(I Ox^Co-^iyf- / J , / d^s THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES GIFT OF CAMPIOW COOK tTOAt MO &i;MMi TOI.-F'" WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE iTij^y^o- THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS ATLANTA • SAIJ FRANCISCO MACMILLAN & CO., Limitko LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCIJTTA MELBOURNB THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. TORONTO WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE Describing the Progress of Economic and Political Demoralization in Europe During the Year of American Hesitation BY PIERREPONT B. NOYES American Rhineland Commissioner April 1919 to June 1920 Jl3eto gorfe THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1921 All rights reserved COPYRIOHT, 1921, By the MACMILLAN COMPANY Set up and electrotyped. Published, January, 1921 TO MR. BERNARD M, BARUCH whose wonderful work as Head of the War Industry Board was a prime factor in America's contribution towards winning the war, and whose courage, optimism and unselfish fidelity to the interests of the United States and the Allies, both during the war and afterwards at the Peace Con- ference, was a source of inspiration to all his associates. 61'^'7'IS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I take this opportunity to thank M. Jean Parmentier of the French Government, Colonel I. L. Hunt, formerly ''Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs" in the American area of occupation, and Wallace H. Day, my deputy in the Rhineland, for valuable assistance in obtaining facts on which the statements in this book are based. WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE CHAPTER I FOREWORD The American people have always been so oblivious to happenings in other coun- tries that their intense concentration dur- ing the Great War on the daily news from Europe was very abnormal. The indiffer- ence which followed the signing of the armistice was a natural reaction. Then came the long struggle over the Peace Treaty, which was made more unpopular by an accumulation of domestic problems pressing for settlement, and which ulti- mately changed public indfference to such a positive distaste for foreign news that editors and publishers were forced to rec- ognize it. The result has been that for 2 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE more than a year the wires have been cut, as it were, and a dangerous ignorance of European developments has resulted. Few Americans seem to realize how near Europe is to collapse — physical, moral, in- dustrial, financial. This book is an attempt to supply the missing information. While I have al- lowed myself to draw certain general con- clusions, my aim has been to give facts and portray conditions as they actually exist in Europe. From the early days of the armistice un- til June of this year I was the American representative on that Commission of four which, by the terms of the ''Agreement" with Germany, became the ' ' Supreme Rep- resentative of the Allies" in the "occupied territories." My post proved to be the storm center of Europe and my official con- nection with the most important actors and events during this period gave me oppor- tunity to check up from original sources the facts and figures which I shall present. It is probable that the average Ameri- can citizen has at no time concealed from FOREWORD 3 himself the dangers which would follow a vicious war settlement. His complacency has been founded on ignorance of facts. He has felt that European countries were gradually working out their own problems, and this feeling has been encouraged by the fact that nearly two years have passed since the war and no catastrophe has oc- curred. Interested foreigners, and Amer- ican ** observers" who observed from our shore of the Atlantic or from European car windows, have done their share to lull the people of the United States into a feeling of security. This optimism seems to me so dangerous that I feel bound to do what little one man can to open the eyes of the American peo- ple to the tragedy impending in Europe, and to the danger to ourselves as well, if we do not take a responsible part in the "settlement" before it is too late. CHAPTER II EUROPE AFTER THE WAR Up to the very day war was declared ex- perts insisted, and the people believed, that a general war was for economic reasons impossible, or at least that it must be very brief. Volumes were written to prove that the cost of modern war-making would reduce the richest country to bankruptcy within a few weeks. Yet, for more than four years the greatest nations of the world maintained a struggle on the most gigantic scale and with an unremitting intensity of action beyond any war in history. A ma- jority of the male population of Europe, and later of America, either fought in the ranks or produced supplies for the armies, and the destruction of property reached a total hitherto undreamed of. Month after month we saw the armies grow larger and munitions increase, both in quantity and 4 EUROPE AFTER THE WAR 5 destructive efficiency. All economic tra- ditions were shattered. War came to seem the normal occupation of mankind. As years went by our minds became accus- tomed to the idea of endless fighting. Financial miracles were commonplaces and people ceased to speculate on the economic conditions which would follow the war. When a series of events has proved our earlier opinions false or exaggerated, it is easy to forget that we ever held such opin- ions, and although the unexpected results may have followed an error as to one fac- tor only, all that was true in our original conception is apt to be abandoned along with the false. This is especially the case when the disproof is positive and dramatic. From a pre-war belief that world in- solvency must follow even a short general conflict, the average mind swung to the other extreme and came to hold the settle- ment of the world's war losses as a rather academic problem to be adjusted between victor and vanquished. Especially in America, where there was no devastation and the losses were smallest, people were 6 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE prepared to minimize the problem of Euro- pean restoration. As a nation we were war-weary. Our own minor problems of adjustment seemed large. The call for help came faint and confused, and, being far removed from the turmoil in Europe, we allowed ourselves to believe what we wished to believe — that European reorgan- ization was coming along fairly well and that we could safely and conscientiously leave the people of the war-wrecked coun- tries to work out their owm salvation. Unfortunately, our pre-war theory that even a short war meant economic ruin was more nearly correct than our later compla- cency. The only error in this theory arose from overlooking the reserve resources, both material and spiritual, which exist in all nations and which can be temporarily brought to bear when the issue seems life or death. Like a man in the delirium of fever who performs impossible physical feats, appar- ently defying all natural laws, nations locked in a death struggle are able to mus- ter forces unsuspected and at other times EUROPE AFTER THE WAR 7 unavailable. Like the fever patient also, their collapse when the struggle ends is proportionately severe. Europe since the armistice has experienced just such a col- lapse — economically, politically and so- cially. The American people should face the disagreeable fact that little real progress has been made toward European restora- tion, and that ruin still stalks in plain sight of most of our former allies ; and the ad- ditional fact that little progress can be made without our active help. Before entering upon details I ought to add that the repair of material destruc- tion in Europe is greatly hindered by na- tional hatreds and antagonisms, and by the poisoning influence of fear in national councils. Two days before the French Army in- vaded Frankfort, Darmstadt and other ter- ritory across the Rhine last April, I was officially informed that the French Gov- ernment had decided on this military move. A high French official to whom I expressed regret and who was, I think, in- 8 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE clined to regret the decision himself, told me that the Government was "being pushed from behind" — that the people in France were forcing the Administration to adopt an aggressive military policy to- ward Germany. During June I was discussing the situa- tion with the German Foreign Minister in Berlin. He talked to me very frankly and, in the course of our conversation, made one significant statement. ' ' France, ' ' said he, '* refuses to permit us to make any start toward economic recovery. I admit that France will be taking some chances in let- ting us become economically strong, but she will have to take those chances, or give up any idea of indemnity." These two statements furnish a clew to the psychological factor which is mainly responsible for the ''creeping paralysis" now afflicting the continental nations. CHAPTER in THE CRUX OF THE SITUATION— FRANCE AND GERMANY It is very necessary after such a destruc- tive war that suspended production be started as promptly as possible. The only remedy for an economic sickness such as exists to-day in Europe — the only hope of the millions and the only chance for peace lies in production and more produc- tion. But war not only destroys the prod- ucts of industry — it disarranges the en- tire industrial machinery. Hence, each nation must reconstruct its productive sys- tem as quickly as possible under pain of social and pohtical degeneration if it fails. A survey of European conditions and especially of the progress made toward industrial revival by the European na- tions will be greatly simplified if we con- centrate our examination on France and Germany. These two nations have been 10 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE the hub of the continental system. They are the seat of the present disease. Within their boundaries live more than 100,000,000 of the best producers in Eu- rope. These two are so situated with ref- erence to other countries that their eco- nomic condition is the determining factor in the welfare of most of the continental nations. Together with England (omit- ting Eussia for the present), they repre- sent three-fourths of the productive capac- ity upon which the 470,000,000 inhabitants of Europe depend for prosperity and hap- piness. Great Britain, while she is unquestion- ably the most favored spot on the Euro- pean economic map, and the only impor- tant country making progress, can be neglected in this survey. One has only to consider her debts, her loss of foreign trade, her labor situation, hor Irish crisis and the steady drop in the value of the pound sterling to recognize that while her indomitable courage and willingness to face her troubles frankly and to tax herself savagely are likely to keep her afloat until THE CRUX OF THE SITUATION 11 she can make the shore, she positively can- not take any one else into the boat without sinking it. Russia I have omitted because we have little real information as to her condition, and for the time being that country is cut off from the rest of the world. Italy is struggling with an almost hopeless inter- nal situation. A country without coal and formerly very dependent upon foreign cap- ital, she will sink or swim with the failure or success of her larger industrial neigh- bors. The little nations, new and old, while in the aggregate they represent with Italy perhaps a quarter of the European production, are so tied economically to the fortunes of France and the old central Ger- man bloc, that whatever conditions we find in France and Germany will very largely govern their fate. Europe, then, must stand or fall with the success or failure of reconstruction and economic revival in France and Germany, and the steady deterioration of Europe's economic condition from the date of the armistice down to the present time has 12 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE arisen from progressive deterioration in these two countries. They are both sorely wounded ; they are poverty-stricken beyond anything known in modern times. They have need of each other; they need coop- eration. All their energy and intelligence should have been directed during these eighteen months to nursing such industrial and economic resources as they had left. Even had they cleared away the rubbish of war as rapidly as possible and adopted a policy of cooperation, the task ahead of them would still have been a terribly dif- ficult one. But hatred, distrust and fear have dictated an opposite course. CHAPTER IV CONDITIONS IN FRANCE In order to get a clear view of the eco- nomic problems before the French people, it will be well to show, first, the situation which confronted them on the day the ar- mistice was signed, lest stories of the truly heroic efforts toward restoration already made in the devastated regions di- vert attention from the overwhelming mag- nitude of France's original problem. The wonderful courage as well as pride of the French people would conceal from the world how inadequate all of these efforts have been for the solution of that prob- lem. France would rather be represented to the world as hopeful and determined than as an object for pity, and yet, with aU their courage and hopefulness, the respon- sible men of France are sick at heart when they contemplate the gigantic task ahead 13 14 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE of the nation and the broken tools with which they must work. The war cost France in cash nearly $40,- 000,000,000. Her interior debt has in- creased since 1913 $28,000,000,000 and her foreign debt, of which there was none in 1913, is now nearly $6,000,000,000. The destruction of property in France during the war has been variously esti- mated at from $15,000,000,000 to $30,000,- 000,000. The capitalization of pensions for orphans and wounded is $10,000,000,- 000. Although the total of these liabilities would be considerably reduced if figured in par exchange, such an estimate would be misleading. To obtain an American equiv- alent for the internal debt, the value of the franc to-day in French labor and materials must be used and, of course, the full amount of the foreign debt, $6,000,000,000, must be added. If, for the sake of discussion, we cut in half the interior debt and the cost of reconstruction, and the pensions, we still have a staggering total of somewhere be- tween 35 and 40 billion dollars lost by France through the war. It should be re- CONDITIONS IN FRANCE 15 membered that France is a country of only 40,000,000 people and that a few years ago Sir George Paish estimated the total value of all property in France, public and pri- vate, as $50,000,000,000. These huge liabilities created by the war are not the whole story. The French peo- ple bore the brunt of the fighting and their country was the battleground. As a result their most serious loss is the destruction of equipment and the demoralization of those economic forces on which they must rely to make good the huge deficit. One and one-half million of the men of France between eighteen and forty — her best pro- ducers — have been killed, and in spite of this she feels she must keep up a standing army of 700,000 men until some world set- tlement is made which will relieve her of the old danger of invasion. The devastated region, while only 7 per cent, of the area of France, furnished be- fore the war one-fifth of her exports. From it came 92 per cent, of the iron ore ; more than half of the coal (in fact, a large proportion of the industrial coal) ; 60 per 16 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE cent, of the steel ; 77 per cent, of the zinc ; 22 per cent, of the lead ; 20 per cent, of the machinery and machine tools ; 80 per cent. of the linen ; 70 per cent, of the cotton tex- tiles, besides very large contributions to the clothing of the comitry. Of course not all of the machinery for this production was destroyed, but the coal mines and the basic iron and steel mills were wiped out to such an extent that in March of this year the mines had recov- ered only about 13 per cent., and the steel and metal mills only 23 per cent. It should also be noted that the region where destruction was the worst contained steel construction plants and most of the factories making tools and hardware, so greatly needed by all other industries. This is also the district which, more than any other, manufactured what have been called the ''essential" items of merchan- dise, while the regions not touched by war were devoted more to wines, silks and other luxuries. The importance of this fact will be appreciated at this time when the recon- struction of France and Europe places es- CONDITIONS IN FRANCE 17 pecial emphasis on the production of es- sentials. Stress might be laid on the crip- pling of the railways — on the devastation of food-producing land and the loss of an enormous number of cattle. I wish, how- ever, to bring into this survery only those larger factors which, in my opinion, have rendered France unable to save herself economically without help from the out- side. When this situation was considered by the representatives of all the allies assem- bled in Paris, it was unanimously agreed that France's salvation depended upon a huge German indemnity ; German coal as a basic industrial necessity, and German money for financial solvency. Before leaving the survey of French con- ditions, it should be recognized that the miseries of war and the hopeless character of the peace up to date have created a very dangerous internal situation. It is immensely to the credit of the French people that during this very trying year, radicahsm has not gone further in adding to chaos. But there is a limit to IS WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE this immunity. Proportionately, the radi- cal element in France has been increased; for it was found necessary during the war to send a very large number of the factory workers back from the front in order to keep up the manufacture of necessary sup- plies. Women could perform much of the farm work, but the factories depended upon the presence of skilled workmen. The result was that out of the 1,500,000 killed, France lost a much larger propor- tion of her conservative peasant popula- tion than of her industrialists. This shift- ing of balance may have a very decided ef- fect on future events. The increase of conservative deputies returned to Parlia- ment at last year's general election was hailed as evidence that the masses in France were becoming less radical. An examination, however, of election statistics shows that more socialists and ultra- radi- cal votes were cast than in any previous election. It is interesting to note a confirmation of the desperate economic outlook I have de- picted, which can be read "between the CONDITIONS IN FRANCE 19 lines" as it were, in a statement made re- cently to the National City Bank by the head of a great French bank. This state- ment is mainly devoted to showing what re- markable progress France has made under the circumstances. I quote the significant paragraph : **0n the day of the armistice, the whole Amer- ican army in France did not possess a single field-gun which had not been constructed in and supplied by France. Imagine the United States in the same situation ; having lost the coal-fields in the Alleghanies, the iron ore of the lakes, some of the largest and richest cities such as Chicago, Cleveland, and Pittsburg ; having had three mil- lion five hundred thousand men killed, and while struggling for their life on their own soil, help- ing others to get ready and devoting all their productive capacity to war-material, while others had something over for domestic requirements and investments such as shipbuilding, etc., how would American economic conditions look, under these circumstances, after five years ? ' ' He might have added to this picture an American standing army of 2,000,000 men, which in proportion to our population rep- 20 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE resents the burden entailed upon France by the 700,000 soldiers she maintains at the present time. CHAPTER V CONDITIONS IN GERMANY The total German war expenses, includ- ing loans to insolvent allies, were consider- ably larger than those of France. Ger- many's national debt is now around 190,- 000,000,000 marks, to which must be added an unsecured note circulation of about half that amount, and liabilities for indemnity to her own subjects of over 100,000,000,000 marks. On their face these debts are equivalent in American money to more than $100,000,000,000. The total is re- duced, however, to about $30,000,000,000 if as in the French estimate we use the pres- ent value of the **mark" in German labor. On the other side, it should be noted that any attempt to redeem the circulating notes and so restore German currency would bring these notes very close to par and thus largely increase the debt figure 21 22 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE stated above. To the debt must be added the minimum indemnity imposed on Ger- many by the Treaty of Versailles, which is there stated as approximately $24,000,- 000,000. While in one way it is now an advantage to Germany that she was obliged during the war to do all her borrowing at home, this is offset by the fact that having had to rely almost entirely on her own material resources she found herself in 1919 abso- lutely bare of merchandise and of the raw materials with which to manufacture more. An American buyer of long experience in Germany passed through Coblenz during the fall of 1919 with a $25,000,000 credit to be used in buying German merchandise for export. He returned six weeks later and told me that he had advised his syndicate to withdraw the credit ; he found no stocks of any kind in Germany. He said there were small quantities of merchandise in re- tail stores, but absolutely no wholesale stocks. The labor situation is another serious factor in the problem of German economic CONDITIONS IN GERMANY 23 revival. German industrial supremacy was founded on a productive capacity per man which no longer exists. In most trades the output per man is now a little over one-half what it was before the war, due partly to shorter hours which came with the revolution of November, 1918, partly to six years of under-feeding, and partly to a radicalism which makes the masses disinclined to work effectively. When I talked with the Minister of Eco- nomics last June as to the relative impor- tance of the various factors operating to prevent industrial revival, he rated the shortage of coal as one of the worst. In fact, he placed it second only to the unlim- ited indemnity. During the year 1919 production of in- dustrial coal in Germany was about 60 per cent, of the 1914 total. As President of the Interallied Committee on Coal for the occupied territory, I made a careful inves- tigation as to the cause of this reduction in output. The ineffectiveness of labor, re- ferred to above, was blamed for about two- thirds of the difference. I found that 24 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE whereas one ton of coal per man was mined in Germany before and during the war, the average in 1919 was .58 ton. The balance of the shrinkage was accounted for by de- terioration of equipment and by loss of the Saar and Lorraine coal fields to France. Looking to the future, the Germans are worrying over the threatened loss of the LTpper Silesian coal field which produced annually about 45,000,000 tons before the war. If the plebiscite gives this district to Poland, Germany will be obliged to reduce shipments of coal to France or allow her own industries to collapse. During 1919 the average amount of coal received by German industries was little better than 30 per cent, of their normal consumption. The steel mills, because they were near the mines and the output of coal at pit-mouths was greater than the available cars to transport it, received as high as 60 per cent, of their requirements. This summer, however, delivery of coal to steel mills has fallen to about 40 per cent, of their requirements. The contest between France and Ger- CONDITIONS IN GERMANY 23 many over coal deliveries has been misun- derstood in this country. The Versailles Treaty called upon Germany to deliver to the allies 314 million tons per month. This was so manifestly impossible that on August 28, 1919, a new protocol was signed reducing the demand to about 214 million tons per month with a sliding scale based on increased production. When, during the futile discussion in Paris last March between the Reparation Commission and the German Coal Delegation, I was called in as the American expert, I urged that France for her own sake recognize the facts and make a business-like bargain with the German Coal Kommissar, one which could be and, I believed, would be kept. I informed our representative on the Reparation Commission that Germany could at that time deliver ly^ million tons, but no more. M. Poincaire was unwilling to discuss with Germany any reduction, and as a result deliveries continued at about 600,000 tons per month, until at the Spa Conference in June, 2,000,000 tons was agreed upon. This quantity, considering 26 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE the increase of German production at that time, corresponds very closely with my 1,250,000 tons in March. Lack of transportation is another ob- stacle to economic revival. Of ocean ship- ping Germany has practically none left. Her river and canal equipment have been much reduced by the operation of the Treaty. Wliile the railroads, especially the Prussian lines, are doing much better than one would expect from the statistical situation, the 5,000 locomotives sent to France and Beligum, the bad condition of those left in Germany, the lack of good re- pair material, and the inefficiency of shop workers have created a shortage of loco- motive power felt with especial severity in coal distribution. Out of 22,000 locomo- tives left in Germany, 10,000 are continu- ally in the repair shops. Food is still one of the worst deficiencies. Herbert Hoover (the best informed man in America on European food conditions) told me that normally Germany can pro- duce only four-sevenths of her own food — the balance must be imported in exchange CONDITIONS IN GERMANY 27 for German exports. Such imports of food are only possible now at ruinous prices on account of the rate of exchange. The Government has already spent hun- dreds of millions of marks in subsidizing food to bring prices within the limits of the workingman's purse. The mass of the people in Germany can only afford to buy this subsidized food, and the subsidized ''ration" during the first seven months of 1920 contained only 1,090 calories as against 1,500 calories during the war, and 3,000 calories before the war. Both pro- duction and the morale of the people in Germany are suffering from this continued under-feeding. The Versailles Treaty calls on Germany to pay a minimum indemnity of 100,000,- 000,000 gold marks — approximately 24,- 000,000,000 gold dollars which, paid in francs at present exchange rate, would equal 400,000,000,000 francs. In 1871 Ger- many imposed upon France an indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs. At the time this was expected to ruin France, and history has applauded the heroic energy with 28 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE which she accomplished the seemingly im- possible by paying the whole amount within two years. After riiaking every al- lowance, it is not reasonable to expect that France can collect from Germany 80 times the indemnity imposed in 1871. The at- tempt does not seem a good business prop- osition unless the advantage sought is Ger- man bankruptcy instead of cash. Cer- tainly, in the light of the economic pros- tration described above, the policy of Great Britain and Italy, which calls for a revision of the Treaty, seems the wisest course, both in the interest of France and the peace of the world. The most depressing influence of all on German economic life is the uncertainty created by allied refusal to fix a limit for the indemnity. This has been one of the chief points of difference between Great Britain and France, and the facts should be clearly understood. The Treaty of Versailles recognizes that Germany ought to pay for all the devasta- tion, as well as the cost to the allies, of the war. Nothing which has come to light CONDITIONS IN GERMANY 29 since the armistice has raised a doubt as to the justice of this proposition — theoretic- ally. Practically, the Peace Commission- ers agreed that such complete reimburse- ment was impossible. Being ignorant of German economic conditions, they left the total amount of the indemnity to be settled when more information regarding Ger- many's finances should be obtained. The Treaty names 100,000,000,000 gold marks as an immediate payment to be recognized by the issuance of German gold bonds. Beyond that, the Reparation Commission is to decide as to how much additional in- demnity the Germans can pay year by year without ruining their industries. For two years this uncertainty has hung over the economic life of Germany like the sword of Damocles. If you say to a person, ''Work as hard as you can and at the end of the year we will decide how much of your product we will take from you," there is no incentive for that person to work. Equally, if you say to capital, domestic or foreign — "We are waiting to see how much real money 30 ^HILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE will come into sight in Germany before set- tling on a maximum indemnity," capital will certainly refuse to show itself. That provision of the Versailles Treaty which permits the allies to add to the minimum indemnity of $24,000,000,000 whatever they decide at a later date Germany is capable of paying has so far deprived her people of incentive to enterprise, and her industries of much needed new capital. More than a year ago the representative of a group of American capitalists who were prepared under certain conditions to grant large financial credits to German industries, told me that they considered it unwise to invest a cent in Germany until the limits of the in- demnity had been fixed. It has been and is to-day of the utmost importance to Germany and to Europe, and it is an essential prerequisite to the pay- ment of any indemnity, that the broken cir- cle of production — raw material, power, (coal), labor, transportation and sale — be repaired as quickly as possible. So far, there has been no progress made in this direction. CONDITIONS IN GERMANY 31 Certain it is that unemployment in Ger- many is now increasing faster than at any time since the war. Official reports in June, 1920, showed that the Government was giving unemplojTiient pay to less than 1,000,000 men. To-day the same reports show that nearly 1,500,000 are officially out of work and receiving Government aid. To sum up, Germany finds herself de- prived of her iron mines, and a part of her coal, with a debt of at least $30,000,000,000, a fixed liability for indemnity of another $24,000,000,000, and unable after nearly two years to raise the production of her industries to a point where she can pay for the foreign food absolutely necessary for the feeding of her people. She is short of coal, short of food, short of transportation, crippled by social unrest and a weak gov- ernment, and her future is shadowed by such uncertainty regarding the financial and political intentions of the allies that the population, from the government offi- cials down to the workers in the mines, have become possessed with a sort of fatalistic 32 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE hopelessness which has killed both initia- tive and energy. It is my firm opinion that Germany, once the industrial backbone of continental Europe, is steadily sinking into a social and economic feebleness very dangerous to the peace of the world. I agree with Mr. Paul Cravath that it will be hard to make Bolshevists of the German people— that this is not a real danger unless the allies leave them helpless and hopeless too long. CHAPTER VI THE DEADLOCK The above description of the economic wreckage left by the war in France and Germany has not been overdrawn. I be- lieve that the authorities in either country, if they felt free to speak frankly, would confirm my estimate. To complete the pic- ture, it is necessary to describe the dead- lock which has existed between these two countries up to the present time, and which by defeating their attempts to revive in- dustry and restore finance, threatens disas- ter to both. French statesmen are possessed by two great fears. The first is a very natural dread of a revengeful, military Germany again grown strong. When America with- drew from the League, this fear which had been fading away in the hopeful prospect of a new international force capable of making justice an effective arbiter between 33 34 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE nations, swept over the country with re- newed violence. The French populace pas- sionately threw its support to that political group which has no confidence in any inter- national agency save military power. These Chauvinists (not a large, though an influential group) have believed through- out that France should seize the present opportunity so to destroy or mutilate Ger- many as to render her old enemy perma- nently inferior to herself, both economic- ally and in a military way. Now, this mili- tary party in France finds itself backed by an almost unanimous people. Since America deserted, French policy has been poisoned by dreams : 1st, of sep- aratist movements to be fomented among the German states ; 2d, of estabHshing her eastern frontier on the Ehine ; 3d, of a mil- itaristic Poland on Germany's eastern frontier ; and 4th, of new invasions of Ger- many. Many German activities have ap- peared to threaten these ambitions and have been promptly crushed. For instance, when the Sparticists cre- ated a reign of terror in the Ruhr last THE DEADLOCK 35 March, France refused the German Gov- ernment permission to send enough troops to crush the rebellion, and when, in spite of this refusel, 18,000 more reichswehr than are permitted by the Treaty of Versailles entered the Ruhr and cleaned things up, France invaded Frankfort and Darmstadt as reprisal. Since the most radical So- vietism was establishing itself throughout that territory, the allies would have been forced to occupy the Ruhr themselves had the German Government withheld its troops, and such an ** occupation" would have involved France and the allies in a major military adventure. For the Ruhr is a tough district, a mining and steel mill district containing 515,000 miners and a larger number of mill workers (Russians, Poles and Itahans being mixed with the Germans). The Ruhr is also more in- fected with Bolshevism than any other part of Germany with the possible excep- tion of Saxony. News dispatches sent to America during the ' ' Ruhr Trouble ' ' were very conflicting. Later, I obtained permission to go through 36 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE the government files in Berlin and found there hundreds of original letters and tele- grams confirming the reports made by rep- resentatives of the American Commanding General who were in the Ruhr during the rebellion. Fear dictated French insistence on re- duction of the German army to 100,000 men. It is not simply that so small an army will place Germany at the mercy of dangerous eastern neighbors, but 100,000 soldiers cannot keep order at home under present unsettled conditions. She, unlike America and Great Britain, has always de- pended upon the military for police work. Local police forces are small. In Cologne, for instance, there are in proportion to the population less than one-quarter as many policemen as in New York City. The local police in Germany merely manage traffic and arrest drunks. Serious disorder is handled by tlie military. France also fears the economic recuper- ative power of Germany. French states- men are apprehensive as to the temper of their own people who were long fed on glit- THE DEADLOCK 37 tering promises that the expected flow of German money into France would permit a low tax rate to be maintained and would bring prosperity. Believing that if given a chance industrial revival would pro- ceed in Germany faster than in France, these statesmen fear that the French masses would vent their disappointment and wrath upon the Government. Hence, the French refusal to fix a maximum figure for the indemnity; hence, the former French insistence on more coal than Ger- many could possibly send ; hence, also, the French opposition to outside loans to Ger- many. In fact, the determined hostility in France to any revision of the Treaty for the sake of adapting it to known conditions and thus, while obtaining all practicable ''reparations," make economic revival in Germany possible, has been based on a pro- found uneasiness as to the consequences of such revival. CHAPTER VII MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE RHINELAND The allied ''occupation" of the western provinces of Germany, originally planned to last 15 years but extended for an indefi- nite period by M. Millerand's note to the Germans last March, is so unmistakably a prime factor in the European outlook, and it so directly threatens the future peace of the world, that knowledge of its charac- ter and history is essential to a true under- standing of the European situation. The history of Article 428 of the Peace Treaty, and of the "Ehineland Agreement" (cre- ated in conformity with Article 432) which defines the terms of "occupation" are typ- ical of the entire struggle at the Peace Con- ference between what is now referred to as the ''Peace Delusion" of Wilson and Lloyd George and the "Continental Policy" which M. Millerand has during the last six 38 MILITARY OCCUPATION 39 months triumphantly reestabUshed. Sim- ilarly the character and history of the ' ' oc- cupation, " itself , suggest the foundation of sand upon which the present peace of Eu- rope is built. All that portion of Germany lying west of the Rhine, together with about 2,000 square miles on the eastern bank, is now "occupied" by allied troops under condi- tions laid down in the "Agreement." Temporary occupation was absolutely necessary. This "occupation," however, having already lasted longer than the Ger- man "occupation" of France in 1871-72, must according to the Treaty of Peace con- tinue, with possible reduction of territory, for 15 years, and M. Millerand notified the Germans last April that the date from which the 15 years should be reckoned was postponed until all obUgations of the Treaty are met by Germany. Since some of these conditions cannot be complied with at the present time, this automatically ex- tends the "occupation" indefinitely. In order to realize what this means for the peace of the world, Americans should 40 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE conceive of a territory about tlie size of New England, with a larger population than is contained in those six states, and an industrial importance for Germany even greater than New England has for the United States, occupied by 120,000 enemy troops and its people and government sub- jected to minute inspection and interfer- ence by representatives of its traditional enemies. All of the cities in the Rhineland are crowded with allied officers living in the finest private houses, commandeered from their owners. These owners are usually permitted to live in a few rooms in the rear or in the attics of their former homes. Municipal regulations, including street traffic and the prices of merchandise, and many of the smaller restrictions which were in force in America during the war, are prescribed by the representatives of the occupying powers. Every German law and regulation must be submitted to those representatives. If disapproved by them they become invalid throughout oc- cupied Germany. Newspapers are cen- MILITARY OCCUPATION 41 sored, private mail may at any time be seized, and the local movements of persons may be subjected to passport regulations. The right of requisition of supplies for the allied army and officials may at any time break down the very difficult "rationing" plans of the German Food Kommissar. The appointment of even local officials must be approved, and their liability to sum- mary removal on grounds satisfactory to the Allied Commission alone is a standing threat to landrats, burgomeisters and pres- idents. Many other harassing interfer- ences with the daily life of the population are the necessary accompaniments of a hostile ''occupation." These it must be remembered are conditions in the ''occu- pied territory" of Germany under a regime wliich was given a civilian charac- ter and made as liberal as possible by the moderate elements at the Peace Conference against violent opposition from the Mili- tary group. M. Tardieu, in recent magazine articles, gives an account of the struggle over this question of extended "occupation." He 42 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE shows that Mr. Lloyd George and Presi- dent Wilson were for months unalterably opposed to it. He states that a special de- fensive alliance was offered by the two Premiers as inducement to France to aban- don the plan. He reveals step by step how M. Clemenceau's persistence broke down opposition and how in May, 1919, by con- ceding civilian control, he finally made a 15-year ''occupation" part of the Treaty with Germany. An original draft for the ''Rhineland Agreement ' ' was prepared by the Supreme Military Council under the influence of Marechal Foch, and it was an extremely brutal document. It decreed that ''mar- tial law with all its consequences" should remain in force in the Rhineland for 15 years ; it placed control of the German po- lice and the conduct of the "occupation" in the hands of the French Military Com- mander. I was at that time serving on the tem- porary Rhineland Commission, and to- gether with Sir Harold Stuart, the British Commissioner, entered a strong protest MILITARY OCCUPATION 43 against this plan of the Supreme Mili- tary Council. Several revisions were at- tempted, in the preparation of which I as- sisted, but, becoming convinced that a mere revision could not make such a plan work- able, I wrote a letter on Ma}^ 27th to Pres- ident Wilson embodjdng my objections and outlining a plan for civilian control. This letter seems to have reached the President at a psychological moment, for he took it to the Supreme Council and ob- tained unanimous consent to the appoint- ment of a committee mstructed to draft a plan along the lines I had suggested. This committee, after a week of continuous ses- sion, presented to the Peace Conference the "Ehineland Agreement" which was finally sigTied by Gemiany and the allies at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles. The French ^' White Book," containing the discussions of this special committee, states in Paragraph I : "That a Commission composed of: "A representative of the United States of America who will be designated by Presi- 44 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE dent Wilson; Lord Robert Cecil, for Great Britain; Monsieur Loucheur, for France; Marquis Imperiali, for Italy will be appointed to draft a plan of agreement concerning the Occupation of the Rhineland Provinces, in accordance with the scheme sug- gested (skeleton plan) in a letter dated May 27, 1919, from Mr. Noyes, American Delegate to the Interallied Rhineland Commission, to President Wilson." It also contains a copy of the letter, which I will quote since it states my posi- tion at that time ; a position which I havfe since seen no reason to alter. "American Commission to Negotiate Peace "Paris, May 27, 1919. ' ' To the Honorable Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, 11, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris. "Dear Sir: "After a month spent in the Rhineland as American Commissioner, I feel there is danger that a disastrous mistake will be made. The MILITARY OCCUrATION 45 'Convention' for the government of these terri- tories, as drafted by the military representatives of the Supreme War Council on May eleventh, is more brutal, I beleve, than even its authors de- sire upon second thought. It provides for un- endurable oppression of six million people dur- ing a period of years. "This 'Convention' is not likely to be adopted without great modification. What alarms me, however, is that none of the revisions of this doc- ument which I have seen recognize that its basic principle is bad — that the quartering of an en- emy army in a country as its master in time of peace and the billeting of troops on the civil pop- ulation will insure hatred and ultimate disaster. "I have discussed this matter at length with the American Commanders of the Army of Oc- cupation, men who have seen military occupation at close range for six months. These officers em- phatically indorse the above statements. They say that an occupying army, even one with the best intentions, is guilty of outrages and that mutual irritation, in spite of every effort to the contrary, grows apace. Force and more force must inevitably be the history of such occupa- tion long continued. "Forgetting the apparent ambitions of the French and possibly overlooking political limita- 4G WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE tions, I have sketched below a plan which seems to me the maximum for military domination in the Rhineland after the signing of peace. Our Army Commanders and others who have studied the subject on the ground agree with this pro- gram: "Skeleton Plan **I. As few troops as possible concentrated in barracks or reserve areas with no 'billeting,' excepting possibly for offi- cers. "II. Complete self-government for the ter- ritory, with the exceptions below. "III. A Civil Commission with powers: "a. To make regulations or change old ones whenever German law or actions — (1) Threaten the carrying out of Treaty terms, or (2) Threaten the comfort or security of troops. "&. To authorize the army to take the control under martial law, either in danger spots or throughout the territory Avhen- ever conditions seem to the MILITARY OCCUPATION 47 Commission to make this neces- sary. "Very truly yours, (Signed) "Pierrepont B. No yes, "American Delegate, "Interallied Rhineland Commission." The negotiations which resulted in this plan being adopted are of special interest to any one studying the international psy- chology of the past two years. It is his- tory now that M. Clemenceau on May 29th seized upon this more liberal plan of ** oc- cupation" presented by President Wilson in order to make more sure of the final ad- hesion of the American and. British Pre- miers to the main principle of ** occupa- tion. ' ' Sitting in the meetings at the Quai d'Orsai as a spectator, I witnessed the most intense and persistent hostility to this '^civilian" plan on the part of Mar- echal Foch and his aids. During recent months leading French statesmen and the French press have bewailed the weakness which yielded to the Anglo-Saxon liberal- ism. It is loudly maintained that since the compromise was made in view of active 48 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE American participation and a defensive al- liance, a way should now be found to get back to that sterner control originally planned, and by doing away with the inter- ference of the InteraUied High Commis- sion which "has continually opposed French interests" ensure success for the new French policy. I was the American member of the Com- mission from its creation until June of this year. The President of the Commission, M. Paul Tirard, is a forward-looking, con- scientious man who has worked with the other members to carry out the details of the ''Rhineland Agreement" in the spirit intended by the Supreme Council. He has succeeded as well as any man could sur- rounded by an intensely military atmos- phere and under the pressure of a French national policy steadily swinging toward aggressive military and political action. I believe that in the Rhineland a hostile military occupation is seen at its best; and at its best, I can say from personal obser- vation, it is brutal ; it is provocative ; it is continuing war. MILITARY OCCUrATION 49 A temporary occupation was, as I have said, inevitable, and its continuance until the disarmament of Germany has pro- ceeded to a point satisfactory to the allies is probably desirable, but its maintenance as a debt-collecting agency through 15 years is unthinkable — it will be a running sore. America is to-day participating in this '^ occupation" with more troops than any nation excepting France, and yet we have elected to place entirely outside of our own influence the character of the ' * oc- cupation" and the length of its continu- ance. During the 14 months in which I worked as a member of the Rhineland Com- mission, I became daily more shocked that any responsible man should be willing to curse the world with such a hatred and war breeding institution as this. I could multiply the details until every American would be equally shocked, but I will leave it to the imagination of my readers to decide for themselves what would be the ultimate result of a 15-year occupation of the New England states by victorious German or other foreign troops. CHAPTER VIII GERMAN "SEPARATIST" MOVEMENTS INSTI- GATED BY THE FRENCH After the war there was a general con- viction in France, as there was in all allied countries, that a political separation of the Rhine Provinces from Prussia would be in the interest of future peace. Dominated by Prussia the German Empire had plunged the world into war. Hence, it seemed probable that strengthening the power of the other German states and weakening the influence of Prussia in the German Reich would tend to eliminate the Hohenzollern dream of world conquest. Unfortunately, this scheme of political re- adjustment, which was looked upon with favor by many Germans, easily formed the basis in France for the more radical plan ot an independent Rhineland which should act as a '' buffer state." And in the upper 50 > GERMAN "SEPARATIST" MOVEMENTS 51 hierarchy of French nationalism and miU- tarism the thinlj^ veiled expectation that this ** buffer state" would be under French influence became a definite determination to make the Rhineland ultimately French territory. A few months' experience with ''occupation" in the Rhineland and the un- limited power possessed by an occupying army made this plan of annexation seem feasible. In the end it tempted even those Moderates, Avho were at first inclined to look askance at a policy likely to cre- ate another Alsace-Lorraine, to approve French efforts for a "frontier on the Rhine." A brief account of the Separatist plots fomented by the French in the Rhineland during the past eighteen months will add a point of definiteness to my statement that a 15-year hostile "occupation" is certain to prove a curse to the world. It ^vill also suggest in general the part America must play, if Europe in the 20th century is to be anything but a powder magazine of dan- gerous possibilities. While I was in the Rhineland four open 52 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE attempts at secession were made. These were of two kinds. Three of them were roughly similar in principle to the demand of our Southern Slates during the 50 's for ** State rights." The fourth attempt was bald '^ secession." Curiously enough the two most ambi- tious attempts revealed a conflict between two opposing French policies striving for success under the leadership of two rival French Generals. The declaration of ''The Palatinate as an independent neu- tral Republic" on May 21, 1919, was a bold bid by General Gerard, Commander of the French 8th Army, for success in Ms extreme policy of dismembering Germany. Official France was at that time swinging over to the slower and more subtle policy of General Mangin (Commander of the French 10th Army) and it was hinted at the time that General Gerard already knew of his own impending recall and that he precipitated this flare-up as a last gamble. At any rate, he made the action sharp and snappy and he was recalled a short time after his attempt failed. His army was GERMAN "SEPARATIST" MOVEMENTS 53 then added to the command of General Mangin. Proclamation of this new Palatinate Re- public, which was to be entirely independ- ent of Germany, was posted on the night of the 21st of May, and on the 22d General Gerard issued a Manifesto, a copy of which I have seen. The following is a quotation from this document: "It came to the knowledge of the General in command of the French Army that the Landau population owing to their sympathetic senti- ments towards France had to undergo certain annoyances on the part of German officials. Such actions from the side of these officials con- stitute a misuse of power of authority and are 'A breach of orders, of Marechal Foch as well as an incorrect action towards the victorious and benevolent France. ' ' ' The Manifesto also contained a declara- tion that the French Commander of the Occupation of the Palatinate would sup- port in every way all attempts for the crea- tion of a Palatinate Republic in connection with France. 54 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE During the next few days there were riots in Speyer, Landau and Zweibrucken. Regierung's President, Winterstein, was removed from office and expelled from the territory by the French. Other officials hostile to the Separatists were arrested. This ''revolution" was too artificial and too premature for any chance of success. It could not compete with the more moder- ate and carefully planned scheme for a larger Ehineland Republic within the Ger- man Reich which was at the same time de- veloping under the management of Dr. Dorten and General Mangin. This latter movement, usually referred to as the ''Dorten Rebellion," was much more ambitious territorially than any of the oth- ers. Not only the five "Rhine Provinces" were to be included in the new Republic, but it was expected to comprise most of Hesse-Nassau, the Grand Duchy of Hesse, the Bavarian Palatinate and the rich prov- ince of Westphalia across the Rhine, in which are located the great manufacturing industries of Essen and the coal mines of the Ruhr. Final plans for the revolution GERMAN "SEPARATIST" MOVEMENTS 'jo were perfected at a conference in Mayence attended by General Mangin, the French Commander; Dr. Dorten, a Mr. Kuchkoff of Cologne, Frohberger, a newspaper ed- itor, and several other Germans. About 2 A. M. on the morning of May 22d a French Lieutenant-Colonel from General Mangin 's Headquarters arrived in Co- blenz. He managed to get the American Chief of Staff on the telephone and in- sisted on an immediate interview with the American Commanding General. He was very urgent. The conference, however, was postponed until morning when the French officer informed the Americans that on Saturday, the 24th, a Republic would be proclaimed with Coblenz as its capital. He gave the names of the men who would form the new Cabinet and stated that fifty officials of the new administration were then on their way to Coblenz to organize the government. The new state was to re- main for the present a part of the German Empire, but later would be made wholly in- dependent. He stated that he was sent by General Mangin to solicit the aid of the 50 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE American General in promoting this move- ment. Our Commanding General replied that the *' occupation" was governed by the terms of the armistice, that an honest car- rying out of those terms would not permit the '' occupying" authorities to recognize revolutionary movements, that this had been the policy of all the allies, and that in any case his own instructions from Gen- eral Pershing were positive. He courte- ously refused to permit the Coblenz part of the program to be carried out in any way. We found that fifty billets had been actu- ally engaged for the Dorten officials by the French Mission in Coblenz, and it turned out that carloads of proclamations had been printed and were ready for distribu- tion. With its proposed ''Capital" in the hands of the "Ober-Prasident" and the of- ficials of the old regime, and with the for- bidden American area lying like a wedge between Mayence and the rich provinces to the north, the ''Dorten Revolution" GERMAN "SEPARATIST" MOVEMENTS 57 hung fire for a week. The conspiracy, however, had gone too far to be halted. On June 1st the Republic was finally ''de- clared"; proclamations were posted in all Occupied territory excepting the Ameri- can area. Wiesbaden was announced as the temporary capital; Dr. Dorten pro- claimed himself as the Chief of the Pro- visional Government and appealed to the Peace Conference at Paris to recognize the new State and to protect the authors of the movement from punishment for treason. Evidence that the "Revolution" had no popular support began to come from every direction. Even before the 1st of June the revolutionary plans had leaked out and strikes and other demonstrations of pro- test were organized by the population in various cities. When the Dorten Cabinet was announced the list of names was found to be quite different from that brought to Coblenz in the early morning hours of the 22d of May. Not one prominent member of the Centrum party, to which belong a large majority of the Rhinelanders, was in the new Cabinet. In many places the proc- 58 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE lamations were torn down by the inhabi- tants. On the 3d of June a counter-proc- lamation appeared in the German newspa- pers bitterly denouncing the ** discord shown in the rsmks of the Rhinelanders in this the hardest hour of the German Ee- public," and signed by the Rhineland rep- resentatives of six of the great national parties headed by the Centrum party. On the 4th of June Dr. Dorten was "es- corted" and the other Ministers were ''ejected" from the Regierung's building in Wiesbaden, the latter being very roughly handled by the populace waiting outside. This practically ended the "first Dorten Rebellion," It never had a chance of success unless backed by allied bayo- nets. Soon after June 4th the doctor is- sued a statement in which he naively an- nounced that he would "permit the old of- ficials to remain in office for the present." The net result was to effectually kill the sentiment favorable to separation from Prussia which had undoubtedly existed amongst the Germans of the Rhineland. Since then, the separation from Prussia GERMAN "SEPARATIST" MOVEMENTS 59 has meant to the average Ehinelander a first step toward becoming a province of France. He is afraid of it. The failure of the policy entrusted to General Mangin and the need of a different policy which should quiet the fears of the German population became so evident that General Mangin was recalled a little later, and General Degoutte, a man inspiring confidence in every American who meets him, was placed in command of the French ** occupying ' ^ forces. It is significant that afterwards during the enthusiasm aroused by the ''occupation" of Frankfort the Paris journals urged that General Mangin replace General Degoutte in Mayence. Some of the papers even published rumors that the Government had decided to make this change. Dr. Dorten is still conspiring and has been repeatedly protected from official and unofficial persecution. He can bide his time, for French troops are scheduled to stay in the Ehineland at least fifteen years, and M. Millerand has declared French in- dependence of Anglo-Saxon policies. The §0 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACK demand for occupation of the Ruhr (which was temporarily negatived last April by Mr. Lloyd George's note regarding the Frankfort invasion) grows louder and louder in France. It is hinted that the bait of a Ehine-Westphalian state, strengthened economically at the expense of the rest of Germany by the coal of the Ruhr and the steel production of Essen, will bring a majority of the German popu- lation to support the next revolution. No power but the United States can halt the present march of events, which prom- ises to make France temporarily the mili- tary master of Europe, while the peace of the world becomes "a house of cards." CHAPTER IX IF WE ABANDON EUROPE Prophecy is always dangerous. It is es- pecially liable to error of detail when, as in the present European tangle, a thousand factors are working in obscure relations to each other toward the same general re- sult. That disaster is imminent no one can doubt, but it is beyond the power of the keenest vision to predict what form the catastrophe will take. If the brakes of an automobile give way on a steep hill, it is impossible to predict in advance what kind of a smash there will be. The ma- chine may turn over, climb a telegraph pole or run into another auto, but in spite of uncertainty as to where and when and how the catastrophe will come, there is no uncertainty as to the fact that it is inevi- table. In every European country financial in- solvency, economic stagnation, unemploy- 61 62 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE ment, starvation, misery, and social demor- alization have been reacting upon each other with deadly effect during the past year. These conditions are shaping the daily development of European politics, and those who have seen their effects near at hand have no doubt that there must be a tragic conclusion. So interlaced are the many factors, and so interacting are their causes and effects, that one can with diffi- culty classify them for intelligent analysis. The most obvious factors can perhaps be grouped under two headings — economic and military. The facts I have already given showing economic conditions in Eu- rope suggest that there is a ^'jumping-off place" in the financial road not far ahead. A British authority recently asserted that **the whole of Europe to-day is produc- ing not over one-half it is consuming." This may be an exaggeration. When I re- peated the statement to Dr. Leach, an American who has spent all his time dur- ing the past two years on official business in Italy, Servia, Poland and the other coun- tries of Eastern Europe, he was very pos- IF WE ABANDON EUROPE 63 itive that it was not exaggerated. He may have been over-impressed with life in those smaller countries which for more than a year have fought much and pro- duced little or nothing. The announced fact, however, that France, herself, dur- ing the first six months of this year im- ported $1,414,000,000 worth of merchan- dise more than she exported tends to confirm the Englishman's statement. Until the United States comes to the res- cue the nations of Europe, like the inhabi- tants of Mark Twain's village, must con- tinue their present attempt to ''live by tak- ing in each other's washing." Where this financial jugglery, which is partially con- cealing the helplessness of Europe, will end, and when it will end, is hard to pre- dict. That it will end in a crash is cer- tain, although it is possible the economic catastrophe will be obscured by an earlier social or political debacle. More than half the free gold of the world has been shifted to the United States. We have the lion's share of raw materials and if we do not quickly restore, at least par- (M WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE tially, the world's financial balance, our possession of the materials needed by Eu- rope plus our monopoly of the gold and credit, without which she is unable to pay us for those materials, will react with tell- ing effect on our own economic life. The huge favorable balance of our for- eign trade during the past eight months has undoubtedly involved large private credits from America to Europe, princi- pally to England, but these temporary loans are mere palliatives. They tend ul- timately to increase the difficulties of Eu- ropean buyers by forcing down exchange. Organized governmental supervision of credits and exchange can alone make pos- sible continued American exports on a scale sufficient to start industrial revival in Europe. It is, however, the recent political devel- opments in Europe which give us a real glimpse, as it were, of the future. Here one need not tax his imagination with prophecy. The reactionary militaristic movement which started, after America's intention to dissolve partnership with Eu- IF WE ABANDON EUROPE 65 rope seemed certain, and which has made such insidious progress during the past few months, points the moral of our de- linquency and suggests its tragic conse- quences. Belgium has been recently persuaded to sign a treaty with France, by the terms of which she agrees to maintain a field army of 500,000 men as compared with 100,000 men before the war. Italy has exchanged the liberalism of Premier Nitti for the extreme nationalism of Giolotti. Nitti recently declared — "I do not know if there is peace anywhere in the world, but there certainly is none in Europe. Around you, you see nothing but armies. While the war was still going on people said this would be the last war, but Germany's militarist spirit has been acquired by the peoples who overthrew Germany. Europe is alive with proposals of conquest, with eagerness to hoard raw mate- rials." Giolotti, who succeeded Nitti as Premier, concluded at Aix les Bains in September a secret agreement with France. Fiume as 66 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE well as the Dalmatian coast will pass ulti- mately to Italy, depriving the Jugo-Slavs of access to the sea. In return, Italy will never repeat her former protest against the French invasion of Frankfort. Poland, dazzled by hopes of more terri- tory, has cheerfully turned to military con- quest those energies which, if she is to re- main an independent nation, should be con- centrated on her well-nigh hopeless inter- nal problems. The Poles are a brave peo- ple. They have preserved their national hopes through centuries of discourage- ment. Unfortunately their genius seems better adapted to war than to peace. Po- litically they are ''many men of many minds" and they have never developed that capacity for compromise which has made democracy in other countries pos- sible. M. Paderewski struggled for more than a year to form a stable government. He finally resigned the Premiership and left Poland a broken-hearted man. Six- teen political parties are struggling for mastery in the Provisional Parliament of Poland. After a year of discussion not IF WE ABANDON EUROPE 67 even the introduction to the proposed Na- tional Constitution has been agreed upon. Considering the industrial prostration of Poland and her chaotic political condition, the encouragement given by France to Pol- ish military adventure seems very regret- table. And France — France is congratulating herself on the return to a ' * continental pol- icy"; M. Millerand has been elected Pres- ident of the Republic with unanimous ac- claim. Militaristic statesmen and journal- ists loudly assert that he has rescued France, and with her all of Europe, from the Anglo-Saxon peace domination to which M. Clemenceau yielded so weakly. Through the Belgian Treaty of alliance, through the Italian ''Agreement" of Aix les Bains, and through the establishment of a French dominated military Poland on G'ermany's eastern frontier, he has made France for the moment what Germany was before the war — the dominating military power of Europe. The well-known American war corres- pondent, Frank Simonds, in a long newspa- 68 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE per article dated September 26, congratu- lates the French nation on its final disen- tanglement from the peace propositions of Wilson and Lloyd George. He concludes — **A11 in all, the French situation is better diplomatically speaking than at any time since the armistice, and this is due unmis- takably to the return of Millerand to the system which Clemenceau endeavored to follow at the Paris Conference but aban- doned under Anglo-Saxon pressure." This popular writer sums up the blessings conferred on France by the Millerand di- plomacy as follows : ' ' She has finally sub- stituted a Continental for an Anglo-Saxon policy — she has regained her freedom of action by her old-fashioned bargains with the Belgians, the. Poles and the Italians. ' * Yet this same correspondent was eighteen months ago writing from Europe the most fervent hopes for the new Internationalism and the most fulsome praise of the peace ideals of President Wilson and Lloyd George. I have no quarrel with this writer's IF WE ABANDON EUROPE 68 change of opinion. I have quoted him merely to emphasize by contrast the change in European opinion as well as pol- icy which has taken place since America withdrew from the European ** settle- ment." It is another stage passed in weaning the war-weary masses of Europe from those idealists who seemed all-power- ful at the end of 1918. In America as well our people have been almost persuaded that we may well leave European affairs alone. It now only remains to convince them that it will save us much expense and trouble if France will reorganize Europe on the old system of military alliances, ** strategic frontiers" and ''balance of power," which has for hundreds of years given men of ''blood and iron" a chance to show their worth. It was just so that Metternich, after the Napoleonic wars, finding himself unable to directly oppose the demand for a new In- ternationalism, gave way at first and then with consummate skill led the unpractical idealists gradually around a circle to that TO WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE Imperialistic peace which made possible Bismarck, Hindenburg and the great world war. Now as then, the friends of peace are silenced, and on the Continent, at least, there is little chance they will be heard from again unless America, by joining the League of Nations, reopens the discus- sion. All the cynics, pessimists and sin- cere militarists of Europe are rejoicing with the French over the successful launch- ing of the Millerand policy. But what a prospect! Such a military combination maj^ bring glory — for the mo- ment — it may bring revenge, but it cannot bring safety. Looked at even from the Chauvinist's viewpoint, this reenthrone- ment of the god of war is sure to prove a Frankenstein. Consider the situation. A war-ruined France, with the aid of lit- tle Belgium, poverty-stricken Italy, and deluded Poland, sets up a military domina- tion of Europe, while a Brobdingnagian Russia struggling sullenly toward re- birth nurses an ever growing desire for re- venge, and a Germany more powerful po- IF WE ABANDON EUROPE 71 tentially than this new military alliance awaits her opportunity. One hundred and sixty million Slavs will soon emerge from that same melting pot which gave Napo- leon his unconquerable armies and, backed, it may be, by untold millions of Asiatics, will find a Europe returned to the doctrine of ** blood and iron." They may find a Germany driven by desperation into their partnership. Whether Europe is to suffer a Bolshevik inundation or face the chal- lenge of a Napoleonic conquest, the stage is certainly being set for a conflagration from which the United States will be un- able to stand aloof. No one can predict the exact nature of the catastrophe now rushing upon Europe, but a catastrophe is inevitable and not far away, unless we bring to Europe our finan- cial support and the irresistible moral lead- ership which this support insures. CHAPTER X THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS During the last week of July, 1914, when a world war seemed inevitable, Lord Grey endeavored to improvise a League of Na- tions. It was then too late. Afterwards, through all the agonies of the great strug- gle, people fed their courage on talk of a league to prevent future wars, — a ' * League of Nations" which should be organized as soon as peace were come ; and we, in Amer- ica, talked of this louder than any of the rest. During the first six months of the armis- tice we showed every sign of making good, not only on our moral obligation to Eu- rope, but on our definite assurance given during the war to four million young Americans and to their parents, that this should be a ''war to end wars." Every one then regarded the character of the 72 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 73 "settlement" as of equal importance with winning the war. At the Peace Conference the executive half of our government joined in creating the plan for a new kind of peace, and Eu- rope, never dreaming that America was capable of deserting in the hour of need, let President Wilson build into this new international structure the best of Ameri- can ideals. Often in Paris, when states- men hesitated, the people themselves forced their representatives to follow American leadership. The Covenant of the League of Nations is in the main a statement of old American ideals. By the same token, its practicability was always dependent upon the United States taking a leading part in its execution, especially during the crit- ical period of its infancy. The Covenant of the League of Nations is neither complete nor perfect. No one pretends that it is. It was built as a bridge, — primarily as a bridge over which a ruined world might pass from the chaos of war to peace and early reconstruction. But beyond, it was to be a bridge leading 74 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE from the wom-ont mediaeval system of na- tional isolation, selfishness and intrigue which produced the war, to a better world where peace should be the joint responsi- bility of all civilized peoples. It was has- tily built, for its creators knew that only during that time of spiritual exaltation im- mediately following the war, could any ef- fective start be made toward realizing an ideal so contrary to the political habits of mankind. They knew that if this chance were missed, the centrifugal force of hos- tile nationalism would postpone any prac- tical steps for a League until war was again upon us — and again it was too late. In the story of the '^Arkansas Trav- eler,'^ the ** cracker" sitting under his leaky roof explained that when it didn't rain, there was no use of mending it, and when it rained, he couldn't mend it. In times of peace, the need of a League seems small compared with the national sacrifices entailed. When war brews, it is too late. So President Wilson and the most far- seeing of the European statesmen created the Covenant of the League of Nations as a THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 75 Magna Charta of the new internationalism, and during that period when selfishness and ambition were momentarily stilled by the bitter memories of war, they committed most of the nations of the world to its maintenance and development. America's withdrawal destroyed their work. The League of Nations still exists, but in name only. It is a bridge with the central arch — American participation — gone. It was a disingenuous taunt that **the League broke down at its first test in Po- land." Every one knows that there is no effective League without the United States. Certain European statesmen are bravely maintaining its shadow, hoping that we will come in at the last and make it a real- ity, but until we join, the League is help- less as an agency for controlling the wild horses of war. In the past, Europe has looked upon our American peace ideals as Utopian. There is a bitter irony, therefore, in this somer- sault of ours. After thirty-one nations agreed without reservation to accept the League's slight restrictions upon their 76 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE right to make war ''at the drop of the hat," the United States refused. History will not ask who was responsible for this refusal. If we persist, America as a nation will for all time stand accused at the bar of civilization, and by future gen- erations of Americans as well, of having deserted its allies and committed a crime against the peace of the world. CHAPTER XI THE RESERVATIONS As to the Senate "reservations** I have never been able to satisfy myself regard- ing the exact aims or real motives which inspired them. I have read and re-read the Covenant of the League of Nations with the ** reservations" before me. I could find nothing in them which would stamp as foolish or unpatriotic those 41 nations who have signed without reserva- tions. All of those nations have constitu- tions essentially the same as ours, at least as regards the responsibility of their Par- liaments for declaring peace and war or sending troops abroad. No one in any of these countries, not even the politician who is everywhere seeking political capital, has arisen since the Covenant was signed to accuse his Government of ** signing away the country's freedom." 7T 78 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE In general, I am inclined to accept Pres- ident Wilson's statement that — * * Those who drew the Covenant of the Lea^e were careful that it should contain nothing which interfered with or impaired the constitutional arrangements of any of the great nations which are to constitute its members. ' ' Does it not seem incredible that a Peace Commission in which the best legal minds of all nations joined would put into the most important document ever written — a document on which the peace of the world must hang for many years — those crude at- tacks on the national constitutions of its members which we are asked to believe lie concealed in the Covenant of the League? And suppose the provisions of this docu- ment did violate our Constitution. It would have no effect. Their inclusion might hurt the Covenant — it could not tou(^h our Constitution. Every schoolboy knows that no President by signing and no Congress by ratif>dng any agreement can change our Constitution one iota. It can THE RESERVATIONS 79 be changed only by amendment in a pre- scribed manner. The claim that these ** reservations" save us from some kind of slavery to Eu- rope — from being obliged to declare war or send troops abroad against our will — seems ridiculous in view of the perfectly plain stipulations in the Treaty that all such de- cisions must be by unanimous vote of the ''council." Since the Covenant of the League also provides that we shall always have one representative in the council, no important action can be taken mthout the vote of the United States. In Article X the signing nations agree to respect each other's territorial integrity and independ- ence. In case of violation, the action of the League which, as noted before, must be approved by the American representative, can go no further than ''advising" with the principal governments as to what ac- tion shall be taken. I will not go into more detail since the "reservations" have been discussed end- lessly in the public press. American law- 80 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE yers invented these "reservations" and lawj^ers can best discuss them. My own willingness to see the United States take a chance along with the 41 other nations is founded on certain general considerations. The United States of all nations can least be *' enslaved" or bullied by a League of Nations of which it is a member. The idea seems laughable to one who has expe- rienced the overpowering, not to say un- due, influence possessed by any representa- tive of America sitting in European coun- cils. American power and material wealth are the hope of Europe. They are always increasing as compared with Europe. If they do not give America the power to bully other nations they certainly insure that anything touching the interests of the United States will be suggested only after making sure it will be agreeable to us. As a matter of fact, no great nation is or ever will be bulHed or enslaved by fellow mem- bers of a " Peace League. ' ' The voluntary nature of a League of Nations obliges it for the sake of self-preservation to respect the feelings and interests of its members. THE RESERVATIONS 81 As I said before, the Covenant of the League of Nations is only a bridge. It is not complete — it is a skeleton which mostly expresses principles and aspirations. Filling in the details necessary to make a real League was expected to follow actual experience and later discussion. In that process of building a League the United States would be bomid to have a prepon- derant voice. Certainly on matters touch- ing American interests, the word of Amer- ica would be unchallenged. The League of Nations could be anything we chose to make it. This applies to new details still to be worked out as well as old implications which we might wish to clear up in such a way that their relation to our laws and pol- icies would be surely understood. I do not believe that any responsible man in Amer- ica would have voted to withhold our aid from dying Europe during two mortal years had he realized as I do, and as every one who has represented American inter- ests in Europe during this period does, that all modifications desired by the people of the United States could easily have been 82 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE put into the charter of the League in plain language at its first session. If the Senators were unwilling to take this chance, President Wilson had even greater reason to doubt the possibility of adding to the Covenant those positive reg- ulations which he regarded as the very core of the peace guarantees, if they were once eliminated by the terms of American ratification. It is easier to tear down than to build up in such cases. Changes such as those aimed at by the ''reservations'* which tend to weaken the League would meet little opposition from other members, but their willingness to circumscribe na- tional freedom of action in the interest of peace was at its maximum when the Treaty was signed and the President had ample reason to fear that any attempt to strengthen the restrictive provisions at a later date would prove fruitless. I cannot, however, believe that the grounds given on either side were sufficient to warrant killing the Treaty at a time when the need of immediate American par- ticipation was so evident and so extreme. THE RESERVATIONS 83 Personally I would have preferred ratifica- tion without reservations, leaving ** clarifi- cation" to be effected by the United States after it became a member of the League, but I regret that the President refused to accept the modified Treaty when it became evident that the choice lay between ratifica- tion with the ''Lodge reservations" or no ratification at all. CHAPTER XII THE "LABOR SECTION" OF THE TREATY It has been suggested to me that the Eu- ropean diplomat is again back **on the job" and that this ancient tribe will in- trigue as of old until war is the only solu- tion ; so that neither our help nor that of a League will avail to prevent war as long as the real issues are in the hands of the same type of men who have played the game for centuries. It may be admitted that ambi- tious, intriguing statesmen will be in con- trol of the foreign policies of many Euro- pean nations, but a new force has appeared which is likely to change very materially the course of events. Labor representing the masses in every country has become conscious of its power — it is becoming mili- tantly conscious. The workers know full well they have been the pawns in the game of international intrigue and have always been the losers and sufferers by war. 84 "LABOR. SECTION" OP THE TREATY 85 They have had the will and they are now acquiring the power to say "No" to their rulers. I believe that during the era just ahead labor will in all countries paralyze the hands of militaristic politicians and its opinion will stand as a valid threat and warning to statesmen, such as Mr. Lloyd George, who heed the signs of the times. My confidence in the possibility of build- ing at this time a real League of Nations is founded upon two things — the horror of war which exists among the masses of Eu- rope, and the emergence of labor as an effective force in national councils. But why, then, it may be asked, is it necessary for America to join the League of Nations and participate in European affairs'? Why may not the solution be left entirely to labor! The answer is, that only labor responsible and united can accomplish any- thing. Without our stabilizing influence at this moment, labor in many countries is likely to acquire Bolshevik characteristics which will only increase the difficulties of the world settlement. The provisions of the ''Labor Section" of the Treaty, Sa WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE strengthened by our adhesion, will be a great step toward peace as well as indus- trial justice. In Chapter I of the labor section, a permanent conference is estab- lished for the improvement of labor condi- tions, and Articles 388-399 set up a perma- nent organization under the League to ac- complish the objects stated. In Article 437 the following subjects of special and urgent importance are suggested for the attention of this new labor conference : The right of association. The payment of an adequate wage. The eight-hour day. The weekly day of rest. The abolition of child labor. Equal pay for women. The conditions of labor. Here we find a benevolent international- ization of the labor movement tied tightly to the League of Nations. This will tend to unify labor conditions in competing countries; it should give a constructive character to that struggle toward fairer "LABOR SECTION" OF THE TREATY 87 division of the world's prosperity and hap- piness, which most men recognize as in- evitable and desirable; it will ensure to those who must fight and die in every war the influence over international affairs to which they are entitled. Few intelligent men will regret the creation of a confer- ence which is sure to increase the sense of responsibility as it does the power of labor, and no one but a reactionary can oppose the League of Nations because it contains the labor section. CHAPTER XIII AMERICA'S TASK The American people should not let the honeyed words of diplomacy conceal the fact that the masses in Europe are begin- ning to hate America. This is a fact. They see us safe by the accident of dis- tance, and rich through their misfortunes. When we have carried through our policy of ** America for Americans" and ''Why should we trouble ourselves over Europe's troubles" to its squalid end, we shall find one bond uniting all Europe — hatred of America. It is not too late to save the situation, though it soon will be. Already the task has been made immensely more difficult by a year of delay. Millions have died dur- ing this year — untold millions have en- dured misery and starvation, and thou- sands upon thousands have turned in des- peration to the Bolshevik faith. 88 AMERICA'S TASK 89 As to what we are called upon to do, it seems to me very clear : 1st — Katify the Treaty and the Covenant and bring American leadership to the building of a real League of Nations. 2d — Relieve the fears of France and assist the righteous forces in every country to drive from their chancelleries all the agents of military ambition and revenge. 3d — Assume that financial leadership which will be gladly accorded us, and back with the enormous wealth acquired during the war by the United States some carefully worked out plan for the financial salvation of Europe. 4th — Forgive France all the debts she owes the United States as a result of the war. Not forgive ! I cannot regard this as an act of charity. It would represent no more than our share of the ''settlement." France is entitled to and has sore need of all the indemnity provided in the Treaty of Versailles. Hence, if we must in the in- terest of world restoration join Great Britain in advising France to accept a smaller indemnity from Germany, we will 90 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE be hypocrites, indeed, if we permit the full burden of this self-abnegation to fall on the most sorely wounded of our allies. We cannot do less than accept cancella- tion of the Franco-American loans as our share of the allied war burden. I am told that this suggestion is very unpopular in America. This is quite natural, but just as the American people cheerfully spent billions for winning the war when they really sensed its meaning, so I believe they would cheerfully relieve France of this added burden if they knew what it meant toward the winning of a lasting peace. We did not enter the war for nearly three years because we did not realize un- til then that the issues were our own. When it dawned on us that the allies were fighting 'Our battles, as well as their own, many Americans regretted that we had not gone in before. Our loans to France are a small part of the money we would have spent had we entered the war a year ear- lier. France spent it for us, and in addi- tion sent to their death during that year a full half million of her young men in place AMERICA'S TASK 91 of an equal number of American boys who would now be buried in foreign soil. I have yet to meet an American in close touch with the details of the French and European financial situation who has not agreed with the above conclusion. I have talked with the most practical, unsenti- mental bankers and business men. I have in mind one man in particular, a very prominent American financier, who told me that when he came to Paris he would have scoffed at the suggestion that France be relieved of any part of the American loans. After six months' ofificial work in European capitals, he was converted to not only the justice but the necessity of such action on the part of America. He added in a discouraged tone — *'But how can you get the real facts to the 100,000,000 people at home?" I cannot, however, agree with Keynes that the American loans to Great Britain should also be canceled. The conditions are very different and the compelling argu- ments for relieving France do not apply to Great Britain. It is after all a business 92 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE proposition. France has suffered from an "impairment of capital," as the bankers would say, to a far greater extent than Great Britain. In addition if a rational settlement is made with Germany the loss of cash indemnity by France will be out of all proportion to that of the other allies. Great Britain has already obtained advan- tages from the war whose value for her future is incalculable. The threat to Great Britain's carrying trade which just before the war was very menacing has been removed and the German Merchant Fleet has been very largely transferred to her. The specter of a growing German navy has vanished. The British Colonial Empire has been immensely strengthened at the expense of Germany, and the re- moval of German intrigue from the poli- tics of the near East has relieved a former anxiety for the safety of India. Finally, as concerns relations between France and Germany, it is England's pol- icy I have advocated in this book. If we enter the League of Nations, we shall find that we must join England in urging upon AMERICA'S TASK 93 France a modification of her claims under the Versailles Treaty. If we thus ask her to give up that which is justly hers, the benefit of her sacrifices will accrue to Eng- land as well as to ourselves and the rest of the world. It will be the first step to- ward general industrial revival. No one denies that Great Britain played a major part in winning the war. The money cost to her was terrific. She has a staggering debt and immense economic problems, but she also has the resources with which to meet those problems. Going back to the second point suggested above, a question will undoubtedly be raised as to the possibility of our reliev- ing the fear of France and thus reverse the militaristic pohcy to which this fear has led. The answer is contained in a statement made to me by a very prominent French statesman during the excitement over the opposition of Mr. Lloyd George to the new French policy. Said he — ''If America were to really come in and France felt that your country was committed to partnership in the settlement of Europe, 94 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE France would accept any advice America might offer." He meant this to be in con- trast with their unwillingness at that time to accept the advice of England. In spite of all that has been written to the contrary, American opinion was all- powerful at the Peace Conference. This was not from sentimental or personal rea- sons, but arose from two considerations — first, because we had no ''axes to grind" or favors to seek in the settlement; second, because it was evident that for years to come the financial salvation of Europe would depend upon American aid. Great Britain has weakened her influence with the continental nations by too much suc- cess in securing those results which she wished from the war. We obtained noth- ing and asked for nothing. The bankruptcy of Europe is so uni- versal and extreme that whether we will or no, America will sooner or later be forced to act as an informal ''receiver." As such "receiver" we shall be obliged for financial security to insist upon peace and the adoption of policies which will permit AMERICA'S TASK (K; tlie energies of all nations to be devoted to industry. There is not an important nation in Europe will dare to defy our ex- pressed opinion. After all, a majority of the French peo- ple long for peace. They have been con- verted to the Millerand policies by fear alone. They are not blind to the frailty of any military defense against Germany. Our joining the League of Nations and our evident intention to back only those na- tions which accept the development of that League as the basis of their foreign policy would instantly bring a feeling of safety to the French people. It would, I believe, be proper to make it a condition for canceling the French loans that such revisions of the Versailles Treaty be agreed upon as seem to the United States necessary for the peace of the world. Our whole-hearted acceptance of the League will have an equally decided ef- fect on the policy of Germany. That country to-day has a half dozen different policies. The people are hopelessly di- vided and their opinions distracted. One 96 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE element has used every possible means to keep arms and ammunition within reach, against hoped-for opportunities. Another is for throwing overboard without reserve, at least for the time, all that relates to warfare, both plans and equipment, in the hopes that thus the allies will be induced to permit economic revival. A third class, which has grown to huge proportions in nearly all parts of the German Empire, is composed of workmen, both extreme social- ists and moderates, who have a deadly ha- tred of the militaristic junkers of the old regime and will back all the disarmament plans of the allies with a fierce determina- tion to put it out of the power of their former rulers to execute a coup d'etat and lead them again to the slaughter. I asked the German Minister of Foreign Affairs as to a story I had heard of 5,000 aeroplanes taken to pieces and the parts scattered and concealed throughout Germany. He said that even if the German Government de- sired to do such a tiling, it would be im- possible — ''An operation of that kind on even a much smaller scale must employ AMERICA'S TASK 97 workmen, many of whom would jump at the chance to defeat the purpose 'of the Government. It could not be done in the first place, and if it were, detailed infor- mation would come to the allies from a thousand sources." There is a fourth class, including in its numbers many of the old aristocrats who hope and more than half expect that a wave of Bolshevism will sweep over the country. They believe that Germany could recover from such a period of anar- chy quicker than other continental nations, and when they say that Bolshevism would surely pass from Germany into France, their longing for revenge is evident in tone and gesture. The Germans are accustomed to study- ing facts and learning by experience. Be- fore the war, they knew better even than some of our allies the overwhelming re- sources possessed by the United States; they knew that in the production of the sinews of war we outranked any three of the European nations combined ; they knew vJ 98 WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE that we had half the coal of the world and produced nearly as much steel and iron as all Europe taken together; they knew how great was our monopoly of copper and other of the raw materials necessary for fighting. But they believed we would not fight. Now they know that we will fight and that we can fight, and I believe it is written large on every page of the hand- book of German diplomacy — ''No more wars unless America is surely on our side, . or at least is sure to maintain a benevo- ^0''^^ ' 1^^^ neutraKty." Without America the League of Na- tions is a puny, mechanical attempt to con- trol the passions of international hatred and ambition. Under the leadership of America the League of Nations would everywhere strengthen the hands of those men who desire to turn the national en- ergies permanently toward industry and cooperation rather than mutual destruc- tion. It would encourage the forces of de- mocracy, and would discourage that junker class which still in many countries hopes AMERICA'S TASK 99 to rebuild national slavery and its own power on a false patriotism and the hatred of other peoples. PEINTBD IN THE rNTTBD STATES OT AMEEICA UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. APR 17 ^9^' m 29 "• REC'D LD-LRL RENEWfiC JUM t JUN3 1872 Form L9-42m-8,'49(B5573)444 THE LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 000 779 499 3 D6^3 N87w