THE LEGAIv ARTICLES 
 
 IN THE 
 
 JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
 
 Abduction. (S. M.) The subject treats of C'SJ 2:i3 
 as the act of stealing a human being h"^ forcible abduction, 
 which is Kidnapping: In Webster's Dictionary: " This 
 crime (kidnapping) was capital by the Jewish law," while 
 Abduction in law, according to Blackstone, means: "taking 
 away a child, award, a wife, etc either \>-^ fraud, persuasion, 
 or open violence " {ib.). Moreover, the term is usually 
 understood by laymen (for whom the Encyclopedia is 
 primarily intended)as that of Seduction, nriDD in Jewish law 
 (Ex. xxii. i6.) 
 
 "(i) To be amenable to the law, etc " The full des- 
 cription of the malefactor should be omitted, but may be 
 cross referenced to Amenability or Liability, otherwise 
 repetitions will occur in every subject of crime 
 
 ** (c) Enslavement must be accomplished by conscious- 
 ness on the part of the victim. Hence, if a victim be in a 
 state of unconsciousness^ as in a profound sleep, at the incep- 
 tion of the crime, and remain in such state throughout the 
 process of the crime, and until its accomplishment, the 
 crime is incomplete . . . " (7 lines below) " To constitute 
 enslavement the service imposed may be trivial. Thus, 
 when the offender merely leans on the victim or uses him 
 as a screen against a draft and that even while the subject ts 
 asleep, it will be sufficient evidence of enslavement^ These 
 two statements plainly contradict each other. The writer 
 further says : '* By selling him (the victim) the Talmud 
 implies the sale of the victim as bondmen are sold( Lev. 
 XXV. 42). Therefore if the victim be a pregnant woman 
 and be sold with a stipulation that only her prospective off- 
 spring shall become the property of her purchaser . . . 
 this will not constitute selling in the meaning of the law." 
 
 ^•51889 
 
... ,., 
 
 . .'1 
 
 • • « • • • r* 
 
 
 Apparently the writer used second hand sources, as the text 
 in Talmud (Sanh. 85 b) leaves the question open .,p.^: 
 whether or not the act of leaning against a person while he 
 is asleep, or using a body as a screen against a draft, con- 
 stitutes a service in the meaning of the law 11301 in iDVniU- 
 ** and he deal with him as, a slave or (Hebrew and) sell him' 
 (Deut. xxiv. 7. Rev. Ver.) to complete the crime. Maimoni- 
 d£S decides in the negative : that leaning on a sleeping per- 
 son, unless he is aware, at least part of the time, of the 
 service he so renders, is not considered as being enslaved. 
 Also that the use of a body as a screen against a draft is no 
 service, hence in the case of a pregnant woman the crime is 
 not accomplished. (See Rashi. ib.) Thus it will be seen 
 that the first statement beginning " (c) enslavement, etc," 
 is correct, but the second statement " when an offender 
 merely leans on the victim or uses him as a screen against 
 a draft and that even while the subject is asleep, it will be 
 sufficient evidence of enslavement," is entirely wrong, as he 
 combines the two separate questions, and decides contrary 
 to the law. This will recall a recent suit against Mr. 
 Russell Sage by Mr. Laidlaw who was injured by a bomb 
 in the former's office, the latter claiming to have been used 
 as a screen to protect the former. The judge's dismissal of 
 the case coincides with the ruling of Maimonides : that a 
 ^* body screen " is no service of any account or value. 
 
 Abetment (S. M.): The treatment here is similar to 
 that of Accessories (L. N. D.). Both include the seducer 
 (inciter) who is neither one nor the other. The writer of 
 Abetment is right when he says: ♦* idolatry among the 
 Jews was an offense against the state, and an attempt to 
 overthrow the state; it was high treason against the Divine 
 King." But if so, the inciter is a principal not an acces- 
 sory, because " in high treason, there are no accessories 
 but all are principals on account of the heinousness of the 
 crime" (Blackstone's Comm. Bk. iv, ch. 3, § 2, also -Cent. 
 Diet.) And an Abettor who is absent when the felony is 
 committed is merely an accessory. Moreover, an accessory 
 must be concerned either before or after the perpetration 
 of the offensive act, while in the case of an inciter to 
 
idolatry, no act is necessary, as the mere incitement consti- 
 tutes the crime. " The n^DD who incites, whether in a plural 
 let us go) or singular sense, is executed by stoning. Even 
 though no idolatrous act was committed, either by the ir citer 
 or by the one whom he incites" [Code of Moses Couci, 
 Semag) Lavin 29]. 
 
 Accessories, (L. N. D.): The writer of this article 
 gives the stereotyped legal definition of an accessory 
 'either by counseling, advising or procuring the act to be 
 done, in which case he is called an accessory before the 
 act" . . . And further says : " It is therefore not 
 necessary that any one should have been actually misled, as 
 the very attempt of seduction (incitement) is punishable 
 with death." . . . .If this contention is correct how 
 .does it compare with accessory that requires an act either 
 before or after the act ? 
 
 In both Abetment and Accessories mention is made of 
 rf^B^ Agent, should be referred to Agency. In regard to 
 the judicial maxim that " one cannot be an agent in an 
 illegal act," the writer forgets to point out the exception in 
 case of aiding a thief in the slaughter or sale of stolen rat- 
 tle that makes him liable to a fine imposed in the Bible (B. 
 K. 79 a). Also where the agent himself is not legally 
 responsible or prohibited to do the act, the responsibility 
 reverts to the principal, who alone becomes liable. Inas- 
 much as in such a case he cannot plead or point out to the 
 agent his duty, x^'cm ^D.nil llD^nn nni nn nm to "■ rather 
 follow the dictation of the Master (God) than that of His 
 subordinate (man)." 
 
 In citing the case of homicide in Abetment he fails to 
 explain the difference between murder and manslaugh- 
 ter which the Talmud distinguishes broadly. Otherwise 
 the citation is misunderstood and seems senseless, 
 
 Thecivil cases in Abetment properly belongto Damages 
 or Negligence. The subject matter which really belongs 
 to Accessories or Accomplice is omitted. 
 
 Acceptance (L. N. D.): The main features belong to 
 Acquisition and the acceptance of a Get by the wife which 
 he refers to Divorce should be treated under Delivery. 
 
Accident (L. N. D.): This term is usually defined as 
 an unforeseen happening, without assignable cause; an act 
 of God without human agency. It fits the accidental kill- 
 ing in which case the slayer is exiled (Deut. xix. 5), and 
 is here omitted, while there is no question as to the 
 definition of Damages or Negligence which ought to be 
 the proper heading of 1\'5''TJ nUK yaiN or four principal cases 
 of damages, etc., in place of Accident. 
 
 The writer quotes R. Judah who exonerates one who- 
 causes damages to goods by the ignition of his Hanuka 
 lamp placed in front of his shop, whereas if he peaces an 
 ordinary lamp in a similar position he is held liable. The 
 writer remarks that •* this is not good law." The fact is 
 that R. Judah was a good lawyer, and knew how to make 
 an exception in a case of contributory negligence, such as 
 this, where it was the plain duty of the shopkeeper to place 
 the Hanuka lamp outside of his window or door as an- 
 illumination to celebrate the Maccabaean victory. And the 
 negligence contributed by the (Jewish) driver in not 
 observing the Hanuka lamp and looking out for his goods 
 on the passing camel, makes the owner of the lamp blame- 
 less. 
 
 The legal status of an Agent should be referred to 
 Agency, 
 
 Accommodation in Law (M. M.): In a legal-commercial 
 sense the term is applied to a loan of money effected by 
 the security of a promissory note supposed to be due to the 
 borrower, but in reality the maker of the note owes him 
 nothing. He merely " accommodates " him as a friend for 
 the purpose of facilitating his raising a loan by discounting 
 the note, which loan he could not secure otherwise. In 
 other words, the note or transfer of the title was for no 
 value received. We have a similar case of D^DQ nt32' in the 
 Jewish law. This important matter is omitted. On the 
 other hand, the writer attempts to give the term an incor- 
 rect definition and makes illogical applications. 
 
 The postponement of Passover is no more an accommo- 
 dation than is the postponement nmj of the fast day 
 3X3 nv^i^n falling on a Sabbath day. The "accommodated" 
 
•would probably be more satisfied to be exempt from fasting 
 altogether. Nor is it an accommodation in case of danger 
 to life to be allowed to eat prohibited food. Neither the 
 relaxation of the law in relation to Aguna nor the arrange- 
 ment of Ereb and Prusbel can be termed accommodation. 
 The whole matter should be treated under modifications 
 or LAW, relaxation of the. 
 
 Accusatory and Quisitorial Procedure. (L. N. D.): 
 Inasmuch as we find no such procedure in Jewish law, ex- 
 cept by the voluntary accusation of the witnesses confront- 
 ing the accused whose own testimony is of no consideral 
 tion, the whole matter should be referred to cross-exami- 
 nation or examination of witnesses. 
 
 Acquittal in Talmudic (?) Law. (L. N. D.): The 
 -composition of the Jewish Court belongs to Bet-Din or 
 Court of Justice and the ''agreement of witnesses" 
 bhould be under examination of witnesses. 
 
 Admissions in Evidence: The last part of the article 
 ("prepared by the present writer) was excised by the editor, 
 leaving the matter of part-admission riifpDn miD unfinished. 
 
 Adultery (D. W. A.): He errs by saying that the de- 
 tection of actual intercourse required by the Mosaic law in 
 order to establish the crime, was modified by the Talmudic 
 law, etc. His quotation from Mishna (Sotah i. 2) estab- 
 ishes only a cause for separation and divorce^ but does not, 
 constitute the crime of Adultery that carries capital pun- 
 ishment. 
 
 He further says that under the Talmudic law the severity 
 of the Mosaic Code was modified (this theory is several 
 times repeated in this article, unnecessarily), that she could 
 be not convicted unless she knew the law relating to it 
 €tc. "This caution was given to her because of the gen- 
 eral tendency of the rabbinical law toward mercy (?)". 
 The fact is that the law against Adultery was just as rigidly 
 enforced and no "mercy" was shown, but forewarning 
 (nxnnn^ was required in every criminal case, because it 
 was held that "ignorance of the law" is a valid excuse. 
 
 The whole matter relating to the unfaithful wife "x^CtS^ 
 should be cross-referenced to Sotah. 
 
He refers to the Talmud (Yeb. 24b) and says: "A womarr 
 having been suspected of Adultery was divorced, and being: 
 remarried was again divorced, and then married the man 
 who had originally been suspected of having committed 
 Adultery with her; the marriage was declared lawful,'' 
 etc. This is a flat refutation of the conclusion in the Tal- 
 mud (Jb.) which decides that there is no difference whether 
 or not another marriage intervened. The rule is that in 
 any event the suspected paramour is not permitted ni'TiDDi)* 
 {ante factum) to marry her and if he breaks the injunction 
 13^13 {post factum) and marries her, he is forced to divorce 
 her only on the evidence of witnesses, not otherwise. The 
 writer, apparently, glanced over the discussion under con- 
 sideration in the Gemara without taking the trouble to see: 
 the conclusive decision reached there. 
 
 Agency, Law of (L. N. D.): The writer makes no dis- 
 tinction between the term n^>C in the sense of a messenger 
 as a mere "tool" of the sender, and an agent who is an 
 authorized representative to act for his principal. Other- 
 wise it is impossible to harmonize the apparently inconsis- 
 tencies in Talmud in relation to a rrhv. 
 
 He says: "A woman ... or a 'Canaanite bondman' or 
 a bondwoman of an Israelite may be an agent and bind the 
 principal." The fact is a servant may be a messenger for 
 his employer to perform certain acts he is instructed to do 
 for him, but not as an agent in a broader sense. Moreover 
 it means only his own servant who is under his control and 
 considered "like his own hand." So long as the servant is- 
 capable of reasoning, it is sufficient to validate his act as a 
 <'mes^enger " Whereas from the language of the writer it 
 appears as including any bondman or bondwoman, even- 
 those belonging to someone else. (See, Magid Mishna on- 
 Maimonides, Sheluhin ii. 2). 
 
 He further says: "In no case is a Gentile recognized a& 
 an agent of an Israelite, either to bind him or to acquire- 
 anything for his benefit." Here n'^^'V means in the sense- 
 of a representative^ as the condition of being capable of 
 reasoning is insufficient to make him a responsible agent. 
 From the Writ "Ye also shall offer (assign lonn) an heave: 
 
offering unto the Lord of all your tithes (Num. xviii. 28), 
 the Talmud deduces from the words "Ye also," DHK Ui 
 that the assignment of tithes can be done by a representa- 
 tive who may use his judgment vy ny^D in appropriating a 
 portion of the crop as tithes. And also that the represen- 
 tative must be one of the *• Children of the Covenant " like 
 the principal Dsmi'K' fix nnn ^22 D^ix HD Rab Ashi however 
 claime that this case is an exception and that in all other 
 matters of law a Gentile can be made a representative. 
 Rabbina gives a Gentile "acquisition power," n^^Dt, which 
 probably validates his power of attorney, in accordance 
 with a later opinion of R. Tarn who gave power of attorney 
 to a Gentile (Tur, chap. 123, par. 15). The decision in 
 the Gemara is against the contention of both Rab Ashi and 
 Rabbina. Neverthe ess a Jew is prohibited to make a 
 Gentile a "go between" in a case of usury (B. M. 71 b). 
 Rabbi Isaac ben Shcshet ('d '3"i ) responds: "Inasmuch as 
 everyone knows the rule that 'one's proxy is like himself 
 and few know of the biblical interpretation of nnn ^22 Dn« n» 
 etc., it is not to be applied to exempt an act of limitation or 
 prohibition."- ^(Ribash, Responsa, No. 276.) 
 
 Regarding the appointment of a sub-agent, he says: "in 
 the Roman as well as the English-American law, he (the 
 agent) can do so only by special authorization, but both 
 the Talmud and the standard authorities are silent as to 
 the conditions allowing the appointment of a sub-agent." 
 The fact is that the tormula of the delivery of a Ggf contains 
 the words: "And I herewith give you permission to appoint 
 an authority and the latter to appoint another, till the hun- 
 dredth (Tur, Eben Ezar,, chap. i). § 41) Shows the neces- 
 sity of a special authorization. Moreover, Alfasi's opinion 
 quoted there, that the written order to the proxy is not 
 needed, except for the special purpose of giving him 
 authority to appoint a sub agent. (See also, J. Caro, Beth 
 Joseph, ilf.) 
 
 Agnates (L. N. D) : This subject, except the last part 
 which belongs to witnesses compitent or fit to testify, should 
 be cross-referred to Inheritance, Law of, a general term 
 more familiar in law and better understood by laymen. 
 
8 
 
 Referring to a Gentile, he says: "The reputed kinship 
 between one heathen and another is deemed sufficient to 
 determine the right of succession;'* which is inconsistent 
 with what he says further that *'the marriage of a Gentile 
 is not recognized as a basis of heirship, and the estate of a 
 proselyte in such a case has no owner." The real answer 
 is that a proselyte is like a new born babe, I^IJB^ |Cp3 
 hence his former alliances are all severed. 
 
 Agrarian Laws (M. L M.): This subject is well treated 
 but mention should be made that according to Rabba, the 
 law, that " no transfer shall be made from one tribe to an- 
 other," (Num. xxxvi. 9), in cases ot daughters being the 
 sole heirs, was operative only in the time of the desert 
 ^tiabitation, "laiDH "in and became inoperative after the 
 tribes were settled in Palestine. (B. B. 120 a). 
 
 Aguna (D W. A.): This topic, which occupies so much 
 space in Rabbinic law, should in proportion to other matter 
 take up more than a half column in the Encyclopedia. Ten 
 times as much room would hardly be sufficient to ade- 
 quately treat the subject. Especially in reference to pNt}^ D^D 
 »11D Dni» '^endless water." 
 
 Alibi (L. N. D.): The writer fails to distinguish between 
 a refutation of an alibi in case of D'DDU 2nv and that of 
 contradictory witnesses, nt^^nan nj;. Also the fact that the 
 Talmud considered this Mosaic law as an exception and 
 would not use it as a precedent or analogy in other cases- 
 Because they could not reason "why should we place con- 
 fidence in the second pair of witnesses and disbelieve the 
 first pair— two against two?" ^Jnx I^CD ^jn5< n^DDDT nnn '•KO, 
 
 Alienation and Acquisition (L. N. D.): The title 
 should be reversed as the writer admits that acquisition 
 is the V^? of the Jewish law and is better understood by lay- 
 men. 
 
 He says: "Neither the Talmud nor the later standards 
 undertake to define what is meant by a sale of land on ac- 
 count of its badne-s." nnyi ^JQD msj^ -idID means non- 
 productive land that the owner desires to get rid of, prob- 
 ably to avoid taxation, which he sells for a nominal sum^— a 
 mere gift. In such case the deed alone without a consid- 
 
eration is sufficient to make the transfer valid. (See Kes- 
 seph Mishna to Maimonides, Mekirah i, 7). 
 
 "The most effective manner of acquiring land is the so- 
 called purchase by kerchief.'' This assertion is incorrect, 
 as the proper way is stated in the Mishna to be; " Money, 
 deed or possession " And the best way of acquiring chat- 
 tels IS by delivery into the possession of the purchaser or 
 grantee. In case these conditions could not be complied 
 with, the Talmud allowed the title to pass on the nominal 
 consideration of a kerchief, based on the principle of barter 
 or exchange. But while in modern law the nominal con- 
 sideration is a dollar, Jewish law would not legalize money as 
 a consideration, owing to its fluctuation in value at the 
 time of the Talmud. The underlying principle is that the 
 full consent of the vendor is necessary for the alienation of 
 his property in order to pass the title, hence if he depended 
 on the face value of the coin, he did not give his hearty 
 consent when the transaction took place, until he could as- 
 certain of its current value, which was liable to depreciate 
 and make him repent of the sale. At any rate the title did 
 not pass at the time of the sale, which is essential in ac- 
 quisition; whereas a consideration that has no face value 
 he accepts at the time of the exchange for what it is worth 
 and voluntarily consents to the transfer of the title. The 
 same reason is applicable to a consideration of fruit or eat- 
 ables, being liable to decay and depreciation; they have no 
 fixed value, and the purchaser is not yet ready to relinquish 
 his right, ^JpOl "iDi nh. However, where the owner expresses 
 his hearty consent (in a deed), the kerchief considera- 
 tion may be waived. (Maim. Mekirah v. 13). 
 
 **Sales limited by time" should come under Lease or 
 Landlord and Tenant. 
 
 Regarding Delivery he says: *'The early sages feared 
 that where the price was paid before delivery, room would 
 be left for fraud, as the seller after receiving his money 
 might claim that the buyer's goods had been burned or 
 otherwise destroyed in his (the seller's) house or ware- 
 house." The explanation in Talmud is plainly stated: 
 There is no fear of fraud, but of an accident of fire that 
 
10 
 
 might break out at the seller's place, who will be reluctant 
 to render heroic assistance as he would for his own 
 goods. Therefore he is held responsible and compelled to 
 practice the golden rule. (B. M. 47 b.) But the whole 
 matter should be treated under Delivery. 
 
 'The Talmudic passage as to the requisites of changing 
 title in a ship (B. B. 76a et. seq.'i is rather confused, etc. 
 It seems clear that when a ship is in deep juater in the open 
 sea, delivery is sufficient; but it is not clear what degree of 
 removal is required when it is in a narrow, half-private 
 inlet, etc." 
 
 There is no confusion except two variations in the text,, 
 of which ours is correct (see Rashbaum) The sub- 
 stance is as follows : The best kind of delivery is 
 required in passing title of chattels. Hence in bulky and 
 heavy chattels, where the transfer by "lifting up" nnn^n is 
 impossible, ^he next best thing is "pulling," it \\y^'0^ into, 
 the possession of the purchaser. The ship in question 
 happened to be launched on a pond of a public plaza, 
 where mere ''moving" is useless unless it can be pulled in- 
 to his own possession or into an inlet of an open lot fc<DD''D, 
 which has no claimant, and if it has, he must obtain from 
 the owner legal possession of the space occupied by the 
 ship. But in case pulling into the purchaser's possession 
 is impossible, the formal delivery m^DD is sufficient so 
 long as it is removed from the vendor's possession. 
 
 In reference to the case in Jerusalem (Kid 26, b) he 
 says: "A written deed for the lot and the goods would 
 probably have been just as effective." No, it would be null 
 and void in this case where the grantee of the chattels was 
 absent and could not give the consideration of a kerchief 
 The only way his friend could transfer to him the title of 
 the scattered chattels was to gather them or their equiva- 
 lent in money, on a parcel of ground for which he gave him 
 a deed, being sufficient in a grant of real property as a 
 gift without a consideration, and at the same time the chat- 
 tels placed on that lot were also incidentally transferred. 
 
 He translates the word 11»''DX in Mishna (B. M.vi, i) as 
 bath-checks, aseymon is Greek which means " unstamped 
 
11 
 
 coin." (See Lipschitz, Tipheret Israel ib). The Gemara 
 merely explains that it passed as a fee for a bath. 
 
 In reference to the exchange of coins, he says: "The 
 Gemara (/^, 44 a) in this section refers to an older opinion 
 —evidently inconsistent (?) with the Mosaic law, etc." 
 This statement is incorrect and misleading; the fact is thisr 
 Rabbi (Juda I, a Tannaite) taught his son Simon, the 
 Mishna, that "Gold buys silver, but not vice versa," while 
 in his earlier days he taught him just the reverse. The- 
 change of opinion is explained that in his youth he 
 reasoned that because gold being rare, it is the standard 
 and silver being less valuable is but a conlmodity, but when 
 he became older he reached the conclusion differently, that 
 silver being the best currency, is the standard, and main- 
 tains a fixed price which is essential if used as a considera- 
 tion (see above). This proves that "there is nothing new 
 under the sun," that the disoute between the Republicans 
 and Bryan Democrats in regard to the gold standard has 
 been fully discussed 2000 years ago. However the matter 
 should be treated under Consideration. 
 
 The privileges of the Sanctuary (or rather Property, 
 Public or Sacred, li^lpn) and of Orphans should be re- 
 ferred to their proper places. The question of priority 
 should be treated under Deeds, Records of. Conditional 
 sales should be referred to CoNDiTions or Stipulations. 
 The article is entirely too long as it treats of different sub- 
 and should be sub-divided. 
 
 He says: "The law of conditional sales or gifts is rather 
 obscurely stated in the Mishna (B. M. vii., 11.) and the 
 Gemara upon it (94 a) is too scanty to elucidate it, etc." I 
 will give here the translation of the Mishna to show that 
 the subject is very clear indeed: "(i) Whoever stipulates a 
 condition that is contrary to the law of the Torah — such a 
 condition is void. (2) If the specific performance is de- 
 manded prior to a stipulation — the condition is void. (3) 
 A condition stipulated (even) beforehand but is finally im- 
 possible to be executed — such a condition is void." The 
 first paragraph needs no explanation, as no contract can 
 contain a clause which is contrary to the Constitution. The 
 
12 
 
 second paragraph annuls a condition made subsequent to 
 the contract for a specific performance. As the Mishna 
 holds that the contract became in force immediately and 
 the annexed stipulation cannot alter it, consequently it is 
 void and of no value. For this reason the condition has to 
 be repeated. The Talmud shows that the contract 
 made with Gad Reuben and half of Menasseh contained a 
 ^ 'double condition" P1Q3 ^N*Jn; ''If they «//// /«jj the Jordan 
 with you ... ye shall give them the land of Gilead. But 
 // they will not pass . . . they shall (but) have possession 
 among you in the land of Canaan (Num. xxxiii., 29-30). 
 The third paragraph excludes a freak stipulation such as a 
 bill of divorce with a proviso that it shall take effect only 
 when the divorcee shall ascend in a ballgon to Heaven, or 
 swim across the ocean. Such a stipulation is considered an 
 exaggeration, as it cannot be enforced, consequently is ex- 
 cluded and the document is otherwise valid. 
 
 Alimony (D. W. A): The whole article except the lat- 
 ter part and the Document (J. D. E.), treats of Ketuba and 
 should be under that heading, while the legal matter bear- 
 ing on the subject is omitted. 
 
 Important subjects omitted are: Acknowledgment; 
 Action, Legal, and of Bet-din *X1 r\m^\ Advertise 
 MENTSor Announcements, nnan; Affidavits, nny n^^3i; 
 Age of Consent; Agreement; Allotment, ; Alter- 
 ation, ; Ambiguous Language in law; An- 
 nulment OF Betrothment or Marriage, X^^^ nypQn 
 IIK'^D ; Analogy, 1"p C^pM. This is referred to Talmud. 
 But it requires separate treatment, otherwise the article on 
 Talmud will be too long; Antedate in Contracts, ntSB^ 
 DIplO. 
 
 From the detailed criticism above, it will appear that: (i) 
 Many articles are not under their proper headings (2) 
 One subject is treated under several headings. (3) Several 
 subjects are treated under one heading and should be sub- 
 divided. (4) A general description repeated in individual 
 subjects. (5) Repetitions of theories in the same article 
 (6) Contradictions even in the same article. (7) Misstate- 
 ments of facts and of conclusions. (8) Comments that a 
 
13 
 
 certain ruling inTaimud is not good law without consult- 
 ing the usual commentaries which give good legal reasons 
 for it. {9) Remarks about the obscurity in the Mishna and 
 of the Gemara's commenting as "too scanty to elucidate 
 it," whereas the subject is perfectly clear and intelligible 
 to the average Talmudic scholar. (10) Failure to bring 
 out all the points of the law, and state the exceptions and 
 modifications of the latest authorities. (11) Comparatively 
 allowing little room for some important subjects, or omit- 
 ting them entirely. 
 
Commtinicatioii. 
 
 A REPLY TO MR. EISENSTEIN. 
 To The American Hebrew: 
 
 More than a month ago Dr. Funk of the Funk & Wag- 
 nails Company forwarded to me a bulky manuscript from 
 the pen of Mr. Eisenstein, reviewing the articles on Law 
 which appear in Volume L of the Jewish Encyclopedia, 
 with the request that I would make the best possible de- 
 fence. Mr. Eisenstein began by premising that the treat- 
 ment Of Midrash in the Jewish Encyclopedia was fine, but 
 that of Halacha rather poor I answered this in a letter to 
 Dr. Funk, by showing that it is easy enough to repeat a 
 good story, but pretty difficult to abridge a mass of discus- 
 sions on law and to bring out from the conflicting opinions 
 the true result. I might have added another excuse for 
 any shortcoming in that line. Where the Halacha refers 
 not to ritual or moral duties, but to jurisprudence, to Mine 
 and Thine, it must be hand'ed by a modern lawyer in order 
 to make the treatment interesting, or even intelligible to 
 modern readers. Mr Amram and I were chosen by the 
 -editors, the former for the law of marriage and divorce 
 mys-elf for other branches. Both of us have given our 
 lives to the study and practice of American law; in that we 
 are professionals; in Dine Mamonoih we are amateurs. 
 When we make mistakes in finding or interpreting the 
 sources in Talmud or Posekim, the editor of the depart- 
 ment, the learned Dr. Marcus Jastrow, sets us right; but 
 neither of us has the subject at his fingers' ends. There 
 may be some English or American lawyer, writing good 
 English, who is as well posted in the Hashen Mishpot and 
 Eben Haezer, in the three Babas and in Kethuboth, as in 
 Land Titles, Equity, Negotiable Paper, etc. ; if there is one 
 he ought to have been chosen for the work. 
 
 Mr. Eisenstein pointed out that several of the names 
 ;given to my articles and to those of Mr. Amram were ill 
 chosen. In my letter to Dr. Funk I frankly admitted that this 
 
15 
 
 -was so, and I do so now. Thus negligence was the proper 
 heading for accident; acquittal should have come under 
 CRIMINAL procedure; the matter of agnates belonged 
 under Law of descent. Some of the editors, wishing to 
 have a few more juridical articles in the first volume, delib- 
 erately chose a few rather improper headings, knowing that 
 a cross reference in the right place would straighten it out 
 to the searcher for information. Meanwhile I have pro- 
 tested against pursuing any such course in the future. 
 
 Something remains to be said in answer to criticisms on 
 the matter in my own articles. 
 
 I am blamed for treating of the n^DD (inciter to idolatry) 
 under the head of accessories, as he is not an accessory in 
 the Common Law sense of that vvord. But I point out the 
 distinction myself. It comes simply to this: A reader 
 wants to know the Jewish law as to accessories in crime. 
 He looks up my article, and finds that in the Common Law 
 sense of the word, accessories are unknown; in the only 
 case in which incitement to crime is punished, the incite- 
 ment itself is treated as a substantive offence. He says: 
 ^*The writer forgets to point out the exception in ca^e of 
 aiding a thief in the slaughter or sale of stolen cattle," 
 quoting Baba Kamma, 79 a, I admit that I overlooked 
 this passage; but had I given it with any fullness, my 
 editor would probably have stricken it out as unnec- 
 essary detail, overrunning the allotted space. 
 
 Where I, from B. K. ch. 6, last section, quote R, 
 Judah "who exonerates one who causes damage to goods 
 by ignition from his Hanuka lamp placed in front of his 
 shop," I am blamed for the remark that ''this is not 
 good law," and I am told that "R. Judah was a good 
 lawyer and knew, etc." But I think I was right, for in 
 the notes of Obadiah of Bartenoro to the Mishna I found: 
 "the Halacha is not according to R. Judah"; and this 
 annotator is generally correct in such a remark, as he 
 draws it from the Gemara or Posekim. 
 
 The article on accusatory or inquisitorial procedure 
 is objected to by Mr. Eisenstein, because the latter pro- 
 cedure did not exist. But the fact that it did not exist 
 
16 
 
 is worth telling, as one of the glories of the Jewish race^ 
 and as an illustration of the words of Deuteronomy about 
 our "good and rational statutes." 
 
 In the article on agency, I show clearly that the He- 
 brew word r\'^^\y is used in a double sense, a mere messen- 
 ger and an agent having a discretion. If in the same 
 article I have omitted to say that only the principal's own 
 bondman, but not the slave of another, can be entrusted 
 with an agency, I have been no less painstaking or full in 
 detail than Maimonides i^Sheluhin^ ch. ii., 2), from whom I 
 mainly drew the matter for that article; it is a glossator on 
 Maimonides, who first draws the distinction. 
 
 In denying the rightfulness of the appointment of a 
 Gentile as agent, and in thus stating a harsh rule, ill- 
 founded in reason or scriptural authority, I followed the 
 conclusions of the Gemara, of Maimonides and of the 
 Hoshen Mishpat, not my own inclinations. I had neither 
 the time to hunt up the conflicting views of single Amoraim 
 or of later casuists to the contrary, nor the space at my 
 disposal in which to set down these dissenting opinions. 
 
 The review is to be continued and it will take in my 
 articles on alibi and on alienation. I know the criticisms 
 which are likely to appear on some of my positions, and on 
 some of my omissions under those heads, but "a horse 
 should not kick before it is spurred." 
 
 Lewis N. Dembitz. 
 August i8th. 
 
17 
 
 THE LEGAL ARTICLES IN THE JEWISH 
 ENCYCLOPEDIA. 
 
 To The American Hebrew: 
 
 I thank Mr. Dembitz for his courteous reply to my re- 
 V iew, and would be glad if some other writers did the same 
 A discussion, I believe, would lead to the best results, ''NJ^D 
 NnnvOK' n^-^ynDn yy^\. Of course one cannot expect to find 
 perfection in a pioneer work of this magnitude — although 
 judging it as a whole, a great deal has been accomplished. 
 But if every scholar in his particular line of work would 
 point out the errors he may find in the Encyclopedia, im- 
 provements in the following volumes may be expected, and 
 later, perhaps, we may have a revised edition. That is 
 what prompted me to do my share in reviewing the legal 
 articles, especially those appearing to have been compiled 
 in haste and loosely treated by the editor in charge, in con- 
 trast with the Haggadic portion, which is fairly treated and 
 includes some valuable articles by Dr. K. Kohler and Dr. 
 L. Ginsberg. 
 
 While agreeing with Mr. Dembitz that the Halacha is 
 the most difficult to handle, I doubt the inability to find 
 some competent jurists familiar with both the Jewish and 
 the English law. If one person be not gifted with both 
 talents, why not employ two individuals for this purpose, 
 one learned in Jewish and the other in English law. Let 
 us profit by the Talmudic parable in relation to the soul 
 and the body, each disclaiming responsibility at the Judg- 
 ment Day for the sins of the man, inasmuch as individually 
 neither is capable of doing wrong. Similarly the blind 
 man and the cripple who, being appointed guardians of an 
 orchard, denied having helped themselves to the best fruits 
 by proving their incapacity severally to do the act. The crip- 
 ple was placed on the shoulders of the blind, and punishment 
 meted out accordingly. So with the legal articles let us 
 combine the two lawyers if we cannot find the combined 
 knowledge in one, and hold both responsible for the result. 
 After all, I think that a thorough knowledge of the Jewish 
 law and some acquaintance with modern law and legal ter- 
 
i8 
 
 minology are quite sufficient for the work, considering that 
 the articles must pass a revising editor. 
 
 Now to answer Mr. Dembitz: His defense for treating 
 the inciter of idolatry under Accessories, is that it was 
 done in order to facilitate "the reader who wants to know 
 the Jewish law as to accessories in crime. He looks up 
 the article and finds that in the common-law sense of the 
 word accessories are unknown," etc. But I claim that 
 they are known in Jewish law. Accessory and abettor are 
 termed HTny nniy n^ r^DD, "upholding the hands 
 of transgressors." In homicide, one who causes a person 
 to be devoured by wild beasts, or killed by his hireling, 
 cannot be prosecuted by the authoritative law, D1K ^^n. 
 but is responsible to the moral law, D"'»6J' ^Jn, /. <?., God 
 will require his punishment. This is deduced from Gen- 
 ix., 5, "The blood of your lives will I require at the 
 hands of every beast (through human agency) ... at 
 the hands of every man's (hired) brother will / require 
 the life of man." (Maim., Rozeah, ii , 2-3.) But as capi- 
 tal punishment was abolished before the Talmud was com- 
 piled, the laws against murder became obsolete, discussion 
 from an academic view-point was limited and the various 
 degrees of murder not fully expressed or treated. Hence 
 the Talmud is minus the details regarding the punishment 
 of accessories, etc., and all codifiers, except Maimonides 
 and de Couci, omitted entirely the matter of wilful mur- 
 der. Thus there is no basis in law for Maimonides' 
 assertion that "all who were morally guilty of murder were 
 capitally punished by order of the Jewish king in accord- 
 ance with the laws of the government, or by the temporary 
 (exemplary) edict, nVK^ nxiin, by the Jewish court, who 
 ordinarily had discretional power to administer corporal 
 punishment and impiisonment " (Maim. Rozeah, ii , 4-5). 
 The latter part is derived from the Talmud, on the hear- 
 say evidence of R. Eliezar ben Jacob, that during the 
 Temple period the supreme court administered stripes and 
 punishment not in strict accordance with the Torah— nor 
 against it, but as a fence, a^''D. to protect us provisions and 
 laws {.San. 46a). The writer of Abetment (S. M.) says: 
 
19 
 
 'The abettor in murder is imprisoned {Sank 8ib; Maim, 
 Rozeah, ii., 5; iv. 8)." This is incorrect for the imprison- 
 ment mentioned in Sank. (ibid.)y does occur not in a case of 
 abetment, and Maimonides, as quoted above, gives discre- 
 tional power to the judges to punish the abettor by either 
 stripes, imprisonment or even death. 
 
 Morally, however. Abetment or Accessory in murder was 
 considered a great crime. R. Moses de Couci writes: "Go 
 and learn a lesson from Ahab, the infamous idol worship- 
 per, whom the Scriptures accuse thus: 'There was none 
 like unto Ahab who did sell himself to work unkindness in 
 the sight of the Lord' (I. Kings, xxi , 25), and yet when 
 his good and bad deeds were assorted and weighed before 
 God, who controls the spirit of all flesh, there was none 
 against Ahab to overbalance the scale and seal the doom of 
 his destruction, save the spirit of the blood of Naboth, as 
 is written: 'And there came forth a spirit and stood be- 
 fore the Lord and said, I will persuade him' — that was the 
 spirit of Naboth (Sabb. 149b) — ' And the Lord said unto 
 him . . . thou shalt persuade him ... go forth and do 
 so.' (I. Kings, xxii., 21-22.) Although the wretch Ahab 
 was but an accessory and did not kill Naboth with his own 
 hand. How much more so if one personally kills his fel- 
 lowman!" (Semag, Laivin, No. 163). 
 
 Associate witnesses who aid the original, pair of false 
 witnesses in accusing one of a capital crime, are equally 
 guilty and convicted by a subsequent pair of witnesses who 
 confront them with an alibi, Dn^M liDV, /. e , that the 
 said witnesses were with them in a place removed from the 
 scene of the crime — in such case retaliation was of the 
 same kind (Deut. xix., 19), and capital punishment was 
 visited on the perjured witnesses, irrespective of their num- 
 bers; and if the accusation carried corporal punishment, 
 each of the false witnesses received instead the prescribed 
 number of stripes (Deut- xxv , 3.). Except when the ver- 
 dict involved a money payment, the amount was divided in 
 equal shares, each paying his ratio as a fine to the accused 
 (Makot i , 3-5-7 ). This upset--, the statement of the writer 
 of Abetment, who says: "As in homicide, so in all capital 
 
30 
 
 crimes, Talmudic jurispiudence does not convict more than 
 one person of a crime which can be accomplished by a 
 single person (p. 9-54) The fact is the Talmudic law 
 convicts more than a hundred false witnesses who accuse 
 but one person, on the ground that every one is considered 
 a principal, or perhaps this is an exception to all other ac- 
 cessories in crime. 
 
 In regard of one assisting another to desecrate the Sab- 
 bath in a task of labor which the principal could do single- 
 handed, the abettor is not liable. Amemar, as an example, 
 allowed a Gentile to paint his eyes on Sabbath, though he 
 helped in the opening and closing of the eyelids, because 
 he ruled that assistance is of no consequence, JJ'DO )2 i^N V^'^DD 
 {jBgzakf 22a). 
 
 indirect aid rendered to a principal before the act, as in 
 a case of selling farm implements to one suspected as a 
 violator of the Sabbatic year rest, is prohibited, provided 
 there is a reasonable presumption that the purchaser would 
 use them that year {Shebiity v., 6-9). This, however, is not 
 the law, but a regulation, as the Yerushalmi explains, for 
 the protection of society, Di»iyn jlpT) '•JSD 
 
 We are cautioned not to put a stumbling block before 
 the blind (Lev. xix., 14), and to fix a balustrade on the 
 house-roof, "that thou bring not blood upon thine house." 
 (Deut. xxii , J.) R. Nathan says: * One must not permit a 
 vicious dog or a tottering ladder in his premises," on the 
 same principle; and ought to be ostracised or excommuni- 
 cated unless he removes anything that might cause danger 
 to life or property in his premises. (Ket. 41c). 
 
 It is prohibited to sell to a Gentile incense, etc., which is 
 supposed to be used in idol worship {A, Z. 13b). R. Iz- 
 haki, however, permits minor assistance to a Gentile, who 
 is not bound by the Jewish law (Rashi's Comm , A* 
 
 Z' 55a.) 
 
 In civil cases, one who by a minor part completes the 
 major part of a principal actor, as in case of negligence, 
 "If a man dig a pit and not cover it and an ox or an ass 
 fall therein (Ex. xxi., 33), the Talmud calculates that 
 the fall in a pit of ten spans deep is of sufficient force to 
 
21 
 
 kill; hence the digger of the pit in not taking the necessary 
 precaution to protect it, is responsible for the death of the 
 animal. But if one make an excavation of nine spans and 
 another person completes the tenth, the latter only is held 
 liable for the animal's death; though in case of injury they 
 must both share in the payment of the assessed amount of 
 damages {B. K. lob). 
 
 Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel in his Responsa decides a case 
 of an accessory in theft (which is civil in Jewish law). The 
 facts were as follows: A.'s purse containing money was 
 stolen by his wife and thrown out of the window into a 
 court-yard where her brother B. picked it up and assisted 
 her in removing the money to a place of safety. Rabbi 
 Asher ruled that the act of theft was accomplished by the 
 woman when she took (lifted up) the purse, and the sub- 
 sequent assistence rendered by her brother was of no ac- 
 count, hence B. was not liable {Rosh Responsiuniy No. 64, 
 rule i). 
 
 Mr. Dembitz's excuse for saying that R. Judah's ruling 
 "is not good law" because of R. Obadiah da Bartinoro's 
 comment that *'the Halacha is not according to R. Judah," 
 is not plausible. The fact that the Chief Justice of the 
 Supreme Court of the United States is overruled by his 
 colleagues does not make his opinion bad law. Indeed, in 
 many instances, the opinion of the minority is better law 
 than that of the majority. And so it is here, the ruling of 
 the Hakamim majority to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 Moreover, Bartinoro himself explains the reason of R. Ju- 
 dah for excepting the Hanuka lamp, because it involves a 
 duty, niJfD. Such a distinction in contributory negligence 
 is of great interest to the student of historical and compar- 
 ative jurisprudence, to stimulate which, I presume, is one 
 of the objects of the promoters of the Encyclopedia. Hence, 
 the various opinions bringing out the points of law as in- 
 terpreted by the Jewish jurists, is of more importance than 
 the final dry decisions. Surely, Mr. Dembitz does not for 
 a moment dream that the Encyclopedia will replace the 
 Shulkan Aruk, as the latest code for the Rabbaniml 
 
 As to the article on accusatory procedure, I did not 
 
22 
 
 object to the statement that the practise of inquisition was * 
 unknown in Jewish law, but I suggested that it should be 
 cross-referenced to Examination of witnesses. 
 
 As to the editors who "wished more judicial articles in 
 the first volume and. deliberately chose a few rather im- 
 proper headings," etc., and the excuse for omitting to Btate 
 an exception on the ground that "the editor would prob- 
 ably have stricken out as unnecessary detail, over-running 
 the allotted space," I must remark that if the editors were 
 anxious to secure legal matter they could have easily 
 availed themselves of many topics pointed out in my criti- 
 cism that properly belong to Vol. I., which they have 
 omitted, instead of crowding in subjects under misapplied 
 headings. While I admit the impossibility and impractic- 
 ability of filling in all details in every article, as space is 
 the greatest factor to be considered in the compilation of 
 an Encyclopedia, nevertheless room should have been 
 given to the exceptions to a ruling rather than to additional 
 matter on the same subject 
 
 J. D. ElSENSTEIN. 
 
 MR. EISENSTEIN'S CRITICISM 
 Tc The American Hebrew: 
 
 The rest of Mr Eisenstein's criticism of law articles in 
 the Jewish Encyclopedia, Volume i, has appeared in your 
 paper. It will be fully answered by Dr. S. Mendelsohn, of 
 Wilmington, who does me in some respects more than full 
 justice. Only he admits that in my article on alibi, I do 
 not distinguish between the alibi proved on the accusing 
 witnesses, which renders them "plotting witnesses," pun- 
 ishable as such, and the ordinary alibi showing that the 
 prisoner was not present at the place of the crime commit- 
 ted This distinction is made in the Mishna, Makkot, ch. 
 i-> § 3*1 and I translate what is there said, almost at the be- 
 
«3 
 
 ginning of my article. What more could I or should I 
 do ? 
 
 Dr. Mendelsohn, in his reply, thinks that I was a little 
 incorrect in comparing the accusatory system of the Jews 
 with that of Anglo-American law, because in the former 
 the witnesses of a crime alone were under the duty to pro- 
 secute, while in England and America there are prosecuting 
 officers. But in England, at least until very lately, the 
 Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, etc., only instituted 
 proceedings for political offences, or offences against the 
 revenue; the prosecutions of ordinary crimes such as mur- 
 der or theft was left altogether to the persons who hap- 
 pened to be present, or to the injured parties, who were 
 ^'recognized," that is put under bond to prosecute. My 
 object in the comparison was only this: to show that the 
 jurisprudence of the Jews, a liberty-loving people, agreed 
 in fundamentals with that of the English stock, the most 
 liberty-loving race of modern times. 
 
 L. N. Dembitz. 
 
 A FURTHER REPLY TO MR. EISENSTEIN 
 
 I. 
 
 To The American Hebrew: 
 
 Without preface or introduction I beg your leave to show 
 that Mr. J. D. Eisenstein's 'detailed criticism" on "the 
 Legal Articles in the Jewish Encyclopedia," published 
 in your columns (Aug. i6th and 23d respectively) and 
 which he concludes with a formal indictment of eleven 
 counts, is the result of misreadings and misunderstand- 
 ings on his part. 
 
 Mr. Eisenstein opens his series of criticisms by object- 
 ing to my treating, under the term abduction, "the act 
 of stealing a human being by forcible abduction, which 
 is KIDNAPPING." He cites Webster and Blackstone to 
 
prove that this is a solecism, and concludes the para- 
 graph with the assertion that ' the term [Abduction] is 
 usually understood by laymen (for whom the Encyclo- 
 pedia is primarily intended) as that of Seduction, nriDO, 
 in Jewish law." As for the first objection, even in view 
 of Webster's and Blackstone's definitions, as quoted by 
 him, // is unfounded, since the elements of force or vio- 
 lence as well as stealing or taking away enter into both. 
 More. recent authorities very clearly justify the use of 
 the term Abduction in the sense of man^stealIng. The 
 Standard^t Dictionary says: "Abduction . . . {Law), A 
 carrying away of a person against his will, or illegally;" 
 and the Century Dictionary gives a similar definition. 
 Indeed, if the critic will consult the Encyclopedia Brit- 
 tanica (xiv. 69), he may learn that the term kidnap- 
 ping is 'now more commonly applied to the offence of 
 taking away children from their parents." 
 
 And as for his statement that abduction is understood 
 by laymen as synonymous with Seduction nriBD, he is 
 simply mistaken. Seduction is effected by means of per- 
 suasion (nna, Piel of nna — to persuade), Abduction by 
 means of fraud or violence; Seduction, ^ins, is generally 
 understood as an offence against a woman, Abduction 
 may be perpetrated on any human being. It seems to 
 me that Mr. Eisenttein's fear of a layman's misunderstand- 
 ing the term is entirely groundless, for the layman that 
 is not intelligent enough to distinguish between Abduc- 
 tion and Seduction, is not intelligent enough to consult 
 the Jewish Encyc'opedia. 
 
 Mr. Eisenstein further objects to the fulness of the 
 ♦'description of the malefactor," wherein reality no attempt 
 at fulness is made, for that alone would cover the space of 
 the whole article. In my modest work on "The Criminal 
 Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," a chapter is de- 
 voted to "Persons Indictable," ^hich covers with the notes 
 8 pages (78-86)! And when he avers that, unless ''the full 
 description of the malefactor" be omitted, "repetitions will 
 occur in every subject of crime," he forgets that no En- 
 cyclopedia is free from repetitions; that it is impossible to 
 
25 
 
 write a heterogeneous series of articles,without more or less 
 frequently repeating one's self, and that no article would 
 be complete, were every detail mentioned elsewhere 
 omitted. 
 
 Mr Eisenstein next criticizes my statement of the 'aw. 
 He cites it thus: "'Enslavement must be accomplished 
 ["accompanied" ?] by consciousness on the part of the vic- 
 tim. Hence, if the victim is in a state of unconsciousness 
 — as in a profound sleep — at the inception of the crime, 
 and remains in such state throughout the process of the 
 crime, and until its accomplishment, the crime is incom- 
 plete . . * (7 lines below) *To constitute enslavement the 
 service imposed may be trivial. Thus, when the offender 
 merely leans on the victim or uses him as a screen against 
 a draft and that even while the subject is asleep, it will be 
 sufficient evidence of enslavement ' These two statements 
 plainly contradict each other " Plainly Mr. Eisenstein 
 fails to distinguish between the victim's unconsciDUsness 
 throughout the process of the crime and his being asleep 
 at a particular stage of the crime of which enslavement is 
 only a part. In the first case the crime is incomplete, even 
 where the several steps in the crime were taken; in the 
 second case, where the victim was asleep only during part 
 of the criminal procedure, if the other conditions were 
 present, the crime is considered complete (compare Maim., 
 H. Genebah ix. 2-3) It seems to me that any layman read- 
 ing the extracts from the article, even in the garbled and 
 disfigured form presented by the critic, can and does read- 
 ily see the difference. 
 
 He continues: "The writer further says: 'By selling him 
 (the victim) the Talmud implies the sale of the victim as 
 bondmen are sold (Lev. xxv 42). [Mr. Eisenstein here 
 omits the explanatory clause: "that is, the whole person is 
 conveyed," but makes up for it in advance by interpolating 
 "the victim".] Therefore, if the victim be a pregnant 
 woman, and be sold with a ["the"] stipu'ation that only her 
 prospective offspring shall become the property of her pur- 
 chaser . . , this will not constitute selling in the meaning 
 of the law.' Apparently the writer used second-hand 
 
26 
 
 .sources, as the text in Talmud (Sanh. 85!)) leaves the ques 
 tion open ip'»n: whether or not the act of leaning against a 
 person while he is asleep, or using a body as a screen 
 against a draft, constitutes a service in the meaning of the 
 law nDDI ^2 noynni 'and he deal with him as a slave or (He- 
 brew and) sell him' (Deut xxiv 7 Rev. Ver.) to complete 
 the crime." Mr. Eisenstem cites fiom my article the case 
 of a pregnant woman sold with the sole purpose of trans- 
 ferring to her purchaser her prospective offspring, and im- 
 pugns my conclusion by adducing the Talmudic moot 
 question: "Whether or not the act of leaning against a 
 sleeping person, or using the body as a screen" constitutes 
 a service! The Talmudic passage to which both the article 
 and its critic refer, includes the question of the pregnant 
 woman; and although this is the main, if not the only part 
 relevant to the criticism, the critic inadvertently bmits it! — 
 But what may he mean by saying: "Apparently the writer 
 used second-hand sources"? Surely by '^second-hand 
 sources" he cannot mean Maimonides, Hoshen Mishpat, 
 Semag, etc., or why say "apparently"? I cite them often 
 and openly, and he himself refers to them! Probably he 
 means old books or second-hand copies of the ancient Jew- 
 ish writers; if so, he is right. Some of my books are 
 second-handed and quiet ancient looking and considerably 
 dog-eared. But this proves nothing either for or against 
 the correctness of my article or of the criticism. 
 
 "Maimonides decides in the negative: that leaning on a 
 sleeping person, unless he is aware, at least part of the 
 time, of the service he so renders, is not considered as being 
 enslaved." In the second-hand Yad ha-Hazakah before 
 me (edition Furth, 1767), Maimonides decides just as I 
 state in the article. Maimonides here says: ]V\^^^]^i2 
 n ^J2n^: T,n ]^^ 2^:2^^ a'VN U IDDJ in vhv • • • . ' if he re- 
 clined on him, or supported himself by him. ^ven while the 
 stolen one was asleepy he made use of him' (H. Genebah ix. 
 2). This is quite different from what the critic ascribes to 
 Maimonides; has he a modernized version of this passage 
 in Maimonides* works? Or had he in mind the next sec- 
 tion, where Maimonides says: t^^^riK^Jl y^"" Nini 1133 DN 
 
37 
 
 liDQ f n 1^'' Nin pnyi "1-13^1 IC'^ Nl&j'j U— * If he stole him 
 while he was asleep, and made use of him while 
 he was asleep, and sold him while he still slept, — in such a 
 case he is not guilty.' If this is the critic's excuse, then he 
 again manifests a failure to distinguish between the vic- 
 tim's intermediate sleep and his continuous sleep 
 
 "Also that the use of the body as a screen against a draft 
 is no service , hence in the case of a pregnant woman the 
 crime is not accomplished." Granting the premise, because 
 (or: although) Maimonides makes no mention of that case 
 — the critic's implication to the contrary notwithstanding — 
 I cannot see how the conclusion fol'ows from it. It is 
 true, the Gemara (Sanh. 85b) includes NpT ""DNn NCpINT HETN 
 — 'Placing a woman against a draft,' and Rashi (ad 1.) de- 
 clares it to be no service; but as I refer not to the woman 
 placed against a draft, but to mmj;^ nE^J>? id^ — 'Selling the 
 woman with the view to the transfer of her prospective 
 offspring,' the critic's combination and conclusion are rather 
 strange. Hence when he further says: "He [I] combines 
 the two separate questions, and decides contrary to the 
 Sly," the reader can readily see that it is the critic who is 
 making curioas combinations, and that the decisions given 
 in the article are in full accordance with the law. 
 
 II. 
 
 "Abetment (S. M )" is the next article receiving the 
 critic's attention. He remarks: "The treatment here is 
 similar to that of accessories (L. N, D), Both include 
 the seducer (inciter) who is neither one nor the other." 
 That the treatment is similar is owing to the similarities in 
 the nature of the offences those terms usually imply; ard 
 that the seducer (niD?.:) is an abettor follows from the char- 
 acter of his crime. In criminal law, only the actor in the 
 commission of a crime is a principal, and of principals 
 there are two kinds: a principal in the first degree, or the 
 person actually perpetrating the fact; and a principal of 
 the second degree, or he who is present aiding and abetting 
 
t9 
 
 the commission of the fact. Now, the Mesith is certainly 
 not a principal in the first degree, since he commits no act: 
 he serves no idol, or he would cease to be denominated a 
 Mesith and would be termed an Idolater; he is not a princi- 
 pal in the second degree, since his guilt does not depend 
 on results: a mere attempt to incite is sufficient, and the 
 law punishes him even where no apostasy results from his 
 incitement. He is punished for his evil intention: for 
 counselling to do evil, or as Scripture expresses it (Deut. 
 xiii. iij: -JM^JX n'byD "]nnnWpi ^3—" Because he hath 
 sought to thrust thte away from the Lord thy God,*' — 
 hence we recognize in him an abettor of evil. He may also 
 become an accessory where his counsel succeeds in mislead- 
 ing. And since the imposition of punishment on the Mesith 
 is unique in Jewish law, neither the Bible nor the Talmud 
 punishing for ideas "E^yD U pNK^ w!?, except in certain cases 
 (see Josef. Mak iv — ed. Zuckermandel, v. ii; Gemara 
 Mak. i6a), his case is properly cited under both abetment 
 and ACCESSORIES, 
 
 Mr. Eisenstein admits my statement that 'idolatry among 
 the Jews was an offense against the state, . . . high treason 
 against the Divine King,' and says: "But if so. the inciter 
 is a principal not an accessory, because 'in high treason 
 there are no accessories but all are principals on account of 
 the heinousness of the crime' (Blackstone's com. Bk iv, 
 ch. 3, par. 2, also Cent. Diet.). And an Abettor who is 
 absent when the felony is committed is merely an acces- 
 sory.'' The objections raised in this sentence are removed 
 by what has just been said. Besides, the critic should re- 
 member that the Rabbis of old were no disciples of Black- 
 stone and did not copy Common Law; and as Rabbinic 
 law is ancient Jewish law, Blackstone's Commentaries can- 
 not be authority for articles on Jewish law drawn from Rab- 
 binic sources. 
 
 '•Moreover, an accessory must be concerned either before 
 or after the perpetration of the offensive act, while in the 
 case of the inciter to idolatry, no act is necessary, as the 
 mere incitement constitutes the crime." — Hence the inciter 
 is, as has been shown, sometimes an abettor and sometimes 
 
29 
 
 an accessory: it depends on the circumstances following his 
 attempt. 
 
 In this connection, Mr. Eisenstein quotes from the "Code 
 of Moses Couci (Semag) Lavin 29" (26?), a passage which 
 he renders thus : " The JT'DD who incites, whether in the 
 plural (let us go) or singular sense, is executed by stoning; 
 even though no idolatrous act was committed, either by 
 the inciter or by the one whom he incites "-:-This, I submit, 
 is not very intelligible, and misrepresents the learned 
 author. The original reads thus : 
 
 i6v Q*VN bpo: T'n i^n' ]^t^h2 r^ D'^*^ rE^^:i V^ n'or^^ n-DonK^ 
 
 n^DD T'n nnyi "ji? 
 
 and means this : *The Mesith who incites, whether he 
 expresses himself in the plural or in the singular, must be 
 stoned, even though no idol has yet been worshipped [in 
 consequence of his attempt] either by the inciter or by the 
 incited. How [must he express himj-elf to become liable]? 
 If he says to his friend : " Let us go and worship [idols]' 
 or: " Go and worship," this constitutes him a Mesith: -As 
 both articles, abetment and accessories, state the law 
 in language almost identical with that of the "Semag," and 
 both articles refer to Talmud and Rabbinic Codes, the 
 critic's object in citing the Semag does not appear on the 
 surface; therefore I must pass it by without further notice. 
 "The writer of accessories gives the stereotyped legal 
 definition of an accessory ^either by counseling,advising,etc" 
 If this contention is correct, how does it [inciting to idolatry] 
 compare with accessory that requires an act either before 
 or after the act?" — while the mere attempt to incite does 
 not agree with the "legal definition of accessory," the 
 contention, "It is not necessary that any one should have 
 been actually misled" is none the less correct. The critic 
 himself has just cited a passage from the Semag "proving it 
 so. This passage, as quoted above, is almost a verbatim 
 transcription of the law as expounded by Maimonides (H) 
 'Akkum V. 2 and part of 1 ; compare Kesef Mishneh ad 1.) 
 and is based on the dictum of the Mishnah (Sanh. vii 10) 
 
and of the Boraita (cited Sanh 67a), referred to by the writers 
 of Abetment and Accessories. 
 
 "In both ABETMENT and accessories mention is made 
 of n''7tJ', Agent, it should be referred to^ agency." — Mr 
 Eisenstein at last makes a good point, but only this one 
 point; and I plead guilty of having omitted to cross refer 
 n''7K* to agency where it naturally receives detailed treat- 
 ment. He is, however, mistaken in ascribing to the writers 
 of the said articles another omission. He says: "In regard 
 to the judicial maxim that one cannot be an agent in an 
 illegal act, the writer forgets to point out the exception in 
 aiding a thief in the slaughter or sale of stolen cattle that 
 makes him liable to a fine imposed in the Bible (B K. 
 79a)." — To this I might answer: As this supposititious case 
 is a creation of the critic's imagination, and not cited in 
 "B. K. 79a" or in any one of the Rabbinical works on 
 which the writers of the articles rely, they cannot justly be 
 criticized for the failure to quote it. And even were it as 
 the critic states: were this case cited in '*B. K, 79a" or in 
 any standard code, there would still be no reason for 
 criticizing the omission thereof. The case as given by the 
 critic is no "exception" in the proper sense, and is covered 
 by what the writer of abetment says under the sub-heading, 
 "Ritual Matters"(p. 55b). As there, so here, the liability 
 would depend on the ability, or inabi ity of the thief to 
 accomplish the act by himself (compare Hoshen Mishpat 
 cccxl vii 8); and i fully agree with the "Reply to Mr. 
 Eisenstein"(in your issue of 23rd inst.) where the writer says: 
 "Had I given it with any fullness, my editor would pro- 
 bably have stricken it out as unnecessary detail." — How- 
 ever, the Talmud (B K. 79a or rather: 78 et seq ) does 
 cite a case of a thief and a slaughterer or seller of stolen 
 cattle, but it reads thus : n3»^ "'ns? ]n:) m n3t2i ^mh ]n:) 3JJ 
 T^n-.... He steals and delivers to another, and he [that 
 other] slaughters; he steals and delivers to another, and he 
 [that other] sells .. he [the thief] is liable ' In this case, 
 contrary to the maxim cited, the law says: *One may be an 
 agent in an illegal act ' Still the criticism is baseless, for 
 even this case is no real exception to the general maxim. 
 
3' 
 
 It is the better, if not tlie unanimous opinions ot the stand- 
 ard jurists, that the agent in this case is merely the tool, the 
 innocent messenger of the thief; that he was ignorant of 
 the fact that the cattle he handled were stolen cattle, and 
 that he was ignorant of participating in a felony: therefore 
 the thief alone is liable Had the slaughterer or seller 
 known that the cattle were j-tolen he would be guilty, and 
 1 able to fines (se€ Hoshen Mihhpat clxxxii, Proem; Hagadah 
 and G ossaries; Tos. B. M. lob s. v.. And as this case too 
 is fully covered by what is said under abetment (p. 55a), 
 there was no need for citing it. 
 
 Again, the critic says; "Also where the agent himself is 
 not legally re>ponsible or prohibited to do the act, the 
 responsibility reverts to the principal, who alone becomes 
 liable. Inasmuch as in such a case he cannot plead or 
 point out to the agent his duty, nai n^oi?nn ^^nm mn ^^21 
 VroiiJ' ^D"" to rather follow the dictation of the Master (God) 
 than that of his suborinate man "— Of course,Mr. Eisenstein 
 means to say that the writer of the article on abetment 
 has omitted this case also; but he seems to have overlooked 
 the citation in that aiticle (p.5£a, line 24 et seq.) of the case 
 of the bailee's breach of trust committed through his s'ave. 
 That case clearly illustrates the law governing all cases 
 "where the agent himself is rot legally responsible "— As 
 for the maxim 2in nni 'One should rather follow the 
 Master, etc.,' thi*, too, is fully illustrated under abetment 
 (p 54b, line 17 from bottom et seq ). 
 
 "In citing the case of homicide in abetment he fails to 
 explain the difference between murder and manslaughter 
 which the Talmud distinguishes broadly. Otherwise the 
 citation is misunderstood and seems senseless.,' — The 
 article on abetment is certainly not the place to explain 
 such differences. They belong, under homicide, and there 
 they will be detailed Had they been discussed here one 
 might justly suggest that they should have been omitted 
 and reserved for their proper place. And as to the critic's 
 conclusion regarding the citation's being misunderstood and 
 appearing senseless, the writer thought and still thinks that 
 the citation, as it appears in the article, fully illustrates the 
 
snbject treated, and leaves no room whatever for misunder- 
 standing. 
 
 ••The civil cases of abetment properly belong to 
 Damages or Negligence "—So do other cases, used for the 
 purpose of illustrating other topics, belong, and must of 
 necessity, belong to some other general titles. It is by the 
 cases 'properly belonging to damages and negligence' 
 that the rules governing Abetment in civil cases are, and 
 must be illustrated and made clear. 
 
 S. Mendelsohn 
 
 Wrightsville Beach, N. C, Aug. 30th, 1901., 
 
 MR. EISENSTEIN'S COUNTER REPLY. 
 
 To The American Hebrew: 
 
 Rev. Dr. S. Mendelsohn's reply to my criticism that 
 " it is the result of misreading and misundersiandir g on 
 my part " is quite a " clever argument," but when his logic 
 is analyzed well — the reader may judge for himself 
 after I conclude. I shall not, however, stop to argue again 
 whether " men-stealing " should be treated under abduc- 
 tion or KIDNAPPING, except to remark that I did not say 
 that "Abduction ' is absolutely wrong, but suggested that 
 since ' Kidnapping " means by force only, and that Web- 
 ster in his dictionary especially mentions this Jewish law on 
 men-stealing under Kidnapping and not under Abduction, 
 the former should have been selected as the proper head- 
 ing 
 
 In reference to the contradiction in the statements 
 of Re/. Mendelsohn, pointed out in my criticism, he re- 
 plies that I " plainly fail to distinguish between the victim's 
 unconsciousness throughout the process of the crime and 
 his being asleep at a particular stage of the crime." This 
 is not so, and Rev. Mendelsohn himself quotes my words 
 that: • Maimonides decides . . . that leaning on a sleep- 
 ing person, unless he is aware at least part of the time, of 
 
33 
 
 the services he so renders, is not considered as being en- 
 slaved." Surely, this draws the distinction clear enough, 
 and in conformity with Rev. Mendelsohn's first statement 
 in his article that ** enslavement must be accompanied by 
 consciousness on the part of the victim," etc. But his sec- 
 ond statement, seven lines further, in which he says that, 
 " to constitute enslavement the service imposed may be 
 trivial. Thus, when the offender merely leans on the vic- 
 tim or uses him as a screen against a draft, and that even 
 whi e the subject is asleep it will be sufficient evidence of 
 enslavement," is a glaring contradiction. Perhaps Rev, 
 Mendelsohn intended to say •* while the subject is partly 
 asleep." If so, he omitted a very important word, and 
 anyhow this is not sufficient evidence of enslavement. On 
 the contrary, the only evidence of enslavement is that part 
 of the time when he is aivake. 
 
 Rev. Mendelsohn accuses me of omitting in my quota- 
 tion his words " that is, the whole person is conveyed," I 
 confess that I was fir^t inclined to believe that this refers to 
 a half-slave and half freeman, that is, if sold for part ser- 
 vice, but since he insists that it refers to the pregnant 
 woman, I can now readily understand his misconstruction 
 of the whole subject in the Gemara (Sanh. 85b), which 
 compels me to give it here in full: 
 
 " R. Jeremiah asked: * what is the law in case of one 
 who stole a person and sold him while he was asleep. Also, 
 what is the law in case he sold a woman for her offspring; 
 shall we rule that this constitutes enslavement?" The 
 Rabbis of the academy were surprised and retorted: *'Why, 
 he (R. Jeremiah) ought to be able to arrive at the decision 
 from the fact that there is no enslavement at all in these 
 cases " [which is an essential condition before the sale to 
 complete the crime] The question was then amended; 
 " Provided, he inclined upon the stolen person who was 
 asleep, and he stood up the woman against a draft. — Is this 
 enslavement or not? — No decisioa." [^Rashi: Standing 
 up the pregnant woman against the draft, he profits by the 
 additional space occupied by the embryo who thus renders 
 service as a screen]. This amended question being unde- 
 
34 
 
 cided, Maimonides, according to the established Talmudic 
 rule, to give the accused criminal the benefit of any unde- 
 cided question (Magid Mishna to Rambam, Geneba ix 3. 
 4 ), renders his decision in the negative. Consequently, it 
 is no service and no enslavement to recline on an unawar- 
 ing sleeping person, or to use a body as a screen. 
 
 Thus, the principal errors included in Rev. Mendel- 
 sohn's article are: (i) The statement that the reason •♦ be. 
 cause the whole person is not conveyed" which applies to 
 a half-slave, he conveys to the pregnant woman, which is 
 untenable, as the woman herself being free plays no part in 
 the transaction, while her embryo, if sold, is considered as 
 a whole body. (2) The only question remains whether or 
 not the embryo, by its services as a screen constitutes the 
 condition of enslavement. The same negative ruling is 
 also to be applied in this case. Hence the services of a 
 body as a screen is not enslavement, in contradiction to 
 the second statememt of Rev. Mendelsohn who says: 
 " when the offender . . . uses him as a screen ... it will 
 be sufficient evidence of enslavement." (3) In the same 
 statement, he claims that, ** when the offender merely leans 
 on the victim, . . . even while the subject is asleep it will 
 be sufficient evidence of enslavement," which is contrary to 
 the decision of Maimonides, quoted by me in an abridged 
 form and is also contrary to that of Maimonides, quoted^by 
 Rev. Mendelsohn who says: ** if he stole him while he 
 was asleep ... he is not guilty." In the previous para- 
 graph Rev. Mendelsohn misconstrues Maimonides' mean- 
 ing by quoting *' if he inclined on him, or supported him- 
 self by him, even while the stolen one was asleep, he made 
 use of him." The text in the copy before me reads as 
 follows: Even if the. service he makes use of isof less value 
 than a Peruta (widow's mite), as for instance he inclined on 
 him or supported himself on him." Then begins a new 
 sentence: " Even if the stolen one is asleep, etc.," which 
 follows and is explained by the next paragraph (see Magid 
 Mishna). 
 
 Rev. Mendelsohn makes another mistake by saying 
 that Maimonides does not mention the case of the preg- 
 
35 
 
 nant woman, which case follows the above paragraphs, as 
 the fourth in that section. I doubt if it is omitted in his 
 Furth edition. He further says: ** that he refers not to 
 the woman placed against a draft, but to selling the woman 
 with a view to the transfer of her prospective offspring," 
 and cannot understand my rather strange combination and 
 conclusion (that the case of the pregnant woman refers to 
 the question of a body screen). I think, that the Gemara 
 referring to this, as fully translated before, is self-explana- 
 tory, and should convince any impartial reader (who is re- 
 quested to look up the sources quoted) to judge whether I 
 or Rev. Mendelsohn make " curious combinations." The 
 importance of the Encyclopedia warrants a careful consid- 
 eration and should not be treated as a trivial matter. Rev. 
 Mendelsohn pretends not to understand what I mean by 
 my presumption that he used second-hand sources to 
 compile his article. As I could not for a moment believe 
 that a Talmudic scholar would so misinterpret the plain 
 words of the Gemara, I judged him charitably, assuming 
 that he did not look up the original source in the Talmud. 
 But since Rev. Mendelsohn informs us that " his books are 
 second handed and quite ancient looking and considerable 
 dog eared," I must still be kind and presume that he 
 neglected to dust them for some time. 
 
 J. D. ElSENSTEIN. 
 
 THE LEGAL ARTICLES IN THE JEWISH 
 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
 
 II 
 
 To The American Hebrew: 
 
 Rev. Mendelsohn's defence of his article Abetment, if 
 anything, strengthens my criticism: that the Mesith being 
 a traitor to theocracy is a principal and not an abettor or 
 an accessory, in accordance with the English law, as 
 expounded by Blackstone. Rev. Mendelsohn's excuse is 
 
. 36 
 
 that ** the rabbis of old were no disciples of Blackstone 
 and did not copy Common Law; and as rabbinic law is 
 ancient Jewish law, Blackstone's Commentaries cannot be 
 authority for articles of Jewish law." Yes, but common 
 sense is the basi? of all laws. Besides, Abettor and Aces- 
 cesorv are English legal terms and must be defined in ac- 
 cordance with the conception of English law. If these 
 terms do not fit the case of Mesith, it should be under a 
 different heading: Incitement or Idolatry. 
 
 My citation from the " Semag " about the Mesith, he 
 says "is not intelligible and misrepresents the learned 
 author," consequently he gives his own version which does 
 not alter the substance in the least, only he uses more 
 words These are the two for comparison: 
 
 My Citation. His Version 
 
 The Mesith who incites, '^The Mesith who incites, 
 whether in the plural (let us whether he expresses him- 
 go) or singular sense, is exe- self in the plural or in the 
 cuted by stoning; even singular, must be stoned, 
 though no idolatrous act even though no idol has yet 
 was committed, either by been worshiped (in conse- 
 the inciter or by the one quence of his attempt,) cith- 
 whom he incites." er by the inciter or by the 
 
 incited." 
 
 Rev. Mendelsohn is evidently perplexed and cannot dis- 
 tinguish between a parallel and a contradiction He makes 
 the same mistake regardmg the maxim that '"one cannot be 
 an agent in an illegal act" to which I observed that: '* the 
 writer forgets to point out the exception in aiding a thief 
 ift the slaughter or sale of stolen cattle, that makes him 
 liable to a fine imposed in the Bible ( B. k. 79 a.)" To 
 this Rev. Mendelsol^n objects with the following extraor- 
 dinary remark: " As this supposititious case is a creation 
 of the critic's imagination, and not cited in B. k 79a or in 
 any of the rabbinical works on which the writers of the 
 articles rely, they cannot justly be criticized for the failure 
 to quote it." Twelve lines further he forgets this remark 
 and says: "However, the Talmud (B. k. 79a or rather 78 et 
 seq) does cite a case of a thief and a slaughterer or seller 
 of stolen cattle, but it reads thus: He steals and delivers 
 
37 
 
 to another, and he [that other] sells ... he [the thief] is 
 liable." Which is in substance exactly what I said in con- 
 cise form, without giving the literal translation to spoil the 
 sense Moreover, the matter is quoted wholly in B. k. 79a, 
 save one-half of the last line on 78 b. And in spite of 
 Rev. Mendelsohn's assertion that this is no ''exception" in 
 the proper sense, the Gemara (79a) distinctly gays: Not- 
 withstanding the maxim governs all laws of the Torah, an 
 exception is made in this case that a Sheliah for the slaugh- 
 ter or sale completes the illegal act of a thief, to make him 
 liable to pay a fine of four and five times the amount of his 
 theft." A little further, Rev. Mendelsohn again forgets 
 and states that ** the case (the exception) is fully covered 
 by what he said under Abetment (p 55b.)" The logic of 
 such contradictory and twisted reasoning is no less aston- 
 ishing than his invention of a new law, for instance: "Had 
 the slaughterer or seller(?) known that the cattle were stolen 
 he would be guilty and liable to fines (see Hoshen Mishpat 
 cl.xxxii. Proem; Hagadah (?^ and Glossaries; Tos. B. M. 
 lobs. V. )" The quoted authorities simply confirm my 
 second exception that I pointed out " when the agent him- 
 self is not legally responsible or prohibited to do the act, 
 the responsibility reverts to the principal," and which, I 
 claimed was also omitted in the article. But of course, 
 those authorities do not mention the newly coined law of 
 Rev. Mendelsohn that the slaughterer or seller, (pur- 
 chaser?) would be guilty. Moreover, even if such a law 
 did exist, the Hoshen Mishpat would omit it, because that 
 author records only operative laws, not those bearing fines 
 or capital punishment, which become inoperative and 
 obsolete. The funniej't view of it is. that this part of my 
 criticism touches the article of Mr Dembitz, who being 
 broadminded, frankly admitted in your issue ot Aug. 23d 
 that "he overlooked the passage in B. k 79a " 
 
 To form a correct idea of Rev. Mendelsohn's interpreta- 
 tion of the Talmud h la Rodkinson, I may be permitted to 
 cite from his article Abimi (p.62 ) He says: Abimi is 
 mentioned as reporting (?) Baraitot, one of these treating 
 of the honor due to parents, says, ** one man feeds his 
 
38 
 
 father on pheasants and yet tires him of this world; while 
 another yokes his father to the treadmill and yet prepares 
 him the enjoyments of the world to come (Kid. 31 a)." 
 Rev. Mendelsohn fails to explain how the son prepares 
 his father for the enjoyment of the future world by yoking 
 him to the treadmill. We can probably comprehend that, 
 being overfed, the father makes a hurried exit from this 
 world; but where does the enjoyment of the next world 
 come in after hard labor ? However, here is the correct 
 translation of that Talmudical passage: ** Some one may 
 be [punished and] ousted by tribulation from this world 
 although he feeds his father on chickens; and some one 
 may be [rewarded] in the spiritual world to come although 
 he makes him (his father) turn the mill." As Rashi ex- 
 plains: it depends entirely on the demeanor and treatment 
 of the son. Some rich son may cook wild fowl for his 
 father and be disrespectful, in a bad humor and a growl- 
 ing disposition, for which behavior the son is punished 
 even in this world; while another son who is poor, may be 
 compelled to employ his father to grind the mill to help 
 eke out a livlihood, and jet if the son treats him gently 
 and kindly, showing good will, love and affection, and ex- 
 pressing regret because he is temporarily obliged to pursue 
 such a course owing to his poverty. For such a son a, 
 reward is reserved even in the future world. I.am done with 
 Rev Mendelsohn. Now, I would like "to go higher" and 
 ask what the editor of that department of the Encyclopedia 
 has to say to these defects and shortcomings ? Neverthe- 
 less, I still maintain that the Encyclopedia, as a whole, is 
 an excellent work and deserves every effort, encourage 
 mcnt and assistance to complete it. 
 
 J. D. ElSENSTEIN. 
 
c 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
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