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THESIS 
 FOR THE DOCTORATE 
 
 The Principle of the Ego in Philosophy with 
 
 Special Reference to its Influence upon 
 
 SchlegePs Doctrine of "Ironie" 
 
 BY 
 
 AUGUSTA MANIE WILSON, A.M. 
 
 April, 1908 
 
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 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Introduction— 
 
 Problem of the "Self." Subjective and Objective 9 
 
 I. Principle of the Self. 
 
 Historical Orientation. 
 
 1. With Vedanta. 
 
 a. Hindoo thought, a reduction from thirty-three gods, 
 through Prajapati and Brahman to Self 9 
 
 b. Upanishads-Khandogya — tat twam asi. 
 
 Brihadaranyaka — aham brahma asmi 10 
 
 c. Vedanta-Sutras of Shankara. Identification of Self and 
 Brahman 10 
 
 d. Conclusion — Emancipation of soul, and annihilation of 
 
 Self. Absolute Nirvana H 
 
 2. The Socratic Self-knowledge. 
 
 "Know thyself" — Virtue is knowledge — Socratic "irony" — 
 apparent abnegation of Self — opinions vs. knowledge. Ends 
 in ethical eudaemonism 11 
 
 3. The Self in Christianity. 
 
 Origin of Religion — Ego's sense of need. Phase — psycho- 
 logical. Negation of world and affirmation of Self. End — 
 Kingdom of God 12 
 
 4. The Cartesian Self. 
 
 Maxim — " Cogito, ergo sum" — Cf. Vedanta. Mens, res 
 cogitans ; corpus, res extensa. Ethical ideal — reason vs. 
 sensibility. Mind and matter merge in God 13 
 
 5. The Fichtean Ego. 
 
 " Wissenschaftslehre." 
 1 st. Affirmation of the Ego. 2d. Negation of the Ego= 
 Non-ego. 3d. Limitation of the Ego's activity. Ethical 
 purpose— to develop character 14 
 
 Conclusion and Transition to Romantic School 16 
 
 II. Ideals of Romanticism. 
 
 Their Origin. 
 
 1. Fundamental idea — to reconcile philosophy and poetry 17 
 
 2. Phases — subjectivity — sesthetical love of the picturesque 
 
 and mysterious (Tieck) — reactionary (Wackenroder) 18 
 
 3. Cause— opposition to art-formalism of Winckelmann and 
 Lessing, and to classicism of Goethe and Schiller 17 
 
 4. Influences— (a) philosophical, {b) political, (c) poetical 18 
 
 296277 
 
(a) Philosophical, 
 i. Kant's M Critique of Judgment." 
 
 Beauty pleases without interest — a universal without a 
 
 concept — a play of the faculties — subjective 18 
 
 Influence on period : subjectivity, and free play 20 
 
 2. Fichte. 
 
 The Ego and its activity vs. the Non-ego. Fichte ethical, 
 
 Romanticism sesthetical, how relate them: (1) Ego and 
 
 its infinite doing— (2) Culture idea in " Urtheile uber die 
 
 franzosische Revoluzion." 
 Influence on Romanticism : freedom of culture, subjectivity, 
 
 infinite doing 23 
 
 (5) Political. 
 
 The French Revolution 23 
 
 Rousseau's freedom in Nature, emphasis on individual 23 
 
 Influence: egoism, freedom 23 
 
 (c) Poetical. 
 
 1. Goethe. 
 
 Classicism and utilitarianism 23 
 
 "Wilhelm Meister" — "Sorrows of Young Werther" — 
 
 "Faust" — from egoism to altruism. Opposed by Roman- 
 ticists 23 
 
 Positive Influence : individualism, freedom from moral 
 
 restraint 24 
 
 2. Schiller. 
 
 a. "The ^Esthetical Letters." 
 
 " Spiel-trieb" — play between sense and reason. Art, from 
 physical to moral 24 
 
 b. " Uber Naive und sentimentalishe Dichtung." Naive — 
 ancient — all form — no life. Sentimental — modern — all 
 
 fancy — reflection 25 
 
 Influence on Romanticism : 
 Struggle of artist to unite real and ideal. Basis for all 
 philosophy of Romanticism 27 
 
 III. Schlegel's "Ironie"— 
 
 1. Influence of Schiller. 
 
 Schiller's naive and sentimental poetry. Schlegel's "Die 
 Griechen und Romer" — defines ancient (classic) and modern 
 poetry 27 
 
 2. Influence of Fichte. 
 
 Egoism — free activity of Ego 3r 
 
 3. Influence of Goethe. 
 
 "Gesprach ueber die Poesie." 32 
 
 "Characteristiken und Kritiken." ^ 
 
 Uber Wilhelm Meister. 
 
 Modern art called Romantic 33 
 
 Classic—lost in material 33 
 
 Romantic— fancy beyond reality 33 
 
4. " Die Ironie "—An unending play of fancy, no goal, ever striving 3 
 
 " Ueber die Unverstandlichkeit "—kinds of " Ironie." Frag- 
 mente — "Athenaeum," "Lyceum," "Ideen." Criticism 
 and aphorisms on "Ironie, "(subjective, sesthetical, ethical, 
 religious, logical, pessimistic) 35 
 
 '* Lucinde" — freedom in society 40 
 
 5. Schlegel's ' ' Ironie ' ' contrasted with Socratic and Christian irony 41 
 
 6. His Influence. 
 
 Philosophy : Novalis, Schelling, Solger. Literature : Tieck, 
 Wackenroder. Religion: Schleiermacher 43 
 
 7. His Effect. 
 
 Literature : Grillparzer and Lenau. Philosophy : Schopen- 
 hauer — objectless will 48 
 
 Wagner and Nietzsche. 
 Ibsen, Hauptmann, Sudermann. 
 Schopenhauer's return to Vedanta — " Ex oriente lux" — 
 
 "will is world, world is nothing" 53 
 
 IV. Conclusion. 
 
 Self as fundamental principle leads to 
 
 1. Nihilism 53 
 
 2. Pessimism — "Weltschmerz" 54 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Boyesen, Hjalmar Hjorth — Essays on German Literature. 
 
 Erdmann, Johann — History of Philosophy — Vol. II. Translated by W. S. 
 Hough. 
 
 Eucken, Rudolph — Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophic Thought — 
 Translated by M. S. Phelps. 
 
 Fichte, J. G. — i. Wissenschaftslehre — Werke Band I. 2. Ueber die franzo- 
 sische Revoluzion — sammtliche Werke — (Berlin, 1845) Band VI und VII. 
 
 Goethe, Johann W. — Sorrows of Young Werther — Bohn. Lib. ed. 
 Faust — German ed. — Calvin Thomas. 
 Wilhelm Meister — Translated by Thos. Carlyle. 
 
 Haym, Rudolph — Die romantische Schule. 
 
 Kant, Immanuel — Critique of Pure Reason — Translated by Max Muller. 
 Critique of Judgment — Translated by J. H. Bernard. 
 
 Lessing, Gotth. E. — Education of the Human Race. Translated by Robertson. 
 
 Minor, J. — Friedrich Schlegel — Prosaische Jugendschriften (Vienna, 1906) 
 Bd. I und II. 
 
 Novalis — Schriften (Berlin, 1846). 
 
 Schriften (Berlin, 1815) Bd. I und II. 
 
 Paulsen, Friedrich — A System of Ethics — Translated by Frank Thilly. 
 
 Robertson, John G. — History of German Literature. 
 
 Schiller, Johann F. — The ^Esthetic Letters — Translated by J. Weiss. 
 
 Naive and Sentimental Poetry — Bohn. Lib. ed. 
 Werke — Gustav Hempel (Berlin). 
 
 Schlegel, Friedrich — J. Minor Prosaische Jugendschriften. 
 Athenaeum, Lyceum, Ideen. Fragmente. 
 Characteristiken und Kritiken ueber W. Meister. 
 Ueber die Griechen und Romer. 
 Ueber die Unverstandlichkeit. 
 Gesprach iiber die Poesie. 
 "Lucinde" — Universal-Bibliothek — Reclam. Leipsig. 
 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich — On Religion— Translated by J. Oman. 
 
 Schopenhauer, Arthur — The World as Will and Idea — Translated by Hal- 
 dane and Kemp. 
 
 Shaw, Charles Gray — Christianity and Culture. 
 
 Upanishads — Sacred Books of the East Vol. I, XV — Translated by Max 
 Muller. 
 
 Vedanta — Deussen: English translation. 
 
 Wagner, Richard — Essay on Beethoven — Translated by A. R. Parsons. 
 
 Windelband, W. — History of Philosophy — Translated by James H. Tufts. 
 Geschichte der neuen Philosophic Bd. I. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The problem of the Self involves profound thought in philosophic 
 systems where it forms the fundamental principle. 
 
 There are two possible paths open to philosophic speculation: one 
 based on the subject, or the soul within, the other on the object, or 
 world without. The second method carries the philosopher into the 
 depths of materialism, or the rigor of dogmatism. 
 
 The first method, where the Self is the keystone, leads to the 
 various results of subjectivism, idealism, scepticism and "Ironie;" 
 this latter, we purpose to show, finds its true source in the doctrine 
 of the Self. As types of subjectivism and idealism, the Vedanta 
 philosophy, the Socratic ethics, the Christian Self and the Fichtean 
 Ego will be examined: as type of scepticism the Cartesian maxim. 
 
 The climax of the Ego-lehre is "Die Ironie": when the subjec- 
 tive Self formulates ideals to which it strives to attain, and the awful 
 gulf between the real and ideal is perceived, in the endless striving 
 and longing for a goal, the "Ironie" is experienced. This "Ironie" 
 was first defined by Friedrich Schlegel. His doctrine influenced and 
 affected many writers, the "Ironie" leading them into a world of 
 dream or phantasy, but at length culminating in the darkest pessimism. 
 
 I. Principle of the Self — Historical Orientation. 
 i. With Vedanta. 
 
 In earliest Hindoo thought, the Vedic hymns were addressed to 
 thirty-three gods; then came a longing for one, who might be a god 
 of gods, and such a being was Prajapati, who was conceived of as 
 having a locality and moving about the earth. Not yet content, a 
 deity, Brahman was worshipped, and finally came a philosophic 
 conception of the Self, where Brahman is identified with the ego and 
 the Self is in all. It is a pantheistic form of religion, wherein the 
 Ego is the Infinite and everything is a manifestation of the Self. 
 
 The Upanishads contain the philosophy of the Vedas, i. e., Vedanta. 
 Their aim was to impress belief in one Spirit, who is the Creator; as 
 also a faith in the world's reality, dependent on Brahman ; and the 
 human soul as identical with Brahman, whence it emanates. In the 
 
Khandogya-Upanishad, the sacred syllable "Om" is explained as the 
 essence of all in earth, sky, and man till Brahman is finally reached as 
 the cause of the universe. This Brahman is "my self within the 
 heart ... he, from whom all works, all desires proceed, who 
 embraces all this, who never speaks, and who is never surprised, he 
 is myself within my heart, is the Brahman. When I shall have departed 
 from hence, I shall obtain him (that Self)." 1 "The subtle essence of 
 all that exists is the True, is the Self, and Thou art it (Tat twam asi)." 2 
 The Infinite is everywhere, but it is the Self, from which all things 
 spring. He who sees this shall not taste death but shall enter the City 
 of Brahman and secure freedom from all worlds and cares. 
 
 The Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad is based on the tenet "I am a Brah- 
 man" (aham brahma asmi). 3 In the beginning was the Self, or Brah- 
 man, who created all things, in earth, in sky, in spirit world. This 
 Brahman is "thy Self, the Immortal, the Imperishable." 4 
 
 The Vedanta is the culmination of the doctrine of the Upanishads. 
 It attempts to explain the statements set forth in the Upanishads, "tat 
 twam asi," and "aham brahma asmi," and asks why are we not conscious 
 of the identification of Self and Brahman, and why is there the difficulty 
 of Self vs. not-Self, the subject and the object? Vedanta answers that 
 the difficulty arises through ignorance, or illusion (Maya). As mother- 
 of-pearl appears silver, as a rope may seem a snake, or the moon as 
 double, so the Self appears as two through Maya. The theology of the 
 Vedanta consists in emancipation and cessation from transmigration. 
 When Self is known to be one with Brahman, there is complete libera- 
 tion from care and the soul goes to Brahman, never to return. The 
 cosmology presents two views: an empirical world for the transmi- 
 gration of souls and a metaphysical world where Brahman and the 
 soul are identical; where there is no beginning, no continuance, no 
 end. "As clay vessels are clay, but differ in name, so all is Brahman, 
 differing in name. The world has no existence, is all Brahman." 5 
 Cause and effect are identical, the substance persists in changes of its 
 qualities, world is an objectification of the Self. The empirical world 
 is illusion, or Maya. 
 
 The psychology in Vedanta that the soul alone is real is the fore- 
 runner of Descartes, "Cogito, ergo sum" The soul is one with 
 Brahman, not part, but the whole; it is all powerful. Rebirth is 
 due to the fact that the soul's own nature is hidden under various 
 
 i Kh-U. III. 14: 3, 4. (Max Mtiller Sacred Books, Vol. I.) 
 
 2 K. U. VI. 8. 7. 
 
 3 B. U. 1—4. 10— (Sacred Books, Vol. XV.) 
 
 4 B. U. 3. 7, 8. 
 
 5 K. U. VI. 1. 4. 
 
II 
 
 conditions which prevent total identification with Brahman. After 
 death begins the migration of the soul; the bad man is born again 
 as a lower animal; the man with lower knowledge enters into lower 
 Brahman, descends into a higher caste and by progressive emancipa- 
 tion enters finally into eternal and absolute Nirvana; the soul with 
 higher knowledge reaches immediate emancipation. This is the key- 
 note of Vedanta, emancipation through knowledge of the Self, 
 hidden in the body, "a patched-together hiding place." 1 This knowl- 
 edge is attained by study of Veda, renunciation of pleasure, attain- 
 ment of control of body, meditation and contemplation of "tat twam 
 asi" Knowledge immediately identifies Self with Brahman, and sees 
 the non-reality of the world. There is no world, no body, no pain 
 for the knowing one for "I am a Brahman," non-actor and non- 
 enjoyer. At the moment of death, a complete and eternal emancipa- 
 tion begins for the enlightened one. He is a Brahman and in Brah- 
 man is he merged. "As rivers run, and in the ocean renouncing 
 name and form, from vision vanish, so names and forms the enlight- 
 ened Sage renouncing, enters great Brahman, the all-embracing 
 Spirit." 2 
 
 With complete emancipation, comes annihilation of Self; Absolute 
 Nirvana is reached but with the nihilism of the soul, a blotting out 
 of things. Death is the end of all. From the most definite and 
 real worship of many gods, Hindoo thought passed to the most 
 indefinite and unreal Self and this belief embodied in the Vedanta 
 philosophy culminates in nihilism, a complete obliteration of Self. 
 
 2. The Socratic Self -knowledge. 
 
 Previous to the conquest of Persia, the Greeks had been ruled 
 by tradition and custom ; laws were followed blindly with unques- 
 tioned belief in their validity. Now the Sophists declared "Man is 
 the measure of all things," what each man thinks is for him the 
 truth. From the study of the cosmos, Greek thought had turned to 
 the study of man. Natural law was now opposed to law of custom; 
 the Sophists held that natural law was the only genuine law and that 
 opinions of men were to reign supreme. Contrary to this idea, Socrates 
 emphasized the elements of knowledge and reason. The Sophists 
 obeyed law if for their own interests and put an end to a blind following 
 of law. Socrates agreed with their purpose but urged all to follow the 
 law by the use of reason, and to obey the law, because it was the law. 
 
 i b. u. 4-4-". 
 
 2 3 Mundaka. 
 
12 
 
 Socrates held that it were better to do wrong knowingly, than the 
 right blindly, and made a universal truth of "Virtue is knowledge of 
 the good" and can be taught and sin is an error. The best kind 
 of life is that which a man leads by the exercise of his reason and 
 in strict conformity to law. According to Socrates, all excellence is 
 insight, or exact knowledge. His maxim was "Know thyself." Man 
 should know his own reason and have an exact knowledge of things 
 in civil and political life. Socrates' purpose was the welfare of the 
 State through the individual's self-knowledge. His was an ethical 
 knowledge, seeking the happiness of all. He made the great distinc- 
 tion between opinion and knowledge by means of his irony. This 
 irony, however, is not the modern doctrine, as will be seen when com- 
 parison is made later. His is a dialectic irony, which is evident in the 
 dialogues of Plato. 1 By a pretended abnegation of his own knowledge, 
 the adversary's opinions are put in the foreground until all further 
 argument to support them is impossible and the opinions sink to naught 
 by their own absurdity. By feigning ignorance and dullness, he drew 
 out the opinions of others and finally caused the opponent to pass 
 judgment on himself. He dropped his own individuality, that others 
 might see the error in opinions and be led to self-knowledge by 
 reason. Here we again see the spirit of nihilism, in the abnegation 
 of Self, that reason and knowledge may reign and an ethical eudae- 
 monism be brought about in the State. 
 
 3. The Self in Christicmity. 
 
 Ancient life was characterized by a feeling of na'ive complacency, 
 but even with the Stoics is discerned a feeling of need for a higher 
 power to save us and lead us to the ideal of virtue. A feeling of unrest 
 abounds caused by the self-diremption of the human soul. The Neo- 
 Platonists attain rest only in the moment of ecstasy when the person- 
 ality of the individual is lost in the Absolute. 
 
 Religion has its origin in the Self. The religious feeling is within 
 man's own nature. 
 
 Man contemplates the evil and discontent about him and longs for 
 salvation from these ills. He needs help and so a Deity is formulated. 
 Man worships and by God's help may be saved. 
 
 Christianity sets up the dualism of soul and world. Man must 
 negate the world in order to save his soul, he must lose his body to find 
 his soul's salvation. The goal of the Ego's striving through life 
 
 1 (Jf. Thesetetus, Philebus, Gorgias. 
 
13 
 
 is the "Kingdom of God." The Ego must renounce the world and 
 all egoistic natural desires and become one with the Infinite in the 
 Eternal Kingdom. Man is free to develop his own character and to 
 realize the Kingdom, and God is supreme in perfecting this home. 
 Both man and God have one goal, the Kingdom. The Ego must lose 
 himself and become one with God. There is a complete renunciation 
 and resignation of the Ego in Christianity. The worldly individual 
 must be negated and the spiritual soul affirmed. Again the Ego loses 
 its identity, merged in the Infinite in the Kingdom of God. 
 
 4. The Cartesian Self. 
 
 Descartes' theory is dependent upon the "inner experience" of St. 
 Augustine and the ontological proof of God's existence set forth by 
 Anselm. He was the modern sceptic, he began by doubting and 
 changed Anselm's "Credo, ut intelligam" to "dubito, ut intelligam" 
 As the senses deceive, he finds it necessary to exercise thought in order 
 to doubt. In this, he is a rationalist. I doubt, therefore I think; and 
 if I think, I am. Thus "Cogito, ergo sum" 1 the maxim was estab- 
 lished that the thinking being, the Self, exists. This is comparable to 
 the Vedanta conception of the identification of all in the Self. 
 If the Self exists, all else exists. The soul is the thinking thing (res 
 cogitans) and the body, the object projected by thought (res 
 extensa)} This antithesis has set the problem for modern thought; 
 the soul is a 'thing and its content is thought ; then, how does the 
 inner soul relate to the external body, how can subjective relate to 
 objective? 
 
 Descartes applies the attribute of extension and declares interaction 
 to be a miracle. It is a real but unintelligent connection, due to the 
 pineal gland of the brain. There is a dualism, but "mens and corpus 
 are on the same level with a possible relation. His "cogito, ergo sum" 
 is a truth grasped by immediate intuition ; it forms one of the elemen- 
 tary truths of consciousness. Innate ideas are clear and distinct ideas, 
 non-deducible, ground solely in themselves. They are as clear and 
 distinct as self -consciousness and he cannot doubt consciousness. Judg- 
 ment as to the distinction between distinct and confused presentations 
 is founded on the will power. Descartes' ethics rest on this method ; 
 from distinct knowledge follows right willing and acting; from the 
 confused impulses, result sin and error. This ethical ideal reminds one 
 of Socrates' rule of reason over sense. 
 
 1 Meditations II. and VI. 
 
 2 Meditations II. and VI. 
 
14 
 
 Descartes made a threefold division of the world ; mind, matter and 
 God. Then as substance is that which can be conceived of as itself 
 alone, mind and matter are not substances as they cannot be con- 
 ceived of as apart from God; so only God exists. He overcomes 
 dualism by relating all things to God. Mind and matter no longer 
 exist. All merge into God as the Brahmanic Self into Nirvana. 
 
 5. The Fichtean Ego. 
 
 With Fichte, Cartesianism seems to be inverted; not "Cogito" but 
 "Ago," not thought but "Thathandlung" Goethe's "Faust," about 
 this time meditates on "Im Anfang war die That" 1 This forms the 
 basis of the Fichtean philosophy. His is a voluntaristic method, follow- 
 ing a dialectical movement. The Ego posits itself (Das Ich setzt sich 
 selbst, well es ist.) 2 Fichte would say "sum, ergo sum" (Ich bin Ich) 
 not "Cogito, ergo sum!' It is the nature of this Ego to act, not in a 
 contemplative direction, but ethically. The Ego therefore opposes to 
 itself a Non-ego on which it acts and reacts. (Aber das dem Ich 
 entgegengesetzte ist-Nicht-Ich.) s The outer world is nothing, except 
 a projection of the Ego, and exists as an obstacle which the Ego must 
 overcome in order to develop character. 
 
 The Ego's self -activity (Thathandlung) 4 acting on the world will 
 result in "die sittliche Weltordnung." We have first the affirmation 
 and activity of a subject; second, an object, world, a product of the 
 Ego, and opposed for ethical development; and third, a limitation, as 
 Ego and Non-ego act on each other as will and thought meet. How 
 can Ego and Non-ego, be considered together, without canceling 
 each other? They mutually limit each other. (Sein und Nicht-sein 
 Realitdt und Negation werden sich gegenseitig einschrdnken) . 5 To 
 limit means a canceling in part; the Non-ego is what the Ego is not, 
 and vice versa. Ego and Non-ego possess reality, divisibility, and 
 negation. They may be united thus : Ich setze im Ich dem theilbaren 
 Ich ein theilbares Nicht-Ich entgegen. 6 Such a synthesis posits activity 
 (Thatigkeit) 7 and may be called the synthesis of causality (Wirksam 
 keit)* The Ego represents the active cause, and the Non-ego, the 
 passive effect. 9 The Ego is a feeling Ego and posits a Non-ego (ein 
 Objekt) 10 upon which it reflects and contemplates ; a reflecting Ego, and 
 a reflected Ego, or Non-ego. The Ego is free in acting, but if it 
 
 1 Faust — Thomas ed. Pt. I. 1. 1237. 6 Ibid. s. no. 
 
 2 Werke — Band I. s. 96, 97. 7 Ibid. s. 136. 
 
 3 Werke — Band I. s. 104. 8 Ibid. s. 136. 
 
 4 Ibid. s. 91. 9 Ibid. s. 137. 
 
 5 Ibid. s. 108. 10 Ibid. s. 200. 
 
15 
 
 reflects on the act, it ceases to be free and the act becomes product. 
 Here arises the distinction between reality and ideality, representation 
 and the thing-in-itself. Freedom, or the Ego's activity, is the uniting 
 link. The Ego must posit itself, and it also posits a Non-ego; there 
 a centripetal and here a centrifugal force; there as an Ego reflecting 
 and here as reflected upon. The relation of the infinite self-activity 
 of the Ego to its object is a tendency toward self-determination, 
 an unending strife; (Eine Tendenz zur Bestimmung, ein Streben, ein 
 unendliches Streben.) 1 
 
 This striving is an impulse (ein Trieb) 2 in the subject which forces 
 it to posit a Non-ego, and the counter activity of the Non-ego is a 
 check (Gegenstreben) , the balance of the two is feeling (Gefiihl). In 
 the feeling is united activity (Thdtigkeit) and limitation (Beschrdnk- 
 ung.). This feeling is caused by reflection; the activity is a yearn- 
 ing (Sehnen) 3 ; an impulse toward the unknown, a dissatisfaction 
 (Misbehagen) and a want (Leere) to be filled. In yearning, ideality 
 and impulse (Trieb nach Realitdt) are closely united. 4 If the Ego 
 posits this harmony it must also posit an opposite which would be 
 accompanied by a feeling of disapproval (disharmony between impulse 
 and act). The harmonious is to be impulse (Trieb) and act (Hand- 
 lung). Each is to determine and be determined together. If an 
 impulse produced itself, merely for impulse, it would be an act like 
 the categorical imperative, simply because it is done with self-deter- 
 mination, without an object. They should be reciprocally related; then 
 harmony and satisfaction (Zufriedenheit) prevail. This lasts only 
 a little, as yearning returns. If act is opposed to impulse, a feeling 
 of dissatisfaction arises, a self-diremption of the subject (der Ent- 
 zweiung des Subjekts mit sich selbst). 5 
 
 The Ego is the basis from which regularity and harmony proceed. 
 Reality is simply the product of the Ego; "Die Philosophie lehrt uns 
 alles im Ich aufsuchen." 6 Back of all is the moral will, which creates 
 the world, for a field of action. Fichte's is an idealism, which sees in 
 all things a product of consciousness. "Was man fiir ein Mensch isf 1 
 determines his philosophy. The activity of the Ego is to develop 
 character. It was the individualism and ethics of Fichte which the 
 Romanticists followed. "In ihrem innersten Kern war die Wissen- 
 shaftslehre Ethik; die moralische Weltordnung war das Herz, von dem 
 sie die Pulse des Alls ausgehen Hess." 9, Fichte's distinction between the 
 
 i Ibid. s. 261. 5 s. 328. 
 
 2 Ibid. s. 288. 6 s. 412. 
 
 3 Ibid. s. 302. 7 s. 434. 
 
 4 Ibid. s. 320. 8 Haym's Romantische Schule — s. 218, 219. 
 
i6 
 
 absolute and the empirical Ego formed a problem for Friedrich 
 Schlegel. Kant had separated noumenon and phenomenon and now 
 Fichte declared that the absolute Ego rules in philosophy, yet since 
 complete freedom remains an ideal, the absolute is never reached. 
 Fichte does not advance beyond Kant. The activity of the Ego, to 
 reach the ideal exerted a great influence on the period of Roman- 
 ticism. 
 
 Let us, however, briefly sum up these five phases of self-doctrine: 
 with Vedanta, Self was the Infinite ; the individual Self must be 
 annihilated and identified with the Brahmanic Self, before Nirvana 
 could be enjoyed; it results in total obliteration of the personal self — ■ 
 nihilism. In the Socratic ethics, Socrates denied himself in order 
 to develop others ; this was an effacement of the personal to bring about 
 a eudaemonistic result in the State. The Christian Self must be lost, 
 so that it can be found in the "Kingdom" ; it is a loss of Self on earth 
 for a new Self above. The Cartesian sceptic must believe in personal 
 existence and in a God's existence and blends the Self in the true 
 substance, God; like the Vedanta, the individual is absorbed by the 
 Infinite. 
 
 Therefore we have found that the personal must be done away 
 with in order to realize a greater Self or realm. With Fichte, we have 
 the transition to the Romantic School. The Fichtean Ego does not 
 become obliterated but strives in endless activity to realize itself in 
 a world, which it posits. This Ego positing an ideal, never reaches the 
 Absolute, but ceaselessly strives for the goal. 
 
 Let us now examine the Romantic period to study the Fichtean 
 influence and to find where the striving Ego will lead us. 
 
 II. Ideals of Romanticism ; Their Origin. 
 
 Two years before , the close of the eighteenth century in Berlin 
 a reaction in philosophy and literature was expressed by the new 
 Romantic School. How did it arise? 
 
 German thought had been passing through an age of Enlighten- 
 ment, with Winckelmann and Lessing as the chief representatives. It 
 was a period marked by "narrowness of vision, a crude intellectual 
 complacency, utter absence of imagination and extreme utilitarianism" 1 
 The supremacy of reason was to be established by means of sesthetical 
 criticism. According to Winckelmann, the ancients formulated their 
 ideals of beauty in much the same way as Socrates formed the ethical 
 
 i Boyesen — Essays, p. 285. 
 
17 
 
 concepts. Through the dialogue, Socrates learned his opponents' opin- 
 ions and united these into a universal; so Phidias and Praxiteles 
 formed a composite ideal from a feature here and there. These ideals, 
 though beautiful, were not characteristic; but Winckelmann lays 
 emphasis on the passiveness of these classical ideals; "Nach diesem 
 Begriff soil die Schonheit sein, wie das vollkommenste Wasser, welches 
 je weniger Geschmack es hat, desto gesunder geachtet *wird, well es von 
 fremden Theilen geldutert zvird." 1 The absence of qualities, "eine stille 
 Grosse und edle Einfalt," mark the finest art which appeals to the 
 intellect, not the emotions. 
 
 Lessing accepts this theory and it forms the nucleus of his "Lao- 
 koon, or Theory of Limits." Art must be beautiful, so Laokoon does 
 not scream ; this would be unfitting as art must represent what is static 
 and permanent. Art, i. e., painting and sculpture, is limited in the 
 spatial realm as it must show co-existence. Poetry appeals to the 
 mind through the ear and employs the medium of time. Art has its 
 limits. Lessing sets up the antique ideal of quietude and complacency 
 as the type of pure art. 
 
 In religion, also, Lessing endeavored to emphasize the rational. In 
 his "Erziehung des Menschen Geschlechts" he argues the problem, "Die 
 zufalligen Geschichtswahrheiten konnen nie der Beweis fur die 
 ewigen Vernunftwahrheiten werden," by making revelation for the 
 race, analogous to education of the individual. Revelation is a means 
 of communicating the truths of God's Fatherhood and Kingdom and 
 the soul's immortality. It was an intellectualistic revelation for it 
 confined itself to the communication of speculative knowledge. 2 
 
 During this period literary men were seeking to revive interest in 
 Greek authors and ancient life. Goethe evinces this tendency in his 
 "Iphigenie" and "Tasso" and Schiller also in his "Braut von Messina." 
 
 The Germans, emotional and imaginative as they are, were not con- 
 tent with the lack of these traits in the classic art and literature and 
 sought relief. The outcome was the Romantic School, opposed to the 
 art formalism of Winckelmann and Lessing and to the classicism 
 in Goethe and Schiller. The new school was marked by the enthusiasm 
 of its founders. The fundamental idea was the reconciliation of 
 poetry and philosophy. 
 
 Romanticism despised prosaic utility and sought to find artistic 
 expression. Classicism had been characterized by complacency and 
 quietude ; objectivity and a satisfaction in Nature ; Romanticism empha- 
 
 i Winckelmann Werke, lib. 4 cap. 2 § 23. 
 
 2 Cf. Erziehung d. mensch. Geschlechts, trans, by Robertson. 
 
i8 
 
 sized first of all subjectivity, evinced by the writer's aspiration and 
 vague longing. Paulsen says, "The Greek ideal of life, revived, is an 
 aesthetical, rather than practical ideal. Not general utility but the per- 
 fection and manifestation of the personality is the function of the free 
 man. This view reached its climax in Romanticism. Its program was 
 to despise utility and prose, to worship the individual and poetry, in 
 literature and in life." 1 The movement, in the second place, portrayed 
 a love of the picturesque and strange mystery. Tieck, called the 
 "Pioneer of Romanticism," thrills the reader with his fantastic legends 
 and "Marchen" and in 
 
 "Mondbeglanzte Zaubernacht, 
 Die den Sinn gefangen halt, 
 Wundervolle Marchenwelt, 
 Steig' auf in der alten Pracht" 2 , 
 
 he voices the motto of the School. Lastly we discern a reactionary 
 spirit against materialism, a retroactive spirit against classicism, and 
 an attempt to revivify mediaevalism. Wackenroder revived enthusiasm 
 over Christian art by his Madonna-worship, extravagant but sincere. 
 
 Schlegel in the "Athenaeum" declares that "Die franzbsische Revo- 
 lution, Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, und Goethe's Meister sind die 
 grossten Tendenzen des Zeitalters" s and according to Novalis, these 
 great influences philosophical, political and poetical were brought to 
 bear in the development of the Romantic School. Kant and Fichte con- 
 tributed much to the new era through their philosophy. 
 
 ( a ) . Philosophical. 
 
 Kant, in the "Critique of Judgment," creates an epoch in aesthetics. 
 He appears as a mediator between the sensationalism of the English 
 Burke, and the rationalism of the German Baumgarten. The former 
 defines the beautiful as "that which pleases" and the latter declares it to 
 be "perfection apprehended through the senses by the intellect." Kant 
 makes aesthetics an independent science; to judge whether a thing 
 is beautiful, or no, requires taste, and the judgment of taste is aesthet- 
 ical; it is a subjective feeling. We must examine our own impres- 
 sions, and impartially survey the object without interest. 4 Anything 
 that pleases our senses arouses inclination and a desire for satisfaction, 
 and the person whose interest has been aroused and who then enjoys 
 
 i Paulsen's Ethics. 
 
 2 Tieck Schriften (1828) — Bd. I. s. 36. Prolog to K. Octavianus. 
 
 3 Fr. Schlegel Prosaische Jugendschriften, ed. J. Minor (Wien 1906), Band II. Ath. 
 § 216. 
 
 4 Critique of Judgment, trans, by J. H. Bernard, p. 55 et seq. 
 
19 
 
 dispenses with judgment. The pleasant pleases immediately. A good 
 or useful object may be pleasing but the idea of its purpose must bring 
 the pleasure of the senses under the principle of reason to call it 
 good. We feel an interest in its use or goodness ; and satisfaction in 
 the good presupposes the reason of its goodness. It is desire deter- 
 mined by reason. The pleasant and the good relate to desire, seeking 
 satisfaction. 
 
 The judgment of taste is contemplative; it is disinterested and free. 
 All interest presupposes a desire ; we satisfy our inclinations, as hunger 
 and thirst; we obey and respect the moral law, the categorical 
 imperative, but taste differs from these. "It only plays with the objects 
 of satisfaction." 1 The beautiful is, therefore, that which pleases with- 
 out interest. This applies to all men, and is of universal validity. It 
 is not founded on concepts, as are logical judgments, but is purely 
 subjective. The pleasant is pleasing to each one as each one has his 
 own taste ; the beautiful is not beautiful for one, but is beautiful if all 
 agree with him. Taste may apply to the pleasant but only in the latter 
 case is it universal. The good depends on concepts of the good which 
 are universal ; the beautiful is like the good, universal but without a 
 concept. "The beautiful, therefore, is that which pleases universally, 
 without requiring a concept." 2 Such universality is subjective ; in judg- 
 ments of taste the faculties of the imagination and the understanding 
 have free play. Pleasure follows the judgment and we impute our 
 pleasure to someone else. The subjective element consists in the 
 more lively play of both these mental powers animated by mutual agree- 
 ment. 3 This subjectivity and "free play" of the imagination are the 
 great influences on Romanticism. 
 
 Kant makes judgments of pleasure empirical; those of morality a 
 priori, while those of beauty rest on a priori principles, but are synthetic 
 and of subjective validity. Beauty is caused by the free play of the 
 cognitive faculties, receiving a regular play of impressions, and is 
 evinced in either figure or play. In pantomime, and dancing, it is the 
 play of figures, in tune, the play of sensations. "The judgment is called 
 sesthetical, because it depends on the feeling of harmony in the play 
 of the mental powers."* 
 
 A product of art is caused by a free play of the representative 
 powers 5 and is not necessarily regular and symmetrical. Art differs 
 from handicraft because the first is free, regarded as play, i. e., an 
 occupation that is pleasant in itself. The best art is produced where 
 
 i Ibid. p. 55. 4 Ibid. p. 80. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 67. 5 Ibid. p. 98. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 64; cf. 71, 93. 
 
20 
 
 all constraint is removed, and thus from work, it is changed to "mere 
 play." 1 
 
 Kant divides beautiful arts into arts of speech, formative arts, 
 and the arts of the "play" of sensations. Arts of speech are rhetoric 
 and poetry; the orator gives us an entertaining "play" of the imag- 
 ination, while the poet announces a "mere play" with ideas. 2 The 
 formative arts are sculpture, architecture and painting; these furnish 
 entertainment of the imagination in free play with ideas and the sesthet- 
 ical judgment, is merely a play, without purpose. The arts of the 
 "play" of sensations, produced externally, are music and color. "Music 
 is the beautiful play of sensations, or a play of pleasant sensations." 3 
 Kant places music last of the arts as it only plays with sensations. 
 Rhetoric and poetry, although a play, carry on a serious business. 4 
 Further free play of sensations is evinced in play of fortune (games 
 of chance), play of tones (music) and the play of thought (wit) 5 ; 
 the first arouse interest, and are not beautiful ; the second changes 
 from bodily sensations to sesthetical ideas ; the third shows an 
 animated mind, without interest. Jokes begin with the thoughts which 
 occupy the body and pass to sesthetical ideas. 6 
 
 Kant contributed the ideas of subjectivity and "free play" to the 
 Romanticists. In his "Critique of Pure Reason" he likewise uses the 
 word "play;" if in our thought we have subjective perception of an 
 object, but no objective equivalent, we should have a "mere play of re- 
 presentations, unconnected with any object." 7 Our concepts are empty; 
 "we have thought in them, but have not arrived at any knowledge. We 
 have only "played" with representations." 8 With Kant, all things con- 
 verge to the synthetic unity of apperception, the conscious "I." So in 
 his aesthetics, all is subjective, all is of the "I." 
 
 Fichte follows Kant with a philosophy, the basis of which is "Das 
 Ich." As seen in the "Wissenschaftslehre," the "Ich" posits itself, and 
 also an opposing object, the world, or "Nicht-Ich ;" this latter forms 
 an obstacle, which being overcome, develops the character of the "Ich." 
 It exists only for an ethical purpose, to develop character. There are 
 then two facts, "Das Ich" and its ethical self-activity {Die That- 
 handlung.) 
 
 Romantic writings were sentimental, artistic and emotional. Fichte 
 was ethical ; how does the ethical Fichte relate to the sesthetical Roman- 
 ticism? The Romanticists accepted the concept of "Das Ich," as the 
 basis of their art. The principal elements for them were subjectivity 
 
 i Ibid. p. 185. 5 Ibid. p. 221. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 207, 208. 6 Ibid. p. 222, 223. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 212, 213, 218. 7 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 159. 
 
 4 Ibid. p. 219. 8 Ibid. p. 127. 
 
; 
 
 21 
 
 and originality. It is true, they introduced the picturesque background 
 of the Middle Ages, but the main thought sprang from the Self. The 
 result, oftentimes, seemed odd and eccentric, due to marvelous creations 
 of the imagination. The Self created ideals, to which it could never 
 attain; the struggle was vain, the Self could not reach the. goal. 
 
 The second connecting link, we find to be the idea of Culture. 
 Fichte's extreme moralism did not exclude an idea which was central 
 to Romanticism; it was the idea of Culture. The ethical with Fichte 
 included both poetry and politics, because his conception of morality 
 was broad. 
 
 In his "Beitrage zur Berichtigung der Urtheile iiber die franzosische 
 Revolution," he uses the word "Culture" many times. It is the first 
 marked use of the word found in philosophy 1 although Kant uses it in 
 his "Critique of Pure Reason," "culture, which is intended to form 
 a certain kind of skill, without destroying another kind which is already 
 present" 2 and "Metaphysics is the completion of the whole culture of 
 human reason." 3 
 
 The French Revolution had been a struggle for political freedom. 
 Rousseau's works cried out for freedom, through a complete return to 
 nature. The French took up this idea of the rule of the individual, and 
 how did it culminate? By bloodshed and a Reign of Terror. Fichte 
 finds it necessary to follow a very different path to attain freedom. 4 
 It is by means of Culture. 
 
 None of our own impulses have any value, except in so far as they 
 affect our Culture ("Nichts in der Sinnenwelt, nichts von unserem 
 Treiben, Thun oder Leiden, hat einen Werth, als insofern es auf Cultur 
 wirkt"). 5 In attempting the freedom of "Das Ich," the first act is 
 the "Bezahmung der Sinnlichkeit ;" the second is the "Cultur der 
 Sinnlichkeit." "Culture is the exercise ( Uebung) of all of our powers 
 (Kraft e) toward the goal of complete freedom (Zweck der volligen 
 Freiheit) ; of complete independence of all which is not pure Self 
 (reines Selbst)."* This Culture arises through and from the self-activity 
 of "Das Ich;" it depends on the use of freedom and affects freedom. 
 Fichte refers to the French Revolution as a means of Culture, "Der 
 Krieg cultivirt;" 7 by means of war strong souls are roused to heroic 
 feelings and deeds; weak souls become coarse and oppressive. Also, 
 "der hdrteste Despotismus cultivirt;"* the slave hears in the death 
 
 i Eucken — Modern Phil. Concepts, trans, by M. S. Phelps — p. 216. 
 
 2 Critique of Pure Reason — trans. Max Miiller, p. 570 [710]. 
 
 3 Critique of Pure Reason — trans. Max Mtiller, p. 682 [851]. 
 
 4 Ueber die fr. Rev. — ; Sammtliche Werke, Bd. VI. s. ft. 
 
 5 Ibid. s. 86. 7 Ibid. s. 90, 91. 
 
 6 Ibid. s. 86. 8 Ibid. s. 91. | 
 
22 
 
 sentence the promise of an everlasting" freedom and peace. But these 
 means of culture should not be employed. 
 
 Fichte asks what was the goal in the founding and government of 
 the country? The answer gives two aims; (a) Alleinherrschaft eures 
 Willen im Innern and (b) Verbreitung eurer Grenzen von Aussen. He 
 accepts the first as a means to the highest aim, Cultur zur Freiheit; 
 and compares the second with this final aim and finds it cannot injure 
 Culture, whether few or many thousands will be affected. 1 He speaks 
 of three kinds of freedom; transcendental, the same in all rational 
 beings; cosmological, only possessed by the Eternal, but aimed at by 
 all mortals, to be dependent on naught outside Self ; political, or the 
 right to acknowledge no law except what man gives himself. This 
 should be in every state; "Cultur der Freiheit soil der einzige End- 
 zweck der Stoat s-verbindung sein." 2 Society (Gesellschaft) and state 
 differ but neither can give Culture; but C( Beider Einfluss auf unsere 
 Cultur verhdlt sich wie ihr beiderseitigen Gebiet." 3 One who receives 
 Culture from the state will not turn it against the state; but man 
 must work for the highest goal of all "moralischen IVesen" through 
 Culture. Man has a right and it is his duty to seek means of Culture ; 
 Culture is mine, as my property is and does not belong to the state. 
 
 As his second definition of Culture, Fichte gives "the restraining 
 and rooting out of our own erring inclinations (fehlerhaften Nei gun- 
 gen), which oppose the awakening of reason (Erwacken unserer 
 Vernunft) and the feeling of our own self-activity (Gefilhl unserer 
 Selbstthdtigkeit) ; and also the modifying of external things and 
 changing them according to our concepts. (B e griff e)"*. Culture 
 is capable of great variety, but differs only in degree. Culture is 
 the highest means by which man can reach self-harmony (Ueber- 
 einstimmung mit sich selbst) ; it is the means of moral perfection ; 
 "Die Sinnlichkeit soil cultivirt werden." 5 
 
 Fichte's aim is the spreading of Culture and the elevation of 
 humanity. 6 He carries it into politics where "culture creates the politi- 
 cal aim." 7 It is possible to obtain political freedom and he voices it 
 in "The true Fatherland is that state which is most highly cultured." 8 
 This idea of Culture was used by Fichte in an ethical sense, even in 
 politics; it was the restraint of impulse and it aimed for absolute 
 freedom of Self and state. The Romanticists put an sesthetical cast 
 on the idea of "Cultur" ; they aimed to revive the study of the Middle 
 
 i Ibid. s. 92. 5 Ibid. s. 298, 299. 
 
 2 Band VI. s. 101. 6 Ibid. s. 301. 
 
 3 Ibid. s. 139. 7 Band VII. s. 146. 
 
 4 Ibid. s. 298. 8 Band VII. s. 212. 
 
23 
 
 Ages, but they are closely related to Fichte through the concepts of 
 the "Ich" and "Cultur" the latter being the free activity of the 
 former. 
 
 (b) Political. 
 
 The political influence on Romanticism was derived from the 
 French Revolution. A return to nature, where absolute freedom 
 would be enjoyed, was advocated by Rousseau. In a state of nature, 
 we would find primitive man, not in a state of peace, but in war 
 ("Bellum omnium contra omnes), says Hobbes, the English thinker, 
 and what was the result with civilized man? A Revolution, whereby 
 freedom was not won. In this period, however, the ideas of egoism 
 and freedom of the Ego were paramount and these were to exert a 
 great influence on the Romantic School. Kant, with his subjectivity 
 and free play in aesthetics; Fichte, with the subject and its free 
 activity, expressed as Culture, in ethics and politics, and the French 
 Revolution with its egoism and freedom, all powerfully influenced 
 the enthusiasts of Romanticism. 
 
 (c) Poetical. 
 
 From the realm of poetic art. we choose Goethe and Schiller as 
 influencing the School. With Goethe and his "Wilhelm Meister," the 
 influence is a negative one; the book tells of the desire of a youth 
 to attain happiness. His egoistic attempts were void of the desired 
 result, and it is not until he serves his fellowmen that happiness comes 
 to him. It portrays a growth from egoism to altruism ; it also pur- 
 posed to show the breaking up of a feudal system into an industrial 
 society. A man, Goethe believed, should be ranked according to his 
 utility. In "Faust," the same doctrine is put forth. It is based on 
 the Fichtean activity (Thathandlung) : "Im Anfang war die That" 1 
 and "Die That ist alles, nichts der Ruhm" 2 The egoistic sensual 
 pleasures, then those of self-culture and self-fame are in vain, and 
 only when "Faust" drains the large morass and secures health and 
 happiness for posterity, can he say "Verweile doch, du bist so schon!"* 
 In the "Leiden des jungen Werthers," the letters teem with the cry 
 for happiness, but the egoistic longing for self-satisfaction ends in 
 suicide. 
 
 The Romanticists deemed these works lacking in art and imagina- 
 tion and opposed Goethe with tales of idealism and imagination. They 
 despised utility in all, but more especially in tales. Goethe exerted a 
 
 i Faust — Thomas ed. — Bk. I. 1. 1237. 
 
 2 Faust — Thomas ed. — Ek. II. 1. 10188. 
 
 3 Ibid. Vol. II. line 11582. 
 
24 
 
 positive influence, however, by his portrayal of freedom from moral 
 restraints and his great emphasis on the individual and his activity. 
 
 Schiller follows Kant in his idea of play in aesthetics. Where 
 Kant places the judgment of taste between the judgments of sense and 
 of the good, Schiller places "beauty" between sense and morality. 
 Schiller gives evidence of the influence of idealistic moralism from 
 Kant, the great "Konigsberger," and a lower realism from Goethe, 
 "der grosse Heidner." 
 
 In his "Briefe," he opposes two natures in man, and attempts to 
 prove this by metaphysical, psychological, ethical and aesthetical dis- 
 tinctions. We study the Ego, and distinguish something permanent, 
 and something that changes ; the first we call the person, the second, 
 his condition. The person is permanent, a law in itself, whereas con- 
 ditions change ; but in all our conditions ; moods, feelings, thought? 
 and acts we are the same person ; these conditions do not arise from 
 the person, and the path to unite person and condition would never 
 find its goal. 1 
 
 The permanent personality is enclosed in reason and reflection; the 
 changing is due to sense-perception. These may be called impulses, 
 the one. relating to reason, the form-impulse (Formtriebe), and the 
 other, relating to sense, the sensuous-impulse (sinnliches Triebes). 2 
 The sensuous-impulse relates to man's physical being and puts him in 
 contact with matter; it is due to perception and demands continued 
 change. The form-impulse relates to man's rational nature, and 
 creates eternal laws and brings harmony into various conditions. 3 The 
 sense-impulse arouses inclination for the present need ; the form- 
 impulse shows man his eternal unchangeable duty for dignity of life 
 (Erhaltung des Lebens) and maintenance of character (Bewahrung 
 der Wurde).* 
 
 These two impulses are to be reconciled, but how ? Kant says there 
 can be no other influence save duty in living the categorical impera- 
 tive. Goethe in the "Confessions of a Fair Saint" 5 does not unite 
 inclination and reason, but shows the victory of reason over impulse. 
 "My longing after the Invisible . . . is an impulse that leads me 
 and guides me aright. I freely follow, knowing little of restraint." 6 
 
 Schiller places the "Spiel-trieb" or "play-impulse" between the two 
 which shall raise man to perfection, and set man free physically and 
 
 i "Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen"; Brief n. 
 
 2 Brief 12. 
 
 3 Briefe t?, 13. 
 
 4 s. 390, Werke (Hempel). 
 
 5 Wilhelm Meister, trans, by Carlyle, Bk. VI. Vol. I., p. 340 et seq. 
 
 6 p. 397- 
 
25 
 
 morally. 1 This is the consummation of humanity. The object of sen- 
 suous-impulse is life (Leben), and that of the form-impulse is form 
 (Gestalt) ; the object of the "Spieltrieb" is beauty, or living form. The 
 ancient statue is all self-satisfied form, but lacks life. Beauty must 
 unite and balance reality and form; it must lead the sensuous man to 
 form and perfection, and must lead the too spiritual man to matter. 
 From the physical to the moral, we are led by the sesthetical. "Das 
 Spieltrieb" is then a struggle in the soul of the artist to unite sense 
 and reason. It is art. "Man is only entirely a man when he plays. 
 Man shall only play with beauty, and shall play only with beauty" 2 {der 
 Mensch soil mit der Schonheit nur spielen, und er soil nur mit der 
 Schonheit spielen.") The genius is he who unites perfection of art 
 and conduct. 
 
 With Fichte, the activity of the Ego was ethical, with Schiller 
 sesthetical. With Kant and Schiller, beauty or art is only a "play" 
 between sense and duty. Herbert Spencer speaks of a "play activity," 
 but his is biological ; it is merely surplus of vigor, ideal excitement such 
 as is seen in the play of kittens, and heard in the song of the birds. 
 The savage, after the hunt, carves his implements of war and the 
 chase because he possesses extra activity and it expresses itself in crude 
 attempts at art. Art with Spencer is "play activity," or surplus vigor ; 
 with Schiller is a "play" with beauty, a means of passing from the 
 sensuous to the moral. 3 There are three epochs in man's development ; 
 man in his physical state endures only forces of nature ; he frees him- 
 self in the aesthetical condition, and governs them in the moral state. 
 
 When Schiller discusses poetry, he makes similar distinctions. 
 Poetry may ie naive or sentimental. As a child in its simplicity needs 
 no art to make it great, so simplicity in nature triumphs over art; if 
 unconsciously, it is "simplicity as surprise" (U eberraschung) ; if con- 
 sciously, it is "simplicity of feeling" (Gesinnung). 4 The child seems an 
 ideal, and as we realize what we are not, sadness is aroused, and we 
 strive for this that we are not and this is sentimentality. "Genius is 
 simple, or it is not genius" (Naiv muss jedes wahre Genie sein, oder 
 es ist keines)." 5 It must be guided by nature and instinct, not by laws. 
 Nature is as it should be, but we have become free and have fled from 
 nature ; we regret this and long to get back ; we long for happiness and 
 for the perfection we should find there. The ancient Greeks felt nat- 
 urally, so there is no sadness there ; their life, even their religion was 
 founded on simple nature; the moderns have lost nature, except in 
 
 i Briefe 14, 15, 16. 3 Brief 24. 
 
 2 Schiller Werke (Berlin — Hempel) — (15) 4 Werke — s. 474 (Hempelausgabe). 
 
 s. 392. 5 Ibid. s. 479- 
 
26 
 
 childhood, and are discontented with humanity and strive to find their 
 lost happiness. 
 
 "The poet is the guardian of nature (Bewahrer der Natur)" -, 1 
 he either expresses nature, or seeks it. Therefore we have two kinds 
 of poetry, naive or simple, and sentimental. Schiller calls Homer and 
 Shakespeare, naive poets, lost in nature and we forget the poet in his 
 subject. Goethe in "Werther" evinces this same naive love of nature. 2 
 The sentimental poet seeks nature. The naive poet imitates the real, 
 as he sees it ; the modern poet represents an ideal as for him the real 
 does not exist. Ideal humanity will unite these views ; "Natur macht 
 ihn mit sick eins, die Kunst trennt und entzweit ihn, durch das Ideal 
 kehrt er zur Einheit zuriick." s 
 
 . The simple poet imitates the real, and is content; the sentimental 
 poet reflects on nature and expresses the real and ideal. Which will 
 predominate? In satirical poetry, the real is contrasted with the ideal 
 showing the distance things are from nature. It may be humorous or 
 pathetic satire. In elegaic poetry, either nature or the ideal are objects 
 of sadness, as lost to man, or both are objects of joy„ being represented 
 as reality; the first is elegy, the second, the idyl. Rousseau is an 
 elegaic poet seeking nature ; Klopstock and Kleist are others who seek 
 the ideal. Goethe's "Werther" expresses the sentimental longing also in 
 "Alas, when we have attained our object, we are as poor as ever, and 
 our souls still languish for unattainable happiness." 4 "The idyl pre- 
 sents the idea of an innocent and happy humanity; man in a state of 
 innocence; it is humanity reconciled with itself; it is union of inclina- 
 tion and duty (Vereinigung der Neigungen mit dem Gesetze einer 
 zur hochsten sittlichen Wilrde) ; it is the ideal of beauty applied to real 
 life (Ideal der Schonheit auf das wirkliche Leben angewendet) ." 5 
 
 It reconciles the real and the ideal. 
 
 The simple poet is limited by sensuous reality; whereas the senti- 
 mental poet has absolute unconditional freedom. The first accomplishes 
 his object, but is limited; the second does not attain his goal, but 
 has an unlimited goal. The simple poet needs help from without, 
 whereas the sentimental poet is his own genius. The simple poet is 
 in danger of acquiring vulgar habits of style and expression; the 
 sentimental poet may remove all limits, nullify human nature, rise 
 beyond the finite and reality and become a dreamer; freed from all 
 law, he loses himself in fantasy; he may exaggerate and become 
 extravagant. 
 
 i Ibid. s. 487. 3 Werke — Schiller — (15) s. 493. 
 
 2 Letters May 26, June 21, Aug 28; 4 Letter June 21. 
 
 May 9, Sept. 4. 5 Werke — Schiller s. 527. 
 
27 
 
 The simple poet must not sink too low, nor the sentimental poet 
 dream too high. Harmony must prevail and a union of simple and 
 sentimental will attain a "beautiful humanity" as beauty results from 
 the harmony of spirit and sense. The consummation of humanity is 
 where the "Spieltrieb" raises man to perfection from physical to 
 moral freedom, and where the naive poet uses sentimental material in 
 his art. 
 
 The struggle of the artist to unite the real with the ideal forms 
 the basis of all the philosophy of Romanticism, with Friedrich 
 Schlegel as the founder. 
 
 III. Schlegel's "Ironie." 
 i. Influence of Schiller. 
 
 In Friedrich Schlegel is found a synthesis of Fichte, Goethe and 
 Schiller. The dualism of Kant, his noumenon and phenomenon, ana 
 that of Fichte, the Ego and Non-ego, formed a problem for Schlegel. 
 Schiller had attempted to combine permanence and becoming, duty and 
 sense by means of the "Spieltrieb/' making "play" the mediator between 
 the spiritual and sensuous sides of man ; thus it is that man only plays 
 in art and that the poet is tht true man. 
 
 Schiller's contrast between naive and sentimental poetry was 
 accepted by Schlegel, but in "Die Griechen und Romer" he renames 
 and remodels the distinction. As we have seen, the naive poet is lost 
 in his portrayal of nature ; the sentimental bard evinces the search for 
 nature, as a lost paradise, and sets forth the gulf between the real and 
 the ideal ; real art will unite ; the naive poet using sentimental material. 
 
 With Schlegel, sentimental poetry represents the "return to lost 
 nature" (die Riickkehr zur verlohrnen Natur), 1 but he adds that not 
 every expression of strife toward the infinite (Streben nach dem 
 Unendlichen) is sentimental, nor is every portrayal of the absolute 
 (Darstellung des Absoluten) 2 ; the real characteristics of the senti- 
 mental poetry are, "interest in the reality of an ideal (Inter esse an der 
 Realitdt des Ideals), reflexion over the relation of the ideal and real, 
 and the relation of the idealizing fancy of the poet upon an individual 
 object (die Beziehung auf ein individuelles Objekt der idealisirenden 
 Embildungskraft des dichtenden Subjekts)." 9 
 
 Grecian poetry begins with nature and aims to reach beauty through 
 culture; 4 it is pure art of the beautiful (reine Kunst des Schonen).* 
 
 i Prosaische Jugendschriften, ed. J. Minor, Bd. I., s. 80. 
 
 2 Ibid. «. 81. 4 Ib»d. s. 10. 
 
 3 Ibid. s. 82. 5 Ibid. s. 38. 
 
28 
 
 With modern poetry, beauty is not the ideal ; it begins with interest, 
 or subjective sesthetical power (das Inter esse, d. h. subjektive cesthet- 
 iche Kraft) 1 and its goal either has not been attained, or else it has 
 no set aim, no direction, no unity. 
 
 Satisfaction can only arise from complete enjoyment, when all 
 longing has ceased; modern poetry expresses unsatisfied longing; the 
 moderns set aside beauty as an ideal and yet exhibit all the longing and 
 dissatisfaction in striving for it after all ; "Je mehr man sich von dem 
 Schonen entfernte, je heftiger man nach demselben strebte." 2 The 
 limits of knowledge and art are confused and philosophy becomes 
 poetry, and poetry philosophy. (Die Philosophic poetisirt und die 
 Poesie philosophirt.) 3 Schlegel denies the distinction between poetry 
 and philosophy and requires everyone to be a true philosopher, i. e., a 
 poet. Poetry demands absolute originality (absolute Originalitdt) and 
 the genius arises, making a disregard of law the first principle of his 
 art ; his poetry based on the interest of the Ego (interessante Individu- 
 ality) results in confusion (Verwirrung), lawlessness (Gesetzlosig- 
 keit), scepticism (Skeptizmus), and want of principle (Characterlo- 
 sigkeit) .* 
 
 Each genius strives after his own ideal with unsatisfied yearning 
 (strebt in unbefriedigter Sehnsucht) ; this disregard of law and lack 
 of uniformity in the ideal causes modern poetry to appear as "a sea of 
 striving forces (Meer streitender Krafte), a chaos of beauty (ein 
 Chaos alles Erhabnen, Schonen, Reizenden) , an anarchy." 5 Will such 
 an anarchy bring about a beneficial revolution ? 
 
 Modern poetry is spurred on by the free act (freier Aktes des 
 Gemiiths) ; it is "a restless unsatisfied striving after the new, the piquant 
 and the striking (das rastlose unersdttliche Streben nach dem Neuen, 
 Piquanten und Frappanten) ," but the yearning remains unsatisfied (die 
 Sehnsucht bleibt unbefriedigt) 6 Either freedom or nature gives man 
 the impulse for culture; in modern art, it is the "free play without 
 a set goal" (freies Spiel ohne bestimmten Zweck) ; the fantasy of the 
 Romantic School proves this. 
 
 Schlegel mentions three classes of poets, whose goal may be the 
 good (das Gute), the beautiful (das Schbne), or the true (das 
 Wahre), 1 but for him the ideal poetry is that which has for its goal 
 the philosophical interest (das philosophisch Interessante). Accord- 
 ingly he places Shakespeare as the foremost of all modern poets, 
 whereas Schiller had placed him, as we have seen, among the na'ive 
 
 i Ibid. s. 79. 5 Ibid. s. 92. 
 
 2 Ibid. s. 89. 6 Ibid. s. 95. 
 
 3 Ibid. s. 89. 7 Ibid. s. 103. 
 
 4 Ibid. s. 91. 
 
29 
 
 or simple poets j 1 he portrays for Schlegel romantic fantasy and heroic 
 greatness mingled with poetical philosophy. 
 
 In modern poetry, the highest aim is the greatest which can be 
 demanded of art, toward which she can strive. This unconditioned 
 goal can never be entirely reached and the genius will be ever creating 
 a new goal through the endless play of his fancy ; it can be approached 
 but never reached. Modern poetry will be ever changing ; as the goal 
 is changeable, so the poetry will change. With a fixed objective 
 unchangeable goal, sesthetical culture can itself be fixed, but the sub- 
 jective changeable goal set by the genius will not allow of a permanent 
 style in poetry. 
 
 In this "aesthetical revolution," two postulates are formulated; aes- 
 thetical strength and morality. Man postulates through his freedom 
 the moral laws. As he wills the sesthetical, so he wills the moral ; then, 
 as both arise from himself, he will persist in their furtherance. A 
 proper taste can only arise from a morally good mind. 2 This reminds 
 us of the Fichtean moral will. 
 
 With the Greeks, beauty was the all ; nature surrounded the Greek 
 poet completely; he is sunk in nature. Grecian art shows a tendency 
 toward the objective; it is classic as Grecian plastic; "the complete 
 harmony of poetic art and nature poetry is found only in the classic 
 poetry" (die volkommne Harmonie der Kunstpoesie und Naturpoesie 
 iindet sich nur in den Alten, in der klassischen Poesie). 3 As all are 
 sons of nature, fate (Schicksal) plays a great part in Greek poetry 
 and drama. Beauty is a gift from nature and to the ideal of "free 
 beauty," the Grecian poetry attained; "a golden age, enjoyment com- 
 plete and self-satisfying (Genuss vollstandig und selbstgenugsam) , 
 highest beauty." 4 "Greek culture was original and national, a com- 
 plete whole (ein in sich vollendetes Ganses), which through pure inner 
 development attained a high place and then again sank into itself after 
 a complete cycle (Kreislauf) ; so original was also Greek poetry." 5 
 It is a natural history of taste and art, containing the simple and pure 
 elements into which modern poetry must be analyzed in order to 
 unravel the chaos. Morality has no place in Grecian poetry, but 
 patriotism attains a prominent position. 
 
 Greek poetry starts with nature and ends there; it was fostered 
 through worldliness (Sinnlichkeit) and finally sank into lowest debauch- 
 ery (Schwelgerei), into the deepest degeneracy (Entartung) . 7 With 
 
 i Ibid. s. 107. S 8. 143- 
 
 2 s. 122. 6 s. 146. 
 
 3 Athenaeum § 252. 7 s. 151. 
 
 4 Die Gr. und R., s. 133. 
 
30 
 
 the Romans, life also was the full enjoyment of nature, lawless and 
 unlimited, and it finally ended in complete dissolution (Erschlaifung 
 und Auflosung). 1 
 
 Modern poetry sets forth the strife of subjective disposition and 
 objective tendency of sesthetical power, and the predominance of the 
 latter (den steten Streit der subjektiven Anlage und der objektiven 
 Tendenz des cesthetischen Vermogens und das allmahlige Ueberge- 
 wicht des letztern) ." 2 The understanding is constantly striving be- 
 tween two opposites ; from within, the eternal directions of the striving 
 mind (die ewigen Richtungen des strebenden Gemiiths) ; from without, 
 the unalterable laws of nature (die unwandelbaren Gesetze der 
 Natur). s With the Greek, art started with nature and ended there; 
 the modern strives to find nature again. Many German authors show 
 a desire to unite the ancient with the modern such as the chorus 
 (Tendenz zum Chor) in Schiller. 4 
 
 Schlegel places Goethe's poetry as the "dawn of real art and pure 
 beauty" (die Morgenrbthe echter Kunst und reiner Schonheit) f a 
 union of ancient and modern, between the "interesting and the beauti- 
 ful" (Interessanten und die Schonen)? In "Faust," the hero's marriage 
 with Helena of Troy is evidence of attempt to unite ancient with mod- 
 ern, a pursuit of the beautiful, a reconciliation of Greek ideals with 
 northern art, but Helena vanishes and Faust awakes to practical life ; 
 also, the awful face of the Earth spirit (schreckliches Gesicht des Erd- 
 geistes), like the large face of Jupiter, is a return to Greek life. 7 
 Schlegel says Goethe's style is a mixture of that of Homer, Euripides 
 and Aristophanes, of pure and simple aesthetical elements. 8 
 
 Life to the modern is an earnest strife (ein ernster Kampf) seeking 
 satisfaction. Man must be free and he forms from himself taste and 
 enjoyment in the beautiful (Geschmack, Genuss des Schonen). Love 
 is the delight of the free man, and the highest love is the love of coun- 
 try. (Liebe ist der Genuss des freien Menschen und die hochste Liebe 
 ist die Vaterlandsliebe) . 9 This reminds one of the patriotism of the 
 Greek and Roman. "All love is in itself poor and its fullness is a 
 gift of nature ; pure nature is all abundance ; all harmony is a gift 
 of love. In art fullness and harmony unite. Both infinites (Unendlich- 
 keiten) form a new whole. Nature gives to taste extension; to love, 
 power ; to art, order and law. (Natur gibt dem Geschmack Umfang, 
 die Liebe Kraft, die Kunst Ordnung und Gesetz.) 10 
 
 i s. 25 (Die Grenzen des Schonen)— 6 Haym's Rom. Schule, s. 189. 
 
 Minor I. . 7 Goethe's Faust — Thomas ed. — Pt. I., 1 
 
 2 s. 171. 483. 
 
 3 s. 21. 8 Die Gr. und Romer — s. 146. 
 
 4 s. 177. 9 s. 23 und 25. (Grenzen des Schonen.) 
 
 5 s. 114. 10 s. 27. 
 
31 
 
 Schiller made naive and sentimental poetry a distinction not of 
 time, but of manner ; with Schlegel, it is a difference in the action, and 
 therefore historical (in der That, ein historischer). 1 He sees the 
 objective is the true goal of the ancient and that the only remedy for 
 the modern is to cease being sentimental, whereby he is ruled by indi- 
 vidual interest, and return to the classic style, that he may become 
 Grecian again. "Schiller's standpoint," says Haym, "was ideological; 
 Schlegel's was doctrinal." 2 
 
 In the "Athenaeum" the contrast is expressed in similar fashion. 
 Schlegel says of the Greeks and Romans that they had little genius, 
 but much ingenuity; but antiquity itself was a kind of genius which 
 for the modern is unattainable. 3 A similar distinction is made in the 
 "Lyceum," where he asserts that "out of that which the moderns wish, 
 one must learn what poetry should be ; out of that which the ancients 
 did, what it must be." 4 The same work points out how the ancients 
 were masters of poetical abstraction, while the moderns are more 
 given to poetical speculation ; 5 among the ancients, he further declares, 
 one sees the very letter of poetry itself, while the modern has simply an 
 idea of the poetical spirit. 6 With his philosophical conception of 
 poetry, Schlegel urges that all poetry is but a commentary upon the 
 texts of speculation and in the same manner he endeavors to unite art 
 and science by saying "all art should become science and all science, 
 art." 7 By such means, Schlegel hopes to bring about a unity of poetry 
 and philosophy; "Zur Harmonie gelangt sie nur durch Verbindung 
 der Poesie und der Philosophies 8 
 
 The ancient with Schlegel is like the naive of Schiller, — a poet 
 lost in nature and thus satisfied ; the modern like the sentimental seeks 
 for a new object; with endless play, the genius has no Hurts; he soars 
 above nature, setting his own .goal, which he again destroys and 
 creates anew. Perfect art would unite the ancient and modern ; would 
 unite poetry and philosophy. Can such art be realized ? 
 
 We have now completed the survey of the essay "Die Griechen und 
 Romer," which sets forth the poetical influence of Schiller on Friedrich 
 Schlegel. Thus it is seen that ancient art, like naive, is calm and con- 
 tent, but modern, like the sentimental, evinces the struggle to attain 
 a goal, which the genius creates and then destroys. 
 
 2. Influence of Fichte and Goethe. 
 
 We will now examine the influence of Fichte on Schlegel. Fichte, 
 
 i Haym's Rom. Schule, s. 205. 5 Lyceum § 107. 
 
 2 Romantische Schule, s. 205. 6 Lyceum § 93. 
 
 3 Athenaeum 8 248. 7 Lyceum § 115. 
 
 4 Lyceum § 84. 8 Athenaeum § 451. 
 
32 
 
 in his "Theory of Morals," likens philosophy to poetic talent. "Art 
 makes the transcendental view the common one, and aesthetic contem- 
 plation finds in everything, even in the moral law, not an absolute 
 command but itself, and hence it is related to moral law as a free 
 being, not as a slave." 1 
 
 Schlegel declares Fichte's "Wissenschaftslehre" to be a philosophy 
 of the material of Kant's philosophy (eine Philosophie tiber die Materie 
 der Kantischen Philosophie). One can comprehend the identity of his 
 philosophy with the Kantian (man kann die Identitdt seiner Philosophie 
 mit der Kantischen sehen und begreifen). 2 Fichte believed reason and 
 freedom should rule the state ; in the world, all was the expression of 
 freedom, the rule of the individual (Ausdruck der Freiheit, die Allein- 
 herrschaft des Ich), 3 and his ethical philosophy was the result of his 
 politics. 
 
 Schlegel agreed with the theory of the power of the Ego's activity, 
 but put an sesthetical aspect over the Fichtean ethics. Fichte's unend- 
 ing activity surpasses self-imposed barriers; Schlegel's activity is the 
 fancy of the genius directed toward a self-imposed ideal, far beyond 
 reality. He is powerfully influenced by Fichte, especially as he finds 
 the modern Fichte to be as ethical as Plato and the ancients by whom 
 his ethical ideals has been aroused. Two impulses strove in Schlegel's 
 spirit for union; one the calm contented beauty and harmony of the 
 ancient classics; the other, the subjectivism of the modern philosophy 
 with its freedom and its strife toward the unending. (Die befriedigte 
 Schonheit und Harmonie in der Alterthum und der Klassiker; der 
 Subjektivismus der modernen Philosophie mit ihrer Freiheitsbe geist- 
 erung und ihrem Streben nach dem Unendlichen). 4 How can he 
 reconcile them? 
 
 Goethe in his poetry portrays the beautiful and harmonious (das 
 Schone und Harmonische) ; Fichte, the striving ego (W eltbekdmpf en- 
 den Ich). 6 Schlegel, in his aesthetical and ethical doctrine unites 
 Goethe and Fichte ; he places the "Wissenschaftslehre," "Wilhelm 
 Meister" with the French Revolution, as the three greatest tendencies 
 of the age, 6 and again the Fichtean idealism and Goethe's poetrv are 
 the two centers of German art and culture (die beiden Centra der 
 deutschen Kunst und Bildung). 1 
 
 In his essay, "Uber die Poesie," Schlegel speaks of three charac- 
 teristics of "Wilhelm Meister," whereby we learn of Goethe's influ- 
 ence on Schlegel. The characteristics are first, individuality (Individu- 
 
 i Cf. Erdmann Vol. II., § 314; 3. 5 Haym s. 249. 
 
 2 Athenaeum § 281. 6 Athenaeum § 216. 
 
 3 Haym s. 218. 7 U. die Unverstiindlichkeit — Minor Bd. 
 
 4 Haym s. 249. 11., s. 389. 
 
33 
 
 alit'dt), second, antique spirit under a modern veil (antike Geist unter 
 der modernen Hulle), and third, a harmony of classic and romantic 
 (Harmonie des Classischen und des Romantischen) . The author 
 expresses two ideas; that of a romance (Kunstler-roman) , and the 
 education of a life (Bildungslehre der Lebenskunst) } As stated above, 
 Goethe unites the antique style with the "Ironie" of reflection, the 
 ancient and the modern. The Romantic element of mystery is accorded 
 by Mignon and the Harper, whose lyrics both entertain and give food 
 for reflection. Schlegel declares the book to be "an historical phil- 
 osophy of art" (eine historische Philosophic der Kunst), "a work of 
 art, or poem" (ein Kunstwerk oder Gedicht), "all poetry, pure poetry" 
 (alles Poesie, reine, hohe Poesie. . . . ), "this wonderful prose 
 is prose and yet poetry. The book has genius" (diese wunderbare 
 Prosa ist Prosa und doch Poesie. Das Buch hat Genius) ? 
 
 Throughout the book is seen the "Ironie," which we learn now is 
 a contrast between hope and result (Hoifnung und Erfolg), fancy and 
 reality {Einbildung und Wirklichkeit) , reality and idealism (Realitat 
 und Idealitdt). 3 Wilhelm's unending impulse for culture is another 
 phase of "Ironie." The book seems a play, but it soon becomes serious- 
 ness (Es ist ein inter essantes Spiel und wurde nun Ernst). 41 The 
 Romantic personae Mignon, Sperata and Augustine all pass away on 
 account of the excess (Uebermass) of their own soaring fancies. 
 Schlegel considers Goethe to have reached the goal in art. "He who 
 has properly characterized Goethe's Meister has truly said what the 
 poetry of the age is." (Wer Goethe's Meister behorig charakterisirte, 
 der hatte damit wohl eigentlich gesagt, was es jetzt an der Zeit ist in 
 der Poesie). 5 Schlegel calls "Wilhelm Meister" the genuine romance, 
 the sum of everything poetical, and he designates this poetical ideal, the 
 "Romantic poetry" (romantische Dichtung). 9 Here he changes the 
 term modern to "Romantic" and lays stress on the fact that it does 
 not lack "Die Ironie." 
 
 The ancient classic art expressed complete harmony and satisfac- 
 tion; the modern, or under its new term, Romantic, art expresses 
 strife. "Die romantische Dichtung ist eine progressive Universal- 
 poesie (is a progressive universal poetry) ... a union of poetry 
 and philosophy . . . it is unending, because it alone is free and 
 posits as its first law that the poet will suffer no law over him (es 
 ist unendlich, weil sie allein frei ist und das als ihr erstes Gesetz 
 
 i Ueber die Poesie — Minor II., s. 381. 4 Ibid s. 182. 
 
 2 Ueber W. Meister — Ch. und Kr. Minor II s. 171. 5 Lyceum Minor II. § 120. 
 
 3 Ibid s. 174. 6 Haym s. 251. 
 
34 
 
 anerkennt, dass die Willkuhr des Dichters kein Gesetz iiber sich 
 leide. 1 
 
 We see here the Fichtean influence of freedom and the Goethean 
 expression of egoism. This is Schlegel's "Ironie/' the watchword of 
 Romanticism, as Novalis says "Die Spadille, womit immer gestochen 
 wurde." 2 
 
 4. "DIE IRONIE." 
 
 The concept of "Ironie" involves a gradual growth as did Roman- 
 tic poetry itself. The first use of "Ironie" with Schlegel was a mention 
 of the "Socratic irony; all jest and earnestness; it springs from the 
 union of natural philosophy and philosophy of art" {die Sokratische 
 Ironie, alles Scherz und Ernst; sie entspringt aus dem Zusammen- 
 treffen vollendeter Naturphilosophie und vollendeter Kunstphiloso- 
 phie) 3 . . . die Urbanitdt der Sokratischen Muse.* He then 
 gives voice to a new "Ironie," a "Widerstreit des Unbedingten und des 
 
 Bedingten . . . sie ist die freieste alter Licenzen sie 
 
 ist Selbstparodie (a strife of unconditioned and conditioned . . . 
 it is the freest of all licenses . . . it is a parody of Self). 5 
 
 "Ironie" expresses the problematic dualisms of Kant and Fichte, 
 the freedom of the Fichtean Ego and the individuality of Goethe's 
 hero. 
 
 Schlegel further characterizes "Ironie" as finding its true home in 
 philosophy, and as the means of raising poetry to the heights of 
 philosophy, and uniting them. He asserts that there are many 
 poems, both old and new, that breathe the air of "Ironie." 6 "Ironie" 
 is much in evidence in "Wilhelm Meister ;" the author seems to laugh 
 at his own masterpiece from a position far above it. 7 
 
 This is not the "Socratic irony ;" it is a transcendental buffoonery ; 
 within, a spirit which oversees all and ever elevates itself over all 
 conditioned (im Innern, die Stimmung welche alles ubersieht, und 
 sich uber alles Bedingte unendlich erhebt) ; without, in expression, 
 the mimical manner of a clown (im Aussern, in der Ausfuhrung die 
 mimische Manier eines guten Buffo). 8 
 
 Two characteristics of "Ironie" are evident; first, strife, of an 
 unavoidable incongruity (Widerstreit, unvermeidlicher Unangemes- 
 senheit) and second, the triumphal elevation of the subject into 
 
 1 Athenseum § 116 (Minor II) 5 Lyceum § 108. 
 
 2 Ch. Haym s. 258. 6 Lyceum 8 42. 
 
 3 Lyceum § 108. 7 Ueber W. Meister — (Minor II) s. 171. 
 
 4 Lyceum § 42. 8 Lyceum § 42. 
 
35 
 
 unconditional freedom (die triumphirende Erhebung in die unbedingte 
 Freiheit des Subjekts). 1 The first seems to remind us of the Socratic, 
 while the second is a recasting of the concept. 
 
 In the Fichtean Ego's activity can be united these two ideas; the 
 strife of the Ego and its freedom and limitation in the ethical world 
 order. It is an endless strife, never attaining realization. The 
 "Ironie" contains the same doctrine, the strife of the real and ideal 
 in art and poetry is never to be adjusted. The Ego can never reach 
 the ideal it posits in its aesthetical freedom. 
 
 Such a doctrine aroused what Schlegel called the "Unverstand- 
 lichkeit" (unintelligibility) and he writes a "Fragment" to lighten 
 the difficulty. He gives a system of "Die Ironie" in which he describes 
 various sorts of "Ironie ;" "die grobe, die delikate und die extra-feine 
 Ironie" (coarse, delicate and extra fine), all used by writers in ex- 
 pressing feigned friendliness waiting for an opportunity to injure; 
 fourth, "die redliche Ironie;" then, "die dramatische Ironie" where 
 the dramatist plans for three acts, and then finds he must add two 
 more ; "die doppelte Ironie" one for Parterre, the other for die 
 ho gen; lastly "Die Ironie der Ironie" and this is the most profound 
 (griindlichste) "Ironie of Ironie." 2 This "Ironie" is "the form of the 
 Paradox. Paradox is all that is great and at the same time good. 
 (Paradox ist alles zvas zugleich gut und gross ist.)" 3 The romances 
 are the Socratic dialogues of our age (Sokratischen Dialoge un- 
 serer Zeit). 4 
 
 The strife of real and ideal as the basis of "Ironie" may be shown 
 in the meaning of an "Idee": — "Ein Ideal ist Idee. Eine Idee ist 
 eine absolute Synthesis absoluter Antithesen, der stete sich selbst 
 erzeugende Wechsel zwei streitender Gedanken. . . . Nichts ist 
 kldglicher als die sentimentale speculation ohne Objekt." 6 He further- 
 more brings in the idea of change in saying that "Ironie" is an 
 everlasting change of self-creation and self-destruction, 6 and that it 
 is "clear knowledge of the eternal activity in the unending chaos." 7 
 
 "Ironie" creates and then destroys both "Idee" and "Projekt." A 
 project is the subjective germ of an object to be — it must be both sub- 
 jective and objective; — the transcendental is that which has reference 
 to the union or separation of the ideal and the real (zuas auf die 
 Verbindung oder Trennung des Idealen und Realen Bezug hat). 8 
 
 With the subjective element now emphasized in the Schlegelian 
 
 i Haym s. 259. 5 Athenaeum § 121. 
 
 2 Ueber die Unverst&ndlichkeit— Minor II. s. 392. 6 Athenaeum § 51. 
 
 3 Lyceum §48. 7 Ideen § 69. 
 
 4 Lyceum § 26. 8 Athenaeum § 22. 
 
36 
 
 poetry and philosophy, we see a contradiction to his theory which was 
 supreme when he wrote, "Ueber die Griechische Poesie" and prayed 
 for a return to it. There all was objective; here all is the free unend- 
 ing subjectivity of the Ego; now "Ironie" rules where objectivity, 
 or nature, had reigned then. He himself declares: "Mein Versuch 
 uber das Studium der griechischen Poesie ist ein manierirter Hymnus 
 in Prosa auf das Objektive in der Poesie. Das Schlechteste daran 
 scheint mir der ganzliche Mangel der unentbehrlichen Ironie" 1 Here 
 we see that Schlegel himself now judges that the "Ironie" is a neces- 
 sity in poetry ; we also perceive the influence of the Fichtean "Wissen- 
 schaftslehre," in changing Schlegel's doctrine to one of subjectivity. 
 
 Schiller's sentimental poetry, in satire, elegy or idyl, set forth the 
 relation of real and ideal ; Schlegel uses the word "transcendental" as 
 noted above; it is the opposite to naive. He writes that "Transcen- 
 dental ist was in der Hohe ist, sein soil und kann" 2 and that transcen- 
 dental poetry has its entirety in the relation of real and ideal, and 
 though it begins as satire, showing the difference of ideal and real, it 
 soars about as elegy, and ends as an idyll with the identity of the two. 3 
 
 Transcendental poetry is marked by reflexion and self-mirroring 
 (Selbstbespiegelung) and will become the "poetry of poetry." Schlegel 
 calls Dante, the prophet, Shakespeare, the centre and Goethe, the 
 climax of transcendental poetry, the great trio of modern poetry (der 
 grosse Dreiklang der modernen Poesie). 4 In "Faust," "die Ironie" 
 is noticed in "Ihn treibt die Gdhrung in die Feme;" 5 "nicht ein Wunsch 
 erf illlen wird;" 6 "0 dass dem Menschen nicht s Vollkommnes wird, 
 empUnd' ich nun" ; 7 "so taumV ich von Begierde zu Genuss, und im 
 Genuss verschmachf ich nach Begierde;" 8 "des Ruhms, des Namens- 
 dauer Trug." 9 Already we have mentioned "die Ironie" in Meister." 
 Schlegel places Goethe as the greatest poet ; his works evincing all the 
 characteristics of the transcendental Romantic poetry, united with a 
 classic style of beauty and simplicity. As "die Ironie," the unending 
 strife after the ideal, hovers over transcendental poetry, so in the 
 transcendental philosophy of Kant, we perceive the same unending 
 longing to attain a goal, although it was not then called "Ironie;" 
 "We have traversed the whole domain of the understanding. This 
 domain is an island, and enclosed by nature within limits that can 
 never be changed. It is the country of truth, but surrounded by a 
 wide and stormy ocean, the true home of illusion (eigentlichen Sitze 
 
 i Lyceum §7. 6 1. 1557- 
 
 2 Athenaeum § 388. 7 1- 3240. 
 
 3 Athenaeum § 238. 8 1. 3249-50. 
 
 4 Athenaeum § 247. 9 Faust I. 1. 1596- 
 
 5 Faust I. 1. 302. 
 
37 
 
 des Scheins), where many a fogbank and ice that soon melts away 
 tempt us to believe in new lands, while constantly deceiving the 
 adventurous mariner with vain hopes (leere Hoffnungeri), and involv- 
 ing him in adventures which he can never leave, and yet can never 
 bring to an end." 1 This, with Kant, became the unending ethical 
 activity of Fichte and later, "die Ironie/' the ceaseless creative fancy 
 of the free genius of Schlegel. 
 
 Closely related to "Ironie" in the sesthetical doctrine of Schlegel is 
 found wit. From the following aphorisms, wit will be seen to be 
 subjective, arising from an excess of spirit and casting mysticism and 
 fantasy over the poetic art: "Wit is unconditioned social spirit, or 
 a fragmentary ingenuity; 2 wit is logical sociability; 3 it is an "explo- 
 sion" of restrained spirit; 4 nothing is more wretched than sad wit; 5 
 mild wit, or wit without a point is a privilege of poetiy;" 6 a prophet- 
 ical power. 7 Witty conceits are the proverbs of cultured people; 8 one 
 should have wit, but should not wish to have it (man soil Witz haben, 
 aber nicht haben wollen) f comic wit is a mixture of epic and iam- 
 bic; 10 wit is the principle (Prinzip) and the medium of universal 
 philosophy. Kant had critical wit ; X1 humor is the wit of sensation ; 12 
 real social wit is without a crack (ohne Knall) ; 13 reason is mechanical, 
 wit is chemical, and genius is an organic spirit ; 14 there is a kind of wit, 
 that on account of its strength (Gediegenheit), fulness (Ausfuhrlich- 
 keit) and symmetry may be called the architectonic : 15 wit is the appear- 
 ance, the outward flash of fantasy (Blitz der Fantasie). Therefore 
 its divinity, and the resemblance of wit to mysticism, 16 fantasy and 
 wit are everything to you — interpret the charming appearance and 
 make seriousness out of the play (Ernst aus dem Spiel), so you will 
 grasp the central point and will again find art ; 17 urbanity is the wit of 
 a harmonious universality, 18 one can only think of wit as written, like 
 law ; one must value its products according to their weight. 19 
 
 Wit, therefore, is a play from the surplus of spirit in the Ego; it 
 may be social, logical, comical, humorous, sad, prophetical, critical, 
 powerful or fantastic, but it always is subjective and sesthetical and 
 allied to "Ironie." 
 
 "Die Ironie" with Schlegel has various phases; the idealistic, 
 
 i Krit. der reinen Vernunft — s. 295 — Hartenstein s. 214. 
 
 2 Lyceum § 9. 11 Ath. 220. 
 
 3 Lyceum § 56. 12 Ath. 237. 
 
 4 Lyceum § 90. 13 Ath. 289. 
 
 5 Lyceum §17. 14 Ath. 366. 
 
 6 Ly. 109. IS Ath. 383. 
 
 7 Ly. 126. 16 Ideen 26. 
 
 8 Ath. 29. 17 Ideen 109. 
 
 9 Ath. 32. 18 Ath. 438. 
 10 Ath. 156. 19 Ath. 394. 
 
38 
 
 1 
 
 aesthetical, ethical, religious, logical, and pessimistic in its result 
 although optimistic in its start. Let us examine each of these phases 
 briefly, accompanying each statement with Schlegel's own aphorisms. 
 
 1. "Ironie" with Schlegel is subjective and idealistic; it is based 
 upon the Ego's fancy and the self positing of a goal — "Die Individuali- 
 ty ist das Urspriingliche und Ewige im Menschen; Die Biidung und 
 Entwicklung dieser Individuals at als hbchsten Beruf zu treiben, 
 ware ein gottlicher Egoismus; 1 again, "Die Philosophie ist eine 
 Ellipse. Das eine Centrum ist das Selbstgesetz der Vernunft. Das 
 andre ist die Idee des Universums;" 2 "Nur wer einig ist mit der Welt 
 kann einig sein mit sick selbst." 3 The starting point is the Ego and 
 the Ego's inclination to strive toward an ideal. 
 
 2. "Ironie" is aesthetical ; it is founded on interest. The Ego, as a 
 genius, knows no law, but creates an ideal toward which he strives. 
 The ideal is ever changing according to the never-ending play of the 
 Ego's fancy. "Nicht die Kunst und die Werke machen den Kunstler, 
 sondern der Sinn und die Begeisterung und der Trieb/^ "Die intel- 
 lektuale Anschauung ist der kategorische Imperativ der Theorie;"* 
 here we perceive the Kantian influence. In "Poetischer Schein ist 
 Spiel der V orstellungen, und Spiel ist Schein von Handlungen" 6 the 
 idea of "play" is emphasized. "Ironie" is very marked in "Was in 
 der Poesie geschieht, geschieht nie, oder immer" 1 and the disregard of 
 law is evident in "Der Schein der Regellosigkeit." 8 
 
 3. "Ironie" is ethical. As the Ego knows no law in art, so he knows 
 no law in morals. His laws come from within and he seeks freedom 
 in morality; this ended in vulgarity in his "Lucinde." Note the oppo- 
 sition to law in "Die erste Regung der Sittlichkeit ist Opposizion 
 gegen die Gesetzlichkeit und konvenzionelle Rechtlichkeit, und eine 
 granzenlose Reizbarkeit des Gemiiths." 9 "Man hat nur so viel Moral, 
 als man Philosophie und Poesie hat," 10 evinces the relation of the 
 three, as also "Athmet ein Werk die ganze Fulle der Menschheit, ist 
 es moralisch." 11 "Alle Selb standi gkeit ist ursprunglich, ist Originalitdt, 
 und alle Originalitdt ist moralisch, ist Originalitdt des ganzen 
 Menschen/' 12 "Ironie" is ethical, following self-imposed laws, which 
 exist for pure enjoyment. 
 
 4. "Ironie" is religious, for the Ego enjoys freedom of spirit. 
 Religion is a product of freedom; "je freier, je religibser; und je 
 
 1 Ideen 60. 7 Ath. § 101. 
 
 2 Ideen 117. 8 Ath. § 227. 
 
 3 Ideen 130. 9 Ath. § 425. 
 
 4 Lyceum § 63. 10 Ideen 62. 
 
 5 Ath. § 76. 11 Ideen § 33- 
 
 6 Ath. § 100. 12 Ideen § 153. 
 
39 
 
 mehr Bildung, je weniger Religion/' 1 "Die Religion ist nicht bios ein 
 Theil der Bildung, sondern das Centrum" 2 . "Frei ist der Mensch, 
 wenn er Gott hervorbringt oder sichtbar macht, und dadurch wird er 
 unsterblich." z The unending ideal and eternal God are related in 
 "Wenn jedes unendliche Individuum Gott ist, so giebts so viele 
 Gbtter als Ideale. Das Verhdltniss des wahren Kunstlers und des 
 wahren Menschen zu seinen Idealen ist durchaus Religion" 4 "Wer 
 Religion hat, wird Poesie reden." 5 "Jcde Beziehung der Menschen 
 aufs Unendliche ist Religion.. Das Unendliche ist die Gottheit."* 
 With Fichte, "Wenn das Inter esse am Uebersinnlichen das Wesen 
 der Religion ist, so ist seine ganze Lehre Religion in Form der 
 Philo sophie." 1 "Was der freie Mensch schlechthin constituirt, 
 worauf der nicht freie Mensch alles bezeiht, das ist seine Religion."* 
 "Ohne Poesie wird die Religion dunkel, falsch und bbsartig; ohne 
 Philosophic ausschweifend in aller Unzucht und wollustig bis zur 
 Selbstentmannung. " 9 
 
 5. "Ironie" is logical. It sets a problem but it is not able to solve. 
 The problem of the gulf between the real and ideal presents a riddle 
 too difficult to be unraveled. It has to do with Sein und Nicht — sein, 
 and its very being is "Reflexion." 10 
 
 6. "Ironie" is optimistic when it lays stress on man's ability to solve 
 the problem of the real and ideal. Soon the strife is found to be 
 unending, the ideal to be unattainable, and "Ironie" becomes pessim- 
 ism. Man fails to reach the goal his fancy has created, there is no 
 satisfaction but only an everlasting "Sehnsucht" and "Weltschmerz." 
 
 From the above paragraphs, we find, therefore, that "Ironie" is 
 idealistic and subjective ; that it invades the realms of aesthetics, ethics, 
 religion and logic, and that although it starts out on an optimistic 
 basis, it soon becomes pessimistic in its inability to solve its problem 
 of attaining an ideal. 
 
 The possession of "Ironie," or the power to create ideals makes 
 man a genius j 11 he admits no limitation to his creative power, he 
 possesses the highest virtue, and seeks free play of his own fancy. 
 The ordinary individual sees the established limits of convention and 
 respects these, but the transcendental poetical and original Ego, as the 
 Fichtean Ego, sees only what he himself posits and what he may 
 change at will; he plays with his own limits. Genius has no care, 
 knows no law. 
 
 1 Ath. § 233. 7 Ideen 105. 
 
 2 Ideen § 14. 8 Id. 147. 
 
 3 Ideen § 29. 9 Id. 149. 
 
 4 Ath. 406. 10 Ath. § 305. 
 
 5 Ideen 34. 11 Cf. Erdmann Hist, of Phil., Vol. II, §314:3. 
 
 6 Ideen 81. 
 
40 
 
 This constitutes morality, an opposition to law and custom j 1 the 
 spiritless man fears custom, and is guilty when he breaks a law, but 
 the person of genius is free from it. This is also religion, the highest 
 enjoyment of one's own freedom. 2 
 
 With Schiller, the genius makes his own laws ; is simple and naive 
 in his manner, uniting perfection of art and morality. With Schopen- 
 hauer a genius is an Ego possessing excess of power and surplus of 
 knowledge ; one who has freed himself from the service of the will ; 
 Kant's genius is an intelligence that works like nature ; Lombroso puts 
 genius akin to madness and Plato expresses it as "those who come 
 into the sunlight from a dark cave, cannot afterwards see properly." 
 
 Schlegel calls genius an "instinct for unrestricted caprice ;" 3 or 
 "genius is a system of talents." 4 In another aphorism, "not unre- 
 stricted caprice but freedom as wit, love and faith." 5 " Some have 
 genius for truth ; many have genius for going astray ;" 6 "genius is an 
 organic spirit ;" 7 "every complete person has genius. True virtue is 
 inventive genius." 8 
 
 As stated above, the genius knows no law and morality for him 
 constitutes opposition to all law. 
 
 In his "Lucinde," Schlegel attempts to show contempt for all rules 
 and laws which may repress man's freedom. Fichte's Ego with its 
 self-contemplation lends itself as foundation for the novel. He 
 accepts Goethe's "Meister" as a typical novel and attempts to produce 
 a similar one. Beginning with an "allegory on boldness" (Allegorie 
 von der Frechhcit), in which he contemplates the novels he will under- 
 take in future, he promises wit and fantasy, which are the chief char- 
 acteristics of poetry. 
 
 The story, copying "Meister," as it does, deals with the life of a 
 youth, Julius. This Julius, an artist, roams about seeking satisfaction. 
 Nothing interested him except while untried. He lives a life of 
 sensuous enjoyment, but in the moment of greatest passion, would 
 analyze his feelings with unfeeling coldness. Finally, he meets 
 "Lucinde," who like himself feels contempt for the world's proprieties. 
 "She lived in a world of her own building and creating (selbstge- 
 dachten und selbstgebildeten) . . . she had broken all bonds and 
 all deference (Riicksichten) and lived free and independent (frei und 
 unabhangig) ." 9 Julius now feels a life of happiness dawn before 
 him ; he has found a new feeling which he may study. They live in 
 
 i Athenaeum 425. 6 Ath. § 265. 
 
 2 AtHenaeum 406. 7 Ath. § 366. 
 
 3 Char, und Kr. s. 170 (Minor II) 8 Ideen § 36. 
 
 4 Ath. § 119. 9 Lucinde (Universal-Bibliothek-Keclam.) — s. 61. 
 
 5 Lyceum § 16. 
 
41 
 
 supreme bliss and love. "Love is not only the quiet longing for the 
 unending; it is also the holy enjoyment of a beautiful present (Genus s 
 einer schonen Gegenwart). It is the complete unity of mortal and 
 immortal (Sterblichen und Unsterblichen). 1 
 
 "Lucinde" is an expression of Schlegel's theory of sesthetical free- 
 dom, but here it enters the realm of morality. Freedom of the Ego 
 is the basis of the romance ; opposition against form and order, against 
 law and custom is the spirit of the work. It raises the ironical free 
 will and egotistic self -enjoyment to a high plane. 
 
 As the man of genius is above law, so real morality consists in 
 defiance of any existing code. Actions will be called immoral by 
 those, who are not in the same class with the genius. 
 
 "Lucinde" is a war against the conventional. It is Romantic free- 
 dom of the Ego applied to society. Marriage for the man of genius 
 is not a sacred institution. He, therefore, disregards it and is capable 
 of true love, existing in a natural marriage. We have here the highest 
 form of happiness derived from absolute freedom, in gratification of 
 the spiritual (above custom), and the sensuous side of the Ego. 
 
 This also is religion; "For what God can be worthy of honor 
 to the man who would not be his own God (zvelcher Gott kann dem 
 Menschen ehrwiirdig sein, der nicht sein eigener Gott ist) ?" 2 
 
 In the following he sets forth his opposition to limitations ; 
 "Friendship is partial marriage and love is friendship on all sides und 
 universal friendship in all directions. Knowledge of the necessary 
 limits is the most indispensable and the most rare in friendship. 3 " 
 Again in "What one calls a happy marriage, relates itself to love, as 
 a correct poem does to an improvised song" 4 and "Almost all mar- 
 riages are only concubinages," 5 he shows contempt for legal marriage. 
 
 "Lucinde" was an attempt to gain freedom in morality as had 
 been done in poetry, religion and philosophy. Great emphasis was 
 laid on the Ego and the Ego's creative fancy, which is "die Ironie." 
 This freedom Schlegel admits into all departments of culture and life. 
 
 5. Contrast of Socratic, Christian and modern irony. 
 
 We have learned that with Schlegel "Ironie" means the painful 
 sense which predominates when the individual cannot pass from the 
 reality to the ideal. The Ego is ever creating by means of his fancy 
 unattainable goals, and, when not gained, gloom and despair follow. 
 
 1 Ibid. s. 69. 
 
 2 Lucinde s. 30. Cf. Nathan der Weise s. 56. (Univ. Bibliothek.) 
 
 3 Athenaeum 359. 
 
 4 Ath. 268. 
 
 5 Ath. 34. _ , 
 
42 
 
 With Socrates, we find an irony which is rhetorical rather than 
 metaphysical. His was an artistic and humorous play by which he 
 led his opponents on in argument until, by a clever question, he turned 
 their own arguments against themselves. This irony was optimistic 
 and self-contained; he feigned ignorance for the purpose of snaring 
 his antagonist. His "accustomed irony" was humorous and subtle ; he 
 humbled himself, putting the opposing opinions in the foreground, 
 until these fall to the ground after his humble questioning. He 
 knew human nature and as a master of irony brought out the incon- 
 sistencies of human nature. The reader of the Platonic dialogues can 
 scarcely distinguish between the real and the assumed wisdom of 
 Socrates. The irony prevents it. In the "Theaetetus," he plays both 
 parts, charging his own arguments with unfairness and arrives at no 
 conclusion. 1 In the Philebus, he says, "I cannot tell you, rather God 
 will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to my prayers." 2 The 
 triumphs of this irony consist in the overthrow of false ideas through 
 clear demonstration of the truth. 
 
 Schlegel's "Ironie" was not humorous or artistic; on the contrary, 
 it was very practical, resulting in Weltschmerz and pessimism as the 
 longing and strivings could never be realized. As Riickert says: 
 
 "Vor jedem steht ein Bild des, das er zverden soil; 
 So long er das nicht ist, ist nicht sein Fricde poll* 
 
 Renan calls Christ "Le grand maitre en ironie." This irony ot 
 Christianitv arises from discontent with the world and life and a 
 desire for an ideal existence in another realm. Schlegel's "Ironie" 
 creates images which must come to naught ; Novalis creates a world 
 which is a "dream;" Christian irony consists in the disappointment 
 resulting from the comparison of the reality of this world and the 
 ideals created by the spirit. The Christian religion is founded upon 
 pain and evil ; the Christian makes ideals and suffers because he cannot 
 realize these. Human life cannot attain to the spiritual, and so despair 
 succeeds. This is the "Ironie." The Christian must negate the world 
 and find God and this is where the struggle comes. 
 
 Christ is like Socrates in the irony on a few occasions: He knew 
 the Gospel was the universal one, but He talks as one believing in 
 local gods when He converses with the woman of Samaria in St. John 
 IV: 20, 21, 24, and again when talking to the Syro-phenician woman 
 in St. Mark VII: 28. In the rest of His teaching, Christ's irony is 
 
 1 Theaetetus (for Protagoras 166-168); vs. doctrine 183E. 
 
 2 Philebus (Jowett's trans.) — 25. 
 
43 
 
 like that of Schlegel, a painful life founded on evil and suffering, and 
 a struggle to realize an ideal. 
 
 Modern "Ironie," as said above, is the strife between reality and 
 the ideal which Schiller brought forth in his "Spieltrieb" in art, and 
 which was followed by Schlegel in the "Ironie;" by Novalis as a 
 Traum, and finally by Schopenhauer in irrational pessimism. 
 
 As Goethe in "Werther" says, "But alas! when we have attained 
 our object, when the distant there becomes the present here, all is 
 changed again ; we are as poor and circumscribed as ever and our souls 
 still languish for unattainable happiness." 1 
 
 Many were influenced and affected by the "Ironie," and tried to 
 solve the problem by art, philosophy, religion or morality, but the 
 ideal is not yet attained and the W eltschmerz still abides. 
 
 6. SchlegeVs Influence. 
 
 A. 
 
 The influence of Schlegel's "Ironie" is felt in the realm of phil- 
 osophy, literature and religion. Among the philosophers we will briefly 
 examine Novalis, Schelling and Solger. 
 
 Schlegel says of Friedrich von Hardenberg, or Novalis, that "Nicht 
 auf der Granze schwebst du, sondern in deinem Geiste haben sich 
 Poesie und Philosophie innig durchdrungen.'" 1 Schlegel's conception 
 of the Ego creating a world, which after all is only ideal, is accepted 
 by Novalis; for him, the world is merely the dreamy creation of the 
 fancy; "Die Welt wird Traum, der Traum wird Welt" z He is the 
 "Prophet of Romanticism," and assigns to poetry the task of solving 
 the problem of life. To the ideals of Romanticism, he gave expres- 
 sion in "Heinrich von Ofterdingen;" this was in opposition to "Wilhelm 
 Meister," which he considered prosaic, with its industrialism and com- 
 mercial affairs, a growth away from the artistic. "Heinrich" is a 
 nature allegory, setting forth the poetry in life; it is full of Romantic 
 longing, the search for an ideal. Here it is happiness which will be 
 attained when Heinrich finds the "Blue Flower." 4 The first part is 
 called Expectancy (Die Erwartung) and the second, Fulfillment (Die 
 Erfullung) ; the latter was left unfinished. The search of Heinrich 
 is in vain, and even in his dreams, when the flower seems near, in a 
 moment it is gone. He cannot gain the longed-for happiness. It is 
 an endless search, a nameless longing, all dreamy Zauberei, a play of 
 his imagination. 
 
 i Bohn Lib. ed. — Werther — p. 267 (letter June 21). 
 
 2 Ideen — An Novalis — s. 307 (Minor). 
 
 3 Novalis Schriften (Berlin 1815) I s. 219. 
 
 4 Novalis Schriften (Berlin 1815) I s. 9. 
 
44 
 
 The "Blue Flower" is symbolic of the Romantic School and typifies 
 the longings of a poet's soul. 
 
 In Novalis, we discover the influence of Kant's "free beauty" and 
 Schiller's "free play," of Fichte's individualistic idealism, of Goethe's 
 egoism but an opposition to his utilitarianism, and lastly, of Schlegel's 
 concept of "Ironie" (Lieblingsbe griff der Ironie). 1 
 
 With Schlegel, "Ironie" is the wavering freedom of the Ego, 
 Novalis applies the fantastic freedom to the world; Schlegel's is the 
 freedom of the reason, Novalis' is the freedom of the spirit 
 (Gemuths) : it makes the world, a myth, a fantasy, only a product 
 of the imagination. 2 
 
 Novalis' writings have been characterized as mystical subjectivism, 
 magical idealism and musical phantasy; 3 they are laden with moral 
 and religious sentiments but over all is felt the phantasy of nature. 
 Nature, however, is only the product of the Ego, only a "Traumbild," 
 a dream-world 4 and we are only despairing players. 5 "Die Welt ist 
 Resultat eines unendlichen Einverstdndnisses, und unsre eigne innere 
 Pluralitdt ist der Grund der Weltanschauung. 9 
 
 He calls philosophy a longing, "eigentlich Heimweh, ein Trieb 
 uberall zu Hause zu sein." 1 In his "Fragmente" he speculates on all 
 possible truths, such as "Goethe ist der wahre Statthalter des poetischen 
 Geistes auf Erden* "Des Dichters Reich sei die Welt, 9 die Blumen- 
 welt ist eine unendliche Feme, 10 die Indkndualitdt in der Natur ist 
 unendlich, 11 die individuelle Seele soil mit der Weltseele ubereinstim- 
 mend werden 12 die Phantasie ist der stofF des Verstandes, 18 Philosophic 
 ist die freie eingebildete Kunst, 1 * der Traum ist bedeutend und pro- 
 phetisch, well er eine Naturseelenwirkung ist, wie Poesie; durchaus 
 frei; 15 wir sind in und ausser der Natur; 1Q Der Liebe gehts wie die 
 Philosophic, sie ist also das Ich — das Ideal jeder B estrebung ; 17 Kann 
 ein Ich sich als Ich setzen, ohne ein anderes Ich oder nicht-Ich?" 18 
 
 As Schlegel was dependent on the Fichtean Ego, so also was 
 Novalis. His philosophy and morality are interchangeable; at the 
 base of all is the Ego and his will, but the power of nature is over 
 him. He knows no law, and uses nature as symbolic of his poetical 
 inspirations. "The barrier (Scheidewand) between fable and truth, 
 
 i Haym s. 379. 9 s. 186. 
 
 2 Haym s. 380. 10 s. 192. 
 
 3 Haym s. 377, 378. 11 s. 197- 
 
 4 Novalis Sch. (Berlin 1846) III s. 155. 12 s. 203. 
 
 5 Novalis Sch. s. 157. 13 s. 224. 
 
 6 Novalis Sch. CBer. 1815) II s. 152. 14 s. 275. 
 
 7 Novalis Schriften (Berlin 1815) II s. 15 s. 293. 
 118. 16 s. 309. 
 
 8 Novalis Schriften (Berlin 1846) III. s. 17 s. 316. 
 
 164. 18 s. 320. ' I 
 
45 
 
 between past and present is cast down; faith, fantasy, and poetry 
 disclose the inmost world," 1 and this world is only a "Zauberstadt" a 
 dream. 
 
 With Schelling, in his aesthetics, we find again the opposition 
 between reality and ideal, causing a struggling in the artist's soul. 
 The ancients felt no opposition and there is no indication of a strife 
 in their art and sculpture; the "Venus of Milo" is calm and com- 
 placent; the face is beautiful, but it lacks expression. The modern 
 artist feels the relation between the finite appearance and his ideal. 
 
 Schelling speaks of an unconscious will, creating these ideas, which 
 are more "divinely beautiful in his vision than upon his canvas." 
 Modern art sets forth the struggle of the soul, and its suffering. The 
 modern feels his inability to produce his ideal; all is dark striving. 
 
 Schelling carries the same idea into philosophy; his was a nature 
 philosophy, and he regards nature and spirit as two aspects of the 
 "world-soul;" Nature is the visible spirit, the spirit is invisible nature 
 for him. His philosophy led to mysticism. His chief service in 
 Romanticism was in his aesthetics, and there nature and spirit were 
 to be identified, were to be blended in art; art was to harmonize all 
 contradictions when it reached perfection ; the unconscious-conscious 
 activity of the genius will abolish all antitheses. "Art is the true 
 organon of philosophy; science and philosophy are one-sided, and 
 never completely develop the subjective reason; art is complete as 
 entirely realized reason." 2 
 
 Schelling's doctrine again caused the Neo-Platonic conception of 
 beauty, as phenomenal manifestation of the Idea in the sensuous, to 
 be recognized. The relation between finite and infinite agreed with 
 Schlegel's principle of irony and Solger made this the basis of his 
 theory of art; art is the artist's strife for his ideal. 
 
 B. 
 
 In the realm of literature, we may take Tieck and Wackenroder 
 as exponents of Schlegel's influence. As mentioned above, Tieck 
 added the phase of picturesque mystery to the Romantic movement. 
 His earlier works were wild and horrible, but finally he finds his true 
 self in the world of legend (Mdrchenzvelt). His love songs and 
 nature mysteries are attempts to explain his emotion, his fleeting feel- 
 ings ; he revels in the supernatural, in allegories on Nature ; he talks 
 
 i Tieck's Nachwort zum Ofterdingen (.Novalis Sch. 1815) I. 258. 
 2 Windelband — Hist, of Phil. p. 607. 
 
4 6 
 
 of moonlight, of magic, makes the bugle the instrument of Romantic- 
 ism, and envelops the reader in a Romantic haze by his imagery. 
 
 The bewilderment aroused by the real and ideal ended in the 
 free play of the fantastic, of the lyrical-musical and the legends, 1 as 
 it had ended in the poetical "dream" of Novalis. The legend lies 
 between reason and mystery. Wackenroder's love for the beautiful 
 aroused his earnestness for a life of art; for him art is holy and 
 divine; it is a religion. His conception of art was opposed to the 
 classical ideals of Goethe and Schiller, and the art of Lessing. His 
 was the love of the mediaeval art, the Madonnas of Raphael and Hol- 
 bein, the art of Diirer; he gave the impetus to the Madonna-worship, 
 which caused many of the Romanticists to become Roman Catholic; 
 we find Novalis inditing a verse in "Ich sehe dich in tausend Bildern, 
 Maria, lieblich ausgedriickt u. s. w. 2 
 
 Wackenroder however loved music even more; "music is the land 
 of faith, where all our doubts and sufferings are lost in a tuneful 
 sea." 3 Tieck agrees with him, because music came before written or 
 spoken language; poetry appeals more by its music than its meaning 
 and love needs no words, as: 
 
 "Liebe denkt in siissen Tonen, 
 Denn Gedanken steh'n zu fern, 
 Nur in Tonen mag sie gern 
 Alles, was sie will, verschonen." 4 
 
 Tones are the language of the soul striving to express its inmost 
 feelings. 
 
 The Schlegelian influence causes Novalis to move in a dream 
 world of fantasy ; Tieck to find relief in the legend world of mystery 
 and Wackenroder to live in the art of medievalism and the world 
 of tone. 
 
 C. 
 
 In the realm of religion, Friedrich Schleiermacher may be taken 
 as one influenced by Romanticism. Throughout his "Discourses on 
 Religion," he makes frequent reference to the importance of the 
 individual, as did Kant and Fichte, and also to the ceaseless activity 
 of the universe, which is ever revealing itself to us. The opposing 
 activities found in the other Romantics are also voiced by him. 
 Every definite thing, according to Schleiermacher. is made up of 
 
 i Haym s. 350. 4 Phantasien fiber die Kunst — (1799) s. 
 
 2 Novalis Schriften (181 5) II. 42. 246. 
 
 3 Tieck-Phantasien ii die Kunst s. 150. 
 
47 
 
 two opposite activities. Each life is a manifestation of gain and loss. 
 The spirit and the human soul are created by two great impulses ; by 
 the one impulse, the soul strives to establish itself as an individual; 
 by the other, it longs to surrender itself to the whole, to be absorbed, 
 fearing to stand alone. 1 Those in whom one impulse alone exists 
 are not living in the nature of humanity. This longing to be one 
 with the whole, the striving to unite the individual with the living 
 World-spirit is the ideal of religion. The pious man can see the 
 operation of the World-spirit in all that belongs to human activity. 2 
 He understands, through contemplation, that the individual is one 
 form of humanity, and that humanity is one form of the unity of 
 spirit and matter. 
 
 But above this, is the feeling of some higher, closer union of the 
 two, a feeling which cannot be described. The striving individual, 
 "the fruit of opposing views" stands contrasted with the quiet, uni- 
 form whole. 3 He longs to be united with it, and this is attained 
 through feeling, a living contact with the world. "In man is an 
 insatiable longing for ever stricter purification, ever richer fulness. 
 . . . What do you call that feeling of unsatisfied longing which 
 is directed toward a great object? . . . With Christians this 
 holy sadness is the dominant tone of all their religious feelings." 4 
 Personality must be "annihilated" and we, lost in the Infinite, become 
 one with it. 5 "Whosoever loses his life for my sake, shall find it." 6 
 The impulse to establish individuality must be lost by union with the 
 whole, by which the individual is absorbed. The strife will then be 
 over. This is the nature of true religion, the ideal religion of 
 Schleiermacher, when we reach a sense and taste for, and a feeling 
 of absolute dependence on the Infinite. 
 
 The "Ironie" of Schlegel will be overcome when religion becomes 
 ideal and the striving ceases. Schleiermacher speaks of "play" also. 
 He declares that all imaginative natures have some stirrings of piety; 
 also that they fail in mastering the essential, as "a light, changing 
 play of beautiful, charming but merely fortuitous and subjective com- 
 binations satisfies them." 7 In his tribute to Novalis, he says that "his 
 whole contemplation was a poem ; and that when artists become pious 
 the great resurrection shall be celebrated. 8 He indicates that art may 
 be an aid to the attainment of the ideal religion and that play of the 
 imagination may be important, after all. 
 
 i On Religion — trans, by John Oman, p. 5 Ibid. p. 137. 
 
 3, 4- 6 St. Mark VIII, 35- 
 
 2 Ibid p. 84. 7 On Religion p. 133. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 81. 8 On Religion p. 41. 
 
 4 Ibid. p. 245. 
 
4 8 
 
 Schleiermacher was powerfully under the influence of the Roman- 
 ticists, when he wrote "On Religion," and in the unsatisfied longing 
 we see echoed the "Ironie" of Schlegel. Religion starts with the Ego 
 and revelation, portrays his longings, feelings and sadness and finally 
 absorbs him in the Infinite. So peace can be secured. Schlegel gives 
 the problem of strife and Schleiermacher answers with religion, aided 
 by art. "Lucinde," he opposed and yet found that it contained his 
 own theory of the union of soul and body. Later he breaks from 
 the Romanticists; from the mere exaltation of feeling and intuition 
 (Gefuhl und Anschauung) to a feeling which gives reality to knowl- 
 edge and a substance to morals and his religion becomes historical and 
 positive. This feeling of absolute dependence in monotheism produces 
 the harmony of the Ego and the Infinite. 
 
 7. Schlegel' s Effect: 
 
 A. 
 On the dramas of Grillparzer and the poetry of Lenau, the effect 
 of "Ironie" is felt. Grillparzer depicts the conflict of will and cir- 
 cumstances ; his novels are full of the bitterness of disappointed hopes, 
 a cry for inspiration, or the mockery of unhappy love. In "Das 
 goldene Vlies," no rest comes ; all is strife and sorrow ; it is a tragedy 
 of pessimism : 
 
 "Was ist der Erde Gluck? — Ein Schatten! 
 Was ist der Erde Ruhm? — Ein Traum!" 1 
 "Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen" is a love-tragedy ending in the 
 death of Hero and Leander; "Der Traum ein Leben" depicts desire 
 and ambition, without power of realization; it represents a dream full 
 of terror and on awakening Rustan decides: 
 
 "Des Innern stiller Frieden 
 Und die schuldbefreite Brust! 
 Und die Grosse ist gefahrlich, 
 Und der Ruhm ein leeres Spiel; 
 Was er gibt, sind nichtige Schatten, 
 Was er nimmt, es ist zu viel !" 2 
 
 Grillparzer sought this "inner peace"; the nothingness of fame, of 
 happiness and love is the burden of all his plays. The noblest form 
 of heroism is renunciation, the highest virtue is contentment. 
 
 Nikolaus Lenau's poems are full of melancholy pessimism and 
 discontent. All his poems, elegaic and pessimistic, are filled with 
 
 1 Sammtliche Werke 5 — 228 (Stuttgart 1892-94). 
 
 2 Werke 7 — 2 141. 
 
49 
 
 despair; he voices the pessimism of his time, the inability to realize 
 the ideal. His works are depressing. Even when he seeks freedom 
 in America, he calls it a land "voll traumerischen Trug," and returns 
 to Europe. "Faust" is full of scepticism and despair and "Savonarola" 
 and "Die Albigenser" are pessimistic. 
 
 B. 
 
 In the realm of philosophy, with Schopenhauer, the endless play, 
 the "Ironie" becomes irrationalism. Here we have the absolute 
 unreason of an objectless will. "The world is my idea," 1 existing only 
 in relation to the Self; otherwise it has no reality. "The world is 
 my will," 2 that is, the will is objectified in various grades of inorganic 
 life, plant, animal and man. All gravitation, locomotion and growth, 
 in fact, all forces are only will. The will creates itself perpetually and 
 is never satisfied ; so misery ensues. The will is the thing-in-itself , and 
 life and the phenomenal world, the mirror of the will, or its objectivity. 
 By negation of the will-to-live, misery will be lightened by morality. 
 By art and science, misery will be overcome. Art will emancipate 
 man as "the beautiful is that which pleases without stirring the will." 
 In art, the artist becomes absorbed in nature, feels the sublimity and 
 loses himself in the contemplation of infinite greatness. He feels 
 himself, as the condition of all objective existence; he transcends his 
 own individuality and becomes one with nature. In painting, he feels 
 the objectification of his inner nature and communicates it. We may 
 use the Hindoo formula "tat twam asi" (the living thing art thou) 
 to express these objective manifestations. 
 
 A genius, Schopenhauer says, has a surplus of energy; "it is as if, 
 when genius appears in an individual, a far larger measure of the 
 power of knowledge falls to his lot than is necessary for the service 
 of an individual will, and this superfluity of knowledge, being free, 
 now becomes subject purified from will, a clear mirror of the inner 
 nature of the world." 3 
 
 This denial of the will, this freedom, is only partial denial, as all 
 are not artists, nor can we be sesthetical all the time. All can be 
 moral all the time, however, so we can obtain complete denial by 
 moral asceticism. In religious art, resignation is expressed as the 
 spirit of Christianity and Indian philosophy. Tragedy represents the 
 strife of will with itself; purified by suffering, it becomes quiet and 
 resigned. 
 
 i The World as Will and Idea— Bk. I, § I. 
 
 2 Ibid., Bk. II, § 18. 
 
 3 Ibid., Bk. Ill, § 36. 
 
50 
 
 Time in all phenomena (Kant), becoming and never being (Plato), 
 and the web of Maya (Vedanta) are all dependent on the principle 
 of sufficient reason. The will is life, the will-to-live; it belongs to 
 the present, not past, nor future. The world is will and phenomenon 
 is will objectified. There is negation of the will, but if no will, there 
 is no world — nothing. As we abhor annihilation, we will-to-live and 
 are nothing but will ; all strife, a weary longing and complaining with- 
 out aim or end. To those that deny the will, as ascetics and sufferers 
 as Goethe's "Gretchen," peace will come and salvation. 
 
 We assume three extremes in life: first, Radscha-Guna, the 
 powerful active will, or the strong passion, which appears in great his- 
 torical characters; second, pure knowing, the freeing of knowledge 
 from the will, the life of genius or purity (Sattwa-Guna) ; third, 
 lethargy of the will, or ignorance, empty longing (Tama-Guna). The 
 Ego wavers between these, suffering, longing and dreaming until death 
 comes. Life is a tragedy of never satisfied wishes and frustrated 
 hopes. "By contemplation of the life and conduct of saints and by 
 art, we banish nothingness which is behind all virtue and holiness as 
 their goal; we do not evade it as the Hindoo, by reabsorption in 
 Brahma or Nirvana." 1 We acknowledge that after the abolition of 
 will, nothing remains. Our world is nothing ; all is no more. 
 
 On the philosophy of Schopenhauer, Wagner worked out a theory 
 of music. Schopenhauer writes "Music is as direct an objectification 
 and copy of the whole will as the world itself . . . it is not like 
 the other arts, the copy of the Ideas, but the copy of the will itself, 
 whose objectivity the Ideas are." 2 Wagner accepts this theory that 
 music is based on the will. Tone forces its way into the world, as the 
 immediate utterance of the will. It represents the greatest excitation of 
 the will. Plastic art is merely a representation by means of the intellect 
 and is distinguished by greatest quietude of the will. Wagner also 
 makes use of the "Spieltrieb" of Schiller and the allegorical "dream" 
 of Novalis. 
 
 The musician is "like one, who awakening from deepest sleep, uses 
 all his efforts in vain in the endeavor to recall the blissful dream of 
 his soul." 3 We awaken with a cry, and we immediately enter the world 
 of sound. So art, arises from a cry. In plastic art, we feel repose 
 in perceiving the object presented to our view, but not so in music. 
 Music is an idea in Self. It is not beheld, but is felt in the depths of 
 consciousness. The outer world disappears. Music occupies all our 
 
 i Ibid., Bk. IV, | 71. 
 
 2 Bk. Ill, § 52. 
 
 3 On Beethoven, trans, by A. R. Parsons, p. 69. 
 
51 
 
 attention, now creating the highest joy, now moving us to tears. The 
 musician cries from his inmost soul, and the most certain answer is 
 given by music. It can stir and arouse our sympathies. Music is sub- 
 lime; it can cause the highest ecstacy and with Christianity can 
 exclaim "Our kingdom is not of this World." It is like the revelation 
 of a dream, like the cry of fright on awakening from a fearful dream. 
 The will calls from within, which is answered by a counter-call from 
 without. "So call and counter-call become a 'play' with itself." 1 The 
 power of producing something, to set forth the never-experienced, the 
 never-seen in joy. "All the pain of existence is shattered upon the 
 immense pleasure derived from the play with it." 2 
 
 This seems to argue that art will relieve and overcome the pain 
 found in the world of Schopenhauer. The great artist may laugh 
 at misery. He belongs to another realm. After a portrayal of anguish, 
 unfulfilled desire, torment, rage, love, misery, sorrow, or rapture, the 
 mighty player smiles to himself, for the incantation was to him, after 
 all, only a "play." 3 The spirit of music soars aloft from within the 
 consciousness, leading us in the path of redemption. Art will emanci- 
 pate man. Music is a cry of the composer's soul, striving to set forth 
 the ideas he feels. 
 
 Like the "Thathandlung" of Fichte's Ego, the "Spieltrieb" of Schil- 
 ler and Kant, the "Ironie" of Schlegel, "der Traum' of Novalis, the 
 striving of Schleiermacher and Schelling, the unreason of Schopen- 
 hauer's will, is the call from the soul of the musician. All reach out for 
 a goal too far removed. All is a dream of something that never was 
 and never will be. 
 
 Friedrich Nietzsche applies Schopenhauer's thought to Wagner's 
 musical drama, presenting art as a salvation from the torture of the 
 will. Certainly this seems true. In "Tannhauser," "Lohengrin" and 
 "Der fliegende Hollander," we see the powers of darkness, or evil, 
 opposed to those of light. In each, we find salvation sought through 
 a woman's love. Redemption comes only with the death of the one 
 tested. In "Der Ring des Nibelungen," is set forth the struggle for 
 the ring. It is obtained successively by Alberic, the Nibelung, Fafnir 
 the Giant, and Siegfried; but what does it bring them? Only death 
 and unhappiness till the Rhine-maidens get back their own. The curse 
 of the ring and its powers are destroyed but the race of Volsungs is 
 ended and "Gotterdammerung" has come. The waking of Brunhilde 
 brought only disappointment. 
 
 i Ibid., p. 31. 
 
 2 p. 64. 
 
 3 P- 73- 
 
52 
 
 In "Tristan and Isolde," Wagner's theme of love is once more 
 portrayed. No fulfillment of happiness in life ; in death they are united. 
 "Happiness cannot overtake the swift course of woe." "Rienzi," Wag- 
 ner's earliest opera, sets forth the story of the "Last of the Roman 
 Tribunes." His ambition to free Rome ends only in the destruction of 
 the capitol by those he sought to liberate, and in the death of Rienzi 
 and his devoted sister, Irene. His life was sacrificed to the love he 
 bore Rome. 
 
 "Parsifal," his last drama, is festive and yet is full of evil and 
 temptation. Finally, wise through pity, Parsifal heals Amfortas, and 
 redeems Kundry, who dies. Then the Grail glows with light, and a 
 white dove descends in heavenly benediction ; but even in the exaltation 
 of Parsifal, we know that Titurel must now die. This last is a sort 
 of transfigured pessimism. We feel in "Parsifal" also the fatalism of 
 the East and Nirvana. 
 
 Nietzsche began as a follower of Schopenhauer and Wagner, but 
 finally worked out a new philosophy for man's salvation. He creates 
 heroes, and the hero, the "U r ebermensch" is the man with the strong 
 will, the self-asserting genius, who has risen above his fellows and rules 
 them. This assertion of individualism is like that of the Romantic 
 pioneers. Mankind is to be ruled by the tyranny of culture, the 
 "U ebermensch." "Die Umwerthung aller Werthe," and "Die Wieder- 
 herstellung des Gleichen" (cf. Zarathustra and Confucius), represent 
 the writer's philosophy. He had in his nature much of Schlegel's 
 genius, which is based on "Ironie." He could not find his way back 
 from the individual mind to the universal Ego, to the conception of 
 values, which are valid for all. 1 
 
 In Herman Sudermann, we find embodied the realism of life; the 
 feelings of evil and misery set forth in Schopenhauer. Poverty, dis- 
 honor, loss of love of home through ambition are portrayed in his 
 works; in his last cycle called "Roses," he continues the mysterious 
 reality and dark side of life and each closes with disappointment and 
 unattained hopes. 
 
 Gerhart Hauptmann also writes in a crude realistic manner. "Die 
 Weber" and "Vor Sonnenaufgang" are full of misery, "Hanneles 
 Himmelfahrt," full of naturalism and romanticism, a wretched family 
 and the vanishing dream of a child. "Die versunkene Glocke" is a 
 Marchendrama, full of imagination and symbolism. The bell founder, 
 Heinrich, seeking the ideal, typifies human aspiration ; he leaves the 
 
 i Windelband Hist, of Phil. p. 680. 
 
53 ....... . ■•« . \. s „ 
 
 realistic figures of his home to follow Rautendelein, the fairy who typi- 
 fies the freedom of the soul and lends him strength to climb the 
 heights. His egoistic ambition ends in death. The piece is filled with 
 the self-assertion of the will and the end of ambition in death. 
 
 Heinrich Ibsen is a pessimist and an idealist. He portrays the 
 gloomy, sombre side of life; he argues that life must be purified by love 
 and based upon individual will. In "Peer Gynt," the "Be thyselt ; to 
 thyself be sufficient," is the prevailing theme. In Brand, "I am what I 
 am." Both men failed; their freedom kills. We must compromise — 
 "Go roundabout." Like the Bhagavat Gita "Nothing is greater than 
 I ;" like the will of Schopenhauer, so is the Ego of Ibsen. The doctor 
 in "Peer Gynt" declares "Each one shuts himself up in the barrel of 
 self ; with the self-bung he seals it hermetically." The Ego is all. In 
 "The Master Builder," ambition meets with death as it did in Haupi- 
 mann's "Die versunkene Glocke." 
 
 These three authors emphasize the power of the Ego and his will, 
 and are examples of Schopenhauer's influence, and in turn, of 
 Schlegel's "Ironie." 
 
 Schopenhauer returned to Vedanta and his work is filled with the 
 Asiatic pessimism. "In the world, there is no study so beneficial and 
 elevating as that of the Oupnek'hat. It has been the solace of my 
 life; it will be the solace of my death." 
 
 His own philosophy of the objectified Ego contains much of the 
 fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads. He makes frequent refer- 
 ence to the "tat twam asi" and the Maya, or deceptive web of the 
 world. He thinks the pantheism of India, is destined, sooner or later, 
 to become the faith of the people. "Ex oriente lux." As the Hindoo 
 philosophy ends in annihilation of the Self, Schopenhauer would abol- 
 ish will and thus the world would be — nothing. His pessimism 
 excludes all hope of a race development. It is a pessimism which ends 
 in the negation of the will and the cessation of existence. 
 
 IV. Conclusion. 
 In the survey of Self as a subjective principle, as seen previously, a 
 philosophy will culminate in nihilism; in Vedanta, there must be anni- 
 hilation of Self and absorption in Brahman to attain Nirvana; with 
 Socrates, he must deny his own Self in order to make others see the 
 truth ; in Christianity, the Self must be affirmed against the world, but 
 must become one with the Infinite to find salvation, the individual must 
 lose Self in order to find it again in the Kingdom of God ; the Cartesian 
 
54 
 
 Self must be blended in the one true substance, which is God. The 
 Fichtean Ego strives in endless activity to realize itself in the self- 
 posited world, which exists to develop the character of the Ego. 
 With the Fichtean Ego is marked the transition to the Romantic 
 School. Here the philosophy does not end in nihilism of the Self, but 
 the endless activity will end in pessimism. The Ego posits a goal, but 
 this is ever changing and never reached. The Romanticist starts in the 
 pure idealism of Fichte ; he sets up his own ideal, the fruit of his imag- 
 ination. This activity is at first "mere play" but gradually the vague 
 longing for the ideal "Die Ironie" develops into a vain struggle, a cease- 
 less strife for a goal, which when the Ego finds he cannot reach, 
 envelops him in pessimism and misery. He sets up art, philosophy and 
 religion as means for salvation in this painful kingdom of time and 
 space, but they cannot fulfill the task imposed. 
 
 From a "mere play" of the faculty of the imagination, an outlet of 
 superfluous energy, "Die Ironie" grew into a serious pessimism, into an 
 aspect of life, which life Disraeli describes as "youth, a delusion ; man- 
 hood, a struggle; old age, a regret." Ambition meets with reverse as 
 Napoleon aiming to rule the world met his Waterloo ; the hand of des- 
 tiny is the "Ironie" of life. 
 
 The period that dawned with the "play" in art, poetry and philoso- 
 phy, has set with a "Weltschmerz" casting the philosopher into the 
 gloom of pessimism and irrationalism. 
 
 The Self as a ruling principle in philosophy culminates in nihilism 
 of the Self, or in a painful pessimism, from which misery.no art, no 
 philosophy, no religion has as yet proven the savior.