bd r 1568 yi3 VI SPEECH OF NEW YORK, DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THF, MISSION TO PANAMA. MARCH, 1826. > PRINTED BY GALES & SEATON, 1826. Bancroft Library 77,233 The following Resolution, reported by the Committee of Foreign Relations, being under consideration, viz: " Resolved, That it is not expedient at this time, for the United States to send anf Ministers to the Congress of American Nations, assembled at Panama" MR. VAN BUREN, of New York, addressed the Senate, in sub stance, as follows : It is with great reluctance, Mr. President, that I rise to address you. The cause of that reluctance shill be stated with frankness, but without asperity. I entertain no feelings but those of perfect liberality towards gentlemen with whom it is my misfortune to differ. Claiming for myself an entire freedom of opinion, I yield it cheerfully to them. With their motives t do not interfere. That they are pure no one will question. But, against the course pursued by the advocates of the mission, I do object. It is my right to do so ; a right which I shall exercise freely, but respect fully. The subject before us presents a question entirely new. It is one, too, of intense interest, involving considerations which, when once fully understood, cannot fail to excite the deep solicitude of our constituents, and ought to fill us with proportionate anxiety. It has grieved me to hear it announced, on different occasions, and in various forms, that gentlemen had so definitively made up their minds as to render discussion unavailing. I venture to affirm, that a similar course has never been pursued in a deli berative assembly. Cases have occurred where the sinister de signs of a factious minority have been defeated by a refusal to reply- to speeches made after a subject had been fully discussed, and with the sole view of embarrassing the operations of Govern ment ; but to commence the consideration of a great national measure with the declaration, on the part of its advocates, that it ought to be settled by a silent vote, is an occurrence, in the an nals of legislation, which, as it now stands without precedent, will remain, I trust, forever, without imitation It is not for me to advise those with whom I differ in opinion : nor am 1 disposed to arrogate a privilege to which I have no claim. I will, however, with permission, and in all kindness, in* treat gentlemen to reconsider the propriety of a course which can not, I atn persuaded, receive the sanction of their deliberate judg ments. Let each determine/or himself whether it will read well in the history of this measure, that its progress through this House has been marked by a circumstance of so extraordinary a charac ter. Entertaining an entire confidence in the motives of gentle men, I will still encourage the hope, that they will diffuse the light which has brought conviction to their minds; and, as far as practi cable, divest themselves of all predetermination. This hope alone induces me to trespass, for a moment, on the time of the Senate. Nothing can contribute more to a just decision of the question before us, than a correct understanding of what that question is. I will endeavor to state it. A Congress of deputies from several of the Spanish American States, is to be held at the Isthmus of Panama. The objects, powers, and duties of the Congress, are set forth in certain treaties, formed by those of whom the Congress will be composed. The United States were not parties to these Treaties, but, sub sequently to their formation, it was thought advisable, by some of the States, to invite us to join them. Foreseeing the difficulties which might prevent an acceptance of their invitation, and unwil ling to impose the necessity of a refusal, these States, with a com mendable delicacy, made an informal application to our Govern ment to know if it would be agreeable to it, that such an invita tion should be given. On receiving this intimation, the President had before him the choice of one of several courses. If he believed that the attendance of an authorized Agent of the United States at Panama, with suitable instructions, would be beneficial, it was competent for him to have sent a private agent, at the public ex pense, with proper credentials. If he had thought it more advisa ble, because more respectful, he might have directed our Ministers at Colombia and Mexico, or either of them, to repair to the pro posed seat of the Congress, instructed to express the interest we take in the success and prosperity of the States there assembled, to explain to thcmi the principles of our policy, and the reasons which dissuaded our Government from uniting in the Congress, and to communicate whatever else, in the opinion of the Executive, the interests of the United States required. Or he might have ex pressed his desire, that the invitation to the United States, to be represented in the proposed Congress, should be given, and, as far as his constitutional power extended, determined to accept it. He has chosen the latter: and if the Senate approve, and Congress make the necessary appropriation, his decision will of course su persede any other steps which might have been taken. But, if the Senate do not approve, or Congress refuse the appropriation, either of the other measures may still be adopted. Their execution is within the constitutional competency of the Executive, and the contingent fund will supply the means. It will be seen, therefore, that the question is not whether measures shall be taken to avail ourselves of all attainable advantages from the assembly of the Spanish American States, but whether they shall be of the charac ter, and in the form proposed. That form is, to send a represen tation, on the part of the United States, to the Congress of Panama, according to the invitation given to our Government, and its con ditional acceptance. 1 cannot give my advice and consent to this measure ; and, in assigning the reasons for my dissent, I hope to be excused for omitting to notice some of the topics so largely dwelt on, in former debates, on the subject of Spanish American Affairs: such as the geographical description and great extent of these States, the character of their inhabitants, moral, physical, and intellectual, the injustice of their first enslavement, the odious tyranny practised upon them for a succession of ages, and the cru elties inflicted by their unnatural mother during the war of inde pendence. Subjects which, although they may at times, have pro duced some of the finest effusions of genuine patriotism, have also nut unfrequently been the theme of wild and enthusiastic, not to say frothy and unprofitable declamation. We have had enough of such essays. I will not say that they have become stale, because I would not so speak of any honest efforts in the cause of public liberty. For the present, at least, they would be misdirected. The condition of things is changed. Affairs have advanced. The colonies, whose distressed condition has occasioned these strong appeals to our sympathies, are now of right, and in fact, free and sovereign States. Their independence has been deliberately recognized by us and other Powers, in the face of the world ; and, though not yet ac knowledged by Spain, (or likely soon to be,) is held by as good a tenure, and stands, I hope, upon as firm a basis, as our own. They have severed the tie which bound them to the mother country ; and, unlike ourselves, have achieved their liberation by their own, unaided, efforts. As they have thus won an honorable station among independent States, it becomes our imperative duty to treat with them as such. In our intercourse with them, as with all, it should be our first and highest concern to guard, with anxious so licitude, the peace and happiness of our own country ; and, in the fulfilment of this duty, to reject every measure, however dazzling, which can have a tendency to put these great interests at hazard. Whether the measure, now proposed, will endanger those interests, or whether there is not reasonable ground to apprehend it, is the question. To this will my observations be directed, alike regard less of all extraneous excitement, and indifferent to the unmerited suspicion of being lukewarm in the cause of South American liberty. The first points which naturally present themselves for our con sideration, are the character of the Congress, and the limitations under which it is proposed that the United States should become a party. In the former are embraced the objects of the assembly, present and future ; the powers of the deputies; its duration, whe ther temporary or permanent ; and its manner of acting, whether legislative or diplomatic. In the latter are embraced the portion of the concerns of the Congress, in which the United States are invited to participate, and the manner of that participation. Upon some, if not all these points, it must be admitted, we are without satisfactory information. But the fault, if fault there be, in this particular, does not lie at our door, There was a time when the Executive required, as a condition precedent to the acceptance of the invitation, an adjustment of several preliminary points, such as " the subject to which the attention of Congress was to be "directed ; the nature and form of the powers to be given to the diplomatic agents who were " to compose it; and the mode of its organization and action." But that condition was after wards, and I cannot but think improvidently, dispensed with. When this subject was first laid before us, we were furnished with no evidence, upon some of the points referred to, except the little that could be gleaned from the letters of invitation* It was not until the 10th of January, in compliance with the call of the Senate, of the 4th, that the treaties, in virtue of which the Congress is to be held, were sent to us. Sir, the in roads which the insinuating, not to say insidious, influence of Execu tive authority has made upon the rights and privileges of this body, from which so much was expected by the framers of the Constitu tion, are great indeed. This remark is not made with particular reference to the present Executive. The history of our Govern ment, for many years, presents an unbroken series of similar en croachments. The relation in which the President stands to the Senate, when acting under the treaty-making power, is essentially different from the other relations prescribed by the Constitution, He has Executive duties to discharge, in which the legislature have no participation, duties which ordinarily commence when theirs have terminated. Information, in his possession, relating to that branch of his public duties, it is his right to communicate or withhold from Congress, as, in his opinion, may best subserve the public interest. By the Constitution, also, the exclusive right of nomination to of fice is given to him, and the Senate are called on, only, to approve or disapprove. There, too, he acts distinct from us, and possesses a discretion, though, perhaps, more limited, with regard to the com munication of information. But on the subject of treaties, the case is evidently different. They are to be made "by and with the ad vice and consent of the Senate." Upon that subject, every step, preliminary as well as final, ought, in the spirit of the Constitution, to be submitted to the Senate. The practice of conceding to the Executive the preliminary steps in a negotiation, first adopted from, convenience, and since acquiesced in from habit, is now consider ed by some as an unquestioned right. But in the early adminis tration of the Government it was different. General Washington, pursuing the spirit of the Constitution, before commencing any new negotiation, laid before the Senate the views of the Executive, the instructions proposed to be given to ministers, and all the in formation in his possession, and then asked the benefit of their counsel. He appears to have thought that information necessary to both should be viewed in all respects as the common property of both. But now, instead of those full and explicit communications, a portion, only, of the requisite information is sparingly doled out just enough to satisfy the successive calls of the Senate ; calls al ways made with reluctance, because considered by some as imply ing r.n unwillingness to communicate what may be desired. It will be recollected, that it was not until the 2d of February, that the Senate obtained the information upon which it consented to act. It is not my intention to impute to the Executive a disposition to suppress any thing connected with this subject. I have no reason to believe that these views exist. It is to the practice itself which he found on entering into office, that I have deemed this a proper op portunity to object, not without a hope that a remedy may be ap plied. It is known to every member of the S; nate that, from this cause on the subject before us, its deliberations have been embar rassed, and its action impeded. Hoping to be excused from a digression not wholly irrelevant, I shall proceed to the discussion of the subject. What is the character of the Congress of Panama, first, as it respects the Spanish American States, by whom it is constituted, and secondly, the footing on which our Representatives are to stand. Is it to be, as asserted by the gentleman from Rhode Island, a mere diplomatic council, held for convenience in negotiation, with power to make and receive proposals, but without authority to bind the represented States?* or is it to be an efficient public body, the per manent organ of a confederation of free States, formed for great national purposes ? In short, is it to be an adcising or an acting body ? The Treaties between the Republics of Colombia and those of Peru, Chile, Mexico, and Guatemala, formed in the years 1822, Tne President, in his Lite Message to the House of Representatives, adopts a similar construction of the Treaty. His opinion is founded on the matttr here discussed, and upon nothing else. The question remains: Is that construction the true one? Does il comport w>t>. the views and inten tions of he Spanish American States, who have instituted the Congress? U is respectfully contended that it does not. ? 23, and ? 25, so far as they relate to the institution and character of the Congress, are alike. By these Treaties, a permanent League and Confederation, in peace and war. is established among the par ties: containing guarantees of the Territories of the respective States, and stipulating for contributions in ships, men, and money, for the common defence. In a word, they provide for the union and application of their joint means, for the purpose of promoting the general good of the Confederate States, reserving to each its sovereignty in whatever relates to its internal concerns, and cer tain portions of its foreign relations. The second, third, and fourth articles of the Treaty between Colombia and Chile, are in the fol lowing words: "ART. 1. The Republic of Colombia and the State of Chile are "united, bound, and confederated, in peace and ivar, to maintain ' with their influences and forces, by sea and land, as far as cir- 'cumstances permit, their independence of the Spanish nation, * and of any olher foreign domination whatever; and to secure, after 'that is recognized, their mutual prosperity, the greatest harmony 'and good understanding, as well between their people, subjects, 'and citizens, as with other Powers with which they may enter " into relations. "ART. 2. The Republic of Colombia, and the State of Chile, ** therefore, voluntarily promise and contract a League of close "alliance and constant friendship, for the common defenre, for the "security of their independence and liberty, for their reciprocal "and general good, obliging themselves to succor each other, "and repd, in common, every attack or invasion which may, in "any manner, threaten their political existence. " ART. 3. In order to contribute to the objects pointed out in "the foregoing articles, the Republic of Colombia binds itself to " assist, with the disposable sea and land forces, of which the num- "ber, or its equivalent, shall be fixed at a meeting of Pleni potentiaries. "ART. 4. The State of Chile shall also contribute with the dis- "posabie sea and land forces, of which the number, or its equiva lent, shall likewise be fixed at said meeting." The other Treaties contain stipulations of similar import. For the Confederation thus formed, a National Council is provided, composed of two deputies from each of the Confederate States: they are to meet at Panama; but if ever, from the accidents of war, or for any other reason, that should be deemed an improper place, a majority of the States may remove it to some other spot in Spanish America. Its objects and powers are thus stated in all the Treaties : "A General Congress shall be assembled, composed " of Plenipotentiaries from the American States, for the purpose 9 "of establishing on a more solid basis, the intimate relations which "should exist between them all, individually and collectively : and " that it may serve as a Council in great events, as a point of union "in common danger, as a faithful interpreter of public Treaties, " in cases of misunderstanding, and as an arbitrator and conciliator " of disputes and differences." Now, for the purpose of simplifying the question, permit me to ask, can the two specific objects and duties of the Congress, viz: the interpretation of treaties, and the umpirage of all disputes and differences between the confederate States, be effected upon the limited construction now for the first time given to its powers 5 a construction resorted to, and enforced with much ingenuity, by the gentleman from Rhode Island, when the dangerous steps we are about to take are fully presented to his view. Upon further reflection, that gentleman cannot fail to detect the fallacy of the reasoning, by which he has been induced to adopt a construction against the express letter of the treaties. He asks where are the powers by which the Congress is to enforce its decisions ; none are given ; hence he infers, that they are only authorized to ad vise, but not to direct. Permit me to ask the worthy gentleman to define the character of our Congress under the Articles of Con federation. Was that a mere diplomatic council an advising power a convention of Diplomatists met to negotiate, but not to decide ? It was a legislative body, acting to the extent of the powers conferred. If the gentleman will compare the treaties by which the Congress of Panama is established, with our Articles of Confederation, he will perceive a striking similarity between them. Our " Congress was declared to be the last resort "or appeal for all " disputes or differences now subsisting, or that may hereafter "arise, between two or more States, concerning boundary, juris- " diction, or any other cause whatever." Was any direct power conferred to enforce its decisions ? Not at all. That Congress was left, as the Congress of Spanish American States is left, to the obligations resting on each of the confederate States, to abide by the decisons of a tribunal of their own creation, and to the known consequences of contumacy. Our Congress, it is true, had the express power to decide on peace or war. But was it clothed with the means of sustaining their decision ? Was it not wholly dependent on the voluntary contributions of the States ? The gentleman also refers to the stipulation contained in the treaties, securing (i the exercise of the national sovereignty of each of the " contracting parties, as well as to what regards their laws, and " to the establishment and form of their respective Governments," &c. &c. By adverting to the Articles ef our Confederation, he will again find a stipulation " that each State should retain its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, juris- 2 10 diction, and right," which was not expressly delegated to the United States, But if he be correct in supposing that this Con- gress will be a mere diplomatic meeting, for the purpose of nego tiating treaties in the usual form, and without power to bind any State except by its own consent, whence the necessity of this reservation ? Does he not perceive that the very fact of inserting the exception, on which he so confidently relies, overthrows the argument he attempts to sustain by it ? It can require no argu ment, or elucidation, to establish the permanent character of the Congress ; it has no limitation as to time in the treaties. It is to be the Congress of the Confederation, and of course to last as long as the Confederation endures. Such is the necessary result, and that such is the design of its founders, appears from the provision authorizing the removal of the seat of Government, by the vote of a majority, if ever the casualties of war, or any other cause, may render it advisable to do so. There is no express stipulation as to the manner of acting by the Congress. Our Government required information upon this point, and afterwards, as I have already stated, consented to act without it. But that its decisions are to be governed by a majority, results from the propriety of that course, from the equality of representation, from the provision that such shall be the case, in relation to the place of meeting, and the absence of any other provision in regard to the other concerns of the Congress. This view of the subject is confirmed by the letter from the Government Council of Peru, to the Government of Bue nos Ayres, of the 2d of May last, urging a union in the arrange ments of the Congress, in which, after stating that if the world had to elect a Capital, "the Isthmus of Panama would be pointed " out for that august destiny, placed as it is in the centre of the ** globe, looking on the one side to Asia, and on the other to Afri- "ca and Europe : that the Isthmus had been offered for that pur- "pose by the Republic of Colombia ; that it was at an equal dis- " tance from both extremities, and, on that account, might serve as "a provisional place for the^zrsf Assembly of the Confederates." Ft is added, that, " in the first conference between the Plenipoten- " tiaries, the residence of the assembly, and its powers* may be " settled in a solemn manner, by the majority, after which every " thing will be arranged to our satisfaction." We have been invited to unite in a Congress thus constituted. The Executive asks our consent to his acceptance of that invitation. What are the limits contained in the invitation, and the restriction prescribed in the proposed acceptance ? They consist in this, and in this only: that the United States shall not be called upon to do any act, during the continuance of the present war between Spain and the other States, which will conflict with our neutral obliga tions. If there be any other restriction or limitation, 1 call upon 11 gentlemen to point it out. I affirm that there is none. I do not ask gentlemen for the suggestions or opinions of those either within or without doors. I appeal to the documents by which we are to judge now, and by which we shall be judged hereafter. If no other is pointed out, I shall assume that none exists. We are then in vited to become a member of the proposed Congress, and of this confederacy of American States. If the views of the Executive are not such as the documents import, why, in the communications made to us, are we not specially advised upon this point? But we are not without evidence of the most explicit character. We have called upon the Executive for information. Among other things sent us, are extracts from the correspondence between Mr. Clay and Mr. Poinsett, our Minister at Mexico. When the declara tions of one of our Ministers, bearing; distinctly upon a question before the Senate, made directly and officially to a foreign Govern ment, is sent to us by the Executive, without explanation or disa vowal, I know not how we are to avoid the conclusion, that the Minister has spoken a language authorized by his Government. More especially must that be the case when the declaration of the Minister, instead of being disavowed by his Government, is sub stantially in accordance with the declarations of its official organ, the Secretary of State. If this assumption be correct, much light, as to the views of our Government, may be derived from the cor respondence before referred to, between Mr. Poinsett and Mr. Clay. In the letter of the former to the latter, of the 28 h Septem ber, 1825, we find the following sentiments: " I first objected to " the exception in favor of the American Nations, formerly Spanish " possessions, on the ground that no distinctions ought ti be made " between any of the members of the Great Americas Family. ' That Great Britain having consented to such a provision, ought 11 not to influence the American States, because the Republics of " America were united by one and the same interest, and that it " was the interest of the European Powers to cause such distinc- " tions to be made, as would divide it into small confederacies, *' and, if possible, to prevent us from uniting, so as to present one if front against the attempts of Europe, upon our Republican Insti- " tutions." And afterwards still more explicitly, as follows: ' I and ought not to have been given to this, if it is not to be ft considered as one of the American Nations." It is, therefore, fair to conclude, that the language of Mr. Poinsett to the Mexican Government was authorized by his own ; and if this be conceded, the views of the Executive must be such as I have contended. With these views, ought we to join a Congress thus constituted ? I contend we ought not if we could, and that the power to do so is not conferred by the Constitution. I will not detain the Senate by the discussion of either of those points. The first is too plain to require elucidation and in noticing the second, (the constitu tional objection,) I only repeat an objection, first made on this floor by my friend from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH.) The distinct and impressive view he has taken of it, and the knowledge that the point has been fully considered, and will be thoroughly discussed, by at least two other gentlemen, (Messrs. BENTON and BERRIEN,) induces me to desist from doing so myself. Such, in my judgment, is a correct view of the first great ques tion arising on the subject of the Panama Mission. I will now ask the attention of the Senate to the next branch of the subject, viz: THE BUSINESS TO BE TRANSACTED at the Congress, and particularly that portion of it in which we have been invited to participate. Unless I greatly deceive myself, the difficulties will be found to multiply as we proceed in the discussion of the matters proposed to be acted unon, so far as the United States are concerned. There are those which in the view of the Spanish American States* as well as of our own Government, are of primary importance; and others of a secondary character, which, athough they would not have furnished adequate inducement for the invitation or accept ance, are still deemed worthy of consideration if our ministers attend. Of the former, stipulations on our part to make common cause withth? Spanish JUmerifan States* in the event of any Euro pean Power assisting Spain to re establish her dominionin Spanish flmerica, and resistance to European Colonization on this continent, stand in the front ground. But for these, the United States would never have been invited to send a representative to the Congress of Panama. But for these, the presence of our deputies would cause embarrassment, instead of affording facilities to the confeder ate States. Never in the course of the little experience which it has been my good or ill fortune to have had in public affairs, have 13 I been more thoroughly disappointed, as to the probable course ot discussion upon any point than I have been upon this. That our Ministers, or Commissions-is, or Deputies, or whatever else they may be called, shall be fully empowered to enter into an a^re^ment (in whatever form gentlemen may please) first, that the United States, upon the happening of the cants feeder ia, the interference of any of the Powers of Europe, in th - struggle between Spain and her revolted Colonies, shall make common cause with the latter in repelling such interference; and, secondly, that we shall resist, either jointly or separately, all attempts on the part of any Euro pean Power to establish new Colonies in this hemisphere, are mat ters so precisely enumerated, and so clearly concurred in by all parties, that I did not imagine either that the views of our Govern ment, or those of the Spanish American States, in regard to them, could be misunderstood by any honorable gentleman. Judge then of my surprize, to hear it denied from all quarters that such views are entertained by the Executive to hear it announced, that if there were grounds to believe that any such agreement was contem plated, there would be perfect unanimity in the Senate in check ing, in its birth, a design so adverse to the interests of this country. A state of things so unexpected, necessarily changes the course of discussion from an attempt to prove the impolicy of the contem plated measure, to the establishment of the position that such, in reality, are the views of the Executive. From the year 1818 to 1823, a sort of rivalship existed in this country between the Presi dent, (Mr. MONROE) and a quasi opposition to his administration, on the subject of Spanish American aftYirs. On the one hand, the boldest steps were taken to impel the administration to the recog nition of the independence of Spanish America, accompanied by unreserved censures on the imputed reluctance and timidity of the Government. This spirit was combatted, on the part of the ad ministration, by ascribing their conduct to a prudent and circum spect policy, designed to eftect the greatest good with the least possible hazard. Time will not permit the enumeration of the various acts of the contending parties on the political arena in reference to this matter: suffice it to say, that, in 1823, Mr. MONROE determined to crown the measures of the Government upon this subject, by adopting a course in relation to it, to which, while it rendered efficient service to the Spanish American cause, could not fail to secure to his administration the reputation of being its greatest patron. In pursuance of this policy he, in his Message of December, 1823, among other things, said " We owe " it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations subs sting " between the United States and those Powers [the Powers of Eu- ' rope] to declare that we should consider any attempt on their "part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as "dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing Colonies 5 ,or dependencies of any European Powers, we have not interfered, "and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have "declared their Independence, and maintained it, and whose *' independence we have on great consideration and on just prin- "ciples acknowledged, we could not view any interposition, for "the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling, in any manner, their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States, in the war between those New Governments and Spain. We declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition ; and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, pro- vided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the com- petent authorities of the Government, shall make a correspond- ing change on the part of the United States, indispensable to their security." And further, in the discussion with Russia re lative to the Northwestern coast of this continent, the occasion was embraced, " for asserting, as a principle, in which the rights and interests of the United States were involved, that the Am- "erican continents, by the free and independent position which " they had assumed and maintained, were thenceforward not to " be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power." The character and effect which has been given, or attempted to be given, to these declarations, is full of instruction as to the probable consequences of similar acts at this day. To say here that they did not pledge the United States to any course, would be superfluous. There are few who require to be informed that no declaration of the Executive could have that effect. But he had no such intention. He asserted (if you please) correct principles, but left us at liberty to act, or not, in enforcing them, as our in terest or our policy might at the moment require : a question to be decided like all similar questions, by determining whether, under all circumstances, it will best promote the honor and interest of the Country to act or stand still. But how strangely have these de clarations been distorted not only by others, but our public function aries themselves. In a letter from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, to the Envoy of the Republic of Buenos Ayres, of the 6th of March last, announcing the assent of the Republic of Peru, to the proposition of the General Assembly of the American States at Panama, and requesting the concurn nee of the Government of Buenos Ayres, it is stated that among the objects of the Congress will be "to take into consideration the " means to give effect to the declaration of the President of the "United States of America, in his Message to the Congress last " year, concerning the means to prostrate any ulterior design of " colonization upon this continent, by the Powers of Europe, and tj resist all interference in our domestic concerns." 15 In the letter of invitation from the Mexican Minister, Mr. Ob- regon, of the 25th of November last, he says the "Government of " the subscriber, never supposed nor desired that the United States "would take part in the Congress about to be held, in other mat ters than those which, from their nature and importance, the "late administration pointed out as being of general interest to the " continent, for whichreason, one of the subjects which will occupy "the attention of the Congress, will be the resistance or opposition " to the in*erf*ren e of any neutral nation in the question and war of " independence between the new Powers of the continent and Spain. u The Government of the undersigned apprehends that, as the Pow- '* ers of America are of accord as to resistance, it behoves them to " discuss the means of giving to that resistance all possible force, " that the evil may be met if it cannot be avoided : and the only " means of accomplishing this object is by a previous concert as to " the mode in which each of them shall lend its co-operation," &c. " The opposition to colonization is in the like predicament with "the foregoing."* Having thus specified the objects of deliberation, he invites our Government to send "Representatives" to the Congress of Panama, with authorities as aforesaid, and with cypress instructions upon the two principal questions. Mr. Salazar. th* Colombian minister, in his letter of invitation of the 2d November last, thus expresses himself upon the topics referred to : *' The manner in which all colonization of European *' Powers, on the American continent, shall be resisted, and their " interference in the present contest between Spain and her former colo- " nies prevented, are other points of great interest. Were it proper, " an eventual alliance, in case these events should occur, which " is within the range of possibilities, and the treat/i of which no 41 use should be made until the casus foederis should happen, to re- " main secret; or, if this should seem premature, a convention so " anticipated would be different means to secure the same end, of " preventing foreign influence. This is a matter of immediate " utility to the American States that are at war with Spain, and is " in accordance with the repeated declarations of the Cabinet oj Washington." Mr. Canas, the Minister of the Republic of Central America, says, that, " as Europe has formed a Continental system, and held * " Most of the new American Republics have declared their entire assent *' to them, and they now propose among the subjects of consultation at " Panama, to take into consideration the means of making effectual the as- 41 ser'.ion of that principle, (resistance to European colonization,) as -well as " the means of restating interference from abroad -with the domestic concerns of ff the American Government." President's message to the House of Repre sentatives. 16 " a Congress whenever questions affecting its interests were to be * 6 discussed, America should have a system for itself, and assem- " ble, by its Representatives in Cortes, when circumstances of ne- " cessity and great importance should demand it." The views entertained by those Governments,as to the condition of the United States, in relation to its obligation to resist any at tempts on the part of Europe upon the two subjects referred to, ap pears still more clearly from the fact, stated by our Secretary of State, (Mr. Clay,) that when, in the course of the last summer, an invasion of the Island of Cuba was apprehended, from the appear ance of a French fleet in our waters, we were promptly called on, by the Government of Mexico, to fulfil the alleged pledge of Mr. Monroe, in his message of December, 1823. Such are the views and expectations of the Spanish American States, in inviting us to the Congress of Panama. Permit me now to show how far these extravagant pretensions have b?en encouraged, countenanced, and recognized, by our own Government. I confess, sir, that I approach this part of the sub ject with regret and disappointment. If I know my heart, it har bors no inclination to view either this or any measure of the Go vernment, with any other feelings than those of libenlity and in dulgence. But, if there be here no cause for censure, I am under the influence of the grossest delusion. I have before had occasion to allude to the correspondence of Mr. Poinsett, our Minister at Mexico. The discretion of this gen tleman is well known, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to con ceive, that he would commit the honor and interest of his country, upon a point of great delicacy and importance, unless authorized by the letter of his instructions. The communications from the Executive contain no intimation of his having transcended his in structions ; and the striking coincidence between his declarations, and those of the Secretary of State, leaves little ground to think that he has done so. In his letter to Mr. Clay, of the 28th of Sep tember last, speaking of his discussions with the plenipotentiaries of the Mexican Government, upon the subject of the Commercial Treaty, then under negotiation, he says: " To these observations, " I replied that, against the power of Spain, they had given suffi- " cient proof that they required no assistance, and the United " States had PLEDGED THEMSELVES not to permit any other Power " to interfere, either wish their independence, or form of Govern- " merit; and that, as, in the event of such an attempt being made " by the Powers of Europe, we would be compelled to take the most " active arid efficient part, and to bear the brunt of the contest, it was " not just that we should be placed on a less favorable footing than " the other Republics of America, whose existence we were ready " to support at such hazards." 17 The language of the Secretary coincides with that of Mr. Poin- sett. In his letter to the latter, of the 9th November, he thus ex presses himself: " No longer than about three months ago, when an "invasion by France of the island of Cuba was believed at Mexico, "the United Mexican Government promptly called upon the Go- * f vernment of the United States, through you, to fulfil the memo~ " rable pledge of the President of the United States in his message " to Congress of December, 1823. What they would have done, "had the contingency happened, may be inferred from a des- " patch to the American Minister at Paris, a copy of which is here- " with sent which you are at liberty to read to the Pienipotentia- ** ries of the United Mexican States." Mr. President Consider, for a moment, the entire coincidence between the language expressed abroad by Mr.Poinsett, our minis ter, and at home by Mr. Clay, the responsible organ of the Govern ment, and if you do not concur with me in thinking it amounts to a re cognition of a pledge on the part of the Government, of the character claimed by the Spanish American States, and an avowal of our readi ness to redeem it, I will hereafter distrust the clearest deductions of my understanding. Had the opinion of the Executive been different, the languageof our Government, instead of declaring what we would have done, "had the contingency happened," would have been, what it ought to have been, an explicit disavowal of all obligation on the part of the United States to take any other part in anv state of things, than that which the interests of the country might be supposed to require. But if a doubt could exist as to the views of the Executive, it would be dispelled by a reference to the invita tions and letters of acceptances, especially when connected with the subjects referred to. In the letters of invitation, the Mexican and Colombian Ministers, specify the subjects which, in their view, are of " general interest to the Continent, viz resist ance to European interference aad colonization -and request that our Ministers should have express instructions upon these two " principal questions." Our Government, without questioning the specification, thus made at their instance, in the letters of accept ance, say, that our Commissioners to the Congress of Panama will be fully empowered and instructed upon all questions likely to arise in the Congress, on subjects which the Nations of America have a common interest. What those subjects are, had been stated by the parties inviting, with express reference to our explanations, and unequivocally assented to by us.* The President, in his * The views here taken are, it is contended, confirmed by the last Message of the President to the House of Kepresentatives. The expressions of Mr. Poinsett were referred to in support of the folio wing declaration of the Mexican Minister, contained in his note of invitation : " The Government of the under- ^signed apprehends that,as thePowers of America are of accord as to resistance, 3 18 message communicating the nominations, leaves the subject of Eu ropean interference in the struggle between Spain and her former Colonies, to the correspondence between the Secretary of State and the inviting Governments, to which I have referred ; but on the subject of colonization he contemplates an agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, " that each will guard, by "its own means, against the establishment of any future European " Colonies within its borders." If these two prominent points were not intended, by our Government, to be the subjects on which stipulations were to be entered into at the Congress, what was meant by the President in his declaration to the ministers of Mexico and Colombia, that, in his opinion, "such a Congress might benignly ft useful in settling several important questions of public law, and " in arranging other matters of deep interest to the American Conti- " nent ?" And if it be indeed true that the proponed mission is designed to be no more than a matter of compliment to our sister Republics, without subjecting the rights or duties of the United States to the decision of that Congress, then why the solicitude, on the part of our Government, to adjust previously the powers to be given to the deputies, and the mode of its organization and ac tion ? But I forbear to multiply proofs upon this point. Had it *' it behoves them to discuss the means of giving 1 to that resistance all possible "force, that the evil maybe met if it cannot be avoided? and the only means of *'accomplishingthisobject,isby a previous cowcerJ as to the mode in which each " shall lend its co-operation " And of that of Mr Salazar, the Colombian Minister, that these views are '* n strict accordance with the repeated declarations and *' protests of the Cabinet of --Vashington." Mr. Poinsett, in his communication with the Mexican Government, urges favorable commercial stipulations, on the ground of our liability to aid the Spanish American States, in resisting Euro pean interference in their internal concerns. Mr. Clay, in his letter to Mr. Poinsett, refers that obligation to '* the memorable pledge of the President "of the U> ited States, in his Message to Congress, in December, 1823" In the report communicated to the tL use of Representatives, with the Message now referred to, the Secretary says: '-If, indeed, any attempt by force had *' been made by allied Europe, to subvert the liberties of the Southern Nations "on this Continent, and to er^ct upon the ruins of the free institutions, monar- "chical systems, the people of the United States would have stood pledged, in "the opinion of the Executive, not to any foreign State, but to themselves "and their posterity, by their dearest interests and highest duties, to resist to " the utmost such an attempt ; and it is to a pledge of that character that Mr. "Poinsett alone refers." These are but different modes of accounting for and describing the same thing. An obligation, on our part, in a certain event to assist Spanish America, equally warranting the inference that the "outhern Re publics expect that stipulations u 'Oil that subject will be made at the Con gress of Panama, and that our Government are willing to do so; no one supposed that Mr. Poinsett had been specially instructed to make or renew any pledge upon this subject, or that he had done S'\ He was instructed to *' impress the principles of the Message of Mr. Monroe, in 1823, upon the "Government of the United Mexican States," anJ he has done it in a man- ner satisfactory to our Government. What that manner was ; the above ex,- tracts from his letter shew- Hot been for the strong manifestation of unwillingness, on the part of the Senate, to enter into any such agreement, I am strongly in clined to think no question would have been made respecting it. With these Governments, above all others, it is both our duty and policy to observe the most scrupulous sincerity and good faith. With them, at least, we ought not to encourage expectations not intended to be realized a coarse alike reprehensible in principle, and ruinous in its effects. It is, then, the design of the Execu tive to enter into an agreement at the Congress, (it is not material for the present in what form,) that if the Powers of Europe make common cause with Spain, or otherwise attempt the subjugation of Spanish America, we shall unite with the latter, and contribute our proportion of the means necessary to make resistance effectual : and further, that we thall bind ourselves, at that Congress, as to the manner in which we shall resist any attempts, by the iMiropean Powers, to colonize any portion of this Continent. This design has been fully, frankly, and explicitly stated to the Spanish Ameri can States, and to us. Is the Senate of the United States willing to sanction a measure of that description? I care not for the pre sent whether it be by treaty or by act, decree, or ordinance of the Congress. Will you in any shape or form, preliminary or final, give to it your sanction? Upon this subject, at least, we have had *' thoughts that breathe." In the confidence that I do not misun derstand them, I will venture to affirm that there is not a member on this floor who will avow his willingness to enter into such a stipulation. If mistaken, I desire to be corrected. No I am not. Whatever may be his views, no one, within these walls, is yet pre pared to give his sanction to such a measure a measure by which the peace of the country is to be exposed to a contingency beyond the control of our Government by which the great question of peace or war will be taken from the Representatives of the People- by which, instead of retaining that freedom of action, which we now possess, we shall bind ourselves, in a certain event, to pursue a certain course, whatever those, to whom the government of the country may then have been committed, shall think the honor or interest of the country may require by which, in the language of the Father of his Country, we "shall quit our own to stand on foreign ground." No thank Heaven a policy so opposite to all the feelings of the American People ; so adverse, as I firmly be lieve it to be, to its true interests, has no friend, at least no advo cate on this floor. If, by any act of ours, we contribute to its adoption, it will be, (ancl I derive infinite satisfaction from that conviction,) through a mistaken belief that the measure of which I speak is not contemplated by the Executive. It has, I know, been said, that if such views are elsewhere entertained, they can be effected by Treaty only, and that the Senate may refuse its sanc tion. That this would be the fate af such a treaty, is certain. 20 But, if correct in my position, that the Executive has distinctly apprized you of his intention to negotiate such a treaty, with what propriety can you refuse to ratify ? What excuse can you give your friends, the Spanish American States, for the entire prostra tion of all th? expectations vou have rarsed ? What justification will you be able to render to your constituents for the exacerbation which would result from the rejection of stip ulations, deriving sanction from your acquiescence, if not your ap proval ? None, that I can perceive ; none, most certainly, that they will approve. But let it be supposed that I mistake the intention of the President and his cabinet that our Ministers are to have no- such instructions. Reject, if you please, the irresistible evi dence of a fixed determination on the part of the Executive, to form, with the South American States, a dangerous political connection.* What, let me ask, will be the consequence of de clining a proposed co-operation ? Let it be remembered that they consider the recognition of their independence by Spain as essential to their security ; that their only ground of apprehension is the assistance which may be yielded to Spain by the Powers of Europe, and that, to prevent this aid, they place reliance on the anticipated compact with us. Can there then be a doubt whether a failure to enter into the proposed stipulations would tend to impair our friendl) relations? Will they not refer you to your own exposition of the message of Mr. Monroe, of 1823; to the assurance given by Mr. Poinsett to the Mexican Government ; to the despatch of Mr. Clay in reply to their application ; to the explicit avowal of their motives in inviting us to the Con gress ; and to our unreserved acceptance of that invitation ? And if holding to our view this mass of evidence, which, unfortunately, it would not be in our power to palliate, to cancel, or deny, they should charge us with insincerity and duplicity where would we find an advocate so unblushing as to attempt our justification, or * In the late message of the President to the House of Representatives sent after the decision of the Senate, he represents his views upon this subject,, in the following explicit terms : ''Compare our situation and the circumstances of that time, with those of " the present day, and what, from the very words of Washington, then, would " be his counsels to his countrymen now ? Europe has still her set of primary *' interests with which we have little or a remote relation. Our distant and tj detached situation, with reference to Europe, remains the same. But we " were then the only independent nation of this hemisphere, and we were " surrounded by European colonies, with the greater part of which we have " no more intercourse than with the inhabitants of another planet. Those " colonies have now been transformed into eight independent nations, ex- " tending to our very border Seven of them, Republics like ourselves*. " with whom we have an immensely growing commercial, and must have.. v and have already, important political connections." 21 to urge that our conduct had heen marked with the frankness ana singleness of purpose which are the surest defence of all Republi can Governments, and have hitherto been the boast and glory of our own ? The fair fame of our Republic would be tarnished shame would precede our approach and disgrace follow in our path. Is it possible, if such be the natural, the inevitable result of the favorable construction assumed by ihe advocates of the mission, that the mission itself can receive the sanction of the Senate, or the support of the People? The subject I have thus far considered, is avowedly the principal inducement to the mission. Others, of subordinate character, have been thrown out for consideration ; but I affirm that there is not one wholly free from serious objection not one from which there is reasonable ground to expect either credit or advantage. I will briefly consider those suggested in the message. And first, that which may justly be said to be least objectionable : " The comen- " famous adoption of principles of maritime neutrality," such as, " that free ships skull make free goods, and the restriction of reason " upon the txtent of blockades.'* To effect this object, it is not ne cessary to unite with the Congress of Panama. It may be reached in another way. That it can be better attained at the Congress is mere conjecture. The probability is different. No evidence is afforded that the ministers of the confederate States will be empow- ed to enter into treaties concerning their foreign relations. But, should it be otherwise, what great object remains to be accomplish ed ? With the Republic of Colombia, standing at the head of the confederacy, we have already entered into a treaty, containing all the proposed stipulations. With that of Central America, we hav been alike successful. With Mexico, we have reason to believe that a similar treaty has been formed, and w? know, if our negotia tion with that Government is not yet finally concluded, that this point presents no serious obstacle. Can it, then, be urged by any honorable member, that he apprehends serious difficulty in negotia ting treaties with the smaller States, similar to those we have al ready concluded with the larger? 1 think not. Why, then, go to Panama ? But, if any such object could be accomplished at the Congresses this the time most suitable to effect it? In my judgment it is not. The reasons are obvious. Those States are at war. Their views, like those of other States, will be controlled by their condition. The relation of neutral and belligerent is not the state best adapted to the amicable adjustment of neutral rights. The interests of the parties are adverse the war in which they are engaged, involves their existence, and they may not now be disposed to believe the adoption of a principle is expedient, because they know it to be just. But when are the principles, proposed to be established, to have their beneficial operation ? During the present war they caw 22 not. Take, for instance, the stipulation that free ships shall make free goods. A modern condition attached to that stipulation is, that it shall be binding only in cases where the property sought to be protected by the flag of the neutral, belongs to the citizens or subjects of a country, whose Government is bound by a similar en gagement. We have a stipulation in our treaty with Spain, that free ships shall make free goods. Suppose the case of goods belong ing to the citizens of either of the Spanish American States, found on board of one of our vsesels. Will Spain respect it ? No. She denies the capacity of her revolted colonies to enter into treaty stipulations, and she seizes the property as belonging to her rebel lious subjects. Unless, therefore, you can force Spain to recognize their independence, you cannot oblige her to respect, as far as re gards them, this article in our treaty with her. If Spain does not, as she assuredly will not, will the Southern Republics ? Can you expect it? Ought you to ask it? And Spain and those Republics are the only belligerents. If the operation of the desired stipula tions is to be deferred to a future period, to that period let their settlement be also deferred. At present there is little reason to hope that, upon this point, any advantageous stipulation can be made at the Congress. The enumeration of these objects may serve to make, on paper, an imposing parade ; but on paper only. I forbear to notice the objectionable manner in which these principles of international law are proposed to be settled ; the occasion does not require it. "The indirect influence which the United States may exercise upon 61 any projects or purposes originating in the war, in which the Southern Republics are still engaged, which might seriously " affect the interests of this Uni&n," is another of the objects re ferred to by the Executive as among the "contingent and eventual motives" to the mission. I subscribe to the complaints of the worthy gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. White) of the want of clear ness in the diplomatic language held throughout upon this subject. Why not specify what those ' projects or purposes" are supposed to be, so that we may act understanding!)' ? This part of the message is however supposed to refer to the probable designs of the confederate States upon the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. The gentleman from Rhode Island (who, unlike most of those who agree with him in opinion, has assigned the reasons which will determine his vote, supposes that nothing can be decided by the Congress on this subject. In this he is doubtless mistaken. We have before us abundant evidence, that, if the independence of Spanish America is not recognized bv old Spain, the fate of those Islands is to be settled by the Congress of Panama. Mr. Salazar informs our Government " that the fortune of these Islands must be decided in the Congress of the Isthmus of Panama:" Assuming (as we may) that this will be the case, can we effect any 23 thing by sending a representation to that Congress ? I have earn estly reflected on this branch of the subject, as one in which the United States are deeply concerned, and the result is a conviction that under existing circumstances, no benefit whatever can result from the measure proposed. Before I assign my spe cific reasons for this opinion, I shall be excused for a brief reference to the novel and embarrassing position of our depu ties in "ffering advice on the fate of Cuba and Porto Rico. They must present themselves as the representatives of a Power which seeks a peace through the mediation of anothpr Power, which maintains, theoretically, the right of Spain to the islands in question ; as the representatives of a Power which has advocated a peace by which they are to be forever condemned to Spain. They go to confederate with a Congress of free States for the purpose of resisting the designs of the Holy Alliance ; and of supportwg^ so far as Cuba and Porto Rico are concerned, the views, if not the doc trines of the Holy Alliance; and that too under the auspices of the very head of that unhallowed combination. We affect to glory in. the success of the principles upon which the. revolution of Spanish America is founded but still consent to become the advocates of a peace which will condemn Cuba and Porto Rico to the yoke of Spain ; and, for the very justifiable and consistent reason, that our interests require it ! ! But, leaving these glaring inconsistencies to their merited fate, what are we to do ? What can we do ? It is contended that the interests of our country require that the con dition of Cuba should remain unchanged. That upon this point we should hazard every thing. Admit the fact ; will'our Ministers be allowed to take that ground ? Can the Executive instruct them to protest against any movements on the part of the confederate States against those Islands ? To admonish them of its impropriety, and denounce resistance ? No, sir. Upon a subject of such vital importance, the only one in which our presence at the Congress could be useful, the Executive has already taken a step which he can never retrace. Deceived by the artful letter of Count Nessel- rode ; misled by the unsuspecting confidence of Mr. Middle- ton ; and supposing that the Emperor Alexander would under take, in earnest, the desired mediation, and that, under his high auspices, its success would be inevitable ; he has solemnly declared that we fiught not and will not resist the attempts of the confede rates upon these Islands, should Spain refuse compliance. In the letter from Mr. Clay, to Mr. Middleton of the 10th of May last, instructing him to invite the mediation of Russia, which was read to the Colombian Minister, and communi cated to the principal European Governments, it is declared, 4< and " thus the Peninsula, instead of derivhg the revenue and the aid " so necessary to the revival of its prosperity from Cuba and Por- " to Rico, must be further drained to succor those islands ; for it " cannot be doubted, that the new States will direct their com- 24 ** bined and unemployed forces to the reduction of those valuable ' islands. They will naturally strike their enemy wherever they " can reach him, and they will be stimulated to the attack by the " double motive arising from the richness of the prize, and from " the (act that those islands constitute the rendezvous of Spain, "where are concentrated, and from which issue, all the means of an- " noyingthem which remain to her." Having understood that an expedition was fitting out at Carthagena against Cuba or Porto Rico, by Colombia, or Mexico, or both, our Secretary of State, on the 20th of December last, addressed notes to the Ministers of those Governments, in which, after assuring them that by late ad vices from St. Petersburg, he was enabled to say that the appeal to the Emperor of Russia had not been without eff.-ct, and that there was reason to believe that he was then exerting his friendly en deavors to put an end to the war, he solicited their Governments, in the name of the President, " to forbear to attack those Islands "until a sufficient time has elapsed to ascertain the result of the " pacific efforts the gre;it Powers are now making on Spain." These communications were transmitted by those Ministers to their res pective Governments; and finally, in the letter from the Secretary to Mr. Middleron, of the 26th of December, he thus explicitly communicates the views and opinions of this Government on the subject: " We cannot allow the transfer of the Islands to any Eu- "ropeasi Power. But if Spain should refuse to conclude a peace, "and obstinately resolve on continuing the war, although we do **not desire that either Colombia or Mexico should acquire the '* Island of Cuba, the Prrsidmt cannot see any justifiable, ground '* on which we can forcibly interfere. Upon the hypothesis of an " unnecessary protraction of the war, imputable to Spain, it is evi- " dent that Cuba will be her only point d'appui in this hemisphere, fl How can we interpose, on that supposition, against the party " CLEARLY HAVING KiGHT ON HIS SIDE, to retrain or defeat a lawful 61 operation of war? If the war against the Islands should be con- "ducted oy those Republics in a desolating manner; if, contrary " to all expectation, they should put arms into the hands of one " race of the inhabitants to destroy the lives of anoth r ; if, in short, '* they should countenance and encourage excesses and examples, "the contagion of which, from our neighborhood, would be danger-