1^1 !*nf 
 
 ^MNVSO^ "%I3AINH 3\\V 
 
 
 tfEUNIVER% .vVOSANCELfj^. ^OFCALIFOfy* ^OFCALIFO/fcfc, 
 
 <Til33NV-S01^ "%HHAINIV3t\V 
 
 
 ^•LIBRARY 
 
 HIBRARYQr 
 
 AVK-UNIVERto 
 
 ^lOSANCElfj> 
 
 %MnV>J0^ ^0JHV3-JO^ "ftlMNV-SOl^ "%3A!N(H^ 
 
 A-OF-CAIIFO% 
 
 
 *WE-UNIVER%. ^AOS-ANGFlfj^ 
 
 ^Aavaan-i^ <fii3DNV$oi* x 
 
 -< 
 
 SME-UNIVERS/A 
 
 <TJ130NVSOV^ 
 
 AtfEUNIVERS//, 
 
 vvlOSANCElfj> 
 
 WM3AIN1HWV 
 
 ,**lOS-ANGElfj> 
 
 <Tii3QNVS01^ %J3AIN(V3\\V 
 
 ^•UBRARY^ ^UIBRARYO^ 
 
 %03I1V3JO> V ^OdllVD JO>" 
 
 ^•OF-CALIFOfc^ 
 
 
 y omm] ■& avaan-v^- 
 
 ^UIBRARY^. ^tllBRARYO/- 
 
 tymww ^HCU ITVi 
 
 ^WE-UNIVERS/a 
 
 ^lOS-ANGElfj>
 
 
 %M 
 
 
 v^z^l * Vf/\ 
 
 \oi\Wj 
 
 \oi\m^ 
 
 V=Wi 
 
 ■iS-ANCEl% 
 <5 — 
 
 "^/SWAININ^ 
 
 ^•OKALIFOftfc 
 
 ^0F-CALIF(%. 
 
 
 y <?Aiivyan-# y o-Aavaan-i^ 
 
 AWE 
 
 <Til3 r JN' 
 
 <$HIBRARYfc 
 
 ^OdllVD-JO^ 
 
 5WE-UMIVERS/A 
 
 <Tii30NV-SO^ 
 
 iS-ANCElfj> 
 
 "%3AINfHWV 
 
 ^UIBRARY^ 
 
 
 ^OKAUFOfcfe, 
 
 r» ■& 
 
 -> v< 
 
 .-^E-UNIVERS/a 
 
 ^lOS-ANGELtt* 
 
 ^Aavaaru^ ^tjto-soi^ ^/m\iN(H\\v 
 
 ^OF-CALIFOfcfc 
 
 y 0AavnaiH^ 
 
 ^clOS-ANCELFj> 
 
 ^•LIBRARYQ^ <$UIBRARY0/> 
 
 5ME-UNIVERS/A 
 
 ■fysMAiNiHV^ ^ojiwd-jo^ %ojiiv3jo^ <r?u 
 
 v^lOS-ANCElfjj> 
 
 "%3mnihv\v 
 
 
 ^0F-CALIF(% 
 
 ^AavyaiH^' ^A«vaan-# 
 
 \WEUNIVER% 
 
 
 <vtfLIBRARYQr 
 £ 1 I (-* '4. 
 
 ^WEUNIVER% ^lOSANCElfr> 
 
 ^/OJUVDJO^ ^fJlMW-SOl^ %U3AIN 
 
 ^UIBRARYfi^ 
 
 ^OJIIVD:
 
 Story of the Nations 
 
 A Series of Historical Studies intended to present in 
 graphic narratives the stories of the different 
 nations that havf attained prominence in history. 
 
 In the story form the current of each national 
 life is distinctly indicated, and its picturesque and 
 noteworthy periods and episodes are presented for 
 the reader in their philosophical relations to each 
 other as well as to universal history. 
 
 12°, Illustrated, cloth, each . . $1.50 
 Half Leather, each .... $1.75 
 Nos. 62 and following Nos. . net $1.35 
 Each .... (By mail) $1.50 
 Half leather, gilt top, each . net $1.60 
 
 (By mail) $1.75 
 
 FOR FULL LIST SEE END OF THIS VOLUME
 
 PARTHIA
 
 THE STORY OF THE NATIONS 
 
 PARTHIA 
 
 BY 
 GEORGE RAWL1NSON, M.A., F.R.G.S. 
 
 LATE CAMDEN PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 
 
 CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF TURIN; AUTHOR 
 
 OF "THE FIVE GREAT MONARCHIES OF THE ANCIENT EASTERN 
 
 WORLD," "THE STORY OF ANCIENT EGYPT," ETC. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 
 LONDON: T. FISHER UNWIN 
 1903 
 
 49566
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1893 
 
 By G. P. Putnam's Sons 
 
 Entered at Stationers' Hall, London 
 
 By T. Fisher Unwin 
 
 Electrotyped, Printed, and Bound by 
 
 Ubc IRnicfccrbocfcer press, mew HJorfc 
 G. P. Putnam's Sons
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Geographical — Parthia Proper, and the Par- 
 thian Empire ...... 1-26 
 
 Dimensions of Parthia Proper, i, 2 — General character of the 
 region, 2, 3 — Rivers, valleys, and mountain tracts, 3, 4 — 
 Climate, 5 — Products, 6- Countries included in the Parthian 
 Empire — Hyrcania, 6, 7 — Territory of the Mardi, 8, 9 — Media 
 Rhagiana, 9, 10 — Western Bactria, 10, 11 — Media Magna, 
 11-13 — Elam or Susiana, 13, 14 — Babylonia, 14, 15 — Persia, 
 15-17 — Assyria, 17, 18— Eastern Bactria, 18, 19 — Margiana, 
 19 — Aria, 20 — Drangiana or Sarangia, 20, 21 — Sacastana, 21 — 
 Arachosia, 21 — Sngartia, 21, 22 — Chorasmia, 22 — Mesopo- 
 tamia Proper, 22, 23 — Media Atropatene, 24— Armenia, 24, 
 25- -Dimensions of the Empire, 25- Boundaries ,25, 26. 
 
 II. 
 
 Ethnographical — Turanian Character of the 
 
 Parthian People ..... 27-35 
 
 First appearance of the Parthians in history, 27 — Connection 
 with the Persians, and supposed Arian character, 27, 28 — ■ 
 Statements of ancient writers, Arrinn, Trogus Pompeius, 
 Strabo, 28-30 — Close connection with the nomadic races of 
 Central Asia, 30,31 — These races Turanian, 31, 32 — Turanian 
 character of the Parthian names, 32 — Their physical and mental
 
 Vlll CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 type, Turanian, 32-34 — Resemblance of the Parthians to the 
 Accadians, Mongols, and Turks, 34, 35— Their other con- 
 geners, 35. 
 
 III. 
 
 Condition of Western Asia in the Third Cen- 
 tury b.c. — Origin of the Parthian State. 36-62 
 
 Disruption of the Empire of Alexander, 36, $"] — Formation 
 of the Four Great Monarchies, 37 — Kingdom of the Seleu- 
 cidae, 37-39 — Mistaken policy of the Seleucid princes — Trans- 
 fer of capital to Antioch, 39, 40— Entanglement in Western 
 wars, 40 — Weak organisation of the kingdom, 41, 42 — Atten- 
 tion concentrated on the West — Commencement of disorders, 
 43, 44 — Weak character of the second Antiochus, 44 — Ex- 
 amples of successful revolt, 44, 45 — Revolt of Bactria, 45, 
 46— Revolt of Parthia, 47-49— The first Arsaces, 50— The 
 first Tiridates, 50, 51 — Ptolemy Euergetes and Seleucus II., 
 52, 53 — Tiridates occupies Hyrcania, 53 — His war with 
 Seleucus, 53-56 — His new capital, 57 — Accession of Arta- 
 banus I., 58 — His war with Antiochus the Great, 59-61 — 
 Peaceful reign of Priapatius, 61 — Reign of Phraates I. — Con- 
 quest of Media Rhagiana, 62. 
 
 IV. 
 
 First Period of Extensive Conquest — Reign of 
 
 Mithridates 1 63-76 
 
 Accession of Mithridates I., 63 — His physiognomy and cha- 
 racter, 63, 64 — Condition of Western Asia at his accession, 
 64-68 — Attack of Mithridates on Western Bactria, 69 — War 
 with Eupator, 69, 70 — Conquest of Media Magna, 70 — Re- 
 volt and reduction of Hyrcania, 71— Conquest of Elymais, 
 71, 72 — Submission of Babylonia and Persia, 72, 73 — War 
 with Heliocles, and conquest of Eastern Bactria, 73, 74 — War 
 with Demetrius II. of Syria, 74, 75 — Capture of Demetrius, 
 and death of Mithridates, 76.
 
 CONTENTS. IX 
 
 PAGE 
 V. 
 
 Governmental System of Mithridates I. — 
 
 Laws and Institutions .... 77—90 
 
 Origin of Parthian society : Tribes, Chieftains, Great Chief or 
 Monarch, 77, 78 — Power of the chieftains — The Two Coun- 
 cils: the "Sophi, " the "Magi," 78— The Surena or Com- 
 mander-in-chief, 79 — Power of the monarch, 79, 80 — Govern- 
 ment of the provinces by Vitaxre or subject kings, 80, 81 — 
 Semi-independence of the Greek cities, 81, 82 — Position of 
 the Jewish communities, 82, 83 — Organisation of the Parthian 
 Court, 83, 84 — Titles assumed by the monarch : his dress, 84, 
 85 — Migrations of the Court, 86, 87 — Pomp and grandeur of 
 the nobles, 87, 88 — Rudeness of the mass of the people, 88, 
 S9 — Mithridates J. as organiser, 89, 90. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Last Struggle with Syria — Defeat and Death 
 
 of Antiochus Sidetes . . . .91-103 
 
 Accession of Phraates II. : War threatens with Syria, 91, 92 
 — Inaction of Phraates, 93 — Parthia invaded by Antiochus 
 Sidetes, 94 — Size of his army, 94, 95 — Force collected to meet 
 him, 95 — Equipment of the Syrians, 95, 96 — Advance of 
 Phraates, followed by three Syrian victories, 96, 97 — Despe- 
 rate position of Phraates, 97 — He sends Demetrius to stir up 
 revolt in Syria, 97, 98 — Goes into winter quarters, 98 — Plans 
 a massacre of the invaders, 99— Negotiates with Sidetes, 99, 
 100 — Great rising— Battle and massacre, 100, 101 — Death of 
 Sidetes, 101 — Rapid decline of Syria, 101, 102 — Proceedings 
 of Phraates, 102, 103. 
 
 VIL 
 
 Pressure of the Northern Nomads upon Parthia 
 — Scythic Wars of Phraates II. and Arta- 
 banus II. . 104-116 
 
 Frequency of barbaric inroads from the North, 104, 105 — 
 Character of such inroads, 105, 106 — Constant danger to 
 Parthia from the Trans-Oxianinn region, 106 — Great move-
 
 X CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ment among the Northern Asiatic hordes at this period : the 
 Yue-chi, the Su, 106-108 — Inroads of the Scyths into Bactria 
 and Ariana, 108, 109 — Occupation of Sacastana, and lodg- 
 ment in Cabul, 109— Settlement in India, no — Principal 
 tribes of the Scythians, no — Character of their barbarism, 
 no, in — Danger which threatened Western Asia, m-113 — 
 Scythian War of Phraates II., 113, 114 — Accession of Arta- 
 banus II., 114 — His war with the Tochari, 115 — His death, 
 116. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 mlthridates ii. and the nomads — war with 
 
 Armenia — First Contact with Rome . 117-131 
 
 Accession of Mithridates II. : Meagre accounts of his reign, 
 117 — Mithridates checks the advance of the Scyths, 118 — 
 Takes territory from them in Bactria, 118, 119 — Crushes the 
 revolt of Hymerus, 119 — Attacks Armenia, 119 — Dimens ; ons 
 and physical character of Armenia, 119-121 — Character of the 
 Armenian people, 121, 122— Previous history of the country, 
 122, 123 — Armenia under the Persians, 123, 124 — Conquered 
 by Alexander the Great, 124— Revolts from Antiochus III., 
 124 — Wars of the Armenians with the Syrians, 124, 125 — 
 War of Mithridates II. with Ortoadistus, 125, 126 — First con- 
 tact of Parthia with Rome, 126 — Previous relations of Rome 
 with Asia, 126-129 — Mithridates II. sends an embassy to 
 Sulla, 129 — Establishes a friendly understanding, 130 — Loses 
 territory to Tigranes : Dies, 130— His appearance and cha- 
 racter, 130, 131. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Dark Permd of Parthian History — Accession of 
 
 Sanairikces — Phraates III. and Pompey 132-146 
 
 Civil war in Parthia : Time of general disturbance, 132 — ■ 
 Struggle of Rome with Mithridates of Pontus, 133, Con- 
 quests of Tigranes, 133, 134 — Accession of Sanatroeces to the 
 Parthian throne, 135 — His policy of abste >tion, 126 — Sana- 
 troeces succeeded by Phraates III. : Overtures made to him by 
 Pompey lead to an alliance, 136-138 — War between Phraates 
 and Tigranes, 138, 139 — Settlement of the East by Pompey : 
 Discontent of Phraates, 139, 140 — Phraates comes to terms
 
 CONTENTS. XI 
 
 PAGE 
 
 with Tigranes, 141, 142 — He is murdered by his sons, 143 — 
 Short reign of Mithridates III., 144, 145 — Accession of his 
 brother, Orodes. 
 
 X. 
 
 Great Expedition of Crassus against Parthia, 
 and its Failure — Retaliatory Raid of 
 Pacorus 147-184 
 
 Antecedents of Crassus, 147, 148 — His appointment to the 
 Prefecture "f Syria, 149 — His wild ambition, 149, 150 — He 
 starts for the East, and reaches Antioch, 150, 151 — Prepara- 
 tions made to meet him by Orodes, 151, 152 — Crassus wastes 
 time in plundering expeditions, 152, 153 — Holds a conference 
 with Artavasdes, 153, 154 — Receives an embassy from Orodes, 
 and insults him, 154, 155 — Resolves on an invasion, 156 — 
 Possible lines of route, 156, 157 — Line of the Euphrates 
 chosen, but given up at the suggestion of the Osrhoenian 
 sheikh, Abgarus, 157, 158 — March begun through Mesopo- 
 tamia, 158 — Disposal of his forces made by Orodes, 158-160 
 — The Surena's army : the light horse, the heavy horse, 161, 
 162 — Disadvantages under which the Romans laboured, 162- 
 164 — Treachery of Abgarus, 164, 165 — Meeting of the two 
 armies, 165, 166 — Parthian tactics and great Roman loss, 166, 
 167 — Charge made by Publius Crassus, 167 — Its failure and 
 his death, 168 — Renewed attack on the main army, 168, 169 — 
 Retreat of the Romans during the night, 169, 170 — Carrhse 
 renched, but retreat continued, 170, 171 — More fighting at 
 Sinnaca, 171 — Conference, and death of Crassus, 172, 173 — 
 Estimate of the Roman loss, 174 — Causes of the failure of 
 Crassus, 174-176 — Treatment of the body of Crassus, 177 — 
 Farcical ceremony at Seleucia, 177, 178 — Slight effect of the 
 disaster, 178. 179 — Death of the Surena, 180, 181 — Raid of 
 Pacorus, 181-183 — Pacorus recalled by Orodes, 184. 
 
 XI. 
 
 Second War of Parthia with Rome — Parthian 
 Invasion of Syria, Palestine, and Asia 
 Minor ....... 185-202 
 
 Negotiations between Orodes and Pompey, 185-187 — Julius
 
 Xll CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Caesar in the East, 187, 188 — His supposed intention of invad- 
 ing Parthia, 188 — His death, 189 — Parthia's part in the War 
 of the " Liberators," 189, 190 — The situation after the Battle 
 of Philippi, 190, 191 — Orodes determines to invade the Roman 
 territory, 191 — Great invasion under Pacorus and Labienus, 
 191, 192 — Fall of Antioch, 192 — Reduction of Syria, Phoe- 
 nicia, and Palestine : Parthian occupation of Jerusalem, 193 
 — Asia Minor overrun by Labienus, 193, 194 — Turn of the 
 tide : Successes of Ventidius, 194-196 — Renewed attack by 
 Pacorus, 106 — His defeat by Ventidius, and death, 197 — 
 Final failure of the invasion, 198 — Reflections on this first 
 period of struggle, 198-200 — Grief of Orodes at the death of 
 Pacorus, 200 — His abdication in favour of Phraates IV., 201 
 — His death and character, 201, 202. 
 
 XII. 
 
 Expedition of Mark Antony against Parthia 
 — its Failure — War between Parthia and 
 Media ......*. 203-218 
 
 Accession of Phraates IV., 203 — His cruelties, 204 — Intrigues 
 of Monneses with Antony, 204-206 — Re-olve of Antony to 
 attack Parthia, 206, 207 — His preparations, 207 — His junction 
 with Artavasdes, and attack on Media Atropatene, 208 — The 
 march to I'raaspa, 209 — The siege, 209-21 1 — Commencement 
 of the retreat, 211 — Antony's heavy losses, 212, 213 — Quarrel 
 of Phraates with the Median subject-king, 213, 214 — Alliance 
 between that king and Antony, 214 — Antony seizes the person 
 of Artava?des, and occupies Armenia, 215 — Arranges matters 
 with the Median king and quits Asia, 216, 217 — Phraates 
 recovers Media Atropatene, and Armenia regains her indepen- 
 dence, 217 — Result of the expedition of Antony favourable, 
 rather than the reverse, to Parthia, 218. 
 
 XIII. 
 
 Internal Troubles in Parthia — Her Relations 
 
 with Rome under Augustus and Tiberius 219-245 
 
 Troubles in Parthia : Revolt of Tiridates, 219 — Negotiations 
 between Phraates IV. and Augustus, 220, 221 — Later years of
 
 CONTENTS. Xlll 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Phraates, 221, 222 — He sends four of his sons to Rome, 222, 
 223 — Revolution in Armenia, 223, 224 — Phraates takes Ar- 
 mena under his protection, 224, 225 — Caius sent by Augustus 
 to settle the affairs of the East, 225, 226 — Revolution in 
 Parthia : Phraates murdered and throne seized by Phraataces, 
 226 — Negotiations between Phraataces and Augustus, 227, 
 228 — Conference between Caius and Phraataces : Submission 
 of the latter, 228, 229 — Difficult position of Phraataces : 
 his deposition by his subjects, 229, 230 — Short reign of 
 Orodes II., 230 — Accession of Vonones, 230, 231 — His vic- 
 tory over the pretender, Artabanus, 232, 233 — His later for- 
 tunes, 233, 234 — Reign of Artabanus III. : Visit of Ger- 
 manicus to the East, 234-236 — Peaceful interval, 236, 237 — 
 Ambition of Artabanus : he occupies Armenia, 237 — Tiberius 
 stirs up fresh troubles in Parthia, 238-241 — Flight of Artabanus 
 to Hyrcania, 241 — Tiridates III. made king by the Romans, 
 241, 242 — Return of Artabanus and expulsion of Tiridates, 
 243,244 — Peace concluded between Artabanus and Rome, 245. 
 
 XIV. 
 
 ASINAI AND ANIT.AI — An EPISODE OF PARTHIAN 
 
 History ....... 246-256 
 
 Important Tewish element in the population of Parthia, 246, 
 247 — Freedom allowed the Jewish communities, 247, 248 — 
 Early history of Asinai and Anilai, 248 — Their first successes : 
 Asinai made satrap of Babylon, 249 — Fresh outbreak on the 
 part of Anilai, 249, 250 — He supersedes his brother as satrap, 
 250 — Anilai's misgovernment, 250 — His quarrel with Mithri- 
 dates, and cruel treatment of him, 250, 251 — Mithridates re- 
 venges himself: Defeat and death of Anilai, 251, 252 — Attack 
 on the Jewish population of Babylon, 252, 253 — Flight to 
 Seleucia, 253 — Massacres of Jews in Seleucia and Ctesiphon, 
 254 — Reflections on the occurrences, 254-256. 
 
 XV. 
 
 End of the Reign of Artabanus III. — Gotarzes 
 
 and his Rivals 257-269 
 
 Further troubles in Parthia — Death of Artabanus, 257, 258 — 
 Revolt of Seleucia, 258, 259 — Succession disputed between
 
 XIV CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 his sons — Vardanes and Gotarzes — First reign of Gotarzes, 
 259 — Gotarzes driven from his throne by Vardanes, 260— Ar- 
 rangement made between the brothers, 261 — Quarrel of Var- 
 danes with Izates, 261, 262 — Gotarzes attacks Vardanes, but 
 without success, 262, 263 — Vardanes murdered by his subjects, 
 263 — Second reign of Gotarzes: discontent 01 the Parthians 
 with his government, 263, 264 — Appearance of a pretender in 
 the person of Meherdates, 264 — Support lent him by the 
 Roman Emperor, Claudius, 264,265 — Invasion of Meherdates, 
 and its failure, 265-267 — Monument set up by Gotarzes to 
 commemorate his victory, 267, 268 — Death of Gotarzes, and 
 decline of Parthia under him, 268, 269. 
 
 XVI. 
 Parthia in the Time of Nero — Vologases I. 
 
 AND CORBULO ...... 270-290 
 
 Two-months' reign of Vonones II. and accession of Volo- 
 gases I., 270 — His brothers, Pacorus and Tiridates, 271 — His 
 first attempt upon Armenia fails, 272, 273 — His quarrel with 
 Izates, 273, 274 — His Scythian war, 274 — His second attack 
 on Armenia succeeds : Tiridates established there as king, 274, 
 275 — Rome threatens war, but at first only negotiates, 275- 
 277 — Civil war for three years between Vologases and his son, 
 Vardanes II., 277 — Negotiations between Vologases and Cor- 
 bulo, 278 — Corbulo recovers Armenia and dismembers it, 279 
 — Vologases occupied in Hyrcania, 279, 280 — War with Rome 
 renewed : Campaign of a.d. 62, 281, 282 — Arrival of Paetus 
 in the East : his relations with Corbulo, 282-284 — Successes 
 of Vologases against Partus, 284, 285 — Re-establishment of 
 Tiridates in Armenia, 285 — " Eirenicon " proposed by Volo- 
 gases to Nero, 285,286 — "Eirenicon" accepted, and peace 
 made, 286, 287 — Journey of Tiridates to Kome, and his in- 
 vestiture by Nero with the crown of Armenia, 287-290. 
 
 XVII. 
 
 Vologases I. and Vespasian— Pacorus II. and 
 
 Decebalus of Dacia .... 291-298 
 
 Little light thrown on Parthian history by Roman writers for
 
 CONTENTS. XV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 the next fifty years, 291, 292 — Friendly relations of Vologases 
 I. with Vespasian and Titus, 292 — Attempt made by Pectus to 
 trouble the relations fails, 292-294 — Invasion of Parthia by 
 the Alans ; application to Rome for aid refused ; coolness 
 between the two powers, 294-296 — Accession to the throne of 
 Pacorus II., 296 — Negotiations between Pacorus and the 
 Dacian monarch, Decebalus, 297, 298 — Pacorus troubled by a 
 pretender, named Artabanus, 298. 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 Chosroes and Trajan — Trajan's Asiatic Con- 
 quests — Relinquishment of these Conquests 
 by Hadrian ...... 299-317 
 
 Accession of Chosroes : Trajan's designs against the East, 
 299-302 — His march to the Euphrates, and seizure of Partha- 
 masiris, 302-304 — Armenia made a Roman province, 305 — 
 Parthia invaded by Trajan : Mesopotamia conquered, and 
 made a province, 305, 306— Advance from Nisibis to the 
 Tigris, and passage of the Tigris, 307, 308 — Conquest of 
 Adiabene, 308 — Fall of Hatra and Babylon ; submission of 
 Ctesiphon, 309 — Trajan's pleasure voyage, 310 — Revolts in 
 his rear, 310, 311 — His retreat, repulse at Hatra, and death, 
 312, 313 — Trajan's conquests relinquished by Hadrian, 313, 
 314 — Friendly relations between Chosroes and Hadrian, 315 
 — Later years of Chosroes, 316 — Troubles caused him by 
 Pretenders, 317. 
 
 XIX. 
 
 Vologases II. and Antoninus Pius — Vologases 
 
 III. and Verus . . . . . 318-330 
 
 Accession of Vologases II., 318 — Alanic war, 319 — Hadrian 
 and Pharasmanes, 319, 320 — Vologases II. and Antoninus, 
 320, 321 — Reign of Vologases III. ; he invades Armenia, 322 
 —Defeats Severianus and attacks Syria, 323 — Verus sent to 
 the East : Armenia recovered, 324 — Great expedition of Avi- 
 dius Cassius, 325-327 — Results of the expedition, 327, 328 — 
 Later years of Vologases III. : His relations with Marcus 
 Aurelius and Commodus, 328-330.
 
 XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 XX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS .... 33I~345 
 
 Reign of Vologases IV.: Death of Commodus, 331, 332 — 
 Pretensions of Pescennius Niger : His struggle with Severus, 
 332-334 — Mesopotamian expedition of Severus, 335, 336 — 
 His recall to the West : Parthian successes in his absence, 236, 
 337 — Great expedition of Severus against Parthia, 337-339— 
 Sack of Ctesiphon, 339 — Return of Severus through Meso- 
 potamia ; .Siege of Hatra, 340-343 — Failure of the siege, 343, 
 344 — General results of the expedition, 344, 345. 
 
 XXI. 
 
 Artabanus V. and Caracallus — The Last War 
 
 with Rome — Defeat of Macrinus . . 346-357 
 
 Parthian throne disputed between Artabanus and his brother, 
 Vologases ; Artabanus holds the Western provinces, 346, 347 
 — Mad project of Caracallus, 347, 348 — His negotiations with 
 Artabanus, 348-350 —His peaceful journey to Ctesiphon, and 
 Festive Meeting with the Parthian monarch, 350, 351 — His 
 cruel massacre of the unarmed multitude, 352— His violation 
 of the Parthian Royal sepulchres, 352, 353 — His lion-hunting, 
 353 — His murder by his guards, 354 — Difficulties of his suc- 
 cessor, Macrinus, 354, 355 — Three days' fight at Nisibis, 355, 
 356 — Macrinus forced to purchase a peace, 357. 
 
 XXII. 
 
 Revolt of the Persians — Downfall of the 
 
 Parthian Empire 358-37° 
 
 Tendency of the Parthian Empire to disintegration, 358, 359 
 — Frequency of revolts, 359, 360 — Grounds of the general 
 discontent, 360-362 — Special grievances alleged by the Per- 
 sians, 363, 364 — Other probable causes of dissatisfaction, 364, 
 365 — Revolt of Persia, and struggle between Artabanus and 
 Artaxerxes ; Artabanus defeated and slain, 366, 367 — Last 
 efforts of Artavasdes, 367, 368 — Duration and character of the 
 Parthian Empire, 368-370. 
 
 "?R a" ~a- 

 
 CONTENTS. XV11 
 
 XXIII. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Parthian Art, Religion, and Customs . 372-419 
 
 Parthian architecture, 372, 373 — Buildings at Al Hadhr, or 
 Hatra, 373-383— Architectural fragments at Warka, 383-385 
 — Parthian fictile art, 385-388— Parthian aesthetic art, 389 — 
 Parthian reliefs, 389-393 — General estimate of their art, 393, 
 394 — Parthian religion, 394-396 — Customs in war, 396-404 
 — Customs in peace, 404-407 — Seclusion of women, 407 — 
 State and pomp of the king, 408-410 — Power of the nobles, 
 410-413 — Ordinary Parthian food, 413 — Degree of civilisation, 
 414-418 — General survey, 418, 419. 
 
 Appendix 420 
 
 Index 421
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 ROCK SCULPTURE OF GOTARZES AT BEHISTUN 
 
 MAP OF PARTHIAN EMPIRE 
 
 COIN OF TIRIDATES I. 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS I. 
 
 COIN OF PRIAPATIUS 
 
 COIN OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 COIN OF PHRAATES II. 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS II. 
 
 COIN OF MITHRIDATES II. 
 
 COIN OF SANATRGECES 
 
 COIN OF MITHRIDATES III 
 
 COIN OF ORODES I. . 
 
 COIN OF PACORUS I. 
 
 COIN OF PHRAATES IV. 
 
 COIN OF TIRIDATES II. 
 
 COIN OF PHRAATACES AND MUSA 
 
 COIN OF ORODES II. 
 
 COIN OF VONONES I. 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS III 
 
 COIN OF VARDANES I. 
 
 COIN OF GOTARZES . 
 
 Frontispiece 
 facing p. i 
 
 5° 
 58 
 61 
 
 63 
 9i 
 
 "5 
 
 130 
 
 135 
 
 144 
 
 J5 1 
 1S1 
 
 204 
 
 220 
 
 227 
 
 230 
 
 232 
 
 260 
 263
 
 XX 
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 COIN OF VOLOGASES I. 
 
 COIN OF VARDANES II. . 
 
 COIN OF PACORUS II. 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS IV. . 
 
 COIN OF CHOSROES . 
 
 COINS OF VOLOGASES II. . 
 
 COIN OF MITHRIDATES IV. 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS IV. . 
 
 COIN OF VOLOGASES III. . 
 
 COIN OF VOLOGASES IV. . 
 
 COIN OF VOLOGASES V. 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS V. . 
 
 COIN OF ARTAVASDES 
 
 MAP OF PARTHIA PROPER 
 
 GROUND PLAN OF THE CITY OF AL HADHR 
 
 PLAN OF THE PALACE-TEMPLE OK HATRA 
 
 FRIEZE IN THE PALACE-TEMPLE OF HATRA 
 
 STONES OF ARCHIVOLTS .... 
 
 PILASTER AT HATRA, WITH CORNICE AND CAPITAL 
 
 PROPOSED RESTORATION OF THE HATKA BUILDING 
 
 ARCHITECTURAL FRAGMENTS AT WARKA 
 
 PARTHIAN JUGS AND JARS 
 
 PARTHIAN SLIPPER-COFFIN 
 
 PARTHIAN PERSONAL ORNAMENTS 
 
 PARTHIAN HELMET .... 
 
 ORDINARY DRESS OF PARTHIAN MONARCH 
 
 COIN OF KAMNASCIRAS ....
 
 THE STORY OF PARTHIA. 
 
 GEOGRAPHICAL — PARTHIA PROPER, 
 PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 AND THE 
 
 PARTHIA Proper, the earliest home (so far as our 
 knowledge extends) of the Parthian people, was, like 
 Persia Proper and Macedonia Proper, a tract of some- 
 what scanty dimensions. From the south-eastern 
 corner of the Caspian Sea there extends, in a direc- 
 tion a little south of east, a narrowish mountain 
 region, connected at one extremity with the lofty 
 Elburz range, w lich skirts the Caspian on the south, 
 and, at the other, with the Paropamisus, or Hindu 
 Kush. On eithe side, northwards and southwards, 
 stretch for hundreds of miles extensive sandy or 
 gravelly deserts, that to the north known as the 
 desert of Khorasan or Khiva, and that to the south 
 as the Great Salt Desert of Iran. Between these is 
 a comparatively rich and productive tract, reaching 
 from the fifty-fourth to the sixty-first meridian, a 
 distance of some seven degrees, or about three hun- 
 dred miles, with a breadth varying from two to three 
 degrees, and averaging about one hundred and
 
 2 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 seventy miles. This region, in the earliest times of 
 which we have any distinct historical knowledge, was 
 parcelled out into two countries, belonging to two 
 different peoples, and known respectively as Parthia 
 and Hyrcania. The exact line of demarcation which 
 separated the two, it is impossible to trace ; but there 
 is sufficient proof, that, while Hyrcania lay towards 
 the north and west, the Parthians held the districts 
 towards the east and south. The valleys of the Ettrek 
 and the Gurghan belonged to the former, while the 
 regions south and east of these valleys, the skirt of 
 the southern mountains from Damaghan to Shebri- 
 No, and the valleys of the Tejend and the river of 
 Nishapur, constituted the country of the latter. 
 
 If the limits of Parthia Proper be thus defined, it 
 will have corresponded nearly to the modern Persian 
 province of Khorasan — that is to say, it will have 
 extended from about Damaghan (long. 54 20') upon 
 the west to the Heri-rud, or river of Herat, upon the 
 east, and have comprised the modern districts of 
 Damaghan, Shah-rud, Sebzawar, Nishapur, Meshed, 
 Tersheez, and Shebri-No. Its length from east to 
 west will have been about three hundred miles, and 
 its average width about a hundred or a hundred and 
 twenty. It will have contained an area of about 
 33,000 square miles, being thus about equal in size 
 to Ireland, Bavaria, or St. Domingo. 
 
 The general character of the region is, as has been 
 observed, rich and productive. The mountain forma- 
 tion consists of four or five distinct ranges, having 
 between them latitudinal valleys, with glens trans- 
 verse to their courses. The valleys arc often well
 
 SIZE AND CHARACTER OF PARTHIA PROPER. 3 
 
 wooded ; the flat ground at the foot of the outer 
 ranges of hills is fertile ; water abounds ; and the 
 streams gradually collect into rivers which are of a 
 considerable size. Of these the principal are the 
 Tejend, or river of Meshed, and the river of Nishapur. 
 The Tejend rises from several sources in the central 
 mountain range, anciently known as Labus or Labuta, 
 and now as Alatagh, and runs with a course con- 
 siderably south of east, past Meshed, to a point 
 a little beyond the sixtieth meridian, where it de- 
 flects towards the left, and runs east and a little 
 north of east to the Heri-rud. Having absorbed the 
 Heri-rud, it makes a second, and still sharper, turn to 
 the left, and flows with a northerly and north-westerly 
 course past Sarrakhs — now a Russian post — along the 
 foot of the northern Parthian range, now known as 
 'the Hills of the Kurds," to a marsh, in which it is 
 swallowed up, between the fifty-seventh and fifty- 
 eighth parallels. The river of Nishapur is a smaller 
 stream. It rises from the mountains which on three 
 sides enclose that city, and flows southwards and 
 south-westwards towards the Iranian desert. At times 
 the water is entirely absorbed in the irrigation of the 
 fertile plain immediately south of Nishapur, but the 
 channel is always traceable, past Tersheez into the 
 desert, and in some seasons it carries a certain quan- 
 tity of water into that parched and arid region. 
 
 The valleys of these two streams are among the 
 most fertile and productive portions of the entire 
 territory ; but anciently the tract which was most 
 valued, and which supported the largest population, 
 seem to have been that which is now known as the
 
 4 PARTHTA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 " Atak," or" Skirt " — the low cultivable country at the 
 foot of the southern hills, intervening between them 
 and the desert. Along this whole region, from Dama- 
 ghan to Tersheez, the mountains send down a con- 
 tinued succession of rills, rivulets, and rivers, which 
 make it easy, at the expenditure of a little care and 
 labour, to carry the life-giving element to a distance 
 of four or five miles from their base. Some hus- 
 banding of the water may be needed, together with 
 the creation of a system of reservoirs and kanats, or 
 underground channels ; but, if these be provided, the 
 return is ample. The abundant remains of large 
 cities, crumbled into dust, along the entire " Atak " is 
 a sufficient indication of the beneficence of nature in 
 this tract of country, if it be only seconded by a fair 
 amount of human industry and skill. 
 
 On the other hand, the mountain tracts, of which 
 the country so largely consists, offer a strong contrast 
 to the valleys of the main streams, and to the southern 
 strip of territory. They are for the most part barren 
 and rugged, very scantily supplied with timber, and 
 only in places capable of furnishing a tolerable pas- 
 turage to flocks and herds. This is the more remark- 
 able, as they do not attain any great elevation. 
 While Mount Demavend in the Elburz range south of 
 the Caspian exceeds 20,000 feet, and the same eleva- 
 tion is reached, or exceeded, by many peaks in the 
 Paropamisus, the greatest altitude of the Parthian 
 ranges does not exceed ten thousand, or, at the utmost, 
 eleven thousand feet. The northern range, called now 
 the Daman-i-Koh, is the loftiest and the least known, 
 the rudeness of the Kurdish tribes by which it is in-
 
 CLIMATE OF PARTHIA PROPER. 5 
 
 habited repelling travellers : the central range, called 
 towards the west Alatagh, and towards the east Mac- 
 rabea, is considerably lower ; while the southern 
 range, called indifferently Djuvein and Jaghetai, is of 
 about the same elevation. 
 
 The climate of Parthia Proper, according to ancient 
 writers, was an extreme one, exceedingly hot in the 
 low plains, and exceedingly cold in the mountains. 
 But modern travellers are inclined to modify both 
 statements. They tell us, that the winters, although 
 protracted, are nowhere very inclement, the thermo- 
 meter rarely sinking below ten or twelve degrees of 
 Fahrenheit during the nights, and during the day- 
 time rising, even in December and January, which 
 are the coldest months, to forty or fifty. The winter, 
 however, sets in early. Cold weather commences in 
 October, and continues till nearly the end of March, 
 when storms of sleet and hail are usual. A consider- 
 able quantity of snow falls in the earlier portion of the 
 winter, and the valleys are scarcely clear of it till 
 March. On the mountains it remains much longer, 
 and forms the chief source of supply for the rivers 
 during the spring and the early summer time. In the 
 height of summer the heat is undoubtedly great, 
 more especially in the region known as the " Atak," 
 or " Skirt " ; and here the unwholesome wind, which 
 blows from the southern desert, is felt from time to 
 time as a terrible scourge. But in the upland country 
 the heat is at no time very intense ; and the natives 
 boast at the present day that they are not compelled 
 by it to sleep upon their house-tops more than one 
 month during the year.
 
 6 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 The country, though reported by modern travellers 
 to be only scantily clothed with wood, is still found 
 to produce the pine, the walnut, the sycamore, the 
 ash, the poplar, the willow, the vine, the mulberry, the 
 apricot, and numerous other fruit trees. There is 
 reason to believe that, in ancient times, if the variety 
 of trees was not so great, the number of them was 
 very much greater. Strabo calls the territory haaeta, 
 or " densely wooded." Among indigenous plants are 
 saffron, the assafcetida plant, and the gum ammoniac 
 plant. Wheat, barley, and cotton are capable of being 
 raised in large quantities ; and the fertility is such 
 that the ordinary return on wheat and barley, under 
 a bad system of cultivation, is reckoned at ten for one, 
 while instances are said to have been known of the 
 return of a hundred for one. The return from rice, 
 according to one witness, is often four hundred for 
 one ! Game abounds in the mountains, and fish in 
 the underground watercourses. Among mineral pro- 
 ducts may be mentioned salt, iron, copper, and lead. 
 The mountains contain precious stones of several 
 kinds, especially that delicate and valuable gem, the 
 turquoise. 
 
 Starting from this narrow, but fairly productive 
 region, the Parthians gradually brought under their 
 dominion the greater portion of Western Asia. Very 
 soon after establishing their own independence, they 
 made an attack on their nearest neighbour to the west, 
 Hyrcania. Hyrcania was a country geographically 
 connected, in the closest way, with Parthia, very 
 similar in general character, but richer, warmer, and 
 altogether more desirable. It occupied the western
 
 PARTHIAN CONQUESTS — HYRCANIA. 7 
 
 half of the mountain region already described (p. 2) 
 — extending from the Caspian Sea to the Heri-rud — 
 whereof the eastern half was Parthia. Mainly com- 
 posed of the two fertile valleys of the Gurghan and 
 Ettrek, with the mountain chains enclosing and 
 dividing them, it was a picturesque and richly wooded 
 district almost as large as Parthia itself, and con- 
 siderably more productive. Here, on the slopes of 
 the hills, grew the oak, the beech, the elm, the alder, 
 the wild cherry ; here luxuriant vines sprang from 
 the soil on every side, raising themselves aloft by the 
 aid of their stronger sisters, and hanging in wild 
 festoons from tree to tree ; beneath their shade the 
 ground was covered with flowers of various kinds, 
 primroses, violets, lilies, hyacinths, and others of un- 
 known species ; while in the flat land at the bottom 
 of the valleys were meadows of the softest and ten- 
 dcrest grass, capable of affording to numerous flocks 
 and herds an excellent and never-failing pasture. 
 Vast quantities of game found shelter in the forests, 
 while towards the mouths of the rivers, where the 
 ground is for the most part marshy, large herds of 
 wild boars were frequent, and offered a variety to 
 sportsmen. Altogether Hyrcania was a most valu- 
 able and desirable region, and well deserved Strabo's 
 description of it as "highly favoured of heaven." Its 
 fertility was extraordinary. We are told that a single 
 vine in Hyrcania produced nine gallons of wine, and 
 a single fig-tree ninety bushels of figs, while corn 
 did not require to be sown by the hand, but sprang 
 sufficiently from the casual droppings of the last 
 year's crop.
 
 8 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 Not very long after the absorption of Hyrcania, the 
 Parthian arms were directed against the country of 
 the Mardi. This region adjoined on Hyrcania towards 
 the west, and consisted mainly of the mountain tract 
 which shuts in the Caspian on the south, forming a 
 continuation of the most southern of the three 
 Parthian chains, and generally known under the 
 appellation of Elburz. It is uncertain how far the 
 Mardian territory extended towards the west, but 
 probable that it was comprised within about two 
 degrees, reaching from the neighbourhood of Dama- 
 ghan to the great mountain of Demavend, or from 
 E. long. 54 to 5 2° nearly. It is generally described 
 as wholly rough and mountainous, but probably in- 
 cluded the tract between the foot of the mountains 
 and the Caspian— the eastern portion of the modern 
 Mazanderan. This is a rich flat plain of alluvial soil, 
 but little raised above the level of the neighbouring 
 sea, from which rise gently-swelling hills, gradually 
 increasing in elevation, and forming the supports of 
 the lofty range, which was the heart of the Mardian 
 territory. Here high rocky summits alternated with 
 dense pathless woods, the mountains being clothed 
 on their northern flank nearly to the top with dwarf 
 oaks, or with shrubs and brushwood ; while lower 
 down their sides were covered with forests of elms, 
 cedars, chestnuts, beeches, and cypress-trees. At the 
 present day, the gardens and orchards of the natives, 
 interspersed among the masses of primeval forest, are 
 of the most superb character ; the vegetation is 
 luxuriant ; lemons, oranges, peaches, pomegranates, 
 besides other fruits, abound ; rice, hemp, sugar-canes
 
 THE MARDIAN COUNTRY — MEDIA RHAGIANA. O, 
 
 mulberries, are cultivated with success ; vines grow 
 wild ; and the valleys are strewn with shrubs and 
 flowers of rare fragrance, among which may be noted 
 the rose, the honeysuckle, and the sweet-briar. Nature 
 however — inexorably just, as usual — has balanced 
 these extraordinary advantages with peculiar draw- 
 backs ; the tiger, scarcely known in any other part of 
 Western Asia, here lurks in the jungles, ready to 
 spring at any moment on the unwary traveller ; inun- 
 dations are frequent, and carry desolation far and 
 wide ; the waters, which thus escape from the river- 
 beds, stagnate in marshes, and, during the summer and 
 autumn heats, pestilential exhalations arise, which 
 destroy the stranger, and bring even the acclimatised 
 native to the brink of the grave. The Mardian territory- 
 was thus of no great value to the conquerors, except 
 as conducting to other and healthier regions, a neces- 
 sary link in the chain which was to unite East with 
 West, and by means of which were to be re-knit in 
 one the scattered fragments of the empire, which, 
 built up originally by Cyrus, had been destroyed by 
 Alexander. 
 
 The third tract which the Parthians annexed was a 
 portion of Media. A strong spur runs out from the 
 Elburz mountain range, about E. long. 52 20', which 
 projects far into the desert, and forms a marked 
 natural division between the regions west and east of 
 it. The tract immediately to the west of the spur 
 belonged to the ancient Media, and was known as 
 Media Rhagiana from its capital city, Rhages, situ- 
 ated in the angle between the spur and the main 
 range, at no great distance from either. Parthia, soon
 
 10 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 after the conquest of the Mardians, invaded this 
 territory, and effected a lodgment in it at a place 
 called Charax, quite close to the spur, probably on 
 the site now called Uewanikif. Hence, by degrees, 
 the rest of Rhagiana was overrun, and the entire tract 
 passed into the possession of the Parthians, as far 
 probably as Kasvin westward, and southward as far as 
 Kum. This was a district of a considerable size, a 
 hundred and fifty miles long from the spur to Kasvin, 
 and about eighty broad from the Elburz mountains 
 to Kum. It was an elevated plain, from three thou- 
 sand to four thousand feet above the sea level, having 
 a climate dry and healthy, but a soil of indifferent 
 quality. Portions of it belonged to the great central 
 Iranian desert, and were absolutely unproductive, 
 while the remainder could not boast any special fer- 
 tility. It possessed, however, salt in abundance, was 
 tolerably well watered, and could produce cereals and 
 green crops in sufficient quantity to sustain a numerous 
 population. 
 
 The next aggressive movement of the Parthians 
 was in the opposite direction — towards the east. Here 
 Parthia adjoined on the considerable state of Bactria, 
 which had grown up simultaneously with herself, and 
 had absorbed several extensive countries. Parthia's 
 first aggression was on a small scale, and its result 
 was merely the detachment from the Bactrian 
 dominion of two inconsiderable provinces, known 
 respectively as Turina and Aspionus. The exact 
 position of these tracts is unknown to us, but they 
 must certainly be placed in the western portion of 
 the Bactrian territory, and probably were districts
 
 PART OF BACTRIA— MEDIA MAGNA. II 
 
 north of the Paropamisus, cither upon the Murghab, 
 or upon the Ab-i-Kaisar river. The accession of 
 territory gained by this conquest was insignificant. 
 
 But some extensive and most valuable conquests 
 soon followed. Turning her attention once more 
 towards the west, Parthia made war upon Media, the 
 great country which had for a time held the first place 
 in Western Asia, and exercised a dominion which 
 reached from the Caspian Gates to the Halys, and 
 from the mouth of the Araxes to the vicinity of 
 Isfahan. Subjected first by Persia, and then by 
 Alexander the Great, she had sunk back within much 
 narrower limits, and had at the same time become 
 split up into three provinces— Media Rhagiana, Media 
 Magna, and Media Atropatene. The Parthians had 
 previously swallowed up, as already stated, Media 
 Rhagiana : now they attacked Media Magna. This 
 was an extensive tract situated between the thirty- 
 second and thirty-seventh parallels, and reaching from 
 the Great Salt Desert of Iran upon the east to the 
 main chain of Mount Zagros upon the west. Its 
 length from north to south was about five degrees, or 
 nearly three hundred and fifty miles, and its width 
 from west to east four degrees, or about two hundred 
 and forty miles. The entire area cannot have been 
 much under eighty thousand square miles, which is a 
 little less than the size of Great Britain, and a little 
 more than that of German Austria. The tract divides 
 itself into two portions — the w r estern and the eastern. 
 The western, which is rather more than one half of 
 the whole, lies within the limits of the broad mountain 
 region known as Zagros, and is a country of alternate
 
 12 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 mountain and valley, with here and there a tolerably 
 extensive plain, very productive, and for the most, part 
 picturesque and beautiful. The loftiest of the moun- 
 tains are bare and rugged towards their summits, but 
 the inferior ranges are thickly clothed with forests 
 quite to their top, while the valleys are full of mag- 
 nificent orchards and gardens. The walnut, the 
 Oriental plane, the dwarf oak, the willow, and the 
 poplar abound, while occasionally are to be seen the 
 ash, and the terebinth, or turpentine tree. The fruit- 
 trees in the orchards and gardens include, besides 
 vines and mulberries, the apple, the pear, the quince, 
 the plum, the almond, the nut, the chestnut, the olive, 
 the peach, the nectarine, and the apricot. With this 
 western region, the eastern is in strong contrast. East 
 of Zagros, where the mountains sink down almost 
 at once into the plain, lies a vast gravelly or sandy 
 plateau, covered often with a saline efflorescence, 
 called the " Kavir," and in places with a thick salt 
 deposit, only scantily supplied with water from 
 streams or wells which are often brackish, and crossed 
 in places by bare rocky ridges, destitute of all vege- 
 table mould, and incapable of nourishing even a bush 
 or a tuft of grass. Still, excepting where the salt 
 efflorescence prevails, even the plateau can be made 
 to produce good crops, if only water be supplied in 
 sufficient quantity. Hence the system of kanats, 
 which is of great antiquity. Everywhere the small 
 streams and rills which descend from the mountains, 
 and which, if left to themselves, would be almost 
 immediately absorbed by the sands of the desert, are 
 led into subterranean channels, which are placed at a
 
 EL AM OR SUSIANA. 1 3 
 
 considerable depth below the surface, and conducted 
 for many miles across the plain. Openings are made 
 at intervals, from which water may be drawn by 
 means of a bucket for purposes of irrigation ; and in 
 this way a considerable portion of the plateau is 
 brought into cultivation. 
 
 The conquest of Media Magna about doubled the 
 extent of the Parthian dominions, while it also soon 
 led to further acquisitions of a most important 
 character. On the western flank of Media Magna lay 
 the rich and valuable country, known originally as 
 Elam, and later on as Kissia or Susiana. This was an 
 extensive tract of very productive territory, interposed 
 between the main chain of Zagros and the lower 
 Tigris river, extending a distance of about five 
 degrees, or three hundred and fifty miles from north- 
 west to south-east, and having an average breadth of 
 about a hundred and fifty, or a hundred and sixty 
 miles, in the transverse direction. Like Media 
 Magna, it consisted of two strongly contrasted 
 regions. Towards the west was a broad tract of 
 fertile alluvium, intervening between the Tigris and 
 the mountains, well watered by numerous large 
 streams — the Jerahi, the Karun, the Kerkhah, the 
 Diala, and others — which are capable of giving an 
 abundant irrigation to almost the whole of the low 
 country. Above this region, towards the east and 
 the north-east, was a still more pleasant district, com- 
 posed of alternate mountain, valley, and upland plain, 
 abounding in beautiful glens, richly wooded, and full 
 of gushing brooks and clear rapid rivers. Much of 
 this region is of course uncultivable mountain, range
 
 14 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 succeeding range in six or eight nearly parallel lines, 
 as the traveller advances towards the north cast ; and 
 most of the ranges exhibiting vast tracts of bare and 
 often precipitous rock, in the clefts of which snow rests 
 till midsummer. Still the lower flanks of the mountains 
 are, in general, cultivable ; while the valleys teem with 
 orchards, and the plains furnish excellent pasture. 
 The region closely resembles the western portion of 
 Media Magna, whereof it is a continuation. As we 
 follow it, however, towards the south-east, into the 
 Bakhtiyari country, where it adjoins upon the ancient 
 Persia, it deteriorates in character, the mountains 
 becoming barer and more arid, and the valleys 
 narrower and less fertile. 
 
 The fate of Susiana decided that of the adjoining 
 countries of Babylonia and Persia, which seem to 
 have submitted to Parthia without a struggle. Baby- 
 lonia extended from the Persian Gulf on either side 
 of the mouth of the Euphrates to the extreme 
 northern limit of the alluvium, or to the vicinity of 
 Hit on the Euphrates, and Samarah on the Tigris — a 
 distance of about four hundred miles. The greatest 
 width was about one hundred and eighty miles ; but 
 the average width cannot be estimated at more than 
 sixty or seventy, so that the area probably did not 
 much exceed twenty-five thousand square miles. But 
 the qualities of the soil were such as rendered the 
 tract one of the chief granaries of the world. Accord- 
 ing to Herodotus and others, wheat, barley, and 
 millet, which were the grains principally grown, 
 yielded ordinarily a return of two hundred, and in 
 some instances of three hundred, fold. Palm groves
 
 BABYLONIA AND PERSIA. 1 5 
 
 were numerous all along the courses of the rivers, and 
 the dates which they produced were of first-rate 
 quality. Under the early Achaemenian kings, when 
 the food of the Court was supplied by each of the 
 provinces in turn for a fixed portion of the year,, 
 Babylonia had the duty of furnishing the supplies 
 during four months, so that it was reckoned equal, in 
 respect of resources, to one-third of the empire. Irri- 
 gation was so easy in Babylonia that the whole 
 country was brought under cultivation, and trans- 
 formed into a garden. Here Parthia inherited all the 
 advantages of an ancient civilisation, and had only to 
 maintain the works of earlier times — canals, sluices, 
 dams, embankments — in order to obtain from a single 
 province a supply of food equal to the wants of almost 
 her entire population. 
 
 Persia lay in the opposite direction from Babylonia, 
 towards the east and the south-east. It stretched 
 along the south-eastern shore of the Persian Gulf, 
 from the inner recess of the Gulf near Mashur to Cape 
 Jask, a little outside the straits of Ormuz, in E. long. 
 57° 40'. Inland it reached to the neighbourhood of 
 Isfahan on the west, and to the deserts of Kerman 
 and Yezd eastward. In length it thus extended to 
 about eight degrees of longitude, a distance of six 
 hundred and twenty miles, while in width it covered 
 five degrees of latitude, or nearly three hundred and 
 fifty miles. The entire area cannot have fallen much 
 short of one hundred and fifty thousand square miles. 
 The character of the region, speaking broadly, was 
 far inferior to that of either Babylonia or Susiana. 
 Along the coast, in the Ghermsir, or " warm country,"
 
 16 PARTHTA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 as it is now called, was a sandy tract, often impreg- 
 nated with salt, extending the whole length of the 
 province, being a continuation of the flat region of 
 Susiana, but falling very much short of that region 
 in all the qualities which make a territory valuable. 
 The soil is poor, consisting of alternate sand and clay 
 — it is ill-watered, the entire tract possessing scarcely 
 a single stream worthy of the name of river — and, 
 lying only just outside of the northern tropic, the 
 district is by its situation among the hottest in 
 Western Asia. Fortunately, it was not very large in 
 extent, since it reached inland a distance of only 
 from ten to fifty miles, and thus did not constitute 
 much more than one-eighth of the entire country. 
 Of the other seven-eighths a considerable portion — 
 perhaps as much as half — was very little superior, 
 consisting of salt or sandy deserts, especially those of 
 Kerman and Yezd, which were almost wholly unpro- 
 ductive by nature, and capable of only a very scanty 
 cultivation. But, between these two arid districts, 
 the stretch of hilly country which separated them 
 was of a superior character, consisting of mountain, 
 plain, and valley curiously intermixed, and for the 
 most part fairly fertile. In places it is rich, 
 picturesque, and romantic, almost beyond imagina- 
 tion, with lovely wooded dells, green mountain sides, 
 and broad plains suited for the production of crops 
 of almost any description. But, more commonly 
 these features are absent, and there is a general look 
 of sterility and barrenness which is unpleasant, or 
 even forbidding. The supply of water is, almost 
 everywhere, scanty. Scarcely any of the streams are
 
 ASSYRIA. 17 
 
 strong enough to reach the sea. After short courses, 
 they are either absorbed by the sand, or end in small 
 salt lakes, from which the superfluous water is evapo- 
 rated. Persia Proper deserves, on the whole, the 
 description which its ancient inhabitants gave of 
 it to Cyrus the Great — " a scant land and a rugged " — 
 a land in which subsistence can only be obtained by 
 strenuous and continual labour, and where the vicissi- 
 tudes of climate are such as to brace and harden 
 those who dwell in it. 
 
 Another country, probably subjugated about the 
 same time as Media Magna, Susiana, Babylonia, and 
 Persia Proper, was Assyria. Assyria, which had 
 been long previously reduced nearly within its original 
 limits, was at this period a smallish country, interposed 
 between Mount Zagros and the Tigris, bounded on 
 the east by Media Magna, on the north by Armenia, 
 on the west by Mesopotamia, and on the south by 
 Susiana or Elymais. Its greatest length was about 
 three hundred and twenty miles, and its average 
 width about a hundred. It would thus have had an 
 area of about thirty-two thousand square miles, or 
 have been equal in size to Ireland. But these narrow 
 limits were amply compensated by the fertility of the 
 soil. The tract between the Zagros mountains and 
 the Tigris is principally an alluvium brought down by 
 the rivers, which from time to time overflow their 
 banks and spread themselves far and wide over the 
 flat country. It produces excellent crops of wheat, 
 barley, millet, and sesame ; besides growing palms in 
 places, as well as walnuts, Oriental planes, sycamores, 
 and poplars. The lower ranges of hills, outposts of
 
 18 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 Zagros, bore olives, and in favoured situations the 
 citron was largely cultivated ; while figs, vines, mul- 
 berries, pomegranates, and other fruit-trees were 
 common. Of minerals, Assyria produced iron, cop- 
 per, lead, bitumen, naphtha, petroleum, sulphur, alum, 
 and salt. 
 
 The empire having been thus far extended towards 
 the west, the time seemed to have arrived when some- 
 thing like an equivalent expansion towards the east 
 was desirable. Bactria had hitherto stood in the 
 way of any considerable Parthian advance in this 
 direction ; and though Parthia had contrived to filch 
 from her two small districts, yet no real impression 
 had been made upon the powerful Bactrian kingdom, 
 which at this time bore rule over the entire territory 
 between the Tejend and the Hydaspes. But, soon 
 after the time when the great expansion of the Par- 
 thian dominion towards the west was accomplished, 
 Bactria began to decline in power, and may be said to 
 have invited invasion. In the war which followed 
 between the two countries, the success of the Par- 
 thian arms was marvellous. A few years sufficed for 
 the subjugation of Bactria Proper, of Margiana, Aria, 
 Sarangia or Drangiana, Sacastana, Arachosia, and per- 
 haps we may add Sagartia and Chorasmia. It follows 
 to give a short account of each of these countries. 
 
 Bactria Proper, the nucleus from which the Bac- 
 trian Empire had proceeded, may be considered as 
 equivalent to the upper valley of the Ox us, or, in 
 other words, to that valley from the remotest sources 
 of the river towards the east down to its entrance on 
 the great Chorasmian desert, in about E. long.
 
 BACTRTA ASD MARGIANA. 19 
 
 65 30', towards the west. The valley is enclosed on 
 the north by the Hazaret Sultan, and Hissar moun- 
 tains, while on the south it is bounded by the Paro- 
 pamisus or Hindu Kush. Eastward it reaches to the 
 Pamir table-land, whence several of its head-streams 
 take their origin. Its length between the Pamir and 
 the desert is about three hundred and sixty miles, 
 while its width between the two mountain chains 
 varies from a hundred and forty to two hundred and 
 fifty miles. The area is probably twice as large as 
 that of Parthia Proper, and may be estimated at 
 about seventy thousand square miles. Much of the 
 tract, being situated at a high elevation above the 
 sea-level, is cold and infertile ; but the lower portion 
 of the valley, especially the country about the ancient 
 capital, Bactra, now Balkh, is fairly productive ; and 
 the region between the Oxus and the Paropamisus — 
 the southern moiety of the province, is regarded as 
 among the most valuable portions of Afghanistan. 
 
 Margiana, or the district upon the Margus river 
 (Marg-ab), adjoined Bactria upon the west, and, 
 though geographically reckoned as distinct, was 
 probably absorbed into it at an early period. It was 
 mainly a narrow tract, shut in by deserts on either 
 side, extending along the course of the Margus river 
 for a distance of some two hundred miles, and then 
 expanding suddenly into a broad oasis of the very 
 highest fertility. Known in ancient, and again in 
 modern times as Merv, it is still a region of some 
 importance, and has recently been annexed by Russia, 
 and connected by railway with Ashkabad and 
 Bokhara.
 
 20 PART HI A PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 Aria lay along the course of the River Arius, now 
 the Heri-rud, which, rising on the south side of the 
 Paropamisus in E. long. 6y° nearly, runs westward, 
 first through the mountains, and then along their 
 southern flank, until, about E. long. 6i°, it makes a 
 sweep round to the north, and finding, or forcing, a 
 way through the chain, joins the Tejend at Pul-i- 
 Khatun, in lat. 36 nearly. The course of the stream, 
 until it makes its great bend, measures between two 
 hundred and seventy and two hundred and eighty 
 miles ; and this may be regarded as the length of 
 Aria from east to west. Its width between the Paro- 
 pamisus and the tract known as Drangiana or 
 Sarangia is difficult to determine, but was certainly 
 not great. It may have averaged about fifty miles ; 
 which would give for the entire area a size of about 
 thirteen thousand square miles. The country was 
 well watered, and tolerably fertile, but it was placed 
 at too high an elevation to be more than moderately 
 productive, Aria (or Herat), the capital, being more 
 than three thousand feet above the sea-level, and the 
 rest of the country being, for the most part, consider- 
 ably more elevated. 
 
 Drangiana, or Sarangia, which adjoined on Aria 
 towards the south, was a region of much greater 
 extent, but of less fertility. It was the country 
 watered by the streams which flow into the Hamun, 
 or lake of Seistan, from the north-east and the north. 
 On the west it verged upon the great Iranian desert, 
 and partook of its character ; on the east it extended 
 to the upper sources of the Kash river. It is difficuLt 
 to determine its exact dimensions ; but it must have
 
 ARIA, SARANGIA, AND SACASTANA. 21 
 
 had an extent at least double that of Aria, and the 
 entire superficies may not have fallen very much short 
 of thirty thousand square miles. 
 
 Another country probably absorbed by Parthia at 
 this time was Sacastana or Seistan. Sacastana was 
 the country immediately south of the Hamun, or 
 Great Salt Lake, in which the river Helmend ends. 
 Except on the very banks of the Helmend, it was 
 almost wholly unproductive, and incapable of habita- 
 tion by any but a nomadic population. Portions of 
 it were, however, liable to inundation, when the Hel- 
 mend overflowed its banks ; and thus its general 
 character was alternate reedy swamp and arid sandy 
 desert. The extent was somewhat vague and indefi- 
 nite, since there were no marked boundaries, unless 
 the Helmend and Hamun may be reckoned such 
 towards the north. Eastward it melted into Satta- 
 gydia, southward into Gedrosia, and westward into 
 the desert of Kerman. 
 
 Dominion over Sarangia and Sacastana carried 
 with it, almost necessarily, the sovereignty over 
 Arachosia, which adjoined those countries upon the 
 east. Arachosia, named from the river Arachotus 
 (Argand-ab), a main tributary of the Helmend, con- 
 sisted of the mountain tract about Candahar and a 
 portion of the adjacent desert, now known as that of 
 Registan. It was a large, but not very valuable 
 country, and lay on the frontier of the Parthian 
 Empire towards the south-east. 
 
 The power which held Hyrcania, Parthia, Aria, 
 and Sarangia, was always predominant also in 
 Sagartia, which coincided with the eastern and
 
 22 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 north-eastern portions of the Iranian desert. The 
 Sagartians wandered freely over the greater part of 
 the central region, where they found a scanty sub- 
 sistence. Their country, notwithstanding its great 
 extent, was almost valueless, being incapable of 
 cultivation, and producing no mineral excepting 
 salt. 
 
 An equally unproductive and undesirable territory, 
 on the opposite side of the Parthian and Arian 
 mountain chain, is commonly regarded as forming, 
 together with Bactria, the limit of the Parthian 
 dominion, east of the Caspian, towards the north. 
 This is Chorasmia, or the country of the Choras- 
 mians, known to moderns as the desert of Khorasan, 
 which extends from the foot of the Bactrian, Par- 
 thian, and Hyrcanian hills to the old course of the 
 Oxus, from its entrance on the desert to its ancient 
 principal mouth. Chorasmia is thus a very extensive 
 country, not less than six hundred miles in length 
 by three hundred in breadth ; but its value is exceed- 
 ingly slight, since, «except along the course of the 
 Oxus, or modern Amu Daria, it does not admit of 
 cultivation. 
 
 By the absorption of these various countries, and 
 regions Parthia obtained her fullest extension towards 
 the east and the north-east, but she was still able to 
 make important additions to her dominions on the 
 opposite side of her empire, especially towards the 
 north-west. At a comparatively early period, certainly 
 before her wars with Rome began, she made herself 
 mistress of the extensive and valuable region of 
 Mesopotamia Proper, which was the tract enclosed
 
 MESOPOTAMIA. 23 
 
 between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, bounded 
 on the north by Armenia, and on the south by the 
 Babylonian alluvium. The length of this region 
 from north-west to south-east was at least three 
 hundred and fifty miles, while its breadth, where it 
 was broadest, cannot be estimated at much under two 
 hundred and sixty. But as in some places the width 
 did not exceed fifty miles, the entire area, it is pro- 
 bable, fell short of fifty thousand square miles. Much 
 of it was very unproductive, being a treeless plain, 
 the home of the wild ass, the bustard, and the gazelle; 
 but towards the north there was more fertility, and 
 the Mons Masius, together with its southern skirt, 
 and the valley of the Tigris north of it, were tracts 
 of some considerable value. Masius produces abun- 
 dant timber, together with manna and gall-nuts ; the 
 pistachio grows wild in the district between Orfah and 
 Diabekr ; the Sinjar range of hills is noted for the 
 cultivation of the fig ; and the whole northern region 
 is favourable to the growth of fruit-trees, and produces 
 walnuts, oranges, lemons, pomegranates, apricots, and 
 mulberries. 
 
 During the period of the wars with Rome the 
 limits of the Parthian Empire fluctuated greatly. 
 Provinces were conquered and reconquered ; large 
 annexations were made and then relinquished ; whole 
 countries were ceded, and, after a time, recovered. 
 This is not the place for tracing out and placing on 
 record all these various changes. We are concerned 
 only with the question of Parthia's extremest limits 
 at her most flourishing period. In order, however, to 
 complete our sketch of this subject, we must bring
 
 24 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 under the reader's notice two more districts — Media 
 Atropatene and Armenia. 
 
 Media Atropatene, which became ultimately a 
 dependency of Parthia, was the tract directly west 
 of the lower Caspian Sea, extending from the River 
 Araxes (Aras) towards the north to the borders of 
 Media Magna and Media Rhagiana towards the 
 south. Westward it bordered on Armenia, with 
 which it was sometimes connected politically. Its 
 southern boundary lay almost along the line of the 
 thirty-sixth parallel. It was thus very nearly a 
 square, extending from east to west for the space of two 
 hundred and forty, and from north to south for the 
 space of about two hundred and twenty miles. The 
 area did not fall much short of fifty thousand square 
 miles. Its chief rivers were the Aras and the Sefid- 
 rud ; and it further contained within it the remark- 
 able lake of Urumiah. The tract was mountainous, 
 but fairly fertile, with a cold climate in the winter, 
 but a delicious one during the summer months. It 
 was a region of considerable value, and is still much 
 prized by its possessors, the modern Persians. 
 
 Armenia, which, to the west of the Caspian, closed 
 in the Parthian territory towards the north when the 
 empire had reached its acme, lay north-west and 
 partly north of Atropatene. It reached from the 
 Caspian at the mouth of the Aras to the elbow of 
 the Euphrates, in lat. 38 30', long. 38 25' nearly, a 
 distance of about six hundred miles, and extended 
 from Iberia on the north to Mount Niphates on the 
 south, a distance of rather more than two hundred 
 miles. But Armenia was lozenge-shaped, narrowing
 
 MEDIA ATROPATENE AND ARMENIA. 25 
 
 gradually towards both extremities ; and thus the area 
 did not much exceed sixty thousand square miles. 
 The character of the region closely resembled that of 
 Atropatene, but was on the whole superior ; and 
 Armenia is found to have been a productive terri- 
 tory, which exported wine to Babylon, and traded 
 in the markets of Phoenicia with horses and mules 
 (Ezek. xxvii. 14). 
 
 It would seem, then, that the Parthian Empire, 
 when at the highest pitch of prosperity, extended 
 fully two thousand miles from east to west between 
 the Pamir upland and the Euphrates, while it had a 
 general width of about five or six hundred miles 
 between its northern and southern frontiers. It 
 included the whole of modern Persia, the greater 
 part of Affghanistan, much of Turkey in Asia, and 
 some large regions which are now in the possession 
 of the Russians. As Persia is said to extend over 
 five hundred thousand square miles, and Affghanistan 
 over two hundred thousand, while the Russian and 
 Turkish provinces which were once Parthian cannot be 
 estimated to contain less than one hundred thousand 
 square miles, the whole territory included within 
 the empire of the Parthians at its greatest extent 
 can scarcely have fallen far short of eight hundred 
 thousand square miles. It would thus have been 
 about equal in extent to France, Germany, Austria, 
 and Turkey in Europe put together. 
 
 The boundaries of the empire were, upon the 
 north, Iberia, the river Kur or Cyrus, the Caspian, 
 the Oxus, and the Hazaret Sultan, and Hissar ranges ; 
 on the east, the Pamir, the Bolor Chain, and the
 
 26 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 valley of the Indus ; on the south, Beluchistan and 
 the Persian Gulf ; on the west, Cappadocia and the 
 Euphrates. Westward of the Euphrates lay the 
 territory of Rome ; northward of the Oxus were the 
 wild tribes of Scythia, Alani, Massagetae, Yue-ehi, 
 and others ; on the eastern frontier were the Indo- 
 Scyths, a weak and divided people. Only two 
 neighbours seemed to be of much account — Rome 
 upon the west, and the Scythic tribes upon the 
 north and north-east. With each of these enemies 
 Parthia had important and dangerous wars, but her 
 destruction came from neither. Revolt within her 
 own borders brought the Parthian dominion to an 
 end, and substituted in its place the Second Persian 
 or Sassanian monarchy.
 
 II. 
 
 ETHNOGRAPHICAL — TURANIAN CHARACTER OF 
 THE PARTHIAN PEOPLE. 
 
 THE Parthians do not appear in history as a people 
 until the time of Darius, the son of Hystaspes (B.C. 
 521-515). There is no mention of them in the Old 
 Testament, cr in the Assyrian Inscriptions, or in 
 the Zendavesta. We first find any record of their 
 existence in the great Inscription of Darius, at 
 Behistun. They are there called the " Parthva," or 
 " Parthvva," and appear in close connection with the 
 " Varkana," or people of Hyrcania. Darius regards 
 them as his subjects, and speaks of their "revolting" 
 against his father, Hystaspes, who seems to have been 
 at the time their satrap, and fighting a battle with 
 him within the limits of their own country. They 
 were defeated with the loss of about ten thousand 
 men in killed and prisoners ; after which they sub- 
 mitted, and returned to their allegiance. 
 
 Through the rest of the Achaemenian period (B.C. 
 515-331) we never hear of them but as faithful 
 Persian subjects. They were assigned by Darius to 
 his sixteenth satrapy, and united in it with the 
 Arians, the Sogdians, and the Chorasmians. They
 
 28 TURANIAN CHARACTER OF PARTHIAN PEOPLE. 
 
 took part in the expedition of his son, Xerxes, 
 against Greece. They fought at Issus and at Arbela. 
 We never hear of their joining in any revolt after 
 their one attempt in the time of general disturbance 
 at the beginning of the reign of Darius. If they did 
 not offer a very strenuous resistance to Alexander, 
 it was probably because the Persian Empire had 
 collapsed, and the conqueror appeared to be irre- 
 sistible. 
 
 This fidelity to the Persian rule, combined with 
 the fact that geographically Parthia was situated in 
 the midst of a group of purely Arian tribes — the 
 Hyrcanians, Chorasmians, Margians, Arians of 
 Herat, Bactrians, Sagartians, and Sarangians — has 
 led some writers on ethnography to maintain that 
 the Parthians, like all the other people of the Iranian 
 plateau, belonged to the Iranian family. They 
 certainly affected, to a large extent, Persian names 
 — e.g., Mithridates, Tiridates, Artabanus, Orobazus, 
 Rhodaspes, Chosroes, if that is a form of Cyrus 
 (Kitrush in Persian) — and some of the appellations 
 peculiar to them are explainable by Arian ety- 
 mologies. " Priapatius," for instance, has been in- 
 geniously compared with the Zendic " Frijapaitis," 
 which means, like the Greek " Philopator," " Lover 
 of his father." But conjectural explanations of 
 names are an exceedingly unsafe basis for ethno- 
 logical speculations. And it is certain that the 
 Parthian names do not, as a general rule, suggest 
 the idea of derivation from Arian sources. 
 
 If we ask what the ancient writers have left on 
 record with respect to the Parthian nationality, we
 
 CALLED SCYTHS BY THE ANCIENT WRITERS. 29 
 
 shall find, in' the first place, a general consensus that 
 they were Scyths. " The Parthian race is Scythic," 
 says Arrian. " The Parthians," says Justin, in his 
 " Epitome of Trogus Pompeius," " were a race of 
 Scyths, who at a remote date separated themselves 
 from the rest of the nation, and occupied the 
 southern portion of the Chorasmian desert, whence 
 they gradually made themselves masters of the 
 mountain region adjoining it." Strabo adds to this, 
 that the particular Scythic tribe whereto they 
 belonged was that of the Dahae ; that their own 
 proper and original name was Parni, or Aparni ; 
 and that they had migrated at a remote period from 
 the country to the north of the Palus Masotis (Sea of 
 Azov), where they left the great mass of their fellow- 
 tribesmen. Some time after this the theory was 
 started that they were Scyths whom Sesostris, on 
 his return from his supposed Scythian expedition, 
 brought into Asia and settled in the mountain tract 
 south-east of the Caspian. We cannot put much 
 faith in the details of any of these various state- 
 ments, since, in the first place, they are contradictory, 
 and, in the second, they are, most of them, highly 
 improbable. Sesostris, for instance, if there ever 
 was such a king, no more made an expedition into 
 Scythia than into Lapland or Kamskatka. No 
 Egyptian monarch ever penetrated further north 
 than the mountain chains of Taurus and Niphates. 
 Arrian's story is a mere variant of the tale told to 
 Herodotus and Diodorus, and believed by them, of 
 the planting of Scythian colonists in Colchis by the 
 hypothetical Sesostris ; and it is even more impro-
 
 30 TURANIAN CHARACTER OF PARTHIAN PEOPLE. 
 
 bable, since it makes the returning conqueror depart 
 from his natural course, and go a thousand miles 
 out of his way, to plant for no purpose a colony in 
 a region which he w r as never likely to visit again. 
 Strabo's migration tale is less incredible, since the 
 tribes to the north of the Euxine and Caspian lived 
 in a constant state of unrest, and migratory move- 
 ments on their part, far exceeding the supposed 
 Parthian movement in the distance traversed, are 
 among the most certain facts of ancient history. 
 But it is difficult to see what trustworthy authority 
 Strabo could even suppose that he had for his 
 assertions, since the migration of which he speaks 
 must have taken place at least six hundred years 
 before his own time, and migratory races rarely 
 retain any tradition of their origin for so much as 
 a century. Strabo, moreover, admits it to be doubt- 
 ful whether there ever were any Dahse among the 
 Scyths of the Maeotis, and thus seems to cut the 
 ground from under his own feet. 
 
 The utmost that can be safely gathered from these 
 numerous and discrepant notices is the conclusion 
 that the Parthians were felt by the Greeks and 
 Romans who first came into contact with them to be 
 an alien nation, intruded among the Arian races of 
 these parts, having their congeners in the great steppe 
 country which lay north of the Black Sea, the Caucasus, 
 the Caspian, and the Oxus river. These nations 
 were nomadic, uncivilised, coarse, not to any brutal, 
 in their habits ; of a type very much inferior to that 
 of the races which inhabited the more southern 
 regions, felt by them to be barbarians, and feared as
 
 CHIEF SCYTHIC CHARACTERISTICS. 3 1 
 
 a continual menace to their prosperity and civili- 
 sation. There is always an underlying idea of dis- 
 praise and disparagement whenever a Greek or a 
 Roman calls any race, or people, or custom "Scythic" — 
 the term connotes rudeness, grossness, absence of 
 culture and refinement — it is not perhaps strictly 
 ethnic, since it designates a life rather than a descent, 
 habits rather than blood — but it points to such a life 
 and such habits as have from the remotest antiquity 
 prevailed, and as still prevail, in the vast plain country 
 which extends from the Caucasus, the Caspian, and 
 the mountain chains of the Central Asian regions to 
 the shores of the great Arctic Sea. 
 
 It is certain that the inhabitants of this tract 
 have belonged, from a remote antiquity, to the ethnic 
 family generally known as Turanian. In the south 
 they are of the Tatar or Turkish type; in the north, 
 of the Finnish, or Samoeidic. Their language is 
 agglutinate, and wanting in inflections; their physique 
 is weak, languid, anaemic, unmuscular ; they have 
 large fleshy bodies, loose joints, soft swollen bellies, 
 and scanty hair. They live chiefly on horseback or 
 in waggons. Still, as enemies, they are far from 
 contemptible. Admirable horsemen, often skilled 
 archers, accustomed to a severe climate and to ex- 
 posure in all weathers ; they have proved formidable 
 foes to many warlike nations, and still give serious 
 trouble to their Russian masters. 
 
 The Scythian character of the Parthians, vouched 
 for on all hands, and their derivation from Upper 
 Asia, or the regions beyond the Oxus, furnish a 
 strong presumption of their belonging to the Turanian
 
 32 TURANIAN CHARACTER OF PARTHIAN PEOPLE. 
 
 family of nations. This presumption is strengthened 
 by the little that we know of their language. Their 
 names, when not distinctly Persian, which they would 
 often naturally be from conscious and intentional 
 imitation, are decidedly non-Arian, and have certain 
 Turanian characteristics. Among these may be 
 mentioned, first of all, the guttural termination, found 
 in Arsac-es, Sinnac-es, Parrhac-es, Vasac-es, Sana- 
 troec-es, Phraatac-es, Valarsac-es, &c. — a termination 
 which characterises the primitive Babylonian, the 
 Basque, and most of the Turanian tongues. Beyond 
 this, it would not be difficult to suggest Turanian 
 etymologies for a large number of Parthian names, 
 but as such suggestions could only be " guesses at 
 truth," not very much weight would attach to them. 
 
 The main argument for the Turanian character of 
 the Parthian people is to be found in their physical 
 and mental type, and in their manners and customs. 
 Their sculptures give them the large ill-formed limbs, 
 the heavy paunches, and the general flaccid appearance 
 which characterise Turanian races. Their history 
 shows them to have had the merits and defects of the 
 Turanian type of character. They were covetous, 
 grasping, ready to take the aggressive, and, on the 
 whole, tolerably successful in their wars against weak 
 races. But they were wanting in dash, in vigorous 
 effort, and in perseverance. They were stronger in 
 defence than in attack; and, as time went on, became 
 more and more unenterprising and lethargic. In the 
 arts they were particularly backward, devoid of taste, 
 and wanting in originality. Considering the patterns 
 that they had before their eye's in the architecture
 
 PARTHIAN MANNERS AND CUSTOMS. 33 
 
 and sculptures of Pasargadae, Nakhsh-i-Rustam, 
 Istakr, and Persepolis, it is simply astonishing that 
 they could rise no higher than the mean palace at 
 Hatra, and the grotesque tablets at Behistun, Sir-pul-i- 
 Zohab, and Tengh-i-Saoulek. Greek art, moreover, 
 was not unknown to them ; and they imitated it upon 
 their coins ; but the travesty is painful, and often 
 verges on the ridiculous. In their manners and 
 customs there was much that was markedly Turanian. 
 Like the Turkoman and Tatar tribes generally, they 
 passed almost their whole lives on horseback, con- 
 versing, transacting business, buying and selling, even 
 eating, while mounted on their horses. They practised 
 polygamy, secluded their women from the sight of 
 men, punished unfaithfulness with extreme severity, 
 delighted in hunting, and rarely ate any flesh but that 
 which they obtained in this way, were moderate 
 eaters but great drinkers, did not speak much, but yet 
 were very unquiet, being constantly engaged in stirring 
 up trouble either abroad or at home. A small portion 
 of the nation only was free ; the remainder were the 
 slaves of the privileged few. Nomadic habits con- 
 tinued to prevail among a portion of those who 
 remained in their primitive seats, even in the time of 
 their greatest national prosperity ; and a coarse, rude, 
 semi-barbarous character attached always — even to the 
 most advanced part of the nation — to the king, the 
 court, and the nobles generally, a character which, 
 despite a certain varnish of civilisation, was con- 
 stantly showing itself in their dealings with each 
 other, and with foreign nations. " The Parthian 
 monarchs," as Gibbon justly observes, " like the
 
 34 TURANIAN CHARACTER OF PARTHIAN PEOPLE. 
 
 Mogul sovereigns of Hindustan, delighted in the 
 pastoral life of their Scythian ancestors, and the 
 imperial camp was frequently pitched in the plain 
 of Ctesiphon, on the eastern bank of the Tigris." 
 Niebuhr seems even to doubt whether the Parthians 
 dwelt in cities at all. He represents them as main- 
 taining from first to last their nomadic habits, and 
 regards the insurrection by which their empire was 
 brought to an end as a rising of the inhabitants of 
 towns — the Tadjiks of those times — against the 
 Ilyats or wanderers, who had oppressed them for 
 centuries. This is, no doubt, an over-statement ; but 
 it has a foundation in fact, since wandering habits, 
 and even tent life, were affected by the Parthians 
 during the most flourishing period of their empire. 
 
 Another respect in which the Parthians resembled 
 some, at any rate, of the principal Turanian tribes was 
 in their combination of the rudeness and coarseness 
 already mentioned with great vigour of administration 
 and government. Like the early (or Accadian) 
 Babylonians, like the Mongols under Jenghis Khan 
 and his successors, like the Turks of the Middle Ages, 
 and to some extent even of modern times, the 
 Parthians possessed, to a large amount, the governing 
 or ruling faculty. They rapidly developed a great 
 power ; and they held together for nearly four 
 centuries a heterogeneous mass of subject nations, 
 who could have had no love for their rule, yet were 
 constrained by their energy and other sterling 
 qualities to render them, for the most part, a cheerful 
 and steady obedience. Their governmental system 
 was not refined, but it was effective ; they never
 
 COMPARISON OF THE PARTHIANS AND TURKS. 35 
 
 permanently lost a province ; and, at the dissolution 
 of the empire, its limits were as extensive as they had 
 ever been. 
 
 On the whole, it may be said, that the Turanian 
 character of the Parthian people, though not abso- 
 lutely proved, appears to be in the highest degree 
 probable. If we accept it, we must regard them as 
 in race closely allied to the vast hordes which, from 
 a remote antiquity, have roamed over the steppe 
 region of Upper Asia, from time to time bursting 
 upon the south, and harassing or subjugating the 
 comparatively unwarlike inhabitants of the warmer 
 countries. We must view them as the congeners of 
 the Huns, Bulgarians, Avars, Komans of the ancient 
 world ; of the Kalmucks, Ouigurs, Eleuts, Usbegs, 
 Turkomans, &c., of the present day. Perhaps their 
 nearest representatives will be, if we look to their 
 primitive condition at the founding of their empire, 
 the modern Turkomans, who occupy nearly the same 
 districts ; if we regard them at the period of their 
 highest prosperity, the Osmanli Turks. Like the 
 Turks, they combined great military prowess and 
 vigour with a capacity for organisation and govern- 
 ment not very usual among Asiatics. Like them, 
 they remained at heart barbarians, though they put 
 on an external appearance of civilisation and refine- 
 ment. Like them, they never to any extent amal- 
 gamated with the subject peoples, but continued for 
 centuries an exclusive dominant race, encamped in 
 the countries which they had overrun.
 
 III. 
 
 CONDITION OF WESTERN ASIA IN THE THIRD 
 CENTURY B.C. — ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 The grand attempt of Alexander the Great to 
 unite the East and West in a single universal 
 monarchy, magnificent in conception, and carried out 
 in act with extraordinary energy and political wisdom, 
 so long as he was spared to conduct his enterprise in 
 person, was frustrated, in the first place, by the 
 unfortunate circumstance of his premature decease ; 
 and, secondly, by the want of ability among his 
 " Successors." Although among them there were 
 several who possessed considerable talent, there was 
 no commanding personality of force sufficient to 
 dominate the others, and certainly none who inherited 
 either Alexander's grandeur of conception or his powers 
 of execution, or who can be imagined as, under any 
 circumstances, successfully accomplishing his projects. 
 The scheme, therefore, which the great Macedonian 
 had conceived, unhappily collapsed, and his effort to 
 unite and consolidate led only to increased division 
 and disintegration. He left behind him at least 
 twelve rival claimants of his power, and it Was only 
 by partition that the immediate breaking out of civil 
 
 36
 
 DIVISION OF THE EMPIRE OF ALEXANDER. 37 
 
 war among" the competitors was prevented. Partition 
 itself did but stave off the struggle for a few years, 
 and the wars of the " Successors," which followed, 
 caused further change, and tended to split the empire 
 into minute fragments. After a while the various 
 collisions produced something like a " survival of the 
 fittest," and about the close of the fourth century, after 
 the great battle of Ipsus (B.C. 301), that division of 
 the Macedonian Empire was made into four principal 
 parts, which thenceforward for nearly three centuries 
 formed the basis of the political situation in Eastern 
 Europe and Western Asia. Macedonia, Asia Minor, 
 Syria, and Egypt became the great powers of the 
 time, and on the fortunes of these four powers, their 
 policies, and lines of action, depended the general 
 course of affairs in the Oriental world for the next 
 two hundred years at any rate. 
 
 Of these four great monarchies the one with which 
 the interests of Parthia were almost wholly bound up 
 was the Syrian kingdom of the Seleucidae. Originally, 
 Seleucus received nothing but the single satrapy of 
 Babylonia. But his military genius and his popularity 
 were such, that his dominion kept continually in- 
 creasing until it became an empire worthy of com- 
 parison with those ancient Oriental monarchies, which, 
 in remoter times, had attracted, and almost monopo- 
 lised, the attention of mankind. As early as B.C. 312, 
 he had added to his original government of Babylonia 
 the important countries of Media, Susiana, and Persia. 
 After Ipsus he received, by the agreement then made 
 among the " Successors," the districts of Cappadocia, 
 Eastern Phrygia, Upper Syria, Mesopotamia, and the 
 
 4956 6
 
 38 WESTERN ASIA IN THE 3RD CENTURY B.C. 
 
 entire valley of the Euphrates ; while, about the same 
 time, or rather earlier, he, by his own unassisted 
 efforts, obtained the adhesion of all the eastern 
 provinces of Alexander's Empire, Armenia, Assyria, 
 Sagartia, Carmania, Hyrcania, Parthia, Bactria, Sog- 
 diana, Aria, Sarangia, Arachosia, Sacastana, Gedrosia, 
 and probably part of India. The empire thus estab- 
 lished extended from the Mediterranean on the west 
 to the Indus valley and the Bolor mountain chain 
 upon the east, while it stretched from the Caspian 
 and the Jaxartes towards the north to the Persian 
 Gulf and the Indian Ocean southwards. Its entire 
 area could not have been much less than 1,200,000 
 square miles. Of these some 300,000 or 400,000 may 
 have been desert ; but the remainder was generally 
 fertile, and comprised within its limits some of the 
 very most productive regions in the whole world. 
 The Mesopotamian lowland, the Orontes valley, the 
 tract between the Southern Caspian and the moun- 
 tains, the regions about Merv and Balkh, were among 
 the richest in Asia, and produced grain and fruit in 
 incredible abundance. The fine pastures of Media 
 and Armenia furnished excellent horses. Bactria 
 gave an inexhaustible supply of camels. Elephants 
 in large numbers were readily procurable from India. 
 Gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, tin were furnished by 
 several of the provinces, and precious stones of various 
 kinds abounded. Moreover, for above ten centuries, 
 the precious metals and the most valuable kinds of 
 merchandise had flowed from every quarter into the 
 region ; and though the Macedonians may have carried 
 off, or wasted, a considerable quantity of both, yet the
 
 SYRIAN KINGDOM OF THE SELEUCIDJE. 39 
 
 accumulations of ages withstood the strain ; and the 
 hoarded wealth, which had come down from Assyrian, 
 Babylonian, and Median times, was to be found in the 
 days of Seleucus chiefly within the limits of his empire. 
 It might have seemed that Western Asia was about 
 to enjoy under the Seleucid princes as tranquil and 
 prosperous a condition as had prevailed throughout 
 the region for the two centuries which had intervened 
 between the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus 
 (B.C. 538) and its destruction by Alexander (B.C. 323 . 
 But the fair prospect was soon clouded over. The 
 Seleucid princes, instead of devoting themselves to 
 the consolidation of their power in the vast region 
 between the Euphrates and the Indus, turned all 
 their attention towards the West, and frittered away 
 in petty quarrels for small gains with their rivals in 
 that quarter — the Ptolemies and the princes of Asia 
 Minor — those energies which would have been far 
 better employed in arranging and organising the 
 extensive dominions whereof they were already 
 masters. It was symptomatic of this leaning to the 
 West, that the first Seleucus, almost as soon as he 
 found himself in quiet possession of his vast empire, 
 transferred the seat of government from Eower 
 Mesopotamia to Upper Syria, from the banks of the 
 Tigris to those of the Orontes. This movement had 
 fatal consequences. Already his empire contained 
 within itself an element of weakness in its over-great 
 length, which cannot be estimated at less than two 
 thousand miles. To counteract this disadvantage a 
 fairly central position for the capital was almost a 
 necessity. The empire of Seleucus might have been
 
 40 WESTERN ASIA IN THE $RD CENTURY B.C. 
 
 conveniently ruled from the old Median capital of 
 Ecbatana, or the later Persian one of Susa. Even 
 Babylon, or Seleucia, though further to the west, were 
 not unsuitable sites ; and had Seleucus been content 
 with either of these, no blame would attach to him. 
 But when, to keep watch upon his rivals, he removed 
 the seat of government five hundred miles further west- 
 ward, and placed it almost on his extreme western 
 frontier, within a few miles of the Mediterranean, he 
 intensified the weakness which required to be counter- 
 acted, and made the disruption of his empire within 
 no great length of time certain. The change loosened 
 the ties which bound the empire together, offended 
 the bulk of the Asiatics, who saw their monarch with- 
 draw from them into a remote corner of his dominions, 
 and particularly weakened the grasp of the govern- 
 ment on those more eastern districts which were at 
 once furthest from the new metropolis, and least 
 assimilated to the Hellenic character. Among the 
 causes which led to the disintegration of the Seleucid 
 kingdom, there is none which deserves so well to be 
 considered the main cause as this. It was calculated 
 at once to produce the desire to revolt, and to render 
 the reduction of revolted provinces difficult, if not 
 impossible. 
 
 The evil day, however, might have been indefinitely 
 postponed, if not even escaped altogether, had the 
 Seleucid princes either established and maintained 
 throughout their empire a vigorous and efficient ad- 
 ministration, or abstained from entangling themselves 
 in wars with their neighbours upon the West — the 
 Ptolemies, the kings of Pergamus, and others.
 
 ORGANISATION OF THE SELEUCID KINGDOM. 4 1 
 
 But the organisation of the Seleucid Empire was 
 unsatisfactory. Instead of pursuing the system in- 
 augurated by Alexander, and seeking to weld the 
 heterogeneous elements of which his kingdom was 
 composed into a homogeneous whole, instead of at 
 once conciliating and elevating the Asiatics by uniting 
 them with the Macedonians and the Greeks, by pro- 
 moting intermarriage and social intercourse between 
 the two classes of his subjects, educating the Asiatics 
 in Greek ideas and Greek schools, opening his court 
 to them, promoting them to high employments, making 
 them feel that they were as much valued and as much 
 cared for as the people of the conquering race, the 
 first Seleucus, and after him his successors, fell back 
 upon the older, simpler, and ruder system — the system 
 pursued before Alexander's time by the Persians, and 
 before them perhaps by the Medes— the system most 
 congenial to human laziness and human pride — that 
 of governing a nation of slaves by means of a clique 
 of victorious aliens. Seleucus divided his empire into 
 satrapies, seventy-two in number. He bestowed the 
 office of satrap on none but Macedonians and Greeks. 
 The standing army, by means of which he maintained 
 his authority, was indeed composed in the main of 
 Asiatics, disciplined after the Greek model ; but it 
 was officered entirely by men of Greek or Macedonian 
 parentage. Nothing was done to keep up the self- 
 respect of the Asiatics, or to soften the unpleasant- 
 ness which must always attach to being governed by 
 foreigners. Even the superintendence over the satraps 
 seems to have been insufficient. According to some 
 writers, it was a gross outrage offered by a satrap to
 
 42 WESTERN ASIA IN THE 3RD CENTURY B.C. 
 
 an Asiatic subject that stirred up the Parthians to 
 their revolt. The story may not be true ; but the 
 currency given to it shows of what conduct to those 
 under their rule the satraps of the Seleucidae were 
 thought, by those who lived near the time, to have 
 been capable. It may be said that this treatment 
 was no worse than that whereto the subject races 
 of Western Asia had been accustomed for many 
 centuries under their Persian, Median, or Assyrian 
 masters, and this statement may be quite consonant 
 with truth ; but a new yoke is always more galling 
 than an old one ; in addition to which we must take 
 into consideration the fact, that the hopes of the 
 Asiatics had been raised by the policy of assimilation 
 avowed, and to some extent introduced, by Alexander; 
 so that they may be excused if they felt with some 
 bitterness the disappointment of their very legitimate 
 expectations, when the Seleucidae revived the old 
 satrapial system, unmodified, unsoftened, with all its 
 many abuses as pronounced and as rampant as ever. 
 
 An entire abstention on the part of the Seleucidae 
 from quarrels with the other "Successors of Alexander," 
 would perhaps scarcely have been possible. Their 
 territory bordered on that of the Ptolemies and the 
 kings of Pergamus, and was liable to invasion from 
 either quarter. But by planting their capital on the 
 Orontes they aggravated the importance of the attacks 
 which they could not prevent, and became mixed up 
 with Pergamenian and Egyptian, and even Macedonian, 
 politics far more than was necessary. Had they but 
 made Seleucia permanently their metropolis, and held 
 lightly by their dominion to the west of the Euphrates,
 
 SYRIAN WARS OF THE PERIOD. 43 
 
 they might certainly have avoided to a large extent 
 the entanglements into which they were drawn by 
 their actual policy, and have been free to give their 
 main attention to the true sources of their real 
 strength — the central and eastern provinces. But it 
 may be doubted whether the idea of abstention ever 
 presented itself to the mind of any one of the early 
 Seleucid princes. It was the fond dream of each of 
 them, as of the other " Successors," that possibly in 
 his person might one day be re-united the whole of 
 the territories which had been ruled by the Great 
 Conqueror. Each Seleucid prince would have felt 
 that he sacrificed his dearest and most cherished 
 hopes, if he had withdrawn from the regions of the 
 west, and shunning engagements and adventures 
 in that quarter, had contented himself with efforts 
 to consolidate a great power in the more inland 
 and more thoroughly Asiatic portions of the 
 empire. 
 
 The result was that, during the first half of the 
 third century (B.C. 300-250), the Seleucid princes were 
 almost constantly engaged in disputes and wars in Asia 
 Minor and Syria Proper, gave their personal super- 
 intendence to those regions, and had neither time nor 
 attention to spare for the affairs of the far East. So 
 long as the satraps of these regions paid regularly 
 their appointed tributes, and furnished regularly the 
 required quotas of troops for service in the western 
 wars, Seleucus and his successors, the first and second 
 Antiochi, were content. The satraps were left to 
 manage the affairs of their provinces at their own 
 discretion ; and we cannot be surprised if the absence
 
 44 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 of a controlling hand led to various complications 
 and disorders. 
 
 As time went on these disorders would naturally 
 increase, and matters might very probably have come 
 to a head in a few more years through the mere 
 negligence and apathy of those who had the direction 
 of the state ; but a further impulse towards actual 
 disintegration was given by the character of the 
 second Antiochus, which was especially weak and 
 contemptible. To have taken the title of " Theos " — 
 never before assumed, so far as we know, by any 
 monarch — was, even by itself, a sufficient indication 
 of presumption and folly, and might justify us, did 
 we know no more of him, in concluding that the 
 calamities of his reign were the fruit of his unfitness 
 to direct and rule an empire. But we have further 
 abundant evidence of his incapacity. He was noted, 
 even among Asiatic sovereigns, for luxury and de- 
 bauchery ; he neglected all state affairs in the pursuit 
 of pleasure ; his wives and his male favourites were 
 allowed to rule his kingdom at their will, and their 
 most flagrant crimes were neither restrained nor 
 punished. The satraps, to whom the character and 
 conduct of their sovereign could not but become 
 known, would be partly encouraged to follow the 
 bad example set them, partly provoked by it to 
 shake themselves free from the rule of so hateful yet 
 contemptible a master. 
 
 It may be added, that already there had been 
 examples of successful revolts on the part of satraps 
 in outlying provinces, which could not but have been 
 generally known, and which must have excited
 
 REVOLTS OF SATRAPS. 45 
 
 ambitious longings on the part of persons similarly 
 placed, from the very beginning of the Macedonian 
 period. Even at the time of Alexander's great 
 conquests, a Persian satrap, Atropates, succeeded in 
 converting his satrapy of Upper Media — thencefor- 
 ward called Media Atropatene — into an independent 
 sovereignty. Not long afterwards, Cappadocia had 
 detached itself from the kingdom of Eumenes (B.C. 
 326), and had established its independence under 
 Ariarathes, who became the founder of a dynasty. 
 Still earlier, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Pontus, once 
 Persian provinces, had revolted, and in each case the 
 revolt had issued in the recovery of autonomy. Thus 
 already in Western Asia, beside the Greco-Macedo- 
 nian kingdoms which had been established by the 
 " Successors of Alexander," there were existent some 
 five or six states which had had their origin in successful 
 rebellions. 
 
 Such were the circumstances under which, in or 
 about the year B.C. 256, which was the sixth year of 
 Antiochus Theus, actual disturbances broke out in 
 the extreme north-east of the Seleucid Empire. The 
 first province to raise the standard of revolt, and pro- 
 claim itself independent, was Bactria. This district 
 had from a remote antiquity been one with special 
 pretensions. The country was fertile, and much of 
 it readily defensible ; the people were hardy and 
 valiant ; they had been generally treated with 
 exceptional favour by the Persian monarchs ; and 
 they seem to have had traditions which assigned 
 them a pre-eminence among the Arian nations at 
 some indefinitely distant period. " Bactria with the
 
 46 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 lofty banner " is celebrated in one of the most ancient 
 portions of the Zendavesta. It remained unsubdued 
 until the time of Cyrus. Cyrus is said by some to 
 have left it as an appanage to his second son, Bardes, 
 or Tanyoxares. Under the Persians, it had for satrap 
 generally, or at any rate frequently, a member of the 
 royal family. Alexander had conquered it with diffi- 
 culty, and only by prolonged efforts. It was therefore 
 natural that disintegration should make its first 
 appearance in this quarter. The Greek satrap of the 
 time, Diodotus, either disgusted with the conduct of 
 Antiochus Theus, or simply seeing in his weakness 
 and general unpopularity an opportunity which it 
 would be foolish to let slip, in or about the year 
 B.C. 256, assumed the style and title of king, struck 
 coins stamped with his own name, and established 
 himself without any difficulty as king over the entire 
 province. Theus, engaged in war with the Egyptian 
 monarch, Ptolemy Philadelphus, did not even make 
 an effort to put him down, and the Bactrian ruler, 
 without encountering any serious opposition, passed 
 into the ranks of autonomous sovereigns. 
 
 The example of successful revolt thus set could 
 not well be barren of consequences. If one Seleucid 
 province might throw off the yoke of its feudal lord 
 with absolute impunity, why might not others ? 
 There seemed to be actually nothing to prevent them. 
 Syria, so far as we can discern, allowed Bactria to 
 go its way without any effort whatever either to check 
 the revolt or to punish it. For eighteen years no 
 Syrian force came near the country. Diodotus was 
 permitted to consolidate his kingdom and rivet his
 
 CHARACTER OF THE PARTHIAN REVOLT. 47 
 
 authority on his subjects, without any interference, 
 and the Bactrian monarchy became thus a permanent 
 factor in Asiatic politics for nearly two centuries. 
 
 It was about six years after the establishment of 
 Bactrian independence that the Parthian satrapy 
 followed the pattern set it by its neighbour, and de- 
 tached itself from the Seleucid Empire. The circum- 
 stances, however, under which the severance took 
 place were very different in the two cases. History 
 by no means repeated itself. In Bactria the Greek 
 satrap took the lead ; and the Bactrian kingdom w r as, 
 at any rate at its commencement, as thoroughly 
 Hellenic as that of the Seleucidae. But in Parthia 
 Greek rule was from the first cast aside. The native 
 Asiatics rebelled against their masters. A people of 
 a rude and uncivilised type, coarse and savage, but 
 brave and freedom-loving, rose up against the polished 
 but comparatively effeminate Greeks, who held them 
 in subjection, and claimed and succeeded in estab- 
 lishing their independence. The Parthian kingdom 
 was thoroughly anti- Hellenic. It appealed to patriotic 
 feelings, and to the hate universally felt towards the 
 stranger. It set itself to undo the work of Alexander, 
 to cast out the Europeans, to recover for the native 
 race the possession of its own continent. " Asia for 
 for the Asiatics," was its cry. It was naturally almost 
 as hostile to Bactria as to Syria, although danger 
 from a common enemy might cause it sometimes to 
 make a temporary alliance with the former kingdom. 
 It had, no doubt, the general sympathy of the popula- 
 tions in the adjacent countries, and represented to 
 them the cause of freedom and autonomy. Arsaces
 
 48 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 effected for Parthia that which Arminius strove to 
 effect for Germany, and which Tell accomplished for 
 Switzerland, and Victor Emmanuel for Lombardy. 
 
 The circumstances of the revolt of Parthia are 
 variously narrated by ancient authors. According to 
 a story reported by Strabo, though not accepted as true 
 by him, Arsaces was a Bactrian, who did not approve 
 of the proceedings of Diodotus, and, when he was 
 successful, quitted the newly-founded kingdom, and 
 transferred his residence to Parthia, where he stirred 
 up an insurrection against the satrap, and, succeeding 
 in the attempt, induced the Parthians to accept him 
 as their sovereign. But it is intrinsically improbable 
 that an entire foreigner would have been accepted as 
 king under such circumstances, and it is fatal to the 
 narrative that every other account contradicts the 
 Bactrian origin of Arsaces, and makes him a Parthian, 
 or next door to a Parthian. Arrian states that Arsaces 
 and his brother, Tiridates, were Parthians, descen- 
 dants of Phriapites, the son of Arsaces ; that they 
 revolted against the satrap of Antiochus Theus, by 
 name Pherecles, on account of a gross insult which 
 he had offered to one of them ; and that finally, 
 having murdered the satrap, they declared Parthia 
 iadependent, and set up a government of their own. 
 Strabo, while giving currency to more than one story 
 on the subject, lets us see that, in his own mind, 
 he accepts the following account : " Arsaces was a 
 Scythian, a chief among the Parnian Dahae, who 
 inhabited the valley of the Ochus (Attrek ?). Soon 
 after the establishment of Bactrian independence, he 
 entered Parthia at the head of a body of his country-
 
 r
 
 CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS OF AUTHORS. 49 
 
 men, and succeeded in making himself master of it." 
 Finally, Justin, who no doubt, here as elsewhere, follows 
 Trogus Pompeius, a writer of the Augustan age, ex- 
 oresses himself as follows : " Arsaces, having been 
 long accustomed to live by robbery and rapine, 
 attacked the Parthians with a predatory band, killed 
 their satrap, Andragoras, and seized the supreme 
 authority." This last account seems fairly probable, 
 and does not greatly differ from Arrian's. If Arsaces 
 was a Dahan chief, accustomed to make forays into 
 the fertile hill country of Parthia from the Choras- 
 mian desert, and, in one of them, fell in with the Greek 
 satrap, defeated him, and slew him, it would not be 
 unlikely that the Parthians, who were of a kindred 
 race, might be so delighted with his prowess as to 
 invite him to place himself at their head. An op- 
 pressed people gladly adopts as ruler the chieftain of 
 an allied tribe, if he has shown skill and daring, and 
 promises them deliverance from their oppressors. 
 
 The date of the Parthian revolt was probably B.C. 
 250, which was the eleventh year of Antiochus Theus. 
 Antiochus was at that time engaged in a serious 
 ;onflict with Ptolemy Philadelphus, King of Egypt, 
 which, however, was brought to a close in the follow- 
 ing year by his marriage with Berenice, Ptolemy's 
 daughter. It might have been expected that, as soon 
 as his hands were free, he would have turned his 
 attention towards the East, and have made an effort, 
 at any rate, to regain his lost territory. But Antio- 
 chus lacked either the energy or the courage to engage 
 in a fresh war. He was selfish and luxurious in his 
 habits, and seems to have preferred the delights of
 
 50 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 repose amid the soft seductions of Antioch to the 
 perils and hardships of a campaign in the rough 
 Caspian region. At any rate, he remained quietly at 
 home, while Arsaces consolidated his power, chastised 
 those who for one reason or another resisted his 
 authority, and settled himself firmly upon the throne. 
 His capital appears to have been Hecatompylus, 
 which had been built by Alexander in the valley of 
 the Gurghan river. According to some late authors 
 of small account, he came to a violent end, having 
 been killed in battle by a spear-thrust, which pene- 
 trated his side. It is certain that he had a short 
 
 COIN OK TIRIDATES I. 
 
 reign, since he was succeeded in B.C. 248 by his 
 brother, Tiridates, the second Parthian monarch. 
 
 Tiridates, on ascending the throne, followed a 
 practice not very uncommon in the East, and adopted 
 his brother's name as a " throne-name," reigning as 
 Arsaces the Second. He is the first Parthian king 
 of whom we possess contemporary memorials. The 
 coins struck by Arsaces II. commence the Parthian 
 series, and present to us a monarch of strongly- 
 marked features, with a large eye, a prominent, 
 slightly aquiline nose, a projecting chin, and an 
 entire absence of hair. He wears upon his head a 
 curious cap, or helmet, with lappets on either side
 
 ARSACES I. AND TIRIDATES. 51 
 
 that reach to the shoulders, and has around his fore- 
 head and above his cars a coronal of pearls, apparently 
 of a large size. On the reverse side of his coins he 
 exhibits the figure of a man, seated on a sort of 
 stool, and holding out in front of him a strung bow, 
 with the string uppermost. This may be either a 
 representation of himself in his war costume, or an 
 ideal figure of a Parthian god, but is probably the 
 former. Tiridates takes upon his coins the title either 
 of " King," or of " Great King." The legend which 
 they bear is Greek, as is that of almost all the kings 
 his successors. The coins follow the Seleucid model. 
 Tiridates was an able and active monarch. He 
 had the good fortune to hold the throne for a period 
 of above thirty years, and had thus ample space for 
 the development of his talents, and for completing 
 the organisation of the kingdom. Having received 
 Parthia from his brother in a somewhat weak and 
 unsettled condition, he left it a united and powerful 
 monarchy, enlarged in its boundaries, strengthened in 
 its defences, in alliance with its nearest and most 
 formidable neighbour, and triumphant over the great 
 power of Syria, which had hoped to bring it once 
 more into subjection. He witnessed some extra- 
 ordinary movements, and conducted affairs during 
 their progress with prudence and moderation. He 
 was more than once brought into imminent danger, 
 but succeeded in effectually protecting himself. He 
 made a judicious use of the opportunities which 
 the disturbed condition of Western Asia in his time 
 presented to him, and might well be considered, as he 
 was by many, a sort of second founder of the State.
 
 52 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 It was within two years of the accession of 
 Tiridates to the Parthian throne that one of those 
 vast, but transient, revolutions to which Asia is 
 subject, but which are rare occurrences in Europe, 
 swept over Western Asia. Ptolemy Euergetes, the 
 son of Philadelphus, having succeeded to his father's 
 kingdom in B.C. 247, made war on Syria in B.C. 245, 
 to avenge the murder of his sister* Berenice, to whose 
 death the Syrian king, Seleucus II., had been a party. 
 In the war which followed he at first carried every- 
 thing before him. Having taken Antioch, he crossed 
 the Euphrates, and, in the course of a couple of years, 
 succeeded in effecting the conquest of Mesopotamia, 
 Assyria, Babylonia, Susiana, Media, and Persia, while 
 the smaller provinces, as far as Parthia and Bactria, 
 submitted to him without resistance. He went in 
 person, as he tells us, as far as Babylon, and, re- 
 garding his power as established, proceeded somewhat 
 hastily to gather the fruits of victory, by compelling 
 the conquered countries to surrender all the most valu- 
 able works of art which were to be found in them, and 
 sending off the treasures to Egypt, for the adornment 
 of Alexandria. He also levied heavy contributions 
 on the countries which had submitted to him, and 
 altogether treated them with a severity that ' was 
 impolitic. Bactria and Parthia cannot but have felt 
 considerable alarm at his victorious progress. Here 
 was a young warrior who, in a single campaign, had 
 marched the distance of a thousand miles from the 
 banks of the Nile to those of the Lower Euphrates, 
 without so much as receiving a check, and who was 
 threatening to repeat the career of Alexander. What
 
 TIRI DATES CONQUERS HYRCANIA. S3 
 
 resistance could the little Parthian state hope to offer 
 to him ? It must have rejoiced the heart of Tiridates 
 to hear that, while the conqueror was reaping the 
 spoils of victory in his newly-subjugated provinces, 
 dangerous disturbances had broken out in his own 
 land, which had forced him to withdraw his troops 
 suddenly (B.C. 243), and evacuate the territory which 
 he had overrun. Thus his invasion proved to be a 
 raid rather than a real conquest, and, instead of 
 damaging Parthia, had rather the effect of improving 
 her position, and contributing to the advance of her 
 power. On Ptolemy's departure, Syria recovered her 
 sway over her lost provinces, and again stood forward 
 as Parthia's principal enemy ; but she was less for- 
 midable than she had been previously ; her hold over 
 her outlying dominions was relaxed, her strength was 
 crippled, her prestige lost, and her honour tarnished. 
 Tiridates saw in her depression his own opportunity, 
 and, suddenly invading Hyrcania, his near neighbour, 
 and Syria's most distant dependency, succeeded in 
 overrunning it and detaching it from the empire of 
 the Seleucidae. 
 
 The gauntlet was thus thrown down to the Syrian 
 king, and a challenge given, which he was compelled 
 to accept, unless he was prepared to yield unresist- 
 ingly, one after another, all the fairest of his remaining 
 provinces. It was not likely that he would so act. 
 Seleucus II. was no coward. He had been engaged 
 in wars almost continuously from his accession, and, 
 though more than once defeated in battle, had never 
 shown the white feather. On learning the loss of 
 Hyrcania, he proceeded immediately to patch up a
 
 54 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 peace with his brother, Antiochus Hierax, against 
 whom he was at the time contending, and having col- 
 lected a large army, marched away to the East. He did 
 not, however, at once invade Parthia, but, deflecting 
 his course to the right, entered into negotiations with 
 the revolted Bactrian king, Diodotus, and made alliance 
 with him against Tiridates. It may be supposed that 
 he represented Tiridates as their common foe, as much 
 a danger to Bactria as to Syria, the head of a move- 
 ment, which was directed against Hellenism, and 
 which aimed as much at putting down Bactrian rule 
 as Syrian. At any rate, he succeeded in gaining 
 Diodotus to his side ; and the confederate monarchs, 
 having joined their forces, proceeded to invade the 
 territory of the Parthian sovereign. Tiridates did not 
 await their onset. Regarding himself as overmatched, 
 he quitted his country, and fled northwards into the 
 region between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, where he 
 took refuge with a Scythic tribe, called the Aspasiacae, 
 which was powerful at this period. The Aspasiacae, 
 probably lent him troops, for he did not remain long 
 in retirement ; but, hearing that the first Diodotus, 
 the ally of Seleucus, had died, he contrived to draw 
 over his son, Diodotus II., to his alliance, and, in con- 
 junction with him, gave Seleucus battle, and com- 
 pletely defeated his army. Seleucus retreated hastily 
 to Antioch, and resumed his struggle with his brother, 
 whom he eventually overcame ; but, having learned 
 wisdom by experience, he made no further attempts 
 against either the Bactrian or the Parthian power. 
 
 This victory was with reason regarded by the 
 Parthians as a sort of second beginning of their
 
 WAR OF TIRIDATES WITH SELEUCUS II. 55 
 
 independence. Hitherto the kingdom had existed 
 precariously, and as it were by sufferance. From the 
 day that the revolt took place, it was certain that, 
 some time or other, Syria would reclaim, and make 
 an attempt to recover, its lost territory. Until a 
 battle had been fought, until the new monarchy had 
 measured its strength against that of its former 
 mistress, it was impossible for any one to feel secure 
 that it would be able to maintain its existence. The 
 victory gained by Tiridates over Seleucus Callinicus 
 put an end to these doubts. It proved to the world at 
 large, as well as to the Parthians themselves, that they 
 had nothing to fear — that they were strong enough 
 to preserve their freedom. If we consider the 
 enormous disproportion between the military strength 
 and resources of the narrow Parthian state and the 
 vast Syrian Empire — if we remember that the one 
 comprised at this time about fifty thousand, and the 
 other above a million of square miles ; that the one 
 had inherited the wealth of ages, while the other was 
 probably as poor as any province in Asia ; that the 
 one possessed the Macedonian arms, training, and 
 tactics, while the other knew only the rude warfare of 
 the Steppes — the result of the struggle cannot but be 
 regarded as surprising. Still, it was not without pre- 
 cedent ; and it has not been without repetition. It 
 adds another to the many instances, where a small 
 but brave people, bent on resisting foreign domina- 
 tion, have, when standing on their defence in their 
 own territory, proved more than a match for the 
 utmost force that a foe of overwhelming strength 
 could bring against them. It reminds us of Marathon,
 
 56 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 of Bannockburn, of Morgarten, We may not sympa- 
 thise wholly with the victors, for Greek civivisation, 
 even of the type introduced by Alexander into Asia, 
 was ill replaced by Tatar coarseness and barbarism ; 
 but we cannot refuse our admiration to the spectacle 
 of a handful of gallant men determinedly resisting in 
 the fastnesses of their native land a host of aliens, 
 and triumphing over their would-be oppressors. The 
 Parthians themselves were so impressed with the im- 
 portance of the conflict, that they preserved the memory 
 of it by a solemn festival on the anniversary of their 
 victory, which was still celebrated in the days of the 
 historian Trogus Pompeius. 
 
 It is possible that Seleucus would not have accepted 
 his defeat as final, or desisted from his attempt 
 to reduce Parthia to obedience, if he had felt per- 
 fectly free to continue or discontinue the Parthian 
 war at his pleasure. But, on his return to Antioch, 
 he found much to occupy him. His brother, Antiochus 
 Hierax, was still a rebel against his authority, and 
 the proceedings of Attalus, King of Pergamus, were 
 threatening. Seleucus was engaged in contests with 
 these two enemies from the time of his return from 
 Parthia (B.C. 237) almost to his death (B.C. 226). He 
 was thus compelled to leave Tiridates to take his own 
 course, and either occupy himself with fresh conquests, 
 or devote himself to the strengthening and adorning of 
 his existing kingdom, as he pleased. Tiridates chose 
 the latter course; and during the remainder of his 
 long reign, for the space of above twenty years, 
 employed his leisure in useful labours within the 
 limits of his own territories. He erected a number
 
 LATER YEARS OF TIRIDATES. 57 
 
 of strong forts, or castles, in suitable positions, fortified 
 the Parthian towns generally, and placed garrisons 
 in them, and carefully selected a site for a new city, 
 which he probably intended to make, and perhaps 
 actually made, his capital. The situation chosen was 
 one in the mountain range known as Zapavortenon, 
 where a hill was found, surrounded on all sides by 
 precipitous rocks, and placed in the middle of a plain 
 of extraordinary fertility. Abundant wood and 
 copious streams of water existed in the neighbourhood. 
 The soil was so rich that it scarcely required cultiva- 
 tion, and the woods were so full of game as to afford 
 endless amusement to hunters. The city itself was 
 called Dara, which the Greeks and Romans elongated 
 into Dareium. Its exact site is undiscovered ; but 
 it seems to have lain towards the east, and was 
 probably not very far from the now sacred city of 
 Meshed. 
 
 We may account for the desire of Tiridates to 
 establish a new capital by the natural antipathy of 
 the Parthians to the Greeks, and the fact that Heca- 
 tompylos, which had been hitherto the seat of govern- 
 ment, was a thoroughly Greek town, having been 
 built by Alexander the Great, and peopled mainly by 
 Grecian settlers. The Parthians disliked close con- 
 tact with Hellenic manners and Hellenic ideas. Just 
 as, in their most palmy days, they rejected Seleucia 
 for their capital, and preferred to build the entirely 
 new town of Ctesiphon in its immediate vicinity, as 
 the residence of the Court and monarch, so even now, 
 when their prosperity was but just budding, an 
 instinctive feeling of repulsion caused them to shrink
 
 58 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 from sharing a locality with the Greeks, and make 
 the experiment of having for their headquarters a 
 city wholly their own. The experiment did not 
 altogether succeed. Either Hecatompylos had natural 
 advantages even greater than those of Dara, or, as the 
 growth of the Parthian power was mainly towards 
 the west, the eastward position of the latter was found 
 inconvenient. After a short trial, the successors of 
 Tiridates ceased to reside at Dara, and Hecatompylos 
 became once more the Parthian capital and the seat 
 of Parthian government. 
 
 Tiridates, having done his best, according to his 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS I. 
 
 lights, for the security of Parthia from without, and 
 for her prosperity within, died peaceably after a 
 reign which is reckoned at thirty-four years, and 
 which lasted probably from B.C. 248 to B.C. 214. He 
 left his throne to a son, named Artabanus, who, like 
 his father, took the " throne-name " of Arsaces, and is 
 known in history as Arsaces the Third. 
 
 Artabanus I , if we may judge by his coins, was 
 not unlike his father in appearance, having the same 
 projecting and slightly aquiline nose, and the same 
 large eye ; but he differed from his father in possessing 
 abundance of hair, and wearing a long beard. He 
 has discarded, moreover, the cap of Tiridates, and,
 
 REIGN OF ARTABANUS I. 59 
 
 instead of it, wears his own hair, which he confines 
 with a band (the diadem), passing from the forehead 
 to the occiput, there knotted, and flowing down behind. 
 He takes the later legend of his father — BA2IAE&S 
 MErAAOY APSAKOY— "Arsaces, the Great King." 
 
 It was the aim of Artabanus to pursue his father's 
 aggressive policy, and further enlarge the limits of 
 the kingdom. He was scarcely settled upon the 
 throne, when he declared war against Antiochus the 
 Great, the second son of Seleucus Callinicus, who had 
 inherited the Syrian crown in B.C. 223, and was 
 entangled in a contest with one of the satraps of 
 Asia Minor, named Achaeus. Proceeding westward 
 along the skirts of the mountains, he made his way to 
 Ecbatana in Media, receiving the submission of the 
 various countries as he went, and (nominally) adding 
 to his dominions the entire tract between Hyrcania 
 and the Zagros mountain chain. From this elevated 
 position he threatened the low-lying countries of the 
 Mesopotamian plain, and seemed likely, unless 
 opposed, in another campaign to reach the Euphrates. 
 The situation was most critical for Syria ; and 
 Antiochus, recognising his peril, bent all his energies 
 to meet and overcome it. Fortunately he had just 
 crushed Achaeus, and was able, without greatly 
 exposing himself to serious loss in the West, to 
 collect and lead a vast expedition against the East. 
 With an army of a hundred thousand foot and twenty 
 thousand horse, he set out for Media in the spring 
 of B.C. 213, recovered Ecbatana without a battle, and 
 thence pressed eastward after his startled enemy, 
 who retreated as he advanced. In vain Artabanus
 
 60 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 attempted to hinder his progress by stopping, or 
 poisoning, the wells along the route which he had 
 necessarily to take ; Antiochus caught the poisoners 
 at their work, and brushed them from his path. He 
 then marched rapidly against Parthia, and entering 
 the enemy's country, took and occupied without a 
 battle the chief city, Hecatompylos. 
 
 Artabanus, bent on avoiding an engagement, re- 
 treated into Hyrcania, perhaps flattering himself that 
 his adversary would not venture to follow him into 
 that rugged and almost inaccessible region. If so, 
 however, he soon found that he had underrated the 
 perseverance and tenacity of the Syrian king. 
 Antiochus, after resting his army for a brief space at 
 Hecatompylos, set out in pursuit of his enemy, crossed 
 by a difficult pass, chiefly along the dry channel of a 
 mountain torrent, obstructed by masses of rock and 
 trunks of trees, the "high ridge which separated be- 
 tween Parthia and Hyrcania — his advance disputed 
 by the Parthians at every step — fought and won a 
 battle at the top, and thence descending into the rich 
 Hyrcanian valley, endeavoured to take possession of 
 the entire country. But Artabanus, brought to bay 
 by his foe, defended himself with extraordinary 
 courage and energy. One by one the principal 
 Hyrcanian towns were besieged and taken, but the 
 monarch himself was unsubdued. Carrying on a 
 guerilla warfare, moving from place to place, occupy- 
 ing one strong position after another, he continued 
 his resistance with such dogged firmness that at 
 length the patience of Antiochus was worn out, and 
 he came to terms with his gallant adversary, conced-
 
 REIGNS OF PRIAPATIUS AND PHRAATES I. 6 1 
 
 ing to him that which was the real bone of conten- 
 tion, his independence. Parthia came out of the 
 struggle with the Great Antiochus unscathed : she did 
 not even have to relinquish her conquered dependency 
 of Hyrcania. Artabanus moreover had the honour of 
 being admitted into the number of the Great King's 
 allies. As for Antiochus, he turned his attention to 
 the affairs of Bactria, and the remoter East, and 
 having arranged them to his satisfaction, returned 
 by way of Arachosia, Drangiana, and Kerman to his 
 western possessions (B.C. 206). 
 
 The retirement of Antiochus, however honourable 
 
 COIN OF PRIAPATIUS. 
 
 to Parthia, must have left her weakened and ex- 
 hausted by her vast and astonishing efforts. She 
 had been taxed almost beyond her strength, and must 
 have needed a breathing-space to recruit and recover 
 herself. Artabanus wisely remained at peace during 
 the rest of his reign ; and his son and successor, Pria- 
 patius, followed his example. It was not till B.C. 
 181 that the fifth Arsaces, Phraates I., son of Priapa- 
 tius, having mounted the throne, resumed the policy 
 of aggression introduced by Tiridates, and further 
 extended the dominion of Parthia in the region south
 
 62 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 
 
 of the Caspian. The great Antiochus was dead. His 
 successor, Seleucus IV. (Philopator), was a weak and 
 unenterprising prince, whom the defeat of Magnesia 
 had cowed, and who regarded inaction as his only 
 security. Aware probably of this condition of affairs, 
 Phraates, early in his reign, invaded the country of 
 the Mardi, which lay in the mountain tract south of 
 the Caspian Sea, overran it, and added it to his terri- 
 tories. Successful thus far, he proceeded to make 
 an encroachment on Media Rhagiana, the district be- 
 tween the Caspian Gates and Media Atropatene, by 
 occupying the tract immediately west of the Gates, 
 and building there the important city of Charax, 
 which he garrisoned with Mardians. This was an 
 advance of the Parthian Terminus towards the west 
 by a distance of nearly two hundred miles — an 
 advance, not so much important in itself as in the 
 indication which it furnished, at once of Parthian 
 aggressiveness and of Syrian inability to withstand 
 it. The conquests of Phraates added little either 
 to the military strength or to the resources of his 
 kingdom, but they were prophetic of the future. 
 They foreshadowed that gradual waning of the Syrian 
 and advance of the Parthian state, which is the 
 chief fact of West Asian history in the two centuries 
 immediately preceding our era, and which was to 
 make itself startlingly apparent within the next few 
 years, during the reign of the sixth Arsaces.
 
 IV. 
 
 FIRST PERIOD OF EXTENSIVE CONQUEST — REIGN 
 OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 MlTHRlDATES THE FIRST, a brother of Phraates, 
 was nominated to the kingly office by his predecessor, 
 who had shown his affection for him during his life 
 by assuming the title of " Philadelphus " upon his 
 coins, and at his death passed over in his favour the 
 claims of several sons. Undoubtedly, he was a born 
 
 
 
 COIN OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 " king of men " — pointed out by nature as fitter to 
 rule than any other individual among his contempo- 
 raries. He had a physiognomy which was at once 
 intelligent, strong, and dignified. He was ambi- 
 tious, but not possessed of an ambition which was 
 likely to " o'erleap itself" — strict, but not cruel— brave, 
 
 6 3
 
 64 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 energetic, a good general, an excellent administrator, 
 a firm ruler. Parthia, under his government, advanced 
 " by leaps and bounds." Receiving at his accession 
 a kingdom but of narrow dimensions, confined 
 apparently between the city of Charax on the one 
 side and the river Arius, or Heri-rud, on the other, 
 he transformed it, within the space of thirty-seven 
 years — which was the time that his reign lasted — into 
 a great and flourishing empire. It is not too much to 
 say that, but for him, Parthia might have remained to 
 the end a mere petty state on the outskirts of the 
 Syrian kingdom, and, instead of becoming a rival to 
 Rome, might have sunk after a short time into insig- 
 nificance and obscurity. 
 
 To explain the circumstances under which this vast 
 change — this revolution in the Asiatic balance of 
 power — became possible, it is necessary that we 
 should cast our eye over the general condition of 
 Western Asia in the early part of the second century 
 before our era, and especially consider the course of 
 events in the two kingdoms between which Parthia 
 intervened, the Bactrian and Syrian monarchies. 
 
 The Bactrian kingdom, as originally established by 
 Diodotus, lay wholly to the north of the Paropa- 
 misus, in the long and broad valley of the Oxus, 
 from its sources in the Pamir to its entrance on the 
 Kharesmian Desert. The countries to the south of 
 the range continued to be Syrian dependencies, and 
 were reckoned by Seleucus Nicator as included within 
 the limits of his dominion. But it was not long before 
 the empire of Alexander in these parts began to 
 crumble and decay. Indian princes, like Sandra-
 
 SITUATION OF BACTRIA AT HIS ACCESSION. 65 
 
 cottus (Chandragupta) and Sophagasenus, asserted 
 their rights over the Region of the Five Rivers 
 (Punjab), and even over the greater portion of 
 Affghanistan. Greek dominion was swept away. 
 At the time when Bactria, having had its indepen- 
 dence acknowledged by Antiochus the Great, felt 
 itself at liberty to embark in ambitious enterprises, 
 as Parthia had done, the Greco-Macedonian sway 
 over the tracts between Parthia and the Sutlej was 
 either swept away altogether, or reduced to a mere 
 shadow ; and Euthydemus, the third Bactrian 
 monarch, was not afraid of provoking hostilities 
 from Syria, when, about B.C. 205, he began his 
 aggressions in this direction. Under him, and under 
 his son and successor, Demetrius, in the twenty years 
 between B.C. 205 and B.C. 185, Bactrian conquest was 
 pushed as far as the Punjab region, Cabul and Can- 
 dahar were overrun, and the southern side of the 
 mountains occupied from the Heri-rud to the Indus. 
 Eucratidas, who succeeded Demetrius (about B.C. 180), 
 extended his sway still further into the Punjab region, 
 but with unfortunate results, so far as his original 
 territories were concerned. Neglected, and compara- 
 tively denuded of troops, these districts began to slip 
 from his grasp. The Scythian nomads of the Steppes 
 saw their opportunity, and bursting into Bactria, 
 harried it with fire and sword, even occupying por- 
 tions, and settling themselves in the Oxus valley. 
 
 While matters were thus progressing in the East, 
 and the Bactrian princes, attempting enterprises 
 beyond their strength, were exhausting rather than 
 advantaging the kingdom under their sway, the
 
 66 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 Seleucid monarchs in the West were also becoming 
 more and more entangled in difficulties, partly of 
 their own creation, partly brought about by the 
 ambition of pretenders. Antiochus the Great, shortly 
 after his return from the eastern provinces, became 
 embroiled with the Romans (B.C. 196), who dealt his 
 power a severe blow by the defeat of Magnesia (B.C. 
 190), and further weakened it by the support which 
 they lent to the kings of Pergamus, which was now 
 the ruling state in Asia Minor. The weakness of 
 Antiochus encouraged Armenia to revolt, and so lost 
 Syria another province (B.C. 189). Troubles began 
 to break out in Elymai's, consequent upon the ex- 
 actions of the Seleucidae (B.C. 187). Eleven years 
 later (B.C. 176) there was a lift of the clouds, and 
 Syria seemed about to recover herself through the 
 courage and energy of the fourth Antiochus (Epi- 
 phanes) ; but the hopes raised by his successes in 
 Egypt (B.C. 1 71-168) and Armenia (B.C. 165) were 
 destroyed by his unwise conduct towards the Jews, 
 whom his persecuting policy permanently alienated, 
 and erected into a hostile state upon his southern 
 border (B.C. 168-160). Epiphanes having not only 
 plundered and desecrated the Temple, but having set 
 himself to eradicate utterly the Jewish religion, and 
 completely Hellenise the people, was met with the 
 most determined resistance on the part of a moiety 
 of the nation. A patriotic party rose up under de- 
 voted leaders, who asserted, and in the end secured, 
 the independence of their country. Not alone during 
 the remaining years of Epiphanes, but for half a 
 century after his death, throughout seven reigns, the
 
 SITUATION OF SYRIA. 67 
 
 struggle continued ; Judaea taking advantage of every 
 trouble and difficulty in Syria to detach herself more 
 and more completely from her oppressor, and being 
 a continued thorn in her side, a constant source of 
 weakness, preventing more than anything else the re- 
 covery of her power. The triumph which Epiphanes 
 had obtained in the distant Armenia, where he de- 
 feated and captured the king, Artaxias, was a poor 
 set-off against the foe which he had created for 
 himself at his doors through his cruelty and intoler- 
 ance. Nor did the removal of Epiphanes (B.C. 164) 
 improve the condition of affairs in Syria. The throne 
 fell to his son, Antiochus V. (Eupator), a boy of nine, 
 according to one authority, or, according to another, 
 of twelve years of age. The regent, Lysias, exercised 
 the chief power, and was soon engaged in a war with 
 the Jews, whom the death of the oppressor had en- 
 couraged to fresh efforts. The authority of Lysias 
 was further disputed by a certain Philip, whom 
 Epiphanes, shortly before his death, had made tutor 
 to the young monarch. The claim of this tutor to 
 the regent's office being supported by a considerable 
 portion of the army, a civil war arose between him 
 and Lysias, which raged for the greater part of two 
 years, terminating in the defeat and death of Philip 
 (B.C. 162). But Syrian affairs did not even then settle 
 down into tranquillity. A prince of the Seleucid 
 house, Demetrius by name, the son of Seleucus IV., 
 and consequently the first cousin of Eupator, was at 
 this time detained in Rome as a hostage, having been 
 sent there during his father's lifetime, as a security 
 for his fidelity. Demetrius, with some reason, regarded
 
 68 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 his claim to the Syrian throne as better than that of 
 his cousin, who was the son of the younger brother ; 
 and, being in the full vigour of early youth, he deter- 
 mined to assert his pretensions in Syria, and to make 
 a bold stroke for the crown. Having failed to obtain 
 the Senate's consent to his quitting Italy, he took his 
 departure secretly, crossed the Mediterranean in a 
 Carthaginian vessel, and landing in Asia, succeeded 
 within a few months in establishing himself as Syrian 
 monarch. 
 
 From this review of the condition of affairs in the 
 Syrian and Bactrian kingdoms during the first half 
 of the second century before Christ, it is sufficiently 
 apparent, that in both countries the state of things 
 was favourable to any aspirations which the power 
 that lay between them might entertain after dominion 
 and self-aggrandisement. The kings of the two 
 countries indeed, at the time of the accession of 
 Mithridates to the Parthian throne (B.C. 174), were, 
 both of them, energetic and able princes, but the 
 Syrian monarch was involved in difficulties at home 
 which required all his attention, while the Bactrian 
 was engaged in enterprises abroad which equally 
 engrossed and occupied him. Mithridates might 
 have attacked either with a good prospect of success. 
 Personally, he was at least their equal, and though 
 considerably inferior in military strength and re- 
 sources, he possessed the great advantage of having 
 a perfectly free choice both of time and place, could 
 seize the most unguarded moment, and make his 
 attack in the quarter where he knew that he would 
 be least expected and least likely to find his enemy
 
 HIS FIRST ATTACK ON BACTRIA. 6$ 
 
 on the alert. Circumstances, of which we now can- 
 not appreciate the force, seem to have determined 
 him to direct his first attack against the territories of 
 his eastern neighbour, the Bactrian king, Eucratidas. 
 These, as we have seen, were left comparatively 
 unguarded, while their ambitious master threw all 
 his strength into his Indian wars, pressing through 
 Cabul into the Punjab region, and seeking to extend 
 his dominion to the Sutlej river, or even to the Ganges. 
 Naturally, Mithridates was successful. Attacking the 
 Bactrian territory where it adjoined Parthia, he made 
 himself master, without much difficulty, of two pro- 
 vinces — those of Turiua and of Aspionus. Turiua 
 recalls the great but vague name of " Turanian," 
 which certainly belongs to these parts, but can 
 scarcely be regarded as local. Aspionus has been 
 regarded as the district of the Aspasiacae ; but the 
 two words do not invite comparison. It is best to be 
 content with saying that we cannot locate the districts 
 conquered, but that they should be looked for in the 
 district of the Tejend and Heri-rud, between the 
 Paropamisus and the great city of Balkh. 
 
 It does not appear that Eucratidas attempted any 
 retaliation. Absorbed in his schemes of Indian con- 
 quest, he let his home provinces go, and sought 
 compensation for them only in the far East. Mean- 
 time Mithridates, having been successful in his Bac- 
 trian aggression, and thus whetted his appetite for 
 territorial gain, determined on a more important 
 expedition. After waiting for a few years, until 
 Epiphanes was dead, and the Syrian throne occu- 
 pied by the boy king, Eupator, while the two
 
 70 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 claimants of the regency, Lysias and Philip, were 
 contending in arms for the supreme power, he 
 suddenly marched with a large force towards the 
 West, and fell upon the great province of Media 
 Magna, which, though still nominally a Syrian 
 dependency, was under the rule of a king, and prac- 
 tically, if not legally, independent. Media was a 
 most extensive and powerful country. Polybius calls 
 it " the most powerful of all the kingdoms of Asia, 
 whether we consider the extent of the territory, or 
 the number and quality of the men, or the goodness 
 of the horses produced there. For these animals," 
 he says, " are found in it in such abundance, that 
 almost all the rest of Asia is supplied with them from 
 this province. It is here also that the Royal horses 
 are always fed, on account of the excellence of the 
 pasture." The capital of the province was now, as in 
 the more ancient times, Ecbatana, situated on the 
 declivity of Mount Orontes (Elwand), and, though 
 fallen from its former grandeur, yet still a place of 
 much importance, second only in all Western Asia 
 to Antioch and perhaps Babylon. The invasion of 
 Mithridates was stoutly resisted by the Medes, and 
 several engagements took place, in which sometimes 
 one and sometimes the other side had the advantage ; 
 but eventually the Parthians prevailed. Mithridates 
 seized and occupied Ecbatana, which was at the time 
 an unwalled town, established his authority over the 
 whole region, and finally placed it under the govern- 
 ment of a Parthian satrap, Bacasis, while he himself 
 returned home, to crush a revolt which had broken 
 out.
 
 HIS CONQUEST OF MEDIA MAGNA. Jl 
 
 The scene of the revolt was Hyrcania. The 
 Hyrcanian people, one markedly Arian, had pro- 
 bably from the time of their subjugation chafed 
 under the Parthian yoke, and seeing in the absence 
 of Mithridates, with almost the whole of his power, 
 in Media a tempting opportunity, had resolved to 
 make a bold stroke for freedom before the further 
 growth of Parthia should render such an attempt 
 hopeless. We are not told that they had any special 
 grievances ; but they were brave and high-spirited ; 
 they bad enjoyed exceptional privileges under the 
 Persians ; and no doubt they found the rule of a 
 Turanian people galling and oppressive. They may 
 well have expected to receive support and assistance 
 from the other Arian nations in their neighbourhood, 
 as the Mardi, the Sagartians, the Arians on the Heri- 
 rud, &c, and they may have thought that Mithri- 
 dates would be too fully occupied with his Median 
 struggle to have leisure to direct his arms against 
 them. But the event showed that they had mis- 
 calculated. Media submitted to Mithridates without 
 any very protracted resistance ; the Parthian monarch 
 knew the value of time, and, quitting Media, marched 
 upon Hyrcania without losing a moment ; the other 
 Arian tribes of the vicinity were either apathetic or 
 timid, and did not stir a step for their relief. The 
 insurrection was nipped in the bud ; Hyrcania was 
 forced to submit, and became for centuries the 
 obedient vassal of her powerful neighbour. 
 
 The conquest of Media had brought the Parthians 
 into contact with the important country of Susiana or 
 Elymai's, an ancient seat of power, and one which had
 
 72 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 flourished much during the whole of the Persian 
 period, having contained within it the principal 
 Persian capital, Susa. This tract possessed strong 
 attractions for a conqueror ; and it appears to have 
 been not very long after he had succeeded in crushing 
 the Hyrcanian revolt, that Mithridates once more 
 turned his arms westward, and from the advantageous 
 position which he held in Media, directed an attack 
 upon the rich and flourishing province which lay to 
 the south. It would seem that Elymai's, like Media, 
 though reckoned a dependency of the Seleucid Em- 
 pire, had a king of its own, who was entrusted with its 
 government and defence, and expected to fight his 
 own battles. At any rate we do not hear of any 
 aid being rendered to the Elymaeans in this war, 
 or of Mithridates having any other antagonist to 
 meet in the course of it, besides " the Elymaean 
 king." This monarch he defeated without diffi- 
 culty, and, having overrun his country, apparently 
 in a single campaign, added the entire territory to his 
 dominions. 
 
 Elymai's was interposed between two regions of 
 first-rate importance, Babylonia and Persia. The 
 thorough mastery of any one of the three, com- 
 monly carried with it in ancient times dominion 
 over the other two. So far as can be gathered from 
 the scanty materials which we possess for Parthian 
 history at this period, the conquest of Elymai's was 
 followed almost immediately by the submission of 
 Babylonia and Persia to the conqueror. Media and 
 Elymai's having been forced to submit, the great 
 Mithridates was very shortly acknowledged as their
 
 HIS SECOND ATTACK ON BACTRIA. 73 
 
 sovereign lord by all the countries that intervened 
 between the Paropamisus and the Lower Euphrates. 
 
 Thus gloriously successful in this quarter, Mithri- 
 dates, who may fairly be considered the greatest 
 monarch of his day, after devoting a few years to 
 repose, judged that the time was come for once more 
 embarking on a career of aggression, and seeking a 
 similar extension of his dominions towards the East 
 to that which he had found it so easy to effect in 
 the regions of the West. The Bactrian troubles had 
 increased. Eucratidas, after greatly straining the 
 resources of Bactria in his Indian wars, had been 
 waylaid and murdered on his return from one of 
 them by his son Heliocles, who chose to declare him 
 a public enemy, drove his chariot over his corpse, and 
 ordered it to be left unburied. This ill beginning 
 inaugurated an unfortunate reign. Attacked by 
 Scythians from the north, by Indians and Sarangians 
 on the east and the south-east, Heliocles had already 
 more on his hands than he could conveniently manage, 
 when Mithridates declared war against him, and 
 marched into his country (about B.C. 150).. Already 
 exhausted by his other wars, Heliocles could bear up 
 no longer. Mithridates rapidly overran his dominions, 
 and took possession of the greater part of them. Ac- 
 cording to some he did not stop here, but pressing still 
 further eastward invaded India, and carried his arms 
 over the Punjab to the banks of the Hydaspes. But 
 this last advance, if it ever took place, was a raid 
 rather than an attempt at conquest. It had no serious 
 results. Indo-Bactrian kingdoms continued to exist in 
 Cabul down to about B.C. 80, when Hellenism in this
 
 74 REIGN OP MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 quarter was finally swept away by the Yue-chi and 
 other Scythic tribes. The Parthian Empire never 
 included any portion of the Indus region, its furthest 
 provinces towards the east being Bactria, Aria, 
 Sarangia, Arachosia, and Sacastana. 
 
 The great increase of power which Mithridates 
 had obtained by his conquests could not be a matter 
 of indifference to the Syrian monarchs. But their 
 domestic troubles — the contentions between Philip 
 and Lysias, between Lysias and Demetrius Soter, 
 Soter and Alexander Balas, Balas and Demetrius II., 
 Demetrius II. and Tryphon — had so engrossed them 
 for twenty years (from B.C. 162 to B.C. 142), that they 
 had felt it impossible, or hopeless, to attempt any 
 expedition towards the East, for the protection or 
 recovery of their provinces. Mithridates had been 
 allowed to pursue his career of conquest unopposed, 
 so far as the Syrians were concerned, and to establish 
 his sway from the Hindu Kush to the Euphrates. 
 A time, however, at last came when home dangers 
 were less absorbing, and a prospect of engaging the 
 terrible Parthians with success seemed to present 
 itself. The second Demetrius had not, indeed, 
 altogether overcome his domestic enemy, Tryphon ; 
 but he had so far brought him into difficulties as to 
 believe that he might safely be left to be dealt with by 
 his wife, Cleopatra, and by his captains. At the same 
 time, the condition of affairs in the East seemed to 
 invite his interference. Mithridates ruled his new 
 conquests with some strictness, probably suspecting 
 their fidelity, and determined that he would not by 
 any remissness allow them to escape from his grasp.
 
 HIS WAR WITH DEMETRIUS NICATOR. 75 
 
 The native inhabitants could scarcely be much 
 attached to the Syro-Macedonians, who had certainly 
 not treated them with much tenderness ; but a 
 possession of one hundred and ninety years' duration 
 confers prestige in the East, and a strange yoke may 
 have galled more than one to whose pressure they 
 had become accustomed. Moreover, all the provinces 
 which the Parthians had taken from Syria contained 
 Greek towns, and their inhabitants might at all 
 times be depended on to side with their countrymen 
 against the Asiatics. At the present conjuncture, 
 too, the number of the malcontents was swelled by 
 the addition of the recently subdued Bactrians, who 
 hated the Parthian yoke, and longed for an oppor- 
 tunity of recovering their freedom. 
 
 Thus, when Demetrius II., anxious to escape the 
 reproach of inertness, determined to make a great ex- 
 pedition upon the formidable Parthian monarch, who 
 ruled over all the countries between the Paropamisus 
 and the Lower Euphrates, he found himself welcomed 
 as a deliverer by a considerable number of his 
 enemy's subjects, whom the harshness or the novelty 
 of the Parthian rule had offended. The malcontents 
 joined his standard as he advanced ; and supported, 
 as he thus was, by Persian, Elymaean, and Bactrian 
 contingents, he engaged and defeated the Parthians 
 in several battles. Mithridates at last, recognising 
 his inferiority in military strength, determined to 
 have recourse to stratagem, and having put Demetrius 
 off his guard by proposals of peace, made a sudden 
 attack upon him, completely defeated his army, and 
 took him prisoner. The conquered monarch was at
 
 j6 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 first treated with some harshness, being conveyed 
 about to the several nations which had revolted, and 
 paraded before each in turn, to show them how 
 foolish they had been in lending him their aid ; but 
 when this purpose had been answered, Mithridates 
 showed himself magnanimous, gave his royal captive 
 the honours befitting his rank, assigned him a 
 residence in Hyrcania, and even gave him the hand 
 of his daughter, Rhodogune, in marriage. It was 
 policy, however, still more than clemency, which 
 dictated this conduct. Mithridates nurtured de- 
 signs against the Syrian kingdom itself, and saw 
 that it would be for his advantage to have a Syrian 
 prince in his camp, allied to him by marriage, whom 
 he could put forward as entitled to the throne, and 
 whom, if his enterprise succeeded, he might leave to 
 govern Syria for him, as tributary monarch. These 
 far-reaching plans might perhaps have been crowned 
 with success, had the head which conceived them 
 been spared to watch over and direct their execution. 
 But Providence decreed otherwise. Mithridates had 
 reached an advanced age, and, being attacked by 
 illness soon after his capture of Demetrius, found his 
 strength insufficient to battle with his malady, and, 
 to the great grief of his subjects, succumbed to it 
 (B.C. 136), after an eventful and glorious reign of 
 thirty-eight years.
 
 V. 
 
 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. — 
 LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS. 
 
 The Parthian institutions had, no doubt, their roots 
 in that early condition of society among the inhabi- 
 tants of the Caspian region, which belongs to the 
 twilight, rather than to the dawn of history, and 
 which has to be conjectured or divined rather than 
 worked out from the statements of ancient writers. 
 From time immemorial this region has been mainly 
 occupied by nomadic tribes, for whom alone it is 
 fitted, and has been divided up among a number of 
 races more or less closely allied, and generally very 
 similar in character. Constant wars and raids occupy 
 such races. Every man has to be a warrior ; and 
 their conduct in war marks out a comparatively few 
 for leaders, the mass for mere soldiery. Hence, 
 something like a feudal organisation naturally pre- 
 vails. The leader in war is the chieftain or noble in 
 peace. An aristocracy forms itself, round which the 
 " villeins " or " serfs " are grouped. When, in course 
 of time, some specially perilous war threatens, or 
 some enterprise is taken in hand of more than usual 
 magnitude and gravity, the need of a directing hand 
 
 77
 
 78 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 is felt — the confederacy of chiefs recognises the 
 weakness of a confederacy — and by common consent 
 a single individual is selected as King, Great Khan, 
 Dictator, Governor, Commander-in-chief. Thus, in 
 such a state of society as has been described, 
 monarchy makes its appearance. The fittest to 
 command and direct is placed at the head of affairs, 
 given some title or other implying authority, and 
 accepted by the general body of chiefs as their 
 suzerain. 
 
 But in conceding this authority to the necessities 
 of the case, the chiefs are careful to reserve to them- 
 selves considerable powers, and the result is thus a 
 limited monarchy. In Parthia, the king was per- 
 manently advised by two councils, consisting of 
 persons not of his own nomination, whom rights, 
 conferred by birth or office, entitled to their high 
 positions. One of these was a family conclave 
 {concilium domesticum), or assembly of full-grown 
 males of the Royal House ; the other was a Senate 
 comprising both the spiritual and the temporal chiefs 
 of the nation, the " Sophi," or " Wise Man," and the 
 " Magi," or " Priests." Together these two bodies 
 constituted the Megistanes, the " Nobles," or " Great 
 Men " — the privileged class which, to a considerable 
 extent, checked and controlled the monarch. The 
 monarchy was elective, but only in the house of the 
 Arsacidae ; and the concurrent vote of both councils 
 was necessary to the election of a new king. Prac- 
 tically, the ordinary law of hereditary descent appears 
 to have been commonly followed, unless in the case 
 where a king left no son of sufficient age to exercise
 
 THE KING, THE SOPHI, AND THE MAGI. 79 
 
 the royal office. Under such circumstances, the 
 Megistanes usually nominated the late king's next 
 brother to succeed him, or, if he had left no brother, 
 went back to an uncle. When the line of succession 
 had once been changed, the right of the elder branch 
 was lost, and did not revive, unless the branch 
 preferred died out or possessed no member qualified 
 to rule. When a king had been duly nominated by 
 the two councils, the right of placing the crown 
 upon his head belonged to the Surena, the " Field- 
 Marshal," or " Commander-in-chief of the Parthian 
 armies." The Megistanes further claimed, and some- 
 times exercised, the right of deposing a monarch 
 whose conduct displeased or dissatisfied them ; but 
 an attempt to exercise this privilege naturally, and 
 almost necessarily, led to a civil war, since no monarch 
 was likely to accept his deposition without a struggle ; 
 and thus it was force, and not right, which practically 
 determined whether a deposed king should lose his 
 crown or no. 
 
 After a monarch had been once elected, and 
 firmly fixed upon the throne, the power which he 
 wielded appears to have been very nearly despotic. 
 At any rate, he could put to death without a trial 
 whomsoever he chose ; and adult members of the 
 Royal House, who ventured to provoke the reigning 
 monarch's jealousy, were constantly so treated. But 
 probably it would have been more risky to arouse 
 the fears of the " Sophi " or " Magi." The latter 
 especially were a powerful body, consisting of an 
 organised hierarchy which had come down from 
 ancient times, and was feared and venerated by all
 
 80 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 classes of the people. Their numbers at the close of 
 the empire, counting adult males only, are reckoned 
 at eighty thousand ; they possessed considerable 
 tracts of fertile land, and were the sole inhabitants of 
 many large towns or villages, which they were per- 
 mitted to govern as seemed good to them. The 
 arbitrary power of the monarchs must, in practice, 
 have been largely checked by the privileges of this 
 numerous priestly class, of which it would seem that, 
 in the later times, they became jealous, thereby 
 preparing the way for their own downfall. 
 
 The dominion of the Parthians over the provinces, 
 which Mithridates and earlier kings had conquered, 
 was maintained by reverting to the system which had 
 prevailed generally throughout the East before the 
 accession of the Achaemenian Persians to power, and 
 which is the simplest and rudest of all possible 
 empire organisations. This was the system of 
 establishing in the various countries either viceroys, 
 holding office for life, or else dependent dynasties of 
 kings. In either case, the rulers, so long as they paid 
 their tribute regularly to the Parthian monarchs, and 
 furnished the contingents required of them for the 
 wars in which Parthia was almost always engaged, 
 were allowed to govern the people under their sway 
 at their pleasure. Among monarchs, in the higher 
 sense of the term, who nevertheless were vassals to 
 Parthia, may be enumerated the kings of Persia, 
 Elyma'i's, Adiabene, Osrhoene, and of Armenia and 
 Media Atropatene, when they formed, as they some- 
 times did, portions of the Parthian Empire. The 
 viceroys, who governed the other provinces, bore the
 
 THE VITAXM, OR VASSAL MONARCHS. 8 1 
 
 title of Vitaxae, or Bistakes, and were fourteen or 
 fifteen in number. The remark has been made by 
 perhaps the greatest of English historians, Gibbon, 
 that the system thus established " exhibited under 
 other names, a lively image of the feudal system, 
 which has since prevailed in Europe." The com- 
 parison is of some value, as pointing out an analogy 
 which might otherwise have been overlooked ; but, 
 like most historical parallels it is inexact, the points 
 of difference between the Parthian and the feudal 
 systems being probably more numerous than those of 
 resemblance, but the points of resemblance being very 
 main points, not few in number, and striking. It was 
 with special reference to the system thus established 
 that the Parthian monarchs took the title of " King 
 of Kings " — BASIAEY2 BA2IAEQN — so frequent 
 upon their coins— a title exchanged, but in one in- 
 stance only, for "Satrap of Satraps" — SATPAI1HS 
 TON SATPAIIQN. The title "King of Kings" 
 naturally appears first on the coins of Mithridates. 
 In the Parthian system there was one anomaly of 
 a very curious character. The Grecian cities which 
 were scattered in large numbers throughout the 
 empire, foundations of Alexander or his successors, 
 enjoyed a municipal government of their own, and in 
 some cases were almost independent communities, 
 the Parthian kings exercising over them little or no 
 control. The great city of Seleucia upon the Tigris 
 was the most important of these places ; its popula- 
 tion was estimated in the first century after Christ at 
 six hundred thousand souls ; it had strong walls, and 
 was surrounded by a most fertile territory. Tacitus
 
 82 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF Mil HR1 DATES I. 
 
 tells us that it had its own senate, or municipal 
 council of three hundred members, elected by the 
 inhabitants to rule over them, from among the 
 wealthiest and best educated of the citizens. Under 
 ordinary circumstances it enjoyed the blessing of 
 complete self government, and was entirely free from 
 Parthian interference, paying no doubt its appointed 
 tribute, but otherwise holding the position of a " free 
 city." It was only in the case of internal dissensions 
 that these advantages were lost, and the Parthian 
 soldiery, invited within the walls, arranged the 
 quarrels of parties, and settled the constitution of the 
 State at its pleasure. Privileges of a similar character, 
 though probably less extensive, belonged, it would 
 seem, to most of the other Greek cities, at least 
 seventy in number, contained within the empire. The 
 Parthian monarchs thought it politic to favour them ; 
 and their practice in this respect justified the title of 
 " Phil-Hellene," which they were fond of assuming 
 upon their coins. On the whole, the policy may have 
 been wise, but it diminished the unity of the empire, 
 and there were times when serious danger arose from 
 it. The Syro- Macedonian monarchs could always 
 count with certainty on having powerful friends in 
 Parthia, anxious to render them assistance, what- 
 ever portion of it they invaded ; and even the 
 Romans, though their ethnic connection with the 
 cities was not so close, were sometimes indebted to 
 them for aid of an important kind. 
 
 Another anomaly of a similar character, but of less 
 importance, since the number of persons which it 
 affected cannot have been nearly so great, was the
 
 THE FREE CITIES — GREEK AND JEWISH. 83 
 
 position occupied by the Jewish communities within 
 the Parthian state. These, though far less numerous 
 than the Grecian, were still not infrequent, and their 
 location in some of the most considerable cities of 
 the empire gave them a consequence which makes it 
 necessary that they should not be overlooked. In 
 Babylon, in Seleucia, in Ctesiphon, and in other 
 principal towns, as Susa probably, and Rhages, there 
 was so large a Jewish element in the population, that 
 it had been thought best to give them municipal 
 independence, the power to elect magistrates, and 
 perhaps a special quarter in each town to dwell in. 
 There were also a certain number of places the 
 inhabitants of which were wholly Jews, and these 
 enjoyed similar privileges with the " free towns " of 
 the Greeks. Hence another element of weakness in 
 the organisation of the empire, wherein an amalga- 
 mation of races, or even a thorough consolidation 
 was impossible. The worst results showed themselves 
 in the towns with mixed populations, where, from time 
 to time, the most fearful disturbances broke out, often 
 terminating in horrible massacres. 
 
 A Greek author of the Augustan age tells us, that 
 the Great Mithridates, after effecting his conquests, 
 made a collection of the best laws which he found 
 to prevail among the various subject peoples, and 
 imposed them on the Parthian nation. This state- 
 ment is, no doubt, an exaggeration ; but we may 
 attribute to Mithridates with some reason, the intro- 
 duction at this time of various practices and usages, 
 whereby the Parthian Court was assimilated to those 
 of the earlier Great Monarchies of Asia, and became
 
 84 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 in the eyes of foreigners the successor and repre- 
 sentative of the old Assyrian and Persian kingdoms. 
 The assumption of new titles and of a new state— the 
 organisation of the Court on a new plan — the bestowal 
 of a new character on the subordinate officers of the 
 empire, were suitable to the new phase of its life on 
 which the monarchy had now entered, and may with 
 the highest probability, if not with absolute certainty, 
 be assigned to this period. 
 
 It has been already noticed that Mithridates I. 
 appears to have been the first Parthian sovereign 
 who took the sounding title of " King of Kings." The 
 title had been a favourite one with the old Assyrian 
 and Persian monarchs, but was not adopted either by 
 the Seleucida^ or by the Greek kings of Bactria. Its 
 revival implied a distinct pretension to that mastery 
 of Western Asia, which had belonged of old to the 
 Assyrians and Persians, and which was, in later times, 
 formally claimed by Artaxerxes, the son of Babek, 
 the founder of the New Persian Kingdom. Previous 
 Parthian monarchs had been content to call them- 
 selves " the King," or " the Great King " — Mithridates 
 I. is " the King of Kings, the great and illustrious 
 Arsaces " — BA2IAEQ2 BA2IAE12N MErAAOY 
 AP2AK0Y EIII<t>ANOYS. 
 
 At the same time Mithridates appears to have 
 assumed the tiara, or tall stiff crown which, with 
 certain modifications in its shape, had been the mark 
 of sovereignty, both under the Assyrians and under 
 the Persians. Previously the royal headdress had 
 been either a mere cap of a Scythic type, pointed, but 
 lower than the Scyths usually wore it, or the ordinary
 
 TITLES, DRESS, AND STATUS OF THE KING. 85 
 
 diadem, which was a band encircling the head, and 
 terminating" in two long ribbons or ends, that hung 
 down behind the head on the back. According to 
 Herodian, the diadem, in the later times, was double ; 
 but the coins of Parthia do not exhibit this peculiarity. 
 The cap of the first king is ornamented with pendant 
 pearls in front ; the stiff tiara of Mithridates has three 
 rows of pearls sewn on to it. 
 
 Ammianus Marcellinus tells us that among the 
 titles assumed by the Parthian monarchs was that 
 of " Brother of the Sun and Moon." The Shahs of 
 modern Persia still claim the epithet. It is ordinarily 
 used, not so much by themselves, as by their courtiers 
 and subjects, in the language of compliment, and this 
 may have been to some extent the case in Parthia. 
 Still, there is reason to believe that in the minds of 
 men at the time, something of a divine character was 
 regarded as attaching to the Arsacid race. In the 
 civil contentions, which form so main a feature of the 
 later history, combatants abstained from lifting their 
 hands knowingly against one of the royal stock, 
 since to kill or wound one was looked upon as a 
 sacrilege. The actual name of @eo?, " God," was even 
 assumed as a title by at least one of the kings, and a 
 favourite epithet upon the coins is Oeo-Trdroop, which 
 implies the divinity of the king's father. After his 
 death the monarch seems generally to have been the 
 object of a qualified worship ; statues were erected 
 to him in the temples, where they were apparently 
 associated with the images of the Sun-God and the 
 Moon-God. 
 
 No account of the Parthian Court has come down
 
 86 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 to us that is cither complete or altogether trustworthy ; 
 but some particulars may be gathered of it from the 
 scattered notices of various ancient writers, on which 
 we may place reliance. The best authorities are 
 agreed that it was not stationary, but migrated at 
 different times of the year to different cities of the 
 empire, in this respect resembling the Court of the 
 Achaemenians. It is not quite clear, however, which 
 of the cities w r ere thus honoured. Ctesiphon was 
 undoubtedly one of them. All writers agree that it 
 was the chief city of the empire, and the ordinary 
 seat of the government. Here, according to Strabo, 
 the kings passed the winter months, delighting in the 
 excellence of the air. The town was situated on the 
 left bank of the Tigris, opposite to Seleucia, twelve or 
 thirteen miles below the modern Baghdad. Pliny 
 says that it was built by the Parthians in order to 
 reduce Seleucia to insignificance, and that when it 
 failed of its purpose, they built another city, Volo- 
 gesocerta, in the same neighbourhood with the same 
 object ; but the account of Strabo is more probable — 
 namely, that it grew r up gradually out of the wish of 
 the Parthian kings to spare Seleucia the unpleasant- 
 ness of having the rude soldiery, which followed the 
 Court from place to place, quartered upon them. The 
 remainder of the year, according to the same authority, 
 was spent by the Parthian monarchs either at the 
 Median city of Ecbatana, which is the modern 
 Hamadan, or in the province of Hyrcania. In 
 Hyrcania the palace, Strabo says, was at Tape ; and 
 between this place and Ecbatana he appears to have 
 regarded the monarchs as spending the whole time
 
 SPLENDOUR OF THE COURT. 87 
 
 which was not passed at Ctesiphon. Athenaeus, how- 
 ever, declares that Rhages, near the Caspian Gates, 
 was the spring residence of the Parthian kings ; and 
 it seems not unlikely that this famous city, which 
 Isidore of Charax, writing in Parthian times, calls 
 " the greatest in Media," was among the occasional 
 residences of the Court. Parthia itself was, it would 
 seem, deserted ; but still a city of that region pre- 
 served in one respect a royal character, being the 
 place where all the earlier monarchs were interred. 
 Ultimately Arbela became the royal burying-place. 
 
 The pomp and grandeur of the Parthian kings are 
 described only in the vaguest terms by the Greek and 
 Roman writers. No author of repute, whose remains 
 have come down to us, appears to have visited the 
 Parthian Court. We may perhaps best obtain a true 
 notion of the splendour of the sovereign from the 
 accounts which have reached us of his relations and 
 great officers, who can have reflected only faintly the 
 magnificence of the sovereign. Plutarch tells us that 
 the general whom Orodes deputed to conduct the war 
 against Crassus came into the field accompanied by 
 two hundred litters wherein were contained his con- 
 cubines, and by a thousand camels which carried his 
 baggage. His dress was the long flowing robe of 
 the ancient Medes ; he wore his hair parted down the 
 middle, and had his face painted with cosmetics. A 
 body of ten thousand horse, composed entirely of his 
 clients and slaves, followed him in battle. We may 
 conclude from this picture, and from the general 
 tenor of the classical notices, that the Arsacidae 
 revived and maintained very much such a Court as
 
 88 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 
 
 that of the old Achaemenian princes, falling probably 
 somewhat below their model in general politeness and 
 refinement, but equalling it in luxury, in extravagant 
 expenditure, and in display. Moreover, in one respect, 
 an advance was made beyond the limits of Achae- 
 menian civilisation. The theatrical representations 
 introduced into Asia by the Greeks proved extra- 
 ordinarily attractive to the semi-barbaric race, 
 unacquainted hitherto with any such performances. 
 The Greek language and literature were so far studied 
 as to render the representation of Greek dramas 
 intelligible to the upper classes. " An exotic litera- 
 ture and a gaudy theatre flourished at Seleucia under 
 the royal patronage, the ritual ceremonies of the most 
 graceful of superstitions were too closely interwoven 
 with the forms of the Grecian drama not to follow in 
 its train. The Court of Seleucia presented a motley 
 combination of the manners of different ages and 
 countries, only to be paralleled, perhaps, in the semi- 
 European fashions of St. Petersburg and Moscow." * 
 
 But if, at their Court, the Parthian kings thus 
 tolerated, or even encouraged, luxurious habits and 
 enervating amusements, among the bulk of the nation 
 the very opposite characteristics prevailed. The taint 
 of their Scythian origin always clung to the Parthian 
 people. They had always about them, as Strabo 
 notes, " much that was barbaric and Scythic." The 
 organisation of their army was very rude. Each 
 chieftain brought into the field, like the nobles of the 
 Middle Ages, an indefinite and probably uncounted 
 contingent of retainers, armed as their means allowed 
 
 1 See Merivale, "Roman Empire," vol. ii. pp. 3, 4.
 
 RUDE ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY. 89 
 
 them — some, the richest, in coats of scale or chain 
 armour, and mounted on steeds similarly protected, 
 carrying, besides the universal bow and arrows, a 
 long spear or pike — others lightly equipped, without 
 armour, and carrying nothing but a bow and arrows, 
 with a short sword or knife. Of these last, a portion 
 only were mounted, while the remainder served on 
 foot. When the contingents united, the troops were 
 simply massed together, according to their character, 
 into three bodies — the heavy cavalry, the light cavalry, 
 and the foot. There were no divisions corresponding 
 to the Roman legions, or our regiments ; and, ap- 
 parently, no petty officers each contingent simply 
 obeying its chief. When he went out to battle with 
 his army, the king was, of course, Commander-in- 
 chief. In his absence, his place was taken by a 
 Surena, or field-marshal, appointed by him to the 
 command. There was, however a chief Surena, whose 
 office was hereditary, and who, besides commanding 
 in the field, was a great State official. 
 
 Such seems to have been the general character of 
 those practices and institutions which distinguished 
 the Parthians from the foundation of their empire 
 by Mithridates. Some of them, it is probable, he 
 rather adopted than invented ; but there is no good 
 reason for doubting that of many he was the 
 originator. He appears to have been one of those 
 rare individuals to whom it has been given to unite 
 the powers and capacities which form the conqueror 
 with those which constitute the successful organiser 
 of a State. Brave and enterprising in war, prompt 
 to seize an occasion and skilful to turn it to the best
 
 90 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 0E MTTHKIDATES I. 
 
 advantage, not even averse to severities when they 
 seemed to be required, he yet felt no acrimony 
 towards those who had resisted his arms, but was 
 ready to befriend them as soon as their resistance 
 ceased. Mild, clement, philanthropic, he conciliated 
 those whom he subdued almost more easily than he 
 subdued them, and by the efforts of a few years 
 succeeded in welding together a dominion which 
 lasted without suffering serious mutilation for nearly 
 four centuries. Though not formally dignified with 
 the epithet of " Great," he was beyond all question the 
 greatest of the Parthian monarchs. Later times did 
 him more justice than his contemporaries ; and, when 
 the names of almost all the other kings had sunk 
 into oblivion, retained his in honour, and placed it 
 on a par with that of the original founder of Par- 
 thian independence. " The Parthians,' says Agathias, 
 " though a subject nation, and previously of very little 
 reputation, put an end to the dominion of the Mace- 
 donians, and subsequently became lords of the whole 
 empire except Egypt, Arsaces first of all beginning 
 the rebellion, and Mithridates not very long afterwards 
 exalting the Parthian name to a high pitch of glory."
 
 VI. 
 
 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA — DEFEAT AND DEATH 
 OF ANTIOCHUS SIDETES. 
 
 The death of Mithridates, and the accession of a 
 comparatively unenterprising successor, Phraates II., 
 encouraged Syria to make one more effort to thrust 
 the Parthians back into their native wilds, and to 
 recover the dominion of Western Asia. So great a 
 position was not a thing to be surrendered without 
 
 COIN OK PHRAATES II. 
 
 a final, even if it were a despairing, struggle ; and in 
 the actual position of affairs it was quite open to 
 question whether, on the whole, Parthia or Syria 
 were the stronger. The dominion of both countries 
 was comparatively recent ; neither had any firm hold 
 on its outlying provinces ; neither could claim to
 
 92 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 
 
 have conciliated to itself the affections of the Western 
 Asiatics generally, or to rest its power on any other 
 basis than that of military force. And in military 
 force it was uncertain which way the balance inclined. 
 Both countries had a nucleus of native troops, on 
 which absolute reliance might be placed, which was 
 brave, faithful, stanch, and would contend to the 
 death for their respective sovereigns. But, beyond 
 this, both had also a fluctuating body of unwilling 
 subjects or subject-allies, unworthy of implicit trust, 
 and likely to gravitate to one side or the other, 
 according as hope, or fancy, or the merest caprice 
 might decide. The chances of victory or defeat 
 turned mainly on this fluctuating body, the in- 
 stability of which had been amply proved in the 
 wars of the last half-century. Those wars them- 
 selves, taken as a whole, had manifested no decided 
 preponderance of either people over the other ; at 
 one time Parthia, at another Syria, had been hard 
 pressed ; and it was natural for the leaders on either 
 side to believe that accidental circumstances, rather 
 than any marked superiority of one of the two 
 peoples over the other, had brought about the re- 
 sults that had been reached. 
 
 In the last war that had been waged success had 
 finally rested with Parthia. An entire army had been 
 destroyed, and the Syrian monarch captured. Deme- 
 trius " the Conqueror," as he called himself, was 
 expiating in the cold and rugged region of Hyrcania, 
 the rashness which had led him to deem himself a 
 match for the craft and strategic skill of Mithridates. 
 But now a new and untried monarch was upon the
 
 REIGN OF PHRAATES II. 93 
 
 throne — one who was clearly without his father's 
 ambition, and probably lacked his ability. Settled 
 in his kingdom for the space of six years, he had 
 not only attempted nothing against Syria, but had 
 engaged in no military enterprise whatever. Yet the 
 condition of Syria had been such as to offer the 
 strongest possible temptation to a neighbour pos- 
 sessed of courage and energy. Civil war had raged, 
 and exhausted the resources of the country, from 
 B.C. 146 to 137, after which there had been a pro- 
 tracted struggle between the Syrians and the Jews 
 (B.C. 137-133), in which the Syrian arms had at 
 first been worsted, but had at length asserted their 
 superiority. Had Phraates II., the son and suc- 
 cessor of Mithridates, inherited a tenth part of his 
 father's military spirit, he would have taken advan- 
 tage of this troubled time to carry the war into 
 Syria Proper, and might have shaken the Syrian 
 throne to its base, or even wholly overturned it. In 
 the person of the captured Demetrius, he possessed 
 one whom he might have set up as a pretender with 
 a certainty of drawing many Syrians to his side, and 
 whom he might, if successful, have left to rule as 
 Vitaxa, or subject king, the country of which he had 
 once been actual monarch. But Phraates had no 
 promptitude, no enterprise. He let all the oppor- 
 tunities which offered themselves escape him, content 
 to keep watch on Demetrius — when he escaped from 
 confinement, to pursue and retake him — and to hold 
 him in reserve as a force of which he might one day 
 make use, when it seemed to him that the fitting time 
 was come for it.
 
 94 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 
 
 The result of his long procrastination was, that the 
 war, when renewed, was renewed from the other side. 
 Antiochus Sidetes, who had succeeded to the Syrian 
 throne on the captivity of his brother, Demetrius, and 
 had taken to wife his brother's wife, Cleopatra, having 
 crushed the pretender, Tryphon, with her assistance, 
 and then with some difficulty enforced submission on 
 the Jews, felt himself, in B.C. 129, at liberty to resume 
 the struggle with Parthia, and, having made great 
 preparations, set out for the East with the full inten- 
 tion of releasing his brother, and recovering his lost 
 provinces. 
 
 It is impossible to accept without considerable 
 reserve the accounts that have come down to us of the 
 force which Antiochus collected. According to Justin, 
 it consisted of no more than eighty thousand fighting 
 men, to whom were attached the incredible number of 
 three hundred thousand camp-followers, the majority 
 of them consisting of cooks, bakers, and actors ! As 
 in other extreme cases the camp-followers do but 
 equal, or a little exceed, the number of men fit for 
 actual service, this estimate, which makes them nearly 
 four times as numerous, is entitled to but little credit. 
 The late historian, Orosius, corrects the error here 
 indicated ; but his account seems to err in rating the 
 supernumeraries too low. According to him, the 
 armed force amounted to three hundred thousand, 
 while the camp-followers, including grooms, sutlers, 
 courtesans, and actors, were no more than a third of 
 the number. From the two accounts, taken together, 
 we are perhaps entitled to conclude that the entire 
 host did not fall much short of four hundred thousand
 
 INVASION OF ANTIOCHUS SIDETES. 95 
 
 men. This estimate receives a certain amount of 
 confirmation from an independent statement made 
 incidentally by Diodorus, with respect to the number 
 on the Syrian side that fell in the campaign, which he 
 estimates at three hundred thousand. 
 
 The army of Phraates, according to two consentient 
 accounts, numbered no more than a hundred and 
 twenty thousand. An attempt which he made to 
 enlist in his service a body of Scythian mercenaries 
 from the regions beyond the Oxus failed, the Scyths 
 being quite willing to lend their aid, but arriving too 
 late at the rendezvous to be of any use. At the same 
 time a defection on the part of the subject princes 
 deprived the Parthian monarch of contingents which 
 usually swelled his numbers, and threw him upon the 
 support of his own countrymen, chiefly or solely. 
 Under these circumstances it is more surprising that 
 he was able to collect a hundred and twenty thousand 
 men than that he did not succeed in bringing into the 
 field a larger number. 
 
 The Syrian troops were magnificently appointed. 
 The common soldiers had their military boots 
 fastened with buckles or studs of gold ; and the 
 culinary utensils, in which the food of the army 
 was cooked, were in many instances of silver. It 
 seemed as if banqueting, rather than fighting, was 
 to be the order of the day. But to suppose that 
 this was actually so would be to do the army of 
 Antiochus an injustice. History, from the time of 
 Sardanapalus to that of the Crimean War of 1854-6, 
 abounds with instances of the somewhat strange com- 
 bination of luxurious habits with valour of the highest
 
 96 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 
 
 kind. No charge of poltroonery can be established 
 against the Syrian soldiery, who, on the contrary, 
 seem to have played their part in the campaign with 
 credit. They were accompanied by a body of Jews 
 under John Hyrcanus, the son of Simon and grand- 
 son of the first Maccabee leader, who had been forced 
 to take up temporarily the position of a Syrian 
 feudatory. As they advanced through the Meso- 
 potamian region after crossing the Euphrates, they 
 received continually fresh accessions of strength by 
 the arrival of contingents from the Parthian tributary 
 states, which, disgusted with Parthian arrogance and 
 coarseness, or perhaps attracted by Syrian luxury 
 and magnificence, embraced the cause of the invader. 
 Phraates, on his part, instead of awaiting attack in 
 the fastnesses of Parthia or Hyrcania, advanced to 
 meet his enemy across the Assyrian and Babylonian 
 plains, and, either in person or by his generals, 
 engaged the Syrian monarch in three pitched battles, 
 in each of which he was worsted. One of these was 
 fought upon the banks of the Greater Zab or Lycus, 
 in Adiabene, not far from the site of Arbela, where 
 Antiochus met and defeated the Parthian general, 
 Indates, and raised a trophy in honour of his victory. 
 The exact scene of the other two engagements is un- 
 known to us, and in no case have we any description 
 of the battles, so that we have no means of judging 
 whether it was by superiority of force or of strategy 
 that the Syrian monarch thus far prevailed, and 
 obtained almost the whole for which he was fighting. 
 The entire province of Babylonia, the heart of the 
 empire, where were situated the three great cities of
 
 EARLY SUCCESSES OF SIDETES. 97 
 
 Babylon, Seleucia, and Ctesiphon, fell into his hands, 
 and a further defection of the tributary countries from 
 the Parthian cause took place, a defection so wide- 
 spread, that the writer who records it says, with a 
 certain amount of rhetoric, no doubt — " Phraates had 
 now nothing left to him beyond the limits of the 
 original Parthian territory." He maintained, however, 
 a position somewhere in the Lower Babylonian plain, 
 and still confronted Antiochus with an army, which, 
 though beaten, was bent on resistance. 
 
 When affairs were in this state, Phraates, recognis- 
 ing the peril of his position, came to the conclusion 
 that it was necessary to attempt, at any rate, a diver- 
 sion. He had still what seemed to him a winning 
 card in his hand, and it was time to play it. Deme- 
 trius, the brother of Antiochus, and dejure the king of 
 Syria, was still in his possession, watched and carefully 
 guarded in the rough Hyrcanian home, from which he 
 had twice escaped, but only to be re-captured. He 
 would send Demetrius into Syria under an escort of 
 Parthian troops, who should conduct him to the 
 frontier and give him the opportunity of recovering 
 his kingdom. It would be strange if one, entitled to 
 the throne by his birth, and its actual occupant for the 
 space of six years, could not rally to himself a party 
 in a country always ready to welcome pretenders, and 
 to accept, as valid, claims that were utterly baseless. 
 Let troubles break out in his rear, let his rule over 
 Syria be threatened in Syria itself, and Antiochus 
 would, he thought, either hasten home, or, at the least, 
 be greatly alarmed, have his attention distracted from 
 his aggressive designs, and be afraid of plunging
 
 g8 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 
 
 deeper into Asia, lest, while grasping at the shadow of 
 power, he should lose the substance. 
 
 Demetrius and his Parthian escort set out, but the 
 distance to be traversed was great, and travelling 
 is slow in Asia. Moreover, the winter time was 
 approaching, and each week would increase the diffi- 
 culties of locomotion. The scheme of Phraates hung 
 fire. No immediate effect followed from it. Antio- 
 chus may not have received intelligence of the 
 impending danger, or he may have thought his wife, 
 Cleopatra, whom he had left at Antioch, capable of 
 coping with it. In any case, it is certain that his 
 movements were in no way affected by the bolt which 
 Phraates had launched at him Instead of withdraw- 
 ing his troops from the occupied provinces and 
 marching them back into Syria, thus relinquishing all 
 that he had gained by his successful campaign, he 
 resolved to maintain all the conquests that he had made, 
 and to keep his troops where they were, merely 
 dividing them, on account of their numbers, among 
 the various cities which he had taken, and making 
 them go into winter quarters. His design was carried 
 out ; the army was dispersed ; discipline was probably 
 somewhat relaxed ; and the soldiery, having no 
 military duties to perform, amused themselves, as 
 foreign soldiers are apt to do, by heavy requisitions, 
 and by cavalier treatment of the native inhabitants. 
 
 Some months of the winter passed in this way. 
 Gradually the discontent of the ciyil populations in 
 the cities increased. Representations were made to 
 Phraates by secret messengers, that the yoke of the 
 Syrians was found to be intolerable, and that, if he
 
 SECRET MACHINATIONS OF PHRAATES. 99 
 
 would give the signal, the cities were ripe for revolt. 
 Much hidden negotiation must have taken place before 
 a complete arrangement could have been made, or a 
 fixed plan settled on. As in the " Saint Bartholomew," 
 as in the " Sicilian Vespers," as in the great outbreak 
 against the Roman power in Asia Minor under 
 Mithridates of Pontus, the secret must have been 
 communicated to hundreds, who, with a marvellous 
 tenacity of purpose, kept it inviolate for weeks or 
 months, so that not a whisper reached the ears of the 
 victims. Sunk in a delicious dream of the most 
 absolute security, careless of the feelings, and deaf to 
 the grumblings of the townsmen, the Syrian soldiers 
 continued to enjoy their long and pleasant holiday, 
 without a suspicion of the danger that was impending. 
 Meanwhile Phraates arranged all the details of his 
 plan, and communicated them to his confederates. It 
 was agreed that, on an appointed day, all the cities 
 should break out in revolt ; the natives should take 
 arms, rise against the soldiers quartered upon them, 
 and kill all, or as many as possible. Phraates 
 promised to be at hand with his army, to prevent the 
 scattered garrisons from giving help to each other. 
 It was calculated that, in this way, the invaders might 
 be cut off almost to a man without the trouble of 
 even fighting a battle. 
 
 But, before he proceeded to these terrible extremi- 
 ties, the Parthian prince, touched perhaps with com- 
 passion, determined to give his adversary a chance 
 of escaping the fate prepared for him by timely con- 
 cessions. The winter was not over ; but the snow was 
 beginning to melt through the increasing warmth of
 
 IOO LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 
 
 the sun's rays, and the day appointed for the general 
 rising was probably drawing near. Phraates felt that 
 no time was to be lost. Accordingly, he sent ambas- 
 sadors to Antiochus to propose peace, and to inquire 
 on what terms it would be granted him. The reply 
 of Antiochus, according to Diodorus, was as follows : 
 "If Phraates would release his prisoner, Demetrius, 
 from captivity, and deliver him up without ransom, at 
 the same time restoring all the provinces which had 
 been taken by Parthia from Syria, and consenting to 
 pay a tribute for Parthia itself, peace might be had ; 
 but not otherwise." To such terms it was, of course, 
 impossible that any Parthian king should listen ; and 
 the ambassadors of Phraates returned, therefore, 
 without further parley. 
 
 Soon afterwards, the day appointed for the out- 
 break arrived. Apparently, even yet no suspicion had 
 been excited. The Syrian troops were everywhere 
 quietly enjoying themselves in their winter quarters, 
 when, suddenly and without any warning, they found 
 themselves attacked by the natives. Taken at disad- 
 vantage, it was impossible for them to make a success- 
 ful resistance ; and it would seem that the great bulk 
 of them were massacred in their quarters. Antiochus, 
 and the detachment stationed with him, alone, so far 
 as we hear, escaped into the open field, and contended 
 for their lives in just warfare. It had been the 
 intention of the Syrian monarch, when he quitted his 
 station, to hasten to the protection of the division 
 quartered nearest to him ; but he had no sooner com- 
 menced his march than he found himself confronted 
 by Phraates, who was at the head of his main army,
 
 THE GREAT MASSACRE. IOI 
 
 having, no doubt, anticipated the design of Antiochus 
 and resolved to frustrate it. The Parthian prince was 
 anxious to engage at once, as his force far out- 
 numbered that commanded by his adversary ; but the 
 latter might have declined the battle had he so willed, 
 and have at any rate greatly protracted the struggle. 
 He had a mountain region — Mount Zagros, probably 
 — within a short distance of him, and might have 
 fallen back upon it, so placing the Parthian horse at 
 great disadvantage ; but he was still at an age when 
 caution is apt to be considered cowardice, and temerity 
 to pass for true courage. Despite the advice of one 
 of his captains, he determined to accept the battle 
 which the enemy offered, and not to fly before a foe 
 whom he had three times defeated. But the determi- 
 nation of the commander was ill seconded by the 
 army which he commanded. Though Antiochus 
 fought strenuously, he was defeated, since his troops 
 were without heart and offered but a poor resistance. 
 Athenaeus, the general who had advised retreat, was 
 the first to fly, and then the whole army broke up 
 and dispersed itself. Antiochus himself perished, 
 either slain by the enemy or by his own hand. His 
 son, Seleucus, and a niece, a daughter of his brother, 
 Demetrius, who had accompanied him in his expe- 
 dition, were captured. His troops were either cut to 
 pieces or made prisoners. The entire number of 
 those slain in the battle, and in the general massacre, 
 was reckoned at three hundred thousand. 
 
 Such was the issue of this great expedition. It was 
 the last which any Seleucid monarch conducted into 
 these countries — the final attempt made by Syria to
 
 102 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 
 
 repossess herself of her lost Eastern provinces. 
 Henceforth, Parthia was no further troubled by the 
 power that had hitherto been her most dangerous and 
 most constant enemy, but was allowed to enjoy, with- 
 out molestation from Syria, the conquests which she 
 had effected. Syria, in fact, had received so deep a 
 wound that she had from this time a difficulty in pre- 
 serving her own existence. The immediate result of 
 the destruction of Antiochus and his host was the 
 revolt of Judaea, which henceforth maintained its 
 independence uninterruptedly to the time of the 
 Romans. The dominions of the Seleucidae were 
 reduced to Cilicia, and Syria Proper, or the tract west 
 of the Euphrates between the chain of Amanus and 
 Palestine. Internally, the Syrian state was agitated 
 by constant commotions from the claims of various 
 pretenders to the sovereignty ; externally, it was kept 
 in continual alarm by the Egyptians, the Romans, 
 and the Armenians. During the sixty years that 
 elapsed between the return of Demetrius to his king- 
 dom (B.C. 128) and the conversion of Syria into a 
 Roman province (B.C. 65) she ceased wholly to be 
 formidable to her neighbours. Her flourishing period 
 was gone by, and a rapid decline set in, from which 
 there was no recovery. It is surprising that the 
 Romans did not step in earlier, to terminate a rule 
 which was but a little removed from anarchy. Rome, 
 however, had other work on her hands — civil troubles, 
 social wars, and the struggle with Mithridates ; and 
 hence the Syrian state continued to exist till the year 
 B.C. 65, though in a feeble and moribund condition. 
 In Parthia itself the consequences of Syria's defeat
 
 RESULTS — REMOTE AND IMMEDIATE. IO3 
 
 and collapse were less important than might have 
 been expected. One would naturally have looked to 
 see, as the immediate result, a fresh development of 
 the aggressive spirit, and a burst of energy and enter- 
 prise parallel to that which had carried the arms of 
 Mithridates I., from his Parthian fastnesses to the 
 Hydaspes on the one hand and to the Euphrates on the 
 other. But no such result followed. We hear indeed 
 of Phraates intending to follow up his victory over 
 Antiochus by a grand attack upon Syria — an attack 
 to which, if it had taken place, she must almost 
 certainly have succumbed — but, in point of fact, the 
 relations between the two countries continued for 
 many years after the Great Massacre, peaceful, if not 
 even friendly. Phraates celebrated the obsequies of 
 Antiochus with the pomp and ceremony befitting a 
 powerful king, and ultimately placed his remains in a 
 coffin of silver, and sent them into Syria, to find their 
 last resting-place in their native country. He treated 
 Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, who had been made 
 prisoner in the final battle, with the highest honour, 
 and took to wife Antiochus's niece, who fell into his 
 hands at the same time. The royal houses of the 
 Seleucidae and the Arsacidae became thus doubly 
 allied ; and, all grounds for further hostilities having 
 been removed, peace and amity were established 
 between the former rivals. No doubt a powerful 
 motive influencing Parthia in the adoption of this 
 policy was that revelation of a new danger which 
 will form the chief subject of the ensuing section.
 
 VII. 
 
 PRESSURE OF THE NORTHERN NOMADS UPON 
 PARTHIA — SCYTHIC WARS OF PHRAATES II. 
 AND ARTABANUS II. 
 
 The Turanian or Tatar races by which Central 
 and Northern Asia are inhabited, have at all times 
 constituted a serious danger to the inhabitants 
 of the softer South. Hordes of wild barbarians 
 wander over those inhospitable regions, increase, 
 multiply, exert a pressure on their southern neigh- 
 bours, and are felt as a perpetual menace. Every 
 now and then a crisis arrives. Population has 
 increased beyond the means of subsistence, or a 
 novel ambition has seized a tribe or a powerful 
 chief, and the barrier, which has hitherto proved a 
 sufficient restraint, is forced. There issues suddenly 
 out of the frozen bosom of the North a stream of 
 coarse, uncouth savages — brave, hungry, countless — 
 who swarm into the fairer southern regions deter- 
 minedly, irresistibly ; like locusts winging their flight 
 into a green land. How such multitudes come to be 
 propagated in countries where life is with difficulty 
 sustained, we do not know ; why the impulse 
 suddenly seizes them to quit their old haunts and-
 
 GENERAL CHARACTER OF NOMADIC INROADS. 105 
 
 move steadily in a given direction, we cannot say ; 
 but we see that the phenomenon is one of constant 
 recurrence, and we have thus come to regard it as 
 being scarcely curious or strange at all. In Asia, 
 Cimmerians, Scythians, Comans, Mongols, Turks ; in 
 Europe, Gauls, Goths, Huns, Avars, Vandals, Bur- 
 gundians, Lombards, Bulgarians, have successively 
 illustrated the law, and made us familiar with its 
 operation. " Inroads of the northern barbarians " 
 has become a common-place with writers of history, 
 and there is scarcely any country of the South, 
 whether in Asia or in Europe, that has not ex- 
 perienced them. 
 
 Such inroads are very dreadful when they take 
 place. Hordes of savages, coarse and repulsive in 
 their appearance, fierce in their tempers, rude in their 
 habits, not perhaps individually very brave or strong, 
 but powerful by their numbers, and sometimes by a 
 new mode of warfare, which it is found difficult to 
 meet, pour into the seats of civilisation, and spread 
 havoc around. On they come (as before observed) 
 like a flight of locusts, countless, irresistible — finding 
 the land before them a garden, and leaving it behind 
 them a howling wilderness. Neither sex nor age is 
 spared. The inhabitants of the open country and of 
 the villages, if they do not make their escape to high 
 mountain tops or other strongholds, are ruthlessly 
 massacred by the invaders, or, at best, fprced to 
 become their slaves. The crops are consumed, the 
 flocks and herds swept off or destroyed, the villages 
 and homesteads burnt, the whole country made a 
 scene of desolation. Walled towns perhaps resist
 
 106 THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 
 
 them, as they have not often patience enough for 
 sieges ; but sometimes, with a dogged determination, 
 they sit down before the ramparts, and by a pro- 
 longed blockade, starve the defenders into sub- 
 mission. Then there ensues an indescribable scene 
 of havoc, rapine, and bloodshed. Ancient cities, 
 rich with the accumulated stores of ages, are ran- 
 sacked and perhaps burnt ; priceless works of art 
 often perish ; civilisations which it has taken 
 centuries to build up are trampled down. Few 
 things are more terrible than the devastation and 
 ruin which such an inroad has often spread over a 
 fair and smiling kingdom, even when it has merely 
 swept over it, like a passing storm, and has led to no 
 permanent occupation. 
 
 Against a danger of this kind the Parthian princes 
 had had, almost from the first, to guard. They were 
 themselves of the nomadic race— Turanians, if our 
 hypothesis concerning them be sound — and had es- 
 tablished their kingdom by an invasion of the type 
 above described. But they had immediately become 
 settlers, inhabitants of cities ; they had been softened, 
 to a certain extent, civilised ; and now they looked 
 on the nomadic hordes of the North with the. same 
 dislike and disgust with which the Persians and the 
 Greco - Macedonians had formerly regarded them. 
 In the Scythians of the Trans-Oxianian tract they 
 saw an unceasing peril, and one, moreover, which 
 was, about the time of Phraates, continually increas- 
 ing and becoming more and more threatening. 
 
 Fully to explain the position of affairs in this 
 quarter, we must ask the reader to accompany us
 
 THE YUE-CHI AND THE SU. 107 
 
 into the remoter regions of inner Asia, where the 
 Turanian tribes had their headquarters. There, 
 about the year B.C. 200, a Turanian people called 
 the Yue-chi were expelled from their territory on 
 the west of Chen-si by the Hiong-nu, whom some 
 identify with the Huns. " The Yue-chi separated 
 into two bands : the smaller descended southwards 
 into Thibet ; the larger passed westwards, and after 
 a hard struggle, dispossessed a people called ' Su,' of 
 the plains west of the river of Hi. The latter ad- 
 vanced to Ferghana and the Jaxartes ; and the Yue- 
 chi not long afterwards retreating from the U-siun, 
 another nomadic race, passed the ' Su ' on the north, 
 and occupied the tracts between the Oxus and the 
 Caspian. The ' Su ' were thus in the vicinity of the 
 Bactrian Greeks ; the Yue-chi in the neighbourhood 
 of the Parthians." I On the particulars of this ac- 
 count, which comes from the Chinese historians, we 
 cannot perhaps altogether depend ; but there is no 
 reason to doubt the main fact, testified by an eye- 
 witness, that the Yue-chi, having migrated about the 
 period mentioned from the interior of Asia, had 
 established themselves sixty years later (B.C. 140) 
 in the Caspian region. Such a movement would 
 necessarily have thrown the entire previous popula- 
 tion of those parts into commotion, and would 
 probably have precipitated them upon their neigh- 
 bours. It accounts satisfactorily for the unusual 
 pressure of the northern hordes at this period on the 
 Parthians, the Bactrians, and even the Indians ; and it 
 completely explains the crisis of Parthian history 
 
 1 See Wilson, " Ariana Antiqua," p. 303.
 
 108 THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 
 
 which we have now reached, and the necessity which 
 lay upon the nation of meeting, and if possible over- 
 coming, a new danger. 
 
 In fact, one of those occasions of peril had arisen 
 to which we have before alluded, and to which, in 
 ancient times, the civilised world was always liable 
 from an outburst of northern barbarism. Whether 
 the peril has altogether passed away or not, we need 
 not here inquire, but certainly in the old world there 
 was always a chance that civilisation, art, refinement, 
 luxury, might suddenly and almost without warning 
 be swept away by an overwhelming influx of savagery 
 from the North. From the reign of Cyaxares, when 
 the evil, so far as we know, first showed itself, the 
 danger was patent to all wise and far-seeing governors 
 both in Europe and Asia, and was from time to time 
 guarded against. The expeditions of Cyrus against 
 the Massagetae, of Darius Hystaspis against the 
 European Scyths, of Alexander against the Getae, of 
 Trajan and Probus across the Danube, were designed 
 to check and intimidate the northern nations, to break 
 their power, and diminish the likelihood of their 
 taking the offensive. It was now more than four 
 centuries since in this part of Asia any such effort 
 had been made ; and the northern barbarians might 
 naturally have ceased to fear the arms and discipline 
 of the South. Moreover, the circumstances of the 
 time scarcely left them a choice. Pressed on con- 
 tinually more and more by the newly-arrived "Su" and 
 Yue-chi, the old inhabitants of the Trans-Oxianian 
 regions were under the necessity of seeking new 
 settlements, and could only attempt to find them in
 
 SCYTHIC INVASION OF BACTRIA. 109 
 
 the quarter towards which they were driven by the 
 new-comers. Strengthened probably by daring spirits 
 from among their conquerors themselves, they crossed 
 the rivers and the deserts by which they had been 
 hitherto confined, and advancing against the Par- 
 thians, Bactrians, and Arians, threatened to carry all 
 before them. In Bactria, soon after the establish- 
 ment of the Greco-Bactrian kingdom, they began to 
 give trouble. Province after province was swallowed 
 up by the invaders, who occupied Sogdiana, or the 
 tract between the Lower Jaxartes and the Lower 
 Oxus, and hence proceeded to make inroads into 
 Bactria itself. The rich land on the Polytimetus, or 
 Ak-Su, the river of Samarkand, and even the high- 
 lands between the Upper Jaxartes and Upper Oxus, 
 were permanently occupied by Turanian immigrants ; 
 and, if the Bactrians had not compensated them- 
 selves for their losses by acquisitions of territory 
 in Afghanistan and India, they would soon have had 
 no kingdom left. The hordes were always increas- 
 ing in strength through the influx of fresh tribes. 
 Bactria was pressed to the south-eastward, and pre- 
 cipitated upon its neighbours in that direction. 
 
 Presently, in Ariana, the hordes passed the moun- 
 tains, and proceeding southwards, occupied the tract 
 below the great lake wherein the Helmend terminates, 
 which took from them the name of Sacastana — " the 
 land of the Saka or Scyths " — a name still to be 
 traced in the modern Seistan. Further to the east 
 they effected a lodgment in Cabul, and another in 
 the southern portion of the Indus valley, which for a 
 time bore the name of Indo-Scythia. They even
 
 HO THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 
 
 crossed the Indus, and attempted to penetrate into 
 the interior of Hindustan, but here they were met 
 and repulsed by a native monarch, about the year 
 B.C. 56. 
 
 The people engaged in this great movement are 
 called in a general way by the classical writers Sacae 
 or Scythae, i.e., Scyths. They consisted of a number 
 of tribes, similar for the most part in language, habits, 
 and mode of life, and allied more or less closely to 
 the other nomadic races of Central and Northern 
 Asia. Of these tribes the principal were the 
 Massagetae ("great Jits or Jats"), the former adver- 
 saries of Cyrus, who occupied the country on both 
 sides of the lower course of the Oxus ; the Dahae, 
 who bordered the Caspian above Hyrcania, and 
 extended thence to the longitude of Herat ; the 
 Tochari, who settled in the mountains between the 
 Upper Jaxartes and the Upper Oxus, where they gave 
 name to the tract known as Tokharistan ; the Asii 
 or Asians, who were closely connected with the 
 Tochari ; and the Sacarauli, who are found connected 
 with both the Tochari and the Asians. Some of 
 these tribes contained within them further sub- 
 divisions, as the Dahae, who comprised the Parni or 
 Aparni, the Pissuri, and the Xanthii ; and the Massa- 
 getae, who included among them Chorasmii, Attasii, 
 and others. 
 
 The general character of the barbarism, in which 
 these various races were involved, may be best learnt 
 from the description given of one of them, with but 
 few differences, by Herodotus and Strabo. According 
 to these writers, the Massagetae were nomads who
 
 CHARACTER OF SCYTHIC BARBARISM. Ill 
 
 moved about in waggons or carts, like the modern 
 Kalmucks, accompanied by their flocks and herds, on 
 whose milk they chiefly sustained themselves. Each 
 man had only one wife, but all the wives were held in 
 common. They were good riders, and excellent 
 archers, but fought both on horseback and on foot, 
 and used, besides their bows and arrows, lances, 
 knives, and battle-axes. They had little or no iron, 
 but made their spear and arrow-heads, and their 
 other weapons, of bronze. They had also bronze 
 breastplates, but otherwise the metal with which they 
 adorned and protected their own persons and the 
 heads of their horses, was gold. To a certain extent 
 they were cannibals. It was their custom not to let 
 the aged among them die a natural death, but, when 
 life seemed approaching its term, to offer them up in 
 sacrifice, and then boil the flesh and feast upon it. 
 This mode of ending life was regarded as the best 
 and most honourable ; such as died of disease were 
 not eaten, but buried, and their friends bewailed their 
 misfortune. It may be added to this, that we have 
 sufficient reason to believe, that the Massageta.* and 
 the other nomads of these parts regarded the use of 
 poisoned arrows in warfare as legitimate, and employed 
 the venom of serpents and the corrupted blood of 
 men, to make the wounds which they inflicted more 
 deadly. 
 
 Thus, what was threatened by the existing position 
 of affairs was not merely the conquest of one race by 
 another cognate to it, like that of the Medes by the 
 Persians, or of the Greeks by Rome, but the oblite- 
 ration of such art, civilisation, and refinement as
 
 112 THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 
 
 Western Asia had attained to in the course of ages 
 by the successive efforts of Babylonians, Assyrians, 
 Mcdes, Persians, and Greeks — the spread over some 
 of the fairest regions of the earth of a low type of 
 savagery — a type which in religion went no further 
 than the worship of the Sun ; in art knew but the 
 easier forms of metallurgy and the construction of 
 carts ; in manners and customs, included cannibalism, 
 the use of poisoned weapons, and a relation between 
 the sexes destructive alike of all delicacy and all 
 family affection. The Parthians were, no doubt, rude 
 and coarse in their character as compared with the 
 Persians ; but they had been civilised to some extent 
 by three centuries of subjection to the Persians and 
 the Greeks before they rose to power ; they affected 
 Persian manners ; they patronised Greek art ; they 
 had a smattering of Greek literature ; they appreciated 
 the advantages of having in their midst a number of 
 Grecian states. Many of their kings called them- 
 selves upon their coins " Phil- Hellenes," or " lovers of 
 the Hellenic people." x Had the Massagetae and 
 their kindred tribes of Sacae, Tochari, Dahae, Yue-chi, 
 and Su, which now menaced the Parthian power, 
 succeeded in sweeping it away, the gradual declension 
 of all that is lovely or excellent in human life would 
 have been marked. Scythicism would have overspread 
 Western Asia. No doubt the conquerors would have 
 learnt something from those whom they subjected to 
 their yoke ; but it cannot be supposed that they 
 would have learnt much. The change would have 
 been like that which passed over the Western Roman 
 
 1 Lindsay, " History and Coinage of the Parthians," p. 213.
 
 WAR OF SCYTHS WITH PHRAATES II. II3 
 
 Empire, when Goths, Vandals, Burgundians, Alans, 
 Heruli, depopulated its fairest provinces and laid its 
 civilisation in the dust. The East would have been 
 barbarised ; the gains of centuries would have been 
 lost ; the work of Cyrus, Darius, Alexander, and 
 other great benefactors of Asiatic humanity, would 
 have been undone ; Western Asia would have sunk 
 back into a condition not very much above that from 
 which it had been raised two thousand years previously 
 by the primitive Chaldaeans and the Assyrians. 
 
 The first monarch to recognise the approach of the 
 crisis and its danger was Phraates II., the son of 
 Mithridates I., and the conqueror of Antiochus 
 Sidetes. Not that the danger presented itself to his 
 imagination in its full magnitude ; but that he first 
 woke up to the perception of the real position of 
 affairs in the East, and saw that, whereas Parthia's 
 most formidable enemy had hitherto been Syria, and 
 the Syro-Macedonian power, it had now become 
 Scythia and the Sacae. No sooner did the pressure 
 of the nomads begin to make itself felt on his north- 
 eastern frontier, than, relinquishing all ideas of Syrian 
 conquests, if he had really entertained them, he left his 
 seat of empire in Babylonia to the care of a viceroy, 
 Hymerus, or Evemerus, and marched in person to 
 confront the new peril. The Scythians, apparently, 
 had attacked Parthia Proper from their seats in the 
 Oxus region. Phraates, in his haste to collect a 
 sufficient force against them, enlisted in his service a 
 large body of Greeks — the remnants mainly of the 
 defeated army of Antiochus — and taking with him 
 also a strong body of Parthian troops, marched at his
 
 114 THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 
 
 best speed eastward. A war followed in the mountain 
 region, which must have lasted for some years, but of 
 which we have only the most meagre account. At 
 last there was an engagement in which the Scythians 
 got the advantage, and the Parthian troops began to 
 waver and threaten to break, when the Greeks, who 
 had been from the first disaffected, and had only 
 waited for an occasion to mutiny, went over in a 
 body to the enemy, and so decided the battle. 
 Deserted by their allies, the Parthian soldiery were 
 cut to pieces, and Phraates himself was among the 
 slain. The event proved that he had acted rashly 
 in taking the Greeks with him, but he can scarcely 
 be said to have deserved much blame. It would have 
 been surprising if he had anticipated so strange a 
 thing as the fraternisation of a body of luxurious 
 and over-civilised Greeks with the utter barbarians 
 against whom he was contending, or had imagined 
 that in so remote a region, cut off from the rest of 
 their countrymen, they would have ventured to take 
 a step which must have thrown them entirely on 
 their own resources. 
 
 We have no information with regard to the ultimate 
 fate of the Greek mutineers. As for the Scythians, 
 with that want of energy and of a settled purpose 
 which characterised them, they proceeded to plunder 
 and ravage the portion of the Parthian territory 
 which lay open to them, and, when they had thus 
 wasted their strength, returned quietly to their homes. 
 
 The Parthian nobles appointed as monarch, in 
 place of the late king, an uncle of his, named Arta- 
 banus, who is known in history as " Artabanus the
 
 WAR CONTINUED WITH ARTABANUS II. 115 
 
 Second." He was probably advanced in years, and 
 might perhaps have been excused, had he folded his 
 arms, awaited the attack of his foes, and stood wholly 
 on the defensive. But he was brave and energetic ; 
 and, what was still more important, he appears to 
 have appreciated the perils of the position. He was 
 not content, when the particular body of barbarians, 
 which had defeated and slain his predecessor, having 
 ravaged Parthia Proper, returned home, to sit still 
 and wait till he was attacked in his turn. According 
 to the brief but emphatic words of Justin, he 
 assumed the aggressive, and invaded the country of 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS II. 
 
 the Tochari, one of the most powerful of the Scythian 
 tribes, which was now settled in a portion of the 
 region that had, till lately, belonged to the Bactrian 
 kingdom. Artabanus evidently felt that what was 
 needed was, not simply to withstand, but to roll 
 back the flood of invasion, which had advanced so 
 near to the sacred home of his nation ; that the 
 barbarians required to be taught a lesson ; that they 
 must at least be made to understand that Parthia was 
 to be respected ; if this could not be done, then the 
 fate of the empire was sealed. He therefore, with a 
 gallantry and boldness that we cannot sufficiently 
 admire — a boldness that seemed likt rashness, but
 
 Il6 THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 
 
 was in reality prudence — without calculating too 
 closely the immediate chances of battle, led his troops 
 against one of the most forward of the advancing 
 tribes. But fortune, unhappily, was adverse. How 
 the battle was progressing we are not told ; but it 
 appears that, in the thick of an engagement, Arta- 
 banus, who was leading his men, received a wound in 
 the fore-arm, from the effect of which he died almost 
 immediately. The death of the leader on either side 
 decides in the East, almost to a certainty, the issue of a 
 conflict. We cannot doubt that the Parthians, having 
 lost their monarch, were repulsed ; that the expedition 
 failed ; and that the situation of affairs became once 
 more at least as threatening as it had been before 
 Artabanus made his attempt. Two Parthian mon- 
 archs had now fallen, within the space of a few years, 
 in combat with the aggressive Scyths — two Parthian 
 armies had suffered defeat. Was this to be always so ? 
 If it was, then Parthia had only to make up her mind 
 to fall, and, like the great Roman, to let it be her care 
 that she should fall grandly and with dignity.
 
 VIII. 
 
 MITHRIDATES II. AND THE NOMADS — WAR WITH 
 ARMENIA — FIRST CONTACT WITH ROME. 
 
 ARTABANUS II. was succeeded on the throne by 
 his son, Mithridates II., about the year B.C. 124. His 
 military achievements were considerable, and pro- 
 cured him the epithet of " the Great," though that 
 title was perhaps better deserved by Mithridates the 
 First, his uncle. However, the reign of the second 
 Mithridates was undoubtedly a distinguished one, and 
 it is most unfortunate that the accounts of it, which 
 have come down to us, are so meagre and unsatis- 
 factory. We can but trace the history of Parthia 
 during his time in its general outline, with very scanty 
 details, and those not always altogether trustworthy. 
 
 There seems, however, to be no doubt, that his 
 earliest efforts after mounting the throne were directed 
 to the quarter where the great danger pressed — the 
 danger which had proved fatal to his two immediate 
 predecessors, his cousin and his uncle. Probably, in 
 thus determining, he scarcely exercised any choice. 
 The Scyths, after their double victory, would naturally 
 take an attitude so menacing that unless immediately 
 met and checked, all hope would have had to be 
 
 117
 
 Il8 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 
 
 given up— absolute ruin would have had to be met 
 and faced — Parthia would have been overrun, and the 
 empire established by the first Mithridates would 
 have been extinguished, within twenty or thirty years 
 of its first appearance, under the second. The young 
 king, perceiving his peril, bent every effort to meet 
 and repel it. He employed the whole force of the 
 State upon his north-eastern frontier, and, in a series 
 of engagements, so effectually checked the advance 
 of the Scyths, that from his time the danger which 
 had been impending wholly passed away. The 
 nomads gave up the hope of making any serious 
 impression on the Arsacid kingdom, and, turning 
 their restless energies in another direction, found a 
 vent for their superabundant population in the far 
 East, in Affghanistan and India, where they settled 
 themselves, and set up permanent governments. 
 Parthia was so completely relieved from their attacks, 
 that she was able once more to take the aggressive in 
 this region, and to extend her sway at the expense of 
 the nation before which she had so lately trembled. 
 The acquisition of parts of Bactria from the Scyths, 
 which is attested by Strabo, belongs, in all probability, 
 to this reign ; and it is even possible that the exten- 
 sion of Parthian dominion over Sacastane, or Seistan, 
 dates from the same period. We are assured that 
 the second Mithridates "added many nations to the 
 Parthian Empire." As these were decidedly not on 
 the western side of the empire, where Mithridates 
 did not even succeed in conquering Armenia, it would 
 seem that they must have lain towards the East, in 
 which case it would be almost certain that thev must
 
 REBELLION OF EUEMERUS. I ig 
 
 have been outlying tribes of the recent Scythic 
 immigration. 
 
 The successes of Mithridates in this quarter left 
 him at liberty, after a time, to turn his attention 
 towards the west, where, though Syria was no longer 
 formidable, troubles of various kinds had broken out, 
 which could no longer be safely neglected. Hymerus, 
 or Euemerus, the viceroy appointed to direct the 
 affairs of the west from Babylon by Phraates II. when 
 he marched eastward against the Scyths, had greatly 
 misconducted himself in his government, and almost 
 shaken himself free from the Parthian yoke. He had 
 treated the inhabitants of Babylon with extreme 
 cruelty, condemning many of them to slavery, and 
 sending them into Media, besides burning the market- 
 place, several temples, and other buildings of that 
 great city. He had greatly encouraged luxury and 
 extravagance, had offended many by his exactions, 
 and affected the state, if he did not actually claim 
 the title, of an independent monarch. Mithridates, 
 on reaching the West, crushed the nascent rebellion 
 of Hymerus, and having thus recovered dominion 
 over those regions, proceeded to engage in war with 
 a new enemy. 
 
 Armenia, the new enemy, was a territory of very 
 considerable importance, and was henceforth so 
 mixed up with Parthia in her various wars and 
 negotiations, that some account of the country, and 
 people, and of the previous history of the people 
 seems to be necessary. 
 
 According to Justin, Armenia was a tract eleven 
 hundred miles long by seven hundred broad ; but
 
 120 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 
 
 this is an extravagant estimate. If we extend 
 Armenia from the Caspian to the range of Taurus, 
 we cannot make its length much more than seven 
 hundred miles ; and if we even allow it to have reached 
 from the Caucasus to Mount Masius and the lake of 
 Urumiyeh, we cannot make its width more than four 
 hundred miles. But, practically, its limits were almost 
 always much narrower. Iberia and Albania were 
 ordinarily independent countries, occupying the 
 modern Georgia, and intervening between Armenia 
 and the Caucasus ; the Euphrates was the natural 
 boundary of Armenia on the west ; and Niphates, 
 rather than Mons. Masius, shut it in upon the south. 
 Its normal dimensions have been already estimated 
 in this volume at six hundred miles in length by a 
 little more than two hundred in breadth, and its area 
 at about sixty. or seventy thousand square miles. 
 There is no reason to believe that, during the Parthian 
 period, it ever much exceeded these dimensions, except 
 it were during the fourteen years (B.C. 83 to 69) when, 
 under Tigranes I., it held possession of the dwindled 
 kingdom of the Seleucidas. 
 
 Armenia was a country of lofty ridges, deep and 
 narrow valleys, numerous and copious streams, and 
 occasional broad plains — a country of rich pasture 
 grounds, productive orchards, and abundant harvests. 
 It occupied the loftiest position in Western Asia, and 
 contained the sources of all the great rivers of these 
 parts — the Euphrates, the Tigris, the Halys, the 
 Araxes, and the Cyrus — which, rising within a space of 
 two hundred and fifty miles long by a hundred wide, 
 flow down in four directions to three different seas.
 
 WAR WITH ARMENIA. 121 
 
 It was thus to this part of Asia what Switzerland is to 
 Western Europe, an elevated fastness region contain- 
 ing within it the highest mountains, and yielding the 
 waters which fertilise the subjacent regions. It con- 
 tained also two large lakes, each occupying its own 
 basin, and having no connection with any sea — those 
 of Van and Urumiyeh — salt lakes of a very peculiar 
 character. The mountain tracts yielded supplies of 
 gold, silver, copper, lead, and other metals, beside 
 emery and antimony. The soil in the valleys was 
 fertile and bore several kinds of grain ; the flanks of 
 the hills grew vines ; and the pastures produced horses 
 and mules of good quality. 
 
 The Armenians of Parthian times were probably 
 identical with the race, which, still under the same 
 name, occupies the greater portion of the old country, 
 and holds an important position among the inhabi- 
 tants of Western Asia. They are a pale race, with a 
 somewhat sallow complexion, marked features, and 
 dark eyebrows and hair. By their language, which 
 can be traced back to the fourth century of our era, it 
 appears that they are an Arian people, but with a 
 certain amount of Turanian admixture. Their rela- 
 tions are closer with the Persians than probably with 
 any other race, but still they possess many notable 
 points of difference. They are of a weaker physique 
 than the Persians, slighter in their frames, less muscular 
 and robust. They are subtle, wily, with a great talent 
 for commerce, but wanting in strength, stamina, and 
 endurance. In the earlier times they were strongly 
 attached to their own independence, and, though 
 seldom able to maintain it for long, were continually
 
 122 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 
 
 reasserting it whenever an opportunity seemed to 
 offer. But they have now for many centuries been 
 absolutely quiescent, and are patient under the harsh 
 rule of the three races which hold them in subjection 
 — the Russians, the Persians, and the Turks. 
 
 Historically, the Armenians of to-day cannot be 
 traced further back than about the sixth century B.C., 
 when they appear to have immigrated into the terri- 
 tory that they have from that time occupied. Pre- 
 viously their land was possessed by three powerful and 
 warlike races, who are thought to have been Turanians, 
 and who from the tenth to the seventh century B.C. were 
 continually at war with the great Assyrian Empire. 
 These were the Nai'ri, the Urarda, and the Mannai, or 
 Minni — names which constantly recur in the cuneiform 
 inscriptions. The Nai'ri were spread from the mountains 
 west of lake Van, along both sides of the Tigris, to Bir on 
 the Euphrates, and even further ; the Urarda, or people 
 of Ararat, probably the Alarodii of Herodotus, dwelt 
 north and east of the Nai'ri, on the Upper Euphrates, 
 about the lake of Van, and probably on the Araxes ; 
 while the Minni, or Mannai, whose country lay south- 
 east of the Urarda, held the Urumiyeh basin, and the 
 adjoining parts of Zagros. Of these three races, the 
 Urarda were the most powerful, and it was with them 
 that the Assyrians waged their most bloody wars. 
 The capital city of the Urarda was Van, on the eastern 
 shores of the lake, and here it was that the kings set 
 up the most remarkable of their inscriptions. The 
 language of these inscriptions is of a Turanian type, 
 and, though it may have furnished the non-Arian 
 element in the modern Armenian, cannot have been
 
 PREVIOUS HISTORY OF ARMENIA. 1 23 
 
 its real main progenitor. An immigration must have 
 occurred between the end of the Assyrian and the 
 early part of the Persian period, which changed the 
 population of the mountain region, submerging the 
 original occupants in a far larger number of Arian 
 in-comers. 
 
 The first distinct knowledge that we obtain of this 
 new people is from the inscriptions of Darius Hys- 
 taspis. Darius, after mentioning Armenia (Armina) 
 among the twenty-three provinces into which his 
 empire was divided, informs us that, in the second 
 year of his reign (B.C. 520), while he was at Babylon, 
 a great revolt broke out, in which Armenia participated, 
 together with eight other districts. It was not till his 
 third year that the revolt was put down, the Arme- 
 nians, as well as the other confederates, making a most 
 vigorous resistance. The names of the persons and 
 of the places mentioned in this campaign seem to be 
 Arian, as are the other Armenian names generally. 
 On the suppression of the revolt, and the full establish- 
 ment of the power of Darius, Armenia, together with 
 some adjacent regions, became a satrapy of the Persian 
 Empire — the thirteenth, according to Herodotus — and 
 was rated in the Royal Books as bound to furnish a 
 revenue of four hundred talents — about ,£96,000 — 
 annually. From this time its fidelity to the Persian 
 monarchs was remarkable. Not only was the money 
 tribute paid regularly, but a contribution of twenty 
 thousand young colts was made each year to the Royal 
 Stud, so far as appears, without any murmuring. Con- 
 tingents of troops were also readily furnished whenever 
 required by the Great Monarch; and, through the whole
 
 124 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 
 
 Achsemenian period, after the reign of Darius, Armenia 
 remained perfectly tranquil, and never caused the 
 Persians the slightest alarm or anxiety. 
 
 After Arbela (B.C. 331) the Armenians submitted 
 to Alexander without a struggle, or an attempt at 
 regaining independence, and, when in the division of 
 his dominions which followed upon the battle of Ipsus 
 (B.C. 301), they were assigned to Seleucus, they 
 acquiesced in the arrangement. It was not until 
 Antiochus the Great suffered his great defeat at the 
 hands of the Romans (B.C. 190), and all Western Asia 
 was thrown into a ferment, that the Arian Armenians, 
 after, at least, four centuries of subjection, raised their 
 thoughts to independence, and succeeded in establish- 
 ing an autonomous monarchy. Even then the move- 
 ment seems to have originated rather in the ambition 
 of a chief than in any ardent desire for liberty upon 
 the part of the people. Artaxias had been governor 
 of the Greater Armenia in the earlier portion of the 
 reign of Antiochus, and seized the opportunity afforded 
 by the defeat of Magnesia to change his title of satrap 
 into that of sovereign. Antiochus was too much 
 occupied at home to resist him ; and he was allowed 
 at his leisure to establish his power, to build a new 
 capital at Artaxata near the Araxes, and to reign in 
 peace for a space of about twenty-five years. Then, 
 however, he was attacked by Antiochus Epiphanes. 
 This prince (about B.C. 165) resolved on an attempt at 
 re-establishing the power of Syria over Armenia, and 
 invading the country with a large army, forced 
 Artaxias to an engagement, in which he defeated him 
 and took him prisoner. Armenia, for the time, sub-
 
 PREVIOUS HISTORY OF ARMENIA. 1 25 
 
 mitted ; but it was not long before fresh troubles broke 
 out. When Mithridates I. overran the eastern pro- 
 vinces of Syria (about B.C. 150), and made himself 
 master in succession of Media, Babylonia, and Ely mats, 
 Armenia was once more thrown into a state of excite- 
 ment, and, partly by her own efforts, partly, it would 
 seem, by Parthian assistance, threw off for a second 
 time the Syrian yoke, and became again independent, 
 this time under an Arsacid prince, named Wagharshag 
 or Val-arsaces, a member of the Parthian royal family. 
 A reign of twenty-two years is assigned to this monarch, 
 whose kingdom is declared to have extended from the 
 Caucasus to Nisibis, and from the Caspian to the 
 Mediterranean. He was succeeded by a son named 
 Arshag or Arsaces, who carried on wars with the 
 neighbouring state of Pontus, and had a reign of 
 thirteen years, probably from about B.C. 128 to B.C. 1 1 5. 
 Ardashes — the Ortoadistus of Justin — then became 
 king, and was firmly seated on the Armenian throne, 
 when Mithridates II., nephew of Mithridates I., having 
 brought the Scythic war to a successful termination, 
 determined (about B.C. 100) to make an attempt to add 
 Armenia to his dominions. 
 
 No account has come down to us of the war between 
 Ortoadistus and the invaders. The relative power of 
 the two states was, however, such as to make it almost 
 certain that in a collision between the two Parthia 
 would have the advantage ; and a casual allusion in 
 Strabo appears to indicate pretty clearly, that in point 
 of fact, the advantage gained was not inconsiderable. 
 Strabo says that Tigranes, the eldest son of Ortoadistus, 
 was a hostage in the hands of the Parthians for some
 
 126 REIGN OF M IT II RI DATES II. 
 
 time before his accession to the throne — a statement 
 from which it may be confidently inferred, that 
 Ortoadistus, having been worsted in battle by Mithri- 
 dates, concluded with him an ignominious peace, and as 
 security for the performance of its terms gave hostages 
 to the Parthian monarch, his own son being among the 
 number. Still, it is also clear, from the fact recorded, 
 that Armenia, if worsted, was far from being subju- 
 gated — she ended the war by a treaty of peace — she 
 maintained her own monarch upon the throne — she 
 was not even seriously reduced in strength, since 
 within the space of the next twenty years she attained 
 to the height of her power, absorbing the Syrian state, 
 and really ruling for a time from the Gulf of Issus to 
 the shores of the Caspian. 
 
 It cannot have been more than a (ew years after the 
 termination of the Armenian war, which must have 
 fallen about the close of the second, or the beginning 
 of the first century before our era, that the Parthian 
 state, while still under the rule of Mithridates II., was 
 for the first* time brought into contact with Rome. 
 
 Rome appears as a permanent factor in the politics 
 of the East somewhat later than might have been 
 expected. When, towards the close of the second 
 century B.C., the ambition of the Great Antiochus 
 dragged her unwillingly into Asiatic quarrels, she 
 disembarrassed herself, as speedily as she could, of all 
 ties binding her to Asia, and made what was almost 
 a formal retreat to her own continent, and renuncia- 
 tion of the heritage of another, which fortune pressed 
 upon her. For more than half a century the policy 
 of abstention was pursued. The various states of
 
 FIRST CONTACT OF PARTHIA WITH ROME. 127 
 
 Western Asia were left to follow their own schemes 
 of self-aggrandisement, and fight out their own quarrels 
 without Roman interference. But, in course of time, 
 the reasons for the policy of abstention disappeared. 
 Macedonia and Greece having been conquered and 
 absorbed, and Carthage destroyed (B.C. 148-146), the 
 conditions of the political problem seemed to be so far 
 changed as to render a further advance towards the 
 East a safe measure ; and accordingly, when it was 
 perceived that the line of the kings of Pergamus was 
 coming to an end, the Senate set on foot intrigues 
 which had for their object the devolution upon Rome 
 of the sovereignty belonging to those monarchs. By 
 dexterous management the third Attalus was induced, 
 in repayment of his father's obligations to the Romans, 
 to take the extraordinary and wholly unprecedented 
 step of bequeathing by will his entire dominions as a 
 legacy to the Republic. In vain did his illegitimate 
 half-brother, Aristonicus, dispute the validity of so 
 strange a testament ; the Romans, aided by Mithri- 
 dates IV., then monarch of Pontus, easily" triumphed 
 over such resistance as this unfortunate prince could 
 offer, and, having ceded to their ally the portion of 
 Phrygia which had belonged to the Pergamene king- 
 dom, entered on the possession of the remainder. 
 Having thus become an Asiatic power, the Great 
 Republic was of necessity mixed up henceforth with 
 the various movements and struggles which agitated 
 Western Asia, and was naturally led to strengthen its 
 position among the Asiatic kingdoms by such alliances 
 as seemed at each conjuncture to be best suited to its 
 interests.
 
 128 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 
 
 Hitherto no occasion had arisen for any direct 
 dealings between Rome and Parthia. Their respec- 
 tive territories were still separated by considerable 
 tracts, which were in the occupation of the Syrians, 
 the Cappadocians, and the Armenians. Their interests 
 had neither clashed, nor as yet sufficiently united 
 them to give rise to any diplomatic intercourse. But 
 the progress of the two empires in opposite directions 
 was, slowly but surely, bringing them nearer to each 
 other ; and events had now reached a point at which 
 the empires began to have— or to seem to have — such 
 a community of interests as led naturally to an ex- 
 change of communications. A new power had been 
 recently developed in these parts. In the rapid way 
 so common in the East, Mithridates V. of Pontus, the 
 son and successor of Rome's ally, had, between B.C. 
 112 and B.C. 93, built up an empire of vast extent, 
 large population, and almost inexhaustible resources. 
 He had established his authority over Armenia Minor, 
 Colchis, the entire eastern coast of the Black Sea, the 
 Chersonesus Taurica, or kingdom of the Bosporus, 
 and even over the whole tract lying west of the Cher- 
 sonese as far as the mouth of the Tyras, or Dniestr. 
 Nor had these gains contented him. He had obtained 
 half of Paphlagonia by an iniquitous compact with 
 Nicomedes, King of Bithynia ; he had occupied 
 Galatia ; and he was engaged in attempts to bring 
 Cappadocia under his influence. In this last- 
 mentioned project he was assisted by the Armenians, 
 with whose king, Tigranes, the son of Ortoadistus, 
 he had (about B.C. 96) formed a close alliance, at the 
 same time giving him his daughter, Cleopatra, in
 
 HIS EMBASSY TO SULLA. 120 
 
 marriage. Rome, though she had not yet determined 
 on war with Mithridates, was bent on thwarting his 
 Cappadocian projects, and in B.C. 92 sent Sulla into 
 Asia, with orders to put down the puppet king whom 
 Mithridates V. and Tigranes were establishing, and 
 to replace upon the Cappadocian throne a certain 
 Ariobarzanes, whom they had driven from his king- 
 dom. In the execution of this commission, Sulla was 
 brought into hostile collision with the Armenians, 
 whom he defeated with great slaughter, and drove 
 from Cappadocia, together with their puppet king. 
 Thus, not only did the growing power of Mithridates 
 of Pontus, by inspiring Rome and Parthia with a 
 common fear, tend to draw them together, but the 
 course of events had actually given them a common 
 enemy in Tigranes of Armenia, who was equally 
 obnoxious to both of them. 
 
 For Tigranes, who, during the time that he was a 
 hostage in Parthia, had contracted engagements 
 towards the Parthian monarch, which involved a ces- 
 sion of territory, and who, on the faith of his pledges, 
 had been aided by the Parthians in seating himself on 
 his father's throne, though he made the cession 
 required of him in the first instance, had soon after- 
 wards repented of his honesty, had gone to war with 
 his benefactors, recovered the ceded territory, and laid 
 waste a considerable tract of country lying within the 
 admitted limits of the Parthian kingdom. These pro- 
 ceedings had, of course, alienated Mithridates II. ; and 
 we may with much probability ascribe to them the 
 step, which he now took, of sending an ambassador to 
 Sulla. Orobazus, the individual selected, was charged
 
 130 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 
 
 with the duty of proposing an alliance offensive and 
 defensive between the two countries. The Roman 
 general received the overture favourably, but pro- 
 bably considered that it transcended his powers to 
 conclude a treaty ; and thus no further result was 
 secured by the embassy than the establishment, at 
 their first contact, of a friendly understanding between 
 the two states. 
 
 Soon after this, Tigranes appears to have renewed 
 his attacks upon Parthia, which in the interval 
 between B.C. 92 and B.C. 83 he greatly humbled, 
 depriving it of the whole of Upper Mesopotamia, at 
 
 COIN OK MITHRIDATES II. 
 
 this time called Gordyene, or the country of the 
 Kurds, and under the rule of one of the Parthian 
 tributary kings. Rome was too deeply engaged in the 
 first Mithridatic war to lend Parthia any aid, even if 
 she had been so disposed, and Parthia herself seems 
 to have been suffering from domestic troubles, a time 
 of confusion and disturbance having followed on the 
 death of Mithridates II. about B.C. 89. 
 
 Mithridates the Second is commonly regarded as 
 the most distinguished of all the Parthian monarchs 
 after his uncle, Mithridates the First. He has a fine 
 head upon his coins, with a large eye, and a pro-
 
 HIS COINS AND TITLES. 131 
 
 minent Roman nose. He takes the epithets of 
 " Theopator " and " Nicator." The obverse of his 
 coins is commonly adorned with the sitting Parthian 
 figure with an outstretched bow ; but sometimes ex- 
 hibits, instead of this, a Pegasus or winged horse. The 
 military exploits of the prince were undoubtedly re- 
 markable, and it is unfortunate for him that the 
 record of them is so scant}'. It is certain that he 
 made a deep impression upon the Scythian hordes, 
 and thus averted from his country a great danger. It 
 is probable that he considerably enlarged the limits of 
 his empire on the side of Bactria and India. But, on 
 the whole, perhaps his permanent fame will rest 
 mainly upon the two facts, that he was the first to 
 initiate those Armenian wars which occupied so large 
 a portion of the later Parthian history, and that he 
 was also the first to bring Parthia into contact with 
 the most formidable of all her external enemies, Rome, 
 and thus — though with far different intent — to pave 
 the way for those many bloody struggles with the 
 Great Imperial Power, which for nearly three centuries 
 — from the time of Crassus to that of Caracallus — 
 riveted the attention of mankind upon the East.
 
 IX. 
 
 DARK PERIOD OF PARTHIAN HISTORY— ACCESSION 
 OF SANATRCECES— PHRAATES III. AND POMPEY. 
 
 The death of Mithridates II. introduced into 
 Parthian history, as has been already observed, a 
 period of confusion and disturbance. Civil wars, ac- 
 cording to one authority, raged during this period ; 
 according to another, there was a rapid succession of 
 monarchs. It would seem that the ancient race of the 
 Arsacidae had pretty nearly died out ; and, as the 
 superstition still prevailed, that fatal consequences 
 would follow, if any one in whose veins the old blood 
 did not run were allowed to ascend the throne, very 
 aged scions of the royal house had to be sought out, 
 and the royal authority committed to hands that were 
 quite unfitted for it. One king who has been thought 
 to belong to the period is said to have died at the age 
 of ninety-six J ; another was eighty at his accession. 
 Under these circumstances it may well have been that 
 younger rivals sprang up, whether of the royal, or of 
 some fresher and lustier stocks, who disputed the crown 
 with the decrepit monarchs preferred to the position 
 by the Megistanes, and threw the whole country into 
 confusion. These quarrels fell out at an unfortunate 
 1 See Appendix.
 
 DARK PERIOD OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 133 
 
 conjuncture. Rome had at last been forced into a 
 contest with M ithridates of Pontus, and this pre-occu- 
 pation of the two great powers had for the moment 
 given Armenia a free hand. Armenia, under Tigranes, 
 one of the most ambitious princes that ever lived, took 
 immediate advantage of the occasion, and, while the 
 Mithridatic war was impending, and also during the 
 eleven years that it lasted (B.C. 85-74), employed herself 
 in building up a powerful and extensive empire. Not 
 content with recovering from Parthia the portion of 
 territory which he had begun by ceding to her, 
 Tigranes had, quite early in his reign, carried his 
 aggressions much further, had made himself master of 
 two most important Parthian provinces, Gordyene or 
 Northern Mesopotamia, and Adiabene or the tract 
 about the Zab rivers, including Assyria Proper and 
 Arbelitis, had conquered Sophene, or the lesser 
 Armenia, which was independent under a king named 
 Artanes, and had also brought under subjection the 
 extensive and valuable country of Media Atropatene, 
 which had maintained its independence since the time 
 of Alexander. Nor had these successes contented 
 him. Invited into Syria, about B.C. 83, by the wretched 
 inhabitants, who were driven to desperation by the 
 never-ceasing civil wars between rival princes of the 
 house of the Seleucidae, he had found no difficulty in 
 absorbing the last remnant of the Syro-Macedonian 
 Empire, and establishing himself as king over Cilicia, 
 Syria, and most of Phoenicia. About B.C. 80 he had 
 determined on building himself a new capital in the 
 recently-acquired province of Gordyene — a capital of 
 a vast size, provided with all the luxuries required by
 
 134 DARK PERIOD OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 
 
 an Oriental Court, and fortified with walls such as 
 should recall the glories of the ancient cities of the 
 Assyrians. Twelve Greek cities were depopulated to 
 furnish Tigrano-certa — so the new capital was called 
 — with a sufficiency of Hellenic inhabitants ; three 
 hundred thousand Cappadocians were at the same 
 time transported thither ; and the population was 
 further swelled by contingents from Cilicia, Gordyene, 
 Adiabene, and Assyria Proper. A royal palace on a 
 large scale was constructed in the immediate vicinity, 
 together with extensive parks or " paradises," marshes 
 well stocked with wild-fowl, and well-appointed hunt- 
 ing establishments. The walls of the city are declared 
 to have been seventy- five feet in height ; and the 
 intention evidently was to constitute it a standing 
 menace to Seleucia, Ctesiphon, Babylon, or whatever 
 might be made the Parthian western capital. The 
 supersession of Parthia by Armenia was clearly aimed 
 at ; and it was only a slight step in advance when 
 finally Tigranes placed upon his coins the ancient title 
 of the Great Sovereigns of Asia — recently claimed 
 only by the Arsacid monarchs — the title of ftacnXevs 
 ftaaiXecov. 
 
 The emergence of Armenia into the position of a 
 Great Power would, under any circumstances, have 
 tended to throw Parthia into the shade ; and now, 
 occurring as it did when she was already under a 
 cloud, rent with civil dissensions, and guided by the 
 uncertain hands of aged and feeble monarchs, it pro- 
 duced her almost entire disappearance. For twenty 
 years— from B.C. 89 to B.C. 69 — amid the rapid 
 movements that occupy the field of Oriental history,
 
 ACCESSION OE SANATRCECES. 135 
 
 we scarcely obtain a glimpse of Parthia, which is 
 jostled out of sight by the stronger and burlier forms 
 that fill the space, and force themselves on our 
 attention. 
 
 It is with difficulty that, by dint of careful search, 
 we at length discover, or fancy we discover, among 
 the fierce struggles of the times two shadowy forms 
 of Parthian kings to place in this interval as links 
 connecting the earlier with the later history. The 
 first of these is a certain Mnasciras, of whom Lucian 
 appears to speak, as a Parthian prince who reached 
 
 COIN OF SANATROZCES. 
 
 the great age of ninety-six years, and whom it is 
 impossible to insert at any other point. 1 The other 
 is a somewhat better defined personage - a certain 
 Sanatrceces, called also Sinatroces and Sintricus — 
 who has left his name upon some of his coins, and 
 is mentioned by several authors. This last-named 
 monarch appears to have reigned from B.C. j6 
 to B.C. 69, and thus to have been contemporary 
 
 1 Professor Gardner argues that the supposed Mnasciras is in reality 
 a certain Kamnasciras, otherwise known to us, who was not a Parthian 
 king at all, and did not belong to this period (" Coinage of Parthia," 
 p. 8). His arguments must be allowed to have great force.
 
 136 REIGN OF SANATRCECES. 
 
 with Tigranes of Armenia, Mithridates of Pontus, and 
 the Roman general, Lucullus. He was seventy-nine 
 years old at his accession, and is said to have been 
 indebted for his crown to aid lent him in the civil 
 struggles, wherein he was engaged with rivals, by the 
 Scythic tribe of the Sacauracre. During his short 
 reign it was his special endeavour to hold himself 
 aloof from the quarrels of his neighbours, and thus 
 escape the fate of the earthen pot when brought into 
 collision with iron ones. He entirely declined the 
 overtures of Mithridates for an alliance, which were 
 made to him in B.C. 72 ; and when, in B.C. 69, the 
 war had approached his own frontier, and, the most 
 earnest appeals for assistance reaching him from both 
 parties, he found it impossible to maintain the line of 
 pure abstention, he had recourse to the expedient of 
 amusing both sides with promises, while he lent no 
 real aid to either. Plutarch tells us that this course 
 of action so offended and enraged Lucullus, that at 
 one time it almost induced him to defer to a more 
 convenient season his quarrel with Mithridates and 
 his ally, Tigranes, and direct the whole force at his 
 command against Parthia. But the prolonged re- 
 sistance of Nisibis, and the success of Mithridates in 
 Pontus (B.C. 67) averted the danger, and, the war 
 rolling northwards, Parthia was not yet driven to 
 take a side, but found herself able to maintain her 
 neutral position for a few years longer. 
 
 The turning point of the Mithridatic War was the 
 recall of Lucullus (B.C. 66), and his replacement by one 
 of the greatest Roman generals of the time, Cneius 
 Pompeius. Pompey's generalship showed him at
 
 ACCESSION OF PHRAATES III. 137 
 
 once that, so long as Rome was obliged to contend 
 single-handed with two such powerful enemies as 
 Mithridates and Tigranes, success could not be 
 reasonably expected. The Pontine and Armenian 
 kings played into each other's hands, and between 
 them possessed such advantages in local position, in 
 men, and in resources, that the war might go on 
 indefinitely without any clear and decisive issue, 
 unless its conditions could be changed. He looked 
 about therefore to see whether a new factor could not 
 be called in, and a change in the balance of force be 
 thereby brought about. Might not Parthia, which 
 had rejected the cheap blandishments of Lucullus 
 and despised his coarse threats, be won over by some- 
 what more dexterous management, and more refined 
 diplomacy ? A Parthian monarch was now seated 
 upon the throne who was untried, to whom overtures 
 had not yet been made, who at any rate had not 
 committed himself to the policy of abstention. Might 
 he not be prevailed upon? Might not Phraates the 
 Third, the son of Sanatrceces, who had just succeeded 
 his father upon the Parthian throne, be induced by 
 a sufficiently tempting promise, to join his forces with 
 those of Rome in the war, and so place the pre- 
 ponderance of military strength on the Roman side ? 
 The main question was, what would be a sufficiently 
 tempting offer ? Pompey thought it enough to 
 pledge himself, that, if Parthia embraced his cause 
 and gave him the assistance which he required, 
 Armenia should at the end of the war be compelled 
 to make restitution to her of her lost provinces — she 
 should be once more put in possession of Gordyene,
 
 138 PHRAATES III. AND POMPEY. 
 
 and Adiabene. The bait took — Phraates came into 
 the terms proposed— and Parthia for the first and last 
 time became a Roman ally. 
 
 The general terms of the agreement made between 
 the high contracting parties seem to have been, that, 
 while Rome pressed the war against the Pontine 
 monarch incessantly and without relaxing in her efforts, 
 Phraates should enter Armenia, and find occupation for 
 Tigranes in his own country. As Parthia and Armenia 
 were conterminous along an extended line of frontier, 
 Phraates could make his assault where he pleased, 
 and how he pleased. It happened that he had at his 
 Court an Armenian refugee of the highest consequence 
 — no less a person than the Crown Prince of Armenia, 
 or eldest living son of Tigranes, who, having quarrelled 
 with his father, had raised a rebellion, and being 
 defeated had been forced to fly, and seek a refuge in 
 Parthia. Phraates determined to take advantage of 
 this circumstance. Having completed his arrange- 
 ments with Pompey, he, in the year B.C 65, placed 
 himself at the head of his troops, and, in conjunction 
 with the Armenian prince, invaded the territory of 
 Tigranes. The prince had a party in the country 
 which desired to see a youthful monarch upon the 
 throne, and was soon joined by a considerable body 
 of supporters. The invading army penetrated deep 
 into Armenia, advancing upon the capital, Artaxata, 
 whither Tigranes had retreated. The Armenian 
 monarch made, however, no stand, even at his 
 metropolis ; but, when his foes still pressed forward, 
 quitted the city, and fled to the neighbouring 
 mountains. Artaxata was invested ; but, as the
 
 PHRAATES III. ATTACKS TIGRANES. 139 
 
 siege promised to be long, Phraates became tired of 
 sitting before the place, and persuaded himself that 
 he had done enough to satisfy Pompey, and might 
 safely leave the young prince, with a contingent of 
 Parthian troops and his own adherents, to carry on 
 the war against his father. Accordingly, he retired, 
 and the young prince remained in sole command. 
 The result followed which might have been antici- 
 pated. Scarcely was Phraates withdrawn, when the 
 old king, descending suddenly from his fastnesses, 
 fell upon his son's army at unawares, defeated it, 
 and drove it out of the country. He thus recovered 
 full possession of Armenia, and was once more 
 in a position to render help to Mithridates against 
 Pompey ; but the time for giving effectual help was 
 gone by. Pompey had made such good use of the 
 interval during which the hands of Tigranes were 
 fully employed, that in a single campaign he had 
 broken the power of Mithridates, driven him in head- 
 long flight from place to place, and finally forced him 
 to seek a refuge beyond the Phasis, at Dioscurias, in 
 the modern Mingrelia. Deprived of his ally, Tigranes 
 was too weak to make further head against Rome, 
 and his complete submission, in the autumn of B.C. 66, 
 left Pompey at liberty to settle the affairs of the East 
 at his pleasure. 
 
 The settlement made was not very greatly to the 
 liking of the Parthian king. His old adversary, the 
 elder Tigranes, who had propitiated Pompey by the 
 gift of six thousand silver talents — nearly a million 
 and a half of our money — though deprived of Syria, 
 which was made into an actual Roman province, was
 
 140 PHRAATES III. AND POMPEY. 
 
 left in full possession of his ancestral kingdom of 
 Armenia, and not even mulcted of the valuable 
 province of Gordyene, which he had seized in the 
 time of the acute Parthian distress. His friend and 
 protege, the younger Tigranes, was first offered the 
 petty principality of Sophene, and when he refused it 
 and remonstrated, was arrested, put in confinement, 
 and reserved by Pompey for h*s triumph. He himself 
 gained nothing by the Roman alliance but the 
 recovery of Adiabene, of which he no doubt took 
 possession before invading Armenia in B.C. 66. 
 When he attemped, without Pompey 's permission, to 
 repeat in Gordyene the process which had proved 
 successful on the other side of the Tigris, Pompey did 
 not scruple to resist him in open warfare — and this 
 notwithstanding that the province had been actually 
 promised to him as the price of his alliance. Phraates 
 learnt what Roman promises were worth, when, on 
 seeking to repossess himself of Gordyene, he was 
 met by Pompey's legate, Afranius, who, at the head 
 of an armed force, drove his troops from the country, 
 and proceeded to deliver it into the hands of the 
 Armenians. Policy might, conceivably, have been 
 pleaded for this measure, which would tend to weaken 
 Parthia, Rome's most formidable rival in the East, 
 and strengthen Armenia, Rome's most convenient 
 ally, against her ; but no plea of policy could excuse 
 the useless insult offered to the Parthian monarch, 
 when Pompey in his written communications refused 
 him his generally recognised title of " King of 
 Kings." 
 
 There can be little doubt, but that, at this time,
 
 HESITATION OF POMPEY. 141 
 
 Pompey was balancing in his mind, with an inclina- 
 tion to the affirmative side, the question whether he 
 should, or should not, declare the Parthian prince, a 
 Roman enemy, and direct the full force of the 
 Republic against him. There was much to attract 
 him to the formation of such a decision. His military 
 career had been hitherto without a reverse. He had 
 great confidence in his good fortune. If not as 
 ambitious as his rival, Julius, he was at any rate 
 thoroughly desirous of posing in the eyes of his 
 countrymen as unmistakably the foremost man of 
 his day. To engage a new enemy, and that enemy 
 the recognised successor of Assyria and Persia in the 
 inheritance of the Asian continent, to tread in the 
 steps of Alexander, and carry the arms of the West 
 to the shores of the ocean which shut in the world 
 upon the East, would give him a prestige which 
 would elevate him far above all rivals, and satisfy all 
 the dreams that he had ever entertained of distinc- 
 tion and glory. But, on the other hand, prudence 
 counselled abstention from a risky enterprise. As 
 the war had not been formally committed to him, his 
 enemies at Rome would make his having entered 
 upon it a ground of accusation. He had seen, more- 
 over, with his own eyes, that the Parthians were an 
 enemy far from despicable, and his knowledge of 
 campaigning told him that success against them was 
 by no means certain. He feared to risk the loss of 
 all the glory which he had hitherto gained by grasp- 
 ing greedily at more, and deemed it wiser to enjoy 
 the fruits of the good luck which had hitherto 
 attended him than to tempt fortune on a new field.
 
 142 PIIRAATES III. AND POMPEY. 
 
 He therefore, after hesitating for a while, determined 
 finally on a pacific course. He would not allow him- 
 self to be provoked into hostilities by the reproaches, 
 the dictatorial words, or even the daring acts of the 
 Parthian king. When Phraates demanded his lost 
 provinces, he replied, that the question of borders was 
 one which lay, not between Parthia and Rome, but 
 between Parthia and Armenia. When he laid it 
 down that the Euphrates properly and of right 
 bounded the Roman territory, and charged Pompey 
 not to cross it, the latter said he would keep to the 
 just bounds, whatever they were. When Tigranes 
 on his part complained, that, after having been 
 received into the Roman alliance, he was still 
 attacked by the Parthian armies, the reply of Pompey 
 was, that he was quite willing to appoint arbitrators 
 who should decide all the disputes between the two 
 nations. The moderation and caution of these answers 
 proved contagious. On hearing them, the monarchs 
 addressed resolved to compose their differences, or at 
 any rate to defer the settlement of them to a more 
 convenient time, when Rome should have withdrawn 
 from the neighbourhood. They accepted Pompey's 
 proposal of an arbitration ; and in a short time an 
 arrangement was effected by which relations of amity 
 were re-established between the two countries. 
 
 With the retirement of Pompey from Asia in the 
 year B.C. 62, the East settled down into a state of 
 comparative tranquillity. There was a general feel- 
 ing that time was necessary to recruit the strength 
 exhausted in the fierce and sanguinary wars of the 
 last thirty years, and a general impression that
 
 MURDER OF PHRAATES BY HIS SONS. 143 
 
 further contention would only advantage the common 
 enemy — Rome. Rome had now to be looked upon 
 as a permanent neighbour, securely lodged in Cilicia, 
 Syria, and Cappadocia, biding her time, and at any 
 moment ready to take advantage of any false step 
 which might be made by any of the Asiatic king- 
 doms. Parthia, as having the most to lose, had the 
 most to fear ; but Armenia was still more exposed to 
 attack, and might expect to be assailed first. The 
 other minor powers could only hope to escape de- 
 struction by remaining quiet, and offering no provo- 
 cation to the stronger states in their vicinity. 
 
 But external tranquillity in Parthia was only too 
 apt to be the precursor of domestic disturbance. 
 Within two years of Pompey's departure from Asia, 
 a conspiracy was formed against the life of Phraates, 
 which resulted in his assassination. His two sons, 
 Mithridates and Orodes, plotted and effected his 
 destruction, for what reason, or on what pretext, we 
 know not. Phraates had held the throne during a 
 time of difficulty, and had ruled, if not with signal 
 success, yet on the whole with prudence and vigour. 
 He had shown himself an active commander, a fair 
 strategist, a successful negotiator. He was apparently 
 in the full possession of all his powers and faculties 
 when he was struck down. It seems as if the motive 
 of the parricide must have been mere personal ambi- 
 tion, that unnatural longing to thrust a parent from 
 his rightful place which has too often produced such 
 tragedies, more especially in the East. 
 
 Mithridates, the elder son, obtained the throne, but 
 scarcely succeeded in establishing himself firmly upon
 
 144 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES III. 
 
 it. Very early in his reign he became jealous of his 
 brother and fellow-conspirator, Orodes, and drove 
 him into banishment ; while at the same time he 
 treated a large number of the Parthian nobles with 
 cruelty. The Megistanes consequently deposed him, 
 and the hereditary commander-in-chief brought back 
 Orodes from exile, and set him up as king in his 
 brother's room. As some compensation for the loss 
 of his independent sovereignty, Mithridates was given 
 the government of the important province of Media 
 Magna ; and, had he been content to remain in this 
 subordinate position he might probably have lived 
 
 COIN OF MITHRIDATES III. 
 
 out the full term of his natural life in peace and quiet- 
 ness. But there are temperaments which nothing but 
 actual kingship will content, after they have once had 
 a taste of it, and the temperament of Mithridates 
 would appear to have been of this order. He was 
 raising an army with a view to the recovery of his 
 lost throne, when Orodes, having become aware of 
 his intention, marched against him, and crushed his 
 nascent rebellion. Mithridates had to cross the 
 frontier, and place himself under the protection of 
 the nearest Roman proconsul, who happened to be 
 Gabinius, governor of Syria, who had obtained his 
 post through the influence of Pompey. Gabinius,
 
 MITHRIDATES III. AND ORODES. I45 
 
 a man of moderate abilities, but of vast ambition, 
 readily received the fugitive, and for a time contem- 
 plated an immediate invasion of the Parthian territory, 
 and an attempt to force back Mithri dates upon his 
 unwilling subjects. The expedition would probably 
 have taken place, had it not happened that, just at 
 the time, the Syrian proconsul received another invi- 
 tation from another quarter, which, on the whole, was 
 more tempting. Ptolemy Auletes (" the Fluter "), 
 expelled from Egypt by his exasperated subjects, 
 having obtained the countenance and patronage of 
 Pompey, presented himself before Gabinius in the 
 spring of B.C. 55, and besought his powerful assistance 
 in recovering his lost kingdom. The price which 
 he was ready to pay for the boon named was a sum 
 nearly equal to two and a half millions of our money 
 (twelve and a half millions of dollars). This offer 
 dazzled Gabinius, and almost persuaded him ; but 
 the opposition made by his officers was such as might 
 perhaps have induced him to decline it, had not the 
 influence of the young Mark Antony, who was in his 
 camp, been exerted in favour of Auletes, and his 
 representations turned the scale in favour of the 
 Egyptian venture. Mithridates, whose hopes had 
 been raised to the highest pitch, was thus left to bear 
 as he might his cruel disappointment. It is surprising 
 that he did not altogether succumb. But it would 
 seem that he still fancied he saw a possible chance of 
 success. The wild Arab tribes recently settled by 
 Tigranes in Mesopotamia were willing to espouse his 
 cause, and the great cities of Seleucia and Babylon 
 appear to have also declared in his favour. Under
 
 146 
 
 DEATH OF MITHR1 DATES III. 
 
 these circumstances he threw himself into Babylon, 
 and there endured a long siege at the hands of his 
 brother. It was not until food failed the garrison 
 that a surrender was determined on. Then at last 
 Mithridates, trusting that the ties of blood would be 
 taken into consideration by his adversary, and would 
 cause him to be spared the usual penalty of rebellion, 
 allowed himself to fall alive into Orodes' hands. But 
 fraternal affection was not strongly developed among 
 the Parthians. Orodes, having declared that he 
 placed the claims of country above those of kindred, 
 caused the traitor who had sought aid from Rome to 
 be instantly executed in his presence. Such was the 
 end of the third Mithridates, a weak and selfish 
 prince, with whom it is impossible to feel any sym- 
 pathy.
 
 X. 
 
 GREAT EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS AGAINST PARTHIA, 
 AND ITS FAILURE — RETALIATORY RAID OF 
 PACORUS. 
 
 CRASSUS — or, to give him his full name, Marcus 
 Licinius Crassus — though one of the foremost Romans 
 of his day, was neither a great man, nor a great com- 
 mander. Sprung from a noble stock, and the son of 
 a respectable father, he first became noted for his 
 skill and success in money-getting, an employment 
 to which for many years he devoted all his energies, 
 and which he pursued with an ardour and persever- 
 ance that made success certain. The times were 
 favourable for the quick accumulation of a fortune 
 by commercial methods. The civil struggles, through 
 which Rome was passing, were accompanied by a 
 continual succession of forfeitures, confiscations, and 
 forced sales, which gave an opportunity, even for 
 moderate capitalists, within a comparatively short 
 space, by judicious investments, to become men of 
 large wealth. Crassus allowed no considerations of 
 compassion, or friendship, or delicacy to hamper him 
 in his bargains ; and the result was that in course of 
 time he came to be the legal owner of the greater
 
 148 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 portion of the soil on which Rome was built. His 
 other possessions were in proportion. He had mines 
 which were rich and productive, fertile and well-culti- 
 vated estates, and, above all, an enormous number of 
 valuable slaves. His own estimate of the worth of 
 his property, shortly before he started on his expedi- 
 tion, rated it at above seven thousand talents, or more 
 than a million and seven hundred thousand English 
 pounds. 
 
 In Rome — or at any rate in the Rome of this time 
 — wealth led, almost of necessity, to political distinc- 
 tion. An enormous expenditure was needed in order 
 to obtain the highest offices of the state, and these 
 offices became naturally the objects of contention 
 among the most opulent men. The wealth of Crassus 
 thrust him into a prominent position, and the position 
 gradually awoke in him those ambitious longings 
 which do not seem to have troubled him during his 
 youth. After a time he began to court popularity, 
 and to endeavour to outshine the other political 
 favourites of the hour. He came forward as a pleader 
 in the courts, undertook causes which others declined, 
 and showed himself especially zealous and pains- 
 taking. He threw his house open to all, lent money 
 freely to his friends without requiring interest, and 
 exercised a wide, if not a lavish, hospitality. In this 
 way he crept on into office, and by degrees worked 
 his way up to the highest grades. There, the talents 
 that he displayed, without being brilliant, were re- 
 spectable. He came to be reckoned shrewd and safe. 
 At last, he was put on a par with the highest candi- 
 dates for political power, and, though really quite
 
 CAREER AND CHARACTER OF CRASSUS. I49 
 
 undeserving of the position, was " bracketed " with 
 Caesar and Pompey in the so-called " First Trium- 
 virate." The consulship followed (B.C. 55) as a matter 
 of course, and when, on the lots being cast, Syria 
 came out as his " province," Crassus found himself 
 exalted to what was, practically, the first position in 
 the state. 
 
 There is reason to believe that, for many long 
 years, the ambition of Crassus, and his jealousy of 
 the other chief political leaders, especially of Pompey 
 and Caesar, had been growing and expanding. It 
 was particularly in military renown that their repu- 
 tation excelled his ; and it was consequently in this 
 respect that he was most anxious to place himself on 
 their level, if not even, as he hoped, to excel and out- 
 do them. In the position now assigned him he 
 thought he saw his opportunity. The project of 
 Gabinius had got wind, and it had flashed upon the 
 imagination of Crassus how grand a thing it would 
 be to reduce under the dominion of Rome a wholly 
 new country, and that country the seat of ancient 
 empires, and the scene of the highest triumphs of 
 Alexander. Like many another man of dull and 
 plodding temper, Crassus no sooner allowed the desire 
 of glory to get a hold on him, than his unstable mind 
 was carried all lengths, and indulged in flights of the 
 most wild and irrational character. Instead of wait- 
 ing till he had reached his province, and examined 
 into the position of affairs, before deciding how he 
 would act, or what enterprise he would undertake, 
 Crassus immediately began to boast among his friends 
 of his designs and intentions. He spoke of the wars
 
 150 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 which Lucullus had waged against Tigranes and 
 Pompey against Mithridates of Pontus as mere child's 
 play, and declared that he was not going to con- 
 tent himself with such paltry conquests as had satis- 
 fied them ; Syria did not bound his horizon, no, nor 
 Parthia either ; it was his intention to carry the Roman 
 arms to Bactria, India, and the Eastern Ocean. The 
 more prudent among the statesmen of the Republic 
 remonstrated, but in vain. His friends and flatterers 
 applauded and encouraged him. Even Caesar, nothing 
 loth to help towards the downfall of a reputation, 
 wrote to him from Gaul to fan the flame of his 
 ambition and stimulate his hopes. Crassus hurried 
 on his preparations, and, though the tribune Ateius 
 endeavoured to deter him by a solemn curse, and 
 even, had the other tribunes permitted, would have 
 arrested his steps at the city gates, left Rome some 
 weeks before his consulship had expired, and, despis- 
 ing alike warnings and omens, set sail with a large 
 fleet from Brundusium. 
 
 ^he journey of Crassus from Brundusium to the 
 E t hrates was prosperous on the whole and unevent- 
 ful. He lost a certain number of his transports in 
 ing the Adriatic, which, as it was already mid- 
 :mber, was not surprising. Landing at Dyrrha- 
 1, he passed through Macedonia and Thrace to 
 t: Hellespont, and thence through Asia Minor into 
 Syi. where he established himself at Antioch. On 
 his way he fell in with an old Roman ally, Deiotarus, 
 King of Galatia, who happened to be building a new 
 city on his line of route. As Deiotarus was far 
 advanced in years, Crassus, forgetting his own age,
 
 PREPARATIONS OF ORODES. 151 
 
 indulged in a joke at his expense : " You begin to 
 build, Prince," he said, " rather late in the day " ; — 
 whereto the other replied with the retort : " And you, 
 too, Commander, are not beginning very early in the 
 morning to attack the Parthians." 
 
 During the time that Crassus was making his 
 preparations at Rome, and the further time that he 
 spent upon his march, Orodes, the Parthian monarch, 
 had an ample space for forming his general plan of 
 campaign at his leisure, and making ready to receive 
 
 COIN OF ORODES I. 
 
 his enemy. Not only was he able to collect his native 
 troops from all parts of the empire, and to arm, train, 
 and exercise them, but he had an opportunity of gain- 
 ing over certain chiefs upon his borders, who had 
 hitherto held a semi-independent position, and might 
 have been expected to welcome the Romans. The 
 most important of these was Abgarus, prince of 
 Osrhoene, or the tract lying east of the Euphrates 
 about the city of Edessa, who had been received into 
 the Roman alliance by Pompey, and was thought by 
 the Romans generally to be well disposed to their 
 cause. Orodes, however, persuaded him, while still
 
 152 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 remaining professedly a Roman ally, to give in secret 
 his best services to the Parthian side. Another chief, 
 Alchandonius, an Arab sheikh of these parts, who had 
 made his submission to Rome even earlier, becoming 
 convinced that Parthia was the stronger power of 
 the two, was at the same time gained over. Orodes 
 held himself on the defensive, covering the important 
 cities of Seleucia and Babylon with his troops, and 
 waiting to see in what way Crassus would develop 
 his attack, and by what route he would advance into 
 the interior. 
 
 The proconsul was at first in no hurry. His old lust of 
 gain came upon him, and after contenting himself with 
 a mere reconnaissance in Mesopotamia, where he 
 defeated a Parthian satrap at Ichnae on the Belik, and 
 received the voluntary submission of a number of 
 small Greek towns, which he garrisoned, he retraced 
 his steps ere the year was half out, and gave himself 
 up to a series of discreditable but "very lucrative" 
 transactions. At Hierapolis, or Bambyce, where was 
 a famous temple of the Syrian goddess, Atergatis 
 or Derketo, he entered the shrine, carefully weighed 
 all the offerings in the precious metals, and then 
 ruthlessly carried them off. Having tidings of the 
 treasures still remaining in the Sanctuary of Jehovah 
 at Jerusalem, notwithstanding Pompey's sacrilege, he 
 paid the city a visit for the mere purpose of plunder, 
 rifled the sacred treasury, carried off the golden orna- 
 ments, and possessed himself by a perjury of a beam 
 of solid gold of 750 pounds weight. In the other 
 cities and states he professed to make requisitions of 
 men and supplies, but let it be understood that in all
 
 PROPOSAL MADE BY ARTAVASDES. 153 
 
 cases he was willing to accept, instead, a composition in 
 money. One Greek town in Mesopotamia, which re- 
 sisted his arms, he took by storm and sacked, after- 
 wards selling all the inhabitants, who survived the 
 sack, as slaves. 
 
 Thus passed the autumn and winter of B.C. 54. 
 The spring of B.C. 53 arrived, and the avaricious pro- 
 consul began to see that he must absolutely do some- 
 thing to justify his high boasts. Caesar had sent him 
 from Gaul his eldest son, a gallant youth and good 
 officer, who was burning to distinguish himself; and 
 his quaestor, C. Cassius Longinus, was also a captain 
 of repute, who would have been ashamed to return to 
 Rome without having fleshed his sword upon some 
 worthier enemy than a handful of miserable Greek 
 colonists. Artavasdes too, the Armenian king, the son 
 of the younger Tigranes, was anxious that so large a 
 Roman army as had been collected, should not quit the 
 neighbourhood without striking Parthia a blow that 
 might seriously weaken, if not even permanently 
 cripple her. With the first appearance of spring he 
 came into the camp of Crassus, and made him the 
 offer of all the resources of his country. He promised 
 the assistance of sixteen thousand cavalry, of whom 
 ten thousand should be equipped in complete armour, 
 and of thirty thousand infantry, at the same time 
 strongly urging Crassus to direct his march through 
 his own friendly territories, well supplied with water 
 and provisions, and abounding with hills and streams, 
 suited to baffle the manoeuvres of the terrible Parthian 
 horsemen. A march through Southern Armenia would 
 conduct to the head streams of the Tigris, whence
 
 154 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 there was an easy route through a fertile and practi- 
 cable country down the course of the river to Seleucia- 
 Ctesiphon, the double Parthian capital. Seleucia 
 might be expected to welcome the Romans as libera- 
 tors ; and there were other Grecian cities upon the 
 route that might lend important aid. The Armenian 
 proposals had much that was tempting about them, 
 and there were not wanting some, among the more 
 sober of the proconsul's advisers, to recommend their 
 acceptance ; but he himself felt hampered by the 
 situation into which he had brought himself by his 
 movements of the preceding year, which had led to 
 his placing garrisons in the various cities of Osrhoene, 
 whom he could not now leave to the tender mercies of 
 the enemy. He therefore felt compelled to decline the 
 offers of Artavasdes ; and it was probably with some 
 feeling of offence that that prince quitted his camp 
 and returned hastily to his own country. 
 
 On the part of Orodes no important movement was 
 made during the winter season except his despatch of 
 an embassy to the proconsul, which seems to have 
 been intended rather to exasperate him than to 
 induce him to forego his attack. The Parthian 
 monarch, it may be suspected, had begun to despise 
 his enemy. He would naturally compare him with 
 Lucullus and Pompey, and when the whole of the 
 first year passed by without anything more important 
 being undertaken then a raid into an outlying province 
 and the occupation of few insignificant and disaffected 
 towns, he would begin to understand that a Roman 
 army, like any other, was formidable or the reverse, 
 according as it was ably or feebly commanded. He
 
 ORODES TAUNTS HIS ADVERSARY. 155 
 
 would know that Crassus was a sexagenarian, and may 
 have heard that he had never yet shown himself a 
 captain or even a soldier. Perhaps he almost doubtec 1 
 whether the proconsul had any real intention of pres- 
 sing the contest to a decision, and might not rather be 
 expected, when he had enriched himself and his troops 
 with Mesopotamia!! plunder, to withdraw his garrisons 
 across the Euphrates. Under these circumstances, 
 Orodes, in the early spring, sent an embassy to the 
 Roman camp, with a message which was well calcu- 
 lated to stir to action the most sluggish and poor- 
 spirited of commanders. " If the war," said his 
 envoys, " was really waged by Rome, it must be fought 
 out to the bitter end. But if, as they had good reason 
 to believe, Crassus, against the wish of his country, had 
 attacked Parthia and seized her territory for his own 
 private gain, Arsaces w r ould be moderate. He would 
 have pity on the advanced years of the proconsul, 
 and would give the Romans back those men of theirs, 
 who were not so much keeping watch in Mesopotamia 
 as having watch kept on them." Crassus, stung with 
 the taunt, made the answer so significant of the pride 
 that goes before a fall — " He would give the ambassa- 
 dors his response in their capital." Wagises, the chief 
 envoy, prepared for some such exhibition of feeling, 
 and glad to heap taunt on taunt, replied, striking the 
 palm of one hand with the fingers of the other : 
 " Hairs will grow here, Crassus, before you see 
 Seleucia." 
 
 Soon after this, before the winter could well be said 
 to be over, the offensive was taken against the Roman 
 garrisons and adherents in Mesopotamia. The towns
 
 156 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 occupied were attacked by the Parthians in force, 
 and though it does not seem that any of them were 
 recovered, yet all of them were menaced, and all 
 suffered considerably. The more timid of the de- 
 fenders made their escape from some of them and 
 brought to the Roman camp an exaggerated account 
 of the difficulties of Parthian warfare. " The enemy," 
 they said, " were so rapid in their movements that it 
 was impossible either to overtake them when they fled 
 or to escape them when they pursued ; their arrows 
 sped faster than sight could follow, and penetrated 
 every kind of defence, while their mail-clad horsemen 
 had weapons that would pierce through any armour, 
 and armour that defied the thrust of every weapon." 
 Considerable alarm was excited by these rumours, an 
 alarm which was reflected in the reports of unfavour- 
 able omens issuing from the augural staff-, but the 
 proconsul had by this time made up his mind that 
 something must be risked, and that he could not face 
 the storm of ridicule that would meet him at Rome, 
 if he did not fight at least one great battle. 
 
 A second campaign was therefore resolved upon ; 
 but it still remained to determine the line of march. 
 Armenia had been already rejected, partly as too cir- 
 cuitous and involving an unnecessary waste of time, 
 but mainly as implying the desertion, and so the sacri- 
 fice, of the troops which to the number of eight thou- 
 sand had been left in Mesopotamia the year before. 
 Crassus felt bound to support his garrisons, and so to 
 make Mesopotamia, and not Armenia, the basis of his 
 operations. But there were several lines of route 
 through Mesopotamia. In the first place, there was the
 
 HIS ADVANCE THROUGH MESOPOTAMIA. 157 
 
 line best known to the Greeks, and through them 
 best known to the Romans — that of the Euphrates — 
 which had been pursued by Cyrus the Younger in the 
 expedition against his brother, whereon he had been 
 accompanied by the Ten Thousand. Along this line 
 water would be plentiful ; forage and other supplies 
 might be counted on to a certain extent ; and the ad- 
 vancing army, resting its right upon the river, could 
 not be surrounded. Another was that which Alexan- 
 der had taken against Darius Codomannus — the line 
 along the foot of the Mons. Masius (Karajah Dagh), 
 by Edessa and Nisibis to Nineveh. Here, too, water 
 and supplies would have been readily procurable, and 
 by clinging to the skirts of the hills the Roman 
 infantry would have been able to set the Parthian 
 cavalry at defiance. Between these two extreme 
 courses to the right and to the left, were numerous 
 slightly divergent lines across the Mesopotamian plain, 
 all of them shorter than either of the two above- 
 mentioned routes, and none offering any great advan- 
 tage over the remainder. 
 
 The original inclination of Crassus seems to have 
 been to follow in the track of the Ten Thousand. He 
 crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma (Bir or Birehjik), in 
 about latitude 37° at the head of seven legions, four 
 thousand cavalry, and an equal number of slingers 
 and archers, and at first began his march along the 
 river bank. No enemy appeared in sight ; and his 
 scouts brought him word that there was none to be 
 seen for a long distance in front ; the only traces that 
 appeared were numerous tracks of horses in rapid 
 retreat before his advancing squadrons. The news
 
 158 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 was considered to be good, and the soldiers marched 
 forward cheerfully. The same direction was main- 
 tained ; but presently, Abgarus, the Osrhoenian sheikh, 
 made his appearance, and had a conference with the 
 proconsul, wherein he professed the most friendly feel- 
 ings, and strongly recommended an entire change of 
 tactics. " The Parthians," he said, " did not intend to 
 make a stand ; they might do so later, when the king 
 had collected all his forces ; but at present they were 
 demoralised, and were thinking only of quitting Meso- 
 potamia, and flying with their treasures to the remote 
 regions of Hyrcania and Scythia. The king was 
 already far away ; the main host was in full retreat ; 
 only a rearguard under a couple of generals, Surenas 
 and Sillaces, still lingered in Mesopotamia, and might 
 be within striking distance. Crassus should give up his 
 cautious proceedings, and hurry on at his best speed ; 
 he would then probably succeed in overtaking and 
 cutting to pieces the rearguard of the great army, 
 a flying multitude encumbered with baggage, which 
 would furnish a rich spoil to the victors." The crafty 
 Osrhoenian was believed ; and, though Cassius with 
 some other officers is said to have still counselled 
 a more cautious advance, the proconsul resolved on 
 giving himself up to the guidance of " the Bedouin," 
 and altering the direction of the march in accordance 
 with his recommendations. Accordingly, he turned 
 off from the Euphrates, and proceeded eastward over 
 the swelling hills and dry gravelly plains of Upper 
 Mesopotamia. 
 
 Here we shall leave him for the present, while we 
 consider the real disposition of his forces which the
 
 ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY ORODES. 159 
 
 Parthian monarch had made to meet the impending 
 attack. Me had, as already stated, come to terms 
 with his outlying vassals, the prince of Osrhoene and 
 the sheikh of the Scenite Arabs, and had engaged 
 especially the services of the former against his as- 
 sailant. He had further, on considering the various 
 possibilities of the campaign, come to the conclusion 
 that it would be best to divide his forces, and while 
 himself attacking Artavasdes in the mountain fast- 
 nesses of his own country, to commit the task of 
 meeting and coping with the Romans to a general of 
 approved talents. It was of the greatest possible 
 importance to prevent the Armenians from effecting a 
 junction with the Romans, and strengthening them in 
 that arm in which they were especially deficient, the 
 cavalry. Probably nothing short of an invasion of his 
 kingdom by the Parthian monarch in person would 
 have prevented Artavasdes from detaching a portion 
 of his troops to act in Mesopotamia. And no doubt 
 it is also true that Orodes had great confidence in his 
 general, whom he may even have felt to be a better 
 commander than himself. Surenas, as we must call 
 him, since his personal appellation has not come down 
 to us, was in all respects a person of the highest con- 
 sideration. He was the second man in the kingdom 
 for birth, wealth, and reputation. In courage and 
 ability he excelled all his countrymen ; and he had 
 the physical advantages of commanding height, and 
 great personal beauty. When he went to battle, he 
 was accompanied by a train of a thousand camels, 
 which carried his baggage ; and the concubines in 
 attendance on him required for their conveyance as
 
 l6o EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 many as two hundred chariots. A thousand mail- 
 clad horsemen, and a still larger number of light- 
 armed, formed his body-guard. At the coronation of 
 a Parthian monarch, it was his hereditary right to 
 place the diadem on the brow of the new sovereign. 
 When Orodes was driven into banishment, it was he 
 who had brought him back to Parthia in triumph. 
 When Seleucia revolted, it was he who at the assault 
 had first mounted the breach, and striking terror into 
 the defenders, had taken the city. Though less than 
 thirty years of age when he was appointed com- 
 mander, he was believed to possess, besides these 
 various qualifications, consummate prudence and 
 sagacity. 
 
 The force which Orodes committed to his brave and 
 skilful lieutenant consisted entirely of horse. This 
 was not the ordinary character of a Parthian army, 
 which often comprised four or five times as many 
 cavalry as infantry. Whether it was to any extent 
 the result of his own selection and military insight, is 
 uncertain. Perhaps fortunate accident rather than 
 profound calculation brought about the sole employ- 
 ment against the Romans of the cavalry arm. Horse 
 would be wholly useless in the rugged and mountainous 
 Armenia, while they would act with effect in the com- 
 paratively open and level Mesopotamian region. Foot- 
 men, on the other hand, were essential for the Armenian 
 war, and perhaps the king thought that he needed 
 as many as he could collect. In this case he would 
 naturally take with him the whole of the infantry, and 
 leave his general the troops which were not required 
 for his own operations. It certainly does not appear, 
 that Surenas was allowed any choice in the matter.
 
 PARTHIAN FORCE OPPOSED TO HIM. l6l 
 
 The Parthian horse, like the Persian, was of two 
 kinds, standing in strong contrast the one to the 
 other. The bulk of their cavalry was of the lightest 
 and most agile description. Fleet and active coursers, 
 with scarcely any caparison but a headstall and a 
 single rein, were mounted by riders clad only in a 
 tunic and trousers, and armed with nothing but a 
 strong bow and a quiver full of arrows. A training 
 begun in early boyhood and continued through youth 
 made the rider almost one with his steed ; and he 
 could use his weapons with equal ease and effect 
 whether his horse was stationary or at full gallop, or 
 whether he was advancing towards or hurriedly re- 
 treating from his enemy. His supply of missiles was 
 practically inexhaustible, since when he found his 
 quiver empty, he had only to retire a short distance 
 and replenish his stock from magazines, borne on the 
 backs of camels, in the rear. It was his ordinary plan 
 to keep constantly in motion when in the presence of 
 an enemy, to gallop backwards and forwards, or 
 round and round his square or column, never charging 
 it, but at a moderate interval plying it with his keen 
 and barbed shafts ; which were driven by a practised 
 hand from a bow of unusual strength. Clouds of this 
 light cavalry enveloped the advancing or retreating 
 foe, and inflicted grievous damage, without, for the 
 most part, suffering anything in return. 
 
 But this was not the whole, nor the worst. In ad- 
 dition to these light troops, a Parthian army contained 
 always a body of heavy cavalry, armed on an entirely 
 different system. The strong chargers selected for this 
 service were clad almost wholly in mail. Their head,
 
 1 62 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 neck, chest, even their sides and flanks, were protected 
 by scale-armour of bronze or iron, sewn probably upon 
 leather. Their riders had cuirasses and cuisses of the 
 same materials, and helmets of burnished iron. For 
 an offensive weapon they carried a long and strong 
 spear or pike. They formed a serried line in battle, 
 bearing down with great weight on the enemy whom 
 they attacked, and standing firm as an iron wall 
 against the charges that were made upon them. A 
 cavalry, answering to this in some respects, had been 
 employed by the later Persian monarchs, and was in 
 use also among the Armenians at this period ; but 
 the Parthian pike appears to have been considerably 
 more formidable than the corresponding weapon borne 
 by either of these nations. 
 
 As compared with these troops, the Romans, as 
 Mommsen observes, were thoroughly inferior both in 
 respect of number and of excellence. Their infantry 
 of the line, excellent as they were in close combat, 
 whether at a short distance with the heavy javelin, or 
 in hand-to-hand combat with the sword, could not 
 compel an army consisting wholly of cavalry to come to 
 an engagement with them ; and they found, even when 
 they did come to a hand-to-hand conflict, an equal 
 or superior adversary in the iron-clad hosts of lancers. 
 As compared with a force like that of Surenas, the 
 Roman army was at a disadvantage strategically, be- 
 cause the cavalry commanded the communications ; 
 and at a disadvantage tactically, because every weapon 
 of close combat must succumb to that which is wielded 
 from a distance, unless the struggle becomes an in- 
 dividual one man against man. The concentrated
 
 HTS ARMY AT A DISADVANTAGE. 163 
 
 position, on which the whole Roman method of war 
 was based, increased the danger in the presence of 
 such an attack, since the closer the ranks of the 
 Roman column, the less could the missiles fail to hit 
 their mark. Under ordinary circumstances, where 
 towns have to be defended, and difficulties of the 
 ground have to be considered, such a system of opera- 
 ting with mere cavalry against infantry could never 
 be completely carried out ; but in the Mesopotamian 
 plain region, where an army was almost like a ship on 
 the high seas, neither encountering an obstacle, nor 
 meeting with a basis for strategic dispositions during 
 many days' march, this mode of warfare was irresistible 
 for the very reason that circumstances allowed it to be 
 developed there in all its purity and therefore in all its 
 power. TJiere everything combined to put the foreign 
 infantry at a disadvantage against the native cavalry. 
 Where the heavily-laden Roman foot soldier dragged 
 himself toilsomely over the steppe, and perished from 
 hunger, or still more from thirst, on a route marked 
 only by water-springs that were far apart and difficult 
 to find, the Parthian horseman, accustomed from child- 
 hood to sit on his fleet steed or camel, nay, almost to 
 spend his life in the saddle, easily traversed the desert, 
 whose hardships he had long learned how to lighten, 
 and in case of need to bear. There no rain fell to 
 mitigate the intolerable heat, and to slacken the bow- 
 strings and leathern thongs of the enemy's archers and 
 slingers ; there in the light soil of some places ordinary 
 ditches and ramparts could hardly be formed for the 
 camp. Imagination can hardly. conceive a situation in 
 which all the military advantages were more on the
 
 164 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 one side, and all the disadvantages more thoroughly on 
 the other. 
 
 The force entrusted by Orodes to Surenas com- 
 prised cavalry of both the kinds above described. No 
 estimate is given us of their number ; but, as they are 
 called " a vast multitude," and " an immense body," 
 we may assume that it was considerable. At any rate 
 it was sufficient to induce him to make a movement 
 in advance — to cross the Sinjar range and the river 
 Khabour, and take up his position in the country be- 
 tween that stream and the Belik — instead of merely 
 seeking to cover the capital. The presence of the 
 traitor, Abgarus, in the camp of Crassus, became now 
 of the utmost importance to the Parthian commander. 
 Abgarus, fully trusted by the Romans, and at the head 
 of a body of light horse, admirably adapted for out- 
 post servic >, was allowed, upon his own request, to 
 scour the country in front of the advancing legions, 
 and had thus the means of communicating freely with 
 the Parthian chief. He kept Surenas informed of all the 
 movements and intentions of Crassus, while at the 
 same time he suggested to Crassus such a line of route 
 as suited the views and designs of his adversary. Our 
 chief authority for the details of the expedition, Plu- 
 tarch, tells us, that he led the Roman troops through 
 an arid and trackless desert, across plains without tree, 
 or shrub, or even grass, where the soil was composed 
 of a light shifting sand, which the wind raised into a 
 succession of hillocks that resembled the waves of an 
 interminable sea The soldiers, he says, fainted with 
 the heat and with the drought, while the audacious 
 Osrhoenian scoffed at their complaints and reproach^-
 
 THE DISADVANTAGE EXAGGERATED. 165 
 
 asking them whether they expected to find the border- 
 tract between Arabia and Assyria a country of cool 
 streams and shady groves, of baths and hostelries, like 
 their own delicious Campania. But our knowledge of 
 the real geographical character of the region through 
 which the march lay makes it impossible for us to 
 accept this account as true. The country between the 
 Euphrates and the Belik is one of alternate hill and 
 plain, neither destitute of trees, nor very ill-provided 
 with water. The march through it can have presented 
 no very great difficulties. All that Abgarus could do to 
 serve the Parthian cause was, first, to induce Crassus 
 to trust himself to the open country instead of cling- 
 ing either to a river or to the mountains ; and, secondly, 
 to bring him, after a hasty march, and in the full heat 
 of the day, into the presence of the enemy. Both 
 these things he contrived to effect ; and Surenas was, 
 no doubt, so far beholden to him. But the notion 
 that he enticed the Roman army into a trackless 
 desert, and gave it over, when it was perishing with 
 weariness, hunger, and thirst, into the hands of its 
 enraged enemy, being in contradiction with the topo- 
 graphical facts, must be regarded as a fiction of Roman 
 apologists, and is one not even consistently maintained 
 by all the classical writers. 
 
 It was probably on the third or fourth day after he 
 had quitted the Euphrates that Crassus found him- 
 self approaching his enemy. After a hasty and hot 
 march he had approached the banks of the Belik, 
 when his scouts brought him word that they had 
 fallen in with the Parthian army, which was advancing 
 in force and seemingly full of confidence. Abgarus
 
 1 66 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 had recently quitted him on the pretence of doing 
 him some undefined service, but in reality to range 
 himself on the side of his true friends, the Parthians. 
 His officers now advised Crassus to encamp upon the 
 river, and defer an engagement till the morrow, but 
 he had no fears ; his son, Publius, a gallant officer 
 formed in the school of Julius Caesar, was anxious for 
 the fray ; and accordingly the Roman commander 
 gave the order to his troops to take some refreshment 
 as they stood, and then to push forward rapidly 
 Surenas, on his side, had taken up a position on 
 wooded and hilly ground, which concealed his num- 
 bers, and had even, we are told, made his troops 
 cover their arms with cloths and skins, that the glitter 
 might not betray them. But, as the Romans drew 
 near, all concealment was cast aside ; the signal for 
 battle was given ; the clang of the kettledrums 
 sounded on every side ; the squadrons came forward 
 in their brilliant array ; and it seemed at first as if the 
 heavy cavalry was about to charge the Roman host, 
 which was formed in a hollow square, with the light- 
 armed in the middle, and with supports of horse along 
 the whole line, as well as upon the flanks. But, if 
 this intention was ever entertained, it was altered 
 almost as soon as formed, and the better plan was 
 adopted of halting at a convenient distance, and 
 assailing the legionaries with flight after flight of 
 arrows, delivered without pause, and with extraordi- 
 nary force. The Roman endeavoured to meet this 
 attack by throwing forward his own skirmishers, but 
 they were quite unable to cope with the numbers and 
 superior weapons of the enemy, who forced them
 
 BATTLE OF THE'BELIK. 167 
 
 almost immediately to retreat, and take shelter 
 behind the line of the legionaries. These were once 
 more exposed to the deadly missiles, which pierced 
 alike through shield and breastplate and greaves, and 
 inflicted the most fearful wounds. More than once 
 the legionaries dashed forward and sought to close 
 with their assailants, but in vain. The Parthian 
 squadrons retired as the Roman infantry advanced, 
 maintaining the distance which they thought best 
 between themselves and their foe, whom they plied 
 with their shafts as incessantly while they fell back as 
 when they rode forward. For a while the Romans 
 maintained the hope that the missiles would at last be 
 all spent, but when they found that each archer con- 
 stantly obtained a fresh supply of arrows from the 
 rear, this expectation deserted them. .It became 
 evident to Crassus under these circumstances that 
 some new movement must be attempted, and, as a 
 last resource, he commanded his son, Publius, whom 
 the Parthians were threatening to outflank, to take 
 such troops as he thought proper and charge. The 
 brave youth was only too glad to receive the order. 
 Selecting the Celtic cavalry which Caesar had sent 
 with him from Gaul, who numbered a thousand, and 
 adding to them three hundred other horsemen, five 
 hundred archers, and about four thousand legionaries, 
 he advanced at speed against the nearest squadrons , 
 of the enemy. The Parthians pretended to be afraid, 
 and beat a hasty retreat. Publius followed with all 
 the impetuosity of youth, and was soon out of sight 
 of his friends, pressing the flying foe, whom he 
 believed to be panic-stricken. But when they had
 
 l68 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 drawn him on sufficiently, they suddenly made a 
 stand, brought their heavy cavalry up against his line, 
 and completely enveloped him and his detachment 
 with their light-armed. Publius made a desperate 
 resistance. His Gauls seized the Parthian pikes with 
 their hands, and dragged the encumbered horsemen 
 to the ground ; or, dismounting, slipped beneath the 
 horses of their opponents, and stabbing them in the 
 belly brought steed and rider down upon themselves. 
 His legionaries occupied a slight hillock, and endea- 
 voured to make a wall of their shields, but the Par- 
 thian archers closed around them, and slew them 
 almost to a man. Of the whole detachment, nearly 
 six thousand strong, no more than five hundred were 
 taken prisoners, and scarcely a man escaped. The 
 young Crassus might possibly, had he chosen to make 
 the attempt, have forced his way through the enemy 
 to Ichnae, a Greek town not far distant, but he pre- 
 ferred to share the fate of his men. Rather than fall 
 alive into the hands of the enemy, he caused his 
 shield-bearer to despatch him ; and his example was 
 followed by his principal officers. The victors struck 
 off his head, and, elevating it on a pike, returned to 
 resume their attack on the main body of the Roman 
 army. 
 
 The main army, much relieved by the diminution 
 of the pressure upon them, had waited patiently for 
 Publius to return in triumph, regarding the battle as 
 well-nigh over, and success as certain. After a time 
 the prolonged absence of the young captain aroused 
 suspicions, which grew into alarm when messengers 
 arrived telling of his extreme danger. Crassus,
 
 RETREAT OF THE ROMANS. l6g 
 
 almost beside himself with anxiety, had given the 
 word to advance, and the army had moved forward a 
 short distance when the shouts of the returning enemy 
 were heard, and the head of the unfortunate Publius 
 was seen displayed aloft, while the Parthian squad- 
 rons, closing in once more, renewed the assault on 
 their remaining foes with increased vigour. The 
 mailed horsemen approached close to the legionaries 
 and thrust at them with their long pikes, which 
 sometimes transfixed two men at once ; while the 
 light-armed, galloping across the Roman front, dis. 
 charged their unerring arrows over the heads of their 
 own men. The Romans could neither successfully 
 defend themselves nor effectively retaliate ; they 
 could neither break the ranks of the lancers, nor 
 reach the archers. Still time brought some relief. 
 Bowstrings broke, spears were blunted or splintered, 
 arrows began to fail, thews and sinews to relax ; and 
 when night closed in both parties were almost equally 
 glad of the cessation of arms which the darkness ren- 
 dered compulsory. 
 
 It was the custom of the Parthians, as of the Per- 
 sians, to bivouac at a considerable distance from an 
 enemy for fear of a night surprise. Accordingly, as 
 evening closed in, they drew off, having first shouted 
 jeeringly to the Romans that they would grant the 
 general one night in which to bewail his son ; on the 
 morrow they would return and take him prisoner, 
 unless he should prefer the better course of surrender- 
 ing himself to the mercy of Arsaces. A short 
 breathing-space was thus allowed the Romans, who 
 took advantage of it to retire towards Carrhae, leaving
 
 170 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 behind them the greater part of their wounded, to 
 the number of four thousand. A small body of horse 
 under the command of Egnatius reached Carrhae 
 about midnight, and gave the commandant such 
 information as led him to put his men under arms 
 and issue forth to the succour of the proconsul. The 
 Parthians, though the cries of the forsaken wounded 
 made them well aware of the Roman retreat, adhered 
 to their system of avoiding night combats, and 
 attempted no pursuit till daybreak. Even then they 
 allowed themselves to be delayed by comparatively 
 trivial matters — the capture of the Roman camp, the 
 massacre of the wounded, and the slaughter of the 
 numerous stragglers scattered along the line of march 
 — and made no haste to overtake the retreating army. 
 The bulk of the troops were thus enabled to effect 
 their retreat in safety to Carrhne, where, having the 
 protection of walls, they were, at any rate for a time, 
 secure. 
 
 It might have been expected that the Romans 
 would here have made a stand. The siege of a 
 fortified place by cavalry is ridiculous, if we under- 
 stand by siege anything more than a very incomplete 
 blockade. And the Parthians were notoriously 
 inefficient against walls. There was a chance, more- 
 over, that Artavasdes might have been more success- 
 ful than his ally, and, having repulsed the Parthian 
 monarch, might be on his way to bring relief to the 
 Romans. But the soldiers were thoroughly dispirited, 
 and would not listen to these suggestions. Pro- 
 visions, no doubt, ran short, since, as there had been 
 no expectation of a disaster, no preparations had been
 
 BATTLE OF SINNACA. 171 
 
 made for standing a siege. The Greek inhabitants of 
 the place could not be trusted to exhibit fidelity to a 
 falling cause. Moreover, Armenia was near, and the 
 Parthian system of abstaining from action during the 
 night seemed to render escape tolerably easy. It was 
 resolved, therefore, instead of clinging to the protec- 
 tion of the walls, to issue forth once more, and to 
 endeavour by a rapid night march to reach the 
 Armenian hills. The various officers seem to have 
 been allowed to arrange matters each for himself. 
 Cassius took his way towards the Euphrates, and 
 succeeded in escaping with five hundred horse. 
 Octavius, with a division which is estimated at five 
 thousand men, reached the outskirts of the hills at a 
 place called Sinnaca, and found himself in compara- 
 tive security. Crassus, misled by his guides, made 
 but poor progress during the night ; he had, however, 
 arrived within little more than a mile of Octavius 
 before the enemy, who would not stir till daybreak, 
 overtook him. Pressed upon by their advancing 
 squadrons, he, with his small band of two thousand 
 legionaries and a few horsemen, occupied a low 
 hillock connected by a ridge of rising ground with 
 the position of Sinnaca. Here the Parthian host 
 beset him, and he would infallibly have been slain or 
 captured at once had not Octavius, deserting his 
 place of safety, descended to the aid of his com- 
 mander. The united seven thousand held their own 
 against the enemy, having the advantage of the 
 ground, and having, perhaps, by the experience of 
 some days, learnt the weak points of Parthian war- 
 fare.
 
 172 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 Surenas was anxious, above all things, to secure 
 the person of the Roman commander. In the East 
 an excessive importance is attached to this proof of 
 success ; and there were reasons which made Crassus 
 particularly obnoxious to his antagonists. He was 
 believed to have originated, and not merely con- 
 ducted, the war, incited thereto by simple greed of 
 gold. He had refused with the utmost haughtiness 
 all discussion of terms, and had insulted the majesty 
 of the Parthians by the declaration that he would 
 treat with them nowhere but at their capital. If he 
 escaped, he would be bound at some future time to 
 repeat his attempt ; if he were made a prisoner his 
 fate would be a terrible warning to others. But now, 
 as evening approached, it seemed to the Parthian 
 that the prize which he so much desired was about to 
 elude his grasp. The highlands of Armenia would 
 be gained by the fugitives during the night, and 
 further pursuit of them would be futile. It remained 
 that he should effect by craft what he could no longer 
 hope to obtain by the employment of force ; and to 
 this point all his efforts were henceforth directed. 
 He drew off his troops and left the Romans without 
 further molestation. He allowed some of his 
 prisoners to escape and rejoin their friends, having 
 first contrived that they should overhear a conversa- 
 tion among his men, of which the theme was the 
 Parthian clemency, and the wish of Orodes to come 
 to terms with the Romans. He then, having allowed 
 time for the report of his pacific intentions to spread, 
 rode with a few chiefs towards the Roman camp, 
 carrying his bow unstrung, and his right hand
 
 DEATH OF CRASSUS. 1 73 
 
 stretched out, in token of amity. " Let the Roman 
 general," he said, " come forward with an equal num- 
 ber of attendants, and confer with me in the open 
 space between the armies on terms of peace." The 
 aged proconsul was disinclined to trust these over- 
 tures, but the Roman soldiery, demoralised as it was, 
 clamoured and threatened ; upon which Crassus 
 yielded, and went down into the plain, accompanied 
 by Octavius and a few others. Surenas received the 
 proconsul and his staff with apparent honour, and 
 terms were arranged ; only, with just bitterness, the 
 Parthian chief required that they should be at once 
 reduced to writing, " since," he said, with pointed 
 allusion to the bad faith of Pompey, "you Romans 
 are not very apt to remember your engagements." A 
 movement being requisite for the purpose of drawing 
 up the formal instruments, Crassus and his officers 
 were induced to mount upon horses furnished by 
 the Parthians, who had no sooner seated the pro- 
 consul on his steed than they proceeded to hurry him 
 forward, with the evident intention of carrying him 
 off to their camp. The Roman officers took the alarm 
 and resisted. Octavius snatched a sword from a 
 Parthian, and killed one of the grooms who were 
 hurrying Crassus away. A blow from behind 
 stretched him on the ground lifeless. A general 
 melee followed, and in the confusion Crassus was 
 killed, whether by one of his own side and with his 
 own consent, or by the hand of a Parthian, is uncer- 
 tain. The army, learning the fate of their com- 
 mander, with but few exceptions, surrendered. Such 
 as sought to escape under cover of the approaching
 
 174 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 night were hunted down by the Bedouins, who served 
 under the Parthian standard, and killed almost to a 
 man. Of the entire force which had crossed the 
 Euphrates, consisting of above forty thousand men, 
 not more than a fourth returned. One half of the 
 whole number perished. Nearly ten thousand 
 prisoners were settled by the victors near the extreme 
 east of their empire in the fertile oasis of Margiana 
 (Merv) as bondsmen, compelled after the Parthian 
 fashion to render military service. Here they inter- 
 married with native wives, and became submissive 
 Parthian subjects. 
 
 Such was the result of this great expedition, the 
 first attempt of the grasping and ambitious Romans, 
 not so much to conquer Parthia, as to strike terror 
 into the heart of her people, and to degrade them to 
 the condition of obsequious dependants on the will 
 and pleasure of the " world's lords." The expedition 
 failed so utterly, not from any want of bravery on 
 the part of the soldiers employed in it, nor from any 
 absolute superiority of the Parthian over the Roman 
 tactics, but partly from the incompetence of the 
 commander, partly from the inexperience of the 
 Romans up to this date, in the nature of the Parthian 
 warfare, and from their consequent ignorance of the 
 best manner of meeting it. To attack an enemy whose 
 main arm is the cavalry with a body of foot soldiers, 
 supported by an insignificant number of horse, must 
 be at all times rash and dangerous. To direct such 
 an attack on the more open part of the country, 
 where cavalry could operate freely, was wantonly to 
 aggravate the peril. After the first disaster, to quit
 
 RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION. 175 
 
 the protection of walls, when it had once been 
 obtained, was a piece of reckless folly. Had Crassus 
 taken care to get the support of some of the desert 
 tribes, if Armenia could not or would not help him, 
 and had he then advanced, either by the way of the 
 Mons. Masius and the Tigris, or along the line of 
 the Euphrates, the issue of his attack might have been 
 different. He might have fought his way to Seleucia 
 and Ctesiphon, as did Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and 
 Septimius Severus, and might have taken and 
 plundered those cities. He would, no doubt, have 
 experienced difficulties in his retreat ; but he might 
 have come off no worse than Trajan, whose Parthian 
 expedition has been generally regarded as rather a 
 feather in his cap, and as augmenting rather than 
 detracting from his reputation. But an ignorant and 
 inexperienced commander, venturing on a trial of 
 arms with an enemy of whom he knew little or 
 nothing, in their own country, without supports or 
 allies, and then neglecting every precaution suggested 
 by his officers, allowing himself to be deceived by a 
 pretended friend, and marching straight into a net 
 prepared for him, naturally suffered defeat. The 
 credit of the Roman arms does not greatly suffer by 
 the disaster, nor is that of the Parthians greatly 
 enhanced. The latter showed, as they had shown in 
 their wars against the Syro-Macedonians, that their 
 somewhat loose and irregular army was capable of 
 acting with effect against the solid masses and well- 
 ordered movements of the best disciplined troops. 
 They acquired by their use of the bow a fame like 
 that which the English bowmen obtained at Crecy
 
 176 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 and Agincourt. They forced the arrogant Romans tc 
 respect them, and to allow that there was at least one 
 nation in the world which could meet them on equal 
 terms and not be worsted in the encounter. They 
 henceforth obtained recognition from the Greco- 
 Roman writers — albeit a grudging and covert recogni- 
 tion — as the Second Power in the world, the admitted 
 rival of Rome, the only real counterpoise upon the 
 earth to the mighty empire which ruled from the 
 banks of the Euphrates to the shores of the Atlantic 
 Ocean. 
 
 While the general of King Orodes was thus com- 
 pletely successful against the Romans in Mesopotamia, 
 the king himself had in Armenia obtained advantages 
 of almost equal importance, though of a different kind. 
 Instead of waging an internecine war with Artavasdes, 
 he had come to terms with him, and, having con- 
 cluded a close alliance, had set himself to confirm and 
 cement it by uniting his son, Pacorus, in marriage 
 with the sister of the royal Armenian. A series of 
 festivities was in course of being held, to celebrate 
 the auspicious event, when news arrived of the triumph 
 of Surenas and the fate of Crassus. According to the 
 barbarous customs at all times prevalent in the East, 
 the head and hand of the slain proconsul accompanied 
 the intelligence. We are told that, at the moment of 
 the messengers' arrival the two sovereigns, with their 
 attendants, were being amused by a dramatic enter- 
 tainment. Strolling companies of Greek players were 
 at this time frequent in the East, where they were sure 
 of patronage in the many Greek cities, and might 
 sometimes find an appreciative audience among the
 
 TREATMENT OF THE BODY OF CRASSUS. 1 77 
 
 natives. Artavasdes, as the master of the revels, had 
 engaged such a company, since both he and Orodes 
 had a good knowledge of the Greek literature and 
 language, in which he had himself composed both 
 historical works and tragedies. The performance had 
 begun, and it happened, that, when the messengers 
 arrived, the actors were engaged in the representation 
 of the famous scene in the " Bacchae " of Euripides, 
 where Agave and the Bacchanals come upon the 
 stage with the mutilated remains of the murdered 
 Pentheus. The head of Crassus was thrown to them ; 
 and instantly the player who personated Agave seized 
 the bloody trophy, and placing it on his thyrsus in 
 lieu of the one that he was carrying, paraded it before 
 the delighted spectators, while he chanted the well- 
 known lines — 
 
 " From the mountain to the hall 
 New-cut tendril, see, we bring — 
 Blessed prey ! " 
 
 The horrible spectacle was one well suited to please 
 an Eastern audience ; loud and prolonged plaudits, 
 we may be sure, rang out ; and the entire assemblage 
 felt a keen satisfaction in the performance. It was 
 followed by a proceeding of equal barbarity, and still 
 more thoroughly Oriental. The Parthians, in derision 
 of the motive which was supposed to have led Crassus 
 to make his attack, had a quantity of gold melted and 
 poured it into his mouth. 
 
 Meanwhile Surenas was amusing his victorious 
 troops, and seeking to annoy the disaffected Seleu- 
 cians by the exhibition of a farcical ceremony. He
 
 178 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 spread the report that Crassus was not killed but 
 captured ; and selecting from among the prisoners 
 the Roman most like him in appearance, he dressed 
 the man in woman's clothes, mounted him upon a 
 horse, and requiring him to answer to the names of 
 "Crassus" and " Imperator," conducted him in triumph 
 to the Grecian city. Before him went, mounted on 
 camels, a band arrayed as trumpeters and lictors, 
 the lictors' rods having purses suspended to them, and 
 the axes in their midst being crowned with the bleed- 
 ing heads of Romans. In the rear followed a train of 
 Seleucian music-girls, who sang songs derisive of the 
 effeminacy and cowardice of the proconsul. After 
 this pretended parade of his prisoner through the 
 streets of the town, Surenas called a meeting of the 
 Seleucian senate, and indignantly denounced to them 
 the indecency of the literature which he had found in 
 the Roman tents. The charge, it is said, was true ; 
 but the Seleucians were not greatly impressed by the 
 moral lesson read to them, when they remarked the 
 train of concubines that had accompanied Surenas 
 himself to the field, and thought further of the loose 
 crowd of dancers, singers, and prostitutes, that was 
 commonly to be seen in the rear of a Parthian army. 
 
 It might have been expected that the terrible 
 disaster which had befallen the Roman arms, and the 
 vast triumph which the Parthians had achieved for 
 themselves, would have had extraordinary and far- 
 reaching consequences. No one could have been 
 surprised if the result had been to shake the very 
 foundations of the Roman power in the East, or even 
 to restore to Asia that aggressive attitude towards the
 
 TEMPORARY INACTION OF THE PARTHIANS. 179 
 
 rest of the world, which she had held four hundred 
 and fifty years earlier. But the commotion and 
 change produced was far less than might have been 
 anticipated. Mesopotamia was, of course, recovered 
 by the Parthians to itsextremest limit, the Euphrates ; 
 and Armenia was lost to the Roman alliance, and 
 thrown for the time into complete dependence upon 
 Parthia. The whole East was, to some extent, excited ; 
 and the Jews, always impatient of a foreign yoke, and 
 recently aggrieved by the unprovoked spoliation of 
 their Temple by Crassus, flew to arms. But no 
 general movement of the Oriental races took place. 
 It might have been supposed that the Syrians, Phoe- 
 nicians, Cilicians, Cappadocians, Phrygians, and other 
 Asiatic peoples whose proclivities were altogether 
 Oriental, would have seized the opportunity of rising 
 against their Western lords and driving the Romans 
 back upon Europe. It might have been thought that 
 Parthia at least would have immediately assumed the 
 offensive in force, and have made a determined effort 
 to rid herself of neighbours who had proved so 
 troublesome But though the conjuncture of circum- 
 stances was most favourable — though not only was 
 Rome paralysed in the East, but was also on the 
 point of civil war in the West — yet the man was 
 wanting. Had Mithridates of Pontus or Tigranes of 
 Armenia been living, or had Surenas been king of 
 Parthia instead of a mere general, advantage would 
 probably have been taken of the occasion, and Rome 
 might have suffered seriously. But Orodes seems to 
 have been neither ambitious as a prince nor skilful 
 as a commander ; he lacked at any rate the keen and
 
 l8o EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 
 
 all-embracing glance which could sweep the political 
 horizon, and, comprehending the exact character of the 
 situation, see at the same time how to make the most 
 of it. He allowed the opportunity to slip by without 
 hastening to put forth his full strength, or indeed 
 making any considerable effort ; and the occasion 
 once lost was sure never to return. 
 
 If there was a man living at the time who might 
 possibly have taken full advantage of the situation, 
 and forced Rome to pay the deserved penalty of her 
 rashness and aggressiveness, it was Surenas. But 
 that chief had lost the favour of his sovereign. 
 There are services which, in the East, it is not safe 
 for a subject to render to the head of the state, and 
 Surenas had exceeded the proper measure. The 
 jealousy of Orodes was aroused by the success and 
 reputation of his general ; and it was not long before 
 he found an excuse for handing him over to the 
 executioner. Parthia was thus left without any com- 
 mander of approved merit, for Sillaces, the second 
 in command during the war with Crassus, had in no 
 way distinguished himself in the course of it. This 
 condition of things may account for the feebleness of 
 the efforts made, in the years B.C. 53 and 52, to 
 retaliate on the Romans the damage done by their 
 invasion. A few weak flying bands only crossed the 
 Euphrates, and began the work of plunder and 
 ravage, in which they were speedily disturbed by 
 Cassius, who easily drove them back across the river. 
 Rome should have taken advantage of the interval 
 to strengthen her forces in these parts, and secure the 
 inviolability of her frontier ; but those who were at
 
 RETALIATORY RAID OF PACORUS. 161 
 
 the head of the Roman State, knowing civil war to 
 be imminent, declined to detach troops from their 
 own party standards for the advantage of the 
 national cause. 
 
 Hence, when, in B.C. 51, Orodes had made up his 
 mind to attempt a blow, and a great Parthian army 
 under the young prince, Pacorus, and an officer of 
 ripe age and experience, by name Osaces, appeared 
 on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, there were no 
 means of resisting them. Cassius had done his best 
 to unite and re organise the broken remnants of the 
 army of Crassus, which he had formed into two weak 
 
 COIN OF PACORUS I. 
 
 legions ; but no reinforcements had reached him, and 
 he did not feel justified in taking the open field with 
 his small force, much less in giving battle to the 
 enemy. The Parthians therefore crossed the Euphrates 
 unopposed, and swarmed into the rich Syrian territory. 
 The walled towns shut their gates, and maintained 
 themselves ; but the open country was everywhere 
 overrun : and a thrill of mingled alarm and excite- 
 ment passed through all the Roman provinces in 
 Asia. These provinces were at the time most 
 inadequately supplied with Roman troops, owing to 
 the impending civil war in Italy. The natives were 
 for the most part disaffected, and inclined to hail the
 
 182 RETALIATORY RAID OF PACORUS. 
 
 Parthians as brethren and deliverers. Excepting 
 Deiotarus of Galatia, and Ariobarzanes of Cappa- 
 docia, Rome had, as Cicero (then proconsul of Cilicia) 
 plaintively declared, not a friend on the Asiatic con- 
 tinent. And Cappadocia was miserably weak, and 
 open to attack on the side of Armenia. Had Orodes 
 and Artavasdes acted in concert, and had the latter, 
 while Orodes sent his armies into Syria, poured the 
 Armenian forces into Cappadocia and then into 
 Cilicia (as it was expected that he would do), there 
 would have been the greatest danger to the Roman 
 possessions. As it was, the excitement in Asia 
 Minor was extreme. Cicero marched into Cappa- 
 docia with the bulk of his Roman troops, and 
 summoned to his aid Deiotarus with his Galatians, 
 at the same time writing to the Roman Senate to 
 implore reinforcements. Cassius shut himself up in 
 Antioch, and allowed the Parthian cavalry to pass 
 him by, and even to proceed beyond the bounds of 
 Syria into Cilicia. But the Parthians seem scarcely 
 to have understood the straits of their adversaries or 
 to have been aware of their own advantages. Pro- 
 bably their " information department " was ill 
 organised. Instead of spreading themselves wide, 
 raising the natives, and leaving them to blockade the 
 towns, while with their as yet unconquered squadrons 
 they defied the enemy in the open country, we find 
 them engaging in the siege and blockade of cities, for 
 which they were totally unfit, and confining them- 
 selves almost entirely to the narrow valley of the 
 Orontes. Under these circumstances we are not 
 surprised to learn that Cassius, having first beaten
 
 PLOT TO MAKE PACORUS KING. 1 83 
 
 them back from Antioch, contrived to lead them into 
 an ambush on the banks of the river, and severely 
 handled their troops, even killing the general, Osaces. 
 The Parthians withdrew from the neighbourhood 
 of the Syrian capital after this defeat, which must 
 have taken place about the end of September, and 
 soon after went into winter quarters in Cyrrhestica, or 
 the part of Syria immediately east of Amanus. 
 Here they remained quietly during the winter months 
 under Prince Pacorus, and it was expected that the 
 war would break out again with fresh fury in the 
 spring ; but Bibulus, the new proconsul of Syria — 
 " as wretched a general as he was an incapable 
 statesman " — conscious of his military deficiencies, 
 contrived to sow dissensions among the Parthians 
 themselves and to turn the thoughts of Pacorus in 
 another direction. He suggested to Ornodapantes, 
 a Parthian noble, with whom he had managed to 
 open a correspondence, that Pacorus would be a more 
 worthy occupant of the throne of the Arsacidae than 
 his father, and that he would consult well for his own 
 interests, if he were to proclaim the young prince as 
 king, and lead the army of Syria against Orodes. 
 Pacorus had already been associated in the govern- 
 ment by his father, and his name appears on some of 
 his father's later coins ; but this, while stimulating, 
 did not satisfy his ambition. He appears to have 
 lent a ready ear to the whispers of Ornodapantes, and 
 to have been on the verge, if he did not even over- 
 step the verge, of rebellion. There are Parthian 
 coins bearing the head of a beardless youth, and 
 the exact set of titles that had become fashionable
 
 184 END OF THE FIRST ROMAN WAR. 
 
 under Orodes, which are with ample reason assigned 
 to this prince, and which must have been struck to be 
 put in circulation when his revolt was declared. But 
 the plot was nipped in the bud. Orodes, learning the 
 designs cherished by Pacorus, summoned him to his 
 Court ; and, the plans laid down not being yet ripe 
 for execution, he felt that there was no other course 
 open to him but to obey. The Parthian squadrons 
 seem to have recrossed the Euphrates in July, 
 B.C. 50. The danger to Rome was past ; but the 
 stain was not wiped out from the shield of Roman 
 honour, nor was the reputation of Rome restored in 
 the East. The " First Roman War " ended, after a 
 period of a little more than four years, with the 
 advantage wholly on the side of Parthia, both in 
 respect of glory and of material gain. The laurels 
 lost by Rome at Carrhae had never been recovered, 
 and the acquisition of Armenia by Parthia was a 
 substantial increase of strength.
 
 XI. 
 
 SECOND WAR OF PARTHIA WITH ROME — PARTHIAN 
 INVASION OF SYRIA, PALESTINE, AND ASIA 
 MINOR. 
 
 The end of the first war of Parthia with Rome 
 synchronised nearly with the breaking out of the 
 civil contest between Caesar and Pompey. In this 
 struggle the sympathies of Parthia were on the 
 Pompeian side. Though Pompey had certainly not 
 given the Parthians much reason for regarding him 
 with favour, since he had openly and flagrantly 
 broken the terms of his treaty of alliance with them, 
 yet on the whole they seem certainly to have pre- 
 ferred his cause to that of his great adversary. 
 Perhaps they viewed Caesar as more bound in 
 honour than Pompey to seek revenge for the death 
 of Crassus, since he had sent a favourite officer, with 
 a contingent of troops, to his aid, or possibly they 
 may simply have felt more fear of his military 
 capacity. Communications certainly took place be- 
 tween Orodes and Pompey in the course of the year 
 B.C. 49 or 48, and the terms of an alliance were dis- 
 cussed between them. Pompey, who was not very 
 scrupulous, or really patriotic, made the overtures, 
 and desired to know on what terms the Parthian 
 
 185
 
 l86 SECOND WAR OF PARTHIA WITH ROME. 
 
 monarch would lend him effective aid in the war 
 which was on the point of breaking out. The reply 
 of Orodes was to the following effect : "If the 
 Roman leader would deliver into his hands the 
 province of Syria, and make it wholly over to the 
 Parthians, Orodes was willing to conclude an alliance 
 with him and send him help ; but not otherwise." 
 It is to the credit of Pompey that he rejected these 
 terms, and, while not above contemplating a foreign 
 alliance against a domestic foe, was unwilling to 
 purchase the assistance to himself at a cost that 
 would have inflicted a serious injury on his country. 
 The rupture of the negotiations produced an estrange- 
 ment between the negotiators, and Orodes went so 
 far as to throw Hirrus, the envoy of Pompey, into 
 prison, as a means of giving vent to his disappoint- 
 ment. Still, however, Pompey looked upon Orodes 
 as a friend ; and when, a few months later, he had 
 fought his great fight, and suffered his great defeat, 
 at Pharsalus (August 9, B.C. 48), his thoughts reverted 
 to the powerful Parthian king, and he entertained for 
 some time the idea of taking refuge at the Court of 
 Ctesiphon. It is even said that he only relinquished 
 the design, and made his disastrous choice of Egypt 
 as a refuge, when, on the receipt of intelligence that 
 Antioch had declared for his rival, he understood that 
 the route to the Parthian capital was no longer open 
 to him. Otherwise, notwithstanding the persuasions 
 of his friends, who thought the risk too great, both 
 for himself and his wife, Cornelia, to be run with 
 prudence, the world might have have seen the spec- 
 tacle of a second Coriolanus, thundering at the gates
 
 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO IT. 187 
 
 of Rome and demanding recall and reinstatement, at 
 the head of legions recruited in a foreign land and 
 furnished by a foreign enemy. As it was, Roman 
 history was spared this scandal ; and at the same 
 time Orodes was spared the awkwardness and 
 difficulty of having to elect between repulsing a 
 suppliant, and provoking the hostility of the most 
 powerful chieftain and the greatest general of the 
 age. 
 
 The year B.C. 47 saw Caesar in Syria and Asia 
 Minor, whither he was drawn by the necessity of 
 crushing the mad schemes of Pharnaces, son of 
 Mithridates of Pontus, who thought he saw in the 
 internal quarrels of the Romans an opportunity of 
 re-establishing his father's ertipire. After the facile 
 victory of Zela, the Great Roman can scarcely have 
 avoided debating with himself the question, whether 
 he should at once turn his arms against his only 
 other Asiatic enemy, and by a movement as rapid as 
 that which had crushed Pharnaces, strike a blow 
 against Orodes, and so avenge the defeat of Carrhae. 
 But, if the idea crossed his mind, he dismissed it. 
 The time was not suitable. Too much remained to 
 be done in Africa, in Spain, and at home, for so large 
 a matter as a Parthian War to be, for the moment, 
 taken in hand. Caesar resolutely averted his gaze 
 from the far East, and deferring the " revenge " to a 
 comparatively remote date, kept whatever projects he 
 may have entertained on the subject to himself, and 
 was careful, while he remained in Asia, to avoid 
 provoking or exasperating by threats or hostile 
 movements, the Power on which the peace of the
 
 l88 SECOND WAR OF PARTHIA WITH ROME. 
 
 East principally depended. It was not until he had 
 brought the African and Spanish wars to an end that 
 he allowed his intention of leading an expedition 
 against Parthia to be openly talked about. In B.C. 44, 
 four years after Pharsalus, having put down all his 
 domestic enemies, - and arranged matters, as he 
 thought, satisfactorily at Rome, he let a decree be 
 passed, formally assigning to him the Parthian War, 
 and sent the legions across the Adriatic on their way 
 to Asia. What plan of campaign he may have con- 
 templated is uncertain. One writer represents him 
 as intending to enter Parthia by way of the Lesser 
 Armenia, and to proceed cautiously to try the 
 strength of the Parthians before engaging them in a 
 battle. Another credits him with a plan for rapidly 
 overrunning Parthia, and then proceeding by the 
 way of the Caspian into Scythia, from Scythia 
 invading Germany, and after conquering Germany 
 returning into Italy by the way of Gaul ! But neither 
 author is likely to have had any trustworthy authority 
 for his statement. The Great Dictator would not be 
 likely to have formed any definite scheme ; he would 
 have felt the need of being guided by circumstances. 
 Still, there can be no doubt that an expedition under 
 his auspices would have constituted a most serious 
 danger to Parthia, and might have terminated in her 
 subjection to Rome. The military talents of Julius 
 were of the most splendid description ; his powers of 
 organisation and consolidation enormous ; his pru- 
 dence and caution equal to his ambition and courage. 
 Once launched on a career of conquest in the East, 
 it is impossible to say whither he might not have
 
 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO IT. 189 
 
 carried the Roman eagles, or what countries he might 
 not have added to the empire. But Parthia was saved 
 from the imminent peril without any effort of her 
 own. The daggers of the " Liberators " struck down 
 on the 1 5th of March, B.C. 44, the only man whom 
 she had seriously to fear ; and with the removal of 
 Julius passed away even from Roman thought for 
 many a year the design which he had entertained, 
 and which he alone could have accomplished. 
 
 In the civil war which followed on the murder of 
 Julius, the Parthians appear to have actually taken 
 a part. The East fell into confusion on the with- 
 drawal of Julius after Zela, and in the course of the 
 troubles a Parthian contingent was sent to the aid of 
 a certain Caecilius Bassus, a Pompeian adherent, who 
 was seeking to obtain for himself something like an 
 independent principality in Syria. The soldiers of 
 Bassus, after a while (B.C. 43), went over in a body to 
 Cassius, who was in the East collecting troops for his 
 great struggle with Antony and Octavian ; and thus 
 a handful of Parthians came into the power of the 
 second among the " Liberators." Of this accidental 
 circumstance he determined to take advantage, in 
 order to obtain, if possible, a considerable body of 
 troops from Orodes. He therefore presented each of 
 the Parthian soldiers with a sum of money for their 
 immediate wants, and dismissed them graciously to 
 their homes, at the same time seizing the opportunity 
 to send some of his own officers as ambassadors to 
 Orodes, with a request for substantial aid. On re- 
 ceiving this application, the Parthian monarch seems 
 to have come to the conclusion that it would be a
 
 IQO SECOND WAR OF PARTHIA WITH ROME. 
 
 wise policy to comply with it. It was for the interest 
 of Parthia that the Roman arms, instead of being 
 directed to Asiatic conquests, should be engaged for 
 as long a time as possible in intestine strife ; and 
 Orodes might well conceive that he was promoting 
 his own advantage by fomenting and encouraging 
 the quarrels which, at any rate for the time, secured 
 his own empire from attack. He may have hoped 
 also to obtain some equivalent in territory from the 
 gratitude of Cassius at some future period, since 
 Cassius was at the time Proconsul of Syria, and, if 
 successful against Octavian and Antony, might be 
 expected to choose the East for his province and to 
 make a fresh arrangement of it. At any rate, he 
 complied with Cassius's request, and sent him a body 
 of Parthian horse, which were among the troops 
 engaged at Philippi. 
 
 The crushing defeat suffered by the "Liberators" 
 (November, B.C. 42) was an immediate disappointment 
 to Orodes, but, as instead of producing a pacification 
 of the Roman world, it only intensified the strife and 
 general confusion, it cannot be said to have worked 
 disadvantageously for his interests. He himself, at 
 any rate, judged otherwise. The Roman world 
 seemed to him more divided against itself than ever ; 
 and the " self-wrought ruin," which Horace prophesied, 
 seemed absolutely impending. Three rivals held 
 divided sway in the corrupted State, each of them 
 jealous of the other two, and anxious for his own 
 aggrandisement. The two chief pretenders to the 
 first place were bitterly hostile ; and while the one 
 was detained in Italy by insurrection against his
 
 ATTACK MADE BY ORODES. 1 91 
 
 authority, the other was plunged in luxury and dis- 
 sipation, enjoying the first transports of a lawless 
 passion, at the Egyptian capital. The nations of the 
 East were, moreover, alienated by the exactions of 
 the profligate Triumvir, who, to reward his parasites 
 and favourites, had laid upon them a burden that it 
 was scarcely possible for them to bear. The condi- 
 tion of things generally seemed to invite a foreign 
 power to step in, and, taking the opportunity offered 
 by Rome's weakness, seriously to cripple her power. 
 
 Parthia enjoyed also at the time the rare good 
 fortune of having at her disposal the services of a 
 Roman general. Quintus Labienus, the son of Titus, 
 Caesar's legate in Gaul, who had gone over to the 
 Pompeians, having been sent a^ envoy to Orodes by 
 Brutus and Cassius a little before Philippi, had, on 
 learning the severities of the Triumvirs, elected to 
 make Parthia his home, and had taken service under 
 the Parthian banner. Though not an officer of much 
 distinction among his countrymen, he had the advan- 
 tage of knowing the weak points of their military 
 system ; and it might well seem to Orodes, that the 
 occasion which thus offered itself ought to be utilised. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the Parthian monarch, 
 who had never accepted the failure of Pacorus in B.C. 
 52-50 as final, made preparations during the winter 
 of B.C. 41-40, for a fresh attack upon the Roman 
 territory. Having collected an imposing force from 
 all parts of his dominions, he placed it under the joint 
 command of his son, Pacorus, and the Roman refugee, 
 Q. Labienus, and sent it across the Euphrates with the 
 first blush of spring, while Antony was still occupied
 
 192 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA. 
 
 with his Egyptian dalliance, and Octavius, having at 
 last captured Perusia, was applying himself to the 
 pacification of Italy. Antony might perhaps have 
 exchanged the soft delights of Cleopatra's Court 
 for the perils of a Parthian campaign, since when 
 roused to action by what seemed to him a sufficient 
 motive, he had all the instincts of a soldier ; but it 
 happened that, just at the time, messengers reached 
 him from his brother Lucius, imploring him to hasten 
 to the West, and arrest before it was too late the 
 victorious progress of Octavius. With one regretful 
 glance in the direction of Syria, the self-seeking 
 Triumvir sailed away from Alexandria to Italy, 
 leaving the care of Roman interests in the East to the 
 incompetent hands of his lieutenant, Decidius Saxa, 
 who had already alienated the affections of the 
 provincials by his exactions, and was about to lose 
 their respect by his incapacity. The Parthian hordes, 
 thus w eakly opposed, burst into Syria with irresistible 
 force rapidly overran the open country between the 
 Euphrates and Antioch, and entering the rich valley 
 of the Orontes, threatened the great seats of Hellenic 
 civilisation in these parts, Antioch, Apameia, and 
 Epiphaneia. From Apameia, situated (like Durham) 
 on a rocky peninsula almost surrounded by the river, 
 they were at first repulsed ; but, having shortly 
 afterwards defeated Decidius Saxa and his legions 
 in the open fields, they received the submission of 
 Apameia and Antioch, which latter city Saxa 
 abandoned at their approach, flying precipitately 
 into Cilicia. 
 
 Encouraged by these successes, Labienus and
 
 SUCCESSES OF LABIENUS AND PACORUS. 193 
 
 Pacorus agreed to divide their troops, and to engage 
 simultaneously in two great expeditions. Pacorus 
 undertook to carry the Parthian standard throughout 
 the entire extent of Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine, 
 while Labienus took upon himself to invade Asia 
 Minor, and see if he could not wrest some of its more 
 fertile regions from the Romans. Both expeditions 
 were crowned with extraordinary success. Pacorus 
 reduced all Syria, and all Phoenicia, except the single 
 city of Tyre, which he was unable to capture for want 
 of a naval force. He then advanced into Palestine, 
 which he found in its normal condition of intestine 
 commotion. Hyrcanus and Antigonus, two princes 
 of the Asmonaean house, uncle and nephew, were 
 rivals for the Jewish crown ; and the latter, whom 
 Hyrcanus had driven into exile, was content to make 
 common cause with the invader, and to be indebted 
 to a rude foreigner for the possession of the kingdom 
 whereto he aspired. He offered Pacorus a thousand 
 talents — nearly a quarter of a million of our money — 
 and five hundred Jewish women, if he would espouse 
 his cause, and seat him upon his uncle's throne. The 
 offer was readily embraced, and by the irresistible 
 help of the Parthians a revolution was effected at 
 Jerusalem. Hyrcanus was deposed and mutilated. 
 A new priest-king was set up in the person of 
 Antigonus, the last Asmonaean prince, who reigned 
 at Jerusalem for three years — B.C. 40-37 — as a 
 Parthian satrap or vitaxa, the creature and dependant 
 of the great monarchy on the further side of the 
 Euphrates. 
 
 Meanwhile, in Asia Minor, Labienus carried all
 
 IQ4 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA. 
 
 before him. Decidius Saxa, having once more (in 
 Cicilia) ventured upon a battle, was not only defeated, 
 but slain. Pamphylia, Lycia, and Caria — the whole 
 south coast — were overrun. Stratonicea was be- 
 sieged ; Mylasa and Alabanda were taken. According 
 to some writers, the Parthians even pillaged Lydia 
 and Ionia, and were in possession of Asia Minor to 
 the shores of the Hellespont. It may be said that 
 for a full year Western Asia changed masters : the 
 rule and authority of Rome disappeared ; and the 
 Parthians were recognised as the dominant power. 
 Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not sur- 
 prising that Labienus lost his head ; that he affected 
 the style and title of " Imperator ; " struck coins, and 
 placed his own head and name on them, and even 
 added the ridiculous title " Parthicus," which to a 
 Roman ear meant " Conqueror of the Parthians " — 
 a title of honour whereto he had no possible claim. 
 
 But the fortune of war now began to turn. In the 
 autumn of B.C. 39, Antony, having patched up his 
 quarrel with Octavius and set out from Italy to 
 resume his command in the East, sent his lieu- 
 tenant, Publius Ventidius, into Asia, with orders to 
 act against Labienus, and the triumphant Parthians. 
 Ventidius landed unexpectedly on the coast of Asia 
 Minor, and so alarmed Labienus, who happened to 
 have no Parthian troops with him, that the latter fell 
 back hurriedly towards Cilicia, evacuating all the 
 more western provinces, and at the same time send- 
 ing urgent messages to Pacorus to implore succour. 
 Pacorus despatched a strong body of cavalry to his 
 aid ; but these troops, instead of putting themselves
 
 PARTHIAN REVERSES. 195 
 
 under his command, had the folly to act indepen- 
 dently, and the result was, that, in a rash attempt to 
 surprise the Roman camp, they were defeated by 
 Ventidius, whereupon they fled hastily into Cilicia, 
 leaving Labienus to his fate. The self-styled " Im- 
 perator," upon this, deserted his men and sought 
 safety in flight ; but his retreat was soon discovered ; 
 and he was pursued, captured, and put to death. 
 
 Meamvhile, the Parthians under Pacorus, alarmed 
 at the turn which affairs had taken in Asia Minor, left 
 Antigonus, the Asmonaean prince, to manage their 
 interests in Palestine, and concentrated themselves in 
 Northern Syria and Commagene, where they awaited 
 the approach of the Romans. A strong detachment, 
 under a general named Pharnapates, was appointed 
 to guard the " Syrian Gates," a narrow pass over 
 Mount Amanus, leading from Cilicia into Syria. 
 Here Ventidius gained another victory. He had 
 sent forward an officer called Pompadius Silo with 
 some cavalry to endeavour to seize this post, and 
 Pompaedius had found himself compelled to an en- 
 gagement with Pharnapates, in which he was on the 
 point of suffering defeat, when Ventidius himself, 
 who had probably feared for his subordinate's safety, 
 appeared on the scene, and turned the scale in favour 
 of the Romans. The detachment under Pharnapates 
 was overpowered, and Pharnapates himself was 
 among the slain. When news of this defeat reached 
 Pacorus, he thought it prudent to retreat, and ac- 
 cordingly withdrew his troops across the Euphrates, 
 This movement he appears to have executed without 
 being molested by Ventidius, who thus recovered
 
 196 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA, ETC. 
 
 Syria to the Romans towards the close of B.C. 39, or 
 early in B.C. 38. 
 
 But Pacorus was far from intending to relinquish 
 the contest. He had made himself popular among 
 the Syrians by his mild and just administration, and 
 knew that they preferred his government to that of 
 the Romans. He had many allies among the petty 
 princes and dynasts, who occupied a semi-indepen- 
 dent position on the borders of the Parthian and 
 Roman empires, as, for example, Antiochus, King of 
 Commagene ; Lysanias, tetrarch of Ituraea ; Malchus, 
 sheikh of the Nabataean Arabs, and others. More- 
 over, Antigonus, whom he had established as king of 
 the Jews, still maintained himself in Judaea against 
 the efforts of Herod, to whom Octavius and 
 Antony had assigned the throne. Pacorus therefore 
 arranged during the remainder of the winter for a 
 fresh invasion of Syria in the spring, and, taking the 
 field earlier than his adversary expected, made ready 
 to recross the Euphrates. We are told that, if he had 
 crossed at the usual point, he would have come upon 
 the Romans quite unprepared, the legions being still 
 in their winter quarters, some of them north and some 
 south of the great mountain range of Taurus. Ven- 
 tidius, however, contrived by a stratagem to induce 
 him to effect his passage at a different point, consider- 
 ably lower down the stream, and in this way to waste 
 some valuable time, which he himself employed in 
 collecting his scattered forces. Thus, when the Par- 
 tisans appeared on the right bank of the Euphrates, 
 the Roman general was prepared to engage them, 
 and was not even loth to decide the fate of the war
 
 DEATH OF PACORUS. 197 
 
 by a single battle. He had taken care to provide 
 himself with a strong force of slingers, and had en- 
 trenched himself in a position on high ground at 
 some distance from the river. The Parthians, finding 
 their passage of the Euphrates unopposed, and, when 
 they fell in with the enemy, seeing him entrenched, 
 as though resolved to act only on the defensive, 
 became over bold ; they thought the force opposed to 
 them must distrust its own strength, or its own fighting 
 capacity, and would be likely to yield its position 
 without a blow, if suddenly and vigorously attacked. 
 Accordingly, as on a former occasion, they charged 
 up the hill on which the Roman camp was placed, 
 hoping, like the Boers at Majuba, to take it by mere 
 audacity. But the troops in the camp were held 
 ready, and at the proper moment issued forth ; the 
 assailants found themselves in their turn assailed, and, 
 fighting at a disadvantage on the slope, were soon 
 driven down the declivity. The battle was continued 
 in the plain below, where the mail-clad horse of the 
 Asiatics made a brave and prolonged resistance ; but 
 the slingers galled them severely, and in the midst of 
 the struggle it happened by ill fortune that Pacorus was 
 slain. The result followed which is almost invariable 
 in the case of an Oriental army : having lost their 
 leader, the soldiers almost everywhere gave way ; 
 flight became universal, and the Romans gained a 
 complete victory. The Parthian army fled in two 
 directions. Part made for the bridge of boats by 
 which it had crossed the Euphrates, but was inter- 
 cepted by the enemy and destroyed. Part turned 
 northwards into Commagene, and there took refuge
 
 198 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA, ETC. 
 
 with the king, Antiochus, who refused to surrender 
 them to the demand of Ventidius, and no doubt 
 allowed them to return to their own country. It 
 was said that this final encounter took place on the 
 anniversary of the great disaster of Carrhae, and 
 Rome flattered herself that she had at last retrieved 
 that disgrace, having compensated for the loss of her 
 own legions by the destruction of a Royal Parthian 
 army, and having by the death of the associated 
 monarch, Pacorus, more than avenged the slaughter 
 of Crassus. 
 
 Thus terminated the great Parthian invasion of 
 Syria under Labienus and Pacorus ; and with it 
 terminated the prospect of any further spread of the 
 Arsacid dominion towards the West. When the two 
 great world-powers, Rome and Parthia, first came into 
 collision, when the hard blow struck by the latter in 
 the annihilation of the army of Crassus was followed 
 up by the advance of their clouds of horse into Syria, 
 Palestine, and Asia Minor — when Apameia, Antioch, 
 and Jerusalem fell into their hands, when Decidius 
 Saxa was defeated and slain — Cilicia > Pamphylia, 
 Lycia, and Caria occupied, Lydia and Ionia ravaged 
 — it seemed as if Rome had met, not so much an 
 equal, as a superior ; it looked as if the power hitherto 
 predominant would be compelled to draw back and 
 retreat, while the new power, Parthia, would make a 
 long step in advance, and push her frontier to the 
 yEgean and the Mediterranean. The history of the 
 contest between the East and West, between Asia 
 and Europe, is a history of re-actions. At one time 
 one of the two continents, at another time the other,
 
 FINAL FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION. 1 99 
 
 is in the ascendant. The time appeared to have come 
 when the Asiatics were once more to recover their 
 own, and to beat back the European aggressor to his 
 proper shores and islands. The triumphs achieved 
 by the Seljukian Turks between the eleventh and 
 the fifteenth centuries would in that case have been 
 anticipated by above a thousand years through the 
 efforts of a kindred and not dissimilar people. But 
 it turned out that the effort now made was premature. 
 While the Parthian warfare was admirably adapted 
 for the national defence on the broad plains of inner 
 Asia, it was ill suited for conquest, and, comparatively 
 speaking, ineffective in more contracted and difficult 
 regions. The Parthian military system had not the 
 elasticity of the Roman — it did not in the same way 
 adapt itself to circumstances, or admit of the addition 
 of new arms, or the indefinite expansion of an old 
 one. However loose and seemingly flexible, it was 
 rigid in its uniformity ; it never altered ; it remained 
 under the thirtieth Arsaces such as it had been under 
 the first, improved in details perhaps, but essentially 
 the same system. The Romans, on the contrary, were 
 always modifying and improving their system, always 
 learning new combinations, or new manoeuvres, or 
 new modes of warfare, from their enemies. They 
 met the PaVthian tactics of loose array, continuous 
 distant missiles, and almost exclusive employment of 
 cavalry, with an increase in the number of their own 
 horse, a larger employment of auxiliary irregulars, 
 and a greater i.se of the sling. At the same time 
 they learnt t'j take full advantage of the Parthian 
 inefficiency against walls, and to practise against
 
 200 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA, ETC. 
 
 them the arts of pretended retreat and ambush. The 
 result was that Parthia found she could make no 
 serious impression upon the dominions of Rome, and 
 having become persuaded of this by the experience 
 of a decade of years, thenceforth laid aside for ever 
 the dream of Western conquest. She took up, in 
 fact, from this time a new attitude. Hitherto she had 
 been consistently aggressive. She 1iad laboured con- 
 stantly to extend herself at the expense of the 
 Bactrians, the Scythians, the Syro- Macedonians, and 
 the Armenians. She had proceeded, like Rome, from 
 one aggression to another, leaving only short intervals 
 between her wars, and had always been looking out 
 for some fresh enemy. Henceforth she became, 
 comparatively speaking, pacific. She was content, 
 for the most part, to maintain her limits. She sought 
 no new foe. Her contest with Rome degenerated, in 
 the main, into a struggle for influence over the border 
 kingdom of Armenia ; and her hopes were limited to 
 the reduction of that kingdom to a subject position. 
 
 The grief of Orodes at the death of Pacorus 
 was something extreme and abnormal, even in the 
 emotional East. For many days he would neither 
 eat, nor speak, nor sleep ; then his sorrow took 
 another turn. He imagined that his son had re- 
 turned ; he thought continually that he heard or saw 
 him ; he could do nothing but repeat his name. 
 Every now and then, however, he awoke to a sense of 
 the actual fact, and mourned the death of his favourite 
 with tears. After a while this excessive grief wore 
 itself out; and the aged king began to direct his atten- 
 tion once more to public affairs, and to concern him-
 
 EXTREME GRIEF OF ORODES — HIS DEATH. 201 
 
 self about the succession. Of the thirty sons who 
 still remained to him there was not one who had 
 made himself a name, or was in any way distinguished 
 above the remainder. In the absence, therefore, of 
 any personal ground of preference, Orodes — who 
 seems to have regarded himself as possessing a right 
 to nominate the son who should succeed him — thought 
 that the claims of primogeniture were entitled to be 
 considered, and selected as his successor, Phraates, the 
 eldest of the thirty. Not content, however, with 
 nominating him, or perhaps doubtful whether the 
 nomination would be accepted by the Megistanes, he 
 proceeded further to abdicate in his favour, whereupon 
 Phraates became actual king. The transaction proved 
 a most unhappy one. Phraates, jealous of some of 
 his brothers, who were the sons of a princess married 
 to Orodes, whereas his own mother was only a concu- 
 bine, removed them by assassination, and when the 
 ex-monarch ventured to express disapproval of the 
 act, added the crime of parricide to that of fratricide 
 by putting to death his aged father. Thus perished 
 Orodes, son of Phraates, the thirteenth Arsacid, after 
 a reign of eighteen or twenty years — the most 
 memorable in the Parthian annals. Though scarcely 
 a great king, he carried Parthia to the highest pitch 
 of her glory, less however by his own personal merits, 
 than by his judicious selection of able officers for the 
 command of his armies. Exceedingly ambitious, he 
 allowed no scruples to interfere with his personal 
 aggrandisement, but, having waded to power through 
 the blood of a father and a brother, maintained him- 
 self in power by the sacrifice of his foremost subject.
 
 202 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA, ETC. 
 
 His affection for his son Pacorus is the most amiable 
 trait in his character, and redeems it from the charge, 
 to which it would otherwise be liable, of a complete 
 defect of humanity. Even here, however, he showed a 
 want of balance and moderation ; and, by allowing 
 his mind to become unhinged, brought disaster on 
 himself, and on those dearest to him. It may have 
 been a just Nemesis, that he should die at the hands 
 of one of his sons, but it seems hard that affection 
 for one son should have put him altogether in the 
 power of another.
 
 XII. 
 
 EXPEDITION OF MARK ANTONY AGAINST PARTHIA 
 — ITS FAILURE — WAR BETWEEN PARTHIA AND 
 MEDIA. 
 
 PHRAATES, the son of Orodes, who is generally- 
 known as Phraates the Fourth, ascended the Parthian 
 throne in the year B.C. 37. The Roman world was 
 still in the throes of revolution. A mock peace had 
 indeed been patched up between the irreconcilable 
 rivals, Octavian and Antony, in the year B.C. 40, by 
 the sacrifice of " the fair, the modest, and the discreet 
 Octavia " — " that marvel of a woman," as Plutarch 
 calls her — to the short-lived passion of the coarse 
 Triumvir ; but dissension had quickly broken out — 
 the bride and bridegroom had quarrelled — and, before 
 the year B.C. 37 was over, had parted, never to come 
 together again. Antony and Octavian were once 
 more acknowledged enemies, and felt it necessary to 
 place half the world between them in order that they 
 might not at once come to blows. Antony betook 
 himself to the eastern portion of the Roman Empire, 
 and renewed his dalliance with his Egyptian mistress. 
 Octavian remained in Italy, launching recriminations 
 against his rival, and preparing for the deadly struggle 
 which, he well knew, impended. Phraates probably
 
 204 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 
 
 thought himself safe from attack under the circum- 
 stances, and felt himself free to indulge his natural 
 temperament, which was cruel, jealous, and blood- 
 thirsty. Not content with having brushed from his 
 path the brothers whose title to the throne was 
 better than his, 1 he proceeded to make a clean sweep, 
 and killed the remainder of the thirty. Nor was 
 this all. From the massacre of his own relations, he 
 passed to executions of Parthian nobles who had 
 provoked his jealousy, and at last created such a 
 panic among them, that numbers of them fled the 
 
 COIN OF PHRAATES IV. 
 
 country, and taking refuge in the territory west of 
 the Euphrates, filled the camps and cities of the 
 Roman provinces. Among these fugitives was a 
 certain Monaeses, a nobleman of high distinction, who 
 appears to have gained more than one military success 
 in the Syrian war of Pacorus. 2 This officer repre- 
 sented to Antony that Phraates had by his tyranni- 
 cal and sanguinary conduct made himself detested by 
 his subjects, and that a revolt on the part of large 
 numbers could easily be effected. " If the Romans 
 would support him," he said, " he was quite willing to 
 
 1 See above, p. 201. 2 Hor. " Od.," iii. 6 ; 1. 10.
 
 ATTEMPT OF MONAESES. 205 
 
 invade Parthia, and he made no doubt of wresting 
 the greater portion of it from the hands of the tyrant, 
 and of being himself accepted as king. In that case, he 
 would consent to hold his crown of the Romans, as their 
 dependant and feudatory ; and they might count on 
 his fidelity and gratitude." Antony received Monaeses 
 with ostentatious generosity, and, affecting the munifi- 
 ence of an Artaxerxes towards a Themistocles, made 
 him a present of three cities of Asia, Larissa, Arethusa, 
 and Bambyce, or Hierapolis. The Parthian monarch, 
 alarmed at the prospect, sought to withdraw his 
 traitorous subject from the enemy's blandishments 
 by the offer of pardon and renewed favour ; and 
 Monaeses, after duly balancing the proposals made to 
 him one against the other, came to the conclusion 
 that his home prospects were the more promising. 
 He therefore represented to Antony that he might 
 probably do him better service as a friend at the 
 Court of Phraates than as a pretender to his crown, 
 and asked permission to accept the overtures which 
 he had received, and to return to his native country. 
 It is probable that the Triumvir was clever enough to 
 see through his motives, and to understand that no 
 dependence was to be placed on his protestations ; 
 but it fitted in with his own interests to amuse 
 Phraates for a short time longer with pacific pro- 
 fessions, and he saw in the request of Monaeses an 
 opportunity for throwing dust in the eyes of a not very 
 keen-sighted barbarian. Monaeses thus obtained per- 
 mission to rejoin his sovereign, and was instructed to 
 assure him that the Roman commander desired 
 nothing so much as peace, and asked only that the
 
 206 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 
 
 standards captured by the Parthians in the war with 
 Crassus and Ventidius, and such of the prisoners 
 taken as still survived, should be handed over to the 
 Romans. 
 
 But while thus playing with his adversary, and de- 
 luding him with fond expectations, the Triumvir had 
 fully made up his own mind to plunge into war, and 
 was leaving no stone unturned to perfect his prepara- 
 tions. It is very unlikely that it had required the 
 overtures of a Monaeses to put a Parthian expedition 
 into his thoughts. The successes of his own lieutenants 
 must have been stimulants of far greater efficacy. C. 
 Sosius, as governor of Syria, had performed several 
 martial exploits on the frontiers of that province. 
 Canidius Crassus had defeated the Armenians, with 
 their Albanian and Iberian allies, and had once more 
 planted the Roman standards at the foot of the 
 Caucasus. Above all, the great glory of Ventidius, 
 who had been allowed the much-coveted honour of a 
 " triumph " at Rome on account of his defeats of the 
 Parthians in Cilicia and Syria, must have rankled in 
 his mind, and have moved him to emulation, and caused 
 him to cast about for some means of outshining his 
 lieutenants and exalting his own military reputation 
 above that of his subordinates. Nothing, he well 
 knew, could be so effectual for this purpose as a 
 successful Parthian expedition — the infliction upon 
 this hated foe of an unmistakable humiliation, and 
 the dictating to them of terms of peace on their own 
 soil after some great and decisive victory. Nor did 
 this now appear so very difficult. After the successes 
 of Ventidius and Canidius Crassus the prestige of the
 
 NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF HIS ARMY. 207 
 
 Parthian name was gone. The legionaries could be 
 trusted to meet them without any undue alarm, and 
 to contend with them in the usual Roman fashion, 
 without excitement or flurry. Time had shown the 
 weakness, as well as the strength, of the Parthian 
 military system, and the Roman tacticians had suc- 
 ceeded in devising expedients by which its strong points 
 might be met and triumphed over. With the forces 
 at his command Antony might well expect to attack 
 Parthia successfully, and not merely to avoid the fats 
 of Crassus, but to obtain important advantages. 
 
 At the same time he had his eyes open to all the 
 possibilities of the military situation, and was making 
 his preparations with the greatest prudence and 
 secrecy. He collected Roman troops from every 
 available quarter, and gradually raised his legions to 
 the number of sixteen, or (according to some) of 
 eighteen. These he disposed in the different cities of 
 Asia, and did not begin to mass them until he had no 
 further need for concealment. He had brought with 
 him from Europe Gallic and Iberian horse to the 
 number of ten thousand ; his Roman infantry is 
 reckoned at sixty thousand ; and the cavalry and 
 infantry of the Asiatic allies amounted to thirty thou- 
 sand. The Armenian monarch, Artavasdes, was 
 secretly won over in the course of the winter, and 
 promised a contingent of seven thousand foot and 
 six thousand horse. Thus the entire number of all 
 arms on which he could count to begin the campaign 
 was 113,000. 
 
 Antony was in no hurry to begin. More lover 
 than soldier, he was glad to defer the hour for parting
 
 208 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OE ANTONY. 
 
 with the siren by whose charms he was fascinated, 
 and exchanging the delights of voluptuous dalliance 
 for the hardships of life in the field. Thus it was not 
 until the midsummer of B.C. 36 had arrived that he 
 could bring himself to dismiss his mistress to her 
 Egyptian home, and place himself at the head of his 
 legions. It was his original intention to cross the 
 Euphrates into Mesopotamia, and to advance against 
 Parthia by the direct route, as Crassus had done ; but, 
 on reaching the banks of the Euphrates, possibly 
 at Zeugma, he found the attitude of defence assumed 
 by the enemy on his own frontier so imposing, that 
 he abandoned his first design, and, turning north- 
 wards, entered Armenia, resolved to attack Parthia, 
 in conjunction with his Armenian ally, from that 
 quarter. Artavasdes gladly welcomed him, and 
 recommended that he should begin the war, not by 
 invading Parthia itself but by an attack on the 
 dominions of a Parthian feudatory, the King of 
 Media Atropatene, whose territories adjoined Ar- 
 menia on the south-east. The king, he said, was 
 absent, having been summoned to join his suzerain 
 on the banks of the Euphrates, and having marched 
 away with his best troops to the rendezvous. His 
 territory, therefore, would be ill-defended, and open to 
 ravage ; it was even possible that Praaspa, his capital, 
 might be an easy prey. The prospect excited Antony, 
 and he put himself at the disposition of Artavasdes. 
 Dividing his army into two portions, and ordering 
 Oppius Statianus, one of his best officers, to follow 
 him leisurely with the more unwieldly portion of the 
 troops, the siege-batteries, and the baggage-train, he
 
 HIS INVASION OF NORTHERN MEDIA. 20Q 
 
 himself proceeded by forced marches to Praaspa, 
 under the guidance of Artavasdes, accompanied by 
 all the cavalry and infantry of the better sort. This 
 town was situated at the distance of nearly three 
 hundred miles from the Armenian frontier ; but the 
 way to it lay through well-cultivated plains, where 
 food and water were abundant. Antony accomplished 
 the march without any difficulty, and sat himself 
 down before the place. But the want of his siege- 
 engines and battering-train caused him to make little 
 impres.sion ; and he was compelled to have recourse 
 to the long and tedious process of raising up a mound 
 against the walls. For some time he cherished the 
 hope that Statianus would arrive to his relief ; but 
 this illusion was ere long dispelled. News arrived 
 that the Parthian monarch, having been made ac- 
 quainted with his plans and proceedings, had followed 
 on the footsteps of his army, had come up with Sta- 
 tianus, and made a successful onslaught on his detach- 
 ment. Ten thousand Romans were killed in the 
 engagement; many prisoners were taken ; all the- 
 baggage- waggons and engines of war fell into the 
 enemy's hands ; and Statianus himself was among 
 the slain. A further and still worse result followed. 
 The Armenian monarch was so disheartened by the 
 defeat, that, regarding the Roman cause as desperate, 
 he retired from the contest, drew off his troops, and 
 left Antony to his own resources. 
 
 The situation became now one of great difficulty. 
 Autumn was approaching ; supplies were falling 
 short ; the siege works which Antony had attempted 
 made no progress ; and it was impossible to construct
 
 210 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 
 
 a fresh battering-train to replace that which had been 
 taken. If Antony could only capture the town 
 before the winter set in, he would feel himself in 
 safety, and, having a breathing-space during which 
 he might repair his losses, would be able to re- 
 cruit himself for another campaign. He therefore 
 made desperate efforts to overcome the resistance 
 offered by the besieged, and to obtain possession of 
 the city. But all was in vain. The walls were too 
 strong and too high. His mound was never brought 
 to a level with their summit. From time to time the 
 defenders made sallies, drove off his workmen, and 
 inflicted serious damage on his construction. The 
 Parthian monarch, hovering about in the neighbour- 
 hood, looked with scorn on his unavailing endeavours, 
 and contented himself with hindering his supplies 
 and interfering with his foraging parties. Efforts 
 made by Antony to bring on a general engagement 
 by means of a foraging expedition on a large scale 
 failed, the Parthians retreating as soon as attacked, 
 and exhibiting their marvellous power of getting out 
 of an enemy's reach almost without suffering any 
 losses. The Roman commander, as the equinox 
 drew near, came to the conclusion that he must with- 
 draw from the siege and retire into Armenia, but 
 before making this confession of failure, as a last 
 resource, he sought to persuade his adversary to 
 terms of accommodation. He would at once relin- 
 quish the siege, and recross the frontier, he said, if 
 Phraates would only yield up to him the Crassian 
 captives and standards. The demand was prepos- 
 terous, and the Parthians simply laughed at it, feeling
 
 HIS FAILURE TO TAKE PR A ASP A. 211 
 
 that it was for Antony rather to purchase an un- 
 molested retreat, than for themselves to pay him for 
 retiring. Each day that he lingered placed him in 
 a worse position, and made it more certain that he 
 could not escape serious disaster. 
 
 At last the equinox arrived, and retreat became 
 imperative. There were two roads by which it would 
 be possible to reach the Araxes at the usual point 01 
 passage. One lay to the left, through a plain and 
 open country, probably along the course of the Jag- 
 hetu and the eastern shores of Lake Urumiyeh, which 
 is the route that an army would ordinarily take ; the 
 other, which was shorter but more difficult, lay to the 
 right, leading across a mountain tract, but one fairly 
 supplied with water, and in which there were a number 
 of inhabited villages. The Triumvir was informed by 
 his scouts that the Parthians had occupied the easier 
 route in the expectation that he would select it, and 
 were hopeful of overwhelming his entire force with 
 their cavalry in the plains. He therefore took the 
 road to the right, through a rugged and inclement 
 country— probably that between Takht-i-Sulei'man 
 and Tabriz — and, guided by a Mardian who was well 
 acquainted with the district, set out to make his way 
 back to the Araxes. His decision took the Parthians 
 by surprise, and for two whole days he was unmo- 
 lested. By the third day, however, they had thrown 
 themselves across his path. Antony, expecting no 
 interference, was pursuing his march in a somewhat 
 disorderly manner, when the Mardian guide, perceiv- 
 ing signs of recent injury to the route, gave him warn- 
 ing that the enemy could not be far off, and the
 
 212 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 
 
 Roman general had just time to make his troops 
 form in battle array, and bring his light armed and 
 slingers to the front, when the Parthian horsemen 
 made their appearance on all sides, and began a fierce 
 assault. But the Roman light troops, especially those 
 armed with slings and darts, made a vigorous resist- 
 ance, the leaden missiles of the slingers being found 
 particularly effective ; and, after a short combat, the 
 Parthians, following their usual tactics, drew off, only, 
 however, to return again and again, until at last 
 Antony's Gallic cavalry found an opportunity of 
 charging them, when they broke and fled hastily, 
 having received a serious check, from which they did 
 not recover during the remainder of the day. 
 
 However, on the day following, they reappeared ; 
 and thenceforth for nineteen consecutive days they 
 disputed with Antony every inch of his road, and 
 inflicted on him the most grievous losses. " The 
 sufferings of the Roman army during this time," says 
 a modern historian of Rome, " were unparalleled in 
 their military annals. The intense cold, the blinding 
 snow and driving sleet, the want sometimes of pro- 
 visions, sometimes of water, the use of poisonous 
 herbs, and the harassing attacks of the enemy's 
 cavalry and bowmen, which could only be repelled 
 by maintaining the dense array of the phalanx or the 
 tortoise, reduced the retreating army by one-third of 
 its numbers." Much gallantry was shown, especially 
 by some of the officers, as Flavius Gallus ; and Antony 
 himself displayed all the finest qualities of a com- 
 mander, except judgment ; but every effort was in 
 vain : as the Roman army dwindled in numbers, that
 
 HIS RETREAT AND LOSSES. 213 
 
 of the Parthians increased ; as the strength of the 
 individual soldiers failed through scantiness or un- 
 wholesomeness of food, the courage and audacity of 
 their adversaries were augmented ; the Roman losses 
 grew greater from day to day, and at last culminated 
 in one occasion of extreme disaster, when eight thou- 
 sand men were placed hors de combat, three thousand 
 of them, including Gallus, being slain. At length, 
 after a march of 300 Roman, or 277 British, miles, 
 the survivors reached the river Araxes, probably at 
 the Jul fa ferry, and, crossing it, found themselves in 
 Armenia. But the calamities of the return were not 
 yet ended. Although it had been arranged with 
 Artavasdes that the bulk of the Roman army should 
 winter in Armenia, yet, before the various detach- 
 ments could reach the quarters assigned them in 
 different parts of the country, eight thousand more 
 had perished, through the effect of past privations or 
 the severity of the Armenian winter. Altogether, 
 out of the hundred thousand men whom Antony had 
 taken with him into Media Atropatene in the mid- 
 summer of B.C. 36, less than seventy thousand re- 
 mained to commence the campaign of the ensuing 
 year. Well may the unfortunate commander have 
 exclaimed during the later portion of his march, as 
 he compared his own heavy losses with the light ones 
 suffered by Xenophon and his Greeks in these same 
 regions : " Oh, those Ten Thousand ! those Ten Thou- 
 sand ! " 
 
 On the withdrawal of Antony into Armenia, a 
 quarrel broke out between Phraates and his Median 
 vassal. The latter complained that he was wronged 
 
 V
 
 214 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 
 
 in the division made of the Roman spoils, and ex- 
 pressed himself with so much freedom as seriously to 
 offend his suzerain. Perceiving this, he became 
 alarmed lest Phraates should punish his boldness 
 by deposing him from his office and setting up 
 another vitaxa in his place. He thought it necessary 
 therefore to look out for some powerful support, and 
 on carefully considering the political situation, came 
 to the conclusion that his best hope lay in making a 
 friend of his late foe Antony, and placing himself 
 under Roman protection. Antony was known to 
 have been deeply offended by the conduct of his 
 Armenian ally in the late campaign, and to be 
 desirous of taking vengeance on him. He had 
 already made an attempt to get possession of his 
 person, which had failed through the suspiciousness 
 and caution of the wily Oriental. Hostilities between 
 Armenia and Rome were evidently impending, and 
 might break out at any moment. It would be clearly 
 for Antony's interest, when war broke out, to have a 
 friend on the Armenian frontier, and especially one 
 who was strong in cavalry and bowmen. The Median 
 monarch therefore sent an ambassador of rank to 
 Alexandria, where Antony was passing the winter, 
 and boldly proposed an alliance. Antony readily 
 accepted the offer. He was intensely angered by the 
 conduct of his late confederate, and resolved on 
 punishing hir disaffection and desertion ; he viewed 
 the Median alliai.~e as of the utmost importance, not 
 only as against Arme< : a, but still more in connection 
 with the design, which he still entertained, of invading 
 Parthia itself; and he saw in the Atropatenian ruler
 
 RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION. 215 
 
 a prince whom it would be well worth his while to 
 bind to his cause indissolubly. He therefore embraced 
 the overtures made to him with joy, and even rewarded 
 the messenger who had brought them with a princi- 
 pality. After sundry efforts to entice Artavasdes into 
 his power, which occupied him during the greater 
 part of B.C. 35, but which were unsuccessful, in the 
 spring of B.C. 34 he suddenlv made his appearance in 
 Armenia. His army, which had remained there from 
 the previous campaign, held all the most important 
 positions, and, as he professed the most friendly feel- 
 ings towards Artavasdes, even proposing an alliance 
 between their families, that prince, after some hesita- 
 tion, at length ventured into his presence. He was 
 immediately seized and put in chains. Armenia was 
 rapidly overrun. Artaxias, the eldest son of Arta- 
 vasdes, whom the Armenians made king in the room 
 of his father, was defeated, and forced to take refuge 
 with the Parthians. Antony then arranged a marriage 
 between a daughter of the Median monarch and his 
 own son by Cleopatra, Alexander ; and leaving garri- 
 sons in Armenia to hold it as a conquered province, 
 carried off Artavasdes, together with a rich booty, 
 into Egypt. 
 
 Phraates, during these transactions, had remained 
 wholly upon the defensive. He was not a man of 
 much enterprise, and probably thought that a waiting 
 policy was, under the circumstances, the best one. 
 It cannot have been displeasing to him to see Arta- 
 vasdes punished ; and doubtless he must have been 
 gratified to observe how Antony was injuring his own 
 cause by exasperating the Armenians, and teaching
 
 2l6 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 
 
 them to detest Rome even more than they detested 
 Parthia. But while the Roman troops held possession 
 both of Syria and of Armenia, and the alliance be- 
 tween Rome and Media Atropatene continued, he 
 could not venture to take any aggressive step, or think 
 of doing more than protecting his own frontier. 
 Almost any other Roman commander than Antony 
 would, after crushing Armenia, have at once carried 
 the war, in conjunction with his Median ally, into 
 Parthia, and have endeavoured to strike a blow that 
 might avenge the defeat of Carrhae. Phraates natu- 
 rally expected an invasion of his territories both in 
 B.C. 34, after Antony's occupation of Armenia, and in 
 the following year, when he again appeared in these 
 parts, and advanced to the Araxes. But Antony's 
 attention was so much engrossed by the proceedings 
 of his rival, Octavian, in the West, and it was so clear 
 to him that the great contest for the mastership of 
 the Roman world could not be delayed much longer, 
 that Eastern affairs had almost ceased to interest him, 
 and his chief desire was to be quit of them. The 
 object of his advance to the Araxes in B.C. 33 was to 
 place things in such a position that his presence might 
 be no longer necessary. ' It seemed to him that the 
 interests of Rome would be sufficiently safeguarded, 
 if the Median alliance were assured, and he therefore 
 sought an interview with the Atropatenian king, and 
 concluded a treaty with him. The terms were very 
 favourable to the Median. He received a body of 
 Roman heavy infantry in exchange for a detachment 
 of his own light horsemen ; his dominions were con- 
 siderably enlarged on the side of Armenia ; and the
 
 RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION. 2iy 
 
 marriage previously arranged between his daughter, 
 Jotapa, and Antony's son, Alexander, was accom- 
 plished. Antony then marched away to meet his 
 Roman rival, flattering himself that he had secured, 
 at any rate for some years, the tranquillity of the 
 Asiatic continent. 
 
 But Phraates now saw his opportunity. In con- 
 junction with Artaxias, he attacked the Median king, 
 and, though at first repulsed by the valour of the 
 Roman troops in the Median service, succeeded, after 
 Antony had required them to rejoin his standard, in 
 inflicting on him a severe defeat, and even making 
 him a prisoner. This success led to another. Artaxias, 
 having now only the Roman garrisons to contend 
 with, re-entered and recovered Armenia. The Roman 
 garrisons were put to the sword. Armenia became 
 once more wholly independent of Rome ; and it is 
 probable that Media Atropatene returned to the 
 Parthian allegiance. 
 
 The result of the expedition of Antony was thus 
 rather to elevate Parthia than to depress her. An- 
 tony, notwithstanding his undoubted courage, let it be 
 clearly seen that he shrank from a direct encounter 
 with the full force of the Parthian kingdom. Hence his 
 avoidance of any invasion of actual Parthian territory, 
 and the limitation of his efforts to the injuring of his 
 enemy by striking at her through her dependencies, 
 Media and Armenia. Nor was the timidity thus ex- 
 hibited compensated for by success in the compara- 
 tively small enterprises to which he confined himself. 
 The expedition against Media Atropatene was a com- 
 plete failure, and resulted in the loss of thirty thousand
 
 21! 
 
 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 
 
 men. The Armenian campaign succeeded at the time, 
 but it alienated a nation which it was of the utmost 
 importance to conciliate, and it was followed almost 
 immediately by a revolt in which Rome suffered fresh 
 disasters, and which drew Armenia closer to Parthia 
 than she had ever been drawn previously. On the 
 retirement of Antony from the East, Parthia occupied 
 as grand a position as had ever before been hers, 
 excepting during the brief space of her successes under 
 Pacorus and Labienus.
 
 XIII. 
 
 INTERNAL TROUBLES IN PARTHIA — HER RELATIONS 
 WITH ROME UNDER AUGUSTUS AND TIBERIUS. 
 
 Phraates, justly proud of his successes against 
 Antony, and of the re-establishment of his authority 
 over Media Atropatene, regarding, moreover, his posi- 
 tion in Parthia as thereby absolutely secured, pro- 
 ceeded to indulge the natural cruelty of his disposi- 
 tion, and resumed the harsh and tyrannical treatment 
 of his subjects, by which he had made himself odious 
 in the early years of his reign. 1 So far did he push 
 his oppression, that ere long the patience of the people 
 gave way, and an insurrection broke out against his 
 authority, which compelled him to fly the country (B.C. 
 33). The revolt was headed by a certain Tiridates, a 
 Parthian noble, who, upon its success, was made king 
 by the insurgents. Phraates fled into Scythia, and 
 appealed to the nomads to embrace his cause. Ever 
 ready for war and plunder, the hordes were nothing 
 loth ; and, crossing the frontier in force, they suc- 
 ceeded without much difficulty in restoring the exiled 
 monarch to the throne from which his subjects had 
 deposed him. Tiridates fled at their approach, and, 
 
 1 See above, p. 204. 
 219
 
 220 INTERNAL TROUBLES IN PARTHIA. 
 
 having contrived to carry off in his flight the youngest 
 son of Phraates, presented himself before Octavian, 
 who was in Syria at the time (B.C. 30) on his return 
 from Egypt, surrendered the young prince into his 
 hands, and requested his aid against the tyrant. 
 Octavian accepted the valuable hostage, but, with his 
 usual caution, declined to pledge himself to furnish 
 any help to the pretender ; he might remain, he said, 
 in Syria, if he so wished, and while he continued 
 under Roman protection a suitable provision should 
 be made for his support, but he must not expect to be 
 
 COIN OF TIRIDATES II. 
 
 replaced upon the Parthian throne by the Roman 
 arms. Some years later (B.C. 23), Phraates in his turn 
 made application to the Imperator for the surrender 
 of the person of Tiridates and the restoration of his 
 kidnapped son ; but the application was only partially 
 successful. Octavian said he willingly restored to him 
 his son, and would not even ask a ransom ; but the 
 surrender of a fugitive was a different matter, and one 
 that he could not possibly consent to. Where would 
 be the honour of Rome, if such a thing were done ? 
 Phraates would, no doubt, feel that some return was 
 due on account of his son. An acceptable return
 
 PHRAATFS IV. AND AUGUSTUS. 221 
 
 would be the delivery to the Romans of the standards 
 and captives taken from Crassus and Antony. T.he 
 Parthian monarch made no direct reply to this sug- 
 gestion. He gladly received his son, but ignored the 
 rest of the message. It was not until three years 
 later, when Octavian (now become Augustus) visited 
 the East, and war seemed the probable alternative if he 
 continued obdurate, that the Parthian monarch brought 
 himself to relinquish the trophies, which were as much 
 prized by the victors as by the vanquished. The act 
 was one so unpatriotic as to be scarcely pardonable ; 
 but we must remember that Phraates held his crown 
 by a very insecure tenure — he was extremely un- 
 popular with his subjects, and Augustus had it in his 
 power at any moment to produce a pretender, who 
 had once occupied, and with Roman help might easily 
 have ascended for a second time, the throne of the 
 Arsacids. 
 
 The remaining years of Phraates — and he reigned 
 for nearly twenty years after restoring the standards 
 — were almost unbroken by any event of importance. 
 The result of the twenty years' struggle between 
 Rome and Parthia had been to impress either nation 
 with a wholesome fear of the other. Both had 
 triumphed on their own ground ; both had failed 
 when they ventured on sending expeditions into their 
 enemy's territory. Each now stood on its guard, 
 watching the movements of its adversary across the 
 Euphrates. Both had become pacific. It is a well- 
 known fact that Augustus left it as a principle of 
 policy to his successors that the Roman territory had 
 reached its proper limits, and could not with any ad-
 
 222 PARTHIA'S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 vantage be extended further. This principle, followed 
 with the utmost strictness by Tiberius, was accepted 
 as a rule by all the earlier Caesars, and only regarded 
 by them as admitting of rare and slight exceptions. 
 Trajan was the first who, a hundred and thirty years 
 after the accession of Augustus, made light of it, and 
 set it at defiance. With him re-awoke the spirit of 
 conquest, the aspiration after universal dominion. 
 But in the meantime there was peace — peace not 
 indeed absolutely unbroken, for border wars occurred, 
 and Rome was sometimes tempted to interfere by 
 arms in the internal quarrels of her neighbour ; but a 
 general state of peace and amity prevailed ; neither 
 state made any grand attack on the other's dominions ; 
 no change occurred in the frontier ; no great battle 
 tested the relative strength of the two peoples. Such 
 rivalry as still continued was exhibited less in arms 
 than in diplomacy, and showed itself mainly in en- 
 deavours on either side to obtain a predominant in- 
 fluence in Armenia. There alone during the century 
 and a half that intervened between Antony and Trajan 
 did the interests of Rome and Parthia come into col- 
 lision, and in connection with this kingdom alone was 
 there during these years any struggle between the two 
 empires. 
 
 After Phraates had yielded to Augustus in the im- 
 portant matter of the standards and the prisoners, he 
 appears for many years to have studiously cultivated 
 his good graces. In the interval between B.C. n and 
 B.C. 7, having reason to distrust the intentions of his 
 subjects towards him, and to suspect that they might 
 not improbably depose him and place one of his sons
 
 PHRAATES IV. AND AUGUSTUS. 223 
 
 upon the Parthian throne, he resolved to send these 
 possible rivals out of the country ; and on this occa- 
 sion he paid Augustus the compliment of selecting 
 Rome for his children's residence. The youths were 
 four in number — Vonones, who was the eldest, Seras^ 
 padanes, Rhodaspes, and Phraates ; two of them 
 were married and had children. They resided at 
 Rome during the remainder of their father's lifetime, 
 and were treated as became their rank, being sup- 
 ported at the public charge, and in a magnificent 
 manner. The Roman writers speak of them as 
 " hostages " given by Phraates to the Roman Em- 
 peror ; * but this was certainly not the intention of 
 the Parthian monarch, and it was scarcely possible 
 that the idea could be entertained by the Romans 
 at the time of their residence. 
 
 The friendly relations thus established between 
 Phraates and Augustus would probably have con- 
 tinued undisturbed until the death of the one or the 
 other had not a revolution broken out in Armenia, 
 which tempted the Parthian king beyond his powers 
 of resistance. On the death of Artaxias, in the year 
 B.C. 20, Augustus, who was then in the East, had sent 
 Tiberius into Armenia, to arrange the affairs of the 
 nation ; and Tiberius had thought it best to place 
 upon the throne a brother of Artaxias, named Tigranes. 
 Parthia had made no objection to this arrangement, 
 but had tacitly admitted the Roman suzerainty over 
 the Armenian nation. Fourteen years afterwards, in 
 B.C. 6, Tigranes died ; and the Armenians, without 
 
 1 Veil. Paterculus, Suetonius, Tacitus, Justin, Eutropius, Orosius, 
 &c.
 
 224 PARTTIIA'S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 waiting to know the pleasure of the Roman Emperor, 
 conferred the sovereignty on his three sons, whom 
 their father had previously designated for the royal 
 office by associating them with him in the govern- 
 ment. But this was a liberty which Augustus could 
 not possibly allow. He therefore, in B.C. 5, sent an 
 expedition into Armenia, deposed the three sons of 
 Tigranes, and established in the kingdom a certain 
 Artavasdes, whose birth, rank, and claims to the royal 
 position are unknown. But the Armenians were dis- 
 satisfied and recalcitrant. After enduring the rule of 
 Rome's nominee for the short space of three years, 
 they rose in revolt against him, defeated the Romans 
 who endeavoured to support his authority, and drove 
 him out of the kingdom. Another Tigranes was 
 placed upon the throne ; and, at the same time, Parthia 
 was called in to give the Armenians their protection, 
 in case Rome should again interfere with the choice 
 of the nation. Phraates could not bring himself to 
 reject the Armenian overtures. Ever since the time 
 of the second Mithridates, it had been a settled prin- 
 ciple of Parthia's policy that Armenia should be de- 
 pendent on herself; and, even at the cost of a rupture 
 with Rome, it seemed to Phraates that he must re- 
 spond to the appeal made to him. The rupture might 
 not come. Augustus was now advanced in years, and 
 might submit to the indignity offered him without 
 resenting it. He had lately lost the services of his 
 best general — his stepson, Tiberius — who, in conse- 
 quence of the slights put upon him, had gone into 
 retirement at Rhodes. He had no one that he could 
 entrust with an army but his grandsons, youths who
 
 PHRAATES IV. AND AUGUSTUS. 225 
 
 had not yet fleshed their maiden swords. Phraates 
 probably hoped that, under such circumstances, 
 Augustus would draw back before the terrors of a 
 Parthian war, and would allow without remonstrance 
 — or, at any rate, without resistance — the passing of 
 Armenia into the position of a Parthian subject-ally. 
 
 But, if such were his expectations, he had greatly 
 miscalculated. Augustus had as keen a sense of 
 what the honour of Rome required now that he was 
 an old man of sixty as when he was a youth of 
 twenty. From the time that he first heard of the 
 Armenian outbreak, and of the support lent it by 
 Parthia, he appears never to have wavered in his 
 determination to re-assert the Roman claim to a pre- 
 ponderating influence over Armenia, but only to have 
 hesitated for a time as to the individual whose services 
 it would be best to employ in the business. Tiberius 
 naturally presented himself to his mind as by far the 
 fittest person for such a work — a work in which diplo- 
 matic and military ability might be, both of them, 
 almost equally required ; but Tiberius had recently 
 taken offence at certain slights which he supposed 
 himself to have received, and had withdrawn from the 
 public service and from official life altogether. In 
 default of his brave and astute stepson, Augustus 
 could only fall back upon his grandsons ; but the 
 eldest of these, Caius, was now, in the year B.C. 2, no 
 more than eighteen years of age, and the policy of 
 employing so young a man in so difficult and impor- 
 tant a business could not but appear to him extremely 
 questionable. Augustus therefore hesitated, and it 
 was not until late in the year B.C. 1 that he despatched
 
 226 PART HI A" S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 Caius to the East, with authority to settle the Parthian 
 and Armenian troubles as it should seem best to him. 
 Meanwhile, however, a change had occurred in 
 Parthia. Phraates, when somewhat advanced in life, 
 had married an Italian slave-girl, called Musa, who 
 had been sent to him as a present by Augustus, and 
 had had a son born to him from this marriage, who, 
 as he grew up, came to hold an important position 
 in the Parthian state. It was perhaps through the 
 influence of this youth's mother, Musa, that Phraates 
 was induced to send his four elder boys to Rome, there 
 to receive their education. At any rate, their absence 
 left an opening for her son, Phraataces, of which she 
 took care that he should have the full advantage ; and 
 the youth, becoming his father's sole support in his 
 declining years, came to look upon himself, and to 
 be looked upon by others, as his natural successor. 
 Conscious, however, of the weakness of his claim to 
 the throne, and doubtful of his father's intentions with 
 regard to him, if he allowed events to take their 
 natural course, the ambitious youth resolved to become 
 the shaper of his own future, and, in conjunction with 
 his mother, administered poison to the aged monarch, 
 from the effects of which he died. Phraataces then 
 seized the throne, and reigned as joint sovereign with 
 his mother, to whom he allowed the titles of " Queen " 
 and " Goddess," and whose image he placed upon the 
 reverse of most of his coins. 
 
 Among the first acts of Phraataces as king was the 
 sending of an embassy to Augustus, whom he pro- 
 fessed to regard as still friendly to Parthia, though he 
 must have known that the Parthian attitude towards
 
 PHRAATACES AND AUGUSTUS. 227 
 
 Armenia had alienated him. He informed Augustus 
 of his accession to the throne of the Arsacidae, apolo- 
 gised for the circumstances under which it had taken 
 place, and proposed a renewal of the treaty of peace 
 which had subsisted between Augustus and his father, 
 adding a request that the Roman Emperor would, in 
 consideration of the peace, kindly surrender to him 
 his four brothers, whose proper place of residence was 
 not Rome, but Parthia. With respect to Armenia he 
 observed a discreet silence, leaving it to Augustus to 
 initiate negotiations on the subject or to accept the 
 status quo. Augustus replied to this message in terms 
 of extreme severity. Addressing Phraataces by his 
 
 COIN OF PHRAATACES AND MUSA. 
 
 bare name, without adding the title of king, he re- 
 quired him to lay aside the royal appellation, which 
 he had so arrogantly and unwarrantably assumed, and 
 at the same time to evacuate all the portions of 
 Armenia which his troops wrongfully occupied. With 
 respect to the surrender of the Parthian princes, the 
 brothers of Phraataces, and their families, he said 
 nothing. Nor did he respond to the appeal concern- 
 ing the formal renewal of a treaty of peace. He left 
 Phraataces to infer that his brothers w r ould be retained 
 at Rome, as pretenders to the throne of Parthia, whom 
 it might be convenient at some future time to bring
 
 228 rARTHIA'S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 forward ; and he not obscurely intimated that no treaty 
 of peace would be concluded until the Parthian 
 troops were withdrawn across the Armenian frontier. 
 Phraataces, however, was not to be cowed by mere 
 words. He repaid Augustus in his own coin, sending 
 him a contemptuous message, in which, while assum- 
 ing to himself the high-sounding Oriental designation 
 of " King of Kings," he curtly addressed the Roman 
 Emperor as " Caesar." 
 
 It is probable that this attitude of defiance would 
 have been maintained, and that the Parthian troops 
 would have continued to garrison Armenia, had 
 Augustus refrained from active measures, and been 
 content with menaces. But when, in B.C. I, the 
 Emperor proceeded from words to acts, and des- 
 patched his grandson, Caius, to the East at the head 
 of a large force, with orders to re-establish the Roman 
 influence in Armenia, even at the cost of a Parthian 
 war, and when Caius showed himself in Syria with all 
 the magnificent surroundings of the Imperial dignity, 
 Phraataces became alarmed. It was arranged during 
 the winter that an interview should be held between 
 the two princes in the spring of A.D. I, on an island 
 in the Euphrates, where the terms of an arrangement 
 between the two empires should be discussed and 
 settled. For the first and almost the last time a 
 Parthian monarch and a scion of the Roman Imperial 
 House met amicably for the purpose of negotiation, 
 and discussed the terms on which the two empires 
 could be friends. On either bank of the " great river " 
 were drawn up the mighty hosts, which, within a few 
 days, if no agreement were come to, would be loosed at
 
 PHRAATACES AND CAIUS. 220. 
 
 each other's throats. The two chiefs, accompanied by 
 an equal number of attendants, passed from their 
 respective banks to the island, and there, in the full 
 sight of both armies, proceeded to hold the conference. 
 An arrangement satisfactory to both sides was made, 
 the chief proviso of which was the evacuation of 
 Armenia by the Parthians. Feasting and banqueting 
 followed. The Parthian king was first entertained by 
 Caius on the Roman side of the river, after which Caius 
 was in his turn feasted by the Parthian on the opposite 
 bank. Cordial relations were established. For once 
 in the course of the long struggle with Rome, Parthia 
 seems to have actually made up her mind to relinquish 
 Armenia to her adversary. She gave up her claims, 
 withdrew her troops, and, during the serious troubles 
 which followed — troubles wherein Caius lost his life — 
 honourably abstained from all interference, either by 
 intrigue or arms, in Armenian affairs, and allowed 
 Rome to settle them at her pleasure. 
 
 The willingness of Phraataces thus to efface himself, 
 and concede to Rome the foremost position in Asia, 
 arose probably from the unsettled state of the king- 
 dom, and the internal difficulties which threatened him. 
 To be a parricide was not in Parthia an absolute bar 
 to popularity and a quiet reign, as had been proved 
 by the prosperous reign of Phraates IV., but there were 
 circumstances connected with the recent palace revo- 
 lution, which threw special discredit upon the prin- 
 cipal agent in it, and grievously offended the pride of 
 the Parthian nobles. Private and selfish motives had 
 alone actuated the young prince, who could not even 
 pretend any public ground for the extreme step that
 
 230 PARTHIA'S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 he had taken. His subjection to female influence, 
 especially when the female was a foreign slave-girl, 
 enraged the nobles and drew down their contempt. 
 The exalted honours which he heaped on her 
 offended their pride. Rumours, which may have had 
 no foundation in fact, increased his unpopularity, and 
 covered his companion on the throne with even a 
 deeper shade of disgrace. The Megistanes consulted 
 together, and within a few years of his establishment 
 as king raised a revolt against his authority, which 
 terminated in his deposition or death. An Arsacid, 
 
 COIN OK ORODES II. 
 
 named Orodes, was chosen in his place ; but he too, 
 in a short time, displeased his subjects, and was mur- 
 dered by them, either at a banquet or during a hunt- 
 ing expedition. It then occurred to the Megistanes 
 to fall back on the legitimate heir to the throne, who 
 was still at Rome, whither he had been sent by his 
 father some fifteen years previously. Accordingly, 
 they despatched an embassy to Augustus (A.D. 5), and 
 asked to have Vonones, the eldest son of Phraates 
 IV., sent back to Parthia, that he might receive his 
 father's kingdom. Augustus readily complied, since 
 he regarded it as for the honour of Rome to give a
 
 ACCESSION OF VO NONES I. 23 1 
 
 king to Parthia, and Vonones was sent out to Asia 
 with much pomp and many presents, to occupy a 
 position which was the second highest that the world 
 had to offer. 
 
 It is said that princes are always popular on their 
 coronation day ; and certainly Vonones was no ex- 
 ception to the general rule. His subjects received 
 him with every demonstration of joy, pleased like 
 children with a new plaything. But this state of 
 feeling did not continue very long. The foreign train- 
 ing of the young monarch soon showed itself. Bred 
 up at Rome, amid the luxuries and refinements of 
 Western civilisation, the rough sports and coarse 
 manners of his countrymen displeased and disgusted 
 him. He took no pleasure in horses, seldom ap- 
 peared in the hunting-field, absented himself from the 
 rude feastings which formed a marked feature of the 
 national manners, and, when he showed himself in 
 public, was usually seen reclining in a litter. He had 
 brought with him, moreover, from the place of his 
 exile, a number of Greek companions, whom the 
 Parthians despised and ridiculed. The favour which 
 he showed these interlopers excited their jealousy and 
 rage. It was to no purpose that he sought to con- 
 ciliate his angry subjects by the openness and 
 affability of his demeanour, or by the readiness with 
 which he allowed access to his person. Virtues and 
 graces, unknown to the nation hitherto, were, in the 
 eyes of the courtiers, not merits but defects. Dislike 
 of the monarch led them to look back with dissatis- 
 faction on the part which they had taken in placing 
 him upon the throne. " Parthia had indeed degene-
 
 232 
 
 PART II I A 'S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 rated," they said, " in asking for a king who belonged 
 to another world, and into whom there had been 
 engrained a foreign and hostile civilisation. All the 
 glory gained by destroying Crassus and repulsing 
 Antony was utterly lost and gone, if the country was 
 to be ruled by Caesar's bond-slave, and the throne of 
 the Arsacidae to be treated as if it were a Roman 
 province. It would have been bad enough to have 
 had a prince imposed upon them by the will of a 
 superior, if they had been conquered ; it was worse, 
 in all respects worse, to suffer such an insult, when 
 they had not even had war made upon them." Under 
 
 COIN OF VONONES I. 
 
 the influence of these feelings, the Parthians, after 
 they had tolerated Vonones for a few years, rose in 
 revolt against him (about A.D. 10), and summoned 
 Artabanus, an Arsacid, who had grown to manhood 
 among the Dahae of the Caspian region, but was at 
 this time subject-king of Media Atropatene, to rule 
 over them. 
 
 A crown, when it is offered, is not often declined, 
 though a few crowns may have gone begging in the 
 modern world, now that kingship has lost its glamour ; 
 and Artabanus, on receiving the overture from the 
 Parthian nobles, at once expressed his willingness to
 
 WAR OF VONONES AND ARTABANUS. 233 
 
 accept the proffered dignity. He invaded Parthia at 
 the head of an army consisting of his own subjects, 
 and engaged Vonones, to whom in his difficulties 
 the bulk of the Parthian people had rallied. This 
 engagement resulted in the defeat of the Median 
 monarch ; and Vonones was so proud of his victory 
 that he immediately had a coin struck to commemo- 
 rate it, bearing on the obverse his own head, with the 
 legend of, BASIAEYS ONQNHS, and on the reverse a 
 Victory with the legend— BASIAEYS ONQNHS NEI- 
 KH2A2 APTABANON— "Kingr Onones on his defeat 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS III. 
 
 of Artabanus." But the self-gratulation was prema- 
 ture. Artabanus had made good his retreat into his 
 own country, and, having there collected a larger army 
 than before, returned to the attack. This time he 
 was successful. The forces of Vonones were defeated, 
 and he himself, escaping from the battle with a few 
 followers, fled on horseback to Seleucia, while his 
 vanquished army, following more slowly in his track, 
 was pressed upon by the victorious Mede, and suffered 
 great losses. Artabanus, entering Ctesiphon in 
 triumph, was immediately acclaimed king. Vonones 
 took refuge in Armenia, and, the throne happening to
 
 234 parthia's RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 be vacant, was not only given an asylum, but ap- 
 pointed to the kingly office. Artabanus naturally 
 remonstrated, and threatened war unless Vonones 
 were surrendered to him. Armenia was alarmed, and 
 began to waver ; whereupon Vonones withdrew him- 
 self from the country, and sought the protection of 
 Creticus Silanus, the Roman governor of Syria, who 
 received him with favour, gave him a guard, and 
 allowed him the state and title of king, but at the 
 same time kept him in a sort of honourable captivity. 
 It was under these circumstances that the Roman 
 Emperor, Tiberius, who had recently succeeded 
 Augustus, determined to entrust the administration 
 and pacification of the East to a personage of impor- 
 tance — one who should combine the highest rank with 
 considerable experience, and should strfke the imagi- 
 nation of the Orientals, and command their attention, 
 at once by the dignity of his office, and by the pomp 
 and splendour of his surroundings. It may be that, 
 in his selection of the individual, he was actuated by 
 motives of jealousy, and by the wish to separate one, 
 whom he could not but regard as a rival, from an army 
 which had grown too much attached to him. But it 
 seems scarcely fair to attribute these motives to him 
 upon mere suspicion, and it is difficult to see what 
 better choice than the one he made was open to him 
 under the circumstances of the period. Germanicus 
 was, at the time, the second man in the State. He 
 had knowledge of affairs ; he was a good soldier 
 and general ; his manners were courteous and agree- 
 able ; and he was popular with all classes. At 
 once the nephew and the adopted son of the sove-
 
 ARTABANUS III. AND TIBERIUS. 235 
 
 reign, he would scarcely seem to the Orientals to 
 shine with a reflected radiance ; they would see 
 in him the alter ego of the great Western autocrat, 
 and would be awed by the grandeur of his posi- 
 tion, while fascinated by the charm of his person- 
 ality. The more to affect their minds, Tiberius 
 conferred on his representative none of the ordinary 
 and well-worn titles of Roman administrative em- 
 ployment, but coined for him a phrase unknown 
 in official language previously, investing him with 
 an extraordinary command over all the Roman 
 dominions east of the Hellespont. Full powers were 
 granted him for making peace or war, for levying 
 troops, annexing provinces, appointing subject kings, 
 concluding treaties, and performing other sovereign 
 acts without referring back to Rome for instructions. 
 A train of unusual magnificence accompanied him to 
 his charge, calculated to impress the Orientals with 
 the conviction that this was no common negotiator. 
 Germanicus arrived in Asia in the spring of A.D. 18, 
 and within the space of a single year completed the 
 task, which he had undertaken, satisfactorily. Having 
 visited Artaxata in person, and ascertained the feel- 
 ings and disposition of the Armenians, he made up 
 his mind not to demand the re-instatement of Vonones, 
 which would have been throwing down the gauntlet 
 to Parthia, nor yet to allow the establishment of an 
 Arsacid on the Armenian throne, which would have 
 been exalting Parthia to the shame and dishonour of 
 Rome, but to pursue a middle course, at which neither 
 the Armenians nor the Parthians could take offence, 
 while Roman dignity would be upheld, Roman tradi-
 
 236 PARTHIA'S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 tions maintained, and something done to soothe the 
 feelings and gratify the wishes of both the irritated 
 Asiatic nations. There was in Armenia, where he had 
 grown up, a foreign prince, named Zeno, the son of 
 Polemo, once king of the curtailed Pontus, and after- 
 wards of the Lesser Armenia, who was in very good 
 odour among the Armenians, since he had, during a 
 long residence, conformed himself in all respects to 
 their habits and usages Finding that it would please 
 the Armenians, Germanicus determined on giving 
 them this man for ruler, and at the seat of govern- 
 ment, Artaxata, in the presence of a vast multitude 
 of the people, and with the consent and approval of 
 the principal nobles, he placed with his own hand 
 the diadem on the brow of the favoured prince, and 
 saluted him as king under the Armenian name, which 
 he had never hitherto borne, of " Artaxias." For the 
 satisfaction of the Parthian monarch, who required 
 that Vonones should either be delivered into his hands 
 or removed to a greater distance from the Parthian 
 frontier, he " interned " the unhappy prince in the 
 Cilician city of Pompeiopolis — a change of residence 
 so much disliked by the prince himself that the next 
 year he endeavoured to escape from it, but, his 
 attempt being discovered, he was pursued, overtaken, 
 and slain in a skirmish on the banks of the river 
 Pyramus. The pacification of the East was thus, 
 with some difficulty, effected ; and Germanicus, quit- 
 ting Asia, indulged himself in the luxury of a pleasure 
 trip to Egypt. 
 
 The dispositions which Germanicus had made 
 sufficed to preserve the tranquillity of the East for the
 
 ART AB ANUS III. AND TIBERIUS. 237 
 
 space of fifteen years. Artabanus, at peace with 
 Rome and with Armenia, employed the time in the 
 chastisement of border-tribes, and in petty wars, 
 which however increased his reputation. Success 
 followed on success ; and by degrees his opinion of 
 his own military capacity was so much raised that he 
 began to look upon a rupture with Rome as rather to 
 be desired than dreaded. He knew that Germanicus 
 was dead ; that Tiberius was advanced in years, and 
 not likely to engage in a distant military expedition ; 
 and that the East was under the rule of an official 
 who had never yet distinguished himself as a com- 
 mander. When, therefore, in A.D. 34, the Armenian 
 throne was made vacant by the death of Artaxias 
 III., the nominee of Germanicus, he boldly occupied 
 the country, and claiming the disposal of the vacant 
 dignity, bestowed it upon his own eldest son, a prince 
 who bore the name of Arsaces. Nor did he rest 
 content with this. Insult must be added to injury. 
 Ambassadors were despatched to Rome with a 
 demand for the restoration of the treasure which 
 Vonones had carried off from Parthia and taken with 
 him into Roman territory ; and a threat was held 
 out that Artabanus was about to reoccupy all the 
 territory which, having been once Macedonian or 
 Persian, was now properly his, since he was the 
 natural successor and representative of Cyrus and 
 Alexander. According to one writer, 1 the Parthian 
 monarch actually commenced military operations 
 against Rome by the invasion of Cappadocia, which 
 had been for some time a Roman province. 
 
 1 Dio Cassius.
 
 238 PARTHTA\S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 It is uncertain what response Tiberius would have 
 made to these demands and proceedings had the 
 internal condition of Parthia been sound and satisfac- 
 tory. He was certainly averse to war at this period 
 of his life, and had actually sent instructions to 
 Vitellius, the governor of Syria, after the seizure of 
 Armenia by Artabanus, that he was to cultivate 
 friendly relations with Parthia. But the Parthian 
 kingdom was internally in a state of extreme disquiet ; 
 insurrection was threatened ; and the nobles were in 
 active correspondence with the Imperial court on the 
 subject of bringing forward a pretender. " Arta- 
 banus." they said, " had, among his other cruelties, 
 put to death all the adult members of the royal family 
 who were in his power, and there was not an Arsacid 
 in Asia of age to reign ; but for a successful revolt an 
 Arsacid leader was absolutely necessary : would not 
 Rome supply the defect ? Would she not send them 
 one of the surviving sons of Phraates IV., to head the 
 intended insurrection, which would then be sure to 
 succeed ? One son, named Phraates, like his father, 
 was still living, and was, they understood, at Rome ; if 
 Tiberius would only send him, and he were once seen 
 on the banks of the Euphrates, they guaranteed a 
 successful outbreak — Artabanus would be driven from 
 his throne without difficulty. Tiberius was prevailed 
 upon to do as they desired. He furnished Phraates 
 wilh all things necessary for his journey, and sent 
 him into Asia, to lay claim to his father's kingdom. 
 
 Phraates, however, was unequal to the task 
 assigned him. The sudden change in his life and 
 habits, which his new position necessitated, broke
 
 ARTABANUS III. AND TIBERIUS. 239 
 
 down his health, and he was but just arrived in Syria 
 when he sickened and died. Tiberius replaced him 
 by a nephew, named Tiridates, probably a son either 
 of Rhodaspes or of Seraspadanes, and proceeded to 
 devote to the affairs of the East all the energies of a 
 mind eminently sagacious and fertile in resources. 
 At his instigation, Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, a 
 portion of the modern Georgia, was induced to take 
 the field, and invade Armenia ; where, after removing 
 the reigning Parthian prince, Arsaces, by poison, he 
 occupied the capital, and established his own brother, 
 Mithridates, as king. Artabanus met this movement 
 by giving the direction of affairs in Armenia to 
 another son, Orodes, and sending him with all speed 
 to maintain the Parthian cause in the disputed 
 province ; but Orodes proved no match for his adver- 
 sary, who was superior in numbers, in the variety of 
 his troops, and in familiarity with the localities. 
 Pharasmanes had obtained the assistance of his 
 neighbours, the Albanians, and opening the passes of 
 the Caucasus, had admitted through them a number 
 of the Scythic or Sarmatian hordes, who were 
 always ready, when their services were well paid, to 
 take a part in the quarrels of the south. Orodes 
 failed to secure either mercenaries or allies, and had 
 to contend unassisted against the three enemies who 
 had joined their forces to oppose him. For some time 
 he prudently declined an engagement ; but it was 
 impossible to restrain the ardour of his troops, whom 
 the enemy exasperated by their reproaches. After a 
 while he was compelled to accept the battle which 
 Pharasmanes incessantly offered. The troops at his
 
 240 PARTHIA'S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 disposal consisted entirely of cavalry, while Pharas- 
 manes had, besides his horse, a powerful body of 
 infantry. The conflict was nevertheless long and 
 furious ; the Parthians and Sarmatians were very 
 equally matched ; and the victory might have been 
 doubtful, if it had not happened that in a hand-to- 
 hand combat between the two commanders, Orodes 
 was struck to the ground by his antagonist, and 
 thought by most of his own side to be killed. As 
 usual under such circumstances in the East, a rout fol- 
 lowed. If we are to believe Josephus, " many tens 
 of thousands " were slain. Armenia was wholly lost 
 to Parthia ; and Artabanus found himself left with 
 diminished resources and tarnished reputation to 
 meet the intrigues of his domestic foes. 
 
 Still, he would not succumb without an effort. In 
 the spring of A.D. 36, having levied the whole force of 
 the empire, he took the field in person, and marched 
 northwards, with the intention of avenging himself 
 on the Iberians and recovering his lost province. But 
 his first efforts were unsuccessful ; and before he 
 could renew them the Roman general, Vitellius, put 
 himself at the head of his legions, and, moving 
 towards the Euphrates, threatened Mesopotamia with 
 invasion. Placed thus between two dangers, the 
 Parthian monarch felt that he had no choice but to 
 abandon Armenia and return to the defence of his 
 own proper territories, which in his absence must 
 have lain temptingly open to an invader. His return 
 caused Vitellius to change his tactics. Instead of 
 challenging Artabanus to an engagement, and letting 
 the quarrel be decided by a trial of strength in the
 
 ARTABANUS III. AND TIBERIUS. 241 
 
 open field, he fell back on the weapon of intrigue so 
 dear to his master, and proceeded by a lavish ex- 
 penditure of money to excite disaffection once more 
 among the Parthian grandees. This time the con- 
 spiracy was successful. The military disasters of the 
 last two years had alienated from Artabanus the 
 affections of those whom his previous cruelties had 
 failed to disgust or alarm ; and he found himself 
 without any armed force whereon he could rely, 
 beyond a small number of the foreign guards whom 
 he maintained about his person. It seemed to him 
 that his only safety was in flight ; and accordingly 
 he quitted his capital, and removed himself hastily to 
 Hyrcania, in the immediate vicinity of the Scythian 
 Dahae, among whom he had been brought up. Here 
 the population was friendly to him, and he lived a 
 retired life, waiting (as he said) until the Parthians, 
 who could judge an absent prince with fairness, 
 although they could not long continue faithful to a 
 present one, should repent of their behaviour to him. 
 
 When the flight of Artabanus became known to 
 the Romans, Vitellius immediately advanced to the 
 banks of the Euphrates, and introduced Tiridates 
 into his kingdom. Fortunate omens were said to 
 have accompanied the passage of the river, and these 
 were followed by adhesions, the importance of which 
 was undoubted. Ornospades, satrap of Mesopotamia, 
 and a former comrade of Tiberius in the Dalmatic 
 war, was the first to join the standard of the pretender 
 with a large body of horse. Next came Sinnaces, 
 who had long been in correspondence with the 
 Romans, with a contingent ; then his father, Abda-
 
 242 
 
 PARTHIA'S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 gescs — " the pillar of the party," as Tacitus calls 
 him— and the keeper of the royal treasures, together 
 with other persons of high position. Vitellius, on 
 seeing the pretender thus warmly welcomed by his 
 countrymen, regarded his mission as accomplished, 
 and returned with his troops into Syria. Tiridates 
 proceeded through Mesopotamia and Assyria, re- 
 ceiving on his way the submission of many Greek 
 and some Parthian cities, as Halus and Artemita. 
 The Greeks saw in his Roman breeding a guarantee 
 of the politeness and refinement which had been 
 wholly wanting in Artabanus, brought up among the 
 uncivilised Scyths. In the great city of Seleucia he 
 was received with an obsequiousness that bordered on 
 adulation. Besides paying him all the customary 
 royal honours, both old and new, they flatteringly 
 compared him with his predecessor, who, they said, 
 had been no true Arsacid. Tiridates was pleased to 
 reward these unseemly compliments by a modification 
 of the Seleucian constitution in a democratic sense. 
 From Seleucia he crossed the Tigris to Ctesiphon, 
 where, after a short delay, caused by the absence 01 
 some important governors of provinces, he was 
 crowned King of Parthia according to the established 
 forms by the Surena, or Commander-in-chief of the 
 period. 
 
 Tiridates thought that now all was secure. Arta- 
 banus was in hiding in Hyrcania, leading a miserable 
 existence. The whole of the western provinces had 
 declared for him, and no signs of hostility appeared 
 in the East. He deemed his rule acquiesced in 
 generally, and there is reason to suppose that his
 
 ARTABANUS III. AND TIBERIUS. 243 
 
 anticipations would have proved correct, had not 
 discontent shown itself at the Court and among the 
 higher officials. There had been many who had hoped 
 for the office of Grand Vizier, and in nominating one 
 to it Tiridates had displeased all the rest. There 
 were also many, who through accident or hesitation 
 in making up their minds had been absent from the 
 coronation ceremonial, and who believed themselves 
 to be on that account suspected of disaffection, or 
 at any rate of lukewarmness. It is also more than 
 probable that the " Roman breeding " of the new 
 monarch, which delighted his Grecian, offended his 
 Parthian subjects. At any rate, however we may 
 account for it, disaffection certainly broke out. 
 Emissaries from the nobles sought the dethroned 
 monarch in his obscure retirement, and placed 
 before him the prospect of a restoration, which they 
 declared themselves anxious to bring about. Dis- 
 trustful at first of what seemed to him mere levity 
 and fickleness, Artabanus was ultimately persuaded 
 that the overtures made to him were sincere, and that 
 if he himself were not the object of any very devoted 
 affection on the part of the malcontents, Tiridates 
 at any rate was the object of a very real and pro- 
 nounced hostility. He therefore placed himself in 
 the hands of the conspirators, and, having first 
 secured the services of a body of Dahae and other 
 Scyths, marched westward with all speed, anxious at 
 once to cut short the preparations which were being 
 made to resist him by his enemies, and to forestall 
 the desertions, which he could not but anticipate, on 
 the part of his friends. The good policy of this rapid
 
 244 P ART II I A* S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 
 
 movement is unquestionable. It startled and greatly 
 discomposed Tiridates and his counsellors. Of these, 
 some recommended an immediate attack on the 
 troops of Artabanus before they were recovered from 
 the fatigues of their long march ; while others, and 
 among them Abdageses, the chief vizier, advised a 
 retreat into Mesopotamia, and a junction with the 
 Armenian levies, and with the Roman troops, which 
 Vitellius, on the first news of the insurrection, had 
 thrown across the Euphrates. The more timid 
 counsel prevailed, and a retreat was determined 
 on. But reader pour mieux sauter is a maxim only 
 suited to the West. In the East the first step in 
 retreat is the first step towards ruin. No sooner was 
 the Tigris crossed and the march through Mesopo- 
 tamia begun than the host of Tiridates melted away 
 like an iceberg in the Gulf Stream. The Arabs of 
 the Mesopotamian desert were the first to break up 
 and disband themselves, the nearness of their homes 
 offering an irresistible attraction ; but their example 
 was soon followed by the rest of the army, which had 
 no such excuse. Some directed their steps home- 
 wards ; others joined the enemy ; Tiridates was at 
 last left with a mere handful of adherents, and, 
 hastening into Syria, put himself once more under 
 Roman protection. 
 
 The attempt to establish the influence of Rome 
 over the Parthian kingdom, by fixing a Roman puppet 
 on the throne of the Arsacidae, thus proved altogether 
 a failure. But the general effect of the struggle was 
 advantageous to Rome, and reflects credit on the 
 prince who, at the age of seventy-seven, at once vin-
 
 CONCESSIONS MADE BY ARTABANUS. 245 
 
 dicated the Roman honour and baffled the schemes 
 of one of the ablest of the Parthian monarchs. 
 Artabanus, when after his various vicissitudes he 
 recovered his throne, had no longer any stomach for 
 great enterprises. He took no further steps to disturb 
 Mithridates in his possession of Armenia, and he 
 left Vitellius unmolested on the Euphrates. When, 
 towards the close of A.D. 36, or very early in A.D. 37, 
 he had an interview with the Roman proconsul half- 
 way between the two banks of the river, he distinctly 
 renounced all claims to the Armenian kingdom ; at 
 the same time agreeing to send one of his sons, 
 Darius, to Rome in a position which Rome regarded 
 as that of a hostage, and further consenting to offer 
 incense to the emblems of Roman sovereignty — an 
 act, as the Romans understood it, of submission and 
 homage. Artabanus, by these concessions, the 
 meaning of which he did not perhaps fully under- 
 stand, decidedly lowered the prestige of his nation, 
 and yielded to Rome a pre-eminence which was 
 scarcely admitted by any other monarch, or at any 
 other period. We cannot be surprised that the 
 credit of concluding such a peace, though belonging 
 really to Tiberius, was falsely claimed by his flatterers 
 for Caligula, the new emperor, soon after whose 
 accession in March, A.D. 37, the news of the success- 
 ful negotiations reached Rome.
 
 XIV. 
 
 ASINAI AND ANILAI — AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN 
 HISTORY. 
 
 It was during the troubled reign of Artabanus the 
 Third, when the state was distracted between foreign 
 war and domestic feud, that disturbances broke out 
 in Mesopotamia, which have been graphically de- 
 scribed by the Jewish writer Josephus, and which 
 serve to throw considerable light on the internal 
 condition of the Parthian Empire at this period. 
 There was a large Jewish element in the population 
 of the more western provinces of the empire, an 
 element which dated from a time anterior to the rise, 
 not only of the Parthian, but even of the Persian 
 monarchy. That system of " transplantation of 
 nations," which was pursued on so large a scale by 
 the Assyrian and Babylonian sovereigns of the 
 eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries before Christ, 
 had introduced into the heart of Asia a number of 
 strange nationalities, and among these there was 
 none more remarkable than that of the Hebrews. 
 Whatever had become of the descendants of the Ten 
 Tribes — whether in any places they still constituted 
 
 distinct communities, or had long ere this been 
 
 246
 
 THE JEWS IN PARTHIA. 247 
 
 absorbed into the general population of the country 
 — at any rate, colonies of Jews, dating from the time 
 of Nebuchadnezzar's Captivity, maintained them- 
 selves, often in a flourishing condition, in various 
 parts of Babylonia, Armenia, Media, Mesopotamia, 
 Susiana, and probably in other Parthian provinces. 
 These colonies exhibited very generally the curious 
 but well-known tendency of the Jewish race to a rate 
 of increase quite disproportionate to that of the 
 population among which they are settled. The 
 Hebrew element became continually larger and 
 more important in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, and the 
 the adjacent countries, notwithstanding the large 
 draughts which from time to time were made upon 
 it by Seleucus Nicator, and others of the Syrian 
 princes. And this alien element in the population, 
 for the most part prospered. The Jewish settlers 
 seem to have enjoyed under the Parthians the same 
 sort of toleration, and the same permission to 
 exercise a species of self-government, which both 
 Jews and Christians enjoy now in several parts of 
 Turkey. In many cities they formed a recognised 
 Community under their own magistrates ; some 
 towns they had wholly to themselves ; those who 
 dwelt in Mesopotamia possessed a common treasury ; 
 and it was customary for them to send up to 
 Jerusalem from time to time the offerings of the 
 faithful, escorted by a convoy of thirty thousand or 
 forty thousand armed men. The Parthian kings 
 treated them well, and probably regarded them as a 
 valuable counterpoise to the disaffected Greeks and 
 Syrians of this part of the empire. They laboured
 
 248 AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 
 
 under no disabilities ; suffered no oppression ; had 
 no grievances of which to complain ; and it would 
 have seemed beforehand very improbable that they 
 would ever become the cause of trouble or dis- 
 turbance to the state ; but circumstances seemingly 
 trivial threw the whole community into commotion, 
 and led on to disasters of an unusual and lamentable 
 character. 
 
 There were two young Jews, named respectively 
 Asinai and Anilai, brothers, natives of Nearda, the 
 city in which the general treasury of the community 
 was established, who, on suffering some ill-usage at 
 the hands of the manufacturer in whose service they 
 were, threw up their employment, and, retiring to a 
 marshy district enclosed between two arms of the 
 Euphrates, made up their minds to exchange the dull 
 career of honest labour for the more exciting one of 
 robbery. The vagabonds of the neighbourhood, by 
 the attraction which draws like to like, soon gathered 
 about them, and a band was formed which in a little 
 time became the terror of the entire vicinity. They 
 exacted a black mail from the peaceable population 
 of shepherds and others who lived near them, occa- 
 sionally made plundering raids to a distance, and 
 required a contribution from all travellers and mer- 
 chants who passed through their district. Their 
 proceedings having become notorious and intolerable, 
 the satrap of Babylonia thought it his duty to put 
 them down, and marched against them with the 
 troops at his disposal, intending to take them by 
 surprise on the Sabbath day, when it was supposed 
 that Hieir religious scruples would prevent them from
 
 ARTABANUS III. AND ASINAT. 249 
 
 making any resistance. But his intentions got wind, 
 and the robber band, having agreed among themselves 
 to disregard the obligation of the Sabbatical rest, 
 turned the tables upon their assailant, and, instead of 
 allowing themselves to be surprised, surprised him, 
 and inflicted on him a severe defeat. Tidings of the 
 affair having reached Artabanus, who had his hands 
 already sufficiently occupied, he thought it best to 
 make pacific overtures to the victors, and having 
 induced them to pay him a visit at his Court, instead 
 of inflicting any punishment, assigned to Asinai, the 
 elder of the two brothers, the entire government of 
 the Babylonian satrapy. At first the experiment 
 appeared to be a success. Raised from the condition 
 of an outlaw to that of a vitaxa, or Persian provincial 
 governor, Asinai was perfectly content, and adminis- 
 tered his province with zeal, diligence, and ability. For 
 the space of fifteen years all things went smoothly in 
 Babylonia, and no complaint was raised against the 
 administration. At the end of that time, however, 
 the lawless temper which from the first had charac- 
 terised the two brothers, reasserted itself, .not, how- 
 ever, in Asinai, but in Anilai. Having fallen in love 
 with the wife of a Parthian nobleman, who seems to 
 have been the commander of the Parthian troops 
 stationed in Babylonia, and not knowing how other- 
 wise to accomplish his purpose, he made an open 
 attack upon the chieftain and killed him. Having 
 thus removed the obstacle to a marriage, he, within a 
 short space, made the object of his affections his wife, 
 and having established her as the mistress of his 
 house, allowed her to introduce into it the heathen
 
 250 AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 
 
 rites whereto she had always been accustomed. But 
 this gave great offence to the entire Jewish com- 
 munity, who were shocked that idolatrous practices 
 should be permitted in a Hebrew household, and laid 
 their complaint before Asinai, calling upon him to 
 interfere in the matter, and compel Anilai to divorce 
 his Parthian wife. Asinai came into their views, and 
 would probably have enforced them upon his brother, 
 had not the lady, alarmed at her impending disgrace, 
 and, it may be, sincerely attached to her Jewish 
 husband, anticipated the accomplishment of the 
 project by secretly poisoning her brother-in-law. 
 On the death of Asinai the authority which he had 
 wielded with so much satisfaction to all concerned, 
 passed, apparently without any fresh appointment by 
 the crown, into Anilai's hands, who thus became 
 satrap of the extensive province of Babylonia, at 
 this time the most important in the empire. 
 
 Anilai, however, possessed unfortunately none of 
 his brother's capacity for administration and govern- 
 ment. His instincts were those of a mere ordinary 
 freebooter, and he was no sooner settled in his pro- 
 vince than he proceeded to give them free vent by 
 invading, without so much as a pretext, the territory 
 of a neighbouring satrap, named Mithridates, who 
 was not only a Parthian noble of the highest 
 rank, but was connected with the Royal house, being 
 married to a daughter of Artabanus. Mithridates 
 flew to arms in defence of his province, but Anilai, 
 who had military if he had no other talent, fell 
 suddenly upon his encampment in the night, com- 
 pletely routed his troops, and took Mithridates himself
 
 ASlNAt SUCCEEDED BY ANILAI. 251 
 
 prisoner. The unhappy captive was subjected to ex- 
 treme indignity ; by the orders of Anilai, he was 
 stripped naked, set upon an ass, and in this guise con- 
 ducted from the battlefield to the camp of the victors, 
 where he was paraded before the eyes of the soldiery. 
 Not daring, however, to put to death a connection of 
 the Great King, of whose vengeance he had a whole- 
 some dread, Anilai felt compelled after a time to release 
 his captive and allow him to return to his satrapy. 
 There the account which he gave of his sufferings so 
 exasperated his wife, that she set herself to make 
 his life a burden to him, and never rested until he 
 consented to collect a second army and continue 
 the war. His forces advanced against Anilai's 
 stronghold, but the Jewish captain was too proud 
 to remain within it. Quitting the marshes, he led his 
 troops a distance of ten miles through a hot and 
 arid plain to meet the enemy, thus foolishly and 
 quite unnecessarily exhausting them, and exposing 
 them to the attack of the enemy under circumstances 
 of the greatest disadvantage. The natural conse- 
 quence followed. Anilai was defeated with great 
 loss, but he himself escaped, and having enrolled 
 fresh troops of a worthless character, proceeded to 
 revenge himself by carrying fire and sword over the 
 lands of his own Babylonian subjects, whom he must 
 have looked upon as on the point of escaping from 
 his jurisdiction. The unfortunate natives sent to 
 Nearda and required that Anilai should be given up 
 to them ; but the Jews of Nearda, even supposing 
 them to have had the will, had not the power to com- 
 ply. Negotiations were then tried, but with no better
 
 252 AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 
 
 result, except that, in the course of them, the Baby- 
 lonians contrived to obtain an exact knowledge of 
 the position which Anilai and his troops occupied, 
 together with a general notion of their habits. 
 Taking advantage of the knowledge thus acquired, 
 they one night fell suddenly upon them, when they 
 were all either drunk or asleep, and at one stroke 
 exterminated the whole band. Such was the end of 
 Anilai. 
 
 Up to this point, though the occurrences had been 
 strange and abnormal, indicative of extreme dis- 
 organisation and weakness on the part of the Par- 
 thian government, yet no very great harm had been 
 done. Two Jewish bandits had been elevated into 
 the position of Parthian satraps, and had borne 
 rule over an important province, with the result, in 
 the first place, of fifteen years of peace and prosperity, 
 and subsequently of a short civil war, terminating in 
 the destruction of the surviving robber chief and the 
 annihilation of the entire band of marauders. But 
 worse consequences were to follow. The bonds of 
 civil order cannot be relaxed or disturbed without 
 extreme danger to the whole social edifice. There 
 had long been a smouldering feud between the native 
 Babylonian population and the Jewish colonists in 
 Babylon, which from time to time had broken out 
 into actual riot and commotion. Diverse in race, in 
 manners, and in religion, the two nationalities were 
 always ready to fly at each other's throats when a 
 fitting occasion offered. The present seemed an occa- 
 sion not to be missed ; authority was relaxed ; the 
 Jewish element in the population of Mesopotamia
 
 ANTI-SEMITIC DISTURBANCES. 253 
 
 was at once disgraced and weakened. It had made 
 itself obnoxious to the dominant power in the state, 
 and was not likely to receive government support or 
 protection. Moved by these considerations, the 
 native Babylonian population, very shortly after the 
 destruction of Anilai, rose up against the Hebrews 
 settled in their midst and threatened them with 
 extermination. Finding themselves unable to make 
 an effectual resistance, and receiving no assistance 
 from the government, the Hebrews came to a de- 
 termination to withdraw from the conflict by retiring 
 altogether from a city where they provoked such 
 hostility and were subjected to such ill-usage. Not- 
 withstanding the enormous pecuniary loss which such 
 a migration necessarily entails, and the vast difficulty 
 of finding new homes for a population of many scores 
 of thousands, they quitted Babylon in a body and 
 transferred themselves to Seleucia. Seleucia, origi- 
 nally a Hellenic city, had at this time a tripartite 
 population, consisting of Greeks, Syrians, and Jews. 
 The Greeks and Syrians were opposed to each other, 
 but hitherto the Hebrew element had managed to live 
 on tolerably friendly terms with both the other na- 
 tionalities. Now, however, the new-comers felt them- 
 selves drawn to the Syrians, who were a kindred race, 
 and, uniting with them against the Greeks, forced 
 these last to succumb, and to accept a subordinate 
 position. But such a condition of things could not 
 last ; the Greeks found it insupportable ; and before 
 many months were past they succeeded in gaining 
 over the Syrians to their side, and persuading them 
 to join in an organised attack upon the Hebrews.
 
 254 AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 
 
 Too weak to make head against so powerful a combi- 
 nation, the Hebrews were utterly overpowered, and 
 in the massacre that ensued they lost, it is said, 
 above fifty thousand men. Those who escaped 
 crossed the Tigris, and transferred their abode to 
 Ctesiphon, but the malice of their enemies was still 
 unsatisfied. The persecution continued, and did not 
 come to an end until the entire Jewish population, de- 
 serting the metropolitan cities, withdrew to the smaller 
 provincial towns, which had no other inhabitants. 
 
 The series of events here related derives its in- 
 terest, partly from its connection with the Jewish 
 people, whose history will always, more or less, 
 command our sympathies, but parti}' - also, and indeed 
 mainly, from the light which it throws on the cha- 
 racter of the Parthian rule, and the condition of the 
 countries under Parthian government. Once more 
 the resemblance between the Parthian and the Tur- 
 kish systems is brought vividly to our notice, and the 
 scenes enacted in Syria and the Lebanon before our 
 own eyes — the mutual animosities of Christian and 
 Druse and Maronite, the terrible conflicts, and the 
 bloody massacres that have been an indelible dis- 
 grace to Turkish administration, present themselves 
 to our thoughts and memories. The picture has the 
 same features of antipathies of race, unsoftened by 
 time and contact, of perpetual feud bursting out into 
 occasional conflict, of undying religious hatreds, of 
 strange combinations, of massacres, of fearful out- 
 rages, and of a government looking tamely on, and 
 allowing things for the most part to take their course. 
 It is clear that the Parthian system failed utterly to
 
 PARTHIAN AND TURKISH GOVERNMENT. 255 
 
 blend together or amalgamate the conquered races ; 
 and not only so, but that it rubbed off none of their 
 angles, rendered them after the lapse of centuries not 
 one whit more friendly, or better disposed one to- 
 wards another than they had been at the first, did 
 absolutely nothing towards producing the " unity, 
 peace, and concord," which ought to knit together 
 the subjects of a single government, the constituent 
 elements of a single kingdom. Moreover, the Par- 
 thian system, as set before us in the events which we 
 are considering, was impotent even to effect the first 
 object of civil government, the securing of quiet and 
 tranquillity within its borders. If we were bound to 
 regard the events of the Asinai and Anilai episode as 
 representing to us truthfully the normal condition of 
 the peoples and countries with which it is concerned, 
 and to take the picture as a fair sample of the general 
 condition of the empire, we should be forced to 
 conclude that Parthian government was merely a 
 euphemistic name for anarch}', and that it was a rare 
 good fortune which prevented the State from falling 
 to pieces at this early period, within three centuries 
 of its establishment. But, on the whole, there is 
 reason to believe that the reign of Artabanus III. 
 puts before us, not the normal, but an exceptional 
 state of things — a state of things which could only 
 arise in Parthia when the machinery of government was 
 deranged in consequence of rebellion and civil war. 
 We have to bear in mind that Artabanus III. was 
 actually twice driven from his kingdom, and that 
 during the greater part of his reign he lived in 
 perpetual fear of revolt and insurrection. It is not
 
 2=>C) 
 
 AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 
 
 at all improbable that the culminating atrocities of 
 the struggle which we have described, synchronised 
 with the second expulsion of the Parthian monarch, 
 and are thus not so much a sign of the ordinary 
 weakness of the Parthian rule, as an indication of 
 the terrible strength of the forces which that rule for 
 the most part restrained and held under control.
 
 XV. 
 
 END OF THE REIGN OF ARTABANUS III.— GOTARZES 
 AND HIS RIVALS. 
 
 ARTABANUS did not continue on the throne very- 
 long after his undignified submission to Vitellius. 1 
 His proceedings probably disgusted his subjects, who 
 vented their indignation in murmurs and threats of 
 revolt. These threats coming to the knowledge of 
 the king, provoked him to adopt severe measures 
 against the malcontents; who thereupon banded 
 themselves together, and from malcontents became 
 open conspirators. Artabanus felt himself unequal 
 to the task of coping with the movement, and, 
 quitting his capital, fled to the Court of Izates, tribu- 
 tary king of Adiabene, who received him hospitably, 
 and undertook to replace him upon the throne from 
 which he had been driven. It lends an interest to 
 this portion of Parthian history to learn from 
 Josephus, who relates it, that Izates, and his mother, 
 Helena, were converts to Judaism, and entertained so 
 much affection for the Jewish people as to send 
 supplies of corn to Jerusalem, when (about A.D. 44) 
 that city was threatened with famine. 2 Meanwhile, 
 
 1 See above, p. 245. 2 Compare Acts xi. 28-30. 
 
 257
 
 258 END OF THE REIGN OF ARTABANUS III. 
 
 however, the Parthian Megistanes had deposed 
 Artabanus, and elected in his place a certain 
 Kinnamus, or Cinnamus, a distant relation of the 
 cashiered monarch, brought up by him in his house. 
 War would probably have broken out had not 
 Cinnamus, who was of a gentle disposition, waived his 
 claim in favour of his benefactor, and written to him, 
 inviting him to return. Artabanus upon this remounted 
 his throne, while Cinnamus carried his magnanimity 
 so far as to take the diadem from his own head, and, 
 replacing it on that of the old monarch, to salute 
 him as king. It was a condition of the restoration, 
 guaranteed both by Artabanus and Izates, that the 
 transaction should be accompanied by a complete 
 amnesty for all political offences. Such mildness, 
 very unusual among the Parthians, may perhaps be 
 ascribed to the gentle councils of the Judaean Izates. 
 
 It seems that Artabanus died very shortly after his 
 restoration to the throne. His last days were 
 clouded by the calamity of the revolt of Seleucia, 
 far the most important of the Hellenic cities of the 
 empire. We may assume that the disturbed condi- 
 tion of the Parthian kingdom, the frequent revolts, 
 the occasional civil wars, the manifest tendency to 
 disruption which the empire about this time showed, 
 had raised among the Hellenic subjects of the 
 Parthian crown, always disaffected, a belief, or at 
 any rate a hope, that they might succeed in shaking 
 off the yoke of their barbaric lords. Seleucia, natu- 
 rally, took the lead. Had she succeeded in estab- 
 lishing her independence, other lesser towns, as 
 Apollonia, Nicephorium, Edessa, Carrhae, might
 
 VARDANES AND GOTARZES. 259 
 
 have followed her example. Rome might have been 
 called in as a protector, and might perhaps have 
 undertaken the charge. An imperium in imperio 
 might conceivably have been established. But, as 
 the event proved, the attempt now made was ill- 
 judged. Though Artabanus himself failed to recover 
 the revolted city, which maintained a precarious 
 independence for the space of over six years (A.D. 
 40-46), yet there was at no time any reasonable 
 prospect of a prosperous issue. Rome held aloof. 
 The unhappy Greeks were overmatched. Though 
 Parthia was thought to have incurred some dis- 
 grace T by her inability to reduce a single rebel city 
 to subjection for the space of nearly seven years, 
 yet ultimately she prevailed. Seleucia succumbed to 
 a son of Artabanus in A.D. 46, and resumed a subject 
 position under her old masters. 
 
 On the death of Artabanus, the succession was 
 disputed between two of his sons, Vardanes and 
 Gotarzes. According to Josephus, the crown was 
 left by his father to the former, who was probably 
 the elder of the two ; but, as he happened to be at a 
 distance, while Gotarzes was present in the capital, 
 or close at hand, the last named had the opportunity 
 of occupying the throne, and, being an ambitious 
 prince, availed himself of it. He reigned, however, 
 at this time only for a few weeks. Having put to 
 death a brother, named Artabanus, together with his 
 wife and son, and otherwise shown a tyrannical 
 disposition, he so alarmed his subjects, that they sent 
 hurriedly for Vardanes, and offered him the post of 
 1 Tacit. " Ann.," xi. 9 : " Non sine dedecore Parthorum.'
 
 260 REIGN OF VARDANES I. 
 
 king. Vardanes, a man of prompt action, instantly 
 complied, and, having accomplished a journey of 350 
 miles in two days, drove Gotarzes from the kingdom ; 
 after which he received the submission of the pro- 
 vinces and cities generally, the only exception being 
 Seleucia, which maintained its revolt, and resisted all 
 his efforts to reduce it. Meantime Gotarzes had fled 
 to the Dahae of the Caspian region, and thrown him- 
 self upon their support and protection. The Dahse, 
 who were not Parthian subjects, willingly gave him 
 an asylum ; and from this secure retreat he proceeded 
 to seduce the neighbouring Hyrcanians from their 
 
 COIN OF VARDANES I. 
 
 allegiance to his brother, and drew together so large 
 a power, that Vardanes felt himself under the neces- 
 sity of raising the siege of Seleucia, and marching in 
 person to the distant East. The two armies con- 
 fronted each other in the plain country of Bactria, but 
 before they came to an engagement, the commanders 
 on either side thought it expedient to hold a con- 
 ference, and arrange, if possible, terms of peace. It 
 had come to the knowledge of Gotarzes, that there 
 was a design afloat among the chief nobles in either 
 army to get rid of both the brothers, and elect to the
 
 HIS DESIGNS ON ARMENIA. 26 1 
 
 throne a wholly new king. Having informed his 
 brother of this alarming discovery, he succeeded in 
 arranging a secret meeting with him, where pledges 
 were interchanged, and an understanding come to 
 with respect to the future. Gotarzes agreed to relin- 
 quish his claims to the Parthian crown, and was 
 assigned a residence in Hyrcania, which was probably 
 made over to his government. Vardanes returned to 
 the West, and resuming his siege operations, finally 
 compelled Seleucia to a surrender in the year A.D. 46, 
 the seventh year of the insurrection. 
 
 Regarding himself now as firmly settled in his 
 kingdom, and as having nothing more to fear from his 
 brother, Vardanes thought that the time was come for 
 taking in hand a new and important enterprise. This 
 was no less than the recovery of Armenia from the 
 Roman influence. That country, relinquished to 
 Tiberius by Artabanus III. in A.D. 37, and placed 
 by Rome under the government of Mithridates, an 
 Iberian, had suffered various vicissitudes, and was now 
 (A.D. 46) extremely discontented with its ruler, as well 
 as with his Roman patrons and upholders. Var- 
 danes thought that there would be no great difficulty 
 in driving out Mithridates from the kingdom upon 
 which he had so weak a hold, and replacing Armenia 
 within the sphere of the Parthian rule and influence. 
 But for success in such an enterprise he required the 
 hearty concurrence and support of his principal 
 feudatories, and especially of the great Izates, whose 
 services to Artabanus had been rewarded by an 
 important enlargement of his dominions, and who 
 was now king both of Adiabene and of Gordyene or
 
 262 ACCESSION OF GOTARZES. 
 
 Upper Mesopotamia. Accordingly, he took this 
 prince into his councils, and requested his opinion as 
 to the prudence of the course which he was contem- 
 plating. Izates gave the project his most strenuous 
 opposition. He was profoundly convinced of the 
 military strength and greatness of Rome, and on that 
 account wholly disinclined to quarrel with her, while 
 further he had a private and personal motive for 
 desiring to maintain amicable relations with the 
 great Western power from the fact that five of his 
 sons were residing in Rome, whither he had sent 
 them in order that they might receive a polite educa- 
 tion. He refused, therefore, to abet Vardanes in his 
 design, and the latter, indignant at a refusal, which 
 he regarded as an act of rebellion, proceeded to 
 engage in hostilities against his feudatory. 
 
 It was probably this condition of things which 
 induced Gotarzes suddenly to come forth from his 
 retirement, and again assert his claim to the Parthian 
 throne — a claim which he had only withdrawn under 
 the pressure of necessity. The quarrel of Vardanes 
 with Izates had weakened his power, and inclined 
 even the nobles who had hitherto supported his 
 cause to desert him, and go over to his adversary. 
 Many of them invited Gotarzes to resume the 
 struggle ; and Vardanes found himself compelled 
 for the second time to march eastward. Several 
 battles were fought between the two pretenders to 
 the throne in the country between the Caspian and 
 Herat, in which the advantage mostly rested with 
 Vardanes ; but his successes in the field failed to 
 overcome the aversion in which he was held by his
 
 DISCONTENT OF HIS SUByECTS. 26) 
 
 subjects ; and on his return from the war a number 
 of them, in spite of the glory which he had acquired, 
 conspired against him, and treacherously slew him in 
 the hunting field. 
 
 Gotarzes was then unanimously accepted as king, 
 and reigned for some years in peace. But he had 
 the common Parthian defect of a cruel and suspicious 
 temper, while he added to this defect the compara- 
 tively unusual faults of indolence and addiction to 
 luxury. In a short time he alienated the affections 
 of his subjects from him, partly by his severities, 
 
 COIN Ob GOI'ARZES. 
 
 partly by his luxurious living, and to some extent by 
 his ill-success in some small military expeditions. 
 In the year A.D. 49. steps were taken by those especi- 
 ally opposed to him, for relieving their country from 
 the incubus of a thoroughly bad king. Claudius, the 
 Roman Emperor, was approached, and entreated to 
 come to the aid of his Parthian " friends and allies." 
 " The rule of Gotarzes," they said, " had become in- 
 tolerable, alike to the nobility and the common 
 people. He had murdered all his male relations, or 
 at least all those who were within his reach — first his
 
 264 REIGN OF GOTARZES. 
 
 brothers, then his near kinsmen, finally even those 
 whose relationship was more remote ; nor had he 
 stopped there ; he had proceeded to put to death 
 their young children and their pregnant wives. He 
 was sluggish in his habits, unfortunate in his wars, 
 and had betaken himself to cruelty, that men might 
 not utterly despise him for his want of manliness. 
 They knew that Rome and Parthia were bound 
 together by the terms of a treaty, and they wanted 
 no infringement of it. Let Rome send them an 
 Arsacid worthy of reigning in the place of the un- 
 worthy scion of the house under whose tyranny they 
 groaned. They asked for Meherdates, the son of 
 Vonones, and grandson of Phraates IV., who was 
 resident at Rome, and, having been so long accus- 
 tomed to Roman manners, might be expected to 
 rule justly and moderately." This speech was de- 
 livered in the Roman Senate, Claudius being present, 
 and also Meherdates, the candidate for the Parthian 
 throne. The Emperor made a favourable response — 
 " He would follow the example of the Divine 
 Augustus, and allow the Parthians to receive from 
 Rome the monarch whom they requested. That 
 prince, bred up in the City, had always been remark- 
 able for his moderation. He would (it was to be 
 hoped) regard himself in his new position, not as a 
 master of slaves, but as a ruler of citizens. He 
 would find that clemency and justice were the more 
 appreciated by a barbarous people, the less they had 
 experience of them. Meherdates might accompany 
 the Parthian envoys ; and a Roman of rank, Caius 
 Cassius, the prefect of Syria, should be instructed to
 
 WAR OF GOTARZES WITH MEHERDATES. 265 
 
 receive them on their arrival in Asia, and to see them 
 safely across the Euphrates." 
 
 Meherdates thus set out for his proposed kingdom 
 under the fairest auspices. He had a large party 
 devoted to his cause in Parthia itself ; he was backed 
 by the great name of Rome ; and he had the active 
 support of a Roman of distinction, well acquainted 
 with the East, and of good antecedents. Moreover, 
 when he arrived at Zeugma on the Euphrates, he 
 found himself welcomed, not only by a number of 
 the Parthian nobles, but by a personage of great 
 importance in those parts, no other than Abgarus, 
 the Osrhoenian king, who commanded the passages 
 of the Euphrates, and held the country to the east 
 of the river, probably as far as the Khabour, or at 
 any rate of the Ras-el-Ain, its western tributary. 
 The parting advice of Cassius to his young protege 
 was, that he should lose no time in pressing forward 
 against his rival, Gotarzes, since the barbarians were 
 always impetuous at the commencement, but lost 
 their energy, or even grew perfidious, if there was 
 delay. Meherdates, however, fell entirely under the 
 influence of the Osrhoenian monarch, who seems to 
 have been a traitor, like his predecessor in the time 
 of Crassus, 1 and to have determined from the first 
 to lure the young prince to his destruction. By the 
 persuasions of Abgarus, Meherdates was induced, 
 first of all, to waste precious time while he indulged 
 in a series of feasts and banquets at Edessa, the' 
 Osrhoenian capital, and then to proceed against his 
 antagonist by the difficult and circuitous Armenian 
 
 1 See p. 164.
 
 266 REIGN OF GOTARZES. 
 
 route, which followed the course of the Tigris by 
 Diarbekr, Til, and Jezireh, instead of striking directly 
 across Mesopotamia to Ctesiphon. The rough moun- 
 tain passes and the snow-drifts of Armenia harassed 
 his troops and seriously delayed his progress, ample 
 time being thus given to Gotarzes for collecting a 
 strong force and disposing it in the most convenient 
 situations. Fortune, however, still continued to smile 
 on the pretender. When he reached Adiabene, 
 Izates, the powerful monarch of that tract, openly 
 embraced his cause, and brought a body of troops to 
 his assistance. Pressing forward towards Ctesiphon, 
 Meherdates possessed himself of the fort which 
 occupied the ancient site of Nineveh, as well as of 
 the strong post of Arbela, and there found himself 
 in the near vicinity of his adversary. But Gotarzes 
 was unwilling to risk all on the fate of a battle. He 
 stood on the defensive, with the river Corma in his 
 front, and would not suffer himself to be provoked, 
 or tempted, to an engagement. Reinforcements were 
 still reaching him, and he had a good hope of drawing 
 to his own side, or at any rate persuading to neutrality, 
 a portion of his adversary's adherents, if he could 
 set his emissaries at work among them. These tactics 
 were crowned with success. After a brief hesitation, 
 Izates, the Adiabenian, and Abgarus, the Osrhoenian 
 monarch, proved faithless to the cause which they 
 had professedly espoused, and drew off their troops. 
 Meherdates feared that other desertions might follow, 
 and resolved, before losing more of his army, to pre- 
 cipitate a fight. Gotarzes being also willing to engage, 
 since he was no longer outnumbered, the battle took
 
 ROCK TABLET OF GOTARZES. 267 
 
 place. It was stoutly contested. For a long time 
 neither side could boast any decided advantage ; 
 but at last Carrhenes, the chief general on the side of 
 Meherdates, having repulsed the troops opposed to 
 him, was tempted to pursue them too far, and being 
 intercepted by the enemy on his return was either 
 killed or made prisoner. His misfortune decided the 
 engagement. The loss of their principal commander 
 caused a general panic among the soldiers of Meher- 
 dates, who dispersed in all directions. The pretender 
 might perhaps have escaped ; but having entrusted 
 his person to a certain Parrhaces, a dependent of his 
 father's, who promised to conduct him to a place of 
 safety, he was seized, bound, and delivered up to 
 Gotarzes. Gotarzes seems to have been touched with 
 compassion by his rival's youth and helplessness. 
 Instead of awarding him the usual punishment of 
 rebels and pretenders who fall into their enemies' 
 hands, he contented himself with inflicting on him 
 a slight mutilation, sufficient, according to Oriental 
 ideas, to incapacitate him from ever exercising 
 sovereignty. 
 
 This victory which brought the troubles of Gotarzes 
 with his rivals to an end, was regarded by him as 
 worthy of commemoration in an unusual way. The 
 Parthians had but little taste for mimetic art, and 
 seldom indulged in artistic representations of any of 
 the events of their history. But Gotarzes on this 
 occasion took the exceptional course of commemo- 
 rating his achievement by a rock tablet. On the 
 great and sacred mountain of Behistun (originally, 
 Baghistan, " The Place of the Gods "), which was
 
 268 DEATH OF GOTARZES. 
 
 already adorned by a sculptured tablet representing 
 the Achaemenian monarch, Darius, the son of 
 Hystaspes, with two attendants, receiving a number 
 of conquered rebels, he caused to be engraved a 
 second, though much smaller tablet, representative 
 of his own exploit. In this he appeared seated on 
 horseback, with a heavy spear in his right hand, while 
 a Victory flying in the air crowned him with a wreath 
 or diadem, and behind him his army galloped over 
 the plain in pursuit of the flying foe. Some of the 
 figures formed, apparently, a walking procession ; 
 while an inscription in the Greek character and 
 language explained the intention of the monument. 
 This inscription is now almost illegible, but, when 
 first found, contained in two places the name 
 " Gotarzes," and in one the name " Mithrates," an 
 undoubted equivalent of " Meherdates." 
 
 It appears that the successful monarch did not 
 long survive his victory. His death, which is assigned 
 by the best authorities to the year AD. 50, is variously 
 related by the historians. According to Tacitus, it 
 was natural, the result of disease ; but according to 
 Josephus it was violent, and effected by a conspiracy. 
 There would be nothing surprising in this, since 
 through his whole reign he was unpopular, and must 
 have had many bitter enemies. But Tacitus is an 
 authority who cannot be lightly set aside ; and his 
 emphatic words — " morbo obiit " — have generally 
 been accepted as closing controversy on the subject. 
 The reign of Gotarzes must be considered to have 
 helped forward in no small degree the disorganisation 
 of the Parthian state. It showed Rome how easy it
 
 ILL EFFECTS OF HIS RETGN. 
 
 269 
 
 was to interfere in the internal affairs of her eastern 
 neighbour, and to paralyse her action beyond her 
 frontier, by raising troubles within it. It accustomed 
 the Parthians themselves to intrigue, civil war, and con- 
 fusion. It must have tended, moreover, to exhaust the 
 resources of the empire. At any rate the downward 
 course of the state from this time, though not rapid, 
 is marked and continuous ; and, though the tenacity 
 of the race enables it to prolong its independent 
 existence for nearly two centuries longer, yet the 
 student of the history clearly sees that a decline 
 has set in from which any real recovery is impossible.
 
 XVI. 
 
 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO — VOLOGASES I. 
 AND CORBULO. 
 
 GOTARZES was succeeded by a distant relative, an 
 Arsacid called Vonones, and known in Parthian 
 history as " Vonones the Second." This prince did 
 not occupy the throne more than about two months, 
 and is chiefly remarkable as the father of three kings 
 much more celebrated than himself — Vologases I., 
 King of Parthia, Tiridates, King of Armenia, and 
 Pacorus, dependent King of Media. Tiridates appears 
 to have been the eldest, Pacorus the second, and 
 Vologases the third son ; but, on the death of their 
 father, the two elder princes agreed to cede the 
 Parthian throne to their younger brother. This 
 was the more remarkable as Vologases was the son 
 of Vonones by a Greek concubine, whereas his two 
 brothers were legitimate. Probably he had given 
 indications of an ability, which they did not recognise 
 in themselves, and for which he may have been in- 
 debted to the foreign blood that flowed in his veins. 
 At any rate he found himself, in A.D. 50 or 51, 
 established upon the throne, and able to reward 
 Pacorus for his complaisance by bestowing on him
 
 ACCESSION OF VOLOGASES I. 271 
 
 the quasi-royal government of Media. For Tiridates 
 something more was needed, and Vologases may be 
 presumed to have been anxiously on the watch, 
 during the earlier portion of his reign, for an oppor- 
 tunity of conferring on his other brother a dignity 
 worthy of his acceptance. The opportunity came 
 in A.D. 51, through circumstances which had lighted 
 up the flames of war in the neighbouring territory of 
 Armenia. 
 
 The origin of the strife was the following. Rhada- 
 mistus, the eldest son of Pharasmanes, King of 
 
 COIN OF VOLOGASES I. 
 
 Iberia, was a youth of such recklessness, and 
 possessed with such a lust for power, that, for the 
 security of his own crown, his father thought it 
 necessary to divert his son's thoughts to the acquisi- 
 tion of another. He therefore pointed out to him 
 that his uncle, Mithridates, King of Armenia under 
 the Romans, was a most unpopular ruler, and that 
 it might not be difficult to supplant him, if he took 
 up his residence at his court and gave his mind to 
 ingratiating himself with the Armenian people. The 
 ambitious youth followed the advice offered him, and
 
 272 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 
 
 ere long succeeded in making himself a general 
 favourite, after which, having contrived to get 
 Mithridates into his power, he ruthlessly put him to 
 death, together with his wife and children. This was 
 a challenge to the Romans, who had established 
 Mithridates in his kingdom ; but the Roman officer, 
 Ummidius Quadratus, president of Syria, whose 
 business it was to take up the challenge, neglected 
 to do so, and another official, Julius Pelignus, pro- 
 curator of Cappadocia, even went further, and 
 authorised Rhadamistus to assume the title and 
 insignia of king. A large party in Armenia was, 
 however, adverse to the new rule, distrusted Rhada- 
 mistus, and condemned the course which he had 
 pursued. The country was accordingly thrown into 
 a ferment ; and Vologases, having recently ascended 
 the Parthian throne, and needing a principality for 
 his brother Tiridates, thought he saw in the situation 
 of Armenia an excellent opportunity of at once 
 gratifying his brother and advancing his own repu- 
 tation. To detach Armenia once more from the 
 dominion of Rome and re-attach it to Parthia would 
 be a happy inauguration of h's reign, and one that 
 would draw down upon him the open applause and 
 secret envy of his neighbours. 
 
 Accordingly, Vologases, in A.D. 51, the year of his 
 accession, having collected a large force, led an 
 expedition into Armenia. At first it seemed as if 
 he would effect an easy conquest. The Iberian 
 garrison, on whose support Rhadamistus principally 
 relied, quitted the field without risking a battle ; his 
 Armenian troops made but a poor resistance ;
 
 VOLOGASES I. INVADES ARMENIA. 273 
 
 Artaxata and Tigrano-certa, his two principal cities, 
 opened their gates to the foe ; Vologases took 
 possession of Armenia, and established Tiridates at 
 Artaxata, the capital. But this fair beginning was soon 
 clouded over. A severe winter, and some defect in the 
 commissariat arrangements, caused the outburst of a 
 pestilence, which so thinned the Parthian garrisons 
 that Vologases was compelled to withdraw them. 
 Rhadamistus returned, and, though ill-received by 
 his subjects, and occasionally in danger of losing his 
 life, on the whole contrived to maintain himself 
 during the three years extending from A.D. 5 1 to 54, 
 and was still in possession when Vologases, in the 
 last-named year, having brought some other wars to 
 an end, found himself in a position to resume his 
 designs upon Armenia. 
 
 The delay in grappling with the Armenian difficulty 
 had had a double origin. In A.D. 52 a dispute had 
 arisen between Vologases and one of his principal 
 feudatories, Izates, vitaxa of Adiabene, whose preten- 
 sions to exclusive privileges appeared to his feudal 
 lord excessive and even dangerous. After fruitless 
 negotiations, Izates appealed to arms, and took up a 
 position on the Lower Zab, which was the southern 
 limit of his territory. Vologases had advanced to the 
 opposite bank of the river, and was on the point of 
 crossing, and attacking his adversary when tidings 
 reached him of the invasion of his own dominions 
 by a foreign enemy. The Daha?, and the Scythians 
 in their neighbourhood, had passed into Parthia 
 Proper from the Caspian region, and were threatening 
 to carry fire and sword through the entire province.
 
 274 PART HI A IN THE TIME OF NERO. 
 
 Domestic revolt could be chastised at any time, but 
 a foreign foe must be met as soon as he showed 
 himself. Vologases, accordingly, marched away from 
 Adiabene to the Parthian and Hyrcanian frontier, 
 east of the Caspian sea, where he met and repulsed 
 the band of marauders, who had probably only ven- 
 tured to invade his territory because they knew him 
 to be engaged in a serious quarrel at a considerable 
 distance, and imagined that they would therefore be 
 unresisted. Successful in this quarter, he was about 
 to resume his operations in Adiabene, when infor- 
 mation reached him of the death of Izates, which 
 brought his domestic difficulties to an end. The 
 pretensions of the deceased monarch had been 
 personal, being grounded upon special privileges 
 granted him by Artabanus III., which would not 
 pass to a successor, and Vologases had consequently 
 no quarrel with Monobazus, Izates' brother, who had 
 inherited his throne. He thus found himself, at the 
 close of A.D. 53, wholly his own master, and free to 
 engage in whatever enterprise might seem to him 
 most promising. 
 
 Under these circumstances, it is not surprising 
 that, in A.D. 54, he turned his attention once more 
 to Armenian affairs, and resumed his project of 
 establishing his brother, Tiridates, upon the throne 
 of that ancient, and still semi-independent, kingdom. 
 Rhadamistus, though he continued in possession of 
 the nominal sovereignty, had failed to establish his 
 power, or to obtain any firm hold on the affections ot 
 his subjects, and might be attacked with a good 
 prospect of success, unless he received external
 
 TIKIDATES ESTABLISHED IN ARMENIA. 2J$ 
 
 assistance. The real question was, would Rome 
 interfere ? Would she come to the aid of a monarch, 
 who had not received his throne from herself, but had 
 obtained it by supplanting, and finally murdering, her 
 protege} Vologases was probably aware that a new 
 sovereign had recently ascended the Imperial throne, 
 a youth not yet eighteen years of age, one wholly 
 destitute of military tastes or training, devoted to 
 music and the arts, who could not be credited with 
 very keen patriotic feelings, or with a very full 
 comprehension of the niceties of the political situa- 
 tion. Would this raw youth grasp the meaning of 
 a diminution of Roman influence in the far East, 
 or rush to arms because a border kingdom — not 
 a Roman province — wavered in its allegiance ? 
 Vologases, it would seem, answered three questions 
 in the negative : or perhaps, while recognising the 
 risk, he may have thought the immediate advantage 
 so great as to make it worth his while to encounter 
 the hazard. At any rate, early in A.D. 54, he made 
 his invasion, drove Rhadamistus out of Armenia, 
 reduced the whole country to subjection, and 
 established his brother, Tiridates, as king in the 
 capital city of Artaxata. 
 
 The boldness of this stroke took the Romans by 
 surprise, and produced something like a panic in the 
 Imperial city. But the traditions of Imperial policy 
 were too firmly fixed in the minds of the official 
 class for any doubt to be entertained as to the 
 necessity of meeting and resisting the aggression. 
 Orders went forth at once for recruiting the Oriental 
 legions up to their full strength, and for moving them
 
 276 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 
 
 nearer to the Armenian frontier ; preparations were 
 made for bridging the Euphrates ; Agrippa II., 
 King of Chalcis, and Antiochus, King of Commagen£, 
 were ordered to raise troops and make ready for an 
 invasion of Parthia ; new governors were appointed 
 over Sophene and the Lesser Armenia ; above and 
 beyond all, the brave and experienced Corbulo, 
 universally allowed to be the best general of the 
 time, was summoned from his command in Germany, 
 and given the general superintendence of the war in 
 Armenia, with Cappadocia and Galatia as his pro- 
 vinces. Ummidius Ouadratus was maintained in 
 the proconsulship of Syria, but required to co-operate 
 with Corbulo, and made practically his second in 
 command. Four legions, together with numerous 
 auxiliaries were concentrated on the Armenian 
 frontier ; and it seemed as if the next year would 
 see the contest between Rome and Parthia renewed 
 on a scale which would recall the times of Antony 
 and Phraates IV. 
 
 But to ardent spirits the new year brought nothing 
 but disappointment. Instead of rushing to arms, 
 and pouring their combined legions into Armenia or 
 Parthia, the two Roman commanders suddenly 
 showed a disposition for peace. Emissaries from 
 both sought the Court of Vologases with offers of 
 peace — offers which implied an acceptance of the 
 status quo, provided that the Parthian monarch would 
 take no further steps in opposition to Rome, and 
 would place some Parthians of importance in the 
 hands of the Romans as hostages. This he was 
 quite willing to do, as he knew many of the nobles
 
 REVOLT OF VARDANES. 2JJ 
 
 to be disaffected, and their absence from his Court 
 would relieve him of the necessity of watching them. 
 Internal troubles, probably fomented by Rome 
 had commenced by the open revolt of his son, 
 Vardanes, whose defection from his father Tacitus 
 places in A.D. 54, 1 and whose coins show that he had 
 assumed the royal title, and set himself up as a rival 
 to Vologases, certainly before the end of the next 
 year. A truce with Rome was, consequently, what 
 the Parthian monarch must earnestly have desired ; 
 and we can only feel surprised that the Roman 
 
 COIN OF VaRDANES II. 
 
 commanders should have consented to play into his 
 hands, and have left him wholly unmolested in the 
 time of his greatest difficulties. Probably they were 
 already jealous of each other, and disinclined to press 
 forward a war in which each felt that mere accident 
 might give the*chief laurels to the other. 
 
 Vologases was thus able to give his whole attention, 
 during the three years from A.D. 55 to A.D. 58, to the 
 contest with his son. Its details have not come down 
 to us ; but it appears to be certain that by the spring 
 of A.D. 58 he had succeeded in crushing the revolt, 
 
 1 Tacit., "Ann.," xiii. 7, ad Jin.
 
 278 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 
 
 and re-establishing his authority over the whole 
 kingdom. As Vardanes is no more heard of, we may 
 presume that he either perished in battle, or was 
 executed. His coins, which are numerous, belong to 
 the years A.D. 55-58, and show a strong, masculine, 
 type of face, with an expression that is fierce and 
 determined. 
 
 The Great King, being now at liberty to resume 
 the projects and plans, which his son's rebellion 
 had compelled him to drop, took up once more the 
 Armenian question, which was still unsettled between 
 his own Court and that of Rome, and by his envoys 
 pressed for a final arrangement. He claimed that of 
 right, and by ancient possession, Armenia was a 
 Parthian province, or at least a Parthian dependency, 
 and required that not only should Tiridates be left in 
 undisturbed possession of it, but that there should be 
 a distinct understanding that he held it, not as a 
 Roman, but as a Parthian, feudatory. To this the 
 Romans, and especially Corbulo, demurred. Armenia, 
 they said, had been added to the Roman Empire by 
 Lucullus, or at any rate by Pompey, and it was not 
 consistent with the greatness of Rome to surrender 
 territory which she had once acquired. Let Tiridates 
 remain quiet, and the matter be settled by negotia- 
 tion ; otherwise Rome would be compelled to use 
 force. Corbulo had utilised the three years of waiting 
 by recruiting his legions from Cappadocia and Galatia, 
 by tightening their discipline, and by accustoming 
 them to the hardships of winter marches and move- 
 ments ; he had also obtained an additional legion 
 from Germany ; and he now felt ready for a campaign.
 
 VOLOGASES I. AND CORBULO. 2JCJ 
 
 Tiridates soon gave him the opportunity which he 
 seems to have desired. Having received a contingent 
 of troops from Vologases, he commenced proceedings 
 against the Roman partisans in Armenia, harrying 
 them with fire and sword; whereupon Corbulo crossed 
 the frontier to their relief. A number of partial engage- 
 ments were fought in which Rome had the advantage, 
 and at last, after three years' fighting, Tiridates, 
 having lost his capital city, Artaxata, in A.D. 58, 
 and Tigrano-certa, the second city of his kingdom, 
 in A.D. 60, withdrew from the contest, and yielded the 
 entire possession of Armenia to the Romans. By the 
 favour of Nero, Tigranes, grandson of Archelaus, a 
 former monarch of Cappadocia, was made king ; but, 
 as his ability to administer so large a territory 
 was doubted, portions of it were detached from his 
 rule, and made over to the neighbouring princes. 
 Pharasmanes of Iberia, Polemo of Pontus, Aristo- 
 bulus of the Lesser Armenia, and Antiochus of 
 Commagene, profited by the new arrangement, 
 which could not, however, but be distasteful .to the 
 Armenians, who saw the country of which they were 
 so proud, not merely conquered, but broken into 
 fragments. 
 
 Corbulo's success must be attributed in a great 
 measure to the absence of Vologases from the scene 
 of contest. The Armenian monarch had been called 
 away in A.D. 58 to his north-eastern frontier by a 
 revolt, perhaps fomented by Rome, 1 of the distant 
 province of Hyrcania, and had found full occupation 
 there for his utmost energies, so that he was wholly 
 
 1 So Dean Merivale, "Roman Empire," vol. vii. p. 23.
 
 280 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 
 
 unable to lend effectual aid to his brother. But 
 about the year A.D. 62, the Hyrcanian troubles came 
 to an end, and, the hands of Vologases being once 
 more free, he had to consider and determine whether 
 he should accept the state of things established in 
 Armenia by Corbulo, or interfere by force of arms to 
 modify it. To what conclusion he would have come, 
 had his own dominions been left unmolested, it is im- 
 possible to say : as it was, the intolerable aggressions 
 of Tigranes upon his rich province of Adiabene, and 
 the bitter complaints of his subjects, who threatened 
 to transfer their allegiance to Rome, left him no choice. 
 His own interests and the honour of his country 
 alike required him to assert his cause in arms ; and 
 Vologases, having made up his mind to declare war, 
 announced his intention to a council of his nobles in 
 a speech which is reported as follows : " Parthians, 
 when I obtained the sovereignty of Parthia by the 
 cession of my brothers' claims, my intention was to 
 substitute for the old system of fraternal hatred and 
 strife, a-new one of domestic affection and agreement ; 
 my brother Pacorus, accordingly, received Media 
 from my hands at once ; and Tiridates, whom you 
 see now present before you, I shortly afterwards 
 inducted into the royal appanage of Armenia, a 
 dignity reckoned the third in the Parthian kingdom. 
 Thus I put my family matters on a peaceful and 
 satisfactory footing. Rut these arrangements are 
 now disturbed by the Romans, who have never 
 hitherto gained anything by breaking faith with us, 
 and will scarcely do so on the present occasion. I 
 shall not deny that up to this time I have proposed
 
 VOLOGASES I. AND CORBULO. 281 
 
 to maintain my right to the dominions left me by my 
 ancestors by fair dealing rather than by shedding of 
 blood, by negotiation rather than by arms ; if how- 
 ever I have erred in this, and have been weak to 
 delay so long, I will now amend my fault by showing 
 the more vigour. You at any rate have lost nothing 
 by my holding back ; your strength is intact, your 
 glory undiminished. Nay, you have added to your 
 other well-known merits, the credit of moderation — a 
 virtue which not even the highest among men can 
 afford to despise, and which the gods view with special 
 favour?" His speech ended, Vologases placed a 
 diadem on the brow of Tiridates, in token of his 
 determination to restore him to the Armenian throne, 
 at the same time commanding Moneses, a Parthian 
 noble, and Monobazus, the Adiabenian king, to take 
 the field and invade Armenia, while he himself 
 collected the whole strength of the empire, and 
 marched to attack the Roman legions on the 
 Euphrates. 
 
 The campaign which followed was of less impor- 
 tance than might have been anticipated from these 
 preparations for it. Vologases, instead of invading 
 Syria, marched no further than Nisibis, which was 
 well within the limits of his own dominions. Moneses 
 and Monobazus, on the other hand, carried out the 
 concerted programme, and having invaded Armenia, 
 and advanced to Tigrano-certa, which had now become 
 the capital of the kingdom, besieged Tigranes in that 
 city (A.D. 62). But the Parthian attack on walled 
 places was always ineffective, and Tigrano-certa hap- 
 pened to be exceptionally strong. The walls are said
 
 282 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 
 
 to have been seventy-five feet in height, the river 
 Nicephorius, a broad stream, washed a portion of 
 them ; a huge moat protected the remainder ; the 
 town was strongly garrisoned ; and the besieging 
 force, though not wanting in gallantry, proved unable 
 to make any serious impression upon the place. 
 Vologases, as time went on, began to despair of 
 effecting very much under existing circumstances by 
 force of arms, and leant towards negotiation, which 
 Corbulo invited. His army, which consisted almost 
 entirely of cavalry, was reduced to inaction by want 
 of forage, Mesopotamia having recently suffered from 
 a plague of locusts. Hence he consented to con- 
 clude a truce with his antagonist, and to send a fresh 
 embassy to Rome for the purpose of making a satis- 
 factory arrangement. The truce was to last until the 
 ambassadors returned ; and, meanwhile, Armenia was 
 to be evacuated by both parties, and care was to be 
 taken that no collision should occur between the 
 soldiers of the two nations. 
 
 But this well-meant effort at pacification was 
 entirely without result. Nero gave the envoys no 
 answer ; and, indeed, he had made arrangements be- 
 fore their arrival, from which he anticipated a trium- 
 phant issue to the contest instead of a mere patched-up 
 ind unstable convention. At the request of Corbulo, 
 who was anxious not to arouse his jealousy, he had 
 sent out a second commander to the East, a special 
 favourite of his own, and from the conduct of the war 
 by this new leader he looked for immediate results of 
 the most important character. L. Caesennius Paetus 
 was a man of energy and boldness, confident in him-
 
 CAMPAIGN OF C&SENNIUS PMTUS. 283 
 
 self, and contemptuous of the prudence and caution 
 of his colleague. He held a separate command, with 
 forces equal to those led by Corbulo, and soon let it 
 be known that he was about to carry on the war in a 
 new fashion. " Corbulo," he said, " had shown no 
 dash or vigour ; he had neither plundered nor massa- 
 cred ; if he had besieged cities, it had been in name 
 rather than in reality. His own method would be 
 different. Instead of setting up shadowy kings he 
 would bring Armenia under Roman law, and reduce 
 it to the condition of a province." These brave words 
 were followed up by a show of brave deeds. Cross- 
 ing the Euphrates, Psetus invaded Armenia with two 
 legions, and spreading his troops over a wide extent 
 of country, burnt the strongholds, ravaged the terri- 
 tory, and carried off a considerable booty. But he 
 neither fought a single battle, nor ventured to besiege 
 a single town. As winter approached, he withdrew 
 his troops into Cappadocia, but, intent on pleasing his 
 Imperial master, he gave in his despatches an exag- 
 gerated account of what he had achieved in his short 
 campaign, and spoke as if the war was well-nigh over. 
 Corbulo, on his part, maintained the prudent atti- 
 tude habitual to him. He bridged the Euphrates in 
 the face of a large opposing force by anchoring vessels 
 laden with military engines in mid-stream. He then 
 passed his troops across, and occupied a strong posi- 
 tion in the hills at a little distance from the river, 
 where he caused his legions to construct an entrenched 
 camp, and remained on the defensive. He greatly 
 distrusted Paetus, and would not allow himself to be 
 so entangled in military operations as not to be able
 
 284 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 
 
 at any moment to march to his colleague's assistance 
 if he should hear that he was in any danger. 
 
 The prudence of this course soon became evident. 
 Paetus, regarding the season for war as over, sent one 
 of his legions to winter in Pontus, while he himself 
 with the other two took up his quarters in the country 
 between the Taurus and the Euphrates, and allowed 
 free furloughs to all the soldiers who applied for them. 
 While his legions were in this way much weakened, 
 he suddenly heard that Vologases, braving the in- 
 clemency of the season, was advancing against him 
 at the head of a strong force. The crisis revealed his 
 incapacity. He was uncertain whether to await the 
 enemy in quarters or to take the field against him, 
 whether to concentrate his troops or to disperse 
 them. Now he adopted one course, now another. 
 The only consistency that he showed was in imploring 
 aid from Corbulo, to whom he sent messenger after 
 messenger. That general, however, was in no hurry 
 to render help, since he did not wish to appear upon 
 the scene as deliverer until it was clear that the danger 
 threatening Paetus was imminent. Vologases, mean- 
 while, steadily pursued his way. Without attempting 
 any rapid movements, he closed in upon Paetus, his 
 adversary, swept away the small force that Paetus had 
 detached to guard the passes of Taurus, and blocked up 
 the remainder of his army in a position from which 
 extrication, unless his colleague came to his aid, was 
 almost impossible. Corbulo was now on his march, and 
 pressing forward with all speed, but a panic had seized 
 on Paetus and his soldiers. Though he had abundant 
 provisions, and might have prolonged the defence
 
 CORBULO ONCE MORE IN COMMAND. 285 
 
 for weeks, or even for months, yet in his cowardly 
 alarm he preferred to precipitate matters, and having 
 entered into negotiations with Vologases, he practically 
 capitulated to him. The terms granted were, that the 
 blockaded army should be allowed to quit its entrench- 
 ments, and be free to march away, but that it must 
 at once quit Armenia ; its stores and its fortified posts 
 must be surrendered ; no further hostilities must be 
 engaged in ; and Paetus should obtain from Nero the 
 exact conditions on which he would now be willing to 
 make peace. These terms were carried out, not how- 
 ever without the addition of some further insults and 
 indignities. The Parthians entered the Roman en- 
 trenchments before the legionaries had quitted them, 
 claiming and seizing whatever they professed to 
 recognise as Armenian spoil ; they even took posses- 
 sion of the soldiers' arms and clothes, which were 
 tamely relinquished to them with the object of avoid- 
 ing a conflict. Armenia was then quitted hastily, and 
 not without disorder, Paetus setting the example of 
 unseemly hurry. Corbulo was reached after a three 
 days' march, and received the fugitives without re- 
 proaches, and with every demonstration of sympathy. 
 Vologases followed up his success against Paetus by 
 at once re-establishing his brother, Tiridates, in the 
 Armenian kingdom. At the same time he devised a 
 plan whereby, he thought, the interminable quarrel 
 between the two empires of Rome and Parthia might 
 be made up, and a modus vivendi arrived at. Rome, 
 under Nero at any rate, was not really bent upon fur- 
 ther conquests. It was rather her honour for which she 
 was jealous than her power which she desired to see
 
 286 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 
 
 augmented. Vologases therefore sent an embassy to 
 the Court of Nero, and explained that, so long as his 
 brother was accepted and acknowledged by Rome as 
 Armenian king, he would offer no objection to his 
 going in person to Rome and receiving investiture 
 from the Imperial hands. Nero and his counsellors 
 in reality approved this compromise, but they felt that 
 it would be too palpable a surrender of former claims, 
 and too manifestly a concession extorted by recent dis- 
 aster, if they closed with the suggestion of the Parthian 
 monarch at once. No ; Rome must not make an open 
 confession of defeat ; her recession from a claim must 
 be glossed over, cloaked. Dust must be thrown in 
 the eyes of the nations, and they must be induced to 
 think that, whatever change Rome made in her politi- 
 cal arrangements was made of her own free will, and 
 because she regarded it as for her advantage. Accord- 
 ingly, the envoys of Vologases were dismissed with 
 an ambiguous answer. Partus was recalled from the 
 East, and Corbulo reinstated in sole command, and 
 invested with a new and almost unlimited authority. 
 The number of his troops was augmented, and their 
 quality improved by draughts from Egypt and Illyri- 
 cum. He was bidden once more to take the offensive, 
 and, in the spring of A.D. 6$, he crossed the frontier, 
 and penetrated to the heart of Armenia by the road 
 formerly opened by Lucullus. Tiridates met him, not 
 however in arms, but for negotiation. On the site of 
 the camp of Paetus, an interview was held between the 
 Roman general and the Aimenian monarch, where 
 the terms suggested by the envoys of Vologases at 
 Rome were accepted. It was agreed that Rome
 
 COMPROMISE SUGGESTED BY VOLOGASES. 287 
 
 should withdraw her support from Tigranes, and ac- 
 knowledge Tiridates as rightful monarch, while Tiri- 
 dates should perform an act of homage to Rome for 
 his kingdom, and be nominally Rome's feudatory. 
 To indicate his acceptance of these terms, Tiridates, 
 in the presence of Corbulo and his suite, divested him- 
 self of the regal ensigns, and placed them at the foot 
 of the statue of Nero, undertaking not to resume 
 them except at Nero's hands. For actual investiture 
 he undertook to journey to Rome as soon as circum- 
 stances permitted, and meanwhile he placed in the 
 hands of Corbulo one of his daughters as a hostage. 
 Corbulo, on his part, undertook that Tiridates should 
 be treated with the utmost honour and respect, both 
 during his stay at Rome and on his journey to and 
 from Italy, should be entitled to wear his sword, and 
 have free access to all the provincial authorities upon 
 the route. Peace was made upon these terms to the 
 satisfaction of both parties, and it only remained that 
 the terms should be faithfully executed. 
 
 The execution was delayed for the space of above 
 two years ; but in the spring of A.D. 66, Tiridates, 
 having set the affairs of Armenia in order, started 
 upon his promised journey, accompanied by his wife, 
 by a number of the Parthian princes and nobles, 
 including sons of Vologases, Pacorus, and Mono- 
 bazus, and by an escort of three thousand Parthian 
 cavalry in all the glittering array of their gold 
 ornaments and bright-gleaming panoplies. The long 
 cavalcade passed, like a magnificent triumphal pro- 
 cession, through two-thirds of the Roman Empire, 
 and was everywhere received with warmth, and
 
 288 PART HI A IN THE TIME OF NERO. 
 
 entertained with profuse hospitality. The provincial 
 cities which lay upon the line of route selected were 
 gaily decorated to receive their unwonted visitors, 
 and the loud acclamations of the assembled multi- 
 tudes showed that they fully appreciated the novel 
 spectacle. The whole journey, except the passage of the 
 Hellespont, was made by land, the cavalcade proceed- 
 ing through Thrace and Illyricum to the head of the 
 Adriatic Gulf, and then descending the peninsula. 
 The Roman Treasury defrayed the entire expenses of 
 the travellers, which are said to have amounted to 
 an average daily cost of 800,000 sesterces, or about 
 £6250 of English money. As this outlay was 
 continued for nine months, the entire sum expended 
 by the Treasury must have exceeded a million and 
 a half pounds sterling. Audience was given to the 
 Parthian prince at Naples, where Nero happened to 
 be residing, and passed off without serious difficulty. 
 At first, indeed, an obstacle presented itself; it was 
 the etiquette of the Roman Gourt that those intro- 
 duced to the Emperor were to be unarmed, and 
 consequently the usher, when Tiridates approached 
 the Hall of Audience, requested him to lay aside his 
 sword. This he refused to do, since he was entitled 
 to wear it by the terms of his agreement . with 
 Corbulo. The affair might have ended in a dead- 
 lock, had not it been ingeniously suggested, that the 
 Emperor's safety might be assured and the Parthian 
 prince's honour saved, by the simple expedient of 
 fastening the obnoxious weapon to its scabbard with 
 half a dozen nails. This done, Tiridates was intro- 
 duced into the Imperial presence, where he made
 
 NERO'S INVESTITURE OF TIRIDATES. 289 
 
 obeisance, bending one knee to the ground, interlacing 
 his hands, and at the same time saluting the Emperor 
 as his " lord." 
 
 The investiture was reserved for a subsequent 
 occasion, and was made a spectacle to the Roman 
 populace. On the night preceding, all the streets of 
 the city were illuminated and decorated with garlands; 
 as morning approached, " the Tribes," clothed in long 
 white robes and bearing branches of laurels in their 
 hands, entered the Forum and filled all the middle 
 space, arranged as was customary ; next came the 
 Praetorians, in their splendid arms and with their 
 glittering standards, stationing themselves in two 
 lines which reached from the further extremity of 
 the Forum to the Rostra, to maintain the avenue of 
 approach clear ; all the roofs of the houses which 
 gave upon the Forum were hidden beneath the masses 
 of spectators ; at break of day Nero himself entered, 
 accompanied by the Senate and by his own body- 
 guard, wearing the garb appropriated to Triumphs, 
 and, passing down between the two lines of Prae- 
 torians, ascended a raised platform near the Rostra, 
 and took his seat in an archaic curule chair. Tiridates 
 was then introduced ; silence was proclaimed ; and 
 in a short speech of a sufficiently abject character, 
 the Parthian prince placed himself at the Roman 
 Emperor's disposal. Nero responded haughtily, but 
 executed the covenanted investiture. Saluting Tiri- 
 dates as king of Armenia, he handed him to a seat 
 prepared for the purpose at his own feet, gave him 
 the kiss which sovereigns only gave to sovereigns, 
 and with his own hand placed upon his brow the
 
 290 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 
 
 coveted diadem, the symbol of Oriental sovereignty. 
 Magnificent entertainments followed, with shows and 
 games of various kinds, in which the emperor himself 
 took part ; but this condescension astonished, more 
 than it pleased, the Asiatic. However, he doubtless 
 appreciated better the closing act of the entire drama, 
 which was a parting gift from his nominal suzerain of 
 not much less than a million sterling ! 
 
 Tiridates returned to Asia across the Adriatic, and 
 by the ordinary route through Greece, no doubt well 
 pleased with his visit. At the cost of a formal sub- 
 mission, and a certain amount of personal humiliation, 
 he had obtained a sum which not even a king could 
 despise, and an assured title to the throne of a con- 
 siderable kingdom. Vologases, who must be regarded 
 as the moving spirit throughout the whole transaction, 
 may also well have been satisfied. He had firmly 
 established his brother upon the Armenian throne, 
 and if he had conceded to Roman vanity the honour 
 and glory of the arrangement, yet he had secured for 
 himself the substantial advantage. As Dean Merivale 
 well observes, " While Tiridates did homage for his 
 kingdom to Nero, he was allowed to place himself 
 really under the protection of Vologases." x 
 
 1 " Roman Empire," vol. vii. p. 26.
 
 XVII. 
 
 VOLOGASES T. AND VESPASIAN — PACORUS 
 DECEBALUS OF DACIA. 
 
 II. AND 
 
 The establishment of peace between Rome and 
 Parthia, while no doubt a fortunate circumstance for 
 the subjects of the two empires, is one vexatious to 
 the modern historian of the Parthians, since it places 
 him at a considerable disadvantage. Until the con- 
 clusion of the peace, he is able to obtain tolerably 
 ample materials for his narrative from the Greek and 
 Roman writers who describe the condition of affairs 
 in the East under the early Roman Emperors, and 
 who have to trace the causes and course of the 
 hostilities in which the two countries were engaged 
 almost continuously. From the date of the paci- 
 fication he wholly loses the benefit of this consecutive 
 history, and has nothing to rely upon except a few 
 scattered and isolated notices, not always very in- 
 telligible, occurring here and there in the pages of the 
 classical authors, together with the series, which now 
 becomes very confused and confusing, of the Parthian 
 coins. The view obtainable of Parthian history is 
 thus, for the space of above half a century, most im- 
 perfect and disjointed. Even the succession of the
 
 292 VULOGASES I. AND VESPASIAN. 
 
 kings is uncertain ; and the attribution of the coins to 
 this or that monarch, rests frequently on conjecture. 
 
 The latest authorities seem to be of opinion that 
 Vologases I. — the monarch who ascended the Parthian 
 throne in a.d. 50 or 51 — continued to reign until 
 about A.D. yj. If so, he must have been contemporary 
 with six Roman Emperors — Claudius, Nero, Galba, 
 Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian— reigning contempo- 
 raneously with the last named of these for about 
 eight years. The relations between the two rulers 
 were, for the most part, friendly. When Vespasian first 
 came forward as a candidate for empire (A.D. 70), Volo- 
 gases went so far as to offer him the services of forty 
 thousand horse-archers to assist in his establishment 
 upon the throne ; but the successes of his generals in 
 Italy enabled the Emperor to decline this magnificent 
 proposal, and so to escape the odium of employing 
 foreign troops — "barbarians," the Romans would have 
 said — against his own countrymen. In the same spirit, 
 when, a year later, Titus paid a visit to the Roman 
 station of Zeugma on the Euphrates, the Parthian 
 monarch sent to congratulate him on his successful 
 conclusion of the Jewish war, and begged him to 
 accept at his hands a crown of gold. Titus, with his 
 usual amiability, consented ; and, to show his appre- 
 ciation of the compliment paid him, invited the envoys 
 of Vologases to a banquet and sumptuously enter- 
 tained them. 
 
 Shortly after this, however, by the machinations of 
 Caesennius Paetus, the unsuccessful general in the last 
 Armenian campaign, who had been recently pro- 
 moted to the office of Syrian proconsul, these pleasing
 
 MACHINATIONS OF CMSENNIUS PJETUS. 293 
 
 prospects were overclouded, and a rupture in the 
 amicable relations that had hitherto subsisted be- 
 tween the two monarchs, appeared to be imminent. 
 Caesennius Paetus — on what grounds it is impossible to 
 say, perhaps on no reasonable grounds at all — sent 
 a report to Vespasian, in A.D. 72, of a most important 
 and alarming character. He had discovered a plot, he 
 said, for the transfer of the Roman dependency of 
 Commagene, a portion of Upper Syria, from the 
 Roman to the Parthian allegiance — a plot concerted, 
 he declared, between Vologases and the Commagenian 
 king, Antiochus, and about to be almost immediately 
 put into execution. Samosata, the capital of Comma- 
 gene, which commanded the passage of the Euphrates, 
 was to be put into the hands of the Parthian monarch 
 by the Commagenians, and a ready access thereby 
 given him to the Roman provinces of Cappadocia, 
 Cilicia, and Syria itself, which could all be easil) 
 invaded from the important site. Unless he were 
 authorised at once to take steps to prevent the 
 transfer, it would within a very short space be ac- 
 complished, and the East once more thrown into 
 confusion. Vespasian, who had no reason to doubt 
 the correctness of the proconsul's information, replied 
 to him without delay, and gave him full liberty of 
 acting as he thought best. Hereupon, Paetus, who 
 had made every preparation in anticipation of such 
 a response, immediately marched a strong force into 
 Commagene, and meeting with no resistance, pro- 
 ceeded against Samosata, which he carried by a 
 coup de main. It cannot but be suspected that the 
 whole story told to Vespasian was the invention of
 
 294 VOLOGASES I. AND VESPASIAN. 
 
 Paetus, who desired war as a field for his energies. 
 His sudden invasion only failed to produce the crisis 
 that he sought to bring about, owing to the moderation 
 and prudence of the two sovereigns against whom his 
 charges had been made. Antiochus, the Comma- 
 genian monarch, refused altogether to assume the 
 part of rebel which had been assigned him, and, 
 though his sons took arms against Paetus, himself 
 withdrew from the country, and passing into the 
 Roman province of Cilicia, took up his abode at 
 Tarsus. Vologases declined to give the action taken 
 by the sons of Antiochus any support. He folded 
 his arms, and simply looked on while they contended 
 with Paetus ; when, on their father's withdrawal into 
 Cilicia, their troops abandoned them, and they were 
 forced to take to flight, he contented himself with 
 allowing them a temporary refuge in Parthia, and 
 writing a letter to Vespasian on their behalf. It was 
 probably this letter which induced Vespasian so far 
 to pardon the young princes as to allow them to 
 reside in Rome with their father, while at the same 
 time he made the family an ample allowance from his 
 privy purse. 
 
 It was not long after he had escaped the danger 
 of a Roman war that Vologases was attacked by a 
 savage enemy from another quarter. The Alani, a 
 Scythic, or more probably a Finnish tribe from the 
 regions east of the Caspian, having made alliance 
 with the important nation of the Hyrcanians, which 
 in later Parthian history gave many signs of being 
 disaffected, burst through the Caspian Gates suddenly 
 in the year A.D. 75, and, pouring into Media, drove
 
 PARTHIA IMPLORES ROMAN AID. 2Q5 
 
 King Pacorus, the brother of Vologases, to take refuge 
 in the fastnesses of the mountains, while they carried 
 fire and sword over the open country. From Media 
 they passed on into Armenia, which was still held by 
 Tiridates, defeated him in a pitched battle, and very 
 nearly succeeded in making him prisoner by means 
 of a lasso. Vologases, in great alarm, sent an embassy 
 to Vespasian, and relying on his own offer, a few years 
 previously, to lend the Roman Emperor, if he required 
 it, a body of forty thousand horse archers, asked 
 that an efficient contingent of Roman troops might 
 now be placed at his disposal. He further requested 
 that their commander might be either Titus or Do- 
 mitian. The latter prince, jealous of his brother's 
 military fame, was most anxious to be selected, and 
 to be placed at the head of a powerful army, so that 
 he might have an opportunity of rivalling the great 
 achievements of Titus. But Vespasian, with the 
 caution of old age, felt averse from embarking the 
 State in fresh adventures, and bluntly declared that 
 he saw no reason for making himself a busybody in 
 affairs that no way concerned him. Had he accepted 
 the proffered support of Vologases in years previously, 
 the case would have been different, but, as he had 
 declined it, his hands were unshackled, and he was 
 free either to consent or to refuse as he chose. The 
 best interests of the State seemed to him to require 
 abstention, and he therefore sent a negative reply to 
 Vologases. The Parthian prince was not only dis- 
 appointed, but angered, and vented his spleen by 
 withholding from the Emperor, in subsequent diplo- 
 matic correspondence, his rightful titles. Vespasian,
 
 296 VOLOGASES I. AND VESPASIAN. 
 
 with a sense of humour rare in persons so highly 
 placed, made no remonstrance beyond the ironic one 
 of adopting in his reply the humble style assigned 
 him by his correspondent. To the salutation — 
 " Arsaces, King of Kings, to Flavius Vespasianus 
 sends greeting," he answered, " Flavius Vespasianus, 
 to Arsaces, King of Kings, sends greeting." 
 
 A coolness in the relations between the two powers 
 now set in. Parthia, thrown on her own resources, 
 was forced to submit to considerable loss in the way 
 of booty at the hands of the Alani and their allies, 
 and was unable to take any revenge upon them for 
 their unprovoked attack ; but she succeeded in main- 
 taining her western territories intact, and in recover- 
 ing both Media and Armenia. Hyrcania, it may be 
 suspected, was from this time detached from her rule, 
 and the cause of continual trouble and disturbance, 
 falling under the dominion of pretenders who claimed 
 Arsacid descent, and even took the full titles of Par- 
 thian sovereignty. 
 
 Vologases died about A.D. 78, and was succeeded 
 by a certain Pacorus, not his brother, but probably 
 his son, who appears by his coins to have been, at 
 his accession, a very young man, and seems to have 
 reigned for thirty years, from A.D. 78 to A.D. 108. 
 This prince was thus contemporary with five Roman 
 Emperors — Vespasian, Titus, Domitian, Nerva, and 
 Trajan — but with none of these does he seem to have 
 held any communications. The " coolness " which 
 had set in under his father gradually deepened into 
 hostility ; and, when the warlike Trajan came to the 
 throne, it was soon apparent that an open quarrel
 
 ACCESSION OF PACORUS II. 297 
 
 could not be long avoided. Rome's pretensions to a 
 predominating influence in Armenia were revived, and 
 Parthia, not knowing how soon she might be attacked, 
 began to look out for allies among the avowed 
 enemies of the Roman Empire. Relations were 
 established between Pacorus and Decebalus, 1 the 
 Dacian monarch, who had been at war with Rome in 
 the reign of Domitian (A.D. 81-90), and was now (A.D. 
 10 1 ) again threatened by Trajan. Pacorus, however, 
 had not the courage to lend his ally any active 
 assistance, either by sending troops to his aid in the 
 
 COIN OK PACORUS II. 
 
 struggle that went on upon the Danube, or by effect- 
 ing a diversion in his favour upon the Euphrates. 
 When Decebalus fell, in A.D. 104, and Dacia became 
 a Roman province, Pacorus must have felt that he 
 stood alone, and that, having provoked the hostility 
 of Rome by his relations with her enemy, he might 
 expect at any moment an attack. Trajan, however, 
 was too wise and too cautious to precipitate matters ; 
 an invasion of the East needed careful preparation ; 
 and the invasion which he contemplated was one of 
 
 1 Plin., " Epist.," x. 16; Merivale, " Roman Empire," vol. viii. p. 
 154-
 
 2Q' 
 
 PACORUS AND ART A BAN US IV. 
 
 unusual importance and magnitude : he therefore 
 abstained for the present from all offensive measures, 
 and contented himself with paving the way for his 
 intended expedition by intrigues in Armenia and 
 elsewhere, by accumulating warlike stores, and 
 increasing the strictness of military discipline. 
 Pacorus was thus left in peace to the termination of 
 his long reign (A.D. 108), and the storm which had so 
 long threatened did not burst until the time of his 
 successor. A pretender, however, Artabanus IV. ; 
 who has left coins, falls into this reign. 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS IT.
 
 XVIII. 
 
 CHOSROES AND TRAJAN — TRAJAN'S ASIATIC CON- 
 QUESTS— RELINQUISHMENT OF THESE CON- 
 QUESTS BY HADRIAN. 
 
 PACORUS the Second was succeeded upon the 
 throne by Chosroes, his brother, whom the Parthian 
 Megistanes preferred over the heads of Exedares and 
 Parthamasiris, Pacorus's two sons, as more fit to rule 
 under the difficult circumstances of the period. It 
 
 COIN OF CHOSROES. 
 
 was known, or at any rate suspected, that the warlike 
 
 and experienced Trajan designed an expedition 
 
 against the East, and it therefore seemed necessary 
 
 to entrust the government of the Parthian state to a 
 
 man of mature age and sound judgment. The sons of 
 
 Pacorus were young and rash, certainly incompetent 
 
 to cope with so dangerous an antagonist as Trajan. 
 
 299
 
 300 CH0SR0ES AND TRAJAN. 
 
 Chosroes was of ripe age, at any rate, and, though 
 untried, was believed to possess ability, a belief which 
 after events, on the whole, justified. 
 
 The ostensible cause of quarrel between Rome and 
 Parthia was, as so frequently before, Armenia. On 
 the death of Tiridates, in or about the year a.d. ioo, 
 Pacorus appears, without any consultation with Rome, 
 to have placed his own son, Exedares, upon the 
 Armenian throne. This was certainly throwing out 
 a challenge to Trajan, and was a high-handed pro- 
 ceeding, not justified by the previous relations of the 
 countries. On the last occasion of the throne being 
 vacant, though Parthia had nominated the prince, 
 Rome's right to give investiture had been admitted, 
 and Tiridates had, in fact, received his diadem from 
 the hands of Nero. But Pacorus probably knew that 
 Trajan had his hands fully occupied with the Dacian 
 troubles, and was therefore not likely to engage in 
 another war, while he may perhaps have thought 
 that the right of investiture was too shadowy a 
 matter for Rome greatly to value it. Events so fa 
 justified his expectations that Trajan made neither 
 remonstrance nor threat at the time, but seemingly 
 acquiesced in the new departure. When, however, 
 the Dacian War was over, and the country reduced 
 into the form of a Roman province (about A.D. 114), 
 the Emperor, whose appetite for conquest was 
 whetted rather than satisfied by his Danubian suc- 
 cesses, considered that the time was come for taking 
 the affairs of the East into his serious consideration, 
 and for placing them on a footing which should give 
 Rome security against the troubles that had now, for
 
 TRAJAN ON THE EASTERN QUESTION. 30I 
 
 about a century and a half, threatened her from this 
 quarter. 
 
 Two views might be taken of the Oriental ques- 
 tion. It might be regarded in the light in which the 
 greatest of the Roman Emperors — Augustus, Tiberius, 
 Vespasian — had hitherto regarded it, as chronic — a 
 fatal necessity involving continuous trouble, con- 
 tinuous effort, and at the best of times only admitting 
 of a sort of patched-up arrangement. Or it might be 
 viewed in a more heroic light, as Alexander the 
 Great had viewed it in his day, as an evil to be con- 
 quered, a difficulty to be overcome, an intolerable 
 state of things, which might be brought to an end, 
 and ought to be brought to an end as soon as 
 possible. Ordinary minds would naturally see it in 
 the former light. There had always been an East, 
 there would necessarily always be an East, set in 
 antagonism to the West, with a perpetual quarrel 
 going on between them. The case would then only 
 admit of palliatives, partial remedies, modi vivendi, 
 such expedients as a wise diplomacy might suggest, 
 and t .carry out, for avoiding collisions or minimising 
 them, and carrying on such intercourse as was neces- 
 sary with as little friction as possible. The other 
 view opened a wider range both of thought and 
 action. Might it be practicable to crush the East, to 
 get rid of the constant antagonism ; and if so, by 
 what means, and at what cost ? 
 
 That this latter alternative was not an altogether 
 hopeless one had been shown by Alexander himself. 
 Alexander had conquered the East, and for a cen- 
 tury and a half there had been no great barbaric
 
 302 CH0SR0&S AND TRAJAN. 
 
 Oriental monarchy standing over against the West, 
 thwarting it and threatening it. The ambition of 
 Trajan seems to have been fired by the thought of 
 what Alexander had achieved, and an idea of rivalry 
 seems to have taken possession of him. Without 
 divulging his intentions even to his intimates, much 
 less, like Crassus, 1 making an open boast of them, he 
 determined on an attempt to bring the Eastern ques- 
 tion to an end by the subjugation of Parthia. At 
 first, however, he veiled his designs under a cloak of 
 pretended moderation. He professed that his sole 
 object was the vindication of the Roman honour in 
 respect of Armenia. Both Pacorus and Chosroes, he 
 said, had insulted Rome by dealing with Armenia as 
 if its government were altogether a Parthian, and not 
 a Roman, affair. He maintained, on the contrary, 
 that the authority of Rome was paramount. It was 
 in vain that Chosroes offered to fall back upon the 
 modus vivendi which had been accepted by Nero, and 
 to allow Trajan to invest his nephew, Parthamasiris, 
 a son of Pacorus, and younger brother of Exedares, 
 with the diadem. Trajan replied ambiguously^that 
 he would see what was fittest to be done when he 
 arrived in Syria, and proceeded to hasten his march, 
 to augment the number of his troops, and to make 
 preparations of an unusual character. The autumn 
 of A.D. 114 saw him at Antioch, and in the spring of 
 the ensuing year, undaunted by the terrible earth- 
 quake which had almost destroyed the Syrian capital 
 in the winter of A.D. 1 14-5, he set out upon his march 
 from Antioch to the Armenian frontier. The satraps 
 
 1 See above, pp. 149, 150.
 
 SEIZURE OF PARTHAMASIRIS. 303 
 
 and petty princes of the region made submission as 
 he advanced, and sought his favour with gifts of 
 various kinds, which he was pleased to receive 
 graciously, while he made his way from Zeugma, the 
 Roman outpost, to the passages of the Euphrates at 
 Samosata and Elegia. Here, on the frontier of the 
 Greater Armenia, he awaited the arrival of Partha- 
 masiris, who, after attempting to negotiate with him 
 as an equal, and being treated with disdain, had been 
 encouraged to present himself as a suppliant in the 
 Roman camp, and to ask his crown of Trajan. There 
 can be no doubt that the Armenian prince understood 
 that the scene was to be a repetition of that enacted 
 at Rome in A.D. 66, when Tiridates received the 
 diadem from Nero. But Trajan was otherwise 
 minded. When the young prince, having ridden 
 into the camp at the head of a small retinue, stript 
 the diadem from his own brows and laid it at the feet of 
 the Roman Emperor, then stood in dignified silence, 
 expecting that his mute submission would be 
 graciously accepted, and that the emblem of sove- 
 reignty would be returned to him, Trajan made no 
 movement. The army, which stood around, pre- 
 pared, no doubt, for the occasion, shouted with all 
 their might, and, saluting Trajan anew as Imperator, 
 congratulated him on his " bloodless victory." Par- 
 thamasiris saw that he had fallen into a trap, and 
 would fain have fled ; but the troops had closed in 
 upon him on all sides, and he found his retreat inter- 
 cepted. Hereupon he once more confronted the 
 Emperor, and demanded a private audience, which 
 was "ranted him. A short conference was held be-
 
 304 CH0SR0ES AND TRAJAN. 
 
 tween the two in the Emperor's tent, but the pro- 
 posals of Parthamasiris were rejected. He was given 
 to understand that he must submit to the forfeiture 
 of his crown, and summoned a second time before the 
 Imperial tribunal, to show cause, if he desired to do 
 so, against the proposed forfeiture, and to hear the 
 Emperor's decision. Parthamasiris, justly indignant, 
 spoke at some length, and with much boldness. 
 " He had neither been defeated," he said, " nor made 
 prisoner by the Romans, but had come of his own 
 free will to hold a conference with the chief of the 
 Roman State, in full assurance that he would suffer no 
 wrong at his hands, but would be invested by him with 
 the Armenian sovereignty, just as Tiridates had been 
 invested by Nero. He demanded to be set at liberty, 
 together with his retinue." Trajan answered curtly 
 that he did not intend to give the sovereignty of 
 Armenia to any one. The country belonged to Rome, 
 and should have a Roman governor. Parthamasiris 
 might go where he pleased with his Parthians ; but 
 any Armenians that he had brought with him must 
 remain — they were Roman subjects. Parthamasiris, 
 upon this, rode off; but Trajan had no intention of 
 allowing him to escape, and become the leader in an 
 Armenian war. He ordered some of his troops to 
 follow and arrest him, and, if he resisted, to put him 
 to death. These instructions were carried out, and 
 Parthamasiris w r as killed, as a recent historian says, 
 " brutally." 
 
 Cruel and brutal acts are frequently successful — at 
 any rate, for a time. Trajan's " sharp and sudden 
 blow " was effective, and produced the prompt and
 
 ARMENIA MADE A ROMAN PROVINCE. 305 
 
 complete submission of Armenia No resistance was 
 made. It did not, perhaps, much matter to the bulk 
 of the inhabitants whether a Parthian vitaxa or a 
 Roman proconsul governed them. Trajan found no 
 difficulty in carrying out his intention of absorbing 
 Armenia into the empire. The two Armenias — 
 the Greater and the Less — were united together, 
 placed under a Roman governor, and reduced into 
 the form of a province. 
 
 Attention was then turned to the neighbouring 
 countries. Friendly relations were established with 
 Anchialus, king of the Heniochi and Macheloni, and 
 gifts were sent him in return for those which his 
 envoys had brought to Trajan. A new king was 
 given to the Albanians. Alliances were concluded 
 with the Iberi, Sauromatae, Colchi, and even with the 
 distant tribes sett.ed on the Cimmerian Bosphorus. 
 These names recalled to the Romans the glorious 
 times of the great Pompey, and made it evident to 
 them that Roman influence was now paramount in 
 the entire region between the Caucasus, the Caspian, 
 and the Araxes. 
 
 Still, the Emperor viewed what he had achieved 
 as a mere prelude to what he was bent on achieving. 
 It was Parthia, not Armenia, against which his ex- 
 pedition had been really aimed. Accordingly, having 
 arranged matters in the north-east, and left garrisons 
 in the principal Armenian strongholds, he made a 
 counter-movement towards the south-west, on which 
 side Parthia seemed to him most assailable. Station- 
 ing himself at Edessa, the capital of the province of 
 Osrhoene, which was still administered by a Parthian
 
 306 CHOSROES AND TRAJAN. 
 
 vassal, bearing the usual name of Abgarus, he partly 
 terrified, partly coaxed, that shifty prince into sub- 
 mission, after which he entered into negotiations with 
 Sporaces, phylarch of Anthemusia, Mannus, an 
 Arabian chieftain, and Manisares, a Parthian satrap, 
 who had a quarrel of his own with Chosroes. Having 
 drawn these chiefs to his side, he commenced his 
 attack on the great Parthian kingdom by a double 
 movement. Part of his troops marched southward, 
 by the route which Crassus had followed, and made 
 themselves masters of the tract known as Anthemusia, 
 or that between the Euphrates and the Khabour ; part 
 proceeded eastward against Batnae, Nisibis, and 
 Gordyene, or the country of the Kurds. No serious 
 resistance was offered to the invaders on either route. 
 Chosroes had withdrawn his forces to the further side 
 of the Tigris, and left the defence of the provinces to 
 his vassals, who w y ere for the most part too weak to 
 venture on opposing the march of a well-appointed 
 Roman army. By the end of the year the whole tract 
 between the Euphrates and the Tigris, as far south as 
 the town of Singara and the modern range of Sinjar, 
 had been overrun, and occupied ; Upper Mesopotamia, 
 in the broadest sense of the term, had become 
 Roman ; and the conqueror, pursuing the system 
 which he had resolved on adopting from the first, 
 absorbed the newly won territory into the empire 
 and made Mesopotamia a Roman province. At 
 Rome these successes were greeted with enthusiasm 
 medals were struck, on which the subjected countries 
 were represented as prostrate under the foot of their 
 conqueror, and the Senate conferred on him the titles,
 
 TRAJAN INVADES PARTHIA. 307 
 
 which now appear upon his coins, of " Armeniacus " 
 and " Parthicus." 
 
 As winter approached, the Emperor quitted his 
 army, and retired to Edessa or Antioch, leaving his 
 generals to maintain possession of the conquered 
 regions, and giving them very special instructions 
 with respect to the preparations that they were to 
 make for the campaign of the ensuing year. As 
 Trajan had resolved not to attempt the passage 
 through the desert which intervenes between the 
 Sinjar range and Babylonia, the crossing of the 
 Tigris would be the first important operation to be 
 accomplished. But the banks of the Tigris were, as 
 Trajan knew, very deficient in "wood, or at any rate 
 in wood suitable for the construction of such boats 
 as were required for the building of a bridge 
 across the river. He therefore gave orders that, 
 during the winter, a large fleet should be prepared at 
 Nisibis, the headquarters of the army, where timber 
 was excellent and abundant, so constructed that the 
 vessels could be readily taken to pieces and put 
 together again. These, when the spring came, were 
 conveyed in waggons to the western bank of the 
 Tigris, probably at the point where it debouches from 
 the mountains upon the low country, a little above 
 Jezireh. Trajan and his army accompanied them, 
 meeting with no resistance until they reached the 
 river and began their preparations for passing it. 
 Then, however, the inhabitants of the opposite bank 
 — not disciplined soldiers, but brave mountaineers 
 —gathered together in force, to dispute the passage. 
 It was only by launching a number of his boats at
 
 308 CHOSROES AND TRAJAN. 
 
 different points, laden with companies of heavy-armed 
 and archers, which advanced into mid-stream and 
 engaged the enemy, while at the same time they 
 threatened to land at many different points, that 
 Trajan was able, slowly and with difficulty, to com- 
 plete his construction, and finally bridge the river. 
 His troops then effected their passage, the enemy 
 dispersing ; and the Emperor rapidly overran the 
 whole of the rich country of Adiabene, between the 
 river and the hills, occupying in succession Nineveh, 
 Arbela, and Gaugamela, and nowhere meeting with 
 any resistance. Chosroes remained aloof, waiting till 
 he had drawn his enemy further away from his base 
 of operations, and nursing his own resources. Mebar- 
 sapes, the vitaxa or subject-king of Adiabene, who 
 had hoped to be able to defend the line of the Tigris, 
 finding that forced, appears to have despaired, and 
 withdrew from the struggle. One after another the 
 forts and strongholds of the district were taken and 
 occupied. Adenystrae, a place of great strength, was 
 captured by a small knot of Roman prisoners, who, 
 when they found their friends near, rose upon the 
 garrison, killed the commandant, and opened the 
 gates to their countrymen. In a few weeks all 
 Adiabene, the heart of the ancient Assyria, was 
 conquered ; and a third province was added to the 
 empire. 
 
 It might now have been expected that the Roman 
 army would advance directly upon Ctesiphon. The 
 way was open ; and Trajan might well have antici- 
 pated, as Napoleon did in 1812, that the capture of 
 the enemy's main capital would conclude the war.
 
 THE ROMANS OCCUPY CTESIPHON. 309 
 
 But for reasons that are not made clear to us, the 
 Emperor determined otherwise. Having repassed the 
 Tigris into Mesopotamia, he took Hatra, one of the 
 most considerable towns of the Middle Mesopotamia!! 
 region, and, crossing to the Euphrates, visited the 
 bitumen pits at Hit, so famous in the world's history, 
 whence the march was easy to Babylon. As still no 
 enemy showed himself, Babylon was approached, in- 
 vested, and taken — so far as appears — without a blow 
 being struck. Seleucia soon afterwards submitted ; 
 and it only remained to attack and reduce the capital 
 in order to have complete possession of the entire 
 region watered by the two rivers. Here a fleet was 
 again needful ; and Trajan, accordingly, transported 
 the flotilla, which he had taken care to have in readi- 
 ness on the Euphrates, across the narrow tract be- 
 tween the streams in N. lat. 33 , on rollers, and 
 launched it upon the Tigris. He was prepared for a 
 vigorous resistance, but once more found himself 
 unopposed. Ctesiphon opened its gates to him. 
 Chosroes had some time previously evacuated it, with 
 his family and his chief treasures, withdrawing further 
 into the interior of his vast empire, and seeking to 
 weary out his assailant by means of distance, natural 
 obstacles, and guerilla warfare. The tactics pursued 
 resemble those which have not uncommonly been 
 adopted by a comparatively weak enemy when 
 attacked by superior force, and remind us of the 
 method by which Idanthyrsus successfully defended 
 Scythia against Darius Hystaspis in the sixth century 
 B.C., and by which the Russian Alexander baffled the 
 Great Napoleon in the days of our own fathers or grand-
 
 3IO CHOSROES AND TRAJAX. 
 
 fathers. But Trajan may be excused if he took his 
 enemy's retreat for entire withdrawal from the contest, 
 and the apathy of the Western provinces for the 
 complete submission of the empire. Ctesiphon was 
 his ; Babylon was his ; Susa, the old capital of the 
 Achaemenidae, was his ; the war might be regarded 
 as over ; and so, not troubling himself to pursue his 
 flying foe into the remote and barbarous regions of 
 the far East, he proceeded to enjoy his triumph, 
 embarked on a pleasure voyage down the Tigris, and 
 even launched his bark upon the waters of the 
 Persian Gulf. The career of Alexander the Great 
 presented itself vividly to his imagination ; and he 
 sighed to think that, at his age, he could not hope 
 to reach the limits which had been attained by the 
 Macedonian. He instituted inquiries, however, with 
 respect to India, and may have contemplated sending 
 an expedition there, when he had had time to settle 
 and arrange his Parthian conquests, and to place 
 Mesopotamian affairs on a satisfactory footing. No 
 suspicion seems to have crossed his mind that the 
 conquests which he had so rapid ly effected were 
 insecure — no prevision of coming trouble appears 
 to have disturbed his self-complacency. In a fool's 
 paradise he dreamed away the closing weeks of the 
 summer of A.D. 116, and was still lazily floating on 
 the waters of the Southern Sea, when intelligence of 
 a startling character was suddenly brought to him. 
 
 Revolt had broken out in his rear. At Seleucia, at 
 Hatra, at Nisibis, at Edessa, the natives had flown to 
 arms, had ejected the Roman garrisons from their cities, 
 or in some instances massacred them. His whole line
 
 REVOLTS IN THE EMPERORS REAR. 311 
 
 of retreat was beset by foes, and he ran a great risk 
 of having his return cut off, and of perishing in the 
 distant region which he had invaded. The occasion 
 called for the most active exertions and for the 
 greatest energy ; fortunately for the Romans, Trajan 
 was equal to it. Personally, he hastened northwards, 
 while he issued peremptory orders to his generals that 
 they should everywhere take the most active measures 
 against the rebels, and do their utmost to check the 
 spread of insurrection. The chastisement of Seleucia 
 was intrusted to Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander, 
 who stormed the city, and ruthlessly delivered it to 
 the flames. Lucius Quietus succeeded in recovering 
 Nisibis, and punished its rebellion in the same way. 
 He also plundered and burnt Edessa. Maximus, 
 however, one of Trajan's most trusted officers, on 
 coming to an engagement with the enemy, was de- 
 feated and slain. A Roman army with its legate was 
 cut to pieces. Trajan himself, having returned to 
 Ctesiphon, and made himself acquainted with the 
 whole condition of affairs, woke up from his dream of 
 an easy conquest, and saw that a complete change of 
 policy was necessary. Parthia must not be treated 
 like Armenia and Mesopotamia — its people must be 
 humoured and conciliated. A native king and a 
 show of independence must be allowed them. Ac- 
 cordingly, he selected a certain Parthamaspates, a 
 man of Arsacid descent, who had embraced the 
 side of Rome in the recent struggle, and summoning 
 the Parthians of the capital and its neighbourhood to 
 a great meeting in a plain near Ctesiphon, he pro- 
 duced before them the individual whom he favoured,
 
 312 CHOSROltS AND TRAJAN. 
 
 commended him to their loyal affection in a speech of 
 considerable length, and, after magnifying somewhat 
 injudiciously the splendour of his own achievements, 
 placed the diadem with his own hand upon his brow. 
 He then commenced his retreat. Taking the direct 
 line through Mesopotamia, he marched, in the first 
 instance, upon Hatra, one of the towns which had re- 
 volted from him, and had not yet been reduced. The 
 place was small, but strongly fortified. It lay in the 
 desert between the Tigris and Euphrates, nearer to 
 the former, and was protected, by the scantiness of its 
 water, and the unproductiveness of the region around, 
 from attack except by a small force. Trajan battered 
 down a portion of the wall, and attempted to enter by 
 the breach ; but his troops met with a decided repulse, 
 and he himself, having rashly approached too near 
 the walls, was in the greatest danger of being wounded. 
 The horseman nearest to him was actually struck by 
 an arrow and slain. After this the siege did not last 
 long. As autumn approached the weather broke up, 
 and thunderstorms prevailed, with rain and violent 
 hail. It was believed that whenever the Romans 
 proceeded to the assault, the fury of the elemental 
 war increased in severity. Moreover, a plague of 
 insects set in. Gnats and flies disputed with the 
 soldiers every morsel of their food and every drop of 
 their drink. Under these circumstances the Emperor 
 felt compelled to relinquish the siege and beat a re- 
 treat. He retired through Mesopotamia upon Syria, 
 and took up his quarters at Antioch, having suffered, 
 it would seem, 1 considerable loss upon the way. At 
 
 1 So Fronto, " Princip. Hist." p. 338.
 
 RETREAT AND DEATH OF TRAJAN. 313 
 
 Antioch the effects of his heavy toils and exertions 
 began to show themselves. He fell sick, and quitting 
 his army, made an attempt to reach Rome, but suc- 
 cumbed to his malady before he had proceeded very 
 far, and died at Selinus, in Cilicia, August, A.D. 117. 
 
 On the retirement of Trajan, the Parthian monarch, 
 quitting Media, returned to Ctesiphon, expelled 
 Parthamaspates without difficulty, and re-established 
 his own rule over the regions which Trajan had over- 
 run, but had not reduced into the form of provinces. 
 Armenia, however, Upper Mesopotamia, and Assyria, 
 or Adiabene, were still held in force by the Romans, 
 and might probably have been maintained against 
 any attack that Parthia could have made, had the 
 new Emperor, Hadrian, who had succeeded Trajan, 
 regarded their retention as desirable. But Hadrian, 
 who, as prefect of Syria, had been a near witness of 
 Trajan's campaigns, and possessed an intimate ac- 
 quaintance with the general condition of the East, 
 was deeply convinced that the attempt of Trajan had 
 been a mistake, and that the true policy for Rome 
 was that laid down in principle by Augustus — that 
 the possession: of the empire should not be extended 
 beyond their natural and traditional limits. He re- 
 solved, therefore, to withdraw the Roman legions once 
 more within the Euphrates, and to relinquish the 
 newly-conquered provinces, of which so great a boast 
 had been made — Armenia, Mesopotamia, Adiabene. 
 It is generally allowed by modern historians, that the 
 resolution was a wise one. " There was no soil be- 
 yond the Euphrates," says Dean Merivale with excel- 
 lent judgment, "in which Roman institutions could
 
 314 TRAJAN'S CONQUESTS RELINQUISHED. 
 
 take root, while the expense of maintaining them 
 would have been utterly exhausting." 1 As far as 
 the Euphrates Greek colonisation had so leavened 
 the original Asiatic mass as to render it semi- Euro- 
 pean, and so to prepare it to a large extent for the 
 reception of Roman ideas and Roman principles of 
 government : beyond, the Greek infusion had been 
 too weak to produce much effect — Orientalism pure 
 prevailed — and Western institutions, if introduced, 
 would have found themselves in an alien soil, where 
 they could only have withered and died. Even apart 
 from this, the Roman Empire was already so large as 
 to be unwieldy, and to endanger its continued cohesion. 
 The chiefs of provinces east of the Euphrates would 
 have been so far removed from the seat of government 
 as to be practically exempt from effectual control and 
 supervision. They would have had enormous forces 
 in men and money at their command, and have been 
 under a perpetual temptation to revolt and endeavour 
 to secure for themselves an independent position. The 
 garrisoning, moreover, of such extensive countries 
 would have been a severe drain upon the military 
 resources of the empire, and would have exercised a 
 demoralising influence upon the soldiery, such as was 
 already felt to some extent with regard to the legions 
 quartered in Syria. Altogether, it is clear that the 
 course pursued by Hadrian in contracting once more 
 the eastern limits of the empire was a prudent one, 
 and entitles the prince who adopted it, not only to the 
 praise of " moderation," but to that of political insight 
 and sagacity. 
 
 1 " Roman Empire," vol. viii. p. 192.
 
 CHOSROES AND HADRIAN. 3I5 
 
 The evacuation of the conquered countries brought 
 about a return to the condition of things in the East 
 which had prevailed ever since the time of Augustus. 
 Rome and Parthia resumed their ancient boundaries. 
 Armenia reverted to its old condition of a kingdom 
 nominally independent, but too weak to stand alone, 
 and necessarily leaning on external support, at one 
 time practically dependent on Rome, at another on 
 Parthia. Its first ruler, after it ceased to be a Roman 
 province, was Parthamaspates, to whom Hadrian 
 seems to have handed it over, and in whose appoint- 
 ment Chosroes must have acquiesced. Chosroes could 
 not but be well disposed towards the ruler who, with- 
 out being compelled to do so by a defeat, had restored 
 to Parthia the two most important and valuable of her 
 provinces ; and the consolidation of his power in them 
 probably gave him ample occupation, and made him 
 satisfied to have a time of repose from external 
 troubles. He seems to have continued on friendly 
 terms with Hadrian during the remainder of his life. 
 Once only, in A.D. 122, was the good understanding 
 threatened. The exact causes of complaint have not 
 come down to us ; but it appears that^ in that year 
 rumours of an intended Parthian invasion reached the 
 Emperor, and induced him to make a journey to the 
 far East, in order, by his personal influence and as- 
 surances, to avert the danger. An interview was held 
 between the two monarchs upon the frontier, and ex- 
 planations were given and received, which both parties 
 regarded as satisfactory The Parthian prince gave up 
 his intention of troubling the peace of Rome, and the 
 two empires continued, not only during the rest of the
 
 316 
 
 LATER YEARS OF CHOSROES. 
 
 reign of Chosroes, but till some time after the death 
 of Hadrian, on terms of friendship and amity. Hadrian 
 went so far as to restore to Chosroes (about A.D. 130) a 
 daughter who had been taken prisoner at Susa by the 
 generals of Trajan fourteen years before, and had re- 
 mained at Rome in captivity ; and he is even said to 
 have promised the restoration of the golden throne 
 
 COINS OF VOLOGASES II. 
 
 COIN OF MITHRIDATES IV. COIN OF ARTABANUS IV. 
 
 captured at the same time, on which the Parthians set 
 a special value. 
 
 Chosroes, during his later years, had to contend 
 with a pretender to his throne, who bore the name, so 
 common at this time, of Vologases. The Parthian 
 empire showed, more and more as time went on, a 
 tendency to disintegration ; and there is reason to 
 believe that, during the space commonly assigned to 
 Chosroes (A.D. 108-130), different monarchs reigned,
 
 TROUBLES CAUSED BY PRETENDERS. 
 
 3*7 
 
 not infrequently, in different parts of Parthia at the 
 same time. The coins of Vologases II. run parallel 
 for many years with those of Chosroes. A coin of a 
 Mithridates, and another of an Artabanus, fall into 
 the same interval. The classical writers make no 
 mention of these rival kings ; and the native remains 
 are so scanty that it is impossible to draw any con- 
 tinuous narrative from them. We can only say, 
 generally, that Parthia has entered the period of her 
 decadence, and that, even apart from foreign attack, 
 she would, if left to herself, have probably expired 
 within little more than a century.
 
 XIX. 
 
 VOLOGASES II. AND ANTONINUS PIUS — VOLOGASES 
 III. AND VERUS. 
 
 The Vologases who had for so many years dis- 
 puted the crown with Chosroes, appears, on the 
 decease of the latter, to have been generally ac- 
 knowledged as king. He was an aged prince, in- 
 disposed to any unnecessary exertion, and quite 
 content to continue on the friendly terms with Rome 
 which had been established under his predecessor. 
 He had not, however, been settled more than three 
 years upon the throne, when hostilities came upon 
 him from an unexpected quarter. Pharasmanes, who 
 enjoyed the sovereignty of Iberia under Roman pro- 
 tection, but chafed at his dependent position, and had 
 private grounds of quarrel with Hadrian, in the year 
 A.D. 133, suddenly threw the whole of the East into 
 a blaze. Inviting into Asia a great horde of the 
 northern barbarians from the tracts beyond the Cau- 
 casus, he induced them to precipitate themselves upon 
 Armenia, Cappadocia, and Media Atropatene, which 
 was once more a dependency of Parthia, and to carry 
 fire and sword into the midst of those fertile regions. 
 Vologases at once complained to Rome of the injury 
 
 3'8
 
 REIGN OF VOLOGASES II. 319 
 
 done him by her feudatory, and requested assistance ; 
 but Hadrian regarded troubles in so distant a region as 
 unimportant, and, satisfied that Cappadocia would be 
 sufficiently protected by its governor, who was Arrian, 
 the historian of Alexander, he left Vologases to 
 struggle with his difficulties as he best might. The 
 aged monarch, under these circumstances, had recourse 
 to an expedient at once impolitic and disgraceful — 
 he bribed the horde of Alans, which had invaded his 
 province, to quit the country, and turn their arms in 
 another direction. Such a policy, though occasionally 
 adopted by the Romans themselves, can never be 
 other than mistaken and ruinous. Once entered 
 upon, it is almost certain to be continued, and to bring 
 about at once the exhaustion and the degradation of 
 the people that condescends to it. 
 
 It is not perhaps surprising that Hadrian, always 
 studious of peace, abstained from taking any active 
 part in the Alanic war ; but it certainly seems strange 
 that, instead of inflicting any punishment on Pharas- 
 manes for his reckless action in introducing the bar- 
 barians into Asia, and actually letting them loose 
 upon the empire, he should have shortly afterwards 
 loaded him with honours and benefits. He summoned 
 him indeed to Rome, to answer for his conduct, but, 
 having done this, accepted his explanations, condoned 
 his crimes, and not only so, but rewarded him by an 
 enlargement of his dominion, and by various other 
 marks of favour. He permitted him to sacrifice in 
 the Capitol, placed his equestrian statue in the temple 
 of Bellona, and was present at a sham fight in which 
 the Iberian monarch, his son, and his chief nobles
 
 320 VOLOGASES II. AND ANTONINUS PIUS. 
 
 exhibited their skill and prowess. It is not likely 
 that Vologases can have been much pleased at these 
 results of his complaints ; but he seems to have sub- 
 mitted to them without a murmur ; and, when Hadrian 
 died (in A.D. 138), and was succeeded by his adopted 
 son, Titus Aurelius, better known as Antoninus Pius, 
 he sent to Rome an embassy of congratulation, and 
 presented his Roman brother with a crown of gold. 
 The medal, which records this event, was struck in 
 the first year of Antoninus, and exhibits on the 
 reverse a female figure holding a bow and quiver in 
 the left hand, and with the right presenting a crown, 
 while underneath is the inscription, PARTHIA. 
 
 Having thus, as he thought, secured the good-will 
 of the new monarch by a well-timed compliment, 
 Vologases ventured on intruding upon him with an 
 unpleasant demand. Hadrian, in a moment of weak- 
 ness, had promised that the golden throne, captured 
 by Trajan in his great expedition, should be given 
 back to its proper owners ; but,, finding that the act 
 would be unpalatable to his subjects, had delayed the 
 performance of his promise, and finally died without 
 giving effect to it. Vologases hoped that his successor 
 might be more accommodating, and instructed his 
 envoys to bring the matter before Antoninus, to 
 remind him of Hadrian's pledged word, and make a 
 formal request for the delivery to them of the much- 
 prized relic. But Antonine was as much averse to 
 relinquishing the trophy as his predecessor had been, 
 and positively refused to grant the request made of 
 him. The envoys had to return re iufecta, and to 
 report to their master that, for the present at any
 
 ACCESSION OF VOLOGASES III. 321 
 
 rate, all hope must be laid aside of recovering the 
 emblem of Arsacid sovereignty. 
 
 The remainder of the reign of Vologases II. was 
 tranquil and unmarked by any striking incident. No 
 pretensions were put forward by the Parthians with 
 respect to Armenia, to which, probably on the death 
 Parthamaspates, Rome was suffered, without protest, 
 to appoint a new monarch. No further attempt was 
 made to obtain the surrender of the " golden throne." 
 The coolness between the two states, which had 
 followed on Antonine's rejection of the demand pre- 
 ferred by Vologases, merely tended to keep the rival 
 powers apart, and to prevent occasions of collision, 
 while Antonine's truly peaceful policy preserved 
 Parthia even from internal disturbance, and allowed 
 the successor of Chosroes to enjoy his throne, un- 
 threatened by any pretender, for the comparatively 
 long term of nineteen years (A.D. 130 to 149). The 
 aged monarch left his crown to a successor of the 
 same name as himself, who was probably his son, 
 though of this there is no direct evidence. 
 
 The third Vologases ascended the Parthian throne 
 either in A.D. 148 or 149. He took the same titles as his 
 predecessor, but added to them, upon his coins,a Semitic 
 legend — either &ota imb)> " Vologases, King," or •>l ,, 3^i 
 Nsta p^£ -|ens, " Volagases, Arsaces, King of Kings." 
 The dates on his coins extend from A.D. 148-9 to 
 A.D. 1 90- 1, showing that he held the throne for the 
 long space of forty-two years. During the earlier 
 portion of the time (A.D. 148-161) he was contemporary 
 with Antoninus Pius, and, though discontented with 
 the exclusion of Parthia from all influence in Armenia,
 
 322 VOLOGASES III. AND VERUS. 
 
 and meditating a war with Rome on this account, he 
 suffered himself to be persuaded, by letters from the 
 pacific Emperor, to keep the peace as long as he 
 occupied the Imperial throne, and to defer his con- 
 templated outbreak until the reign of his successor. 
 On the death of Antoninus, however, he was not 
 further to be restrained, but at once took the field, and 
 marching an army suddenly into Armenia, carried 
 all before him, expelled Soasmus, Rome's vassal and 
 creature, from the kingdom, and placed upon the 
 throne a protege of his own, a certain Tigranes, a scion 
 
 COIN OF VOI.OGASES III. 
 
 of the old royal stock, whose name recalled to the 
 Armenians the period of their greatest glory. The 
 Roman governors of the adjacent provinces learnt with 
 surprise and alarm that Armenia was detached from 
 the empire ; and Severianus, prefect of Cappadocia, 
 the nearest to the scene of action, and a man of an 
 impetuous disposition, being a Gaul by birth, hurried 
 to the scene at the head of a single legion, partly 
 moved by his own hot temper, partly yielding to the 
 persuasions of a pseudo-prophet of those parts named 
 Alexander, who promised him a signal victory. But
 
 ARMENIA SEIZED BY VOLOGASES. 323 
 
 the result signally falsified the prophecy. Scarcely 
 had Severianus crossed the Euphrates into Armenia, 
 when he found himself in the presence of a superior 
 force under the command of a Parthian general called 
 Chosroes, and was under the necessity of throwing 
 himself into the city of Elegeia, where he was immedi- 
 ately besieged and blockaded. Though he offered a 
 strenuous resistance, it was unavailing. His troops 
 were not of good quality, and, unable to break through 
 the cordon which surrounded them, they were in a 
 short time shot down by the Parthian archers, and 
 perished almost to a man. Severianus shared their 
 fate ; and the Parthians obtained a success which was 
 paralleled with that of Surenas against Crassus, or of 
 Arminius against Varus. Their mastery over Armenia 
 was confirmed, and the Roman provinces were laid 
 wholly open to their attacks. Their squadrons crossed 
 the Euphrates, and marched into Syria, where they 
 obtained a second success. L. Attidius Cornelianus, 
 the proconsul, gathered together the forces of his 
 province, and gave battle to the invaders, but was 
 repulsed. The situation became nearly such as had 
 obtained after the defeat of Crassus, or when Pacorus 
 and Labienus, in the year B.C. 40, carried ravage 
 and ruin over the region between the Euphrates and 
 the Orontes. The Parthians passed from Syria into 
 Palestine, and the whole of the Roman East seemed 
 to lie open to them. Intelligence of what had 
 happened was rapidly carried to Rome, and threw 
 the Senate into consternation. Aurelius felt that he 
 could not be spared from Italy, but deputed Verus to 
 represent him in the East, and bade him hasten to the
 
 324 VOLOGASES III. AND VERUS. 
 
 scene of action with such forces as could be gathered. 
 Verus, however, was a lover of pleasure. First he 
 loitered on his way in Apulia, then proceeded at a 
 leisurely pace to Syria, finally settled himself in the 
 luxurious Antioch, and, giving himself up to its 
 pleasures and amusements, handed over the cares of 
 war to his lieutenants. Fortunately for Rome, there 
 were among these several generals of the antique type, 
 as especially Statius Priscus, Avidius Cassius, and 
 Martius Verus. Cassius, even before the arrival of 
 Verus and his army, had begun an effective resistance. 
 He had, by almost incredible efforts, brought the 
 Syrian legions into a state of order and discipline, had 
 with them checked the advance of Vologases, and had 
 finally found himself in a condition to take the 
 offensive. In A.D. 163 he fought a great battle with 
 the Parthians, defeated them, and drove them across 
 the Euphrates. Meanwhile, Statius Priscus and 
 Martius Verus had undertaken the recovery of 
 Armenia. Statius had advanced without a check 
 from the frontier to the capital, Artaxata, had taken 
 the city, and burnt it to the ground, after which he 
 built a new city, which he strongly garrisoned with 
 Roman troops, and sent intelligence to Rome that 
 Armenia was now ready to welcome back her expelled 
 prince, Soaemus. Soaemus upon this returned, and, 
 though some further disturbances were made by the 
 anti-Roman party, yet these were successfully dealt 
 with, chiefly by Martius Verus, and, in a short time, 
 the Roman nominee was recognised as undisputed 
 king, and the entire country brought into a state of 
 tranquillity.
 
 GREAT EXPEDITION OF AVIDIUS CASSIUS. 325 
 
 The success which had attended the first rush to 
 arms of Vologases III. was thus completely neutralised. 
 In the space of two years Rome had made good all 
 her losses, and shown that she was fully able to main- 
 tain the position in Western Asia which she had 
 acquired by the victories of Trajan. But the ambi- 
 tious generals, into whose hands the conduct of the 
 war had fallen through the incapacity of Verus, were 
 far from satisfied with the mere recovery of what had 
 been lost. Personal, rather than patriotic, motives 
 actuated them. In the circumstances of the time 
 military distinction was more coveted than any other, 
 and was looked upon as opening a path to the very 
 highest honours. The successful general became, as 
 a matter of course, by virtue of his position, a candi- 
 date for the Imperial dignity. If, under the great 
 Napoleon, every conscript felt that he carried a 
 marshal's baton in his knapsack, still more, under the 
 Middle Empire, was every victorious commander per- 
 suaded that each step in the path of victory brought 
 him sensibly nearer to the throne. Of all the officers 
 engaged in the Parthian war, nominally under Verus, 
 the most capable and the most ambitious was Avidius 
 Cassius. Sprung from the family of the great 
 " Liberator," who had contended for the supreme 
 power in the state with Augustus and Antony, he 
 had a hereditary bias towards pushing himself to the 
 front, and might be counted upon to let slip no occa- 
 sion which fortune should put in his way. His posi- 
 tion in Syria gave him a splendid opportunity. After 
 his first successes against Vologases, Aurelius had 
 made him a sort of generalissimo ; and, having thus
 
 326 VOLOGASES III. AND VERUS. 
 
 perfect freedom of action, he resolved to carry the war 
 into the enemy's country, and see if he could not rival, 
 or even outdo, the achievements of Trajan half a 
 century earlier. No continuous history of his cam- 
 paign has reached our time, but from the fragmentary 
 notices of it which are still extant we may gather a 
 good general idea of its course and character. Cross- 
 ing the Euphrates into Mesopotamia at Zeugma, the 
 most important of the Roman stations upon the river, 
 he proceeded first to Nicephorium, near the junction 
 of the Belik with the Euphrates, and thence made his 
 way down the course of the stream to Sura (probably 
 Sippara) and Babylon. At Sura a battle was fought, 
 in which the Romans were victorious, but it was after 
 this that the great successes took place which covered 
 Cassius with glory. The vast city of Seleucia upon 
 the Tigris, which had at the time a population of 
 four hundred thousand souls, was besieged, taken, and 
 burnt, to punish an alleged treason of the inhabitants. 
 Ctesiphon, upon the opposite bank of the river, 
 the summer residence of the Parthian kings, was 
 occupied, and the royal palace there situated was 
 pillaged, and levelled with the ground. The vari- 
 ous fanes and temples were stripped of their 
 treasures ; and search was made for buried riches 
 in all the places which were thought likely to have 
 been utilised, the result being that an immense 
 booty was carried off. The Parthians, worsted in every 
 encounter, after a time, ceased to resist, and all the 
 conquests made by Trajan, and relinquished by 
 Hadrian, were recovered. Further, an expedition was 
 made into the Zagros mountain tract, and a portion of
 
 RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION. 327 
 
 it, considered to lie within the limits of Media, and 
 never yet possessed by Rome, was occupied. Aurelius 
 owed it to the valour and good fortune of his general 
 that he was thus entitled to add to the epithets of 
 " Armeniacus" and " Parthicus," which he had already 
 •assumed, the further and wholly novel epithet of 
 " Medicus." 
 
 The victories of Avidius Cassius, unlike those of 
 Trajan, were followed by no reverses, and they had 
 further the effect, denied to Trajan's, of making 
 the permanent addition of a large tract to the Roman 
 Empire. When Vologases, after five years of un- 
 successful warfare, finally sued for peace to his too 
 powerful antagonist, he was compelled to surrender, as 
 the price of it, the extensive and valuable country of 
 Western Mesopotamia. The entire region between 
 the Euphrates and the Khabour passed under the 
 dominion of Rome at this time, and though not 
 formally made into a province, became wholly lost to 
 Parthia. The coins of the Greek cities within the 
 area bear henceforth on the obverse the head of a 
 Roman Emperor, and on the reverse some local token 
 or legend ; every trace of Patthian influence is removed 
 from them. 
 
 But, if Rome thus carried off all the honours of the 
 war with Vologases III., still she did not escape the 
 Nemesis which usually attends upon the over-fortu- 
 nate. During its stay in the marshy regions of 
 Lower Mesopotamia, the army of Cassius was deeply 
 infected with the germs of a strange and terrible 
 malady, which clung to it on its return, and was 
 widely disseminated along the whole line of the
 
 328 VOLOGASES III. AND VERUS. 
 
 retreat. The superstition of the soldiers assigned to 
 the pestilence a supernatural origin. It had crept 
 forth, they said, from a subterranean cell, or a golden 
 coffer, in the temple of the Comaean Apollo at 
 Seleucia, during the time that a portion of the army 
 was engaged in plundering the temple treasures. 
 Placed there in primeval times by the spells of the 
 Chaldaeans, it raged with the more virulence on 
 account of its long confinement, and amply avenged 
 the Parthians for the many woes inflicted on them by 
 Roman hands. Every town that lay upon the route 
 of the returning army was smitten by it ; and from 
 these centres it diverged in every direction, east and 
 west, and north and south, into the adjacent districts. 
 At Rome, the number of victims amounted to tens 
 of thousands. " Not the vulgar herd of the Suburra 
 only, the usual victims of a pestilence, were stricken, 
 but many of the highest rank also suffered." x 
 According to Orosius, 2 in Italy generally the whole 
 country was so devastated, that the villas, towns, and 
 fields were everywhere left without inhabitant or 
 cultivation, and fell to ruin, or relapsed into wilder- 
 nesses. The army suffered especially, and is said to 
 have been almost annihilated. In the provinces more 
 than half the population was carried off, and the 
 pestilence, overleaping the Alps, spread as far as the 
 Rhine and the Atlantic Ocean. 
 
 The remainder of the reign of Vologases III. was 
 uneventful. He continued to occupy the Parthian 
 
 1 Merivale, " Roman Empire," vol. viii. p. 333. 
 s Paul. Oros., "Hist.," vii. 15.
 
 VOLOGASES III. AND COM MODUS. 329 
 
 throne until A.D. 190 or 191, but took no further part, 
 so far as we know, in any military operations. Once 
 only does he seem to have been so far stirred from 
 his inaction as to contemplate resuming the struggle 
 against his powerful enemy. This was in A.D. 174 or 
 175, when, Aurelius being detained upon the Danube, 
 the inordinate ambition of Avidius Cassius drove him 
 into open rebellion, and the prospect of a Roman 
 civil war seemed to offer a chance of Parthia being 
 able to reassert herself. But the opportunity passed 
 before Vologases could bring himself to make any 
 serious movement. The revolt of Cassius collapsed 
 almost as soon as it had broken out, and the East 
 returned to its normal condition. Vologases repented 
 of his warlike intention ; and when (in A.D. 176) 
 Aurelius visited Syria, sent ambassadors to him 
 with friendly assurances, who were received with 
 favour. 
 
 Four years later the reign of the philosophic 
 Emperor came to an end ; and the Imperial power 
 passed into the hands of his weak and unworthy son, 
 Lucius Aurelius Commodus. A second opportunity 
 for an aggressive movement offered itself ; but, again, 
 Vologases resisted the temptation to rush into 
 hostilities, and remained passive within the limits of 
 his own dominions. The reign of Commodus (A.D. 
 180-192) was, from first to last, untroubled by any 
 Parthian outbreak. Vologases was probably by this 
 time an old man, since he had held the Parthian 
 throne for thirty-two years when Commodus suc- 
 ceeded his father, and may naturally have been dis- 
 inclined to further warlike exertion. Rome was
 
 3^> 
 
 VOLOGASES III. AND COM MODUS. 
 
 therefore still allowed to maintain her Mesopotamian 
 conquests unchallenged ; and when Vologascs died 
 (in A.D. 190 or 191), the condition of things continued 
 as established by Aurelius in A.D. 165.
 
 XX. 
 
 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 
 
 The third Vologases was succeeded by another 
 prince of the same name, who is usually regarded as 
 his son, though there is no distinct evidence of the 
 fact. His coins, which generally present his full face 
 upon their obverse, instead of the customary profile, 
 have dates which run from A.D. 191 to 208. He thus 
 appears to have been contemporary with the Roman 
 
 COIN OF VOLOGASES IV. 
 
 Emperors — Commodus, Pertinax, Didius Julianus, 
 Pescennius Niger, and Septimius Severus. The great 
 Parthian war of Severus fell entirely within his reign, 
 and it is as the antagonist of this distinguished prince 
 that he is chiefly known to history. 
 
 It was very shortly after the accession of Vologases 
 IV. that the officers of the Court of Commodus,
 
 332 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 
 
 unable any longer to endure his excesses and 
 cruelties, conspired against the unworthy son of the 
 good Aurelius and assassinated him in his bed- 
 chamber. This murder was soon followed by another 
 — that of the virtuous, but perhaps over-strict, 
 Pertinax. The Praetorians, after this, put up the 
 office of Roman Emperor to public auction, and 
 knocked it down to Didius Julianus, a rich senator, 
 who is said to have paid for his prize no less than 
 three millions of our money. But this indignity 
 exhausted the patience of the legions, and threw the 
 entire empire into confusion. In three places — in 
 Britain, in Pannonia, and in Syria — revolt broke out, 
 and the soldiers invested their respective leaders, 
 Clodius Albinus, Septimius Severus, and Pescennius 
 Niger, with the purple. Niger, who, as prefect of 
 Syria, held the second dignity in the empire, imagined 
 that his elevation would not be disputed, and, instead 
 of straining every nerve to raise forces, and strengthen 
 himself by alliances, declined at first the offers of 
 assistance made him by various Parthian feudatories, 
 and remained inactive in the East, expecting the 
 Senate's confirmation of his appointment. But the 
 unpleasant intelligence soon reached him that Sep- 
 timius Severus, proclaimed Emperor in Pannonia and 
 acknowledged at Rome, was on his way to Syria, 
 determined to dispute with him the prize, whereof he 
 had somewhat rashly thought himself assured. Under 
 these changed circumstances, Niger felt compelled to 
 alter his own policy, and to implore the assistance 
 which so shortly before he had rejected. Towards 
 the close of the year A.D. 193 he despatched envoys
 
 PRETENSIONS OF PESCENNIUS NIGER. 333 
 
 to the courts of the chief princes beyond the 
 Euphrates, and especially to the kings of Armenia, 
 Parthia, and Hatra, entreating them to send con- 
 tingents to his aid as soon as possible. The Armenian 
 monarch — Vologases, the son of Sanatrceces — made 
 answer that it was not his intention to ally himself 
 with either side ; he should stand aloof from the 
 conflict and simply defend his own kingdom if any 
 attack were made upon it. The reply from the 
 Parthian Vologases was more favourable. He could 
 not send troops at once, he said, as his army was 
 disbanded, but he would issue an order to his satraps 
 for the collection of a strong force as soon as possible. 
 Barsemius, king of Hatra, went further even than his 
 suzerain, and actually despatched to Niger's aid a 
 body of archers, which reached his camp in safety, 
 and took part in the war. Vologases IV. must have 
 given his sanction to this movement on the part of 
 his feudatory, who could certainly not have ventured 
 on such a proceeding against the will of his lord 
 paramount. Still Vologases was not prepared to 
 commit himself unreservedly to either side in the 
 impending conflict, and refrained from taking any 
 active steps in furtherance of his professed design to 
 collect an army, waiting to see to which side the 
 fortune of war would incline. 
 
 The struggle between the rival Emperors was soon 
 terminated. Niger passed from Asia into Europe, 
 and took up a position near Byzantium, but, having 
 suffered a defeat at Cyzicus, was soon forced to fall 
 back upon his reserves, and, passing through Asia 
 Minor, gave his adversary battle for the second time
 
 334 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 
 
 near Issus, where his army was completely routed, 
 and he himself captured and put to death. Mean- 
 while, however, the nations of the East had flown to 
 arms. The newly-subjected Mesopotamians had risen 
 in revolt, had massacred most of the Roman detach- 
 ments stationed in their country, and had even laid 
 siege to Nisibis, which was the headquarters of the 
 Roman power in the district. Their kindred tribes 
 from the further side of the Euphrates, particularly 
 the people of Adiabene, had assisted them, and taken 
 part in the attack. The first object of Severus after 
 the defeat and death of Niger was to raise the siege, 
 and to chastise the rebels, with their aiders and 
 abettors. He marched hastily to Nisibis, defeated 
 the combined Osrhoeni and Adiabeni, relieved the 
 distressed garrison, and took up his own quarters in 
 the place. He then proceeded to re-subject Meso- 
 potamia. The inhabitants sought to disarm his 
 resentment by representing that they had taken 
 up arms, not against him, or against the Romans 
 generally, but against Niger, his rival and foe, whom 
 they had endeavoured to distress for his (Severus's) 
 benefit. They professed a readiness to surrender the 
 Romans whom they had taken prisoners, and such 
 portion of the Roman spoil as remained still in their 
 hands ; but it was observed that they said nothing about 
 giving up the strongholds that they had taken, or about 
 resuming the position of Roman tributaries. On the 
 contrary, they put forward a demand that all the Roman 
 troops still in their country should be withdrawn from 
 it, and that their independence should be respected 
 in the future. Severus was not prepared to accept
 
 flRST EXPEDITION OF SEVERUS. 335 
 
 these terms, or to sanction the retreat of Terminus. 
 His immediate adversaries — the kings of Osrhocinc, 
 Adiabene, and Hatra — were of small account, and he 
 might expect to defeat them without difficulty. Even 
 if the Parthian monarch espoused the cause of his 
 feudatories, he was not indisposed to cross swords 
 with him. The expeditions of Trajan and Avidius 
 Cassius had done much to diminish the terror of the 
 Parthian name ; and to ambitious Romans the East 
 presented itself as the quarter in which, without any 
 serious danger, the greatest glory was to be won. 
 
 Accordingly, the Emperor rejected the Mesopo- 
 tamian proposals, and applied himself to the task of 
 reducing their country to complete subjection. From 
 the central position of Nisibis, where he himself 
 remained, he sent out his forces under his three best 
 commanders — Laternus, Candidus, and Laetus — in 
 three directions, with orders to carry fire and sword 
 through the entire region, and to re-establish every- 
 where the Imperial authority. His commands were 
 executed. Resistance was everywhere crushed ; the 
 old administration was restored ; and Nisibis, raised 
 to the dignity of a Roman colony, once more became 
 the metropolis of the country. Nor was Severus 
 contented with the mere restoration of the Roman 
 power. He caused his troops to cross the Tigris 
 into Adiabene, and though the inhabitants offered a 
 stout resistance, succeeded in overrunning the district 
 and occupying it. Further aggressions and further 
 conquests would probably have followed, but the 
 attitude of Albinus in the West made it imperative 
 on Severus to quit these distant lands and return to
 
 336 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 
 
 his capital, which was menaced on the side of Gaul 
 by the commander of the Western legions. The 
 Emperor left Nisibis, and returned to Rome early in 
 the year A.D. 196. 
 
 No sooner had he retired than the flames of war 
 burst out more fiercely than before. Vologases, roused 
 from his inaction by the threatened loss of a second 
 province, poured his troops into Adiabene, drove out 
 the Roman garrisons, and, crossing the Tigris into 
 Mesopotamia, swept the Romans from the whole of 
 the open country. Even the cities submitted them- 
 selves, excepting only Nisibis, which was saved from 
 capture by the courage and capacity of Laetus. Ac- 
 cording to Spartianus, the victorious Parthians, not 
 content with recovering Mesopotamia, even passed 
 the Euphrates, and spread themselves once more over 
 the fertile plains of Northern Syria, as they had done 
 in the times of Pacorus and Labienus. Severus, 
 engaged in his doubtful contest with Albinus on the 
 western side of the empire, could do nothing co 
 relieve the pressure upon the east, and the Syrian 
 prefecture continued open to the Parthian raids for 
 the space of nearly a full year. An enterprising 
 monarch might have done much during this interval ; 
 but Vologases frittered away hjs opportunity, and at 
 length the victory of Lyons set Severus free, and 
 allowed him again to turn his attention to Oriental 
 affairs. In the summer of A.D. 197 he made a second 
 Eastern expedition for the purpose of recovering his 
 lost laurels, and of justifying the titles, which he had 
 already assumed, of " Arabicus " and " Adiabenicus." It 
 is probable that in his own mind he entertained still
 
 SECOND EXPEDITION OF SEVERUS. 337 
 
 loftier aspirations, and, like Trajan, had hopes of 
 reducing the whole Parthian Empire under the Roman 
 yoke. 
 
 One of the most important points to be secured by 
 an assailant of Parthia from the west, was the friend- 
 ship, or at any rate the neutrality, of the two kings 
 of Armenia and Osrhoene. Armenia had professed 
 itself neutral when the quarrel between Severus and 
 Niger first broke out, but had subsequently, in some 
 way or other, offended the former, and on his arrival 
 in the East, was viewed as hostile to the Roman 
 designs. The first intention of Severus was to fall 
 with his full force on Armenia, and to endeavour to 
 reduce it to subjection ; but, before the fortune of war 
 had been tried, the Armenian monarch, Vologases, 
 son of Sanatrceces, made overtures for peace, sent 
 gifts and hostages, assumed the attitude of a suppliant, 
 and so wrought upon Severus that he not merely 
 consented to conclude a treaty with him, but even 
 granted him a certain extension of his dominions. 
 The Arab king of Osrhoene, who is called, as usual, 
 Abgarus, made a more complete and unqualified sub- 
 mission. He rode into the Roman camp at the head 
 of a large body of archers, whose services he offered 
 to the Emperor, and accompanied by a number of his 
 sons, whom Severus was requested to look upon as 
 hostages. All being prosperous thus far, Severus had 
 only to determine by which line of route he should 
 advance against the Parthian monarch, who had taken 
 up his position at Ctesiphon, and to make his pre- 
 parations accordingly. He fixed on the line of the 
 Euphrates, but at the same time masked his intention
 
 338 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 
 
 by sending a strong body of troops under generals 
 across the Tigris to ravage Adiabene, and create an 
 impression that the main attack would come from 
 that quarter. Meanwhile, following the example of 
 Trajan, he was causing a fleet to be built in Upper 
 Mesopotamia, where timber was plentiful, and was 
 preparing to march his main army down the left 
 bank of the Euphrates, while his transports, laden 
 with stores, descended the stream. In this way he 
 reached the neighbourhood of Seleucia and Ctesiphon 
 without suffering any loss, or even incurring any 
 danger, and took the Parthians by surprise, when, 
 having captured the cities of Babylon and Seleucia, 
 which were deserted by their defenders, he made his 
 appearance before the capital. His fleet, which he 
 could easily transfer from one river to the other by 
 means of the great canals that traversed the alluvium, 
 would give him the complete command of the Tigris, 
 and enable him to attack the city on either side, or 
 indeed entirely to invest it. Vologases appears to 
 have fought a single battle in defence of his capital, 
 but, being defeated, shut himself up within its walls. 
 The defences, however, were not strong ; and, after a 
 short siege, Severus took the city, by assault, without 
 much difficulty, the king escaping with a few horse- 
 men in the confusion of the capture. Thus the 
 Parthian capital fell easily — a third time within the 
 space of eighty-two years — into the hands of a 
 foreign invader. On the first occasion it had opened 
 its gates to the conqueror, and had experienced 
 gentle treatment at the hands of a benignant emperor. 
 On the second it had suffered considerably. Now it
 
 SACK OF CTESIPHON. 339 
 
 was to learn what extreme severity meant at the hands 
 of a monarch whose character accorded with his name. 
 The captured city was given up to massacre and 
 pillage. The soldiers were allowed to plunder both 
 the public and the private buildings at their pleasure. 
 The precious metals accumulated in the royal treasury 
 were seized, and the rich ornaments of the royai 
 palace were taken from their places and carried off. 
 All the adult male population was slaughtered ; while 
 the women and children, torn from their homes with- 
 out compunction, were led into captivity by the 
 victorious army, to the number of a hundred thousand. 
 Thus far the expedition of Severus had been com- 
 pletely successful. He stood where Trajan stood in 
 A.D. 116, master of the whole low region between the 
 Arabian desert and the Zagros mountains, lord of 
 Mesopotamia, of Assyria, of Babylonia, of the entire 
 tract watered by the two great rivers from the Arme- 
 nian highlands to the shores of the Persian Gulf. 
 What use would he make of his conquests ? Would 
 he, like Trajan, endeavour to retain them, or would 
 he, like the wiser Hadrian, relinquish them ? He 
 endeavoured to take an intermediate course. Recog- 
 nising the fact, that to retain the more southern 
 districts was impossible, and that the more eastern 
 portions of the Parthian Empire were beyond his 
 reach, he neither pursued the flying Vologases into 
 the remote tracts in which he had taken refuge nor 
 attempted to organise his southern conquests into 
 provinces, but resolved at once to evacuate them. 
 Notwithstanding the elaborate preparations which 
 he had made for his invasion, and the care which he
 
 340 V0L0GASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 
 
 had taken to carry supplies with him, he found hirm- 
 self, about the time that he captured Ctesiphon, in 
 want of provisions. He had exhausted the immense 
 stores of grain which Lower Mesopotamia commonly 
 furnished, or else the inhabitants had destroyed or 
 hidden them, and his troops had, we are told, to 
 subsist for some days on roots, which produced a 
 dangerous dysentery. He was obliged to retreat 
 before famine overtook him. Moreover, as the march 
 of his army along the course of the Euphrates had 
 stripped that region of its supplies of corn and fodder, 
 he could not return as he had come, but was com- 
 pelled to confront the perils of a new route. The line 
 of the Tigris was the only route open to him, and 
 along this he advanced, still supported by his fleet, 
 which with some difficulty made its way against the 
 current up the course of the stream. It does not 
 appear that any opposition was offered to him ; but, 
 after he had proceeded a moderate distance, he found 
 himself in the vicinity of Hatra, the capital of a small 
 state subject to Parthia, which had given him special 
 offence by lending active support to the cause of his 
 rival, Niger. His troops had now obtained sufficient 
 supplies of food in an unexhausted country, and were 
 ready for a fresh enterprise. Severus regarded his 
 honour as concerned in the chastisement of a state 
 which, without provocation, had declared itself his 
 enemy. He may also have remembered that Trajan 
 had attacked Hatra unsuccessfully, and have hoped to 
 place himself above that conqueror by the capture of 
 a town which had defied the utmost efforts of his 
 predecessor. At any rate, whatever his motives, it
 
 SEVERUS BESIEGES HATRA. 34I 
 
 seems certain that, when in the latitude of Hatra, he 
 diverged from his previous line of march, and, pro- 
 ceeding westward, encamped under the walls of the 
 city which had given him such dire offence, and 
 engaged in its siege. He had brought with him a 
 number of military engines — probably those employed 
 with complete success at Ctesiphon, and, putting them 
 in position, made a fierce attack upon the place. But 
 the inhabitants were not daunted ; the walls of the 
 town were strong, its defenders brave and full of 
 enterprise. They contrived to set on fire and destroy 
 the siege machines brought against them, and repulsed 
 with heavy loss the attacking soldiers. The army, 
 upon this, grew discontented, and threatened mutiny ; 
 Severus was obliged to punish with death some of his 
 leading officers, among them his best general, Laetus. 
 This, however, only increased the exasperation ; and, 
 to smooth matters over, he had to pretend that the 
 execution of this officer had taken place without his 
 knowledge. Even so the soldiers' minds were not 
 calmed down, and at last, in order to bring about a 
 better state of feeling, he had to discontinue the siege 
 and remove his camp to a distance. 
 
 He had not, however, abandoned his enterprise. 
 Recu/er pour mieux sauter was among the principles 
 that guided his actions, and it was in the hope of 
 returning and renewing the attack ere many weeks 
 were past, that he had drawn off his army. In the 
 tranquillity and security of the place whereto he had 
 removed, he constructed fresh engines in increased 
 numbers, collected vast stores of provisions, and made 
 every preparation possible for a repetition of his attack
 
 342 VOLOGASES IV. AND SHVERUS. 
 
 and for bringing it to a successful issue. It was not 
 merely that his honour was concerned in overcoming 
 the resistance offered to him by what had always been 
 regarded as no more than a second-rate town — his 
 cupidity was also excited by reports of the rich 
 treasures that were stored up in the city, and espe- 
 cially of those which the piety of successive genera- 
 tions had accumulated in the Temple of the Sun. He 
 therefore, when his preparations were complete, once 
 more put his troops in motion, and proceeded to 
 renew the siege with a more efficient siege-train, and 
 a better appointed army than before. But the inhabi- 
 tants met him with a determination equal to his 
 own. They had a powerful cavalry which hung upon 
 the skirts of his army and crippled his movements 
 in every way, often inflicting severe loss upon his 
 foragers ; they were excellent archers, and shot 
 further and with greater force than the Romans ; 
 they possessed military engines of their own, of no 
 contemptible character ; and they had at their disposal 
 a particular kind of fire, which did considerable 
 damage, and created yet greater alarm. Flames 
 believed to be inextinguishable were hurled both 
 against the Roman machines and against their soldiers 
 with an effect that is said to have been remarkable. 
 A great number of the machines were burnt ; and if 
 the soldiers were more frightened than hurt, the 
 advantage to the defenders was still almost as great. 
 Still the Romans persevered. The presence of the Em- 
 peror, who watched the combat from a lofty platform, 
 encouraged every man to do his best ; and at length 
 it was announced that a practicable breach had been
 
 FAILURE OF THE SIEGE. 343 
 
 effected in the outer wall of the place, and the soldiers 
 were ready, and indeed eager, to be led at once to the 
 assault. But now Severus hung back. By Roman 
 usage a town taken by storm must be given up to the 
 soldiery for indiscriminate pillage ; and thus, if the 
 soldiers had their way, he would lose the great 
 treasures on which his heart was set. He therefore 
 refused to give the word, and resolved to wait a day, 
 and see whether the Hatreni would not now, seeing 
 further resistance to be useless, surrender their town. 
 The delay was fatal. In the night the Hatreni rebuilt 
 the wall where it had been battered down, and man- 
 ning the battlements, stood boldly on their defence. 
 Severus, seeing that they had no intention of sur- 
 rendering, repented of his resolve of the day before, 
 and commanded the soldiers to attack. But the legion- 
 aries declined. They probably suspected the Emperor's 
 motive. At any rate they were unwilling to imperil 
 their lives for an object which but yesterday they 
 might have attained without incurring any peril at all. 
 Severus, not to lose a chance, commanded his Asiatic 
 auxiliaries to see if they could not force an entrance, 
 but with no other result than the slaughter of a vast 
 number. At last he desisted from his attempt. The 
 summer was far advanced ; the heat was intense ; and 
 disease had broken out among his troops, who suffered 
 from drought, from malaria, and from a plague of 
 insects. Above all, his army was thoroughly demo- 
 ralised, and could not be depended on to carry out 
 the orders given it. Severus himself told one of his 
 officers that he had not six hundred European troops 
 on whom he could place any reliance. The second
 
 344 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 
 
 siege of Hatra by Severus lasted twenty days, and 
 terminated in an ignominious withdrawal. Severus 
 returned to Rome with a slur upon his military repu- 
 tation which was not regarded as cancelled by all 
 his previous successes. 
 
 Still, actual disaster was escaped. Had Vologases 
 been an active and energetic prince, or had the spirit 
 and audacity of the Parthian nation been such as 
 once characterised it, the result might have been 
 widely different. The prolonged resistance of Hatra, 
 the sufferings of the Romans, their increasing diffi- 
 culties with respect to provisions, the injurious effect 
 of the summer heats upon their unacclimatised con- 
 stitutions, would have presented irresistible tempta- 
 tions to a prince, or even a general, of any boldness 
 and capacity, inducing him to pursue the retreating 
 enemy, to hang upon their flanks and upon their 
 rear, to fall on their stragglers, to cut off their 
 supplies, to harass and annoy them in ten thousand 
 ways, and render their withdrawal to their own 
 territory a matter of extreme difficulty. A Surena 
 of the temper and calibre of the general opposed to 
 Crassus might not improbably have annihilated the 
 Imperial army, and the disaster of Carrhae might 
 have repeated itself at the distance of between two 
 and three centuries. But Vologases IV. was a 
 degenerate descendant of the great Arsacids, and 
 remained inert and apathetic when the circumstances 
 of the time called for the most vigorous action. 
 
 As it was, the expedition of Severus must be 
 pronounced glorious for Rome and disastrous for 
 Parthia. It exposed for the third time within a
 
 CONQUESTS OF SEVERUS. 345 
 
 century the extreme weakness of the great Asiatic 
 power. It lost her such treasures as had escaped 
 the cupidity of Avidius Cassius. It both exhausted 
 and disgraced her. Moreover, it cost her a second 
 and most valuable province. Severus was not 
 content with fully re-establishing the Roman sway 
 in Mesopotamia. He overstepped the Tigris, and 
 firmly planted Roman authority in the rich and 
 fertile region between that river and the Zagros 
 mountains. Henceforth the title of " Adiabenicus " 
 became no empty boast. Adiabene, or the tract 
 between the two Zab rivers — the most productive 
 and valuable part of the ancient Assyria — became a 
 Roman dependency under Severus, and continued 
 to be Roman till after the destruction of the Parthian 
 Empire. For the remainder of the time during 
 which Parthia maintained her independence, the 
 Roman standards were planted within less than two 
 degrees of her capital. 
 
 Vologases reigned for the space of about eleven 
 years (a.d. 197-208) after his defeat by Severus. 
 Parthian history is for this interval a blank. The 
 decline of national feeling and of the military spirit 
 went on, no doubt, without a pause, and the power 
 of Parthia must continually have grown . less and 
 less. No pretenders arose, since there was probably 
 no one who coveted the position of ruler over a state 
 evidently nodding to its fall. Rome abstained from 
 further attack, content, it would seem, with the gains 
 which she had made, and a brief calm heralded the 
 storm in which Parthian nationality was to perish.
 
 XXI. 
 
 ARTABANUS V. AND CARACALLUS — THE LAST WAR 
 WITH ROME— DEFEAT OF MACRINUS. 
 
 The death of Vologases IV. was immediately 
 followed by a dispute between his two sons, Volo- 
 gases V. and Artabanus V., for the succession. We 
 do not know which was the elder; but it would seem 
 
 COIN OF VOLOGASES V. 
 
 COIN OF ARTABANUS V. 
 
 that at first the superiority in the struggle rested 
 with Vologases, who was recognised by the Romans 
 as sole king in A.D. 212, and must have then ruled 
 in the western capital, Ctesiphon. Afterwards Arta- 
 banus acquired the preponderance, and from the 
 year A.D. 216 we find no more mention of Vologases 
 by the classical writers. It is Artabanus who 
 negotiates with Caracallus, who is treacherously 
 
 346
 
 AMBITION OF CARACALLUS. 347 
 
 attacked by him, who contends with Macrinus, and 
 is ultimately defeated and slain by the founder of 
 the New Persian monarchy, Artaxerxes. Similarly, 
 the Persian historians ignore Vologases altogether, 
 and represent the contest for empire, which once 
 more carried Persia to the front, as one between 
 Ardeshir and Ardevan. Still, the Parthian coins 
 show that Vologases, equally with his brother, both 
 claimed and exercised sovereignty in Parthia to the 
 close of the kingdom. The probability would there- 
 fore appear to be that about A.D. 216 a partition of 
 the kingdom was amicably made, and that while 
 Artabanus reigned over the western provinces, the 
 eastern were ceded to Vologases. 
 
 It was while the struggle between the two brothers 
 continued that the Emperor Severus died, and the 
 period of tranquillity inaugurated by him, on his 
 return from the East in A.D. 198, came to an end. 
 His son and successor, Caracallus, a weak and vain 
 prince, nourished an inordinate ambition, and was 
 scarcely seated on the throne when he let it be 
 known that in his own judgment he was a second 
 Alexander, and that he was bent on imitating the 
 marvellous exploits of that mighty hero. He 
 adopted the Macedonian costume, formed his best 
 troops into a " Macedonian phalanx," made the 
 captains of the phalanx take the names of 
 Alexander's best generals, and caused statues to 
 be made with a double head, presenting the counte- 
 nance of Alexander on one side and his own upon 
 the other. As Alexander, he was bound to conquer 
 the East ; and, as early as his second year, he began
 
 348 ARTABANUS V. AND CARACALLUS. 
 
 his predetermined aggressions. Summoning Abgarus, 
 the tributary monarch of Osrhoene, or north-western 
 Mesopotamia, into his presence, he seized upon his 
 person, committed him to prison, declared his terri- 
 tories forfeited, and reduced Osrhoene into the 
 form of a Roman province. Soon afterwards he 
 attempted to repeat the proceeding with Armenia ; 
 but, although the Armenian king was weak enough 
 to fall into the trap, the nation was on the alert, and 
 frustrated his efforts. No sooner did they learn that 
 their king was arrested and imprisoned than they 
 flew to arms, placed their country in a position of 
 defence, and made themselves ready to resist all 
 aggression. Caracallus hesitated, and when, three 
 years later (A.D. 215), he sent Theocritus, one of his 
 favourites, to effect their subjugation, they met him 
 in arms, and inflicted a severe defeat on the utterly 
 incompetent general. It was perhaps this disaster 
 which suggested to Caracallus a change in his 
 method of proceeding. Professing to put away from 
 him all thoughts of war and conquest, he propounded 
 a grand scheme for the permanent pacification of the 
 East, and the establishment of a reign of universal 
 happiness and tranquillity. Having transferred his 
 residence from Nicomedia to Antioch, the luxurious 
 capital of the Roman Oriental provinces, he sent am- 
 bassadors with presents of unusual magnificence to 
 the Parthian monarch, Artabanus, who were to make 
 him a proposal of a novel and unheard-of character. 
 " The Roman Emperor," said the despatch in question, 
 could not fitly wed the daughter of a subject, or 
 accept the position of son-in-law to a private person.
 
 MAD PROPOSAL OF CARACALLUS. 349 
 
 No one could be a suitable wife for him who was not 
 a princess. He therefore asked the Parthian monarch 
 for the hand of his daughter. Rome and Parthia 
 divided between them the sovereignty of the world ; 
 united, as they would be by this marriage, no longer 
 recognising any boundary as separating them, they 
 would constitute a power which could not but be 
 irresistible. It would be easy for them to reduce 
 under their sway all the barbarous races on the skirts 
 of their empires, and to hold them in subjection by 
 a flexible system of administration and government. 
 The Roman infantry was the best in the world, and 
 in steady hand-to-hand fighting must be allowed to 
 be unrivalled. The Parthians surpassed all nations 
 in the number of their cavalry and the excellence ot 
 their archers. If these advantages, instead of being 
 separated, were combined, and the various elements 
 on which success in war depends were thus brought 
 into harmonious union, there could be no difficult} 
 in establishing and maintaining a universal monarchy. 
 Were that done, the Parthian spices and rare stuffs, 
 as also the Roman metals and manufactures, would 
 no longer need to be imported secretly and in small 
 quantities by merchants, but, as the two countries 
 would form together but one nation and one stace, 
 there would be a free interchange among all the 
 citizens of their various products and commodities." 
 To the Parthian king and his advisers the proposition 
 was as unwelcome as it was strange. The whole 
 project appeared to them monstrous. Artabanus 
 himself misdoubted the Emperor's sincerity, and d'd 
 not believe that he would persevere in it But it
 
 350 ARTABANUS V. AND CARACALLUS. 
 
 threw him into a state of extreme perplexity. 
 Bluntly to reject the overture was to offend the 
 master of thirty-two legions, and to provoke a war 
 the results of which might be ruinous. To accept it 
 was to depart from all Parthian traditions, and to 
 plunge into the unknown and the unconjecturable. 
 Artabanus therefore temporised. Without giving a 
 positive refusal, he stated certain objections to the 
 proposal, which made it, he thought, inexpedient, 
 and begged to be excused from complying with it. 
 " Such a union as was suggested could scarcely," he 
 said, " prove a happy one. The wife and husband, 
 differing in language, habits, and modes of thought, 
 could not but become estranged one from another. 
 There was no lack of patricians at Rome, possessing 
 daughters with whom the Emperor might wed as 
 suitably as the Parthian kings did with the females 
 of their own royal house. It was not fit that either 
 family should sully its blood by mixture with a 
 foreign stock." 
 
 Upon this answer reaching him, Caracallus, accord- 
 ing to the Court historian, Dio Cassius, immediately 
 declared war, and invaded the Parthian territory with 
 a large army. Herodian, however, who seems here 
 to be more trustworthy, gives a different account. 
 Caracallus, he declares, instead of quarrelling with 
 Artabanus for his qualified refusal, followed up his 
 first embassy with a second ; his envoys brought rich 
 gifts to Ctesiphon, and assured the Parthian monarch 
 that the Emperor was serious in his proposals, and 
 had the most friendly intentions possible. Hereupon 
 Artabanus yielded, either satisfied with the assurances
 
 FESTIVE MEETING AT CTESIPHON. 351 
 
 given him, or else afraid to give offence ; he addressed 
 Caracallus as his future son-in-law, and invited him 
 to come with all speed, and fetch home his bride. 
 " And then," continues the historian, "when this was 
 noised abroad, the Parthians made ready to give the 
 Roman Emperor a fit recepti: n, being transported 
 with joy at the prospect of an eternal peace. Cara- 
 callus thereupon crossed the rivers without hindrance 
 and entered Parthia, just as if it were his own land. 
 Everywhere along his route the people greeted him 
 with sacrifices, and dressing their altars with garlands, 
 offered upon them all manner of spices and incense, 
 whereat he made pretence of being vastly pleased. 
 As his journey now approached its close, and he 
 drew near to the Parthian Court, Artabanus, instead 
 of awaiting his arrival, went out and met him in the 
 spacious plain before the city, with intent to enter- 
 tain his daughter's bridegroom and his own son-in- 
 law. Meanwhile, the whole multitude of the bar- 
 barians, crowned with freshly gathered flowers, and 
 clad in garments embroidered with gold and variously 
 dyed, were keeping holiday, and dancing gracefully 
 to the sound of the flute, the pipe, and the drum — 
 an amusement wherein they take great delight after 
 they have indulged freely in wine. Now, when all 
 the people had come together, they dismounted from 
 their horses, hung up their quivers and their bows, 
 and gave themselves wholly to libations and revels. 
 The concourse of barbarians was very great, and 
 they stood arranged in no sort of order, since they 
 did not apprehend any danger, but were all en- 
 deavouring to catch a sight of the bridegroom.
 
 352 ARTABANUS V. AND CARACALLUS. 
 
 Suddenly the Emperor gives his men the signal to 
 fall on and massacre the barbarians. These, amazed 
 at the attack, and finding themselves struck and 
 wounded, forthwith took to flight. Artabanus was 
 hurried away by his guards, and lifted on a horse, 
 whereby he escaped with a few followers. The rest 
 of the barbarians were cut to pieces, since they could 
 not reach their horses, which, when they dismounted, 
 they had allowed to graze freely over the plain ; nor 
 were they able to make use of their legs, since these 
 were entangled in the long flowing garments which 
 descended to their heels. Many, too, had come 
 without quivers or bows, which were not wanted at 
 a wedding. Caracallus, when he had made a vast 
 slaughter, and taken a multitude of prisoners and a 
 rich booty, moved off without meeting with any 
 resistance. In his retreat he allowed his soldiers to 
 burn all the cities and villages, and to carry away as 
 plunder whatever they chose." 
 
 The advance of Caracallus had been through 
 Babylonia, probably along the course of the 
 Euphrates ; his return was through Adiabene and 
 Mesopotamia. In Adiabene' he still further out- 
 raged and offended the Parthians by violating the 
 sanctity of the royal burial-place at Arbela, where, as 
 a rule, the Parthian kings were interred. Arbela 
 had been regarded from of old as a City of the 
 Dead ; and the Arsacidae had made it their ordinary 
 place of sepulture. Caracallus caused the tombs to 
 be opened, the bodies dragged forth from them, and 
 the remains dispersed to the four winds. No insult 
 could be greater than this, and the act seems rather
 
 RETREAT OF CARACALLUS — HIS DEATH. 353 
 
 that of a madman than of a mere ordinary tyrant. 
 We are reminded of Aristotle's observation, that 
 " families of brilliant talents go off after a time into 
 dispositions bordering upon madness," and see that 
 that of the Antonines was no exception. Caracallus 
 can scarcely have been in his senses to have com- 
 mitted an action from which no possible good could 
 arise, and for which, as he might have anticipated, a 
 severe reckoning was afterwards to be exacted. 
 
 Meanwhile, however, he was pursuing his gay 
 career, no whit alarmed, and no whit abashed. He wrote 
 to the Senate in the lightest possible tone, to declare, 
 without giving any details, that the whole East was 
 subject to him, and that there was not a kingdom in 
 those parts but had submitted to his authority. The 
 Senate, though not imposed upon, wrote back in 
 flattering terms and granted him all the honours that 
 would have been suitable to a veritable conqueror. 
 For his own part, he remained in Mesopotamia, pass- 
 ing the winter there, and amusing himself with hunting 
 and chariot-driving. There were still lions in the 
 Mesopotamian region, as in Assyrian times, and 
 the young Antonine, though a poor soldier, seems to 
 have been a bold hunter. He had, apparently, 
 persuaded himself that no external danger threatened 
 him, and was content to idle away his time in the 
 grassy Mesopotamian plains, which now — in early 
 spring — must have been an earthly paradise. April 
 was reached, and it was high time for an active 
 commander to have commenced the marshalling and 
 exercising of his troops, or even the initiatory move- 
 ments of the designed campaign ; but Caracallus con-
 
 354 THE LAST WAR WITH ROME. 
 
 tinued impassive, occupied in his amusements, his 
 suspicions of his officers, and his consultations of 
 augurs, magicians, and oracles as to what fate was in 
 store for him. He was on his way to visit an oracle 
 in the Temple of the Moon-God, near Carrhas, when 
 some of his inquiries having leaked out, a conspiracy 
 was formed against him in the camp, and he was 
 murdered by Julius Martialis, one of his guards, on 
 April 8, A.D. 217. 
 
 In the place of Caracallus, a new emperor had to be 
 appointed. The choice of the soldiery fell upon Macri- 
 nus, one of the Praetorian Prefects, the chief mover in 
 the recent conspiracy. His elevation almost exactly 
 coincided with the advance of Artabanus, who, having 
 reunited and increased his army during the course of 
 the winter months, and brought it into excellent con- 
 dition, had now conducted it into Roman Mesopo- 
 tamia, and was anxious to engage the Romans in a 
 pitched battle, in order to exact a heavy retribution 
 for the treacherous massacre of Ctesiphon and the 
 wanton impiety of Arbela. But Macrinus was scarcely 
 prepared to meet him. Though Praetorian Prefect, 
 he had none of the instincts of a soldier, but was far 
 more versed in civil affairs, and adapted to hold office 
 in the civil administration or in the judiciary. Ac- 
 cordingly, no sooner did he find himself menaced by 
 the Parthian monarch than he hastily sent am- 
 bassadors to his camp with an offer to surrender all 
 the prisoners carried off in the late campaign as the 
 price of peace. But Artabanus had higher aims. 
 " The Roman Emperor," he said in reply, " must not 
 only restore the prisoners unjustly captured in a time
 
 BATTLE OF NISI BIS. 355 
 
 of peace, but must also consent to rebuild all the 
 towns and castles which Caracallus had laid in ruins, 
 must make compensation for the wanton injury done 
 to the tombs of the kings, and must further cede 
 Mesopotamia to the Parthians, and retire behind the 
 line of the Euphrates." It was morally impossible 
 for a Roman Emperor to consent to such demands as 
 these without first trying the fortune of war ; and 
 accordingly Macrinus felt himself compelled, much 
 against his will, to risk a battle. He had with him 
 a large army, which, if not exactly flushed with 
 victory, had at any rate not known defeat ; and he 
 had, besides, the prestige of the Roman name, always 
 a source of confidence to those who boasted it, and of 
 terror to their adversaries. 
 
 Artabanus, on his part, had done his best to make 
 his army formidable. He had collected it from all 
 quarters, had made it strong in cavalry and archers, 
 and had attached to it a novel force of considerable 
 importance, consisting of a corps of picked soldiers, 
 clad in complete armour, and carrying spears or 
 lances of unusual length, who were mounted on 
 camels. The Romans had, besides the ordinary 
 legionaries, in which their strength mainly consisted, 
 a large number of light-armed troops, and a powerful 
 body of Mauretanian cavalry. The battle, which 
 lasted three days, and was fought near Nisibis, in 
 Upper Mesopotamia, began at daybreak on the first 
 day by a rapid advance of the Parthians, who, after 
 saluting the rising sun, rushed with loud shouts to the 
 combat, and, under cover of a sleet of arrows, delivered 
 charge after charge. The Romans, receiving their
 
 356 THE LAST WAR WITH ROME. 
 
 own light-armed within the ranks of the legionaries, 
 stood firm, but suffered greatly from the bows of the 
 horse-archers and from the lances of the corps 
 mounted on camels ; and though, whenever they 
 could reach their enemy, and engage in close combat, 
 they had always the advantage, yet after a while their 
 losses from the cavalry and the camels forced them 
 to retreat. As they retired they strewed the ground 
 with spiked balls (or caltrops) and other contrivances 
 for injuring the feet of animals, and this stratagem 
 was so far successful that the pursuers soon found 
 themselves in difficulties, and the two armies re- 
 spectively returned, without any decisive result, to 
 their camps. 
 
 On the following day there was again a combat, 
 which is said to have lasted from morning till night, 
 and to have been equally indecisive with the pre- 
 ceding one ; but of this, which is wholly ignored by 
 Dio, we do not possess any description. The third 
 day arrived, and the fight was once more renewed ; 
 but this time the Parthians had recourse to new 
 tactics. Hitherto it had been their aim to rout and 
 disperse their enemies ; now they directed all their 
 efforts towards surrounding them, and so capturing 
 the entire force. Their troops, which were far more 
 numerous than those of the Romans, spread themselves 
 to right and left, threatening to turn the Roman 
 flanks and envelop the whole army. Macrinus, to 
 meet these tactics and baffle them, was forced more 
 and more to extend his own line, and consequently 
 to attenuate it unduly, so that at last it broke up. 
 Confusion once begun was speedily increased by the
 
 TERMS ACCEPTED BY MACRINUS. 2>57 
 
 cowardice of the Roman Emperor, who was among 
 the first to take to flight, and hurry back to his camp. 
 As a matter of course his army followed his example, 
 and having a refuge so close at hand, suffered no very 
 severe losses. The defeat, however, was acknow- 
 ledged, even by the Romans themselves ; and, in the 
 negotiations which followed the battle, Macrinus had 
 to accept terms of peace, which, though less disgrace- 
 ful than those at first proposed, must be regarded as 
 sufficiently onerous. The cession of Mesopotamia 
 was not, indeed, insisted on ; but, besides restoring 
 the captives and the booty carried off by Caracallus 
 in his raid, Macrinus had to pay, as compensation for 
 the damages inflicted, no less a sum than a million 
 and a half of our money. The transactions of Rome 
 with Parthia were thus brought to an end, after nearly 
 three centuries of struggle, by the ignominious pur- 
 chase of a peace. Macrinus retired within his own 
 frontier in the summer of A.D. 217, and before Rome 
 was again called upon to make war in these parts the 
 sovereignty of the Parthians had terminated.
 
 XXII. 
 
 REVOLT OF THE PERSIANS — DOWNFALL OF THE 
 PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 The tendency of the Parthian Empire to disin- 
 tegration has been frequently noted in these pages. 
 From the first there was a want of attachment among 
 its parts, and a looseness of organisation which boded 
 ill for the prolonged existence of the body politic. It 
 was not only that the races composing it were so 
 various, the character and conditions of the provinces 
 so unlike, the ideas prevalent in different parts so 
 diverse, but the entire system by which it was sought 
 to give compactness and unity to the disjecta membra 
 was so deficient in vigour and efficacy, that a long 
 continuance of cohesion was almost impossible. 
 " Kingdom- Empires," as they have been called, are 
 always unstable ; and, unless the dominant power 
 possesses a very marked preponderance, they are 
 sure sooner or later to break up. In the widespread 
 empire built up by the Arsacidae the Parthians could 
 not really claim any very decided superiority over the 
 other principal component parts, either in physical or 
 in mental characteristics. They were not braver than 
 the Medes, the Hyrcanians, the Armenians, or the 
 
 358
 
 TENDENCY OF THE EMPIRE TO BREAK UP. 359 
 
 Persians ; they were not more intelligent than the 
 Babylonians, the Bactrians, or the Assyrians. That 
 they had some qualities which brought them to the 
 front, cannot, of course, be denied; but these were not 
 such as to strike the minds of men very strongly, or 
 to obtain universal and unqualified recognition. Their 
 rule was acquiesced in so long, rather because the 
 Oriental appreciates the advantages of settled and 
 quiet government, than because the subject races re- 
 garded them as having any special aptitude or capacity 
 for governing. Each of the principal nations probably 
 thought itself quite as fit to hold the first place in the 
 commonwealth as the Parthians ; and under favour- 
 able circumstances each secondary monarch was quite 
 ready to assert and maintain his independence. 
 
 Revolts of subject kingdoms or tribes were thus 
 of frequent occurrence during the entire period of the 
 Parthian monarchy ; but, as time went on, they 
 became more frequent, more determined, and more 
 difficult to subdue. It has been already related how, 
 as early as the time of Vologases I., Hyrcania broke 
 off from the empire, and was probably not reduced 
 subsequently. 1 Bactria was also from time to time 
 a sort of separate appanage, conceded to a prince of 
 the Royal House, who accepted it in satisfaction of 
 his claims to the chief authority. Armenia was still 
 more loosely attached to the empire, being more often 
 and for longer periods reckoned an independent state 
 than a subjected one. At one time Babylonia is 
 found almost independent under Hymerus. 2 The 
 single tie of a nominal subjection to a distant 
 
 1 Supra, p. 296. 2 Page 119.
 
 j60 DOWNFALL, OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 suzerain proved a weak bond when any strain was 
 put upon it, and there was constant danger of this or 
 that province detaching itself from the great mass of 
 the empire, and entering upon a separate existence. 
 
 We are thus entitled to say that there was some- 
 thing like a general discontent of the provinces with 
 their condition und'T the central government, at any 
 rate for the last century and a half of Parthian rule. 
 It is difficult, however, to analyse the grounds of this 
 discontent, or to decide what elements in it had the 
 greater weight, and which were of minor importance. 
 An alien rule must always be more or less irksome to 
 those who have to submit to it, and must more or less 
 chafe and gall them, as they exceed or fall short in 
 pride and sensibility. The friction will be increased 
 or diminished by the character of the rule, its con- 
 sonance with justice, its regard for promises and 
 engagements, its care for its subjects, its clemency, 
 its power and will to protect, its general fairness and 
 equity. It cannot be said that the Parthians fell 
 flagrantly short in any of these particulars, or deserve 
 to be regarded as either on the one hand weak and 
 careless, or on the other harsh, unjust, and oppressive. 
 They no doubt took the lion's share of pomp, power, 
 and privilege ; but beyond this advantage, which is 
 one taken by all dominant peoples, it does not appear 
 that their subjects had any special grievances of which 
 to complain. The Parthians were tolerant ; they did 
 not interfere with the religious prejudices of their 
 subjects, or attempt to enforce uniformity of creed or 
 worship. Their military system did not press over- 
 heavily on the subject races ; nor is there any reason
 
 CAUSES OF GENERAL DISCONTENT. 361 
 
 to believe that the scale of their taxation was ex- 
 cessive. Such tyranny as is charged upon certain 
 Parthian monarchs is not of a kind that would have 
 been sensibly felt by the conquered nations, since it 
 was exercised on none who were not Parthians. If 
 at any time the rulers of the country failed to perform 
 the great duties of civil government, it was rather in 
 the way of laxity that they erred than of tension, 
 rather by loosening the bonds of authority than by 
 over-tightening them. 
 
 Some tangible ground for the general discontent, 
 beyond the " ignorant impatience " of a dominant race 
 which is so usual, may perhaps be made out by careful 
 consideration, in two respects, but in two only. In 
 the first place, there were times when the Parthian 
 government very imperfectly accomplished its great 
 duty of preserving internal order and tranquillity. 
 The history of Anilai and Asinai, which has been 
 dwelt upon at some length in a former chapter, 1 
 brings out very strongly this defect in the Parthian 
 governmental system, and reveals a condition of 
 things which, if it had been permanent, must have 
 been intolerable. We can only suppose that the 
 anarchical times, of which we have so melancholy a 
 picture, were occasional and exceptional, the result of 
 internal disorders, which ere long came to a head, and 
 then passed away ; or we should have to imagine a 
 government, which fulfilled none of the functions of a 
 government, lasting for centuries, and some of the 
 most spirited nations on the earth submitting to it 
 and seeking no better. 
 
 1 Chap. XIV. pp. 246-256.
 
 362 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 The other failure of the Parthians belongs to the 
 later period only of their history. It consisted in the 
 general decline of the vigour of the nation, which 
 rendered it less competent, than it had been previously, 
 to afford adequate protection to the conquered states 
 — especially protection against the wholly alien power, 
 which had intruded itself into Asia, and which sought 
 to bring all the nations of Asia under subjection. 
 The suzerainty of Parthia had been accepted by the 
 other Asiatic powers as that of the one out of their 
 number which was most competent to make head 
 against European invaders, and to secure the native 
 races in continued independence of an influence which 
 they recognised as antagonistic, and felt to be hateful. 
 It may well have appeared at this time to the various 
 vassal states that the Parthian vigour had become 
 effete, that the qualities which had advanced the race 
 to the leadership of Western Asia were gone, and 
 that unless some new power could be raised up to act 
 energetically against Rome, the West would obtain 
 complete dominion over the East, and Asia be 
 absorbed into Europe. Vague thoughts would arise 
 as to which nation might be conceived to be the fittest 
 to take the lead, if Parthia had to be deposed ; and 
 the instinct of self-aggrandisement would lead the 
 more eminent to contemplate the possibility of them- 
 selves aspiring to the position, if not even to take 
 measures to push their claims. Probably for some 
 considerable time before the movement headed by 
 Artaxerxes, son of Babek, commenced, such thoughts 
 had been familiar to the wiser men among many of 
 the Asiatic nations, and a long preparation had thus
 
 SPECIAL GRIEVANCES OF THE PERSIANS. 363 
 
 been made for the revolution, which seemed to break 
 out so suddenly at last. 
 
 If, ay a in, we ask, what peculiar grounds of grievance 
 had the Persians above the other subject races, or why 
 did the burden of raising the standard of revolt fall 
 especially upon them, we have a further difficulty in 
 obtaining an answer. There is no appearance of the 
 Persians having been in any way singled out by the 
 Parthians for oppression, or having had any more 
 grounds of complaint against them than any other of 
 the subject nations. The complaints which are made 
 are negative rather than positive, and amount to little 
 more than the following: — 1. That high offices, 
 whether civil or military, were for the most part con- 
 fined to those of Parthian blood, and not thrown open in 
 any fair proportion to the Persians. 2. That the priests 
 of the Persian religion were not held in sufficient 
 honour, being even less accounted of in the later than 
 in the earlier times ; and 3. That no advantage in 
 any respect was allowed to the Persians over the rest 
 of the conquered peoples, notwithstanding that they 
 had for so many years exercised supremacy over 
 Western Asia, and given to the list of Asiatic worthies 
 such names as those of Cyrus and Darius Hystaspis. 
 It was thus not because they were worse treated than 
 their brother subjects that the Persians were dissatis- 
 fied, but because their pretensions were higher. They 
 thought themselves deserving of exceptional treat- 
 ment, and, since they did not receive it, they murmured. 
 In fact, the Persians had at no time ever forgotten 
 that they had once been " lords of Asia," and it 
 angered them that their conquerors seemed to have
 
 364 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 forgotten it. They had at all times submitted to 
 Parthian hegemony as it were under protest ; now 
 they were no longer inclined to submit to it. They 
 believed, and probably with justice, that, under the 
 changed circumstances of the time, they were better 
 suited than the Parthians to direct the affairs of 
 Western Asia, and they resolved at any rate to make 
 the attempt. Their justification is to be found in 
 their success. As the Parthians had no right to their 
 position but such as arose out of the law of the 
 strongest, so, when the time came that they had lost 
 this pre-eminence, superiority in strength having 
 passed to a nation hitherto counted among their 
 subjects, it was natural and right that the seat of 
 authority should shift with the shift in the balance of 
 power, and that the leadership of the Persians should 
 be once more recognised. 
 
 In one respect the Parthian rule must always have 
 grated upon the feelings of their Persian subjects 
 more than upon those of the generality, since there 
 was in the Parthians an ingrained coarseness and 
 savagery which could not but be especially distasteful 
 to a people of such comparative refinement as the 
 Persians. Persian art, Persian manners, Persian 
 literature had a delicacy and a polish which the rude 
 Parthians, with their Tatar breeding, could not 
 appreciate ; and the countrymen of Cyrus and Darius, 
 of Firdausi and Hafiz, must have had an instinctive 
 aversion from the nomadic race whose manners were 
 still deeply tinged with Scythicism. 
 
 It may also be suspected, though of this there is 
 less evidence, that the revolution which transferred the
 
 PERSIAN RELIGIOUS ZEAL. 365 
 
 dominion of Western Asia from the Parthians to the 
 Persians, from the Arsacid?e to the Sassanidae, was to 
 some extent a religious one. The " Book-Religion " 
 of Zoroaster, with its dualism, its complicated spirit- 
 ualism, and its elaborate ritual, was unsuited for the 
 rough times through which Western Asia had to pass 
 between the invasion of Alexander and the foundation 
 of the Neo-Persian state, and it appears to have been 
 superseded, except in Persia Proper, by a ruder system, 
 of which the principal elements were devotion to the 
 Sun and Moon and the worship of ancestral images. 
 But the time was now again come when more com- 
 plicated ideas were in the ascendant. The various 
 forms of Gnosticism show how mysticism once more 
 asserted itself among the Western Asiatics in the first 
 and second centuries of our era, and how speculations 
 were rife which reopened all the deepest problems of 
 spiritual religion. The stir had begun which issued 
 ultimately in Manicheism, and the Persian aspirations 
 after leadership may have been partly caused by a 
 desire to push their religion to the front, and to take 
 advantage of the popular favour with which dualistic 
 tenets were beginning to be regarded. It is certain 
 that among the principal changes consequent upon 
 the success of the Persians was a religious revolution 
 in Western Asia — the substitution for Parthian toler- 
 ance of all faiths and worships, of a rigidly enforced 
 uniformity in religion, the establishment of the Magi 
 in power, and the bloody persecution of all such as 
 declined obedience to the precepts of Zoroaster. 
 
 The space of about six or seven years seems to 
 have separated the conclusion of peace with Rome
 
 366 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 from the outbreak of rebellion under Artaxerxes. 
 During this time the division of sovereignty between 
 Artabanus V. and Vologases V. continued without in- 
 terruption, and the power of Parthia was still further 
 weakened by Arsacid intrigues originating with 
 branches of the royal family which were settled in 
 Bactria. No doubt internal debility showed itself in 
 various ways, and the tributary king of Persia, a young, 
 active, and energetic prince, became daily more con- 
 vinced of his ability, if not to recover the empire of 
 Cyrus, at any rate to shake off the rude yoke which 
 had galled and chafed his nation for so many centuries. 
 Independence was probably all that he originally 
 looked for ; but, in course of time, as the struggle 
 went on, wider views with respect to the possibilities 
 of the situation opened themselves before him, and 
 the contest became one for life or death between the 
 two kingdoms. After establishing his authority in 
 Persia Proper, he turned his arms eastward against 
 Carmania (Kerman), and in a short space of time 
 easily reduced that sparsely peopled and not very 
 desirable country. He next took in hand a more 
 daring enterprise. The valuable and fertile country 
 of Media adjoined Persia to the north. Artaxerxes 
 proceeded to make war in this quarter, and to annex 
 to his dominions portions of the Median territory. But 
 this was to attack the Parthian kingdom at its heart, 
 since Media, Assyria (Adiabene), and Babylonia 
 formed the main strength and the central mass of the 
 Empire. Artabanus, who had thought but lightly of 
 a Persian revolt, and had probably regarded incursions 
 into Carmania with absolute indifference, as concern-
 
 LAST EFFORTS OF ARTAVASDES. 367 
 
 ing his brother rather than himself, was now effectu- 
 ally roused. Collecting his forces, he took the field in 
 person, invaded Persia Proper, and engaged in a 
 desperate struggle with his rival. Three great battles 
 are said to have been fought between the contending 
 powers. In the last, which took place, according to 
 the Persian authorities, in the plain of Hormuz, 
 between Bebahan and Shuster, on the course of the 
 Jerahi river, Artabanus was, after a desperate conflict, 
 completely defeated by his antagonist (A.D. 226), and 
 lost his life in the battle. 
 
 The struggle, however, was not yet over. Arta- 
 
 COIN OK ARTAVASDES. 
 
 vasdes, the eldest son of Artabanus, claimed the crown, 
 and was supported by a large number of adherents. 
 His uncle, Chosroes, who had received the throne of 
 Armenia from Artabanus, espoused his cause, gave the 
 Parthian refugees an asylum in his kingdom, and even 
 fought a battle with Artaxerxes in their defence. In 
 this he was so far victorious that the Persian found 
 it necessary to retreat, and retire to his own dominions 
 in order to augment his forces. But the struggle was 
 too unequal for long continuance. Within a very few 
 years of its commencement the contest was everywhere 
 ended ; the arms of Artaxerxes prevailed, and the 
 Parthian Empire was overthrown. All the provinces
 
 358 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE, 
 
 submitted ; the last Arsacid prince fell into the hands 
 of the Persian king ; and the founder of the new 
 dynasty sought to give legitimacy to his rule by taking 
 to wife an Arsacid princess. 
 
 The duration of the Parthian monarchy was a little 
 short of five centuries. It commenced about B.C. 250, 
 and it terminated in A.D. 227. It was the rule of a 
 vigorous tribe of Tatar or Turkic extraction over a 
 mixed population, chiefly of Semitic or Arian race, 
 and, for the most part, more advanced in civilisation 
 than their rulers. Though its organisation was loose,- 
 it was not ill -adapted for Orientals, who prefer a flexible 
 system to one where everything is "cut and dry," and 
 are opposed to all that is stiff and bureaucratic. 
 Western Asia must be considered to have enjoyed 
 a time of comparative rest under the Parthian 
 sovereignty, and to have been as prosperous as at 
 almost any other period of its history. The savage 
 hordes of Northern Asia and Europe were, in the 
 main, kept off; and, though the arms of Rome from 
 time to time ravaged the more western provinces, and 
 even occasionally penetrated to the capital, yet this 
 state of things was exceptional ; for the most part 
 European aggression was averted, or quickly repulsed ; 
 very few conquests were made, and when they were 
 made, they were not always retained ; and to the last 
 the limits of the Parthian dominion remained almost 
 the same as they had been under the first Mithridates. 
 Still, there was no doubt a gradual internal decay, 
 which worked itself out especially in two directions. 
 The Arsacid race, with which the idea of the empire 
 was closely bound up, instead of clinging together in
 
 ITS DURATION AND CHARACTER. 369 
 
 that close " union " which constitutes true " strength," 
 allowed itself to be torn to pieces by dissensions, to 
 waste its force in quarrels, and to be made a handle 
 of by every foreign invader or domestic rebel who 
 chose to use its name in order to cloak his own selfish 
 projects. The race itself does not seem to have become 
 exhausted. Its chiefs, the successive occupants of the 
 throne, never sank into mere weaklings or fainecuits, 
 never shut themselves up in their seraglios, or ceased 
 to take an active and leading part, alike in civil broils 
 and in struggles with foreign princes. Artabanus, the 
 adversary of Artaxerxes, was as brave and capable a 
 monarch as had ever sat upon the Parthian throne in 
 previous ages. But the hold which the race had on 
 the population, native and foreign, was gradually 
 weakened by the feuds which raged within it, by the 
 profusion with which the sacred blood was shed by 
 those in whose veins it ran, and the difficulty of 
 knowing which living member of it was its true head, 
 and so entitled to the allegiance of all those who 
 wished to be faithful Parthian subjects. Further, the 
 vigour of the Parthian soldiery must have gradually 
 declined, and their superiority over the mass of the 
 nations under their dominion must have diminished. 
 Marked evidence was given of this when, about A.D. 
 75, Hyrcania became independent ; and it is possible 
 that there may have been other cases of successful 
 rebellions in the remoter eastern regions. Oriental 
 races, when they are suddenly lifted to power, almost 
 always decline in strength, and sometimes with 
 extreme rapidity. The Parthians cannot be said to 
 have experienced a rapid deterioration ; but they too,
 
 370 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 like the dominant races of Western Asia, both before 
 and after them, felt in course of time the softening 
 influence of luxury, and had to yield their place 
 to those who had maintained manlier and hardier 
 habits.
 
 XXIII. 
 
 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 " The Parthians," according to one writer of high 
 repute, " have left no material traces of their exis- 
 tence." x When the Achaemenian Persians were 
 struck down by Alexander, " the old arts," he says, 
 " disappeared from the Mesopotamian world." It 
 would be strange indeed if so broad a statement 
 could be justified, when made of any time or of any 
 distinguished people. Roughly and coarsely, no 
 doubt, it embodies a certain curious and important 
 fact — the fact, namely, that the Parthians were, in no 
 full or pregnant sense of the terms, either builders or 
 proficients in any of the fine arts. But it is an over- 
 statement, a very considerable exaggeration. The 
 position held by the Parthians in numismatics should, 
 alone have been sufficient to save them from the 
 undeserved reproach, since numismatists have long 
 had under their notice many hundred types of coins 
 issued from Parthian mints during the five-centuries 
 of their sovereignty, and have assigned to several of 
 them a fair amount of merit. Careful inquiry shows, 
 as might have been expected, that in other branches 
 
 1 See Fergusson, " History of Architecture," vol. ii. p. 422. 
 
 37 2
 
 PARTHIAN ARCHITECTURE. 373 
 
 of art also, and especially in architecture, Parthia 
 made efforts and produced results not wholly des- 
 picable. 
 
 The remains at Hatra, or El Hadhr, are the most 
 imposing which can reasonably be assigned to the 
 Parthian period. Hatra first comes into notice in the 
 ?arly part of the first century before Christ, and is 
 then a place of no small importance. It successfully 
 resists Trajan in A.D. 116, and Severus in A.D. 198. 
 It is then described as a large and populous city, 
 defended by strong and extensive walls, and contain- 
 ing within it a famous Temple of the Sun, celebrated 
 for the great value of its accumulated offerings. The 
 people are regarded as of the Arabian stock, and 
 they have their own kings, who are tributary monarchs 
 under Parthia. By the year A.D. 363, Hatra has 
 gone to ruins, and it is then described as " long since 
 deserted." x It plays no part at all in Sassanian 
 history, and clearly has for its most flourishing 
 period the last century, or century and a quarter, of 
 the Parthian rule, from A.D. 100 to A.D. 226. 
 
 The ruins of El Hadhr have been carefully described 
 by two English travellers, Mr. Ross and Mr. Ains- 
 worth, whose accounts will be found in the ninth 
 and eleventh volumes of the " Geographical Society's 
 Journal." They have also attracted the attention of 
 a professional critic, Mr. James Fergusson, who has 
 given a description of them, with one or two wood- 
 cuts, in his " History of Architecture." The following 
 account rests especially on the two former — the only 
 original — authorities. 
 
 1 Ammianus Maicellinus, xxv. 8.
 
 374 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 The city of Hatra was circular in shape, and nearly 
 an English mile in diameter. It was enclosed by a wall, 
 ten feet in thickness, built of large square-cut stones, 
 and strengthened at intervals of about a hundred and 
 seventy yards by square towers or bastions. Its cir- 
 cumference considerably exceeded three miles. Out- 
 side the bastioned wall was a broad and deep ditch, 
 
 of tlie City- p 
 
 Tfcdc, Eamparf 
 
 and on the further side of the ditch an earthen 
 rampart of considerable size and thickness. The 
 wall was pierced by four gateways, of which the 
 principal faced the east. Two detached forts, situated 
 on eminences, commanded the approaches to the city, 
 one of them lying towards the east and the other 
 towards the north.
 
 BUILDINGS AT AL HADHR, OR HA IRA. 375 
 
 Within the walled enclosure the circular space was 
 divided into two parts by a water-course, which 
 crossed it from north to south, nearly midway in 
 the circle, but somewhat more towards its eastern 
 portion. The city proper lay west of the water- 
 course. Here were the public edifices, and the 
 houses of the more opulent inhabitants. The space 
 towards the east was used chiefly as a necropolis, 
 though a certain number of buildings were interspersed 
 among the graves. Almost in the centre of the circle 
 stood a walled enclosure, nearly square in plan, and 
 fronting the cardinal points, having a length of about 
 eight hundred feet from west to east, with a width 01 
 about seven hundred. Strong bastions, similar in 
 character to those of the outer circle, flanked the wall 
 at intervals along its entire course. The space within 
 was again subdivided by a wall running north and 
 south into an outer and an inner court. The outer, 
 which lay towards the east, and was rather the larger 
 of the two, was wholly unencumbered by buildings, 
 while the inner contained two considerable edifices. 
 One of these, and the less important of the two, 
 stretched from north to south across the entire 
 enclosure, and abutted upon the wall which divided 
 the two courts. It was confused in plan, and seems 
 to have consisted only of a number of small apart- 
 ments, which have been conjectured to have been 
 "guard-rooms." The other building was, however, 
 one of considerable pretension ; and it is from this 
 mainly that we must form our conception of Par- 
 thian architecture. 
 
 The great Palace, or " Palace-Temple " of Hatra, as
 
 3/6 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 it has .been called, was an edifice three hundred and 
 sixty feet long by two hundred and ten feet broad in 
 the broadest part. It consisted of a series of seven 
 oblong vaulted halls, placed side by side longi- 
 tudinally, with a certain number of smaller apart- 
 ments, and one large building at the back. The 
 halls were of various dimensions. The smaller ones, 
 
 PLAN OF THE PALACE-TEMPLE OF HATRA. 
 
 of which there were four (Nos. I., III., IV., and VI. 
 on the plan), measured about sixty feet long by 
 twenty wide, and had a height of thirty feet. Two 
 of the larger ones (Nos. II. and V. on the plan) 
 measured ninety feet in length, and were from thirty- 
 five to forty feet broad, with a height of sixty feet. 
 One (No. VII. on the plan), with a width of forty-
 
 BUILDINGS AT AL HADIIR, OR HATRA. 3JJ 
 
 five, had a length of not much above seventy feet. 
 Variety in the size of the halls was thus carefully 
 studied, while the shape was almost identical, and 
 the plan of construction the same throughout. " All 
 the halls were roofed by semicircular tunnel-vaults, 
 without ribs or other ornaments ; and they were all 
 entirely open in front, all the light and air being 
 admitted from the one end." * Trte outer and party 
 walls were alike thick ; the doorways connecting 
 apartments were awkwardly narrow, and their 
 position in the walls which they pierced was irregular 
 and unsymmetrical. The small apartments behind 
 the halls received no light, except from these narrow 
 doorways, and must have been almost absolutely 
 dark. 
 
 The large building attached to the series of halls 
 at the back lay directly behind the second hall, from 
 which there was an opening into it. This building 
 consisted of a single chamber, square in shape, and 
 measuring about forty feet each way, surrounded on 
 all sides by a vaulted passage, into which light 
 penetrated from two windows, situated at its south- 
 west and north-west angles, and from a doorway in 
 the middle of the western wall. The chamber, how- 
 ever, which the passage surrounded, could only be 
 entered from the east, where, directly opposite to 
 the communication with Hall No. II., was a doorway 
 surmounted by a magnificent frieze. Above a row 
 of acanthus leaves, delicately carved, was placed an 
 ornamentation of inverted gradines, on which followed 
 a line of oval rings, each containing an oval ball in the 
 
 1 Fergusson, " History of Architecture," vol. ii. p. 424.
 
 3j8 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 centre. Immediately over this was a line of emblematic 
 figures — griffins, eagles, human and animal heads, and 
 the like — as will be best understood by the accompany- 
 ing representation, which is taken from a drawing by 
 Mr. Ross. Crowning the whole was a cornice projecting 
 slightly, and covered with a sort of arabesque or scroll- 
 work. Among the emblematic heads is one, which 
 so manifestly represents the Sun-God, that the build- 
 ing has been generally recognised as a temple to that 
 deity. Mr. Fergusson, however, thinks that it " more 
 
 ^E^ a^^^^^^^^^^^^p 
 
 FRIEZE IN THE PALACE-TEMPLE OF HATRA. 
 
 probably contained a stair or inclined plane, leading 
 to the roof or upper rooms, which almost certainly 
 existed over the smaller halls at least." l 
 
 The chief ornamentation, however, of the Hatra 
 " Palace-Temple " was on its eastern facade, which 
 was evidently its main front. Here the seven con- 
 secutive arches of the basement storey, which is all 
 that now exists, formed in themselves no mean adorn- 
 ment, and this was heightened in several ways by 
 artistic additions. In the first place, the arches 
 2 Fergusson's " History of Architecture," vol. ii. p. 424.
 
 BUILDINGS AT AL HADHk, OR HATRA. 379 
 
 sprang from pillars, or rather pilasters, having bases 
 and capitals of some elegance, the number of such 
 pilasters along the entire front amounting to sixteen. 
 Secondly, the stones composing the archivolts of the 
 arches bore a human head, or mask, under a cornice 
 of ovals and acanthus leaves, which gave a very- 
 peculiar character to the edifice, and has no exact 
 parallel elsewhere. " The only thing known at all 
 similar," says Mr. Fergusson, " is the celebrated arch 
 at Vol terra with three masks ; but here these are 
 infinitely more numerous over all the arches, and 
 form in fact the principal features of the decora- 
 tions." 1 Further, in the spaces be- 
 tween the pilasters were, in some 
 cases, sculptures representing embla- 
 matic figures, as griffins, and the like. 
 Internally, the halls had, for the 
 most part, no ornamentation. The 
 four smaller ones were absolutely stones of archi- 
 devoid of it, while even the larger volts. 
 
 ones had only a scanty amount. The longer sides of 
 the halls II. and V. were broken by three squared 
 pilasters, rising to the commencement of the vaulting, 
 and terminated by a quasi-capital of ornamental work, 
 consisting of a series of alternate ovals and lozenges, 
 each oval containing in its centre a ball of dark stone. 
 Underneath these quasi-capitals, at the distance of 
 between two and three feet, ran a cornice, which 
 crossed the pilasters, and extended the whole length 
 of the apartment, sometimes ornamented with flowers 
 and half-ovals, sometimes with alternate ovals and 
 1 Fergusson's " History of Architecture," vol. ii. p. 425.
 
 380 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 lozenges. Finally, on the pilasters, immediately 
 below the cornice, were sculptured either two or 
 three human heads, the length of each head being 
 about two feet, and the faces representing various 
 types of humanity, some old and some young, some 
 
 PILASTER AT HATRA, WITH CORNICE AND CAPITAL. 
 
 male and some female, some apparently realistic, some 
 idealised and more or less grotesque in their accompani- 
 ments. The drawing of the heads is said to be full 
 of spirit and their general effect lifelike and striking. 
 No. VII. had a peculiar ornamentation. In lieu of
 
 BUILDINGS AT AL HADHR, OR HATRA. 381 
 
 pilasters and cornices, the two side walls appear to 
 have been decorated with two rows of eight human- 
 headed bulls standing out from the wall as far as their 
 shoulders at a distance from the ground of about ten 
 feet. Similar figures of lions are found occasionally 
 in Phoenicia, but otherwise the ornamentation is very 
 unusual. 
 
 It is believed by Mr. Fergusson and others, that 
 
 PROPOSED RESTORATION OF THE HATRA BUILDING. 
 
 the entire edifice, or at any rate the greater portion of 
 it, had originally an upper story. At present the 
 ruins nowhere attain a height much exceeding sixty 
 feet ; but it is thought that this height was, originally, 
 at least doubled, either a single story, or two stories, 
 containing apartments, being superimposed upon the 
 existing range of vaulted halls. One explorer * 
 thought that he found some remains of the staircase, 
 which conducted to these upper apartments, at the 
 southern extremity of the building. If we accept 
 
 1 Mr. Ross.
 
 382 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 the view of this traveller, we may suppose, with 
 another explorer, 1 that the entire eastern facade of the 
 edifice presented some such appearance as shown on 
 page 381, and conclude that the type of architecture, 
 which is entirely different from any previously known 
 in the country, either under the Assyrians, the Baby- 
 lonians, or the Achaemenian Persians, was an inven- 
 tion of the Parthian period, though whether struck 
 out by the Parthians themselves, or by one of the 
 nations subjected to their sway, may be doubted. The 
 type appears to be the germ out of which the Sas- 
 sanian architecture, well known for its magnificence, 
 grew up, and may be said to have held possession of 
 Mesopotamia and the adjacent countries from about 
 A.D. 150 to A.D. 640, when it was superseded by the 
 architecture of the Arabs. 
 
 The general style of the buildings at Hatra has been 
 said to have been " Roman or Bvzantine," and the 
 details are declared to be in many cases "almost literal 
 imitations of Roman models." 2 This may well be, 
 since Rome was, at the time of their erection, 
 universally recognised as standing at the head of 
 civilisation and the arts, so that the builders of other 
 nations naturally went to her for instruction. But the 
 plan of the Hatra building is certainly not Roman ; 
 and it is allowed that the execution of the ornaments is 
 too rude to admit of the idea, that the work was done 
 under the superintendence of a Roman artist. Native 
 talent alone can have been employed ; and there is 
 every reason for considering that we may regard the 
 
 1 Mr. Ainsworth. 
 
 2 Fergusson, " History of Architecture," vol. ii. pp. 424-5.
 
 ARCHITECTURAL FRAGMENTS AT WARKA. ^83 
 
 work as a fair specimen of what was achieved by the 
 native builders of the Parthian period during; the latter 
 times of the empire. The palace of Vologases III. 
 at Ctesiphon, which Avidius Cassius destroyed in his 
 invasion, 1 was probably of the same general character, 
 a combination of lofty halls, suitable for ceremonies 
 and audiences, with small and dark sleeping or living 
 rooms, opening out of them, the whole placed in the 
 middle of a paved court, with ready access to a chapel 
 or temple, where the devotions of the Court might be 
 performed. 
 
 It must be added that the halls and rooms of the 
 Hatra edifice are divided into two groups. Halls I., 
 II., and III., with the apartments in their rear, are 
 inter-connected, and form one group. Halls IV., V., 
 VI., and VII., form the other. A low fence, starting 
 from the wall separating between Halls III. and IV., 
 was carried in a straight line, eastward, across the 
 court in front of the building, to the wall separating 
 the inner court from the outer. Thus there could be 
 no communication between the two groups of apart- 
 ments excepting by making a long circuit round almost 
 the entire edifice. It is thought that the two groups 
 formed, respectively, the male and the female apart- 
 ments. 
 
 Some architectural fragments, discovered by Mr. 
 Loftus at Warka (the ancient Erech), in combination 
 with a large number of Parthian coins, and therefore 
 possessing a claim to be regarded as Parthian, seem 
 to deserve mention in this place. They consisted 
 of fragments of cornices, capitals, bases of columns, 
 1 See above, p. 326.
 
 384 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 friezes, fragments of open -screen work, with compli- 
 cated geometric designs of different patterns on the 
 opposite sides, large flakes of painted plaster, and the 
 like. Most of the capitals resembled those of the 
 Greek Ionic order, but presented peculiarities in the 
 proportions of the volutes and other members. Some, 
 however, were of an altogether peculiar type. One in 
 particular, which, though square at the summit, must 
 have crowned a round column, is especially remarkable. 
 " A large and elegant leaf rises from the necking, and 
 bends under each corner of the abacus. Springing 
 
 ARCHITECTURAL tRAGMENTS AT WARKA. 
 
 from behind a smaller curled leaf in the centre is the 
 bust of a human figure, wearing the same preposter- 
 ous head-dress which is characteristic of the (Parthian) 
 slipper coffins, and the Parthian coins." * Other 
 capitals had crowned square pillars, and were orna- 
 mented with ovals, and half- ovals, rosettes, leaves 
 resembling those of the oak, circles containing geome- 
 trical tracery, and the like. One large fragment of a 
 cornice bore, among other devices, a spirited crouch- 
 ing griffin, which reminded the discoverer of the 
 
 1 Loftus, " Chaldsea and Susiana," p. 226.
 
 PARTHIAN FICTILE ART. 385 
 
 similar figures sculptured on the Temple frieze at 
 Hatra. 1 Some of the friezes had a decoration con- 
 sisting of alternate vine-leaves and bunches of grapes. 
 
 The building, within which these fragments were 
 discovered, was a rectangular chamber forty feet long 
 by twenty-eight feet wide, the mud walls of which, 
 still standing to the height of four feet, had been 
 covered originally with painted plaster of various 
 hues, and further adorned with small Ionic half 
 columns. The columns had half-smooth and half- 
 fluted shafts. The lower portion of each was smooth, 
 and had been striped diagonally with bands of red, 
 green, yellow, and black ; the upper portion was 
 fluted, the flutes being painted black, red, and yellow 
 alternately, while the level ridges between them were 
 painted white. Underneath the floor of the chamber ) 
 at the depth of six feet, was discovered a "slipper- 
 coffin " of the type so common at Warka, bearing em- 
 bossed figures on its upper surface of a type generally 
 regarded as Parthian. The building would thus seem 
 to have been a sepulchral chamber erected over a 
 tomb, such as is found so frequently in Phoenicia and 
 Egypt. 
 
 The decorative and fictile art of the Parthians has 
 also received considerable illustration from the re- 
 mains discovered at Warka. These included several 
 statuettes modelled in terra-cotta ; a vast number of 
 slipper-coffins ; many jars, jugs, vases, and lamps in 
 earthenware ; some small glass bottles ; and various 
 personal ornaments, such as armlets, bangles, beads for 
 necklaces and fillets, finger-rings, ear-rings, and toe- 
 
 * Compare above, p. 378.
 
 386 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 rings. Of the statuettes the most interesting is one 
 representing a Parthian warrior, recumbent, and leaning 
 upon his left arm, wearing a coat-of-mail or padded 
 tunic reaching to the knees, greaves, and a helmet orna- 
 mented in front. Others represented females : these 
 had lofty head-dresses, which sometimes rose into 
 two peaks or horns, recalling the costume of English 
 ladies in the time of Henry IV. These figures were 
 veiled, and carefully draped about the upper part of 
 
 PARTHIAN JUGS AND JARS. 
 
 the person, but showed the face, and had the legs bare 
 from the knee downwards. 
 
 The jars, jugs, vases, and lamps in earthenware 
 greatly resembled those of the Assyrian and Babylo- 
 nian periods, but were on the whole more elegant and 
 artistic. The influence of Greek models is apparent 
 in them. One jug, the central one of the engraving, 
 is of " extremely artistic form," 1 and was placed in 
 a recess, within arm's length of a coffin, probably for 
 
 1 Loftus, " Chaldaea and Susiana," p. 213.
 
 PARTHIAN FICTILE ART 
 
 3*7
 
 388 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 the refreshment of the deceased. The lamps repro- 
 duce well-known Greek types. 
 
 The " slipper-coffins " found at Warka possess a 
 peculiar interest. They are of a very beautiful green 
 glazed ware, and vary in length from three feet to six. 
 Great skill in pottery must have been required for 
 their construction. The upper surface presents at one 
 end a large oval aperture, by means of which the body 
 was passed into the interior — an aperture which is 
 furnished with a depressed ledge for the reception of 
 a lid, which exactly fitted it, and was firmly fixed in 
 its place by a layer of lime cement. At the lower ex- 
 tremity was a semicircular hole, to prevent the burst- 
 ing of the coffin by the gases disengaged during 
 decomposition. Both the lid which closed the large 
 aperture, and the remainder of the upper surface of 
 the coffin, were ordinarily divided by elevated ridges 
 into small rectangular compartments, each containing 
 an embossed figure of a man, standing with his arms 
 akimbo and his legs astride, with a short sword hang- 
 ing from his belt, and on his head an enormous 
 coiffure of a very curious appearance. 
 
 The personal ornaments were in many cases of 
 tasteful and elegant design. Tall pointed head- 
 dresses in thin gold are said to have been not uncom- 
 mon, and one or two broad ribbons of thin gold not 
 unfrequently occurred in the tombs, depending on 
 either side of the head. Gold and silver finger-rings 
 abounded, and some had stones set in them. Bead- 
 necklaces were found, together with armlets, bangles, 
 and toe-rings of silver, brass, and copper. Many of 
 the ear-rings were exceedingly elegant, and small
 
 PARTHIAN JESTHETIC ART. 
 
 389 
 
 gold plates, which seem to have been strung together 
 for necklaces or fillets, were very delicately modelled. 
 
 The glass bottles were perhaps lachrymatories. 
 They closely resemble glass-work of the Assyrian 
 and Babylonian periods, and exhibit the same irides- 
 cent hues which are the result of slow decomposition. 
 The commonest shape is a rounded belly, surmounted 
 by a short, round neck, having a small handle on 
 either side of it, but flattened so that the smaller 
 diameter of the bottle is less than one-third of the 
 greater one. 
 
 In purely aesthetic art — art, that is, into which the 
 idea of the useful does not enter at all — the Parthians 
 
 PARTHIAN PERSONAL ORNAMENTS. 
 
 appear to have been very deficient. Beyond the 
 statuettes, in clay and terra-cotta, which have been 
 already described, 1 no figures " in the round " can be 
 ascribed to them. Nor are there more than three or 
 four reliefs which have much claim to be pronounced 
 Parthian. One alone is undisputable. At the foot of 
 the great rock of Behistun, which exhibits at the height 
 of many feet above the plain the long inscription, and 
 remarkable sculpture, of Darius, the son of Hystaspes, 
 is a much-worn sculpture in alto relievo, which is 
 proved by the inscription accompanying it to belong to 
 
 1 See above, p. 386.
 
 390 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 the second reign of Gotarzes (A.D. 46-51), and which 
 was almost certainly set up by that monarch after his 
 defeat of the pretender, Meherdates. 1 It seems to 
 have contained a series of tall figures, looking towards 
 the right, and apparently engaged in a march or pro- 
 cession, while above and between them were smaller 
 figures of men on horseback, armed with lances, and 
 galloping in the same direction. One of these was 
 attended by a Nike, or figure of Victory, floating in 
 the air, and about to place a diadem around the rider's 
 brow. The present condition of the sculpture is ex- 
 ceedingly bad. Time and atmospheric influences have 
 almost completely worn away the larger figures, which 
 the latest travellers appear not even to have perceived ; 
 and a recent governor of Kirmanshah has barbarously 
 inserted into the middle of the relief an arched niche, 
 in which he has placed a wholly worthless Arabic 
 inscription. Under these circumstances, there is a 
 difficulty in forming any opinion on the original 
 artistic merit of the work ; but the best judges are 
 agreed in pronouncing that, even at its best, it must 
 have been a work of inferior quality, falling consider- 
 ably below the level attained by the Assyrian and even 
 the Achaemenian artists. The resemblance is rather 
 to the productions of the Sassanian, or New-Persian, 
 period. The human figures have aheaviness and clumsi- 
 ness about them which it is painful to contemplate ; the 
 horses are rudely outlined, and are too small for the 
 men who ride them ; the figure of Victory is out of all 
 proportion to that of the hero whom she crowns, 
 and the diadem which she places upon his head is 
 
 1 Supra, p. 267.
 
 PARTHIAN RELIEFS. 39 1 
 
 ridiculously large, being almost as big as herself! On 
 the other hand, there is spirit in the attitude both of 
 men and horses ; the Victory floats well in mid-air; 
 and the relief is free from the coarse grotesqueness 
 which is so offensive in the greater part of the Sassa- 
 nian sculptures. 
 
 • Another relief, belonging probably to a later 
 period, after the Parthians had adopted a Semitic 
 instead of the Greek character, has the Sassanian 
 defects still more accentuated. It represents a king 
 mounted on horseback, and receiving a chaplet at the 
 hands of a subject. The king wears a low cap bound 
 round with the diadem, the two long ends of which 
 depend over his shoulder. He is dressed in a closely 
 fitting tunic and loose trousers, and wears also a short 
 cloak, fastened under his chin, and reaching nearly to 
 the knee. On his right arm he seems to carry a 
 bracelet ; and his feet are encased in boots. The 
 horse which he bestrides is small but strongly made ; 
 the tail is long ; the ears seem to be cropped, and the 
 mane plaited. The whole representation is rude and 
 clumsy, the forepart of the horse, and the Parthian 
 who offers the chaplet, being particularly ill drawn. 
 The relief is accompanied by an inscription in the 
 Parthian (Semitic) character. 
 
 A series of reliefs, discovered by the Baron de Bode 
 in the Bakhtyari mountains in the year 1841, is also 
 generally regarded by those best acquainted with 
 the subject as Parthian. In one of these a hunter, 
 mounted on horseback, and armed with a bow and 
 arrows and a sword, or short spear, is engaged in 
 combat with a bear. The bear raises itself on its
 
 392 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. . 
 
 hind legs to a level with the horse's head, and 
 advances boldly to the attack. The hunter, who is 
 clothed simply in a long flowing robe, like a dressing- 
 gown, and a rounded cap, leans forward on his horse 
 to meet the angry animal, and thrusts his sword, or 
 spear, whichever it may be, into its neck. The horse 
 shows no alarm, but ambles gently to the encounter. 
 The execution is somewhat rude, but the figures are 
 fairly well drawn, if we except the head of the house. 
 Another relief on the same rock shows a female 
 figure reclining on a couch, and guarded by three 
 male attendants, one at the head of the couch, 
 unarmed, and the remaining two at its foot, seated, 
 and armed with spears. The female has puffed-out 
 hair, and carries in her right hand, which is out- 
 stretched, a chaplet or wreath. One of the spearmen 
 has a curious rayed head-dress ; the other has a short 
 streamer attached to the head of his spear. Below 
 the main group are three rudely carved standing 
 figures, which represent probably other attendants. 
 The third relief of the series is the largest and most 
 elaborate. It shows us a personage of importance, 
 perhaps a Magus, engaged in what seems to be a 
 religious ceremonial, standing with his right arm 
 elevated by the side of a cippus, adorned with 
 wreaths or chaplets, and mounted upon a threefold 
 pedestal. Fifteen spectators are present, arranged in 
 two rows, one above the other, and all of them, except 
 the first in each row, standing. The first in each row 
 sits upon a rudely designed chair or stool. A 
 religious function is probably represented. We can 
 scarcely fail to recognise in the principal figure, who
 
 GENERAL ESTIMATE OF THEIR ART. 393 
 
 wears a conical cap, has his hair puffed out in 
 enormous masses on either side of the head, like the 
 kings upon the later coins, and is altogether richly 
 costumed, a priest of the Parthian religion, probably 
 a great hierarch, engaged in one of the duties of his 
 office. Perhaps we may best regard the set of reliefs 
 as forming a connected series, No. I. representing the 
 Parthian monarch occupied in the chase of the bear ; 
 No. II. the queen awaiting his return on her couch in 
 the midst of her attendants ; and No. III. exhibiting 
 the chief Magus attached to the Court making prayer 
 for the monarch's safety. 
 
 Altogether, the Parthians cannot be said to have 
 shown more than a very moderate degree of artistic 
 or aesthetic talent. Their architecture is their best 
 point ; and even that falls far below the architecture 
 of the other dominant races of Western Asia, whether 
 before or after them, whether Assyrians, Babylonians, 
 Achaemenian Persians, Sassanian Persians, Mongols, 
 or Arabs. Their glyptic art is even worse, and, con- 
 sidering that they had access, not only to Assyrian 
 and Achaemenian, but also, in some degree, to Greek 
 models, must be regarded as possessing a very low 
 amount of merit. A certain number of their coins are 
 fairly good, and one or two of their reliefs, though rude 
 and clumsy, have spirit. But, speaking generally, we 
 must admit that the vocation of the people was not 
 towards the artistic, and that they were probably well- 
 advised to employ their energies in other directions. 
 The scant remains of their*art are an indication that 
 they recognised their own deficiencies, and, conscious 
 that it was not in their power to excel in the aesthetic
 
 394 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 field, preferred to occupy themselves in pursuits for 
 which they were better fitted, as war, hunting, and 
 government. 
 
 Not much can be said on the subject of the 
 Parthian religion. It seems probable that, under 
 the Achaemenian Persians, they submitted to the 
 Zoroastrian system, as maintained by the princes of 
 the house of Cyrus from Xerxes downwards ; but, as 
 this was certainly not their own ancestral religion, 
 they cannot be supposed to have been at any time 
 very zealous followers of the Bactrian prophet. As 
 age succeeded age, they naturally became more luke- 
 warm in their feelings, and more lax in their religious 
 observance. The main characteristic — the essence, if 
 we may so call it — of the Zoroastrian belief, was 
 Dualism — recognition of Two Great Principles of 
 good and evil, called respectively Ormazd and Ahri- 
 man. We need not doubt that, with their lips, the 
 Parthians from first to last admitted this antagonism, 
 and professed a belief in Ormazd as the supreme god, 
 and a dread of Ahriman and his ministers. But, prac- 
 tically, their religious aspirations rested, not on these 
 dim abstractions, but on beings whose existence they 
 could better realise, and whom they could feel to be 
 less remote from themselves. The actual devotions of 
 the Parthians were rendered to the Sun and Moon, to 
 deities which were supposed to preside over the Royal 
 House, and to ancestral idols, which each family 
 possessed, and conveyed with it from place to place 
 with every change of habitation. The Sun was 
 saluted at his rising, was worshipped in temples, 
 probably under the Arian name of Mithra, with
 
 POSITION OF THE MAGI IN PARTHIA. 395 
 
 sacrifices and offerings ; had statues erected in his 
 honour, and was usually associated with the lesser 
 luminary. 1 The deities of the Royal House were 
 probably either genii, ministers of Ormazd, like the 
 bagdha vithiya of the Persians, or else the ancestors 
 of the reigning monarch, to whom a qualified divinity 
 seems to have been assigned in the later times of the 
 empire. The Parthian kings usually swore by these 
 deities on solemn occasions, and other members of the 
 royal family made use of the same oath. The main 
 worship, however, of the great mass of the people, 
 even when they were of the royal stock, was con- 
 centrated upon ancestral images, which had a place 
 sacred to them in each house, and received the 
 constant adoration of the household. 
 
 In the early times of the empire the Magi were 
 
 held in high repute, and most of the peculiar tenets 
 
 and rites of the Magian religion were professed and 
 
 followed by the Parthians. Elemental worship was 
 
 practised. Fire was held sacred, and there was an 
 
 especial reverence for rivers. Dead bodies were not 
 
 burned, but were exposed to be devoured by birds 
 
 and beasts of prey, after which the dry bones were 
 
 collected and placed in tombs. The Magi formed a 
 
 large portion of the great national council, 2 which 
 
 elected, and, if need were, deposed the kings. But, in 
 
 course of time, much laxity was introduced. The 
 
 Arsacid monarchs of Armenia allowed the Sacred 
 
 Fire of Ormazd, which ought to have been kept 
 
 continually burning, to go out ; and we can scarcely 
 
 1 See the " Armenian History " of Moses of Chorene, ii. 74. 
 
 2 Compare above, Chap. V. p. 78.
 
 396 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 suppose but that the Parthian Arsacidas were equally 
 negligent. Religious respect for the element of fire 
 so entirely passed away, that we hear of the later 
 Parthians burning their dead. 1 The Magi fell into 
 disrepute, and, if not expelled from their place in the 
 national council, at any rate found themselves despised 
 and deprived of influence. 2 The later Parthian 
 religion can have been little more than a worship 
 of the Sun and Moon, together with a cult of the 
 terapliim, or sacred images, which were the most 
 precious possessions of each household. 
 
 The manners and customs of the Parthians may be 
 most conveniently considered under the two heads of 
 their customs in war and in peace. As they were 
 essentially a warlike people, the chief interest must 
 attach to their military customs, and to these will 
 therefore be assigned the foremost place. It appears 
 that, like the European monarchs of the feudal times, 
 they did not regard it as necessary to maintain any 
 standing army. When hostilities threatened, and 
 war seemed likely to break out, the king made his 
 immediate vassals acquainted with the fact, and 
 demanded from each of them a contingent. A certain 
 rendezvous was named, and all were required to meet 
 together on a certain day. The troops thus summoned 
 were of two kinds, native and foreign. The governors 
 of the provinces, whether tributary kings or satraps, 
 called out the military strength of their respective 
 districts, saw to their arming and provisioning, and, 
 marching each at the head of his contingent, brought 
 a foreign auxiliary force to the assistance of their 
 ' Herodian, iv. 30. 2 Agathias, ii. 26.
 
 CUSTOMS IN WAR. 397 
 
 suzerain. But the backbone of the army, the 
 portion on which alone much reliance was placed, 
 consisted of Parthians. Each Parthian noble was 
 bound to call out his slaves and his retainers, to arm 
 and equip them at his own expense, and bring them 
 to the general rendezvous by the time fixed upon. 
 The number of troops brought into the field by each 
 noble varied according to his position and his means ; 
 we hear in one instance of their amounting to ten 
 thousand, 1 while in another recorded case 2 the average 
 number which each of them provided did not exceed 
 125. The various contingents had their own baggage 
 trains, consisting ordinarily of camels, in the propor- 
 tion (as it would seem) of one to every ten fighting 
 men. 
 
 The Parthian armies, like most others, consisted 
 usually of both horse and foot, but in proportions 
 which were not common elsewhere. The foot 
 soldiers were comparatively few in number, and 
 were but very little esteemed. Every effort, on the 
 contrary, was made to increase the number and 
 improve the equipment of the horsemen who bore the 
 brunt of every conflict, and from whose exertions 
 alone victory was expected. Sometimes armies con- 
 sisted of horsemen only, or rather of horsemen 
 followed by a baggage train composed of camels and 
 chariots ; but this only happened under special 
 circumstances. 
 
 The horse was of two kinds, heavy and light. The 
 heavy horsemen (tcardtypcucToi) wore coats of mail 
 reaching to the knee, composed of raw hide covered 
 
 1 Plutarch, " Vit. Crass., : ' i. § 21. 2 Justin, xli. 2.
 
 PARTHIAN HELMET.
 
 CUSTOMS IN WAR. 399 
 
 «■ 
 with plates or scales of iron or steel, very bright, 
 and capable of resisting a strong blow. They had 
 their heads protected by burnished helmets of Mar- 
 gian steel, whose glitter dazzled the spectator. A 
 specimen in the British Museum, figured by Professor 
 Gardner, will best convey the shape. They do not 
 seem to have ordinarily worn greaves, but had their 
 legs encased in a loose trouser, which hung about the 
 ankles and embarrassed the feet, if by any chance the 
 horseman was induced or forced to dismount. They 
 carried no targe or shield, being sufficiently defended 
 by their coats of mail. Their chief offensive arms 
 were a spear (kovtos), which was of great strength 
 and thickness, and a bow and arrows of unusual 
 dimensions. They likewise carried in their girdle a 
 short sword or knife (nu^capa), which was intended 
 to be used in close combat. Their horses were, like 
 themselves, protected by a defence of scale-armour, 
 which was either of steel or of bronze, polished like 
 the armour of the men. 
 
 The light horse appears to have been armed with 
 the same sort of bows and arrows as the heavy 
 cavalry, but carried no spear, and was not encumbered 
 with armour. It was carefully trained to the deft 
 management of the horse and bow, and was unequalled 
 in the rapidity and dexterity of its movements. The 
 archer delivered his arrows with as much precision and 
 force in retreat as in advance, and was almost more 
 feared when he retired than when he charged his foe. 
 Besides his bow and arrows, the light horseman 
 seems to have carried a sword, and he no doubt wore 
 also the customary knife in his belt ; but it was as an 
 archer that he was chiefly formidable.
 
 400 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 During the later period of the monarchy, the 
 Parthians, who had always employed camels largely 
 in the conveyance of stores and baggage, are said to 
 have introduced a camel corps into the army itself, 
 and to have derived considerable advantage from the 
 new arm. The camels could bear the weight of the 
 mailed riders and of their own armour better than 
 horses ; and their riders were at once less accessible 
 in their elevated position, and more capable of dealing 
 effective blows upon the enemy. As a set off, how- 
 ever, against these advantages, the spongy feet of the 
 camel were found to be more readily injured by the 
 tribulus or caltrop than the harder feet of the horse, 
 and the corps was thus more easily disabled than 
 an equal force of cavalry, if it could be tempted or 
 forced to pass over ground on which these obstacles 
 had previously been scattered. 
 
 We do not hear of any use of chariots by the 
 Parthians, except for the conveyance of the females 
 who commonly accompanied the nobles on their 
 warlike expeditions. The wives and concubines of 
 the chiefs followed the camp in great numbers, and 
 women of a less reputable class— singers, dancers, and 
 musicians — swelled the ranks of the supernumeraries. 
 Many of these were Greeks from Seleucia, Nice- 
 phorium, and other Macedonian settlements. The 
 commissariat and baggage departments are said to 
 have been badly organised, 1 but some thousands of 
 baggage camels always accompanied an army for the 
 conveyance of stores and provisions. Of these a 
 considerable portion were laden with arrows, of which 
 
 1 Dio Cassius, xl. 15.
 
 PARTHIAN TACTICS. 4OI 
 
 the supply was in this way rendered practically 
 inexhaustible. The employment of the elephant in 
 war was even more rare in Parthia than that of 
 the chariot. Parthian coins occasionally exhibit the 
 creature x ; so that it was certainly known to the 
 people, but its actual employment in warefare is 
 mentioned on one occasion only, 2 and then we hear 
 of only a single animal, which is ridden by the 
 monarch. As both the Seleucid princes and the 
 Sassanidae made large use of the elephant in their 
 campaigns, its entire neglect by the Parthians is 
 somewhat remarkable. Probably the unwieldy 
 creature was regarded by them as too heavy and 
 clumsy to suit the light and rapid movements of 
 their armies, and was therefore almost wholly disused 
 during the period of their supremacy. 
 
 The Parthian tactics appear to have been of a 
 simple kind, and to have differed but little from 
 those of other nations in the same region which have 
 depended mainly on their cavalry. To surround 
 their foe, to entangle him and involve him in diffi- 
 culties, to cut of his supplies and his stragglers, 
 and ultimately to bring him into a position where 
 he might be overwhelmed by missiles, was the aim 
 of all Parthian commanders of any military ability. 
 Their warfare was suited for defence rather than for 
 attack, unless against contemptible enemies. They 
 were particularly inefficient in sieges, and avoided 
 engaging in them as far as possible ; but when cir- 
 
 1 Lindsay, " History and Coinage of the Parthians," pi. vii., No. II ; 
 pi. viii., No. 30: Matkoff, " Arsac. Monet." Tab. iii., No. 2. 
 
 2 Tacit., "Ann.," xv. 15.
 
 402 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 cumstances made it necessary, they did not shrink 
 from undertaking the uncongenial operation. Long 
 wars were very distasteful to them ; and, if they did 
 not find victory tolerably easy they were apt to retire 
 and allow their foe to escape, or to baffle him by 
 withdrawing their forces into a distant and inaccessible 
 region. After their early victories over Crassus and 
 Antony, they never succeeded in preventing the 
 steady advance of a Roman force into their territory, 
 or in repulsing a determined attack upon their 
 principal capital. Still they generally had their 
 revenge after a little time. It was easy for the 
 Romans to overrun Mesopotamia, but it was not 
 so easy for them to hold it ; and it was scarcely 
 possible for them to retire from it after an occupation 
 without incurring disaster. The clouds of Parthian 
 horse hung upon their retrea ting columns, straitened 
 them for provisions, galled them with missiles, and 
 destroyed those who could not keep up with the 
 main body. The towns, upon the line of their retreat, 
 revolted and shut their gates, defying even such com- 
 manders as Severus and Trajan. Of the six great 
 expeditions of Rome against Parthia, one only, that 
 of Avidius Cassius, was altogether successful. In 
 every other case either the failure of the expedition 
 was complete, or the glory of the advance was 
 tarnished by suffering and calamity during the 
 retreat. Other enemies they usually repulsed with but 
 little difficulty. 
 
 When the Parthians entered into battle it was with 
 much noise and shouting. They made no use of 
 trumpets or horns, but employed in their place the
 
 PARTHIAN TACTICS. 403 
 
 kettledrum, which resounded from all parts of the 
 field when they made their onset. Their attack was — 
 for the most part — furious. The mailed horsemen 
 charged at speed, and (we are told) often drove 
 their spears through the bodies of two enemies at 
 a blow. The light horse, and the foot (when any 
 were present), delivered their arrows with precision, 
 and with extraordinary force. 43ut if the assailants 
 were met with a stout and firm resistance, the first 
 vigour of the attack was rarely long maintained. The 
 Parthian warriors very quickly grew weary of an 
 equal contest, and, if they could not force their enemy 
 to give way, soon changed their tactics. Pretending 
 panic, beating a hasty retreat, and scattering in their 
 flight, they endeavoured to induce their foe to pursue 
 hurriedly and in disorder, being themselves ready at 
 any moment to turn and take advantage of the least 
 appearance of confusion. If these tactics failed, as 
 they generally did after they came to be known, then 
 the simulated flight was commonly converted into 
 a real one ; further conflict was for the time avoided, 
 and the army withdrew itself into a distant region. 
 
 If the Parthians wanted to parley with an enemy, 
 they unstrung their bows and, advancing with the 
 right arm outstretched, asked for a conference. They 
 are accused by the Romans of sometimes using 
 treachery on such occasions ; but, except in the single 
 instance of Crassus, the charge of bad faith breaks 
 down when it is examined into. On solemn occasions, 
 when the intention was seriously to discuss grounds 
 of complaint likely to lead to war, or to bring an 
 actual war to an end by the arrangement of terms
 
 404 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 of peace, a formal meeting was ordinarily held by 
 appointment between the representatives of either 
 side, generally on neutral ground, as on an island in the 
 Euphrates, or on a bridge newly constructed across 
 it. Here the chiefs or envoys of the respective nations 
 met, accompanied by an equal number of guards, 
 while the remainder of their forces occupied the two 
 opposite banks of the river. Matters were discussed 
 in friendly fashion, some language known to both 
 parties being employed as a means of communication ; 
 after which festivities usually took place, the two 
 chiefs mutually entertaining each other, or accepting 
 in common the hospitalities of a third party. The 
 terms of peace agreed upon were reduced to writing ; 
 hands were grasped as a sign that faith was pledged ; 
 and oaths having been interchanged the conference 
 broke up, and the chiefs with their armies set out on 
 their return to their respective countries. 
 
 The wonderful splendour of the Parthian Court is 
 celebrated in general terms by several writers, but not 
 many particulars have come down to us respecting it. 
 We are told that it was migratory, moving from one 
 of the chief cities of the empire to another at different 
 seasons of the year; and that, owing to the vast numbers 
 of the persons composing it, there was sometimes a diffi- 
 culty in providing for their subsistence while they were 
 upon the road. The Court comprised, of course, the 
 usual extensive harem of an Oriental sovereign, con- 
 sisting of a single recognised queen, and a multitude 
 of secondary wives or concubines. The legitimate 
 wife of the prince was with rare exceptions a native, 
 and in most cases was a member of the royal race
 
 CUSTOMS IN PEACE. 405 
 
 of the Arsacidae ; but sometimes she was the daughter 
 of a dependant monarch, and she might even be a 
 slave, whom the royal favour had elevated from that 
 position. Both wives and concubines remained 
 ordinarily in the closest seclusion, and we have but 
 little mention of them in the Parthian annals. In one 
 instance however, at any rate, a queen, educated in 
 the notions of the West, succeeded in setting Oriental 
 etiquette at defiance ; she boldly asserted herself, 
 took the direction of affairs out of the hands of 
 her husband and subsequently ruled the empire in 
 conjunction with her son. 1 Her name and image 
 were even placed upon the coins. 2 Generally, how- 
 ever, the Parthian kings were remarkably free from 
 the weakness of subservience to women and managed 
 their kingdom with a firm hand, without allowing 
 either wives or ministers to exercise any undue ascen- 
 dency over them. In particular, we may note that they 
 never, so far as appears, fell under the baleful influence 
 of eunuchs, who, from first to last, play a very subor- 
 dinate part in the Parthian history. Here the contrast 
 is striking between the Parthian and the early Persian 
 monarchy. 
 
 The ordinary dress of the monarch was the long 
 loose "Median robe" which had been adopted from 
 the Medes by the Achaemenian Persians. This robe 
 flowed down to the feet in numerous folds, enveloping 
 and concealing almost the entire figure. Trousers 
 and a tunicwere ordinarily, it is probable, worn beneath 
 
 1 See above, p. 226. 
 
 2 Gardner, "Parthian Coinage," pi. iv., Nos. 27, 28; Lindsay, 
 " History an>l Coinage of the Parthians," pi. hi., Nos. 62. 63.
 
 406 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 it, the latter of linen, the former made of silk or wool. 
 As head-dress, the king wore either the 
 4iB simple diadem, which was a band or 
 
 fV\) ribbon passed once or oftener round the 
 
 jl|JP=3 head and terminating in two long ends 
 (]§i^s»j which fell down behind, or else a more 
 <jp vl ^l pretentious cap, which in the earlier times 
 was a sort of Scythian pointed helmet 
 and in the later a rounded tiara, sometimes adorned 
 with pearls or gems. His neck appears to have 
 been generally encircled with two or more collars 
 or necklaces, and he frequently wore ear-rings in his 
 ears. The beard was almost always cultivated, and, 
 with the hair, was worn variously. Generally, 
 both hair and beard were carefully curled, but some- 
 times they hung down in long straight locks. Mostly 
 the beard was pointed, but occasionally it was 
 worn square. In later times a fashion grew up of 
 puffing out the hair extravagantly on either side of 
 the head — a practice continued by the Sassanians. 
 When he went out to war, the monarch seems to 
 have exchanged his " Median robe " 
 for a short cloak, reaching halfway 
 down the thigh. His head was pro- 
 tected by a pointed helmet, without 
 crest or plume, and he carried the 
 national arm of offence, the bow. 
 Under his cloak he wore a coat of 
 mail. He usually took the field on horseback, but was 
 occasionally mounted on an elephant trained to en- 
 counter the shock of battle. Gold and silver were 
 lavishly employed in the trappings of his charger and
 
 SECLUSION OF WOMEN. 407 
 
 on his arms. For the most part he took the command, 
 and freely exposed his person in the fight, though it 
 was regarded as no disgrace if he preferred to avoid 
 the perils of the actual encounter. A bodyguard 
 protected his person, surrounding him on ordinary 
 occasions, and interposing themselves between him 
 and his assailants : he had also attendants, whose 
 duty it was to assist him in mounting on horseback, 
 and in dismounting, which the armour that he wore 
 made no easy business. 
 
 It has been already observed that the queen lived, 
 ordinarily, in seclusion. When, however, under 
 peculiar circumstances, she emerged from privacy, 
 her status and dignity were not much below those of 
 the monarch. She wore a tiara far more elaborate 
 than his, and one which, like his, was encircled with 
 the diadem. Her neck was adorned with a necklace 
 or necklaces. In the typical instance of Musa or 
 Thermusa, we find her allowed the title of 
 "Heavenly Goddess" (9EA OYPANIA). Separate 
 apartments were of course assigned to the queen and 
 to the royal concubines in the various palaces, which 
 were buildings on a magnificent scale and decorated 
 with the utmost richness. Philostratus, who wrote in 
 Parthian times (a.d. 172-244), and had a good know- 
 ledge of the East, thus describes the royal palace at 
 Babylon : " The palace is roofed with brass, and a 
 bright light flashes from it. It has chambers for the 
 women and chambers for the men, and porticoes, 
 partly glittering with silver, partly with cloth-of-gold 
 embroideries, partly with solid slabs of gold, let into 
 the walls like pictures. The subjects of the em-
 
 408 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 broideries are taken from the Greek mythology, and 
 include representations of Andromeda, of Amymone, 
 and of Orpheus, who is frequently repeated. Datis 
 is, moreover, represented, destroying Naxos with his 
 fleet, and Artaphemes besieging Eretria, and Xerxes 
 gaining his famous victories. You behold the occu- 
 pation of Athens and the battle of Thermopylae, and 
 other things still more characteristic of the great 
 Persian War, rivers drunk up and disappearing from 
 the face of the earth, and a bridge stretched across 
 the sea, and a canal cut through Athos, and the like. 
 One chamber for the men has a ceiling fashioned 
 into a vault like the heaven, composed entirely of 
 sapphires, which are the bluest of stones, and 
 resemble the sky in colour. Golden images of the 
 gods whom they worship are set up about the vault, 
 and show like stars in the firmament. This is the 
 chamber in which the king delivers his judgments. 
 Four golden magic wheels hang from the roof, and 
 threaten the monarch with the Divine Nemesis, if he 
 exalts himself above the condition of man. These 
 wheels are called ' the tongues of the gods,' and are 
 set in their places by the Magi who frequent the 
 palace." J This description must not be taken as 
 altogether exact. The tapestries may have repre- 
 sented other scenes than those which Philostratus 
 imagined ; the ceiling was certainly not " composed 
 entirely of sapphires," but either of enamelled bricks 
 or plaster painted blue ; and the " magic wheels " are 
 questionable ; but the general effect was probably 
 very much that which the philosopher of Tyana 
 
 1 See Philostratus, " Vit. Apoll. Tyan.," i. 25.
 
 STATE AND POMP OF THE KING. 409 
 
 portrays, and presented an ensemble that was curious, 
 striking, and magnificent. 
 
 It is probable that the state and pomp which 
 surrounded the monarch fell little short of the Achae- 
 menian standard. Considered as in some sort divine 
 during his life, and always an object of national 
 worship after his death, the " Brother of the Sun and 
 Moon " * occupied a position far above that of the 
 most exalted of his subjects. Tributary monarchs 
 were shocked, when, in times of calamity, the "Great 
 King" stooped to solicit their aid, and appeared 
 before them in the guise of a suppliant, shorn of his 
 customary splendour. Nobles coveted the dignity of 
 " King's Friend," and were content to submit to blows 
 and buffets at the caprice of their royal master, 
 before whom they prostrated themselves in humble 
 adoration after each such castigation. The Parthian 
 monarch dined in solitary grandeur, extended on his 
 own special couch, and eating from his own special 
 table, which was placed at a higher elevation than 
 those prepared for his guests and retinue. His 
 " friend " sat on the ground at his feet, and was fed 
 by scraps from his master's board. Guards, ministers, 
 and attendants of various kinds surrounded him, and 
 were ready at a word, or at a sign, to do his bidding. 
 Throughout the empire he had numerous " Eyes " 
 and " Ears " — officers who watched his interests, and 
 sent him timely notice of whatever touched his safety. 
 The bed on which the monarch slept was of gold, 
 and subjects were forbidden to take their repose on 
 couches of the same material. No stranger could 
 
 1 Ammian. Marcellin. , xxiii. 6.
 
 4IO PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 obtain access to him unless introduced by the proper 
 officer : and it was expected that whoever asked an 
 audience should be prepared with a present of con- 
 siderable value. For the gifts which he received the 
 monarch made a suitable return, allowing such 
 persons as he especially favoured to choose the 
 presents that they most desired. 
 
 The Parthian nobles enjoyed a power and dignity 
 greater than that which is usually possessed by any 
 subjects of an Oriental king. Rank in Parthia being 
 hereditary and not simply official, the Megistanes 
 were no mere creatures of the monarch, but a class 
 which stood on its own indefeasible rights. As they 
 had the privilege of electing to the throne upon a 
 vacancy, and even the further privilege of deposing 
 a duly elected monarch, the king could not but stand 
 in wholesome awe of them, and feel compelled to 
 treat them with considerable respect and deference. 
 It is to be remembered, moreover, that they were not 
 without a material force calculated to give powerful 
 support to their constitutional rights and privileges. 
 Each stood at the head of a body of retainers 
 accustomed to bear arms, and to serve in the wars of 
 the empire. Together these bodies constituted the 
 strength of the army; and though the royal body- 
 guard might perhaps have been capable of dealing 
 successfully with each group of retainers separately, 
 yet such an esprit de cori>s was sure to animate the 
 nobles generally, that in almost every case they 
 would make common cause with any one of their 
 number who was attacked, and would support him 
 against the Crown with the zeal inspired by self-
 
 POWER OF THE NOBLES. 4II 
 
 interest. Thus the Parthian nobility were far more 
 powerful and independent than any similar class 
 under the Achaemenian, Sassanian, Modern Persian, 
 or Turkish sovereignties. They exercised a real 
 control over the monarch, and had a voice in the 
 direction of the empire. Like the great feudal 
 vassals of the Middle Ages, they from time to time 
 quarrelled with their liege lord, and disturbed the 
 tranquillity of the kingdom by prolonged and 
 dangerous civil wars ; but these contentions served 
 to keep alive a vigour, a life, and a spirit of sturdy 
 independence very unusual in the East, and gave a 
 stubborn strength to the Parthian Monarchy, in which 
 Oriental states and governments have for the most 
 part been remarkably deficient. 
 
 There appear to have been several grades of rank 
 among the Parthian nobles. The highest dignity in 
 the kingdom, next to the Crown, was that of the 
 Surena, or " Field-Marshal " ; and this position was 
 hereditary in a particular family, which can have 
 stood but a little below the royal house in wealth and 
 consequence. The head of this noble house is said 
 to have at one time brought into the field as many as 
 ten thousand retainers and slaves, of whom a thou- 
 sand were heavy-armed. 1 It was his right to place 
 the diadem on the king's brow at his coronation. 
 The other nobles lived for the most part on their 
 domains, but took the field at the head of their 
 retainers in case of war, and in peace might some- 
 times serve the offices of satrap, vizier, or royal 
 councillor. The wealth of the class was great ; 2 its 
 
 1 Plutarch, " Vit. Crass.," § 21. 2 See above, pp. 80 and 397.
 
 412 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 members were inclined to be turbulent, and, like the 
 barons of the European kingdoms, acted as a constant 
 check and counterpoise to the royal authority, which 
 they often resisted, and occasionally even overthrew. 
 
 After war, the employment in which the king and 
 the nobles took most delight, was hunting. The lion 
 continued in the wild state an occupant of the Meso- 
 potamian river banks and marshes ; and in other 
 parts of the empire bears, leopards, and even tigers 
 abounded. Thus the higher kinds of sport were 
 constantly and readily obtainable. But the ordinary 
 practice of the monarch and his courtiers seems to 
 have fallen short of the true sportsman's ideal. 
 Instead of seeking the more dangerous kinds of 
 beasts in their native haunts, and engaging with 
 them under the conditions designed by Nature, the 
 Parthians were generally content with a poorer and 
 tamer method. They kept lions, leopards, and bears 
 in enclosed parks, or " paradises," and found pleasure 
 in the pursuit and slaughter of these denaturalised 
 and half-domesticated animals. The employment 
 may still, even under these circumstances, have con- 
 tained an element of danger which rendered it 
 exciting ; but it was a poor substitute for the true 
 sport which the " mighty hunter before the Lord " 
 had been the first to practise in these regions 
 (Gen. x. 9). 
 
 The ordinary dress of the Parthian noble was, like 
 that of the monarch, a long loose robe reaching to 
 the feet, under which he wore a vest and trousers. 
 Bright and varied colours were commonly affected, 
 and sometimes dresses were interwoven or em-
 
 ORDINARY PARTHIAN FOOD. 413 
 
 broidered with threads of gold. In seasons of 
 festivity it was usual for garlands of fresh flowers to 
 be worn upon the head. A long knife or dagger was 
 carried at all times, and by all classes, suited for use 
 either as an implement or as a weapon. 
 
 In the earlier and simpler period of the empire — 
 when the nation was just emerging from barbarism — 
 the Parthian was noted as a spare liver ; but, as time 
 went on, he aped the vices of more civilized people, 
 and became an indiscriminate eater and a hard 
 drinker. Game formed a main portion of his diet ; 
 but he indulged also in pork, and probably in other 
 sorts of butcher's meat. He ate leavened bread with 
 his meat, and various kinds of vegetables. The 
 bread, which was particularly light and porous, seems 
 to have been sometimes imported by the Romans, 
 who knew it as panis aquaticus or panis Parthicus. 
 Dates were also consumed largely by the Parthians, 
 and the fruit grew in some parts of the country to 
 an extraordinary size. A kind of wine was made 
 from it ; and this seems to have been the intoxica- 
 ting drink in which the nation generally indulged over- 
 much. The liquor made from the dates of Babylon 
 was the most highly esteemed, and was reserved for 
 the use of the king, and the higher order of satraps. 
 The vulgar herd had to content themselves with 
 drink of an inferior quality. Of the Parthian enter- 
 tainments music was commonly an accompaniment. 
 The flute, the pipe, the drum, and the instrument 
 called the sambitca, appear to have been known to 
 them ; and they understood how to combine these 
 instruments in concerted harmony. They are said
 
 414 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 to have concluded all their feasts with dancing, 1 an 
 amusement of which they were inordinately fond ; but 
 this was probably the case only with the lower orders 
 of the people. Dancing in the East, unless associated 
 with religion, is viewed as degrading, and is not 
 indulged in by those who wish to be considered 
 respectable. 
 
 The Parthians were jealous of their women, and 
 the separation of the sexes was very decided among 
 them. The women took their meals, and passed the 
 greater portion of their lives, apart from the men. 
 Veils were commonly worn, as in modern Moham- 
 medan countries ; and it was regarded as essential 
 to female delicacy that women, whether married or 
 single, should converse freely with no males who were 
 not either their near relations or else eunuchs. Adul- 
 tery was punished with extreme severity ; but divorce 
 was obtained without much difficulty, and women of 
 rank released themselves from the nuptial tie on light 
 grounds of complaint, and with little loss of reputa- 
 tion. Polygamy was the established rule ; and every 
 Parthian was entitled, besides his chief wife, to main- 
 tain as many concubines as he pleased. Some of the 
 nobles supported an excessive number ; but the ex- 
 penses of the seraglio prevented the generality from 
 taking very much advantage of the indulgence which 
 the law permitted. It is probable that the bulk of the 
 population, as is the case now in Mohammedan coun- 
 tries, was monogamous. 
 
 As to the degree of refinement and civilisation 
 whereto the Parthians attained, it is difficult to judge 
 
 1 Philostratus, " Vit. ApoW. Tyan.," i. 21,
 
 DEGREE OF CIVILISATION. 415 
 
 and determine with accuracy. In mimetic art their 
 remains (as we have already seen) do not show much 
 taste or sense of beauty. There is perhaps sufficient 
 ground to believe that their architecture possessed a 
 certain amount of merit ; but the existing monuments 
 can scarcely be taken as representations of pure Par- 
 thian work, since they may have owed their excellence 
 — in some measure — to foreign artists, or at any rate 
 to foreign influence. Still the following particulars, 
 for which there is good evidence, seem to imply that 
 the nation had risen in reality far above that " bar- 
 barism," which it was the fashion for the Greek and 
 Roman writers to impute to it. In the first place, the 
 Parthians had a considerable knowledge of foreign 
 languages. Plutarch tells us, 1 that Orodes, the op- 
 ponent of Crassus, was so far conversant with the 
 Greek language and literature, that he could enjoy the 
 representation of a play of Euripides. The general 
 possession of some knowledge of Greek — at any rate 
 by the kings and upper classes — seems to be implied 
 by the use of the Greek letters and language in the 
 legends upon coins, and in inscriptions. Other lan- 
 guages were also to a certain extent studied and 
 understood. The later kings almost invariably placed 
 a Semitic legend upon their coins ; and there is at 
 least one instance of a Parthian prince adopting an 
 Arian legend of the type known as Bactrian. 2 Jose- 
 phus, moreover, regarded the Parthians as familiar 
 with Hebrew, or Syro-Chaldee, since he wrote his 
 history of the Jewish War in his own native tongue, 
 
 1 Plutarch, " Vit. Crassi." § 32. 
 
 2 "Numismatic Chronicle," No. vi. p. 104.
 
 416 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 before he put out his Greek version, for the benefit 
 especially of the Parthians, among whom he declares 
 that he had a large number of readers. 1 
 
 It does not appear that the Parthians had any- 
 native literature ; writing, however, was familiar to 
 them, and was widely employed by them in matters 
 of business. Not only were negotiations carried on 
 with foreign powers by means of written despatches, 
 but the affairs of the empire generally were transacted 
 by means of writing. A custom-house system was, 
 we are told, established along the frontier, and all 
 commodities liable to duty that entered the country 
 were registered in a book at the time of entry by the 
 custom-house officer. In the great cities where the 
 Court passed a portion of the year, account was kept 
 o( the arrival of strangers, whose names and descrip- 
 tions were placed upon record by the keepers of the 
 gates. The orders of the Crown were signified in 
 writing to the satraps ; and they doubtless corres- 
 sponded with the Court in the same way. In the 
 earlier times the writing material commonly used was 
 linen ; but, shortly before the date of Pliny, the Par- 
 thians began to make paper from papyrus, which grew 
 in the neighbourhood of Babylon, though they still 
 continued also to employ, and gave the preference to, 
 the material to which use had accustomed them. 
 
 The Parthians had many usages which seem to 
 imply a fairly advanced civilisation. There was a 
 considerable trade between Rome and Parthia, carried 
 on by means of travelling merchants. Parthia im- 
 ported from Rome various metals, and a multitude of 
 
 1 Joseph., "Bell. Jud.," Proem, § i and § 2.
 
 DEGREE OF CIVILISATION. 417 
 
 manufactured articles of a high class. Her principal 
 exports were textile fabrics and spices. The textile 
 fabrics seem to have been produced chiefly in Baby- 
 lonia, and to have consisted principally of silks, 
 carpets, and coverlets. The silks were largely used 
 by the Roman fashionable ladies. The coverlets, 
 which were patterned with a variety of colours, fetched 
 enormous prices, and were regarded as fit adornments 
 of the Imperial palace. Among the spices exported, 
 the most celebrated were bdellium, and Xhejuncus odo- 
 ratus, or sweet-scented bulrush. Advanced civilisation 
 is also implied in the Parthian tolerance of varieties in 
 religion, which has been already mentioned. 1 Even 
 in political matters they appear to have been free 
 from the narrowness which generally characterises 
 barbarous nations. They behaved mercifully to 
 prisoners, admitted foreigners freely to offices of high 
 trust, gave an asylum to refugees, and treated them 
 with respect and kindness, were scrupulous observers 
 of their pledged word, and eminently faithful to their 
 treaty obligations. On the other hand, it must be 
 admitted that they had some customs which imply 
 that they retained a tinge of barbarism. They used 
 torture for the extraction of replies from accused 
 persons, employed the scourge to punish trifling 
 offences, and, in certain cases, condescended to muti- 
 late and insult the bodies of their dead enemies. 
 Their addiction to intemperance is also a barbaric trait. 
 They were no doubt, on the whole, considerably less 
 civilised than the contemporary Greeks and Romans ; 
 but the difference does not appear to have been so 
 
 1 Supra, p. 360.
 
 418 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 great as the classical writers would have us imagine 
 it. 
 
 We cannot, however, deny, and we do not wish 
 to conceal the fact, that the Parthians exhibited, 
 especially during the later period of the empire, 
 a strong tendency to degenerate. They lost their 
 primitive virtues of simplicity and abstemiousness. 
 They became luxurious, and to a certain extent 
 effeminate. The dash or elan, which characterised 
 their warfare in the earlier times is " conspicuous by 
 its absence " in the campaigns of the later monarchs. 
 A decline in art and letters is also observable in the 
 Parthian remains that have come down to us, especially 
 in the coins, which, after the reign of Gotarzes, pro- 
 ceed from bad to worse, and end with presenting to 
 us effigies that have neither force nor character, and 
 legends that are absolutely illegible. A knowledge 
 of Greek is still possessed, the Greek letters being 
 employed, and the words, when they can be de- 
 ciphered, being clearly intended to be Greek. But 
 they are often misspelt ; the forms used are ungram- 
 matical ; while, at the last, the letters merely straggle 
 over the field of the coin, and are not really formed 
 into words. Further, the anomaly is introduced of a 
 second legend, which is Semitic both in language and 
 character, and reads from right to left. 
 
 Still, to judge fairly of the Parthians, we must view 
 them, not in their decline, but rather in the earlier 
 stages of their career, before decline had set in. 
 Speaking broadly, the position which they occupied 
 among the nations of the old world was not very dis- 
 similar to that which is held by the Turks in the
 
 GENERAL SURVEY. 4I9 
 
 system of Modern Europe. They possessed a military 
 strength which caused them to be both respected and 
 feared, while they were further noted for a vigour of 
 administration rarely seen among Orientals. It is 
 true that a certain coarseness and rudeness attached 
 to them which they found it impossible to shake off, 
 and this gave their enemies a plausible ground for 
 representing them as absolute barbarians. But we 
 must not be led away by the exaggerations of pre- 
 judiced writers, who sought to elevate the fame and 
 reputation of their own countrymen by blackening the 
 character of their chief rivals. Except in respect of 
 their military prowess, it is doubtful if justice is done 
 to the Parthians by any classical author. They occu- 
 pied the position of the second nation in the world 
 from about B.C. 150 to A.D. 226. They were a check 
 and a counterpoise to Rome, preserving a " balance 
 of power," and preventing the absorption of all other 
 nations into the Tyrant Empire. They afforded a 
 refuge to those whom Rome would fain have hunted 
 down, allowed a freedom to their subjects which no 
 Roman Emperor ever permitted, excelled the Romans 
 in toleration and in a liberal treatment of foreigners, 
 and gave the East a protection from foreign foes, and 
 a government well suited to its needs, for a period of 
 nearly four cen'uries. 
 
 THE END.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 (See p. 132.) 
 
 Tin-; king alluded to has been called Mnascires or 
 Mnasciras, and was formerly admitted into his list 
 of Parthian monarchs by the author, who followed 
 Lindsay and others. But Professor Gardner has 
 shown that the name, which occurs in no author but 
 Lucian, should probably be read as Kamnascires, and 
 not Mnascires (koi Mvaatciprj'i he being a manifest 
 corruption from KafivaaKiprjq 8e), and that the king 
 intended is probably a tributary monarch of the 
 Parthian period, well known to numismatologists, 
 whose coins bear the legend of BASIAEQS 
 KAMXASKIPOY. 
 
 COIN OF KAMN ASCI HAS. 
 
 The probable date of the monarch is about that of 
 Mithridates I. of Parthia. (See Professor Gardner's 
 
 " Parthian Coinage," pp. 8 and 61.) 
 
 420
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Abdageses, 244 
 
 Abgarus I., makes alliance with 
 Pompey, 151 ; joins Crassus, 
 164 ; treachery of, 166 
 
 Abgarus II., joins Meherdates, 
 265 
 
 Achnemenian period, Parthia in 
 the, 27 
 
 Achxus, adversary of Antiochus 
 the Great, 59 
 
 Adiabene, governed by a Yitaxa, 
 80 ; conquered by Tigranes, 
 133 ; inhabitants of, placed in 
 Tigrano-certa, 134 ; made a 
 Roman province by Trajan, 
 308 ; relinquished by Hadrian, 
 313 ; overrun by Severus, 335 ; 
 and made into a Roman pro- 
 vince, 345 
 
 Agathias, quoted, 90 
 
 Ak-su, river, 109 
 
 Alani, wild tribes of, 26, 294, 296 
 
 Alarodii, 122 
 
 Alatagh Range, 5 
 
 Albanians, 239, 305 
 
 Albinus, his contest with Severus, 
 336 
 
 Alexander Balas, 74 
 
 Alexander the Great, II, 36 
 
 Amu Daria, river, 22 
 
 Andragoras, 49 
 
 Anilai, brother of Asinai, 248 ; 
 succeeds him, 250; his battles 
 with Mithridates, 251 ; his 
 death, 252 
 
 Antigonus of Jerusalem, 193 
 
 Antioch, Parthian capital trans- 
 ferred to, 39, 40 
 
 Antiochus Hierax, brother to 
 Seleucus Callinicus, 54 ; wars 
 with Callinicus, 56 
 
 Antiochus of Commagene, 196, 
 198 
 
 Antiochus I., 43 
 
 Antiochus II., takes the title of 
 " Theos," 44 ; his character, 
 ibid. ; revolt of Bactria from, 45, 
 46 
 
 Antiochus III., the Great, his war 
 with Achseus, 59 ; attacked by 
 Artabanus I., ibid. ; invades 
 Parthia, 60; his Bactrian expe- 
 dition, 61 ; his death, 62 
 
 Antiochus IV. (Epiphanes), h's 
 unwise policy towards the Jews, 
 66 ; his death, 67 
 
 Antiochus V., surnamed Eupator, 
 his accession, 67 ; dethroned by 
 his brother, Demetrius I., 68 
 
 Antiochus Sidetes, successor to 
 Demetrius II., 94 ; his war with 
 Tryphon, ibid. ; his Parthian 
 war, 95-100; defeated and 
 killed by Phraates II., 101 
 
 Anti-Semitic disturbances, 253 
 
 Antoninus, 320 ; death of, 322 
 
 Antony, his war with the " Libe- 
 rators," 189, 190; his quarrel 
 with Octavian, 194, 293 ; his 
 support of Herod the Great, 
 196 ; his Parthian expedition, 
 206-210 ; repulsed from Praaspa
 
 422 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 by the Medians, 209 ; retreat 
 of, 21 1 1 212; great losses of, 
 213 ; sei/.ureof Artavasdes, 215 ; 
 arrangement of the East, 216 ; 
 return to Italy, and war with 
 Octavian, 217 
 Apameia, 192, 198 
 Aparni or Parni, no 
 Arachosia, subjugation of, 18 : 
 account of, 21 ; conquered by 
 Mithridates I., 74 
 Arachotus, river, 21 
 Araxes (Aras), river, 24, 305 
 Arbela, 87, 352 
 Arbelitis, 133 
 Ardashes, 125 
 
 Aria, subjugation of, 18; account 
 of, 20 ; conquered by Mithri- 
 dates I., 74 
 Arians of Herat, 27, 28 ; attacked 
 
 by Scythic tribes, 109 
 Arians, tribes of the, 28 
 Ariarathes of Cappadocia, 45 
 Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, 129 
 Aristonicus of Cappadocia, 127 
 Arius, river, 64 
 
 Armenia, description of, 24, 25, 
 119: early history of, 122-126; 
 held as a Roman province by 
 Pompey, 215 ; becomes a 
 Parthian subject-ally, 225 ; 
 yielded by Parthia to the 
 Romans, 229 ; annexed by 
 Artabanus III., 237 ; again 
 becomes Roman, 240 ; Tiri- 
 dates, king of, 272-279 ; inva- 
 sion of by Pretus, 28; ; Tiridates 
 established in, by arrangement 
 between Parthia and Rome, 
 285 ; made by Trajan into a 
 Roman province, 305 ; seized 
 by Vologases III., 323 ; 
 wrested from Vologases by the 
 Romans, 324 ; claims indepen- 
 dence, 333 ; but submits to 
 Severus, 337 
 Armenia Minor, conquered by 
 
 Mithridates of Pontus, 128 
 Armenians, personal characteris- 
 tics of, 121 ; become allies of 
 Mithridates of Pontus, 128; 
 
 defeated by Sulla, 129 ; at- 
 tacked by I'hraates III., 138 
 Armies, Parthian, description of, 
 
 397 
 Arrian, quoted, 48 
 Arsaces I., establishes Parthian 
 
 independence, 48, 49, 90 
 Arsacid intrigues, 366 
 Arshag, second king of Armenia, 
 
 124 
 Art, general estimate of Parthian, 
 
 393 
 Artabanus I., appearance of, 58 ; 
 
 reign of, 59-61 
 Artabanus II., Scythian war of, 
 
 115 ; death of, 1 16 
 Artabanus III., Parthian crown 
 offered to, 232 ; accepted by, 
 233 ; defeats and expels 
 Vonones, 233 ; proclaimed 
 king, ibid. ; annexes Armenia, 
 237 ; attacked by Scythians, 
 239 ; loses Armenia, ibid. ; 
 attempt to regain it, fails, 240 ; 
 flight of, 241 ; return of, 244 ; 
 submission to Vitellius, 245 ; 
 death of, 258 
 Artabanus IV., pretender to 
 
 Parthian throne, 298 
 Artabanus V. , accession of, 346 ; 
 overture made to him by Cara- 
 callus, 348, 349 ; his reply, 350 ; 
 he receives Caracallus at Ctesi- 
 phon, 351 ; treachery of Cara- 
 callus, 352 ; his death, 354 ; 
 war with Rome, ibid. ; defeat of 
 Macrinus at Nisibis, 355—357 
 Artanes of Armenia, 133 
 Artavasdesof Armenia, 155; makes 
 alliance with Antony, 207 ; con- 
 ducts him to Praaspa, 208 ; 
 withdraws his troops, 209 ; and 
 offends Antony, 214 ; seized 
 and put in chains by Antony, 
 
 215 
 
 Artavasdes of Parthia, the last 
 
 king, 367 
 Artaxata, 124, 236 
 Artaxerxes of Persia, his war with 
 
 Artabanus V., 366, 367 
 Artaxias I., first king of Armenia,
 
 INDEX. 
 
 423 
 
 124; his war with Antiochus 
 Epiphanes, 67, 124, 125 
 
 Artaxias III., ruler of Armenia, 
 236 
 
 Ashkabad, 19 
 
 Asia Minor, wars in, 43 
 
 Asia, Western, the tiger in, 9 
 
 Asinai and Anilai, Semitic high- 
 waymen, 248 
 
 Asinai, robber chief, 248 ; made 
 satrap of Babylon, 249 ; poison- 
 ing of, 250 
 
 Aspasiacse, the, 54, 69 
 
 Aspionus, province of, 10, 69 
 
 Assyria, description of, 17 ; con- 
 quered by Mithridates I., 73 ; 
 occupied by Tigranes of 
 Armenia, 133 ; recovered by 
 the Parthians, 140 ; see Adia- 
 bene 
 
 Atak, the, 5 
 
 Atergatis, Syrian goddess, temple 
 of, 152 
 
 Athenaeus, general of Sidetes, 101 
 
 Atropatene, a part of Media, 
 description of, 24, 25 ; absorbed 
 into Parthia, 24 ; established as 
 a separate state by Atropates, 45 
 
 Attains, 56 
 
 Augustus, 221-234 
 
 Aurelius, 323 
 
 Avidius Cassius, expedition of, 
 325, 327 ; revolt of, 329 
 
 B 
 
 Babylon, troubles in, 252 
 Babylonia, description of, 14, 15 ; 
 
 submission of, to Parthia, 72 ; 
 
 revolt of, under Hymerus, 119 
 Bactria, description of, 18; makes 
 
 itself independent, 45, 47 ; 
 
 attacked by Mithridates I., 69 ; 
 
 conquered by him, 73 ; Scythic 
 
 invasion of, 109 ; occasional 
 
 detachment from Parthia, 359 
 Balas, Syrian king, 74 
 Bambyce, temple at, 152 
 Barsemius, king of Hatra, 333 
 Behistun, Parthian sculpture at, 
 
 267, 268 
 Belik, battle of the, 167 
 
 Berenice, sister of Ptolemy Euer- 
 
 getes, 52 
 Bokhara, 19 
 Bolor, mountains, 25 
 
 Cabul, 65, 69, 109 
 
 Cheilitis Bassus, Pompeian 
 
 general, 189 
 Caesar and Pompey, rivals for 
 
 power, 14 x ; contest between, 
 
 185; Caesar in Syria, 187; 
 
 murder of, 189 
 Csesennius Partus, Roman general, 
 
 282 ; intrigues of, 292-294 
 Caius, eldest grandson of Augus- 
 tus, sent to the East, 225, 227 ; 
 
 holds conference with Phraa- 
 
 taces, 229 ; dies, ibid. 
 Caligula, 245 
 Callinicus, see Seleucus 
 Candahar, 21, 65 
 Canidius Crassus, Roman general, 
 
 206 
 Cape Jask, 15 
 Cappadocia, 26, y], 45, 129, 237, 
 
 276, 283, 318 
 Caracallus, ambition of, 347 ; 
 
 Abgarus made prisoner by, 348 ; 
 
 his oveitures to Artabanus V., 
 
 348 ; mad proposal of, 349 ; 
 
 arrival in Parthia, 351 ; treachery 
 
 of, 352 ; his insult to dead kings, 
 
 352 ; death of, 354 
 Caria, country of, overrun by the 
 
 Parthians, 194 
 Carmania, country of, 366 
 Carrhse, city of, 169, 170 
 Carrhenes, general of Meherdates, 
 
 267 
 Carthage, destruction of, 127 
 Caspian Gates, II, 62 
 Caspian Sea, the, 1, 4, 7, 8, 24, 
 
 25> 3°. 2 74 . 
 Cassius (Avidius), expedition of, 
 
 326 ; strange pestilence in his 
 
 army, 328 
 Cassius, Caius, prefect of Syria, 
 
 265 
 Cassius Longinus, Roman general, 
 
 sent by Julius Caesar to Crassus,
 
 424 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 153; his prudent advice, 158; 
 
 his successful retreat, 171 ; his 
 
 later successes, 180, 181 
 Cassius, the " Liberator," his 
 
 dealings with the Parthians, 
 
 189- 191 
 Caucasus, mountains, 30, 31, 120, 
 
 206 
 Celtic cavalry. 167, 212 
 Chandragupta, Indian monarch, 
 
 6 5 
 Charax, city of, 10, 62, 64 
 
 Chinese historians, quoted, 107 
 
 Chorasmia, country of, 18 ; 
 
 described, 22 ; people of, 27, 
 
 28, no 
 
 Chosroes, Farthian general, 323 
 
 Chosroes, Parthian king, accession 
 
 of, 298 ; his affront to Trojan, 
 
 302 ; his Roman war, 306-313 ; 
 
 his friendly relations with 
 
 Hadrian, 313-316; his death, 
 
 317 
 Chosroes, uncle of last Parthian 
 
 king, 367 
 Cicero alarmed at the Parthian 
 
 victory over Crassus, 182 
 Cilicia, country of, 133, 134 ; 
 
 invaded by Parthians, 182, 194, 
 
 198 ; death of Trajan in, 313 
 Cimmerians, 105 
 Cinnamus, Parthian noble, 258 
 Civilisation of the Parthians, 415 
 
 et seq. 
 Claudius, Roman emperor, 263, 
 
 292 
 Cleopatra, wife of Demetrius II., 
 
 74, 94, 98 
 Cleopatra, wife of Mithridates of 
 
 Pontus, 128 
 Cleopatra, mistress of Antony, 
 
 192, 215 
 Climate of Parthia, 5 
 Clodius Albinus, 332 
 Colchi, 305 
 
 Colchis, country of, 29, 128 
 Comans, people, 105 
 Commagene, country of, 195, 196, 
 
 197, 279 
 Commodus, reign of, 329; assassi- 
 nation of, 332 
 
 Corbulo, Armenian campaign of, 
 
 278 ; Armenia conquered by, 
 
 279 ; his relations with Psetus, 
 283-286 ; his peaceful arrange- 
 ment with Tiridates, 287 
 
 Corma, river, 266 
 
 Cornelia, wife of Pompey, 186 
 
 Crassus, expedition of, against 
 Parthia, 147-173 ; wealth of, 
 148 ; career and character of, 
 148, 149; hesitation of, 153- 
 155 ; advance through Mesopo- 
 tamia, 158 ; his army, 162 ; 
 his battle with Surenas, 166; 
 his retreat, 169, 171 ; his death, 
 173 ; treatment of his body, 177 
 
 Crassus, Publius, sent to his father 
 by Julius Caesar, 153 ; leads 
 charge on the Parthians, 167; 
 slain, 168 
 
 Creticus Silanus, Roman governor 
 of Syria, 234 
 
 Ctesiphon, city of, 34 ; building 
 °f' 57 > Jews in, 83 ; chief city 
 of Parthia, 86 ; taken by Trajan, 
 309 ; by Avidius Cassius, 326 ; 
 by Severus, 338 ; approached 
 by Caiacallus, 351 
 
 Cyaxares, Median king, 108 
 
 Cyrus, river, 25, 120 
 
 Cyrus the Great, Persian king, 39, 
 46, 108, no, 363 
 
 D 
 
 Dacia made a Roman province, 
 
 297 
 Dahae, people, 48, 112, 243, 260, 
 
 273 
 Damaghan, city, 2, 8 
 Daman-i-Koh, mountains, 4 
 Dara, city of, 57 ; called also 
 
 Dareium, ibid. 
 Darius Codomannus, Persian 
 
 king, 157 
 Darius, Persian king, inscription 
 
 of, 27 ; expedition against the 
 
 European Scyths, 108 ; revolt 
 
 of Armenia from him, 123 
 Decebalus of Dacia, adversary of 
 
 Trajan, 297 
 Deiotarus of Galatia, 182
 
 INDEX. 
 
 425 
 
 Demavend, Mount, 4, 8 
 
 Demetrius of Bactria, 65 
 
 Demetrius I. of Syria, 67, 68 
 
 Demetrius II. , ol Syria, his 
 struggle with Tryphon, 74 ; 
 defeated by Mithridates III. 
 and made prisoner, 75 ; his 
 attempts to escape fail, 93 ; he 
 is sent into Syria to provoke a 
 revolt, 67, 68 
 
 Derketo, Syrian goddess, 152 
 
 Diala, river, 13 
 
 Didius Julianus, Roman emperor, 
 
 33i> 332 
 
 Dio Cassius, quoted, 237, 350, 
 
 400 
 Diodotus, first king of Bactria, 
 
 46, 54, 64 
 Djuvein, mountains, 5 
 Dniestr, river, 128 
 Domitian, Roman Emperor, 295- 
 
 297. 
 Drangiana, account of, 20 
 Dress, Parthian, description of, 
 
 405 
 
 E 
 
 Ecbatana, capital of Media, 59, 
 
 70 
 Edessa, city, 151, 265, 305, 311 
 El Hadhr, modern name of Hatra, 
 
 373 
 
 Elam, country of, 13-17 ; con- 
 quered by Mithridates I., 72 
 
 Elburz, mountains, I, 4, 8, 9 
 
 Elegeia, city, 302, 323 
 
 Eleuts, wild tribes, 35 
 
 El wand, Mount, 70 
 
 Epiphaneia, city, 192 
 
 Erucius Clarus, Roman general, 
 
 311 
 
 Ettrek, valley of, 2, 7 
 
 Eucratidas of Bactria, attacked by 
 
 Mithridates I., 69 ; murder of, 
 
 by his son, 73 
 Euemerus, made Viceroy of 
 
 Babylon, 1 1 3 ; rebellion of, 1 19 
 Euergetes, expedition of, 52 
 Eupator, Syrian king, 67 
 Euphrates, The, 14, 25, 26, &c. 
 Euthydemus of Bactria, 65 
 
 Exedares, son of Pacorus II., 
 299, 300 
 
 Ferghana, 107 
 
 Fergusson, quoted, 372, 377-9, 
 
 382 
 Foods, Parthian, description of, 
 
 413 
 Forum Romanum, 289 
 Fronto, quoted, 312 
 
 G 
 
 Gabinius, governor of Syria, 144, 
 
 145 > 149 
 
 Galatia, country of, 128, 275 
 
 Gallus, Roman general, 212 
 
 Gedrosia, country of, 21 
 
 Georgia, country of, 120, 239 
 
 Germanicus, character and ap- 
 pointment of, 235 ; his arrange- 
 ment of affairs in the East, 236 
 
 Ghermsir, or " warm country," 15 
 
 Gibbon, quoted, t,^ 
 
 Gordyene, country of, 130, 1 33, 
 140, 306 
 
 Gotarzes, accession of, 263 ; brutal 
 nature of, 264 ; his war with 
 Meherdates, 265 ; rock tablet 
 of, 267 ; death of, 268 ; ill 
 effects of his reign, 269 
 
 Goths, 105 
 
 " Great King," title of, 84 
 
 Great Salt Desert of Iran, 1 
 
 Greater Zab, river, 96 
 
 Greek art, 33 
 
 Greek towns in Parthia, 75, 81 
 
 Gurghan river, valley of the, 2, 7 
 
 H 
 
 Hadrian relinquishes Trajan's 
 conquests, 313 ; sagacity of, 
 314 ; his relations with Chos- 
 roes, 315, 316 ; his quarrel with 
 Pharasmanes, 318 ; his death, 
 320 
 
 Hafiz, Persian port, 364 
 
 Halus, Persian city, 242 
 
 Hamun, Lake, 20, 21
 
 426 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Hatra, revolt of, from Trajan, 
 310; unsuccessful attacks on, 
 
 312,341 
 Ilatreni, people of Hatra, 343 
 Hazaret Sultan range, 25 
 Hecatompylos, city of, 50, 57, 
 
 58, 60 
 Helena, mother of Izates, 257 
 Heliocles, Bactrian king, 73 
 Helmend, river, 3, 20, 09 
 Heniochi, people, 305 
 Herat, city, 20, 28 
 Heri-rud, river, 3, 20, 69 
 Herod the Great, 196 
 Herodian quoted, 350, 396 
 Herodotus quoted, m, 123 
 Heruli, people, 113 
 Hierapolis, city, 152, 205 
 " Hills of the Kurds," 3 
 Hindu- Kush, mountains, 19, 74 
 Hissar, mountains, 19, 25 
 Hit, on the Euphrates, 14 
 Horace quoted, 190, 204 
 Hormuz, plain of, 367 
 Hydaspes, river, 73 
 Hymerus, 113, 359 
 Hyrcania, 2 ; description of, 6, 7 ; 
 
 conquered by Tiridates I., 53 ; 
 
 invaded by Antiochus III., 60 ; 
 
 revolts from Mithridates I., and 
 
 is reduced, 71 ; breaks off from 
 
 the Parthian Empire, 296, 359 
 Hyrcanus, John, Maccabee king, 
 
 96 
 Hyrcanus II., 193 
 Hystaspes, Persian king, 27 
 
 I 
 
 Iberia, country of, 25 
 
 Ichnas, Greek town in Parthia, 
 
 152, 168 
 Indates, Parthian general, 96 
 Indo-Scyths, people of, 26 
 Indus, valley of, 26 
 Ipsus, battle of, 37 
 Iran, Salt Desert of, 1, 10, II 
 Iranian family, the, 28 
 Isidore of Charax, quoted, 87 
 Ispahan, city, 15 
 Istakr, city, 33 
 
 Izates, king of Adiabene\ receives 
 Artabanus II., 257 ; sends relief 
 to Jerusalem, ibid. ; opposes 
 Gotarzes, 262 ; joins Meher- 
 dates, 266; deserts him, ibid. ; 
 quarrels with Vologases I., 273 
 
 J 
 
 Jaghetai, mountains, 5 
 Jerahi, river, 13, 367 
 Jerusalem, revolution in, 193 ; 
 receives offerings from Parthia, 
 
 Jewish element in Parthia, 26 
 Jezireh, towns on Tigris, 266, 307 
 Josephus quoted, 240, 257, 416 
 Judaea, revolt of, from Syria, 102; 
 
 overrun by Parthians, 193 
 Julius Alexander, Roman general, 
 
 311 
 Julius Caesar, 185, 187, 189 
 Julius Martialis, 354 
 Julius Pelignus, 272 
 Justin quoted, 29, 1 15, 119, 397 
 
 Kalmucks, wild tribes of, 35 
 
 Kamnasciras, 135, 420 
 
 Kanats, system of, 12 
 
 Karun, river, 13 
 
 Kasvin, city of, 10 
 
 Kavir, salt efflorescence, 22 
 
 Kerkhah, river, 13 
 
 Kerman, country of, 61, 366 ; 
 
 desert of, 15, 16 
 Khabour, river, 265 
 Kharesmian desert, 64 
 Khiva, desert of, 1 
 Khorasan, desert of, I ; province 
 
 of, 2 
 King of Kings, title of, 81, 84, 228 
 Kissia, country of, 13-17 
 Romans, wild tribe, 35 
 Kum, city of, 10 
 Kurdish tribes, rudeness of, 4 
 " Kurds, Hills of the," 3 
 
 Labienus, successes of, 193 ; as- 
 sumption of title of " Im-
 
 INDEX. 
 
 427 
 
 perator," 194 ; capture and 
 
 death of, 195 
 Labus, or Labuta, mountain, 3 
 Laetus, officer of Severus, 335, 341 
 Lindsay quoted, 112, 401, 405 
 Longinus, C. Cassius, Roman 
 
 general, 153, 158, 171 
 JLucullus, Roman general, 136, 
 
 278 
 Lycus river, 96 
 
 Lysanias, tetrarch of Iturasa, 196 
 Lysias, regent of Syria, 67 
 
 M 
 
 Macedonian Empire, division of, 
 
 37 
 Macheloni, people, 305 
 Macrabea range, 5 
 Macrinus, elected emperor, 354 ; 
 
 defeated by Artabanus V., 356 
 Magnesia, battle of, 124 
 Magi, position of, 78, 365, 395 
 Manicheism, 365 
 Mannai, or Minni, people, 122 
 Manners and customs of the 
 
 Parthians, 33, 396 et seq. 
 Marcellinus quoted, 85, 373, 409 
 Mardi, country of, 8, 9; conquest 
 
 of, 62 
 Markoff quoted, 401 
 Margiana, account of, 19 
 Margians, people, 28 
 Mark Antony, 145 ; see Antony 
 Mashur, 15 
 Massagetse, wild tribes of, 25, 108, 
 
 no 
 Maximus, Roman officer, 311 
 Mazanderan, country of, 8 
 Media Atropatene, II, 24, 45 ; 
 
 see Atropatene 
 Media Magna, description of, n- 
 
 17 ; conquered by Mithridates 
 
 I., 70, 71 ; placed under Mithri- 
 dates II., 144 
 Media Rhagiana, description of, 
 
 9 ; conquest of, 10, 62 
 Megistanes, Parthian nobles, 78, 
 
 79, 201 
 Meherdates, attempts to depose 
 
 Gotarzes, 265 
 
 Merivale, Dean, quoted, 88, 290, 
 
 297, 314, 328 
 Merv, oasis of, 19, 38, 174 
 Mesopotamia, 17, 22, 39, 52, 59, 
 
 &c. 
 Mithridates of Armenia, 271 
 Mithridates I., appointed king, 
 63 ; attack on Bactria, 69 ; con- 
 quest of Media, 70 ; submission 
 of Babylonia to, 72; second 
 attack on Bactria, 73 ; defeat of 
 Demetrius II., 74; death of, 
 76 ; his system of government, 
 78 ; " King of Kings," 84 
 Mithridates II., the Great, 117; 
 defeat of Scythian tribes, 118; 
 personal description of, 130; 
 death of, 130 
 Mithridates 111., accession of, 
 143 ; reign of, 144 ; death of, 
 146 
 Mithridates IV. of Pontus, 127 
 Mithridates V. of Pontus, vast 
 
 empire of, 128 
 Mithridates, Parthian sntrap, 250 
 Mnasciras, supposed Parthian 
 
 km g. I35> 420 
 Monaeses, pretender, revolts 
 
 against Phraates IV., 204 
 Monaeses, Parthian noble, 281 
 Monarchy, second Persian, or 
 
 Sassanian, 26 
 Mongols, nation of, 34, 105 
 Monobazus, king of Adiabene, 
 
 274, 281, 287 
 Mons Masius, 23 
 Mount Amanus, 195 
 Musa, queen of Parthia, 226, 227 
 Music girls, Parthian, 178 
 
 N 
 
 Nearda, city of, 248 
 
 Nero, Tiridates' audience with, 
 
 289 
 Nicephorium, city of, 326 
 Nicomedes of Bithynia, 128 
 Niger, Pescennius, prefect of 
 
 Syria, 332 ; a rival of Severus, 
 
 333 ; death of, 334 
 Nishapur, city, 2 ; river of, 3
 
 428 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Nisibis, city, 307 ; revolts from 
 
 Trajnn, 310 ; recovered 311 ; 
 
 made a Roman colony, 335 ; 
 
 battle of, 355 
 Nomads, northern, barbarity of, 
 
 105 
 
 O 
 
 Ochus, river, 48 
 
 Octavian, rival of Antony, 190, 
 203, 217 ; becomes emperor, 
 and takes the name of Augustus, 
 221 ; his dealings with Phraates 
 IV., 221-225 ! w ' tn Phraataces, 
 226-229 > with Vonones, 231 
 
 Octavius, general under Crassus, 
 
 171, 173 
 Ornaments, personal, of the 
 
 Parthians, 388, 389 
 Onones, variant form of the 
 
 name Vonones, 233 
 Ornodapantes, Parthian noble, 183 
 Ornospades, Mesopotamian satrap, 
 
 241 
 Orobazus, 129, 130 
 Orodes I., brother of Mithridates 
 
 III., 143 ; his plan of defence, 
 
 160-162 ; jealousy of Surenas, 
 
 180; death of, 201 
 Orodes II., accession and death 
 
 of, 230 
 Orodes, son of Artabanus III., 239 
 Orontes, river, 192 
 Orosius, quoted, 94 
 Ortoadistus, king of Armenia, 125 
 Osrhoene, tributary kingdom 
 
 under Parthia, 80; king of, joins 
 
 Crassus, 151 ; occupied by 
 
 Crassus, 154 ; joins Meherdates, 
 
 265 
 Oxus, river, valley of, i8_; modern 
 
 name of, 22 
 
 Pacorus I., son of Orodes, 181 ; 
 
 associated by his father, 183 ; 
 
 victories of, 192-194 ; death of, 
 
 197 
 Pacorus II., accession of, 296; 
 
 negotiates with Decebalus of 
 
 Dacia, 297 ; his death, 298 
 
 Psetus, campaign of, 282-285 5 
 machinations of, 292, 293 
 
 Pamir, the, 19, 25 
 
 Paropamisus, mountains, 1, 11, 
 &c. 
 
 Parthamasiris, son of Pacorus II., 
 299 ; Trajan's seizure of, 303 ; 
 death of, 304 
 
 Parthamaspates, made king of 
 Parthia by Trajan, 311 ; de- 
 posed by Chosroes, 313 ; made 
 king of Armenia by Hadrian, 
 315 ; his death, 321 
 
 Parthia, description of, 1-5 ; cli- 
 mate of, 5 ; productions of, 6 ; 
 establishes her independence, 
 47-49 ; becomes a Roman ally, 
 138 ; wars with Rome, 140, 
 152-198, &c. ; attacked by 
 Antony, 207 ; architecture and 
 art of, 373, et seq. ; degree of 
 civilisation, 415, et seq. ; des- 
 cription of its armies, 397 ; 
 doubtful period of its history, 
 292 ; duration of its monarchy, 
 368 ; general survey of, 419 ; 
 golden throne of, 316 ; Jewish 
 communities in, 83, 246 ; pomp 
 of its kings, 409 ; limits of its 
 dominion, 4, 23, 368 ; loss of 
 power, 345 ; Magi in, 395 ; 
 military sysiem of, 199; tactics 
 of, 401, et seq. ; nobles, 
 power of, 411 ; nomadic pres- 
 sure on, 104 ; organisation of 
 its army, 89 ; religion of, 394 ; 
 splendour of Court of, 87 ; pre- 
 tenders to throne of, 298, 317; 
 320 ; titles of monarcjis of, 85 ; 
 empire, character of, 369 ; ten- 
 dency to break up, 358 ; causes 
 of discontent in, 361 ; downfall 
 of, 362, 367 
 
 Parthians defeated by Scyths, 
 114 ; governing faculty of, 34 ; 
 manners and customs of, 396, 
 405 ; personal ornaments of, 
 388 ; savagery of, 364 
 
 Pergamus, kings of, 42, 56, 66 
 
 Persia, description of, 14, 17, 25 
 
 Persian Empire, collapse of, 28
 
 INDEX. 
 
 429 
 
 Persian Gulf, 14, 15, 26 
 
 Fersian, Second, or Sassanian, 
 
 monarchy, 26 ; names, 28 ; rule, 
 
 fidelity of, 28 
 Persians, religious zeal of, 365 ; 
 
 special grievances of, 363 ; 
 
 characteristics of, 364 
 Pertinax, Roman Emperor, 331 
 Pescennius, see Niger 
 1'harasmanes I., of Iberia, 239,279 
 Pharasmanes II., of Iberia, his 
 
 quarrel with Hadrian, 318 
 Pharnaces of Pontus, 187 
 Pharnapates, Parthian general, 
 
 195 
 Pharsalus, battle of, 186 
 Philippi, battle of, 191 
 Philostratus, quoted, 408, 414 
 Phraataces and Musa, reign of, 
 
 226 ; embassy to Augustus, 
 
 227 ; meeting with Caius, 229 ; 
 
 deposition and death of, 230 
 Phraates I., accession of, 61 ; 
 
 conquests of, 62 
 Phraates II., accession of, 91 ; 
 
 reign of, 93 ; attacked by 
 
 Antiochus Sidetes, 96 ; clever 
 
 stratagem of, 97 ; plot of, 99 ; 
 
 massacre of Syrians by, 100 ; 
 
 war with the Scyths, 113; death 
 
 of, 1 14 
 Phraates III., accession of, 137 ; 
 
 alliance with Pompey, 138 ; 
 
 attack on Armenia, 138, 139 ; 
 
 quarrel with Pompey, 140-142; 
 
 murder of, 143 
 Phraates IV., accession of, 203 ; 
 
 wholesale murders by, 204 ; 
 
 attack of Antony on, 208 ; 
 
 quarrel of Median monarch 
 
 with, 213 ; quarrel arranged, 
 
 216 ; insurrection against, 219 ; 
 
 poisoning of, 226 
 Pliny, quoted, 297 
 Plutarch, quoted, 136, 397, 41 1, 
 
 415 
 Polemo of Pontus, 236, 279 
 Polytimetus, river, 109 
 Pompredius Silo, Roman general, 
 
 195 . 
 
 Pompeiopolis, city of, 236 
 
 Pompey, Roman general, 137- 
 142 ; and Casar, contest be- 
 tween, 185 
 Priapatius, Parthian king, 61 
 Ptolemy Auletes, king of Egypt, 
 
 145 
 
 Ptolemy Euergetes.kingof Egypt, 
 
 34 
 Ptolemy Philadelphia, king of 
 Egypt, 46, 49 
 
 Q 
 Quadratus, Roman general, 276 
 Quietus, Lucius, officer of Trajan, 
 3" 
 
 R 
 
 Registan, desert of, 21 
 
 Rhadamistus, of Iberia, his murder 
 of Mithridates of Armenia, 272 ; 
 ascent of throne of Armenia, 
 272 ; driven out by Vologases 
 
 I.. 2 75. 
 
 Rhages, city of, 9 
 
 Rhagiana, country of, 9, 10, 62 
 
 Rhodaspes, 223 
 
 Rhodogune, 76 
 
 Roman Emperor, the post sold 
 
 by auction, 332 
 Roman invasions of Parthia, 1 52- 
 
 176, 208-218, 306-312; 326, 
 
 327 ; 3357344 ; 350-354 
 
 Romans, military system of the, 
 199 
 
 Rome, Armenia a province of, 
 305 ; Armenian compromise 
 with, 287 ; at peace with 
 Parthia, 291 ; first Parthian 
 contact with, 127; la<-t Parthian 
 war with, 354 ; Parthia seeks 
 aid of, 295 ; Parthia an ally of, 
 138 
 
 Ross quoted, 381 
 
 Sacarauli, tribe of Scyths, 110 
 Sacastana, account of, 21, 74, 109, 
 
 118 
 Sagartia, account of, 21, 22 
 Salt Desert Great, of Iran, 1, 11 
 Samarah, city on Tigris, 14
 
 430 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Sanatrceces, reign of, 135-137 
 
 Sarangia, account of, 20, 21 
 
 Sarrakhs, fort, 3 
 
 Sassanian monarchy, 26 
 
 Satraps, revolts of, 44 
 
 Sauromatae, nation of, 305 
 
 Saxa, Decidius, Roman general, 
 192, 194 
 
 Scythia, wild tribes of, 26 ; at 
 war with Artabanus II., 115 ; 
 settle in Affghanistan, 109 
 
 Scythic characteristics, 31 
 
 Scyths, 26, 29 ; description of, 
 1 10; barbarity of, 11 1 ; at war 
 with Phraates II., 113; defeat 
 him, 114; at war with Arta- 
 banus II., 115 
 
 Second Persian, or Sassanian, 
 monarchy, 26 
 
 Sebzawur, city of, 2 
 
 Seleucia, city of, 81 ; Jews in, 83 ; 
 position of, 86 ; inclined towards 
 Rome, 154; Surenas at, 177, 
 178 ; massacre of Jews at, 253 ; 
 submits to Trajan, 309 ; taken 
 by Avidius Cassius, 326 ; by 
 Severus, 338 
 
 Seleucid kingdom, organisation 
 of, 41 
 
 Seleucid princes, 42-47 
 
 Seleucus I. (Nicator), 37-41 
 
 Seleucus II., 53, 54, 56 
 
 Seleucus IV., reign of, 62 ; son of, 
 
 6 7 
 
 Selinus, city of, Trajan's death 
 there, 313 
 
 Seraspadanes, Parthian prince, 
 223 
 
 Severus, Roman Emperor, 331 ; 
 rival of Niger, 333 ; crushes 
 him, 334 ; crushes his other 
 rival, Albinus, 336 ; first ex- 
 pedition of against Parthia, 
 335 ; second expedition of, 337— 
 339 ; unsuccessful siege of 1 1 atra, 
 341-344 : conquests of, 345 ; 
 death of, 347 
 
 Shah-rud, river, 2 
 
 Shebri-No, town, 3 
 
 Silanus, Governor of Syria, 234 
 
 Sillaces, Parthian general, 180 
 
 Sinnaca, battle of, 171 
 Sogdians, people, 27 
 Sophagasenus, 65 
 Statianus, Roman general, 209 
 Statius Priscus, Roman general, 
 
 324 
 
 Strabo quoted, 6 ; doubtful his- 
 torian, 30 
 
 Su, a nomadic race, 107 
 
 Sulla, defeat of Armenians by, 
 129 ; embassy of Mithridates 
 II. to, ibid. 
 
 Sura, city of, 326 
 
 Surena, Parthian name for com- 
 mander-in-chief, 89, 411 
 
 Surenas, general of Orodes I., 
 159 ; character of, 160 ; Army 
 of, 164 ; his battle with Crassus, 
 166 ; stratagem of, 172 ; farcical 
 ceremony of, 177, 178; death 
 of, 180 
 
 Susiana, country of, 13-17, 37 
 
 Sutlej, river, 67 
 
 Syria, Parthian invasion of, 192- 
 195 ; recovered by the Romans, 
 196 
 
 Syrian gates, 195 
 
 Syrian troops, massacre of, 100 
 
 Syro-Macedonian Empire, 37-44 
 
 Tacitus, quoted, 82, 259, 268, 
 
 277, 401 
 Tactics, Parthian, 401 et seq. 
 Tadjiks, people, 34 
 Takht-i-Suleiman, city, 21 1 
 Tanyoxares, Persian prince, 46 
 Tatar races, 104 
 Taurus, mountains, 29 
 Tejend, river, 3, 18, 20 
 Tersheez, town, 2, 3 
 Theocritus, Roman general, 348 
 Theos, title taken by Antiochus 
 
 II., 44 ; by Parthian kings, 85 
 Tiberius, relations with Augustus, 
 
 223 ; retreat to Rhodes, 224 ; 
 
 relations with Artabanus III., 
 
 234-245 
 Tigranes I., king of Armenia, 
 129 ; attack on Parthia, 130 ;
 
 INDEX. 
 
 431 
 
 capture of Parthian provinces, 
 x 33; flight of, 138; victory 
 over his son, 139 ; relations 
 with Pompey, 138-142 
 
 Tigranes II., son of Tigranes I., 
 ally of Phraates III. and Pom- 
 pey, 138-140 ; carried to Rome, 
 140 
 
 Tigranes III., brother of Artaxias, 
 made king of Armenia by 
 Tiberius, 223 ; dies, ibid. 
 
 Tigranes IV., made king by the 
 Armenians, 224 
 
 Tigranes V., make king by Nero, 
 279; attacks Adiabene, 180 
 
 Tigrano-certa, city, built by Ti- 
 granes I., 134 ; great strength 
 of, 281 
 
 Tigris, river, 13, 81, 120, 153; 
 Trajan's fleet on, 309 ; his 
 pleasure voyage on, 310 ; 
 Severus's fleet on, 340 
 
 Tiridates I. , coin of, 50 ; reign of, 
 50-58 
 
 Tiridates II., short reign of, 219, 
 220 
 
 Tiridates III., pretender, 239, 
 
 241 ; crowned King of Parthia, 
 
 242 ; flight of, 244 
 Tiridates, established as king of 
 
 Armenia by Vologases I., 275 ; 
 driven out, 279 ; re-established, 
 285 ; his compromise with 
 Rome, 287 ; his journey to 
 Rome, 287 ; his audience with 
 Nero, 289 ; defeated by the 
 Alani, 295 ; death of, 300 
 Tiger, in Western Asia, 9 
 Titus, Roman Emperor, 295, 296 
 Tochari, people, no, 112, 115 
 Trajan, his march on Armenia, 
 302 ; his seizure of Parthama- 
 siris, 303 ; his invasion of 
 Parthia, 306; his retreat and 
 death, 313 
 Trogus Pompeius, Roman writer, 
 
 56 
 Tryphon, Syrian pretender, 74 
 Turanian characteristics, 31, 32, 
 
 104 
 Turiua, province of, 10, 69 
 
 Turks, resemblance of to Par- 
 tisans, 35, 254 
 Tyre, city of, 193 
 
 U 
 
 Urarda, people, 122 
 Urumiyeh, lake of, 24, 121 
 
 V 
 
 Val-arsaces, Armenian king, 125 
 
 Van, lake of, 121, 122 
 
 Vardanes I., accession of, 260 ; 
 war with Gotarzes, 260 ; de- 
 signs on Armenia, 261 ; murder 
 of, 263 
 
 Vardanes II., revolt and reign of, 
 277 
 
 Ventidius, Roman general, 194, 
 206 
 
 Verus, Roman Emperor, expedi- 
 tion to the East, 323 
 
 Vespasian, his relations with 
 Vologases I., 292, 294-296 ; 
 his relations with Caesennius 
 Partus, 292-294 
 
 Vitaxre, the, 81, 249, 273 
 
 Vitellius, governor of Syria under 
 Tiberius, 238 ; his war with 
 Artabanus III., 240 ; introduces 
 Tiridates III. into his kingdom, 
 241 ; crosses Euphrates into 
 Parthia, 244 ; has interview with 
 Artabanus III., and receives 
 concessions, 245 
 
 Vologases I. , accession of, 270 ; 
 first invasion of Armenia, 272 ; 
 dispute with Izates, 273, 274 ; 
 second invasion of Armenia, 
 274 ; war with Rome, 276- 
 279; attempt to recover Ar- 
 menia, 281 ; truce with Corbulo, 
 282 ; victory over Psetus, 284 ; 
 arrangement with Corbulo, 287 ; 
 attacked by the Alani, 294 ; 
 asks aid of Rome, 295 ; death 
 of, 296 
 
 Vologases II., pretender under 
 Chosroes, 316, 317 ; reign of, 
 318; mistaken policy of, 319;
 
 432 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 his dealings with Antoninus 
 Pius, 320, 321 ; his death, 321 
 
 Vologases III., accession of, 321 ; 
 Armenia seized by, 323 ; de- 
 feated by Avidius Cassius, 324 ; 
 further victories of Cassius, 326 ; 
 dealings of Vologases with Corn- 
 modus, 329 ; his death, ibid. 
 
 Vologases IV., accession of, 331 ; 
 relations with Pescennius Niger, 
 332, 333; war wiih Seveius, 
 336-345 ; later years of, 345 ; 
 death of, 346 
 
 Vologases V., disputes succes- 
 sion with Artabanus V., 347 ; 
 reigns in Eastern Parthia, 347 
 
 Vonones I., accession of, 231 ; 
 attempted deposition of, 232 ; 
 defeated by Artabanus III., 
 
 233 ; made king of Armenia, 
 
 234 ; death of, 236 
 Vonones II., accession of, 270; 
 
 children of, ibid. 
 
 W 
 
 Wagises, Parthian envoy to Cras- 
 
 sus, 155 
 Wagharshag, early Armenian 
 
 king, 125 
 Western Asia, the tiger in, 9 
 Wilson H. II., quoted, 107 
 Women, seclusion of, in Parthia, 
 
 405, 407, 414 
 
 X 
 
 Xenophon, 213 
 
 Y 
 
 Yezd, country of, 16 
 Yue-ehi, wild tribes of, 26, 107, 
 112 
 
 Z 
 Zab, rivers, 273, 345 
 Zagros, mount, II, 13, 17, 59, 339, 
 
 345 
 Zela, battle of, 187, 189 
 Zendavesta, 27 
 Zoroaster, 365, 394
 
 The Story of the Nations. 
 
 In the story form the current of each National life 
 is distinctly indicated, and its picturesque and note- 
 worthy periods and episodes are presented for the 
 reader in their philosophical relation to each other 
 as well as to universal history. 
 
 It is the plan of the writers of the different volumes 
 to enter into the real life of the peoples, and to bring 
 them before the reader as they actually lived, labored, 
 and struggled — as they studied and wrote, and as 
 they amused themselves. In carrying out this plan, 
 the myths, with which the history of all lands begins, 
 will not be overlooked, though these will be carefully 
 distinguished from the actual history, so far as the 
 labors of the accepted historical authorities have 
 resulted in definite conclusions. 
 
 The subjects of the different volumes have been 
 planned to cover connecting and, as far as possible, 
 consecutive epochs or periods, so that the set when 
 completed will present in a comprehensive narrative 
 the chief events in the great Story of the Nations; 
 but it is, of course, not always practicable to issue 
 the several volumes in their chronological order. 
 
 Nos. 1-6 1, each $1.50 
 
 Half leather. 1.75 
 
 Nos. 62 and following Nos., each (by mail, 1.50 
 
 net 1.35 
 Half leather (by mail, $1.75) .net 1.60 
 
 For list of volumes see next page.
 
 THE STORY OF THE NATIONS. 
 
 GREECE. Prof. Jas. A. Harrison. 
 ROME. Arthur Gilman. 
 
 THE JEWS. Prof. James K. Hos- 
 mer. 
 
 CHALDEA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
 GERMANY. S. Baring-Gould. 
 NORWAY. Hjalmar H. Boyesen. 
 SPAIN. Rev. E. E. and Susan 
 
 Hale. 
 HUNGARY. Prof. A. Vambery. 
 CARTHAGE. Prof. Alfred J. 
 
 Church . 
 
 THE SARACENS. Arthur Gil- 
 man. 
 
 THE MOORS IN SPAIN. Stanley 
 Lane-Poole. 
 
 THE NORMANS. Sarah Orne 
 
 Jewett. 
 PERSIA. S. G. W. Benjamin. 
 ANCIENT EGYPT. Prof. Geo. 
 
 Rawlinson. 
 
 ALEXANDER'S EMPIRE. Prof. 
 
 J. P. Mahaffy. 
 ASSYRIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
 THE GOTHS. Henry Bradley. 
 IRELAND. Hon. Emily Lawless. 
 TURKEY. Stanley Lane-Poole. 
 MEDIA, BABYLON, AND PER- 
 SIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
 MEDIAEVAL FRANCE. Prof. Gus- 
 
 tave Masson. 
 HOLLAND. Prof. J. Thorold 
 
 Rogers. 
 MEXICO. Susan Hale. 
 PHCENICIA. George Rawlinson. 
 THE HANSA TOWNS. Helen 
 
 Zimmern. 
 EARLY BRITAIN. Prof. Alfred 
 
 J. Church. 
 THE BARBARY CORSAIRS. 
 
 Stanley Lane-Poole. 
 RUSSIA. W. R. Morrill. 
 THE JEWS UNDER ROME. W. 
 
 D. Morrison. 
 SCOTLAND. John Mackintosh. 
 SWITZERLAND. R. Stead and 
 
 Mrs. A. Hug. 
 PORTUGAL. H. Morse-Stephens. 
 THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE. C. 
 
 W. C. Oman. 
 SICILY. E. A. Freeman. 
 
 THE TUSCAN REPUBLICS. 
 
 Bella Duffy. 
 POLAND. W. R. Morfill. 
 PARTHIA. Geo. Rawlinson. 
 JAPAN. David Murray. 
 THE CHRISTIAN RECOVERY 
 
 OF SPAIN. H. E. Watts. 
 AUSTRALASIA. Greville Tregar- 
 
 then. 
 SOUTHERN AFRICA. Geo. M. 
 
 Theal. 
 VENICE. Alethea Wiel. 
 THE CRUSADES. T. S. Archer 
 
 and C. L. Kingsford. 
 VEDIC INDIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
 BOHEMIA. C. E. Maurice. 
 CANADA. J. G. Bourinot. 
 THE BALKAN STATES. William 
 
 Miller. 
 
 BRITISH RULE IN INDIA. R. 
 
 W. Frazer. 
 MODERN FRANCE. Andre" Le 
 
 Bon. 
 THE BRITISH EMPIRE. Alfred 
 
 T. Story. Two vols. 
 THE FRANKS. Lewis Sergeant. 
 THE WEST INDIES. Amos K. 
 
 Fiske. 
 
 THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND, 
 Justin McCarthy, M.P. Two 
 vols. 
 
 AUSTRIA. Sidney Whitman. 
 CHINA. Robt. K. Douglass. 
 
 MODERN SPAIN. Major Martin 
 A. S. Hume. 
 
 MODERN ITALY. Pietro Orsi. 
 
 THE THIRTEEN COLONIES. 
 Helen A. Smith. Two vols. 
 
 WALES AND CORNWALL. Owen 
 M. Edwards. Net $1-35. 
 
 MEDIEVAL ROME. Wm. Miller. 
 
 THE PAPAL MONARCHY. Wm. 
 Barry. 
 
 MEDIAEVAL INDIA. Stanley 
 Lane-Poole. 
 
 BUDDHIST INDIA. T. W. Rhys- 
 Davids. 
 
 THE SOUTH AMERICAN RE- 
 PUBLICS. Thomas G. Daw- 
 son. Two vols. 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY ENGLAND. 
 Edward Jenks.
 
 Heroes of the Nations. 
 
 A Series of biographical studies of the lives and 
 work of a number of representative historical char- 
 acters about whom have gathered the great traditions 
 of the Nations to which they belonged, and who have 
 been accepted, in many instances, as types of the 
 several National ideals. With the life of each 
 typical character will be presented a picture of the 
 National conditions surrounding him during his 
 career. 
 
 The narratives are the work of writers who are 
 recognized authorities on their several subjects, and, 
 while thoroughly trustworthy as history, will present 
 picturesque and dramatic "stories" of the Men and 
 of the events connected with them. 
 
 To the Life of each "Hero" will be given one duo- 
 decimo volume, handsomely printed in large type, 
 provided with maps and adequately illustrated ac- 
 cording to the special requirements of the several 
 subjects. 
 
 Nos. 1-32, each $1.50 
 
 Half leather 1.75 
 
 No. 33 and following Nos., each 
 
 (by mail $1.50, net 1.35) 
 
 Half leather (by mail, $1.75) net 1.60 
 
 For full list of volumes see next page.
 
 HEROES OF THE NATIONS. 
 
 NELSON. By W. Clark Russell 
 GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. By C. 
 
 R. L. Fletcher. 
 PERICLES. By Evelyn Abbott. 
 THEODORIC THE GOTH. By 
 
 Thomas Hodgkin. 
 SIR PHILIP SIDNEY. By H. R. 
 
 Fox-Bourne. 
 JULIUS C-ESAR. By W. Warde 
 
 Fowler. 
 WYCLIF. By Lewis Sergeant. 
 NAPOLEON. By W. O'Connor 
 
 Morris. 
 HENRY OF NAVARRE. By P. 
 
 F. Willert. 
 CICERO. By J. L. Strachan- 
 
 Davidson. 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN. By Noah 
 
 Brooks. 
 PRINCE HENRY (OF PORTU- 
 GAL) THE NAVIGATOR. 
 
 By C. R. Beazley. 
 JULIAN THE PHILOSOPHER. 
 
 By Alice Gardner. 
 LOUIS XIV. By Arthur Hassall. 
 CHARLES XII. By R. Nisbet 
 
 Bain. 
 LORENZO DE' MEDICI. By Ed- 
 ward Armstrong. 
 JEANNE D'ARC. By Mrs. Oli- 
 
 phant. 
 CHRISTOPHERCOLUMBUS. By 
 
 Washington Irving. 
 ROBERT THE BRUCE. By Sir 
 
 Herbert Maxwell. 
 
 By W. O'Connor 
 
 By William 
 
 By 
 
 Henry 
 By H. 
 Lane- 
 
 By 
 
 HANNIBAL. 
 
 Morris. 
 ULYSSES S. GRANT. 
 
 Conant Church. 
 ROBERT E. LEE. 
 
 Alexander White. 
 THE CID CAMPEADOR. 
 
 Butler Clarke. 
 SALADIN. By Stanley 
 
 Poole. 
 BISMARCK. By J. W. Head- 
 
 lam. 
 ALEXANDER THE GREAT. 
 
 Benjamin I. Wheeler. 
 CHARLEMAGNE. By H. W. 
 
 Davis. 
 OLIVER CROMWELL. 
 
 Charles Firth. 
 RICHELIEU. By James B. Per- 
 
 kins. 
 DANIEL O'CONNELL. By Rob- 
 ert Dunlop. 
 SAINT LOUIS (Louis IX. of 
 
 France). By Frederick Perry. 
 LORD CHATHAM. By Walford 
 
 Davis Green. 
 OWEN GLYNDWR. By Arthur 
 
 G. Bradley. $1.35 net. 
 HENRY V. By Charles L. Kings- 
 ford. $1.35 net. 
 EDWARD I. By Edward Jenks. 
 
 $1.35 net. 
 AUGUSTUS CAESAR. By J. B 
 
 Firth. $1.35. net. 
 
 By 
 
 Other volumes in preparation are: 
 
 MOLTKE By Spencer Wilkinson. 
 JUDAS MACCABEUS. By Israel 
 
 Abrahams. 
 SOBIESKI. By F. A. Pollard. 
 ALFRED THE TRUTHTELLER. 
 
 By Frederick Perry. 
 FREDERICK II. By A. L. Smith. 
 
 MARLBOROUGH. By C. W. C. 
 
 Oman. 
 RICHARDTHELION-HEARTED 
 
 By T. A. Archer. 
 WILLIAM THE SILENT. By 
 
 Ruth Putnam. 
 
 G. P PUTNAM'S SONS, Publishers, 
 Mew York London
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
 Los Angeles 
 
 This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. 
 
 L3- 
 
 1 ^cC'O iw> 
 
 »* DV i|-,OCT0l199' 
 ion rm a » *"* 
 
 
 
 LO URL IR T U H7»| 
 
 MLj7 190 
 
 PE ntuum 
 
 38b in 
 
 PSD 2343 9/77 
 
 MAR 2 8 f99T 
 
 ft JA?- 21 '992 
 
 3AN 2 1 199? 
 
 4WH DEC 1 1 WW 
 
 4 In 
 
 NOM 
 
 
 :JRL 
 
 V JW14^» 
 
 999 
 
 1 Z000 
 
 zing uun 
 
 ^tjimnv-sov^ ^ainihw^ ^ahvmib^ ^waaii-^ 
 
 
 ^UIBRARYQ^ ^UIBRARYQ^ <^EUNIVER% ^lOS-ANGElfj^ 
 
 > 
 
 so
 
 "%3AlNfl ]\\V 
 
 ^vWSANC[tfx>. 
 
 "%3<\ 
 
 3 1158 00484 5748 
 
 ^0F-CALIF(% ^OFCALIF0%, 
 
 SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY <FAC jIUTY 
 
 AA 000 835 240 
 
 l5S 
 
 MIVER5 1 
 
 <Til33NV-SQn : 
 
 WOf. ^UIBRARYfl/- 
 
 ' %)3llV3-30^ 
 m % ^OFCAilFO^ 
 
 } 
 
 
 ,^EUNIVERS/a 
 
 .VlOSANCFLfj> 
 
 o 
 
 <TJ133NV-S01^ "fyflHAINIUtW 
 
 5ME-UNIVERS/A 
 
 <TJ130NV-S01^ 
 
 ^clOS-ANCElfju 
 
 v/OR\|Nfl -}\\V 
 
 <$UIBRARY£ 
 
 OFCAIIFO^ 
 
 y ^A8vaan-T 
 
 :r% 
 
 ^:lOS-ANCElfj> 
 
 D 
 
 ;oi^ "%a3AiNn-3\\v 
 
 ^UIBRARYOc. 
 
 ^•LIBRARYQr 
 
 ^/OdllVDJO^ %0JnV3JO^ 
 
 \tiEUNIVERS, 
 
 <TJ13D! 
 
 ER% 
 
 — n 
 
 ;o# 
 
 ^lOS-ANCElfj^ 
 
 ^3AINil3V\V 
 
 ^OKALIFOft^ ^0KALIF(% 
 
 4? 
 
 
 -\WEUN 
 
 <Tii30| 
 
 -otf-llBRARYfl/- 
 
 IVERto 
 
 *$d(MCElfj> 
 
 ^UIBRARY6