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FROM BOULOGNE TO AUSTERLITZ 
 
 1805 
 
THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN 
 SERIES 
 
 Crown Svo, doth^ copiously supplied with Maps and 
 Plans. Price ^s. net each. 
 
 I. SAARBRCCK to PARIS : The Franco- 
 German War. By Col. Sisson C. Pratt, 
 late R.A. 
 
 II. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877. By 
 Major F. Maurice. 
 
 III. FREDERICKSBURG: A STUDY IN 
 
 WAR, 1862. By Major G. W. Redway, 
 
 IV. THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA and 
 
 SOLFERINO, 1859. By Col. H. C. Wylly, C.B. 
 
 V. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. By Col. 
 Sisson C. Pratt, late R.A. 
 
 VI. THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 1866. 
 By Lt.-Col. G, J. R. Glunicke. 
 
 VII. THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN, 1813. By 
 
 Col. F. N. Maude, C.B., late R.E. 
 
 VIIL GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA, 
 
 1864 (The Wilderness Campaign). By Capt. 
 Vaughan Sawyer, Indian Army. 
 
 IX. THE JENA CAMPAIGN, 1806. By CoL. 
 F. N. Maude, C.B., late R.E. 
 
 X. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. By 
 
 Capt. F. R. Sedgwick, R.F.A. 
 
 XL THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1861-1862 
 (Bull Run to Malvern Hill). By Major G. W. 
 Redway. 
 
 XII. THE ULM CAMPAIGN. By CoL. F. N. 
 Maude, C.B., late R.E. 
 
 XIII. THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1863 
 
 (Chancellorsville and Gettysburg). By Col. 
 P. H. Dalbiac, C.B. 
 
 XIV. THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1862 
 
 (Cedar Run, Manassas, and Sharpsburg). By 
 E. W. Sheppard. 
 
 XV. NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY, 
 
 1796-1797 and 1800. By Lt.-Col. R. G. Burton. 
 
 XVI. THE CAMPAIGN IN MANCHURIA, 
 
 1904-1905. By Capt. F. R. Sedgwick, R.A. 
 
 X ^x. 
 
SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES. 
 
 No. 17 
 
 FROM BOULOGNE TO 
 AUSTERLITZ 
 
 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 By 
 
 LiEUT.-CoLONEL R. G. BURTON 
 
 Indian Ar?ny 
 WITH EIGHT MAPS AND PLANS 
 
 "All great nations learned their truth of words and strength of 
 thought in war ; they were nourished in war and wasted by peace ; 
 taught by war and deceived by peace ; trained by war and betrayed 
 by peace ; in a word, they are born in war and expired in peace." 
 
 RUSKIN. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 GEORGE ALLEN & COMPANY, LTD. 
 
 RUSKIN HOUSE, 44 and 45 RATHBONE PLACE 
 NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 1912 
 
 > i y i 
 
bcz^T 
 
 
 A«B« 
 
 ^// rights reserved 
 
 HENRY MORSE STEPHENS 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Europe in 1804-5 ..... i 
 
 The Peace of Amiens — The Invasion of England — German 
 Views on Invasion — The Third Coalition — Villeneuve's 
 Failure — Sea Power and Preparation for War — Patriotic 
 Spirit 
 
 CHAPTER n 
 
 Character of the Opposing Forces . . .10 
 
 The Grand Army — Infantry — Cavalry — Artillery — Charac- 
 teristics of the French — The French in Attack — French 
 Leaders — Napoleon — Youth of French Generals — 
 Napoleon's System of Work — The Austrian Army — The 
 Russians — Theatre of Operations — Comments 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 The Advance to the Rhine . . . .23 
 
 Napoleon's Plans — Plans of the Allies — Napoleon's 
 Preparations — Reconnaissance — Austrian Preparations — 
 The March to the Rhine — Proclamation to the Grand 
 Army — Passage of the Rhine — Comments 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 From the Rhine to Ulm . . . .36 
 
 Orders of 28th September — Diary of Events — Passage of 
 the Danube — Action in Wertingen — Action at Haslach — 
 The Enemy destroyed by Marches — The Circle completed 
 — Surrender of Mack — Comments 
 
 
vi CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 PAGE 
 
 From Ulm to Austerlitz . . . .51 
 
 Violation of Prussian Territory — Trafalgar — Napoleon's 
 Plans — Supply Arrangements — The Valley of the Danube 
 — French Movements — Situation of the Allies — Russian 
 Retreat — French Advance — Destruction of an Austrian 
 Column — The Russians cross the Danube — Battle of 
 Durrenstein — Entry into Vienna — General Situation — 
 Napoleon's Dispositions — Murat's Pursuit — Battle of 
 Hollabrunn — Advance to Brunn — Comments 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Operations in Italy and the Tyrol . . .72 
 
 Operations in Italy — Battle of Caldiero — Operations in the 
 Tyrol — Comments 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 The Battle of Austerlitz . . . '77 
 
 General Situation — The Field of Austerlitz — Movements of 
 the Allies — French Position — Napoleon's Orders — Plans of 
 the Allies — The Morning of 2nd December — Attack on the 
 French Right — Napoleon's Counter-stroke — Action on the 
 French Left — Repulse of Bagration — Destruction of the 
 Allied Left— The Battle ends— Pursuit— The Fruits of 
 Victory — Comments 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 The Causes of Success 
 
 99 
 
 MAPS AND PLANS 
 In Pocket — 
 
 From the Rhine to Ulm — From Ulm to Austerlitz — 
 Northern Italy and the Tyrol — Country round Austerlitz — 
 Battle of Caldiero — Battle of Austerlitz 
 
 In Text— 
 
 PVom Boulogne to the Rhine .... 25 
 
 Country round Ulm • • . . , 53 
 

 
 Napoleon's Campaign of 1805 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 EUROPE IN 1804-1805 
 
 The Peace of Amiens — The Invasion of England — German Views 
 on Invasion — The Third Coalition — Villeneuve's Failure — Sea 
 Power and Preparation for War — Patriotic Spirit 
 
 In sketching the events which led up to the campaign 
 of Austerlitz, in 1805, it is necessary to go back to May 
 The Peace 1803, when the Peace of Amiens came to an end. 
 of Amiens That peace could probably in no case have 
 remained lasting. The continued occupation of Malta 
 and Alexandria by England ; the toleration of a scurrilous . 
 press, directed against the First Consul, in London ; the -^ 
 British naval preparations — all these were calculated 
 to arouse the hostility of Napoleon, while territorial 
 acquisitions by France in Genoa and Piedmont, and the 
 character of the First Consul himself, were not factors 
 which made for the maintenance of peace. 
 
 The renewal of hostilities with England marked the 
 initiation of Napoleon's project for the invasion of that 
 The country; for this purpose the Grand Army 
 
 Invasion of was assembled on the shores of the Channel, 
 England ^^^ r^ corps under Bernadotte was stationed 
 in Holland. In July 1803 the First Consul established his 
 famous " Continental System " for the exclusion of British 
 trade from the continent of Europe ; in March 1804 the 
 seizure and execution of the Due d'Enijhien aroused the 
 

 t € 
 
 t r r r 
 
 2:"rr,-:i^.AP0LEO?srS CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 horror and indignation of all the dynasties of the 
 Continent. 
 
 In May, Napoleon was crowned Emperor of the French, 
 thus consolidating his military and political power in the 
 state. He had now at length supreme authority, both to 
 direct policy and to organise the means to carry it into 
 effect. By July he had assembled a numerous and well- 
 equipped army for the invasion of England, and his 
 troops in camp at Boulogne swore allegiance to the 
 newly made Emperor, who was seated in the iron chair of 
 Dagobert, in the midst of his vast camp, from whence in 
 the misty distance he could discern, in imagination if not 
 in reality, those white cliffs of Albion which marked the 
 goal of his ambitions. From Boulogne he proceeded to 
 Aachen, the ancient capital of Charlemagne, his pre- 
 decessor in the Empire of the West a thousand years 
 before. Nothing but the humbling of England appeared 
 wanting to the triumph of his genius and ambition, 
 and to the establishment of almost illimitable power. 
 " Masters of the Channel for six hours, we are masters of 
 :he world," wrote the Emperor, and there appears to be 
 little doubt that his intention of invading England was 
 real, although many historians have averred the contrary. 
 Certainly, the preparations for a descent were equally 
 efficacious for carrying on a Continental war, which, 
 according to many, was the intention he cloaked under 
 his scheme of invasion. In pursuance of this scheme he 
 had assembled an army of 150,000 men on the shores of 
 the Channel, and had collected a large number of flat- 
 bottomed boats and other transports to convey them to 
 the English coast. The French coast was fortified 
 against English attacks, and every preparation was made 
 for the expedition, down to the smallest detail. 
 
 The clearance of the Channel or the absence of the 
 
EUROPE IN 1804-1805 
 
 English fleet was all that was wanted for the project to 
 be put into execution ; and for this purpose Napoleon 
 had organised a great fleet, at first under command of 
 Latouche Treville, and subsequently under Villeneuve. 
 This squadron was to draw off the English fleet to the 
 West Indies, while a second squadron, under Gauteaume, 
 which was in Brest harbour, would convey Augereau's 
 division to Ireland. 
 
 Napoleon considered that he would be able to destroy 
 the shipyards of Plymouth and Portsmouth, and enter 
 London in three weeks, there to dictate terms of peace. 
 In Ireland he would find a disloyal population eager to 
 welcome any enemies of England, and ready to raise the 
 flag of revolution. It is recorded that an Irish exile 
 named O'Connor, a general of division in Augereau's army, 
 had several interviews with Napoleon in May 1805, and 
 endeavoured to persuade him that the best way to conquer 
 England was to go first to Ireland. It was agreed that 
 all the English in Ireland should be exterminated. That 
 the danger in Ireland was real is shown by the events 
 of 1798, when a raiding party of 1000 landed in that 
 country without opposition after a sixteen days' voyage, 
 having escaped the observation of the English navy. 
 Four times they defeated British forces opposed to them ; 
 captured 11 guns, and for nearly three weeks engaged 
 the attention of all the troops in Ireland, some 10,000 men. 
 
 Napoleon was not the last to entertain ideas as to the 
 feasibility of the invasion of England ; and in this con- 
 nection, and to throw some light on the views of the 
 General Staff in Berlin, the following passage from the 
 work of the late Count Yorck von Wartenburg ^ is of 
 considerable interest : — 
 
 ^ "Napoleon as a General." By Count Yorck von Wartenburg 
 (Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co.). 
 
4 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 " This plan shows his genius at its full height. The idea 
 which underlay his landing was perfectly correct ; it was 
 German ^ putting into practice of the highest rules of 
 Views on war, namely, ' try to put your strong points as 
 Invasion ^o time and space against the enemy's weak 
 points.' Napoleon's strength lay in his army and war 
 on land ; England's strength consisted in its fleet and in 
 war at sea ; to attack her in such a way that his strength 
 might be brought to bear was, therefore, assuredly good 
 strategy. Napoleon has been condemned because the 
 execution of his plan is said to have been impossible. 
 But if we remember all that has been declared impossible 
 in the history of the world by contemporaries, and yet 
 was achieved by the power of genius, who can say that 
 a landing of his army in England would have been an 
 impossibility for Napoleon ? Hannibal's great plan of 
 crossing the Alps and attacking Rome in Italy and 
 conquering it there, would perhaps have been considered 
 impossible now had it remained a plan only. 
 
 " The fact that this landing was not effected, and 
 England not conquered, is generally considered by 
 historians as the salvation of Europe, for one country 
 at least escaped Napoleon's domination. I do not share 
 this opinion. The States of the Continent suffered at the 
 time too severely and directly from Napoleon's tyranny 
 for them to realise that England had not less exclusively, 
 though in a more practical and enduring manner, its own 
 interests in view, and by no means those of Europe at that 
 time. Had Napoleon entered England at the head of his 
 army, his strength would on the one hand have been 
 weakened thereby, and the Continent would have obtained 
 greater freedom of action, and on the other hand England, 
 shaken to its very foundations at home, would not have 
 been able to concentrate, as it did, almost the whole 
 
EUROPE IN 1804-1805 
 
 colonial possessions of the world in its own hands, and 
 the Continental powers would nowadays have a more 
 equal share of them." This passage is interesting and 
 instructive, even though the author's reasoning may not 
 be entirely logical, for it indicates the trend of Teutonic 
 thought with regard to our Colonial Empire. 
 
 The execution of the Due d'Enghien in March 1804 
 had roused the governments of Europe against Napoleon, 
 but only the Tsar Alexander had broken off diplomatic 
 relations in consequence. The French Emperor still 
 awaited on the shore of the English Channel the favour- 
 able moment for the invasion of England. His plans, 
 however, suffered a severe blow in the death of Latouche 
 Treville, his most competent admiral, who was succeeded 
 by Villeneuve, an able commander, but timid and lacking 
 in enthusiasm. 
 
 In April 1805 Villeneuve sailed for the West Indies, 
 drawing Nelson and the English fleet after him, and 
 returning in the ensuing month to European waters, 
 whither he was followed by the ships of England. 
 
 In the meantime the newly made Emperor had been 
 crowned King of Italy at Milan ; and he had concluded 
 The Third negotiations with Prussia, under the terms of 
 CoaUtion which the Prussian troops in Hanover were 
 relieved by the French army. Pitt's opportunity for 
 the formation of a third coalition had now arrived. 
 Austria, alarmed by the augmentation of the French 
 army in Italy on the occasion of Napoleon's coronation 
 at the capital of Lombardy, was strengthening her forces 
 and negotiating with Russia for co-operation in the 
 coming war. The Peace of Luneville had left Austria 
 crippled, with her power and prestige in the councils of 
 Europe greatly diminished. Bvit Napoleon's prepara- 
 tions for the invasion of England, leading him to con- 
 
6 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 centrate his attention on that enterprise, appeared to 
 afford her an opportunity of recovering her lost provinces. 
 Already, in October, a sanitary cordon was established on 
 the Austrian frontiers of Italy and Switzerland, nominally 
 for the exclusion of yellow fever, which had broken out in 
 Spain, but in reality to cover ulterior designs. And when 
 the French troops assembled for Napoleon's coronation 
 at Milan, in May 1805, Austria increased her forces in 
 Carinthia and the Venetian provinces. 
 
 Pitt, meanwhile, was engaged in forming a third 
 coalition with Russia, Austria, Sweden and Naples against 
 France. Austr ia was weak in military strength, owing to 
 the reorganisation tha t was in progi-pss in her army, and 
 it wa s agreed that Rus sia should put two armies into the 
 field . ^a^eden^ jwa s of little account, and in September 
 Naples came to terms^withJhsJErench Emperor. 
 
 ButT^apoleon was fully aware of what was going on, 
 and had already turned his eyes towards the Rhine and 
 Danube. His correspondence with his foreign minister, 
 Talleyrand, shows that he contemplated the possibility 
 of a land campaign. Early in August 1805 the idea 
 gained strength, and on the 28rd he ^vrote to Talleyrand 
 from Boulogne that his squadron had left Ferrol, and if it 
 joined the Brest squadron, and entered the Channel, he 
 would yet be master of England. Failing in the plan of 
 invasion, he would, he said, strike his camp, and march 
 to Germany with 200,000 men. He would not lay down 
 his arms until he had Naples and Venice, and had so 
 enlarged the territories of the Elector of Bavaria that he 
 would have nothing more to fear from Austria. 
 
 Villeneuve's orders were to assemble the French and 
 Villeneuve's Spanish fleets and set sail from Ferrol. He 
 Failure -yvas to sweep the Channel, raise the blockade of 
 Brest, and so clear the passage for Napoleon's army of 
 
EUROPE IN 1804-1805 
 
 invasion. But Villeneuve was wanting in energy and 
 enterprise ; on the report that an English fleet was 
 approaching, he returned to safe harbourage at Cadiz, 
 and before the end of the month Napoleon's Grand Army 
 was on the march to the Rhine. 
 
 The lessons of this period are mainly those of the 
 influence of sea power, and the necessity of preparation 
 for war in time of peace. We see that, without 
 command of the sea, Napoleon could accom- 
 plish nothing towards the invasion of England. We also 
 perceive that, failing the maintenance of that command, 
 England would have been a helpless prey in the absence 
 of sufficient strength of land forces. But if command 
 of the sea conferred immunity from invasion, it proved 
 in no way decisive. England, having no army to speak 
 of, could do but little injury to a Continental nation ; 
 Trafalgar did not eclipse Austerlitz. Great issues are 
 fought out on land, and Napoleon was finally conquered 
 at Leipzig and Waterloo. What would have happened 
 had the English fleet been destroyed ? It is placing the 
 issue on one chance to have no second line of defence in 
 case of defeat at sea. It is like fighting a battle with all 
 your troops in the first line, and no reserve. 
 
 Napoleon himself said : "A nation is very foolish 
 when she has no land forces to rely upon in the event of 
 Preparation ^ picked and warlike army of 100,000 men 
 for War arriving in her midst." It has been said and 
 thought by the ignorant that a half-trained force or the 
 uprising of the people would suffice to deal with invasion. 
 But what could such effect against an army of trained 
 and disciplined warriors ? What has it ever effected — 
 as recorded in the history of the world ? " From the 
 beginning of the formation of national entities until the 
 present time the idea of popular uprisings to repulse 
 
8 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 foreign invaders has ever been a universal conceit, an 
 indelible vanity that neither the erosion of ages has 
 erased, nor the deluge of blood issuing from them has 
 washed away. Yet, while there exists not an age that has 
 not resounded with the triumphant hoof -beats of invading 
 armies, the tmth is there is not a single instance in the 
 whole military history of the world where the mobile 
 armies of a warlike race have been destroyed or defeated 
 by the popular uprisings of a militantly decadent state." ^ 
 Preparation does not imply merely the provision of 
 armed forces and armament, " neither is money the sinews 
 Patriotic of war, if the sinews of men's arms in base and 
 Spirit effeminate people are failing." ^ ice^aration 
 
 includ es tj bg^cultivation of patriotic feeling, the direction 
 of the thoughts of the people into unselfish and pure 
 %annels, where they w[ll jplace ideas of nationality and 
 the love of country before the meaner instincts of personal 
 comfort. For man usJihapririiary instrunaent-in-war^and 
 no number of guns , armaments- or ' -dreaxhiaughts ' ' can 
 suppIyTHe^jvant jdI the- imti^nal and patriotic spirit of 
 self-sacrifice. AJL history tells the same tale. Ancient 
 E,ome^ii_d._Spartajwere fr^e and strong for many ages, 
 thanks to their armies drawn from the people, but they 
 declined when they put their trust in mercenary troops. 
 Gibbon tells us ; " The theory of war was not more 
 familiar to the camp of Csesar and Trajan than to those 
 of Justinian and Maurice. The iron of Tuscany or 
 Pbntus still received the keenest temper from the skill 
 of the Byzantine workmen. In the construction and 
 use of ships, engines and fortifications the barbarians 
 admired the superior ingenuity of a people whom they 
 so often vanquished in the field. The science of tactics, 
 
 * "The Valour of Ignorance." Homer Lea. 
 ^ Francis Bacon, 
 
EUROPE IN 1804-1805 
 
 the orders, the evolutions, the stratagems of antiquity, 
 was transcribed and studied in the books of the Greeks 
 and Romans. But the soHtude or degeneracy of the 
 provinces could no longer supply a race of men to handle 
 those weapons, to guard those walls, to navigate those 
 ships and to reduce the theory of war to bold and 
 successful practice." * 
 
 It jwas^ the patriotism of the French people, their 
 rnilitary spirit and love of glory, that enabled them under 
 Napoleon to conquer half Europe, and to carry their arms 
 in triumph from Madrid to Moscow, It was the steady 
 patriotism of the English, in spite of the presence in their 
 midst of unpatriotic factions, that gave them the mastery 
 of the sea, led them for twenty years to contend with the 
 tyranny of Napoleon, and built up their great Colonial 
 Empire. 
 
 ^ " Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire." 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 CHARACTER OF THE OPPOSING FORCES 
 
 The Grand Army — Infantry — Cavalry — Artillery — Characteristics of 
 the French — The French in Attack — French Leaders — Napoleon 
 — Youth of French Generals — Napoleon's System of Work — 
 The Austrian Army — The Russians — Theatre of Operations — 
 Comments 
 
 Napoleon had 
 
 available something over 200,000 
 
 men. 
 
 with 300 guns, organised as follows into 
 
 the Grand Army. 
 
 
 The 
 
 Emperor 
 
 
 
 
 Chief of the Staff, Berthiei 
 
 
 
 The Guard 
 
 
 Bessieres 
 Infantry 
 Divisions 
 
 Cavalry 
 Divisions 
 
 6ooo 
 
 First Corps 
 
 Bernadotte 
 
 Drouet 
 Rivaud 
 
 Kellermann 
 
 1 85O00 
 
 Second Corps 
 
 Marmont 
 
 Boudet 
 
 Grouchy 
 
 Dumonceau 
 
 Lacoste 
 
 2IjOOO 
 
 Third Corps 
 
 Davout 
 
 Bisson 
 Friant 
 Gudin 
 
 Vialannes 
 
 27,000 
 
 Fourth Corps 
 
 Soult 
 
 St Hilaire 
 Vandamme 
 Legrand 
 Suchet 
 
 Margaron 
 
 41,000 
 
 Fifth Corps 
 
 Lannes 
 
 Oudinot 
 Gazan 
 
 Treilhard 
 
 18,000 
 
 Sixth Corps 
 
 Ney 
 
 Dupont 
 Loison 
 Malher 
 Cuirassiers 
 
 Tilly 
 Dragoons 
 
 24,000 
 
 Cavalry Reserve 
 
 Murat 
 
 Nansouty 
 d'Hautpoul 
 
 Klein 
 Walther 
 
 
 
 
 Dis7nounied Di 
 
 Beaumont 
 Bouvrier 
 
 •agoons 
 
 
 
 
 Baraguey d'Hilliers -1 
 
 22,000 
 
 10 
 
CHARACTER OF THE OPPOSING FORCES ii 
 
 The Seventh Corps, under Augereau, 14,000 men, was 
 in process of formation. The Bavarians (20,000), Wurtem- 
 burgers and Baden Contingent numbered together 28,000, 
 making a total of 219,000 men. Bernadotte was in 
 Hanover ; Marmont's Corps round Utrecht, in Holland. 
 He had in addition 50,000 men and 100 guns in Italy 
 under Massena's command, while there was also a force 
 of 20,000 under St Cyr at Naples, which was able to 
 join Massena on conclusion of a treaty of neutrality in 
 September. 
 
 Napoleon himself characterised the Grand Army as 
 "the finest army that has ever existed." It is probable 
 that this estimate was justified. We sear ch inj yain in the 
 pages of history for the record of an army so well organised, 
 trained and commanded, and inspired by a spirit so 
 warlike and patriotic. It had been in camp undergoing 
 continuous training for eighteehT months, and had attained 
 a high standard of efficiency in every respect, whilst it had 
 the great advantage of being trained by those who would 
 lead it in war. While the ranks were filled with young 
 men, there was a valuable leaven of veterans who had 
 fought on the battlefields of Italy and Egypt. 
 
 The infantry was composed of infantry of the line and 
 light infantry, formed into demi-brigades (regiments) of 
 two, or in some cases three, battalions, one 
 battalion being allocated to recruiting and 
 reserve purposes. Four demi-brigades formed a division. 
 In action the light troops advanced skirmishing in extended 
 order and taking advantage of all cover; behind them 
 followed the infantry in formed bodies in two or three 
 lines, the attack being made generally in column. In 
 these manoeuvres, in deployments, and in skirmishing 
 and attack in column with the bayonet, the troops had 
 acquired great proficiency. The infantry was armed with 
 
12 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 j a flint gun, effective from one hundre d to jwo hundred 
 I yards, but ranging double that distance. Each man 
 \ carried fifty rounds, and thirty more were in reserve. 
 \ The cavalry consisted of heavy and light horse- — 
 cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars and mounted chasseurs. 
 They were armed with sabre and pistol, and 
 in some cases with carbines. We know that 
 \ Napoleon recognised the necessity of equipping cavalry 
 f with carbines ; on one occasion he wrote : " How is it 
 possible to carry on any but a defensive war, covered by 
 entrenchments and natural obstacles, if one has not 
 cavalry fairly equal to that of the enemy ? An army 
 superior in cavalry will have the advantage of being- 
 able to conceal its movements, of having good information 
 of the enemy's movements, and of delivering battle when 
 it pleases. Defeats will have few evil results, and victories 
 will be decisive." He wrote again. Count Yorck tells us : 
 "It is universally conceded that the cuirassiers have 
 difficulty in using their carbines ; but on the other hand 
 it seems absurd that 8000 or 4000 brave men should be 
 exposed to surprise in their cantonments or stoppage on 
 their marches by a couple of light companies. ... I 
 cannot reconcile myself to seeing 3000 men, picked troops, 
 liable to be overwhelmed by any partisan leader during 
 a popular rising or in a surprise by light troops, or to be 
 arrested on their march by a few good sharpshooters 
 behind a stream or a house ; it seems absurd. It is my 
 wish that every man should have a musket, even if it 
 be only a very short carbine. . . . Place some proposal 
 before me so that these 3000 men may not have to depend 
 on infantry to protect them in cantonments, and that 
 they may be able to clear their way if any infantry, 
 inferior in numbers, attack them. ... As to lancers, 
 see whether we can arm them with both carbine and lance ; 
 
CHARACTER OF THE OPPOSING FORCES 13 
 
 and if this is impossible, at least one-third of each troop 
 ought to be armed with carbines." A knowledge of such 
 records of history might save us from having to learn these 
 lessons again from bitter experience. 
 
 The cavalry regiment was organised in four squadrons. 
 Cavalry brigades were variable in strength. The dragoons 
 were principally employed in reconnoitring and on 
 outpost duties. Like all great commanders, Napoleon 
 knew well how to utilise his cavalry. In action the bulk 
 was assembled in reserve. 
 
 The artillery, consisting of guns which had the dis*^ 
 advantage of being of numerous calibres, was formed into 
 divisions, and was generally massed, its fire 
 ^^^ being concentrated on points of attack. It is 
 noteworthy that co-operation between the three arms had 
 been taught, and was thoroughly understood ; the artillery 
 especially had learned to give close support to the infantry. 
 The gunners were armed with musket and bayonet. 
 Troops were well clothed and shod and especial attention 
 was paid to the commissariat. While in general the army 
 lived on the country, magazines were formed when 
 convenient. Each man carried three or four days' 
 supplies, and double that amount was on regimental 
 wagons. The transport was furnished by the contractors 
 of a private company. 
 
 In morale the French soldiers were now unequalled. 
 The inauguration of the Empire had added to the power 
 Character- ^^^^^ prestige of Napoleon, whose troops were 
 istics of the inspired by his presence, his reviews and his 
 French personal distribution of honours at the camp 
 at Boulogne. They possessed that which is half the battle 
 — confidence in themselves and their commanders, and 
 in the certainty of victory. They endured fatigue and 
 privation with remarkable constancy. They were active 
 
14 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 and enterprising, wonderful marchers, of superior intelli- 
 gence, and most susceptible to appeals to their love of 
 glory. They knew well how to adapt themselves to the 
 ground and to take advantage of its natural features. 
 Every French soldier had the hope of reward and pro- 
 motion, for many officers, and even marshals, had risen 
 from the ranks. It could be truly said that each one had 
 a baton in his knapsack. 
 
 The regimental officers were excellent, constantly with 
 their men, to whose training and well-being they devoted 
 all their time and interest. 
 
 General Foy gives us a description of the French 
 advance to the attack : " The action was begun by a 
 The French cloud of skirmishers, both horse and foot, 
 in Attack thrown forward according to a general idea, 
 and not directed as to the detail of their movements. 
 They harassed the enemy ; escaped his massed troops 
 by their speed, and his guns by their extended formation. 
 They were relieved with the object of continuing their 
 fire, and they were reinforced to increase their effect. 
 The field artillery came up at a gallop and fired grape and 
 canister at point-blank range. The line of battle broke 
 up in the direction of the attack, the infantry in column, 
 for it had no fire to deliver, the cavalry in regiments or 
 squadrons ready to act in any direction. When the hail 
 of bullets and shot began to thicken, the soldiers advanced 
 at the double, charging with the bayonet, the drums beat 
 the charge, and the air resounded with the oft -repeated 
 cries of ' Forward ! Forward ! ' " 
 
 This fine army was led by such a galaxy of military 
 
 / French talent as the world has never seen. Napoleon 
 
 \ Leaders himself was at t he zenith of his physic al and 
 
 I intellectual power. ""* ' 
 
 ^ The assumption of the imperial purple had made him 
 
 
CHARACTER OF THE OPPOSING FORCES 15 
 
 supreme in the state as in the army. He had gained in 
 personal experience of war since he commanded the army -^ 
 of Italy, but he had what was of more value — \ 
 ^^° ° the experience derived from the study of history, 
 and none of his campaigns excelled in execution the first 
 one, when his previous experience was that of history only. 
 But he had gained in prestige with the nation and 
 the army, which regarded him as invincible. The great 
 officers of the army, the marshals, were the devoted 
 slaves of him who had raised them to the highest pinnacles 
 of glory. It has been said that " only in despotisms are . 
 men in high offices chosen only for their fitness," another \ 
 factor of success. The decline of military skill in Rome \ 
 began, Machiavelli 1 tells us, from the time when science 
 and talent were despised, and only those gained distinction 
 who knew how to please the authorities. But in the^ 
 French army at this period, merit was the sole basis of 
 promotion and reward. 
 
 A remarkable feature of the French armies of this 
 epoch is the youth of the officers, a factor that must be 
 Youth of taken into account. But the value of youth 
 French is nothing new ; it is a distinctive feature of 
 Generals all history. At thirty-two, Alexander's career 
 was drawing to a close ; at twenty-six, Hannibal was 
 acclaimed leader of the Carthaginian army ; a.t t-y venty- 
 six, Napoleon Bonaparte was conducting his most bril- 
 liant campaign with the army of Italy ; at thirty-four 
 Wellington had won the battle of Ass aye, and twelve 
 years later, after bringing the arduous Peninsular War to 
 a successful conclusion, he vanquished the great man 
 whose mighty genius was already declining at the early 
 age of forty-six. 
 
 In 1805, of the French officers who commanded the 
 
 1 « 
 
 The Art of War." 
 
i6 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 corps of the Grand Army, only two, Augereau and Berna- 
 dotte, were over forty years of age. Napoleon himself, 
 Lannes, Soult and Ney were thirty-six ; Davout was 
 thirty-five^ BJidj|armont thirty-one. Half the divisional 
 commanders were between thirty and forty, while only 
 a single one was fifty. 
 
 The campaign of Jena, in the ensuing year, when the 
 Prussian army was led to destruction by venerable 
 creatures of routine, furnishes us with another example 
 in this connection. The Duke of Brunswick, "a spend- 
 thrift, a loose liver, and a martinet," was seventy ; 
 Mollendorf was over eighty ; Karlkreuth was sixty -six ; 
 even the fiery Blucher was over sixty, and only a few of 
 the younger officers understood Napoleon's revolutionary 
 tactics and strategy. To look to more recent times, most 
 /of the successful commanders of the American Civil War 
 were comparatively young men. 
 
 When they advance in years, most men lose in energy 
 of both body and mind ; they become too old to learn, 
 and too confirmed in their opinions to adopt methods that 
 are new, but that may be rendered necessary by altered 
 conditions. They have a tendency to become soft and 
 enervated, and disinclined to physical discomfort. Their 
 peculiarities become accentuated; their fads are fully 
 developed, and their ideas do not advance with the times. 
 Age may have its advantages, bringing a calm calculation 
 frequently absent in youth and securing its jDOssessor 
 against hasty, impetuous and perhaps ill-advised action. 
 But on the other hand, where an original or novel mode 
 of operations is called for, or where brilliancy and dash 
 are required, younger commanders are more likely to 
 succeed than those who are wedded to antiquated and 
 obsolete ideas. The youth of his generals was not the 
 least factor in Napoleon's success in war. The Emperor 
 
CHARACTER OF THE OPPOSING FORCES 17 
 
 himself said that no general had any enterprise left after 
 his forty-fifth year. He proved this in his own person, 
 for in 1815 his genius and his physical powers were 
 already in a profound decline, notwithstanding the 
 brilliant conception of the Waterloo campaign. At 
 Austerlitz he said : " One has but a short time for war. 
 I am good for another six years, and then I shall have to 
 stop." 
 
 And what manner of men were Napoleon's generals ? 
 
 As leaders of men they were unequalled bv any in 
 Europe . Accustomed to look to their chief for guidance 
 in all things, they developed little power of initiative 
 on wide theatres of war, though fine tacticians. Berna- 
 dotte was clever, and a good leader under the eye of the 
 Emperor, but, like many of the others, incapable of 
 exercising independent command. 
 
 The same remarks apply to Marmont, an officer of 
 artillery. Davout was one of the most capable of the \ 
 marshals, having a wide outlook on the art of war, while ' 
 his corps was under perfect discipline. Soult had great 
 talents, which he displayed later as an independent 
 commander in Spain. Lannes had no wide intellectual 
 capacity, but possessed those qualities which inspire 
 troops on the field of battle. Ney, "the bravest of the 
 brave," was unequalled as a leader of men in action, 
 but had not the capacity of a great commander. Murat 
 was a splendid leader of cavalry, possessing unexampled 
 courage, activity and dash — but he was no general. 
 Berthier was a model chief of the staff, with a capacity 
 for infinite labour, but he did not learn the great principles 
 of the art of war in twenty campaigns. 
 
 Napoleon's system of working is thus described by 
 Jomini : " The Emperor himself was in reality his own 
 Chief of the Staff ; holding in his hand a pair of compasses 
 
 B 
 
 N. 
 
/ 
 
 i8 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 opened by scale to a distance of seven or eight leagues in 
 a straight line (which, reckoning the turnings of the roads, 
 Napoleon's covers a march of nine or ten leagues), bent. 
 System of nay, often lying, over his map, on which the 
 Work positions of his army corps and the supposed 
 
 positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different 
 colours, he arranged his o^vn movements with a certainty 
 of which we can scarcely form a just idea. Moving his 
 compasses rapidly over the map, he calculated in a 
 moment the number of marches for each of his corps 
 to reach any point he wished it to reach on a fixed day, 
 and then, sticking his pins into these new positions, and 
 calculating the rate at which each column would move, 
 he dictated those orders which if they stood alone would 
 entitle him to glory." It is notable that he rose and 
 dictated his orders at midnight or early da^vn. By this 
 method the troops were not kept waiting for orders at 
 night, but received them before the march ; while at 
 the same time the latest information, which might have 
 involved a change in orders issued earlier, was thus 
 available. 
 
 From the particulars that have been given, some idea 
 may be gained as to this great army, its composition and 
 
 the methods which led to its wonderful success in war. 
 
 It has already been mentioned that the Austrian army 
 
 was still undergoing reform when the war broke out in 
 
 / The 1805. The Austrians had learnt something from 
 
 / Austrian their defeats on the battlefields of Italy, and 
 
 \ Army many improvements had been introduced into 
 
 J their military methods. New conditions of service were 
 
 <^ established in 1802, under which men were liable for 
 
 / service between the ages of seventeen and forty ; but the 
 
 I system had not attained its full development at the time 
 
 of the Austerlitz campaign, when, in fact, the x\ustrian 
 
CHARACTER OF THE OPPOSING FORCES 19 
 
 military organisation was in an incomplete state, and 
 they were weak in consequence. Its full effects were not j 
 seen until 1809, when corps and batteries were formed / 
 on the French model. In imitation of the French, 
 some light battalions were raised ; but in 1805 the / 
 organisation of the army was still wooden and antiquated , 
 and the movements of troops ponderous and complicated. / 
 The method of discipline, though considerably ameliorated ; 
 by the efforts of the Archduke Charles, was still harsh, 
 and not calculated to inspire the soldier with patriotic J 
 enthusiasm. 
 
 The Austrian army in Italy was under the command of 
 the Archduke Charles, one of the ablest generals of his 
 time, but, as will be seen, this army took no part in the 
 Austerlitz campaign. The total strength of the allied 
 forces has been given as : 
 
 Main Army in Italy 120,000 
 
 Army of the Danube 84,000 
 
 Tyrol Army 30,000 
 
 Reserve 30,000 
 
 Russians 140,000 
 
 Swedes, etc. 26,000 
 
 430,000 
 
 It is probable that these numbers are in some cases 
 over-estimated. The Austrian armies were organised 
 as follows : — 
 
 Army of the Danube 
 
 The Archduke Ferdinand 
 
 Qua7-termaster-General^ Field-Marshal Mack 
 
 Kienmayer 4 brigades 18,000 men 
 
 Wernecke 3 divisions 20,000 „ 
 
 Schwartzenberg 2 divisions 15,000 „ 
 
 Riesch 3 divisions I3)000 » 
 
 \ 
 
20 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 Army of the Tyrol 
 
 The Archduke John 
 Four divisions . ; . 50,000 (including Jellachich) 
 
 Army of Italy 
 
 The Archduke Charles 
 
 Chief of the Staffs Field-Marshal Zach 
 
 Four corps 
 
 Although nominally under the Archduke Ferdinand, 
 the army of the Danube was in reality commanded by 
 Mack as Chief of the Staff of the Emperor Francis of 
 Austria. The Austrians had the disadvantage of being 
 directed by a ponderous and stupid Aulic Council. There 
 were two Russian armies, under Kutusoff and Bux- 
 howden, able and enterprising commanders, under 
 whom were Bennigsen, Dokhturoff and Bagration, brave 
 and capable leaders. The Russian soldiers had those 
 characteristics for which they are known to-day. .^othing 
 jcould_.gxceed__their J3ravery\;_their patience and tHeTr 
 en durance un der a.11 circumstances. TKeRiissian coTunins 
 were encumbered by enOTnotls^ains, an infantry regiment 
 having some fifty wagons and three hundred horses. 
 
 Their first army was not expected to reach the Inn 
 before the 20th October ; their second army was on the 
 Vistula. 
 
 There were, in addition to the allied forces detailed, 
 some 20,000 Swedes under Tolstoi on the shores of the 
 Baltic. 
 
 The theatre of operations between the Rhine and the 
 Danube was characterised by the densely wooded and 
 Theatre of mountainous region of the Black Forest, in 
 Operations which the Danube takes its rise ; but this 
 country, extending between Basle and Stuttgart, would 
 
CHARACTER OF THE OPPOSING FORCES 21 
 
 form a screen to an advancing army, covering its move- 
 ments, and together with the Jura Mountains, extending 
 on the north and parallel to the Danube, favouring a 
 masked advance towards Nordlingen and Donauworth. 
 With the exception of the Black Forest, then rugged and 
 difficult for the passage of an army, the whole country was 
 rich and fertile, and traversed by good roads ; while 
 numerous bridges afforded means of passage across the 
 Danube. Bavaria and Wurtemburg, the territories of 
 Napoleon's allies, extended southward to the borders of 
 the mountainous region of the Tyrol, and as far as the 
 Inn. 
 
 The character of Napoleon is the first factor to be 
 noted in considering the causes of success. As he said?) 
 
 "In war, the man is everything." Unity 0/ ^ 
 command, and the concentration of all power? 
 in his hands, gave him a great superiority over an enemy y 
 ^who suffered from the disadvantages of divided counsels.^ 
 The generals of the Allies, although some of them capable ( 
 commanders, had neither the experience nor prestige of 
 the French leaders ; some of them had, indeed, lost 
 prestige in previous campaigns. Mack had been cap- 
 tured at Civita-Castellana in 1799, and had been a prisoner 
 in Paris ; the Archduke Charles had been driven out of 
 Italy by Napoleon urTT97T^s"XHlef'ot'tKe Staff "^w^^^ 
 Zach, whoTIa3r acted m tKe same capacity at Marengo in 
 1800 ; the Archduke John had been vanquished at 
 Hohenlinden in 1800. We meet also with the names of 
 Lusignan, Argenteau, Weyrother and Wukassovich, the 
 latter a brave and able leader, who had all waged un- 
 successful war against Napoleon in Italy in 1796. 
 
 It will be observed throughout this campaign that 
 divided command and consequent dissension among the 
 Allies was a fruitful cause of defeat. Napoleon says on 
 
^ 
 
 22 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 ^his point : " Nothing is so important in war as an 
 undivided command. For this reason, when war is 
 J carried on against a single power, there should be only- 
 one army, acting upon one base, and conducted by one 
 chief." 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE ADVANCE TO THE RHINE 
 
 Napoleon's Plans — Plans of the Allies — Napoleon's Preparations — 
 Reconnaissance — Austrian Preparations — The March to the 
 Rhine — Proclamation to the Grand Army — Passage of the 
 Rhine — Comments 
 
 On the 23rd August 1805 Napoleon wrote to his Foreign 
 Minister, Talleyrand : "I shall strike my camp here, 
 Napoleon's ^^'^^ order my third battalions to replace my 
 Plans field battalions ; on the 23rd September, I shall 
 
 be in Germany with 200,000 men and in the Kingdom of 
 Naples with 25,000. I shall march on Vienna." 
 
 At this time his troops were disposed as follows : — 
 
 Bernadotte in Hanover ; Marmont at Utrecht ; Davout 
 at Ambleteuse ; Soult and the Cavalry Reserve, under 
 Murat, at Boulogne ; Mortier at Etaples ; Ney at 
 Vimereux; Augereau at Brest. Massena commanded 
 the troops in Italy. 
 
 Napoleon^jplan^:»^as J:o march to the Rhine, and then 
 to the^Dajaub%with-the GiSitd^^Arir^^ and 
 
 to defeat the enemy in- detail before theycoiild concentrate 
 their f orces.„ 3Iassena.JWBS_ to assemble his forces on the 
 Adige, in Northern Jtaly^and^hoIdTth^Au^strians there ; 
 and Saint Cyr was to prepare for the occupation of | 
 Naples. Thus tEe T^rench Emperor would have one | 
 
 strong corps as a holding force in Italy, and seven corps^ 1 
 
 for the invasion of ^Germany. „— 
 
 The plan of the Allies was for 60,000 Austrians and | 
 
 23 
 
 / 
 
 f 
 

 24 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 two Russian armies, amounting to 90,000 men, to operate 
 in the valley of the Danube, under command of the Austrian 
 Plans of Emperor, with Field-Marshal Mack as Chief of 
 the Allies the Staff. The Tyrol was to be garrisoned with 
 50,000 men under the Archduke John, who could reinforce 
 Mack or the Archduke Charles as necessity arose, while 
 the Archduke Charles was to take the offensive with 
 120,000 men in Italy, where it was expected Napoleon 
 would make his main attack. The Allies were also to 
 make a diversion in Naples. The Austrian army, nomin- 
 ally under Ferdinand, but in reality commanded by Mack, 
 was already assembling in the Danube Valley ; the 
 Russians were to take the field with two armies. One, of 
 55,000 men, was to start from Brody on the 20th August, 
 and march to Braunau. on the Inn, to reinforce Mack ; 
 the second, of 40,000 men, was to occupy Bohemia, but 
 was still on the Vistula. But the Austrian plans were 
 drawn up on the assumption that a French army could 
 not reach the Danube before 10th November, and it is 
 related that they made the curious mistake of omitting 
 to allow for the twelve days' difference between the old 
 calendar, observed by Russia, and the new one. In the 
 meantime Mack was to coerce the Bavarians. 
 
 Napoleon, having decided to march into Germany, 
 lost no time in preparing for the campaign and carrying 
 Napoleon's ^^^ ^^^ plans. The army was long since ready. 
 Prepara- His care in reconnoitring the country through 
 tions which his armies were to march is instructive. 
 
 From Boulogne, 25th August 1805, instructions were 
 given to Bertrand to go to Bavaria, making notes of all he 
 Recon- saw. From Munich he was to go to Passau and 
 naissance up the Inn to Kuf stein. "He will make a 
 regular reconnaissance, giving the situation of places, their 
 distances, the nature of the roads, the width of the river, 
 
26 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 the amount of water, the alternate domination of one or 
 other bank, the brooks, the bridges, the fords. He will 
 be accompanied by some Bavarian engineers, but he will 
 be careful to look for himself, and will write what the 
 engineers tell him about the conditions of the river, and 
 what has happened on it." With similar reports he was 
 to go to Salzburg and back to Munich via Wasserburg, 
 thence to Fussen, down the Lech, and to Ingoldstadt and 
 Donauworth, paying heed to the Danube ; thence down 
 the Regnitz to the Main, to Bamberg, back to Ulm, 
 
 t Stuttgart, and thence to Rastadt, "reporting the con- 
 dition of the roads from a military and general staff 
 standpoint." Then follows a note of items to be examined 
 and reported on, such as this : " He will make a detailed 
 reconnaissance of the little river Ilz (which empties into 
 the Danube at Passau), and the nature of the roads and 
 the ground from the source of the Ilz, which comes from 
 the mountains of Bohemia, to the mouth of the Ilz ; 
 what is the width of the valley, what is the nature of the 
 roads, the principal to^vns, and the facilities and the 
 difficulties that an army would have which should cross 
 to the left bank of the Danube, and by these means 
 should turn the Inn and march on Freistadt with 
 the purpose of moving into Moravia." 1 Other officers 
 were sent with similar instructions. Thus Savary was 
 told " to reconnoitre the roads which, starting from 
 Philipsburg, Bruchsal and Dorlach, crossed the Necker at 
 Heilbronn, Cannstadt and Esslingen, and led thence to 
 the Danube, Dilingen, Guldenfingen and Ulm, as well 
 as the cross-roads between them." Emissaries were 
 
 r despatched to negotiate with Berlin, Bavaria, Wurtem- 
 burg and Baden. The newspapers were forbidden to 
 
 1 " Life of Napoleon." By Colonel Theodore Dodge, U.S.A. 
 (Gay & Bird). 
 
THE ADVANCE TO THE RHINE 27 
 
 refer to the movements of the French army. Com- 
 munication was suspended along the left bank of the 
 Rhine ; post offices were occupied. In fact, every pre- 
 caution was taken that might tend to ensure success. 
 Roads in France were repaired and maps of the theatre 
 of war got ready. Reserve corps of conscripts and the 
 National Guard were formed at Mainz and Strassburg. 
 
 The Allies were not so forward in their preparations. 
 They may still have clung to the hope of peace, and at 
 Austrian ^^Y ^^^^' ^^ ^^^ been stated, they did not foresee 
 Prepara- the possibility of the French army reachi; g the 
 tions Danube before November. The Austrian army 
 
 was not ready, but England would supply money, and 
 Russia would furnish men. The Austrian troops were 
 mobilised in July, but it was not until the 3rd September 
 that the Emperor Francis declared war. The army under 
 Mack crossed the Inn on the 8th September and reached 
 the Iller before the end of the month. The Bavarians 
 retreated before the Austrian advance, and Mack posted 
 Kienmayer across the Danube at Neuberg and Ingoldstadt 
 to observe them, while he halted with his right on Ulm 
 and his left on Memmingen. The Russian forces, which 
 were on the frontiers of Galicia, were to march to the 
 Inn. But while their enemies were taking counsel the 
 Grand Army was marching. 
 
 On the 25th August Napoleon issued orders for the 
 march of the Grand Army to the Rhine. The third 
 The March battalions of demi - brigades were left at 
 to the Rhine Boulogne, and formed into an army corps 
 for the protection of the coast and the flotilla from 
 English raids. Their grenadier companies had been 
 taken to form Oudinot's division. The I. Corps was 
 to leave Hanover on the 2nd September and reach 
 Wurzburgon on the 27th. There Bernadotte would 
 
c 
 
 28 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 be joined by the Bavarians, whom Mack's advance 
 had forced back on Bamberg. The VI. Corps, forming 
 the right wing, left camp on 27th August, and marched 
 by Laon and Vitry upon Schlettstadt ; the V. Corps and 
 the Cavalry Reserve marched by Sedan, Metz and Nancy 
 to Strassburg ; Soult with the IV. Corps followed the same 
 route as far as Metz, when he deflected his march to 
 Speyer ; Davout marched from Ambleteuse with the 
 III. Corps through Lille, Namur and Luxembourg to 
 Mannheim. The II. Corps, under Marmont, forming 
 the left wing, marched from Utrecht to Mainz ; and 
 Augereau brought the VII. Corps from Bayonne to the 
 neighbourhood of Basle. Napoleon had himself calculated 
 the march of the various corps of his army, and had 
 written from Boulogne on the 31st August : " The 
 Grand Army is in full march ; on 23rd September it will 
 have reached the Rhine." The distance from Boulogne 
 to Strassburg, 300 miles, was covered in twenty -nine days ; 
 and on the 27th September the whole army was across the 
 Rhine. 
 
 Napoleon remained in Paris until 24th September ; 
 he reached Strassburg on the 27th, and from there, 
 three days later, issued a proclamation to the Grand 
 Army : 
 
 " Soldiers, the War of the Third Coalition has begun. 
 The Austrian army has crossed the Inn, violated treaties, 
 Prociama- attacked and driven our ally from his capital, 
 tion to the You yourselves have had to hasten by forced 
 Grand Army marches for the protection of our frontiers ; 
 but you have already passed the Rhine. I will not halt 
 until I have ensured the independence of Germany, 
 supported our allies, and lowered the pride Of lawless 
 aggressors. We will make no peace without this 
 guarantee. Our generosity shall no longer deceive our 
 
THE ADVANCE TO THE RHINE 29 
 
 policy. Soldiers, your Emperor is in your midst. You 
 are only the vanguard of a mighty people. If necessary 
 that people will rise at my call to destroy this new league, 
 formed by the hatred and the gold of England. But, \ 
 soldiers, we have forced marches to make, fatigues and \ 
 privations to endure. We will vanquish all obstacles, / 
 and we will not rest until we have planted our eagles upon ( 
 the territory of our foes." ^^""^ 
 
 Napoleon had timely information of the movements 
 of Mack's army. On 10th September Murat reported 
 60,000 Austrians at Wels, 15,000 at Constance, and 
 10,000 at Braunau, where a large camp was marked out, 
 and stores had been collected ; 80,000 Russians were on 
 the borders of Galicia. His orders for the crossing of the 
 Rhine and the further march of his troops were issued 
 from Paris on the 17th September. This order is sum- 
 marised as follows : — 
 
 The Cavalry Reserve to cross first, at Mannheim ; 
 Nansouty to reach Heidelberg with his cuirassiers on 
 Passage of the 25th. Klein's dragoons were to advance to 
 the Rhine Bretten when Soult^s tirst division had passed 
 the river. Bourcier's dragoons were to cross the same 
 day at Kehl, cover Ney's passage, and proceed next day 
 towards Durlach. Beaumont and Hautpoul with their 
 cavalry were to cross at the same place and day, and go 
 to Offenburg and Oberkirch respectively. Other cavalry 
 was to advance on Freiburg, and reconnoitre towards 
 Donauschingen. 
 
 The divisions were to follow this cavalry screen in the 
 following order : — 
 
 Davout, headquarters Mannheim, to cross there on 
 26th and push his cavalry on to Sinsheim. 
 
 Soult, to cross at Germersheim on 25th, and establish 
 headquarters next day at Bruchsheim. 
 
30 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 Ney, to cross at Selz on 25th, and establish head- 
 quarters at Rastadt next day. 
 
 Lannes, to cross at Kehl on 25th. 
 
 For the further advance to the Danube : 
 
 Lannes was to march on 29th, by way of Oberkirch 
 and Rothenburg, to Ulm, 9th October. 
 
 Ney, to march, 27th, by Durlach, Stuttgart, EssHngen 
 to Ulm, 7th October. 
 
 '• Soult, by Bruchsal, Ludwigsburg, Gmund to Aalen, 
 9th October. 
 
 Davout, to march by Heidelberg and Heilbronn to 
 Nordlingen, 10th October. 
 
 Bernadotte and Marmont, leaving Wurzburg, 1st 
 October, to reach Weissenburg, 9th October. 
 
 The Guard, Reserve cavalry, and Artillery park to 
 concentrate at Gmund, 9th October. 
 
 The French Emperor had made provision for reserve 
 camps at Mainz and Strassburg, which, together with 
 Breisach and Huningen, were fortified to guard his line 
 of communications. 
 
 Mack had reached Wels on the 2nd September, and then 
 moved into Bavaria, hoping to coerce the Bavarians to 
 an alliance or disarmament before the arrival of the 
 French. But his movements were dilatory, and although 
 he entered Munich on the 10th, and pushed his advanced 
 troops down the Iller to Ulm, he failed in his object ; 
 the Bavarians withdrew to Bamberg and effected a 
 junction with Bernadotte. Mack then marched up the 
 Danube, and eventually took up an advanced and isolated 
 position on the Iller, with his headquarters at Ulm. 
 The Russians were still far distant. They were not to 
 reach the Inn before the 16th October. 
 
 It was not until the 28th September, by which time he 
 realised that Mack had taken up an apparently permanent 
 
THE ADVANCE TO THE RHINE 
 
 31 
 
 position on the Iller, that Napoleon issued his final orders 
 for turning them, and cutting them off from the advancing 
 Russians. 
 
 The following note, written about 22nd September, 
 embodies his first ideas : — 
 
 
 28M SepL 
 
 6^/1 Oct. 
 
 gfk Oct, 
 
 \Q)th Oct. 
 
 Bernadotte 
 
 Wurzburg 
 
 Anspach 
 
 Nurnberg 
 
 Ratisbon 
 
 Marmont 
 
 Wurzburg 
 
 Anspach 
 
 Nurnberg 
 
 Ratisbon 
 
 Davout 
 
 Mannheim 
 
 Mergentheim 
 
 Anspach 
 
 Dietfurt 
 
 Ney 
 
 Selz 
 
 Crailsheim 
 
 Weissenburg 
 
 Ingoldstadt 
 
 Lannes 
 
 Strassburg 
 
 Gmund 
 
 Nordhngen 
 
 Neuberg 
 
 Soult 
 
 Landau 
 
 Aalen 
 
 Donauvvorth 
 
 
 This note is of great interest as showing the clear 
 and methodical way in which the Emperor worked. 
 
 One of the greatest lessons of this period, as already 
 
 indicated in the first nV>aptf^r Js th^ Ti^^pp^sity ^^ prepara- 
 
 tions forjgBT^^For this purpose policy and 
 
 Comments ,,-__ — . - """^ "Vi i i • i i ti.* i 
 
 strategy should go hand m hand ; political 
 
 measures should not be allowed to outstrip the military 
 means necessary for carrying them into effect. Austria T 
 should not have joined the coalition until her army was J 
 ready. The opening of the campaign affords one of many^ 
 instances of the outbreak of hostilities without declara- 
 tion of war. For Napoleon's march to the Rhine may be( 
 taken as a hostile act ; and war was not declared until hi^ 
 troops were well on their way. 
 
 Napoleon's plan was simple in design. Its advantages 
 are obvious, and it appears strange that the Allies should 
 have thought that he would make his attack in Italy. 
 His army was favourably situated for an advance into 
 Germany, the decisive point. Success there would 
 automatically clear the situation in Italy as well. It 
 may be recollected that in 1800, prior to the campaign 
 
32 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 of Marengo,^ he conceived a similar plan, but that circum- 
 stances induced him to alter it and cross the Alps instead 
 of crossing the Danube. 
 
 In the present instance Napoleon's plan was correct 
 from every point of view, if only that it was in accordance 
 with the principle of not doing what the enemy wished 
 and expected him to do. He would have the advantage of 
 being in French or allied territory as far as the Austrian 
 frontier on the Inn. He would strike straight at the 
 hostile capital of Vienna, and would be able to place 
 superior forces in the field at the decisive point and 
 moment. 
 
 The Austrian plan was faulty from the beginning.^ 
 In the first place it involved a division of forces and 
 a neglect of the principle of concentration. Political 
 considerations for the protection of their Venetian 
 provinces, as well as the expectation of the French main 
 attack being made in Italy, induced them to take 
 measures to meet a situation that did not arise. They 
 should have been content to leave a holding force in 
 Italy ; to abandon, if necessary, the Venetian provinces, 
 in order to concentrate at the decisive point and moment, 
 when the development of the situation should indicate 
 these factors. A successful battle would then have 
 settled everything in their favour. But they had not 
 learnt, even from the bitter experience of the campaigns 
 in Italy in 1796, the fatal effect of a division of force 
 
 L against an active and mobile enemy. Although having, 
 even without the Russians, a strength equal to the French, 
 they scattered their forces and were weak at all points, 
 r In war, as in all things, concentration of effort is the secret 
 L of success. Their plans were based on false assumptions 
 
 ^ "Napoleon's Campaigns in Italy." By Lt. -Colonel R. G. Burton 
 'Campaign Series, No. XV.). 
 
THE ADVANCE TO THE RHINE 33 
 
 as to what the enemy would do, which of itself was 
 sufficient to induce him to do something quite different. 
 When once he had decided to march to Germany and 
 abandon the idea of invading England, Napoleon's plans 
 were made with remarkable certainty, secrecy and celerity. 
 His systematic arrangements for collecting information^ 
 are worthy of note in view of the principle that timely 
 information regarding the enemy's dispositions and the 
 topographical features of the theatre of operations is an 
 essential factor of success in war. ~* 
 
 His strategical concentration on the Rhine is a model 
 for all time. It will be observed how the different corps 
 were despatched by different roads at a distance from one 
 another so that they would not clash upon the march, 
 and that there would be no difficulty in billeting and 
 supplying them. And they were directed so that the 
 concentration on the Rhine was on a front sufficiently 
 distant from the enemy, but sufficiently limited in extent 
 to satisfy all possible requirements, even should the 
 situation undergo a change. Napoleon's measures to 
 ensure secrecy are well worthy of note and imitation. 
 
 In commenting on this initial advance. Count Yorck 
 von Wartenburg says : " Here we must point out the 
 difference which is shown between Napoleon's strategy 
 and that in vogue nowadays. Napoleon, as appeared 
 from his first plan in 1800, and as now may be more 
 particularly noted here, effected the strategical con- 
 centration of his army in the first place on the enemy's 
 flank, so that with a simple forward movement for battle 
 he gained the latter's communications ; hence the first 
 encounter could not fail to prove an Ulm or a Jena. 
 Nowadays this can no longer be done. Inasmuch as we 
 must endeavour now to employ all the railway lines for 
 our concentration, and as the enemy also has to make use 
 
34 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 of all his railway lines leading towards the frontier, there 
 will be in the main a frontal concentration on the part of 
 both combatants, and it will no longer be possible to gain 
 such an enormous advantage with respect to space in 
 the first massing of forces as Napoleon gained here by 
 his strategical marches on the enemy's flank ; it will 
 only be possible to gain an advantage in point of time. 
 
 " In Napoleon's day there was plenty of time during 
 the march of the armies to the field (for then they had to 
 march) to become acquainted with the enemy's formation 
 and to direct one's own concentration to his flank, assum- 
 ing of course a correct strategical perception of the situa- 
 tion. The modern rapidity of mobilisation and of the 
 strategical deployment by means of railways have made 
 the latter a task which must be arranged in all its details 
 during peace ; it is therefore impossible to alter it accord- 
 ing to the disposition of the enemy's flank. Only after 
 the armies have been massed, and operations have begun, 
 can a superiority of strategical calculation be displayed 
 as to placing oneself on the flank or the rear of the 
 enemy ; hence the manoeuvres with which Napoleon was 
 in the habit of opening his campaigns will only be possible 
 after the first few encounters. We can no longer begin 
 immediately with a Jena, but we can still, after a Worth 
 or a Spicheren, choose our lines of operation in such a 
 manner that we may force the enemy to a Gravelotte." 
 
 That Napoleon struck the enemy's right flank will be 
 seen in the next chapter, but his first concentration did not 
 effect this. That concentration took place on the Rhine ; 
 how indeed could the French Emperor arrange to con- 
 centrate on the enemy's flank and gain his communica- 
 tions when that enemy did not cross the Inn until the 
 9th September ? In 1800 his first plan had been to 
 advance against Kray's left flank. In 1805 the disposi- 
 
THE ADVANCE TO THE RHINE 35 
 
 tion of his troops, and especially of Bernadotte, favoured 
 the route taken round the north of the Black Forest. 
 Moreover, had he had to traverse that region, and pass 
 the Danube at its source, he would have been obliged to 
 violate Swiss neutrality and would have presented his 
 flank to the enemy on the Tyrol. His first concentration 
 was, therefore, made with a view to the further advance 
 to the Danube and the passage of that river between Ulm 
 
 and Ratisbon. 
 
 The perfection of the arrangements for the march to the— j 
 Rhine are worthy of note, the troops marching by different I 
 routes for convenience of supply and billeting ; and, while J 
 widely separated during the march, they were concentratedT] 
 on the Rhine within a space which admitted of a rapid/ 
 closer concentration when required. Bernadotte, it will 
 be observed, was directed by a route that brought him 
 quickly to the support of the Bavarians. The use of the 
 cavalry to cover the advance is noteworthy, and in 
 accordance with modern principles. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 FROM THE RHINE TO ULM 
 
 Orders of 28th September — Diary of Events — Passage of the Danube — 
 Action at Wertingen — Action at Haslach — The Enemy destroyed 
 by Marches — The Circle completed — Surrender of Mack — 
 Comments 
 
 ^Napoleon's fresh orders of 28th September provided for 
 Orders turning the enemy by a shorter Hne. 
 of 28th Davout was to march through Heidelberg and 
 
 September Ingelfingen to Neuberg, 8th October. 
 
 Soult, through Heilbronn and NordHngen to Donau- 
 worth, 8th October. 
 
 Lannes, by Ludwigsburg and Aalen to Neresheim, 8th 
 October. 
 
 Ney, through Stuttgart and Esshngen to Heidenheim, 
 7th October. 
 
 The Cavah'y Reserve was to make a demonstration 
 through the passes of the Black Forest, and, marching 
 through Stuttgart and Heidenheim, to reach Donauworth, 
 8th October. 
 
 Bernadotte was to march through Anspach in Prussian 
 territory to Eichstadt by 8th October, and thence 
 manoeuvre towards Ingoldstadt. 
 
 Marmont, having crossed the Main at Mainz, to move 
 through Aschaffenberg in the direction of Nassenfels, 8th 
 October. 
 
 ! These movements cut the Austrian line of retreat down 
 the valley of the Danube ; and Napoleon wrote to Berna- 
 
 36 
 
FROM THE RHINE TO ULM 37 
 
 dotte, 22nd September, from Strassburg : " If only I am 
 lucky and Mack remains three or four days more on the 
 Iller and in the Black Forest, I shall surround his army, 
 and only its shattered remnants will escape." 
 
 In pursuance of the orders of 28th September, the 
 French corps occupied on the 2nd October a frontage 
 Diary of ^^ Some ninety miles between Stuttgart and 
 Events, Wurzburg. The Bavarians joined Bernadotte at 
 2nd October the latter place. Mack, deceived by the move- 
 ments of the cavalry in the Black Forest, thought that the 
 French were advancing from that direction, but his plans 
 were not thought out, which Napoleon quicldy perceived, 
 for he wrote to Joseph : " The enemy is marching and 
 countermarching and appears to be embarrassed." 
 
 Mack's forces were still scattered. Jellachich was in 
 the Vorarlberg with 14,000 men ; Riesch had 19,000 and 
 Schwarzenberg 12,000 along the Iller and Danube 
 from Kempten to Gunzburg. Kienmayer had 
 been detached with 6000 men in the direction of Ingold- 
 stadt to watch the Bavarians. His troops also were 
 scattered. Reinforcements called up by Mack were 
 advancing from the Tyrol. 
 
 Napoleon arrived at Ludwigsburg on the 4th October. 
 The French corps, favoured by fine weather, continued 
 their march, and Mack at length had suspicions 
 that his flank was being turned, for he had in- 
 formation from Kienmayer that strong forces of the enemy 
 were marching on Donauworth. 
 
 Mack accordingly moved towards Ulm on the 5th, 
 collecting his army on the line Gunzburg-Illereichen. 
 Kienmayer concentrated at Neuberg, on observ- 
 ing the approach of the strong hostile columns, 
 and Jellachich was ordered to march to Biberach by the 
 8th October. Napoleon, who was this day at Gmund, 
 
 4th October 
 
38 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 perceived that the enemy was concentratmg on Ulm. 
 The French advance to Nordhngen had now contracted 
 their front to sixty miles. 
 
 Napoleon reached Nordlingen on the 6th. He was 
 expecting a battle at Donauworth, and his front was this 
 day reduced to fifty miles between Heidenheim 
 and Eichstadt. He could now concentrate on 
 his centre in twenty-four hours or on either flank in forty- 
 eight hours. His corps were in position as follows : — • 
 /''"''"IBernadotte and the Bavarians at .Weissenburg. 
 
 Marmont at Wassertrudingen. 
 
 Davout at Oettingen. 
 
 Soult at Nordlingen. His advanced guard captured 
 the bridge at Munster in the evening. 
 
 Lannes at Neresheim. 
 
 Bessieres, with the guard, at Aalen. 
 
 Ney near Heidenheim, protecting the communications 
 towards Ulm. 
 
 Murat near the Danube. 
 ^- Baraguey d'Hilliers and Bourcier, with their dragoons, 
 protected the right wing at Geisslingen. 
 
 D'Hautpoul's and Nansouty's divisions of cuirassiers 
 formed rearguards behind Bessieres and Soult respectively. 
 Finding no enemy, Napoleon prepared to cross the Danube. 
 Mack wrote this day to the Aulic Council that the enemy 
 were apparently acting against his communications, but he 
 remained inactive. 
 7th October, The French began to cross the Danube next 
 
 Passage of day. 
 
 the Danube Murat crossed at Donauworth and marched 
 
 towards Rain. 
 
 Soult crossed at the same place, and moved on Augsburg. 
 
 Bernadotte was at Eichstadt. 
 
 Marmont was at Treuchtlingen. 
 
 1 
 
FROM THE RHINE TO ULM 39 
 
 Lannes was at Nordlingen. 
 
 Davout was at Monheim. 
 
 D'Hautpoul was at Nordlingen. 
 
 Nansouty was at Donauworth. 
 
 Ney was at Giengen. 
 
 Bourcier and Baraguey were in support at Heidenheim. 
 
 Ney had instructions to approach nearer to the Danube 
 as soon as the army was across. 
 
 Mack, hearing that the French were crossing, made 
 arrangements to concentrate on Gunzburg, detaching 
 Auffenberg, with eight battaHons and thirteen squadrons, 
 to Wertingen, and preparing to follow with a view to 
 attacking the French as they crossed. He appears to have 
 .known nothing of their strength. Jellachich was directed 
 to march to Ulm. This day Napoleon, who was with 
 Soult, wrote that " the enemy has no time to lose in order 
 to avoid entire destruction." 
 
 Murat, joined by Lannes and Nansouty, recalled from 
 8th October R^^t^j defeated and dispersed Auffenberg's 
 Action at column at Wertingen on the 8th October. 
 Wertingen Qn this day— 
 
 Bernadotte crossed the Danube at Ingoldstadt, 
 
 Soult approached Augsberg. 
 
 Davout crossed at Neuberg, and marched towards 
 Aichach. 
 
 Marmont reached Neuberg. 
 
 Bessieres and d'Hautpoul were at Donauworth. 
 
 Ney was on the march, in two columns, towards Ulm 
 via Langenau, and towards Gunzburg via Ingelfingen. 
 
 That night an unsuccessful attempt was made to 
 capture the bridge at Elchingen. Napoleon, who was at 
 Donauworth, was urging his lieutenants to vigorous 
 action. Thus he wrote to Davout : " Lose no time 
 and let me know that you occupy Aichach " ; and to 
 
40 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 Soult : " Send me at least three or four thousand 
 prisoners." 
 
 On the Austrian side this day Mack did nothing. Kien- 
 mayer marched to Dachau. The weather had hitherto 
 been fine, but on this day heavy rain set in, and continued 
 for a week. 
 
 The French front was now contracted to thirty-five 
 miles. Bourcier with his dragoons w^as at Stuttgart ; 
 Ney was on the Brenz, facing Ulm, to cover the 
 right flank and communications of the army 
 and bar the way to Bohemia. Bernadotte completed the 
 passage of the river at Ingoldstadt on the 9th. Napoleon 
 was with Murat and Lannes at Zusmarshausen for the 
 night. 
 
 Mack had concentrated near Gunzburg, but he heard of 
 the defeat of his detachment at Wertingen ; then Ney came 
 up and took possession of the bridge opposite Gunzburg, 
 and Mack retired to Ulm. Ney occupied Gunzburg with 
 one division. Kienmayer continued his retreat to the Inn. 
 
 Napoleon did not expect the Austrians to remain at 
 Ulm, as their magazines were at Memmingen, and their 
 loth greatest interest was not to break communica- 
 
 October tion with the Tyrol. He expected the Russians 
 to advance to Mack's relief, and on this review of the sit- 
 uation he formed his army into two groups. Murat, under 
 whose orders Ney was placed, and Lannes were to march 
 on Ulm. Bernadotte, with Marmont and the Bavarians, 
 were sent to Munich to oppose the expected Russian 
 advance, but were to continue to hold Ingoldstadt. 
 
 Napoleon went to Augsberg on the 10th, where Soult 
 was. There the information reached him that Mack was 
 still in Ulm, and that the Russians were not advancing. 
 Davout was at Dachau ; Marmont at Pottmes. Murat 
 reached Burgau. In the light of this information, the 
 
FROM THE RHINE TO ULM 41 
 
 French Emperor resolved to march with his whole army 
 to cut off Mack from the Tyrol and hold him in Ulm, 
 leaving only Bernadotte and Davout to oppose any 
 Russian advance. 
 
 Soult was accordingly to make for Landsberg. 
 
 Marmont to march on Augsberg. 
 
 Lannes to follow Murat to Burgau. 
 
 Bernadotte and Davout to m^arch on Munich, the former 
 having instructions to clear the enemy out of the country 
 between the Isar and the Lech. 
 
 Ney was still at Gunzburg, where he prepared for a 
 general advance on Ulm next day. Dupont, with a divi- 
 sion and Bourcier's dragoons, formed the right at Albeck. 
 nth On the morning of the 11th Napoleon wrote 
 
 October to Murat : 
 
 " To-night I shall order Marshal Lannes to pass to 
 Burgau. I do not yet consider matters finished on your 
 side. The enemy being surrounded will fight. He is being 
 reinforced from the Tyrol and Italy ; he can therefore 
 oppose you in a few days with more than 40,000 men. 
 Your reserve with Ney and Lannes Corps, which number 
 in all fifty or sixty thousand men, should therefore march 
 close together, so that they can unite in six hours and 
 crush the enemy. The Russians are approaching rapidly ; 
 march on the enem.y, then, wherever he may be, but with 
 caution and close together ; it he escapes you, he v/ill be 
 stopped on the Lech. Moreover, in a successful battle, 
 with the spirit by which the troops are animated, half the 
 enemy would fall into your hands." 
 
 Mack now conceived the idea of escaping to Bohemia 
 by w^ay of Albeck, Heidenheim and Nordlingen, and at 
 the same time cutting the French communications. To 
 cover this movement he intended to leave the corps of 
 Jellachich on the Iller. This project was a good one, 
 
42 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 and gave some chance of success if carried out with 
 vigour. 
 
 Murat, knowing Napoleon's idea that Mack would 
 attempt to escape to the south, directed Ney to cross 
 with his whole force to the right bank of the Danube. But 
 Ney wisely left Dupont's division and Baraguey d'Hilliers' 
 dragoons on the left bank, with orders to march on Ulm, 
 where it was supposed only a few of the enemy would remain. 
 
 Thus on the 11th, Dupont, with his 6000 men, met the 
 enemy's 25,000 under the Archduke Ferdinand at Haslach. 
 Action at He deployed his whole division in one line, and 
 Haslach held the Austrians at bay until nightfall, when he 
 was driven back on Albeck, and retreated to Langenau and 
 the Brenz, having lost a third of his force, and his baggage. 
 Baraguey d'Hilliers, who was at Langenau, had been 
 ordered to support him, but no orders reached him. 
 However Dupont had succeeded in convincing Mack that 
 his road was barred, and he hesitated in uncertainty until 
 the 13th, when it was too late to carry out his project. 
 His vacillation is indicated in a letter which the Archduke 
 Ferdinand wrote to the Austrian Emperor on the 12th : 
 '' General Mack has already projected and put into execu- 
 tion to-day three absolutely different plans." 
 
 On the 11th the Emperor remained with the Guard at 
 Augsberg, where Marmont joined him. 
 
 Soult reached Landsberg. 
 
 Lannes reached Burgau. 
 
 Davout reached Dachau. 
 
 Kienmayer retired on the Inn, where he heard that 8000 
 Russians had arrived at Braunau. 
 
 i2th Bernadotte entered Munich on the 12th 
 
 October October. 
 
 Davout and d'Hautpoul remained at Dachau to watch 
 the Russians, 
 
FROM THE RHINE TO ULM 43 
 
 Soult had been directed on Memmingen to block the 
 enemy's way to the Tyrol. 
 
 Marmont entered Tannhausen. 
 
 Murat, with Lannes and his cavalry, was on the Roth- 
 bach on the line Wissendorn-Pfaffenhauseh-Falheim. 
 
 Ney, who was on the right bank of the Danube, less 
 Dupont and Bourcier on the left bank, fell back behind 
 the Brenz. Bessieres was at Zusmarshausen. 
 
 Mack's way to Bohemia had been opened by Ney's / 
 movements under Murat's orders, and by the defeat of 
 Dupont. But the Austrian did not take immediate ad- 
 vantaofe of this chance. He decided to march on the 13th 
 towards Heidenheim, and attack the French communica- 
 tions. 
 
 But it was then too late, for he was shut in on every 
 side, and Napoleon could truly say that he had destroyed 
 The Enemy ^^e enemy merely by marches. In two more 
 destroyed marches the circle would be complete. An- 
 by Marches ticipating success, the Emperor said : " On the 
 14th, the day of battle, the enemy will be annihilated, for 
 he is hemmed in on every side " ; and " Never will so 
 much have been decided in so short a tim^e." He wrote 
 to Soult : " The decisive m^oment has arrived." But, 
 true to his principle of collecting all available troops for 
 battle, he also wrote in a letter to Murat on the 12th : "I 
 intend, should the enemy remain in his present positions, 
 and be prepared to accept battle, to fight, not to-morrow, 
 but the next day, so that Marshal Soult and his 30,000 
 men may take part in it ; he will march to the enemy's 
 right flank, and attack when he has turned it, a manoeuvre 
 which will ensure a decisive result." His attention to de- 
 tails is sho^vn in this same letter : " Have a bridge thrown 
 over the Danube as near as possible to your line opposite 
 Albeck, so that the corps in Albeck may be in communica- 
 
44 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 tion with the rest of the army. . . . Order the generals to 
 inspect the arms and ammunition, and assemble all your 
 men who may have been detached with the baggage train ; 
 send away the baggage and wagons beyond Burgau, to 
 park in the fields, so that there shall be nothing on the 
 main roads." He also gave Murat directions regarding 
 provision for the w^ounded, doctors, ambulances and 
 supplies." 
 
 He wrote to Otto the same da}^ : " The discouragement 
 of the Austrian army is unexampled. Our worst regiments 
 of chasseurs charge and put to night heavy regiments of 
 cuirassiers." Far different was the spirit of the French. 
 The Fifth Bulletin says : " The Emperor was on the 
 bridge over the Lech when Marmont's corps defiled. Each 
 regiment was formed in a circle, and he spoke to them 
 of the situation of the enemy, the imminence of a great 
 battle, and his confidence in them. This harangue took 
 place during terrible weather. Heavy snow was falling, 
 the troops were up to their knees in mud, and suffered from 
 the intense cold ; but the Emperor's words were of fire. 
 The soldiers forgot their privations and fatigues and were 
 impatient for the hour of combat." 
 
 Mack, instead of concentrating for his proposed stroke 
 towards Heidenheim, lingered in Ulm, and detached 
 Jellachich to the Vorarlberg. 
 
 On the night of the 12th the French Emperor drove 
 thirty miles to Pfaffenhausen, and at once sent Ney 
 13th to reinforce Dupont, whom he ordered back to 
 
 October Albeck. The Guard was called into Gunzburg. 
 Napoleon himself joined Ney at Kussendorf . 
 
 This day he issued a proclamation to the army : 
 
 " Soldiers ! It is only a month since you were en- 
 camped on the ocean opposite England. Less than a 
 fortnight since, we passed the Rhine, the Wurtemburg 
 
FROM THE RHINE TO ULM 45 
 
 Alps, the Neckar, the Danube and the Lech ; these famous 
 barriers of Germany have not delayed our march a day, 
 an hour, an instant. . . . Remember that to-morrow I 
 
 you fight against the allies of the English. Soldiers ! 
 to-morrow will be a hundred times more famous than the 
 day of Marengo. I have placed the enemy in the same 
 position. ... I can say to my people : ' Your emperor 
 and your army have done their duty. Do yours, and 
 200,000 conscripts whom I have called will rush with 
 forced marches to reinforce our second line.' " 
 
 Mack left Ulm on the 13th, marched along the left bank 
 of the Danube, and sent 25,000 men under Wernecke 
 towards Heidenheim, while another column under Loudon 
 was directed down the river towards Gundelfingen. 
 Wernecke's vanguard reached Heidenheim ; and the 
 second column drove off a French post at the bridge of 
 Elchingen ; but the French destroyed the bridge and 
 stopped the Austrian advance. The latter occupied the 
 heights of the '"town. Mack, instead of using all his 
 strength on this enterprise, remained in Ulm with the 
 bulk of his forces. 
 
 This day the Austrian General Spangen surrendered 
 to Soult at Memmingen with 5000 men. Jellachich 
 retreated into the Vorarlberg, and Soult turned back 
 towards Ulm. 
 
 14th Dupont was sent to Albeck on the 14th 
 
 October October. 
 
 At dawn on the same day Ney moved on Elchingen, 
 which was held by 15,000 Austrians, who occupied 
 The Circle ^ strong position among gardens and en- 
 completed closures. After a stubborn fight, the Austrians 
 were driven back on Ulm with the loss of 3000 prisoners 
 and 20 guns. Ney then established his headquarters at 
 Albeck. 
 
 i 
 
46 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 Lannes took up a position on the heights of Pfuhl, 
 overlooking Ulm. 
 
 Marmont arrived at Kirchberg on the Iller. 
 
 Napoleon established his headquarters at the abbey of 
 Elchingen, and sent orders to Lannes and the greater part 
 of the cavalry to come up at daybreak. The idea was to 
 deliver the main attack on the left bank, Marmont holding 
 the enemy in check on the south. 
 
 On hearing of Mack's advance on Elchingen, Wernecke 
 had turned back with a view to attacking Ne}^ in rear, but 
 he was repulsed by Dupont, and retired to Nerenstetten. 
 Mack took up a position on the Lahr-Mohringen heights 
 in front of Ulm, on the left bank of the Danube. 
 
 Ulm is dominated on the north by the heights of the 
 Michelsberg and the Tuillerie, which were fortified, but 
 iSth on the morning of the 15th, when the various 
 
 October French corps closed in, the Michelsberg was 
 occupied by Ney and the Tuillerie by a division of 
 Soult's corps. Lannes crossed the river at Elchingen, and 
 prolonged Ney's left. 
 
 Mack retired into Ulm, and refused to surrender when 
 summoned. Dupont held off Wernecke, who had been 
 joined by the Archduke Ferdinand from Ulm with 1000 
 cavalry. 
 
 Soult reached Biberach. 
 
 After an hour's bombardment, negotiations for surrender 
 i6th were reopened with the Austrians. Murat was 
 
 October despatched with the cavalry and Dupont's and 
 Oudinot's divisions to attack Wernecke. 
 
 Mack agreed to surrender on the 25th if not relieved. 
 •17th Wernecke retreated but was delayed by his 
 
 October baggage train and was vigorously pursued. 
 i8th Wernecke, with 2500 men, surrendered at 
 
 October Trochtelfingen. 
 
FROM THE RHINE TO ULM 47 
 
 The Archduke Ferdinand rode off with 1000 horse 
 and was pursued by Murat from Albeck to Nurnberg, 
 but made good his escape. 
 
 Napoleon succeeded in persuading Mack to surrender — 
 without further delay, and on the 20th October the 
 loth October Austrian army in Ulm filed past Napoleon, to 
 Surrender the number of 27,000 men, with 80 guns. During 
 of Mack the scene of surrender, an Austrian officer wrote 
 in his journal, " Napoleon in the uniform of a common 
 soldier, with a grey coat singed on the elbows and tails, 
 a slouch hat, without any badge of distinction, on his 
 head, his arms crossed behind his back, and warming 
 himself at a camp-fire, conversed with vivacity and made 
 himself agreeable." He was throughout this campaign -^ 
 no longer the Emperor, but the General Commanding the \ 
 Army in the Field. ^ 
 
 If Napoleon's masterly movement to the Danube is 
 followed on the map it will be seen that it explains itself. 
 The use of the cavalry is especially noteworthy, 
 as well as the ordered march of the corps, 
 gradually closing in as they drew nearer to the enemy. 
 While Murat covered the right flank of the advancing 
 army in its movement round the Black Forest, the cavalry 
 of each corps covered the advance. The cavalry do not 
 appear to have obtained much information regarding the 
 enemy, whose general situation only seems to have been 
 kno^vn to Napoleon until he arrived at Augsberg on the 
 10th October. Until then the situation was generally 
 enveloped in the fog of war. This want of information 
 led to a greater dispersion of force than would have been 
 necessary had the Emperor known that the Russians 
 were still so far off. But the situation has to be examined 
 as it presented itself at the time, and not in the light of 
 information not then available. 
 
48 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 The withdrawal of troops from the left bank of the 
 Danube on the 11th left the French communications 
 dangerously exposed, and opened an avenue of escape 
 to Mack. This appears to have been due to Murat mis- 
 understanding the situation, and ordering Ney to cross 
 the Danube. But for the latter taking upon himself 
 to leave Dupont's division on the other side, an entirely 
 fresh situation would have had to be provided for. 
 
 Certainly Napoleon appears to have conclusively made 
 up his mind that Mack would attempt to break out to 
 the south, but his letter to Murat on the morning of the 
 11th shows that he had given that commander every 
 latitude. He has been criticised for having finally 
 succeeded in concentrating round Ulm only 120,000 out 
 of his 200,000 men. But he w^ould surely have been open 
 to censure had he not provided for the possibility of the 
 advance of a hostile force from the Inn, where he knew 
 preparations had been made for a base at Braunau ; and 
 from the Tyrol, where the Archduke John had a consider- 
 able army. In its masterly conception, its execution, 
 and its results, the advance to the Danube furnishes one 
 of the most remarkable episodes in the history of war. 
 From beginning to end the influence of the master mind, 
 the great driving force, is evident. Only where his hold 
 on events slackens for a moment is there any occurrence 
 to interfere with the mechanical progress of this great 
 manoeuvre. 
 
 ~"^ The Austrians in the first place took up a position that 
 was too far advanced, and thus laid themselves open to 
 
 _ being surrounded. The allied forces were not only un- 
 wisely disseminated over the whole theatre of war, but 
 on this theatre of operations also. Mack's active opera- 
 
 \tions, when he undertook any, were partial and half- 
 hearted, undertaken by portions of his force at a time, 
 
FROM THE RHINE TO ULM 49 
 
 and thus open to defeat in detail. We see this in his 
 sending Auffenberg to Wertingen, in Jellachich's move- 
 ment to the Tyrol, and in the attempts north of the 
 Danube on every occasion. The character of the com- 
 mander is reflected throughout on the course of events. 
 
 On the 6th October he was already aware that his 
 communications were being threatened, and he should 
 at once have taken action with his full strength, and made 
 dispositions to attack the enemy as they were crossing 
 the Danube. Instead, he waited until next day and 
 then despatched Auffenberg, unsupported, to Wertingen, 
 with the result that might have been expected. He might 
 still have marched to the Vorarlberg, joined hands with 
 the Archduke John, and have stood with the Prussians 
 on the line of the Inn. Instead of this he despatched 
 Jellachich to the Vorarlberg, and with a portion of his 
 reduced force made an attempt on the French com- 
 munications. 
 
 His chance came when Dupont was driven back on the 
 11th, and an enterprising commander might then not 
 only have inflicted considerable damage on the enemy, 
 but escaped into Bohemia. On this point Napoleon says : , 
 "When you are occupying a position which the enemy') 
 , threatens to surround, collect all your force immediately 
 ' and menace him with an offensive movement." But 
 Mack's measures were all half -measures : " Half-hearted 
 measures never attain success in war, and lack of deter- 
 mination is the most fruitful source of defeat." The 
 truth of this aphorism is nowhere more fully exemplified 
 than in this campaign. 
 
 Criticism should not be destructive only, and it is 
 interesting to consider what Mack might have done in 
 view of the general situation and with the resources at 
 his disposal. It has already been indicated that the 
 
50 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 position he took up was too advanced. But the French 
 invasion was expected neither so soon nor in such great 
 force. When the enemy appeared in great force on the 
 Danube, the Russian army advancing to his support was 
 still a fortnight distant. But he might have gained some 
 days by concentrating his forces, and attacking the first 
 of the hostile columns that crossed the river. He could 
 then have fallen back on the Isar as a first line of defence, 
 his left flank resting on the Archduke John in the moun- 
 tains of the Tyrol. Having made what stand he could 
 there, he would have fallen back to the Inn, where he had 
 in Braunau a strongly fortified place, and where the front 
 to defend was still narrower. The enemy's advance might 
 have been further delayed by the destruction of the bridges 
 over these rivers. If the Russians came up in time, he 
 could have held the line of the Inn ; if forced back before 
 their arrival, on the 20th October, he could have pursued 
 the tactics which we shall see were subseqeuntly employed 
 by Kutusoff in his retreat towards Vienna. A concentra- 
 tion would have been effected, and the allies could have 
 stood for battle in the strong position of St Polten with 
 some hope of success. 
 
 But Mack was not the man to undertake any such 
 methodical operations. Weak and vacillating, as his 
 opponent was strong and determined, he frittered away 
 1 his time and his force in futile and half-hearted measures. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 FROM ULINI TO AUSTERLITZ 
 
 Violation of Prussian Territory — Trafalgar — Napoleon's Plans — 
 .^j*-'"^ up ply Arrangements — The Valley of the Danube — French 
 Movements — Situation of the Allies — Russian Retreat — French 
 Advance — Destruction of an Austrian Column — The Russians 
 cross the Danube — Battle of Durrenstein — Entry into Vienna — 
 General Situation — Napoleon's Dispositions — Murat's Pursuit — 
 Battle of Hollabrunn — Advance to Brunn — Comments 
 
 Although Napoleon's plans had hitherto been crowned 
 with success, there were factors in the general European 
 Violation of situation that were not favourable to his views, 
 Prussian either with regard to his immediate operations 
 Territory qj. future designs. It has been related how 
 Bernadotte crossed the neutral Prussian territory of 
 Anspach. This violation of neutrality aroused great -^ 
 indignation in Prussia. It appeared at one time as 
 though the Prussian King would declare war, thus 
 placing a hostile army and territory in Napoleon's rear. 
 But the French Emperor managed to smooth the affair 
 over, and it was to some extent condoned by the passage 
 of Russian troops through Prussian territory, by per- 
 mission. But the Russian Emperor went in person to 
 Berlin and attempted to draw Frederick William into the 
 coalition. In November the two monarchs entered into 
 a defensive treaty at Potsdam, and in a manner worthy 
 of the modern successor of the Prussian King swore a 
 dramatic oath of eternal friendship over the tomb of 
 Frederick the Great. 
 
 51 
 
52 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 The designs of the alHes and the possibility of hostile 
 action on the part of Prussia did not, however, in any 
 way deter the French Emperor from carrying out his plans. 
 Indeed, the best thing for him to do in any case was to 
 gain a victory. Retreat would weaken him in both a 
 political and military sense. A victory would reduce 
 the strength of his enemies, and would probably decide 
 the Prussian Government to maintain neutrality. More- 
 over, he knew that Prussia would take some months to 
 prepare for war. 
 
 The second event which disturbed the French Emperor 
 was the news of the battle of Trafalgar, which was to have 
 so great an effect on the destinies of Europe. 
 On 25th September Villeneuve, who com- 
 manded the French fleet at Cadiz, received orders to pass 
 through the Straits of Gibraltar and proceed to Naples 
 to co-operate with the army there under St Cyr. He was 
 to engage the enemy wherever found. On 21st October 
 the combined French and Spanish fleets were destroyed 
 off Trafalgar by Nelson's English fleet. Although the 
 destruction of his fleet did not affect the military situation 
 on the Continent, it dimmed to some degree the lustre 
 of Napoleon's arms. Sloane says that " it produced a 
 depressing effect on the ranks of the Grand Army," but 
 it does not appear on what evidence this statement is 
 based. Great issues are fought out on land, and the 
 effects of Trafalgar were still remote. Napoleon received 
 the news of the destruction of his fleet with calm philo- 
 sophy ; but no doubt he realised its full significance, as 
 he had always realised the value of sea power, which he 
 had hitherto considered the principal and constant aim 
 of his policy. 
 
 The events of this period prove that, while dominant 
 sea power is a necessity to the very existence of an 
 
CouNrn Y 
 
54 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 insular empire, it is not essential to land campaigns on 
 the part of a Continental nation. It proves that, while 
 Nelson and his storm-beaten ships may have stood 
 between Napoleon and the dominion of the world, they 
 in no way influenced his domination of the Continent. 
 The absence of an effective army rendered England 
 powerless to injure Napoleon in Europe, except by the 
 formation of political leagues and the subsidising with 
 gold of military powers. 
 
 Napoleon had already, when he saw that success at 
 Ulm was certain, turned his thoughts to subsequent 
 Napoleon's operations. On the 12th October Berthier 
 Plans wrote to Davout : " On completion of this 
 
 affair, his IVIajesty will return and cross the Inn imme- 
 diately." The further advance of his army was facilitated 
 by the presence of Bernadotte on the Isar, whither he had 
 been despatched, as already related, to hold back the 
 ^'--•-Jlussians and cover the operations round Ulm. 
 
 His general idea now was to pursue and destroy 
 Kutusoff' s army before it was joined by the second army 
 
 under Buxhowden, and to finish the campaign early, in 
 
 case the Prussians should decide on hostilities. 
 
 The French Emperor on the 20th October issued orders 
 for the concentration of the army on the Isar. On the 
 Supply 21st October he left Elchingen for Augsberg, 
 Arrange- where he established his principal magazine, 
 ments Here a central depot was formed and supplies 
 
 were collected. Hitherto the rapidity of the march and 
 the necessity for secrecy had not allowed of the formation 
 of magazines. The troops had lived on the country, but 
 such a system, or want of system, while it was detri- 
 mental to discipline, would have been disastrous in the 
 event of scarcity or in the event of the army suffering 
 reverses. 
 
FROM ULM TO AUSTERLITZ 55 
 
 The valley of the Danube between Ratisbon, where the 
 river takes a turn to the south-east, and Munich, which 
 is approached by the foothills of the Tyrolese Alps, is 
 The Valley about a hundred miles in width. But towards 
 of the the east it gradually narrows until, when the 
 
 Danube Enns is reached, the mountain spurs descend 
 to within twenty-five miles of the Danube, while in the 
 neighbourhood of Vienna the Weinarwald approaches still 
 nearer to the city and the river. 
 
 Thus an army marching down this valley, at first upon 
 a wide front, finds itself more restricted laterally as 
 regards good communications as it descends the stream, 
 for the main roads available for use become fewer in 
 number. 
 
 While the left flank of the army is protected by the '\ 
 Danube, the second largest river of Europe, and already J 
 at Passau over two hundred and thirty yards in width and / 
 sixteen feet deep ; at first its right and subsequently its 
 rear is obviously exposed to any advance from the Tyrol 
 and from Italy. 
 
 From the Vorarlberg roads lead to Munich down the 
 valley of the Iller and the Lech. From the Tyrol also, 
 from Trent and Innspruck, a good road ran in 1805 down 
 the valley of the Inn to Wassenburg and Muhldorf. 
 From Trieste and Venice there were roads to Salzburg, 
 and that by way of Leoben, down the valley of the Muhr 
 to Vienna, by which Napoleon had advanced after his 
 campaign in Italy in 1797. 
 
 Napoleon, then, in advancing from Ulm to Vienna, 
 had to pay special attention, at first to his right flank and 
 then to his rear, in view of the presence of Austrian armies 
 in Italy and the Tyrol. 
 
 A feature of the Danube valley is the succession of 
 rivers, the Inn, Traun, Ips, Enns and Traisen, which 
 
56 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 would afford a succession of rearguard positions for an 
 army retreating on Vienna ; and, when the bridges were 
 broken, a series of obstacles to the pursuing force. 
 French The orders now issued provided for the 
 
 Movements following movements : — 
 
 Davout, from Dachau to Freising. 
 
 Marmont, from Weissenhorn to Munich. 
 
 Bernadotte to concentrate at Munich. 
 
 Lannes, with Nansouty's cuirassiers, from Nordlingen 
 to Landshut, where Napoleon established his head- 
 quarters on the 24th. 
 
 Soult, from Memmingen to Landsberg. 
 
 Augereau, from Huningen to Kempten, at the base 
 of the Vorarlberg, where he covered the army from the 
 direction of the Tyrol. 
 
 Ney remained at Ulm for the present. 
 
 Murat stood at Hohenlinden, with a portion of his 
 cavalry. 
 
 Augsberg and Ingoldstadt were held by some cavalry 
 and the divisions of Dupont and Dumonceau, who 
 formed a rearguard, and would march along the Danube 
 towards Passau. 
 
 The movements detailed above were completed by the 
 25th October. 
 
 Kutusoff, with 40,000 Russians, had on the 20th 
 reached Braunau, on the Austrian frontier, where a depot 
 Situation of had been formed. Kienmayer was at Muhldorf, 
 the Allies and Mer veldt soon joined with reinforcements, 
 making a total of 20,000 men. 
 
 The Archduke John was in the Tyrol with 20,000 men ; 
 and Ferdinand commanded 10,000 men in Bohemia. 
 The Archduke Charles was holding the Adige. The 
 Austrians wished to hold the line of the Inn, but Kutusoff 
 judged it better to retire, hoping to join the second 
 
FROM ULM TO AUSTERLITZ 57 
 
 Russian army, and to give time for the Archduke Charles 
 to co-operate, and for Prussia to a.ct. 
 
 On the 23rd October Kutusoff heard from Mack, who 
 passed Braunau on his way to Vienna, of the disastrous 
 Russian events at Ulm, and of the approach of the French. 
 Retreat The Russian general at once decided to retreat 
 down the right bank of the Danube to the line of the 
 Enns. Leaving a rearguard on the right bank of the 
 Inn, he destroyed all the bridges across that river and 
 reached Wels on the 27th. Orders to make a stand on 
 the Inn came from Vienna too late. 
 
 French Napoleon was at Munich with Marmont 
 
 Advance, and the Guard on 26th October. 
 26th October Soult was en route to Muhldorf. 
 
 Lannes at Landshut. 
 
 Davout at Dorfen. 
 
 Bernadotte at Wasserburg. 
 
 Ney had left Ulm for Landsberg, where he covered the 
 right flank of the advance. 
 
 Bourcier and Baraguey with cavalry at Augsberg and 
 Ingoldstadt. 
 
 Dupont and Dumonceau, forming the rearguard, ad- 
 vancing down the Danube on Passau, at the junction of 
 the Inn with that river. 
 
 27th Next day Murat with the cavalry reached 
 
 October Muhldorf, followed by Soult. 
 
 Davout arrived at Muhldorf. 
 
 Lannes advanced towards Braunau. 
 
 Bernadotte, with Marmont in reserve, reached Wasser- 
 burg and Rosenheim, where the bridges were then 
 repaired. Murat saw to the repair of the bridges over 
 28th the Inn at New Oetling and Marktl ; and crossed 
 
 October next day, when he marched to Burghausen, 
 followed by Davout. Bernadotte crossed the river; 
 
58 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 Marmont reached Wasserburg ; Lannes — Braunau ; 
 Soult — Muhldorf ; Napoleon was at Haag. 
 
 Braunau was occupied without opposition, and the ad- 
 vanced base, hitherto at Augsberg, was estabhshed there. 
 29th Napoleon rode to Muhldorf on the 29th, and 
 
 October arrived at Braunau in the evening, finding it a 
 strong fortress filled with stores and ammunition. 
 
 The army was now directed on Wels and Lambach. 
 
 ]\Iurat, followed by Soult, who crossed the Inn at Muhl- 
 dorf, and Davout, who reached Burghausen, forming the 
 first line, advanced to Altheim. 
 
 Marmxont was directed on Steyer, to turn the enemy's 
 30th left should he make a stand on the Traun ; 
 
 October he reached Tittmoning on the 30th. 
 
 The same day Bernadotte entered Salzburg. Ney 
 marched on Innspruck, where he would be in a position 
 to clear the Tyrol, and deal with any advance from that 
 direction on the part of the Archduke John. He was 
 supported by Augereau at Kempten. 
 
 The Russians continued their retreat, but Napoleon, 
 who remained some days at Braunau, now advised 
 caution in following them up. He had not met them 
 yet, and did not know their qualities ; but he wrote to 
 Murat : " The Russians are not yet broken ; they know 
 how to attack." 
 
 31st On the 31st October Murat marched on 
 
 October Lambach. 
 
 Lannes was at Scharding, moving on Linz. 
 
 Soult, at Obernberg, making for Wels. 
 
 Davout, at Ried, making for Lambach. 
 
 Marmont, at Strasswaldchen, moving on Vocklabruck. 
 
 This day a Russian rearguard held the right bank of 
 the Traun at Lambach, and burnt the bridge there, thus 
 covering the retreat of their main body. 
 
FROM ULM TO AUSTERLITZ 59 
 
 The weather, which had continued to be wet, now 
 1st became cold and dry. Napoleon this day 
 
 November reached Ried and halted a day on the Traun. 
 On the 2nd November Lannes was at Linz. 
 
 Soult at Wels. 
 
 Davout at Lambach. 
 
 Murat beyond Wels. 
 
 Bernadotte and Marmont were moving towards the 
 Tyrol to gain touch with Ney and cover the right flank 
 of the advancing army. 
 
 The Russians were on the Enns at Strenberg ; the 
 Austrians under Mer veldt at Steyer. Next day Kutusoff 
 continued his retreat to Molk, and Merveldt passed through 
 Altenmarkt to the Muhr. Kutusoff stopped at Amstetten, 
 covering the single road from the Molk defiles. 
 
 On the 4th November Murat crossed the Enns and 
 4th advanced on Amstetten, followed next day 
 
 November by Lannes and Soult. At that place he was 
 held back for a time by the Russian rearguard under 
 Bagration. 
 
 Marmont and Bernadotte had been directed to regain 
 touch with the main army ; they followed Davout, who 
 marched by way o^ Kremunster to Steyer, which he 
 reached on the 4th, and Marmont on the 5th. 
 
 On the 6th November Gazan's and Klein's (Cavalry) 
 divisions were despatched across the Danube at Linz, and 
 6th next day these and the divisions of Dupont and 
 
 November Dumonceau, which were coming from Passau, 
 were formed into a new corps under Marshal Mortier, who 
 was to march down the left bank of the Danube. 
 
 At Linz a flotilla was formed, so that the army might be 
 able to cross at any moment, and, as the Emperor said, 
 " so that the river would no longer exist " for him. 
 
 This day Napoleon wrote to Murat complaining that 
 
6o NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 he sent him no information, and telling him to write two 
 or three times a day : " You must have a cavalry picket 
 of six men every three leagues to carry your letters. 
 This will enable you to pass your correspondence very 
 rapidly." 
 
 Kutusoff reached St Polten on the 7th November, and 
 7th from here Merveldt marched up the Enns to 
 
 November threaten the French right, orders having come 
 from Vienna for a stand to be made on the Enns. 
 
 As it was expected that the enemy would stand at St 
 Polten, Davout was sent to march to Lilienfeld via Gaming; 
 by this manoeuvre he would turn the enemy's left, cover 
 the right flank of the French advance, and relieve con- 
 gestion on the one road that led to Vienna from Linz. 
 Marmont was ordered to Leoben to cover the right from 
 the Tyrol. 
 
 While Napoleon was at Linz a deputation arrived from 
 the Austrian Emperor, asking for an armistice. But the 
 terms offered by Napoleon, including the abandonment by 
 Austria of Venice and the Tyrol, and the retirement of the 
 Russians to Poland as a preliminary, could not be accepted 
 by Francis. Napoleon had, indeed, nothing to gain by a 
 cessation of hostilities at this stage. Delay would admit 
 of the concentration of the Austrian and Russian forces, 
 and might induce Prussia to join the coalition. It was to 
 his interest to dictate terms of peace after the defeat of his 
 enemies, and not agree to any terms before then. 
 
 On this day Lannes was on the Ipps near Neumarkt. 
 
 Soult at Amstetten. 
 
 Bernadotte at Steyer. 
 
 Davout at Gaming. 
 
 Marmont at Weyer. 
 
 Murat's cavalry reached Molk. 
 
 Ney operating in the Tyrol. 
 
FROM ULM TO AUSTERLITZ 6i 
 
 The Austrian column under Merveldt, which had 
 Destruction ^^^^.rched up the Enns as already related, was 
 of an caught between Davout and Marmont at 
 
 Austrian Mariazell and cut to pieces in attempting to 
 Column regain St Polten ; only a broken remnant 
 escaped to Gratz. 
 
 Kutusoff now had only 35,000 men, so gave up all idea 
 of defending Vienna. On the night of the 8th he crossed 
 »Pjjg the Danube from Mautern to Krems, destroy- 
 
 Russians ing the wooden bridge there after completing 
 cross the his passage, his intention being to effect a 
 Danube junction with the second Russian army under 
 Buxhowden at Brunn, which he could reach four days 
 sooner than had he marched to Vienna. The Russian 
 passage of the Danube was covered by the Austrian 
 cavalry, which then went on to Vienna. 
 
 Napoleon, by the formation of Mortier's Corps on the 
 left bank of the Danube, appears to have expected some 
 movement on that side ; but he had placed Mortier in a 
 dangerous situation. 
 
 pth Napoleon left Linz on the 9th November, and 
 
 November established his headquarters at Molk. 
 
 He had directed Murat to push on to the Wienerwald, 
 unless he was resisted in force ; Soult followed in support, 
 with the other corps marching in rear, 
 loth On the 10th November Murat was at Siegharts 
 
 November Kirchen. 
 
 Lannes passed St Polten. 
 
 Soult was on the Traisen, with a division at Mautern. 
 
 Bernadotte was at Amstetten. 
 
 This day Mortier, on the left bank of the Danube, 
 drove back some outposts, and with Gazan's division took 
 up a position in the defile of Durrenstein, his other divisions 
 being a day's march in rear. Mortier appears to have 
 
62 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 paid little heed to the enemy. He used up all his cavalry 
 away on his left flank watching the Bohemian passes. He 
 had neither advanced nor flank guard. 
 
 Napoleon does not appear to have heard of the Russians 
 having crossed the Danube until the 11th November, 
 nth when we find him blaming Murat for pushing 
 
 November on ahead, regardless of this circumstance, which 
 should have induced him to ask for fresh instructions. 
 Napoleon wrote to him : 
 
 " You do not weigh your orders. The Russians, instead 
 of covering Vienna, have recrossed the Danube at Krems. 
 This circumstance should have made you understand that 
 you should not act without new instructions. Without 
 knowing the enemy's plans, or my wishes, you continue to 
 rush my army on to Vienna. Yet you were ordered to 
 pursue the Russians with your sw^ord in their ribs. It is a 
 curious way of pursuing them to move away from them 
 by forced marches." 
 
 He told Murat to occupy Tulln and reconnoitre to his 
 front. He now realised Mortier's danger, but too late. 
 As soon as he reached St Polten he called Soult up, and 
 directed Davout to halt at Modling. 
 
 But Kutusoff had perceived Mortier's isolated situation, 
 and on the morning of the 11th, advancing with Milorad- 
 Battleof ovich's division from Stein, attacked him in 
 Durrenstein front. Mortier counter-attacked, and drove the 
 Russians back, but at this moment Dokhturoff's division, 
 which had been despatched to Weisskirchen, closed the 
 rear of the Durrenstein defile ; Miloradovich was reinforced, 
 and Mortier, surrounded by 25,000 Russians, had to cut his 
 way out and rejoin Dupont, who arrived too late to relieve 
 him. In this battle Gazan's division was almost anni- 
 hilated. 
 
 After his defeat, Mortier recrossed the river at Spitz, 
 
FROM ULM TO AUSTERLITZ 63 
 
 with the aid of the flotilla, leaving Klein's dragoons to 
 reconnoitre on the left bank. 
 
 Napoleon now perceived that Kutusoff could either 
 retreat into Moravia or march down the left bank of the 
 Danube and hold the bridge at Vienna. He accordingly 
 directed Murat to go on and seize the Vienna bridge, pass 
 the Danube with part of his cavalry and Lannes' division, 
 to be followed by Soult, less two divisions to remain in 
 Vienna in reserve, and cover the route with cavalry. If 
 he could not force the bridge, or if it had been destroyed, 
 he was to pass at Tulin or Klosterneuburg. 
 
 Murat entered the Austrian capital in the early morning 
 of the 18th November. Vienna had been pusillanimously 
 i^th abandoned by the Austrians, whose emperor 
 
 November, had proceeded to Brunn to join the Emperor 
 Entry into Alexander of Russia, who had arrived there with 
 lenna ^j^^ second Russian army. Only a detachment 
 had been left at the northern end of the great Floridsdorf 
 bridge to blow it up when the French advanced. 
 
 While Napoleon was at Linz, the Austrian Emperor h^ 
 made overtures for an armistice, as already related. On 
 the 12th November a messenger arrived in Napoleon's 
 camp with reference to these negotiations. Murat took 
 advantage of this circumstance to deceive the Austrians 
 at the bridge into the belief that an armistice had been 
 concluded. Accompanied by Lannes and Bertrand he 
 walked along the bridge, and managed to bring some of his 
 troops up to seize it. Although the bridge was ready for 
 demolition, its destruction was thus prevented, and the 
 Austrian detachment withdrew towards Brunn. 
 
 jMurat pushed on, followed by the infantry, and reached 
 Stockerau the same evening ; the Russians were no 
 longer on Napoleon's flank, where, as the Emperor said 
 on the 11th, he had no intention of leaving them. 
 
64 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 Kutusoff had already left Krems and retreated to 
 Ebersbrunn. 
 
 Napoleon this day crossed the Danube and at midnight 
 reached his troops. Finding that the outposts were not 
 satisfactory he enunciated a tactical principle in his orders : 
 '' One must always assume that the enemy has moved at 
 night in order to attack at daybreak." 
 
 To Bernadotte he wrote on the 13th : " The enemy has 
 three courses open to him : (1) to move to Bohemia ; 
 (2) or to Moravia ; (3) to concentrate at Krems. The 
 last is so absurd that it is only taken into consideration 
 as a possibility. There would be no supplies, as he is not 
 master of the Danube. He would find himself surrounded 
 by the entire French army, of which he knows the strength. 
 But the probabilities are that he is already on the march." 
 Bernadotte was directed to cross the Danube at Krems, 
 and to pursue the enemy; the other corps would co-operate. 
 He would have to construct a bridge, as the Russians had 
 destroyed the wooden structure after crossing the river 
 on the 8th November. 
 
 It is interesting to note the distances marched by the 
 various corps. Lannes and Soult marched 152 miles in 
 thirteen days ; Davout, 180 miles in sixteen days. These 
 marches were generally over bad roads, cut up by the 
 movements of the retreating enemy, or by country roads, 
 and during or after bad weather. 
 
 On the 14th November Napoleon entered Vienna with 
 the Guard, and established his headquarters at the palace 
 General oi Schonbrunn. The Russians had reached 
 Situation Mcissau ; the garrison of Vienna, 13,000 strong, 
 after giving up the Floridsdorf bridge, had retreated to 
 Weikersdorf. Soult followed when relieved by Davout in 
 the afternoon. 
 
 The French line of communications had greatly 
 
FROM ULM TO AUSTERLITZ 65 
 
 lengthened, necessitating many detachments, some of 
 which held all the passages over the Danube from Ulm 
 to Presburg. Ney was operating in the Tyrol ; Augereau 
 was at Ulm to keep watch upon the Prussians, who had 
 formally joined the Coalition under the terms of the 
 Treaty of Potsdam concluded on 3rd November. Marmont 
 was at Leoben to guard the rear from any advance from 
 the direction of Italy and the Tyrol. Lauriston com- 
 manded detachments holding the line of the Inn. 
 
 Napoleon had directed Murat to press on in pursuit of 
 the Russians. He hoped to destroy Kutusoff's force before 
 Napoleon's it joined the second Russian army under Bux- 
 Dispositions howden, which was now approaching Brunn. 
 But in any case, in view of the general situation, he re- 
 solved to bring the enemy to battle. Seeing the necessity 
 for concentration, he directed Ney to leave the defence 
 of the Tyrol to the Bavarians, and to march to Salzburg. 
 The Austrians had already been driven out of the Tyrol, 
 and events had occurred there, and in the Italian theatre 
 of war, which will be related in the next chapter. Davout 
 was to place Friant's division on the Presburg road, and 
 Gudin's division at Neustadt, to connect with Marmont. 
 His remaining division, now commanded by Caffarelli in 
 place of Bisson, wounded at Lambach, was posted on the 
 road to Brunn. 
 
 Murat, under pressing orders to try to head off, or at 
 least inflict some damage on, Kutusoff, pushed on on the 
 Murat's 15th, having Lannes and Soult in support, as 
 Pursuit well as Caffarelli's division. On the 14-15th the 
 Russian had made a night march over the mountains to 
 Schrattenthal, with a view to retreating by Jetzelsdorf 
 on Brunn. To cover this movement he sent Bagration 
 with 8000 men to take up a position about Hollabrunn. 
 Murat came up with this detachment at Schongraben, but 
 
 £ 
 
66 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 allowed himself to be drawn into negotiations for an 
 armistice, an aide-de-camp of the Russian Emperor being 
 employed by the enemy for the purpose. Thus Murat, 
 instead of attacking, although he had no authority to act 
 in this respect, concluded an armistice and sent back 
 information to Napoleon. In the agreement the French 
 were to halt, and the Russians to march out of Germany 
 as soon as Napoleon's approval had been obtained. This 
 was, of course, just what the Russians wanted to gain time. 
 
 On receipt of this news on the morning of the 16th, 
 Napoleon at once wrote to Murat : "I cannot express my 
 displeasure. You only command my vanguard and have 
 no right to agree to an armistice without my orders. You 
 lose the fruits of a campaign. End the armistice at once, 
 and attack the enemy. Inform him that the general who 
 has signed this treaty has no power to make it, that only 
 the Russian Emperor has the right ; whenever the Tsar 
 ratifies the agreement, I also will ratify it. But it is only 
 a ruse. March, destroy the Russian army. You are in a 
 position to take his baggage and artillery." 
 
 Murat at once pressed forward with his cavalry and four 
 divisions of Soult's and Lannes' Corps. Bagration had 
 Battle of withdraAvn a little and occupied a defensive 
 HoUabrunn, position about the village of Grund, his guns 
 i6th posted to sweep the road from Hollabrunn, 
 
 November j^-g cavalry on either flank. Here the Russian 
 infantry fought with that stolid valour for which they 
 have ever been and still are famous. Pressed back from 
 Grund, they gave way slowly, fighting and in good order 
 retiring to a second position. Here the contest was 
 renewed, and it was not until nearly midnight that the 
 remnant of Bagration's 8000 men, reduced to some 3000 
 after a fight of three to one, were beaten from the field 
 of battle, and cut their way through the enemy, who 
 
FROM ULM TO AUSTERLITZ 67 
 
 was closing in on every side. But they had gained their 
 object, in covering the retreat of Kutusoff's main body. 
 
 Napoleon came up next morning, and pushed on in 
 pursuit. The cavalry reached Znaim, and was followed 
 i7thandi8th by Soult, Lannes, Caffarelli and the Guard, 
 November which arrived there on the morning of the 18th. 
 Bernptdotte, who had only succeeded in crossing the 
 Danube at Mautern on the 15th, was also coming up ; 
 reinforced with a Bavarian division, he was ordered towards 
 iBudweis to hold back the Archduke Ferdinand, who was 
 in Bohemia with 15,000 men. Mortier, after his defeat at 
 Durrenstein, had recrossed the Danube and reached Krems. 
 Beaumont was holding the Vienna-Brunn road with his 
 dragoons. Klein's cavalry watched the passes to Bohemia. 
 Napoleon gave his troops a day's rest at Znaim, writing to 
 the Austrian Emperor that he did so out of consideration 
 for the presence of the latter at Brunn. But no doubt the 
 necessity for giving his men repose was the real reason for 
 the halt, although there was no need to tell the enemy 
 this. Very properly, it was not his custom to show con- 
 sideration for his opponents in such circumstances. 
 
 On the 17th Kutusoff had reached Pohrlitz, and the 
 remnant of Bagration's rearguard was at Fraisnitz. At 
 Advance to Pohrlitz the Vienna garrison joined the Russians, 
 Brunn and on the 19th Kutusoff effected a junction with 
 
 the second army under Buxhowden at Wischau, some 
 twenty miles north-east of Brunn ; a few days later the 
 allied forces under the two emperors concentrated at 
 Olmutz. 
 
 That day the Grand Army continued the advance. 
 Murat got to Brunn ; Lannes and the headquarters to 
 Pohrlitz, and Soult beyond that place, on the right flank. 
 Bernadotte was at Budweis. Mortier was directed to 
 march two of his divisions to Vienna, leaving Dumonceau 
 
68 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 at Krems. There he would reheve Davout, who would 
 then occupy Presburg. On the 20th November Kutusoff 
 fell back to Prossnitz, Murat advanced to the Santon, push- 
 ing the enemy's advanced posts back to Wischau, and 
 Napoleon established his headquarters at Brunn. 
 
 It will be observed that Napoleon advanced from the 
 Lech in three great columns, which made good the 
 
 passage of the Isar and the Inn successively. 
 
 On the left, Lannes marched on Braunau; 
 Murat, Soult and Davout on Muhldorf in the centre ; 
 Bernadotte and Marmont, along the foothills, on Salzburg. 
 His left flank was covered by the Danube, and the rear- 
 guard echeloned on that side moving on Passau. The 
 right column guarded the approaches from the Tyrol, 
 where also Ney was to operate. Augereau held the line 
 of the Lech — the advanced base. Arrived on the Inn, 
 he established a new base, and the fresh advance to the 
 Traun and the Enns was made on a narrower front — the 
 left on Linz, the right on Vocklabruck. This narrowing 
 of the front was rendered necessary by the nature of the 
 country, and the possibility of battle. The Emperor 
 throughout acted on his principle : " Separate to live, 
 gather to fight." Later, as his flank became exposed 
 to an advance from the valley of the Muhr, Marmont 
 covered the flank on the Styrian Alps. His troops closed 
 in as St Polten was approached, for there was a fine 
 position where the enemy might be expected to give battle. 
 The advance on Vienna from beginning to end ; the 
 boldness combined with care for his communications 
 and his flanks, the turning of the enemy on each defensive 
 position on the successive rivers — these movements 
 furnish a fine example of the manner in which such 
 operations should be carried out. The boldness of his 
 policy and his strategy in view of the attitude of Prussia 
 
FROM ULM TO AUSTERLITZ 69 
 
 has already been dealt with. There are, however, one 
 or two points that require critical examination. 
 
 First, there is the detachment of Mortier's Corps to the 
 left bank of the Danube, resulting in its partial destruction 
 at the battle of Durrenstein. Detachments are, generally 
 speaking, undesirable ; and we may be sure that Napoleon 
 would not have detached this force had he not considered 
 it necessary to watch the passes from Bohemia. This 
 especially in view of the fact that it was his habit, and 
 one of his most invariable principles, to collect every 
 available man for battle. For, as he himself said : " No" 
 force should be detached on the eve of battle, because 
 affairs may change during the night, either by the retreat 
 of the enemy or by the arrival of large reinforcements 
 which might enable him to resume the offensive, and 
 render your previous dispositions di astrous." He was 
 expecting the enemy to make a stand at St Polten. 
 That he looked to the left bank of the river is, moreover, 
 evident from his establishment of a flotilla, which should 
 have formed a means of communication with Mortier. 
 It may be accepted, then, that it was necessary to have 
 a force on that bank. The fault which resulted in 
 Mortier's defeat lay in the first instance with Murat, who 
 was either unaware that the Russians had crossed the 
 Danube at Mautern or, if he knew of it, did not send back 
 information to the Emperor. In any case Murat should 
 have kept touch with the enemy, and should have followed 
 them closely to Mautern, and engaged their attention 
 instead of leaving them free to deal with Mortier. He 
 seems to have been anxious only to push on to Vienna. 
 Mortier's defeat was due largely to his own faulty 
 tactical dispositions. He had no advanced guard to 
 speak of, and no flank guard ; his forces were divided, 
 one division being a day's march in rear, and he took 
 
 C 
 
 y 
 
70 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 up a bad position in a defile, where he was hable to be 
 surrounded. It may be said that he had not expected 
 to meet with the Russians, bvit he came on their outposts, 
 and should then have taken up a strong position and 
 called in his other division. He here violated two 
 principles of war ; the first thus expressed by Napoleon : 
 " An army should be ready every day, every night, 
 and at all times of the day and night, to oppose all the 
 resistance of which it is capable " ; the second, that a 
 orce should be concentrated when it is possible that the 
 enemy may be met with, for every man is wanted in 
 attle. 
 
 Napoleon's situation at Linz, so far from the front, 
 until the 8th November, is open to criticism. But it 
 must be remembered that he had the affairs of an empire 
 as well as operations over a vast theatre of war to direct. 
 Moreover, in too close proximity to an enemy a com- 
 mander is liable to have his attention distracted by minor 
 issues. He was, it will be observed, negotiating with the 
 Austrian Emperor, and may have wished to protract 
 these negotiations and so gain time and keep the enemy 
 in uncertainty. This object would be assisted by his 
 remaining far back from the front. 
 
 Kutusoff conducted his retreat with skill, and his 
 rearguard actions were well and manfully fought, as 
 were those by the Russians in Manchuria a hundred years 
 later. The Russian general was sufficiently strong to 
 resist the demands of the Aulic Council that he should 
 make a stand on the Inn or the Enns vv^ith his inadequate 
 force. Divided command caused Merveldt to detach 
 himself and court the destruction which overtook him. 
 There can be no doubt that the Russian was right in 
 refusing battle until sufficient forces had been con- 
 centrated. Had he stood for the defence of Vienna with 
 
FROM ULM TO AUSTERLITZ 71 
 
 an inadequate force both the battle and the capital 
 would have been lost. He recognised, as did Napoleon, 
 that no geographical point, not even the capital of a 
 country, but the enemy's army, is the proper objective 
 in war. This cannot be too clearly recognised, for in our 
 own time a general has said that he had " thought the 
 war was over because he had taken the enemy's capitals." 
 Napoleon very rightly saw that, although he had taken 
 the enemy's capital, it was no time to negotiate ; he must 
 defeat their armies in the field. While Murat was to 
 blame for entering into an unauthorised armistice with 
 the Russians, this event w^ould not have occurred had 
 Napoleon been nearer the front. Bernadotte's dilatory 
 movements were also partly responsible for the escape 
 of Kutusoff. 
 
 J 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 OPERATIONS IN ITALY AND THE TYROL 
 
 Operations in Italy — Battle of Caldiero — Operations in the Tyrol — 
 
 Comments 
 
 While the opposing armies are facing one another at 
 Brunn and Olmutz, it will be convenient to glance at the 
 Operations secondary theatres of war in Italy and the 
 in Italy Tyrol, and review the progress of operations 
 in those countries, 
 j^ It has been related how Massena commanded some 
 50,000 men in Italy, whose role was to " contain " the 
 'Austrian army under the Archduke Charles. The two 
 armies stood on either side of the Adige, which, under the 
 terms of the Treaty of Luneville, formed the boundary 
 between Austrian and Italian territory. Neither com- 
 mander seemed anxious to take the initiative. The 
 Archduke preferred to hold Vcnetia rather than attempt 
 the conquest of Lombardy, especially as he overestimated 
 the strength of his opponents. Massena, in standing on 
 the defensive, was fulfilling his role of holding the 
 Austrians. 
 
 Thus a truce continued until the 18th October, when 
 Massena attacked and took the half of Verona that lay 
 on the Austrian side of the river, and pushed his advanced 
 posts towards Caldiero. The Archduke fell back to the 
 Caldiero position, with his left on that place and his right 
 on Colognola. This was the position held by the Austrians 
 under Alvinzy prior to the battle of Areola in 1796, of 
 
 72 
 
OPERATIONS IN ITALY AND THE TYROL 73 
 
 which Jomini says : " The heights of Caldiero are the 
 spurs of the mountains of Sette Communi, which slope 
 gradually to the Adige, and cross the post-road from 
 Verona to Vicenza. These heights, steep and covered 
 with vineyards, guarded on one side by the river and on 
 the other by the lofty mountains from which they spring, 
 form one of the most remarkable of military positions." 
 In these positions the armies remained facing one another 
 until the 28th October, when Massena heard of the 
 capitulation of Ulm, and sent two of his divisions to turn 
 one each flank of the Austrians, while the others were kept 
 in reserve in the centre. But the Archduke Charles, who 
 had received orders to retreat on Vienna, decided first 
 to take the offensive and strike a blow to check the 
 pursuit. On the 30th October he attacked the French 
 left, but the Austrians were pushed back on Colognola. 
 Battle of Massena's right at Combine also held their own ; 
 Caldiero but although a vigorous attack was made on the 
 Austrian position at Caldiero, the French were eventually 
 forced back on Verona when the Archduke's reserves 
 came up. Either side had lost some 6000 men. 
 
 The Archduke now decided to retreat. On the 2nd 
 November he fell back towards the Brenta, and crossed 
 the Tagliamento on the 8th. Massena followed, leaving 
 Gouvion St Cyr, arrived from Naples with 20,000 men 
 after the conclusion of the treaty with that state, to lay 
 siege to the large Austrian force in Venice. 
 
 A series of rearguard actions was fought, but the 
 Archduke retreated to Lay bach without much loss, 
 and on the 26th November joined the Archduke John 
 at Marburg. Massena halted on the Isonzo on the 16th, 
 but pressed on on receiving orders from Berthier, dated 
 22nd November : " The intention of the Emperor is 
 that you pursue the enemy without halting. Leave a 
 
74 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 corps of observation before Venice and another before 
 Palmanova, and pursue the enemy with your sword in 
 his ribs so that he may not be able to attack us, as we are 
 jiow in the presence of the whole Russian army." Late 
 in November Massena passed Tarvis, and on the 29th 
 descended the valley of the Save to Laybach, where he 
 got into communication with Ney, on the Drave, and 
 with Marniont. 
 
 While these events were taking place, a campaign was 
 in progress in the Tyrol. The Archduke John took 
 Operations command of the Austrian forces in the Tyrol 
 in the Tyrol in the middle of October. Reduced by re- 
 inforcements sent to Ulm and Italy, his army now 
 amounted to some 18,000 men, in addition to the Tyrolese 
 militia. Of these Jellachich had 6000 in the Vorarlb^g, 
 at Lindau and Hohenembs, whither he had retreated just 
 before the capitulation of Ulm, as related in a previous 
 chapter. In the valley of the Inn there were 9000 men, 
 under St Julien and Chasteler, between Kufstein and 
 Schaniitz ; and the Count de Rohan, a French emigre, 
 commanded 3000 between Landech and Fussen. 
 
 The advance of the Grand Army necessitated the 
 evacuation of the Vorarlberg and the Tyrol, and the 
 Archduke attempted to concentrate his forces at Inn- 
 spruck with a view to retreating down the Inn to Radstadt, 
 to support the flank of the main army on its way to 
 Vienna. Chasteler's column of 4O0O men reached 
 Radstadt; but the operations of the French obliged the 
 Archduke to change his plans and retreat southwards 
 across the Brenner Pass. 
 
 This was early in November. In the meantime Ney 
 had reached Innspruck on 5th November, and Augereau 
 had entered the Vorarlberg. This combined advance 
 made it difhcult for the Archduke to clear the Tyrol. 
 
OPERATIONS IN ITALY AND THE TYROL 75 
 
 His forces were divided. Jellachich was surrounded, 
 and surrendered to Augereau at Hohencnibs on the 14th 
 November. The Archduke retreated down the Puster 
 Valley to Klagenfurt, where he arrived on the 20th, but 
 de Rohan was unable to join the main body, and attempted 
 to escape to Venice. On the 19th he got to Trent, and 
 on the 23rd captured Bassano. But he was surrounded 
 at Castelfranco by St Cyr, who was besieging Venice, 
 and was compelled there to lay down his arms next 
 day. 
 
 In the meantime Ney had crossed the Brenner Pass to 
 Brixen, where he turned down the valley of the Drave 
 in pursuit of the Archduke John. But the latter was 
 already far ahead. On the 26th he joined the Archduke 
 Charles at Marburg. From there the combined forces 
 fell back towards Hungary, when Marmont occupied 
 Leoben, as related in the last chapter, but were unable 
 to rejoin the main army before the battle of Austerlitz. 
 Their combined forces now numbered 80,000 men. They 
 reached Komorn on the Danube, forty miles below 
 Presburg, on the 6th December. 
 
 The faulty strategy of the Allies, which sent the Archduke 
 Charles with the main Austrian army to Italy, has already . 
 been noted. Napoleon's rapid march on Vienna \ 
 rendered useless the skilful retreat of the Arch- | 
 duke towards the capital. The Grand Army was already J 
 interposed between him and the i^llies in Moravia before 
 he could possibly reach the Danube. 
 
 The Austrian forces remaining in the Tyrol were too 
 weak to be able to effect anything after the fall of Ulm. 
 Had the Tyrolese militia been well organised, in good 
 time, the country might have proved more difficult to 
 conquer, as was seen later by the patriotic resistance of 
 the people under Andreas Hofer in 1809. In this con- 
 
76 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 nection Napoleon's dictum, " without the aid of a regular 
 army national risings are easily suppressed," is interesting. 
 The evacuation of the Tyrol released Augereau's Corps 
 for service on the line of communications of the Grand 
 Army. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 
 
 General Situation — The Field of Austerlitz — Movements of the Allies 
 — French Position — Napoleon's Orders — Plans of the Allies — 
 The Morning of 2nd December — Attack on the French Right — 
 Napoleon's Counter-stroke — Action on the French Left — Repulse 
 of Bagration — Destruction of the Allied Left — The Battle ends — 
 Pursuit — The Fruits of Victory — Comments 
 
 Napoleon arrived in Brunn at 10 a.m. on the 20th 
 General November 1805. A review of the whole 
 Situation theatre of war revealed the situation as 
 follows : — 
 
 Position 
 
 Corps 
 
 Divisions 
 
 
 
 The Guard 
 
 
 5)3oo 
 
 Brunn 
 
 / Oudinot \ 
 Lannes \ g^^^et / 
 
 I2,000 
 
 
 
 ■ St Hilaire 
 
 
 Austerlitz 
 
 Soult 
 
 Legrand 
 ^ Vandamme . 
 Drouet 
 
 26jOOO 
 
 ) 
 
 Znaym and Budwitz 
 
 Bernadotte ■ 
 
 Rivaud 
 . Wrede's Bavarians . 
 
 j- 19,000 
 
 Pohrlitz 
 
 
 Caffarelli 
 
 6,OOQ 
 
 
 
 Nansouty 
 
 
 
 Wischau 
 
 Murat 
 
 d'Hautpoul 
 . Walther 
 
 * 
 
 4,500 
 
 Nicholsberg 
 
 
 Friant 
 
 6,000 
 
 En route to Presburg 
 
 
 Klein 
 
 1,000 
 
 Bohemia 
 
 
 Baraguey 
 
 4,500 
 
 En route to Znaym 
 
 
 Bourcier 
 
 2,000 
 
 Presburg 
 
 Davout 
 
 Gudin 
 
 8,000 
 
 Vienna 
 
 Mortifer \ 
 
 Dupont \ 
 L Gazan J 
 
 6,000 
 
 Neustadt 
 
 \ 
 
 Beaumont 
 . Dumonceau 
 
 2,000 
 
 4,500 
 
 Leoben and Gratz 
 
 Marmont i 
 
 r Boudet \ 
 L Gruchy / 
 
 Total 
 
 9,000 
 
 
 115,800 
 
 77 
 
78 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 The distances of these places from Brunn is about — 
 Pohrhtz, 18 miles, Znaym, 37 miles, Budwitz, 35 miles, 
 Nicholsberg, 30 miles, Presburg, 80 miles, Vienna, 70 miles, 
 Neustadt, 95 miles, Leoben, 145 miles, Gratz, 155 miles. 
 As the Allies were forty miles distant, it may be said that 
 Napoleon had in hand for battle about Brunn and Auster- 
 litz all troops within that range, about 75,000 men ; 
 while he could collect another 20,000 within four days. 
 Or, if he considered that he was not strong enough to fight 
 a battle, he could retire a few marches, call in his detach- 
 ments and have the whole force above detailed at his 
 disposal. The Allies, with the Emperors of Russia 
 and Austria, had now assembled at Olmutz, some forty 
 miles from Brunn. In Bohemia the Archduke Ferdinand 
 was collecting 15,000 men, but these would be kept in 
 check by Bernadotte and Baraguey d'Hilliers. 
 
 Ney had cleared the Tyrol, and the Archduke Charles 
 was retiring before Massena, as already related. The 
 Archdukes Charles and John effected a junction of their 
 forces, 80,000 strong, at Marburg on the 26th November, 
 but they were far distant from the decisive point ; Massena 
 and Ney were following them, and were at Laybach and 
 Botzen on the 29th and 21st November respectively. 
 Napoleon's communications with Vienna, and beyond that 
 to the Rhine, were well protected. The only event to 
 be feared in that direction was hostility on the part of 
 Prussia. But the French Emperor was aware of the 
 weak and vacillating character of the Prussian King. 
 He also knew that the Prussian army could not be ready 
 to take the field for some weeks. In case of defeat, 
 Napoleon need not retire through Vienna. He could 
 retreat by the right bank of the Danube, calling in his 
 detachments to join him on the march. In view of 
 the general situation, that has been detailed, it is 
 
THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 79 
 
 obvious that the best thing for him would be an early 
 battle. 
 
 The Allies immediately opposed to Napoleon were in 
 superior strength. They had 80,000 men, increased to 
 some 90,000 when the Grand Duke Constantine arrived 
 with the Guard on the 25th November. But by a policy 
 of delay they might hope for the arrival of the Archduke 
 Charles and the strategical assistance of the Prussian 
 army. But the Archduke Charles would have to march 
 through Hungary. 
 
 The_coyxs£S_Qpen^ t o them were to attack Napoleon ; 
 
 to threaten his line of communications in the hope of 
 
 obliging hirn to retreat ; to await events in their present 
 
 position, or to retire, in order to gain time, and draw out 
 
 the French line of communications if Napoleon advanced 
 
 to attack them. 
 
 / On the 21st November Murat's cavalry pushed back 
 
 \Buxhowden and established advanced posts at Wischau. 
 
 '^ During the ensuing few days both armies rested, the 
 
 ) Austrians at Olmutz and Olschau ; the French — Lannes 
 
 i^and the Guard in and in front of Brunn ; Soult at Auster- 
 
 litz and Pratzen ; Murat on the road towards Olmutz ; 
 
 Caffarelli between Znaim and Brunn. 
 
 During this time there was some dissension in the camp 
 of the Allies, who were nominally under command of the 
 Tsar Alexander, but in reality under Kutusoff. The 
 latter wished to retreat farther towards Poland, thus to 
 facilitate the supply of the army, a matter of considerable 
 difficulty, and for other reasons already given. Several 
 councils of war were held ; Weyrother, who had much 
 influence, headed the party who were in favour of attacking 
 the French, and as he was supported by the Tsar's im- 
 mediate entourage his views eventually prevailed. 
 
 No doubt the views of this party were encouraged by 
 
8o NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 Napoleon's apparent desire to avoid battle. He opened 
 negotiations, and sent Savary, his aide-de-camp, to the 
 Russian Emperor, " to compliment him on his arrival 
 with the army " and " to express his esteem and his desire 
 to gain his friendship." Savary profited by his visit to 
 observe the " presumption, imprudence and inconsidera- 
 tion " that prevailed in the military cabinet of the Allies. 
 At the same time the Prussian minister and two envoys 
 from the Emperor Francis came to Napoleon's head- 
 quarters, to negotiate for peace, the Austrians hoping 
 for more favourable terms in view of the attitude of 
 Prussia. 
 
 But Napoleon perceived that the object of the Allies 
 was to conceal theff inteiitions, and in fact they began 
 tcT move wHIe^nego tiations were iii progress. On the 
 27thjliey_ moved to Prossnitz, and on the 28th again 
 advanced, Bagration driving ia the Fm^ from 
 
 Wischau and occupymg that place. His cavalry had 
 brought the Emperor news of the advance of the Allies, 
 and he at once directed Caffarelli, Bourcier and Klein to 
 come up to Brunn by 7 a.m. On the morning of the 29th 
 Bernadotte was also called in from Iglau, to reinforce the 
 left with hi 3 two French divisions, leaving Wrede's 
 Bavarian division to hold the Archduke Ferdinand. 
 Mortier was ordered up by forced marches from Vienna ; 
 Davout was to advance to Raigern, where he could support 
 the French right in the battle which seemed imminent, 
 and which Napoleon now, in view of the Allies' movements, 
 expected on the 29th.— 
 
 Soult was in position at Posoritz, and after issuing orders 
 for these movements the Emperor rode over to that place, 
 and from the heights of Austerlitz observed the move- 
 ments of the allied forces. These did not indicate an 
 immediate attack, but that evening Savary returned from 
 
THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 8i 
 
 a mission to Olmutz, and reported that the entire hostile 
 army was on the march. 
 
 On the 29th November the alHed army, formed in five 
 columns, continued to advance towards Austerlitz, their 
 right on the Olmutz-Brunn road, their left on the Littawa 
 stream. On the right was Bagration with 12,000 Russians, 
 and 6000 cavalry under Lichtenstein. In the centre — 
 Kollo wrath J Austria n)^ with rT,XI0O men, his own corps 
 and i Viilor adovicli's Kussians ; on the left Buxhowden had 
 three columns of 40,000 Russians under Dokhturoff, 
 Langeron and Pribizevski, with an advanced guard of 
 6000 Austrian horse under Kienmayer. The Grand Duke 
 Constantine was in reserve with the Russian Impenal 
 Gruafd7 8000 strong. 
 
 Napoleon now perceived that the Allies intended to turn 
 his right and cut him off from Vienna. He used every 
 means to encourage the enemy to attack ; received Prince 
 Dologoruki, the Tsar's aide-de-camp, at the outposts, and 
 gave him the impression that he did not desire battle ; 
 evacuated Austerlitz and withdrew Soult to the line 
 Sokolnitz-Schlappanitz, and drew back his cavalry. 
 
 On the 30th November the Allies' outposts advanced 
 on their left as far as Satschan, their right being at 
 Schumitz. 
 
 Napoleon spent the 30th November in surveying the 
 country between the Goldbach stream, behind which his 
 The Field of troops were posted, and the Littawa. The 
 Austerlitz principal feature of this ground was formed 
 by the heights of Pratzen, which extended from Augezd 
 to the Santon Hill, and the valleys and slopes of which 
 afforded good cover for the movements of troops. The 
 summit of these heights formed a plateau of considerable 
 extent. South-west of the Pratzen were the Satschan 
 and Melnitz lakes, now frozen over, as was the marshy 
 
 F 
 
 / 
 
82 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 ground in the valleys. The line from the San ton Hill to 
 the Satschan Lake obviously offered a fine defensive 
 position, behind which the Goldbach stream was no 
 obstacle to the passage of troops to the Vienna road. 
 Brunn was ,a strong fortress, between which and Raigern 
 flowed the Schwatzawa stream behind a wood of consider- 
 able extent, affording a second defensive position. 
 
 It may seem strange, then, that Napoleon did not 
 
 occupy the position indicated, and fight a defensive battle 
 
 in protection of his communications with Vienna. But 
 
 he had formed a great resolve. He did not wish to fight. 
 
 ^n ordinary_battlejjn_which victory would mean merely 
 
 ya set-back to the enemy. He determined to gain a de- 
 
 \J cisive victory. This he hoped to do by allowing the enemy 
 
 to continue the turning movement which he had been ob- _ 
 
 "serving. - The turning movement in progress involved the 
 
 massing of troops on the allied left, and the consequent 
 
 weakening of their centre, while at the same time their 
 
 columns on the march would present their flank to attack. 
 
 Napoleon resolved to mass his strength in the centre behind 
 
 the Goldbach stream, and at the right moment break the 
 
 allied centre and then destroy their separated wings. 
 
 On the 1st December the Allies continued the move- 
 ment which was to bring them into a position to turn 
 Movements the French right flank. Their army was still 
 of the Allies in five columns ; Bagration, with 13,000 men, 
 halted in front of Raussnitz on the Olmutz road. 
 Dokhturoff had 8500 men on the line Hostjeradek- 
 Augezd ; Langeron was in command of 11,600 on the 
 right of Dohkturoff, on the plateau of Pratzen ; Pribizevski 
 had 13,800 behind Pratzen, and behind him stood Kollow- 
 rath with 25,400, in front of Krzenowitz, where were 
 the headquarters and the Grand Duke Constantine with 
 8500 of the Russian Imperial Guard ; Lichtenstein was 
 
THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 83 
 
 with 6000 horse at the foot of the Pratzen plateau, between 
 Langeron and Pribizevski. 
 
 On the 1st December Napoleon's troops were posted on 
 the general line of the Goldbach stream : his left on the San- 
 French ton Hill, which was fortified, and strengthened 
 Position with twelve guns ; his right on the Menitz Lake. 
 Lannes, under whom Caffarelli had also been placed, held 
 the left, astride of the Olmutz road, with Suchet's division 
 on the Santon to Girzigowitz, and Caffarelli behind him ; 
 Oudinot south of the road and in front of Napoleon's 
 bivouac, which was on a commanding hill, between 
 Schlapanitz and Blasowitz, now known as " Napoleon's 
 Mount," behind which the Guard was posted, in front of 
 Bellowitz, Bernadotte on arrival this day took up a 
 position in rear of Caffarelli, and Murat with the cavalry 
 was posted in rear of the left wing. Soult, drawn back 
 from the Pratzen plateau, was in the centre between 
 Puntowitz and Kobelnitz, behind the Goldbach, having 
 Vandamme's and St Hilaire's divisions on the left, and 
 Legrand's on the right between Kobelnitz and Telnitz. 
 Davout, Friant and Bourcier reached Raigern that 
 night. 
 
 Observing the enemy's movements during the day, the 
 French Emperor v/atched the progress of their turning 
 movement, which proceeded as he wished and expected. 
 
 In the afternoon he sent for his corps commanders, 
 Napoleon's ^^^ explained to them the situation and his 
 Orders intention for next day. His orders were issued 
 as follows at 8.30 p.m. : — 
 
 " Marshal Soult will direct his three divisions to be 
 beyond the ravine (the Bosenitz stream) at seven o'clock 
 in the morning, ready to begin the manoeuvre of the day, 
 which is to be a forward movement by echelons, right wing 
 
84 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 leading. Marshal Soult himself will be at the Emperor's 
 bivouac at 7.30 a.m. 
 
 " Prince Murat will order the cavalry divisions of 
 Generals Kellermann, Walther, Beaumont, Nansouty and 
 Hautpoul to be between Marshal Soult's left and Marshal 
 Lannes' right at 7 a.m., to occupy as little space as possible, 
 so that as soon as Marshal Soult advances, all the cavalry 
 will pass the stream, and find itself in the centre of the 
 army. 
 
 " At 7 A.M. General Caffarelli will march and place his 
 division on the right of General Suchet's division, after 
 passing the stream. Suchet's and Caffarelli's divisions 
 will each form two lines, a brigade in each forming one line, 
 so that the space now occupied by Suchet's division will 
 suffice for both divisions. 
 
 " Marshal Lannes will see that Suchet's and Caffarelli's 
 divisions are placed behind the ridge in such a manner as 
 not to be observed by the enemy. 
 
 " At 7 A.M. Marshal Bernadotte will move his two 
 divisions into the position now occupied by Caffarelli's 
 division, except that his left will be close to and in rear 
 of the Santon Hill, and will remain there in column of 
 regiments. 
 
 " Marshal Lannes will order the Grenadier Division 
 (Oudinot) to take post in line in front of his present 
 position, the left in rear of General Caffarelli's right. 
 General Oudinot will reconnoitre the defile where he is to 
 pass the stream, the same defile by which Marshal Soult 
 will have passed. 
 
 " Marshal Davout, with Friant's division and Bourcier's 
 dragoons, will start at 5 a.m. from Raigern Abbey, and 
 come up on Marshal Soult's right. Gudin's division will 
 be placed at Marshal Soult's disposal when it reaches him. 
 
 " At 7.30 A.M. the marshals will be at the Emperor's 
 
THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 85 
 
 bivouac, when fresh orders will be given according to any 
 movements the enemy may have made during the night. 
 
 " Marshal Bernadotte's cavalry is placed under the 
 orders of Prince Murat, who will order it to march so as to 
 be in position at seven o'clock. 
 
 " Prince Murat will similarly have Marshal Lannes' 
 light cavalry at his disposal. 
 
 " All troops will remain as above disposed pending fresh 
 orders. 
 
 " As Prince Murat 's cavalry must occupy as little space 
 as possible at first, he will have it in column. 
 
 " Marshal Davout will find at the abbey a squadron and 
 a half of the 21st Dragoons, which he will send to the 
 bivouac. 
 
 " All the marshals will give the necessary orders conse- 
 quent on these dispositions." 
 
 It will be seen from these orders that Napoleon held his 
 right weakly with Legrand's division, but that it would 
 receive support from Davout ; that his strength was 
 massed in his centre, but hidden from the enemy, and 
 ready for the offensive counter-stroke, which he would 
 order in the morning according to the development of 
 events. On his left Lannes at the fortified Santon Hill 
 formed a strong point d^appui, and held the main road to 
 Brunn. 
 
 / in a proclamation read to the soldiers this day Napoleon 
 said : " We occupy a formidable position, and while the 
 enemy are marching to turn my right they will present 
 their flank to me. ' ' At ni^ht he walked round the bivouacs, 
 and was received everywhere with acclamations and 
 / shouts of " Vive I'Empereur ! " while the soldiers hoisted 
 f torches of burning straw on the tops of poles. He spent 
 X^some time in observing the enemy's position, and after 
 
86 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 midnight rode over to the Satschan, to observe some re- 
 ported movements of the enemy. And then he slept until 
 dawn of 2nd December. 
 
 That night orders were issued to the allied army for 
 
 next day's battle in accordance with a plan drawn up 
 
 Plans of the by Weyrother. Bagration was to attack the 
 
 /^ Allies Santon Hill, the fortified post on the French left, 
 
 ( supported by Lichtenstein's cavalry, which was to move 
 
 V in the morning from its bivouac on the Pratzen plateau 
 
 ^nd deploy between Krug and Blasowitz. The Grand 
 
 (Duke Constantine with the Russian Inperial Guard would 
 form a reserve on the allied right. 
 Dokhturoff was to march on Telnitz, covered by Kien- 
 / mayer's cavalry, which would afterwards move in the 
 direction of Raigern Abbey. Langeron and Pribizevski 
 were to advance against Sokolnitz and its castle, and then, 
 conforming to the movements of the other columns, wheel 
 to the right to roll up the French right. This attack was 
 under Buxhowden. Miloradovich and Kollowrath, with 
 the allied headquarters, were to advance towards Pratzen 
 and Pontowitz. Thus the centre of the Allies was weak. 
 They were massed in strength on their left, and they were 
 unduly spread out and split into isolated columns over a 
 front eight miles in extent in order to carry out a plan 
 which involved attack by three separate columns. More- 
 over, the manoeuvre was complicated in view of the 
 position of the troops, and involved flank marches in the 
 presence of the enemy. Briefly, the Allies would be massed 
 on their left against the French right ; the French, holding 
 their right lightly, were in greatly superior force on their 
 left, facing the allied right and centre. 
 
 Napoleon had already risen when the Allies began to 
 move at daybreak on the 2nd December, and with his 
 marshals was standing on the hill where he had bivouacked, 
 
THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 87 
 
 and from whence he had a commanding view of the 
 battlefield. The landscape was hidden by a thick fog, 
 The ^^^ these mists of night gradually cleared from 
 
 Morning the higher ground and shrank into the valleys ; 
 of 2nd by seven o'clock the hilltops appeared like islands 
 
 December jj^ mid-air ; then the sun rose and by degrees 
 dispersed the gathered mists. On both sides the troops in 
 the low ground were hidden by the fog, but Lichtenstein's 
 cavalry was seen marching towards Holubitz and soon 
 afterwards the march of Buxhowden's masses towards 
 Augezd, Telnitz and Sokolnitz was observed. 
 
 The__battl^ developed exa^ly as Napoleon had an- 
 ticipated, or, as he said, "as if^both armies were per- 
 forming manoeuvres under my direction." The Pratzen ^ 
 was soon denuded of troops as the columns moved off to • 
 the flanks, a manoeuvre not carried out without some con- ^' 
 fusion, for the various divisions had to pass each other ^ 
 on the march, and delay was caused by their becoming " , 
 involved with one another. Preceded by Kienmayer's ^ 
 cavalry, Buxhowden marched his 40,000 men to turn the ^ 
 French right. Lichtenstein, moving off to support 
 Bagration on the allied right, got mixed up with Pribi- 
 zevski's and Kollowrath's rearguards in succession, while 
 Pribizevski and Langeron also reached the neighbourhood 
 of the Goldbach in some disorder. 
 
 And now on the French right the roll of musketry 
 announced that the battle had begun. Debouching from 
 Attack on Augezd, Kienmayer attacked Telnitz, followed 
 the French by Dokhturoff's columns, while Langeron 
 ^^sht advanced on Sokolnitz, with Pribizevski in 
 
 support. Legrand's weak division could do but little 
 against the masses of their foes ; their sharpshooters were 
 driven back across the stream and Telnitz and Sokolnitz 
 fell into the enemy's hands. But Davout, who had 
 
88 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 marched from Raigern at 5 a.m., now appeared on the 
 scene, and took post on the hills about Ottmarau. He 
 attacked the heads of the allied columns as they debouched 
 from the captured villages, and these were taken and 
 retaken several times, until, largely with the aid of their 
 well-posted batteries, the French re-established themselves 
 on the line of the Goldbach and held their enemies in check. 
 From his commanding position the French Emperor 
 had observed the weakness of the allied centre and the 
 evacuation of the Pratzen heights. He asked Soult, at 
 about half-past eight, how long it would take him to 
 reach the heights of Pratzen, and, being told, " less than 
 twenty minutes," said : " In that case we will wait another 
 quarter of an hour." At about nine o'clock, seeing that 
 the enemy's left had gone far to the flank, he gave orders 
 for Lannes to engage Bagration in front of the Santon 
 Hill, and directed Soult and Bernadotte to advance up 
 the Pratzen. 
 
 These troops had been hidden in the low ground at the 
 
 foot of the plateau. With Vandamme on the left and St 
 
 Napoleon's Hilaire on the right, Soult climbed the slope and, 
 
 Counter- as they reached the summit, his troops beheld, 
 
 st^ke advancing in column of route, the divisions of 
 
 Miloradovich (Russian) and Kollowrath (Austrian), with 
 
 which were the headquarters and Kutusoff. Taken by 
 
 ^ surprise, these columns made a gallant stand ; Kutusoff 
 
 ^ held Pratzen, and deployed to meet the attack ; but he 
 
 had no reserve, and was outnumbered and overwhelmed, 
 
 largely by the fire of the French artillery, and in an hour 
 
 was driven down the slope with the loss of all his guns. 
 
 \ The remnants of the beaten columns retreated — Milorad- 
 
 J^ovich on Krzenowitz, Kollowrath on Hostieradek. 
 
 While this fight was in progress in the centre, Berna- 
 dotte, with Murat on his left, between himself and Lannes, 
 
THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 89 
 
 had marched on Krug and Blasowitz, while Lannes at 
 the same time advanced upon the allied right under 
 Action on Bagration. Lichtenstein's cavalry, which should 
 the French have formed the first line in prolongation 
 Left of Bagration, had been delayed, as already 
 
 related, and the Grand Duke Constantine with the Russian 
 Imperial Guard, who was to have formed the reserve in 
 rear of Lichtenstein, found himself in front of the latter 
 in the first line, advancing on Blasowitz. The Grand 
 Duke thus came unexpectedly into collision with Berna- 
 dotte, and Lichtenstein passed round his rear and came 
 into action on his right. The Russians at once attacked, 
 the infantry charging with the bayonet, and the cavalry 
 riding down at the same time one of Vandamme's brigades, 
 which was thrown into confusion, suffered heavy loss and 
 lost an Eagle. But Napoleon saw this reverse, and 
 ordered Bessieres and Rapp to charge with the cavalry 
 of his Guard, which overthrew the Russians, but were in 
 turn charged by fresh squadrons. After a combat of 
 varying fortunes, the French horsemen remained masters 
 of the field. Bernadotte's divisions now pushed on to 
 attack the Russian Imperial Guard, and these were soon 
 driven across the Littawa. 
 
 On the allied right Bagration had met with no better 
 success ; attacked by Lannes' divisions, his infantry 
 Repulse of niade a fierce stand about Bosenitz, which 
 Bagration the Russians captured. But nothing could 
 withstand the elan of the French. Caught between the 
 fire of Rivaud and Caffarelli, some Russian cuirassiers 
 that had made a gallant and successful charge were swept 
 from the field with the loss of half their number. Bagra- 
 tion was driven out of Bosenitz, and forced back on 
 Kowalowitz by the weight of numbers, with the loss of 
 his baggage and artillery. Seeing the Russians beaten, 
 
90 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 Napoleon sent to halt his left on the Olniutz road, and 
 Lannes drew back to Raussnitz, while Bagration eventu- 
 ally retreated on Austerlitz. 
 
 In the meantime Soult had cleared the Pratzen plateau 
 of the enemy ; he now turned to his right to cut off the 
 Destruction retreat of the allied left wing, still fighting on 
 of the Allied the Goldbach, advancing on Kobelnitz, Telnitz 
 L^^^ and Augezd ; Drouet flanked him by moving on 
 
 Krzenowitz. It was past midday, Davout and Legrand 
 were still holding their own, and Soult's advance struck 
 the Allies in flank and in reverse. At Kobelnitz, being 
 surrounded, Pribizevski laid down his arms, while 
 Langeron drew off the remnant of his troops to Telnitz. 
 But now the French were closing in on every side, 
 and the Allies were penned in between the Goldbach and 
 the Satschan ponds. Napoleon, who had seen the over- 
 throw of Bagration on the left at about one o'clock, 
 followed Soult with the Guard and Oudinot's grenadiers, 
 and took post at the Chapel of St Antony. Already the 
 battle was won, and the word to that effect passed along 
 the French line. Buxhowden tried to break out towards 
 Aujezd, but found his way barred by Vandamme, who 
 pierced and cut the Russian column in two. Half the 
 ^remnant, with Buxhowden at their head, broke through 
 j and reached Austerlitz with the loss of their guns ; while 
 Dokhturoff with the other half turned between the 
 Satschan ponds. Here his troops came under a devastat- 
 ing artillery fire, and only a shattered remnant, skilfully 
 and gallantly covered by Kienmayer's cavalry, made their 
 escape into the hills to the south-east. 
 } The battle was over. Night fell on the scattered 
 The Battle remnants of the enemy fleeing in so many 
 ends directions that their general line of retreat 
 
 could not be ascertained for some time. 
 
THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 91 
 
 Never was victory more complete. The Allies had lost 
 15,000 killed and wounded, 20,000 prisoners, 200 guns, 
 and the greater part of their baggage. The French loss J 
 has been variously stated at 7000 to 10,000 men. 
 
 Napoleon had watched the destruction of the enemy's 
 left wing from his position at the Chapel of St Antony. 
 On the conclusion of the battle he rode over the battle- 
 field, observing the killed and wounded. Passing through 
 the bivouacs, he addressed each regiment ; and at mid- 
 night established his headquarters at the post-house of 
 Posoritz. 
 
 The French troops bivouacked on the line Raussnitz- 
 Hostieradek, that had been held by the Allies the preceding 
 day. It was too late to take up the pursuit that night, 
 nor was it known in what direction the enemy had 
 retreated. In fact, Napoleon himself appears scarcely 
 to have realised the extent of his victory. But at dawn, 
 on the 3rd, Lichtenstein came to ask for a truce on behalf, 
 Z^^ . of the Emperor Francis, and Napoleon then 
 
 J knew that the Allies were completely broken. 
 But his principle was not merely to defeat but to destroy>^ 
 the enemy. He refused a truce, appointing next day for 1 
 an interview with the Austrian Emperor. He wrote to 
 Soult : " The Emperor will personally follow on the 
 heels of the enemy. His opinion is that in war nothing 
 is done so long as anything remains to be done. As long 
 as more can be accomplished, no victory is complete. 
 The one thing to do is to inflict as much loss as possible 
 upon the enemy, and complete the victory." ^ 
 
 The Allies had been obliged to abandon their line of 
 communications with Olmutz, and had taken the road to 
 Hungary through Coding. All troops were ordered to 
 pursue, including Gudin's division at Nicholsberg, with 
 the object of coming up with the enemy before they 
 
92 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 crossed the March river ; and already the French troops 
 had obtained contact with the hostile rearguards, when 
 a truce was agreed to. 
 n On the afternoon of the 4th the Emperor Francis 
 arrived at Napoleon's camp, and a suspension of arms 
 The Fruits was arranged, under the terms of which the 
 of Victory Russians returned to their country and negotia- 
 tions for peace were entered upon between France and 
 Austria, who would agree to such terms as the French 
 
 /:) Emperor imposed. 
 On the 26th December the Treaty of Presburg was 
 concluded ; by this treaty France received the Dalmatian 
 provinces ; the Venetian states were ceded to Italy ; 
 Bavaria obtained the Tyrol and Vorarlberg ; and Baden 
 and Wiirtemberg received some accession of territory. 
 Bavaria and Wiirtemburg became independent kingdoms, 
 and Baden a grand duchy. As an indirect result of the 
 campaign, Prussia also came to terms, to be broken in 
 the ensuing year, when the debacle of Jena took place. 
 Holland and Naples became kingdoms in the Napoleonic 
 system. 
 
 It is a trite saying that Austerlitz was the first great 
 
 Napoleonic battle. In his previous campaigns the 
 
 Emperor had not such numerous forces at 
 
 his disposal. In the battles in Italy he had 
 
 comparatively small armies : at Rivoli only 30,000, and 
 
 about the same number at Marengo. 
 
 It is too frequently said that, in view of modern develop- 
 ments, we have nothing to learn from the tactics of the 
 past. But, though details of minor tactics change, the 
 great principles of battle tactics remain the same, and 
 of these the greatest is t he necessity for the __Q£fensive 
 spirit . Aus terlitz is the type of modern battles, and 
 illustrales—those great principles which are recognised 
 
THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 93 
 
 Jn our day. It shows us that, although an army may ^ 
 stand on the defensive for a time with advantage, decisive .jZ^ 
 success can be gained only by the adoption^ of a vigorous *^-> ^^ 
 offensive at the right p!ace_and moment ; and it proves ( 
 that, while superior nu mbers have an advantage, they )^^ 
 can not staiid^ga inst superior skill, organisation, training-^ 
 an d moral . It is not necessary to review in detail all the 
 lessons of this model battle ; but the value of the co- 
 operation of the three arms ; of the tactical surprise/^ iJ-uyy 
 which struck the enemy unexpectedly at his weakest < 4^ 
 point, and of relentless pursuit may be indicated ; as also ^ ^ 
 the danger of ^^ank march in the presence of an enemy. 
 On this point Napoleon said : " Nothing is so rash or ^k^ 
 ] so contrary to principle as to make a flank march before 
 Laruarmy in position." The conception of the Allies, when ^ /jn 
 they had decided to attack, in its widest sense was excel- ^^^^^^ 
 lent, but its execution was bad. Austerlitz shows us thai: ^ 
 the counter-attack is the soul of defence, and that in '''% 
 defence, as in attack, the enemy should be held all along ^^^^t^^ 
 the line, while the decisive stroke is delivered at the 
 favourable place and moment. 
 
 The Allies should have strengthened their centre on 
 the Pratzen with earthworks and guns, and should have 
 executed the earlier part of their turning movement on 
 the previous day or night out of view of the enemy, so 
 that it might have had in it some element of surprise, f^^^"^ 
 Their troops were badly posted on the 1st December^ T,,,^y> 
 SLiid were badly led in the battle next day. They violated 
 Napoleon's maxim : "It should be laid down as a \^ 
 principle never to leave intervals by which the enemy can^^ v/'tx 
 penetrate between corps formed in order of battle, unless />/U^ 
 it be to draw him into a snare." They discussed in councils Y^'] 
 of war the action that was to be taken, and, after the usual 
 manner of councils of war, they came to a wrong decision. 
 
1 
 
 94 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 Prior to the battle the strategical situation was largely 
 in their favour. They had at Austerlitz an army 
 numerically superior to the French. Napoleon was far 
 from his base, and his line of communications was greatly 
 extended. It was, then, to the advantage of the Allies 
 to have drawn him out still farther. They might well 
 have abandoned their line of communications with 
 Olmutz, and fallen back on the road to Hungary, where 
 they would have been joined in a few days by the Arch- 
 duke Charles with 80,000 men. They would then not 
 only have had more chance of fighting a successful battle, 
 but would have gained more time for Prussia to declare 
 herself. They had in fact everything to gain, as Napoleon 
 had everything to lose, by delay. But the hot-heads in 
 the allied camp who were for immediate battle gained the 
 day, and again proved the futiiity^ofjiyided command, _ 
 and the evijsof^ councils of war. On this point we find 
 in Napoleon's maxims : '' The same consequences which / 
 have uniformly attended long discussions and councils | 
 of war will follow at all times. They will terminate in 
 the adoption of the worst course." 
 
 As has been remarked. Napoleon might have occupied 
 the Pratzen and taken up a regular defensive position, 
 as an ordinary commander would have done. But by 
 every principle of war, and especially of that great 
 principle which makes surprise essentia l to succe ss, he 
 acted rightly. He was, moreover, m a position from 
 which he could withdraw to another farther back, had 
 such a course of action been necessary. It has been said 
 that, if defeated or obliged to retreat, he would have 
 found himself in a precarious situation with his line of 
 communications with Vienna severed by the allied army. 
 But that line was by no means essential to his safety. 
 His shorter line was to retire through Znaim and by the 
 
THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 95 
 
 left bank of the Danube on Passau or Ratisbon which he 
 could have done without difficulty, favoured by the 
 configuration of the country and by the situation of his 
 detachments which would have conformed to the move- 
 ment. 
 
 It is, perhaps, more wi th_ regard t ru-eofiamand— that 
 tacticsj].ave_chajiged_iii_iiur xiay. In former times, as at 
 Au sterli tz, when even artillery ranged to no great dis- 
 tance, rnen~were handled in m^asses by the commander 
 on the field of battle. He was able to direct personally 
 the manoeuvresofhistroops, all of which were within a 
 lirnited area almost within range of his vision. H!e couT^ 
 pass rapidlyfr ^rgTie°5flgrot thenBatn^ yTffTrn^p othpi-^ 
 VatcK^v ery phasfi o fjjje fight, nrfd ^at the critical mom ent 
 launch bis--Jceseryeinto the conflict. Thus Napoleon, 
 posted on a commanding eminence, could survey the 
 whole area of operations, observe the panorama-like ) 
 unfolding of events, and with the unerring eye of genius j 
 could see for himself the measures that became necessary, '^ 
 
 as fheh^f]e. dpvploppd, ^'^ bring phont Jhhp ksiip of the 
 
 contest. The battle lay in the hollow of his hand, and 
 his military genius sufficed to secure the victory. The 
 combatants were, moreover, closely engaged, and with 
 Napoleon victory meant disaster for his enemies, who 
 were unable to extricate their forces. 
 
 There followed the terror of the pursuit, close, pitiless, yy^^ 
 unrelenting, the whole theory of which is contained in 
 Napoleon's instructions to Soult after the battle of if1 Cam 
 Austerlitz. No hastily formed rearguard with short- f ^ ^ 
 ranging weapons could keep at bay pursuers who were 
 flushed with victory. Under the conditions prevailing 
 a hundred years ago, cavalry were in their element. 
 Able to approach with impunity within charging distance 
 of the foe, they could strike home with deadly effect. 
 
96 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 They completed the victory and they were pre-eminent 
 in pursuit. 
 
 Napoleon placed great armies in the field, but the 
 limitations of the weapons of those days led to a curtail- 
 ment of the area of tactical manoeuvre. Under modern 
 conditions, partly owing to the facilities for supply and 
 transport afforded by raihvays, partly to increase of 
 population and extension of the system of conscription, 
 ^ and to improvements in organisation, still larger armies 
 / are assembled in the battle area, until we find something 
 ; approaching half-a-million of men arrayed on either side. 
 \ This has led to an extension of the field of battle, whilst 
 the power of modern arms has resulted in still greater 
 extension, both laterally and in depth. 
 
 It will therefore be easily understood that the concentra- 
 tion of tactical command in one person, though facilitated 
 by the telegraph, telephone and improvements in signal- 
 ling, is no longer possible as in Napoleon's day. The 
 tactics of command have given place to the tactics of 
 disposition. The Commander-in-Chief, under present 
 conditions, can only dispose his troops and make known 
 the object he desires to attain. His subordinates must 
 z'- therefore exercise a wide initiative ; they must not be 
 \ dependent on the chief as the marshals of France were 
 on the great Emperor. They must be men of high attain- 
 ments and strong character. 
 yy^-;) In one respect, however, concentration of command 
 ^^ is as necessary as it was at Austerlitz. The battle may be 
 r*t won in one part of the field, but such local victory may 
 
 be rendered useless by reverses elsewhere. Then it is that 
 the Commander-in-Chief can influence the contest by the 
 disposal of the great general reserve which he must have 
 kept in his hand. In our day, as in Napoleon's time, 
 battles are only won by reinforcing a line at the critical 
 
THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ 97 
 
 moment. It was at that moment which decided the 
 winning or losing of a battle that the great master of the 
 art of war was in the habit of using his reserves. 
 
 Austerlitz, the first great Napoleonic battle, was in 
 some respects the precursor of the modern conflict. We 
 find here the battle neglected by Napoleon in one part 
 of the field in order to make the ultimate victory more 
 crushing. Here, too, in an area of inconsiderable extent, 
 is included a variety of physical features — hills, rivers, 
 valleys and lakes — making the theatre of tactical opera- 
 tions something like a miniature of that likely to be 
 involved in a modern battle, the vast extent of which will 
 provide every variety of landscape. 
 
 In recent times it is with regard to cavalry and its role 
 that controversy has been most in evidence. We see 
 cavalry used as it should be employed throughout the 
 Austerlitz campaign. Napoleon perfected cavalry. He 
 separated the mounted arm from the infantry divisions 
 and organised it in independent bodies. And although 
 in his time almost the whole role of cavalry on the field 
 of battle was comprised in shock tactics, he recognised 
 the necessity of arming his cavalry with carbines. Many 
 of his instructions with regard to the use of this arm 
 hold good to this day. Thus : " An army superior in 
 cavalry will always have the advantage of being able to 
 cover its movements, and give battle only when it chooses. 
 Its defeats will have few evil consequences and its successes 
 will be decisive." It may be safely said that cavalry 
 still has a great future before it, and that its deeds in the 
 next European war will be no less glorious than at Auster- 
 litz. Under modern conditions the battle is long drawn 
 out, sometimes lasting many days. The bloody scenes of 
 the fight are continuous ; there is no wild charging and 
 cheering of infantry amid the smoke, to sustain the 
 
98 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 spirits and fire the energies of the combatants ; the 
 horrors of the battle will be ever before them, and they 
 will become physically and morally exhausted. But the 
 cavalry, kept back under cover, will be comparatively 
 fresh for the attack on exhausted infantry with both fire- 
 arms and cold steel, according to circumstances. Woe ! 
 then, to that side which breaks and flies. 
 
 Possibly we may yet see the horrors of a Napoleonic 
 pursuit. But effective pursuit is more difficult owing to 
 the containing capacity of modern arms. A few rifles 
 or guns strongly posted may hold in check a very large 
 body of men ; and a strong rearguard thus disposed, 
 especially if fresh troops are available for the purpose, 
 should enable the retreat of a defeated army to be carried 
 out comparatively unmolested. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE CAUSES OF SUCCESS 
 
 It has been said of Napoleon that he always defeated the 
 enemy with numerically superior forces. Even were 
 this true, there could be no higher praise ; the fact that 
 he overwhelmed Mack with 200,000 men exhibits the skill 
 of the great commander who could bring such superior 
 force into operation at the decisive point and moment. 
 In fact, it was one of the attributes of the great com- 
 mander that he always had this superiority. Even^when 
 rt^irpf^riPQ^^^ mferior, as ^^jO¥f->the _field_of_Ai^^ Jlg_- y 
 
 brought a si^ipepior-ioree-4aJiea^rjon the enemy at^the-^e- ^ 
 cisive^oi nt and mome nta, . In his tactics, as in his strategy, i,. >-^ 
 surprise was one of the main f actors ^of^ucce§s. 
 
 He had, as has been indicated, the advantage of un- 
 divided command an d comm and of the resources ofy^^Ee 
 "Stated And, asTTeTmnself said, " nothing is so important 
 ill war as undivided command ; for this reason, when 
 war is carried on against a single power, there should be 
 only one army, acting upon one base, and conducted by 
 one chief." He showed his pre-eminence both as a soldier 
 and a statesman in preparation for war, re cognising th e 
 f act that such preparation is the main factor of success , 
 for an army cannot be improvised on t he outbreak o f 
 hostilities. 
 
 He fullilled the duty of the statesman in providing the 
 army which as the soldier he trained and led in war. 
 
 In the foregoing chapters the factors of success on the 
 
 99 
 
100 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 one hand and of failure on the other have been generally 
 indicated. But it seems necessary to go deeper than the 
 mere indication of principles or events which evolved 
 cause and effect. The achievements of Nap ol eon canno t 
 be ascribed merely to his observ ance of certain principles, 
 deduced from the nature of things and from a study of 
 milit ary history . Certajnly h^s exposition of military art, 
 marks an epoch in t*he operations of war, and it fell to him, 
 in arfage when the correct application of military principles 
 had been forgotten, to deduce from the experience of 
 history and illustrate in the practice of war the whole art 
 of war, based on immutable principles and exemplified in 
 the annals of the world. 
 
 Napoleon's very name sounds like a trumpet-call ; his 
 genius illuminates one of the most lurid and marvellous 
 epochs in the history of the world. But it is not sufficient 
 to ascribe his success to " genius," although in effect that 
 was the main and primary cause. Genius must be analysed 
 or, at least, being in itself something intangible and indefin- 
 able, it is necessary to discover the means by which it 
 operated or found expression. In the first place we find 
 an unbounded energy of both mind and body ; a grasp of 
 first principles, of cause and effect — a knowledge that 
 certain causes would produce certain effects ; a faculty of 
 creating favourable situations, and of commanding the 
 situations so created ; an imperious disposition, which 
 insisted on things being accomplished, and recognised 
 nothing as impossible of accomplishment ; a cool head, 
 even in the most exciting situations ; miequalled force 
 and decision of character, and a mind capacious of great 
 events. While he had an unequalled grasp of details, and 
 knew that the success of an enterprise frequently depends 
 on such details. Napoleon knew also how to neglect minor 
 matters, leaving them to adjust themselves, and to con- 
 
THE CAUSES OF SUCCESS' ' loi 
 
 centrate his attention on broad issues. He had, in fact, 
 J;hat wisdom beside which the mere term " cleverness " 
 sounds petty and insignificant. There are many " clever " 
 'men, but few wise ones. And he had an insight into 
 hxirhan nature which enabled him to rule men, partly by his 
 knowledge that " there are two levers for influencing men, 
 fear and self-interest." All these faculties constituted 
 character, and a personality whose magnetism dominated 
 all with whom he came into contact or who served under 
 his command ; and even now, nearly a hundred years 
 ^fter his death, that personality influences the minds of 
 men and ensures him that deathless fame of which he said : 
 "^ I hold the immortality of the soul to be the memory we 
 leave in the minds of men ; it were better never to have 
 lived at all than to leave no trace of one's existence behind." 
 Eminently a man on what Matthew Arnold terms " the 
 first plane," he knew not only how to command success, 
 but to reap the fruits of victory — the faculty of the 
 statesman. 
 
 He possessed in the highest degree the ability of choosing 
 subordinates to carry out his will. It has been said that 
 " only in despotisms are men in high places chosen only 
 for their fitness." The galaxy of talent that rose to 
 eminence in the Napoleonic epoch is evidence of the truth ( 
 of this aphorism ; but other factors contributed. As ( 
 Napoleon said : " Revolutions are a favourable time for 
 soldiers possessing courage and intellect." Only in great 
 political cataclysms are men of character and talent likely 
 to find a fair opportunity of rising professionally above the 
 general dead-level. It may be recognised, in all armies, 
 in the words of the famous Prussian General Order of 
 1849, that "it is necessary that the higher commands 
 should be attained only by those officers who unite dis- 
 tinguished ability and military education with correspond- 
 
 
102" " NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 ing qualities of character." But in practice, especially 
 in times of peace, though that is the time for such appoint- 
 ments if we are to be prepared for war, this ideal is difficult 
 of attainment. The general atmosphere of intellectual 
 sterility, the dull routine of army life, the slow promotion 
 by seniority, which generally renders it impossible for men 
 to reach high command until past their intellectual and 
 physical prime, under a system where mediocrity succeeds 
 no less surely than brilliant attainments — these do not 
 conduce to the production of men on the first plane in any 
 rank of an army. 
 
 It is frequently said that generals are born, not made. 
 There was even a period, not so long ago, when men who 
 made a study of their profession were regarded as mere 
 bookworms, and intellectual attainments were regarded 
 as of small moment, if not as a positive disadvantage. 
 Those days are happily past, although even now, at least 
 in our army, the man who makes a constant study of 
 his profession is exceptional. But while generals are not 
 born, certainly there are attributes, inherent in some men, 
 which are favourable to the development of military genius. 
 These have been indicated in the case of Napoleon, of 
 whom General Clarke, French plenipotentiary in Italy, 
 ^vrote to the Directory in 1796 : " Here all regard him as 
 a man of genius. He has great power over the soldiers 
 of the Republican army. His judgment is sure ; his 
 resolutions are carried out with all his powers. His calm- 
 ness amidst the most stirring scenes is as wonderful as his 
 
 I extraordinary rapidity in changing his plans if obliged to 
 
 Ld€ so by unforeseen circumstances." 
 
 But in his case, as in that of practically every great 
 general known to history, knowledge gained by study 
 supplemented the inherent qualities of genius. Let us 
 see what he says himself on this point : " Read again 
 
 IICC 
 
THE CAUSES OF SUCCESS 103 
 
 and again the campaigns of Hannibal, Caesar, Gustaviis / 
 Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick. Model your- J 
 self upon them. This is the only means of becoming a" 
 great captain and of acquiring the secret of the art of war.'* 
 The truth of this is exemplified in the career of Napoleon. 
 His subsequent campaigns were conducted with no greater 
 skill than the campaign of Italy, in which he held his first ^.— ^ 
 command. His strategical conceptions were due to no j 
 inborn genius,"no inspiration of the moment. They were 
 based on the immutable principles derived from a close 
 study of military history, which, says Jomini, " rightly 
 interpreted, is the true school of war." Yet elsewhere 
 we find Napoleon saying that " Generals -in -Chief must 
 be guided by their own experience. . . . The science of *^ 
 strategy is only to be acquired by experience." At first-/ 
 ^ight this dictum may not appear to agree with the pre- 
 ceding one. Napoleon took command of an army and 
 exercised it with success when a young man of twenty-six 
 with no experience of war, as experience is commonly 
 understood ; but he had what is worth more, the,^exp£ri*-| 
 ence^^.gathered from the wide doraam of history^andjhe / 
 ability toappTy iflnpracticeT"' Indeed, m a lifetime theJ 
 
 ordinary soMleFcah acquire but little personal experience 
 of war, and such as he has will probably tend to limit his 
 mental horizon and obscure his view of the wider issues 
 of military art, unless he has also deeply studied war ; just 
 as the general who is too near the actual scene of conflict 
 in a battle is liable to have his attention distracted by 
 minor issues, and his breadth of vision narrowed by what 
 is taking place before his eyes. We have seen this in our 
 time, when we were deluged with "lessons of the war " to 
 the exclusion of all the experience of previous history. 
 
 Napoleon himself said : " All great leaders of ancient 
 times, as well as those who have since followed in their 
 
104 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805 
 
 footsteps, accomplished great deeds only by observing the 
 I principles of the art of war, by the correctness of their com- 
 i binations and a careful weighing of means and results. 
 They have succeeded only by adapting themselves to these 
 principles, no matter what the boldness of their enter- 
 prises and the extent of their operations. They never 
 ceased to make war a true science. To this extent they are 
 our great examples, and only by imitation can we hope 
 to emulate their deeds. The principles of the whole art 
 of war are those which guided the great commanders 
 whose exploits are handed down to us by history." At 
 the same time it must be borne in mind that the lessons of 
 history are no guides to be followed blindly and mechanic- 
 ally, nor are the facts themselves of importance, but the 
 knowledge we derive from them. Wisdom, however, does 
 not consist in the mere accumulation of knowledge, but 
 in the derivation of judgment from experience. 
 
 And what is experience ? The personal experience of 
 the little span of one human life is limited indeed, but we 
 C haxejat our command th^experience of twqjhousand 
 \ years of histo ry. Willisen ^ wisely sal^Tregarding ex- 
 perience in war : "'It is true war can only be learned by 
 experience ; but what are we to understand by ' ex- 
 perience ' ? Who gains experience, the man who has been 
 present during this or that event, but has never thought 
 in the least about it, either before or after it or while it 
 was taking place ; or the man who has had no personal 
 experience of such matters but who studies a great number 
 of such wars, and who has always and everywhere examined 
 the causes which produced the results, and learnt from 
 them that certain results always recur if preceded by the 
 same causes, and who has at length formulated views and 
 deduced general principles ? Has not the latter ' ex- 
 * Quoted in Yorck von Wartenburg's " Napoleon as a General." 
 
THE CAUSES OF SUCCESS 105 
 
 perience ' and the former none ? Shall I not by such 
 experience alone learn to know war, whilst by the other I 
 shall remain altogether ignorant of it ? " 
 i^^ Thus by these means we find Napoleon well versed in the 
 art of war before he had any personal experience in the 
 field ; and Berthier unable to apply the very first prin- 
 ciples of strategy after twenty campaigns, with the living 
 example of the great master ever before his eyes. 
 
 But study and a knowledge of theory, however completer 
 are not alone sufficient. The general must have also 
 character, indomitable resolution, iron will and physical 
 and mental vigoiir-to-Xjan:y_his conceptions to a successful 
 issue ; for the ablest plans will not command success unless 
 carried through with resolution. The pedant may make 
 a good plan of campaign, but he will not-Ue able to execute 
 it. For, when all is said, man is the last, as he is the first, 
 instrument in .war. The ultimate business of war is 
 fighting. As leaders of ^en we^;do^jLot^ant mere arm- 
 chair students^qr those who Jiaye commanded only office 
 flies. We want men of affairs, nien of action, accustomed 
 to live a life of jDhysical and mental activity, possessing an 
 adventurous spirit, and having a wide knowledge of the 
 world and of himanjiature^_ Victory may be on the side 
 of the big battalions, but only if jthey are properly directed 
 and inspired with the spirit of offensive warfare by their 
 
 r-i^aders. " The strength of an army," said Napoleon, '' is 
 
 \ estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity " ; 
 
 1 and the rapidity will be in proportion to the energy and 
 
 ^enterprise of the leaders. 
 
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