:/^'^.^.V^< -=^^y^*A^'^^'^A'^A«y^ h^m .'^.A';'a-«A ■^^^^-^^^^^^^^^A^^^^^n;^^, W^^"^ 1 ^ - .' •':-i\^.^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ -o';n-;/^:c;q;^:Aa;^a^^aa Vj^^^aC- i^v-?*^ ^^; '*"^^i^A.,^,/^^^^; JTd .OA%^^l ^^^A^A. ^?§^!^^' i:}:^^?'^^- ^Si'?^%^>^^0^^ s^^^^ 2'fl r- THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE AAA'-\^ ' , , ., J , ft- '■^>\P^^^ - /- '■ ^ k^-^Mmm:. T ^ •^ ^ A .x;s--«:-;:^>&;«?^^>i^^^^ .»»*»*»' ''^mm^m^^^^sm^-^^s^r^m " . /Sl iPv' >vA A«A^'< MfflsWAfUlL^^ - ^ ^ A ^ /^ a' ■^ '^ '^ ^ ":,'-"' _ . r^AAf^C /K A A rv .^''..:i^^ .r\;rNAO.Ar\?,A,' --(^^^ r>onA ^^^>*tp^^<^n^ .r - -^^ArAOQA,A,..A^,n^A^^- ;.>-.-.^^^^' p,. f^^_ ,1 '/.^r':- X z>^ ///-^ . -#♦ •^ vv^ '• * * . i i> \ -• c, . v^. j) ^^fc^'/T? HISXOHY WAR m THE PENINSULA AND IN TBK SOUTH OF FRANCE; FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. BT ^^ W. F. P. NAPIER, C. B., COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES. D. & J. SADLIER & CO., 31 BARCLAY STREET. MONTREAL :—i;UKM':R OK NOTRE DAME & FRANCIS XAVIER STREETS. N 3 / NOTICE. Or ihe manuscript authorities consulted for this history, those marked with the letter S. the author owes to the Kiniiness of marshal Soult. For the notes dictated by Napoleon, and the plans of campaign sketched out by king Joseph, he is indebted to his grace the duke of Wellington. The returns of the French army were extracted from the original half-monthly statements presented by marshal Berthier to the emperor Napoleon. Of the other authorities it is unnecessary to sny more, than that the author had access to the origi- n:il papers, wiih the exception of Dupot I's Memoir, of which a copy only was obtained. r .-\'<'\c£^m^': PREFACE ^m:eiiio-A-N^ editioist. The greater the number of authorities on any period of human history, the more likely is the historical student to arrive at a true and just appreciation of the epoch, the events, and the men of which they treat. Every writer, according to his idiosyncrasy, attaches himself to especially develope some branch of the subject which is more particularly adapted for successful treatment by his peculiar talent, to the neglect very often of other and more important portions of the theme. A scholar and man of a purely literary turn will allow his desire of making his work a harmonious whole, — of producing a literary chef d' oeuvre^ artistic in the arrangement of its parts and boldly striking in its general effect, to injure the exactitude and correctness necessary in all petty details of a work which aspires to a high historical character. The writer of diplomatic tendencies will be apt to look upon the Cabinet as the principal feature in his story, and the Camp as a mere mechanical accessory. He will occupy himself with the discussions of councils, the disputes of diplomatists, the issuing of protocols, and the stipulations of treaties, and will give but an accessory importance to the movements of armies, the plans of strategists, and the vicis- situdes of the battle-field. The soldier will most probably enthusiastically dwell upon and develope the plans and tactics of military leaders, and describe with scientific minute- ness every remarkable movement or achievement,, and will be inclined to look upon cabinets, ministers and diplomatists as noxious individuals, who, by their discussions, indecision and procrastination, are but impediments to the soldier's march to success. Thus is it that multiplicity of authorities is conducive to the development of truth. One writer supplies the deficiency of another; this author corrects the errors of that; and they mutually complete each other. The history of any epoch or event cannot be said to have been luritten until it has been re-wriiien several times and by several hands. For those reasons, our author's history of the Peninsular War was wanting to complete one portion of the history of that great struggle, though it had already been treated by many before 4 PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITIOIT. he determined to iake up Lis pen and leave us a record of the war of Spanish indo pendence. No book having a human origin is without its faults, and our author has not escaped the penalty of humanity. His work teems with excellent qualities, and, indeed, they more than counterbalance his errors, which, whatever they are, are certainly not intentional, but rather the effect of education, national or professional prejudice. We purpose briefly to point out the more salient beauties and virtues of the work, as well as conscientiously to signalize its vices and deformities, that the general reader or historical student may the more readily enjoy and profit by the former, and guard against and detect the latter. The author of the History of the War in the Peninsula was peculiarly fitted for the task of relating the military history of that contest. He was himself a soldier, and an actor in many of the stirring scenes he so strikingly describes. His proficiency in military science rendered him capable of appreciating the strategetical movements of the belligerents in the campaign, so that his battle scenes are not the vague and misty outlines of a man of peace describing the operations of war. His descriptions of actual conflict are vivid to intensity, and full of movement. The reader's imagination sees in his stirring page the "magnifi- cently stern array," and hears in his impetuous prose the terrible sounds of the fight, until the enthusiasm of the student, however pacifically inclined he may naturally be, is roused by the exciting picture, and he becomes himself an actor in the scene, and pauses breath- lessly for the trumpet-command of " Charge !" The author's style is exceedingly vigorous £Lid terse. It has a plain and simple vehemence, which is both captivating and imposing. He knows nothing of amplification. He tells his story in the fewest words possible ; marches straight to a fact, seizes it, and places it before the reader without any useless preliminaries, takes some fortress of error built up with care and pains by some precedent, interested or partial historian, by a coup de main, and razes it to the ground. His narrative is full of life, motion and impulsiveness; his portraiture of character, bold, striking and impressive. His every word possesses significance, and every phrase, to use a simile 1(.\S3 perhaps in good taste than in consonance with the subject, is a piece of historical artillery charged to the muzzle with the grape of meaning. His honest and chivalrous nature enabled him to rise above the then popular British prejudice against the French. While he is careful to guard the military reputation of his own countrymen from injustice, he is equally solicitous to do justice to the prowess of the French army, and the military skill of the great men who commanded it. He pays a proper tribute to the military genius of the great Napoleon, whom he places on the loftiest pedestal in the Pantheon of the great captains of modern times. He loves to paint him as the great champion of equality and the popular principle, contending against the allied forces of privilege and aristocracv. Tiie errors of the great commander he ascribes to the force of circumstances, and extends even to the political ideas of the first Bonaparte an admiration which to many will appear exaggerated. He docs ample justice to the character and military talents of SoULT, and defends him from the calumnies of prejudiced writers. The figure of the Iron Duke stands out in bold and rugged outline, second only in greatness and majesty to his imperial rival. He shows what an efF.'ct fortuitous circumstances have in neutralizing the talents and PREFACE TO THE A:\IERICAX EDITION. " 5 efforts of a general, and shows liow the disasters that cabinets, newspnpcrs and popnlnr opinion too frequently ascribe to inefficiency on the part of the commander, are purely tho result of a combination of adventitious eventualities. The principal blemish of the work consists in the rather unjust spirit in which Spain and her people are treated. The Portuguese are highly lauded, while the Spaniards are severely censured. It contemns the patriotic pride of Spain, so impatient of English dictation, and has the highest praise for the docility of Portugal to English leadership. It is rare to find a book written by an Englishman in which an English prejudice will not somewhere insinuate itself The sympathies of Spain ever turned more naturally to France than to England, while Portugal might be called a mere province of the latter. Here lies the principal cause of the author's unfavorable treatment of Spain. The insig- nificance of the part in the struggle which he assigns to Spanish patriotism, developed in the Partida bands, is explained by the acquired antipathy of the disciplinarian and the man of science to all descriptions of undisciplined and unscientific warfare. This professional prejudice is shown unmistakably towards the end of the work, wdiere he acknowledges the increased efficiency of the Partidas, but ascribes it to the increase of discipline among them. He neglects the history of the efforts of Spanish patriotism throughout the war, and attaches himself more particularly to the achievements of the English arms. This was only natural in an English soldier, and it is in its account of that especial portion of the war that bis work has its highest historical value. While fighting for the principle of hereditary dignity and privilege represented by his own country, the author of this History sympathized ardently with the principle of equality and rank according to merit, of which he considered Napoleon Bonaparte the representa- tive. His political opinions were strongly tinged with republicanism. He sympathized with the unrepresented and unrecognized mass, and held the opinion that legislatures, in- stead of adding to the intrinsic influence which property gives to its possessor, should coun- terpoise its power, by giving political importance to the working classes. He boldly and honestly condemns the egotistical policy of his own government, and pictures the position of his country, at the commencement of the war, in colors by no means flattering: "Eng- land, omnipotent at sea, was little regarded as a military power. Her enormous debt was yearly increasing in an accelerated ratio, and this necessary consequence of anticipating the resources of the country and dealing in a factitious currency, was fast eating into the vital strength of the State : for, although the merchants and great manufacturers were thriving from the accidental circumstances of the times, the laborers were suffering and degenerating in character ; pauperism, and its sure attendant, crime, were spreading over the land, and the population was fast splitting into distinct classes, — the one rich and arbitrary, the other poor and discontented ; the former composed of those who profited, the latter of those who suffered by the war. Of Ireland it is unnecessary to speak ; her wrongs and her misery, peculiar and unparalleled, are too well known and too little regarded, to call for remark." Such sentiments as these were not likely to find favor with the privileged classes in Eng- land, and the consequence was that, on the first appearnnce of our author's work, a strong feeling of aristocratic prejudice was arrayed against it. The fairness with which the French 6 PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION". were treated injured its sale among that class of Englishmen who believed themselves the highest expression of humanity in every development of talent and genius, and their coun. try the great champion of order, and the leader of civilization. Pitting less than six Frenchmen against one Englishman was looked upon by them as treason of the blackest dye, and it required the Crimean struggle to show them that an Englishman may engage an unaided Frenchman and find an adversary worthy of his sword. These ignorant pre- judices are fast being dispelled, in England, by the development of popular intelligence, the rapidity of communication, and the facility of intercourse with other nations. These increased oppportunitics of judging themselves by comparison, have enabled Englishmen to learn that they can be met, and in many things surpassed by those nations for whom their contempt was but the fruit of their ignc^rance. With tlie increase of this enlightenment the reputation of our author increases, and he is now the popular historian of the Peninsular War. In America his book will acquire the authoritative position it deserves. Its success among us will compensate for the difficulties which national and class-prejudice threw in its "way in the author's native country. It is certainly one of the mn^^f retn;irkable modern works of its kind, and as a military authority, with regard to the operations of the English and French armies in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814, it stands in acknowledged pre-eminence. TABLE OF CONTENTS. IlSniODUCTION BOOK I. CHAPTER 1. CHAPTER II. Pasre 9 Dissensions in the Spanish court — Secret treaty and convention of l-'ontainebltau — Junot's army enters Spain — Dupont's and Moncey's corps enter Spain — Duhesme's corps enters Cata- lonia — Insurrection of Aranjuez and Madrid — Charles the Fourth abdicates — F'erdinand proclaimed kin^ — Murat mar- ches to Madrid — Refuses to recognize Ferdinand as King — The sfvord of Francis the First delivered to the French general — Savarv arrives at Madrid — Ferdinand goes to oayonne — Charles the Fourth goes to Bayonne — The for- tresses of St. Sebastian, Figueras, Panipeluna, and Barce- lona, treacherously seized bv the French — Riot at Toledo, 23d of April, Tuiinilt at Madrid 2d May, Charles the Fourth abdicates a second time in favour of Napoleon — Assembly of Notables at Bayonne — Joseph Buonaparte declared king of Spain — Arrives at Madrid - - - 11 CHAPTER III. Council of Castile refuses to take the oath of allegiance — Su- preme Junta established at Seville — Marquis of Solano mur- dered at Cadiz, and the conde d'Aguilar at Seville — Inter- course between Castanos and sir Hew Dalrymple — General Spencer and admiral Purvis offer to co-operate with the Spaniards — Admiral Rossilv's squadron surrenders to Moria — General insurrection — Massacre at Valencia — Horrible murder of Filanghieri .... 16 CHAPTER IV. New French corps formed in Navarre — Duhesme fixes himself at Barcelona — Importance of that city — Napoleon's military plan and arrangements - - - - 19 CHAPTER V. First operations of marshal Bessieres — Spaniards defeated at Cabc^on, at Segovia, at Logrono. at Torquemada — French take St. Ander — Lefebre Desnouettes defeats the Spaniards on the Ebro, on the Huecha, on the Xalon — First siege of Zaragoza — Observations - - • - 22 CHAPTER VI. Operations in Catalonia — General Swartz marches against the town of Manresa, and general Chabran against Taragona — French defeated at Biuch — Chabran recalled — Burns Arbos — Marches against Brurh — Retreats — Duhesme assaults Gerona — Is repulsed with loss — Action on the Llobregat — General insurrection of Catalonia — Figueras blockaded — General Reilie relieves it — First siege of" Gerona — The mar- quis of Palacios arrives in Catalonia with the Spanish troops from the Balearic isles, fledared captain-general un- der St. Naicis«us, re-establishes the line of the Llobregat — The count of CaKlagues forces the French lines at Gerona — Duhesme raises the siege and returns to Barcelona— Ob- servations — Mnncey marches against Valencia, defeats the Spaniards at Pajaso, at the Siete Aguas, and at Quarte — Attacks Valencia, is repuked, marches into Murcia — Forces the passage of the Xucar, defeats Serbellani at San Felippe, arrives at San Clemeiite — Insurrection at Cuenca, quelled by general Caulincourt — Observations - • • • 25 CHAPTER Vn. Second operations of Bessieres — Blake's and Cuesta's arniicg unite at Benevente- -Generals disagree — Bailie of Rio Seco — Bessieres' enrieavour to corr\ipt the Spanish generals fails — Bessieres marches to invade Gallicia, is recalled, and falla back to Burgos — Observations - - - 31 CHAPTER VIII. Dupont marches against Andalusia, forces the br/dge of Alco- lea, takes Cordoba — Alarm at Seville — Castanos arrives, forms a new army — Dupont retreats to Andujar, attacks the town of Jaen — Vedcl forces the pass of Despenas I'erros, ar- rives at Baylen — Spanish army arrives on the Guadalquivir — General Gobert defeated and killed — fienerals Vedel and Darfour retire to Carolina — General Reding takes posses- sion of Baylen — Dupont retires from Andujar — Battle of Baylen — Dupont's capitulation, eighteen thousand French troops lay down their arms — Observations — Joseph holds a council of war, resolves to abandon INIadrid — Impolicy of so doing .... . - 33 BOOK II. CHAPTER I. The Asturian deputies received with enthusiasm in England — Ministers precipitate — Imprudent choice of agents — Junot marches to Alcantara, joined by the Spanish contingent, en- ters Portugal, arrives at Abranles, pushes on to Lisbon — • Prince regent emigrates to the Brazils, reflections on that transaction — Dangerous position of the French army — Por- tuguese council of regency — Spanish contingent well re- ceived — General Taranco dies at Oporto, is succeeded by the French general Quesncl — Solano's troops retire to Badajos — Junot takes possession of the Alemtejo and the Algarves; exacts a forced loan; is created duke of Abranteg; suppresses the council of regency; sends the flower of the Portuguese army to France — Napoleon demands a ransom from Portugal — People unable to pay it — Police of Lisbon — Junot's military position; his character"; political position — Pef>plc discontented — Prophetic eggs — Sebastianists — The capture of Rossilv's squadron known at Lisbon — Pope's nuncio takes refuge on board the English fleet — Alarm of the French .----- 39 CHAPTER n. The Spanish general Belesta seizes general Quesnel and retires to Gallicia — Insurrection at Oporto — Junot disarms and con- fines the Spanish soldiers near Lisbon — General Avril'i column returns to Estremos — General Loison marches from Almeida against Oporto; is attacked at Mezani Frias; cross<-« the Ehjero; attacked at Castro d'Airo; recalled to Lisbon — French driven out of the Algarves — The fort of Figuera* taken — Abrantes and Elvas threatened — Setuval in commo- tion — General Spencer appears o-fl the Tagiis — Junot's plan — Insurrection at Villa Viciosa suppressed — Colonel Maransin takes Beja with great slaughter of the patriots — The insur- gents advance from Leria, fall bark — Action at Leiria — Loi^ son arrives at Abrantes — Observations on his march — French army concentrated — The Portuguese general Leite, aided by a Spanish corps, takes post at Kvora — Loison crosses the Tagns; defeats Leite's advanced guard at Montemor — Battle of pA'ora — Town taken and pillaged — Unfriendly conduct of the Spaniards — Loison reaches Elvas; collects provisions; i» recalled by Junot — Observations - - - 43 CHAPTER IIL Political and military retrospect — Mr. Fox's conduct contrasted with that of bis successors — General Spencer sent to the Mediterranean — Sir John Moore withdrawn from thence; arrives in England; sent to Sweden — Spencer arrives at Gibraltar — Ceuta, the object of his expedition — Spanish in- surrection diverts his attention to Cadiz; wishes to occupjr that city — Spaniards averse to it — Prudent conduct of Sir Hew Dalrymple and lord Collingwood — Spencer sails to Ayatnonte'; returns to Cadiz; sails to the month of the Ta- gus; riturns to Cadiz — Prince Leooold ofSicily ajid th» duke of Orleans arrive at Giliraltiir— Curious intrigue— Army as9eml)led at Cork hy the Wlii'^^ a'^niinis-lratron, with a view to pernianpiit conquest in Sniilh America, the only disposa- ble British force— Sir A. VVellesley takts the < onimand— TABLE OF CONTENTS. Contra;]irtory instrurtions of the ministers — Sir John Moore returns iVoin Sweden; ordered to Portugal — Sir Hew Dal- ryiuple appointed roniinander of the forces — Confused ar- rangements made by the ministers - - - - 46 CHAPTER IV. Sir A. Wellesley quits his troops and proceeds to Coruna — Junta refuse assistance in men, but ask for and obtaui monev — Sir Arthur fjofs to Oporto; arranges a plan with the bishop: proceeds to the Tagus; rejoins his troops; joined by Spen- cer; disembarks at the MonJego; has an interview with peneral Freire d'Aiidrada; marches to Leria — Portuguese insurrection weak — Junot's position and dispositions — La- borde marches to Alcoba^a, Loison to Abrantis — General Freire separates from the British — Junot quits [/isbon with the reserve — Laborde takes post at Rori^a — Action of Rori- ^ — Laborde rtweats to Montachiqiie — Sir A. Wellesley marches to Vimiero — Junot concentrates his army at Torres Vedras • • - - - ' - 60 CHAPTER V, Portuguese take Abrantes — Generals Acklana ond Anstruther land and j:)in tlie army at Vimiero — Sir Ha rv Burrard ar- rives — Battle of Vimiero — Junot defeated — Sir Hew Dul- rymple arrives — Armistice — Terms of it — Junot retuins to I-isbon — Negotiates for a convention — Sir John Moore's troops land — State of the public mind in Lisbon — The Rus- sian admiral negotiates separately — Convention concluded — Tne Russian fleet surrenders upon terms — Conduct of the people at Lisoon — The Monteiro Mor requires sir C harles Cotton to interrupt the execution of the convention — Sir John Hope appointed commandant of Lisbon; represses all disorders — Disputes between the French and English com- nilssioners — Reflections thereupon - - - 55 C^IAPTER VL The bishop and junta of Oporto aim at the supreme power; wish to establish the seat of governmert at Oporto; their intrigues; strange proceedings of general Detken; reflections thereupon — Clamour raised against ttie coiivention in Eng- land and in Portugal; soon ceases in Portugal — The Spanish general G.iliizzo refuses to acknowledge the convention; in- vest.' fort Laiippe; his proceedings absurd and unjustifiable — S John Hope marches asrainst him; he alters his con- duct — Garrison of Laiippe — Marc.'i to Lisbon — Embarked — Garrison of Almeida; march to Oporto; attacked and plun- dered by the Portuguese — Sir Hew Dalrymple and sir Harry Burrard recalled to England — Vile conduct of the daily I press — Violence of public feeling — Convention, improperly called, of Cintra — Observations — On the action of Rorigi — On the battle of Vimiero — On the convention - - 61 BOOK III. CHAPTER I. tumparison between the Portuguese and Spanish people — The general opinion of French weakness and Spanish strength and energy, fallacious — Contracted jiolicy of the English cabinet — Account of the civil and military agents employed — Manv of iheni are without judgment — Mischievous effects thereot" — Operations of the Spanisli armies after the battle of Bavlen — Murciau army arrives at Madrid — Valencian army marches to the relief of Zaragoza — General Verdier raises the siege — Castanos enters Madrid — Contumacious conduct ofGaIt.zzo — Disputes between Blake and Cuesta — Dilator^' conduct of the Spaniards — Sagacious observation of Napo- leon — Insurrection at Bilboa; quelled by general Merlin — French corps approaches Zaragoia — Palafox alarmed, threat- ens the council of Castile — Council of war held at Madrid — Plan of operations — Castanos unable to march from want of money — Bad conduct of the pmta of Seville — Vigorous con- duct of m^pr Cox — Want ol arms — Extravagant project to duct ot m^i procure them - - - - - ' 69 CHAPTER n. Internal political transactions — F'actions in Gallicia, Asturias, Leon, and Castile — Flagitious confluct of the junta of Se- ville — Mr. Stuart endeavours to establish a northern cortes — Activity of tiio council of Ca«tile; projioses a supreme gov- ernment agreeable to the public — local juntas become gene- rally Oflious — Cortes meet at Lugo; declare for a central and iupreme government — Deputies appointed — Clamours of the Galliciaii junta and bishop of Oiense — Increasing influence of the council of Castile — I^nderhand proceerlings of the junta of Seville, disconcerted by the quickness of the Bailv Valdez — Character of Cuesta; f^e denies the legality of the northern cortes, abandons the line of military operations, returns to Seg.ivia, arr< ?t« the Bally Valdez and other de- riuties fr)m Lugo — Cent"al and supreme gf)vernment estab- i«hed .it Aratiiitez, Florida Blanra pr'-«ident — Vile intrigues of the local junt.u — Cuesta removed from the conimaud of his arm)-; ordered to Aranjuez — -ropular feeling in favour of the central junta; vain arid interested prdcFFTlings of that body; its timidity, inactivity, and folly: refLSi s tj name a generalissuno — Foreign rtlatiuiis — Mr. Canning Lavts Mr. Stewart without any instructions for three months — Mr. Frere appointed envoy-extraordinary, &c. - - 74 CHAPTER III. Political position of Napoleon; he resolves to crush th« Spaniards; his energy and activity; marches his armies from every part of Europe towards Spain; his oration to his sol- diers — Conference at Erfurlh — Negotiations for peace — Petulant conduct of Mr. Canning — 160,000 Conscripts en- rolled in France — Power of that country — Napoleon s speech to the senate — He repairs to Bayoniie — Reniiasntss of the English cabinet — Sir John Moore appointed to lead an army into .Spain; sends his artillery by the Macirid road, and marches himself by Almeida — The central junta impatient for the arrival of the English army — Sir David liaiid arrives at Coruna; is refused permis.-ion to disembark liis troops — Mr. PVere and the marquis of Romana arrive at Coruna; account of the latter's esca])e from the Danish l^^lts — Centi'al junta resolved not to appoint a generalissimo — Gloomy aspect ofali'airs ..--.. 80 CHAPTER IV. Movements oi ihe Spanish generals on the Ebro; their absurd confidence, their want of system and concert — General opinion that the French are weak — Real strength of the king — Marshal i\ey and general Jourdan join the army — Military errors of the king exposed by Napoleon, who instructs him how to make war — Joseph proposes six plans of operation- Observations thereupon .... 86 CHAPTER V. Position and strength of the French and Spanish armies — Blake moves from Reynosa to the Upper Ebro; sends a division to Bilbao; French retire from that town — Ney quits his posi- tion near Lngrono, and retakes Bilbao — The ainiies of the centre and right approach the F'bro and the Aragun — Vari- ous evolutions — Blake attacks and takes Bilbao — Head of the grand French army arrives in Spain — The Castllians join the army of the centre — The A.-turian3 join Blake — Apathy of the central junta — Castanos joins the army; holds a con- ference with Palafox; their dangerous position; arrange a plan of operations — The Spaniards cross the Ebro — The king orders a general attack — Skirmish at Sanguessa at Logrono, and Lerim — The Spaniards driver back over 'he Ebro — Logrono taken — Colonel Cruz, with a Spanish bat- talion, surrenders at Lerim — Francisco Palafox, the military deputy, arrives at Alfaro; his exceeding folly and presump- tion; controls and insuits Castanos — Force of tlie French army increases hourly: how composed and disposer! — Blake ascends the valley of Durango — Battle of Zornosa — French retake Bilbao — Combat at Valmaceda — Observations - 90 BOOK IV. CHAPTER L Napoleon arrives at Bayonne — Blake advances towards Bilbao — The count Eelvidere arrives at Burgos — The first and fourth corps advance — Combat of (luents — Blake retreats — Napo- leon at Viltoria: his plan — Soult takes the coniniand ,of the second corps — Battle of (jamonal — Burgos taken — Battle of Espinosa — Flight from Reynosa — Soult overruns the Mon- tagna de St. Ander, and scours Leon — Napoleon fixes his head-quarters at Burgos, clianges his front, lets 10,000 loose cavalry upon Castile and Leon — Marshals Lasues and Ney directed against Castanos — Folly of the central junta — Gene- ral St. Juan occupies the pass of the Somosierra — Folly of the generals on the Ebro — Battle of Tudela - - 96 CHAPTER II. Napoleon marches against the capital; forces the pass tf the Somn'ierra — St. Juan murdered by his men — Tumult.s is Madrid — French army arrives there; the Retiro stormed-* Town capitulates — Remains of Castanos's army driven acros* tlie Tagus; retire to Cuenca — Napoleon explains his policy to the nobles, clergy, and tribunals of Madrid — His vast plans, enormous force — Defenceless state of Spain - 101 CHAPTER HI. Sir John Moore arrives at Salamanca; hears of the battle of Es))inosa — His dangerous position; discovers the real state of affairs; contemplates a hardy enterprise; hears of the de- feat at Tudela; resolves to retreat; waits for general Hope's division — Danger of that general; his able conduct — Central junta fly to Badajos — Mr. Frere, incapable of judging rightly, opposes the retreat; his weakness and levity; insults tlie general; sen 's colontl Chariiiilly to Salamanca — Manly con. duct of sir John Moore; his able and bold plan of opera- tions - ----- 105 TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. British nrmy advances towards Burgos — French oulposts sur- pristd at Kiieda — Letter tVoni Beithier to Soull intercepted — Direction ol tlie march chang^ed — Mr. Stuart and a member of the junta airive at head-quarters — Arrogant and ijisulting letter of Mr. l<"rere — Noble answer of sir John Moore — Bntisli army united at Mayorga; their force and composition — Inconsistent conduct of Roniana; his character — Soult's position and forces; concentrates liis army at Carrion — Com- bat of cavaliT at Sahagun — The British army retires to Benevente — Tlic emperor moves from Madrid, passes the Guadarama, arrives at Tordesillas, expects to interrupt the Britisii line of retreat, fails — Bridge of Casiro Gonzalo de- stroyed — Combat of cavalry at Beneventf — General Lefebre taken — Soult forces the bridge of iMansilla; takes Leon — The emperor unites his army at Astorga; hears of the Aus- trian war; orders marshal Soult to pursue the English army, and returns to France - - - - 111 CHAPTER V. Sir John Moore retreats to^vards Vigo; la closely pursued — Miserable scene at Bembibre — Excesses at Villa Frauca — Combat at Calcabel'os — Death of geneial Colbert — ?ilarch to Nogales — Line of retreat changed from Vigo to Coruna — Skilful passage of the bridge of Const^.ntino; skirmish there — The army halts at Lugo — Sir John Moore oft'eis battle; it is not accepted; he makes a forced march to Betanzos; loses niany stragglers; rallies the army; reaches Coruna — The army takes a position — Two large stores of powder exploded — Fleet arrives in the liarbour; army commences embark- ing — Sattle of Coruna — Death of sir John Moore — His cha- racter - - - - - -116 CHAPTER VI. Observations — The conduct of JVapoleon and that of the Eng- lish cabinet compared — The emperor's military dispositions examined — Propriety of sir John Moore's operations dis- cussed — Diagram, exposing tlie relative situations of .Spanish, French, and English armies — Propriety of sir John iNIoore's retreat discu'sed; and the question, wliether he should have fallen back on Portugal or Gallicia, investigated — Sir John Moore's judgment defended; his conduct calumniated bv interestecl men for party purposes ; eulogised by marshal Soult, by Napoleon, by the duke of Wellington - 123 BOOK V. CHAPTER I. Slight effect produced in England by the result of the ram- f)aign — Debates in parliament — Treaty with Spain — Napo- eon receives addresses at Valladolid — Joseph enters .Madrid — Appointed the emperor's lieutenant — Distribution of the French armv — The duke of Dantzig forces the bridge of Ahnaraz — Toledo entered b}' the first corps — Infaiitado and Paldcios ordered to advance upon Madrid — Cuesta appointed to the command of GailuzZ3's troops — Florida Blanca dies at Seville — Succeeded in the presidency by the marquis of Astorsra — Monej' arrives at Cadiz from Mexico — Bad con- duct of the central junta — State of the Spanish armj- — Con- stancy of the soldiers — Infantado moves on to Tarancon — His advanced guard defeated there — French retire towards Toledo — Disputes in the Spanisli army — Battle of Lfcles — Retreat of Infantado — Cartoajal supersedes him, and ad- vances to Ciiidad Real — Cuesta takes post on the Tagus, and breaks down the bridge of Almaraz - . ]30 CHAPTER n. Operations in Aragon — Confusion in Zaragoza — The third and fifth corps invfst that city — Fortification described — Monte Torrero taken — .\ltack on the suburb repulsed — Mortier takes post at Calatayud — The convent of San Joseph taken— ,r|. The l)riJge-head carried — Huerba passed — Device of theT ~ S|)an!sh leaders to encourage the besieged — .Marquis of La- lan takes post on the Sierra de Alcubierre — Lasnes arrives in the F'rench camp — Recals Mortier — Lazan deteated — Gal- lant exploit of Mariano Galindo — The wai'is of the town taken by assault — General Lacoste and colonel San Genis «!din ------- 134 CHAPTER III. System of terror — Thr convent of St. Monica taken — Spaniards attempt to retake it, but fail — St. Augustin taken — French chans-e their mode of attack — Spaniards change their mode of defence — Terrible nature of the contest — Convent of Jesus taken on the side of the suburb — .\ttack of the suburb re- pulsed — Convent of Francisco taken — Mine exploded under the university faila. and the besieged are repulsed — The Co??') passed — Fresh mines worked under the universitv, and ir six other places — French soldiers dispirited — Lasnes encourages them — The houses leading down to the quay carried by storm — An enormous mine under the univtrsitt being sprung, that building is carried by assault — 1 lie suburb h taken — Baron V ersage kdlfcd,and two thoui^tind Spaniardi surrender — .Successl'ul attack on tlie right bank of the Ebro — Palafox demands terms, which are refused — 1 ire resumed — Miserable condition of the city — Terrible pestilence, and horrible sufferings of the besieged — Zaragoza surrenders — Observations ..... 133 CHAPTER IV. Operations in Catalonia — St. Cyr commands the seventh corp« — Passes tiie frontier — State of Catalonia — Palacios fixes his head-[|uarters at Villa Franca — Duhtsme forces the line of the Llubregat — Returns to Barcelona — English army from Sicily designed to act in Catalonia — Frevented bj' ^Ju^at — Duhesnie i'orages El Valles — .\ction of San Culgat — General Vives supersedes Palacios — Spanish army augments — Block- ade of Barcelona — Siege of Rosas — Foil; and negligence of the junta — Entrenchments in the town carried by the be- siegers — Marquis of Lazan, with six thousand men, reaches Gerona — Lord Cochrane enters the Trinity — Repulses seve- ral assaults — Citadel surrenders 5th December — St. Cyr marches on Barcelona — Crosses the Ter — Deceives Lazan — Turns Hostalrich — Defeats Milaus at San Celoni — Battle of Moliuo del Rey ..... 141 CHAPTER V, Tumult in Taragona — Reding proclaimed general — Reinforce, ments join the Spaniards — .Actions at Bruch — Lazan ad- vances, and fights at Castel Ampurias — He quarrels w ith Reding, and marches towards Zaragoza — Reding's plans — St. Cyr breaks Reding's line at Llacuna — Actions at Capelade^ Igualada, and St. Magi — French general, unable to take tlie abbey of Creuz, turns it, and reaches ViUaradona — Joined by Souhani's division, takes post at Vails and Ik- — Reding ral- lies his centre and left wing — Endeavours to reach Taragona — Battle of Vails — Weak condition of Tortosa — St. C_\r "blockades Taragona — Sickness in that city — St. Cyr re- solves to retire — Chabran forces the bridge of Molino del Rev — Conspiracy in Barcelona fails — Colonel Bridie arrives with a detachment from Aragon — St. Cvr I'etires behind the Llobregat — Pino defeats VV'impfen at Tarrasa — Reding dies — His character — Blake is appointed captain-general of the CornniUa — Changes the line of operations to Aragon — Events in that province — Suchet takes command of the French at Zaragoza — Colonel Perena and Raget oblige eight French companies to surrender — Blake advances — Battle of Alcanitz — .Suchet falls back — Disorder in his army — Blake neglects Catalonia — St. Cyr marches by the valltv ot Con- gosto upon Vich — .Action at the defile of Garriga — Lecchi conducts the prisoners to the Fluvia — St. Cyr hears of the Austrian war — Barcelona victualled by a French squadron — Observations ..... 146 BOOK VI. CHAPTER I. Transactions in Portugal — State of that country — Neglected by the British cabinet — Sir J. Cradock appointed to com- mand the British troop? — Touches at Coruna — .At Oporto — State of this city — Lusitanian legion — State of Lisbon — Cradock endeavours to reinforce jVIoore — Mr. Villiers ar- rives at Lisbon — Pikesgiven to the populac e — Destitute state of the army — MrrFrere7"aTI~at slaughter of the Spaniards — Portuguese retreat upon Cha» • « — Romana (lies to Puebia Scnabria — Portuguese muti- ny —Three thousand throw themselves into Chaves — Soult takes that town — Marches upon Braga — Forces the defiles of Ruivaens and Venda IS'oTa — Tumults and disorders in the Poituguese camp at Braga — Murder of general Friere and others — Battle of Braga — Soult marches against Oporto — Disturbed state of that town — Silveira retakes Chaves — The Fiench force the passage of the Ave — The Portuguese mur- dei- t'leir general Vallonga — French appear in front of Opor- to — Negotiate with the bishop — Violence of the people — 111 neral Fov taken — Battle of Oporto — The city stormed T»'th great slaughter ... - 169 CHAPTER m. 0| "rations of the first and fourth corps — General state of the French army — Description of the valley of the Tagus — Inert- ipss of marshal Victor — .\lbuquerque and Cartoajal dispute The latter atlvances in La Mancha — CJeneral Sebastiani wins 'he battle of Ciudad Real — .Marshal Victor forces the passage >f the Taeus, and drives Cuesta's army from all its positions —French cavalry checked at Miajadas — V'irtor crosses the (luadiana at Medellin — Albuqnenpie joins Cuesta's army — Battle of Medellin — Spaniards totallv defeated — Victor or- Hered, by the king, to invade Portugal — Opens a secret com- munication with some persons in Badaios — The peasants of Alhuera di-icover the plot, which fails — Operations of gene- ral Lapisse — He drives back sir R. Wilson's posts, and makes a slight attempt to take Ciudad Rodrigo — Marches \ suddenly towards the Tagus, and forces the bridge of Alcan- tara — Joins Victor at Merida — General insurrection along the Poituguese frontier — The central junta remove Cartoajal from the command, and increase Cuesta's authority, whose army is reinforced — Joseph discontented with Lapisse's movement — Orders Victor t\> retake the bridge of Alcan- tara 175 CHAPTER IV. TThe bishop of Oporto flies to Lisbon, and joins the regency — Humanity of marshal Soult — The Anti-Brafjanza party re- vives in the north of Portugal — The leaders make proposals to Sciilt — He encourages them — Error arising out of this proceeding — EiTects of Soult's policy — .\ssassination of colo- nel Lanieth — I'.xecution at Arifana — Di«tribution of the French troons — Franreschi opposed, on the \'ouga. by ("ol >- nel Trant — Lnison falls hank behind the Sonza — He.uilelil marches to the relief of T«y — The Spaniards, aided by somr- English frigatcSi oblige thirteen hunJred French to cupituhtc at Vigo — Heudelet retui:* ?,- Braga— The insurrection IB the Entie Minho e Dour.: (eases — Silveira menaces OportC — Laborde reinforces Loison, and drives Silveira over th« Tamega — Gallant conduct and death of colonel Patrick al Amarante — Combats at Aniarant< — French repulsed — Ingt- niuL,s ilevice of captain Brochard — The bridge of .Amarante carried by storm — Loison advances to the Douro — Is sud- denly checked — Observations - . . . . 180 BOOK VIII. CHAPTER L Anarchy in Portugal— Sir J. Cradock quits the command — Sir A. W elle.sley arrives at Lisbon — Happy eflecl of his presence — Nominated captain-general — His military position descri- bed — Resolves to march against Sonll — Reaches Coimbra — Conspiracy in the French Army — D'Argeiiton's proctedingl Sir A. W ellesley's situation compared with that of sir J. Cradock 187 CHAPTER n. Campaign on the Douro — Relative position of the French and English armies — Sir Arthur W'ellesley marches to the Vou- ga — Sends Beresford to the Douro — A division under gene- ral Hill passes the lake of Ovar — .\ttemjit to surprise 1- ran- ceschi fails — Combat of Grijon — The French re-cross the Douro and destroy the bridge at Oporto — Passage of the Douro— Soult retreats upon Amarante — Beresford reachei Amarante — Loison retreats from that town — Sir Arthur mar- ches upon Braga— Desperate situation of Soult — His tnergy — He crosses the Sierra Cataliiia — R< joins Loison — Rtachti Carvalho d'Este — Falls back to Salamonde — Daring action of major Dulong — The French pass the Ponte Nova and tLe Saltador, and retreat by Montalegre — Soult enters Ortnse — • Observations - - - - - - - -190 CHAPTER IIL Romana surprises Villa Franca — Ney advances to Lugo — Ro- mana retreats to the Asturias — Reforms the government there — Ney invades the Asturias by the west — Boiiet and Kel- lerman enter that province by the east and by the south — General Mahi flies to the valley of the Sy I — Romana embark» at Gihon — Balksteros takts St. Andero — Defeated by Bo- net — KeJiernian returns to Valladolid — Ney marches for Coruna — Certra defeats Maucune at St. Jago Composltlla— Mahi blockades Lugo — It is relieved by Soult — Romana re- joins his army and marches to Orense — Lapisse storms tha bridge o( Alcantara — Cuesta advances to the Guadiana — Lapisse retires — Victor concentrates liis army at Torrtnio- cha— l Ell'ect ofthe war in Germany upon that of Spain — Sir A. W^llesley~encairipS"^'~Al5'ntnns^=;TlVe Tfrid ge of Alcan- tara destroyed — Victor crosses the T^gus at Almaraz — Beres- ford returns to the north of Portugal — Ney and Soult com- bine operations — Soult scours the valleys of the S\l — Ro- mana cut off from Castile and thrown back upon CJrense — Ney advances towards Vigo — Combat of San Pavo — Misun- derstanding between him and Soult — Ney retreats to Coru- na — Soult marches to Zamora — Franceschi falls into the haiuls of the Capuchino — His melan< holy fate — Ney aban- dons Gailacia — View of affairs in Aragon — Battles of Maiia and Belchite - .... 197 CHAPTER IV. State ofthe British army — Embarrassmentsof sir Arthur AVel- lesley — State and numbers ofthe French armies — State and Vllnnmbers of the Spanish armies — Some account of the parfi- \l ]dns, commonly called g-iierillns — "Tntligues C5f"Mr. t rere — ljConiTilrt--of ttie centiaTju"lita — Their inhuman treatment of the French prisoners — Corruption and incapacity — State of the Portuguese army — Impolicy ofthe British government — Expedition of Walcheren — E.\pedition against Italy 202 CHAPTER V. Campaign of Talavera — Choice of operations — Sir Arthur W^el- lesley moves into Sjiain — Joseph marches against Vcneg-a? — Orders Victor to return to Talavera — Cuesta arrives at Al- maraz — Sir Arthur reaches Plasencia — Interview with Cuesta — Plan of operation arranged — Sir Arthur, embarrassed hr the want of provisions, detaches sir Robert W'ilson up the Vera de I'lasencia, passes the Tietar, and uniUs with Cuesta at Oropesa — Skirmish at Talavtra — Bad conduct of the Spanish troops — Victor takes post beliind the Alberche— Cuesta's absurdity — Victor retires from the .Mbeiche — Sir Arthur, in want of provisions, refuses to pass that river — In- trigues of Mr. Frere — The junta .secretly orders Venegas not to execute his part of the operation - - 207 CHAPTER VL Cuosta passes the Alberche — Sir Arthur Welle«lfy fiends twj Enjjiiih divisions to support him — Soult is appointed lo coin TA3LE OF CONTENTS. nand the second, fifth, and sixth corps — He proposes to be- siege Ciudad Rodrigo and tlireaten Lisbon — He enters Sala- manca, and sends general Foy to Madrid to concert the plan of operations- -Tlie king quits Madrid — Unites his whole army — crosses the Guadarania river, and attacks Cuesta — C^iuibat of Alcabon — Spaniards fall back in confusion to the Alberciie — Cuesta refuses to pass that river — His dangerous position— The French advanct- — Cuesta re-crosses tiie Tietar — Sir Arthur Wellesley draws up tlie combined forces on the position (jf Talavera — Tlie king crosses tlie Tittar — Skir- nii'>hat Casa de Salinas — Coniliat on the evening of the 27lh — I'anic in the Spanish army — Combat on the morning of the 23th — The king holds a council of war — -Jourdan and Victor propose dilierent plans — The king loilows that of Vic- tor — Battle of Talavera — The French re-cros» the Alberche — General Craufurd arrives in the English camp — His extra- ordinary march — Observations .... 212 CHAPTER Vn. rhe king goes to Iliesras with the fourth corps and reserve — Sir R. VVilson advances to Escalona — Victor retires to Ma- queda — Conduct of the Spaniards at Talavera — Cuesta's cru- elty — The allied generals hear of Soult's movement upon Banos — Hassecour's division marches towards that point — The pass of Hanos forced — Sir A. Wellesley marches against Soult — Proceedings of that marshal — He crosses the Bejar, and arrives at Hasencia with three corps d'armce — Cuesta abandons the British hospitals, at Talavera, to the eneniv, and reti'eats upon Oropesa — Dangerous position of the allies — Sir Arthur crosses the Tagiis at Arzobispo — The F'rench arrive near that bridge — Cuesta passes the Tagus — Combat of Arzobispo — Soult's plans overruled by the king — Nev de- feats sir R. Wilson at Banos, and returns to France - 219 CHAPTER VHI. Venegas advances to Aranjues — Skirmishes there — Sebastian! crosses the Tagus at Toledo — Venegas concentrates his army — Battle of Alnionacid — Sir Arthur Wellesley contemplates passing the Tagus at the Puente de Cardinal, is prevented by the ill-conduct of the junta — His troops distressed for provisions — He resolves to retire into Portugal — False charge made by Cuesta against the British army refuted — Beres- ford's proceedings— Mr. Frere superseded by lord Welles- ley — The English arniv abandons its position at Jarareijo and marches towards Portugal — Consternation of the junta — Sir A. WellesJev defends his conduct, and refuses to remain in Spain — Takes a position within the Portuguese frontier — Sickness in r.he army ... . . 223 CHAPTER IX. General observations on the campaiofn — Comparison between the operations of sir John Moore andsir A. Wellesley - 227 BOOK IX. CHAPTER I. [nartivitv ol the Asturians and Gallicians — Guerilla system in Navarre and Arasron — The Partidas surround the third corps — Blake obandr>iis Aragon— Suchefs operations against the Partidas — Combat of Treniendal — The advantages ofSucbet's position — Troubles at rwiupeluna — Suchet ordered bv Na- pokon to repair there — Ouservations on the Guerilla sys- tem - - - - - - - 232 CHAPTER II. Continuation of the operations in Catalonia — St. Cyr sends Lecchi to the An;purdan; he returns with the intelligence of the Austrian war — Of ^'erdier's arrival in the Ampurdan, and of Au^ereau's appointment to the comman'l of the seventh corps — Augcreau's infl'-.ted proc!nt".ation — It is torn down by t!ie Catalonians — He remains sick at Pcrpignan — St. Cyr continues to coinmaiid — Refuses to obey Joseph's orders to remove intD Aragon — Presses Verdier to commence the siege of Gerona — Reinforces Verlier — Remains himself at Vich — Constancy of the Spaniards — St. Cyr marches from Vich, defeats thrie Spanish battalions, and captures a convoy — Storms St, Felieu de Quixols — Takes a position to cover Verdier'' operations — Sies^e of Gerona — State of the con- tending iiarties — Assault of Monjouic fails — General F'ontanes jtorms Prtianns — Wimphen and the Milaiis makes a vain Rttein|ii to throw succours into Gerona — Monjouic aban- d-jned ...... 235 CHAPTER III. Claros and Rovira attack Bascara and spread dismay along the French frontier — Two Spanish officers pass the Ter and enter Gerona with succours — Alvarez reinoiwlrates with the junta of Catalonia — liad conduct of the latter — Blake advan- ces to the aid of the city — Pestilence there — Affects the French armv — St. Cyr's finnnpss — Bl ike's timid operations -O'Donne! fight* Souhain. but withou. iuccess — St. Cyr takes a position of battle — Garcia Conrle forces the F rencli lines and introduces a convoy into Gerona — Blake retires- Siege resumed — Garcia Conde comes out of the city — Kidi- culaus error of the F'rtncli — Conde forcfs the French line* and escapes — Assault on Gerona fails — Blake advances a se- cond time — Sends anotlier convoy under the command of O'Donnel to the cit) — O Doiinel with the head of the convoy succeeds, the remain;ler is cut oil — Blake's incapacity — He retires — St. Cyr goes to Perpignan — Augertau tukes the coiu- niand of the siege — O'Donnel breaks through the Frtnch lines — Blake aflvances a third time — Is beaten by Souhani — Pino takes Hostalrich — Admiral Martin intercepts a French squadron — Captain Hollowell destroys a convoy in Kosas- bay — Distress in Geicna — AKarez is seized witli delirium, and the city surrenders — Observations ... 23tt CHAPTER IV. Plot at Seville against the Supreme Junta defeated by lord Wellesley — Jui-ta propose a new form of government — Op- posed by Romana— -Junta announce the convocation of the national Cortez, but endeavour to deceive the peojjle — A Spanish army assembled in the Morena under F'guia — Bassc- cour sends cavalry to reinforce Del Parque, who coiicf ntratea the Spanish army of the left at Ciudad Rodrigo — He is joined by the (jallician divisions — Santocildes occupies Astoiga — French endeavour to surprise him, but are repulsed — Ballas- teros, t|uits the .Asturias, and niarchina: by Astoiga attempts to storm Zainora — Enters Portugal — Del Parque demandsthe aid of the Portuguese army — Sir A. Wellesley refuses, giving his reason in detail — Del Parque's operations — Battle of Ta- mames — Del Parque occupies Salamanca, but htaring tliat French troops were assembling at Valladolid retires to Be- jar ------ - 243 CHAPTER V. Areizaga takes the command of Eguia's army and is ordered to advance against Madrid — Folly of the Supreme Junta — Ope- rations in La Mancha — Combat of Dos Barrios — Cavalry combat of Ocana — Battle of Ocana — Destruction of the Span- ish ariuy ...... 246 CHAPTER VI. King Joseph's re'urn to Madrid — Del Parque's operations — Battle of x\iba de Tormes — Dispersion of the Spanish troops — Thtir great sufferings and patience — The Supreme Junta treat sir A. Wellesleys couiise s with contempt — He breaks up from the Guadiana and moves to the Mondt go — Vindica- tion of his conduct lor having remained so long on the Gua- diana — French remain torpid about Madrid — Observa- tions ...... 250 BOOK X. CHAPTER I. Joseph prepares to invade Andalusia — Distracted state of affairs in that province — Military position and resources described — Invasion of Andalusia — Passes of the Moivna lorced by ihe French — Foolish deceit of the Supreme Junta— Tumult in Seville — Supreme Junta dissolved — Junta of Seville re-as- sembles, but dispersed immediately after — The F rem h take Jaen — Sabastiani enters Grenada — King Joseph enters Cor- doba and afterwards marches against Seville — Albuquerque'3 march to Cadiz — Seville surrenders — Insurrection at Malaga put down by Sebastiani — Victor invests Cadiz — Faction in that city — .\Iortier marches against Ba lajos — The visconde de Gand flies to Ayamonte — Inhospitable conduct of the bishop of Algarve ..... 253 CHAPTER IL Operations in Navarre, Aragon, and Valencia — Pursuit of the student Mina — Suchtt's preparations — His incursion against Valencia — Returns to Aragon — DitHculty of the war in Cata. Ionia — Operations of the seventh corps — French detachments surprised at Mollet and San Per|)etua — Augerfnu enters Barcelona — Sends Duhesme to France — i^eturns lo (Jerona — O'Donnel rallies the Sjjanish army near Ct-iitellas — Com- bat of Vich — Spaniards make vain etibrts to raise the block- ade of Hostalrich — Augereau again advances to Barcelona — Sends two divisions to Reus — Occiii)irison-huiks,and drift during a tempest- General Lacey's expedition to the Ronda— liisbad conduct— Returns to Cadiz— Reflections on the state of alTaiis ... - - 268 CHAPTER VI. Continuation of the operations in Andalusia — Description of the Soanisli and l'(>iliig\!i-se lines of position south of the Tagus —Situation of tiie armies in Estremadura — Complex opera- tions in that province — Soult's policy ... 272 CHAFFER VH. Situation of the armies north of the Tagus — Operations in Old Castile and the Asturias — Ncy menaces Ciudad Rodrigo — Loison repulsed from Aslorga — Kellerman chases Carrera from the Gata mountains — Obscurity of the French projects Sie'J-e of Astorga — Mahi driven into Gallicia — Spaniards defeafed at Monibouey— Ney concentrates the sixth corps at Salamanca — The ninth corps and the imperial guards enter Soain — Massena assumes the command of the army of Portu- fat and of the northern provinces — Nev commences the rst siege of Ciudad Rodrigo — Julian Sanchez breaks out of the town — .Masseua arrives and alters the iilan of attack — Daring-action of three French soldiers — Place surrenders — Andreas Herrasti — His fine conduct — Reflections upon the Spanish character .... 275 BOOK XL CHAPTER I. Lord Wellington's policy — Change of administration in Eng- land- Duel between Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning- Lord W( lleslev joins the new ministry — Debates in Parlia- ment — Factious violence on both sides— Lord Wellington's sagacity and tinnness vindicated — His views for the defence of^Portugal — Ministers accede to his demands — Grandeur of Napoleon's designs against the Peninsula — Lord Wellington enters into fresh explanation with the English ministers — Discusses the state of the war — Similarity of his views with those of sir Jolm Moore — His reasons for not advancing into Spain explained and vindicated - - - 278 CHAPTER H. Greatness of Lord Wellington's plans— Situation of the belli- gerents desriihed — State of llie French — Character of Joseph Of his Ministers — Disputes with tlie Marshals — Napoleon's policy — Militarv governments — Aimeiiara sent to Paris- Curious deception executed by the marquis of Romana, Mr. Stuart, and tlie hist>rian Cabanes — Prodigious force of the French army — State of Spain — Inertness of Gallicia — Secret plan of the Regency for encourajring the Guerillas — Opera- tions of those bands'— Injustice and absurdity of the Regency, with respect to Soutii America — England — State of parties Factious injustice on both sides — Dilliculty of raising mo- nPV — lUillion" committee — William Cobbett— Lord King — Mr. Vansiltart — Extravagance of the Ministi rs -State of Portugal— Parties in that country — Intrigues of the Patriarch and the Souza's — Mr. Stuart is appointed Plenipotentiary — His firmness— Princess Carlotta (daims the regency of the whole Peninsula, and the succession to the throne of Spain ...--- 282 CHAPTER IH. fx>rd Wellington's scheme for the defence of Portugal— Vast- new of his desi2:ns — IVumbpr of his troops — Descriptiin of tb« country— Plan of defence analysed -DiTioulty of supply- ing the army — Resources of the belligerents compared — Ch»p racter of the British soldier ... 23i CHAPTER IV. Character of Miguel Alava — Portuguese government demand more English troops — Lord Wellington refuses, and reproach- es the Regency — Tlie factious conduct of (he latter — (Cha- racter of the light division — G( neral Crawfurd passes tliB Coa — His activity and skilful arrangements — Is joined by Carrera — Skirmish at Barba del 1 uerco — Carrera invites Ney to desert — Romana arrives at head-quarters — Lord \V el- liiigton refuses to succour Ciudad Rodrigo — His decision vindicated — Crawfurd's ability and obstinacy — He niaiutaius his position — Skirmish at Alameda — Captain Eraiikcnberg'j gallantry — Skirmish at Villa de Puerco — ('(dont I Talbi.t killed — Gallantry of the French captain Guaclu — Combat cl the Coa — Coni]jarison between general Ficton and general Crawfurd - - - - - - ill] CHAPTER V. Slight ojierations ir. Gallicia, Castile, the Asturias, Estremadura, and Andalusia — Reynier passes thel'agus — Hill makes a par- allel movement — Romana spreads his troops over Fslri niadura — Lord Wellington assembles a reserve at Thomar — Ciitichl situation of Silveira — Captures a Swiss battalion at Putbla dc Seiiabria — Romaiia's troo]js defeated at B* nvt nida— Las- cy and captain Cockburne land troops at Moguer but are forced to reimbark — Lord Wellington's plan — How thwarted — Siege of Almeida — Allies advance to Frexadas — The maga- zine of Almeida explodes — Treachery of Hareiros — Town surrenders- — The allies withdraw behind the Mondego — Fort of Albuquerque ruined by an explosion — Reynier marches on Sabugal, but returns to Zarza Mayor — Napolenn directs Massena to advance — Description of the country — Erroneous notions of lord Wellington's views entertained by botii armies ...... 298 CHAPTER VL Third Invasion of Portugal — Napoleon's prvidence in military aflairs vindicated — Massena concentrates iJis corps — Occupies (luarda — Passes the Mondego — Marches on \ iseu — Lord Wellington falls back — Secures Coinibra, passes to the riirht bank of tlie Mondego, and is joined by the reserve from I'fio- mar — General Hill anticipates his orders, and b\ a forced march readies the Alva — The allied army is thus interposed between the French and Coimbra — Daring action of colons 1 Trant — Contemporaneous events in Estremadura, and the Condado de JViebla — Romana defeated — Gallantry of the Portuguese cavalry undergeneral Madden — Dangerous crisis of aflairs — Violence of the Souza faction — An indiscreet let- ter from an English officer, creates great confusion at Opor to — Lorti Wellington rebukes the Portuguese Rtgenc\ — He is forced to alter his plans, and resolves to ofier battle- Chooses the position of Busaco ... 299 CHAPTER VII. General Pack destroys the bridges on the Criz and Dao — Re markable panic in the light division — The second and sixth Corps arrive in front of Busaco — Ney and Regnier desire to attack, but Massena delays — The eighth corps and the cav- alry arrive — Battle of Busaco — Massena turij» the right of the allies — Lord Wellington falls back, and orders the north- ern militia to close on the French rear — Cavalry skirmish on the Mondego — Coinibra evacuated, dreadful scene there — • Disorders in the army — Lord Wellington's firmness contrast- ed with iMassena's indolence — Observations - 302 CHAPTER VIH. Massena resumes his march — The militia close upon his rear^ Cavalry skirmish nearLeiria — Allies retreat u|)on the lines — Colonel Trant surprises Coimbra — The I'rench anii\ con- tinues its march — Cavalry skirmish at Rio Mayor — (ieneial Crawfurd is surprised at Alemquer and r< treats by the wrong road — Dangerous results ol this error — Description of the lines of Torres Vedras — Massein arrives in front of them — Romana reinforces lord Vv''eHinglon with two Spanish di- visions — Remarkable works executed by the light division at Aruda — The French skirmish at Sobral — Cieiural Harvey woun(l<;d — General St. Croix i:il!ed — Massena lakfs a per- manent |)osition in front of the Lines — He is harassed on the rear and flanks by the British cavalry and the Portuguese militia ..... 307 CHAPTER IX. State of Lisbon — Embargo on the vessels in the river — Factious conduct of the Patriarch — The desponding letters from th« army — Base policy of ministers — Alarm of lord Liverpool — Lord Wellington displays the greatest firmness, vigour, and dignity, of mind — He rebuk bridge near Jerunienlia and passes tlie Guadiana — Outpost of cavalry cut off by the French — Castanos ariives at Elva* — Arrangements relative to the chief command — Beresford advances against Latour Maubourg, who returns to Llerena — General Cole takes Olivenza — Cavaliy-skirnii<>h near Usa- gre — Lord Wellington arrives at Elvas, exaniims Badajos — Skirmish there — Arranges the 0])erations — Political difficul- ties — Lord Wellington returns to the .Agueda — Operations in the north — Skirmishes on the Agueda — Massena advsmcea to Ciudad Rodrigo — Lord Wellington reaches the army' — Retires behind the Dos Casas — Combat of Fuentes Oiioro — Battle of Fuentes Onoro — Evacuation of Almeida • 339 CHAPTER VI. Lord V\'^ellington quits the army of Beira — Marshal Berosford'g operations — Colonel Cclborne beats up the French quarters in Estreniadura, and intercepts their convoj's — !■ irst English siege of Badajos — Captain Squire breaks ground before Sai> Cristoval — His works overwhelmed by the French fire — Soult advances to rdieve the place — Beresford raises the siege — Holds a conference with the Spanish generals, and resolves to fight — Colonel Colborne rejoins the army, which takes a position at Albnera — Allied cavalry driven in by the French — General Blake joins Beresford — General Cole ar- rives on the frontier — Battle of Albuera - - 347 CHAPTER VII. Continuation of the battle of Albuera — Dreadful state of both armies — Soult retreats to Solano — General Hamilton resumes the investment of Badajos — Lord Wellington reaches the field of battle — Third and seventh divisions arrive — Beresford follows Soult — The latter abandons the castle of Villalba and retreats to Lerena — Cavalry action at Usagre — Beresford quits the army — General Hill reassnnies the command of the second divisior,, and lord Wellington renews the siege of Badajos — Observations - .... 351 BOOK XIII. CHAPTER I. Lord Wellington's sieges vindicated — Operations in Spain — State of Gallicia — Change of commanders — Bond's opera- tions in the Asturias — Activity of the Pai tides — Their system of operations — Mina cajilures a large convoy at Ariaban — Bessieres contracts his position — Bonet abandons the Astu. rias — Santocildes advances into Leon — French dismantle As- torga — Skirmish on the Orbigo — General ineflTicienry of the Gallicians and Asturians — Operations in the eastern provinces — State of Aragon — State of Catalonia — State of Valencia — Suchet marches against Tortoza — Fails to burn the t>oat- bridge there — M'Donnel remains at Gerona — The Valen- cians and Catalonians combine operations against .Suchet — O'Donnel enters Tortoza — Makes a sally and is repulsed — The Valencians defeated near Uldecona — Operations of tbo seventh corps — M-Donald reforms the discipline of the troops — Marches with a convoy to Barcelona — Returns to Ge- rona and dismantles the out-works of that place — O'Donnel'i plans — M'Donald marches with a second convoy — Reaches Barcelona and returns to Gerona — Marches with a third cok- voy — Forces the pass of Ordal — Enters Reus and opens the communications with Suchet ... 355 CHAPTER H. O'Donnel withdraws his troops from Falcct and surrounds the seventh corps — M'Donald retires to Lerida — Arranges a ne»v plan with Suchet — Ravages the plains of Urgel and the high- er valleys — The people become dfsperate — O'Donnel cuts the French communication with the Ampurdan — Makes n forced march towards Gerona — Surprises Swartz at Abispal — Takes Filieu and Palamos — Is wounded and returns to Taragona — Campo Verde marches to the Cer(!ano— M'D^iin- ald enters Solsona — Campo Verde returns — Combat of Car- dona— The French retreat to Guisona, and the sev« nth corp« returns to Gerona— M'Donald marches with a fomth convoy to Barcelona— Makes new roads — Advances to P< u«-— The Spaniards harass his llanks— He forages the Garriga distrirt and joins the third corps— Operations of Suchet— General Leval dies— Operations of the Partidas- Ilnti of th.e secret junta to starve A rasron— General Cbrif'i'l'i defeats Villa 'Campa— Siichet's dilTicullies- He assemblts the notables of Aragon and reorganizes that province— lie defeats and lak«» general Ni.vprro at Falcet— Bassecour's operfttions — He u defeated at Uldecona - • 351 m TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER III. T'Jrtoia — Its governor feeble — Tlie Spaniards outside disputing and negligent — Captain Fane lands at raianios — Is taken — O'Donntl resigns and is succeeded Ijy Caa)po V'erde — De- •rription of Tortoza — It is invested — A division of the seventli rorps piared under Surhet's roniiniind — Siault repulsed — Suchet's embarrass- ments — Operations i'l his rear in Catalog 'i — Medas islands taken — L&iy propos".» to form a general di-^il al Palamos — Discouraged bv »i' 'l. Peilevv — The Spaiiianio blow up the works of Berga, '.r . fix their chief depot at Busa — Descrip- tion of that plac J - 'Lacy surprises the French in the town ot Igualada — Eioh J vhole of Andalusia is in cominofiou — Seville is saved by the subtlety of a Spaniard in the French interest — Balle-teros retiies — A.s-anlts Zahara and is repul.^ed — Sends a division a'.;:aiust Ossuna. which is also repulsed by the E^copeterot — Drives g(,'nei-al Rev from Allora to Malaga — Soult marches from Llcrena toward Seville and gcieral Conrou.x brings a b'i:,'ade up friun the Guadalcte to attack Ballesteros — Sir S. Cotton defeats general Peyreymont's cavalry near Usagre — Soult concentrates his army near Seville to fi Tht the allies — Lo'"d Wellington marches to Beira — Marmont's operations — He man^hes ag linst Ciudad Kodngo —Carlos d'Espana retires toward Almeida, and Victor Alten toward Penaraacor — The Fi*er.ch appear before Almeiila — General Tratit arrives on the Cabetja Neirro — The French retiio and Trant unites with .1. ■Wilson at Guardti — Marmout advances U^ Sabugal — Victor Ahen abandons Penamacor and Castello franco, and cros.scs the Tairns — The Portuguese eeneral Lecor opposes the ene- my with --kill and courage — Marmont drives Trant from Guar- da and defeats his militia on the Mondeito — Lord Wellington crosses the Tagus and enters Castello Branco — Marmont's position jterilous — Lord Wellington advances to attack him — He retreats over the Acruees with diillculty — licap|)ears in the Rioja — Gains the defiles of Navas Tolosa — Captures two convoys — Is chased by general Abbe and n(!arly crushed, ^vllerl•by the Partidas in the north are discouraged — Those in other parts become more enterprising — The course of the Ebro from Tuilela to Tortoza so inrosted by them that the army of the Khro is formed by drafts from Suchct's forces and pf.ned under general lleille to repress them — Operations of Pdlonibini against the Partidas — He moves toward Mad- rid — Returns to the Ebro — Is ordered to join the king's array — Operations in Ara,'Ou and Catalonia — The (Jatalonians are cut od' from the coast line — Eroles raises a new rlivision ia Talarn — .\dvances in Aragon — Defeats general Bourke at Rhorla — Is driven into Catalonia by Severoli — Decaen defeats Sarslield and goes to Lcrida — Lacy concentrates in the mount. ains of Olot — Descends iipmi Mattaro — Flies thence dis- gracefully — Lamarque defeats Sarslield — Lacy's bad conduct — Miserable state of Catalonia - - - <68 CHAPTER in. Operations in Valencia and Murcia — Suchet's able goverrwnent of Valencia — O'Donel organizes a new army in Murcia — Or- igin of the Sicilian expedition to Spain — Secret intriguea against Na|)oleon in Italy and other parts — Lord William Bentiiick proposes to invade Italy — Lord Wellington opposes it — The Russian admiral Tclitchagotf projects a descent npou Italy — Vacillating conduct of the ICnglish ministers product- ive of great mi.schief — Lord William Bentinck sweeps tha money-markets to the injury of Lord Wtillington's opera- tions — Sir John M(}re's plan for Sicily rejected — His ability and foresight proved by the ultimate result — Evil eti'ects of bad government shown by examples - - 471 CHAPTER IV. Operations in Andalusia and Estremadura — Advantage of Wei- linirton's position — Soult's plans vast, but w
:nniissary on the Douro — Remarkable letter of lord Welliiiiiton to lord Liverpool — Arrangements for securing the allies' flanks and operating against tlie enemy's flanks de^icnbed — Marmont's plans — His military character — He restores discifilinc to the army of Portugal — His measures for that purpose and the state of the French army describ- ed and compared with the state of the British army and Wellington's measures ----- 484 CHAPTER IL Campaign of 1812 — Wellington advances to the Tormes — Marniont retires — The allies besiege the forts of Salaman- ca — General aspect of all'airs changes and becomes gloomy — The king concentrates the army of the centre — Mar- mont returns to the Tormes and cannonades the allies on the position of San ('hristoval — Vaiious skirmishes — Ad- venture of Mr. Mackay — Marmont retires to Monte Rubia — (Jrosses the Tormes with a ]>art of his army — Fine con- duct of general Uuck's German cavalry — Graham crosses the Tormes and Marmont retires again to Monte Rubia — Observations on this movement — Assault on San Vin- cente fails — Heroic death of general Bowes — Siege sus- pended for want of ammunition — It is renewed — Cajetano is stormed — San Vincentc being on Are surrenders — Mar- mont retires to the Duero followed by Wellington — The French rear-guard sutlers some loss between Rucda and 'J'oidesillas — Positions of the armies described — State of alTairs in other parts described — Procraslination of the Gallician army — General Bonet abandons the Asturias — Coincidence of Wellington's and Napoleon's views upon that subject — Sir Home Po[)ham arrives with his squadron on the coast of Biscay — }Iis operations — Powerful effect of thein upon the campaign — Wellington and Marmont alike cautious of b.-inging on a battle — extreme difficulty and distress of Wellington's situation - - - 459 CHAPTER HL Bonet arrives in the French camp — Marmont passes the Du- ero— Combat of Castrejon — Allies retire across the Gua- rena — Combat on that river — Observations on the move- ments — Marmont turns Wellington's flank — Retreat to San Christoval — Marniont passes the Tormes — Battle of Salamanca — Anecdote of Mrs. Dalbiac - - 495 CHAPTER IV. (Jlau7.el passes the Tormes at Alba — Cavalry combat at La Serna — Chauvel's cavalry joins the French army — The king reaches Blasco Sancho — Retires to Espinar on hear- ing of the battle — Receives letters from Cinuzel which in- duce him to inarch on Segovia — Wellington drives Clau- zel across the Duero — Takes Valladolid — Brings Santocil- des over the Duero — Marches upon Cuellar — The king abandons Segovia and recrosses the GuaJarama — State of alfdirs in other [larts of Sjiain — General Long defeats Lal- lemand in Estremadnra — Caflarelli is drawn to the coast by Popham's expedition — Wellington leaves Clinton at Cueliar. and passes the Guadaraina — (Cavalry combat at Majadahonda — The king unites his army at Valdemoro — Miserable state of the French convoy — .loseph passes the Tagus; hears of the arriv;;! of the Sicilian expedition at Alicant — Retreats u;>on Valencia instead of Andalusi.a — Maunoint's bri'j;ade succours the garrison of Cuenca. is beaten at TTtiel by Villa (ximpa — Wellington enters Ma- drid — The Retiro surrenders — Emjiecinado takes Guada- laxara — Extr;iordinarv journey of colonel Fabvier — Na- joleon hears of Marmont's defeat — His generous conduct towards that marshal — Receives tliD king's report against Soult — liis maenanimity — Observations - - 503 BOOK XIX. CHAPTER L State of the war — Eastern oj^erations — Jjacy's bad conduct — French anny of the l^bio dissolved — I acv's secret agents blow up the magazines in Lerida — He is afraid to storm the place — Calumniates Sarsfield — Suchet comes to Reus — The hermitage of St. Dimas surrendered to Decaen by colonel Green — 'J'he French gei:eral burns the convent of Montserrat and marches to Lerida — General Maitland with the Anglo-Sicilian army ap[iears oH' Palamos — Sails for Alicant — Reflections on this event — 0])crali()ns in Mur- cia — O'Donel defeated at Castalla — Maitland lands at Ali- cant — Siichet concentrates his forces at Xaliva — Entrench- es a camp there — Maitland advances to Alcoy — His diffi- culties — Returns to Alicant — 'J'he king's army arrives at Almanza — The remnant of Mau])oiiit's brit;ade arrives from Cuenca — Suchet reoccupies Alcoy — O'Donel comes up to Yecla — Maitland is reinforced trom Sicily and en- trenches a camp under the walls of Alicant - - 510 CHAPTER II. Operations in Andalusia — The king orders Soult to abandon that province — Soult urges the king to join him with tlie other armies — Joseph reiterates the order to abandon An- dalusia — Soult sends a letter to the minister of war ex- pressing his suspicions that Joseph was about to make a sej;arate peace with the allies — The king intercepts this letter, and sends colonel D>;sprez to Moscow, to represent Soult's conduct to the emperor — Napoleon's magnanimity — W<-llini;ton anxiously watches Soult's movements — Or- ders Hill to flgiit Drouet, and directs general Cocke to at- tack llie French lines in front of the Isla de Leon — Bal- lesteros, pursued by Leval and Villatte, skirnushes at Coin — Enters Malaga — Soult's preparations to abandon Anda- lusia — Lines before the Isla de Leon abandoned — Soult marches towards Grenada — Colonel Skerrit and ('ruz Mur- geon land at Huelva — Attack the French rear-guard al Seville — Drouet marches ujion Hucscar — Soult. moving by the mountains, reaches Hellin, and effects his junction with the king and Suchet— IVIailland desires to return t(i Sicily — Wellington prevents him — V/cIIington's general plans considered — State of aflairs in Castile — ClauzrJ comes down to Valladolid with the French army — Saiiti> c'l'ides retires to Torrelobaton, and Clinton falls back to Arevalo — Foy marches to carry off the French garrisons in Tjcon — Astorga surrenders before his arrival — He march- es to Zamora and drives Silvcira into PortUiial — Menaces Salamanca — Is recalled by Clauzel — The Partidas get r.os- session of the French jjosts on the Biscay coast — T:\ke the city of Bilboa — Reille abandons several posts in Arasron — The northern provinces become ripe for insurrections Li CHAPTER TIL Wellinofton's combinations described — Foolisli arrangements of the English ministers relative to Spanish clothing — AVant of money — Political persecution in Madrid — Miser- able state of that citv — Character of the Madrilenos — Wellington marches against Clauzel — Device of the Por- tuguese regency to avoid supplying thoir troops — Welling- ton enters Valladolid — Waits for ("astanos — His opinion of the Spaniards — Clauzel retreats to Burgos — His able generalship — The allies enter Burgos, which is in danger of destruction from the Partidas — Reflections upon the movements of the two armies — Siege of the castle of Bur- gos 520 CHAPTER IV. State of the war in various parts of Spain — Josejih's distress for money — Masscna declines the command of the army of Portugal — Caflarelli joins that army — Reinforcements come from France — Mischief occasioned by the English newspapers — Sonham takes the coiiimand — Operations of the Partidas — Hill reaches Toledo — S uham advaiu-es tc relieve the castle of Burgos — Skirmish at Monasterio- XX TABLE OF CONTENTS. Wellington takes a position of battle in front of Burgos — SccoikI skirmish — Wellington weak in artillery — Negli- gence of the British government on that head — The rela- tive situation of the hcUigerents — Wellington ollered the chief conunaiul of the Spanish armies — His reasons for accepting it — Contumacious conduct of Ballesteros — He is arrested and sent to Ceuta — Suchet and Jourdan refuse the command of the army of the south — t>oult reduces (Jliincliilla — 'I'he king communicates with Souliam — Hill communicates with Welliiigton — Retreat from Burgos — Combat of Vente de Pozo — Drunkenness at 'I'orquemada — Condiat on the Carion — Wellington retires behind the Pisucr'j;a — Disorders in the rear of the army — Souham skirmishes at the bridge of Cuhefon — Wellington orders Hill to retreat from the Tagiis lo the Adaja — 8ouham fails to force the bridges of Valladolid and Simancas — 'I'he French captain Guingret swims the Duero and surprises the bridge of Tordesillas — Wellington retires behind the Duero — Makes a rapid movement to gain a position in front of tlie bri('ge of Tordesillas, and destroys the bridges of Toro and Zamora, which arrests the maich of the French 526 CHAPTER V. The king and Soult advance from Valencia to the Tagus — General Hill takes a position of battle — The French pass the Tagus — Skirmish at the Puente Largo — Hill blows up the Rctiro and abandons Madrid — Riot in that city — At- tachment of the Madrilenos towards the British troops — The hostile armies pass the Guadararna — Souham restores the bridge of Toro — Wellington retreats towards Sala- manca and orders Hill lo retreat upon Alba de 'J'ormes — The allies take a position of battle behind tlie 'J'ornies — The Spaniards at Salamanca display a hatred of the Bri- tish — Instances of their ferocity — Soult cannonades the castle of Allia — The king re Tganizes the French armies— Soult and Jourdan propose ditlerent plans — Soult's plan adopted — French pass the Tormes — Wellingion by a re- markable movement gains the Valmusa river and retreats — Misconduct of the troops — Sir Edward Paget taken prisoner — ("ombat on the Huehra — Anecdote — Retreat from thence to (Jiudad Rodrigo — The armies on both sides take winter cantonments - - - - 532 CHAPTER VI. Continuation. of the partizan warfiire — General Lameth made governor of Santona — Reille takes the command of the army of Portugal — Drouct, count D Erlon, commaruls that of the centre — Works of Astorga dcstroxed by the Spaniards — Mina's operations in Aragon — Villa Campa's operatmns — Em[)ecinado and others enter Madrid — The duke Del Par.pie enters La Maiicha — Elio and Bassecour march to Albacete and communicate with the Anglo-Sicil- ian army — 'Vhe kin'i enters Madrid — Soult's cavalry scour La Mancha — Suchet's operations — General Donkin men- aces DiMiia — (Jeneral W. Clinton takes the conmiand of the Anglo-Sicilian army — Suchet entrenches a camp at Xativa — The Anglo-Sieiliaa army falls into tlisrcpnte — General Campbell takes tlie command — Inactivity of the army — The Frayle surjjrises a convoy of French artillery — 0))erations in Catiilonia — Dissensio 'S in that province — Eroies and (>odrington menace Tarragona — Erolcs sur- prises a French detachment at Arbeca — Lacy threatens ATataro, and Hostairich returns to Vich — Manso defeats a Fienc'li delachment near Moliiio del Rev — Dociien defeats the unitcil Calaloiiian army, and j)enetrates to V'ich — The S[>anisii divisions separate — Colonel Villamil attempts to suiprisc Sail Felipe de Balaguer — Atta.ks it a second time in concert with ('odrin>j;ton — The place succoured by tiie garrison of 'J'orto/a — I/acy sulfers a French convoy to reach Bircclona. is ai-cu-^cd of trcacliery and displaced — The regular warfare in Calalonia ceases — The parli/.an warfaic continues — England the real support of the war . 540 CHAPTER VIL General observations — Wellington ref>roachcK the army — His censures i rid iscrinn mite — Analvsis of his campaign — (Criti- cisms of Jomini and others examined — Ertors of execution — The French operations analyzed — Sir John More's re. treat compared with lord Wellington's - - 544 BOOK XX. CHAPTER L Political affairs — Their influence on the war — Napoleon's in- vasion of Russia — Its influence on the contests in the Pen« insula — State of feeling in England — Lord Wcllesley charges the ministers,- and esyiecially Mr. Perceval, with imbecility — His [irnofs thereof — Aliility ar.d zeal of lord Wellington and Air. Stuart shewn — Absurd plans of the count of Funchal — Mr. Villiers and Mr. Vansittart — 'I'he English ministers propose to sell the Portuguese crown and church lands — 'J'he folly and injustice of these and other schemes exposed by lord Wellington — He goes to Cadiz — His reception there — New organization of the Spanish armies — Wellington goes to Lisbon, where he ia enthusiastically received — His departure fr(.ni (Cadiz the signal of renewed dissensions — (Caiiotta's iiitiiiTues — De- cree to abolish the inquisition opposed by the clergy — The regency aid the clergy — Are disj. laced by the cortes — New regency apjiointcd — The American j^arty in the cortes adopt Carlotta's cause — Fail from fear of the peoiile-— Many bishops and church dignitaries are arrested, ;nid others fly into Portugal — The Pope's nuncio, Gravina, op- poses the cortes — His benefices sequestered — He flics to Portugal — His intrigues there — Secret overtures made to Joseph by some of the Spanish armies - - 549 CHAPTER n. Political state of Portugal- — Wellington's difTcultics — Tin pr >por conduct of some English ships of war — Piratical violence of a Scotch merchantman — Disorders in the mili- tary system — Irritation of the people — Misconduct of the magistrates — Wellington and Sluart grapjile with the di'5- orders of the administration — The latter calls fur the inter- ference of the British government — \'\ elliiigt(in writes a remarkable letter to the prince regent, and re(]uesls him to return to Portugal — Partial amendment — The efiicic ncy of the army restored: but the coimtry remains in an un- settled state — The prince unable to quit the Brazils — ('ar^ lotta prepares to come alone — Ls stopped by the interfe rence of the British government — An auxiliary Russian force is offered to lord Wellington by admiral Greig — The Russian andiassador in London disavows the oi'Vr — The emperor Alexander proposes to mediate between England and America — 'J'he emjieror of Austria ofliirs to mediate for a general peace — Both oilers are refused - 556 CHAPTER in. Napoleon's embarrassed position — His wonderful activity— His designs explained — The war in S[)ain becomes sec- ond; armi geroi [irovinces creeps N-apoleon orders the king to fix his quarters at Valladolid, to menace Portugal, and to reinforce the army of the north — Joseph complains of liis generals, find especially of Soult — Napoleon's magnanimity — Joseph's comjilaints not altogether without foundation - - - - 561 CHAPTER IV. Operations south of theTaaus — Eroles and Codrington seek to entrap the governor of 'i'arragona — 'i'liey fiil — Sarsfitid and \'illa Campa unite, but disperse at the afiproach of Panneticr and Severoli — Sucliet's (losition — Great force of the allies in his front — The y(ninger Soult engages the Spanish cavalry in La Mancha — General Daricau marchca with a column towards Valencia — Receives a large convoy and returns tu La Mancha — Absurd rumours about the ICn'jflish army rife in the French cam|) — Some of lora Wellington's sjiies (letecteerations north of the Tagus — Position of the French armies — Palombini marches from Madrid to join the army of the north — Various combats take place with the Parti- das — Foy fails to surprise the British post at Bejar — Caf- tarelii demands reinforcements — Joseph misconceives the emperor's plans — Wellington's plans vindicated against French writers — Soult advises Joseph to hold Madrid and the mountains of Avila — Indecision of the king — He goes to Valladolid — Concentrates the f^-ench armies in Old Castile — A division under Leval remains at Madrid — Reil- le sends reinforcements to the army of the north — Various skirmishes with tiie Partidas — Leval deceived by false ru- mours at Madrid — Joseph wishes to abandon that capital — Northern insurrection — Operations of Caffarelli, Palom- bini, Mendizabel, Longa and Mina — Napoleon recalls Caf- farelli — Clauzel takes the command of the army of the north — Assaults Castro but fails — Palombini siurmishes with Mendizabel — Introduces a convoy into Santona — Marches to succour Bilboa — His operations in Guiposcoa — The insurrection gains strength — Clauzel marches into Navarre — Defeats Mina in the valley of Roncal and pur- sues him into Aragon — Foy acts on the coast — Takes Castro — Returns to Bilboa — Defeats the Biscayan volun- teers under Mugartegui at Villaro, and those of Guipuscoa under Artola at Lequitio — The insurrectional junta flies — Bermeo and Isaro are taken — Operations of the Partidas on the great line of communication - - 570 CHAPTER VI. Wcllingtoi /estores the discipline of the allied army — Rela- tive strength of the belligerent forces — W'ellington's plans described — Lord W, Bentinck again proposes to invade Italy — W^ellington opposes it — The opening of the cam- paign delayed by the weather — State of the French army — Its movements previous to the opening of the cam- paign ........ 578 CHAPTER VIL Ijangerotis discontent of the Portuguese army — Allayed by Wellington — Noble conduc^of the soldiers — The let't wing of the allies under general Graham marches through the Tras OS Montes to the Esla — The right wing under Wel- lington advances against Salamsnca — Combat there — The alii'^s pass the Tormes — Wellington goes in person to the Esla — Passage of that river — Cavalry combat at Morales — The two wings of the allied amiy unite at Toro on the Duero — Remarks on that event — W'ellington marches in advance — Previous movements of the P'rench described — They pass the Carion and Pisuerga in retreat — The allies pass the (Jarion in pursuit — Joseph takes post in front of Burgos — Wellington turns the Pisuerga with his left wing and attacks the enemy with his right v^'ing — Combat on the Hormaza — The French retreat behind Pancorbo and blow up the castle of Burgos — W^ellington crosses the Up- per Ebro and turns the French line of defence — Santander is adopted as a depot station and the military establish- ments in Portugal arc broken up — Jose])h changes his dis- positions of defence — The allies advance — Combat of Os- ma — Combat of St. Millan — Combat of Subijana Morillas — The French armies concentrate in the basin of Vittoria behind the Zadora - - - - - - 581 CHAPTER VIIL Confused state of the French in the basin of Vittoria — Two convoys are sent to the rear — The king takes up a new order of battle — The (Jallicians march to seize Orduna but are recalled — Graham marches across the hills to Murguia — Relative strength and position of the hostile armies — Battle of Vittoria — Joseph retreats by Salvalierra — Wei- 1 lington pursues him up the Borundia and Araciuil valleys — Sends Longa and Giron into Guipuscoa — Joseph halts at Yrursun — Detaches the army of Portugal to the Bidas- soa — Retreats with the army of the centre and the army of the south to Pampeluna — Wellington detaches Graham throuch the mountains by the pass of St. Adrian into Gui[)Uscoa and marches himself to Pampeluna — Combat with the French rear-guard — Joseph retreats up the valley of Roncevalles — General Foy rallies the French troops in Guipuscoa and lights the Spaniards at Montdragon — Re- treats to Bergara and Villa Franca — Graham enters Gui- puscoa — Combat on the Orio river — Foy retires to Tolosa — Combat there — The French posts on the sea-coast aban- doned with exception of Santona and St. Sebastian — Foy retires behind the Bidassoa — Clauzel advances toviards Vittoria — Retires to Logrono — Wellington endeavours to surround him — Clauzel makes a forced march to 'i'udela — Is in great danger — Escapes to Zaragoza — Halts there — Is deceived by Mina and finally marches to Jaca — Gazan re-enters Spain and occupies the valley of Bastan — O'Don- el reduces the forts of Pancorbo — Hill drives Gazan from the valley of Bastan — Observations • - 588 BOOK XXI. CHAPTER I. Lord W^ellington blockades Pampeluna, besieges San Sebas- tian — Operations on the eastern coast of Spain — General Elio's misconduct — Sir John Murray sails to attack Tarra- gona — Colonel Prevot takes St. Felipe de Balaguer — Sec- ond siege of Tarragona — Suchet and Maurice Mathicu en- deavour to relieve the place — Sir John .Murray raises the siege — Embarks with the loss of his guns — Disembarks again at St. Felipe de Balaguer — Lord William Bertiiick arrives — Sir John Murray's trial — Observations - 596 CHAPTER H. Danger of Sicily — Averted by Murat's secret defection from the emperor — Lord William Btntinck re-enitarks — His design of attacking the city of Valencia frustrated — Del Parque is defeated on the Xucar — The Anglo-Sicihai.s disembark at Alicant — Suchet prepares to attack the allies Prevented by the battle of Vittoria — Abandons Valencia — Marches towards Zaragoza — Clauzel retreats to France — Paris evacuates Zaragoza — Suchet retires to 'i'arragona — Mines the walls — Lord William Bentinck }>ap:is the Ebro — Secures the Col de Balaguer — Invests Tanagona — Partial insurrection in Upper Catalonia — Con>bat of Salud — Del Parque joins lord William Bentinck who pro- jects an attack upon Suchct's cantonments — Suchet con- centrates his army — Is joined by Dccaen — Advances— The allies retreat to the mountains — Del Parque invests Tortosa — His rear-guard attacked by the garrison while passing the Ebro — Suchet blows up the walls of Tarrago- na — Lord William desires to besiege Tortosa — Hears that Suchet ha? detached troops — Sends Del Parque's army to join lord Wellington — Advances to Villa Franca — Combat of Ordal — The allies retreat — Lord Frederick Bentinck fights with the French general Myers and wounds him — • Lord William returns to Sicily — Observailons - 603 CHAPTER TIL Siege of San Sebastian — Convent of San Bartolomeo storm- ed — Assault on the place fails — Causes thereoi^ — Siege turned into a blockade, and the guns embarked at Passages — French make a successful sally - - - 611 CHAPTER TV. Soult appointed the emperor's lieutenant — Arrives at Bay- onne — Joseph goes to Paris — Sketch of Napoleon's political and military situation — His greatness of mind — Soull's activity — Theatre of operations described — Soult resolves to succour Pampeluna — Relative positions and numbers of the contending armies described - - - 616 CHAPTER V. Soult attacks the right of the allies— Cmibat of R-ncevalIra — Combat of Linzoaiu — Count D'Erion attacks the allies' TABLE OF CONTENTS. right centre — Combat of ^Taya — General Hill takes a po- ' sition at Irneta — General Pietou and Gole retre;it down , the Val dc Zubiri — Tiiey turn at Iluarte and offer bat- tle — Ijoril V.cliington arrives — Combat of the 27th — First battle of !^i!;roren — Various movements — D'Eilon joins Soult who attacks general Ilili — Second battle of Saurorcii — Fov is cut oirfroMi the main army — Night march of the light "division — Soult rctriiits — ('onihut of Dona Maria — Dangerous position of the French at St. Estevan — Soult marches down the Bidassoa — Forced inarch of the light division— Terrible scene near the bridge of Yanzi — Com- I bat of Echallar and Ivantelly — IN'arrow escape of lord Welhngton — Observations .... 621 BOOK XXII. CHAPTER I. New positions of the armies — Lord Melville's mismanagement of the naval co-operation — Siege of San Sebastian — Pro- gress of the second attack ... - 638 CHAPTER n. Storming of San Sebastian — Lord Wellington calls for vol- unteers from the first, fourth and light divisions — The place is assaulted and taken — Th(^ town burned — The cas- tle is bombarded and surrenders — Observations - 642 CHAPTER HI. Soult's views and positions during the siege described — He endeavours to succour the place — Attacks lord Wellington — Combats of San Marcial and Vera — The French are repulsed the same day that San Sebastian is stormed — Soult resolves to adopt a defensive .<;ystem — Observa- tions ........ 646 CHAPTER IV. The duke of Berry proposes to invade France, promising the aid of twenty thoa^asid insurgents — Lord Wellington's views on this suhject^His personal acrimony against Na- poleon — That monarch's policy and character defended — Dangerous state of aH'airs in Catalonia — Lord Wellington designs to go there himself, but at the desire of the allied sovereigns and the English government resolves to estab- lish a part of his army in France — His ;)lans retarded by aMMents and bad weather — Soult unable to divine his pro- ject— Passao'e of the Bidassoa — Second condiat of Vera — Colonel Colbirne's gr.^at presence of mind — Gallant action of lieutenant Havelock — '/'he French lose the redoubt of Parre and abandon the great Rliune — Obseriations 651 CHAPTER V. Soult retakes t'le redoubt of >'arre — Wellington organizes the army in three great divisions under sir Rowlai;d Hill, marshal Beresford, and sir John Hope — Disinterested con- duct of the last-named oihcer — Soult's immense intrench- ments described — His correspondence with Suchet — Pro- poses to ret ike the oirensive and unite their armies in Ara- gon — Suchet will not accede to his views, and makes in- accurate stateme%ls — I^ord Wi^llington, hearing of advan- tages gained by the allied sovereigns in Germany, resolves to invade France — Blockide and fall of Pampeluna — Lord Wellington oraanizes a brigade under lord Aylmer to be- siege Santona, but afterwards changes his design - 659 CHAPTER VI. Political state of Portugal- -Violence, ingratitude and folly of the government of that country — Political .state of Spain — Various factions described, tln'ir violence, insolence and folly — Scandalous scenes at (^adiz — Several Spanish gene- rals desire a revolution — Lord Wellinalon describes the (miserable slate of the country — Anticipates the necessity of putting down the cortez by {>ircc — Resigns his command I of the Spanish armies — The Entrlish mii.istors propose to removi- liim to Ctcrmany — The new cortez reinstate him as generalissimo on his own terms — He expresses fears that the cause will finally fail, a:.d advises the English aiinistcrs to withdraw the Britibh army - . 664 j BOOK XXIII. CHAPTER L War in the south of France- -Soult's political difficultiea — Privations of the allied troops — Lord U ellington a] ■peals to their military honour with ell'cct — Averse to olltnsive operations, but when JN'apoleon's disasters in Gennany bt> came knovvn, again yields to the wishes of the allied sov- ereigns — His disi)ositions of attack retarded — Thcv are described — Battle of the ISivelle — Observations — Deatha and characters of Mr. Edward Freer ai»d colonel Thomas Lloyd 672 CHAPTER II. Soult occupies the intrenched camp of Bayonne, and the hne of the IS'ive river — Lord Wellington unable to pursue his victory from the state of the roads — Bridge-head of Cam- bo abandoned by the French — Excesses of the Spanish troops — Lord M ellington's indignation — He sends them hack to Spain — Various skinnishes in front of Bavonne— The generals John Wilson and Vandeleur are wounded — I Mina plunders the Val de Baigorri — Is beaten by the na- / tional guards — Passage of the INive and battles in front of Bayonne — Combat of the lOth — Combat of the 11th — Combat of the 12th — Battle of St. Pierre — Observa- tions 680 CHAPTER in. Respective situations and views of lord Wellington and Soult — Partisa n w a rfare — The Basques of the Val de Baigorri ^ excitedhj arms by the excesses of Mina's troops — General Harispe takes the command of the insurgents — VAnuztl advances beyond the Biduuze river — General movements — Parii.san combats- — Excesses committed by the Sj Pii- iards — Lord Wellineton reproaches their generals — .His vigorous and resolute conduct — He menaces the French insursents of the valleys with lire and sword, and the in- surrection subsides — Soult hems in the allies' right closely — Partisan combats continued — Remarkable instances of the habits e.-Uablished between the French and British sol- diers of the light division — Shipwrcckr ^n the coast 68 1 CHAPTER IV. Political state of Portugal — Political state of Spain — Lord Wellington advises the English government to [)repaie Joj a war with Spain, and to seize San t-'cbastian as a security for tiie withdiawal of the British and Portuguese troops — The seat of government and the new cortez are rein'-vxJ to Madrid — 'I'he duke of >an Carlos arrives sccrftiy with the treaty of Valenfay — It is njected by the Sianish re- gency and corttz — Lord Wellington's views on the sub- ject G'J5 CHAPTER V. Political state of Napoleon — Guileful policy of the allied s BOOK XXIV CHAPTER I. Napoleon recalls several divisions of infantry and cavalry from Souk's army — P^mbarrassmcnts of that marshal — M. Batbedat, a banker of Bayonne. oilers to aid the allies secret- ly with money and provisions — La Roche-Jacquelin and other Bourbon partisans arrive at the allies' liead-quartcrs — The duke of Angouli^me arrives tliere — Lord Wellington's political views — General reflections — Soult embarrassed by the hostility of the French people — Lord Wellington em- barrassed by the hostility of the Spaniards — Soull's re- markable project for the defence of France — Napoleon's reasons for neglecting it put hypotb.etically — I^ord Wel- lington's situation suddenly ameliorated — His wise policy, foresight and diligence — Resolves to throw a bridge over the Adour b-'low Bayonne, and to drive Soult from that river — Soult's system of defence — Numbers of the con- tending armies — Passage of the Gaves — Combat of Garris — Lord Wellington forces the line of the Bidouze and Gave do Maulvlon — Soult takes the line of the Gave d'Ol >- ron and resolves to change his system of operation 714 CHAPTER n. ) trd Wellington arrests his movements and returns in person to St. Jean de Luz to throw his bridge over the Adour — is prevented by bad weather and returns to the Gave de Mauloon — Passage of tiie Adour by sir Jolm Hope — Dif- ficulty of the operation — The flotilla pa^-ses the bar and enters the river — The French sally from Bayonne, but are repulsed, and the stupendous bridL^e is cast — Citadel in- vested after a severe action — Lord Wellington passes t[:c Gave d'Olaron and iiivests Navarreins — Soult concentrates his army at Orthez — Beresford passes the Gave de Pau near Peirchorade — Battle of Orthez — Soult changes his line of operations — Combat of Aire — Observations 721 CHAPTER TIL Koult's perilous situation — He falls back to Tarbrs — Napo- leon sends him a plan of operations — His reply and vie ws stated — Lord Wellington's embarrassment^ — ?^ou!t's pro- clamation — Ob.icrvations upon it — Lord Wellington calls up Freyre's CJallicians and detaches Beresford against Bor- deaux — The mayor of that city revolts from Napoleon — Beresford enters Bordeaux and is followed by the duke of Angoubmip — Feyrs of a reaction — The mayor issues a false proclamatio:i — Lo'd Wellington expresses his indig- nation — Rebukes the duke of Angoul^me — Recalls Beres- ford, but leaves lord Dalhousie with the seventh division and some cavalry — Decaen commences the organization of the army of the Gironde — Admiral Penrose enters the Ga- ronne — Remarkable exploit of the commissary Ogilvic — Lord Daihousie, passes the Garonne and the Dordogne. and defeats L'Huilli;T at Etavdiers — Admiral Penrose de- stroys the Frencli flotilla — The French set fire to their ships of war — The British seamen and marines land and destroy all the French batteries from Blaye to the mouth of the tiaroune -.-.-- 731 CHAPTER IV. Wellington's and Soult's situations and forces described — Folly of the I'^nslish ministers — Freyre's Gnllicians and Ponsonby's heavy cavalry join lord Wellington — He or- ders Giron's Andalus-ians and Del Prin;nr's army to entsr France — Soult suddenly lakes the olit i,.--ive — ("cuibats y--( cavalry — Partisan cxp'oditicn of captain Dania — Welling- ton menaces the peasantry with flie and sword if they tak« up arms — Soult retires — Lord Wellijigton advances Combat of Vic en Bigorre — Death and character of coin- nel H nry Sturgeon — Daring exploit of caiilain WiJl'iun Light — Conibat of Tarbes — Soult retreats by forced iriaich es to Toulouse — \\'ellington follows more slowly — Cav airy combat at St. Gaudens — The allies arrive in front of Toulouse — Rellections . . - - . 737 CHAPTER V. Views of the commanders on each side — Wf llington de?;igna to throw a bridge over the Garonne at Portet above 'J'ou- louse, but below the confluence of the Arricge and Gur- onne — The river is found too wide for tlw pontoons — Ho changes his design — Cavalry action at St. Martin de Toiuh — General Hill passes the Garonne at Pensaj.^url above thn confluence of the Arriege — Marches upon Cuilcgabcile — . Crosses the Arricge — Finds the cc;:ntry too dirp for his artillery and returns to Pcnsaguel — Kccrosscs the Garonne — Soult fortifies Toulouse and tlic Mont Rave — Lord Wellington sends his pontoons dow^n the Garonne — Pa.s- ses that river at Grenade, filtcen niiit^s belcw 'J oulcuse, with twenty thousand men — i'he river fio(;ds and hig bridge is talieia up — The waters subside — The biidge is again laid — The Spaniards pass — Lord Wellington ad- vances up the right bank to Fenouilhet- — Condiut of cav- alry — 'Jlie eighteenth hussars win the bridge of Croix d'Orade — Lord Wellington resolves to attack Soult on the 9th of April — Orders the pontoons to be taken up and re- laid higher up the Garonne atSeilh, iii the riight of the 8th — 'I'inic is lost m the execution and the attack is defer- red — The light division cross at Seilh on the uioniing of the ICth— Battle of Toulouse ... 742 CHAPTER VL General observations •^nd reflections 749 APPENDIX. No. L Two letters fmm sir A. Wellesley to sir Harry Bui rard - - - - ... 758 No. n. ■i.rticlt;R of the convention for the eyacu.?.t'.on of Portu- gal 759 No. UL Despatch fi-nm the cohlL' de Bsh'cdore relative lo the battle of Gamonai .-.--- 761 Nc. IV. Extract of a letter from the duke of Dalmatic »o the au- thor - 7(>1 No. V. Especiil return of loss during sir John Moore's cam- paign - - • 761 No. VI. Three letters from lord Coliingwood to sir Hew Dalrym pie 76a xxvr TABLE OF CONTENTS. 1 No. VII. No. XV. Proceedings of major-ijeneral McKenzie's detachment from Lisbon to Cadiz - - - - - 764 No. VIII. Letter from sir Arthur Wellesley to sir J. Cradock; two frcvm the same to lord Castlereaujh ; lord Wellington to the marquis Wellesley; general Hill to sir A. Wellesley; colonel Stopford to lieutenant-general Sher- brooke ..--.--. 766 No. IX. Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby - - 771 No. X. Extracts of letters from lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, and one from sir John Moore to majoi-general M'Ken- zie, commanding in Portugal - - - - 771 No. XL Extracts of letters from lord Wellington - - 774 No. XII. Letter from licut.-gen. Graham to the riarht. hon. Henry Wellesley — Letter from general F. Ponsonby, battle of Barossa — From col. Light, battle of Albuera - 779 No. XIII. Extracts from the correspondence of capt. Squire, of the engineers - - 781 No. XIV. General Campbell to lord Liverpool 781 Siese of Tarragona, capt. Codrington's correspondence, &.C. - 781 No. XVL Siege of Tarifa, extracts from memoirs and letters of offi- cers ------... 786 No. XVII, On the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos - 788 No. XVIII. ESCALADK OF ST. VtNCENT. Extract from a memoir by capt. Edward P. Hopkins 790 No. XIX. BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. Extract from a memoir by colonel Money — Extract of a letter from sir Jfenry Watson — Extract from a letter of colonel Towns^-nd - - - - - -791 No. XX. marmont's operations. Colonel Le Mesurier to brigadier-eeneral Trant — Extract from a memoir of general Tiant ... 791 No. XXL COMBAT OF MAYA. Extract from a manuspvipt memoir by capt. Norton 792 No. XXI I. COMBAT OF RONCEVALLES. General Cole to lord Wellington — Marshal Soiilt to die minister of var ;9>s HISTORY OF THB PENINSULAR WAR BOOK I. INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER I. Thj hostility of the European aristocracy caused the enthusiasm of republican France to take a military direction, and forced that poweruil nation into a course Df policy which, however outrageous it might appear, was in reality one of necessity. Up to the treaty of Tilsit, the wars of France were essentially defensive, — for the bloody contest that wasted the continent so many years, was not a struggle for preeminence be- tween ambitious powers, not a dispute for some access- ion of territory, nor for the political ascendency of one or other nation, but a deadly conflict, to determine whether aristocracy or democracy should predominate, whether e-quality or privilege should henceforth be the principle of European governments. The French Revolution was pushed into existence oefore the hour of its natural birth. The power of the aristocratic principle was too vigorous and too much identified Avith that of the monarchical principle, to be successfully resisted by a virtuous democratic effort, much less could it be overthrown by a democracy riot- ;ng in innocent blood, and menacing destruction to oolitical and religious establishments, the growth of centuries, somewhat decayed indeed, yet scarcely showing their grey hairs. The first military events of the Revolution, the disaffection of Toulon and Ly- ons, the civil war of La Vendee, the feeble, although successful resistance made to the duke of Brunswick's invasion, and tlie frequent and violent change of rulers whose fall none regretted, were all proofs that the French revolution, intrinsically too feeble to sustain he physical and moral force pressing it down, was lAst sinking, wlien the wonderful genius of Napoleon, bafiling all reasonable calculation, raised and fixed it on the basis of victory, the only one capable of sup- porting the crude production. Nevertheless that great man knew the cause he up- held was not sufliciently in unison with the feelings of the age, and his first care was to disarm, or neu- tralize, monarchical and sacerdotal enmity, by restor- ing a church e-sta-blishrnent, and by becoming a mon- arch hinrself. Once a sovereign, hi? vigorous character, his pursuits, his talents, and the critical nature of th« times, inevitably rendered him a despotic one ; yet while he sacrificed political Ifberty, which to the great bulk of mankind has never been more than a pleasing sound, he cherished with the utmost care equality, a sensible good that produces increasing satisfaction as it descends in the scale of society. But this, the real principle of his governme«t and secret of his populari- ty, made him the people's monarch, not the sovereign of the aristocracy, and hence, Mr. Pitt called him ' tho child and the champion of democracy,' a truth as evi- dent as that Mr. Pitt and his successors w^ere the chil- dren and the chjanpionSirof aristocracy : hence also the privileged classes of Europe consistently transferred their natural an'* ' iplacablo hatred of the French revo- lution to his peison; for they saw, that in him innova- tion had found a protector, that he alone having given preeminence to a system so hateful to them, was really what he called himself, ' the State.' The treaty of Tilsit, therefore, although it placed Napoleon in a commanding situation with regard to the potentates of Europe, unmasked the real nature of the war, and brought him and England, the respective champions of equality and privilege, into more direct cp'iiaot ; peace could not be between them while both were strong, and all that the French emperor had hither- to gained, only enabled him to choose his future field of battle. When the catastrophe of Trafalgar forbade him to think of invading England, his fertile genius had con- ceived the plan of sapping her naval and commercinl strength by depriving her of the markets for her manu- factured goods, that is, he prohibited the reception of English wares in any part of the continent, and exacted from allies and depen'-lants the most rigid compliancn with his orders ; but this ' continental system,' as it W2.p3.se 1808-9. Napoleon, in Las Casas, vol ii. 4tli paM. I) Ibid, tjth jart. 1807.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR, 11 o'lt f)f the revolution, because his victories had baffled | tlieir calculations, and shaken their hold of power. As > the chief of revolutionary France, he was constrained to ^ continue his career until the final accomplishment of j her destiny, — and this necessity, overlooked by the j great l)ulk of mankind, afforded plausible g^rouud fori imputinq: insatiable ambition to the French g-overnment and to the French nation, of which ample use was made. Rapacity, insolence, injustice, cruelty, even j cowardice, were said to be inseparable from the charac- i ter of a Frenchman, and, as if such vices were nowhere else to be found, it was more than insinuated that all the enemies of France were inherently virtuous and ; disinterested. Unhappily, history is but a record of crimes, and it is not wonderful that the arrogance of j men, buoyed up by a spring-tide of military ^lory, j should, as well amonof allies, as amoncr vanquished j enemies, have produced sufficient disgust, to insure a ready belief of any accusation however false and ab- ^ surd. i Napoleon was the contriver and the sole support of a political system that required time and victory to con- solidate ; he was the connectinir link, between the new interests of mankind and what of the old were left in a state of vicrour, he held them too-ether strontrly, but he was no favourite witi\ either, and consequently in dan- ger from both; his power, unsanctified by time, de- pended not less upon delicate management than upon vigorous exercise ; he had to fix the foundations of, as well as to defend, an empire, and he may be said to have been rather peremptory than despotic ; there were points of administration with which he durst not med- dle even wisely, much less arbitrarily. Customs, prejudices, and the dregs of the revolutionary license, interfered to render his policy complicated and diffi- cult, but it was not so with his inveterate adversa- ries. The delusion of parliamentary representation enabled the English government safely to exercise an urdimited power over the persons and the property of ihe nation, and, through the influence of an active and corrupt press it exercised nearly the same power over the public mind. The commerce of England, pene- trating, as it were, into every house on the face of the globe, supplied a thousand sources of intelligence, — the spirit of traffic, which seldom acknowledges the ties of country, was universally on the side of Greal Britain, and those twin-curses, paper-money and public credit, so truly described as 'strer.gth in the beginning, but weakness in the end,' were recklessly used by statesmen, whose policy regarded not the interests of posterity. Such were the adventitious causes of En- gland's power, and her natural, legitimate resources, were nnny and great. If any credit is to be given to the census, the increasing population of the United Kincrdom amounted at this period to nearly twenty millions, and France reckoned but twenty-seven mill- ions when Frederick the Great declared that, if he were her king, ' not a gun should be fired in Europe with- out his leave.' The French army was undoubtedly very formidable from numbers, discipline, skill, and bravery; but, con- trary to the general opinion, the British army was in- ferior to it in none of these points save the first, and in discipline it was superior, because a national army iill always hear a sterner code than a mixed force will suf- fer. Amongst the latter, military crimes may be pun- ished, but moral crimes can hardly be repressed; men will submit to death for a breach of great regulations which they kRow by experience to be useful, but the constant restraint of petty, though wholesome rules, they will escape from by desertion, or resist by muti- ny, when the ties of custom and countr)' are removed ; for the disgrace of bad conduct attaches not to them, but to the nation under whose colours they serve. Great indeed is that genius that can keep men of differ- ent nations firm to their colours, and preserve a rigid discipline at the same time. Napoleon's niilitarj' sys- tem was, from this ca>ise, inferior to l>he British, which, if it be purely administered, combines the solidity of the Germans with the lapidity of tn< French, exclud- ing the mechanical dulness of the one. and the danger- ous vivacity of the other; yet, before the campaign in the Peninsula had proved its excellence in every branch of war, the English army was absurdly under-rated in foreign countries, and absolutely despised in its own. It was reasonable to suppose that it did not possess that facility of moving in large bodies which long practice had given to the French, but the individual soldier was most falsely stigmatized as deficient in intelligence and activity, the officers ridiculed, and the idea that a British could cope with a French army, even for a sin- gle campaign, considered chimerical. The English are a people very subject to receive, and to cherish false impressions; proud of their creduli- ty as if it were a virtue, the majority will adopt any fal- lacy, and cling to it with a tenacity proportioned to its grossness. Thus an ignorant contempt for the British soldiery had been long entertained, before the ill-suc- cess of the exped. lions in 1794 and 1799 appeared to justify the general prejudice. The true cause of those i'ailures was not traced, and the excellent discipline af- terwards introduced and perfected by the duke of York was despised. England, both at home and abroad, was, in 1S08, scorned as a military power, when shs possessed, without a frontier to swallow up large ar- mies in expensive fortresses, at least two hundred thou- sand of the best equipped and best disciplined soldiers in the universe,* together with an immense recruiting establishment; and through the medium of the militia, the power of drawing upon the population without lim.it. It is true that of this number many were neces- sarily employed in the defence of the colonies, but enough remained to compose a disposable force greater thdn that with which Napoleon won the battle of Aus- terlitz, and double that with which he conquered Italy. In all the materials of war, the superior ingenuity and skill of the English mechanics were visible, and that intellectual power which distinguishes Great Britain amongst th^ nations, in science, arts, and literature, was not wanting to her generals in the hour of danger. CHAPTER II Dissensions in the Spanish court — Secret treaty and convention of Fontaintbleau — Junot's army t nters Spain — Dupont's and jNIonrey's corps enter Spain — Duhewiie's corns enters Cata- lonia—Insurrection of Aranjuez and iMadriJ — Cliailes tlie 1 oii:th abdicates— Ferdinand proclaimed kin;^ — Murat mar- ches to Madrid — Refuses to recognize Ferdinand as iiina--The s'v rd of Francis the First delivered to the French fienical — Savary arrives at Madrid — F'erdinand g.>€s to BayoTine— The fortresses of St. Sebastian, Fig-ueras, Paiiiptluna, and Barce- • ona, treacherously seized bv tlie French — Riot .t Toledo 23J of \pril, Tumult at .Madrid 2d May, Charles the Fourtii ab- di^.t es a second time in favour of Napoleon — Assen)b!y ol the Notables at Bayonne — Joseph Buonaparte declared king of Spain — Arrives at Madrid. For many years antecedent to the French invasion, the royal family of Spain were distracted with domes- tic quarrels ; the son's hand was against his mother, the fiilher's against his son, and the court was a scene of continual broils, under cover of which artful men, as is usual in such cases, pushed their own interest for- ward, while they seemed to art only for the sake of the party whose cause they espoused. Charles IV. at- tributed this unhappy state of his house to the intrigues » See Abstract of the m'.litaty force ■>( Great Brituin in 13U3. 12 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book I. of his sis^fr-in-law, tho qiiRen of the Two Sicilies ;* he hinr^plf, a weak and inefficient old man, was (rnvern- ed hy Ill's wife, and she ag^ain by don Manuel GodoVif of whose person it is said she was enamoured even to follv. From the rank of a simple gentleman of the Toyal cruards, this person had been raised to the high- est digrnities, and the title of Prinre of the Peace was conferred upon him whose name must be for ever con- nected with otie of the blooi'iest wars that fill the page of history. Ferdinand, prince of tl e Asturias, hated this favour- ite, and the miserable death of his young wife, his own youth, and apparently forlorn condition, created such an interest in his favour, that the people partook of his feelings ; thus the disunion of tiie royal family extend- ing its effects bevond the precincts of the court, involv- ed the nation in ruin. Those who know how Spaniards hate will comprehend why Godoy, who, though sensu- al, was a mild, good-natured man, has been so over- loaded with imprecations, as if he, and he alone, had been the cause of the disasters in Spain, It was not so. The canon. Escoiquiz. a subtile politician, who appears to have been the chief of Ferdinand's party,:^ finding the influence of the Prince of the Peace too strong, looked for support in a powerful quarter, and under his tuition, Ferdinand wrote upon the llth of October, 1807, to the emperor Napoleon. |] In this let- ter hf" complained of the influence which bad men had obtained over his father, prayed for the interference of the ' hero destined by Providence,' so run the text, ' to save Europe and to support thrones ;' asked an alliance by marriage with the Buonaparte family, and finally desired that his communication might be kept secret from his father, lest it should be taken as a proof of disresp<»ct. Me received no answer, and fresh matter of quarrel being found by his enemies at home, he was placed in arrest, and upon the 29lh of October, Charles denounced hiin to the emperor as guilty of treason, and of having projected the assassination of his own moth- er. Napoleon caught eagerly at this pretext for inter- fering in the domestic policy of Spain, — and thus the lionour and independence of a great people were placed in jeopardy, by the squabbles of two of the most worth- less persons. Some short time before this, Godoy, either instiga- ted by an ambition to found a dynasty, or fearing that the death of the king would expos* him to the ven- geance of Ferdinand, had made proposals to the French court to concert a plan for the conquest and division of Portugal, promising the assistance of Spain, on condi- tion that a principality for himself should be set apart from the spoil. Such is the turn given by Napoleon to tliis affair. But the article which provided an indem- nification for the king of Etruria, a minor, who had just been obliged to surrender his Italian dominions to France, renders it doubtful if the first offer came from Godoy, and Napoleon eagerly adopted the project if he did not propose it. The advantages were all on his side. Under the pretext of supporting his army in Portugal, he might fill Spain with his troops ; the dis- tuite between the father and the son, now referred to lis arbitration, placed the golden apples within his reach, and he resolved to gather the fruit if he had not planted the tree. A secret treaty was immediately concluded at Fon- tainebleau, between marshal Duroc on the part of France, and Eugenio Izquerdo on the part of Spain. This treaty, together with a convention dependant on it, was signed the 27th, and ratified by Napoleon on the 2f)th of October, the contracting parties agreeing on the following conditions. • Nf llerto. The ana|»Tam of Llorenfe. + Vide I)L)bhdo'» Ltttera. J JN'apolcon in Las Casas. |] A'ellerto. The house of Braganza to be driven forth of Portu- gal, and that kingdom divided into three portions. The province of Entre Minho e Duero, including the town of Oporto, to be called the kingdom of North Lusitania, and given as an indemnification to the dis» possessed sovereign of Etruria. The Alemtejo and the Algarves to be erected into a principality for Godoy, who, taking the title of pritica of the Algarves, was still to be in some respects de- pendant upon the Spanish crown. The central provinces of Estremadura, Beira, and the Tras OS Monies, together with the town of Lisbon, to be held in deposit until a general peace, and then to be ex- changed under certain conditions for English conquests. The ultramarine dominions of the exiled family to be equally divided between the contracting parties, and in three years at the longest, the king of Spain to be gratified with the title of Emperor of the two Ameri- cas. Thus much for the treaty. The terms of the con- vention were : France to employ 25,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Spain 24,000 infantry, 30 guns, and 3,000 cavalry. The French contingent to be joined at Alcantara by the Spanish cavalry, artillery, and one-third of the in- fantry, and from thence to march to Lisbon. Of the remaining Spanish infantry. 10,000 were to take posses- sion of the Entre Minho e Duero and Oporto, and 6,000 were to invade Estremadura and the Algarves. In the mean time a reserve of 40,000 men was to be assem- bled at Bayonne, ready to take the field by the 20th of November, if England should interfere, or the Portu- guese people resist. If the king of Spain or any of his family joined the troops, the chief command to be vested in the person so joining, but, with that exception, the French gener- al to be obeyed whenever the armies of the two nations came into contact, and during the march through Spain, the French soldiers were to be fed by that country, and paid by their own government. The revenues of the conquered provinces to be ad- ministered by the general actually in possession, and for the benefit of the nation in whose name the prov- ince was held. Although it is evident, that this treaty and conven- tion favoured Napoleon's ulterior operations in Spain, by enabling him to mask his views, and introduce large bodies of men into that country without creating much suspicion, it does not follow, as some authors have as- serted, that they were contrived by the emperor for the sole purpose of rendering the Spanish royal family odious to the world, and by this far-fetched expedient, to prevent other nations from taking an interest in their fate, when he should find it convenient to apply the same measure of injustice to his associate, that they had accorded to the family of Braganza. To say noth- ing of the weakness of such a policy, founded, as it must be, on the error, that governments acknowledge the dictates of justice at the expense of their supposed interests, it must be observed that Portugal was intrin- sically a great object. History does not spe-ak of tho time when the inhabitants of that country were defi- cient in spirit, the natural obstacles to an invasion had more than once frustrated the efforts of large armies, and the long line of communication between Bayonne and the Portuguese frontier, could only be supported by Spanish co-operation. Add to this, the facility with which England could, and the probability that she would, succour her ancient ally, and the reasonable conclusion is, that Napoleon's first intentions were \a accordance with the literal meaning of the treaty of Fontainebleau, his subsequent proceedings being tha res\ilt of new projects, conceived, as the wonderous imbecility of the Spanish Bourbons became manifest.* * Voice I'roiu St. Helena, /ol. ii. 1807 J NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 13 Again, the convention provided for the org^anization of a larire Spanish force, to be stationed in the north and south of Portup^al, that is, in precisc'y the two places from whence they could most readily march to the as- sistance of their country, if it was invaded. In fact the division of the marquis of Solano in the south, and that of general Taranco in the north of Portui^al, did. when the Spanish insurrection broke out, (Nov. 1807,) form the strentjth of the Andalusian and Gallician armies, the former of which gained the victory at Bay- len, while the lalter contended for it, although inef- fectually, at Rio Seco. The French force, destined to invade Portugal, was already assembled at Bayonne, under the title of the " First army of the Garonne," and actually entered Spain before the treaty was signed. It was commanded by general Junot, a young man of a bold, ambitious disposition, but of greater reputation for military talent than he was able to support; and his soldiers, princi- pally conscripts, were ill fitted to endure the hardships which awaited them. At first by easy marches, and in small divisions, he led his troops through Spain, but the inhabitants, either from a latent fear of what was to follow, or from a dislike of foreigners common to all secluded people, were not friendly.* When the head of the columns reached Salamanca, the general halted, intending to complete the organiz tion of his troops in that rich country, and there to await the most favourable moment for penetrating the sterile frontier which guarded his destined prey ; but political events marched faster than his calculations, and fresh instruc- tions from the emperor prescribed an immediate ad- vance upon Lisbon ; .Tunot obeyed, and the family of Braganza, at his approach, fled to the Brazils. The series of interesting transactions which attended this invasion will be treated of hereafter, at present, I must return to Spain, now bending to the first gusts of that hurricane, which soon swept over her with destructive violence. The accusation of treason and intended parricide, preferred by Charles IV. against his son Ferdinand, (Dec. 1807,) gave rise to some judicial proceedings, which ended in the submission of the prince, who be- ing absolved of the imputed crime, wrote a letter to his father and mother, acknowledging his own fault, but accusing the persons in his confidence, of being the instigators of deeds which he himself abhorred. | The intrigues of his advisers, however, continued, and the plans of Napoleon advanced as a necessary conse- quence of the divisions in the Spanish court. By the terms of the convention of Fontainebleau, forty thousand men were to be held in reserve at Bay- onne ; but a greater number were assembled on differ- ent points of the frontier, and in the course of Decem- ber, two corps had entered the Spanish territory, and were quartered in Vittoria, Miranda, Briviesca, and the neighbourhood. The one commanded by general Du- pont, was called the second army of observation of the *Gironde.' The other, commanded by marshal Mon- cey, took the title of the army of observation of the ' Cote d'Ocean.' In the gross, they amounted to fifty- three thousand men, of which above forty thousand were fit for duty ;:j: and in the course of the month of De- cember, Dupont advanced to Valladolid, while a rein- forcement for Junot, four thousand seven hundred in number, took up their quarters at Salamanca. It thus appeared as if the French troops were quietly follow- ing the natural line of communication between France r^nd Portugal ; but in reality, Dupont, and Moncey's positions cut off the capital from all intercourse with the northern provinces, and secured the direct road from * Thebault, Exp. du Portugal. + Ntlltrto. Hist ria de la Gue iuerra contra Nap. Return of the French army. Appendix. Journal of Du- Bayonne to Madrid.* Small divisions under different pretexts continually reinforced these two bodies, and through the Eastern Pyrenees twelve thousand men, commanded by general Duhesme, penetrated into Cata- lonia, and established themselves ia Barcelona. In the mean time the dispute between the k'lnrr (March 1808.) and his son, or rather between the Prince of the Peace and the advisers of Ferdinand, wag brought to a crisis by insurrections at Aranjnez and Madrid, which took place upon the 17lh, 18th, and 19th of March, 1808, The old king, deceived by in- trigues, or frightened at the difficulties which sur- rounded him, had determined, as it is supposed by some, to quit Spain, and take refage in hiy American dominions, and preparations were made for a flight to Seville, when the prince's grooms commenced a tu- mult, in which the populace of Aranjuez soon joined, and were only pacified by the assurance that no jour- ney was in contemplation. Upon the 18th, the people of Madrid, following the example of Aranjuez, sacked the house of the obnox- ious Manuel Godoy, and upon the 19th the riots having recommenced at Aranjuez, that minister secreted him- self, but his retreat being discovered, he was maltreat- ed, and on the point of being killed, when the soldiers of the royal guard rescued him. Charles IV., terrified by the violent proceedings of his subjects, had abdi- cated the day before, and this event beina proclaimed at Madrid on the 20th, Ferdinand was declared king, to the great joy of the nation at large : little did the people know what they rejoiced at, and time has since taught them that the fable of the frogs demanding a monarch had its meaning. During these transactions, (March 1808,) Murat, grand duke of Berg, who had taken the command of all the French troops in Spain, quitted his quarters at Aranda de Duero, passed the Somosierra, and entered Madrid the 23d, with Moncey's corps and a fine body of cavalry; Dupont at the same time, deviating from the road to Portugal, crossed the Duero, and occupied Segovia, the Escurial, and Aranjuez. Ferdinand who arrived at Madrid on the 24th, was not recognised by Murat as king; nevertheless, at the demand of his powerful guest, he delivered to him the sword of Fran- cis I. with much ceremony. Meanwhile Char'es pro- tested to Murat that his abdication had been forced, and also wrote to Napoleon in the same strain. This state of affairs being unexpected by the emperor, he sent general Savary to conduct his plans, which appear to have been considerably deranged by the vehemence of the people, and the precipitation with which Murat had seized the capital. t But previous to Savary's arrival, Don Carlos, the brother of Ferdinand, departed from Madrid, hoping to meet the emperor Napoleon, whose presence in that city was conf.deuiiy expected ; and upon the 10th of April, Ferdina.'id, having first ap- pointed a supreme junta, of winch his uncle, Don An tonio, was named president and Murat a member, com- menced his own remarkable journey to Bayonne. The true causes of this measure have not yet been devel- oped ; perhaps, when they shai! be known, some petty personal intrigue, may be found to have had a greater influence than the grand mac! inations attributed to Napoleon, who could not have anticipated, much less have calculated, a great political scheme upon such a surprising example of weakness. The people everywhere manitested their anger at this journey; in Vittoria they cut the traces of Fc-dinand'g carriage, and at different times several gallant men of- fered, at the risk of their lives, to carry him off by sea, in defiance of the French troops quartered along llie poat's Operations MSS. * Noffs of Napoleon, found in the portfolio of king Joseph at the battle of Vittoria. f Napuleou iu Lai Cata*. 14 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book I. road. Un/noved by their entreaties and zeal, and re- gardless of the warning contained in a letter that he re- ceived at this period from Napoleon, (vvlio, witliholding the title of majesty, sharply reproved him for his past conduct, and scarcely expressed a wish to meet him) Ferdinand continued his progress, and, on the 20th of April, ISOS, found himself a prisoner in Bayonne. In Uie meantime, Charles under the protection of Murat, resum«>d his authority, obtained the liberty of Godoy, and quittintr Spain, also threw himself his cause and KinsTdom, into the emperor's hands. These events were in themselves quite enough to urge a more cautious people than the Spaniards into ac- tion ; but other measures had been pursued, which prov- ed, beyond tlie possibility of doubt, that the country was destined to be the spoil of the French. The troops of that nation had been admitted, without reserve or pre- caution, into the ditTerent fortresses upon the Spanish frontier, and, taking advantage of this hospitality to forward the views of their chief, they got possession, hy various artifices, of the citadels of St. Sebastian in Guipuscoa, of Pampeluna in Navarre, and of the forts of Figueras and Monjuik, and the citadel of Barcelona in Catalonia. Thus, under the pretence of mediating between the father and the son, in a time of profound peace, a foreign force was suddenly established in the capital, on the communications, and in the principal frontier fortresses ; its chief was admitted to a share of the government, and a fiery, proud, and jealous nation was laid prostrate at the feet of a stranger, without a blow being struck, without one warning voice being raised, without a suspicion being excited, in suflicient time, to guard against those acts upon which all were gazing with stupid amazement. It is idle to attribute this surprising event to the subtlety of Napoleon's policy, to the depth of his deceit, or to the treachery of Godoy ; such a fatal calamity could only be the result of bad government, and the con- sequent degradation of public feeling. It matters but little to those who wish to derive a lesson from experi- ence, whether it be a Godoy or a Savary that strikes the last bargain of corruption, the silly father or the rebel- lious son, that signs the final act of degradation and in- famy. Fortunately, it is easier to oppress the people of all countries, than to destroy their generous feelings ; when all patriotism is lost among the upper classes, it may still be found among the lower ; in the Peninsula it was not found, but started into life with a fervor and energy that ennobled even the wild and savage form in which it appeared ; nor was it the less admirable that it burst forth attended by many evils ; the good feeling dis- played was the people's own, their cruelty, folly, and perverseness, were the effects of a long course of mis- government. There are many reasons why Napoleon should have meddled with the interior affairs of Spain, there seems to be no good one for his manner of doing it. The Spanish Bourbons could never liave been sincere friends to France while Buonaparte held the sceptre, and the moment that the fear of his power ceased to operate, it was quite certain that their apparent friendship would change to active hostility ; the proclamation issued by the Spanish cabinet Just before the battle of Jena was evidence of this fact. But if the Bourbons were Na- poleon's enemies, it did not follow that the peo|)le sympathized with their rulers; his great error was that lie looked only to the court, and treated the nation with contempt. Had he, before he openly meddled in their nffairs, brought the people into hostile contact with their government, — and how many points would not such a government have offered! — instead of appearing as the treacherous arbitrator in a domestic quarrel, he would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people. The journey of Ferdinand, the liberation of Godoy, ihe flight of Charles, the appointing Mura: ^s be a member of the governing junta, and the movements of the French troops who were advancing from all part* towards Madrid, aroused the indignation of the nation, and tumults and assassinations had taken place in va- rious parts; at Toledo a serious riot occurred on the 23d of April, the peasants joined the inhabitants of the town, and it was only by the advance of a division of infantry and some cavalry of Dupont's corps, then quartered at Aranjuez, that order was restored.* The agitation of the public mind, however, increased, the French troops were all young men, or rather boys, ta- ken from the last conscription, and disciplined after they had entered Spain ; their youth and apparent fee- bleness excited the contempt of the Spaniards, who pride themselves much upon individual prowess, and the swelling indignation at last broke out. Upon the 2d of May, a carriage being prepared, as the people supposed, to convey Don Antonio, the un- cle of Ferdinand, to France, a crowd collected about it, their language indicated a determination not to permit the last of the royal family to be spirited away, the traces of the carriage were cut, and loud imprecations against the French burst forth on every side ; at that moment colonel La-Grange, aide-de-camp to Murat, ap- peared, he was assailed and maltreated, and in an in- stant the whole city was in commotion. The French soldiers, expecting no violence, were killed in every street, about four hundred fell, and the hospital was at- tacked, but the attendants and sick men defended them- selves; and meanwhile the alarm having spread to the camp outside the city, the French cavalry galloped in to the assistance of their countrymen by the gate of Alcala, while general Lanfranc, with three thousand infantry, descending from the heights on the n.^rth-west quarter, entered the Calle Ancha de Bernardo. As he crossed the end of the street Maravelles, Daois and Velarde, two Spanish officers who were in a state of great excitement, discharged a cannon at the passing troops, and were immediately attacked and killed oy some voltigeurs ; the column, however, continued it3 march, releasing, as it advanced, several superior offi- cers, who were in a manner besieged by the populace. The cavalry at the other end of the town, treating the affair as a tumult, and not as an action, made some hundred prisoners, and some men were killed or maimed by the horses, but marshal Moncey, genera! Harispe, and Gonzalvo O'Farril, restored order.| Neverthe- less, after nightfall, the peasantry of the neighbour- hood, who were armed and in considerable numbers, beset the city gates, and the French guards firing upon them, killed twenty or thirty, and wounded more. In the first moment of irritation, Murat ordered all the prisoners to be tried by a military commission, which condemned them to death; but the municipality interfering, represented to that prince the extreme cru- elty of visiting this angry ebullition of an injured and insulted people with such severity, whereupon admit- ting the weight of their arguments, he forbade any executions on the sentence. Yet it is said that gener- al Grouchy, in whose immediate power the prisoners re- mained, after exclaiming that his own life had been at- tempted, that the blood of the French soldiers was not to be spilt with impunity, and thai the prisoners having been condemned by a council of war, ought and should be executed, proceeded to shoot them in the Prado. Forty were thus slain before Murat could cause his orders to be effectually obeyed. The next day some of the Spanish authorities having discovered that a co- lonel, commanding the imperial guards, still retained a number of prisoners in the barracks, applied to have them also released. Murat consented, but it is said by some, although denied by others of greater authority, * Journal of Dupont's Operation? MSS. t Memoir of Azauza and O'Farril. 1803.1 NATMER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 15 that tlie colonel gcttinor intelligence of what was pass- ing, and being enraged at the loss of so many choice soldiers, put forty-five of his captives to death before the order arrived to stay his bloody proceedings.* Such were nearly the circumstances that attended this celebrated tumult, in which tlie wild cry of Spanish warfare was first heard, and as many authors, adopting without hesitation all the reports of the day, have rep- resented it, sometimes as a wanton and extensive mas- sacre on the part of the French, sometimes as a barba- rous political stroke to impress a dread of their power, 1 thini< it necessary to remark — First, that it was com- menced by the Spaniards; their fiery tempers, the irri- tation produced by passing events, and the habits of violence which they had acquired in their late success- ful insurrection against Godoy, rendered an explosion inevitable. vSecond, that if the French had secretly stimulated this disposition, and had resolved in cold blood to make a terrible example, they would have pre- pared some check on the Spanish soldiers of the gar- rison ; they would not have left their own hospital un- guarded, still less have arranged the plan so, that their loss should far exceed that of the Spaniards ; and surely nothing would have induced them to relinquish the profit of such policy after having suffered all the injury! Yet marshal Moncey, and general Harispe were actively engaged in restoring order ; and it is cer- tain that, including the peasants shot outside the gates, and the executions afterwards, the whole number of Spaniards slain did not amount to one hundred and twenty persons, while several hundred French fell.| Of the imperial guards seventy men were wounded, and this fact alone would suffice to prove that there was no premeditation on the part of Murat;:J: for if he was base enough to sacrifice his own men with such unconcern, he would not have exposed the select sol- diers of the French empire in preference to the con- scripts who abounded in his army. The affair itself was certainly accidental, and not very bloody for the patriots, but policy induced both sides to attribute secret motives, and to exaggerate the slaughter. The Spaniards in the provinces, impressed with an opinion of French atrocity, were thereby ex- cited to insurrection on the one hand ; and, on the other, the French, well aware that such an impression could not be effaced by an accurate relation of what did hap- pen, seized the occasion to convey a terrible idea of their own power and severity. It is the part of his- tory to reduce such amplifications. But it is impos- sible to remain unmoved in recording the gallantry and devotion of a populace that could thus dare to assail the force commanded by Murat, rather than abandon one of tiieir princes ; such, however, was the character of the Spaniards throughout this war, they were prone to sudden and rash actions, and though weik in military execution, fierce and confident individually, and they had always an intuitive perception of what was great and noble. The commotion of the 2d of May was the forerunner of insurrections in every part of Spain, few of which were so honourable to the actors as that of Madrid. Unprincipled villains hailed the opportunity of direct- ing the passions of the multitude, and under the mask of patriotism, turned the unthinking fury of the people against whomever it pleased them to rob or to destroy. Pillage, massacres, assassinations, cruelties of the most revolting kind, were every where perpetrated, and tht' intrinsic goodness of the cause was disfigured by the enormities committed at Cadiz, Seville, Badajos, and other places, but chiefly at Valencia, pre-eminent io barbarity at a moment when all were barbarous ! • See ^en. Harispe's observations at the end of thii volume, ■f Manifesto of the council of Castile. Page 28. \ Surgical Cauipuigns of Barron Larre/. The first burst of popular feeling being thus laisdi* rected, and the energy of the people wasted in asseis- sinations, lassitude and fear succeeded to the insolencje of tumult at the approach of real danger ; for i' is one thing to shine in the work of butchery, and another to establish that discipline which can alone sustain tlie courage of the multitude in the hour of trial. To cover the suspicious measure of introducing more troops than the terms of the convention warranted, a variety of reports relative to the ultimate intentions of the French emperor had been propagated ; at one time Gibraltar was to be besieged, and officers were dis- patched to examine the Mediterranean coasts of Spain and Barbary ; at another, Portugal was to become the theatre of great events ; and a mysterious importance was attached to all the movements of the French ar- mies, with a view to deceive a court that fear and sloth disposed to the belief of any thing but the truth, and to impose upon a people whose unsuspicious ignorance was at first mistaken for tameness. In the mean time, active agents were employed to form a French party at the capital ; and, as the insur- rections of Aranjuez and Madrid discovered the fierce- ness of the Spanish character, Napoleon enjoined more caution and prudence upon his lieutenant than the lat- ter was disposed to practise. In fact, Murat's precipi- tation was the cause of hastening the discovery of his master's real views before they were ripe for execution. For Dupont's first division and cavalry had crossed the Duero as early as the 14th of March, and upon thff 10th of April had occupied Aranjuez, while his sec- ond and third divisions took post at the Escurial and at Segovia, thus encircling the capital, which was soon occupied by Moncey's corps. It was then evi- dent that Muiat designed to control the provisional gov- ernment left by Ferdinand ; and the riot at Toledo, al- though promptly quelled by the interference of the French troops, indicated the state of the public mind, before the explosion at Madrid had placed the partie,* in a state of direct hostility. Murat seems to hav« been intrusted with only a half confidence, and as iiia natural impetuosity urged him to play a rash rather than a timid part, he appeared with the air of a con- queror before a ground of quarrel was laid. His poli- cy was too coarse and open for such difficult affairs, yet he was not entirely without grounds for his pro- ceeding; a letter addressed to him about this time by Napoleon contained these expressions : ' The dtJu of Infantado has a party in Madrid ; it will attack you i dissipate it, and seize the government.^ At Bayonne the political events kept pace with thoso of Madrid. Charles IV. having reclaimed his rights in presence of Napoleon, commanded the infant, Don Antonio, to relinquish the presidency of the governing junta to Murat, who, at the same time, received the ti- tle of lieutenant-general of the kingdom. This ap- pointment, and the restoration of Charles to the :egal dignity, were proclaimed in Madrid, with the acquies- cence of the Council of Castile, on the 10th of May; but five days previous to that period, the old monarch had again ceded his authority to Napoleon, and Ferdi- nand and himself were consigned, with large pensions^ to the tranquillity of private life. The throne of Spaiu being thus rendered vacant, the right to fill it was as- sumed by the French emperor in virtue of the cession made by Charles IV., and he desired that a king might be chosen from his own family. After some hesitation, the council of Castile, in concert with the municipali- ty of Madrid and the governing junta, declared that their choice had fallen upon Joseph Buonaparte, whc was then king of Naples ; and cardinal Bourbon, primate of Spain, first cousin of Charles IV., and archbishop of Toledo, not only acceded to this arrangement, but actually wrote to Napoleon a letter testifying his ad- hesion to the new order of things. As it was easy te 18 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book 1. fjretel the result of the election, the king of Naples was ' already journeying towards Bayonne, where he arrived on the 7lh of June. The principal men of Spain had neen previously invited to meet in that town upon the 15th, with a view to obtain their assent to a constitution prepared by Napoleon ; and at this meeting, called ' the Assembly of Notables,' ninety-one Spaniards of emi- nence appeared. They accepted Joseph as their king, proceeded to discuss the constitution in detail, and af- ter several sittings adopted it, and swore to maintain its provisions. Thus finished the first part of this eventful drama. | The new constitution was calculated to draw forth j all the resources of Spain; compared to the old system ■ it was a blessing, and it would have been received as i Buch under different circumstances, but now arms were j to decide its fate, for in every province the cry of war had been raised. In Catalonia, in Valencia, in Anda- lusia, Estremadura, Gallicia, and the Asturias, the peo- ple were gathering, and fiercely declaring their determi- nation to resist French intrusion. Nevertheless Joseph, upparently contented with the acquiescence of the ninety-one notables, and trusting to the powerful sup- port of his brother, crossed the frontier on the 9th of July; and on the TJth arrived at Vittoria. The inhabi- tants still remembering the journey to Bayonne, seem- ed disposed to hinder his entrance; but their opposi- tion did not break out into actual violence, and the next morning he continued his progress by Miranda del Eb- To, Breviesca, Burgos, and Buitrago. The 20th of July he entered Madrid, and on the 24th he was pro- claimed king of Spain and the Indies, with all the solem- nities usual upon such occasions, thus making himself the enemy of eleven millions of people, the object of a nation's hatred ! W ith a strange accent, and from the midst of foreign bands, he called upon a fierce and haughty race to accept of a constitution which they did not understand, and which few of them had ever heard of. his only hope of success resting on the strength of his brother's arms, his claims uDor". the consent of an imbecile monarch, and the weakness of a few pusillani- mous nobles, in contempt of the rights of millions now arming to oppose him. This was the unhallowed part of the enterprise; this it was that rendered his offered constitution odious, covered it with a leprous skin^and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution of its touch ! CHAPTER III. Council of Castile refuses to take the oath of alle^^iance — Su- preme junta estalilished at Seville — ^Marquis of bolano niur- oered at Cadiz, and the coiKie d'Aguilar at Seville — Inter- course between Castanos and sir Hew Dalryniple — General Spencer and adniirrd Purvis offer to co-0|)erate with the Spaniarls-^Admiral Rostily's squadron surrenders to Morlu — General insurrtction — Massacre at Valencia — Horrible niur- de.r of Kilanghieri. Joseph being proclaimed king, required the council of Castile to take the oath of allegiance prescribed by the constitution ; hut, with unexpected boldness, that body, hitherto obsequious, met his orders with a remon- strance, for war, virtually declared on the 2d of May, was at this time raging in all parts of the peninsula, nnd the council was secretly apprized that a great mis- fortune had befallen the French arms.* It was no long- er a question between Joseph and some reluctant public bodies ; it was an awful struggle between great nations ; and how the spirit of insurrection, breaking forth simul- taneously in every province, was nonxished in each, un- til it required the consistence of regular warfare, I will now relate. * Memoir of O'Farril, and Azaaza. Just before the tumult . ' Arasjuez, the marquis of Solano y Socoro, commaLuing the Spanish auxiliary force in the Aleiutejo, had received an order from Godoy^ to withdraw his division, and post it on the frontier of" Andalusia, to cover the projected journey of Charles IV. Napoleon was aware of this order, but would not interrupt its execution, wherefore Solano quitted Portu- gal without difficulty, and in the latter end of May, observing the general agitation, repaired to his govern- ment of Cadiz, in the harbour of which place five French sail of the line and a frigate, under admiral Rossily, had just before taken refuge from the English fleet. Seville was in a great ferment, and Solano, in passing through was required to put himself at the head of an insurrection in favour of Ferdinand VII., he re- fused, and passed on to bis own government ; but there also the people were ripe for a declaration against the French. A local government was established at Seville, which assuming the title of ' Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies,' declared war in form against the intru- sive monarch, commanded all men between the ages of sixteen and forty-five to take arms, called upon the troops of the camp of San Roque to acknowledge their authority, and ordered Solano to attack the French squadron. That unfortunate man would not acknowl- edge the authority of this self-constituted government, and as he hesitated to commit his country in war against a power whose strength he knew better than he did the temper of his own countrymen, he was murdered. His ability, his courage, his amiable and unblemished character, have never been denied, and yet there is too much reason to believe that the junta of Neville sent an agent to Cadiz for the express purpose of procuring his assassination. This foul stain upon the cause was en- larged by the perpetration of similar, or worse deeds, in every part of the kingdom. At Seville the conde d'Aguilar was dragged from his carriage, and without even the imputation of guilt, inhumanly butchered ; and here again it is said that the mob were instigated by a leading member of the junta, count Gusman de Tilly, a man described as ' capable of dishonouring a whole nation by his crimes,' while his victim was uni- versally admitted to be virtuous and accomplished. As early as April, general Castaiios, then command- ing the camp of Sari Roque, had entered into communi- cation with sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of Gibral- tar. He was resolved to seize any opportunity that of- fered to resist the French, and he appears to have been the first Spaniard, who united patriotism with prudent calculation : readily acknowledging the authority of the junta of Seville, and stifling the workings of self-inter- est, with a virtue by no means common to his country- men at that period. When the insurrection first broke out, admiral Purvis commanded the British squadron off Cadiz, and in concert with general Spencer, w ho happened to be in that part of the world with five th,^u- sand men, offered to co-operate with Solano, in an attack upon the French ships of war in the harbour. Upon the death of that unfortunate man, this offer was renewed and pressed upon don Thomas Morla, his successor; but he, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, refused all assistance, and reduced the hostile ships iiimself.— » Castafios, however, united himself closely with the British commanders, and obtained from thum supplies of arms, ammunition, and money ; and at the instance of sir Hew Dalrymple, the merchants of Gibraltar ad- vanced a loan of forty-two thousand dollars for the ser- vice of the Spanish patriots. * Meanwhile the assassinations at Cadiz and Seville were imitated in every part of Spain ; hardly can a town be named in which some innocent and worthy per- sons were not slain. | Grenada had its murders ; Car- • Sir Flew Dalryniple's correspondence. t Moniteur. Aianza and O'Farril : Nellerto. 1808. NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 17 thagena rivalled Cadiz in ruthless cruelty, and Valencia reeked with blood. Don Miiruel de Saavedra, the oovernor of that city, was killed, not in the first fury of cemmotion, which he escaped, but, having returned, v.-as deliberately sacrificed. Balthazar Calvo, a canon of the church of San Isido, at Madrid, came down to Valencia, and having collected a band of fanatics com- menced a massacre of the French residents ; and this ruthless villain continued his slaughters unchecked, un- til French victims failing, his raging thirst for murder urged him to menacethejimta, who with the exception of the English consul Mr. Tupper, had given way to his previous violence, but now readily found the means to crush his power. The canon, while in the act of brav- inor their authority, was seized by stratagem, and soon afterwards strangled, together with two hundred of his band. The conde de Serbelloni, captain-general of the province, then proceeded to organize an array, the old count Florida Blanca placed himself at the head of the Wurcian insurrection, and his force acted in unison with that of Valencia. In Catalonia the occupation of Barcelona repressed the popular effervescence, but the feeling was the same, and an insurrection, breaking out at the town of Man- resa, soon spread to all the unfettered parts of the prov- ince. In Aragon the arrival of don Joseph Palafox kin- dled the fire of patriotism. He had escaped from Bay- onne, and his family were greatly esteemed in a coun- •jry where it was of the noblest among a people absurd- ly vain of their ancient descent. The captain-general, fearful of a tumult, ordered Palafox to quit the prov- ince, but this circumstance, joined to some appearance of mystery in his escape from Bayonne, encreased the passions of the multitude ; a crowd surrounded his abode, and forced him to assume the command, the captain-general was confined, some persons were mur- dered, and a junta was formed. Palafox was consid- ered by his companions as a man of slender capacity and creat vanity, and there is nothing in his exploits to create a doubt of the justness of this opinion ; it was not Palafox that upheld the glory of Aragon, it was the spirit of the people, wbich he had not excited, and could 60 little direct, that for a long time after the commence- ment of the first siege, he was kept a sort of prisoner in Zaragoza, his courage and fidelity being distrusted by the population which he is supposed to have ruled. The example of Aragon aroused the Navarrese, and Logrono became the focus of an insurrection which ex- tended along most of the valleys of that kingdom. In the northern and western provinces, the spirit of in- dependence was equally fierce and as decidedly pro- nounced, accompanied also by the same excesses. In Badajos the conde de la Torre del Frenio was butch- ered by the populace, and his mangled carcass dragged through the streets in triumph. At Talavera de la Reyna, the corregidor with difficulty escaped a similar fate by a hasty flight; Leon presented a wide, unbro- ken scene of anarchy, and, generally speaking, in all the great towns violent hanos were laid upon those who opposed the people's wishes. Gallicia seemed to hold back for a moment, but the example of Leon, and the arrival of an agent from the Asturias, where the insurrection was in full force, pro- duced a general movement. A junta was formed, and Filanghieri, the governor of Coruiia, an Italian, was c.illed upon to exercise the functions of royalty by de- claring war in form against France. Like every man of sense in Spain he was unwilling to commence a revolution upon such uncertain grounds, and the impa- tient populace sought his death ; he w^s saved at the moment by the courage of an officer of his staff, yet his horrible f ite was only deferred. Being a man of talent and sincerely attached to Spain, he exerted him- self to orga lize tlie r 'ilary resources of the provinc*, and no suspicion attached to his conduct ; hut such was the inherent ferocity of the peo-ple and of the lime, tlial the soldiers of the regiment of Navarre seized him z} Villa Franca del Bierzo, and, as some say, stuck him full of bayonets, while others assert that tliey plante.i their weapons in the ground, and then tossing him oi; to their points, left him tiiere to struggle, and then d\i- banded themselves. The Asturians were the first who proclaimed th^ir indefeasible right of choosing a new government when the old one ceased to afford them protection. Tliey established a local junta, declared war against the French, and despatched deputies to England to solicit assistance. Meanwhile, although the gr«at towns ii Biscay and the Castiles were overawed by fifty thou- sand bayonets, the peasantrj' commenced a war, in their own manner, against the stragglers and the sick, an'- thing but commendable. Constituted as modern state* are, with little in their systems of government or edu- cation adapted to nourish intense feelings of patriotism, it would be miraculous indeed if such a result was oh tained from the pure virtue of a nation, wliich for two centuries had groaned under the pressure of civil and relioious despotism. The Spanish character, with relation to public affcirs, is distinguished by inordinate pride and arrogance. Dilatory and improvident, the individual as well as the mass, all possess an absurd confidence that every thing is practicable which their heated iniao;inations suggest; once excited, they can see no difficulty in the execu- tion of a project, and the obstacles th^'y encounter are attributed to treachery; hence the sudden murder of so many virtuous men at the conmencemt nt of this com- motion. Kind and warm in his attachments, but bit- ter in his anger, the Spaniard is nntient under priva- tions, firm in bodily sufferin--, [.rone to suauen passion, vindictive, bloody, rememberir? ^ asult longer than .if jury, and cruel in his revenge. With a strong natural perception of what is noble, his promise is lofty, but as he invariably permits his passions to get the mas- tery of his reason, his performance is mean. In the progress of this war, the tenacity of vengeance pecu- liar to the nation supplied the want of cool, perseve- ring intrepidity ; but it was a poor substitute for that essential quality, and led rather to deeds of craft and cruelty than to daring acts of patriotism. Now the abstraction of the royal family, and the unexpected pre- tension to the crown, so insultingly put fortli by Napo- leon, had aroused all the Spanish pride, and tlie tumults of Madrid and Aranjuez, prepared the public mind fir a violent movement ; the protection afforded by the French to tlie obnoxious Godoy increased the ferment of popular feeling, because a dearly cherished ven- geance was thus frustrated at the moment of its ex- pected accomplishment, and the disappointment excited ull l'^ It fierceness of anger which wi'h Spaniards is, foi 18 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book J the moment, uncontrollalile ; and then came the tumult of Madrid, which, swollen and distorted, was cast like Caesar's body before the people to urge them to phren- zy; they arose, not to meet a danger the extent of ■which they had calculated, and were prepared for the sake of independence to confront, but to crratify the fu- ry of their hearts, and to slake their tiiirst of blood. Durinir Godoy's administration the property of the church iiad been trenched upon, and it was evident, from the example of France and Italy, that under the new system, tlie operation would be repeated ; this was a matter that involved the interests, and, of course, stimulated the activity of a multitude of monks and priests, who found no difficulty in persuading an igno- rant and bigoted people, that the aggressive stranger was also the enemy of religion and accursed of God. With processions, miracles, prophecies, distribution of reliques, and the appointment of saints to tlie command of the armies, they fanaticised the mass of the patriots, and in every part of the peninsula the clergy were dis- tinguished for their active zeal ; monks and friars were invariably, either leaders in the tumults, or at the side of those who were, instigating them to barbarous ac- tions. Buonaparte found the same cause produce simi- lar effects during his early campaigns in Italy; and if the shape of that country had been as favourable for protracted resistance, and a like support had been fur- nished by Great Britain, the patriots of Spain would have been rivalled by modern Romans.* The continental system of mercantile exclusion was another spring of this complicated machinery. It threatened to lessen the already decayed commerce of the maritime towns, and the contraband trade, which has alwaj's been carried on in Spain to an incredible extent, was certain of destruction ; with that trade the fate of one hundred thousand excise and custom-house officers was involved. | It required but a small share of penetration to perceive, that a system of armed reve- nue officers, organized after the French manner, and stimulated by a vigorous administration, would quickly put an end to the smuggling, which was, in truth, only a consequence of monopolies and internal restrictions upon the trade of one province w'ilh another — vexations abolished by the constitution of Bayonne : hence all the activity and intelligence of the merchants engaged in foreign trade, and all the numbers and lawless vio- lence of the smugglers, were enlisted in the cause of the country, swelling the ranks of the insurgent patri- ots ; and hence also, the readiness of the Gibraltar mer- chants to advance the loan before spoken of. 'I'he state of civilization in Spain was likewise ex- actly suited to an insurrection, for if the people had been a little more enlightened, they would have joined the French, if very enl ightened, the invasion could not have happened at all. But in a country where the comforts of civilized society are less needed, and therefore less attended to than in any other part of Europe ; where the warmth and dryness of the climate render it no sort of privation, or even inconvenience, to sleep for the great- est part of the year in the open air; and where the universal custom is to go armed, it was not difficult for any energetic man to assemble and keep together large masses of the credulous peasantry. No story could be too gross for their belief, if it agreed with their wishes. * Es verdad, los dicen,' ' It is true, they say it,' is the invariable answer of a Spaniard if a doubt is expressed of the truth of an absurd report. Temperate, posses- sing little furniture, and generally hoarding all the gold he can get, he is less concerned for the loss of his hojse than the inhabitant of another country would be, and the etforl that he makes in relinquishing his abode, must not be measured by the scale of an Englishman's * Napoleon's Memoires, Campagne d'ltalie, Venise. \ Welkslej's letter to Uurrard. exertion in a like case ; once engaged in an adventure, the lightness of his spirits and the brilliancy of his sky, make it a matter of indifference to the angry peas- ant whither he wanders. The evils which had afflicted the country previous to the period of the French interference also tended to prepare the Spaniards for violence, and aided in turn- ing that violence against the intruders. Famine, od- prcssinn, poverty, and disease, the loss of commerce, and unequal taxation, had pressed sorely upon them. For such a system the people could not be enthusias- tic, but they were taught to believe, that Godoy was the sole author of the misery they suffered, that Ferdi- nand would redress their grievances; and as the French were the protectors of the former, and the oppressors of the latter, it was easy to add this bitterness to their natural hatred of the domination of a stranger, and it was so done.* Such were the principal causes which combined to produce this surprising revolution, from which so many great events flowed, without one man of eminent tal- ent being cast up, to control or direct the spirit thu3 accidentally excited. Nothing more directly shows the heterogeneous nature of the feelings and interests, which were brought together, than this last fact, which cannot be attributed to a deficiency of natural talent, for the genius of the Spanish people is notoriously ar- dent, subtle, and vigorous ; but there was no common bond of feeling, save that of individual hatred to the French, which a great man could lay hold of to influ- ence large masses. Persons of sagacity perceived, very early, that the Spanish revolution, like a leafy shrub in a violent gale of wind, greatly agitated, but disclosing only slight unconnected stems, afforded no sure hold for the ambition of a master-spirit, if such there were. It was clear that the cause would fail, un- less supported by England, and then England would direct ail, and not suffer her resources to be wielded for the glory of an individual, whose views and policy might afterwards thwart her own ; nor was it difficult to perceive that the downfall of Napoleon, not the re- generation of Spain, was the object of her cabinet. The explosion of public feeling was fierce in its ex- pression, because political passions will always be ve- hement at the first moment of their appearance among a people new to civil commotion, and unused to per- mit their heat to evaporate in public discussions. The result was certainly a wonderful change in the affairs of Europe, it seems yet undecided whether that change has been for the better or for the worse; and in the progress of their struggle, the Spaniards certainly de- veloped more cruelty than courage, more violence than intrepidity, more personal hatred of the French than enthusiasm for their own cause. They opened, in- deed, a wide field for the exertions of others, they pre- sented a fulcrum upon which a lever was rested that moved the civilized world, but assuredly the presiding genius, the impelling power, came from another quar- ter; useful accessories they were, hut as principals they displayed neither wisdom, spirit, nor skill suffi- cient to resist the j)rodigious force by which they were assailed. If thej' appeared at first heedless of danger, it was not because they were prepared to perish, rathei than submit, but that they were leckless of provoking a power whose terrors they could not estimate, and in their ignorance despised. It is, however, not surprising that great expec'atio.is were at first formed of the heroism of the Spaniards, and those expectations were greatly augmented by their agreeable qualities. There is not upon the face of the earth a people so attractive in the friendly intercourse of society. Their majestic language, fine persons, ai>d becoming dress, their lively imaginations, the inexprcs- * Historia dc la Gucrra contra Napolfou, 1808.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 19 sible beauty of their women, and the air of romance whicli thev throw over every action, and infuse into every feeling-, all combine to delude the senses and to impose upon the judgment. As companions, they are incomparably the most agfreeable of mankind, but dan- £r(-T and disappointmrnt attend the man who, confidiniiT in their promises and energy, ventures upon a difficult enterprise. ' Never do to-day what you can put off un- til to-morrow,' is the favourite proverb in Spain, and rigidly followed. CHAPTER IV New French corps formed in Navarre — Duhesme fixes him- Sf li'at Barcelona — Importance of that city — Napcleon'sinili- tarv plan and arrangements. The commotion of Aranjuez undeceived the French emperor, lie perceived that he was enffagred in a deli- cate enterprise, and that the people he had to deal with were anythinnr but tame and quiescent under insult. Determined, however, to persevere, he pursued his po- litical intrifjues, and without relinquishing the hope of a successful termination to the affair by such means, he arrano-pd a profound plan of military operations, and so distributed his forces, that at the moment when Spain was pouring forth her swarthy bands, the masses of the French army were concentrated upon the most important points, and combined in such a manner, that, from their central position, they had the power of over- whelming each separate province, no three of which could act in concert without first beating a French corps. And if any of the Spanish armies succeeded in routing a French force, the remaining corps could unite without difficulty, and retreat without danger. It was the skill of this disposition which enabled seventy thousand men, covering a great extent of country, to brave the simultaneous fury of a whole nation ; an ar- my less ably distributed would have been trampled un- der foot, and lost amidst the tumultuous uproar of eleven millions of people. In a political point of view the inconvenience which would have arisen from suffering a regular army to take the field, was evident. To have been able to characterise the opposition of the Spanish people, as a partial insurrection of peasants, instigated by some evil- disposed persons to act against the wishes of the res- pectable part of the nation, would have given some colour to the absorbing darkness of the invasion. And to have permitted that which was at first an insurrec- tion of peasants, to take the form and consistence of regular armies and methodical warfare, would have been a military error, dangerous in the extreme. Na- poleon, who well knew that scientific war is only a wise application of force, laughed at the delusion of those who regarded the want of a regular army as a favourable circumstance, and who hailed the undisci- plined peasant as the more certain defender of the country. He knew that a general insurrection can never last long, that it is a military anarchy, and inca- pable of real strength ; he knew that it was the disci- plined battalions of Valley Forge, not the volunteers of Lexington that established American independence; that it was the veterans of Arcole and Marengo, not the republicans of Valmy, that fixed the fate of the French revolution. Hence his efforts were directed to hinder thf Spaniards from drawing together any great body of regular soldiers, an event that might easily happen, for the gross amc^unt of the organized Spanish force was, in the month of May, about one hundred and twenty-seven thousand men of all arms. Fifteen thou- sand of these were in Holstein, under the marquis of Romana, but twenty thousand were already partially concentrated in Portugal, and the remainder, in whici: were comprised eleven thousand Swiss and thirty thousand militia, were dispersed in various parts of the kingdom, principally in Andalusia. Besides this force, there was a sort of local reserve called the ur- ban militia, much neglected indeed, and more a name than a reality, yet the advantage of such an institution was considerable ; men were to be had in abundance, and as the greatest difficulty in a sudden crisis is to prepare the framework of order, it was no small re- source to find a plan of service ready, the principle of which was understood by the people.* The French army in the Peninsula about the same period, although amounting to eighty thousand men, exclusive of those under .lunot in Portugal, had not more than seventy thousand capable of active opera- tions, the remainder were sick or in depots. The pos- session of the fortresses, the central position, and the combination of this comparatively small army, gave it great strength, but it had also many points of weak- ness ; it was made up of the conscri[)ts of different na- tions, French, Swiss, Italians, Poles, and even Portu- guese whom Junot had expatriated ; and it is a curious fact, that some of the latter remained in Spain until the end of the war. A few of the imperial guards were also employed, and here and there an old regiment of the line was mixed with the young troops to give them consistence, yet with these exceptions the French army must be considered as a raw levy, fresh from the plough and unacquainted with discipline :j" so late even as the month of August, many of the battalions had not com- pleted the first elements of their drill, :|: and if they had not been formed upon good skeletons, the difference be- tween them and the insurgent peasantry would have been very trifling.|| This fact explains, in some meas- ure, the otherwise incomprehensible checks and de- feats, which the French sustained at the commence- ment of the contest, and it likewise proves how little of vigour there was in Spanish resistance at the mo- ment of the greatest enthusiasm. In the distribution of these troops Napoleon attended principally to the security of Madrid. As the capital, and the centre of all interests, its importance was manifest, and the great line of communication between it and Bayonne was early and constantly covered with troops. But the imprudence with which the grand duke of Berg brought up the corps of Moncey and Dupont to the capital, together with his own haughty, impolitic demeanour, drew on the crisis of affairs be- fore the time was ripe, obliged the French monarch to hasten the advance of other troops, and to make a greater display of his force than was consistent with his policy. For Murat's movement, while it threat- ened the Spaniards and provoked their hostility, isolated the French army, by stripping the line of communica- tion, and the arrival of fresh battalions to remedy this error generated additional anger and suspicion at a very critical period. It was, however, absolutely necessary to fill the void left by Moncey's advance, and a fresh corps sent into Navarre, being, by successive reinforcements increased to twenty-three thousand men, received in June the name of the ' army of the Western Pyrenees.' § Mar- shal Bessieres assumed the command, and, on the first appearance of commotion, fixed his head quarters at Burgos, occupied Vittoria, Mir, nda de Ebro, and other towns, and pushed advanced posts into Leon. This position, while it protected the line from Bayonne to the capital, enabled him to awo the Asturias and Bis- cay, and also by giving him the command of the valley of the Duero to keep the kingdom if Leon and the pr> vince of Segovia in check. The town and castle of * Historia de la Guerra contra Napoleon I5uonaparte. + Napoleon's notes. \ 'I'liiehanlt. II Dupont's Journal, MSS. J Napoleon's note* 20 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR, [Book T. Bursfos, put into a state of defence, contained his dep'ts, and bi.caine the centre and pivot of his operations, while interniedi ite posts, and the fortresses, connected iiim with Uayonne, where a reserve of twenty thousand men was formed under general Drouet, then commanding the eleventh military division of France. Hy tlie convention of Fontainehleau, the emperor was entitled to send forty thousand men into the northern parts of Spain, and tliough the right thus acquired was grossly abused, t!ie exercise of it, being expected, creat- ed at first but little alarm ; it was however different on the eastern frontier. Napoleon had never intimated a wish to pass forces by Catalonia, neither the treaty nor tlie convention authorized such a measure, nor could the pretence of supporting Junol in Portugal be advanc- ed as a mask ; * nevertheless, so early as the 9th of February eleven thousand infantry, sixteen hundred cavalry, and eighteen pieces of artillery, under the com- mand of general Duhesme, | had crossed the frontier at La Jonquera, and marched upon Barcelona, leaving a detachment at the tov,-n of Figueras, the strong citadel of wliich commands the principal pass of the mountains. Arrived at Barcelona. Duhesme prolonged his residence there, under the pretext of wailing for instructions from Madrid relative to a pretended march upon Cadiz ■,'\: but his secret orders were to obtain exact information con- cerning the Catalonian fortresses, dep 'ts, and magazines, — to ascertain the state of public feeling, — to preserve a rigid discipline, — scrupulously to avoid giving any offencH to the Spaniards, and to enter into close com- munication with marshal Moncey, at that time com- manding the whole of the French army in the north of Spain. The political affairs were then beginning to indicate serious results, and as soon as the troops in the north were in a condition to execute their orders, Duhesme, whoso report had been received, was directed to seize upon the citadel of Barcelona and the fort of Monjuick. 'J'he citadel was obtained by stratagem ; the fort, one of the strongest in the world, was surrendered by the governor Alvarez, because that brave and worthy man knew, that from a base court he should receive no sup- port. It is said that, stung by the disgrace of his sit- uation, he was at one time ready to spring a mine be- neath the French detachments, yet his mind, betraying his spirit, sur.k under the weight of unexpected events. What a picture of human weakness do these affairs pre- sent ! — the boldest shrinking from the discharge of thfir trust like t!ie meanest cowards, the wisest following the march of events, confounded, and without a rule of action ! If sufh a firm man, as Alvarez afterwards proved himself to be, could think the disgrace of sur- renfi(^ring his charge at the demand of an insolent and perfiJious guest, a smaller misfortune than the anger of a miserable court, what must the state of public feel- ing have been, and how can those who, like O'Farril and Azanza, served the intruder, be with justice blam- ed, if, amidst the general stagnation, they could not perceive ti»e elements of a salutary tempest. At the view of such scenes Napoleon might well enlarge his ambitious designs, his fault was not in the projection, but in the rough execution of his plan ; another combina- tion would have ensured success, and the resistance be encountered only snows, that nations, like individuals, are but the creatures of circumstances, at one moment weak, trembling, and submissive, at another proud, haughty, and daring; every novel combination of events has an effect upon public sentinumt distinct from, and often at variance with what is called national character. The treacherous game played at Barcelona was re- newed at Figueras, with equal success, the citadel of • ?t. Cvr. •)• Nnpolrnn'" notes. { UuLljiu.'s Instructious, .'ar. 23ili. Vide St. Cjr. that place fell into the hands of the detachment left there; a free entrance, and a secure base of operations, was thus established in Catalonia; and when the mag- azines of Barcelona were filled, Duhesme, whose corps took the name of the ' army of the Eastern Pyrenees.' concluded that his task was well accomplished. The af- fair was indeed a momentous one, and Napoleon earnestly looked for its termination, before tlie transactions at Madrid could give an unfavourable impression of his ulterior intentions, for he saw the importance which, under certain circumstances, a war would confer upon Barcelona, which with its immense population, great riches, good harbour, and strong forts, might be called the key of the south of France or Spain, just as it hap- pened to be in the possession of the one or the other na- tion. The proximity of Sicily, where a large British foMe was kept in a state of constant preparation, made it more than probable that an English army would be quickly carried to Barcelona, and a formidable syste- matic war be established upon the threshold of France, and hence Napoleon, seeing the extent of the danger, obviated it, at the risk of rendering abortive the attempt to create a French party in Madrid. The greater evil of finding an English army at Barcelona left no room for hesitation; thirty or forty thousand British troops occupy- ing an intrenched camp in front of that town, support- ed by a powerful fleet, and having reserve depts in Sicily and the Spanish islands, might have been so wielded as to give ample occupation to a hundred and fifty thousand enemies. Under the protection of such an army, the Spanish levies might have been organized and instructed ; and as the actual numbers assembled could have been easily masked, increased, or diminish- ed,- and the fleet always ready to co-operate, the south of France, whence the provisions of the enemy must have been drawn, would have been exposed to descents, and all the inconvenience of actual hostilities. Tha Spanish provinces of Valencia, Murcia, and even Anda- lusia, being thus covered, the war would have been drawn to a head, and concentrated about Catalonia, the most warlike, rugged, sterile portion of Spain. Du- hesme's success put an end to this danger, and the affairs of B?rcelona sunk into comparative insignifi- cance ; nevertheless, that place was carefully watched, the troops were increased to twenty-two thousand men, their general corresponded directly with Napoleon, and Barcelona became the centre of a system distinct from that, which held the other corps rolling round Madrid as their point of attraction. The capital of Spain is situated in a sort of basin, formed by a semicircular range of mountains, which, under the different denominations of the Sierra de Guadarama, the Carpentanos, and the Sierra de Gua- dalaxara, sweep in one uitbroken chain from east to west, touching the Tagus at either end of an arch, of which that river is the chord. All direct communica- tions between Madrid and France, or between the for- mer and the northern provinces of Spain, must there- fore necessarily pass over one or other of these Sier- ras, which are separated from the great range of the Pyrenees by the valley of the Ebro, and from the Bis- cayan and Asturian mountains by the valley of the Duero. Now the principal roads which lead from France di- rectly upon Madrid are four. The first a royal causeway, which passing the fron- tier at Irun runs under St. Sebastian, and through a wild and mountainous country, full of dangerous de- filed, to the Ebro : it crosses that river by a stone bridge at Miranda, goes to Burgos, and then turning short to the left, is carried over the Duero at Aranda. After- wards encountering the Carpentanos and the Sierra de Guadalaxara it penetrates them by the strong pass of the Somosierra, and descends upon the capital. The se -and, v, hich is an ii;fcrioi road, commences at 1808.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 21 St> Jean P'lPd de Port unites with the first at Pampe- lona, runs through Taffalla, crosses the Ebro at Tude- In, and enters the basin of Madrid by the eastern range of the Sierra de Guadalaxara, where the declination of the mountains presents a less rugged barrier than the snowy summits of the northern and western partot the chain. The third threads the Pyrenees by the way of Jaca, passes the Ebro at Zaragoza, and uniting with the second, likewise crosses th-e Guadalaxara ridge. The fourth is the great route from Perpignan by Fi- gneras, Gerona, Barcelona, Cervera, Lerida, and Zara- goza, to Madrid. Thus Zaragoza, which contained fifty thousand in- habitants and was one of the great Spanish magazines for arms, furnished a point of union for two great roads and was consequently of strategic importance; an army in position there could operate on either bank of the Ebro, intercept the communication between the Eas- tern and Western Pyrenees, and block three out of the four great mutes to Madrid. If the French had occu- pied it in force, their army in the capital would have been free and unconstrained in its operations, and might have acted with more security against Valen- cia; and the danger from the united forces of Gallicia and Leon would also have been diminished, when the road of Burgos ceased to be the only line of retreat from the capital. Nevertheless, Napoleon neglected Zaragoza at first, because, having no citadel, a small body of troops could not control the inhabitants, and a large force, by creating suspicion too soon, would have prevented tlie success of the attempts against Pampe- lona and Barcelona, objects of still greater importance; neither was the heroic defence afterwards made within a reasonable calculation. The grand duke of Berg and the duke of Rovigo re- mained at Madrid, and from that central point appeared to direct the execution of the French emperor's projects ; but he distrusted their judgment, and exacted the most detailed information of every movement and transaction. In the course of June, Murat, who was suffering from illness, quitted Spain, leaving behind him a troubled people, and a name for cruelty which was foreign to his character. Savary remained the sole representative of the new monarch, and his situation was delicate. He was in the midst of a great commotion, and as upon every side he beheld the violence of insurrection, and the fury of an insulted nation, it behoved him to calculate with coolness and to execute with vigour. Each Span- ish province had its own junta of government, and they were alike enraged, yet not alike dangerous in their anger. The attention of the Catalonians was complete- ly absorbed by Duhesme's operations, but the soldiers which had composed the Spanish garrisons of Barce- lona, Monjuick, and Figueras, quitted their ranks after tlie seizure of those places, and joined the patriotic stan- dards in Murcia and Valencia ; the greatest part belong- ed to the S{)anish and Walloon guards, and they formed a good basis foranarmy which the riches of the two pro- vinces and the arsenal of Carthagena afforded ample military resources to equip. * The French had, howev- er, nothing to fear from any direct movement of tnis arrny against Madrid, as such an operation could only bring on a battle ; but if. by a march towards Zaragoza, the Valencianshad united with the Aragonese, and then operated against the line of communication with France, the insurrection of Catalonia would have been sup- ported, and the point of union for three great provinces fixed. In the power of executing this project lay the Bting of the Valencian insurrection, and to besiege Zaragoza and pievent such a junction was the remedy. Tiie importance of Andalusia was greater. Tlie regular troops which, under the command of the un- * Cabane's War m Catalonia, 1st Part. happy Solano, had been withdrawn Trom Portugal, were tolerably disciplined ; a large veteran force was assembled at the camp of San Roque under general Castauos, and the garrisons of Ceuta, Alo-eziras, Ca- diz, Granada, and other places being unitecf, the whole formed a considerable army, while a superb cannon foundry at Seville, and the arsenal of Cadiz, furnished the means of equipping a train of artillery. An active intercourse was maintained between the patriots and fhd English, and the juntas of Granada, Jaen. and Coido- va and the army of Estremadura, admitted the su- premacy of the junta of Seville. Thus Andalusia, rich, distant from tlie capital, and well fenced by the Sierra Morena, afforded the means to establish a sys- tematic war, by drawing together all the scattered ele- ments of resisiance in the southern and western prov- inces of Spain and Portugal.* This danger, pregnant with future consequences, was, however, not immedi- ate ; there was no line of offensive moment, against the flank or rear of the French army, open to the Anda- lusian patriots ; and as a march to the front, against Madrid, would have been tedious and dangerous, the true policy of the Andalusians was palpably defen- sive. In Estremadura neither the activity nor means of the junta were at first suflicient to excite much attention ; but in Leon, Old Castille, and Gallicia, a cloud was gathering that threatened a perilous storm. Don Gre- joria Cuesta was captain-general of the two former kingdoms. Inimical to popular movements, and of a haughty, resolute disposition, he at first checked the insurrection with a rough hand, and thus laid the foun- dation for quarrels and intrigues, which afterwards im- peded the military operations, and split the northern provinces into factions ; yet finally, he joiuf-d the side of the patriots. Behind him the kingdom of Gallicia, under the direction of Filanghieri, had prepared a large and efficient force, chiefly composed of the strong and disciplined body of troops \\hich, under the command of Tarranco. had taken possession of Oporto, and after that general's death had returned with Belosta to Gal- licia; the garrisons of Ferrol and Coruf.a, and a num- ber of soldiers flying from the countries occupied by the French, swelled this army, the agents of Great Bri- tain were active to blow the flame of insurrection, and money, arms, and clothing were poured into the prov- ince through their hands, because Coruua afforded an easy and direct intercourse v.'ith England. A strict connexion was also maintained between the Gnllician and Portuguese patriots, and the facility of establishing the base of a regular systematic war in Gallicia was, therefore, as great as in Andalusia; the resources were perhaps, greater, on account of the proximity of Great Britain, and the advantage of position at this time was essentially in favour of Gallicia, because, while the sources of her strength were as well covered from the direct line of the French operations, the slightest offfin- sive movement upon her part, by threatening the com- munications of the French army in Madrid, endangered the safety of any corps marching from the capital against the southern provinces. To be prepared against the Gallician forces was, therefore, a matter of pressing importance, a defeat from that quarter would have been felt in all parts of the army ; and no considerable, or sustained operation, could be undertaken against the other insurgent forces until the strength of Gallicia had been first broken. Biscay and the Asturias wanted regular troops and fortified towns, and the contracted shape of those prov- inces placed them completely v.ithin the power of the French, who had nothing to fear as long as they could maintain possession of the sea-p'.;it«. From this sketch it results that Savary, in classing « Mr. Stuait's Letters ; vide Parliamentary IVpcrs, 1310. 22 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book I. the (lan^rrs r* !• • situation, should have rated Gallicia and Leon in tl.c » st, Zarag^oza in the second, Andalu- sia in the third, t^.id Valencia in the fourth rank, and by that scale he onould have regfulatrd his operations. It was thus Napoleon looked at the affair, but the duke of Rovigfo, waveriniT in his opinions, nesjl-ected or niis- tinderstood the spirit of his instructions, lost the control of the operations, and sunk amidst the confusion which he had himself created. Nearly fifty thousand French and eighty g-uns were disposable for offensive operations in the beginning of June; collected into one mass, such an army was more than sufficient to crush any or all of the insurgent ar- mies combined, but it was necessarj' to divide it, and 1o assail several points at the same time. In doing ibis, the safety of each minor body depended upon the stability of the central point from whence it emanated, and again the security of that centre depended upon the strength of its communications with France ; in other words, Bayonne was the base of operations an at the same time. A change also took place in the -ijommand, for hitherto the French troops employ- ed in the siege formed a part of marshal Bessieres' corps, but the emperor now directed Lefebre to rejoin that marshal with a brigade, and then constituting the ten thousand men who remained with Verdier a separ- ate corps, gave liim the command. Verdier continued to press the siege as closely as his numbers would permit, but around him. the insurgents were rapidly organising small armies, and threatened to enclose him in his camp, wherefore he sent detach- ments against them •,X ^^'^ it is singular that, with so few men, while daily fighting with the besieged, he should have been able to scour the country, and put down the insurrection, as far as Lerida, Barbastro, Tu- dela, Jacca and Calatayud, without any assistance save what the garrison of Pampelona could give him from the side of Navarre. In one of these expeditions the powder-mills of Villa Felice, thirty miles distant, were destroyed, and the baron V^ersage was defeated, and forced to retire with his division towards Valencia. || During the course of July, Verdier made several as- saults on the gate of El Carmen and the Portillo, but he was repulsed in all, and the besieged having been rein- forced by the regiment of Estremadura. composed of eight hundred old soldiers made a sally with two thousand men to retake the Monte Torrero; they were, however, beaten, with the loss of their commander, and regular ap- proaches were then commenced by the French against the quarter of St. Engnicia and the castle of Aljaferia. The 2nd of August, the. besieged were again reinforced by two hundred men of the Spanish guards and volun- • Cavallero. +S. -nrnal of Lefebre 'g Operations, MSS. I Napoleon'i Notes. |J Cavallero. teers of Aragon, who brought some artillery with them, but the French aiso, were strengthened by two old rejri- ments of the line, wlii(,-h increased their numbers to fif- teen thousand men; and on the 3rd of August the breaching batteries opened against St. Engracia and Aljaferia ; the mortars threw shells at the same time, and a Spanish magazine of powder blowing up in tiie (~^osso a public walk formed on the line of the ancient Moorish ramparts, destroyed several housps. and killed many of the defenders. The place was then summon- ed, but as Palafox rejected all offers, a breach in the convent of St. Engracia was stormed on the 4lh. The French penetrated to the Cosso, and a confused and ter- rible scene ensued, for while some Spaniards defended the houses and some drew up in the streets, others fled by the suburb to the country, where the cavalry fell i.-pon them.* Cries of treason, the sure signals for assassina- tions, were everywhere heard, and all seemed lost, when a column of the assailants, seeking a way to the bridge over the Ebro, got entangled in the Arco de Cineja, a long crooked street, and being attacked in that situation, were driven back to the Cosso ; others began to plunder, and the Zaragozans recovering cour- age, fought with desperation, and finally set fire to tha convent of Francisco : at the close of day the French were in possession of one side of the Cosso, and the Spaniards of the other. A hideous and revolting spec- tacle was exhibited during this action, for tlie public hospital being set on fire, the madmen confined there, issued forth among the combatants, muttering, shout- ing, singine", and moping, each according to the char- acter of his disorder, while drivelling idiots mixt-d their unmeaning cries with the shouts of contendin^r soldiers. f The Spaniards now perceived that, with courage, tho town might still be defended, and frtim that day the fighting was murderous and constant; one party en- de-.v:ir:ng to take, the other to defend the hcuses. In this warfare, where skill was nearly useless, Ver« dier's force was too weak to make a rapid progress, and events disastrous to the French arms taking phce in other parts of Spain, he received, about the 10th, orders from the king to raise the siege, and retire to Logrona. Of this operation I shall speak in due tirne.^ OBSERVATION'S. L Mere professional skill and enterprise do not con- stitute a great general. Lefebre Desnouettes, by his activity and boldness, with a tithe of their numbers, defeated the insurgents of Aragon in several actions, and scoured the open country; but the same Lefebre, wanting the hiirher qualities of a general, failed miser- ably where that intuitive sagacity which reads passinor events aright, was required. There were thousands in the French army who could have done as well as lie, probably not three who could have reduced Zaragoza ; and yet it is manifest that Zaragoza owed her safety to accident, and that the desperate resistance of the inha- bitants was more the result of chance than of any pecu- liar virtue. 2. The feeble defence made at Mallen, at the Xalon, at the Monte Torrero, at Epila; the terror of the be- sieged on the IGlh, when the French penetrated into the town ; the flight of Palafox under the pretence of seeking succour; nay. the very assault which in such a wonderful manner called forth the eneruy of the Zar- agozans. and failed only because the French troops plundered, and, by missing the road to the bridge, mis- sed that to victory, proves, that the file of the city was determined by accident, in more than one of those nico conjunctures, which mt^n of genius know how to seize, but others leave to the decision of fortime. However, • Cavallero. + Ibid. I S. Journal of Lefebre's Operations, ^ISS. 1808.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 25 it must be acknowledg-ed that Lefebro and Verdipr, es- pecially the latter, displayed both vio-our and talent; for it was no mean exploit to quell the insurrections to a distance of fifty miles on every side, at the same time investinrr double their own numbers, and pushing the attack with such ardour as to reduce to extremity a rity so detended. 3. The current romantic tales, of women rallyinrr the I troops and leadinrrthem forward at the most danjrerous I periods of this sioiTp, I have not touched upon, and may j perhaps he allowed to doubt; yet it is not unlikely,; I thai when suddenly environed with horrors, the deli- ' cite sensitiveness of women, drivinn;- them to a kind I of phrenzy. mifrht produce actions above the heroism of men, and in patient sufferinof their superior fortitude is acknowledfjed by all nations: wherefore I neither wholly believe, nor will deny, their exploits at Zarag-o- za, merely reRTarkin^, that for a long time a*''<:;rwards, Spain swarmed with heroines from that city, clothed in half uniforms, and loaded with weapons. 4. The two circumstances that principally contribu- ted to the success of the defence were, the bad disci- pline of the French soldiers, and the system of terror which was established by the Spanish leaders, who- ever those leaders were. Few soldiers can be restrain- ed from plunder when a town is taken by assault, yet there is no period when the chances of war are so sudden and so decisive, none where the moral respon- sibility of a s^eneral is so g^reat. Will military reg-u- lations alone secure the necessary discipline at such a ' moment 1 The French army are not deficient in a stern code, and the Enorlish army, tiken altog-elher, is prob- ! ably the best refrulated of modern times ; but here it is seen that Lefebre failed to take Zaratroza in default of discipline; and in the course of this work it will ap- pear, that no wild horde of Tartars ever fell with more \ licenee upon their rich effeminate neitrhbours, than did j the English troops upon the Spanish towns taken by storm. The infcence to be drawn is, that national in- | stitutions orlv will produce that moral discipline ne- ; cessary to make a soldier capable of fulfilling^ his whole j duty; yet vhe late Lord Melville was not ashamed to declare in parliament that the worsi men make the best [ soldiers; and this odious, narrow-minded, unworthy, maxim, had its admirers. That a system of terror was j at Zaragfoza successfully employed to protract the de- ferice is undoubted. The commandant of Monte Tor- 1 rero, ostensibly for sufferingf himself to be defeated, ] but according to some for the gratification of private malice, was tried and put to death ; a general of artil- ; lery was in a more summary manner killed without any trial, and the chief engineer, a man of skill and un- daunted courage, was arbitrarily imprisoned. The Fligrhtest word, or even gesture, of discontent, was punished with instant death.* A stern band of priests, and plebeian-leaders, in whose hands Palafox was a tool, ruled with such furious energy, that resistance to the enemy was less dangerous than disobedience to their orders: stispicion was the warrant of death, and this system once begun, ceased not until the town was takeu-^in t!ie second siege. CHAPTER VI. Operations in Catalonia — Gpneral Swartz marches ag-ainsf the tjwn of Mnnrf Si, and "general Chabran a'r^onst Tar:;g-ona — p'renrh defeattH at Briirh — Chabran roralled — Burns Arbos — Marches atiy westward of the Llobregat is rugged and (lifTicult for an army, had reached Tarragona on the Sth without encnintering an enemy ; but when he at- tempted to return, tbe line of his march was intercept- ed bv the insuroents. who took post at Vendrill, Arbos, and Villa Franca, and spread themselves along the banks of the Llobregat. As he approached Vendrill the somatenes fell back to Arbos, and were defeated there, whereupon the French set fire to the towm, and proceeded to \'illa Franca. Here the excesses so com- • mon at this time among the Spaniards were not spared ; the governor, an old man, and several of his friends, \ had been murdered, and the perpetrators of these crimes, as might be expected, made little or no defence against the enemy. Meanwhile general Lechi moved out of Barcelona, and actino- in concert with Swartz's I brigade, which had reached Martorel. cleared the banks of the LlobrefT-at and formed a junction at J^an Felice •with Chabran on the 11th. The latter, after a day's rest, then marched with his own and Swartz brigade i on Manresa to repair the former disgrace, and he arri- [ ved at Bnich the 14th ; but the somatenes assisted by j some regular troops with artillery, were again there, and Chabran, more timid even than Swartz. finding that in a partial skirmish he made no impression, took the extraordinary resolution of retreating, or rather fly- insr from these gallant peasants, who pursued him with scoffs and a galling fire back to the very walls of Barcelona. Tliese successes spurred on the insurrection. Gero- na, Rosas. Ilostalrich. and Tarrasrona prepared for de- fence. The somatenes of the Ampurdan, obliged the French commandant to quit the town of Figueras, and shut himself up with three hundred men in the citadel, while others, g;Hhering between the Ter and the Besos, intercepted all communication between France and Barcelona. In this predicament, Duhesme resolved to make a sudden attempt on Gerona, with six thousand of his best troops, and einrht pieces of artillery; but as tlie fortress of Hostalrich stood in the direct road, he followed the coast line, and employed a French priva- teer, then in the harbour, to attend his march. The somatenes soon got intelligence of his desio-ns ; one multitude took pesession of the heitjhts of Moncada, which are six mi'es from Barcelona, and overhang the road to Hostalrich ; another multitude was posted on the ridge of Mongat, which, at the same distance from Barcelona abuts on tbe sea, and these last were pro- tected on the left by an intrenched castle with a battery j of fifteen gtins, and on the right were slightly connect-! pd with the people at Moncaila. The 17ih, Duhesme, • after s/^me false movements, defeated them, and a de- tachment from Barcelona dispersed those at IMoncada the same day; the 18th, the town of Mattarowas taken Brd plundered, the somatenes were again def(>ated at the pass of St. Pol, and at nine o'ch^ck in tlie morning; of the 20th, the French appeared befjre Gerona. | This town, built on the right bank of the Ter, is cut' in two by the Ona. To the eastward it is confined by I strong rocky hills, whose points filling the space be- tween the dfia and the Ter, overlook the town at dif ferent distances. Fort Mont .louy, a regular fortification, crowned the nearest hill or table land, at five hundred yards' distance; three other forts, namely tlial of the Constable, that of queen Ann, and that of Capuciiins, all connected by a ditch and rampart, formed one ir- regular outwork, a thousand yards in length, and com- manding all the ridge to the south-east. The summit of this ridge is five, eight, and twelve hundred yards from Gerona, and sixteen hundred from Fort Mont Jouy, and is separated from the latter by tlie narrow valley and stream of the Gallegan. South-west, between the left of the Ofia and the Ter, the country is comparatively flat, but full of hollows and clefts close to the town, and the body of the place, on that side, was defended by a ditch and five regular bastions connected by a wall with towers. To the west the city was covered by the Ter, and on the east fortified by a long wall with towers having an irregular bastion at each extremity, and some small detached works placed at the opening of the valley of Gallegan. Three hundred of the regiment of Uitonia and some artillery-men composed the garrison of Gero- na ; thev were assisted by volunteers and by the citi- zens, and the somatenes also assembled on the left of the Ter to defend the passags of that river. Duhesme, after provoking some cannon-shot from the forts, occupied the village of St. Eugenia in the plain, and making a feint as if to pass the Ter by the bridge of Salt, engaged the somatenes in a useless skirmish. Great part of the day was spent by him in preparing ladders for the attack ; at five o'clock in the evening the French jrtillery opened from the heights of Palau, and then a column crossing the OTia passed between the outworks and the town, threw out a de- tachment to keep the garrison of the fornner in check, and assaulted the gate of El Carmen.* This attempt failed completelj', and with great loss to the assailants. Two hotirs after, another column advancing by the left of the Oi"^,a, assaulted the bastion of Santa Clara, but with so little arrangement or discipline, that the storm- ing party had only three or four ladders ;f and although by favour of the hollows they reached the walls unper- ceived, and the Neapolitan colonel Ambrosio and the engineer Lafaille actually gained the top of the ram- parts, the confusion amongst the assailants was such, that no success w^as obtained. Duhesme. tried negoci- ation on the following day, )'et dreading a longer absence from Barcelona, broke up on the 22d, and returned by forced marches, leaving Chabran with some troops in Mattaro as he passed. During his ab- sence the victorious somatenes of Bruch had descended the Llobregat, rallied those of the lower country, and getting artillery from Tarragona and other fortresses, planted batteries at the difl'erent passages of the river, and entrenched a line from San Boy to Martorel, Regular officers now took the command of the peas- ants. Colonel Milans assembled a body at Granollers ; don .luan Claros put himself at the head of the peasants of the Ampurdan; colonel Baget look the command of those at Bruch. Chabran, after a few days' rest at Mattaro, made a for- aging excursion through the district of El Valles, but !Milaus, who held the valley of the Congosta, encoun- tered him near Granollers, and both sides claimed the victory; Chabran, however, retired to Barcelona, and Milans remained on the banks of the Besos. The 30th, Duhesme caused the somatenes on the Llobregat to be attacked, sent Lechi to menace those at the bridge o*" Molinos del Hey, and the brigades of Bessieres and Goullus, to cross at San Boy; the latter having sur- prised a battery at that point, turned the whole line, * St. Cyr. t Lafaille. 1808.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 27 ZTii Lechi then crossinp^ the river by the briilge of Mo- linos, ascendcH the left bank, took all the artillery, burnt several villages, and put the insurgenln to flio-ht. They however rallied ajrnin, at Bruch and Igualada, and returning' the Gth of Jul}% infested the immediate vicinity of Barcelona, taking possession of all the liills between San Boy and Moncada, and connecting their operations with colonel Rlilans. Other parties collected between the Besos and the Ter, and the line of insur- rection was extended to the Ampurdan ; .Tuan Clares occupied the flat country about Rosas, and the French garrison of Figueras having burnt the town, were blocked up in the fort of San Fernando by two thousand somatenes of the Pyrenees; a nest of Spanish privateers was formed in Palamos Bay, and two English frigates, the Imperieuse and the Cambrian, watched the coast from Rosas to Barcelona. A supreme junta was now established at Lerida, and opened an intercourse with Aragon, Valencia, Seville, Gibraltar, and the Balearic islands; it also decreed, that forty tercios, or regime nts of one thousand men, to be selected from the somatenes, should be paid and organized as regular troops, and that forty others should be kept in reserve, but without pay. This state of affairs being made known to Napoleon through the medium of the moveable columns watching the valleys of the eastern Pyrenees, he ordered general Reille, then commanding the reserve at Perpignan, to take the first soldiers at hand and march to the relief of Figueras ; after which, his force being increased by drafts from the interior of France to nine thousand, he was to assault Rosas and besiege Gerona ; and the em- peror imagined, that the fall of the latter place would induce the surrender of Lerida, and would so tranqiiil- lize Catalonia, that five thousand men might again be detached towards Valencia. On receiving this order, Reille, with two battalions of Tuscan recruits, cenduet- ed a convoy safely to Figueras and raised the blockade, but not without difficulty, for his troops were greatly terrified, and could scarcely be kept to their colours.* He however relieved the place the lOlh of July, and the same day, Duhesme, who had been preparinyf for a second attack on Gerona, quitted Barcelona with six thousand infantry, some cavalry, a battering train of twenty-two pieces, and a great number of country car- riages to transport his ammunition and stores, leaving Lechi in the city with five thousand men. Meanwhile Reille, having victualled Figueras and received a part of his reinforcements, proceeded to invest Rosas; but he had scarcely appeared before it, when Juan Claros raised the country in his rear, and Captain Otway, of the Montague, landing with some marines, joined the migueletcs, whereupon the French retired with a loss of two hundred men. ■{" Duhesme pursued his march by the coast, but the somatenes broke up the road in his front, Mil.ins hung on his left, and Lord Cochrane, with the Imperieuse fiigate and some Spanish vessels, cannonaded his right. Thus incommoded, he halted five days in front of Are- nas de Mar, and then dividing his force, sent one part across the mountains by Villagorguin, and another by San Isicle. The first column made an attempt on Hos- talrich, and failed; the second, beating Milans, dis- persed the somatenes of the Tordera, and finally, Duhesme united his forces before Gerona, but he lost many carriages on his march. The 23d he passed the Ter, and dispersed the migueletes that guarded the left bank. The 24th general Reille, coming from Figueras with six thousand men, took post at Puonte INIayor, and the town was invested, from that point, by the heights of San Miguel to the Monte Livio; from Monte Livio by the plain to the bridge of Sail; and from thence along the left bank of the Ter to Sarria. The garrison, • Foy's History. ••• Lord CoUingwood'g despatch, Aug 27. Foy's History. consisting of five hundred migueletes and four hundred of the regiment of Lltonia, was reinforced on the 25th by thirteen hundred of the regiment of Barcelona, who entered the town with two guns ; the defences were la bad repair, hut the people were resolute. In the night of the 27lh, a French column passed the valley of the Galligan, gained the table land of Mont Jouy. and of three towers, which the Spaniards aban- doned in a panic. This advantage so elated Duhesme, that he resolved, without consulting his engineer, to break ground on that side;* but at this period a great change in the affairs of Catalonia had taken place. f The insurrection hitherto confined to the exertions of the unorganized somatenes, was now consolidated by a treaty between lord Collingwood, who commanded the British navy in the INIedilerranean, and the marquis of Palacios, who was captain-general of the Balearic isles; thus the Spanish fleet and the troops in INIinorca, Ma- jorca, and Ivica, became disposable for the service of the patriots.:!: Palacios immediately sent thirteen hun- dred men to the port of San Felice di Quixols to rein- force the garrison of Gerona, and these men entered that city, as we have seen, on the 25th, while Palacios himself disembarked four thousand others, together with thirty-seven pieces of artillery, at Tarragona, an event which excited universal joy, and produced a sur- prising eagerness to fight the Frencli. The supreme junta immediately repaired to that town, declared Pala- cios their president, and created him commander-in-chief, subject, however, to their tutelar saint. Narcissus, who was appointed generalissimo of the forces by sea and land, the ensigns of authority being, with due solemni- t)', placed on his coffin. The first object with Palacios was to re-establish the line of the Llobregat. To effect this, the c;u?it of Cal- dagues, with eighteen hundred men and four guns, marched from Tarragona in two columns, the one mov- ing by the coast way to San Boy, and the other by the royal road, through Villafranca and Ordal. Caldagnes, in passing by tlie bridge of Molino del Hey, established a post there, and then ascending the left bank, fixed his quarters at Martorel, where colonel Baget joined him with three thousand migueletes of the new levy. Now the Llobregat runs within a few miles of Barcelona, but as the right bank is much the steepest, the lateral communications .easier, and as the heights command a distinct view of everything passing on the opposite side, the line taken by Caldagues was strong, for the country in his rear was rough with defiles, and very fitting for a retreat after the loss of a battle. General Lechi, thus hemmed in on the west, was also hampered on the north, because the mountains fill- ing the space between the Llobregat and the Besos, ap- proach in tongues as near as two and three miles from Barcelona, and the somatenes of the Manresa and Vails districts occupying them, skirmished daily with the French outposts. And beyond the Besos, which bounds Barcelona on the eastward, a lofty continuous ridge, ex- tending to Ilostalrich, runs parallel to and at the dis- tance of two or three miles from the sea coast, separa- ting the main from the marine roads, and sending its shoots down to the water's edge ; this ridge also swarmed with somatenes, who cut off all communica- tion with Duhesme, and lay in leaguer round the castle of Mongat, in which were eighty or ninety French. The Cambrian and the Imperieuse frigates blockaded the harbour of Barcelona itself; and, on the .31st, lord Cochrane having brought his vessel alongside of INIon- gat, landed his marines, and, in concert with the soma- tenes, took it, blew up the works, and rolled the rocks and ruins down in such a manner as to destroy the * St. CjT. Campaign in Catalonia. t Calwnes' History. i St. Cyr. Cabanes' History, 2d Part. 28 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR, [Book I. To?.(l.* Thus, at the very moment that Duhesme com- menced the siepre of Gernna, he was cut oiT from his own base of operations, ami the communication between Fifjueras and general Rcille's division was equally in- Pecure ; for the latters convoys were attacked the 2Sth of July and the 3d of Aucrust; and so fiercely on the 6lh, that a Neapolitan battalion was surrounded, and lost one hundred and fifty men.[ Palacios, whose forces increased daily, now wished 1 to make an effort in favour of Gerona, and with this view sent the count of Caldajiues, at tlie head of three or four thousand men, part miirueletes, part refjulars, to interrupt the progress of tiie siege, intending to follow himself with greater forces. Caldngues marched by Tarrasa, Sabadell, Granollers, and San Celoni, and reached Hostalrich the mnrning of the 10th, where his ff>rce was increased to five thousand men and four guns. The l3th, he entered Ll.igostera, and the 14th Castel- lar, a small place situated behind the ridges that over- look Gerona, and only five miles from the French camps. Here .Tuan Claros with two thousand five hun- dred migueletes, mixed with some Walloon and Span- ish Guards from Rosas, met him, as did also Milans witii eight I'.undred somatenes. A communication with the junta of Gerona was then opened. Fort Mont Jouy was upon the point of surrendering, but the French, who were ignorant «( Caldagues' approach, had, con- trary to good discipline, heaped their forces in the plain between the let't of the Ona and the Ter, but only kept a slender guard on the hills, while a single battalion protected the batteries raised against Mont Jouy. Being an enterprising man, the Spanish general resolved to make an immediate effort for the relief of the place, and, after a careful observation, sent, on the 16th, several columns against the weak part of the besiegers' line, the garrison sallied forth at the same time from Mont Jouy, and the French guards being taken between two fires, wee quickly overpowered, and driven first to the Puf-nte Mayor and finally over the Ter. The Catalans re-formed on the hills, expecting to be attacked ; but Duhesme and Reille remaiopd quiet until dark, and then breaking up the siege, fled, the one to Figueras, the other to Barcelona, leaving both artillery and stores behind. Duhesme at first wished to retreat by the coast, but at Callella he learned that the road w;is cut, that an English frigate was ready to rake his columns, and that the somatmes were on all the heights, wherefore, destroying his ammunition, he threw his artillerj' over the rocks, and, taking to the mountains, forced a pas- sage through the somatenes to Mongat, where Lcchi met him and covered the retreat to Barcelona. Observation 1st. — Three great communii'ations pierce the Pyrenean frontier of Catalonia, leading di- rectly upon Barcelona. The first, or Pnycerda road penetrates between the sources of the Segre and the Ter. 'I'be second, or Campredon road, between the sources of the Ter and the Fluvia. riie third, or Figueras road, between the sources of the Miiga and the sea-coast. The first and second unite at Vicqne; the second and third are connected by a transverse road running from Olot, by Castle P'ollit, to Gerona; the third also divid- ing near the latter town, leads with one branch through Hostalrich, and with the other follows the line of the icoast. After the union of the first and second at Vicque, a single route pursues the stream of the Besos to Bar- celona, thus turning the Miiga, the Fluvia, the Ter, the Tordera, Besos, and an infinity '^f minor streams, which in their rapid course to the .Mediterranean, furrow all the country between the eastern Pyrer. -cs and Barce- lona. The third, which is the direct and best commu- nication between Perpignan and the capital of Catalo- nia, crosses all the above-named rivers, and their deep channels and sudden floods offer serious obstacles to the march of an army. All these rnads, with the exception of that from Olot to Gerona, are separated by craggy mountain ridges scarcely to be passed by troops : and the two first lead- iucr throutrh wild and savage districts, are incommodeil by defiles, and protected by a number of old castles and walled places, more or less capable of resistance. The third, passing through many rich and flourishing places, is however completely blocked, to an invader, by the strong fortresses of Figueras and Rosas on the Muga, of Gerona on the Ter, and Hostalrich on the Tordera. Palamos and other castles likewise impede the coast road, which is moreover skirted by rocky mountains, and exposed for many leagues to the fire of a fleet. Such is Catalonia, eastward and northward of Barcelona. On the west, at five or six miles distance, the Llobre- gat cuts it off from a rough and lofty tract, through which the Cardena, the Noga, the Foix, Gaya, Angue- ra, and Francoli rivers, breaking down deep channels, descend, in nearly parallel lines, to the coast, and the spaces between are gorged witli mountains, and studdert witii fortified places which command all the main roads. So few and contracted are the plains and fertile val- leys, that Catalonia may, with the exception cf the rich parts about Lerida, and the Urgel, be described as a huge mass of rocks and torrents, incapable of supplying subsistence even for the inhabitants, whose prosperity depends entirely upon manufactures and commerce. Barcelona, the richest and most populous city in Spain, is the heart of the province, and who masters it, if he can hold it, may suck the strength of Catalonia away. But a French army, without a commanding fleet to as- sist, can scarcely take or keep Barcelona; the troops must be supplied by regular convoys from France, the fortresses on the line of communication must be taken and provisioned, and the active intelligent population of the country must be beaten from the rivers, pursued into their fortresses, and warred down by exertions which none but the best troops are capable of: for the Catalans are robust, numerous, and brave enough after their own manner. Observation 2d. — It follows from this exposition, that Duhesme evinced a surprising want cf fore- thought and military sagacity, in neglecting to secure Gerona, Hostalrich, and 7\irragona, with garrisons, when his troops were received into those places. It was this negligence that rendered the timid operations of Swartz and Chahran capital errors; it was this that enabled some poor, injured, indignant peasants to kin- dle a mighty war, and in a very few weeks obliged Na- poleon to send thirty thousand men to the relief of Bar- celona. Observation 3d. — Duhesme was experienced in bat- tles, and his energy and resources of mind have been praised by a great authority ;* but undoubtedly an ab- sence of prudent calculation and arrangement, a total neglect of military discipline, marked all his opem tions in Catalonia, witness his mode of attack on Ge- rona, the deficiency of ladders, and the confusion of the assaults ;f witness also his raising of the second siege, and absolute flight from Caldagues, whose rash en- terprise, although crowned with success, should have caused his own destruction. In those affairs it is cer- tain Duhesme displayed neither talent nor vigour; but in the severities he exercised at the sacking of Matta- ro, in the burning of villages, which he executed to the extreme verge of', if not beyond what the harshest laws of war will justify, an odious energy was apparent ;:^ Lord CoIIing^ood'i despatchei. f St. Cyr. * Napoleon. f ^^t- f^.V. J Jy'apoleou'B notes. St. Cjr. Cabaues. 1808.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 29 and as the ardour of the somateneswas rather increased than repressed by these rigorous proceeding's, iiis con- duct may be deemed as impolitic as it was barbarous. It is however to be remembered that Duhesme has not wanted defenders, who, assertino^ that he was humane and just, accuse Lechi, his equal in rank, of being the author of the severities exercised at Barcelona.* Observation 4th. — In Catalonia all the inherent cru- elty (*f the Spaniards was as grossly displayed as in any other province of Spain; the Catalans were like- wise vain and superstitious. But their courage was higher, their patriotism purer, and their efforts more sustained, the somatenes were bold and active in bat- tle, the population of the towns firm, and some of the juntas apparently disinterested ; the praise merited and bestow'cd, upon the people of Zaragoza is great, yet Gerona more justly claims the admiration of m.ankind. For the Aragonese troops were by Lefebre driven from the open country in crowds to their capital, and little was wanted to induce them to surrender at once ; it was not until the last hour that, gathering courage from despair, the people of Zaragoza put forth all their energy, whereas those of Gerona, although attacked by a greater force, and possessing fewer means of de- fence, without any internal system of terror to coun- terbalance their fear of the enemy, manfully and suc- cessfully resisted from the first. The people of Zara- goza rallied at their heauhstone, those of Gerona stood firm at the porch. But quitting these matters, I must now, following the order I have marked out, proceed to relate the occurrences in Valencia. OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL MONCEY. The execution of Calvo and his followers changed the horrid aspect of the Valencian insurrection ; the epirit of murder was checked, and the patriotic energy assumed a nobler appearance. Murcia and Valencia were united as one province, and towards the end of June, nearly thirty thousand men, armed and provided nith artillery, attested the resources of these rich prov- inces, and the activity of their chiefs. The Valencians then conceived the plan of marching to the assistance of the Aragonese ; but Napoleon had already pre- scribed the rneasuies which were to render such a movement abortive. An order, dated the .?Oth of May, had directed Mon- key to move, with a column often thousand men, upon Cuenca; from that point he was to watch the country Comprised between the lower Ebro and Carthagena, and he was empowered to act against the city of Va- lencia if he judged it fitting to do so. The position of Cuenca was advantageous; a short movement from thence to the left would place Moncey's troops upon the direct line between Valencia and Zaragoza, and enable him to intercept all communication between those towns;! and a few marches to the right would place him upon the junction of the roads leading from Carthagena and V'alencia to Madrid. If he thought it essential to attack Valencia, the division of general Chabran was to co-operate from the side of Catalonia, by which combination the operations of Lefebre Des- nouettes at Zaragoza, and those of Duhesme in Cata- lonia, were covered from the Valencians ; and at the same time the flank of the French army at Madrid was protected on the side of Murcia. The Gth of June Moncey marched from Aranjuez by Santa Cruz, Tarancon, Carascoso, and Villa del Osma, and reached Cuenca the 11th. Here receiving infor- mation of the rapid progress of the insurrection, of the state of the Valencian army, and of the projected movement to relieve Zaragoza, he resolved to make an attempt against the city of Valencia. :J: In this view, * I^falUe \ Ibid. f S. Journal of Moncfy's Operations MSS. supposing general Chabran to be at Tortosa, he or- dered him to march upon Castellon de la Plana, a town situated at some distance eastward of the river Guadalaviar, proposing him&elf to clear the country westward of that river, and he fixed the 25th of June as the hatest period at which the two columns were to communicate in the immediate vicinity of Valencia. Halting from the 11th to the Ujth at Cuenca, he marched the 17th to Tortola, the 18th to Buenaches, the 19ih to Malilla, the 20th to Minglanilla, and the 21st to Pesquiera ; but from Buenaches to Pcsquiera no inhabitants were to be seen, the villages were de- serted, and either from fear or hatred, every living per- son fled before his footsteps. At length, a Swiss regi- ment, some of the Spanish guards, and a body of armed peasantry, made a stand at the bridge of Pajaso, upon the river Gabriel, and the manner in which the country had been forsaken, the gloomy and desolate marches, and the sudden appearance of an armed force ready to dispute this important pass, prognosticated a desperate conflict ; yet the event belied the omens, scarcely any resistance was made. Moncey, having informed general Chabran of this success, appointed the 27th and 28th for a junction un- der the vralls of Valencia. The next day he took a position at Otiel ; * but hearing that the defeated patri- ots had rallied and, reinforced, to the number of ten or twelve thousand, were intrenching themselves upon his left, he quitted the direct line of march to attack them in their post of Cabrillas, which was somewhat in ad- vance of the Siete Aguas. The Spanish position was of extraordinary strength, the flanks rested upon stee]> rocky mountains, and the only approach to the front was through a long narrow defile, formed by high scarped rocks, whose tops, inaccessible from the French side were covered with the armed peasantrj' of the neighbourhood. As a direct assauh upon such a po- sition could not succeed, and general Harispe was di- rected to turn it by the right, while the cavalry and artil- lery occupied the attention of the Spaniards in front ; that general soon overcame the obstacles of ground, reached the Spanish troops, and defeated thein, with the loss of all their cannon, ammunition and baggage, and also of the Swiss regiment which came over to the victors. This action happened on the 24th, it freed Moncey's left flank, and he resumed his march by the direct road to Valencia, where he arrived the twenty- seventh. The ancient walls remained, all the ap- proaches were commanded by works hastily repaired or newly raised, the citadel was in a state of defence, and the population were willing to fight. A city, containing eighty thousand people actuated by violent passions, cannot be easily overcome ; and Valencia, built upon low ground, and encircled with nu- merous canals and cuts, made for the purposes of irri- gation, had its deep ditches filled with water, so that no approach could be made except against the gates. An assault seemed hopeless, but it is said that the mar- shal had corrupted a smuggler, who promised to betray the city during the heat of the assault, and it is proba- ble that some secret understanding of that kind in- duced him to make an attempt which would otherwise have been rash and unmilitary. Don Joseph Caro. a brother to the marquis of Ro- mana, was with four thousand men entrenched behind the canal of the Guadalaviar. five miles in advance of the city gates ; and as the village of Quarte, and some thickly planted mulberry trees, helped to render this post very strong, Moncey, who attacked it upon the 27th, met with a vigorous resistance. Caro was, how- ever, beaten, and chased into the city, with the loss of some cannon, and on the 28th the French drove in the outposts, and occupied all the principal avenues of the • S. Journal of Moocej's Opei^tions M.SS. 30 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book I. town. Enthusiastic as the Valencians were while the I enemy was at a distance, Monce3''s appearance filled j them wilh terror, and ii is possible that a vig-orous as- sault niiufht have succeeded at the first moment of con- j Btejrnation ; vet the favourable opportnnity. if it really | existed, quickly passed away. Padre liico, a friar' distinofuished by his resolution, traversi-d the streets, ■with a cross in one hand and a sword in the other, | arousinor the sinkinir spirit and excitincr ihe fanaticism j of the multitude; Xhe fear of retaliation for the massa- | ere of the French residents, and the certainty that Mon- cey's troops were few, powerfully seconded his efforts, and as it is usual for undisciplined masses of people to pass suddenly from one extreme to another, fear was soon succeeded b\' enthusiasm. After dispnsinpr his field-pieces at the most favoura- ble points, Moncey. while the impression of Caro's defeat was fresh, summoned the g^overnor. The latter answered. 'That he would defend the city,' and the French fire then opened ; but the heavy cruns of the Spaniards soon overpowered it. A warm skirmish about the houses of the suburbs and at the gates en- sued, and the Valencians foug-ht so well, that when the! niofht fell, no impression had been made on the defen- ces; the assailants were repulsed with loss at every point, and the situation of the French marshal became delicate. The persons sent to seek Chabran could gfain no intelljorence of that jjpneral's movements; the secret connexions in the town, if any there were, had failed ; the ammunition was nearh^ expended, and the army was encumbered with seven or eiiiht hundred wounded men, and amonor them the general of engineers. Mon- cey, swayed b}' these circumstances, relinquished his attack, aiid the'29th fell back to Quarte. \Vhen it is considered that in a great city only a small number of persons can estimate justly the im- mense advantages of their situation and the compara- tive weakness of the enemy, it must be confessed that the spirit displayed by the Valencians upon this occa- sion was very sfreat ; unfortunately it ended here, nothinor worthy of such an energetic commencement was afterwards performed, although very considerable armies were either raised or maintained in the prov- ince. At Quarte, the French ascertained that the captain- general, Serbelloni. was marching upon Almanza to in- tercept the communication wilh Chieva and Bunol, whereupon Moncey resolved to relinquish the line of Cuenca. and attack him before he could quit the king-- dom of Murcia.* This vigrorous resolution lie executed with great celerity; for, directing the head of his col- umn towards Torrente, he continued his march until night, halting a short distance from that town, and by a forced march the next diy reached Alrira, only one ieague from the river Xurar. From his bivouac at that place he despatched advice to general Chabran of this change of affairs, and meanwhile Serbelloni, surprised in the midst of his movement, and disconcerted in his calculations by the decision and rapidity of Moncey, took up a position to defend the passage of the Xucar. 'ITie line of that river is strong, and offers many advan- tageous points of resistance, but the Spaniards impru- dently occupied both banks, and in this exposed situa- tion they were attacked on the morning of the 1st of July. The division on the F'rench side of the river ■was overthrown, the passage forced without loss of time, and Serbelloni retired to the heights of San Fe- lice, which covered the main road leading from Alcira to Almanza, hoping to secure the defiles m front of the latter town before the enemy could arrive there. But Moncey was again too quick for him ; leaving San Fe- lice to his left, he continued his march on another route, and by a strt nuous exertion seized the gorge of the de- * Jour'ial of Mun''ef . files near Almanza late in the night of the 2d, and when the Spanish troops approaclied his position, lie dispersed them at day-break on the 3d, and captured some of their guns. The road being now open, Mon- cey entered Almanza, and then marched by Bonete, and Chinchilla to Albacete, where he got intelligence that Frere's division, which he expected to find at San Clemente, was gone to Requena. To understand this movement of Frere, it must be known, that, when Dupont and Moncey marched a- gainst Anil«ilusia and Valencia, two divisions were re- tained by Savary to scour the country near Madrid, and to connect the operations of the main bodies ; but they were ill-managed. General Gobert, who, following Napoleon's orders, should have been at Valladolid, re- inforced Dupont ; and general Frere was sent to Reque- fia to reinforce Moncey. when he should have been at San Clemente, a central point, from whence he could have gained the road of Seville, that of Valencia and Cuenca, or that of Carthagena. Meanwhile the people of the Cuenca district having suddenly overpowered a detachment left there by Moncey, Savary ordered Frere to move from San Clemente to Requena, and sent Cau- laincourt from Taracon to quell the insurgents, which was effected with great slaughter on the 3d of July ; and the town of Cuenca was pillaged. Hence when Frere, who quitted San Clemente the 26th, reached Requeiia, he found the country quiet, heard of Caulain- court's success, and discovered that IMoncey, having crossed the Xucar, was on the road to San Clemente. Then retracing his steps, he returned to the latter place with troops, sickly, wearied, and exhausted by these longf useless marches in t!ie heat of summer. Moncey now re-organized his forces, and was pre- paring artillery and other means for a second attempt against Valencia, when he was interrupted by Savary, who, alarmed at the advance of Cuesta and Blake, re- called Frere towards Madrid. The marshal, extremely offended that the duke of Rovigo, inflated with momen- tary power, should treat him with so little ceremony, then abandoned San Clemente, and returned by the way of Ocana to the capital.* OBSERVATIONS. 1. The result of marshal Moncey 's campaign was published by the Spaniards, as a great and decisive failure, and produced extravagant hopes of final suc- cess ; a liappy illusion, if the chiefs had not partaken of it, and pursued their wild course of mutual flattery and exaggeration, without reflecting that in tr«fth there was nothing very satisf;ictory in the prospect of affiiirs. Moncey's operation Avas in the nature of a moveable column, the object of which was to prevent the junc- tion of the Valencian army with the Arag nese; the attempt upon the town of Valencia was, th(>refore, a simple experiment, which, successful, would have pro- duced great effects, failing, was of trifling consequence in a military point of view. Valencia was not the es- sential object of the expedition, and the fate of the general campaign depended upon the armies in Old Castile. 2. It was consoling that a rich, and flourishing town, had not fallen into the power of the enemy ; but at the same time, a want of real nerve in the Spanisii insur- rection was visible. The kingdoms of .Murcia and \ a- lencia acted in concert, and contained two of the richest sea-port towns in the Peninsula; their united forca amounted to thirty thousand organized troops, exclu- sive of the armed peasants in various districts, ami the populace of Valencia were deeply committed by the massacre of the F'rench residents. Here then, if in any place, a strenuous resistance was to be expected ; nevertheless, marshal Moncey, whose whole force was, at first, only eight thousand French, and never exceeded * Foy't Hiitorj. 1808.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 31 ten thousand men. continued marcl-.ing^ and fipfhting without cessation for a month, forced two of the stroncr- est mountain passes in the world, crossed several larire and difficulirivers, and carried the war into the streets of Valencia. Disanpciiited of assistance from Catalonia, he yet extricated himself from a difficult situation, de- feated his opponents in five actions, killed and wound- ed a nunibei of them, equal in amount to the whole of his own force, and made a circuit of above three hun- dred miles throun-h a hostile and populous country, without havincr sustained any serious loss, without any desertion from the Spanish battalions incorporated with his own, and what was of more importance, having those battalions much increased by desertions from the enem3^ In short, the jrreat object of the expedition had been attained, the plan of relieving Zaragoza was entirely frustrated, and the organization of an efficient Spanish force retarded. But Moncey could hardly have expected to succeed against the town of Valen- cia; for to use Napoleon's words, 'a city with eighty thousand inhabitants, barricatloed street,^, and artillery ■placed at th" gates, cannot be taken by the collar. 3. General Frere's useless march to Reque^'a was very hurtful to the French, and the duke of Rovigo was rated by the emperor for his want of judgment upon the occasion : 'It was a folly,' the latter writes, 'to dream of reinforcing Moncey, because, if that mar- shal failed in taking the city by a sudden assault, it be- came an affair of artillery, and twenty thousand men, more o\ less, would not enable him to succeed.' — ' Frere could do nothing at Valencia, but he could do a great deal at San Clemente; because from that post he could support either iNIadrid or general Dupont.' 4. Moncey was slightly blamed by the emperor for not halting within a day's march of Valencia, in order to brt-ak the spirit of the people, and make them feel the weight of the war; but this opinion was probably formed upon an imperfect knowledge of the local de- tails. The marshal's line of operations from Cuenca was infested by insurgent bands, his ammunition was nearly exhausted, he could hear nothing of Chabran's division, the whole force of Murcia was collecting upon his flank and rear, the country behind him was favora- ble for his adversaries, and his army was encumbered by a number of wounded men; it was surely prudent, under L^ui-h circumstances, to open his communication again with Madrid as quickly as possible. By some authors, the repulse at Valencia has been classed with the inglorious defeat of Dupont at Baylen, but there was a wide difference between the events, the generals, and the results. Moncey. although an old man, was vigorous, active, and decided, and the check he received produced little effect. Dupont was irreso- lute, sloAV, and incapable, if not worse, as I shall here- after show ; but before describing his campaign, I must narrate ihe operations of the Gallician army. CHAPTER VII. Second operations of Bessierfs — Bkke's and Cuesta's armies unite at Benevpnle--Generals disngree — Battle of Rio Seco , — Bfsiiere:?' enJeavDur to corrupt the Spanish generals fails — Bessieres inarches to invade Gallicia, is recalled, and falls back to Burgos-— Observations. OPERATIONS OF BESSIERES AGAINST BLAKE AND CUESTA. While Bcssieres' moveable columns, ranging over the Asturian and Biscayan mountains, dispersed the insurgent patriots of those provinces, Cuesta, undis- mayed by his defeat at Cabezon, collected another ar- my at Benevente, and prepared to advance again to- wards Burgos ; and he was supported by the Gallici- an army, which Filanghieri had organized without dif- ficulty, because the abundant supplies poured in from England were beginning to be felt, and patriotism is never more efhcacious than when supported by large sums of money. Taranco's soldiers joined to the gar- risons of Ferrol arid Corur.a, had been reinforced with new levies, to twenty-five thousand men, and being well equipped, and provided witli a considerable train of artillery, were assembled at Manzanal, a strong pos in the mountains, twelve miles behind Astorga. The situation of that city offered great advantages to the Spaniards, for the old Moorish walls whfrh sur- rounded it were complete, and susceptible of beintr strengthened, so as to require a regular siege ; but a siege could not be undertaken by a small force, while the army of Gallicia was entrenched at Manzanal, and while Cuesta remained at Benevente; neither could Bessieres, with any prudence, attack the Gallicians at Manzanal while Cuesta was at Benevente, and wiiile Astorga contained a strong garrison. Filanghieri, who appears to have had some notion of its value, had com- menced forming an entrenched camp in the mountains; but being slain by his soldiers, Joachim Blake suc- ceeded to the command, and probably fearing a similar fate, if the army remained stationary, left one divis- ion at Manzanal, and with the remainder marched to- wards Benevente to unite with Cuesta. Bessieres immediately collected his scattered col- umns at Palencia, and his plan, founded upon instruc- tions from Bayonne, was to make a rapid movement against Cuesta, in the hope of beating him, while Blake was still behind Leon; then wheeling to the right, to drive the Gallicians back to the mountains, to overrun the flat country with his numerous cavalry, to open a communication with Portugal, and after receiving cer- tain reinforcements, preparing for him, to subdue Gal- licia, or assist Junot, as might seem most fitting at the time.* At this period the king was on his journey to Mad- rid, and the military system of Napoleon was brought to its first great crisis; for unless Bessieres was suc- cessful, there could be no sure footing for the French in the capital ; and as Madrid was the base of Moncey's and Dupont's operations, the farther prosecution of theii plans depended upon the result of the approaching strug'jle in the plains of Leon. Napoleon, foreseeing this crisis, had directed Savary to occupy Segovia, to send general Gobert's division to Valladolid, and to hold Vedel's and Frere's, the one in La Maiicha, a few marches from the capital, and the other at San Clemen- te, a central point connectincr Moncey, Dupont, and Madrid. But Savary, unable to estimate justly the relative importance of the different operations, sent Ve- del and Gobert into Andalusia, to reinforce Dupont, when he should rather have recalled the latter to the northern side of the Sierra Morena ; he caused Frere, as we have seen, to quit San Clemente, and march by Requefia against Valencia, at th? moment when Mon- cey was retiring from that city through Alurcia to San Clemente; thus he dispersed and harassed his reserves by long marches to the south without any definite ob- ject, when the essential interests were at stake in the north. Now, struck with fear at the approach of Cu esta and Blake, whose armies he had hitherto disre< garded, he precipitately recalled Frere, Vedel, Goliert, and even Dupont, to !\Iadrid; too late to take part with Bessieres in the coming battle, but exactly timed to frustrate Moncey's projects, and, as we shall hereafter find, to ensure the ruin of Dupont. In this manner, steering his vessel against every wind that blew, he could not fail of storms. Greatly was Napoleon discontented with these er- rors; he relied, and with reason, on the ability of bes- sieres for a remedy, but to Savary he sent the follow- ing instructions, dated the 13th of .July: * Journal of Bessieres' Operations MSS. Napoleon's not;». 32 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book 1. marches and army is hcco ' Marsha! with JiJ0cen til • The French a^^airs t?i Spain would be in an excellent etatt if GoberCs division had marched upon VulIadoUd, and Frtre''s had occupied San Ciemente, u-i'h a moveable column, three or finir marches tjj)on the route (f general Dtipnnl. Gobert having been directed upon Jhipont, Frere heins %'i'h Munccij, harassed and enfeebled by itermarches, the position of the French advantageous, res fs this day at Medina del Rio S-co nd men, irfunlry, cavalry, and artille- ry ; the loth or lulh he will attack Benevcnte, open a communication with Portugal, drive the rebels into Gnlli- cia, and seize upon Leon. If his operations succeed l/ivs, and in a bril.'iant manner, the position if the French army will an^ain be as good as it iras. ' If general Cuesfa retires from Ber.cvente without fight- ing, he will move by Zeimora and Salamanca to gain Avila and Segovia, certain that then Bessitres cannot jmr- 8u? hi:.!, as, in that case, he would be menaced by the army of Gallicia, whose advanced guard is at Leon. The gene- ral who commands at Madrid must then be able to assemble six or sei'cn thousand men and march upon Cuesfa ; the citadel (f Segovia must be occupied by three or four hun- dred convalescents, with some guns and six icetAs^ biscuit. Jl was a s,r cat fault not to have occupied this citadel when the major-general ordered it ,■ of all the possible positions, Segovia is the most dangerous f,r the army ; the capital of a province, and situated between two routes; it deprives the army rf all its cummunicaiions, and the enemy once pos'ed in th^ citadel, the French army cannot dislodge him. Three or four hundred coiwalescents, a good commandant, and a squad if artillery, icill render the castle of Segovia impregnable fir some time, and will insure to the army tht irnfortant position ff Segovia. ' ^ general Cuesta throivs himsef into Gallicia without figh'ing or si'ffering a dtfat, the position rf the army will become better ; rf coune it will be still better if he does so, (fter having suffered a drftat. ' If marshal Bessieres faces Cuesfa at Benevente without attacking him, or if he is repulsed by him, his object u-ill always be to cover Burgos, and to hold the enemy in check as long as possih'e ; he anild, perhaps, be reirfureed with the three thousand troops of the line which accompany the king, but th-'n tht:re would be no room for hesitation. If Bessieres retires wilhiut a battle, he must be reiiforced in- i-'ani'y with six thousand men. If he retreats after a bat- tle wherein he has suffered great kss, it will be necessary to make great di.spo:tiiions ; to recall Frere, Gobert, Cau- lair.courl, and Vedel, by firced inarches to Madrid ,■ to withdraw Dupnnt into tht Sierra M'.reiw, or even bring him nearer to Madrid {keeping him always, however, seven or eight marches off), then to crush Cuesta and all the Gaili- eion army, ivhile Dvpont will serve as an advanced guard to h'dd the army 'f Andalusia in check.'' Howevf-r, before Bessieres could collect his troops, Blake effected a junction with Cuesta, at Benevente, and three plans were rpen to those generals. 1. To remove into the mountains, and take a position covering Gallicii. 2. To maintain the head of the Gallician army in advance of Astorga, while Cuesta, with his Castilians, pusliingby forced marches through Salamanca and Avila, reached Segcvia. 3. To advance farther into the plains, and try the fate of a battle. This last was rash, seeing that Bessieres was well provided with horsemen, and that the Spaniards had scarcely any ; but Cuesta, assuming the chief command, adopted it. He left a division at Benevente to protect l>is stores, and advanced, much against Blake's wishes, with twenty-five thousand re^u!ar infantry, a few hun- dred cavalry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artil- lery, in the direction of Palrncia. His march, as we liave seen, dismayed Savary. To usn Napoleon's expressions, he v< ho had beeu ' hUurlo acting as if the army of Gallicia was not in existence,^ row acted *as if Bessieres teas already beaten-' but that Oiarshal, f.rm and experienced, rather than risk an action of such impor- tance with insufficient means, withdrew even the gar- rison from the important post of St. Ander, and having' quickly collected fifteen thousand men and thirty pieces of artillery at Palcncia, moved forward on the i2th of July to the encounter. His line of battle consisted of two divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, and twenty-four guns, his reserve was formed of four battalions and some horse grenadiers of the imperial guards, wilh si\ pieces of artillery. On the 13th he halted at Ampudia and Torre de Mormojon, butadvancingon the 14tli in two columns, he drove in an advanced guard of one hundred and fifty Spanish cavalry, and arrived about nine o'clock in front of Rio Seco, where Cuesta's army was drawn up like some heavy, domestic animal, awaiting the spring of an active wild beast.* BATTLE OF RIO SECO. The first line of the Spaniards with all the heavy guns were posted along the edge of a sir p of land which had an abrupt fall towards tlie French. The second line, composed of the best tree [s, augmented but not strengthened by some eighteen thousand armed peasants, was displayed at a great distance behind the first, and the town of Rio Seco was in rear of the centre. Bessieres was at first startled at their nunlh^rs, and doubted if he should attack ; but soon perceiving the vice of Cuesta's disposition, he ordered gener.!n>asalle to make a feint, against the front, with the light caval- ry, while he himself, marching obliquely to the right, outstretched the left of the Spaniards, and suddenly thrust Merle's and Mouton's divisions and the imperial guards, horse and foot, between the lines, and threw the first into confusion ; at that moment LasrJle charged furiously, the Spanish front went down at once, and fifteen hundred dead bodies strewed the field. | The victor's ranks were disordered, and Cuesta made a gallant effort to retrieve the day, for, supported by the fire of all his remaining artillery, he advanced with his second line upon the French, and his right wing fall- ing on boldly, took six guns; but his left hung back, and the flank of the right was thus exposed. Bessie- res, with great readiness, immediately charged on this naked flank with ISIerle's division and the horse grena- diers, while the fourteenth provisionary regiment made head against the front ; a fierce short strucgle ensued, and the Spaniards were overborne, were broken and dispersed : meanwhile the first line rallied in the town of Rio Seco, but being a second time defeated by Mouton's division, fled over the plains, pursued by the light cavalry and suffering severely in their fliglit. X Five orsix thousand Spaniards were killed and wound- ed on the field, twelve hundred prisoners, eighteen guns, and a great store of ammuniiion, remained in the hands of the French, and the vanquished sougi:t safety in all directifuis, chiefl)' on the side of Benevente. [) Blake and Cuesta separated in wrath with each other, the former made for the mountains of Gallicia, and the latter towards Leon, while the division Ittt at Bene- vente dispersed. The French who had lost fifty killed and three hundred wounded, remained at Rio Seco all the 15th, and the 16ih advanced to Benevente, where they found many thousand EnoHsh muskets and vast quan- tities of ammunition, clothing and provisions. 'I'he communication wilh Portugal was now open, and Bes- sieres at first resolved to give his hand to Junot, but hearing that the fugitives were likely to rally on the side of Leon, he pursued them by the road of Villa- fere. On his march, learning that Cuesta was gone to Mayorga, he turned aside to that place, and on the 5J2d » S. Journal of Cessii res' Opt rations. f Ibid, } Ibid. y iMr. Stuart's Papere. 1808.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 33 captured there another pn-eat collection of stores ; for the Spanish general with the usual improvidence of his nation, had established all his magazines in the open towns of the flat country. After this Bessieres entered the city of Leon and remained there until the 29th, during which time he received the submission of the municipality, and pre- ■ pared to carry the war into Gallicia. Meanwhile the junta of Castile and Leon, whose power had hitherto been restrained by Cuesta, retired to Puente-Ferrada, assumed supreme authority, and the quarrel between the rrenerals having become rancorous, they sided with Blake. This appeared to Bessieres a favourable occa- sion to tamper with the fidelity of the chiefs. He therefore sent his prisoners back, argued the hopeless state of the insurrection, offered the viceroyalty of Mexico to Cuesta, and promised military ranks and honours to Blake. But as neither would listen to him, he had reached Puente Orbigo the 31st, intending to break into Gallicia, when he was suddenly recalled to protect the king; for Dupont had surrendered with a whole army in Andalusia. The victory of Rio Seco was rendered useless, the court was in consternation, and Bessieres immediately returned to Mayorga, where he took a defensive position. OBSERVATIONS. 1. As Blake was overruled by Cuesta, he is not responsible for the errors of this short campaign ; but the faults were gross on both sides, and it seems diffi- cult to decide whether Savary or Cuesta made the ^eatcst number. If Savary had sent Gobert's division to Valladolid, Bessieres would have had twenty-two thousand men and forty pieces of artillery in the field ; a torce not at all too great, when it is considered that the fiite of three French armies depended upon a battle, to which the Spaniards might have brought at least double the number. On the other hand, Cuesta having determined upon an offensive movement, disregarded the powerful cavalry of his enemy, and chose a field of battle precisely in the country where that arm would have the greatest advantage ; when he should have brought every man to bear upon the quarter which he did attack, he displayed his ignorance of the art of war, by fighting the battle of Rio Seco with twenty- five thousand men only, leaving ten thousand disci- plined troops in the rear, to guard positions which could not be approached until he himself was first beaten. Neither was the time well chosen for his ad- vance. Had he waited a few days, the port of St. Ander would have been attacked by eight English frigates, and a detachment of Spanish troops under the command of general da Ponte ; an enterprise that would have distracted and weakened Bessieres, but which was relinquished in consequence of the battle of Rio Seco. 2. Once united to Blake, Cuesta's real base of opera- tions was Gallicia, and he should have kept all his stores within the mountains, and not have heaped them up in the open towns of the flat country, exposed to the marauding parties of the enemy ; or covered, as at Be- nevente, by strong detachments which weakened his troops in the field and confined him to a particular line of operations in the plain. 3. The activity and good sense of marshal Bessieres overbalanced the errors of Savary. and the victory of Rio Seco was of infinite importance, because, as we have seen, a defeat in that quarter would have sliaken the French military system to its centre; it would also have obliged the king, then on his jour- ney to Madrid, to halt at Vittoria, until the distant divisions of the army were recalled to the capital, and 5J powerful effort made to crus-h the victorious enemy. Napoleon's observations are full of strong expressions c.f discontent at the imprudence of his lieutenant. — ''A 4 check given to Dupont,'' he says, ' would have a. slight cf- f^d, but a wound received by Bessieres would give a locked jaw to Ike whole army. Not an inhabitant if Madrid, not a peasajit of the valleys that docs not feel that the affairs of Spain are involved in the affairs of Bes- sieres ; how unfortunate, then, that in such a great event yuu have ivi fully given the enemy twenty chances against yourself.'' When he heard of the victory, he exclaim- ed, that it was the battle of Almanza, and that Bes- sieres had saved Spain. The prospect was indeed very promising; the king had arrived in Madrid, bringing with him the veteran brigade of general Rey and some French guards, and all fears upon the side of Leon being allayed, the affairs of Andalusia alone re- mained of doubtful issue ; for Zaragoza, hard pushed by Verdier, was upon the point of destruction, in de- spite of the noble courage of the besieged.* Nor did the subjugation of Andalusia appear in reason a hard task, seeing that Moncey was then at San Clemente, and from that point threatened Valencia, without losing the power of succouring Dupont, while Frere's and Caulaincourt's troops were disposable for any operation. In fine the French army possessed the centre, the Spaniards were dispersed upon a variety of points on the circumference without any connexion with each other, they were in force only upon the side of Andalu- sia, and the great combinations of the French emperor were upon the point of being crowned with success, when a sudden catastrophe overturned his able calcu- lations and raised the sinking hopes of Spain. It was the campaign in Andalusia which produced such important t fi:ects, and it offers one of tlie most interesting and curious examples, recorded by history, of the vicissitudes of war ; disorder, unaccompanied by superior valour, triumphed over discipline ; inexperien- ced officers were successful against practised generals, and a fortuitous combination of circumstances enabled the Spaniards, without any skill, to defeat in one day an immense plan, wisely arranged, emtiracing a variety of interests, and until that moment happily conducted in all its parts. This blow, which felled Joseph from his throne, marked the French army with a dishonour- able scar, the more conspicuous, because it was the only one of its numerous wounds that misbecame it. CHAPTER VIIL Dupont marclies ag'ainst Andalusia, forces the bridge of Alro- tea, takes Cordoba — Alarm at Seville — Castanos arrives, forms a new army — Dupont rttreats to Andujar, attacfcs the toviii of Jaen — Vedel forces the pass of Dcspenas Perros, arrives at Bavlen — Spanish army arrives on the Guadalquivir — Ge- neral Gobert defeated and killed — Generals Vedel and Dar- four retire to Carolina — General Reding takes possession of Baylen — Dupont retires from Andujar — Battle of Bavlen — Duponts capitulation, eighteen thousand French troops la}' down their arms — Observations — Joseph holds a council of war, resolves to abandon Madrid — Impolicy of so doing. OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA. Dupont was ordered to march against Cadiz with a force composed of the Spanish-Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding — Barbou's division of French in- fantry; Fresia's division of cavalry — a marine battal- ion of the imperial guards, and eighteen pieces of ar- tillery.]" Three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, were to join him at Seville, from tho army of Portugal ; three other Swiss regiments were in Andalusia, and it was expected that both they, and the troops at San Roque, would join the French army. In the latter end of May he traversed La Mancha, entered the Sierra Morena by the pass of Despenas Perros, and proceeded by Carolina and Baylen to Aii- ISapoleon's Noteg. | Journal of Dupont's Operations, MS. 34 NAPIKR'S PKMNSULAR WAR. [Book I. dujar, where he arrived the 2d of June. There he was informed that a supreme junta of government was es- tablished at Seville, that minor juntas ruled in Granada, Jaen, and Cordoba ; that war was formally declared n^inst the French, that the whole of Andalusia, was in arms and the Swiss reoriments ranirpd under the Spanish banners : lastly, that prpneral Avril, command- ing- the detachment expected from PortULnil, had halted in 1\ivora, and was preparing^ to return to Lisbon. Alarmed by this intellifjence, Dupont wrote to Murat and Savary to demand reinforcements, and in the mean time closed up the rear of his columns, and established an hospital in Andujar. The 6th he crossed the Gua- dalquivir, and continued his march towards Cordoba, followiuCT the left bank of the river. But two leagues from that ancient city the road recrossed the Guadal- quivir by a long stone bridge, at the farthest end of which stood the village of Alcolea ; and when the French general arrived there at daybreak on the 7th, his progress was opposed by the Spanish general Eche- varia, who had fortified the head of the bridge, placed twelve guns in battery on the right bank, and was pre- pared to dispute the passage, with a force composed of three thousand regulars, supported by ten thousand new levies and smugglers. Besides these troops, a small reserve was left in a camp close to Cordoba, and a cloud of armed peasants, from the side of Jaen, hovered on the hills behind the French, ready to fall on the rear when they should attack the bridge. Dupont having observed this disposition, placed the cavalry, the Swiss regiments, and the marine battalion in reserve, facing to the hills, and with the division of Barbou stormed the head of the bridge. The Span- iards there, making a feeble resistance, were driven across the river, and their whole line immediately fled to the camp at Cordoba. The multitude on the hills descended during the battle, but were beaten back by the cavalry witb loss, and the French general, then leaving the marine battalion at Alcolea, to secure the bridge, marched with the rest of his forces to complete the victory. At his approach the Spaniards took re- fuge in the town, and opened a fire of musketry from the walls, whereupon the French, bursting the gates with ilieir field-pieces, broke in, and after a short and confused fight Echevaria's men fled along the Seville Toad, pursued by the cavalry. As the inhabitants took no part in the contest, and received the French without any signs of aversion, the first disorders attendant on the action were soon suppressed, the town was protect- ed from pillage, and Dupont, fixing his quarters there, Bent patroles as far as Ecija without finding an enemy. In Seville the news of this disaster, and the arrival of the fugitives, struck such a terror, that the junta were only prevented from retiring to Cadiz by their dread of the populace, they even entertained thoughts of abandoning Spain altogether, and flying to South America.* Castanos, who a few days before had been declared captain-general of the armies, and was at this time in march with seven thousand troops of the line from San Roque, repaired to Seville the 9th, and after a short conference with the junta, proceeded to take the command of Echevaria's forces ; the greater part of these were re-assembled at Carmona, but in such con- fusion, and so moody, that Castanos returned immedi- ately. Having persuaded the president Saavedra to accompany him, he fixed his head-quarters at Utrera, where he gathered two or three thousand regulars from the nearest garrisons, directed all the new levies to re- pair to him, and hastened the march of his own men from San Roque. | He also pressed general Spencer to diseml)ark, and take up a position with the British for- ces at Xeres ; hut that officer, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, sailed to Ayamonte, — a circumstance » Ntll.rlo. I Sir Hew DalrymjAc's Papers. which augmented the general distrust of the English, prevailing at the time, and secretly fomented by Morla, and by several members of the junta. Andalusia was lost, if Dupont had advanced. His inactivity saved it. Instead of pushing his victory, he wrote to Savary for reinforcements, and to general Avril, desiring that he would, without delay, come to his assistance, remaining himself meanwhile in Cordo- ba, overwhelmed with imaginary dangers and difficul- ties. For although Castanos had in a few days col- lected at Carmona and Utrera, seven or eight thousand regulars, and above fifty thousand new levies ; and although Dupont's desponding letters were intercepted and brought to him, such was the condition of altairs that, resigning all thoughts of making a stand, he had, under the pretence of completing the defences of Cadiz, embarked the heavy artillery and stores at Seville, re- solving, if Dupont should advance, to burn the timbers and harness of his field artillery, and retreat to Cadiz. Nevertheless he continued the organization of his for- ces, filled up the old regiments with new levies, and formed fresh battalions, in which he was assisted by two foreigners ; the marquis de Coupigny, a crafty French emigrant, of some experience in war, and Red- ing, a Swiss, a bold, enterprising, honest man, but with- out judgment, and of very moderate talents as an officer. Castafios wished to adopt a defensive plan, to make Cadiz his place of arms, and to form an entrenched camp, where he hoped to be joined by ten or twelve thousand British troops, and, in security, to organize and discipline a large army ; but, in reality, he had merely the name and the troubles of a commander-in- chief, without the power.* Morla was his enemy, and the junta, containing men determined to use their au- thority for their own emolument and the gratification of private enmity, were jealous lest Casta .os should control their proceedings ; they thwarted him, humour- ed the caprice and insolence of the populace, and med- dled with affairs foreign to the matter in hand. But as the numbers at Utrera increased, the general confidence augmented, and a retreat was no longer contemplated ; plans were laid to surround Dupont in Cordoba, and one detachment of peasants, commanded by regular officers, was sent to occupy the passes of the Sierra Morena, leading into Estremadura; another detach- ment marched from Grenada, accompanied by a regi- ment of the line, to seize Carolina, and cut off the communication with La Mancha; a third, under colo- nel Valderafios, prbposed to attack the French in Cor- doba without any assistance ; and this eagerness for action was increased by a knowledge of the situation of affairs in Portugal, and by rumours exaggerating tiie strength of Filanghieri and Cuesta. It was believed that the latter had advanced to Valladolid, and had offered Murat the option of abiding an attack, or retir- ing immediately to France by stated marches, and that, alarmed at Cuesta's power, the grand duke was forti- fying the Retiro. These reports, so congenial to the wishes and vanity of the Andalusians, caused the de- fensive plan proposed by Castanos to be rejected ; and when Dupont's des|)atches, magnifying his own danger and pressing in the most urgent manner for reinforco- ments, were again intercepted and brought to bead-quar- ters, it was resolved to attack Cordoba immediately. Dupont's fears outstripped the Spaniard's impatience. After ten days of inactivity, by wiiich he lost the im- mediate fruit of his victory at Alcolea, — the lead in an offensive campaign, and all the imposing moral force of the French reputation in arms, he resolved to fall back to Andujar, because Savary would not promise any succwur save what Moncey, after subduing Valen- cia, could give by the circuitous route of Murcia. j" This * Sir Hew Dalryinple's Papers, f Jaurnul of Dupout'a OperatioM. 1808.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 35 retreat was commenced the 17th nf June, and the French wero followed as far as Carpio hy the advanced guard of the Andalusians, under general Coupigny.* Along- the line of march, and in the town of Andu- jar, where he arrived the evening of the 18th, Dupont found terrible proofs of Spanish ferocity ; his strag- glers had been assassinated, and his hospital taken ; the sick, the medical attendants, the couriers, the staff officers, in fine, all who had the misfortune to be weak- er than the insurgents, were butchered, with circum- stances cf extraordinary barbarity, and upwards of four hundred men had perished in this miserable manner since the fight nf Alcolea.t The fite of colonel Rene was horrible. He had been sent on a mission to Por- tuofal, previous to the breaking out of hostilities, and was en his return, travelling in the ordinary mode, without arms, attached to no army, engaged in no op- erations of war. but being recognised as a Frenchman, he was Sf ized, mutilated, and then being placed, liv- inij. between two plrnks was sawed in two. At Andujar the French general collected provisions, and prepared to maintain himself until he should be reinforced ; yet wishing to punish the city of Jaen, from whence the bands had come to murder his sick, he sent captain Baste, a naval officer, with a battalion of infantry and some cavalry, to accomplish that object. The soldiers, inflamed by the barbarity of their ene- mies, inflicted a severe measure of retaliation, because it is the nature of cruelty to reproduce itself in war; and for this reason, although the virtue of clemency is to all persons becoming, it is peculiarly so to an offi- cer, the want of it leading to so many and such great evils. Meanwhile the Andalusian army remained quiet, and Dupont. who knew that general Vedel, with a di- vision of infantry, and escortinor a large convoy for the army, was marching through La Mancha, sent captain ' Baste with a second detachment to clear the pass of Despefas Perros. which was now occupied hy insur- gents and smugglers from Grenada to the number of three thousand. Th_? pass was of incredible strength, and the Spaniards had artillery, and were partially en- trenched ; however their commander, a colonel of the line, deserted to the enemy, and before Baste could arrive, Vedel had forced his way to Carolina, where he left a detachment, and then descended to Baylen, a small town sixteen miles from Andujar. But other insurgents came from Grenada, to Jaen, and would have moved on Despeilas Perros and Carolina, by the Linhares road ; wherefore Vedel sent general Cassagne against them, Jaen was again taken, and the Grenadans were driven back with slaughter; but the French w^ho lost two hundred men, returned on the 5th to Baylen without the provisions, to obtain which had been one object of the expedition. Notwithstanding these successes, and that Vedel, besides his own division, brought reinforcements for Barbou's division and the cavalry, Dupont's fears in- creased. His position at Andujar covered the main mad from Seville to Carolina ; but eight miles lower down the river, it could be turned by the bridge of Marmolexo ; sixteen miles higher up by the roads leading from Jaen to the ferry of Mengibar and Bay- len ; and beyond that line by roads from Jaen and « Grenada to Uzeda, Linhares, and the passes of El Rey and Despenas Perros. The dryness of the season had rendered the Guadalquivir fordable in many places ; the regulri.r force under Castaiios was daily increasing in strength ; the population around was actively hostile, and the young French soldiers were drooping under privations and the heat of the climate : six hundred were in hospital, and the whole were discouraged. :j: It * Aapolfon's Notes. + Whittinfjhani. Journal of Dupont. Fo~'s History. Vic- loires et Conquetes. J Dupont's Journal. Toy's Ilistorj. is in such situations that the worth of a veteran is found ; in battle the ardour of youth often appears to shame the cool indifference of the old soldier, but when the strife is between the malice of fortune and fortitude, between human endurance and accumulating hardships, the veteran becomes truly formidable, when the youuf soldier resigns himself to despair. After the actions at Jaen. Vedel posted general Li- gier Bellair's brigade at the ferry of Mengibar, with a post beyond the river, but on the 13th this post was driven across the Guadalquivir, and on the 15th, Go- bert, who should have been at Rio Seco with Bessieres, arrived at Baylen with a division of infantry and some cuirassiers. Vedel then advanced to Mengibar, and it was full time, seeing that the whole vSpanish army was on the opposite bank of the river.* For when Dupont's retreat from Cordoba had frustrated the plan of the Spaniards to surround him, Castafios would have re- turned to his old project of a rigorous defensive system, but the junta, although at first they acquiesced, were unsettled in their policy, and getting intelligence of Vedel's march, had ordered Castaiios to attack Du- pont at Andujar before the reinforcements could arrive. | The Spanish general had twenty-five thousand regu- lar infantry, two thousand cavalry, and a very heavy train of artillery. Large bodies of armed peasantry, commanded by officers of the line, attended this army, and the numbers varied from day to day, but the whole multitude that advanced towards the Guadalquivir could not have been less than fifty thousand mr«i ; hence the intellio-ence that Vedel had actually arrived did not much allay the general fierceness. Castar.os, however, was less sanguine than the rest, and learninir that Spencer had again returned to Cadiz with his di- vision, he once more requested him to land and advance to Xeres, to afl^ord a point of retreat in the event of a disaster, and the English general consented to disem- bark, but refused to advance farther than Port St. Mary.ij^ From the 1st of July the Spanish army occupied a position extending from Carpio to Porcuiias, and the llth, a council of war being held, it was resolved that Reding's division should cross the Guadalquivir at the ferry of Mengibar, and gain Baylen ; !| that Coupigny should cross at Villa Nueva, and support Reding; and that Castaiios, with the other two divisions, advancing to the heights of Argonilla, should attack Andujar in front, while Reding and Coupigny should descend from Baylen and attack it in the rear : some detach- ments of light troops under colonel Cruz were also or- dered to pass the Guadalquivir by Marmolexo, and to seize the passes leading through the Morena to Es- tremadura. The 13th, Reding, with the first division, and three or four thousand peasantry, marched towards Mengibar, and, as I have said, drove the French post over the Guadalquivir, while Coupigny, with the second division, took the road of Villa Nueva. § The 15lh, Cas- taiios crowned the heights of Argonilla, in front of An- dujar, with two divisions of infantry, and a multitude of irregular troops ; Coupigny skirmished with the French picquets at Villa Nueva, and Reding attacked Ligier Bellair, but when Vedel came up retired. If When Dupont saw the heights of Argonilla covered with enemies he sent to Vedel for succour, broke the bridge of Marmolexo, occupied an old tower on the bridge of Andujar, and detached cavalry parties to watch the fords above and below the town. The 15th Casta- iios cannonaded the bridge of Andujar, while colonel Cruz, with four thousand men, crossed the river near Marmolexo. The 16th he attacked, and Cruz fell up- on the French rear, but was chased into the hills by a single battalion, and about two o'clock Vedel, who had * Vedel's Precis of Operations. •f Whittinghani's Correspondence. MSS. { Ibid. II Ibid. { Ibid. T Du^oonfs Journal I'oj, S6 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR, [Book I. marched all night, arrived, which put an end to the ac- tion. * Durinor those events, Reding passed the Guadalquivir at Menjjihar, and drove Ligicr Belhiir before him, Go- berl arrTved, and renewed the action, but fell mortally ■wounded, and trpneral Dufour suceeeiled him. The Frenrh then returned to Baylen, HedinjT to Meng^ibar, and Dufour, findiiig the Spaniards did not push their success, raslily credited a rumour that they were in march by l/mhares, and therefore retreated to Carolina. Meanwhile Dupont, hearing, on the evening of the IGlh, that Mengibar had been forced, sent Vedel again to Baylen, luit with instructions so vague that he was in- duced to follow Dufour on the 17th, whereupon Reding, who, strange to say, had remained tranquil at Mengi- bar, being now reinforced by Coupigny, seized Baylen in the uFsht, and throwing out a detachment on \he side of Carolina, took a position focing Andujar with about twenty thousand men including a multitude of peasants. The armies were thus interlaced in a singular man- ner, Dupont between Reding and Castafios, Reding be- tween Dupont and Vedel, and the affair became one of time, yet Castailos remained tranquil in his camp, and Dupont, although he knew on the 17lh of Vedel's march to Carolina, did not quit Andujar until the night of the 18lh. His movement was unobserved by Castanos, and at day-break he reached the Tiedras, a torrent with ruo-tred banks, only two miles from Reding's position which was strong, well shaded with olive-trees, and intersected by deep ravines. Dupont, hoping that Ve- del would return, immediately passed the Tiedras, and leavine Barbou with a few battalions on that stream, to check Castafios if he should arrive during the action, fell on, yet feebly, and with few troops ; for his march had been nnmilitary, and his best soldiers were employ- ed guarding the baggage, which was enormous, and mixed with the columns. For some time the French appeared to gain ground, but fatigued by their night's work, and unable to force the principal points, they be- came discouraged ; the Swiss then went over to the Spaniards, and about twelve o'clock, after losing two thousand men, killed and wounded, Dupont proposed an armistice with a view to a convention, which Red- ing, hard pressed, willingly granted. Vedel had quitted Carolina at five in the morning of the 19ih. The sound of battle became distinct as he advanced, yet he halted at Guaroman, two leagues from Baylen, and remained there until three o'clock, to refresh his men, and to ascertain if any enemy was at Linhares ; | when the firing had entirely ceased, he re- sumed his march, and coming upon the rear of Reding, attacked, and after some fighting, captured two guns and made fifteen hundred prisoners ; j^ an aide-du-camp of Dupont's then brought him an order to cease the at- tack, whereupon he awaited the result of this singular crisis. Castanos who did not discover Dupont's march until eight hours after the latter's departure from Andujar, had sent La Pena's division in pursuit, but remained himself in that town. II La Pena reached the Tiedras about five o'clock, and soon after, one Villoutreys pas- sed his posts, going to ask CastaHos' consent to the terms accepted by Reding, and on the 20th generals Marescot and Chabcrt likewise passed to Andujar, be- ing empowered by Dupont to conclude a convention. § They demanded permission for the French army to re- tire peaceably upon Madrid, and Castanos was ready to grant this, but Savary's lelt(>r, written just before the battii' of Rio Seco, to recal Dupont, was intercepted, and brought at this moment to the Spanish head-quarters. The aspect of affairs immediately chnnn-ed, and a con- vention was no longer in question. Dupont's troops were required to lay down their arms, and become pri- soners of war, on condition of being sent by sea to France, and Vedel's division was to surrender, and be sent to France likewise, but not as prisoners of war : without hesitation these terms were accepted. Meanwhile Vedel had proposed to Dupont to make a joint attack upon Reding, and general Prive gave a like counsel, but the French general refused, and sent Vedel orders to give up his prisoners, and retreat to Carolina. * Castaf.os menaced Dupont with death if Vedel did not return, and the latter, on receiving his commander's or- ders to that effect, did come back to Baylen the 22d, and surrendered. Thus above eighteen thousand French soldiers laid down their arms, before a raw ar- my incapable of resisting half that number led by an able man. Nor did this end the disgraceful transaction, for Villoutreys, as if to show how far fear and folly com- bined, will carry men, passed the Morena with a Spanish escort, and gathering up the detachments left by Du- pont in La Mancha, even to within a short distance of Toledo, sent them to Andujar as prisoners under the convention. Nay, he even informed Castanos how to capture two French battalions that had been left to guard the passes into La Mancha ; and these unheard- of proceedings were quietly submitted to by men be- longing to that army which for fifteen years had been the terror of Europe ; a proof how much the character of soldiers depends upon their immediate chief. This capitulation, shameful in itself, was shamefully broken. The French troops, instead of being sent to France, were maltreated, and numbers of them murder- ed in cold blood, especially at Lebrixa, where above eighty officers were massacred in the most cowardly manner. Armed only with their swords, they kept tlie assassins for some time at bay, and gathering in a com- pany, upon an open space in the town, endeavoured t© save their lives, but a fire from the neighbouring houses was kept up until the last of those unfortunate gentle- men fell. No distinction was made between Dupont's and Vedel's troops, and all who survived the march to Cadiz, after being exposed to every species qf indigni- ty, were cast into the hulks at Cadiz, whence a few hundreds escaped, two years afterwards, by cutting the cables of their prison-ship, and drifting in a storm upon a lee shore : the remainder, transported to the desert island of Cabrera, perished by lingering torments in such numbers, that few remained alive at the termina- tion of the war. Dupont himself was permitted to re- turn to France, and to take with him all the generals ; and it is curious that general Prive, who had remons- trated strongly against the capitulation, and had press- ed Dupont, on the field, to force a passage through Red- ing's army, was the only one left behind, f Don Thomas Morla, after a vain attempt to involve lord Collingwood and sir Hew Dalrymple in the trans- action, formally defended the conduct of the junta in breaking the capitulation ; and soon afterwards betray- ed his own country with the readiness that might be expected from his shameless conduct on this occasion. OBSERVATIONS. I. The gross amount of Dupont's corps when it first entered Spain was about twenty-four thousand men, with three thousand five hundred horses ; of these twenty-one thousand were fit for duty. X It was after- wards strengthened by a provisionary regiment of cui- rassiers, a marine battalion of the guard, and the two Swiss regiments of Prenx and Reding. It could not therefore have been less than twenty-four thousand fighting men when Dupont arrived in Andalusia; and as the whole of Vedel's, and the greatest part of Go- • Vfidfl's Irfris. t Foy. J Journal of Dupo-.t's Oportfions. MSS. (l Whittinghaiu's Corrciij.ond nee MSS. Ibid. * Vp(if I's Prdcis of Operations. { Rtti|rn o;' the French army. f Victoires et Conquetcs. 18(}8.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 37 bert's division, had joined before the capitulation, and as eiohteen thousand men laid down their arms at Bay- len, Diipont must have lost by wounds, desertion, and deaths in hospital or the field, above five thousand men. 2. The order which directed his corps upon Cadiz was drspatt^'hed from Bayonne before the Spanish insur- rection broke out ; it was therefore strange that Dupont should have persevered in his march, when he found affairs in such a different state, from that contemplated by Napoleon at the time the instructions for this expe- dition were framed. If the emperor considered it ne- cessary to reinforce the division, which marched under Dupont's own command, with a detachment from the army in Portugal, before the insurrection broke out, it was evident that he never could have intended, that that general should blindly follow the letter of his or- ders, when a great and unexpected resistance was op- posed to him, and that the detachment from Portugal was unable to eff'ect a junction. The march to Cordo- ba was therefore an error, and it was a great error, be- cause Dupont confesses in his memoir, he advanced under the conviction that his force was too weak to ob- tain success, and, consequently, having no object, his operations could only lead to a waste of lives. 3. At Cordoba, Dupont remained in a state of torpor for ten days. This was the second error of a series which led to his ruin; he should either have followed up his victory and attacked Seville in the first moment of consternation, or he should have retired to Andujar while he might do so without the appearance of being compelled to it. If he had followed the first plan, the city would inevitably have fallen before him, and thus time would have been gained for the arrival of the second and third division of his corps. It may be ob- jected, that ten thousand men dared not penetrate so far into a hostile country; but at Alcolea, Dupont boasts of having defeated forty thousand men without any loss to himself: from such armies, then, he had nothing to fear, and the very fact of his having pushed his small force between the multitudes that he defeated upon the 7th, proves that he despised them.* ' He retired from (Jordoba.' he says in his memoir, ' because to fight a battle when victory can be of no use, is against all discretion ;' but to make no use of a victory when it is gained, comes to the same thing, and ho should never have moved from Andujar, unless with the deter- mination of taking Seville. These errors were, how- ever, redeemable; the position behind the Guadalquivir, the checks given to the patriots at Jean after the arri- val of Vedel at Carolina upon the 27th, above all, the opportune junction of Gobert at the moment when Cas- tanos and Reding appeared in front of the French line, proved that it was not fortune, but common sense, that deserted Dupont. The Spanish forces divided, and ex- tended from Argonilla to INIengibar, were exposed to be beaten in detail ; but as their adversary was indulgent to them, their false movements were successful, and, amidst the mass of greater errors on both sides, ap- peared like acts of wisdom. 4. At Mengibar a variety of roads branch oflT, lead- ing to Jaen, to Linhares, to Baylen, and other places. From Andujar, a road nearly parallel to the Guadal- quivir runs to the ferry of Mengibar, and forms the base of a triangle, of which Baylen may be taken as the apex. The distance of this latter town from the ferry is about six miles, from the ferry to Andujar is about eighteen, and from the latter to Baylen the dis- tance may be sixteen miles. P'ifteen miles above Bay- len, the town of Carolina, situated in the gorge of the Sierra Morena, was the point of communication with La Mancha, and the line of retreat for the French in the event of a defeat ; hence Baylen, not Andujar, was the pivot of operations. The French force was infe- Dupont's Journal of Operation* rior in numtier to that under Casta~os, yet Dupont spread his divisions upon several points, and the natu- ral results followed. The Spaniards, althouirh the most unwieldy body, took the lead and became the as- sailants ; the French divisions were worn out bj^ use- less marches ; the orders of their chief were mista- ken or disobe3'ed ; one position being forced, another was of necessity abandoned, confusion ensued ; and finally Dupont saj's he surrendered with eighteen ih'iit- ."*upont's Journal, MSS. 38 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR, [Book f. and artillery is a powerful column of attack, and the Spanish line could not have withstood it for a moment. The battle should have been one of half an hour; Du- pont, by his ridiculous evolutions, made it one of ten hours, and yet so badly did the patriots fiffht, that in all that lime not a sinfjle prisoner or ^un fell into their hands, and the fact of Redinor's enterinsr at all into a convention, proves his fears for the final result. It is truly astonishing that Dupont, who, from his rank, must have been well acquainted with Napoleon's Ital- ian campaigfns, should have caught so little of the spirit of his master. And then the capitulation of Vedel, after his retreat was actually effected ! Vedel, who might have given battle and disputed the victory by himself without any great imprudence ! Joseph called Dupont's capitulation, a ' Jtfeclion.^ 8. Castaiios, although active in preparation, discov- ered but little talent in the field ; his movements were slow, uncertain, and generally false. The attempt to turn the French position at Andujar by detaching four thousand men across the river, was ill conceived and badly supported ; it was of that class of combinations to which the separate march of Reding's corps be- longed. To the latter general the chief honour of the ■victory is due; yet, if Vedel had returned from Caro- lina upon the 19th, with the rapidity which the occa- sion required, Reding would have repented taking post at Baylen ; it was undoubtedly a daring step ; but in- stead of remaining at that place, he should have de- scended instantly upon the rear of Dupont, leaving a coips of observation to delay the march of Vedel. Time not being taken into his calculation. Reding acted like a bold, but rash and unskilful ofl^icer. Fortune, however, favoured his temerity, and with her assistance ■war is but child's play. Intelligence of the capitulation of Baylen was se- cretly spread among the Spaniards in Madrid as early as the 23d or 24th of July; but the French, although alarmed by rumours of some great disaster, were una- ble to acquire any distinct information, until the king sent two divisions into La Mancha to open the commu- nication; these troops having reached Madrilejos, one hundred and twenty miles from Baylen, met Villou- treys wiih his Spanish escort collecting prisoners, and apparently intending to proceed in his disgraceful task to the very gates of Madrid ;* the extent of the disas- ter thus became known, anfl the divisions retraced their steps. Joseph then called a council of war, and it was proposed to unite all the French forces, place a small garrison in the Retiro, and fall upon the Spanish armies in succession as they advanced towards the capital. But a dislike to the war was prevalent amongst the higher ranks of the French army, the injustice of it ■was too glaring; hence the reasons for a retreat which might perchance induce Napoleon to desist, being lis- tened to with more complacency than this proposal, it was resolved to abandon Madrid and retire behind the Kbro. The operation commenced on the 1st of Aui^ust. The king marched by the i^omosierra, and Bessieres, posted at Mayorga, covered the movenu^nt until the court reached Burgos, and then fell back himself; in a short time the French were all behind the Ebro, the siege of Zaragoza was raised, and the triumphant cry of the Spaniards was heard throughout Europe. This retreat was undoubtedly hasty and ill considered; whether as a military or politicval measure it was unwise. Bessieres, with seventeen thousand victorious troops, and forty pieces of artillery, paralyzed the northern pro- vinces; the Spanish army of Andalusia was too distant from that of Valencia to conC( rt a combined movement, and if they had fornu^d a junction, their united forc(^ could rot have exceeded forty thous-and fighting men, ill prt- rided, and commanded by jealous independent chiefs. Fo}''s History. Now the king, without weakening Bessieres' corps toe much, could have collected twenty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and eighty pieces of artillery ; the battle of Rio Seco shows what such an army could have effected, and every motive of prudence and of honour called for some daring action to wipe olT the ignominy of Baylen. Let it be conceded that .Toseph could not have main- tained himself in Madrid ; the line of the Duero was then the true position for the French army. Taking Aranda as a centre, and occupying the Somosierra, Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, Burgos, and Soria on the circum- ference, two ordinary marches would have carried the king to the succour of any part of his position, and the northern provinces would thus have been separated I'rom the southern. Then Blake dared not have made a flank march to the Guadarama, Castafios dared not have re- mained in the basin of Madrid, and the siege of Zaragoza might have been continued ; because from Aranda to Zaragoza the distance is not greater than from Valencia, or from Madrid, and from Soria it is only three marches ; wherefore the king could h-ave succoured Verdier if the Valencians attacked him, and it was impossible for Cas- tafios to have arrived at Zaragoza under a month. Now by taking up the line of the Ebro, Napoleon's plan of separating the provinces, and confining each to its own exertions, was frustrated, and Joseph virtually resigned the throne; for however doubtful the prudence of oppo- sing the French might have been considered before the retreat, it became imperative upon all Spaniards, to aid the energy of the multitude when that energy was proved to be efficient. In this manner Napoleon's first effort against Spain was frustrated. Yet he had miscalcuhated neither the difficulties, nor the means to overcome them ; for al- though Bessieres was the only general who perfectly succeeded in his operations, the plan of the emperor was so well combined, that it required the destruction of a whole army to shake it at all. Even when the king, by committing the great fault of abandoning Madrid and raising the siege of Zaragoza, had given the utmost force to Dupont's catastrophe, it was only the political position of the French which was shaken ; their military hold of the country was scarcely loosened, and the Span- iards were unable to follow up their victory. But there was another operation, too great indeed for Joseph, yet such a one as in Napoleon's hands would have fixed the fate of the Peninsula. The king might have di- rected the troops before Zaragoza, and the detachments upon the communication with France, to have assembled round Pampeluna, while he, uniting with Bessieres, made, not a retreat, but a march with forty thousand men into Portugal. He would have arrived about the period of the battle of Vimiero, and the English would have been overwhelmed ; a demonstration ag-ainst Seville or Cadiz would then have sufficed to keep the Spanish armies from gathering on the p]bro, and three months hater. Napoleon was on th'dt river with two hundred thousand men ! The moral effect of the battle of Baylen was surpri- sing; it was one of those minor events which, insignifi- cant in themselves, are the cause of great changes in the affairs of nations. The defeat of Rio Seco, the prejjara- tions of Moncey for a second attack on Valencia, the miserable plight of Zaragoza, the desponding view taken of affairs by the ablest men of Spain, and, above all, the disgust and terror excited among the p'atriot>- by the excesses of the populace, weighed heavy on the Spanish cause. One victory more, and probably the moral as well as the physical force of Sp-ain would have been crushed ; but the battle of BayliHi, opening as it were a new cral.T for the Sp-anish fire, -all their pride, and vanity, and arrogance burst forth, the glory of past ages seemed to be renewed, every m-an conceived himself a second Cid, and perceived in the suiTender of Dupont, not tlie ISOS.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 89 deliverance of Spain, 'nit the immediate conquest of France. ' We are much obliged to our good friends the English,' was a common phrase among- them when con- versing with the officers of Sir John Moore's army ; ' we thank them for their good-will, and we shall escort them through France to Calais ; tJie journey will be pleasanter than a long voyage, we shall not give them the trouble of fighting the French, but will be pleased at having them spectators of our victories.' This absurd confi- dence might have led to great '.hings if it had been sup- ported by wisdom, activity, or valour ; but i Was 'a voice, and nothing more.' BOOK II. CHAPTER I. The Asturian deputies received with enthusiasm in P'.ngland — Ministers precipitate — Imprudent choice of agents — Junot marciies to Alcantara, joined by the Spanish contingent, en- ters Portugal, arrives at Abi-antes. puslies on to Lisbon^ Prince regent emigrates to the Brazds, reflections on that .ransaction — Dangerous position of the French army — Portu- guese council of regency — Spanish contingent well received — General Taranco dies at Oporto, is succeeded by the French general Quesnel — Solano's troops retire to Badajos — funot takes possession of the Alenitejo and the Algarves; ex- acts a forced loan; is created duke of Abrantes; suppresses the council of ""egency; sends the flower of the Portuguese arnu to I rancc — Napoleon demands a ransom from Portu- gal — People unable to pay it — Police of Lisbon — Junot's mili- tary position; his character; political position — People dis- contented — Prophetic eggs — Sebastianists — The capture of Rossily's squadron known at Lisbon — Pope's nuncio takes refuge onboard the English fleet — Alarm of the French. The uninterrupted success that, for so many years, at- tended the arms of Napoleon, gave him a moral influence doubling his actual force. Exciting at once terror, ad- miration, and hatred, he absorbed the whole attention of an astonished world, and, openly or secretly, all men acknowledged the power of his genius; the continent bowed before him, and in England an increasing number of absurd and virulent libels on his person and charac- ter, indicated the growth of secret fear. Hence, his proceedings against the Peninsula were viewed, at first, with anxiety, rather than with tlie hope of arresting their progress; yet when the full extent of the injustice be- came manifest, the public mind was vehemently excited ; a sentiment of some extraordinary change being about to take place in the affairs of the world, prevailed among all classes of society ; and when the Spanish people rose against the man that all feared, the admiration which energy and c lurage exact, even from the base and timid, became enthusiastic in a nation conscious of the same virtues. No factious feelings interfered to check this enthusi- asm. The party in power, anxious to pursue a warlike system, necessary to their own political existence, saw with joy that the stamp of justice and high feeling would, for the first time, be affixed to tlieir policy. The party out of power having always derided tlie impotence of the ancient dynasties, and asserted that regular ar- mies alone were insufficient means of defence, could not consistently refuse their approbation to a struggle originating with, and carried on entirely by the Spanish multitude. The people at large exulted that the superi- ority of plebeian virtue and patriotism was acknowl- edged. The arrival of the Asturian deputies was, therefore, universally hailed as an auspicious event; their wishes were forestalled, their suggestions v.-ere attended to with eagerness, their demands were readily complied with; nay, the riches of England were so profuse! 3' tendered to them by the ministers, that it can scarcely be doubted, the after arrogance and extravagance of the Spaniards, arose from the manner in which their first applications were met. There is a w-ay of conferring a favour tj at appears like accepting one, and this secret being dis- covered by the English cabinet, the Spaniards soon de- manded as a right, what they had at first solicited as a boon. In politics it is a grievous fault to be too gene- rous; gratitude, in state affairs, is unknown, and as the appearance of disinterested kindness never deceives, it should never be assumed. The capture of the Spanish frigates had placed Great Britain and Spain in a state of hostility without a dec- laration of war; the invasion of Napoleon produced a friendly alliance between those countries without a declaration of peace ; for the cessation of hostilities was not proclaimed until long after succours had been sent to the juntas. The ministers seemed, by their precipi- tate measures, to be more afraid of losing the assis- tance of the Spaniards, than prepared to take the lead in a contest which could only be supported by the power and riches of Great Britain. Instead of adopting a sim- ple and decisive policy towards Spain; instead of send- ing a statesman of high rank and acknowledged capa- city to sustain the insurrection, and to establish the influence of England by a judicious application of money and other supplies ; the ministers employed a number of obscure men in various parts of the Peninsula, who, without any experience of public affairs, were empow- ered to distribute succours of all kinds at their own discretion. Instead of sifting carefully the infurmation obtained from such agents, and consulting distinguished military and naval officers in the arrangement of some comprehensive plan of operations, which, being well understood by those who were to execute it, might be supported vigorously, the ministers formed crude pro- jects, parcelled out their forces in small ex})editions without any definite object, altered their plans with every idle report, and changed their commanders a.. lightly as their plans. Entering into formal relations with ever)' knot of .Spanish politicians that assumed the title of a supreme junta, the government dealt, with unsparing hands, en- ormous sup|)lies at the demand of those self-elected au- thorities ; they made no conditions, took no assurance that the succours should be justly applied ; and with af- fected earnestness disclaimed all ii.tcMlion of interfering with the internal arrangements 01 .h«j Spaniards, whtia 40 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book II. the ablest men in Spain expected and wished for such an interference to repress the folly and violence of tlieir countrymen ; and when England was entitled, both in j)olicy and justice, not only to interfere, but to direct the councils of the insurs^ents.* The latter had soli- cited and obtained her assistance, the cause was be- come common to both nations ; and for the welfare of both, a prudent, just, and vioorous interference on the part of the most powerful and enlirrhtened, was neces- sary to prevent that cause from beinfr ruined by a few itrnorant, and conceited men, accidentally invested with authority. The numbers and injudicious choice of military agents were also the source of infinite mischief, selected, as it would appear, principally because of their acquain- tdnce with the Spanish languatre, few of tliose agents had any knowledge of war beyond the ordinary duties of a regiment, and there was no concert among them, for there was no controlling power vested in any ; each did that which seemed good to him.j Readily affect- ing to consult men whose inexperience rendered them amenable, and whose friendship could supply the means of advancing their own interest in a disorganized state of society, the Spanish generals received the agents with a tiattering and confidential politeness, that divert- ed the attention of the latter from the true objects of their mission. Instead of ascertaining the real numbers and efficiency of the armies, they adopted the inflated language and extravagant opinions of the chiefs, with whom they lived ; and their reports gave birth to most erroneous notions of the relative strength and situation of the contending forces in the Peninsula. Some ex- ceptions there were, but the ministers seemed to be better pleased with the sanguine than with the cautious, and made their own wishes the measure of their judg- ments. Accordingly, enthusiasm, numbers, courage, and talent, w'ere gratuitously found for every occasion, but money, arms, and clothing, were demanded inces- santly, and supplied with profusion; the arms were, however, generally left in their cases to rot, or to fall into the hands of the enemy ; the clothing seldom reached the soldier's back ; and the money, in all in- stances misapplied, was in some embezzled by the au- thorities, into whose hands it fell, in others employed to create disunion, and to forward the private views of the juntas, at the expense of the public welfare: it is a curious fact, that from the beginning to the end of the war, an English musket was rarely to be seen in the hands of a Spanish soldier. But it is time to quit this subject, and to trace the progress of Junot's invasion of Portugal, by which the whole circle of operations in the Peiiinsula will be completed, and the reader can then take a general view of the situation of all parties, at the moment when sir Arthur Wellesley, disembark- ing at the IMondego, commenced those campaigns which furnished the subject of this history. INVASION OF PORTUGAL BV JUNOT. Peremptory orders had obliged Junot to commence operations at an unfavourable time of year, before his preparations were completed, when the roads were nearly impracticable, and while some of his troops were still in the rear of Salamanca. :|: Hence his march from that town to Alcantara, where he elTected his junc- tion in the latter end of November, 1807, with the part of the Spanish force that was to act under his immedi- ate orders, was very disastrous, and nearly disorgani- zed his inexperienced army. The succours he expected To receive at Alcantara were not furnished, and the re- pugnance of the Spanish authorities to aid him, was the cause of so much embarrassment, that his chief officers doubted the propriety of continuing operations under » Mr. Stuart's Letters. Lord W. Bcntinck's Ditto. + Vide Instructions fo" Sir Tho. Dye\ &c. Parliamentarj' Paper*, 1809. J Thiebau the accumulating difficulties of his situation ; but Ju- not's firmness was unabated. He know that no Eng- lish force had landed at Lisbon; and as the cowardice of the Portuguese court was notorious, he without hes- itation undertook one of those hardy enterprises v\ liioh astound the mind by their success, and leave the histo- rian in doubt if he should praise the happy daring, oi stigmatise the rashness of the deed. Without money, without transport, without ammuni- tion sufficient for a general action, and with an auxilia- ry force of Spaniards by no means well disposed to aid him, Junot, at the head of a raw army, penetrated the mountains of Portugal on the most dangerous and diffi- cult line by which that country can be invaded. He was ignorant of what was passing in the interior, he knew not if he was to be opposed, nor what means were, prepared to resist him, but trusting to the inert- ness of the Portuguese government, to the rnpidity of his own movements, and to the renown of the French arms, he made his way through Lower Beira, and sud- denly appeared in the town of Abrantes, a fearful and unexpected guest. There he obtained the first informa- tion of the true state of affairs. Lisbon was tranquil, and the Portuguese fleet was ready to sail, but the court still remained on shore. On hearing this, Junot, animated by the prospect of seizing the prince regent, pressed forward, and reached Lisbon in time to see the fleet, having the royal family on board, clearing the mouth of the Tagus, One vessel dragged astern with- in reach of a battery, the French general himself fired a gun at her, and on his return to Lisbon, meeting some Portuguese troops, he resolutely commanded them to form an escort, for his person, and thus attended, pas- sed through the streets of the capital. Nature, alone had opposed the progress of the invaders, yet such w-ere the hardships endured, that of a column which numbered twenty-five thousand at Alcantaia, two thou- sand tired grenadiers only entered Lisbon with their general ; fatigue, and want, and tempests, had scatter- ed the remainder alon j two hundred miles of rugged mountains, inhabited by a warlike and ferocious peas- antry, well acquainted with the strength of their fast- nesses, and proud of the many successful defences made by their forefathers against former enemies. Lis- bon itself contained three hundred thousand inhabitants and fourteen thousand regular troo]5s were collected there ; a powerful British fleet was at the mouth of the harbour, and the commander, sir Sidney Smith, had urged the court to resist, oflering to land his seamen and marines to aid in the defence of t\w town, but his offers were declined ; and the people, disgusted with the pusillanimous conduct of their rulers, and confound- ed by the strangeness of the scene, evinced no desire to impede the march of events. Thus three weak batta- lions sufficed to impose a foreign yoke upon this great capital, and illustrated the truth of Napoleon's maxim : — !hat in war thu moral is to the physical force as three parts to one. The prince regent, after having, at the desire of the French government, ex|)elled the British factory, sent the British minister plenipotentiary away trom his court, sequestered British property, and shut the ports of Por- tugal against British merchants ; after having degraded himself and his nation by performing every submissive act which France could devise to insult his weakness, was still reluctant to forego the base tenure by which he hoped to hold his crown. Alternately swayed by fear and indolence, a miserable example of helpless fol- ly, he lingered until the reception of a .Moniteur which, dated the 13th of November, announced, in startling terms, that the ^ house (f Bra^anza had ceased to reigr..'' Lord Strangford, the British plenipotentiary whose ef- forts to make the royal family emigrate, had entirely fiiled. was then on board the squadron, with the inten- tion of returning to England ; but sit Sydney Smith, 1808.J NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 41 seizingf the favourable moment, threatened to boiiihard Lisbon, if the prince regent iiesitated any lontrer, and thus urged on both sides, the latter embarked with his whole court, and sailed for the Brazils on the 29th of Novenib( r, a few hours before .Tunot arrived. Lord Strano-ford's despatch, relating this event, al- though dated the 29th of November, on board tlie Hi- bernia, was written the 19th December, m London, and was so worded, as to create a notion that his exertions during the 27tli and 2Sth had caused the emigration, a notion quite contrary to the fact. For the prince regent of Portugal, yielding to the united pressure of the ad- miral's menaces, and the annunciation in the Moniteur, had embarked on the 27th, before lord Strangford reach- ed Lisbon ; and actually sailed on the 29th, withrut having had an interview with that nobleman, who con- sequently had no opportunity to advance or retard the event in question. Nevertheless, lord Strangford re- ceived the red riband, and sir Sydney Smith was neg- lected. This celebrated emigration was beneficial to the Bra- zils in the highest degree, and of vast importance, to Enijland in two ways, for it ensured great commer- cial advantages, and it threw Portugal completely into her jiower in the approaciiing conflict; but it was dis- graceful to the prince, insulting to the brave people he abandoned, and impolitic, inasmuch as it obliged mien to inquire how far subjects were bound to a monarch who deserted them in their need 1 how far the nation could belong to a man who did not belong to the nation 1 It has been observed by political economists, that where a gold and paper currency circulate together, if the paper be depreciated it will drag down the gold w ith it, and deteriorate the whole mass ; but after a time, the metal revolts from this unnatural state, and asserts its own intrinsic superiority : so a privileged class, corrupted by power and luxury, drags down the nation- al character. Yet there is a point when the people, like the gold, no longer suffering such a degradation, W'ill separate themselves with violence from the vices of their efleminate rulers, and until that time arrives, a nation may appear to be sunk in hopeless lethargy, when it is really capable of great and noble exertions; and thus it was witii ihe Portuguese who were at this time unjustly despised by enemies, and mistrusted by friends. The invading army, in pursuance of the convention of Fontainebleau, was divided into three corps. * Tiie central one, composed of the French troops, and a Spanish division under general Caraffa, had penetrated by the two roads, which from Alcantara lead, the one by Pedragoa, the other by Scbreira Formosa ; but at Abrantes, Caraffa's division had separated from the French, and took possession of Thomar,and meantime the right, under general Taranco, marching from Gallicia, had established itself at Oporto, while the marquis of Solano, with the left, entered the Alemtejo, and fixed liis quarters at Setuval. The Spanish troops did not suffer on tlieir route : but such had been the distress of the French army, that three weeks afterwards, it could only nmster ten thousand men under arms, and the privations encountered on this march led to excesses, which first produced that rancorous spirit of mutual hatred, so ^-emarkable between the French and Portu- guese. Young soldiers always attribute their sufferings to the ill-will of the inhabitants, it is difficult to make them understand tliat a poor peasantry have nothing to spare ; old soldiers, on the contrary, blame nobody, but know how to extract subsistence, and in most cases without exciting enmity. .Tunot passed the month of December in collecting his army, securing the great military points about Lis- bon, and in preparations to supplant the power of a • TluLl/ac! . Foj council of regency, to whom the piince at his depar- ture had delegated the sovereign authority. As long as the French troops were scattered on the line of march and the fortresses held by Portuguese garrisons, it would have been dangerous to provoke the enmity, or to excite the activity of this council, hence the members were treated with studious respect ; yet they were of the same leaven as the court tliey emanated from, and the quick resolute proceedings of .Tunot soon deprived them of any importance conferred by the critical situa- tion of affairs during the first three weeks. The Spanish auxiliary forces were well received 'n the north and in the Alemtejo, and as general "^{"aranco died soon after his arrival at Oporto, the French gene- ral Quesnel was sent to command that province. Junct had meanwhile taken possession of Elvas, and detached general Maurin to the Algarves, with sixteen hundred men; and, when Solano was ordered by his court to withdraw from Portugal, nine French battalions and the cavalry, under the command of Kellerman, took posses- sion of the Alemtejo, and occupied the fortress of Setuval.* At the same time CaraflTa's division, being replaced at Thomar, by a French force, was distributed in sinall bodies at a considerable distance from each other, on both sides of the Tagus, immediately round Lisbon.")" As the provisions of the treaty of Fontaine- bleau were unknown to the Portuguese, the Spanish troops met with a better reception than the French, and the treaty itself was disregarded by Tunot, whose conduct plainly discovered that he considered Portugal to be a possession entirely belonging to France. For when all the stragglers were come up, and the army recovered from its fatigues, and when a reinforcement of five thousand men had reached Salamanca, on its march to Lisbon the French general assumed the chief authority.:}^ Commencing by a forced loan of two hundred thousand pounds, he interfered with the diffe- rent departments of state, and put Frenchmen into all the lucrative offices, while his promises, and protesta- tions of amity, became loud and frequent in proportion to his encroachments. II At last being by Napoleon created duke of Abrar- tes, he threw off all disguise, suppressed the council of regency, seized the reins of government, and while he established irtany useful regulations, made the na- tion sensibly alive to the fact that he was a despotic conqueror. The flag and the arms of Portugal were replaced by those of France; eigfht thousand men were selected and sent from the kingdoin und^r the command of the rnarquis d'Alorna and Gomez Frere, two noblemen of the greatest reputation for military talent among the nati\'- officers; five thousand more were attached to the P lench army, and the rest were disbanded. An extraordinary contribution of four mil- lion sterling, decreed by Njpoleon, was then demanded under the curious title of a ransom for the state, but this sura was exorbitant, and Juiiot prevailed on the em- peror to reduce it one half.§ He likewise on his own authority, accepted the forced loan, the confiscated English merchandise, the church h late, and the royal property, in part payment; yet the people were still unable to raise the whole arnount, for the court had before taken the greatest part of the church plate and bullion of the kingdom, and had also drawn large sums of money from the people, under the pretext of defen- ding the country ; and with this treasure they departed, leaving the public functionaries, the army, private creditors, and even domestic servants, unpaid. But, al hough great discontent and misery prevailed, the tranquillity of Lisbon, during the first month after the arrival of the French was remarkable; no disturb- ance look place, and the populace were completely •' Return of the J'rench ariny. \ Ibid. 11 Tbiebault. + Foy. { toy. 42 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [r?noK fl. controlled by the activitj f a police, first established uiidor the prince regent's government by the count de Novion,a I'rench emigrant, and continued by Junot on an extended scale. No cai)ilal city in Europe suffers Fo much as Lisbon from the want of good police regu- lations, and the French general conferred an unmixed benefit on tlie inhabitants by giving more effect to Novion's plans ; yet, so deeply rooted is the prejudice m favour of ancient customs, tiiat no act gave the Por- tuguese more offence, than the having the streets cleansed, and the wild dogs, who infested them by thousands, killed. A French Serjeant, distinguished by his zeal in destroying those disgusting and danger- ous animals, was in revenge assassinated. In the course of March and April, Junot's military system was completed.* The arsenal of Lisbon, one of the finest establishments in Europe, contained all kinds of naval and military stores in abundance, and tea thousand workmen excellent in every branch of business appertaining to war, hence the artillery, the carriages, the ammunition, with all the minor equip- ments of the army, were soon renewed and put in the best possible condition, and the hulks of two line-of- battle shi^is, three frigates, and seven lighter vessels of war, were refitted, armed, and moored across the river to defend the entrance, and to awe the town. The army itself, perfectly recovered from its fatigues, rein- forced, and better disciplined, was grown confident in its chief from tlie success of the invasion, and being well fed and clothed, was become a fine body of robust men, capable of any exertion. It was re-organized in three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. General La Borde commanded the first, general Loison the sec- ond, general Travot the third, general Margaron the fourth, and general Taviel directed the artillery. Gen- eral Keilerman commanded in the Alemtejo, general Quesnel in Oporto, general Maurin in the Algarves, and Junot himself in Lisbon. The i"ortresses of Faro in Algrave, of Almeida, of Elva, La-Lippe, St. Lucie, Setuval, Palmela, and those between Lisbon and the mouth of the Tagus, of Eri- cia and Peniche, were furnished with French garrisons ; Esiremos, Aldea-Gallegos, Santarem, and Abrantes were occupied, and put in such a state of defence as their decayed ramparts would permit. The whole army, including the French workmen and marines attached to it, amounted to above fifty thousand men, of which above forty-four thousand were fit for duty;| that is to say, fifteen thousand five hundred Spaniards, five thousand Portuguese, and twenty-four thousand four hundred French. Of tlie latter 1000 were in Elvas and La Lippe, 1000 in Almeida, 1000 in Peniclie, KiOO in the Algarves, 2892 in Setuval, 750 in Abrantes, 450 cavalry were kept in Valencia d'Alcantara, in Spanish Estre- madura, and 350 distributed in the proportion of fifteen men to a post, guarded the lines of communica- tion which were established from Lisbon to Elvas, and from Almeida to Coimbra. Above fifteen thousand men remained disposable. Lisbon, containing all the civil, military, naval and greatest jiart of the commercial establishments; th(! only fine harbour, two-eighths of the population, and two-thirds of the riches of the whole kingdom, formed a centre!, which was sefuired by the main body of the French, while on the circumference a number of strong posts gave support to the operations of their moveable columns. The garrison in Peniche secured the only • Thiebault. f Return of the French aniiy. harbour between the Tagus and the IVIondego, in which a large disembarkation of English troops could take place; the little port of Figueras, held by a small garri- son, blocked the mouth of the latter river; the division at Thomar secured all the great lines of communication to the north-east, and in conjunction with the garrison of Abrantes, commanded both sides of the Zezere. From Abrantes to Estremos and Elvas, and to Setuval, the lines of communication were short, and through an open country suitable for the operations of the cavalry, which was all quartered on the south bank of the Tagus. Thus, without breaking up the mass of the army, the harbours were sealed against the English; a great and rich tract was enclosed by posts, and rendered so per- vious to the troops, that any insurrection could be reach- ed by a few marches, and immediately crushed ; the connexion between the right and left banks of the Tagus at Lisbon was secured, and the entrance to the port de- fended by the vessels of war which had been refitted and armed. A light squadron was also prepared to com- municate with South America, and nine Russian line- of-battle ships and a frigate, under the command of ad- miral Siniavin, which had taken refuge some time be- fore from the English fleet, were of necessity engaged in the defence of the harbour, forming an unwilling, but not an unimportant auxiliary force. These military arrangements were Junot's own, and suitable enough if his army had been unconnected with any other; but they clashed with the general views of Napoleon, who regarded the force in Portugal, only as a division of troops to be rendered subservient to the general scheme of subjecting the Peninsula; wherefore in the month of May, he ordered, that general Avril, with three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, should co-operate with Dupontin Andalusia; and that general Loison, with four thousand infantry, should proceed to Almeida, and from thence co-operate with Bessieres in the event of an insurrection taking place in Spain. General Thiebault complains of this order as injurious to Junot, ill combined, and the result of a foolish vanity, that prompted the emperor to direct all the armies himself; yet it would be difficult to show that the arrangement was faulty. Avril's division, if he had not halted at Tavora, for which there was no reason, would have ensured the capture of Seville; and if Dupont's defeat had not rendered the victory of Rio Seco useless, Loison's division would have been emi- nently useful in controlling the country behind Bessie- res, in case the latter invaded Gallicia ; moreover it was well placed to intercept the communication be- tween the Castilian and the Estremaduran armies. The emperor's combinations, if they had been fully exe- cuted, would have brought seventy thousand men to bear on the defence of Portugal. Such was the military attitude of the French in May, but their political situation was far from being so fa- vourable. Junot's natural capacity, though considera- ble, was neither enlarged bj"^ study nor strengthened by mental discipline. * Of intemperate habits, indolent in business, prompt and brave in action, quick to give of fence yet ready to forget an injury, he was, at one mo- ment a great man, the next below mediocrity, and at all times unsuited to the task of conciliating and govern- ing a peoj)l(! like the Portuguese, who, with passions as sudden and vehement as his own, retain a sense of injury or insult with incredible tenacity. He had many (litlicullies to encounter, and his duty towards France was in some instances incompatible with good policy towards Portugal, yet he was not without resources for establishing a strong French interest, if he had posses- sed the ability and disposition to soothe a nation that, without having suffered a defeat, was suddenly bowed to a foreign yoke. • Napoleon, in Las Casas. I'oy. 180S. NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 43 But the pride and the poverty of the Portuo-iiese, and the intluence of ancient usagres, interfered with Junot's pnliey. 7'lie monks, and most of the nchility, were inimical to it, and ail the activity of the expelled Brit- ish factory, and the secret warfare of spies and writers in the pay of Eng'land, were directed to undermine his plans, and to render him and his nation odious. On the other hand, he was in possession of the government and of the capital, he had a fine army, he could ofler novelty, so dear to the multitude, and he had the name and the fame of Napoleon to assist him. The promises of power are always believed bj"^ tiie many, and there were abundance of grievances to remedy, and wrongs to redress, in Portugal. Among the best educated men, especially at the universities, there existed a strong feeling against the Braganza family, and such an earn- est desire for reformed institutions, that steps were actually taken to have prince Eugene declared king of Portugal ; * nor was this spirit extinguished at a much later date. With these materials and the military vanity of the Portuguese to work upon, Junot might have establish- ed a powerful French interest; under an active govern- ment, the people would not long have regretted the loss of an independence that had no wholesome breathing amidst the corrupt stagnation of the old system. But the arrogance of a conqueror, and the necessities of an army, Avhich was to be subsisted and paid by an im- poverished people, soon gave rise to all kinds of op- pression ; private abuses followed close upon the heels of public rapacity, and insolence left its sting to rankle in the wounds of the injured. The malignant humours broke cut in quarrels and assassinations, and the severe punishments that ensued, many of them unjust and barbarous in the highest degree, created rage, not terror, for the nation had not tried its strength in battle, and would n5t believe that it was weak. Meanwhile the ports being rigorously blockaded by the English fleet, and the troubles in Spain having interrupted the com- merce in grain, by which Portugal had been usually supplied from that country, the unhappy people suffer- edunderthetriple pressure of famine, war-contributions, and a foreign yoke. | With all external aliment thus cut off, and a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the nation could not remain tranquil ; yet the first five months of Junot's government was, with the exception of a slight tumult at Lisbon, when the arms of Portu- gal were taken down, undisturbed by commotion. Nev- ertheless the whole country was ripe for a general in- surrection. The harvest proved abundant, and Junot hailed the prospect of returning plenty as a relief from his princi- pal difficulty; but as one danger disappeared, anotiier presented itself. The Spanish insurrection excited the hopes of the Portuguese, and agents from the neigh- bouring jimtas communicated secretly with the Spanish generals in Portugal ; the capture of the French f^eet in Cadiz became known, assassinations multiplied, the pope's nuncio fled on board the English fleet, and all things tended to an explosion. The English agents were, of course, actively engaged in promoting this spirit, and the appearance of two English fleets at dif- ff^rent points of the coast, having troops on board, pro- duced great alarm among the French, and augmented the impatient fierceness of the Portuguese. Among the various ways in which the people dis- covered their hatred of the invaders, one was very char- acteristic ; an egg being, by a chemical process, marked with certain letters, was exhibited in a church, and the letters were interpreted to indicate the speedy coming of don Sebastian, king of Portugal, who, like Arthur of Romantic memory, is supposed to be hidden in a secret island, waiting for the destined period to re-ap- Foy. + Thiebault. pear and restore his coimtry to her ancient glory. The trick was turned against the contrivers; other egog prophesied in the most unpatriotic manner, yet the be- lief of the Sebastianists lost nothing of its zeal; many people, and those not of the most uneducated classes, wore often observed upon the highest points of iho hills, casting earnest looks towards the ocean, in the hopes of descrying the island in which their long-lost hero is detained. CHAPTER IL The Spanish general Bellesta seizes general Quesnel and retires to (jalllrja — Insurreftion at Oporto — Junot dis-.irnis and con- fines the Spanish sohlitr? near Lisbon — General Avril s col- uri)n returns to Estrenios — General Loisoti marches from Almeida against Opurto; is attacked at iilezam Frias ; cross- es the Duero ; attacked at Castro d'Airo ; recalled to I>isbon — French driven out of the Algarves — The fort of P'igueras taken — Abrantes and Elvas threatened — Setuval in commo- tion — General Spencer appears oli the Tagus — Junot's plan — Insurrection at Villa Viciosa suppressed — Colonel jMaran- siii takes Beja with great slaughter of the patriots — The in- surgents advance from Leiria, fall back — Action at Leiria — Loison arrives at Abraiitfs — Observations on his march — Frencli army concentrated — The Portuguese general Leite, aided by a Sjianish corps, takes post at Fvora — Loison cros- ses theTajcus; defeats Leite's advanced guard at Montcmor — Battle ofEvora — Town taken and pillaged — Unfriendly con- duct of the Spaniard^ — Loison reachts FIvas; collects provi- sions; is recalled by Junot — Observations. The first serious blow was struck at Oporto. The news of what had taken place all over Spain was known there in June, and general Bellesta, the chief Spanish officer, immediately took an honourable and resolute part. He made Ihe French general Quesnel, with his staff, prisoners ; after which, calling together the Por- tuguese authorities, he declared that they were free to act as they judged most fitting for their own interests, and then marched to Gallicia with his army and cap- lives. The opinions of the leading men at Oporto were divided upon the great question of resistance, but, after some vicissitudes, the boldest side was successful ; tlie insurrection, although at one moment quelled by the French party, was finally established in Oporto, and soon extended along the banks of the Douro and the Minho, and to those parts of Beira which lie between the Mondego and the sea-coast. Junot being informed of this event, perceived that no time was to be lost in disarming the Spanish regiments quartered in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, which was not an easy operation. Carraifa's division was above six thousand men, and without employing the garrisons of the citadel and forts of Lisbon, it was difficult to collect an equal force of French ; the suspicions of the Spanish regiments had been already excited, they were reluctant to obey the French generals, and one, quar- tered at Alcacer do Sal, had actually resisted the orders of the general-in-chief himself.* To avoid a tumult was also a great object, because in Lisbon fifteen thou- sand Gallicians were ordinarily engaged as porters and water-carriers, and if a popular movement had been ex- cited, these men would naturally have assisted their countrymen. Notwithstanding these difhculties, Ju- not, in the night of that day, upon which he received the information of Bellesta's defection, arranged all his measures, and the next day, the Spanish troops being under various pretexts assembled in such numbers and in such places, that resistance was useless, were dis- armed, and placed on board the hulks in the Tagus, with exception of eight hundred of the regiment of Murcia and three hundred of that of Valencia, who es- caped. Thus, in the course of twenty-four hours, and with very little bloodshed, Junot. by his promptness and dexterity, averted a very serious danger. « Thiebault. 44 NAPIEirS PENINSULAR WAR. [Book II. Althoucrh thi'; stroke produced considerable effect, it did not prevent the insurrection from becomintr general; all couriers and officers carryincr orders, or coinmandinqr small posts of communications, were suddenlj' cut otf ; Junot, reduced by a single blow from fifty to twenty- eig'ht thousand men. found himself isolated, and de- pendent upon his individual resources, and the courage of his soldiers, for the maintenance of his conquest, and even for tlie preservation of his army. The Rus- Bian squadron, indeed, contained six thousand seamen and marines, hut while they consumed a oreal quantity of provisions, it was evident, from certain symptoms, that thev could not be depended upon as useful allies, except in the case of an English fleet attempting to force the entrance of the river. In this situation the duke of Abrantes would have seized Badajos, but was deterred by the assembling of an Eslremaduran army, then under the command of general (Jaluzzo. However, Avril's column, having failed to join Dupont, returned to Estremos, and it is probable that Junot never in- tended that it should do otherwise. Meanwhile Loison, then in Upper Beira, was ordered to march upon Oporto.* He had reached Almeida on the 5lh of Jun(\ one daj' previous to Bellesta's defec- tion, and on the 12lh, when he read the order, partly by menace, partly by persuasion, got possession of Fort Conception, a strong, but ill-placed Spanish work on that frontier. He first attempted to penetrate the Entre-Mitiho e Douro by Amarante, but as his division was weak, and that it was possible Bellesta might re- turn and fill upon his flank, he advanced timidly. At Mezam Frtas he was opposed, and his baggage was at the same time menaced by other insurgents, whereupon he fell back to Villa Real, and after a trifling skirmish at that place, crossed the Douro at Lamego, and marched to Castro d'Airo, where he turned and defeated the armed peasants of the mountains, who had particu- larly harassed his flanks. From Castro d'Airo he moved upon Coimbra. whence he dislodged a body of insurtjeiits. and was about to scour the country, when he received one of twenty-five despatches, the rest had been intercepted, sent by Junot to recall him to Lisbon. He immediately uuited his columns, placed his sick and weakly men in Almeida, raised the garrison up to twelve hundred and fifty men, and then having ruined the defences of Fort Conception, commenced his march to Lisbon by the way of Guirda. But while these events were passing in the Beira an insurrection also broke out in the Algarves wliere general Maurin commanded. It begun near Faro, and Maurin himself, lying sick in that town, was made prisoner. Some Portuguese troops attached to the French force then joined the insurgents ; the Spaniards from Andalusia prepared to cross the Cuadiana, and general Spencer appeared off Ayamonte with five thou Band British troops. The French colonel Maransin, '/fho had succeeded Maurin, immediately retired to Hertola. leaving his baggage, military chest, and above a hundred prisoners, besides killed and wounded, in the hands of the patriots, who, finding that Spencer would not land, did not pursue beyond the Algarve moun- tains. The circle of insurrection was now fast closin. !i;09. English admiral had opened a communication with the insurgents on the side of Setuval, and the patriots were assembled in considerable numbers at Alcacer do Sal. In this dilemma Junot resolved to leave the northern people quiet for a while, and attack the Alemtejo, be- cause that was his line of retreat upon Spain, from thence only he could provision the capital, and there also, his cavalr}' could act with the most effect. Ac- cordingly, Loison, with seven thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery, crossed the Tagus the ^Sth of July, and marched by Os Ppgoens, Vendanovas, and Montemor. At the lat- ter place he defeated an advanced guard, which fled to Evora, where the Portuguese general Leite had assem- bled the mass of the insurgents, and assisted by three or four thousand Spanish troops under Moretti, had taken a position to cover the town. When Loison dis- covered them, he directed Margaron and Solignac to turn their flanks, and fell upon their centre himself; the battle was short, for the Spanish auxiliaries per- formed no service, and the Portuguese soon took to flight, but there was a great and confused concourse, a strong cavalry was let loose upon the fugitives, and many being cut off from the main body, were driven into the town, which had been deserted by the princi- pal inhabitants ; there, urged by despair, they endea- voured to defend the walls and the streets for a few moments, but were soon overpowered, the greater part slain, and the houses pillaged. The French lost two or three hundred men, and the number of the Portu- guese and Spaniards that fell was very considerable ;* disputes also arose between them, and the latter ravag- ed the country in their retreat with more violence than the French. Loison, after resting two days at Evora, proceeded to Elvas, and drove away the numerous Spanish par- ties which had again infested the neighbourhood of that fortress, and were become obnoxious alike to Por- tuguese and French. He then scoured the country round, and was accumulating provisions to form maga- zines at Elvas, when he was suddenly interrupted by a despatch from the duke of Abrantes, recalling him to the right bank of the Tagus, for the British army, so long expected, had, at last, descended upon the coast, and manly warfare reared its honest front amidst the desolating scenes of insurrection. OBSERVATIONS. L Loison's expedition to the Alemtejo was an opera- tion of military police, ratiier than a campaign. Junot wished to repress the spirit of insurrection by sudden and severe examples, and hence the actions of his lieu- tenant were of necessity harsh; but they have been represented as a series of massacres and cruelties of the most revolting nature, and Loison disseminated such stories to increase the terror which it was the ob- ject of his expedition to create. The credulity of the nation that produced the Sebastianists was not easily shocked, the Portuguese eagerly listened to tales so de- rogatory to their enemies, and so congenial to their own revengeful dispositions ; but the anecdotes of French barbarity current for two years after the convention of Cintra were notoriously false, and the same stories be- ing related by persons remote from each other is no ar- gument of their truth. The report that Loison was cap- tured, on his march from Almeida, reached Junot through fifty difl^erent channels; there were men to declare that they had beheld him bound with cords; f others to tell how he had been entrapped ; some named the places he had been carried through in triumph, and his habitual and characteristic expressions were quoted ; the story was complete, and the parts were consistent, yet the whole was no* only false, but the rumour had not even the slightest foundation of truth. Tiiivbault. + Ibid. 46 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book II 2. The PoTtufriiPse aoroiinls of the events of this pe- riod are angry amplifications of every real or pretended act tf French harharity and injustice ; the crimes of individuals are made matter of accusation against the whole army. The French accounts are more plausible, yet scarcely more safe as autliorities, seeing that they are written by men who being for the most part actors in the scenes they describe, are naturally concerned to defend their own characters ; their military vanity also has had its share in disguising the simple facts of the insurrection; for willing to enhance the merit of the troops, they have exaggerated the number of the insur- gents, the obstinacy of the combats, and the loss of the patriots. English party writers, greedily fixing upon such relations, have changed the name of battle into massacre; and thus prejudice, conceit, and clamour, have combined to violate the decorum of history, and to perpetuate error. 3. It would, however, be an egregious mistake to suppose, that because the French were not monsters, tliere existed no cause for the acrimony with w'hich their conduct has been assailed. The duke of Abran- tes, although not cruel, nor personally obnoxious to the Portuguese, was a sensual and violent person, and his habits were expensive ; such a man is always rapaci- ous, and as the character of the chief influences the manners of those under his command, it may be safely assumed that his vices were aped by many of his fol- lowers.* Now the virtuous general Travot was es- teemed, and his person respected, even in the midst of tumult, by the Portuguese, while Loison was scarcely safe from their vengeance when surrounded by his troops ; the execrations poured forth at the mere men- tion of ' the bloody Maneta,' as, from the loss of his hand, he was called, proves that he must have commit- ted many heinous acts; and Kellerman appears to have been as justly stigmatised for rapacity, as Loison was for violence. 4. It has been made a charge against the French generals, that they repressed the hostility of the Por- tuguese and Spanish peasants by military executions; but in doing so, they only followed the custom of war, and they are not justly liable to reproof, save where they may have carried their piinishments to excess, and dis- played a wanton spirit of cruelty. All armies have an undoubted right to protect themselves when engaged in hostilities. An insurrection of armed peasants is a military anarchy, and men in such circumstances can- not be restrained within the bounds of civilised warfare. They will murder stragglers, torture prisoners, destroy hospitals, poison wells, and break down all the usages that soften the enmities of modern nations; they wear no badge of an enemy, and their devices cannot, there- fore, be guarded against in the ordinary mode ; their war is one of extermination, and it must be repressed by terrible examples, or the civilised customs of mo- dern warfare must be discarded, and the devastating system of the ancients revived. The usage of refusing quarter to an armed peasantry, and burning their villa ges, however luijust and barbarous it may appear at first view, is founded upon a principle of necessity, and is in reality a vigorous infliction of a partial evil, to prevent universal calamity: hut however justifiable it may be in tlie(;r3', nf)wisc man will hastily resort to it, and no good man will carry it to any extent. CHAPTER IIL Political and riiilitary rctrospprt — Mr. Fox's rondurt rontrastcd with that of hissiirrpssors — (itneral Spenctr sent to the Medi- terranean — Sir John Moore withdrawn from thtnce; arrives in England; sent to Sweden — Spencer arrives at Gibraltar — • Napoleon i T.-". CnsM. Ceuta,the object of his expedition — Spanish insurrection di- verts his attention to Cadiz ; wishes to occupy that city — • Spaniards averse to it — Prudent conduct of sir Hew Dalrjm- plf and lord Colli ne;wood — Spencer sails to Ajanionte ; re- * turns to Cadiz ; sails to the mouth of the Taofus ; returns to Cadiz — Prince Leopold of Sicily and the duke of Orleans arrive at Gibndtar — Curious intrigue — Army assembled at Cork by the Whig administration, with a view to jiermanent conquest in south America, tlie only disposable British force — Sir A. Wellesley takes the command — Contradictory in- structions of the ministers — Sir John Moore returns from Svveden; ordered to Portugal — Sir Hew Dalrvmple appoint- ed commander of the forces — Confused arrangements made by the tuinisters. The subjugation of Portugal was neither a recent nor a secret project of Napoleon's. In 1H06, Mr. Fox, penetrating this design, had sent lord Rosslyn, lord St. Vincent, and general Simcoe, on a politico-military mission to Lisbon, instructing them, to warn the court that a French army destined to invade Portugal was assembling at Bayonne, and to offer the assistance of a British force to meet the attack.* The cabinet of Lisbon afl^ected to disbelieve the information, Mr. Fox died during the negotiation, and as the war with Prus- sia diverted Napoleon's attention to more important objects, he withdrew his troops from Bayonne. The Tory administration, which soon after overturned the Grenville party, thought no further of this afi^air, or at least did not evince as much foresight and ready zeal as its predecessors. They, indeed, sent sir Sydney Smith with a squadron to Lisbon, but their views seem to have been confined to the emigration of the royal family, and they intrusted the conduct of the negotia- tion to lord Strangford, a young man of no solid influ- ence or experience. But, the Russian squadron, under admiral Siniavin, suddenly entered the Tagus, and this unexpected event produced in the British cabinet, an activity which the danger of Portugal had not been able to excite. It was supposed, that as Russia and England were in a stale of hostility, the presence of the Russian ships would intimidate the prince regent, and prevent him from passing to the Brazils, wherefore sir Charles Cotton, an admiral of higher rank than sir Sydney Smith, was sent out with instructions to force the en- trance of the Tagus. and attack Siniavin. f Gcncra\ Spencer, then upon the point of sailing with five thou- sand men upon a secret expedition, was ordered to touch at Lisbon, and ten thousand men, under sir John Moore, were withdrawn from Sicily to aid tins enterprise ; j^ but before the instructions for the commanders were even written, the prince regent was on his voyage to the Brazils, and Junot ruled in Lisbon. When sir John Moore arrived at Gibraltar, he could hear nothing of sir Sydney Smith, nor of general Spencer, and ].roceeded to England, which he reached the 31sl of December, 1807. From thence, after a detention of four months on ship-beard, lu>was despatched upon that well-known and eminently-foolish expedition to Sweden, which ended in such an extraordinary manner ;|| and which seems from the first to have had no other object, tlian the factifuis one of keeping an excellent general and a superb division of troops at a distance from the only country where their services were really required. Meanwhile general Spencer's armament, long baflled by contrary winds, and once forced back to port, was finally dispersed in a storm, and a part arrived at Gib- raltar, by single ships, the latter end of January, 1808. Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of that fortress, hearing, on the 5th of February, that a French fleet had just passed the Strait, and run up the Mediterranean, became alarm(>d for Sicily, and caused the first comers to proceed to that island on the 11th; but Spencer himself, whose instructions included an attack on Ccu- ta, did not arrive at Gibraltar until the 10th of March, * Parliamentary Papers, 1809. } Sir John Mooie's Journal, MS. + Ibid. II Ibid. 1808.] NAPIER'S PENINSULIR WAR, 47 wher the deficiency in his armament was supplied bji a draft from the garrison, and a council was held to arranp^p the plan of attack on Ceuta ; the operation was however finally judired impracticable. The objects of Spencer's expedition were manifold. He was to co-operate with Moore anrainst the Russian fleet in the Tagrus ; he was to take the French fleet at Cadiz ; he was to assault Ceuta; and he was to make an attempt on the Spanish fleet at Port \Iahon ! But the wind which brouofht Moore to Lisbon blowed Spencer from tliat port, and a consultation with admiral Purvis convinced him that the French fleet in Cadiz was invul- nerable to his force ; Ceuta was too stromr; and it only remained lo sail to Port Mahon, when the Spanish in- surrection breakinar out, drew him back to Cadiz with altered views. In the relation of Dupont's campaifjn, I have already touched upon Spencer's proceedings at Cadiz ; bul in this place it is necessary to give a more detailed sketch of those occurrences, which forttmately brought him to the coast of Portugal, at the moment when sir Arthur Wellesley was commencing the cam- paign of Vimiero. When the French first entered Spain, general Casta- fios commanded the Spanish troops at San Roque. In that situation he was an object of interest to Napoleon, who sent two French officers privately to sound his dis- position ; Castauos, who had secretly resolved to op- pose the designs of the emperor, thought those officers were coming to arrest him, and at first determined to kill them, and fly to Gibraltar, but on discovering his mistake treated them civilly, and prosecuted his original plans.* Through the medium of one Viali, a merchant of Gibraltar, he opened a communication with sir Hew Dalrymple, and the latter, who had been closely watch- ing the progress of events, encouraged him in his views, and not only promised assistance, but recommended several important measures, such as the immediate sei- zure of the French squadron in Cadiz, the security of the Spanish fleet at Minorca, and a speedy communica- tion with South America: however, before Castalos could mature his plans, the insurrection took place at Seville, and he acknowledged the authority of the junta. Meanwhile Solano arrived at Cadiz, and general Spencer, in co;ij unction with admiral Purvis, pres=ied him to attack tlie French squadron, oflering to assist if he would admit the English troops into the town. So- lano, whose mind was not made up to resist the inva- ders, expressed great displeasure at this proposal to oc- cupy Cadiz, and refused to treat at all with the Briti=ih, an event not unexpected by sir Hew. for he knew that most of the Spaniards were mistrustful of the object of Spencer's expedition, and the offer was made without his concurrence. Thus a double intercourse was car- ried on between the British and Spanish authorities, the one friendly and confidential between sir Hew and C is- taiios, the other of a character proper to increase the suspicions of the Spaniards. And when it is consider- ed that Spain and England were nominally at war: that the English commanders were acting without the au- thority of their government; that the troops, which it was proposed to introduce into Cadiz, were in that p irt of the world for the express purpose of attacking Ceuta, and had already taken the island of Perexil close to that fortress, little surprise can be excited by Solano's con- duct. When he was killed, and Morla had succeeded to the command, Spencer and Purvis renewed thoir offers ; but Morla also declined their assistance, and having himself forced the French squadron to surrender, by a succession of such ill-directed attacks, that some doubt was entertained of his wish to succeed, he com- menced a series of low intrigues calculated to secure his own personal safety, while he held himself ready to betray his country if the French should prove the strongest. * Sir Hew Dalrymple'* Correspondence, MS. After the reduction of the enemy's ships, the people were inclined to admit the English troops, but the local junta, swayed by Morla's representations, were averse to it;* and he, while confirming this disposition, secretly urged Spencer to persevere in his oflTer, saying that he looked entirely to the British force for the future defence of Cadiz : thus dealing, he passed with the people for an active patriot, yet made no preparations for resist- ance, and by his double falsehood preserved a fair ap-. pearance both with the junta and the English general. With these affairs sir Hew Dalrymple did not meddle, he early discovered that Morla was an enemy of Casta- fios. and having more confidence in the latter, carried on the intercourse at first established between them, with- out reference to the transactions at Cadiz. He also supplied the Spanish general with arms and two thou- sand barrels of powder, and placing one English officer near him as a military correspondent, sent another in the capacity of a political agent to the supreme junta at Seville. When Castafios was appointed commander-in-chief of the Andalusian army, and had rallied Echevaria'3 troops, he asked for the co-operation of the British force, and offered no objection to their entering Cadiz, but he preferred having them landed at Almeria to march to Xeres. General Spencer confined his offers to the occu- pation of Cadiz, and when Morla pretended, that to fit out the Spanish fleet was an object of immediate impor- tance, colonel sir George Smith, an officer employed by general Spencer to conduct the negotiations, promised, on his own authority, money to pay the Spanish sea» men, who were then in a state of mutiny. However lord Collingwood and sir Hew Dalrymple refused to fulfil this promise, and the approach of Dupont causinor Morla to wnsh Spencer's troops away, he persuaded that general to sail to Ayamonte, under the pretence of pre- venting Avril's division from crossing the Guadiana, although he knew well that the latter had no intention of doing so. The effect produced upon colonel Maran- sin by the appearance of the British force off Ayamonte has been already noticed. General Thiebault says that Spencer might have struck an important blow at that pe- riod against the French ; but the British troops were unprovided Avith any equipment for a campaign, and to have thrown five thousand infantry, without cavalry and without a single place of arms, into the midst of an ene- my who occupied all the f rtresses. and who could bring twenty thousand men into the field, would have been imprudent to the greatest degree. General Spencer, who had by this time been rejoiu'^d by his detachment from Sicily, only made a demonstration of landing, and having thus materially aided the insurrection, returned to Cadiz, from whence he was almost immediately sum- moned to Lisbon, to execute a new project, which prov- ed to be both ill-considered and fruitless. Sir Charles Cotton, being unable to force the entrance of the Tagus without troops, had blockaded that post with the utmost rigour, expecting to force the Russian squadron to capitulate for want of provisions. This scheme, which originated with lord Strangford, never had the least chance of success, and only augmented the privations and misery of the wretched inhabitants ; f Junot, therefore, had recourse to various expedients to abate the rigour of the blockade with regard to them, and among others, employed a Portuguese, named Sataro, to make proposals to the English admiral. This man, who at first ])relended that he came without thb privity of the French, led sir Charles to believe that only four thousand French troops remained in Lisbon, and under that erroneous impression, the latter desired general Spencer might join him, for the purpose of attacking the enemy while they were so weak. Spen- cer, by the advice of sir Hew Dalrymple and lord * Sir Hfw Dalrvniple'g Correspondence, t Mr. Caiiniug to lord Castlerea^h, 'iath Dec. 1807. 48 NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book 11. Colling^vood, obeyed the summons, but on his arrival was led to doubt the correctness of the admiral's infor- mation ; * instead of four thousand, it appeared that there could not be less than fifteen thousand French in or near Lisbon, and the attack was of course relinquish- ed, f Spencer returned to Cadiz. Casta: os ag-ain pressed liim to co-operate with the Spanish forces, and he so far consented, as to disembark them at the port of St. Mary, and even agreed to send a detachment to Xeres ; yet deceived by IMorla, who still gave him hopes of finally occupying Cadiz, he resolved to keep the greater part close to that city.:^ At this period the insurrection of Andalusia, attract- ed all the intriguing adventurers in the Mediterranean towards Gibraltar and Seville, and the confusion of Agraniant's camp would have been rivalled, if the prudent firmness of sir Hew Dalrymple had not check- ed the first efforts of those political pests. Among the perplexing follies of the moment, one deserves partic- ular notice, on account of some curious circumstances that attended it, the full explanation of which I must, however, leave to other historians, who may perhaps find in that and the like affairs, a key to that absurd policy, which in Sicily so long sacrificed the welfare of two nations to the whims and follies of a profligate court. The introduction of the salique law had long been a favourite object with the Bourbons of Spain ; but it had never been promulgated with the formalities ne- cessary to give it validity, and the nation was averse to change the ancient rule of succession ; this law was, however, now secretly revived by some of the junta of Seville who wished to offer the regency to the prince of Sicily, because, Ferdinand and his brother dying without sons, the regent would then succeed to the prejudice of the princess Carlotta of Portugal. With this object in view, the chevalier Robertoni, a Sicilian agent, appeared early at Gibraltar, and from thence, as if under the auspices of England, attempt- ed to forward the views of his court, until sir Hew Dalrymple, being accidentally informed that the British cabinet disapproved of the object of his mission, sent hi;n away-ll Meanwliile Castaf.os, deceived by some person en- gaged in the intrigue, was inclined to support the pre- tensions of the Sicilian prince to the regency, and pro- posed to make use of sir Hew Dalrymple's name to give weight to his opinions, a circumstance which w'ould have created great jealousy in Spain, if sir Hew had not promptly refused his sanction. The affur then seemed to droo|) for a moment, but in the middle of July an English man of war suddenly appeared at Gibraltar, havinir on board prince Leopold of Sicily, a complete court establishment of chamberlains with their keys, and ushers with their white w^ands ; § and the duke of Orleans, who attended his brother-in-law the prince, making no secret of his intention to negotiate for the re- gency of Spain, openly demanded that he should be received into Gibraltar. Sir Hew, foreseeing all the mischief of this proceeding, promptly refused to permit the prince orany of his attendants to land, and the cap- tain of the ship, whose orders were merely to carry him to Gibraltar, refused to take him back to vSicily. Finally, to relieve his royal highness from this awkward situation, sir Hew consented to receive him as a guest, provided that he divested himself of his public charac- ter, and that the duke of Orleans departed instantly from the fortress. Sir William Drummond, British envoy at Palermo, Mr. Vlali, and the duke of Orleans, were the ostensi- ble contrivers of this notable scheme, by which, if it had succeeded, a small party in a local junta, would have appointed a regency for Spain, paved the way for • Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence. + rarliiiiiicnttiry Fsip-rs, 1809. i Sir Hew Duli>inple'3 Corrcip->n Jence. |1 Ibi Ibid. altering the laws of succession in that country, estab- lished their own sway over the other juntas, and crea- ted interminable jealousy between England, Portugal, and Spain. With whom the plan originated does not very clearly appear. Sir William Druuuuoud's repre- sentations induced sir Alexander Ball to provide the ship of war, nominally for the conveyance of the duke of Orleans, in reality for prince Leopold, with whoi;o intended voyage sir Alexander does not appear to have been made acquainted. That the prince should have desired to be r gent of Spain was natural, but that he should have been conveyed to Gibraltar in a British ship of the line, when the English government disap- proved of his pretensions, was really curious. Sir William Drummond could scarcely have proceeded such lengths in an affair of so great consequence, with out secret instructions from some member of his own government, yet lord Castlereagh expressed unqual- ified approbation of sir Hew's decisive conduct upon the occasion ! Did the ministers act at this period without any confidential communication with each other? or was lord Casllereagh's policy secretly and designedly thwarted by one of his colleagues ] But it is time to quit this digression and turn to THE PROCEEDINGS IN PORTUGAL. The bishop of Oporto being placed at the head of the insurrectional junta of that town, claimed th(i assist- ance of England. ' We hope,' said he, 'for an aid of three hundred thousand cruzado novas ; of arms and accoutrements complete, and of cloth for forty thou- sand infantry and for eight thousand cavalry ; tiiree thousand barrels of cannon powder, some cargoes of salt fish, and other provisions, and an auxiliary body of six thousand men at least, including some cavalry.' This extravagant demand would lead to the supposition that an immense force had been assembled by the pre- late, yet he could never at any time have put five thou- sand organized men in motion against the French, and had probably not even thought of any feasible or ra- tional mode of employing the succours h& demanded; the times were however favourable for extravagant de- mands, and his were not rejected by the English minis- ters, who sent agents to Oporto and other parts, with power to grant supplies. The improvident system adopted for Spain, being thus extended to Portugal, produced precisely the same effects, that is, cavils, intrigues, waste, insubordination, inordinate vanity and ambition, among the ignorant upstart men of the day. More than half a year had now elapsed since Napo- leon first poured his forces into the Peninsula, every moment of that time was marked by some extraordina- ry event, and one month had passed since a general and terrible explosion, shaking the unsteady structure of diplomacy to pieces, had left a clear space for the shock of arms; yet the British cabinet was still unac- quainted with the real state of public feeling in the Peninsula, and with the Spanish character; and ulthougli possessing a disposable army, of at least eighty thou- sand excellent troops, was totally unsettled in its plans, and unprepared for any vigorous ellbrt.* Agents were indeed despatched to every accessible province, the publico treasure was scattered with heedless j)rofusion, and the din of preparation was heard in every depart- ment : but the bustle of confusion is easily inisiaken for the activity of business, and time removing the veil of official mystery covering those transactions, has exposed all their dull and meagre features ; it is now clear, that the treasure was squandered without judgment, and the troops dispersed without meaning. Ten thousand exiled to Sweden proved the truth of Oxenstiern's address to his son ; as many more idly kept in Sicily were degraded into the guards of a vi cious court; Gibraltar was unnecessarily filled with » Purl. Pjp. l,.u;(:i.KlU.i«.i-.-i. t. »ii A. W . II .-h , ...si Jill, 1808.] NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 49 fig'hting men, and general Spencer, with five thousand excellent soldiers, was doomed to wander between Ceu- ta, Lisbon, and Cadiz, seeking, like the knight of La Mancha, for a foe to combat. A considerable force remained in England, but it was not ready for service, when the minister resolved to send an expedition to the Peninsula, and nine thou- sand men collected at Cork, formed the onlj' disposa- ble army for immediate operations. The Grey and Grenville administration, so remarkable for unfortunate military enterprises, had assembled this handful of men with a view to permanent conquests in South America! upon what principle of policy it is not neces- sary to inquire, but such undoubtedly was the inten- tion of that administration, perhaps in imitation of the Roman senate, who sent troops to Spain when Hanni- bal was at the gates of the city. The Tory administra- tion relinquishing this scheme of conquest, directed sir Arthur Wellesley to inform general Miranda, the military adventurer of the day, not only that he must cease to expect assistance, but that all attempts to sep- arate the colonies of Spain from the parent state would be discouraged by the English government ; thus the troops assembled at Cork became available, and sir Ar- thur Wellesley being appointed to command them, sailed on the 12th of .luly, to commence that long and bloody contest in the Peninsula which he was destined to terminate in such a glorious manner. Two small divisions were soon after ordered to assemble for embarkation at Ramsgate and Harwich, under the command of generals Anstruthcrand Acland, yet a considerable lime elapsed betbre they were ready •J sail, and a singular uncertainty in the views of the ministers at this period subjected all the military operations to perpetual and mischievous changes. * General Spencer, supposed to be at Gibraltar, was directed to repair to Cadiz, and there await sir Arthur's orders, and the latter was permitted to sail under the impression that Spencer was actually subject to his command ;| other instructions empowered Spencer, at his own disCiCtion, to commence operations in the south, without reference to sir Arthur Wellesley's pro- ceedings^ admiral Purvis, who, after lord Colling- wood's arrival, had no separate command, was also authorised to undertake any enterprise in that quarter, and even to control the operations of sir Arthur Wel- lesley by calling for the aid of his troops, that general being enjoined to 'pay all due obedience to any such requisition !'|| Yet sir Arthur himself was informed, that 'the accounts from Cadiz were bad ;' that 'no dispo- sition to move either there or in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar was visible,' and that ' the cabinet were un- willing he should go far to the soutliward, whilsf'the spirit of exertion appeared to reside more to the north- ward.' Again, the admiral, sir Charles Cotton, was informed that sir Arthur Wellesley was to co-operate with him in a descent at the mouth of the Tagus, but sir Arthur himself had no definite object given for his own operations, although his instructions pointed to Portu- gal. 'I'hus in fact no one officer, naval or military, knew exactly what his powers were, with the exception ofridmiral Purvis, who, being only second in command for his own service, was really authorised to control all the operations of the land forces, provided he directed them to that quarter which had been declared unfavour- able for any operations at all ! These inconsistent orders were calculated to create confusion and prevent all vigour of action, but more egregious conduct fol- lowed. In recommending Portugal as the fittest field of action, the ministers were chiefly guided by the advice of the * Farlianifntarv Papers, 1808. f Ibid. J Lil. CastltreaRh to sir A. VVelk'siey, 30th June. II I'lid. Lcl. Castlereagh to gen. S[jencer, '^'dtU and 30th Juue. Cli. tj adin. I'urvh 2*1*^ Uiiie. Asturian deputies. Yet having received sir Hew Dal- rymplc's despatches to a late date, their own informa- tion must have been more recent and more extensive than any that they could obtain from those dep\ities, who had left Spain at the commencement of the insur' rection, who were ill informed of what was passing in their own province, utterly ignorant of the state of any other part of the Peninsula, and under any circumstan- ces incapable of judging rightly in such momentous affairs.* But though sir Arthur Wellesley's instructions were vague and confined with respect to military oper- ations, he was expressly told that the intention of the government, was to enable Portugal and Spain to throw oft' the French yoke, and ample directions were given to him as to his future political conduct in the Peninsu- la. He was informed how to demean himself in any disputes that might arise between the two insurgent nations, how to act with relation to the settlement of the supreme authority during the interregnum. He was directed to facilitate communications between the colonies and the mother country, and to oflTer his good offices to arrange any difierences between them. Tha terms upon which Great 'Britain would acquiesce in any negotiation between Spain and France were impar- ted to him, and finally he was empowered to recommend the establishment of a paper system in the Peninsula, as a good mode of raising money, and attaching the holders of it to the national cause; the Spaniards were not, however, sufficiently civilised to adopt this recom- mendation, and barbarously preferred gold to credit, wt a time when no man's life, or faith, or wealth, or power, was worth a week's purchase. Sir Hew Dalrymple was also commanded to furnish sir Arthur with every information that might be of use. in the operations, and when the tenor of these instruc- tions, and the great Indian reputation enjryed by sir Arthur Wellesley are considered, it is not possible to doubt that he was first chosen as the fittest man to conduct the armies of England at this important con- juncture.)" Yet scarcely had he sailed when he was superseded, not for a man whose fame and experiencn might have justified such a change, but by an extraor- dinary arrangement, which can hardly be attributed to mere vacillation of purpose, he was reduced to the fourth rank in that army, for the future governance of which, he had fifteen days before received the most extended instructions. Sir Hew Dalrj'mple was now appointed to the chief command, and sir Jolm Moore, v,ho had suddenly and unexpectedly returned from the Baltic, having by his firmness and address saved himself and his troops from the madness of the Swedish monarch, was with marked disrespect, directed to place himself under the orders of sir Harry Burrard, and proceed to Portugal. Thus two men comparatively unknown and unused to the command of armies, superseded the only generals in the British service whose talents and expe- rience were indisputable. The secret springs of this proceeding are not so deep as to baffle investigation , but that task scarcely belongs to the general liislorian, who does enough when he exposes the effects of envy, treachery, and base cunning, without tracing those vices home to their possessors. Notwithstanding these changes in the command, the uncertainty of the minister's plans continued. Tiie same day that sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to be commander-in-chief, a despatch, containing the following i)roject of campaign, was sent to sir Arthur Wellesley::): 'The motives which have induced the sending so large a force to that quarter (the coast of Portugal,) are, 1st, to provide efl'ectually for an attack upon the Tagus; and, '2illy, to have such an addition- al force disposable beyond what may be indispensably * Pari. Pap. Ld. Castlereagh to sir A. Wellesley, 30th Junt. t Pari. Pap. Ld. Castl. reagh to sirH. Paliviiij le, 2Uth June, i Pari. Pap. Ld. Castlncugh to sir A. WiUeslty, 15th July. ho NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book 11. requisite for thnt operntion, ns may atlmit of a detach- ment being made to the southward, either with a view to secure Cadiz, if it should be threatened by the French force under general Dupont, or to co-operate with the Spanish troops in reducing that corps, if cir- cumstances should favour such an operation, or any other that may be concerted. His Majesty is pleased to direct that the attack upon the Tw^us should be consider- ed as the first object to be attended to ; and as the whole force of which a statement is enclosed, when assembled, •will amount to not less than thirty thousand, it is coti- sidered that both services may be provided for amply. The precise distribution, as between Portugal and Andalusia, both as to time and proportion of force, must depend upon circumstances, to be judged of on the spot; and should it be deemed advisable to fulfil the assurance which lieutenant general sir Hew Dal- rymple appears to have given to the supreme junta of Seville, under the authority of my despatch of (no date), that it was the intention of his Majesty to em- ploy a corps of ten thousand men to co-operate with the Spaniards in that quarter; a corps of this magnitude may, I should hope, be detached without prejudice to the main operation against the Tagus, and may be reinforced, according to circumstances, after the Tagus has been secured. But if, previous to the arrival of the force under orders from England, Cadiz should be seriously threatened, it must rest with the senior officer of the Tagus, at his discretion to detach, upon receiving a requisition to that effect, such an amount of force as may place that important place out of the reach of immediate danger, even though it should for the time suspend operations against the Tagus.'' The inconsistent folly of this despatch is apparent, but the occupation of Cadiz was a favourite project with the Cabinet, which was not discouraged by Spencer's unsuccessful effort to gaiji admittance, nor by the repre- sentations of sir Hew Dalrymple, who had grounds to believe that the attempt would bring down the army under CastaHos to oppose it by force. Neither did the minister consider that, in a political view, such a mea- sure, pressed as a preliminary, would give a handle for misrepresentation, and that, in a military view, the bur- den of Cadiz would clog operations in Portugal. Adopt- ing all projects, and weighing none, they displayed the most incredible confusion of ideas ; for the plan of send- ing ten thousand men to Seville, was said to be in pursuance of a promise made by sir Hew Dalrymple to the junta, whereas the despatch of that general, quoted as authority for this promise of help, contained notiiing of the kind, and was even written before any junta exist- ed! In England, at this period, personal enmity to Napo- leon, and violent party prejudices, had so disturbed the Judgments of nien relative to that monarch, that any in- formation speaking of strength or success for him, was regarded with suspicion even by the ministers, who, as commonly happens in such cases, becoming the dupes of their own practices, listened with complacency to all those tales of mutiny among his troops, disaffection of his generals, and insurrections in France, which the cunning or folly of their agents transmitted to them. Hence sprung such projects as the one above, the false calculations of which may be exposed by a short com- parative statement. The whole English force was not much above thirty thousand men, distributed off Cadiz, off the coast of Portugal, on the eastern parts of Eng- land, and in the Channel. The French in Spain and Portugal were about a hundred and twenty thousand men, and they possessed all the Portuguese, and most of the Spanish fortresses. The English army had no reserve, no fixed plan, and it was to be divided, and to act upon a double line of operations. The ?>ench had a strong reserve at Bayonne, and the grand French arii.y of f'.ur hundred thousand veteran- v is untouched, and ready to succour the troops in the Peninsula if they required it. Happily, this visionary plan was in nc )articular fol- lowed by the generals entrusted with the conduct of it. A variety of causes combined to prevent the execution. The catastrophe of Baylen marred the great combina- tions of the French emperor, fortune drew the scattered divisions of the English army together, and the deci- sive vigour of sir Arthur Wellesley sweeping away these cobweb projects, obtained all the success that the bad arrangements of the ministers would permit. In the next chapter, resuming the thread of the history, I shall relate the proceedings of the first British campaign in the Peninsula. But I judged it necessary to make an exposition of the previous preparations and pl.ins of the cabinet, lest the reader's attention not being fully awa- kened to the difficulties cast in the way of the English generals by the incapacity of the government, should, with hasty censure, or niggard praise, do the former in- justice ; for, as a noble forest hides many noisome swamps and evil things, so the duke of Wellington's actions have covered the innumerable errors of the min- isters. CHAPTER IV. Sir A. Wellesley quits his troops and proceeds to Coruna Junta refuse assistance in men, hut ask for and obtain money — Sir Arthur ffoes to Oporto; arrangesa plan witli the bish- op; proceeds to the Ta^iis; rejoins his troops; joined ')y Spencer; disembarks at tiie Mondego; has an interview with general Freire d'Andrada; marches to Leria — Portuguese in- surrection weak — Junot's position and dispositions — Laborde marches to Alcobaca, Loison to Abrantts — (ieneral Freire separates from the British — Junot quits Lisbon with the re- serve — Laborde takes post at Rorica — Action of Rorica — I,a- borde retreats to Montecliique^Sir A. Wellesley marches to Viniiero — Junot concentrates his army at Torres Vedras. A FEW days after sailing from Cork, sir Arthur Wel- lesley, quitting the fleet, repaired in a frigate to Coru^i, where he arrived the 20th of .Tuly, and immediately held a conference with the Gallieian junta, by whom he was informed of the battle of Rio Seeo.* The ac- count was glossed over in the Spanish manner and tlie issue of that contest had caused no change of policy, if policy that may be called, which was but a desire to ob- tain money and to avoid personal inconvenience. The aid of troops was rejected, but arms and gold were demanded, and while the conference went on, the last was supplied, for an English frigate entered the harbour with two hun- dred thousand pounds. The junta recommended that t!ie British should he employed in the north of Portugal, promised to aid them by sending a Spanish division to Oporto, and supported their recommendation with an incorrect statement of the number of men, Spanish and Portuguese, who, they asserted, were in arms near that city. They gave also a still more inaccurate estimate of the forces under Junot, and in this manner persuaded sir Arthur not to land in their province : yet, at the mo- ment they were rejecting the assistance of the British troops, the whole kingdom of Gallicia was lying at the mercy of marshal Bessicres, and there were neithe* men nor means to impede the progress of his victorious army. Mr. Charles Stuart, appointed envoy to the (rallician junta, had arrived with sir Arthur Wellesley at Corui~ia, and quickly penetrated the flimsy veil of Spanish en- thusiasm, informed his government of the true state of affairs ; but his despatches were unheeded, while the inflated reports of tlie subordinate civil and military agents were blazoned fortii, and taken as sure guides. Meanwhile sir Arthur proceeded to Oporto, where ha found colonel Browne, an active, intelligent officer, em- * Sir A. WellesIey'B Narrative. Court of Inquiry. 1808. J NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR. 51 ploj'ed to distribute succours. From his reports it ap- j^f'rirs that no Spanish troops were in the north of Por- tHtral, and that all the Portuo^uese force was upon the Monde^o, to the south of which river the insurrection had already spread. A French division of eight thou- sand men was supposed to be in their front, and some preat disaster was to be expected, for, to use colonel Browne's words, ' with every sfood will in the people, their exertions were so short-lived, and with so little combination, that there was no hope of their hein^ able to resist the advances of the enemy;* in fact, only five thousand regulars and militia, half armed and associat- ed with ten or twelve thousand peasants without any arms, were in the field at all. A largp army was, how- ever, made out upon paper by the ".dshop of Oporto, who, havino' assembled his civil /nd military coadju- tors in council, proposed variou? plans of operation for the allied forces, none of which sir Arthur was inclined to adopt ;'\ but after some discussion it was finally ar- ranfjed that the prelate and the paper army should look to the defence of theTras os Montes against Bessieres, and that the five thousand soldiers on the Mondego should co-operate with the British forces. Tills bring settled, sir Arthur Wellesley hastened to consult with sir Charles Cotton relative to the descent at the mouth of the Tagus, which had so long haunted the imaginations of the ministers. The strength of the French, the bar of the river, the disposition of the forts, and the difficulty of landing in the imme- diate neighbourhood, occasioned by the heavy surf playintr upon all the undefended creeks and bays, con- vinced him that such an enterprise was unadvisable, if not iinpracticablf. There remained a choice of landing to the north of Lisbon at such a distance as to avoid the danger of a disputed disembarkation ; or of proceed- ing to tiie southward to join general Spencer, and com- mence operations in that quarter against Dupont.:}: Sir Arthur Wellesley decided against the latter, which promised no good result while Junot held Portugal and Bessieres hung on the northern frontier; for he foresaw that the jealousy of the Spaniards, evinced by their frequent refusal to admit English troops into Cadiz, would assuredly bring on a tedious negotiation, and waste the season of action before the army could obtain a place of arms ; or that the campaign must be com- menced without any secure base of operations. [| Noth- ing was then known of the Spanish troops, except that they were inexperienced, and without good aid from them, it would have been idle with fourteen thousand men to take the field against twenty thousand, strongly posted in the Sierra Morena, and communicating freely with the main body of the French army. A momenta- ry advance was useless ! and if the campaign was pro- tacted, the line of operations running nearly parallel to the frontier of Portugal, would have required a covering ar.ny on the Guadiana to watch the movements of Junot. The double line of operations, proposed by lord Cas- tlereagh, was contrary to all military principle, and as Spencer's despatches announced that liis division was at St. Mary's, near Cadiz, and disengaged from any connexion with the Spaniards — a fortunate circum- stance, scarcely to have been expected, — sir Arthur sent him orders to sail to the mouth of the Mondego, whith- er he himself also repaired, to join the fleet having his own army on board. Off" the Mondego he received the despatches an- nouncing sir Hew Dalrymple's appointment and the sailing of sir John Moore's troops, but this mortifying intelligence did not relax his activity ; he directed fast- sailing vessels to look out for Anstruther's armament, and conduct it to the Mondego, and having heard of * Parliamentnry Papers, 1809. t Sir A. Wfllesley's Narrative. Court of Inquiry, t Ibid. y Sir H. Dalrymplt's and lordCcllingwood'j Correspondence. Dupont's capitulation, resolved without waiting for gen- eral Spencer's arrival, to disembark his own troops and commence the campaign — a determination that marked the cool decisive vigour of his character. He was, in- deed, sure that, in consequence of Dupont's defeat, Bessieres would not enter Portugal ; yet his informa- tion led him to estimate Junot's own force at sixteen to eighteen thousand men, a number, indeed, below the truth, yet sufficient to make the hardiest general pause before he disembarked with only nine thousand men, and without any certainty that his fleet could remain even for a day in that dangerous offmg :■* another man, al&o, was coming to profit from any success that might be obtained, and a failure would have ruined his own reputation in the estimation of the English public, al- ways ready to deride the skill of an Indian general. It was difficult to find a good point of disembark- ation. The coast of Portugal, from the Minho to the Tagus, presents with few exceptions, a rugged and dangerous shore ; all the harbours formed by the rivers have bars, that render most of them difffcult of access even for boats ; with the slightest breeze from the sea- board, a terrible surf breaks along the whole line of coast, forbidding all approach ; and when the south winds which commonly prevails from August to tlie winter months, blows, a more dangerous shore is not to be found in au)"^ part of the world. The small peninsula of Peniche, about seventy miles northward of the Lisbon Rock, alone offered a safe and accessible bay, perfectly adapted for a disembarka- tion ; but the anchorage was completely within range of the fort, which contained a hundred guns and a gar- rison of a thousand men. The next best place was the Mondego river, and as the little fort of Figueras, taken, as I have before related, by the student Zagalo, and now occupied by English marines, secured a free en- trance, sir Arthur commenced landing his troops there on the 1st of August. The weather was calm, yet the operation was so difficult, that it was not completed before the 5th, and at that moment, by singular good fortune, general Spencer arrived ; he had not received sir Arthur's orders, but with great promptitude had sailed for the Tagus the moment Dupont surrendered, and by sir Charles Cotton had been directed to Mon- dego. f The united forces, however, only amounted to twelve thousand three hundred men, because a vete- ran battalion, being destined for Gibraltar, was left on board the ships. When the army was on shore, the British general re- paired to Montemor Velho, to confer with don Bernar- dim Freire d' Andrada, the Portuguese commander-in- chief, who proposed that the troops of the two nations should relinquish all communication with the coast, and throwing themselves into the heart of Beira, commence an offensive campaign. He promised ample stores of provisions, but sir Arthur having already discovered the weakness of the insurrection, placed no reliance on those promises; wherefore furnistiing Freire with five thousand stand of arms and ammunition, he refused to separate from his ships, and seeing clearly that the insurgents were unable to give any real assistance, resolved to act with reference to the probability of their deserting him in danger. The Portuguese general, dis- appointed at this refusal, reluctantly consented to join the British army, yet pressed sir Arthur to hasten to Leiria, lest a large magazine filled, as he affirmed, with provisions for the use of the British army, should fall into the enemy's hands. After this the two gen erals separated, and the necessary preparations being completed, the advanced guard of the English army quitted the banks of the Mondego on the 9tli, taking the road to Leiria, and the 10th, sir Arthur Wellesley followed with the main body. * Sir A. Wellcsley's Narratire. Court of Inquiry, f lb 52 NAPIER S PENINSULAR WAR. [Book IT. His plnn pmbracrd three principal objects : 1. To hold on by the sea-coast, as well for the sake of his supplies, as to avoid the drain upon his army, which the proteftion of magazines on shore would oc- casion, and also to cover the disembarkation of the re- inforcements expected from Enirland. 2. To keep his troops in a mass, that he might strike an important blow. 3. To strike that blow as near Lisbon as possible, that tlie affairs of Portugal might be quickly brought to a crisis. He possessed very good military surveys of the ground in the immediate neighbourhood of Lisbon, and he was anxious to carry on bis operations in a part of the country where he could avail himself of tliis re- source ; * but the utter inexperience of his commis- sariat staff, and the want of cavalry, rendered his movements slow, and obliged him to be extremely cir- cumspect; especially as the insurrection, although a generous, was a feeble effort, and its prolongation rather the result of terror than of hope ; the blow had been hastily struck in the moment of suffering, and the patriots, conscious of weakness, trembled when they reflected on their own temerity. Bernardim Freire had received arms and equipments complete for five thou- sand soldiers, yet his army at Leiria did not exceed six thousand men of all arms fit for action, and besides this force, there were in all the provinces north of the Tagus only three thousand infantry, under the com- mand of the marquis of Valladeres, half of whom were Spaniards :| lience it appears, that nothing could be more insignificant than the insurrection, nothing more absurd than the lofty style adopted by the junta of Oporto in their communications with the British min- isters. L'pon the other side, Junot, who had received infor- ."nation of the English descent, in the Mondego, as early as the 2d, was extremely embarrassed by the dis- tance of his principal force, and the hostile disposi- tion of the ii:habitants of Lisbon.:!: He also was ac- quainted with the disaster of Dupont, and exaggerated notions of the essential strength of the Portuguese in- surgents were generated in his own mind, and in the minds of his principal officers. The patriots of the Alemtejo and Algarves, assisted by some Spaniards, and aniniatf^d by manifestos and promises assiduously promulgated from the English fleet, had once more as- sembled at Alcacer do Sal, from whence they threat- *>ned the garrisons of St. Ubes, and the French posts on the south bank of the Tagus, immediately opposite to Lisbon. That capital was very unquiet. The an- ticipation of coming freedom was apparent in the wrath- ful looks and stubborn manners of the populace, and superstition was at work to increase the hatred and the h( pes of the multitude; it was at this time the prophetic eggs, dt-ncuncing death to the French, and deliverance to the Portuguese, appeared. But less equivf cal indications of approaching danger were to be drawn frcm the hesitations of Junot, who, waveringr between his fear of an insurrection in Lisbon, and his desire to check the immediate progress of the British army, gave certain proof of an intellect yielding to the pressure of events. Loison, having seven or eight thousand men. was now in the neighbourhood of Estremos; two thousand five hvmdred men W(>re in the fortresses of Elvas ai;d Almeida, a few hundred were at Abrantcs, a thousand in Santiirem, and the same number in Peniche ; general Thomieres, with one brigade, was in the vicinity of Alcobaf;a, and the rest of the army was quartered at Lisbon ami on a circuit round, including both sides of the river. The Tagus itself was guarded on the north * Sir A. Welleslpy's IVarrative. Court of Inqiiirv. f Proccedi.^