UC-NRLF $B SMS bbS i^^Qiwni & PORTUGAL OLD AND YOUNG Oxford University Press London Edinburgh Glasgow New Tork Toronto Melbourne Cape Town Bombay Humphrey Milford Publisher lu the University 1832.5 PORTUGAL OLD AND YOUNG AN HISTORICAL STUDY BY GEORGE YOUNG AUTHOR OF 'corps DE droit OTTOMAN'; 'NATIONALISM AND WAR IN THE NEAR EAST ' ; 'PORTUGAL: AN ANTHOLOGY' FORMERLY SECRETAKY OF LEGATION, LISBON i o rt >. O -1© O • - > OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1917 The Altar-piece of San Vicente, by Nuno Gonsalvez, oJ which one panel is reproduced as a frontispiece to this book, is one of the few surviving masterpieces of Portuguese mediaeval painting, and gives us the portraits of some of the leading personages of the period when Portugal was a Great Power. The youth kneeling before St. Vincent in theforeground isAfonzo V, ^ el rey cavalleiro ' {h. 1432, k. 1438, d. 1481), and the lady opposite is his wife and niece, the Infante of Castile, through whom he claimed the Crown of Castile. The Castilians resisted the union, made Isabella her younger sister Queen, defeated the Portuguese at Toro, 14^6, as completely as they had been defeated by the Portuguese at Aljubarrota in Ij8j, and founded the Kingdom of Spain by marrying Isabella to Ferdinand of Ar agon. Affonzo was also involved in Moroccan adventures, which earned hivi the title of ' the African ' and nothing much else. The child behind is his son, John II ^ the Perfect' [b. 1433, k. 1481^ d. 14^^^, and the careworn intellectual face in the background, under a large hat, is no other than Prince Henry the Navigator — uncle of Affonzo and son of John the Great and Philippa, daughter of John of Gaunt — the most illustrious and interesting personality of this Anglo-Portuguese dynasty. These paintings were lost in dirt and darkness in a Lisbon church until the Revolut/ort.' After ^ be ing m^ost carefully cleaned, they can now be seen in the Mus-eii^t. Theif resplendence makes them a worthy record of Old Portugal, -^aYi^'^Tvuf;t.g, Portugal is significantly symbolized in their resur- recttonl ,^ .* i -* ; «^* * « . etc, C« C< J > ♦ > ; • ; . > ' ' ... > > ' ' ' ' CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE 1. PORTUGAL AND THE WAR i 2. OLD PORTUGAL 41 3. EMPIRE AND ECLIPSE 92 4. RESTORATION AND REACTION 146 5. POMBAL AND THE PENINSULAR WAR . . . 179 6. YOUNG PORTUGAL . • 235 7. PORTUGAL AND THE PEACE 302 INDEX ILLUSTRATIONS The Altar-piece of San Vicente, By Nuno Gonsalvez . Frontispiece Spain and PortugaL . . ^ viii The World, showing Spanish and Portuguese colonization . . 159 Portugal .......... 181 Portugal and the War For thou hast great allies : Thy friends are exaltations, agonies, and Love, and man's unconquerable mind. Wordsworth. How is it that Portugal comes to be included in this series as a belligerent ? Why is Portugal at war — and at war on our side ? This book has been written as an answer to these questions — questions which can only be answered by giving some idea of the part played by Portugal in past European history, of the present position of Portugal in the European polity, and of the potential power, moral and intellectual, repre- sented by the Portuguese people. The present war has taught us to take moral factors into account in dealing with political problems, and to accept nationalism as a moral force capable of dealing with the most unpromising material facts. Even those who have hitherto been accustomed to consider foreign affairs in terms of big battalions and battleships may now be ready to admit that the military and material mechanisms of the greatest Empires are dependent for their driving force on the spirit of Nationalism. But such ' real-politikers ' would probably still maintain that the practical effect of any particular nationalist factor in European politics is measured by the national force in terms of men, money, or munitions. And if there are 1832-5 p « " f - - - r < f '-' P'okugal and the War 4 I C 'aiiy *wh6 for 'this- reasb'rf may be inclined to ignore Portugal as a factor in our foreign relations, they may well be surprised to learn what an important influence on the fortunes of Europe in general, and of England in particular, Portugal has exercised and will no doubt exercise again. Indeed, to show this much will be comparatively easy. Though it will be much less easy to explain exactly how Portugal comes to be involved in the conflict now proceeding between opposing European national philosophies. Even when in due course this crisis comes to be considered without prejudice and in a proper perspective, it will probably still be difficult for the future historian to explain the principles governing the attitude to the present war of the lesser nationalities. If, now, an attempt were made to lay down the general principles governing the participation or non-participation in the war of the secondary nations it would be little more than a profession of faith in our national cause as drawn up for us by our own prophet and daily proclaimed from the minarets of our press. Yet even now, while rejoicing over the enrolling of the Portuguese in the ranks of the faithful, we may be curious to know how they came to be there, while other nations are not. Putting on one side those lesser nations involuntarily involved as belligerents, such as Belgium and Serbia, how does it happen that Portugal is a belligerent, Spain a neutral, Italy a belligerent, Greece a neutral, Bulgaria a belligerent, Albania a neutral, Turkey a belligerent, Persia a neutral, Roumania a belligerent, Sweden a neutral ? The answer is of course different in each case, and each case would take a book to answer. But it is suggested that the course of national policy in each case will probably be found to have been a compromise along the line of least resistance between Portugal and the War 3 conflicting static and dynamic political forces ; the static forces of dynastic, capitalistic, conservative, class interests, and the dynamic forces of democratic, progressive, popular influences. Sometimes these political forces have been so evenly balanced that the initial impetus for the plunge into war or for the recoil from it could be given by some party or even by some personality. In these cases anti- national influence has in some cases been able to exercise a decisive influence over national policy. If it were possible to explain these collisions between political forces as straight issues between democratic and despotic influences, between public opinion and personal policy, between progressive influences and particular interests, then the business of explaining belligerency or neutrality in such a case as that of Portugal would be merely that of analysing present-day politics in that country. It cannot, however, be maintained that the more democratic polities where public opinion and a progressive party are both strong have invariably taken up arms on our side, or that the despotic and conservative polities are all enlisted on the side of our enemies ; though it is demonstrable that a balance of these forces tends to a policy of neutrality. It does, however, seem to be indisputable that in the West at all events, nationalism as expressed in popular opinion, and as existing in Spain, Italy, Greece, Roumania, and Portugal, has tended to take up arms on our side ; although circum- stances have in cases retarded or restrained it from carrying this preference to the point of belligerency. Moreover it is as indisputable that in the East the principles and policies of our opponents have proved more attractive than ours to the Eastern form of nationalism as existing in Bulgaria, Turkey, and Persia ; possibly because these nations are still B 2 4 Portugal and the War in an earlier, cruder stage in which the fear of disintegra- tion at home and domination from abroad drives nationalism to the drill-sergeant and the despot. It is not difficult to understand how the Prussian faith in organization of the national, moral, mental, and material resources may seem to offer salvation to nations with strong tribal traditions and low individual diiferentiation like the Bulgars, Turks, Turkomans, and Tartars. This is, of course, only a generaliza- tion, for there are, no doubt, some Portuguese to whom Prussian ideals appeal ; while the Bulgars as a whole would apparently have remained neutral, or might even have joined us, but for the combination between nationalist demands for Bulgar Macedonia and despotic ambitions for Balkan hegemony. Moreover the belligerency of Portugal is due to pecu- liarities in its national institutions as well as to its parti- cipation in our national ideals. It is instructive, for instance, to take the result of the conflict in Greece — a monarchy with a sovereign strong in political power, and in the personal prestige of victorious campaigns, and compare it with the result of the same conflict in Portugal — a Republic with a President then as weak in personality as in constitu- tional powers. King Constantine and President Arriaga both imposed neutrality on their respective governments by a coup d'etat under German influence ; but whereas in the Monarchy, the arbitrary regime has so far resisted a considerable amount of pressure from inside and from outside, constitutional government and with it a pro-ally policy was very quickly restored by internal forces alone in the Republic. The resignation of President Arriaga, the resumption of military co-operation with us and the subse- quent declaration of war by Germany render the case of Portugal and the War 5 Portugal the best evidence in favour of our claim that progressive principles and the popular point of view in Europe are both in favour of our cause. But the fact that Portugal is a Republic with a professorial president and not a Monarchy with a conquering king is not enough to explain its belligerency. We can only account for the part played by Portugal in this war by assuming that, as in the cases of the other nationalities, it is an effect of the force of nationalism acting along the lines of least resistance. This theory substitutes a simple and sufficient explanation of the various movements of these secondary States for the complicated theories of * orbits of influence ', lately much in favour ; even as the simple theory of the force of gravity replaced the cycles and epicycles of pre-Newtonian astronomy. In short, Portugal is at war because the instinct both of national self-preserva- tion and of national progress indicated that war on our side was the policy required by the national interest and by the national ideal. But it will be objected that Portugal's national ideals are all adequately realized already, and that Portugal can have little or no national interest in the issues of this war, all- pervading and all-predominant as they may be. It may further be urged that the remoteness of Portugal from the centres of collision is indisputable, its political relationship with the causes and consequences of the war only indirect, and its popular interest in the issues involved by no means intense. And if this be so then cannot Portuguese belli- gerency be accounted for by less recondite reasons than national instincts and ideals ? For example, it may be pointed out, there is the reason that the Portuguese Govern- ment considers the reconsolidation of the Anglo-Portuguese 6 Portugal and the War Alliance essential to the security of Portugal and its posses- sions — a reason of policy. Or that Portuguese finances, disordered by the war just as they were in a fair way to be regulated, require a foreign loan — a reason of pocket. Or there is the reason that the intellectuals who compose the Republican Government of Portugal have French associations, whereas the various interests composing the Royalist opposition have for the most part German affinities — a reason of preference. Or the reason that Lisbon fears and defies Spain and the Pope, and that these are both neutral — a reason of prejudice. Or again that the proclamation of the Allies of a crusade for the lesser nations appealed to the public opinion of this minor Power, whereas the mode of warfare of their opponents profoundly shocked the public sentiment of a humane people — a reason of principle. All of which explanations are no doubt true so far as they go ; but the point is that they will all be found to lead back to some essential national characteristic or circumstance. That is to say, Portugal is a belligerent because of essential characteristics and conditions inherent in its nationality ; or in simpler words Portugal is at war because it is a nation. This, however, only suggests another question distinctly more troublesome to answer : Why is Portugal a nation ? Reviewing the qualifications essential to nationality we shall indeed find, at first, no small difiiculty in justifying the claim of Portugal to be a nation. For instance, one such qualifica- tion of a nation is that it should have, not only a name, but a local habitation — some region geographically defined, and more or less racially delimited. But a glance at the map shows that the country of Portugal is only an enclave in the Iberian Peninsula — a chunk chopped out of Spain. At first sight its position suggests political and provincial rather Portgual and the War 7 than national characteristics. Again another national qualification would be racial difference. Whereas the Portu- guese would seem to have in their origin less racial difference from the Spaniards than have the Basques or Catalans who are still provincials of Spain and not nations ; for, ethnologi- cally speaking, the Portuguese stock originates in Galicia, which is not now, and never has been, part of the Portuguese nation. Then again, if culture is the test, accepted authorities on Portugal agree in asserting — some even argue — that Portugal has no language, but merely a Latin dialect ; no literature, but merely some songs on French models ; no painting, but merely bad imitations of Spanish Schools ; no architecture, but merely a debased development of flamboyant Gothic ; no political principles, but merely parochial politicians. In reply, it is to be observed in the first place that these all concern material qualifications, whereas nationality is above all a moral quality. Yet leaving this for the present, let us see whether even these material disqualifications will stand investigation ; although some of them may seem at first sight obvious, and others might not be objected to by Portuguese writers themselves. In the first place, the want of defined territory is only cartographical, and an example of the misleading ideas given by maps and such-like conven- tional representations. The country of Portugal is not, as the map suggests, an integral portion of a geographical entity, the Iberian Peninsula, merely partitioned off from Spain by a political frontier and dependent on Spain for its communications with Europe. Portugal, on the contrary, has always been, and is to-day in closer relations with Europe than was, or is, Spain itself. Communications by the sea- route between European ports and Lisbon were, until .1^- 8 Portgual and the War quite recently, safer and quicker, and still are more comfort- able and economical than communications between European capitals and Madrid by the land-route ; while for commercial purposes sea conveyance will remain unchallenged until air carriage comes into general use. The seas that on the maps seem to wall in Portugal on the west, really weld it to the maritime states of Europe and America ; while the sierras and stony wastes that apparently connect Portugal on the east with Spain constitute in reality a natural boun- dary and a national frontier. If we take that large-scale map recommended to political students by Lord Salisbury, we see at once the blank spaces, the * despobladas ', in these marches between Spain and Portugal, empty of towns and villages except for an occasional * villa franca ', artificially established as a frontier post in some pass where a river breaks through from the Spanish tablelands. To the traveller by road, or even by rail, the natural frontier afforded by those barren plateaux and high ranges is obvious, and no less obvious is the change from the typical landscapes of Portugal to those of Spain. Indeed no two countrysides could be more unlike than the well-wooded, well-watered hills and valleys of coastal Portugal and the stony ridges and wide uplands of central Spain. The traveller from Lisbon to Madrid will find no resemblance between the broad alluvial pastures and hill vineyards of the lower Tagus valley and the rolling ploughlands and rocky gorges of the upper Tagus. The traveller from Oporto to Burgos will, just before crossing the national frontier, pass the ancient University town of Coimbra, a pile of white buildings perched over green meadows between blue mountains and a blue river ; and just after crossing the frontier he will come to the ancient University town of Salamanca, a plaster Portugal and the War 9 of red buildings on a yellow upland. In the extreme north where the mountains of the old County of Portugal merge into those of Galicia, and in the extreme south where the North African landscapes of the Algarves march on those of Andalusia, there is less of a marked frontier between Portugal and Spain ; but that there should be less sign of a national division in those regions where there is least national distinction, is itself evidence of the national differ- ence between the two countries. Passing next to the people themselves we find that only ethnographically is there any difficulty in distinguishing Portuguese from Spaniards. In type and temperament the Portuguese differ as widely from the Spaniard as do the Irish from the Scots, and something on the same lines. They differ even from the Gallegans of Spain from whom they are supposed to descend ; though the part played by Gallegan stock in populating Portugal has probably been overrated. For while it is true that Portuguese populations descended from the north to take the place left vacant as the Moors were driven south, this does not mean that there were no Portuguese in the country before, or that there were none but Portuguese in the country thereafter. It is clear that the successive invasions of Portugal were, as else- where, of diminishing intensity. The Celts, as place-names show, probably exterminated the Iberians except in the mountains ; whereas the Visigoths and Romans only ex- pelled the Celt-Iberians from the castles and cities into the countrysides ; while the Moorish occupation of the Iberian Peninsula, like the Turkish occupation of the Balkan Penin- sula, only drove out and dispossessed the upper classes, leaving the cultivators of the soil and the small craftsmen for the most part undisturbed. The Celt-Iberian stock 10 Portugal and the War of Portugal survived the centuries of Moorish overlords as they had survived the overlordship of Visigoths and Romans. Indeed, these conquering races have left far fewer visible relics of their association with the country than have the commercial races whose connexion with the national culture was apparently far less close. The Roman who governed the country for centuries left his language, his law, and his logomachic habit ; but his type — both physical and temperamental — has long since disappeared with most of his institutions. On the other hand the Carthaginian and the Greek, who had only trading settle- ments on the coast, have perpetuated their respective types in certain districts to an extent that is remarkable. There are fishing villages where the men, their boats, and implements, their songs and even some of their words, are still Greek ; and in Lisbon itself the fish-girls from the Tagus villages still show examples of a type of beauty which, if not Phoenician, as generally supposed, is obviously from some stock of very ancient culture. The people of these villages not only have the small head, hands and feet, and graceful bearing of an ancient civilization, but can, it is said, stand the severest test of good breeding — social pro- motion. Not long ago a foreign financier found that one of these fish-girls made a very satisfactory countess : an experiment that could hardly have been successful unless there had been a leaven of Semitic aristocracy on both sides. Owing partly to the isolated and primitive conditions of country life in Portugal these colonies of ancient foreign races have survived intact wherever they struck root in the soil or were associated with some particular industry. On the other hand in cases where the invader was only a super- Portugal and the War ii ficial upper class he has, as a rule, disappeared leaving no trace. The last of the Visigothic aristocracy, reinforced as it was from French chivalry and later again from that of other northern aristocracies, was exhausted centuries ago by conquest and crusade. But in the agricultural class there are still obvious English and other European types ; as for instance in certain villages of the Tagus valley, where crusaders, among them yeomen from Devon and apprentices from London, settled centuries ago. Povos, a village on the Tagus, was until the seventeenth century known as Cornoalha through its having been a Cornish settlement dating from the time of the taking of Lisbon from the Moors with the help of an English expedition. In the same way the House of Lancaster now only survives in Portugal as a not uncommon surname, Lencestre, whose bearers show no trace of their origin ; whereas some red-headed, long-legged ' Saloyo ' that you may meet riding after the fighting bulls over the water meadows of the Tagus may talk to you in the same soft voice, and with the same sly humour as he would in the meadows of the Tavy. Again, all trace of the Moorish governing caste has disappeared from the Portuguese stock, such types as suggest it being of later origin ; but in the south there are only too obvious traces of the imported negro slave. The Spaniard and the Inquisition have disappeared, leaving nothing but a heritage of hate and atheism ; while the Jew has survived centuries of proscription and persecution, even where the latter has forced him to abandon his religion and mingle as a ' new Christian ' with the Portuguese population. For instance the town of Braganza, the ancient seat of royalty, on the north-east frontier, is still remarkable for its Jewish types, the descendants of refugees from Spain ; , while the whole 12 Portugal and the War Portuguese race owes much to tHe strong Jewish strain that runs through every class from the lowest to the highest. When King Joseph in a pious mood proposed that in the interests of religion and society all Jews be made to wear white hats, Pombal, his minister, replied next day by appearing with two — one, as he explained, for Joseph, and the other for himself. To this strong strain of Jewish blood can be attributed, indeed, the curious counter-current of radicalism and nationalism in the otherwise ultra clerical and conservative upper class of Portugal. Southey, writing just before the French Revolution, remarked that ' Whenever revolutionary principles shall find their way to Portugal, the Jews will probably be the first to receive them '. . Both of these qualities, the power of absorbing successive ruling castes and that of preserving intact foreign colonies, are evidence of a strong racial type. This Portuguese type can for convenience be described as Celt-Iberian. It may be said, indeed, that the Portuguese nation is composed of three elements — the first, the latest, representing the foreigners that colonized like the Greeks, or those that coalesced like the Jews ; the second, the Celtic element ; and the third, the indigenous Iberian of the Stone Age. So clear indeed to the seeing eye is the manner of the composition of the Portuguese race, that one can often make out not only the contributions of foreign colonists and conquerors, but even the original components of Celt and Iberian. There is, moreover, very broadly speaking, a preponderance of one or other element according to position. The foreign types are most in evidence of course along the Tagus valley and on the coast ; the fertile middle country shows on the whole a preponderance of Celts, while the interior mountain ranges up to the frontier are Portugal and the War 13 still inhabited by the more primitive Iberian. The lowland Celts are big men, in appearance and character very like the Southern Irish ; a resemblance increased by their witty picturesque talk, and by their taste for mutton-chop whiskers, frieze coats, donkey carts, and faction fights. The hill men, on the other hand, show much the same difference that we find in Ireland, between the large fair man and the small dark type ; the difference of the Milesian from the Firbolg. This very summary and superficial survey of the Portuguese race is supported by interesting anthropometrical statistics collected by the Portuguese Government, and by the more entertaining evidence of Portuguese literature. For there is a Portuguese literature, and most copious and character- istic it is, though few of us English know of its existence. To most of us Portuguese literature probably suggests the Letters of a Portuguese Nun which are in French, or the Sonnets from the Portuguese which are in English. We shall, accordingly, call in evidence to prove Portuguese nationality, a playwright of the sixteenth century, Gil Vicente, whose plays will be found to be very living pictures of a very live nation. In the following extract we see the old racial feuds between Iberian mountaineers and Celtic iowlanders, and the national hostility between Portuguese and Spaniard, still surviving each in its degree ; and we may note that the racial feud has become no more than a friendly rivalry, whereas the national hostility is a real hatred. Moreover, here and elsewhere in these plays we find not only those strongly marked types which are charac- teristic of a nation, but also a recognizable raciness of the soil such as characterizes aU truly national poetry. Unfortunately the more * national ' poetry and playwriting is, the less is it translateable, although where the national 14 Portugal and the War quality is so marked as it is here, some evidence of it may, perhaps, remain even in the translation. The Serra. Are you from Castille, my son, or from beyond, down on the level ? Jorge. Hark to that now — Why the devil turn me into a Spanish Don ? , Why, I would sooner be a lizard, by Matthew, Mark, and Luke and John ! The Serra. Whence are you then ? Jorge. From Sardoal, — take it or leave it, my good fellow : and we have come to give defiance to all you of the Serra d'Estrella, to beat us at a song or dance. Rodrigo. I warrant you a saucy fellow ; ' for here are singers not a few, and very skilful dancers too, who need fear no men from below. Lopo. Many hill rats come down there from up here, a-harvesting ; and so, you see, we hear them sing and dance the way you do up here ; and it is much in this manner. Hill Song. ' And what if I give myself, sweetheart, to you : A pretty thing is love. On a day I had a swain, golden apples he sent in vain. A pretty thing is love. On a day I loved a swain, golden apples he sent again. A pretty thing is love. Golden apples he sent amain ; the best of them was cleft in twain. A pretty thing is love.' Portugal and the War 15 That's the way like as two twos you mountain men make melody. The Serra. Prithee, now sing such harmony as in Sardoal you use. Jorge. Oh ! that 's another pair of shoes. Wait a bit and you shall see. Valley Song. My lady now no more takes pleasure privily with me perpending — Alack for pains that are unending ! For oh, my lady once did tell me she would speak with me one day ; But ah, because of my offending, now she saith she never may — Alack for pains that are unending ! For oh, my lady once did tell me she had. something she would say ; But ah, because of my offending, now she will not look my way — Alack for pains that are unending ! For oh, because of my offending, she doth ever say me nay ; So out into the wide world wending, whither fortune leads, I stray — Alack for pains that are unending ! Felipa. Nay, you shall not get off so : Let us now have up the flute and the tambourine to boot ; We'll dance you dead before you go, until you can't stir hand or foot. Caterina, Meantime, by my life, I ween, it were well we should prepare us for our little chacotine ; and therewith, we then will fare us forth to see the King and Queen, i6 Portugal and the War This scene, in which the highlanders and lowlanders compete in singing and dancing in their own characteristic style, may serve as a parable of Portuguese nationality. It shows us the different elements that form the Por- tuguese people retaining as they still do many of their original characteristics, but all uniting in a common senti- ment of loyalty whether to a king as in the time of Gil Vicente, or to a republic as to-day. One might have expected these different elements to develop each its own separate sentiment, or its own self-governing institu- tions ; or at least that the lines of political cleavage would follow the lines of these constituent parts. But this is not so. One of the curious contrasts between the Portuguese and the Spaniard is that the former neither cares for, nor has ever got a respectable local government, whereas he never rests until he gets a tolerable central government. The converse is true of the Spaniard, whose local govern- ment has repeatedly run the country when the central government has entirely broken down. In other words liberty in Portugal is national. In Spain it is provincial. In Spain it was Saragossa or Madrid that fought the invader. In Portugal it was Portugal. Gil Vicente's lowlander resents the uplander mistaking him for a Spaniard on account of his way of speaking Portu- guese. Survival of the Portuguese language is in itself an example of the way in which the symbols of Portuguese nationality have survived in spite of the attempts to suppress them. Spanish was the language of the Portuguese Court for a century, and of the Portuguese Government for another half-century, but remained always an alien tongue ; and to this temporary dethroning of Portuguese by Spanish no doubt we owe the general impression that Portuguese is Portugal and the War 17 a sort of dependent dialect of Spanish. Whereas Portuguese is really an entirely different language and much less like Spanish than other Latin languages, such as the Languedoc or Italian. Even when Latin was still a common tongue the Low Latin spoken on the coasts was probably always different from that spoken in Spain, owing to difference of race and occupation. This distinction was no doubt then not much more than that between sailor-Latin and soldier-Latin ; like the sort of provincial plus professional difference between the slang of Plymouth and of Aldershot. Portuguese literature, on the other hand, owes more to France than to Spain, and in its origins is Gallegan, which is neither French nor Spanish. To-day Portuguese and Spanish are as different in form as they are in spirit. There is a clear hard quality about Spanish, both In sound and in syntax, as different from the slurred consonants, softened vowels, and involved sen- tences of Portuguese as well may be. The curious perver- sions of syllables, characteristic of the Portuguese language, would be Impossible to the Spaniard, and Indeed the Portuguese are, so far as I know, the only race that have this strange taste for planting their Latin roots upside down. Spanish Is clarified, consolidated , crystallized, stiff and starched and rather dead ; whereas Portuguese is a conglomerate full of corruptions and anomalies, fluid and very much alive. The humane sociability of the race has led them to borrow freely words from every other language with which they have come into contact, while the conservative conditions of life in Portugal have kept these borrowings unassimilated. Thus Portuguese alone of the modern languages descended from Latin has kept so many of the most archaic forms such as the pluperfect indicative, the gerund, and even the 1832.5 Q i8 Portugal and the War declined infinitive ; and is still in many ways the modern language most like Latin as spoken under the lower Empire. It is still easy to write a sentence of Portuguese that will read as classical Latin, and a student of colloquial Latin will find in Portuguese the explanation of many puzzles. If the original Latin of the language expresses well the tem- perament of the Portuguese, the borrowings from Moorish, Indian, Brazilian, and Chinese give interesting evidence of the experiences through which the Portuguese nation has passed. In a list of Moorish words, concerning as they do agriculture, industry, medicine, administration, art and science, we see the important but superficial contribu- tions made by the Moors to Portuguese culture. On the other hand the character of the Hebraisms in the language, containing as they do forms of syntax and turns of expression, suggest the more penetrating influence of this oriental race on the Portuguese mind. Other adoptions from alien races of the far East and far West show that the commercial relations of humane and v^arm-blooded races such as the Portuguese, involve a closer relationship than with the colder races of the North such as ours. The Portuguese have left a deeper linguistic impression in their short regime over a few districts in India than we have in our centuries of rule over the whole country; while 'Pidgin' English, the * lingua franca ' of the far East, is in structure and vocabulary as much Portuguese as English. Finally, if the test of nationality in a language be peculiarity, Portuguese is the most national language of Western Europe. The pro- nunciation with its compound consonants comparable only to Russian, and its sixteen diphthongs, two of which exist only in Chinese, is practically impossible of really accurate acquirement by an adult alien. PorUigal and the War 19 If we go on to the other regions of national culture, such as expression in art and architecture, we find again evidence of intense nationalism which has either been under- rated abroad on account of its very peculiar quality, or altogether overlooked on account of its small output. Both the art and architecture of Portugal are peculiarly national. They not only represent the national tempera- ment but even reflect the phases of foreign influence, or the pressure of circumstances through which that national tem- perament has passed ; and they respond by their development or decline to the rise and fall of the national fortunes of Portugal. Both art and architecture have at certain periods, and in one or two particular cases, reached the highest point of excellence. But those periods are so short, the particular cases so few, and the total production so small that it is no wonder that such excellence as there is, has been and still is for the most part denied. For quality, unless based on quantity, has little chance of recognition nowadays. Again and again we find art critics, after excursions through the large outputs and long periods of the Spanish schools, passing, exhausted with enthusiasm, to a hasty examination of Portuguese painting. These pundits, finding at first sight in Portugal only bad imitations of Spanish schools, proceed to pass a summary judgment of hearty and wholesale condemnation. One can almost hear them thanking heaven they are well rid of" a knave. Those critics who, like Oswald Crawfurd, really got to know Portugal eventually changed their opinion ; and it is curious to see in one of his books, evidently compiled from notes of travel, a denunciation on an early page of the admirers of Portuguese painting together with a total denial of its existence, and on a later page an account of what is evidently a good specimen c 2 20 Portugal and the War of the peculiar Portuguese style which he had found in a remote monastery, together with an enthusiastic and exact description of the excellences of the best Portuguese school of painting. But fortunately the Portuguese Revolu- tion has made it unnecessary for us to go to remote monas- teries in order to decipher the significance of the Portuguese school from a smoke-browned painting in a dark chancel. Good examples of this school — among them the triptych of Nuno Gonsalvez reproduced in the frontispiece — have been resurrected and restored, and can now be admired in all their splendour in the Lisbon Museum. We shall see from them at a glance that as Portuguese poetry at its best and when in its most impressionable stage of development owes much to Provence, so Portuguese painting is based, not on the Spanish, but on the Flemish school. Nuno Gonsalvez is Van Eyck ; but a Van Eyck glowing with the sun of the South, and lording it with a gay and gallant air. The difference between the two is just the diiference of the spirit of mediaeval Portugal from that of mediaeval Flanders. But the masterpieces of Portuguese painting are, like their masterpieces in poetry and in public buildings, so few and far between that it is difficult to trace their development. A small nation can produce quality but not quantity, and without a large ^output there is no means of tracing the growth of the magnum opus. Consequently Portuguese masterpieces are parvenus, things of the people, fish-girls turned countesses in a day with nothing to explain how the miracle was done. Spanish masterpieces, on the other hand, are patrician, and claim respect not only for their intrinsic merits, but for their inheritance from the past and their influence on posterity. Even phenomenal masters like Portugal and the War 21 Calderon or Velasquez have more relation to their predeces- sors and successors than have Gil Vicente or Nuno Gonsalvez, who, so far as we know, had neither. It is indeed curious to find that German critics, arguing as Germans and critics will from ' ce qu'on voit ' and ignoring the far more im- portant ' ce qu'on ne voit pas ', agree for the most part in rejecting the claim of the Portuguese nation to their Gil even as they reject that of the English to our Will, and assert that both are products of the continental and not of the national spirit. We, however, are at liberty to believe that neither of these poets would ever have existed but for the desire of the national spirit to give itself expression by the intermediary of the best instrument then obtainable, the Court playwright, the Court being then the centre of national culture. In the same way as the national need of poetical expression made use of such to us unpromising instruments as Court playwrights, so the same need of pictorial expression has converted to its use the rigidities and reticences of altar-pieces and Court portraits. The same strongly national character appears in the few but very fine buildings of note. Moreover, as man must build though he need not paint, it is easier to trace in the great buildings of Portugal a direct connexion with the national history. Thus in the year 1 153 Affonzo Henriquez, the first King of Portugal, celebrated his conquest of the kingdom from the Moors by building the monastery church of Alcobaga. There is more than a merely imaginative relation between the simple severity of the style of this great church and the stern struggle from which Portuguese nationality fought its way into its own. Stripped of later additions there could be no more eloquent monument to the virtues of these early crusaders, no more expressive I 22 Portugal and the War memorial of the national life at this early epoch than this fortress fane where the cathedral is still only rough-hewn out of the castle. A few miles from Alcobaga is the abbey of Batalha — the Battle Abbey of Portuguese nationality by which Portugal, more fortunate than England, commemorates the successful issue of the next fight for its freedom and the defeat of one of the Spanish attempts at invasion. Batalha Abbey, like all Portuguese masterpieces, has no architectural past or posterity, and no environment. It stands far from everywhere in a lonely valJey with only a small village round it. It has little or nothing in common with Alcoba^a, other than a general Gothic basis, but like Alcoba^a every feature in it reflects its close relationship to the national life of the time and to the event it commemorates, the victory over the Spaniards at Aljubarrota in 1385. Like all national buildings it has changed with subsequent changes in national taste, but it is not difficult to distinguish the original structure. An English observer is at once struck by the fact that the style is English Gothic, though disguised by local and mostly later additions ; but an English Gothic, which like the English rose, transplanted to Portugal, has burst into a wealth and splendour of bloom, only like the English rose to exhaust itself in a few years and die. In Alcobaga we had the symbol of the long fight of Portuguese nationality against Moorish dominion, in alliance with French chivalry. In Batalha we have the symbol of its long fight against Spanish despotism in alliance with English archery. We are reminded, when we look at Batalha Abbey, that Alju- barrota was won with the help of English bowmen and that the Treaty of Windsor and the marriage with John of Gaunt's daughter established the glorious national dynasty PorUigal and the War 23. of Aviz. and inaugurated the golden age of Portuguese nationality. Combining as it does the strength and restraint of English Gothic with a wealth of oriental ornament, much of it admirable even to our attenuated taste, and conjoining the cross of Christianity with cryptic symbols and mottoes of oriental mysticism, Batalha is a projection into stone of the mediaeval mind in general and in particular of the Portuguese nation that so vividly developed some of the most typical phases of that mind. There is one other masterpiece of architecture in Portugal better known than either of the two preceding buildings,, because of its being close to Lisbon and because it is a striking instance of a style whose national peculiarities force them- selves on the attention. The convent of Belem was built by King Emmanuel in the ' manueline ' style, a sort of super-decorated, subter-decadent Gothic, as a memorial of the successful voyage of Vasco da Gama. The cloister of Belem, a polygon of petrified pergolas, is a marvel of masonic art. The orientalism here is no longer mystical as at Batalha, but purely material. The magic of the East has disappeared, leaving only its magnificence. To the designers of Batalha the East was the ' Moirama ', that is the mastery of Portugal by Moorish wizardry, or it was Mahound, the rule of evil over the Holy Places. To the designers of Belem the East was the wealth of the Great Mogul and of the ' Golden City of Manoa '. Batalha is national, Belem has become imperial. With the break in its national life caused by the Spanish invasion and Inquisition, Portugal ceased to exist both architecturally and artistically. Old Portugal rallied from the paralysing oppression of the Spanish Church and State, but its creative faculty was gone and it never recovered its 24 Portugal and the War power of artistic expression. The seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries in Portugal were dominated by a virulent theocracy, a vicious aristocracy and a vapid autocracy, and produced nothing but palatial extravagances like Mafra, that cumbers a dull plain with its monotonous masses of masonry — the vision of a Versailles Vitruvius, or the Pena Palace perched on a rock pinnacle — the fantasy of a South German scene-painter ; together with a multitude of rococo churches of which the less said the better. Young Portugal has not yet found its expression in art or architecture, for these are the products of a more simple and less sophisticated phase of national culture than any that is possible at present. But it has already shown promise, especially in its preservation of the national monuments of the past ; and this is itself perhaps no less sure evidence of national spirit, than the production of public buildings. Although a government of rationalist Republicans might have been expected to neglect churches and palaces, not only does it keep them in better repair than the previous regime, but shows a more reverent respect for them. It is not respect for the deposed royalties that keeps the Pena Palace with Pears' soap on the washstands and the Sphere on the reading tables, just as they were left. Nor is it reverence for the disendowed and disestablished religion that restores so carefully the manoeline monstrosities of the cathedrals. It is nothing but pure nationalism, the feeling that these matters are relics with a historic relation to Portuguese nationality, and retaining consequently a sentimental value apart from their intrinsic worth. This makes their preserva- tion a duty ; not as it would be with us, a duty to posterity or to the past, but a duty to Portugal. It has been suggested above that the possession of a Portugal and the War 25 national religious cult is a test of nationality, and it might be asserted that since the Revolution Portugal not only has had no national cult, but has shown little religious sentiment. It must be admitted in this respect that the intelligenzia of professional men and politicians that governs the country for the Republic, has taken drastic action against all Roman Catholic influences and institutions. Laws have been passed on the model of those adopted by the French Republic, suppressing the whole ecclesiastical organization and substituting civil for clerical control. But this is not inspired by an inclination to repress religion as such, but by a reaction against the political oppression of the Church and its institutions. The Church having of old usurped many civil functions, the State has now by a natural reaction assumed some authority that might perhaps as well have been left to the Church. If, then, the Revolution went for a few months rather far in its repression of religion, this is natural enough in view of the centuries during which religious reactionaries repressed the liberties of the Portu- guese State. For since Madrid and Rome have continually conspired to use religion as a means of riveting their foreign rule on Portugal, Portuguese nationalism has had to seek its religious ideals otherwise than in the Church. In the Middle Ages Portuguese princes and prelates resisted Rome as strongly and as successfully as did those of England. But when this resistance became organized and general at the Reformation Portugal found itself both racially, geographically, and sympathetically out of the range of the movement. In the great moral revolution of the sixteenth century with which the history of most modern European nations begins, Portugal had no part. That section of the nation that might have formed the Protestant 26 . Portugal and the War party was absorbed in amassing the wealth that poured into Lisbon from the East and West. The conservative section remained true to its ideal of the unity of Christendom. Portugal and England had developed concurrently along a slow rising curve, that of Portugal having taken a sharp upward turn after the age of discovery. But at the Reforma- tion the curve of England starts as sharply upward and that of Portugal as suddenly sinks down. The Portuguese monarchy absorbed in dynastic designs on the Spanish Succession, the gentry attracted still by Crusades and colonial adventure, the clergy dependent on Rome, the burghers deep in imperial trade, were all committed to anti-national and unprofitable interests. Unprofitable because it profits a nation nothing if it gain the whole world and lose its own soul. As a result, instead of Lisbon absorbing Madrid, as the dynasty intended, Madrid absorbed Lisbon. The Spanish intrigues brought the Spanish Inquisition, and the Spanish Inquisition brought the Spanish occupation. The last king of Old Portugal, himself a cardinal, was succeeded by that arch-priest, Philip of Spain, who had no difficulty in descending upon Lisbon along a road trodden smooth by the emissaries of Rome. When at last liberation came, the yoke of Rome proved harder to shake off than that of Madrid. The Spanish Government of Portugal lasted only some sixty years, but the rule of Rome which had begun long before the Spanish occupation, and reached a climax during that occupation, was not even shaken until the reforms of Pombal in mid-eighteenth century. At that time the control exercised by the Church over national life was still such that no books might be printed except by licence, or sold otherwise than by the organization estab- lished for that purpose by the Church ; while the prisons Portugal and the War 27 were permanently filled with such persons as the Inquisition suspected of any inclination for intellectual independence. For two centuries and a half Portugal, the nation of poets and orators, was gagged. For the succeeding two centuries the national history of Portugal was, and to some extent still is, mainly the history of the struggle with the absolute authority of the Church, a struggle in which the best minds and characters of many generations of the nation have been mercilessly sacrificed. For this has not been such a political struggle as we English have had, in which both sides have found a political education, but a war in which too often the best on both sides have been exterminated. The country having associated all religion with Roman Catholicism, and the Church having associated Roman Catholicism with reaction, religion became, in the eyes of the educated, responsible for such excesses as the perse- cution of Liberals by Miguel, or the persecution of the Jews by Manuel. Any possibility there mig-ht have been of a National Catholic Church was long ago extinguished, not only directly, as a matter of policy, by Rome, but indirectly by the persistence with which the Church supported all anti-national elements in the Court and in the country. * Delenda est Roma ' became the first principle of the new Nationalism of Young Portugal. The Revolution of 1910 was finally triumphant in the long conflict — the conflict of Portuguese nationalism against Papal internationalism, of popular government against personal government, of Jews against Jesuits, of nationalism against religion, and last, if not also least, of republicanism against royalism. For it was largely long and bitter experience, proving that the connexion between the Crown and the Curia could not be permanently cut, that drove Portuguese reformers into 28 .. Portugal and the War republicanism. Apart, however, from this political motive the republican ideal appeals to the strong sense of a com- munity of civilization inherent in all Portuguese. Forced to abandon the ideal of a Universal Church because the claims of that Church could not be combined with nationalism, the Portuguese see in their republican institutions not only a bond of sympathy between themselves and other republics but a basis for a possible European federation. An Association of Republics seems to them to offer a better basis for possible international institutions and a better expression of inter- national ideals than an Alliance of Courts, such as was the Holy Alliance, or an assertion of authority by the Church such as was the Catholic League. Roman Catholicism and Royalism were in close alliance against the Republic when the war broke out, and though they had lost all hold over Portuguese nationalists and nearly all hold over the nation as a whole, they yet claimed to enjoy the sympathy and support of England, whose alliance is an essential element of the policy of Portuguese nationalists. If there were until lately many notes that were out of time and out of tune in the Anglo-Portuguese harmony, this has been corrected by the declaration of the Portuguese Republic for our cause, by the dissociation of the party of action among the Royalists from that declaration, and by the evi dence of events, showing that the Republicans represent Portugal and the Royalists do not. There is, therefore, nothing to complicate the simple issue in Portugal which for the time being places religion on the side of reaction and Prussia, and rationalism on the side of a Republic and progress. Yet Portugal is not irreligious. The peasantry still have a lively and simple faith, while the educated classes express their religious instincts in various less attractive forms. Portugal and the War 29 Even the Republic though anti-Roman is not anti-religious, and one of its first acts was to set up a National Catholic Church in independence of Rome : an experiment fore- doomed to failure because there was no demand for such a compromise. For Young Portugal was, and remains still, what might be called Primitive Rationalist, whereas Old Portugal was, and still is, Roman Catholic. It is indeed difficult at present to see what will be the end of this division. Education and enlightenment will no doubt relieve if they do not remove the difficulty, for both points of view are already much behind the times. The rationalism of the proletariat is as much cruder than that of the average Western European public opinion of the day as the religion of the peasantry is more credulous than that of other Western peoples. Both rationalism and religion are deeply rooted in superstition, and both show relics of primitive paganism. There are few countries, for instance, where one could have seen a year or two ago on a^ Good Friday on one side of the village square a church — one of the ugly churches of the Inquisition period — with a Government order on the door prohibiting entry under penalty of imprisonment ; and on the other side of the square the quondam congrega- tion occupied with the spring ritual of human sacrifice. It is true that the Republican administrator will explain to you that the door is legally closed under the Law of the Associations, just as the Royalist cure will explain to you that the dummy representing the Winter God is really Judas. But the door is shut as firmly, the dummy is burnt and its ashes thrown into the sea as fiercely, as if the fanaticism were that of an auto-da-fe or of a pagan festival. But, after all, religion is something different from ritual. • And, if so, we may perhaps find the national religion of the 30 Portugal and the War Portuguese in their humane conscience and their conscious- ness of a common humanity, for both are national char- acteristics. An appeal to the charity or to the courtesy of a true Portuguese is unfailing ; if we except those urban classes in whom circumstances, as in every race, have extinguished their national characteristics. In the same way an appeal to the humanity of the Portuguese nation, as a whole, has never been in vain. The humanity of the Portuguese is especially evident in their treatment of foreigners, inferiors, criminals, or animals. In Portugal domestic and draught animals are better treated than in any other Latin country. Not long ago English residents, influenced partly perhaps by experiences in Spain, partly by belief that our own virtues must be unique, and partly by cases of occasional overloading on the steep hills of Lisbon, started there an S.P.C.A. organization. The Portuguese accepted this, as they do all our proceedings," with professions of sympathy, but were really profoundly shocked that it should have been necessary in England to organize for this purpose, or that anything in Portugal should have suggested that such an organization was neces- sary in Portugal, where the farm animals seem to own the farm, where the draught animals seem to go where they please, as they please, where only the pig and the dog are not petted — and even they are politely ignored. Nor does Portugal allow of exceptions in favour of sport. A bull fight in Portugal, instead of a brutal butchery, is the best of sport in every sense. For real excitement and enjoyment, the proper mixture of thrills and laughter, there is no show to equal a Portuguese village * corrida ' ; while the more formal performances in Lisbon are quite satisfactory from an aesthetic or athletic point of view. The cavalier in Portugal and the War 31 picturesque costume on a spirited horse galloping and wheeling within inches of the pursuing bull's horns is as fine a show as the village grocer, running hard for the barrier with a bull calf behind him, is funny. But those who claim for the Portuguese a larger measure of humanity than that possessed by other people must face worse accusations than those of cruelty to domestic animals. An unfortunate and very incorrect impression has been made on the British public by the long campaign in our press, against certain labour conditions in certain Portuguese colonies. This question will be dealt with more fully later, and it will be enough to point out here that conditions in the Portuguese colonies had, until lately, little to do with the people of Portugal — that they have since the installation of a more democratic Government, through the Revolution of 191 o, been so much improved that they have now been officially recognized by us as beyond criticism — and that the principles on which Portugal has conducted its relations with its subject overseas populations are so different from ours that they can scarcely be submitted to the same standard, or even regarded from the same stand- point. This latter point is the one which most concerns us here, where we are dealing with the Portuguese people rather than with the Portuguese Empire. The Portuguese people, in dealing with a subject race, draw little or no colour line, and do not govern as a caste apart. This has its disadvantages, which are more obvious to us than the advantages. But if it seems to us that the first result of this is a demoralization on both sides, this is certainly not the final result, and equally certain is it that the relationship is at every stage more human than ours. Moreover, where abuses have occurred Young Portugal has shown a keen 32 Portugal and the War remorse, and has on the first opportunity reformed. Far more sensitive than ourselves as the Portuguese are to outside criticism, they have never been any more inclined than ourselves to protect themselves by self-deception. Indeed, we can scarcely imagine a British prophet of national- ism writing of a British extension of Empire as Guerro Junqueiro has written of the conquests in America by the Portuguese adventurers. There could scarcely be any stronger evidence of national humanitarian conscience than the following passage from the political play of Patria by this Republican and Chauvinist poet : PATRIA Justice of God, — thine equity divine is manifest, to all with eyes that see, in the long tragedy of my decline. My glorious past ! — it is because of thee I suffer now and search my soul with tears. My glories ? — Deeds of infamy and shame by robbers, murderers, and buccaneers ! • •••••• New worlds I sought, new spaces broad and long, but not the more to worship and be wise. A cruel greed hurried my feet along, the pride of conquest made my sword-arm strong and lit the light of madness in my eyes. I shall not wash the blood I then did spill with tears of twice ten thousand centuries. But leaving the Empire and coming to the nation, we find that in Portugal itself the Portuguese have never been efficient persecutors. The Jews survived in Portugal the Portuguese persecution, even when it was conducted by Spanish Inquisitors. The Liberals of the last century were persecuted, many were imprisoned and many perished ; but Portugal and the War 33 such bad reputations for persecution as those acquired by Miguel in the eighteenth century, or Manoel in the six- teenth century, are due as much to the feeling of horror they created as to the actual harm they did. Finally, to come down to the present day, contrary to the impression created in England by an interested propaganda, the Royalist insurrectionists of the last few years have been treated with the utmost clemency consonant with the maintenance of order ; the terms of imprisonment have been a matter of months at most, there have been no executions and practically no exilings. Again, if we consider the case of ordinary criminals, we find even more proof of Portuguese humanity in the evident difficulty they have in convincing themselves, as we can, that there is nothing in common between a citizen and a convict. They are very proud of having been the first Europeans to abolish capital punishment as they did early last century ; and if Portu- guese prisons are not all of them, hygienically speaking, as good as ours, humanitarianly speaking they are less inhuman. The standard of housing in Portugal, as in all southern lands, is not high, and a Portuguese would not hesitate long in choosing between the promiscuities of the Limoeiro and the immaculacies of Wormwood Scrubbs. Here again we have the same differences of standards and of standpoint as in the relationship with subject races ; and here again we find Portugal unfairly prejudiced by a foreign press agitation. The campaign conducted in the English press on account of alleged ill-treatment of Royalist conspirators during the first few years of the Republic was well-intentioned perhaps, but ill-founded. There was much crowding and consequent discomfort ; but seeing the crisis through which the country was passing, and the bitterness of the conflict, the still 1832.5 D 34 Portugal and the War infantile Portuguese Republic, in its dealing with a very formid- able Royalist conspiracy, gave an example of humanity that we ourselves did not follow under circumstances of inferior provocation. The difference is due to temperament. A Portuguese will kill readily in hot blood, but cannot in cold. He will work himself up to commit a political murder or a crime passionel, and public opinion in its turn will judge the case neither impartially nor dispassionately and rather as if it were a duel than as if it were a delinquency ; but the cold-blooded killing of a criminal by society is revolting to him. Portugal was quite unmoved by the assassination of King Carlos and his son, which to our point of view was an atrocious crime ; but when a year or two ago a drunken degenerate Portuguese murdered his mistress on a Royal Mail liner and was brought to trial in England, the ponderous processes of British justice slowly and surely eliminating the man out of existence threw the Portuguese people into a sort of hysteria. Petitions poured in, the position of the Government was imperilled, and the whole foreign policy of the country was put in question. When in due course the capital sentence was commuted to confinement in an asylum, the revulsion of feeling was equally strong. For the moment the sympathy of London society and its press with the Royalist cause was forgiven, the support by the British Government of German schemes in Africa was forgotten, and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance was considered as having been renewed and ratified by the British Crown in favour of the Portuguese Republic ; and when the com- mutation of the sentence was announced in the Chamber by the Premier, the whole House rose as a tribute of respect to King George. Have we not here, perhaps, an example somewhat exaggeratedly expressed of the things that will Portugal and the War 35 really matter in foreign affairs when the national sentiment of a people exercises an influence over foreign relations ? If Europe had been composed of small national communities no larger than Portugal, with as close a control of their governments as the Portuguese, it would never have incurred the present collapse of its civilization. ' By the soul only the nation shall be great and free,' and it would hardly be too much to say that if one could analyse the soul of Portugal one would find that the real religion of the nation was humanity, the religion of which the cult is chivalry and the creed courtesy. Courtesy, it is true, in Portugal, as in other southern lands, has very generally degenerated into ceremony ; and there is a ritual prescribing elaborate and exaggerated forms for almost every act of daily intercourse. To the foreigner this is at first noticeable in conversation, in which no one may be addressed as less than * Your Excellency ', while such things as pigs or dogs have to be referred to in polite periphrasis ; but later on it is found that the same spirit affects almost every ordinary act. While this ritual can become as wearisome as any orthodox liturgy, its formalities and absurdities are really inspired by a very true respect for others. Moreover, though the Portuguese will of course prefer it if you can deal with him in the current conversational coin, he will not refuse to change into thousands of reis the solitary sovereign of a sentence you may be able to produce at long intervals. The reason why a Portuguese is good company and a Spaniard is not, is not only that the former is humorous and cordial, for the Spaniard can be witty and companionable too if he likes, but that the point of view from which the Portu- guese approaches you is different. The Spaniard feels that he is in Spain, the Portuguese feels that you are in Portugal ; D 2 36 Portugal and the War the Spaniard condescends to you as a foreigner, the Portu- guese collogues with you as a fellow man. This courtesy is traditional with the Portuguese. Colbatch {Court of Portugal, p. 171) writes in 1700, at a time when religious intolerance was at its height, as follows : ' The common people about the city are not guilty of any rudeness to the English on account of their religion ; such as have had cause to be most exposed to affronts having never met with any, which, in my opinion, ought, in justice, to be ascribed to the humanity of the Portuguese nation.' It is the essential humanity of the Portuguese, and their national preference for the charitable and chivalrous point of view, that counts for much in the decision of the country to fight on the side of England and France. Except among a very small section of the conservative, clerical, and capitaHst class to whom Prussian principles appealed, the claims of the Allies to be crusading on behalf of the minor nations and the liberties of Europe found ready acceptance. Those who knew the Portuguese had no difficulty in understanding their entry into the war, for there has always been, in Portugal, a strong sense of the solidarity of European culture or Christianity, and a ready response to a summons for a crusade on its behalf. This was one reason why Portugal resisted such movements as the Reformation, that, whatever its merits, undoubtedly broke up Europe into two hostile camps and ended the common cause of Christianity. Camoens, writing when the new epoch was already well begun, constantly returned upon these old regrets for the community of Europe. In the following stanzas from the Lusiad he bitterly reproaches the Western Powers for their defection from the common cause of Europe against Asia. Portugal and the War 37 You Portuguese are few, but fortified through ne'er your weakness with your will contrasting. You, who at cost of death on every side, still spread the Gospel of life everlasting. You, so diminutive that men deride — On you, before all, Heaven the lot is casting to do great deeds for Christ your Saviour holy : For thus doth Christ exalt the poor and lowly. See now the Germans, — stiff-necked steers are they, ranging at pasture over fertile meads. From Peter's place-holders they broke away to seek new pastors, and new-fangled creeds. See them in ugly warfare pass their day, — (blind errors not sufficing for their needs !) not fighting 'gainst the mighty Moslem folk, but shaking off our Mother Church's yoke. See the dour Englishman who doth purport to be king of that ancient holy city where the base Ishmaelite still holds his court, — (who e'er saw title so remote from verity ?) Among his northern snows he lives for sport and grows new kinds of Christianity. Against Christ's followers he bares his sword, nor seeks to free the birthplace of his Lord. • All newest and most formidable inventions in deadly weapons of artillery should have been proved by now in stern contentions against the bulwarks of Byzance and Turkey : Dispersing to their wild and wooded mansions, in Caspian hills and snows of Tartary, that Turkish brood which mounts and multiplies, on wealthy Europe's foreign policies. Armenian and Georgian, Greek and Thracian, each cries for help, — in that the brute Soldan takes his dear sons in terrible taxation as is approved by the profane Koran. 38 Portugal and the War The punishment of this inhuman nation should be the glory of a brave statesman — not the pursuit of arrogant applause by bullying others of the Christian cause. It is for this defection that we are now doing penance, for there is no doubt that had the Western Powers been able to continue some measure of common action against Asia until the Eastern Europeans were wholly free, we should not have drifted and been driven into our present disaster. Portugal, alone among European States, has always been true to the common cause of Western civilization. For instance, it was not until 1843 that Portugal concluded capitulations with the Ottoman Empire, while those of England and France dated from 1579 and 1535. Again, Portugal has never lost any opportunity of supporting any common action by Europe in general, or any special action by England in particular (even when, as in the slave trade, it imperilled its own imperial existence). Portugal has, moreover, felt keenly any occasions on which it has been omitted from such joint action, even when this has been done out of consideration for its small purse or political situation. Now that we have at last learnt from this war the great moral value of the support of any independent State, however small, and the great practical value that independent peoples might have as preservers of the peace under proper international arrangements, Portugal may possibly be given the part in which its national quality will find proper scope. The past age, in which everything was expressed in terms of military or material progress, was not one that could appreciate or employ the peculiar qualities of the Portuguese. It has consequently been for the Portuguese, as for other smaller nations, a time of watching Portugal and the War 39 and waiting. In the Revolution of 1910 and in the Republic, Portugal expressed something of what it had most at heart, but so long as Europe remains what it has been, Portugal cannot be to it what it might be. This feeling that the era before the war was the dark hour before dawn has always been very present to the mind of the Portuguese and has been a favourite theme of their poets. The verses addressed to the Republic by Sousa Viterbo, an early Portuguese reformer who never saw the day break, express, crudely and clumsily perhaps, a sentiment peculiar to every smaller nation whether itself free or not. TO THE REPUBLIC You fear her ? See, she 's quiet, not yet awake, the goddess of interminable wars, while all around the cruel winter roars, and all about is dark before daybreak. Nay, think not that she drowses, drunk with wine, soft slumbers that from royal wine-cups flow : Like Dante, she descends to worlds below, and rests awhile from what she doth design. The same idea, almost the same imagery, is found in the lines written lately by another revolutionary republican who died for the freedom of one of the lesser nations. She sleeps and dreams that she no longer sleeps. Her trembling heart impassionate with song : But her unsleeping soul waits crooning low Sad tunes, so stately that the golden deeps Melt into murmurs all the shore along And lapse to silence in the shallows low. These are the visions of young men who led their forlorn hope in the first fight against tlie forts of folly. The more 40 Portugal and the War mature view of Dr. Braga who, one of the earliest Portuguese Republicans, has survived to be twice president of the new Republic, gives a more definite idea of the spiritual part that Young Portugal may play in a new Europe. After reviewing the roles of the great Empires in the World's History, Dr. Braga defines that of Portugal in the epilogue to his poem the Twelve of England. And with what arms shall Portugal engage, so little as she is, in such great feats ? They call on her to play a leading part who know that in the Lusitanian heart Love beats ! ' *Love and man's unconquerable mind' are the contribu- tions that Portugal will make to the World under happier circumstances, and it is perhaps not too much to hope that Europe may, as a result of the war, so revise the relationships between the Great Powers and the Lesser Peoples that Portugal may find an even nobler expression of its loyalty to its ancient alliance with Great Britain, and its ancient allegiance to Christendom, than in sending its sons to fight at our side. How long, O ruling Teutons, Slavs, and Gaels, Must your wroth reasonings trade on lives like these, That are as puppets in a playing hand ? When shall the saner softer polities Whereof we dream, have sway in each proud land, And patriotism, grown godlike, scorn to stand Bondslave to realms, but circle earth and seas ? Old Portugal Planitie pars tensa iacet ; pars llttora curvat ; Pars datur in tumulos ; pars aspera rupibus horret ; Pars data dulcifluis undantis fontibus agri. Promitur herba virens, it surculus omnis in auras, Et, semper vestita comis, frondescit oliva : Torta per obliquos it vitis in orbe corymbos ; Vinea pampineos subarundinat ebria campos, Munera laetitiae spondens pendentibus uvis ; Fructibus et variis redolent florentia rura : Una parens tellus non unum fundit odorem. Dracontius. The attractions of Portugal as a holiday resort or a place of residence have often been described since Dracontius, but have never been taken proper advantage of by us moderns in spite of its being one of the easiest of foreign lands for English tourists to reach. In vain do guide-books praise its wonderful climate and scenery, and point out how these may be reached and enjoyed with a minimum of trouble and expense; * perfect climate ', ^romantic scenery', 'wonderful colouring ', * picturesque peasants ', all the usual attractions to an unusual extent have hitherto failed to lure us from our beaten tracks. But other imperial races have shown more appreciation, and the Romans, to whom also the civilized world lay open, clearly ranked Portugal very highly as a resort. To most of us Portugal does not suggest very ancient 42 Old Portugal associations. The name stands for modern matters such as African colonies, Republican movements, a Royal Mail steamer en route for South America, &c. To a few of us it may suggest mediaeval literature and picturesque peasant life. But even those of us who have been to Portugal do not, at first, realize the vast antiquity of much that is in plain view to those with eyes to see. The Portuguese themselves, with few ^exceptions, know little of the significance of the survivals of ancient civilization. Just as a Wessex peasant looks on every prehistoric monument as the work of the Danes or of the Devil, so for the Portuguese the Iberian cromlech, the Celtic earthwork, and the Roman viaduct are all the work of the Moors or the King of Spain ; while ' before the Moors ' or ' before Pombal ' will probably content the more educated townsman. But to the foreigner, with a taste for archaeology, a tour into Portugal is almost like a trip in Mr. Wells's flying machine. For the tourist finds that as he goes deeper into the country he goes further back into the past. After he has explored the eighteenth-century life of the port he lands at, the mediaeval manners of the provincial town he reaches by rail, and the Roman ways of life of the country-side he walks through, he will not be surprised to find prehistoric survivals if he penetrates as far inland as the ranges on the Spanish border. The bold explorer who should reach the remote valleys of the Monte de Outeiro, where live beehive hut-dwellers dressed in skins, will find himself back in the dim grey dawn of the world. For this great mountain barrier between Portugal and Spain is, indeed, a fearsome place, and it is easy enough for the lonely traveller there to believe in even more sur- prising survivals than the wolves and bears or the hut- dwellers and cavemen he will see there. There are eerie Old Portugal 43 tales of mysterious presences still holding power in these high passes. More than one engineering project is said to have been abandoned owing to these uncanny influences, one of which is said to take the form of a mysterious and mortal sickness. Presumably the native gods here still hold out against those raiding Djinn we call engineers. But without going back so far as these mountains that are still wrapped in the mist before sunrise, it is easy, via Portugal, to make a delightful trip in the bright morning sunshine of European civilization. Let us take, for example, two express excursions back into Old Portugal, the first, such as we might make on our way from our business in London to our business in Rio de Janeiro. The second, such as will give sufferers from the sullen sodden gloom and grime of a London winter a week of clear air, bright colour, woods and wild-flowers and the most vivid and various of sights to say nothing of smells — * una parens tellus non unum fundit odorem.' In the first excursion, starting from the twentieth century of the Royal Mail saloon with its architecture and atmosphere of South America chastened by Southampton, we shall land at Oporto straight into the eighteenth century. Taking the train to Braga we rapidly retire into the Middle Ages. At Braga we hire a motor, and as we go further up country we find that every jolt of the Portuguese car is taking us back at least fifty years. The centuries pass in a disinte- grating defilade as the hotel chauffeur, getting more and more drunk with driving as Southern Europeans do, hurls us into the past over gaps and round corners that even Portuguese mediaeval history seems scarcely to explain. Time travelling in a Portuguese motor is certainly not as smooth as in Mr. Wells's machine, and the traveller pays 44 Old Portugal little attention to the passage of events until the car stops finally in a Virgilian country-side. The first glance shows there is no doubt about the period. We are here among people whose civilization is still Roman, though some of the less essential features of it may not be quite in the picture. But you will not notice such minor matters as that, for instance, the Christian and not the Augustan era is used — a change made as long ago as 1400 ; for all the out- ward and more material features of Roman life remain. An oxcart comes creaking past carrying a rough wooden plough, just a forked piece of timber shod with an iron coulter on it, and both are Roman. The cart is a little oblong box on two solid wooden disks whose wooden ungreased axle, as it turns bodily, keeps up an ear-piercing shriek. This not only serves to clear the narrow lane worn by centuries of use into a deep ditch, but also to keep away evil spirits who notoriously hate cart-wheels almost as much as church bells. No doubt this superstition seemed absurd to the Roman legionary, and the yoke also would, perhaps, strike the Roman farmer as rather old-fashioned, being a large board carved with conventional designs of whorls and geometric patterns of obviously Celtic character. Again, the girl that guides the pair of little mouse-coloured oxen is dressed in bodice and kirtle, embroidered in designs and colours that were introduced when the country was flooded with the cheap textiles of the Phoenician. But the girl herself is oldest of all as she is evidently of that mys- terious race we call Iberian. We, in our northern countries, welcome some survival of this Iberian strain, the dark- haired, sombre-skinned, vital type, as giving qualities of charm, character and creative force so badly needed in our dull race and damp regions. But in Portugal, where this Old Portugal 45 strain is still in places comparatively pure, and where the kindliest of climates develops instead of deadening every faculty, the vital force and primaeval power of this mysterious people is still cause for fear and dislike. Women, such as this girl, from a village near by where the type is still dis- tinct, are all well known to be witches. Our driver, who is quite as much interested in magic as he is in motors, knows this. You may observe that he does not try to attract the attention of this sombre beauty as he has that of every other pretty girl he has passed ; but you would not probably guess that he does not do so because he cannot decide as to whether she has, as yet, become a were-wolf . The oxcart has come out of the gateway of a Roman homestead. The yard inside is shaded by vines trellised over granite posts, the long low house behind is divided into bedroom, living-room, and stable, the rooms separated from the stable by the floor being raised. Another step in the room itself at the far end from the stable represents a mediae- val improvement and makes the dais where the women sit. The fire-place is in the middle of the room and a square wooden funnel catches such smoke as comes out from the roof. There is generally an old woman crouching by the fire making some delectable stew or brew in a black pot, as old women, with the help of black pots, always could, until by an evil enchantment they became cooks with kitcheners. The farmer is leaning against the door-post, a broad-brimmed hat on his head such as Roman travellers used to wear, and, if it be wet weather, a cape of reed-thatch over his shoulders, a local adaptation of the Roman vine twig waterproof — the toga viminalis. While both the farmer and the rest of the family are clearly Celtic in type, in spite of their Roman surroundings, it is obvious that the 46 Old Portugal oxcart girl comes of a different stock. To reach the home of her Iberian race we must leave the car and climb up a stony track through the woods and enclosures. There, on a lonely ridge overlooking the blue distances of North Portugal, we shall find what is left of an Iberian town. The Roman historian, Valerius Maximus, mentions a fortified city, Citania, on a mountain in North Portugal which long resisted the Roman arms and, as there is no reason why we should not, we may suppose this ruined city to be Citania. And just as the Roman Age in Portugal is not repre- sented to-day merely by a few ruined temples of a dead faith, by the grass-grown roads of a dead civilization, or by the relics of a dead language, but by the life and speech of the land ; so, of this Celt-Iberian civilization killed by Rome, there remains enough to let us see clearly how very much of it survived. There is indeed so much remaining that shows a developed domestic civilization — such as the curve of the tiles to make them watertight, the sockets in the stone lintels and thresholds to hold the wooden door that is still used in Portuguese barns, the conduits for water, the rounded stone seats, and so forth — that one would be tempted to think the settlement was later than Iberian, but for the unmistakable evidence of the pottery and of the general plan. Some of the houses — stone bee-hive huts — remind one of the Celtic Cashels of Ireland, but there are also unmistakable relics here of the earlier race. Besides the Celtic inscriptions there are others as yet unread, and stones curiously ornamented and inscribed in unknown characters. Here we have, in all probability, words written by primitive man when ' Rome was on the march to wipe out his petty tribe and name at once '. A point of special Old PorUigal 47 interest, explaining why the wiping out process took so long, is the skill with which the defences of the town are drawn along the ridge so as to use the ground to the best advantage — the general strategic plan being one followed in Portuguese hill fortifications until quite recently. The working of the mediaeval mind is often so difficult for us moderners to follow that the evidence everywhere given in Portugal, that the workings of the mind, and the ways of life of primaeval man were on lines comprehensible to us, is of the greatest interest. Indeed, the mediaeval mysticism of Batalha Abbey or the modern monstrosities of Bussaco Palace .seem to-day remoter from us than the simple life of Citania. Those of us, who have other hopes for humanity than perpetual progress along the line of modern move- ments, will find much that is comforting in Old Portugal. In the northern world it may seem as though everything had always been going either up or down, according to our point of view ; but in this southern world of Portugal it is equally evident that things have always gone round and round. With such reflections, as the result of our excursion into northern Portugal, let us return to our Royal Mail steamer and steam on southward through the night until wx come on deck in the morning to find we are rounding the bar into the Tagus. The difference between the narrow gorge of the Douro and the broad reaches of the Tagus prepares us for the dissimilarity between Lisbon and Oporto. Oporto brought to our mind the eighteenth century, the Methuen Treaty, Pitt and his port. But Lisbon rather suggests classical memories, the Felicitas Julia of the Roman, the Olyssippo of the Greek. For this city of seven hills is as fundamentally Roman as Constantinople is Greek or New York EngHsh. 4B Old Portugal Even so early as Roman times there was a spirit of national- ism alive in Portugal. When Roman^^en^ralsjn^j^gj^ i8q . ■ ■ .. B. c. began to extend their conquests from the Carthagin ian colonies on the Mediterranean westward to the Atlantic,__ they encountered a stubborn resistance in the Portugues.e . _ highlands. Only one name comes down to us from the Roman records, that of the shepherd and patriot Viriatho, who has been made the first national hero. But the resis- tance was evidently confined to that band of hardy moun- taineers who have, from their rocky fortresses, held out against every subsequent foreign occupation of Portugal, and who represent the spine, though not the spirit, of the Portuguese nation. The Celt-Iberian lowlanders readily accepted Roman civilization, adopted the Roman language and law, and were duly made Roman citizens by the decree of Caracalla. Portugal under Rome must, indeed, have been for five centuries as happy a land as well could be imagined, and the Roman name of the country Felicitas lulia suggests that they appreciated the amenities of life in this pleasant land among a peaceful people. In return Rome gave Portugal public works and public institutions, some of which are serviceable still. Especially is this the case with the municipal institutions which long defended public liberties against the national predilection for strong central government. Even in its outward characteristics Lisbon still suggests the Roman city. The curious difference between the formal respectability of the business quarter, rebuilt by Pombal in the eighteenth century, which occupies the lower ground with its streets and squares of uniform design each assigned to its own trade, and the mediaeval and Moorish quarters on the hills around, picturesque and disreputable, repre- Old Portugal 49 sents, no doubt, the usual arrangement of a Roman pro- vincial town. It is many centuries since the Tagus was the political frontier between Western and Eastern civilization, between Europe and Africa, between Christian and Moor, but it is still a geographical frontier, one of those boundaries between two different regions. We shall see this at once if, leaving Lisbon on a southerly excursion, we cross the Tagus and take the train past the great rock fortress of Palmella down through the orange gardens of Setubal to the shallow lagoon of the Sado estuary where the brown, pointed sails of the sardine fishers come and go against the southern sun. Our northern excursion was through the rugged gorges, the oak woods, and the bramble thickets, the water meadows and the hill- side fields of a country-side that might almost be in our own country ; but here, a few miles south of Lisbon, we are already in the atmosphere and scenery of Africa. Here is the clean clear colouring, the long sweep of yellow sand- bank and blue sea-line, the bare rocky range and the little white town with its sub-tropical trees and walled gardens. Moored along the quay of the little port are lateen-sailed eastern-looking vessels. Lurking among them is a motor- boat which plies across the lagoon to a sandy spit, separating it from the Atlantic, where is the site of another prehistoric city. Nothing can be much more unlike the mountain city of Citania that we visited from Oporto than this city of Troya. The unlikeness is not only in its position and general picture, but in the people. Here are no comfortable Roman farms, no fertile vineyards, and meadows knee-deep in grass, but a bare sandbank with no sign of life other than one long long narrow boat, pointed high at. bow and stern 1832.5 £ 50 Old Portugal and with a single lateen sail. On the bow there are eyes painted and the stem has a curious kind of figure-head. The structure is strong and rough, but the lines of the boat show a long evolution of swiftness and seaworthiness. An old man at the stern sits doubled over the steering oar, and on the sand not far away is a boy scraping among half- buried stones with a stick. He comes towards us holding out a coin that he has dug up. He won't sell it but will take a present of a testoon for it, and it is not likely to be worth more, being common Roman of the later period of occupation — as are obviously many of the ruins half-buried in the sand around. But the boy and the town itself are clearly of a more Eastern origin. His short curling black hair, slender and delicate build, narrow eyes, and oval face are all Semitic ; and some relics of the settlement also sug- gest that originally it was of Phoenician foundation. Troya, as the place now is called, was identified so long ago as the sixteenth century, by the antiquarian Resende, as the Roman Cetobriga ; and is possibly the place mentioned by Strabo as being situated on a spit of sand in this part of Portugal, and inhabited by the * Bastuli ', a Phoenician tribe. It would indeed have been a poor site for any settlement other than a factory or trading station, and, though it has suffered much from the unscientific excavation of a French treasure-seeking company, and the less methodic grubbings of the native, enough of it remains to show from the ground plans of the houses that they must have been the dwellings of a population that made the best of the attractions of what must have been homelike scenery to an emigrant from Tyre. For even now as we rest among the ruins of Phoenician Troya and look out over the lagoon to the long line of the Sierra Arabida, with the scent of the orange blossom Old Portugal 51 blowing from Setubal, we may scarcely believe that we are in the twentieth century and the fortieth parallel of latitude. If the first excursion gave you some idea of the deep roots of the Portuguese stock, this second excursion may give you an impression of the vividness and vitality of Portugal — a country that you have probably only thought of as dead, or at best dormant. And perhaps, for some evenings after, as you steam away to South America in your Royal Mail saloon, your port and oranges may bring back to you an afterglow of the purple and gold of this land that is as poor as a farm girl, and as beautiful, as penurious as a fisher boy, and as proud, that is as old as youth and as young as time. But, fortunately, we are not all of us Royal Mail passengers in a hurry to make fortunes in South America. Some of us may prefer to visit Portugal under the more leisurely and scarcely less luxurious auspices of the Booth liners. For these afford a more prolonged and proteid-fuU excursion into Portuguese history than the port and oranges which are all that the Royal Mail have time or taste for. As Booth tourists, with a fortnight in Portugal before us, there is no need for abrupt and breathless plunges into the remotest past by motor-car or motor-boat, excursions which leave us with only a few hastily acquired and half- assimilated impressions ; but we can allow ourselves a care- fully planned, personally conducted, trip out and home again by a comfortable Portuguese train along the well-worn track of mediaeval history. Whereby, we shall find that early Portuguese history is the good old nursery history of kings who liberally ' fostered ' everything, and of the lesser personages who loyally ' flourished ' in their reigns — of conquests and of crusades — of ' the vexed moods of gallant E 2 52 Old Portugal gentlemen ' and the caprice of fair ladies — that same old history of our childhood that we now find it so hard to be- lieve in. We shall find that this excursion through Portugal will bring it all back to us again ; for it seems to have come to an end there only yesterday and to be ready to begin again to-morrow. By going to school again as tourists, in that open- air school where buildings take the place of books, and * summa diligentia ' may rightly be construed as the top of a diligence, we may recover the romantic reading of history and we may learn that the village pupil-teacher's view of the way the world goes round is more interesting and no more incorrect than that of the university professor. The short and uninteresting railway journey from Roman Lisbon to Moorish Cintra will serve to remind us that there is little to record in Portuguese history between the going of the Romans and the coming of the Moors, and that compared with the recasting of society by the Romans, the overlaying of it by the Visigoths was comparatively unim- portant. Beginning with the fifth century the Visigoths had reached the zenith of their power under Euric at the end of that century, and ended it with the death of Roderick on his defeat by the Moors in 711. The Visigothic occupa- tion left, as a legacy, nothing more than a dominant, but perpetually decadent, caste. The next remoulding of Portuguese society was far more fundamental. The Moorish invasion was probably inevitable, but it was hastened by the struggle between the Chivalry and the Church of the time, a struggle that the weak Visigothic dynasty was unable to keep in bounds. It was the ecclesiastical leaders, Count Julian and Archbishop Oppus, who invited the Moors into Portugal : a betrayal of nationalism by ecclesiasticism, and of Christianity by Old Portugal 53 the Church, regularly repeated on later occasions whenever the nationalist and humanist spirit of the country was too weak to prevent it. To such a defection from the nationalist cause on the part of clerical and class-interests can be traced, in part, the Moorish occupation of some five hundred years, the Spanish occupation in the seventeenth century of some fifty years, and the French occupation in the last century of some five years. Portugal, from its important position and inferior power, always has been, and still is, exposed to such betrayals ; but it is interesting to note the increased pace of the rate at which nations live in the decreasing length of the periods of occupation. The inference, that if a foreign power now occupied Lisbon the period of occupation would not be much longer than six months, is probably sound enough. But to return to our * Booth ' excursion, and our trip from Lisbon to the rocky range of mountains that bound the Lower Tagus Valley on the north. High in the range lies Cintra, where we can spend comfortable nights and cool days in romantic gorges and woods not unlike those of the north, but growing as no northern woods ever grow. Here, at Cintra, is the Palace of the Moors, their last resting-place of any permanence in Portugal. This wonderful Arabian Nights sort of building with its curious chimney cowls, its arcaded courts, and its green-tiled bathrooms, framed among hanging gardens in a wooded glen, is a worthy relic of the civilization that forced science and sanitation upon a dark and dirty age. Above it, crowning the top of a precipitous rock pinnacle, is the Moorish castle, an empty shell of walls and towers, that recalls the grimmer side of the Moorish occupation. There are, indeed, two points of view of the occupation of Portugal by the Moors. Looked at 54 Old Portugal from one point it was the beginning of a cruel and continuous race-war between a subjected Christian community and a horde of Moslem oppressors : the suppression of Arian freedom by African feudalism, the substitution for Roman law of the Cheriat, the subversion of European democracy by Asiatic despotism. From the other point of view the Moorish occupation was the ending of interminable internecine warrings between feudal, municipal, and local interests, by uniting them under a strong central administration — the superseding of superstition by science — the subordination of the individual and local interest to a common authority and to a community of purpose from which, first, the spirit of nationality was forged — and finally, the infusion of the cultivated leaven of Asiatic mentality into a raw lump of European humanity, whereby a national culture was created. These two points of view are sufficiently symbolized for us to-day by the difference between the Moorish palace and the Moorish castle at Cintra, and can be seen even more clearly in the more reliable record of the national poesy ; for a nation's buildings are a more remote and less reflex expression of its mind than its ballads. Compare, for example, such ballads as that recovered from the monastery of Celanova, giving an account of the holding of such a rock stronghold as this of Cintra by the villagers against the raiding Moors, and its vivid picture of ugly ruthless race-war, with the ballad Ai Valen^a, guai Valenga and its chivalrous episode, in which, be it remarked, the chivalry is all on the side of the Moor and the treachery on that of the Christians. They are too long to quote in full here, but an extract from either will serve to give the different point of view of the Moorish occupation taken by each. Old Portugal 55 These Moorish men, and thickets eere devils were they ; we bore the Christ they harried all — and all our gear, we fled away. The Moorish sheikh The altar dear miscreant reneager, of God on high came up the hill was left all bare — so fierce and eager, a sunless sky. and our rock fortress Into the rocks did beleaguer, &c, WOE VALENCA The Sheikh. ' Oh, Valenga, woe Valen^a ! Thou shalt burn with fire anon, for thou wast a Moorish city ere by Christians thou wert won. Oh, Valenga, woe Valenga ! Thou wast laid with silver once — now thou art a Christian city thou art built of ill-hewn stones. Oh, Valenga, woe Valenga ! How thou standest fair to see — but before three days are over Moors shall beleaguer thee.' The Baron, * Dress and deck thee, oh, my daughter, all in gold and silver rarely — go, detain me that Morisco, hold me him awhile in parley', &c. Cintra, whether we look down at the wizard's palace in the glen or up at the giant's castle on the rocky peak, repre- sents Moorish Portugal and the life of the country for some five hundred years of its history. During these five hundred years of Moorish rule, as during the previous five hundred 56 Old Portugal years of Roman rule, Portuguese nationality was taking shape, but was as yet unborn. The Moorish occupation that probably postponed the appearance of the Portuguese nation for centuries, and possibly caused the curiously spasmodic and uneven course of its subsequent growth, was, in itself, as progressive and prosperous a period in the history of the country as was. the... period of the Roman occupation. The Ommeyad Caliphs were enlightened rulers who tolerated the municipal and ecclesiastical institutions that they found existing in the country, and greatly improved both the conditions of life and such culture as was possible in those days. The Arab words left in the language show clearly enough the scope of their activities ; and the main industries of the country, especially that of agriculture, have vocabularies that are still largely Arabic ; while science, especially medicine and administration, also show their debt to the Arab mind. There was, indeed, as much good to be said for the Ommeyad rule in the Iberian Peninsula as for the early Ottoman rule in the Balkan Peninsula. Such foreign rule did not become wholly evil until the inevitable renaissance of the subjected western nationality, and the equally inevitable decadence of the eastern ruling race, brought on in either land the long wars of liberation, and the long-drawn-out dissolution of the eastern domination. This dissolution began in Portugal towards the end of the tenth century with the decline of the Ommeyad Caliphate ; and thereafter, for a time, the history of the Peninsula became one of small wars between the Moorish emirs of the Algarves and Beira, and the Christian nobles of Gallicia and Asturias. This was the period of the Cid and of the Crusades, the school in which the future Portuguese chivalry was bred ; and many Old Portugal 57 of the ideals of Portuguese nationality date back to this dark age. But the liberation of the land was not yet due ; and the unification of the Christians had, as a first result, the reconsolidation of the Moorish factions. The rise of a strong central power, the Almoravide Caliphate, gave new life to Moorish rule ; so that the war between Christian and Moor ebbed and flowed continually from the Douro to the Tagus. Meantime, the people of Portugal, the raw material of the new nation, lay like a flooded land awash under this welter of warring creeds, waiting until the tide of time should free them from the Asiatic flood ; for the ebb and flow of the Moorish flood had broken up and beaten down into one solid society the Iberian, Celtic, Roman, and Visigothic elements composing the new nation. The Portuguese State, unlike other West European nations, but like many Central and East European nations, was mainly the product of wars of race and religion ; and we may, perhaps, consider that Portugal, towards the end of the Moorish wars, had already acquired a nationality. But it had as yet no name, and was without any sufficient territorial holding. /^ Late in the Moorish wars we first find the name of the / country as that of a northern feudal province, the county of Portugal, so called because it contained the Portus Cale \ of the Romans — our Oporto. With the history of this province the political history of Portugal begins. It is a truth, though a much disputed one, that war can create nothing ; and those who attribute the birth of Portugal as a nation wholly to the wars against the Moors are as ' far astray as those more enthusiastic nationalists who find its birth in the skirmishes of Viriatho against the Romans. But where the expression of an impulse towards civilized 58 Old Portugal association, such as the impulse towards national association, is retarded by internecine and inherent warfare, an inter- national war for a definite national purpose may be the lesser evil and will possibly bring about a national unity that did not previously exist. Leaving beautiful Cintra and its Moorish associations, we go along the railway northward — ignoring Mafra that is as out-of-place in our programme as that Grand Mon- archical monstrosity has always been in every respect and relationship. During the short journey to Alcobaga, our next landmark, we may review the swift growth of the infant Portugal from the Moorish period, that is marked by Cintra to the mediaeval period that is well illustrated in Alcoba^a. In^ 1095 Count Henry of Burgundy had become Count of Portugal, but he was in position no more than a feudatory of Galicia, and in personality not much more than the average ambitious adventurer of those days. He clearly had not associated his interests in any way with those of the infant state, as his successors did. His restless rovings, his collisions with the victorious Almohades on his southern frontier, his crusades into Palestine, and his conspiracies against other Christian princes show that he had no instinct other than his own personal promotion. Portugal was, in fact, still only a County, and had, as yet, no king. It had begun to realize itself, though it, as yet, was recognized by no one else, not even by its own prince. So important has been the part played by Portuguese sovereigns in symbolizing the stage that Portuguese national development reached in their reign, that historians have been apt to * put the cart before the horse ', and to attribute the character of each particular period to the personality of the king. No doubt a king counted for much, especially in Old Portugal 59 such a state of society as that of the Middle Ages, both in directing and in developing various national activities ; but only in so far as he identified himself with the national instincts and interests. If the king succeeded in concen- trating these popular instincts and interests on himself he had achieved his function, and may then, perhaps, not unfairly be credited by history with having created that which really he had merely conformed to. Even under the light of this theory we find kings looming too large in the history of Portugal. The great kings of early Portuguese history cannot really have been quite so great as they are represented to us ; nor can the eighteenth-century mon- archs have been quite so despicable as they seem. But, broadly speaking, every country has the government that it deserves, and it is as fair, on the whole, to judge a mediaeval country by its king as to judge a mediaeval king by his country. The view that these early monarchs were probably, as the later undoubtedly were, only reflections of the state of society and the state of nationality in the country at the time, seems to be confirmed by such curious coincidences as occur in the contemporary careers of neighbours like Theresa of Portugal and her half-sister Urraca of Castile. This coincidence may be explained by the fact that Spain and Portugal being still at the same stage of development and their national temperaments not yet differentiated, the government of both went through the same phase in the very similar careers of these two queens. Both these ladies, after marriage to foreign adventurers, became queens in their own rights. Both were good mothers to their infant nations until they fell under the influence of a courtier. Both alienated their subjects by devotion to their lovers ; 6o Old Portugal and both, after thus damaging the public interest for private reasons, were deposed by their sons. It was as a result of this deposition that Portugal got its first king, and took rank as a kingdom. And it was the spirit of Portu- guese nationality, nascent in the nobles, that substituted Affonzo Henriquez for his mother as soon as the latter fell into an anti-national policy ; for the national instinct of Portugal could, at this time, express itself only through the professional and personal interests of the bishops and barons. This Portuguese spirit was at once aroused when Alfonzo the Seventh of Castile, the son of Urraca, having deposed his mother, then invaded Portugal and forced Theresa of Portugal to submit to his suzerainty and to sur- render territory. So unwelcome was such a surrender in the eyes of all the elements of the new nation that they repudiated the capitulation by setting up Affonzo Henriquez, a boy of seventeen, in place of his mother. She raised a force of Galicians but was defeated at San Mamede (1128) and exiled. Poor Theresa, who deserved a happier end, wandered with her lover for some months in the mountains of Galicia and died of the privations to which she was exposed. Kingship in these early days was no sine- cure and no certainty, and one serious mistake of national policy was enough, in mediaeval Portugal at least, to bring about the deposition of a queen who was beautiful and brave, and who had been the nursing mother of the new nation. Affonzo Henriquez has become almost a legendary character in Portugal. In that land, where the tradition of chivalry has never been lost, he is honoured as the first champion of chivalry, sometimes with as little regard for historic harmonies as in the case of our King Arthur. Indeed, history sho\vs how curiously the general political Old Portugal 6i tendencies of the nation were a compromise between a sound and self-consistent national policy and the romantic unrealities of chivalry. Affonzo Henriquez, having got rid of his mother, repudiated her capitulation to Spain, a sound and sensible national policy. But the breach of faith and of chivalrous honour had to be expiated by the voluntary surrender to Spain of his old tutor, Agas Moniz, the statesman who negotiated the capitulation. Fortu- nately chivalry also prescribed that Alfonzo of Spain should treat the old man well, though he at once set about preparing to retaliate on his own cousin. Affonzo of Portugal pressed the war against Spain, and frontier fighting continued until 1 1 37, when Alfonzo of Spain, now Emperor, decided to finish off Portugal and invaded it with a large army. Affonzo of Portugal saved himself this time by calling in the Church, who negotiated for him the Peace of Tuy, under which he agreed to convert his campaign against Spain into a crusade against the Moors. It looks as though he might never have realized, without the help of Rome, that the road to independence and sovereignty lay not eastward in barren battles with Castile, but southward in the conquest of fertile provinces from the decaying Moorish power. The time was, indeed, very favourable for a crusade against the Moors, who, it must be remembered, at this time held Portugal as far north as the line of the Lis ; for the main armies of the civilized Almoravides were away in Africa fighting the fanatical movement of the Almohades under their new Mahdi. Affonzo had secured an under- taking from Spain at Tuy that Andalusia should be invaded by the Spaniards simultaneously, and he had, accordingly, little difficulty in defeating the Emir Omar at Ourique just south of Beja on July 25, 1 1 39. Indeed, the chroniclers 62 Old Portugal report that so depleted were the Moorish forces that they had reinforced the ranks of the levy sent against the Portuguese with women. The Crusade, thus well begun, went on from success to success, for the northern chivalry now saw their interest in prosecuting it instead of in fighting among themselves, and they had also the support of the country-folk. More- over, Innocent the Second was a crusading Pope, and he had not only done much to unite Christian chivalry against the Moors, but he had also provided that crusading in Spain should be a service of equal merit to crusading in the Holy Land. The crusading movement does not seem ever to have accepted this ruling altogether, but it became the recognized procedure for crusading expeditions from the north on their way to the Levant to put into Portugal for a short trial campaign against the heathen there. It was, no doubt, a pleasant promenade after the trials of a voyage across the Bay in a half-decked boat, and a useful preliminary to the greater hardships of the Holy Land. In this curious way did the position of Portugal, as a Sea State, and the association with England which this position involved, first influence the national fortunes of the country. And we shall see later how Portuguese inde- pendence has continually been menaced from the land by England's enemies, and maintained from the sea by English expeditions. The first of these English expeditions on behalf of the Portuguese nation was that which captured Lisbon for Portugal in 1147. Fortunately, an account of the expedition by one of the Crusaders has been preserved,-^ and it is a curious anticipation in its general strategy of the ^ Vol. i, p. 392, Portugalliae Monumenta Historia — a publication of the Lisbon Academy. Old Portugal 63 unsuccessful attempt by Drake to free Lisbon from the Spaniards at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and of the successful attempt to free it from the French at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is also curious that while the East Coast English in the Fleet — the men of Norfolk and Suffolk under one Hervey Glanville ; the men of London under one Andrew ; the men of Kent under Simon of Dover- — all responded wholeheartedly to the appeal of the Bishop of Oporto to join him in a campaign against the Moors, the more independent West Country Englishmen preferred to follow certain ' pirates ' on a more profitable excursion. Fortunately, however, for the future of Portugal, the ' Pirate ' Gulielmus Vitulus (alias William Widdle), was persuaded to give up his prospect of plunder, and to join the Crusade. William Widdle can, therefore, claim to be the first, as Wellington was the last, of the English who helped to make. Portugal ; for without this reinforcement from the sea, by which the Portuguese territories still under the Moors were cut in two, there is little doubt that Affonzo Henriquez could never have carried his frontier down to the Tagus line or acquired the future capital of the new State. As a result of these conquests the political independence, that Affonzo Henriquez had been unable to secure in direct conflict with his suzerain of Castile, came into his hands of itself. He had, soon after beginning the Moorish campaign, broken the Peace of Tuy, and again attacked Alfonzo of Spain ; JDut he seems soon to have been convinced that this was a mistaken policy, a conviction probably resulting partly from his being defeated and wounded. By the efforts of the Church the campaign was converted into a tournament — the famous Tourney of Valdevez — at which the Portuguese 64 Old Portugal knights defeated the Spaniards. This, in virtue of the conventions of chivalry, provided one of the sanctions required by Affonzo Henriquez in order to promote himself from the position of a subordinate prince to that of a sove- reign prince. The previous step, from a private subject to a subordinate prince, had been won by Theresa, who had assumed the semi-royal style of Infanta. After the tourney Aifonzo is found to call himself King of Portugal, apparently with the tacit approval of the Emperor and of the Pope. This tacit approval, dating from the * Truce of Valdevez', was converted in 1143 into formal recognition by the Treaty of Zamorra, negotiated by the Pope between the Emperor and the new King of Portugal ; which treaty also secured Affonzo the succession of his dynasty by placing him under the protection of the Holy See. So large does the personality of Affonzo Henriquez loom in this misty morning of Portuguese history that there has been a tendency among historians to attribute the establishment of Portuguese nationality wholly to his political skill and personal influence, as shown in his duels with the Emperor and his diplomacies with the Pope. This is the view followed, for example, in the excellent English summary of Portuguese history in the Story of the Nations Series, by Mr. Morse Stephens. On p. 41 he writes, ' It was not until the modern school of historians arose in Portugal which examined documents . . . , that it was clearly pointed out that Affonzo Henriquez won his crown by his long struggle with his Christian cousin and not by his exploits against the Moors. This fact ranks among the most startling discoveries of the modern scientific school of historians,' &c. But there seems to be some confusion in this point of view with the later period of Portuguese Old Portugal 65 history when resistance to Madrid and Rome in alliance with France or England became the criterion of a ' national ' policy. At this early stage the criterion was resistance to Islam in alliance with Spain and Rome. Moreover such opposition to popular traditional opinion, on the strength of documents only concerned with some very partial or partisan region of the national life, cannot be approved if, as in this case, it also conflicts with obvious general tendencies as well. And, apart from this, both the recorded facts of these political relationships and a careful review of the political forces at work suggest that popular opinion is right in considering that Portuguese nationality originated mainly in the crusade against the Moors. Affonzo Henriquez invariably failed when he tried to assert his independence by direct conflict with Spain, and he would never have secured the support of the Church for a merely feudal and factious ambition. By fighting the Moors he secured, first, the de facto independence of Portugal by doubling its territory and prestige, and secondly, the de jure sovereignty of Portugal by convincing both the Pope and the Emperor that a King of Portugal would be more useful to them, and to Christendom, as an independent ally than as a disaffected vassal. It does not follow from this that his skill, or that of his episcopal advisers, was of no value to the new nation, nor that the forces forming Portugal into a nation were not many of them rather material than moral ; for instance, territorial conquest was as much the object of these early Portuguese as a religious crusade. But, none the less, the fact remains that the popular * moral' view of the foundation of Portugal is nearer the truth than the historic ' political ' view, and nearer also than the scientific ethnological view. 1832-5 r> 66 Old Portugal If the Royalist-Conservative school of historians has been tempted to attribute the foundation of Portugal to the ^Tourney of Valdevez', the Feudal System, and the Statesman-Sovereign, the other school of Republican- Liberal w^riters has sought the genesis of the nation in a national Crusade and the * Cortes of Lamego '. Tourna- ments being easier to report and better reading than parliaments, the documentary evidence for the * Tourney of Valdevez ' is more satisfying than that as to the * Cortez of Lamego '. Nevertheless, the tradition in favour of the latter is strong, and what w& know of the international political conditions of the province makes it probable that Affonzo Henriquez would have sought to secure the succes- sion of his sons, not only by conciliating any possible opposi- tion from Chivalry or from the Church, but also by getting some sort of recognition from the Commonalty. The ^history of the origin of popular assemblies and of democracy ■generally shows that such institutions originate in just such occasions as this, when monarchs,whose titles are weak in right divine, have to strengthen them by democratic recognition. The subsequent history of Portugal suggests that it is most probable that this first king did, at this early date, seek some public sanction. If, moreover, we take the view that these early kings of Portugal were really personifications of the period in which they reigned and not, as they are represented, the principal motive power of the nation at the time, then some such formal expression of the national will as would account for the Cortes of Lamego becomes more than probable. The question is of some importance to the understanding of the Portuguese nation, because a large, perhaps the larger^ school of students of Portuguese history attributes its very Old Portugal 67 slow progress in modern times, compared with its very swift progress in mediaeval times, to the absence nowadays of such national leaders as were the early kings. The point of view of this school is put before English readers by Mr. Morse Stephens,-^ * There is no geographical or ethno- logical reason why the part of the Iberian Peninsula called Portugal should have formed an independent kingdom more than Leon or Castile. It was the greatness of one man which made it an *' independent country ". This is the first lesson taught by the history of Portugal.' Again, Oswald Crawfurd, writing in 1880, says : * Because Affonzo Henriquez lived there has been in this corner of Europe an enduring kingdom which, in spite of its size, is in the true sense of the word a great kingdom.' The doctrine of the superman as preached by Carlyle, and practised by others since, is not, however, the lesson to be learnt from the history of the lesser nations such as Portugal. The opposing point of view, which is held here, prefers to attribute the slow progress of Portugal in modern times to the exhaustion of the national stock by wars, an exhaustion to which kings contributed their fair share. A great expan- sion of national vitality will carry the heads of the people, kings or no, into prominence ; while the same expenditure of force will, for centuries after, leave the nation too ex- hausted to force a head to the surface at all. If further proof were wanted that the success of Affonzo Henriquez was due to national rather than personal forces, it is to be found in the end of his long reign. He can never clearly have realized that Portugal had won its own inde- pendence and his crown by expansion southward, and by alliance with Spain — for in 1169 he laid siege to Badajoz, 1 Story oj the Nations : Portugal^ ^p. ^<), F 2 68 Old Portugal a gross breach of good faith and treaty right. His son-in-law, Ferdinand of Castile, raised a large army, defeated him and took him prisoner, a blow from which he never recovered, though he was soon after released. He then resigned in favour of his son Sancho, though legend relates that he lived to be carried in a litter at the raising of the siege of Santarem in 1178. Portugal, thereafter, was a full-fledged nation with an adequate territory, namely, all Portugal north of the Tagus, with suitable frontiers, namely, the Tagus line against the Moors and the mountains against Spain — with political re- cognition by the temporal and spiritual authorities of Europe ■ — with a sovereign and a dynasty, no unimportant qualifi- cations in those days — and with a foreign policy of balancing sea power against land power — and the Pope against Spain. The long reign of Affonzo Henriquez, during which Portugal became a European State, shows very clearly all the elements already existing that afterwards enter into the development of the nation. Some of these elements, such as those of chivalry and of the Church, were to decay and eventually disappear as material factors in modern Portugal though they still exist morally. Others, such as the English Alliance and the aspiration for popular govern- ment, were to develop until they dominated the country's fortunes. It is chiefly with a view to showing how mediaeval Portugal changes into modern Portugal, and how much in modern Portugal there remains of mediaeval Portugal, that the following historical review will be written. Unlike as the two may appear to be, the modern Portuguese intellec- tual will be found to be the lineal heir of the mediaeval Portuguese crusader. You must understand Affonzo Hen- riquez if you are to understand Affonzo Costa. Old Portugal 69 The popular Portuguese view of the origin of Portuguese political independence is, it has been said, that it is to be attributed wholly to the crusade against the Moors. On this theory, Portugal won its status as a nation in the same way as the Portuguese won their standing as knights, by military service to Christendom and civilization. It is this point of view that inspired the people with such legends as that of the vision vouchsafed to Affonzo Henriquez before the decisive battle with the heathen, and that impelled them to the building of such wonderful expressions of natural religion as the Alcobaga Church. From Affonzo Henriquez and Alcobaga we go on north- ward to the next landmark in Portuguese history, Batalha and John of Aviz. On the way — a pleasant upland road through the heart of Portugal — we may pass in review the main happenings to the Kjngs and Commons of Portugal in this first chapter of its history as a nation. Fortunately, the lives of the kings so closely conform to the theory that their public characters are summaries and symbols of the social conditions of their reigns, that in their reigns we have a convenient record of the rapid growth of their people. The first of these eponymous heroes is Sancho — * the Populator '. His reign is historically a record of inter- minable struggles with the Moors and of intricate marriage intrigues with Spain and other European States. We note, for instance, that the beauty of the Portuguese princesses was of world-wide repute and that one of them refused an offer from our King John, as also that Sancho was a high- spirited, broad-minded ruler, and resisted the Papacy and the great prelates of Oporto and Braga in the interest of the poorer clergy. Such facts have their significance, not only because the independence of these royalties proves the 70 Old Portugal growing international importance of Portugal, nor only because we have here the first approximation to the Anglo- Portuguese Alliance, but also because, in attacking the political power of the Church, Sancho of Portugal was follow- ing the same policy as our Henry II — a nationalist policy which led us eventually into the Reformation. But the chief national service of Sancho is seen in his economic activities. During his reign, not only were the cities that had been ruined in the Moorish wars rebuilt, but much land was brought into cultivation by placing it under the protection of knightly orders. Sancho did not add to the extent of his territory, but he must have increased its productiveness and population many times over. His successor, Affonzo the Second, * the Fat ', devoted himself to swelling the Royal revenues ; but as it was mainly at the expense of the Church, and of his relatives, his acquisitiveness did not bring him into collision with the people. Rather the contrary, for in order to pass his Law of Mortmain he had to summon a Cortes ; and by refusing to give up his brothers' and sisters' legacies he let himself in for a defensive war against the King of Castile and Pope Innocent the Third — both popular and national policies. His Moorish wars also furthered the national fortunes, and introduced a new military era ; for the great victory of Naves de Tolosa in 121 2 was won, not by the chivalry which had hitherto alone conducted such crusades, but by Portuguese infantry. Thus, if we look back over the Portuguese Crusades we see that the first Moorish war, under Henry of Bourbon, had been an international crusade of the upper class for Mother Church ; the second, under Affonzo Henriquez,had become a race-war owing to the participation of the middle-class citizens and the northern peasants ; Old Portugal 71 whereas the third, under Affonzo, was a true national war. So also if we look at early Portuguese deeds and grants, while we find that the tenures under Affonzo Henriquez require the furnishing for the king's wars of one or more * horses ', sometimes * great horses ' ; under Affonzo the Fat^ it is rather the number of men than of horses that is required of the feudal lord. In fact, the foot-soldier was already challenging the supremacy of the cavalier, and the latter was to be driven into heavier and heavier defensive armour and armament until his fighting-value became something like that of a modern Dreadnought. In this reign we find Portuguese territory extended by almost as important an addition as the previous advance to the Tagus, and again the extension is secured with the help of English auxiliaries. In July 1217a crusade put into the Tagus, and the Bishop of Lisbon succeeded in persuading the English contingent to land. Joined with a Portuguese army, which had been recruited by Bishops and Templars, but not by the King, who was then at odds with the Church, this English force, under the Earl of Wight, de~ feated the Moors and extended the frontier to the south of the Sado. Besides excluding Affonzo from this success, the Church injured his reputation in many other ways ; but we may infer that he deserved well of his people, on the whole, from the fact that he died excommunicate, but not in exile. His son Sancho the Second was less fortunate. A long minority, combined with the Papal interdict bequeathed to him by his father, gave him a bad start ; but he threw himself into the national crusade, and so distinguished himself at the siege of Elvas that he secured the support of the Pope in bringing his unruly bishops to order. By 72 Old Portugal 1244 he had conquered the northern part of the Algarves, and, by his suppression of the great prelates and nobles and his success over the Moors, he had become a highly popular monarch. But he fell into the same snare as Theresa, and his devotion to a Spanish widow. Dona Mencia Lopez de Haro, ruined both his character and his career. Affonzo of Boulogne, his brother, invaded Portugal as Pretender with the sanction of the Pope and the support of the people. Sancho, deserted by his Castilian mercenaries, male and female, died in exile at Toledo (1248). Affonzo the Third, being a usurper, was forced to be constitutional and summoned a great Cortes at Leiria, in which commoners were included for the first time. This democratic policy so strengthened him that he was able to put a check, not only on his clergy, but on the nobility as well. -On the strength of the consent of the Cortes he even succeeded in doing that which had ruined Sancho, marrying a Spaniard and braving a Papal Interdict. He was a politic person and died as King of Portugal and the Algarves ; having secured peaceful recognition by Spain of this extension of his territory. But he had to pay for his constitutionalism. The Cortes of Coimbra (1261) claimed to have a say in taxation, and his son Diniz, alarmed at the loss of the royal prerogatives, embittered his last years by rebellion. By the accession of Diniz, 1279, Portugal had acquired its full national territory ; a national population which, thanks to its fertile soil, was already comparable with that of other European powers ; and a form of national govern- ment which for liberty and enlightenment compared well with any of them. With the reign of Diniz the ' Lavrador ', the Worker, Old Portugal 73 begins the Golden Age of Mediaeval Portugal ; and Dom Diniz, or Denis, as we should call him, was successful, not only in personifying, but in personally promoting the nascent national activities. It was a period of economic reconstruc- tion and of great development in agriculture, and the ' Lavrador ' worked like any improving squire. The plains of the Alemtejo were ploughed for cereals and the slopes of the Douro planted with vines, while the vast pine forests that we drive through on our way to Batalha from the north date from this period, and are attributed to the personal initiative of Diniz. Agricultural schools, model farms, and a kind of Barnardo homes for educating and establishing orphans on the land, were some of the features of this thirteenth-century industrial movement, which was inspired, moreover, by strong pacifist and socialist principles. This may seem impossible in a feudal society in a state of inherent and incessant war ; but the writings of the time show that the mediaeval mind did not differ from the modern in being able to combine the incompatible and to compromise between the contradictory. It was a time also of commercial revival, and Portugal gave evidence of the initiative, which afterwards distinguished the nation in enterprise of this nature, by setting up a navy and by con- cluding a treaty of commerce with England, signed in 1294. There is extant an interesting correspondence on foreign commerce between Diniz and Edward the First of England, and their commercial treaty is the first chapter in the long Anglo-Portuguese economic relationship. It is evident, that even thus early in the development of Europe, Portugal and England could not keep apart owing to economic and political reasons essential to their existence. When we see, moreover, that then, as now, this essential economic relation- 74 Old Portugal ship between England and Portugal contained no menace to the political independence of either nation, we may record a passing regret that Ireland, which in its people and position so much resembles Portugal, should not have had the few more miles of sea from England and the few miles of land frontier to some other Power that would have put Ireland in the same relation to England as is Portugal. The previous governors of Portugal had shown consider- able administrative ability, and their labours were now crystallized into the form of law. With Diniz Portuguese law begins to become a homogeneous and indigenous system and not a mere reproduction of Roman precepts and Visigothic common law. Nor did new mental activity stop there. Diniz founded, in 1300, the first university at Lisbon, which was subsequently transferred to Coimbra, where it was to take a leading part in the process of converting foreign ideas into national ideals, until eventually it became the centre and citadel of Portuguese nationalism. This seedling was to survive many cruel winters and still give shade and shelter to the generations of to-day, but the early spring sunshine of the reign of Dom Diniz was also marked by the brilliant, if brief, glory of national poetry that blazed out and faded away even as the iris that for a few days in March clothes in purple the ploughlands of Portugal. Portugal had already appropriated the Trouvere forms of northern French poetry, while there must also have been relics of other foreign poesies, Gothic, Greek, and Celtic ; but so far there had been no characteristic national poesy. Under Denis ' Troubadour ' lyrics and Provencal love-poetry came into fashion, more sympathetic to the national temperament. than the severer * Trouvere ' Old Portugal 75 traditions. As a result, there suddenly blossoms a flower of national poetry of surprising splendour. It was natural enough that this national development should have been attributed to Diniz, who was, like every other gentleman of the time, something of a poet. The best examples of these early lyrics have accordingly been ascribed to him, and, by ignoring much that precedes, the very existence of lyric poetry in Portugal has been traced to his activities. But, even if he had written all the thousands of * cantigas ' preserved in his name in the Vatican Song Book and elsewhere, in the intervals of fighting his relations and founding socialistic institutions, it could not alter the fact that the Portuguese always have sung and always will sing ; for the reason that no race could live in so lovely a land as Portugal without singing. It would have taken a very bad king to stop the renascence of Portugal at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and Diniz was a good king. But there are records which show that the national instinct at the time recognized rightly that the great accession of strength to the monarchy, due to the centralizing tendency of the day, was not without danger. In other words, at a time when Old Portugal was still only in the first bloom of its youth. Young Portugal was already alive and kicking. From nursery rhymes, those most faithful store-cupboards of home-truths, we learn that : Good King Diniz does just as he please for a man with such gold can do as he wold. There is indeed no doubt but that, in spite of all the glory and glitter of his reign, and of all his solid service to the nation, Diniz does not escape censure for having 76 Old Portugal encroached overmuch on the local liberties of the people. Moreover, if his Court was a radiant centre of chivalry and culture it also had its shadow side of licence and extravagance. The curious combination in the Portuguese character of mirth and melancholy was never more marked than in the cultivated Court of Diniz with its brilliant gaieties and its brutal tragedies. The king himself can have had no easy life, and, having won his throne after a fierce fight with his brother Affonzo, who questioned his legitimacy, he was involved in war at the end of his reign with his legitimate son Affonzo, whom he had passed over in favour of his bastards. Affonzo the Fourth, the Brave, marks by his nickname the final defeat of the Moors by the allied armies of Castile and Portugal at the battle of Salado in 1340. Otherwise he continued the policy of his father without enjoying, apparently, the attraction of his personality. The English alliance now advanced, matrimonially speaking, from the stage of a refusal to that of a betrothal. The daughter of Sancho had refused our King John, but the Infanta Maria now accepted Edward Prince of Wales, afterwards Edward the Third, in 1325, and the Infanta Leonora was engaged to the Black Prince in 1347. Neither marriage, as a matter of fact, came off, and the two Englishmen were jilted for two Spaniards ; for Dona Maria married the King of Castile and Dona Leonora the King of Aragon. Yet the friendly relations between the two countries stood the strain of a marked declaration in favour of the Spanish alliance, under conditions which ordinarily, in that age, would have been a casus belli. In July 1352 a proclamation of Edward the Third declared the Portuguese to be our friends, and the following year an interesting commercial Old Portugal 77 treaty was signed in London by Affonzo Martins Alho, the representative of the Portuguese wine trade ; which com- mercial treaty, in combination with the failure of the dynastic alliance, is interesting evidence that, even so early as this, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was an association between the peoples and too firmly established to be disturbed by dynastic disagreements. Even more curious evidence of the popular basis of the alliance is, that in the Portuguese ballad, the Portuguese Infanta does, in defiance of fact, marry the Prince Edward. Here are some verses of the song in which the Portuguese have adapted an old ballad (that of the elopement of Robert the Devil with the King of Rome's daughter) so as to record a popular royal marriage which never took place : — All in the month of April, of May but and a day, the lilies and the roses do show themselves so gay ; 'twas then the fair Infanta aboard ship went her way, all through her father's garden, and weeping she did say : * Farewell, my thousand flowers, cool streams where I did play, I never more shall see you, I leave you all to-day ; and if my father seeks me, as, for love of me, he may, tell him my love doth lead me, I cannot say him nay.' Then up spake Don Duardos, when he heard what she did say oh, hush thee, fair Infanta Hush thee, my pearl, I pray. 78 Old Portugal Within the ports of England far clearer fountains play, more gardens and more woodlands my lady shall obey. Another interesting example of how a nation can find food for its national sentiment in the most unpromising fact is found in the famous tragedy of the end of Affonzo's reign. Affonzo, like most of his predecessors, closed his career in bitter enmity with his son. Their warfare was ended only by the peacemaking of the queen, Beatrice, even as the war between Affonzo himself and his father Diniz had been ended only by the sainted Isabel. It must, indeed, be remembered by those who attribute the misfortunes of mediaeval Portugal to the Spanish marriages of her kings, that both these queens were daughters of Spain, as many of the best queens of Portugal have been. But the personalities of those ladies could rarely, if ever, compensate for the bad policy of a Spanish alliance ; and the conflict between Affonzo and his son Pedro was itself an example of the evil effect of a Spanish political match. Pedro had an * official ' wife, the mother of his heir Ferdinand; an ' official ' mistress, Theresa Lourengo, the mother of Joao, afterwards John of Aviz, or John the Great; and a * private ' wife, Inez de Castro, with whom he lived. The difHcultyarose when, Pedro's Spanish wife having died, another was proposed for him, and it was found that he had, on his wife's death, married the beautiful Inez by whom he already had several children. Affonzo was a weak man in the hands of his nobles, who were determined on a Spanish alliance, and he allowed himself to be persuaded into letting Inez be murdered in the streets of Coimbra by his courtiers. Pedro, who was away at the time, at once prepared for war, but yielded Old Portugal 79 after a time to his mother's mediation. After his accession in 1357 he extradited two of the murderers from Spain (the third was safe in England), and had them slowly- tortured to death under his own windows ; then exhumed the body of poor Inez and had it solemnly crowned at Alcobaga. This grim tragedy, with its gruesome vindication of injured innocence, made the most extraordinary appeal to the popular feelings of the nation, an appeal which has never since lost its force. The tragedy of the true love of Pedro and Inez made a sensation only comparable to that created in England by the murder of a'Becket. The villain of the piece in either case was the king. And though at the time, to Affonzo, it might have seemed a small matter to murder a not altogether virtuous lady-in-waiting in the street compared with murdering a venerated archbishop at the altar ; yet nolo episcopari is a popular policy, while all the world loves a lover. So that if Henry oif ended religion, Affonzo outraged humanity. Consequently the British Crown as an institution got no permanent and little temporary damage from what was popularly con- sidered rather as an unfortunate incident in a political struggle than as an insult to religion ; whereas the murder of this girl has been through all ages a constant reminder to the Portuguese nation of the deadly sins that may grow from the cold calculations of dynastic policies. This may be the reason why there is hardly any poet, in a nation where every one is a possible poet, that has not in some form or other recurred to this theme, and why the sup- posed scene of the tragedy at Coimbra has always been a place of popular pilgrimage. It is not merely the love pf a sad tale, the national * Saudade ', still less is it any 8o Old Portugal conscious association of the story with nationality or other abstract ideals. But the story of Inez undoubtedly finds a response in the essential chords of the Portuguese character. It is for this reason that the many popular ballads that tell the story seem more satisfactory than the classical version of Camoens, the historical version of Garcia Resende, or the romantic treatment of later writers, in explaining why Inez still lives for the Portuguese nation. Even in transla- tion we get near the heart of Portugal in such lines as follow : {Here singeth Inez. :) * Mine own Infant, and Lord of me, for whom I suffer wrong ! Oh hear, wherever thou mayst be, thine own Inez her song. And when my sighs no longer will reach to thy heart — yet long these hills and vales shall sing thee still thine own Inez her song. To this my piteous tale of woe these halls shall e'er belong ; No other music shall they know than thine Inez her song.' Marked as his reign was by a sensational crime, Pedro * the Severe ', as he came to be called, stands for a period in Portugal in which the main movement was a desire for justice. Just as the Portuguese of the day of Affonzo Henriquez would have said that the national need for the moment was land, as those of Sancho would have said that what was wanted was population, as those of Diniz would have elected for economic progress, so those of Pedro would no doubt have declared in favour of just laws and an equit- able government. Pedro, both in public and private life, Old Portugal 8i represented this tendency, and his justice on peer or pauper was without fear or favour. While the stories of the judicial adventures of himself in company with his chancellor, which are very similar to, and perhaps suggested by, those of the Kalif and his Vizier, are creditable to his character, they also suggest that the Crown in this region of justice had become almost Oriental in its despotism. In the gradual absorption by the monarchy of the governing functions that of justice had been the first to be entirely assimilated ; probably because the system of justice in Portugal, unlike that in England and in other Saxon states, had been almost entirely feudal. But, if in his public character as a faithful justiciary Pedro strengthened the monarchy, in his private character as a faith- ful lover he had, as we have seen, dealt it a very deadly blow ; and the dynasty did not long survive the sacrifice of Inez to its mistaken ambitions. Ferdinand * the Handsome ', who succeeded in 1367, was the only legitimate son of Pedro and his reign was spent in dynastic intrigues with Spain. The Moors had by now been finally expelled, and Portugal only required peace with Spain to become one of the first European Powers. Already this people, in industry and in the arts, in commerce and in culture, was abreast and in some respects ahead of other nations of less homogeneous character. The king and his Court had, however, fallen behind the times, and could no longer march in front of the people as in the early days of the bold fighter Affonzo Henriquez or of the sweet singer Don Diniz. Prosperity and peace had demoralized an upper class not as yet adapted for them. Though the vices of the early kings, as reflected in their Courts, were only the obverse of their virtues, there was, unfortunately, now less opportunity for the 1832-5 n % 82 Old Portugal exercise of royal virtues than for the exhibition of royal vices. Both the monarchical institution and the individual monarchs were in decadence, and the descent from Don Diniz through Pedro to Ferdinand can best perhaps be seen in the deterioration of their women. Don Diniz introduced Courts of Love and what may be called the late decorated style of Chivalry ; and, if his Court was to our modern ideas very dissolute, there was yet an ideal in it all. The relations of Pedro to Inez had no such ideal, but were redeemed by their personal romance, and perhaps did as much good as harm as a moral example to a somewhat sensual society. But the relations of Ferdinand to Dona Leonor Telles de Menezes did no good to any one and least of all to himself. For her sake Ferdinand sacrificed in turn his knightly honour and his kingly duty. For her he so insulted Castile by breaking off his dynastic match that he incurred a Spanish war ; and so outraged his own people, who preferred a Spanish wedding to a Spanish war, that he raised a riot in Lisbon. The rioters, headed by a tailor, forced him to swear to keep faith with the Spanish princess — a pretty position for a king and a knight ! and he did not improve that position when, after being released, he cut the tailor's head off and broke his oath. He then married Leonor, though her husband was still alive ; and thereafter she was the real ruler. But one feels almost sorry for the woman, bad as she was, in having to work through such a weak man ; for again and again he failed her. He twice broke faith with England and twice with Castile, until he was as much discredited abroad as detested at home. At last she got rid of him. He was made to call a Cortes at Leiria to declare her daughter Beatrice heiress to the throne, thereby abolishing the Salic Law and excluding from the succession in conditions such as those of early Victorian England, was quite inappropriate to those of Portugal. It required a strong personal power to persuade generals and colonels to become peaceable ministers and under-secretaries and to prevent them calling out the troops instead of canvassing the electorate. If in England with a professional army very small in proportion to the population, with a people long trained in the traditions of self-government, and with a Parlia- ment which had jealously resisted all military domination, the effects of the Napoleonic wars were still at this date disturbing factors in politics, the prospect of restoring peace conditions and constitutional politics seemed still remote in Portugal, where they had to be constructed de novo out of a nation in arms. When a two-party system again emerged it was on a broad division into moderates calling themselves ' chartists ' and corresponding to the old ' English party ', and into progressives calling themselves ' constitutionalists. ' and ^^i. 232 Pomhal and the Peninsular War connected with the old French party — with an unconsti- tutional opposition of absolutists in the background. But these terms are really rather misleading, for Charter and Constitution meant nothing more permanent than a political programme, as the parties still looked for support to cer- tain military leaders and sections of the army. Militarism in politics must always make either for autocracy or anarchy — and in Portugal affairs narrowly missed anarchy. If we consider the constitution alone we find that in 1836 a military pronunciamento replaced the liberal Charter of 1826 by the radical Constitution of 1822, which latter was then revised in a liberal sense and repromulgated in 1838. But in 1842 Cabral and General Villa Flor, the latter now Duke of Terceira, combined to restore the old Charter. In 1846 the Constitutionalists, or Septembrists as they were now called, returned to power by a coup d'etat of General Saldanha, and had hardly restored the Constitution before Cabral, with the Charter, replaced them again in 1849. In 185 1 Saldanha again recovered control by a coup (Tetat, and brought with him the Constitution. But by that time, though on the surface of politics there seemed to be little improvement, there had been a social change. The old generation of Peninsular veterans was dying out and the new generation, which had acquired some political education, were weary of being endlessly whirled in the militarist maelstrom. The Charter, which had become very conservative, was restored, renamed the Constitution and revised in a radical sense ; and a further break with the past came when Maria da Gloria died in 1853. With the rise of a new generation cam.e the resurrection of the old democratic spirit. The education of the upper and middle classes in political procedure and systematic self- Pomhal and the Peninsular War 233 government was very rapid. We may trace it in the con- version of civil war, first into the miUtary coup (Tetaty and then into the ministerial crisis. When, in 1870, the aged and incorrigible General Saldanha attempted a coup-d'etat, he encountered only kindly contempt. But if the education of the commanders was quick, that of the rank and file has been slow. To this day the Portuguese peasantry are still mediaevally minded, while the proletariat tend to become more and more mass-minded. The peasantry are still feudal and the proletariat still factious ; though these disabilities, dating from a past chapter, are yielding slowly to the better conditions of the present day. There are, of course, no chapters in the story of a nation ; but as we follow a nation's story we realize from time to time that we have turned a page or taken up a new volume. Such a feeling is strong as one passes from the history of Portugal in the first fifty years of the last century to that of the last fifty years. The change goes so much further and cuts so much deeper than that between any other two half-centuries since the seventeenth that we feel we are indeed beginning a new chapter. In this new chapter we shall find Portugal recovering the ground it had lost owing to the French revolutionary wars and working out a national renascence. But its upward progress will be no more regular than before. For Portugal is of such special interest to the student just for this reason, that it exhibits in a small field easy to focus, and in a course of rapid recurrence, the general laws which govern the movements of the national bodies of our European civiliza- tion. It has already been said that the general effect of this movement in the case of Portugal is that, looked at from one point of view it seems just to go round and round. But 234 Pomhal and the Peninsular War if we look closer we shall see that the orbit is slowly narrow- ing and is all the time approaching a central point — an ulti- mate goal. Looked at from another point it seems merely to swing from side to side, from revolution into reaction through intervening stages of stagnation. But again looking closer we see that the pendulum-swings are getting shorter and quicker and that it is really oscillating onward. Could we look at it from all points of view at once, we should see. probably that the true movement was in a spiral, and ,that along its ascending curve the nation was approaching that point in the far future where as a nation it will have fulfilled its function. Young Portugal Even as by winds the pine-tree cones are cast upon the ground and scattered in the throwing, — and, one by one, down to the very last their seeds upon the mountain sides are sowing. Even so, by storms of time, ideas are strown little by little, though none see them fly, — and thus in all the fields of life are sown the vast plantations of posterity. Antero Quental. We have seen Portugal during the eighteenth century in a sort of glacial epoch, and during the first half of the nineteenth century in such a thoroughgoing thav^ brought on by the volcanic eruptions of the French Revolution, that the v\^hole field of national life v^^as flooded for a time by long-pent-up turbulent theories. As this flood drained dow^n during the half-century of diminishing civil war it left behind it a waste, but a waste fertilized by a sediment of disintegrated political ideals and full of seeds of new political institutions. The new epoch that followed was one in which all the growths were indeed developments of growths in the previous epoch, but showing differences due to reversion or variation. Regrown once more from seed instead of reproducing themselves on the same old stock, they either reverted to a primitive type or else evolved into a new species. Thus the old passion of loyalty and devotion to 236 Young Portugal central authority that so long induced the Portuguese people to suffer wrong from the Church and the Crown, did not die but developed a new form, one which seems likely before long to replace altogether the old belief in divine right and religious dogmas. The new ideal of the National Renaissance and of the Republican State is still young, but it has already proved effective in its action upon national vitality. Again we have seen how in the days of dynastic diplomacy the lure of a marriage alliance with Spain was always seduc- ing the princes of Portugal into anti-national policies, and we now find that this ignis fatuus had in the nineteenth century, and still to some extent has, its counterpart in the Pan-Iberian ideal of a federated Iberian Republic. ' Iberi- anism ' was never popular in Portugal, and is not practical politics now ; for though the peninsula may some day become a federation of republics, such a development will involve as a condition precedent the disintegration of the State we now know as Spain, and the establishment as nations of such communities as those of the Basques, Catalans, and possibly Andalusians. Again the old duel between European militarism and maritimism still keeps Portugal between the devil and the deep sea, and, while occasionally coquetting with the devil, in the end committing its fortunes to the deep sea ; but the centre of gravity and source of militarist aggression have shifted from Paris to Berlin. The entry of Germany as an economic and political element into all Portuguese problems is a marked feature of this new chapter. As for the old internal duel between Old Portugal and Young Portugal, between conservatives and progressives, between clerical and class vested interests and the ideas of Young Portugal 237 intellectuals, between privilege and the professions, between property and the proletariat, we find them all again in slightly modified form — landlordism with its consequence in excessive emigration, industrialism with its consequence in discontent and disorder, capitalism with its pursuit of anti- national policies. There is little difficulty in tracing any of the modern troubles of Portugal to its mediaeval source. Even when the connexion is most far-fetched, and when it may seem fanciful at first sight, it will often prove helpful in conveying an idea of the nature and extent of the present evil and the lines along which it will probably be combated. For it is so much easier to realize the negligences and ignorances of our forefathers than it is those of ourselves. For instance, a comparison of the burden imposed on the country under the clerical regime by the religious orders with that now inflicted on it for the support of a host of idle and interfering ofiicials is helpful to our understanding. It helps us not only in recognizing the extent of the evil in Portugal, but in realizing the nature of that evil by comparing the Portuguese civil service with our own. Such a comparison suggests that whereas the British departmental temperament can rival in austerity and in authority the severer monastic orders, Cistercians or Dominicans, with some relaxation in favour of the more literary and leisured Benedictines, the Portuguese tradition favours the more human methods of the mendicants, such as pardoners, almoners, and friars. Let us not, however, pride ourselves too much on our superiority. For the Portuguese democracy recognizes the evil, and realizes that it is a dry-rot at the roots of individual liberty and of national life. There are then two main sources of interest in present- 238 Young Portugal day Portugal. The first is the extent to which the national ideals and institutions reproduce what is good in the moral forces and political forms of the past, and the second the extent to which these new ideals and institutions are succeeding in reducing the evils inherited from past conditions, and those inherent in the new circumstances of the present day. If we deal in the first place with national ideals of present- day Portugal, leaving the national institutions to later, we find that these ideals are to-day represented principally by the ideas of what we have already called Young Portugal — young, not because it is of recent date, for, as we have seen, this element has played a part in every period of Portu- guese history ; but because it seems generally to represent the new men, the young idea, a renascence, or at least a recrudescence of inspiration. As we have seen. Young Portugal has generally drawn its inspiration from France — as for instance the poetry of Provence that did so much for Portuguese culture in the Middle Ages, or the political theories of Paris that have done so much for Portuguese self-government. Just as we have found it impossible to give an idea of Portugal in the past without giving more space than they intrinsically seem to deserve to the deeds and misdeeds of princes, and as when we come to deal with Portuguese institutions of the present day it will be impossible to ignore apparently unimportant altercations of political parties, so in dealing with Young Portugal we are forced to take account of the somewhat petty jealousies of rival literary schools. For such rivalries, in themselves ridiculous, represent real movements under the surface. The lineal descendants of the Arcadians and of the Young Portugal 239 Academicians of the Young Portugal of the eighteenth century had been the Romanticists and ultra-Romanticists of the first half of the nineteenth. The exiles brought back with them whole literary repertoires of the European Romantic school, chiefly of course as represented in France. From this basis Almeida Garrett succeeded in reviving the national theatre, and Alexander Herculano repeated the efforts of Young Portugal of the renascence of 1640 by producing a history constructed from real records and conceived in the best spirit of nationalism. But this was no more than mere intellectual industrialism, such remaking of foreign raw material as every nation carries on at every stage. There was as yet no popular inspiration or passionate conviction ; and the end of this romanticism was reaction. In Castilho (i8oc»-75) reaction took the form of a reversion to eighteenth-century classicism, and in Joao de Deus it found a truer and more attractive expression in a revival of the methods of the Middle Ages. Castilho was little more than a cultured versifier like the Arcadians, but Joao de Deus was an inspired improvisatore like King Denis. Revolt- ing against all foreign fetters he returned to the simple speech of his own people and to their simple feeling. His was a perennial spring of pure poetry, and he allowed the stream of his verse to find its natural channel in popular imagery and the idiom of the people. The difference between his poetry and the productions of the classicists is that between one of the living rivers of Portugal and an Italianesque ornamental water or a French canal. The clear stream of his inspiration flows on from its springs in the bed-rock of the national life through a sunlit country- side ; but its natural beauty is as devoid of national con- sciousness. It serves in its course none of the works of man 240 Young Portugal nor turns any mills of God. For the national service of Joao de Deus was a service in its earliest, most elemental stage. He restored to the people of Portugal a sense of the beauty of their own speech and of their own simple life. He showed, too, once for all, that it was not necessary to be more than a poetic Portuguese in order to be a Portuguese poet, and that the classicists and romanticists who required a gradua- tion in some foreign school were, in so far, pedants and peddlers of foreign goods. But his nationalist mission stopped there, and he never attempted to give direct expres- sion to any of the passions or sufferings of his people as a whole, keen as they were in his time. Portugal at this opening of a new era was looking for a leader, but Joao de Deus was no priest, neither was he a prophet. His philosophy of life could be of little help to a generation that found life very real and earnest. According to him, Life is this present hour : Life is a cry aloud : Life is a driving shower : Life is a drifting cloud : 'Tis a dream that comes and goes, that melts like summer snows or a vapour, past recalling. Life is a thing of naught, 'tis lighter than a thought, of every wind the sport : Life is a leaf that 's falling. Life is a flower by a stream : Life is a laughter light : Life is a meteor gleam : Life is a swallow flight : 'Tis one cloud that another races, one wave that another chases. Young Portugal 241 blown both upon one breath. Life is a feather riven from a wing stricken high in heaven, from valley to valley driven and borne on the winds to death. We find therefore in Joao de Deus the poetic link between Old Portugal and Young Portugal. He revived in Young Portugal of the present day the soul of the Old Portugal of the day before yesterday ; but then, inasmuch as his was ' pure ' not ' applied ' poetry, his national and political importance was less than that of lesser poets who came later. The next generation was that of the famous * Coimbra School ', whose work stands in direct relation with the Portuguese Renascence and the Revolution of 1910. This movement began, like that of the Arcadians of the eighteenth century, as no more than a literary clique, and gave little promise of the national part it was to play in providing prophets of the Revolution and presidents of a new Republic. Its first public appearance is in the very year that has been chosen, for this and for other reasons, as the beginning of present-day Portugal, 1865. There then raged a wordy war between the Young Guard of the Coimbra School and the Old Guard of romanticists under Castilho, who had by then reverted to classicism. For six months the fight raged in the fiercest dialectic, relieved by less formidable duels. When it ended, the literary leadership of the country had passed finally into the hands of the Coimbra School. This obscure and long-forgotten literary controversy had more importance than all the cabinet crises in the fifty years that followed, for by it the intellectual direction of the educated electorate passed into the hands of a body 1832.5 ^ 242 Young Portugal of propagandists, who used their position to the full with considerable skill and great persistence for the purpose of forcing reform on a recalcitrant Government. As it became clear that the governmental system was incapable of carry- ing reform, this extra-constitutional party, which had always had revolutionary tendencies, adopted a definite pro- gramme of Republicanism. As it grew in political power it passed almost imperceptibly from literary propaganda to political action; just as its leaders, who began life as university professors, and who became revolutionary politicians, have ended as Presidents of the Republic. Of these men the first in time was Antero de Quental (1842-91), whose unhappy life serves as a link between the futile self-sacrifices of the pioneers of liberty in the earliest struggles of Young Portugal and the fruition achieved by some of his contemporaries. Descended from one of the in-bred, bred-out aristocrat families of the Azores, and with a constitution weakened by early excesses, he never had the necessary stamina to stand the strain of his career, nor had he that unerring instinct of nationalism that might have come with a more plebeian and puritan stock to save him from some of the blind alleys into which he blundered. His poetry never freed itself in form from the influence of French romanticism, but when the Coimbrists were still young men, he reached his most revolutionary point of view, and became the acknowledged leader of the republican vision- aries. These young men were led to choose republicanism as the expression of their ideals partly because it was their appropriate and most practical expression, partly because of its existence in France, and of the experiment in Spain that had not as yet expired. It was the example of the Spanish Republic that caused Quental, with characteristic Young Portugal 243 want of instinct, to let himself in for the logical but quite illusory corollary of the Pan-Iberian Union. He was led into this by a cosmopolitanism that was the result of his foreign culture, and by a pacificism that was intellectual rather than moral. It may be that a Pan-Iberian federation is one of the possibilities of the future, but it was clearly out of place as a programme at a time when the question was not as to whether Portuguese nationalism could come to terms with Spanish nationalism, but as to whether Portuguese nationalism could show vitality enough to justify its further independent existence. It says much for the poetic inspiration of Quental that his many attempts to give expression to this untrue poetic orientation are all failures. For instance : There shall they recognize in each a brother, those friends that have been kept apart long ages : Then (new and strange event) they see each other, these nations, face to face, and neither rages to tear the other's heart out. And, lo, there a protocol is read from great gold pages, all written fair, with no word marred or missed, by Love's own hand, — that great diplomatist. In fact Quental did not show the political ability in affairs of other members of the Coimbra School, and it was as well that he early went into retirement in the country, from which he did not emerge until the catastrophic crisis of the British ultimatum, of the abortive Republican rising, and of the repudiation of the debt which marks the middle of our period in 1890-3. His admirers then put him at the head of the public protest against our high-handed pro- ceedings. This protest could do no more, and was perhaps not expected to do more, than give a safety-valve for a public R 2 244 Young Portugal opinion at high pressure. But its failure to obtain any satisfaction drove Antero de Quental to suicide. In his death as in his Hfe he was symbolical of the Romanticist element in Young Portugal, and it is fortunate that the movement contained members of sterner stuff and sounder strain. As it was, the tragedy of Quental only throws into greater relief the triumph of his colleagues. In Guerro Junqueiro we for the first time find the full expression, poetic and political, of Young Portugal of the present day. A disciple of Victor Hugo in more than mere form, for his attacks on the corruption and incompetence of the Royalist regime recall those of the great Romantic on the Second Empire, Guerro Junqueiro is none the less the poet of Portuguese nationalism par excellence. No better idea of the meaning and motives of the Young Portugal movement can be got than from his poems, and they will be freely drawn on for this purpose in the pages that follow. He was from the beginning of the reform movement accepted as its prophet, and like the Hebrew prophets, whom he so much resembles in character and career, no less than in countenance, his sceva indignatio against oppression is often vindictive and occasionally only vituperative. The poetic inspiration of his jeremiads only fails, however, when the feeling itself, is forced, as in his bitter attacks on us in the years following the crisis of 1890. Wiser than Quental, he has taken no direct part in the political cam- paign, and the trumpet-blasts of his sonorous diatribes have been no longer heard since the walls of jjericho 'fell flat before them. With Dr. Theophilo Braga we come to a personality in whom an unusual combination of qualities has produced an exceptional capacity for national service. He has him- Young Portugal 245 self given poetic expression to the national ideals, as we noted at the end of the first chapter, but it is as a ' producer ' of the national literature of Portugal that he is best known, and his labours in collecting, editing, and publishing have opened a large part of the unexplored field of Portuguese literature and folk-lore to foreigners. It has always been the pride of Young Portugal that its mission has been not only to express the spirit of present-day Portugal, but to revive the spirit of Portugal of the past, and to recall to the world the half-forgotten glories of Portuguese art and literature. The work of Dr. Braga is perhaps the most important personal contribution to this patriotic task, and the recognition given to his work both at home and abroad has won him a position which he has more than once turned to good political account. Keeping away from the fighting line of politics, he has been available to fill a gap when all the political leaders themselves were for any reason hors de combat, as may always happen in the corps-d-corps of congressional conflicts. Thus he became President of the provisional Republican Government on the establishment of the Republic in 1910, and five years later was made interim President on the re-establishment of constitutional government after the coup (Tetat. Dr. Bernardino Machado, Premier of Portugal at the outbreak of war, and now President, was one of the younger members of the Coimbra School, and may be considered as their political leader. The movement, by the time he came to the front, had indeed become rather political than literary, and required a statesman and a man of the world to represent it in the new role upon which it was entering. The long training of Dr. Bernardino Machado as politician and plenipotentiary, the courage he has shown in such crises as 246 Young Portugal that of the coup d'etat of 191 5, his unfailing courtesy, and his unchallenged character, all combine to concentrate on him the confidence of a political community which is only too critical of its leaders. This has enabled him to serve his country as a centre round which the best elements could rally when it was realized that the national interest was being imperilled by faction. A master of that diplomacy of politics which alone makes government possible when party conflict has resulted in a deadlock, Dr. Bernardino Machado has steered the State through some perilous passages. His services as Premier and President may be considered as crowning the work of the Coimbra School and the first chapter of the Young Portugal movement. Thanks largely to him, we may hope that the difficulties of the transition stage and of the establishment of a working system of party government will be successfully traversed. Before leaving the Coimbra School we must note two other members of it whose careers led to a different conclusion. Oliveira Martins who, as a friend of Antero de Quental, had faced the trials of the first years of the movement, succumbed early in life to the temptations of the enemy. Involved as a Royalist in the meaningless maze of rotativist politics, his career lost all direction and his considerable driving-power now only survives in some excellent historical studies. On the other hand Dr. Arriaga, like Antero de Quental, of an aristocratic island family, professor of mathe- matics at Coimbra and of English at Lisbon, and one of the first avowed Republicans, carried his career of courageous national service consistently to its culmination in the Presidency of the Repubhc, 191 1-15. But the strain thrown on the chief executive by the European War, and the conflict it produced in Portugal itself, was too great for the capacities Young Portugal 247 of the aged and humane President. He allowed himself to be led into anti-national and unconstitutional action, and, as will be recounted later, his tenure of office was prematurely closed. So much, then, for the personalities of the Coimbra School, which gave Young Portugal its line of action and its leaders. But just as these men who have been mentioned are only a part of the Coimbra School, so that body was only a por- tion of the Young Portugal movement. The careers of these presidents, like those of the princes of Old Portugal, only symbolize and illustrate the forces that were driving developments. In the same way we can judge of these forces by their effect on those who opposed them ; as we may estimate the ideals of Young Portugal from their operation on the institutions of the country. Let us trace, then, first of all, the process by which the change in the form of government was brought about : — a change which converted a religious and a royalist people, that could suffer and even support enthusiastically the despot Miguel, into a rationalist and Republican electorate that revolted against the dilettante Don Carlos and his reforming dictator Franco. Queen Maria, following good precedent, had been given a prince-consort from the German House of Saxe-Coburg Gotha. As king-consort, and after Maria's death in 1853 as regent for his son Pedro V, Ferdinand was in every way admirable. He was mildly artistic and not too immoderately architectural, and he kept himself clear of Portuguese politics. But he was a German with all the inadaptability and much of the intractability of that race. Thus the Portuguese Crown during this critical, because constructive, period was practically in abeyance, and the very virtues of the foreign trustee tended to depreciate the value of the 248 Young Portugal trust. For the attitude of dignified detachment which certainly at this time strengthened the Crown with us, as certainly did not do so in the very different political con- ditions in Portugal. With Ferdinand the Braganza dynasty had undergone a change, which, while it produced rulers of far better quality than the Braganzas of the eighteenth century, had deprived the Crown of much of its Portuguese tem- perament, and consequently of its touch with the people. A northern stock, and these men were Germans, when subjected to the forcing effect of the Portuguese climate flourishes generously, even grossly, for a time before it acclimatizes. A stock in which the strain of greatness is dominant will, as we have seen in the Anglo-Portuguese dynasty of Aviz, throw out under this forcing influence offshoots of great splendour, but any strain of grossness will also appear with equal emphasis. Pedro V, a handsome and intelligent youth, became King in 1855 ^^^ promised well. Had he lived, the history of Portuguese politics might have been different ; but he sacrificed himself to his people, like his grandfather Pedro, by exposing himself to a cholera epidemic. He was succeeded by his brother Luis, a more teutonic type, and one on which the powerful stimulus of thePortuguese atmosphere had had a different effect. The loss of Pedro was, like that of his grandfather, a national calamity, and the accession of Luis — whose education, as a second son, had been neglected — was no less so. It was during the reign of Luis, 1861-89, that political movements and ideas in Portugal took a definite direction, a direction that was little controlled by the meaningless muddle of party politics, and in which the Crown was scarcely considered. Young Portugal 249 With the accession of Carlos I, a king came to the throne who might have succeeded, had he come to power earUer, in estabhshing constitutional monarchy as an essential element in the Portuguese State. But it was too late for such qualities as Carlos possessed to recover the lost ground. The circles by which he was surrounded, and the circumstances to which he succeeded, were too great a handicap on his moderate abilities. While his affection for the picturesque and poetic element in the Portuguese nation might have made him a popular king in a country requiring less from its king than did Portugal, pressure drove him into attempting revolutionary reform in opposition to such popular repre- sentatives as the nation possessed, and sent him to a defeat that was at all times imminent and at last inevitable. His complete failure to appreciate the moral power of his people, and to aid them in their struggle to give that power poHtical expression, soon forced him, in spite of his apprecia- tion of the picturesque side of Portuguese life and his affection for the peasantry, into bitter conflict with the national movement of the age. Cynical in his point of view and sensual in his pursuits, his was not the personality to concentrate in itself the energies and enthusiasms of the people in an intellectual and scientific age. Consequently his efforts to exercise control of affairs through a contemptible Court and a by no means incorruptible Cabinet were such as still further to demoralize and emasculate a government that was never equal to its task. At a time when the mainte- nance of national independence was menaced by a bank- ruptcy due to nothing but futile frittering away of the national resources, he set the worst of examples, being always in debt to the nation and not over-scrupulous in his transactions with the exchequer. It is true that he got 250 Young Portugal a bad start, for the opening of his reign coincided with the compHcation of catastrophies from 1890 to 1893, and the twenty years of his reign all passed under the shadow of an impending tragedy that he had not the capacity to avert. It was, in fact, not long after his accession that Guerro Junqueiro predicted the end in a grim satire, very expressive of the formidable temper of the reform movement : — The King is left to die — the King is dying : In the grim citadel no light is seen, no sound is heard, only the deep sea sighing and the low, passionate weeping of the Queen. * Oh, who is that passing, my court popinjay ? ' * Prince Simon, — Prince Simon was hunting to-day.' The King is dead — bells tolling — dirges droning — all Death's appalling pomp and awful show : From every stricken soul goes up a moaning, a measureless moan of misery and woe. ' Oh, who is that passing, my court popinjay ? ' ' King Simon, King Simon goes hunting to-day.* Our Liberties are dead — dead is our State — dead black our night — there are no stars, no lights : Our deadly enemy grins at the gate — dishonoured are the graves of our dead knights. * Oh, who is that passing, my court popinjay ? ' ' King Simon — King Simon goes hunting to-day.' Shots afar off — rebellion all ablaze ! a rising multitude comes rolling on — a barrack bugle blows the Marseillaise — a blast — a throne goes crashing and is gone. ' Oh, who are those passing down there, popinjay ? ' ' The hunters — The hunters are hunting to-day one Simon, the huntsman.' Young Portugal 251 As is always the case when the Government is a bad one, the mass of the people were poverty-stricken, while a class, and notably the Court, were plutocratic. The Court and, through it, the country were controlled by barons of finance, many of them German Jews, whose pilferings and plunderings were all too recent to be respectable. While this prostitution of the nobility had begun before the reign of Carlos, under him it became rampant, until the spirit of revolt against this ruling class was perhaps the strongest force in the reform movement. The Portuguese had suffered patiently the tyranny and stupidity of their landed gentry, but from the first resented the cupidity of foreign financiers. A rhymist of the early nineteenth century summarized public opinion thus : Who steals pennies gets a year ; who steals pounds is made a peer ; who steals piles and isn't took, from a Lord is made a Dook. And the same indictment is brought against the ruling class and the Court of the late nineteenth century by Guerro Junqueiro : Hungry, half clothed, no mother and no quarters, I stole some clobber. Who 's that in uniform with stars and garters ? — A robber ! All crimes in me, descendant of disgrace, have had their vogue. Who 's that in the pink of fashion and pride of race ? — A rogue ! Who ravishes, debauches, robs, and murders ? Mammon Bashaw. — Who is that harlot singing to his orders ? — The Law 252 Young Portugal For the men whom the king delighted to honour were only too often those cosmopolitan concessionnaires or those too politic politicians who were looked on by the public as robbers and traitors. The failure of the nobility and gentry of Portugal to fulfil their function as in our constitutional history, and act as trustees in the transfer of the sovereign power from the prince to the people, is due to such early differences of tradition as have been reviewed in the previous chapter — to their exclusion from education in governing themselves and others by the Church during the eighteenth century — to the shattering of the social structure by the Peninsular War and the civil wars in the first half of the nineteenth century — and to the failure of the Crown in the second half of that century in reconstituting and reconcentrating a nobility capable of governing. After the death of the great political landed proprietors that had as constitutionalist leaders governed the country during the troubled times, such as Palmella and Louie, and after they had been followed by the coup d'etat commanders who governed through the army, such as Saldanha, there were no personalities to take their place, and such as there were had no power other than that of popularity with the proletariat in the capital. The landed gentry showed no interest in public affairs further than in the retention or restoration of their properties and privileges, and the few exceptions fell early victims to the trials and temptations that beset them between a corrupt Court and the fickle crowd. On the other hand, the new parvenus were only fit for money making or money wasting. Both old and new nobility and gentry considered solely their class interest and took no account of the growing pressure from the country for reform. These financial and Young Portugal 253 territorial interests believed that they had only to control the Court and to keep the Cortes from effective expression of the national will in order to continue indefinitely exploiting the national resources delivered over by bad government to their depredations. A strong Court could have dissociated itself from this conspiracy and a strong Cortes could have destroyed it. But Portugal had neither. The Portuguese representative system, as constituted in a Cortes of two chambers, was during this period in its hobbledehoyhood. It was slowly adapting itself to its functions, but as yet scarcely capable of providing a respec- table executive, still less of producing a reforming legislature. The democratic ideal of government by responsible repre- sentatives subject to well-considered periodic revision by an educated electorate is an ideal that in States such as Portugal is not only still remote from practical possibility as in our own, but that cannot even be made a basis for working institutions. A nation of southern stock at the social stage of the Portuguese can be governed easily enough by a variety of combinations of political authority and of popular appeal, but a representative Chamber does not in itself contain the minimum of either. In the present stage of Portuguese opinion we shall find that the recent coup d' Hat and closing of the Republican Congress by an anti-national pro-German clique caused as passionate a resentment as did the attempts of Spain to overthrow the House of Braganza after the revolution of 1640. But this was after the revo- lution, when the representative Chambers had clearly become as indispensable and integral an institution in the Republican regime as the Crown had been in the absolute monarchy of the first Braganza. Congress, under the stimulus of the Republican revolution, now makes its proper appeal, and 254 Young Portugal will in time acquire its proper authority. But after the dying down and choking off of the popular impulse which had set up the constitutional monarchy the old Cortes fell like the Crown and the upper class into a period when it was propelled by no popular impulses and produced little or nothing to meet the popular demands. This condition, when there is only enough steam to turn the wheels round, is the cause of ' rotativism ', the coming in and going out of ofhce by mutual arrangement of persons and parties, without any consideration for the public interest or any connexion whatever with popular ideas. At first ' rotativism ' revolves solely under the influence of personal or party interest, but gradually, as the years pass, we find the influence of public opinion beginning to play a part. The party in power reluctantly relinquishes the spoils of office, not only because it can no longer hold together, but because it recognizes that the term of toleration it can count on is running out, and that it is in the interest of personalities concerned not to outrun that term. It accord- ingly goes into liquidation and a reconstruction or resignation brings in the other leaders. The majority is, of course, arranged by the party leaders and their local agents without difficulty at first. But as the influence of public opinion increases, and more steam comes into the machinery, this system can no longer be smoothly worked. There are recriminations over the way the game is being played, and refusals of the minority to play any'more. Therewith Con- gress and constitutional government enters a new phase, where development will depend generally on the extra- constitutional institutions that may have grown up in the meantime. British critics may shake their heads and contrast the stormy scenes and strained situations in the Young Portugal 255 Congress with the sedater atmosphere of the High Court of Parliament, but these scenes are really satisfactory signs of vitality, and show that the representative chamber is really becoming representative and is no longer merely ' rotative '. But under the monarchy rotativism seemed likely to have a long reign, and in consequence the Cortes was quite useless even for dealing with the one really pressing political problem. This was no less than the question whether Portugal could pay its way as a nation. If it could not be made to do so, then obviously it could not hope even to maintain its position as a sovereign State, still less to make good its pretensions to be a world-empire. It is not correct to trace all the muddles and miseries of Portugal during this period directly to the failure of the Government to balance its budget ; but indirectly they were all due to it to some extent, if only because nothing could be done by way of improvement until the budget was balanced and the deficit abolished. The annual deficit, growing merely by bad economy and extravagance, caused an annually accumulating load of floating debt on more and more onerous terms as the country's credit declined. It is the familiar story of the poor man and the money- lenders. In order to put down new security, everything was pawned, and in order to pay up the debt-charges, everything was taxed. To meet the tribute thus exacted from Portugal by foreign capital everything that could be sold abroad had to be exported — down to the very labour of the people. Indeed, as taxation and the cost of living rose, the impoverished peasantry of the small- holding class — the backbone of the nation — were practically sold into slavery in America. We shall deal later with the 256 Young Portugal economics of this. Here we are only concerned with the political effect of a process which was obviously bleeding the country to death. As the population of Beira drained away to Brazil and Massachusetts, and the resources of the country and its colonies were drawn more and more into the clutches of the German Jews of Lisbon, resentment grew against the impotence of a Government that could not cut the evil at its root by economizing the few thousand contos required to balance the budget. Even to-day one can scarcely read the terrible denunciations of Guerro Junqueiro without anger at the contemptible incompetence that was the main cause of it all. The land is poor, the children swarm, our fields lack seed : Our cradles fill, — a double harm : God sends a drought upon the farm and a mouth to feed. The kine are lost, the crop is lost, lost all delight : Burnt up by sun, cut down by frost : At the door stands the famine ghost, by day and night. The bells are tolled, the bells are tolled — Ill-omened ringing : We bury young, we bury old — the bells are tolled, the bells are tolled — The grave-digger is singing. The sexton chants, the clerk intones the funeral staves. Poor men sleep sound beneath their stones ; There are soft beds for weary bones in quiet graves. Young Portugal 257 There go the emigrants in troops : Look, look, they're starting ! WaiHng along the streets, in groups upon the quays, crowding the poops of ships departing. Driven o'er the deep sea, unresistant, from lands and loves — oh, pitiless ! — to distant countries, — countries, Christ, how distant ! Is it for ever ? Say, oh surf insistent ! Ah yes, ah yes. The vine is dead, nor shall bear grapes again : The old-time villagers die off and go : The cottage walls are swept by wind and rain, the roof trees fall — widows and waifs remain. Want, waste, and woe ! The politics of the quarter-century, 1865-90, leading up to the catastrophe can be treated briefly. Even the party names are unimportant except as showing that it was soon recognized that the Portuguese people would insist on a ' Liberal ' label. Since the original ' Progresistas ' and ' Regeneradors ', representing more or less Liberals and Conservatives, almost every word suggesting reform or pro- gress has been appropriated at one time or another by some group of politicians. But such party labels were remote from the realities which, it must be repeated, were at this time to be found only in finance and foreign politics. It was obvious from the first that the Government had not enough authority to deal with finance. Thus in 1868 a Progresista ministry, under Aguiar, is forced by the accumulating deficits to pass new revenues and retrench- ments ; but public disorders break out and the ministry falls. His successor, d'Avila, proposes the repeal of these 1832.5 o 258 Young Portugal measures, but the Cortes sustain them, and are therefore then dissolved by the Crown, which suspends the new taxation by administrative order. The new * Cortes ' not only approve but repeat the new proposals for raising money, and as the king refuses another dissolution, d'Avila's reforming ministry goes too. Then in 1870 came the belated and meaningless coup d'etat of the senile Saldanha, and after that a term of Re- generador ministries, ending with that of Pontes Pereira de Melho, who attempted mild financial reforms, but without any solid success, and made way for the Progresistas. They never got a chance of dealing with finance, because the African colonial questions held the field. The treaty of March 23, 1881, with Great Britain regulating transit relations between Mozambique and the interior caused public disorders, and after various Progresista ministries, the return of the Regeneradors. They at once found them- selves occupied with the settlement of Portuguese claims to the Congo, but none the less Pontes de Melho again attempted financial reform, and resigned on its rejection by the Cortes (February 1886). The following Progresista ministry had to deal with Germany's claims in Africa, and in 1890, the year after the accession of Carlos, they fell before the fury of indignation excited in the country by Lord Salisbury's ultimatum, calling on Portugal to evacuate the Makololo country, where an expedition was operating under the popular explorer, Major Serpa Pinto. The question was settled the following year by a treaty in which the disputed territory and other choses in action were divided fairly enough ; but the weakness of the whole governmental system of Portugal had been exposed. We have now reached the middle of our period, 1865 to Young Portugal 259 1914, and our attention is claimed by the events of the five years 1889-93. This was the nadir of the national fortunes ; and after this the next twenty years will begin to show signs of recovery — imperceptibly slow for the first ten years, because altogether subterraneous, incredibly swift in the last five, when it was all on the surface. For the catastrophes of the early nineties were indeed comprehensive and condign enough to serve as the turning-point of any national Rake's Progress. In 1889 King Carlos had succeeded his father and taken over command of a position that was rapidly becoming politically untenable. Events gave him little time to con- solidate his defence or acquire the confidence of his people. For such improvement in the prestige of the monarchy as was inseparable from the accession of a young and promising prince was counteracted by the British ultimatum and by the declaration of a Republic in Brazil. Until an equilibrium could be brought about between current revenue and current, expenditure, not only was no national renascence possible but the integrity of the national possessions over- seas was put in question, and even the nation's independence was prejudiced. Obviously it could not claim to exclude the great economic empires from the undeveloped areas of Africa, when its own petty Portuguese resources were being annually pawned to foreign financiers to pay for its current budgetary expenditure. Portugal seemed rather in a fair way to find the fate of Persia, since the control of public utilities and national resources was rapidly passing into the hands of foreign financial cliques, and the power these were thereby acquiring was beginning to make itself felt in the national administration and legislation. Nor could it count on its ancient ally in this juncture, for until a settle- s 2 26o Young Portugal ment could be arrived at between the traditional title de jure of Portugal to immense tracts of African territory and the de facto claims to them acquired by the all-conquer- ing capitalist centres, London and Berlin, there could be no stability in the international position of Portugal ; and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, the foundation of its foreign policy, was being perpetually exposed to constant strain and such occasional shocks as that of Lord Salisbury's ultimatum. It mattered little that the motive of our Government was possibly not careless contempt for all comity or even courtesy towards a weaker nation, but a wish to prevent the often preposterous imperial pretensions of Portugal from prejudicing its international position and its further internal prosperity. The effect on the Portuguese people was just the same even though the slap in the face may have been well meant. Certainly the first resentment was followed by a wholesome reaction, and Portugal, that impecunious im- perialist, realized that it was peacocking in borrowed plumes. Yea, seeing thee, Portugal, I mourn thy lot. How the great Lion of the Occident has lost his claws, and is as he were not. Nor do I mourn that most, 'tis painfuUest to see thy Lion's mane omnipotent decayed and dwindled to a peacock's crest. So had written Antero de Quental some years before. The new mood was one of grim determination so to set its house in order at home as to secure respect abroad ; and incidertf ally, as England was too strong to retaliate upon, to make reprisals against the English party in Portugal, that is to say, against the Crown. It is difficult for self-satisfied and self-possessed people, such as ourselves, to understand the frenzied searchings of Young Portugal 261 heart into which Young Portugal was cast by our casual insolence. Undoubtedly, should we ever be so ill-advised as to behave thus to the Portuguese Republic, we shall have war declared on us. On this occasion the effect of our action was good in the end, though Lord Salisbury and our Conservative Government might not have considered it so, had they known what it would be, for we definitely launched the forces of reform in Portugal into Republicanism. The indignant imperialism of Young Portugal was really injured nationalism. Not only they but the whole in- telligentsia realized that the government by royalist and rotativist interests had reduced Portugal from being an imperial power that could treat with other empires on an equal footing to becoming a petty principality that could not even count on the ordinary courtesies of international intercourse, but must take orders like a protectorate. If the Portuguese Crown could not get common courtesy from its ancient ally, how could it count on the respect of its subjects ; how could it be considered worth its not inconsiderable contribution to the pecuniary embarrassment of the country ; how could it even be trusted not to sell the nation's colonies, as it had other national resources, in order to relieve its own pecuniary difficulties ? The accusation of treason now raised against the king and his cabinets for their concessions to British and German claims in Africa was obviously unfair in itself, for no executive in the circumstances could have done otherwise ; but, then, none but a very weak and wasteful executive would have got into those circumstances. The Government found themselves forced to defend their weak colonial and foreign policy by minimizing the value of the colonies to Portugal, and thereby gave the Republicans the vantage-point of 262 Young Portugal taking their stand in defence of the empire, its possessions and ideals. While it is possible that the king and his advisers were mainly right in thinking, if they did so think, that the African colonies were not essential to the prosperity of Portugal — and while perhaps the Republicans were morally wrong in making the issue a ground for truculent attacks and accusations of treason, yet by the time the question of the sale of the colonies became actual the Republican rising of 1 891 had made the internal situation one of suppressed civil war — and d la guerre comme d la guerre. The effect of the ultimatum in weakening the monarchy was combined with a strengthening of the Republican movement by the fall of the Emperor of Brazil, and this from no personal fault or political defeat of the constitu- tional monarchy, but from a preference for the Republican principle. The relation of Brazil to Portugal is even more intimate than of the United States to the United Kingdom, and whereas Portugal is, economically speaking, already to a large extent an annexe of Brazil, in matters of the mind Brazil is still to a large extent in the debt of Portugal. The establishment of republicanism in this vastly more pros- perous and populous Portuguese community overseas — a community that had no such cause for complaint against the results of its constitutional monarchy as had the mother country, made Portuguese republicanism at once a practical possibility. Republicanism was no longer a mere protestant principle and a profession of an unknown faith, but a political programme and a procedure for reform. Just as the Ameri- can Revolution contributed to our national liberties at the cost of our imperial possessions, so the collapse of a Portuguese Empire in South Africa and the conversion of a Portuguese Empire into a Republic in South America gave a moral Young Portugal 263 stimulus and a political status to republicanism and reform in Portugal. The debut of revolutionary republicanism was indeed insignificant enough. The republicans had still to learn that mere popular discontent with the powers that be and public approval of the principles of the opposition, are not enough to secure support for armed insurrection. Carlos, on his accession, had described his kingdom as a monarchy with no monarchists ; but when the republic was proclaimed at Oporto, January 31, 1 891, it was a republic with no repub- licans. There was no sign of that simultaneous shout of acclamation that alone can make unorganized usurpation of power successful. The ease with which the rising was isolated and suppressed taught the republicans that to gain power they must rely on their own resources ; and that they should have either proceeded by peaceful penetration of the constitutional system until they had got hold of the reins and had the whip hand of the interests opposed to them, or should have organized an extra constitutional force sufficient to carry through a revolution. For the moment they had done no more than close against themselves for a time the avenue of constitutional action, while they had considerably aggravated the pitiable position of their country. Close on this abortive revolution followed the last blow — financial repudiation. The failure of all attempts to restore the country's credit by regulating its finances had made this inevitable, but the shock, when it came, was none the less severe. We shall return to this repudiation later in its financial and economic aspects, and we have only to deal here with the effect of it in stripping the last rags of public respect from the existing regime and in the prospect it 264 Young Portugal opened up of a foreign financial control being imposed on Portugal. While this last indignity was in the end so mitigated as to amount to little, the diplomatic struggle to avoid it and to deal with the dictatorial demands of foreign governments dragged on for years, and was an open sore to a people so keenly sensitive as are the Portuguese to their position before Europe. For some time after this complicated catastrophe, to all outward appearances there was no change in Portuguese affairs. There was no improvement in its international position, and internal politics continued to ' rotate ' as ineffectively as before. But below the surface forces were now at work that on both sides were bound to lead either to revolution and a national renascence or to reaction and repression by anti-national foreign force. A few words are all that the outward events on the surface are worth during this decade of suppressed and subterranean action from 1896 to 1906. The ministry of Diaz Ferreira had tried to stave off repudiation by passing a measure for reducing salaries, including the civil list, and for raising taxation. Repudia- tion being none the less inevitable, this ministry fell ; while that of Hintze Ribeiro succeeded in effecting some econo- mies by reducing the army and thereby in pacifying some- what Portugal's creditors. But his comprehensive scheme for financial reform was successfully resisted by the capitalist and class interests it attacked, and he had to ask for a disso- lution in 1894. He was returned with a majority ; but even with this direct mandate in favour of his programme he could do nothing, and gave way to a Progresista ministry under Luciano de Castro in 1897. He also failed in his attempt to regulate the budget, and thereafter it was clear Young Portugal 265 to all that the constitutional system was powerless to deal with the class interests that were ruining the country. Thereafter the Regeneradores and Progresistas continued to rotate, re infecta^ though their regime was drawing to a close. The two constitutional parties which alternated in office were not so constituted as to be representative of the real political movements in Portugal or even of public opinion. Opinion originated in the towns, especially Lisbon — whereas the political machines of both Progresistas and Regeneradores relied for such support as was required on the ' bosses ' of the country towns, on the local magnates and municipal leaders, and on the clergy. Into this old bottle was now poured the new wine of the bitter radicalism and excitable nationalism of the urban professional class and proletariat. The governmental system might have stood the strain in a country requiring no very radical and urgent reforms ; but under pressure of political conditions in Portugal the two- party system rapidly broke up into a frenzy of faction. The parties had failed because they could not overcome the vis inertiae of vested interests ; the factions that followed failed because they dissipated their driving power in friction with each other. Meantime if the reform movement could not force the government into financial reformation it could at least retard it in its road to ruin. One of the most costly methods of raising money had been that of pawning national revenues and resources to the German Jews of Lisbon. An especially insidious instance of this was the tobacco monopoly ; and the resistance raised against it for years by both Royalist and Republican reformers represented the principal appearance of that new force and feeling in politics which was to make rotativism impossible and revolution inevitable. 266 Young Portugal In March 1906 Luciano de Castro and his Progresistas made way for the last time to Hintze Ribeiro and the Regeneradores ; but in vain, for the latter followed him into retirement in a few months. The solidarity of both parties had in fact broken up, a ' dissident ' faction under Jose Maria Alpoim detaching itself from the former, and another under Joao Franco from the latter. An even more ominous sign of the times was the election of Republicans by the populace of Lisbon and Oporto. The election of Dr. Bernardino Machado, the present President of the Republic, as Republi- can deputy for Lisbon was made the occasion of a Republican demonstration, and the instantaneous collapse of the Government as a result of somewhat severe repression by the executive of the demonstrations, showed how thin was the coating of constitutionalism covering the rising revo- lutionary and reactionary forces. It is evident that about this time also King Carlos defi- nitely decided for or was drawn into a reactionary and unconstitutional policy. He can scarcely be criticized for this ; and the courage of his decision, if it was his, does him credit. For the system of constitutional monarchy had shown itself up to that point quite incapable of dealing with the national difficulties, and the inference was obvious that either the Constitution or the Crown had to go. He could not be expected to realize that the new factious phase of politics, which for the time made the Constitution less effective for reform than ever, was a blowing off steam. If the new steam could have been turned into the old machinery all might yet have been well. Had he done nothing he would have had a few more years of power, and then a peaceable revo- lution, such as that of Brazil, would have pensioned him off into the amenities of an English exile. But he was probably Young Portugal 267 persuaded that he could carry through the indispensable re- forms if the constitutional obstacles to progress were suspended for a time. Or failing such success, that the support of the aristocracy would retain in their loyalty the bulk of the army officers, while support from the plutocracy representing, as it already did, the resources of German financial, or even political assistance, would enable him to drive the Republican profes- sional class and urban proletariat into open and premature revolt such as could be crushed by armed force. The calcula- tion was correct enough in some respects. It was clear, for instance, that if the constitutional monarchy could not work with the rotativist and Royalist Cortes, it certainly could not do so with the Cortes without a party system containing a Republican element, and that the Crown must either enforce reforms dictatorially or suppress revolution drastically if the monarchy was to be saved. It was also clear that if the Republicans had no more actual force behind them than they had in 1891, and no other programme than that of consti- tutional action, that this policy of unconstitutional reaction in the name of reform would undoubtedly defeat them — in the worst event, at the price of some further concessions to German 'pacific penetration'. But one mistake he made was in considering that Germany would do anything to secure a strong government in Portugal, seeing that however profitable and promising the new economic domination of Portugal by Germany might be, the collapse of the tottering Portuguese colonial empire that must come with the continuance of the struggle between rotativist Royalism and revolutionary Republicanism oifered German ambitions for expansion a far more attractive prospect. Another and a worse mistake was in believing that he could unite his Royalist adherents in support of an unconstitutional regime 268 Young Portugal that would effect those very reforms at the expense of the privileges and profits of the propertied class that they had so successfully blocked by constitutional political intrigue. A third mistake was in believing that he was again opposed mainly by a few professors and their pupils, as in 1891, and in thinking that the Republicans, whose prominent leaders had apparently preferred constitutional action by appearing in the Cortes, were still quite unprepared for revolution. After the failure of 1891, while the Republican campaign outwardly pursued a constitutional course in literary propa- ganda and appeals to the electorate, its main force had taken an extra-constitutional channel. The Republicans had recog- nized long before the Royalists that reform could only be reached through revolution ; indeed their Republicanism was itself largely a result of that realization. Their collapse in 1891 had shown them to be, in so far as revolution was concerned, merely a party of leaders with no rank and file. Accordingly like all other revolutions, and especially like that of the Young Turks which this one resembled in many essentials, they pro- ceeded to build up the body of a revolutionary force round the dry bones of dead secret societies. Various forms of freemasonry had been used by Young Portugal in the days when all free thought was driven underground ; and the tradition, and to some extent the organization, of these had survived a generation of free speech and the franchise. One of these societies — the Carbonaria — had been founded in 1823 in imitation of the Italian organization, had been revived again in 1848, and being the lowest of the secret organizations had been least affected by a constitutional system which left disfranchised the eighty per cent, or so of illiterates. It was this Carbonaria organization that the Republicans converted after 1891 into as efficient an instru- k Young Portugal 269 ment for revolution as was that of the Committee of Union and Progress that the Young Turks were even then con- structing at Salonica. The object was the same in both cases : to control a sufficient proportion of the proletariat of the two principal towns and a sufficient majority of the non-commissioned officers to secure the effective action of the mob, the navy, and certain corps, and the passive neutrality of the bulk of the army. By 1906 the existence of this Republican organization was known ; but its real strength was probably underestimated, because it obviously realized that it was not yet ready for offensive action. In May 1906 the reply of the Royalists to the election of Dr. Bernardino Machado was a repartee in kind. The king sent for the ' dissident ' Joao Franco, who had made himself head of a faction he called regenerador-liberal, and who was openly acclaimed by both the king and the upper class as the ' strong man ' who was to ' save the situation '. In August the Republicans retorted by electing four more of their leaders, including their two principal fighting men, Dr. Affonso Costa and Dr. A. J. de Almeida, the former notorious as the chieftain of the Carbonaria and the latter a hero of 1891. These things being so, the end of the constitutional monarchy came in May 1907, when, Joao Franco having lost his majority, the king dissolved the Cortes, and it was recognized that the constitution was to be suspended and the country was to be governed by a dictator- ship. The justification of illegality, whether public or private, is its success. Those who welcomed the initial success of the Royalist dictatorship, and they were at one time a very great majority of the English interested in Portugal, fell into their usual mistake of accepting as a 'strong' government 270 Young Portugal 3l government driven to take strong action ; and failed to see that, sound sportsman as was King Carlos, and strong man as was Joao Franco, there was no health or strength in their joint regime. It is not even necessary to consider whether these two could have coerced or cajoled Republicanism, because they never even succeeded in controlling Royalism. The condition precedent of success was that they should bring the class interests into line in acceptance of such reforms as should deprive Republicanism of its vantage points. Neither Joao Franco, a somewhat sinister personality, of no public or private standing and with few personal qualifications other than courage and consistency, nor the no less courageous and cynical King Carlos himself, could rally the Royalist ranks into voluntary renunciation of anything. The dic- tatorship set valiantly to work enforcing economies, most of them well advised — one or two ill advised, such as the in- crease of the civil list in substitution for irregular ' advances '. But not only was every economy resisted by Royalists and Republicans alike, but the resistance increased as it became evident that some results were being realized. After the deficit showed a distinct decrease, the dictatorship, that had never been intended to be more than a suspension of a much under-used franchise, was forced into a suppression of a much- abused freedom of speech. The suspension from publication of the leading organs of the various Royalist factions, as well as the Republican Mundo, showed that the dictatorship was in defiance of all forms of Portuguese public opinion. No doubt the dual opposition to the reforming dictatorship was largely actuated by motives deserving the diatribes in the foreign press against such opposition. If the Royalists had rallied to their king, if the revolutionary Republicans had rallied to a revolutionary reformer, if the people of Young Portugal 271 Portugal had rallied to a patriotic Portuguese, the odium and onus of the events that followed might have been avoided. But the opposition was not all mere self-interest, either of privilege and property, or of parties and persons. The growing tradition of respect for constitutional forms and the gradual transfer of the ideal of loyalty from the prince to the nation have already been noticed. The resistance to the dictatorship was inspired by resentment at the usurpation of a prince whose record gave him no right to represent the nation and of a politician whose reputation had not even earned for him public respect. But so long as the army and the police obeyed orders and the navy remained passive the dictatorship could carry on for a time without public support, and might even count on crippling the many-headed opposition by cutting off some of its heads. The step from the closing of a Chamber to a coup d^etat is as inevitable as that from a coup (Tetat to a civil war. Accordingly, in January 1908, the dictatorship struck its blow, and, on an accusation of conspiracy against the person of Franco, arrested first two Republican journalists, Joao Chagas and Franga Borges, and a week later the Republican deputies Almeida and Affonzo Costa, the chiefs of the Carbonaria. Riots at once foUovv^ed in Lisbon and were promptly repressed with some loss of life. The next step was obviously that suspension of the personal guarantees of the individual which must follow the suspension of the con- stitutional guarantees of the community. A decree of the 31st of January suspended the ordinary judicial procedure in respect of the accused Republicans, and appointed a special tribunal for their trial, also giving the Executive power in any case to banish them. This was generally and probably correctly read as a revival of the deportations to Africa that 272 Young Portugal Miguel had used against the constitutionalists with such deadly effect. The response of the Carbonaria to this attack on the persons of the elected of the people was a repartee in kind such as might have been anticipated, but clearly was not. A few days later, on King Carlos arriving in Lisbon from a country seat south of the Tagus, it was inferred in order to sign the decree of deportation, as he drove with the queen and the two princes, Luis and Manoel, out of Black Horse Square on his way to the palace, he and the heir, Prince Luis, were shot dead by three bystanders, Prince Manoel being slightly wounded. Of the three assassins, all Carbonarios, two were killed on the spot ; the third escaped, * and eventually got to Brazil. It is difficult to deal with so recent and ruthless a crime as this with historical detachment, especially in respect of the murder of Luis, a boy of great promise, who had, of course, played no part in the political conflict that cost him his life. But such detachment is indispensable if we are to have a correct idea of an occurrence which, however repellant, was but a logical link in a chain of events. Though the assassination undoubtedly came as a shock both to the Royalists, who should have prepared against it, and to the * constitutional ' Republicans, who would willingly have prevented it, yet Portuguese public opinion was probably right in treating it from a political rather than from a moral standpoint. To us abroad, ignorant of the duel to the death that had been engaged in between the representatives of reaction and revolution, and of the Portuguese point of view as to deaths caused by such public duels, the absence of any public reaction against the perpetrators of the crime and of any sustained repudiation of it by the Republicans Young Portugal 273 as a whole, convicted not only the whole of Young Portugal as accomplice to the crime, but the whole nation itself as condoning it. In a word, it lost to the Portuguese renascence the sympathy and support of its only ally at a time when the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was more than ever indis- pensable to the independence of Portugal and the integrity of its possessions. We simply added regicide to repudia- tion as another count in the indictment already drawn up by our public opinion against Portugal. Fortunately there is as yet no bar of a world parliament before which peccant peoples can be summoned, or it would have gone hard with the Portuguese in 1908. On the ground that both parties were equally responsible for the resort to violence, no one would at that time have listened to a defence of homicide, nor could they then have argued in extenuation, as they can now, that the duel and its fatal issue was really a civil war, which brought about reforms that constitutional controversies had failed to effect. For, with the death of the king, not only did the dictatorship disappear, but the direction of affairs was thrown, after a very short interregnum, into the hands of those who alone could provide the moral, mental, and material force to restore the fortunes of Portugal. While on the one hand the assassination may only have anticipated that result at a price in national prestige that was excessive, yet on the other, if Carlos had succeeded as did Miguel in his reaction, it might have resulted in a quarter of a century of general civil war, open or suppressed. Whereas, therefore, European opinion at the time returned a verdict of wilful murder against the Portuguese Republicans, the judgement in the appeal court of history will probably be that it is well that all they who take the sword should perish by it, 1832*5 rr\ 274 Young Portugal especially if they be princes ; and that the most important consideration in the death of a prince, whatever the circum- stances, is whether it is to the detriment or no of his people. Evidence that the assassination of Carlos was unpre- meditated and not part of the revolutionary programme appears in the fact that the Republican organization was obviously caught by the crisis unprepared to exploit it. It is true that reasons of policy might have dictated post- ponement of the proclamation of the Republic to a more auspicious inauguration, but the real reason why King Manoel was allowed a peaceful and undisputed accession was that the Republicans were not ready. Events had moved too swiftly for them and they still had to consolidate on their side the mass of moderate opinion in Lisbon that would adhere to whichever was evidently the winning side, and to convert the majority in the garrisons and guardships to their cause. It was, however, only a question of time before the Republic was proclaimed, for with the failure of the Royalist reform movement, the death of King Carlos, and the dis- missal of the dictator Franco by the queen, there was nothing opposing a Republican regime but civil ms inertiae and the tradition of loyalty to the sovereign in the army and navy. The constitutional monarchy, now more con- stitutional and less of a monarchy than ever, could offer the nation nothing but empty promises. The Cortes at once relapsed into the frenzy of faction that has nullified its functions ever since the end of the old routine rotativism, in 1906. No faction had any public force behind it, and no coalition of factions had any consistency, so that ministries followed one another at intervals of one or two months, or Young Portugal 275 even weeks. The young king, a boy of eighteen, in no way mentally precocious, was kept as much as possible in the palace by his mother. The queen, whose piety and philan- thropy had never won her any popularity, was suspected of being in the hands of the Jesuits, those traditional traducers of Portuguese national liberties. Indeed, the principal political contribution of the Court of Manoel to the crisis was to put the king's opponents in a position to raise an effective anti-clerical agitation. King 'Carlos had been clever enough to keep the Crown clear of accusations of clericalism, though his court was ultramontane. No worse mistake could have been made at this juncture than the measure that was now introduced asserting the control of the bishops over the appointment of teachers, or the sup- pression that was now enforced of a Lisbon periodical, under orders from the Pope. On the other hand, no attempt was made to interfere with the Republicans, and they were content to bide their time. But the respite given to the Crown was no long one. In the autumn of 1910 a ministry under Teixeira da Sousa had been in power since June, the seventh ministry in eighteen months, and the elections held in August had returned 89 Ministerialists, 41 Royalist opposition, and 14 Republican opposition. On September 23 King Manoel opened Parliament with a programme of reforms which left little to be desired other than some prospect of their being realized; and he later attended a review at Busaco on the anniversary of Wellington's battle, where he was fairly well received by the army. But one political assassina- tion to the account of the Republicans had given a coup de Jarre tte to the hope of the monarchy, and another to the account of the Royalists was to give it the coup de grace. T 2 276 Young Portugal On October 3 Dr. Bombarda, a recent recruit to Repub- licanism from Royalism, was assassinated by a half-witted fanatic. The Republicans had by this time won over the greater part of official and industrial Lisbon, the guardships, and the Marines, together with the First Artillery and i6th Infantry Regiments of the garrison ; so the fighting section decided for immediate action. The course of the Revolution, however, suggests that there was more improvization on both sides than might have been expected in an event so long prepared for. The insurrection was started that same day under the command of Admiral Candido dos Reis and, meeting with more opposition than had been expected, was that evening assumed to have failed. The admiral, in despair at the supposed disaster, committed suicide that same night, and several of the political leaders went into hiding. But the gunboats in the river having thrown a few shells in the course of the night over the palace, the young king, deserted by his advisers, who on their part had assumed the success of the Revolution, and ignorant of the real course of events, fled from the palace early in the morning of the fourth, and with the queen and the Duke of Oporto, his uncle, boarded the royal yacht at Ericeira, and steamed straight off to Gibraltar. Meantime the small Republican force under Lieutenant Machado Santos had held out in a building in the town called the Rotunda until the flight of the king became known, with the result that the further resistance to the Revolution that was being organized never materialized, and the Republicans were relieved to find that they were not defeated. The Republican political leaders then reappeared and resumed command ; whereas the king was beyond all possibility of recall by those still in arms in his Young Portugal 277 cause ; consequently no further resistance was raised in any of the provincial Royalist centres. It is a question whether the want of caution of Carlos or the want of confidence of Manoel did the greatest service to their country, and the least to their own cause. One thing is certain, that nothing but the general conviction that monarchy, constitutional or unconstitutional, was a lost cause, would have established a Republic in Portugal with only a few hours' fighting and at a cost of no more than about 100 killed and 500 wounded, and that had that conviction been given a year or tw^o more to consolidate, even these casualties might have been avoided. A more constitutional and less casual advent of Republican institu- tions might also have avoided the series of Royalist risings that followed, by accustoming the public mind to the stability of such institutions and convincing their opponents that they had come to stay. But, anyhow, the Republic was proclaimed on the morning of October 5, 1910, and welcomed by the population of Lisbon as the opening of a new era. The Republic professed itself to be the advent of a national renascence, a claim that was met at the time with derisive scorn in foreign political circles, and with a determination to disprove it on all counts and at all costs on the part of its political opponents at home. Of the Portuguese upper class there were, it is true, a few like Freire de Andrade, the colonial administrator, who put Portugal before party, and rallied to the Republic, no doubt with mental reserves ; and many more who, like the Marquis de Soveral, the dis- tinguished diplomatist, remained Royalist, but took no part in revolutionary reaction ruinous to his country. But, from the landed class and the clergy as' a whole, the 278 Young Portugal Republic could expect nothing but intransigeance, tempered only by incompetence, and from the peasantry on nothing but indifference. On their own side an enthusiasm which expressed itself too effusively in eloquence, and an energy too often diverted into personal and party ambitions, did not seem likely to make up for a lack of experience in affairs, and of that esteem that can only come from an inherited public position or long public prominence. Therefore, while it is generally realized that in its five years of existence the Republic has scarcely been given a fair chance, no foreign publicist has as yet properly appreciated its extra- ordinary feat, not only in wearing down or winning over its adversaries but in profiting by circumstances so suc- cessfully that it can to-day claim to have realized a reasonable proportion of its ideals. Such a feat could never have been accomplished except by rulers representing a new national energy and enthusiasm, and to this extent the Republic of Portugal has justified its claim to be a national renascence. In describing the difficulties successfully dealt with by the Republic during these five years, a distinction must be made between those that it inherited from a previous regime and those inherent to itself. It will be found that whereas those which it inherited bulk largest and were at first the most burdensome, they are all in a fair way of being successfully dealt with. Whereas others still insignifi- cant, but at present ineradicable, are really more ominous. Nevertheless, if the Republic can retain vitality long enough to relieve Portugal of the rem.2Lmmgdam?iosa hereditas of the previous regime, it will have fulfilled its function. The Provisional Government at once set to work, with an energy explained in part probably by the necessity of Young Portugal 279 getting the more urgent reforms administratively in action before party politics developed, to dissipate the energy and distract the unity of the revolutionary body. Even so during these first few months, while reforming decrees gave almost daily evidence of the activity of the Revolu- tion and their rigid enforcement gave satisfactory assurance of its reality, there were forces at work which seriously embarrassed the progress of the Republic and prejudiced its prestige. One of these was its own fighting force, the so-called ' Carbonario ' revolutionary organization. This force had only had enough fighting to give it an excessive conceit of its own contribution to the Republic, and was difiicult to control. It accordingly carried on the war against Royalism and defeated any chance there might have been of convert- ing the Royalist cause into a constitutional opposition by rioting round the Jesuit establishments in Lisbon, wrecking the offices of Royalist papers, and ransacking Royalist and Clerical clubs. These disorders have recurred at Lisbon at intervals since, generally in reprisal for the Royalist risings in the provinces. No doubt this organization, both in its revolutionary form as the fighting force and in its present political form as the machine of the Republican Democratic party, has rendered services to the Republic but for which there would undoubtedly be no Republic in Portugal to- day, yet the absorption of this force into the constitutional system has perhaps been unduly slow. For while it was the absence of any such organization that made the rotativist parties of the constitutional monarchy so powerless to put through the reforms they planned, and though without the Democrats and their leader, Dr. Costa, the Republic could not show half its record of Radical reforms ; yet the 28o Young Portugal continual perfecting of this organization and the failure of any other to acquire any corresponding importance or competing power has delayed the development of con- stitutional government either in the form of the two- party system or as an improvement of the present system of government by groups. Meantime, however, yeoman's service was rendered by the bosses and henchmen of the ' Democratic Civil Groups ' as they called themselves, or by ' Costa's White Ants ' as they were called by their enemies, against two formidable forces that threatened the Republic. Of these enemies the least formidable but the most difficult to deal with was the annual Royalist rising. The proclamation of the Republic had caused a general exodus of the aristocracy and courtiers, some following the king to Richmond and others settling elsewhere in England, where their Catholic and class connexions enabled them to influence materially the press and public opinion against the Republic ; others went to Paris and got into touch there with the plutocracy of the Brazil Republic, which became the principal pecuniary support of the Royalist cause. This will seem strange until it is remembered that the wealthy Brazilians had been in the habit of coming over to Lisbon for the titles and Court favours denied them in their own Republic. Wealthy Brazilians were prepared to subscribe to a restoration of the Court of Portugal and of the fount of honour, much as they might to a reopening of the Opera. But the party of action of the Royalists, the younger and more active men, crossed the frontier into Spain, where they became a permanent menace to the frontier of Portugal and to its friendly relations with Spain. For whereas the Republic of Brazil lost no time in recognizing and re- inforcing in every way the Republic of Portugal, and could Young Portugal 281 not be held responsible for snobbish subscriptions of Parisian Brazilians to Royalist funds, the monarchy of Spain obviously had a direct interest in discouraging the establishment of a Republic on the Iberian peninsula, and an indirect interest in driving an independent Portugal deeper into disorder. The British Government could not prevent a press cam- paign against Portuguese radicals and regicides, whereas the Spanish Government could have prevented, and subse- quently to some extent did prevent the use of its territory as a base for insurrectionary expeditions. The first of these was the incursion in September 191 1 into North Portugal of a Royalist force under Pablo Couceiro. Both in the character of its leader — a soldier of the crusader type, in its object — the restoration of King Manoel, and in its operations — the raising of provinces know^n to be predominantly Royalist in sentiment — this first insurrection commands respect as a legitimate gamble of double or quits. Its complete failure, however, due to the inefficiency of its own arrangements, the indifference of the population, the complete control of the situation by the ' Carbonario ' intelligence organization, and the unexpected administra- tive and military strength exhibited by the Republican Government, convinced all patriotic Portuguese, among them Couceiro himself, that the Royalist cause was for the time hopeless. It is unfortunate for the prospects of Royalism that more Royalists did not take the view of Couceiro ; for the picture of this Don Quixote riding gloomily at the head of his troop of enthusiasts in their aimless wanderings through the mountain mists of the frontier ranges, made a fitting closing scene for the tragedy of the Braganzas. Unfortunately, the Royalists, for the most part, went the way of all emigres who having lost contact with their own 282 Young Portugal countrymen, associate themselves with foreign govern- ments against that of their own country. The later risings accordingly show a difference both in motive and in method. They now become obscure in their object other than that of weakening the Republican Government, and rely more and more on the support of Spain and the Central Powers — a support that became more subterranean as the Republic of Portugal secured abroad first official and finally public recognition. For this reason the ' Miguelists ' who looked to Spain and the Central Powers, took the lead of the ' Manoelists,' who in spite of Manoel's marriage to a German princess, relied on the sympathy of the English upper class ; and there were even factions in favour of annexation to Spain or of becoming a German protectorate under a Prussian prince. At the same time the procedure of open invasion over the Spanish frontier by a fighting force for the purpose of raising the country, tended to become mere plotting of mutinies in garrisons and secret tampering with the troops, for the purpose of embarrassing the Government. These plots had never any prospect of success, and the principals ran little risk, while the ignorant participants were invariably ruined. The rising of the summer of 19 12 was more insurrection than incursion, and the principal, Joao d'Almeida, a Portuguese under Austrian protection, was caught and imprisoned. In October 191 3 a Royalist plot centring round one Azevedo Coutinho, broke out in small provincial disorders, the ringleaders, as usual, making dramatic escapes abroad while the rank and file of ignorant peasants were left to pay. So insignificant were the results and so complete the Govern- ment control of the situation that the Royalist press showed an inclination to repudiate foreign responsibility and ascribe Young Portugal 283 it to agents provocateurs. But the motive in promoting such attempts, hopeless as they were, was clear enough, and was already rather the discrediting and disabling of any Govern- ment in Portugal in the interest of foreign colonial ambitions than the restoration of the monarchy in the interest of Manoel or Miguel. Moreover, this object was to a large extent attained, for the chief embarrassment to the Re- public from these risings lay in the resentment they caused among the Radicals, in the consequent repressive measures forced on the Government, and in the resulting reaction on a foreign press prepossessed against the Republic. For, while the energy and efficiency of the ' Carbonario ' in- telligence service could be relied on to render such attempts hopeless even before they were attempted, this very energy was itself an embarrassment, filling the prisons with suspects from the lower classes, rendering life a burden to those of the upper classes suspected of Royalism, and making reprisals for every rising in wreckings and ransackings of newspaper offices and clubs at Lisbon, with an ever-recurrent risk of worse — for example the assassination of the Royalist officer, Lieutenant Soares. The moderate Government did its best to restrain the damaging activities of its zealots and correct the bad impres- sion they caused. No penalties were enforced worse than a short imprisonment, even against revolutionaries taken under arms. Such imprisonment, without trial, under unsuitable and often insanitary conditions, was a hardship no doubt, but in the moral and material circumstances of mobs clamouring for vindictive treatment of their class- enemies, of few and ill-found prisons, and of a new regime fighting with reaction, there was certainly no justification for the clamour raised in our press against the inhumanity 284 Young Portugal of the Republican Government. They avoided on the one hand the mistake of making martyrs of their enemies by hanging them, and on the other that of giving them more rope than was just enough to let them hang themselves. On the third anniversary of the Republic, October 191 3, a decree released all persons prepared to ask for it, just in time to make room for the ' suspects ' of the October rising. A second amnesty in February 1914, the first act of the ministry of Dr. Bernardino Machado, was uncon- ditional and complete, all political prisoners being released and only eleven ringleaders banished for ten years, and even this sentence was repealed a year later. The subsequent activities of the reaction after the outbreak of war, such as the Mafra incident and the coup d^etat, belong to a later chapter, in which they will be found to have acquired altogether the character of a German mancEuvre and to have lost altogether that of a Royalist movement. If the Royalists were indirectly a difficulty to the Republic, the ' Reds ' were for a time a direct danger to it. Their activities in strikes not only disturbed the peace but dis- organized the whole economy of the country. If the Republic had not succeeded in checking these irresponsible revolutionaries the results would have been more fatal than a defeat by the reactionaries. There comes, of course, a point in every revolution as in every form of war where a sufficient proportion of the principles or property at issue has been secured and there is a struggle for power between the practical plain man and the impassioned man of the mountain. But there was more than this between the Constitutional Republicans and the Red or Radical Republicans of Portugal. An industrial proletariat had for a generation been developing in Portugal Young Portugal 285 under a Government that not only afforded it no protection against exploitation but did not even allow it to protect itself by organization and strikes. Before the revolution the rights of labour were regulated in Portugal by the Civil Code, based on Roman law and the Code Napoleon. Trade unions had obtained bare toleration under a degree of 1891, but strikes were still a contravention of the penal code. Portugal was at this time with one exception, Russia, the only country in Europe where striking was a crime. Consequently, when the Republican Provisional Government legalized striking the result was naturally enough an excessive and exaggerated use of the new liberty by labour organizations that had no training in its use and were disposed to exploit the millennium to their material advantage. The great increase of labour troubles that immediately followed the revolution was only indirectly a result of it, but they were none the less debited to its discredit and added to its diffi- culties. ■*■ One most serious feature in this phenomenon was 1 The number of Portuguese strikes during the years 1903-13 (compiled from Boletin do Trabalho Industrial) were as follows : Strikes. Strikers. 1903 27 1904 10 1905 II 2,300 1906 10 9,150 1907 10 5,200 1908 10 1,100 1909 13 1,650 I9I0 36 11,000 I9II 4^ 25,670 I9I2 13 7,730 For a detailed review of these strikes see As Greves, F. E. da Silva, Coimbra, 1912. 286 Young Portugal the extraordinarily rapid growth of Syndicalism. This was partly due to the growth of SyndicaHsm being at this period at its height in Europe generally and partly to the suitable soil it found in Portugal. In 191 1, the difficult first year of the Republic, Lisbon was threatened with a general strike, and local strikes were epidemic everywhere. This phase passed of itself; but later the movement took on a more organized and dangerous form, and about the time that the Royalist movement became negHgible, the Re- publicans were seriously menaced by a revolution in favour of a ' Radical Republic '. In January 191 2 a revolutionary strike in Lisbon was only quelled by the declaration of martial law and the arrest of over a thousand Syndicalists. The ' Reds ' could at any moment by their control of the railways prevent the conveyance of troops, and the centre of their organization in Lisbon was a regular citadel, well supplied with bombs and small arms. Fortunately, matters reached this head during the ministry of Dr. Affonzo Costa, who by a free use of troops ended the syndicalist control of the railways, and with the help of the ' Carbonarios ' succeeded in peacefully disarming the ' Reds ' of Lisbon and breaking up their organization. The third difficulty of the Republic was more intimate than either of these. It lay in the complete disintegration of the Republican party as a political factor the moment it had the political field to itself. This disintegration did not become obvious until the provisional government, under the presidency of that distinguished litterateur. Dr. Theo- philo Braga, had given wayt o the constitutional Republic with Dr. Manoel de Arriaga as President, in August 191 1. The constitution was unfortunately devised to meet what Young Porhigal 287 the example of the constitutional monarchy and of the South American republics had shown to be the most serious dangers in principle, with the result that it contained certain practical disadvantages. Thus the president is elected for four years only, not being re-eligible ; and Congress cannot be dissolved for three years, senators being elected for six years, one-half renewable at each election. An electoral law was to secure independence of the election from the Government of the day, but its passage was repeatedly postponed. Under this regime the Premier, or President of the Council, as he is called, can make himself all-powerful, while the President is scarcely powerful enough. No sooner was the Congress constituted than the faction fight for power between the party leaders began. As there were as yet no differences of principle and scarcely any of opinion in either chamber, in neither of which the RoyaHsts or ' Reds ' had any place, there was nothing to check the passionate pursuit of personal ambition. The proceedings of Congress, in fact, were resumed much at the stage where the development of the old monarchical Cortes had been broken off. The leading politicians each had his group of partisans and his party name, and his object was to lobby and logroll with other groups until there was an aggregation large enough to get a majority and form a government. But there was now even less reality under- lying this game than before, because the Royalists and * Reds ', the only real opposition, were not represented, and there was in fact only one political party that had any existence in the country outside Congress — the ' Carbonario ' organization, now transformed into the Democratic party under Dr. Affonzo Costa. The other groups consisted of ' Evolutionists ' under J. A. de Almeida, of ' Unionists ' under 288 Young Portugal Brito Camacho, and * Independents ' under Machado Santos. The ' Democrats ', having monopolized the full progressive programme of Republican radicalism, the ' Evolutionists ' were compelled to adopt a more moderate colour, while the ' Unionists ' stood for little more than the personality of Brito Camacho, the ' Cato ' of the Republic, and a policy of holding the balance between the two larger groups. The ' Independents ' and their leader came nearer to a real opposition, as they were dissatisfied with the poli- tical situation in general and that of their own party in particular. Republican dissatisfaction with the political situation was legitimate, for the political training and traditional procedure that were necessary for successful parliamentary government were conspicuously wanting, and it looked as though the Republican Congress was going to be as hopeless a machine for reform as the monarchist Cortes. The first necessity of efficient government was an adequate period of power for the ministry ; but whereas during the ten years that preceded the revolution there were ten changes of government, during the five years that succeeded it there were twelve. Yet the cause of instability was really quite different under the Republic, and lay not, as before, in attempts to break up the two-party system of Re gener adores and Pro- gresistas, but in attempts to break up the one-party system of the democrats. No government could stay in ofiice without the support of the democrats, and Costa commanded not only a majority of Congress but control of the elections. On the other hand, the other groups could and would make government by Costa and the democrats impossible by obstinate obstruction, or, as a last resort, by refusals to remain in Congress. The appeal, in fact, lay not to the Young Portugal 289 electorate by way of elections, but by way of embarrassing and even endangering the Republic. The new Government, that of Joao Chagas, was not radical enough for the Democrats, and lasted only ten weeks. The first Royalist rising and the growing labour troubles reconsolidated factions a little, and another coalition ministry, of Augusto de Vasconcellos, lasted from November 191 1 to June 191 2. The difficulties of the Republic, especially that of finance, continued to call for urgent action, and nothing very practical was accomplished. The Demo- crats got restive again, and another coalition combination came in under Duarte Leite in June. This was no better than its predecessor, and it became clear that the power would have to be put directly into the hands of the Demo- crats. In January 191 3 Affonzo Costa became Premier and held office for just a year, in which term he undoubtedly succeeded in getting the Republic out of the worst of its difficulties. His financial achievement will be described later; and his success in balancing the budget and paying off the external floating debt which gave foreign Jews the whip- hand of the Portuguese Government was at the time the most practical realization of its promises that the Republic had achieved. He could not have done this had his power been any less than that of a dictatorship ; but we see that his ' dictatorship ' differs from that of the royalist Joao Franco, who preceded him, or from the ' militarist ' Pimento de Castro, who came later, in that all constitutional forms were rigidly respected by Costa but rejected by them, and that he represented a majority of the politically-minded population, namely the middle and lower classes, but they a minority of the upper class. Moreover, his constructive success in reform was so sensational and stimulating that it 1832.5 U 290 Young Portugal would have justified more drastic action with Congress than he ever attempted. The mistake that he made, or that was made by his party in spite of him, was, rather, in using his power and the prestige of his success to strengthen the some- what narrow and sinister basis of his party machine, instead of boldly transferring this base to the people themselves. This distrust of the democracy caused his fall, for the opposition that would have been powerless had he sought his support direct from the polls were prepared to make things impossible for him so long as he relied on his party machine. During his first months of power he had to look for a sufficient majority to the support of Brito Camacho and the Unionists ; but by-elections held in November, under Democratic auspices, to fill a number of vacancies, returned Democrats with only two exceptions, and thereby relieved Costa of dependence on Brito Camacho and put into his power the possibility of exercising a similar sole dispensation over the approaching presidential and general elections. The Republican leaders may be excused if, in spite of the un- equalled services of Costa and the Democrats in saving the Republic from Royalists, Reds, and foreign Jews, it was not prepared to entrust so much power to him ; especially as, since the by-elections, he had broken with the austere Brito Camacho. Costa accordingly became, during the winter of 1912-13, as suspect and odious to his Unionist, Evolutionist, and Independent colleagues as was Caesar himself ; while they in their turn seemed to good Democrats, conscious of having saved the Republic, even less patriotic than Royalists. The Democrats now had in coalition against them all the other Republican groups in the Chamber, as also a majority in the Senate, the President, the whole upper class furious with the land laws and new taxation, the Royalists now filtering Young Portugal 291 back into a political situation that offered them a good opening, the clergy outraged at the Law of Separation, the high finance that saw itself likely to be both paid off and made to pay up, and both socialists and syndicalists, whose revolutionary action had just at that very juncture been finally suppressed. This issue between a successful dictatorship observing constitutional forms and a democracy without constitutional remedy resulted in conflicts between groups in the Chamber, between the Chamber and the Senate, and between the Premier and the President, that made Costa's position impossible, and with great common sense he gave way and provided a vice-gercDt ; though not before the Republican opposition had compromised them- selves by a brotherhood in arms with Royalism and a breach with constitutionalism. The constitutional relations be- tween the Senate and the Chamber were strained by a con- troversy between Costa and a crypto-royalist Senator Joao de Freitas, and those between President and Premier by a circular letter sent by the former in excess of his powers to the Premier and leaders of the Opposition calling for a release of all political prisoners, a revision of the Law of Separation, and a non-partisan regulation of the elections. This programme, good in itself, and better as removing the grievances of Royalists and of Reds, of the clergy and of the politicians, was adopted by Costa, and in January 19 14 Dr. Bernardino Machado, who, with great prudence, had kept out of the early chaos of the congressional cosmogony as ambassador to Brazil, was summoned by Costa, as a personal friend, to deal with a situation that called for all the natural adroitness and diplomacyof the present President. His services as Premier during this critical year, in keeping the machinery of government oiled and operating, are not u 2 292 Young Portugal inferior to those of Dr. Costa, who first raised steam enough to move it. It was, fortunately for Portugal, this com- bination of its strongest administrator and its most skilful statesman that had to face the crisis in which Portugal was plunged by the European War. Dr. Bernardino Machado took office in February 19 14 and at once began his work of reconciliation. Under his diplomatic direction of affairs the crisis in Congress was tided over, while the release of all the imprisoned Royalists by a general amnesty should have terminated the civil warfare. Thereby, at some cost to the radical reconstruction in social and financial reform, the political position of Portugal, both at home and abroad, was greatly improved. The Revolution had thus entered its last chapter and was reaping the first fruits of its success when the European War again put the whole situation in question. Those who have read the preceding chapters will under- stand how it came about that in August 1914 the reform party — the Republicans — at once pronounced for our cause — the measure of their radicalism being the measure of their militarism ; while the more reactionary Royalists preferred the cause of our opponents. The ' Democrats ' were for ^-'instant and insistent belligerency, whereas the other Republican factions were either for postponing action until we asked for it or for a benevolent neutrality. On the other hand, the ' Miguelites ' made no concealment of their pro- Germanism, and carried with them into the German camp the whole fighting force of royalism with a programme of a restoration under German protection, or even under a German prince. The ' Manuelites ' and a small moderate section resident in England were professedly pro-ally, though without severing connexions with their pro- Young Portugal 293 German confreres. Finally, those Rc^alists who had rallied to the Republic saw the best interests of Portugal in neutrality. It was evident from the first that the insistence of the Radicals on belligerency would impose a severe strain on the whole structure of the new regime. The call to a crusade on behalf of the lesser nations was popular with the press and reading public, whose intellectual sympathies were all with France, as their political sense was with us ; but as the full force of the enemy's war-engine developed and our first failures showed our usual initial inadequacy, public opinion turned more to a benevolent neutrality, such as by its benevolence would maintain the British alliance and by its neutrality would prevent a breach with Germany, or at least postpone it until it could be of some practical use to the allied cause. This policy was, moreover, that which at the time best responded to the requirements of our rulers. These failed to see that by allowing our Army and Navy to exploit the generous mihtary offers of the Portuguese party in power without encouraging any corresponding military enthusiasm for the cause in the Portuguese people, they were putting an unfair strain on the position of their friends. We find consequently, during the autumn of 1914, a cooling off in the Portuguese public enthusiasm for our cause not wholly attributable to our military difficulties and deficiencies. When Congress was summoned, on August 7, in special session, the emergency produced an enthusiasm and a unanimity which was somewhat deceptive, and the Premier easily secured full powers on a pronouncement of policy that was pro-ally though unprovocative. The first instalment of support to us was pacific enough, being no more than the signing of our long-delayed Treaty of Commerce, which 294 Young Portugal put us more or less 01? an equality with Germany ; though even so it only came into force in September 1916. We on our part renewed a popular relationship, interrupted since the Revolution to the detriment of our prestige in Portugal, by sending a cruiser on a visit of courtesy to Lisbon in September. The next Portuguese measure, though military, was still non-committal, and consisted in increasing the garrisons of the African colonies contiguous to German territory. More marked was the next step — our acceptance in October, for use in France, of an offer, as a free gift, of a considerable portion of the Portuguese artillery ; which led to a definite invitation in November from the British Govern- ment to take part in the war. Congress, summoned in a second special session on November 23 to consider this invitation, again gave its unanimous support to the pro-ally policy of the Premier, and sanctioned the mobilization of a division apart from colonial reinforcements ; but the moment for sweeping the country into war was past. The enemy had had time to develop his strength, and with his usual strategic insight had already carried the war into Por- tugal. It was fortunate for Portugal that material strength and political strategy are not enough to win a war of peoples. The strategy of neutralizing Portugal by reviving civil dissension was obvious enough to have called for some precaution ; but probably the strength of Germany in Portugal was not realized at the time. The great advantage our enemy had was that his purpose was sufficiently served by keeping Portugal neutral, as this would preserve his shipping interned in Portuguese ports and provide him with Portuguese foodstuffs through the neutral ports of the North Sea. For such a policy he could count on receiving support or sympathy not only from those who favoured his Young Portugal 295 cause, but also from such Portuguese who, measuring Portu- gal's possible contribution as a belligerent against its probable consequences, considered belligerency an unsound national policy. Such neutralists were, moreover, a controlling element in the Government. Besides President Arriaga — an active pacifist — owing to the coalition character of the Ministry all the more important posts other than the Premier- ship were held by neutralists. The Foreign Minister, Freire d'Andrade, a rallied Royalist, even did his best to compensate for minor contraventions of the neutral proprieties in our favour by especial courtesies to our enemies ; while neutral proclivities of the Ministers of War, Marine, and the Colonies checked at every turn the pro-ally policy of the Government. Neutralism, moreover, though represented by a small minority in Congress, undoubtedly reproduced the point of view of the urban proletariat, the peasantry, and many of the privates. Their hearts had not been stirred nor their homes imperilled, and for a war of policy there was little to attract in the Belgian ' matadouro ' or the African guerrilla. To these negative neutralists must be added the more posi- tive — such as Royalists ready to risk national independence and to welcome a German-Spanish occupation for the chance of overthrowing the Republic, Republican factions ready to risk a Royalist restoration for the chance of overthrowing the Democrats, and Conservative, capitalist, and commercial in- terests ready to risk civil war for the chance of overthrowing Radical reform. The first months of the war passed in the belligerents of the Government trying to carry the neutralists with them into some act that would provoke a German declaration of war — while the neutralists and pro-Germans outside the Government were doing what they could to embarrass this 296 Young Portugal policy. As early as October 20 small military mutinies had been excited by Royalists in Mafra and other garrisons, which in spite of their futility postponed belHgerency while proving by their failure that the people would not purchase neutrality at the price of Royalism. On the other hand, there was no popular protest when the Minister of Marine imprisoned Leote de Riego, a political naval officer, for pro- ally propaganda. It was, in fact, evident that the Govern- ment could not carry the country into war, though war would at once have carried the country into united support of the Government. On December 7 was published an army order, dated November 23, definitely committing Portugal to co-operation on the Western Front, and by December 9 Dr. Bernardino Machado had been forced out of office. The dissent of his neutralist colleagues from the principle of his belligerent policy and the distrust of the Democratic congressional majority for his cautious procedure, combined with the defec- tion of President Arriaga, created a crisis no diplomacy could longer defer. He was succeeded by a purely Democratic Government under V. H. de Azevedo Coutinho, and there- upon all semblance of national unity disappeared. By December 18 all the opposition factions had left the Chamber and the Unionists, under Brito Camacho, had renounced their seats. It became evident that it would require a civil war to carry Portugal into the war for civilization. Yet there was no want of warning as to the danger that threatened the Portuguese Republic from its failure to present a solid front to its enemy. On the very day that the ' Cato ' of the Republic had recourse to unconstitutional opposition a German punitive expedition had inflicted severe Young Portugal 297 loss on the Portuguese in Angola, at Naulilla. But the main blow was to be struck in Lisbon, and the neutralists, under German guidance, showed considerable statecraft. They did not make the mistake made by the ' belligerents ', for want of British support, of letting their extremists override their moderates. Owing to the congressional majority being * belligerents ' Congr3ss was on our side, and action against them could only be in the nature of a coup d'etat, but owing to their also being Radicals and odious to the upper class, and owing to the monopoly of power which the Radical organization enjoyed through the ' Democratic ' party having driven the Republican opposition into unconstitutionalism, such a coup detat could be given a conservative and even a constitutional colour. This was, indeed, done so cleverly that the unconstitutional dictatorship set up as the result of a German intrigue was welcomed as a saving of society by many British, whose business it was to know better. The conspiracy to restore German control in Portugal began with a meeting of ministers and ex-ministers sum- moned by President Arriaga on January 15, which, while professing to be a move to restore unity, seems rather to have been a manoeuvre to put the ' belligerents ' in a false position. It was followed on January 19 by a deputation to the President on the part of officers of the Lisbon garrison hostile to the Government — many of them being Royalists. The deputation was intercepted and sixty officers arrested ; whereupon the President, on January 23, without consulting the Government, published an official note declaring his intention of receiving such deputations. The Ministry submitted their resignation in protest against this unconsti- tutionalism and asked the President to suspend civil guaran- tees and declare martial law, so that they might restore 298 Young Portugal discipline. This was refused, and the same evening the President entrusted the Government to the pro-German general, Pimento de Castro, whose authority with the army was considerable, while the Royalist neutralist, Freire d'Andrade, again became Foreign Minister. Not only the Democrats, but all the congressional parties, were excluded from power, and the new Ministry had a predominant military element with more than a suspicion of pro-German and Royalist proclivities. Its nominal policy was to restore national unity ; but its real object was to preserve neutrality and to prepare a Royalist restoration through the army. As both President Arriaga and the Premier, Pimento de Castro, have since published their reminiscences, we are able to judge impartially the inwardness of the coup d'etat, and to appreciate fully the insight of the British censorship under which our national press sang paeans over the success of our reactionary enemies and the overthrow of our Radical allies. Though the coup d etat ultimately failed, as must all conspiracies against the liberties of a free people, yet it did not fail for any want of cleverness in its inception on the part of our enemies, nor for any want of crassness in our reception of it. It has already been said that the passion of loyalty to the Crown, once strong in Portugal, was replaced by a passion of loyalty to the State as represented by Congress ; and this feeling survived the disappointment when Congress failed to embody the high ideals of the national renascence, even as the older feeling could survive a bad king. Portugal was accordingly profoundly shocked by the coup d'etat and by its consequences — as when the venerable Dr. Bernardino Machado was met at the door of Congress by bayonets, or when the national representatives were forced to hold Young Portugal 299 hurried meetings in the suburbs, or when the German success was received with the ill-concealed exultation of anti-constitutional interests, financial and political. Prepara- tions for a restoration of constitutional government by force were at once put in hand, though the hold over the army exercised by the * dictatorship ' through the disaffected ofiicers delayed its outbreak until the spring, and forced it to base itself on naval action. At three in the morning of May 14, 191 5, the guns of the fleet gave the signal, and by that evening the constitutional forces under Leote de Riego had mastered Pimento de Castro's troops and the dictatorship was overthrown. The loss of life and damage was small ; but the effort, combined with the evidence that the whole of the navy and of the * civil elements ', as well as the greater part of the army were Constitutional and Republican, revived in the restored regime that national unity it had lost since the revolution. The summer passed in reconstruction and reconciliation. Dr. Arriaga had, of course, resigned, and General Pimento de Castro took refuge in Germany. A provisional presidency of Dr. Braga, called on a second time for that difficult office, preluded the election of Dr. Bernardino Machado in August. The first Prime Minister, Dr. Joao Chagas, Minister in Paris, and one of the founders of the Republic, was shot by the crypto-Royalist Senator, de Freytas, and was succeeded by a Ministry of Affairs under Dr. Jose de Castro. The Demo- crats, having secured a majority at the elections, under conditions such as gave their opponents no ground for com- plaint, Dr. Costa returned to power in November, and could resume a belligerent policy with general consent, or at any rate without the possibility of opposition. But Germany met these Portuguese belligerents half way, for the British blockade 300 Young Portugal had by now made Portugal useless as a source of supply, while the course of the campaigns in Europe gave Berlin hopes of an early settlement in which Portuguese Africa might con- veniently be included. The sixty ships in Portuguese ports were the only consideration in favour of peace, and when these were seized by Portugal, in February 1916, to fill the gaps in the Allied shipping caused by the first submarine campaign, little deference was paid to the formulae by which the Portuguese Government did their best to legalize and alleviate the blow. On March 9 came the German declara- tion of war — a long denunciation of Portugal's breaches of neutrality. The Anglo-Portuguese alliance, like most real associations in international relations, is not adequately expressed in any diplomatic document ; but in future this recital by our most formidable foe of the aid and comfort given us by Portugal will serve as a worthy record of the most ancient alliance in modern history between two free peoples. May it remind us also that Portugal had to free itself by two insurrections before it could give that alliance worthy expression ; and may we remember, when we are again free to set our own house in order, that we on our part have much to do before we are worthy of alliance with a people who have known how to fight for their own free- dom while fighting for that of others. As these words are written the long-delayed Portuguese division is landing in France. What they will win for Portugal thereby is for the next chapter, but they have already secured a full measure of sympathy with Portugal's renascence and our future firm support of its reformed regime. This history of Young Portugal could have no more fitting close than such a crusade — foretold as it was by the prophet of the Revolution, Guerro Junqueiro : Young Portugal 301 Dashed down by traitor lances to the ground and seven times pierced, low doth our country lie : Youth Ministrant, oh come, anoint each wound, and kiss her hands, wind her with garlands round, she shall not die. The courtier crew, servile and libertine, they have no ears to hear our country's cry. Youth Militant, thou madcap heroine, strap on your sabre, shoulder your carabine, she shall not die. Bear all her pain, nor count the cost at all, bring her your life's blood, though 'tis brought in vain : Youth Martyr, beautiful, heroical, Go to death singing, die, and Portugal shall live again. Portugal and the Peace Au fond des cieux un point scintille, regardez, il grandit, il brille, il approche enorme et vermeil. O Republique universelle, tu n'es encore que I'etincelle, demain tu seras le soleil. Victor Hugo. The Portuguese Republic, by enlisting in our cause, has secured both our hearty recognition of its claim to represent a new Portugal, and our future recognition of its claim to co- operate in a new Europe. But really both these rights rest on a firmer foundation than mere military co-operation. The Republic's claim to be a new Portugal cannot be denied in view of its record during the five years from the Revolution to the War ; its claim to be partner in a new Europe must be admitted in view of its having been the first State to realize that national renascence which alone will make a new Europe possible. It has since been followed in this new birth by the giant States of China and Russia, and the list is happily not yet closed. For it will no doubt be found elsewhere that when social misery and national humiliation bring about such a revival as that in Portugal and Russia, Republicanism is the only political ideal with sufiicient com- pelling and co-ordinating force to unite the various pro- gressive elements long enough for the -necessary effort. Portugal and the Peace 303 If Republicanism is to be the new motive principle in internal and international reconstruction, it concerns us much to learn just what it has practically effected for Portugal, before considering what part we can properly assign to the new Portugal in a new Europe. In reckoning up the actual achievements of the Republic, we must remember in what depth of disaster it took over affairs. Nearly twenty years before the revolution Guerro Junqueiro wrote : ' The Republic is more than a form of government, it is the last rally of a nation against death.' ■ The question whether the nation can now be considered convalescent cannot be answered by a mere list of new laws. It would be necessary to examine how far these laws were enforced and whether they had given good results. These results again must largely depend on the manner in which the national vitality responds to the stimulus of better laws and administration. Thus in the matter of education, the efforts of the Republican regime seem already to be seconded by a national desire for literacy. The constitution of a Ministry of Education and the increases in the educational budget, are indications of these efforts. Illiteracy is being combated by ambulatory schools for adults, and the percentage of illiterates, which was 82 per cent, in 1900 and 77*4 per cent, in 191 1, is already estimated to be down several points. In 1910 there were 5,500 primary schools, and in 1914 there were nearly 7,000, with over 900 more teachers. Besides this there were instituted 125 ambulatory schools and 160 night classes. The grants to secondary education in the estimates have been raised from 370,000 dol. to over 400,000 dol., and for superior schools from 450,000 dol. to about 725,000 dol. The grants for museums, libraries, con- 304 Portugal and the Peace servatoires, art schools, Sec, have been considerably increased with excellent results. The best way, perhaps, of enabling foreign opinion to judge of the reality of those social reforms which cannot have a demonstrable effect on economic prosperity for some time, will be to indicate certain regions in which improve- ment was badly needed and may be expected first to appear. One principal and primary cause of the difficulties of Portugal is that which is peculiar to minor States and small businesses in an age of Great Powers and big corporations. Although Portugal has everything requisite to prosperity — an industrious peasantry and an intelligent professional class, a good soil and climate, and a situation secluded from international trouble — it has fallen behindhand in develop- ment. This is partly because of bad management and excessive unreproductive administrative expenditure ; partly because the whole affair is on so small a scale that the turn- over, so to say, is not enough to keep the plant up to date in a go-ahead age. The former disadvantage has been largely reduced by the Revolution, which has reconstructed the management on cheaper lines. A comparison between expenditures under the Monarchy and those under the Republic shows that a saving of ^1,500,000 annually, or about one- twelfth of the total expenditure, has been made on civil list and such-like charges ; nor does this represent the whole saving. Moreover, there has been a considerable recovery of national capital through the restoration of Church property ; as, for instance, the ^2,500,000 worth of State bonds in ecclesiastical ownership which have reverted to the State. On the other hand, the Revolution has not as yet decreased the cost of the public services, and there is Portugal and the Peace 305 still a disproportionate burden of salaried and pensioned officials. Officialism — the relationship between the desire of the middle classes to get Government employment and the democratic control of Government — is a deeply-rooted social .and political difficulty, but none recognize more clearly than the Portuguese that it must be dealt with.-^ The public services in Portugal are said to cost 30 fr. per head, as compared with 24 fr. in France, 10*5 fr. in the United Kingdom, and 6 fr. in Switzerland. There are over 50,000 persons in Government employment, or about 10 per cent., and costing about ^2,500,000 annually. In comparing this burden with that of the monasteries the historian, Oliveira Martins, writes : * The monastery became a department. The porter was kept on, the brother became a clerk, the rector an under-secretary, and now on all sides we hear the solemn chanting of the departmental choirs.' As business develops, and education becomes more available generally, and better adapted to requirements, this form of middle-class pauperism will improve. Technical education, to which much attention is being given, should be specially helpful. Finance has been shown to have been the incubus which the constitutional monarchy failed to exorcise, and to which it fell a victim, and the better success of the Republic has been asserted. This success can only be realized by reviewing what the state of Portuguese finance was at the time of the Revolution. Portugal had for over a century been involving itself deeper and deeper in a vicious circle of national finance. A dead weight of debt, due to misgovernment, and doubled ^ Anselmo de Andrade, Portugal Econ., page 469 ; Mar. de Carvalho, Port. Financ, p. 27 ; [I. de Magalhaens, Incompetencia burocratica, passhn. 1832.5 " ^ 3o6 Portugal and the Peace and redoubled by maladministration, produced annual deficits, and they in turn added to the dead-weight debt until the charges could be no longer met. Then came repudiation, loss of credit, and borrowing from new sources on still more onerous terms. At the Revolution the capital value represented ^i8 nominal value per head of the population, or ^^13 12s. market value, and a total charge of 15/. per head (i.e. 12s. for interest, 2s. for redemption, and is. for loss on exchange). This represented in the days before the war a per capita burden second only to that of wealthy France, and far heavier than that of Great Britain. Moreover, the debt was dead weight, i.e. it represented wastage, not investment in remunerative enterprise, and a large proportion of it was never realized, at all. Thus of the nine loans floated between 1862 and 1866 to a nominal value of ^46,700,000, only a sum amounting to about 42 per cent, was realized, the remainder representing the cost of borrowing. Of the amount realized a still smaller per- centage was put to remunerative use in increasing the national resources and revenues in railways and other public works. Thus of the total ^108,865,295 raised by 3 per cent, loans, less than 20 per cent, seems to have been spent on public works."*^ Well might a financial authority^ say, ' the money represented by the public debt was squandered by the Government.' The history of the debt falls into three chapters. In the first we find the country emerging from the Peninsular Wars with a load of dead-weight debt that it could not possibly carry through the turmoil of the civil wars. Interest was defaulted in 1841, and in 1845 a more or less ^ A. V. de Rocha, Finangas em Portugal^ 19135 P- 1902. ^ Tomas Cabreira, problema financeiro, p. 86. Portugal and the Peace 307 compulsory conversion was effected. Another was opposed in 1852, but finally effected in 1856, arid thus closes this first war chapter of the debt, leaving it at the moderate total of about eleven million sterling. In the second chapter the country has acquired the usual credit abroad of a European State with a constitutional Government and exploits it extravagantly. Between 1856 and 1892 over j^200,ooo,ooo was borrowed abroad in 3 per cent, to 5 per cent, stock on the security of the national credit. If we estimate the remunerative investment in railways and public works at a quarter of this total we shall probably be over the mark. In 1890 this chapter closed with the Brazilian crisis and the collapse of Barings, the two principal foreign financers of Portugal. The overstrained structure of Portuguese national credit collapsed, no fresh loan could be raised, and national bankruptcy ensued. The Act of February 26, 1892, reduced by a third — under the guise of an income tax — the interest on the internal debt, and that on the external debt was, by a decree of June 13, reduced by two-thirds. The internal debt-holders had no remedy, and still remain under this regime in spite of many proposals for regularizing the situation by a conversion. The external debt-holders opened negotiations through the foreign Governments concerned, which were protracted for ten years. In 1902 a conversion of the external debt was arranged, and it was divided into three series, giving the holders respectively one-half, two-thirds, and three-quarters of their original holding, and assigning the customs revenues as security for the charge under control of a Public Debt commission. Portugal was, moreover, successful in prevent- ing this commission having any foreign diplomatic or representative character, such as that set up in Turkey or X 2 3o8 Portugal and the Peace Greece. Thus ended the second chapter of foreign borrow- ings on the national credit. The third chapter, from 1892 to 191 2, represents an exploitation of internal credit and a pawning of national resources and revenues to foreign financiers, and it is need- less to point out that this was no less detrimental to the national credit and far more dangerous to the national cause than formal funded loans from the foreign public. The financial situation becomes more and more obscure, and it is even often difficult to distinguish between funded internal debt, floating debt, and the farming of revenues and privileges. In these twenty years the only formal foreign loans were those raised on the much-contested tobacco monopoly in 1891 and 1896, producing about ^6,000,000, an internal redeemable debt which raised some j^7,ooo,ooo, and levies on the national pawnshop (Caixa de Depositos) and Land Bank (Credito Predial) producing some ^2,000,000 more. But the most important source of subsidy was the Bank of Portugal and the foreign bankers. The obligations to the bank must rank partly as funded debt in respect of the permanent overdraft of ^5,000,000, partly as floating debt in the periodic advances made by the bank, amounting in 191 2 to ^9,000,000, and partly as the farming of privileges, such as the issue of paper currency, which represent another ^4,000,000. To this we must add over ^10,000,000 of paper currency, only 10 per cent, of which is secured by cash, an excessive amount for so poor a country, even allowing for peculiarities in its currency requirements. Finally comes the floating debt in Treasury Bills and short-term loans by Lisbon bankers, which in 1900 amounted to ^9,000,000, and in 191 2 to ^18,000,000. We have, then, for this period some ^60,000,000 of fresh Portugal and the Peace 309 debt of the worst class. If we allow ^15,000,000 of this for costs and the same amount for remunerative investment, and distribute the remaining ^30,000,000 over the twenty years in paying for an annual deficit averaging really about j^i, 500,000 instead of ^500,000 as the budgets suggest, we shall have a rough idea of the national economy of Portugal at the time when the reform took hold. Something had to be done if only because there was no credit, national or special, left to pledge and nothing to sell but the colonies, a policy against which the Revolution itself was in part a protest. It was to this situation that Dr. Costa succeeded in January 191 3, and which he had morally and to some extent materially changed by January 1914. His reforms gave a good start to the two main financial tasks that lie before the Republic — redemption of the debt by the restoration of credit and riddance of the deficit by reform of the administrative system. Nothing much could, of course, be attempted at this stage in the way of debt redemp- tion ; and what was accomplished, namely the redemption of the external floating debt, seems on close investigation to have been really a conversion of this most objectionable and onerous form of floating debt into a semi-funded form. The external floating debt has been described by Dr. Costa as ' the nightmare of patriotic financiers ', and he also has revealed the use made of it to force the ruinous terms of the tobacco loans on the monarchist Government.'^ It stood at just over ^2,000,000 when he paid it off, trans- ferring the debit, it would seem, to the Government account with the Bank of Portugal. This was a sound and skilful operation carried through without interference with the 1 Dr. Afionzo Costa, Les Fin, Port., pp. 4 and 39. 310 Portugal and the Peace regular redemption of the funded debt or any increase of the ordinary floating debt. His success with the budget was even more sensational. The actual average annual deficit of the previous regime has been assessed above at about ^1,500,000, instead of the ^500,000 admitted in the budget, the real deficit being difficult to determine, partly because the complicated French system of public accountancy is followed. The budgets during the first three years of the Republic showed deficits averaging over ^1,500,000, and the estimates for 191 3-14 were presented with a deficit of ^1,692,800. Dr. Costa then came to power, recast the budget in a few days, and reduced the deficit to ^687,200, and during the six months converted the deficit into a small surplus of ^195,800. The budget he himself pre- sented after a year's strenuous reform showed a surplus of ^678,600, a sufficient margin in a budget of which the total receipts are some ^16,000,000. Of course these results were received with scepticism, but they stand investigation, and are, moreover, confirmed by the similar success secured in administering the accounts of previous budgets. Thus, under the improved yield of revenues and the reduction of expenditures due to these reforms, the budget of 191 2-1 3, which was passed with a deficit of over ^1,500,000, was closed with a small surplus. The reforms were not only administrative for two useful legislative measures were passed, one of which prohibited a precarious practice by which debt could be increased by a mere departmental instruction, and the other, the ' break ' law {Lei travao)^ prevented the equally ruinous practice of Congress in destroying the balance of the budget by voting * extraordinary credits ' into it without providing revenue to meet them. Finally, Dr. Costa crowned his services by Portugal and the Peace 311 publishing in Portuguese and French a full and fair state- ment of the real condition of the national finances. It has unfortunately not been possible to maintain this high standard of efficiency in Portuguese financial administra- tion, because the outbreak of the European war and a renewal of domestic disturbance due to it disorganized every- thing. But it has, nevertheless, shown once for all that Republican Portugal can pay its way, and any political party which in future fails to make it do so can be held responsible. But the financial future of Portugal now no longer rests only on the overburdened shoulders of poor 'Ze Povinho. The participation of Portugal in the war, though it has over- thrown the Republican programme of Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform, has restored the national credit that has been in abeyance since 1892. Indeed it would not be too much to say that now the credit of London stands behind that of Lisbon. This, of course, revives the old danger of excessive and extravagant borrowing, but on the other hand reopens the possibility of an efficient exploitation of Portugal's as yet unexplored national and imperial resources. If the balance-sheet of a government, as shown in the budget, is a fair indication of good or bad government, then the balance-sheet of a nation gives an even better insight into the prosperity and progress of a people. Unfortunately, difficult as it is to reduce to a few leading facts the labyrin- thine figures in State accounts, it is even more difficult to estimate the true incomings and outgoings of a people and its dependent populations. The following balance-sheet of Portugal is therefore presented with every reserve, and principally as the best method of giving as shortly as possible a picture of the very peculiar economic conditions of the Portuguese Empire. 312 Portugal and the Peace Commercial Balance-sheet of Portugal Outgoings 1. Excess in value of imports for consumption over exports of local production (average for 1910-12) 1 . 2. {a) External funded' debt, interest and re- demption charges for 191 2 {b) External floating debt, interest and re- demption charges for 191 2 3. {a) Foreign investments in Portuguese rail- way shares and bonds ^ . {b) Foreign investments : gas, trams, elec- tricity, telephones, mines, &c. . 4. {a) Foreign freight on about 1,000,000 tons ^ {b) Foreign passage-money on emigrants and tourists, about 75,000 persons ^. 5. Foreign missions and armaments, &c. . 6. Portuguese abroad ..... Total ..... In 1,000,000 Dollars. 37i 7* 2 2i- 3 a 60 Excess of imports over exports in 1912, by tariff classes : Importation Exportation I. Live animals . . II. Raw Materials . • III. Textiles, &c. . • IV. Food-stuffs . V. Machinery and instruments VI. Manufactures . VII. Tare .... for Consumption. In 1,000 Dollars, 2,515 33,659 6,976 16,020 6,393 6,919 0/ Native Products. In 1,000 Dollars. 3,941 7,896 1,170 19,769 145 2,293 132 — 2 These estimates are based on those published by M. Edmond Thery in the Economiste Europeen of 1912. ^ Table No. 17 o^ Comer cio y Navegagao shows that Portuguese shipping took only 309,552 tons of 1,448,413 tons shipped. * Authorized emigration 88,929, which with unauthorized and travellers equals, say, 100,000, of which at least 75 per cent, travelled in foreign vessels. Portugal and the Peace 313 In 1,000,000 Incomings 1. Re-exports of colonial produce (average for Dollars. 1910-12) ...... I4|- 2. {a) Returns on three-quarters of total funded foreign debt, held by Portuguese . . 6 {b) Returns on one-half of total floating debt, held by Portuguese .... J- 3. Returns on 60 per cent, foreign investments held by Portuguese . . . . I J 4. Return on Portuguese capital invested abroad 4J 5. Freight to Portuguese on foreign shipments J 6. Foreigners in Portugal .... i 7. Brazilian and North American remittances, including profits of the Rio financial agency ...... 3^ 8. Unaccounted for ..... if Total . . • . . . 60 A glance at this balance-sheet shows that a full half of the national incomings consist of remittances from Portuguese emigrants in Brazil and New England, and that a quarter of the whole is represented by re-exports of colonial produce. Portugal is, in fact, paying its way by exporting its own citizens and the produce of its colonies. In other words, instead of the Portuguese population producing its own food and sufficient surplus of produce raw or manufactured to pay its creditors abroad, and for such commodities as it cannot produce at home, it is dependent on foreign supplies for its food, and pays for this and the rest by exporting its own national labour and by exploiting the native labour of its imperial possessions. Here is an economic embroglio that will test the strength and staying power of the republican renascence. For 314 Portugal and the Peace these are no recent conditions. The two staple foods of the Portuguese, bread and bacalhao (dried cod), are and long have been, the former largely and the second altogether, foreign imports. We find in Hakluyt (vol. vi, p. 520), 'Though the countryside of Portugal do some years find themselves corn, yet are they never able to victual the least part of their city of Lisbon.' Taking the latest information we find that the deficit in the native supply of cereals is about one-third of the total consumption,-^ and that in the supply of wheat the deficit is even more serious, averaging about one-half of the consumption. Since 1899 the importation of cereals is under Government con- trol, and an annual decree fixes how much maybe imported and the duty to be paid. All Portuguese home-grown wheat must be bought at prices fixed by law according to quality ; the wheat is made into flour under regulation and the flour into bread, also under regulation, to be sold at fixed prices, weights, and qualities. This artificial regime has various awkward results. One is that the very great variation in the revenues from the import duty on cereals is disturbing to the budget ; ^ while speculation on the amount to be admitted and the duty to be fixed turns the food of the country into a gambling counter for a small ring of specu- lators. Consequently a bad harvest in Portugal means a bonus to the Treasury and a bonanza to the wheat ring. Moreover, the protection of native agriculture has not as 1 Ega de Campos, Riqueza nacional, 19 14, p. 247. 2 The duties collected from the importation of cereals were as follows : Dollars. 1910 ....... 1,817,800 191 1 ....... 171,900 1912 . . . . . . . 689,400 19 1 3 (first six months) .... 1,992,800 Portugal and the Peace 315 yet resulted in any marked increase in acreage or improve- ment in productive power. Portugal, in the proportion of v^^heat raised per hectare, still stands below Russia at the bottom of the scale.-*^ The regime has, however, had its advantages under war conditions by facilitating regulation of the national food supply. In the vicious economic circle in which Portugal is enclosed, as by an evil enchantment, excess of rural emigra- tion lies between deficiency of food production and the excess of foreign debt. The strength of Portugal in one respect and its weakness in another lies in the population being still mainly agricultural, and emigration is neces- sarily mainly from the northern provinces where the peasantry is the most prolific, the most progressive, and the most prosperous. The rate of emigration is highest from the less fertile inland fringe of these provinces, and least from the centre and south, and it began to take disquieting proportions coincidently with the financial collapse in the early nineties. The pressure of a direct taxation dispro- portionately heavy on the peasant, the rise in prices due to the highest tariff in Europe and an inconvertible paper currency, the absence of capital for land development and the want of alternative employment in industry, has been driving abroad not only the surplus population, but even the necessary race-stock. The close relationship between the increase of emigration and the increase both of food prices and of the inconvertible currency, can be traced with con- siderable precision. The decrease of emigration noticeable in the years before the war was probably only due to the financial crisis in Brazil reducing the main demand for 1 V. Tear Book of Dept. of Agriculture^ U.S.A., 1912, p. 5685 and Estatistica do Trigo, 19 10. 3i6 Portugal and the Peace labour ; though the new conditions, economic and financial, created by the war, which have temporarily redressed the trade balance and restored foreign exchange, will give the Republican Government an opportunity of stopping this drain on the nation's life. But in the end it can only yield to better social and financial administration, for which the measures of reform in taxation, land ownership, and educa- tion already passed by the Republican Government will serve as a sound foundation. The ambition of the Portu- guese reformers is to make Portugal pay its way economically as well as financially, and redress its balance of trade by exporting the manufactured products for which the industry, taste, and technical skill of the people so admirably equips them. As has been pointed out, the main export of the Portu- guese, next to their own peasants, is re-exportation of the produce of native labour in the colonies. This brings us to the question of the relationship between the Portuguese nation and the Portuguese Empire, a matter so intricate and delicate that it is perhaps a mistake to try and deal with it within the limits allotted to it here. It must, how- ever, be adequately dealt with if we are to understand Portugal's part in the war, because Portugal has entered this war as an Empire for imperial reasons as well in its character as a nation for national reasons. The precedent of Spain suggests that Portugal, as a nation, would probably have benefited in the end by the loss of the colonies, in spite of the loss of the economic asset of the colonial produce that now makes so important an item in the trade balance. This would have been all the more so in that if colonial produce has contributed considerably to squaring the national balance-sheet, colonial subsidies have Portugal and the Peace 317 contributed even more considerably to queering the national budget. The estimated deficits in the colonial budgets give no good basis for calculating the amount spent on the colonies, for various reasons ; but a careful calculation of this amount by a competent authority^ puts the total spent from 1870 to 191 2 at 76,032 contos (about ^15,000,000). This con- stitutes a serious sum in Portuguese finance, even if small compared with the outlay of other colonial powers ; and the greater part was spent on unremunerative purposes. For it will be seen that over half this outlay went on adminis- trative expenses, of which a large though indeterminable proportion was properly a local charge. Moreover, this drain on the budget still continues, though owing to the general improvement in colonial economic conditions, the colonial budgets lately instituted now as a general rule show surpluses with two small exceptions — Timor and Guinea — and one very large exception, Angola ; these being the least-developed colonies. The others have either recovered from relapses, like Cape Verde or India, or are steadily in surplus like San Thome, Principe, or less so, like Mozambique. - In developing the vast tracts of the African continent that have fallen to Portugal as founder's shares, so to say, in the European partition of Africa, the main difficulty has always been the want of capital and of colonial adminis- trators. The ruling class in Portugal, exhausted by the initial effort of occidental conquest and of oriental crusades, and degenerating for centuries, could not even supply the ^ A. R. de Almeida Ribeiro, Colonial Minister of the Republic, who was charged with the colonial reorganization (see Administragao Financeira das Prov. Ultr.^ 1914)' 3i8 Portugal and the Peace home service with able and honest officials. As the national spirit of adventure was almost dead, the colonies were left to get on as well as they could. Even so, there have been colonial administrators of ability ; and indeed, when the resources of Portugal are compared with those of the other colonizing Powers, it is surprising to find how much has been done, especially since the Revolution, not only to make the colonial possessions profitable, but also to make them worthy of a naturally humane people. The internal colonial problems which faced the Republican Government on its accession fell into two categories : the question of the relationship of the Portuguese Government to the natives, and the question of its relationship to the colonists. On the successful solution of these two problems directly depended the trade between the two countries, as well as serious indirect reactions on the future of the Portu- guese Empire. It is, therefore, worth while examining in some detail the way in which these two questions have been dealt with. It is unnecessary to review the conditions of recruitment and employment of native labour in the cocoa plantations of San Thome and Principe under the previous regime, which caused a press campaign hostile to Portugal, and led to the renunciation by certain prominent British manu- facturers of the purchase of the produce of those islands. But it is noteworthy that the effect of this subordination of business interests to moral instincts was considerable enough to produce a marked decline in the trade between the two countries and in the prosperity of the islands, until fresh markets in Germany were developed. Nor is it possible to review in detail the measures taken by the Portuguese Government by the regulation of recruitment Portugal and the Peace 319 of employment and of repatriation in order to remove this reproach. The present system has now for some time been under careful and impartial observation, and reports on its result indicate that a satisfactory solution has been found, and that, with a continuance of adequate administra- tion, no further trouble need be feared. All the more so, in I9i4when the colonial reforms of the revolution took shape, there appeared a general Codifying Act, embodying all the various protective provisions relating to contract labour."^ Further, in the organic acts of the colonies, which will next be dealt with, is found a regulation of the peculiar civil status of natives,^ placing them under the direct administration of the governor, i. e. of the Home Govern- ment, while it recognizes their right to be under their own customs. In fact, in so far as legislation by the Home Government can provide, the status of natives in Portuguese colonies, whether in their homes or working abroad under contract, seems now to be satisfactory. Passing now to the other question of the relationship between the Home Government and the colonial settlers, we find that the year 19 14 has brought a re-orientation of policy and a revision of the principles of colonial policy in this respect which amount to a revolution. While Portugal does not seem to have gone to such extremes in centralizing its colonial administration as did France, the oversea provinces had never acquired any formal recognition of local rights, and such original organs of local government as had grown up had been extinguished 1 The Act of October 14, 19 14. The preamble contains a review of policy concerning Government relations with natives, of considerable interest. 2 Civil Organic Act, August 1914, paras. 18, 22, and 38. 320 Portugal and the Peace by the centralizing policy of the latter part of the last century. There had been no charters to the original colonists, and the policy of the Colonial Pact of the eighteenth century was that of a mere mercantile exploitation for the benefit of Lisbon. The fiscal councils (Juntas de Fazenda), which might have become a nucleus of self-governing institutions, were abolished by a decree of December 30, 1888, and with them went the power of contracting colonial loans and other practical exercises of independent status. Independence, especially in this matter of finance, was looked on as the initial step to secession, and the metro- politan fiscal system was imposed on the colonies, tant bien que mat. This carried with it the French system of a division of colonial governmental authority between the administrative power under the governor, and the financial power under the treasurer. There was consequently endless local friction, and no unity of control, nor was there any authority in the metropolitan government capable of taking effective action in the interests of the colonies. The Colonial Office was a mere department in the Ministry of Marine, and the colonies were in every respect, no more than their designa- tions described — oversea provinces. In the all-important financial relationship, centralization became merely a euphemism for confusion. There was a colonial budget, including all the colonies together, but there was no definition of what were central and what colonial charges or revenues, and no distinction between the colonies. Such as it was, this budget seldom passed until long after the opening of the year, whence more confusion. Any surpluses were at first simply absorbed for home purposes, but of late years a practice had grown up of transferring funds from colonies with a surplus to colonies Portugal and the Peace 321 with a deficit. This invidious proceeding first obtained legal recognition in the budget of 1885-6, and seemed to have little to recommend it either on grounds of policy or procedure. During the nineties, Wwh. the growing prosperity of the cocoa islands, it was freely resorted to, but did not relieve the mother country of a steady drain for the making good of colonial deficits. This charge appeared in the budgets under various headings, and for various amounts, but its varying amount cannot be considered as any clue to the development or decline of the colonies, as the descrip- tion and dimensions of it were chiefly regulated by con- siderations of budget convenience. As a result of this confusion and centralization, the condition of the colonies in the nineties was such as to justify to some extent those statesmen who considered their retention only as a drain on and a disturbance of the national economy, and contemplated their alienation with equani- mity.^ Considered from a political point of view, the dilemma that faced the new Republic in respect of their colonies was the choice of two policies. The one previously followed w^as that of keeping them as oversea provinces in complete dependence on the mother country. This gave some immediate advantage to the national balance-sheet by ^ For example, writers such as Pedro Diniz, Antonio Inez, Mousinho de Albuquerque, Edouardo Costa, Rodriguez de Freitas, Oliveira Martins and other statesmen supported proposals for selling the colonies, which in 1888 and 1891 were brought forward as a Bill by Ferreira d' Almeida. The anticipated purchaser was Germany, and the estimate for Macao, Timor, India, Guinea and Mozambique was 25,000,000/. sterling. The choice of colonies and of customer and the coincidence with the colonial dispute with the United Kingdom suggests a probable explanation of this last proposal. 1832.5 V 322 Portugal and the Peace retaining for Lisbon the commerce and control of their produce, but also caused serious prejudice to their develop- ment. This was all the more serious in that their backward condition had become a reproach to Portugal, an incentive to separatist agitation in the colonies, and an excuse for foreign interference. The other policy, that of giving the colonies self-government and financial independence, and opening them up to foreign capital, might in the end cost Lisbon its profitable control of the colonial trade, and leave only the sentimental tie as a safeguard against foreign financial penetration, which latter might end in political predominance. This dilemma, which threatened Portugal with loss of her colonies in either case, was increased by the fact that the only two capitalist Powers likely to finance the development of Portuguese Africa were the United Kingdom and Ger- many. The former alone would not have been feared, but was less ready to put up money than was Germany, for the latter had in view presumably the acquisition of reversionary interests. It seemed possible that the loss of status suffered by Portugal owing to repudiation and revolution, and the desire to conciliate Germany, might induce the United Kingdom to agree to a delimitation of business interests in Portuguese Africa which would be a preliminary to par- tition. To provide openings for foreign capital without giving any to foreign control was the task which was heavily taxing the ability of Portuguese statesmen when the war swept the board. The provisional government of the Republic included colonial self-government in its programme, and lost no time in making a start. It was indeed high time, for the colonial agitation for self-government, stimulated by the Portugal and the Peace 323 revolution at home, had become insistent and, in the case of Angola, almost menacing. Accordingly, beginning at the easiest end, the first colonial reform was the constitu- tion of the colonial ministry whereby a central authority was established capable of securing proper consideration for colonial interests. Another step was taken in the decree of May 27, 191 1, which defined the respective financial responsibilities of the mother country and the colonies, and gave the latter a financial status as of right. Further, the budget of 191 2-1 3 gave each colony a separate budget, and a separate subsidy when necessary. These reforms, however, did not go beyond questions of procedure, and left principles of policy unchanged. A revolution in principle has now been realized and recorded in two organic Acts passed on August 15, 1914. Their effect may be summed up as promoting the oversea provinces to a status and autonomy ranking with that of our Crown colonies ; but they seem, very properly, to have been framed rather as a development of than as a departure from the previous regime, and rather as a means of dealing with difiiculties and disadvantages already experienced than as an adoption of any foreign system. The first Act regulates the civil institutions of the central and colonial administration ; the second regulates their financial and commercial relations. The Act itself is in each case very brief, but is accompanied by principles upon which the colonial constitutions now in preparation must be based. These colonial constitutions are to be approved .within a year. The principles annexed to the Civil Organic Act define restrictively the rights of interference of the home Govern- ment, and determine the relationship of the colonial Y 2 324 Portugal and the Peace minister to the colonial governors ; the powers and position of the colonial governor which were previously insufficient are made satisfactory, and an embryo colonial legislature appears in a Government council composed of official and elected members in such proportion as the colonial con- stitution provides. The administrative system is completed by district governors, with district councils and municipal chambers. The Financial Act is even more important, and introduces an even greater revolution of the existing regime. Thus Article i of the Act establishes colonial financial autonomy — with the unavoidable exception of the territory adminis- tered by chartered companies — and this principle is very fully and fairly developed in the subsequent provisions. The economic relationship between the home country and the colonies is also revised, but without a radical change of principle. The difficulties of any drastic change are very great, though the demand for such change is even greater than in respect of the administrative relationship. The monopolist and mercantilist principle of the traditional colonial. policy have their most practical expression in the preferences and prohibitions imposed by the home country on the colonies. Thus, colonial products on importation into Portugal enjoy a 50 per cent, reduction of import duties, but Portuguese products got a 90 per cent, reduc- tion in the colonies — a preference all the more profitable that the Portuguese tariflF is practically prohibitive in many products. This differential preference is now replaced by an even preference establishing a mutual 50 per cent., reduction of duties. Another burdensome preference imposed on the colonies was that in favour of Portuguese shipping. This had the double object of promoting the Porhigal and the Peace 325 national mercantile marine and of preserving Lisbon's position as the centre of deposit, of warehousing, of dis- tribution, and of financing of the colonial trade. For this purpose the ocean coasting trade between Portugal and West Africa, as well as the petty coasting trade generally, is reserved to the national flag by an Act of January 23, 1905, and a 20 per cent, reduction of duties is granted to foreign products imported into the colonies via Lisbon. These measures have been effective in diverting to Lisbon almost the whole trade of the cocoa islands, of Guinea, and of Angola. The consequence is that these colonial exports play a very important part, as has been shown, in reducing the economic trade balance against Portugal. It is pre- sumably considered that the home country cannot at present afford to give up the advantages of this somewhat artificial arrangement, and it is accordingly maintained, with only a reference to its possible modification in unlikely contingencies. Subject to certain considerable restrictions, the colonies will now have control of their customs duties, and they can reduce the disadvantages of the restrictions by lowering duties if their budgets allow. It is evident, therefore, that the Republic made an effort towards putting the Portuguese Empire on a reformed basis. But this effort did not free the Republic from the dilemma that whether it followed a liberal or an imperial policy in respect of its colonies, it seemed likely to lose them in either case. If it kept them in complete political and economic dependence, their backward condition would excite separatist agitation in the colonies themselves and excuse altruistic intervention from outside. If they were given political and economic autonomy they would be exposed until they attained a certain maturity and 326 Portugal and the Peace prosperity to the risk of foreign pacific penetration and financial control. The first danger, that of altruistic inter- ference, was the lesser of the two, coming as it did mainly from Great Britain ; the second, originating in German colonial expansion, was more formidable. When some years ago it became known that the two had come to an under- standing and that Great Britain and Germany had defined their economic spheres of interest in the Portuguese colonies, the end of the Portuguese Empire and of the Anglo-Portu- guese alliance seemed at hand. We have seen that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance suffered a serious eclipse at the critical time in Portuguese affairs when the colonial disputes culminating in the British ultimatum of January 1891 caused a deep wound to the national sensitiveness of the Portuguese ; while the financial crisis of 1892 and the reductions of interest on the foreign debt no less offended British business sensibilities. As a consequence, during the later years of the Monarchy, the British alliance, the Court camarilla, and the Society of Jesus had formed a trinity which was the object of constant attacks by Young Portugal and by the Republican opposition. Fortunately, no sooner was the revolution accomplished than the statesmanship of its authors showed them that the British alliance was not only innocuous but indispensable. The position of Republican and restoration parties towards the British alliance was eventually transposed and the more extreme Republicans became the most enthusiastic of our friends. Unfortunately, British public opinion as represented in the London press was not so flexible and continued to show itself indifferent, if not ill-disposed, towards Portugal until the war made us appreciate the moral value of support from an independent and intellectual democracy. Portugal and the Peace 327 During the last decade in Europe conditions were such that moral values were overlooked somewhat in international relations ; which seemed everywhere and for ever to be regulated by material considerations. The material value to us of the Portuguese alliance had been declining for over a century through the development of vast markets and sources of supply in the Americas and in the Far East, and by the giant growth of the world's industry and commerce which relegated Portugal to comparative insignificance. But with the new century the world's business reached a point where a return was being made to the by-products and way-stations, passed over in the time of sensational output and of rush for the larger centres of demand. In this latter phase we overlooked the importance of Portugal as a convenient way-station on the great South Atlantic trade route ; and with this neglect came the opportunity of rivals ready to exploit any opening left by those earlier in the field. To German enterprise Lisbon offered two opportunities. The first was that of capturing the markets of Portugal itself by means of cheap freights on their South Atlantic and Mediterranean lines, cheap credits through local agents, and cheap goods through dumping of surplus protected products. The second and the most important was the opportunity of getting economic control of large tracts of Africa under Portuguese sovereignty by establishing a financial predominance in Lisbon.''" The German exploita- tion of Portugal began with the closing years of the last century, and its course is interesting to trace as an indication of the deadly danger to a centralized Empire such as that ^ The same policy can be observed in a more developed form in respect of Constantinople and Asia Minor. 328 Portugal and the Peace of Portugal caused by financial embarrassment with its consequences in high tariffs and want of capital. A high tariff regime gives an obvious opening for an active foreign Power to alter in its own favour the com- merce and therewith the political relationships of a smaller State. The Portuguese tariff of 1892 was the highest tariff in force before the war."^ Dictated by fiscal difficulties, and partly also by the protectionist principles then generally prevalent, it has been as unsatisfactory a form of taxation as any of the even more antiquated direct taxes ; but, like them, is now very difficult to alter or abolish. The new tariff arrangements of 1908 were adopted with a view to having an instrument more efficacious in getting favourable treatment for Portuguese exports, especially wine, than could be got under the old single-column tariff of 1892. Thus three tariffs were established : a penal tariff, the normal tariff, and a conventional tariff. The German Empire was at that moment trying to effect an economic establishment of German influence on the Atlantic sea-board, and at once took advantage of this opportunity of making good the checks she had received in the attempt to ' penetrate ' Madeira and Morocco. The attempt to penetrate Madeira in the form of a con- cession obtained from the monarchy for the establish- ment of a sanatorium there had failed under British pressure on Portugal. So, realizing that Madeira could not be absorbed against the determined opposition of the Western Sea Powers, Germany, with great diplomatic skill. ^ A report of the Minister of Finance submitted in February 1906 showed how heavily this tariff fell on the poorer consumers. Thus the duties on wheat that year worked out at 40 per cent, ad valorem^ those on dried cod at 27 per cent., on sugar 146 per cent., on rice 60 per cent. Portugal and the Peace 329 used the position acquired there for strengthening its hold on Portugal. Part of the compensation for cancellation of the Hohenlohe Concession in Madeira took the form of a commercial treaty which gave Germany preferential treatment over Great Britain. Under this treaty, signed on November 30, 1908, to come into force on June 6, 1910, Germany gave Portuguese wines most-favoured-nation treatment, and also the much-coveted monopoly of the terms ' Port ' and ' Madeira ', which afforded protection against inferior foreign imitations. The schedules as to reductions in Portuguese duties annexed to the treaty were complicated in their operation ; but the general result seems to have been to favour German imports into Portugal rather more than Portuguese imports into Germany — though both have made remarkable advances. From this date until the war the trade of Germany was pressing to the front. Not content with the advantages secured in the treaty, the German Government took every opportunity of pro- moting trade with Portugal, and was well seconded by the enterprise of its capitalists, by the energy of its merchants, and by the local experience of its business representatives. If we compare the respective positions of British and German trade with Portugal in, say 1890 and 1910, we see that this campaign of the Germans in Portugal, though commercially speaking not so successful as is generally supposed, yet promised before long to substitute the Germans for our- selves as the predominant Power in Portugal. The extent to which this German campaign .for the national and colonial trade was a simple and natural com- mercial development, or, on the other hand, had a political purpose in securing the reversion of the African colonies, can only be guessed. But it is to be noted that the colonial 330 Portgual and the Peace trade has a peculiar financial importance to Portugal at present, and that control of it carries with it a commanding influence in the affairs of the mother country. This arises from the fact that Portugal imports far more for consump- tion than it exports of native products, the balance against her for the five-year period 1908-12 being about 35,000,000/. (180,892 contos). The total re-exportation of colonial produce for the same period was about 12,250,000/. {6y,o66 contos), or more than one-third of this deficit. Of this re- exportation, the staples are cocoa, coffee and rubber to more than 90 per cent., and these come almost entirely from San Thome and Angola. Of this colonial produce 85 per cent, was redistributed thus : Contos. Germany ...... 20,293 10,886 6,497 6,168 3,071 2,686 the war larger United States United Kingdom Netherlands Denmark Russia The Germans had therefore become before purchasers of Portuguese products than the United Kingdom, and will probably retain this position after the war, if only for the natural reason that they are a northern people with a market for southern produce even larger than that of the United Kingdom^ while, unlike the British, they have few sources of supply under their own control in their colonies. So long as Germans buy Portuguese colonial pro- duce, they must pay for it either with surplus manufactures or with surplus capital, as they have hitherto done, and they will therefore, normally, continue to control the financial centre of the colonial trade. And, so long as that centre Portgual and the Peace 331 remains at Lisbon, there will be a danger of their dominating Portugal, and of their eventually acquiring the Portuguese colonies. Portugal can only prevent this by so developing the vitality and nationality of the colonies that annexation of them becomes as impossible astheDutchfound that of Brazil. It is this imperialist economic expansion that the re- settlement of international relationships after the war must provide against, if we are to have the full period of peace that will then be due to the world. In respect of African territories it can only be provided against by an inter- nationalization of interests — by some neutralization of the national character of the various colonies — British, French, German, Portuguese, Belgian, Spanish. The colonial reforms of the Portuguese Republic and its military and naval co-operation have, without question, placed Portugal on a footing of full equality with the other allies. Nothing can be required of Portugal that is not equally required of Great Britain in respect of territorial contribution to such a scheme. But besides this Portugal must not be required to contribute more than its propor- tional share ; and if the African territories that would be required from Portugal for the foundation of an inter- nationalized and neutralized Federation of Central Africa should prove to be more than that contributed by any other State, which would depend on the boundaries given to the Federation, and if the loss of revenue to Portugal should prove to be more than it has gained in other respects, which will depend on the financial relationship in which we stand to Portugal after the final settlement, then some compensation must be given to Portugal. For in any case we must secure the free consent of the Portuguese Government to the arrangement. 332 Portgiial and the Peace Whether such consent can be obtained will depend very much on how the matter is handled. An appeal to the Portuguese people to join the other peoples of Europe in surrendering their imperial privileges in Central Africa for the better security of the future peace of the world, might possibly arouse a response in Portugal that would permit the Government to take a course that would otherwise imperil the Republic. The Government itself would probably not be unwilling to renounce burden- some responsibilities for African administration in return for a relief from debt charges that are crushing the life out of Portugal itself. Finally, an appeal to Portugal to join the Great Powers in renouncing imperialism in Africa might be reinforced by a concession to Portuguese nation- alism. For instance, Portugal might be given its Alsace- Lorraine — the only ' Lusitania irredenta " — that district of Olivenga that was reft from its eastern frontier at the last European settlement. Whether Spain could be induced to give it up, or rather whether we should be prepared to pay the price that Spanish nationalism would require of us for it, is another question. If the Portuguese people can, without prejudice to their national pride, be freed from that burden of colonial depen- dencies and of debt charges that has impoverished and depopulated them while exposing them to constant insult and injury, and if the Portuguese Republic be given the place to which it is entitled in the new Europe and the new Africa that we hope may arise from the war, then Portugal will not have cause to complain of the results of its loyal allegiance to its ancient ally. INDEX ' Academias ' of the eighteenth cen- tury, 239. Affonzo Henriquez, first King of Portugal, 21, 60-S, 81, 95. Affonzo II, 'the Fat,' 70, 71. Affonzo III,' of Boulogne', Pretender and King, 72. Affonzo IV, ' the Brave ', 76. Affonzo V, 'the African ', 105-8. Affonzo VI, 'the hooligan', 175. African colonies and Germany, 258- 61 ; deportations, 271. Aguiar, 257. Alca9er Kebir, defeat and death of Sebastian, 139. Alcantara, Alva defeats Antonio, 142. Alcoba9a, convent of, 21, 22, 58, 69, 79, no. Alfarobeira, battle of, 106. Aifonzo, King of Castile, wars with, 60, 6r, 63. Algarves, conquest of, 72 ; kingdom of, 208; slavery in, 117. Alho, Affonzo Martin, envoy to Eng- land, 77. Aljubarrota, defeat of Spain, 22,84, 94, 166. Almanza, defeat of Anglo-Portu- guese, 183. Almeida, Dr. A. J., 269, 271, 282, 287. Almeira, Cortes of, 140. Alpoim, Jose Maria, 266. Ameixial, defeat of Spain, 173. Amelie, Queen, 274-6. America, discovery of, 92. Amiens, Treaty of, 206. Amnesty of royalists, 284. Andrade, Freire d', 217, 277, 295, 297. Angola, deficit, 317; self-govern- ment, 323. Antonio, Prior of Crato, claim to Crown, 159-43. Arabic, words, &c., 18, 56. Aranda, 195. ' Arcadians ' of eighteenth century, 239- Armada, defeat of, 142. Armed neutrality and Portugal, 203. Arriaga, Dr., President, 246, 286- 97- Arundel, Earl of, marries princess, 87. Aumale, Mdlle de, marries Affonzo VI, 175, and Pedro, J 76. Avila, 257. Aviz, House of, 22, 104-6. Azores, discovered, 103 ; expedition to, 228 ; expedition from, 329. Badajos, peace of, 206. Bailen, battle of, 211. Ballads, translations from, 55, 77, 251. Baltic Confederacy and Portugal, 203. Barbosa, Ayres, 130. Batalha Abbey, 22, 46, 69, 73, 85, 90, 94, no. Beatrice, Queen, 78. 336 Index Beatrice, Princess, 82. Beira, province of, 96, 117, 256. Belem, convent of, 23, no. Belle Isle, Pedroite base, 229. Beresford, Lord, 212-18. Berwick, Duke of, 183. Black Prince, betrothal of, 76. Blake, Admiral, raids colonies, 171. Boccage, Manoel de, eighteenth- century poet, 193. Bombarda, Dr., assassinated, 276. Bombay, ceded to England, 172. Bonaparte, Joseph, 212. Bonaparte, Napoleon, q. v. Booth SS. Line, tours by, 50. Borges, Fran9a, eighteenth -century poet, 271. Braga, Dr. Theophilo : The rdle of Portugal, 40; personality of, 245 ; first presidency, 286 ; second, 299. Braga, Archbishop of, seventeenth- century conspirator, 170. Braga, town of, 42, 69. Braganza, House of, 100-8, 219, 248. Braganza, town of, it. Brazil, discovery, 112; inquisition, 119; emigration, 124, 256; Dutch occupation, 161 ; liberation, 169 ; gold, 182, 186, 187 ; Jesuits, 194-5 ; sugar, 198 ; part cession to France, 206 ; independence 218; republic, 259, 262; royalism, 280. British alliance, 6, 28, 86, 89, 97, 203, 205, 260, 326 ; expeditions, 71, 84, 205, 211 ; commercial treaty, 73, 293; trade, 327-30; ultimatum, 258, 260. Budget, national, 255, 310 ; colonial, 317- Bull fights, 30. Bussaco, defeat of French, 212 ; hotel, 46 ; review, 275. Cabral, discoverer, 112 ; statesman 232. Camacho, Brito, * unionist ' politi- cian, 288, 290, 296. Camara brothers, Jesuits, 136. Camoens, sixteenth-century poet, 36, 80 ; imperialist, 132 ; transla- tions from Lusiads^ 37, 133. Canning, Portuguese policy, 221-3. Cao, Deogo, discoverer, iii. ' Carbonario', political organization, 268-72, 279-83, 286, 287. Carlos I, last king, reign, 249-77 5 murder of, 34, 272, 274; person- ality, 249 ; translation King Simon, 250. Carlotta, Queen, eighteenth and nineteenth century, 209, 219, 220. Carthaginians, colonies of, 10, 48. Castelmelhor, seventeenth-century statesman, 175. Castilho, nineteenth-century poet, 239, 241. Castlereagh, Portuguese policy, 217. Castro, General Pimento de, premier, 289 ; dictator, 298-9^ Castro, Inez de, tragedy of, 78 ; translation of ballad, 80. Castro, Jose, nineteenth-century politician, 299. Castro, Luciano da, 264, 266. Catholic League, 28. Celt-Iberians, 12, 46, 48, Censorship, British, and coup d'etat, 298. Cetobriga, ancient settlement, 50. Ceuta surrendered, 105 ; ceded, 175. Chagas, Joao, republican politician, 271, 289, 299. Charles II, marries Catharine of Braganza, 172. Index 337 Charles II of Spain, succession to, 182. Charles V of Spain, British support, 131. Chartists, nineteenth-century party, 231. Chaves, 221. Cid, The, 56. Cintra, Convention of, 211. Cintra, Moorish remains, 52, 58. Citania, ancient settlement, 46, 49. Ciudad Rodrigo, Spanish defeat, 173- Coasting trade, restrictions on, 325. Coimbra, school and party, 241-6 ; university and town, 8, 72, 74, 78, 83, 94, 192, 193- Colonial pact, eighteenth-century colonial policy, 320. Colonies, labour, 31, 261 ; debt, 309 ; produce, 3i3> 33° ; budgets, 3i7> 320, 323; reforms, 319, 323, 331; alienation, 316, 321, 331; neutralization, 331. Columbus, Christopher, loss of ser- vices, 112. Commerce, treaty with Great Britain, 73, 293. Congress of the Republic, 253, 287, 288, 293, 294, 297. ' Constitutionalists ', nineteenth-cen- tury party, 231, Corte Real, discoverer of Labrador, 112. Corte Real, Treaty of (1715), 183, 186. Cortes, of the Monarchy, 222-3, 253-5,258,267,269,274,287. V. also Thomar, Almeira, &c. Costa, Affonzo, republican premier and reformer, 68, 269, 271, 279, 286-91, 299, 30Q-11. Couceiro, Pablo, royalist leader, 281. i8sa-5 Coup d'etat of 1914, 297. Courts of Love, early monarchy, 82. Coutinho, Azevedo, Royalist con- spirator, 282. Coutinho, Victor Hugo de, premier, 296. Crawfurd, Oswald, writer, 19, 67. Crusades, 52, 62, 114, 137, 179, 187. Debt, history of, 306 et seq. Democrats, republican party, 279, 287-99. Deus, Joao de, nineteenth-century poet, 239, 240 ; translation, Life, 240. Diaz, Bartolomeo, discoverer, iii. Diniz, King, ' the Worker', 72, 81, 93, 95- Discovery, age of, 1 1 1 . Drake, Sir Francis, expedition under, 63, 142. Dutch in Brazil, 161, 169. Edouard, King, loi, 105. Education, 303. Edward I of England, 73, Elvas, siege of, 71. Emigration, 312-15. Emmanuel, King, 'the Fortunate ', 109, 120. Ericeira, flight of monarchy, 276. * Evolutionists ', republican party, 287, 288. Evora Monte, Convention of, 230. Ferdinand, King, ' the Handsome ', 78-83, 94. Ferdinand of Aragon, 107. Ferdinand of Castile, 68. Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, King Consort, p. 247. Ferdinand of Spain, 187. Fernando, ' the Constant Prince ', 100, 105. 338 Index Ferreira, Diaz, 204. Fielding, Henry, in Portugal, 1S5. Fish girls, 10. Fontainebleau, Treaty of, 208. France and Portugal, 197, 204, 205, 208, 210, 211. Franco, Joao, monarchist dictator, 266-71, 274, 289. Freemasons, 209, 215. Freire d'Andrade. v. Andrade. Freitas, Joao de, reactionary senator, 291, 299. French Revolution, 179-206, 218, 235- Gallegans, 9. Gama,Vasco da, discoverer, 23,101, 110, III. Germany and Portugal, 236, 267, 328 ; and republic, 282, 294, 297 ; declares war, 306 ; and colonies, 258, 261, 322,326,327; trade, 329, 330. Goa, 194-206. Godoy, Prince of the Peace, 205, 208. Gonsalvez, Nuno, 20. N Govea, 130. Haro, Donna Mencia Lopez de, 72. Henry, King, inquisitor and cardinal, I3i» 136, 140- Henry,Prince, ' the Navigator', 98, 102, 103. Henry II of England, 70. Henry IV of England, 87. Herculano, Alexander, historian, 239. Holy Alliance, 28, 218, 220, 222. Iberianism, 236, 243. Iberians, 9, 42, 44. Imperialism, 113, 117, 261. Inchiquin, Earl of, expedition under, 172. Independents, republican party, 288. Inquisition, 11, 23, 26, 32, 119, 120, 124, 131, 186, 192-4. Ireland, 13, 46, 74. Isabel, Queen, 78. Jesuits, foundation, 119; Brazil, 119, 137 ; abolished, 195 ; and the republic, 275, 299, 326. Jews, persecution of, 120; con- spiracy, 170 ; German, 251-6, 265, 267. John I of Aviz, * the Great ', 69, 78, 83, 84^ 87, 93, lOI. John II, 'the Perfect', 108, iii. John III, TIC, 122, 131, 186. John IV, of Braganza, 139, 166-71. John V, 186, 188. John VI, 204, 208, 209, 210-13, 218-21. John of Austria, 172. John of England, 69, 76. John of Gaunt, 83, 84-7. Joseph I, 187-92, 198. 'Junius', British envoy, 198. Junot, marshal and envoy, 208-9, 211-213, 218. Junqueiro, Guerro, Republican poet, 233, 244 ; translations. King Simon, 250; Mammon Bashaw, 251 ; Want, Waste, aiid Woe^ 256 ; La Pairia, 32 ; Young Portugal, 300. Katherine, Queen, 136. Kinnoull, Lord, envoy, 198. Laborde, French general, 211. Labour legislation, 285; native, 31, 318. Lamego, Cortes of, 66. Lancaster, House of, 11. Language, 7, 16-19. Lannes," marshal and envoy, 207. Index 339 League of Neutrals, 203. Leiria, 72-82, 83-95. Leite, Duarte, politician, 289, Lencestre, 11. Leonora, Infanta, 76. Lepanto, battle of, 154; ballad \.x^.r\s- lation, 155. Levant Company, foundation of, 151. Liberals, 27-32, 257. Lisbon, growth of, 47, 62, 74, 95, 113; treaty, 175; earthquake, 290, 192 ; French in, 182, 209 ; English in, 218, 225, 224; re- publicans, 266, 274, 216; strikes, 286. Literature, 7, 13. Lopez, Martin, discoverer, in. Louis XIV of France, 182, 184, 188. Louie, Duke of, nineteenth-century statesman, 220, 252. Lucena, seventeenth-century states- man, 170. Luis, King, 248. Luis, Prince, 272. Machado, Dr. Bernardino, 245, 246 ; republican deputy, 266, 269 ; Premier, 291; President, 299; services, 292, 296, 298. Madeira, discovery of, 103, 206; Germans in, 328, 329. Mafra, palace, 24, 58, 188 ; risings, 284, 296. Magalhaens, discoverer, 112. Manoel, King, 272, 275, 276, 277, 280, 282. Manoelists, royalist party, 282, 292. Mantua, Duchesse, Spanish Regent, 167, 168. Maria da Gloria, Queen, 222, 223, 227, 228, 230, 232. Maria Francisca, Queen, 199, 204, 209. Maria Isabella, Queen, 221, Maria II, Queen, 247. Marianna Victoria, Queen, 199. Martins, Oliveira, politician, 246, 305. Methuen Treaty, 47, 182-7. Metternich, Prince, and Portugal, 223, 229, Miguel, Dom, King, 219-30. Miguelists, royalist party, 282, 292. Moniz. Agas, fourteenth-century statesman, 61. Montes Claros, Spanish defeat, 173. Montijo, Spanish defeat, 168. Moors, 9, 10, 21, 42, 52, 53, 56, 57, 61, 69, 70, 76, 81. Mornhig Post and Miguelists, 229. Morocco, fortresses of, 1 35 ; Germans in, 328. Muley, Morocco Sultans, 139. Mtmdo, republican journal, 270. Napier, history, quotations from, 214, 230. Napoleon, 205-8, 210. v. Penin- sular War. Nascimiento, Francisco de, eigh- teenth-century poet, 193. Nassau, Count Maurice, in Brazil, 161, 169. Naulilla, encounter with Germans, 297. Naves de Tolosa, battle of, 1 70. Neutrality in F^uropean War, 293, ^95- Nova Zembla, discovery, in. Nunez, Pedro, mathematician, 130. Oeiras, Count of. v. Pombal. Olivares, Count -Duke, Spanish statesman, 166, 167, 170- 01iven9a district, cession of, 206 ; claim to, 332. Omar, Emir, 61. 340 Index Oporto, 43, 47, 69 ; British factory, 184, 197; rising against English, 218; for Maria, 223, 224; Pedro lands, 229; republic proclaimed, 263 ; republican election, 266. Oppus, Archbishop, and the Moors, 52. Ossorio, Bishop of, library sacked, 156. Ourique, defeat of Moors, 61. Palmella, castle of, 49. Palmella, Duke of, nineteenth-cen- tury statesman, 220, 221, 228, 252. Palmerston, Portuguese policy, 226, 228. Papacy, Bull of 1725, 186; crusades, 179, 187; Portuguese policy, 6, 25-7j 84, 118, 195, 275 ; decay of, 13 f. Pedro I, 70, 78. Pedro II, 176, 177, 182. Pedro III, 199. Pedro IV, Emperor of Brazil and King, 220, 222, 229, 230. Pedro V, King, 247, 248. Pedro, Prince Protector, 100, 106. Pena Palace, 124. Penella, battle of, 106. Peninsular War, 203, 211 et seq. Philip II of Spain, King of Portugal, 26, 139, 141, 147-50, 152. Philip V of Spain, 182, 183, 187. Philippa, Queen, 86, 98. , Phoenicians, 10, 44, 50. Pirates and Portugal, 135. Pombal, J. de Carvalho, eighteenth- century statesman, 12, 26, 48^ 180, 189, 190; and Jesuits, 192-4, 195, 196 ; banished, 199. Port wine, 185, 197, 329. 'Progresistas ', republican party, 258, 265, 288. Prisoners, 53 ; political, 283, 284. Principe, 317; native labour, 318. Quental, Antero de, republican poet, 235, 240, 242 ; translations from, 243, 260. Radicals, 279, 283, 284. Reformation, 92, 117, 122, 124. ' Regeneradores', nineteenth-century party, 257-8, 265, 266, 288. 'Reichegou', ballad, translation, 225, 228. Reis, Candido dos, Admiral, 276, Republic, in Brazil, 259 ; in Portugal, 263, 274, 277, 278, 283,302. Republicanism, 262-6, 302. Republicans, election of, 266; pro- gramme, 267, 268; trial of, 271. Repudiation, financial, 263, 273. Resende, Andrea de, antiquarian, 50, 130. Resende, Garcia de, poet, 80. ' Revenge ', ballad, translation, 155. Revolution, American, 262 ; Turkish, 268; Portuguese, 276, 305. v. French. Ribeiro, Bernardim, poet, 125, 130. Ribeiro, Hintze, nineteenth-century politician, 264, 266. Ribeiro, Joao, seventeenth-century reformer, 147, 168, 170, 189. Richelieu, Portuguese policy, 166. Richmond, royalists at, 280. Riego, Leote de, republican leader, 296, 299. Roli9a, battle of, 211. Romans, 9, 10, 41, 44, 48, 52. Rooke, expedition under, 183. Rotativism, 254, 255, 264, 267. Royal Mail SS. Co., 43, 51, 90. Royalists, 28, 33, 267-8, 272, 275, 279-82, 284, 292. Russia, labour legislation, 285. Index 341 Sado, River, 49-71. Sagjes, promontory, 102, 156. Salado, battle of, 76. Salamanca University, 8. Saldanha, Duke, nineteenth-century statesman, 221, 229, 232, 233, 252, 258. Salisbury, Portuguese policy, 8, 260 ; ultimatum, 258, San Ildefonso, treaty, 205. San Mamede, battle of (1128), 60. San Salvador occupied by Dutch, 160. San Thome and native labour, 317, 318- Sancho I, King, 68, 69, 70, 76. Sancho II, King, 71. Santarem, siege of, 68. Santos, Machado, republican leader, 276, 288. Sartorius, Admiral, expedition under, 230. Schomberg, expedition under, 173. Schools, 303. Sebastian, King, 136-9. Sebastianism, 144, 164, 202-4, 209, 215. Separation, law of, 291. Serpa Pinto, nineteenth-century explorer, 258. Setubal, 49. Shakespeare, 125. Shipping, Portuguese, 312; German, 300. Silva, Antonio da, eighteenth-century poet, 193. Simon of Dover, 63. Slavery, introduction of, 117; abolished, Brazil, 137 ; abolished, Portugal, 196. Smith, Sir Sidney, 209. Soarez, Lieutenant, murdered, 283. Soult, Marshal, 212. Sousa, Teixeira de, nineteenth-cen- tury politician, 275. Southey, Robert, author, 12, 188, 192. Soveral, Marquis de, royalist, 277. Spain, 6, 8, 26, 78, 131, 158, 162, 167, 180, 183, 204, 206, 210, 236, 282. Stephens, Morse, historian, 64, 67. Stewart, de Rothesay, envoy, 212, 215-17, 222. Strikes, 285, 286. Stukely, Sir Thomas, expedition under, 138. Syndicalism, 286. Talavera, battle of, 213. Tangier, siege of, 105 ; expedition, 138 ; cession, 172. Tariff, 315, 324, (1892) 328, (1908) 328. Tavora plot against Pombal, 195-6. Terceira. v. Villa Flor. Teresa, Queen, 59, 60, 64, 72. Tobacco monopoly, 265, 308. Thomar, 143, 148, 162. Toro, battle of, Spanish victory, 107. Torres Vedras, lines of, 212. Trade unions, 285. Trouin, Duguay-, 183. Troya, ancient settlement, 49, 50. Tuy, peace of, 61, 63. ' Twelve of England ', ballad, 87. Tyrawley, Lord, envoy, 187. 'Unionists', republican party, 287, 288. United States trade, 330. Urraca, Queen of Castile, 59. Utrecht, Treaty of, 183. Valdevez, Tourney of, 63, 66, 88. Valdevez, Truce of, 63. 342 Index Valen9a, ballad of, translation, 55. Vasconcellos, Augusto de, repub- lican politician, 289 ; seventeenth- century politician, 167. Vicente Gil, sixteenth-century poet, 13, 21, 123-5; Attto da Alma, translation, 128-9; Auto da Feira, translation, 126 ; Barca do Inferno, translation, 128; Ex- horta^do da Gtieri-a, translation, 127: /'a^/'£»r«/, translation, 14. Villa Flor, nineteenth-century general, 221, 228, 230. Villa Flor, seventeenth-century general, 175. Vimiera, battle of, 211. Viseu, Duke of, 108. Visigoths, 9, 52. Viterbo, Sousa, republican writer. To the Republic, translation, 39. War, of 1914, 292, 294, 311. Wellington, Duke of, 211-13, 215, 217, 223. Wheat, supply of, 314, 315. Wight, Earl of, expedition under, 71. Windsor, Treaty of, 22, 86, 87. Wraxall, Sir William, quotation from, 224. 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