was most needed for the populace, because in 
 the general case most difficult to obtain from expositors, and 
 most demanded, because in his individual case most easy to 
 give. 
 
 To this want so clamorous, to this crisis so bewitching, De 
 Quincey brought nothing but a gleam or two of critical 
 insight, and with a result that is naturally more tantalizing 
 than the shortcoming of Aristotle. Against any such short- 
 coming, as detrimental to his general reputation, Aristotle 
 had virtually pleaded in the blazing originality of the Organon. 
 
 1 This refers not to anything De Quincey failed to do, but evidently to some 
 positive misunderstanding of certain philosophic problems. The reader of De 
 Quincey surmises that the special victim of this obliquity — but with no desire 
 on the part of the critic save to state the matter truthfully, and disarmed as 
 to the special misinterpretation by its very naiveti — was Kant. 
 
INTKODUCTION. 13 
 
 And, which made the matter still more interesting, his power 
 in the Organon shone not merely by itself, but by an invo- 
 lution of itself, which upon the arena of Style might have 
 been illustrated, in a way more comprehensive and theatrical, 
 by De Quincey. AVhat Aristotle effected had this peculiar 
 property, that it was effected by a movement of circularity. 
 It was the judgment itself occupied upon the judgment ; and 
 such a judgment, occupied on such materials, as to produce a 
 result in which all men should virtually agree. Deny the 
 perfection of the judgment, and, a priori, you impugn the 
 truth of the system. Deny the truth of the system, and, a 
 posteriori, you infer the weakness of the judgment. Accepting 
 absolutely the thesis of Aristotle, you admit it as a criterion 
 of the process by which you pronounce upon the logic of the 
 thesis itself. Eefusing to accept the thesis as true, you 
 imply, and are bound to produce, another explanation of that 
 very process by which you have discovered that the process 
 is other than that laid down by the theorist. By a parallel 
 chance in Style, a writer like De Quincey is practically the 
 exponent of the very principles which in theory he enunciates 
 and commends. Now, in such a case, it is the Sensibility 
 which forms the machinery of the involution. Lustre will 
 unquestionably be given to logical science by beauty of Style. 
 But this element is adventitious. It is not implicit in the 
 conception of Logic, as perceptive sympathy is implicit in the 
 conception of sensibility on such a scale as De Quincey 's. 
 But Style, besides this element of sensibility, as inseparably 
 a condition for scientific exposition, demands also the more 
 palpable element of speculative insight. Where a science of 
 Logic demands one element, therefore, an adequate science of 
 Style demands two. And while Logic is thus its own expo- 
 
14 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 nent, Style may be mora illustriously so, because having an 
 involution of scientific insight the same in degree as that 
 of Logic, to which Logic, on its part, has nothing to answer 
 in the way of sensibility. This sensibility was neutralized 
 in De Quincey for its scientific application (despite his fas- 
 tidious thinking), by the want of that element, which, in the 
 converse case of Aristotle, was neutralized by the want of 
 the antithetic sensibility. 
 
 The antithesis, which is thus illustrated, is equally true in 
 relation to its two elements, whether existing in insulation 
 from each other, or aiding one another in a scientific rationale 
 of the whole field under review. Wliat is easy to perceive is 
 p^o tanto easy to systematize. And what tends, by its very 
 nature, to incarnate itself under universal distinctions is fro 
 tanto easy to perceive. And here, as suggesting itself from 
 the special contrast already indicated in the historical rela- 
 tions of both sciences, a general contrast may be drawn 
 between Style and Logic. Logic, in the Organon of Aristotle, 
 was then first recognised as a fact, when it was first recog- 
 nised as a science. Its phenomena were first matter of general 
 observation, when their connecting principles were first 
 formally arranged in their relation to its dominant principle. 
 Style, on the other hand, has been long recognised as a fact — 
 certain even of its distinctions are current and popular — but 
 not earnestly and conscientiously as a science. And so long 
 as its main distinctions remain ]ieither explicated, nor shown 
 in their propulsion, nor in their analogical relations, nor in 
 their speculative significance, there is nothing to contribute to 
 the science, much less the history, of the subject, which is 
 also the history of the science. 
 
 The final lesson, therefore, of the antithesis between the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 15 
 
 two elements is that of their being mutually necessary to each 
 other, and, as it were, in a certain order ; and precisely, for the 
 science, in (his order, that it must presuppose and follow the 
 sensibility. Nothing, indeed, can be more self-evident than 
 that a man should be unable to give the rationale of certain 
 facts, when he does not perceive them, or does not perceive 
 them to the extent that they ought to be perceived. How, 
 for instance, should he expect to be listened to as a critic, 
 who pronounces a certain image to be sublime, or the cadence 
 of a certain passage to be harmonious, ha\'ing no sesthetic 
 perception whatsoever ? For in Style generally there may be 
 discriminated three classes of effects : (1) those which the 
 investigator sees in common with all, (2) those which he sees 
 in common with a few, and (o) those which possibly he sees 
 to the exclusion of everybody else. In view of this, and 
 relying upon the common ground of agreement which he has 
 with all, it is his business gradually to extend the frontier of 
 perception as far as he can — initiate the first class of readers 
 into the secrets of the second, and the second into those of the 
 third, along with such of the first class as have surmounted 
 the difficulties of the second sphere. LTuless, indeed, he has 
 either something special to communicate, or some more con- 
 cise or more fascinating method of communicating to the 
 many what as yet is only enjoyed by the few, or of impress- 
 ing upon all, from his station of authority, what is only held 
 vaguely, there is no justification for the obtrusion of his views. 
 But only as founding ultimately on a catholic sensibility, is 
 he warranted in putting the matter in such a way as to secure 
 interest for it, and attention for himself. Nor is this a 
 method which belongs to these facts as an insulated class of 
 facts. It is the method of the Fine Arts generally. In 
 
16 INTllODUCTION. 
 
 Painting, for instance, besides the abstract science, which 
 treats of the "general divisions of form and colour, &c., there 
 is the concrete science, which tells, according to the criterion 
 of the sensibility, why certain individual effects are beautiful, 
 or tlie opposite. Among such effects, it is the province of the 
 most ordinary sensibility to recognise the agreeable impres- 
 sion produced by clusters of scarlet berries upon a background 
 of green. But a subtler question arisfes, why it is that such 
 berries are more effective as seen on a tree with feathery 
 branches, than they would be on a yew tree, for example. 
 The reason generally is this : — The combination cannot fail to 
 benefit in effect by the greater disclosure of the wood of the 
 branches, as in the former case, and of the berries themselves; 
 leaves, berries, and branches forming, first, a perceptible 
 variety in material, next, one of colour, and, finally, a 
 graduated series in regard to stability (as under the possible 
 movements of the wind), which would not be available to the 
 same extent in the case of the obscuring branches of the yew. 
 But, specially, the difference is due (1) to the contrast of the 
 perky or pensile character of the leaves, in the former case, 
 Avith the solid and pendulous character of the berries — con- 
 trast, the sense of which w^ould be stifled in regard to the 
 clotted or matted branches of the yew. And (2) in the case 
 of the tree which allows for so much variegation in the super- 
 ficial outline, and, as it were, so much general transparency, 
 there is a chance of both leaves and berries being relieved 
 against a common background. 
 
 3. In thus discovering itself to be a Fine Art, Style is not 
 to be distinguished from Logic, as if it were something 
 superior, merely because it has something superadded. Any 
 superiority which it can show must rest iipon its value, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 17 
 
 considered teleologically, Here, nevertheless, a practical 
 superiority is claimed for Style. Not that its aim is abso- 
 lutely higher than the aim of any art which proposes to 
 redress the inequalities, and correct the infirmities, of the 
 human judgment. JSTo intellectual aim can possibly be so 
 high. Besides, the improvement of the catholic judgment, in 
 so far as it is corrigible by rules, involves an education 
 generally for other purposes, by which Art itself must ulti- 
 mately profit. But the lower art as to aim may yet happen 
 to approximate more closely to its aim than the higher. The 
 defence, therefore, which might apply to Logic, as a science 
 that must be examined formally, before it can yield its full 
 quota of practical results (notwithstanding that these results 
 are concerned with rules whose application must already be 
 presupposed), is irrelevant to Style. For while in Logic the 
 alternatives are few, under which effects are good or bad, the 
 particularization of which Style is capable admits of an 
 indefinite number of examples of good or of vicious expression 
 being given, having all the vividness of a circumstantial 
 treatment and all the force of a general principle. It thus 
 provides for a graduated improvement, to which Logic (as 
 universally understood) makes no pretension. The reason of 
 this is plain. In so far as Style is complex, it allows of a 
 specific treatment in a degree unattainable by Logic ; — for the 
 same reason a history of Universal Literature is evidently a 
 much subtler problem than a history of Philosophy. But by 
 Logic in what guise is this unattainable? It is as being 
 formally too simple. A certain fallacy may be seen, and not 
 only seen, but seen to come under a special principle and 
 category of fallacy; and yet the man who sees it may be 
 unable to bring it home to the man who uses it, and who per- 
 
18 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 sists that his argument does not come within that category. 
 Did Logic seek to go beyond this, its boundaries would be 
 inordinately enlarged, and it would have to descend to impos- 
 sible details. The objection to it in such a case would be, not 
 that it is too simple, but that it is too complex. And if the 
 logician will descend into the region of material truth, he 
 must not be disgusted to find that his researches are circum- 
 scribed and arbitrary. It is significant, therefore, in this 
 connection, when such a man chooses liis illustrations from 
 science: when he analyses foregone conclusions, and builds 
 up formal results from acknowledged data. In this way he 
 attains certainty : but it is at the expense of catholicity, and 
 Logic becomes a science of particular, not of universal appli- 
 cation. For the sphere, within which the universal science is 
 practical, is limited, Nor can it become more practical 
 without becoming special, and ceasing to be a pure science. 
 Whereas the advantage for science otherwise, and for the arts 
 generally, is precisely that they are special — that they are 
 complex, where complexity, in relation to circumstantial con- 
 clusions, is of use, and not complex, where complexity would 
 disconcert or confound. And the advantage for Style is 
 simply that the manifold detaUs which aid its practical 
 exposition may be gathered into unity in a system whose 
 formal limits coincide with its material. 
 
 To the application of a science which, on such a general 
 view, promises a wider adaptation than even Logic, there can 
 be no direct objection, save under that class of objections 
 which founds on its special pretensions as an art. The sphere' 
 which is most sanguinely claimed for it is, of course, the very 
 sphere from which it will be warned off most boisterously. 
 
INTRODUCTION". 19 
 
 But the fact remains, that it will always be treated implicitly 
 as a science. And not the circumstance of its being practical 
 will supersede all scientific analysis, but analysis will be 
 summoned to direct the bent of the practical issues; especially 
 if a loose and flippant criticism is likely to prevail, and train 
 it into a low and sterile order of performance. Under ordi- 
 nary conditions, a subject is cultured theoretically because it 
 is obscure: not comporting with the ease and extent of its 
 practice, or not tallying with the results which might be 
 expected from what already is presumed of its elastic powers, 
 or from the forging ahead of kindred subjects. And if it 
 remains obscure, it does so in spite of the counterworking 
 culture. But where the analysis applied to it is superficial, 
 not merely is the first of these cases reversed, but both are 
 reversed. And the subject is not only cultured in spite of 
 remaining obscure, but is obscured by the culture itself The 
 attitude of such a culture might perhaps be expected to be 
 hostile to a more decisive analysis, the tendency of which is 
 inevitably to supersede the other where it is narrow, and to 
 amend it where it is false. And all the more, that in such a 
 case it tends to dissipate the feeling of satisfaction with 
 partial principles accepted as universal, and subordinate prin- 
 ciples assumed as ultimate and fundamental. But the nature 
 and beauty of the theme are sufficiently a corrective of any 
 such illiberal reception. It is always an advantage, when it 
 is possible to shift the reproach which may attach to the 
 manner in which a subject is treated upon the subject itself 
 as necessitating that treatment. Especially is it an advantage, 
 when the attractiveness of the subject will neutralise the 
 odium which might otherwise settle upon the particular mode 
 of the examination. Most of all, however, when the general 
 
20 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 opinion is deeply prepossessed in favour of the question, as 
 being of an interest so directly practical as that which is 
 inseparable from Style even under the most abstruse mode of 
 investigation. 
 
 It is well for literary criticism, nevertheless, that it should 
 be fortified in this way against vulgar misconceptions, whether 
 of a popular cast or of a quasi-philosophic. Its adaptability 
 for scientific purposes is indeed, to a certain extent, a reason 
 why it should not be cultivated, in spite of the concurrent 
 interest attaching to it ; and why a collision arises between 
 the speculative bias and the practical. For here is a matter 
 coming under the eye of the ordinary reader every day, and in 
 so far qualifying him for a speculative interest in it in spite of 
 himself. Yet, on the other hand, his very familiarity with it 
 may, in spite of itself, and to the same extent, be a disqualifi- 
 cation. The general question, however, with regard to the 
 treatment of such a subject in such a fashion, becomes really a 
 question of the right to treat it scientifically. Now apart from 
 the fact that a disgrace attaches to a science undeveloped, 
 similar to that which attaches to an individual or a nation 
 that is undeveloped, it is to be observed, that it is not 
 the absolute minimum of capacity which is addressed, 
 but only those are addressed, for whom possibly the theme 
 has attraction and intelligibility. A scientific treatment, 
 besides, is its own justification. It is nothing more than 
 an accurate examination of a mass of facts, directly or 
 indirectly in subordination to the highest known principles. 
 It can only be shown to fail, therefore, by a reference 
 to its own criterion, and by being detected to be 7wt scientific, 
 i.e. not accurate, however pretentious in phrase; — and in so 
 far as it is inaccurate and pretentious, it is also culpable, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 21 
 
 because discrediting sound terms and principles. As to the 
 reader, he need not feel insulted by the assumption of his 
 ignorance on the part of the critic. That ignorance on this 
 particular subject is accidental. And the critic reciprocally 
 pledges himself to give his most polite attention, at that date 
 when the reader shall find it convenient to enlighten him on 
 any subject he may chance to be ignorant of. Being a poor 
 man, he will naturally wish to learn how to make money. 
 Being an honest man, he will wish to have an insight into the 
 way of making it fraudulently; the more especially that, being 
 also inoffensive, he is disposed to find out how he can render 
 himself obnoxious to society and to the law. And since he is 
 farther a person of refinement, he will be seized with a desire 
 to know upon what minimum scale of luxury a prison discip- 
 line allows a man to live. There is, in fact, no limit to the 
 amount of theoretical information which may be supplied in 
 this way; unless, of course, the reader demurs to such insinua- 
 tions, as impertinently seeking to exalt his erudition at the 
 expense of his honesty. Be it so: let the reader be as ignorant 
 of these subjects as he is of the laws of literary criticism; and 
 let it be equally an insult to his honesty to suppose him 
 acquainted with these laws when he is not. But because the 
 critic does not insult the reader in assuming his ignorance, he 
 is not bound to insult him by assuming his incapacity. He 
 dare not do so, indeed, when presenting to him for his profit, 
 in a systematic form, what in any other would be meaningless. 
 No pillar of fine proportions exists but what may be broken 
 and pulverised; with a difficulty, moreover, in pulverising, 
 corresponding to the difficulty of chiselling into shape. But 
 the lessons which might be taught regarding the relations of 
 angle and mass, etc. are not to be learned after the process of 
 
22 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 disintegration — else the sea-beacli is the befitting spot for 
 instruction. 
 
 The superficial treatment which is popularly decreed to 
 Style, is sometimes decreed to it also by pure science. Thus 
 it is that, under certain aspects, philosophic thought generally 
 is repudiated by science, as attaining by mere brain-carpentry 
 to a visionary stateliness of proportion, while it is buffeted by 
 the populace for a proficiency that is gained only at the 
 expense of its being communicable. All mental activity, 
 indeed, is justly at a discount with exact thinkers, where it 
 does not yield accurate results. It is only by irreflective per- 
 sons that such rare inaccuracy is tolerated as that of an 
 analyst, who, having enumerated all the facts (perhaps four or 
 five) which come under a certain classification, adds, " these 
 and a score of others," when his enumeration is simply com- 
 plete. If undetermined in cases where the channel is so clearly 
 marked out for him, is he likely to be less so, when his survey 
 is partial or confused from the very outset ? Philosophy itself 
 is the first to sneer at such bungling. At the same time the 
 case may appear to it only normal in the circumstances, and 
 inevitable under a critical regime. And that it does not sneer 
 in this particular instance, may be owing to the fact that it 
 has already recorded its formal disapprobation of the entire 
 critical method. While from analogy, therefore, philosophy 
 might be expected to support criticism, we must not be dis- 
 comfited if it should withdraw its support, just at that point 
 where the interests of the two cease to be common, and repu- 
 diate connection with it in its peculiar extensions, if not 
 in toto, as cherishing principles incompatible with its own. 
 The more the two orders of effects are studied, however, the 
 more will it be seen that they resemble each other ; and the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 23 
 
 more will the thinking appear rustic and provincial, which 
 sets down the facts of literary science as trivial, and its prin- 
 ciple as nugatory. And since the relations under which such 
 a charge may be substantiated are these two — (1) of the pos- 
 sibility of certain effects being analysed, and (2) of the possi- 
 bility of their being communicated, it is in these relations that 
 the validity of a scientific criticism is most happily vindi- 
 cated. 
 
 1. The case suggests itself as to the decomposition of rhe- 
 torical effects being possible. Sensibility being granted, the 
 question arises as to whether it is transformable into logical 
 propositions. A question so simple might be met by a refer- 
 ence to Art, as a branch of culture whose practical rules found 
 on effects which are first experienced in the sensitivity and 
 then brought into system — were it not that the reference 
 might be considered insufficient. For it might be argued that 
 the results in that section, in so far as they are parallel, are 
 due to quackery or self-delusion, or at least are equally unin- 
 telligible as to principle. Now the distinctive medium is the 
 same for both — a self-consciousness that yields faithfully, on 
 the one hand, %o the impressions of sensibility, and readily, 
 on the other, to the pressure of the analytic intellect, when it 
 insists upon these impressions being reproduced. The part of 
 the intellect, therefore, is to suggest the alternative possi- 
 bilities that might separately, or in combination, have effected 
 certain results. On equating and confronting these with the 
 reproduced sensibility, it will be declared which it is that has 
 been the sole or chief agent. Sometimes this takes place by 
 a positive and immediate decision. Sometimes, under a less 
 lively self-consciousness, it is brought about by the rejection 
 one after another of all the alternatives except those which 
 
24 INTKODUCTION. 
 
 are to be received as having instigated the result. The alter- 
 native (if it is a single one) may happen to be indifferent, and 
 may refuse to give any positive token of its having operated. 
 Yet if the others shew positive signs of dissent, there is suffi- 
 cient reason, in the circumstances, for accepting it as the 
 influential agent. 
 
 Such is the rationale of these effects, which (other things 
 equal) will shew themselves in exact proportion to the subtlety 
 of the investigator. And where no such results are found, we 
 simply infer, not the inviolability of the effects, but the inep- 
 titude of the analysis. That the presumed sensibility in any 
 individual case is great, in proportion to the meagreness of its 
 antecedents (as published through the scientific examination), 
 argues not that the sensibility is more, but that the critical 
 faculty is less. The very vagueness of exaltation with which 
 the critic colours his exposition, so far from testifying to the 
 exceptional degree of his susceptibility, may be simply the 
 exponent of his obscurity regarding it. What is possibly an 
 over-estimate of the delicacy of his individual impressions, can 
 never become the measure of the real subtlety of the impres- 
 sions. For an excess of sensibility in regard to certain effects, 
 being purely subjective, is irrelevant to any purpose of philo- 
 sophic analysis. It is with an objective sensibility, allowing 
 for the collation of one man's impressions with those of 
 another, that the science is concerned. Of two analysts, there- 
 fore, his conclusions will have most weight, who has inter- 
 preted his impressions most thoroughly. A critic may be very 
 modest, as well as very honest, in declaring that the facts with 
 which he occupies himself are too subtle for explanation. But 
 he is certainly a nincompoop, if he does not see that that 
 invalidates not in the least the chances of their being ex- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 25 
 
 plained, except in so far as it is a fatal disqualification of 
 himself, in point of that which is his sole recommendation in 
 the matter. His assurances do not kill anybody but himself; 
 they do not frighten, much less wound people of ordinary 
 respectability. The sole exponent of sensibiKty is analytic 
 power. That analysis meets the sensibility, therefore, is no 
 lowering of it, but is an expansion of the parallel energy of 
 the analytic intellect. Eefuse the mind power to analyse, and 
 you degrade it without exalting the sensibility. Admit tliis 
 power, and you exalt it without degrading the sensibility. But 
 the secret is that the indefiniteness of the sensibility (if it is 
 indefinite) can only be shewn by at least assuming that it may 
 be overtaken by analysis. It is either to be analysed, or not. 
 If it is, this is aU that is demanded. If not, then instead of 
 the sensibility remaining simply at a point beyond the limits 
 at which it may be pounced upon by science, it will be seen 
 to mount indefinitely higher; since the more the analysis 
 expands, the subtler will be the sensibility if after aU it evades 
 it, and the greater the indefiniteness of that of which confess- 
 edly the analysis has not been able to bring back any 
 account. 
 
 The first alternative is the one to be concurred in for less 
 speculative reasons. Not merely on a sentimental view, such 
 as that of slighting the subtlety of the human mind in one 
 sphere for the sake of magnifying it in another — which is fal- 
 lacious as regards the first and futile as regards the second ; 
 nor because it is superficial to suppose that a study of the 
 mind, in any even of its most barren sections, can be dismissed 
 superficially; nor because the division of effects into those 
 which may be treated analytically, and those which may not, 
 is arbitrary, making a distinction of kind, where ^here is only 
 
 (( UNIVEE: 
 
26 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 warrant for one of degree ; but because tlic theory as to fact 
 is so erroneous ; and to adopt the other correspondingly a 
 necessity, from the impulse not so much to embrace what is 
 psychologically true, as to reject what is psychologically 
 absurd. The sensibility, we will assume, has yielded to cer- 
 tain effects, and in yielding has conformed to them. But it 
 could not thus have conformed to them, except by conforming 
 to their principles, under an intellectual guidance more or less 
 subconscious ; which princij)les of guidance are exactly those 
 which it is the cue and the duty of the analysis to define. 
 Nor again, if the principles which underlie the sensibility are 
 not evasive, are they at least so anomalous as to interfere with 
 scientific completeness. They only appear anomalous to a 
 critic who either overlooks significant data, or else, having 
 already confused the data by a false classification, naturally 
 ascribes to them, by way of heterogeneousness, what is due to 
 the inconsistency of the method. Ultimate difiiculty of this 
 order in science there need be none : so much barricade, so 
 much material for scaffolding. Finally, therefore, the investi- 
 gator need not be confounded by any multiplicity of details, 
 in rising to the principles that will enable him to set and 
 view them in their proper relations. The same complexity is 
 common to all other sciences. It does not operate in the way of 
 bafUing artistic insight ; but is the indispensable condition of 
 artistic culture, and of a culture that is extended in proportion 
 as the details are numerous. 
 
 2. The distinctions which the theorist on Style has to deal 
 with present themselves first in the way of art, of art passive 
 and intuitive or perceptional; they are next received by science, 
 and their principles explicated ; and finally they issue again 
 in the form of art, but this time of art active and militant, 
 
INTRODUCTION, 27 
 
 ministerial and didactic. In this process science has a 
 double function, reposing on an organic connection, first, 
 between the actual sensibility of the i ivestigator and his 
 analytic capacity, and secondly, between the analytic recep- 
 tivity of those he addresses and their potential susceptibility. 
 It is with Style in this latter relation that the second problem 
 is concerned, viz., as to the possibility of culture. 
 
 The instructor has to see and point out not merely abstract 
 varieties of expression, but these varieties under a limited 
 number of relations as ultimately good or bad. Hence the 
 farther classification of effects into those (1) which he along 
 with his readers sees as bad or good, (2) those which he sees, 
 but which they do not see, and (3) those which they see, but 
 which he does not see, i.e. those which he sees them to see 
 through a medium of fallacy or distortion. From the collision 
 which may ensue between his sensibility and theirs, the 
 dilemma arises : — on the one hand, it is needless to put in a 
 scientific form what is abeady recognised as practical truth, 
 and, on the other, what is not recognised, since that confes- 
 sedly is transcendental or contradictory. For either the result 
 which he seeks to establish is within the reach of the pupil, 
 in which case it is useless to harp upon it ; or else it is out 
 of his reach, and there is no common ground to go upon. 
 Now, on a coarse estimate, it is quite possible to speak 
 of certain effects as being perceptible to the learners in 
 common with their instructor. But identically the same 
 effects will not be perceptible to each, or to all in the 
 same degree. A will represent an order of effects appreci- 
 able only in part to some who appreciate B, a different order 
 of effects, or a higher order like C ; and so by permutation all 
 through — points seen by some in common with the expositor 
 
28 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 being missed by those who are more at home in other sections. 
 Some effects, therefore, there will always be repugnant to some 
 among the learners, prior to the philosophic explanation. But 
 besides this distinction, and apart altogether from the manifest 
 value of holding in a precise form (with increased security for 
 its practical application and for acquiring facts that move to the 
 music of similar principles) what otherwise must be held in- 
 definitely, it is to be observed, that the novice demands for his 
 satisfaction a systematic rationale that indirectly shall confirm 
 or correct the impressions which previously he may have 
 formed. A rationale of such a kind has this value for the 
 tyro, not merely that he may know what is right or wrong in 
 the cases that are specified, but that he may decide to what 
 extent his standard has been just. And for this purpose he 
 requires in a formal treatise — which is supposed to transcend 
 at least the hints of conversation and of desultory criticism — 
 something more than the mere expression of a casual coinci- 
 dence between himself and the critic. The needs of the case 
 are not met by a simple statement, that such and such a 
 passage is beautiful, etc. The vagueness of the assertion may 
 really be in league with the reader's falser taste to deceive 
 him, even in cases where, if specific reasons had been alleged, 
 they might have been repudiated, and the plea resting upon 
 them dispelled. A more definite statement would be made in 
 describing the passage as luminous, etc. But the objection to 
 the use of metaphorical equivalents is not thereby removed. 
 Practically, indeed, such a term may be definite enough for 
 the reader. But this can only be through the distinct logical 
 meaning which he has already attached to it. 
 
 A certain number of technical equivalents is thus presup- 
 posed as known to the student, even in cases where his views 
 
INTRODUCTION. 29 
 
 harmonise with those of the preceptor. Where the latter, 
 however, is concerned to put the matter so as to provide for a 
 rapprochement, in the event of being misunderstood, he will 
 do his best fully to explicate his meaning. In cases, there- 
 fore, where his sensibility is contradictory or transcendental, 
 it clamours most of all for a scientific exposition. A meta- 
 phorical expression may be not only vague, but sometimes 
 unintelligible or paradoxical. To say, for example, that the 
 following definition is brilliant in a literary sense, is only 
 puzzling to the mind whose preconceptions of brilliance are 
 those of vivid metaphor, or racy personality, etc. " I use the 
 term negative condition as equivalent to the term conditio sine 
 qua non and both in the scholastic sense. The negative con- 
 dition of X is that which being absent x cannot exist ; but 
 which being present x will not therefore exist, unless a posi- 
 tive ground of x be co-present. Briefly — if not, not : if yes, 
 not therefore yes." When it is explained, however, that the 
 brilliance, on which stress is laid in this instance, is that of 
 condensation (by means of the most exquisite simplicity), the 
 synthesis of the two ideas becomes apparent. And a new 
 flexion is given to the idea of brilliance generally, under 
 which rapidity of execution is subsumed as an element of 
 rhetorical prowess, and therefore to be admired, and of effect, 
 and to be imitated. The figurative expressions, regarding 
 which a sufficient definiteness of opinion prevails, are too 
 general for the specification which criticism needs, as well as 
 by far too limited in their number. The public, for the most 
 part, conceits itself upon the recognition of the principle that 
 reasons must be assigned for maintaining any proposition. It 
 does not take much pains, at all events, to remember that 
 it is specific, not general reasons, which constitute a valid 
 
30 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ground of autJwrity ; and especially that this is the only 
 ground of authority. It is too obstinately or too languidly 
 content with phrases, which seem comprehensive, but simply 
 are vague, neither ultimate, on the one hand, nor specific, on 
 the other. Most of all, in reference to literary art, it needs 
 peremptorily to be reminded that every statement which is not 
 countersigned by distinct reasons is to be received only as a 
 personal assurance. Individual opinion is virtually private 
 opinion, though it were published in folio, and had run through 
 fifty editions. There are occasions, doubtless, on wliich an 
 unsupported assertion is quite allowable. But these stand in 
 a class by themselves. And the reader need not hesitate to 
 reject an assurance in cases where the point at issue is strictly 
 critical — i.e. admitting a halance of reasons," and calling for a 
 determination to one side or the other — especially in the 
 absence of any indirect support given to it by a general 
 scientific cast of treatment. In the casual absence of such 
 reasons he will respect the critic for his general judiciousness 
 (as shown in the accuracy of his explanations, and the tact 
 with which he selects and varies his examples, etc.), and 
 give him the reflex benefit and prestige of any success which 
 lie has fairly won. For the critic, however, to take advantage 
 of his acknowledged status, for bullying the reader into com- 
 pliance regarding one solitary fact of which he cannot furnish 
 the rationale, is the vulgar trick of the electioneering landlord, 
 in a political contest, who uses his influence to bias the votes 
 of his tenants. 
 
 The sensibility of the communicator is, then, we will 
 assume, virtually transcendental : since that is a condition for 
 its being of use to others. The remaining condition, which is 
 that it shall be intelligibly communicated, is fulfilled in its 
 
INTRODUCTION. 31 
 
 scientific exposition, in so far as that is a guarantee of its 
 tincquh'ocal expression. Anything more, indeed, would be 
 finical or officious ; in the spirit of the martinet or the pro- 
 pagandist. We have thus in sensibility, acting concurrently 
 with analysis, guaranteed the abnegation of all benefit to 
 be derived from the monopoly of any faculty of aesthetic per- 
 ception, except in so far as its results are incommunicable. 
 And to that extent there is a warrant for individual sincerity ; 
 since it is clearly not for the interest of any one to exhibit 
 nakedly for imitation effects, which constitute indefeasibly 
 the ground of a certain superiority on his part. Not that 
 such a practice is necessarily disinterested. What the analyst 
 aims at may be simply the advertising of his own peculiar 
 mode of expression. ■ But it is clear that strict analysis, so far 
 from lending itself to promote that abuse, is hostile to it. 
 Since the moment the critic supplies the rationale of certain 
 efi'ects (to whomsoever they may belong), he places the reader 
 in a position to appraise them. It is precisely in the absence 
 of a scientific valuation that impertinent collusion is possible 
 on the part of the writer with his own individuality, — and a 
 rhapsody on the art and its divine principles ; which art and 
 which principles naturally find their illustration in the jack- 
 anapes himself who commends them. 
 
 For his own sake, therefore, the writer is bound to supply 
 a rationale that shall tally with the results of each artistic 
 perception, and to free himself from the reproach of an ex- 
 position too servile in its glorification of a limited or spurious 
 sensibility. Besides, his appreciation of effects, being possibly 
 out of proportion to his executive power, may not have 
 sufficient indirect testimony in the latter to win for it the re- 
 spect which virtually it might deserve. On the other hand. 
 
32 • INTRODUCTION. 
 
 though his executive power may be considerable, it may be 
 partial ; and narrow, in so far as it may be imitable. He is, 
 consequently, bound to show that he has a wider appreciation 
 of what is beautiful in expression than is registered in his 
 own practice. The contradiction might quite well arise, of 
 an analyst with inferior executive power, who yet shows a 
 greater knowledge of effects, not on account of his superior 
 analytic perception (which might easily happen), but on 
 account of his wider sympathy with artistic effects, than 
 another of greater intensive susceptibility. And a methodical 
 analysis is thus demanded, not merely as a means of the 
 proper interpretation of sensibility to the reader, or of recon- 
 ciliation between two hostile modes of artistic perception, 
 but through a blunt necessity, as the only test of artistic in- 
 sight, whether existing in connection with executive sen- 
 sibility, or not. 
 
 It scarcely needs to be said that the sort of rationale which 
 is here contemplated, is in every case a passive rationale ; and 
 that critical science repudiates the conjuring up of factitious 
 reasons, as on a level with the practice of the auctioneer who 
 is paid on commission. It may be added that the philosophic 
 method is the one to be adopted by the critic, were it for no 
 other purpose than that of self-defence. The tendency of most 
 readers is, on the one hand, to agree on indifferent matters 
 with a critic who agrees with their opinions on other points ; 
 and, on the other hand, to be ill-disposed on indifferent points 
 to a critic who generally disagrees with them. It is his 
 dignity as a critic which the scientific method secures ; since 
 it enables him to free himself, in the one instance, from the 
 charge of having failed through his own weakness or bad 
 taste, and, in the other, of having succeeded merely through 
 
INTRODUCTION. 33 
 
 favouritism. Finally, it is the tendency of the method to 
 lower the apparent transcendence of the effects which are 
 explained. An effect, unanalysed at two removes, is as trans- 
 cendent to explication, and, prior to explication, is confounded 
 under the same category of transcendence, as one at twenty 
 removes. The critic is not in all cases, therefore, anything so 
 very portentous in the matter of sensibility. Nor is he in- 
 terested in concealing that many of his supposed new effects 
 are only original, because for the first time formally stated, or 
 explicated in new relations to each other, or from having 
 been casually overlooked in a field that potentially is open 
 to all, or having been perceived under circumstances of 
 accidental facility yielded by proficiency in kindred sciences. 
 As to the actual results arising in any particidar instance 
 from the attempted transmission of the sensibility, it is clear 
 that no absolute maxinnim can be guaranteed, even under a 
 scientific process. A man whose natural sensibiKty is unequal 
 in keenness to his intellect will by his unassisted efforts be 
 unable to rise in the appreciation of artistic beauties. Yet so 
 great potentially is the energy of the human susceptibility, 
 acting in connection with the pure intellect, that when the 
 rationale of the effects is explained to him (which rationale 
 he could not have devised, simply because for him the effects 
 did not exist), the sensibility will mount towards the point at 
 which he has apprehended the other. And if it moves up- 
 wards by a fraction, the expedient is justified of colleaguing 
 with it the analytic intellect ; since without such a con- 
 federate, even under the contemplation of the sublimest 
 models, the sensibility would not have travelled by that 
 fraction towards the point which, in spite of its weakness, it 
 has reached. In the converse case, the sensibility being 
 
34 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 great as the analytic force is small, it is the former which 
 acts by way of stimulus to the latter. The result in this 
 instance is that of a proper discipline. For the untutored 
 sensibility, which is apt to be partial and to run riot in 
 extremes, science points out severer beauties, and beauties 
 simpler and plainer in th(>ir subordinate value. 
 
 It is essentially a corollary from this, and in keeping with 
 tlie whole tenor of the discussion, that the scientific method 
 is the invariable regulator and guide, whether for the 
 development of a sympathy with art where it is rudimentary, 
 or for the moderating of it where it is in excess. The method 
 of the instructor is not always positive, but often negative ; 
 though always for the sake of some positive result. And 
 that this discipline of his does not necessarily travel from a 
 lower degree to a higher will counterbalance the objection 
 which may be raised against the method on the score of 
 elevating commonplace to the rank of genius, and so 
 degrading genius to the level of what is too easily to be 
 reproduced. This objection may now be added as supple- 
 mentary to the other two. 
 
 3. The more transcendental the effect that is to be com- 
 municated, there is the greater necessity that it shall be 
 explicitly communicated : but the more explicitly it is com- 
 municated, the more chance will there be of its becoming 
 mechanical. Now what the method has to do is not to work 
 the lowest sensibility immediately, or even ultimately, up to 
 the highest — any more than it has to do with training the 
 dray-horse into the racer. What it aims at is a proficiency 
 from stage to stage, and from an initial stage in each case 
 to a final stage proportioned to the latent capacity of the 
 individual. The proficiency which it seeks to establish is 
 
INTRODUCTION. 35 
 
 mechanical, in so far as it is easy and complete. But it is 
 just on that account organic ; since the effects are only repro- 
 ducible in so far as they involve discrimination, and the 
 discarding of vicious and less pertinent alternatives. Nor 
 can that happen without the power to apprehend that this or 
 tliat turn of thought under formation is or is not allowable 
 on the score of relevance. What took place in analysing the 
 presupposed sensibility is now taking place conversely in the 
 application by the sensibility of what has been given to it 
 through the presupposed analysis. When, therefore, a writer 
 shows that he discerns what, in certain circumstances, is or is 
 not relevant, he must be admitted to be in possession of the 
 principle — a principle that being continually more under 
 control works more rapidly, and therefore more organically, 
 as manifested in its power to vary the form of expression ; 
 making easy what it holds, and making easy in order to hold. 
 Otherwise, there is nothing of the nature of a nostrum in 
 this scientific treatment, any more than of encouragement 
 to a quavering and paralytic imitation of the more sublime 
 effects. 
 
 In so far as the scientific method is the true method 
 both of attaining and expounding the rationale of literary 
 beauties, any illustration of its j^rinciple is not more a 
 vindication of it than a condemnation of every other. Pro- 
 perly speaking, it is not vindicated, but freed from mis- 
 apprehension. Since its merit is not distinguished from 
 the merit of any other method, in the same way as 
 homoeopathy might be vindicated by one physician as 
 against allopathy by another. It is not opposed to any 
 
36 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 other as a more catholic to a less catholic, a more dignified 
 to a less dignified, a more effective to a less effective. It 
 is blankly the only method; and beside it every other is 
 false. No absolute vindication of it, therefore, is needed, and 
 no formal condemnation of any other. The final objection, 
 however, is not one that applies to it as contradistin- 
 guished from possible rival methods — the other two do 
 apply to it in that sense — nor does its being rebutted 
 imply anything against them. That objection is one that 
 might be brought against any art, and amounts to the 
 charge against the art that it is too practical — wdiich is no 
 objection whatever, but a clumsy compliment. The only 
 objection, in fact, on that score would be the second, viz. 
 that it is not practical; which the method evades by 
 enabling learners to reproduce, and, where that is im- 
 practicable, to appreciate, effects; distributing a greater 
 excellence in expression generally, and an increased ap- 
 preciation of effects that are not imitable. 
 
 What concerns finally the positive results of the theory 
 of Style — its practical relations to other sciences — may be 
 summarily indicated. 
 
 1. For Philosophy generally it may be regarded as a 
 special introduction, like Logic and Grammar, either as 
 preliminary or complementary to these. It is quite legiti- 
 mately a propedeutic, since it contains a special discipline. 
 The other relations which it has to philosophy — its 
 secondary relation, as illustrating in its own details the 
 principle of philosophy, and its final relation, as possibly an 
 integral moment of philosophy, and having in and for 
 philosophic science an inseparable significance, as itself the 
 principle of Critique — do not concern us at this moment. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 37 
 
 Psychology in general might be expected to reflect upon 
 the science of literature a light, and that no intermittent 
 light. But so much more chance is there of finding re- 
 current phenomena — apart from all resorts to cross-illumina- 
 tion from ahnormal phenomena, which of themselves induce 
 confusion — imbedded in literary expression, that there is 
 more likelihood of literary science reflecting light upon 
 psychology. Not otherwise did Logic stand in relation to 
 psychology, as an offshoot from it, in certain respects, and 
 derivatively an exponent of mental operations in spheres that 
 showed themselves by no means so amenable to the laws of 
 pure psychology as the facts of literature. The science of 
 Style stands side by side with that of Logic ; and mediates 
 between the abstract intellect and pure sensibility, which in 
 turn is bounded by the anomalies that scowl and gibber on 
 the outskirts of Medical Psychology. 
 
 2. Within the sphere of psychology Art in general falls 
 itself to be treated. And the science of Style, just in pro- 
 portion as its principles are stated with authority, cannot fail 
 to reflect a light upon the arts, any more than they re- 
 ciprocally upon it. Especially it must add its testimony to 
 that of Painting (an art that is infinitely further advanced), 
 in regard to the analysis of Music, which, in so far as melody 
 and the other concrete phenomena are concerned, is scien- 
 tifically a blank. In this relation it is an isolated science, 
 not organically connected with fundamental principles of 
 psychology. 
 
 But more decisively, as connected with those effects which 
 appeal to the eye, on the one hand, and to the ear, on the 
 other, literary science is central to all artistic criticism. It is 
 not merely one among the branches of art, and (since it 
 
38 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 falls to be taken into account in any complete survey of 
 art), indispensable to scientific completeness. It comes to 
 affect and modify the general conception of art, which, being 
 true only in so far as it takes notice of all the varieties and 
 in their leading ramifications, is headlong in acknowledgment 
 of this its most catholic form. Literary science must, there- 
 fore, radiate an influence upon art that practically will make 
 itself felt, not merely in the suggestion of individual relations 
 to the artist, under the rapprochement of the total science, but 
 in moulding the judgments of artists of one class with regard 
 to those of another. Supreme pity it is, when jealousy, the 
 jealousy of irritation to inferiors, and of animosity to men of 
 equal or of higher powers, is permitted to stifle the genial 
 sympathy which should belong to art. The landscape painter 
 knows himself, on the ground of high conception and of 
 delicate execution, to be above the house-painter. But he 
 feels much more inclined to sympathy with the latter, when 
 his spirit is professionally roused : and that not because, but 
 in spite of the fact that the acknowledgment of the nexus 
 between the two arts is not so much due to catholic senti- 
 ment as to a refined intellectual perception. Even if such 
 jealousy were the rule, however, among artists of the same 
 class, the widening of the boundaries of art, showing the 
 inosculation of the various arts with each other, by extending 
 indefinitely the opportunities for jealousy instead of fostering 
 bad feeling is more likely to do away with it altogether. 
 
 3. There is one sphere, finally, for which, as a preliminary 
 study, the theory of Style is less of a scientific luxury, and 
 more of a necessity, that, viz. of literary criticism ; for which 
 it cannot fail to supply a rich fundus of operative principles. 
 Owin^ to its scientific cohesion, it has an advantage in in- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 39 
 
 ^■rJ' >< 
 
 fluencing the other branches of literary art that is not 
 possessed by unsystematic criticism. And from isolated 
 criticism — the criticism that is applied to separate works or 
 fragments of works— it is still further distinguished by being 
 Removed above the element of personality ; and of personality 
 in both its forms. In the first instance, it is spared the 
 temptation, or the necessity, of criticising individual writers, f 
 And in the second, it evades such circumstances of the critic's 
 own personality as the want of space, the necessity of a treat- yj.-^y^ 
 ment that shall be popular, diffuse, and without regard to any 
 scientific basis, and more specially, a position on a staff of 
 writers, where, the general tenor of thought being prescribed, 
 the critic is not entirely free, or where, if its tenor is pro- 
 miscuous, he finds little reason for preserving consistency. 
 
 Absolutely central to the sciniccs which control literary 
 criticism Style must always be. Psychological distinctions 
 manifest themselves here most appreciably. At no point, 
 therefore, is its culture unattended by a reflex illumination of 
 these sciences, which present such Pacific expansions of 
 novelty for speculation. Itself forms the first in the order 
 of analytical development ; the second being that general 
 science which has for its main divisions Poetry, Philosophy, 
 etc. The third is the science of Ehetoric, the synthesis and 
 application of both; which may be viewed, in the latter 
 respect, as a special science, in the former, and by way Qf 
 comprehending the others, as equivalent to the theoretical 
 generally in literary science. 
 
 The sciences in this triad, while they are complementary 
 to each other, and admit of a natural sequence in their 
 
40 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 treatment, admit of being treated independently of one 
 another. At the same time they all acknowledge the follow- 
 ing method of division, (1) as a body of facts shown in their 
 scientific cohesion, (2) as a body of principles shown in their 
 ultimate significance, and (3) as a body of truth shown in its 
 relations to praxis. Accordingly the immediate science 
 divides itself as, in the first place, the Analytic of Style, in 
 the second, the Logic, and in the third, the Synthetic of Style. 
 With regard to which partition it is to be noted, in the first 
 place, that the nomenclature is ambiguous, in so far as the 
 metliod is concerned, that being in the Logic as much analytic 
 as in the technical Analytic itself. In the second place, the 
 Logic, with which this volume is engaged, usurps the place of 
 the Analytic ; the order is transposed ; the inversion being a 
 matter of scientific propriety and of convenience. Tlie de- 
 ductive portion, however, which the Logic represents, founds 
 exclusively on the inductive, represented by the Analytic (by 
 which indeed it was suggested). Does the Logic, therefore, 
 contain more or less than is warranted by the other, it errs, 
 certainly by inadvertence, possibly by fallacy. The Analytic 
 of Style, along with the Synthetic, or third and final section, 
 is for the time withheld. Not unnaturally the speculative 
 treatment by itself may seem to exhibit a certain lieartless- 
 ness of abstraction. And to exhibit Style abruptly in its 
 unity, its principle, is doubtless to make it somewhat ab- 
 struse for the general reader. Nevertheless it is here, in any 
 event, that the supreme nisus must be made. The Analytic 
 is only secured, whetlier by anticipation or not, through a 
 rationale of the fundamental principles of Style in their 
 ultimate coherence — after which to pursue the theme into its 
 separate sections is mere undress and holiday scramble. 
 
THE LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of Style Genekally. 
 Section I. Of Expression Generally. 
 
 1. 
 
 That is a natural distinction which obtains between Thought 
 as it exists in the mind per se — Thought pure and essential — 
 and Thought as formulated in Expression, The distinction 
 is natural in so far as it is first fundamental, and secondly 
 obvious. And it holds not merely of Thought generally, but 
 of Thought in particular. It is true, therefore, of every result 
 of mental activity in which Thought and Expression coexist; 
 what is contemplated being, not an order of cases in which 
 the antithesis basks between two quasi-equivalent terms, of 
 which the one is a spurious or precarious form of the other, 
 but the universal case, in which it glares between the two 
 relations of any term, considered in the one view as Expres- 
 sion, and in the other as Thought. 
 
 No antithesis can be conceived more universal, since it is 
 an antithesis whose principle is involved in every expres- 
 sion. No principle the most universal can be expressed 
 
42 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 which does not involve it. But this is not the entire truth. 
 It has a distinctive mode of involution, superadded to the 
 otlier and arising from it. Lord S. holds that ]\Ir. Y. is 
 the proper person to fill a vacant office of state. That he 
 means what he says is one thing ; but that it implies some- 
 thing else in addition is another, as is clear from this, that 
 his assertion gives offence to Lord T., who presumably 
 holds another view, since he contradicts the view of Lord 
 S. And he seconds his contradiction by the avowal that 
 Mr. X. is the person for the situation. But having avowed 
 so much, he likewise imjjlies (what is painfully disagree- 
 able to Lord S.) that Mr. Y.'s claims are not for a moment 
 to be put in comparison with those of his respected friend 
 ■ Mr. X. And if Lord S. cherishes animosity against Lord T. 
 it will be not so much because it was asserted that ]\Ir. X. 
 was worthy of the place, as because it was implied that his 
 candidate and 2^'^'oteg6 Mr. Y. was not. If, indeed, you 
 accept the expression of favour shown for his client by 
 each of tlie noble lords, you will be convinced that both 
 ought to have the place ; but if you accept his implication, 
 you will see that both are equally unfit. Wherever, there- 
 fore, a principle is expressed, it is not involved. And con- 
 versely, where it is involved, it is not expressed. Now the 
 peculiarity of our principle — that of the distinction be- 
 tween thought and expression — is that the truth which it 
 expresses is at the same moment also involved or implied. 
 For since every principle that is expressed involves this 
 principle, and this principle is now expressed, it follows 
 that this principle involves this principle, i.e. involves 
 itself. Q. E. D. ItseK is involved by itself, and is itself an 
 illustration of itself The implication in the case we con- 
 
OF STYLE GENEEALLY. 43 
 
 siderecl first is not, of course, the same in kind with the latter 
 implication, which is more strictly an involution. It was 
 introduced merely by way of oblique illustration. On 
 reading a proposition, its implication (in the proper sense) 
 is the first to occur to any one. A higher reflection is 
 needed to suggest to itself the relation which in addition it 
 involves — the antithetic relation of thought and expres- 
 sion — as well as the universality of that involution ; and 
 still a higher to perceive that this is not merely an abstract 
 relation, but a concrete — a fact coincident with its own 
 principle, and a subject amenable to its own laws. 
 Cor. — No distinction is held with the most lively chance of 
 being realised, until it is seen in a concrete case. And 
 generally such an illustration is hardest to bring to light, 
 when it is most necessary that it should be forthcoming to 
 vindicate the principle— in many cases to enforce it, in some 
 even to mahe it intelligible. In this instance there is no 
 such difficulty. The principle of the distinction is universal. 
 Allowing for the extreme of abstruseness and complexity, it 
 provides also for the extreme of simplicity. A simple 
 thought, therefore, is as completely an illustration of the 
 antinomy in its relation to expression as a complex. 
 
 The independence in the mutual relations of thought and 
 expression is one that practically holds true only of thought, 
 and for expression is quite nugatory. For the latter the distinc- 
 tion is purely an abstract, not an operative distinction. For 
 the former, too, it is only practical within certain limits. 
 The activity of thought must, as a rule, be enhanced and 
 multiplied by permitting a formula, and with a result whose 
 
 L. 
 
44 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 magnitude is often inversely as the force employed. I do not 
 mean simply in such a case as that of an intellectual revolu- 
 tion, whose influences radiate through a purely literary 
 medium; since that suggests too advantageously for illus- 
 tration the inseparable element of expression, and its value 
 as a medium — but in an order of cases where both elements 
 are combined in by no means a similar degree of harmony 
 and purity. In a political revolution, for example, there is 
 one constant and animating element of thought, whether pro- 
 pagating itself by mere animal contagion of sympathy, or by 
 sympathy of a more intellectual type. Which element is 
 radically the same with that in the other case, and its con- 
 ditions of success are essentially the same, and its mode of 
 working is in principle the same. The prominent fact in this 
 instance, as in the other, is the communication of the influ- 
 ence, which again we will suppose to have radiated from 
 a solitary individual. Thus between the origin and the 
 result, the obscure origin and the vast result, there is, if we 
 look forward, merely the fact of a silence ; if we look back- 
 ward, merely the fact of a silence negated. Simply in his 
 own person the initiator could not have affected what, by 
 this negation of his silence, he has virtually effected. Other- 
 wise he must single-handed have done the whole work, 
 manned the batteries, marched in a body to the point of 
 attack, etc. And just in proportion as he discarded expres- 
 sion, would he become increasingly unable to fulfil his 
 mission, when it was becoming increasingly necessary that 
 he should fulfil it. The more thought is required, therefore, 
 the more does expression as a coefficient mount into impor- 
 tance. And if forethought, in certain relations, expression 
 
 /A 
 is indispensable/ much more is thought indispensable to 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 45 
 
 expression ; since only in and through thought is expression 
 
 possessed of a living and elastic energy. 
 
 1. Considered in their idtimatc relation to each other, 
 thought has a regulative value for expression. To say that 
 expression has no significance apart from thought is the 
 same thing as saying that it has no existence apart 
 from thought: its very existence founds upon its being 
 significant. For it is to be noted that this significance is 
 not the figurative thing that is commonly represented by 
 the term in relation to individual expressions. It is, in 
 fact, the condition of their existence ; which existence, in 
 its turn, becomes the condition of the derived significance 
 as popularly understood. The meaning of the symbol 
 " brand," for instance, is for us that of a billet under con- 
 sumption by fire, and reduced more or less to a smoulder- 
 ing red. So long as it preserves this form, every English- 
 man understands what is meant. But let the letters be 
 transposed, so that they shall read " bnard," and instantly 
 for us it becomes unintelligible. Its total significance has 
 not disappeared, however ; only its actual significance has 
 disappeared. Its potential significance remains ; its precise 
 significance for us now consisting in this that it is un- 
 iuteUigible, i.e. not directly and immediately significant. 
 For the savage in the same way a very simple sign may 
 produce discomfiture, as before something which he can 
 easily reproduce, but which he cannot interpret. That dis- 
 comfiture arises not more from ignorance than from know- 
 ledge ; it being the special aggravation of the case that to 
 his perception of the sign he adds so much acquaintance 
 with the principle of signs generally, as to decide that this 
 sign is not accidental, but for somebody has an obvious 
 
46 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 interpretation that is denied to him. The occasion of his 
 perplexity is the same with that of the art of the pro- 
 fessional decipherer. In the one case, however, the 
 possible significance of symbols mediates only to con- 
 scious recognition of ignorance, in the other to its removal. 
 2. It is npon thought that the positive and immediate 
 significance of every expression depends. Expression has 
 no operative value, except as being the medium of propaga- 
 tion for thought ; a truth which holds particularly in rela- 
 tion to expressions connected in a series, since that depends 
 entirely upon the logical movement of tlie thought, and the 
 associations inseparably connected with each expression. 
 Of which express corroboration is found in the fact 
 (apparently iiTeconcileable with the principle) that a mean- 
 ing may be gleaned from propositions whose terms are not 
 separately clear. The onus of the weak terms has simply 
 been borne by the stronger, which, but for their own 
 integrity, must themselves have succumbed under the 
 extra responsibility. The proposition has proved intelli- 
 gible in spite of the casual unintelligibility of one of the 
 terms, not in spite of the rule which demands the intelli- 
 gibility of all the terms. Under the latter alternative the 
 meaning of the proposition as a whole would not have been 
 made out. And very specially it is overlooked, in arguing 
 for the contradiction of the rule by this apparent exception, 
 that in the final result the word is intelligible ; what is 
 contemplated in the rule being that no term shall be 
 introduced which may absolutely withstand the plenary 
 power of a passage to interpret itself, a power of interpreta- 
 tion that extends even over its obscure members. For 
 there is a separate reason why any superficial canon, 
 
OF STYLE GENEUALLV. 47 
 
 ordaining tlie exclusion of obscure terms, should be 
 suspended. What the familiar terms of the proposition are 
 commissioned to raise to their own status is invariably a 
 term that is not absolutely unfamiliar, but simply is not 
 yet quite explicitly comprehended. And what they do is 
 to ratify, under a specific collocation of ideas, what had 
 been left inchoate under other collocations, though pre- 
 pared by tliese successively for that ratification. It is 
 because the number of alternatives was limited, under 
 which the unknown term could be understood, that it has 
 been understood. And it is the other terms in the connec- 
 tion which have been exactly the agency (for I represent 
 them collectively, not individually as agents) in reducing 
 these alternatives from indeterminateness to an operative 
 and influential definiteness. That agency evidently is not 
 the one to be overlooked. And yet it is the agency that is 
 overlooked, in saying that the meaning has been reached 
 independently of the connection between expression and 
 thought. To deny the interdependence is in fact as 
 rational as, in the converse case, to complain of the want 
 of news in a public journal, in the forgetfulness of the 
 circumstance that one had previously gone the round of all 
 the contemporary papers within reach. 
 
 3. Indirectly thought is always present in expression. 
 This is what the mechanical reader chiefly misses — the 
 suggestiveness of certain collocations of thought. For 
 there is a very trenchant distinction between the man 
 who reads with just enough intelligence to surmount 
 the meaning of every proposition as it reached him, 
 and the man who reads with active intelligence sufficient 
 to explicate for himself the associations with which the 
 
48 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 terms of a proposition may exalt and reflect its primary 
 significance. 
 
 " She came to tlie village cliurcli 
 And sat by a pillar alone ; 
 An angel watching an nrn 
 Wept over her, carved in stone ; 
 And once, but once, slie lifted her eyes, 
 And suddenly, sweetly, strangely l)lu.sli'd, 
 To find they were met by my own." '■ 
 
 The situation is infinitely natural — tlie evasive quies- 
 cence of the maiden, confronted by the eternal, aggressive 
 masculine gaze — for else how could the boy knoiv that she 
 had lifted her eyes only once? — and the disruption, in 
 which, through a mere gleam, a quiver, all is for her 
 undone, and the very quiescence has become for Aim 
 treacherously significant. But the circumstances, but the 
 associations — the fusion of sentiment at that exact point 
 where the spiritual merges into the sensuous — the intensity 
 of ritual suggestion, variously expounded by the solemn 
 agencies of the ceremonial, mystically by the organ, 
 articulately by the priest, and by the worshippers in a 
 murmured unison that is half mystical, half articulate — 
 confounded and overborne by the intensity of human passion, 
 that ought to be in antagonism to it, but is not, does not 
 strive with it, therefore, but leagues it subtly with itself, 
 and so helps to concentrate and amplify the sense of com- 
 munion — a communion equivocal, and founding expressly 
 upon a truth equivocally applied, viz. Love — all this 
 perishes as in a vacuum to the careless reader. In this re- 
 lation, therefore, he may legitimately be styled mechanical, 
 either from his want of the power of reflection, or from his 
 1 From Mr. Tennv-son's "Maud." 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 49 
 
 want of the power of attention, interfering with the natural 
 action of tlie other. Not that every passage will Lear the 
 same stress of reflection. The difficulty often is to avoid 
 reflection. Indeed an evil motive in criticism, whether of 
 partiality for or against a writer, where it does not manifest 
 itself in tampering with the views expressed by him, will 
 manifest itself in tampering with the expression of these 
 views — in reading for profound what is superficial, and for 
 superficial what is profound. And the rationale of the fact 
 which is so vaguely expressed in saying that a man sees in 
 the writing of another more or less than there is to be seen, 
 is precisely this, that unduly he masses and brings into 
 relief, or fails duly to integrate and gather into a focus the 
 collateral suggestions of the text. 
 Cor. — No distinction more visionary could be drawn than 
 that which it might be attempted to draw between the 
 organic in expression and the mechanical. Such a distinction 
 (if it has any meaning at all, apart from that indicated in § 1) 
 can only take effect in relation to the movement of full-blown 
 propositions. Now it is here precisely that the power of 
 expression in the way of oblique suggestion is most valuable, 
 for reciprocally controlling and modifying the meaning of the 
 constituent terms in a proposition, so as to preserve its organic 
 unity. Let us, for instance, examJne this proposition: "Tlie 
 prejudices of society have not been found directly to aid its 
 progress." If we subtract the word "not" from the pro- 
 position, we sliall have committed a most comprehensive 
 felony upon the tenor and direction of the thought. It ran 
 from east to west : we have made it run from west to east. 
 But if, reintroducing the "not," we expunge the word 
 " directly," we shall effect substantially the same result. The 
 
50 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 well-being of a state would doubtless be increased, if that 
 malignity of prejudice were absent, which often springs from 
 local or individual rivalry. Yet that may help to breed com- 
 petition and higher activity in branches of trade that else 
 might languish. And so prejudice does not absolutely im- 
 pede the progress of society, but indirectly abets it. Other 
 flexions might be given to the proposition, such as that " im- 
 mediately," or " finally," or " unconsciously," or " impalpably," 
 or " paradoxically," or " naturally," " the prejudices of society 
 have been found to aid its progress." But always another in- 
 flection is given to the sense. Expressions the most contra- 
 dictory, such as "paradoxically," and "naturally," may on 
 occasion be used indifferently; and expressions like "un- 
 consciously " and " impalpably " (where the one is as it were 
 the specific form, the other the generic) may be substituted 
 for each other. But there is no expression, however faintly 
 differing from another, for which, in precise writing, most 
 circumstances are not crucial in applying its distinction from 
 that other. 
 
 In. regard to which it may be observed, that the new 
 specific terms that are continually being made do not tend to 
 supersede the old, any more than they do in the mind of the 
 individual writer — old terms revealing themselves to his mind 
 more explicitly and completely, and new terms filling up 
 lacunas in thought hitherto unsuspected. In both instances 
 the movement is universal, that of a tide, not of a wave. And 
 it is only by relation to the terms of older standing that tlie 
 new are enabled to maintain their position. The old is not 
 therefore indefinite, because the new happens to be specific, 
 nor the new incomplete, because the other is more imiversal. 
 The coarse and grotesque way of interpreting innovation in 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 51 
 
 expression is that all fresh terminology supersedes the ancient, 
 and is useless ; further that it tends unnecessarily to multiply 
 terms, and is therefore harmful, which is precisely to say 
 that the needle tends to supersede the chisel. IMeantime the 
 value of the needle generally consists in this, that it does not 
 do every kind of work, and in particular that it is not avail- 
 able for the work to be done by the chisel. And to put a 
 stop to the variation of terms before the proper limit, is not 
 merely to suppress the immediate forms of variation, but the 
 possible ramifications of these in arrear. For every new 
 thought there must arise a corresponding expression. Nor 
 can any other principle be laid down, by which the number 
 of ideas shall be increased for every term from this limit to 
 the abracadabra or ideal formula, which shall embrace ex- 
 plicitly the whole cycle of knowledge and being, the sum of 
 things actual and possible. An economising of terms has no 
 use apart from an economising of ideas. But such an ex- 
 pedient as that of diminishing the number of terms would 
 never reduce the sum of ideas. If it could, it would do so 
 wrongly. The only real economy that is possible in the matter 
 is in the suppression of the riderless and supernumerary 
 among terms. And so it is that economy is in exact 
 harmony with the converse canon, viz. that every expression 
 shall have its independent thought. To multiply expressions, 
 therefore, for a single idea is not to enhance the chances of its 
 being distinguished, but to defeat them ; and in this case to 
 violate the canon of reciprocity by sheer blankness of mean- 
 ing, as in the other by sheer multiplicity of interconfounded 
 association. Hence, and on both sides, the essential vice of 
 modern slang; which may be described generally as the 
 tendency, on the one hand, to elevate expressions drawn from 
 
52 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 the vulgar quasi-professional classes, etc., and on the other to 
 degrade expression, by drawing into a comical quasi-figurative 
 reference terms of ordinary and even catholic significance. 
 Thus, on the one side, we have a pui-poseless multiplication 
 of terms for such acts as stealing, running away, etc., and on 
 the other, a burdening of certain terms, such as " governor " 
 and " lot " (c.ff. " a queer lot " applied to an individual) with a 
 superfetation of meanings. This happens obviously within 
 limits. Since no possibility of leisure, no possibility of 
 malice, could ever enable an individual or a number of in- 
 dividuals to multiply terms for every thought ; and no 
 possibility of indolence or of preoccupation can prevent men 
 from fitting up most of their ideas with an adequate ter- 
 minology. But excesses and defects do exist more or less in 
 all languages to disturb the just equilibrium between the in- 
 novations of language and the stagnation of thought. In so 
 far as these tend to neutralise each another, thought is kept in 
 activity. Otherwise, in individual instances, they constitute 
 separate sources of imperfection — such as might be found in 
 polyandry superadded to polygamy. 
 
 Expression is to be regarded as coinciding Avith thought ; 
 but inasmuch as every thought (with certain obvious excep- 
 tions) is complex, a dual or equivocal relation arises for ex- 
 pression, that, viz., in which it corresponds wholly to the 
 thought, and that in which it corresponds to it only in part. 
 This happens constantly in composition, where terms are used 
 now in relation to their generic meaning, now in relation to 
 their specific. One may say, for example, that " curiosity led 
 a man to watch the movements of the celestial bodies," 
 
OF .STYLE GENERALLY. -to 
 
 where he means simply " the desire of knowledge," dis- 
 engaged from the element of pettiness and gratuitousness 
 which is implied in the actual statement. Or again, he may- 
 say that " the desire of knowledge induced a man to open 
 his friend's writing-case, and examine his correspondence," 
 when he means curiosity. In the one instance he says too 
 much, in the other too little; and in both cases we know 
 analytically by how much, the measure of excess in the one 
 being identically the measure of defalcation in the other. 
 But the novelty is this, that it is by the very inaccuracy of 
 the statement that we are able to correct it, and by substitut- 
 ing the one reciprocal for the other to give our amended 
 version of the truth. The principle of specification has been 
 abused in the one case, and neglected in the other. But 
 virtually/ it has righted itself. And by way of compensation 
 its value now mounts into its place and is realized, when we 
 present the truth in its authorized form. • Thus it happens 
 that expression may be represented in two aspects, under the 
 one of which it is exceedingly vague, and under the other 
 exceedingly definite. A charge of verbalism, for example, is 
 a charge of meaninglessness. And, on the other hand, ex- 
 pression is regarded as the seal and redundance of faithfulness 
 in all communication. Tlie one founds upon the indisputably 
 arbitrary nature of signs considered in themselves, the other 
 on the indisputable teleologic value of signs. Convertibly 
 thought and expression are the same ; a virtual coincidence 
 being secured, whether the expression is something more, or 
 less, or else, than the thought. But their coincidence may be 
 actual as well as merely virtual. And hence the relation of 
 expression to thought is equivocal. 
 
 If every term as it is met with in general writing were 
 
54 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 to be understood ahvays in its sjjccial incidence, and not 
 with reference to its proximate terms, its genus and 
 species, it would begin to fluctuate in its meaning ; that 
 meaning would begin to be shared by other terms, and it 
 itself by degrees might ((|uite apart from the dialectical 
 tendency of language) drift into other relationships, and 
 become the bearer of successive associations widely differing 
 from each other. That, for the most part, the phrases in 
 present use have not yielded to such a tendency, is to be 
 ascribed to the fact of the counter-tendency to revert after 
 deflection to the original signification. These terms pre- 
 serve in a double sense the consistency of language, both 
 in themselves, and for others, by acting as centres of 
 stability amid fluctuation. But occasionally they them- 
 selves fluctuate ; and in so far language is elastic and not 
 rigid ; as, with regard to the essentially unstable terms, it 
 is elastic, not ductile. It gains its virtual immobility by 
 seasonable fluctuation. But that literary effect varies, not 
 in relation to langunge alone, (and, for example, the very 
 contradictory expression of what one means is a form of 
 wit) and bears an equivocal relation through what is itself 
 essentially stable, may be illustrated from mathematics, 
 which hitherto has shown itself the most adamantine and 
 inexorable of standards. Fifty pounds are fifty for the 
 banker and for everybody. But the literary significance 
 of fifty is different from its financial. Three may be more 
 significant. But also fifty may be more significant than 
 three. This significance then is variable, and aifronts 
 arithmetic, first by discarding its principle of proportion, 
 and, in the next breath, by coming back to it. But note how 
 for all that it is indebted to the arithmetical immobility. 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. o5 
 
 For if the number fifty were not always the same, whether 
 existing at a premium with regard to three, or at a discount, 
 who could guarantee that the one, which had stood up with 
 alacrity to discount the other, should not have transmuted 
 itself into some third number when the time came for it to be 
 discounted ? The invariability of the number, therefore, which 
 is the safeguard of the banker against embezzlement by his 
 clerks, is precisely the safeguard of literary significance. 
 Cor. — Writing generally consists in a variation of the two 
 styles of absolute precision and merely relative precision. And 
 so long as that variation is preserved, it is to a certain extent 
 indifferent in individual cases which style is observed. The 
 ideal absurdity would be to use the generic and the specific as 
 convertible where they are not, and to neglect using them as 
 convertible where they are indifferent. To say, therefore, that 
 it is indifferent which standard is used, does not imply that 
 the privilege of having alternate standards is to be abused. A 
 writer, from extreme prepossession or carelessness, may use a 
 generic term for a specific, and vice versa ; so as to bewilder 
 his readers by ambiguity, or even absolutely to mislead them. 
 In this case the alternative standard becomes simply pestilent, 
 A second order of cases is that in which it is really indifferent, 
 as to the sense, whether the expression is absolutely precise 
 or not. Here there is a legitimate use of the standard as sup- 
 plementary to the other. But thirdly, there are occasions on 
 which this standard becomes virtually or even absolutely a 
 complementary standard. Thus, for example — what suits emi- 
 nently the elliptical method of poetical expression — it is so in 
 the lines : — 
 
 Like form in Scotland is not seen, 
 Treads not such step on Scottish green — 
 
56 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 a rare truism iu itself, since notwithstanding that certain types 
 of gait might accompany certain types of figure, everybody 
 knows that no two men have the same shape and carriage. 
 But for that very reason it is seen that something more is 
 hinted than the truistic fact — a comparison within the com- 
 parison, and an expression of pre-eminent or paramount dignity 
 associated M-ith form and step. Again the antithesis of the 
 idea may be employed to convey a transferred meaning. Thus 
 
 in the expression : — 
 
 Fallen heroes want 
 Yonder in heaven their crown of blessedness 
 Till the last bondsmmi clasp unfettered hands 
 O'er the last slaver whelm'd beneath the wave, 
 
 the word " bondsman" is taken to designate a special agent 
 in a significant circumstance, where ex hypothesi the individual 
 is no longer a bondsman. To such an extent does the prin- 
 ciple of expression sublate itself in its literal form (and quite 
 apart from every metaphorical usage of terms) for a relative 
 and virtual intelligibility ; and in special cases by hinting the 
 substantial truth where more is expressed, by integrating it 
 where less, and by rectifying it where the reverse is expressed. 
 
 Section II. Of Style in its relation to Expression. 
 4. 
 
 Style is the Differential in Expression : and this, which 
 exhibits it in its most characteristic reference, is its scientific 
 definition. 
 
 In relation to Style, expression, which tends indefinitely 
 to extend or differentiate itself as regards thought, must be 
 assumed to have reached a limit. It is very clear that Style 
 is not the differential of expression, in the same way that 
 
(( u N J ^- K K ^i n^ \ A\ 
 
 OK STYLE GENE11ALL\V^ ^ ,„ .// 
 
 expression may be regarded as the differential oriTToiiglit. 
 (1) Expression does not reach a limit in order to aHow style 
 to take up the process of specification. Such a limit would 
 he arbitrary ; and it would be unjust to expression to lay 
 down any terminus at which its distinctive principle was to 
 be superseded. (2) Style does not consist in stray specifi- 
 cations made by individual thinkers. That would be unjust 
 to itself These casual terms can only show themselves in 
 obedience to the general laws of differentiation ; and in so 
 far as they do that they belong to expression, not to style. 
 It is distinctly a proof of this (what might appear in direct 
 contradiction of it) that every expression in use at any 
 period must have been struck out by an individual. Since 
 precisely to the extent that it was necessary M'ould it be 
 adopted, with a rapidity that would confound the indivi- 
 duality of the discoverer. Of innovation in terminology 
 only these four kinds are possible, (1) that which is re- 
 quired and is adopted, (2) that which is required but is not 
 adopted (not being published widely enough for immediate 
 adoption), (3) that which is not required but is adopted, 
 and (4) that which is not required and is not adopted. These 
 classes, however, reduce themselves to two, the first and the 
 last ; since the other two tend to right themselves, and in 
 part by neutralising each other. Now (with regard to the 
 fourth) there are many terms that sj^rout up in the spor- 
 tiveness of correspondence, or in the heat and condensation 
 of journalism, that are literally ephemeral. And connecting 
 themselves with no catholic principle of expression, they 
 cannot be viewed as possibly approaching a thing so organic 
 as style. As to the terms of the first class, it is clear that 
 they are few, and can never serve as the exponent of a 
 
58 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 writer's individuality. Besides, being engrossed by other 
 writers, they lose, except to the antiquary, any value as 
 having been originated by him ; the very permanence of 
 literature, which guarantees the perpetuation of the term, 
 gainsaying its permanence as affecting our estimate of the 
 oriirinator. It is to his use of the common items of expres- 
 sion that a man owes his individuality. The limit which 
 expression is assumed to have reached for style is not, there- 
 fore, a limit at which innovation in expression begins ; which 
 would be to extend the limit that ex hypothesi is final That 
 process is the very one which we must assume to have 
 ceased. For now the movement for style is precisely in the 
 opposite direction. Accordingly to differentiate expression 
 is obviously not to distribute it by diversification of indivi- 
 dual expressions, but (3) to redistribute it, by combining and 
 unifying a variety of these under a definite idiosyncrasy. 
 Tlie individuality in the one case is that of a fact, in the 
 other that of a person — of individuals as against individuals, 
 writers against writers, speakers against speakers. Formally 
 the principle of the one is variety, that of the other unity. 
 Only style tends also to differentiation in a mass, with a 
 resultant variety of styles proportioned to the variety of 
 individual expressions. 
 Cor. — The relation of style to expression is one of complete 
 interdependence. Expression being distinctively the basis of 
 the other, there is no point in its extension by which style 
 does not profit ; being the sphere for the exhibition of style, 
 which raises the potential in expression to the actual, there 
 is no extension of style by which it does not profit. All that 
 is assumed is, therefore, a certain totality of expression. 
 Which totality, acting, in the second i)lace, in combination 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 59 
 
 witli psychological tendencies, is determined, in the third 
 place, to a known variation and recnrrence of certain forms of 
 expression, forming in itself that totality of expression, 
 in its extent or intensity, which we call a man's style. 
 This is properly illustrated in the relation of the classical 
 and Saxon elements in the English language. It has 
 been shown (§ 2, p. 50) to be gratuitous and unscientific to 
 treat the former element as if by possibility it could supplant 
 the latter. Together they form a totality of expression, in 
 which generally (1) the Latin (as the typical exoteric element) 
 is the differential of the Saxon. " World " for example has its 
 definite significance, generally considered. But what of it iu 
 special relations — in relation to totality as compared with its 
 own local sections ? In that case it is " cosmopolitan." Or 
 "what of it again by way of relation to the transcendent whole 
 of the universe, or as equivalent itself to that whole ? It then 
 becomes " sublunary," or " cosmical." And through the com- 
 bination of these two elements it is that the genius of the 
 English nation is realised in that special literary form which 
 we call its " idiom." Out of that relation, however, arises 
 another, in which each element becomes a separate function, 
 or a separate aggregate of functions. Thus, roughly speaking, 
 the Saxon takes cognisance of facts, the Latin of principles. 
 More particularly, the Saxon is concerned with the domestic 
 and the catholic sensibilities (in a nation so keenly alive, on 
 the one hand, to the tendernesses, and, on the other, to the 
 sublimities of human sympathy as the English) and the Latin 
 with the abstract relations of things. Thus (2) in regard to 
 the totality of expression, each becomes a co-differential with 
 the other. Each represents a leading psychological distinc- 
 tion. Latin, as being the element which is not the vernacular, 
 
60 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 and being superinduced upon the other (as the thinking of the 
 adult is superinduced upon the thinking of the child), becomes 
 valuable not for its Ijeing casually or immediately the nega- 
 tion of popular thinking, but positively for its catholic 
 precision, which is the cardinal test and necessity of a 
 scientific diction. On the other hand, the virtue of our Saxon 
 lies in its simplicity, which is the necessity of a poetical 
 diction. A writer's general bias will, therefore, be determined 
 by the proportion in which the two elements mingle in his 
 expression. For evidently it is a proportion, in which neither 
 is found exclusively. And hence (3) the Latin and the Saxon 
 become each rcd-promlly the differential of the other. If, in 
 average use, these two elements bear a certain proportion to 
 each other, then evidently the writer who uses more Latin 
 than other people has that for the differentia of his literary 
 manner, — the quantity being supposed equal in all cases, he 
 will use less of the Saxon. And similarly in the converse 
 case. A more natural case, of course, is that of subvarieties in 
 these elements. Thus, of two. writers having a poetical and 
 philosophic diction, one has in addition a scientific bias ; that 
 becomes his differentia, not, however, simply in relation to the 
 Latin compound, but to the whole complement of his ex- 
 pression. The Saxon is still a co-efficient to discriminate 
 that complement from any other; what was expressed in 
 the previous instance by extent, being now represented by 
 intensity, as measured by recurrence. 
 
 5. 
 
 Since Style is to be viewed, first, as concerned with the 
 
 relation of each individual writer to the totality of expression, 
 
 it is concerned, secondly, with the relation of the totality of 
 
 writers to the totality of expression, and mediately, in the 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 61 
 
 tliiixl place, with tlie individual in relation to the totality of 
 ■svriters. Each style thus becomes reciprocally the differential 
 of every other. To speak mathematically, the style of every 
 writer represents some function of every other. 
 
 As a literature grows, it becomes obvious that the ten- 
 dency of its writers in succession is to diverge from each other. 
 But at a certain point it begins to be suspected that the 
 mode of the new writers is in part a reproduction of the old. 
 The principle of variation, in fact, is limited. Moreover, it 
 tends to a limit, viz, the circumference of all variations, 
 which is itself a new variety. And under that, either as a 
 fact realised, or as a possibility, the separate orders of ex- 
 pression are seen to be vitally connected with each other, 
 in so far as they are efficients of this common manifesta- 
 tion. The process is threefold. (1) The resultant varieties 
 may be regarded independently, as antagonistic and com- 
 plementary to each other. (2) From their limited number, 
 and the common relationships existing among all, they tend 
 to intersect and coincide with one another. (3) These 
 tendencies are combined, so as to involve an antagonism to 
 each, and a coincidence with all, in a variety which com- 
 prehends, and therefore supersedes all the rest. In this 
 latter case, which is the most interesting and important, 
 the relation of the writer is equally one of immanence and 
 transcendence. This transcendence is not that which A 
 exercises over B because he has so many more effects at 
 his call ; since B, in respect of that which is immanent in 
 himself, transcends A. It is because the great writer is 
 not transcended by any that he transcends all. And though 
 his transcendence founds on the same basis as theirs, viz. 
 immanence, that immanence is not of the ordinary type, the 
 
62 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 exclusive and siKcial immanence of a distinctive range of 
 expression absolutely liis own. The ordinary immanence 
 may be of two kinds, that which is common to all or that 
 which is peculiar to each. In this case it is neither, but 
 that which is peculiar to one in so far as it is distributed 
 separately among all. Other writers of individuality, when 
 the sum of all other individualities is taken, have sorae- 
 thins to add to it. To that sum he has nothing to add : it 
 is identically his own distinction. If it is a sum of 25, in 
 which A, B and C have each a share of one, it is clear that 
 he transcends each by 24. Or if X happens to travel in the 
 same way as himself, and musters up 13, him he transcends 
 by 12; i.e,. the gross result being taken, otherwise his 
 superiority to X travels in a geometrical ratio. The ideal 
 thus formed is no abstract ideal, but one that is essentially 
 concrete, one in which all the elements are resolved. It is 
 not meant, for example, that every peddling idiosyncrasy is in- 
 cluded in the individuality of Shakspere. But those elements 
 of expression are included like the wit of Ben Jonson, which 
 are possessed by certain poets in special measure, and 
 wdiich go to integrate a totality of their own. And 
 especially those pure and formal elements, which in some 
 degree are possessed by all true poets, structural felicity and 
 modulated intensity of expression — in simple terms, mas- 
 tery of quantity and quality. How the catholic behaves 
 when united with the individual, may be seen (in a dialec- 
 tical shape) in relation to nationality. AVhat we mean by 
 a classic, is a writer who represents adequately the genius 
 of his country, with sufficient force superadded of his own 
 to expound that genius and make it interesting. It is only, 
 therefore, by coalescing with a certain degree of force in 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 63 
 
 individuals, that the genius of a nation becomes a co-efficient 
 for its own illustration. It is quite another question to 
 what extent the appearance of such an individual may be 
 accidental, and whether it is the increase of the national 
 intelligence, or the increasing richness of national charac- 
 teristic, that is the immediate occasion of that illustration. 
 I assume simply that the national bias will be found 
 directly represented in its literature, apart from this as a 
 possibility, that the very earliest literature was not pre- 
 served just because it was simple, and reflected no national 
 complexity of character, while only such legends were pre- 
 served as were connected ex Jnjpothesi with the doings of 
 the race. But this very glorification of national tendencies 
 and national interests, defeats itself by demanding too 
 necessitously an increase of individual power. For obvi- 
 ously the supreme poet or the supreme thinker is not 
 national, but reflects the catholic in all nationality. But 
 his genius is not therefore anti-national. It is the danger 
 of a partial acuteness to conceive that a catholic genius is of 
 necessity opposed to a national. An English writer may, 
 in the first instance, by accident have the genius of a French- 
 man; in which case, of course, he is anti-national. Or, 
 secondly, he may have a truly catholic genius, in which 
 case his genius would infallibly be anti-national, but for the 
 chance of its coinciding, in the third place, with the 
 national genius, the nationality to which he belongs being 
 the most catholic. The common elements are glorified by 
 other nations in varying degrees, but by this in so perfect 
 a degree, as to become indefeasibly its differentia. The 
 catholic poets, the poets of intensity and compass, are those 
 of England ; the catholic thinkers, the systematic thinkers, 
 
G4 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 are those of Germany. And, as notoriously Sbakspere is 
 the unique catholic poet, so notoriously Hegel is the unique 
 catholic metaphysician. Absolutely catholic intellects they 
 are neither of them, since both are only partial ; and abso- 
 lutely catholic only that nation can be pronounced which 
 produces an intellect that shall be equally philosophic and 
 poetical. But evidently it is unjust, it is a perversion, to 
 exalt the individuality of either, as if it transcended the 
 national genius by its catholicity ; "svhen it is expressly as 
 being an outcome of that genius that it is catholic. Unjust 
 it is to the individual, since it represents his catholicity as 
 anti-national, which it is not, and to the nation, since it 
 represents as accidental what is essential. 
 CoE. — The function of a Logic is to give universals by 
 eliminating particulars. That which is common to all men 
 concretely in the midst of diversity, is the logical faculty; 
 that which is common to them, in spite of their common 
 logical faculty, is abstractly their diversity. Logic proper has 
 to deal with the first universal. And a Logic of Style is con- 
 cerned with the second, a universal as complete and scientific 
 as the other ; since every man has a differentia, as well as a 
 ground of community with other men. This universal is 
 Mode; a man's style being his mode, his manner, his 
 mannerism. The general questions concerned with this mode 
 are three. (1) As to the possible varieties of style which 
 may be possessed by any writer. In this respect he may 
 have a very complex differentiation ; from the philosopher, for 
 example, he may be distinguished by being also a poet, and 
 vice versa ; or from the poets and philosophers by some 
 special poetical or philosophic faculty ; or, through the same 
 faculty, from those who like himself are both. (2) As to the 
 
OF STYLE GENEEALLY". ' 65 
 
 possible fluctuations in individual style within certain limits. 
 Such may be produced by changes in health, by varying 
 degrees of interest in the subject, or of aptitude for particular 
 modes of expression, speaking and writing. (3) As to the co- 
 herence of his literary manner with his manner as a whole ; 
 how far that is controlled by his temperament, and consists 
 with his personal habits and social bearing. 
 
 6. 
 
 The particular varieties of literary effect, with whatsoever 
 complexity they may manifest themselves, rest notoriously 
 upon a fundus of natural sensibility. This appears in three 
 forms, (1) as creative, (2) as reproductive, and (3) as critical 
 or negative. 
 
 That the same kind of power should be possessed by 
 more than one man, does not make it less original, or what 
 is meant specially by " genial." It is creative in so far as it 
 is not communicable. And causing in the reader a desire 
 to reproduce it, in the same breath it shows him his 
 impotence to do anything but imitate it. For the 
 distinction between reproduction and imitation is that 
 the first obtains a revival of the principles of certain 
 orders of effect, and the second merely a resemblance 
 to certain isolated effects. And what imitation is ordi- 
 narily to reproduction, reproduction is in this case to 
 creation; and accordingly, since ex hy'pothesi these effects 
 are unique, any attempt to reproduce them falls to the ^; 
 level of imitation. For there are two orders of creative 
 sensibility, which may be described as the faculty of 
 developing the possibilities of expression. On the one 
 
 hand it manifests itself as the jower to devise new fo rms of 
 
 E 
 
66 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 QQmbmaiioit-^afidr~strapMcation, etc., and on the other to 
 mature new orders of individual effect. It is, for example, 
 an approach to the expansion of style in the latter aspect, 
 to produce a pecidiar mode of fanciful or humorous ex- 
 pression. And to the expansion of it in its former aspect, 
 it is a contribution, to discover a principle of transition by 
 which the general sense of elegance or economy is en- 
 hanced, at the same time that the demands of the case for 
 fulness are adequately met. The former element tends 
 sometimes in the direction of eccentricity ; which is in any 
 case revolting, because it is either unaffected, in which case 
 it is monstrous, or assumed, in which case it is insolent. 
 But the eccentricity, which immediately I speak of, arises 
 just from attempting externally to reproduce what is 
 absolutely original in another man's expression, and so fall- 
 ing into grotesque travestie. And the tendency is the more 
 dangerous, because the result is for many people so much 
 more striking than quieter and more perfect effects. Hence 
 its essential vulgarity, which consists, not in preferring 
 what is loud to what is unobtrusive, but in preferring what 
 is simply clumsy to what is forcible. Tor there is a sphere 
 in which higher effects are attainable, and with the 
 additional privilege of being legitimate, and not essentially 
 futile. This is the alternative sphere indicated, in which 
 the copyists may be as successful as the original artists, 
 provided they have the power readily to appropriate the 
 turns of thought devised by earlier writers, and to employ 
 them in their variety and relevance. To a certain extent, 
 therefore, this power is accompanied by a power that is 
 critical or negative. Generally, it manifests itself in 
 perceiving that certain turns of expression are in them- 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY, 67 
 
 selves vulgar and clumsy, aud for ever, therefore, irrelevant. 
 Ill its higher form, it consists of a discrimination of effects, 
 which ill themselves are valid, as invalid in certain relations 
 — inadequate, redundant, or vicious. For not the perception 
 merely or chiefly of what is good in itself is the test of true ' 
 sensitiveness, but of what is good in certain circumstances. 
 Such a sensibility will manifest itself, therefore, in the 
 repudiation of every mode of expression that is incongruous 
 with the prevailing cast of thought, or the general structure 
 of a proposition ; in the perception, that this or that 
 expression requires to be expunged or modified, as affecting 
 too severe_a_jp^,lification of a certain idea, or requires 
 modification before it can operate'^axrequatdy as an 
 exponent of the spirit of a certain passage. JNIost obviously, 
 this capacity is useful in critically reorganising and re- 
 modelling one's own compositions. Every writer feels the 
 necessity more or less of altering his first draught of a com- 
 position for the better, not only in the conception and 
 motif, and the modification of long reaches of thinking, by 
 the resources of transposition, and the altering of distant 
 proportions, or the interpolation of new ideas, etc., but in 
 the diction itself. 
 CoE. — What is good in an author's expression may be rather 
 the reflex of good thinking otherwise, than the result of a 
 general capacity for Style. The more logically, for instance, a 
 man thinks, the less will he be disposed to write with any 
 extra measure of gracefulness. Yet that of itself is a guar- 
 antee for a certain quality of elegance. And where he is 
 most of all in a condition to benefit by his logic, is where it 
 coexists with the independent facilities and graces of expres- 
 sion. There is, in fact, no collateral agency, whether of 
 
68 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 intellect or of temper, that may not co-operate to individual 
 force of style. And no writer is above being improved by 
 the aid of the machinery which exists internally for ratify- 
 ing his distinctive brilliance as an artist, in the way of repro- 
 duction and revision. Naturally, in connection with revision, 
 it sounds paradoxical to say that a man is inevitably an artist, 
 whose original execution leaves much to remodel, and no artist, 
 because it leaves nothing to amend. For evidently it is just 
 the impracticable blockhead, who will find it most diflBcult 
 to vary his original conceptions. In this, however, he is 
 formally on a level with the greatest of impromptu performers. 
 And what is intended is, that, with every necessity for 
 amendment, there must exist a corresponding ability to meet 
 it. In the case of the blockhead, the necessity for improve- 
 ment exists at a maximum, with the minimum power of 
 counteraction ; with the supreme artist it exists at a mini- 
 mum, with the additional pleasant condition of a critical taste 
 at its maximum. Certainly a happy adjustment applied to 
 continuous expression is a crucial test of the artist, under con- 
 ditions of success so liable to disturbance, even from physical 
 causes. And if in such circumstances the mental balance is 
 disturbed, it is evident to what extent it must draw^ upon its 
 facilities for repeal and amendment. Apart from this, the 
 critical faculty is constantly used in the original composition. 
 And that it is not needed for subsequent correction is due, 
 not to the spontaneity of the mind in that original effort 
 having oveiTidden the necessity for it, but precisely to its 
 having itself been in full play ; that it is required ultimately, 
 being a sign ^ro tanto of its not having co-operated originally 
 to produce a satisfactory residt. 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. G9 
 
 Section III. Of Style in its relation in Rhetoric. 
 
 The method of Style is essentially that of a Critique, i.e. a 
 separation or dis-cernment of individual expressions from each 
 other, in so far as it has to do with expression, and of indi- 
 vidual complements of expression from each other, in so far 
 as it has to do with individuals. This method, on the one 
 side, is distinguished from the dialectical, by placing its 
 specific results and items as ultimate and permanent, and 
 expressly as not having a tendency to pass into each other. 
 On the other, the science is distinguished from Ehetoric, 
 whose function it is to apply the data of expression ; and 
 which stands, therefore, as l^e practical science of Style. \ 
 A man's literary power is ^?'oTaM7oli fund of expression ; 
 indestructible, but capable of being modified within certain 
 limits, of being extended or intensified, limited or sup- 
 pressed. The final question, in the case where one writer 
 is pitted against another, is as to the adaptation of their 
 respective styles jtojthe circumstances. And thus expres- 
 sions begin to acquire invidiously, so to speak, and by way 
 of rivalry, a certain value as opposed to each other. The 
 duty of every artist is accordingly, (1) to develop his own 
 special skill of diction, (2) to supplement it with whatever 
 hie may lawfully reproduce from the common fund of ex- 
 pression, and (3) to adopt the several varieties of diction 
 to the separate circumstances in which he thinks accommo- 
 dation is demanded — which may include expressly the abne- 
 gation of the more luxurious or even more catholic effects 
 for the sake of the lower and coarser. The science of 
 
70 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 jthis distribution, affiliating itself to Style at tliis point,^ 
 Elietoric ; and its function on the negative side is to con- 
 travene and truncate mere stylic brilliance, where that is 
 necessary — to reproduce spontaneity in chasteness of propor- 
 tion, and the transcendental in the practical, and, generally, 
 to insist on the subordination of immediate to mediate 
 effect. Thus high literary effort upon a magnificent scale 
 is a desirable thing in relation to the literary ideal. But 
 the high style on occasion may be useless, and for effect 
 virtually lower than one absolutely less forcible. That 
 collision, however, may be resolved, and the former ideal 
 restored, if it should happen that culture could be given, 
 by not condescending to the immediate exigencies. There 
 are degrees of merit in the different standards. Nor does 
 the higher artist supersede tlie lower, even if his literary 
 culture be merely secondary, and superinduced by the 
 necessity to write, because some men must read him — i.e. 
 are compelled to apply to him for instruction — who have 
 no occasion to study the higher models. Even lie, the 
 journeyman author, the conscript, has it in his power to 
 raise the art as an art, (1) by raising the average standard 
 of execution, (2) the standard of appreciation, (3) the pro- 
 fessional standard, stimulated by the non-professional 
 sympathy, and reacting upon it. 
 Cor. — This distinction is the broad external distinction 
 between Elietoric and Style, according to which the one is the 
 regidative science of the facts which constitute the other. The 
 condition of origin being satisfied, in Style, Rhetoric deals with 
 the conditions of result. A man is bound, in the first instance, 
 by individual, local, or professional bias; his individuality 
 combating these elements perhaps, or coalescing with them to 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 71 
 
 a good or a bad purpose. These he may wish, in the next 
 instance, to foster or to overcome for certain ends. And so 
 there arises the teleologic ideal, according to which it is deter- 
 mined not what the man ought absolutely to be, but what he 
 ought relatively to be. 
 
 Style is distinguished more especially from Ehetoric, by 
 taking account of ideas immediately connected with each 
 other in detail, while PJietoric is the science of passages and 
 pieces in their totality. To regard an entire paragraph, as 
 offering a relief to another, for example, is rhetorical and para- 
 stylic. The two sciences become thus complementary modes 
 of viewing any particvilar passage. For it may quite easily 
 happen that the individual expressions are good, but that the 
 disposition of the larger masses is confused or disproportionate, 
 or that 'the total conception is clear, but the diction clumsy, 
 etc., there being thus not one criterion, but two criteria. The 
 distinction is most easily illustrated from a complete piece, 
 and one whose outlines are few even if complex, as for example 
 a poem, which allows a special condensation : — 
 
 BIETH AND DEATH.i 
 
 Ever gaze to each other two figures, one lit Avith the light 
 
 Of earth's sunshine, and one in the shadow thrown back from the 
 
 bright 
 Larger sun of the future. Lo, Birth, but a child : her bright hair, 
 Thai life's breeze gently stirs on her forehead so snowily fair, 
 Kipples golden and glad in the sunlight, and mirth's frolic beam 
 In her eyes' aziue dances, unwitting of that sombre dream 
 
 From "First Fruits and Slicd Lecaves : " by the Author of " The Wreck of 
 the Northlleet." 
 
72 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 That darkens the distance. Joy-jmrted, her mouth seems to sip 
 With cleft coral the exuberant brightness that breaks on her lip. 
 As frail-seeming and white as a mist- wreath, her garment o'erclings 
 Her flesh softlj' moulded and rosy as when the light springs 
 With last kiss from the ardorous sunset to cloud in the east — 
 So pure are her young limbs and rosy, so dimpled and creased. 
 
 As silent and dark as a shadow, unmoved as a stone 
 
 That standeth all day in the desert, unseen and alone, 
 
 Waiteth Death : no breeze touches her mantle that falleth right 
 
 doivn 
 Over feet that we see not and hands that we see not; a frown 
 Seems to drift down the distance and blight the fresh pastures of 
 
 life, 
 And an icy breath seems to blow from her and make the air rife 
 With tremblings. And yet as we gaze in her fathomless eyes 
 The charm of her beauty awakens, although her hair lies 
 White and thinly laid over her forehead's mysterious shade 
 (That looms with a beauty no earth-light may ever invade), 
 And her fine lips together are set in a sadness divine, 
 Too deep and too holy for sorrow — each loveliest line 
 Of her limbs 'neath her raiment of shadow a presence becomes, 
 And a scent broodeth round her far sweeter than odours of spices 
 
 or gums. 
 
 This poem in its totality is essentially subtle. There is, 
 first, a broad and obvious antithesis between Birth and Death 
 — Birth in her morning beauty, and Death in her austere 
 repellance. But secondly, a contrast is introduced between 
 Death in this aspect, and Death in a more auspicious aspect, 
 as being spiritually its own euthanasy, and the emancipator 
 of the soul into life. But is this all ? Not, certainly, accord- 
 ing to the genial significance of the poem. For in the third 
 instance, there is the contrast between Death, no longer Death 
 the sullen, but Death the serene, and the unchanged joyous- 
 ness of Birth. And here is what might be the coincidence of 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 73 
 
 Death and Birth. Negate Birth, and you have Death ; 
 negate Death, and you have Birth. That is, in the ordinary 
 dialectic. But the special subtlety of this conception is not 
 merely, having differentiated Death from Birth, to differentiate 
 it again from itself, but to differentiate it so that, under the 
 last aspect, it shall still be differentiated from Birth, and not 
 repeat any of the characteristic imagery there. The dialectic 
 is the true dialectic, by which hoth elements are held resolved 
 in a higher medium. Such is the motif, or rhetorical aspect 
 of the poem. Xow obviously enough, the imagery which runs 
 in a series of parallels expounding the general conception, 
 reflects in detail the dominant idea of the piece. But, apart 
 from that, it has a purely styhc value, according to the degree 
 of beauty and precision with which it expresses the separate 
 idea that it is intended to convey. Thus, independently, the 
 italicised passages are perfect in their effect. The one ex- 
 presses the redundancy of delicate sensuousness — delicate, 
 because sipping just catches the aspect of the lingeringly 
 parted lip, redundant, because the lip is painted as tasting, i.e. 
 receimng, a radiance, of whicli its own redness is in part the 
 cause, i.e. diffuses. The other expresses the sense of mystery, 
 in the veiling of the feet and hands, since the hand and the 
 foot are just the members that universally in ordinary use, 
 and for the sake of freedom of touch and movement, are left 
 uncovered by the mantle. 
 
 It happens that, mediately, through their relation to the 
 common totality, individual expressions have a relation to 
 each other, which are not immediately connected. Stylic_ 
 connection of individual propositions is with those which 
 stand next to them in the process of thinking ; rhetorical 
 connection of separate thoughts is that in which they recip- 
 
74 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 rocally illuminate each other at remoter distances. A piece 
 like " Birth and Death," so rich in felicitous concurrences, 
 and so frugal in its anxiety not to expend a single unneces- 
 sary thought or image, abounds in this kind of comple- 
 mentary significance. The beauty of Death has been 
 demonstrated not merely to comprehend the beauty of 
 Birth, but to transcend it. And that is the significance of 
 " a scent broodeth round her," &c., as opposed rhetorically 
 to the mere phase of vision in Birth. This reservation 
 marks a severely intellectual style of treatment. For the 
 sensuousness in the representation of Birth had reached, it 
 might have been supposed, a limit. And yet beyond that 
 limit, upon the necessity arising, the luxuriance is pressed, 
 the scent expressing a redundance of luxury that the mere 
 sight could never give. A subtler sense is brought into 
 action, and, as it happens, a rarer sensory even within that, 
 for the effect is not deadened by a description of the scent, 
 which simply is not that " of spices or gums " — an essence 
 that no flame of earth may ever kindle, and that asons of 
 ritual will not burn away. The significance of this part is 
 enhanced by its position as the concluding idea of the piece. 
 For by drafting the imagery into a separate world of sense, 
 the movement of the poem, towards its climax, is translated 
 suddenly into a transcendent region, and locked up into a 
 perpetual rest, inviolate as cathedrals, and of cathedral 
 stillness. 
 Cor. — Apart from the indirect significance every individual 
 expression ought to have in relation to the piece of which it 
 forms a part, and from the significance it may reflect upon 
 other individual expressions, it may occasionally have a direct 
 rhetorical significance. Why, in the concluding pliase of this 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 75 
 
 poem, should death be represented as sad with " a sadness 
 divine, too deep and too holy for sorrow," when it is felt that 
 (according to the Christian conception) she is the medium of 
 immortality ? Obviously enough, the association of jubilance 
 being preoccupied by Birth, if the totality of the conception is 
 to be integrated, a contrast must be preserved between the 
 two. Yet that is quite beside the point. Even literary sym- 
 metry must vanish, must be abolished, unless it coincides with 
 the radical truth on the question. It is also evident, but not 
 more pertinent, that if Death were represented as jubilant, in 
 a moment would go to ruin the primary conception of her as 
 sullen. And as a matter of fact in the execution, this cohesion 
 of the character is beautifully preserved against contradiction 
 in the contrasted phases late and early — to match the melan- 
 choly sweetness of the one there is no scowl, but a frown, nor 
 even a frown, but what " seems" to be a frown. That primary 
 conception, nevertheless, gives the cue to the representation of 
 Death, and is determined, antecedently to all artistic consi- 
 derations, by the natural feeling which it betokens, that of 
 instinctive awe. For here the poem is entirely subjective : 
 her dreadful aspect representing our feeling of dread. And 
 hence in the sequel her sorrow for us means our sorrow, our 
 anxiety for ourselves ; her attitude being one in spirit with our 
 own ; neither maliciously jubilant over her power of destruc- 
 tion, nor gratuitously jubilant over the reversionary gain; too 
 " holy" for the one, too " deep" for the other. Xor is that any 
 marvel, seeing that the mood of Death is too " deep" and too 
 "holy" for sorrow; a fortiori, therefore, as regards rejoicing. 
 Yet that which is too profound and too spiritual for vulgar 
 grief, as it is for vulgar jubilation, is not joy, but sadness ; and 
 necessarily so, in accordance with the subjective feeling. But 
 
76 LOGIC OF SriTE. 
 
 why " deep," and why " holy " ? Because, in the one case, it is 
 associated with reflection, in the other, because it is unselfish. 
 And the grief of sadness is infinitely deeper than the grief of 
 sorrow, because expounded by a power of reflection, by which 
 Death sees herself as a universal agency, remembering all 
 whom she has destroyed, and thinking of all those whom she 
 must destroy; and infinitely holier, because she gTieves not 
 for herself the inevitable destroyer, but for us whom she 
 destroys. That is the philosophic rendering of the truth of 
 the distinction, and that is also the stylic significance of the 
 expression. What now of its rhetorical application to the 
 whole final conception of Death as sad ? It founds upon the 
 essential j^assivity, expressed in the words " deep" and " holy." 
 Death knows no casual victims, and grieves with no petulant 
 grief, since she is no arbitrary instrument, but the fulfilling of 
 a fatality, which being necessary must for that very reason be 
 just, and not to be made the occasion of sickly grief, — and 
 being just, must be laden with some reversionary hope. StiU 
 that hope, being yet in reversion, is not to be saluted with 
 boisterous anticipation. The figure of Death is still turned 
 toward us, as an experience that must be faced ; though its 
 illumination is from beyond. But since its significance, if 
 understood in its intense passivity, is not more that of a uni- 
 versal than that of a mediate necessity, the indirect suggestion 
 of the one by the other is infinitely more subtle and pregnant, 
 than if the figure had been turned round amid the blare of 
 anthems and the blaze of resurrection. 
 
 9. 
 
 Besides the indirect significance which any passage may hear, 
 there is for every passage an indirect literary efl'ect, superadded 
 
OF STYLE GENEKALLY. 77 
 
 to its immediate stylic effect. This superadded effect is also 
 rhetorical, as contradistinguislied from the stylic. 
 
 The two canons according to which literary effect is most 
 rapidly determined are these two — force and artistic beauty. 
 There is no effective passage, of which we cannot say it is 
 either forcible or beautiful. But obviously every passage 
 that is forcible is also to a certain extent beautiful, and 
 vice versa. That a man does not generally admire the way 
 in which he has been knocked down, does not disprove 
 this ; his irritation may interfere to prevent it. But that in 
 a single instance he has so far abstracted from his personal 
 feeling as to admire a telling blow of that kind, is a com- 
 plete proof that the exhibition of modulated power has of 
 itself a reflex esthetic value. So also the mere view of a 
 fragile object, a petal, or a piece of porcelain, conveys pro 
 tanto a sense of power. Even verbally they may be shown to 
 have a certain identity. By " effect," in common phrase, we 
 mean, on the one hand, palpable result ; and a thing is effec- 
 tive just in proportion as it produces such a result. But a 
 thing done " for effect," on the other hand, expresses the last 
 definite purpose assignable for any exertion whatever — the 
 sublation of all ordinary purpose — viz. an aesthetic purpose. 
 The phrase has become partly one of contempt. But it is 
 legitimate, seeing that the aesthetic purpose is itself a 
 teleologic purpose, and the teleologic value in that case is 
 exactly proportioned to the a3sthetic result. It is the same 
 with literary effect : — 
 
 How sweet is thy love, O my sister, my betrothed ! 
 
 How sweet is thy love above wine ! 
 
 And the fragrance of thy perfumes above all the spices ! 
 
 Thy lips, my betrothed, distil boney ; 
 
 Honey and milk are under thy tongue, 
 
78 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 And the odoiir of tliy gamients is as the smell of Lebanon. 
 
 A closed garden art thou, my sister, my betrothed, 
 
 A closed (jarden, a sealed fountain. 
 
 Thy shoots like a garden of pomegranates, 
 
 With precious fruits. 
 
 Cypresses and nards, 
 
 Nard and crocus. 
 
 Calamus and cinnamon, 
 
 With all sorts of frankincense trees, 
 
 Myrrh and aloes ; 
 
 With all kinds of excellent aromatics, 
 
 With a garden-fountain, 
 
 A well of living waters, 
 
 And streams flowing from Lebanon. 
 
 Arise, north wind ! and come, thou south ! 
 
 Blow upon my garden, 
 
 That its perfumes may flow out ! 
 
 There is no immediate force of expression here ; never- 
 theless it produces for us not merely a sense of power in 
 the artist, but a sense of force that is not in spite of, but 
 directly proportioned to, the beauty in the expression. And 
 so conversely : — 
 
 The mouth is amply developed. Brutalities unspeakable sit upon 
 the upper lip, which is confluent Avith a snout ; for separate nostrils 
 there are none. But the lower lip, which is drawn inwards with the 
 curve of a marine shell — oh, what a convolute of cruelty and revenge 
 is there! Cruelty! — to whom 1 Eevenge !— for what ? Pause not to 
 ask ; but look i;pwards to other mysteries. In the very region of his 
 temples, driving itself downwards into his cruel brain, and breaking 
 the continuity of his diadem, is a horrid chasm, a ravine, a shaft, that 
 many centuries would not traverse ; and it is serrated on its posterior 
 wall with a harrow that is partly liidden. From the anterior wall of 
 this chasm rise, in vertical directions, two processes ; one per^Dendi- 
 cular, and rigid as a horn, the other streaming forward before some 
 portentous breath.^ 
 
 1 Description of the Kclula in Orion : by De Quincey. 
 
OF STYLE GENERALLY. 79 
 
 Not an image of beauty is here ; yet extrinsically, and 
 because of its essential force, a reflex testlietic sense is pro- 
 duced. And but for its force this effect would not be given. 
 Directly it excludes beauty just as much as weakness. But 
 that which in itself excludes beauty becomes thus the me- 
 diator of it in relation to expressions which seemed calculated 
 to express the reverse, viz. repulsiveness. The indirect effect 
 in both these cases is rhetorical, that is to say, it is not dis- 
 tinctively the same for either, but alternatively. It may 
 be difficult at times to say which is the immediate effect, 
 and which the derived, since they meet in every passage. 
 But the same causes which operate to make the relation 
 dual, and, therefore, on occasion, equivocal, necessarily 
 operate as a ground for distingtushing which is the derived, 
 and which the immediate, whether beauty or force. 
 COK. — The rhetorical principle holds true in the converse case, 
 that whatever is generally inartistic is to that extent weak, 
 and whatever is weak is inartistic. But whether negatively, 
 or positively, the rhetorical possibilities of effect, as well as 
 those of stylic effect on which they found, rest ultimately on 
 the possibilities of the formation and aggregation, the differen- 
 tiating and the grouping of individual expressions, in tlieir 
 simple ultimate relations of Quality and Quantity. Of these 
 the primary relation is that of Quality. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of Quality. 
 Section I. The Conditions of Quality. 
 
 10. 
 
 The universal criterion for style, first and last, is effect. If a 
 man calls you a fool, he produces a result, because of some 
 issue or principle suggested, and connecting itself with some 
 sentiment — of chagrin or astonishment, of pain or resentment, 
 etc. Now the inevitable co-factor in all such cases is novelty. 
 The proposition advanced need not be substantially new ; it 
 may be identically a repetition of an old charge or statement. 
 But that mere quantitative or numerical difference is sufficient 
 to create a sensation of novelty. It is not that you have not 
 been told so before ; but it is that you are now told so by a 
 different person. Or perhaps it is not even that ; but it is 
 that you are now told it by the same person a second time. 
 That of itself stimulates the attention, apart from the stimulus 
 otherwise lent by the fact that something was to be said, 
 which you expected to be something new. And the faculties 
 of reproduction are known implicitly to be so weak, that your 
 informant trusts either to your having forgotten it, or else you 
 politely bear with it, trusting that he has forgotten having 
 said it. And if not, you revolt. You did not come there, 
 you say, to learn that, or you did not pay to hear that, etc. 
 
OF QUALITY. 81 
 
 And supposing what you are told to be something like this, 
 that six and five make eleven, you rebel, because an effect is 
 produced which you cannot get rid of, and which is produced, 
 just because the statement which occasions it is not novel. 
 That being your desideratum, perhaps even your sine qua non, 
 the result is not immediately, because the statement is com- 
 monplace, but mediately, because it is not original. 
 
 In so far as logic is the immediate science of truth, it 
 supplies any essential virtue that might be found to belong 
 to an art like style in expounding truth. What style re- 
 ceives for itself is only a certain percentage of commission 
 for making the truth tell. The amount of its profits, how- 
 ever, is determined, not merely by the degree of its success, 
 but by the amount of truth which it communicates. This 
 is the second and implicit condition of style, just as logic, 
 after its own fashion, acknowledges the condition of origi- 
 nality. There is no need, it is felt there, of illustrating the 
 multiplication-table ; all that must be left to the illumi- 
 nator, or embosser on new patterns. And even in testing a 
 proposition accepted as true, the tester is virtually assuming 
 that it is not known to be true. When attested, therefore, 
 it is 2^'i'o tanto original ; truth becoming thus a synthetic idea. 
 And conversely, originality, instead of meaning simply that 
 which is not known, comes to mean that which is not 
 known to be true. 
 Cor. — The absolute criterion of all suggestion is truth ; novelty 
 is only relative. But, as it happens, style deals distinctively 
 with the relative, leaving logic to deal with the absolute. It 
 is to be distinctly observed, however, that the relativity 
 of truth ascribed to style is that of novelty, not of particu- 
 larity. A statement, according to literary modes of dealing. 
 
82 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 is relatively true for a man for whom it was not true before, 
 not as being true for him, because false for some one else. 
 The purpose of style is not simply to defend or aggrandise a 
 foregone conclusion in any man's mind, dividing the world on 
 any particular question into two factions, those who believe 
 the one phase, and those who believe the other. The division 
 which it makes is of all men into two sections, those who 
 know a truth, and those who know it not (a much more uni- 
 versal division than the other, since that upon most questions 
 leaves a third space open and indifferent), or, it may be, those 
 wdio know it adequately, and those who know it inadequately. 
 For as soon as a truth is announced, and to some extent 
 recognised, there is a call to intensify the impression at the 
 moment, and make the truth better known — known more 
 clearly, more forcibly, more captivatingly. If the idea is ap- 
 prehended as yet only in figure, explicate it literally ; if it is 
 scientifically obscure, bring it through figure into a clearer 
 apprehension. Have the data become stale ? — let them be 
 vivified by historical illustration ; or superannuated ? — let 
 them be supplemented by later researches, so as to equate the 
 interest of the listener, on the one hand, with their importance, 
 and on the other, with their fertility. The result in this case is 
 not, as in the first, where the gain to one side is a dead loss to 
 the other, but always a positive advantage ; and, for the 
 individual, of knowledge experimental instead of visionary, 
 and of knowledge coherent instead of confused and partial. 
 
 11. 
 All effect, depending ultimately on the conditions of novelty 
 and truth, is produced mediately through the terms of separate 
 propositions, through the mutual relations of subject and pre- 
 
OF QUALITV. 0.3 
 
 dicate. This is what constitutes Quality in stylo generally ; 
 
 in which if is identical as to its basis with Quantity in lorjic. 
 The quality of a thought is that wliich makes it to differ 
 from other thoughts, to be that which distinctively it is. 
 In logic, all this descends upon the copula; and the 
 differentiation there is of the simplest; for no matter in 
 what way the subject and predicate behave, the question 
 revolves upon us : Is it, or is it not so ? With a different 
 criterion, the differentiation of style is more complex; it 
 allows of various kinds and degrees of effect, where logic 
 allows of none. And hence the fact that the onus of the 
 differentiation settles upon the subject and predicate. In 
 logic, novelty being satisfied {i.e. postulated), the question 
 of truth devolves upon the copula. AVhich implicit canon 
 of observance being settled for style, the explicit stylic con- 
 dition is fulfilled in the subject and predicate. It would be 
 spurious to insist upon the distinction between truth and 
 novelty, as if the first were related specially to the subject, 
 and the latter to the predicate. It is to a certain extent 
 true, that, since the predicate comes last, the attention 
 apprehends the novelty of the conception, only when the 
 final term is distinctly rapped out, and its truth, only when 
 it travels back upon the subject, to compare the one with 
 the other. In fact neither term acts without the other. 
 And as logic claims the copula, in which its results are 
 determined, through the subject and predicate, so style lays 
 claim to the latter, in which its results are determined 
 through the copula. And this happens not in spite of, but 
 because of the fact, that the terms and the copula are 
 capable of reciprocal variation (by permutation, etc.). Also 
 it happens not in spite of, but expressly because of the fact. 
 
84 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 that each science is governed fundamentally l3y the same 
 
 laws. 
 Cor. — Quality in the scientific sense is obviously to be dis- 
 criminated from any thoughtless figurative use of the term 
 applied to what are certain 'properties of style (loosely called 
 qualities) or quasi -rhetorical criteria (§ 9, p. 77), founding 
 upon this one elementary and homogeneous fact of quality. 
 It would evidently be a very coarse and a very gratuitous 
 confusion, to place such properties of style as Force and 
 Beauty in the same category with the elements of style, such, 
 for example, as sublimity. (1.) These properties form a dis- 
 tinct set of criteria, applicable to any passage, superadded to 
 the criteria which determine its effect as regulated by the 
 amount of sentiment. And to place both under a common 
 category is, therefore, the same thing as to classify together 
 wool, platinum, hardness and flexibility. Metaphor and 
 other elements are quite overlooked in this process, which have 
 equal right to go into the category of so-called qualities 
 with sublimity. And the gist of their exclusion is, that as 
 elements they are left to be qualified by the properties includ- 
 ing sublimity; which means precisely that tin and copper, 
 etc., are qualified in respect of certain attributes, such as hard- 
 ness, flexibility — and iron ! (2.) While the properties of style 
 involve each other reciprocally (§ 9), the elements of style do 
 not ; they are either indifferent, as in metaphor and sublimity, 
 or else mutually exclusive, as in sublimity and humour. (3.) 
 The properties of style are to be found in every thought ; the 
 elements are only occasional, i.e. variable merely and alterna- 
 tive. Every thought is more or less clear, more or less beauti- 
 ful, more or less forcible ; the properties come directly into 
 question in regard to every expression, and in their totality. 
 
OF QUALITY, 85 
 
 Some element of expression must, of course, be in every 
 thought, but each, as it were, only in rotation. 
 
 12. 
 
 The principle by which a term is divided, according as it 
 signifies certain attributes, or the number of objects to which 
 these may be extended, is known under some name or other 
 to all readers. It might be supposed that for style, if any 
 change of nomenclature were required, it would be sufficient to 
 introduce some phrase which might express the essentially 
 compound nature of the connotation in its terms. That, in 
 fact, is not the case, but the reverse ; since the very relation 
 which calls attention to the connotation of attributes in a 
 compound, calls attention to the fact that each complex term 
 is divisible into attributes numerically separate. Accordingly, 
 by the inclusion of a term is meant, in relation to style, the 
 aggregation of a certain number of attributes, and by its im- 
 plication, its comprehension of a certain congeries of in- 
 dividuals. The implication of " thing," for example, is 
 universal; since it covers all objects indifferently, and, 
 without a hint of the brilliance and mass of whatsoever 
 attributes they may include, itself most meagre in respect of 
 that inclusion which it vilipends in other terms. This is 
 borne out in a somewhat paradoxical way. When a boarding- 
 school young lady does not dare to be directly and maliciously 
 impudent, or is too excited or too refined to express herself 
 with vehemence, she calls her friend and enemy a " thing ; " 
 where the very absence of all positive inclusion is the ground 
 of the derived significance. The individual is denuded of all 
 that constitutes individuality in the sense affecting her — is re- 
 duced to the individuality which distinguishes one farthing 
 
86 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 from another. And tlie term is applied witli most effect to j 
 person, since from a person there is most to take away. This 
 is the opposite case, viz., depth of inclusion. For, agreeably 
 to the dual meaning of the term, individuality, which, on tlit 
 one side, signifies abstract identity, an identity which one other 
 individual is sufficient to expound, signifies also a concrete 
 identity, which it may take an infinite variety of others to 
 expound. 
 
 The more common and superficial relations of description 
 and distribution (as opposed to definition and division) are 
 essentially stylic in their adaptation. Description, for ex- 
 ample, by way of simile — e.g. a stammerer being described, 
 as one who had swallowed the alphabet wdthout chewing it, 
 and in revenge had to go through the process of mastication 
 when needing to use it — is highly in the manner of style. 
 To call a man " both knave and fool " is quite allowable, as 
 a matter of description. But a very comical mode of de- 
 scription is to counterfeit the technical machinery of 
 division, as in saying that a man is " half knave and half 
 fool," the man being indivisible in that sense, and indescrib- 
 able, therefore, if he were so divided. 
 CoE. — Quality as such in style has a definite meaning, in so 
 far as it is to be distinguished from a possible quantity ; and 
 a technical meaning, in so far as it is to be contradistinguished 
 from logical quality. A second meaning which may be 
 attached to it is the metaphysical. And accordingly, I draw 
 attention, for the moment, to the fact of the internal relations 
 of propositions generally, thus : — 
 
 Quantity. Qualitij. Mode. 
 
 All IMen (are) Hypocrites. 
 
 Thirdly, however, it happens that, in common phrase, the 
 
OF QUALITY. 87 
 
 relations, wliicli here are seen to commingle, may be spoken 
 of as convertible with each other. Accordingly, if I proclaim 
 the fact that all men are hypocrites, I shall receive the next 
 day anonymous letters, requesting, indifferently as regards the 
 expression (though peremptorily enough, in all likelihood, as 
 regards the intention), that the statement shall be " qualified," 
 or •• modified." " Quantified," as being a trifle too scientific 
 and, therefore, too calm for an anonymous letter, would not 
 be used. Nevertheless, either of the three terms may be 
 applied to any of the specific functions of the proposition. 
 And as " modify," which means first of all to accentuate, or be 
 the cause of the accentuation of any specific difference in 
 an object, comes to signify a variation of the present state 
 of the object, so "quantify" comes to signify a variation in 
 the numerical relations or possibilities of any term. The pre- 
 dicate, therefore, which strictly is modal, may also be quanti- 
 fied. Only it is a variation of its inclusion which takes place, 
 not of its implication; the distinction of the altered term 
 being, not that it is specifically connected with this or that 
 subject, to the exclusion of other subjects, but that it is con- 
 nected with this or that subject to the exclusion of other pre- 
 dicates. Its value is determined accordingly either by way of 
 its being preferred to other predicates generally, or differ- 
 entially, by way of its being preferred to such as from their 
 resistance are hard to supersede. That being understood, it 
 does not matter how I amend my statement, whether by 
 quantifying, qualifying, or modifying. Only that most appro- 
 priately (according to the scheme already given), when I am 
 asked to retract my paradox, I quantify it, by saying " some 
 men are hypocrites ; " being pressed still farther, I qualify it, 
 by saying "some hoicked men are hypocrites," --and finally, 
 
 UNIVEKSITY 
 
 iSlZ-IFORNlA. 
 
88 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 being pressed into something like the truth, modify it, by 
 acknowledging in desperation, that " some wicked men are 
 occasionally hypocrites." With regard to which it may be 
 noticed (1) that the critical term in every proposition is the 
 middle term, the qualitative, which preserves an equivocal 
 relation to the others, changing what is ushered into it from 
 qiiantity in the shape of implication, into the shape of inclu- 
 sion when that is transferred to mode. (2) The ratios of 
 variation are the same, both for implication and inclusion, in 
 so far as both vary numerically. Thus an "all" is always 
 greater than a " some." (o) The subject and predicate ex- 
 pound and modify each other, and that directly, through the 
 common relations of implication and inclusion. A diminution 
 of the implication of the subject is followed by an expansion 
 of the inclusion of the predicate, and conversely. Also a 
 diminution of the implication or inclusion of the subject is 
 accompanied by a corresponding diminution in the implication 
 or inclusion of the predicate ; and similarly in regard to its 
 expansion. But while the process of variation may be ex- 
 pounded numerically, the immediate ground of the variation 
 is essentially one of quality. The union of two attributes is 
 not simply one of numerical increment, but one of combina- 
 tion. " Quaint," for example, which, abstractly considered, is 
 the synthesis of two conceptions, to wit peculiarity, with an 
 element of simplicity, is really qualitative, in so far as one of 
 these attributes, at least, is complex, and its,Q\i a fortiori is a 
 unity of complex meaning. The general principles, according 
 to which the variation of quality is determined, are Subtlety 
 and Comprehensiveness. 
 
OF QUALITY, 
 
 89 
 
 Section II. Of SuUlety. 
 13. 
 Every truth that is determined negatively, i.e. by way of 
 resistance to, or essential variation upon some antecedent con- 
 ception, falls, like every truth that is simply positive, under 
 one of three categories : it is either an All, a Some, or a None. 
 And it does so, by way of contradistinction to some one of the 
 correlative formulae. The disaffection is organic ; each form 
 being complementary to the rest, not simply as a positive 
 resource for meeting a specific emergency, but negatively, as 
 an exponent of the value and significance of the form against 
 which for the time being it is measured. Accordingly the 
 form of every proposition may be explicated thus, the thesis 
 representing the fallacious version, and the antithesis the 
 amended version : — 
 
 Thesis. 
 
 
 Antithesis. 
 
 No P is Q. 
 
 {Univ.) 
 
 All P is Q. 
 
 No P is Q. 
 
 {Part.) 
 
 Some P is Q. 
 
 All P is Q. 
 
 {Sing.) 
 
 Some P is Q, 
 
 and conversely : — 
 
 
 
 Tliesis. 
 
 
 Antithesis. 
 
 All P is Q. 
 
 {Univ.) 
 
 No P is Q. 
 
 Some P is Q. 
 
 {Part.) 
 
 No P is Q. 
 
 Some P is Q. 
 
 {Sing.) 
 
 All P is Q. 
 
 The implication of the terms is thus expanded, in the first 
 section of the scheme, and restricted in the second. Accord- 
 ingly, a restrictive universal is formed by reducing an all to a 
 none, and an expansive universal, by extending a none to an 
 all ; and the particular is restricted and expanded correspond- 
 ingly. In the case of singular propositions, however, the 
 reverse takes place. To reduce an all to a some is to expand 
 
90 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 the force of wliat is thus restricted, and to raise the appreci- 
 able value of the term as singular — as sole and peculiar. 
 And so to reduce the force of a singular proposition is not to 
 reduce it to a blank negation, but to make it indistinguishable 
 and general, by expanding the some to an all. Any fallacy 
 there consists in equating all P with Q, when what should 
 have been equated with Q was simply some portion or func- 
 tion of P, viz. p. But now, let P be measured against other 
 terms, as being itself the singular equivalent for the predicate 
 Q ; and the fallacy will consist in equating the generic term, 
 say S, with Q, to the obscuring of P. P is here a portion of 
 S ; and, by substituting S for P, you neutralise the specific 
 value of P. But by substituting S, you have altered the 
 inclusion of the term : so long as the talk was of P simply, 
 there was only change of implication ; but now that you have 
 brought in S, and expanded the implication (from P = some 
 S, to all S) you have restricted the inclusion. Hitherto, I had 
 held that only those refined-men-who-were-easily-provoked 
 were backbiters, but you disabuse me of that belief, by insist- 
 ins that all refined men, more or less, are backbiters. But 
 now, upon this suggestion of a variation in the inclusion of a 
 term, follows another change. You tell me, for example, that 
 "all language is progressive, save in very rude and early 
 periods," and I am startled by the proposition, having been 
 accustomed to regard language as then most aggressive, when 
 much remained to be discovered in the way of new ideas, 
 and most stationary, when literature had developed, and made 
 men everywhere conversant with the whole complement of 
 ideas. But the form, under which the new conception pre- 
 sents itself to me is this, surprise that anytliing in language 
 should be associated with progression — in the technical for- 
 
OF QUALITY. 
 
 91 
 
 inula, that any P should be Q. By and by, I may realise the 
 fact, that all language is progressive, by pitting that proposi- 
 tion (all P is Q) against the other (some P is Q), and so, 
 mediately, pitting it against the original one, no P is Q. The 
 distinction, in regard to this form of proposition, is that it 
 eliminates the negative universal of the first schema, and 
 substitutes, under a different valuation, what was the singular 
 form as its particular, having provided itself with a new 
 singular, determined, not internally and by preserving the 
 same term (P), but externally, and by repudiating a new 
 generic form, S, thus : — 
 
 Tliesis. 
 
 
 Antithesis. 
 
 Some P is Q. 
 
 (Univ.) 
 
 All P is Q. 
 
 No P is Q. 
 
 (Part.) 
 
 Some P is Q. 
 
 All S is Q. 
 
 (Sincj.) 
 
 Only P is Q. 
 
 and negatively: — 
 
 
 
 Thesis. 
 
 
 Antithesis. 
 
 All P is Q. 
 
 (Univ.) 
 
 Some P is Q. 
 
 Some P is Q. 
 
 (Part.) 
 
 No P is Q. 
 
 Only P is Q. 
 
 {Sing.) 
 
 AU S is Q, 
 
 Evidently, therefore, in the positive part of the schema, the 
 universal antithesis is formed upon the thesis, by expanding the 
 implication, the particular, by expanding the inclusion, and 
 the singular, by restricting the implication. And in the 
 privative section, the iiniversal antithesis is formed, by 
 restricting the implication, the particular, by restricting the 
 inclusion, and the singular, by expanding the implication. 
 
 Now subtlety, in general, consists precisely (with the help of 
 surprise) in the legitimate variation of one or other of these 
 formulae to its antithetic formula ; and always by means of 
 the inclusion of the proposition. For any variation in a pro- 
 position, whether real or fancied, depends uj)on some varia- 
 tion, real or spurious, in its inclusion. Its terms need not 
 
92 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 vary verbally ; but they must substantially, so that the varia- 
 tion shall be reciprocally expounded by each. If a man tells 
 me that the dogma of Papal Infallibility is a regulative and 
 practical, as opposed to a constitutive and essential doctrine, 
 he expands for me the permanent inclusion of the dogma, on 
 that side at least. But, at the same moment, he has added to 
 the implication of the term " regulative," as extended to this 
 very dogma. Accordingly, in this instance, in which it is the 
 inclusion of the subject that is expanded, the variation is 
 advertised by a corresponding expansion in the implication of 
 tlie predicate. Here, however, appears what might be a blank 
 contradiction to the principle of variation (as expressed on p. 
 88), affecting the inverse movement of expansion and implica- 
 tion in subject and predicate. The rationale, nevertheless, is 
 clear : " any " and " none " cannot be measured the one 
 against the other, as if they stood to each other as genus and 
 species, or vice versa ; they are contraries, and not partial coin- 
 cidents. But the moment it is a question of reciprocal varia- 
 tion of terms, where they may be compared as genus to 
 species, or species to genus, the principle of inversion takes 
 effect ; as in fact it does here with regard to the other forms 
 of variation in propositions. The subject and predicate vary 
 reciprocally thus (the particular proposition being here made 
 to usurp the position of the universal) in the positive 
 scheme : — 
 
 The Particular (some P, as against no P) expands the 
 inclusion of the subject, and the implication of the pre- 
 dicate. 
 
 The Universal (all P, as against some P) restricts the 
 inclusion of the subject, and expands the implication of 
 the predicate. 
 
OF QUALITY. 93 
 
 Tlic Singular (only P, as against all S) expands the 
 inclusion of the subject, and restricts the implication of the 
 predicate. 
 In the negative : — 
 
 The Particular (no P, as against some P) restricts the 
 inclusion of the subject, and the implication of the pre- 
 dicate. 
 
 The Universal (some P, as against all P) expands the 
 inclusion of the subject, and restricts the implication of the 
 predicate. 
 
 The Singular (all S, as against P simply) restricts the 
 inclusion of the subject, and expands the implication of the 
 predicate. 
 So far, however, there is nothing to discriminate what is 
 subtle from what is novel. You tell us that your brother has 
 joined a secret society. The terms certainly expound each 
 other ; but there is no subtlety in your statement, and if there 
 could be, it would be in the fact, not in you. And were it 
 not that the subtlety would be in us, for suggesting it, we 
 should advise you to go and look your brother well round, 
 and see if he is not immensely corpulent, and then come and 
 tell us that he had gained admission to the society through 
 the keyhole. For in some such fashion must you strike the 
 manner of subtlety, i.e. in a proposition, whose terms do not 
 appear immediately to reciprocate, as to their differential 
 restriction and expansion. It will astonish people to hear 
 that corpulence should include anything like getting through 
 a keyhole, and that getting through a keyhole should 
 implicate anything in the shape of corpulence. 
 
 Any variation of a truth that is logically coherent must 
 itself be definite. Only, in logic, it is quite enough, if the 
 
94 ■ LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 alteration rests with the antithesis, and simply says that 
 the thesis is not what it was asserted to be. But this is not 
 sufficient, according to style. Tliere it is indispensable to 
 assign the counter-position, to say what a thing is or is not, 
 and hoiv much of it. And thus it happens, that many a 
 writer, bent simply on the exposition of his subject, and 
 concerning himself not in the least about his logic, or about 
 the possible objections he may be meeting, is reversing 
 whole trains of thought in the minds of his readers, without 
 being aware that he is overriding theories of which he has 
 never heard, and without even being reminded that he is 
 colliding wdth theories wdiich he knows very well. It is a 
 commonplace fact, that a man may write well, and may 
 reason well, without knowing how he does it. But the real 
 point of such a fact is this, that he should write well, with- 
 out knowing that he is effecting a good deal by his involved 
 reasoning. After a similar fashion, it happens, that the 
 perception of a subtle effect on the part of the reader, as 
 w^ell as of the writer, while it is always positive, and 
 matches a definite antecedent, does not necessarily involve 
 the formulating of the antagonist position from which it is 
 a rebound. At the same time, a process of rapid mediation 
 does go on in the adjusting of subtle effects — which forms a 
 distinctive mode of syllogising. To speak of re-entrant 
 angles as " tedious," for example, is subtle. "What we bar- 
 gained for in the inclusion of the re-entrant angle was its 
 intricacy, wdiich we find quite safe, i^lus the idea of weari- 
 someness, with a trifle of carriage to pay for the additional 
 hint. Our knoAvledge of the first has been employed to 
 mediate the conception of the second. Accordingly, this is 
 the rationale of the stylic syllogism : — 
 
OF QUALITY. 95 
 
 Re-entrant angles are tedious. 
 Since — ? They are intricate. 
 And forsooth — ? All that is intricate is tedious. 
 
 And correspondingly in the negative case. The progress is 
 
 from the singular, through the particular, to the universal ; 
 
 and consists rigorously in making explicit what in the 
 
 subject was implicit. 
 Cor. — The second and third formulie in both branches of the 
 scheme, as finally explicated, admit each of a twofold mode of 
 phrasing. For example, all P, as against some P, may be 
 read, either as restricting the inclusion of the subject, and 
 expanding the implication of the predicate, or else as expand- 
 ing the implication of the former, and restricting the inclu- 
 sion of the latter. But secondly, the universal in the first 
 section, and the singular in the second, are identical as to 
 phrasing, in either of these relations ; and correspondingly, 
 the singular of the first section is identical in form with the 
 universal in the second. Accordingly, the formulee reduce 
 themselves to four. But thirdly, the remaining universal and 
 singular are really functions of the particular, the one in the 
 positive, the other in the negative relation. For, having 
 been accustomed to think, good soid, that some S (viz. P) 
 was Q, I am naturally surprised to learn that " any S may 
 be Q," as, for example, X & Y. Or conversely, having 
 been used to associate X & Y with Q, among other members 
 of S, I am horrified to discover that, P only being Q, they are 
 now disimplicated in relation to Q, i.e. that " any S is not Q." 
 The variation, therefore, in either case (negative or positive), 
 being a differential variation, and since the universal and 
 singular may each be expressed in terms of the implication of 
 the predicate, and the inclusion of the subject, the generic or 
 representative formula for subtlety in a proposition is this : 
 
96 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 that it turns upon the differential inclusion of the subject, as 
 expounded by the differential implication of the predicate. 
 
 14. 
 
 Subtlety may appear in three forms, in a proposition, in a 
 term (which is a condensed form of the proposition), or in the 
 link between two propositions (which is an expanded form of 
 the proposition). Now the terms and the propositions have 
 this in common, that each is concerned either with a fact, a 
 principle, or an analogy. In regard to the term, for example, 
 we have the word " fool," to express a fact, " doltish," to 
 express the principle or tendency, and " donkey," to express 
 the analogy. And in the proposition, after its own method, 
 we express the fact, by saying that such and such a man is a 
 fool, or doltish, or a donkey ; the principle, by saying that all 
 people who sit long with damp feet are fools, doltish, etc. ; 
 and the analogue, by saying that such and such a person 
 looked like a donkey — which is precisely the distinction 
 between metaphor and simile, the one belonging to the term, 
 the other to the proposition. 
 
 1. In the realm of Fact ; and according to the principle of 
 Attention. (1) There is the order of cases, in which the 
 mind simply reproduces individual phenomena, with no 
 activity beyond wdiat is needed to make these significant. 
 Thus {a) in the relation of the universal, the expression, 
 applied to the bee, of " velvet " — because, being in the first 
 place recondite {i.e. not such as most men would explicate 
 to themselves), it applies to all bees, and so enhances 
 differentially the perception of the individual who does 
 explicate the idea, seeing that other people, from the very 
 commonness of the fact, have just as much opportunity for 
 
OF QUALITY. 97 
 
 explicating it as he. (b) In the region of the particular, 
 
 the expression, 
 
 Grape-green all the waves are, 
 
 is subtle, just for the converse reason, viz. that the effect 
 
 thus painted is comparatively rare, and, therefore, evasive. 
 
 All waves are not green, nor all green waves grape -green. 
 
 (c) In the relation of the singular : — 
 
 Yonder bee anon 
 Muffles low huni in some campanula 
 Of nectared amethyst, and hums again. 
 
 That applies only to the bee. The noise of a blue-bottle, 
 gratuitously hushed on a window-pane, is a very different 
 thing. This has all the effect of accident, with all ^the 
 sanction of necessity. (2) Subtlety in the reproduction of 
 fact arises from the activity of the mind in relation to the 
 phenomena, so as to produce a result that is true, but 
 hypostatised. («) By way of negatively hypostatising the 
 collateral facts, e.g. to speak of the sea-beach as 
 
 Kissed by wavelets by winds forsaken, 
 (h) By way of abstracting from the real totality of the 
 facts, e.g. 
 
 Green lizards glance among the sunbaked stones, 
 Or rest at gaze with shoulder on the stone 
 And half their shadow, 
 
 where there is a very quiet oblivion of the other, and, as 
 the poet perhaps whispers maliciously to himself, the 
 better half, (c) By way of integrating the conception to 
 something more than it appears. Thus a writer describes 
 the ox : — 
 
 Audibly ruminating, couch'd at ease 
 Upon his shadow, in a luminous moon. 
 G 
 
98 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 The idea naturally attached to shadow is that obscuration 
 which may be seen — which demands some space inter- 
 mediate between the object and the surface on which the 
 shade is projected. So that what the animal seems to lie 
 upon is precisely not its shadow. Now the poet has a 
 perfect sanction, from the natural science point of view, to 
 speak as he does. Only, and quite apart from that, he 
 produces artistically an effect appreciable by all in extend- 
 ing the ground-shadow, so as to make it bounded on either 
 side by light, and not on the one side by light, and on the 
 other by the shade on the animal — in extending the 
 unilluminated space from what w^e see to what (though it 
 exists) we do not and never shall see. (3) Subtlety in the 
 portraiture of fact may show itself in realising to the 
 reflection truth that is actual and complex, (a) In the 
 selection of an accidental relation or complexity : — 
 
 From the sails the dew did drip — 
 Till clomb above the eastern bar 
 The homed moon, with one bright star 
 Within the nether tip. 
 
 There is such a thing in what is casual as profound 
 
 verisimilitude, for it is just the fortuitous which is the 
 
 constant in all natural phenomena, (h) In the portrayal of 
 
 a reflex agency : — 
 
 Those angel forms — 
 Such blush their grain of puiion warms 
 As in a milk-%vhite lily gloics, 
 Leaned over by a lovelit rose ; 
 
 and (c) in the expression of relief, as here : — 
 
 And then away the toddler flew 
 To bury her wee face where covert grew 
 Of marestail and of fern, a forest small 
 Within the forest, taller than them all. 
 
OF QUALITY. 99 
 
 2. In the realm of Principle, and according to the 
 canon of Eeason. By principle, I mean relation substantial 
 and philosophic ; whose various orders are embraced within 
 the following schema : — 
 
 Relation. 
 Origination. 
 Mediation. 
 Resiiltance. 
 Disrelatioyi. Correlation. 
 
 Transcendence. Community. 
 
 Adversation. Reciprocity- 
 
 Approximation. Convertibility. 
 
 Subtlety of mediation, which is the central conception of 
 the first group, may be illustrated from the syllogism, 
 which is expressly the formulating of a conclusion regard- 
 ing one proposition, through the medium of another. This 
 paragraph affords a fine example of subtlety (under the 
 category of origin), in discerning the secret source and 
 motive of a certain symbolic treatment : — " It has been said 
 that the fawn belongs to Apollo and Diana, because stags are 
 sensitive to music. But I have myself no doubt, that in 
 this particular relation to the gods of morning, it always 
 stands as the symbol of wavering and glancing motion on the 
 ground, as well as of the light and shadow through the 
 leaves, chequering the ground as the fawn is dappled."^ 
 Here the commonplace explanation, relying upon a prin- 
 ciple that is sometimes subtler than that of the eye, but 
 which in this case is too remote and visionary, is easily 
 overthrown by a reference drawn from the more obvious 
 sense. And in fact, an absolute proof, unique in character 
 and in dignity, is given of the truth of the latter rendering, 
 
 1 Mr. Euskin. 
 
100 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 by an expression in a poem^ published a short time 
 previously : — 
 
 " And as they leave her in the rain, 
 A milk-white doe she often fed 
 Through the dim forest limps ia pain 
 
 To lean its head 
 Upon the harsh grave-wall and die. 
 
 More sweet to it than dells of green, 
 Where mate and fawn sun-dappled lie, 
 Thy grave, Kathleen ! " 
 
 The effect of transcendence (in the second group of cate- 
 gories) is always produced by a result that has apparently 
 broken loose from its mediation, and whose factors it re- 
 quires a little reflection to rally. Thus : — " If a luminous 
 body were to be struck out of existence twelve millions of 
 miles away, an observer would still see it for a minute after 
 its extinction." And, in mathematics, the principle of 
 approximation is perfectly exemplified in the asymptote of 
 a curve, which obviously holds the relations of transcend- 
 ence and adversation resolved in itself. In the 
 relations of the circle and the eUipse (under the general 
 category of correlativity), we have a subtle illustration of 
 the principle of community. There the coincidence — the 
 describing of equal areas by the radius vector in equal 
 times — is expounded by the differences — the equidistance 
 from the centre, in the one case, as against the varying 
 distance in the other, and the uniform velocity of the one 
 moving body, as against the varying velocity of the other. 
 A frequent way for the principle of reciprocity to manifest 
 itself is under these three forms, (1) of positive correspond- 
 ence, (2) of negative, and (o) of inverse correspondence ; 
 
 ' " Kathleen," in '* Beatrice, and other Poems," by the Hon. Roden Noel. 
 
OF QUALITY. 101 
 
 which may be illustrated from one example. In the first 
 instance, it may be said that the more a people abhors 
 crime, the more it punishes it. But in the second instance, 
 the fact arises to neutralise that, viz. that the mitigation of 
 punishment " does not result from a laxer, but an exacter 
 estimate of law and justice. It is because the many so cor- 
 rectly regard the law, that we can afford to punish less the 
 few who err." And hence, thirdly, " that is the circum- 
 stance that explains the apparent paradox, the more a 
 people abhors crime, the less it punishes it," — the readiness 
 to punish, and the necessity to punish, moving inversely as 
 each other. A certain form of dialectic will exemplify the 
 principle of conversion. It is easy to construct such 
 examples. Thus we may say, it is a universal rule, that 
 there is no rule without exception; obviously, therefore, 
 one rule must be excepted, as having no exception, and as 
 being itself the exception to the general rule ; which rule, 
 however, is just the universal rule first named (it being the 
 rule which has no exception), viz. that there is no rule 
 without exception. It excepts itself in the very moment of 
 expressing itself, i.e. is at once the rule and the exception, 
 alternately and convertiUy either. 
 
 8. In the realm of Analogy, and according to the canon 
 of Fancy. (1) Subtlety underlies the differential com- 
 pleteness of the coincidence between type and thino- 
 typified, e.g. 
 
 There is beauty in the long-ribb'cl hills, in the valley soft and green, 
 In the trees that stand like sages with their shadow all between, 
 
 expressing first, the towering dignity and inevitable calm 
 beneficence of great minds ; next, the extent of their indi- 
 vidual overshadowing influence ; and finally, the continuity 
 
102 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 in the influence of each — it is " shadow," not shadows — 
 
 interblending with tliat of his neighbour. (2) There is an 
 
 order of effects, whose subtlety consists in the partial 
 
 coincidence of the symbol with what is symbolised, and 
 
 where the points of non-coincidence are hinted : — 
 
 A wild bee in a dim chapelle, 
 Hovering near a flower-bell, 
 With a drowsy mnrmur droning, 
 Imitates a priest intoning. 
 With his lowly eyes intent 
 Upon the Holy Sacrament. 
 
 The salient points of resemblance are these : first, in regard 
 to the sound, as being subdued and continuous ; secondly, 
 in regard to the solitariness of the sound, it being the only 
 voice heard amid the surrounding and expectant silence ; 
 thirdly, in regard to the sound as prelusive to the feast, and 
 ceasing with it. Again, the points of contrast are, first, the 
 suggestion of a festive and secular purpose, as compared 
 with the devotional; secondly, the suggestion of isolation 
 and self-ministry, as compared with the distributive of&ce 
 of the priest ; and thirdly, the fact, that wdth the bee the 
 feast which the sound preludes is merely one of many 
 rapidly succeeding each other, one that ceases, expressly to 
 be renewed, while in the other case, it is only occasional, 
 and ceases, expressly that its influence may be diffused 
 along the intervals. (3) There is the case in which 
 subtlety of effect arises from the utter antagonism between 
 the symbol and the substantial idea which is typified. 
 
 As two spent s\vimmers that do cling together 
 And choke their art. — 
 
 What do we gain from that expression ? Why, that two 
 friendly parties have inopportunely leagued themselves 
 
OF QUALITY. 
 
 103 
 
 together, to their mutual disadvantage. Now, in fact, it is 
 
 the reverse that is meant : the expression is used of enemies 
 
 in battle. Nor is this a case like the last, where the image 
 
 is divided within itself, and suggests collateral contrast; 
 
 the simile takes off at the very root of the coincidence ; as 
 
 may easily be proved, for discard it from its connection 
 
 with foes in conflict, and immediately it finds a perfect 
 
 antitype in the idea of friends in distress " leagued together," 
 
 etc., while if you divorce the other image, with all its train 
 
 of coincidences and non-coincidences, what antitype will 
 
 you find to suit it ? 
 
 CoK. — The degree of subtlety varies according to different 
 
 principles. A very complex effect, of course, is produced by 
 
 a subtle combination of propositions, each in itself subtle, and 
 
 with an involution of subtlety in the phrasing. The effect, 
 
 again, may arise from the aggregation of suggestions in one 
 
 image, thus : — 
 
 Still flames of window, long and thin, 
 
 descriptive of the stained glass window-divisions in a cathe- 
 dral — " long and thin," to call up the stripling look of such 
 divisions, " flames," to call up their pointed form, quite as 
 much as the glow of colour, and " still," partly to indicate the 
 sanctuary peace, and partly to impose a significant limitation 
 on the " flames." That last effect is, therefore, a complex one. 
 Again, a subtle principle may be superadded to an image 
 already subtle from its completeness, as in the expression, used 
 in speaking of a futile effort, that it is " an attempt to paw 
 the horizon." The conception is of infinite force, not only 
 on account of the physical impossibility (since the horizon 
 recedes just as the animal approaches), but metaphysically, 
 because " horizon" is virtually an abstraction, and to speak of 
 
104 LOGIC OF STYLE, 
 
 pawing it, therefore, pretty mucli as if one should speak of 
 being first cousin to the equator, or having a pair of trousers 
 measured for the ecliptic. A conspicuous order of subtlety, 
 too, is that where the reflex or complex principle is enhanced 
 by the delicacy of the form or material : — 
 
 Eyelash so frail, mlay loith trail 
 
 Of shade her eyes, a maze of sweetness ! 
 
 My soul sinks through their dimlit blue 
 To find in them her own completeness — • 
 
 as if each eyelash left its separate impress of shade, and (as 
 
 the " trail " hints) were fringed off in the shading. 
 
 15. 
 
 Every subtle truth is essentially paradoxical, i.e. it bears, on 
 its first consideration, a different value from that which it 
 bears on reflection. It is, at least, abrupt, and possibly sub- 
 versive of some existing conception. Occasionally it divides 
 mankind into two classes, those to whom the suggestion is 
 startling, and those to whom it is contradictory. Possibly it 
 ranges all under the latter category, as did the discovery of 
 the earth's motion round the sun. That was a total contra- 
 diction of everybody's experience. Not, however, an absolute : 
 the senses were not affronted, as if they had been told that 
 there was no motion in the circumstances at all. For mani- 
 festly, if the earth did revolve — not sidle, but turn upon its 
 axis — round the sun, the very same phenomenon would be 
 produced ; the one hypothesis, for the reflecting mind, was 
 just as consonant with the facts as the other, and by much 
 the more exciting. The popular mind, and the mind educated 
 up to a certain point, are often alike inconsistent in this 
 respect; at onetime believing statements just on account of 
 their paradox, and at another, disbelieving them for their 
 
OF QUALITY. 105 
 
 paradox. The educated person repudiates the popular idea, 
 that a man may he lighter just after his dinner than he was 
 before it ; but in the same moment he revolts from the not 
 very unobvious truth, that any two pure abstractions (such as 
 Being and Non-Being) are identical, as a lie, or if not, a snare, 
 and if not a snare, a joke. These inconsistencies, nevertheless, 
 go according to a principle, which it would not be difficult to 
 frame, so as to anticipate and neutralise the essentially vulgar 
 and discreditable kind of testimony, in regard to certain ques- 
 tions, which is derived from majorities. Meantime, the more 
 commonplace the mind, the less does it value pure originality, 
 and the more, confounding what is merely fresh with what is 
 original, does it tend to undervalue the latter by comparison. 
 For imaginative synthesis the populace has no sympathy what- 
 ever, and for dialectical truth in particular, as much adapta- 
 tion as a cow has for getting through a turnstile. 
 
 A man cannot be said to have subtlety for his differentia 
 in style, unless he is equal to a sustained originality in 
 thinking. Everybody says something subtle now and 
 again : the dice must occasionally turn out as if the experts 
 had loaded them. And the modes of thus reaching subtle 
 truth are just the modes of the expert, only they are not 
 employed so continuously, or upon the same fields. Sub- 
 tlety is never more transcendental than reflection; and a 
 truth is only subtle for those who can fully apprehend it. 
 It would be inaccurate, therefore, to speak of a thing unin- 
 telligible, as absolutely subtle ; much rather a suggestion is 
 absolutely subtle, which is perfectly intelligible, and a truth 
 not quite intelligible is only relatively subtle, because it can 
 be valued only indirectly. By reflection, therefore, it is 
 that such effects are attained ; and often through a man's 
 
106 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 discarding his first impressions, or reverting to those which 
 forsooth he had discarded for others which have now to be 
 reUnquished as false. Subtlety is not always a second-sight, 
 that raises a man, as if inspired, above his fellows, but often 
 a second sight in the coarse numerical sense. Thus an 
 author, in speaking of a death by drawing asunder, remarks 
 that the victim was torn " by antagonist, yet confederate 
 forces " ; where he shows the maximum of reflective power, 
 since in " confederate " he has given the very antithesis of 
 his primary drift ; and yet he has only exhibited a power of 
 fanciful reflection, after alL 
 Cor. — No man is truly original who is not also subtle to his 
 finger-ends. But no perception is really subtle, unless it is 
 also true. And in proportion as the speculative truth in the 
 world has been brought out by individuals, in that proportion 
 is it indebted to subtlety. That subtlety should be regarded 
 as necessarily equivocal, arises in part from this, that men 
 take pleasure in certain forms of it, without thinking earnestly 
 of its allied truth ; or even charge the pleasure, attendant on 
 the perception of the truth, to the account of the other ; and 
 so come to regard subtle suggestion as a medium of amusement, 
 not of work — of information and reformation. Nor is this 
 mode merely to be regarded as one of the ways of attaining 
 certain truths : there are truths — and truth in many instances 
 lies on the farther side of a quicksand — which cannot be 
 attained in any other way. Of which the most natural proof 
 is in the immediate case of subtlety itself : how should the 
 truth on that question be attained without subtlety ? It 
 cannot possibly be attained otherwise, any more than minute 
 atmospheric changes can be registered, except by an apparatus 
 correspondingly delicate. Subtlety here becomes an instru- 
 
OF QUALITY. 107 
 
 ment as tecbnical as the barometer ; and thus the necessity 
 for it is demonstrated, precisely in those regions where 
 its application is most pertinent and unique. And in 
 literature, subtlety is not applicable to anything but what is 
 true, whether poetical or scientific. To deny the existence of 
 the external world, therefore, by affirming it to be an affection 
 of the senses, etc., is more offensive than the most putrid 
 commonplace. So to speak of the sun, in poetry, as " burn- 
 ing without beams," is pure nonsense, and in the spurious 
 maudlin oriental style of expression. Contrast with that the 
 unaffected rendering of a natural fact in the lines : — 
 
 Dimples, here and there, 
 
 That insects dint with long-legged stride. 
 
 Everybody kno^s's that what distinguishes a ripple from a wave 
 is the twitching up of the sJci7i of the water, as it were, under 
 the wind. Now as a wave is to a ripple, so is the plash of a 
 stone to the dimple of the water by the limb of an insect : the 
 plunge goes beyond dinting. But to the limber tonch of the 
 fly, the surface of the water, so easily shattered by the plunge 
 of a stone, merely undergoes a shiver or flicker; and the 
 expression "dint" conveys precisely the momentary im- 
 pression upon the impervious elastic surface of the pool. 
 The image is subtle, is poetical, just because it is so loudly 
 scientific in its truth. The true mode of a man's power, who 
 has such sensibility to natural effects, it may take a genera- 
 tion fully to appreciate, even for his fidelity of perception, so 
 long as people see with their noses. But it is just this same 
 intensity of truth, in the midst of his characteristic subtlety 
 of insight, that has made our contemporary poet, Mr. Noel, in 
 so extraordinary a degree, the greatest among the poetical 
 draughtsmen and colourists of all time. 
 
108 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 Section III. Of Comprehensiveness. 
 
 16. 
 
 In regard to any statement, no matter whether that con- 
 cerns a principle or a detail, the question arises, do its subject 
 and predicate lawfully reciprocate ? The immediate relation 
 here is one of truth. And the general form of such a question 
 is this, does the subject as a whole include that specific com- 
 plement of attributes which form the predicate, and do these 
 apply in their completeness to everything that is implicated 
 in the subject ? If that condition is fulfilled, the proposition 
 is comprehensive. And the formula for such a quality of 
 thought is this : comprehensiveness in any proposition turns 
 upon the integral inclusion of its subject, as expounded hy the 
 integral implication of its predicate. 
 
 If the inclusion of many terms were to be explicated, their 
 momenta would appear to be very heterogeneous. Never- 
 theless, when once the relations of a term are fixed, it 
 behaves according to one uniform principle. By which I 
 do not mean, in the first instance, that every term, being a 
 singular, must have each of its moments specifically fixed, 
 as either universal or particular, and not as alternatively 
 the one or the other, according to the proximate conception 
 which for the moment regulates its internal significance. 
 That, no doubt, is true : expressions must not veer or be 
 bandied about in such a fashion. But it follows as a 
 corollary from this, that every term has its own complement 
 of inclusion ; " curiosity," for example, having on the one 
 side, as its universal, " desire for information," and on the 
 other " pettiness," as its particular. Now the vitiating of 
 
OF QUALITY. 109 
 
 comprehensiveness arises from putting too fine or too blunt 
 an edge upon the predicate of a proposition, using, e.g., the 
 proximate singular " prurience," instead of the subordinate 
 singular, which stands to "prurience" for a universal, viz. 
 '* curiosity," and vice versa. An uncomprehensive thinker 
 betrays himself immediately, even to people of not much 
 general discernment ; probably by a neglect of the singular, 
 if his temperament is languid, and by an abuse of it, if his 
 bias is impulsive. Wherever motive is concerned, there is 
 all the chance in the world of a man's abusing the singular. 
 Cor. — The universal canon of integrity in the compre- 
 hensiveness of propositions may be variously expounded. To 
 a certain extent, it might appear to depend on the nature of 
 the subject treated of, whether the result were comprehensive, 
 or the reverse. IVIuch more, however, depends on the indi- 
 vidual. It is better to hear a man of capacity on midges, 
 than a noodle on the Trinity. But much depends also on the 
 mode of writing prescribed. If you prescribe the treatment 
 solely of details, you proscribe the very essence of a compre- 
 hensive treatment in style. Hence the second canon of 
 dignity, which ordains a universal implication in the subject. 
 Hence, too, the essential dignity of poetry, that, with the 
 representation of a fact, it may convey a principle. This 
 image, for example, is as purely analytic as any axiom in 
 mathematics : — 
 
 The moonpath flecking thin and tremulous the sea, 
 where each expression tells like the explosion of a bomb. 
 The more perfect such an image, the more does it supersede 
 and disparage all other renderings of the same phenomenon. 
 The phrase, " inlaying the sea with pearl," applied to the 
 glimmer of the moon, is artificial, in comparison, and narrow. 
 
110 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 But this happens, because the otlier is so trenchant — apar^ 
 from the fact, that a literal rendering of nature-phases ii 
 necessarily more forcible than a metaphorical. Hence the 
 canon of felicity, which ordains that the differentia of every 
 subject shall be given, by deepening the inclusion of the 
 predicate. Objection may, therefore, be taken at once to all 
 such terms as " angelic " and " fairy-like," which are simply the 
 most dead and ineffective of poetical mannerisms. By the 
 side of the finesse that reveals itself in the expression just 
 quoted, " fairy," applied to anything whatsoever, is lumpish, 
 and " angel " unspiritual. Here it is precisely that the 
 spurious, and quasi-tautological, in analytic expression is so 
 offensive : — " But let the sober and serious hour come, which 
 sooner or later must come to all, the power of truth will soon 
 prove too strong for all that can he ojJjJosed to it, and pierce 
 into his heart," which is pretty much the same thing as a 
 man's saying, that D. V. he intends to shave to-morrow morn- 
 ing with a razor, if he cannot lay hands on anything else ; — 
 with this gross difference, that the last man must be a wag, 
 the other is not. Thus the circle is completed. For it is the 
 abuse of this principle which constitutes the breach of the 
 initial principle of integrity. If the predicate includes too 
 many attributes, it cannot be applied in its integrity to 
 implicate the subject. Thus " some anachronisms are 
 solecisms " must be altered to the universal of " solecisms," 
 viz. " anomalies," That being accomplished, it is the tui^n of 
 the subject to raise the " some " to an " all," and, by way of 
 reversion upon that, it is for the predicate again to expand 
 the inclusion, by assigning the differentia of anachronism, as, 
 for example, thus : " All anachronisms are anomalous trans- 
 positions of different events in time." 
 
OF QUALITY. Ill 
 
 17. 
 
 Comprehensiveness may appear in two relations, besides that 
 which it has to simple propositions. On the one hand, it may 
 appear in the connection between propositions, and, on the 
 other, in the connection between the clauses or sections of 
 single propositions. 
 
 A tr«>- jition is uncomprehensive when it shoots beside 
 the mark — either over or under it. For example, it is so, 
 when the occasion of anything is assigned as the cause. 
 And, on the other hand, its want of comprehensiveness con- 
 sists in placing together indefinitely, propositions, w^hose 
 mediation, from one to the other, should be made explicit; 
 as, for instance, in putting side by side, as parallel facts, 
 circumstances, of which the one is the direct outcome of the 
 other. In such a case, the writer often fails of being incisive, 
 not because he mistrusts the severer connection, but because 
 he does not see it at all : he does not shirk it, he misses it. 
 The proposition again, as divided internally, may be 
 either a binomial, a trinomial, or a polynomial. (The 
 mononomial relation has been discussed in the preceding 
 paragraph.) Thus: — "Endless are the purposes of men, 
 merely festal, or merely comic, and aiming but at the 
 momentary life of a cloud, which have earned for them- 
 selves the distinction and apparatus of a separate art." 
 Here, in the first clause, "festal" and comic" mark a 
 bisection in the thought, and in the second, " distinction " 
 and " apparatus." There is, however, an apparent trisection 
 in the first, owing to the phrase, "and aiming," etc.; but 
 that is the statement of a characteristic which is common 
 to both "festal" and "comic," viz. their intrinsic levity. 
 A perfect illustration of the threefold division is this : — 
 
112 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 " From tlie first intermeddling of law with the movement 
 of the higher moral affections, there is an end — to freedom 
 in the act, to purity in the motive, to dignity in the per- 
 sonal relation;" where there is given, first, the fact, next, 
 its origin, and finally its result. The polynomial relation 
 may be illustrated from this proposition: — "We glory 
 in tribulations also — knowing that tribulation worketh 
 patience, and patience experience, and experience hope, and 
 hope maketh not ashamed." It is not hard to discover 
 what is the critical point for comprehensiveness in such 
 propositions, or what divisions are imperfect. It does not 
 follow, that because a statement is broken up into sections, 
 it is less comprehensive than a simple statement ; although 
 it may happen that a threefold distribution is necessarily 
 more comprehensive, because more economical, than a four- 
 fold. What is required is, on the one hand, that the 
 divisions shall not be elliptical — no polite proposition ever 
 yawns to the extent of a third or fourth of its whole 
 superficies. The principle of distribution must not be blind. 
 On the other hand, the sections must not overlap each 
 other. An impetuous writer, or one who writes for im- 
 pression upon the common mind, is very apt to fall into 
 slovenly modes of co-ordinating his ideas ; — " Whatsoever 
 things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever 
 things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever 
 things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report ; if 
 there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on 
 these things." The last clause contains a very happy 
 antithesis, as summing up the virtues as they are in them- 
 selves, on the one hand, and as they are for us, on the other. 
 And the same antithesis holds in the main division 
 
OF QUALITY, 113 
 
 of tlic first clause. Only there the separate phrases are 
 very loosely connected ; since there is no fundamental 
 principle of division. And what holds for ordinary 
 thought, holds also for poetry. It is true that Shakespere 
 constantly multiplies metaphors ; but only for the sake of 
 intensifying an impression, by expounding it from different 
 points of view, which is quite a distinct practice from trail- 
 ing a mass of particulars in rag-tag-and-bobtail fashion 
 after the main thought. For if a definite principle of 
 ■ division underlies the conception, any mere details are 
 superfluous, and if not, they must be more or less arbitrary. 
 CoK. — The general appearance of a comprehensive thought 
 may be rendered appropriately by a very genial extension of 
 the term sententious. The sentence is the full, rounded pro- 
 position; and whatever causes a thought to assume a robust 
 appearance, is sententious. By the term generally is under- 
 stood, whatsoever is characterised by this in excess. Accord- 
 ingly all such writing is bombastic, and weak. But, in the 
 milder sense of the term, all good writing is sententious, more 
 or less ; just in proportion as the thoughts of men who write 
 carelessly give the idea of limpness, and a want of having 
 come into being through resistance. Hence it happens that 
 so much writing is unequivocally fiat, and wanting in relief. 
 It is not necessary that every thought should be epigrammatic 
 in its setting ; but it is indispensable that it should be analyti- 
 cally definite. This is the fundamental order of the senten- 
 tious; and accordingly there is (1) the simple proposition; 
 pure in the double sense of being undiluted, and free from 
 extraneous matter. Thus : " No man escapes the contagion 
 from contemporary bystanders." Of such, too, are all mathe- 
 matical theorems, &c. : " The three angles of a triangle are 
 
114 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 together equal to two right angles." (2) There is the proposi- 
 tion, with a clause qualifying the main idea. These sen- 
 tences are formed in various ways, by augmenting, or limiting, 
 or simply explicating, the primary thought. E.g. " ]\Iany of 
 the inhabitants (and all those of respectability) subscribed to 
 the fund." — " Tliis is a paradox, only in the sense wliich makes 
 it honourable to be paradoxical." — " Popularly, i.e. amongst 
 the thoughtless, literature is held to include everything that is 
 printed in a book." All good writing deals constantly with 
 the relations of facts — their aim, origin, exceptions, circum- 
 stances, adverse influences, advantages, proportions, &c., &c. 
 And as the vocabulary of a bad writer is indefinite, so is his 
 grouping. (3) There is the proposition with an antithesis; 
 e.g. " The possibility of selecting books wisely is becoming 
 more hopeless, as the necessity for selection is becoming con- 
 tinuall}^ more pressing." A certain distrust might be attached 
 to effects so glittering, were it not that these very effects are 
 most exposed to criticism, where they have the chance of 
 being most telling, and are most brilliant, when they found 
 upon such principles of reciprocity as are logically the most 
 just. And wliat becomes thus a habit of good writing is due 
 to more dignified sources than literary knack and facility : it 
 is engrained in the thinking. Such effects, of course, are the 
 most elaborate ; and many men write from year to year, with- 
 out striking a single antithesis. This mode of setting the 
 thought gains, accordingly, by comparison, while it cannot 
 lose by any abuse that might be attempted. 
 
 18. 
 In so far as subtlety and comprehensiveness represent, the 
 one the differential, the other the integral, in the variation of 
 
OF QUALITY. ' ' ^ J)ll5 
 
 terms, they are formally opposed to each other. But they are 
 so distinguished from each other, just because they are corre- 
 lative functions. The one takes up what the other leaves 
 undone ; and where the one is active, the other is in abeyance. 
 But this is only true formally. And in a very obvious sense, 
 to integrate a terra is to differentiate it, after a fashion, and to 
 differentiate it is to integrate it. Alter a term in any way 
 you please, up or down, and you must integrate its inclusion 
 or its implication. And at the same time you have caused 
 the meaning to differ from what it was a moment previously. 
 Just in the same way it happens that a writer's totality of 
 expression, forming an integral fact, becomes his differentia in 
 regard to other individual writers. So long as comprehensive- 
 ness and subtlety are looked at apart from one another, each is 
 seen to assume a characteristic form. But the one is involved in 
 the other, and in practice this involution is of exceeding power 
 and significance. There may be an isolated remark comprehen- 
 sive, without being subtle, and vice versa. But there is no such 
 thing as continuous expression that is comprehensive, without 
 being subtle — although, of course, either quality can only be 
 illustrated from individual expressions — and vice versa. For 
 evidently, if everybody holds that all P is Q, you, who see 
 that some P only is Q, must have embraced the rejected 
 members of P with a grasp as comprehensive as that of any 
 one else, as it is certainly more pertinent than that of every 
 one else. And if, on the other hand, you embrace all P, as 
 being implicated by Q, your subtlety must have co-operated to 
 discover the principle upon which the outcast section of P 
 has been fallaciously excluded from association with Q. Each 
 quality is the exponent of the other. 
 
116 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 The cattle are grazing, 
 Their heads never raising, 
 There are forty feeding like one. 
 
 What have we here — an image that is more comprehensive, 
 or more subtle ? Subtle it is to begin with, from the sudden 
 combination of ideas — some P is some Q — that by and by 
 diffuses itself like the dawn. For after the surprise, it is seen 
 that there is no straining in the predicate, no spurious refine- 
 ment, or discordance. It is at least generic in relation to 
 animals as opposed to non-generic, and applies comprehensively 
 to the subject; — some P is all Q. But is this not merely a 
 vanishing picture, as applied to that predicate ? The habit 
 belongs, so far as we can recollect, to no other animal ; but are 
 cattle found feeding in such fashion so frequently, as to con- 
 stitute it, for them, a habit ? Surely — only some P is not 
 all Q. This the comprehensiveness verifies, by summing up 
 the occasions on which cattle have been remembered to graze 
 in this manner, and mounts the proposition thus : — all P is 
 all Q — the predicate being a proprium, not an accident. But 
 now, again, are there not other animals besides cattle, which 
 feed after this manner ? No ; — any S is not all Q. Sheep 
 feed in numbers, too, and of all animals, therefore, most 
 resemble cattle in that respect. But sheep do not feed 
 " forty like one." They lack the consentaneousness and 
 repose of a herd of cattle feeding (and what, by the way, 
 is the secret distinction between "flock" and "herd"?); 
 their motion in feeding is a twitching, rather than a 
 browsing ; and some of them in a flock are always in 
 impatient motion. This is distinction enough, and is the dis- 
 tinction indicated in the expression ; — although the diflerence 
 to the ear in the sound made by the different animals in feed- 
 
 1 
 
OF QUALITY. 117 
 
 ing might accentuate that distinction, and even if the 
 
 spectator were removed out of hearing might associate itself 
 
 with what he sees, especially if he is sensitive to the converse 
 
 case, that, viz. of passing by a field after nightfall, when the 
 
 cattle may be heard and not seen. And this distinction the 
 
 comprehensiveness ratifies by showing the predicate to be the 
 
 differentia, not applicable to the genus : — only P is all Q. 
 
 Subtlety. Comprehensiveness. 
 
 1, Some P is some Q. 2. Some P is all Q. 
 
 3. Only some P is not all Q. 4. All P is all Q. 
 
 5. All S is not all Q. 6. Only P is all Q. 
 
 And conversely, instead of beginning with the negation of the 
 
 proposition, no P is any Q (viz. some P is some Q), we may 
 
 begin by negating the result attained in No. 6. Thus if we 
 
 are told that only certain kinds of scientific men are the 
 
 authorities on a subject, we may demur, by suggesting (1) that 
 
 there may be others who have a claim to be heard, in fact (2) 
 
 that all scientific men have an equal claim ; further that the 
 
 specialists are (3) not all competent upon the subject, but (4) 
 
 that only some of them are competent ; and finally, that (5) 
 
 even these are more or less incompetent, because, as it turns 
 
 ou.t, this subject is not their subject, but one apart, so that (6) 
 
 not one of them has a voice in the matter. Thus, the 
 
 predicate being still quantified : — 
 
 Subtlety. Comprehensiveness. 
 
 1. Only P is not all Q. 2. All S is aU Q. 
 
 3. All P is not all Q. 4. Only some P is all Q. 
 
 5. Some P is not all Q. 6. No P is any Q. 
 
 Novelty is the hidden condition of comprehensiveness, 
 
 just as truth is its overt condition. Certain principles, just 
 
 by reason of their novelty and subtlety, tend to become 
 
 commonplace. They are at first striking, and so come to be 
 
118 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 iu everybody's mouth, with the reversionary certainty of 
 being the opposite of striking. In the same way it 
 happens with figurative expressions. The simile about the 
 lion shaking the dewdrops from his mane once was new. 
 And for central Africa at the present moment undoubtedly 
 it is new ; that expression being understood to bring down 
 the house nightly in the Theatre Eoyal of the Sahara. 
 Only by and by it will come to the ears of the lions, who 
 will grow sulky, and refuse to do the shake, and so the 
 metaphor will be no longer true. But meantime, and for 
 home consumption, the expression must be turned over 
 to the wags, who will find plenty ways of applying it, 
 so that it shall blossom like the apple-trees in spring. 
 Otherwise, such expressions, being derived, involve no com- 
 prehensiveness on the part of the writer who uses them. A 
 proverb is equally an exponent of comprehensiveness; 
 which is a form of expression professing to be com- 
 prehensive, and not subtle ; though it is not always what it 
 professes to be, and when it is, that happens because it is 
 subtle as well, i.e. is that which it does not profess to be. 
 Cor. — Considered psychologically, and in a strict scientific 
 sense, it is the union of subtlety and comprehensiveness 
 which constitutes genius. The term may be used vulgarly to 
 denote anything, from heat and clap-trap to a rhythmical 
 felicity that is comparatively mechanical ; and may be bent 
 to suit a variety of descriptions, which are simply not quack 
 definitions, because they do not pretend to be scientific. The 
 term, as commonly used, is itself equivocal. A writer may 
 quite well be distinct from the crowd, who is yet not to be 
 classed with men of the highest power ; and would not be so 
 classed, even by those who confound under the one term 
 
OF QUALITY. 119 
 
 catholic power, and power that is merely eccentric. The men 
 of true power have a bond drawing them together, and 
 isolating them from men of the second class, plus their 
 individuality. It is not individuality alone that constitutes 
 genius. For manifestly, if A, B, and C, are all men of genius, 
 there must be something common amongst them, just as if 
 they are Chinese, there must be something common to them 
 all, whether they wear pigtails or not. In itself, individuality 
 is the most barren criterion that can be conceived ; for beinf. 
 in the abstract, common to them all, it denudes each of the 
 writers of his common, concrete. j)ower; each man's in- 
 dividuality excludes that of his neighbour. That being the 
 case, the distinction of genius between the mind of high 
 originality and the ordinary mind, is just as peremptory 
 between it and the middle-men or eccentrics. AVhich dis- 
 tinction is something of a definite intellectual cast. It is, there- 
 fore, co-present with genial power of whatever kind ; and that 
 not merely as an accompaniment, but as a substratum. Xo 
 emotion can possibly be gauged, can possibly express itself in 
 literature, except through some intellectual medium. Its 
 force and delicacy are expounded by its comprehensiveness 
 and subtlety. Nor is this a task to which language is unequal. 
 Communication of such emotion, now ethereal, now masculine, 
 is made every day ; and with this proof of the infallibility of 
 the medium, that all who read do not respond to the feeling, 
 or respond to it in different degrees. Those who are affected 
 by it are precisely those of whom we could predict that they 
 should be affected ; and those who are not, are precisely those 
 in whom we have seen the want of capacity for appreciating 
 it. The influence of emotion is, therefore, manifestly regulated 
 by principle, precisely because it is not indiscriminate. It 
 
120 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 might be thought, that the fact of a man's not having seen the 
 emotional force of a passage, and apprehending it, upon re- 
 reading the piece, were a proof of the insecurity of this mode 
 of communication. It is in fact the very opposite ; the mood 
 simply has not been favourable at first for catching the 
 peculiar sentiment ; and tlie mode of transit would indeed be 
 precarious if, when the emotions were inert, the piece had 
 been adequately apprehended. Hence it is, that the reader 
 recurs to the passage with undiminished pleasure. All of 
 which depends upon the permanence of the intellectual co- 
 efficients. It is not merely that these include the principles 
 of poetical genius, but that they allow for genius of the philo- 
 sophic and scientific cast, as well as of the poetical ; — and here 
 is another source of equivocation, since so few people can 
 square the idea of poetical genius with scientific, and most 
 people when they talk of genius mean distinctively the former. 
 The power, therefore, as not merely (1) concrete, and to be 
 found in a man's individual expressions, but (2) specifically 
 intellectual and constant, is (3) essentially recoverable by 
 analysis, and to be measured in detail. It does not foUow that 
 because comprehensiveness and subtlety are not to be 
 predicated of a man's style from single expressions, his genius 
 can be determined without appraising these expressions. It 
 is predicable in detail, provided you predicate in regard to a 
 sufficient number of details. And just because it is so, the 
 caution needs to be given at all regarding isolated expressions. 
 These appear as particulars, and form the universal which we 
 call genius, which, in so far, is not local or individual ; only 
 the specific form which realises the genius of each man in its 
 individuality, is just that mode of expression under which the 
 common element incarnates itself, in art and science. 
 
CHAPTEE III. 
 
 Of Quantity. 
 Section I. The Principle of Quantity. 
 
 19. 
 
 A VERY important distinction exists in Style between tliouglits 
 as they are independently, and tlie same thoughts in a process. 
 It holds both in relation to single propositions and to proposi- 
 tions in a series. So that, on the one hand, a series of thoughts 
 may be regarded as containing propositions separately intelli- 
 gible ; and, on the other, separate propositions may be regarded 
 in relation to mutual reticulation or coherence, each of them 
 being potentially a link or item in a series. For the distinct- 
 ness or completeness of an idea is as necessary for progress as 
 for positive disconnection — which in fact is just the difference 
 between insulation and isolation : dig a trench across the home 
 end of a peninsula, and you insulate it ; wash away the island 
 now formed, from the side of the canal, till its diameter is less 
 than the distance which divides it from the mainland, and 
 you isolate it. And this progression to an indefinite extent, 
 with transitions more or less severe and artistic, and ap- 
 pealing more or less to a chain of unexpressed connec- 
 tion, reposes upon a natural tendency to the evolution, more 
 or less systematic, of one thought through the medium of 
 
 another. 
 
 I 
 
122 THE LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 I apprehend that a person asked to discourse to an 
 audience on landscape-gardening may formulate his subject 
 as he pleases, may select for his text a fact, or a proposition, 
 or a series of propositions, and may deliver accordingly an 
 essay, a thesis, or a lecture. But, in either case, his very- 
 first movement towards an elucidation or confirmation of his 
 theme is a departure from the position he has assumed. He 
 cannot expound his subject by simply reiterating the phrase 
 " landscape-gardening." He must proceed by beginning 
 somewhere else. If he is simply obtuse, he will begin with 
 a few general remarks on the interesting nature of the art. 
 If he is pretentious as well as obtuse, he will grasp at futile 
 analogies in the subject to landscape-painting, led thither 
 by the coincidence of the term, and proceed to splice the 
 two subjects according to the correspondence which he has 
 chipped smooth for them. If he is a master, he will sever 
 the subject in its differentia from the generic science of 
 gardening, with a hint of its leaning to landscape to convey 
 its affinities to the picturesque as well as the stubbornly 
 useful in art. Nor does this happen from the common usage 
 with regard to introductions and exordia. On the contrary, 
 these are possible only through this principle of quantity ; 
 they derive their proportion to the whole theme entirely 
 from it ; and their abuse arises through an unseasonable 
 extension of its peculiar functions. Not one of the propo- 
 sitions in the series may contain an expression implicating 
 any of the terms in the text, and yet the whole may be a 
 perfect exposition of it. Or the terms themselves may be 
 expressed in every proposition of the discourse, and no illus- 
 tration given of it whatever. Universally, therefore, it 
 holds, that the secession of the expositor from his first posi- 
 
OF QUANTITY. 123 
 
 tioii is the first condition of his return to it ; the fact bein^ 
 that the thesis, which henceforth is his terminus ad quern, 
 is, for the moment of its being stated, his terminus a quo. 
 CoK. — The practical conditions of all interesting thought are 
 two, that it shall explicate truth, or make it impressive. In 
 the one case, the communicator takes advantage of the ob- 
 scurity of a principle, in the other of its simplicity ; or rather 
 he lessens or remedies the disadvantage attaching on the one 
 hand to a truth that is profound, and on the other to one that 
 is commonplace. Now to set the truth in its relations cannot 
 be effected for either aim, unless he causes the parts of his 
 exposition in detail to be apprehended mediately through each 
 other. And since the separate propositions must precede or 
 succeed one another in time, priority and subsequence become 
 the exponent of relation in thought. For its own part, the 
 principle overlooks all difference in the importance of indivi- 
 dual thoughts. One idea may be worth in quality of sugges- 
 tion all the rest put together ; or it may be the sole unfertile 
 thought in a series that is massively and resplendently sug- 
 gestive. Its value for transition may or may not coincide 
 with its intrinsic and independent value. 
 
 20. 
 
 By whatsoever laws of sequence in fact, or of analogy, or of 
 logical consequence, a thought has reached its position in a 
 series, it is the rule, that the truth which for the time being 
 occupies the attention shall have an advantage over every 
 other — an advantage immediate, in the way of excluding 
 every other, an advantage derivative, in the way of suggesting 
 others. It is a supplanter of every other truth to this extent, 
 that any truth supplanting it shall do so only in virtue of the 
 
124: THE LOGIC OF STYLE, 
 
 relation of that truth to itself the proximate truth. Ab- 
 dicating the throne, it has a right to name its successor ; the 
 • chances being that this will be a relative, according to its 
 force at the moment of resignation. That a certain range of 
 thought has been in occupation for some time is a pre- 
 sumption that it will soon be displaced ; its displacement, in 
 fact, is rapidly being carried on, For each idea has two dis- 
 tinct values, a potential value, as a generating or multiplying 
 source of ideas, and an actual, as a link in the development 
 of a succession of ideas. The potential value, therefore, of 
 such a chain of thought is being reduced with every suc- 
 cessive proposition to actual value. And correspondingly its 
 power of resistance to a possible succeeding series of thoughts 
 is being reduced to zero — a process that, with discontinuous 
 thinkers, goes on very rapidly. 
 
 The two factors requisite for systematic composition are 
 physical energy and intellectual fertility, Nor will their 
 conjoint operation be defeated, except on the suspension 
 of the conditions under which the initial thought was 
 generated. That suspension will be a mixed result from 
 physical exhaustion, and a lack of that surplus fund of 
 unorganized suggestions regarding the immediate theme, 
 precisely to the extent that the potential energy, or the 
 potential fund of illustration, has had demands made upon 
 it. The resistance, in such a case, to the production of 
 fresh thought would certainly be enormous. In fact, writ- 
 ing under such circumstances is quite exceptional. It is, 
 however, the ordinary case which I contemplate, and pre- 
 cisely the opposite circumstances, viz., those in which 
 the resistance arises from the tumult and redundancy of 
 the thought. For every new idea operates by way of dis- 
 
OF QUANTITY. 125 
 
 turbing existing relations. If these have been exhausted, 
 it does not come a moment too soon. If not, it acts in the 
 way either of delaying the development of the thought, or 
 of precipitating it. A resistance has, in fact, been inter- 
 posed which it was beyond its province to interpose, arising 
 from weakness or impatience. And there are two factors, 
 as poiccrs, which are affected by a want of distribution of 
 energy in the mental powers — the powers of suggestion 
 and modulation ; so that it is not so much they that are 
 disturbed, as the process of combination which is dis- 
 turbed, because they do not act in harmony. The fault 
 may be a defect in either case. Or it may be an abnormal 
 activity of the suggestive faculty, the elaborative faculty 
 not being able to weave into shape the materials as they 
 are passed back to it. i^I'ot that by any means this activity 
 could be represented as so much surplus energy. It is the 
 same force applied momentarily in a different direction ; 
 and viciously applied, because it is not distributed so as 
 to sustain the modulating agency. Such action of the 
 imagination is simply spasmodic, and just as much a sign 
 of vigour as tetanus might be of muscular power. It is not 
 enough, therefore, that the writer's force is at its maximum, 
 it must also be, as to its two factors, in eqiLilihrio. "With 
 diminished total energy a finer result will be attained, 
 than with increased energy disproportionately applied. The 
 moment any plethora is felt, the diastole begins to remedy 
 the disturbance and restore the diminishing clearness. 
 Otherwise not merely will some of the suggestions founder, 
 but the elements which were about to consolidate in their 
 totality wiU be dispersed. To obviate that, a cessation of 
 the process is necessary, and a revision, to the extent that 
 
126 THE LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 the attention has failed in its first effort to meet its extra 
 engagements — has failed to neutralize the resistance offered 
 by the difficulties of the process augmented by the 
 difiiculties of the situation. The two functions must again 
 concur in amending the relations of the thought to their 
 mutual satisfaction. And they will do so in the converse 
 order from that in which they concurred to fashion the 
 combination which now they are called upon to recon- 
 stitute ; each in that ratio being called out or withheld, in 
 which, for the original draught, it had unduly been de- 
 preciated or exalted. 
 COK. — This tendency to disturbance exists in all composition, 
 even the most negligent. And, properly controlled, it is the 
 very springboard of effective composition. It is felt, therefore, 
 most decidedly in the experience of the best writers, who 
 precisely are those born with the best resources for managing 
 it. A writer who has the advantage of a thinking that is 
 highly complex, must share its partial disadvantages for rapid 
 improvisation. His tendency is to involve fresh suggestions 
 with every turn of his argument. But counterworking that, 
 and with a view to the summary extinction of those intermin- 
 able ramifications, which make it oftentimes uncertain what is 
 the leading idea, is a regulative faculty, moving abreast of the 
 tumultuary flux of ideas, and determining what phases of the 
 thought are to be rejected, what subordinated, and what re- 
 served for a more special expansion in arrear. His resource 
 lies in the exceptional rapidity with which he is able to pass 
 from the final adjustment of a thought to the rehearsal of an 
 impending thought, and from the pioneer stage back into the 
 complementary one of adjustment. 
 
OF QUANTITY. 127 
 
 21. 
 
 The correspondences, which take effect in the relations of 
 the suggestive and regulative faculties during composition, 
 are founded on the reciprocity of relation between Quantity 
 and Quality. It is self-evident, that you cannot connect two 
 ideas unless they have some common tenor and significance 
 (their quality), or, on the other hand, expound that relation- 
 ship, unless both, and in their individuality (their numerical 
 distinctness, their quantity), be co-present. For example, a 
 historian, treating of the causes of a revolution, sums them up 
 in three propositions. This has been accomplished by their 
 mutual relevance, depending ultimately on their separate sig- 
 nificance ; which has been the agency in limiting them to 
 that precise number as a maximum. The quality in this 
 instance has determined the quantity. Suppose, however, 
 that there could not have been less than three. In that case 
 the effect depends upon the comprehensiveness of each of the 
 three propositions ; and quantity has become the exponent of 
 quality. For if another writer requires a larger compass to 
 produce three truths of equal dimensions, if his complete 
 truths only alternate with partial truths, it is evident that the 
 other is the more comprehensive thinker. If you allow 
 an author to unite two propositions separately obvious, you 
 may produce a subtle result. For by showing its unexpected 
 relation to a principle, he may have glorified a fact which 
 was commonplace, and even the principle, by developing 
 unexpectedly its wealth of application. Or conversely, by 
 reading into connection with other truths a truth that in iso- 
 lation was original, you may make it commonplace. This 
 proposition : " Fathers of the church are no more to be relied 
 
128 THE LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 on as authorities in doctrine than lay authors," is docked con- 
 siderably as to its impressiveness by a preceding statement : 
 " There have been many heterodox professors of divinity and 
 freethinking bishops." The function of quantity is thus 
 precisely to determine the variation of quality. For when I 
 say that the one expounds the other, I do not mean by way of 
 illustrating its brilliance ; but simply that it enforces the other, 
 whether in the way of magnifying or depreciating it — of show- 
 ing it up as subtle or non-subtle, just according as it is either. 
 It is a most significant truth, that condensation is a test 
 of high thinking, and for the profound reason, that it 
 depends in such great measure on the quality of the think- 
 ing. An accidental advantage, therefore, it is not ; nor one 
 ^ arising where, we might imagine, it could best be dispensed 
 with ; but one arising from necessity, since it is pre- 
 cisely vast combinations that are the most subtle, exquisite 
 transitions that are the most just. A great writer is 
 dissatisfied with such relations as do not cause his mean- 
 ing to subtend a definite angle in the preceding thought. 
 The inferior writer has usages of transition known only to 
 himself. When he is at a loss for a connection, he simply 
 couples his ideas formally together as one, two, three, 
 without troubling himself to ascertain what cross-division 
 he may have made, or whether there is any coherence in 
 his chain of thought at all. Strictly speaking, these are 
 transitions only in the sense that creeping is walking. 
 That he does not write very much absolute nonsense is just 
 owing to this, that he evades definite logical forms of articu- 
 lating his thoughts. It is not tliat, having to use the 
 looser forms of transition, he has no occasion for those that 
 are more severe, but that, being illogical, he instinctively 
 
OF QUA^:TITY. 129 
 
 evades them. For confine him entirely to these formulce, 
 and you will find not that he braces himself np correspond- 
 ingly to wield them, but that he will commit himself more 
 than ever ; so closely does the sharpness of a man's transi- 
 tions depend upon his logical sagacity. JMaking an infre- 
 quent use of certain forms of combination in his ordinary 
 composition, he makes inevitably a disproportionate use of 
 those which remain; thus inverting the practice of all 
 conscientious artists, which is to apply with discrimination 
 the most telling transitions, by continually turning over the 
 whole complement of transitions. 
 Cor. — The functions of Quantity and Quality, in their inter- 
 connection, form the essential principle of what we mean by 
 Style. The varieties of imagery and mood are quite 
 secondary. It is not that these primary distinctions are 
 abstract principles, on which the others may rest theoretically ; 
 nor merely that they are vital functions, with which the 
 varieties of expression may coalesce and interpenetrate. 
 They are superlative facts in all composition. The more 
 catholic, therefore, a style is — the more it relies upon sound 
 and original thinking, and rapid precision of movement — the 
 less it is imitable ; in part, because it is wanting in the mere 
 vividness and the mere agility of the secondary attributes of 
 expression (and which alone can be imitated), and in part 
 because it depends on an organic force that is incommuni- 
 cable. Hence another secret of the vulgarity of imitation ; 
 for a man can only copy that which is extra-essential, whether 
 existing in or out of connection with what is really vital. 
 Hence, too, the utter impotence of charging plagiarism upon 
 a style that resembles another, so long as the coincidence is 
 in the cardinal functions ; as if by possibility any writer 
 
130 THE LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 could counterfeit a manner that is essentially inimitable, and 
 as if it were not a libellous misreading of his independent 
 merits to suppose him coveting what, being incommunicable 
 from himself, he must first have divorced from his own 
 manner in order to counterfeit. 
 
 Section II. Of Extension. 
 
 22. 
 
 Since the proposition is for Style the unit of length, it 
 must internally be complete. Directly or indirectly it takes 
 part in propagating the thought ; and ex hypothesi is an 
 integral portion of the whole series. Every such unit, 
 whether disinterestedly, and for the welfare of the series, or 
 selfishly, and as having a stake in the total application of the 
 line of thought, is compelled to be distinct, and to realise a 
 specific identity, with whatsoever detail it may be expressed 
 in the text, or in whatsoever variety of form it might other- 
 wise be expressed. There can be no range of thought so great, 
 as to extend the unit of length in proportion, nor any so short, 
 as to diminish the necessity for insulating each proposition. 
 The onus of bearing the thought may be shared by the 
 subordinate members of a proposition, but only in so far as 
 they help to preserve its unity. It need not be simple ; 
 but it must be single. This unity is the necessity for 
 expression, into wdiatever complexity a thought may run. 
 A man may wish to compose a sentence of hyperbolical 
 length, but unless he writes nonsense he does not lose the 
 unity ; so long as he continues to add to the sentence, 
 he is simply deferring it ; and his subordinate ideas them- 
 selves will be capable each of being explicated into a 
 totality similar to that which he is seeking to evade. 
 
OF QUANTITY. 131 
 
 Cor. — xis the basis of Quality in Style is the same as that of 
 logical Quantity, so the basis of QiLantity in Style is identieal 
 with that of Quality in Logic. Every thought fully mounted 
 for transition has first a distinct meaning, in order that it 
 may have a direction, or what is technically called a drift, 
 whether it is to be regarded as a synthesis of compatible 
 elements, or a disjunction of elements that analytically are 
 involved in each other. Every proposition depends, therefore, 
 for its coherence on the copula, no matter whether that be 
 negative or positive. 
 
 23. 
 
 The principle of movement in composition is from one 
 complete proposition to another, and so on indefinitely, pro- 
 vided the nexus is preserved between each. Every proposi- 
 tion thus becomes alternately complementary to that which 
 precedes and that which follows. The two conditions of this 
 movement are, positively, that of advance, and, negatively, 
 that of connection. Mere succession without connection is 
 not progress. Discoursing on it matters not what, I an- 
 nounce, first, " that in savage times men are much more 
 liable wantonly to provoke each other to bloodshed than in 
 civihsed times," and, next, " that we are at present in the 
 middle of harvest." Now a first thought, in relation to any 
 theme whatsoever, is excused from being directly in connec- 
 tion, on the express understanding that it will take the first 
 chance of ingratiating itself with something that will lead it 
 into that connection. Instead of that, in this instance, it is 
 as far from the possible theme as ever, and, together with 
 proposition No. 2, the exponent of a principle that would 
 reduce all expression to a series of detached remarks, relevant 
 
132 THE LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 to nothing, and as rigorously introductory to nothing. The 
 position of the thought is constantly shifting, and so rapidly, as 
 to make it impossible to say at what angle the new idea meets 
 the old. The vice of the case lies in its being merely the 
 repetition of the initial jyrinciple. We do not advance, simply 
 because we are always beginning ; and, unless we connect, we 
 never get beyond that beginning. 
 
 But it does not follow, on the other hand, that if we state 
 the same proposition over again with a little variation, we 
 are fulfilling the law of connection which is outraged in set- 
 ting side by side two disjunct ideas. For in such a case it is 
 evidently the minimum of variation which ought to be aimed at. 
 And it is impossible to multiply to any extent the circumstan- 
 tial variations of the same substantial thought, even if that were 
 of any use. But this is just what is demanded, viz., that the 
 same idea shall be reiterated indefinitely (short of absolute re- 
 petition), so as not to encroach upon the identity of any other 
 thought. Now certain thoughts allow of no permutation; 
 absolute truths have little patience for being tampered with. 
 And the writer will find that, with every succeeding change of 
 his capital theme, he is further from the identity he had 
 agreed to preserve, and more and more in league with the 
 difference which he was committed to avoid. So far, in fact, 
 from evading the impropriety of advance without connection 
 — which was proved to consist in repeating merely the initial 
 impulse — this is a gross aggravation of it, the truth being that 
 the initial movement is repeated, and with staleness of matter 
 superadded to sameness of principle. 
 
 An abrupt transition is quite a common thing in writing. 
 Thus : " The prisoners having no other refuge, saw one in 
 the sea. The weltering billows might at least hide them 
 
OF QUANTITY. 133 
 
 from their enemies ; those hellish faces through the gather- 
 ing mists of death they might at least shut out. Not so : 
 not thus were they to be dismissed. The Syrian sea is an 
 inhospitable chamber of the great central Christian lake." 
 Understood in its possible relation to what goes before, this 
 last sentence, so abrupt, cannot have any reference to the 
 change of death as affected by the volition of the prisoners. 
 If drown these wretches must, the more turbulently hostile 
 the sea, the better — the more in secret friendly to their 
 melancholy purpose, the more solicitous to their despairing 
 mood. The sentence, therefore, can only indicate either 
 compassion on the part of the captors, or sarcasm on the 
 writer's part at their meditating some more elaborately 
 cruel form of death for the prisoners than suffering them to 
 drown themselves. In the context, however, it runs: — 
 " Nothing rose to view but a barren rock," to which, in the 
 sequel, the captives swam out; and being recalled under 
 promises of amnesty for the past, were treacherously 
 massacred. The reference points onward, then, to the 
 sheltering rock, not to the devouring waves — the sea was 
 hospitable to the extent of providing a rock ; and it was in 
 spite of its general inhospitality, and not because of it, that 
 the catastrophe was deferred. The transition is virtually 
 the same with the principle of the initial movement in 
 any piece of composition. ]\Ieantime, its relation to 
 what succeeds is certain; and it is only by pickiuo- 
 up the connection to windward of the spot where the 
 thought flagged and faltered in tacking, that we are 
 able to ascertain what advance has been made. Even 
 here it is true that there is no advance without connec- 
 tion, where the one is precocious and the other dubious. 
 
134 THE LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 The advance from general inliospitality to the barren rock is 
 only from a principle to a detail, or, if you prefer it, from a 
 rule to an exception — according as you find it in or out of 
 keeping with the shabbiness of the coast. And as to the 
 connection, what angle of incidence is that, to which for the 
 life of us we could not adjust our instruments, without an 
 interregnum of confusion or suspense between alternative 
 issues ? How of all modes of transition should that be the 
 coryphaeus and the nonpareil ? There are two criteria of 
 progress in composition — advance in logic, and advance in 
 information ; which may be directly or inversely as each 
 other. Meantime it is sufiicient that all advance in logic 
 is directly and not inversely as logical connection. What 
 we mean by reason and consequent is the recognition, in 
 abstract speech, of a universal fact in nature ; and to express 
 the relation between them is impossible except by assuming 
 their duality. We say accordingly: I strike this match, 
 and therefore it begins to blaze. The matter we may know 
 to be identical ; but it is the form, by which expression is 
 bound, both fore and aft, with a necessity as eternal as its 
 inability to fix by any fraction of a second the instant in 
 which the one phenomenon shoots into the other amidships. 
 But what become the forms of a material substance, under 
 various conditions in nature, are just the material for a 
 formal existence like expression. Being distinct as forms 
 of a common fact or substance in the physical world, they 
 are distinct as separate facts, in the world of expression, 
 under a common form. The two stand to each other con- 
 versely : advance in the natural sphere being from phase to 
 phase, in the formal, from ultimatum to ultimatum, and the 
 nexus in the natural sphere being one of material, in the 
 
OF QUANTITY. 135 
 
 other one of form. Hence the nexus in the illustration is 
 absolute, founding on physical identity. And similarly, the 
 advance is absolute, from the one idea to its companion. It 
 would be impossible to gauge any degree of advance, without 
 assuming some standard of connection, by which it mio-ht 
 be expounded. And consider simply how fiercely hostile 
 two things must be, which, in spite of so perfect a nexus, 
 are yet distinct. Eeal connection, therefore, being removed 
 as far from total identity as from total difference, it is self- 
 evident, that real advance is as far from total difference as 
 from total identity. 
 Cor. — There is no prerogative mode of transition in style, any 
 more than there is a prerogative velocity of descent for a 
 heavy body, falling a hundred feet, over a light one. Each is 
 indispensable for its own special function. Nevertheless as 
 the ponderous body will create more heat when it strikes the 
 earth then the light body, so a series of thoughts, with a 
 single order of interconnection (if such a thing were possible), 
 would be more or less rigorous than another, provided the 
 principle of connection there were uniform also. Most 
 passages therefore, and all of any length, exhibit an averac^e 
 cohesion in their transitions. 
 
 24. 
 The necessity, for composition, of a duality of ideas to act in 
 combination is also its limit. The principle of extension in 
 thought has nothing to do with an indefinite series of ideas, 
 except by way of providing the elementary conditions of each. 
 In the middle, or at the end, the series does no more than 
 repeat its experiences at the beginning: it is simply the 
 bridge of which these are the arches. It is not they, there- 
 
136 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 fore, that are subdivisions from the series, but the series which 
 is an accumulation of such integral portions. And in every 
 case of transposition or transformation of the larger masses, it 
 is they that regulate the result — not they through any section 
 or whole, but the section through them. 
 
 In the process, which in composition is continually 
 going forward, of alternate grasping and releasing by the 
 attention — grasping that it may release, and releasing 
 that it may grasp — the motion of style is necessarily 
 modified by the number of ideas that can be received at 
 the same moment in sufficient force to be co-ordinated. 
 Tlie process is one taking place with the full conscious- 
 ness of the writer. But concurrently with this, there may 
 be a subconscious process, moulding the thought as a 
 whole into conformity with one dominant idea, not 
 dispersed through the thoughts separately, but secretly 
 determining the bias of all. These influence each other 
 very greatly ; it depends, for example, on the rigid con- 
 nection of its members, that a train of thought completes 
 its curriculum round a given centre, so as to produce a 
 symmetrical result ; and on the stability of its focus (which 
 may be complex, but must be distinctly conceived), that a 
 series of ideas forms a recognisable whole. What, there- 
 fore, in theory is the evolution of a determinate conception 
 through its separate phases, is in practice the setting of these 
 into mosaic — the conscious formation of successive details 
 to a totality subconsciously fixed, subconsciously regulative. 
 That totality, having been reached, may be regarded con- 
 sciously as a whole ; in which event the principle is 
 reversed, the totality is recognized explicitly, and the 
 details implicitly. Such a mode of regarding the effect of 
 
OF QUANTITY. 137 
 
 a piece of composition is, therefore, the exact converse of 
 the stylic. Style, being concerned with the process of 
 movement, has nothing to do with results. In its own way, 
 it has accounted for every item in the whole composition — 
 for every slide and pirouette, for every jerk and oscillation 
 — not a crevice remains for explanation. Any other mode 
 of explaining the facts must transcend style, and ex 
 hypothcsi cannot be stylic; it is simply rhetorical. Now 
 evidently the same function, which deals with the effect of 
 the sections of a piece, deals a fortiori with the totality of 
 the piece. And the rhetorical relation of any piece being 
 that in which it is a universal, and the stylic that in wj^idi 
 it is regarded in its particulars, the same rhetorical function, 
 which treats of every complete piece in relation to its 
 sections, treats also of these in relation to their subsections, 
 and mediately to the individual reticulations of the latter 
 in style. — Another mode of viewing a passage, quite dis- 
 tinct from either of these, but rhetorical also in its applica- 
 tion, is by estimating its general brilliance of connection. 
 " Most passages, and all of any length, exhibit an average 
 cohesion in their transitions." But the total estimate in 
 such a case founds solely on the aggregation of individual 
 brilliances, separately noted in any review for purposes of 
 style. — Casually, of course, the last thought of a section 
 may inosculate as closely with the first of the succeeding 
 one, as if the latter were simply a continuation of the self- 
 same idea. Indeed the more closely a writer mediates his 
 thoughts the one through the other, in relation to the total 
 idea, there will be the more difficulty in determining where 
 his new sections begin, apart from some mechanical device 
 for advertising such a transition. Which artificial device, 
 
 E 
 
 
138 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 as we have it now-a-clays, is quite inadequate to distinguish 
 the hierarchies of articulation, of section and subsection; 
 and is in fact often misleading, because it confounds what 
 is co-ordinate with what is subordinate. But a writer has no 
 business to play fast and loose with the one distinction that 
 is recognized so sacredly, that viz. between the section and 
 the proposition. He may, if he likes, turn a waggon-load 
 of small paragraphs into one, with a view to keeping the 
 resources of the paragraph for the grouping of the larger 
 masses of his thought. But in tliat case, he ought to be 
 the very last person who should wish to distribute one 
 section into two. It is very ungenteel to straddle back 
 against a door-post, one leg in the room, and the other in 
 the lobby. Indefeasibly his section is one and continuous, 
 notwithstanding the mechanical division. And when a 
 Trench novelist writes: "Jacques could not collect his 
 thoughts — Why?— He w^as mad," — in three parallel lines, 
 we pass it without remark, because it is too furious an 
 exaggeration to be harmful, or to escape anybody's notice. 
 On the other hand, when a section opens, for example, with 
 a " therefore," we take the first conception to be a resultant 
 of the preceding section as a whole, and not of its last pro- 
 position. If the two sections are specifically unconnected 
 in their drift, our author should either give a different turn 
 to the inaugural proposition, or omit it altogether. 
 Cor. — No writer holds more than one total thought at a time 
 in relation to any other, whether that be one already com- 
 pleted, or one that suggests itself as the resolution of the 
 thought under formation. Tliis number is a constant in all 
 composition. Any variation between man and man occurs in 
 two ways. In the one instance, it depends upon the rapidity 
 
OF QUANTITY, 139 
 
 with which the individual composes. In the other, it de- 
 j)ends on the complexity of the conception. Virtually there is 
 often a plurality of suggestions moving abreast at once, and 
 threatening to break tiie critical nexus ; and there arises a 
 counteracting force, not to extend the limit, however, but to 
 cause the thoughts to travel backwards and adapt themselves 
 to it. The machinery, by which the attention is thus vir- 
 tually expanded, and the volume of the thought increased, is 
 that of Intension. 
 
 Section III. Of Intension. 
 
 25. 
 
 There are certain relations (such as that of cause and effect), 
 to which, from their essential coherence, it is indifferent per se 
 whether they shall be expressed in one proposition or in two. 
 These are of a bivalvular form, that no compression will hide, 
 and no extension disunite. In the second place, there are 
 many thoughts which are indivisible, and can only be stated 
 independently ; for example, " The rate of discount varies 
 with the degree of commercial prosperity." But finally, 
 there are certain conceptions, which cannot adequately be 
 expressed, unless their special relation is expressed within the 
 proposition ; whose totality is not complete, is not significant, 
 without a limitation. They resemble the second class of 
 ideas, in so far as they are formally single ; but are unlike, in 
 so far as the}'' approximate to being substantially dual pro- 
 positions. And it is in this latter point that they resemble 
 the first class, while they differ from that by not containing 
 their two factors in the same exact equilibrium. By way of 
 illustration, I may say, with reference to the distinction in 
 
140 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 point, " This class of marsupial propositions resembles tlie 
 first, only in so far as it approximates to a division of sub- 
 stance;" and virtually I have expressed by intension all that 
 could be expressed by extending the position into a separate 
 phrase. 
 
 If you assert, without its accompanying limitation, tlie 
 fact that " all persons holding property exercise the right of 
 suffrage, except women," you assert what is false. If again 
 it is expressed thus, " No women have the right of suffrage," 
 the fact of tlie exception is still omitted ; and there is an 
 appeal made to the imagination of the reader to supply 
 what is involved, viz. that every one else has it. Which 
 appeal is either premature or gratuitous ; since if the reader 
 does not know anything about the fact, he will not gain it 
 from such a bare statement ; and if he does know it, and all 
 that remains is to insist upon it oratoricaUy, you forego the 
 chance of parading it with that special emphasis which the 
 discarded relation expressly secures. The thought thus 
 being coaxed into a simple proposition, there flies into the 
 wilderness the very point of having a complex formula. 
 Nor, if you express it in a double proposition, will you 
 •whistle your hawk back from the wilderness. For express 
 yourself thus : " All men have the right of suffrage — but 
 women have it not," — and it will be evident that you have 
 simply adjusted the two facts as j)articv.lar to 2'>ctTticular. 
 And meantime, the logical principle, which is radiantly ac- 
 knowledged in the proposition as it stood originally, and of 
 whose organic force this is the complete abnegation, is that 
 of the universal to the ^particular. This form of statement 
 has its own use in the economy of transitions. By which I 
 mean to infer, that it only comes into collision with other 
 
OF QUANTITY. 141 
 
 forms, upon a question arising of differential propriety. 
 And on the other hand, I infer that it is liable to be drawn 
 into spurious comparisons, by the perversions or neglect of 
 its own principle — by a writer's treating, as if it were 
 subordinate, what is of cardinal import, and using the 
 machinery of inter-propositional connection for what is 
 strictly intra-propositional. 
 Cor. — Even in a mere literary fashion, the principle of 
 subordination is of use to preserve the thought against diverg- 
 ing from the main issue. "Were there no such resource, 
 co-ordinate and subordinate relations would be confounded 
 together. And consequently, it relieves the pressure that 
 otherwise must overtake the function of simple transition; 
 especially where the new limb of the proposition expresses 
 no specific limitation, but a casual addition to the thought. 
 Thus in reporting on the fact that ]\rajorX. (who had recently 
 returned to this country from the East) was about to publish 
 a volume of travels, the parenthetical clause is admissible, 
 which would have been out of place as an independent truth 
 between that fact and the disjunct fact, that the IMajor's 
 experiences had extended over a great number of years. In- 
 deed it would be admissible even as a separate fact {e.g. INlajor 
 X. is about to publish a volume of travels — He has lately re- 
 turoed from the East) provided something else be put in the 
 stead of the third sentence ; upon the principle that you may 
 ask a person to dine with yourself and a confidential friend, 
 whom you would not ask to dine with your friends pro- 
 miscuously. Hence another value of the process of subordina- 
 tion, as an alternative mode of varying the form of transition 
 — the first form in which the illustration stood being a variety 
 of the last — apart from the resource of making the clausal 
 
142 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 addition iu any thought the specific link of connection between 
 it and the next. 
 
 26. 
 
 Some machinery, then, must plainly be devised for incorporat- 
 ing into a proposition, without oti'ence, collateral or supple- 
 mentary statements, that, if explicated in full, would distiirb 
 the principle of progression, and for i-ecognising as subordinate 
 those which perforce had incorporated themselves in the 
 uncompleted thinking. Statements there are, which may be 
 presers'ed as additions, without encumbering the conception, 
 and be identified with it, without abating their significance. 
 The abuses of the process are threefold. (1) The apparatus of 
 subordination may be applied to an idea which ought to be 
 explicated in fidl further on, perhaps with a whole flourish 
 of pendants of its own. (2) There is the case in which a 
 suggestion is introduced, hanging merely by some happy-go- 
 lucky connection, or quite irrelevant. Greater laxity is allowed 
 to a subordinating principle than to one of co-ordination. But 
 whatever tells in the case of the one tells in a corresponding 
 degree in the case of the other. (3) There is a chance of the 
 principle of the minor clause being indefinitely repeated. 
 This is the chief danger. And it is this which makes any 
 exasseration of the others so much to be dreaded: in the 
 second instance, it would be to add irrelevance to irrelevance, 
 impertinence within impertinence. The abstract ideal and 
 the practical, with regard to the statement of relative truth, 
 have no such intimate connection with each other, as in the case 
 of the integral statement of truth absolute. A single state- 
 ment of truth in the abstract, that should include in it im- 
 plicitly every other truth, would be essentially compendious. 
 
OF C2UAyTITY. 143 
 
 A single statement of truth in its subordination — in its pro- 
 cessions and divisions, its oppositions and concessions — would 
 include every express relation of every truth to every other : 
 it would be essentially pancyclopccdic. The attention could 
 not yield to the strain for a moment ; it would not even try- 
 to prefigure the eternally advancing, eternally receding con- 
 clusion. It bends, therefore, to the same limitations in inten- 
 sion as in extension. Being flushed from the primary- 
 thought, and overflowing, it returns to fill the lacuna which it 
 had anticipated in the thought that succeeds ; its practical 
 limit not interfering with, but specifically enhancing any 
 purposes of literary propriety — of perspicuity, or economy, 
 or elegance. 
 
 The medium for the di.stribution of the energy of subor- 
 dination in thought is again the faculty of attention. It is 
 not attention, however (any more than in the preceding 
 case), in the sense of that which is exhausted during the 
 evolution of thought, and every exertion of which involves 
 a separate decrement in the stock of available energy. For 
 so far as exhaustion goes, it does nut matter to the reader 
 whether that is effected by fiftj curt propositions, or by 
 twenty voluminous ones. Fatigue is no independent 
 criterion, therefore; and even as a symptom it is incon- 
 stant and precarious. Moreover, its degree, when it does 
 move in an appreciable ratio, is itseK otherwise predeter- 
 mined, viz. by the intellectual conditions for apprehending 
 rapidly the bearing of a new thought, and for sustaining it 
 without impatience through its development to its technical 
 sublation in the thought which succeeds. It is not atten- 
 tion in its length that is meant, but in its breadth — the 
 capacity for holding a number of conceptions simultane- 
 
144 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 ously, so as to form a unity, varying in complexity accord- 
 ing to the clearness with which these may be combined. 
 Cor. — The principle of certain writings conducted apparently 
 in defiance of this limit is really exoteric. The structure of 
 law documents is often according to a coarse and very 
 different method. The various clauses, instead of being em- 
 braced in a unity of consciousness, are held together in the 
 memory. This, psychologically, is the distinction ; the unity 
 in transition being often merely arbitrary and precarious. 
 
 27. 
 Every proposition must be either simple or complex. If 
 simple, however, it may be so by having rejected the chance 
 of forming a member of a complex proposition ; and if com- 
 plex, it may be so by refusing to have its members scattered 
 into separate propositions. The permutations, according to 
 which the several limbs of an original complex thought may 
 be arranged, are very numerous. Only each of these, as ulti- 
 mately placed, is still one of the two alternative forms, either a 
 simple thought or a compound, and is alternatively that wliich 
 it is, by having refused to incarnate itself under the correla- 
 tive form. This is the simple case, in which the reader sees 
 all the apparent alternatives spread out on the page before 
 him at once. Nor is it woi-th while inquiring particularly 
 into the hidden alternatives; — what might have happened, 
 viz. in the way of sn23];)rcssion, before the thought was per- 
 mitted to stand as it is. All that moves agreeably to the 
 same principles. So in tlie case of revision : if a new thought 
 is to be admitted, it must be either as an integral fact, or as a 
 fact in affiliation with some other fact (must be a leading fact, 
 or a secondary, or an offshoot again from that), whether it be 
 
OF QUANTITY. 145 
 
 as a total increment, or as a substitute for some other fact 
 that has been suppressed. Any alteration must take effect 
 either (1) by way of addition, or (2) by way of retractation, 
 or (3) of both combined, the new fact being promoted vice the 
 previous fact superannuated. — Even here of course there is a 
 mode of keeping the tliought in life, viz. the appendix, or 
 note ; which may radiate from the original suggestion of the 
 text at various angles, and with varying degrees of importance. 
 Only its scope is limited ; otherwise, upon the same principle, 
 a succession of notes, taking off from each other, might be 
 continued ad infinitum. And besides, exhibiting in itself the 
 same principles of composition which govern the primary 
 text, the note has no special value as illustrating how these 
 work. — So far there is nothing to alter — to multiply or 
 diminish— the forms under which the result must appear. 
 But these processes throw a very searching light upon the 
 secret rationale of variety in composition, and a very signifi- 
 cant one upon the reciprocal relations of transition and 
 subordination. Interpose a thought between two complex 
 thoughts, and possibly you will attract the allegiance of their 
 near members to itself, transmuting what is left into a simple 
 transitional phase from an ultra-transitional. Eliminate a 
 proposition, and the thoughts, between which it has stood, 
 may coalesce. Each resultant form, however, will still arise, 
 just by rejecting the form in which it would not be what it is. 
 This simply is the differential principle in Quantity, which 
 by the side of Quality is too apt to appear flaccid and 
 meagre, and which these external modes of variation tend 
 vastly to enhance and expound, by illustrating the organic 
 nature of transitional connection. 
 
 To say that one thought may influence the form of 
 
146 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 auotlier standing in connection with it, is to say nothing. 
 It gives no chie to tlie degree or the kind of variation wliich 
 may be involved. For, transition being known to be the 
 most important matter in composing, we should each of us 
 * naturally incline to look upon any modification arising 
 within that as very trilling. And as a rule it is so : so long 
 as the change descends upon the subordinate clauses it is 
 inconsiderable. " An immense majority of the Eoman 
 people never lighted a candle, unless sometimes in the 
 early dawn. And this custom w^as the custom of all 
 nations that lived round the Mediterranean." Let the final 
 clause be eliminated from the first proposition, and it will 
 make no difference to the connection of the two sentences ; 
 since the reference in the latter is to the rule, not to the 
 exception. Upon the same principle, the corresponding 
 clause in the text of this sentence, which I have suppressed, 
 ought to be superfluous. "The daylight furnished gratis 
 was certainly undeniable in its quality. . . . Seneca even in 
 his own luxurious period called those men by ugly names 
 who lived chiefly by candle-light." Yet no ; there is a 
 hiatus. For why " ugly " ? Because the men were too 
 ugly themselves to come abroad in the day-time, or because 
 they were luxurious, or perhaps because they were candle- 
 making, which being such a public disgrace, itself required 
 to be prosecuted by artificial (to wit candle) light ? For no 
 such reason, but for one more obvious, yet still puzzling, 
 because one of several more or less obvious reasons, — which 
 is supplied by the intercalated phrase, " quite sufficient for 
 all purposes that were honest." The difference of variation 
 in the first instance is at its minimum, in the other at its 
 maximum, the complex proposition in the one case being 
 
OF QUANTITY. 147 
 
 virtually a simple thouglit, in tlie other virtually a 
 dual. 
 
 Now let both clauses, instead of being suppres.sed, 
 undergo the other change, that of elevation into an in- 
 dependent thought. Immediately the values are reversed. 
 The subordinate member of the first instance is seen to be 
 incompatible with the seriousness of the transition that is 
 made to rest upon it ; while, in the other case, the altera- 
 tion makes very little real difference. The degree of varia- 
 tion is now at its maximum in the first case, and at its 
 minimum in the second. 
 
 The difference of variation, therefore, exists at a maximum 
 or a minimum, according as in each case the alternative 
 orders of circumstance take effect ; the same condition in 
 either producing the opposite result to that which it 
 produces in the other, and the same ratio of effect being 
 produced in the one as is produced by the opposite con- 
 dition in the other. The general principle, however, is (1) 
 that of intermodification (and not of suppression), and (2) 
 that of a maximum change under such intermodification — a 
 subordinate clause being raised to the rank of a separate 
 proposition. Now if this is the ordinary case, it will not do 
 simply to say that one proposition affects the form of its 
 neighbour ; which implies that the change is quite incon- 
 siderable. Especially the degree of the variation requires 
 to be specified, when it is the exception to the second rule 
 that is to be taken into account, and the change is a 
 mijiimum, the subordinate clause being virtually a co- 
 ordinate already, and benefiting little by its promotion. 
 Still more peremptorily does the nature of the variation 
 require to be adjusted, when (the first law being violated) it 
 
148 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 is a suppression, and not a mere alteration of form ; since 
 that suppression brings this last exceptional minimum 
 change of the subordinate clause to the normal maximum, 
 and the first normal maximum change to an exceptional 
 minimum. It would be utterly vain, therefore, to look in 
 the mere form of a proposition for a clue to its transitional 
 value; and just for this reason, that there are only the two 
 forms — compromise between them tliere is none. No more 
 palpable distinction of form can exist between a pot with a 
 handle and a pot without. And it is all the more readily 
 assumed, that the substantial value of each is uniformly the 
 same; while none could be more equivocal. Meantime, the 
 possible modification that may be produced by one pro- 
 position upon another is modification enough ; in the first 
 instance the sentence following the clause " unless per- 
 haps," etc., determines that that clause, if introduced, shall 
 not be co-ordinate with it, but must be subordinate to 
 the preceding thought ; and in the second instance, 
 the subordinate clause determines that the succeeding 
 proposition shall not supplant it, but must stand 
 apart. 
 Cor. — The interaction of the two fundamental processes in 
 composition is the ground not more of certain average effects 
 in style, than of certain broad differences. No man writes 
 without using both ; but they may be used in different pro- 
 portions, so as to distinguish even diverse nationalities. And 
 a tariff might even be fixed for certain artificial stimulants, 
 according to the results of their physiological action upon the 
 several processes of composition. The effect of wine, for 
 example, appears to be that of inducing a more brusque and 
 discontinuous mode of writing, and to discourage a more 
 
OF QUANTITY, 149 
 
 elaborate style of movement, the tendeucy to wlucli is doubt- 
 less exaggerated by opium. 
 
 More immediately, however, the power of literary con- 
 densation depends upon a knowledge of the manner in which 
 these processes mutually affect each other. Most people seem 
 to think that the way to condense is by suppression. Let a 
 writer run his pen through a sentence here, and a clause there, 
 and he does all that is required. Especially, it would be said, 
 let the carnage descend most heavily on the clauses. Now 
 really it is not the derivative and parenthetical clauses that 
 harbour diffuseness, but the garrulous or querulous iteration 
 of the same truth in successive propositions. Nevertheless 
 let the clauses be thinned out. And let your redundant main 
 propositions be dismissed at the same time. But now, where 
 many people imagine the work of compression to be over, the 
 important part of it is just beginning. Only instead of com- 
 mencing with the secondary clauses, we commence with the 
 primary ; and instead of lessening the number of subordina- 
 tions, we increase them, by making the co-ordinate propositions 
 coalesce, and subordinating one to the other. 
 
 All practical instruction in the art of composition j9ows 
 naturally out of these principles. As for mechanical criteria, 
 they are of no use. Direct the tyro to write in long sentences, 
 or in short sentences, and you tell him nothing. There may 
 be more difference between two short propositions than 
 between a short and a long. A thought, for example, with a 
 significant exception attached to it, and that turns back upon 
 itself at a very acute angle, may make more demand upon the 
 attention than one which carries the leading idea through a 
 whole series of antistrophes. To talk of brevity, v/ith a dis- 
 tinction like that concealed under it, is to give no hint of the 
 
150 LOGIC OF STYLE. 
 
 real case, to a pupil who measures results by the square foot, 
 and possibly to encourage a vicious style of writing, by leav- 
 ing him to suppose that one curt proposition is as good as 
 another. Now a staccato movement of thought is not merely 
 one of the most offensive, but specifically the most unpromis- 
 ing of all the modes of composition. In its own degree the 
 most lively, it is in continuity the most monotonous. And 
 in a higher sense it is vicious, because it generates irreflec- 
 tion ; which is a vice, just in proportion as the majority of 
 truths are relative. The most effective mode of statement is 
 that of a truth in its relations. Accordingly your true rhe- 
 torician aims chiefly at such results, not because they are the 
 most elaborate, or the most uncommon, but simply because 
 they are the most telling. I'antasias he can spin by the 
 hour, when the mood impels him, but his preference is for a 
 severer brilliance. He trusts, for his music, to precision, and, 
 for his artistry, to the rigour of his proportions. It is here 
 that your ordinary rhetorician discovers another weakness. 
 Having finished his tale of short propositions, he thinks to 
 take it out in long boa-constrictor periods, with a good deal 
 less of the fantasia, and a very great deal more of the spin- 
 ning. For as there are effects of the turkey-cock order, so 
 there is a class of people who go about gobbling upon a very 
 limited amount of provocation — afflicted with a sort of sodden 
 enthusiasm, borrowed from the memory of platform excite- 
 ment, or from imitations of such memories. Now the undida- 
 tion and the swoop, the strenuousness and the ease, which 
 ought to mark the rhetorical wave are in general all very well 
 
 for the sea. Nevertheless, if his foam does not look like 
 
 lather, nor the movement of the water betray a surreptitious 
 besom — so long as his waves slop and lunge, and rally for an 
 
OF QUANTITY. 151 
 
 instant before the fall, and flounce over in mist and thunder 
 — a man does well. And unquestionably, even a pretentious 
 effect is not nearly so bad as the practice of involution, when 
 carried to an excess. For that there is no defence. Never- 
 theless, it may arise sometimes from an exceptional power of 
 manoeuvring complicated truth, and not from slovenliness, 
 which in literature is often a species of locomotor ataxy. 
 And for that reason it is not to be regarded as something 
 very heinous by the side of the tendency to extreme brevity. 
 Of the two it is that which promises best for amendment ; 
 since the positive tendency in it is more easily checked than 
 the partial tendency in the other is likely to be developed. 
 This is true, however, only so long as each is regarded speci- 
 fically as a tendency : as an intermittent effect the subsultory 
 order of proposition is of great use, but the other never. And 
 this is the rationale of the value of the short proposition 
 generally, as opposed to the long, either ^jc?' sc being indifferent 
 — viz. that as an effect alternating with a proposition of 
 moderate length, it is better than the other ; it behaves better 
 in combination. But it is not the normal proposition ; that 
 is calculated from the medium, not from either extreme. 
 The proposition of medium length is the constant, and is 
 relieved most effectively by the one variable which is not the 
 most cumbrous ; upon the same principle that, in waltzing, 
 it is better for a man — he being the active or determinino- 
 force — to have a partner shorter than himself, rather than 
 one who is proportionately taller. 
 
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 London, Noz-cmbcr 1874. 
 
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 Knowledge; Questions and A Bi- 
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 ments. 
 iSmo. is. 
 
 The Stepping-Stone to Bio- 
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 on the Lives of Eminent Mm and 
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 The Stepping-Stone to Irish 
 History: Containing several Hun- 
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 ral Hundred Questions and An- 
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INDEX. 
 
 Acton's Modern Cookery 39 
 
 Aird's Blackstone Economised 39 
 
 Alpine Club Map of Switzerland 33 
 
 Alpine Guide (The) 33 
 
 Amos's Jurisprudence 10 
 
 Primer of the Constitution 10 
 
 Anderson's Strength of Materials 20 
 
 ^//-/«j-/;-(7//o''j' Organic Chemistry 20 
 
 Arnold's (Dr.) Christian Life 29 
 
 Lectures on Modern History 2 
 
 Miscellaneous Works 12 
 
 School Sermons 29 
 
 Sermons 29 
 
 (T.) Manual of English Literature 12 
 
 Arnoiild's Life of Lord Denman 7 
 
 Atherstone Priory 39 
 
 Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson ... 13 
 
 Ayi-e's Treasury of Bible Knowledge 38 
 
 Bacon's Essays, by Wkately 10 
 
 Life and Letters, by 5/^(/(////^' ... 10 
 
 Works 10 
 
 Bain's Mental and Moral Science 11 
 
 on the Senses and Intellect 11 
 
 Baker's Two Works on Ceylon 32 
 
 Z?a//'j Guide to the Central Alps 38 
 
 Guide to the Western Alps 38 
 
 Guide to the Eastern Alps 38 
 
 Becker s Charicles and Gallus 34 
 
 ^/afi'i- Treatise on Brewing 39 
 
 Blackley's German-Enghsh Dictionary 15 
 
 Blaine's Rural Sports 36 
 
 Bloxam's Metals 20 
 
 Boultbee on 39 Articles 28 
 
 Bourne's Catechism of the Steam Engine . 27 
 
 Handbook of Steam Engine 27 
 
 Treatise on the Steam Engine ... 27 
 
 Improvements in the same 27 
 
 Bawdier s Family Shakspeare 35 
 
 Bramley-Moore' s Six Sisters of the Valley . 39 
 Brande's Dictionary of Science, Literature, 
 
 and Art 22 
 
 Bray's Manual of Anthropology 22 
 
 Philosophy of Necessity 11 
 
 Brinkley's Asivonomy 17 
 
 Browne's Exposition of the 39 Articles 28 
 
 Brunei' s\J\{& oi Brunei 7 
 
 Buckle's History of Civilisation 3 
 
 Posthumous Remains 12 
 
 Bull' s Hints to Mothers 39 
 
 Maternal Management of Children . 39 
 
 Burgomaster's Family (The) 39 
 
 Burke's Rise of Great Families 8 
 
 Vicissitudes of Families 8 
 
 Busk's Folk-lore of Rome 34. 
 
 Valleys of Tirol 32 
 
 Cabinet Lawyer 39 
 
 Ca7?ipbell's Norway 33 
 
 Gates' s Biographical Dictionary 8 
 
 and Woodward' s 'E,ncyc\o-pxAn ... 5 
 
 Changed Aspects of Unchanged Truths ... 13 
 
 Chesney s Indian Polity 3 
 
 Modern Military Biography 3 
 
 Waterloo Campaign 3 
 
 dough's Lives from Plutarch 4 
 
 Cy/tvejo on Moabite Stone &c 32 
 
 's Pentateuch and Book of Joshua. 32 
 
 Speaker's Bible Commentary ... 32 
 
 Collins' s Mineralogy of Cornwall 27 
 
 Perspective 26 
 
 Commonplace Philosopher in Town and 
 
 Country, by A. K. H. B 13 
 
 Comfe's Positive Polity 8 
 
 Comy?is Elena 34 
 
 Congreves Essays g 
 
 Politics of Aristotle 10 
 
 Co?iington's Translation of Virgil's vEneid 36 
 
 Miscellaneous Writings 14 
 
 Contanseau s Two French Dictionaries ... 14 
 Conybcare and Hotvsoti's Life and Epistles 
 
 of St. Paul 29 
 
 Cotton's Memoir and Correspondence 7 
 
 Counsel and Comfort from a City Pulpit... 13 
 
 Cox's (G. W.) Aryan Mythology 4 
 
 Crusades 6 
 
 History of Greece 4 
 
 Tale of the Great Persian 
 
 War 4 
 
 Tales of Ancient Greece ... 34 
 
 and yones's Teutonic Tales 34 
 
 Crawley's Thucydides 4 
 
 Cr^fZJv on British Constitution 3 
 
 Cresy s Encyclopaedia of Civil Engineering 27 
 
 Critical Essays of a Country Parson 14 
 
 Crct)/J«'j Chemical Analysis 24 
 
 Dyeing and Calico-printing 28 
 
 Culley's Handbook of Telegraphy 26 
 
 Ci^jac/fe'j^ Student's History of Ireland 3 
 
 D' Aubigni's Reformation in the Time of 
 
 Calvin 6 
 
42 
 
 NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO. 
 
 Davidsons Introduction to New Testament 31 
 
 Dead Shot (The), hy Marksman 37 
 
 Dc Caisne and Le Maoiit's Botany 23 
 
 /?£ yW(3r^««'5 Paradoxes 13 
 
 De Tocqueville s Democracy in America... 9 
 
 Disraeli's Lord George Bentinck 7 
 
 Novels and Tales 35 
 
 Dobson on the Ox 36 
 
 Dove's Law of Storms 18 
 
 Doyle's Fairyland 24 
 
 Z>r£w'j Reasons of Faith 29 
 
 Eastlakes Gothic Revival 25 
 
 Hints on Household Taste 26 
 
 Edwards's Rambles among the Dolomites 33 
 
 Elements of Botany 22 
 
 EllicoW s Commentary on Ephesians 30 
 
 Galatians 30 
 
 Pastoral Epist. 30 
 
 Philippians,&c. 30 
 
 Thessalonians . 30 
 
 Lectures on Life of Christ 29 
 
 Epochs of History 6 
 
 /jziawji Ancient Stone Implements 22 
 
 Ewald's History of Israel 30 
 
 Fairbairn s Application of Cast and 
 
 Wrought Iron to Building... 28 
 
 Information for Engineers 28 
 
 Treatise on Mills and Millwork 27 
 
 /^(zrrar'j Chapters on Language 13 
 
 Families of Speech 13 
 
 Fitz'tvygram on Horses and Stables 37 
 
 i^orjry/A'j Essays 9 
 
 Fowler's Collieries and Colliers 38 
 
 Francis's Fishing Book 36 
 
 Freeman sW\%\.ox\q.?\ Geography of Europe 5 
 
 From January to December 14 
 
 /7v«(/<?' J- English in Ireland 2 
 
 History of England 2 
 
 Short Studies 12 
 
 Gairdner's Houses of Lancaster and York 6 
 
 Gamgee on Horse-Shoeing 36 
 
 Ganot's Elementary Physics 19 
 
 Natural Philosophy 19 
 
 Gardiner's Buckingham and Charles 3 
 
 Life of Christ 32 
 
 Thirty Years' War 6 
 
 Gilbert a.n<i. Churchill's 'DoXovmX.cs 32 
 
 Girdlestone's Bible Synonyms 29 
 
 Goodeve's Mechanics 20 
 
 Mechanism 20 
 
 Grant's Ethics of Aristotle 10 
 
 Graver Thoughts of a Country Parson 14 
 
 Grcvi lie's Journal i 
 
 Griffin's Algebra and Trigonometry 20 
 
 Griffith's Sermons for the Times 29 
 
 Grove on Correlation of Phy.sical Forces ... 18 
 
 Gwilt's Encycloprcdia of Architecture 26 
 
 //(?;-^ on Election of Representatives 14 
 
 Hai-risoii's Political Problems 8 
 
 Hartivig's Aerial World 21 
 
 Polar World 21 
 
 Sea and its Living Wonders ... 21 
 
 Subterranean World 2X 
 
 Tropical World 21 
 
 Ha i/ghfo!?' s Amm:i\ Mechanics 19 
 
 /^(7>'K'<?;'rf'j Biographical and Critical Essays 7 
 
 Heer's Switzerland 22 
 
 //6'/;;?/zc//'3'j Scientific Lectures 18 
 
 Helmsley s Trees, Shrubs, and Herbaceous 
 
 Plants 23 
 
 Herschel's Outlines of Astronomy 17 
 
 Holland's Recollections 7 
 
 Hoivitt' s Rural Life of England 32 
 
 Visits to Remarkable Places 33 
 
 Humboldt' s Life 7 
 
 Hume's Essays 11 
 
 Treatise on Human Nature 11 
 
 Ihnc's History of Rome 5 
 
 Ingelow's Poems 36 
 
 Jameson s Legends of Saints and Martyrs . 25 
 
 Legends of the Madonna 25 
 
 Legends of the Monastic Orders 25 
 
 Legends of the Saviour 25 
 
 Jenkins Electricity and Magnetism 20 
 
 _7t';';'(7;«'j Lycidas of Milton 35 
 
 J cr raid's Life of Napoleon i 
 
 Johnston s Geographical Dictionary 17 
 
 KaliscK s Commentary on the Bible 30 
 
 jTwV/i'j Evidence of Prophecy 30 
 
 Kenyo7i's (Lord) Life 7 
 
 Kci'r s Metallurgy, by Crookes and R'dhrig. 27 
 
 A''/r/y and .?/<?«(-(.'' J Entomology 21 
 
 Knatchhull - Hugesseti s WHiispers from 
 
 Fairy-Land 34 
 
 Landscapes, Churches, iS:c. by A. K. H. B. 13 
 
 Lang's Ballads and Lyrics 35 
 
 Lathani s English Dictionary.... 14 
 
 Laiigliton's Nautical Surveying 18 
 
 Laii'lor' s CentuUe 34 
 
 La'wrence on Rocks 22 
 
 Lecky's History of European Morals 5 
 
 Rationalism 5 
 
 Leaders of Public Opinion 7 
 
 Leisure Hours in Town, by A. K. H. B 13 
 
 Lessons of Middle Age, by A. K. H. B 13 
 
 Lewes' s Biographical History of Philosophy 5 
 
 Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicons 15 
 
 Life of Man Symbolised 25 
 
 Lindlcy and Moore s Treasury of Botany... 23 
 
 Lloyd's Magnetism 20 
 
 Wave-Theory of Light 20 
 
NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO. 
 
 43 
 
 LoiigmaHS Cliess Openings 39 
 
 Edward the Third 3 
 
 Lectures on History of England 3 
 
 Old and Xew St. Paul's 26 
 
 Loudon's Eneyclopaidia of Agriculture ... 28 
 
 Gardening 28 
 
 Plants 22 
 
 Lowndes's Engineer's Handbook 27 
 
 Lubbock's Origin of Civilisation 22 
 
 Lyra Germanica 25, 31 
 
 J/7A?///,7y^ (Lord) Essays 2 
 
 History of England ... 2 
 
 Lays of Ancient Rome 25,35 
 
 Miscellaneous Writings 12 
 
 Speeches 12 
 
 Works 2 
 
 McCulloch's Dictionar)' of Commerce 16 
 
 Macleod's Principles of Economical Philo- 
 sophy 10 
 
 Theory and Practice of Banking 38 
 
 Markhani s History of Persia 4 
 
 Marshall's Physiology 24 
 
 Todas 22 
 
 Marshman' s History of India 3 
 
 Life of Havelock 8 
 
 .l/<7r////ca/c'j- Christian Life 31 
 
 Hymns 31 
 
 Maunders Biographical Treasury 38 
 
 Geographical Treasury 38 
 
 Historical Treasurj' 38 
 
 Scientific and Literary Treasury 38 
 
 Treasury of Knowledge 38 
 
 Treasury of Natural History ... 38 
 
 ]fax7ccirs Theory of Heat 20 
 
 May's History of Democracy 2 
 
 History of England 2 
 
 Melville's Digby Grand 39 
 
 General Bounce 39 
 
 Gladiators 39 
 
 Good for Nothing 39 
 
 Holmby House 39 
 
 Interpreter 39 
 
 Kate Coventry 39 
 
 Queen's Maries 39 
 
 A/endelssoAn's 'Letters 8 
 
 Menzics' Forest Trees and Woodland 
 
 Scenery 23 
 
 .l/(,v7tw/4;'j Fall of the Roman Republic ... 4 
 
 Romans under the Empire 4 
 
 Mcrrificld' s Arithmetic and Mensuration... 20 
 
 Magnetism 18 
 
 Miles on Horse's Foot and Horse Shoeing 37 
 
 on Horse's Teeth and Stables 37 
 
 Mill (J.) on the Mind 10 
 
 (J. S.) on Liberty 9 
 
 Subjection of Women 9 
 
 on Representative Government 9 
 
 Utilitarianism 9 
 
 '5 Autobiography 6 
 
 Dissertations and Discussions 9 
 
 Essays on Religion (S:c 29 
 
 Hamilton's Philosophy 9 
 
 System of Logic 9 
 
 .Mill's Political Economy 9 
 
 Unsettled Questions 9 
 
 .1////^/-',? Elements of Chemistry 23 
 
 Inorganic Chemistry 20 
 
 Mintds (Lord) Lifeand Letters 6 
 
 Mitchell's Manual of .Architecture 2, 
 
 Manual of Assaying 28 
 
 Modern .Novelist's Library 34 
 
 J/(>//.f(V/'.f ' .Spiritual Songs ' 31 
 
 A/t(c)rt''j Irish Melodies, illustrated 35 
 
 Lalla Rookh, illustrated 35 
 
 MorcH's Elements of Psychology 11 
 
 Mental Philosophy n 
 
 Af orris's French Revolution 3 
 
 Miiller's Chips from a German Workshop. 12 
 
 Science of Language 12 
 
 Science of Religion 5 
 
 New Testament Illustrated with Wood 
 
 Engravings from the Old Masters 24 
 
 Northcott on Lathes and Turning 26 
 
 O' Conor's Commentary on Hebrews 30 
 
 Romans 30 
 
 St. John 30 
 
 Odling's Course of Practical Chemistry ... 24 
 Owens Comparative Anatomy and Physio- 
 logy of Vertebrate Animals 20 
 
 Owen's Lectures on the Invertebrata 20 
 
 Packe's Guide to the PyTenees 33 
 
 Pattison's Casauban 7 
 
 Pay en s Industrial Chemistry 26 
 
 Pc-wtners Comprehensive Specifier 39 
 
 Pierce's Chess Problems 39 
 
 Pole's Game of Whist 39 
 
 /'rtv/t/t'/'^izj^'j Master)' of Languages 15 
 
 Present-Day Thoughts, by A. K. H. B. ... 13 
 
 P/vf/fr' J- Astronomical Essays 17 
 
 Moon 17 
 
 Orbs around Us 17 
 
 Other Worlds than Ours 17 
 
 Saturn 17 
 
 Scientific Essays (New Series) ... 20 
 
 Sun 17 
 
 Transits of Venus 17 
 
 Two Star Atlases 18 
 
 Universe 17 
 
 Public Schools Atlas 16 
 
 Modem Geography 16 
 
 Ancient Geoi^aphy 16 
 
 Ranken on Strains in Trasses 28 
 
 Kawlinson's Parthia 4 
 
 Sassanians 4 
 
 Recreations of a Country Parson \^ 
 
 AV(/^ratr'j Dictionary of Artists 24 
 
 Keilly's Map of Mont Blanc 37 
 
 * Monte Rosa 37 
 
 Reynardso)t' s'QowntyieKo'xA 36 
 
 Rich's Dictionary of Antiquities 15 
 
 AVirr'j Rose Amateur's Guide 22 
 
 Rogers' s Eclipse of Faith 29 
 
 Defence of Eclipse of Faith 29 
 
 Essays. 9 
 
44 
 
 NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO, 
 
 Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and 
 
 Phrases 14 
 
 Roiiahfs Fly-Fisher's Entomology 37 
 
 Nolhsc/iild's Israelites 30 
 
 A'««^// on the Christian Religion 6 
 
 English Constitution 2 
 
 's Recollections and Suggestions ... 2 
 
 5(T;/(f(7r/i Justinian's Institutes 10 
 
 Saiifoni' s English Kings 2 
 
 Savory's Geometric Turning 26 
 
 Schelleiis Spectrum Analysis 18 
 
 Scott' s A\har\. Durer 24 
 
 Papers on Civil Engineering 28 
 
 Seaside Musing, by A. K. H. 13 13 
 
 Seebohm's Oxford Reformers of 1498 3 
 
 Protestant Revolution 6 
 
 SewelFs History of the Early Church 5 
 
 Passing Thoughts on Religion 31 
 
 Prepnration for Communion 31 
 
 Principles of Education 14 
 
 Readings for Confirmation 31 
 
 Readings for Lent 31 
 
 Examination for Confirmation ... 31 
 
 Stories and Tales 35 
 
 Thoughts for the Age 31 
 
 Thoughts for the Holy Week 31 
 
 Sharp's Post-office Gazetteer 16 
 
 Shelley's Workshop Appliances 20 
 
 5/;(7ri'j Church History S 
 
 Simpson's Meeting the Sun 32 
 
 Smith's Paul's Voyage and Shipwreck 30 
 
 (Sydney) Essays 12 
 
 Life and Letters 7 
 
 Miscellaneous Works ... 12 
 
 Wit and Wisdom 12 
 
 (Dr. R. A.) Air and Rain 18 
 
 Sneyd's Cyllene 34 
 
 Southey's Doctor 13 
 
 • Poetical Works 35 
 
 Stanley's History of British Birds 21 
 
 Stephen's Ecclesiastical Biography 7 
 
 Freethinking and Plainspeaking 9 
 
 Stepping Stones (the Series) 40 
 
 .Si'/r//;/^'j Secret of Hegel 11 
 
 Sir William Hamilton 11 
 
 Stonchenge on the Dog 37 
 
 on the Greyhound 37 
 
 Sunday Afternoons at the Parish Church of 
 
 a University City, by A. K. H. B 13 
 
 Supernatural Religion 31 
 
 7V»'/i3/-'j History of India 3 
 
 Manual of Ancient History 6 
 
 Manual of Modern History 6 
 
 (y(?r-^;«)') Works, edited by /;Vi;//. 31 
 
 Teft-Books of Science 19 
 
 y/!/r/(y<z//'j History of Greece 4 
 
 Thomson s Laws of Thought 11 
 
 7";^(7;'/«'.r Quantitative Analysis 20 
 
 and Muir's Qualitative Analysis ... 20 
 
 y/^/^a^/cZ/wwi'^ Chemical Physiology 23 
 
 Todd (A.) on Parliamentary Government... 2 
 
 and Bowman's Anatomy and 
 
 Physiology of Man 2\ 
 
 Trench's Realities of Irish Life 12 
 
 Trollope's Barchester Towers 39 
 
 Warden 39 
 
 Tyndall's American Lectures on Light ... 20 
 
 Belfast Address 19 
 
 Diamagnetism 20 
 
 Fragments of Science 19 
 
 Hours of Exercise in the Alps... 33 
 
 Lectures on Electricity 20 
 
 Lectures on Light 20 
 
 Lectures on Sound 20 
 
 Heat a Mode of Motion 20 
 
 ■ Molecular Physics 20 
 
 6'6'i^«-wt;o-'j System of Logic n 
 
 Ure's Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures, 
 and Mines 27 
 
 Warburton s Edward the Third 6 
 
 \Vatso7is Geometry 20 
 
 I Fa^/j' J Dictionary of Chemistry 24 
 
 Webb's Objects for Common Telescopes ... 18 
 
 Weinhola' s Experimental Physics 19 
 
 Wellington's Life, by Glcig 8 
 
 Whately s English Synonymes 14 
 
 Life and Correspondence 6 
 
 Logic 10 
 
 Rhetoric 10 
 
 White and Donkin's English Dictionary... 15 
 
 and Riddle's Latin Dictionaries ... 15 
 
 Whilu'orth on Guns and Steel 27 
 
 Wilcocks's Sea-Fisherman 36 
 
 H^/7//rt;«j' J- Aristotle's Ethics 10 
 
 Willis's Principles of Mechanism 26 
 
 Willoiighhy's (Lady) Diary 34 
 
 Wood's Bible Animals 22 
 
 Homes without Hands 21 
 
 Insects at Home 21 
 
 Insects Abroad 21 
 
 Out of Doors 21 
 
 Strange Dwellings 21 
 
 Yongc's English-Greek Lexicons 16 
 
 Horace 36 
 
 F(?//i?/^ on the Dog 37 
 
 on the Horse 36 
 
 Zf//c/j Socrates 5 
 
 Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics... 5 
 
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