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RECIPROCITY 
 
 THE TRADE TREATY OF 1854-66 
 
 Bl rWEEN 
 
 CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES; 
 HOW IT CAME TO BE NEGOTIATED 
 
 AMI 
 
 WHY IT WAS ANNULLED 
 
 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TRADE TREATIES 
 IN PROTECTIONIST COUNTRIES 
 
 E. B. BIGGAR 
 
 BIGGAR-WILSON, Limited 
 
 PUBLISHERS 
 
 TORONTO, CANADA 
 
 10 CENTS PER COPY 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 
 
 When the present negotiations for a reciprocal trade 
 agreement between Canada and the United States were 
 started it was stated that the agreement would be in 
 the form of a treaty, and the writer began to investigate 
 the history of the old reciprocity treaty of 1854-66 to 
 learn how it began and why it was ended. The result 
 of this enquiry is now presented in the hope that it will 
 throw some light on the subject of Canadian trade 
 relations with the United States, whether the present 
 conference at Washington results in a trade treaty or 
 any other form of agreement. 
 
 At the time these pages are being made ready for 
 the press the result of the negotiations is unknown to 
 the public, and, therefore, these facts and opinions are 
 not presented as a criticism on the particular form of 
 agreement which may be devised. The efforts of the 
 negotiators, if any agreement is reached, are entitled 
 to the sympathetic consideration of the people of both 
 countries, for we know that the statesmen concerned 
 in it are men whose strong desire is to serve their 
 country Jaithfully, and at the same time to promote 
 international harmony. If they do not succeed, owing 
 to the variety of oonicdino interests, to- .be dealt with, 
 it will not be f-pr ;l*ack -of.' ccKiscjejnt'LdjJS . 'effort. If an 
 agreement is ratified and does not prove enduring, we 
 must remember that the former reciprocity, although 
 doomed to early dissolution, was negotiated by one of 
 the ablest statesmen who ever represented the interests 
 of British America since parliamentary institutions were 
 established on this part of the continent. 
 
 As the example of Abraham and Lot shows, trade 
 advantages may be lost with a light heart if by such 
 loss other causes of friction may be put out of the way ; 
 and the main question in the present tariff negotiations 
 is not "What present trade advantages do they give 
 us?" but "Are they likely to prevent future misunder- 
 standings?" 
 
 This review is chiefly limited to discussing the 
 efficiency of trade treaties as a policy for a country 
 which raises its chief revenues by a protective tariff. 
 
 E. B. Biggar. 
 Toronto, Jan. 24, 191 1. 
 
RECIPROCITY. 
 
 Let us first ask, What is Reciprocity? It is well 
 to get a clear notion of the term, because it is evident 
 from the statements of public men in both countries that 
 ideas differ widely, and if these various theories were 
 put into practice the results would not be reciprocity. 
 
 "Reciprocal," according to Webster, means "re- 
 curring in vicissitude ; alternate ; done by each to the 
 other ; interchanging or interchanged ; given and re- 
 ceived ; due from each to each; mutual." The same 
 authority gives "Reciprocity Treaty" as "a treaty con- 
 cluded between two countries, conferring equal privi- 
 leges as regards customs or charges on imports or in 
 other respects." In a political sense the present com- 
 mon idea restricts the term to a treaty dealing with 
 customs tariffs, and Chambers' Cyclopedia defines reci- 
 procity as "a term for an arrangement between two 
 countries having a protective tariff against other coun- 
 tries to admit into each other's territories certain 
 specified taxable articles of commerce duty free, or at 
 exceptionally light duties. The classes of articles are 
 arranged to balance one another on one side and the 
 other." The Cabinet Cyclopedia gives another definition 
 as follows: "A term in economics commonly applied in 
 international relationships to the arrangement whereby 
 two nations mutually agree to import from each other 
 certain goods, either duty free or with duties which are 
 equivalent." If this definition is accepted, then the 
 last clause is important as declaring what is equitable 
 and reciprocal in any treaty contemplated between 
 Canada and the United States. 
 
 Reciprocity First Applied to Shipping. 
 
 A glance at European and American commen ial 
 history of the past 150 years will show that the term 
 "reciprocity treaty" as at first used applied to shipping 
 regulations rather than to customs tariffs. When ex- 
 
 M9088.1 
 
perience showed that the restrictions of the navigation 
 laws of the eighteenth century resulted in as much harm 
 to the nations imposing them as to the nations against 
 whom they were directed, they began to deal with each 
 other more liberally, and the first breach into these 
 restrictions took place between Great Britain and the 
 United States. A British Order-in-Council was passed 
 in 1783 putting United States' ships on the same level 
 as British when trading direct between these two coun- 
 tries. These privileges were not extended to the West 
 Indies, however, out of consideration to the British 
 American provinces, which might be deprived of this 
 trade. After the War of 181 2 the treaty of peace con- 
 cluded between Great Britain and the United States 
 provided, besides the disarmament on the Great Lakes, 
 that the ships of one nation should not be liable to 
 greater charges in the ports of the other than were 
 exacted by such nation in its own ports. This broad 
 approach to free navigation was afterwards somewhat 
 stultified by the coastal regulations adopted by the 
 United States ; but it was effective in leading the nations 
 of Europe to look favorably on lower tariffs. It was 
 followed by the complete adoption of free trade by Great 
 Britain in 1846, and might, perhaps, have resulted in 
 free trade between Britain and Europe and America but 
 for the effect of the German Zollverein, followed by the 
 Franco-Prussian war and the development of interstate 
 commerce of the United States, followed by the Civil 
 War and the collapse of the continental reciprocity 
 plans, of which the treaty between Canada and the 
 States was a part. 
 
 Britain's Economic New Birth. 
 
 From before the time of Britain's adoption of free 
 trade the subject of reciprocity was much discussed, 
 both in the United States and in Canada. Two years 
 before the adoption of free trade by Britain a treaty was 
 actually negotiated between the United States and the 
 German Zollverein (1844), but shared the same fate as 
 a later treaty with Mexico by being killed in the Senate. 
 The constitutional objection of the Senate was that the 
 President, in negotiating the treaty, exceeded his au- 
 thority in dealing with a question affecting the revenues ; . 
 
but how far the Senate was influenced by those whose 
 interests would he adversely affected by the treaty cannot 
 be known. 
 
 The huge debt piled up by the two wars referred 
 to and the consequent necessity of raising increased 
 revenues was largely responsible for the high tariff 
 movement in Germany and France — which by example 
 as well as by force of circumstances affected the smaller 
 European States — while in the United States the demand 
 for a high tariff to pay off the Civil War debt had its 
 effect on the abrogation of the reciprocity treatv with 
 Canada. Thus war caused a reaction in the direction of 
 high tariffs in Europe and America, which continued to 
 the opening of the present century. 
 
 There were, however, local influences also at work 
 both in Canada and the United States affecting the trade 
 developments of the two countries. These will be dealt 
 with in another section, and their explanation will serve 
 to show some of the danger spots in any fresh readjust- 
 ment of trade relations such as now contemplated. 
 
 Taught to Swim Alone. 
 
 The adoption of free trade in Great Britain and the 
 withdrawal of the preferences allowed in favor of British 
 colonies was a rude shock to the tender and undeveloped 
 industries of British America, and this -was all the 
 harder to bear when, in the violence of the contest for 
 free trade, British statesmen of eminence declared the 
 colonies to be a burden, and appeared indifferent to their 
 political, as well as their economic conection with the 
 Mother Country. While the loyalty of the great majority 
 of the people of the provinces stood the test all through, 
 the belief of the British people that free imports would 
 be beneficial to the nation had its effect on the public 
 mind in both Canada and the United States, and the 
 most natural thing, when cut off from their advantages 
 in the markets of the home land, was thai the British 
 American provinces should turn to their next-door neigh- 
 bors and seek- by mutual concessions to make up here 
 what was lost in trade across the ocean. At that time 
 the, industries of the provinces were ol .1 crude char- 
 acter, the people being engaged chiefly in fishing, lum- 
 bering, shipping and agriculture, with a little mining. 
 
The United States had developed its manufactures on a 
 considerable scale in some lines, but the general dis- 
 position of the people, influenced by the ,free trade 
 discussions in England was towards a low tariff, especi- 
 ally as the new free trade policy of Great Britain was 
 seen to lead to opening up fresh avenues of Anglo- 
 American trade. There was a natural tendency to deal 
 on a more liberal basis with the British colonies in 
 North America, especially as men of foresight saw a 
 prospect of large future trade in United States manu- 
 factures in exchange for the raw materials which 
 Canada and the Maritime Provinces could supply and 
 which the northern and eastern States needed in greater 
 abundance. It would lessen the tariff friction between 
 the States and the provinces, which had been a cause 
 of trouble as far back as 1806; while the fisheries had 
 been the cause of constantly recurring troubles since 
 1818. 
 
 The Economic Stepmother. 
 
 The question of reciprocity, which began to be 
 earnestly discussed in 1846, interested only the eastern, 
 northern and western States as a practical question ; but 
 in the Canadian provinces it was the leading problem 
 of governments from the moment free trade was adopted 
 in Britain. Had the home government taken the fore- 
 thought to stipulate for reciprocity on behalf of these 
 colonies when conceding free imports from the United 
 States a comprehensive treaty would doubtless have been 
 framed at once. That this provision had been neglected 
 was a most serious aggravation of the condition in which 
 the colonists were left, and many of the public men gave 
 frank, utterance to these grievances, which contributed 
 to such demonstrations as the annexation manifestos of 
 1849. It was from the votes of the Southern States, 
 however, that Canada got reciprocity, and the adoption 
 of the treaty came about through an influence remote 
 from the question of international trade itself. For years 
 before the Civil War the question of State sovereignty, 
 with the question of slave ownership linked up with it, 
 was being thought out and determined by the people of 
 the South. Though reciprocity bills had been defeated 
 in Congress in 1848 and 1849, it was seen by the 
 
Southern representatives that the idea was not only 
 favored by Great Britain and Canada, but was gaining 
 ground in all the northern States, and, when the agita- 
 tion for annexation began to develop, leaders of opinion 
 in the South took quiet note of it, and foresaw that the 
 alternative to a reciprocity treaty might be a complete 
 union of the Canadian provinces with* the States, in 
 which case the separatist movement in the southern 
 States would be swamped by a new union element in 
 the North. Then the southern Senators yielded and 
 withdrew their opposition to the treaty, and thus in the 
 decree of Providence, the motive which determined the 
 southern States to secede, and which brought on the 
 terrible Civil War, gave to Canada her desires without 
 the sacrifice of her British connection, and, the economic 
 waste of the same war bringing up at its close new 
 revenue problems, cut Canada off from her dependence 
 on the trade' of the States, and thus confirmed Her 
 against her wishes, in the path of a separate existence 
 as a nation. Besides the need of fresh revenue to pay 
 off the war debt, there were other motives at work in 
 the recision of the treaty in 1866. One of these was the 
 resentment of the northern people towards Great Britain 
 and Canada for their sympathy with the under dog in 
 the conflict, but this is only another illustration of the 
 alienating effects of war, and serves to show that the 
 law of retaliation does not benefit those who invoke its 
 power. 
 
 The Situation in 1846=53. 
 
 The news of the repeal of the corn laws brought 
 consternation to the merchants of Montreal, Quebec, 
 Toronto, Halifax and St. John. Mr. Workman, presi- 
 dent of the Montreal Board of Trade, described the 
 situation in the phrase, "We are laboring under con- 
 cussion of the brain." While Canadian cities were thus 
 depressed, New York, Boston, Portland and Phila- 
 delphia were elated, and" the prospects for expanding 
 trade with Great Britain made the coast cities well dis- 
 posed towards the Canadian provinces. There were 
 selfish reasons for this friendly disposition. The Inter- 
 colonial Railway not yet being in exist cure, there was 
 no connection by rail between the Maritime Provinces 
 
and the Canadian provinces; and when in 1853 the rail- 
 ways of Upper and Lower Canada were amalgamated 
 under the name of the Grand Trunk, it was to carry 
 traffic, not to the seaboard of Nova Scotia or New 
 Brunswick, but to Portland, Maine. The St. Lawrence 
 canals could only accommodate vessels of 600 or 700 
 tons; Lake St. "Peter had only a depth of n 1 .. feet in 
 summer, and it was not till i860 that it was dredged 
 to a depth^of 18 }- 2 feet. The Gulf of St. Lawrence had 
 not yet lived down the name it had got as a dangerous 
 route for ocean steamships. The Welland Canal had not 
 been enlarged, and could only take vesels of 400 tons, 
 and the railway and canal traffic from the western 
 States and Upper Canada drifted naturally to New York 
 and Boston, aided thereto by the British subsidy given 
 to the Cunard line of steamers. For these reasons the 
 United States seaports were already doing an increasing 
 and profitable transit trade with Canada, and freer inter- 
 change of traffic would naturally tend to settle the busi- 
 ness of the future in these channels. The merchants of 
 the inland cities, such as Rochester, Buffalo, Detroit, 
 etc. — as well as the industrial centres of New England, 
 New York and Pennslyvania — stood to gain by access 
 to the markets of Canada, and the western States, now 
 filling up with new settlers, badly needed better shipping 
 facilities to the Atlantic seaboard, which access to the 
 Canadian canal system would give them. 
 
 The Hard Times. 
 
 On the Canadian side the case for reciprocity was 
 still stronger. The first effect of the withdrawal of the 
 British preference by the repeal of the corn laws was 
 a commercial depression, which deepened to such an 
 extent that the population of some towns dwindled to 
 one-half, and more than half of the merchants and manu- 
 facturers went into bankruptcy. Even the government 
 was reduced by shortage of cash to pay its officials by 
 debentures, which could not be exchanged at par. A 
 market to take the place of that lost in Great Britain 
 had to be sought, and here in the United States was one 
 near at hand; the canal system, constructed at such 
 heavy cost to a young and struggling country, wanted 
 traffic, which the home market could not yet supply, and 
 
 s 
 
United Slates shipping could fill up the blank; the same 
 problem applied to the railways. 
 
 The Treaty a Surprise. 
 
 Where the self-interest of merchants and manufac- 
 turers, the needs of the people and the requirements of 
 the revenue on both sides of the line could all be har- 
 monized by a reciprocal trade agreement, one would 
 have thought that such an agreement would be reached 
 within a year or two. But it took eight years of dis- 
 cussion and negotiation before the treaty was ratified, 
 and when it was at last signed at midnight on the 5th 
 June, 1854, as the last act before dissolution of Con- 
 gress, "a ten-minute speech or the opposition of a 
 single member would have killed it." "It passed simply 
 because the country (the United States) was not pre- 
 pared, on that last day of Congress, for such a 
 possibility. 
 
 The Unhonored Hero of the Treaty. 
 
 On the Canadian side the treat}- was due to the high 
 statesmanship and keen knowledge of human nature 
 possessed by Lord Elgin, as anyone will believe who 
 reads the account of the negotiations contained in Lau- 
 rence Oliphant's "Episodes in a Life of Adventure." 
 On the United States side the real hero of the reciprocity 
 treaty was a man whom history has almost completely 
 ignored, and who, after years of indefatigable labor in 
 the cause, was left to bear the disgrace of a Boston 
 prison for debts contracted in preparing the facts and 
 Statistics which made the treaty so plainly a favorable 
 one for the United States, especially for New England, 
 in one of whose prisons he suffered his social martyrdom. 
 
 This man was Israel I). Andrews, a native of East- 
 port, Me., who, at the lime the corn laws were repealed, 
 was United Stales consul at St. John, N.B. As a lad 
 of ten or twelve, Andrews look his first lessons in 
 political economy in the emplo) of a merchant near the 
 New Brunswick-Maine border, whose operations con- 
 sisted chiefly in smuggling. He thought of the absurdity 
 of neighboring farmers and merchants being forbidden 
 
 l 1 Keef. i. ' l 
 
to have dealings with each other because an imaginary 
 line between farm and store marked them off as 
 aliens against their natural inclinations. When Andrews 
 learned of the reciprocity as a proposal to exchange farm 
 products only, he opposed it as being too narrow, and 
 urged that the fisheries be included in the exchange, 
 so that the long-standing fishery disputes could be settled 
 by the same agreement ; also that the right of navi- 
 gating the St. John River and the St. Lawrence River 
 and canals be arranged for. He went to Washington 
 to advocate these views, and was handed over to 
 Webster. Calhoun, and other Senators, whom he so 
 impressed that the bill then before Congress was stopped 
 in the Senate, and this accounted for a year's delay in 
 the negotiations. The leading statesmen soon saw that 
 Andrews was right, and that both from a commercial 
 point of view and for peaceable relations with Great 
 Britain the fishery rights and the navigation of the 
 lakes and canals were as important as inland trade 
 advantages, as appeared clear before the treaty was 
 finally framed. Andrews rendered not less important 
 services on the British American side. Inland New 
 England was apathetic, because ignorant of the advan- 
 tages of its trade with the provinces, and both New 
 Brunswick and Nova Scotia were on the whole hostile 
 to the movement. This was the attitude of the United 
 States politicians as a whole, and it may be said that 
 political prejudices were the last and hardest difficulties 
 to be overcome. The patience, intelligence and amia- 
 bility of Andrews did more to overcome these obstacles 
 than all other influences combined. He interviewed 
 members of the governments in both countries, explained 
 the situation to members of the legislatures, addressed 
 commercial bodies, and then set to work to gather 
 figures of the trade and shipping of the United States 
 and the provinces at a time when the returns were very 
 imperfect and the means of gathering them little under- 
 stood by the officials. He was duly authorized by Con- 
 gress, aided by the Canadian authorities, to prepare 
 these reports, and the volumes in which they were 
 printed has been recognized as the most valuable col- 
 lection of commercial data published up to that time ; 
 vet this verv work — which, after exhausting his own 
 
means, he carried on by agreeing to pay others, thinking- 
 he would he recouped — was afterwards repudiated, and 
 he was left to suffer the odium. It was true thai when 
 the treaty was put into force he was appointed United 
 States Consul-General for the provinces, hut, out of 
 consideration to the commercial interests of both coun- 
 tries, declined to take the usual consular fee of $2 on 
 each entry — which his successor did not hesitate io 
 accept, and the receipts from which would have enabled 
 Andrews to pay off all his obligations, private and public 
 — and of the millions of money which his work placed 
 in the path of his countrymen not enough came back 
 to him to keep him out of disgrace and out of the debts 
 incurred in his unselfish service to both countries. 
 
 Dangers of the Fisheries Dispute. 
 
 Time soon gave proof that Andrews foresaw in 
 their true perspective the important problems of the 
 
 *A very interesting- account of Andrews, throwing- much 
 light on the history of the reciprocity treaty, appeared in a 
 pamphlet by Thos. C. Keefer, the well-known civil engineer. 
 Mr. Keefer, testifying to the public spirit of this man, says : — 
 "The government at Washington had not the control of Con- 
 gress, or of the press, and it required just such an enthusiast 
 as Andrews — with his power of approaching everybody, of 
 appeasing- everybody, and offending no one — to take the 
 special oversight of a measure which he prided himself on 
 having converted from a Canadian to an Imperial question. 
 The fact that through all the changes of departmental heads 
 and political parties, from 1843 to 1857, he remained fifteen 
 years in the service of the government, proves him to have 
 been no ordinary man. . . . Andrews had it in his 
 power to make Canada pay'every dollar of the debts he as- 
 sumed on account of reciprocity, and the grc.it mistake of 
 his life was that he did not exercise it. In his appointment of 
 consular agents, also, he selected British subjects, in mos1 
 cases, being unwilling to place us in the category of foreign 
 countries." After Andrews' own government neglected i*. paj 
 his claims the Canadian Government rendered .1 tardy act of 
 justice in contributing to relieve him of some of his debts; 
 hut Mi. Keefer, who had spenl months of time and much of 
 his own money in collecting information and tabulating 
 figures for Andrews from Canadian sources, was nevei re- 
 couped f<>! his outlay; 
 
convention. Francis Hincks, on behalf of the govern- 
 ment of United Canada, went to Washington in 1851 
 with the expectation of arranging a trade treaty with 
 Canada only, but, discomfited and irritated by his failure, 
 he wrote a letter to the United States Government, 
 threatening to close the Canadian canals to United 
 States traffic and to impose prohibitive duties on United 
 States goods. The only notice taken of this was a letter 
 from Webster to Sir Henry Buhver, in which the British 
 Government was told that "these petty annoyances from 
 the colonies must cease" before he would resume nego- 
 tiations. Hincks had denounced as preposterous the 
 suggestion of Wm. Hamilton Merritt that reciprocity 
 was the only antidote to annexation, but Merritt now 
 advocated that Great Britain should sanction the impo- 
 sition of the same duties against the United States as 
 that country imposed against the British American pro- 
 vinces. The Whig Ministry turned a deaf ear to this 
 proposal, but in the fall of 1S52 Sir John Packington 
 sent Admiral Seymour with a British -fleet to the Atlantic 
 fishing grounds. This action was treated as a threat by 
 the United States Government, and even Webster, who 
 was personally favorable to a treaty, declared that the 
 American fishermen should be protected, "hook and 
 line, bob and sinker," and a United States steam frigate 
 was sent up to the fishing grounds under Commodore 
 Perry, of War of 1812 fame. It turned out, however, 
 that Seymour was instructed to deal gently with the 
 fishermen, and, being a discreet and genial man, no 
 trouble developed. The unpleasant possibilities of drift- 
 ing on with these questions unsettled showed the United 
 States Government that more was to be gained by 
 meeting the people of British' America in a reasonable 
 spirit than by antagonizing or mere bluff. Webster died 
 in 1853, and, unfortunately, Everett, who succeeded him 
 as Secretary of State, raised various questions, appar- 
 ently designed to prevent reciprocity altogether. But in 
 March of that year Pierce became President and Marcy 
 Secretary of State. Apart from the unceasing education 
 which Andrews had carried on among commercial men 
 all over both countries, and the louder call of the West 
 for better access to the ocean, Mr. Pierce saw the pos- 
 sibilities of political union to which reciprocity in trade 
 
might lead, and when Lord Elgin appeared in Wash- 
 ington the atmosphere was more favorable than the 
 ordinary observer could have imagined. What the Presi- 
 dent and some of the northern statesmen had in mind 
 in the treaty is indicated in the following from his letter 
 of private instructions to Andrews, who was sent up as 
 a commissioner to report on developments in the pro- 
 vinces. Andrews was not only to have in mind the 
 increase of "commercial intercourse, mutually advan- 
 tageous, but to stimulate and extend an increased regard 
 and interest for this country and its institutions. . . 
 The feelings and sympathy of a people sometimes follow 
 in the same channel with its trade and commerce; and, 
 while it would be gratifying to see such a result in this 
 instance," he was to remember the circumstances of the 
 early settlement of the colonies. 
 
 The Cross Currents. 
 
 In the northern States political opposition to reci- 
 procity yielded partly to the pressure of commercial 
 needs on both sides, and partly to the belief that the 
 new commercial relationship would lead to political 
 union. The South, believing with most Canadians that 
 reciprocity alone would satisfy the provinces, favored the 
 treaty to keep them out of the union, fearing their influ- 
 ence on the secession movement. The intuition of the 
 South was correct, for, as soon as the treaty was nego- 
 tiated, the annexation sentiment, which was never very 
 deep, died out. 
 
 Trade and Tariff Conditions. 
 
 What were the tariff relationships between the two 
 countries at this time and what classes of trade were 
 affected by the treaty? 
 
 It is to be noted, in the first place, that the trade 
 of th<- Canadian provinces did not rise from the dead 
 by virtue of the reciprocity treaty. The interchange oJ 
 goods had been increasing steadily for many years 
 before. The United States returns showed thai in the 
 twelve years from 1821-32 the Republic exported of 
 domestic goods $30,997,417 and of foreign-made goods 
 $403,909 to the British North American provinces, while 
 
 M 
 
in the period from 1833-45 this export increased to 
 $54,082,537 of domestic goods and $4,640,332 of foreign 
 goods ; while in the short period from 1846-53 the total 
 was $55,072,260 of domestic goods and $22,020,252 
 foreign. In the period from 1821-32 the provinces of 
 British North America exported to the United States 
 $7,684,559; in the period of 1833-45, $23,356,275, and 
 in the short term of 1846-53 it grew to $36,753,592. 
 
 This brings the record down to the time of reci- 
 procity. The tariff conditions under which the trade of 
 the last-named period was carried on were these : that 
 the duties imposed by the United States on all articles 
 manufactured in Canada ranged from 20 per cent, to 
 40 per cent., while Canada imposed an average of i2 J / 2 
 per cent, on like goods from the United States. The 
 Maritime Provinces' rates ranged from 5 per cent, to 
 10 per cent., the extreme being 12^2 per cent. Horace 
 Greeley, in a pamphlet published shortly after this, 
 figured it out as follows: "On all such manufactures .s 
 he (the Canadian) could send to the United States he 
 is shut out by a duty of 24 to 30 per cent., while the 
 Canadians admit manufactures of the United States to 
 a considerable extent free of duty, some at 5 per cent., 
 and the great bulk of their manufactures at 15 per cent." 
 Not only did this inequality of tariffs on manufactured 
 goods exist, but no sooner had the British Corn Laws 
 been repealed than the United States Government, in 
 order to transfer the traffic of the West to United States 
 seaports from the St. Lawrence route, granted a draw- 
 back of the duty on goods shipped from Canada to the 
 States for re-export, and bonding privileges were also 
 granted to imports into Canada via United States ports. 
 It was in the same year (1846) that the tariff of the 
 United States was increased on a number of articles 
 which would adversely affect the trade of the provinces. 
 These facts are to be remembered in connection with 
 the complaints afterwards made as to the observance if 
 the spirit of the treaty. 
 
 The Scope of the Treaty. 
 
 By the reciprocity treaty of 1854 the following 
 classes of goods were put on the free list of both coun- 
 tries : Grain, flour and breadstuffs of all kinds ; animals 
 
 14 
 
of all kinds; fresh, smoked or salted meats; cotton, 
 wool, seeds and vegetables; dried and undried fruits; 
 fish of all kinds ; products of fish and of all other crea- 
 tures living in the waters; poultry and eggs; hides, 
 furs, skins or tails, undressed ; stone or marble in crude 
 or unwrought state; slate; butter, cheese, tallow; lard, 
 horns, manures-; ores of metals of all kinds ; coal ; pitch, 
 tar, turpentine and ashes ; timber and lumber of all 
 kinds; firewood; plants, shrubs and trees; pelts, wool; 
 fish oil; rice, broom corn and bark; gypsum, ground or 
 unground ; grindstones; dyestuffs ; flax, hemp and tow, 
 unmanufactured ; unmanufactured tobacco ; rags. 
 
 These articles, and these only, were to be free from 
 both countries. The navigation of the St. John River, 
 the River St. Lawrence and the canals of Canada was 
 conceded, and mutual fishing rights were agreed to; 
 but nothing whatever was said or implied limiting the 
 freedom of either country in its tariff on articles other 
 than those named in the free list. The treaty was to 
 endure for ten years from the time it should take effect, 
 but this was not till March, 1855, although by legis- 
 lation of the Canadian provinces the United States got 
 the benefit of the treaty in those territories in 1854. The 
 treaty was terminated in March, 1866, by formal notice 
 from the United States. 
 
 The Unstable Equilibrium. 
 
 During the currency of this treaty the tariff of the 
 United States and of the Maritime Provinces remained 
 the same on manufactured goods, but in Upper and 
 Lower Canada there were almost yearly alterations to 
 the tariff, and these alterations were generally upward. 
 As these changes took place there were protests from 
 U.S. manufacturers of goods affected thai Canada was 
 violating the spirit of the reciprocity treaty. It would, no 
 doubt, seem so to most of those engaged in the United 
 States industries adversely touched by these increases 
 of duties. There was nothing in the treaty nor in the 
 negotiations on which it was based preventing either 
 country from changing its tariff on goods not specified 
 in the agreement; bul il is almost certain that il the 
 manufacturing interests <>!' the United States had known 
 
before hand that duties would be raised on what they 
 had to sell in Canada they would not have favored the 
 treaty. There is no evidence of any conscious bad faith 
 on the part of the Canadian Government, and, after all 
 the changes that had been made during- the life of the 
 treaty, the tariff of Canada on those manufactures 
 mainly affected was still lower by about 25 per cent, 
 than that of the United States, so that if reciprocity was 
 to imply equality of conditions the advantage was still 
 on the side of the United States, especially when there 
 was no industry in Canada, except lumbering, that was 
 organized as well as in the Republic. But as evidence 
 that Canada was willing to meet the United States 
 even under these unequal conditions a committee of the 
 Canadian Legislature in 1858, reporting on .the com- 
 merce of the country, recommended that "precisely the 
 same principle as exists in the intercourse between the 
 different States of the American Union may be estab- 
 lished in these colonies," and also that "the principle 
 of reciprocity with the United States may be extended 
 to manufacturers, the registry of Canadian and United 
 States-built vessels and to the -shipping and coasting 
 trade in the same manner as to the productions of the 
 soil" which applied to the existing treaty. This recom- 
 mendation was conveyed to the United States Govern- 
 ment by J. W, Taylor, who, with Hon. Israel T. Hatch, 
 was appointed to enquire into the operation of the 
 treaty. Mr. Taylor in his report presented to Congress 
 in i860 endorsed this proposal, extending the treaty 
 to manufactures, and establishing "an American Zoll- 
 verein, each country adopting the policy of unlimited 
 free trade with the other. ' ' 
 
 This was the policy afterwards known as Com- 
 mercial Union, and favored in influential quarters in the 
 United States, but rejected in Canada, where it had 
 been first proposed in all sincerity. 
 
 The First Reaction. 
 
 In the old Legislatures of Upper Canada com- 
 mercial matters were in charge of a Cabinet Minister, 
 known as the Inspector-General. The title of Finance 
 Minister was first conferred on Alex. T. Gait (afterwards 
 Sir A. T. Gait), and in dealing with the financial situa- 
 
 16 
 
tion that confronted Canada in this period, Mr. Gait, in 
 a statement published in England in i860, explains in 
 an incidental way the reasons that had compelled the 
 Canadian Government — by which is meant the Govern- 
 ment of the united provinces of Upper and Lower 
 Canada — to increase the tariff. Mr. Gait mentioned that 
 it was not till 1848 that the differential duties imposed 
 by Great Britain on importations into Canada were 
 repealed and the provinces permitted to import whence 
 they pleased, this freedom being further promoted by 
 the repeal of the navigation laws so far as they related 
 to Canada. These changes, however, left Canada with 
 an exhausted exchequer, a crippled commerce and a 
 depreciated credit, to which was added the racial friction 
 between the English and French of the two provinces. 
 But Canada accepted the conditions and ceased to apply 
 to the Imperial Government for favors that could only 
 be obtained to the detriment of other countries. He 
 then shows the success Canada had already attained 
 in working out her own internal problems — educational, 
 municipal, social and moral. The financial situation was 
 that, on the repeal of the Corn Laws, the provinces had 
 a debt of $20,000,000, incurred for public works and 
 railway and canal constructions, while the direct debt 
 due to these works had by 1853 amounted to ^9,677,672. 
 With this load to carry and a small revenue from these 
 works — owing to the fact that the drawbacks allowed 
 by the United States and the steamship subsidies allowed 
 by the British Government tended to divert the profits 
 of the shipping business away from Canadian ports — 
 there came a partial failure of crops in [857, and an 
 almost total failure in 1858. To meet the situation the 
 government had to choose between borrowing money to 
 meet the deficiency of revenue or imposing fresh taxa- 
 tion. Since the provinces had been thrown on their own 
 resources, they were not disposed to ask favors; and 
 at the same time, 'desiring to keep faith with individual 
 British investors who had put faith in the Canadian 
 Government, they chose the alternative method ol in- 
 creasing the tariff. Mr. Call went on to say: "The 
 writer has been reproached in this country as the author 
 and promoter of a protective policy in Canada. To this he 
 makes no reply other than that the commercial measures 
 
which have produced the results he is about to state 
 have always had his support while a member of the 
 provincial parliament, and, coming into office as Finance 
 Minister of the country in 1858, with an exhausted 
 exchequer, in the face of a general failure in the harvest, 
 and with a deficit of no less than ^500,000 in the 
 revenue for 1858, he rests the defence of his policy on 
 the fact that the government has maintained the credit 
 of the country unimpeached, and in less- than eighteen 
 months has so far succeeded in reducing the expenditure 
 and increasing the revenue that the year will be found 
 to be within the income." He declared that the policy 
 of Canada had been brought as far as possible into 
 harmony with that of the Mother Country, and their 
 willingness to negotiate the reciprocity was cited as a 
 proof. He stated that in the period from 1844-48 the 
 duties imposed on importations averaged 10^ per cent., 
 and the free goods were 2^ per cent, of the total im- 
 portations. In the next period, from 1849-54, the duties 
 averaged 13 J4 per cent, and the free goods 7 per cent. ; 
 while in the reciprocity period, from 1855-58, the duties 
 averaged 10 *| per cent., while free goods increased to 
 29 per cent. It was true that a large and influential 
 party existed who advocated a protectionist policy, but 
 this policy had not been adopted by the government, 
 though the necessities of revenue had compelled action 
 in partial unison with their views. It would undoubtedly 
 be a subject of gratification to the government if they 
 find that the duties absolutely required to meet their 
 engagements should incidentally benefit and encourage 
 the production in the country of many of those articles 
 we now import. The government had no expectation 
 that the moderate duties imposed would do more than 
 establish works requiring comparatively unskilled labor 
 in producing goods which could be equally well made in 
 Canada. The obligations which had caused most of the 
 country's indebtedness had been incurred in carrying out 
 the former policy of the Imperial Government or in pro- 
 tecting those who had recently invested their means in 
 our railways and municipal bonds. The government had 
 changed the duties from specific to ad valorem in order 
 that the burden might press more equally upon all 
 classes. The former specific duties had resulted in 
 
 iS 
 
diverting the trade in teas, sugars, etc., from Canadian 
 ports to the United States and destroyed the trade for- 
 merly done with the lower provinces and the West 
 Indies. The average rate of duty under the presenl 
 tariff of 1859 was only 13 '_> per cent., and the increase 
 to the consumer would be balanced by the cheapened 
 cost of transportation." 
 
 Such was the situation as explained by Mr. Gait, 
 and what other method he could have adopted to make 
 ends meet was never made clear. 
 
 Canada Justified. 
 
 Professors Laughlin and Willis, in "Reciprocity," 
 the most comprehensive American work the writer has 
 seen on the history of the reciprocity treaties of the 
 United States, justifies the Canadian Government even 
 more completely than the Canadian Finance Minister 
 himself in regard to the tariff relationship of the two 
 countries. Discussing the report of Mr. Taylor to the 
 United States Government on the tariff changes in 
 Canada, the authors say: "The specific conclusion drawn 
 from this comparison was that our (United States) 
 average ad valorem duties under the Act of 1857 
 amounted to about 21 per cent., while under the Cana- 
 dian Act of 1S58 they were only 16 per cent. This 
 situation gave a ridiculous appearance to the demand 
 that Canada should restore the rate of duties which 
 existed when the reciprocity treaty was ratified, upon 
 penalty of abrogation. The demand bordered on arro- 
 gance, said Mr. Taylor, in view of the fact that the 
 duties imposed under the tariff of 1857 were at least 25 
 per cent, higher than the corresponding rates of the 
 Canadian tariff. ... It seemed clear that the in- 
 crease in duties was absolutely demanded by the revenue 
 needs of the Canadian Government. The Act of 1858 
 was a revenue measure, and imposed heavy duties upon 
 articles like tea and coffee, which were likely to be pro- 
 ductive sources of income. It is hard, in view of these 
 facts, to account fully for the loud clamor on the part 
 of our manufacturers against the discrimination which 
 they supposed themselves to be either subjected to, or 
 about to suffer from, in Canadian markets. In part, this 
 was due to that general prejudice againsl Canada which 
 sought its arguments even where they did nol exist." 
 
 '9 
 
While these accusations were made against the 
 Canadian Government by commercial and manufac- 
 turing" interests of the United States opposed to the 
 competition of British American products, it is evident 
 that political and economic influences were at work 
 which would have ended the treaty, even if no change 
 had been made in the tariff of the two Canadian pro- 
 vinces. There was only one condition under which the 
 treaty would have been perpetuated, and this was com- 
 plete union with the American States ; but financial 
 consideration alone would, at this stage, have made this 
 unacceptable to the provinces, which would have been 
 compelled to pay through the tariff a share of taxes 
 arising from a costly war in which they had no concern. 
 
 Minor Influences. 
 
 But before explaining the effect of the war on the 
 reciprocity treaty it may be well to refer to some of the 
 minor causes of. abrogation. Partly from the tariff in- 
 creases and partly from a growing appreciation of the 
 products of Canadian industry the export of Canadian 
 manufactured articles to the United States began to 
 increase, that increase being from $234,234 in 1858 to 
 $375,201 in 1859. One of the reports to the government 
 at Washington states: "Many manufacturing establish- 
 ments on our side [referring more particularly to the 
 New York frontier] dismissed their workmen and were 
 closed, and many were removed to Canada in order to 
 avoid the payment of duty on their productions. It can. 
 create no surprise that much indignation was excited, 
 without exception, in all those cities on the Canadian 
 frontier which are daily and hourly witnesses of the one- 
 sided nature of our dealings with Canada in the pro- 
 ducts of American labor. . . . Many of the citizens 
 of Buffalo and Rochester have been compelled by the 
 Canadian tariffs to leave their homes and remove their 
 families to Canada." Resolutions and memorials of 
 boards of trade in the towns of Upper Canada are then 
 cited to show that the blame for this was not due to 
 the people of the upper province, but to Lower Canada, 
 which province sought to divert the trade of the West 
 to Montreal and Quebec from New York and Boston. 
 
The Transportation Influence. 
 
 But these pretexts were the levers by which a more 
 powerful influence against the treaty was brought to 
 bear upon Washington. During the life of the treaty 
 the American West was rapidly filling up with settlers, 
 who were grain and stock-raisers — as now in the Cana- 
 dian North-West — and the railway, canal and shipping 
 systems- of New York and other States were taking in 
 tolls "all the traffic would bear." There were times 
 when the cost of getting grain to the seaboard exceeded 
 the price which the Western farmer himself received at 
 the first point of shipment. If these transportation in- 
 terests could eliminate the competition of the Grand 
 Trunk and the St. Lawrence canals they would hold 
 the traffic of the Western States in the hollow of their 
 hand. The Western farmers and merchants had been 
 protesting against the excessive charges for transpor- 
 tation, and, at a great convention of chambers of com- 
 merce at Detroit in 1865, the owners of elevators and 
 warehouses at Buffalo w'ere denounced as extortionists, 
 who exacted charges sufficient to pay profits equal in a 
 single year to the whole value of the property. Hatch 
 and Taylor, the two commissioners who reported in i860 
 on the operation of the treaty, presented separate state- 
 ments, the former against the continuance of the treaty, 
 and the latter in its favor. Mr. Taylor, in his report, 
 conceded the immense service to the United States ren- 
 dered by the reciprocity treaty in removing the dangers 
 latent in the fisheries convention of 181 8. He quoted 
 from a speech by Lord Elgin, in which thai statesman 
 said: "A British admiral and an American commodore 
 were sailing on the coast with instructions founded on 
 opposite conclusions, and a single indiscreet act on the 
 part of one or the other would have brought on a ((in- 
 flict involving all the horrors of war." He then takes 
 up the commercial aspects of the treaty, and shows that 
 the exports of the United States to the provinces have 
 each year exceeded those of Canada to the United 
 States, and as to the increases in the Canadian tariff 
 In- asks: "What righl have we to demand th.it the pro- 
 vinces should encourage importations from the United 
 States when our legislation of 1846 imposed duties as 
 high as 30 per cent., and the \et of [857 only reduced 
 
their average to 24 per cent, on Canadian manufactures? 
 Canada needs revenue; the public lands, as with us, 
 have ceased to yield any considerable revenue, and it 
 became a necessity to increase the tariff. In doing so 
 how can we assert that Canada 'has acted in bad faith 
 to the United States and violated the spirit of the reci- 
 procity treaty,' to repeat the current complaints of the 
 New York journals?" Mr. Taylor then compares the 
 tariffs in detail, and shows how, even after the down- 
 ward general revision of 1857, the United States tariff 
 was still higher than that of Canada and contained fewer 
 items on the free list. [See appendix.] He points out 
 that, notwithstanding the outcry as to the Canadian 
 tariff, the exports of manufactured goods from the 
 United States to Canada increased from $2,560,413 in 
 1858 to $3,140,275 in 1859; while the exports of Cana- 
 dian manufactured goods to the United States made a 
 total of only $234,234 in 1858 and $375,201 in 1859. 
 He concludes by the following statement: "The late 
 attack on that policy (reciprocity) can be traced ex- 
 clusively to one quarter, the shipping interest of New 
 York and Philadelphia and the lines of transportation 
 between those cities and the West. Pennsylvania as a 
 State cannot share the sentiment, for coal and iron, with 
 the manufactures of the latter, are prominent exports 
 to Canada ; while the other manufacturing interest, both 
 of Pennsylvania and New York, gain largely from the 
 consumption of their products in the provinces. But the 
 importing and railroad interests of the two States are 
 apprehensive of the competition of the Grand Trunk 
 Railway and the navigation of the St. Lawrence ; and 
 the north-western, and even the Mississippi States, must 
 be forced, by the abrogation of reciprocal trade and 
 navigation, to pursue exclusively certain channels of 
 communication. It is not possible that the Government 
 of the United States can be induced to yield to such an 
 appeal." 
 
 Mr. Taylor appears to have been only partially cor- 
 rect as to the opinion of the importing interest of New 
 York, for the Chamber of Commerce of New York city, 
 in 1865, adopted the report of its "select committee," 
 in which the most forcible plea yet made was presented 
 in favor of the continuance of the treaty, and that body 
 
has remained to this day a constant advocate of reci- 
 procity between the two countries. 
 
 Death of the Treaty. 
 
 That Mr. Taylor had correctly estimated the aim 
 of the transportation interests of New York to a greater 
 hold on the traffic of the West appeared two years later 
 in a set of resolutions of the New York State 1 
 lature, declaring that Canada was violating the spirit 
 of the treaty. Following up these resolutions, Repre- 
 sentative Ward, of New York, made a report on behalf 
 of the Committee on Commerce at Washington, in which 
 he distinctly charged that it was the avowed purpose 
 of Canadian officials to divert American trade from its 
 "natural transportation routes within this country," 
 and to carry it through Canadian territory by means of 
 special rates. Mr. Ward's report was, however, peculiar 
 in that, while it complained of existing conditions, it 
 argued strongly for the general principle of reciprocity, 
 and advocated the extension and revision of the treaty.* 
 Mr. Ward returned to the attack on the treaty in 1864-, 
 and moved that the President be authorized to give 
 notice of its termination unless a new convention satis- 
 factory to both governments should be concluded. After 
 various motions and amendments, a simple motion, 
 adopted in the Senate by a vote of 33 to 8, was passed 
 in the year 1865 declaring that "It is no longer for the 
 interest of the United States to continue .the same (the 
 treaty) in force," and that notice be given of its ter- 
 mination. Under this notice the treaty came to an end 
 on St. Patrick's Day, 1866. 
 
 Attempts at Resurrection. 
 
 A deputation consisting of A. T. Gait, Finance 
 Minister, and W. P. Howland, Postmaster-General of 
 Canada; A. J. Smith, Attorney-General of New Bruns- 
 wick, and W. A. Henry, Attorney-General of Nova 
 Scotia, came to Washington and remained for two 
 weeks, making various proposals, but in vain. A bill 
 was, indeed, presented to Congress in March, 1806, but 
 
 *Laughlin and Willis' "Recipro Lty 
 
failed, and, even if it had gone through Congress, its 
 terms, in the opinion of Laughlin and Willis, "were so 
 unfair that Canada could not have dreamed of accepting 
 them." 
 
 Many efforts on both sides of the line have been 
 made since then to bring about a new treaty, but up to 
 the present all have failed, and each decade has reduced 
 the chances of a treaty of general application, such as 
 the provinces were once willing to negotiate. 
 
 A noteworthy presentation of the case was made 
 by Sir Edward Thornton, British Ambassador, and Hon. 
 George Brown, representing Canada, in 1874. Taking 
 up the assertion that the advantage of the old treaty 
 was all on the side of Canada, Mr. Brown pointed out 
 that the high prices of commodities in the United States 
 caused by the war during the last years of the treaty 
 seemed to give an advantage to Canada, but this ad- 
 vantage was an apparent one, and due to fictitious 
 values. The war conditions were abnormal, and no 
 deductions could be drawn from them. Had the treaty 
 not been in existence at all, every ton of these goods 
 would have gone from Canada to the United States, 
 with only this difference, that they would have cost the 
 consumers of the United States that much more by 
 reason of the duties. Notwithstanding that the exports 
 of Canada to the States were reduced in volume because 
 of the war, the aggregate balance was still in favor of 
 the United States, as in the thirteen years of the treaty 
 the total imports of the provinces from the United States 
 were $346,180,264 and the imports of the United States 
 from the provinces were $325,726,520. The real differ- 
 ence was still greater in favor of the United States, 
 owing to the inflation of the currency, and because, also, 
 there being no duties on the products going to the 
 United States, there was a more common temptation to 
 over-valuation. This was evident from the fact that the 
 Canadian returns showed a total import from the United 
 States of $363,188,088 and an export thereto of $267,- 
 612,131. He gave figures to show that the traffic in 
 bond through United States ports had developed to the 
 advantage of the United States railways, canals and 
 shipping interests. The free navigation of the Canadian 
 canals had been given during the treaty, and had been 
 
 24 
 
continued since to the great benefit of the United States, 
 and the only return Canada had got from this valuable 
 privilege was a promise to equal rights in the navi- 
 gation of Lake Michigan, which promise had never been 
 fulfilled. The repeal of the treaty had driven the Cana- 
 dian provinces into confederation and had started the 
 construction of the Intercolonial Railway, and its effect 
 on Canadian foreign trade was notable. The exports 
 of Canada and Newfoundland, formerly done largely 
 through the United States, increased from $139,000,000 
 in 1867 to $235,000,000 in 1873. The lumber exports of 
 Canada to the United States, which were threatened by 
 the annulment of the treaty, had gone on increasing, 
 and the effect on the wheat and flour trade was to send 
 more of those products out by the St. Lawrence route 
 and less by New York and Boston. E. H. Derby, 
 reporting to the United States Government on the effects 
 of the repeal, estimated that it cost the port of Boston 
 alone trade to the amount of $27,000,000 a year. 
 
 These representations were futile, as were the sub- 
 sequent approaches of various Canadian governments 
 since Confederation. 
 
 Since some of the best minds in the United States 
 and Canada approved of freer trade relations, and, since 
 it was admitted that the navigation of the St. Lawrence 
 route and the settlement of the old-standing fisheries dis- 
 putes were achievements transcending in national import- 
 ance the commerced advantages of the treaty, we may 
 ask why, in the face of its manifest trade benefits, the 
 United States cut Canada off at the risk of fresh diplo- 
 matic troubles with Great Britain ? 
 
 National Sentiment and Tariffs. 
 
 There were two influences, one political, the other 
 economic, either of which would have ended the treaty. 
 The war caused the sacrifice of 500,000 lives and piled 
 up a bill of $5,000,000,000. The war debt had to be 
 paid. With a Republican administration in power, and 
 already committed to higher protection, and with a 
 national spirit intensified by the triumph of the North, 
 which declared the indivisibility of the Union, the nation 
 was determined to be independent of the rest of the 
 world as far as possible. These two influences decided 
 
the nation to pay off its war debt by a higher tariff 
 rather than any other form of taxation, and to do this 
 a number of commodities admitted free from Canada 
 had now to be taxed and the tariff raised all round. 
 The necessities of the revenue involved an advance of 
 duties affecting Canada, just as Canada's necessities ;i 
 few years before compelled an increase of duties which 
 furnished an excuse for the recision of the treaty. 
 
 But the motives were mixed. The war brought an 
 aftermath of resentment against that portion of both 
 British and Canadian people who had sympathized with 
 the South, and a higher tariff would not only pay off 
 the war debt, but would hit the trade of both Canada 
 and Great Britain. Moreover, there was a large section 
 of the public men in the United States who, remem- 
 bering the great anxiety of the provinces to secure the 
 treaty, firmly believed that its abrogation would soon 
 be followed by an application for unconditional entrance 
 into the American Union. At a great convention of 
 commercial organizations held at Detroit in 1865, to 
 which Canadian boards of trade were invited, this belief 
 was plainly expressed by more than one delegate. For 
 example, Mr. Potter, then United States consul at 
 Montreal, said: "Now, we are ready to give you in 
 Canada the most perfect reciprocity. We will give you 
 complete free trade, but we ask you to come and share 
 with us the responsibilities of our own government. 
 It is not the policy of our government to con- 
 tinue this treaty, and I believe that in two years from 
 the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty the people r f 
 Canada themselves will apply for admission to the 
 United States." 
 
 The strength of this feeling was noted by Charles 
 Francis Adams, then United States Minister to Great 
 Britain, who wrote to Secretary Seward that, in his 
 opinion, "All these measures (for abrogation) were the 
 result rather of a strong political feeling than of any 
 commercial considerations." "The same opinion," say 
 Laughlin and Willis, "is entertained by others, and this 
 "testimony is of great importance because of the claim 
 now frequently made that the Canadian treaty was very 
 disadvantageous to us commercially." 
 
 26 
 
Force and Free Will. 
 
 This measure illustrated the futility of force as a 
 means of cultivating the friendship of a nation, and the 
 speech of the Hon. Joseph Howe, of Nova Scotia, at 
 the Detroit Convention should have been enough to 
 indicate the response that would be given to the freezing- 
 out process. After pointing out the unfair advantages 
 that were taken by the United States, and not contem- 
 plated when the treaty was signed, in regard to the 
 fisheries, Mr. Howe showed that the blockading of one- 
 half of the seaboard of the United States had cut off a 
 large part of the benefits that should have accrued ro 
 the Maritime Provinces during the war, while the United 
 States got the benefit of the trade of the whole provincial 
 coast during the entire war period. Turning to the war, 
 he contended that in the main the sympathies of the 
 Canadians and British were with the North, and cited 
 instances of many young men from his own province 
 who had fought in the northern armies. A colleague cf 
 his own had held the rank of lieutenant in a Massa- 
 chusetts regiment, with only one leg to take back home 
 instead of two. He then proceeded : — 
 
 "In my own family and person I have suffered not 
 a little by this unhappy rebellion. I have five boys, and 
 one of them took it into his head to enter your army. 
 He has now been nearly two years in the 23rd Ohio 
 Regiment, and has fought in all the battles of that regi- 
 ment during this period. He was in both the great 
 battles under Sheridan, in which General Early's forces 
 were scattered and the Shenandoah valley cleared. All 
 the persona] benefit that I have derived from the reci- 
 procity treaty, or hope to derive from its renewal, will 
 never compensate me or that boy's mother for the 
 anxiety we have had with regard to him ; but when he 
 produced his certificate of his commanding ollicer, show- 
 ing that he had conducted himself like a gentleman and 
 had been faithful and brave, it was some consolation 
 for all our anguish to know that he had performed his 
 duty. (Enthusiastic applause. As the applause subsided 
 a gentleman proposed "Three cheers lor the boy," 
 which were given with great heartiness.) I have heard 
 it said since I came t<> the convention thai ii the reci- 
 
procity treaty is annulled the British provinces will be 
 so cramped that they will be compelled to- seek annexa- 
 tion to the United States. I .know the feeling in the 
 Lower Provinces, and I believe I am well enough ac- 
 quainted with the Canadians to speak for them also 
 when I make the assertion that no considerations of 
 finance, no question of balance for or against them on 
 the interchange of commodities can have any influence 
 upon the loyalty of the inhabitants of the British pro- 
 vinces, or tend in the slightest degree to alienate the 
 affections of the people from their country, their insti- 
 tutions, their government and their Queen. There is 
 not a man who dare, on the abrogation of the treaty, 
 if such be its fate, to take the hustings and appeal to 
 any constituency on annexation principles throughout 
 the entire Dominion. The man who avowed such a 
 sentiment would be scouted from society by his best 
 friends. What other treatment would a man deserve 
 who had turned traitor to his government and violated 
 for pecuniary advantages all obligations to the country 
 that gave him birth? The very boy to whom I have 
 alluded as having fought manfully for the stars and 
 stripes would rather blow his own father's brains out 
 than haul down the honored flag under which he was 
 born. If any member of the convention harbors the 
 idea that in refusing reciprocity to British America they 
 would undermine the loyal feelings of the people of 
 those colonies, he is laboring under a delusion. 
 I sincerely hope that all thought of forcing annexation 
 upon the people of Canada will be abandoned." 
 
 Mr. Howe's speech was throughout received in 
 good spirit, and it is worth noting that at this conven- 
 tion a resolution was unanimously passed in favor of a 
 reciprocity treaty between the two countries, and of 
 extending its scope so as to include British Columbia, 
 the Selkirk Settlement and Vancouver Island." 
 
 Commercial Independence. 
 
 We thus see how the Canadian provinces, first by 
 the declaration of free trade in Great Britain, and second, 
 by being cast off from commercial dependence on the 
 United States, were forced, somewhat against their will, 
 to stand upon their own feet and take their destined 
 
way among the nations. We see also what an important 
 part the tariffs had in separating the Canadian provinces, 
 first from the Mother Country and the United States, 
 and then driving them into their present federal union. 
 Having- indicated some of the chief causes that led 
 to the framing, and afterwards to the revision, of the 
 old reciprocity treat}-, let us now enquire into reciprocity 
 as a policy of commercial development. 
 
 Reflections. 
 
 A reciprocity treaty is an illogical step to a logical 
 conclusion. That conclusion is free trade Between the 
 parties to the agreement, and, so long as any tariff at 
 all is maintained between them, the treaty must in course 
 ot time work injustice to one or the other, and come to 
 an end. This is so because a treaty made for a term of 
 years assumes a fixity of conditions in a world of 
 change. As the lives of individuals, so the lives of 
 nations are undergoing perpetual changes, and the eco- 
 nomic and political conditions which exist in one decade 
 will never be repeated in the next or any succeeding 
 period. The chip thrown on the bosom of the river now 
 will be miles down stream an hour hence, and will never 
 return as long as the river flows. The economic relations 
 between any two countries which would give perfect 
 equality at the time a treaty is negotiated will, in ac- 
 cordance with this law, render any fixed treaty an 
 instrument of unstable equilibrium. The recognition oi 
 this law of perpetual (lux is what is bringing pi 
 tionist nations to see the need of permanent tariff com- 
 missions, by which the tariff may be adjusted to the 
 constantly changing conditions of international trade. 
 We have already seen how this law of change operated 
 in the history of the reciprocity contract under discus- 
 sion. No sooner was it signed than new necessities 
 arose by which Canada was soon to be compelled either 
 to uproot its whole economic system or to make modi- 
 fications in its tariff which materially changed the terms 
 upon which the manufacturers ol the United Slates were 
 doing business with this country; while on the other side 
 of the line a political convulsion forced on economic 
 
 alterations of a still more profound nature. These 
 changes compelled the United Stales to terminate a 
 
compact, even though many of their statesmen foresaw 
 that its cancellation would start the provinces on a new 
 path that would close the door forever to that organic 
 union to which the treaty seemed likely to lead. The 
 war put an end to the treaty more quickly, but the 
 tariffs would have ended it sooner or later, war or no 
 war. The only alternative that could have made the 
 treaty permanent was to include all products in the zone 
 of free interchanges, and this would have involved a 
 common tariff against the rest of the world. Such a 
 tariff would naturally be framed and readjusted at the 
 will of the dominant partner. In short, while any tariff 
 system is maintained between two countries, reciprocity 
 in a wide sense is doomed to abortion from the day of 
 its conception. When reciprocity is complete it is no 
 longer reciprocity, but free trade between the parties to 
 the agreement. Tariffs and complete reciprocity cannot 
 co-exist permanently between two nations. Partial reci- 
 procity may exist with tariffs, but both would have to 
 be readjusted with changing conditions, and every read- 
 justment involves discriminations against other nations 
 not parties to the agreement. 
 
 A reciprocity treaty is between nations just what a 
 contract is between two individuals who propose to fix 
 terms and conditions with each other on articles, the 
 prices and supply of which are not under their own 
 control. If Farmer A. says to Merchant B. : "Let me 
 sell you my crop of wheat for ten years to come at go 
 cents a bushel," and B. accepts the proposition and 
 signs an agreement, it is certain that, if next year and 
 for the following nine years the market price of wheat 
 averages only 75 cents, B. will be the loser; while, if 
 wheat for the same term of years went up to an average 
 of $1 a bushel, A. would be dissatisfied with his own 
 proposition. These two men, like two nations, attempted 
 to fix relations between them without reckoning changes 
 outside of their own relationship which they could not 
 govern, and one or the other must be disappointed. 
 
 If tariffs were entirely eliminated between two coun- 
 tries and a common tariff adopted against the rest cf 
 the world, it would not follow that equality of advantage 
 under that common tariff would exist in trade with the 
 world unless legislative control were also equally divided 
 
between the two, and unless the natural and industrial 
 products were the same. This would not be the case in 
 two countries like the United States and Canada, either 
 as to legislation or industrial conditions, because foreign 
 trade has also to be taken into the account and the 
 special commodities of Canada's foreign trade are dif- 
 ferent from those of the United States. 
 
 If an approach to free trade is the object aimed at 
 in a reciprocity treaty, is it not more logical to move 
 in this direction by a reduction of the tariff, or its entire 
 removal, for the whole world. In the case of Canada 
 and the United States, for example, we find that for 
 nearly a hundred years the tariff of the latter country 
 has been higher than this country by a large percentage, 
 and, therefore, if free trade is sought, the more complete 
 the reciprocity, the more backward the step would He 
 if Canada yoked herself into a system whose tariff is 
 from two to five times as restrictive as her own. If 
 free trade is good as between Canada and the United 
 States, it is still better as between Canada and the whole 
 world. This reduces commercial union with the United 
 States to an absurdity, as a move towards free trade. 
 
 A reciprocity treaty, being an attempt to fix a land- 
 mark in a mid-ocean of change, is not only bound to 
 tend to an unstable equilibrium, as between the two 
 prime parties to the contract, but each new treaty nego- 
 tiated with other nations must end in a greater or less 
 breach of the terms and advantages already pledged by 
 the previous bargains. It may not be a conscious breach 
 of faith, but every fresh contract must necessarily qualify 
 the preferences given to the others, since the total of a 
 country's productive powers, and consequently the total 
 of its trade, cannot be multiplied by ten because it makes 
 ten treaties. Its total trade is limited to the productive 
 capacity of its individual workers. Canada has had an 
 example of this in the commercial treaty with France. 
 That country, for certain equivalent privileges, bought 
 what it thought would be a special market for its silks, 
 wines, etc., but under the favored nation treaties the chief 
 advantage has been reaped by Switzerland and Italy, 
 whose silks and other goods proved to be more adapted 
 to the Canadian demand. It does not lessen the force 
 of the argument to explain that the favored nation 
 
 3 ] 
 
treaties, and not a specific reciprocity treaty with Italy 
 and Switzerland, deprived France of the benefits she 
 expected to get. The favored nation clause is only an 
 automatically operating reciprocity effect. 
 
 A study of the economic history of nations shows a 
 high rate of mortality among reciprocity treaties. Thev 
 do not endure because they are founded on a fallacy. 
 "In the United States," says the authority previously 
 quoted, "reciprocity has been a failure, so far as tarii'i 
 reform through that means is concerned. . . . Mani- 
 festly, 'there is no difference, so far as the consumer 
 is concerned, between such a policy (reciprocity) and a 
 reduction of the tariff by law. . . . Of the question 
 whether it is right to barter away one man's protection 
 in order to gain a trade opening for another man it is 
 not necessary to speak. The usual argument states that 
 we barter only that protection which is no longer needed. 
 To Mich a statement it is natural to reply that if the 
 protection is no longer needed it should be withdrawn 
 in the interest of the consumers. . . . If, therefore, 
 the ordinary man analyzes the situation to consider his 
 own interest as a consumer he is likely to become a 
 tariff revisionist rather than a reciprocity advocate." 
 The authors just quoted consider the reciprocity treaties 
 hitherto made by the United States to have been failures, 
 and they conclude: "In short, if we should ever approach 
 the stage of development in tariff matters where reci- 
 procity could be had, we should not need it." 
 
 The old reciprocity treaty of 1854-66 — negotiated at 
 a time when means of transport were few and their cost 
 very high — served a good purpose in its day. It tided 
 Canada over its period of depression and helped prepare 
 its transportation systems for confederation, and it 
 ^ave the industries of the United States the only large 
 opening available, while it also assisted the development 
 of the American West. But since then the outlook of 
 both nations has materially changed. The means of 
 transport have enormously developed and become less 
 costly than in 1854, and the time consumed in delivering 
 goods to the ends of the earth is being continually short- 
 ened, so that every continent is coming within reach ot 
 the exporter. The complex demands of modern com- 
 merce call for direct connections with every nation rather 
 than for a trunk line to one. To speak, therefore, (f 
 
 3* 
 
one country only as affording a "natural market" is !o 
 fail to understand Canada's coming relationship to the 
 nations. The natural market for a bushel of Canadian 
 wheat, a barrel of Canadian flour, or a ton of Canadian 
 asbestos is anywhere in the world where it can be sold 
 to best advantage, and Japan or Australia may be 
 nearer, because better, than five miles across a boun- 
 dary line. Geographical hindrances to trade count for 
 less and less as these distances are reduced by rapid 
 and cheap transit. 
 
 The United States is at last realizing that it cannot 
 continue to absorb everything and give out nothing in 
 return. In order to extend its foreign trade in manu- 
 factured goods it must produce cheaper, and to do so 
 it must have cheaper raw materials. It happens that 
 Canada has a number of these raw materials in more 
 or less abundance, and a reciprocity treaty at the ex- 
 pense of other domestic interests of the United States 
 is very attractive to such manufacturers. But if indus- 
 trial development is all in all to a nation, then this pro- 
 blem has two sides. Canadian manufacturers are also 
 looking for development in foreign trade, and, if the 
 supply of these materials are essential to United States 
 manufacturers in extending their foreign trade, they will 
 also become essential to the Canadian export trade, and 
 it soon becomes a problem whether the country should 
 not look to the wide world for its industrial development 
 rather than to sink into dependence upon the trade ol 
 a next-door neighbor with whom, in any case, a large 
 trade has always been done, with and without treaties. 
 
 i 
 Unity of Industrial Processes Illustrated. 
 
 Assuming that a reasonable development ol factory 
 occupation is necessary for the all-round life ol ;i nation, 
 whose citizens have every variety of taste and inclina- 
 tion, there are cases where the exportation ol crude 
 materials is not a thing to be sought after, least of all 
 to be »ivcn as a right to a nation under the sanction ol 
 a treaty. Take, for example, the i;im' of limber and 
 wood products. Manufactures of wood, as carried on in 
 this country, consist in the main ol three elements: first, 
 logs; second, pulp, lumber, etc., and third, paper and 
 its derivative manufactures, and structural materials, 
 
 33 
 
furniture and the great variety of articles made from 
 wood after it passes from the form of lumber. These 
 are three elements, but they are one and indivisible, 
 regarded as a home industry touching the general 
 wants of the people. Logs are not an article of general 
 consumption as such, nor are pulp and lumber till they 
 go through another process and become paper, furni- 
 ture, etc. It is only then that they first touch the needs 
 of the people at large. Now, it has come about, through 
 the reckless destruction of the forests of the United 
 States, that that country is now short of the raw ma- 
 terials by which its hitherto large foreign trade can be 
 maintained in paper, furniture and the various manufac- 
 tures derived from wood. If an unlimited supply of raw 
 or semi-manufactured wood, such as lumber and pulp, 
 can be obtained from an outside source, such as Canada, 
 those foreign exports may be maintained and extended. 
 Suppose, then, a trade arrangement is made, under the 
 specific sanction of which such industries are created in 
 the United States in dependence on raw materials from 
 Canada, it must follow that the supply of such materials 
 
 34 
 
cannot be suddenly cut off without far-reaching financial 
 losses and industrial disturbance in the United States. 
 The accompanying conventional tree may illustrate 
 in a simple way the relations of this trinity of industries. 
 Inasmuch as the processes of converting forests into 
 articles of use for mankind do not bring them into con- 
 tact with the general consumers till the third stage is 
 reached, and it is in this third stage that by far the 
 greatest amount of capital and labor are employed, the 
 logical purpose of any tariff intended to develop such 
 an industry is to make it a trinity in unity. To sever it in 
 the middle and have the most important processes com- 
 pleted in another country, with this connection maintained 
 at the hazard of a tariff Act, may sow the seeds of future 
 trouble, where these industries of the two 'countries 
 are in rivalry in seeking foreign trade. In this particular 
 case we have a forestry problem added to an industrial 
 problem, and the forestry problem is of graver concern 
 than the industrial. The preservation of Canada's water 
 powers by the conservation of its forests is a matter of 
 such consequence that the fate of the woodworking, pulp 
 and paper and all other industries directly concerned in 
 both countries could be completely ignored with less 
 danger to the nation. Within recent years such a flood 
 of light has been thrown on the development or downfall 
 of nations that one states a proved truth and not a pro- 
 phecy in asserting' that the destruction of a country's 
 forests is national suicide. This is realized in the United 
 States, and the problem is giving its statesmen grave 
 concern. But, remembering the parable of the five wise 
 virgins and the five foolish ones, those responsible for 
 the administration of this domain cannot with safety 
 to posterity permit the forests to be swept from the 
 remaining half of the continent because the work of 
 devastation has been so nearly completed in the other 
 half. In such a matter we should look far beyond the 
 needs and dangers of the present generation. 
 
 Canada's Separate Destiny. 
 
 No thoughtful Canadian can have reflected upon the 
 history of his country, from the beginning of its coloni- 
 zation by white men till the formation of the Dominion, 
 without recognizing a Controlling Hand that has willed 
 
 35 
 
us to be a distinct people. The very history of the birth 
 and dissolution of the reciprocity treaty here sketched 
 reveals a plan which thwarted our own desires in that 
 generation to make us the separate nation we are now. 
 We now begin to see, dimly as it may be to some, that 
 there are missions Canada can carry out and services 
 to the world she can perform in the spheres of moral, 
 civic and social reform, which can be better effected 
 under our own political organization than any other, and 
 there is ample room on this continent for two sets of 
 experiments in the problems of government, worked out 
 in the spirit of amity which befits nations who are great 
 enough to rejoice in each other's success and happiness. 
 To maintain this free play to our political institutions 
 our fiscal 'system should be quite as unfettered, and any 
 entanglements which restrict this freedom are more likely 
 to tend towards friction than harmony in the political 
 relations. 
 
 Nations Not Great by Trade Alone. 
 
 We have to this point been discussing reciprocity 
 chiefly as an economic question, but a nation cannot 
 become great by trade alone. The history of the rise 
 and fall of empires of the past furnishes too many sad 
 evidences that the nation whose policy is swayed first 
 and last by trade considerations is running its train on 
 to a broken bridge. A certain natural bent of mind 
 makes this a peculiarly dangerous snare to the Anglo- 
 Saxon peoples, and so far have they headed on this 
 moral down grade that it has become almost a heresy 
 to declare it possible for a nation to lose its self-respect 
 through gaining trade advantages. War is one of the 
 retributive calamities begotten of greed of wealth and 
 that lust of dominion into which greed develops when it 
 has become a national vice. Canada owes, first and 
 foremost, the debt of good-will not only to her neighbor 
 and the Mother Country, but to the whole world. If we 
 centre our minds merely on the acquisition of material 
 wealth, forgetting the claims of other nations, who could 
 benefit by a share of the light and blessing we have 
 received, then we fail of the chief source of our future 
 influence on the world. Wheat is not the source of the 
 nation's well-being. If it were, then Babylon, which was 
 
 36 
 
the world's first wheat country, would have been a 
 power to-day.* Like Babylon, the Anglo-Saxon nations 
 devote all their energies to the accumulation of stores 
 of material wealth, and then build Babylonian walls 
 in the form of navies and engines of slaughter with 
 which to protect this wealth. Will Canada place her 
 sole dependence in these Babylonian walls, or will she 
 seek some better way of winning the world's good-will? 
 Taking the estimates for militia and naval service, the 
 cost of the new warships purchased and to be built, the 
 outlays in the Marine and Fisheries Department charge- 
 able to the organization of the naval service, the items 
 in the Public Works Department allotted for the erection 
 and maintenance of armories, military storehouses, etc., 
 we have a total to which the country is committed for 
 war preparations in ign of a little over $22,250,000. 
 In 1880 the amount spent on militia and defense was 
 $690,078, in 1900 it was $1,846,178, and since 1896 
 $12,118,150 has been spent in this department charge- 
 able to capital account, or, in other words, added to 
 the public debt. If one-tenth of the amount to which 
 Canada is committed in preparing for war were spent 
 on missions of peace and on educational propaganda to 
 the people of other nations, showing the waste and 
 wickedness of war, might it not be the means of avoiding 
 the unspeakable woes now threatening the peace of the 
 world by these unparalleled preparations? 
 
 .This may be a digression, but it will serve to sug- 
 gest to those with a mind open to receive it that reci- 
 procity of trade is the least urgent of all the relations 
 which Canada may hold with other nations just now. 
 "Above all nations is humanity," and the reciprocity of 
 good-will is what humanity most needs at a time when 
 millions of the poor of the great nations are literally 
 sinking beneath the burden of taxation for needless war 
 preparations. 
 
 *Thc first definite notice of wheat is in the writings of 
 Besorus, the priest of Chaklca, who says: "The land of the 
 Rahylonians produces wheal as an indigenous plant." 
 
 37 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Comparison of the United 
 reciprocity period. From j. 
 States Government. 
 
 American 
 Articles. 1846. 
 
 Manufactures of wood 30 
 
 Manufactures of mahogany ... 40 
 
 Wax, bees' 20 
 
 Refined sugar 30 
 
 Chocolate 20 
 
 Spirits from grain, whiskey. .. .100 
 
 Spirits from grain, other 100 
 
 Molasses 3° 
 
 Vinegar 30 
 
 Beer, ale, porter, cider 3° 
 
 Linseed oil 20 
 
 Spirits of Turpentine 20 
 
 Household furniture 30 
 
 Carriages and cars 30 
 
 Hats 30 
 
 Saddlery 30 
 
 Candles 20 
 
 Soap 30 
 
 Soap, perfumed and fancy 30 
 
 Snuff 40 
 
 Tobacco, manufactured 40 
 
 Leather 20 
 
 Leather, boots and shoes 30 
 
 Cables and cordage 25 
 
 Gunpowder 20 
 
 Salt 20 
 
 Lead 20 
 
 Iron — pig, bar, nails, etc 30 
 
 Other manufactured .... 30 
 Agricultural implements .. 30 
 
 Copper — in pigs and bars 5 
 
 Manufactures of 30 
 
 Brass — in pdgs and bars 5 
 
 Manufactures of 30 
 
 Brass and copper wire and cloth 30 
 
 Medical preparations 30 
 
 Medical drugs 20 
 
 Cottons (average duties) 25 
 
 Hemp, manufactures of 20 
 
 Wearing apparel 30 
 
 Earthenware 30 
 
 Combs 30 
 
 Buttons 25 
 
 Brushes and brooms 30 
 
 Umbrellas and parasols 30 
 
 Printing materials 20 
 
 Musical instruments 20 
 
 Bioks and maps 10 
 
 Paints 20 
 
 Glassware 3° 
 
 Tinware 30 
 
 Manufactures of pewter and 
 
 lead 30 
 
 Manufactures of marble 30 
 
 Manufactures of India rubber.. 30 
 Manufactures of gold and silver 
 
 leaf 15 
 
 Artificial flowers 30 
 
 Lard oil 30 
 
 Manufactures of wool 30 
 
 hair 25 
 
 fur 30 
 
 goat's hair ... 25 
 
 silk 25 
 
 worsted 25 
 
 hemp 20 
 
 flax 20 
 
 States and Canadian tariffs in 
 W. Taylor's report to United 
 
 Rates of Duty. 
 
 Canadian Tariff. 
 
 Tariff. 
 1S57. 
 
 24 
 4o 
 «5 
 24 Specific ; 
 
 30 Specific ; 
 
 3 o Specific ; 
 
 24 Specific; 
 
 24 Specific ; 
 
 24 Specific ; 
 
 15 
 
 15 
 
 21 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 24 
 '5 
 
 24 Specific 
 24 
 
 30 Specific 
 30 Specific 
 (ace 
 15 
 
 $2.50 per 100 lbs. 
 
 18c. gallon. 
 
 50 to iooc. per gal. 
 
 4c. per gallon. 
 
 6c. per gallon. 
 8, 25, i2!;c. (Vide.) 
 
 $1.25 per 100 lbs. 
 
 ; ioc. per lb. 
 
 ; s, y]i, 10c. per 
 
 ■rding to value). 
 
 lb. 
 
 24 "spades," etc. 
 
 24 
 Free 
 
 (Brooms, corn, S. 
 
 Free 
 
 15 
 Free 
 
 |5 
 
 S 
 
 s 
 
 Free 
 20 
 
 5 
 20 
 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 
 25 
 
 15 
 'S 
 
 20 
 
 50c. p. doz.) 
 *5 
 15 
 20 
 Free 
 >5 
 
 38 
 
14 DAY USE 
 
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 LOAN DEPT. 
 
 This book is due on the last date stamped below, or 
 
 on the date to which renewed. 
 
 Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. 
 
 _aisy!£2Q£- 
 
 REC'D U0 
 
 MAY 2 3 1862 
 
 WOV 6l3fifl 94 
 RECEIVED 
 
 LOAN PEPT. 
 
 LD 21A-50m-3,'62 
 :TslO)476B 
 
 General Library _ 
 University of California 
 Berkeley 
 

 Gaylamount 
 
 Pamphlet 
 
 Binder 
 
 Gaylord Bros.. Inc. 
 
 Stockton, Calif. 
 T. M. Reg. U.S. Pal. Off. 
 
 R9U881 »Fg. 
 
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