GIFT OF 
 
 Jr 
 
SELECTIONS 
 
 FROM 
 
 LOCKE'S ESSAY ON THE HUMAN 
 UNDERSTANDING. 
 
SELECTIONS FROM 
 
 LOCKE'S ESSAY ON THE 
 HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES 
 
 BY S. H. EMMENS 
 
 AUTHOR OP " A TREATISE ON LOGIC, PURE AXD APPLIED," ETC. 
 
 Ihirfc (Edition 
 
 LONDON 
 
 CROSBY LOCKWOOD AND SON 
 
 7, STATIONERS' HALL COURT, LUDGATE HILL 
 1890 
 

OF T 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION 1 
 
 No INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND 6 
 
 Note on the Laws of Thought 25 
 
 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INNATE PRINCIPLES, BOTH 
 
 SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL ..... 26 
 Note on the Cartesian Doctrine of Innate Ideas ... 46 
 
 OF IDEAS IN GENERAL AND THEIR ORIGINAL . . . .47 
 
 Notes: A. Locke's Metaphysical System considered his- 
 torically and critically 63 
 
 B. Is the Mind always in a state of conscious 
 
 activity ? 68 
 
 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY 69 
 
 Note on Personal Identity 92 
 
 OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS ...... 95 
 
 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS . . . . . . .111 
 
 Notes : A. The Schoolmen . . . . . .131 
 
 B. Locke's Notion of Logic 132 
 
 OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES 134 
 Note Are Disputes really verbal ? 150 
 
VI CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE 151 
 
 Note on Sensitive Knowledge 157 
 
 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 158 
 
 Notes : A. Of Intuition 182 
 
 B. Of Locke's Theory concerning Knowledge . 183 
 
 OF REASON 187 
 
 Note on the Syllogism 209 
 
 OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES . .210 
 
[U1I7ER3ITY 
 
 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 THE design of the accompanying volume is to give, 
 in small compass, a general view of Locke's philoso- 
 phical system as exhibited in his celebrated Essay, 
 and, at the same time, to present the reader with 
 some of the most striking and brilliant passages that 
 are to be found in that work. 
 
 As, however, a series of " selections " must in some 
 measure produce but a fragmentary and imperfect idea 
 of any system, it has been deemed advisable to add 
 such critical notes as might serve to point out the 
 unity of thought which pervades the following extracts, 
 and elucidate those topics which would otherwise re- 
 main obscure. By this means the present work will, 
 it is hoped, possess a completeness that may not only 
 render it a mirror, as it were, of Locke's Essay, but 
 may also enable it to be used as an introduction to the 
 study of metaphysics. At the same time, it must not 
 
Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 be supposed that there is, in these notes, any attempt 
 whatsoever at a formal discussion of philosophical 
 questions all that they contain being merely a sketch 
 of the more salient points connected with Locke's 
 system, and a few outlines of the relations which obtain 
 betwixt its precursors, itself, and its successors. 
 
 S. H. E. 
 
 LONDON, October, 1865 
 
> > - ! ~**\g^ 
 [TfflTlKSItY] 
 
 
 SELECTIONS FBOM 
 
 LOCKE'S ESSAY ON THE HUMAN 
 UNDERSTANDING. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 IN the bright annals of philosophy few names occupy a more 
 conspicuous position than that of John Locke. Distinguished 
 for his acute and penetrating intellect, for his proficiency in 
 physical studies, and for the great learning which he brought 
 to bear upon every subject, he has exercised a remarkable 
 influence upon the progress of thought ; and if at times the 
 objections of his opponents have prevailed against some por- 
 tions of the theories which he adopted, we must yet consider 
 how much we owe to the illustrious philosopher whose exer- 
 tions in the dawn of modern science were attended with such 
 eminent success. 
 
 Foremost among Locke's works stands his " Essay on the 
 Human Understanding," a book which early attained to Euro- 
 pean celebrity ; and as the following pages are devoted to a 
 series of Selections from this noble treatise, it is evident that 
 they will be most fitly introduced by a short account of its 
 general design and execution. 
 
 The purpose, then, with which the Essay was written was 
 "to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human 
 knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, 
 
 B 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 opinion, and assent." This is sought to be accomplished by' 
 a discussion of the subject under four distinct heads, to each 
 of which a book of the Essay is devoted. The first book treats 
 upon the question of Innate Notions ; and after a consideration 
 of the arguments which tend to support this doctrine, it is 
 finally concluded that all knowledge is the result of expe- 
 rience, and that none of our ideas are native to the mind. 
 The second book then proceeds to discuss these ideas in detail, 
 showing both the precise manner in which they are severally 
 acquired, and the classes into which they may be most con- 
 veniently grouped. This gives occasion for an inquiry into 
 the nature of some ideas which are more remarkable than the 
 rest, such as those of Solidity, Space, Infinity, &c. The book 
 concludes with a subtle disquisition on the various Relations 
 which obtain betwixt our notions, that of Identity being most 
 fully noticed, and with an admirable chapter upon the Associa- 
 tion of Ideas. The third book is allotted to a consideration of 
 that great instrument of thought language ; and this portion 
 of the Essay is inferior to none, whether in force of reasoning, 
 in fertility of illustration, or in permanency of value. It 
 investigates the manner in which the meaning of words is 
 acquired ; the history and method of their application ; the 
 various imperfections and abuses to which they are liable ; 
 and, finally, discloses the most suitable remedies for the 
 numerous defects of which language is susceptible. The 
 fourth and concluding book is composed of a series of chapters 
 which treat upon the degrees^extent, and reality of human 
 knowledge ; the means whereby we attain to acknowledge of 
 existence in general, and of ourselves and the Deity in par- 
 ticular ; the nature of judgment and probability ; the degrees 
 of assent, and how far this should be guided by faith or reason ; 
 the operations of enthusiasm and error ; and the proper method 
 of classifying the sciences. 
 
 Such is, in briefest outline, the general scope of the " Essay 
 concerning Human Understanding," as it was termed by its 
 author ; and it must be confessed that the manner in which 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 he has treated this great subject affords a striking proof of 
 that practical sagacity and those varied abilities for which 
 Locke was so renowned. The style, however, of the Essay 
 has not been so fortunate as to escape all adverse criticism : 
 indeed, it has at times been censured in terms of severe rebuke. 
 Thus, to give but one instance, we find Sir William Hamilton 
 speaking as follows:* "In his language, Locke is, of all 
 philosophers, the most figurative, ambiguous, vacillating, 
 various, and even contradictory" an opinion, which, coming 
 from so distinguished a quarter, is not to be lightly esteemed. 
 At the same time, it should be borne in mind that while from 
 a strictly philosophical point of view many exceptions may be 
 taken to Locke's style, yet there are few writers who are 
 better calculated to please when we regard the ease and 
 dexterity with which he handles the most complicated argu- 
 ments, the force and aptness of his illustrations, and the 
 singular beauty of his metaphors. 
 
 As regards the general character of Locke's philosophical 
 system, it may be mentioned that it was, for the most part, 
 taken from that propounded by Grassendi, a celebrated French 
 metaphysician, who flourished in the first half of the seven- 
 teenth century. The latter, although a professed opponent 
 of the Aristotelian philosophy, yet adopted many of his doc- 
 trines from the Schoolmen ; and it is a matter of no little 
 admiration to find that Locke, whose allusions to the schools 
 are in the highest degree acrimonious, should, whilst follow- 
 ing Gassendi, have become deeply indebted to those very 
 philosophers whom he was treating with such asperity. The 
 doctrines, however, which he thus acquired were (in general), 
 greatly improved and amplified ; and, interweaving these with 
 the principles which he had himself developed, he succeeded 
 in producing a system of great completeness and harmony. 
 It was intended as a refutation of the celebrated Cartesian 
 philosophy, and after a sharp struggle for existence against 
 the attacks of Serjeant and others, it at length succeeded in 
 * " Discussions," p. 78. 
 B 2 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 firmly establishing itself as the basis of English speculation 
 In France, also, under the auspices of Voltaire and Condillac, 
 it speedily met with almost universal favour ; but in Germany 
 the case was different. In that country, Locke's doctrine 
 of Sensualism, as it is generally termed, was opposed with 
 great vigour and ability by Leibnitz, the celebrated rival of 
 Newton ; the result being that it was finally rejected in 
 favour of the Rationalistic system, established by the joint 
 efforts of Leibnitz and Wolf. 
 
 Between these two systems, then, of Sensualism, or the 
 relegation of all knowledge to sensible experience, and 
 nationalism, or the assumption of a native source of know- 
 ledge (speaking broadly) in the mind itself, was the empire 
 of European thought divided; and this state of things con- 
 tinued to obtain until it was brought to an end by the 
 writings of David Hume, who showed that both the Lockian 
 and Leibnitian philosophies, if pushed to their logical conse- 
 quences, must result in the establishment of Nihilism or 
 Scepticism. Such a deduction roused all the dormant energies 
 of speculation by exposing to the broad light of day the glaring 
 defects of those doctrines, which, whilst immured in the dark 
 temples of custom and inactivity, philosophers had for so long 
 a period been content to worship as perfect. In Britain, the 
 Scottish metaphysicians were the first to take the alarm ; and 
 under the guidance of Dr. Thomas Reid, they replaced the Sen- 
 sualist doctrine of Locke by a system which is generally known 
 as the Common- Sense Philosophy, and of which the main posi- 
 tions are, first, an intuitive knowledge of material existence ; 
 and, secondly, a recognition of some notions as native to the 
 mind. In Germany, the revolution of opinion induced by 
 Hume was consummated by Immanuel Kant and his fol- 
 lowers; the Leibnitian system being superseded by New 
 Rationalism or Transcendentalism, a doctrine which, com- 
 mencing with the principle that the mind can know nothing 
 beyond itself, has by Eichte and Schelling been raised to the 
 summit of absolute idealism ; thus identifying Reason (as clis- 
 
INTRODUCTION. O 
 
 tinct from Understanding) with absolute Being, that is, with 
 the Deity. This system, has, however, for the most part, 
 given place to the Scottish philosophy, which, owing to the 
 exertions of Cousin, Royer-Collard, and Jouffroy, is also 
 very generally accepted in Erance and Italy ; so that it may 
 fairly be considered as the prevalent doctrine of the present 
 day.* 
 
 I have thus attempted to point out the position which 
 Locke's Essay occupies in the progress of philosophy ; and I 
 trust that I have succeeded in conveying some idea of the 
 relations which exist between it and the most prominent doc- 
 trines of modern speculation. Nor is this, I venture to think, 
 of little consequence as regards the nature of the present 
 volume ; for while each selection is complete in itself, yet a 
 general knowledge of the system to which it belongs, and of 
 that system's distinguishing features, must evidently be indis- 
 pensable to a correct appreciation of its value. 
 
 * Of late years the Scottish philosophy has undergone some modifier begin 
 but these it is unnecessary to notice. , 
 
 "It is 
 
 7 hich, 
 te. 
 
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 
 
 1. The way shown how we come ly any knowledge, sufficient 
 to prove it not innate. It is an established opinion among 
 some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate 
 principles ; some primary notions, KOIVOL twoiat,* characters, 
 as it were, stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul 
 receives in its very first being, and brings into the world 
 with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced 
 readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only 
 show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this dis- 
 course) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, 
 may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help 
 of any innate impressions, and may arrive at certainty with- 
 quei nnv 6UC ] 1 original notions or principles. For I imagine, 
 Scepi ne w ift easily grant, that it would be impertinent to 
 f 8 P:>se the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom 
 defe hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the 
 tyes from external objects : and no less unreasonable would 
 it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature 
 and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves 
 faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them 
 as if they were originally imprinted on the mind. 
 
 But because a man is not permitted without censure to 
 follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they_ 
 lead him ever so little out of the common road, I shall set 
 down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that 
 opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one ; which 
 I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose 
 themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it. 
 
 2. General assent the great argument. There is nothing 
 more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain 
 
 * Common thoughts, i.e. thoughts shared in by all the world. ED, 
 

 
 NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 7 
 
 principles, both speculative and practical (for they speak of 
 both), universally agreed upon by all mankind ; which there- 
 fore, they argue, must needs be constant impressions which 
 the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they 
 bring into the world with them, as necessarily and really as 
 they do any of their inherent faculties. 
 
 3. Universal consent proves nothing innate. This argument, 
 drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that 
 if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain 
 truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them 
 innate, if there can be any other way shown, how men may 
 come to that universal agreement in the things they do 
 consent in ; which I presume may be done. 
 
 4. " What is, is ;" and, "It is impossible for the same thing \ 
 to be, and not to be," not universally assented to. Eut, which I 
 is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made 
 use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstra- 
 tion that there are none such ; because there are none to 
 which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin 
 with the speculative, and instance in those magnified prin- 
 ciples of demonstration: " Whatsoever is, is;" and "It is 
 impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be," which, 
 of all others, I think, have the most allowed title to innate. 
 These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally 
 received, that it will, no doubt, be thought strange if any 
 one should seem to question it. Eut yet I take liberty to 
 say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal 
 assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they 
 are not so much as known. 
 
 5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not knoun 
 to children, idiots, fyc. For, first, it is evident, that all 
 children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought 
 of them ; and the want of that is enough to destroy that 
 universal assent, which must needs be the necessary con- 
 comitant of all innate truths : it seeming to me near a con- 
 tradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul 
 which it perceives or understands not ; imprinting, if it 
 
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 
 
 signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain 
 truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the 
 mind, without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly 
 intelligible. If, therefore, children and idiots have souls, 
 have ^uinds, with those impressions upon them, they must 
 unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent 
 to these truths ; which, since they do not, it is evident that 
 there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions 
 naturally imprinted, how can they be innate ? And if they 
 are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown ? To say, 
 a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time 
 to say that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took 
 notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No propo- 
 sition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, 
 which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may, 
 then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and 
 the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in 
 the mind, and to be imprinted ; since if any one can be said 
 to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only 
 because it is capable of knowing it ; and so the mind is of 
 all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be im- 
 printed on the mind which it never did, nor ever shall, know : 
 for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many 
 truths which his mind was capable of knowing, and that 
 with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the 
 natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever 
 comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them 
 innate : and this great point will amount to no more, but 
 only to a very improper way of speaking ; which, whilst it 
 pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from 
 those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, 
 ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several 
 truths. The capacity, they say, is innate ; the knowledge 
 acquired. But then, to what end such contest for certain 
 innate maxims ? If truths can be imprinted on the under- 
 standing without being perceived, I can see no difference 
 'there can be between any truths the mind is capable of 
 
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 9 
 
 knowing in respect of their original : they must all be innate, 
 or all adventitious ; in vain shall a man go about to distin- 
 guish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the 
 understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort 
 of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding as it 
 never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these 
 words (" to be in the understanding") have any propriety, 
 they signify to be understood. So that, to be in the under- 
 standing, and not to be understood ; to be in the mind, and 
 never to be perceived ; is all one as to say, any thing is, and 
 is not, in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two 
 propositions: " Whatsoever is, is," and "It is impossible 
 for the same thing to be, and not to be," are by nature im- 
 printed, children cannot be ignorant of them ; infants, and 
 all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their 
 understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it. 
 
 6. That men know them when they come to the use of reason, 
 answered. To avoid this, it is usually answered, that all 
 men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of 
 reason ; and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer. 
 
 7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, 
 go for clear reasons to those who, being prepossessed, take 
 not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. 
 For, to apply this answer with any tolerable sense to our 
 present purpose, it must signify one of these two things ; 
 either, that, as soon as men come to the use of reason, these 
 supposed native inscriptions come to be known and observed 
 by them ; or else, that the use and exercise of men's reasons 
 assist them in the discovery of these principles, and certainly 
 makes them known to them. 
 
 8. If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate. 
 If they mean that by the use of reason men may discover 
 these principles, and that this is sufficient to prove them 
 innate, their way of arguing will stand thus : viz. That, 
 whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make 
 us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the 
 mind ; since that universal assent which is made the mark of 
 
 B 3 
 
10 NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 
 
 them, amounts to no more but this that by the use of 
 reason we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of, and 
 assent to, them ; and by this means there will be no difference 
 between the maxims of the mathematicians and theorems 
 they deduce from them : all must be equally allowed innate, 
 they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and 
 truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know, 
 if he apply his thoughts rightly that way. 
 
 9. It is false that reason discovers them. But how can these 
 men think the use of reason necessary to discover principles 
 that are supposed innate, when reason (if we may believe 
 them) is nothing else but the faculty of deducing unknown 
 truths from principles or propositions that are already known ? 
 That certainly can never be thought innate which we have 
 need of reason to discover, unless, as I have said, we will 
 have all the certain truths that reason ever teaches us to be 
 innate. We may as well think the use of reason necessary to 
 make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be 
 need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the under- 
 standing see what is originally engraven in it, and cannot be 
 in the understanding before it be perceived by it. So that to 
 make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say, 
 that the use of reason discovers to a man what he knew before ; 
 and if men have those innate impressed truths originally, and 
 before the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them 
 till they come to the use of reason, it is in effect to say that 
 men know, and know them not, at the same time. 
 
 10. It will here perhaps be said, that mathematical demon- 
 strations, and other truths that are not innate, are not assented 
 to, as soon as proposed, wherein they are distinguished froLi 
 these maxims and other innate truths. I shall have occasion 
 to speak of assent upon the first proposing more particularly 
 by-and-by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, 
 that these maxims and mathematical demonstrations are in 
 this different that the one has need of reason, using of 
 proofs, to make them out and to gain our assent ; but the 
 other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least 
 
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 11 
 
 reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave 
 to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge 
 which requires the use of reason for the discovery of these 
 general truths, since it must be confessed that in their dis- 
 covery there is no use made of reasoning at all. And I think 
 those who give this answer will not be forward to affirm, t'hat 
 the knowledge of this maxim, " That it is impossible for the 
 same thing to be, and not to be," is a deduction of our reason. 
 For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem 
 so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles 
 to depend on the labour of our thoughts ; for all reasoning is 
 search and casting about, and requires pains and application. 
 And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed that 
 what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of 
 our reason, should need the use of reason to discover it ? 
 
 11. Those whd will take the pains to reflect with a little 
 attention on the operations of the understanding, will find 
 that this ready assent of the mind to some truths depends not 
 either on native inscription or the use of reason ; but on a 
 faculty of the mind quite distinct from, both of them, as we 
 shall see hereafter. Reason, therefore, having nothing to do 
 in procuring our assent to these maxims, if by saying that 
 " men know and assent to them when they come to the use 
 of reason," be meant that the use of reason assists us in the 
 knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly false ; and, were it 
 true, would prove them not to be innate. 
 
 1 2, The coming to the use of reason, not the time we come to 
 know these maxims. If by knowing and assenting to them 
 " when we come to the use of reason," be meant, that this is 
 the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind ; 
 and that as soon as children come to the use of reason, they 
 come also to know and assent to these maxims ; this also is 
 false and frivolous. Pirst, it is false ; because it is evident \ 
 these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of ! , 
 reason, and therefore the coming to the use of reason is j 
 falsely assigned as the time of their discovery. How many 
 instances of the use of reason may we observe in children, a 
 
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 
 
 long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim, 
 " That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to 
 be !' : And a great part of illiterate people and savages pass 
 many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking 
 on this and the like general propositions. I grant, men come 
 not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract 
 truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of 
 reason ; and I add, nor then neither. "WTiich is so, because, 
 till after they come to the use of reason, those general 
 abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which those 
 general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles, 
 but are indeed discoveries made, and verities introduced, and 
 brought into the mind by the same way, and discovered by 
 the same steps, as several other propositions which nobody 
 was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope 
 to make plain in the sequel of this discourse. I allow, there- 
 fore, a necessity that men should come to the use of reason 
 before they get the knowledge of those general truths ; but 
 deny that men's coming to the use of reason is the time of 
 their discovery. 
 
 13. By this they are not distinguished from other knowable 
 truths. In the mean time it is observable, that this saying, 
 "That men know and assent to these maxims when they 
 come to the use of reason," amounts, in reality of fact, to no 
 more but this : That they are never known nor taken notice of 
 before the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to some 
 time after during a man's life ; but when, is uncertain : and 
 so may all other knowable truths as well as these ; which 
 therefore have no advantage nor distinction from others, by 
 this note of being known when we come to the use of reason, 
 nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary. 
 
 14. If coming to the use of reason were the time of their dis- 
 covery, it would not prove them innate. But, secondly, were 
 it true that the precise time of their being known and assented 
 to were when men come to the use of reason, neither would 
 that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, 
 as the supposition of itself is false. For by what kind of 
 
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 13 
 
 logic will it appear that any notion is originally by nature 
 imprinted in the mind in its first constitution, because it 
 comes first to be observed and assented to when a faculty of 
 the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert 
 itself ? And therefore the coming to the use of speech, if it 
 were supposed the time that these maxims are first assented 
 to (which it may be with as much truth as the time when 
 men come to the use of reason), would be as good a proof that 
 they were innate, as to say they are innate because men 
 assent to them when they come to the use of reason. I 
 agree, then, with these men of innate principles, that there is 
 no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the 
 mind till it comes to the exercise of reason ; but I deny that 
 the coming to the use of reason is the precise time when they 
 are first taken notice of ; and if that were the precise time, I 
 deny that it would prove them innate. All that can, with 
 any truth, be meant by this proposition, " That men assent 
 to them when they come to the use of reason," is no more but 
 this, That the making of general abstract ideas, and the un- 
 derstanding of general names, being a concomitant of the 
 rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly 
 get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for 
 them, till, having for a good while exercised their reason 
 about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their 
 ordinary discourse and actions with others, acknowledged to 
 be capable of rational conversation. If assenting to these 
 maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true in 
 any other sense, I desire it may be shown ; or, at least, how 
 in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate. 
 
 15. The steps by which the mind attains several truths. The 
 senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet 
 empty cabinet ; and the mind by degrees growing familiar 
 with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and 
 names got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceedirg farther, 
 abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general 
 names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with 
 ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its 
 
14 NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 
 
 discursive faculty ; and the use of reason becomes daily more 
 visible, as these materials, that give it employment, increase. 
 Eut though the having of general ideas, and the use of 
 general words and reason, usually grow together, yet I see 
 not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge 
 of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind ; but in a 
 way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will 
 observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas not innate, but 
 acquired ; it being about those first, which are imprinted by ex- 
 ternal things, with which infants have earliest to do, which 
 make the most frequent impressions on their senses. In 
 ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some agree, and others 
 differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory, as soon 
 as it is able to retain and receive distinct ideas. Eut whether 
 it be then or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has 
 the use of words, or comes to that which we commonly call 
 " the use of reason." For a child knows as certainly, before 
 it can speak, the difference between the ideas of sweet and 
 bitter (that is, that sweet is not bitter), as it knows after- 
 wards, when it comes to speak, that wormwood and sugar- 
 plums are not the same thing. 
 
 16. A child knows not that three and four are equal to 
 seven till he comes to be able to count to seven, and has got 
 the name and idea of equality ; and then, upon explaining 
 those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the 
 truth of that proposition. Eut neither does he then readily 
 assent because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent want- 
 ing till then because he wanted the use of reason ; but the 
 truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in his 
 mind the clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for ; 
 and then he knows the truth of that proposition upon the 
 same grounds, and by the same means, that he knew before, 
 that a rod and cherry are not the same thing ; and upon the 
 same grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, 
 "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to 
 be," as shall be more fully shown hereafter : so that the 
 later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas 
 
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 15 
 
 about which those maxims are, or to know the signification of 
 those general terms that stand for them, or to put together 
 in his mind the ideas they stand for ; the later also will it 
 be before he comes to assent to those maxims, whose terms, 
 with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than 
 those of a cat or weasel, he must stay till time and observa- 
 tion have acquainted him with them ; and then he will be in 
 a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first 
 occasion that shall make him put together those ideas in his 
 mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according 
 as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is 
 that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to 
 thirty-seven, by the same self-evidence that he knows one 
 and two to be equal to three ; yet a child knows this not so 
 soon as the other ; not for the want of the use of reason, but 
 because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty- 
 seven stand for, are not so soon got as those which are 
 signified by one, two, and three. 
 
 17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them 
 not innate. This evasion, therefore, of general assent when 
 men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving 
 no difference between those supposed innate and other truths 
 that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have en- 
 deavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call 
 maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to as soon as 
 proposed and the terms they are proposed in understood : see- 
 ing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and under- 
 stand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is 
 sufficient to prove them innate. Por, since men never fail, 
 after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge 
 them for undoubted truths, they would infer that certainly 
 these propositions were first lodged in the understanding, 
 which without any teaching, the mind, at the very first 
 proposal, immediately closes with, and assents to, and after 
 that never doubts again. 
 
 18. If such an assent be a mark of innate, then that one and 
 two are equal to three, that sweetness is not bitterness, and a 
 
16 XO INNATE PEIXCIPLES IN THE MIND. 
 
 thousand tlie like, must le innate. In answer to this, I de- 
 mand whether ready assent, given to a proposition upon first 
 hearing and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an 
 innate principle ? If it be not, such a general assent is in 
 vain urged as a proof of them : if it be said, that it is a mark 
 of innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be 
 innate which are generally assented to as soon as heard ; 
 whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with 
 innate principles. For upon the same ground, viz. of assent 
 at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would 
 have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit 
 several propositions about numbers to be innate, and thus, that 
 " one and two are equal to three," that " two and two are 
 equal to four," and a multitude of other the like propositions 
 in numbers, that everybody assents to at first hearing and 
 understanding the terms, must have a place amongst these 
 innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, 
 and propositions made about several of them; but even 
 natural philosophy, and all the other sciences, afford proposi- 
 tions which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are 
 understood. That " two bodies cannot be in the same place," 
 is a truth that nobody any more sticks at than at this maxim, 
 that " it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," 
 that "white is not black," that "a square is not a circle," 
 that " yellowness is not sweetness : " these, and a Trillion of 
 other such propositions, as many at least as we have distinct 
 ideas, every man in his wits at first hearing, and knowing 
 what the names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If 
 these men will be true to their own rule, and have " as- 
 sent at first healing and understanding the terms " to be 
 a mark of innate, they must allow not only as many innate 
 propositions as men have distinct ideas, but as many as men 
 can make propositions wherein different ideas are denied one 
 of another ; since every proposition, wherein one different 
 idea is denied of another, will as certainly find assent at first 
 hearing and understanding the terms, as this general one, 
 ' It is impossible for the same to be and not to be ; " or that 
 
NO INNATE PKIXCIPLES IN THE &IXD. 17 
 
 which is the foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the 
 two, " The same is not different ; " by which account they will 
 have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without 
 mentioning any other. But since no proposition can he innate, 
 unless the ideas about which it is be innate, this will be to 
 suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, figure, &c., 
 innate ; than which there cannot be anything more opposite 
 to reason and experience. Universal and ready assent upon 
 hearing and understanding the terms is, I grant, a mark of 
 self-evidence ; but self-evidence, depending not on innate 
 impressions, but on something else (as we shall show here- 
 after), belongs to several propositions, which nobody was yet 
 so extravagant as to pretend to be innate. 
 
 19. Such less general propositions known before these universal A 
 maxims. Nor let it be said that those more particular self- 
 evident propositions which are assented to at first hearing, as, 
 that "one and two are equal to three," that "green is not 
 red," &c., are received as the consequences of those more 
 universal propositions, which are looked on as innate princi- 
 ples ; since any one who will but take the pains to observe what 
 passes in the understanding will certainly find that these and 
 the like less general propositions are certainly known and 
 firmly assented to by those who are utterly ignorant of thoso 
 more general maxims ; and so, being earlier in the mind than 
 those (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them 
 the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing. 
 
 20. One and one equal to two, fyc., not general nor useful, 
 answered. If it be said that these propositions, viz. "Two 
 and two are equal to four," "Bed is not blue," &c., are not 
 general maxims, nor of any great use ; I answer, That makes 
 nothing to the argument of universal assent, upon hearing and 
 understanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, 
 whatever proposition can be found that receives general 
 assent, as soon as heard and understood, that must be ad- 
 mitted for an innate proposition, as well as this maxim, that 
 "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," 
 they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference 
 
18 NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 
 
 of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote 
 from being innate ; those general and abstract ideas being 
 more strangers to our first apprehensions, than those of more 
 particular self-evident propositions ; and therefore it is longer 
 before they are admitted and assented to by the growing un- 
 derstanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnified 
 maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is gene- 
 rally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more 
 fully considered. 
 
 21. These maxims not leing known sometimes till proposed, 
 proves them not innate. But we have not yet done with 
 "assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding 
 their terms : " it is fit we first take notice, that this, instead 
 of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the con- 
 trary ; since it supposes that several who understand and 
 know other things, are ignorant of these principles till they 
 are proposed to them, and that one may be unacquainted with 
 these truths till he hears them from others. For if they were 
 innate, what need they be proposed in order to gaining 
 assent ; when, by being in the understanding, by a natural 
 and original impression (if there were any such), they could 
 not but be known before ? Or doth the proposing them print 
 them clearer in the mind than nature did ? If so, then the 
 consequence will be, that a man knows them better after lie 
 ! has been thus taught them than he did before. Whence it 
 j will follow, that these principles may be made more evident 
 / to us by others' teaching than nature has made them by im- 
 | pression ; which will ill agree with the opinion of innate 
 principles, and give but little authority to them ; but, on the 
 contrary, make them unfit to be the foundations of all our 
 other knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot 
 be denied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these 
 self-evident truths, upon their being proposed ; but it is clear 
 that whosoever does so, finds in himself that he then begins 
 to know a proposition which he knew not before ; and which, 
 from thenceforth, he never questions; not because it was 
 innate, but because the consideration of the nature of the 
 
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIXD. 19 
 
 things contained in those words would not suffer him to 
 think otherwise, how or whensoever he is brought to reflect 
 on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing and 
 understanding the terms, must pass for an innate principle, 
 every well-grounded observation drawn from particulars into a 
 general rule must be innate ; when yet it is certain, that not 
 all but only sagacious beads light at first on these observa- 
 tions, and reduce them into general propositions ; not innate, 
 but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on 
 particular instances. These, when observing men have made 
 them, unob serving men, when they are proposed to them, 
 cannot refuse their assent to. 
 
 22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the mind 
 is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing. If it 
 be said, "The understanding hath an implicit knowledge of 
 these principles, but not an explicit, before the first hearing" 
 (as they must who will say that they are in the understand- 
 ing before they are known), it will be hard to conceive what 
 is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding im- 
 plicitly ; unless it be this, that the mind is capable of under- 
 standing and assenting firmly to such propositions. And 
 thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first prin- 
 ciples, must be received as native impressions on the mind : 
 which I fear they will scarce allow them to be, who find it 
 harder to demonstrate a proposition than assent to it when 
 demonstrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to 
 believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn were but 
 copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven 
 upon their minds. 
 
 23. The argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a 
 false supposition of no precedent teaching. There is, I fear, 
 this farther weakness in the foregoing argument, which would 
 persuade us that therefore those maxims are to be thought 
 innate which men admit at first hearing, because they assent 
 to propositions which they are not taught nor do receive from 
 the force of any argument or demonstration, but a bare expli- 
 cation or understanding of the terms. Under which there 
 
! 
 
 20 NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 
 
 seems to me to lie this fallacy : tliat men are supposed not to 
 be taught, nor to learn anything de novo ; when in truth they 
 are taught and do learn something they were ignorant of 
 before. For, first, it is evident they have learned the terms 
 and their signification ; neither of which was born with 
 them. Eut this is not all the acquired knowledge in the 
 case ; the ideas themselves, about which the proposition is, 
 are not born with them no more than their names, but got 
 afterwards. So that in all propositions that are assented to 
 at first hearing, the terms of the proposition, their standing 
 for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they stand for, 
 being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there 
 is remaining in such propositions that is innate. For I would 
 gladly have any one name that proposition whose terms or 
 ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get ideas 
 and names, and learn their appropriated connection one with 
 another ; and then to propositions, made in such terms whose 
 signification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or 
 disagreement we can perceive in our ideas when put together 
 is expressed, we at first hearing assent ; though to other 
 propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which 
 are concerning ideas not so soon or so easily got, we are at 
 the same time no way capable of assenting. For though a 
 child quickly assents to this proposition, that " an apple is 
 not fire," when, by familiar acquaintance, he has got the 
 ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted on 
 his mind, and has learnt that the names " apple" and "fire" 
 stand for them ; yet it will be some years after, perhaps, 
 before the same child will assent to this proposition, that " it 
 is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," because 
 that, though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet 
 the signification of them being more large, comprehensive, and 
 abstract than of the names annexed to those sensible things 
 the child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their 
 precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form 
 in his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till that be 
 done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent 
 
NO INNATE PF1NCIPLES IN TI1E MIND. 21 
 
 to a proposition made up of such general terms ; but as soon 
 as ever he has got those ideas, and learned their names, he 
 forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the 
 fore-mentioned propositions, and with both for the same 
 reason, viz. because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to 
 agree or disagree, according as the words standing for them 
 are affirmed or denied one of another in the proposition. 
 But if propositions be brought to him in words which stand 
 for ideas he has not yet in his mind ; to such propositions, 
 however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords 
 neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant. Eor words 
 being but empty sounds, any farther than they are signs of 
 our ideas, we cannot but assent to them as they correspond 
 to those ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the 
 showing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our 
 minds, and the grounds of several degrees of assent being 
 the business of the following discourse, it may suffice to have 
 only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of 
 those innate principles. 
 
 24. Not innate, because not universally assented to. To 
 conclude this argument of universal consent, I agree with 
 these defenders of innate principles, that if they are innate, 
 they must needs have universal assent. For, that a truth 
 should be innate and yet not assented to, is to me as un- 
 intelligible as for a man to know a truth and be ignorant of 
 it at the same time. But then, by these men's own con- 
 fession, they cannot be innate ; since they are not assented 
 to by those who understand not the terms, nor by a great 
 part of those who do understand them, but have yet never 
 heard nor thought of those propositions ; which, I think, is 
 at least one-half of mankind. But were the number far less, 
 it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby 
 show these propositions not to be innate, if children alone 
 were ignorant of them. 
 
 25. These maxims not the first known. But that I may not 
 be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants, whizh are 
 unknown to us, and to conclude from what passes in their 
 
22 NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 
 
 understandings, before they express it, I say next, that these 
 two general propositions are not the truths that first possess 
 the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and 
 adventitious notions ; which, if they were innate, they must 
 needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters 
 not ; there is certainly a time when children begin to think, 
 and their words and actions do assure us that they do so. 
 When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, 
 of assent, can it rationally be supposed they can be ignorant 
 of those notions that nature has imprinted, were there any 
 such ? Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, 
 that they perceive the impressions from things without, and 
 are at the same time ignorant of those characters which 
 nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Can they 
 receive and assent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of 
 those which are suj posed woven into the very principles of 
 their being, and in) printed there in indelible characters, to 
 be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge 
 and future reasonings ? This would be to make nature take 
 pains to no purpose, or, at least, to write very ill ; since its 
 characters could not be read by those eyes which saw 
 other things very well : and those are very ill supposed the 
 clearest parts of truth and the foundations of all our know- 
 ledge, which are not first known, and without which the 
 undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had. 
 The child certainly knows that the nurse that feeds it is 
 neither the cat it plays with, nor the Blackmoor it is afraid 
 of ; that the worm, seed or mustard it refuses is not the apple 
 or sugar it cries for ; this it is certainly and undoubtedly 
 assured of: but will any one say it is by virtue of this 
 principle that " it is impossible for the same thing to be and 
 not to be," that it so firmly assents to these and other parts 
 of its knowledge ? or that the child has any notion or appre- 
 hension of that proposition at an age wherein yet, it is plain, 
 it knows a great many other truths? He that will say, 
 ' ' Children j oin these general abstract speculations with their 
 sucking-bottles and their rattles," may perhaps, with justice, 
 
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 23 
 
 be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion, but 
 less sincerity and truth, than one of that age. 
 
 26. And so not innate. Though therefore there bo several 
 general propositions that meet with constant and ready assent 
 as soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the 
 use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing 
 for them ; yet they not being to be found in those of tender 
 years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pre- 
 tend to universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no 
 means can be supposed innate ; it being" impossible that any 
 truth which is innate (if there were any such) should be un- 
 known, at least to any one who knows anything else : since, 
 if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts ; 
 there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has never 
 thought on. Whereby it is evident if there be any innate 
 truths [in the mind], they must necessarily be the first of any 
 thought on, the first that appear there. 
 
 27. Not innate, because they appear least where what is innate 
 shows itself clearest. That the general maxims we are dis- 
 coursing of are not known to children, idiots, and a great 
 part of mankind, we have already sufficiently proved ; where- 
 by it is evident, they have not an universal assent, nor are 
 general impressions. But there is this farther argument in 
 it against their being innate : that these characters, if they 
 were native and original impressions, should appear fairest 
 and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps 
 of them ; and it is, in my opinion, a strong presumption that 
 they are not innate, since they are least known to those in 
 whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves 
 with most force and vigour. Tor children, idiots, savages, 
 and illiterate people, being of all others the least corrupted 
 by custom or borrowed opinions learning and education 
 having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds, nor 
 by superinducing foreign and studied doctrinconfounded 
 those fair characters nature had written there HOtt^might 
 reasonably imagine, that in their minds these innate notions 
 should lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain 
 
24 NO HsN.ATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND. 
 
 the thoughts of children do. It might very well he expected 
 that these principles should he perfectly known to naturals ; 
 which, heing stamped immediately on the soul (as these men 
 suppose), can have no dependence on the constitutions or 
 organs of the body, the only confessed difference between 
 them and others. One would think, according to these men's 
 principles, that all these native beams of light (were there 
 any such) should in those who have no reserves, no arts of 
 concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in 
 no more doubt of their being there than we are of their love 
 of pleasure and abhorrence of pain. But, alas ! amongst 
 children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what 
 general maxims are to be found ? what universal principles 
 of knowledge ? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed 
 only from those objects they have had most to do with, and 
 which have made upon their senses the frequentest and 
 strongest impressions. A child knows his nurse and his 
 cradle, and, by degrees, the playthings of a little more advanced 
 age ; and a young savage has perhaps his head filled with 
 love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe. Eut 
 he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of 
 the woods, will expect these abstract maxims and reputed 
 principles of sciences, will, I fear, find himself mistaken. 
 Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in 
 the huts of Indians ; much less are they to be found in the 
 thoughts of children, or any impressions of them on the 
 minds of naturals. They are the language and business of 
 the schools and academies of learned nations, accustomed to 
 that sort of conversation or learning where disputes are 
 frequent : these maxims being suited to artificial argumen- 
 tation and useful for conviction ; but not much conducing to 
 tl'-fl discovery of truth or advancement of knowledge. 
 
 28. Recapitulation. I know not how absurd this may 
 seem to the masters of demonstration : and probably it will 
 hardly down with anybody at first hearing. I must, there- 
 fore, beg a little truce with prejudice and the forbearance oi 
 censure till I have been heard out in the sequel of this dis- 
 
NOTE ON THE LAWS OF THOUGHT. 25 
 
 course, being very willing to submit to better judgments. 
 And since I impartially search after truth, I shall not be 
 sorry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my own 
 notions ; which, I confess, we are all apt to be when appli- 
 cation and study have warmed our heads with them. 
 
 Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground to think 
 these two famed speculative maxims innate, since they are 
 not universally assented to ; and the assent they so generally 
 find is no other than what several propositions, not allowed 
 Co be innate, equally partake in with them ; and since the 
 assent that is given them is produced another way, and comes 
 not from natural inscription, as I doubt not but to make 
 appear in the following discourse. And if these first prin- 
 ciples of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, 
 no other speculative maxims can, I suppose, with better right 
 pretend to be so. 
 
 NOTE ON THE LAWS OF THOUGHT. 
 Page 7, Section IV. 
 
 The "speculative principles" here alluded to are the famous 
 " laws of thought/' which nave obtained a place in all systems of 
 philosophv, from Plato downwards. They are three in number, 
 and may oe thus expressed : 
 
 1. Whatever is, is. This, known as the law of Identity, was 
 not thoroughly discriminated from the two following laws, 
 and enunciated as a co-ordinate principle, until the time of 
 the Schoolmen. 
 
 2. It is impossible for the same thing at the same time both to 
 be and not to be. The name appropriated to this piinciple 
 is the law of Contradiction. 
 3. A thing either is or is not. This axiom is denominated the 
 
 law of Excluded Middle. 
 
 The second of these laws is that which has most excited dis- 
 cussion, and is that to which, it will be observed, Locke most 
 frequently alludes. The point which he endeavours to prove is 
 that the law, considered as an explicit statement, or fact of know- 
 ledge, does not exist in the mind until it has been acquired by a 
 generalisation or inference from experience. Leibnitz, however, suc- 
 ceeded in re-establishing the apr iori characters of these laws, which 
 for a time had been apparently deposed by Locke; but, as is usual 
 
26 OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 in discussions of this nature, the opposing parties were far more 
 nearly allied in opinion than their words would seem to show. 
 The fact is, that the whole of the disputes which the " laws of 
 thought " have occasioned may be traced to a confusion of the two 
 points of view from which these principles may be examined. 
 Thus, they may be considered as articulate enunciations of certain 
 conditions or forms of thinking that is, as laws, a compliance 
 with which is necessary to all valid thought; or they may be 
 looked upon as certain truths, a knowledge of which is acquired 
 by due reflection. The former of these views is that which in the 
 main (though obscurely) is held by Leibnitz, while the latter has 
 received the support of Locke's able pen ; and as the two opinions 
 are by no means incompatible, it will be seen that, as was, indeed, 
 the case, these philosophers might very readily play at cross 
 purposes; for, each of them in a great measure mistaking the 
 point which the other was discussing, it resulted that that was 
 attacked which was never defended, and that was defended which 
 was never attacked. 
 
 There is a fourth law of thought, termed the law of Sufficient 
 Reason, which, although recognised by Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, 
 had fallen into neglect for ages previous to the time of Leibnitz, 
 who first, among modern philosophers, gave this principle a pro- 
 minent position in the science of mind. It has been thus expressed 
 " Whatever exists or is true must have a sufficient reason why 
 the thing or proposition should be as it is, and not otherwise." 
 Latterly, however, this principle has been relegated to the class of 
 derivative, instead of fundamental laws. 
 
 All further particulars with reference to Locke's remarks upon 
 innate notions will be found in the notes at the end of the two 
 following selections. 
 
 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INNATE 
 
 PRINCIPLES, BOTH SPECULATIVE AND 
 
 PRACTICAL. 
 
 1. Principles not innate, unless their ideas be innate. Had 
 those who would persuade us that there are innate principles, 
 not taken them together in gross, but considered separately the 
 parts out of which those propositions are made, they would not, 
 perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate ; 
 since, if the ideas which made up those truths were not, it was 
 impossible that the propositions made up of them should he, 
 
OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 27 
 
 innate, or our knowledge of them be born with us. For if the 
 ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was 
 without those principles ; and then they will not be innate, but 
 be derived from some other original : for where the ideas them- 
 selves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental 
 or verbal propositions about them. 
 
 2. Ideas, especially those belonging to principles, not lorn iviih 
 children. If we will attentively consider new-born children, we 
 shall have little reason to think that they bring many ideas into 
 the world with them : for, bating, perhaps, some faint ideas of 
 hunger, and thirst, and warmth, and some pains which they may 
 have felt in the womb, there is not the least appearance of any 
 settled ideas at all in them ; especially of ideas answering the 
 terms which make up 1hose universal propositions that are 
 esteemed innate principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, 
 afterwards, ideas come into their minds ; and that they get no 
 more, nor no other, than what experience, and the observation 
 of things that come in their way, furnish them with ; which 
 might be enough to satisfy us that they are not original cha- 
 racters stamped on the mind. 
 
 3. " It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be," 
 is certainly (if there be any such) an innate principle. But can 
 anyone think, or will anyone say, that impossibility and identity 
 are two innate ideas ? Are they such as all mankind have, and 
 bring into the world with them ? And are they those that are 
 the first in children, and antecedent to all acquired ones ? If 
 they are innate, they must needs be so. Hath a child an idea of 
 impossibility and identity before it has of white or black, sweet 
 or bitter ? And is it from the knowledge of this principle that 
 it concludes that wormwood rubbed on the nipple hath not the 
 same taste that it used to receive from thence ? Is it the actual 
 knowledge of Impossibile est idem esse, et non esse,* that makes 
 a child distinguish between its mother and a stranger ; or that 
 makes it fond of the one and fly the other ? Or does the mind 
 regulate itself, and its assent, by ideas that it never yet had ? 
 or the understanding draw conclusions from principles which 
 
 * It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. El). 
 
OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 it never yet knew or understood ? The names " impossibility 71 
 and "identity" stand for two ideas so far from being innate, 
 or born with us, that, I think, it requires great care and atten- 
 tion to form them right in our understandings : they are so far 
 from being brought into the world with us, so remote from the 
 thoughts of infancy and childhood, that, I believe, upon exami- 
 nation, it will be found that many grown men want them. 
 
 4. Identity, an idea not innate. If identity (to instance in 
 that alone) be a native impression, and, consequently, so clear 
 and obvious to us that we must needs know it even from our 
 cradles, I would gladly be resolved, by one of seven or seventy 
 years old, whether a man being a creature consisting of soul 
 and body, be the same man when his body is changed ; 
 whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras,* having had the same 
 soul, were the same man, though they lived several ages 
 asunder ; nay, whether the cock,f too, which had the same soul, 
 were not the same with both of them ? Whereby, perhaps, it 
 will appear, that our idea of sameness is not so settled and clear 
 as to deserve to be thought innate in us. For if those innate 
 ideas are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known 
 and naturally agreed on, they cannot be subjects of universal 
 and undoubted truths, but will be the unavoidable occasion 
 of perpetual uncertainty. For, I suppose, every one's idea of 
 identity will not be the same that Pythagoras and thousands 
 others of his followers have ; and which, then, shall be the 
 true? which innate? or are there two different ideas of 
 identity, both innate ? 
 
 5. Nor let any one think that the questions I have here pro- 
 posed, about the identity of man, are bare, empty speculations ; 
 which if they were, would be enough to show that there was 
 in the understandings of men no innate idea of identity. He 
 that shall, with a little attention, reflect on the resurrection, 
 and consider that Divine Justice shall bring to judgment, at the 
 last day, the very same persons, to be happy or miserable in 
 
 * An allusion to the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration as manifested 
 in the existence of Pythagoras himself. A detailed account of the changes 
 which he underwent may be found in Diogenes LacTtius, viii. ED. 
 
 t See Lucian's Dream of Micyllus. ED. 
 
OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES 29 
 
 the other, who did well or ill in this, life, will find it, perhaps, 
 not easy to resolve with himself what makes the same man, or 
 wherein identity consists ; and will not be forward to think 
 he and every one, even children themselves, have naturally 
 a clear idea of it. 
 
 6. Whole and part, not innate ideas. Let us examine that 
 principle of mathematics, viz. that the " whole is bigger than a 
 part." This, I take it, is reckoned amongst innate principles. I 
 am sure it has as good a title as any to be thought so ; which yet 
 nobody can think it to be, when he considers the ideas it compre- 
 hends in it, whole and part, are perfectly relative ; but the 
 positive ideas to which they properly and immediately belong 
 are extension and number, of which alone whole and part are 
 relations. So that if whole and part are innate ideas, extension 
 and number must be so too ; it being impossible to have an 
 idea of a relation, without having any at all of the thing to 
 which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now, whether 
 the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the ideas 
 of extension and number, I leave to be considered by those who 
 are the patrons of innate principles. 
 
 7. Idea of worship not innate. That " God is to be wor- 
 shipped," is, without doubt, as great a truth as any can enter 
 into the mind of man, and deserves the first place amongst all 
 practical principles ; but yet it can by no means be thought 
 innate, unless the ideas of God and worship are innate. That 
 the idea the term " worship " stands for is not in the under- 
 standing of children, and a character stamped on the mind in 
 its first original, I think, will be easily granted by any one 
 that considers how few there be, amongst grown men, who 
 have a clear and distinct notion of it. And, I suppose, there 
 cannot be anything more ridiculous than to say that children 
 have this practical principle innate that "God is to be 
 worshipped ;" and yet that they know not what that worship 
 of God is, which is their duty. But, to pass by this. 
 
 8. Idea of God not innate. If any idea can be imagined) 
 innate, the idea of God may, of all others, for many reasons, 
 be thought so ; since it is hard to conceive how there should 
 
30 OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 be innate moral principles without an innate idea of a Deity: 
 without a notion of a law-maker, it is impossible to have a 
 notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it. Besides the 
 atheists taken notice of amongst the ancients, and left 
 branded upon the records of history, hath not navigation dis- 
 covered, in these later ages, whole nations, at the Bay of 
 Soldania,*in Brazil, fin Boranday,J and the Carribee Islands, 
 &c., amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a 
 God, no religion ? !Nicholaus del Techo in Literis, ex Para- 
 quarid de Caaiguarum Conversione, has these words : Reperi 
 earn gentem nullum nomen habere, quod Deum et hominis animam 
 nignijicet : nulla sacra habet, nulla idola. These are instances 
 of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself, 
 without the help of letters and discipline, and the improve- 
 ments of arts and sciences. But there are others to be found, 
 who have enjoyed these in a very great measure, who yet for 
 want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want 
 the idea and knowledge of God. It will, I doubt not, be a 
 surprise to others, as it was to me, to find the Siamites of 
 this number ; but for this let them consult the king of 
 Prance's late envoy thither, || who gives no better account of 
 the Chinese themselves.^ And if we will not believe La 
 Loubere, the missionaries of China, even the Jesuits them- 
 selves, the great encomiasts of the Chinese, do all to a man 
 agree, and will convince us, that the sect of the Literati, or 
 "Learned," keeping to the old religion of China, and the 
 ruling party there, are all of them atheists. ( Vid. Navarette, 
 in the Collection of Voyages, vol.. i. ; and Historia Cultus 
 Sinensium). And, perhaps, if we should with attention mind 
 
 * ROE apud THEVENOT, p. 2. 
 
 t Jo. DE LERY, cap. xvi. 
 
 J MARTINIERE, f f i ; TERRY, -&Vy, and -/A ; OVINGTON, |--f . 
 
 Eelatio triplex de Relus Indicis Caaiguarum, -fo". [The translation of 
 the passage quoted may be thus given : " I found that this nation has no 
 name which signifies either God or the soul of man : neither has it any holy 
 rites or idols." Soldania is another name for Saldanha. ED.] 
 
 |j LA LOUBERE, Du Royaume de Siam, torn. i. cap. ix. sect. xv. &c. ; cap. 
 xx. sect, xxii. &c. ; cap. xxii. sect. vi. 
 
 f Jlid,, torn. i. cap, xx. sect. iv. &c. ; cap. xxiii. 
 
OT] 
 
 OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 31 
 
 the lives and discourses of people not so far off, we shoiild 
 have too much reason to fear that many, in more civilised 
 countries, have no very strong and clear impressions of a 
 Deity upon their minds ; and the complaints of atheism made 
 from the pulpit are not without reason. And though only 
 some profligate wretches own it too barefacedly now, yet, 
 perhaps, we should hear more than we do of it from others, 
 did not the fear of the magistrate's sword, or their neigh- 
 hour's censure, tie up people's tongues ; which, were the 
 apprehensions of punishment or shame taken away, would as 
 openly proclaim their atheism as their lives do. 
 
 9. But had all mankind everywhere a notion of a God 
 (whereof yet history tells us the contrary), it woulu not from 
 thence follow that the idea of him was innate. For though 
 no nation were to he found without a name and some few 
 dark notions of him, yet that would not prove them to he 
 natural impressions on the mind, no more than the names of 
 "fire," or the "sun," "heat," or number," do prove the 
 ideas they stand for to be innate, because the names of those 
 things, and the ideas of them, are so universally received and 
 known amongst mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want 
 of such a name, or the absence of such a notion out of men's 
 minds, any argument against the being of a God, any more 
 than it would be a proof that there was no loadstone in the 
 world, because a great part of mankind had neither a notion 
 of any such thing, nor a name for it ; or be any show of argu- 
 ment to prove that there are no distinct and various species of 
 angels or intelligent beings above us, because we have no 
 ideas of such distinct species or names for them. Eor men, 
 being furnished with words by the common language of their 
 own countries, can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of 
 those things whose names those they converse with have 
 occasion frequently to mention to them : and if it carry with 
 it the notion of excellency, greatness, or something extra- 
 ordinary ; if apprehension . and concernment accompany it ; 
 if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it upon the 
 mind ; the idea is likely to sink the deeper and spread the 
 
32 OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 farther, especially if it be such an idea as is agreeable to the 
 common light of reason, and naturally deducible from every 
 part of our knowledge, as that of a God is. For the visible 
 marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly 
 in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature who 
 will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery 
 of a Deity ; and the influence that the discovery of such a 
 Eeing must necessarily have on the minds of all that have but 
 once heard of it is so great, and carries such a weight of 
 thought and communication with it, that it seems stranger to 
 me that a whole nation of men should be anywhere found so 
 brutish as to want the notion of a God, than that they should 
 be without any notion of numbers or fire. 
 
 10. The name of God being once mentioned in any part of 
 the world to express a superior, powerful, wise, invisible Being, 
 the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of com- 
 mon reason, and the interest men will always have to men- 
 tion it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide, and 
 continue it down to all generations ; though yet the general 
 reception of this name, and some imperfect and unsteady 
 notions conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind, 
 prove not the idea to be innate ; but only that they who 
 made the discovery had made a right use of their reason, 
 thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced them to 
 their original ; from whom other less considering people 
 having once received so important a notion, it could not 
 easily be lost again. 
 
 1 1 . This is all could be inferred from the notion of a God, 
 were it to be found universally in all the tribes of mankind, 
 and generally acknowledged by men grown to maturity in all 
 countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, 
 as I imagine, is extended no farther than that ; which, if it 
 be sufficient to prove the idea of God innate, will as well 
 prove the idea of fire innate ; since, I think, it may truly be 
 said, that there is not a person in the world who has a notion 
 of a God who has not also the idea of fire. I doubt not but 
 if a colony of young children should be placed in an island 
 
I 
 
 OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 33 
 
 where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any 
 notion of such a thing nor name for it, how generally soever 
 it were received and known in all the world besides ; and 
 perhaps, too, their apprehensions would be as far removed from 
 any name or notion of a God, till some one amongst them had 
 employed his thoughts to inquire into the constitution and 
 causes of things, which would easily lead him to the notion 
 of a God ; which having once taught to others, reason and 
 the natural propensity of their own thoughts would after- 
 wards propagate and continue amongst them. 
 
 12. " Suitable to God's goodness, that all men should have an 
 idea of him, therefore naturally imprinted ly him" answered. 
 Indeed it is urged that it is suitable to the goodness of God 
 to imprint upon the minds of men characters and notions of 
 himself, and not to leave them in the dark and doubt in so 
 grand a concernment ; and also by that means to secure to 
 himself the homage and veneration due from so intelligent a 
 creature as man ; and therefore he has done it. 
 
 This argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more 
 than those who use it in this case expect from it. For if we 
 may conclude that God hath done for men all that men shall 
 judge is best for them, because it is suitable to his goodness 
 so to do, it will prove not only that God has imprinted on the 
 minds of men an idea of himself, but that he hath plainly 
 stamped there, in fair characters, all that men ought to know 
 or believe of him all that they ought to do in obedience to 
 his will ; and that he hath given them a will and affections 
 conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think it 
 better for men, than that they should, in the dark, grope after 
 knowledge, as St. Paul tells us, all nations did after God 
 (Acts xvii. 27) ; than that their wills should clash with their 
 understandings, and their appetites cross their duty. The 
 Romanists say, it is best for men, and so suitable to the good- 
 ness of God, that there should be an infallible judge of con- 
 troversies on earth ; and therefore there is one. And I, by 
 the same reason, say, it is better for men that every man 
 himself should be infallible. I leave them to consider 
 
 c 3 
 
34 01HEK REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 whether, by the force of this argument, they shall think that 
 every man is so. I think it a very good argument to say, 
 1 1 The infinitely wise God hath made it so, and therefore it is 
 best." But it seems to me a little too much confidence of 
 our own wisdom to say, ' ' I think it best, and therefore God 
 hath made it so ;" and in the matter in hand, it will be in 
 vain to argue from such a topic that God hath done so, when 
 certain experience shows us that he hath not. But the 
 goodness of God hath not been wanting to men without such 
 original impressions of knowledge or ideas stamped on the 
 mind ; since he hath furnished man with those faculties which 
 will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to 
 the end of such a being ; and I doubt not but to show that a 
 man, by the right use of his natural abilities, may, without 
 any innate principles, attain the knowledge of a God, and 
 other things that concern him. God, having endued man 
 with those faculties of knowing which he hath, was no more 
 obliged by his goodness to implant those innate notions in 
 his mind, than that, having given him reason, hands, and 
 1 materials, he should build him bridges or houses ; which some 
 ; people in the world, however of good parts, do either totally 
 want, or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly 
 without ideas of God and principles of morality, or at least 
 have but very ill ones : the reason in both cases being that 
 \ they never employed their parts, faculties, and powers 
 I industriously that way, but contented themselves with the 
 {opinions, fashions, and things of their country as they found 
 them, without looking any farther. Had you or I been born 
 at the Bay of Soldania, possibly our thoughts and notions had 
 not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hottentots that inhabit 
 there : and had the Virginian king Apochancana been 
 educated in England, he had, perhaps, been as knowing a 
 divine, and as good a mathematician, as any in it ; the differ- 
 ence between him and a more improved Englishman lying 
 barely in this, that the exercise of his faculties was bounded 
 within the ways, modes, and notions of his own country, and 
 never directed to any other or farther inquiries ; and if he 
 
OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 35 
 
 had not any idea of a God, it was only because he pursued 
 not those thoughts that would have led him to it. 
 
 13. Ideas of God various in different men. I grant that if J 
 there were any ideas to he found imprinted on the minds of 
 men, we have reason to expect it should be the notion of his 
 Maker, as a mark God set on his own workmanship, to mind 
 
 .man of his dependence and duty; and thai herein should 
 appear the first instances of human knowledge. But how 
 late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children ! 
 and when we find it there, how much more does it resemble 
 the opinion and notion of the teacher than represent the true 
 God ! He that shall observe in children the progress 
 whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will 
 think that the objects they do first and most familiarly con- 
 verse with are those that make the first impressions on their 
 understandings ; nor will he find the least footsteps of any 
 other. It is easy to take notice how their thoughts enlargft 
 themselves only as they come to be acquainted with a greater 
 variety of sensible objects, to retain the ideas of them in their 
 memories, and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, 
 and several ways put them together. How by these means 
 they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a 
 Deity, I shall hereafter show. 
 
 14. Can it be thought that the ideas men have of God are 
 the characters and marks of himself, engraven in their minds 
 by his own finger, when we see that in the same country, under 
 one and the same name, men have far different, nay, often con- 
 trary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him ? Their 
 agreeing in a name or sound will scarce prove an innate 
 notion of him. 
 
 15. What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could they 
 have who acknowledged and worshipped hundreds ? Every 
 deity that they owned above one was an infallible evidence of 
 their ignorance of him, and a proof that they had no true no- 
 tion of God, where unity, infinity, and eternity were excluded. 
 To which, if we add their gross conceptions of corporeity, 
 expressed in their images and representations of their deities, 
 
36 OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 the amours, marriages, copulations, lusts, quarrels, and other 
 mean qualities attributed by them to their gods, we shall 
 have little reason to think that the heathen world, i.e., the 
 greatest part of mankind, had such ideas of God in their 
 minds as he himself, out of care that they should not be mis- 
 taken about him, was author of. And this universality of con- 
 sent, so much argued, if it prove any native impressions, it will 
 be only this : That God imprinted on the minds of all men, 
 speaking the same language, a name for himself, but not any 
 idea ; since those people who agreed in the name had, at the 
 same time, far different apprehensions about the thing signi- 
 fied. If they say that the variety of deities worshipped by 
 the heathen world were but figurative ways of expressing the 
 several attributes of that incomprehensible Being, or several 
 parts of his providence ; I answer, What they might be in 
 their original, I will not here inquire, but that they were so 
 in the thoughts of the vulgar I think nobody will affirm ; and 
 he that will consult the voyage of the Bishop of Beryte, cap. 
 xiii. (not to mention other testimonies), will find that the 
 theology of the Siamites professedly owns a plurality of gods ; 
 or, as the Abbe de Choisy more judiciously remarks, in his 
 Journal du Voyage de Siam, !ff> it consists properly in 
 acknowledging no God at all. 
 
 If it be said that wise men of all nations came to have true 
 conceptions of the unity and infinity of the Deity, I grant it. 
 But then this, 
 
 First, excludes universality of consent in anything but the 
 name ; for those wise men being very few perhaps one of a 
 thousand this universality is very narrow. 
 
 Secondly, it seems to me plainly to prove that the truest 
 and best notions men had of God were not imprinted, but 
 acquired by thought and meditation and a right use of their 
 faculties ; since the wise and considerate men of the world, by 
 a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason, 
 attained true notions in this as well as other things ; whilst 
 the lazy and inconsiderate part of men, making the far greater 
 number, took up their notions, by chance, from common 
 
OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 37 
 
 tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their 
 heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the notion 
 of God innate because all wise men had it, virtue, too, must 
 be thought innate ; for that also wise men have always had. 
 
 16. This was evidently the case of all Gentilism : nor 
 hath, even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans, who 
 acknowledge but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken 
 in those nations to teach men to have true notions of a God, 
 prevailed so far as to make men to have the same and 
 true ideas of him. How many, even amongst us, will be 
 found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the shape of a man, sit- 
 ting in heaven ; and to have many other absurd and unfit 
 conceptions of him 1 Christians, as well as Turks, have had 
 whole sects owning and contending earnestly for it, that the 
 Deity was corporeal and of human shape ; and though we find 
 few amongst us who profess themselves anthropomorphites 
 (though some I have met with that own it), yet, I believe, he 
 that will make it his business may find, amongst the ignorant 
 and uninstructed Christians, many of that opinion. Talk but 
 with country-people almost of any age, or young people 
 almost of any condition, and you shall find, that though the 
 name of God be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions 
 they apply this name to are so odd, low, and pitiful, that no- 
 body can imagine they were taught by a rational man, much 
 less that they were characters writ by the finger of God himself. 
 Nor do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of God 
 that he has given us minds unfurnished with these ideas of 
 himself, than that he hath sent us into the world with bodies 
 unclothed, and that there is no art or skill born with us. For 
 being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is want of 
 industry and consideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if 
 we have them not. It is as certain that there is a God, as that 
 the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight 
 lines are equal. There was never any rational creature, that 
 set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these proposi- 
 tions, that could fail to assent to them ; though y et it be past 
 doubt that there are many men who, having not applied their 
 
38 OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 thoughts that- way, are ignorant Loth of the one and the 
 rllier. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost 
 of its extent) universal consent, such an one I easily allow ; 
 but such an universal consent as this proves not the idea of 
 God, no more than it does the idea of such angles, innate. 
 
 17. If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be supposed 
 inna e. Since, then, though the knowledge of a God he the 
 most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him 
 is not innate, as, I think, is evident from what has been said ; 
 I imagine there will be scarce any other idea found that can 
 pretend to it ; since, if God had set any impression, any cha- 
 racter, on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to 
 expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of 
 himself, as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive 
 so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds 
 being at first void of that idea which we are most concerned 
 to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate 
 characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find 
 none, and would be glad to be informed by any other. 
 
 18. Ideas of substance not innate. I confess there is another 
 idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as 
 it is of general talk as if they had it ; and that is the idea of 
 
 j substance, which we neither have nor can have by sensation 
 or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any idea, we 
 might well expect it should be such as by our own faculties 
 we cannot procure to ourselves : but we see, on the contrary, 
 that, since by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into 
 our minds this is not, we have no such clear idea at all, and 
 therefore signify nothing by the word " substance," but only 
 an uncertain supposition of we know not what (i.e., of some- 
 thing whereof we have no particular, distinct, positive idea), 
 which we take to be the substratum, or support of those ideas 
 we do know. 
 
 19. No propositions can be innate since no ideas are innate. 
 Whatever, then, we talk of innate, either speculative or prac- 
 tical, principles, it may with as much probability be said, that 
 a man hath 100 sterling in his pocket, and yet denied that 
 
OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 39 
 
 he hath either penny, shilling, crown, or any other coin out 
 of which the sum is to be made up ; as to think, that certain 
 propositions are innate, when the ideas about which they are 
 can by no means be supposed to be so. The general reception 
 and assent that is given doth not at all prove that the ideas 
 expressed in them are innate ; for in many cases, however the 
 ideas came there, the assent to words expressing the agreement 
 or disagreement of such ideas will necessarily follow. Every 
 one that hath a true idea of God and worship, will assent to 
 this proposition, that " God is to be worshipped," when ex- 
 pressed in a language he understands ; and every rational man 
 that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to assent to 
 this proposition to-morrow ; and yet millions of men may bo 
 well supposed to want one or both of those ideas to-day. For 
 if we will allow savages and most country-people to have ideas 
 of God and worship (which conversation with them will not 
 make one forward to believe), yet, I think, few children can 
 be supposed to have those ideas, which therefore they must 
 begin to have some time or other ; and then they will also 
 begin to assent to that proposition, and make very little ques- 
 tion of it ever after. But such an assent upon hearing, no 
 more proves the ideas to be innate, than it does that one born 
 blind (with cataracts which will be couched to-morrow) had 
 the innate ideas of the sun or light, or saffron or yellow, be- 
 cause, when his sight is cleared, he will certainly assent to 
 this proposition, that "the sun is lucid," or that " saffron is 
 yellow ; " and therefore if such an assent upon hearing cannot 
 prove the ideas innate, it can much less the propositions made 
 up of those ideas. If they have any innate ideas,! would be 
 glad to be told what and how many they are. 
 
 20. JNb innate ideas in the memory. To which let me add :) 
 If there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind which the! 
 mind does not actually think on, they must be lodged in thel 
 memory, and from thence must be brought into view by remem- \ 
 brance ; i. 0., must be known, when they are remembered, to I 
 have been perceptions in the mind before, unless remembrance 1 
 can be without remembrance. For to remember is to per- 
 
40 OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 ceive anything with memory, or with a consciousness that 
 it was known or perceived before ; without this, whatever idea 
 comes into the mind is new and not remembered ; this con- 
 sciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that 
 which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of 
 thinking. Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, 
 was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is 
 either an actual perception, or else, having been an actual per- 
 ception, is so in the mind, that by the memory it can be made 
 an actual perception again. "Whenever there is the actual 
 perception of an idea without memory, the idea appears per- 
 fectly new and unknown before to the understanding. When- 
 ever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with 
 a consciousness that it had been there before, and was not 
 wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so, I 
 appeal to every one's observation : and then I desire an in- 
 stance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any 
 impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one 
 could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known ; 
 without which consciousness of a former perception there is no 
 remembrance ; and whatever idea comes into the mind without 
 that consciousness, is not remembered, or comes not out of the 
 memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that appear- 
 ance. For what is not either actually in view or in the 
 memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it 
 never had been there. Suppose a child had the use of his eyes 
 till he knows and distinguishes colours ; but then cataracts shut 
 the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark, 
 { ; nd in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of 
 colours he once had. This was the case of a blind man I once 
 talked with, who lost his sight by the small-pox when he was 
 a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. 
 I ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas 
 of colours in his mind any more than one born blind ? And 
 I think nobody will say, that either of them had in his mind 
 any ideas of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and 
 then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, de 
 
OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 41 
 
 novo, by his restored sight conveyed to his mind, and that 
 without any consciousness of a former acquaintance. And 
 these now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In 
 this case all these ideas of colours which, when out of view can 
 be revived, with a consciousness of a former acquaintance, 
 being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind. The 
 use I make of this is, that whatever idea, being not actually 
 in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory ; 
 and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind ; and if 
 it be in the memory it cannot by the memory be brought into 
 actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the 
 memory ; which is this, that it had been known before, and is 
 now remembered. If, therefore, there be any innate ideas, 
 they must be in the memory, or else nowhere in the mind ; 
 and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without 
 any impression from without ; and whenever they are brought 
 into the mind, they are remembered, i. e. they bring with 
 them a perception of their not being wholly new to it ; this 
 being a constant and distinguishing difference between what 
 is, and what is not in the memory or in the mind that what 
 is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears per- 
 fectly new and unknown before ; and what is in the memory 
 or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, 
 appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, 
 and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, 
 whether there be any innate ideas in the mind before impres- 
 sion from sensation or reflection. I would fain meet with the 
 man who, when he came to use of reason, or at any other 
 time remembered any of them ; and to whom, after he was 
 born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are 
 ideas in the mind that are not in the memory, I desire him 
 to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible. 
 
 21. Principles not innate, because of little use or little cer- 
 tainty. Besides what I have already said, there is another 
 reason why I doubt that neither these nor any other prin- 
 ciples are innate. I that am fully persuaded that the infi- 
 nitely wise God made all things in perfect wisdom, cannot 
 
42 OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 satisfy myself why he should be supposed to print upon the 
 minds of men some universal principles, whereof those that 
 are pretended innate and concern speculation are of no great 
 use, and those that concern practice not self-evident, and 
 neither of them distinguishable from some other truths not 
 allowed to be innate. For to what purpose should characters 
 be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not 
 clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or 
 cannot be distinguished from them ? If any one thinks there 
 are such innate ideas and propositions, which by their clear- 
 ness and usefulness are distinguishable from all that is adven- 
 titious in the mind and acquired, it will not be a hard matter 
 for him to tell us which they are, and then every one will be 
 a fit judge whether they be so or no : since, if there be such 
 innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other 
 perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in 
 himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims I 
 have spoken already ; of their usefulness I shall have occasion 
 to speak more hereafter. 
 
 22. Difference of men's discoveries depends upon the different 
 application of their faculties. To conclude : some ideas for- 
 wardly offer themselves to all men's understandings ; some 
 sorts of truths result from any ideas as soon as the mind puts 
 them into propositions ; other truths require a train of ideas 
 placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions 
 made with attention, before they can be discovered and 
 assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general 
 and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate ; but the 
 truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts 
 and sciences ; though some of them, indeed, offer themselves 
 to our faculties more readily than others, and therefore are 
 more generally received ; though that, too, be according as 
 the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to 
 be employed ; God having fitted men with faculties and 
 means to discover, receive, and retain truths accordingly as 
 they are employed. The great difference that is to be found 
 in the notions of mankind is, from the different use they put 
 
OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 43 
 
 their faculties to : whilst some (and those the most), taking 
 things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily 
 enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, 
 in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine, and 
 not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow ; others, em- 
 ploying their thoughts only about some few things, grow ac- 
 quainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of know- 
 ledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let 
 their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries. Thus, 
 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, 
 is a truth as certain as anything can be, and I think more 
 evident than many of those propositions that go for principles ; 
 and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, 
 who know not this at all, because they never set their 
 thoughts on work about such angles ; and he that certainly 
 knows this proposition may yet be utterly ignorant of the 
 truth of other propositions in mathematics itself, which are 
 as clear and evident as this, because, in his search of those 
 mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short, and went 
 not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we 
 have of the being of a Deity ; for though there be no truth 
 which a man may more evidently make out to himself than 
 the existence of a God, yet he that shall content himself with 
 things as he finds them in this world, as they minister to 
 his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little 
 farther into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and 
 pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may 
 live long without any notion of such a Being : and if any 
 person hath, by talk, put such a notion into his head, he may, 
 perhaps, believe it ; but if he hath never examined it, his 
 knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his who, having 
 been told that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two 
 right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demon- 
 stration, and may yield his assent as a probable opinion, but 
 hath no knowledge of the truth of it ; which yet his faculties, 
 if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to 
 him. But this only by-the-bye, to show how much our know- 
 
41 OTHER REMARKS UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 ledge depends upon the right use of tho : o powers nature hath 
 bestowed upon us, and how little upon such innate principles 
 as are in vain supposed to be in all mankind for their direc- 
 tion ; which all men could not but know, if they were there, 
 or else they would be there to no purpose ; and which since 
 all men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventi- 
 tious truths, we may well conclude there are no such. 
 
 23. Men must think and know for themselves. What censure 
 doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men 
 who will be apt to call it " pulling up the old foundations of 
 knowledge and certainty," I cannot tell : I persuade myself, 
 at least, that the way I have pursued, being conformable to 
 truth, lays those foundations surer. This I am certain, I 
 have not made it my business either to quit or follow any 
 authority in the ensuing discourse : truth has been my only 
 aim ; and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts 
 have impartially followed, without minding whether the foot- 
 steps of any other lay that way or no. Not that I want a 
 due respect to other men's opinions; but, after all, the 
 greatest reverence is due to truth ; and I hope it will not be 
 thought arrogance to say, that perhaps we should make 
 greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative 
 knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, in the considera- 
 tion of things themselves, and made use rather of our own 
 thoughts than other men's to find it : for, I think, we may as 
 rationally hope to see with other men's eyes as to know by 
 other men's understandings. So much as we ourselves con- 
 sider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we possess 
 of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men's 
 opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, 
 though they happen to be true. What in them was science 
 is in us but opiniatrety, whilst we give up our assent only to 
 reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own 
 reason to understand those truths which gave them reputa- 
 tion. Aristotle was certainly a knowing man ; but nobody 
 ever thought him so because he blindly embraced and con- 
 fidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking 
 
OTHER REMARRr! UPON INNATE PRINCIPLES. 45 
 
 up of another's principles without examining them made not 
 him a philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make any one else 
 so. In the sciences, every one has so much as he really knows 
 and comprehends ; what he believes only, and takes upon 
 trust, are but shreds; which, however well in the whole 
 piece, make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers 
 them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it 
 were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but 
 leaves and dust when it comes to use. 
 
 24. Whence the opinion of innate principles. When men 
 have found some general propositions that could not be 
 doubted of as soon as understood, it was, I know, a short and 
 easy way to conclude them innate. This being once received, 
 it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the 
 inquiry of the doubtful, concerning all that was once styled 
 innate ; and it was of no small advantage to those who 
 affected to be masters and teachers, to make this the principle 
 of principles, that principles must not be questioned ; for, 
 having once established this tenet, that there are innate 
 principles, it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving 
 some doctrines as such ; which was to take them off from the 
 use of their own reason and judgment, and put them upon 
 believing and taking them upon trust, without farther ex- 
 amination ; in which posture of blind credulity, they might 
 be more easily governed by, and made useful to, some sort of 
 men who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. 
 Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another, to 
 have the authority to be the dictator of principles, and 
 teacher of unquestionable truths ; and to make a man swallow 
 that for an innate principle which may serve to his purpose 
 who teacheth them. Whereas had they examined the ways 
 whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal 
 truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of 
 men from the being of things themselves, when duly con- 
 sidered ; and that they were discovered by the application of 
 those faculties that were fitted by nature to receive and judge 
 of them, when duly employed about them. 
 
 IT"! 
 
46 ON THE CARTESIAN DOCTRINE OF INNATE IDEAS. 
 
 NOTE ON THE CARTESIAN DOCTRINE OF INNATE 
 IDEAS. 
 
 The philosophers to whom Locke alludes in the two preceding 
 selections, and against whom the Essay was directed, were the 
 famous Descartes and his followers. These writers were supposed 
 by Locke to maintain that the mind is possessed of certain prin- 
 ciples (Y. e. has a knowledge of certain truths) antecedently to all 
 sensible experience; and it is this view which he essayed to 
 refute. His argument, ^t will be noticed, is divided into two 
 divisions first, where he denies the a priori character of various 
 axioms or propositions ; and secondly, where the ideas about which 
 these propositions are conversant are declared to be adventitious, 
 rid not innate. In each of these divisions the principal heads of 
 his reasoning are the non-universality of such principles or 
 ideas ; the necessity for everything in the mind to be either in 
 actual consciousness, or in the memory, and so at some previous 
 time to have been actually perceived ; the fact that such prin- 
 ciples and ideas are neither the first of which we become conscious, 
 nor those perceived by persons of the fewest notions and faculties ; 
 and, finally, the superfluous nature of innate principles and ideas, 
 since we have powers sufficient for the acquirement of every truth 
 that it may be necessary for us to know. 
 
 Now, the garrison of this stronghold which Locke so success- 
 fully stormed, had, in reality, no existence apart from his own 
 imagination; for neither Descartes nor his followers had ever 
 attempted to maintain an opinion so erroneous as that which is 
 imputed to them by the English philosopher. That this is so 
 may be proved by the following passage from the reply which 
 Descartes made to the Programme of Regius : " I have never 
 either said or thought that the mind has need of innate ideas 
 which are in any way diverse from its faculty of thinking ; but 
 when I remarked that there were within me certain thoughts 
 
 which did not proceed from external objects, I called 
 
 them innate in the same sense in which we say that generosity is 
 innate in certain families, and in others certain diseases, as gout 
 or gravel ; not that, therefore, the infants of those families labour 
 under those diseases in the womb of the mother, but because they 
 are born with a certain dispo ition or faculty o f contracting them:" 
 that is to say, the nature of our mind is such, that when a suitable 
 occas'on is presented to us by our senses, we cannot refrain from 
 forming certain ideas, and entertaining certain beliefs. " Hence 
 it is, that our knowledge has its commencement in sense, external 
 or internal, but its origin in intellect." 
 
 Here, then, we see that the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas 
 had nothing in common with that which Locke combated ; for the 
 former merely asserts that dispositions exist in the mind to conceive 
 

 OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 47 
 
 certain ideas immediately that (but not until) the senses afford a \ 
 suitable occasion ; whereas the latter holds that actual facts of 
 knowledge dwell in the mind previously to all sensible experience. 
 And this leads us to notice a somewhat curious fact, which is, 
 that Locke implicitly held the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas, 
 the same, indeed, which he nominally opposed. Thus, in one 
 part of his essay (Book I., c. 3, 4), he says "He would be 
 thought void of common sense, who, asked on the one bide or the 
 other, went to give a reason why it is impossible for the same 
 thing to be and not to be ;" and " in admitting, as he here virtually 
 does, that experience must ultimately ground its procedure on the 
 laws of intellect, he admits that intellect contains principles of 
 judgment, on which experience being dependent cannot possibly 
 be their precursor or their cause." (Hamilton's "Reid," Diss. I.) 
 This affords a further illustration of the remarks contained in the 
 note at the end of the first selection. 
 
 But, although Locke's misconception of the Cartesian doctrine 
 renders his argument altogether inept as regards its professed 
 object, it is still of great value as presenting a noble example of 
 philosophical reasoning, and as throwing much light upon the 
 general character of human knowledge. It is for this reason, 
 doubtless, that the Essay succeeded in obtaining such a widespread 
 dominion both in England and in France; its evident beauty 
 and utility being a golden apple to charm its readers into a devia- 
 tion from the only path which could lead to speculative truth. 
 
 The object of the preceding remarks has been merely to point 
 out the precise aim with which Locke discussed the question of 
 innate ideas, and the real bearing of his argument as regards 
 the Cartesian doctrines. With reference to the validity of his 
 reasoning, e';ther in whole or in part, or to the general character 
 of the reception with which it has met, I have said nothing ; this 
 more properly falling to be considered after a perusal of the next 
 selection, where Locke discloses his theory of the exact manner in 
 which all our ideas are obtained. Accordingly, I must refer to 
 the note which is appended thereto for a historical and critical 
 notice of Locke's metaphysical system. 
 
 OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 
 
 1. Idea is the object of thinking. Every man being con- 
 scious to himself, that he thinks, and that which his mind is 
 applied about, whilst thinking, being the ideas that are there, 
 it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas, 
 
48 OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 
 
 such as are those expressed by the words, " whiteness, hard- 
 ness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, 
 drunkenness," and others. It is in the first place then to be 
 inquired, How he comes by them ? I know it is a received 
 doctrine, that men have native ideas and original characters 
 stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This 
 opinion I have at large examined already ; and, I suppose, 
 what I have said in the foregoing bo<& will be much more 
 easily admitted, when I have shown whce the understanding 
 may get all the ideas it has, and by "vmat ways and degrees 
 they may come into the mind ; for which I shall appeal to 
 . every one's own observation and expenence. 
 
 2. All ideas come from sensation or reflection. Let us then 
 suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all 
 characters, without any ideas ; how comes it to be furnished ? 
 Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and 
 boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost 
 i -lid less variety ? Whence has it all the materials of reason 
 and knowledge ? To this I answer, in one word, From ex- 
 perience : in that all our knowledge is founded, and from 
 that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed 
 either about external sensible objects, or about the internal 
 operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by our- 
 selves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the 
 materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of know- 
 ledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally 
 have, do spring. 
 
 3. The object of sensation one source of ideas. First. Our 
 senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey 
 into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according 
 to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them ; 
 and thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, 
 heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we 
 call sensible qualities ; which when I say the senses convey 
 into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into 
 the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great 
 ?ouree of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon 
 
OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 49 
 
 ur senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call, 
 *' sensation." 
 
 4. The operations of our minds the other source of them. 
 Secondly. The other fountain, from which experience fur- 
 nisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the 
 operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed 
 about the ideas it has got ; which operations, when the soul 
 comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding 
 with another set of ideas which could not be had from things 
 without ; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, be- 
 lieving, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different 
 jictings of our own minds ; which we, being conscious of, and 
 observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our under- 
 standings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our 
 senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in him- 
 self ; and though it be not sense as having nothing to do with 
 external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly 
 enough be called " internal sense." But as I call the other 
 " sensation, "so I call this " reflection," the ideas it affords 
 being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own 
 operations within itself. By reflection, then, in the following 
 part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that 
 notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the 
 manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of 
 these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, 
 viz., external material things as the objects of sensation, and 
 the operations of our own minds within as the objects of re- 
 flection, are, to me, the only originals from whence all our 
 ideas take their beginnings. The term " operations" here, I 
 use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions 
 of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising 
 sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness 
 arising from any thought. 
 
 5. All our ideas are of the one or the other of these. The 
 understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering 
 of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. 
 External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible 
 
50 OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 
 
 qualities, which are all those different perceptions they pro- 
 duce in us ; and the mind furnishes the understanding with 
 ideas of its own operations. 
 
 These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their 
 several modes, combinations, and relations, we shall find to 
 contain all our whole stock of ideas ; and that we have 
 nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these 
 two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and 
 thoroughly search into his understanding, and then let him 
 tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any 
 other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of 
 his mind considered as objects of his reflection ; and how great 
 a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he 
 will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in 
 his mind but what one of these two have imprinted, though 
 perhaps with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by 
 the understanding, as we shall see hereafter. 
 
 6. Observable in children. He that attentively considers 
 the state of a child at his first coming into the world, will 
 have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas 
 that are to be the matter of his future knowledge. It is by 
 degrees he comes to be furnished with them ; and though the 
 ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves 
 before the memory begins to keep a register of time and 
 order, yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities 
 come in the way, that there are few men that cannot recollect 
 the beginning of their acquaintance with them : and, if it 
 were worth while, no doubt a child might be so ordered as to 
 have but a very few even of the ordinary ideas till he were 
 grown up to a man. Eut all that are born into the world 
 being surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversely 
 affect them, variety of ideas, whether care be taken about it, 
 or no, are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and 
 colours are busy at hand everywhere when the eye is but 
 open ; sounds and some tangible qualities fail not to solicit 
 their proper senses, and force an entrance to the mind ; but 
 yet I think it will be granted easily, that if a child were 
 
OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 51 
 
 fcept in a place where he never saw any other but black and 
 white till he were a man, he would have no more ideas of 
 scarlet or green, than he that from his childhood never tasted 
 an oyster or a pine-apple has of those particular relishes. 
 
 7. Men are differently furnished with these according to the 
 Different objects they converse with. Men then come to be 
 furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without, 
 according as the objects they converse with afford greater or 
 less variety ; and from the operations of their minds within, 
 according as they more or less reflect on them. For, though 
 he that contemplates the operations of his mind cannot but 
 have plain and clear ideas of them ; yet, unless he turn his 
 thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no 
 more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his 
 mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will 
 have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts 
 and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and 
 with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture or clock 
 may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day ; 
 but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts they 
 are made of, till he applies himself with attention to consider 
 them each in particular. 
 
 8. Ideas of reflection later, because they need attention. And 
 hence we see the reason why it is pretty late before most 
 children get ideas of the operations of their own minds ; and 
 some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest 
 part of them all their lives : because, though they pass 
 there continually, yet like floating visions, they make not 
 deep impressions enough to leave in the mind, clear, distinct, 
 lasting ideas, till the understanding turns inwards upon itself, 
 reflects on its own operations, and makes them the object of 
 its own contemplation. Children, when they come first into 
 it, are surrounded with a world of new things, which, by a 
 constant solicitation of their senses, draw the mind constantly 
 to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted 
 with the variety of changing objects. Thus the first years 
 are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men's 
 
 D 2 
 
52 OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 
 
 business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be 
 found without ; and so, growing up in a constant attention 
 to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection 
 on what passes within them till they come to be of riper 
 years ; and some scarce ever at all. 
 
 9. The soul begins to have ideas when it legint to perceive. 
 To ask, at what time a man has first any ideas, is to ask when 
 he begins to perceive ; having ideas, and perception, being 
 the same thing. I know it is an opinion that the soul always 
 thinks ; and that it has the actual perception of ideas within 
 itself constantly, as long as it exists ; and that actual thinking 
 is as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from 
 the body : which if true, to inquire after the beginning of a 
 man's ideas is the same as to inquire after the beginning of his 
 soul. For, by this account, soul and its ideas, as body and 
 its extension, will begin to exist both at the same time. 
 
 10. The soul thinks not always ; for this wants proofs. But 
 whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval 
 with, or some time after, the first rudiments or organization, 
 or the beginnings of life in the body, I leave to be disputed 
 by those who have better thought of that matter. I confess 
 Imyself to have one of those dull souls that doth not perceive 
 itself always to contemplate ideas ; nor can conceive it any 
 more necessary for the soul always to think, than for the body 
 always to move ; the perception of ideas being, as I conceive, 
 to the soul, what motion is to the body : not its essence, but 
 one of its operations; and, therefore, though thinking be 
 supposed never so much the proper action of the soul, yet it 
 is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, 
 always in action ; that, perhaps, is the privilege of the infinite 
 Author and Preserver of things, " who never slumbers nor 
 sleeps ;" but it is not competent to any finite being, at least 
 not to the soul of man. "W^e know certainly, by experience, 
 that we sometimes think ; and thence draw this infallible 
 consequence that there is something in us that has a powei 
 to think ; but whether that substance perpetually thinks, or 
 no, we can be no farther assured than experience informs us. 
 
OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 53 
 
 For to say, that actual thinking is essential to the soul and 
 inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to 
 prove it by reason ; which is necessary to be done, if it be 
 not a self-evident proposition. But whether this that " the 
 soul always thinks," be a self-evident proposition, that every 
 body assents to on first hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is 
 doubted whether I thought all last night, or no ; the question 
 being about a matter of fact, it is begging it to bring as a 
 proof for it an hypothesis which is the very thing in dispute ; 
 by which way one may prove anything ; and it is but sup- 
 posing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think, and 
 it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that rny watch 
 thought all last night. But he that would not deceive him- 
 self ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and 
 make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on 
 matter of fact because of his hypothesis ; that is, because he 
 supposes it to be so ; which way of proving amounts to this 
 that I must necessarily think all last night because another 
 supposes I always think, though I myself cannot perceive 
 that I always do so. 
 
 But men in love with their opinions may not only suppose 
 what is in question, but allege wrong matter of fact. How 
 else could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing 
 is not because we are not sensible of it in our sleep ? I do 
 not say there is no soul in a man because he is not sensible of 
 it in his sleep ; but I do say, he cannot think at any time, 
 waking, or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being 
 sensible of it is not necessary to anything but to our thoughts; 
 and to them it is, and to them it will always be, necessary, 
 till we can think without being conscious of it. 
 
 11. It is not always conscious of it. I grant that the soul in 
 a waking man is never without thought, because it is the con- 
 dition of being awake ; but whether sleeping without dreaming 
 be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, 
 may be worth a waking man's consideration ; it being hard to 
 conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of 
 it. If the soul doth think in a sleeping man without being 
 
54 OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 
 
 conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has 
 any pleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness or misery ? 
 I am sure the man is not, no more than the bed or earth he 
 lies on. For to be happy or miserable without being conscious 
 of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if 
 it be possible that the soul can, whilst the body is sleeping, 
 have its thinking, enjoyments, and concerns, its pleasure or 
 pain, apart, which the man is not conscious of, nor partakes 
 in, it is certain that Socrates asleep, and Socrates awake, is 
 not the same person; but his soul when he sleeps, and Socrates 
 the man, consisting of body and soul, when he is waking, are 
 two persons ; since waking Socrates has no knowledge of, or 
 concernment for that happiness or misery of his soul which it 
 enjoys alone by itself whilst he sleeps, without perceiving 
 anything of it, no more than he has for the happiness or 
 misery of a man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For if 
 we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sen- 
 sations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernment 
 that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place 
 personal identity. 
 
 12. If a deeping man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping 
 and waking man are two persons. " The soul, during sound 
 sleep, thinks," say these men. Whilst it thinks and perceives, 
 it is capable, certainly, of those of delight or trouble, as well 
 as any other perceptions ; and it must necessarily be conscious 
 of its own perceptions. Eut it has all this apart. The sleeping 
 man, it is plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us 
 suppose, then, the soul of Castor, whilst he is sleeping, retired 
 from his body; which is no impossible supposition for the 
 men I have here to do with, who so liberally allow life with- 
 out a thinking soul to all other animals. These men cannot, 
 then, judge it impossible, or a contradiction, that the body 
 should live without the soul ; nor that the soul should subsist 
 and think, or have perception, even perception of happiness or 
 misery, without the body. Let us, then, as I say, suppose 
 the soul of Castor separated, during his sleep, from his body, 
 to think apart. Let us suppose, too, that it chooses for its 
 
OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 55 
 
 scene of thinking the body of another man, v. g. "Pollux, who 
 is sleeping without a soul: for if Castor's soul can think whilst 
 Castor is asleep, what Castor is never conscious of, it is no 
 matter what place it chooses to think in. "We have here, then, 
 the bodies of two men with only one soul between them, which 
 we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns ; and the soul still 
 thinking in the waking man, whereof the sleeping man is 
 never conscious, has never the least perception. I ask, then, 
 whether Castor and Pollux, thus, with only one soul between 
 them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is 
 never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct 
 persons as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were? 
 and whether one of them might not be very happy and the 
 other very miserable ? Just by the same reason they make 
 the soul and the man two persons, who make the soul think 
 apart what the man is not conscious of. Tor, I suppose, 
 nobody will make identity of persons to consist in the soul's 
 being united to the very same numerical particles of matter ; 
 for if that be necessary to identity, it will be impossible, in 
 that constant flux of the particles of our bodies, that any man 
 should be the same person two days or two moments together. 
 
 13. Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, 
 that they think. Thus, methinks, every drowsy nod shakes 
 their doctrine who teach that their soul is always thinking. 
 Those, at least, who do at any time sleep without dreaming 
 can never be convinced that their thoughts are sometimes for 
 hours busy without their knowing of it ; and if they are taken 
 in the very act, waked in the middle of that sleeping contem- 
 plation, can give no manner of account of it. 
 
 14. That men dream without remembering it, in vain urged. 
 It will perhaps be said, that the soul thinks even in the 
 soundest sleep, but the memory retains it not. That the soul 
 in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a-thinking, and 
 the next moment in a waking man not remember, nor be able 
 to recollect one jot of all those thoughts, is very hard to be 
 conceived, and would need some better proof than bare asser- 
 tion to make it be believed. For who can, without any more 
 
56 OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 
 
 ado but being barely told so, imagine that the greatest part of 
 men do, during all their lives, for several hours every day 
 think of something which, if they were asked even in the 
 middle of these thoughts, they could remember nothing at all 
 of ? Most men, I think, pass a great part of their sleep with- 
 out dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar, 
 and had no bad memory, who told me, he had never dreamed 
 in his life till he had that fever he was then newly recovered 
 of, which was about the five-or-six-and-twentieth year of his 
 age. I suppose the world affords more such instances ; at 
 least, every one's acquaintance will furnish him with examples 
 enough of such as pass most of their nights without dreaming. 
 15. Upon this hypothesis, the thoughts of a sleeping man ought 
 to be most rational. To think often and never to retain it so 
 much as one moment, is a veiy useless sort of thinking ; and 
 the soul, in such a state of thinking does very little if at all 
 excel that of a looking-glass, wnich constantly receives a 
 variety of images, or ideas, but retains none ; they disappear 
 and vanish, and there remain no footsteps of them ; the looking- 
 glass is never the better for such ideas, nor the soul for such 
 thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, " that in a waking man 
 the materials of the body are employed and made use of in 
 thinking ; and that the memory of thoughts is retained by the 
 impressions that are made on the brain, and the traces there 
 left after such thinking ; but that in the thinking of the soul 
 which is not perceived in the sleeping man, there the soul 
 thinks apart, and, making no use of the organs of the body, 
 leaves no impression on it, and consequently no memory of 
 such thoughts." Not to mention again the absurdity of two 
 distinct persons, which follows from this supposition, I answer 
 farther, that whatever ideas the mind can receive and contem- 
 plate without the help of the body, it is reasonable to conclude 
 it can retain without the help of the body too ; or else the 
 soul, or any separate spirit, will have but little advantage by 
 thinking. If it has no memory of its own thoughts ; if it 
 cannot lay them up for its use, and be able to recall them 
 upon occasion j if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and 
 
OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 57 
 
 make use of its former experiences, reasonings, and contem- 
 plations, to what purpose does it think ? They who make 
 the soul a thinking thing, at this rate will not make it a much 
 more noble being than those do whom they condemn for 
 allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of matter. 
 Characters drawn on dust that the first breath of wind effaces, 
 or impressions made on a heap of atoms or animal spirits, are 
 altogether as useful, and render the subject as noble, as the 
 thoughts of a soul that perish in thinking ; that, once out of 
 sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves 
 behind them. Nature never makes excellent things for mean 
 or no uses ; and it is hardly to be conceived that our infinitely 
 wise Creator should make so admirable a faculty as the power 
 of thinking, that faculty which comes nearest the excellency 
 of his own incomprehensible being, to be so idly and uselessly 
 employed, at least a fourth part of its time here, as to think 
 constantly without remembering any of those thoughts, with- 
 out doing any good to itself or others, or being any way useful 
 to any other part of the creation. If we will examine it, we 
 shall not find, I suppose, the motion of dull and senseless 
 matter anywhere in the universe made so little use of, and so 
 wholly thrown away. 
 
 16. On this hypothesis, the soul must have ideas not derived 
 from sensation or reflection, of which there is no appearance. It 
 is true we have sometimes instances of perception whilst we 
 are asleep, and retain the memory of those thoughts : but how 
 extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are, how 
 little conformable to the perfection and order of a rational 
 being, those who are acquainted with dreams need not be told. 
 This I would willingly be satisfied in : Whether the soul, when 
 it thinks thus apart, and as it were separate from the body, 
 acts less rationally than when conjointly with it, or no ? If its 
 separate thoughts be less rational, then these men must say that 
 the soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body ; if 
 it does not, it is a wonder that our dreams should be for the 
 most part so frivolous and irrational, and that the soul should 
 retain none of 'its more rational soliloquies and meditations. 
 
 D 3 
 
f>8 OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 
 
 17. If 1 think when I know it not, nobody else can know it. 
 Those who so confidently tell us that the soul always actually 
 thinks, I would they would also tell us what those ideas are 
 that are in the soul of a child before or just at the union with 
 the body, before it hath received any by sensation. The dreams 
 of sleeping men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking 
 man's ideas, though for the most part oddly put together. It 
 is strange, if the soul has ideas of its own that it derived not 
 from sensation or reflection (as it must have, if it thought 
 before it received any impression from the body), that it 
 should never in its private thinking (so private, that the man 
 himself perceives it not) retain any of them the very moment 
 it wakes out of them, and then make the man glad with new 
 discoveries. Who can find it reasonable that the soul should 
 in its retirement, during sleep, have so many hours' thoughts, 
 and yet never light on any of those ideas it borrowed not from 
 sensation or reflection, or at least preserve the memory of none 
 but such which, being occasioned from the body, must needs 
 be less natural to a spirit ? It is strange that the soul should 
 never once in a man's whole life recall over any of its pure, 
 native thoughts, and those ideas it had before it borrowed 
 anything from the body ; never bring into the waking man's 
 view any other ideas but what have a tang of the cask, and 
 manifestly derive their original from that union. If it always 
 thinks, and so had ideas before it was united, or before it 
 received any from the body, it is not to be supposed but that 
 during sleep it recollects its native ideas ; and during that 
 retirement from communicating with the body, whilst it thinks 
 by itself, the ideas it is busied about should be, sometimes at 
 least, those more natural and congenial ones which it had in 
 itself, underived from the body, or its own operations about 
 them ; which since the waking man never remembers, we 
 must from this hypothesis conclude, either that the soul 
 remembers something that the man does not, or else that 
 memory belongs only to such ideas as are derived from the 
 body, or the mind's operations about them. 
 
 18. How knows any one that the soul always thinks? For if 
 it be not a self-evident proposition, it needs proof. I would be 
 
OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 59 
 
 glad also to learn from these men, who so confidently pro- 
 nounce that the human soul, or, which is all one, that a man 
 always thinks, how they come to know it ; nay, how they 
 come to know that they themselves think, when they them- 
 selves do not perceive it ? This, I am afraid, is to be sure 
 without proofs, and to know without perceiving. It is, I 
 suspect, a confused notion taken up to serve an hypothesis ; 
 and none of those clear truths that either their own evidence 
 forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence 
 to deny. For the most that can be said of it is, that it is 
 possible the soul may always think, but not always retain it 
 in memory ; and I say, it is as possible that the soul may not 
 always think, and much more probable that it should some- 
 times not think, than that it should often think, and that a 
 long while together, and not be conscious to itself, the next 
 moment after, that it had thought. 
 
 19. That a man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain 
 it the next moment, very improbable. To suppose the soul to 
 think, and the man not to perceive it, is, as has been said, to 
 make two persons in one man ; and if one considers well these 
 men's way of speaking, one should be led into a suspicion that 
 they do so. For they who tell us that the soul always thinks, 
 do never, that I remember, say, that a man always thinks. 
 Can the soul think, and not the man ? or a man think, and 
 not be conscious of it ? This perhaps would be suspected of 
 jargon in others. If they say, " The man thinks always, but 
 is not always conscious of it," they may as well say, his body 
 is extended without having parts. For it is altogether as 
 intelligible to say, that a body is extended without parts, as 
 that anything thinks without being conscious of it, or per- 
 ceiving that it does so. They who talk thus may, with as 
 much reason, if it be necessary to their hypothesis, say, that 
 a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it : 
 whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking 
 consists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say, that 
 a man is always conscious to himself of thinking, I ask how 
 they know it ? Consciousness is the perception of what passes 
 
60 OF IDEAS tN T GENERAL, AND THEIR "ORIGINAL. 
 
 in a man's own mind. Can another man perceive that I am 
 conscious of anything, when I perceive it not myself ? !N"o 
 man's knowledge here can go beyond his experience. Wake 
 a man out of a sound sleep, and ask him what he was that 
 moment thinking on. If he himself be conscious of nothing 
 he then thought on, he must be a notable diviner of thoughts 
 that can assure him that he was thinking : may he not with 
 more reason assure him he was not asleep ? This is something 
 beyond philosophy ; and it cannot be less than revelation that 
 discovers to another thoughts in my mind when I can find 
 none there myself : and they must needs have a penetrating 
 sight who can certainly see that I think, when I cannot per- 
 ceive it myself, and when I declare that I do not ; and yet 
 can see that dogs or elephants do not think, when they give 
 all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us 
 that they do so. This some may suspect to be a step beyond 
 the E-osicrucians ; it seeming easier to make one's self invisible 
 to others than to make another's thoughts visible to me, which 
 are not visible to himself. But it is but defining the soul to 
 be a substance that always thinks, and the business is done. 
 If such definition be of any authority, I know not what it can 
 serve for, but to make many men suspect that they have no 
 souls at all, since they find a good part of their lives pass 
 away without thinking. For no definitions that I know, 
 no suppositions of any sect, are of force enough to destroy 
 constant experience ; and perhaps it is the affectation of 
 knowing beyond what we perceive that makes so much useless 
 dispute and noise in the world. 
 
 20. No ideas but from sensation or reflection evident, if we 
 observe children. I see no reason therefore to believe that the 
 soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to 
 think on ; and as those are increased and retained, so it comes 
 by exercise to improve its faculty of thinking in the several 
 parts of it ; as well as afterwards, by compounding those ideas 
 and reflecting on its own operations, it increases its stock, as 
 well as facility in remembering, imagining, reasoning, and 
 other modes of thinking. 
 
OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 61 
 
 21. He that will suffer himself to be informed by observa- 
 tion and experience, and not make his own hypothesis the 
 rule of nature, will find few signs of a soul accustomed to 
 much thinking in a new-born child, and much fewer of any 
 reasoning at all. And yet it is hard to imagine, that the ra- 
 tional soul should think so much and not reason at all. And 
 he that will consider that infants newly come into the world 
 spend the greatest part of their time in sleep, and are seldom 
 awake, but when either hunger calls for the teat, or some pain 
 (the most importunate of all sensations), or some other violent 
 impression on the body, forces the mind to perceive and attend 
 to it : he, I say, who considers this will, perhaps, find rea- 
 son to imagine, that a foetus in the mother's womb differs not 
 much from the state of a vegetable ; but passes the greatest 
 part of its time without perception or thought, doing very 
 little but sleep in a place where it needs not seek for food, 
 and is surrounded with liquor always equally soft, and near 
 of the same temper ; where the eyes have no light, and the 
 ears so shut up are not very susceptible of sounds ; and where 
 there is little or no variety or change of objects to move the 
 senses. 
 
 22. Eollow a child from its birth, and observe the altera- 
 tions that time makes, and you shall find, as the mind by the 
 senses comes more and more to be furnished with ideas, it 
 comes to be more and more awake, thinks more the more it 
 has matter to think on. After some time it begins to know 
 the objects which, being most familiar with it, have made 
 lasting impressions. Thus it comes by degrees to know the 
 persons it daily converses with, and distinguish them from 
 strangers; which are instances and effects of its coming to 
 retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it : and 
 so we may observe how the mind, by degrees, improves in 
 these, and advances to the exercise of those other faculties of 
 enlarging, compounding, and abstracting its ideas, and of 
 reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these ; of which 
 I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter. 
 
 23. If it shall be demanded, then, when a man begins to 
 
62 OF IDEAS IX GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL. 
 
 have any ideas ? I think the true answer is, "When he first has 
 any sensation. For since there appear not to be any ideas in 
 the mind before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive 
 that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation ; 
 which is such an impression or motion made in some part of 
 the body as produces some perception in the understanding. 
 It is about these impressions made on our senses by outward 
 objects that the mind seems first to employ itself in such 
 operations as we call " perception, remembering, considera- 
 tion, reasoning, " &c. 
 
 24. The original of all our knowledge. In time the mind 
 comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by 
 sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, 
 which I call " ideas of reflection." These are the impressions 
 that are made on our senses by outward objects, that are 
 extrinsical to the mind ; and its own operations, proceeding 
 from powers intrinsical and proper to itself, which, when 
 reflected on by itself, become also objects of its contemplation, 
 are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge. Thus the 
 first capacity of human intellect is, that the mind is fitted to 
 receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses 
 by outward objects, or by its own operations when it reflects 
 on them. This is the first step a man makes towards the 
 discovery of anything, and the groundwork whereon to build 
 all those notions which ever he shall have naturally in this 
 world. All those sublime thoughts which tower above the 
 clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and 
 footing here : in all that great extent wherein the mind 
 wanders in those remote speculations it may seem to be 
 elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which 
 sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation. 
 
 25. In the reception of simple ideas, the understanding is for 
 the most part passive. In this part the understanding is 
 merely passive ; and whether or no it will have these begin- 
 nings, and, as it were, materials of knowledge, is not in its 
 own power. For the objects of our senses do many of them 
 obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds, whether we 
 
ON LOCKE'S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM. 63 
 
 will or no ; and the operations of our minds will not let us 
 be without at least some obscure notions of them. No man 
 can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. 
 These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the under- 
 standing can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are 
 imprinted, nor blot them out and make new ones itself, than 
 a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas 
 which the objects set before it do therein produce. As the 
 bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the 
 mind is forced to receive the impressions, and cannot avoid 
 the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 A. LOCKE'S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM CONSIDERED HISTORI- 
 CALLY AND CRITICALLY. 
 
 The course which I propose to adopt in this note is to divide 
 the subject into three heads, viz., first, a precise statement of 
 Locke's system ; secondly, a chronological view of the different 
 systems which mark the epochs of philosophical history; and 
 lastly, a resum6 of the arguments by which Locke's system has 
 been assailed. 
 
 1. A Statement of Locke's System. " We have nothing in our 
 minds which did not come in one of these two ways," viz., either! 
 by sensation or by reflection. Sensation is the state of being 
 impressed by the qualities of objects exterior to ourselves, such 
 impressions being followed by certain ideas in the mind ; and the 
 perception or consciousness of these ideas by the understanding 
 constitutes a knowledge of them. Reflection is the act of direct- 
 ing our attention upon the operations of our minds about the 
 ideas produced by sensation ; and the result of thus reflecting 
 isj, that ideas of these operations (thinking, doubting, reasoning, 
 willing, &c.) are formed in the mind. It is by our understanding 
 perceiving these ideas, that we become conscious of, or know them. 
 Since, therefore, the knowledge acquired by sensation depends 
 entirely upon our experience of an outer world, and since that 
 acquired by reflection depends upon previous sensation ; it follows 
 that we can have no knowledge or ideas whatever until they are 
 provided by sensible experience of some sort. 
 
 Now, the fundamental and distinguishing features of every 
 system of philosophy are the doctrines which it advocates relative 
 to, first, the origin of ..our knowledge, and, secondly, the manner 
 in which we perceive or become conscious of the existence of an 
 
64 
 
 outer world. These points, it will be seen, are, in Locke's system, 
 resolved as follows : 1. Our knowledge is all adventitious and 
 acquired ; 2. Our understanding perceives only ideas, and not the 
 objects themselves which originate them. 
 
 Such is Locke's system, as explicitly stated in his essay ; but he 
 can be shown (vide note to preceding selection) to have implicitly 
 surrendered that portion of it which refers to the origin of our 
 knowledge. This apparent contradiction is owing to his miscon- 
 ception of the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas. 
 
 2. A Chronological View of the principal Philosophical Systems 
 which have existed. In stating these, I shall merely give such 
 portions of the various doctrines as bear upon the two fundamental 
 points which I have mentioned, viz., the origin of knowledge, and 
 the perception of an outer world. 
 
 a. The Greek metaphysicians prior to Plato mainly directed 
 their speculations to the question of existence, rather than of 
 knowledge ; and, consequently, for our present purpose, they may 
 be passed over. 
 
 b. Plato : Origin of Knowledge. There can be no fact of know- 
 ledge unless the mind or intellect contributes something to it in 
 addition to what is provided by experience. Mode of Perception. 
 His doctrine is doubtful ; the most probable opinion being that he 
 considered the objects of perception to be ideas consisting of a 
 modification of the mind itself, and called into existence by the 
 senses being impressed by an outer world. 
 
 c. Aristotle: Origin 'of Knowledge. There is a faculty (Intel- 
 lect) in the mind which contains various primary facts or principles, 
 these being required by the thinking faculty (Reason) in order to 
 arrive at valid and consequential results. Mode of Perception. The 
 outer world is viewed immediately and directly by the under- 
 standing, there being no intervening ideas. 
 
 d. Epicurus and Democritus : Origin of Knowledge. The soul 
 is material ; and when movements take place in it, either from 
 within or from without, it thinks. Mode of Perception. Little 
 images or pellicles are continually being thrown off from the 
 surfaces of bodies, and, by striking the soul, cause themselves to 
 be perceived. 
 
 e. The Peripatetics of the Middle Ages ; the Schoolmen : 
 Origin of Knowledge. In addition to what we gain by experience, 
 we have certain innate principles innate, that is to say, in the 
 sense of being latent in the intellect until sense affords an occasion 
 of their manifestation. Mode of Perception. Certain existences, 
 neither material nor immaterial, and termed intentional or sensible 
 species, are continually emitted by objects of the outer world, and 
 proceed to our senses. These species, when affecting any par- 
 ticular sense, are termed species impresses ; and when felt, as it 
 were, by the sense, the ideas thus formed constitute species 
 expresses. When the operations of sense are thus completed, the 
 
ON LOCKE'S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM. 65 
 
 active intellect steps in, and examining the sensible species^ proceeds 
 to construct from its own immaterial substance certain intelligible 
 species, and transmits them as species intelligibiles impresses, to the 
 passive intellect. Arrived there, and being perceived, they become 
 species intelligibiks expresses, or, in other words, knowledge. This, 
 of course, is but a faint shadowing of the mediaeval philosophy, 
 and can but ill portray its shifting phases. It will, however, 
 serve as an illustrative sample of the doctrines then current. 
 
 /. Descartes: Origin of Knowledge. The same doctrine as that 
 held by the Schoolmen. (See, also, note to preceding selection.) 
 Mode of Perception. Exterior objects produce, through the organs 
 of sense, certain impressions in the brain. The mind., however, 
 cannot perceive or be conscious of anything else but mind; and 
 therefore, the Deity, whenever an impression is made upon the 
 brain, excites a corresponding thought in the mind ; and when- 
 ever a thought occurs to the mind, He produces an equivalent 
 motion in the body. This is the famous doctrine of Divine 
 Assistance, or of Occasional Causes, which Malebranche expanded 
 into the Vision of all things in God; his theory holding that the 
 perceptions which the Deity excites in us, as before explained, are 
 directed upon the ideas of God himself. 
 
 g. Locke : See above. 
 
 h. Leibnitz and Wolf : Origin of Knowledge. Their doctrine is 
 similar to that held by the Schoolmen and Descartes. Mode of 
 Perception. God, before uniting souls and bodies, knew all the 
 movements and modifications of which each body would be sus- 
 ceptible, and all thoughts which would occur to each soul. He 
 then assorted the souls and bodies, uniting them so that every soul 
 should have a body whose movements would correspond to its own 
 thoughts. Accordingly, " the soul and body are like two clocks 
 accurately regulated, which point to the same hour and minute, 
 although the spring which gives motion to the one is not the 
 spring which gives motion to the other." Such is the doctrine of 
 Pre-established Harmony. 
 
 i. Berkeley: Origin of Knowledge. It is derived partly from 
 beliefs co-existent with the mind, and partly from occasional 
 thoughts produced by the Deity. Mode of Perception. The 
 common account of his doctrine is that he denied the existence of 
 any outer, material world, and held that what we perceive is 
 merely a succession of ideas implanted in our minds by God. 
 There are, however, reasons for believing that he maintained the 
 immediate object of perception to be the material universe, con- 
 joined inseparably with some modification of the mind. 
 
 k. Hume : Origin of Knowledge. It is all derived from expe- 
 rience, no portion being innate. Mode of Perception. We perceive 
 nothing but ideas, corresponding to which no realities exist, 
 whether of body or of mind. 
 
 1. Reid: Origin of Knowledge. Our minds themselves supply 
 
66 ON LOCKE S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM. 
 
 some principles and facts, experience the rest. Mode of Percep- 
 tion. Nothing intervenes between the real outer world and our 
 perception of it. Ideas are entirely discarded, even for the 
 faculties of memory and imagination. 
 
 in. Kant : Origin of Knowledge. Partly from the mind, and 
 partly from experience. Mode of Perception. We perceive nothing 
 but modifications of our own minds; of these alone can we be 
 conscious ; and of an outer, material world we are ignorant. 
 
 n. Schelling: Origin of Knowledge. The mind is divided into 
 intellect and reason ; of these, the former knows by experience, 
 the latter by native supplies. Mode of Perception. The intellect 
 perceives merely the phenomena of mind ; the reason its own self, 
 this being identical with the Deity. 
 
 Such are the principal theories which have been held with 
 reference to the fundamental points of philosophy ; and before 
 quitting this portion of the subject, it will be well to say a word 
 respecting the nomenclature of such systems, this having fre- 
 quently given rise to serious misconceptions, in consequence of 
 the principles employed not being properly discriminated. 
 
 Names, then, are given to systems as considered from three 
 points of view, viz., as regarding, first, their doctrines- with -refe- 
 rence to the source of our knowledge ; secondly, their theories of 
 perception ; and thirdly, their opinions respecting the nature__ol_ 
 ourselves and the universe. The principal classes under these 
 three heads are 
 
 A. Sensualists, who derive all knowledge from experience ; and 
 
 Rationalists, who admit that the mind furnishes some 
 knowledge from its own stores. 
 
 B. Those (Realists) who hold an immediate perception of outer 
 
 objects ; and those holding a mediate perception, this class 
 comprising what are known as Cosmothetic Idealists. 
 c. Materialists, who doubt the existence of a spiritual mind; 
 Idealists, who recognise nothing but mind and its ideas; 
 Nihilists, who deny that either mind or body exists ; and 
 Absolutists, who view mind as identical with the Deity. 
 3. A Resume of the Arguments by which Locke's Essay has been 
 assailed. In accordance with the principles already laid down, the 
 arguments here recapitulated will be confined to the questions of 
 native knowledge, and the manner of perception. 
 
 A. Native Knowledge. Truths are of two kinds, necessary and 
 contingent. Experience may, indeed, show us that winter always 
 succeeds summer, and that two and two always make four; but 
 yet the understanding recognises a difference between these truths 
 over and above that which our senses declare. Thus, that two 
 and two should make four is a truth necessary and inseparable 
 from the very idea of things ; whereas that winter should succeed 
 summer is by no means an inevitable fact, as, under certain 
 circumstances, a perpetual winter or summer might easily occur. 
 
ON LOCKE'S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM. 67 
 
 Whence, then, comes the knowledge that these ^ truths are neces- 
 sary, since experience cannot impart it? Obviously, from the 
 intellect itself ; and therefore such knowledge, at least, must be 
 held to be innate. 
 
 This distinction between necessary and contingent knowledge, 
 which underlies the*whole fabric of modern philosophy, we owe to 
 the genius of Leibnitz. That celebrated metaphysician, in his 
 "Nouveaux Essais sur 1'Entendement Humain," a work written 
 in refutation of Locke's essay, first explicitly enounced the doctrine 
 that necessity is the criterion of all truth which is native to the 
 mind ; and this is justly considered as the brightest discovery in 
 philosophy since the days of Plato and Aristotle. The following 
 passage from his " Nouveaux Essais " very clearly points out the 
 distinction which I have mentioned : " All the examples which 
 confirm a general truth, how numerous soever, would not suffice to 
 establish the universal necessity of this same truth ; for it does not 
 follow that what has hitherto occurred will always occur in future. 
 If Locke had sufficiently considered the difference between truths 
 which are necessary or demonstrative, and those which we infer 
 from induction alone, he would have perceived that necessary 
 truths could only be proved from principles which command our 
 assent by their intuitive evidence, inasmuch as our senses can inform 
 us only of what is, not of what must necessarily be." 
 
 B. Mode of Perception. Locke, it will be remembered, was a 
 cosmothetic idealist that is to say, he maintained that the only 
 objects of perception are ideas in the mind. On this point his 
 principal opponents were Berkeley, Hume, and Reid; but their 
 methods of procedure were very different, for the two former 
 accepted his doctrine of ideas, while the latter rejected it. Ac- 
 cordingly, the statement that Berkeley and Hume were Locke's 
 opponents rnay^ seem somewhat paradoxical ; for, by accepting his 
 principles, it is evident that they agreed with him : the fact is, 
 however, that, while desirous of befriending him, they unwittingly, 
 made a shipwreck of his doctrine of perception. This was done by 
 reasoning it out to its ultimate consequences; from whence it 
 appears that cosmothetic idealism must lead to scepticism. The 
 arguments are too extensive to be given here, but their general 
 drift may be thus stated: Our only objects of knowledge are 
 ideas, these being neither matter nor mind. Accordingly, as we 
 are conscious of nothing else, we certainly cannot be entitled to 
 assume the existence of anything besides ideas; therefore we can- 
 not assume either mind or body to exist. Neither can such an 
 existence be proved from the mere fact of our perceiving ideas ; 
 and since neither assumption nor proof can take place, we are not 
 able to believe that there is any such thing as body or soul. Here, 
 virtually, we have a reductio ad absurdum of Locke's doctrine. 
 
 Reid and the Scottish school proceed upon higher grounds, 
 thus ; Our mental consciousness is the grand criterion of philo- 
 
68 ON THE CONSCIOUS ACTIVITY OF THE MIND. 
 
 sophy ; and all the facts which it presents must he assumed to he 
 perfectly true, as, if consciousness itself were mendacious, we could 
 oe certain of nothing. But, as is agreed to by all philosophers, in 
 e\ery act of external perception we are conscious of ourselves as 
 existing and perceiving, and of an outer material object as existing 
 and perceived : we are conscious of a self and a not-self, of an ego 
 and a non-ego. Therefore, we must believe in the existence of our- 
 selves and a material world ; and therefore the hypothesis of a 
 representative perception (t. e., a perception by means of ideas) is 
 false, as subverting those facts of consciousness which in the outset 
 were admitted to be true. 
 
 B. IS THE MIND ALWAYS IN A STATE OF CONSCIOUS ACTIVITY ? 
 
 This question Locke, it will be observed, answers in the nega- 
 tive ; and the only fact upon which he grounds his reply is that of 
 sleep. Furthermore, the only phenomenon connected with sleep 
 to which he appeals for confirmation of his opinion is our frequent 
 inability to remember that we have been dreaming j and, accord- 
 ingly, his argument resolves itself into this : " Since it has not 
 been proved that we do dream without a remembrance of our 
 visions ; and since it is certain that we frequently awake without 
 any memory of having dreamt ; it follows that the assertion of our 
 always dreaming during sleep is a mere arbitrary assumption, and, 
 as such, is inadmissible." 
 
 But here Locke argued from an insufficient examination of the 
 facts ; for recent investigations have conclusively shown that his 
 first premiss is unfounded that is to say, the fact of our minds 
 being consciously active during sleep, without any memory of such 
 a state being retained upon awakening, has been established 
 beyond the possibility of a doubt. Thus, a person, when sleeping, 
 is often observed to be occupied with the ideas which possess his 
 mind, this being shown by his talking about them, and in other 
 ways ; yet if he" be awakened in the midst of such mental activity, 
 or if he be suffered to wake of himself, it frequently happens that 
 in either case no remembrance of any vision is retained. So much 
 for ordinary sleep : but if we refer to the evidence of somnambu- 
 lism, the fact of which we are speaking is still more unmistakeable. 
 Indeed, the question in hand is decided by the very existence of 
 somnambulism, the essential feature of this state being that the 
 events of mental activity which occur are never remembered. 
 And yet, during the somnambulic crisis, the mind is usually far 
 more active than when the body is awake. For instance : " The 
 patient has recollections of what he has wholly forgotten. He 
 speaks languages of which, when awake, he remembers not a 
 word. If he use a vulgar dialect when out of this state, in it he 
 employs only a correct and elegant phraseology. The imagination, 
 the sense of propriety, and the faculty of reasoning, are all, in 
 general, exalted." 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 69 
 
 It is certain, then, that during sleep and somnambulism the 
 mind remains consciously active, without any necessity existing 
 for a remembrance of its thoughts ; this not merely refuting the 
 argument of Locke regarding sleep, but, by analogy, leading us to 
 infer that in cases of insensibility and trance the same conditions 
 obtain ; so that our most probable conclusion can only be that the 
 mind thinks always. 
 
 Such is a sketch of the argument from induction with reference 
 to this question j but it may also be treated in an a priori manner. 
 This Locke has, in a measure, done, by founding on his denial of 
 innate notions, and on his doctrine of personal identity. The 
 former of these grounds has been already discussed ; the latter 
 will be found more explicitly set forth in the next selection. As / 
 regards the a priori reasons for maintaining the affirmatwe of the \ 
 question, the principle upon which they are based is the impos- \ 
 sibility of being conscious of mind without thought; and the 
 conclusion to which the deduction leads is that mind cannot exist 
 without thinking, that is, without being consciously active.* / 
 
 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 1. Wherein identity consists. Another occasion the mind 
 often takes of comparing is the very being of things, when, 
 considering anything as existing at any determined time and 
 place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and 
 thereon form the ideas of identity and diversity. When we 
 see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are 
 sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not 
 another, which at that same time exists in another place, how 
 like and ^indistinguishable soever it may be in all other 
 respects : and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is 
 attributed to vary not at all from what they were that 
 moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to 
 which we compare the present. For we never finding, nor 
 conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind 
 should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly 
 conclude that whatever exists anywhere at any time excludes 
 
 * For a brilliant example of pure a priori reasoning as regards the science 
 of Knowledge and Being, &ee the late Professor Ferrier's " Institutes of Meta- 
 physic." ED. 
 
70 OP IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 all of the same kind, and is there itself alone. "When there- 
 fore we demand whether anything be the same or no ? it 
 refers always to something that existed such a time in such a 
 place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with 
 itself and no other : from whence it follows, that one thing 
 cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one 
 beginning, it being impossible for two things of the same kind 
 to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place, or 
 one and the same thing in different places. That therefore 
 that had one beginning, is the same thing ; and that which 
 had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not 
 the same, but diverse. That which has made the difficulty 
 about this relation has been the little care and attention used 
 in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed. 
 2. Identity of substances. Identity of modes* We have the 
 ideas but of three sorts of substances : 1. God. 2. Finite 
 intelligences. 3. Bodies. First. God is without beginning, 
 eternal, unalterable, and everywhere ; and therefore con- 
 cerning his identity there can be no doubt. Secondly. Finite 
 spirits having had each its determinate time and place of 
 beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will 
 always determine to each of them its identity as long as it 
 .exists. Thirdly. The same will hold of every particle of 
 matter, to which no addition or subtraction of matter being 
 made, it is the same. For though these three sorts of sub- 
 stances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of 
 the same place, yet we cannot conceive but that they must 
 necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of 
 the same place; or else the notions and names of " identity 
 and diversity" would be in vain, and there could be no such 
 distinction of substances, or anything else, one from another. 
 For example : Could two bodies be in the same place at the 
 same time, then those two parcels of matter must be one and 
 the same, take them great or little ; nay, all bodies must be 
 
 * Modes are complex ideas of properties and affections of substances ; 
 things which exist not by themselves, but as inhering in some other beings. 
 Thus, "triangle," "gratitude," "murder," "a dozen/' "beauty," &c., are 
 modes. ED. 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 71 
 
 one and the same. For by the same reason that two particles 
 of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place ; 
 which, when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction 
 of identity and diversity, of one and more, and renders it 
 ridiculous. But, it being a contradiction that two or more 
 should be one, identity and diversity are relations and ways 
 of comparing well-founded, and of use to the understanding. 
 All other things being but modes or relations ultimately ter- 
 minated in substances, the identity and diversity of each 
 particular existence of them too will be by the same way 
 determined : only as to things whose existence is in succes- 
 sion, such as are the actions of finite beings, v.g. y motion and 
 thought, both which consist in a continued train of succession, 
 concerning their diversity there can be no question ; because, 
 each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in 
 different times, or in different places, as permanent beings 
 can at different times exist in distant places ; and therefore no 
 motion or thought, considered as at different times, can be 
 the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of 
 existence. 
 
 3. Principium individuationis.* From what has been saidp 
 it is easy to discover, what is so much inquired after, the 
 vrincipium individuationis ; and that, it is plain, is existence 
 itself, which determines a being of any sort to a particular 
 time and place incommunicable to two beings of the same 
 kind. This, though it seems easier to conceive in simple 
 substances or modes, yet, when reflected on, is not more 
 difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is 
 applied; v.g. y let us suppose an atom i.e., a continued body 
 under one immutable superficies, existing in a determined 
 time and place ; it is evident that, considered in any instant of 
 its existence, it is in that instant the same with itself. For, 
 being at that instant what it is and nothing else, it is the 
 same, and so must continue as long as its existence is con- 
 tinued for so long it will be the same and no other. In like 
 
 * The principle of individuation t. e, that which confers individuality 
 upon any object. ED. 
 
72 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 manner, if two or more atoms be joined together into the same 
 mass, every one of those atoms will be the same, by the fore- 
 going rule : and whilst they exist united together, the mass, 
 consisting of the same atoms, must be the same mass, or the 
 same body, let the parts be ever so differently jumbled ; but 
 if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it 
 is no longer the same mass, or the same body. In the state 
 of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the 
 same particles, but on something else. For in them the 
 variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity ; an 
 oak, growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is 
 still the same oak ; and a colt, grown up to a horse, sometimes 
 fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same horse though, 
 in both these cases, there may be a manifest change of the 
 parts ; so that truly they are not either of them the same 
 masses of matter, though there be truly one of them the same 
 oak, and the other the same horse. The reason whereof is, 
 that, in these two cases of a mass of matter and a living body, 
 identity is not applied to the same thing. 
 
 4. Identity of vegetables. We must therefore consider 
 wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter ; and that seems 
 to me to be in this : That the one is only the cohesion of 
 particles of matter anyhow united; the other such a dis- 
 position of them as constitutes the parts of an oak, and such 
 an organisation of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute 
 nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and 
 leaves, &c., of an oak, in which consists the vegetable life. 
 That being then one plant, which has such an organisation 
 of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, 
 it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the 
 same life, though that life be communicated to new particles 
 of matter vitally united to the living plant in a like continued 
 organisation, conformable to that sort of plants. For this 
 organisation being at any one instant in any one collection of 
 matter, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all 
 other, and is that individual life which, existing constantly 
 from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the same 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 73 
 
 continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living 
 body of the plant, has that identity which makes the same 
 plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same plant, during 
 all the time that they exist united in that continued organ- 
 isation, which is fit to convey that common life to all the 
 parts so united. 
 
 5. Identity of animals. The case is not so much different 
 in brutes, but that any one may hence see what makes an 
 animal, and continues it the same. Something we have like 
 this in machines, and may serve to illustrate it. Tor exam- 
 ple : what is a watch ? It is plain that it is nothing but a 
 fit organisation or construction of parts to a certain end, 
 which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to 
 attain. If we would suppose this machine one continued 
 body, all whose organised parts were repaired, increased, or 
 diminished, by a constant addition or separation of insensible 
 parts, with one common life, we should have something very 
 much like the body of an animal, with this difference that 
 in an animal the fitness of the organisation, and the motion 
 wherein life consists, begin together, the motion coming from 
 within ; but in machines, the force coming sensibly from 
 without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well 
 fitted to receive it. 
 
 6. Identity of man. This also shows wherein the identity 
 of the same man consists ; viz., in nothing but a participation 
 of the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of 
 matter, in succession vitally united to the same organised 
 body. He that shall place the identity of man in anything 
 else but, like that of other animals, in one fitly organised 
 body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued 
 under one organisation of life in several successively fleeting 
 particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an 
 embryo, one of years, rnad, and sober, the same man, by any 
 supposition that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismael, 
 Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Caesar Borgia, to be the 
 same man. For if the identity of soul alone makes the same 
 man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the 
 
 E 
 
74 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, 
 it will be possible that those men living in distant ages, and 
 of different tempers, may have been the same man : which 
 way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word 
 "man," applied to an idea out of which body and shape is 
 excluded : and that way of speaking would agree yet worse 
 with the notions of those philosophers who allow of trans- 
 migration, and are of opinion that the souls of men may, for 
 their miscarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beasts, as 
 fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their 
 brutal inclinations. Eut yet, I think, nobody, could he be 
 sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, 
 would yet say that hog were a man or Heliogabalus. 
 
 7. Identity suited to the idea. It is not therefore unity of 
 substance that comprehends all sorts of identity, or will deter- 
 mine it in every case ; but, to conceive and judge of it aright, 
 we must consider what idea the word it is applied to stands 
 for ; it being one thing to be the same substance, another the 
 same man, and a third the same person, if " person, man, 
 and substance," are three names standing for three different 
 ideas ; for such as is the idea belonging to that name, such 
 must be the identity ; which, if it had been a little more 
 (a re fully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great 
 deal of that confusion which often occurs about this matter, 
 with no small seeming difficulties, especially concerning per- 
 sonal identity, which therefore we shall in the next place a 
 little consider. 
 
 8. Same man. An animal is a living organised body ; and 
 consequently the same animal, as we have observed, is the 
 same continued life communicated to different particles of 
 matter, as they happen successively to be united to that 
 organised living body. And, whatever is talked of other 
 definitions, ingenious observation puts it past doubt, that the 
 idea in our minds, of which the sound " man" in our mouths 
 is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a ceitain 
 form ; since I think I may be confident, that whoever should 
 see a creature of his own shape and make, though it had no 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 75 
 
 more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call him 
 still a " man ;" or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot 
 discourse, reason, and philosophise, would call or think it 
 nothing but a cat or a parrot ; and say, the one was a dull 
 irrational man, and the other a very intelligent rational 
 parrot. A relation we have in an author of great note, is 
 sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational parrot. 
 His words are : 
 
 " I had a mind to know from Prince Maurice's own mouth 
 the account of a common, but much credited story, that I had 
 heard so often from many others of an old parrot he had in 
 Brazil, during his government there, that spoke, and asked 
 and answered common questions like a reasonable creature ; 
 so that those of his train there generally concluded it to be 
 witchery or possession ; and one of his chaplains who lived 
 long afterwards in Holland, would never from that time 
 endure a parrot, but said they all had a devil in them. I 
 had heard many particulars of this story, and assevered by 
 people hard to be discredited, which made me ask Prince 
 Maurice what there was of it. He said, with his usual 
 plainness and dryness in talk, there was something true, but 
 a great deal false, of what had been reported. I desired to 
 know of him what there was of the first ? He told me short 
 and coldly, that he had heard of such an old parrot when he 
 came to Brazil ; and though he believed nothing of it, and it 
 was a good way off, yet he had so much curiosity as to send 
 for it : that it was a very great and a very old one ; and 
 when it came first into the room where the prince was, with 
 a great many Dutchmen about him, it said presently, * What 
 a company of white men are here ? ' They asked it what he 
 thought that man was, pointing at the prince ! It answered, 
 1 Some general or other.' When they brought it close to 
 him, he asked it, D'ou venez-vous ? It answered, De Marinncm. 
 The prince, A qui estes vous ? The parrot, A un Portugais. 
 Prince, Que fais-tu Id ? Parrot, Je garde les poules. The 
 prince laughed, and said, Vous garden les poules ? The parrot 
 answered, Ouy, may, et je s^ay bien faire ; and made the 
 
 E 2 
 
76 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 chuck four or five times that people use to make to chickens 
 when they call them.* I set down the words of this worthy 
 dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said them to me. 
 I asked him in what language the parrot spoke ? and he said, 
 In Brazilian. I asked whether he understood Brazilian ? He 
 said, !N"o : but he had taken care to have two interpreters by 
 him, the one a Dutchman that spoke Brazilian, and the other 
 a Brazilian that spoke Dutch ; that he asked them separately 
 and privately, and both of them agreed in telling him just the 
 same thing that the parrot said. I could not but tell this 
 odd story, because it is so much out of the way, and from the 
 first hand, and what may pass for a good one ; for I dare say 
 this prince, at least, believed himself in all he told me, having 
 ever passed for a very honest and pious man. I leave it to 
 naturalists to reason, and to other men to believe, as they 
 please upon it; however, it is not perhaps amiss to relieve or 
 enliven a busy scene sometimes with such digressions, whether 
 to the purpose or no."f 
 
 I have taken care that the reader should have the story at 
 large in the author's own words, because he seems to me not 
 to have thought it incredible ; for it cannot be imagined that 
 so able a man as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant 
 all the testimonies he gives of himself, should take so much 
 pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin so close 
 not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a 
 prince, in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and 
 piety a story which, if he himself thought incredible, he 
 could not but also think ridiculous. The prince, it is plain, 
 who vouches this story, and our author, who relates it from 
 him, both of them call this talker " a parrot ; " and I ask any 
 one else, who thinks such a story fit to be told, whether if 
 this parrot, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have 
 
 * " ' Whence come ye ? ' It answered, * From Marinnan.' The PRINCE, 
 ' To whom do you belong ? ' The PARROT, < To a Portuguese.' PRINCE, 
 ' What do you "there ? ' PARROT, ' I look after the chickens.' The PRINCH 
 laughed, and said, ' You look after the chickens?' The PARROT answered, 
 'Yes, I, and I know well enough how to do it."' 
 
 t " Memoirs of what passed in Christendom, from 1672 to 1679," p. -^ 2 -. 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY, 77 
 
 a prince's word for it, as this one did ; whether, I say, they 
 would not have passed for a race of rational animals ; but yet 
 whether for all that, that would have been allowed to be men, 
 and not parrots ? For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking 
 or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in most 
 people's sense, but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it ; 
 and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not 
 shifted all at once must, as well as the same immaterial spirit, 
 go to the making of the same man. 
 
 9. Personal identity. This being premised, to find wherein 
 personal identity consists, we must consider what "person" 
 stands for ; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, 
 that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, 
 the same thinking thing, in different times and places ; which 
 it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from 
 thinking, and it seems to me essential to it : it being impos- 
 sible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does 
 perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or 
 will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as 
 to our present sensations and perceptions : and by this every 
 one is to himself that which he calls "self;" it not being 
 considered, in this case, whether the same self be considered 
 in the same or diverse substances. For since consciousness 
 always accompanies thinking, and it is that that makes every 
 one to be what he calls " self," and thereby distinguishes 
 himself from all other thinking things ; in this alone consists 
 personal identity, i. e. the sameness of a rational being : and 
 as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any 
 past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that per- 
 son ; it is the same self now it was then ; and it is by the 
 same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that 
 that action was done. 
 
 10. Consciousness makes personal identity. But it is farther 
 inquired, whether it be the same identical substance ? This, 
 few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these percep- 
 tions, with their consciousness, always remained present in 
 the mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the 
 same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty 
 is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by 
 forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we 
 have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in 
 one view ; but even the best memories losing the sight of one 
 part whilst they are viewing another ; and we sometimes, and 
 that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past 
 selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and, in sound 
 sleep, having no thoughts at all, or, at least, none with that 
 consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts : I say, in 
 all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we 
 losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether 
 we are the same thinking thing, t. e. the same substance, or 
 no ? which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not 
 personal identity at all : the question being, what makes the 
 same person ? and not, whether it be the same identical sub- 
 stance which always thinks in the same person ? which in this 
 case matters not at all ; different substances, by the same con- 
 sciousness (where they do partake in it), being united into one 
 person, as well as different bodies by the same life are united into 
 one animal, whose identity is preserved, in that change of sub- 
 stances, by the unity of one continued life. For it being the 
 same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, 
 personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed 
 only to one individual substance, or can be continued in a suc- 
 cession of several substances. For as far as any intelligent 
 being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same 
 consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same conscious- 
 ness it has of any present action ; so far it is the same personal 
 self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present 
 thoughts and actions that it is self to itself now, and so will be 
 the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to 
 actions past or to come ; and would be by distance of time, or 
 change of substance, no more two persons than a man be two 
 men, by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday, 
 with a long or short sleep between : the same consciousness 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 79 
 
 uniting those distant actions into the same person, whatever 
 substances contributed to their production. 
 
 11. Personal identity in change of substances. That this is 
 so, we have some kind of evidence in our very bodies, all 
 whose particles whilst vitally united to this same thinking 
 conscious self, so that we feel when they are touched, and are 
 affected by and conscious of good or harm that happens to 
 them are a part of ourselves i. e. of our thinking conscious 
 self. Thus the limbs of his body is to every one a part of 
 himself: he sympathises and is concerned for them. Cut off 
 an hand and thereby separate it from that consciousness he 
 had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no 
 longer a part of that which is himself, any more than the 
 remotest part of matter. Thus we see the substance, whereof 
 personal self consisted at one time, may be varied at another, 
 without the change of personal identity ; there being no ques- 
 tion about the same person, though the limbs, which but now 
 were a part of it, be cut off. 
 
 12. Whether in the change of thinking substances. But the 
 question is, Whether, if the same substance which thinks be 
 changed, it can be the same person, or remaining the same, it 
 can be different persons ? 
 
 And to this I answer, Eirst, this can be no question at all 
 to those who place thought in a purely material, animal con- 
 stitution, void of an immaterial substance. For, whether their 
 supposition be true or no, it is plain they conceive personal 
 identity preserved in something else than identity of substance ; 
 as animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of 
 substance. And, therefore, those who place thinking in an 
 immaterial substance only, before they can come to deal with 
 these men, must show why personal identity cannot be pre- 
 served in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of 
 particular immaterial substances, as well as animal identity is 
 preserved in the change of material substances, or variety of 
 particular bodies : unless they will say, it is one immaterial 
 spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as it is one imma- 
 terial spirit that makes the same person in men, which the 
 
80 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes 
 thinking things too. 
 
 13. But next, as to the first part of the question, "Whether, 
 if the same thinking substance (supposing immaterial sub- 
 stances only to think) be changed, it can be the same person ? 
 I answer, That cannot be resolved but by those who know 
 what kind of substances they are that do think, and whether 
 the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one 
 thinking substance to another. I grant, were the same con- 
 sciousness the same individual action, it could not ; but it 
 being but a present representation of a past action, why it 
 may not be possible that that may be represented to the mind 
 to have been which really never was, will remain to be shown. 
 And, therefore, how far the consciousness of past actions is 
 annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot pos- 
 sibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know 
 what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex 
 act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by 
 thinking substances who cannot think without being conscious 
 of it. Eut that which we call " the same consciousness " not 
 being the same individual act, why one intellectual substance 
 may not have represented to it as done by itself what it never 
 did, and was perhaps done by some other agent ; why, I say, 
 such a representation may not possibly be without reality of 
 matter of fact, as well as several representations in dreams 
 are, which yet, whilst dreaming, we take for true, will be 
 difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it 
 never is so, will by us (till we have clearer views of the 
 nature of thinking substances) be best resolved into the good- 
 ness of God, who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of 
 his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal 
 error of theirs transfer from one to another that consciousness 
 which draws reward or punishment with it. How far this may 
 be an argument against those who would place thinking in a 
 system of fleeting animal spirits, I leave to be considered. 
 But yet, to return to the question before us, it must be allowed, 
 that if the same consciousness (which, as has been shown, is 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 81 
 
 quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or 
 motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking sub- 
 stance to another, it will be possible that two thinking sub- 
 stances may make but one person. For the same consciousness 
 being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, 
 the personal identity is preserved. 
 
 14. As to the second part of the question, Whether, the 
 same immaterial substance remaining, there may be two dis- 
 tinct persons ? Which question seems to me to be built on 
 this, Whether the same immaterial being, being conscious of 
 the actions of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all 
 the consciousness of its past existence, and lose it beyond the 
 power of ever retrieving again ; and so, as it were, beginning 
 a new account from a new period, have a consciousness that 
 cannot reach beyond this new state ? All those who hold 
 pre-existence are evidently of this mind, since they allow the 
 soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that 
 pre-existent state, either wholly separate from body, or in- 
 forming any other body ; and if they should not, it is plain 
 experience would be against them. So that personal identity 
 reaching no farther than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent 
 spirit not having continued so many ages in a state of silence, 
 must needs make different persons. Suppose a Christian, 
 Platonist, or Pythagorean, should, upon God's having ended 
 all his works of creation the seventh day, think his soul hath 
 existed ever since ; and should imagine it has revolved in 
 several human bodies, as I once met with one who was per- 
 suaded his had been the soul of Socrates : (how reasonably I 
 will not dispute : this I know, that in the post he filled, which 
 was no inconsiderable one, he passed for a very rational man ; 
 and the press has shown that he wanted not parts or learning:) 
 would any one say, that he, being not conscious of any of 
 Socrates 7 s actions or thoughts, could be the same person with 
 Socrates ? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude, 
 that he has in himself an immaterial spirit, which is that 
 which thinks in him, and in the constant change of his body 
 keeps him the same ; and is that which he calls himself : let 
 
 E 3 
 
82 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY, 
 
 him also suppose it to be the same soul that was in Nestor or 
 Thersites, at the siege of Troy (for souls being, as far as we 
 know anything of them, in their nature indifferent to any 
 parcel of matter, the supposition has no apparent absurdity in 
 it), which it may have been as well as it is now the soul of 
 any other man : but he now having no consciousness of any 
 of the actions either of Nestor or Thersites, does or can he 
 conceive himself the same person with either of them ? Can 
 he be concerned in either of their actions ? attribute them to 
 himself, or think them his own, more than the actions of any 
 other man that ever existed ? So that this consciousness not 
 reaching to any of the actions of either of those men, he is no 
 more one self with either of them, than if the soul or imma- 
 terial spirit that now informs him had been created and began 
 to exist when it began to inform his present body, though it 
 were ever so true that the same spirit that informed Nestor's 
 or Thersites' s body were ni merically the same that now in- 
 forms his. For this would no more make him the same 
 person with Nestor, than if some of the particles of matter 
 that were once a part of Nestor, were now a part of this man ; 
 the same immaterial substance, without the same conscious- 
 ness, no more making the same person by being united to any 
 body, than the same particle of matter, without consciousness, 
 united to any body, makes the same person. But let him 
 once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Nestor, he 
 then finds himself the same person with Nestor. 
 
 15. And thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to 
 conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body 
 not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the 
 same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it. 
 But yet the soul alone, in the change of bodies, would scarce 
 to any one, but to him that makes the soul the man, be enough 
 to make the same man. For, should the soul of a prince, 
 carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, 
 enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by 
 his own soul, every one sees he would be the same person 
 with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions : 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 83 
 
 but who would say it was the same man ? The body too goes 
 to the making of the man, and would, I guess, to everybody 
 determine the man in this case, wherein the soul, with all its 
 princely thoughts about it, would not make another man ; 
 but he would be the same cobbler to every one besides him- 
 self. I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the same 
 person and the same man stand for one and the same thing. 
 And, indeed, every one will always have a liberty to speak 
 as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what 
 ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. 
 But yet, when we will inquire what makes the same spirit, 
 man, or person, we must fix the ideas of spirit, man, or 
 person in our minds; and having resolved with ourselves 
 what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine 
 in either of them, or the like, when it is the same and 
 when not. 
 
 16. Consciousness makes the same person. But though the 
 same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it 
 be, and in whatsoever state, make the same man ; yet it is 
 plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should 
 it be to ages past, unites existences and actions, very remote 
 in time, into the same person, as well as it does the existence 
 and actions of the immediately preceding moment : so that 
 whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is 
 the same person to whom they both belong. Had I the same 
 consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I 
 saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I 
 write now, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, 
 that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed 
 the flood at the general deluge, was the same self, place that 
 self in what substance you please, than that I who write this 
 am the same myself now whilst I write (whether I consist of 
 all the same substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I 
 was yesterday. For, as to this point of being the same self, 
 it matters not whether this present self be made up of the 
 same or other substances, I being as much concerned and as 
 justly accountable for any action [that] was done a thousand 
 
84 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 years since, and appropriated to me now by this self-con- 
 sciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment. 
 
 17. Self depends on consciousness. Self is that conscious 
 thinking thing (whatever substance made up of, whether 
 spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not) 
 which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable 
 of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far 
 as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that 
 whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little 
 finger is as much a part of itself as what is most so. Upon 
 separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go 
 along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it 
 is evident the little finger would be the person, the same 
 person ; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest 
 of the "body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes 
 along with the substance, when one part is separate from 
 another, which makes the same person, and constitutes this 
 inseparable self, so it is in reference to substances remote in 
 time. That with which the consciousness of this present 
 thinking thing can join itself makes the same person, and is 
 one self with it, and with nothing else ; and so attributes to 
 itself and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far 
 as that consciousness reaches, and no farther ; as every one 
 who reflects will perceive. 
 
 18. Object of reivard and punishment. In this personal 
 identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and 
 punishment ; happiness and misery being that for which every 
 one is concerned for himself, not mattering what becomes of 
 any substance not joined to or affected with that conscious- 
 ness. For as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if 
 the consciousness went along with the little finger when it 
 was cut off, that would be the same self which was concerned 
 for the whole body yesterday, as making a part of itself, 
 whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. 
 Though, if the same body should still live, and immediately 
 from, the separation of the little finger have its own peculiar 
 consciousness, whereof the little finger knew nothing, it 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY; 85 
 
 would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itself, or 
 could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed 
 to him. 
 
 19. This may show us wherein personal identity consists, 
 not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the 
 identity of consciousness ; wherein if Socrates and the present 
 mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the same person. If 
 the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the 
 same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the 
 same person ; and to punish Socrates waking for what sleep- 
 ing Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never con- 
 scious of, would be no more of right than to punish one twin 
 for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, 
 because their outsides were so like that they could not be 
 distinguished ; for such twins have been seen. 
 
 20. But yet possibly it will still be objected, " Suppose I 
 wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond the 
 possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never 
 be conscious of them again ; yet am I not the same person 
 that did those actions, had those thoughts, that I was once 
 conscious of, though I have now forgot them?" To which I 
 answer, That we must here take notice what the word "I" 
 is applied to ; which, in this case, is the man only. And the 
 same man being presumed' to be the same person, "I" is 
 easily here supposed to stand also for the same person. Eut 
 if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommu- 
 nicable consciousnesses at different times, it is past doubt the 
 same man would at different times make different persons ; 
 which, we see, is the sense of mankind in the solemnest 
 declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the 
 mad man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for 
 what the mad man did, thereby making them two persons ; 
 which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in 
 English, when we say, " Such an one is not himself, or is 
 beside himself;" in which phrases it is insinuated as if those 
 who now or, at least, first used them, thought that self was 
 changed, the self- same person was no longer in that man. 
 
86 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 21. Difference between identity of man and person. But yet 
 it is hard to conceive that Socrates, the same individual man, 
 should be two persons. To help us a little in this, we must 
 consider what is meant by Socrates, or the same individual 
 man. 
 
 First, It must be either the same individual, immaterial, 
 thinking substance ; in short, the same numerical soul, and 
 nothing else. 
 
 Secondly, Or the same animal, without any regard to an 
 immaterial soul. 
 
 Thirdly, Or the same immaterial spirit united to the same 
 animal. 
 
 !N"ow, take which of these suppositions you please, it is 
 impossible to make personal identity to consist in anything 
 but consciousness, or reach any farther than that does. 
 
 For by the first of them, it must be allowed possible that a 
 man born of different women, and in distant times, may be 
 the same man. A way of speaking which, whoever admits, 
 must allow it possible for the same man to be two distinct 
 persons, as any two that have lived in different ages, without 
 the knowledge of one another's thoughts. 
 
 By the second and third, Socrates in this life and after it 
 cannot be the same man any way but by the same conscious- 
 ness ; and so, making human identity to consist in the same 
 thing wherein we place personal identity, there will be no 
 difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person. But 
 then they who place human identity in consciousness only, 
 and not in something else, must consider how they will make 
 the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after the 
 resurrection. But whatsoever to some men makes a man, and 
 consequently the same individual man, wherein perhaps few 
 are agreed, personal identity can by us be placed in nothing 
 but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what we 
 call "self"), without involving us in great absurdities. 
 
 22. " But is not a man drunk and sober the Fame person ? 
 Why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, 
 though he be never afterwards conscious of it?" Just as 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 87 
 
 much the same person as a man that walks and does other 
 things in his sleep is the same person, and is answerahle for 
 any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both 
 with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge ; because in 
 these cases they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, 
 what counterfeit; and so the ignorance in drunkenness or 
 sleep is not admitted as a plea. For, though punishment be 
 annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and 
 the drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did ; yet 
 human judicatures justly punish him, because the fact is 
 proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be 
 proved for him. Eut in the great day, wherein the secrets of 
 all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, 
 no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing 
 of; but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or 
 excusing. 
 
 23. Consciousness alone makes self. Nothing but consciousness 
 can unite remote existences into the same person ; the identity 
 of substance will not do it. For, whatever substance there 
 is, however framed, without consciousness there is no person : 
 and a carcass may be a person, as well as any sort of sub- 
 stance be so without consciousness. 
 
 Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable conscious- 
 nesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the 
 other by night ; and, on the other side, the same conscious- 
 ness acting by intervals two distinct bodies : I ask, in the 
 first case, whether the day and the night man would not be 
 two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato ? and whether, 
 in the second case, there would not be one person in two dis- 
 tinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct 
 clothings ? "Nor is it at all material to say, that this same 
 and this distinct consciousness, in the cases above mentioned, 
 is owing to the same and distinct immaterial substances, 
 bringing it with them to those bodies ; which, whether true 
 or no, alters not the case : since it is evident the personal 
 identity would equally be determined by the consciousness, 
 whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual 
 
88 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 immaterial substance or no. For, granting that the thinking 
 substance in man must be necessarily supposed immaterial, it 
 is evident that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part 
 with its past consciousness, and be restored to it again, as 
 appears in the forgetfulness men often have of their past 
 actions, and the mind many times recovers the memory of a 
 past consciousness which it had lost for twenty years together. 
 Make these intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take 
 their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two 
 persons with the same immaterial spirit, as much as in the 
 former instance two persons with the same body. So that 
 self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, 
 which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 24. Indeed, it may conceive the substance whereof it is now 
 made up to have existed formerly, united in the same con- 
 scious being : but, consciousness removed, that substance is 
 no more itself, or makes no more a part of it, than any other 
 substance ; as is evident in the instance we have already given 
 of a limb cut off, of whose heat, or cold, or other affections, 
 having no longer any consciousness, it is no more of a man's 
 self than any other matter of the universe. In like manner 
 it will be in reference to any immaterial substance, which is 
 void of that consciousness whereby I am myself to myself : if 
 there be any part of its existence which I cannot upon recol- 
 lection join with that present consciousness whereby I am now 
 myself, it is in that part of its existence no more myself than 
 any other immaterial being. For, whatsoever any substance 
 has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my 
 consciousness make my own thought and action, it will no 
 more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, 
 than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial 
 being anywhere existing. 
 
 25. I agree, the more probable opinion is, that this consci- 
 ousness is annexed to, and the affection of, one individual 
 immaterial substance. 
 
 But let men, according to their diverse hypotheses, resolve 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 89 
 
 of that as they please. This every intelligent being, sensible 
 of happiness or misery, must grant, that there is something 
 that is himself that he is concerned for, and would have happy ; 
 that this self has existed in a continued duration more than 
 one instant, and therefore it is possible may exist, as it has 
 done, months and years to come, without any certain bounds 
 to be set to its duration ; and may be the same self, by the 
 same consciousness, continued on for the future. And thus, 
 by this consciousness, he finds himself to be the same self 
 which did such or such an action some years since, by which 
 he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account 
 of self, the same numerical substance is not considered as 
 making the same self : but the same continued consciousness, 
 in which several substances may have been united, and again 
 separated from it, which, whilst they continued in a vital 
 union with that wherein this consciousness then resided, made 
 a part of that same self. Thus any part of our bodies vitally 
 united to that which is conscious in us, makes a part of our- 
 selves ; but upon separation from the vital union by which 
 that consciousness is communicated, that which a moment 
 since was part of ourselves is now no more so than a part of 
 another man's self is a part of me, and it is not impossible but 
 in a little time may become a real part of another person. And 
 so we have the same numerical substance become a part of 
 two different persons, and the same person preserved under 
 the change of various substances. Could we suppose any 
 spirit wholly stripped of all its memory or consciousness of 
 past actions, as we find our minds always are of a great part 
 of ours, and sometimes of them all, the union or separation of 
 such a spiritual substance would make no variation of personal 
 identity, any more than that of any particle of matter does. 
 Any substance vitally united to the present thinking being, 
 is a part of that very same self which now is : anything 
 united to it by a consciousness of former actions, makes also a 
 part of the same self, which is the same both then and now. 
 
 26. " Person" a forensic term. " Person," as I take it, is 
 the name for this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls 
 
90 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 
 
 " himself," there, I think, another may say is the same person. 
 It is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit ; 
 and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, 
 and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself 
 beyond present existence to what is past, only by conscious- 
 ness ; whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns 
 and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground 
 and for the same reason that it does the present. All which 
 is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable con- 
 comitant of consciousness ; that which is conscious of pleasure 
 and pain desiring that that self that is conscious should 
 be happy. And therefore whatever past actions it cannot 
 reconcile or appropriate to that present self by consciousness, 
 it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been 
 done : and to receive pleasure or pain, t. 0., reward or punish- 
 ment, on the account of any such action, is all one as to be 
 made happy or miserable in its first being without any de- 
 merit at all. For, supposing a man punished now for what 
 he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have 
 no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that 
 punishment and being created miserable ? And therefore, 
 conformable to this, the apostle tells us, that at the great day, 
 when every one shall " receive according to his doings, the 
 secrets of all hearts shall be laid open." The sentence shall 
 be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have that 
 they themselves, in what bodies soever they appear, or what 
 substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the same 
 that committed those actions, and deserve that punishment 
 for them. 
 
 27. I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this 
 subject, made some suppositions that will look strange to some 
 readers, and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet, I 
 think, they are such as are pardonable in this ignorance we 
 are in of the nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and 
 which we look on as ourselves. Did we know what it was, 
 or how it was tied to a certain system of fleeting animal 
 spirits ; or whether it could or could not perform its opera- 
 
OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 91 
 
 tions of thinking and memory out of a body organised as ours 
 is ; and whether it has pleased God that no one such spirit 
 shall ever be united to any but one such body, upon the right 
 constitution of whose organs its memory should depend, we 
 might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions I have 
 made. Eut taking, as we ordinarily now do (in the dark 
 concerning these matters), the soul of a man for an immate- 
 rial substance, independent from matter, and indifferent alike 
 to it all, there can from the nature of things be no absurdity 
 at all to suppose that the same soul may, at different times, 
 be united to different bodies, and with them make up, for 
 that time, one man : as well as we suppose a part of a sheep's 
 body yesterday should be a part of a man's body to-morrow, 
 and in that union make a vital part of Melibaeus himself, as 
 well as it did of his ram. 
 
 28. The difficulty from ill use of names. To conclude : "What- 
 ever substance begins to exist, it must, during its existence, 
 necessarily be the same : whatever compositions of substances 
 begin to exist, during the union of those substances the 
 concrete must be the same : whatever mode begins to exist, 
 during its existence it is the same : and so if the composition be 
 of distinct substances and different modes, the same rule holds. 
 Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or obscurity that 
 has been about this matter rather rises from the names ill 
 used, than from any obscurity in things themselves. For 
 whatever makes the specific idea to which the name is applied, 
 if that idea be steadily kept to, the distinction of anything 
 into the same and diverse will easily be conceived, and there 
 can arise no doubt about it. 
 
 29. Continued existence makes identity. For supposing a 
 rational spirit be the idea of a man, it is easy to know what 
 is the same man ; viz., the same spirit, whether separate or in 
 a body, will be the same man. Supposing a rational spirit 
 vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts to 
 make a man, whilst that rational spirit, with that vital con- 
 formation of parts, though continued in a fleeting successive 
 body, remains, it will be the same man. But if to any one 
 
92 NOTE ON PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain 
 shape, as long as that vital union and shape remains, in a 
 concrete no otherwise the same but by a continued succession 
 of fleeting particles, it will be the same man. For, whatever 
 be the composition whereof the complex idea is made, when- 
 ever existence makes it one particular thing under any deno- 
 mination, the same existence, continued, preserves it the same 
 individual under the same denomination. 
 
 NOTE ON PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 The above chapter is remarkable for the great precision and 
 perspicuity with which Locke has distinguished the various kinds 
 of identity from each other; and for the striking manner in which 
 he has shown that our idea of personal identity depends entirely 
 upon consciousness, this including the operation of memory. In 
 fact, it may well be doubted whether any subsequent dissertation 
 upon the same subject has ever exhibited an equal array of lucid 
 exposition or cogent reasoning; and it is certain that he who 
 wishes to obtain an eminent example of easy and elegant discus- 
 sion, cannot do better than study the foregoing chapter from 
 Locke's Essay. 
 
 But while the general features and style of this chapter are 
 thus competent to excite our admiration, it cannot be denied that 
 Locke's doctrine, as far as personal identity is concerned, was 
 doomed to a speedy and complete refutation. Bishop Butler, the 
 author of the justly celebrated " Analogy," is generally credited 
 with having been Locke's earliest opponent upon this point ; but 
 such an opinion is without any foundation, as to John Serjeant, a 
 contemporary of Locke, belongs the merit of priority in redarguing 
 the faulty doctrine. The other principal iconoclasts are Burner, 
 Dr. Reid^ and M. Cousin. 
 
 In briefly discussing the merit of Locke's theory, I shall con- 
 sider, first, the manner in which he gives two contradictory 
 accounts of personal identity ; secondly, the contradictions involved 
 in his doctrine ; and, thirdly, the causes which led to his adopting 
 an erroneous conclusion. 
 
 In the first place, then, it is to be remarked that Locke gives 
 two accounts of personal identity ; one implicitly, the other ex- 
 plicitly. This latter, which he openly adheres to, and which is 
 universally associated with his name, consists in the opinion that 
 it is consciousness alone which makes, which constitutes, personal 
 identity. That is to say, if a man perform some action and after- 
 wards lose all consciousness of it ; he is no longer the same person 
 
NOTE ON PERSONAL IDENTITY. 93 
 
 that did it. So far all is clear : we have a precise, if a paradoxical 
 statement of that in which personal identity consists. But let us 
 now proceed to Locke's implied doctrine, which is to be found in 
 the account that he gives separately of "person" and "identity." 
 A " person " we find ( 9) to be a " thinking intelligent being ; " 
 and "identity," or individuality, is (3, 29) neither more nor 
 less than " continued existence." Accordingly, putting these to- 
 gether, we find that personal identity is merely the continued 
 existence of a thinking intelligent being. Thus, we arrive at 
 something very different from the first statement : on the one 
 hand we have existence, on the other, consciousness ; in one place 
 the continuity of being, in another a phenomenon of the mind. 
 I am not aware of this discrepancy having been ever pointed out, 
 although it is of great importance, as showing that Locke had in 
 reality more correct notions upon the subject than the shackles of 
 his system would allow him to develop. 
 
 In the second place it will only be necessary to exhibit some of 
 the contradictions which inhere in the explicit doctrine of Locke ; 
 and for this purpose I shall select the two following : 
 
 a. Since it is consciousness alone that makes personal identity, it 
 follows that those who existed during times of which we retain no 
 memory or consciousness, were not the same persons as ourselves. 
 But I have no remembrance of my birth ; therefore, I am not the 
 same person as him who was then born j i.e. I never commenced 
 to exist, or was born. 
 
 b. " Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged, when a boy at 
 school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the 
 enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in 
 advanced life : suppose also, which must be admitted to be pos- 
 sible, that, when he took the standard he was conscious of his 
 having been flogged at school ; and that when made a general he 
 was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost 
 the consciousness of his flogging. 
 
 " These things being supposed, it follows from Mr. Locke's doc- 
 trine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who 
 took the standard; and that he who took the standard, is the same 
 person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be 
 any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him 
 who was flogged at school. But the general's consciousness does 
 not reach so far back as his flogging ; therefore, according to Mr. 
 Locke's doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- 
 fore the general is, and at the same time is not, the same person 
 with him who was flogged at school." * 
 
 Thirdly. The cause of Locke's maintaining so erroneous a 
 doctrine is to be found in his theory as to the origin of all our 
 knowledge. This, it will be remembered, is that every idea arises 
 either from sensation or reflection ; and, consequently, since it was 
 
 * Reid's " Essays on the Intellectual Powers," III. chap. vi. 
 
94 NOTE OX PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 evident that sensation could never produce the idea of personal 
 identity, Locke resorted to reflection as its source. Reflection, 
 however, can give nothing beyond the idea of consciousness, and 
 this Locke was, therefore, compelled to regard as constituting the 
 idea of personal identity. 
 
 Now, throwing aside for a momsnt all theory as to the source of 
 our knowledge, let us-consider what it is that the idea of personal 
 identity really comprehends, with especial reference to conscious- 
 ness and memory. First, it is evident that, as thought or 
 consciousness is merely a phenomenon of mind, it requires mind to 
 exist before it can take place ; and we can have no idea of thought 
 unless as inhering in a thinking subject. Secondly, memory, in 
 like manner, requires the continued existence of mind, as an 
 essential condition of its occurrence ; and no idea of memory can 
 be had, unless a duration of mental being forms part of it. From 
 this it follows that a consciousness of remembrance necessitates, as 
 a condition, the idea of the same existence continued from past to 
 present time j or, in other words, whenever I am conscious of 
 remembering anything, I am also conscious of myself as now 
 existing, and of myself as having existed at some prior period. 
 But what is this second idea of which I am conscious ? It is the 
 idea of personal identity ; which is thus seen to be distinct from 
 both consciousness and memory. At the same time it is suffi- 
 ciently obvious that we could have no idea of personal identity 
 until after perceiving a present consciousness, and remembering a 
 past one. Thus the ideas of consciousness and memory, with 
 reference to that of personal identity, are first in order of time, but 
 last in order of reason ; while the idea of personal identity is first 
 in order of reason, but last in order of time. These modes of suc- 
 cession are respectively termed the logical and chronological orders.* 
 
 We are thus in a position to fully understand the nature of 
 Locke's error upon this subject. It was twofold, and consisted, 
 first, in confining his attention exclusively to the chronological 
 order of ideas ; and, secondly, in confusing the occasion of an idea 
 with the idea itself. The former of these phases was produced by 
 his reference of all knowledge to experience ; this leading him 
 merely to remark the various times at which the faculties of 
 sensation and reflection were enabled to present the mind with 
 ideas. The latter was a consequence of his assuming that the 
 mind has no innate knowledge; this compelling him to treat the 
 ideas of consciousness and personal identity as the same. 
 
 In the above discussion we have another illustration of the true 
 doctrine respecting innate ideas, to which reference has been made 
 in former notes. It will be perceived that the key to the whole 
 question is the recognition of a distinction between the logical and 
 chronological orders of ideas and their originals between actual 
 existence and the knowledge of existence. 
 
 * Compare Cousin's Coitrs de Philosophic, 2 e , torn. Hi., xviii. 
 
OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 95 
 
 OF THE IMPERFECTION OP WOBDS. 
 
 1. Words are used for recording and communicating our 
 thoughts. From what has been said in the foregoing chapters, 
 it is easy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, 
 and how the very nature of words makes it almost unavoid- 
 able for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their 
 significations. To examine the perfection or imperfection of 
 words, it is necessary first to consider their use and end : for 
 as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so they are more 
 or less perfect. We have, in the former part of this discourse, 
 often, upon occasion, mentioned a double use of words. 
 
 First, One for the recording of our own thoughts. 
 Secondly, The other for the communicating of our thoughts 
 to others. 
 
 2. Any words will serve for recording. As to the first of 
 these, for the recording our own thoughts for the help of our 
 own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves, any 
 words will serve the turn. For, since sounds are voluntary 
 and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he 
 pleases to signify his own ideas to himself : and there will be 
 no imperfection in them if he constantly use the same sign 
 for the same idea: for then he cannot fail of having his 
 meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and per- 
 fection of language. 
 
 3. Communication by words civil or philosophical. Secondly, 
 As to communication of words, that too has a double use. 
 
 I. Civil.. 
 
 II. Philosophical. 
 
 First, Ey their civil use, I mean such a communication of 
 thoughts and ideas by words as may serve for the upholding 
 common conversation and commerce about the ordinary affairs 
 and conveniences of civil life, in the societies of men one 
 amongst another. 
 
 Secondly, Ey the philosophical use of words, I mean such 
 an use of them as may serve to convey the precise notions of 
 things, and to express, in general propositions, certain and 
 
96 OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 
 
 undoubted truths which the mind may rest upon and he satis- 
 fied with, in its search after true knowledge. These two uses 
 are very distinct ; and a great deal less exactness will serve 
 in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows. 
 
 4. The imperfection of words is the doubtfulness of their signi- 
 fication. The chief end of language in communication "being 
 to be understood, words serve not well for that end, neither 
 in civil nor philosophical discourse, when any word does not 
 excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for in the 
 mind of the speaker. !NTow since sounds have no natural con- 
 nexion with our ideas, but have all their signification from 
 the arbitrary imposition of men, the doubtfulness and uncer- 
 tainty of their signification, which is the imperfection we 
 here are speaking of, has its cause more in the ideas they 
 stand for, than in any incapacity there is in one sound more 
 than in another to signify any idea : for in that regard they 
 are all equally perfect. 
 
 That then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the 
 signification of some more than other words, is the difference 
 of ideas they stand for. 
 
 5. Causes of their imperfection. Words having naturally 
 no signification, the idea which each stands for must be 
 learned and retained by those who would exchange thoughts 
 and hold intelligible discourse with others, in any language. 
 But this is hardest to be done, where, 
 
 First, The ideas they stand for are very complex, and 
 made up of a great number of ideas put together. 
 
 Secondly, Where the ideas they stand for have no certain 
 connection in nature ; and so no settled standard anywhere in 
 nature existing to rectify and adjust them by. 
 
 Thirdly, Where the signification of the word is referred to 
 a standard, which standard is not easy to be known. 
 
 Fourthly, Where the signification of the word, and the real 
 essence* of the thing, are not exactly the same. 
 
 These are difficulties that attend the signification of several 
 
 * By "real essence" Locke understands that peculiar internal constitution 
 of a thing upon which its perceptible qualities are dependent. ED. 
 
OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 97 
 
 words that are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible 
 at all, such as names standing for any simple ideas, which 
 another has not organs or faculties to attain, as the names of 
 colours to a blind man, or sounds to a deaf man, need not here 
 be mentioned. 
 
 In all these cases we shall find an imperfection in words ; 
 which I shall more at large explain, in their particular appli- 
 cation to our several sorts of ideas : for if we examine them, 
 we shall find that the names of mixed modes* are most liable 
 to doubtfulness and imperfection for the two first of these 
 reasons ; and the names of substances chiefly for the two 
 latter. 
 
 6. The names of mixed modes doubtful. First, The names of 
 mixed modes are many of them liable to great uncertainty and 
 obscurity in their signification. 
 
 First, Because the ideas they stand for are so complex. 
 I. Because of that great composition these complex ideas are 
 often made up of. To make words serviceable to the end of 
 communication, it is necessary (as has been said) that they 
 excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for in 
 the mind of the speaker. "Without this, men fill one another's 
 heads with noise and sounds ; but convey not thereby their 
 thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is 
 the end of discourse and language. But when a word stands for 
 a very complex idea, that is compounded and decompounded, it 
 is not easy for men to form and retain that idea so exactly as 
 to make the name in common use stand for the same precise 
 idea without any the least variation. Hence it comes to pass, 
 that men's names of very compound ideas, such as for the 
 mo^t part are moral words, have seldom, in two different men, 
 the same precise signification ; since one man's complex idea 
 seldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own, 
 from that which he had yesterday, or will have to-morrow. 
 
 7. Secondly, Because they have no standards. II. Because 
 the names of mixed modes, for the most part, want standards 
 
 * "Mixed modes" are ideas compounded of several simple notions or 
 modes. ED. 
 
98 OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 
 
 in nature, whereby men may rectify and adjust their signifi- 
 cations ; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They 
 are assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the 
 mind, pursuing its own ends of discourse, and suited to its 
 own notions, whereby it designs not to copy anything really 
 existing, but to denominate and rank things, as they come to 
 agree with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that 
 first brought the word " sham, "wheedle," or " banter" in 
 use, put together, as he thought fit, those ideas he made it 
 stand for : and as it is with any new names of modes that are 
 now brought into any language, so was it with the old ones 
 when they were first made use of. Names, therefore, that 
 stand for collections of ideas which the mind makes at plea- 
 sure, must needs be of doubtful signification when such collec- 
 tions are nowhere to be found constantly united in nature, 
 nor any patterns to be shown whereby men may adjust them. 
 What the word "murder" or "sacrilege," &c., signifies, can 
 never be known from things themselves. There be many of 
 the parts of those complex ideas which are not visible in the 
 action itself: the intention of the mind, cr the relation of 
 holy things, which make a part of murder or sacrilege, have 
 no necessary connection with the outward and visible action 
 of him that commits either : and the pulling the trigger of 
 the gun, with which the murder is committed, and is all the 
 action that perhaps is visible, has no natural connection with 
 those other ideas that make up the complex one, named 
 "murder." They have their union and combination only 
 from the understanding which unites them under one name : 
 but, uniting them without any rule or pattern, it cannot be 
 but that the signification of the name that stands for such 
 voluntary collections should be often various in the minds of 
 different men, who have scarce any standing rule to regulate 
 themselves and their notions by any such arbitrary ideas. 
 
 8. Propriety not a sufficient remedy. It is true, common 
 use, that is, the rule of propriety, may be supposed here to 
 afford some aid to settle the signification of language ; and it 
 cannot be denied but that in some measure it does. Common 
 
OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 99 
 
 use regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common 
 conversation ; but nobody having an authority to establish the 
 precise signification of words, nor determine to what ideas any 
 one shall annex them, common use is not sufficient to adjust 
 them to philosophical discourses ; there being scarce any name, 
 of any very complex idea (to say nothing of others), which in 
 common use has not a great latitude, and which, keeping 
 within the bounds of propriety, may not be made the sign of 
 far different ideas. Besides, the rule and measure of propriety 
 itself being nowhere established, it is often matter of dispute 
 whether this or that way of using a word be propriety of 
 speech or no. From all which it is evident, that the names 
 of such kind of very complex ideas are naturally liable to this 
 imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain signification ; 
 and, even in men that have a mind to understand one another, 
 do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer. 
 Though the names " glory" and " gratitude" be the same in 
 every man's mouth through a whole country, yet the complex 
 collective idea, which every one thinks on or intends by that 
 name, is apparently very different in men using the same 
 language. 
 
 9. The way of learning these names contributes also to their 
 doubtfulness. The way also wherein the names of mixed 
 modes are ordinarily learned, does not a little contribute to 
 the doubtfulness of their signification. Eor if we will observe 
 how children learn languages, we shall find that, to make 
 them understand what the names of simple ideas or substances 
 stand for, people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they 
 would have the idea ; and then repeat to them the name that 
 stands for it, as, " white, sweet, milk, sugar, cat, dog." But 
 as for mixed modes, especially the most material of them, 
 moral words, the sounds are usually learned first ; and then, 
 to know what complex ideas they stand for, they are either 
 beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for 
 the most part) are left to their own observation and industry ; 
 which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise 
 meaning of names, these moral words are, in most men's 
 F 2 
 
100 OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 
 
 mouths, little more than bare sounds ; or, when they have 
 any, it is for the most part but a very loose and undetermined, 
 and consequently obscure and confused, signification. And 
 even those themselves, who have with more attention settled 
 their notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience to have 
 them stand for complex ideas, different from those which 
 other, even intelligent and studious, men make them the signs 
 of. "Where shall one find any either controversial debate or 
 familiar discourse concerning " honour, faith, grace, religion, 
 church/' &c., wherein it is not easy to observe the different 
 notions men have of them ? which is nothing but this, that 
 they are not agreed in the signification of those words ; nor 
 have in their minds the same complex ideas which they make 
 them stand for : and so all the contests that follow thereupon 
 are only about the meaning of a sound. And hence we see 
 that, in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, 
 there is no end ; comments beget comments, and explications 
 make new matter for explications : and of limiting, distin- 
 guishing, varying the signification of these moral words, there 
 is no end. These ideas of men's making are, by men still 
 having the same power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a 
 man, who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text 
 of Scripture, or clause in the code, at first reading, has, by 
 consulting commentators, quite lost the sense of it, and by 
 those elucidations given rise or increase to his doubts, and 
 drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not this, that I think 
 commentaries needless ; but to show how uncertain the names 
 of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those 
 who had both the intention and the faculty of speaking as 
 clearly as language was capable to express their thoughts. 
 
 10. Hence unavoidable obscurity in ancient authors. What 
 obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of 
 men who have lived in remote ages and different countries, it 
 will be needless to take notice ; since the numerous volumes 
 of learned men, employing their thoughts that way, are 
 proofs more than enough to show what attention, study, 
 sagacity, and reasoning are required to find out the true 
 
OF THE IMPERFECTION ; OP -WO'IDS-. TQl 
 
 meaning of ancient authors. But, there being no writings 
 we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about 
 the meaning of, but those that contain either truths we are 
 required to believe or laws we are to obey, and draw incon- 
 veniences on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be 
 less anxious about the sense of other authors ; who writing 
 but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity to 
 know them than they to know ours. Our good or evil de- 
 pending not on their decrees, we may safely be ignorant of 
 their notions : and therefore in the reading of them, if they 
 do not use their words with a due clearness and perspicuity, 
 we may lay them aside, and, without any injury done them, 
 resolve thus with ourselves, 
 
 Si non vis intelligij debes negligi* 
 
 11. Barnes of substances of doubtful signification. If the 
 signification of the names of mixed modes are uncertain be- 
 cause there be no real standards existing in nature to which 
 those ideas are referred and by which they may be adjusted, 
 the names of substances are of a doubtful signification for a 
 contrary reason, viz., because the ideas they stand for are 
 supposed conformable to the reality of things, and are referred 
 to standards made by nature. In our ideas of substances we 
 have not the liberty, as in mixed modes, to frame what com- 
 binations we think fit to be the characteristical notes to rank 
 and denominate things by. In these we must follow nature, 
 suit our complex ideas to real existences, and regulate the 
 signification of their names by the things themselves, if we 
 will have our names to be the signs of them, and stand for 
 them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; but 
 patterns that will make the signification of their names very 
 uncertain : for, names must be of a very unsteady and various 
 meaning, if the ideas they stand for be referred to standards 
 without us, that either cannot be known at all, or can be 
 known but imperfectly and uncertainly. 
 
 * "If you are not willing to be understood, vou ou^ht to be neg- 
 lected. ED. 
 
102 'OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WOEDS. 
 
 12. Names of substances referred. First, to real essences that 
 cannot be known. The names of substances have, as has been 
 showed, a double reference in their ordinary use. 
 
 First, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their 
 signification is supposed to agree to, the real constitution of 
 things from which all their properties flow, and in which 
 they all centre. But this real constitution, or (as it is apt to 
 be called) essence, being utterly unknown to us, any sound 
 that is put to stand for it must be very uncertain in its appli- 
 cation ; and it will be impossible to know what things are or 
 ought to be called "an horse," or " antimony," when those 
 words are put for real essences that we have no ideas of at all. 
 And therefore, in this supposition, the names of substances 
 being referred to standards that cannot be known, their signifi- 
 cations can never be adjusted and established by those standards. 
 
 13. Secondly, To co-existing qualities which are known but 
 imperfectly. Secondly, The simple ideas that are found to 
 co-exist in substances being that which their names imme- 
 diately signify, these, as united in the several sorts of things, 
 are the proper standards to which their names are referred, 
 and by which their significations may best be rectified. But 
 neither will these archetypes so well serve to this purpose, as 
 to leave these names without very various and uncertain sig- 
 nifications. Because these simple ideas that co-exist, and are 
 united in the same subject, being very numerous, and having 
 all an equal right to go into the complex specific idea, which 
 the specific name is to stand for, men, though they propose to 
 themselves the very same subject to consider, yet frame very 
 different ideas about it : and so the name they use for it 
 unavoidably comes to have, in several men, very different 
 significations. The simple qualities which make up the com- 
 plex ideas being most of them powers, in relation to changes 
 which they are apt to make in or receive from other bodies, 
 are almost infinite. He that shall but observe what a great 
 variety of alterations any one of the baser metals is apt to 
 receive from the different application only of fire, and how 
 much a greater number of changes any of them will receive 
 
OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 103 
 
 in the hands of a chemist by the application of other bodies, 
 will not think it strange that I count the properties of any 
 sort of bodies not easy to be collected and completely known 
 by the ways of inquiry which our faculties are capable of. 
 They being therefore at least so many that no man can know 
 the precise and definite number, they are differently discovered 
 by different men, according to their various skill, attention, 
 and ways of handling ; who therefore cannot choose but have 
 different ideas of the same substance, and therefore make the 
 signification of its common name very various and uncertain. 
 For the complex ideas of substances being made up of such 
 simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in nature, every one 
 has a right to put into his complex idea those qualities he 
 has found to be united together. For though, in the sub- 
 stance, gold, one satisfies himself with colour and weight, yet 
 another thinks solubility in aqua regia* as necessary to be 
 joined with that colour in his idea of gold, as any one does 
 its fusibility ; solubility in aqua regia being a quality as con- 
 stantly joined with its colour and weight, as fusibility or any 
 other: others put in its ductility, or fixedness, &c., as they 
 have been taught by tradition or experience. Who of all 
 these has established the right signification of the word 
 " gold ?" or who shall be the judge to determine ? Each has 
 his standard in nature which he appeals to, and with reason 
 thinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea 
 signified by the word "gold 11 those qualities which upon 
 trial he has found united ; as another, who has not so well 
 examined, has to leave them out ; or a third, who has made 
 other trials, has to put in others. For, the union in nature 
 of these qualities being the true ground of their union in one 
 complex idea, who can say one of them has more reason to 
 be put in or left out than another ? From whence it will 
 always unavoidably follow, that the complex ideas of sub- 
 stances, in men using the same name for them, will be very 
 various ; and so the significations of those names very un- 
 certain. 
 
 * A mixture of nitric with hydrochloric acid. ED. 
 
104 OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 
 
 14. Besides, there is scarce any particular thing existing, 
 which, in some of its simple ideas, does not communicate with 
 a greater, and in others with a less, number of particular 
 beings: who shall determine in this case, which are those 
 that are to make up the precise collection that is to be sig- 
 nified by the specific name ; or can with any just authority 
 prescribe which obvious or common qualities are to be left 
 out, or which more secret or more particular are to be put 
 into the signification of the name of any substance? All 
 which together seldom or never fail to produce that various 
 and doubtful signification in the names of substances, which 
 causes such uncertainty, disputes, or mistakes, when we come 
 to a philosophical use of them. 
 
 15. With this imperfection, they may serve for civil, lut not 
 well for philosophical use. It is true, as to civil and common 
 conversation, the general names of substances, regulated in 
 their ordinary signification by some obvious qualities (as by 
 the shape and figure in things of known seminal propagation, 
 and in other substances for the most part by colour, joined 
 with some other sensible qualities), do well enough to design 
 the things men would be understood to speak of ; and so they 
 usually conceive well enough the substances meant by the word 
 " gold " or " apple," to distinguish the one from the other. Eut 
 in philosophical inquiries and debates, where general truths are 
 to be established, and consequences drawn from positions laid 
 down, there the precise signification of the names of sub- 
 stances will be found not only not to be well established, but 
 also very hard to be so. For example : He that shall make 
 rnalleableness, or a certain degree of fixedness, a part of his 
 complex idea of gold, may make propositions concerning gold, 
 and draw consequences from them, that will truly and clearly 
 follow from gold taken in such a signification : but yet such 
 as another man can never be forced to admit, nor be convinced 
 of their truth, who makes not malleableness, or the same 
 degree of fixedness, part of that complex idea that the name 
 " gold," in his use of it, stands for. 
 
 16. Instance, liquor. This is a natural and almost unavoid- 
 
OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 105 
 
 able imperfection in almost all the names of substances, in all 
 languages whatsoever, which men will easily find when, once 
 passing from confused or loose notions, they come to more 
 st* % }t and close inquiries. For then they will be convinced 
 h*. w doubtful and obscure those words are in their significa- 
 tion, which in ordinary use appeared very clear and deter- 
 mined. I was once in a meeting of very learned and inge- 
 nious physicians, where by chance there arose a question, 
 Whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves ? 
 The debate having been managed a good while, by variety 
 of arguments on both sides, I (who had been used to suspect 
 that the greatest part of disputes were more about the signifi- 
 cation of words, than a real difference in the conception of 
 things) desired, that before they went any farther on in this 
 dispute, they would first examine and establish amongst them 
 what the word " liquor" signified. They at first were a little 
 surprised at the proposal ; and had they been persons less 
 ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivo- 
 lous or extravagant one : since there was no one there that 
 thought not himself to understand very perfectly what the 
 word " liquor" stood for; which I think, too, none of the 
 most perplexed names of substances. However, they were 
 pleased to comply with my motion ; and, upon examination, 
 found that the signification of that word was not so settled 
 and certain as they had all imagined ; but that each of them 
 made it a sign of a different complex idea. This made them 
 perceive that the main of their dispute was about the signifi- 
 cation of that term ; and that they differed very little in their 
 opinions concerning some fluid and subtile matter passing 
 through the conduits of the nerves, though it was not so easy 
 to agree whether it was to be called " liquor " or no ; a thing 
 which when each considered, he thought it not worth the con- 
 tending about. 
 
 17. Instance, gold. How much this is the case in the 
 greatest part of disputes that men are engaged so hotly in, I 
 shall, perhaps, have an occasion in another place to take 
 notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly the 
 
 F 3 
 
106 OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 
 
 fore-mentioned instance of the word " gold," and we shall see 
 how hard it is precisely to determine its signification. I think 
 all agree to make it stand for a body of a certain yellow shin- 
 ing colour; which being the idea to which children hare 
 annexed that name, the shining yellow part of a peacock's 
 tail is properly to them gold. Others finding fusibility joined 
 with that yellow colour in certain parcels of matter, make of 
 that combination a complex idea to which they give the name 
 " gold," to denote a sort of substances ; and so exclude from 
 being gold all such yellow shining bodies as by fire will be 
 reduced to ashes ; and admit to be of that species, or to be 
 comprehended under that name " gold," only such substances 
 as having that shining yellow colour will by fire be reduced 
 to fusion, and not to ashes. Another by the same reason 
 adds the weight, which being a quality as straitly joined with 
 that colour as its fusibility, he thinks has the same reason to 
 be joined in its idea, and to be signified by its name : and 
 therefore the other, made up of body of such a colour, and 
 fusibility, to be imperfect ; and so on of all the rest : wherein no 
 one can show a reason why some of the inseparable qualities, 
 that are always united in nature, should be put into the 
 nominal essence,* and others left out : or why the word 
 " gold," signifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is 
 made of, should determine that sort rather by its colour, 
 weight, and fusibility, than by its colour, weight, and solu- 
 bility in aqua regia : since the dissolving it by that liquor is 
 as inseparable from it as the fusion by fire ; and they arc both 
 of them nothing but the relation which that substance has to 
 two other bodies, which have a power to operate differently 
 upon it. For by what right is it that fusibility comes to be 
 a part of the essence signified by the word " gold," and solu- 
 bility but a property of it ? Or why is its colour part of the 
 essence, and its malleableness but a property ? That which I 
 mean is this, that these being all but properties, depending 
 on its real constitution, and nothing but powers either active 
 
 * A " nominal essence " is the abstract idea to which a general name, such 
 as " man," " metal," " body," &c., is applied. ED. 
 
OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 107 
 
 or passive in reference to other bodies, no one has authority 
 to determine the signification of the word " gold " (as referred 
 to such a body existing in nature) more to one collection of ideas 
 to be found in that body than to another: whereby the significa- 
 tion of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain : since, 
 as has been said, several people observe several properties in the 
 same substance ; and I think I may say, nobody all. And 
 therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of things, 
 and words have very uncertain significations. 
 
 18. The names of simple ideas the least doubtful. Prom what 
 has been said it is easy to observe, what has been before 
 remarked, viz., that the names of simple ideas are, of all 
 others, the least liable to mistakes, and that for these reasons : 
 First, Because the ideas they stand for, being each but one 
 single perception, are much easier got and more clearly 
 retained than the more complex ones ; and therefore are not 
 liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those com- 
 pounded ones of substances and mixed modes, in which the 
 precise number of simple ideas that make them up are not 
 easily agreed, and so readily kept in mind. And, Secondly, 
 Because they are never referred to any other essence but 
 barely that perception they immediately signify : which refer- 
 ence is that which renders the significations of the names of 
 substances naturally so perplexed, and gives occasion to so 
 many disputes. Men that do not perversely use their words, 
 or on purpose set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake, in any 
 language which they are acquainted with, the use and signi- 
 fication of the names of simple ideas : white and sweet, yellow 
 and bitter, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which 
 every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is 
 ignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise col- 
 lection of simple ideas modesty or frugality stands for in 
 another's use, is not so certainly known. And, however we are 
 apt to think we well enough know what is meant by "gold" 
 or " iron," yet the precise complex idea others make them the 
 signs of is not so certain : and I believe it is very seldom that 
 in speaker or hearer they stand for exactly the same collec- 
 
108 OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 
 
 tion. AVhich must needs produce mistakes and disputes, when 
 they are made use of in discourses wherein men have to do with 
 universal propositions, and would settle in their minds universal 
 truths, and consider the consequences that follow from them. 
 
 19. And next to them, simple modes. By the same rule, the 
 names of simple modes are, next to those of simple ideas, least 
 liable to doubt and uncertainty, especially those of figure and 
 number, of which men have so clear and distinct ideas. ^Vho- 
 ever, that had a mind to understand them, mistook the ordi- 
 nary meaning of " seven," or " a triangle ? " And in general 
 the least compounded ideas in every kind have the least 
 dubious names. 
 
 20. The most doubtful are the names of very compounded mixed 
 modes and substances. Mixed modes therefore, that are made 
 up but of a few and obvious simple ideas, have usually names 
 of no very uncertain signification. But the names of mixed 
 modes, which comprehend a great number of simple ideas, are 
 commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning, as 
 has been shown. The names of substances, being annexed to 
 ideas that are neither the real essences nor exact representa- 
 tions of the patterns they are referred to, are liable yet to 
 greater imperfection and uncertainty, especially when we 
 come to a philosophical use of them. 
 
 21. Why this imperfection charged upon icordi. The great 
 disorder that happens in our names of substances proceeding 
 for the most part from our want of knowledge and inability 
 to penetrate into their real constitutions, it may probably 
 be wondered why I charge this as an imperfection rather 
 upon our words than understandings. This exception has so 
 much appearance of justice, that I think myself obliged to 
 give a reason why I have followed this method. I must 
 confess, then, that when I first began this discourse of the 
 understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least 
 thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary 
 to it. But when, having passed over the original and compo- 
 sition of our ideas, 1 began to examine the extent and certainty 
 of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connection with 
 
OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 109 
 
 words, that unless their force and manner of signification 
 were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly 
 and pertinently concerning knowledge : which, being con- 
 versant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. 
 And though it terminated in things, yet it was for the most 
 part so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed 
 scarce separable from our general knowledge. At least, they 
 interpose themselves so much between our understandings and 
 the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend, that, 
 like the medium through which visible objects pass, their 
 security and disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our 
 eyes, and impose upon our understandings. If we consider, 
 in the fallacies men put upon themselves as well as others, 
 and the mistakes in men's disputes and notions, how great a 
 part is owing to words and their uncertain or mistaken signi- 
 fications, we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle 
 in the way to knowledge ; which T conclude we are the more 
 carefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from 
 being taken notice of as an inconvenience, that the arts of 
 improving it have been made the business of men's study, and 
 obtained the reputation of learning and subtilty, as we shall 
 see in the following chapter. But I am apt to imagine that, 
 were the imperfections of language, as the instrument of 
 knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the 
 controversies that make such a noise in the world would of 
 themselves cease ; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps 
 peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does. 
 
 22. This should teach us moderation in imposing our own sense 
 of old authors. Sure I am, that the signification of words, in 
 all languages, depending very much on the thoughts, notions, 
 and ideas of him that uses them, must unavoidably be of 
 great uncertainty to men of the same language and country. 
 This is so evident in the Greek authors, that he that shall 
 peruse their writings will find, in almost every one of them, 
 a distinct language, though the same words. But when to 
 this natural difficulty in every country there shall be added 
 different countries and remote ages, wherein the speakers and 
 
 USf 
 
110 OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS. 
 
 miters had very different notions, tempers, customs, orna* 
 ments and figures of speech, &c., every one of which influenced 
 the signification of their words then, though to us now they 
 are lost and unknown, it would become us to be charitable 
 one to another in our interpretations or misunderstanding of 
 those ancient writings ; which, though of great concernment 
 to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of 
 speech, which (if we except the names of simple ideas, and 
 some very obvious things) is not capable, without a constant 
 defining the terms, of conveying the sense and intention of 
 the speaker without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to 
 the hearer. And in discourses of religion, law, and morality, 
 as they are matters of the highest concernment, so there will 
 be the greatest difficulty. 
 
 23. The volumes of interpreters and commentators on the 
 OM and ISTew Testament are but too manifest proofs of this. 
 Though everything said in the text be infallibly true, yet the 
 reader may be, nay, cannot choose but be, very fallible in the 
 understanding of it. "Nox is it to be wondered that the will 
 of God, when clothed in words, should be liable to that doubt 
 and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of con- 
 veyance, when even His Son, whilst clothed in flesh, was 
 subject to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, 
 sin excepted. And we ought to magnify His goodness, that 
 He hath spread before all the world such legible characters of 
 His works and providence, and given all mankind so sufficient 
 a light of reason, that they to whom this written word never 
 came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search) 
 either doubt of the being of a God, or of the obedience due to 
 Him. Since, then, the precepts of natural religion are plain, 
 and very intelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be 
 controverted ; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed 
 to us by books and languages, are liable to the common and 
 natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words : methinks 
 it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing 
 the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious in 
 imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter. 
 
OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. Ill 
 
 OF THE ABUSE OF WOBDS. 
 
 1. Abuse of words. Besides the imperfection that is natu- 
 rally in language, and the obscurity and confusion that is so 
 hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several wilful 
 faults and neglects which men are guilty of in this way 
 of communication, whereby they render these signs less 
 clear and distinct in their signification than naturally they 
 need to be. 
 
 2. First, Words without any, or without clear, ideas. First, 
 In this kind, the first and most palpable abuse is, the using 
 of words without clear and distinct ideas ; or, which is worse, 
 signs without anything signified. Of these there are two 
 sorts : 
 
 I. One may observe, in all languages, certain words that, 
 if they be examined, will be found, in their first original and 
 their appropriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct 
 ideas. These, for the most part, the several sects of philo- 
 sophy and religion have introduced. For their authors or 
 promoters, either affecting something singular, and out of the 
 way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange 
 opinions, or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom 
 fail to coin new words, and such as, when they come to be 
 examined, may justly be called, "insignificant terms. " For, 
 having either had no determinate collection of ideas annexed 
 to them when they were first invented, or at least such as, if 
 well examined, will be found inconsistent, it is no wonder if 
 afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain 
 empty sounds with little or no signification, amongst those 
 who think it enough to have them often in their mouths, as 
 the distinguishing characters of their church or school, with- 
 out much troubling their heads to examine what are the pre- 
 cise ideas they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up 
 instances ; every one's reading and conversation will suffi- 
 ciently furnish him : or if he wants to be better stored, the 
 great mint masters of these kind of terms, I mean the school- 
 
112 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 
 
 men and metaphysicians (under which, I think, the disputing 
 natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be 
 comprehended), have wherewithal abundantly to content him. 
 
 3. II. Others there be who extend this abuse yet farther, 
 who take so little care to lay by words which, in their pri- 
 mary notation, have scarce any clear and distinct ideas which 
 they are annexed to, that, by an unpardonable negligence, they 
 familiarly use words which the propriety of language has 
 affixed to very important ideas, without any distinct meaning 
 at all. " Wisdom, glory, grace," &c., are words frequent 
 enough in every man's mouth ; but if a great many of those 
 who use them should be asked what they mean by them, they 
 would be at a stand, and not know what to answer : a plain 
 proof that, though they have learned those sounds, and have 
 them ready at their tongues' end, yet there are no determined 
 ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed to 
 others by them. 
 
 4. Occasioned by learning names before the ideas they belong to. 
 Men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn 
 words which are easily got and retained, before they knew or 
 had framed the complex ideas to which they were annexed, 
 or which were to be found in the things they were thought 
 to stand for, they usually continue to do so all their lives ; 
 and, without taking the pains necessary to settle in their 
 minds determined ideas, they use their words for such unsteady 
 and confused notions as they have, contenting themselves with 
 the same words other people use ; as if their very sound 
 necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning. 
 This though men make a shift with in the ordinary occur- 
 rences of life, where they find it necessary to be understood, 
 and therefore they make signs till they are so ; yet this insig- 
 nificancy in their words, when they come to reason concern- 
 ing either their tenets or interest, manifestly fills their dis- 
 course with abundance of empty, unintelligible noise and 
 jargon, especially in moral matters where the words for the 
 most part, standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of 
 ideas, not regularly and permanently united in nature, their 
 
OF THE ABUSE OF WORI^*. 113 
 
 bare sounds are often only thought on, <?r at least very 
 obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take 
 the words they find in use amongst their neighbours ; and 
 that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use 
 them confidently, without much troubling their heads about 
 a certain fixed meaning ; whereby, besides the ease of it, they 
 obtain this advantage, that as in such discourses they seldom 
 are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that 
 they are in the wrong ; it being all one to go about to draw 
 those men out of their mistakes who have no settled notions, 
 as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation, who has no settled , 
 abode. This I guess to be so ; and every one may observe in 
 himself and others whether it be or no. 
 
 5. Secondly, Unsteady application of them. Secondly, 
 Another great abuse of words is, inconsistency in the use of 
 them. It is hard to find a discourse written of any subject, 
 especially of controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he 
 read with attention, the same words (and those commonly the 
 most material in the discourse, and upon which the argument 
 turns) used sometimes for one collection of simple ideas, and 
 sometimes for another, which is a perfect abuse of language. 
 "Words being intended for signs of my ideas, to make them 
 known to others, not by any natural signification, but by a 
 voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse when I make 
 them stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another : 
 the wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great 
 folly or greater dishonesty. And a man, in his accounts with 
 another, may, with as much fairness, make the characters of 
 numbers stand sometimes for one and sometimes for another 
 collection of units (#.#., this character 3 stands sometimes for 
 three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight), as in his 
 discourse or reasoning, make the same words stand for different 
 collections of simple ideas. If men should do so in their 
 reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them ! One 
 who would speak thus in the affairs and business of the world, 
 and call eight sometimes seven, and sometimes nine, as best 
 served his advantage, would presently have clapped upon him 
 
114 OF THE ABUSE OF WOKDS. 
 
 one of the two names men constantly are disgusted with. And 
 yet in arguings and learned contests the same sort of proceeding 
 passes commonly for wit and learning : but to me it appears a 
 greater dishonesty than the misplacings of counters in the 
 casting up a debt ; and the cheat the greater by how much 
 truth is of greater concernment and value than money. 
 
 6. Thirdly, Affected obscurity by wrong application. 
 Another abuse of language is an affected obscurity, by either 
 applying old words to new and unusual significations, or in- 
 troducing new and ambiguous terms without defining either : 
 or else putting them so together as may confound their ordi- 
 nary meaning. Though the peripatetic philosophy has been 
 most eminent in this way, yet other sects have not been wholly 
 clear of it. There is scarce any of them that are not cum- 
 bered with some difficulties (such is the imperfection of 
 human knowledge), which they have been fain to cover with 
 obscurity of terms and to confound the signification of words, 
 which, like a mist before people's eyes, might hinder their 
 weak parts from being discovered. That "body" and "ex- 
 tension" in common use, stand for two distinct ideas, is plain 
 to any one that will but reflect a little. For, were their sig- 
 nification precisely the same, it would be properand as intel- 
 ligible to say "the body of an extension," as "the extension 
 of a body ;" and yet there are those who find it necessaiy to 
 confound their signification. To this abuse, and the mischiefs 
 of confounding the signification of words, logic and the liberal 
 sciences, as they have been handled in the Schools, have 
 given reputation ; and the admired art of disputing hath added 
 much to the natural imperfection of languages, whilst it has 
 been made use of and fitted to perplex the signification of words 
 more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things : and 
 he that will look into that sort of learned writings, will find the 
 words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined 
 in their meaning than they are in ordinary conversation.* 
 
 * In this Locke does the Schools an injustice ; for the language of the 
 mediaeval philosophers is, generally speaking, characterised by great clearness 
 and precision. ED. 
 
OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 115 
 
 7. Logic and dispute has much contributed to this. This is 
 unavoidably to be so, where men's parts and learning are 
 estimated by their skill in disputing. And if reputation and 
 reward shall attend these conquests, which depend mostly on 
 the fineness and niceties of words, it is no wonder if the wit 
 of men so employed should perplex, involve, and subtilize the 
 significations of sounds, so as never to want something to say 
 in opposing or defending any question ; the victory being ad- 
 judged not to him who had truth on his side, but the last 
 word in the dispute. 
 
 8. Calling it "subtilty." This, though a very useless skill, 
 and that which I think the direct opposite to the ways of 
 knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and 
 esteemed names of "subtilty" and "acuteness;" and has had 
 the applause of the Schools, and encouragement of one part of 
 the learned men of the world. And no wonder since the 
 philosophers of old (the disputing and wrangling philosophers 
 I mean, such as Lucian wittily and with reason taxes), and 
 the Schoolmen since, aiming at glory and esteem for their 
 great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal to be pre- 
 tended to than really acquired, found this a good expedient to 
 cover their ignorance with a curious and inexplicable web of 
 perplexed words, and procure to themselves the admiration of 
 others by unintelligible terms, the apter to produce wonder 
 because they could not be understood : whilst it appears in all 
 history that these profound doctors were no wiser nor more 
 useful than their neighbours,*' and brought but small advan- 
 tage to human life, or the societies wherein they lived : un- 
 less the coining of new words, where they produced no new 
 things to apply them to, or the perplexing or obscuring the 
 signification of old ones, and so bringing all things into ques- 
 tion and dispute, were a thing profitable to the life of man, or 
 worthy commendation and reward. 
 
 9. This learning very little benefits society. Eor, notwith- 
 standing these learned disputants, these all-knowing doctors, 
 
 * Their metaphysical knowledge and acumen have not yet been sur- 
 
116 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 
 
 it was to the unscholastic statesman that the governments of 
 the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties ; and from 
 the illiterate and contemned mechanic (a name of disgrace) 
 that they received the improvements of useful arts. Never- 
 theless, this artificial ignorance and learned gibberish prevailed 
 mightily in these last ages, by the interest and artifice of those 
 who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and do- 
 minion they have attained, than by amusing the men of busi- 
 ness and ignorant with hard words, or employing the inge- 
 nious and idle in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, 
 and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless 
 labyrinth. Besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, 
 or give defence to strange and absurd doctrines, as to guard 
 them round about with legions of obscure, doubtful, and 
 undefined words ; which yet make these retreats more like 
 the den of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortresses of 
 fair warriors : which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not 
 for the strength that is in them, but the briers and thorns, 
 and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with. For, 
 untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man, there is no 
 other defence left for absurdity but obscurity. 
 
 10. But destroys the instruments of knowledge and communi- 
 cation. Thus learned ignorance, and this art of keeping even 
 inquisitive men from true knowledge, hath been propagated 
 in the world, and hath much perplexed whilst it pretended to 
 inform the understanding. For we see that other well-mean- 
 ing and wise men, whose education and parts had not acquired 
 that acuteness, could intelligibly express themselves to one 
 another, and in its plain use make a benefit of language. But 
 though unlearned men well enough understood the words 
 ''white" and " black," &c., and had constant notions of the 
 ideas signified by those words ; yet there were philosophers 
 found who had learning and subtilty enough to prove that 
 snow was black; i.e., to prove that white was black. 
 Whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments 
 and means of discourse, conversation, instruction, and society ; 
 whilst, with great art and subtilty, they did no more but per- 
 
OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 117 
 
 plex and confound the signification of words, and thereby 
 render language less useful than the real defects of it had 
 made it ; a gift which the illiterate had not attained to. 
 
 11. As useful as to confound the sound of the letters. These 
 learned men did equally instruct men's understandings and 
 profit their lives, as he who should alter the signification of 
 known characters, and, by a subtile device of learning, far 
 surpassing the capacity of the illiterate, dull, and vulgar, 
 should, in his writing, show that he could put A for E, and 
 D for E, &c., to the no small admiration and benefit of his 
 reader ; it being as senseless to put " black," which is a word 
 agreed on to stand for one sensible idea, to put it, I say, for 
 another or the contrary idea, i.e., to call snow " black," as to 
 put this mark, A, which is a character agreed on to stand for 
 one modification of sound made by a certain motion of the 
 organs of speech, for B, which is agreed on to stand for 
 another modification of sound made by another certain motion 
 of the organs of speech. 
 
 12. This art has perplexed religion and justice. Nor hath 
 this mischief stopped in logical niceties or curious empty 
 speculations; it hath invaded the great concernments of 
 human life and society, obscured and perplexed the material 
 truths of law and divinity, brought confusion, disorder, and 
 uncertainty into the affairs of mankind, and, if not destroyed, 
 yet in great measure rendered useless, those two great rules, 
 religion and justice. What have the greatest part of the 
 comments and disputes upon the laws of God and man served 
 for, but to make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the 
 sense ? "What has been the effect of those multiplied curious 
 distinctions and acute niceties, but obscurity and uncertainty, 
 leaving the words more unintelligible, and the reader more at 
 a loss ? How else comes it to pass that princes, speaking or 
 writing to their servants, in their ordinary commands, are 
 easily understood ? speaking to their people, in their laws, are 
 not so ? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen 
 that a man of an ordinary capacity very well understands a 
 text or a law that he reads, till he consults an expositor, or 
 
118 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 
 
 goes to counsel ; who, by that time he hath done explaining 
 them, makes the words signify either nothing at all, or what 
 he pleases ? 
 
 13. And ought not to pass for learning. Whether any by- 
 interests of these professions have occasioned this, I will not 
 here examine ; but I leave it to be considered, whether it 
 would not be well for mankind, whose concernment it is to 
 know things as they are and to do what they ought, and not 
 to spend their lives in talking about them, or tossing words to 
 and fro : whether it would not be well, I say, that the use of 
 words were made plain and direct ; and that language, which 
 was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bond of 
 society should not be employed to darken truth, and unsettle 
 people's rights ; to raise mists, and render unintelligible both 
 morality and religion ; or that at least, if this will happen, it 
 should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so. 
 
 14. Fourthly, Taking them for things. Fourthly, Another 
 great abuse of words is the taking them for things. This, 
 though it, in some degree, concerns all names in general, yet 
 more particularly affects those of substances. To this abuse 
 those men are most subject who confine their thoughts to any 
 one system, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the 
 perfection of any received hypothesis : whereby they come to 
 be persuaded, that the terms of that sect are so suited to the 
 nature of things that they perfectly correspond with their real 
 existence. Who is there that has been bred up in the peri- 
 patetic philosophy, who does not think the ten names, under 
 which are ranked the ten predicaments,* to be exactly con- 
 formable to the nature of things ? Who is there of that school 
 that is not persuaded, that " substantial forms,"f " vegetative 
 souls," " abhorrence of a vacuum," " intentional species, "J 
 
 * The "predicaments" or "categories" of the Aristotelic philosophy were 
 the manners or modes in which all things were supposed to exist. Their 
 enumeration is as follows: 1 Substance; 2 Quantity; 3 Quality; 
 4 Relation ; 5 Acticu ; 6 Passion ; 7 Where ; 8 When ; 9 Posture ; 
 10 Habit. ED. 
 
 t i. e. The qualities of bodies, which were said to be real separate existences, 
 occasionally conjo'ned to matter. ED. 
 
 | Vide note to thh-1 selection. ED. 
 
OF THE -ABUSE OF WORDS. 119 
 
 &c., are something real? These words men have learned 
 from their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found 
 their masters and systems lay great stress upon them : and 
 therefore they cannot quit the opinion that they are conform- 
 able to nature, and are the representations of something that 
 really exists. The Platonists have their " soul of the world," 
 and the Epicureans their " endeavour towards motion" in 
 their " atoms when at rest." There is scarce any sect in 
 philosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others under- 
 stand not. But yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness 
 of human understanding, serves so well to palliate men's igno- 
 rance and cover their errors, comes by familiar use amongst 
 those of the same tribe to seem the most important part of 
 language, and of all other the terms the most significant : and 
 should aerial and ethereal vehicles* come once, by the pre- 
 valency of that doctrine, to be generally received anywhere, 
 no doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds, 
 so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such 
 things, as much as peripatetic forms and intentional species 
 have heretofore done. 
 
 15. Instance in matter. How much names taken for things 
 are apt to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of 
 philosophical writers would abundantly discover; and that, 
 perhaps, in words little suspected of any such misuse. I 
 shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How 
 many intricate disputes have there been about matter, as if 
 there were some such thing really in nature distinct from 
 body; as it is evident the word " matter" stands for an idea 
 distinct from the idea of body ! Tor, if the idea these two 
 terms stood for were precisely the same, they might indiffer- 
 ently in all places be put one for another. Eut we see, that 
 though it be proper to say, " There is one matter of all 
 bodies," one cannot say, " There is one body of all matters : " 
 we familiarly say, " One body is bigger than another;" but 
 
 * That is, as a means of communication between mind and matter a 
 doctrine not -very far removed from that which now obtains as regards the 
 existence of " ether." ED 
 
120 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 
 
 it sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say, "One 
 matter is bigger than another." "Whence comes this then? 
 Yiz., from hence, that though matter and body be not really 
 distinct, but wherever there is the one there is the other; 
 yet "matter" and "body" stand for two different concep- 
 tions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the 
 other. For, "body" stands for a solid, extended, figured 
 substance, whereof "matter" is but a partial and more con- 
 fused conception, it seeming to me to be used for the sub- 
 stance and solidity of body, without taking in its extension 
 and figure : and therefore it is that, speaking of matter, we 
 speak of it always as one, because, in truth, it expressly con- 
 tains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is every- 
 where the same, everywhere uniform. This being our idea of 
 matter, we no more conceive or speak of different matters in 
 the world, than we do of different solidities ; though we both 
 conceive and speak of different bodies, because extension and 
 figure are capable of variation. But since solidity cannot 
 exist without extension and figure, the taking "matter" to 
 be the name of something really existing under that precision, 
 has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible dis- 
 courses and disputes which have filled the heads and books of 
 philosophers concerning materia prima ; which imperfection 
 or abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general 
 terms, I leave to be considered. This, I think, I may at least 
 sny, that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the 
 world, if words were taken for what they are, the signs of 
 our ideas only, and not for things themselves. For when we 
 argue about "matter," or any the like term, we truly argue 
 only about the idea we express by that sound, whether that 
 precise idea agree to anything really existing in nature or no. 
 And if men would tell what ideas they make their words 
 stand for, there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling 
 in the search or support of truth that there is. 
 
 16. This makes errors lasting. But whatever inconvenience 
 follows from this mistake of words, this, I am sure, that by 
 constant and familiar use they charm men into notions far 
 
OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 121 
 
 remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter 
 to persuade any one that the words which his father or school- 
 master, the parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor 
 used, signified nothing that really existed in nature : which, 
 perhaps, is none of the least causes that men are so hardly 
 drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely philo- 
 sophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. 
 For the words they have a long time been used to remaining 
 firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions 
 annexed to them should not be removed. 
 
 17. Fifthly, Setting them for what they cannot signify. 
 Fifthly, Another abuse of words is the setting them in the 
 place of things which they do or can by no means signify. 
 We may observe that, in the general names of substances, 
 whereof the nominal essences are only known to us, when we 
 put them into propositions, and affirm or deny anything about 
 tkem,we do most commonly tacitly suppose or intend they should 
 sb-and for the real essence of a certain sort of substances. For 
 when a man says, " Gold is malleable," he means and would 
 insinuate something more than this, that what I call " gold" 
 is malleable (though truly it amounts to no more), but would 
 Lave this understood, viz., that gold, i. e., what has the real 
 essence of gold, is malleable ; which amounts to thus much, 
 fchat malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from, the 
 real essence of gold. Eut a man, not knowing wherein that 
 real essence consists, the connection in his mind of malleable- 
 ness is not truly with an essence he knows not, but only with 
 the sound "gold" he puts for it. Thus when we say, that 
 animal rationale is, and animal implume, lipes, latis unguilus* 
 is not, a good definition of a man ; it is plain we suppose the 
 name "man" in this case to stand for the real essence of a 
 species, and would signify that "a rational animal" better 
 described that real essence than " a two-legged animal with 
 
 * This is the celebrated definition of " man," as given by Plato. It was at 
 first merely " a two-legged animal without feathers ;" but when a rival philo- 
 sopher introduced a plucked cock to the assembled sages, and called it Plato's 
 *man," it was found necessary to add the epithet "broad-nailed" to the 
 definition. ED. 
 
122 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 
 
 broad nails, and without feathers." For else, why might not 
 Plato as properly make the word a/0pa>7roc, or "man," stand 
 for his complex idea, made up of the ideas of a hody dis- 
 tinguished from others hy a certain shape, and other out- 
 ward appearances, as Aristotle make the complex idea, to 
 which he gave the name arfyxoTroe, or "man," of body and 
 the faculty of reasoning joined together; unless the name 
 avflpeoTToc, or "man," were supposed to stand for something 
 else than what it signifies ; and to be put in the place of some 
 other thing than the idea a man professes he would express 
 by it? 
 
 18. V. g., Putting them for the real essences of substances. 
 It is true, the names of substances would be much more use- 
 ful, and propositions made in them much more certain, were 
 the real essences of substances the ideas in our minds which 
 those words signified. And it is for want of those real 
 essences that our words convey so little knowledge or cer- 
 tainty in our discourses about them : and therefore the mind, 
 to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, 
 by a secret supposition, to stand for a thing having that real 
 essence, as if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it. 
 For though the word "man" or "gold" signify nothing truly 
 but a complex idea of properties united together in one sort 
 of substances : yet there is scarce anybody, in the use of these 
 words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for a 
 thing having the real essence on which those properties de- 
 pend. Which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of 
 our words, that by a plain abuse it adds to it, when we would 
 make them stand for something which, not being in our com- 
 plex idea, the name we use can no ways be the sign of. 
 
 19. Hence we think every change of our idea in substances, 
 not to change the species. This shows us the reason why, in 
 mixed modes, any of the ideas that make the composition of 
 the complex one being left out or changed, it is allowed to be 
 another thing, i. e., to be of another species, as is plain in 
 chance-medley, manslaughter, murder, parricide, &c. The 
 reason whereof is, because the complex idea, signified by that 
 
OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 123 
 
 name, is the real as well as nominal essence ; and there is no 
 secret reference of that name to any other essence but that. 
 But in substances it is not so. For, though in that called 
 " gold" one puts into his complex idea what another leaves 
 out, and vice versd ; yet men do not usually think that there- 
 fore the species is changed : because they secretly in their 
 minds refer that name, and suppose it annexed, to a real 
 immutable essence of a thing existing, on which those proper- 
 ties depend. He that adds to his complex idea of gold that 
 of fixedness or solubility in aqua regia, which he put not in 
 it before, is not thought to have changed the species; but 
 only to have a more perfect idea by adding another simple 
 idea, which is always, in fact, joined with those other of 
 which his former complex idea consisted. But this reference 
 of the name to a thing whereof we have not the idea, is so 
 far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve 
 us in difficulties. For, by this tacit reference to the real 
 essence of that species of bodies, the word "gold" (which, 
 by standing for a more or less perfect collection of simple 
 ideas, serves to design that sort of body well enough in civil 
 discourse) comes to have no signification at all, being put for 
 somewhat whereof we have no idea at all, and so can signify 
 nothing at all when the body itself is away. For, however 
 it may be thought all one ; yet, if well considered, it will be 
 found a quite different thing to argue about " gold" in name, 
 and about a parcel of the body itself, v. g., a piece of leaf- gold 
 laid before us : though in discourse we are fain to substitute 
 the name for the thing. 
 
 20. The cause of the abuse, a supposition of natures working 
 always regularly. That which, I think, very much disposes 
 men to substitute their names for the real essences of species, 
 is the supposition before mentioned, that nature works regu- 
 larly in the production of things, and sets the boundaries to 
 each of those species by giving exactly the same real internal 
 constitution to each individual, which we rank under one 
 general name. Whereas any one who observes their different 
 qualities can hardly doubt that many of the individuals called 
 
 a 2 
 
124 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 
 
 by the same name are, in their internal constitution, as 
 different one from another as several of those which are ranked 
 under different specific names. This supposition, however, 
 that the same precise internal constitution goes always with 
 the same specific name, makes men forward to take those 
 names for the representatives of those real essences, though 
 indeed they signify nothing but the complex ideas they have 
 in their minds when they use them. So that, if I may so 
 say, signifying one thing, and being supposed for or put in the 
 place of another, they cannot but in such a kind of use cause 
 a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses ; especially in 
 those who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of substantial 
 forms, whereby they firmly imagine the several species of 
 things to be determined and distinguished. 
 
 21. This abuse contains two false suppositions. Eut, how- 
 ever preposterous and absurd it be to make our names stand 
 for ideas we have not, or (which is all one) essences that we 
 know not, it being in effect to make our words the signs of 
 nothing ; yet it is evident to any one, who reflects ever so 
 little on the use men make of their words, that there is 
 nothing more familiar. When a man asks whether this or 
 that thing he sees, let it be a drill* or a monstrous foetus, be 
 a man or no, it is evident the question is not whether that 
 particular thing agree to his complex idea expressed by the 
 name "man," but whether it has in it the real essence of a 
 species of things which he supposes his name " man" to stand 
 for. In which way of using the names of substances there are 
 these false suppositions contained : 
 
 First, That there are certain precise essences according to 
 which nature makes all particular things, and by which they 
 are distinguished into species. That everything has a real 
 constitution whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible 
 qualities depend, is past doubt ; but I think it has been proved 
 that this makes not the distinction of species as we rank them, 
 nor the boundaries of their names. 
 
 Secondly, This tacitly also insinuates as if we had the ideas 
 * A baboon. ED. 
 
OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 125 
 
 of these proposed essences. For to what purpose else is it to 
 inquire, whether this or that thing have the real essence of 
 the species man, if we did not suppose that there were such a 
 specific essence known ? "Which yet is utterly false : and 
 therefore such application of names, as 'would make them stand 
 for ideas which we have not, must needs cause great disorder 
 in discourses and reasonings about them, and be a great incon- 
 venience in our communication by words. 
 
 22. Sixthly, A supposition that words have a certain and 
 evident signification. Sixthly, There remains yet another 
 more general, though perhaps less observed, abuse of words ; 
 and that is, that men having by a long and familiar use 
 annexed to them certain ideas, they are apt to imagine so near 
 and necessary a connection between the names and the signi- 
 fication they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one 
 cannot but understand what their meaning is, and therefore 
 one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered ; as if it were 
 past doubt that, in the use of those common received sounds, 
 the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas. 
 Whence, presuming that when they have in discourse used 
 any term, they have thereby, as it were, set before others the 
 very thing they talk of; and so likewise taking the words of 
 others as naturally standing for just what they themselves have 
 been accustomed to apply them to ; they never trouble them- 
 selves to explain their own or understand clearly others' meaning. 
 From whence commonly proceeds noise and wrangling, without 
 improvement or information ; whilst men take words to be the 
 constant, regular marks of agreed notions, which, in truth, are 
 no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own 
 ideas. And yet men think it strange if, in discourse or (where 
 it is often absolutely necessary) in dispute, one sometimes asks 
 the meaning of their terms : though the arguings one may 
 every day observe in conversation make it evident that there 
 are few names of complex ideas which any two men use for 
 the same just precise collection. It is hard to name a word 
 which will not be a clear instance of this; "life" is a term, 
 none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an 
 
126 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 
 
 affront to be asked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes 
 in question whether a plant, that lies ready formed in the 
 seed, have life ; whether the embryo in an egg before incuba- 
 tion, or a man in a swoon without sense or motion, be alive 
 or no ; it is easy to perceive, that a clear, distinct, settled idea 
 does not always accompany the use of so known a word as 
 that of "life" is. Some gross and confused conceptions men 
 indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common 
 words of their language ; and such a loose use of their words 
 serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs. 
 But this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries. Know- 
 ledge and reasoning require precise determinate ideas. And 
 though men will not be so importunately dull as not to under- 
 stand what others say, without demanding an explication of 
 their terms, nor so troublesomely critical as to correct others 
 in the use of the words they receive from them ; yet where 
 truth and knowledge are concerned in the case, I know not 
 what fault it can be to desire the explication of words whose 
 sense seems dubious : or why a man should be ashamed 
 to own his ignorance in what sense another man uses his 
 words, since he has no other way of certainly knowing it but 
 by being informed. This abuse of taking words upon trust 
 has nowhere spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst 
 men of letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes 
 which has so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to 
 nothing more than this ill use of words. For, though it be 
 generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions in 
 the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted 
 with, yet the most I can find that the contending learned 
 men of different parties do in their arguings one with another, 
 is, that they speak different languages. For I am apt to 
 imagine, that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon 
 things, and know what they think, they think all the same : 
 though perhaps what they would have, be different. 
 
 23. The ends of language : First : To convey our ideas. To 
 conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse of 
 language : The ends of language, in our discourse with others, 
 
OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 127 
 
 being chiefly these three : First, To make known one man's 
 thoughts or ideas to another : Secondly, To do it with as much 
 ease and quickness as is possible ; and, Thirdly, Thereby to 
 convey the knowledge of things. Language is either abused 
 or deficient when it fails of any of these three. 
 
 First, Words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open 
 one man's ideas to another's view : First, When men have 
 names in their mouths without any determined ideas in their 
 minds whereof they are the signs : or, Secondly, When they 
 apply the common received names of any language to ideas, 
 to which the common use of that language does not apply 
 them : or, Thirdly, When they apply them very unsteadily, 
 making them stand now for one and by-and-by for another 
 idea. 
 
 24. Secondly, To do it with quickness. Secondly, Men fail 
 of conveying their thoughts with all. the quickness and ease 
 that may be, when they have complex ideas without having 
 distinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the 
 language itself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to 
 such a signification : and sometimes the fault of the man, who 
 has not yet learned the name for that idea he would show 
 another. 
 
 25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the knowledge of things. 
 Thirdly, There is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's 
 words, when their ideas agree not to the reality of things. 
 Though it be a defect that it has its original in our ideas, 
 which are not so conformable to the nature of things as atten- 
 tion, study, and application might make them ; yet it fails not 
 to extend itself to our words, too, when we use them as signs 
 of real beings which yet never had any reality or existence. 
 
 26. How men's words fail in all these. First, He that hath 
 words of any language without distinct ideas in his mind to 
 which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in dis- 
 course, only make a noise without any sense or signification ; 
 and, how learned soever he may seem by the use of hard 
 words, or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby 
 in knowledge, than he would be in learning who had nothing 
 
128 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 
 
 in his study but the bare titles of books, without possessing 
 the contents of them. For all such words, however put into 
 discourse according to the right construction of grammatical 
 rules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount 
 to nothing but bare sounds, and nothing else. 
 
 27. Secondly, He that has complex ideas without particular 
 names for them, would be in no better a case than a book- 
 seller who had in his warehouse volumes that lay there un- 
 bound, and without titles, which he could therefore make 
 known to others only by showing the loose sheets, and com- 
 municate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his 
 discourse for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, 
 which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumera- 
 tion of the simple ones that compose them ; and so is fain 
 often to use twenty words to express what another man signi- 
 fies in one. 
 
 28. Thirdly, He that puts not constantly the same sign for 
 the same idea, but uses the same words sometimes in one and 
 sometimes in another signification, ought to pass in the schools 
 and conversation for as fair a man as he does in the market 
 and exchange who sells several things under the same name. 
 
 29. Fourthly, He that applies the words of any language 
 to ideas different from those to which the common use of that 
 country applies them, however his own understanding may be 
 filled with truth and light, will not by such words be able to 
 convey much of it to others without defining his terms. For, 
 however the sounds are such as are familiarly known and 
 easily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them, 
 yet, standing for other ideas than those they usually are an- 
 nexed to, and are wont to excite in the minds of the hearers, 
 they cannot make known the thoughts of him who thus uses 
 them. 
 
 30. Fifthly, He that hath imagined to himself substances 
 such as never have been, and filled his head with ideas which 
 have not any correspondence with the real nature of things, 
 to which yet he gives settled and defined names, may fill his 
 discourse, and perhaps another man's head, with the fantastical 
 
OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 129 
 
 imaginations of his own brain, but will be very far from 
 advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge. 
 
 31. He that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in 
 his words, and speaks only empty sounds. He that hath 
 complex ideas without names for them, wants liberty and 
 despatch in his expressions, and is necessitated to use peri- 
 phrases. He that uses his words loosely and unsteadily will 
 either be not minded or not understood. He that applies his 
 names to ideas different from their common use, wants pro- 
 priety in his language, and speaks gibberish. And he that 
 hath ideas of substances disagreeing with the real existence of 
 things, so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his 
 understanding, and hath, instead thereof, chimeras. 
 
 32. How in substances. In our notions concerning sub- 
 stances we are liable to all the former inconveniences: v.g., 
 (1) He that uses the word " tarantula," without having any 
 imagination or idea of what it stands for, pronounces a good 
 word : but so long means nothing at all by it. (2) He that 
 in a new-discovered country shall see several sorts of am* mala 
 and vegetables unknown to him before, may have as true ideas 
 of them as of a horse or a stag ; but can speak of them only 
 by a description, till he shall either take the names the natives 
 call them by, or give them names himself. (3) He that uses 
 the word "body" sometimes for pure extension, and some- 
 times for extension and solidity together, will talk very falla- 
 ciously. (4) He that gives the name "horse" to that idea 
 which common usage calls "mule," talks improperly, and 
 will not be understood. (5) He that thinks the name " cen- 
 taur" stands for some real being, imposes on himself, and 
 mistakes words for things. 
 
 33. How in modes and relations. In modes and relations 
 generally, we are liable only to the four first of these incon- 
 veniences, viz., (1) I may have in my memory the names of 
 modes, as "gratitude" or "charity," and yet not have any 
 precise ideas annexed in my thoughts to those names. (2) I 
 may have ideas, and not know the names that belong to them ; 
 v. g.) I may have the idea of a man's drinking till his colour 
 
 G 3 
 
130 OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS. 
 
 and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look 
 red, and his feet fail him, and yet not know that it is to be 
 called " drunkenness." (3) I may have the ideas of virtues 
 or vices, and names also, but apply them amiss; v. g., when 
 I apply the name "frugality" to that idea which others call 
 and signify by this sound, " covetousness." (4) I may use 
 any of those names with inconstancy. (5) But in modes and 
 relations, I cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence of 
 things : for, modes being complex ideas made by the mind at 
 pleasure, and relation being but my way of considering or 
 comparing two things together, and so also an idea of my own 
 making, these ideas can scarce be found to disagree with any- 
 thing existing; since they are not in the mind as the copies of 
 things regularly made by nature, nor as properties inseparably 
 flowing from the internal constitution or essence of any sub- 
 stance ; but, as it were, patterns lodged in my memory, with 
 names annexed to them to denominate actions and relations 
 by, as they come to exist. But the mistake is commonly in 
 my giving a wrong name to my conceptions ; and so using 
 words in a different sense from other people, I am not under- 
 stood but am thought to have wrong ideas of them, when I 
 give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of 
 mixed modes or relations any inconsistent ideas together, I 
 fill my head also with chimeras; since such ideas, if well 
 examined, cannot so much as exist in the mind, much less 
 any real being be ever denominated from them. 
 
 34. Seventhly, Figurative speech also an abuse of language. 
 Since wit and fancy finds easier entertainment in the world 
 than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative speeches and 
 allusion in language will hardly be admitted as an imperfec- 
 tion or abuse of it. I confess, in discourses where we seek 
 rather pleasure and delight, than information and improve- 
 ment, such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce 
 pass for faults. But yet, if we would speak of things as they 
 are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order 
 and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of 
 words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to 
 
THE SCHOOLMEN. 131 
 
 insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead 
 the judgment ; and so indeed are perfect cheats : and there- 
 fore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them 
 in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all 
 discourses that ^pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be 
 avoided; and, where truth and knowledge are concerned, 
 cannot but be thought a great fault either of the language or 
 person that makes use of them. "What and how various they 
 are, will be superfluous here to take notice ; the books of 
 rhetoric which abound in the world will instruct those who 
 want to be informed. Only I cannot but observe how little 
 the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge 
 is the care and concern of mankind ; since the arts of fallacy 
 are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men 
 love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful 
 instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, 
 is publicly taught, and has always been had in great reputa- 
 tion ; and I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if 
 not brutality, in me to have said thus much against it. Elo- 
 quence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it 
 to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to 
 find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find plea- 
 sure to be deceived. 
 
 NOTES. 
 A. THE SCHOOLMEN. 
 
 In the preceding article Locke has taken occasion to animadvert 
 in strong terms upon the philosophy of the Schoolmen. This 
 censure, however, is, for the most part, very unfounded j and it is 
 most probable that whilst apparently speaking of the metaphy- 
 sicians who flourished in the middle ages, Locke was in reality 
 alluding to the alchemists and natural philosophers of those times. 
 In any case it is certain that he adopted although unwittingly 
 many of his own doctrines from the systems of philosophy which 
 had found place in those very Schools that he condemned. 
 
 At the same time it must not be denied that the discussions 
 which occupied the attention of the Schoolmen were oftentimes 
 
132 LOCKE'S NOTION or LOGIC. 
 
 of a very trivial and ridiculous character. Theology formed the 
 great staple of these debates, and the disputants shrank not from 
 investigating questions the most inapproachable and absurd. Thus, 
 the dress of the angel Gabriel became an object of much research ; 
 it being doubtful as to whether he wore clean or dirty linen, and 
 as to whether his garment were white or of two colours. With 
 regard also to the Virgin Mary, it was sought to ascertain pre- 
 cisely the colour of her hair, and the extent of her knowledge. 
 But the most insoluble difficulty which came under the notice of 
 the Schoolmen, and which never was disposed of, lay in the fol- 
 lowing question : " When a hog is carried to market with a rope 
 tied about his neck, which is held at the other end by a man, 
 whether is the hog carried to market by the rope or the man? " * 
 These debates, however, were engaged in merely for the purpose 
 of recreation. 
 
 The similarity of black and white to which Locke alludes had 
 reference to the real essences of these colours, it being contended 
 by the Schoolmen that the only difference was in the sensations, 
 and not in the colours themselves. But, indeed, if it be granted 
 that black can be seen, or that black is something different from 
 absolute darkness, it can easily be shown that black is white. 
 For, a black body reflects the same kind of light as a white body, 
 as may be seen when polished surfaces are employed ; and, there- 
 fore, since it is by light that vision is alone possible, it follows 
 that in both cases the same colour is seen : i.e. 9 black is white, 
 the difference being one of degree, not of kind. 
 
 Taken as a whole, the scholastic philosophy may be justly con- 
 sidered as one of the most stupendous monuments of human acute- 
 ness and wisdom that have ever existed ; and the time is rapidly 
 approaching when, freed from the crust of prejudice and ignorance 
 accumulated during so many ages of unmerited neglect, it will 
 shine forth in pristine splendour, and will reveal to the world such 
 beauties of structure and detail as cannot fail to inspire all be- 
 holders with sentiments of the liveliest admiration. 
 
 B. LOCKE'S NOTION OF LOGIC. 
 
 When speaking of logic, Locke invariably betrays his entire 
 misconception of that science ; and, guided through the night of 
 ignorance by an ignis fatuus of his own providing, he jousts madly 
 against those forms which he takes to be giants of deceit and 
 fraud, but which in reality are the massive towers of truth and 
 reason. It is in no small degree astonishing that this should be 
 the case, for it consorts but ill with that consummate acumen and 
 penetration which are so evident in the remainder of Locke's 
 writings j but it may doubtless be ascribed to his scanty know- 
 
 * Compare Disraeli's Curiosities of Literature, vol. i. p. 65. 
 
LOCKE'S NOTION OF LOGIC. 133 
 
 ledge of the scholastic philosophy ; a cause which, as we saw in 
 the preceding note, led him into many errors respecting the meta- 
 physicians of the middle ages. 
 
 But, whilst thus attributing Locke's attacks upon logic to his 
 misapprehension and ignorance of the spirit which animated the 
 scholastic speculations, I would be held merely to allude to the 
 cause of his animosity against logicians, and not to the cause of 
 this cause, i.e., the cause of the misapprehension referred to ; and 
 this will appear plain if I enter a little more into detail. The 
 lamp, then, by whose light Locke examined the subject of logic 
 was his erroneous idea as to the aim of the scholastic doctrines ; 
 and the source from whence its flame was fed, is to be found in 
 his own system of Sensualism. With respect to the former of 
 these it may be briefly stated that Locke looked upon the School- 
 men as mere disputants for the sake of victory and applause ; as 
 caring in nowise for the foundation and veracity of the propo- 
 sitions which they advanced, providing that they succeeded in 
 silencing their adversaries ; and as occupied solely in logomachies, 
 whose only possible result was the overthrow of all qualities 
 whereby language might be adapted to its proper purpose of useful 
 intercommunication. In this, however, Locke was altogether 
 wrong, and to his authority may be charged much of the foolish 
 abuse with which it has, till lately, been the fashion to attack the 
 Schools. 
 
 As regards the second point mentioned above, it will be suffi- 
 cient to recall the fact that, in Locke's system, all the products of 
 thought, or, in other words, all knowledges, are derived entirely 
 from experience; from sensation, and from reflection depending 
 upon sensation j no such thing as mental laws being imagined or 
 admitted. From this it results that thought is, tacitly at least, 
 held to be a faculty or phenomenon of the mind which proceeds 
 in an arbitrary manner ; and since it is thus subservient to no 
 rigorous and necessary laws, the idea of any science which should 
 investigate the nature and working of such laws is at once dis- 
 missed, or, rather, is never entertained. Accordingly, it is evident 
 that, bound by the fetters of an incomplete and vicious psychology, 
 Locke was never free to grasp the vital principle of logic: for 
 him, the harmonious symmetry of that noble science was as a 
 thing of naught ; and the sure guide through the whole universe of 
 thought became, in his regard, nothing more than a paltry means 
 of equivocation and dispute. Logic, in fact, the science of the 
 laws of thought, was by Locke imagined to be but a form, a 
 method of argumentation ; and this mistake, while caused by, yet 
 at the same time served to perpetuate, the fundamental error of 
 his system ; for by it he was deprived of access to a science which 
 would have shown him that our knowledge cannot be altogether 
 dependent on experience. 
 
134 OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING 
 
 OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPER- 
 FECTIONS AND ABUSES. 
 
 1. They are worth seeking. The natural and improved 
 imperfections of languages we have seen above at large ; and 
 speech being the great bond that holds society together, and 
 the common conduit whereby the improvements of knowledge 
 are conveyed from one man and one generation to another ; it 
 would well deserve our most serious thoughts to consider 
 what remedies are to be found for these inconveniences above 
 mentioned. 
 
 2. Are not easy. I am not so vain to think that any one 
 can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming the languages 
 of the world, no, not so much as of his own country, without 
 rendering himself ridiculous. To require that men should 
 use their words constantly in the same sense, and for none 
 but determined and uniform ideas, would be to think that all 
 men should have the same notions, and should talk of nothing 
 but what they have clear and distinct ideas of. Which is 
 not to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough 
 to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing or 
 very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the world 
 who thinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a 
 good understanding; or that men's talking much or little 
 shall hold proportion only to their knowledge. 
 
 3. But yet necessary to philosophy. But though the market 
 and exchange must be left to their own ways of talking, and 
 gossippings not be robbed of their ancient privilege ; though 
 the Schools and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss 
 to have anything offered to abate the length or lessen the 
 number of their disputes ; yet, methinks, those who pretend 
 seriously to search after or maintain truth, should think 
 themselves obliged to study how they might deliver them- 
 selves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equivocation, to 
 which men's words are naturally liable, if care be not taken. 
 
IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES. 135 
 
 4. Misuse of words the cause of great errors. For he that 
 shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakes and 
 confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, 
 will find some reason to doubt whether language, as it has 
 been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or 
 hinderance of knowledge amongst mankind. How many are 
 there, that, when they would think on things, fix their 
 thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply 
 their minds to moral matters ! And who then can wonder, 
 if the result of such contemplations and reasonings, about 
 little more than sounds, whilst the ideas they annexed to 
 them are very confused, or very unsteady, or perhaps none at 
 all ; who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and reason- 
 ings end in nothing but obscurity and mistake, without any 
 clear judgment or knowledge ? 
 
 5. Obstinacy. This inconvenience, in an ill use of words, 
 men suffer in their own private meditations : but much more 
 manifest are the disorders which follow from it in conversa- 
 tion, discourse, and arguings with others. For, language being 
 the great conduit whereby men convey their discoveries, reason- 
 ings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an 
 ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of 
 knowledge which are in things themselves, yet he does, as 
 much as in him lies, break or stop the pipes whereby it is 
 distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind. He 
 that uses words without any clear and steady meaning, what 
 does he but lead himself and others into errors? And he 
 that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to 
 truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder, that all 
 the sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged 
 with obscure and equivocal terms and insignificant and doubt- 
 ful expressions, capable to make the most attentive or quick- 
 sighted very little, or not at all, the more knowing or ortho- 
 dox ; since subtilty, in those who make profession to teach or 
 defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue ? a virtue in- 
 deed which consisting, for the most part, in nothing but the 
 fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is 
 
136 OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING 
 
 only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance, and 
 obstinate in their errors. 
 
 6. And wrangling. Let us look into the books of contro- 
 versy, of any kind, there we shall see that the effect of ob- 
 scure, unsteady, or equivocal terms, is nothing but noise and 
 wrangling about sounds, without convincing or bettering a 
 man's understanding. For, if the idea be not agreed on be- 
 twixt the speaker and hearer for which the words stand, the 
 argument is not about things, but names. As often as such 
 a word whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them 
 comes in use, their understandings have no other object 
 wherein they agree but barely the sound; the things that 
 they think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being 
 quite different. 
 
 7. Instance bat, and lird. Whether a bat be a bird or not, 
 is not a question whether a bat be another thing than indeed 
 it is, or have other qualities than indeed it has ; for that 
 would be extremely absurd to doubt of : but the question is, 
 (1) Either between those that acknowledged themselves to 
 have but imperfect ideas of one or both of those sorts of 
 things, for which these names are supposed to stand; and 
 then it is a real inquiry concerning the nature of a bird or a 
 bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas of it more complete, 
 by examining whether all the simple ideas to which, com- 
 bined together, they both give the name " bird" be all to be 
 found in a bat : but this is a question only of inquirers (not 
 disputers), who neither affirm nor deny, but examine. Or, 
 (2.) It is a question between disputants; whereof the one 
 affirms, and the other denies, that a bat is a bird. And then 
 the question is barely about the signification of one or both 
 these words ; in that, they not having both the same com- 
 plex ideas to which they give the two names, one holds and 
 the other denies that these two names may be affirmed one of 
 another. "Where they agree in the signification of these two 
 names, it were impossible they should dispute about them. 
 For they would presently and clearly see (were that adjusted 
 between them) whether all the simple ideas of the more 
 
IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES. 
 
 general name "bird" were found in the complex idea of a 
 bat or no ; and so there could be no doubt, whether a bat 
 were a bird or no. And here I desire it may be considered, 
 and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the dis- 
 putes in the world are not merely verbal and about the signifi- 
 cation of words ; and whether if the terms they are made in 
 were defined, and reduced in their signification (as they must 
 be where they signify anything) to determined collections of 
 the simple ideas they do or should stand for, those disputes 
 would not end of themselves and immediately vanish. I 
 leave it then to be considered what the learning of disputa- 
 tion is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of 
 themselves or others whose business is only the vain ostenta- 
 tion of sounds ; i.e., those who spend their lives in disputes 
 and controversies. "When I shall see any of those combatants 
 strip all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity (which every 
 one may do in the words he uses himself), I shall think him 
 a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the 
 slave of vain- glory, ambition, or a party. 
 
 8. To remedy the defects of speech before mentioned to 
 some degree, and to prevent the inconveniences that follow 
 from them, I imagine the observation of these following rules 
 may be of use till somebody better able shall judge it worth 
 his while to think more maturely on this matter, and oblige 
 the world with his thoughts on it. 
 
 First remedy: To use no word without an idea. First, A 
 man should take care to use no word without a signification, 
 no name without an idea for which he makes it stand. This 
 rule will not seem altogether needless to any one who shall 
 take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such 
 words as "instinct," "sympathy," and "antipathy," &c., in 
 the discourse of others, so made use of as he might easily 
 conclude, that those that used them had no ideas in their 
 minds to which they applied them ; but spoke them only as 
 sounds, which usually served instead of reasons on the like 
 occasions. Not but that these words and the like have very 
 proper significations in which they may be used; but there 
 
138 OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING 
 
 being no natural connection between any words and any ideas, 
 these and any other may be learned by rote, and pronounced 
 or writ by men, who have no ideas in their minds to which 
 they have annexed them, and for which they make them 
 stand ; which is necessary they should, if men would speak 
 intelligibly even to themselves alone. 
 
 9. Secondly, To have distinct ideas annexed to them in modes. 
 Secondly, It is not enough a man uses his words as signs 
 of some ideas : those ideas he annexes them to, if they be 
 simple, must be clear and distinct ; if complex, must be de- 
 terminate ; i. <?., the precise collection of simple ideas settled 
 in the mind, with that sound annexed to it as the sign of that 
 precise determined collection, and no other. This is very 
 necessary in names of modes, and especially moral words ; 
 which, having no settled objects in nature from whence their 
 ideas are taken as from their original, are apt to be very con- 
 fused. " Justice" is a word in every man's mouth, but most 
 commonly with a very undetermined, loose signification : 
 which will always be so unless a man has in his mind a dis- 
 tinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea 
 consists of: and if it be decompounded, must be able to 
 resolve it still on till he at last comes to the simple ideas that 
 make it up.: and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use 
 of the word, let it be " justice," for example, or any other. 
 I do not say, a man needs stand to recollect, and make this 
 analysis at large, every time the word " justice" comes in his 
 way : but this, at least, is necessary, that he have so examined 
 the signification of that name, and settled the idea of all its 
 parts, in his mind, that he can do it when he pleases. If one 
 who makes this complex idea of justice to be such a treatment 
 of the person or goods of another as is according to law, hath 
 not a clear and distinct idea what law is, which makes a part 
 of his complex idea of justice, it is plain his idea of justice 
 itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will, 
 perhaps, be judged very troublesome ; and therefore most men 
 will think they may be excused from settling the complex 
 ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds. But yet I 
 
IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES. 139 
 
 must say, ti'l tLis be done it must not be wondered that they 
 have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own 
 minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourses with 
 others. 
 
 10. And conformable in substances. In the names of sub- 
 stances, for a right use of them something more is required 
 than barely determined ideas. In these the names must also 
 be conformable to things as they exist : but of this, I shall 
 have occasion to speak more at large by-and-by. This exact- 
 ness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical 
 knowledge, and in controversies about truth. And though it 
 would be well, too, if it extended itself to common conversa- 
 tion and the ordinary affairs of life, yet, I think, that is 
 scarce to be expected. Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses : 
 and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the 
 market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and 
 tailors, have words wherewithal to despatch their ordinary 
 affairs ; and so, I think, might philosophers and disputants, 
 too, if they had a mind to understand, and to be clearly 
 understood. 
 
 11. Thirdly, Propriety. Thirdly, It is not enough that 
 men have ideas, determined ideas, for which they make these 
 signs stand ; but they must also take care to apply their 
 words, as near as may be, to such ideas as common use has 
 annexed them to. For, words, especially of languages already 
 framed, being no man's private possession, but the common 
 measure of commerce and communication, it is not for any 
 one, at pleasure, to change the stamp they are current in, nor 
 alter the ideas they are affixed to ; or at least when there is a 
 necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. Men's 
 intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be under- 
 stood ; which cannot be without frequent explanations, de- 
 mands, and other the like incommodious interruptions, where 
 men do not follow common use. Propriety of speech is that 
 which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds 
 with the greatest ease and advantage ; and therefore deserves 
 some part of our care and study, especially in the names of 
 
140 OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING 
 
 moral words. The proper signification and use of terms is 
 best to be learned from those who in their writings and dis- 
 courses appear to have had the clearest notions, and applied 
 to them their terms with the exactest choice and fitness. 
 This way of using a man's words according to the propriety 
 of the language, though it have not always the good fortune 
 to be understood, yet most commonly leaves the blame of it 
 on him who is so unskilful in the language he speaks as not 
 to understand it, when made use of as it ought to be. 
 
 12. Fourthly, To make known their meaning. Fourthly, 
 But because common use has not so visibly annexed any sig- 
 nification to words, as to make men know always certainly 
 what they precisely stand for ; and because men in the im- 
 provement of their knowledge come to have ideas different 
 from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they 
 must either make new words (which men seldom venture to 
 do, for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or novelty), 
 or else must use old ones in a new signification; therefore 
 after the observation of the foregoing rules, it is sometimes 
 necessary for the ascertaining the signification of words, to 
 declare their meaning ; where either common use ha r s left it 
 uncertain and loose (as it has in most names of very complex 
 ideas), or where the term, being very material in the dis- 
 course, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any 
 doubtfulness or mistake. 
 
 13. And that three ways. As the ideas men's words stand 
 for are of different sorts, so the way of making known the 
 ideas they stand for, when there is occasion, is also different. 
 For though defining be thought the proper way to make 
 known the proper signification of words ; yet there are some 
 words that will not be defined, as there be others whose pre- 
 cise meaning cannot be made known but by definition ; and 
 perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, 
 as we shall see in the names of simple ideas, modes, and sub- 
 stances. 
 
 14. First, In simple ideas, ly synonymous terms or showing. 
 First, When a man makes use of the name of any simple 
 
IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES. 141 
 
 idea, which he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to 
 be mistaken, he is obliged, by the laws of ingenuity and the 
 end of speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what 
 idea he makes it stand for. This, as has been shown, cannot 
 be done by definition ; and therefore when a synonymous 
 word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. 
 (Eirst,) Sometimes the naming the subject, wherein that 
 simple idea is to be found, will make its name be understood 
 by those who are acquainted with that subject, and know it 
 by that name. So to make a countryman understand what 
 feuille-morte colour signifies, it may suffice to tell him, it is 
 the colour of withered leaves falling in autumn. (Secondly,) 
 But the only sure way of making known the signification of 
 the name of any simple idea, is, by presenting to his senses 
 that subject which may produce it in his mind, and make 
 him actually have the idea that word stands for. 
 
 15. Secondly, In mixed modes, ly definition. Secondly, 
 Mixed modes, especially those belonging to morality, being 
 most of them such combinations of ideas as the mind puts 
 together of its own choice, and whereof there are not always 
 standing patterns to be found existing, the signification of 
 their names cannot be made known as those of simple ideas, 
 by any showing ; but, in recompense thereof, may be per- 
 fectly and exactly defined. For, they being combinations of 
 several ideas that the mind of man has arbitrarily put to- 
 gether without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they 
 please, exactly know the ideas that go to each composition, 
 and so both use these words in a certain and undoubted sig- 
 nification, and perfectly declare, when there is occasion, what 
 they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great 
 blame on those who make not their discourses about moral 
 things very clear and distinct. For since the precise signifi- 
 cation of the names of mixed modes, or, which is all one, the 
 real essence of each species, is to be known, they being not 
 of nature's but man's making, it is a great negligence and 
 perverseness to discourse of moral things with uncertainty 
 and obscurity ; which is more pardonable in treating of natu- 
 
142 OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING 
 
 ral substances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, 
 for a quite contrary reason, as we shall see by-and-by. 
 
 16. Morality capable of demonstration. Upon this ground 
 it is that I am bold to think, that morality is capable of de- 
 monstration, as well as mathematics; since the precise real 
 essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly 
 known ; and so the congruity or incongruity of the things 
 themselves be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect 
 knowledge. Nor let any one object, that the names of sub- 
 stances are often to be made use of in morality, as well as 
 those of modes, from which will arise obscurity. For as to 
 substances, when concerned in moral discourses, their divers 
 natures are not so much inquired into as supposed ; v. g., 
 when we say that " man is subject to law," we mean nothing 
 by "man " but a corporeal, rational creature : what the real 
 essence or other qualities of that creature are in this case, is 
 no way considered. And therefore, whether a child or change- 
 ling be a man in a physical sense, may amongst the natural- 
 ists be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all " the 
 moral man," as I may call him, which is this immoveable, 
 unchangeable idea, a corporeal, rational being. For, were 
 there a monkey or any other creature to be found, that had 
 the use of reason to such a degree as to be able to understand 
 general signs, and to deduce consequences about general ideas, 
 he would no doubt be subject to law, and, in that sense, be a 
 man, how much soever he differed in shape from others of that 
 name. The names of substances, if they be used in them as 
 they should, can no more disturb moral than they do mathe- 
 matical discourses : where, if the mathematician speaks of a 
 cube or globe of gold, or any other body, he has his clear 
 settled idea, which varies not, though it may, by mistake, be 
 applied to a particular body to which it belongs not. 
 
 17. Definitions can make moral discourses clear. This I have 
 here mentioned by-the-bye, to show of what consequence it is 
 for men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in 
 all their moral discourses, to define their words when there is 
 occasion : since thereby moral knowledge may be brought to 
 
IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES. 143 
 
 so great clearness and certainty. And it must be great want 
 of ingenuity (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it : since a 
 definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of 
 moral words can be known ; and yet a way whereby their 
 meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any 
 room for any contest about it. And therefore the negligence 
 or perverseness of mankind cannot be excused, if their dis- 
 courses in morality be not much more clear than those in 
 natural philosophy : since they are about ideas in the mind, 
 which are none of them false or disproportionate ; they having 
 no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred 
 to, and must correspond with. It is far easier for men to 
 frame in their minds an idea which shall be the standard to 
 which they will give the name " justice," with which pattern, 
 so made, all actions that agree shall pass under that denomina- 
 tion ; than, having seen Aristides, to frame an idea that shall 
 in all things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let men 
 make what idea they please of him. For the one, they need 
 but know the combination of ideas that are put together 
 within in their own minds ; for the other, they must inquire 
 into the whole nature and abstruse, hidden constitution, and 
 various qualities of a thing existing without them. 
 
 18. And is the only way. Another reason that makes the 
 defining of mixed modes so necessary, especially of moral 
 words, is what I mentioned a little before, viz., that it is the 
 only way whereby the signification of the most of them can be 
 known with certainty. For the ideas they stand for, being 
 for the most part such whose component parts nowhere exist 
 together, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the mind 
 alone that collects them and gives them the union of one idea : 
 and it is only by words, enumerating the several simple ideas 
 which the mind has united, that we can make known to others 
 what their names stand for ; the assistance of the senses in 
 this case not helping us by the proposal of sensible objects, to 
 show the ideas which our names of this kind stand for, as it 
 does often in the names of sensible simple ideas, and also to 
 some degree in those of substances. 
 
144 OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING 
 
 19. Thirdly, In substances, by showing and defining. 
 Thirdly, For the explaining the signification of the names of 
 substances as they stand for the ideas we have of their dis- 
 tinct species, both the fore-mentioned ways, viz., of showing 
 and defining, are requisite in many cases to be made use of. 
 .For there being ordinarily in each sort some leading qualities, 
 to which we suppose the other ideas which make up our com- 
 plex idea of that species annexed, we forwardly give the 
 specific name to that thing wherein that characteristical mark 
 is found, which we take to be the most distinguishing idea of 
 that species. These leading or characteristical (as I may so 
 call them) ideas, in the sorts of animals and vegetables, is ... 
 .... mostly figure, and in inanimate bodies colour, and in 
 some both together. Now, 
 
 20. Ideas of the leading qualities of substances are lest got ly 
 showing. These leading sensible qualities are those which 
 make the chief ingredients of our specific ideas, and conse- 
 quently the most observable and invariable part in the defini- 
 tions of our specific names, as attributed to sorts of substances 
 coming under our knowledge. For though the sound " man," 
 in its own nature, be as apt to signify a complex idea made up 
 of animality and rationality united in the same subject, as to 
 signify any other combination ; yet used as a mark to stand 
 for a sort of creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the 
 outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex 
 idea signified by the word " man," as any other we find in it ; 
 and therefore why Plato's animal implume, bipes, latis unguilus, 
 should not be as good a definition of the name u man," stand- 
 ing for that sort of creatures, will not be easy to show : for it 
 is the shape, as the leading quality, that seems more to deter- 
 mine that species than a faculty of reasoning, which appears 
 not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allowed 
 to be so, I do not know how they can be excused from murder 
 who kill monstrous births (as we call them), because of an 
 unordinary shape, without knowing whether they have a ra- 
 tional soul or no ; which can be no more discerned in a well- 
 formed than ill-shaped infant as soon as born. And who is it 
 
IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES. 145 
 
 lias informed us, that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement, 
 unless it has just such a sort of frontispiece, or can join itself 
 to and inform no sort of body but one that is just of such an 
 outward structure ? 
 
 21. Now these leading qualities are best made known by 
 showing, and can hardly be made known otherwise. For, 
 the shape of a horse or cassiowary will be but rudely and im- 
 perfectly imprinted on the mind by words : the sight of the 
 animals doth it a thousand times better. And the idea of the 
 particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description 
 of it, but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it ; 
 as is evident in those who are used to this metal, who will 
 frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adul- 
 terate, by the sight ; where others (who have as good eyes, 
 but yet by use have not got the precise nice idea of that 
 peculiar yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like 
 may be said of those other simple ideas, peculiar in their 
 kind to any substance ; for which precise ideas there are no 
 peculiar names. The particular ringing sound there is in 
 gold, distinct from the sound of other bodies, has no particular 
 name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellow that 
 belongs to that metal. 
 
 22. The ideas of their powers lest ly definition. But be- 
 cause many of the simple ideas that make up our .specific 
 ideas of substances, are powers which lie not obvious to our 
 senses in the things as they ordinarily appear : therefore, in 
 the signification of our names of substances, some part of the 
 signification will be better made known by enumerating those 
 simple ideas, than in showing the substance itself. For he 
 that, to the yellow shining colour of gold got by sight, shall, 
 from my enumerating them, have the ideas of great ductility, 
 fusibility, fixedness, and solubility in aqua regia, will have 
 a perfecter idea of gold than he can have by seeing a piece of 
 gold, and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious 
 qualities. But if the former constitution of this shining, 
 heavy, ductile thing (from whence all these its properties 
 flow) lay open to our senses, as the formal consticution or 
 
 H 
 
146 OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING 
 
 essence of a triangle does, the signification of the word 
 "gold" might as easily be ascertained as that of "triangle." 
 
 23. A reflection on the knowledge of spirits. Hence we may 
 take notice how much the foundation of all our knowledge of 
 corporeal things lies in our senses. For how spirits, sepa- 
 rate from bodies (whose knowledge and ideas of these things 
 are certainly much more perfect than ours), know them, we 
 have no notion, no idea at all. The whole extent of our 
 knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond our own ideas, 
 limited to our ways of perception : though yet it be not to 
 be doubted that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed 
 in flesh may have as clear ideas of the radical constitution of 
 substances as we have of a triangle, and so perceive how all 
 their properties and operations flow from thence : but the 
 manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds our con- 
 ceptions. 
 
 24. Ideas also of substances must be conformable to things. 
 But though definitions will serve to explain the names of 
 substances as they stand for our ideas, yet they leave them 
 not without great imperfection as they stand for things. For, 
 our names of substances being not put barely for our ideas, 
 but being made use of ultimately to represent things, and so 
 are put in their place, their signification must agree with the 
 truth of things, as well as with men's ideas. And therefore 
 in substances we are not always to rest in the ordinary com- 
 plex idea commonly received as the signification of that word, 
 but must go a little farther, and inquire into the nature and 
 properties of the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as 
 much as we can, our ideas of their distinct species ; or else 
 learn them from such as are used to that sort of things, and 
 are experienced in them. For since it is intended their 
 names should stand for such collections of simple ideas as do 
 really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex 
 idea in other men's minds, which in their ordinary accepta- 
 tion they stand for : therefore to define their names right, 
 natural history is to be inquired into ; and their properties 
 are, with care and examination, to be found out. For it is 
 
IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES. 14.7 
 
 not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences in discourses 
 and arguings about natural bodies and substantial things, to 
 have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common 
 but confused or very imperfect idea to which each word is 
 applied, and to keep them to that idea in our use of them : 
 but we must, by acquainting ourselves with the history of 
 that sort of things, rectify and settle our complex idea be- 
 longing to each specific name ; and in discourse with others 
 (if we find them mistake us) we ought to tell what the com- 
 plex idea is that we make such a name stand for. This is 
 the more necessary to be done by all those who search after 
 knowledge and philosophical verity, in that children being 
 taught words whilst they have but imperfect notions of things, 
 apply them at random and without much thinking, and sel- 
 dom frame determined ideas to be signified by them. Which 
 custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the 
 ordinary affairs of life and conversation) they are apt to 
 continue when they are men : and so begin at the wrong end, 
 learning words first and perfectly, but make the notions to 
 which they apply those words afterwards very overtly. By 
 this means it comes to pass, that men speaking the proper 
 language of their country, i.e., according to grammar rules of 
 that language, do yet speak very improperly of things them- 
 selves ; and, by their arguing one with another, make but 
 small progress in the discoveries of useful truths, and the 
 knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, 
 and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much, for the 
 improvement of our knowledge, how they are called. 
 
 25. Not easy to be made so. It were therefore to be wished 
 that men versed in physical inquiries, and acquainted with 
 the several sorts of natural bodies, would set down those simple 
 ideas wherein they observe the individuals of each sort con- 
 stantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that con- 
 fusion which comes from several persons applying the same 
 name to a collection of a smaller or greater number of sensi- 
 ble qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less 
 acquainted with or accurate in examining the qualities of any 
 H2 
 
148 OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING 
 
 sort of things which come under one denomination. But a 
 dictionary of this sort containing, as it were, a natural history, 
 requires too many hands, as well as too much time, cost, pains, 
 and sagacity, ever to he hoped for ; and till that he done, we 
 must content ourselves with such definitions of the names of 
 substances as explain the sense men use them in. And it 
 would he well, where there is occasion, if they would afford 
 us so much. This yet is not usually done ; hut men talk to 
 one another, and dispute in words whose meaning is not agreed 
 hetween them, out of a mistake that the significations of com- 
 mon words are certainly established, and the precise ideas they 
 stand for perfectly known ; and that it is a shame to be igno- 
 rant of them. Both which suppositions are false : no names 
 of complex ideas having so settled, determined significations, 
 that they are constantly used for the same precise ideas. Nor 
 is it a shame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of any 
 thing but by the necessary ways of attaining it ; and so it is 
 no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands 
 for in another man's mind without he declare it to me by some 
 other way than barely using that sound, there being no other 
 way without such a declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed, 
 the necessity of communication by language brings men to an 
 agreement in the signification of common words, within some 
 tolerable latitude, that may serve for ordinary conversation : 
 and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the ideas 
 which are annexed to words by common use, in a language 
 familiar to him. But common use, being but a very uncertain 
 rule, which reduces itself at last to the ideas of particular men, 
 proves often but a very variable standard. But though such 
 a dictionary as I have above mentioned will require too much 
 time, cost, and pains to be hoped for in this age, yet, methinks, 
 it is not unreasonable to propose, that words standing for 
 things which are known and distinguished by their outward 
 shapes, should be expressed by little draughts and prints made 
 of them. A vocabulary made after this fashion would, per- 
 haps, with more ease and in less time, teach the true significa- 
 tion of many terms, especially in languages of remote countries 
 
IMPERFECTIONS AND ABUSES. 149 
 
 or ages, and settle truer ideas in men's minds of several things, 
 whereof we read the names in ancient authors, than all the 
 large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalists 
 that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of this 
 way : and he that has had occasion to consult them, will have 
 reason to confess that he has a clearer idea of opium or ibex 
 from a little print of that herb or beast, than he could have 
 from a long definition of the names of either of them. And 
 so no doubt he would have of strigil and sistrum, if, instead of 
 " a curry-comb " and " cymbal," which are the English names 
 dictionaries render them by, he could see stamped in the mar- 
 gin small pictures of these instruments, as they were in use 
 amongst the ancients. Toga, tunica, pallium, are words easily 
 translated by "gown," "coat," and "cloak: " but we have 
 thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits 
 amongst the Eomans, than we have of the faces of the tailors 
 who made them. Such things as these, which the eye distin- 
 guishes by their shapes, would be best let into the mind by 
 draughts made of them, and more determine the signification 
 of such words than any other words set for them, or made use 
 of to define them. But this only by-the-bye. 
 
 26. Fifthly, By constancy in their signification. Fifthly, If 
 men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their 
 words, and definition of their terms are not to be had ; yet 
 this is the least can be expected, that, in all discourses where- 
 in one man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should 
 use the same word constantly in the same sense. If this were 
 done (which nobody can refuse without great disingenuity), 
 many of the books extant might be spared ; many of the con- 
 troversies in dispute would be at an end; several of those 
 great volumes, swollen with ambiguous words now used in 
 one sense and by-and-by in another, would shrink into a very 
 narrow compass ; and many of the philosophers' (to mention 
 no other) as well as poets' works might be contained in a 
 nut-shell. 
 
 27. When the variation is to be explained. But, after all, 
 the provision of words is so scanty in respect of that infinite 
 
150 ARE DISPUTES MERELY VERBAL? 
 
 variety of thoughts, that men wanting terms to suit their pre- 
 cise notion, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be 
 forced often to use the same word in somewhat different senses. 
 And though in the continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit 
 of an argument, there be hardly room to digress into a par- 
 ticular definition, as often as a man varies the signification of 
 any term ; yet the import of the discourse will, for the most 
 part, if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid 
 and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it : but where 
 that is not sufficient to guide the reader, there it concerns the 
 writer to explain his meaning, and show in what sense he 
 there uses that term. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 ARE DISPUTES MERELY VERBAL? 
 
 With reference to this question which Locke, for the most part, 
 answers in the affirmative, it may be well if I quote the following 
 passage from M. Cousin's Cours de Philosophic , 2e, tome iii., 20. 
 
 " Everywhere Locke attributes to words the greatest part of our 
 errors ; and if you expound the master by the pupils, you will find 
 in all the writers of the school of Locke that all disputes are 
 disputes of words j that science is nothing but a language, and 
 consequently, that a well- constructed science is a well- constructed 
 language. I declare my opposition to the exaggerations of these 
 assertioDs. No doubt words have a great influence; no doubt they 
 have much to do with our errors, and we should strive to make 
 the best language possible. Who questions this ? But the question 
 is to know whether every error is derived from language, and 
 whether science is merely a well-constructed language. No ; the 
 causes of our errors are very different j they are both more 
 extended and more profound. Le\ity, presumption, indolence, 
 precipitation, pride, a multitude of moral causes influence our 
 judgments. The vices of language may be added to natural causes, 
 and aggravate them, but they do not constitute them. If you 
 look more closely, you will see that the greater part of disputes, 
 which seem at first disputes of words, are, at bottom, disputes of 
 things. Humanity is too serious to become excited and often 
 shed its best blood, for the sake of words. Wars do not turn upon 
 verbal disputes ; I say as much of other quarrels, of theological 
 quarrels, and of scientific quarrels, the profundity and importance 
 of which are misconceived when they are resolved into pure logo- 
 machies." 
 
OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. 151 
 
 OF THE DEGEEES OF OTJE KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 1 . Intuitive. All our knowledge consisting, as I have said, 
 in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the 
 utmost light and greatest certainty we, with our faculties 
 and in our way of knowledge, are capable of, it may not he 
 amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. The 
 different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in 
 the different way of perception the mind has of the agree- 
 ment or disagreement of any of its ideas. For if we will 
 reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that some- 
 times the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of 
 two ideas immediately by themselves, without the interven- 
 tion of any other : and this, I think, we may call ' * intuitive 
 knowledge." For in this the mind is at no pains of proving 
 or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth light, 
 only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives 
 that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that 
 three are more than two, and equal to one and two. Such 
 kind of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the 
 ideas together, by bare intuition, without the intervention of 
 any other idea ; and this kind of knowledge is the clearest 
 and most certain that human frailty is capable of. This part 
 of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces 
 itself immediately to be perceived as soon as ever the mind 
 turns its view that way ; and leaves no room for hesitation, 
 doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently filled with 
 the clear light of it. It is on this intuition that depends all ! 
 the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge, which cer- j 
 tainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, 
 and therefore cannot require, a greater: for a man cannot 
 conceive himself capable of a greater certainty, than to know 
 that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be ; and 
 that two ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are diffe- 
 rent, and not precisely the same. He that demands a greater 
 certainty than this demands he knows not what, and shows 
 
 \ 
 
152 OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE 
 
 only that he has a mind to he a sceptic without heing ahle to 
 he so. Certainty depends so wholly on this intuition, that in 
 the next degree of knowledge, which I call " demonstrative," 
 this intuition is necessary in all the connections of the inter- 
 mediate ideas, without which we cannot attain knowledge and 
 certainty. 
 
 2 Demonstrative. The next degree of knowledge is, where 
 the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any 
 ideas, hut not immediately. Though wherever the mind per- 
 ceives the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, there 
 he certain knowledge; yet it does not always happen that the 
 mind sees that agreement or disagreement which there is be- 
 tween them, even where it is discoverable ; and in that case 
 remains in ignorance, and at most gets no farther than a 
 probable conjecture. The reason why the mind cannot always 
 perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two 
 ideas, is, because those ideas concerning whose agreement or 
 disagreement the inquiry is made, cannot by the mind be so 
 put together as to show it. In this case then, when the 
 mind cannot so bring its ideas together as, by their immediate 
 comparison and, as it were, juxtaposition or application one 
 to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is 
 fain, by the intervention of other ideas (one or more, as it 
 happens), to discover the agreement or disagreement which it 
 searches ; and this is that which we call "reasoning." Thus 
 the mind, being willing to know the agreement or disagree- 
 ment in bigness between the three angles of a triangle and 
 two right ones, cannot, by an immediate view and comparing 
 them, do it : because the three angles of a triangle cannot be 
 brought at once, and be compared with any one or two 
 angles ; and so of this the mind has no immediate, no in- 
 tuitive knowledge. In this case the mind is fain to find 
 out some other angles, to which the three angles of a triangle 
 have an equality ; and finding those equal to two right ones, 
 comes to know their equality to two right ones. 
 
 3. Depends on proofs. Those intervening ideas which serve 
 to show the agreement of any two others, are called " proofs;" 
 
OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. 153 
 
 and where the agreement or disagreement is by this means 
 plainly and clearly perceived, it is called "demonstration," 
 it being shown to the understanding, and the mind made to 
 see that it is so. A quickness in the mind to find out these 
 intermediate ideas (that shall discover the agreement or dis- 
 agreement of any other), and to apply them right, is, I sup- 
 pose, that which is called " sagacity." 
 
 4. But not so easy. This knowledge by intervening proofs, 
 though it be certain, yet the evidence of it is not altogether 
 so clear and bright, nor the assent so ready, as in intuitive 
 knowledge. For though in demonstration the mind does at 
 last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it 
 considers, yet it is not without pains and attention: there 
 must be more than one transient view to find it. A steady 
 application and pursuit is required to this discovery : and 
 there must be a progression by steps and degrees before the 
 mind can in this way arrive at certainty, and come to per- 
 ceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that 
 need proofs and the use of reason to show it. 
 
 5. Not without precedent doubt. Another difference be- 
 tween intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, is, that though 
 in the latter all doubt be removed, when by the intervention 
 of the intermediate ideas the agreement or disagreement is 
 perceived ; yet before the demonstration there was a doubt ; 
 which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind that 
 has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of dis- 
 tinct ideas, no more than it can be a doubt to the eye (that 
 can distinctly see white and black), whether this ink and thia 
 paper be all of a colour. If there be sight in the eyes, it 
 will at first glimpse, without hesitation, perceive the words 
 printed on this paper, different from the colour of the paper : 
 and so, if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception, it 
 will perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas 
 that produce intuitive knowledge. If the eyes have lost the 
 faculty of seeing, or the mind of perceiving, we in vain in- 
 quire after the quickness of sight in one, or clearness of 
 perception in the other. 
 
 H 3 
 
154 OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 6. Not so clear. It is true, the perception produced by 
 demonstration is also very clear ; yet it is often with a great 
 abatement of that evident lustre and full assurance that 
 always accompany that which I call " intuitive ;" like a face 
 reflected by several mirrors one to another, where, as long 
 as it retains the similitude and agreement with the object, it 
 produces a knowledge ; but it is still in every successive 
 reflection with a lessening of that perfect clearness and dis- 
 tinctness which is in the first, till at last, after many removes, 
 it has a great mixture of dimness, and is not at first sight so 
 knowable, especially to weak eyes. Thus it is with know- 
 ledge made out by a long train of proofs. 
 
 7. Each step must have intuitive evidence. Now, in every 
 step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge, there is an 
 intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks 
 with the next intermediate idea, which it uses as a proof : for 
 if it were not so, that yet would need a proof; since without 
 the perception of such agreement or disagreement there is no 
 knowledge produced. If it be perceived by itself, it is intui- 
 tive knowledge : if it cannot be perceived by itself, there is 
 need of some intervening idea, as a common measure, to show 
 their agreement or disagreement. Ey which it is plain, that 
 every step in reasoning that produces knowledge has intui- 
 tive certainty ; which when the mind perceives, there is no 
 more required but to remember it, to make the agreement 
 or disagreement of the ideas, concerning which we inquire, 
 visible and certain. So that to make anything a demonstra- 
 tion, it is necessary to perceive the immediate agreement of 
 the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement or disagree- 
 ment of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one is 
 always the first, and the other the last in the account) is 
 found. This intuitive perception of the agreement or dis- 
 agreement of the intermediate ideas, in each step and progres- 
 sion of the demonstration, must also be carried exactly in the 
 mind, and a man must be sure that no part is left out : which, 
 because in long deductions, and the use of many proofs, the 
 memory does not always so readily and exactly retain ; there- 
 
OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. 155 
 
 fore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intui- 
 tive knowledge, and men embrace often falsehood for demon- 
 strations. 
 
 ******* 
 
 14. Sensitive knowledge of particular existence. These two, 
 viz., intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of our know- 
 ledge ; whatever comes short of one of these, with what as- 
 surance soever embraced, is but faith or opinion, but not 
 knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is, indeed, 
 another perception of the mind employed about the particular 
 existence of finite beings without us ; which, going beyond 
 bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of 
 the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of 
 " knowledge." There can be nothing more certain, than that 
 the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds ; 
 this is intuitive knowledge. Eut whether there be anything 
 more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can 
 thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us 
 which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men 
 think there may be a question made ; because men may have 
 such ideas in their minds when no such thing exists, no such 
 object affects their senses. Eut yet here, I think, we are 
 provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting ; for I 
 ask any one, whether he be not invincibly conscious to him- 
 self of a different perception when he looks on the sun by day, 
 and thinks on it by night ; when he actually tastes wormwood, 
 or smells a rose, or only thinks on that savour or odour ? We 
 as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived 
 in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into 
 our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct 
 ideas. If any one say, " A dream may do the same thing, and 
 all these ideas may be produced in us without any external 
 objects ; " he may please to dream that I make him this 
 answer : (1) That it is no great matter whether I remove his 
 scruple or no : where all is but dream, reasoning and argu- 
 ments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. (2) That 
 I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between 
 
156 OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in it. But 
 yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain, that 
 what I call " being actually in the fire" is nothing but a 
 dream ; and that we cannot thereby certainly know that any 
 such thing as fire actually exists without us ; I answer, that 
 we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the 
 application of certain objects to us, whose existence we per- 
 ceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses ; this certainly 
 is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have 
 no concernment to know or to be. So that, I think, we may 
 add to the two former sorts of knowledge this also, of the ex- 
 istence of particular external objects by that perception and 
 consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from 
 them, and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz., intui- 
 tive, demonstrative, and sensitive : in each of which there are 
 different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty. 
 
 15. Knowledge not always clear, where the ideas are so. But 
 since our knowledge is founded on and employed about our 
 ideas only, will it not follow from thence that it is conform- 
 able to our ideas ; and that where our ideas are clear and dis- 
 tinct, or obscure and confused, our knowledge will be so too ? 
 To which I answer, No : for our knowledge consisting in the 
 perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, 
 its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity 
 of that perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the 
 ideas themselves ; v. g., a man that has as clear ideas of the 
 angles of a triangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any 
 mathematician in the world, may yet have but a very obscure 
 perception of their agreement, and so have but a very obscure 
 knowledge of it. But ideas which by reason of their obscurity 
 or otherwise are confused, cannot produce any clear or distinct 
 knowledge ; because as far as any ideas are confused, so far 
 the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or dis- 
 agree. Or, to express the same thing in a way less apt to be 
 misunderstood, he that hath not determined the ideas to the 
 words he uses cannot make propositions of them, of whose 
 truth he can be certain. 
 
ON SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 157 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 ON SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Locke's general theory of knowledge, as knowledge, will most 
 properly fall to be considered at the end of the next Selection : 
 but it is necessary in the present place to say a few words respect- 
 ing that sensitive knowledge of which mention is made in 14 of 
 the preceding article. 
 
 Since, in 1, Locke asserts that all knowledge consists " in the 
 view the mind has of its own ideas," and since, in 14, he admits 
 that ideas are something different both from mind and from 
 external objects ; it follows that for him a sensitive knowledge 
 involves a contradiction. This is evident from a consideration of 
 the elements into which this sensitive knowledge may be resolved; 
 for, by his own account, it is a knowledge " of the existence of 
 particular external objects " acquired " by that perception and 
 consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them ; " 
 in which " perception and consciousness " three terms are known ; 
 first, the external objects themselves; secondly, the ideas produced 
 in the mind ; and, thirdly, the act of production or entrance. 
 There is, indeed, a fourth term, viz., the mind, but this may for 
 present purposes be omitted. Accordingly, we see that this sen- 
 sitive knowledge implies, inter alia, a pre- existence and separate 
 knowledge of external objects, i. e., a knowledge of something 
 different from ideas ; which is in direct contradiction to the theory 
 that all knowledge consists " in the view the mind has of its own 
 ideas." Thus have I proved my point; but worse remains be- 
 hind : this being that the doctrine of sensitive knowledge as exhi- 
 bited by^ Locke, founds upon a gross paralogism, and is, therefore, 
 utterly inadmissible. For, we have already seen that the " per- 
 ception and consciousness " by means of which a sensitive know- 
 ledge is acquired, cannot take place without a previous, or, at all ; 
 events a co-ordinate and distinct knowledge of external objects. 
 But what is this sensitive knowledge? It is a a knowledge of the 
 existence of particular external objects." Behold, then, the circle ; 
 in which this reasoning revolves ! A knowledge is asserted to 
 exist, because it must follow from a certain supposed action of 
 the mind, which action, when duly analysed, is discovered to imply 
 the very knowledge whose existence is in question. 
 
 From the general tone of 14, it may be seen that Locke has 
 some little presentiment of the results to which the theory of 
 ideas as advocated by him must necessarily lead ; that is to say, 
 he saw that those who should accept his doctrines might legiti- 
 mately doubt the existence of an external world, unless some 
 saving clause were introduced. To meet this difficulty he pro- 
 posed, with evident hesitation, the theory of " sensitive 'knowledge." 
 We have seen the result. 
 
158 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 OP THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWXEDGE. 
 
 1. KNOWLEDGE, as has been said, lying in the perception 
 of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it fol- 
 lows from hence, that, 
 
 First, No farther than we have ideas. First, We can have 
 knowledge no farther than we have ideas. 
 
 2. Secondly, No farther than we can perceive their agreement 
 or disagreement. Secondly, That we can have no knowledge 
 farther than we can have perception of that agreement or dis- 
 agreement: which perception being, (1) Either by intuition, 
 or the immediate comparing any two ideas ; or, (2) Ey reason, 
 examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the 
 intervention of some others ; or, (3) Ey sensation, perceiving 
 the existence of particular things ; hence it also follows, 
 
 3. Thirdly, Intuitive knowledge extends itself not to all the 
 relations of all our ideas. Thirdly, that we cannot have an 
 intuitive knowledge that shall extend itself to all our ideas, 
 and all that we would know about them ; because we cannot 
 examine and perceive all the relations they have one to 
 another by juxtaposition, or an immediate comparison one 
 with another. Thus having the ideas of an obtuse and an 
 acute-angled triangle, both drawn from equal bases, and be- 
 tween parallels, I can by intuitive knowledge perceive the 
 one not to be the other ; but cannot that way know whether 
 they be equal or no : because their agreement or disagreement 
 in equality can never be perceived by an immediate com- 
 paring them ; the difference of figure makes their parts un- 
 capable of an exact immediate application ; and therefore 
 there is need of some intervening qualities to measure them 
 by, which is demonstration or rational knowledge. 
 
 4. Fourthly, Nor demonstrative knowledge. Fourthly, It 
 follows also, from what is above observed, that our rational 
 knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas : 
 because between two different ideas we would examine, we 
 cannot always find such mediums as we can connect one to 
 another with an intuitive knowledge, in all the parts of the 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 159 
 
 deduction ; and wherever that fails, we come short of know- 
 ledge and demonstration. 
 
 5. Fifthly, Sensitive knowledge narrower than either. 
 Fifthly, Sensitive knowledge, reaching no farther than the 
 existence of things actually present to our senses, is yet much 
 narrower than either of the former. 
 
 6. Sixthly, Our knowledge therefore narrower than our ideas. 
 Erom all which it is evident, that the extent of our know- 
 ledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even 
 of the extent of our own ideas. Though our knowledge be 
 limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent 
 or perfection : and though these be very narrow bounds in re- 
 spect of the extent of all being, and far short of what we may 
 justly imagine to be in some even created understandings not 
 tied down to the dull and narrow information [which] is to 
 be received from some few and not very acute ways of per- 
 ception, such as are our senses ; yet it would be well with us 
 if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there 
 were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we 
 have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this 
 world, resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question but that 
 human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our 
 beings and constitutions, may be carried much farther than it 
 hitherto has been, if men would sincerely, and with freedom 
 of mind, employ all that industry and labour of thought in 
 improving the means of discovering truth which they do for 
 the colouring or support of falsehood, to maintain a system, 
 interest, or party they are once engaged in. But yet, after 
 all, I think I may, without injury to human perfection, be 
 confident that our knowledge would never reach to all we 
 might desire to know concerning those ideas we have ; nor be 
 able to surmount all the difficulties, and resolve all the ques- 
 tions, [which] might arise concerning any of them. We have 
 the ideas of a square, a circle, and equality : and yet, per- 
 haps, shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square, 
 and certainly know that it is so. We have the ideas of 
 matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know 
 
160 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 whether any mere material being thinks or no ; it being im- 
 possible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas with- 
 out revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given 
 to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive 
 and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a 
 thinking immaterial substance : it being, in respect of our 
 notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to 
 conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a 
 faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it 
 another substance with a faculty of thinking ; since we know 
 not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances 
 the Almighty has been pleased to give that power which 
 cannot be in any created being but merely by the good plea- 
 sure and bounty of the Creator. For I see no contradiction 
 in it, that the first eternal thinking Being should, if he 
 pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, 
 put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, percep- 
 tion, and thought : though, as I think I have proved .... 
 it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which 
 is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought) 
 should be that eternal first thinking Being. What certainty 
 of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such 
 as, v. g.j pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies 
 themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as 
 well as that they should be in an immaterial substance upon 
 the motion of the parts of body ? body, as far as we can con- 
 ceive, being able only to strike and affect body ; and motion, 
 according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to 
 produce nothing but motion : so that when we allow it to 
 produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we 
 are fain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute 
 it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For, since we 
 must allow he has annexed effects to motion, which we can 
 no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have 
 we to conclude that he could not order them as well to be 
 produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as 
 well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 161 
 
 can any way operate upon? I say not this that I would 
 any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality : I am 
 not here speaking of probability, but knowledge : and I 
 think, not only that it becomes the modesty of philosophy not 
 to pronounce magisterially, where we want that evidence 
 that can produce knowledge ; but also, that it is of use to us 
 to discern how far our knowledge does reach ; for the state 
 we are at present in, not being that of vision, we must, in 
 many things, content ourselves with faith and probability : 
 and in the present question about the immateriality of the 
 soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty, 
 we need not think it strange. All the great ends of morality 
 and religion are well enough secured, without philosophical 
 proofs of the soul's immateriality ; since it is evident that he 
 who made us at first begin to subsist here sensible intelligent 
 beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can 
 and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another 
 world, and make us capable there to receive the retribution 
 he has designed to men according to their doings in this life. 
 And therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine 
 one way or the other, as some, over zealous for or against the 
 immateriality of the soul, have been forward to make the 
 world believe : who either, on the one side, indulging too 
 much their thoughts immersed altogether in matter, can 
 allow no existence to what is not material : or who, on the 
 other side, finding not cogitation within the natural powers 
 of matter, examined over and over again by the utmost in- 
 tension of mind, have the confidence to conclude that Omnipo- 
 tency itself cannot give perception and thought to a sub- 
 stance which has the modification of solidity. He that con- 
 siders how hardly sensation is, in our thoughts, reconcileable 
 to extended matter, or existence to anything that hath no 
 extension at all, will confess that he is very far from certainly 
 knowing what his soul is. It is a point which seems to me to 
 be put out of the reach of our knowledge : and he who will 
 give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark 
 and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his 
 
162 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul's 
 materiality ; since on which side soever he views it, either as 
 an unextended substance, or as a thinking extended matter, 
 the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone is in 
 his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side : an unfair 
 way which some men take with themselves : who, because of 
 the unconceivableness of something they find in one, throw 
 themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis, though 
 altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding. 
 This serves not only to show the weakness and the scantiness 
 of our knowledge, but the insignificant triumph of such sort 
 of arguments which, drawn from our own views, may satisfy 
 us that we can find no certainty on one side of the question ; 
 but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running into the 
 opposite opinion, which on examination will be found clogged 
 with equal difficulties. For what safety, what advantage to 
 any one is it, for the avoiding the seeming absurdities and, to 
 him, insurmountable rubs he meets with in one opinion, to 
 take refuge in the contrary, which is built on something alto- 
 gether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his compre- 
 hension ? It is past controversy, that we have in us some- 
 thing that thinks ; our very doubts about what it is confirm 
 the certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves 
 in the ignorance of what kind of being it is : and it is as vain 
 to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most 
 other cases to be positive against the being of anything, be- 
 cause we cannot comprehend its nature. For I would fain 
 know, what substance exists that has not something in it 
 which manifestly baffles our understandings. Other spirits, 
 who see and know the nature and inward constitution of 
 things, how much must they exceed us in knowledge ? To 
 which if we add larger comprehension, which enables them 
 at one glance to see the connection and agreement of very 
 many ideas, and readily supplies to them the intermediate 
 proofs, which we, by single and slow steps, and long poring 
 in the dark, hardly at last find out, and are often ready to 
 forget one before we have hunted out another, we may guess 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 163 
 
 at some part of the happiness of superior ranks of spirits, who 
 have a quicker and more penetrating sight, as well as a 
 larger field of knowledge. But, to return to the argument in 
 hand : our knowledge, I say, is not only limited to the pau- 
 city and imperfections of the ideas we have, and which we 
 employ it about, but even comes short of that too : but how 
 far it reaches, let us now inquire. 
 
 7. How far our knowledge reaches. The affirmations or nega- 
 tions we make concerning the ideas we have, may, as I have 
 before intimated in general, be reduced to these four sorts, viz., 
 identity, co-existence, relation, and real existence. I shall 
 examine how far our knowledge extends in each of these : 
 
 8. First. Our knowledge of identity and diversity, as far as 
 our ideas. First, As to identity and diversity, in this way of 
 the agreement or disagreement of ideas, our intuitive know- 
 ledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves : and there 
 can be no idea in the mind which does not presently, by an 
 intuitive knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be 
 different from any other. 
 
 9. Secondly. Of co-existence, a very little way. Secondly, 
 As to the second sort, which is the agreement or disagreement 
 of our ideas in co-existence, in this our knowledge is very 
 short, though in this consists the greatest and most material 
 part of our knowledge concerning substances. For our ideas 
 of the species of substances being, as I have showed, nothing 
 but certain collections of simple ideas united in one subject, 
 and so co-existing together ; v. g., our idea of " flame " is a 
 body hot, luminous, and moving upward ; of " gold," a body 
 heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fusible. 
 These, or some such complex ideas as these in men's minds, 
 do these two names of the different substances, " flame " and 
 " gold," stand for. When we would know anything farther 
 concerning these, or any other sort of substances, what do we 
 inquire but what other qualities or powers these substances 
 have or have not ? which is nothing else but to know what 
 other simple ideas do or do not co- exist with those that make 
 up that complex idea 
 
164 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 1 0. Because the connection between most simple ideas is unknown . 
 This, how weighty and considerable a part soever of human 
 science, is yet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The reason 
 whereof is, that the simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of 
 substances are made up are, for the most part, such as carry 
 with them, in their own nature, no visible necessary* con- 
 nection or inconsistency with any other simple ideas, whose co- 
 existence with them we should inform ourselves about. 
 
 11. Especially of secondary qualities. The ideas that our 
 complex ones of substances are made up of, and about which 
 our knowledge concerning substances is most employed, are 
 those of their secondary qualities ; which depending all (as 
 has been shown) upon the primary qualities of their minute 
 and insensible parts, or, if not upon them, upon something 
 yet more remote from our comprehension, it is impossible we 
 should know which have a necessary union or inconsistency 
 one with another : for, not knowing the root they spring from, 
 not knowing what size, figure, and texture of parts they are 
 on which depend and from which result those qualities which 
 make our complex idea of gold, it is impossible we should 
 know what other qualities result from or are incompatible with 
 the same constitution of the insensible parts of gold ; and so, 
 consequently, must always co-exist with that complex idea 
 we have of it, or else are inconsistent with it. 
 
 12. Because all connection between any secondary and primary 
 qualities is undiscoveralle. Besides this ignorance of the 
 primary qualities of the insensible parts of bodies, on which 
 depend all their secondary qualities, there is yet another and 
 more incurable part of ignorance, which sets us more remote 
 from a certain knowledge of the co-existence or in-co-existence 
 (if I may so say) of different ideas in the same subject ; and that 
 is, that there is no discoverable connection between any secondary 
 quality and those primary qualities that it depends on. 
 
 13. That the size, figure, and motion of one body should 
 
 * This hint, if rightly followed up, might have led Locke to perceive the 
 grand distinction between necessary and contingent truth ; and so might have 
 altered his entire svsU-in. ED. 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 1C5 
 
 cause a change in the size, figure, and motion of another body, 
 is not beyond our conception. The separation of the parts of 
 one body upon the intrusion of another, and the change from 
 rest to motion upon impulse ; these, and the like, seem to us to 
 have some connection one with another. And if we knew 
 these primary qualities of bodies, we might have reason to 
 hope we might be able to know a great deal more of these 
 operations of them one upon another : but our minds not being 
 able to discover any connection betwixt these primary qualities 
 of bodies, and the sensations that are produced in us by them, 
 we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted rules 
 of the consequence or co-existence of any secondary qualities, 
 though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those 
 invisible parts which immediately produce them. We are so 
 far from knowing what figure, size, or motion of parts produce 
 a yellow colour, a sweet taste, or a sharp sound, that we can 
 by no means conceive how any size, figure, or motion of any 
 particles can possibly produce in us the idea of any colour, 
 taste, or sound whatsoever ; there is no conceivable connection 
 betwixt the one and the other. 
 
 14. In vain therefore shall we endeavour to discover by our 
 ideas (the only true way of certain and universal knowledge) 
 what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with that 
 of our complex idea of any substance : since we neither know 
 the real constitution of the minute parts on which their quali- 
 ties do depend ; nor, did we know them, could we discover 
 any necessary connection between them and any of the second- 
 ary qualities ; which is necessary to be done before we can 
 certainly know their necessary co-existence. So that, let our 
 complex idea of any species of substances be what it will, we 
 can hardly, from the simple ideas contained in it, certainly 
 determine the necessary co-existence of any other quality 
 whatsoever. Our knowledge in all these inquiries reaches 
 very little farther than our experience. Indeed some few of 
 the primary qualities have a necessary dependence and visible 
 connection one with another, as figure necessarily supposes 
 extension, receiving or communicating motion by impulse 
 
166 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 supposes solidity. But though these and perhaps some others 
 of our ideas have, yet there are so few of them that have, a 
 visible connection one with another, that we can by intuition 
 or demonstration discover the co-existence of very few of the 
 qualities [which] are to be found united in substances : and we 
 are left only to the assistance of our senses to make known to 
 us what qualities they contain. For, of all the qualities that 
 are co-existent in any subject, without this dependence 
 and evident connection of their ideas one with another, we 
 cannot know certainly any two to co-exist any farther than 
 experience, by our senses, informs us. Thus though we see 
 the yellow colour, and upon trial find the weight, malleable- 
 ness, fusibility, and fixedness that are united in a piece of 
 gold : yet, because no one of these ideas has any evident 
 dependence or necessary connection with the other, we cannot 
 certainly know that where any four of these are, the fifth will 
 be there also, how highly probable soever it may be ; because 
 the highest probability amounts not to certainty ; without 
 which there can be no true knowledge. For this co-existence 
 can be no farther known than it is perceived : and it cannot 
 be perceived but either in particular subjects by the observa- 
 tion of our senses, or in general by the necessary connection 
 of the ideas themselves. 
 
 15. Of repugnancy to co-existence, larger. As to incompati- 
 bility or repugnancy to co-existence, we may know that any 
 subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one 
 particular at once v. g., each particular extension, figure, 
 number of parts, motion, excludes all other of each kind. The 
 like also is certain of all sensible ideas peculiar to each sense : 
 for whatever of each kind is present in any subject, excludes 
 all other of that sort ; v. g., no one subject can have two smells 
 or two colours at the same time. To this, perhaps, will be 
 said, ' ' Has not an opal or the infusion of lignum nephriticum 
 two colours at the same time ? " To which I answer, that 
 these bodies, to eyes differently placed, may at the same time 
 afford different colours : but I take liberty also to say, that to 
 eyes differently placed it is different parts of the object that 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 167 
 
 reflect the particles of light : and therefore it is not the 
 same part of the object, and so not the very same subject, 
 which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For 
 it is as impossible that the very same particle of any body 
 should at the same time differently modify or reflect the rays 
 of light, as that it should have two different figures and tex- 
 tures at the same time. 
 
 16. Of the co-existence of powers, a very little way. But as 
 to the power of substances to change the sensible qualities of 
 other bodies, which makes a great part of our inquiries about 
 them, and is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge ; I 
 doubt, as to these, whether our knowledge reaches much 
 farther than our experience ; or whether we can come to the 
 discovery of most of these powers, and be certain that they 
 are in any subject, by the connection with any of those ideas 
 which to us make its essence. Because the active and passive 
 powers of bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a 
 texture and motion of parts which we cannot by any means 
 come to discover, it is but in very few cases we can be able 
 to perceive their dependence on or repugnance to any of those 
 ideas which make our complex one of that sort of things. I 
 have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis, as that 
 which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible explication 
 of the qualities of bodies ; and I fear the weakness of human 
 understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will 
 afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary con- 
 nection and co-existence of the powers which are to be 
 observed united in several sorts of them. This at least is 
 certain, that whichever hypothesis be clearest and truest (for 
 of that it is not my business to determine), our knowledge 
 concerning corporeal substances will be very little advanced 
 by any of them, till we are made to see what qualities and 
 powers of bodies have a necessary connection or repugnancy 
 one with another ; which, in the present state of philosophy, I 
 think, we know but to a very small degree : and I doubt 
 whether, with those faculties we have, we shall ever be able 
 to carry our general knowledge (I say not particular experi- 
 
168 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 ence) in this part much farther. Experience is that which 
 in this part we must depend on. And it were to be wished 
 that it were more improved. We find the advantages some 
 men's generous pains have this way brought to the stock of 
 natural knowledge. And if others, especially the philoso- 
 phers by fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their 
 observations and sincere in their reports as those who call 
 themselves philosophers ought to have been, our acquaintance 
 with the bodies here about us, and our insight into their 
 powers and operations, had been yet much greater. 
 
 17. Of spirits yet narrower. If we are at a loss in respect 
 of the powers and operations of bodies, I think it easy to 
 conclude we are much more in the dark in reference to spirits, 
 whereof we naturally have no ideas but what we draw from 
 that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own 
 souls within us, as far as they can come within our observa- 
 tion. But how inconsiderable a rank the spirits that inhabit 
 our bodies hold amongst those various, and possibly innume- 
 rable, kinds of nobler beings ; and how far short they come 
 of the endowments and perfections of cherubims and sera- 
 phims, and infinite sorts of spirits above us, is what by a 
 transient hint, in another place, I have offered to my reader's 
 consideration. 
 
 18. Thirdly, Of other relations, it is not easy to say how far. 
 As to the third sort of our knowledge, viz., the agreement 
 or disagreement of any of our ideas in any other relation : this, 
 as it is the largest field of our knowledge, so it is hard to 
 determine how far it may extend : because the advances that 
 are made in this part of knowledge depending on our sagacity 
 in finding intermediate ideas that may show the relations and 
 habitudes of ideas, whose co-existence is not considered, it is a 
 hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such discoveries, 
 and when reason has all the helps it is capable of for the 
 finding of proofs, or examining the agreement or disagreement 
 of remote ideas. They that are ignorant of algebra, cannot 
 imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it : and 
 what farther improvements and helps, advantageous to other 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 169 
 
 parts of knowledge, the sagacious mind of man may yet find 
 out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that 
 the ideas of quantity are not those alone that are capable of 
 demonstration and knowledge ; and that other, and perhaps 
 more useful, parts of contemplation would afford us certainty, 
 if vices, passions, and domineering interest did not oppose or 
 menace such endeavours. 
 
 Morality capable of demonstration. The idea of a Supreme 
 Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose work- 
 manship we are, and on whom we depend ; and the idea of 
 ourselves, as understanding, rational beings, being such as are 
 clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, 
 afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as 
 might place morality amongst the sciences capable of demon- 
 stration : wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident propo- 
 sitions, by necessary consequences, as incontestable as those in 
 mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made 
 out, to any one that will apply himself with the same in- 
 differency and attention to the one as he does to the other of 
 these sciences. The relation of other modes may certainly be 
 perceived, as well as those of number and extension : and I 
 cannot see why they should not also be capable of demonstra- 
 tion, if due methods were thought on to examine or pursue 
 their agreement or disagreement. " Where there is no pro- 
 perty, there is no injustice," is a proposition as certain as any 
 demonstration in Euclid : for, the idea of property being a 
 right to anything, and the idea to which the name "injus- 
 tice " is given being the invasion or violation of that right ; 
 it is evident that these ideas being "thus established, and these 
 names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this propo- 
 sition to be true as that a triangle has three angles equal to 
 two right ones. Again : ' ' No government allows absolute 
 liberty :" the idea of government being the establishment of 
 society upon certain rules or laws, which require conformity to 
 them ; and the idea of absolute liberty being for any one 
 to do whatever he pleases : I am as capable of being certain 
 of the truth of this proposition as of any in the mathematics. 
 
170 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 19. Two things have made moral ideas thought uneatable of 
 demonstration : their complexedness, and want of sensible repre- 
 sentation. That which, in this respect, has given the advan- 
 tage to the ideas of quantity, and made them thought more 
 capable of certainty and demonstration, is, 
 
 First, That they can be set down and represented by sen- 
 sible marks, which have a greater and nearer correspondence 
 with them than any words or sounds whatsoever. Diagrams 
 drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in the mind, and not 
 liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their significa- 
 tion. An angle, circle, or square, drawn in lines, lies open 
 to the view, and cannot be mistaken : it remains unchange- 
 able, and may at leisure be considered and examined, and the 
 demonstration be revised, and all the parts of it may be gone 
 over more than once, without any danger of the least change 
 in the ideas. This cannot be thus done in moral ideas : we 
 have no sensible marks that resemble them, whereby we can 
 set them down : we have nothing but words to express them 
 by ; which though, when written, they remain the same, yet 
 the ideas they stand for may change in the same man ; and 
 it is very seldom that they are not different in different 
 persons. 
 
 Secondly, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty 
 in ethics is, that moral ideas are commonly more complex 
 than those of the figures ordinarily considered in mathematics. 
 From whence these two inconveniences follow : First, that 
 their names are of more uncertain signification ; the precise 
 collection of simple ideas they stand for not being so easily 
 agreed on, and so the sign that is used for them, in commu- 
 nication always, and in thinking often, does not steadily carry 
 with it the same idea. Upon which the same disorder, con- 
 fusion, and error follows as would if a man, going to demon- 
 strate something of an heptagon, should, in the diagram he 
 took to do it, leave out one of the angles, or by oversight 
 make the figure with one angle more than the name ordina- 
 rily imported, or he intended it should when at first he thought 
 of his demonstration. This often happens, and is hardly 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 171 
 
 avoidable in verv complex moral ideas, where, the same name 
 being retained, one angle, i. e., one simple idea, is left out or 
 put in in the complex one (still called by the same name) 
 more at one time than another. Secondly, From the com- 
 plexedness of these moral ideas there follows another incon- 
 venience, viz., that the mind cannot easily retain those pre- 
 cise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in 
 the examination of the habitudes and correspondencies, agree- 
 ments or disagreements, of several of them one with another ; 
 especially where it is to be judged of by long deductions, and 
 the intervention of several other complex ideas, to show the 
 agreement or disagreement of two remote ones. 
 
 The great help against this which mathematicians find in 
 diagrams and figures, which remain unalterable in their 
 draughts, is very apparent ; and the memory would often 
 have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly, 
 whilst the mind went over the parts of them, step by step, 
 to examine their several correspondencies. And though, in 
 casting up a long sum, either in addition, multiplication, or 
 division, every part be only a progression of the mind taking 
 a view of its own ideas, and considering their agreement or 
 disagreement, and the resolution of the question be nothing 
 but the result of the whole, made up of such particulars 
 whereof the mind has a clear perception ; yet without setting 
 down the several parts by marks whose precise significations 
 are known, and by marks that hist and remain in view when 
 the memory had let them go, it would be almost impossible 
 to carry so many different ideas in mind, without confound- 
 ing or letting slip some parts of the reckoning, and thereby 
 making all our reasonings about it useless. In which case, 
 the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all to perceive tho 
 agreement of any two or more numbers, their equalities or 
 proportions : that the mind has only by intuition of its own. 
 ideas of the numbers themselves. .But the numerical charac- 
 ters are helps to the memory to record and retain the several 
 ideas about which the demonstration is made, whereby a man 
 may know how far his intuitive knowledge in surveying 
 
 i 2 
 
172 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 several of the particulars lias proceeded ; that so he may, 
 without confusion, go on to what is yet unknown, and, at 
 last, have in view before him the result of all his perceptions 
 and reasonings. 
 
 20. Remedies of those difficulties. One part of these disad- 
 vantages in moral ideas, which has made them be thought 
 not capable of demonstration, may in a good measure be re- 
 medied by definitions, setting down that collection of simple 
 ideas which eveiy term shall stand for, and then using the 
 terms steadily and constantly for that precise collection. And 
 what methods algebra, or something of that kind, may here- 
 after suggest, to remove the other difficulties, is not easy to 
 foretell. Confident I am, that if men would in the same 
 method, and with the same indifferency, search after moral 
 as they do mathematical truths, they would find them to have 
 a stronger connection one with another, and a more necessary 
 consequence from our clear and distinct ideas, and to come 
 nearer perfect demonstration, than is commonly imagined. 
 But much of this is not to be expected, whilst the desire of 
 esteem, riches, or power makes men espouse the well-endowed 
 opinions in fashion, and then seek arguments either to make 
 good their beauty, or varnish over and cover their deformity : 
 nothing being so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind, 
 nothing so deformed and irreconcileable to the understanding 
 as a lie. For, though many a man can with satisfaction enough 
 own a no-very-handsome wife in his bosom, yet who is bold 
 enough openly to avow that he has espoused a falsehood, and 
 received into his breast so ugly a thing as a lie ? Whilst the 
 parties of men cram their tenets down all men's throats whom 
 they can get into their power, without permitting them to 
 examine their truth or falsehood ; and will not let truth 
 have fair play in the world, nor men the liberty to search 
 after it ; what improvements can be expected of this kind ? 
 what greater light can be hoped for in the moral sciences '? 
 The subject part of mankind, in most places, might, instead 
 thereof, with Egyptian bondage, expect Egyptian darkness, 
 were not the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's 
 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 173 
 
 minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man 
 wholly to extinguish. 
 
 21. Fourthly, Of real existence. We have an INTUITIVE 
 knowledge of our own, DEMONSTRATIVE of God's, SENSITIVE of 
 some few other things'. As to the fourth sort of our know- 
 ledge, viz., of the real actual existence of things, we have an 
 intuitive knowledge of our own existence ; a demonstrative 
 knowledge of the existence of a God ; of the existence of 
 anything else, we have no other but a sensitive knowledge, 
 which extends not beyond the objects present to our senses. 
 
 22. Our ignorance great. Our knowledge being so narrow, 
 as I have showed, it will, perhaps, give us some light into 
 the present state of our minds, if we look a little into the 
 dark side, and take a view of our ignorance : which, being 
 infinitely larger than our knowledge, may serve much to the 
 quieting of disputes and improvement of useful knowledge, 
 if, discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas, we 
 confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those things 
 that are within the reach of our understandings, and launch 
 not out into that abyss of darkness (where we have not eyes 
 
 , to see, nor faculties to perceive anything), out of a presump- 
 tion that nothing is beyond our comprehension. But to be 
 satisfied of the folly of such a conceit, we need not go far. 
 He that knows anything, knows this in the first place, that 
 he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance. The 
 meanest and most obvious things that come in our way have 
 dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. 
 The clearest and most enlarged understandings of thinking 
 men find themselves puzzled and at a loss in every particle 
 of matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so when we 
 consider the causes of our ignorance, which, from what has 
 been said, I suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three : 
 
 FIRST, Want of ideas. 
 
 SECONDLY, Want of a discoverable connection between the 
 ideas we have. 
 
 THIRDLY, Want of tracing and examining our ideas. 
 
 23. First, One cause of it, want of ideas, either such as w& 
 
174 OF THE EXTENT OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 have no conception of. PIUST, There are some things, and 
 those not a few, that we are ignorant of for want of ideas. 
 
 First, All the simple ideas we have are confined (as I have 
 shown) to those we receive from corporeal objects by sensa- 
 tion, and from the operations of our own minds as the objects 
 of reflection. But how much these few and narrow inlets 
 are disproportionate to the vast whole extent of all beings, 
 will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as 
 to think their span the measure of all things. "What other 
 simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the 
 universe may have by the assistance of senses and faculties 
 more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours, it is 
 not for us to determine ; but to say or think there are no such 
 because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argu- 
 ment than if a blind man should be positive in it, that there 
 was no such thing as sight and colours because he had no 
 manner of idea of any such thing, nor could by any means 
 frame to himself any notions about seeing. The ignorance 
 and darkness that is in us no more hinders nor confines the 
 knowledge that is in others, than the blindness of a mole is 
 an argument against the quicksightedness of an eagle. He 
 that will consider the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness 
 of the Creator of all things, will find reason to think it was 
 not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a 
 creature as he will find man to be, who, in all probability, is 
 one of the lowest of all intellectual beings. "What faculties 
 therefore other species of creatures have to penetrate into the 
 nature and inmost constitutions of things, what ideas they 
 may receive of them far different from ours, we know not. 
 This we know and certainly find, that we want several other 
 views of them besides those we have, to make discoveries of 
 them more perfect. And we may be convinced that the ideas 
 we can attain to by our faculties are very disproportionate 
 to things themselves, when a positive, clear, distinct one of 
 substance itself, which is the foundation of all the rest, is 
 concealed from us. But want of ideas of this kind, being a 
 part as well as cause of our ignorance, cannot be described. 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 175 
 
 Only this, I think, I may confidently say of it, that the intel- 
 lectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike that that 
 part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with 
 what we see not ; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes 
 or our thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almost 
 nothing, in comparison of the rest. 
 
 24. Or want of such ideas as particularly we have not, because 
 of their remoteness. Secondly, Another great cause of igno- 
 rance is the want of ideas we are capable of. As the want of 
 ideas which our faculties are not able to give us shuts us 
 wholly from those views of things which it is reasonable to 
 think other beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we 
 know nothing ; so the want of ideas I now speak of keeps us 
 in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known to 
 us. Bulk, figure, and motion we have ideas of. But though 
 we are not without ideas of these primary qualities of bodies 
 in general, yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, 
 figure, and motion, of the greatest part of the bodies of the 
 universe, we are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and 
 ways of operation, whereby the effects which we daily see are 
 produced. These are hid from us in some things by being too 
 remote ; and, in others, by being too minute. When we 
 consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of 
 the world, and the reasons we have to think that what lies 
 within our ken is but a small part of the immense universe, 
 we shall then discover a huge abyss of ignorance. What are 
 the particular fabrics of the great masses of matter which 
 make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings, how 
 far they are extended, what is their motion, and how con- 
 tinued or communicated, and what influence they have one 
 upon another, are contemplations that, at first glimpse, our 
 thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our contempla- 
 tion, and confine our thoughts to this little canton, I mean 
 this system of our sun, and the grosser masses of matter that 
 visibly move about it, what several sorts of vegetables, animals, 
 and intellectual corporeal beings, infinitely different from 
 those of our little spot of earth, may there probably be in the 
 
176 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 other planets, to the knowledge of which, even of their out- 
 ward figures and parts, we can no way attain whilst we are 
 confined to this earth, there heing no natural means, either by 
 sensation or reflection, to convey their certain ideas into our 
 minds ! They are out of the reach of those inlets of all our 
 knowledge ; and what sorts of furniture and inhabitants those 
 mansions contain in them, we cannot so much as guess, much 
 less have clear and distinct ideas of them. 
 
 25. Or because of their minuteness. If a great, nay, far the 
 greatest part of the several ranks of bodies in the universe 
 escape our notice by their remoteness, there are others no less 
 concealed from us by their minuteness. These insensible 
 corpuscles being the active parts of matter and the great 
 instruments of nature, on which depend not only all their 
 secondary qualities, but also most of their natural operations, 
 our want of precise, distinct ideas of their primary qualities 
 keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we desire to know 
 about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the figure, 
 size, texture, and motion of the minute constituent parts of 
 any two bodies, we should know without trial several of their 
 operations one upon another, as we do now the properties of a 
 square or a triangle. Did we know the mechanical affections 
 of the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and a man, as a 
 watchmaker does those of a watch, whereby it performs its 
 operations, and of a file, which, by rubbing on them, will 
 alter the figure of any of the wheels, we should be able to tell 
 beforehand that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill, and opium 
 make a man sleep, as well as a watchmaker can, that a little 
 piece of paper laid on the balance will keep the watch from 
 going till it be removed ; or that some small part of it being 
 rubbed by a file, the machine would quite lose its motion, and 
 the watch go no more. The dissolving of silver in aqua fortis, 
 and gold in aqua regia, and not vice versa, would be then 
 perhaps no more difficult to know, than it is to a smith to 
 understand why the turning of one key will open a lock, and 
 not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of 
 senses acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies, 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 177 
 
 and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we must be 
 content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of opera- 
 tion ; nor can we be assured about them any farther than 
 some few trials we make are able to reach. But whether they 
 will succeed again another time we cannot be certain. This 
 hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning 
 natural bodies, and our reason carries us herein very little 
 beyond particular matter of fact. 
 
 26. Hence no science of bodies. And therefore I am apt to 
 doubt, that how far soever human industry may advance 
 useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, scien- 
 tifical will still be out of our reach; because we want 
 perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are 
 nearest to us and most under our command. Those which we 
 have ranked into classes under names, and we think ourselves 
 best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incom- 
 plete ideas of. Distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies 
 that fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may 
 have ; but adequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one 
 amongst them. And though the former of these will serve us 
 for common use and discourse : yet whilst we want the latter, 
 we are not capable of scientifical knowledge, nor shall ever 
 be able to discover general instructive, unquestionable truths 
 concerning them. Certainty and demonstration are things we 
 must not, in these matters, pretend to. By the colour, figure, 
 taste, and smell, and other sensible qualities, we have as clear 
 and distinct ideas of sage and hemlock, as we have of a circle 
 and a triangle ; but having no ideas of the particular primary 
 qualities of the minute parts of either of these plants, nor of 
 other bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell 
 what effects they will produce ; nor when we see those effects 
 can we so much as guess, much less know, their manner of 
 production. Thus, having no ideas of the particular me- 
 chanical affections of the minute parts of bodies that are 
 within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their constitu- 
 tions, powers, and operations ; and of bodies more remote we 
 are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very 
 
 i3 
 
178 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their 
 constitutions. 
 
 27. Much less of spirits. This, at first sight, will show 
 us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent 
 even of material heings ; to which if we add the considera- 
 tion of that infinite number of spirits that may be, and 
 probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, 
 whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to ourselves 
 any distinct ideas of their several ranks and sorts, we shall 
 find this cause of ignorance conceal from us, in an impene- 
 trable obscurity, almost the whole intellectual world; a 
 greater, certainly, and more beautiful world than the material. 
 For, bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, 
 " superficial, " ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of 
 our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the 
 Father of all spirits, the eternal independent author of them 
 and us and all things, we have no certain information so much 
 as of the existence of other spirits but by revelation. Angels 
 of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery ; and all those 
 intelligences whereof it is likely there are more orders than 
 of corporeal substances, are things whereof our natural 
 faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are 
 minds and thinking beings in other men, as well as himself, 
 every man has a reason, from their words and actions, to be 
 satisfied ; and the knowledge of his own mind cannot suffer 
 a man that considers to be ignorant that there is a God. 
 But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and 
 the great God, who is there that by his own search and 
 ability can come to know ? Much less have we distinct ideas 
 of their different natures, conditions, states, powers, and 
 several constitutions, wherein they agree or differ from one 
 another and from us. And therefore, in what concerns their 
 different species and properties, we are under an absolute 
 ignorance. 
 
 28. Secondly, Want of a discoverable connection between ideas 
 we have. Secondly, What a small part of the substantial 
 beings that are in the universe the want of ideas leaves open 
 
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 179 
 
 to our knowledge, we have seen. In the next place, another 
 cause of ignorance of no less moment is a want of a dis- 
 coverable connection between those ideas which we have. 
 For wherever we want that, we are utterly uncapable of 
 universal and certain knowledge ; and are, as in the former 
 case, left only to observation and experiment; which how 
 narrow and confined it is, how far from general knowledge, 
 we need not be told. I shall give some few instances of this 
 cause of our ignorance, and so leave it. It is evident that 
 the bulk, figure, and motion of several bodies about us, pro- 
 duce in us several sensations, as of colours, sounds, taste, 
 smell, pleasure, and pain, &c. These mechanical affections 
 of bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they 
 produce in us (there being no conceivable connection between 
 any impulse of any sort of body, and any perception of a 
 colour or smell which we find in our minds), we can have 
 no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our ex- 
 perience ; and can reason no otherwise about them than as 
 effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely wise 
 Agent which perfectly surpass our comprehensions. As the 
 ideas of sensible secondary qualities which we have in our 
 minds can by us be no way deduced from bodily causes, nor 
 any correspondence or connection be found between them and 
 those primary qualities which experience shows us produce 
 them in us ; so, on the other side, the operation of our minds 
 upon our bodies is as unconceivable. How any thought 
 should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature 
 of our ideas, as how any body should produce any thought 
 in the mind. That it is so, if experience did not convince 
 us, the consideration of the things themselves would never 
 be able in the least to discover to us. These and the like, 
 though they have a constant and regular connection in the 
 ordinary course of things ; yet that connection being not dis- 
 coverable in the ideas themselves, which appearing to have 
 no necessary dependence one on another, we can attribute 
 their connection to nothing else but the arbitrary determi- 
 nation of that all- wise Agent who has made them to be, and 
 
180 OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak under- 
 standings to conceive. 
 
 29. Instances. In some of our ideas there are certain 
 relations, habitudes, and connections so visibly included in 
 the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive 
 them separable from them by any power whatsoever. And 
 in these only we are capable of certain and universal know- 
 ledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily 
 carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. 
 NOT can we conceive this relation, this connection of these 
 two ideas, to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any 
 arbitrary power, which of choice made it thus, or could make 
 it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts 
 of matter, the production of sensation in us of colours and 
 sounds, &c., by impulse and motion, nay, the original rules 
 and communications of motion, being such wherein we can 
 discover no natural connection with any ideas we have, we 
 cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good 
 pleasure of the wise Architect. I need not, I think, here 
 mention the resurrection of the dead, the future state of this 
 globe of earth, and such other things which are by every 
 one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of 
 a free agent. The things that, as far as our observation 
 reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may 
 conclude do act by a law set them ; but yet by a law that 
 we know not; whereby, though causes work steadily, and 
 effects constantly flow from them, yet their connections and 
 dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas, we can 
 have but an experimental knowledge of them. From all 
 which it is easy to perceive what a darkness we are in- 
 volved in, how little it is of being, and the things that are, 
 that we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do 
 no injury to our knowledge when we modestly think with 
 ourselves, that we are so far from being able to comprehend 
 the whole nature of the universe and all the things con- 
 tained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophical 
 knowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part 
 
OF THE EXTENT OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 181 
 
 of us ; concerning their secondary qualities, powers, and 
 operations, we can have no universal certainty. Several 
 effects come every day within the notice of our senses, of 
 which we have so far sensitive knowledge ; but the causes, 
 manner, and certainty of their production, for the two fore- 
 going reasons, we must be content to be ignorant of. In 
 these we can go no farther than particular experience 
 informs us of matter of fact, and by analogy to guess what 
 effects the like bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce. 
 But as to a perfect science of natural bodies (not to mention 
 spiritual beings), we are, I think, so far from being capable 
 of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek 
 after it.* 
 
 30. Thirdly, want of tracing our ideas. Thirdly, Where we 
 have adequate ideas, and where there is a certain and dis- 
 coverable connection between them, yet we are often ignorant 
 for want of tracing those ideas which we have or may have ; 
 and for want of finding out those intermediate ideas which 
 may show us what habitude of agreement or disagreement 
 they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of 
 mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their 
 faculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves ; but for 
 want of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways 
 comparing those ideas. That which has most contributed to 
 hinder the due tracing of our ideas, and finding out their re- 
 lations and agreements or disagreements one with another has 
 been, I suppose, the ill use of words. It is impossible that 
 men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover, the agree- 
 ment or disagreement of ideas themselves, whilst their 
 thoughts flutter about, or stick only in sounds of doubtful and 
 uncertain significations. Mathematicians, abstracting their 
 thoughts from names, and accustoming themselves to set before 
 their minds the ideas themselves that they would consider, and 
 
 * In these modern times, however, a very near approach is being made to 
 such a science as that which Locke mentions. Natural philosophy has 
 emerged from the helplessness of infancy; and in the recently-developed 
 doctrine of the Conservation of Force, we may recognise a foreshadowing of 
 that Unity which is, as it were, the adolescence of science. ED. 
 
182 OF INTUITION. 
 
 not sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great 
 part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has 
 so much hindered men's progress in other parts of knowledge. 
 For whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertain 
 signification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, 
 certain from probable, consistent from inconsistent, in their 
 own opinions. This having been the fate or misfortune of a 
 great part of the men of letters, the increase brought into the 
 stock of real knowledge has been very little in proportion to 
 the schools, disputes, and writings, the world has been filled 
 with ; whilst students, being lost in the great wood of words, 
 knew not whereabout they were, how far their discoveries 
 were advanced, or what was wanting in their own or the 
 general stock of knowledge. Had men, in the discoveries of 
 the material, done as they have in those of the intellectual, 
 world, involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful 
 ways of talking, volumes writ of navigation and voyages, theo- 
 ries and stories of zones and tides multiplied and disputed, nay, 
 ships built, and fleets set out, would never have taught us 
 the way beyond the line ; and the antipodes would be still as 
 much unknown as when it was declared heresy to hold there 
 were any. But having spoken sufficiently of words, and the 
 ill or careless use that is commonly made of them, I shall not 
 say anything more of it here. 
 
 NOTES. 
 A. OF INTUITION. 
 
 Intuition, according to Locke, is the immediate perception of 
 the agreement or disagreement betwixt two idas ; and it may be 
 well to point out here that the knowledge tkus acquired depends 
 for its legitimacy upon those mental la^s of which Locke was 
 accustomed to speak in such disparaging terms, viz., "Whatever 
 is, is j" and " It is impossible for the same thing at the same time 
 to be and not to be." For, since no comparison between two ideas 
 can take place without some analysis, it follows that an assertion 
 or their agreement or disagreement is an assertion of their respec- 
 
OF LOCKE'S THEORY CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE. 183 
 
 tive characters (t. e. the appearances which they present to the 
 mind) being similar or dissimilar. But this proceeds upon the 
 assumption that an idea viewed as a whole is the same thing as 
 all its parts or characters when viewed together, and that two 
 sets of characters which differ in any portion are not the same 
 idea : such assumptions being merely other modes of expressing 
 the laws, " Whatever is, is ;" and " It is impossible for the same 
 thing at the same time to be and not to be." 
 
 B. OF LOCKE'S THEORY CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 In this theory there are two points requiring discussion first, 
 the notion that all knowledge concerns ideas, and ideas only j and, 
 secondly, the statement that ever} 7 judgment, or act of knowledge, 
 is a recognition of the agreement or disagreement existing between 
 two ideas. 
 
 As regards the former of these, it has already (p. 67) been 
 shown that representative ideas are now discarded 'from all legiti- 
 mate psychologies ; but yet it will be desirable to add a few words 
 respecting the character of such knowledge as these ideas, if. ad- 
 mitted to exist, are capable of imparting. That is to say, we seek 
 to inquire whether the knowledge thus acquired be true or false ; 
 and the only method of doing so is to investigate that quality 
 which constitutes real or valid knowledge. This is pointed out 
 by Locke as follows : " It is evident the mind knows not things 
 immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of 
 them. Our knowledge, Jtheief ore, is real only so far as therej&ja 
 conformity between our ideaauftnd the reality "of tMngs. 77 "' TrTother 
 words, when our ideas faithfully reflect the objects which produce 
 them, our knowledge is true : when a dissimilarity exists between 
 our ideas and their archetypes, we have only a false knowledge. 
 
 Now, ideas, admitting them, with Locke, to exist, are either 
 material or immaterial. If they be material, they cannot resemble 
 or represent mind, the Deity, time, space, &c. ; and therefore, of 
 these we can have no true knowledge : if they be immaterial, they 
 cannot resemble or represent corporeal bodies ; and therefore the 
 world of matter is to us chimerical. Again, even if material, they 
 cannot resemble the secondary qualities of bodies, i.e. colours, 
 savours, odours, &c., which are sensations in nowise like the 
 physical properties which produce them ; nor can they represent 
 primary qualities, such as solidity, figure, &c., which in this sense 
 are abstractions ; and still less can they represent matter per se, 
 i. e. substance divested of all sensible qualities : it follows, therefore, 
 that material ideas can give no true knowledge of matter ; and, as 
 we have before seen that they can give none of spirit, we are 
 unable, while dependent upon ~them for knowledge, to believe in 
 the existence or reality of either minds or bodies. So also, even if 
 ideas be immaterial, they can in no manner represent any spiritual 
 
OF LOCKE'S THEORY CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 being, for it is only of matter that images or resemblances exist : 
 and we have already seen that they cannot represent bodies ; 
 therefore we are led to the same result with immaterial as with 
 material ideas that is to say, we can have no valid belief in either 
 souls or bodies. But, furthermore, if ideas be representative, they 
 must be material, as otherwise they could not be images or 
 resemblances: accordingly, the subject in which they inhere, 
 t. e. the mind, must be material too, and also everything repre- 
 sented ; so that we are compelled to adopt a complete system of 
 Materialism, if we are so sparing as not to carry the doctrine to its 
 logical result, that is, to Nihilism. And, finally, after having thus 
 shown that the theory of representative ideas cannot on any 
 supposition be saved, it remains to be pointed out that, although 
 one should admit that we only perceive ideas, and that these ideas 
 are representative of their archetypes, yet, in spite of all this, we 
 should still remain without any means of discovering whether our 
 knowledge were true or false. This follows from the same analysis 
 as that performed in the note on "sensitive knowledge:" for, as 
 the truth or error of our knowledge defends upon the agreement 
 or disagreement of our ideas and the objects producing them, it is 
 evident that we cannot judge whether such conformity or non- 
 conformity exists, unless we perceive on the one hand the objects 
 themselves, and on the other the ideas. But as we are only able 
 to perceive ideas, we cannot be conscious of the objects themselves, 
 and therefore cannot perceive whether the two things agree or 
 disagree that is, we cannot tell whether our knowledge be true 
 or false. 
 
 The second of the points alluded to at the commencement of 
 this note is that portion of Locke's doctrine which declares that 
 every judgment, or act of knowledge, is a recognition of the 
 agreement or disagreement existing between two ideas. The 
 objection urged against this theory is that, whilst professing to 
 I account for all knowledge, it can only do so for some of our 
 I judgments. Take, for example (as is done by M. Cousin), this 
 'judgment, "I exist;" the question is whether such a knowledge 
 as it expresses is the recognition of an agreement between two 
 ideas ; and the argument for a negative answer runs as follows : 
 Jf this judgment be the result of a comparison between two ideas, 
 these ideas must evidently be those of a me, an ego, and of 
 existence. But the ego must not be conceived as existing, for 
 .then there would be no necessity for the judgment: it must be 
 imagined as separate from existence, as an abstract me, as ego in 
 general. For similar reasons, the idea of existence must not be 
 that of an existing me, but of existence in the abstract. Behold, 
 then, the two terms which are to be compared ; they are abstrac- 
 tions : it therefore follows that the agreement between them must 
 be an abstract relation j that is to say, we can merely form the 
 judgment that " Every me must exist " a very different truth 
 
OF LOCKE'S THEORY CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE. 185 
 
 from that which we are investigating, viz. an assertion of personal 
 existence, a statement of a single real fact, " I exist." not a mere 
 generalisation of possible existence. 
 
 Again, since, according to Locke, the knowledge of personal 
 existence is acquired from the comparison of two ideas, and since 
 these ideas must, as we have shown, be abstractions, it follows 
 that human knowledge commences with abstractions ; whereas, in 
 fact, it is things in the concrete which are first known, which are 
 the subjects of primitive knowledge. 
 
 Once more : the theory in question is based upon a paralogism, 
 a petitio principii ; for the idea of abstract existence could only 
 have been obtained from a previous knowledge of concrete exis- 
 tences; and therefore to attempt to derive the latter from the 
 former is to attempt to prove a thing by means of something else 
 which implies it. 
 
 (l We thus have three radical objections against the theory of 
 Locke : 
 
 " 1. It sets out from abstractions ; consequently it gives only 
 an abstract result, and not that which you are seeking. 
 
 "s2. It sets out from abstractions; and, consequently, it does 
 not set out from the true starting point, the human intelligence. 
 
 "3, It sets out from abstractions which it could have obtained 
 only by aid of this same concrete knowledge which it pretends to 
 draw from abstractions which suppose it; consequently it takes 
 for granted what is in question." 
 
 Such is a resume of M. Cousin's celebrated argument against 
 Locke's theory of judgment; and this may be taken as a fair 
 exposition of the views now generally entertained upon the 
 subject. But although the other portions of his system would 
 prevent Locke himself from successfully combating the above 
 objections, yet they may easily be met with a complete rejoinder, 
 as the following remarks will tend to show. 
 
 When we first acquire that knowledge which is expressed by 
 the judgment, " 1 exist," it is evident that we are thinking of a 
 particular concrete me ; this is admitted on all sides. It is like- 
 wise evident that, previously to the time of our forming this 
 judgment, we either have the idea of abstract existence, or we 
 have it not ; and this, too, is admitted by all. What I undertake 
 to prove, then, is that on either of the last-mentioned suppositions 
 (one of which must be the case), when we say, " I a particular 
 concrete ego exist," we express the recognition of an agreement 
 between two ideas. 
 
 In the first place, let it be assumed that, at the time of our 
 acquiring the knowledge of persona] existence i. e. when we first 
 say, "I exist" that at that time we have had no anterior 
 knowledge of abstract existence. I next ask, what are the neces- 
 sary conditions of conceiving our own concrete individual self? 
 In what manner does consciousness reveal it to us ? It cannot be 
 
186 OF LOCKE'S THEORY CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 as an abstract me as ego, per se ; for we are all agreed that it is a 
 concrete me which is known. No ; it must be as a thinking, per- 
 cipient me as an ego accompanied by some thought or perception. 
 Tnat is to say, we are conscious of something which is me, .and of 
 something which is not me of an ego and of a non-ego. But are 
 these two ideas entirely distinct ? Can we regard them as dis- 
 united, and offering no common quality to consciousness? We 
 cannot. An irresistible law or faculty of the mind compels us 
 towards unity of conception; and, simultaneously with our per- 
 ception of the ego and non-ego, we see that they are, in pan at 
 least, the same ; we reduce the variety to unity. What Is this 
 quality, then, in which they agree? It is existence. The mind 
 exists, the thought exists j the ego exists, the non-ego exists ; they 
 both exist : t. c. I the concrete formed by ego and non-ego exist. 
 
 It will thus be seen that the act of knowledge by which we are 
 enabled to say, " I exist," is a duplex perception of the agreement 
 between the idea of the concrete me (== ego -\- non-ego), and that 
 of existence. It should also be noted, that the operation, though 
 complex, is simultaneous. 
 
 In the second place (although an impossible alternative), let it 
 be assumed that the idea of abstract" existence is in the mind 
 previously to our forming the judgment, "I exist." We have 
 then the idea of a something, an ego -f- non-ego, which we term 
 " I," and which is not conceived as existing, that is, as compre- 
 hending the notion of existence, but as a combination of only two 
 elements, the ego and the non-ego. But we also have the idea of 
 existence ; and therefore, in accordance with the imperative dictates 
 of our mental nature, we seek for unity in this variety. We find 
 it ; or, in other words, we recognise that both the " I " and 
 " existence " produce a partially similar impression upon our 
 minds. Then, perceiving this, we say, "I exist." 
 
 Thus, with or without an anterior knowledge of abstract exis- 
 tence, I have shown that our first idea of personal existence is 
 derived from a perception of the agreement between two ideas. 
 
 Hence, too, it follows that the cloctrine does not " set out from 
 abstractions;" and therefore it is obnoxious to neither of the 
 charges brought against it 
 
 Locke, it is true, gives no account which &Lall serve to throw 
 any light upon the rea] nature or bearing of his theory concerning 
 judgment -, but there is no doubt that he has ; ipon this subject, 
 formed a more correct opinion than the majority of those who 
 have attacked him. It is merely one phase of the question which 
 has just now been discussed, but in the present place it is impos- 
 sible to enter upon any more detailed investigation : those, however, 
 who wish for further information upon the subject may be referred 
 to the second series of M. Cousin's Cours de Philosophic, and to the 
 Treatise on Logic, Pure and Applied (Appendix, articles A, C, and 
 D), in the series to which the present volume belongs. 
 
 
OF REASON. 187 
 
 OF REASON. 
 
 1. Various significations of the ivord "reason." The word 
 " reason," in the English language, has different significa- 
 tions : sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles ; 
 sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles ; 
 and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. 
 But the consideration I shall have of it here is in a significa- 
 tion different from all these ; and that is, as it stands for a 
 faculty in man ; that faculty whereby man is supposed to be 
 distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he much 
 surpasses them. 
 
 2. Wherein reasoning consists. If general knowledge, as has 
 been shown, consists in a perception of the agreement or dis- 
 agreement of our own ideas, and the knowledge of the existence 
 of all things without us (except only of a God, whose existence 
 every man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself 
 from his own existence) be had only by our senses ; what 
 room then is there for the exercise of any other faculty but 
 outward sense and inward perception ? What need is there 
 of reason ? Yery much ; both for the enlargement of our 
 knowledge and regulating our assent : for it has to do both in 
 knowledge and opinion, and is necessary, and assisting to all 
 our other intellectual faculties, and indeed contains two of 
 them, viz. sagacity and illation. By the one it finds out, 
 and by the other it so orders, the intermediate ideas as to 
 discover what connection there is in each link of the chain, 
 whereby the extremes are held together ; and thereby, 
 as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which is 
 that we call " illation " pr " inference," and consists in 
 nothing but the perception of the connection there is between 
 the ideas in each step of the deduction, whereby the mind 
 comes to see either the certain agreement or disagreement of 
 any two ideas, as in demonstration, in which it arrives at 
 knowledge ; or their probable connection, on which it gives 
 or withholds its assent, as in opinion. Sense 
 
188 OF REASON. 
 
 reach but a very little way. The greatest part of our know- 
 ledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas : and 
 in those cases where we are fain to substitute assent instead 
 of knowledge, and take propositions for true without being 
 certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and 
 compare the grounds of their probability. In both these 
 cases the faculty which finds out the means, and rightly 
 applies them to discover certainty in the one and probability 
 in the other, is that which we call "reason." For, as reason 
 perceives the recessary and indubitable connection of all the 
 ideas or proofs one to another in each step of any demonstra- 
 tion that produces knowledge, so it likewise perceives the 
 probable connection of all the ideas or proofs one to another, 
 in every step of a discourse to which it will think assent due. 
 This is the lowest degree of that which can be truly called 
 " reason." For, where the mind does not perceive this pro- 
 bable connection, where it does not discern whether there be 
 any such connection or no, there men's opinions are not the 
 product of judgment or the consequence of reason, but the 
 effects of chance and hazard, of a mind floating at all adven- 
 tures, without choice and without direction. 
 
 3. Its four parts. So that we may in reason consider these 
 four degrees : The grst and highest is the discovering and 
 finding out of proofs ; the second, the regular and methodical 
 disposition of them, and layingThem in a clear and fit order 
 to make their connection and force be plainly and easily per- 
 ceived ; the third is the perceiving their connection ; and the 
 fourth, a making a right conclusion. These several degrees 
 mayT)e observed in any mathematical demonstration : it being 
 one thing to perceive the connection of each part as the 
 demonstration is made by another; another to perceive the 
 dependence of the conclusion on all the parts ; a third, to 
 make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and 
 something different from all these, to have first found out 
 those intermediate ideas or proofs by which it is made. 
 
 4. Syllogism not the great instrument of reason. There is 
 one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concern- 
 
OF REASON. 189 
 
 ing reason ; and that is, whether syllogism, as is generally 
 thought, be the proper instrument of it, and the usefullest 
 way of exercising this faculty. The causes I have to doubt 
 are these : 
 
 First, Eecause syllogism serves our reason hut in one only 
 of the fore-mentioned parts of it ; and that is, to show the 
 connection of the proofs in any one instance and no more : hut 
 in this it is of no great use, since the mind can perceive such 
 connection where it really is as easily, nay, perhaps better, 
 without it. 
 
 If we will observe the actings of our own minds, we shall 
 find that we reason best and clearest when we only observe 
 the connection of the proof, without reducing our thoughts to 
 any rule of syllogism. And therefore we may take notice 
 that there are many men that reason exceeding clear and 
 rightly, who know not how to make a syllogism. He that 
 will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find men 
 reason there, perhaps, as acutely as himself, who yet never 
 heard of a syllogism, nor can reduce any one argument to 
 those forms : and I believe scarce any one ever makes syllo- 
 gisms in reasoning within himself. Indeed, syllogism is made 
 use of on occasion to discover a fallacy hid in a rhetorical 
 flourish, or cunningly wrapped up in a smooth period ; and 
 stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and good language, 
 show it in its naked deformity. Eut the weakness or fallacy 
 of such a loose discourse it shows, by the artificial form it is 
 put into, only to those who have thoroughly studied mode 
 and figure, and have so examined the many ways that three 
 propositions may be put together, as to know which of them 
 does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what 
 grounds it is that they do so. All who have so far considered 
 syllogism as to see the reason why, in three propositions laid 
 together in one form, the conclusion will be certainly right, 
 but in another not certainly so, I grant are certain of the 
 conclusions they draw from the premisses in the allowed 
 modes and figures. Eut they who have not so far looked into 
 those forms are not sure, by virtue of syllogism, that the 
 
190 OF REASON. 
 
 conclusion certainly follows from the premisses; they only 
 take it to be so by an implicit faith in their teachers, and a 
 confidence in those forms of argumentation : but this is still 
 but believing, not being certain. Now, if of all mankind 
 those who can make syllogisms are extremely few in compa- 
 rison with those who cannot, and if of those few who have 
 been taught logic there is but a very small number who do 
 any more than believe that syllogisms in the allowed modes 
 and figures do conclude right, without knowing certainly that 
 they do so ; if syllogisms must be taken for the only proper 
 instrument of reason and means of knowledge ; it will follow 
 that before Aristotle there was not one man that did or could 
 know anything by reason ; and that, since the invention of 
 syllogisms, there is not one of ten thousand that doth. 
 
 But God has not been so sparing to men to make them 
 barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to mukc 
 them rational ; i.e., those few of them that he could get so to 
 examine the grounds of syllogisms as to see that in above 
 threescore ways that three propositions may be laid together, 
 there are but about fourteen wherein one may be sure that 
 the conclusion is right, and upon what ground it is that in 
 these few the conclusion is certain, and in the other not. 
 God has been more bountiful to mankind than so ; he has 
 given them a mind that can reason without being instructed 
 in methods of syllogising : the understanding is not taught to 
 reason by these rules ; it has a native faculty to perceive the 
 I coherence or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them 
 f right without any such perplexing repetitions. I say not this 
 any way to lessen Aristotle, whom I look on as one of the 
 greatest men amongst the ancients ; whose large views, acute - 
 ness and penetration of thought, and strength of judgment, 
 few have equalled ; and who, in this very invention of forms 
 of argumentation, wherein the conclusion may be shown to be 
 rightly inferred, did great service against those who were not 
 ashamed to deny anything. And I readily own that all right 
 reasoning may be reduced to his forms of syllogism. But yet 
 I think, without any diminution to him, I may truly say, that 
 
OF REASON. 191 
 
 they are not the only nor the best way of reasoning, for the 
 leading of those into truth who are willing to find it, and 
 desire to make the best use they may of their reason for the 
 attainment of knowledge. And he himself, it is plain, found 
 out some forms to be conclusive and others not, not by the 
 forms themselves, but by the original way of knowledge, i.e., 
 by the visible agreement of ideas. Tell a country gentle- 
 woman that the wind is south-west, and the weather louring 
 and like to rain, and she will easily understand it is not safe 
 for her to go abroad thin clad in such a day, after a fever : 
 she clearly sees the probable connection of all these, viz., 
 south-west wind, and clouds, rain, wetting, taking cold, 
 relapse, and danger of death, without tying them together in 
 those artificial and cumbersome fetters of several syllogisms 
 that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds from one part 
 to another quicker and clearer without them : and the proba- 
 bility which she easily perceives in things thus in their native 
 state would be quite lost, if this argument were managed 
 learnedly and proposed in mode and figure. For it very often 
 confounds the connection : and, I think, every one will per- 
 ceive in mathematical demonstrations, that the knowledge 
 gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without syllogisms. 
 
 Inference is looked on as the great act of the rational 
 faculty ; and so it is when it is rightly made : but the mind, 
 either very desirous to enlarge its knowledge, or very apt to 
 favour the sentiments it has once imbibed, is very forward to 
 make inferences, and therefore often makes too much haste 
 before it perceives the connection of the ideas that must hold 
 the extremes together. 
 
 To infer is nothing but, by virtue of one proposition laid 
 down as true, to draw in another as true ; i. e., to see or 
 suppose such a connection of the two ideas of the inferred 
 proposition. V. g., let this be the proposition laid down, 
 " Men shall be punished in another world," and from thence 
 be inferred this other, " Then men can determine them- 
 selves." The question now is to know whether the mind has 
 made this inference right or no ; if it has made it by finding 
 
192 OF REASON. 
 
 out the intermediate ideas, and taking a view of the connec- 
 tion of them placed in a due order, it has proceeded rationally, 
 and made a right inference. If it has done it without such a 
 view, it has not so much made an inference that will hold, or 
 an inference of right reason, as shown a willingness to have 
 it be or be taken for such. But in neither case is it syllo- 
 gism that discovered those ideas, or showed the connection of 
 them ; for they must be both found out, and the connection 
 everywhere perceived, before they can rationally be made 
 use of in syllogism : unless it can be said that any idea, with- 
 out considering what connection it hath with the two other, 
 whose agreement should be shown by it, will do well enough 
 in a syllogism, and may be taken at a venture for the medius 
 terminus to prove any conclusion. But this nobody will say, 
 because it is by virtue of the perceived agreement of the in- 
 termediate idea with the extremes, that the extremes are 
 concluded to agree, and therefore each intermediate idea must 
 be such as in the whole chain hath a visible connection with 
 those two it is placed between, or else thereby the conclusion 
 cannot be inferred or drawn in ; for wherever any link of the 
 chain is loose and without connection, there the whole 
 strength of it is lost, and it hath no force to infer or draw in 
 anything. In the instance above mentioned what is it shows 
 the force of the inference, and consequently the reasonableness 
 of it, but a view of the connection of all the intermediate ideas 
 that draw in the conclusion or proposition inferred? v.g., 
 4 'Men shall be punished ; God the punisher ; just punishment ; 
 the punished guilty ; could have done otherwise ; freedom ; 
 self-determination; " by which chain of ideas thus visibly linked 
 together in train, i. e., each intermediate idea agreeing on 
 each side with those two it is immediately placed between, 
 the ideas of men and self-determination appear to be con- 
 nected ; i.e., this proposition, " Men can determine them- 
 selves," is drawn in or inferred from this, that "they shall 
 be punished in the other world." For here the mind, seeing 
 the connection there is between the idea of men's punishment 
 in the other world and the idea of God punishing, between 
 
OF REASON. 193 
 
 God punishing and the justice of the punishment, between 
 justice of punishment and guilt, between guilt and a power 
 to do otherwise, between a power to do otherwise and free- 
 dom, and between freedom and self-determination, sees the 
 connection between men and self-determination. 
 
 Now, I ask, whether the connection of the extremes be not 
 more clearly seen in this simple and natural disposition than 
 in the perplexed repetitions and jumble of five or six syllo- 
 gisms ? I must beg pardon for calling it " jumble" till some- 
 body shall put these ideas into so many syllogisms, and then 
 say that they are less jumbled, and their connection more 
 visible, when they are transposed and repeated, and spun out 
 to a greater length in artificial forms than in that short, 
 natural, plain order they are laid down in here, wherein every 
 one may see it ; and wherein they must be seen before they 
 can be put into a train of syllogisms. For the natural order 
 of the connecting ideas must direct the order of the syllogisms, 
 and a man must see the connection of each intermediate idea 
 with those that it connects, before he can with reason make 
 use of it in a syllogism. And when all those syllogisms are 
 made, neither those that are nor those that are not logicians 
 will see the force of the argumentation, L e., the connection 
 of the extremes, one jot the better. [For those that are not 
 men of art, not knowing the true forms of syllogism, nor the 
 reasons of them, cannot know whether they are made in right 
 and conclusive modes and figures or no, and so are not at all 
 helped by the forms they are put into, though by them the 
 natural order, wherein the mind could judge of their respec- 
 tive connection, being disturbed, renders the illation much 
 more uncertain than without them.] And as for logicians 
 themselves, they see the connection of each intermediate idea 
 with those it stands between (on which the force of the in- 
 ference depends) as well before as after the syllogism is 
 made, or else they do not see it at all. For a syllogism 
 neither shows nor strengthens the connection of any two 
 ideas immediately put together, but only by the connection 
 seen in them shows what connection the extremes have one 
 
194 OF REASON. 
 
 with another. But what connection the intermediate has with 
 either of the extremes in that syllogism, that no syllogism 
 does or can show. That the mind only doth or can perceive, as 
 they stand there in that juxtaposition, only by its own view, 
 to which the syllogistical form it happens to he in gives no 
 help or light at all ; it only shows that if the intermediate 
 idea agrees with those it is on hoth sides immediately applied 
 to, then those two remote ones, or, as they are called, " ex- 
 tremes," do certainly agree ; and therefore the immediate 
 connection of each idea to that which it is applied to on each 
 side, on which the force of the reasoning depends, is as well 
 seen hefore as after the syllogism is made, or else he that 
 makes the syllogism could never see it at all. This, as has 
 been already observed, is seen only by the eye, or the per- 
 ceptive faculty of the mind, taking a view of them laid 
 together in a juxtaposition; which view of any two it has 
 equally whenever they are laid together in any proposition, 
 whether that proposition be placed as a major or a minor, in 
 a syllogism or no. 
 
 1 f Of what use, then, are syllogisms ? " I answer, Their chief 
 and main use is in the schools, where men are allowed, with- 
 out shame, to deny the agreement of ideas that do manifestly 
 agree ; or out of the schools, to those who from thence have 
 learned, without shame, to deny the connection of ideas which 
 even to themselves is visible. But to an ingenious searcher 
 after truth, who has no other aim but to find it, there is no 
 need of any such form to force the allowing of the inference ; 
 the truth and reasonableness of it is better seen in ranging of 
 the ideas in a simple and plain order. And hence it is that 
 men, in their own inquiries after truth, never use syllogisms 
 to convince themselves, [or, in teaching others, to instruct 
 willing learners,] because, before they can put them into a 
 syllogism, they must see the connection that is between the 
 intermediate idea and the two other ideas it is set between 
 and applied to to show their agreement ; and when they see 
 that, they see whether the inference be good or no, and so 
 syllogism comes too late to settle it. Tor, to make use again 
 
OF REASON. 195 
 
 of the former instance, I ask, whether the mind, considering 
 the idea of justice placed as an intermediate idea between the 
 punishment of men and the guilt of the punished (and till it 
 does so consider it, the mind cannot make use of it as a 
 medius terminus) does not as plainly see the force and strength 
 of the inference as when it is formed into syllogism ? To 
 show it in a very plain and easy example : Let animal be the 
 intermediate idea, or medius terminus, that the mind makes 
 use of to show the connection of homo and vivens ; I ask, 
 whether the mind does not more readily and plainly see that 
 connection in the simple and proper position of the connecting 
 idea in the middle, thus, 
 
 Homo A nimal Vivens, 
 
 than in this perplexed one, 
 
 Animal Vivens Homo Animal ? 
 
 which is the position these ideas have in a syllogism, to show 
 the connection between homo and vnens by th.3 intervention 
 of animal. 
 
 Indeed, syllogism is thought to be of necessary use, even 
 to the lovers of truth, to show them the fallacies that are often 
 concealed in florid, witty, or involved discourses. Eut that 
 this is a mistake, will appear, if we consider that the reason 
 why sometimes men who sincerely aim at truth are imposed 
 upon by such loose, and, as they are called, " rhetorical " 
 discourses, is, that their fancies being struck with some lively 
 metaphorical representations, they neglect to observe or do 
 not easily perceive what are the true ideas upon which the 
 inference depends. Now, to show such men the weakness of 
 such an argumentation, there needs no more but to strip it of 
 the superfluous ideas which, blended and confounded with 
 those on which the inference depends, seem to show a con- 
 nection where there is none, or at least do hinder the dis- 
 covery of the want of it ; and then to lay the naked ideas on 
 which the force of the argumentation depends in their due 
 order : in which position the mind, taking a view of them, 
 
 K 2 
 
196 OF REASON. 
 
 S96R -what connection they have, and so is able to judge of the 
 inference, without any need of a syllogism at all. 
 
 I grant that "mode" and "figure" is commonly made use 
 of in such cases, as if the detection of the incoherence of such 
 loose discourses were wholly owing to the syllogistical form ; 
 and so I myself formerly thought, till upon a stricter exami- 
 nation I now find, that laying the intermediate ideas naked 
 in their due order shows the incoherence of the argumenta- 
 tion better than syllogism ; not only as subjecting each link 
 of the chain to the immediate view of the mind in its proper 
 place, whereby its connection is best observed ; but also be- 
 cause syllogism shows the incoherence only to those (who are 
 not one of ten thousand) who perfectly understand " mode " 
 and " figure," and the reason upon which those forms are 
 established : whereas a due and orderly placing of the ideas 
 upon which the inference is made makes every one, whether 
 logician or not logician, who understands the terms, and hath 
 the faculty to perceive the agreement or disagreement of such 
 ideas (without which, in or out of syllogism, he cannot per- 
 ceive the strength or weakness, coherence or incoherence, of 
 the discourse), see the want of connection in the argumenta- 
 tion, and the absurdity of the inference. 
 
 And thus I have known a man unskilful in syllogism, who 
 at first hearing could perceive the weakness and inconclusive- 
 ness of a long artificial and plausible discourse, wherewith 
 others better skilled in syllogism have been misled ; and I 
 believe there are few of my readers who do not know such. 
 And indeed, if it were not so, the debates of most princes' 
 councils and the business of assemblies would be in danger to 
 be mismanaged, since those who are relied upon, and have 
 usually a great stroke in them, are not always such who have 
 the good luck to be perfectly knowing in the forms of syllo- 
 gism, or expert in mode and figure. And if syllogism were 
 the only, or so much as the surest way to detect the fallacies 
 of artificial discourses, I do not think that all mankind, even 
 princes in matters that concern their crowns and dignities, 
 are so much in love with falsehood and mistake, that they 
 
OF REASON. 197 
 
 would everywhere have neglected to bring syllogism into the 
 debates of moment, or thought it ridiculous so much as to 
 offer them in affairs of consequence ; a plain evidence to me 
 that men of parts and penetration, who were not idly to dis- 
 pute at their ease, but were to act according to the result of 
 their debates, and often pay for their mistakes with their 
 heads or fortunes, found those scholastic forms were of little 
 use to discover truth or fallacy, whilst both the one and the 
 other might be shown, and better shown, without them to those 
 who would not refuse to see what was visibly shown them. 
 
 Secondly, Another reason that makes me doubt whether 
 syllogism be the only proper instrument of reason in the dis- 
 covery of truth, is, that of whatever use mode and figure is 
 pretended to be in the laying open of fallacy (which has been 
 above considered), those scholastic forms of discourse are not 
 less liable to fallacies than the plainer ways of argumentation ; 
 and for this I appeal to common observation, which has 
 always found these artificial methods of reasoning more 
 adapted to catch and entangle the mind than to instruct and 
 inform the understanding. And hence it is that men, even 
 when they are baffled and silenced in this scholastic way, are 
 seldom or never convinced, and so brought over to the con- 
 quering side ; they perhaps acknowledge their adversary to be 
 the more skilful disputant, but rest nevertheless persuaded of 
 the truth on their side ; and go away, worsted as they are, 
 with the same opinion they brought with them, which they 
 could not do if this way of argumentation carried light and 
 conviction with it, and made men see where the truth lay ; 
 and therefore syllogism has been thought more proper for th 
 attaining victory in dispute, than for the discovery or confir- 
 mation of truth in fair inquiries : and if it be certain that 
 fallacy can be couched in syllogisms, as it cannot be denied, 
 it must be something else, and not syllogism, that must 
 discover them. 
 
 I have had experience how ready some men are, when aJ 
 the use which they have been wont to ascribe to anything is 
 not allowed, to cry out, that I am for laying it wholly aside. 
 But to prevent such unjust and groundless imputations, I tell 
 
198 OF REASON. 
 
 them, that I am not for taking away any helps to the under- 
 standing in the attainment of knowledge ; and if men skilled 
 in and used to syllogisms find them assisting to their reason 
 in the discovery of truth, I think they ought to make use of 
 them. All that I aim at is, that they should not ascribe 
 more to these forms than belongs to them ; and think that 
 men have no use, or not so full a use, of their reasoning 
 faculty without them. Some eyes want spectacles to see 
 things clearly and distinctly ; but let not those that use them 
 therefore say, nobody can see clearly without them : those who 
 do so will be thought in favour of art (which perhaps they are 
 beholding to) a little too much to depress and discredit nature. 
 Eeason, by its own penetration, where it is strong and exer- 
 cised, usually sees quicker and clearer without syllogism. If 
 use of those spectacles has so dimmed its sight that it cannot 
 without them see consequences or inconsequences in argumen- 
 tation, I am not so unreasonable as to be against the using 
 them. Every one knows what best fits his own sight ; but 
 let him not thence conclude all in the dark who use not just 
 the same helps that he finds a need of. 
 
 2. Helps little in demonstration, less in probability. But, 
 however it be in knowledge, I think I may truly say, it is of 
 far less or no use at all in probabilities. For, the assent there 
 being to be determined by the preponderancy, after a due 
 weighing of all the proofs with all circumstances on both 
 sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that as syllo- 
 gism ; which, running away with one assumed probability, or 
 one topical argument, pursues that till it has led the mind 
 quite out of sight of the thing under consideration, and, 
 forcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there 
 entangled perhaps, and as it were manacled, in the chain of 
 syllogisms, without allowing it the liberty, much less afford- 
 ing it the helps, requisite to show on which side, all things 
 considered, is the greater probability. 
 
 6. Serves not to increase our knowledge, but fence with it. 
 But let it help us (as perhaps may be said) in convincing men 
 of their errors and mistakes ; (and yet I would fain see the 
 man that was forced out of his opinion by dint of syllogism ;) 
 
OF REASON. 199 
 
 yet still it fails our reason in that part which, if not its 
 highest perfection, is yet certainly its hardest task, and that 
 which we most need its help in ; and that is, the finding out 
 of proofs, and making new discoveries. The rules of syllo- 
 gism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate 
 ideas that may show the connection of remote ones. This 
 way of reasoning discovers no new proofs, but is the art of 
 marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The 
 forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid is very 
 true ; but the discovery of it, I think, not owing to any rules 
 of common logic. A man knows first, and then he is able to 
 prove syllogistically : so that syllogism comes after know- 
 ledge ; and then a man has little or no need of it. But it is 
 chiefly by the finding out those ideas that show the connec- 
 tion of distant ones, that our stock of knowledge is increased, 
 and that useful arts and sciences are advanced. Syllogism, at 
 best, is but the art of fencing with the little knowledge we 
 have, without making any addition to it ; and if a man should 
 employ his reason all this way, he will not do much other- 
 wise than he who, having got some iron out of the bowels of 
 the earth, should have it beaten up all into swords, and put 
 it into his servants' hands to fence with and bang one another. 
 Had the king of Spain employed the hands of his people and his 
 Spanish iron so, he had brought to light but little of that trea- 
 sure that lay so long hid in the dark entrails of America. And 
 I am apt to think, that he who shall employ all the force of his 
 reason only in brandishing of syllogisms, will discover very 
 little of that mass of knowledge which lies yet concealed in 
 the secret recesses of nature ; and which I am apt to think, 
 native rustic reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to 
 open a way to and add to the common stock of mankind, 
 rather than any scholastic proceeding by the strict rules of 
 mode and figure. 
 
 7. Other helps should be sought. I doubt not, nevertheless, 
 but there are ways to be found to assist our reason in this 
 most useful part ; and this the judicious Hooker encourages 
 me to say, who, in his Eccl. Pol., lib. i. sec. 6, speaks thus: 
 " If there might be added the right helps of true art and 
 
200 OF REASON. 
 
 learning (which helps, I must plainly confess, this age of the 
 world, carrying the name of a learned age, doth neither much 
 know nor generally regard), there would undoubtedly be 
 almost as muc|: Difference in maturity of judgment between 
 men therewith ^Aured, and that which now men are, as be- 
 tween men that are now and innocents." I do not pretend 
 to have found or discovered here any of those right helps of 
 art this great man of deep thought mentions: but this is 
 plain, that syllogism, and the logic now in use, which were 
 as well known in his days, can be none of those he means. 
 It is sufficient for me, if by a discourse, perhaps something 
 out of the way (I am sure, as to me, wholly new and un- 
 borrowed), I shall have given occasion to others to cast about 
 for new discoveries, and to seek in their own thoughts for 
 those right helps of art which will scarce be found, I fear, by 
 those who servilely confine themselves to the rules and dic- 
 tates of others ; for beaten tracks lead these sort of cattle (as 
 an observing Roman calls them), whose thoughts reach only 
 to imitation, non quo eundum est y sed quo ttur.* But I can 
 be bold to say, that this age is adorned with some men of 
 that strength of judgment and largeness of comprehension, 
 that, if they would employ their thoughts on this subject, 
 could open new and undiscovered ways to the advancement of 
 knowledge. 
 
 8. We reason about particulars. Having here had an occa- 
 sion to speak of syllogism in general, and the use of it in 
 reasoning and the improvement of our knowledge, it is fit, 
 before I leave this subject, to take notice of one manifest 
 mistake in the rules of syllogism; viz., " that no syllogistical 
 reasoning can be right and conclusive but what has, at least, 
 one general proposition in it ; " as if we could not reason and 
 have knowledge about particulars : whereas, in truth, the 
 matter rightly considered, the immediate object of all our 
 reasoning and knowledge is nothing but particulars. Every 
 man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas exist- 
 ing in his own mind, which are truly, every one of them, 
 
 * " Not where the thing sought is to be found, but wherever the road may 
 happen to lead them." ED. 
 

 OF KEASON. 201 
 
 particular existences;* and our knowledge and reasoning 
 about other things is only as they correspond with those our 
 particular ideas. So that the perception of the agreement or 
 disagreement of our particular ideas is the w e and utmost 
 of all our knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, 
 and consists only in this, that the particular ideas about 
 which it is are such as more than one particular thing can 
 correspond with and be represented by. But the perception 
 of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, and con- 
 sequently our knowledge, is equally clear and certain, whether 
 either, or both, or neither of those ideas be capable of re- 
 presenting more real beings than one, or no. One thing more 
 I crave leave to offer about syllogism before I leave it, viz., 
 May one not upon just ground inquire whether the form 
 syllogism now has, is that which in reason it ought to have ? 
 Eor, the medius terminus being to join the extremes, i. e., 
 the intermediate ideas by its intervention, to show the agree- 
 ment or disagreement of the two in question, would not the 
 position of the medius terminus be more natural, and show the 
 agreement or disagreement of the extremes clearer and better, 
 if it were placed in the middle between them ? which might 
 be easily done by transposing the propositions, and making the 
 medius terminus the predicate of the first, and the subject of 
 the second. As thus : 
 
 Omnis homo est animal, 
 Omne animal est vivens ; 
 Ergo omnis homo est vivens. 
 
 Omne corpus est extensum et solidum, 
 Nullum extensum et solidum est pur a extensio ; 
 Ergo corpus non est pur a extensio. ,f 
 
 * As being a tertium quid, distinct both from external objects and from 
 mind. ED. 
 
 t " Every man is an animal, 
 Every animal is living ; 
 Therefore every man is living. 
 
 " All body is extended and solid, 
 
 Nothing extended and solid is pure extension (i. e. space) ; 
 Therefore body is not space." 
 
 Here Locke has fallen into the common error of supposing that logic 
 insists upon some special arrangement of the premisses in a syllogism.- -ED. 
 K 3 
 
202 OF REASON. 
 
 I need not trouble my reader with instances in syllogisms 
 whose conclusions are particular, The same reason holds for 
 the same form in them as well as in the general. 
 
 9. Reason, though it penetrates into the depths of the sea 
 and earth, elevates our thoughts as high as the stars, and 
 leads us through the vast spaces and large rooms of this 
 mighty fabric, yet it comes far short of the real extent of 
 even corporeal being ; and there are many instances wherein 
 it fails us : as, 
 
 First, Reason fails us for want of ideas. First, It perfectly 
 fails us where our ideas fail. It neither does nor can extend 
 itself farther than they do. And therefore, wherever we 
 have no ideas, our reasoning stops, and we are at an end of 
 our reckoning : and if at any time we reason about words 
 which do not stand for any ideas, it is only about those 
 sounds and nothing else. 
 
 10. Secondly, Because of obscure and imperfect ideas. 
 Secondly, Our reason is often puzzled and at a loss, because 
 of the obscurity, confusion, or imperfection of the ideas it is 
 employed about; and there we are involved in difficulties and 
 contradictions. Thus, not having any perfect idea of the 
 least extension of matter nor of infinity, we are at a loss 
 about the divisibility of matter ; but having perfect, clear, 
 and distinct ideas of number, our reason meets with none of 
 those inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself in- 
 volved in any contradictions about them. Thus we, having 
 but imperfect ideas of the operations of our minds, and of the 
 beginning of motion or thought, how the mind produces 
 either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet of the opera- 
 tion of God, run into great difficulties about free created 
 agents, which reason cannot well extricate itself out of. 
 
 11. Thirdly, For want of intermediate ideas. Thirdly, 
 Our reason is often at a stand, because it perceives not those 
 ideas which could serve to show the certain or probable agree- 
 ment or disagreement of any two other ideas : and in this some 
 men's faculties far outgo others. Till algebra, that great instru- 
 ment and instance of human sagacity, was discovered, men 
 
OF REASON. 203 
 
 with amazement looked on several of the demonstrations of 
 ancient mathematicians, and could scarce forbear to think the 
 finding several of those proofs to be something more than 
 human. 
 
 12. Fourthly, Because of wrong principles. Fourthly, The 
 mind, by proceeding upon false principles, is often engaged 
 in absurdities and difficulties, brought into straits and con- 
 tradictions without knowing how to free itself : and in that 
 case it is in vain to implore the help of reason, unless it be 
 to discover the falsehood, and reject the influence of those 
 wrong principles. Reason is so far from clearing the diffi- 
 culties which the building upon false foundations brings a 
 man into, that, if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more, 
 and engages him deeper in perplexities. 
 
 13. Fifthly, Because of doubtful terms. Fifthly, As obscure 
 and imperfect ideas often involve our reason, so, upon the 
 same ground, do dubious words and uncertain signs often, in 
 discourses and arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle 
 men's reason, and bring them to a nonplus : but these two 
 latter are our fault, and not the fault of reason. But yet the 
 consequences of them are nevertheless obvious ; and the per- 
 plexities or errors they fill men's minds with are everywhere 
 observable. 
 
 14. Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive, without 
 reasoning. Some of the ideas that are in the mind, are so 
 there that they can be by themselves immediately compared 
 one with another : and in these the mind is able to perceive 
 that they agree or disagree as clearly as that it has them. 
 Thus the mind perceives that an arch of a circle is less than 
 the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a circle : 
 and this therefore, as has been said, I call " intuitive know- 
 ledge," which is certain beyond all doubt, and needs no pro- 
 bation,* nor can have any ; this being the highest of all 
 human certainty. In this consists the evidence of all those 
 maxims which nobody has any doubt about, but every man 
 (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be true, as 
 
 * Vide supra, note on " Intuition." ED. 
 
204 OF REASON. 
 
 soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding. In the 
 discovery of and assent to these truths, there is no use of the 
 discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are known 
 by a superior and higher degree of evidence. And such, if I 
 may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think that angels 
 have now, and the spirits of just men made perfect shall have 
 in a future state, of thousands of things which now either 
 wholly escape our apprehensions, or which our short-sighted 
 reason has got some faint glimpse of, we in the dark grope after. 
 
 15. The next is demonstration by reasoning. Eut though 
 we have here and there a little of this clear light, some sparks 
 of bright knowledge ; yet the greatest part of our ideas are 
 such, that we cannot discern their agreement or disagreement 
 by an immediate comparing them. And in all these we have 
 need of reasoning, and must, by discourse and inference, make 
 our discoveries. Now, of these there are two sorts, which I 
 shall take the liberty to mention here again. 
 
 First, Those whose agreement or disagreement, though it 
 cajmoTTbe seen by an immediate putting them together, yet 
 may be examined by the intervention of other ideas which 
 can be compared with them. In this case, when the agree- 
 ment or disagreement of the intermediate idea, on both sides, 
 with those which we would compare, is plainly discerned, 
 there it amounts to demonstration, whereby knowledge is 
 produced ; which though it be certain, yet it is not so easy 
 nor altogether so clear as intuitive knowledge ; because in that 
 there is barely one simple intuition, wherein there is no room 
 for any the least mistake or doubt ; the truth is seen all per- 
 fectly at once. In demonstration, it is true, there is intuition 
 too, but not altogether at once : for there must be a remem- 
 brance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium or 
 intermediate idea with that we compared it with before, when 
 we compare it with the other ; and when there be many 
 mediums, there the danger of the mistake is the greater. 
 For, each agreement or disagreement of the ideas must be 
 observed, and seen in each step of the whole train, and re- 
 taiaed in the memory just as it is, and the mind must be sure 
 
OF REASON. 205 
 
 that no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstra- 
 tion is omitted or overlooked. This makes some demonstra- 
 tions long and perplexed, and too hard for those who have not 
 strength of parts distinctly to perceive and exactly carry so 
 many particulars orderly in their heads. And even those who 
 are able to master such intricate speculations are fain some- 
 times to go over them again, and there is need of more than 
 one review before they can arrive at certainty. But yet, 
 where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had of the 
 agreement of any idea with another, and that with a third, 
 and that with a fourth, &c., there the agreement of the first 
 and the fourth is a demonstration, and produces certain know- 
 ledge, which may be called " rational knowledge," as the 
 other is " intuitive . ' ' 
 
 16. To supply the narrowness of this, we have nothing 
 but judgment upon probable reasoning. (Secondly, There are 
 other ideas whose agreement or disagreement can no other- 
 wise be judged of, but by the intervention of others which 
 have not a certain agreement with the extremes, but an usual 
 or likely one : and in these it is that the judgment is pro- 
 perly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the mind that 
 any ideas do agree by comparing them with such probable 
 mediums. This, though it never amounts to knowledge, no, 
 not to that which is the lowest degree of it ; yet sometimes 
 the intermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together, 
 and the probability is so clear and strong, that assent as 
 necessarily follows it as knowledge does demonstration. The 
 great excellency and use of the judgment is to observe right, 
 and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each pro- 
 bability ; and then casting them up all right together, choose 
 that side which has the over-balance. 
 
 17. Intuition, demonstration, judgment. Intuitive know- 
 ledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagree- 
 ment of two ideas immediately compared together. 
 
 Rational knowledge is the perception of the certain agree- 
 ment or disagreement of any two ideas by the intervention of 
 one or more other ideas. 
 
206 OF REASON. 
 
 Judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or 
 disagree by the intervention of one or more ideas whose 
 certain agreement or disagreement with them it does not per- 
 ceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual. 
 
 18. Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas. 
 Though the deducing one proposition from another, or making 
 inferences in words, be a great part of reason, and that which 
 it is usually employed about : yet the principal act of ratio- 
 cination is the finding the agreement or disagreement of two 
 ideas one with another by the intervention of a third : as a 
 man by a yard finds two houses to be of the same length, 
 which could not be brought together to measure their equa- 
 lity by juxtaposition. Words have their consequences as the 
 signs of such ideas : and things agree or disagree as really 
 they are ; but we observe it only by our ideas. 
 
 19. Four sorts of arguments. Before we quit this subject, 
 it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four sorts of 
 arguments that men in their reasonings with others do ordi- 
 narily make use of to prevail on their assent ; or, at least, so 
 to awe them as to silence their opposition. 
 
 First, Ad verecundiam. First, The first is, to allege the 
 opinions of men whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or 
 some other cause, has gained a name and settled their reputa- 
 tion in the common esteem with some kind of authority. 
 When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is 
 thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way 
 from it, and question the authority of men who are in posses- 
 sion of it. This is apt to be censured as carrying with it too 
 much of pride, when a man does not readily yield to the de- 
 termination of approved authors, which is wont to be received 
 with respect and submission by others : and it is looked upon 
 as insolence for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion 
 against the current stream of antiquity, or to put it in the 
 balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise ap- 
 proved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authori- 
 ties, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready 
 to style it " impudence" in anyone who shall stand out 
 

 OF REASON. 207 
 
 I 
 
 against them. This I think may be called argumentum ad 
 verecundiam. 
 
 20. Secondly, Ad ignorantiam. Secondly, Another way 
 that men ordinarily use to drive others, and force them to 
 submit their judgments and receive the opinion in debate, is to 
 require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof, or 
 to assign a better. And this I call argumentum ad ignoran- 
 tiam. 
 
 21. Thirdly, Ad hominem. Thirdly, A third way is to 
 press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles 
 or concessions. This is already known under the name of 
 argumentum ad hominem. 
 
 22. Fourthly, Ad judicium. Fourthly, The fourth is the 
 using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of know- 
 ledge or probability. This I call argumentum ad judicium. 
 This alone of all the four brings true instruction with it, and 
 advances us in our way to knowledge. For, (1) It argues 
 not another man's opinion to be right, because I, out of 
 respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, 
 will not contradict him. (2.) It proves not another man to 
 be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with 
 him, because I know not a better. (3.) Nor does it follow 
 that another man is in the right way because he has shown me 
 that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore 
 not oppose another man's persuasion ; I maybe ignorant, and 
 not be able to produce a better ; I may be in an error, and 
 another may show me that I am so. This may dispose me 
 perhaps for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it ; 
 that must come from proofs and arguments, and light arising 
 from the nature of things themselves, and not from my shame- 
 facedness, ignorance, or error. 
 
 23. Above, contrary, and according to reason. By what has 
 been before said of reason, we may be able to make some 
 guess at the distinction of things, into those that are according 
 to, above, and contrary to reason. (1.) " According to rea- 
 son " are such propositions whose truth we can discover by 
 examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation 
 
208 OF REASON. 
 
 and reflection, and by natural deduction find to be true or 
 probable. (2.) "Above reason" are such propositions whose 
 truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those 
 principles. (3.) " Contrary to reason" are such propositions 
 as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and dis- 
 tinct ideas. Thus the existence of one God is according to 
 reason ; the existence of more than one God is contrary to 
 reason ; the resurrection of the dead above reason. Farther : 
 as " above reason" maybe taken in a double sense, viz., 
 either as signifying above probability, or above certainty, so 
 in that large sense also, " contrary to reason " is, I suppose, 
 sometimes taken. 
 
 24. Reason and faith not opposite. There is another use 
 of the word " reason," wherein it is opposed to faith; which, 
 though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yet 
 common use has so authorized it, that it would be folly either 
 to oppose or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be 
 amiss to take notice, that, however faith be opposed to reason, 
 faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind ; which, if it 
 be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything 
 but upon good reason, and so cannot be opposite to it. He 
 that believes, without having any reason for believing, may 
 be in love with his own fancies ; but neither seeks truth as 
 he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who 
 would have him use those discerning faculties He has given 
 him to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does not 
 this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on 
 truth, is in the right but by chance ; and I know not whether 
 the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of 
 his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be ac- 
 countable for whatever mistakes he runs into ; whereas he 
 that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, 
 and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and 
 abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his duty 
 as a rational creature, that though he should miss truth, he 
 will not miss the reward of it; for he governs his assent 
 right, and places it as he should, who in any case or matter 
 
NOTE ON THE SYLLOGISM. 209 
 
 whatsoever believes or disbelieves according a& reason directs 
 him. He that does otherwise, transgresses against his own 
 light, and misuses those faculties which were given him to 
 no other end but to search and follow the clearer evidence 
 and greater probability. But since reason and faith are by 
 some men opposed, we will so consider them in the following 
 chapter. 
 
 NOTE ON THE SYLLOGISM. 
 
 An erroneous system, like a mist, is productive of much distor- 
 tion in the appearance of every fact which it apprehends. It will, 
 therefore, excite no surprise to find that Locke, in the preceding 
 article, is but combating a phantom, or, at best, a very false repre- 
 sentation of syllogism as it really exists ; and that such is the case 
 may, I think, be proved in the following manner : 
 
 Logic takes cognizance of two things of the process of thought 
 as existing in the mind j and of the manner iu which this process 
 may be verbally expressed. Against this it will possibly be urged 
 that no mental science can be conversant about mere words } but, 
 in reply, I would point out that, as words are the record of thought 
 for all purposes not purely individual, so any science which has 
 thought for its subject-matter must attend to the manner and 
 style, so to speak, of this record. Accordingly, in logic we find 
 two great divisions, thought and words; each of these being 
 subdivided into form and matter. But with regard to these latter 
 heads, matter meets with little more notice than that which is 
 implied iu a bare recognition of its existence ; while form, on the 
 contrary, is subjected to a complete and exhaustive analysis. 
 Thus, finally, we arrive at a clear notion of logical science ; that is 
 to say, we see that it deals with the forms iu which all thought 
 must exist, and with the forms in which all record of such thought 
 must be made. 
 
 The conclusion from this is easy, nay, irresistible ; and, had not 
 Locke been doubly blinded, both by the vices of his own system, 
 and by his complete misapprehension of the scholastic philosophy 
 he must, indubitably, have perceived it. The fact, then, is, that 
 syllogism has a twofold nature, corresponding to the divisions of 
 logic above mentioned ; that it is a form of words indicating a 
 certain arrangement of terms or notions ; and that it is, by virtue 
 of its being such an arrangement, a record and expression of a 
 certain form which thought must assume in order to become intel- 
 ligible and consequential. Locke, however, looked upon it from 
 the former point of view alone $ and, not conceiving the existence 
 
r 
 
 210 OF FAITH AND REASON, 
 
 of any laws of thought, he took it to be a mere arbitrary colloca- 
 tion of ideas which had, and could have no universal authority. 
 He was, therefore, merely consistent in his error, when he devoted 
 page after page to a repudiation of all claims on the part of syllo- 
 gism to any share in the throne of reason. At the same time, 
 his powerful intellect could not fail to obtain some slight 
 and partial glimpses of the truth through the fog of his errant 
 psychology; and, accordingly, we find him in one place ( 4) 
 saying, " I readily own that all right reasoning may be reduced to 
 . . . forms of syllogism." Here was a very near approach to the 
 truth ; and, had he not been shackled in his researches, this clue 
 must have led him to an opinion in accordance with the facts of 
 the case. 
 
 It is by no means necessary to enter into a detailed refutation of 
 Locke's arguments against syllogism, since they all hinge upon the 
 radical misconception which" has been here pointed out. 
 
 OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT 
 PROVINCES. 
 
 1. Necessary to know their boundaries. It has been above 
 shown, (1) That we are of necessity ignorant, and want 
 knowledge of all sorts where we want ideas. (2.) That we 
 are ignorant, and want rational knowledge where we want 
 proofs. (3.) That we want general knowledge and certainty 
 as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas. (4.) 
 That we want probability to direct our assent in matters 
 where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony 
 of other men to bottom our reason upon. 
 
 From these things thus premised, I think we may come to 
 lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and 
 reason ; the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, 
 if not of great disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and 
 perhaps mistakes, in the world : for till it be resolved how 
 far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we 
 shall in vain dispute and endeavour to convince one another 
 in matters of religion. 
 
 2. faith and reason what, as contradistinguished. I find 
 every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly ; 
 
AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES. 211 
 
 and, where it fails them, they cry out, "It is matter of faith, 
 and above reason." And I do not see how they can argue 
 with any one, or ever convince a gainsayer, who makes use of 
 the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between 
 faith and reason, which ought to be the first point established 
 in all questions where faith has anything to do. 
 
 Reason therefore here, as contradistinguished to faith, I 
 take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such 
 propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction 
 made from such ideas which it has got by the use of its natural 
 faculties, viz., by sensation or reflection. 
 
 Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, 
 not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the 
 credit of the proposer, as coming from God in some extraor- 
 dinary way of communication. This way of discovering 
 truths to men we call " revelation." 
 
 3. No new simple idea can le conveyed ly traditional revela- 
 tion. "First, then, I say, that no man inspired by God can, 
 by any revelation, communicate to others any new simple 
 ideas which they had not before from sensation or reflection : 
 for, whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the 
 immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new simple 
 ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words or any 
 other signs ; because words, by their immediate operation on 
 us, cause no other ideas but of their natural sounds ; and it is 
 by the custom of using them for signs that they excite and 
 revive in our minds latent ideas, but yet only such ideas as 
 were there before. Eor, words seen or heard recall to our 
 thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been wont to 
 be signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new and 
 formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in all other 
 signs, which cannot signify to us things of which we have 
 before never had any idea at all. 
 
 Thus, whatever things were discovered to St. Paul when 
 he was rapt up into the third heaven, whatever new ideas his 
 mind there received, all the description he can make to others 
 of that place is only this, that there are such things as " eye 
 hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the 
 
212 OF FAITH AND REASON, 
 
 heart of man to conceive." And supposing God should dis- 
 cover to any one, supernaturally, a species of creatures in- 
 habiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn (for that it is possible 
 there may be such, nobody can deny), which had six senses, 
 and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that 
 sixth sense, he could no more by words produce in the minds 
 of other men those ideas imprinted by that sixth sense, than 
 one of us could convey the idea of any colour by the sounds of 
 words into a man who, having the other four senses perfect, 
 had always totally wanted the fifth of seeing. For our simple 
 ideas, then, which are the foundation and sole matter of all 
 our notions and knowledge, we must depend wholly on our 
 reason, I mean, our natural faculties, and can by no means 
 receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation ; I 
 say, " traditional revelation," in distinction to original revela- 
 tion. By the one I mean that first impression which is made 
 immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we 
 cannot set any bounds ; and by the other, those impressions 
 delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of 
 conveying our conceptions one to another. 
 
 4. Traditional revelation may make us know propositions know- 
 able also by reason, but not with the same certainty that reason 
 doth. Secondly, I say, that the same truths may be discovered 
 and conveyed down from revelation, which are discoverable 
 to us by reason and by those ideas we naturally may have. 
 So God might, by revelation, discover the truth of any pro- 
 position in Euclid ; as well as men, by the natural use of their 
 faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all 
 things of this kind there is little need or use of revelation, God 
 having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at 
 the knowledge of them. For, whatsoever truth we come to 
 the clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation 
 of our own ideas, will always be certainer to us than those 
 which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation : for the 
 knowledge we have that this revelation came at first from God, 
 cjin never be so sure as the knowledge we have from the clear 
 and distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of 
 our own ideas : v.g., if it were revealed some ages since, that 
 
AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES. 213 
 
 the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I 
 might assent to the truth of that proposition upon the credit 
 of the tradition that it was revealed : but that would never 
 amount to so great a certainty as the knowledge of it upon 
 the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles, 
 and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter- 
 of-fact, knowable by our senses : v. g., the history of the deluge 
 is conveyed to us by writings which had their original from 
 revelation ; and yet nobody, I think, will say he has as cer- 
 tain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah, that saw it, 
 or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive and 
 seen it. Tor he has no greater an assurance than that of his 
 senses, that it is writ in the book supposed writ by Moses in- 
 spired ; but he has not so great an assurance that Moses writ 
 that book as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assur- 
 ance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance of 
 his senses. 
 
 5. Revelation cannot le admitted against the dear evidence of 
 reason. In propositions, then, whose certainty is built upon 
 the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our 
 ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in self- 
 evident propositions, or by evident deductions of reason in 
 demonstrations, we need not the assistance of revelation as 
 necessary to gain our assent and introduce them into our minds ; 
 because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there, 
 or had done it already, which is the greatest assurance we can 
 possibly have of anything, unless where God immediately reveals 
 it to us ; and there too our assurance can be no greater than 
 our knowledge is, that it is a revelation from God. But yet 
 nothing, I think, can under that title shake or overrule plain 
 knowledge, or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for 
 true, in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own 
 understanding : for, since no evidence of our faculties by 
 which we receive such revelations can exceed, if equal, the 
 certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for 
 a truth anything that is directly contrary to our clear and dis- 
 tinct knowledge : v. g., the ideas of one body and one place do 
 so clearly agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of 
 
214 OF FAITH AND REASON, 
 
 their agreement, that we can never assent to a proposition that 
 affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once, how- 
 ever it should pretend to the authority of a Divine revelation : 
 since the evidence, first, that we deceive not ourselves in 
 ascribing it to God, secondly, that we understand it right, can 
 never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive know- 
 ledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to 
 be in two places at once. And therefore no proposition can 
 be received for Divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to 
 all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge, 
 because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations 
 of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever : and there 
 would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no 
 measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful 
 propositions shall take place before self-evident, and what we 
 certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken 
 in. In propositions, therefore, contrary to the clear percep- 
 tion of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it 
 will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot 
 move our assent under that or any other title whatsoever : for 
 faith can never convince us of anything that contradicts our 
 knowledge, because, though faith be founded on the testimony 
 of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us, yet 
 we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a Divine 
 revelation greater than our own knowledge ; since the whole 
 strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that 
 God revealed it, which, in this case, where the proposition 
 supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will 
 always have this objection hanging to it, viz., that we cannot 
 tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful 
 Author of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn 
 all the principles and foundations of knowledge He has given 
 us ; render all our faculties useless ; wholly destroy the most 
 excellent part of His workmanship, our understandings ; and 
 put a man in a condition wherein he will have less light, less 
 conduct, than the beast that perisheth. For if the mind of 
 man can never have a clearer, and perhaps not so clear, evidence 
 of anything to be a Divine revelation as it has of the principles 
 
AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES. 215 
 
 of its own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear 
 evidence of its reason, to give place to a proposition whose 
 revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles 
 have. 
 
 6. Traditional revelation much less. Thus far a man has use 
 of reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and 
 original revelation, where it is supposed to he made to himself: 
 but to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but 
 are required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths re- 
 vealed to others, which, by the tradition of writings or word 
 of mouth, are conveyed down to them, reason has a great deal 
 more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive 
 them. For, matter of faith being only Divine revelation and 
 nothing else, faith (as we use the word, called commonly 
 " divine faith") has to do with no propositions but those 
 which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not 
 see how those who make revelation alone the sole object of faith 
 can say that it is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe 
 that such or such a proposition, to be found in such or such a 
 book, is of Divine inspiration ; unless it be revealed that that 
 proposition, or all in that book, was communicated by Divine 
 inspiration. Without such a revelation, the believing or not 
 believing that proposition or book to be of Divine authority 
 can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason ; and such 
 as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason, 
 which can never require or enable me to believe that which is 
 contrary to itself : it being impossible for reason ever to pro- 
 cure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable. 
 
 In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from 
 our ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have above 
 mentioned, reason is the proper judge ; and revelation, though 
 it may, in consenting with it, confirm its dictates, yet cannot 
 in such cases invalidate its decrees : nor can we be obliged, 
 where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to 
 quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is 
 matter of faith ; which can have no authority against the plain 
 and clear dictates of reason. 
 
 7. Things above reason. But, Thirdly, there being many 
 
216 OF FAITH AND REASON, 
 
 things wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all ; 
 and other things, of whose past, present, or future existence, 
 by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge 
 at all : these as being beyond the discovery of our natural 
 faculties and above reason, are, when revealed, the proper 
 matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against 
 God, and thereby lost their first happy state : and that the 
 dead shall rise, and live again: these, and the like, being 
 beyond the discovery of reason, are purely matters of faith, 
 with which reason has, directly, nothing to do. 
 
 8. Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith. 
 Eut since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not there- 
 by tied up His own hands from affording us, when he thinks 
 fit, the light of revelation in any of those matters wherein our 
 natural faculties are able to give a probable determination, 
 revelation, where God has been pleased to give it, must carry 
 it against the probable conjectures of reason ; because the 
 mind, not being certain of the truth of that it does not evi- 
 dently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears 
 in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony, which, 
 it is satisfied, comes from One who cannot err, and will not 
 deceive. Eut yet it still belongs to reason to judge of the 
 truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the 
 words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if anything shall be 
 thought revelation which is contrary to the plain principles of 
 reason and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own 
 clear and distinct ideas, there reason must be hearkened to as 
 to a matter within its province : since a man can never have 
 so certain a knowledge that a proposition, which contradicts 
 the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge, was 
 divinely revealed, or that he understands the words rightly 
 wherein it is delivered, as he has that the contrary is true ; 
 and so is bound to consider and judge of it as a matter of 
 reason, and not swallow it, without examination, as a matter 
 of faith. 
 
 9. Revelation, in matters where reason cannot judge, or but 
 probably, ought to be hearkened to. First, "Whatever proposi- 
 tion is revealed, of whose truth our mind, by its natural 
 
AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES. 217 
 
 faculties and notions, cannot judge, that is purely matter of 
 faith, and above reason. 
 
 Secondly, All propositions whereof the mind, by the use of 
 its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge, from 
 naturally acquired ideas, are matter of reason ; with this 
 difference still, that in those concerning which it has but an 
 uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded of their truth only 
 upon probable grounds, which still admit a possibility of the 
 contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain 
 evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles 
 of all reason ; in such probable propositions, I say, an evident 
 revelation ought to determine our assent even against proba- 
 bility. For where the principles of reason have not evidenced 
 a proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear revela- 
 tion, as another principle of truth and ground of assent, may 
 determine ; and so it may be matter of faith, and be also 
 above reason, because reason, in that particular matter, being 
 able to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the deter- 
 mination where reason came short, and revelation discovered 
 on which side the truth lay. 
 
 10. In matters where reason can afford certain knowledge, 
 that is to le hearkened to. Thus far the dominion of faith 
 reaches, and that without any violence or hinderance to 
 reason; which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and 
 improved, by new discoveries of truth, coming from the 
 eternal Fountain of all knowledge. "Whatever God hath 
 revealed is certainly true : no doubt can be made of it. This 
 is the proper object of faith : but whether it be a Divine 
 revelation or no, reason must judge ; which can never permit 
 the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less 
 evident, nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to 
 knowledge and certainty. There can be no evidence that any 
 traditional revelation is of Divine original, in the words we 
 receive it, and in the sense we understand it, so clear and so 
 certain as that of the principles of reason : and therefore 
 nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear 
 and self-evident dictates of reason has a right to be urged or 
 
 L 
 
218 OF FAITH AND REASON. 
 
 assented to as a matter of faith, wherein reason hath nothing to 
 do. Whatsoever is Divine revelation ought to overrule all our 
 opinions, prejudices, and interests, and hath a right to be 
 received with full assent : such a submission as this of our 
 reason to faith takes not away the landmarks of knowledge ; 
 this shakes not the foundations of reason, but leaves us that 
 use of our faculties for which they were given us. 
 
 11. If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no 
 enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion can be contradicted. If 
 the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these 
 boundaries, there will, in matter of religion, be no room for 
 reason at all ; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies 
 that are to be found in the several religions of the world will 
 not deserve to be blamed ; for to this crying up of faith in 
 opposition to reason, we may, I think, in good measure, 
 ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions which 
 possess and divide mankind. For men having been principled 
 with an opinion that they must not consult reason in the 
 things of religion, however apparently contradictory to com- 
 mon sense and the very principles of all their knowledge, have 
 let loose their fancies and natural superstition ; and have 
 been by them led into so strange opinions and extravagant 
 practices in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand 
 amazed at their follies, and judge them so far from being 
 acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid 
 thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober, good man. 
 So that, in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us 
 from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us as 
 rational creatures above brutes, is that wherein men often 
 appear most irrational, and more senseless than beasts them- 
 selves. Credo quia impossibile est, "I believe because it is 
 impossible," might, in a good man, pass for a sally of zeal, but 
 would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions 
 or religion by. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Absolutists, 66. 
 
 Actions, cannot be tiie same in different 
 
 times or places, 71. 
 
 Adequate ideas, none of species of sub- 
 stances, 177. 
 Arguments, ad verecundiam, 206 ; ad 
 
 ignprantiam, 207 ; ad hominem, 207 ; 
 
 ad judicium, 207. 
 Aristotle, 64. 
 
 Arithmetic, use of cyphers in, 171. 
 Assent to maxims, 10, 15; a mark of 
 
 self-evidence, 17 ; but not of innate, 39. 
 Atheism, 30. 
 Atom, what, 71. 
 Belief, when without reason is against 
 
 our duty, 208. 
 Berkeley, 65. 
 Best, in our opinion, not a rule of God's 
 
 actions, 34. 
 Buffier, 92. 
 Butler, 92. 
 
 Certainty, depends on intuition, 151. 
 
 Chronological view of philosophical sys- 
 tems, 64. 
 
 Common-sense philosophy, 4. 
 
 Condillac, 4. 
 
 Consciousness, makes the same person, 
 77, 83 ; probably annexed to the same 
 individual immaterial substance, 88 ; 
 necessary to thinking, 52, 53, 59; what, 
 59. 
 
 Cosmothetic idealists, 66. 
 
 Cousin, 5, 92, 150. 
 
 Democntus, 64. 
 
 Demonstration, what, 153, 204 ; not so 
 clear as intuition, 153, 154 ; intuitive 
 knowledge necessary in each step of, 
 154. 
 
 Descartes, 65 ; his doctrine of innate 
 ideas, 46. 
 
 Disputes, are they merely verbal? 150; 
 their multiplicity owing to the abuse of 
 words, 125 ; are most about the signifi- 
 cation of words, 137. 
 
 Disputing, art of, prejudicial to know- 
 ledge, *114 ; destroys the use of lan- 
 guage, 116. 
 
 Diversity and identity, 69. 
 
 Dreaming, 55 ; seldom in some men, 56. 
 
 Dreams, for the most part irrational, 57 ; 
 contain no ideas but of sensation or 
 reflection, 58. 
 
 Epicurus, 64. 
 
 Faith and reason, 210 ; not opposite to 
 reason, 208 ; as contradistinguished 
 from reason, 210 ; cannot convince us 
 
 in opposition to reason, 213; its matter 
 can only be Divine revelation, 217 ; and 
 is only that which is above reason, 217. 
 Fichte, 4. 
 
 Gassendi, 3. 
 
 God, the idea of, not innate, 29 ; His exis- 
 tence obvious to reason, 31 ; the notion 
 of, likeliest to spread and continue, 32 ; 
 the idea of, late and imperfect, 3537 ; 
 best notions of, got by thought and 
 application, 36 ; His Being certain, 
 37, 43. 
 
 Hume, 4, 65. 
 
 Hypotheses, are to be built on matter of 
 fact, 53. 
 
 Idealists, 66. 
 
 Ideas, in general, 59; their original in 
 children, 27, 35, 61 ; none innate, 38, 
 39 ; are what the mind is employed 
 about in thinking, 47 ; all from sensa- 
 tion or reflection, 48, 62; the way of 
 getting them observable in children, 
 50; of reflection got late and negli- 
 gently, 51 ; that we are incapable of, 
 174; that we cannot attain, 175, 176; 
 particular, are first in the mind, 99 ; 
 different in different men, 102. 
 
 Identity, of a plant, 72 ; of animals, 73 ; of 
 a man, 73, 74 ; and diversity, 69 ; per- 
 sonal, Locke's theory of, discussed, 92 ; 
 not always made by unity of substance, 
 74 ; depends on same consciousness, 
 77 ; is made by continued existence, 91. 
 
 Ignorance, our, infinitely exceeds our 
 knowledge, 173; causes of, 173, 175, 
 181. 
 
 Illation, what, 187. 
 
 Imperfection, of words, 95. 
 
 Impossibility, not an innate idea, 27. 
 
 Impression, on the mind, what, 7. 
 
 Incompatibility, how far knowable, 166. -- 
 
 Individuationis principium, is existence, 
 
 Innate ideas, Cartesian doctrine of, 46. 
 
 Innate notions, 6. 
 
 Innate principles, the doctrine of, has ill 
 
 consequences, 45. 
 Innate truths, the first known, 23. 
 Intuition, 182. 
 Intuitive knowledge, 151 ; our highest 
 
 certainty, 203. 
 
 Jouffroy, 5. 
 
 Kant, 4, 66. 
 
 Knowledge, Locke's theory concerning, 
 183; Cousin's argument against, 184* 
 
220 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Cousin's argument against, rejoinder 
 to, 185 ; has great connection with 
 words, 127; depends mainly on our 
 senses, 146 ; its beginning and progress, 
 13, 14 ; to be got only by the employ- 
 ment of our own mind, 44 ; human, 
 extent of, 158 ; certain and universal 
 where to be had, 180. 
 
 Language, its imperfections, 95 ; double 
 use of, 95 ; ends of, 126 ; its imperfec- 
 tions, remedies of, 134. 
 
 Laws of thought, 25; dispute between 
 Locke and Leibnitz concerning, 25. 
 
 Learning, its ill state at present, 95 ; of 
 the schools, 114. 
 
 Leibnitz, 4, 65. 
 
 Locke, his essay, analysis of, 1 ; his essay, ! 
 its style, 3 ; his system, resume of 
 arguments by which it has been as- 
 sailed, 66 ; his system, considered his- 
 torically and critically, 63 ; his system, 
 its character and position, 3 ; his sys- 
 tem, statement of, 63 ; his misconcep- 
 tion of die Cartesian doctrines, 46 ; his 
 notion of Logic, 132. 
 
 Logic, has introduced obscurity into lan- 
 guage, 114; has hindered knowledge, 
 115. 
 
 Malcl/ranche, 65. 
 
 Man, the same, what, 86, 91 ; the same, 
 may be in different persons, ?5. 
 
 Idatcriatixtt, 66. 
 
 Matter, what, 104 ; whether it may think 
 is not to be known, 160. 
 
 Maxims, when first known, 10, 14 ; how 
 they gain assent, 18 ; not in the under- 
 standing before they are actually known, 
 
 Mind, is it always consciously active? 68. 
 Morality, capable of demonstration, 142, 
 
 169 ; discourses in, if not clear, die 
 
 fault of die speaker, 142. 
 
 Names, of mixed modes doubtful, 97 ; of 
 substances doubtful, lul ; of simple 
 ideas least doubtful, 107. 
 
 Natural philosophy, not capable of science, 
 177. 
 
 Nihilism, 4. 
 
 Nihilists, 66. 
 
 Obscurity, unavoidable in ancient audiors, 
 100. 
 
 Parrot, mentioned by Sir W. Temple as 
 holding a rational discourse, 75. 
 
 Person, what, 77 ; a forensic term, 89. 
 
 Personal identity, 92 ; Locke's dieory of, 
 discussed, 92. 
 
 Plato, 64. 
 
 Principles, none innate, 6. 
 
 Proofs, 152. 
 
 Qualities, secondary, 164 ; of substances, 
 165 ; of spirits, 168. 
 
 Nationalism, 4. 
 
 Rationalists, 66. 
 
 Realists, 66. j 
 
 Reason, its various significations, 187 ; ill 
 four parts, 188 ; where it i'ails us, 202, 
 as contradistinguished from faith, 210. 
 
 Reflection, 49. 
 
 Reid, 4, 65, 92. 
 
 Remembrance, what, 39. 
 
 Revelation, traditional, cannot convey 
 new simple ideas, 211 ; not so sure a* 
 our reason or senses, 212 ; cannot over> 
 rule our clear knowledge, 217 ; should 
 overrule probabilities of reason, 216. 
 
 Rhetoric, an art of deceiving, 130. 
 
 Royer-Collard, 5. 
 
 Sagacity, 153. 
 
 Same, 91. 
 
 Scepticism, 4. 
 
 Schelling, 66. 
 
 Schoolmen, the, 131 ; their system, 64. 
 
 Schools, wherein faulty, 114. 
 
 Science, none of natural bodies, 177. 
 
 Scripture, interpretation of, 110. 
 
 Self, what makes it, 85, 87. 
 
 Sensation, 48. 
 
 Sensitive knowledge, 
 
 Sensualism, 4. 
 
 Sensualists, 66. 
 
 Serjeant, 3, 92. 
 
 Soul, thinks not always, 52 ; its immate- 
 riality we know not, 161. 
 
 Species, 123. 
 
 Spirits, their operation on bodies not con- 
 ceivable, 179 ; what knowledge they 
 have of bodies, 174; how far we are 
 ignorant of them, 178. 
 
 Substance, the idea of, 38 ; three sorts of, 
 70. 
 
 Subtilty, what, 115. 
 
 Syllogism, no help to reasoning, 189 ; its 
 use and inconveniences, 189; helps not 
 to new discoveries, 198 ; Locke's mi&- 
 appreheusion of, shown, 209. 
 
 Thinking, an operation of the soul, 52 ; 
 
 without memory, useless, 56. 
 Transcendentalism, 4. 
 
 Understanding, passive in the reception 
 of simple ideas, 62. 
 
 Voltaire, 4. 
 
 Whole and part, not innate ideas, 29. 
 
 Wolf, 4, 65. 
 
 Words, abuse of, 111 ; imperfection of, 
 95; coined by the schools, 111; ren-, 
 dered obscure by the schools, 114; their 
 uses, 126 ; their civil and philosophical 
 use, 95 ; should be constantly employed 
 in the same sense, 149. 
 
 Worship, not an innate idea, 29. 
 
 Writini/s ancient, why hardly to be pre- 
 cisely understood, 100. 
 
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