556 
 SB5b 
 
 Stewart 
 
 Bondholders* Conspiracy to 
 demonetize Silver
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 The Silver Question. 
 
 BY 
 
 WM. JM. STKWART.
 
 Boniolders Conspiracy to Demonetize Silver. 
 
 LEGISLAriON AFFECTING NATIONAL DEBT 
 
 AND 
 
 GOLD AND SILVER. 
 
 UNFAITHFUL TREASURY OFFICIALS. 
 
 HOSTILITY OF NATIONAL BANKS. 
 
 Independent Financial Policy for the United States. 
 
 Free Coinage or Enforcement of Existing Laws. 
 
 By WM. M. STEWART. 
 
 San Francisco : 
 
 Print of Gio, Spaulding & Co., 414 Clay Street. 
 
 1885.
 
 556 
 5Z5b 
 
 WAE ON SILVEE. 
 
 The silver question is a contest between European bond- 
 holders and the laborers of the world. The National Banks 
 of the United States are the allies of European bondhold- 
 ers. While the demonetization of silver would necessarily 
 destroy silver mining, that fact is of little consequence com- 
 pared with the disastrous efifect it would have upon society. 
 It would destroy the confidence of the masses in the good 
 faith of their rulers. Nihilists, socialists, communists and 
 other disturbers of the public peace are powerless SQ 
 long as the people believe substantial justice will be admin* 
 istered under the present systems of government. 
 
 The proposal to demonetize silver is in violation of exist* 
 ing contracts for the payment of money. It emanates from 
 a bondholding directory in Europe, and its purpose is tc 
 enhance the value of all obligations for the payment ot 
 money. 
 
 To appreciate the designs of the bondholders, and to un- 
 derstand their motives in this war upon silver, it is neces- 
 sary to consider the bonded debt which they control. 
 
 The national debts of the world aggregate over $26,000,- 
 €00,000, all of which is substantially controlled by a small 
 European syndicate. If we exclude India, China and Japan, 
 with a population of about 662,000,000 and a debt of about 
 $1,100,000,000, the national debts of the remaining civilized 
 countries are, in round numbers, $25,000,000,000, and the 
 other indebtedness of the same countries is estimated to be 
 several times the amount of the national debts. But if we 
 assume that all other bonded obligations are only equal to 
 double that amount, we have a total of $75,000,000,000. 
 The nations owing this debt have a population of 488,000, - 
 
 2002990
 
 000, about 38,000,000 of whom are not sufficiently civilized 
 to pay taxes. Of the remaining 450,000,000, not more than 
 one in four is a producer; that is to say, only 112,500,000 
 are productive laborers. This one-quarter must therefore 
 not only support the other three-quarters, and supply 
 armies and navies (for purposes hereafter noticed), but it 
 must pay an annual interest of at least four per cent, on 
 $75,000,000,000. If the duration of a generation is assumed 
 to be thirty-four years (which is according to recent esti- 
 mates), the enormous sum of $102,000,000,000 must be paid 
 by each generation for interest alone. If nothing but gold 
 will satisfy this demand, who can estimate the days or hours 
 of toil requisite to procure it? If, in addition to this, the 
 debts of the world continue to increase in the future — which 
 is most probable in view of the fact that during the present 
 century they have increased more than 300 per cent. — the 
 burden of the producer must be correspondingly increased. 
 All countries, however, are not equally involved. The 
 United States, with greater resources than any other coun- 
 try, owes comparatively a small debt. Based upon the 
 foregoing ratio of debt to population, a producer in this 
 country would probably be required to pay only about $500 
 on interest account in a generation of thirty-four years, if 
 our bonded debts — national and corporate — should remain 
 what they now are, without increase or diminution. But it 
 is to be hoped that our national debt will soon be paid, and 
 the people of the United States liberated from its depress- 
 ing influence. In Europe, however, the situation is differ- 
 ent. For example: In France each individual producer (on 
 the assumption that thirty-four years is the period of a gen- 
 eration), must pay on interest account alone more than $2000, 
 with no prospect of relief. 
 
 CONDITION OF THE DEBTOR. 
 
 A contract of indebtedness is an undertaking on the 
 part of the debtor to deliver at a future time to the creditor
 
 a certain amount of property or money named in an obliga- 
 tion. The condition of the debtor owing money is precisely 
 analogous to that of a person who agrees to deliver wheat, 
 corn, cotton, or other farm product, at a future time, or after 
 the same shall have been harvested. If his crop is good, 
 the seller can deliver the article required at the designated 
 time; but if his crop fails, it may become difficult or even 
 impossible for him to comply with his contract. His con- 
 dition is also like that of a person who sells stock " short." 
 That is, he agrees to deliver at a future time a certain num- 
 ber of shares which he does not then possess. If, when the 
 time for delivery arrives stock is plenty, the contract can 
 be easily performed; but if the stock has been "pooled," or 
 by any other means taken out of the market, compliance may 
 be* impossible. 
 
 BONDED DEBT PAYABLE IN GOLD OK SILVER. 
 
 The 175,000,000,000 bonded debt was, at the time it was 
 contracted, an agreement on the part of the debtor to de- 
 liver to the creditor at the various times named in the sev- 
 eral contracts, either gold or silver, at the option of the 
 debtor. If silver is to be withdrawn from the money of the 
 world so that it cannot be delivered by the debtor in dis- 
 charge of his obligation, the contract will be changed and 
 the debtor injured. Money will be scarce — there will be a 
 failure in the crop of coin; in other words, demonetization 
 of silver means a "corner" in money. 
 
 AMOUNT OF COIN IN CIECULATION AN ELEMENT IN ALL CONTRACTS . 
 
 The amount of silver coin in the world when the war on 
 silver commenced is supposed to have been about equal to 
 the amount of gold coin. All contracts were made with re- 
 ference to the amount of coin in circulation, relying on the 
 probable production of the mines to keep good the world's 
 stock of money. If the mines of either metal are more pro- 
 ductive than usual, the debtor is benefited, and the creditor
 
 has no reason to complain, for that contingency entered 
 into the contract. Nor can the debtor complain if the 
 mines cease to produce, for he contracted to deliver coin, 
 and made no condition relieving him of his contract in con- 
 Bequence of scarcity of coin resulting from natural causes. 
 So long as the option of the debtor to pay in either gold or 
 silver remains, and the units of money are unchanged, the 
 obligation of the contract is not violated. It is true when 
 both gold and silver are used as money, the amount of coin 
 in the world as compared with wealth and population fluctu- 
 ates, and the value of money changes. This cannot be 
 remedied until some device shall be adopted by govern- 
 mental action, whereby the number of units of money shall 
 bear a fixed relation to the wealth and population of the 
 country in which such money is circulated. 
 
 UPON WHAT THE TALUE OF MONEY DEPENDS. 
 
 The value of a unit of money in any country must depend 
 upon the number of such units in circulation as compared 
 with wealth and population, and not upon the material of 
 which the money is manufactured. The ratio between the 
 wealth and population of most countries is practically a fixed 
 ratio; in other words, the increase or decrease of the pop- 
 ulation will substantially indicate the increase or decrease 
 of the aggregate wealth of a nation. If, therefore, the ratio 
 of units of money to the number of inhabitants of a country 
 remains the same, it will preserve a fixed ratio of money to 
 both wealth and population. A monetary system, therefore, 
 regulated as to the number of units in circulation by the 
 Dumber of inhabitants of the country in which such money 
 IS circulated, will approximate as nearly as practicable to a 
 perfect system. It matters not what number of units of 
 money per capita exists in any country, provided that the 
 ratio of population to such units is constantly maintained. 
 When that ratio is changed by a diminution of the quantity 
 of money we call it contraction; and when the ratio is dis- 
 turbed by abundance of money it is called inflation.
 
 BI-METALLIC MONEY PREVENTS VIOLENT FLUCTUATIONS IN THE 
 VALUE OF MONEY. 
 
 Our objection to the demonetization of silver is that it 
 involves violent and continuous contraction. The use of the 
 two metals (as we have already seen) does not furnish a per- 
 fect monetary system. It does not altogether avoid the 
 evils of expansion and contraction, but does have a tend- 
 ency to prevent violent fluctuations in the value of money. 
 Over-production of one metal is generally offset by a failure 
 of production of the other. Although the two metals do not 
 serve the highest ideal purpose of money by furnishing the 
 exact amount necessary to maintain at all times the same 
 relation numerically to population — and thereby afford an 
 invariable rule with which to measure values and adjust 
 contracts — yet they approximate more nearly to such ideal 
 standard than either metal alone could possibly do. It is, 
 therefore, not only dishonest but inexpedient to dispense 
 with the use of either metal until a more certain standard 
 than metallic money by which to measure values and adjust 
 contracts can be devised. 
 
 SHAM PRETENSES OF BONDHOLDERS. 
 
 The various excuses put forth by the bondholders for the 
 demonetization of silver are insulting to the understanding 
 of mankind. They say they prefer gold because it is more 
 convenient than silver. They might as well tell us that they 
 prefer platinum because it is more convenient than gold. It 
 is not a question of convenience — it is a question of common 
 honesty. The object of demonetizing silver cannot be con- 
 cealed by such sham pretenses — it is to enhance the value 
 of securities. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE BONDHOLDERS' WAR FOR CONTRACTION. 
 
 The effort to contract the coin of the world for the benefit 
 of the bondholders commenced more than thirty years ago.
 
 8 
 
 Exaggerated reports from the gold fields of California and 
 Australia brought forth appeals from Chevalier and other 
 representatives of European bondholders for the demonetiza- 
 tion of gold, with the avowed purpose of increasing the value 
 of bonds. Germany and Austria, in 1857, actually demone- 
 tized gold in the interest of the bondholders. France fa- 
 vored the demonetization of one of the precious metals, but 
 seemed to think it was best to demonetize silver and con- 
 tract the world's money to a gold standard. After years of 
 discussion the French Monetary Commission of 1869 came 
 to the following conclusion : 
 
 "As Governments control the weight and standard of 
 money, they ought, so far as possible, to assure its value. 
 And as it is admitted that the tendency of the metals is to 
 •depreciate, this tendency should be arrested by demonetiz- 
 ing one of them." 
 
 The only reason assigned by Chevalier, the Monetary Com- 
 mission of France, and other representatives of the bond- 
 holders, for the demonetization of one of the metals was the 
 -appreciation of the value of bonds. They did not pretend 
 that the people at large would be benefited by the demone- 
 tization of either metal, but boldly declared that it would 
 increase the value of bonds, and that such was their pur- 
 pose. 
 
 WAR FOR CONTRACTION CONCENTRATED ON THE DEMONETIZATION 
 
 OF SILVER. 
 
 The discussions in monetary commissions and financial 
 circles as to the propriety of demonetizing one of the precious 
 metals in the interest of the bondholders continued from time 
 to time until 1871. About that time exaggerated rumors in 
 regard to the fabulous amount of silver which would be pro- 
 duced from the Comstock obtained circulation. Germany, 
 not having succeeded in obtaining an international agree- 
 ment to demonetize gold, seized upon these rumors as a 
 pretext and demonetized silver. The United States, by the
 
 9 
 
 Acts of 1873 and 1874 (hereafter noticed), did the same. 
 Sweden and Norway in 1874, followed the bad example of 
 Germany and the United States. France, Belgium, Switzer- 
 land and Italy in the same year so limited the coinage of 
 silver as to practically demonetize it. In 1875 Holland 
 closed her mints against the coinage of silver on private 
 account. In the same year Switzerland refused to coin sil- 
 ver. In 1876, the President of the French Republic, under 
 a law authorizing him to do so, suspended the coinage of 
 silver. In the same year, Spain closed her mints against 
 depositors of silver. Since that time no European nation 
 has shown the least disposition to remonetize silver. On 
 the contrary the tendency has been in the other direction. 
 
 THE ABSUEDITY OF ASKING EUROPEAN BONDHOLDERS TO REGU- 
 LATE AMERICAN FINANCES. 
 
 In 1881 a monetary convention was held in Paris, to 
 which the United States sent Commissioners, for the pur- 
 pose of inducing the European Governments to agree upon 
 some basis whereby silver could be used as money. The 
 folly of sending Commissioners to such a convention will be 
 appreciated when the fact is stated that the majority of that 
 convention was necessarily composed of the bondholding 
 class. The indifference, bordering on contempt, with which 
 the proposal of the United States to remonetize silver was 
 received, should have been anticipated. It ought not to 
 have been expected that the bondholders, who controlled 
 the Paris Convention, would remonetize silver, and thereby 
 depreciate the value of their securities. 
 
 IS MANTON MARBLE TO IMPORT FROM EUROPE INSTRUCTIONS TO 
 
 CONGRESS ? 
 
 The present administration has renewed the practice pur- 
 sued by our Government since the war on silver commenced 
 of colluding with the enemy. In May last the Hon. Thomas 
 F. Bayard, Secretary of State, by order of the President,
 
 10 
 
 sent Mr.Manton Marble — amono-metallist — to Europe for the 
 ostensible purpose of obtaining the " adoption of a com- 
 mon ratio between gold and silver for the purpose of estab- 
 lishing interuationally the bi-metallic money and securing a 
 fixity of value between those metals." Mr. Bayard at the 
 same time wrote to the American Ministers in England, 
 France and Germany, requesting them to assist Mr. Marble 
 in the accomplishment of his mission. He expressed great 
 solicitude for an early report from Mr. Marble, and added : 
 
 ' ' I trust, therefore, that no later than the 1st of November 
 next, with the assistance of Mr. Marble's labors, you will 
 enable the President to lay before Congress such informa- 
 tion, coupled with proper suggestions, which may make 
 practicable such legislation as will meet the grave emer- 
 gency." 
 
 The ignorance of Mr. Bayard of the history of the de- 
 monetization of silver in Europe and the attitude of the 
 bondholding directory is surprising. How he could have 
 expected that Mr. Manton Marble — a mono-metallist — would 
 be able to induce the European bondholders to adopt a ratio 
 between gold and silver, for the purpose of establishing in- 
 ternationally bi-metallic money, is incomprehensible. It is 
 possible, however, that Mr. Bayard's real object for sending 
 Mr. Marble to Europe was to enlighten the American peo- 
 ple, by spreading before them, in an official form, the rea- 
 sons of the bondholding directory for the violation of the 
 obligation of contracts in the demonetization of silver. He 
 says that he wants Mr. Marble's report to "enable the 
 President to lay before Congress such information, coupled 
 with proper suggestions, which may make practicable such 
 legislation as will meet the grave emergency." In other 
 words, he desires Mr. Marble to collect and import from 
 Europe information and suggestions from the bondholding 
 directory to guide Congress in its deliberations. A mo- 
 ment's reflection would have satisfied Mr. Bayard that the 
 bondholding directory is sufficiently interested in the actions
 
 11 
 
 of CoDgress upon the silver question to furnish all the in- 
 formation in its power, without the expense of sending Mr. 
 Marble to Europe. 
 
 It is gravely suspected by many that the European bond- 
 holding directory had somethiug to do with the clandestine 
 legislation whereby the legal tender character of the silver 
 dollar was destroyed in the revision of the laws. Every 
 American citizen of ordinary intelligence knows that it 
 would be less difficult to induce Shylock to surrender his 
 pound of flesh than it would be to obtain from Europe a 
 recommendation for the restoration of silver to the place it 
 occupied when the bonded debts of the world were con- 
 tracted. It is to be hoped that the sordid views of the 
 bondholders have not reached the President, and that his 
 forthcoming message will contain no argument imported 
 from Europe. The power of $75,000,000,000 has already 
 subsidized the genius of Europe and the metropolitan press 
 of America to invent reasons why the debtor ought to pay 
 two dollars when he has contracted to pay but one. 
 
 HOW THE PRICE OF SILVER WAS AFFECTED BY HOSTILE LEGISLA- 
 TION. 
 
 After silver was demonetized and the fact became known 
 by the refusal of the mints to receive it in exchange for 
 coin, its value declined, as compared with gold, until the 
 year 1878, when its partial remonetization by Congress 
 checked its further decline and produced an upward ten- 
 dency, which continued until the recent adverse action of 
 the present administration. It is now more than twenty-one 
 per cent, below par in gold. In 1873 (when silver was de- 
 monetized), the amount of silver necessary to make a silver 
 dollar was worth over three cents more than the amount of 
 gold necessary to make a gold dollar. The present discount 
 added to the former premium shows a decline in the value 
 of silver since 1873, as compared with gold, of about 25 per 
 cent. Labor and property since that time have depreciated.
 
 12 
 
 as compared with gold, more rapidly than silver. If silver 
 is finally demonetized and gold alone used as money, there 
 must be a continual decline in the price of labor and prop- 
 erty. When the world shall have reached the gold standard, 
 the decline in prices will have but just begun, for the pro- 
 duction of gold as compared with the demand, is continu- 
 ally decreasing. The wear, loss, use in the arts, and the 
 increasing demands of commerce, cannot be supplied from 
 the mines now known to exist. The probabilities of new 
 discoveries are diminisliing year by year as the surface of 
 the earth is more minutely examined. 
 
 OPPEESSION OF THE PEOPLE. 
 
 What will be the condition of the laborer when the money 
 of tlie world shall be confined to gold alone, and when a 
 few thousand men shall have the power to require of each 
 generation more than $100,000,000,000 on interest account 
 alone ? The contemplation of this vast sum to be paid by 
 the producer, in connection with the fact that gold is con- 
 stantly decreasing as compared with population, suggests to 
 every right-minded man the necessity of immediate resist- 
 ance to the bondholder's demands. He must be confined to 
 the terms of his contract. He agreed to take either silver or 
 gold. He must not be permitted to extort gold and de- 
 fraud the debtor of his right to pay in silver. 
 
 In this great contest the United States must be the bat- 
 tle-field. In no other country is free discussion allowed. 
 No other people have the power to resist. There is too 
 much poverty and ignorance in Europe. Poverty and igno- 
 rance always submit to oppression until the point of desper- 
 ation is reached. Then comes revolution. Eevolution de- 
 stroyed the feudal system; it may finally overthrow the 
 bondholding directory. The time may come when the 
 armies of Europe may take sides with the starving popula- 
 tion, and hurl their oppressors from power, as did the 
 people of France when they tore down the Bastile, and de- 
 stroyed feudal tyranny.
 
 13 
 
 ARMIES AND NAVIES COLLECT INTEREST. 
 
 To fully appreciate the magnitude, power and motives of 
 the bondholding directory, we must take into consideration 
 the alarming fact that to-day Europe is a military camp; 
 that each of the great Powers have from 150,000 to 1,000,000 
 men under arms, and supjDorts, in addition thereto, a vast 
 navy. These military establishments serve several pur- 
 poses: 1. They increase the national debts, and thereby fur- 
 nish bonds for further investment. 2. They increase taxa- 
 tion, and thereby make the poor poorer and the rich richer; 
 and, 3. They furnish a most effective instrument for the en- 
 forcement of taxation. Take, for example, Egypt — a poor, 
 half civilized country, allured into contracting an enormous 
 debt, which was sold to speculators for from forty to fifty 
 cents on the dollar. These speculators well knew that it 
 was impossible for the people of Egypt to pay such a debt 
 without being reduced to the most abject slavery. Egypt 
 defaulted in the payment of interest. The ironclads of the 
 most civilized nation on earth razed Alexandria to the ground 
 and placed tax-gatherers over the people to exact the utter- 
 most farthing. To-day no laborer in Egypt is allowed to eat 
 a morsel of bread made from the wheat his labor has pro- 
 duced. The same oppression in kind, although perhaps not 
 so excessive in degree, exists throughout Europe, 
 
 THE MORTGAGE SYSTEM. 
 
 The system now inaugurated, and which has supplanted 
 the feudal system, may be termed the " Mortgage System." 
 It has many advantages. The feudal lord was responsible 
 for the protection, and, to some extent, the maintenance of 
 his serfs. The bondholder is free from all responsibility. 
 Hundreds of ironclads and millions of armed men protect 
 him and collect the interest on his bonds. With these ad- 
 vantages the bondholder ought to be satisfied; but he is not. 
 He is now scheming to make the bonded debt payable in 
 gold coin only. If successful, he will increase more than
 
 u 
 
 100 per cent, the hours of toil required for the payment of 
 the $100,000,000,000 in interest, for which the labor of each 
 generation is already mortgaged. We repeat that this fraud 
 can only be defeated in the United States. The time for 
 discussion in Europe has passed. Nothing but a revolution 
 can affect the solid foundation of the bonded system across 
 the Atlantic. The armies and navies of the great Powers 
 are already sufficient to suppress the nihilist, communist, so- 
 cialist, and even the great body of the people, if the divine 
 right of the bondholder is questioned. 
 
 LEGISLATION OF CONGEESS IN REGARD TO GOLD AND SILVER COIN. 
 
 The dollar devised by Hamilton and authorized to be 
 coined by the Act of April 2, 1792, consisted of 416 grains 
 of standard silver; fineness, 892 4-10; equivalent to 371^ 
 grains of pure silver, with 44f grains alloy of pure copper. 
 The weighi of the dollar was changed by the Act of January 
 18, 1837, to 412^ grains of standard silver; fineness changed 
 to 900, preserving the same amount of pure silver — to wit: 
 371^ grains, with one-tenth alloy. By both the Acts of 1792 
 and 1837, the subsidiary coins — to wit: the half-dollar, quar- 
 ter-dollar, dime and half-dime, had the same proportion of 
 standard silver as the silver dollar. In 1853 the amount of 
 silver in the subsidiary coins was reduced by Act of Con- 
 gress, and those coins were declared to be legal tender for 
 only $5. The dollar was not affected by that Act, but re- 
 mained the unit of value and a full legal tender until the 
 passage of the Acts of 1873 and 1874, hereafter noticed. 
 
 BONDED INDEBTEDNESS OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The bonds issued for the suppression of the rebellion were 
 payable in lawful money or greenbacks — the same kind of 
 money with which the soldier was paid — interest only being 
 payable in coin. These bonds were sold for from forty to fifty 
 cents on the dollar in coin. After peace was declared the 
 bondholder contended that one of the inducements for his
 
 15 
 
 investment was his patriotism, and that therefore he was 
 entitled to special consideration. Besides, he claimed that 
 it was generally understood that the bonds of the United 
 States would ultimately be paid in coin. On March 18, 
 1869 (after the first election of President Grant), "An Act 
 to strengthen the public credit" was passed, which declared 
 that the bonds of the United States were payable in coin. 
 This Act greatly enhanced the value of United States bonds, 
 and was exceedingly liberal to the bondholders — and per- 
 haps unjust to the people; but it was fairly considered, and 
 no one is charged with fraudulent practices in securing its 
 passage. Besides, the question was submitted to the people 
 at General Grant's first election in November, 1868, and de- 
 cided in favor of paying the bonds in coin. Thereafter, on 
 the 14th day of July, 1870, an Act was passed "to authorize 
 the refunding of the national debt," in which the pledge of 
 the United States to pay the debt in coin was renewed. It 
 was provided in that Act that the bonds issued under its 
 provisions should be redeemable in coin of the standard 
 value of July 14, 1870 — that is to say, in gold dollars con- 
 sisting of 25 8-10 grains of standard gold, or in silver dollars 
 of 412|^ grains of standard silver. If the bondholder had 
 been honest he would have been fully satisfied with the gen- 
 erosity of the Government in making its obligations — which 
 were originally payable in greenbacks — payable in coin. He 
 was not honest, and therefore he was not satisfied. As soon 
 as he had secured the change of his contract from an agree- 
 ment to pay greenbacks to an agreement to pay coin, he com- 
 menced to connive with European bondholders to convert 
 his contract for coin into a contract for gold alone. Through 
 inattention or some secret agency, the Acts of 1873 and 
 1874 — demonetizing silver — were passed without debate and 
 without the attention of either House being called to the 
 subject. The Government was thereby deprived of its op- 
 tion to pay its bonded obligation in either gold or silver.
 
 16 
 
 THE STAXDAED DOLLAR OMITTED FROM THE LIST OF COINS. 
 
 'The first assault upon the dollar of Hamilton was con- 
 tained in a long Act (consisting of sixty-seven sections) 
 "revising and amending the laws relative to the mints, 
 assay-offices and coinage of the United States." The Act 
 was approved February 12, 1873. The section enumerating 
 the silver coins in this Act (Section 15) makes no mention of 
 the silver dollar, but provides for what is called a " trade 
 dollar,' ' to contain 420 grains of standard silver. The object 
 of the bill, as expressed in the title, was to "revise and amend 
 the laws relative to the mints, assay-offices and coinage of 
 the United States." It was not supposed that in such a law 
 there would be any radical change in the laws of the United 
 States with regard to the use of silver as money. The at- 
 tention of Congress was not called to the fact that the silver 
 dollar was omitted, and this fact was probably unknown to 
 all except those having immediate charge of the bill, and if 
 known, it is not at all probable that the effect of the law 
 would have been understood. Besides, neither gold nor sil- 
 ver was in general circulation as money in the United States 
 at that time, and the necessity of coining either was proba- 
 bly not regarded as very pressing. 
 
 The object of the trade dollar, provided for in that Act, 
 was stated to be for circulation in China. It was said that 
 the standard dollar of 412| grains was less in weight than 
 the Mexican dollar, which circulated in China, and that our 
 trade with China would be greatly benefited by coining a 
 dollar worth as much or a little more than the Mexican dol- 
 lar. It was not pretended that the trade dollar was to be 
 circulated in the United States. 
 
 The standard dollar was not, however, demonetized by 
 this Act. It was simply omitted from the list of coins, 
 and this fact was not observed or commented upon in either 
 House.
 
 17 
 
 DEMONETIZATION OF THE STANDARD DOLLAR. 
 
 The boDcIholding directory was not satisfied with the simple 
 omission of the standard dolhir from the list of coins, for so 
 long as it remained a legal tender to any amount, it could 
 again be added to the list without any change of the unit of 
 value in the coins of the United States. Its manipulators, 
 therefore, deemed it necessary to demonetize the standard 
 dollar and destroy its legal tender character. This was 
 surreptitiously accomplished. At the time of the passage 
 of the Act of February 12, 1873, the statutes of the United 
 States were being revised by a commission acting under a 
 law which did not authorize new legislation, but simply 
 contemplated a codification and rearrangement of existing 
 laws. Notwithstanding this fact, a provision was inserted 
 by some unknown agency, destroying the legal tender char- 
 acter of the standard dollar. It is in the following lan- 
 guage : 
 
 "The silver coins of the United States shall be a legal 
 tender at their nominal value for any amount not exceeding 
 $5 in any one payment." (Revised Statutes United States, 
 Sec. 3586.) 
 
 The Revised Statutes of the United States is a very large 
 volume — a volume so large that it was impracticable to read 
 it in either House of Congress. In 1874 this volume was 
 adopted by Congress and the reading dispensed with on the 
 assurance of the Commissioners charged with the duty of 
 codifying the laws that they had inserted no new legislation. 
 The fact^that Section 3586 — demonetizing silver — was in the 
 Revised Statutes, was not publicly known until a long time 
 after the^adoption of the revision. 
 
 THE PARTIAL REMONETIZATION OF SILVER. 
 
 On the 28th of February, 1878, an Act was passed "to 
 authorize the coinage of the standard silver dollar, and to 
 jrestore its legal tender character." This Act made the sil- 
 
 2
 
 18 
 
 ver dollar a legal tender for any amonnt, and it provided 
 that the Secretary of the Treasury should purchase at the 
 market price not less than $2,000,000 nor more than §4,000,- 
 000 of silver bullion per month for coinage. This was a 
 partial remonetization of silver. The Act, however, did 
 not authorize the owner of silver bullion to exchange it at 
 the mints for coin on any terms, nor to deliver it at the 
 Treasury of the United States and receive silver certificates 
 therefor. But notwithstanding the refusal (or neglect) of 
 the Treasury Department to execute this law in good faith 
 (as we shall hereafter see), the further decline of silver was 
 checked by the Act of 1878, and an upward tendency was 
 produced thereby, which continued until the war to demon- 
 etize silver was renewed under the present administration. 
 Great credit is due to the zeal and patriotism of the mem- 
 bers of Congress who passed this Act and checked the evil 
 work of the bondholding directory. The names of Jones, 
 of Nevada; Bland, of Missouri; Keagan, of Texas; Warner, 
 of Ohio, and their co-workers, will not be forgotten. It is 
 the only considerable victory which has been won by the 
 people against the despotic power of money since the bond- 
 holder has assumed dictatorial power in the financial world. 
 The report of Senator Jones, and his great argument in the 
 Senate on the passage of this Act, was the first impartial 
 and philosophical exposition of the money question after 
 the conspiracy to demonetize one of the precious metals 
 was formed. His argument against the demonetization 
 of silver remains unanswered. The bondholder now de- 
 mands the repeal of the Act of 1878. But he cannot 
 succeed if the present House of Representatives is com- 
 posed of as brave and patriotic material as the last. The 
 example of the members of the last House who resisted 
 the President's demand for the passage of a law demonetiz- 
 ing silver, furnishes one of the brightest pages of our his- 
 tory. It is difficult for a member of Congress to refuse any 
 request from the President of the United States with 100,-
 
 19 
 
 000 offices at his disposal; but to refuse the request of the 
 President, when that request is reinforced by the power of 
 $75,000,000,000, is evidence of the purest patriotism. 
 
 EESUMPTION OF SPECIE PAYMENT. 
 
 It has been suggested by the attorneys of the bondhold- 
 ing directory that the Act of January 14, 1875, entitled "An 
 Act to provide for the resumption of specie payments," obli- 
 gated the Government to pay the bonded indebtedness in 
 gold. This claim is as destitute of truth as it is bold and 
 arrogant. The following extract from that Act will show the 
 fallacy of the claim : 
 
 " And on and after the first day of January, anno Domini 
 eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, the Secretary of the 
 Treasury shall redeem, in coin, the United States legal ten- 
 der notes then outstanding, on their presentation for re- 
 demption at the office of the Assistant Treasurer of the 
 United States in the City of New York, in sums of not less 
 than fifty dollars. And ro enable the Secretary of the 
 Treasury to prepare and provide for the redemption in this 
 Act, authorized or required, he is authorized to use any sur- 
 plus revenues, from time to time, in the Treasury not other- 
 wise appropriated, and to issue, sell and dispose of, at not 
 less than par, in coin, either of the descriptions of bonds of 
 the United States described in the Act of Congress approved 
 July fourteenth, eighteen hundred and seventy, entitled 
 ' An Act to authorize the refunding of the national debt,' 
 with like qualities, privileges, and exemptions, to the extent 
 necessary to carry this Act into full efiect, and to use the 
 proceeds thereof for the purposes aforesaid." 
 
 This Act provided for the redemption of legal tender notes 
 (greenbacks) — not bonds. The redemption was to be made 
 in coin — not gold coin. It makes no difference whether or not 
 silver was then demonetized so far as regards the kind of 
 money in which the .United States bonds are to be paid. 
 It is expressly provided in the part of the Act above quoted 
 that the bonds which are therein authorized to be sold to 
 obtain coin with which to resume specie paj^nents were to
 
 20 
 
 be issued under the provisions of the Act of July 14, 1870. 
 We have already seen that all bonds issued under the pro- 
 visions of that Act may be redeemed in silver dollars con- 
 sisting of 412| grains of standard silver, if the Government 
 elects to pay them in that kind of coin. After the passage 
 of the Kefunding Act of July 14, 1870, it was the duty of 
 the Government to provide gold and silver dollars of the 
 standard value of that date with which to redeem the bonds 
 issued under that Act. If gold and silver had both been 
 demonetized and paper substituted therefor, does any one 
 pretend that it would not liave been right and proper for 
 the United States to coin gold and silver dollars to be used 
 in payment of the bonds according to the terms of the law 
 under which they w-ere issued ? Why is it not both the 
 right and duty of the Government to continue the coinage 
 of silver dollars for the purpose of complying with its obli- 
 gation to pay the bondholder in silver ? If silver were the 
 dearer metal the bondholders would demand its coin- 
 age. It being the cheaper metal, why may not the 
 people demand that it be coined and used in the discharge 
 of all Government obligations which are payable in silver ? 
 We maintain that when the bondholder is paid in silver for 
 a debt originally contracted in greenbacks, he will receive 
 more than he contracted for; but whether the bondholder 
 was benefited or not by exchanging a contract payable in 
 greenbacks to a contract payable in coin, is immaterial for 
 the purposes of this argument. The question now is: Shall 
 the rights of the bondholders and of the people be adjusted 
 according to the existing contract, or shall the contract be 
 again changed for the purpose of enhancing the value of 
 bonds? We advise the bondholder to pause and reflect be- 
 fore he again departs from the letter of his contract, 
 and attempts to obtain more than is named in the bond. 
 If he does not stop tampering with contracts between 
 himself and the people, the question may arise: What moral 
 right has one generation to mortgage the services of the next ?
 
 2i 
 
 African slavery was guarded and protected by as perfect a 
 framework of constitutions and laws as huinan ingenuity could 
 invent. It was abolished by the sword, without compensa- 
 tion to the owners of slaves. The $75,000,000,000 of bonded 
 indebtedness rests upon contracts no move zealously guarded 
 by law than the title of the American planter to the African 
 slave. It will not do to so increase the difficulties of paying 
 the bonded debt as to involve the enslavement of the pro- 
 ducer, for in that event there may be a demand for an 
 equitable adjustment of contracts that will disturb the 
 peace of society. Is the bondholder prepared to ad- 
 just equities with the laborer ? Dare he say to the poor- 
 est laborer in Christendom : ' ' You and I were born equal, 
 and neither of us ought to enjoy of this world's goods more 
 than the labor of his hands has produced, and we will adjust 
 our equities on that basis ?" The whole superstructure of 
 the bondholder's power rests upon the strict adherence to 
 the letter of the contract. We, therefore, warn him to abide 
 by the terras of his contract, for if equities are invoked, the 
 luxuries which he now enjoys may be exchanged for pov- 
 erty and toil. We especially warn him. to proceed no fur- 
 ther in his attempt to convert existing contracts payable in 
 either gold or silver into contracts payable in gold alone, or 
 the laboring classes may demand an adjustment of equities, 
 which he will have no power to deny. 
 
 NATIONAL BANKS. 
 
 The national bankers, at a convention held at Chicago on 
 September 23d last, passed the following resolution : 
 
 ^'Resolved, That it is the sense of the convention that the 
 coinage of the silver dollars, under the compulsory law of 
 1878, is detrimental to the best interests of the people and 
 dangerous to the welfare of the Government, and that the 
 law should be immediately suspended, and remain inopera- 
 tive until an international agreement of the leading commer- 
 cial nations shall give substantial assurance as to the future 
 relation of gold and silver as money."
 
 22 
 
 lu other words, the national bank managers resolved that 
 silver should be demonetized until the European bondhold- 
 ing directory should otherwise dictate. The cool assurance 
 which these bankers assume in pretending to advocate the 
 best interests of the people and the Government leads to the 
 inquiry as to who they are and what they represent. If, on 
 investigation, it shall appear that they are subsidized monop- 
 olists and allies of European bondholders, their advice may 
 not be regarded as valuable unless supported by argument. 
 
 This favored class came into existence in the following 
 manner: Greenbacks drawing no interest were in circulation 
 as money. The Government was induced to issue interest- 
 bearing bonds, and purchase and retire therewith a large 
 amount of the greenbacks then in circulation — say $400,000,- 
 000. This created an excuse for issuing other paper to sup- 
 ply the deficiency created by the retirement of the green- 
 backs. The national banks were allowed to deposit in the 
 Treasury the bonds of the United States issued to retire the 
 greenbacks and draw interest thereon; and in addition 
 thereto the Government furnished the national banks, free 
 of charge, the use of paper money issued by the Government 
 and called "National Currency," to the extent of ninety 
 cents on the dollar of the amount of bonds deposited. The 
 Government thereby succeeded in substituting one kind of 
 paper money, called ''National Bank Notes," for another 
 kind of paper money, commonly called "Greenbacks" — 
 both resting for validity upon the credit of the United States. 
 This change has cost the Government from $12,000,000 to 
 $15,000,000 in interest annually for the last twenty years. In 
 order to justify the change and show that national bank notes 
 are better than greenbacks, the advocates of the national 
 banks would have us believe that money issued and guar- 
 anteed by the United States is not money until it is reissued 
 by some person calling himself a "National Banker," and 
 that the credit of. the United States is so bad that it can only 
 issue money through a stranger, who might be termed either
 
 John Doe or Richard Eoe. Although the holders of green- 
 backs have had the privilege for more than ten years of 
 exchanging them for coin, there are now in circulation, 
 on a par with gold, about $360,000,000 of that kind of 
 currency. It has always been difficult for the national 
 banks to explain why the United States retired green- 
 backs drawing no interest, and substituted therefor national 
 bank notes at so great a sacrifice. Many people now be- 
 lieve that there is no satisfactory reason why green- 
 backs should not be reissued and exchanged for bonds, 
 and the' $324, 000, 000 of national currency retired. Would it 
 not be well for the national bank manipulators to furnish a 
 good reason for their own existence before they attempt to 
 destroy silver? Can any satisfactory reason be given why 
 silver should not be remonetized and again received at the 
 mints, and certificates guaranteed by the Government issued 
 therefor? Why should not such certificates, guaranteed by 
 the Government and secured by the deposit of silver bullion 
 be as good money as national bank notes with no security 
 or guarantee other than the credit of the United States? 
 Have the national banks any other objection to the use of 
 silver than the fact that its remonetization and the issuance 
 of silver certificates based on the deposit of bullion would 
 supersede the necessity of national bank notes? The reso- 
 lutions of these national bank managers must be read in the 
 light of the fact that it is worth more than §12,000,000 a year 
 to them to prevent the retirement of the national bank notes 
 by substituting therefor either silver coin or silver certificates. 
 It must also be remembered that the correspondents of 
 these national banks in Europe are controlled by the bond- 
 liolding directory, and that the financial credit of these 
 American banks depends upon the fidelity with which they 
 serve the great financial operators who control and direct 
 the policy of the bondholders. There are about twenty- 
 seven hundred national banks, which are always ready on 
 "call" to furnish the managers of the lobby such a per-
 
 24 
 
 centage of the $12,000,000 subsidy which tliej receive from 
 the United States aunuall}^ as may be required to perpetuate 
 their power. The combination of these national banks and 
 European bondholders is indeed formidable, and threatens 
 the liberties of the people of the United States. But there is 
 no doubt that the people will finally triumph against na- 
 tional banks and bondholding syndicates as they did in the 
 time of Jackson, when a less objectionable institution called 
 the United States Bank was throttled and destroyed. 
 
 We do not object to bankers any more than we do to 
 shoemakers, merchants, or mechanics of any kind. It is 
 the subsidy to which we object. In proof that a subsidy is 
 no more necessary in the banking business than in any 
 other, we call attention to the fact that the principal com- 
 mercial banks of the Pacific Coast do business on their own 
 money, without subsidies, and their financial standing is as 
 good as any banks in the United States. 
 
 CONGEESS TO EEGULATE THE VALUE OF MONEY. 
 
 The Constitution of the United States provides that 
 "Congress shall have power * '^ ^ to coin money and 
 regulate the value thereof. " Under this provision the 
 United States continues to some extent to coin money, but 
 does not regulate its value. It is true that the units of 
 value of the coins of the United States are called dollars, 
 and that a gold dollar contains 25 8-10 grains of stand- 
 ard gold, and a silver dollar 412J grains of standard 
 silver. But this does not determine the value of the coin. 
 The value of each dollar (as we have already seen) is deter- 
 mined by the number of dollars in use in the United States, 
 and not by the quality or quantity of the material of which 
 the dollar is made. The amount of material to make a sil- 
 ver dollar is worth twenty-one per cent. less than the amount 
 of material necessary to make a gold dollar, and the mate- 
 rial necessary to make a paper dollar — whether that paper 
 dollar be greenback or national currency — is comparatively
 
 25 
 
 nothing; and yet each of these dollars has the same pur- 
 chasing power. If the present circulating medium — con- 
 sisting of national currency, greenbacks, silver and gold 
 dollars — were doubled by the issue of gold or silver, green- 
 backs or national currency, the value of each dollar now in 
 circulation would be reduced about one-half. This would 
 be unfair to the creditor class, but it would be no more un- 
 fair than the demonetization of silver would be to the debtor 
 class. It is the duty of Congress to regulate the value of 
 money so that neither the debtor nor the creditor can be 
 robbed by violent contraction or expansion. 
 
 NEW YOEK CITY . 
 
 It is not surprising that New York City should be opposed 
 to silver. Its business relations with the bondholdiug syn- 
 dicate of Europe are exceedingly intimate. It deals in se- 
 curities, imports foreign goods and apes foreign manners. 
 Many of its business houses are either branches of European 
 establishments or are so connected with the business of 
 Europe as to be under the immediate influence of the bond- 
 holding directory. The people of the United States cannot 
 submit to dictation from either New York or Europe. They 
 must have an independent financial policy of their own. 
 Civil liberty cannot survive financial slavery. It may take 
 time for the people to comprehend the designs of Europe 
 on the liberty of this country, but sooner or later the 
 money question will be understood. The metropolitan 
 press may, for a time, mislead good men, but if the fraudu- 
 lent practices of European bondholders are continued much 
 longer in this country, the day of retribution will shake the 
 foundations of society. Let it now be averted by an honest 
 observance of the obligation of contracts. 
 
 WHY SILVER DOES NOT CIRCULATE, 
 
 The reason why silver does not circulate freely is because 
 the Treasury officials refuse to obey the law and put it in
 
 26 
 
 circulation. Although the bonded indebtedness of the 
 United States^both principal and interest — is payable in 
 silver, not a dollar of that metal has been paid in liquida- 
 tion of the public debt. On the contrary, in July last, the 
 Treasury Department, according to its long-established pol- 
 icy, borrowed of the national banks of New York, through 
 the clearing house of that city, $6,000,000 in gold, and issued 
 fractional currency therefor. The excuse given for this re- 
 markable transaction was to strengthen the Federal Govern- 
 ment's gold reserve, and to furnish it with gold to pay in- 
 terest on the national debt. It is a remarkable fact that 
 while the Secretary of the Treasury — himself recently a 
 national banker — was supplicating his fellow national bank- 
 ers to save the Government of the United States from bank- 
 ruptcy by the loan of §6,000,000, the Treasury was over- 
 flowing with silver applicable to the payment of the 
 principal and interest of the public debt. If the Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury could have been induced to regard the 
 Acts of Congress with some respect, he would not have felt 
 himself compelled, at the dictation of any bondholdiug syn- 
 dicate to allow silver to lie idle in the vaults of the Treasury, 
 and to complain of want of storage room for that money, 
 while there was a demand for it for the payment of interest 
 on United States bonds. It is to be regretted that so 
 many members of Congress and Treasury officials have 
 been connected with national banks. If a Secretary of the 
 Treasury, free from relations or complications with national 
 banks or bondbolding syndicates, could be appointed, there 
 might be some hope that the laws of Congress would be en- 
 forced. It can hardlj' be expected, however, that any person 
 interested in a national bank or connected with those syndi- 
 cates will be able to impartially administer the laws of Con- 
 gress regulating the currency of the United States. 
 
 CREDIT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 We hear much from Treasury officials about preserving 
 the sacred credit of the United States. This is all sham.
 
 27 
 
 The credit of the United States is already too good. Bonds 
 upon which the Government realized only forty per cent, and 
 has paid more than an hundred cents on the dollar in iuterest, 
 are to-day selling for 120 cents — an advance of 200 per cent. 
 This results in part from the restoration of peace and the 
 growth and prosperity of the country, but i^rincipally from 
 the various changes in the contract between the Government 
 and its creditors, produced by legislation and the refusal of the 
 Treasury officials to obey the law. Bonds payable in green- 
 backs (as we have already seen) were made payable by Act 
 of Congress in coin. Bonds payable in either gold or silver 
 are paid b}'^ Treasury officials in gold alone, thereby creating 
 an extraordinary demand for gold and enhancing its price, 
 and depreciating silver. Nothing but a gross violation of 
 law and a partiality for bondholders could induce the Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury to refuse to pay bonds in silver when 
 the law so provides, and when the people would be benefited 
 thereby. How dare any Secretary of the Treasury give to 
 the bondholder twenty to twenty-five per cent, more than 
 the law requires ? Why should not the credit of the United 
 States be good when the Government is made to pay three 
 times as much as it agreed to pay ? Our national debt at the 
 close of the war was, in round numbers, $2,800,000,000-^$!,- 
 000,000,000 of which has been paid. The remaining $1,800,- 
 000,000 is more than double the amount of the $2,800,000,000 
 as it existed at the close of the war, if measured by days of 
 labor, bushels of wheat or bales of cotton. If the Treasury 
 officials are not required to obey the law, but may pay the 
 bondholder as much as they please and in any kind of money 
 they choose, the United States, with its boasted resources, 
 may never be able to liquidate the national debt. Since 
 1865 to the present time, for every dollar paid on the prin- 
 cipal of the national debt two dollars have been added by 
 manipulation. Is it not time that the people were informed 
 •of the practices by which financial robbery is conducted 
 wholesale at their expense ?
 
 28 
 
 WHAT LEGISLATION IS WANTED. 
 
 If Congress would authorize the Treasury Department to 
 receive all silver bullion offered at the rate of 41 2| grains of 
 standard silv6r for a dollar, in exchange for coin or silver 
 certificates at the option of the Government, and retain the 
 bullion so received as security for the certificates issued 
 therefor, and make such certificates a full legal tender for 
 all purposes and to any amount, silver would be remone- 
 tized, and the currency of the United States would be placed 
 on a solid metallic basis. If, however, this cannot be done, 
 let the present law be executed. By the Act of 1878 the 
 Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to invest $4,000,000 
 a month in the purchase of silver bullion. Let him pur- 
 chase the full amount each month, coin it, and pay it out 
 for public dues. If the people do not like silver dollars they 
 need not use them. Silver coin can now be converted into 
 silver certificates at the option of the owner. Persons having 
 silver coin may deposit it in the Treasury and receive certifi- 
 cates therefor, which are "receivable for customs, taxes and 
 all public dues." No one receiving silver coin from the 
 Government need move it from the vaults of the Treasury. 
 He can change it before it is removed or at any time thereaf- 
 ter for paper, which is on a par with gold. While it would be 
 better to coin no more silver than the necessities of com- 
 merce require, and issue certificates on bullion as well as 
 coin, still, in the absence of the necessary legisla- 
 tion for that purpose, the Government must bear the 
 expense of coinage until a law can be passed for the 
 issuance of certificates on uncoined bullion. A Sec- 
 retary of the Treasury who would act in the interests 
 of the people, and who was under no obligations to bond- 
 holders, could, in a very short time, under the existing 
 law, put silver on a par with gold. The investment of 
 $4,000,000 a month in silver bullion would soon exhaust 
 the surplus in the market, and create such a demand for 
 silver as to advance it to par with gold. The present produc-
 
 29 
 
 tiou of silver is not in excess of the demand from India and 
 China. The additional demand Avhich would be created by 
 the investment of $4,000,000 a month, instead of 12,000,000, 
 in the purchase of silver bullion, with the avowed purpose 
 on the part of the United States to remonetize it, would 
 settle the question in favor of silver as money. If the bond- 
 holders were paid in silver, they would become interested in 
 appreciating it. It would then become their money, and 
 they would not hire newspapers to give it a bad name. Be- 
 sides, the prompt payment of Government dues in silver to 
 the extent of the full amount that could be coined from 
 $4,000,000 a month worth of bullion would put in circula- 
 tion about $50,000,000 a year of silver coin or certificates. 
 Fifty million dollars a year of coin or silver certificates 
 ■would take the place of the hot-house plants called national 
 bank notes, as fast as the bonds upon which they are issued 
 can be paid and retired. This would avoid any more special 
 or class legislation to put out or keep out the national bank 
 notes. 
 
 NO COMPROMISE. 
 
 The advocates of bi-metallic money must consent to no com- 
 promise. Silver must be either fully remonetized or the 
 present law enforced. The people are not suflaciently versed 
 in intrigue to cope with the bondholding directory in the 
 construction of doubtful laws. Every doubtful expres- 
 sion in any law will be construed in favor of the bond- 
 holders. The proposition known as the Warner Bill has 
 much to commend it, but the difiiculty is that many of its 
 provisions are subject to construction, and that the Treasury 
 Department must execute it. The influence of the bond- 
 holding directory in that Department must not be over- 
 looked. If, according to the general plan of the Warner 
 Bill, the Government would receive in good faith all silver 
 bullion ofi'ered at the market price, on the day of the offer, 
 in exchange for coin or certificates, which should be a full 
 legal tender for every purpose, and to any amount, and re-
 
 30 
 
 tain on deposit the bullion so received as security for such 
 certificates, and the Treasury officials would execute such 
 a law, silver would be fully remonetized, and would be very 
 soon placed on a par with gold at the ratio now established. 
 The difference between the receipt of bullion by the United 
 States at the rate of 412| grains of standard silver for 
 a dollar and its receipt at its market value in gold, so far 
 as ultimate results are concerned (if such a law could be 
 executed), is more imaginary than real. The receipt by the 
 United States of all silver bullion offered on either plan would 
 make an unlimited market for silver, which would place it 
 on a par with gold according to the ratio of 15 98-100 to 1 
 before the United States could possibly obtain the amount 
 necessary to meet the increasing demand for a circulating 
 medium. If, however, silver should be received at its mar- 
 ket value in gold, it would be necessary to limit the price 
 and provide that no higher price should be paid for silver 
 in exchange for coin or certificates than the ratio of 15 98- 
 100 to 1, or silver would rise above that ratio. 
 
 THE SUBSTITUTION OP CARTWHEELS FOR DOLLARS. 
 
 The mosb dishonest and insidious proposition that has 
 been suggested is to increase the amount of silver requisite 
 to make a silver dollar. It is suggested by some that the 
 silver dollar should be composed of 1:80 grains instead of 
 412| grains. It is also suggested that no more dollars 
 shall be coined, but that half dollars, consisting of 
 240 grains each, should be coined after this change shall 
 have been made. It is argued that half dollars of 
 that size will not be as cumbersome as the present dollar 
 of 412| grains. The frigid impudence of either of these 
 propositions would be surprising if we were not accustomed 
 to the demands of the boudholdiug directory to change the 
 basis of their contracts with the people at pleasure. The 
 bondholders, as we have already seen, have, by their agents 
 in Europe, and in the Treasury Department of the United
 
 31 
 
 States, depressed the value of silver about twenty-five per 
 cent, as compared with gold, and they now propose to make 
 it equal to gold by adding more silver. When this is done, 
 they will again depreciate the value of silver by their manip- 
 ulations, and add more silver, until a silver dollar will 
 be as lai"^e as a cartwheel, silver mining stopped, and silver 
 demonetized by this cuttle-fish process. 
 
 If the remonetization of silver, or the enforcement of 
 existing laws, should result in the retirement of the national 
 banks and the relief of the Treasury of its idle surplus 
 revenue in the redemption of the bonds upon which the 
 national bank notes were issued, no honest man ought to 
 complain. The readjustment on the original basis of the 
 contract between the bondholder and the people is certainly 
 desirable. The extortion contemplated by the demonetiza- 
 tion of silver must be prevented by restoring that metal to 
 its original place. Nothing short of that will satisfy the 
 people. 
 
 Let it not be supposed that any person not holding a bond, 
 the payment of which is absolutely secure, can be benefited 
 by contraction. Even the money-lender suffers with the 
 balance of the community. The rate of interest declines, 
 and money flows to financial centers and remains idle for 
 want of confidence and good security, and also because 
 prudent men will not borrow — that is, sell money " short" — 
 while it is increasing in value. 
 
 In conclusion we ask : Why should entei"prise be crushed, 
 the laborer thrown out of employment, and gloom and 
 misery be spread over the land to satisfy the selfish greed 
 of the bondholder? Let the arrogant bondholder take warn- 
 ing from history. Revolution and repudiation are written 
 on all its pages. Oppression in the end destroys the op- 
 pressor as well as the oppressed. The only absolute secur- 
 ity of the bondholder is general prosperity. No prosperity 
 can exist with a decreasing circulating medium. Contrac- 
 tion means all of the misfortunes that can happen to civilized
 
 32 
 
 society concentrated in a single word. Stagnation, bank- 
 ruptcy, idleness, starvation, crime and misery are the legiti- 
 mate offspring of a decreasing circulating medium; wbile, 
 on the other hand, prosperity, employment, abundance, 
 obedience to law and happiness follow a suflScient circu- 
 lating medium as naturally and as regularly as good crops 
 follow generous rains and favorable weather, ^ 
 
 WM. M. STEWAKT. 
 
 Carson City, Nev., November 27, 1885.
 
 SUPPLEMENT 
 
 COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON THE 
 SILVER QUESTION. 
 
 Since the foregoing pages were printed, the President's 
 message has been received. That remarkable document 
 contains all the arguments that Manton Marble was able to 
 import from Europe, and all the sophistry that the managers 
 of the national banks could invent in America. It boldl\ 
 recommends the repeal of the Act of 1878, and the utter de- 
 monetization of silver. 
 
 DOES AN INCREASE OF COINAGE PRODUCE CONTRACTION? 
 
 The President admits the disastrous effects of a decreasing 
 circulating medium, but boldly utters the manifest paradox 
 that the coining of money produces contraction. In other 
 words, the more coin the more contraction. The President 
 says: 
 
 "Those who do not fear any disastrous consequences 
 arising from the continued compulsory coinage of silver as 
 now directed by law, and who suppose that the addition to 
 the currency of the country intended as its result will be 
 a public benefit, are reminded that history demonstrates 
 that the point is easily reached in the attempt to float at the 
 same time two sorts of money of different grades of excel- 
 lency, when the better will cease to be in circulation. The 
 hoarding of gold, which has already taken place, indicates 
 that we shall not escape the usual experience in such cases. 
 So, if this silver coinage be continued, we may reasonably 
 expect that gold and its equivalent will abandon the field of 
 circulation to silver alone. This, of course, must produce 
 a severe contraction of our circulating medium, instead of 
 adding to it."
 
 34 
 
 If the President would inform us where to find the history 
 which demonstrates that an increased coinage of silver ever 
 produced contraction, we might be able to verify the truth 
 of his statement. 
 
 SILVER HAS NOT DRIVEN GOLD FROM THE COUNTRY. 
 
 If the presence of inferior grades of money produce con- 
 traction, the retirement of such inferior grades ought to pro- 
 duce inflation. If this be so, why not retire greenbacks, 
 national bank notes and standard silver dollars, and have 
 an abundance of money at once ? There must be some de- 
 fect iu the President's historical demonstration as applied 
 to the present age, for our experience is contrary to the 
 President's history. Greenbacks, national bank notes and 
 silver coin have been in circulation for several years. 
 Have they contracted the currency? They certainly have 
 not thus far driven gold out of the country. On the con- 
 trary, the amount of gold in circulation has constantly in- 
 creased since the passage of the Act of 1878 providing for 
 the coinage of the silver dollar. 
 
 In 1878 the gold and silver coins of the United States 
 amounted to about $380,000,000. On July 1, 1885, accord- 
 ing to the report of the Director of the Mint, the gold and 
 silver coins in the United States (including bullion in the 
 mints and assay-offices for coinage) amounted to $891,501,- 
 682 — making an increase of about $510,000,000. Between 
 February 28, 1878, and July 1, 1885, the amount of silver 
 was increased by coinage by about $210,000,000. Deducting 
 the increase of silver from the total increase of both gold 
 and silver, shows an increase of gold in the United States 
 of about $300,000,000 since the passage of the Act of 1878 — 
 an average increase of about $3, 448 ,000 a month. 
 
 THE CONSPIRATORS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR OWN WRONG. 
 
 The argument against silver, founded on its present de- 
 preciated value as compared with gold, is unfair. It is an
 
 35 
 
 attempt on the part of the enemies of silver to take advan- 
 tage of their own wrong. When the war on silver com- 
 menced, the amount of silver necessary to make a silver 
 dollar (as before stated) was Avorth three cents more than 
 the amount of gold required to make a gold dollar. The 
 combined power of $75,000,000,000 of bonds and twenty- 
 seven hundred national banks has depressed the market 
 value of silver, as compared with gold, more than 25 per 
 cent. The active co-operation of the President and his 
 advisers with the bondholders and the national banks has 
 depressed the market value of silver since the 4th of March 
 last as much as 5 per cent. The President now points to the 
 difference in the market value of silver and gold, produced 
 by himself and the powers he serves, as a reason why there 
 should be no further opposition to the utter demonetization 
 of silver, and tlie final consummation of a crime against civ- 
 ilization which will entail burdens upon the people too 
 grievous to bear. 
 
 CONTEACTION AND THE EFFORT TO DEMONETIZE SILVER THE 
 CAUSE OF HARD TIMES. 
 
 It is true that enterprise is at a standstill, and that indus- 
 try is paralyzed and millions are unemployed. What has 
 caused this deplorable state of affairs? It is not inflation, be- 
 cause now is a time of contraction. According to the "Amer- 
 ican Almanac" for 1885, there was an increase of the amount 
 of money in actual circulation among the people, between 
 November 1, 1879. and November 1, 1882, of about $118,- . 
 000,000. This increase substantially corresponded with the 
 ratio of increase of population, and it was a period of great 
 prosperity. From November 1, 1882, to November 1, 1884, 
 there was a decrease in the currency in circulation among 
 the people of about $45,000,000. The decrease in the circu- 
 lation from November 1, 1884, to November 1, 1885, we have 
 no means of accurately stating, but we know it was much 
 greater than in any preceding year. It is safe t© say that
 
 36 
 
 the amount in actual circulation among the people to-day is 
 more than $100,000,000 less than it was three years ago, 
 while the demand for circulation has increased with the in- 
 crease of population. The "vast army of the unemployed" 
 bear witness to the evil effects of this contraction. The pa- 
 ralysis of business, produced by contraction, has been ag- 
 gravated by the declared purpose of the present administra- 
 tion to demonetize silver and contract the world's money to 
 the gold standard. Well may capital timidly shrink from 
 trade, and investors be unwilling to take the chance of pur- 
 chasing property when a promise is made to them by a 
 powerful administration that silver shall be demonetized, 
 property and labor made cheaper, and gold made dearer. 
 Why should not capitalists hoard gold, and refuse to invest 
 in property, when the administration proposes to enhance 
 the value of money, and depress the price of property. 
 
 EOBBERY IN THE NAJVIE OF PATEIOTISM. * 
 
 The message contains an appeal to the patriotism of the 
 country to do an act which would rob the taxpayer and enrich 
 the bondholder. The message does not in terms assert that 
 the bonded indebtedness of the United States is payable in 
 gold alone, but appeals to all good citizens not to pay gold 
 obligations in silver. We call particular attention to the 
 following remarkable passage in the message : 
 
 "The condition in which our Treasury may be placed by 
 a persistence in our present course is a matter of concern to 
 every patriotic citizen who does not desire his Government 
 to pa}^ in silver such of its obligations as should be paid in 
 gold; nor should our condition be suclj as to oblige us, in a 
 prudent management of our affairs, to discontinue the call- 
 ing in and payment of interest-bearing obligations which 
 we have the right now to discharge, and thus avoid the pa}'^- 
 ment of further interest thereon." 
 
 Whom is the President accusing of bad faith ? Did any 
 advocate of silver ever propose to violate the obligation of
 
 37 
 
 contracts ? or pay gold obligations in silver ? What does 
 the President mean by " such of its obligations as should be 
 paid in gold?" If he means the bonded indebtedness of 
 the United States, why does he not so declare ? If he can 
 show that the people of the United States are under any 
 legal or equitable obligation to pa}^ that debt in gold, all 
 patriotic citizens will join him in requiring its payment in 
 that metal, at any cost. But the President knows very well 
 that every dollar of the interest-bearing debt of the United 
 States may lawfully be paid in either g'ld or silver. 
 
 The Act authorizing payment in either gold or silver is 
 printed on every bond. When the bondholders first put 
 forward their jireposterous claim for jDayment in gold alone, 
 the Congress of the United States immediately took the 
 matter under consideration and passed a concurrent reso- 
 lution, after exhaustive debate, which we commend to 
 the consideration of the President. The resolution to which 
 we refer passed the Senate on the 25th day of January, 1878, 
 by a vote of 42 ayes to 20 noes, and was concurred in by the 
 House on the 28th day of the same month by a vote of 189 
 ayes to 79 noes. It is as follows: 
 
 Whekeas, By the Act entitled "An Act to strengthen the 
 public credit," approved March 18, 1869, it was provided 
 and declared that the faith of the United States was thereby 
 solemnly pledged to the payment, in coin or its equivalent, 
 of all the interest-bearing obligations of the United States, 
 except in cases where the law authorizing the issue of such 
 obligations had exj)ressly provided that the same might 
 be paid in lawful money or other currency than gold and 
 silver: and 
 
 Whereas, All the bonds of the United States autho- 
 rized to be issued b}^ the Act entitled "An Act to authorize 
 the refunding of the national debt," approved July 14, 1870, 
 by the terms of said Act were declared to be redeemable in 
 coin of the then present standard value, bearing interest 
 payable semi-annually in such coin; and 
 
 Wheeeas, All bonds of the United States authorized to be 
 issued under the Act entitled "An Act to provide for the
 
 38 
 
 resumption of specie payments," approved January 14, 1875, 
 are required to be of the description of bonds of the United 
 States described in the said Act of Congress, approved July 
 14, 1870, entitled "An Act to authorize the refunding of the 
 national debt;" and 
 
 WHEREA.S, At the date of the passage of said Act of Con- 
 gress last aforesaid, to Avit: the 14th day of July, 1870, the 
 coin of the United States of standard value of that date in- 
 cluded silver dollars of the weight of 412^ grains each, de- 
 clared by the Act approved January 18, 1837, entitled "An 
 Act supplementary to the Act entitled 'An Act establishing 
 a mint and regulating the coins of the United States,' " to 
 be a legal tender of payment, according to their nominal 
 value, for any sums whatever; therefore. 
 
 Resolved hy the Senate {the Hoitse of Representatives concur- 
 ring therein) That all the bonds of the United States, issued, 
 or authorized to be issued, under said Acts of Congress, 
 hereinbefore recited are payable, principal and interest, at 
 the option of the Government of the United States, in silver 
 dollars, of the coinage of the United States, containing 412| 
 grains each of standard silver; and that, to restore to its 
 coinage such silver coins as a legal tender in payment of 
 said bonds, principal and interest, is not in violation of the 
 public faith, nor in derogation of the rights of the public 
 creditor. 
 
 We ask: What patriotic citizen would again change the con- 
 tract between the bondholder and the people and convert an 
 obligation payable in silver or gold into a contract for the 
 payment of gold alone ? Does the President advocate such 
 change? If the change must be made, let it be made 
 directly and not indirectly. If there is no respect for the 
 obligation of contracts, pass a law for the payment of the 
 bonds in gold or platinum, or anything else that the bond- 
 holder may demand, but do not do it by demonetizing silver 
 and depriving the people of a sufficient circulating medium. 
 The declaration of the President that he would advocate the 
 conversion of contracts payable in silver into contracts pay- 
 able in gold has already prostrated the industries of the 
 country. What does the President mean by saving that the
 
 39 
 
 condition of the Treasury may be such if the coinage of 
 silver is not stopped as to oblige us to discontinue to call in 
 and pay interest-bearing bonds '? There is a large amount 
 of overdue bonds outstanding. Does he mean that there is 
 no money in the Treasury with which to pay them, when he 
 at the same time reports an enormous surplus of idle money 
 incumbering the vaults of the Government? Does he really 
 mean that the Treasury officials with his approval will con- 
 tinue to refuse to call in and pay bonds in silver according 
 to the letter and spirit of the law of July 14, 1870, under 
 which they were issued? Is the Chief Executive faithfully 
 executing the law when he hoards silver with whicli the 
 bonded debt is payable, and allows interest to accumulate 
 on overdue bonds? Or is he subserving some interest an- 
 tagonistic to the people ? 
 
 THERE ARE WIDOWS AND ORPHANS WHO HATE NO BONDS. 
 
 The allusion of the President to the debtor class is unfor- 
 tunate. The intimation that a debtor is dishonest who 
 claims the right to pay according to the terms of his con- 
 tract is unjust. The President, however, seems to realize 
 that the sympathies of mankind may be on the side of the 
 toiling ma?;ses, whose burdens must necessarily be increased 
 by the enormous contraction which he proposes in the de- 
 monetization of silver. To avoid the effect of such sympa- 
 thy, and to keep from view the real beneficiaries in the 
 scheme to contract the world' s money by the demonetization 
 of silver, he puts forward in the place of the Eothschilds 
 and the Vanderbilts, poor widows, orphans and helpless 
 beneficiaries. He says (if the coinage of silver were con- 
 tinued) : — 
 
 "The pittance of the widow and orphan and the incomes 
 of helpless beneficiaries of all kinds would be disastrously 
 reduced." 
 
 The President seems to forget that there are poor widows 
 and orphans who have no bonds. He also ignores the fact
 
 40 
 
 that the bonds of the United States are to-day worth three 
 times as much as when thej were originally issiied ; that it 
 now requires three times the amount of labor to buy a dollar 
 in either gold or sih-er that it did in 1863 to buy a dollar in 
 United States bonds. 
 
 It is an insult to the intelligence of the people to argue 
 that the poor and not the rich are the owners of bonds. 
 The President ought to reflect that if the burdens of the 
 laborer are increased by the manipulations of bondholders 
 and national bank managers the food and clothing of poor 
 widows and helpless orphans who have no bonds will be 
 ' ' disastrously reduced. ' ' 
 
 THE "VAST ARMY OF THE UNEMPLOYED" AEE EARNING NO 
 MONEY TO DEPOSIT IN SAVINGS BANKS. 
 
 The President appeals to depositors in savings banks, and 
 tells them that if they are not paid in gold, when they de- 
 posit paper or silver, they will be wronged. The depos- 
 itors in savings banks are laborers. They earned their 
 money when there was an abundant circulating medium and 
 when the circulation consisted of gold, silver and paper. 
 Then the Jjrmy of the unemployed was not vast, and 
 did not include millions who were willing to work. The 
 depositors in savings banks are honest, and they are satis- 
 fied to be paid in the same kind of money which they de- 
 posited. They are laborers, and the contraction which the 
 demonetization of silver would produce would throw them 
 out of employment, and force them to consume their present 
 accumulations before good times can come again. No labor- 
 ing man desires to increase the bondholder's power, or sub- 
 ject himself or his posterity to slavery to enrich a favored 
 few. The President ought to know that if silver is demone- 
 tized, and the gold standard adopted, there will be no end 
 to contraction, no end to depression of business no end to 
 low wages and starvation and suttering among the masses.
 
 41 
 
 CON'SPIFACY TO [MAINTAIN BONDED ARISTOCRACY AND SUBSIDIZED 
 
 BANKS. 
 
 Is it possible that tlie President of the United States is 
 really scheming to demonetize silver for the purpose of in- 
 creasing the power of the national banks ? Does he really 
 intend that the national bank circulation shall take the 
 place of silyer, and that millions shall be added to the an- 
 nual subsidy which those powerful corporations now receive? 
 Why does not the present administration call in the bonds 
 that are due, and relieve the Treasury of its surplus revenue? 
 Why invent schemes for increasing the expenditures of the 
 government, or for reducing its revenues, while unpaid, 
 over-due bonds remain subject to call? Why has the 
 present administration refused to ap]^ly the surplus in 
 the Treasury to the payment of the public debt? Is it 
 possible that there is a conspiracy on foot in the interest of 
 the national banks and the bondholders to keep the exist- 
 ing national debt afloat, and increase it, if possible, so that 
 a bonded aristocracy can be maintained in the United States, 
 and the national banks furnished with an ample supply of 
 United States bonds to enable them to increase the enor- 
 mous subsidy which they now enjoy, and maintain permanent 
 control of the political as w-ell as the financial power of the 
 government? It is manifest from the President's message 
 that all patriotic citizens ought to unite in resisting the com- 
 bined power of the bondholders and national banks, which 
 have for years controlled all national administrations, and 
 threaten to subvert the liberties of the people. 
 
 The President's message has spread gloom and apprehen- 
 sion over the Pacific Coast. The refusal of the Treasury 
 ofl&cials to execute the law of 1878 in good faith was famil- 
 iar to the mining States and Territories. They were annoyed 
 by the vexatious and arbitrary rules of the Treasury Depart- 
 ment, which deprived them of silver as a circulating medium. 
 They could see no reason why silver coin needed here could 
 not be exchanged for gold by the Sub-Treasury without
 
 42 
 
 applying to Wasliington in each case for autlioiity to make 
 the exchange; nor could they see why silver coin needed 
 here should be shipped to New York or Washington at 
 great expense, and withheld from circulation among the 
 people. But they did not imagine for a moment that the 
 President of the United States was a party to such disreput- 
 able transactions. They do not now believe that he is guilty 
 of any intentional wrong, but the}' fear what is equally 
 disastrous to the best interests of the country, that he is 
 misled, deceived and imposed iipon by the unscrupulous 
 and artful misrepresentations of the bondholders and 
 national banks. 
 
 ilANY WHEAT GROWERS AND COTTOX PLANTERS ESPECIALLY 
 
 INJURED. 
 
 We call the attention of the President to tlie fact, that, in 
 addition to the general depression of business and the great 
 injustice to the people which would be effected by the de- 
 monetization of silver, there are three great industrial 
 classes of the United States who would be especially 
 injured thereby, to wit: gold and silver miners, cultivators 
 of wheat and planters of cotton. The great wheat and 
 cotton producing empire of India, with its 250,000,000 of 
 population, has silver for- its circulating medium. All pro- 
 ducts of India are bought on the silver basis. W^heat and 
 cotton are purchased in India with silver and sold in Eu- 
 rope for gold. The difference between silver and gold in 
 London is about 25 per cent. This difference gives the 
 wheat or cotton merchant of India 25 per cent, advantage 
 in the European markets over the merchant of the United 
 States dealing in those commodities. The rapid accumu- 
 lation of the wealth of the merchants of San Francisco who, 
 during the civil war, bought goods in the East with green- 
 backs worth 50 cents on the dollar in coin, and sold the 
 same goods on the Pacific Coast for gold, illustrates the 
 advantafje which the merchant of India has when he buys
 
 •43 
 
 wheat or cotton at home for silver, and sells it in Europe 
 for gold. 
 
 The cotton planters of the South and the wheat-growers 
 of the Northwest and of the Pacific Coast have suffered in 
 their European market for several years by a ruinous com- 
 petition with India, resulting from cheap silver anil dear 
 gold. If the law of 1878 is repealed and the price of silver 
 still further reduced, the advantages of the importer of 
 wheat and cotton from India over the importer of the same 
 articles from the United States in every European market 
 will be greatly increased. 
 
 No one will deny that the demonetization of silver would 
 stop silver mining, but the fact that it will also stop one of 
 the principal supplies of gold is not generally understood. 
 Most of the great silver mines of the world contain a large 
 percentage of gold. The average amount of gokbin the ores 
 of the Comstock exceeds forty per cent, of their value. If 
 silver mining is stopped it will not pay to work the so-called 
 silver mines for gold alone. The silver mines will be closed 
 down, and a source of supply ^vhich furnishes a large per- 
 centage — perhaps one-half — of the annual product of gold 
 in the world will be cut ofH. 
 
 Every industry in the United States will be injured by the 
 demonetization of silver. The only possible good that has 
 been or can be suggested from this attack upon silver is to 
 enhance the value of bonds, and furnish an excuse for further 
 subsidies to national banks. The government of the United 
 States does not exist for these two favored classes alone, 
 and the time will come when the people will rise against 
 the now apparently overwhelming power of the combination 
 of European syndicates and American bankers. 
 
 W. M. S.
 
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